Opinion ID: 2265911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Tax Is Narrowly Tailored Because It Leaves Open Alternative Means of Conveying the Erotic Message and Any Burdens It Places on Speech Are De Minimis

Text: ¶ 38 Finally, the Tax satisfies the fourth prong of the O'Brien test as well, in that the burdens that the Tax places on protected expression are no greater than necessary. Although the Supreme Court's use of the no greater than necessary language in O'Brien appears similar to the least restrictive means requirement for strict scrutiny, the Court has made clear that this prong does not require the state to show that its chosen means for advancing the substantial state interest is the least restrictive means available. [62] Instead, the fourth prong of the O'Brien test imposes only a requirement that the regulation be narrowly tailored, in the sense that it promote[] a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. [63] De minimis impacts on protected speech are permissible. [64] ¶ 39 Plaintiffs argue that the Tax fails this prong because there are less burdensome ways of addressing the state's interest in providing treatment for sex offenders and that the First Amendment requires that these methods, rather than the Tax, be used. ¶ 40 To begin with, Plaintiffs' argument suggests that O'Brien requires a regulation of conduct placing incidental burdens on some protected expression to use the least restrictive means available to serve the state's asserted interest. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected that formulation of the O'Brien test. [65] Additionally, Plaintiffs' least restrictive means argument is contrary to its own position that a general taxone that burdens all businesseswould satisfy First Amendment scrutiny under O'Brien. A generalized tax would no doubt inflict burdens on a greater variety of protected expression than the Tax at issue here, and therefore would not be the least restrictive means available. The Supreme Court's cases have made clear that the fourth prong of O'Brien is satisfied so long as a content-neutral regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. [66] Further, de minimis impacts on protected expression are permissible. [67] ¶ 41 In this case, the Tax promotes the interest in providing treatment for sex offenders by raising revenue and directing that revenue towards treatment programs. While there may be other, less speech-restrictive means of accomplishing the interest, the Tax is not invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech. [68] The validity of [content neutral regulations of conduct] does not turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests. [69] ¶ 42 Additionally, any burdens the Tax imposes on protected expression are de minimis. Indeed, the Tax burdens protected expression substantially less than the public nudity ordinance upheld by the Supreme Court in Erie. The Erie ordinance imposed a blanket ban on nudity in public. The Supreme Court noted that the public nudity ban's burden on nude dancing was de minimis, since all the dancers had to do to avoid the ban was to wear G-strings and pasties. [70] The ordinance left nude dancers ample capacity to convey [their] erotic message [71] and only limited whatever expression that might occur when the last stitch is dropped. [72] ¶ 43 Plaintiffs can avoid the Tax, just like the businesses in Erie could avoid the ordinance, simply by having their erotic dancers use G-strings and pasties. Additionally, the Tax places less of a burden on protected expression than the ordinance upheld in Erie in two ways. First, in contrast to the Erie ordinance, which banned all public nudity under threat of criminal sanctions, [73] the Tax neither prohibits public nudity nor imposes criminal penaltiesit simply imposes an additional cost on the commercial use of nudity as a method of expression. Secondly, the 30-day exemption period further limits the Tax's burden on protected expression. The exemption period allows businesses to use nudity as a means of expression for up to 30 days each calendar year without being subject to the Tax. Since the Tax's impact on protected expression is even less burdensome than the impact of the public nudity ordinance upheld in Erie, we determine that the Tax satisfies the narrow tailoring prong of the O'Brien test. ¶ 44 We are unpersuaded by Plaintiffs' citation to cases such as Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue [74] and Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland [75] for the proposition that First Amendment rights may not be taxed. To begin with, as set out above, the Tax is, on its face, a regulation of conduct. The Tax is thus meaningfully distinguishable from those struck down in Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers' Project, which were content-based regulations of speech. [76] ¶ 45 Additionally, neither Minneapolis Star nor Arkansas Writers' Project actually stand for the blanket proposition that a tax, whether general or differential, can never burden protected First Amendment expression. Instead, they simply confirm the already well-established rule that content-based regulations of speech are presumptively unconstitutional. [77] They also evidence an understandable concern for regulations that directly implicate the freedom of the press. [78] This is made clear by Leathers v. Medlock, in which the Supreme Court, in distinguishing that case from Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers' Project, clarified that a tax scheme that does not target specific ideas or viewpoints on its face, and that is not structured or enacted in order to impose a penalty for particular speakers or particular ideas, does not necessarily run afoul of the First Amendment. [79] As set out above, the Tax is neither facially discriminatory nor does the record or the Tax's structure establish that it was enacted with the predominant purpose of suppressing protected expression. ¶ 46 Finally, the taxes in Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers' Project were sales and use taxes imposed on the necessary materials for newspaper publishing and sales of magazines, respectively. The affected publishers could not avoid paying the taxes if they wanted to continue to operate as newspapers and magazines. [80] In contrast, Plaintiffs, and other erotic dancing clubs, can avoid the Tax and continue to operate as erotic dance clubs simply by requiring their dancers to use GS-trings and pasties. The effect on the erotic message is minimal. The Tax simply imposes a cost on using a particular means of expression rather than on the expression itselfa distinction that the Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged as significant in Erie. [81] ¶ 47 Accordingly, we conclude that the Tax is narrowly tailored and that it satisfies the fourth prong of the O'Brien test. Having determined that the Tax is a content-neutral regulation of conduct that passes the O'Brien test, we now turn to Plaintiffs' argument that the tax is unconstitutionally overbroad.