Opinion ID: 2451869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Differences

Text: Actions for defamation in Texas are subject to numerous procedural and substantive hurdles. For example, accounts of governmental proceedings, public meetings dealing with a public purpose, or any reasonable and fair comment on or criticism of an official act are privileged under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code ง 73.002. Broadcasters are generally not liable in defamation for broadcasts made by third parties. Tex.Civ.Prac. 73.-004. Qualified privileges against defamation exist at common law when a communication is made in good faith and the author, the recipient or a third person, or one of their family members, has an interest that is sufficiently affected by the communication. Restatement (Second) of Torts งง 594-97 (1977); see also Holloway v. Texas Medical Ass'n, 757 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1988, writ denied). A communication may also be conditionally privileged if it affects an important public interest. Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 598 (1977); see generally Bruce W. Sanford, supra, at 701-94.1 (collecting libel privilege statutes from all fifty states). Damages awarded for defamatory statements may be mitigated by factors such as public apology, correction, or retraction. Tex.Civ.Prac. 73.-003; see generally Bruce W. Sanford, supra, at 701-94.1 (collecting libel retraction statutes from thirty-three states). Constitutional county courts in Texas are without jurisdiction to hear defamation cases. Tex. Gov't Code ง 26.043(1). Finally, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 137 provides that in defamation actions, if the verdict for the plaintiff is less than twenty dollars, the plaintiff will not recover costs, but each party will be taxed with the costs incurred in the suit. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 652E, comment e (1977) (listing other possible limitations on the defamation action, including bond posting requirements and proof of special damages). These technical restrictions serve to safeguard the freedom of speech. [9] Every defamation action that the law permits necessarily inhibits free speech. As the Supreme Court stated with respect to political speech in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 702 (1964), [w]hatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate. While less compelling, these same considerations are also at play in private, non-political expression. Thus, the defamation action has been narrowly tailored to limit free speech as little as possible. Courts in many jurisdictions have preserved their protection of speech by holding false light actions to the same strictures as defamation actions. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 652E, comment e reasons: [w]hen the false publicity is also defamatory... it is arguable that limitations of long standing that have been found desirable for the action for defamation should not be successfully evaded by a proceeding upon a different theory of later origin, in the development of which the attention of the courts has not been directed to the limitations. Several courts have followed this reasoning, particularly regarding the applicable limitations period. See Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 480 (Mo.1986) (limitations); Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal.3d 20, 81 CaLRptr. 360, 370, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (1969) (privilege for truthful publications); Gashgai v. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir.1983) Qimitations). See also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, supra, at nn. 16 Debra Ann Bacharach, Comment, The Privacy Action in Texas: Its Characterization, and a Determination of Applicable Statutes of Limitations, 29 Sw.LJ. 928, 950 (1975); Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, False Light Invasion of PrivcayโDefenses and Remedies, 57 A.L.R. 4th 244, 266-68 (1987). But see Covington v. Houston Post, 743 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (declining to apply defamation statute of limitations to false light claim); Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co., 793 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied). Permitting plaintiffs to bring actions for false light without the limits established for defamation actions may inhibit free speech beyond the permissible range. [10] This is especially true in Texas since this Court recently held in Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex.1992), that article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution affords greater protection to free speech than the First Amendment. [11] On the other hand, no useful purpose would be served by the separate tort if these restrictions are imposed. As the court observed in Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405, cert denied, 469 U.S. 858, 105 S.Ct. 187, 83 L.Ed.2d 121 (1984): Given the First Amendment limitations placed upon defamation actions by [New York Times v.] Sullivan and upon false light invasion of privacy actions by [ Time, Inc. v.] Hill , we think that such additional remedies as we might be required to make available to plaintiffs should we recognize false light invasion of privacy claims are not sufficient to justify the recognition in this jurisdiction of such inherently constitutionally suspect claims for relief. Id. at 413. See also Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d 123, 135 (2d Cir.1984) (regardless of whether [plaintiff's] cause of action is cast in terms of libel or false light ... the same constitutional protections apply); Berry v. NBC, Inc., 480 F.2d 428, 431 (8th Cir.1973) ([t]he problem is whether the plaintiff can, by suing for invasion of privacy, by-pass the various safeguards and limitations which have grown up around the accusation of defamation). Thus, we should decline to restrict speech in any manner beyond our existing tort law.