Opinion ID: 2690898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: conclusion

Text: {¶ 30} Applying our holding to the facts of this case, we conclude that Clifton lacks standing to bring a takings claim against the village. However, we emphasize that we do not hold that an adjoining property owner may never have standing. Instead, we hold that a property owner lacks standing under the facts and circumstances presented here. {¶ 31} The zoning at issue applies to J&M’s property, not Clifton’s. Therefore, the zoning imposes no limitation on Clifton’s use of his property whatsoever. Further, the alleged diminution in value of Clifton’s property is not a direct result of the village’s zoning, but instead is caused by J&M’s use of its property, as allowed by the rezoning. Finally, the rezoning that changed part of J&M’s property from “business industrial” to “general industrial” merely expanded a similar, existing, permitted use. Under these particular facts, we hold that there is an insufficient nexus between the rezoning of J&M’s property and the alleged diminution in value of Clifton’s adjacent property to indicate that Clifton is a proper party to bring a regulatory-taking claim. {¶ 32} Furthermore, because Clifton’s property is outside the village limits, the village has no authority to appropriate his property for an alleged regulatory taking. Accordingly, Clifton also has no redressable claim against the village for a regulatory taking. {¶ 33} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. Judgment affirmed. O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. PFEIFER, J., dissents. 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO __________________ PFEIFER, J., dissenting. {¶ 34} This is a difficult case. The majority opinion has some logic on its side, and the end result is hardly unconscionable, but I am concerned that the resolution of this case will make it harder for future plaintiffs with legitimate complaints to force the government to initiate appropriation actions in similar circumstances. {¶ 35} The majority reaches three conclusions: (1) the city of Blanchester’s zoning change “imposes no limitation on Clifton’s use of his property whatsoever” and, therefore, Clifton cannot show a nexus between the zoning change and a diminution in the value of his property, (2) Blanchester cannot appropriate Clifton’s property, because it is not in Blanchester, and, therefore, (3) Clifton does not have standing to initiate an inverse-condemnation proceeding against Blanchester. I will address each of these conclusions in turn. No Limitation {¶ 36} It is clear that Blanchester’s zoning change does not directly limit Clifton’s use of his property. It cannot, because it is outside the Blanchester village limits. But it can indirectly limit Clifton’s use, and it can cause a diminution of value in his property. It is obvious that it is possible for a zoning change to diminish the value of adjacent property within a municipality, even if indirectly. So naturally it is possible for a zoning change to diminish the value of adjacent property that is in a different political subdivision. I dispute the majority’s claim that there is “no limitation,” because it is possible that certain uses of the property are less feasible and that certain uses have less economic value than before the zoning change was made. {¶ 37} The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that “regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 [98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631] (1978).” 10 January Term, 2012 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2005), 544 U.S. 528, 538, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876. The court in Lingle stated that the primary factors to consider when evaluating regulatory-takings claims are “ ‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.’ ” Id. at 538–539, quoting Penn Cent. at 124. These inquiries are aimed at identifying “regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain. Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property rights.” Lingle at 539. A “Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.” Id. at 540. {¶ 38} It is quite clear that the majority in this case has engaged in no such analysis. It may be difficult for Clifton to show that the zoning change has interfered with his legitimate property interests, but he should have the opportunity to establish that his rights under the federal or Ohio constitution have been infringed. Blanchester Can’t Appropriate {¶ 39} This is a troubling aspect of the case but one that ought not prevent this court from doing justice to the parties. It is obvious, as the majority opinion discusses, that Blanchester does not have the authority to appropriate property that is not within its jurisdiction. A plausible solution in this situation, if Blanchester is shown to have effected a taking, is to require Blanchester to buy the affected property or pay the amount of diminution. That remedy would fall within the concept of a virtual taking. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court of Appeals of Utah has written that “if a regulation falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial use of land, an analysis of a complex of 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO factors indicates whether the interference is so great that a virtual taking has nonetheless occurred.” Arnell v. Salt Lake Cty. Bd. of Adjustment (2005), 2005 Utah App. 165, 112 P.3d 1214, ¶ 17, citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001), 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592. The factors to be considered include “ ‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations    [and] the character of the governmental action.’ ” Id., quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631. “These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to prevent the government from ‘forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’ ” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617–618, quoting Armstrong v. United States (1960), 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554. {¶ 40} In this case, Clifton is seeking to avoid bearing alone the burden of a zoning change and the effect that it has on his property. Whether he will be able to prove a taking or diminution in value is beside the point at this time. We should analyze the various factors that the United States Supreme Court has determined bear on the issue and decide whether Blanchester has effected a virtual taking. If it has, we should order an equitable remedy and require Blanchester to make Clifton whole, either by buying his property or by paying him the amount of diminution. The end result would be the same as in an appropriation action—the government entity (Blanchester) would own the property, and the affected property owner (Clifton) would be compensated for harm suffered, whether directly or indirectly inflicted, at the hand of a governmental entity (Blanchester).