Opinion ID: 2779368
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Witness Vouching

Text: Vázquez's first charge of prosecutorial misconduct is that the prosecutor improperly vouched for L.O.'s credibility during the government's initial closing argument. Improper vouching encompasses statements by the prosecutor that place[] the prestige of [the prosecutor's] office behind the government's case. United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003). The precise line between improper vouching and permissible argument is a hazy one. United States v. Vizcarrondo-Casanova, 763 F.3d 89, 96 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore begin by describing a few types of argument that fall fairly clearly on either side of that line. It is generally permissible for the government to offer specific reasons why a witness ought to be accepted as truthful by the jury. United States v. Rodríguez, 215 F.3d 110, 123 (1st Cir. 2000) (not improper for prosecutor to argue that cooperating witness was credible because his testimony put him and his family in danger). One such reason is that the witness testified pursuant to a plea agreement that required the witness to testify truthfully to receive the benefit of the bargain. See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 92, 101-02 (1st Cir. 2006) (not improper for prosecutor to remind jury that witness testified that he agreed to tell the truth in a plea agreement); United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 106 (1st Cir. 2003) (same). Another proper -10- credibility argument is that a witness would have told a better, more consistent story if the witness had been lying, see, e.g., Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 9-10 (If they were all going to get up and make up a story, wouldn't it have been a better story?), at least as long as the argument does not assert that the lack of consistency was viewed as a sign of credibility by the government itself, see Vizcarrondo-Casanova, 763 F.3d at 96 (possibly error, but not clear or obvious error, when prosecutor's statement that the Government knew that the [witnesses'] versions were going to conflict could have been understood as a suggestion that the government itself concluded that the stories were credible.). In contrast, several forms of credibility argument plainly cross over into improper vouching. The first form occurs when the prosecutor tells the jury that the prosecutor takes personal responsibility or ownership of the case and thus directly places the government's credibility at issue. See, e.g., United States v. Rojas, 758 F.3d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 2014) ([I]f you have any issues with the way this investigation was run, blame me. I'm in charge. I'm responsible.); United States v. Josleyn, 99 F.3d 1182, 1197 (1st Cir. 1996) (I'm a married person with a family, and I go home at night with a sound conscience. I have worked very hard on this case. . . . And we are very proud of what we have done. We have done nothing to be ashamed of.). The second form of prohibited vouching occurs when the prosecutor impart[s] her -11- personal belief in a witness's veracity, Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 9, or in the defendant's guilt, see United States v. Andújar-Basco, 488 F.3d 549, 560-61 (1st Cir. 2007) (I feel comfortable and the United States feels comfortable that they have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that this man delivered five kilograms of cocaine.). Bare assertions that a witness was honest or correct are therefore improper. See, e.g., United States v. Rodríguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2012) (Was [the passenger] credible? Was he honest? Of course, he was. (alteration in original)); United States v. Gomes, 642 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 2011) (telling a jury that a police detective gave you honest, candid, truthful testimony (emphasis removed)); United States v. Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 67 (1st Cir. 2010) (I think [the identity witness's] testimony was very clear . . . . It seems to me, and I submit to you, that [the witness] is right on the money. (emphasis removed)). It is this latter form of improper vouching--the personal assurance of a witness's credibility--that Vázquez accuses the prosecutor of employing during his initial closing argument. The alleged vouching, emphasized and accompanied by the surrounding argument, went as follows: Now, let's talk about [L.O.]. She had a third grade education. I submit to you she was a difficult witness, difficult to get her story out. Difficult to get from her the things that she had to tell. You saw her on the stand, you were able to evaluate her credibility. -12- And I ask you, was she telling you the truth? I submit to you that she was. Now, do you think she minimized things? Do you think she didn't want to tell you about the verdugo brand of drugs? Possibly. Possibly. But is there any doubt that she was a member of [Vázquez's] conspiracy, beginning in the early 1990s, all the way up until 2004? There should be no reasonable doubt based on the evidence you heard of her participation, and more particularly, of this Defendant's involvement in a conspiracy, and when it began . . . . You heard that testimony. You remember that. Vázquez argues that the emphasized language improperly conveyed to the jury the prosecutor's personal opinion that L.O. was truthful. We doubt the foregoing statement amounted to improper vouching. The prosecutor did not claim to think or believe the point asserted. Cf. Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d at 67. Also, the prosecutor's words as printed on the page are ambiguous. Submit can mean to present or propose to another for review, consideration or decision. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1244 (11th ed. 2012). In this sense, it is unobjectionable. See Hansen, 434 F.3d at 102 ([Witness's] [plea] deal here is to tell the truth, and I submit to you, that is precisely what he did during this trial, was not improper vouching); United States v. Marshall, 109 F.3d 94, 100 (1st Cir. 1997) (They say, I submit to you, they have told the story the way it truly unfolded, was not improper). Submit can also mean to put forward as an opinion or contention. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1244 (11th ed. 2012). Whether a juror would -13- hear the spoken words as conveying a proposition for review, or conveying what the prosecutor himself thinks, likely depends on tone, context, and the juror's disposition. Defense counsel heard the prosecutor's tone, in context. His lack of any objection suggests that neither tone nor context pointed toward vouching. See Marshall, 109 F.3d at 100 ([A]n excellent test [for determining whether the prosecutor's statement was a personal endorsement] is whether counsel contemporaneously thinks the line has been crossed, and objects, which, in turn, enables the court to instruct the jury.). The prohibition against vouching is widely understood by defense counsel, the objection is easy to make, and the collateral effects of scoring a correction in the prosecutor's closing are often advantageous for the defendant. Even on the cold page, context suggests that the message as conveyed and received was not one of personal vouching. The prosecutor's immediately preceding statement ([y]ou saw her on the stand, you were able to evaluate her credibility) drew the jurors' attention to its proper focus--their evaluation of L.O.'s credibility based on their observations during her testimony. And immediately afterward the prosecutor anticipated and addressed the -14- defense's point that L.O. minimized her involvement in the conspiracy.5 In sum, the prosecutor's statement upon which Vázquez principally bases his argument was likely not vouching,6 and in any case was not clearly or obviously vouching. See Vizcarrondo-Casanova, 763 F.3d at 96 (While the prosecutor unwisely put his toes up to the line, if there was error it was not 'clear and obvious.'). For that reason alone we must reject this grounds for appeal.