Opinion ID: 2981456
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Burden on Local Boards of Elections

Text: The State contends that halting in-person early voting at 6:00 p.m. on the Friday before the election is necessary to give local county boards of elections enough time to prepare for Election Day. The State introduced the affidavit of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Damschroder, who explained the myriad tasks that the boards must complete during the Saturday, Sunday, and Monday before the election. Among these duties are: (1) validating, scanning, and tabulating absentee ballots that have been cast in-person or received by mail prior to the final weekend, (2) securing all the necessary ballots, instruction cards, registration forms, and other materials for use by voters, (3) ensuring that each polling place has the proper voting equipment, tables, chairs, and signs, (4) ensuring that each polling place is accessible and making any temporary improvements that are necessary, such as installing ramps, (5) preparing the official lists of registered voters, including notations for those voters who have already requested absentee ballots, and (6) handling any last-minute issues that arise, including moving polling places and replacing poll workers who are suddenly unable to serve. (See R. 35-9, Defs.’ Ex. 8, at 3.) Granted, the list of responsibilities of the boards of elections is long, and the staff and volunteers who prepare for and administer elections undoubtedly have much to accomplish during the final few days before the election. But the State has shown no evidence indicating how this election will be more onerous than the numerous other elections that have been successfully administered in Ohio since early voting was put Nos. 12-4055/4076 Obama for America, et al. v. Jon Husted, et al. Page 14 into place in 2005. During that time, the Ohio boards of elections have effectively conducted a presidential election and a gubernatorial election, not to mention many other statewide and local elections, all while simultaneously handling in-person early voting during the three days prior to the election. The State has not shown that any problems arose as a result of the added responsibilities of administering early voting, and in fact, it seems that one of the primary motivations behind instituting early voting was to relieve local boards of the strain caused by all voters casting their ballots on a single day. See League of Women Voters, 548 F.3d at 477–78 (describing the many problems faced by voters during the November 2004 election in Ohio, including extremely long lines and wait-times on Election Day). The district court considered evidence from several of Ohio’s counties that contradicts the State’s assertions. Ohio’s most populous county, Cuyahoga County, asserted that maintaining in-person early voting would actually alleviate some of its burden by spreading out the demand for voting over more days, thus reducing lines and wait times at polling places on Election Day. Further evidence showed that several more Ohio counties have already allocated funding for early voting, thus allaying concerns about the financial hardship that early voting might cause. While these counties cannot speak for all of Ohio’s counties, the State introduced no specific evidence to refute any of their assertions, nor has it suggested that the experience of these counties is unique. Under the Anderson-Burdick standard, we must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury” against the “precise interests put forward by the State . . . taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added). The State must propose an “interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.” Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992). The burden on Plaintiffs’ voting rights is surely real, as the district court found, but the elimination of in-person early voting during the three-day period prior to the election does not absolutely prohibit early voters from voting. However, because early voters tend to be members of demographic groups that may be unable to vote on Election Day or during the workday at local boards of elections Nos. 12-4055/4076 Obama for America, et al. v. Jon Husted, et al. Page 15 because of work schedules, their ability to cast a ballot is impeded by Ohio’s statutory scheme.6 The burden on non-military Ohio voters is not severe, but neither is it slight. The State’s proffered interest in smooth election administration must be “sufficiently weighty” to justify the elimination of in-person early voting for nonmilitary voters during the three-day period in question. If the State had enacted a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation that limited in-person early voting for all Ohio voters, its “important regulatory interests” would likely be sufficient to justify the restriction. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. However, Ohio’s statutory scheme is not generally applicable to all voters, nor is the State’s justification sufficiently “important” to excuse the discriminatory burden it has placed on some but not all Ohio voters. The State advances only a vague interest in the smooth functioning of local boards of elections. The State simply indicates that allowing in-person early voting, as was done in the past, “could make it much more difficult for the boards of elections to prepare for Election Day.” (R. 35-9, Defs.’ Ex. 8, at 3 (emphasis added).) With no evidence that local boards of elections have struggled to cope with early voting in the past, no evidence that they may struggle to do so during the November 2012 election, and faced with several of those very local boards in opposition to its claims, the State has not shown that its regulatory interest in smooth election administration is “important,” much less “sufficiently weighty” to justify the burden it has placed on nonmilitary Ohio voters. 2. Unique Challenges to Military Service Members and Their Families The State’s asserted goal of accommodating the unique situation of members of the military, who may be called away at a moment’s notice in service to the nation, is certainly a worthy and commendable goal. However, while there is a compelling reason to provide more opportunities for military voters to cast their ballots, there is no 6 The Equal Protection Clause permits states to enact neutrally applicable laws, even if the impact of those laws falls disproportionately on a subset of the population. See, e.g., Crawford, 553 U.S. at 207 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976)). However, Ohio’s statutory scheme is self-evidently not neutrally applicable; it restricts the rights of some voters and not others. Nos. 12-4055/4076 Obama for America, et al. v. Jon Husted, et al. Page 16 corresponding satisfactory reason to prevent non-military voters from casting their ballots as well. Federal and state law makes numerous exceptions and special accommodations for members of the military, within the voting context and without, and no one argues that these exceptions are somehow constitutionally suspect. By and large, these statutes and regulations—from UOCAVA and the MOVE Act to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act—are based on highly relevant distinctions between service members and the civilian population, and they confer benefits accordingly. For example, UOCAVA’s accommodations for military and overseas voters are based almost entirely on the difficulties that arise from being physically located outside the United States. To address communication difficulties, Ohio law permits absent military and overseas voters to request an absentee ballot by mail, fax, email, or in person, while other voters may only do so by mail or in person. Ohio Rev. Code. §§ 3509.03, 3509.05, 3511.04. To account for inconsistencies and delays in foreign mail systems, UOCAVA, as amended by the MOVE Act, requires states to provide absentee ballots to absent military and overseas voters at least 45 days prior to an election. 