Opinion ID: 4525812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I’m sorry. I don’t understand the question.

Text: THE COURT: [Father], it would help if you’d just ask a very simple question like, do you remember the time you visited my house? [FATHER]: Like again -- like I said, Your Honor, I would like to see a lawyer because I would like to practice my right to -- ‘cause I don’t know -- I don’t know how to do this thing. THE COURT: Well, it’s not hard, [Father]. If you’re asking her about what she did or didn’t see on a visit to your house, all you have to do is ask her, do you remember -- Do you remember visiting [Father’s] house? THE WITNESS: Yes. THE COURT: What did the house look like? THE WITNESS: It was a one-bedroom, one-bath, with a living room into an open kitchen area apartment. (continued. . .) social worker never testified as to the contents of the Report or her recommendations, except in response to the few questions asked by Father. The rules of evidence should be followed. 22  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  [FATHER]: In her report, she didn’t write down what inside of the refrigerator, things like that, what . . . foods that my children eat, and then what (indiscernible) my parent’s house, and what the childrens do . . . there. So to me -- THE COURT: Okay. [FATHER]: –- this woman is incomplete. THE COURT: All right. [FATHER]: (Indiscernible.) THE COURT: Do you agree that your report is incomplete in any way? THE WITNESS: No. THE COURT: Okay. [FATHER]: Your Honor, again, I would like to practice my right to hire a lawyer, to . . . THE COURT: [Father], again, we’re in the middle of the trial. If you wanted to hire a lawyer, this was something you should have done way before this. Do you have any other questions for [the social worker]? Because if you don’t, I’m going to release her. [FATHER]: That’s all I want to ask (indiscernible). After the CIU social worker left the stand, Father was given an opportunity to present his evidence. Father elicited testimony from three witnesses. Father also testified. For the most part, Father testified in English, on his own; he relied on the Tagalog interpreter to clarify that he believed his children would experience anxiety if they relocated to Durham. As he testified, Father went through his exhibits, explained their contents, and explained how each exhibit supported that moving to Durham was not in the children’s best interests. 23  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  Mother and Father then gave their closing arguments. Father’s closing argument was as follows: [FATHER]: Thank you, Your Honor. It’s -- for me, it’s more about the stability, that the kids will be there. Over here in Hawaii, they are more stable. They already establish stability here. School, family, medical. Everything’s -- everything that already is stable. Moving -- moving her in North Carolina is (indiscernible) especially –- THE COURT: It’s what? [FATHER]: Anxiety. (Through interpreter) Anxiety. (In English) Anxiety. (Through interpreter) Creates anxiety. THE COURT: Anxiety for? [FATHER]: For them, especially they’re too young. I’ve been taking care of them -- my -- to them, except to my son, who has just came here, since his (sic) birth. So if they’re going to be remove, Your Honor, that relationship is going to be different because they -- weekly we -- we always see each other, so it’s going to be hard for both of us, for the -- for the -- for me and for my both children, that they enjoying, also, their family -- extended family here, which is their cousins, their uncle, the auntie, the grandparents. And, also, Your Honor, I've been a good father to them. I would like to continue that. They are my life. I will do more best for my kids. Last, Your Honor, I never do anything bad or a crime. I’m a good citizen. I deserve to have them. They are my life. They are my happiness. And then, also, Your Honor, it’s not fair to me, as the petitioner or plaintiff in the very beginning, that I -- I going to -- I going to have only two months during the summer and from the – for . . . [MOTHER], having school year the whole year, which is ten months. Just change the - - the -- change the -- the situation. Have her the summertime, and I get the school year. Do you think it’s going to be fair? THE COURT: You should have asked that question of [MOTHER] on cross-examination. Okay. Anything else, [FATHER]? [FATHER]: That’s all, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. At the conclusion of his closing argument, the following further exchange took place: 24  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. The Court at this time is going to take the matter under advisement. I’m going to look over the exhibits that you folks have provided, and I’ll render a decision within the next week. Okay? I want to thank both [FATHER] and [MOTHER] . . . . Thank you very much for your presentation and for your very professional -- your very professional demeanor. I appreciate it. [FATHER]: I have a question, Your Honor. I’m sorry about every -- if this -- like I said in the very beginning, this is my first time to be in this kind of setup of -- in the court, ‘cause normally the