Opinion ID: 2285979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Presentment of a Claim

Text: Petitioner contends that under section 6-105, Todd had the authority to bind Ferguson's estate prior to his appointment and that he did bind the estate through his actions when he requested from Elizabeth any bills of Ferguson's that she incurred while Ferguson was in the hospital. Petitioner also contends that when Elizabeth then sent a letter to Todd with a list of checks, that letter was a valid presentment of a claim. We hold that the letter was not a valid presentment of a claim because the claim was not in substantial compliance with section 8-104(b) and Rule 6-413(a), by not being presented to a personal representative or to the Register of Wills. This Court has never had the opportunity to directly address the questions now presented. The Court of Special Appeals, however, has held that claimants have to be in substantial compliance with sections 8-103 and 8-104. In Lampton v. LaHood, 94 Md.App. 461, 617 A.2d 1142 (1993), [18] the Court of Special Appeals stated that: The sole authority cited by Lampton in support of her argument is Lowery v. Hairston, supra [73 Md.App. 189, 533 A.2d 922 (1987) ]. There, plaintiffs filed an action against the personal representative of an estate seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase option. The circuit court dismissed the action, finding that the option constituted a claim under § 8-103(a) and that the plaintiffs had failed to file the claim in a timely fashion. We reversed, holding that three letters from the plaintiffs to the personal representative, which were sent and received by him prior to the statutory deadline for claims, and in which were stated the names and addresses of the claimants, the terms of the option, and their intent and ability to exercise it, constituted substantial and timely compliance with the statute. This holding is, as we noted then, entirely consistent with the use of the word `may' throughout § 8-104, indicating that the forms of presentment are permissive and not mandatory in nature. 73 Md.App. at 197 n. 2, 533 A.2d 922. The view that substantial, rather than strict compliance, is all that is necessary, has also been adopted by other courts interpreting similar statutes. See e.g., Peterson v. Marston, 362 N.W.2d 309 (Minn.1985); Quinn v. Quinn, 772 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah App.1989); Strong Bros. Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Strong, 666 P.2d 1109 (Colo.App.1983). See also Matter of Estate of Phillips, 532 A.2d 654 (D.C.App.1987). To permit substantial compliance with these kinds of statutory requirements, does not, however, sanction the elimination of such requirements altogether. There must still be compliance with the statute, indeed there must be substantial compliance with it. Lampton does not cite any case, from any jurisdiction, in which a court has held that in the absence of some writingwhether it be a formal claim, or a letter, or a memorandum, or a lawsuita claimant has been held to have substantially complied with a claims notice statute like § 8-104. In Lowery and all of the out-of-state cases cited above, the claimant timely notified the personal representative of the claim by a writing of some kind. Id. at 469-70, 617 A.2d at 1146 (emphasis added); see Chamberlin v. Carter, 835 F.Supp. 869, 874 (D.Md.1993); Lowery v. Hairston, 73 Md.App. 189, 197, 533 A.2d 922, 927 (1987). Considering only section 8-104 and Rule 6-413, [19] we hold that a claimant is not in substantial compliance with section 8-104 and Rule 6-413 when the claimant presents a claim to a person who has not been appointed the personal representative. When Elizabeth sent her letter dated July 24, 1998 to Todd, Ferguson's will was not yet filed with the Register of Wills. It was not filed until September 9, 1998, nearly seven weeks later and after Elizabeth was dead. At the time that the will was filed, the will named Donna and Benjamin Baird as personal representatives. At the time that Elizabeth sent her letter to Todd, not only was he not the personal representative, but he was not even named in the will as the personal representative. It was not until September that Todd was appointed co-personal representative, after the personal representatives named in the will renounced their appointment. [20] We note that the language of section 8-104 and Rule 6-413 would indicate that a claim cannot be presented to a person who has not been appointed a personal representative. Section 8-104 and Rule 6-413 both make allowances for the proper procedure a claimant is to follow if a personal representative has not been appointed. If a personal representative has not been appointed, then a claim should be filed with the Register of Wills, or a suit should be filed. As stated numerous times, supra, in the case sub judice, not only was Todd not yet appointed a co-personal representative when he received the letter from Elizabeth, but he was not even named in the will as the personal representative. Under the facts of the case sub judice, we cannot find that Elizabeth was in substantial compliance with section 8-104(b) and Rule 6-413(a) when she sent a letter to Todd approximately two months before he was appointed personal representative and at a time when he was not named in the will as a personal representative. The record gives no indication of Todd's stating to Elizabeth that he was or was not going to be the personal representative. There is also no proof that Todd thought, or had any indication that, he was going to be the personal representative when he asked Elizabeth to send him any bills she incurred while his father was in the hospital. He may well have been considering personally paying such bills. His inaction after receiving the letter from Elizabeth further confirms that he was not acting as a personal representative. We can find no evidence in the record that would indicate that Elizabeth ever thought that Todd was the personal representative and that was her reason for sending him the letter. Furthermore, we cannot find any evidence in the record where, prior to his appointment, Todd conducted himself or held himself out to be the personal representative. Based on these facts, we cannot find that Elizabeth was in substantial compliance with section 8-104. She did not deliver her letter to the personal representative because a personal representative had not been appointed at the time. If Elizabeth wanted to deliver her claim then, under section 8-104, she should have properly filed it with the Register of Wills or filed suit on her claim.