Opinion ID: 559506
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Court of Law

Text: 69 The Company and the Commissioner assert that Article II's reference to Courts of Law is necessarily limited to courts created pursuant to Article III and that, therefore, the Chief Judge of the Tax Court, a non-Article III judge, constitutionally cannot be vested with the power to appoint under this designation. Amicus argues that this is too narrow a reading of Article II. He submits that the phrase Courts of Law means any court authorized by Congress to adjudicate cases. 10 Amicus points out that Article I confers on Congress the power [t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court. U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 9. All the parties acknowledge that the creation of such legislative courts is constitutionally valid. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51, 52 S.Ct. 285, 292, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932) (under Article I Congress can establish courts to adjudicate public rights--rights which arise between governmental agencies and the citizens subject to the authority of these bodies); Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 451, 49 S.Ct. at 413 (legislative courts may be used to determine matters that do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) (Congress has the authority under Article I to create territorial courts that are not vested with the judicial power defined in Article III). Amicus goes one step further, however, and asserts that there can be little doubt that these Article I courts are Courts of Law within the meaning of Article II. In support of this proposition, Amicus points to the functions performed by the Tax Court and Congress' history of vesting Article I courts with the authority to appoint certain officers. We reject Amicus' arguments. 70 The provisions of Article II incorporate the principle of separation of powers, permitting the Congress to place the appointment power in the President, a head of department, or the Courts of Law. The Constitution also gives the Congress a direct role in the appointments process by requiring the advice and consent of the Senate for the appointment of principal officers. 71 In identifying the Courts of Law as a potential repository of the appointment power, there is no indication that the Framers contemplated any courts other than those provided for under Article III. Indeed, Article III contains the Constitution's only other use of the term courts. Moreover, in interpreting the Appointments Clause, the Supreme Court has declared that inferior officers can be appointed only by the President alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132, 96 S.Ct. at 688 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court's consistent use of the term Judiciary emphasizes that Article II's reference to Courts of Law solely encompasses Article III courts. The Federal Judiciary was ... designed by the Framers to stand independent of the Executive and Legislature--to maintain the checks and balances of the constitutional structure, and also to guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remained impartial. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2864, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (plurality opinion). The term Judiciary refers exclusively to those judges appointed in conformity with the requisites of Article III--life tenure and no diminution of salary. Id. at 59-60 & n. 10, 102 S.Ct. at 2865 & n. 10. Only courts that possess the attributes prescribed in Article III can exercise the judicial power of the United States. Id. at 59, 102 S.Ct. at 2865. Although the Supreme Court has subsequently clarified certain statements made by the plurality in Northern Pipeline, see Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584-86, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 3334-36, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985), the Court has not undermined the proposition that the term Judiciary refers exclusively to Article III courts. 11 72 In pressing the argument that the Tax Court is a Court of Law, Amicus emphasizes that in several instances Congress has vested Article I courts with the power to appoint. For example, Congress vested several territorial and specialized courts with the power to appoint inferior officers--such as clerks and commissioners. See Act of June 4, 1812, ch. 95, Sec. 10, 2 Stat. 743, 746 (giving Missouri territorial court the power to appoint a clerk); Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, Sec. 9, 26 Stat. 81, 86 (Oklahoma) (same); Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, Sec. 6, 31 Stat. 321, 323 (Alaska) (same); Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, Secs. 3, 11, 10 Stat. 612, 613-14 (vesting Claims Court, which at the time was considered an Article I court, with power to appoint commissioners and a clerk). Amicus asserts that this tradition establishes that such bodies are Courts of Law within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. While we view this historical practice to be evidence that Article I courts can constitutionally be vested with the power to appoint, we do not believe that it necessarily establishes that such courts are permitted to be vested with this power because they are Courts of Law under Article II. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 401, 109 S.Ct. at 669 ( 'traditional ways of conducting government ... give meaning' to the Constitution) ((quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 610, 72 S.Ct. at 897) (concurring opinion)). It is equally probable, as we discuss infra, that these Article I courts were viewed as a department. In any event, Congress' vesting these courts with the power to appoint does not make the placement of that power necessarily constitutional. 73 Amicus encourages us to treat as secondary the formal constitutional distinctions between Article I and Article III. Instead, he suggests focusing on the functions performed by the Tax Court. Amicus reasons that because the Tax Court adjudicates disputes it must therefore be a Court of Law. We do not dispute Amicus' factual assertions. Indeed, we acknowledge that the Tax Court performs many functions similar to those performed by Article III courts. The judges of the Tax Court hear evidence, make rulings, review briefs, and render opinions that are binding on the parties and appealable to the Court of Appeals. These facts, however, do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the Tax Court is a Court of Law as the term is used in the Appointments Clause. It is not enough merely to focus on the nature of the function being performed. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 386, 109 S.Ct. at 661. Very often administrative agencies that are in or associated with the executive branch perform adjudicatory functions. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 850-54, 106 S.Ct. at 3256-3259. One need only consider the operation of the Social Security Administration to recognize that our system of government is replete with instances of administrative agencies performing adjudicatory functions. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). As Justice Brandeis once explained, the principle of separation of powers left to each [Branch] power to exercise, in some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291, 47 S.Ct. 21, 84, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926) (dissenting opinion). Certainly administrative agencies are not Courts of Law, as that term is used in Article II, simply because they perform adjudicatory functions. A purely functional analysis, therefore, fails adequately to consider the importance of the Constitution's framework and often would lead to untenable results. 74 Despite the functional nature of the Tax Court and the fact that Article I courts historically have been vested with the power to appoint, we conclude, in light of the language of the Appointments Clause and the structure of the Constitution, that the Tax Court is not a Court of Law within the meaning of Article II. 75