Opinion ID: 2977316
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Consult About an Appeal

Text: Johnson’s failure to consult Richards about an appeal was not objectively unreasonable conduct. Where the attorney has not consulted with the defendant, the attorney’s failure to do so may itself constitute deficient performance. See id. at 478. The attorney has a “duty to consult” when there is reason for him to think “(1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal . . . or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.” Id. at 480. A review of the record shows that this duty did not arise here. Because there were no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal, Johnson would not have thought a rational defendant would want to appeal. Id. First, “a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable issues.” Id. Richards “received the sentence bargained for as part of the plea.” Id. The sentence was within the guidelines, which were mandatory at that time, and this fact weighs against any cause for appeal. See USSG § 1A1.1.A (2003) (invalidated by U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). Second, although Richards now objects to the methodology used in the PSR, Johnson could not have known at that time that Richards would want to appeal these issues because Richards did -6- No. 05-2135 Richards v. United States not raise these concerns at sentencing and these objections are frivolous. The district court was within its discretion to deny the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, given that Richards’s drug use “constituted a continuation of criminal activity that precluded an . . . adjustment.” United States v. Walker, 182 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Zimmer, 14 F.3d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1994). Also, although the Probation Officer estimated the amount of drugs Richards possessed, those estimations were based on Richards’s own statements and the Probation Officer erred on the side of caution.1 See United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, the Government’s decision not to file a Rule 35(b) motion did not violate the plea agreement because the decision to file was within the Government’s discretion. See United States v. Moore, 225 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2000). Even so, because the Government had one year to file such a motion, this would not have been a reason to appeal during the ten-day appeal period. Richards has not shown that a reasonable defendant would want to appeal and therefore Johnson’s failure to consult Richards about the appeal was not objectively unreasonable. Additionally, it is not clear that Richards was “reasonably . . . interested in appealing.” Roe, 528 U.S. at 480. An attorney may not think the defendant wants to appeal because “a guilty plea . . . may indicate that the defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings.” Id. This indication was bolstered by the fact that Richards did not discuss the matter of an appeal with Johnson until after 1 Although all of the drugs Richards claimed he possessed were converted to marijuana for sentencing purposes, even if Richards was sentenced solely on the basis of his confessed methamphetamine possession, he would have received the same base offense level. See USSG § 2D1.1 (2003) (awarding a base offense level of 32 for possession of more than 500 g but less than 1.5 kg of methamphetamines). -7- No. 05-2135 Richards v. United States the window to appeal had closed. As discussed above, the district court’s finding of fact on this point is not clearly erroneous. Also, the district court told Richards that he had a right to appeal during sentencing. That Richards was aware of the right and did not bring up his desire to appeal until much later supports that he was not reasonably interested in appealing. “[T]ak[ing] into account all the information counsel knew or should have known” at the time, id. at 480, Richards has not shown that Johnson should have known he wanted to appeal and therefore Johnson’s failure to consult Richards about the appeal was not objectively unreasonable. While an attorney’s “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable,” an attorney’s utter failure to investigate his client’s options is not entitled to the same deference. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary . . . . [A] particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances . . .” Id. at 691. Johnson’s complete lack of knowledge about appellate procedure makes it doubtful that Johnson actually investigated the option of an appeal and decided to reject it because it would be futile. Johnson stated that he didn’t “feel there was any need for an appeal” if the Government was going to make a Rule 35(b) motion. However, even if Johnson did fail to investigate and that decision was unreasonable, Richards fails to show that he was prejudiced by Johnson’s deficient conduct. -8- No. 05-2135 Richards v. United States