Opinion ID: 8414574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The J&M Firms’ Purported First Amendment Rights

Text: These cases illustrate why the J&M Firms have failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that any First Amendment right held by them is infringed by the New York regulations, especially in light of the demanding standard that governs a facial constitutional challenge. The J&M Firms argue that the rights at issue are the lawyers’ “right of access to the courts” and “right to associate with clients for purposes of accessing the courts.” Appellants’ Br. 20. But we think In re Primus, Ohralik, and Nyquist foreclose recognizing any such rights in a for-profit law partnership or PLLC that is not itself engaged in its own political advocacy or expression. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32, 98 S.Ct. 1893; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458, 98 S.Ct. 1912; Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1245. Clients have First Amendment expressive rights for which litigation may provide a vehicle. When the lawyers’ own expressive interests align with those rights, the lawyers themselves may have a cognizable First Amendment interest in pursuing the litigation. We are not aware of any judicial recognition of such an interest, however, when it comes to the lawyer’s generic act of pursuing litigation on behalf of any client. The J&M Firms’ lead argument to the contrary rests primarily on what we think is a misreading of the Supreme Court’s union cases. In particular, they cite United Transportation Union and United Mine Workers, which we describe above, for the proposition that “lawyers hold First Amendment rights of access to courts.” Appellants’ Br. 11, 15. But those cases do not so hold. Rather, they uniformly decide that unions and union members have rights under the First Amendment to associate and to act collectively to pursue legal action — action that ordinarily necessitates the involvement of lawyers. They do not establish that an attorney is entitled to access the court on a client’s behalf, at least not under the First Amendment rights to petition or association. Our reading of these two cases, focusing on the expressive rights of clients, riot their counsel, is in keeping, moreover, with the constitutional text: the rights of petition and assembly attach to “the people” — who are themselves aggrieved and accordingly who seek to assemble or to petition in order to redress their own grievances. U.S. Const, amend. I. Lawyers in a for-profit practice who act in their representative capacities do riot themselves seek access to the courts to remediate their own grievances; rather, they are doing so as a part of a commercial transaction in which they serve, and are paid. 6 The J&M Firms’ error is compounded by their apparent assumption that they enjoy a constitutionally protected right to associate with clients qua clients. But the so-called “freedom of association” protected by the First Amendment has been generally understood to encompass two quite different types of associational activity: “choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships,” and “association] for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment — speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617, 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). The J&M Firms do not purport to invoke the former. And if their associations with clients merit protection as a version of the latter form of constitutionally-protected association, it must be that they offer a means to serve other First Amendment ends, not that the association is itself a protected First Amendment activity. See Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 50 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The [Supreme] Court has tended to view the right of association as dependent on underlying individual rights of expression; there is no right of association in the abstract.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). In other words, because the J&M Firms have not asserted that their clients’ underlying suits implicate First Amendment concerns, we are aware of no constitutional protection for associating to bring those suits. See Nyquist, 590 F.2d at 1245. The J&M Firms fault the District Court for relying on a distinction drawn in case law between the rights and interests of private, for-profit attorneys and not-for-profit political advocacy organizations. They contend that “the right of access to courts is not limited to instances in which attorneys provide services in cases with a political or constitutional dimension,” and that Supreme Court precedent holds “that a for-profit attorney employed by an individual client to litigate a non-political grievance (such as a personal injury case) is fully protected by the First Amendment right of access to the courts.” Appellants’ Br. 17. Although these assertions may hold some superficial appeal, again, we think they misconstrue precedent. As noted above, the Supreme Court has taken pains to differentiate between the protections that the Constitution affords the activities of lawyers acting in a for-profit setting and those acting in a not-for-profit context, advocating political causes in which the attorneys themselves share; those cases reference the attorneys’ own associational and petition rights only in limited circumstances. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32, 98 S.Ct. 1893; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459 n.16, 98 S.Ct. 1912 (observing that, in Trainmen, “the Court highlighted the difference between permissible regulation of lawyers and regulation that impinges on the associational rights of union members.... The Court implicitly approved of the State’s regulation of conduct characterized colloquially as ‘ambulance chasing.’ ”). Neither Jacoby & Meyers, LLP, nor Jacoby & Meyers USA II, PLLC, is a not-for-profit political advocacy organization engaging in its own expression, nor a collection of individuals seeking redress of their own grievances or vindication of their own rights. Instead, the J&M Firms are engaged in the practice of law as a business. Thus, their firms can be regulated as businesses, and, as will be explained below, those regulations do not automatically trigger strict scrutiny simply because one of the law firm’s functions is to help clients access the courts. Of course, we do not question the right to petition a court, with the aid of a lawyer, for redress. But in the context of for-profit law firms that serve their clients’ interests as a business, that right belongs to the client, not the attorney. As in a comparable case in the Third Circuit, “[a]ppellants provide no support for the proposition that the Petition Clause protects the rights of an attorney [operating in the context of a for-profit law firm] to appeal to courts or other forums on behalf of another.” Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Multijurisdictional Practice v. Castille, 799 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2015). Indeed, as the Supreme Court has observed, a “lawyer’s procurement of remunerative employment is a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment concerns. It falls squarely within the State’s proper sphere of economic and professional regulation.” Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459, 98 S.Ct. 1912. The J&M Firms also perceive their challenge as encompassing both present and potential clients’ Petition Clause rights. To the extent that they may bring such claims on behalf of their clients, we reject that challenge on the merits for the reasons explained below. 7 But in the context of for-profit law firms who serve their clients’ interests as a business, that right belongs to the client, not the attorney. The plaintiff firms have accordingly failed to state a claim that the New York regulations violate their First Amendment rights.