Opinion ID: 887862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Qualified immunity still protects Zenker

Text: ¶ 34 Where allegedly injurious conduct arguably falls outside of the quasi-judicial functions, the prosecutor's conduct is entitled to qualified immunity rather than absolute immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity operates to shield government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Losleben v. Oppedahl, 2004 MT 5, ¶ 13, 319 Mont. 269, ¶ 13, 83 P.3d 1271, ¶ 13. We use a two-part test for determining whether the qualified immunity shield applies. Sacco v. High Country Press, 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411, 415 (1995). First, we consider in a light most favorable to the party asserting injury, whether the official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. Losleben, ¶ 14, citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If not, qualified immunity bars the suit and the case should be dismissed. Losleben, ¶ 14. If so, we determine whether a reasonable person or official would have known that his conduct violated that right. Losleben, ¶ 14. ¶ 35 Rosenthal does not allege, nor does the record reveal, the violation of any constitutional right by virtue of the Defendants' actions. This being so, under Losleben, qualified immunity bars the suit (assuming for the sake of Rosenthal's argument that absolute immunity does not). Moreover, as the District Court pointed out in its Decision and Order, Zenker's performance of those prosecutorial duties with respect to both the 310 violation and the stalking complaint was guided by the existence of sufficient probable cause. Among other things, Zenker was presented with (1) the RVSCD chairman's letter requesting prosecution of Rosenthal based on specific complaints of six individuals who lived along Wisconsin Creek; (2) a letter from Richard Oswald, a biologist with the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, indicating that Rosenthal was in violation of the 310 law; (3) several investigation reports, including photos, prepared by members of the State inspection team indicating that the log and power line crossing were in violation of the 310 law; and (4) the January 3, 2002, letter from the RVSCD Board of Supervisors requesting that Madison County prosecute Rosenthal. As to the stalking matter, the case was brought following several complaints and at the instigation of Curtis Kruer, a citizen who perceived that his wife was being threatened by Rosenthal. Zenker did not instigate this case, nor did Zenker prosecute it. ¶ 36 In sum, we conclude the District Court did not err in determining that under the facts presented, Zenker was entitled to immunity  be it absolute or qualified  for his actions undertaken in connection with the prosecutions of Rosenthal. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Rosenthal's Rule 56(f) Motion? ¶ 37 Next, Rosenthal argues the District Court erred in denying his M.R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion for additional discovery. As we have stated many times, the district courts have inherent discretionary power to control discovery. Environmental Contractors, LLC v. Moon, 1999 MT 178, ¶ 19, 295 Mont. 268, ¶ 19, 983 P.2d 390, ¶ 19. This discretionary power extends to deciding whether to deny or to continue a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(f), M.R. Civ. P., on the basis that the party opposing the motion needs further discovery. Stanley, ¶ 19. M.R. Civ. P. 56(f) states: Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. ¶ 38 A district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a M.R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion where the party opposing a motion for summary judgment does not establish how the proposed discovery could preclude summary judgment. J.L. v. Kienenberger, 257 Mont. 113, 120, 848 P.2d 472, 477 (1993, rev'd in part on other grounds); Howell v. Glacier General Assur. Co., 240 Mont. 383, 386, 785 P.2d 1018, 1020 (1989, rev'd in part on other grounds). ¶ 39 Rosenthal claims that additional discovery would allow him to demonstrate Zenker's animus toward him. He argues that he should not be required to specify with precision what information he believes he will secure from discovery because he is unsure what he will learn from facts in the possession of others. He asserts that his affidavit sets forth sufficient evidence to support his claim that Zenker acted with oppression and malice. We disagree. Rosenthal's affidavit fails to meet the requirements of M.R. Civ. P. 56(e) and 56(f) because his statements are speculative and based on belief rather than personal knowledge. Throughout his affidavit, Rosenthal accuses Zenker of threatening remarks yet is unable to substantiate these accusations or provide affidavits of additional witnesses. ¶ 40 Moreover, the affidavit of Rosenthal's attorney is wholly inadequate because he lacks personal knowledge of the threats and is merely restating his client's version of the story. As we said in Hiebert v. Cascade County, 2002 MT 233, ¶ 30, 311 Mont. 471, ¶ 30, 56 P.3d 848, ¶ 30, [w]e have previously held that `an attorney's affidavit is admissible only to prove facts that are within his personal knowledge and as to which he is competent to testify; an affidavit stating what the attorney believes or intends to prove at trial will be disregarded.' ¶ 41 Rosenthal argues that he has not been afforded any opportunity to perform discovery and that the District Court's denial of his M.R. Civ. P. 56(f) request denied him that opportunity. This argument misconstrues the facts. Rosenthal had every opportunity between May 14, 2004, when he filed his malicious prosecution claim, and January 14, 2005, when Defendants filed their summary judgment motion, to request discovery from the Defendants. However, Rosenthal made no attempts at discovery until December 8, 2004, when he sent a letter to Defendants' attorneys asking them to calendar depositions with 19 people, and December 28, when he filed a notice of service of the first set of discovery requests to Defendant Zenker. On the other hand, the record is clear that the Defendants complied with discovery rules and Rosenthal's demands for discovery. ¶ 42 A court need not force a party to undergo more discovery when [t]he only reason to believe that additional, relevant evidence would materialize . . . is the [plaintiff's] apparent hope of finding a proverbial `smoking gun.' Davis v. G.N. Mortg. Corp., 396 F.3d 869, 885 (7th Cir.2005). Rosenthal has failed to establish what evidence he aimed to secure or how that evidence would preclude summary judgment on the basis of absolute immunity. Moreover, even if we were to speculate with Rosenthal that new evidence would establish that Zenker's conduct was entitled to qualified immunity rather than absolute immunity, he does not show how he will pierce the qualified immunity shield protecting Zenker. ¶ 43 Although the District Court did not reach the merits of the M.R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion on the basis that it was moot after granting summary judgment, [w]e will uphold a district court's decision if correct, regardless of the reasons given below for the result. State v. Rensvold, 2006 MT 146, ¶ 34, 332 Mont. 392, ¶ 34, 139 P.3d 154, ¶ 34. We conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Rosenthal's M.R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Rosenthal's claim for attorney's fees under the private attorney general doctrine? ¶ 44 Rosenthal argues that the allegations in his complaint were sufficient to satisfy the private attorney general fee shifting requirement. The State of Montana rebuts that the court correctly denied Rosenthal's request to add this new count to his amended complaint on the basis of futility, because on the face of the pleadings this case does not qualify for fee shifting. ¶ 45 We agree. Moreover, in light of our conclusion here that summary judgment was appropriate, we need not address the propriety of an amendment to support Zenker's claim for attorney's fees.