Opinion ID: 3015242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The BIA’s Application of the CAT Standard

Text: “An applicant for relief on the merits under [Article 3] of the [CAT] bears the burden of establishing ‘that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’” Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). The standard for relief under the CAT “has no subjective component, but instead requires the alien to establish, by objective evidence, that he is entitled to relief.” Id. at 175 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1180 (11th Cir. 2004); Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 398 (1st Cir. 2004). We have stated that: For an act to constitute torture under the [CAT] and the implementing regulations, it must be: (1) an act causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for an illicit or proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical control of the victim; and (5) not arising from lawful sanctions. Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 297 (BIA 2002) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)); Cadet, 377 F.3d at 1192 (outlining same requirements); Elien, 364 F.3d at 398 (same). An “alien’s testimony, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.” Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 471 (citing Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir. 2000)). “If an alien the terseness of the BIA’s opinion, we were primarily concerned that the BIA had allowed “the taint of the [IJ’s] earlier adverse credibility determination” regarding Zubeda’s asylum claim to “bleed through to the BIA’s consideration of her [CAT] claim.” Id. at 476. No such concern is implicated here. 15 meets his/her burden of proof, withholding of removal under the [CAT] is mandatory just as it is for withholding of deportation under § 243(h).” Id. at 472 (citing INA § 241(b)(3) and 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-208.18).8 The BIA stated the proper legal standard in its opinion. J.A. at 37 (“[T]o demonstrate eligibility for relief pursuant to the [CAT], an alien must prove that he or she more likely than not faces torture.”). We take issue, however with its application of the above standard to the undisputed facts of the case. Under the BIA’s application of the CAT regulations, to qualify for relief, Kamara was required to establish either: (1) that there was a greater than 50% probability that he would face torture at the hands of the RUF; or (2) that there was a greater than 50% probability that he would face torture at the hands of the Sierra Leone government. The BIA separately considered the likelihood of torture by each entity. Under its analysis, Kamara would be entitled to relief only if he was able to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that at least one of the entities, taken alone, would torture him if he were returned to Sierra Leone. 8 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) provides that: In assessing whether it is more likely than not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of removal, all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be considered, including, but not limited to: (i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant; (ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured; (iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal, where applicable; and (iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the country of removal. 16 A proper application of the regulations, however, merely requires Kamara to establish that it is more likely than not that he faces torture by “a public official (government)” in Sierra Leone; i.e., by the RUF or the Sierra Leone government, when the two entities are considered together.9 In other words, Kamara is entitled to CAT protection if he is able to demonstrate that the cumulative probability of torture by the two entities exceeds 50%. Thus, for illustrative purposes only, let us assume that the probability of Kamara being returned to RUF controlled territory is 30%, and that the probability of Kamara suffering torture at the hands of the RUF, if returned to RUF controlled territory, is 90%. Assume further that the probability of Kamara being returned to territory controlled by the Sierra Leone government is 70% and the probability of torture if returned to such territory is 40%. The probability that Kamara will be subjected to torture, if returned to Sierra Leone, is the sum of the weighted probability of torture in each of the two territories; in this case 55% (30% multiplied by 90% + 70% multiplied by 40% = 55%). See Roger A. Carlson, Statistics 12 (Holden-Day, Inc. 1973) (“If A and B are mutually exclusive [events], then the probability of A union B [i.e., the event which occurs whenever A or B occurs] must be the sum of the probabilities of A and B.”). Thus, despite the fact that Kamara cannot demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured by the RUF (30% multiplied by 90% = 27%), or by the Sierra Leone government (70% multiplied by 40% = 28%) when each entity is considered independently, under the circumstances assumed above, Kamara 9 8 C.F.R. 1208.16(c)(3)(ii) provides in pertinent part that: In assessing whether it is more likely than not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of removal, all evidence relevant to the possibility of torture shall be considered, including, but not limited to: . . .(ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured.” 17 may be able to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if returned to Sierra Leone when the two entities are considered together.10 The BIA’s erroneous application of the regulations is evident in its opinion. The BIA first concluded that because “‘it cannot be found . . . more likely than not that [Kamara] would find himself in the RUF’s hands,’” J.A. at 37 (quoting IJ opinion), Kamara failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he will be tortured by rebel forces. The Board 10 The above analysis, of course, assumes that Kamara falling into the hands of the RUF, and Kamara falling into the hands of the Sierra Leone government are mutually exclusive events. They may not be. There does exist a probability greater than zero (however slight) that Kamara could find himself in territory controlled by one entity and then, at a later time, find himself in a territory controlled by the other. Assume that Kamara has a 20% probability of falling into RUF hands alone and a 90% probability of torture if such an event occurs. Assume furthermore that Kamara has a 70% chance of falling into the hands of the Sierra Leone Government alone, and a 40% chance of torture if such an event occurs. Finally assume that there is a 10% probability that Kamara will fall into the hands of both the RUF and the Sierra Leone Government. The chance of torture by either, or both, entities if such an event occurs is (100% - (the probability that he will not be tortured by either entity)), or (100% - (10%  60%)) = 94%. Thus the overall probability of torture if Kamara is returned to Sierra Leone is equal to (the weighted probability of Kamara being tortured by the RUF, if he finds himself only in RUF territories) + (the weighted probability of Kamara being tortured by the Sierra Leone Government, if he finds himself only in Government controlled territories) + (the weighted probability of Kamara being tortured by either, or both, the RUF and the Sierra Leone Government if Kamara finds himself in both RUF and Government territories). Applying our hypothetical to this equation, yields an overall probability of torture of (20%  90%) + (70%  40%) + (10% %) = 55.4%. 18 proceeded as if this aspect of the case was no longer pertinent, stating that “[t]herefore, we decline to address whether the RUF constitutes a government for purposes of the [CAT].” J.A. at 37; see also Appellant’s Br. at 15 (“No more needed to be said on that front.”). The Board then reasoned that Kamara failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he will be tortured by the Sierra Leone government. Because the likelihood of torture by the RUF is less than 50% and the likelihood of torture by the Sierra Leone government is less than 50%, the BIA concluded that the IJ’s decision must be reversed. Properly applying the CAT regulations to the stipulated facts of this case, Kamara may indeed be entitled to relief under the CAT. The IJ concluded that although “it is impossible to speculate with any accuracy the likelihood” of Kamara falling into RUF hands, if such an event should happen, “torture is all but certain.” JA. at 28. He further concluded that the chances of Kamara falling into the government hands “is much greater” than his chances of falling into RUF hands, and while “[c]learly not as brutal as the rebels, the government of Sierra Leone nonetheless poses a significant risk of torture for its citizens, depending on who they may be.” J.A. at 29. Thus, although any application of the regulations must necessarily be more qualitative than quantitative, see, e.g., Matter of Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211, 229 (BIA 1985), we conclude that the BIA improperly applied the CAT standards to Kamara’s petition for relief. As stated by the IJ, “the very difficulty of proof is further reflection of the instability of the country, which raises, rather than reduces, the likelihood of torture.” J.A. at 30. Our above analysis, however, rests on the assumption that the IJ was correct in concluding that the RUF was a “public official” for purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a). Neither the CAT regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18, nor the Convention Against Torture, Art I (which § 208.18 incorporates), defines the term “public official.” As stated in the IJ’s July 12, 2001 written decision, the United Nations Committee Against Torture, which hears and adjudicates certain individual claims arising under Article 3 of the CAT, has held that the rebel group Sendero Luminoso [Shining Path] of Peru was not a “public official” 19 because it was neither the government, nor did it act with the government’s acquiescence. J.A. at 25 (citing Matter of S-V-, Int. Dec. # 3430 (BIA 2000), slip op. at 8-9). Similarly the BIA has held, as of May 2000, that guerillas in Colombia were not shown to act as, or with the acquiescence of, “public officials” in that country. Id. As noted above, because of its erroneous application of the CAT regulations, the BIA declined to address whether the RUF constitutes a “public official” for purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 208.18. On remand, the BIA is instructed to determine that issue first. If it determines that the RUF should be deemed a “public official,” the BIA should then apply the proper CAT analysis explained above to the undisputed facts of the case.11 See INS v. 11 The intervening passage of the REAL ID Act relieves us of resolving the unsettled issue of whether remand is appropriate when granting an alien’s habeas corpus petition. In contrast to the pre-IIRIRA statutory regime (allowing for direct review of a final order of deportation against an alien who is removable by reason of committing a criminal offense), which bestowed upon the courts “the broad authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief,” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 309 (2001), under the post-IIRIRA (but pre-REAL ID) scheme for criminal aliens, “the limited role played by the [habeas] courts” is “far narrower than the judicial review authorized by [the old statutory structure].” Id. at 312. The writ of habeas corpus “performs a precise and specific function: it forces the government to justify a decision to hold an individual in custody.” Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292, 299 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) (stating that “the historic purpose of the writ [is] to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial . . .”) (internal citation and quotations omitted); Helfin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 421 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The very office of the Great Writ, its only function, is to inquire into the legality of the detention of one in custody.”). This singular focus 20