Opinion ID: 807910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deshaun Germany

Text: On appeal, Germany brings several procedural and substantive challenges to the reasonableness of his sentence. Again, we presume the district court’s imposition of a within-Guidelines sentence to be reasonable and review it for abuse of discretion. United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2009). We review de novo its procedures during sentencing, including the court’s consideration of the § 3553 factors. Id. Germany argues that the district court failed to follow the proper procedure in determining his sentence because the court relied on his arrest record and did not adequately consider the mitigating factors that he presented at sentencing. A sentencing court must first correctly calculate the advisory Guidelines range. United States v. Rodriguez-Alvarez, 425 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 2005). Next, the defendant must be given the opportunity to bring to the court’s attention any factors under § 3553(a) that might warrant a sentence below the Guidelines range. United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2005). The court must consider those factors in selecting an appropriate sentence, although it need not expressly address all of them. United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2005). When the court selects a sentence within the Guidelines range, it is enough that “the record confirms that the judge has given meaningful consideration to the section § 3553(a) factors.” Id. Nos. 10-3130, 10-3505 & 11-1395 9 The district court completed the required steps in this case. First, there is no dispute that the district court correctly determined that, because the statutory maximum—48 months—was less than the applicable Guidelines range—135 to 168 months—the statutory maximum became the Guidelines sentence.2 The district court found that Germany was accountable for 280 grams of crack cocaine. Based on the 18-to-1 ratio under the FSA, that amount of crack cocaine is equivalent to a little over five kilograms of powder cocaine. Under the current Guidelines, five kilograms results in a base offense level of 32, which, when combined with Criminal History Category II, results in a Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. After the correct Guidelines range was determined, Germany was allowed to argue the § 3553(a) sentencing factors in his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing. The district court then considered the statutory factors in § 3553(a), including the nature of the offense, Germany’s criminal history, and his characteristics. Germany argues that the district court “overlooked” and failed to address significant mitigating factors; namely, the disparity in sentences between powder cocaine and crack cocaine or the disparity in his sentence with that of other persons convicted of the same offense. But the district court is not required to address each factor under § 3553(a). Williams, 425 F.3d at 480. It bears 2 See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). 10 Nos. 10-3130, 10-3505 & 11-1395 repeating that Germany’s sentence is within a correct Guidelines range; and the record here provides sufficient support to conclude that the district court meaningfully considered the § 3553(a) factors after Germany was given an opportunity to make his argument for probation or a sentence at the bottom of the statutory maximum. The district court was not required to discuss Germany’s disparity arguments at length. For the sake of thoroughness, however, we will address Germany’s contention that the district court’s consideration of those factors was somehow inadequate. Germany argues that, had the district court accepted one of his alternative Guidelines calculations, his sentence would have been less than the statutory maximum. Germany objected to the Probation Office’s Guidelines calculation of 135 to 168 months, arguing three alternative calculations, which together ranged from 12 to 63 months, depending on the amount and type of cocaine— i.e., crack or powder—and whether a 100-to-1 or 18-to-1 powder to crack ratio applied. The district court, over Germany’s objection, accepted the Probation Office’s calculation, which Germany argues improperly influenced the district court’s decision to impose the statutory maximum. Here again, the district court followed proper procedure; the judge heard the evidence presented at trial and ultimately agreed with the recommended Guidelines range, which was based on an offense involving 280 grams of crack. See Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 513-14 (1998). We also reject Germany’s argument that the district court failed to address the disparity in his sentence Nos. 10-3130, 10-3505 & 11-1395 11 with other defendants’ sentences. We have said that sentences within the Guidelines range, like Germany’s, “cannot be treated as unreasonable by reference to § 3553(a)(6).” United States v. Boscarino, 473 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2006). “Sentencing disparities are at their ebb when the Guidelines are followed, for the ranges are themselves designed to treat similar offenders similarly.” Id. Finally, we disagree with Germany’s assertion that the district court improperly based its sentence on his arrest record, which according to Germany overstates his criminal history. First, the record here does not suggest that the district court relied on Germany’s arrest record itself; instead, it indicates that the district court properly considered the underlying conduct. See United States v. Guajardo-Martinez, 635 F.3d 1056, 1059 (7th Cir. 2011) (a sentencing judge may not rely on the arrest record itself in deciding a sentence). Second, the conduct considered in the arrest record was supported by sufficiently-detailed information in the presentence report which specified his arrest and conviction in Indiana for selling rock-like cocaine. See id. (noting that the court may consider the underlying conduct detailed in arrest records where there is a sufficient factual basis for the court to conclude that the conduct actually occurred). Germany asks us to now re-balance the § 3553(a) factors and disagree with the district court’s determination of that balance. We decline to do this. The record provides sufficient support to conclude that the district 12 Nos. 10-3130, 10-3505 & 11-1395 court did not err procedurally or otherwise. We affirm Germany’s sentence.