Opinion ID: 709483
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: applicability of exemption 7(c)

Text: 18 Customs relied on Exemption 7(C) of FOIA to justify its refusal to confirm or deny the existence of any responsive records in its TECS investigatory files. Letter of Mar. 30, 1994, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 89. The district court affirmed this response, ruling that appellants were not permitted to obtain any information that might be found in the investigatory files because they initially had expressed doubts as to whether those files contained responsive records. Mem.Op. at 6-7. The court also determined that the records sought, if they existed, would pertain to the activities of a private citizen rather than to agency conduct, and thus were not covered by FOIA. Id. at 7-8. We will sustain the district court's grant of summary judgment for the agency on this issue only if we find that the agency has met its burden of demonstrating that the requested records are exempt from disclosure. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173, 112 S.Ct. 541, 546, 116 L.Ed.2d 526 (1991); see also 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(B). 19 As an initial matter, we can dispense with the district court's ruling that appellants' skepticism about whether the TECS files were a likely source of information indicated that they were engaged in a fishing expedition and abrogated their right to any responsive records that might be found in those files. Mem.Op. at 7. If appellants had first identified the investigatory files as a target of their FOIA request, but then proclaimed doubts as to whether the files contained relevant information, the district court's decision to withhold information might strike us as more reasonable. But here, Customs repeatedly identified the TECS files and the index of the Commissioner's correspondence as the systems which logically would maintain records responsive to the Plaintiff's request. Supplemental Decl. of Kathryn C. Peterson at 4; see also Second Supplemental Decl. of Kathryn C. Peterson at 4. Appellants challenged this assertion not in bad faith, but in the context of contesting the adequacy of Customs' search. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, No. 94-808 at 3, 14-15, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 174, 185-86. To deny appellants access to any information that the TECS files might contain on the basis of these doubts would make sense only if their statements could reasonably be read as a withdrawal of their request insofar as the TECS files were pertinent, a standard not here satisfied. 20 The district court's affirmance of Customs' reliance on Exemption 7(C) to justify its Glomar response presents a more difficult legal question. Customs seeks affirmance of a policy to neither confirm nor deny the existence of investigative information pertaining to third parties ... whether the individual be a suspect or a witness. Decl. of Kathryn C. Peterson at 6. We understand this policy to be a categorical rule that Customs will refuse to confirm or deny the existence of any information in its law enforcement records which mentions an individual by name. Because we find that in these circumstances a categorical rule authorizing issuance of a Glomar response is inappropriate, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue and direct the court on remand to perform the ad hoc balancing of private and public interests generally required under Exemption 7(C). 21 As the Customs Service noted, rules exempting certain categories of records from disclosure are sometimes permitted, even encouraged, as a workable manner of meeting FOIA obligations. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 779, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1485, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989) (quoting FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983)); Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1579, 123 L.Ed.2d 147 (1992). There are limits, though, to when categorical rules may be employed. Only when the range of circumstances included in the category characteristically support[s] an inference that the statutory requirements for exemption are satisfied is such a rule appropriate. See United States v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 2014, 2022-23, 124 L.Ed.2d 84 (1993) (rejecting categorical rule for applying Exemption 7(D), which applies to confidential sources). 22 Exemption 7(C) allows an agency to withhold investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, or information which if written would be contained in such records, but only to the extent that the production of such records or information would ... constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(C). The courts have construed this provision as permitting exemption if the privacy interest at stake outweighs the public's interest in disclosure. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 776, 109 S.Ct. at 1483; Davis v. United States Dep't of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C.Cir.1992). Under the exemption, a Glomar response may be issued in place of a statement acknowledging the existence of responsive records but withholding them, if confirming or denying the existence of the records would associate the individual named in the request with criminal activity. See, e.g., Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 757, 109 S.Ct. at 1473 (refusal to confirm or deny whether FBI had rap sheets on named individual); Beck v. United States Dep't of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489, 1491-92 (D.C.Cir.1993) (refusal to confirm or deny whether Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility had records of complaints against named agent); Dunkelberger v. United States Dep't of Justice, 906 F.2d 779, 780 (D.C.Cir.1990) (refusal to confirm or deny whether FBI has records on administrative disciplinary action against named agent). 