Opinion ID: 437273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the jury's substantial-impairment finding

Text: 34 Cosden claims that the district court erred by refusing to give effect to the jury's finding that Helm's failure to pay for polystyrene delivered under order 1004 on the date such payment was due substantially impaired the value to Cosden of any agreement with respect to such order. Arguing that order 04 was one of four distinct contracts, Cosden states that the substantial impairment finding is equivalent to finding that Helm breached the whole 04 contract. See Sec. 2.612(c). Cosden claims that it was entitled to suspend its performance under section 2.610(3) and that it is not liable for any undelivered amounts of polystyrene under 04. 35 The district judge correctly ignored the jury's finding of substantial impairment. In light of the bulk of the jury's findings and the evidence, the district court was required to give no legal effect to the finding in order to achieve harmony among the other answers. See, e.g., Griffin v. Matherne, 471 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.1973); Stockton v. Altman, 432 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994, 91 S.Ct. 1232, 28 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971). Immediately following the substantial-impairment finding was a special issue on the repudiation or cancellation of order 04, coupled with written instructions. The jury found that Helm did not repudiate its payment obligations for the second 04 delivery before Cosden cancelled order 04. 12 By finding that Cosden cancelled 04, the jury effectively found that the four orders comprised one contract, under which Helm was entitled to offset damages. See Sec. 2.717. Any other view would have dictated the finding that Helm's attempt to offset constituted a breach or repudiation of its payment obligations under 04. In light of the stipulation that Cosden did not breach 04 before March 19, a few days after the due date, the jury effectively found that missing the payment date did not constitute a breach or repudiation by Helm. 36 This interpretation is also consistent with the jury's answer to another issue, which was given along with the text of (a) and (b) of section 2.609. The jury found that Cosden did not request adequate assurance of payment from Helm after Helm failed to make payments that were due under order 04. Thus, the jury could have found that Helm's failure to pay substantially impaired the value of that order to Cosden to the extent that it created reasonable grounds for insecurity with respect to Helm's performance. Without requesting adequate assurance from Helm, however, Cosden was not entitled to suspend its deliveries under 04. See Sec. 2.609; Tennell v. Esteve Cotton Co., 546 S.W.2d 346, 354 n. 4 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The record shows that Cosden did not regard Helm's failure to pay when due as significant or alarming. See Laredo Hides Co. v. H & H Meat Products Co., 513 S.W.2d 210, 217, 220 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Indeed, Cosden manifested a willingness to proceed with a substitute styrene monomer transaction, negotiating with Helm for up to a week and a half after the middle of March. 37 Since the four orders were components of one contract, Helm was entitled to withhold payment under section 2.717. The record contains evidence that Helm notified Cosden of the reason for withholding payment. The jury's finding of substantial impairment had no legal effect, and the district court properly disregarded it.