Opinion ID: 1522122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c) as Applied to Defendant

Text: Defendant claims that the facts of this case cannot be fit within aggravating factor c(4)(c); that any valid construction of that factor would not allow a reasonable person to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. [68] He also contends that, in any event, the trial court's instructions on this issue were so ambiguous and confusing as to leave the jury, in effect, uninstructed. The ultimate result, according to defendant, was that the jury was left free, arbitrarily and capriciously, to find or not to find that this factor had been proved, precisely the situation that was condemned in Furman v. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed. 2d 346. We disagree with defendant's contention that the facts of this case cannot fit within Section c(4)(c) properly defined. And while we agree that the instructions to the jury may have been inadequate to guide its deliberations, we find it unnecessary, in view of our decision to reverse on other grounds (see VI(F) infra at 299-300), to decide whether this deficiency also warrants reversal. We consider the claim, nevertheless, for the purpose of guidance in other cases. As noted above, we have interpreted aggravating factor c(4)(c) to require a showing by the State that defendant purposely caused severe mental or physical pain or suffering to the victim prior to death. [69] No better demonstration of the fit between that definition of the aggravating factor and the facts of this case can be found than the statement by the trial court in the course of colloquy with counsel (outside of the presence of the jury): I've also considered the aggravated battery upon the victim by the defendant. Again, there was plainly a disfigurement, there was a brutal attack upon the victim consisting of many stab wounds. The defendant then left the scene and walked across the street. The victim was still alive. Defendant according to the witnesses calmly returned. The victim knew she was dying and so stated at the time. She was plainly conscious. The fact that the defendant while the victim was alive threatened to kill her grandchildren if he could find them, the fact that the killing occurred in the presence of the grandchildren and the fact that after making this threat, probably the worst threat that could possibly be made to a dying person, the victim was executed. There is a saying with regard to those who are in the armed forces that the worst they can do is kill you. That really isn't true. The worst thing they can do is while you are dying and knowing you are dying they can destroy your claim to immortality, your children or grandchildren and in effect that is the evidence presented by the State in this case. Were it not for the threat which was clearly testified to by at least one witness, were it not for the fact that the killing occurred in the presence of the grandchildren, were it not for the fact the victim was still alive knowing she was going to die, were it not for the fact there was some lapse of time, however brief, when the defendant left the scene and returned to execute the victim, perhaps the matter would not be presented to the jury in the way it has been presented but I can think of no greater cause for mental anguish. I can think of no greater brutality than to threaten the victim as she lay dying with the intent to kill the grandchildren. Even if State [v.] Reyes [50 N.J. 454 (1967)] were not applicable in this case and that a greater burden were required, I believe that the factual pattern presented here as disclosed by me and more importantly as presented by the evidence would plainly fall within the aggravating factor. Of course, the truth of that evidence is an issue of fact for the jury. I make no finding in that regard. All I conclude at this point is that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict finding the aggravating factor present under the evidence submitted by the Prosecutor. Put differently, from these facts a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ramseur, in addition to purposely killing the victim, also purposely inflicted severe mental pain prior to her death. In its instructions to the jury the trial court noted that the aggravating factor here involved does not exist with respect to every purposeful or knowing killing. The court then gave the essence of the factor by telling the jury that in order to find it you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant inflicted upon the victim brutal and agonizing mental and bodily harm before death. That summary comes quite close to our definition and, were it standing alone, might be adequate with but little revision (although we do not require a finding of both mental and physical harm). The court also, however, defined depravity of mind (that mental state which leads a murder[er] to torture or commit an aggravated battery upon the victim before committing the crime of murder); and then aggravated battery (purposely causes bodily harm to another by depriving him or her of the member of his or her body or by rendering a member of his or her body useless or by seriously disfiguring his or her body or a member thereof). The court then defined serious bodily injury, presumably referring to the bodily harm previously mentioned: [t]hat term can be defined as bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. The injuries need not be permanent, but they must nevertheless be substantial rather than superficial. Thereafter the court told the jury that the aggravated battery must not be the cause of the death of the victim, it must occur prior to the death and be independent of the cause of death. The court further instructed that [t]orture occurs when a victim is subjected to serious physical or mental abuse before death, and [i]nsofar as aggravated battery and torture are concerned, only acts and conduct occurring prior to death may be considered in determining whether this aggravating factor is