23 To assess the district court's categorical balancing of private and public interests with respect to Customs' contested Glomar policy, we must compare the two interests to determine if the balance characteristically tips in one direction. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 776, 109 S.Ct. at 1483. As is often the case with judicial balancing tests, the manner in which we define the interests on both sides of the scale has a substantial effect on the outcome of our decision. First, we examine the privacy interests implicated by disclosure to third parties of material contained in investigatory files. In a number of cases, this court has found that individuals have an obvious privacy interest cognizable under Exemption 7(C) in keeping secret the fact that they were subjects of a law enforcement investigation. See, e.g., Dunkelberger, 906 F.2d at 781 (citing Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84 (D.C.Cir.1984)); Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 864 (D.C.Cir.1981). That privacy interest also extends to third parties who may be mentioned in investigatory files, as well as to witnesses and informants who provided information during the course of an investigation. See Davis, 968 F.2d at 1281 (citing Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C.Cir.1990)); King v. Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 233 (D.C.Cir.1987). Thus, a substantial privacy interest arises in the circumstances which fall within Customs' categorical rule. This holds true for disclosure of any records that may exist in this case, as well. Perot has some interest in nondisclosure 8 of any records regarding his offers of assistance, even if they refer to him as an individual who has offered to help the agency in performing its law enforcement duties, rather than as a potential violator of Customs laws. 9 Because the magnitude of Perot's privacy interest turns on whether disclosure might result in unwarranted association with criminal activity or reputational harm, records discussing offers of assistance may implicate a less substantial privacy interest than any records associating Perot with criminal activity. 24 Second, we must evaluate the public interest. This interest must be assessed in light of FOIA's central purpose, which is to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny. Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1604, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976). In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court elaborated on the type of interest relevant to an Exemption 7(C) balancing by stating that [o]fficial information that sheds light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose. That purpose, however, is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct. 489 U.S. at 773, 109 S.Ct. at 1481; accord Beck, 997 F.2d at 1492-94; Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282; Dunkelberger, 906 F.2d at 781. Although Reporters Committee and the precedent of this circuit make clear that FOIA extends only to those records which reveal something about agency action, the mere fact that records pertain to an individual's activities does not necessarily qualify them for exemption. Such records may still be cloaked with the public interest if the information would shed light on agency action. 25 It is in applying this standard to the circumstances of this case that the district court erred. Based on its determination that appellants' request related only to the activities of a private citizen, not to agency conduct, the district court concluded that appellants' request triggered only a minimal public interest in disclosure. Mem.Op. at 8. As the language of the contested request indicates, it would be disingenuous to suggest that appellants are not interested in the actions of Perot. Unlike the private activities in Reporters Committee and the cases cited from our own circuit, however, what makes Perot's activities significant is their connection to agency conduct. Appellants want to find out whether Perot offered to help a federal agency fulfill its statutory duties to interdict drugs, and if so, how that agency responded to his overtures. Although Perot himself may be a target of their investigative work, appellants also expressed interest in the privatization of government functions, particularly operations which are covertly funded. The district court acknowledged as much, in stating that appellants sought to determine whether Customs planned to privatize certain components of the nation's drug interdiction efforts. Id. at 6-7. These concerns are about agency activity, not just Perot's private activities. As such, their disclosure may serve the public's interest in knowing what their government is up to. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 773, 109 S.Ct. at 1481. 26 Our characterization of the public interest at stake in this case also informs our appraisal of whether a categorical Glomar response is appropriate. In some, perhaps many, instances where a third party asks if an agency has information regarding a named individual in its law enforcement files, the cognizable public interest in that information will be negligible; the requester will be seeking records about a private citizen, not agency conduct. See, e.g., Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 773-75, 109 S.Ct. at 1481-83; Beck, 997 F.2d at 1493-94; Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282; Dunkelberger, 906 F.2d at 781. In this case, however, appellants have identified a public interest cognizable under FOIA in disclosure of any information regarding Perot's offers of assistance that might exist in Customs' investigatory files. Because the range of circumstances included in Customs' categorical rule do not characteristically support an inference that all material in law enforcement files which names a particular individual is exempt from disclosure to third parties, a more particularized approach is required. Cf. Landano, 508 U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2021-24. On remand, we direct the district court to engage in ad hoc balancing of the competing interests at stake here, taking into consideration our assessment of the cognizable public interest in disclosure of responsive records. Of course, Customs is also free to articulate a revised categorical rule regarding disclosure of law enforcement records if it can identify more narrowly tailored circumstances under which the balance of privacy and public interest characteristically tips in the direction of exemption. 