Opinion ID: 2259150
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel

Text: Appellant raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. A criminal defendant sustains a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel by proving: (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel's performance had no reasonable basis; and, (3) that counsel's ineffectiveness worked to his prejudice. Commonwealth v. LaCava, 542 Pa. 160, 178, 666 A.2d 221, 229 (1995)(citing Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 535 Pa. 210, 237, 634 A.2d 1078, 1092 (1993)). Trial counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if the particular course chosen by counsel was reasonably designed to effectuate his clients' interests. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (1987). The law presumes that trial counsel was effective. Commonwealth v. Miller, 494 Pa. 229, 431 A.2d 233 (1981). First, appellant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Henry Gibson with several prior inconsistent statements. In order to place appellant's specific claims in their proper context, we note that defense counsel conducted extensive cross-examination of Gibson on the following points, inter alia: (1) inconsistencies between trial testimony and earlier statements regarding Gibson's description of the knife that was used to commit the murder; (2) inconsistencies regarding his statements to others the night of the incident; (3) inconsistencies between trial testimony and his statement to a detective regarding whether he tried to stop appellant; (4) his falsehoods about his dishonorable discharge from the United States Marine Corps; (5) his setting false fire alarms; (6) his attempts to commit suicide by overdosing on drugs; (7) his conviction for robbery in California; (8) his violation of conditions of his parole; (9) his pending charges of forgery; and (10) his abuse of alcohol and drugs. Trial counsel also called numerous witnesses to testify as to Gibson's bad reputation for truthfulness and honesty. The first alleged discrepancy regards Gibson's preliminary hearing testimony that he saw a knife in appellant's hand as he stabbed the victim. During trial, Gibson denied seeing a knife in appellant's hand, and testified that he only saw appellant's bare hand moving in a stabbing motion. Trial counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to impeach a witness when such impeachment would only highlight damaging portions of the witness' testimony. See Commonwealth v. Good, 481 Pa. 529, 533, 393 A.2d 30, 32 (1978). Here, trial counsel acted reasonably in declining to pursue the inconsistency, since it would have focused the jury on the possibility that appellant had a knife in his hand at the time of the murder. With respect to the second alleged inconsistency, Gibson testified at the preliminary hearing that he did not remember what color or type of coat he wore on the night of the murder. At trial, however, Gibson testified that he thought he had been wearing a blue coat with a hood. Appellant has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel acted unreasonably by declining to press this minor inconsistency. Moreover, in light of the aforementioned attempts to impeach Gibson on numerous significant points, appellant has failed to demonstrate that the failure to seek to impeach Gibson on the inconsistencies at issue worked to his ultimate prejudice. Thus, appellant is entitled to no relief on his claims of ineffectiveness regarding prior inconsistent statements. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 534 Pa. 527, 633 A.2d 1119 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1114, 115 S.Ct. 908, 130 L.Ed.2d 790 (1995) (attorney not ineffective for failing to impeach accomplice on minor inconsistencies between pre-trial statement and trial testimony). Appellant next claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Gibson with evidence that Gibson had been incarcerated pursuant to bail orders issued under Pa.R.Crim.P. 4017. [34] Specifically, appellant urges that this evidence would have tended to show that Gibson was biased and had a motive to testify in a manner that would please the prosecutor. However, under Rule 4017, a material witness is under no further threat of incarceration or bail orders once that witness has testified, regardless of the content of the witness' testimony. Thus, appellant fails to demonstrate that counsel acted unreasonably by declining to argue that Gibson was biased because he was a Rule 4017 witness. Appellant next claims that trial counsel was ineffective for stating in his closing argument during the guilt phase that Gibson washed his hands after the murder. Specifically, appellant argues that defense counsel undermined his own credibility with this assertion because appellant himself had provided uncontradicted testimony that Gibson was wearing gloves at all times on the night in question. Upon review of the record, it is clear that counsel's statement with respect to Gibson's handwashing was part of an attempt to account for the evidence showing that someone had washed blood from something at the sink in the kitchen area. [35] Trial counsel attempted to show that it could not have been appellant who washed off at the sink because appellant's bloody fingerprints were subsequently found on the door and the lock. Furthermore, appellant had testified that he did not go to the sink or wash any blood from his own hands. Therefore, in accounting for the blood in the sink, the only argument available to defense counsel was to suggest that Gibsonthe only other person in the apartmenthad washed himself off after having committed the murder. Appellant's own testimony that Gibson had been wearing gloves certainly inconvenienced this account, but this does not alter the fact that defense counsel pursued the only reasonable alternative available to him in light of his client's testimony and the physical evidence in the case. Moreover, as stated above, the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury that arguments of counsel do not constitute evidence. The jury is presumed to follow the trial court's instructions. Baker, supra, 531 Pa. at 559, 614 A.2d at 672 (law presumes that juries follow the court's instructions as to the applicable law). In light of the trial court's instructions and the context of the remark at issue, the asserted inconsistency in defense counsel's argument did not prejudice appellant.