Opinion ID: 2622669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: dr. jensen's cross-appeal

Text: ¶126 Dr. Jensen cross-appeals on the issue of fees. He argues that the trial court should have awarded him fees because his work on the claims substantially overlapped, because he did sufficiently allocate the fees between recoverable and nonrecoverable fees, and because Ms. Sawyers did not comply with rule 54(d)(2). He also appeals the trial court's reduction of damages because the awards were based on duplicative claims. We affirm.
¶127 Attorney fees are awarded only when authorized by statute or by contract. The award of attorney fees is a matter of law, which we review for correctness. Paul DeGroot Bldg. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, ¶ 18, 112 P.3d 490. However, a trial court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and we will consider that determination against an abuse-of-discretion standard. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The standard of review on appeal of [the amount of] a trial court's award of attorney fees is patent error or clear abuse of discretion. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
¶128 We first address whether the trial court erred by not awarding attorney fees on the overlapping claims. In general, a prevailing party may collect attorney fees on noncompensable claims only if those claims substantially overlap with compensable claims. Keith Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128, ¶ 30, 26 P.3d 872. ¶129 The trial court properly concluded that Dr. Jensen was not entitled to all attorney fees because some of plaintiff's claims are based on the obtaining of information, and other claims are based on the broadcast of information, there is not a core of facts common to all claims, and the legal theories are unrelated. In this case, not only was some of the time spent on unsuccessful issues, a large portion of time was spent establishing the non-compensable claims of defamation and false light. ¶130 On appeal, Dr. Jensen's counsel merely argues that [a]lthough Dr. Jensen's claims can loosely be categorized as gathering of information claims and broadcast claims, that does not mean that the claims do not overlap. Not only is this argument conclusory, it fails to convince us, or provide us sufficient evidence, to overcome the applicable standard of review. Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the invasion of privacy claims based on newsgathering are not inextricably linked with, and require different proof than, the defamation and false light claims based on the broadcasts. We therefore defer to the trial court's evaluation of the evidence and documentation submitted on the overlapping claims, and affirm.
¶131 The second issue on cross-appealthe issue of attorney fees for compensable and noncompensable claimswas meticulously addressed in two of the trial court's rulings. In July 2001, the court notified Dr. Jensen that his claims had failed to adequately apportion between compensable (i.e., Title 76 and common law intrusion upon seclusion claims), and noncompensable claims. The court invited plaintiff's counsel to supplement their affidavits by separating out the work into three categories: (1) work that pertains specifically to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-401 to -406; (2) work that specifically pertains to common law intrusion upon seclusion; and (3) work on any other claim. With regard to fees of mixed character, plaintiff was to break out (1) what percentage of each billing entry went to support common law intrusion upon seclusion claims, and (2) what percentage went to support Title 76 claims. All other work was deemed to have been done on noncompensable claims. The court stated that failure to adequately separate noncompensable and compensable claims may result in denial of any other fees for the commingled entry. ¶132 In the trial court's second ruling on this matter, it correctly explained that for it to award attorney fees, it must first review all the evidence and make specific findings of fact. Further, the party requesting the attorney fees must categorize the time and fees expended for (1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees. Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998) (quoting Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992)). Noncompliance with these requirements makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the trial court to award the moving party fees because there is insufficient evidence to support the award. ¶133 The trial court noted the extensive work and research conducted in preparation for this case. The court also acknowledged that the attorneys' affidavits did reflect the amount of work necessary to mount the case. The court found that Attorney Gardiner adequately, but not exactly, complied with the attorney fees documenting his time spent on compensable claims. However, Attorney Sine did not. Mr. Sine told the court it was impossible for him to separate his time and merely separated the time into two columns  one compensable and the other noncompensable. As a result, the trial court found it had previously warned counsel in the July order of the importance of adequate separation of the claims, yet again Mr. Sine did not give [the court] sufficient evidence to determine how much time he spent on compensable claims and because the amount of time he claimed to have spent on the compensable claims is unreasonable, this [c]ourt cannot make an appropriate evaluation. ¶134 Mr. Sine presents one sentence for our consideration of his argument on appeal. He writes: If the court closely examines Attorney Sine's submissions, it will see the criteria for fees was met. This is inadequate and does not provide sufficient legal reason for us to override the discretion of the trial court which had the ability to twice review the documentation on this issue. Affirmed.

