Opinion ID: 2048220
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fee or Fine?

Text: Thus the first question we must address is whether the charge imposed by section 5-9-1.1(c) is a fee or a fine. As a threshold matter, defendant argues that the State should not be permitted to take the position that the charge imposed by section 5-9-1.1(c) is a fine, because the State stated that the charge was a fee in a footnote in its appellate court brief. We disagree that the State is precluded from arguing that the charge is a fine. Defendant's complaint sounds in the doctrine of judicial estoppel. As this court has explained, Five elements are generally required for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to apply: the party to be estopped must have (1) taken two positions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intending for the trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged, and (5) have succeeded in the first proceeding and received some benefit from it. (Emphasis added.) People v. Caballero, 206 Ill.2d 65, 80, 276 Ill. Dec. 356, 794 N.E.2d 251 (2002). Application of the doctrine is discretionary. Caballero, 206 Ill.2d at 80, 276 Ill.Dec. 356, 794 N.E.2d 251. The doctrine does not apply in this case for a number of reasons. First, the State's two positions were not factually inconsistentthere was no dispute that the charge was imposed, the only question was whether the charge was a fine or a fee. These positions were merely legally inconsistent. Second, the State's two positions were not adopted in separate proceedings. The appeal before this court is a continuation of the proceedings before the appellate court and the proceedings before the circuit court. Finally, the doctrine cannot apply because the State did not succeed or receive any benefit from its position in the appellate court. Accordingly, we proceed to the merits. Section 5-9-1.1(c) provides as follows: In addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (a) of this Section, a fee of $5 shall be assessed by the court, the proceeds of which shall be collected by the Circuit Clerk and remitted to the State Treasurer under Section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act for deposit into the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund. This additional fee of $5 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2004). As defendant notes, the statute does call the charge a fee. This constitutes strong evidence as to how the charge should be characterized. However, as previously noted, the label attached by the legislature is not necessarily definitive. See Crocker, 99 Ill.2d at 452, 77 Ill.Dec. 97, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (a charge labeled a fee was in reality a tax); Elizalde, 344 Ill. App.3d at 682, 279 Ill.Dec. 571, 800 N.E.2d 859. We note that the statute is ambiguous, in that although the statute does label the charge a fee it also states that the charge shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing. If the charge were truly a fee, there would be no need for the legislature to have included this language because, as the parties agree, the credit for presentence incarceration can only reduce fines, not fees. See 725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2004). Thus to conclude the charge is a fee would render this section of the statute superfluous, a construction to be avoided. Jones, 214 Ill.2d at 193, 291 Ill.Dec. 663, 824 N.E.2d 239; Bonaguro, 158 Ill.2d at 397, 199 Ill.Dec. 659, 634 N.E.2d 712. In this case, notwithstanding the label attached by the legislature, we believe that the charge at issue is in fact a fine. The legislature's label is strong evidence, but it cannot overcome the actual attributes of the charge at issue, as we have repeatedly recognized. See Boynton v. Kusper, 112 Ill.2d 356, 365, 98 Ill.Dec. 208, 494 N.E.2d 135 (1986) (holding that a portion of the marriage license fee which had no relation to the services supposedly supported by that fee is a tax); Crocker, 99 Ill.2d at 452, 77 Ill.Dec. 97, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (although legislature labeled charge a fee it was in reality a tax because court charges imposed on a litigant are fees if assessed to defray the expenses of his litigation). See also Arangold, 204 Ill.2d at 148-49, 272 Ill.Dec. 600, 787 N.E.2d 786 (noting that the charges at issue in Boynton and Crocker, although labeled fees, were in fact taxes). In this case, the $5 charge imposed pursuant to section 5-9-1.1(c) possesses only the attributes of a fine and none of the attributes of a fee. To begin, the charge is imposed only after conviction for a criminal offense, it is contained in article 9 of chapter V of the Unified Code of Correctionsan article entitled Finesand it is payable to the state treasury. The appellate court in Rodriguez found these characteristics insufficient to override the plain language of the statute. See Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 51-52, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543. But Rodriguez does not appear to have considered what we consider to be the most important fact, that this charge does not seek to compensate the state for any costs incurred as the result of prosecuting the defendant. This is the central characteristic which separates a fee from a fine. A charge is a fee if and only if it is intended to reimburse the state for some cost incurred in defendant's prosecution. Boynton, 112 Ill.2d at 364-65, 98 Ill.Dec. 208, 494 N.E.2d 135; Crocker, 99 Ill.2d at 452, 77 Ill.Dec. 97, 459 N.E.2d 1346; White, 333 Ill.App.3d at 781, 267 Ill.Dec. 464, 776 N.E.2d 836; People v. Terneus, 239 Ill.App.3d 669, 672, 180 Ill.Dec. 499, 607 N.E.2d 568 (1992). In this case, with respect to this charge, all evidence is to the contraryindeed, defendant's central argument is that the purpose of the charge is not even rationally related to the crime he committed. The charge is clearly a fine, the label notwithstanding. Defendant argues that the charge is not in the nature of a fine because the amount of the charge does not vary depending on the severity of defendant's conduct, citing People v. Youngblood, 365 Ill.App.3d 210, 302 Ill.Dec. 631, 849 N.E.2d 423 (2006). We find this argument unconvincing. In Youngblood, the court addressed the question of whether the drug assessment pursuant to section 411.2 was subject to offset for presentencing credit pursuant to section 110-14. The court concluded that the drug assessment was in the nature of a fine-and, thus, subject to offsetbecause, inter alia, the funds are payable to a public treasury, and nothing indicated that the assessment was intended as a charge for labor or services. Youngblood, 365 Ill.App.3d at 214, 302 Ill.Dec. 631, 849 N.E.2d 423. The court went on to note that the State argued that the assessment should be construed as a fee because it was `unrelated to the relative infamy of the defendant's behavior.' Youngblood, 365 Ill.App.3d at 214, 302 Ill.Dec. 631, 849 N.E.2d 423. The court dispensed with this argument by simply noting that the assessment did vary with the seriousness of the defendant's conduct. Youngblood, 365 Ill.App.3d at 214-15, 302 Ill.Dec. 631, 849 N.E.2d 423, citing 720 ILCS 570/411.2 (West 2002). Youngblood does not stand for the proposition that a charge must vary with the severity of conduct in order to constitute a fine, and we decline to create any such rule. In this case, despite the fact that the charge does not vary with severity of behavior, the other attributes of the charge convince us that it is properly characterized as a fine, not a fee. Accordingly, the $5 charge may properly be viewed as a criminal penalty. [3]