Opinion ID: 2273949
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Conflicting Delaware Cases

Text: In Beyea's Estate, Judge Speakman of the Orphan's Court held that a promissory note with the word Seal printed to the right of in line with the signature on the note was an instrument under seal. [28] The note did not contain a testimonium clause and there was no reference to the parties' intention to render the note a sealed instrument in the body. [29] In holding the note a sealed instrument, Judge Speakman reiterated Delaware's common law doctrine of sealed instruments: [I]t has been a matter of general and common knowledge in this State for many years past that usage and custom has sanctioned the use of printed forms of notes and other contracts with the word Seal printed on the form immediately to the right of the place intended for the signature, and that when such a printed form is used for the purpose for which it was intended, and is signed to the left of and in line with the printed word Seal, upon the delivery of the executed obligation for or on behalf of the maker to the person for whom it was intended, or to his authorized agent, the character of the obligation of the maker is that of an obligation or contract under seal, irrespective of whether there is any indication in the body of the obligation itself that it was intended to be a sealed instrument. [30] Accordingly, in Beyea's Estate, the court held that bank-held promissory notes were under seal, based solely on the placement of the word seal to the right of the signatures. [31] In American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Harris Corp., [32] the Superior Court held that for an instrument other than a mortgage to be under seal, `... it must contain language in the body of the contract, a recital affixing the seal, and extrinsic evidence showing the parties' intent to conclude a sealed contract. ...' [33] The only evidence of the parties' intent to create a contract under seal in Harris  the presence of corporate seals and the word seal on the signature page of the license agreement at issue  was insufficient as a matter of law to show that the agreement was a specialty contract. [34]