Opinion ID: 399011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bennett's Challenge

Text: 8 Bennett complains that he was misjoined with his co-indictees on dual grounds: first, the charge of conspiracy in Count One was multiplicitous and second, once the conspiracy charges against Mitchell and Marszalkowski were dismissed, his severance was mandatory. 9 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b) permits joinder of defendants in a single indictment where they are alleged to have participated in the same transaction or series of transactions. 2 For purposes of appellate review, the facts recited in an indictment are deemed true unless joinder is based on prosecutorial bad faith or improper legal interpretation. See United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Nims, 524 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 2646, 49 L.Ed.2d 385 (1976). 10 While making no allegation of bad faith, Bennett does contend that the indictment improperly charged multiple conspiracies. Bennett likens his indictment to that in United States v. Whitehead, 539 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1976), where the lone facts that the co-defendants Whitehead and Meredith lived in the same building and sold cocaine to the same buyer were insufficient grounds to support their joint indictment for distribution of the controlled substance. Although the two drug deals in Whitehead possessed the common denominator of defendant Jackson, who bought drugs from Whitehead in one deal and from Meredith in another, id. at 1025, no conspiracy was charged nor was any relationship whatsoever between Jackson and Meredith ever alleged. 539 F.2d at 1024, n.1. Under those circumstances, their separate, unrelated sales of cocaine could not possibly have formed part of the same transaction or series of transactions. Joinder, therefore, was impermissible, (s)ince the alleged criminal acts of Whitehead and Meredith were independent crimes, engaged in separately, without concert of purpose. 539 F.2d at 1023. 11 By contrast, evidence of Bennett's participation in a conspiracy reflects a common scheme supporting joinder. Bennett nevertheless protests that when he purchased cocaine from Brock at the apartment rented by Marzalkowski, the latter remained in the kitchen and that therefore, if anything, multiple unrelated conspiracies existed. A single conspiracy, however, may exist even if not all conspirators take part in all aspects of the scheme. See United States v. Ochoa, 609 F.2d 198, 202 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Alvarez, 625 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 2017, 68 L.Ed.2d 324 (1981). Certainly the introduction of evidence including Marszalkowski's presence in the apartment at the time Bennett purchased cocaine there from Brock; the rental of the apartment in her name; and the presence of drugs in what clearly was her dresser, by virtue of its containing women's clothing, provide the requisite connection between herself and Bennett. Accordingly, we find no merit in the appellant's claim of misjoinder on the ground of multiple conspiracies. 12 Moreover, the mere fact that a mistrial on the conspiracy charge was declared as to Marszalkowski does not detract from the legal adequacy of the conspiracy count. The general rule is that even acquittal of conspiracy does not of itself establish misjoinder. Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 80 S.Ct. 945, 4 L.Ed.2d 921 (1960); Cacy v. United States, 298 F.2d 227, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1961). Bennett's second claim, then, of retroactive misjoinder, which asserts that the dismissal of the conspiracy charge against Marszalkowski requires a finding of misjoinder, is similarly misplaced. 13 Bennett further contests the trial judge's denial of his motion for severance of his trial from co-defendant Marszalkowski on the grounds that the admission of certain evidence, consisting of narcotics, against Marszalkowski was prejudicial as to him. 14 Our analysis of this claim must begin with the accepted principle that defendants jointly indicted should be so tried. United States v. Sullivan, 578 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1978). An exception to this rule may be enforced where such joinder would cause the defendant undue prejudice. F.R.Cr.P. 14. 3 In determining a motion for severance brought on such grounds, the trial judge is empowered to exercise sound discretion in balancing possible prejudice to the defendant against governmental concern for judicial economy. United States v. Staller, 616 F.2d 1284, 1294 (5th Cir. 1980). Inherent in every joint trial is, of necessity, some degree of bias. Only in the event such prejudice appears to be compelling does severance become warranted. United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 65 (5th Cir. 1973). 