Opinion ID: 6329622
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The “single entity” argument

Text: Alborn first points out that it “relied upon assurances” from the Department of Administration that Act-covered items listed in the Bifurcation Letter “had been omitted from Amendment 55, . . . eliminat[ing] the [Act’s] coverage issues.” Quoting Thorsheim v. State, Alborn argues that the Department of Administration and the Department of Labor should be considered “a single entity.”60 Alborn notes that 56 (...continued) relevant “when considering estoppel against a municipality”); Beecher, 408 P.3d at 1214 (same). 57 Cf. AS 23.05.010 (explaining Department of Labor’s purpose); AS 36.05.030 (authorizing Department of Labor to set prevailing wage, determine Act coverage and violations, and refer infractions to attorney general for enforcement). 58 See North Slope Borough v. State, Dep’t of Educ. & Early Dev., 484 P.3d 106, 113 (Alaska 2021) (explaining when substitution of judgment standard applies). 59 Tesoro Alaska Petrol. Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 903 (Alaska 1987). 60 469 P.2d 383, 389 (Alaska 1970) (“[T]he Department of Administration and the Department of Fish and Game were both integral parts of a single entity, the State of Alaska.”). -21- 7589 statutory law lists both as part of the “[S]tate government”61 and that the Act defines “contracting agency” as “the [S]tate.”62 Alborn then sets out a seemingly absurd result: It was the State of Alaska that assured Juneau I that [the Act’s] wage coverage was inapplicable to the project . . . . Conversely, it thereafter was the State of Alaska which sought to label the project as “[Act-covered] public construction,” even though the State of Alaska, wearing a different hat, had indicated it was not. And presently, it also is the State of Alaska which is seeking to recoup the increased wages. (Emphasis in original; citation omitted.) Alborn contends this supports an estoppel defense based on the Department of Administration’s assurances. But Thorsheim, a case about whether the State could be considered a “contractor” in a workers’ compensation proceeding, is inapposite.63 The Department of Administration had negotiated a contract on a state agency’s behalf; we held that under the workers’ compensation statute the State could not be considered a contractor with respect to its public duties no matter which agency was involved.64 That narrow decision does not stand for the proposition that separate State agencies cannot have different stances on a particular issue or that State agencies should be considered a single entity in all contexts.65 61 See AS 44.17.005 (listing government offices and departments). 62 See AS 36.05.900 (defining “contracting agency”). 63 469 P.2d at 385. 64 Id. at 389-90. 65 Such a conclusion would logically contradict state and federal precedent allowing different government branches and agencies to bring lawsuits and administrative enforcement actions against one another; a single party cannot sue itself. (continued...) -22- 7589 Alborn also misstates the definition of “contracting agency” under the Act as “the [S]tate.” The Act defines “contracting agency” as “the [S]tate or a political subdivision of the [S]tate that has entered into a public construction contract with a contractor,”66 and “political subdivision” includes “any [S]tate department [or] [S]tate agency.”67 The Act thus clearly envisions the possibility that one arm of the State could enter into an Act-covered construction contract, taking the position that the Act does not apply, and that the Department of Labor, vested with the exclusive authority to determine Act coverage,68 could bring an enforcement action. In that context, the Department of Labor and the offending “political subdivision” necessarily would have taken opposite positions regarding the Act’s coverage, just as happened in this case. 65 (...continued) See, e.g., Beegan v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 195 P.3d 134 (Alaska 2008) (involving investigation and potential Alaska State Commission for Human Rights (ASCHR) administrative action against DOT&PF); State, Dep’t of Fish & Game, Sport Fish Div. v. Meyer, 906 P.2d 1365 (Alaska 1995) (involving investigation and potential ASCHR administrative action against Department of Fish and Game), superseded on other grounds by statute, ch. 63, § 4, SLA 2006, as recognized in Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc., 372 P.3d 904, 914 n.52 (Alaska 2016); see generally Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893 (1991), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/4; SEC v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 568 F.3d 990, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (collecting cases and explaining why government should not always be treated as single entity for litigation purposes). 66 AS 36.05.900 (emphasis added). 67 AS 36.95.010(6). 68 AS 36.05.030 (“The Department of Labor . . . has the authority to determine . . . [if] this chapter is being violated.”). -23- 7589 Alborn’s “single entity” estoppel theory additionally can be rejected on public interest grounds.69 Even assuming Alborn met the required elements of reasonable and detrimental reliance on a prior position taken by the unitary “State,” application of estoppel would frustrate enforcement of the Act, which was enacted to help construction workers earn better wages.70 Precluding enforcement cuts against the public interest and the Act’s broad policy mandate.