Opinion ID: 748877
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Third Waller Factor--Consideration of Alternatives.

Text: 39 The Ayala panel ruled that the third Waller factor, requiring consideration of reasonable alternatives to closure, imposed on a trial judge an obligation to consider alternatives sua sponte. In considering this issue, we gain some understanding of the Supreme Court's requirement by first recalling that the Court said that the standards enunciated in prior First Amendment cases apply to the Sixth Amendment right at issue in Waller, and then by examining what the Court meant by alternatives in those First Amendment cases. In Press-Enterprise I, after noting that the trial judge had closed an incredible six weeks of voir dire without considering alternatives to closure, 464 U.S. at 513, 104 S.Ct. at 825, the Court suggested two possibilities: (1) [t]hose parts of the transcript reasonably entitled to privacy could have been sealed without such a sweeping order, id., and (2) the trial judge might have disclose[d] the substance of the sensitive answers while preserving the anonymity of the jurors involved, id. The import of the Court's concern appears to be that the trial judge erred in not considering alternatives to complete closure. See id. ([T]here was also a failure to consider alternatives to closure and to total suppression of the transcript.). Similarly, in Press-Enterprise II, the Court faulted the California Supreme Court for its failure to consider whether alternatives short of complete closure would have protected the interests of the accused. 478 U.S. at 14, 106 S.Ct. at 2743 (emphasis added). 40 Some, but not all, members of the majority are of the view that Waller appears to indicate that alternatives to complete closure are what the Court required trial judges to consider sua sponte when First Amendment closure standards are applied in the Sixth Amendment context. After noting that the trial judge had not made findings to justify closure of the entire hearing, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216, the Court pointed out that the trial judge had not considered the alternatives of (1) directing the government to provide more detail about its need for closure, in camera if necessary, id., and (2) closing only those parts of the hearing that jeopardized the interests advanced, id. at 48-49, 104 S.Ct. at 2217. 41 Since none of the alternatives that the Supreme Court identified in Press-Enterprise I, Press-Enterprise II, or Waller had been suggested by any of the parties, it is arguable that the Court expects trial courts to consider lesser alternatives sua sponte only before taking the extreme step of closing an entire proceeding. That is the conclusion recently reached by the New York Court of Appeals. See Ramos, 90 N.Y.2d at 500-06, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 744-48, 685 N.E.2d at 497-501. 42 Moreover, even if the Supreme Court has imposed an obligation upon a trial judge to give sua sponte consideration to alternatives to complete courtroom closure, the Court has never held that a criminal case defendant who has not requested a more limited alternative has a right to a new trial, just because the trial judge failed to consider this or other alternatives sua sponte. The First Amendment cases did not require a new trial for any criminal defendant, and Waller, which ordered only the partial relief of a new suppression hearing, did so on review of the conviction of a defendant who had objected to the complete closure of the hearing that had occurred in that case. Until the decision of the Ayala panel, no case of which we are aware had ever reversed a criminal conviction because the trial judge failed to consider an alternative to courtroom closure (whether complete or partial) that had not been requested by the defendant. 1 There is certainly no automatic basis for doing so. Though the right of the public and the press to attend a criminal proceeding absent circumstances justifying closure is of undoubted importance, the reversal of a criminal conviction for a trial judge's failure to consider an alternative not requested by a defendant is arguably too high a price to pay to protect that right. 43 In the pending cases, however, we need not decide whether a sua sponte obligation to consider alternatives to complete closure exists because the trial judges in these cases took the far lesser step of closing the courtroom only during the testimony of one witness, albeit an important one. Whether or not a sua sponte obligation exists to consider alternatives to complete closure, we see nothing in the First Amendment cases or in Waller to indicate that once a trial judge has determined that limited closure is warranted as an alternative to complete closure, the judge must sua sponte consider further alternatives to the alternative deemed appropriate. At that point, it becomes the obligation of the party objecting to the trial court's proposal to urge consideration of any further alternatives that might avoid the need for even a limited closure. This too is the conclusion reached by the New York Court of Appeals. See Ramos, 90 N.Y.2d at 500-05, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 744-48, 685 N.E.2d at 497-501. 44 The pending cases well illustrate the hazard of obliging a trial judge, who has already considered the alternative of partial closure during the testimony of one witness, to have a further obligation sua sponte to consider alternatives to the alternative. The petitioners suggest that among the further alternatives that the judge should have considered were disguising the undercover officer or placing a screen between the witness and the courtroom spectators. Yet refinements such as these encounter substantial objections. Disguising the witness risks lessening the jury's opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor and assess credibility, and a screen risks implying to the jury that the family or friends of the defendant in attendance are likely to be dangerous. Even if Waller requires a trial judge to consider alternatives to complete closure, we do not believe that the Supreme Court wanted trial judges selecting the alternative of limited closure to consider further alternatives that themselves pose substantial risks to a fair trial for the defendant. Of course, if some further alternative is suggested by the defendant or the prosecution, the trial judge should give it consideration. 45