Opinion ID: 2595488
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony Vouching for the Credibility of EM

Text: Metzger contends that two witnesses were allowed to testify to the credibility of EM, and that those errors are of critical importance in this case because the only evidence supporting the convictions was the report made by EM. We accept the premise that the only evidence linking Metzger with these crimes was the testimony of EM. We embark on our analysis by restating our holding in Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo.1989). Our conclusion in that case was that reversal of a conviction for violation of § 14-3-105 was compelled because two expert witnesses who were called to testify by the State were permitted to testify, over defense objections, to their opinions that the victim's father was the perpetrator of the crime. 774 P.2d at 65, 66. No such testimony was permitted in this case. A second part of our holding was that a third expert who was called as a witness by the State was permitted to testify that the victim told him that the perpetrator was his father and, further, in response to the question posed by the prosecutor, Do you believe [the victim]? the expert answered, Yes. 774 P.2d at 66. Our conclusion in Stephens was that testimony offering an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant, when elicited by a prosecuting attorney, should be perceived as error per se. 774 P.2d at 68. We also rested our decision in Stephens on the conclusion that it is error to permit an expert to vouch for the credibility of a victim who did testify. Id. In the instant case, it was the defense who called the so-called expert witness who gave erroneous testimony. The record does not reflect that he was treated or qualified as an expert witness, but certainly his testimony suggested that he was a person who could be perceived by the jury as an expert. That witness was Mike Baden, a child protection investigator for the Department of Family Services, who testified under direct examination by counsel for Metzger that he had prepared a report concerning the allegations made by EM. At defense counsel's insistence, she was permitted to treat Baden as a hostile witness. In his report, Baden concluded that EM's complaint was unsubstantiated and that ... the report of the child victim does not by itself constitute sufficient credible evidence. Defense counsel also elicited from Baden that he considered EM's case terminated because of his report. On cross examination, the prosecuting attorney asked Baden a number of questions about that same report and the meaning of the conclusions quoted above, including his conclusion that sexual contact had occurred. Ultimately, the following exchange between Baden and the prosecutor took place before the jury: Q. The last thing that Ms. Johnson [defense attorney] went over with you is the report that there was insufficient credible evidence to substantiate the report. And you concluded that, did you not, Mr. Baden? A. Yes, I did. Q. Does that mean that you didn't believe [EM] when you talked to her on January 8th? MS. JOHNSON: I'm going to object to that. He can't testify to the witness's credibility. THE COURT: I think it goes more to his conclusion and his belief, as it would affect that conclusion. So I would admonish the jury that witnesses generally can't comment on the truth or believability of other witnesses. But I'll allow it for the limited purpose of reflecting what his conclusion was and how that may fit in. I'll overrule. You may answer. Q. (By Mr. Schafer) What was your conclusion, as part of your investigation, in speaking with Pat Carr and with [EM]? A. I believe that [EM] was a good witness and appeared to be testifying truthfully. Q. And what you were saying is that you needed more than just her statement to substantiate the report? A. By our rules and regulations, yes. Mr. Baden's overall testimony established that the Department of Family Services rules and regulations require that reports such as that affecting EM must be completed within 60 days, that almost 30 days had passed before the Casper Police Department and Baden could get to the investigation (because of conflicts associated with the Christmas/New Year holidays of 1997-98), and that the remaining 30 days allowed him only enough time to assess the risks to the child, but not much more. A significant element in his conclusion that the report was unsubstantiated was that EM was no longer at risk because the alleged perpetrator was no longer in the home. As is readily evident, there is virtually no similarity between this case and the scenario in Stephens. Here, counsel for Metzger used a witness with expertise to create a factual suggestion that the witness did not believe EM, i.e., that her testimony was not credible. Therefore, in view of the open door doctrine and, in particular, in view of the limiting instruction given by the trial court, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the disputed question to be asked and answered. See Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1344-45 (Wyo.1979). Likewise, we see no significant parallel with our decision in Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332 (Wyo.1992). In that case, we held that reversal of a conviction for sexual assault was required because an experienced law enforcement officer volunteered an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant and to the credibility of the victim under circumstances that made it appear that it was not done inadvertently. We also concluded that in light of the totality of the circumstances of the Whiteplume case: [T]his case is a close one that truly calls upon the most careful exercise of delicate judicial judgment. 