Opinion ID: 75961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Supreme Court Cases Concerning Applicability of AEDPA

Text: 28 The relevance of determining the point from which Isaacs' case should be considered to have been pending derives from the Supreme Court's decision in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether the provisions of AEDPA applied retroactively to pending cases. The Court's decision that AEDPA should not be applied to most pending habeas cases was based largely on the fact that § 107(c) of the Act expressly stated that chapter 154 of AEDPA — a chapter which sets out special rules expediting § 2254 cases when states satisfy certain requirements — should be applied to pending cases. See id. at 327, 117 S.Ct. at 2063. No such retroactivity provision was included in AEDPA chapter 153, the chapter applicable to other § 2254 petitions (including Isaacs' petition, if AEDPA applies). The Court noted that [i]f ... Congress was reasonably concerned to ensure that chapter 154 be applied to pending cases, it should have been just as concerned about chapter 153, unless it had the different intent that the latter chapter not be applied to the general run of pending cases. Id. at 329, 117 S.Ct. at 2064. Because Congress considered the two chapters together, the Court stated that the negative implications raised by disparate provisions are strong[]. Id. at 330, 117 S.Ct. at 2065. After discussing alternative interpretations of the statutory provisions, the Court stated: We hold that the negative implication of § 107(c) is that the new provisions of chapter 153 generally apply only to cases filed after the Act became effective. Id. at 336, 117 S.Ct. at 2068. 29 Although Lindh clearly establishes that AEDPA does not apply to pending cases, it does not address the issue presented in this case of what event marks the beginning of a habeas case. In addressing that issue, Isaacs points to other recent Supreme Court cases interpreting habeas provisions in a way that supports his contention that a habeas case begins at the time a petitioner files a motion for appointment of counsel. 30 First, Isaacs directs us to the Supreme Court's opinion in McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994). In that case, the Supreme Court considered two statutory provisions related to habeas cases: 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), which creates a statutory right to qualified legal representation for capital defendants in federal habeas proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. § 2251, which grants a federal judge before whom a habeas proceeding is pending the power to stay any related state court proceeding. The lower courts in McFarland had refused to appoint habeas counsel for the defendant pursuant to § 848(q)(4)(B) because the defendant had not yet filed a habeas petition. Id. at 851-54, 114 S.Ct. at 2570-71. 31 The Supreme Court began by noting that § 848(q)(4)(B) grants indigent capital defendants a mandatory right to qualified counsel and related services `[i]n any [federal] post conviction proceeding,' but that the statute did not specify how the right was to be invoked. Id. at 854, 114 S.Ct. at 2571 (quoting § 848(q)(4)(B)) (brackets in original). In particular, the statute did not define a `post conviction proceeding' under § 2254 or § 2255 or expressly state how such a proceeding shall be commenced. Id. In light of other related provisions, however, the Court held that § 848(q)(4)(B) ... established a right to preapplication legal assistance. Id. at 855, 114 S.Ct. at 2572. The Court found that the interpretation [of the statute to permit the appointment of counsel prior to the filing of a formal petition] is the only one that gives meaning to the statute as a practical matter, and concluded that: 32 The language and purposes of § 848(q)(4)(B) and its related provisions establish that the right to appointed counsel includes a right to legal assistance in the preparation of a habeas corpus application. We therefore conclude that a post conviction proceeding within the meaning of § 848(q)(4)(B) is commenced by the filing of a death row defendant's motion requesting the appointment of counsel for his federal habeas corpus proceeding. 33 Id. at 855-57, 114 S.Ct. at 2572-73. 34 After reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court went on to address the similar issue of whether a federal court has authority to stay state court proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251 prior to the filing of a formal habeas petition. Section 2251 grants any federal judge before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending power to enjoin related state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2251. McFarland argued that his request for counsel in a `post conviction proceeding' under § 848(q)(4)(B) initiated a `habeas corpus proceeding' within the meaning of § 2251, and that the District Court thus had jurisdiction to enter a stay. McFarland, 512 U.S. at 857, 114 S.Ct. at 2573. The Court held that: 35 The language of these two statutes indicates that the sections refer to the same proceeding. Section 848(q)(4)(B) expressly applies to any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 — the precise habeas corpus proceeding[s] that § 2251 involves. The terms post conviction and habeas corpus also are used interchangeably in legal parlance to refer to proceedings under §§ 2254 and 2255. We thus conclude that the two statutes must be read in pari materia to provide that once a capital defendant invokes his right to appointed counsel, a federal court also has jurisdiction under § 2251 to enter a stay of execution. 