Opinion ID: 1425795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Alleged Witness Vouching

Text: Vázquez and Morell next argue that certain statements made by Agent Vitousek during his testimony improperly vouched for the credibility of other government witnesses, made these witnesses more credible in the minds of the jurors, and thus unfairly prejudiced the outcome of the trial. We describe the specific instances of alleged vouching below, but begin with the applicable legal framework. A prosecutor may not vouch for one of her witnesses by making personal assurances about him; she likewise may not accomplish this goal by putting on another government witness, such as an FBI agent, to make such assurances. This practice is prohibited because of its potential to shore up a witness's credibility by putting the prestige of the United States behind him and thereby inviting the jury to find guilt on some basis other than the evidence presented at trial. United States v. Rosario-Díaz, 202 F.3d 54, 65 (1st Cir. 2000); accord United States v. Pérez-Ruíz, 353 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (Although the prosecution's success often depends on its ability to convince the jury of a particular witness's credibility, it cannot entice the jury to find guilt on the basis of a [government] agent's opinion of the witness's veracity.). The district court's decision to admit testimony over a preserved vouching objection is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Tom, 330 F.3d 83, 94 (1st Cir.2003). In performing our inquiry, we consider various criteria, including the overall strength of the Government's case against the defendant, the prosecutor's willfulness in eliciting the statement from the witness who did the vouching, the strength and clarity of any curative instructions, and the likelihood that any prejudice that may have survived the instructions affected the outcome of the case. See United States v. Page, 521 F.3d 101, 108 (1st Cir.2008); United States v. Cormier, 468 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir.2006). In all events, we will not vacate a defendant's conviction on vouching grounds unless the error likely affected the outcome of the trial. Tom, 330 F.3d at 95; Rosario-Díaz, 202 F.3d at 65. During the first twelve days of trial, the Government called several of the witnesses directly involved in the extortion scheme. Included among them were Cobián and several of the subcontractor-witnesses, all of whom received immunity in exchange for their cooperation or testimony, and the coconspirator Granados, who pled guilty to his role in the extortion and also cooperated with investigators. On the thirteenth day, the Government called Agent Vitousek, an experienced FBI fraud investigator. The defendants identify four episodes in which Vitousek allegedly vouched for other government witnesses; we address these in turn. First, the Government sought to elicit from Agent Vitousek that the FBI had followed normal procedures in investigating this case. When the prosecutor asked Agent Vitousek why the FBI uses cooperating insiders as sources in fraud investigations, Vázquez interposed a vouching objection which the court overruled. Vitousek then described the procedure employed with cooperating insiders, stating such things as, I will tell . . . these cooperating witnesses to tell the truth about the information they are going to provide us, and a cooperating defendant. . . can explain exactly what happened. We fail to see how the jury could possibly have understood these generic descriptions of procedure  with no reference to any specific individual or case  to be Vitousek's assurances that Cobián and Granados were truthful in their dealings with the FBI or otherwise. As the defendants provide nothing more, we will go no further than this. See United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 390 (1st Cir.1998). The second claimed instance of vouching occurred during cross-examination by Vázquez. Vázquez asked Vitousek about an incident in which Cobián told investigators that a certain public official had accepted a bribe from him; the substance of the interview was memorialized in a nonpublic FBI report. Later, Cobián admitted to the investigators that the official had not actually accepted a bribe. Vázquez questioned Vitousek at length over why he failed to correct the FBI records on this point. While conceding that mistakes had been made, Vitousek asserted that there was little likelihood of negative repercussions for the official because the government requires much more than a single interview before it will indict someone. Trust me, Vitousek added, [w]e need much more evidence. Vázquez argues that this testimony gave assurances to the jury that Vitousek would never seek the indictment of an innocent person, and that the FBI corroborated Cobián's information on Vázquez's role in the Superaqueduct extortion with much more evidence. Since Vázquez did not timely object to this testimony or move to strike it at trial, we review the challenge for plain error. United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 72 (1st Cir.2007). Here again, we fail to see how the jury could possibly have understood the testimony as bolstering the credibility of any of the Government's witnesses, and Vázquez does not explain further. As such, we cannot find error, much less plain error. The defendants' third vouching challenge gets them no further. During an exchange in cross-examination, Vázquez asked Agent Vitousek several times why the Government relied on Cobián despite its policy against dealing with cooperators who lie. Ultimately, the following exchange occurred between Vázquez and Vitousek: Q. . . . Based on the records of other people, Cuco and Laracy and all the other