Opinion ID: 1834364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Did the Proof of Prior Convictions Enhancement Sustain the Charge?

Text: Handley was indicted as an habitual offender. Following his conviction, a hearing was held pursuant to Rule 6.04 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice to determine Handley's status. At the conclusion of the hearing Handley was sentenced as an habitual offender. Handley presents two (2) arguments for reversal under this assignment: (1) the constitutionality of both of Mississippi's habitual offender statutes, § 99-19-81 and § 99-19-83 and (2) the validity of the previous convictions. He relies on Phillips v. State, 421 So.2d 476 (Miss. 1982) and Bandy v. State, 495 So.2d 486 (Miss. 1986).
This Court, as well as the Fifth Circuit, has previously upheld the constitutionality of § 99-19-81 and § 99-19-83. See Perkins v. Cabana, 794 F.2d 168, cert. den. 479 U.S. 936, 107 S.Ct. 414, 93 L.Ed.2d 366 (5th Cir.1986); Sutherland v. State, 537 So.2d 1360 (Miss. 1989); Davis v. State, 510 So.2d 794 (Miss. 1987); Bandy v. State, 495 So.2d 486 (Miss. 1986); Jackson v. State, 483 So.2d 1353 (Miss. 1986); Jenkins v. State, 483 So.2d 1330 (Miss. 1986); Bridges v. State, 482 So.2d 1139 (Miss. 1986); McQueen v. State, 473 So.2d 971 (Miss. 1985); Osborne v. State, 404 So.2d 545 (Miss. 1981). This argument has no merit.
This Court addressed the proper procedure to be followed by the trial court when confronted with the use of foreign convictions for the purposes of determining habitual offender status when those convictions are challenged by the defendant in Phillips v. State, 421 So.2d 476 (Miss. 1982): At a hearing conducted by a trial court pursuant to Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court 6.04, for determining the defendant's status as an habitual offender, the prosecution must show and the trial court must determine that the records of the prior convictions are accurate, that they fulfill the requirements of § 99-19-81, supra, and that the defendant sought to be so sentenced is indeed the person who was previously convicted. ... Once the above mentioned factors have been ascertained, the trial court is not required to go beyond the face of the prior convictions sought to be used in establishing the defendant's status as an habitual offender... . In fulfilling its mission to determine whether a prior conviction is constitutionally valid for the purpose of enhancing a defendant's sentence, the trial court must not be placed in position of retrying the prior case. Certainly any such frontal assault upon the constitutionality of a prior conviction should be conducted in the form of an entirely separate procedure solely concerned with attacking that conviction. This role is neither the function nor the duty of the trial judge in a hearing to determine habitual offender status. Likewise, any such proceeding should be brought in the state in which such conviction occurred, pursuant to that state's established procedures. Id. at 481-82. (emphasis added). Applying the Phillips factors shows the following:
At the Rule 6.04 hearing, the State introduced a certified and exemplified pen packet from the State of Ohio showing the following convictions: (1) Complicity in aggravated robbery to which Handley plead guilty on April 22, 1975, and was sentenced to a term of 4 to 25 years; State's Exhibit # 1; (2) Burglary, to which Handley plead guilty on December 30, 1974, and was sentenced to a term of 5 to 15 years; State's Exhibit # 2; (3) Manslaughter, to which Handley plead guilty on February 19, 1969, and was sentenced to a term of 1 to 20 years, State's Exhibit # 3; and (4) Assault with intent to rob, arising out of the same incident as the manslaughter charge, to which Handley plead guilty on February 19, 1969, and was sentenced to a term of 1 to 15 years, to be served consecutively with the manslaughter sentence; State's Exhibit # 4. Handley objected to the use of these prior convictions. Following the arguments of counsel, the trial court deferred its findings on the prior convictions and recessed the hearing for the evening. The trial court articulated its reasons for taking this action: Well, I owe it to this defendant to be as accurate as I possibly can. I'm not going to sentence this man to jail forever on a defective conviction. I want to be very sure that he has all of his rights, substantive as well as procedural. The hearing was reconvened on June 17, 1987, at which time the trial court found that State's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 were certified and exemplified. The trial court gave no weight to State's Exhibit # 4, a computer printout, because it was unable to interpret the printout.
At the sentencing hearing the prosecuting attorney represented to the trial court that Handley had been indicted under, and they were traveling under, § 99-19-83. That section reads: Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall have been sentenced to and served separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, and where any one (1) of such felonies shall have been a crime of violence shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation. The trial court made the following findings regarding the prior convictions: (1) Complicity in aggravated robbery. (State's Exhibit # 1) The exhibit was accepted into evidence; aggravated robbery is a crime of violence; it was not evident from the record that Handley had served one (1) year. (2) Burglary. (State's Exhibit # 2) The exhibit was accepted into evidence; it was not evident from the record that Handley had served one (1) year. (3) Manslaughter. (State's Exhibit # 3) The exhibit was accepted into evidence only insofar as it related to the conviction; the sentence served was not admitted because the cause number on the certificate did not correspond with the cause number on the indictment. (4) Assault with intent to rob. (State's Exhibit # 4) The exhibit (a computer printout) was admitted into evidence but given no weight because the printout could not be deciphered. Based on the preceding findings, the trial court found that the evidence of Handley's prior convictions introduced by the State did not meet the requirements of § 99-19-83. However, the trial court found the evidence presented met the requirements of § 99-19-81 and proceeded to sentence Handley accordingly. The validity of this procedure is discussed in the next assignment of error. Section 99-19-81 reads: Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall have been sentenced to separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, shall be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation.
The Defendant/Appellant in the case sub judice is James Lee Handley. The evidence of prior convictions contained references to a James L. Handley, James A. Handley, and James Handley. The trial court responded to these inconsistencies: I want the record, too, to reflect that in this pen packet there are inconsistencies and incongruities that ought to have been resolved before this packet left Ohio. To give Mr. Cox a packet like this and expect him to use it to its maximum is an imposition on Mr. Cox or any other prosecutor, and I refer specifically to the identification in some of this correspondence of this defendant as Mr. James A. Handley when, in fact, he's James Lee Handley. I resolve that in my own mind because his Ohio Department of Corrections serial number seems to be the same and his date of birth seems to be the same throughout. We find, based on the foregoing, that all of the Phillips factors were met in the case sub judice and, therefore, this argument has no merit.