Opinion ID: 2551468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denying Motions for Polygraph and Medical Examinations

Text: Defendant filed motions to conduct a polygraph examination and psychiatric and neurological examinations of Castillo. The basis for the first was Castillo's purported lack of credibility, and for the other two his purported incompetence to testify. The trial court denied both motions.
In seeking to have Castillo tested by polygraph, defendant relied on constitutional guaranties of due process, the federal constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, the California constitutional guaranty against cruel or unusual punishments, and the right to heightened reliability in the factfinding aspects of a capital case. At a hearing on the motion, counsel for defendant explained, we're not saying that the case should be dismissed, but rather that the special circumstances which Pedro Castillowhich his testimony is the underpinning for, should be stricken, in the absence of every legitimate effort on the part of the prosecution ... to determine whether or not Pedro Castillo is telling the truth.... The trial court ruled, however, that there is not either authority[,] nor acceptance in the scientific community, with reference to the polygraph, [and] for those reasons, the motion will be denied. We agree that defendant was not entitled to have the court compel a polygraph examination of Castillo. Defendant acknowledged that he could not admit in evidence the result of a polygraph test (Evid.Code, § 351.1), but he asserted that a test was justified anyway. Based on the inconsistencies in his [preliminary hearing] testimony and statements to the police, there is a strong probability that Pedro Castillo in some or all respects will not pass a polygraph examination. His failure to do so is a fact that should at least be ... considered by the prosecution in deciding whether to proceed with the special circumstances against these defendants [defendant and Hector Ayala, who joined defendant in the motions]. Also, the defendants are entitled to have the court consider favorable [sic] polygraph results in deciding whether or not to grant a Penal Code section 1385 motion to dismiss the special circumstances and in reviewing a finding imposing the death penalty pursuant to Penal Code section 190.4(e). The use of the results of a psychological examination to impeach a witness's credibility is, in the main, disfavored. (See People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 835, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280.) Evidence Code section 351.1 provides: (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court, unless all parties stipulate to the admission of such results. [I] (b) Nothing in this section is intended to exclude from evidence statements made during a polygraph examination which are otherwise admissible. It is implicit in Evidence Code section 351.1 that a trial court may not compel a polygraph examination. It would be an idle act, which [t]he law neither does nor requires. (Civ.Code, § 3532.) The statute provides that the result of a polygraph examination is without evidentiary effect. It would probably be improper for a trial court to take into consideration, in ruling on a motion to dismiss an action under section 1385, or in ruling on an automatic motion to modify a verdict of death (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), results from a technique that the Legislature has disfavored. We need not decide that questionit suffices to note here that state law certainly does not require a court to compel a polygraph examination. Defendant relied, however, on constitutional notions of due process. He may be understood to assert that because Evidence Code section 351.1 bars the admission of reliable impeachment evidence, or at least the discovery of facts that might lead to impeachment evidence, it violates the due process clauses of the federal and California Constitutions. But we have held that before a criminal defendant can establish a right under state law or as a matter of due process to use the results of a polygraph examination, it is necessary (we expressed no opinion on whether it would suffice) to offer proof that the technique has become generally accepted in the scientific community. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1212, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) The same requirement applies to any right to obtain a polygraph examination for possible use. Defendant undertook no effort here to show that polygraph examinations have been generally accepted by scientists in the relevant field.
Defendant's motion to compel the psychiatric and neurological examinations was based on state law, in particular Evidence Code section 730, which provides in relevant part that the trial court, if it thinks an expert evaluation is required, may appoint one or more experts to investigate ... the fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or may be required. His appeal is also based on state law grounds. At trial, he argued that such tests were justified in order to ascertain whether Castillo was competent to testify. Whether his testimony is the result of his own genuine memory or the result of pressures and suggestions that were brought to bear upon him at a time when he was injured, in a `fog,' and chemically dependent must be resolved ... prior to his testimony. Defendant made clear that he wanted to use any adverse test results for impeachment. The trial court denied the motion without comment. There was no error. Evidence Code section 700 provides: Except as otherwise provided by statute, every person, irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness and no person is disqualified to testify to any matter. Subdivision (a) of section 701 of the Evidence Code provides in turn: A person is disqualified to be a witness if he or she is: [¶] (1) Incapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter so as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him [or her]; or [¶] (2) Incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth. Defendant bore the burden of showing Castillo's incompetence. ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 621-622, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) He failed to meet that burden. The trial court could even have ruled after Castillo's direct examination. (Evid.Code, § 701, subd. (b).) By that time, however, it was apparently evident that he was competent to testify. The court did not err in denying defendant's motion for psychological and neurological examinations.