Opinion ID: 1959682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Matter of Life or Death

Text: Allocating the burden to the defendant to prove that he is mentally retarded makes the decisionwhether Johnson should receive the death penaltyseem capricious. The facts of this case show that the resultlife or deathmay well depend on which party has the burden of proof. The evidence favoring Johnson's position is as follows: Johnson received three intelligence test scores indicating subaverage intellectual functioning. At the age of 12, Johnson received a score of 63 on the WISC test, a standard intelligence test for children. Two of the I.Q. tests Johnson took as an adult indicated that he had a full scale I.Q. of 67. Under the guidelines set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV, a person with an I.Q. score below 70 has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. The defense presented evidence that, as a child, Johnson was placed in special education classes, a placement consistent with a diagnosis of life-long mental retardation. Defense experts also testified that Johnson had deficits in many of the adaptive behaviors described in section 565.030.6, including communication, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics and leisure and work. On the other hand, the state's evidence tending to show a lack of mental retardation is: Johnson received four I.Q. scores indicating an absence of mental retardation, including scores of 77 in 1968, 95 in 1979, 78 in 1994, and 84 in 1995. Dr. Heisler, the state's expert who administered one of the intelligence tests, testified that he believed Johnson's adult score of 67, was the result of malingering and not actual mental retardation. The state also contended that Johnson's functioning both in prison and prior to his incarceration indicate that he does not have adaptive behavior deficiencies. The evidence in this case will support either conclusion. A reasonable jury, considering all the evidence, may be in equipoise. Johnson thus presents precisely the kind of case where the burden of proof is important, even determinative. With the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence allocated to Johnson, as it is by the principal opinion, the jury's determination that Johnson is not mentally retarded is supported by evidence. If the burden were placed upon the state to show that Johnson is not mentally retarded, the jurors may well have found the state's evidence insufficient to carry that burden over the evidence to the contrary. This may be so regardless of whether the burden is beyond a reasonable doubt, as in Ring , or by a preponderance of the evidence, as in section 565.030.4(1).