judge, me, and (indiscernible) or the lawyers. I don’t know anything about cross- examination. That’s why I just like, you know, what to do (indiscernible), I ask him many times. My question is, Your Honor, ‘cause I feel that I need a lawyer, but you -- you deny it, just in case that you favor to her, I can always appeal? I practice my rights to -- to fight for my kids? THE COURT: [FATHER], you can retain the services of an attorney anytime. But you can’t do it in the middle of trial and expect the Court to continue, especially after [MOTHER] has put on her evidence already. So if you want to go out and retain an attorney to prosecute an appeal after the Court’s decision, that’s entirely up to you. [FATHER]: I just ask (indiscernible). THE COURT: As the Court, I can’t give you legal advice. You need to retain your own attorney to do that. [FATHER]: Yeah, I’m sorry about that, ‘cause I didn’t know this going to be the setup. That’s why I don't know that -- you know, how to do this. If I -- if I knew it going to be like this, I probably hire a attorney, ‘cause just considering that I have a interpreter, I don’t know what – THE COURT: Okay. Although the family court had stated it would rule within the next week, the record does not reflect a ruling until almost two months after the September 30, 2016 trial. On November 23, 2016, the family court filed an “Order Granting Defendant’s 25  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  Motion For Post-Decree Relief Filed February 1, 2016” (“the Order”).9 In the Order, the family court issued its factual findings based upon the CIU Report and the evidence presented at trial, and ruled with respect to legal and physical custody as follows: 2. LEGAL CUSTODY. The Court has considered the criteria set forth in [HRS] §571-46(b) . . . with respect to each parent’s request that the Court award them sole legal custody of the minor children. Particularly, the Court focused on subsections (3) through (9), (12), (15)10 9 As argued by Father in his motion for reconsideration, despite stating to the parties at the beginning of trial that it was not interested in the parties’ past disputes and quarrels, apparently based on its review of the record, the family court discussed the previous post-decree motions in some detail, drawing negative inferences against Father, such as “Father’s written response to Mother’s Motion [to allow L.C. and M.C. to pick up the children] demonstrates an intense antipathy for, and hostility to, Mother because of events which occurred during their marriage; and a stated willingness to involve the minor children in disputes with Mother.” In addition, as argued by Father in his motion for reconsideration, the family court might not have had been fully apprised regarding the details regarding this motion. In addition, however, the response negatively referred to by the family court was filed on July 18, 2013, within nine months after the divorce decree, and this matter took place more than three years later. 10 HRS § 571-46(b)(3) through (9), (12), and (15) provide: (b) In determining what constitutes the best interest of the child under this section, the court shall consider, but not be limited to, the following: . . . (3) The overall quality of the parent-child relationship; (4) The history of caregiving or parenting by each parent prior and subsequent to a marital or other type of separation; (5) Each parent’s cooperation in developing and implementing a plan to meet the child’s ongoing needs, interests, and schedule; provided that this factor shall not be considered in any case where the (continued. . .) 26  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  and (16)11 as indicative of the best interests of the minor children . . . . The Court finds that Mother has carried her burden of proof, as set forth below. As between the two parents, it is evident that Mother has been the more consistent parent in providing quality to her relationship with the children since the divorce. She has been the more attentive to the physical, emotional, safety and educational needs of the children. Mother has consistently demonstrated that she can separate the children’s needs from her own, and place the best interests of the children over her own interests. The Court also finds that Mother has demonstrated the occurrence of a change in circumstances necessitating a change in legal custody principally due to Father’s inability or unwillingness to place the best interests of the children above his own disagreements and hostility towards Mother. [fn2 See § 571-46(b)(12), HRS.] Independent of any relocation decision, it is obvious that joint legal custody has not produced the desired benefits for the minor children, because of Father’s behaviors. [fn3 The Divorce Decree requires that the parties attempt mediation of their disputes before filing motions in court. To date, there is (continued. . .) court has determined that family violence has been committed by a parent; (6) The physical health needs of the child; (7) The emotional needs of the child; (8) The safety needs of the child; (9) The educational needs of the child; . . . (12) Each parent’s actions demonstrating that they separate the child’s needs from the parent’s needs; . . . (15) The areas and levels of conflict present within the family; . . . . 