Opinion ID: 409256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: He is the Union representative.

Text: 28 Q. And why did you call him? 29 A. To see what my standards was on because he told me in the shop that I think it was three mechanics that checked it out altogether. 30 App'x at 82-83. 31 Substantial evidence exists on the record considered as a whole which supports the ALJ's determination that Usry's activity was protected by the Act. 32 The next day, February 28, 1979, the truck was assigned to Max Ray. Ray was preparing to leave the terminal when he was approached by three drivers-two of whom were union stewards-who related the previous day's events to Ray. Pickel approached the group and attempted to take Ray aside. He was unsuccessful. Pursuant to his discussions with the union representatives, Ray informed Pickel that he would drive the truck if Pickel could produce the documentation (required by the collective bargaining agreement) that it had been repaired and was safe to operate. Ray testified that he was acting with Union support in refusing to drive the truck without assurances that it was safe. App'x at 95-96. 33 Thus, both Ray and Usry acted pursuant to union instructions, in concerted activity founded upon the collective bargaining agreement then existing. 34 The Company also contends that it was not aware that the drivers were engaged in concerted activity, and that therefore it is not in violation of the Act. The Company is correct insofar as this Circuit has held that it is the employer's knowledge of an employee's concerted activity and subsequent discipline which constitutes a violation of the Act. Jim Causley Pontiac, Division Jim Causley, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 675 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1982). However here it is clear that the company knew that Usry and Ray made their complaints pursuant to union activity. Usry did not refuse to operate the vehicle without first contacting the appropriate union officer. Pickel was present when Usry discussed the truck's condition with other union members; Pickel also prevented Usry from contacting union officers. Ray's complaint was made pursuant to a discussion with union shop stewards during which Pickel was present. The Company's claim as to this issue is therefore without merit. 35 Finally, the company argues that even if Usry and Ray were engaged in concerted activity, 4 such activity was not protected because it was in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The applicable provision of the bargaining agreement is Article 16 which relevantly states: 36 The Employer shall not require employees to take out ... any vehicle that is not in safe operating condition ... 37 It shall not be a violation of this Agreement where employees refuse to operate such equipment unless such refusal is unjustified. 38 The company essentially argues that Usry and Ray violated Article 16 of the collective bargaining agreement and were therefore not protected from retributive acts by management. The company strenuously contends that the ALJ ignored the plain language of the Article. McLean asserts that under Article 16 drivers are justified in refusing to operate a vehicle only when the vehicle is in fact unsafe as determined by a mechanic. However, the collective bargaining agreement does not so provide. Article 16 requires drivers to operate any assigned vehicle unless they justifiably believe the unit unsafe. Drivers are not required to ascertain with definitude, as the company argues they must, that the truck is unsafe; rather, they must merely be justified in their belief. 39 The ALJ, on the basis of substantial evidence and the testimony which he properly chose to credit, determined that Usry's and Ray's concerns were justifiable. The Company's claim on this issue is therefore meritless. 40 The order of the Board should be enforced as substantial evidence supports the ALJ's choice of credible testimony, his findings of fact, and his determination that Usry and Ray were disciplined for participating in concerted union activity. 41