Opinion ID: 2377824
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Winters Charge

Text: Appellants assert that the jury verdict was invalid because the trial court's jury instructions coerced a verdict. We review the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a verdict is the product of coercion. Wilson v. United States, 419 A.2d 353, 356 (D.C. 1980). In this case, the jury did have some difficulty reaching a verdict. After approximately two hours of deliberation, the jury sent out a note asking, in essence, [6] 1) what would happen in the event of a hung jury, and 2) for instructions on how to proceed if they found only one defendant negligent. The trial court reinstructed the jury on vicarious liability and reread Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 1-4 (rev. ed. 1981), on the duty of the jurors to deliberate. Three and one half hours later the jury announced that it was deadlocked. Over appellants' objection, the trial court gave the jury the anti-deadlock Winters charge. [7] Less than one hour later, the jury fore-person announced that the jury had reached a unanimous verdict for appellee in the amount of $100,000. However, upon a poll of the jury, it was revealed that although the jurors were unanimous as to liability, they disagreed as to the amount and some jurors had not even decided upon any sum. [8] The court recognized that the jury apparently had not understood that they had to agree upon liability and the exact amount of damages for there to be a unanimous verdict; therefore, despite appellants' motion for a mistrial, the trial court instructed the jury [9] and asked them to resume their deliberations. The jury thereafter returned with unanimous agreement on the sum of $100,000. Appellants first contend that the trial court in effect gave two Winters charges when it sent the jury back after the second note. While we have held in the criminal context that the giving of two Winters instructions crosses the line into the forbidden area of jury coercion, Epperson v. United States, 471 A.2d 1016 (D.C. 1984), even assuming that this holding applies in civil cases, [10] it is clear that this case is distinguishable. Here, the first note only requested instruction on the consequences of deadlock. The trial court took the jury at its word and did not give an anti-deadlock instruction at that time; rather it merely repeated the standard duty to deliberate instruction. After the second note, the trial court gave the only anti-deadlock instruction in this case, after which the jury reached unanimity on liability. The third episode was merely a clarification as to the need for unanimity on damages as well as liability. Appellants further contend that even if there was no abuse of discretion in giving the Winters charge, the trial court coerced the jury when it sent the jury back after the jury poll revealed that the verdict was not unanimous on damages. For support, appellants cite Thompson v. United States, 354 A.2d 848, 850 (D.C.1976), for the proposition that at least in a criminal case, a trial court which has already given the Winters charge is skating on thin ice if it sends the jury out another time after it receives a report that no verdict has been reached after a reasonable time. In Thompson, however, this court found no abuse of discretion. In this case we find even less reason to question the discretion of the trial court. In civil cases there can be a second trial on damages. In the totality of the circumstances, there was here no abuse of discretion in sending the jury back after it clearly expressed unanimity on liability, particularly when the non-unanimity on damages appears to have been a result of misunderstanding rather than dissention among the jury. [11]