Opinion ID: 166407
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The “mechanical construction” standard

Text: The BLM and SUWA argue that mere public use cannot suffice to establish an R.S. 2477 right of way. Instead, following the BLM administrative determinations in this case, they contend that R.S. 2477 requires that “[s]ome form of mechanical construction must have occurred to construct or improve the 83 highway.” BLM R.S. 2477 Administrative Determination(s) – San Juan County Claims at 5, Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 249 (“San Juan Admin. Det.”); Garfield Admin. Det. at 4, Aplt. App. Vol. 2 at 307; see also Kane Admin. Det. at 5, Aplt. App. Vol. 2 at 371. “A highway right-of-way cannot be established by haphazard, unintentional, or incomplete actions. For example, the mere passage of vehicles across the land, in the absence of any other evidence, is not sufficient to meet the construction criteria of R.S. 2477 and to establish that a highway right-of-way was granted.” “Evidence of actual construction may include such things as road construction or maintenance records, aerial photography depicting characteristics of physical construction, physical evidence of construction, testimony or affidavits affirming that construction occurred, official United States Government maps with legends showing types of roads, as well as other kinds of information.” Id. The BLM and SUWA cite no pre-1976 authority for this interpretation of R.S. 2477, and we are aware of none. No judicial or administrative interpretation of the statute, prior to its repeal, ever treated “mechanical construction” as a prerequisite to acceptance of the grant of an R.S. 2477 right of way. The standard has no support in the common law, which, as we have noted, 30 formed the statutory backdrop for R.S. 2477. In no state was mechanical construction of a 30 See pages 54-60 above. 84 highway deemed necessary for acceptance of a public right of way. Even the BLM took the opposite position not long ago. See BLM Manual 2801, Rel. 2-263, 2801.48B1b (March 8, 1989), reprinted in 1993 D.O.I. Report to Congress, App. II, Exh. M (“passage of vehicles by users over time may equal construction”). The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the validity of an R.S. 2477 claim despite the fact that the road in question “has never been maintained at public expense,” and without any mention of evidence of construction. Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d 107, 108 (Utah 1958). In other cases recognizing R.S. 2477 rights of way, the Utah Supreme Court noted construction that had been done on the roads, but only as evidence contributing to the general conclusion of sufficient public use, and without treating the issue of construction as legally significant. Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646, 647 (Utah 1929) (“At times bridges were built and short dugways constructed by persons directly interested, but it does not appear that any public money was ever expended to maintain or repair the road.”); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1941) (calling the road “well traveled, worked, and defined”). Similarly, in Hughes v. Veal, 114 P. 1081, 1083 (Kan. 1911), the court noted that “work has been done on the road by those in charge of the highways in that locality,” but in determining that the right of way had been accepted by the public, the court “rest[ed] the decision” on 85 “the concurring acceptance of the officers and the public itself at and shortly after the location of the road.” The few decisions in which a construction standard is discussed rejected it. In Nicolas v. Grassle, 267 P. 196, 197 (Colo. 1928), the Colorado Supreme Court held: The district court . . . thought the word ‘construction’ in the congressional grant required that, to constitute an acceptance, work must be done on the road. We do not think so. The purpose of the act was to give every settler, however unable to build a road, lawful access to whatever land he chose to enter. If access is feasible without work with pick and shovel no such work is necessary, and it would be a mistake to hold that action by any governmental authority is required. In Wilkenson v. Dep’t of Interior, 634 F. Supp. 1265, 1272 (D. Colo. 1986), the federal district court stated: The defendants cite the rule of statutory construction that all words in a statute must be given effect, and argue that for the grant to be accepted, this rule requires that there be actual ‘construction,’ meaning ‘more than mere use’ of a highway. However, in Colorado, mere use is sufficient. [T]he statute is an express dedication of a right of way for roads over unappropriated government lands, acceptance of which by the public results from ‘use by those for whom it was necessary or convenient.’ It is not required that ‘work’ shall be done on such a road, or that public authorities shall take action in the premises. User is the requisite element, and it may be by any who have occasion to travel over public lands, and if the use be by only one, still it suffices. 