Opinion ID: 614593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Storey.

Text: Testimony at trial established the following. While on patrol in central Albuquerque around midnight, Officer Storey entered the license plate of Mr. Henry's vehicle into his dashboard computer. Id. at 169, 198. The computer, which was connected to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), returned a hit, meaning that the license plate number had been reported as stolen. Id. at 169, 199. Upon returning a hit, other officers were automatically dispatched to the scene. Id. at 171. When a second patrol car arrived, Officer Storey turned on his emergency lights, and Mr. Henry pulled to the side of the road. Id. at 173. Officer Storey remained in his vehicle and, using the PA system, ordered Mr. Henry to show his hands, turn the vehicle off, get out of the vehicle, and stand with his back to the officers. Id. at 175-78. At this point, six officers were at the scene. Id. at 178. Mr. Henry testified that he saw six guns aimed at him, although he did not know whether Officer Storey had his weapon drawn. Id. at 272. Officer Storey testified that his weapon was holstered because he was using the PA. Id. at 178. Over the PA, Officer Storey ordered Mr. Henry to pull up his shirt to reveal the waistband of his pants and turn in a circle. Id. at 179-80. Satisfied that Mr. Henry did not have a weapon tucked into his pants, Officer Storey ordered him to walk slowly backwards towards the officers' vehicles. Id. at 180. When Mr. Henry was close to the vehicles, Officer Storey ordered him to kneel or lie down. See id.; id. at 279. Officer Fangio handcuffed Mr. Henry, performed a pat-down, and placed him in the back seat of Officer Storey's police vehicle. Id. at 181, 224-25, 280-81. After Mr. Henry was placed in the police vehicle, officers approached the rental vehicle he was driving to make sure no one else was inside. Id. at 192. Mr. Henry promptly complied with all orders. Id. at 177-78, 202. He did not violate any traffic laws. Id. at 173. Mr. Henry testified that he was told to shut up over the PA system, presumably by Officer Storey. Id. at 275. He also testified that Officer Fangio knelt on his back and that the handcuffs were too tight, causing bruising and discomfort. See id. at 280, 284, 296. Mr. Henry argues that Officer Storey used excessive force against him by aiming a deadly weapon at [Mr. Henry's] head from mere feet away. Aplt. Br. at 10. According to Mr. Henry, Officer Storey had no reason to believe that he stole the vehicle by violence. Moreover, he argues, he did not in fact pose a threat to officers and did not attempt to flee; thus, Officer Storey was not justified in aiming his weapon. Id. at 10-12. We are not persuaded. First, we doubt whether the record contains sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Officer Storey aimed a weapon at Mr. Henry. Second, even if it does, Officer Storey's use of force was not excessive under the facts known to him at the time. Mr. Henry's argument that Officer Storey used excessive force relies on a single factual premise: that Officer Storey aimed a firearm at him. See Aplt. Br. 10, 13-14. Officer Storey specifically testified that he had [his] gun holstered at the time while [he] was on [the] PA, although [t]he other officers had their firearms drawn, and they were pointed down towards Mr. Henry in the vehicle. Id. at 178. Mr. Henry testified that when he initially exited the vehicle, he saw six guns pointed at him. Id. at 272. However, he later specifically testified that he [didn't] know exactly who was pointing guns, and that he did not know whether Officer Storey was pointing a gun at him. Id. at 304-05. Even if the jury disregarded Officer Storey's testimony as not credible, Mr. Henry's testimony itself established only that he saw six guns aimed at him; it did not establish that Officer Storey was wielding one of them. Thus, we doubt whether Mr. Henry's testimony provided a reasonable jury with legally sufficient basis to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Officer Storey pointed a weapon at him. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). In any event, even if Mr. Henry produced sufficient evidence to establish that Officer Storey pointed a weapon at him, Officer Storey's actions did not constitute excessive force. In determining whether a use of force is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we balance the nature and quality of the encroachment on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the government's countervailing interests. Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1126 (10th Cir.2010) (citation omitted). When conducting this inquiry, the `reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.' Sturdivan v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). We consult three non-exclusive factors to determine whether an officer's use of force is reasonable: (1) the severity of the crime, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or evading arrest by flight. See Lundstrom, 616 F.3d at 1126. Viewing the facts from a reasonable officer's point of view, Officer Storey did not use excessive force by pointing his weapon at Mr. Henry. Officer Storey had probable cause to believe Mr. Henry had stolen a vehicle, a felony. Officer Storey could reasonably conclude that the driver posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers and the publica driver caught with a stolen vehicle has strong incentive to evade arrest, given the seriousness of the crime. Further, the means of evading arrest were close at hand: the driver was in the vehicle with the engine running. See Aplt.App. 217, 302-304. The incident took place late at night, within Albuquerque city limits. Id. at 214-15. Any resulting chase could place the officers and the public at risk. Although Mr. Henry was not actively