Opinion ID: 1375362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Statute of Limitations for Conspiracy to Commit Murder in the Second Degree

Text: Under the current version of HRS § 705-526(1), conspiracy to commit a class A felony is a class B felony. Conspiracy to commit any other course of criminal conduct is considered an offense of the same class and grade as the most serious underlying offense. HRS § 705-526(2) (1993). In other words, the conspiracy is classified as being exactly on par with the most serious underlying substantive offense (other than a class A felony) that is an object of the conspiracy. We believe the language of HRS § 705-526 is clear and unambiguous. In the instant case, the defendants allegedly conspired to commit second degree murder, and second degree murder is an unclassified felony. Thus, conspiracy to commit second degree murder is also an unclassified felony. HRS § 701-108 (1993) (time limitations) governs the time within which the state must commence a prosecution. As previously indicated, subsection (1) of the limitations statute provides that [a] prosecution for murder, murder in the first and second degrees, attempted murder, and attempted murder in the first and second degrees may be commenced at any time. HRS § 701-108(1). It then specifically delineates the limitations period for those offenses not included in subsection (1). Subsection (2)(b) provides that prosecution for a class A felony must be commenced within six years, and subsection (2)(c) provides that a prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within three years after it is committed. Thus, the statute plainly and unambiguously provides notice to persons of reasonable intelligence that conspiracy to commit murder in the second degree is (1) an unclassified felony that (2) falls within the catchall limitations provision of subsection (2)(c), that is, three years. On appeal, the prosecution attempts to refute this plain language by drawing our attention to HRS § 705-502 (1993), which provides that an attempted offense is of the same class and grade as the underlying substantive offense, and then analogizes that, (1) because conspiracy is of the same class and grade as second degree murder and (2) there is no limitations period on second degree murder, we should read conspiracy to commit second degree murder into the list of offenses exempted from the statute of limitations. We decline to do so because, if we were to so hold, we would effectively, in the absence of any legislative mandate, sub silentio remove the limitations period from conspiracy to commit second degree murder. As previously discussed, only murder and the new homicide offensesthat is, first and second degree murder and attempted first and second degree murderare specifically enumerated as exempted offenses in the amended version of HRS § 701-108. Absent language demonstrating that the legislature contemplated exempting conspiracy to commit second degree murder from the limitations period, we decline to read such an exemption into the statute by analogy to the attempted murder statute. In State v. Meyer, 61 Haw. 74, 595 P.2d 288 (1979), we held that crimes not expressly provided for in the Code cannot be created by analogy to crimes that are provided for in the Code. Similarly, we will not extend the statute of limitations for conspiracy to commit second degree murder by analogy to the attempt statute. Furthermore, the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies in this instance. [T]he specificity of the legislative enumeration in this section means that the [limitations exemption is] applicable only to the [offenses] enumerated. State v. Liuafi, 1 Haw.App. 625, 637, 623 P.2d 1271, 1279 (1981). When the legislature expresses things through a list, the court assumes that what is not listed is excluded. 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.23, at 216-17 (5th ed.1992). [D]eparture from the plain and unambiguous language of the statute cannot be justified without a clear showing that the legislature intended some other meaning would be given the language. In re Tax Appeal of Lower Mapunapuna Tenants Ass'n, 73 Haw. 63, 68, 828 P.2d 263, 266 (1992) (quoting Espaniola v. Cawdrey Mars Joint Venture, 68 Haw. 171, 179, 707 P.2d 365, 370 (1985)). We therefore hold that the circuit court was correct in concluding that the statute of limitations for conspiracy to commit murder is three years, but that it erred in concluding, alternatively, that the statutory scheme failed to give notice of the applicable statute of limitations.