86 (quoting Leach v. Manhart, 77 P.2d 652, 653 (Colo. 1938)); accord, Barker v. County of La Plata, 49 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1214 (D. Colo. 1999). See also Wallowa County v. Wade, 72 P. 793, 794 (Or. 1903) (affirming R.S. 2477 claim despite the servient landowner’s showing that “the road over the land inclosed by him had never been worked or improved by the county authorities, or under their direction”); Fitzgerald v. Puddicombe, 918 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Alaska 1996) (“[n]or does the route need to be significantly developed to qualify as a ‘highway’ for RS 2477 purposes”); Ball v. Stephens, 158 P.2d 207, 209 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945) (recognizing R.S. 2477 right of way even though “it was never improved or maintained by the county”). Consistent with our conclusion that acceptance of the grant of R.S. 2477 rights of way is governed by long-standing principles of state law and common law, we cannot accept the argument that mechanical construction is necessary to an R.S. 2477 claim. Adoption of the “mechanical construction” criterion would alter over a century of judicial and administrative interpretation. This is not to say that evidence of construction is irrelevant. Construction or repair at public expense has sometimes been treated as a substitute for public use, 31 as shortening 31 Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah 1982); see Streeter v. Stalnaker, 85 N.W. 47, 48 (Neb. 1901) (“In this case there was not only evidence of user, general and long continued, but also proof that the public authorities had assumed control over the road, and had worked and improved a portion of it. (continued...) 87 the period of public use necessary for establishing acceptance, 32 or as evidence of public use or lack thereof. 33 Thus, although there are no Utah cases directly on point, we hold that evidence of actual construction (appropriate to the historical period in question), or lack thereof, can be taken into consideration as evidence of the required extent of public use, though it is not a necessary or sufficient 31 (...continued) Both facts were competent evidence tending to show an acceptance of a dedication.”); Moulton v. Irish, 218 P. 1053, 1055 (Mont. 1923) (finding no evidence “to establish the construction of a road or its continuous use by the public over a definite and fixed course”) (emphasis added); Wilson v. Williams, 87 P.2d 683, 685 (N.M. 1939) (“Generally the construction of a highway or establishment thereof by public user is sufficient.”); Town of Rolling v. Emrich, 99 N.W. 464, 465 (Wis. 1904) (acceptance of R.S. 2477 right of way could be “by county authorities by surveying, platting, and marking out a road,” or by 20 years’ use by the public); Roberts v. Swim, 784 P.2d 339, 342-43, 346 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (right of way could be established under state law by prescriptive easement on the basis of “open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use” for five years, or as a public highway by public maintenance and use for five years). 32 In Washington, the period of public use necessary for acceptance of an R.S. 2477 right of way was seven years where the road was “worked and kept up at the expense of the public,” and ten years otherwise. Stofferan v. Okanogan County, 136 P. 484, 487 (Wash. 1913). 33 In the course of rejecting an R.S. 2477 claim, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that “there was no proof of any expenditure of public funds thereon, or of any working of the same by highway officials.” Town of Rolling v. Emrich, 99 N.W. 464, 465 (Wis. 1904). See also Simon v. Pettit, 687 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Colo. 1984) (“evidence that the city had maintained the footpaths or included them on a map of the city’s street system would be a strong indication that the paths had acquired a status as public highways”); Hatch Bros. Co. v. Black, 165 P. 518, 520 (Wyo. 1917) (noting that “those using the road had done considerable work thereon by making dugways, constructing bridges, etc.; one witness testifying that he had spent about $500 on it about 1891”) superseded by statute as noted in Yeager v. Forbes, 78 P.3d 241, 255 (Wyo. 2003). 88 element. This case does not raise the question, and we do not decide, whether a road officially laid out or erected for public use by state or local governmental authority, prior to repeal of R.S. 2477, would qualify as a highway without proof of ten years’ continuous public use. See Utah Code Ann. Sec. 72-1-102(7) (West 2004). The BLM and SUWA defend their proposed “mechanical construction” standard primarily as dictated by the “plain meaning” of R.S. 2477, which grants the rights of way for the “construction” of highways. The BLM quotes the definition of “construction” from an 1860 edition of Webster’s Dictionary as “[t]he act of building, or of devising and forming, fabrication.” BLM Br. 48. SUWA quotes a similar definition from an 1865 edition of Webster’s as: 1. The act of construction; the act of building, or of devising and forming; fabrication; composition. 2. The manner of putting together the parts of any thing so as to give to the whole its peculiar form; structure; conformation. SUWA Br. 21. That same dictionary supplies these synonyms: to “build; erect; form; make; originate; invent; fabricate.” Id. We are not persuaded. First, it would take more semantic chutzpah than we can muster to assert that a word used by Congress in 1866 has a “plain meaning” that went undiscerned by courts and executive officers for over 100 years. But even confining ourselves to the quoted dictionary definitions of “construction,” 89 we are left with a wide range of meanings, including “build,” “form,” and “make.” If nineteenth-century pioneers made a road across the wilderness by repeated use—the so-called “beaten path”—this would fall squarely within the scope of the quoted definition. Such a road would be “formed” and “made” even if no mechanical means were employed. See Cent. