Opinion ID: 1193844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Tran argues that the Government presented insufficient evidence to support conviction. In particular, Tran contends that the jury could not have found facts sufficient to establish (1) that Tran knew about the pills, and (2) that the substance contained a sufficient amount of methamphetamine to support Tran's conviction for an offense requiring proof of 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(H).
In raising an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the defendant faces a heavy burden, because we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor. United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 459 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reversal is warranted only if no rational factfinder could have found the crimes charged proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 459-60.
We agree with the other courts to have addressed the issue that a defendant's sole occupancy of a vehicle cannot alone suffice to prove knowledge of contraband found hidden in the vehicle; corroborating evidence, such as nervousness, a false statement, or suspicious circumstances, is necessary to prove this element. Anchondo-Sandoval, 910 F.2d at 1236 (Fifth Circuit) (Possession of or control over [the] vehicle [cannot], standing alone, suffice to prove guilty knowledge.); Jackson, 55 F.3d at 1226 (Sixth Circuit) (same); Stanley, 24 F.3d at 1319-20 (Eleventh Circuit) (same). Here, the Government introduced evidence of nervousness and suspicious circumstances. On the question of nervousness, the officer who first intercepted Tran testified that when he asked Tran about his destination, Tran began sweating and gripped the steering wheel. Tran became a little fidgety in the vehicle and began moving around, looking around. Although Tran points out, and the officer acknowledged, that it is not unusual for individuals to become nervous at a border crossing, the jury reasonably could have found that Tran's nervousness surpassed that level and thus reflected consciousness of guilt rather than ordinary anxiety upon interacting with law enforcement. In addition to evidence of nervousness, moreover, the Government introduced evidence of suspicious circumstances. For example, Tran said that he had never visited Seneca Niagara Casino and rarely traveled to Buffalo, but he had no directions for getting to the casino. And while Tran intended to stay for a day or longer, he did not bring a change of clothing or any toiletries other than a brush. Furthermore, Tran lost his right to have sufficiency assessed on the basis of the government's presentation alone when he testified on his own behalf. United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1114 (2d Cir.1995). Although a verdict of guilty cannot properly be based solely on the defendant's denial of the charges, id. at 1114-15, because the jury is entitled to disbelieve the defendant's attempts at exculpatory explanation, United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 577 (2d Cir.1991), a testifying defendant might inadvertently add weight to the government's case, Aulicino, 44 F.3d at 1114 (collecting cases). When Tran testified at trial and stated that he did not know about the contraband in the vehicle, he placed his own credibility in issue. A reasonable jury could have found Tran's explanation incredible, as this jury obviously did. That finding would have been a relevant factor in the jury's determination of whether Tran knew that he was transporting controlled substances. Because, in addition to Tran's occupancy of the vehicle, the Government introduced corroborating evidence of nervousness and suspicious circumstances, and because the jury considered and rejected Tran's own testimony denying knowledge of the drugs that were found, sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that Tran knew that those drugs were in the vehicle.
Tran also argues that insufficient evidence supports the finding that he possessed 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, as required to prove a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(b)(1)(H). He contends that the chemist's use of sampling left the jury without a legitimate basis from which it could infer that each of the 40,790 pills  and not just some  contained methamphetamine. Tran claims that because the chemist treated indiscriminately pills contained in numerous bags, some green and others pink, some bearing the `R' logo and others not, the powder mixtures became tainted. (App. Br. 18-19.) As a result, there remains the possibility that some of the pills contained only MDMA, and that others, amounting to a total of less than 500 grams, contained methamphetamine. On this basis, Tran urges that we reverse his conviction or at least remand for resentencing on the more lenient assumption that each pill contained only MDMA, not methamphetamine. As with Tran's inaccurate challenge to the jury instructions, part of this challenge rests on a material misrepresentation of the record. Tran claims that some of the pills were marked with the R logo and others were not, but the DEA chemist explicitly testified that every pill bore the logo. Tran identifies no other ways in which the pills should have been differentiated. Because each powder mixture tested by the DEA chemist was thus formed from pills that were nearly identical in appearance, the chemist was simply employing a sampling technique to determine the chemical makeup of all of the pills. Although the Government must prove the quantity of drugs through specific evidence, such as drug records, admissions or live testimony, United States v. Shonubi, 998 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir.1993), sampling is a permissible method of proof, United States v. Maceo, 873 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that sufficient evidence supported the finding of drug quantity where a DEA chemist tested 16 of 227 identical vials, then extrapolated from those results to determine the total amount of crack cocaine contained in all the vials together). Based on the evidence about the sampling technique that was introduced at trial, as well as the chemist's opinion that all of the pills contained the same substances in approximately the same proportions, a reasonable jury could find that at least 500 grams of the total 10.2 kilograms of pills found in Tran's rental vehicle were a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(H).