Opinion ID: 1830727
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: absolute disparity

Text: Most frequently, courts employ the absolute disparity test in Sixth Amendment cases. Id. In this context, absolute disparity is defined as the difference between the percentage of a certain population group eligible for jury duty and the percentage of that group who actually appear in the venire. Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231 (C.A.3, 1992). Thus, to calculate absolute disparity, courts subtract the percentage of the distinctive group that was in the jury pool from the percentage present in the population. In the instant case, Kent County's jury-eligible black population was 7.28 percent. Fifty-six of the 929 prospective jurors, or six percent, were black. Thus, the instant absolute disparity was 1.28 percent. This showing is insufficient, as courts have consistently held that absolute disparities less than 11.5 percent do not constitute unfair or unreasonable underrepresentation. Id. at 1232 (collecting cases). The absolute disparity test, though frequently employed, is often criticized as well. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated: The risk of using this approach is that it may too readily tolerate a selection system in which the seemingly innocuous absence of small numbers of a minority from an average array creates an unacceptable probability that the minority members of the jury ultimately selected will be markedly deficient in number and sometimes totally missing. Of course, the Sixth Amendment assures only the opportunity for a representative jury, rather than a representative jury itself, ... but that opportunity can be imperiled if venires regularly lack even the small numbers of minorities necessary to reflect their proportion of the population. [ United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 678 (C.A.2, 1990).] This problem is particularly acute when the percentage of the distinctive group eligible for jury service is small. See United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1247 (C.A.2, 1995). In the instant case, for example, even a complete exclusion of black jurors would result in only a 7.28 percent absolute disparity. For this reason, the Court of Appeals declined to adopt the absolute disparity test in People v. Hubbard. Instead, when determining whether representation of black prospective jurors was fair and reasonable, it followed the approach taken in United States v. Osorio, 801 F.Supp. 966 (D.Conn., 1992). There, the court found substantial underrepresentation when disparity resulted from non-benign circumstances, even though the disparity was insubstantial under an absolute disparity test. See id. at 978-979. Basically, this approach glances ahead at the evidence of systematic exclusion, and, if it has the appearance of merit, that is a thumb on the scale when deciding whether representation was fair and reasonable.