present. While it is possible that the jury understood the essence of this aggravating factor in the same way as we have defined it, the potential for confusion in the above charge is apparent. After quoting the statute, the trial court never referred to the function, or lack of function, of the introductory language  that the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman ...; it is possible that the jury, confused by the balance of the charge, simply concluded that the murder was either vile, horrible or inhuman and that the aggravating factor was therefore proven. As to what constituted an aggravated battery the jury would wonder whether the injuries depriv[ed the victim] of a member of his or her body, or whether the injuries rendered such member useless. The only portion of the charge that might appear to the jury related to the facts was the definition that linked aggravated battery to a serious disfigurement, although there was no real proof of that other than the stab wound to the face, nor any proof of any loss of a member or use of a member. A further instruction suggested either an independent meaning or an added condition to finding serious bodily injury, the phrase that the court equated with aggravated battery. This additional definition was that serious bodily injury creates a substantial risk of death or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. But there was no testimony of this either except the obvious fact that the injuries did cause death. The confusion here is caused substantially by the extent to which the definitions were unrelated to the evidence, for instance, [t]he injuries need not be permanent, but they must nevertheless be substantial rather than superficial. There had been no testimony concerning whether the injuries were permanent, or whether they were substantial rather than superficial. The instruction that the aggravated battery must not be the cause of the death of the victim, it must occur prior to the death and be independent of the cause of death is perplexing. There was no testimony that any of the injuries inflicted upon the victim were independent of the cause of death. If the law required such a finding, the aggravated battery issue probably should not have been submitted to the jury. The only possible claim that the defendant inflicted injury upon the victim independent of the cause of death would be his statement, made while the victim was still alive, that he would kill her children in the future, but that of course was not an aggravated battery. The jury might have understood this as torture, but the trial court was not defining torture when it specified that the aggravated battery must be independent of the cause of death. It is clear that the trial court's instruction was patterned largely after the decision in State v. Bass, supra, 189 N.J. Super. 445, which in turn followed the United States Supreme Court decisions in Gregg, supra, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed. 2d 859, and Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed. 2d 398. While it is possible that the charge was beneficial, even possible that it unduly favored defendant, it seems clear that the charge was confusing and lacking in the clarity necessary to satisfy the requirement of Gregg, supra, 428 U.S. at 192-93, 96 S.Ct. at 2934, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 885, that the jury's discretion be rationally channeled. What was needed was a relatively simple charge patterned after our definition. Assuming the State claimed defendant's acts fell within Section c(4)(c) as involving either torture or an aggravated battery, the trial court could have instructed the jury as follows: The State claims the killing of Ms. Stokes involved torture or an aggravated battery, or both. If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that it did, then your answer shall be yes to that question on the jury sheet: That this murder involved torture or an aggravated battery to the victim. I charge you that in order to find that the killing involved an aggravated battery, you must find that defendant had as his purpose more than just killing Ms. Stokes, that additionally it was his purpose to cause her severe physical pain, and you must find that he achieved that goal, that she did in fact suffer the severe physical pain he intended before her death. In other words, in order to find that the killing involved an aggravated battery, you must find two facts: first, that defendant wanted to cause Ms. Stokes severe physical pain before death, and second, that in fact she suffered that severe physical pain as he intended, in other words, he succeeded in his goal. The State also claims that in the killing of Ms. Stokes defendant tortured her, and that aggravating factor c(4)(c) has been proven in that regard as well. I charge you that in order to find that the killing involved torture, you must find that defendant had as his purpose more than just killing Ms. Stokes, that in addition it was his purpose to cause her severe psychological pain before her death, and that he achieved that goal, that she did in fact suffer the severe psychological pain he intended before her death. In other words, in order to find that the killing involved torture, you must find two facts: first, that defendant wanted to cause Ms. Stokes severe psychological pain before death, and second, that in fact she suffered that severe psychological pain as he intended, in other words, he succeeded in his goal. These instructions should also obviously contain directions to the jury to consider all of the circumstances of the matter in determining defendant's intent, that it is unusual for a defendant to state what his intent may have been, and that his state of mind can be determined only from the circumstances. We intend no criticism of the trial court. We note, as we did supra at 155, that this was among the first cases tried under the Act, and that the trial court was without any guidance on the construction of this aggravating factor.