Opinion ID: 782099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Section 207(o)(5)

Text: 27 The Union also attempted to adduce sufficient summary judgment evidence to suggest that, under the HPD's Red Book system, complainant police officers were unable to use their accrued comp time within a reasonable period after making the request. After a careful review of the record, this court concludes, as did the district court, that the Union has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the HPD's alleged misapplication of section 207( o )(5). 28 The principal evidence to which the Union points consists of the following: (1) the deposition of Joe L. Breshears (HPD Executive Assistant Chief); (2) HPD General Order 300-07, September 18, 1995; (3) the data and testimony of Dr. P.R. Jeanneret (HPD expert witness); and (4) the memorandum of G.S. Stewart (Assistant Chief, South Patrol Unit, HPD). These documents do not, either individually or collectively, present any evidence whatsoever that the HPD's Red Book system prevented the city's police officers from using accrued comp time within a reasonable period after making the request. The most that can be found here is some slight evidence of the fact that certain forms of police work, particularly patrol duty, are ill-suited to the removal and substitution of non-fungible officers. 29 To review the evidence briefly: In the deposition testimony of Chief Breshears can be found a detailed description of the manner in which the Red Book policy was formulated and administered; in General Order 300-07 there is a formal policy statement of the same; and in Chief Stewart's memorandum are the results of a poll saying, once again, that comp time could be taken on a first-come, first-served basis. The sharpest version of all, of course, is the information provided by Dr. Jeanneret, as his data and testimony were prepared by the HPD in response to this suit. In none of these reports is there the slightest hint that the Red Book system, either in theory or practice, violated the FLSA as interpreted above. 9 30 Nonetheless, one of the Union's points calls for a more substantial response. This is that officers on patrol duty had experienced rather more substantial delays in their ability to consume their accrued comp time. 31 The report prepared by Dr. P.R. Jeanneret concluded with the following statement: For the most part, an employee who is eligible for compensatory time off is able to obtain approval for a specific time period requested without difficulty. Dr. Jeanneret goes on, however, to note an exception to this general rule: 32 The exception to this conclusion occurs in Patrol and especially those divisions that have a high volume of calls for service. The divisions with high volumes of service calls where operations have been using below minimum staffing levels presented circumstances when not everyone might be able to obtain the specific compensatory time off they had requested. These relatively limited circumstances arise when the red book slots are filled and when making exceptions would present the division with safety concerns and unacceptable increases in response time to calls for service. 33 While the Union does not appear to dispute Dr. Jeanneret's basic conclusion, it argues that his qualification of the general rule is significantly understated. What he fails to mention, the Union argues, is that, of the over 5000 police officers in the HPD, approximately 40% work in patrol. The exception thus swallows the rule. 34 The Union's clarification does not suffice to create a fact issue concerning HPD's violation of section 207( o )(5). First, the proposition to which this factum constitutes an exception is not an exception to the assertion that Houston police officers were unable to take compensatory time within a reasonable period after making the request. It is apposite, rather, to the proposition that officers are able to obtain approval for a specific time period requested without difficulty. As has been discussed, the FLSA does not grant such a right. The HPD's denial of such an option to patrol officers cannot, therefore, be actionable. 35 We also note, moreover, that this exception would be void of legal significance even if the Union's reading of the FLSA were correct. This is so because requiring comp-time usage-on-demand would, as Dr. Jeanneret's uncontroverted analysis concludes, unduly disrupt the operations of the HPD. As he said: 36 Such understaffing would severely impact the operational efficiency and effectiveness of HPD and undermine the Department's continued efforts to provide the required levels of service within the budget allocations provided in the City of Houston. 37 In other words, local neighborhoods could be seriously adversely affected when too many regular duty officers are off work. The FLSA requires, generally, that officers be allowed to take comp time within reasonable periods after making their requests. The burden that this statute places upon public employers is waived, however, in those circumstances where compliance would unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency. This balance represents the statutory compromise between the interests of public agencies and their employees. Without adequate evidence placing Dr. Jeanneret's conclusion of undue disruption into dispute, this court must conclude, as did the district court, that the Union has no claim cognizable under section 207( o )(5).