Opinion ID: 2691602
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: R.C. Chapter 2950

Text: {¶ 3} R.C. Chapter 2950, Ohio’s law governing the registration and classification of sex offenders and the ensuing community-notification requirements, has evolved substantially since its inception in 1963. See former R.C. Chapter 2950, 130 Ohio Laws 669. The original version of the statute was 1. Christian N. Bodyke is an appellant in one of three appeals consolidated by the Sixth District. Bodyke was convicted of sexual battery in 1999. The others, David Schwab and Gerald Phillips, were found guilty of attempted rape in 1999 and gross sexual imposition and sexual battery in 1993, respectively. All of the appellants were classified initially under Megan’s Law and reclassified according to the AWA. Bodyke, Schwab, and Phillips assert six propositions of law. Those propositions aver that the application of the AWA to offenders whose crimes were committed before the AWA’s effective dates violates (1) the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal constitution, (2) the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution, (3) the separation-of-powers doctrine embodied in the Ohio Constitution, and (4) the Double Jeopardy Clause of the state and federal constitutions. They also assert that the AWA, as applied to sex offenders whose cases were adjudicated under the provisions of Megan’s Law, violates due process and constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment and against impairment of contracts. 2 January Term, 2010 seldom used, Sears v. State, Clermont App. No. CA2008-07-068, 2009-Ohio3541, ¶23, and it existed without amendment for three decades. {¶ 4} In 1994, however, a convicted sex offender in New Jersey abducted, raped, and killed a neighbor’s young child, Megan Kanka. See State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 516, 728 N.E.2d 342; State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 405, 700 N.E.2d 570. In the wake of that notorious crime, New Jersey gained national recognition by enacting a law requiring registration of sex offenders and notification to the community of the offender’s presence. The law became known as “Megan’s Law.” Wallace v. State (Ind.2009), 905 N.E.2d 371, 374. The constitutionality of the New Jersey legislation was upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Doe v. Poritz (1995), 142 N.J. 1, 662 A.2d 367. {¶ 5} Federal legislation followed later that year when Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Section 14071, Title 42, U.S.Code (“the Jacob Wetterling Act”). The Jacob Wetterling Act focused on requiring states to implement a registry of sex offenders and those who commit crimes against children. People v. Cintron (2006), 13 Misc.3d 833, 836, 827 N.Y.S.2d 445, fn. 6. Two years after its enactment, the Act was amended to require that states add community-notification provisions. Id. The Jacob Wetterling Act then became better known as the federal “Megan’s Law.” Id. {¶ 6} The federal Megan’s Law mandates that the states adopt registration and community-notification provisions governing sex offenders or face the loss of federal crime-control funds. Section 14071, Title 42, U.S.Code. The General Assembly enacted Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law in 1996. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560, 2601.2 2. Although all of the states enacted some form of sex-offender legislation in order to comply with the federal Megan’s Law, the breadth of the registration and notification provisions varied from state to state. Sex Offender Treatment in the United States: The Current Climate and an Unexpected Opportunity for Change (2010), 84 Tulane L.Rev. 729, 731. 3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 7} Megan’s Law repealed prior versions of R.C. Chapter 2950 and created Ohio’s first comprehensive registration and classification system for sex offenders. 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560. In order to accomplish its goals, Ohio’s Megan’s Law provided for offender registration, classification, and community notification. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 407, 700 N.E.2d 570. {¶ 8} In 1997, we unanimously upheld the application of Megan’s Law over retroactivity and ex post facto claims.3 State v. Cook , 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570. {¶ 9} After Cook, we addressed constitutional challenges to Megan’s Law based on theories other than ex post facto and retroactivity. We rejected, unanimously, the suggestions that Megan’s Law impermissibly intruded on the individual’s rights to maintain privacy, to acquire property, to pursue an occupation, and to maintain a favorable reputation. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d at 524-527, 728 N.E.2d 342. We also rejected arguments based on double jeopardy, bill of attainder, equal protection, and vagueness. Id. at 528-534. {¶ 10} The following year, we were confronted with a separation-ofpowers argument in State v. Thompson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 584, 752 N.E.2d 276. We rejected it unanimously. {¶ 11} Thompson addressed whether former R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) violated “the separation-of-powers doctrine because it encroache[d] upon the judiciary’s fact-finding authority.” Id. at 585. More specifically, we addressed the language 3. In 2003, the United States Supreme Court confronted an Alaskan statutory scheme very similar to Megan’s Law. The high court concluded that the Alaskan law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Smith v. Doe (2003), 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164. In so holding, the court applied the factors from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 159, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, as we did in Cook, and drew the same conclusion – that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not prohibit states from retroactively requiring sex offenders to register periodically with local law enforcement or from disseminating to the community the offender’s name, address, photograph, and other personal information. 