Opinion ID: 2331585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: The District's Choice of Law Principles

Text: In determining which jurisdiction's law will apply to substantive issues, District of Columbia courts use a government interest analysis which requires first a court evaluation of the governmental policies underlying the applicable conflicting laws and then a determination as to which jurisdiction's policy would be most advanced by having its law applied to the facts of the case. See Felch v. Air Florida, Inc., 275 U.S.App. D.C. 403, 866 F.2d 1521, 1523 (1989) (citing Williams v. Williams, 390 A.2d 4, 5-6 (D.C.1978)). See also Stutsman v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 546 A.2d 367, 372 (D.C.1988); Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Rest., Inc., 534 A.2d 1268, 1270-71 (D.C.1987); Gaither v. Myers, 131 U.S.App. D.C. 216, 404 F.2d 216, 222-24 (1968). When the policy of one state would be advanced by application of its law, and that of another state would not be advanced by application of its law, a false conflict appears and the law of the interested state prevails. Where each state would have an interest in the application of its own law to the facts, a true conflict exists and the law of the jurisdiction with the stronger interest will apply. Biscoe v. Arlington County, 238 U.S.App. D.C. 206, 738 F.2d 1352, 1360 (1984) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159, 105 S.Ct. 909, 83 L.Ed.2d 923 (1985). Using this analysis, this Court applies another state's law when (1) [the other state's] interest in the litigation is substantial, and (2) `application of District of Columbia law would frustrate the clearly articulated public policy of that state.' Herbert, supra, 808 A.2d at 779 (citing Kaiser-Georgetown Cmty. v. Stutsman, 491 A.2d 502, 509 (D.C.1985)). In an effort to avoid creating a ready means of producing fraud and injustice, Imirie v. Imirie, 100 U.S.App. D.C. 371, 372, 246 F.2d 652, 653 (1957), the District of Columbia presumes that a joint account opened by an individual for himself and another, where the individual who opened the account provided all the funds therein deposited, was opened for the convenience of the decedent-depositor. Davis v. Altmann, 492 A.2d 884, 885 (D.C.1985). This presumption holds true even where the printed bank cards signed by both parties recite a right of survivorship. Imirie, supra, 100 U.S.App. D.C. at 372, 246 F.2d at 653. In contrast, Virginia, in a departure from its common law, has created statutory presumptions that (1) sums of money on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving party... as against the estate ... unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created, VA. CODE ANN. ง 6.1-125-5.A (2002), and (2) any joint tenancy of real or personal property functions as a tenancy in common upon the death of one of the tenants. VA. CODE ANN. ง 55-20. [11] This last section does not apply, however, when it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument ... that it was intended the part of the one dying should then belong to the others. VA. CODE. ANN. ง 55-21 (2002). Both ง 55-20 and ง 55-21 have been held to apply to investment accounts. [12] Buck v. Jordan, 256 Va. 535, 508 S.E.2d 880, 883 (1998). Thus, while Virginia starts with a presumption of either joint tenancy with survivorship (for cash in bank accounts) or tenancy in common (for property and brokerage accounts), it is willing to look at the language of the forms creating the account and surrounding circumstances to determine whether the decedent-depositor intended a joint account with right of survivorship. Virginia did this to meet the expectations of parties signing the forms to create a joint account (when those forms include survivorship language), [13] create consistency in its law, and protect its financial institutions. [14] Since there is a clear conflict between the public policies of the two jurisdictions, and since both jurisdictions have an interest in applying their law to the facts in this case, a true conflict exists and the law of the jurisdiction with the stronger interest will apply. Biscoe, supra, 238 U.S.App. D.C. at 214, 738 F.2d at 1360 (footnote omitted). The District has a strong interest in preventing fraud and injustice, Imirie, supra, 100 U.S.App. D.C. at 372, 246 F.2d at 653. Indeed, the public policy considerations for the presumption of a convenience account are of the highest magnitude. Davis v. Altmann, supra, 492 A.2d at 887. The District also has a strong interest in the orderly completion of probate for the estate of a decedent who is a domiciliary of the District. Virginia's interest is less pronounced since the expectation interests of the parties and the convenience of estate administration cannot readily be characterized as being of the highest magnitude. Indeed, the Virginia Code essentially acknowledges that Virginia's interest is weaker, because it releases Virginia's jurisdiction over property such as the two accounts here so long as certain procedures are followed. Under the Virginia Code, the administrator of a nonresident decedent's estate may claim stocks, bonds, securities, money or tangible personal property located in Virginia after following notification procedures. VA. CODE ANN. ง 64.1-130 (2002). On balance, then, the District's interests are substantially stronger, and its law governs. Biscoe, supra, 238 U.S.App. D.C. at 214, 738 F.2d at 1360 (footnote omitted). The trial court was correct in applying District of Columbia law to determine whether or not the accounts were part of the estate.