Opinion ID: 2639226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severance of right

Text: ¶ 11 When the trial court ruled that the domestic abuse evidence was admissible with respect to a single count, the appellant moved for severance. He claimed that such evidence would be unduly prejudicial to the capital charge. The state objected on grounds that the motion was too late. The trial court ruled that the motion was timely but denied it because the crimes occurred virtually simultaneously. ¶ 12 Rule 13.4(c) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (2002) states in part: A defendant's motion to sever offenses ... must be made at least 20 days prior to trial or at the omnibus hearing and, if denied, renewed during trial at or before the close of evidence. If a ground not previously known arises during trial, the defendant must move for severance at or before the close of the evidence. Severance is waived if a proper motion is not timely made and renewed. Appellant was aware of the state's intention to use this evidence when the prosecution filed its notice on October 27, 1998. Nevertheless, he claims that a basis for severance did not arise until the court ruled the abuse evidence admissible. ¶ 13 The appellant also asserts that because the facts did not support joinder under Rule 13.3(a)(3), [2] he was entitled to severance as a matter of right. [3] The trial court has broad discretion in such matters. Its decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of such discretion. State v. Walden, 183 Ariz. 595, 605, 905 P.2d 974, 984 (1995). When a defendant challenges a denial of severance on appeal, he `must demonstrate compelling prejudice against which the trial court was unable to protect.' State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 25, 906 P.2d 542, 558 (1995) (quoting State v. Cruz, 137 Ariz. 541, 544, 672 P.2d 470, 473 (1983)). ¶ 14 Consistent with Rule 13.3(a), we have held that crimes can be joined not only when they are of the same or similar character, but also when they arise out of the same conduct. State v. McGill, 119 Ariz. 329, 332, 580 P.2d 1183, 1186 (1978). In such an instance, the defendant is not entitled to a severance unless it is necessary to promote a fair determination of guilt or innocence. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 13.4(a). ¶ 15 Here, the two crimes occurred within seconds of each other and arose out of the same domestic dispute. Joinder was proper pursuant to either Rule 13.3(a)(1) or (2). The appellant was not entitled to severance as a matter of right.