Opinion ID: 4527826
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: NJLAD Hostile Work Environment Claim

Text: Under NJLAD, a plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment on the basis of race and national origin must show that the alleged conduct would not have occurred but for the employee’s race or national origin, and that the conduct is so “severe or pervasive” that a reasonable person in that situation would believe that the “conditions of employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or abusive.” Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 688–89 (N.J. 1998) (citation omitted). This test “conforms to the standard for establishing workplace racial or gender harassment under federal Title VII law.” Id. at 689. Determining whether a work environment is hostile from the perspective of a reasonable person in that situation requires looking at the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency, severity, and nature of the subject conduct. See Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 803 A.2d 611, 622 (N.J. 2002); see also Taylor, 706 A.2d at 692 (noting the alleged discriminatory conduct must be viewed in context from the perspective of a reasonable person from the particular racial or ethnic background who is similarly situated to the plaintiff). Utterances that are merely offensive do not rise to the level of 10 unreasonably interfering with an employee’s job performance. See Mandel v. UBS/PaineWebber, Inc., 860 A.2d 945, 955 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). Moreover, it is “a rare and extreme case in which a single incident will be so severe that it would, from the perspective of a reasonable [person situated as the claimant], make the working environment hostile.” Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 455 (N.J. 1993). At the outset, we find Ali’s claims that Zega, Lottman, and other teachers had called Ali anti-Semitic, unpatriotic, and a conspiracy theorist bear a tenuous relationship to Ali’s race. Since Ali has not shown that the other teachers would have made these remarks but for his race or national origin, this evidence fails the first prong of the NJLAD hostile work environment test. See Shepherd, 803 A.2d at 625 (noting the plaintiff must show “by a preponderance of the evidence that the impermissible conduct would not have occurred but for plaintiff’s protected status”) (citing Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 454). However, the closer question is whether the alleged remarks that Lottman made prior to Ali’s termination meeting are sufficiently “severe or pervasive” that a reasonable person who is Muslim and of Egyptian descent would find the conditions of employment altered. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, we nevertheless conclude that Ali has not presented evidence minimally necessary to form a hostile work environment claim. Ali alleged that Lottman had greeted Ali on two occasions with “Hey Arabia Nights” and “Hey, Big Egypt,” made a comment to Ali regarding computers in Egypt, and referred to him as “Mufasa” or “Mufasa Ali” based on Ali’s middle name, Mostafa, and in reference to a character from the 11 Lion King. App. 11. Although these remarks are offensive, none of them rise to the level of severity that would alter working conditions. There is no evidence that Lottman made these comments in the presence of other employees with “an attitude of prejudice that injects hostility and abuse into the working environment” or that any of them were as severe as the use of an unambiguous racial epithet. See Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that the use of an unambiguous racial epithet by a supervisor, immediately followed by a threat of termination, created a hostile work environment); Taylor, 706 A.2d at 693 (finding sufficiently severe a defendant’s racist slur about and to a plaintiff-employee that was made in the presence of another supervisor and meant to humiliate the plaintiff). Moreover, these were isolated incidents; Ali cannot show that Lottman’s remarks were so pervasive that they altered the working environment. See Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 675 A.2d 684, 693 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (concluding that sexist comments made “once or twice a week” over the course of one year was “pervasive enough to make a reasonable woman . . . believe that her work environment was hostile, abusive, intimidating, or offensive”). We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on the NJLAD hostile work environment claim. 2 2 Under NJLAD, it is unlawful for “any person, whether an employer or an employee . . . to aid, abet, [or] incite . . . the doing of any [unlawful discriminatory acts] or to attempt to do so.