Opinion ID: 1443016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: were the trial court's findings of discrimination and damages supported by substantial evidence?

Text: The New Mexico Human Rights Act, NMSA 1978, Section 28-1-7, which tracks the language of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2, makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual on the basis of age or race. In this suit based on NMSA 1978, Section 28-1-7, for Smith to prevail he was required to demonstrate that FDC discriminated against him in terminating his employment because of his race or age. Although the burdens of proof and methodology for proving employment discrimination under the New Mexico Human Rights Act have not previously been addressed by this court, the United States Supreme Court has considered this question in interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). [1] The evidentiary methodology adopted therein provides guidance for proving a violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act. Our reliance on the methodology developed in the federal courts, however, should not be interpreted as an indication that we have adopted federal law as our own. Our analysis of this claim is based on New Mexico statute and our interpretation of our legislature's intent, and, by this opinion, we are not binding New Mexico law to interpretations made by the federal courts of the federal statute. The McDonnell Douglas methodology, whereby the burden of persuasion shifts in intermediate stages, was developed because often direct proof of discrimination is not available. The analysis allows proof of discriminatory intent absent direct proof. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). This framework, however, is not a required method of proof; it is only a tool to focus the issues and to reach the ultimate issue of whether the employer's actions were motivated by impermissible discrimination. See id. at 253 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n. 6; Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir.1983). [2] A prima facie case of discrimination may be made out by showing that the plaintiff is a member of the protected group, that he was qualified to continue in his position, that his employment was terminated, and that his position was filled by someone not a member of the protected class. Hawkins v. CECO Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 982 (11th Cir.1989); Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 n. 1 (2d Cir.1984). [3] A prima facie case may also be made out through other means; not all factual situations will fit into any one type of analysis, although unlawful discrimination may nevertheless be present. For example, a prima facie case can be shown absent a demonstration that the plaintiff was replaced by someone not in the protected class if he can show that he was dismissed purportedly for misconduct nearly identical to that engaged in by one outside of the protected class who was nonetheless retained. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282-84, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2579-81, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (11th Cir.1984). This prima facie case may then be rebutted by evidence that the plaintiff was dismissed based on a nondiscriminatory motivation. However, the entire McDonnell Douglas framework may be bypassed through a showing of intentional discrimination; the purpose of the test is to allow discriminated-against plaintiffs, in the absence of direct proof of discrimination, to demonstrate an employer's discriminatory motives. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1018-19 (1st Cir.1979). When direct evidence of discriminatory motive exists, each element of the McDonnell Douglas test need not be proved  the New Mexico Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination based on age and race, and if a plaintiff, such as Smith, can show through direct evidence that he was discriminated against because of an impermissible categorization, that is all that is required for him to prevail. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 621, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860, 102 S.Ct. 316, 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014. FDC contends that there is no evidence supporting the court's finding of discrimination. It maintains that the statistical evidence presented was flawed and did not show that the composition of the work force demonstrated an unlawful pattern of discrimination. It argues that no evidence was submitted regarding the racial background of the work force, and that any evidence of the racial composition in the record is meaningless without evidence of the pool from which employees were drawn. Much of its argument is based on the contention that the evidence offered regarding the racial composition of the work force was based on a superficial analysis of surnames, which it maintains is not determinative of race. It further argues that there was a failure of proof concerning the race of other employees who were involved in accidents but were not dismissed. In reviewing a decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence, we examine the record for relevant evidence such that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Toltec Int'l, Inc. v. Village of Ruidoso, 95 N.M. 82, 84, 619 P.2d 186, 188 (1980). We resolve disputed facts in favor of the party prevailing below, indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict and disregarding contrary inferences, and we do not independently weigh conflicting evidence. Id. Smith presented evidence that he was a member of two protected groups. He also presented evidence that he was qualified at the time of his termination to fully perform his job, that he was fired, and that other factory workers, who were not members of protected groups, were not dismissed when they committed similar safety infractions. Evidence was presented regarding the racial composition of the work force that indicated that there were few older or Native American workers in the plant. Although FDC is correct in arguing that the proof of the race of other employees, including those involved in accidents, is unsophisticated, there was evidence that Smith was the oldest employee in the work force and one of only several Native Americans. FDC did not rebut the anecdotal evidence presented, which was sufficient to support the inference that Native Americans and older workers were underrepresented in the work force, and company records submitted to the court supported Smith's testimony. FDC presented evidence demonstrating that Smith was legitimately terminated because of the accident that could have injured the foreman. Smith then presented evidence that this was a pretext, that the foreman caused the accident, and that others who were not members of protected groups but were guilty of similar safety infractions were not terminated. There was thus ample evidence in the record for the trial court to determine that the reason for the dismissal was race or age-based animus and not a valid business judgment. [4] Furthermore, Smith presented direct evidence of age-based animus  Smith was called old man, and the foreman had indicated that he was happily anticipating Smith's retirement. FDC contends that old man is simply a term of respect, an argument we find wholly unconvincing; in the trial court's discretion, it could easily be determined that such statements evinced age-based animus and evidence of discriminatory intent. See Scofield v. Bolts & Bolts Retail Stores, 21 Fair Empl. Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1478, 1480, 1979 WL 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of age discrimination based upon a showing that she was a member of the protected group, she was qualified and capable of doing her job, she was discharged, and that her manager called her old woman, thus evincing age-based animus sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent). We find adequate evidence to support the trial court's similar determination here. Thus, we find that Smith did make out a case that he was terminated because of his age and race, he did identify age and race-based animus, and he did demonstrate that he was treated differently than similarly situated young, non-Native Americans, to a degree sufficient to support the trial court's judgment.