Opinion ID: 1199801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal of an Instruction on Intent to Kill as an Element of the Felony-murder Special Circumstance

Text: (22) The felony-murder special circumstance covers the situation in which the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit certain enumerated felonies, including rape. (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(iii).) The felony-murder special circumstance is generally similar to felony murder. (3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra, Punishment for Crime, § 1582, pp. 1886-1887.) Two comments, however, should be made. The first relates to independent felonious purpose. The felony-murder special circumstance requires that the defendant [must] commit[] the act resulting in death in order to advance an independent felonious purpose. ( People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 850 [254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460].) The second  which is of direct concern here  relates to intent to kill. In Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 153-154 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862] (hereafter Carlos ), we concluded in substance that intent to kill is an element of the felony-murder special circumstance. In People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 (hereafter Anderson ), we overruled Carlos and held to the contrary. But when, as here, the felony-murder special circumstance is alleged to have occurred after Carlos and before Anderson, the former governs. ( People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 981.) (23) The court generally instructed the jury on the felony-murder-rape special circumstance alleged in this case. In most respects, it did so properly. Under the erroneous belief that Anderson controlled and not Carlos, however, it refused to instruct on the element of intent to kill. But in an evident attempt to cure error or avoid prejudice in the event that its view proved to be unsound, it effectively instructed the jury, if it found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Hildreth, to determine whether he killed her intentionally. As noted, the jury subsequently so found. Defendant contends that the court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on intent to kill as an element of the felony-murder-rape special circumstance alleged in this case. The standard of review for a claim of instructional error of this kind is de novo: the question is one of law, involving as it does the determination of the applicable legal principles (see People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 985 [232 Cal. Rptr. 110, 728 P.2d 180]). After independent scrutiny, we conclude that the court did indeed err. As stated, Carlos governs here. Under Carlos, intent to kill is an element of the felony-murder special circumstance. Pursuant to Carlos, the court should have so instructed. Its refusal to do so was error under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (See People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 412 [247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184]; People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 552 [205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 684 P.2d 826].) We further conclude, however, that the error does not require reversal. The erroneous omission of the element of intent to kill is not automatically reversible but rather is subject to harmless-error analysis under the reasonable doubt standard for federal constitutional error laid down in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824]. (See generally, People v. Odle, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 410-415.) In our view, it is not prejudicial on the facts of this case. When, as here, under proper instructions the jury necessarily and soundly makes a finding adverse to the defendant on an issue erroneously omitted from the instructions  in this case, intent to kill  there is no prejudice arising from the omission. ( People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 371-372 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Defendant argues to the contrary, attacking both our analysis and our conclusion. He is unpersuasive. His assertion, among others, that the jury's intentional-killing finding is ineffective for present purposes because it was allegedly not made in the context of felony-murder or the special circumstance, and did not specify that he had the intent to kill concurrent with any sexual assault or sexual activity, is altogether lacking in merit. Neither context nor concurrence is of any consequence here. Notwithstanding what appears to be his assumption, the felony-murder special circumstance does not require a strict causal or temporal relationship between the felony and the murder. Indeed, as noted, it extends even to the situation in which the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in ... the immediate flight after committing the felony. (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(iii), italics added.) Plainly, it does not necessitate the simultaneity that defendant demands. [16]