Opinion ID: 1657445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: reversible error in admitting evidence of an alleged previous uncharged criminal act, and denying appropriate rebuttal

Text: When the appellant took the stand in his own defense, a part of his testimony was that he was a loving and concerned father, and he had gone to the shopping center parking lot, the scene of the shooting, on the night in question because he was told that his son was running loose unprotected in the parking lot, after he had been unable to rouse the authorities to deal with the situation. On the pretext of rebutting this testimony, the Commonwealth recalled Donna Janes, the appellant's former paramour who was now living with Joe Biggerstaff, the decedent, when this homicide occurred. Donna Janes testified to an incident occurring eight months before, which if true, represented collateral criminal activity of a serious and offensive nature, highly prejudicial to the character of the accused. Appellant had lived with Donna Janes for approximately seven years, and the child born of this relationship had been the subject of a custody and visitation battle following their separation. Donna's so-called rebuttal testimony described an altercation some eight months before, wherein the appellant allegedly shot through the window of a car she occupied with their child. As independent corroboration of Donna Janes' story the Commonwealth then called Officer Jay Gadberry, who had gone to the scene of the prior altercation, and who testified that there was a bullet hole in the driver's side window just as Donna Janes had testified. None of this testimony reflected animosity or motive to shoot Joe Biggerstaff, except perhaps by piling inference on inference, or through remote and insubstantial inference, nor does the single transgression, even if true, directly refute the appellant's testimony that he was a loving and concerned father. Its admission fits none of the exceptions to the rule against proof regarding incidents of prior, uncharged, specific acts of criminal misconduct. As we stated in Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380 (1990): The `General Rule' is `[e]vidence of the commission of crimes other than the one that is the subject of a charge is not admissible to prove that an accused is a person of criminal disposition.' [Citation omitted.] Before admitting such evidence the burden is on the Commonwealth to establish a reason to apply some well-defined exception. Id. at 381. Further, even where evidence is debatably or remotely relevant, it is not admissible unless the probative value of the evidence outweighs its inflammatory nature. Commonwealth v. Morrison, Ky., 661 S.W.2d 471, 473 (1983). [Emphasis original.] The appellant denied this evidence regarding a prior shooting incident was true. It is highly significant that in a post-trial affidavit Officer Gadberry, who had confirmed the truth of Donna Janes' claim, recanted a significant part of his testimony. His affidavit stated that, upon reflection, he remembered there was no bullet hole through the driver's side window of the car as Donna Janes had testified. To the contrary, the window had been knocked out and was in pieces across the interior of the car, from causes unknown. Officer Gadberry's new version was consistent with testimony which would have been forthcoming from the appellant's brother, who owned the car and who was denied the right to testify to disprove Donna Janes' version of the prior incident. The brother had been present in court when Donna Janes and Officer Gadberry, testified and the trial court held he was precluded by the so-called separation of witnesses rule, Civil Rule 43.09, from giving surrebuttal testimony. The testimony of this witness, and another witness who swore that she heard Donna Janes admit that in her anger she made up this story about shooting into her car, was offered in surrebuttal, and the separation of witnesses rule was erroneously applied. The separation of witnesses rule is not inflexible, and the interest of justice requires the court to waive an innocent violation in order to permit a party to confront new evidence presented after he has completed his case in chief, evidence which he could not have reasonably anticipated at the time when he allowed witnesses, members of his family, to remain in the courtroom. Under Civil Rule 43.09, the judge has both the duty and the discretion to waive the application of the rule where the circumstances so indicate, and this was obviously such a case. As the cases in the annotations demonstrate, trial courts have very properly been given wide latitude in exercising their discretion in applying this Rule. This is in accord with the policy of the Civil Rules to ignore harmless error and not to permit technical violations to impede the achievement of substantial justice. Bertelsman & Philipps, Kentucky Practice, 4th Ed. Civil Rule 43.09. Where to apply the rule would defeat good trial practice and ultimate ascertainment of the truth, a technical violation such as occurred here should be waived. See Sanders v. Drane, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 54 (1968). In Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 323 S.W.2d 577 (1959), another murder case presenting similar problems to this one, we held that the trial court applied the separation of witnesses rule in an abusive manner, and the same is true in this case. Finally, the trial court should have granted a new trial based on Officer Gadberry's post-trial affidavit. It significantly affected the credibility of critical evidence in this case. The Commonwealth in closing argument placed great emphasis on the importance of the evidence from Jay Gadberry, as an impartial witness and a Deputy Sheriff of Russell County at the time of his investigation of this prior incident. He emphasized the fact that Gadberry saw the bullet hole in that window, when such was not the case. RCr 10.02 provides for a new trial of a criminal case for any cause which prevented the defendant from having a fair trial, or if required in the interest of justice. It was an abuse of discretion to deny a new trial in the circumstances of this case. Our Court has erroneously affirmed a situation where highly inflammatory evidence, either totally irrelevant or, at best, remotely relevant, was admitted over the vehement objection of the accused, where this was compounded by erroneously excluding evidence offered to contradict such evidence, and where this was further compounded by failing to grant a new trial when, by post-trial affidavit, a critical part of this prejudicial evidence was recanted.