Opinion ID: 2010647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Order of Dismissal

Text: On February 12, 2007, the trial court ordered this action [ ] dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.] See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6). To decide whether Solers sufficiently pled its claims for defamation and tortious interference, we look for guidance to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a), which sets forth the minimum requirements for pleading a claim for relief. Bolton v. Bernabei & Katz, PLLC, 954 A.2d 953, 963 (D.C. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). All that is required when we consider the sufficiency of the pleading is a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. The purpose of this statement is to give the defendant fair notice of what the [pleader's] claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.] Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). We conclude that the amended complaint sufficiently states claims for defamation and tortious interference under the fairly minimal pleading requirements of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a). [5] In order to state a claim of defamation, plaintiff must allege and prove four elements: (1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3) that the defendant's fault in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence; and (4) either that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm. Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C.2005) (quoting Crowley v. North Am. Telecomms. Ass'n, 691 A.2d 1169, 1173 n. 2 (D.C.1997)). Unlike some jurisdictions, which apply a heightened pleading rule to claims of defamation, we instead focus our inquiry on whether the factual allegations in the appellant's complaint are sufficient to permit the opposing party to form responsive pleadings, [since this is] the principal reason that some courts demand a heightened standard of pleading in defamation[] cases. Oparaugo, 884 A.2d at 76-77 (quoting Crowley, 691 A.2d at 1172) (internal editing and quotation marks omitted). As to the claim of tortious interference with prospective advantageous business opportunities, plaintiff must show that the interference was intentional and that there was resulting damage. Kreuzer, D.M.D. v. George Washington University, 896 A.2d 238, 247 (D.C.2006) (discussing the showing necessary to establish a prima facie case of interference with business relations) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); accord, NCRIC, Inc. v. Columbia Hospital for Women Medical Center, Inc., 957 A.2d 890, 897 (D.C.2008). Because the trial court's dismissal was based on its conclusion that Solers insufficiently pleaded harm, which is an essential element of both claims, our analysis will focus on that issue. During the April 28th hearing, the court expressed concern about, and questioned Solers extensively on, the sufficiency of its allegations of harm. Solers responded by amending its complaint to (1) identify itself as a for-profit corporation, (2) state that the false statements ... [imply] that its business ethics were improper and untrustworthy... [and that it] lacked fundamental financial integrity and honesty[,] and (3) allege that, as a result of Doe's actions, Solers has been deprived of its good commercial reputation, subject[ed] to contempt and... others within [its] industry [have been deterred] from dealing with it. The amended complaint also asserts that Doe's misconduct has caused cognizable harm in an amount to be proven at trial... [and] has caused damage to Solers' prospective advantageous business opportunities. This language alleges the type of harm that courts have required corporate plaintiffs to prove when pursuing these types of claims. See Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 244 U.S.App. D.C. 1, 6, 753 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1985) (a corporation suing for defamation ... may only recover actual damages in the form of lost profits); Southern Air Transport, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 670 F.Supp. 38, 41 (D.D.C.1987) ([D]efamation suits brought by corporations will lie when `the corporation is one for profit, and the matter tends to prejudice it in the conduct of its business or to deter others from dealing with it ....') (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 561(a) (1977)), aff'd, 278 U.S.App. D.C. 222, 877 F.2d 1010 (1989); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F.Supp. 947, 955 (D.D.C.1976) ([because a corporation] has no personal reputation [it] may be libeled only by imputation about its financial soundness or business ethics) (internal citations, quotation marks, and italics omitted). Solers has not yet proven harm, but that is not the question insofar as dismissal for failure to state a claim is concerned. See In re Curseen, 890 A.2d at 193 (The filing of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) does not call upon the plaintiff to offer his proof.). Our conclusion that the amended complaint satisfies the pleading requirements of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a) requires us to reverse the trial court's order of dismissal. [6]