Opinion ID: 2524947
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tabitha's testimony was sufficiently reliable.

Text: The trial court determined that the issue of Tabitha's memories, as raised in this case, did not warrant exclusion of her testimony. But Lance contends that Tabitha's memories were not ordinary because they were the result of dreams and flashbacks, aided by suggestive literature and counseling. Lance argues that the trial court erred by failing to determine the reliability of Tabitha's testimony and analogizes this case to hypnosis cases because of the element of suggestiveness in false recall. He argues that the trial court should act as a gatekeeper to scrutinize memory evidence, and that Alaska Evidence Rule 104(a) [10] requires examination of memory testimony, not just in hypnosis cases, but where a witness has been subjected to suggestive procedures that raise a substantial risk of memory distortion. Tabitha argues that no preliminary evidentiary hearing was required under Rule 104(a) because she was not relying on the scientific theory of recovered memory. Tabitha contends that the personal knowledge requirement of Alaska Evidence Rule 602 was satisfied by her deposition testimony submitted as an exhibit to her opposition to Lance's first motion in limine, and that questions about the accuracy and reliability of her memory should be addressed through cross-examination and impeachment, not exclusion. Tabitha notes that Lance was given full opportunity to rebut Tabitha's testimony, including his presentation of expert testimony by Dr. Elizabeth Loftus about the problems of recovered memories. [11] Evidence Rule 602 provides in part that [a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness'[s] own testimony. The commentary to the Alaska Rules of Evidence states that personal knowledge is not an absolute but may consist of what the witness thinks he knows from personal perception. As long as there is some evidence that the witness has personal knowledge, the court must let the jury decide whether or not the witness is really knowledgeable. [12] And the Alaska Court of Appeals concluded in Tucker v. State [13] that defects in recollection do not generally render witness testimony inadmissible but are instead a proper subject for cross-examination and impeachment. [14] We agree with that conclusion. The sufficiency of the evidence required to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge is thus minimal. Only where the court finds that no reasonable trier of fact could believe that the witness perceived what he claims to have perceived may the court reject the testimony. [15] That is not the case here. Tabitha's deposition testimony is sufficient to meet the foundational requirement for personal knowledge. [16] Once that threshold is met, it is for the jury to weigh the reliability of the evidence and witness credibility. [17] The reliability of evidence is tested through adversarial methods. [18] And the [c]redibility of witnesses is exclusively within the province of the trier of fact. [19] We conclude that the trial court was not required to make preliminary findings because Tabitha's deposition testimony regarding the nature of her memory was sufficient to show personal knowledge under Rule 602. As such, her testimony was properly subject to the traditional tests of cross-examination and impeachment to allow the jury to determine her reliability and credibility.