Opinion ID: 168971
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Metro Jail Transfer Policy

Text: 56 The parties and the district court also applied McDonnell Douglas in analyzing the job posting at Metro where only requests from male deputies will be accepted. R. at 89. In applying McDonnell Douglas, the district court found the Metro job constituted no more than a lateral transfer and based on Sanchez determined no adverse employment action had occurred. We disagree. 57 The prima facie case from McDonnell Douglas helps establish an inference of discrimination and eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). But where an employer's policy is discriminatory on its face, we need not worry about eliminating nondiscriminatory reasons for an employer's action. In cases of facial discrimination, There is no need to probe for a potentially discriminatory motive circumstantially, or to apply the burden-shifting approach outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.  Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 n. 16 (10th Cir.1995); see also Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 131-132 (3d Cir.1996); Reidt v. County of Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (7th Cir.1992). Once facial discrimination has been established in the record, we review only to see (1) if the affected person is a member of the discriminated class for purposes of standing; (2) whether the policy affects rights protected by the statute; and (3) whether any affirmative defenses exist to the discrimination. 58 In her motion for summary judgment below, Piercy asserted the policy preventing women from taking jobs at Metro discriminated on its face and thus only a bona fide occupational qualification per 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) could justify such facial discrimination. Given the job posting's clear language that women need not apply, the facial discrimination is equally clear. As the job posting's language is plainly discriminatory on its face and Piercy is clearly an affected member of the class, we turn to whether the discriminatory policy affected protected rights. 59 Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.2000e-2(a)(1). [E]mployment decisions that adversely affect an employee's status are covered by the statute. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). And as we noted earlier, this approach requires us to consider the unique factors relevant to the situation at hand. Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 532. 60 Even if we were to analogize this case to Sanchez and its language regarding lateral transfers as the district court did, we are not convinced the case before us constitutes a truly lateral transfer where the job duties were substantially the same such that no adverse employment action occurred. Piercy claims EPSO's policy preventing any female from transferring to Metro materially discriminated against her and the other women deputies, and that, as a consequence, they were ineligible for work in Metro. Piercy points to evidence in the record (1) that work in Metro would be less arduous and stressful than CJC due to the indirect nature of supervision, and (2) that the opportunity to work Metro shifts increased her chances of obtaining additional job and leave flexibility. We think the differences in duties between the two prisons are sufficiently substantial to preclude the district court's finding that a transfer to Metro from CJC would be purely lateral. 61 Summary judgment was improperly granted on whether Piercy's inability to transfer to Metro Jail was an adverse employment action.