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Alameda County, 284 U.S. 463, 467 (1932) (referring to R.S. 2477 roads originally “formed by the passage of wagons, etc., over the natural soil”) (emphasis added); Wallowa County v. Wade, 72 P. 793 (Or. 1903) (“all this time [the road] has been a plain, open, well-beaten track”). Moreover, we must not forget that R.S. 2477 was enacted against a backdrop of a well-developed common law of highways. Early interpreters naturally assumed that its terms should be read in light of the common law concepts of dedication and acceptance. Thus, courts would speak of a highway being “definitely established and constructed in some one of the ways authorized by the laws of the state in which the land is situated,” including having been “used or traveled by the people generally for the period named in the statutes of limitation.” State ex rel. Dansie v. Nolan, 191 P. 150, 152, 153 (Mont. 1920) (emphasis added and citation and quotations omitted). In addition to their “plain language” argument, the BLM and SUWA seek support in Bear Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Co. v. Garland, 164 U.S. 1, (1896), which addressed the meaning of the term “construction” in a different 90 section of the same statute that contained R.S. 2477. That section dealt with grants of rights of way for “the construction . . . of ditches.” Id. at 17 (quoting Act of July 26, 1866, Ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (later codified as R.S. 2339)). In Bear Lake, the Court held that no right of way vests against the government “from the mere fact of such possession, unaccompanied by the performance of any labor thereon. . . . It is the doing of the work, the completion of the well, or the digging of the ditch . . . that gives the right to use the water in the well, or the right of way for the ditches of the canal upon or through the public land.” 164 U.S. at 18-19. The BLM and SUWA argue that the same word, “construction,” must be given the same meaning in two sections of what was originally the same statute. Again, we are unpersuaded. The dispute in Bear Lake was over which of two creditors had priority with respect to a canal owned by the debtor: the canal construction company, which had a lien on the product of its labors, or the mortgage company, which held a lien on the debtor’s real property. The outcome turned on whether the debtor acquired title to the canal property when it began the project (in which case the mortgage company would prevail), or upon completion of the canal (in which case the construction company enjoyed a priority). The Court held that title did not vest until the canal had been dug, just as an R.S. 2477 right of way does not vest until the road is formed, by user or otherwise. The type 91 or degree of work expended on the ditch was immaterial to the decision. It so happens that canals, unlike roads, cannot be created by mere use, so the question with which we are concerned could not arise in Bear Lake. 34 SUWA also points to a number of instances in which the Utah legislature appropriated funds for the construction of roads, specifying work that included surveying, cleaning, grading, ditching, macadamizing, and so forth. But that some roads were built to a higher level of engineering specifications does not mean that other roads, formed by repeated use, were not “constructed.” 35 SUWA supplements its argument that “construction” must refer to “resource-intensive construction,” SUWA Br. 28, by reference to the probable intention of Congress in granting rights of way for highways. According to SUWA, Congress enacted R.S. 2477 “to spur investment in and development of internal improvements” by “grant[ing] a permanent right-of-way in exchange for the ‘construction’ of highways.” Id. at 33. “Like other land-grant statutes, R.S. 34 The same is true of the construction of railroads. See Jamestown & N. R.R. Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 125, 132 (1900) (holding that railroad right of way under the Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 152, 18 Stat. 482, vested upon “actual construction” of the road). 35 SUWA quotes this Court’s Hodel decision to the effect that “‘[c]onstruction’ indisputably does not include the beaten path.” SUWA Br. 24 (quoting Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1080). SUWA neglects to note that the quotation is from the Hodel court’s summary of the position of the Sierra Club in the case, a position which was not adopted by the Court. 92 2477 provided an incentive and reward for the expenditure required to construct a highway.” Id. at 28. The trouble with this theory is that those who made the investment in the road did not receive any rights to it; R.S. 2477 rights of way are owned by the public and not by the individuals who “constructed” the highways. A more probable intention of Congress was to ensure that widely used routes would remain open to the public even after homesteaders or other land claimants obtained title to the land over which the public traveled. That explanation of congressional intent is more consistent with the common law interpretation than with the Appellees’ proposed substitute. We must not project twenty-first (or twentieth) century notions of “mechanical construction” onto an 1866 statute. Historical records of early southern Utah road “construction” indicate that work was performed as economically as possible: if wagons could be conveyed across the land without altering the topography, there was no need for more extensive construction work. Typically, little more was done than move boulders, clear underbrush or trees, or dig the occasional crude