Opinion ID: 2314327
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Watkins' Jurisdictional Challenge

Text: We consider first Watkins' claim in his cross-appeal because he places in question the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the District's appeal. Watkins argues that the trial court abused its discretion in vacating its original order denying the District's post-trial motion to set aside the verdict or grant a new trial and re-entering the order to allow the District to note a timely appeal. He contends that the District has not shown facts which bring it within that narrow exception to the general rule that a party may not rely upon a failure to receive notice of the entry of final judgment as a basis for relief from that judgment under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(b) and for tolling the time for noting an appeal. In a civil case, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. D.C.App. R. 4(a)(1). The Clerk of the Superior Court is required to serve notice of the entry of an order signed or decided outside the presence of the parties to their counsel of record, if any, or to the parties. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 77(d). Generally, [l]ack of notice of the entry by the Clerk [of an order] does not affect the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the Court to relieve a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted in the Rules for the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. Thus, lack of knowledge of the entry of judgment occasioned by failure to receive the clerk's notice does not, without more, constitute grounds for a finding of excusable neglect for purposes of relieving a party from a final judgment or order. See Pryor v. Pryor, 343 A.2d 321, 323 (D.C.1975). There is a narrow exception to this general rule which applies when no party to the action receives notice of the entry of the order. Schmittinger v. Schmittinger, 538 A.2d 1158, 1161 & n. 8 (D.C.1988). The rationale for the exception is that the actual act of mailing of notice by the clerk [is] essential to the computation of appeal time, and the failure of all parties to receive notice is a significant indication that no such notice was in fact mailed by the clerk. Id. at 1162. In such circumstances, we approved the following procedure: [A] trial court may vacate and re-enter a judgment under Rule 60(b) to allow a timely appeal when neither party had actual notice of the entry of judgment, when the winning party is not prejudiced by the appeal, and when the losing party moves to vacate the judgment within a reasonable time after he learns of its entry. Id. at 1161 (quoting Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 163 U.S.App. D.C. 140, 142, 500 F.2d 808, 810 (1974)). Therefore, the trial court has discretion under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(b) to grant relief where the circumstances are such as to indicate that neither party received actual notice of the entry of judgment. [2] Schmittinger, supra, 538 A.2d at 1162-63 & n. 8. Watkins argues that since he received notice, the narrow exception carved out in Schmittinger, where neither party received a copy of the order, does not apply here. This argument fails to take into consideration the rationale underlying the Schmittinger exception. It is the actual act of mailing of notice by the clerk [that is] essential to the computation of appeal time. Schmittinger, supra, 538 A.2d at 1162; see D.C.App. R. 4(a)(3). [3] Therefore, it is evidence that the clerk did not mail the notice which is significant. See Schmittinger, 538 A.2d at 1162. While Schmittinger recognizes, as significant evidence that the clerk did not mail the order, the fact that neither party received a copy, it does not exclude from the trial court's consideration other equally compelling evidence that the clerk did not mail the notice consistent with the requirements of the rules. Such evidence is present here. In this case, the jury returned its verdict in favor of Watkins on May 17, 1993, and the District filed its motion for judgment not-withstanding the verdict or in the alternative, for remittitur or a new trial on June 7, 1993. The trial court's order denying the motion was docketed on October 5, 1993, and the record reflects that a copy of the order was mailed on October 6, 1993. However, although the District's motion specified its new address, it appears from the record that the order was sent to its former address through in[-]house mail. On January 7, 1994, the District filed a motion, with supporting affidavits, requesting the court to vacate its October 5, 1993 order, contending that it had moved from the old address some five months earlier and that it did not receive notice of the court's order until December 21, 1993, when Watkins' counsel called to inquire about payment of the judgment. [4] Having considered the motion and Watkins' opposition, the trial court granted it, vacated its earlier order and re-entered the order on February 22, 1994. The District noted this appeal on March 30, 1994. The grant or denial of a motion for relief from a judgment or order under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(b) is within the discretion of the trial court and will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Clay v. Deering, 618 A.2d 92, 94 (D.C.1992); Jones v. Hunt, 298 A.2d 220, 221 (D.C.1972). In exercising that discretion, the trial court necessarily considered the circumstances surrounding the District's claim that it never received notice of the entry of the subject order, which was directed to its former address. In a related context, we have held that lack of knowledge of the entry of a judgment occasioned by the failure to receive the clerk's notice does not, without more, constitute grounds for a finding of excusable neglect. Pryor, supra, 343 A.2d at 323 (citing Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366, 369-70 (10th Cir.1974)). [5] Subsequently, this court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision granting a party leave to file an appeal after expiration of the time for noting it had expired where the record reflected no notice to any counsel of the entry of the order denying a motion for a new trial. Murville v. Murville, 433 A.2d 1106, 1108 n. 1 (D.C.1981). In Pryor, we observed that [e]xcusable neglect has been held to include lack of knowledge of entry of a judgment, extraordinary cases such as physical disability and unusual delay in the transmission of mail, and so-called `unique circumstances.' 343 A.2d at 322. The combination of factors in this case, including the clerk's failure to mail the notice to the District's last known address, the uncertainty in the record as to how the notice was sent, and the District's failure to receive the notice of the order, presents a sufficient showing of extraordinary circumstances to support the trial court's exercise of its discretion to grant the motion. See Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Brown, 619 A.2d 1188, 1191-92 (D.C.1993). While the actual mailing of the notice is the critical element in the running of the time for notice of appeal, Schmittinger, supra, 538 A.2d at 1162, the rule contemplates that the mail will be directed to the party's address where he or she is likely to receive it. Only when mail is properly directed can the act of mailing justify the presumption of receipt. See Toomey v. District of Columbia, 315 A.2d 565, 567 (D.C.1974) (presumption of receipt arises upon proof of mailing letter, properly addressed and stamped) (quoting Columbia Finance Co. v. Worthy, 141 A.2d 185, 186 (D.C.Mun.App.1958)). The rule provides explicitly that when notifying parties by mail, the clerk must mail the notice to the party's last known address. [6] Super. Ct. Civ. R. 77(d); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 5. The record shows that, although the District's new mailing address was listed on its motion for JNOV, the clerk sent notice of the trial court's ruling on the motion to the District's former address instead of its last known address. Moreover, the notation on the order indicates that the notice may not have been sent by ordinary mail at all, but instead through the court's in-house circulation system. When these facts are considered along with the District's evidence that it did not receive the order, the requisite showing of extraordinary circumstances for a finding of excusable neglect may be found. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the District's motion to vacate and re-entering the order denying the District's motion for JNOV, or in the alternative a new trial, or remittitur. Accordingly, the District's filing of its appeal was timely. We turn then to consideration of the issues raised by the District.