Opinion ID: 1836662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court committed reversible error by overruling flowers's objections to the opinion and hearsay testimony of joe andrews.

Text: ¶ 80. Flowers argues that the evidence put on by the prosecution through one of their experts, Joe Andrews, was based solely on hearsay. The State argues the trial court did not abuse his discretion in admitting the disputed evidence because, as an expert, Andrews is entitled to rely on hearsay to form his opinions. ¶ 81. At trial Flowers objected to Andrews testifying about the shoe impression found at the crime scene because he believed the analysis was based on hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed Andrews to testify regarding the shoe impression. ¶ 82. Andrews, an employee of the Mississippi Crime Lab, was qualified as an expert in the field of forensic microanalysis. As indicated earlier, photographs were taken from the scene which depicted footprints. From those photographs, Andrews determined the prints were of footwear, or shoe impressions. After determining the photographs were of footwear impressions, Andrews next compared the photographs with a pair of shoes taken from the defendant. The shoes, a pair of Nike Flight tennis shoes, were not consistent with the type of shoe that left the impression at Tardy's. Andrews then visited several athletic stores, and found a design that was very similar to the design in the photograph. The design was found on a pair of Fila athletic shoes. ¶ 83. The shoe box found at Connie Moore's home was submitted to Andrews and the Mississippi Crime Lab for the examination for latent prints. After noticing that the shoe box originally contained a pair of Fila Grant Hill II MID shoes, Andrews suggested the Highway Patrol purchase a similar pair of shoes so that they could be compared to the impressions from the scene. An investigator from the Highway Patrol purchased a pair of Fila Grant Hill Olympic athletic shoes. Although the two pair of shoes were different styles, Andrews testified the Fila manufacturer told him all of the Grant Hill II designs have the exact same out sole pattern. Andrews testified that an expert concerning footwear impressions, it is sometimes necessary to confer with manufacturers to obtain information about shoes and shoe soles because there are so many different styles and sizes of shoes available. ¶ 84. Andrews then testified in his expert opinion the type shoe purchased by the Highway Patrol investigator could not be excluded as having made the impressions at the scene of the crime. Andrews also testified that the type of shoe which would have originally been in the shoe box found at Connie Moore's house would have also made the same type of impression. ¶ 85. Miss. R. Evid. 703 states: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. This Court has allowed evidence, as a basis of an expert's opinion, that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay. Mississippi Valley Gas Co. v. Estate of Walker, 725 So.2d 139, 152 (Miss.1998). See Hull v. State, 687 So.2d 708, 716-17 (Miss.1996) (holding statements that expert used to base opinion on admissible where not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted); Slay v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 511 So.2d 875, 879 (Miss.1987) (holding trial court did not err by allowing expert to testify about statements made to him in forming his opinion where statements were not offered to prove the truth of matter asserted). ¶ 86. In Morley v. Jackson Redevelopment Authority, 632 So.2d 1284, 1293 (Miss.1994), this Court addressed the issue of whether the information relied on by an expert is admissible just by virtue of his reliance on it in reaching his expert opinion. In Morley, this Court held that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence hearsay statements used by an expert where the statements were used not to explain the expert's opinion, but to merely bolster his opinion. Id. at 1294. In making its decision, the Court relied heavily United States v. Grey Bear, 883 F.2d 1382, 1392-93 (8th Cir.1989), which held that while a witness may rely on information which is inadmissible in evidence, that does not give the witness the right to circumvent the rules of hearsay by giving statements which corroborate his view. Morley, 632 So.2d at 1294. ¶ 87. However, this Court, in Slay, held that the trial court did not err by allowing an expert to testify about statements made by employees of the Illinois Central Gulf as part of the basis for his opinion. 511 So.2d at 879. The trial judge overruled an objection that the statements were inadmissible, finding the testimony admissible not for the purpose of proving the truth of what was told him, but for the purpose of showing that it was told to him, which led him to take certain other actions, such as conducting his own tests. Id. This Court held: Simply put, hearsay is an out-of-court statement, not made under oath and not subjected to cross-examination, which is introduced for the truth of the matter asserted. Ellis & Williams, Miss. Evidence, § 8-1 (1983). Here, the trial judge properly ruled that Copeland's testimony, relating statements made by those present at McNamara's test, was introduced not to show the manner of McNamara's examination, but to explain the basis for his own test of the locomotive. Consequently, there was no error. Id. ¶ 88. In Walker, Valley Gas asserted that if the offered statements had been allowed into evidence, the statements were not hearsay because they were offered to further explain the basis of the expert's opinion and not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 725 So.2d at 153. The plaintiffs, however, contended that the statements, if allowed, would have enabled Valley Gas to present to the jury statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Id. This Court held: [T]he trial court did not err by refusing to allow [the expert] to testify about the statement made by the unidentified man about the children playing in the abandoned house before the fire because such testimony would not go to explain the basis of the expert's opinion but would be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that there were children playing in the abandoned house where the fire ignited. Therefore, the statements were inadmissible hearsay and properly excluded by the trial court. Walker, 725 So.2d at 152-53. ¶ 89. In the case sub judice, Andrews, as an expert, was qualified to testify regarding his forensic testing performed on the Fila Olympic shoes. However, Andrews went a step further and testified, based on what was told to him by the Fila representative, that if he had performed an analysis on the Fila Grant Hill II MID shoes, those, too, would be consistent with the impressions. This statement does not show that Andrews was led to other actions because the Fila Grant Hill II MID shoes were never tested. This statement was only offered to prove the truth of the matter assertedthat the Fila Grant Hill II MID shoes were consistent with the impressions found at the crime scene. We, therefore, find that the testimony by Joe Andrews regarding the shoe impressions was based on hearsay and was erroneously admitted by the trial court.