Opinion ID: 1182206
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Punitive Damages and the Directed Verdict

Text: The question of whether the issue of punitive damages should go to the jury is somewhat complicated by the fact that the plaintiff must satisfy a burden of proof more onerous than a simple preponderance of the evidence. We faced an analogous question in Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., a libel case in which the plaintiff was required to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice, and adopted the following standard: the appropriate summary judgment question will be whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not. 150 Ariz. 476, 486, 724 P.2d 562, 572 (1986) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). We revisited Dombey in Orme School v. Reeves, noting that there are other civil contexts, including punitive damage cases, in which the plaintiff must establish one or more elements of its case by clear and convincing evidence, and that there was no reason to limit Dombey to first amendment cases. 166 Ariz. 301, 308, 802 P.2d 1000, 1007 (1990). [13] We continue to believe that the same standard is appropriate for punitive damage cases. We recognize that it is difficult for a court to determine whether a specific quantum of evidence is `clear and convincing' without evaluating and weighing that evidence, at least to some minimal extent. Orme School, 166 Ariz. at 308, 802 P.2d at 1007. Nevertheless, as with any motion for directed verdict or for summary judgment, [c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.... The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986), quoted with approval in Orme School, 166 Ariz. at 309-10, 802 P.2d at 1008-09; see also Borland v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 147 Ariz. 195, 200, 709 P.2d 552, 557 (Ct.App. 1985) (If there is a reasonable view of the evidence that will support punitive damages the question should be left to the jury.). We therefore hold that a motion for directed verdict or for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages must be denied if a reasonable jury could find the requisite evil mind by clear and convincing evidence. Conversely, the motion should be granted if no reasonable jury could find the requisite evil mind by clear and convincing evidence. Because in granting or denying such a motion the judge is not a fact finder, the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence should be construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Our review of the record in the instant case reveals several pieces of evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to Thompson, could give rise to reasonable inferences suggesting a high probability that Better-Bilt acted with an evil mind in discharging Thompson. [14] For example, a former low-level manager at Better-Bilt testified that a supervisor informed him and others present at several weekly management meetings that the company was having problems with employees getting injured and filing workers' compensation claims. That supervisor told them to write up any instance of poor job performance by injured employees so that such employees could be dismissed. R.T. Apr. 8, 1988, at 634-39. The jury was not bound to accept allegations that he did not take the statements seriously, see id. at 644-45, and the jury could have inferred that Better-Bilt deliberately pursued a policy of terminating workers who filed workers' compensation claims and that the company sought pretextual reasons to justify actions it knew to be wrong. In addition, Better-Bilt's personnel director did not contact Thompson to verify his voluntary termination; did not attempt to schedule him for an exit interview, which the company ordinarily conducted with departing employees as a matter of course; and did not inform him that he had been terminated until he went in a month later to pick up medical insurance forms, despite the fact that he testified he called in each Wednesday to update the company on the status of his disability. Thus, one could reasonably infer that Better-Bilt avoided informing Thompson of his non-existent voluntary termination to conceal or obfuscate the true reason for his discharge. Finally, several employees testified to having been voluntarily terminated under more or less comparable circumstances, suggesting that Thompson's termination was not an isolated incident but was part of a pattern or practice. While any single piece of evidence, taken alone, might not be clear and convincing evidence of an evil mind, several such pieces of evidence, taken together, might clear the evidentiary hurdle. See Gurule, 152 Ariz. at 602, 734 P.2d at 87. Because of the erroneous instructions, this case is being remanded for retrial of the wrongful termination claim. See ante note 2. Evidence is rarely identical on retrial, and this case is unlikely to prove an exception. Therefore, we make no hard and fast ruling on the question of whether the issue of punitive damages is to go to the jury. Suffice it to say that from the entire body of evidence in the present record, resolving all issues of credibility in favor of the plaintiffs, and allowing the plaintiffs all inferences that may legitimately be drawn from the evidence, it appears that a reasonable jury could reach the following conclusions: 1. Thompson did not indicate that he was quitting or desired to be terminated. 2. Better-Bilt was aware of this fact. 3. Better-Bilt had an informal policy of terminating persons on workers' compensation or medical leave, though the rationale behind such a policy is not apparent from the record.