Opinion ID: 77044
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Doe v. Chao

Text: 21 The district court spends a large part of its decision discussing the effect of Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 124 S.Ct. 1204, 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004) on the remedial provision of the DPPA. Doe v. Chao guides, but does not control, our analysis of the DPPA. Specifically, we interpret dicta in Doe v. Chao as supporting our conclusion that under the DPPA, proof of actual damages is not a condition precedent to a liquidated damages award. 22 In Doe v. Chao, the Supreme Court analyzed the remedial provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2005) (Privacy Act). Pursuant to the Privacy Act, the Government is liable for actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000.00. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(a) (emphasis added). Similar to the issue before us, at issue in Doe v. Chao, was whether a plaintiff must prove some measure of actual damages prior to receiving a minimum statutory award of $1,000.00. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must prove some measure of actual damages to be awarded $1,000.00 pursuant to the Privacy Act. See 540 U.S. at 627, 124 S.Ct. at 1212. 4 23 The Supreme Court majority's analysis in Doe v. Chao relies heavily on the phrase a person entitled to recovery as a critical limiting phrase. Id. at 621 n. 2, 124 S.Ct. 1209 n. 2 (Congress used the entitled-to-recovery phrase only to describe those entitled to the $1,000 guarantee, and it spoke of entitlement and guarantee only after referring to an individual's actual damages, indicating that `actual damages' is a further touchstone of the entitlement.). The relevant language of the remedies provision in the DPPA does not contain this critical limiting phrase, and, thus, differs significantly from the relevant language of the Privacy Act. Moreover, the remedial provision in the Privacy Act lacks any reference to the term liquidated damages. For these reasons, the Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. Chao does not control our interpretation of the DPPA remedial provision in this case. 24 Even though Doe v. Chao does not control our decision in this case, we are guided by the Supreme Court's dicta in that decision. In Doe v. Chao, the Supreme Court suggested language similar to the language in the DPPA as a potential model for a remedial provision in which proof of actual damages is not a prerequisite to recovering statutory damages. See 540 U.S. at 623, 124 S.Ct. at 1210. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that had Congress intended § 552a(g)(4)(a) to be read in the disjunctive, it simply could have provided that the Government would be liable to the individual for actual damages `but in no case ... less than the sum of $1,000.'  Id. (emphasis added). Had we any doubt that § 2724(b)(1), as written, is unambiguous, this dicta by the Supreme Court would assuage those doubts. While there are minor differences between this suggested language and the language actually in the DPPA, these differences do not weaken our reliance on this suggested language. The differences are: (1) that Congress used not instead of in no case in the DPPA; and (2) that Congress specifically called the statutory damages in the DPPA liquidated damages. The first difference is immaterial to our analysis, and the second, the use of the term liquidated damages, strengthens our conclusion because, as stated above, liquidated damages are typically a form of damages separate and distinct from actual damages. 5 Thus, Doe v. Chao lends support to our interpretation that § 2724(b)(1) permits an award of liquidated damages without proof of actual damages.