Opinion ID: 203784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Potential for Coverage within Scope of Policy

Text: Centennial argues that it had no duty to defend Dr. Patterson in the Murphy action because the Murphy complaint did not allege a veterinary incident, as the term is defined in the Policy. As noted above, the Policy defines veterinary incident -8- as any malpractice, negligent act or omission, utterance or publication of a libel or slander, or other defamatory or disparaging material . . . [i]n the furnishing of professional veterinary services. In support of its position that no veterinary incident was alleged, Centennial argues that (a) the Murphy complaint makes no claims of malpractice or negligence in the furnishing of professional veterinary services and that (b) the Murphy complaint makes no claims of libel, slander or defamation against Dr. Patterson - but only against certain media outlets. We disagree. As to Centennial's first argument, it is true that the Murphy complaint does not explicitly assert that Dr. Patterson was negligent or committed malpractice in the furnishing of professional veterinary services. However, the complaint does contain several allegations of wrongful conduct by Dr. Patterson that could potentially be so construed. As a threshold matter, we reject Centennial's contention that the claims asserted against Dr. Patterson related exclusively to Dr. Patterson's testimony at the Animal Possession Hearing. Rather, Murphy's statement, at paragraph 184 of the complaint, that Dr. Patterson testified that two calves that died expired because they had no food and water implies that Dr. Patterson examined the deceased calves in order to reach a professional conclusion regarding their cause of death, and that Murphy's claims arise, in -9- part, from that examination. This inference, that Dr. Patterson examined the animals, is further supported by Murphy's statement that she did not give permission to Patterson to do anything to her animals whether they were alive or dead. Furthermore, Murphy's allegation that Patterson is guilty of treating stolen animals without getting permission from the legal owner, is a claim against Dr. Patterson which does not arise solely from his testimony against Murphy but also from actions taken by Dr. Patterson toward Murphy's animals, either when they were living, or after they had died. Taken together, Murphy's allegations suggest that Dr. Patterson not only testified against Murphy, but performed some type of professional veterinary service on Murphy's animals, which Murphy regarded as wrongful in being carried out without her authorization, wrongful in approach (because Dr. Patterson did not ask her about the calves' origin and prior condition), and wrongful in result (because Dr. Patterson erroneously faulted Murphy for their death). As such, Murphy's complaint can be construed as including claims arising out of veterinary malpractice or negligence; claims which, if proven, potentially fall within the Policy's coverage. We reiterate that a potential of a claim within the policy is all that is required, under Maine law, to trigger Centennial's duty to defend. See J.A.J., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 529 A.2d 806, 808 (Me. 1987) (stating that [i]t -10- is not essential that the complaint specifically and unequivocally make out a claim within the policy but only that it raise a potential . . . that the facts ultimately proved may come within the coverage). We hold that the allegations of the complaint contain sufficient facts to state a claim of negligence or malpractice potentially covered by the Policy. We need not go any further, as this conclusion is sufficient to activate Centennial's duty to defend Dr. Patterson in the underlying suit. Nevertheless, we also hold, contrary to Centennial's assertions, that the duty to defend is independently triggered by our view that Murphy potentially alleged that Dr. Patterson, among other defendants, committed libel and slander against her. The Policy language clearly includes within the scope of coverage claims against the insured alleging the utterance or publication of a libel or slander, or other defamatory or disparaging material . . . in the furnishing of professional veterinary services. Centennial disputes the applicability of this provision by arguing that Murphy's allegations of libel, slander and defamation were directed at defendants in the complaint other than Dr. Patterson, namely, certain media outlets that published newspaper accounts of the proceedings against Murphy. This is certainly one plausible interpretation of the complaint, in that the specific claims of libel and slander enumerated in the -11- complaint were directed towards various media outlets.2 Nevertheless, there is another plausible interpretation. In paragraph 2 of her complaint, Murphy makes general claims of libel and slander which, at paragraph 1, she directs towards State Officials and others. Based on these broadly worded provisions, the complaint may be reasonably construed as potentially stating a defamation claim against any of the defendants, including Dr. Patterson. See Dingwell, 414 A.2d at 227 (noting that with the great latitude with which pleadings are construed today, and the great latitude of amendment, an insured's right to a defense should not be foreclosed unless such a result is inescapably necessary (quoting Donnelly v. Transp. Ins. Co., 589 F.2d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 1978)). Moreover, this construction of paragraph 2's libel and slander claim as potentially applicable to Dr. Patterson, is bolstered by the language of the complaint at paragraph 129, where Murphy alleges that Dr. Patterson provided untruthful and damaging testimony against her at the animal repossession hearing. Reading these portions of the complaint together, we can reasonably infer that Murphy may have intended to state a claim against Dr. Patterson for defamation -- a claim that, if proven, would 2 For example, at paragraph 151 of the Complaint Murphy alleges that the Morning Sentinel newspaper committed libel and slander by print[ing] the story without checking their facts. At para. 157 of the Complaint Murphy makes similar claims against the Kennebec Journal, alleging that this publication was also guilty of libel and slander in printing a story about the conditions on Murphy's farm. -12- potentially trigger coverage under the Policy. See Me. State Acad. of Hair Design, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 699 A.2d 1153, 1156 (Me. 1997) ('Even a complaint which is legally insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss gives rise to a duty to defend if it shows an intent to state a claim within the insurance coverage.' (quoting Dingwell, 414 A.2d at 226) (emphasis added)). Finally, that Murphy had such intent is supported by the overall nature of the complaint, which evidences a general intent on the part of the pro se plaintiff to state the broadest array of claims against the greatest number of potential defendants, in hopes of maximizing the potential for recovery. Centennial further disputes the applicability of the libel and slander provision on grounds that any libel or slander alleged to have been committed by Dr. Patterson took place during his testimony at the Hearing, and thus, was not delivered in the furnishing of professional veterinary services, as required to trigger coverage under the Policy. Centennial suggests that the furnishing of professional veterinary services must necessarily involve some form of malpractice or negligence in the treatment of an animal. However, we hold that the Policy definition, which specifically includes within the scope of coverage the utterance or publication of a libel or slander, an event which, as noted by the district court is unlikely to occur while a veterinarian is physically treating an animal, suggests that the provision has -13- broader applicability. In any event, courts interpreting the term professional services in the context of determining coverage under an insurance policy have generally defined the term broadly, so as to embrace all activities for which the specialized training of the particular profession is required. See, e.g., Med. Records Assoc., Inc. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins., 142 F.3d 512, 515 (1st Cir. 1998) (defining professional services under Massachusetts law as embrac[ing] those activities that distinguish a particular occupation from other occupations -- as evidenced by the need for specialized learning or training -- and from the ordinary activities of life and business); W. World Ins. Co. v. Am. & Foreign Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d 224, 231 (D. Me. 2002) (defining 'professional' act or service under Maine law as one arising out of a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment involving specialized knowledge, labor, or skill (quoting Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 157 N.W.2d 870, 871-72 (Neb. 1968)). Thus, we agree with the district court that [Patterson] could only have been testifying in that proceeding as a veterinarian, that [t]estifying as a professional veterinarian, as an expert witness, must logically be included in the scope of 'professional veterinary services' [absent an applicable exclusion], and therefore, Dr. Patterson's act of testifying constituted 'the furnishing of professional veterinary services' within the meaning of that term as used in the policy. We thus -14- find that at least some of the claims against Dr. Patterson contained in the Murphy complaint arise out of a veterinary incident, and as a result, potentially fall within the scope of coverage.