Opinion ID: 435124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Crew Members' Claims

Text: 20 Caterpillar also contends that the general rule barring recovery solely for economic loss precludes the crew members from recovering their share of the lost catch. The rule in this context, where no contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant exists, focuses not on the applicability of the law of sales or tort law, but on concerns that the defendant will be liable for remote or speculative damages. Union Oil Company v. Oppen, 501 F.2d at 563. The rule also has been justified based on the doctrine of proximate cause. Id. 21 The defendant again has correctly stated the general rule. The Supreme Court in Robins Drydock & Repair Company v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134, 72 L.Ed. 290 (1927), held that as a general rule, at least, a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tort-feasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong. 275 U.S. at 309, 48 S.Ct. at 135. Although this circuit has questioned the rule's wisdom, we nonetheless have abided by it. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. M/V BYULACOMBE, 597 F.2d 469, 472 (5th Cir.1979) (Whatever the wisdom of the traditional rule of non-liability for negligent acts causing economic loss, Robins reflects the state of law in this circuit). See also Kingston Shipping Co., Inc. v. Roberts, 667 F.2d 34 (11th Cir.1982); Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. State of Florida, 720 F.2d 1201 (11th Cir.1983) (Clark, J., concurring), district court judgment affirmed by operation of law because of equally divided en banc court, 728 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir.1984). 22 Despite the general rule announced in Robins Drydock, the district court found that the crew members of the PRISCILLA ANN were entitled to recover their lost share of the catch due to the vessel's delay. In so concluding, the court relied on a line of Ninth Circuit cases holding that the rationale of Robins Drydock does not preclude recovery of lost profits by fishing vessel owners and commercial fishermen. See Jones v. Bender Welding & Machine Works, Inc., 581 F.2d 1331, 1337 (9th Cir.1978); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d at 567; Carbone v. Ursich, 209 F.2d 178, 181-82 (9th Cir.1953); see also Reefer Queen Co., Inc. v. Maritime Construction & Design, 73 Wash.2d 774, 440 P.2d 448 (1969). This circuit has yet to address the issue, 9 and we approach its resolution cognizant that not all courts have embraced the Ninth Circuit's view. See Henderson v. Arundel Corp., 262 F.Supp. 152 (D.Md.1966), aff'd 384 F.2d 998 (4th Cir.1967); Casado v. Schooner Pilgrim, Inc., 171 F.Supp. 78 (D.Mass.1959). 23 In Carbone v. Ursich, supra, the Ninth Circuit overruled a prior case denying crew members a right to recover for their lost share due to a third party's negligence disabling the vessel. The court based its upholding of the fishermen's claims on several grounds. First, the court noted that Robins Drydock was decided against a background of case law which had upheld the fishermen's right to recover against third parties; yet, the Court in Robins Drydock did not indicate that it intended to overrule these prior cases. Second, the court found that the reasoning of Robins Drydock in disallowing recovery by a time charterer of the injured vessel did not apply to the special situation involved with fishermen dependent upon the vessel's catch for their wages: 24 It is quite evident that the [Robins Drydock ] court, although dealing with a well-established rule of law of torts, was not thinking of this special situation of the fishermen who, as we have here indicated, had long been recognized as beneficiaries under a special rule which made the wrongdoer liable not only for the damage done to the fishing vessel, but liable for the losses of the fishermen as well. This long recognized rule is no doubt a manifestation of the familiar principle that seamen are the favorites of admiralty and their economic interests entitled to the fullest possible legal protection. These considerations have given rise to a special right comparable to that of a master to sue for the loss of services of a servant, or the right of a husband or father to sue for the loss of services of wife or child. 25