Opinion ID: 2589798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Alleged Briggs Instruction Error

Text: Defendant contends the trial court improperly emphasized the Governor's commutation power in violation of People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430. We disagree. In Ramos, this court held that portion of section 190.3 embodying what came to be known as the Briggs instruction was unconstitutional under state law. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 159, 207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430; cf. California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 [upholding same instruction against federal constitutional challenge].) This section provides that at the penalty phase [t]he trier of fact shall be instructed that a sentence of confinement to state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole may in [the] future after sentence is imposed, be commuted or modified to a sentence that includes the possibility of parole by the Governor of the State of California. Here, during voir dire, the trial court explained to the prospective jurors that it was the jury's responsibility, if the issue of penalty were reached, to make a choice between the penalty of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Out of concern that the subject of whether any penalty chosen would realistically be carried out would come up during jury deliberations, the court stated, [Y]ou must assume that if you sentence somebody ... [to] death, in due course that person will die.... Now, the Governor has the power to commute death sentences, but that's his problem; not yours. And there is no reason to believe that the Governor is going to decide that you were wrong. So don't look to anybody else to make any such decision. The buck stops here, and so if you serve on this jury, you must expect that you will make the decision which will be carried out. Now, the same thing has to be said of the penalty of life without possibility of parole. It means it. It means that a person who is so sentenced will die in prison, but not by the act of the state; rather of natural causes sooner or later. Now, it's also true that the Governor has the power to commute a sentence of life without possibility of parole. We had that penalty for one kind of offense or another for a good many years.... So far as I know, no Governor has ever commuted one of those sentences, and if you have been paying any attention to the politics, you can figure quite practically that the sentence means it. So those will be your choices, if you come to the issue, and you will bear the ultimate burden of making the choice. There is no thinking, `Oh well, somebody else will fix it.'... And so you can expect your decisions ultimately to be carried out, whichever they are. You do bear the ultimate responsibility. Following the trial court's statement to the first panel of prospective jurors, defendant moved for a mistrial based on the comments regarding the Governor's power to commute a sentence. The matter was revisited the next day, and the People at that time also requested a new jury panel. This request and the motion for a mistrial were denied. As can be seen, no Briggs instruction was given. As a preliminary matter, the instruction was given during voir dire, when the jury's attention is not narrowly focused on its duty to select a penalty, not at the end of the penalty phase. ( People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 918, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571.) More critically, the prospective jurors were expressly told they bore the final responsibility for deciding penalty, and that in doing so they should not consider the Governor's power to commute either a death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The jury, having been so advised, could not have been misled as to the nature and scope of the commutation power. ( People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 782, 251 Cal.Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260.) No error is evident.