Opinion ID: 894611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitations and Nuisances

Text: A nuisance is a condition that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities. [8] There is no question that foul odors, dust, noise, and bright lightsif sufficiently extrememay constitute a nuisance. [9] The limitations period for a private nuisance claim is two years. [10] As with many other common-law claims, the accrual date is not defined by statute, but is a question of law for the courts. [11] For more than a hundred years, this Court has held that accrual of a nuisance claim depends on whether the nuisance alleged is permanent or temporary. [12] A permanent nuisance claim accrues when injury first occurs or is discovered; a temporary nuisance claim accrues anew upon each injury. [13] The distinction is critical in this case, as it is undisputed that conditions similar to those the residents allege have existed for many years. If the nuisances alleged here are temporary, injuries that occurred within two years of suit are timely regardless of when they began; if they are permanent, all the residents' claims are barred.
Many other jurisdictions make the same distinction between temporary and permanent nuisances for the purpose of determining when limitations accrues. [14] But the test used to make the distinction in Texas is fairly unique. Most states define nuisances by looking at the structure of the source or the possibility of stopping it. [15] Thus, some define a permanent nuisance as one that stems from a permanent structure being operated in a lawful, non-negligent manner. [16] Others define a temporary nuisance as one that can be abated by injunction, and a permanent nuisance as one that cannot. [17] Still others balance several factors in making the determination. [18] But for more than a century, Texas courts have defined temporary and permanent nuisances along lines that are somewhat closer to the plain meaning of the words. We define a permanent nuisance as one that involves an activity of such a character and existing under such circumstances that it will be presumed to continue indefinitely. [19] Thus, a nuisance is permanent if it is constant and continuous, [20] and if injury constantly and regularly recurs. [21] Conversely, a nuisance is temporary if it is of limited duration. [22] Thus, a nuisance may be considered temporary if it is uncertain if any future injury will occur, [23] or if future injury is liable to occur only at long intervals. [24] A nuisance is also temporary if it is occasional, intermittent or recurrent, [25] or sporadic and contingent upon some irregular force such as rain. [26] Texas courts in some cases have also considered several of the factors used by other states. For example, some courts in categorizing nuisances have considered whether the source is a permanent structure, [27] whether it is operated lawfully and without negligence, [28] and whether it can be abated. [29] As discussed below, these factors may indeed figure into certain nuisance cases. But the general Texas rulebased on whether a nuisance is constant, regular, and likely to continue or whether it is sporadic, uncertain, and likely to end Bhas been in place for more than a hundred years. Texas appellate opinions rarely refer to the nuisance jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, nor have the many able counsel in this case. Moreover, in other jurisdictions there is no consensus as to where the line between permanent and temporary nuisances should be (there is no clear test generally accepted [30] ), or how it should be applied (which category to allocate a particular nuisance leads to widely varying results [31] ). Accordingly, we adhere to the traditional American rule that distinguishes temporary from permanent nuisances, and to the traditional Texas rule for making that distinction. But we consider the latter rule in some detail because of the conflicts that have arisen among Texas appellate courts regarding its application.
The line in Texas between temporary and permanent nuisances can be plainly and simply stated, but its application to the facts involved in each case has been a continuing problem. [32] The difficulty in applying the stated rule stems from the relative nature of the terms involved. [33] Whether a nuisance is temporary or permanent obviously turns on how long it lasts, and whether it is infrequent or continuous on how often it occurs. But without a standard of reference, the terms give no guidance regarding where either line should be drawn. For example, every plant, feedlot, or landfill could be considered temporary when compared to all of human history, or permanent when compared to the life of a mayfly. And while conditions occurring every day are continuing and those occurring once in a blue moon infrequent, it is not clear which term ought to apply to those in between. [34] Though we have recognized the continuum between temporary and permanent nuisances, [35] we have never indicated where the boundary lines might be. Accordingly, Texas courts addressing very similar cases have reached very different results. For example, in Kraft v. Langford , we held flooding caused by a storm sewer in Montgomery County was a temporary nuisance as a matter of law. [36] But in City of Amarillo v. Ware , we held flooding caused by a storm sewer in Amarillo was properly pleaded as a permanent nuisance. [37] It is not clear from either opinion why heavy rains near the Gulf Coast must be considered temporary, while those in the Texas Panhandle do not. [38] Cases involving soot and cinders are similarly incompatible. In Parsons v. Uvalde Electric Light Co., we held that smoke, dust, and cinders from an electric power plant constituted a temporary nuisance as a matter of law. [39] But in Rosenthal v. Taylor, B. & H . Railway Co., we held that noise, dust, smoke, and cinders from passing locomotives constituted a permanent nuisance as a matter of law. [40] Again, it is hard to see why smoke from an electrical plant is necessarily temporary, while smoke from passing trains must be permanent. Irreconcilable differences also appear to permeate cases involving foul odors. In City of Lubbock v. Tice , the Seventh Court of Appeals found that odors from a landfill presented a permanent nuisance as a matter of law, even though they varied as the West Texas wind changed. [41] In Meat Producers, Inc. v. McFarland , the Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict finding odors from a cattle feedlot permanent, even though they varied with wind direction and humidity. [42] But the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held in Gulf Coast Sailboats, Inc. v. McGuire that jurors could deem odors from a fiberglass plant temporary, even though they occurred about three times a week, and more often in summer. [43] And in Youngblood's, Inc. v. Goebel , the Tenth Court of Appeals found odor from a poultry-rendering plant was temporary as a matter of law, because it depends on direction of wind, comes and goes, and was present 3 or 4 times a week. [44] Thus, in four cases regarding foul odors carried on variable winds, Texas appellate courts have deemed them temporary as a matter of law, permanent as a matter of law, and a fact question that could go either way. Assuming each of these cases turned on the facts stated in each opinion, half of them must be wrong; they are simply unreconcilable. But because the Texas test has no standard of reference, it is not immediately apparent which. Accrual of limitations is a question of law for the court. [45] Clearly, it is up to jurors to decide material factual disputes about frequency, duration, and extent of nuisance conditions. [46] But without a clear standard of reference for the relative terms involved here, jurors cannot apply the law to the facts without deciding the law also. Moreover, as the distinction between temporary and permanent nuisances determines limitations for bringing a claim, different standards in different cases result in different limitations periods. Uncertainty in the test for the distinction can put the parties in a serious predicament. [47] As Chief Justice Radack noted in her dissent below, the law governing nuisances is unclear in its present state. [48] We granted the petition in this case to try to clarify the standards that should apply.