Opinion ID: 1189662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Survival of imperfect self-defense

Text: As previously explained, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, like diminished capacity/voluntary manslaughter, was derived from an expansive definition of malice that included an awareness of one's legal and societal obligations. (See Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 679; Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 322.) Yet, as Saille observes, that broadened definition of malice has now been abrogated, and no mental state need be shown to establish malice other than an intent unlawfully to kill. (Pen. Code, § 188.) Under Saille, it would appear to follow that imperfect self-defense is no longer available to negate the element of malice arising from an unlawful intentional killing, and thereby to reduce a murder to voluntary manslaughter. The majority stresses that the legislative history that accompanied the 1981 amendments indicates no express intent to abrogate imperfect self-defense. First, I am not convinced of the validity of that premise, for the materials provided to the Legislature at the time it was considering these amendments included an analysis by the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice stating as follows: The purpose of this bill [including the 1981 amendments] is to eliminate the use of diminished capacity defenses; to eliminate psychiatric opinions on the ultimate issue of intent; and to reverse Supreme Court decisions that require certain cognitive requirements for first and second degree murder.  (Assem. Com. on Criminal Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 54, June 30, 1981, at p. 3, italics added.) The underscored language indicates a broader reach than merely abrogating the diminished capacity defense and could include reliance on Flannel's imperfect self-defense doctrine to rebut malice. But whether or not the Legislature intended to abrogate Flannel, the fact remains that it did amend Penal Code section 188 to exclude the only statutory support for the imperfect self-defense doctrine. I find no authority for the majority's apparent assumption that a statutory amendment can have no unanticipated consequences. The majority nonetheless argues that one who kills with an honest though unreasonable fear of imminent peril cannot be said to intend to unlawfully kill his victim, as required by Penal Code section 188 to show express malice. Although the Legislature redefined malice to make it clear that unawareness of one's societal/legal obligations cannot negate malice, it left in place the definition of express malice as manifested by a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. (Pen. Code, § 188.) The majority argues that mere intent to kill is insufficient unless the actor intended to act unlawfully. Thus, if the actor honestly believed he could lawfully kill his victim, no matter how absurd that belief was, he would not be acting with express or implied malice. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 779, fn. 3.) There are several flaws in this analysis. First, the single word unlawfully is a very weak statutory hook on which to hang the entire doctrine of imperfect self-defense. Certainly, neither Flannel nor any other case has relied on that word as significant in this regard. And I find it quite difficult to fathom how a doctrine entirely hidden within the statutory definition of express malice could possibly control the outcome in implied malice cases. The majority suggests that one who acts with an unreasonable yet actual belief in the necessity of lethal resistance cannot demonstrate the abandoned and malignant heart required for implied malice murder. But no case has ever interpreted that language as incorporating the imperfect self-defense doctrine as a defense to implied malice murder. In any event, the implied malice issue was neither briefed nor argued and we should not reach it here. Second, a similar argument was made in Saille in the context of a voluntary intoxication defense: Intoxication, it was argued, might reduce the ability to intend an unlawful killing. Rejecting the contention, we quoted with approval an earlier decision's observation that the word unlawfully merely referred to the lack of any legally recognized justification, excuse or mitigation for the killing. (See Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1114-1115; see also People v. Bobo (1990) 229 Cal. App.3d 1417, 1433-1434 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 747]; People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 1259, 1268 [252 Cal. Rptr. 913].) Third, under the majority's construction of the word unlawfully, a defendant could avoid a murder conviction because of his unreasonable mistake of fact as to the necessity of using lethal force to defend himself. But our cases make clear that in order for a mistake of fact to constitute a defense, it must be an honest and reasonable one. (E.g., People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 360-361 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961]; People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 155 [125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337]; People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 534-536 [39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673, 8 A.L.R.3d 1092]; People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 801 [299 P.2d 850].) Fourth, and most critical, to accept the majority's construction of the word unlawfully as including a threshold subjective awareness of the illegality or wrongfulness of one's conduct would conflict with the express language of amended Penal Code section 188 that an awareness of one's legal or societal obligations is no longer a prerequisite to a finding of malice. Stated another way, if one who is wholly unaware of his obligation to obey the law is nonetheless deemed capable of acting with malice (as now provided in § 188), then it would follow that one who mistakenly assesses the nature of his peril and the legality of a lethal response likewise must be deemed so capable. To hold otherwise would improperly create a theory of defense unauthorized by the Legislature. The majority mentions the views of amicus curiae Orange County Women Lawyers Association that preservation of the imperfect self-defense doctrine is appropriate to assist battered or abused women charged with murdering their husbands or other persons who have subjected them to extreme abuse. (See Evid. Code, § 1107 [admissibility of evidence of battered women syndrome].) But in light of the express language of Penal Code section 188 redefining the element of malice, arguments regarding the social utility of the defense seem more properly addressed to the Legislature. Indeed, in 1993, legislation was proposed (1) to add a provision to the Penal Code codifying the imperfect self-defense doctrine (Assem. Bill No. 947), and (2) to amend the self-defense laws to provide additional defenses, including imperfect self-defense, in domestic violence situations (see Sen. Bill No. 1144). Although neither bill had passed before the Legislature adjourned in September 1993, presumably these bills will be reintroduced.