Opinion ID: 2582159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The superior court properly refused to dismiss MEA's debt management claim (fifth cause of action) based on the doctrines of primary agency jurisdiction, comity, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

Text: Even though Chugach prevailed on summary judgment, it argues that the superior court erred by denying its motion to dismiss MEA's claim related to its debt management practices. Chugach argues that dismissal was appropriate on the grounds of primary agency jurisdiction, comity and abstention, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. [12] Chugach's arguments on these issues are based on its mistaken belief that the Commission dismissed MEA's regulatory complaint because it reached the substantive merits of Chugach's debt management practices, and found them reasonable. [13] But the Commission did not reach any such conclusion; it simply exercised its discretion to dismiss MEA's complaint without reaching its merits. The Commission stated that it was convinced that although there is ample room for argument on the merits of competing financial management strategies, it is not in the public interest at this time to devote the resources required on the part of the Commission or the competing utilities to initiate an investigation. Because the Commission declined to exercise its jurisdiction to hear this complaint, the superior court properly declined to dismiss the suit on these grounds. a. The Commission waived its primary agency jurisdiction. Chugach argues that the superior court should have dismissed or stayed MEA's claim that Chugach's debt management practices violated the Agreement's prudent utility practices requirement because the Commission has primary jurisdiction over the claim. We disagree. In Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. City of Anchorage, [14] we stated that the doctrine of primary agency jurisdiction provides that a court may, in appropriate cases, stay or dismiss pending litigation so as to enable a proper agency to initially pass upon an aspect of the case calling for administrative expertise. [15] This generally occurs [w]hen a case raises questions of fact not within the ordinary experience of courts, or if the case requires the exercise of administrative discretion. [16] This doctrine is based on the need for an orderly and reasonable coordination of the work of agencies and courts, [17] which is generally best achieved when courts decline to rule on a subject peculiarly within the agency's specialized field without first taking into account what the agency has to offer. [18] The reasonableness of Chugach's financial management practices is clearly an issue within the Commission's area of expertise. [19] However, as the language of Greater Anchorage suggests, and as numerous courts have stated, the primary agency jurisdiction doctrine is one of prudence, and not an absolute jurisdictional limitation. [20] And when an agency has discretion to deny proceedings requested by the plaintiff and elects not to exercise this discretion, the court may decline to apply the doctrine. [21] The terms of the Agreement itself provide further support for the non-exclusivity of the Commission's jurisdiction. Part 9(f) states: The unavailability of relief from the Commission shall not act to deprive the reviewing court of authority to order any form of equitable remedy the court considers appropriate. In this case, the questions of whether Chugach failed to abide by prudent utility practices in its debt management practices, and the amount of damages caused by this failure, were initially presented to the Commission. The Commission declined to resolve these questions. Accordingly, although the doctrine of primary agency jurisdiction would normally apply to a case such as this one, we find that the Commission has waived its primary jurisdiction. b. The principle of comity is inapplicable. The Commission's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction over MEA's claim also renders moot Chugach's argument that the superior court erred by not deferring to the Commission under the principle of comity. [22] The doctrine of comity is one of deference and respect among tribunals of overlapping jurisdiction. [23] A question of comity arises when there is `tension ... between courts and/or agencies having concurrent jurisdiction over the same matter.' [24] In such cases, [t]he doctrine of comity teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter. [25] While it might have been proper for the superior court to refrain from adjudicating this claim between the filing (on February 8, 2000) and dismissal (on June 6, 2000) of MEA's similarly worded regulatory complaint, the principle of comity was not implicated, because the Commission subsequently declined to exercise its jurisdiction. The Commission had ample opportunity to pass upon the matter, and declined to do so. Following its dismissal of MEA's complaint, the Commission no longer had concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court, and the principle of comity was no longer relevant. c. MEA is excused from exhausting its administrative remedies. Chugach also argues that the superior court should have dismissed this claim because MEA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. A party must generally exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action challenging an agency decision; this allows the agency to apply its expertise and correct its own errors. [26] But this requirement may be excused where the attempt to exhaust administrative remedies is futile or severely impractical. [27] We have held the pursuit of administrative relief to be futile where an administrative body refuses to address a legal claim brought by a petitioner. [28] In this case, MEA brought its claim before the Commission, which dismissed the claim without adjudication. The exhaustion requirement is thus excused in this case. d. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are inapplicable. Finally, Chugach alleges that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude the relitigation of MEA's claim. Only where another tribunal has resolved a claim or issue on its substantive merits will the claim be precluded by res judicata [29] or the issue by collateral estoppel. [30] Because the Commission declined to exercise its discretionary power to investigate Chugach's debt management practices, and did not adjudicate the merits of MEA's regulatory complaint, these doctrines cannot bar the superior court from hearing this claim.