resisting or evading arrest by flight, under the circumstances the amount of force used by Officer Storey was reasonable. To conclude otherwise would merely second-guess an officer's on-the-ground decision using the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. See Sturdivan, 511 F.3d at 1259. We reject Mr. Henry's implicit contention that only vehicles stolen by force pose a threat to officers and the public. See Aplt. Br. 9-11. A person who steals a vehicle non-violently still has the incentive and capability to evade arrest by fleeing in the vehicle. Mr. Henry's proposed bright-line rulethat officers may aim weapons at the occupants of a reportedly stolen vehicle only when they have reason to believe the vehicle was stolen by force or violencehas no basis in Tenth Circuit precedent, and we see no reason to adopt it now. Mr. Henry also argues that it appears that [Officer] Storey deliberately ignored additional information that would have told him that the car was alleged to have been stolen without the use of violence, although that information was readily available to him and that [i]f [Officer] Storey had bothered to read the remarks, he would have known that there was no allegation that the vehicle in question had been taken through force or the use of violence. Aplt. Br. at 9. As we note above, the mere fact that a vehicle was stolen by non-violent means does not obviate officers' need to proceed with caution. Regardless, the factual basis for Mr. Henry's argument is not in the record. Officer Storey repeatedly testified that he did not have information regarding how the vehicle was stolen. Aplt.App. 171-72, 222. The record contains no information as to the contents of the NCIC hit in this case, much less evidence that Officer Storey deliberately ignored information that the car had been stolen by non-violent means. Officer Fangio testified that, generally, an NCIC hit should contain a remark if a vehicle was stolen by force. Id. at 259-60. But that does nothing to prove whether, in this case, the NCIC hit indicated any of the circumstances surrounding the vehicle's theft or, if so, what that information was. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Mr. Henry did not steal the vehicle by force. However, there is absolutely no evidence as to the circumstances under which the vehicle was erroneously reported as stolen. Accordingly, there was no basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that Officer Storey deliberately ignored information that the vehicle was not stolen by means of violence or force. The district court correctly granted JMOL to Officer Storey on the excessive-force claim. Mr. Henry cites no case holding that pointing a firearm at a suspect, without more, constitutes excessive force. The cases he does cite Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir.2007), United States v. Neff, 300 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2002), and Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir.2010), see Aplt. Br. 13are not on point. In McCauley, the plaintiffs did not allege that the officers' use of firearms constituted excessive force. See 478 F.3d at 1126, 1130. We noted that prior cases finding excessive force have involved the pointing of guns, but only in the context of holding that officers were on notice that the force used on Ms. Cortez was excessive despite the absence of any allegations that the officers pointed weapons. Id. at 1131-32. In other words, our discussion of officers' use of weapons in McCauley established only that the officers' aiming of weapons in prior cases did not distinguish those cases for qualified immunity purposes. Accordingly, McCauley does not support Mr. Henry's contention that, under the circumstances of this case, Officer Storey's use of force was excessive. United States v. Neff did not involve an excessive-force claim. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the officers' use of handcuffs and display of weapons exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop. 300 F.3d at 1220. We held that it did not. Id. at 1221. Our analysis focused mainly on the use of handcuffs. We noted, in passing, that the officers' use of guns did not exceed the scope of a Terry stop because it was based on the officers' reasonable belief that weapons were necessary for their protection. See id. at 1220-1222. Accordingly, Neff does nothing to establish that aiming a weapon under the circumstances before us constitutes excessive force. In Lundstrom v. Romero , Mr. Lundstrom's excessive-force claim was predicated on officers pressing him against a vehicle, shoving him to the ground, placing an elbow or knee against his head, and twisting his arm behind his back. 616 F.3d at 1127. The officers' display of weapons was not part of the excessive-force analysis. See id. The language quoted by Mr. Henrythat the pointing of firearms should be predicated on at least a perceived risk of injury or danger to the officers or others, see Aplt. Br. 13appeared in the context of plaintiffs' claims that they were unlawfully seized when the officer aimed a weapon at them at the front door of their home. Lundstrom, 616 F.3d at 1121. Because the analysis in Lundstrom did not take place in the context of an excessive-force claim, we fail to see how it is applicable here. Our independent research reveals only one case in which we held that officers' aiming of firearms, without more, constituted excessive force. See Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir.2001). But Holland involved a SWAT team detaining, at gunpoint, several bystanders' children who were not suspected of a crime, all in the course of executing a misdemeanor warrant. Id. at 1183, 1192-93. Accordingly, Holland has little, if any, bearing on the outcome of this case, where Officer Storey aimed his weapon at an adult who was suspected of a serious crime.