Opinion ID: 2566207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the PDA Requires a Penalty for Each Record

Text: Yousoufian asserts that under the plain meaning of the PDA's penalty provision, the trial court is required to assess penalties for each public record that is requested. The county responds that the penalty provision is ambiguous and that an interpretation of the statute requiring penalties for every record would lead to absurd results contrary to the spirit of the PDA. The Court of Appeals agreed with the county, on this issue, stating, [t]he literal meaning of RCW 42.17.340(4) contemplates a penalty for each day a record request is unlawfully denied; the statute does not require the penalty to be multiplied by the number of records responsive to a single request. Yousoufian, 114 Wash.App. at 848, 60 P.3d 667. Before reaching the core of Yousoufian's argument on this issue, we must first determine whether the trial court is obligated to award a penalty at all. If the trial court is not required to award a penalty, then it follows that the trial court need not award a penalty for each requested record. In Lindberg v. Kitsap County, 133 Wash.2d 729, 746-47, 948 P.2d 805 (1997), we upheld a trial court's order awarding $1,100 as `a combination of attorney fees and ... [an] award of some penalties.' Pursuant to RCW 42.17.340(4), the trial court designated $507.70 as the penalty award but failed to explain the basis for this amount. Although the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in refusing to assess the statutory minimum penalty for each day the records were wrongfully withheld, we concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the penalty. Four justices of this court dissented, believing that a remand was necessary so that the trial court could determine the number of days that the records were wrongfully withheld and assess a penalty between $5 and $100 for each of those days. In Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wash.2d 25, 37, 929 P.2d 389 (1997), however, we unanimously determined that an agency violated the PDA, and therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to a statutory penalty for each day the requested report was wrongfully withheld. We reasoned that when an agency erroneously denies a public record and a party has prevailed against the agency in obtaining a copy of the public record an award is warranted. Id. The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of an award not less than $5 and not more than $100 for each day the report has been withheld. Id. In Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136 Wash.2d 595, 617, 963 P.2d 869 (1998), we reaffirmed Amren, stating, [w]e have interpreted [RCW 42.17.340(4)] to entitle a requester to an award if an agency erroneously denies disclosure of a public record. (Emphasis added.) In Sheehan, the Court of Appeals was faced with the conflicting decisions of Lindberg and Amren when it was asked to decide if penalties are mandatory under the PDA. After a lengthy analysis of both cases and the legislative history of RCW 42.17.340(4), the Sheehan court determined that Lindberg was wrongly decided. Critical to the court's determination was its observation that in 1992, the legislature amended the pertinent sections of RCW 42.17.340. Prior to the 1992 amendment, the statute provided that it shall be within the discretion of the court to award such person an amount not to exceed twenty-five dollars for each day that he was denied the right to inspect or copy said public record. Former RCW 42.17.340(3) (1987). In 1992, however, the statute was amended to provide that it shall be within the discretion of the court to award such person an amount not less than five dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars for each day that he was denied the right to inspect or copy said public record. LAWS of 1992, ch. 139, 8 (emphasis added). The Sheehan court determined that by so amending the statute, the legislature limited trial court discretion, so that a penalty of at least $5 per day is now mandatory where an agency erroneously withholds a public record. Sheehan, 114 Wash.App. at 355, 57 P.3d 307. We agree with the Sheehan courts resolution of this issue. The PDA plainly states that the trial court has discretion in setting the penalty at not less than $5 but not more than $100. If the trial court refuses to assess any penalty, then it is setting the penalty at less than $5, which is contrary to the unambiguous language used in RCW 42.17.340(4). As stated in Sheehan, the legislature limited the trial courts discretion by amending RCW 42.17.340 in 1992 to set a minimum penalty, which the trial court must assess, if the agency is found to have violated the PDA. Having determined that the trial court must award penalties when the PDA is violated, we must now decide whether the trial court is required to award a penalty for each requested record. Although RCW 42.17.340(4) states that penalties are assessed for each day that [the plaintiff] was denied the right to inspect or copy said public record, the definitions section of the PDA provides that [a]s used in this chapter, the singular shall take the plural and any gender, the other, as the context requires. RCW 42.17.020. We have held that [a] statute is ambiguous if it can be reasonably interpreted in more than one way. Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Govt v. Wash. State Boundary Review Bd., 127 Wash.2d 759, 771, 903 P.2d 953 (1995). RCW 42.17.340(4) is, in our view, ambiguous. We say that because we are instructed by the PDAs definitions section to interpret terms as either singular or plural as the context requires. If the term record is interpreted as record, then the plain meaning would suggest that courts should assess penalties for every record that is requested. However, if the term is interpreted as records, then the plain meaning would suggest that courts should assess penalties only for each request regardless of the number of records sought. When a statute is ambiguous, this court will resort to principles of statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law to assist in interpreting it. State v. Watson, 146 Wash.2d 947, 955, 51 P.3d 66 (2002). Moreover, [w]hen construing a statute, the court must ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Shoreline Cmty. College Dist. No. 7 v. Employment Sec. Dept., 120 Wash.2d 394, 405, 842 P.2d 938 (1992). Both parties agree that there is only one case in which this issue is discussed, Lindberg v. Kitsap County, 82 Wash.App. 566, 919 P.2d 89 (1996), revd, 133 Wash.2d 729, 948 P.2d 805 (1997). In Lindberg, the Court of Appeals considered the phrase said public record as used in RCW 42.17.340(4), and it stated, [t]he statutory use of singular phrasing is significant. Lindberg, 82 Wash.App. at 575, 919 P.2d 89. The court then remanded for the trial court to award a statutory penalty award for each record [the plaintiffs] requested. Id. As noted above, we later reversed the Court of Appeals decision to remand the case to the trial court because we concluded that it was unnecessary to determine the number of days that the documents were wrongfully withheld. Lindberg, 133 Wash.2d at 747, 948 P.2d 805. The Court of Appeals decision in Lindberg is not helpful here because its determination that penalties are based on each record was not affirmed by this court. However, our decision in Lindberg is also unhelpful because it was based on our conclusion that the trial court did not need to award a penalty at all. Thus, the only prior case interpreting the term record provides little assistance in determining the issue presented to us here. Both parties ask us to consider legislative intent. Yousoufian argues that given that a liberal construction is mandated for purposes of assessing penalties, it stands to reason that each record requested, when improperly withheld, will result in a discrete penalty. Br. of Appellant at 37. The county responds that the legislature did not intend to require penalties for each record because this would create a windfall only for individuals who make a voluminous request and do nothing to encourage disclosure for reasonable requests. Suppl. Br. of Respts at 11. The Court of Appeals agreed with the county, reasoning that [u]nder Yousoufians interpretation, agencies that acted in good faith but failed to respond adequately to broad requests for multiple documents would often pay higher penalties than agencies that refused to disclose a single document in bad faith. Yousoufian, 114 Wash.App. at 848, 60 P.3d 667. The PDA provides, in pertinent part, that [t]he provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to promote ... full access to public records so as to assure continuing public confidence of fairness of elections and governmental processes. RCW 42.17.010. We have stated that RCW 42.17.340(4) is a penalty to enforce the strong public policies underlying the public disclosure act. Amren, 131 Wash.2d at 35-36, 929 P.2d 389. And [w]hen determining the amount of the penalty to be imposed the existence or absence of [an] agency's bad faith is the principal factor which the trial court must consider. Id. at 37-38, 929 P.2d 389 (second emphasis omitted) (quoting Yacobellis v. City of Bellingham, 64 Wash.App. 295, 303, 825 P.2d 324 (1992)). Although the PDAs purpose is to promote access to public records, this purpose is better served by increasing the penalty based on an agency's culpability than it is by basing the penalty on the size of the plaintiffs request. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the legislature intended to authorize a penalty that Yousoufian once estimated at between $1,534,855 and $30,697,100, considering that the county did not act in bad faith. Therefore, based on the ambiguity of the statute and the purpose for enacting the PDA, we conclude that RCW 42.17.340(4) does not require [9] the assessment of per day penalties for each requested record. [10]