Opinion ID: 2831306
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subsection (b)’s bar and its exception

Text: Regardless of the capacity allegations, when the plaintiff chooses to sue the government employee, then subsection (b), which addresses “a suit against any employee of a governmental unit,” applies. See TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 101.106(b). As a corollary to subsection (a), subsection (b) provides that a plaintiff who chooses to sue a government employee cannot later decide to sue the governmental unit: the decision to sue the employee “constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter.” Id. Unlike subsection (a), however, subsection (b) provides an exception: a plaintiff who sues a government employee cannot sue or recover from the governmental unit “unless the governmental unit consents.” Id. (emphasis added). Because “the manner in which the government conveys its consent to suit is through the Constitution and state laws,” we held in Garcia that the exception applied and subsection (b) did not bar claims against a governmental unit when the Legislature had “consented to suits” by waiving immunity under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. See Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 660. Thus, the “consent” that provides an exception to subsection (b)’s bar includes statutory waivers of immunity, “provided the procedures outlined in the statute have been met.” Id.