¶135 Dr. Jensen also argues that all of his claimed costs should have been awarded because Ms. Sawyers failed to comply with rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(d)(2) states: The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of the judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the finding of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). ¶136 The sum total of Dr. Jensen's argument is that his timely filed motion of dissatisfaction with the court seeking costs in the amount of $122,952.66 should have been granted because Ms. Sawyers filed an objection, rather than a motion, opposing those costs. He cites no authority for support. ¶137 Ms. Sawyers contends that the words motion and objection are interchangeable and therefore she properly complied with rule 54(d)(2). For support, she cites two rule 54(d)(2) cases, Graco Fishing & Rental Tools v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1987), and Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah 1978), which specifically identify the filing of an objection rather than a motion to convey the dissatisfaction with the proposed distribution of cost awards. ¶138 We agree with Ms. Sawyers that motion and objection are interchangeable in this case. Black's Law Dictionary defines a motion as a written or oral application requesting a court to make a specified ruling or order. 1031 (7th ed. 1999). An objection is defined as a formal statement opposing something that has occurred or is about to occur, in court. Graco Fishing, 766 P.2d at 1101. In this case, having reviewed Ms. Sawyers' objection to the memorandum of verified costs which follows the same framework as a motion, we conclude that the distinction Dr. Jensen asks us to make is too narrow and violates the intent and spirit of rule 54(d)(2). We affirm the trial court's finding that Ms. Sawyers complied sufficiently with rule 54(d)(2).
¶139 Dr. Jensen appeals the trial court's denial of his application for costs for necessary disbursements authorized under rule 54(d)(2) and associated with his claim for transcript costs, expert witness fees, court equipment expenses, and other out-of-pocket costs. Dr. Jensen claims that the trial court erred by too strictly applying the rule we set out in Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). The trial court supported its position by writing that the Utah Supreme Court has stated that `there is a distinction to be understood' between legitimate and taxable costs and other expenses of litigation which may ever be so necessary, but are not taxable as costs (citing Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774). Dr. Jensen argues that we should reverse or modify the Frampton rule because rule 54(d)(2) does not distinguish between taxable costs and litigation expenses and because the Frampton rule omits the necessary disbursements language in rule 54(d)(2). We disagree. ¶140 We again reference the appropriate standard of review for costs under rule 54(d)(2). A trial court's decision to award the prevailing party its costs will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, ¶ 4, 16 P.3d 549. Moreover, in Frampton we instructed that the trial court has a duty to guard against excesses or abuses in awarding costs. 605 P.2d at 773. ¶141 The trial court's order on this issue carefully reviewed this court's body of law on necessary disbursements and costs. The court makes clear that many of Dr. Jensen's proposed costs violate the Frampton rule against unnecessary costs. Specifically, the court found that some of the deposition costs were not essential or Dr. Jensen could not demonstrate that a less expensive means of obtaining the transcripts would not have been practical. [14] The court reminded the parties that [c]osts were not recoverable at common law; and are therefore generally allowable only in the amounts and in the manner provided by statute. Frampton, 605 P.2d at 773. As a result, a number of items were held unrecoverable by statutethose included a video consultant and court equipment expenses. ¶142 Dr. Jensen tries to make a case for rejecting Frampton, arguing that the question of necessary costs should not be left entirely to the discretion of the legislature and because it may violate the open courts clause in the Utah Constitution by limiting recoverable costs to those conservatively specified by the legislature. We disagree. For twenty-five years, Frampton has remained our guiding principle for allocation of recoverable costs. The trial court properly applied Frampton to the issue of recoverable costs. Dr. Jensen has failed to persuade us with sufficient authority or evidence that we should overrule Frampton and reject the guidelines established by the legislature for appropriate recoverable costs. We therefore affirm.