people who the jury have heard from, you could prosecute Cobián? A. Yes. Q. And the Government has given him a benefit and chosen not to prosecute him. A. He is cooperating. . . . Q. He will not be prosecuted for the [Superaqueduct]? A. If he tells the truth. And . . . up to now, the assessment has been that he has been truthful. Vázquez objected to this last response as vouching. The district court overruled the objection, finding that Vázquez had opened the door to Vitousek's response. This ruling was entirely appropriate, and certainly not an abuse of discretion: Vázquez cannot complain about vouching in response to his own questions, United States v. García-Morales, 382 F.3d 12, 18 n. 1 (1st Cir.2004), especially when he very purposely invited the answer he got by repeatedly questioning Vitousek about why he continued to deal with Cobián despite the latter's dishonesty, see United States v. Cutler, 948 F.2d 691, 697 (10th Cir.1991) (It is fundamental that a defendant cannot complain of error which he invited upon himself.) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 828 F.2d 630, 633 (10th Cir.1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). [12] The fourth and final claimed instance of vouching is somewhat more problematic, but here too we must conclude that no abuse of discretion occurred. On redirect examination, the Government attempted to clarify an inconsistency raised during Morell's cross: Q. . . . [D]o you recall, at the end of [Morell]'s cross-examination yesterday, he ask[ed] you about the difference between the amount of cash that José Cobián said he gave to Granados and the amount of cash which Mr. Granados admits he received? A. Yes . . . Q. Do you recall that [Morell] asked you, Would it be fair to say one or both of those cooperators is lying about that? Yes or no? A. Yes. Q. And do you recall that you answered, If you say that, yes. Please tell the members of the jury what you mean by that answer. A. . . . I want to explain that at no time I was agreeing with that statement. That is [Morell]'s statement, not mine. And I would like to explain exactly what my words are. . . . . . . Now, I want to say my words, and these are the words of Ivan Vitousek. At no time no witness brought here by the Government has lied under oath in this courtroom. . . . At this, Vázquez objected on vouching grounds. The court indicated it would instruct the jury later, and allowed Vitousek to continue: A. . . . There is a discrepancy on the amounts of cash that were paid illegally by Mr. Cobián to Mr. Granados Navedo, and there is a discrepancy on the amount that Mr. Granados Navedo says that he received in cash from illegal payments from Mr. Cobián. That doesn't mean that they are lying. . . . At sidebar after redirect, Vázquez moved to strike this testimony. [13] The court denied the motion because Morell had opened the door on cross by essentially asking Vitousek which of the two men  Cobián or Granados  was lying. The court opted instead to instruct the jury as follows: The . . . duty to determine whether somebody has been truthful or not is yours. You are the judges of the believability of the witnesses. You will decide how much of a witness' testimony you are going to accept or you are going to reject. You should not take the testimony of Mr. Vitousek just now as him telling you that you should believe any witness. What he basically told you was that he, rightly or wrongly, believed what they told him, which is a different story. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses. You will decide . . . whether you believe Cobián [and] whether you believe Granados . . ., and how much of their testimony you are going to accept and how much you are going to reject. The court's end-of-trial jury instructions contained similar language. Neither defendant objected to either set of instructions. On appeal, Vázquez and Morell argue that Agent Vitousek's statements improperly vouched both for the government's witnesses in general, and for Cobián and Granados in particular. In the circumstances, we need not decide whether either statement constituted vouching because any error the district court may have committed in allowing this testimony to stand was harmless. The district court  obviously mindful of the harm the impugned statements might cause to the defendants  gave a curative instruction that the jurors not trust in Agent Vitousek's views on any witness's veracity, but instead judge veracity for themselves on the weight of the evidence. These instructions were timely (at most a few minutes after Vitousek uttered the statements), straightforward, explicit, and detailed. See Cormier, 468 F.3d at 74 (no prejudice where instructions were `strong and clear') (quoting United States v. Rodríguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153 (1st Cir.1989)); accord Olszewski v. Spencer, 466 F.3d 47, 60 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir.2000). Moreover, as we have noted many times, we presume juries understand and follow the court's instructions, see, e.g., United States v. Kornegay, 410 F.3d 89, 97 (1st Cir.2005), and Vázquez and Morell have given us no reason to believe that this jury acted any differently. [14] Considering this factor together with the general strength of the Government's case against each defendant, we conclude that no prejudice survived the district court's curative instructions, and therefore any vouching that may have occurred could not have affected the outcome of the trial. See Page, 521 F.3d at 108; Cormier, 468 F.3d at 73. For this reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony to remain on the record and in continuing with the trial. Tom, 330 F.3d at 94. Having disposed of all the vouching challenges, we proceed to the next assignment of error.