Opinion ID: 2634887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Edwards' Conflict Infected the District Attorney's Office

Text: The rule that the conflict of one attorney in a firm or government agency is imputed to other members of that firm or government agency is based on the presumption that those attorneys have access to confidential information about each other's clients. People ex rel. Peters v. Dist. Ct., 951 P.2d 926, 930 (Colo.1998). We have held that [t]he rule of imputed disqualification applies to both private firms and public law firms such as a district attorney's office or the state public defender. Id.; see also People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 944 (Colo.1983) (The knowledge and official actions of deputy and assistant district attorneys are imputable to the district attorney.). In jurisdictions, including Colorado, which follow the majority view a prosecution office may be treated as the functional equivalent of a law firm for purposes of invoking the presumption of confidence sharing, but the office will usually be permitted to attempt to rebut that presumption. Richard E. Flamm, Lawyer Disqualification: Conflicts of Interest and Other Bases 649 (2003) (citing Peters, 951 P.2d at 930, to support the proposition that Colorado adheres to this majority rule). Under this rule, proof that the district attorney's office has implemented a timely and sufficient screen will, in the ordinary case, warrant the denial of a motion to disqualify the entire office. Flamm, supra, at 649-50. Conversely, where the personally prohibited prosecutor has not been effectively screened, disqualification of the prosecution office is likely to be ordered. Id. at 650. We have articulated a somewhat more stringent variation of this rule: Certainly, a government prosecutor may be presumed to have some knowledge of the case prosecuted by his co-workers. However, in circumstances not involving vertical intra-agency relationships, we conclude that the presumption may be rebutted by contrary evidence. Cleary v. Dist. Court, 704 P.2d 866, 873 (Colo.1985). Citing the foregoing language in Cleary, Chavez set forth the test for determining whether, under section 20-1-107, the presumption that a conflict of a member of the district attorney's office is imputed to the district attorney has been rebutted, [7] and thus whether special circumstances requiring the disqualification of the entire office and the appointment of a special prosecutor exist. 139 P.3d at 654-55. [8] In Chavez, we stated that the adequacy of screening procedures is a crucial consideration in determining whether the individual prosecutor's conflict should be imputed to the entire office. Id. We held that the adequacy of the screening device is a question of fact to be decided by the judge and we indicated that a device can be effective only if the conflicted attorney is not directly or actually prosecuting the case. [T]he question of whether a district attorney's office has a screening policy that adequately obviates any special circumstances that might lead to an unfair trial is a question of fact to be determined by the judge. If the screening policy is adequate, then no disqualification is necessary because there are no special circumstances which would mandate disqualification. On the other hand, if no screening policy exists or the screening policy is for some reason inadequate, the court must determine whether confidential information from a prior representation nevertheless has been and can continue to be adequately screened from others actually prosecuting the case, in view of the nature of the particular office and circumstances of the prior representation. Id. (emphasis added). Arguably, the question of whether an effective screen was set up to shield the flow of information need not even be decided in this case because Edwards, the conflicted attorney, was one of the attorneys actively prosecuting Perez. Chavez explains that the question of whether a screen was effective is relevant to whether the conflict of an attorney who is not taking an active role in prosecuting the case is imputed to those who are actually prosecuting the case. Id. On the other hand, where the prosecuting attorney had an attorney-client relationship with the defendant in a case that was substantially related to the case in which the defendant is being prosecuted, special circumstances exist that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial and disqualification of the entire district attorney's office is required by section 20-1-107. Id. at 653 (emphasis added); see also Manzanares, 139 P.3d at 659. Because the purpose of an effective screen is to prevent the flow of confidential information from the conflicted attorney to the prosecuting attorneys in order to prevent the information from being used adversely to the former client, then, where the conflicted attorney and the prosecuting attorney are the same person, the adequacy of the screen is irrelevant to whether information has passed to the prosecuting attorney. In such a case, the information has passed to the prosecuting attorney by default, and special circumstances requiring disqualification exist. As detailed in my statement of facts, Edwards' testimony, his time sheets, and the motions he drafted and filed in Perez prove conclusively that he actually prosecut[ed] Perez from May 1, 2007 until June 4, 2007, the date the trial court issued a protective order prohibiting Edwards from further involving himself in the matter. Thus, applying the rationale of Chavez that screening serves only to protect a district attorney's office from disqualification where the conflicted attorney is not actively involved in prosecuting his former client, section 20-1-107 requires disqualification of the entire office in this case. Even assuming that my reading of Chavez is incorrect, and that Chavez requires the court to determine whether a conflicted attorney who is actually prosecuting his former client has been screened from the rest of the office, the district attorney failed to offer sufficient evidence of screening in this case. Chavez requires that a court first inquire as to whether a formal, written screening policy exists. 