4 January Term, 2010 in former R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) that required a judge to consider certain factors before determining whether an offender was a sexual predator. {¶ 12} Our conclusion that the separation-of-powers doctrine was not violated turned on our view that the statute did not divest the court of its factfinding powers. Id., 92 Ohio St.3d at 587-588, 752 N.E.2d 276. We observed that the statutory factors provided an important framework that assisted judges in making the sexual-predator determination and that the factors, as guidelines, “provide consistency in the reasoning process.” Id. at 587. But more importantly, we recognized that the guidelines did not control the judge’s discretion or require a judge to assign a particular weight to certain factors. Thus, we found no improper interference with the judge’s fact-finding powers. {¶ 13} We further held that the factors themselves were nonexhaustive, because the statute directed the judge to “consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to,” the statutory factors. (Emphasis deleted.) Id. at 588. Thus, we concluded, the statute did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, because the judge retained discretion to consider any relevant evidence and to determine what weight, if any, to assign to that evidence. Id. {¶ 14} Ten years after our decision in Cook, we again addressed Megan’s Law in State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110. In that case, a convicted rapist classified as a sexual predator challenged the constitutionality of the amendments enacted in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5 (“S.B. 5”), 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6558, 6687-6702 (eff. July 31, 2003). The claims in Ferguson renewed the challenge against the retroactive application of the amended requirements. {¶ 15} Despite the significant changes wrought by S.B. 5, we upheld the S.B. 5 amendments. In so doing, we rejected Ferguson’s assertions that the amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution (Section 10, Article I) and the retroactivity provision in Section 28, Article II of 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO the Ohio Constitution. We relied on our decision in Cook, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe (2003), 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164, and other state courts’ decisions to find that Megan’s Law remained a remedial statute. Ferguson at ¶ 29-40. Ferguson, however, was not unanimous. See also State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264 (holding that an appellate court must review a trial court’s determination in a sex-offenderclassification hearing under the civil manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard). {¶ 16} The dissent in Ferguson criticized the majority’s reliance on Cook: “R.C. Chapter 2950 has been amended [since Cook]. The simple registration process and notification procedures are now different from those considered in Cook and in [Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 2000-Ohio-428, 728 N.E.2d 342]. R.C. Chapter 2950 has been transformed from remedial to punitive   .” Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 45 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). More specifically, the dissent explained that, since Cook, the “sexual predator” label became permanent, the registration requirements were made more demanding, the community-notification and residency-restriction provisions were made more extensive, and sheriffs’ authority was expanded to include the power to obtain landlord verification that the offender lived at a registered address. Ferguson at ¶ 46. {¶ 17} Even as debate over the S.B. 5 amendments was taking place here, however, the General Assembly was reviewing the law and enacting a new scheme, the Adam Walsh Act, R.C. Chapter 2950. That act, not Megan’s Law and its amendments, forms the basis of this appeal.
{¶ 18} In 2006, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (“Adam Walsh Act”), P.L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, codified at Section 16901 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code. The Act created national standards for sex-offender registration, community notification, and classification. It divides 6 January Term, 2010 sex offenders into three categories or “tiers” – Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III – based solely on the crime committed. Section 16911. The duration of the offender’s obligation to update his personal information for the registry depends on his tier classification. Section 16915. {¶ 19} Section 16912(a) directs every jurisdiction to maintain a sexoffender registry conforming to the requirements of the Act. And to ensure compliance, Congress directed that states that did not adopt the Adam Walsh Act risked losing ten percent of certain federal crime-control funds that would otherwise be allocated to them. Section 16925(a). {¶ 20} The following year, the General Assembly enacted 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10.4 S.B. 10 repealed Megan’s Law and replaced it with a new, retroactive scheme that includes the tier system required by Congress. R.C. Chapter 2950. {¶ 21} The former categories of sexually oriented offender, habitual sex offender, and sexual predator no longer exist, nor is the court required to hold classification hearings as before. Instead, offenders are classified as Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III sex offenders (or child-victim offenders) based solely on the offender’s offense. R.C. 2950.01. Specified officials are required to notify existing offenders of their duties and new tier classification. R.C. 2950.03, 2950.031, and 2950.032. {¶ 22} Significantly for our purposes here, under the AWA judges no longer have discretion to determine which classification best fits the offender. Id. 4. Ohio is the only state to have complied with the mandate, however. Greg Bluestein (December 1, 2009), “Ohio lone state to adopt sex-offender rules,” in Canton Rep.com, available at http://www.cantonrep.com/ohio/x2072228737/Ohio-lone-state-to-adopt-sex-offender-rules (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). The deadline for compliance has been extended from July 2009 to July 2010, but it appears that many states will still be unable, or unwilling, to comply. Id. For many states, the costs of compliance with the Act will far outweigh the ten percent reduction in funding. For example, it has been estimated that the cost for Illinois to comply with the Act in the first year would be $21,000,000 but that it will lose less than $1,000,000 if it does not. See Liz Winiarski, Facing the Compliance Deadline for the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, States are Weighing all the Costs (2009), 14 Pub.Interest L.Rep. 192, 193. 