Opinion ID: 3002101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limiting Cross-Examination

Text: Reyes next argues that he was denied a fair trial by the cutting off of his cross-examination of co-defendant Torres. Under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must be given an opportunity for effective cross-examination. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987); United States v. Smith, 454 F.3d 707, 714 (7th Cir. 2006). We review a district court’s decision to limit the extent of cross-examination for abuse of discretion. United States v. Khan, 508 F.3d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 2007). However, where the limits affect a criminal defendant’s right to confront a witness who testifies against him, we review the limitation de novo. Id. at 417-18. “[W]hen deciding whether limits on cross-examination are permissible, we must first distinguish between the core values of the Confrontation Clause and more peripheral concerns which remain within the trial court’s ambit.” Smith, 454 F.3d at 714. If the “core values” of the Confrontation Clause remain intact, we No. 06-3607 9 merely ensure that the district court’s exercise of its wide discretion in limiting cross-examination was not abusive. Khan, 508 F.3d at 418. During the trial, the government introduced evidence that Reyes had several pre-robbery conversations with his co-defendants regarding the inner workings of the Credit Union. The foundation of these conversations came from the testimony of DeJesus, Vasquez, Torres, and Berrios. During the direct examination of Torres, the government elicited testimony that Torres attended three pre-robbery meetings: one at Torres’s house with Berrios, Vasquez, and Reyes; one with Vasquez, DeJesus, and Reyes; and a final meeting with Reyes alone. On crossexamination, counsel for Reyes attempted to ask about a meeting on August 22, 2004 between Torres and Dayana Rodriguez, the individual who supplied one of the getaway vehicles: [Counsel for Reyes]: Mr. Torres, when you were planning—when the robbery was getting planned, you claim that—well, you said that one thing you had to do—I don’t know if you talked about this on direct, but one thing you did have to do was find a getaway vehicle. That’s something that had to happen, right? [Torres]: Yes. Q: And to do that, you had a meeting with Dayana Rodriguez, correct? A: Correct. Q: And that meeting took place on Sunday, August 22nd, correct? 10 No. 06-3607 At this point, the government objected to the testimony as beyond the scope of the direct examination. The district court sustained the objection. The cross-examination continued: Q: Mr. Torres, during the course of this, you said that Mr. Reyes was involved in all the aspects of planning the robbery, correct? A: Yes. Q: But it’s your understanding, Mr. Torres, that Mr. Reyes, he never was involved in getting the get- away car. That’s the one thing he didn’t have anything to do with, right? A: That’s the only thing. Q: Right. So as far as you know, he never discussed the car with Dayana Rodriguez, correct? ... A: As far as I know, no. Q: Then they never had a discussion at your house on Sunday, the 22nd, did they? ... A: No. Q: Mr. Torres, on the night of the 22nd—well, the 22nd, that was after Mr. Reyes was already gone on vacation. That’s true, isn’t it? A: Yes. Q: On the night of the 22nd, you sat down with Berrios and Vasquez and DeJesus, correct? No. 06-3607 11 A: Yes. Q: And you guys had a meeting where you discussed your final plans, right? [Counsel for the government]: Objection, Your Honor. This is all beyond the scope. [Counsel for Reyes]: Your Honor, they talked about all the planning that Mr. Reyes did. It’s only fair that we discuss whatever planning Mr. Reyes didn’t do so that the jury can make that contrast. The district court then sustained the government’s objection. We find that the district court did not limit the crossexamination so as to affect the “core values” of the Confrontation Clause. In excluding the examination of the meeting between Torres, Berrios, Vasquez, and DeJesus, Reyes was not entirely precluded from delving into the discussion. Moreover, Reyes could have called Torres during his case in chief and elicited testimony on the specifics of that meeting. He chose not to do so. If that would have created difficulties, Reyes should have raised such concerns at that time so that the district court could have weighed the difficulties against allowing the outside-the-scope testimony. To the extent that Reyes argues that by sustaining the government’s first objection that the district court impeded the ability to confront his co-defendant, his argument falls short. Reyes’s counsel was able to quickly recover and get from Torres exactly what he sought: that, in Torres’s opinion, Reyes had nothing whatsoever to do with the planning of acquiring a getaway car. No reversible error occurred. 12 No. 06-3607