36 Id. at 858, 114 S.Ct. at 2573. 37 Because the McFarland Court held with respect to both § 848 and § 2251 that habeas proceedings were commenced with the filing of a motion for appointment of counsel, Isaacs argues that we should also find that his habeas case was pending, for purposes of determining whether AEDPA applies, as of the time he filed his motion for appointment of counsel. If we were to do so then it would follow, of course, that AEDPA would not apply to his petition. 38 The second Supreme Court case on which Isaacs relies is Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998). In Hohn, the Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to review a decision by a court of appeals denying an application for a certificate of appealability (COA). To resolve this issue, the Court had to decide whether a court of appeals' consideration of a COA application constituted a case. Id. at 241, 118 S.Ct. at 1972. The Court concluded that it did, stating: 39 There can be little doubt that Hohn's application for a certificate of appealability constitutes a case under § 1254(1). As we have noted, [t]he words `case' and `cause' are constantly used as synonyms in statutes ..., each meaning a proceeding in court, a suit, or action. Blyew v. United States, 13 Wall. 581, 595, 20 L.Ed. 638 (1871). The dispute over Hohn's entitlement to a certificate falls within this definition. It is a proceeding seeking relief for an immediate and redressable injury, i.e., wrongful detention in violation of the Constitution. There is adversity as well as the other requisite qualities of a case as the term is used in both Article III of the Constitution and the statute here under consideration. This is significant, we think, for cases are addressed in the ordinary course of the judicial process, and, as a general rule, when the district court has denied relief and applicable requirements of finality have been satisfied, the next step is review in the court of appeals. 40 Id. 41 The Hohn Court also rejected the suggestion that an application for a COA was a threshold matter separate from the merits and over which appellate courts lack jurisdiction, stating: 42 Precedent forecloses this argument. In Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 1, 87 L.Ed. 3 (1942), we confronted the analogous question whether a request for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was a case in a district court for the purposes of the then-extant statute governing court of appeals review of district court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 225(a) First (1940 ed.) (courts of appeals had jurisdiction to review final decisions [i]n the district courts, in all cases save where a direct review of the decision may be had in the Supreme Court). We held the request for leave constituted a case in the district court over which the court of appeals could assert jurisdiction, even though the district court had denied the request. We reasoned, [p]resentation of the petition for judicial action is the institution of a suit. Hence the denial by the district court of leave to file the petitions in these causes was the judicial determination of a case or controversy, reviewable on appeal to the Court of Appeals. 317 U.S., at 24, 63 S.Ct., at 9. 43 Id. at 246, 118 S.Ct. at 1974-75. Isaacs contends that, in light of McFarland and Hohn, the Court should hold that he instituted his habeas case at the time that he filed his motion for appointment of counsel. 44 Arguably pointing in the other direction, however, is another recent Supreme Court case that has not yet been discussed by any of the other circuits in connection with the issue before us. In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000), the Supreme Court addressed whether pre or post-AEDPA rules should apply to an appeal filed pursuant to § 2253 after AEDPA became effective, when the original petition was filed with the district court before AEDPA. 2 The Court noted that just as § 2254 was directed to petitions filed in district courts after AEDPA, Section 2253 was directed to proceedings initiated in appellate courts after the Act's effective date. Id. at 481, 120 S.Ct. at 1602. Therefore, the Court concluded that AEDPA's rules applied to appeals filed after AEDPA, even though appellate courts would be required to apply pre-AEDPA law in reviewing the trial court's ruling. Id. 45 As the State points out, the Slack Court's holding indicates that, at least when a case moves from the district court to appellate court level, it may be divisible so that AEDPA would apply to one aspect of the proceeding, but not to the other. The Supreme Court recognized this fact, explaining: 46 While an appeal is a continuation of the litigation started in the trial court, it is a distinct step. We have described proceedings in the courts of appeals as appellate cases. Under AEDPA, an appellate case is commenced when the application for a COA is filed. 47 When Congress instructs us (as Lindh says it has) that application of a statute is triggered by the commencement of a case, the relevant case for a statute directed to appeals is the one initiated in the appellate court. Thus, § 2253(c) governs appellate court proceedings filed after AEDPA's effective date. 48 Id. at 481-82, 120 S.Ct. at 1602-03 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, a case isn't always just a case. Instead this Court must consider the relevant case in order to determine which set of standards apply.