Opinion ID: 795105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the post-desert palace framework for analyzing mixed-motive claims

Text: With this background from our sister circuits, I now turn to the question of how to analyze mixed-motive claims at the summary judgment stage after Desert Palace. 7 Because McDonnell Douglas creates a shifting set of evidentiary burdens aimed at smoking out the single, ultimate reason for the adverse employment decision, see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089 & n. 8, the mixed-motive analysis cannot be fit neatly within the McDonnell Douglas framework. As explained above, the purpose of the prima facie case is to rule out the most likely legitimate reasons for an adverse employment decision. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089. An employee can succeed on a mixed-motive claim, however, even if such legitimate reasons played a role in the decision, so long as an illegitimate reason was a motivating factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Therefore, a different approach is necessary for analyzing mixed-motive claims at the summary judgment stage. I believe that in a case involving mixed motives, to defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment, the employee must present evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to demonstrate that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (holding that summary judgment must be granted against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial). Although the employee need not establish a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case to defeat a motion for summary judgment on a mixed-motive claim, setting forth a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas can aid the employee in showing that an illegitimate reason motivated the adverse employment decision. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (explaining that the prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination ... because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors (quoting Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978))); id. at 255, 101 S.Ct. 1089 n. 10 (noting that the prima facie case may continue to support an inference of discrimination even after a nondiscriminatory motive has been asserted). Other evidence — direct or circumstantial — that an illegitimate reason was a motivating factor for the decision will allow the employee to defeat the employer's summary judgment motion in a mixed-motive case. In assessing whether an employee has demonstrated that an illegitimate reason was a motivating factor in the employer's adverse decision, the court should also consider evidence presented by the employer that the protected characteristic was not a motivating factor for its employment decision. If the employee fails to present sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that a discriminatory reason constituted a motivating factor in the adverse decision or, stated alternatively, if the employer succeeds in showing that the only motivating factors in its decision were legitimate and nondiscriminatory, the employer's motion for summary judgment should be granted. When the employee has presented evidence of an illegitimate motivating factor and the employer's motion for summary judgment cannot be granted, the employer still has the opportunity to raise the limited affirmative defense that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). If the employer can show that it is entitled to this defense, its liability will be limited to declaratory and certain injunctive relief and attorney fees and costs. Id. In this situation, the district court would then determine the extent of the injunctive and declaratory relief as well as the fees and costs to which the employee was entitled. See Fuhr v. Sch. Dist. of Hazel Park, 364 F.3d 753, 760, 762 (6th Cir.2004) (explaining that equitable remedies and the determination of attorney fees are within the discretion of the trial court); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) & (B) (stating that hiring, reinstatement, or promotion and back pay are not available remedies). If the employer cannot show that it is entitled to this affirmative defense — that is, the employer cannot show that it would have taken the same action absent the discriminatory motivating factor — the case must proceed to trial. In conducting this inquiry, there is no need to shift burdens among the parties. The court simply considers whether there are any genuinely disputed issues of material fact, and, if none is present, whether the law supports a judgment in favor of the moving party on the basis of the undisputed facts before it. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Inquiries regarding what actually motivated an employer's decision are very fact intensive and thus will generally be difficult to determine at the summary judgment stage. See Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 564 (6th Cir.2004) (explaining that in discrimination and retaliation cases, an employer's true motivations are particularly difficult to ascertain, ... thereby frequently making such factual determinations unsuitable for disposition at the summary judgment stage). When there is a factual dispute as to the factors that motivated the employer's decision, summary judgment is inappropriate. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).