139 P.3d at 654-55. If it does, then the presumption of shared confidences has been rebutted and the conflict is not imputed to the entire prosecution office. Id. If no policy exists or it is, for some reason, inadequate, then a court must determine whether the prosecution has introduced other evidence which shows that confidential information from a prior representation nevertheless has been and can continue to be adequately screened from others actually prosecuting the case. Id. Again, we review this factual determination for abuse of discretion. Id. In order to overturn it, we would have to determine that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record. Dunlap, 173 P.3d at 1094. The parties do not dispute that the district attorney's office had neither a conflict check nor a screening policy at the time Edwards was deputized. In Manzanares, we addressed the question of what evidence, absent a formal screening policy, is relevant to determine whether confidential information from a prior representation nevertheless has been and can continue to be adequately screened from others actually prosecuting the case. Manzanares, 139 P.3d at 659 (citing Chavez, 139 P.3d at 654). We held that while a properly drafted screening policy provides evidence pertaining to whether confidential information was shared, the assertions of members of the District Attorney's Office, without more, cannot justify the conclusion that no information was shared. Manzanares, 139 P.3d at 659 (emphasis added). [9] Similarly, my research has revealed no jurisdiction holding the assertions of a conflicted attorney that no confidences were shared as evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of shared confidences. If the assertions of members of the district attorney's office are insufficient, standing alone, to rebut the presumption of shared confidences, then, in the absence of any formal screening policy, we must look to other factors which would be useful in determining the likelihood that information has been adequately screened from others actually prosecuting the case. [10] These factors include the size and structure of the prosecution office, Andric v. California, 55 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1066-69 (C.D.Cal.1999) (despite the erection of screen from the outset of the conflict, a government office was disqualified, in part, on the basis that the small size of the office (thirty attorneys) made sharing of confidences likely); the notoriety of the case, Id. at 1066; and whether the conflicted attorney has assisted in the prosecution in any capacity, United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 236 (7th Cir.1990). See also English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs. Inc., 833 F.Supp. 1498, 1507 (D.Colo.1993) (applying Colorado law and endorsing these factors). To these factors, I would add as relevant whether any informal screening mechanisms were employed, despite the absence of a formal, written policy. The prosecution introduced no evidence that, under Chavez and Manzanares, would be sufficient to rebut the presumption of shared confidences as concerns Edwards. The fact that no conflicts check was performed, that there was no screening policy in place, and that Edwards was substantially involved in prosecuting Perez from May 1, 2007 until June 4, 2007 militates strongly against a finding that the presumption was rebutted. Thus, by June 4th, the damage had already been done and the entire office was tainted by Edwards' involvement. Any screening that may have occurred after that time is irrelevant to whether the presumption that confidences were shared during that period has been rebutted. [11] Indeed, not even informal screening could have occurred during that period since, because Edwards, Chambers, and Trout all failed to perform even rudimentary conflict screening, they were unaware that a conflict existed. The only evidence of screening during this period offered by the district attorney is Edwards' assertion that he shared no confidences with his colleagues. Under Manzanares, this assertion, without more, is insufficient as a matter of law to rebut the presumption of shared confidences. The trial court's protective order, which the majority interprets as a de facto screen, could not repair the damage Edwards' involvement had already done. Moreover, the prosecution's conduct even after the trial court issued its protective order establishes that this order did not sufficiently shield Edwards from contact with the attorneys prosecuting the case. Although the prosecution did not introduce evidence of the size of the district attorney's office (at least not of Dan May's office), the record reveals that the Capital Crimes Unit of the Attorney General's Office consists of only two attorneys: Dan Edwards and his superior, Sue Trout. [12] The record further reveals that, not only did Sue Trout continue to work on Perez after the trial court issued the protective order, she continued to meet frequently with Edwards and had access to all of his files on this prosecution. Edwards testified that he was still in contact with Perez prosecutors May and Orman, even after the protective order was issued. Thus, none of the factors which would support the existence of informal screening are present. In sum, the majority's analysis of Edwards' conflict and how it impacts the entire office disregards our precedent. It paints an unrealistic picture of the actual conflict that Edwards faced in both representing Perez and then seeking to convict and sentence him to death, and the manner in which this conflict tainted the entire office. It ignores the fact that neither Edwards nor the district attorney's office advised the court of his conflict. And it fails to provide any rationale demonstrating that the trial court's ruling was manifestly arbitrary, manifestly unreasonable, or manifestly unfair.