Opinion ID: 2075075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the fourth amended complaint

Text: In count V of the fourth amended complaint, plaintiff again alleged that AT & T violated section 2 of the Act. Unlike the allegations in the first amended complaint, that AT & T knowingly received the benefits of a fraud, the allegations here asserted that AT & T directly violated the Act by reviewing, revising, and approving Direct American's deceptive solicitations and recorded messages. Plaintiff further alleged that AT & T violated the Act by billing plaintiff for his calls to the 900 numbers in an allegedly misleading manner. The remaining counts against AT & T in the fourth amended complaint-counts VI and VII-alleged common law fraud. AT & T moved to dismiss the fourth amended complaint. A trial judge temporarily assigned to the case denied AT & T's motion to dismiss the counts against it in the fourth amended complaint; AT & T then answered the complaint. AT & T later filed what it termed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Unique Facts of Plaintiff's Individual Claim. AT & T argued in the motion that plaintiff's deposition testimony demonstrated that plaintiff was not actually deceived by the mailings or the telephone bills and that plaintiff therefore could not establish that any of AT & T's alleged misconduct had caused him injury. With specific reference to the statutory cause of action pleaded in count V of the fourth amended complaint, AT & T contended that the plaintiff's deposition established that the conduct complained of was not the proximate cause of any harm, as the Act requires. See Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill.2d 482, 501, 221 Ill.Dec. 389, 675 N.E.2d 584 (1996) (though plaintiff need not establish reliance, valid claim by private plaintiff must show that alleged fraud proximately caused injury complained of). AT & T also argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on the common law counts. Following a hearing, the trial court granted AT & T's motion for summary judgment. On review, the appellate court agreed with AT & T's contention that the Act required the plaintiff to establish proximate cause. The appellate court found plaintiff's deposition testimony to be inconclusive and incomplete on this issue, however, and therefore reversed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment. Dissenting, Justice Gordon believed that plaintiff's admitted conduct precludes him from seeking any recovery under the relevant provisions of [the] Act. 286 Ill.App.3d at 472, 221 Ill.Dec. 570, 675 N.E.2d 994 (Gordon, J., dissenting). The elements of a claim under section 2 of the Act are: (1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant; (2) defendant's intent that plaintiff rely on the deception; and (3) the occurrence of the deception in the course of conduct involving trade or commerce. Connick, 174 Ill.2d at 501, 221 Ill.Dec. 389, 675 N.E.2d 584. As we noted in our earlier discussion, section 10a(a) of the Act, which governs private causes of action under the statute, mandates that an individual's damages be a result of a violation of [the] Act. 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1992). Thus, this court requires that a successful claim by a private individual suing under the Act also demonstrate that the fraud complained of proximately caused plaintiff's injury. Connick, 174 Ill.2d at 501, 221 Ill.Dec. 389, 675 N.E.2d 584; see also Warren v. LeMay, 142 Ill.App.3d 550, 569, 96 Ill.Dec. 418, 491 N.E.2d 464 (1986). This requirement would pertain as well to alleged violations of section 2P of the Act, which plaintiff also cites. Unlike the allegations in the statutory counts in the first amended complaint, discussed previously, count V of the fourth amended complaint asserts that AT & T directly violated the statute. At issue here is whether AT & T is entitled to summary judgment on these allegations because plaintiff's deposition establishes that the conduct complained of was not the proximate cause of his injury. Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill.2d 325, 333, 214 Ill.Dec. 831, 662 N.E.2d 397 (1996). Our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill.2d 90, 102, 180 Ill.Dec. 691, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992). We believe that plaintiff's deposition testimony precludes him from establishing that the alleged misconduct by AT & T, including its supposed participation in Direct American's own asserted violations of the Act, proximately caused his damages. In the deposition, plaintiff acknowledged that when he received the mailings he did not know whether he had won a cash award and that he made the telephone calls only in the hope that he had won such an award. Plaintiff also said that he understood that he would be charged for each