Opinion ID: 1990859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: court record

Text: Two dates pertinent to our analysis are certain: December 8, 2003, the date on which the information was filed, and September 28, 2007, the date on which Williams filed the motion for discharge which is the subject of this appeal. Obviously, unless significant portions of the nearly 4-year span between those dates constitute excludable periods under § 29-1207, the State's time in which to bring Williams to trial has expired. Our task in this appeal is to determine whether the district court erred in concluding that it had not. This task is made more difficult by the fact that the district court made only general findings. In its ruling on the initial motion for discharge, the court found that all prior trial dates have all been continued at the request of the defendant for a variety of reasons and that according to its unspecified calculations, the six months speedy trial has not run. In ruling on the second motion, the motion at issue in this appeal, the court concluded that it was well within the parameters of the speedy trial statute. At the time of these rulings, neither the speedy trial statute nor our prior case law required more specific findings of excludable periods under § 29-1207(4)(a) and (b). [13] We have required specific findings with respect to the excludable period under another provision of the speedy trial statutes. Section 29-1207(4)(f) provides that other periods of delay not specifically enumerated in the statute may be excluded in the speedy trial computation, but only if the court finds that they are for good cause. In State v. Alvarez, [41] we held prospectively that in order to facilitate appellate review, trial courts must make specific findings with respect to § 29-1207(4)(f) as to the cause or causes of such extensions and the period of extension attributable to such causes. We now conclude that similar findings are necessary in order to facilitate appellate review of all determinations of excludable periods under § 29-1207(4). Effective March 9, 2009, when ruling on a motion for absolute discharge pursuant to § 29-1208, the trial court shall make specific findings of each period of delay excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a) to (e), in addition to the findings under § 29-1207(4)(f) currently required by Alvarez. Such findings shall include the date and nature of the proceedings, circumstances, or rulings which initiated and concluded each excludable period; the number of days composing each excludable period; and the number of days remaining in which the defendant may be brought to trial after taking into consideration all excludable periods.