Opinion ID: 2581607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Factually Distinct Acts

Text: We turn to the analysis of various tests used to determine whether the defendant's conduct constituted factually distinct and separate acts. Courts commonly hold that incidents of sexual assault may be factually distinct if separate criminal acts have occurred at different times and were separated by intervening events. See Gray v. United States, 544 A.2d 1255, 1258 (D.C.1988); see also Vaughan v. State, 614 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Mo.Ct.App.1981) (emphasizing the facts of each case with particular reference to factors of time, place of commission and, preeminently, defendant's intent, as evidenced by his conduct and utterances). Some courts look to the presence of separate volitional acts as constituting basis for separate charges. See, e.g., State v. Bergeron, 162 Wis.2d 521, 470 N.W.2d 322, 327 (App.1991). These courts find that even if the offense is not separate in time, it may comprise a separate offense if it constitutes a new volitional departure in the defendant's course of conduct. See State v. Anderson, 219 Wis.2d 739, 580 N.W.2d 329, 334 (1998). Others explain the requirement by use of the fork in the road test under which, the dispositive issue is whether there was any evidence that [the defendant] reached a `fork in the road, leading to a fresh impulse which resulted in a separate offense.' Sanchez-Rengifo v. United States, 815 A.2d 351, 359 (D.C.2002) (explaining that the question is whether the defendant had time to reflect before embarking on a new outrage). Other jurisdictions have adopted a non-exhaustive list of factors, including temporal proximity, location of the victim (movement or repositioning of the victim), existence of intervening event; sequencing (penetration through different orifices), defendant's intent as indicated by his conduct and utterances; and the number of victims. See Herron v. State, 111 N.M. 357, 805 P.2d 624, 628 (1991); State v. Hamilton, 791 S.W.2d 789, 795 (Mo.Ct.App.1990); Lillard v. State, 528 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tenn.Crim.App.1975); State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis.2d 582, 335 N.W.2d 583, 592 n. 6 (1983); Hamill v. State, 602 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Wyo.1979); see also State v. Johnson, 53 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Tenn.2001) (listing similar factors). However, the courts vary in the evidence considered sufficient to support each factor. As an example, in Bergeron, 470 N.W.2d at 327, the court upheld the defendant's conviction for five counts of sexual assault on the basis that the five charges covered a separate volitional act involving a new volitional departure in the defendant's course of conduct. The opinion was predicated on evidence that the defendant repositioned the victim several times, stopped to remove his pants after several acts and had two ejaculations. Id. Yet in Gray, a case involving longer intervals between the defendant's acts, the court found no significant break in the defendant's course of conduct to justify multiple punishments. There, the defendant had dragged the victim 40 to 45 feet off a path between acts and stopped for up to a minute when interrupted by passers-by. Gray, 544 A.2d at 1256. In Spain v. United States, 665 A.2d 658, 661 (D.C.1995), the court affirmed the defendant's two convictions for sexually abusing a minor after he fondled her, stopped when she asked him not to continue, and then enticed her back for a second round of the game. Cf. Vaughan, 614 S.W.2d at 722 (the court relied on evidence that there as a substantial time interval between the assaults (variously estimated to be 25 to 30 minutes, and 55 minutes), during which time the defendant sat on the bed and engaged the victim in extended conversation); Sanchez-Rengifo, 815 A.2d at 359 (relying on evidence that defendant had over an extended period of time, committed different sex acts on the victim; and concluding that there was time during the two hour period for the defendant to reflect as he ordered his victim into different positions). Though the cases do not form a consensus on the length of time required between acts, all jurisdictions appear to require either that the defendant's acts of sexual perpetration not be so close in time, or be so lacking in intervals, that they constitute a single offense of sexual contact.