11 HRS § 571-46(b)(16) requires consideration of “[a] parent’s prior wilful misuse of the protection from abuse process under chapter 586 to gain a tactical advantage in any proceeding involving the custody determination of a minor” in the best interests analysis. Despite the family court’s reliance on HRS § 571-46(b)(16), there is no record of any HRS Chapter 586 proceedings involving Father and Mother. 27  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  no indication that the parties have attempted mediation.12] Father has placed the minor children at the center of his disputes with Mother; first, by calling HPD repeatedly at the pick up and drop off locations to document his frivolous allegations against Mother for custodial interference; and second, by refusing to communicate with Mother to resolve relatively insignificant issues relating to the pickup and drop off schedule. Moreover, Father’s trial testimony demonstrates that he has no intention of cooperating and coparenting with Mother in the future; his fixation with “fighting for [his] children” with Mother instead of attempting to work with her for the children’s benefit, demonstrates misplaced priorities. From the postDecree history of the parents, the Court has no factual basis for inferring that Father’s hostility towards Mother will lessen with time or distance. Mother has also carried her burden of showing that she has attempted to work with Father for the benefit of the children, albeit unsuccessfully. For these reasons, the Court finds that the best interests of the minor children require a change in legal custody from joint legal custody to sole legal custody in favor of Mother. The Court further finds that the best interests of the children require that Mother be tasked the obligation to inform and confer with Father concerning the major issues of the minor children’s lives. Father shall also have equal access to the children’s medical and school records, as well as their extracurricular activities. If the parties cannot arrive at a consensus decision on the major issues of the children’s lives, then Mother shall make the decision.[13] 3. PHYSICAL CUSTODY/RELOCATION. The Court finds that Mother has carried her burden of demonstrating that the best interests of the children support her request to relocate her residence with the children from Honolulu to 12 Father’s alleged failure to refer matters to mediation was not raised by Mother and was never discussed during the trial, and as also argued by Father in his motion for reconsideration, may have been factually incorrect. 13 Mother’s motion was based on her relocation request. In addition, as noted, Mother repeatedly stated she was not requesting a change in legal custody. Upon questioning by the family court, Mother indicated she wanted “tie-breaking” authority with respect to legal custody. Yet, this portion of the family court’s ruling, which changes legal custody from joint to solely to Mother, is not conditioned on any relocation, and orders a change not requested by Mother. 28  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  Durham, North Carolina, forthwith.[14] The Court also finds that Mother has carried her burden of demonstrating that the best interests of the children require an award of physical custody of the minor children to Mother. Mother has demonstrated that the children’s opportunities for education, medical care, employment and cultural growth in Durham, NC are better than Honolulu. Because the maternal grandparents will accompany Mother to Durham, Mother has shown that she has support for supervision, direction and care for the children, in addition to her husband. Mother has also shown that her opportunities for employment in the Durham area are more numerous and advantageous to her, than those in Honolulu. The Court is not persuaded that the children should remain in Honolulu with Father. First, as noted above, Father’s evident and continuing hostility to Mother, even after the divorce, and his willingness to place the children at the center of their disputes, cannot be in the children’s best interests. Moreover, based on his behavior to date, the Court finds that Father is unable to place the children’s best interests ahead of his own. Second, neither Father nor any of his witnesses at trial articulated any compelling reasons for the children to remain in Honolulu. Finally, Mother’s plan for relocation adequately provides time for Father to visit with and enjoy time with the children. In order to prevail on her request to change physical custody and to relocate with the minor children to Durham, North Carolina, Mother must demonstrate that: (1) “there occurred such a change in circumstances that the replacement of custody would be in for the best interests of the children”, Dascoscos v. Dascoscos, 38 Haw. Terr.265, 266 (1948); and (2) that relocation of the minor children to Durham, North Carolina would be in the best interests of the children as enumerated in §571-46(b), HRS. Mother must demonstrate these elements to a preponderance of evidence. Mother’s proposed relocation of the minor children to Durham, North Carolina is a change in circumstances, the occurrence of which would dictate a change in physical custody, in the best interests of the children. Dascoscos, supra; quoted in Waldecker, supra at p. 22. The Divorce Decree clearly contemplated that the parties would share equal time with the minor children while they resided on the island of Oahu. While the Decree does refer to the possibility of relocation by one or both parties in §3, the provision requires that a relocating party give 60 days 14 Although the Order allows relocation “forthwith,” the record does not indicate any ruling on the September 30, 2016 trial until this November 23, 2016 order. 