Opinion ID: 560456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Resort to State Procedures.

Text: 50 There is a further reason why the takings claims of both groups of plaintiffs are not velivolant: they have not sought compensation through the procedures Massachusetts has provided for that purpose. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part that private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation. This provision is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2385-86, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987) (hereinafter, First Lutheran ). For that reason, so long as the State provides an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and resort to that process holds out some realistic promise of yielding just compensation, an owner of property has no cognizable claim against the State in respect to an alleged confiscation. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194-97, 105 S.Ct. at 3120-22; Ochoa, 815 F.2d at 817; Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rios, 813 F.2d 506, 514-15 (1st Cir.1987). As the Williamson Court explained: 51 ... because the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been denied. The nature of the constitutional right therefore requires that a property owner utilize procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a Sec. 1983 action. 52 Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. at 3120 n. 13. 53 Appellants argue that this requirement does not apply to them because they are seeking declaratory relief, not money damages. They also contend that, since Massachusetts does not provide an adequate process for obtaining just compensation in the circumstances of this case, their claims are ripe. Neither argument withstands scrutiny. 54 1. Absence of Prayer for Damages. On the first issue, appellants assert that Williamson, Ochoa, and Culebras all involved only money damages, whereas appellants seek none. 16 They contrast these cases with earlier cases in which we suggested that, in certain circumstances, a federal court might grant a declaratory judgment as to whether or not a taking had occurred without requiring the property owner first to exhaust state compensation procedures. See, e.g., Ortiz De Arroyo v. Barcelo, 765 F.2d 275, 280 (1st Cir.1985); Citadel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 695 F.2d 31, 34 (1st Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815, 104 S.Ct. 72, 78 L.Ed.2d 85 (1983); Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 35-36 (1st Cir.1980); see also Culebras, 813 F.2d at 509-12. But whatever comfort these cases once held for the proposition advanced by the present appellants has evaporated in light of the Supreme Court's developing jurisprudence. 55 As the district judge recognized, our underlying concern in Pamel and its progeny was the then-unresolved question of whether a temporary taking was compensable. See Gilbert, 745 F.Supp. at 53 n. 10. Within months after our decision issued in Culebras, the Court settled that issue. See First Lutheran, 482 U.S. at 321, 107 S.Ct. at 2389 (establishing that damages are retrospectively available for the period of a temporary or regulatory taking ultimately held unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction). The resolution of this previously unanswered question, coupled with the Court's unambiguous declaration that there can be no constitutional violation under the Takings Clause until just compensation has been denied (and that, therefore, due to the nature of the constitutional right, property owners must resort to available state compensation procedures before suing under section 1983), Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. at 3120 n. 13, leaves no doubt that, so long as the State provides an adequate process for securing compensation, federal equitable intervention in advance of resort to that procedure is premature. Accord Golemis, 632 F.Supp. at 164 (the [Williamson ] Court's ripeness analysis would be completely neutered if its holding were applied to damage claims alone). 17 56 2. Adequacy of State Remedy. This brings us to appellants' alternative argument that, even if a declaratory judgment action on a takings claim is unripe until the gauntlet of available state compensation procedures has been run, Massachusetts offers no remediation in this type of situation. The argument focuses upon the Massachusetts inverse condemnation statute, which says: 57 When the real estate of any person has been taken for the public use ... or has been entered for a public purpose, but such taking [or] entry ... was not effected by or in accordance with a formal vote or order of the board of officers of a body politic or corporate duly authorized by law ..., and by such taking ..., entry ... or use he has suffered an injury for which he is entitled to compensation, the damages therefor may be recovered under this chapter. 58 Mass.Gen.L. ch. 79, Sec. 10. The statute further provides that an aggrieved property owner may bring an action in the State's courts for an assessment of any such damages. See id. at Sec. 14 (A person entitled to an award of damages under [Chapter 79] ... may petition for the assessment of such damages to the superior court of the county in which the property taken or injured was situated.). 59 Appellants contend that the language of section 10 excluding takings effected by or in accordance with a formal vote applies to the Ordinance (which was adopted by vote of the city council), thus barring their access to an inverse condemnation remedy. Appellees, on the other hand, insist that section 10's reference to a formal vote cuts in only when the condemnation of property is direct, not inverse (as in eminent domain proceedings). The district court agreed with the appellees' interpretation of the statute. As the alleged confiscation here was indirect, the court concluded that the Massachusetts inverse condemnation procedure under Sec. 10 provides the plaintiffs with an adequate means of obtaining just compensation for any alleged taking. Gilbert, 745 F.Supp. at 52. 60 We believe that the district court's construction of Chapter 79 is correct. 18 We need not probe the point, however, for a plaintiff seeking to invoke the Takings Clause in a federal court without first exhausting state remedies has the burden of proving the inadequacy of those remedies. Thus, in Culebras, where it was unclear whether the applicable statute would furnish plaintiffs with the certain and adequate relief that the Williamson Court contemplated, we wrote: 61 Lack of clarity is not unusual ... when legal rights are still in process of definition through case-by-case adjudication.... Plaintiffs have certainly not proven the inadequacy of [Puerto Rico's] inverse condemnation remedy. We think they must pursue that remedy before they can maintain a federal damages claim, since, when fleshed out by the local court, that remedy could well provide the certain and adequate relief they seek. 62 Culebras, 813 F.2d at 514-15; see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 539, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3207, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (to prevail on a takings claim, the claimant must either avail himself of the remedies guaranteed by state law or prove that the available remedies are inadequate). We apply the same standard to the appellants. Since they have fallen well short of convincing us that their situation is outside the Massachusetts inverse condemnation remedy, and since that anodyne, if applicable, would confer certain and adequate relief, the takings claims are unripe until the potential state remedy has been more fully pursued.