Opinion ID: 2158835
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Richardson v. United States

Text: [¶ 6] In Richardson, Eddie Richardson had been charged with violating the federal drug statute that makes it a specific crime to engage[] in a continuing criminal enterprise. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1999). The statute defines a continuing criminal enterprise as a `violat[ion]' of the drug statutes where `such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations.' Richardson, 526 U.S. at 815, 119 S.Ct. 1707 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)). At the conclusion of his trial, Richardson requested that the judge instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on which three acts constituted [the] series of violations. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 816, 119 S.Ct. 1707. The trial court denied this request and instructed the jury that it must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses, and it added that [y]ou do not ... have to agree as to the particular three or more federal narcotics offenses committed by the defendant. Id. Richardson was convicted of the charge and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. [¶ 7] The issue before the Court was whether a jury has to agree unanimously about which specific violations make up the `continuing series of violations.' Id. at 815, 119 S.Ct. 1707. The Court specifically held that a jury in a federal criminal case brought under § 848 must unanimously agree not only that the defendant committed some `continuing series of violations' but also that the defendant committed each of the individual `violations' necessary to make up that `continuing series.' Id. It acknowledged that a federal jury does not have to agree as to the means in which a defendant commits an element of a crime as long as the jury unanimously finds that the defendant committed that element. Id. at 817, 119 S.Ct. 1707. The Court determined, however, that each specific underlying violation constituted a particular element and, therefore, juror unanimity was required. Id. at 816, 119 S.Ct. 1707. The Court reached this conclusion after examining the language and breadth of the federal CCE statute, as well as the history and tradition of the criminal law. Id. at 818-20, 119 S.Ct. 1707. [¶ 8] The Court first decided that the term violation, as used in the CCE statute, denotes not simply an act or conduct; it is an act or conduct that is contrary to law. Id. at 818, 119 S.Ct. 1707. It further stated: To hold that each `violation' here amounts to a separate element is consistent with a tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the law. Id. at 818-19, 119 S.Ct. 1707. [¶ 9] The Court next examined the breadth of the statute and considered the potential for unfairness. It noted that the statute used the term violations in order to encompass many different criminal acts with varying degrees of seriousness. Id. at 819, 119 S.Ct. 1707. The Court explained that this breadth also argues against treating each individual violation as a means, for that breadth aggravates the dangers of unfairness that doing so would risk. Id. [¶ 10] Lastly, the Court considered the constitutional tradition of requiring jury unanimity in criminal cases: [T]he Constitution itself limits a State's power to define crimes in ways that would permit juries to convict while disagreeing about means, at least where that definition risks serious unfairness and lacks support in history or tradition.... We have no reason to believe that Congress intended to come close to, or to test, those constitutional limits when it wrote this statute. Id. at 820, 119 S.Ct. 1707 (citations omitted). The Court decided that the considerations [of language, potential unfairness, and tradition], taken together, lead us to conclude that the statute requires jury unanimity in respect to each individual `violation.' Id. at 824, 119 S.Ct. 1707.