Opinion ID: 205429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: carson's motion to amend

Text: Carson does not contest the merits of the district court's decisions regarding complaints MA-08-1844 and MA-07-1668. [2] Rather, he claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to amend the petition in light of the Office of Special Counsel's decision regarding these two complaints. Carson moved to amend his petition to add allegations that, in closing these two complaints, the Office of Special Counsel failed to comply with the requirements set out in a statutory note following section 1214. The district court found that Carson's additional allegations would be futile because the Office of Special Counsel had already performed the non-discretionary duties it owed Carson. Because the district court based its decision to deny leave to amend on the legal conclusion that amendment would be futile, we review this decision de novo. Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 569 (6th Cir.2003). Leave to amend must be freely given when justice so requires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Nevertheless, leave to amend should be denied if the amendment is brought in bad faith, for dilatory purposes, results in undue delay or prejudice to the opposing party, or would be futile. Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 1995). The statutory note following section 1214 provides that: The Special Counsel shall include in any letter terminating an investigation under section 1214(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code . . . the name and telephone number of an employee of the Special Counsel who is available to respond to reasonable questions from the person regarding the investigation or review conducted by the Special Counsel, the relevant facts ascertained by the Special Counsel, and the law applicable to the person's allegations. United States Office of Special Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board: Authorization, Pub. L. 103-424 § 12(b), 108 Stat. 4361, 4367 (1994). Carson contends that the person whose name and number he was given did not respond to his reasonable questions. For a writ of mandamus to be warranted, there must be a mandatory or ministerial obligation. If the alleged duty is discretionary or directory, the duty is not owed. Maczko, 814 F.2d at 310 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A duty is not owed unless the obligation is plainly defined and peremptory. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the Office of Special Counsel had a duty to comply with the statutory note following section 1214, the terms of that note are not readily ascertainable. [W]hen a duty is disputed or subject to various interpretations, . . . the duty is not `owed' in that the obligation to do a particular act cannot be said to be clear, peremptory, defined or ministerial within the meaning of section 1361. Id. There is clearly discretion involved in responding to reasonable questions from the person regarding the investigation or review conducted by the Special Counsel, the relevant facts ascertained by the Special Counsel, and the law applicable to the person's allegations. United States Office of Special Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board: Authorization, Pub. L. 103-424 § 12(b), 108 Stat. 4361, 4367. Carson sought leave to amend his petition to request a writ of mandamus to enforce a statutory note that is subject to differing interpretations. This amendment would be futile because the district court would have no authority to issue the requested writ under section 1361. Furthermore, we note that because MA-08-1844 is a prohibited activity complaint, the procedural requirements of section 1214 do not apply to it in any case. Section 1216, which governs prohibited activity complaints, provides that [i]f the Special Counsel receives an allegation concerning [activities prohibited by any civil service law, rule, or regulation], the Special Counsel may investigate and seek corrective action under section 1214 and disciplinary action under section 1215 in the same way as if a prohibited personnel practice were involved. 5 U.S.C. § 1216(c) (emphasis added). The plain text of the statute suggests that the Office of Special Counsel is not required to provide status reports regarding prohibited activity allegations, but rather has this discretionary power. See also Perkins v. Office of Special Counsel, 522 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2008) ([S]ubsection (c) of section 1216 specifies that [Office of Special Counsel] may seek corrective action under section 1214 . . . for activities described in [section 1216(a)(4)] in the same way as if a prohibited personnel practice were involved. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)). Thus, the district court correctly found that under section 1216, the Office of Special Counsel's decision whether to follow section 1214's procedural requirements was discretionary, and thus permitting Carson to amend his petition regarding a section 1216(a) investigation would be futile. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Carson's motion for leave to amend.