call he made. Plaintiff recalled that at the beginning of each call, he heard a recorded message telling him that he could avoid any charge for the call by immediately hanging up. Plaintiff further acknowledged in the deposition that he knew that he could respond to the award notices by means of the mail instead of by calling the designated 900 number. Plaintiff explained that he did not use the mail, however, because he was eager to learn if he had won a cash prize. Plaintiff said that he continued to make calls even though he knew he had won only discount coupons with every previous call. On occasion, plaintiff made numerous calls in short periods of time, winning only discount coupons with each call. On this record, we do not believe that there exists a genuine issue of material fact whether the allegedly deceptive nature of the solicitations received by plaintiff caused him to incur the charges for the 900 number calls. Rather, it appears that plaintiff understood the requirements and costs of the program. Aware that he could respond to the solicitations through the mail, plaintiff instead voluntarily chose to learn about the prizes in a more expeditious, yet more expensive, manner. The preceding discussion also answers the plaintiff's further contention that he was deceived by AT & T's manner of billing for the calls. By his own admission, plaintiff knew that he had not necessarily won cash prizes, that he did not have to call a 900 number to learn if had won such a prize, and that he would incur a charge if he did choose to learn his prize status by placing the calls. Nonetheless, plaintiff alleged that the bills were deceptive because they failed to disclose that his long-distance service would not be terminated if he refused to pay for the calls to Direct American. We note that plaintiff has not cited any authority in support of the contention that AT & T bore that duty. Although apparently it was AT & T's policy not to charge for calls to these numbers if customers complained about them, AT & T's conduct in that regard appears to be voluntary. In addition, we note plaintiff's statement in his deposition that he did not read or pay the bills himself, delegating those duties to his secretary. Accordingly, plaintiff could not have been misled by the allegedly deceptive nature of the bills. Plaintiff also alleged that the bills misrepresented that they contained only tariffed telephone charges when, in fact, they contained contest entry fees, which are not tariffed charges. The bills, which are included in the record, do not make any representation regarding whether the charges are tariffed or not, however, and they plainly identify each 900 call and the cost of the particular call. In sum, based on the testimony by plaintiff at his deposition, we do not believe that there remains a genuine issue of material fact whether the alleged violations of the Act by AT & T proximately caused his damage, for plaintiff's testimony demonstrates that he was not deceived by AT & T's actions. Plaintiff's statement in the deposition that he became disillusioned with the fact that his name appeared on cards and he was told [he] had won something and [he] did not is insufficient to show proximate cause between the alleged fraud by AT & T and plaintiff's alleged damage. In fact, plaintiff always did win something, though the prizes-discount coupons-were disappointing to him. As noted by the dissenting justice below, plaintiff was induced to place the calls by the mere receipt of a personalized notice announcing that he won a prize, which, by his own admission, could have consisted of coupons rather than cash. 286 Ill.App.3d at 472, 221 Ill.Dec. 570, 675 N.E.2d 994 (Gordon, J., dissenting). We therefore reverse that portion of the appellate court judgment that reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on count V of plaintiff's fourth amended complaint. As a final matter, we note that AT & T has asserted, in its briefs and oral argument before this court, that plaintiff did not appeal from the portion of the circuit court judgment that granted AT & T's motion for summary judgment on the two common law counts against the company. The appellate court opinion does not address these counts. AT & T has not shown the plaintiff's supposed abandonment of these counts, however, by evidence in the record, nor has it presented in this appeal anything more than a brief argument in opposition to those counts. Still, plaintiff does not dispute AT & T's contention that he failed to appeal that portion of the adverse circuit court judgment, or make any argument in support of the common law counts. In view of plaintiff's silence on this question, we do not feel compelled to search the record in this case to rebut AT & T's claim of abandonment. Accordingly, we offer no opinion on the merits of those counts.