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e). Having found that Ali has not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of fact as to his NJLAD discrimination or hostile work 12 C. Defamation, Libel, False Light/Invasion of Privacy Claims A statement is defamatory when the statement harms the reputation of the plaintiff by hurting his image within his community and deterring others from associating with him. See Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972, 978–89 (N.J. 1994); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559. To bring a defamation claim under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that defendants made a false and defamatory statement concerning [plaintiff]; (2) that the statement was communicated to another person (and not privileged); and (3) that defendants acted negligently or with actual malice.” G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 310 (N.J. 2011). Truth is therefore a defense in a defamation action. Id. In New Jersey, a defamatory statement can be expressed in both written and oral form. See W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1153 (N.J. 2012). Opinion statements are generally not defamatory because they reflect a person’s state of mind. See Ward, 643 A.2d at 979. Determining if a statement is one of fact or opinion rests on the concept of verifiability, because if a statement cannot be proven true or false, it cannot be subject to liability. See Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass’n, 735 A.2d 1129, 1137 (N.J. 1999). Similarly, New Jersey recognizes “invasions of privacy involving publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false environment claims, Ali has no basis for his NJLAD aiding and abetting claim. So, we will affirm the District Court on the aiding and abetting claim. 13 light before the public.” Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 289 (N.J. 1988). Like defamation, “a fundamental requirement of the false light tort is that the disputed publicity be in fact false, or else ‘at least have the capacity to give rise to a false public impression as to the plaintiff.’” Id. at 294 (citation omitted). Ali asserts that several statements that Zega made during Zega’s interview with the reporter were defamatory. Here, we agree with the District Court that at least two of Zega’s comments that Ali refers to—that “[i]t’s upsetting . . . that somebody would . . . distribute [the conspiracy theory messages in the MEMRI articles]” and that there was “no [excuse]” for posting the MEMRI articles—are statements of opinion, which are not actionable as defamation or false light/invasion of privacy. App. 207–08; see Lynch, 735 A.2d at 1137 (noting that “[l]oose, figurative or hyperbolic language is not likely to imply specific facts, and thus is not likely to be deemed actionable”). Similarly, Zega’s comment that the posting of the MEMRI articles and the anti-Semitic statements and 9/11 conspiracy theories contained in those articles were “not something that the district agrees with in any way” is not subject to liability for the same reasons. App. 207–08. To the extent that Ali argues that Connelly’s approval of the 9/11 lesson plan contradicts Zega’s statement, Ali has not presented evidence that Connelly represented the position of the District in approving Ali’s lesson plan. In fact, Defendants’ decision to terminate Ali for posting the MEMRI articles is further evidence that the School District did not support the views presented in those articles. 14 Finally, Zega’s affirmation that Defendants took “swift action” to remove the links and that “the teacher [would] be disciplined severely,” if warranted following an investigation, App. 207–08, is also not defamatory nor does it constitute false light/invasion of privacy because it is not false. Indeed, Defendants acted quickly in disciplining the teacher at fault; the same day that the reporter approached Zega, Lottman ordered Ali to remove the MEMRI links from the school’s website and, following two meetings within two days, Defendants terminated Ali. For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court. D. 42 U.S.C. § 1983—Defamation Claim A defamation suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may proceed “only if [the defamatory act] occurs in the course of or is accompanied by a change or extinguishment of a right or status guaranteed by state law or the Constitution.” See Clark v. Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711–12 (1976)). However, Ali alleges only damage to his reputation without any concurrent violation of his constitutional rights. Since simple defamation alone is not a protected interest under the Due Process Clause, Ali cannot recover under § 1983. See Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 402–04 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that harms to a plaintiff’s future employment that flow from statements made by a former employer do not infringe upon a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause); see also Clark, 890 F.2d at 619. 15 E. 42 U.S.C. § 1983—First Amendment Claims To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee must show “(1) that the activity in question is protected by the First Amendment, and (2) that the protected activity was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action.” See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir. 2006). Teachers do not have a protected First Amendment right to decide the content of their lessons or how the material should be presented to their students. See Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that “a public university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the classroom”); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[N]o court has found that teachers’ First Amendment rights extend to choosing their own curriculum or classroom management techniques in contravention of school policy or dictates.”). Ali alleges that posting links to MEMRI articles containing “alternative views” on the 9/11 attacks is protected by the First Amendment. But, based on our case law, Ali did not have a right to decide what would be taught in the classroom. See Edwards, 156 F.3d at 491 (noting that decisions of how and what may be taught in the classroom belong to the public school and not the professor). Hence, Ali posits insufficient evidence to withstand the grant of summary judgment on his First Amendment claims.