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff- 1(a)(8). These special accommodations are tailored to address the problems that arise from being overseas. Providing more time for military and overseas voters to cast their ballots inperson is not a response to the problem of these voters being absent, because absent voters obviously cannot cast ballots in person. Rather, the State argues that these voters need more time to vote early because they could be called away from the jurisdiction in an emergency with little notice. (See R. 35-8, Defs.’ Ex. 7; R. 35-10, Defs.’ Ex. 9.) We acknowledge the difficult circumstances of members of the military and their families, who constantly face the possibility of a sudden and unexpected deployment, and we admire their dedication and sacrifice. For that reason, Ohio’s commitment to providing as many opportunities as possible for service members and their families to vote early is laudable. However, the State has offered no justification for not providing similarly situated voters those same opportunities. See S.S. v. E. Ky. Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 457 (6th Nos. 12-4055/4076 Obama for America, et al. v. Jon Husted, et al. Page 17 Cir. 2008) (“In essence, a State must ‘treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.’” (quoting Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1360 (6th Cir. 1996)). The State asserts that military and overseas voters are not similarly situated to other Ohio voters for equal protection purposes. “The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (emphasis added); see also TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 430 F.3d 783, 790 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that two groups of hospitals were not similarly situated for equal protection purposes because “they differ[ed] in several material respects”). In many respects, absent military and overseas voters are not similarly situated to other Ohio voters. Typically, their absence from the country is the factor that makes them distinct, and this is reflected in the exceptions and special accommodations afforded to these voters under federal and state law. With respect to in-person early voting, however, there is no relevant distinction between the two groups. The State argues that military voters need extra early voting time because they could be suddenly deployed. But any voter could be suddenly called away and prevented from voting on Election Day. At any time, personal contingencies like medical emergencies or sudden business trips could arise, and police officers, firefighters and other first responders could be suddenly called to serve at a moment’s notice. There is no reason to provide these voters with fewer opportunities to vote than military voters, particularly when there is no evidence that local boards of elections will be unable to cope with more early voters. While we readily acknowledge the need to provide military voters more time to vote, we see no corresponding justification for giving others less time. The State and Intervenors worry about the logical extensions and practical implications of Plaintiffs’ position. If states are forced to provide the same accommodations to every voter that they currently provide to military and overseas voters, such as added flexibility and extra time, states may simply eliminate these special accommodations altogether. (See R. 35-10, Defs.’ Ex. 9, at 5.) However, virtually all Nos. 12-4055/4076 Obama for America, et al. v. Jon Husted, et al. Page 18 of the special voting provisions in federal and Ohio law address problems that arise when military and overseas voters are absent from their voting jurisdictions. See Doe v. Walker, 746 F. Supp. 2d 667, 670–71 (D. Md. 2010) (describing the purpose of the MOVE Act as facilitating the receiving and sending of absentee ballots from overseas). They are not similarly situated to all other voters in this respect, and states are justified in accommodating their particular needs. With respect to in-person voting, the two groups are similarly situated, and the State has not shown that it would be burdensome to extend early voting to all voters. Its argument to the contrary is not borne out by the evidence. See supra Part II.B.1. Equally worrisome would be the result if states were permitted to pick and choose among groups of similarly situated voters to dole out special voting privileges. Partisan state legislatures could give extra early voting time to groups that traditionally support the party in power and impose corresponding burdens on the other party’s core constituents. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[P]articularly where [voting restrictions] have discriminatory effects, there is increasing cause for concern that those in power may be using electoral rules to erect barriers to electoral competition.”). To avoid this dangerous result, courts must carefully weigh the asserted injury against the “precise interests” proffered by the State. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. Although the State argues that it has justifiably given more early voting time to military and overseas voters, in fact, the time available to those voters has not changed and will not be affected by the district court’s order. Rather, the State must show that its decision to reduce the early voting time of non-military voters is justified by a “sufficiently weighty” interest. The State has proposed no interest which would justify reducing the opportunity to vote by a considerable segment of the voting population. Having found that neither interest proposed by the State is sufficient to justify the limitation on in-person early voting imposed on all non-military Ohio voters, we find that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that Ohio Rev. Code § 3509.03, as implemented by the Ohio Secretary of State, violates the Equal Protection Clause. Nos. 12-4055/4076 Obama for America, et al. v. Jon Husted, et al. Page 19