Opinion ID: 558039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Continental As An Intended and Foreseeable Beneficiary

Text: 12 Although a federal court sitting in diversity must follow the law directed by the Supreme Court of the state whose law is found to be applicable, Plummer v. Lederle Laboratories, 819 F.2d 349, 355 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898, 108 S.Ct. 232, 98 L.Ed.2d 191 (1987), the district court found, and the parties agree, that the Connecticut Supreme Court has never decided whether an excess carrier may have a claim founded in either contract or tort against a law firm hired by the primary insurer to represent the insured. In the absence of controlling state precedent: 13 [W]e must make our best estimate as to how [Connecticut's] highest court would rule in this case. In making that determination, we are free to consider all the resources the highest court of the state could use, including decisions reached in other jurisdictions. 14 Calvin Klein, Ltd. v. Trylon Trucking Corp., 892 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir.1989) (citing Francis v. INS Life Ins. Co. of New York, 809 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir.1987) (citations omitted)); see also Plummer, 819 F.2d at 355. 15 Continental's first argument is that it was an intended and foreseeable beneficiary of the legal services rendered by counsel hired by Aetna to defend the Griffin Hospital. Continental contends, therefore, that Pullman owed a duty to Continental, and for breach of this duty Continental has a claim for legal malpractice. 16 Connecticut follows the general rule that attorneys are not liable to persons other than their clients for the negligent rendering of services. Krawczyk v. Stingle, 208 Conn. 239, 244, 543 A.2d 733, 735 (1988). While Connecticut has recognized some exceptions to this rule in will cases, see Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 81 (1981) (beneficiaries have claims against attorney who drafted a will which, although valid, provided for benefit shares less generous than the testatrix's expressed intention), Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn.Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966) (beneficiaries have a claim against attorney who drafted a will where attorney failed to get the required number of witnesses and, consequently, the will was invalid), that state has been cautious in expanding attorney liability, and has expressed a continuing concern over the chilling effect of third party intrusion into an attorney's primary duty of loyalty to the best interests of his or her client. Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 501, 529 A.2d 171, 176 (1987). 17 The Krawczyk court forthrightly recognized that [d]etermining when attorneys should be held liable to parties with whom they are not in privity is a question of public policy. Krawczyk, 208 Conn. at 245, 543 A.2d at 735. Acknowledging the exception that permits a third party malpractice claim against an attorney drafting a defective will, Krawczyk framed the issue as whether such liability should be further expanded to encompass negligent delay in completing and furnishing estate planning documents for execution by the client. Id. Declining to take that next step, the supreme court wrote: 18 In addressing this issue, courts have looked principally to whether the primary or direct purpose of the transaction was to benefit the third party. Additional factors considered have included the foreseeability of harm, the proximity of the injury to the conduct complained of, the policy of preventing future harm and the burden on the legal profession that would result from the imposition of liability. 19 Id. at 245-46; 543 A.2d at 735 (citations omitted). Discomfited over imposing liability when such liability had the potential of interfering with the ethical obligations owed by an attorney to his or her client, id. at 246, 543 A.2d at 736, the court reiterated: A central dimension of the attorney-client relationship is the attorney's duty of '[e]ntire devotion to the interest of the client.'  Id. (quoting G. Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics 78 (5th ed. 1896)); see Mozzochi, 204 Conn. at 497, 529 A.2d at 174 (the attorney has a primary duty of robust representation of the interests of his or her client.). 20 We reject appellant's attempt to equate an attorney's dual representation of the insurer and insured with that of the testator and his beneficiary. See Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 163 Conn. 552, 573, 316 A.2d 394, 405 (1972) (trial court committed no error in refusing to charge jury that insureds' attorney was also the attorney for the insurer, because the attorney's primary responsibility was to the insureds and to represent them in accordance with what he considered to be their best interests.). We also agree with the district court's observation that Continental is hardly a neophyte in these matters; with multi-million dollar exposure, Continental could monitor the litigation through its own attorneys and assure itself that Aetna was living up to its responsibilities as a primary insurer. It seems clear to us, therefore, that the Connecticut Supreme Court would not find the primary or direct purpose of the transaction was to benefit the third party. Krawczyk, 208 Conn. at 245, 543 A.2d at 735; see Valentine v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 583, 584 n. 1 (6th Cir.1980) (direct duty between excess insurer and primary carrier difficult to conceptualize since there was no contract relation between them.... Formulating a direct duty from [attorney retained by primary insurer] to [excess insurer] is even more difficult.).