Opinion ID: 2670562
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Third Degree Assault Statute Is Divisible

Text: Mr. Dzerekey contends the BIA erred in determining the Colorado third degree assault statute encompasses a CIMT, arguing the statute requires only the general intent of knowingly committing the offense or recklessly committing the offense without serious bodily injury. He also argues the BIA erred in relying on Garcia.3 3 The Government contends Mr. Dzerekey did not attempt to distinguish Garcia before the BIA and he therefore cannot raise these arguments here. See Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder, 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n alien must present the same specific legal theory to the BIA before he or she may advance it in court.”). Because we determine Garcia controls, we do not decide whether Mr. Dzerekey preserved his arguments. -8- We affirm the BIA’s decision because Garcia controls.4 In Garcia, we were asked whether the BIA properly affirmed the IJ’s cancellation of petitioner’s removal. The petitioner had pled guilty to committing third degree assault in Colorado, but, through no fault of his own, the plea agreement failed to specify whether he had pled guilty to knowingly causing bodily injury or recklessly doing so. 584 F.3d at 1289. As a result, the IJ could not determine whether he was convicted of a CIMT. Because it was the petitioner’s burden to show his conviction was not for a CIMT and he had failed to meet this burden before the IJ, we denied his petition. Id. Although the court in Garcia did not explicitly say that the statute is divisible, the result is possible only if the court determined the statute covered some conduct that involved moral turpitude and other conduct that did not. If the statute covered only conduct not involving moral turpitude, the petitioner would not have needed to present evidence of the nature of his offense. We therefore hold the statute is divisible and includes a CIMT. 2. Application of the Modified Categorical Approach Because the Colorado statute is not categorically a CIMT but covers conduct that is a CIMT, Mr. Dzerekey’s fate before the IJ turned on applying the modified categorical approach. This typically means looking to the record of conviction to determine whether 4 Mr. Dzerekey cites to unpublished BIA decisions reaching the opposite outcome from Garcia. These cases are not controlling because they are unpublished. -9- Mr. Dzerekey was convicted of a CIMT. See Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d at 665. But because Mr. Dzerekey conceded removability, he had the burden to show he was eligible for cancellation of removal, including not being convicted of a CIMT. Garcia, 584 F.3d at 1289.5 Mr. Dzerekey failed to provide any evidence or record of conviction and therefore failed to meet his burden.6 5 In his reply brief, Mr. Dzerekey argues for the first time that he should not have had the burden to prove his conviction was not a crime of moral turpitude because that is a legal question, not a factual one. We do not address issues raised for the first time in reply briefs. See Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1250 (10th Cir. 2007) (“It is our general rule . . . that arguments and issues presented at such a late stage are waived.”). 6 Citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158, Mr. Dzerekey contends the IJ was required to request specifically the record of conviction. He is mistaken. That provision, which governs applications for asylum and the burden of proof for showing the applicant is a refugee, is inapplicable here. Mr. Dzerekey also argues the IJ misapplied the modified categorical approach by looking outside the record of conviction to a police report (introduced by the Government) to determine whether the crime was one of moral turpitude. A police report is not normally consulted under the modified categorical approach. See In re Teixeira, 21 I&N Dec. 316, 319 (BIA 1996). The BIA, however, in In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 687, 699 (BIA 2008), allowed the IJ to look at facts outside the record of conviction if necessary. We have neither accepted nor rejected this approach, see Efagene, 642 F.3d at 921 n.2, 926 n.5, and need not do so here. The BIA did not err by relying on Garcia to decide Mr. Dzerekey did not meet his burden. He failed to meet his burden whether or not the IJ looked at the police report. - 10 -