Opinion ID: 2561876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Resorting to Extrinsic Sources to Resolve the Legislature's Intent

Text: The language of subdivision (h) is susceptible of two reasonable interpretationseither that the word person imposes personal liability on any individual who retaliates or that it points back to other subdivisions aimed at actions a person takes, incorporating the level of liability available in those provisions. Both of these interpretations would result in personal liability under the facts of this case. To resolve which interpretation more likely comports with the Legislature's intent, I consider extrinsic sources. I begin with the legislative history of the bill adding the word person to subdivision (h). As the majority explains, the word person was added to the retaliation provision in 1987, effective January 1, 1988 (Stats.1987, ch. 605, § 1, p.1942), with the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 1167 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.). (Maj. opn., ante, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 632-633, 177 P.3d at p. 240.) The bill was introduced on March 3, 1987, by Assemblymember Bill Bradley on behalf of the DFEH and the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC), which were involved in drafting and developing the bill. As the majority further recounts, almost none of the legislative history specifically addresses the addition of the word person to the retaliation provision. (Maj. opn., ante, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 632-634, 177 P.3d at pp. 240-241.) However, the one piece of legislative history that does specifically address the addition of the word person to the retaliation provision strongly suggests that it was added to create personal liability for anyone that retaliates. The staff of the DFEH and the FEHC prepared a summary of the proposed changes to the FEHA, including the addition of the word person to the retaliation provision. [14] The summary describes the proposed changes to the retaliation provision, and then states: Rationale: [¶] The addition of the word `person' is to conform with other sections of the Act which refer to unlawful conduct by a `person'. More importantly, the change will extend coverage to anyone who retaliates against an individual because that person filed a charge with DFEH. This will provide more protection to people exercising their lawful right to file with DFEH. (Italics added.) The summary's statement that the addition of the word person to the retaliation provision would extend coverage to anyone who retaliates and provide more protection  (italics added) clearly supports the plain language interpretation advanced by plaintiff, that any individual who retaliates may be held individually liable. [15] The majority, by contrast, focuses on the first sentence of the summary's rationale for the proposed changes, that the word person was added to conform to other subdivisions of section 12940 that refer to unlawful conduct committed by a person. (Maj. opn., ante, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 636, 177 P.3d at p. 242.) Even if the majority's emphasis was correctly placed, that portion of the document still supports an interpretation resulting in individual liability for Weissthat the word person was added to point back to uses of the word person in other subdivisions, thus incorporating the level of liability present in the underlying subdivision. What the summary's language does not support is the majority's claim that the word person was added for no reason at all. Discussing other legislative history documents related to Assembly Bill No. 1167 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.), the majority emphasizes that a number of documents, including the Legislative Counsel's Digest, describe the changes the bill made as technical and conforming. (Maj. opn., ante, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 632-636, 177 P.3d at pp. 240-242.) This general description of the bill's changes is less than enlightening. Moreover, as the majority concedes, none of the documents to which it refers specifically mentions the addition of the word person to the retaliation provision. (Maj. opn., ante, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 632-634, 177 P.3d at pp. 240-242.) Additionally, the notion that the changes were conforming, if anything, provides further support for the interpretation that the word person in the retaliation provision was intended to incorporate, or refer back to, other subdivisions aimed at unlawful conduct committed by a personan interpretation that, as explained above, results in individual liability under the facts of this case. In addition to the legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 1167 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.), plaintiff also relies on the legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 1856 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), the bill abrogating our holding in Carrisales. An enrolled bill report prepared by the DFEH said that [e]xisting law provides that when a person retaliates against another person for opposing practices forbidden by the FEHA ... a complaint may be filed against any employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person. (DFEH, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1856 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 11, 2000, p. 3.) While the majority correctly notes that a statement made in 2000 about a statute enacted in 1987 is neither binding nor conclusive in construing that statute (maj. opn., ante, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 634-635, 177 P.3d at pp. 241-242), we have previously acknowledged that the Legislature's expressed views on the prior import of its statutes are entitled to due consideration, and we cannot disregard them. ( Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507.) Moreover, the DFEH's enrolled bill report is particularly persuasive in light of section 12960, which sets forth the procedure for an aggrieved party to follow in filing a complaint regarding unlawful employment practices forbidden under section 12940. Section 12960, subdivision (b) provides that [a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful practice may file ... a verified complaint, in writing, that shall state the name and address of the person, employer, labor organization, or employment agency alleged to have committed the unlawful practice complained of.... [16] (Italics added.) It would be odd for the Legislature to have provided that an alleged victim could file a complaint against a person, if the Legislature did not intend for the person to be held personally liable. A more plausible theory is that the Legislature adopted language in section 12960 to permit a filing of a complaint against each of the entities that may be held liable for violations of section 12940: any employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person. That the language of section 12960 essentially tracks the language of the retaliation provision only bolsters the plain language reading of section 12940, subdivision (h). It is difficult to reconcile the language of section 12960, which was added to the Government Code in 1980 (Stats.1980, ch. 992, § 4, p. 3155), with the majority's interpretation that section 12940 provides for no individual liability with the exception of the harassment provision, which was amended to add such liability in 2001. If the majority is correct, it is hard to comprehend why the Legislature would have allowed, long before it abrogated our decision in Carrisales, individuals to be named in complaints for violating section 12940 provisions. In light of the legislative history, the statutory context in which section 12940, subdivision (h) is placed, and well established canons of statutory interpretation that counsel us to adopt the plain and commonsense meaning of the words the Legislature has employed, I conclude that the Legislature intended the word person in subdivision (h) to mean that any individual who retaliates may be held personally liable. Even if this interpretation were incorrect, the only other plausible interpretation of the statutory language would similarly result in imposing personal liability under the facts of this case. What cannot be supported is the notion that the Legislature intended for no individual liability to be available under any circumstances. Accordingly, I dissent. Fortunately, the majority's adoption of an interpretation of the statute that has no support in its language or legislative history is not the final word on the meaning of the statute. The Legislature can, and should, clarify that meaning. WE CONCUR: KENNARD and WERDEGAR, JJ.