Opinion ID: 1146517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Fundamental Error in State's Closing Argument

Text: Doorbal claims next that reversible error occurred during the State's guilt-phase closing argument. Doorbal contends that the State impermissibly commented on his right to remain silent. He also asserts that the State made an improper Golden Rule argument to the jury. Doorbal did not contemporaneously object to either set of comments. Therefore, the only possible basis for relief is fundamental error. We determine that no fundamental error occurred with regard to either set of comments.
During her closing argument, the prosecutor made the following statements: It doesn't matter how many years Jorge Delgado is going to do, it's not enough.... The issue is, did he tell you the truth and what did he tell you? ... Another thing is thatlisten to the cross examination of Jorge Delgado. Try and recall it. Never once was it anybody else but defendant Doorbal that was the hands-on killer. Lugo, along with hands-on killer Doorbal. Never once did anybody else get up once to say anything different. Doorbal asserts that he is entitled to relief based on our opinion in Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29 (Fla.2000). The comments challenged in this case are not even in the same category as those in Rodriguez. Additionally, in Rodriguez the prosecutor made two sets of statements that could have been construed as being impermissible comments on the defendant's failure to testify. After the first comments [39] in Rodriguez, the court sustained the defendant's objection but denied his motion for mistrial. Therefore, under the proper standard of review, we determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. See id. at 39 (citing Cole v. State, 701 So.2d 845, 853 (Fla.1997), in which we noted that [a] motion for mistrial should be granted only when it is necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial). After the second set of comments [40] in Rodriguez, which were also qualitatively different, the trial court overruled the defendant's objection. Under the proper standard of review, we determined that these comments were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Rodriguez, 753 So.2d at 39. Neither the abuse of discretion standard nor the harmless error standard applies in Doorbal's case because Doorbal neither made a motion for mistrial, nor contemporaneously objected, with regard to the prosecutor's remarks. [41] Rather, as stated above, in our review for fundamental error we must determine whether the prosecutor's statements constituted error that reache[d] down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. McDonald, 743 So.2d at 505. When we consider the statements, along with the magnitude of physical and testimonial evidence related not only to the crimes against Schiller but also to those against Griga and Furton, we are convinced that the prosecutor's remarks at issue here did not affect the jury's verdict. Therefore, we decline Doorbal's request for relief. Finally, we note that although the standards of review applied in Rodriguez are inapplicable here, one aspect of our language in Rodriguez is entirely pertinent: [W]e strongly caution prosecutors against making comments that may be interpreted as comments on the defendant's failure to testify or that impermissibly suggest a burden on the defendant to prove his or her innocence. Rodriguez, 753 So.2d at 39.
Doorbal also claims that he is entitled to relief based on the following remarks by the prosecutor during closing argument in the guilt-innocence phase: Remember [the police detective who] came in and showed you how that Omega taser works. Many of you jumped. Can you imagine how that would feel on your skin right up close? How it felt on Marc Schiller's sweating legs and ankles. But, again and again until he signed over everything. Signed over his entire life. These statements are erroneous and needlessly violated the prohibition against Golden Rule arguments, because they asked jurors to place themselves in the position of the victim. However, in the absence of a contemporaneous objection, we must determine whether the guilty verdict could not have been obtained without the assistance of the error. See McDonald, 743 So.2d at 505. As noted above, a mountain of physical and testimonial evidence established Doorbal's responsibility for the crimes with which he was charged. Therefore, we conclude that the remark, though erroneous, was also isolated and did not affect the jury's verdict. No relief is warranted. Nevertheless, we express our distress that a seasoned prosecutor would flagrantly violate the prohibition on Golden Rule arguments in any case, and particularly under the circumstances here. Well before admission to The Florida Bar, law students learn that they must not resort to improper Golden Rule arguments. Undoubtedly, prosecutors in capital cases are aware of this Court's remonstrations to all attorneys that they not violate this principle of law. A prosecutor in a capital case is entrusted to seek only justice when life or death may be at stake. We fully expect that those representing the State in cases such as this will not walk the edge of reversible error, which is unfortunate conduct, isolated though it was.