29  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  notice of the relocation to the other party, who may then consent or object. Nothing in the Decree governs timesharing between the parties in the event that one relocates out of the State of Hawaii. Based on the evidence at trial and the report of CIU, the Court finds that Mother has been the primary caregiver, and more consistently supportive parent to the children. The Court also finds that Mother has, and is presently able to place the interests of the children ahead of her own, even while working multiple jobs to provide for them financially. No evidence was presented at trial that any safety issues will arise if an award of physical custody is made to Mother for the relocation. On the other hand, Father has failed to show that he has advanced the children’s educational opportunities [fn4 [L.C.] testified that Father, rather than supervising [Son’s] homework, actually did the homework for [Son], which hindered [Son’s] efforts at school.] nor has he demonstrated at trial that he would be an adequate physical custodian. Based upon these findings, the Court awards sole physical custody of the minor children to Mother, subject to Father’s rights of visitation, as set forth below. Additionally, in a footnote, the family court indicated that Father requested a continuance at trial, but that the request was denied: Father requested a continuance of the trial to retain legal counsel after Mother had concluded her presentation of evidence in her case in chief. Despite the passage of 7 months and numerous court hearings since the filing of Mother’s Motion, Father had failed to seek or retain legal counsel. Father presented no excuse for his failure to retain legal counsel in a timely fashion, and the Court denied Father’s request for a continuance literally in the middle of trial as untimely. On December 2, 2016, Father filed a motion for reconsideration. In summary, Father argued that his motion should be granted because: (1) several of the family court’s factual findings were erroneous or based upon incomplete information; (2) the evidence, in his view, demonstrated that relocation to Durham was not in the children’s best interest; 30  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  and (3) the family court should have granted his motion for a continuance so he could have sought advice from a lawyer.15 On January 4, 2017, the family court issued a written order denying Father’s motion for reconsideration. The family court ruled that Father’s motion reiterated arguments he had raised at trial and did not present any new evidence and/or arguments that could not have been presented at trial. C. ICA proceedings On appeal, Father, now represented by counsel, raised two points of error. Father argued that the family court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance at trial and in considering the CIU Report in support of its decision granting mother’s motion for post-decree relief. Regarding the first point of error, in summary, Father argued that the family court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance because: (1) a continuance would not have resulted in any inconvenience to the family court, the parties, or the witnesses; (2) Father had legitimate reasons to seek a continuance, given that “[h]e is not a native English speaker and had great difficulty communicating as he attempted 15 See also notes 9 & 12, supra. 31  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  cross-examination of the witnesses”; and (3) Father was not at fault for waiting to consult a lawyer for several months, as Father did not know he would need the assistance of counsel until shortly before trial because he was not given a copy of the CIU report until, at a maximum, a week before trial. With respect to his second point of error, Father advanced several arguments in support of his position that the family court abused its discretion in considering the CIU Report. First, Father argued that the CIU report was deficient. Father highlighted that the CIU Report only “compared alternatives of MOTHER or FATHER having sole physical custody, without taking into account that these alternatives mean that MOTHER was prepared to abandon the children to FATHER if the motion were denied,” and “failed to consider the advantages to the children of remaining in a stable and familiar environment in Hawai[ʻ]i within the jurisdiction of the Hawai[ʻ]i Family Court.” Father also argued that the CIU Report