Opinion ID: 2105000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: evidence of prior acts of sexual assault

Text: It is a well-settled rule that evidence of other acts is not admissible solely to prove a defendant's criminal disposition. See State v. Woodson, 551 A.2d 1187, 1193 (R.I. 1988); State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176, 179 (R.I. 1983); State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 624, 382 A.2d 526, 531 (1978); State v. Colangelo, 55 R.I. 170, 173, 179 A. 147, 149 (1935). However, this court has recognized certain exceptions to that rule. Evidence of other acts may be admissible if related to the charged conduct in a way that tends to establish guilty knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan, scheme, system, or the like. Woodson, 551 A.2d at 1193 (quoting State v. Beaulieu, 116 R.I. 575, 579, 359 A.2d 689, 691 (1976)). In cases involving sexual assault, this court expanded that list of exceptions to allow evidence of prior acts to show the defendant's lewd disposition or    intent. State v. Bernier, 491 A.2d 1000, 1004 (R.I. 1985) (quoting Jalette, 119 R.I. at 627, 382 A.2d at 533). Indeed, except when used purely to show a criminal predisposition, relevant evidence should not be excluded simply because it reveals the commission of an offense other than the one charged. Woodson, 551 A.2d at 1193 (citing People v. Kelley, 66 Cal.2d 232, 424 P.2d 947, 57 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1967), as adopted by Jalette, 119 R.I. at 627, 382 A.2d at 533). The defendant contends that the lewd disposition or intent exception for prior sexual misconduct first enunciated in Jalette is at odds with the general prohibition against the use of prior-acts evidence to establish defendant's criminal disposition and, more specifically, that Jalette and its progeny have been overruled by Rhode Island's adoption in 1987 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. The defendant correctly points out that the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence were intended by the drafters to track the Federal Rules of Evidence and that the rules utilize, in most instances, identical language. The defendant also states that federal jurisprudence has never recognized an exception for lewd disposition or the like similar to that created in Jalette. The defendant fails to note, however, that because of the nature of the offense, sexual-assault cases are rarely prosecuted in federal courts. See Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 404[11] at 404-83 (1989). Federal case law interpretating Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) in sexual-assault cases is relatively sparse compared to that in state courts. Id. A survey of other state jurisdictions reveals that there is in fact a strong line of authority, despite the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, recognizing a special exception for evidence of a defendant's disposition to commit sexual offenses. See Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 4:18 at 50 (1984); see also Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 404[11] at 404-83. In Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988), the Delaware Supreme Court engaged in an extensive analysis of the admissibility-of-other-acts evidence in sexual-assault cases. The court stated: A survey of other jurisdictions reveals that evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct has been admitted under two general, but sometimes overlapping, categories. The first consists of evidence which is admitted pursuant to one of the enumerated purposes found in    404(b). The most common of these purposes is the defendant's common plan or scheme to engage in sexual misconduct with the same victim or others of similar age or circumstances.    Other purposes for which evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct is offered include defendant's intent    or motive to commit the charged crime. The second category    consists of evidence which is admitted under a lustful disposition or sexual propensity exception to    404(b)'s general prohibition barring use of evidence for such purposes. This exception is almost universally recognized in cases involving proof of prior incestuous relations between the defendant and the complaining victim. Id. at 732. Rhode Island case law clearly falls into the second category of cases described by the Delaware Supreme Court. Although we recognize that our position has been subject to provocative critical comment, [1] we decline to abandon that position. In Jalette we stated that [w]e are extremely conscious that the indiscriminate use of `other crimes' evidence poses a substantial risk to an accused's right to a fair trial. Jalette, 119 R.I. at 627, 382 A.2d at 533. We further warned that such evidence should be sparingly used by the prosecution and only when reasonably necessary. Id. We advised the trial court to exclude such evidence if it is purely cumulative and reiterated the importance of the relevancy of the evidence in relation to the crime charged. Id. We discussed further the cautious manner in which this evidence should be presented to the jury and the judge's role in striking a proper balance between the compelling interests of both prosecutor and defendant. Id. at 628, 382 A.2d at 533-34. If the safeguards so carefully enunciated in our Jalette decision are strictly followed by trial justices, as we believe they have been thus far, we feel that a defendant will have his guilt or innocence determined by an impartial jury, free from the disruptive influences which accompany irrelevant, prejudicial, and extraneous evidence. Id. at 628, 382 A.2d at 534.