Opinion ID: 1138579
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Untimeliness

Text: (1) Petitioner's defense is untimely by his own admission. One of his primary arguments is that the State Bar referee was unaware of petitioner's emotional and physical problems when the August 1988 hearing was held, and that the State Bar would not have recommended disbarment if the bar had been aware of this evidence. As we have explained on several recent occasions, this court generally hesitates to rely upon any documentary evidence that is extrinsic to the record of the proceedings before the State Bar. ( In re Rivas (1989) 49 Cal.3d 794, 801 [263 Cal. Rptr. 654, 781 P.2d 946] (italics in original); Rosenthal v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 658, 663 [238 Cal. Rptr. 394, 738 P.2d 740].) Such evidence is virtually impossible to evaluate in the absence of cross-examination and, to the extent it consists of opinions about the petitioner's mental attitude, is often based on his own self-serving, out-of-court statements. ( Lydon v. State Bar (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1181, 1187 [248 Cal. Rptr. 830, 756 P.2d 217].) Petitioner offers two conflicting explanations for his belated reliance on alleged medical and emotional problems. Neither is persuasive. After the review department adopted the referee's disbarment recommendation, petitioner filed an application to present evidence of his medical and emotional ailments. In support of that application, he declared under penalty of perjury that he did not present the evidence (or tell his counsel of it) because he did not realize until review[ing] the case that in fact this [August 1988] hearing was the proper forum to present such evidence. This assertion is flatly contradicted by petitioner's prior conduct. He had already participated in a disciplinary hearing in March 1987 in Bar Misc. No. 5622 and had presented mitigating evidence. Moreover, in February 1988 he petitioned this court for review of the decision in Bar Misc. No. 5622 and in support of that petition attempted to justify his failure to present additional mitigating evidence to the State Bar. Petitioner's experience with and actions in Bar Misc. No. 5622 demonstrate he was fully familiar with State Bar proceedings by the time of the August 1988 hearing in this matter. Petitioner's claimed ignorance is even more incredible in light of his conduct in this proceeding. At the August 1988 hearing, petitioner testified to emotional difficulties that he had in dealing with his disciplinary problems. For example, he claimed a psychological inability to promptly open mail from the State Bar. Moreover, petitioner was represented by counsel, who did attempt to elicit mitigating testimony. In short, we reject petitioner's claim of ignorance of when to present mitigating evidence. Aside from being unconvincing, this claim is inconsistent with petitioner's other attempted justification for failing to timely present his medical and emotional evidence to the State Bar. He contends that, at the time of the August 1988 hearing, he was unaware of the extent of the emotional and physical problems he was experiencing. Petitioner cannot have it both ways, arguing on the one hand that he was unaware of his problems, but on the other hand that he would have presented evidence of those alleged problems if only he had understood the State Bar hearing procedure. Petitioner's claim that he was unaware of his condition is contradicted by his prior assertions that he had long been emotionally unable to deal with his disciplinary proceedings. For example, he states in his declaration that Prior to the August [1988] hearing, I did everything possible to avoid all dealings with the State Bar or my discipline. It is therefore untenable for petitioner to claim that he was unaware of his emotional problems. By his own admission, he was painfully aware of them. Petitioner's reliance on emotional problems is also inconsistent with his testimony at the August 1988 hearing. As explained above (pp. 121-122, ante ), his sole defense to the alleged violation of rule 955 was that he thought he had no clients and was not required to act under rule 955. He now argues, however, that his emotional problems precluded him from complying with rule 955. This argument necessarily assumes that, absent these problems, he would have notified his clients. The argument therefore refutes his prior contention that he had no clients. Again, petitioner cannot have it both ways. We do not see how this conflict would have led to a more favorable recommendation by the referee. If anything, the conflict would have raised a reasonable doubt for the referee as to petitioner's credibility. In short, petitioner's reliance on his alleged emotional and physical problems is untimely. He must therefore be deemed to have waived any argument based on those problems. ( Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 774 [263 Cal. Rptr. 641, 781 P.2d 933].) Due to the ultimate nature of the sanction recommended by the State Bar, however, we consider the merits of petitioner's belated claim of emotional incapacity.