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Instead, a few months before the AWA’s effective date, the General Assembly directed the attorney general to reclassify existing offenders. R.C. 2950.031(A) and 2950.032(A)(1). Offenders who had registered before December 1, 2007, were to be reclassified as Tier I, II, or III sex offenders according to the new statutes. Id. Tiers are assigned solely by reference to the offense. See R.C. 2950.01(E), (F), and (G). The entire reclassification process is administered by the attorney general, with no involvement by any court. There is no individualized assessment. No consideration is given to any of the other factors employed previously in classification hearings held pursuant to Megan’s Law. Id. As a result, the trial court is stripped of any power to engage in independent factfinding to determine an offender’s likelihood of recidivism. Expert testimony is no longer presented; the offender’s criminal and social history are no longer relevant.5 {¶ 23} After tier classification is completed, the offender is required to register according to the classification. R.C. 2950.04(A)(1). The registration requirements under the AWA vary depending on the tier in which the offender is classified. R.C. 2950.06(B) (frequency of duty to verify personal information differs depending on tier); R.C. 2950.07 (duration of duty to comply with registration/verification requirements depends on tier). 5. {¶ a} In State v. Eppinger (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 158, 743 N.E.2d 881, we emphasized the importance of the classification hearing in assessing each offender on an individualized basis, avoiding wholesale labeling of offenders as sexual predators based only on a conviction, and advancing the purpose of the legislation, which was to protect the public: {¶ b} “If we were to adjudicate all sexual offenders as sexual predators, we run the risk of ‘being flooded with a number of persons who may or may not deserve to be classified as high-risk individuals, with the consequence of diluting both the purpose behind and the credibility of the law.’” Id. at 165, quoting State v. Thompson (1999), 140 Ohio App.3d 638, 647, 748 N.E.2d 1144. {¶ c} We further opined that “[o]ne sexually oriented offense is not a clear predictor of whether that person is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses, particularly if the offender is not a pedophile. Thus, we recognize that one sexually oriented conviction, without more, may not predict future behavior.” Id. at 162. 8 January Term, 2010 {¶ 24} Under Megan’s Law, if an offender was classified at the lowest risk level, i.e., as a sexually oriented offender, he was required to register annually for a period of ten years. Former R.C. 2950.07(B)(3) and 2950.06(B)(2), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2617, 2613. No community notification followed. Under the AWA, although there is still no community notification for the lowest-risk offenders, i.e., offenders classified into Tier I, those offenders must verify their personal information annually for 15 years rather than the ten years required under Megan’s Law. R.C. 2950.07(B)(3). {¶ 25} Under Megan’s Law, an offender who posed an intermediate risk, i.e., less than a sexual predator but more than a sexually oriented offender, was labeled a habitual sexual offender. See former R.C. 2950.01(B), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2601. Habitual sexual offenders were required to verify their personal information annually for 20 years, former R.C. 2950.07(B)(2) and 2950.06(B)(2), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2617, 2613, and community notification was required only if the judge deemed it appropriate. Former R.C. 2950.11(A) and (F), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2627, 2630. In the AWA scheme, the intermediate-risk offender is placed in Tier II. Tier II offenders must verify every 180 days for 25 years, R.C. 2950.07(B)(2) and 2950.06(B)(2), but community notification is not required. R.C. 2950.11(F) (community notification limited to Tier III offenders). {¶ 26} The sexual-predator classification was the highest-risk offender under Megan’s Law. Sexual predators were required to register every 90 days for life. Former R.C. 2950.06(B)(1) and 2950.07(B)(1), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2613 and 2616. Community notification was required. Former R.C. 2950.11(A), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2627. Under the AWA, Tier III offenders have the same obligation to verify their personal information as sexual predators, R.C. 2950.06(B)(3) (every 90 days) and 2950.07(B)(1) (for life), and community notification is required. R.C. 2950.11(A). However, the scope of registration is expanded greatly. 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 27} Megan’s Law required an offender to register with the sheriff in the county in which he resided. Former R.C. 2950.04(A), 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2609. Pursuant to the AWA, the offender must register with the sheriff in the county in which he lives, the county in which he attends school, the county in which he is employed, any county in which he is domiciled temporarily for more than three days, and even a county in another state if he works or attends school there. R.C. 2950.04(A)(2)(a) through (e). When he registers, he must provide his full name and any aliases as well as his date of birth, social security number, address, the name and address of his employer and school, the license plate of any motor vehicle he owns or operates as part of his employment, his driver’s license number, any professional or occupational registration or license, any e-mail address, and all Internet identifiers or telephone numbers registered to him. R.C. 2950.04(C). {¶ 28} Similarly, the AWA expands community-notification requirements. In the new scheme, the sheriff gives notice of a Tier III offender’s name, address, and conviction to all residents within 1,000 feet of the offender’s residence. R.C. 2950.11(A)(1)(a). If the offender lives in a multiple-unit building, all residents who share a common hallway with the offender must be notified. R.C. 2950.11(A)(1)(b). The AWA also forbids all sex offenders, including those who have not offended against children, from living within 1,000 feet of a school, preschool, or child day-care facility. R.C. 2950.034(A).6