841 P.2d at 1337-41. A second important factor in Whiteplume was the tenuousness of the State's case and the quality of the victim's testimony, much of which was not corroborated; indeed much of it was contradicted by, the physical evidence. 841 P.2d at 1338-39. Unlike Whiteplume, here the victim's credibility was attacked on the basis that EM was a chronic liar in other respects, not on the basis that her testimony as to the crime was inherently suspect. Our conclusion is that the facts of this case also require careful exercise of delicate judicial judgment, but we are compelled to exercise that judgment to hold that the testimony of Mr. Baden was not error per se requiring reversal of Metzger's conviction. Metzger also asserts as error testimony of EM's Father which was directed to EM's credibility. That assertion of error played out in the transcript as follows (Father is being questioned by the prosecutor about his reactions to hearing his daughter tell him of the indecent liberties): Q. How did you react to that? A. I was furious. Q. Did you try to talk to her about it more specifically? A. No. I'd ask her a few questions, you know, to help ease my mind, to come up with the same solution. Q. Whatdo you recall the questions you asked? A. I'd asked her ifthat she has to really make sure of what she was saying, make sure that she was telling the truth. Q. And what kind of response did you get to those questions? A. Same response that I got when she told me in the office. Q. What was that? A. What [Metzger] had her do. Q. She acknowledged to you that she was telling you the truth? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Do you believe her? A. Yes, sir. Father's testimony then continues along the lines that he drove to Montana where he believed Metzger lived and intended to confront him. However, Father never did find Metzger, and he returned home to Casper. No objection was interposed to Father's testimony, nor did Metzger ask for any remedial action, other than that the trial court declare a mistrial. The parties agree, as do we, that this assertion of error must be treated under the plain error doctrine and was not error per se. Newport v. State, 983 P.2d 1213, 1216 (Wyo.1999); Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1178-80 (Wyo.1998). The plain error doctrine requires us to make this series of findings: (1) The record must clearly present the incident; (2) appellant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way; and (3) that appellant was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice to him. Newport, 983 P.2d at 1216. In the context of this issue, we again note that the substance of Metzger's defense was that EM was a habitual liar, and that she was coerced by her Mother to tell this lie about Metzger so she could get him out of the house. Mother denied this allegation. That issue was pressed with EM's Mother before Father testified. The basis for the challenge to EM's credibility by the defense was that Mother had coerced her daughter into lying to Father to cover up for Mother's bingo/gambling habit. Father was also pressed about the issue of both Mother and EM lying about those things. It is clearly established in the record that EM did, at her Mother's insistence, lie about Mother and EM going to play bingo. However, this was the only evidence which supported the theory that EM was a liar. Thus, in overall context, the question was not so much directed at Father vouching for his daughter's credibility and/or Metzger's guilt, as it was a confirmation that he did not view her as a liar, and was little more than a father stating that he believed his daughter. Nonetheless, in order to give the benefit of the doubt to Metzger and to underscore our admonitions to prosecuting attorneys that such testimony may result in reversal of a conviction, we conclude that the first element of the test was met, i.e., the record clearly reflects the objectionable testimony. In addition, the prosecutor did ask EM's Father if he believed his daughter, and so we are also compelled to conclude that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious way. However, we are unable to conclude that Metzger has established that the error affected a substantial right. In other words, that there was a reasonable possibility that in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to him. See Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1182 (Wyo.1998). The prosecutor did not seek to take advantage of that testimony in his closing argument. Indeed, the focus of his closing was on the inherent believability of EM's story, not that others had voiced a belief in her credibility. The jury was fully and properly instructed on their role in determining the credibility of witnesses. The defense did not ask for a corrective instruction at the time the testimony came in, nor later, when the jury was finally instructed at the conclusion of the trial. As noted above, the gist of Father's testimony was that he was shocked and outraged at his child's revelation that she had been abused by his own brother, implicitly suggesting throughout that testimony that he believed his daughter. Under the totality of the circumstances presented, we decline to conclude that the verdict might have been more favorable if Father had not been asked the offending questions. Thus, the third prong of the plain error test has not been met and, therefore, we decline to hold this to be reversible error.