Opinion ID: 2684138
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of 56(d) Motion

Text: Rule 56(d) allows, in certain circumstances, for supplemental discovery after a motion for summary judgment has been filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). We have previously cautioned that Rule 56(d) relief is not to be granted as a matter of course. Ayala-Gerena, 95 F.3d at 92. As we have explained: To benefit from the protections of Rule 56[(d)], a litigant ordinarily must furnish the nisi prius court with a timely statement -- if not by affidavit, then in some other authoritative manner -- that (i) explains his or her current inability to adduce the facts essential to filing an opposition, (ii) provides a plausible basis for believing that the sought-after facts can be assembled within a reasonable time, and (iii) indicates how those facts would influence the outcome of the pending summary judgment motion. -7- Velez v. Awning Windows, Inc., 375 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir 2004). In addition, the movant must set forth good cause to explain [her] failure to have conducted the desired discovery at an earlier date. Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 44 (1st Cir. 1998). Even upon submission of the required materials, the district court is entitled to refuse a Rule 56(d) motion if it concludes that the party opposing summary judgment is unlikely to garner useful evidence from supplemental discovery. See FDIC v. Kooyomjian, 220 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2000); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 202 n.15 (1st Cir. 1999). Hicks's decision to seek supplemental discovery shortly after retaining counsel is understandable. As a pro se litigant, she likely had little understanding of the discovery process and had not conducted any depositions. The Secretary had already made affidavits from Commander Rendon, Commander Newby, Blackman, and Sullivan part of the record at the time of her motion, as well as a significant amount of documentary evidence. Specifically, in addition to requesting an opportunity to conduct depositions of those individuals, Hicks sought to depose Krout, who was awarded the position over her, and Norton, her former supervisor. Neither of those individuals were involved in the decision-making process on the promotion at issue. Hicks did not specify the evidence that she expected to obtain from any of this additional discovery. -8- Hicks's request to reopen discovery came late in the process. She also sought vague information from deponents, some of whom were not even relevant to her case. Furthermore, it is far from clear that the requested depositions of the decisionmakers would yield any useful information beyond what was in their affidavits. The district court, while sympathetic to Hicks's situation, acted within the bounds of its discretion in concluding that the additional discovery sought would not alter the summary judgment landscape and that simply granting an extension to the opposition deadline was sufficient to account for the fact that Hicks had been proceeding pro se.