Opinion ID: 1377460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Majority Opinion is Legally Erroneous

Text: The majority says that it is impos[ing] a restriction which affects [Justice McGraw's] eligibility for election to this body, not [his] qualifications for holding a seat on this tribunal. 208 W.Va. at 599, 542 S.E.2d at 420. In other words, the majority says that imposing a restriction that affects certain peopleby saying they are not eligible to be elected to a seat on this Courtis not the same thing as holding that those same people are not qualified to hold a seat on this Court. For any sensible person, this is an utterly non-existent distinction. After wading through a field of irrelevant cases that are apparently cited and discussed to provide cover for the majority's lack of authority for its holding, the majority opinion ultimately hangs its jurisprudential hat on our recent case of Philyaw v. Gatson, 195 W.Va. 474, 466 S.E.2d 133 (1995). In Philyaw, we upheld a (properly promulgated) Supreme Court rule that said that a magistrate court employeenot a judicial officerhad to resign their employment with the court system, if they ran for a non-judicial office. We said that this rule was not an imposition of an additional qualification on a candidate for office, but was a reasonable requirement[ ] for retaining employment [in the] ... judicial branch. We specifically grounded the reasonableness of this regulatory restriction on judicial employees upon the analogous express constitutional provision forbidding judicial officers from running for non-judicial office. Contrasting Philyaw with the instant case: the majority is not reviewing an employment restrictionit is creating one, out of whole cloth. Prior to this case, no West Virginia judicial officer or employee has ever been barred from running for any judicial officebecause, of course, their right to do so is specifically reserved in our Constitution. The majority has by its own acknowledgment created a restriction that has no grounding in any written provision of any rule, statute, or constitutional phrase. The restriction that the majority is creating is notas it was in Philyaw for the judicial employeepart of any power that is given to this Court to set the conditions for Justice McGraw's employment in his current seat on this Court. Justice McGraw's employment conditions are entirely set by the Constitution and other applicable express law. Justice McGraw could be removed from office for a breach of those conditionsnot by any vote of the majority of this Courtbut only by impeachment. Philyaw, then, the sole case that the majority uses to support its distinction-without-a-difference reasoning, is totally inapposite to the case of Justice McGraw. IV. The Majority Opinion Fulfills A Warning from the Past, and Violates Justice McGraw's Fundamental Constitutional Rights and the Rights of the Voters of this State The West Virginia Constitution, Art. 8, § 7, General Provisions Relating to Justices, Judges and Magistrates, states in pertinent part, with emphasis added: No justice, judge or magistrate shall hold any other office, or accept any appointment or public trust, under this or any other government; nor shall he become a candidate for any elective public office or nomination thereto, except a judicial office; and the violation of any of these provisions shall vacate his judicial office. This language is easy to understand. It is clear that if Justice McGraw chose to run for Governor, or State Senator, or County Commissioner or for any other non-judicial office, he would have to first resign from the judiciary (or be automatically removed by filing for the office). However, it is equally clear that if Justice McGraw chose to run for Magistrate, Circuit Judge, or a Supreme Court seatall judicial officeshe is not required to resign from his currently-held judicial office. How in the world can anyone say thaton reading this clear languageJustice McGraw should believe that he was barred from running for an open seat on this Court, when that open seat is a judicial office? But the majority (in essence) says... it just doesn't seem right. Well, a little over 100 years ago, a great Justice [then a Judge] on this Court warned of the dangers of letting people tamper with the Constitution when they thought something didn't seem right. Not long after the Constitution of this state was adopted, Justice Brannon warned that permitting additional qualifications for office to be imposedby any process other than constitutional amendmentwould make the fundamental right to hold public office subject to the fluctuation of sentiment, the caprices of constantly changing legislatures, the passions of the hour: If one additional material qualification may be prescribed, why not another? Why not many others? The constitution is fundamental law, and strictly construed in defense of the citizen's rights. It is the Magna Charta of his freedom and rights, political and civil. Admit once that it does not fix his qualification for office. Where would his disfranchisement end? That would depend upon uncertain political, religious, or other winds. Would we limit the act within the bounds of the reasonable? That would be indefinite, unsafe, precarious, dependent upon the times and motives and aims dominating them. Against these things, it was intended to embed the right in the solid rock of the constitution. State ex rel. Thompson v. McAllister, 38 W.Va. 485, 507-08, 18 S.E. 770, 777-78 (1893) (dissenting opinion of Justice Brannon, adopted by this Court in Marra v. Zink, 163 W.Va. 400, 256 S.E.2d 581 (1979)). In the case before the Thompson court, an additional qualification for office had been created by at least a colorably legitimate waylegislative enactment. In Justice McGraw's case, an additional qualification for office has been created by a majority of this Court, which has asserted the right to add a qualification that is found nowhere in our Constitution in accordance with the majority's views of public policy. In both cases, the result is the same: a fundamental constitutional right of West Virginians