Opinion ID: 788147
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The 29 Questions

Text: 253 As we explained above, when cross-examining Yunkin at trial Lambert's counsel offered into evidence a document that she and Yunkin purportedly passed between each other while they were in jail. Yunkin acknowledged that he and Lambert passed a document between them, but he also testified that the document he was presented with at trial-what we refer to as the 29 Questions-was not the document that he recalled passing back and forth with Lambert. Yunkin testified that his handwriting appeared on the 29 Questions and some of the questions were the same as he recalled from the document he passed with Lambert, but he claimed that he never saw some of the questions on the 29 Questions document. 254 As a preliminary matter, we note that Lambert has made much of this document as conclusively establishing her innocence. The trial judge, sitting as a finder of fact, found the document unreliable and inconclusive. As a result, he did not rely on it when he reached his verdict because he concluded that the document did not create reasonable doubt as to Lambert's guilt. After reviewing the record in some detail, we tend to agree with the trial judge's conclusion. And we find fanciful Lambert's assertion that the only reasonable conclusion from the document is that Yunkin and Buck murdered Show and Lambert was not involved. 255 Yet our opinion of the probative value of the document is irrelevant. Our role is confined to determining whether any constitutional error occurred at trial. Stripped of Lambert's attempts to retry the case in another forum, her claim regarding the 29 Questions is this: Yunkin's testimony regarding the 29 Questions was perjured and the prosecution knowingly elicited that testimony. 256 Lambert specifically bases this argument on two portions of Yunkin's testimony. First, Yunkin testified that although the answers written on the 29 Questions appeared to be in his handwriting the 29 Questions was not the document that passed between him and Lambert in prison. He testified that in the document that had passed between him and Lambert, Lambert had written the questions in pencil and he had written all his answers in pencil and then traced over every other word in ink so that they could not be changed. Yet Lambert's expert testified that the questions in the 29 Questions were written in ink, and there was no indication of any writing in pencil on the document. The expert also confirmed that the answers were written in Yunkin's handwriting. 257 Second, Lambert's counsel asked Yunkin about a portion of the document in which the following question and answer appeared: 258 5) [Question:] I think about Tressa and Laurie! I think you guys are sick! I think about her life you took! All those people at her funeral! And I know very well that you don't feel sad! You were happy, U weren't sad Friday! Do you remember seeing [crossed out word] dead? [Answer:] Yes, I remember seeing [crossed out word] dead. 259 PCRA Opinion (attached). Yunkin testified that on the document he passed back and forth with Lambert he had responded to a question by answering, Yes, I remember seeing Tressa dead, because the question he was answering asked, Do you remember seeing Tressa dead? Do you remember going to her funeral? App. 329. Yunkin testified that although the 29 Questions was not the original document, it was his understanding the word crossed out in Question 5 was Tressa. App. 328-30. But Lambert's expert testified that the crossed-out word was Laurie. 260 The PCRA Court found that the prosecution openly conceded to the trial court that it believed Yunkin was not fully truthful in his testimony regarding the 29 Questions. The Court explained: 261 Mr. Kenneff stipulated to [the testimony of Lambert's expert] on the basis that he had the document examined by a Pennsylvania State Police examiner as well. There was never any effort by the Commonwealth to hide what Mr. Yunkin said or to somehow bolster what Mr. Yunkin said with expert testimony. Mr. Kenneff freely and openly acknowledged that this expert's analysis of the document was consistent with the defense expert and these expert opinions were both inconsistent with Mr. Yunkin's testimony. 262 PCRA Decision 117-118. 36 The Court's finding of fact was eminently reasonable in light of the record. In particular, Kenneff made the following statement to the Court during closing arguments: 263 Mr. Yunkin. Is he guilty of the crime of homicide? Fortunately, neither of you have to decide that in this case nor do I have to argue it. I don't think I held anything back about my feelings about Mr. Yunkin. I said in my openings he's either lying, he's stupid or he's naive. Perhaps the evidence in this case suggests he's all three. 264 I'm not going to stand here and say that Mr. Yunkin was being truthful about [the 29 Questions]. I can't do that. There is no evidence to do that. What I can say about Mr. Yunkin and what I can say about what Miss Lambert needed to cover up for him is that logic says Yunkin was an accessory before the fact. 265 App. 1315. Later on in his closing argument Kenneff stated: Did Yunkin participate in the murder of Laurie? My stomach says he did, my mind says he did. Did he participate in the way that Miss Lambert says? The facts say no. App. 1319. 266 The PCRA Court's factual finding, supported strongly by the record, precludes a determination that the prosecution knowingly used false evidence to obtain a conviction. It also precludes a finding that the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allow[ed] it to go uncorrected when it appear[ed]. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. To the contrary. The government fully and openly informed the Court that it believed Yunkin's testimony was not fully truthful. There was no constitutional violation at trial regarding the 29 Questions. The flaws in Yunkin's testimony were fully aired at trial and candidly acknowledged by the prosecution. 267 Lambert also argues that having conceded that a portion of Yunkin's testimony was questionable, the prosecutor had an ethical obligation to characterize the entirety of testimony as perjury, and to withdraw the witness. These contentions have no merit. A prosecutor fully discharges his obligation when he discloses all inconsistent evidence to the trier of fact and defense counsel. [W]hile the government has a duty to be forthcoming with favorable evidence, it is not required to draw inferences from that evidence which defense counsel is in an equal position to draw.... When the road to what defense counsel think is potential perjury is so plainly marked, the government need not supply a map. United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 59 (2d Cir.1987). Nor is it true that a witness who fabricates in one area is incompetent to testify about others. This concept is embodied in the common jury instruction known as the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus charge, which provides: If you find that any witness testified falsely about any material fact, you may disregard all of his testimony, or you may accept such parts of it as you wish to accept and exclude such parts of it as you wish to exclude. United States v. Rockwell, 781 F.2d 985, 988 (3d Cir.1986) (emphasis omitted).