Opinion ID: 2683890
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adversely affects a child’s educational

Text: performance. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(9)). Despite Plaintiffs’ contrary assertion, the district court did not find any decisions by courts or hearing officers specifically holding that auditory processing disorders qualify as OHIs. Accordingly, the court approached the question as a matter of first impression, using canons of construction. The court determined that “specific learning disability” and “other health impairment” concerned two different categories of impairment.7 The district court, noting that the statute 7 The district court explained: In the regulations, “specific learning disability” is defined to mean “a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language,” see 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(10) (2005); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j) (2005), provided such disorder results in a “severe discrepancy between [the child’s] intellectual ability and achievement,” see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j) E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD 15 included a non-exhaustive list, employed the dictionary meaning of “other” as “another,” and concluded that because a qualifying auditory processing disorder is a “specific learning disability,” “it necessarily follows that an auditory processing disorder cannot at the same time be an ‘other health impairment.’” The court expressed concern that a contrary finding would render superfluous the requirement of showing severe discrepancy to qualify for benefits under the “specific learning disability” category.8 (2005); see also Cal. Educ. Code § 56337 (2005). A “specific learning disability” thus is “specific” to disorders adversely affecting the processing of the written and/or spoken word. As is set forth in the applicable regulations, such processing disorders expressly include “auditory processing” disorders. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(1) (2005). As defined in the regulations, an “other health impairment” is a “chronic and acute health problem” that “[a]dversely affects a child’s educational performance.” See 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(9) (2005); see also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(f) (2005) (providing pupil is entitled to special education where pupil has “chronic and acute health problem[ ]” that “adversely affects a pupil’s educational performance”). 8 The district court reasoned: A contrary finding would effectively negate and render superfluous the statutory and regulatory provisions that a “disorder in a basic psychological process” qualifies as a “specific learning disability” only if, as a result of such disorder, a “severe discrepancy” exists between the child’s intellectual ability and academic achievement. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56337 (2005); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j) (2005); see also Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding “in the construction of administrative regulations, as well as statutes, it is presumed that every phrase serves 16 E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD Having concluded that PVUSD had reasonably determined that Plaintiffs had failed to show a “severe discrepancy” between E.M.’s intellectual ability and academic achievement in 2005, and that E.M.’s auditory processing disorder could not be an “other health impairment,” the district court granted judgment in favor of PVUSD. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.