Opinion ID: 834890
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence Concerning Payne's Observation of the Victim

Text: We turn first to the trial court's rulings concerning Payne's testimony. Because the two issues are related, we consider the state's argument that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's exclusion of Payne's testimony concerning what she told Ecklund on June 25, 2002, together with defendant's argument that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's exclusion of Payne's lay opinion testimony. It is helpful to our analysis to set out the relevant part of Payne's testimony from defendant's offer of proof. In response to defendant's question about what Payne saw when she first arrived at Ecklund's home on June 25, Payne responded, [Payne:] Well, the thing that I observed was [the victim] was laying on the floor on the pallet, down sort of in front of the couch, sort of back by a coffee table, and [Ecklund] was there and she was down there by her, and one of [Ecklunds's] friends, I do believe her name was Kelly, was there. And [the victim] I remember laying there on her back. And as a mother of somebody that's had a child that's had brain surgeries, my instant thought by looking at her is, Oh, my gosh, there's [Payne's daughter] when she was young, when she had pressure on the brain or else she was dehydrated.      She was laying there on her back with her arms sort of up and she looked lucid [sic]. She was looking off to one side, and her eyes were sort of rolled up to the right and they were sort of bulgy and the pupils were dilatedexcuse me, they were enlarged. (Emphasis added.) Defendant then asked Payne to explain her daughter's injury, to put her observations of the victim in context. Payne answered, [Payne:] When [Payne's daughter] was three months old, I had a car wreck which caused a skull fracture. She has a shunt. Her first surgery was done probably within the first two weeks of her skull fracture, and before that her signs were her eyes would roll up and go up, and all I could see was mainly a lot of the white part. But after her first brain surgery, we ran into problems with dehydration as she was still with the bottle and she didn't talk   . She had multiple hospitalizations for dehydration.    [O]ne minute she would look just fine and then the next minute she was just lucid [sic].    And of course, as [Payne's daughter] got older, it was easier for me to pick up the signs of her not feeling well. [Defense Counsel:] Okay. What would those signs be? [Payne:] Some of the signs would be her eyes being bulgy and not reacting, the size of her pupils not being equal, the way that she would just lay around.      [Defense Counsel:] And in your taking care of your daughter    over that period of time, did you come to understand that those very signs and symptom were triggered by either brain swelling or problems that needed to be relieved? [Payne:] Well, over timeit's hard to tell because with having a shunt, if you're dehydrated, the shunt is going to collapse and it's going to stick to the side of the brain, and so there's no fluid in there for the shunt to go across. And you think of dehydration   . So for me to say to look at [the victim] and say she was dehydrated versus a head injury, I could not do that because it was hard for me to distinguish the two because shemy daughter always had multiple things going on. Later in the offer of proof, Payne also testified that she told Ecklund that the victim's condition that day reminded her of her daughter. The trial court attempted to clarify what, exactly, Payne had said to Ecklund: THE COURT: What I heard you say, and Iand so I want to make sure that I understand what you're saying, is that you told her that it reminds you of [Payne's daughter]. [PAYNE]: Correct. THE COURT: Did you say anything more than that? Did shewhen you said it reminds you of [Payne's daughter], would she know what that meant? [PAYNE]: Yes. On redirect examination, defendant's lawyer asked Payne to elaborate on the foregoing. Defense counsel asked Payne whether she had shared her daughter's history with Ecklund, including the facts that Payne's daughter had been in a motor vehicle accident, that she had suffered a brain injury, and that she had been hospitalized many times. Payne answered in the affirmative, and added that Ecklund knew that her daughter had impaired intellectual and motor functioning. Payne concluded, [Payne:] I think sheI assumed as when I said that, she reminded me of [Payne's daughter], as when [Payne's daughter] was in the state of being really sick. As noted, with respect to Payne's testimony that she told Ecklund that the victim reminded her of her own daughter, the trial court erroneously first ruled that that statement was hearsay. The court then added that, even if defendant were offering the statement for its effect on Ecklund, it's speculative as to what that could have meant to her. And so that, I think, causes    the Court the concern about whether or not I should let it in at all, the fact thatthat Ms. Ecklund may or may not have known what that really meant. The witness' statement was that[']I assume that she understood I meant she was really sick.['] `Really sick' isn't what I think the defense is trying to get it in for. The trial court also ruled that, [i]f that testimony is out, then Payne's testimony concerning her daughter also was inadmissible, because it was not relevant to any issue before the jury. In addition, the court ruled that Payne's testimony that the victim looked like she may have been suffering from a brain injury was inadmissible as lay opinion under OEC 701, because Payne was not certain about her opinion that the victim might have been suffering from a brain injury. At the same time, the trial court permitted Payne to testify that she believed that the victim may have been suffering from dehydration. The court also permitted Payne to testify about her observations of the victim's condition when Payne arrived at Ecklund's home on June 25. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling concerning Payne's statement to Ecklund, but affirmed the ruling on Payne's lay opinion. Davis, 235 Or.App. at 337, 230 P.3d 987. The state argues that the Court of Appeals' decision respecting Payne's statements to Ecklund is incorrect because it relies on several attenuated and cumbersome inferential steps that lack a factual predicate. The state argues that, at best, one could infer from Payne's statement to Ecklund that the victim reminded her of her own daughter that Ecklund believed that, on June 25, the victim showed symptoms of brain injury. However, the state contends, that inference does not support the further inference that, on June 25, the victim in fact had a brain injury. And, in any event, the fact that Ecklund believed that the victim showed symptoms of brain injury on June 25 was not relevant, because it would not have helped to establish that any June 25 injury played a role in the victim's death. The state asserts that the indictment charged defendant with causing the victim's death on or between June 29, 2002, and June 30, 2002, and, therefore, the dispositive issue for the jury was whether the symptoms that the victim displayed on June 29 and 30 necessarily reflected fatal injuries that must have been inflicted on June 29 or 30, when the victim was in defendant's care. According to the state, at most, the excluded statement could have established what Ecklund was told about the victim's symptoms on June 25 and what Ecklund believed about those symptoms on that date; it would not have assisted the jury in deciding, as a medical matter, whether any June 25 injury contributed to the victim's death. Although the trial court concluded that it was not clear what Payne's statement to Ecklund that the victim reminded her of her own daughter would have meant to Ecklund, the Court of Appeals paraphrased Payne's statement as testimony about Ecklund's knowledge of the victim's potential brain injury. Davis, 235 Or.App. at 336, 230 P.3d 987. As is evident from our description of the state's argument to this court, the state appears to accept that paraphrase as accurate. We agree. It is clear from Payne's testimony that she and Ecklund had known each other for a long time, that Payne had told Ecklund about her daughter's medical history, and that anyone talking to Payne's daughter would recognize her intellectual and motor limitations. We think it is reasonable to infer from those facts that Ecklund would have understood that, when Payne said that the victim reminded her or her own daughter, she meant that the victim looked like someone with a brain injury. However, we also agree with the state that evidence that Ecklund was told, on June 25, that her child looked like someone with a brain injury was not relevant to the jury's determination whether defendant inflicted fatal injuries on June 29 or 30 or whether, rather, on June 25, the victim already was suffering from the injuries that caused her death a few days later. Assuming, arguendo, that, based on Payne's statement to her on June 25, Ecklund had reason to fear, or even believed, that the victim was suffering from a brain injury that day, we do not think that Ecklund's knowledge of that possibility is relevant to the jury's determination whether the child, in fact, was then suffering from the injuries that ultimately killed her. It is undisputed that Ecklund took the victim to the hospital that day, and that, over the course of several hours, the victim was fully examined and subjected to testing to determine what was wrong with her. Ecklund's deliberate withholding of her fear (or belief) on that day does not make it more likely that the victim actually was then suffering from a brain injury. Even under the low threshold for relevance, Ecklund's belief in the possibility of a brain injury on June 25 does not, even slightly, either increase the probability that the defense rebleed theory was the correct one, or decrease the probability that the fatal injuries occurred on June 29 or 30, while the victim was in defendant's care. The doctors who examined the victim on June 25 concluded that she was dehydrated. They treated her for that condition and the victim appeared to respond favorably to that treatment. Once Ecklund was informed of that medical diagnosis of her daughter's condition, Ecklund had no further reason to report Payne's observations to trained paramedics or emergency room doctors. It follows that nothing at all can be inferred from Ecklund's failure to relay Payne's statement to those who examined the victim on June 29. For those reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in excluding Payne's statement that she told Ecklund that the victim reminded her of her own daughter. The Court of Appeals erred in holding to the contrary. We turn to the related issue: whether the trial court erred in excluding the remainder of Payne's testimony, in which she explained her daughter's condition and stated that the victim looked like her daughter when she was the victim's age and when she was suffering from her brain injury or was dehydrated. Defendant argues that that testimony is admissible as lay opinion under OEC 701 and that the trial court erred in excluding it. For convenience, we set out that rule again here: If the witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony of the witness in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are: (1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and (2) Helpful to a clear understanding of testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue. OEC 