15 The following test for assessing the existence of compelling prejudice has been adopted by this circuit: 16 '(w)hether under all the circumstances of the particular case, as a practical matter, it is within the capacity of the jurors to follow the court's admonitory instructions and accordingly to collate and appraise the independent evidence against each defendant solely upon that defendant's own acts, statements and conduct. In sum, can the jury keep separate the evidence that is relevant to each defendant and render a fair and impartial verdict as to him? If so, though the task be difficult, severance should not be granted.' 17 Tillman v. United States, 406 F.2d 930, 935 (5th Cir. 1969) (citing Peterson v. United States, 344 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1965)). See also United States v. Zicree, 605 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (5th Cir. 1979). 18 Viewed according to the foregoing standard, the trial of Bennett with Marszalkowski was fully proper. Bennett's claim of prejudice is addressed solely to the introduction at his joint trial of evidence consisting of 38 methaqualone tablets and several vials of cocaine, which Marszalkowski had possessed in her apartment. We note, however, that on this evidence, the jury was unable to reach a verdict regarding Marszalkowski's own involvement in a conspiracy; hence a mistrial was declared as to her on this count. Consequently, the court does not accept the appellants' unsubstantiated assertion that what was clearly not prejudicial even to the individual against whom it was introduced-Marszalkowski-could nevertheless have prejudiced Bennett. 19 Bennett argues additionally that the court erred in failing to caution the jury to consider those items only as against Marszalkowski. However, since it was Marszalkowski alone who was charged as to those particular items, jury confusion does not seem likely. Moreover, at the close of trial, the judge carefully instructed the jury to consider each offense and each defendant separately. 4 We conclude that this explicit caution sufficed to cure any possible confusion or prejudice in the minds of the jurors. See United States v. Johnston, 547 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 617, 620 (5th Cir. 1977).
Conspiracy 20 Bennett argues that declaration of mistrials as to Marszalkowski and Mitchell followed by the government's dismissal of their conspiracy indictment renders insufficient the evidence of his own participation in the alleged conspiracy. The crux of Bennett's claim is that once conspiracy charges against Marszalkowski and Mitchell were dismissed, no more than a single sales transaction was provable. He contends that the remaining evidence of a lone sale to him by Brock simply fails to support an inference of their joint conspiracy. Acknowledging that his co-defendant, Congote, was convicted of conspiracy at a separate trial, Bennett suggests, without foundation, that Congote's conviction related to a separate conspiracy. Bennett fails to recognize, however, the crucial principle that a declaration of mistrial is not equivalent to a factual determination. United States v. Nelson, 599 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ballard, 586 F.2d 1060, 1064-66 (5th Cir. 1978). The only prerequisites to a proper finding of the defendant's guilt are proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the conspiracy's existence; Bennett's knowledge of it; and his agreement to become a member. United States v. Suarez, 608 F.2d 584, 586 (5th Cir. 1979). We find that the totality of evidence supplies each of these elements of guilt. Bennett's reference to having contacted his people in order to supply the agents with cocaine; his accurate description of the cocaine package as football-shaped; his agreement to distribute one kilo of cocaine initially, to be followed by three more; his phone call to Brock, in which he discussed the delivery of three additional kilos and in which Brock indicated his complete familiarity with the proposed transaction, point to his and Brock's concert of action, all working together with a single design to accomplish a common purpose, United States v. Villareal, 565 F.2d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1978)-the distribution of cocaine for monetary gain. We therefore reject his assertion of insufficiency. Facilitation 21 Bennett launches a similar attack on the adequacy of the evidence supporting his conviction for use of a telephone to commit a felony. Since one phone call made by Bennett to Brock was initiated at the agents' behest, Bennett contends that it cannot form the basis for the facilitation count. This contention, while accurate, certainly is not dispositive, since it is not upon this particular phone call that the facilitation count is based. Rather, the charge is founded on other phone calls with Agent Brown, see R.Vol. VIII at 57; Supp.R. at 152, and with Brock regarding the drug deal, to which Bennett himself testified at trial, see R.Vol. IX at 316-320. United States v. Arias, 639 F.2d 1183, 1185-6 (5th Cir. 1981). 22 Accordingly, we find meritless the appellant Bennett's challenge of his conviction for facilitation of a felony.