Opinion ID: 1746896
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Deposition Issue.

Text: The court denied Weaver's pretrial application to take the deposition of the victim. His application for authority to take the deposition is unclear as to the basis for it; it simply stated: 3. There is an additional witness who is not listed in the minutes that possess[es] evidence both material and favorable to the defendant which is not merely cumulative. .... 6. The information sought by way of deposition cannot adequately be obtained by a bill of particulars or voluntary statements due to the fact that [the] witness's credibility is a major factor in the preparation of defense of this case. 7. It would be in the interest of justice considering the special circumstances herein for the witness to be deposed by the defendant. The statement in paragraph three of the application (that the proposed deponent was not listed as a witness in the minutes of testimony) suggests Weaver was relying on Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(2) under which a court may authorize the deposition of witnesses not listed in the minutes under special circumstances. However, Weaver does not expressly state in his application that rule 12 is the basis for his application. Nor does he mention any of the specific constitutional claims he now asserts. His attorney merely alluded to the United States Constitution in his oral argument in support of his application. Although we have serious reservations about Weaver's preservation of most of the arguments he now presents, we address the merits of his four assignments of error based on the court's refusal to order pretrial discovery of the victim. Weaver challenges the court's refusal to allow pretrial discovery on four bases: (1) Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, (2) the Compulsory Process Clause, (3) the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (4) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 12. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 allows for a criminal defendant to take the depositions of certain individuals. Subsection 1 provides a defendant the right to depose all witnesses listed by the state on the indictment or information. This proposed deponent, the victim, was not listed in the minutes of testimony, so rule 12(1) is inapplicable. Subsection 2 of rule 12 provides for depositions of witnesses not listed in the minutes. Rule 12(2) provides: a. Whenever the interests of justice and the special circumstances of a case make necessary the taking of the testimony of a prospective witness not included in subsection 1 or 3 of this rule, for use at trial, the court may upon motion of a party and notice to the other parties order that the testimony of the witness be taken by deposition and that any designated book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, not privileged, be produced at the same time and place. For purposes of this subsection, special circumstances shall be deemed to exist and the court shall order that depositions be taken only upon a showing of necessity arising from either of the following: (1) The information sought by way of deposition cannot adequately be obtained by a bill of particulars or voluntary statements. (2) Other just cause necessitating the taking of the deposition. Subsection 2 is inapplicable in this case because the rule itself makes it clear it is to be used to perpetuate testimony, not for discovery as Weaver sought to use it. Rule 12(2) allows testimony of a witness not included in subsection 1 [a witness listed in minutes] or 3 [disclosure of defense witnesses] of this rule, for use at trial .... (Emphasis added.) In discussing rule 12(2), we have also said: To trigger the right of compulsory process, a defendant must make a plausible showing the testimony of the individual otherwise unavailable to the defendant was both material and favorable to his defense. This requirement is embodied in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, which, although allowing a defendant to depose all witnesses listed by the State on its trial information, requires a defendant to establish the necessity for deposing other persons. State v. Wagner, 410 N.W.2d 207, 213 (Iowa 1987) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In this case, the defendant did not claim the victim was unavailable to testify, and his general statement in his application for discovery that the interest of justice requires an order for deposition is insufficient to justify a discovery order under rule 12. B. The Sixth Amendment issues. Weaver's attorney alluded to his client's Sixth Amendment rights at the hearing on his application for discovery, although it was not a part of his application. Assuming the issues were adequately raised, we proceed to discuss them. 1. Compulsory process. The United States Constitution provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... U.S. Const. amend. VI. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988), discussed the scope of the Compulsory Process Clause. The right to compel a witness' presence in the courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary process if it did not embrace the right to have the witness' testimony heard by the trier of fact. The right to offer testimony is thus grounded in the Sixth Amendment even though it is not expressly described in so many words: The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019[, 1023] (1967). The right of the defendant to present evidence stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth Amendment rights that we have previously held applicable to the States. Id. at 18, 87 S.Ct. at 1923[, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1022-23]. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 409, 108 S.Ct. at 653, 98 L.Ed.2d at 810-11. Whether the Compulsory Process Clause guarantees the right to pretrial discovery is not clear. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1000-01, 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 56 (1987), the Supreme Court said it had never squarely held that the Compulsory Process Clause guarantees the right to discover[y], and it declined to decide the issue in that case. Rather, it noted such issues were ordinarily evaluated under the broader scope of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and elected to resolve the issue under a due-process analysis. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56, 107 S.Ct. at 1001, 94 L.Ed.2d at 57. Because Weaver also raises a due-process argument, we do not resolve his claim under the compulsory-process provision of the Constitution. We discuss the due-process claim in a later division. 2. The Confrontation Clause. The United States Constitution provides that: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. This defendant alludes to his right of confrontation but provides no authority to support an argument he was deprived of that right here. In fact, in State v. Froning, 328 N.W.2d 333 (Iowa 1982), we rejected the argument now made, saying:  The Confrontation Clause does not provide the defendant with any right to pre-trial or in-trial discovery of the state's evidence. The purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to provide the defendant with the opportunity to challenge the testimony introduced by the state against the accused at trial by means of cross-examination of the declarant of the testimony.... The petitioner has not cited, and this court has not discovered anything in the English or American history of the Confrontation Clause, or in any decision of the Supreme Court interpreting that clause, which suggests in the slightest that the Confrontation Clause is in any way concerned with discovery. Accepting the petitioner's argument would transform the Confrontation Clause from a device designed to prevent trial by affidavit into a guarantee of the right to demand trial by affidavit. Id. at 336-37 (quoting Martin v. Blackburn, 521 F.Supp. 685, 699 (E.D.La.1981)). For the reasons discussed in Froning, we reject the defendant's confrontation-clause argument. 3. The due-process claim. We have held the right to present a defense is so fundamental and essential to a fair trial that it is accorded the status of an incorporated right through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Iowa 1998). Here, the defendant's due-process argument is very brief. He merely says he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law. He submits no authority to support the argument he was denied due process. We have said: The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law. Id. at 921 (quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at 19, 87 S.Ct. at 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1023). Here, the defendant was not denied the right to present a defense. He was only denied the opportunity to present a defense that suited his own strategy under which he did not even attempt to call the victim as a witness at trial. We reject his due-process argument.