Opinion ID: 2520945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State Personnel Bd.

Text: We discuss State Personnel Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d 422, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354, because the shortcomings of the Civil Service Act (§ 18500 et seq.) discussed in that case (as compared to the FEHA), are equally present with respect to the shortcomings of the City Charter at issue in this case. The main issue in State Personnel Bd. was whether the Department may exercise jurisdiction under the FEHA over state employees who are also protected under the antidiscrimination provisions of the Civil Service Act. (§ 19702, subd. (a).) We concluded that the Legislature made a choice to afford both the remedies of the [state] Civil Service Act and the FEHA to members of the state civil service.... ( State Personnel Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 435, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354.) In reaching this conclusion, we recognized some fundamental differences between the rights given to a discrimination complainant under the FEHA and under the Civil Service Act. It is important to note that the plurality decision in State Personnel Bd. did not reach the issue whether state employees would have to exhaust their remedies under the Civil Service Act in order to assert an FEHA claim. The court merely held that the Department may exercise jurisdiction over state employees. ( Id. at pp. 432-434, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354.) State Personnel Bd. observed, The [Department] provides enforcement services to discrimination complainants that do not have a counterpart in the civil service system. Under the FEHA, the Department bears the expense of investigating, conciliating and, where necessary, prosecuting the action on behalf of the claimant. (§§ 12961-12963, 12963.1-12963.7.) This includes the services of an attorney from the Department to try the case at no expense to the claimant. (§ 12969.) If the Commission decides in the claimant's favor, the Department must thereafter conduct a compliance review to see that the employer is fully obeying the Commission's order. (§ 12973.) ( State Personnel Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 432, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354.) These enforcement services are not available under the Civil Service Act. Appeals filed with the [State Personnel] Board are initially investigated and conciliated not by a neutral, outside agency like the [Department], but by the same state agency (the employer) that is charged with discrimination. (See Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 2, §§ 547.1-547.2.) ... Moreover, while complainants may hire an attorney to represent them at a Board hearing (Cal.Admin.Code, tit.2, § 73), they must bear the cost themselves. ( State Personnel Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 432, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354.) Similarly, under both former section 112 1/2 of title IX and current article X, section 1017 of the City Charter, the City is both the party accused of wrongdoing and the party charged with investigating the wrongdoing. No provision is made in the City Charter for the appointment of an attorney at no cost to the employee. The procedural rights afforded under the FEHA are also quite different from [State Personnel] Board procedures. Beginning with the filing of a complaint, the Board's internal rules require that appeal from an adverse employment decision be filed within 30 days (Board rule 64), whereas the FEHA provides a period of one year in which to file. (§ 12960.) Next, complainants under the FEHA have a private right of action in superior court  a right not afforded by the Civil Service Act. (§ 12965, subd. (b).) If their case is tried before the [Commission] instead of in superior court, and an adverse decision is reached, the superior court will independently review the evidence rather than deferring to the [Commission]'s adverse decision. [Citations.] By contrast, in reviewing Board decisions the superior court is restricted to a `substantial evidence' standard of review under which `[f]actual determinations are not subject to reexamination in a trial de novo, but are to be upheld by a reviewing court if they are supported by substantial evidence.' [Citation.] ( State Personnel Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d. at pp. 432-433, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354, fn. omitted.) The City Charter at issue here was drafted by a board of freeholders in 1924. (Ann. City Charter (1973 ed.) p. iii.) The voters ratified the charter in January 1925, and it took effect on July 1, 1925. ( Ibid. ) Section 112 1/2 was added to the charter on April 4, 1937, and became effective April 29, 1937. ( Ibid. ) The charter focused on the remedies of compensation and reinstatement only, and required those claims to be presented in writing within ninety days following the date on which it is claimed that such person was first illegally, wrongfully or invalidly laid off, suspended or discharged (City Charter, former art. IX, § 112 1/2), a period substantially shorter than the one year afforded to FEHA complainants. Practically speaking, this means that the City's Board of Civil Service Commissioners would hear the matter before the Department would. The court reviewing a petition for writ of administrative mandamus would give deference to the findings of the City's board. If the reviewing court upheld the City board's decision, its findings would then be res judicata on any claims filed after the Department issued a right to sue letter. If so, aggrieved employees would not have had the chance to develop their cases (through adequate discovery, presentation of evidence, and cross-examination, rights not guaranteed at the City's hearing) to the extent the Legislature intended. In State Personnel Bd., we emphasized that [t]he most fundamental difference between the two forums ... is the nature of the forums themselves. The [Commission] is a neutral body, disinterested in the controversy between employer and employee. By contrast, where [State Personnel] Board standards are challenged as discriminatory, the Board occupies the roles of both defendant and judge. Internal review of challenged standards is a healthy endeavor for any agency, and the Board should not be deprived of this opportunity. However, the Legislature has provided for more than this for state, [city and private] employees [alike]. It has provided for review of allegedly discriminatory standards by an independent adjudicatory body  the [Commission]. ( State Personnel Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 434, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354, fn. omitted.) Requiring City's employees to pursue remedies under both the City Charter and through the Department would frustrate the Legislature's intent. State Personnel Bd. emphasized that The Legislature's intent was to give public employees the same tools in the battle against employment discrimination that are available to private employees. The FEHA was meant to supplement, not supplant or be supplanted by existing antidiscrimination remedies, in order to give employees the maximum opportunity to vindicate their civil rights against discrimination. ... [3] ( State Personnel Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 431, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354, italics added.) The court reasoned that given the differences between the two statutory schemes, the Legislature's desire to include state employees within the purview of the FEHA, notwithstanding their coverage by the antidiscrimination provisions of the Civil Service Act, is understandable. The procedures, protections and enforcement services available to discrimination claimants under the FEHA go beyond those available under the Civil Service Act. ( State Personnel Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 431, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354, fn. omitted.) The court concluded that state employees should be able to choose between pursuing their claims under the FEHA or under other statutes that cover similar ground, but do not afford similar procedures, remedies and protections. ( Ibid. )