Opinion ID: 1368892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Did the trial court err in instructing the jury regarding the proper use of admissions from the prior criminal RICO trial?

Text: One of the jury instructions included the following language: [N]one of these defendants may deny that they were convicted of being members of a conspiracy as follows: ... 8.... The defendants, John Joseph Carbone, Joseph M. Carbone and Ronald John Williams were charged and convicted of conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. [§ ] 1962. One of the acts in that charge reads as follows: On or about February 5, 1978, in Pierce County, within the Western District of Washington, John Joseph Carbone, Ronald John Williams, Joseph M. Carbone, a/k/a Joey, and other persons unknown to the Grand Jury, did knowingly and maliciously [cause] a fire which was manifestly dangerous to human life, in that they did cause a fire at the building containing the Night Moves tavern after binding and blindfolding the night watchman of the Night Moves and leaving him bound and blindfolded in or adjacent to the building containing the Night Moves tavern. The aforementioned conviction did not determine in fact whether these three defendants actually committed this act. It will be for you to determine whether plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that these defendants caused this act to be committed. You are further instructed that defendant George Janovich was neither charged nor convicted of this act. The defendants' conviction did not determine that the conspiracy committed the acts of arson and personal injury that plaintiff had complained of in this case. It is for you to determine based upon the evidence you have heard whether plaintiff had proven by a preponderance of the evidence in this case that these individuals as a group or as individuals caused him damage unlawfully. The defendants claim this instruction was an improper use of collateral estoppel against the defendants. [7] When facts have been adjudicated in a lawsuit, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes those parties to the suit from denying those facts in a later proceeding. See generally Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 805, 829 (1985). The United States Supreme Court in Emich Motors Corp. v. GM Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 569, 95 L.Ed. 534, 71 S.Ct. 408 (1951) stated: In the case of a criminal conviction based on a jury verdict of guilty, issues which were essential to the verdict must be regarded as having been determined by the judgment. The Emich case is factually similar to the present one. The plaintiffs in Emich sought to use evidence of the defendants' conviction of conspiracy under the Clayton Act in a later civil Clayton Act proceeding. The conviction in Emich, as here, had not required the government to prove which specific acts among those listed in the indictment had been committed in order to support a guilty verdict. Emich held estoppel extends only to questions `distinctly put in issue and directly determined' in the criminal prosecution. Emich, at 569 (quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 334, 59 L.Ed. 969, 35 S.Ct. 582 (1915)). The trial court may also use other portions of the prior proceeding, however, in order to clarify the jury's understanding of the prior proceeding: [The trial judge] must be free to exercise a well-established range of judicial discretion. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 342 [84 L.Ed. 307, 60 S.Ct. 266] (1939). He is not precluded from resorting to such portions of the record, including the pleadings and judgment, in the antecedent case as he may find necessary or appropriate to use in presenting to the jury a clear picture of the issues decided there and relevant to the case on trial.... A similar discretion must be exercised in approving the attachment of a copy of the indictment as an exhibit to the complaint. In summary the trial judge should (1) examine the record of the antecedent case to determine the issues decided by the judgment; (2) in his instructions to the jury reconstruct that case in the manner and to the extent he deems necessary to acquaint the jury fully with the issues determined therein; and (3) explain the scope and effect of the former judgment on the case at trial. Emich, at 571-72. Here, it appears the trial court satisfied the Emich standards in its instruction regarding the prior criminal RICO proceeding. Only those facts which actually were proved in the criminal prosecution were presented to the jury as established facts. The instruction specified that the portion excerpted from the indictment had not been proved at the criminal trial, and that the plaintiff still carried the burden of establishing the defendants' conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. The instruction was not inaccurate or confusing, but satisfied the guidelines of Emich regarding use of a prior criminal proceeding in a later civil action. We find no error.