27 Finally, we must address the district court's determination that our decision in SafeCard Services, Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197 (D.C.Cir.1991), authorizes Customs' policy of categorically issuing a Glomar response to any requester seeking investigatory information that pertains to a third party. The district court cited SafeCard in support of its ruling that FOIA requesters are not otherwise entitled to information about a private citizen that is housed in an agency's investigatory files. Mem.Op. at 8. As we have explained above, we construe the appellants' FOIA request more expansively than did the district court, to include any information pertaining to Perot's offers of assistance. Although the district court might not have found SafeCard applicable had it interpreted appellants' request in a similar manner, see Mem.Op. at 8 n. 1 (If the Plaintiffs had sought to use investigatory information about Perot to shed light on, for example, Customs' investigatory practices, their search would clearly have fallen within the scope of FOIA.), the district court's discussion of the scope of SafeCard is sufficiently problematic to cause us to briefly clarify that precedent prior to remanding the case. 28 SafeCard permits an agency to withhold the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) [unless disclosure] is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity. Id. at 1206. It is one in a long line of FOIA cases holding that disclosure of the identities of private citizens mentioned in law enforcement files constitutes an unwarranted invasion of privacy and is thus exempt under 7(C). See, e.g., McCutchen v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 30 F.3d 183, 187-90 (D.C.Cir.1994); Keys v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 346-48 (D.C.Cir.1987); King, 830 F.2d at 232-35; Senate of Puerto Rico v. Dep't of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 587-88 (D.C.Cir.1987); Fund for Constitutional Gov't, 656 F.2d at 863-66; Baez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1338-39 (D.C.Cir.1980); Lesar v. Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 486-88 (D.C.Cir.1980); see also Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S.Ct. 1592. In SafeCard, the court relied on those cases to formulate a categorical rule denying disclosure of such information unless the requester can show that the records would confirm or refute allegations of illegal agency activity. 29 We agree with the agency and the district court that, to the extent any information contained in 7(C) investigatory files would reveal the identities of individuals who are subjects, witnesses, or informants in law enforcement investigations, those portions of responsive records are categorically exempt from disclosure under SafeCard. But we do not read SafeCard as permitting an agency to exempt from disclosure all of the material in an investigatory record solely on the grounds that the record includes some information which identifies a private citizen or provides that person's name and address. Because such a blanket exemption would reach far more broadly than is necessary to protect the identities of individuals mentioned in law enforcement files, it would be contrary to FOIA's overall purpose of disclosure, and thus is not a permissible reading of Exemption 7(C). 30 As a general rule, SafeCard directs an agency to redact the names, addresses, or other identifiers of individuals mentioned in investigatory files in order to protect the privacy of those persons. In this case, however, Perot himself has made several public statements indicating that he has offered to aid the federal government in hostage rescue and drug interdiction operations. Redaction of Perot's name from any responsive documents in the TECS files that involve the subject matter of those disclosures, if those records are not otherwise exempt from disclosure under Exemption 7(C) or other exemptions set forth in Sec. 552(b)(7), would not serve any useful purpose in protecting his privacy. Perot's decision to bring information connecting himself with such efforts into the public domain differentiates his privacy interest from the interest of unnamed SafeCard witnesses who did not voluntarily divulge their identities; these public disclosures effectively waive Perot's right to redaction of his name from documents on events that he has publicly discussed. 10 Davis, 968 F.2d at 1280. 31 In summary, we find that both grounds upon which the court granted summary judgment on the applicability of Exemption 7(C) were erroneous. We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment on this issue, as well as on the issue of the adequacy of Customs' search. On remand, we instruct the district court to engage in an ad hoc balancing of the interests implicated by disclosure, in a manner which takes into account our characterization of appellants' request as relating to agency conduct, as well as Perot's activities as a private citizen. 32 So ordered.