701 provides a liberal standard for the admissibility of lay opinion and permits a shorthand description of what the witness perceived, which is, in reality, an opinion. State v. Lerch, 296 Or. 377, 383, 677 P.2d 678 (1984). As Justice Unis explained in his concurring opinion in State v. Tucker, 315 Or. 321, 340, 845 P.2d 904 (1993), the requirement in subsection (1) that lay opinion must be rationally based on the perception of the witness has two limitations. The first comes from OEC 602: the witness must have personal knowledge of the facts from which the opinion or inference is derived. [10] The second is that there must be a rational connection between the opinion or inference and the perceived factual basis from which it derives. The rational connection requirement means only that the opinion or inference advanced by the witness is one which a normal person could form on the basis of observed facts. Id. Subsection (2) provides that, to be admissible, lay opinion must be helpful to the jury. As this court stated in State v. Wright, 323 Or. 8, 17, 913 P.2d 321 (1996), [t]he concept of `helpfulness' in OEC 701 subsumes a relevancy analysis. That is, as OEC 701 itself provides, lay opinion evidence is helpful only if it is relevant either to clear understanding of testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue. As the court explained in Lerch, [a]n essential difference between opinion testimony by a lay witness and an expert witness is that the lay witness is restricted to his personal perceptions while an expert witness may also testify from facts made known to him at or before the hearing. 296 Or. at 384, 677 P.2d 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). Lay opinion is commonly admissible on a variety of topics. For example, the Commentary to the Oregon Evidence Code officially approves lay opinion on the following subjects: (1) the speed of an automobile, (2) the identity of a person, (3) the appearance of another person, (4) the sound of footsteps, (5) footprints, (6) distance, (7) uncomplicated illness or injury, and (8) apparent age. 1981 Conference Committee Commentary to the Oregon Evidence Code. In addition, Oregon case law recognizes that lay witnesses are capable of offering an opinion as to whether a person is intoxicated. State v. Wright, 315 Or. 124, 132, 843 P.2d 436 (1992). See also State v. Clark, 286 Or. 33, 38-40, 593 P.2d 123 (1979) (lay testimony that a defendant lacked signs of intoxication admissible to impeach result of chemical breath test even absent any foundation laid by expert testimony). Further, a lay witness may give an opinion that a stain on the floor was fecal matter. Lerch, 296 Or. at 384, 677 P.2d 678. A lay witness and an expert may testify as to the same subject matter: `The testimony of the chemist who has analyzed blood, and that of the observer who has merely recognized it by the use of the senses belong to the same legal grade of evidence, and though the one may be entitled to greater weight than the other with the jury, the exclusion of either is not sustainable.' Id., (quoting Clifford S. Fishman, 2 Jones on Evidence, § 14:4, 591-592 (6th ed. 1972)). In fact, if the requirements of OEC 701 are met, lay opinion on subjects well outside the purview of most people is admissible. For example, in Lerch, a witness who had served in an infantry unit with the United States Army for 13 months during the Korean conflict was allowed to testify that he recognized the smell of decomposing human flesh in a dumpster, notwithstanding that that smell would be a rare experience to the average person, because the witness's opinion was rationally based on his perception in that he had previously experienced and recognized that smell. Id. at 387, 388, 677 P.2d 678. Applying those standards, we conclude that Payne's testimony that the victim looked like her own daughter when her daughter had pressure on the brain or else she was dehydrated, as well as the background information about her daughter's condition, which explained the basis for her opinion testimony about the victim, satisfied the requirements of OEC 701. At the outset, it is important to observe that defendant's offer of proof did not include testimony by Payne that, in her opinion, the victim actually was suffering from a brain injury on June 25. Only an expert could make that medical diagnosis. [11] Rather, in the offer of proof, Payne was asked to describe what she saw when she arrived at Ecklund's home. In addition to describing the victim's physical appearance, Payne testified that her immediate thought was that the victim looked like her daughter when she was young and had pressure on the brain or else she was dehydrated. Thus, Payne did not testify from the perspective of a physician who has diagnosed a patient, but from the perspective of an observer describing a person's appearance by associating it with a medical condition, much as a witness may describe a person's behavior and appearance by saying that the person looks intoxicated. Although a person without Payne's prior experiences may not have been able to describe the victim's appearance in those terms, Payne was able to do so because, like someone who has seen blood or smelled decomposing human flesh, she often had observed the appearance of her child when she displayed the effects of pressure on the brain or dehydration. Payne's opinion that the victim resembled her daughter when her daughter was suffering from one of those two conditions was rationally based on her perceptions, in that she had a lifetime of previous experience with her own child suffering those conditions. Payne's testimony also was helpful to a clear understanding of testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue. Payne's testimony was consistent with and helpful to corroborate