Opinion ID: 1768154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: double jeopardy and sufficiency of the evidence.

Text: Appellants next contend that their convictions of first-degree robbery and second-degree assault merged, thus, that their convictions of both offenses violated the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. U.S. Const. amend. V; Ky. Const. § 13. Alternatively, Appellants assert that the Commonwealth introduced insufficient evidence to convict them of second-degree assault. We affirm as to both issues. Appellants' double jeopardy claim stems from the jury instructions on both first-degree robbery and second-degree assault. The instruction on first-degree robbery required the jury to find that Appellants stole money and personal property from Jackson and that in the course of so doing and with the intent to accomplish the theft, [they] threatened the immediate use of physical force upon Randall Jackson with a firearm. The instruction on second-degree assault required the jury to find that Appellants inflicted an injury upon Randall Jackson by striking or poking him with a pistol. The brothers claim that the conduct that formed the basis of the assault (poking Jackson with a pistol) was the same as that which formed the basis for the robbery (threatening Jackson with a firearm), ergo, the second-degree assault charge merged with the first-degree robbery charge. However, the appropriate test for double jeopardy was enunciated in Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805, 811 (1996), cert. denied, Effinger v. Kentucky, 522 U.S. 971, 118 S.Ct. 422, 139 L.Ed.2d 323 (1997). In Burge , we departed from the so-called same conduct test described in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), overruled, United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), and in Walden v. Commonwealth, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 102, 106 (1991), overruled, Commonwealth v. Burge , supra, and reinstated the Blockburger rule as the sole basis for determining whether multiple convictions arising out of a single course of conduct constitutes double jeopardy. Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 995 S.W.2d 355, 358 (1999). As stated by the United States Supreme Court, the test ... to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Under this analysis, the two offenses at issue here did not merge. The instruction on first-degree robbery was premised upon KRS 515.020(1)(b), use or threat of physical force with the intent to accomplish a theft while armed with a deadly weapon. The instruction on second-degree assault was premised upon KRS 508.020(1)(b), intentional infliction of physical injury by means of a deadly weapon. Appellants' convictions of first-degree robbery required proof of a theft or attempted theft, an element not required for their convictions of second-degree assault; and Appellants' convictions of second-degree assault required proof of an injury, an element not required for their convictions of first-degree robbery. Thus, each offense required proof of an additional fact which the other did not. The brothers' second argument suffers from a mischaracterization. Though they assert there was insufficient evidence to prove they committed assault in the second degree, an issue preserved by their motions for directed verdict of acquittal, their complaint is actually about the wording of the instruction, to which they did not object. The trial judge instructed the jury that the Appellants could be found guilty of second-degree assault if they acted as either principal or accomplice, or both. However, the theories of liability were identical and read substantially as follows: You will find the Defendant guilty of Second-Degree Assault, Principal, under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about May 8, 1998 and before the finding of the Indictment herein, he inflicted an injury upon Randall Jackson by striking or poking him with a pistol; B. That the pistol was a dangerous weapon as defined in Instruction No. 1; AND C. That in so doing, the Defendant intentionally caused physical injury to Randall Jackson. Appellants argue that the evidence did not prove that Jackson suffered an injury from being prodded with a pistol, thus, the trial court erred in not granting the motion for a directed verdict. However, the issue is not whether the instruction conformed to the evidence introduced at trial, but whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence of second-degree assault to avoid a directed verdict of acquittal. Murphy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 50 S.W.3d 173, 179 (2001); Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991). Second-degree assault can be committed in one of three ways: by intentionally causing serious physical injury to another; by intentionally causing physical injury to another with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; or by wantonly causing serious physical injury to another with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. KRS 508.020(1)(a),(b), and (c). Since Jackson did not suffer a serious physical injury, as that term is defined in KRS 500.080(15), the Commonwealth had to prove that an intentional physical injury was inflicted upon him by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. KRS 508.020(1)(b). To that end, Jackson testified that he was dragged across the carpet, beaten over the back with what he believed to be wood sticks, and kicked in the head, had hot candle wax poured on his neck and ears, and was prodded with a pistol. Photographs admitted into evidence showed large welts across his back and shoulders. The sticks were arguably dangerous instruments under KRS 500.080(3), as they were readily capable of causing ... serious physical injury. This evidence was sufficient to overcome a directed verdict of acquittal of second-degree assault. Benham, supra . Any error in the instruction on second-degree assault was not preserved for appellate review. RCr 9.54(2); Cash v. Commonwealth, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 292, 295 (1995).