Opinion ID: 716733
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: De Veau v. Braisted: Subjective Purpose

Text: 70 We start with De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960), in which the Supreme Court announced a subjective (or actual) legislative purpose test. In that case, the Court upheld, against bill of attainder and ex post facto challenges, a law forbidding certain unions employing former felons from collecting dues. In effect, the law barred convicted felons from working on the New York and New Jersey waterfront. The Court explained that [t]he question in each case where unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation, such as the qualifications of a profession. Id. at 160, 80 S.Ct. at 1155 (emphasis added). 71 The proof is overwhelming, the Court continued, that New York sought not to punish ex-felons, but to devise what was felt to be a much-needed scheme of regulation of the waterfront, and for the effectuation of that scheme it became important whether individuals had previously been convicted of a felony. Id. This early case, emphasized by New Jersey, suggests that actual legislative purpose is the only inquiry. But subsequent cases make clear that this is no longer true. 72