Opinion ID: 2204896
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Covenants

Text: Canatella urges that the contract of sale was not admissible to vary the terms of the deed, citing Mullins v. Ray, 232 Md. 596, 194 A.2d 806 (1963), where Judge Marbury said for the Court: The legal principles which govern here are well established in Maryland. As long ago as 1869, Judge Miller, speaking for the Court, said in Bladen v. Wells, 30 Md. 577, 581: `No principle of law is more firmly settled than that which excludes parol evidence from being used either at law or in equity for the purpose of contradicting, adding to, subtracting from, or varying the terms of a deed, or controlling its legal operation and effect, except where it is impeached for fraud, or where it is sought to be reformed upon the allegations of fraud, accident or mistake.' This is generally referred to as the merger doctrine, and many decisions pertinent thereto are collected in 6 M.L.E., Conveyances, § 94. Id. at 598-99. Davis also points out that, without objection, the real estate agent testified that she showed Davis land at the corner which had a six hundred foot frontage on one street and ran back four hundred feet in depth. She further said that even after the discrepancy relative to the L shaped portion of land on the plat was brought up at the time the settlement was first set, that there was never any indication that Davis was acquiring anything other than six and a fraction acres. She was under the impression that the Canatellas told her approximately how much land they owned, exhibiting to her the Harford County tax bill. They did not point out the land to her. They told her it was at the corner of Jay Cee Drive and Mountain Road and she went up and found it. The parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence, but a substantive rule of law. Foreman v. Melrod, 257 Md. 435, 442, 263 A.2d 559 (1970); Rinaudo v. Bloom, 209 Md. 1, 120 A.2d 184 (1956); and 3 Corbin on Contracts § 573 (1960) citing Rinaudo in the text. The concept expressed in Mullins has been expressed many times by this Court, e.g. Heckrotte v. Riddle, 224 Md. 591, 595, 168 A.2d 879 (1961); Millison v. Fruchtman, 214 Md. 515, 518, 136 A.2d 240 (1957); and Gilbert Const. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 409, 129 A.2d 518 (1957). Davis says, however, that the rule does not apply in instances of fraud, accident, or mistake, pointing to Levin v. Cook, 186 Md. 535, 538, 47 A.2d 505 (1946); Buckner v. Hesson, 159 Md. 461, 464, 150 A. 852 (1930); West Boundary Co. v. Bayless, 80 Md. 495, 507, 31 A. 442 (1895); and Bladen v. Wells, 30 Md. 577, 581 (1869). In Levin the antecedent contract was admitted into evidence because of a collateral agreement. In Buckner there was a bill for specific performance of a contract to convey. The issue was decided upon demurrer. There was a contract by which land was to be conveyed clear and free from the payment of any ground rent. The habendum clause in the conveyance, called a deed but actually an assignment, as this Court pointed out, recited that the grantor would assume payment of the ground rent. Citing Bladen v. Wells, supra , this Court held a conveyance in fee simple was required, stating: In this case, though the appellant argues that the appellee has not in terms charged the appellant with fraud, accident, or mistake in the transaction, we think it is so stated as to come under at least one of these heads, and the appellant should be required to answer the bill of complaint. Id. at 464. West Boundary Co. was an equity action in which this Court affirmed a decree dismissing the bill after demurrer. It recognized the fraud, accident, or mistake doctrine by way of dicta. It held the contract merged into the deed. In Bladen Judge Miller said for our predecessors: No principle of law is more firmly settled than that which excludes parol evidence from being used either at law or in equity for the purpose of contradicting, adding to, subtracting from, or varying the terms of a deed, or controlling its legal operation and effect, except where it is impeached for fraud, or where it is sought to be reformed upon the allegations of fraud, accident or mistake. It would be useless to cite the numerous instances in which our predecessors have enforced this doctrine, and held that all oral negotiations or stipulations between the parties preceding or accompanying the execution of a written instrument, are to be regarded as merged in it, and the latter treated as the exclusive medium of ascertaining the agreement by which the contracting parties bound themselves. Id. at 581. In holding the general rule applicable to the case and the case not within one of the exceptions, he went on to say: If a party, after conveying by solemn deed the whole of his farm for a specified sum of money which has been paid to him, can set up an antecedent or accompanying parol contract like the present, contradicting the deed both as to price and quantity, there would be very little room for the operation of the rule, and very little security or safety in such instruments, or in titles held under them. Id. at 583. (Emphasis in original.) Davis might well have cited Hoffman v. Chapman, 182 Md. 208, 34 A.2d 438 (1943). That was an action in equity to reform the deed. The grantees in the deed had contracted to purchase a lot 96 by 150, only a portion of the land of the grantors, the remainder being improved by other dwelling property. All of the land of the grantors was mistakenly included in the deed. The grantees refused to convey back and the grantors entered suit in equity to reform the deed on the ground of mistake. Judge Delaplaine there said for the Court: It is a general rule of the common law that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms of a written instrument. Markoff v. Kreiner, 180 Md. 150, 23 A.2d 19. But equity refuses to enforce this rule whenever it is alleged that fraud, accident or mistake occurred in the making of the instrument, and will admit parol evidence to reform the instrument, even though it is within the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 210. He explained at page 211, Equity reforms an instrument not for the purpose of relieving against a hard or oppressive bargain, but simply to enforce the actual agreement of the parties to prevent an injustice which would ensue if this were not done. See Deed as superseding, or merging, provisions of antecedent contracts imposing obligations upon the vendor, 84 A.L.R. 1008 (1933) and 38 A.L.R.2d 1310 (1954), and Remedy in case of mistake or fraud respecting actual application on the ground of a correct description in a deed or other instrument, 149 A.L.R. 749 (1944). See also 3 Corbin op. cit. §§ 587, 604, and 614, and 6 Corbin on Contracts § 1319 (1962). This is an action at law for damages, not an action in equity for reformation as in Hoffman, nor an action in equity for specific performance as in Buckner. The circumstances of this case might well have dictated the consideration of the contract had the suit been in equity to reform the deed. In this jurisdiction there is a difference between law and equity, and Davis chose his form of action. We do not find any exception under which this case would fit, nor do we find that the fact that Mrs. Allinson, the real estate saleswoman, testified without objection changes the substantive rule that the contract was merged into the deed. Therefore, the contract should not have been considered against Canatella. It was admissible in evidence, however, since it was an integral part of the case against Real Estate Title. It would have been admissible not for the purpose of varying the deed, but for the purpose of showing what instructions had been given to Real Estate Title. Davis saw the language of Code (1966 Repl. Vol.) Art. 21, §§ 92 and 93 as permitting him to recover for the breach of the covenants against encumbrances and for further assurances if this contract were properly before the court, because those sections refer not only to the land conveyed but to the land intended so to be. Looking at the four corners of the deed to determine the land intended to be conveyed, one determines that Canatella intended to convey and Davis intended to receive 1.6 acres, the amount actually conveyed. Likewise, despite the assertion of Davis that he should recover for a breach of his special warranty because he did not receive two acres in the first parcel, there is no liability under that covenant since the deed makes it crystal clear that the parties intended to convey only the land which remained in the name of Canatella. Accordingly, the trial court was in error in entering judgment in favor of Davis against Canatella.