Opinion ID: 1598462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Award of Extraordinary Attorney's Fees

Text: Lucille argues that the trial court's assessment of extraordinary attorney's fees against the estate was improper because her challenge to the second amended report involved a personal dispute between herself and executor/beneficiary Simpson. She contends Simpson failed to show just cause to justify the award and did not demonstrate any special estate interest warranting the additional fees. The executors argue that they demonstrated just cause for the fee award because the dispute was not personal between Lucille and Simpson but rather involved the validation and clarification of the will in question. They assert that the dispute involved settling the question of what shares the individuals in question would take and their role as fiduciaries required them to act to finalize the distribution of the estate in accordance with the decision of the trial court. Iowa Code section 633.199, Expenses and extraordinary services, governs courts' award of extraordinary attorney fees in probate matters. Section 633.199 provides: Such further allowances as are just and reasonable may be made by the court to personal representatives and their attorneys for actual necessary and extraordinary expenses or services. Necessary and extraordinary services shall be construed to also include services in connection with real estate, tax matters, and litigated matters. Whether an executor may legally obligate the estate for attorneys' fees depends on the peculiar circumstances of each individual case. In re Estate of Law, 253 Iowa 599, 602, 113 N.W.2d 233, 234 (1962). We accord the trial court considerable discretion in taxing executor attorney fees to estates. In re Estate of Ohrt, 516 N.W.2d 896, 902 (Iowa 1994). We have noted that pronouncement of a precise test for the governance of this issue in all instances is not possible. Law, 253 Iowa at 602, 113 N.W.2d at 234. However, general factors guide our decision in this area. In order for an executor to persuade a court of the propriety of charging attorney's fees to the estate, the executor carries the burden of proving he or she acted in good faith and with just cause in engaging in the proceedings. Iowa Code § 633.315; Law, 253 Iowa at 602, 113 N.W.2d at 235. In order for just cause to exist, the executor must demonstrate a special estate interest in the contest. Law, 253 Iowa at 602, 113 N.W.2d at 235. No just cause or substantial estate interest exist where a will contest is narrowed down to one of personal interest only between proponents and contestants. Id., 253 Iowa at 603, 113 N.W.2d at 235; In re Estate of Leighton, 210 Iowa 913, 919, 224 N.W. 543, 546 (1929); In re Estate of Berry, 154 Iowa 301, 305, 134 N.W. 867, 868 (1912); see also Fleming v. Casady, 202 Iowa 1094, 1104, 211 N.W. 488, 493 (1926). In general, it may be said that an action benefits an estate if it involves increasing or preserving the size of the estate. In re Estate of Prichard, 416 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Mich.App.1987). An action may also benefit an estate if it determines or represents the decedent's desires and intentions as expressed in the will. In re Estate of Trynin, 252 Cal.Rptr. 787, 789 (Cal.Ct.App.1988). On the other hand, a contest is generally personal if it: (1) is driven by the personal sentiment and desire of the contestants; or (2) involves a personal contest between beneficiaries regarding division of a specific estate share when the size and preservation of the estate is not an issue. See Leighton, 210 Iowa at 919, 224 N.W. at 546. We have reviewed numerous cases in this jurisdiction and in others on the issue of when a contest amounts to a personal contest. In order for a contest to be personal, it is not enough merely that an executor/beneficiary's share of the estate depend on the outcome of a challenge to the will. Ohrt, 516 N.W.2d at 902. Some personal interest other than or in addition to the interest a will grants to the executor must be at issue. See id. For example, in In re Estate of Jenkins, 245 Iowa 939, 941, 65 N.W.2d 92, 93 (1954), we held that the executor could not charge his attorney's fees against the estate where the decedent's heirs had challenged the will on the ground that the executor had exercised undue influence over the decedent to get the decedent to name him sole beneficiary. For further examples, see In re Estate of Swanson, 240 Iowa 1011, 38 N.W.2d 652 (1949) and In re Estate of Smith, 165 Iowa 614, 146 N.W. 836 (1914). The law places on the executor the duty to offer a will for probate and to make all reasonable efforts to sustain its validity when contested. In re Estate of Hayer, 233 Iowa 1343, 1350, 11 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1943). In Cory, 184 N.W.2d at 698-99, we quoted with approval from Law, 253 Iowa at 604, 113 N.W.2d at 236, wherein the general principles are stated that we have referenced in this opinion. We concluded in Cory that the existence of just cause is a question of fact. Cory, 184 N.W.2d at 699. Lucille claimed a one-half interest in the proceeds of sale in a real estate contract she and her husband executed as sellers. We affirmed the trial court's rejection of her claim on the ground that she was not an owner of the real estate and had merely released her dower interest in it. Estate of Wulf, 471 N.W.2d at 852. The claim, however, affected the administration of the estate by its impact on the total asset amount for distribution, the allocation to beneficiaries, and the tax consequences. The executors' interest in the outcome of this litigation was not that of a passive bystander. In the case at bar, there is no evidence which suggests that Simpson's motivations in defending the will were for his personal benefit rather than for the furtherance of his legal obligations. The record suggests Simpson acted reasonably and with the good faith intention of carrying out his obligations as an executor. We find that the executor met his burden of proof and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in charging the fees to the estate.