has been made indefinite, unsafe, precarious, dependent upon the times and motives and aims dominating them. Thompson, 38 W.Va. at 508, 18 S.E. at 778. West Virginia law is clear that every citizen has the right to run for public office. That right can be tempered only by explicitly stated requirements: The right of a citizen to hold office is the general rule, and ineligibility to hold office is the exception, hence courts will hesitate to take action resulting in deprivation of the privilege to hold office, except under explicit constitutional or statutory requirements. State ex rel. Thomas v. Wysong, 125 W.Va. 369, 24 S.E.2d 463, 468 (1943) (citation omitted); Webb v. County Court of Raleigh County, 113 W.Va. 474, 168 S.E. 760, 761 (1933) (it is so generally true that one who is a citizen and voter is qualified to hold public office, that any exception to that generality should be made clear and explicit). The majority admits that there is no clear or explicit constitutional or statutory prohibition to Justice McGraw's candidacy for election to a 12-year seat. The law mandates that Justice McGraw is presumed to be eligible for office unless the Constitution clearly and explicitly prohibits his candidacy. It is not Justice McGraw's burden to point to some explicit provision allowing him to run for office, because his eligibility is presumed; rather, the law is clear that his right to run can be taken from him only by some clear and explicit constitutional restrictionnot by a judicially-imposed restriction. The Court's ruling in this case thus turns longstanding precedent on its head. This Court's articulation of a new public policy in this case is extraordinary, especially in light of the obvious fact that the Court's previous holdingsrecognizing that our State Constitution has at its core a fundamental right to run for officeconfirm that the public policy of West Virginia is the fundamental right to run for office itself. Creating, from whole cloth, a vague new public policy that defeats the clear expression of this fundamental constitutional right, is antithetical to all known forms of constitutional interpretation. It is wrong for the Court to search outside the Constitution, to create a new public policy to defeat Justice McGraw's fundamental constitutional right. The heart of constitutional construction is not to search for ways to defeat a fundamental constitutional right, but to ensure that such rights are preserved. Qualifications to run for office other than those explicitly stated in the Constitution itself are unconstitutional. Such extra-constitutional qualificationsbe they enacted by the Legislature or, as here, enacted by judicial public policy lawmakingare expressly violative of the West Virginia Constitution ... since there is no direct authority in our Constitution for the Legislature to establish qualifications for office in excess of those imposed by [the West Virginia Constitution ...] we find qualifications other than those in [the Constitution ] unconstitutional by its very terms and under our own equal protection, ... due process, ... and freedom of speech and assembly ... provisions. (Citations omitted.) Marra, 163 W.Va. at 407, 256 S.E.2d at 586. Marra overruled a whole line of cases that appeared to allow the Legislature (but not the judiciary) to impose extra-constitutional qualifications. The majority's holding in the case at bar not only allows the extra-constitutional qualifications barred by Marra, it takes the heretofore never-articulated position that the judiciary may create from whole cloth new qualifications for office. The State may not take action to deny a fundamental constitutional right unless there is a showing that such denial is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Syllabus Point 3, in part, State ex rel. Sowards v. County Com'n of Lincoln County, 196 W.Va. 739, 474 S.E.2d 919 (1996): The public policies in protecting fundamental rights, preserving electoral integrity, and promoting both political and judicial economy have prompted a practical approach in assessing whether an election case is appropriate for mandamus relief. The fundamental and constitutional right to run for public office cannot be denied unless necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. But this compelling state interest analysis is used only where the State has taken some action to deprive a citizen of a fundamental constitutional right: It is beyond cavil that when a state acts to the disadvantage of some suspect class or to impinge upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the West Virginia Constitution, strict scrutiny will apply, and the state will have to prove that its action is necessary because of a compelling government interest. Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier County Bd. of Educ., 199 W.Va. 400, 484 S.E.2d 909, 913 (1996) (emphasis added). The West Virginia Constitution confers a fundamental right to run for public office, which the State cannot restrict unless the restriction is necessary to accomplish a legitimate and compelling governmental interest. Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Billings v. City of Point Pleasant, 194 W.Va. 301, 460 S.E.2d 436, (1995). Accord, e.g., State ex rel. Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee, 160 W.Va. 329, 335, 233 S.E.2d 419, 423 (1977); White v. Manchin, 173 W.Va. 526, 318 S.E.2d 470 (1984). In other words, when the State passes a law that infringes on a fundamental constitutional right, such as the right to stand for election, such a law only withstands strict constitutional scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. Never before has this Court used a compelling state interest analysis, not to review, but to create from whole cloth, a constitutional abridgement. In the instant case, the State has taken no action to deprive anyone of a fundamental constitutional right. To the contrary, Secretary of State Hechler has sought to protect Justice McGraw's fundamental constitutional right to stand for election. There was an attempt in the House of Delegates this year to legislate the very restriction on Justice McGraw's fundamental constitutional right that was sought by the petitioner in this case. Had that measure been enacted, the question of whether the measure was designed to meet a compelling state interest may have presented itself to this Court, because such a law would have abridged Justice McGraw's clear constitutional right to run for office. But the measure failed. Indeed, the Legislature's failure to pass such legislation is another nail in the coffin of the public policy rationale used by the majority. This seems clear from the reaction to this Court's decision by one of the failed House bill's sponsors: McGraw's point of view has support from an unlikely corner: one of the legislators who introduced a bill, spurred by McGraw's candidacy, to block elected officials from running for an office in the middle of another term. I think the decision is ridiculous, said Delegate John Doyle, D-Jefferson. I don't think you ought to be allowed to do it, but I don't think it is proper for the Supreme Court to concoct a law from whole cloth making it illegal. The ruling has all the sounds of judge-made law, Doyle said. The court had to go to New York to find a precedent precisely because there is nothing in West Virginia law to either forbid or permit the practice, he said. And it should be up to the Legislature or to the voters, via constitutional amendment, to outlaw the practice, not the court, Doyle said. It's also unclear if Thursday's ruling extends to offices other than that of Supreme Court justice, as the legislation did. The bill, which was sponsored by members of House leadership, passed the House but never came to a vote in the Senate. March 24, 2000, Charleston Daily Mail. If the public policy of the State is so clear as to restrict Justice McGraw's candidacy, the Legislature presumably would have passed the measure. Concomitantly, if Justice McGraw's fundamental constitutional rights are to be abridged, it must come from the Legislature or by constitutional amendment, not from this Court. There is no precedent that allows this Court to craft public policy from whole cloth and to abridge a fundamental constitutional right. [2] Where a provision of the Constitution is clear in its terms and of plain interpretation to any ordinary and reasonable mind, it should be applied and not construed. As stated in Syllabus Point 3 of State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 150 W.Va. 71, 143 S.E.2d 791 (1965): Where a provision of a constitution is clear in its terms and of plain interpretation to any ordinary and reasonable mind, it should be applied and not construed. The Constitution clearly and plainly allows a justice to run for a judicial office. West Virginia Constitution, Art. VIII, § 7. There is no exception to this provision; there is simply nothing that can be interpreted to limit a justice's right to run for a judicial office. Another term on the Supreme Court of Appeals is, obviously, a judicial office. Nothing about the relevant portion of Art. VIII, § 7 is unclear, yet the majority has grafted onto it an exception for justices who already are in office. The majority's action in this case is not an interpretation of Art. VIII, § 7, but an expansion of it. The Court could not possibly be interpreting the phrase a judicial office because that phrase is clear, and includes the office of Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals. If it did not, circuit judges like Justice Maynard and myself, who ran for a term on the Supreme Court of Appeals while still sitting as circuit judges, would have been barred from running at that time. Rather than interpreting the provision, the majority is expanding it. Such an expansion is foreign to all precedential rules of constitutional construction. The Court's decision also completely ignores longstanding precedent from West Virginia and around the nation that requires every reasonable construction in favor of eligibility for office. In State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney, 159 W.Va. 513, 223 S.E.2d 607 (1976), this Court stated that: [i]n the event of ambiguity a constitutional amendment will receive every reasonable construction in favor of eligibility for office. Thus, even if the majority ignores the overwhelming precedent mandating that the right to run for office can be abridged only by clear and explicit legislation, this Court would have to determine that the provision in question was somehow ambiguous. And if it was ambiguous, then every reasonable construction must be made in favor of eligibility for office. Obviously, there is no ambiguity to construe, as there was in the case of the law practice requirement for judicial candidates in State ex rel. Haught v. Donnahoe, 174 W.Va. 27, 321 S.E.2d 677 (1984). Even if the petitioner had been able to point to some ambiguity that could conceivably be used to support his position, this Court would be ignoring the law in regard to the presumption of eligibility, if it omits any reasonable construction of the Constitution that would allow a sitting justice to run for a judicial office. Art. VIII, § 7, West Virginia Constitution. Significantly, the petitioner has never suggested that a construction of Art. VIII, § 7, that allows a sitting justice to run for re-election before the expiration of his present term, is unreasonable. Indeed, considering the fact that the right to run for office is a fundamental constitutional right and the fact that any ambiguity must be construed in favor of eligibility, such a construction is, at the very least, a reasonable one. It would be a departure from reason and logic and require extraordinary contortions of accepted definitions to find otherwise. The law mandates that this Court ask the question: If the provision is ambiguous, is there any reasonable construction that would allow a sitting justice to run for a separate term on the court? The Constitution specifically allows, without exception, a justice to run for a judicial office. Justice McGraw is a justice, and the two seats open during the 2000 election are both a judicial office. VI.