Opinion ID: 805019
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Under § 1324(a),1 the Government must establish that: “(1) an alien entered or remained in the United States in violation of the law, (2) [the defendant] transported the alien within the United States with intent to further the alien’s unlawful presence, and (3) [the defendant] knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the alien was in the country in violation of the law.” United States v. Nolasco-Rosas, 286 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2002); 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). Specifically, Acosta contends that the Government failed to meet its burden on the second element—move/transport. Although Acosta moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the Government’s case-in-chief, he failed to renew that motion at the close of all the evidence or file a post-verdict motion. Therefore, our review is for a “manifest miscarriage of justice.”2 United States v. Dowl, 619 F.3d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 2010). Under this standard, reversal is only warranted “if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt or contains evidence on a key element of the offense that is so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 1 The statutory text of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) criminalizes the conduct of “any person who knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, transports, or moves or attempts to transport or move such alien within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law.” 2 As we clarified recently in United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), the articulation of the standard of “manifest miscarriage of justice” is a short-hand “restatement” of the familiar plain-error standard of review in the context of “forfeited insufficiency claims.” Id. at 331 & n.9; see also Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 5 Case: 11-50444 Document: 00511930621 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/23/2012 No. 11-50444 The most common conduct that would give rise to culpability for transporting illegal aliens is a situation where the defendant who is charged with violating § 1324(a) is the one driving the vehicle with the illegal aliens. See, e.g., United States v. Tirado-Tirado, 563 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2009). But the statute is obviously broader than this common fact pattern. In fact, our cases reflect that the second element turns on the defendant’s control of the means of transportation. In United States v. Pineda-Jimenez, 212 F. App’x 369 (5th Cir. 2007), a case with similar facts to Acosta’s, we explained that “[a]lthough [the defendant] was not driving at the time of the stop, the jury could infer that he was in control of the operation.” Id. at 372 (emphasis added); cf. United States v. CalderonLopez, 268 F. App’x 279, 287 (5th Cir. 2008) (upholding an aiding-and-abetting conviction where defendant was “in charge of the operation”). There, as here, the Government charged both the driver and the passenger of a truck with transporting illegal aliens, and we affirmed both convictions. Pineda-Jimenez, 212 F. App’x at 372–73. The evidence of control/leadership against the passenger in that case (Rivas-Alvarez) was that passenger was “carrying a large amount of cash” and the “vehicle had been modified in a manner conducive to smuggling.” Id. at 372. In light of our precedent and under a “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard of review, we cannot say that the record against Acosta, who arranged the transportation and acquiesced to taking the others to Austin, is devoid of evidence from which the jury could infer control and therefore meet the second element of § 1324(a).