dugway. See Jay M. Haymond, A Survey of the History of the Road Construction Industry in Utah 2 (1967) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Brigham Young University) (on file with the University of Utah Marriott Library) (“road building in the early days consisted only of removing rocks and stumps and filling in holes”). This is one reason an early court rejected the argument that 93 “work must be done on the road” to constitute acceptance of an R.S. 2477 grant. Nicolas v. Grassle, 267 P. 196, 197 (Colo. 1928). “If access is feasible without work with pick and shovel no such work is necessary, and it would be a mistake to hold that action by any governmental authority is required.” Id. See also Ball v. Stephens, 158 P.2d 207, 210 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945) (the disputed route “came to be a road by means of being used as a road and in the same fashion that many other mountain roads have come into existence”); id. at 211 (the land “is somewhat flat and vehicles could be and were driven across it without the necessity of road construction”). Surely Congress did not require mechanical construction where no construction was needed. The necessary extent of “construction” would be the construction necessary to enable the general public to use the route for its intended purposes. For this reason, we are skeptical that there is much difference, in practice, between a “construction” standard (if applied in light of contemporary conditions) and the traditional legal standard of continuous public use. If a particular route sustained substantial use by the general public over the necessary period of time, one of two things must be true: either no mechanical construction was necessary, or any necessary construction must have taken place. It is hard to imagine how a road sufficient to meet the user standard could fail to satisfy a realistic standard of construction. Thus, we do not necessarily disagree with the BLM’s statement 94 that: A highway right-of-way cannot be established by haphazard, unintentional, or incomplete actions. For example, the mere passage of vehicles across the land, in the absence of any other evidence, is not sufficient to meet the construction criteria of R.S. 2477 and to establish that a highway right-of-way was granted. Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 249; Aplt. App. Vol. 2 at 307, 452. The standard for acceptance of an R.S. 2477 right of way in Utah is “continued use of the road by the public for such length of time and under such circumstances as to clearly indicate an intention on the part of the public to accept the grant.” Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646, 648 (Utah 1929). As the precedents in Utah and other states demonstrate, a road may be created intentionally, by continued public use, without record evidence of what the BLM defines as “mechanical construction.” Such action is not haphazard, unintentional, or incomplete, though it might lack centralized direction; and the legal standard is not satisfied “merely” by evidence that vehicles may have passed over the land at some time in the past. That is a caricature of the common law standard. Indeed, contrary to the apparent assumptions of the parties, it is quite possible for R.S. 2477 claims to pass the BLM’s “mechanical construction” standard but to fail the common law test of continuous public use. See Town of Rolling v. Emrich, 99 N.W. 464, 464 (Wis. 1904) (rejecting R.S. 2477 claim despite evidence that two men “cut out a road . . . through the 80 acres in question 95 to haul logs upon”); Roediger v. Cullen, 175 P.2d 669, 674, 677 (Wash. 1946) (rejecting R.S. 2477 claim despite evidence of construction and repair by members of the community). For example, according to the BLM administrative decision, San Juan County route 507, in the Hart’s Point area, shows signs of mechanical construction: bulldozer grouser marks, berms, pushed trees and debris, and cut banks, San Juan Admin. Det. at 11-12, Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 255-56; and a witness testified that the road was constructed by mining companies in the 1950s, using bulldozers, for the purpose of accessing seismic lines. Id. at 11, 16. Yet the BLM found that “the use of this route by the public has been at most sporadic and infrequent.” Id. 18. 36 The record indicates that the same may be true of others of the contested routes. Large parts of southern Utah are crisscrossed by old mining and logging roads constructed for a particular purpose and used for a limited period of time, but not by the general public. Thus, we cannot agree with Appellees’ argument that a “mechanical construction” standard is necessary to avoid recognition of “a multitude of property claims far beyond the scope of Congress’s express grant in R.S. 2477.” SUWA Br. 39. The common law standard of user, which takes evidence of construction into consideration along with other evidence of use by the general public, seems better calculated to 36 We make these observations regarding route 507 for purposes of illustration only, and without prejudice to the district court’s factfinding on remand. 96 distinguish between rights of way genuinely accepted through continual public use over a lengthy period of time, and routes which, though mechanically constructed (at least in part), served limited purposes for limited periods of time, and never formed part of the public transportation system. We therefore see no persuasive reason not to follow the established common law and state law interpretation of the establishment of R.S. 2477 rights of way.