the testimony of defendant's expert witnesses, based on their examination of the physical evidence, that the victim's brain and abdominal injuries occurred at least several days before she died. The state's experts testified that the fatal injuries had to have been inflicted on the night of her death. [12] Payne's testimony that, on June 25, the victim resembled her child when her child displayed the effects of a brain injury or was dehydrated was relevant. It increased the probability, even if only slightly, that the defense experts were correct and the state's experts incorrect. The state argues that, given that Payne was allowed to testify as to her observations of the victim's condition on June 25, the excluded evidence would not have made it any more probable that the victim had a brain injury on June 25. However, we think that Payne's opinion that, on that date, the victim resembled her own child when her child was suffering from pressure on the brain (or dehydration) is qualitatively different from a description of the victim's symptoms, in much the same way that a witness's opinion that a person looks intoxicated is qualitatively different from the simple observation that a person is disheveled or flushed or glassy-eyed. In both cases, the shorthand reference conveys a picture to the jury that is more complete than a mere list of physical characteristics. Payne's opinion, on June 25, that the victim resembled her child when she was suffering from a brain injury made it more probable that the victim did, in fact, have a brain injury on June 25. And, if the victim already was suffering from a brain injury on June 25, that fact, in turn, made it more probable that the victim died as a result of an injury inflicted on or before that date and not on June 29 or 30, as the state alleged. In excluding Payne's lay opinion testimony, the trial court did not evaluate that testimony in light of the requirements of OEC 701. That is, the court did not consider whether that testimony was rationally based on Payne's perception or whether she had personal knowledge of the facts on which she based her opinion. [13] Rather, the court excluded that testimony because it really was speculative or conjecture orand she was not certain. We agree that Oregon's lay opinion rule precludes opinions based on conjecture or speculation, because opinions based on speculation or conjecture generally are not based on the perception of the witness or on the witness's personal knowledge. Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 701.03[3], Art VII-572 (5th ed. 2007) (so stating); see also Brown v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. Co., 248 Or. 110, 122, 431 P.2d 817 (1967) (under pre-OEC law, guesses or conjecture not admissible testimony and would not suffice as substantial evidence of a fact). However, OEC 701 does not require certainty, as long as it is clear that the witness's opinion is based on personal knowledge and not guesswork. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 701.03[3] at 573. Payne's opinion that the victim looked like her child when she had pressure on the brain or else she was dehydrated was not based on speculation or conjecture. It was based on Payne's personal knowledge of her own daughter's appearance when suffering from one of those two conditions. Payne was offering her lay opinion concerning the victim's appearance as a mother of a brain-injured child; she did not purport to be an expert or to diagnose the victim's condition. Payne's opinion was rationally drawn from her perceptions, even though those perceptions were, as she herself acknowledged, susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation. As this court stated in Salas-Juarez, 349 Or. at 428, 245 P.3d 113, the inference that the proponent of the evidence wishes to be drawn from the evidence need not be the necessary or even the most probable one. Similarly, the inference that the victim was suffering from a brain injury on June 25 was not the only inference that could be drawn from Payne's observations of the victim's condition. The jury could have inferred that the victim was suffering from dehydration instead. However, Payne's complete observations were, nonetheless, helpful to the jury, insofar as they increased the probability, even if slightly, that defendant's experts were correct that, on June 25, 2002, the victim already had suffered the brain injury that eventually killed her. As is evident from the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that Payne's inability or unwillingness to state unequivocally that the victim looked like she was suffering only from a brain injury showed that she was simply guessing or speculating about the victim's condition. Because that was the sole reason that the trial court gave for excluding Payne's lay opinion testimony, and because Payne's opinion was relevant, rationally based on her perceptions, and helpful to the jury, we conclude that the trial court erred in excluding Payne's lay opinion in which she stated that the victim resembled her daughter when she was experiencing brain swelling. [14] The trial court also erred in excluding Payne's testimony explaining her daughter's injury and resultant condition, because that testimony was essential to the jury's understanding of Payne's qualifications to offer her lay opinion. It is axiomatic that not every evidentiary error requires reversal. Under Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, [15] error is harmless and does not require reversal whenever the court is of the opinion that the judgment of the court appealed from was such as should have been rendered in the case. See State v. Willis, 348 Or. 566, 571, 236 P.3d 714 (2010) (so defining harmlessness). Before we turn to an analysis of the prejudicial effect of the trial court's error in excluding Payne's lay opinion testimony, however, we consider the state's criticism of the Court of Appeals' harmless error analysis. