Opinion ID: 889628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Restitution for Past Counseling

Text: ¶ 10 Johnson argues that because the State prosecuted him under the 1999 version of the Montana Code Annotated, that version governs his sentencing, citing to State v. Muhammad, 2002 MT 47, ¶ 24, 309 Mont. 1, 43 P.3d 318. Under the 1999 version of § 46-18-242(1)(a) and (b), MCA, the court must order the officer preparing the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) to include documentation of the victim's pecuniary loss and documentation of the defendant's financial resources and future ability to pay restitution. The author of Johnson's PSI stated, [i]t is this Officer's [sic] understanding there is no restitution in this case. The PSI included information regarding Johnson's financial profile but did not provide documentation related to his future ability to pay. Johnson argues that because the PSI did not contain this documentation, the restitution for past counseling violates § 46-18-242(1)(a) and (b), MCA (1999) and should be vacated as illegal, despite his failure to object during sentencing. ¶ 11 The State argues that the 2003 version of the Montana Code Annotated should apply. The Legislature amended § 46-18-242, MCA, in 2003 to eliminate the requirements that the PSI contain documentation about the victim's pecuniary loss and the offender's future ability to pay restitution. It applied these amendments retroactively to offenders who have an unpaid restitution obligation as of October 1, 2003, the effective date of the Act. Laws of Montana, 2003, ch. 272 §§ 4, 10. The State claims Johnson is such an offender, and therefore, the amendments apply to him. The 2003 amendments require only that the PSI include a list of the offender's assets and an affidavit describing the victim's pecuniary loss. Sections 46-18-242(1)(a), (b), MCA (2003). The State argues that Johnson's PSI properly provided a list of Johnson's assets and that Johnson's failure to object to the lack of a victim affidavit prevents him from challenging that issue on appeal, citing to State v. Johnson, 2011 MT 116, ¶ 21, 360 Mont. 443, 254 P.3d 578. ¶ 12 Johnson counters that because he was not an offender who had a restitution obligation on October 1, 2003, the 2003 amendments do not apply to him. He also argues that he had no reason to object to the restitution deficiencies in the PSI because the author stated her assumption that there would be no restitution in this case. ¶ 13 The law in effect at the time of the crime controls as to the possible sentence. State v. Stevens, 273 Mont. 452, 455, 904 P.2d 590, 592 (1995). The 2003 amendments provide: [This act] applies retroactively, within the meaning of 1-2-109, [2] to offenders who have an unpaid restitution obligation on [the effective date of this act]. Laws of Montana, 2003, ch. 272, § 10. The effective date of the act was October 1, 2003. Offender is broadly defined as a person who has been or is liable to be arrested, charged, convicted, or punished for a public offense. Section 45-2-101(47), MCA (2003). While Johnson was an offender because he was liable to be arrested [or] charged for the public offense of intimidation, having committed the offense in 1999, he did not have an unpaid restitution obligation on October 1, 2003, because he was not sentenced to pay restitution until November 24, 2010seven years after the effective date of the act. Since he did not have an unpaid restitution obligation on October 1, 2003, the 2003 amendments do not apply retroactively to Johnson, and the 1999 statutes are applicable to his sentencing, including restitution. ¶ 14 However, Johnson did not object to the PSI. Although he points out that the PSI author stated her belief that no restitution was sought, Johnson also failed to object at the sentencing hearing when restitution was discussed and imposed. Generally, we will not review an issue to which a party has failed to object and preserve for appeal because the objecting party never gave the trial court an opportunity to address and correct any perceived errors. In the Matter of K.M.G., 2010 MT 81, ¶ 36, 356 Mont. 91, 229 P.3d 1227. A condition of a sentence is reviewed for reasonableness only if the defendant objects at the time of sentencing. Holt, ¶ 10 (citing State v. Hernandez, 2009 MT 341, ¶ 3, 353 Mont. 111, 220 P.3d 25). In State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 343, 602 P.2d 997, 1000 (1979), we recognized a narrow exception to this general rule that permits appellate review of criminal sentences that are alleged to be illegal or in excess of statutory mandates, even if the defendant failed to raise an objection in the district court at the time of sentencing. However, a sentencing court's failure to abide by a statutory requirement rises to an objectionable sentence, not necessarily an illegal one that would invoke the Lenihan exception. State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, ¶ 13, 335 Mont. 344, 151 P.3d 892 (citing State v. Nelson, 274 Mont. 11, 20, 906 P.2d 663, 668 (1995); State v. Swoboda, 276 Mont. 479, 482, 918 P.2d 296, 298 (1996)); see also, In the Matter of K.M.G., ¶¶ 36-39. Here, the sentence imposed, despite the asserted deficiencies in the PSI, rose to an objectionable sentence, but it does not constitute an illegal sentence for purposes of Lenihan review. Kotwicki, ¶ 13 Johnson's failure to object to the restitution condition when the District Court orally imposed it at his sentencing forfeited the issue, and we decline to address whether the District Court erred when it imposed restitution for past counseling expenses incurred by the victim. Holt, ¶ 17, Kotwicki, ¶ 12, State v. Baker, 2008 MT 396, ¶ 22, 347 Mont. 159, 197 P.3d 1001; State v. Park, 2008 MT 429, ¶ 21, 347 Mont. 462, 198 P.3d 321; State v. Stiles, 2008 MT 390, ¶ 14, 347 Mont. 95, 197 P.3d 966; State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83, ¶ 22, 342 Mont. 187, 179 P.3d 1164; State v. Hameline, 2008 MT 241, ¶ 14, 344 Mont. 461, 188 P.3d 1052.