Opinion ID: 795956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of the uncharged prior sexual assaults to prove Count II

Text: 36 Although Seymour did not object to the admissibility of D.T.'s and L.M.'s testimony based on Rule 413, he did argue that the alleged sexual acts sought to be admitted by the government under FRE 413 bear no relevance to the issues in dispute at this trial, and, in any event, would be substantially more prejudicial than probative. This objection was made on the basis of Rule 403. 37 As the district court noted, evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 413 is still subject to the Rule 403 balancing test. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 413 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir.2005) (applying Rule 403 to evidence submitted under Rule 413); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 1998) (same). Seymour specifically argued below that the Rule 403 balancing test weighed in favor of exclusion of the prior-sexual-assault evidence because the jury would confuse the testimony relating to the offenses charged in this case with that regarding other, uncharged sexual assaults, and because he would be forced to devote significant time and effort during the trial refuting allegations made and never charged years ago. (Emphasis in original.) 38 Evidentiary rulings are reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 998 (6th Cir.1999). In reviewing challenges to evidence based on Rule 403, we must give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value. United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 333 (6th Cir.1988) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The district court found the prior-assaults evidence highly probative based on (1) the close[ness] ... in time of the prior acts to the current charges, (2) the similarity of the prior acts, and (3) the alleged frequency of the prior acts. 39 As stated above, Rule 413 was enacted as an exception to the default position set forth in Rule 404(b) that propensity evidence is presumptively more prejudicial than probative. The district court clearly outlined its reasons for admitting the prior-assault evidence, and we find that the admission of this evidence was not an abuse of discretion.