Opinion ID: 1860661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public Record

Text: The trial court determined that the check written by David Eanes was a public record as defined by the FOIA, notwithstanding the fact that the check was written on a joint personal checking account belonging to Mr. Eanes and his wife. The FOIA, codified at Arkansas Code Annotated § 25-19-101 et seq., opens all public records for public inspection and copying. Ark.Code Ann. § 25-19-105(a) (Repl.2002). The FOIA defines public records as follows: (5)(A) Public records means writings, recorded sounds, films, tapes, electronic or computer-based information, or data compilations in any medium required by law to be kept or otherwise kept and that constitute a record of the performance or lack of performance of official functions that are or should be carried out by a public official or employee, a governmental agency, or any other agency wholly or partially supported by public funds or expending public funds. All records maintained in public offices or by public employees within the scope of their employment shall be presumed to be public records. Ark.Code Ann. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (Repl. 2002). In City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990), we held that memoranda prepared in anticipation of litigation by a city's outside counsel were public records under the FOIA. In so holding, we pointed out that the attorneys who wrote the memoranda were acting as the functional equivalent of a city attorney and were paid by public funds. Id. Therefore, the city could not avoid FOIA requirements by substituting a private attorney for the city attorney. Id. Likewise, in Swaney v. Tilford, 320 Ark. 652, 898 S.W.2d 462 (1995), where a state agency hired an outside auditing company to perform required audits, the working papers of the outside auditors were considered public records and the agency was required to provide access to them under the FOIA. Judge Fox argues that, because the FOIA request was directed to him, and he personally did not keep Mr. Eanes's check and was not required to keep the check, the check cannot be considered a public record under the FOIA. He further argues that the check is not a public record because it was not maintained in his office or maintained by Mr. Eanes within the scope of his employment. The FOIA provides that citizens may make a request to the custodian of public records to inspect, copy, or receive copies of public records. Ark.Code Ann. § 25-19-105(a)(2)(A). The FOIA requests here were directed to Judge Fox as custodian of the check, and the FOIA's definition of public record does not require that the custodian be the person who actually keeps the document, nor does it say that the custodian must be required to keep the document. As to Judge Fox's argument that the check was not maintained in his office, the locus of the record is important only to determine whether the record falls under the presumption in § 25-19-103(5)(A) (Repl.2002) (that records are presumed to be public records if they are maintained in public offices or by public employees within the scope of their employment). The definition of public record under the FOIA is not dependent upon who keeps the record or where it is keptjust that it either is required to be kept or is otherwise kept. Here, though there appears to have been no requirement to keep the check, the check was indisputably otherwise kept by Mr. Eanes's bank, and is available, for a fee, to Mr. Eanes, the public employee who wrote the check. Analyzing these facts in light of the language of the statute, we can see that (1) Mr. Eanes's check is a writing, (2) the check is otherwise kept at Mr. Eanes's bank, (3) the check is a record of Mr. Eanes's performance of an official function-purchasing copies of records to be used for evidence in a contempt case, and (4) the official function of purchasing documents was carried out by Mr. Eanes, a public employee, at the behest of Judge Fox, a public official. Furthermore, here, unlike the cases of City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, supra , and Swaney v. Tilford, supra , where an outside agency created the documents that were considered public records, it was actually a public employee who created the document in question. The fact that he created the document by using a private checking account does not negate the public function for which the check was used. As we stated in City of Fayetteville v. Edmark , The City cannot avoid the FOIA requirements by substituting a private attorney for the city attorney. To condone such logic would arguably enable public officials to shield from disclosure sensitive or controversial material by hiring an outside attorney instead of using its regular city attorney. The FOIA requirements cannot be circumvented by delegation of regular duties to one specially retained to perform the same task as the regular employee or official. This would be contrary to the requirements and intent of the FOIA. 304 Ark. at 186-87, 801 S.W.2d at 279. Here, Judge Fox spent money to purchase certified copies of documents used by him as evidence in a criminal contempt case. There is no question that a check for this purchase written on Pulaski County's bank account would be a public record subject to the requirements of the FOIA. As in City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, supra , Judge Fox cannot shield from disclosure the records of his actions merely because the check was drawn on a private bank to perform the same function that would have been performed using a properly drawn public check. Because the check drawn on Mr. Eanes's private checking account is a writing, otherwise kept, that constitutes the record of the performance of an official function carried out by a public official through his employee, [1] we hold that Mr. Eanes's check is a public record subject to the FOIA. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on this point.