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals cited this court's opinion in State v. Walton, 311 Or. 223, 809 P.2d 81 (1991), as the standard for evaluating harmless error. Davis, 235 Or.App. at 336, 230 P.3d 987. In Walton, this court stated that error is harmless if (1) there is convincing evidence of the defendant's guilt in the record as a whole, and (2) there is little, if any, likelihood that the error affected the verdict. 311 Or. at 231, 809 P.2d 81. However, as the state points out, this court's case law has evolved since Walton was decided. In State v. Davis, 336 Or. 19, 30, 77 P.3d 1111 (2003), this court clarified that it had eliminated the first of those two criteria as an independent consideration in the harmless error analysis. In State v. Hansen, 304 Or. 169, 743 P.2d 157 (1987), this court acknowledged that OEC 103(1) [16] and Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution permit consideration of those two factors in determining whether a trial court's evidentiary error warrants reversal, but held that there was no justification for analyzing those two criteria separately, because the applicable constitutional and statutory standards are fully expressed in the second criterion. 304 Or. at 180, 743 P.2d 157. As the court in Hansen went on to state, [w]hether there was substantial and convincing evidence of guilt is not the issue; the issue is whether the error was likely to have affected the result. Of course, the less substantial the evidence of guilt, the more likely it is that an error affected the result, but that is an additional reason not to bifurcate the standard so as to require two independent inquiries. Id. The court in Davis noted that, in Walton and in another case decided after Hansen, State v. Parker, 317 Or. 225, 233, 855 P.2d 636 (1993), this court repeated the erroneous bifurcated test for affirmance despite error. Nonetheless, the Davis court emphasized that Oregon's constitutional test for affirmance despite error consists of a single inquiry: Is there little likelihood that the particular error affected the verdict? The correct focus of the inquiry regarding affirmance despite error is on the possible influence of the error on the verdict rendered, not whether this court, sitting as fact-finder, would regard the evidence of guilt as substantial and compelling. In determining whether the error affected the verdict, it is necessary that we review the record. However, in so doing, we do not determine, as a fact-finder, whether the defendant is guilty. That inquiry would invite this court to engage improperly in weighing the evidence and, essentially, retrying the case, while disregarding the error committed at trial, to determine whether the defendant is guilty. Rather, when we review the record, we do so in light of the error at issue. We ask whether there was little likelihood that the error affected the jury's verdict. We recognize that, if the particular issue to which the error pertains has no relationship to the jury's determination of its verdict, then there is little likelihood that the error affected the verdict. However, that is not a finding about how the court views the weight of the evidence of the defendant's guilt. It is a legal conclusion about the likely effect of the error on the verdict. 336 Or. at 32, 77 P.3d 1111. With the correct standard in mind, we conclude that the trial court's error in excluding Payne's lay opinion testimony was not harmless. As discussed above, in evaluating whether to affirm despite evidentiary error, we review the record    in light of the error at issue. We ask whether there was little likelihood that the error affected the jury's verdict. Davis, 336 Or. at 32, 77 P.3d 1111. In so doing, we consider the nature and the context of the error. Id. at 32-33, 77 P.3d 1111. In this case, the trial court erred in excluding Payne's lay opinion testimony, which defendant offered to support his theory that the injuries that killed his daughter occurred several days before she died, and that nothing that defendant intentionally did to the victim on June 29 or 30 caused her death. Evidence that Payne thought that the victim looked like her daughter when she was suffering from a brain injury (or dehydration) on June 25 supported, but was not duplicative of, defendant's experts' testimony that the victim already was suffering from a brain injury at least several days before she died. The effect of the error was prejudicial. As noted, Payne's testimony in the offer of proof was that the victim looked like her daughter when she was suffering either from a brain injury or from dehydration on June 25. The trial court's ruling, under which Payne was allowed to testify only that she thought that the victim looked dehydrated, rendered her testimony misleading, and it effectively undermined defendant's case and put the state in a better position than it otherwise would have been. That is so because the jury had heard that, on the evening of June 25, doctors at Santiam Hospital diagnosed the victim with dehydration. Testimony that the victim looked dehydrated on June 25 reinforced the innocuous dehydration explanation for her symptoms that day. The stricken lay opinion, on the other hand, would have provided the jury with additional evidence to support a finding that the victim already was suffering from a brain injury on June 25, as defendant's experts contended. In that circumstance, we cannot say that there is little likelihood that that error affected the verdict. Therefore, we reverse the ruling of the trial court excluding Payne's lay opinion and the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that ruling.