Opinion ID: 29729
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lack of Parole Instruction at Sentencing

Text: Crawford next claims that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury regarding the implications of deciding against the death penalty constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. He contends that, because he would not have been eligible for parole until he was ninety-six years old, a decision not to choose the death sentence would effectively constitute a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, thereby entitling him to a parole ineligibility jury instruction. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (holding that, in states where the alternative sentence to death is life without parole, the jury must be informed of that fact as a potential mitigating factor). He also argues that, because the trial judge had discretion over whether to instruct the jury on the parole issue, similarly situated defendants were not treated alike; according to Crawford, this unequal treatment violated the Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected this claim as having been raised and correctly disposed of on the merits by the Court of Criminal 10 Appeals. Crawford fails to show that the state court’s denial of relief on this claim involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Rudd, 256 F.3d at 321 (finding Texas sentencing scheme, where life without parole is not the alternative to a death sentence, not to fall within the scope of Simmons). As to the equal protection challenge, Crawford again fails to show that the state court’s denial of relief involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 1044 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that, because capital defendants are not a suspect class, the Texas sentencing scheme is constitutional because a “state may rationally conclude that its capital sentencing scheme would be better served by not requiring that courts inform juries of parole considerations”). Once again, Crawford fails to demonstrate any errors of law or logic in the district court’s analysis of either the Eighth Amendment or equal protection challenges to the Texas system. Because he has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, we decline to issue a COA on either of these two grounds.