was incomplete because it did not sufficiently investigate Stepfather’s background and the details of the intended neighborhood of relocation. Father further argued that the family court abused its discretion in considering the CIU Report because the social worker was not qualified to serve as a custody evaluator under HRS § 571-46.4 32  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  (Supp. 2013), and Father did not consent to the social worker’s appointment as a custody evaluator. Mother, acting pro se, responded to each of Father’s points of error. Mother first argued that the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s mid-trial motion for a continuance. Mother argued that at the June 8, 2016 hearing, the family court had informed both of the parties that the next proceeding was going to be a trial. Additionally, Mother argued that at the September 30, 2016 hearing, prior to the parties’ opening statements, the family court explained how the trial was going to proceed and provided the parties with an opportunity to ask questions. Mother contended that the family court correctly denied Father’s motion for a continuance, as he had ample opportunity to seek counsel and to resolve any questions regarding the nature of trial proceedings, but still chose to represent himself. With respect to the second point of error, Mother contended that the family court did not abuse its discretion in considering the CIU Report. Mother argued that HRS § 57146(a)(4) does not require a parent to consent to an investigation or report, and asserted that the CIU social worker was qualified to serve as a custody evaluator under HRS § 57146.4(a) (Supp. 2013). Mother also countered that the social 33  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  worker sufficiently investigated Stepfather by speaking with him over the phone twice and by speaking with his landlord/housemate over the phone. Mother concluded that the CIU Report was not only complete, but was thorough, accurate, and drafted by a qualified individual. On December 26, 2017, the ICA filed a summary disposition order, in which a majority of the ICA panel vacated the family court’s orders granting Mother’s motion for post-decree relief and denying Father’s motion for reconsideration. DJ v. CJ, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, at 1-5 (App. Dec. 26, 2017) (SDO). The ICA majority concluded that “the family court abused its discretion in denying Father’s request for a continuance to seek the assistance of counsel.” DJ, SDO at 5. The ICA majority further determined that it need not address Father’s second point of error. DJ, SDO at 2 n.1. Judge Reifurth dissented. DJ, SDO at 6-12 (Reifurth, J., dissenting). In his view, the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s request for a continuance. DJ, SDO at 6 (Reifurth, J., dissenting). He reasoned that because Father had been provided with an interpreter, Mother’s motion had been filed more than seven months before the trial, and Father was familiar with his right to counsel and the process, yet chose not to hire an attorney, Father had not exercised due 34  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  diligence. Accordingly, Judge Reifurth would have ruled that father’s substantive parental rights had not been infringed upon and the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying “Father’s mid-hearing request for a further continuance.” DJ, SDO at 10-11 (Reifurth, J., dissenting). Judge Reifurth also addressed Father’s second point of error. DJ, SDO at 11-12 (Reifurth, J., dissenting). He opined that Father did not demonstrate that: (1) the CIU Report was incomplete in any material sense; (2) the family court’s ability to consider the CIU Report was conditioned upon his consent thereto; or (3) the family court relied upon the CIU report in granting Mother’s motion for post-decree relief. DJ, SDO at 11 (Reifurth, J., dissenting). Based on the family court’s “broad discretion in examining reports concerning a child’s custody,” Judge Reifurth opined that the family court did not abuse its discretion in considering the CIU Report. DJ, SDO at 11-12 (Reifurth, J., dissenting). On February 8, 2018, the ICA entered its Amended Judgment on Appeal. D. Application for writ of certiorari Mother filed a timely application for a writ of certiorari, raising two questions: (1) whether the family court abused its discretion by denying Father’s request for a continuance to 35  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER  obtain legal counsel; and (2) whether the family court manifestly abused its discretion by relying upon a CIU Report that was alleged to be incomplete and performed without Father’s consent. For the reasons below, the ICA majority did not err in ruling that the family court abused its discretion by denying Father’s request for continuance to obtain legal counsel. Based on its ruling on the first question, the ICA majority did not address the second question. As the second question on certiorari would still be at issue on remand, however, we address issues raised therein to provide guidance. Ultimately, we affirm the ICA’s Amended Judgment on Appeal, as modified by this opinion.