Opinion ID: 500646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the denial of the injunction

Text: 5 The remaining appeals attack the District Court's order refusing to restrain the sale of major assets (specifically subsidiaries) of the Associations. 3 Appeal from that order is properly before us under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1). The District Judge approached the plaintiffs' prayer by first reviewing the statutory framework concerning judicial review of FHLBB action against savings and loans. As she noted, Congress set forth the exclusive means of judicial review to challenge the appointment of a conservator in 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1464(d)(6)(A), which provides, in pertinent part: 6 In the event of such appointment [of a conservator], the association may, within 30 days thereafter, bring an action ... [in] the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, for an order requiring the Board to remove such conservator ..., and the court shall upon the merits dismiss such action or direct the Board to remove such conservator.... 7 The exclusivity of this challenge is reflected in 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1464(d)(6)(C), which expressly prohibits the sort of relief sought in this case, stating: 8 Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no court may take any action for or toward the removal of any conservator or receiver, or, except at the instance of the Board restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of a conservator or receiver. 9 While the parties engaged in some debate over the legislative history of the quoted sections and its bearing upon discerning the intent of Congress, the District Court correctly ruled that the clear language of the statutes foreclosed any other claims against the conservator while the statutory challenge was still pending. 4 In Biscayne Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 720 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.1983), the only injunction of the sort sought by the plaintiffs herein, ever to be granted, was dissolved on the conclusion that the District Court had no authority to disrupt the appointment of, or limit the authority of, the FSLIC as receiver for Biscayne once a statutory ground for receivership has been found to exist.... Id. at 1506. 5 The District Court in the instant case, unlike the District Court in Biscayne, recognized its lack of authority and properly declined to issue the injunction. 10 The Associations, however, assert that if the statute is construed to limit the Court's jurisdiction, it is then unconstitutional since the sale of assets amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. However, a review of the authorities makes it plain that the statute as written and construed is not unconstitutional. The statute provides a mechanism for review, albeit, one available only after the seizure of assets. However, the fact that judicial review is available only after the fact does not, in and of itself, render that review constitutionally inadequate. 11 While there is a sparsity of authority on facts analogous to those at bar, the Supreme Court has so held in other circumstances. By way of example, in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974), the Supreme Court dealt with an argument parallel to the Associations' proposition here. In that case, Bob Jones University lost its status as a tax-exempt organization and was denied pre-deprivation review by an anti-injunction statute. On appeal, the University made the same sort of due process arguments before us here. The Supreme Court held these review procedures offer petitioner a full, albeit delayed, opportunity to litigate the legality of the service's revocation of tax-exempt status and withdrawal of advance assurance of deductibility. Id. at 746, 94 S.Ct. at 2051. Similarly, the removal procedure in 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1464 6 provides post-deprivation judicial review. 12 In reaching our conclusion as to the constitutionality of the statute on its face, we consider the due process analysis reviewed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), reflecting the weighing of three distinct factors: 13 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute, procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the physical and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 14 Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903 (citation omitted). 15 In this case, Congress has obviously weighed the competing interests of depositors against those of owners and operators in the drastic circumstances of insolvency or mismanagement. Therefore, [r]ecognizing that swift action is often necessary to minimize economic loss in instances of troubled and failing financial institutions, Congress has given, in the statutory provisions at issue here, an awesome amount of control and authority to the FHLBB in the event of such crises. Biscayne Federal Savings & Loan, supra, at 1503. 16 Therefore, we conclude that the statute is constitutional on its face. The Associations' contentions offer no basis for determining that the deprivation confronted here is any more serious than the deprivation of due process alleged in Bob Jones University, supra. Consequently, the decisions of the District Court are affirmed.