Opinion ID: 1088181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: the jury verdict against roussel should be reversed and rendered: or in the alternative, reversed and remanded

Text: A. AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ENTERED FOR ROUSSEL ON THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM 1. BECAUSE ROUSSEL HAD ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY, THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED. Roussel contends that Robbins' claim for malicious prosecution arising from the bar complaint was barred by an absolute immunity under Miss. Code Ann. § 73-3-345 (Supp. 1992). The statute reads in part: Immunity from civil suit predicated on disciplinary proceedings. All complaints filed pursuant hereto shall be absolutely privileged, and no lawsuit predicated thereon may be instituted, and each person, firm, association or legal entity filing such a complaint shall be immune from any civil suit predicated thereon... . (e)very person shall be immune from civil suit for all of his sworn or written statements made or given in the course of any investigation, investigatory hearing, formal hearing or review proceedings held and conducted under these disciplinary rules. Robbins argues that Disciplinary Rule 14(b), pursuant to which he was granted leave by this Court to file a malicious prosecution claim against Roussel, takes precedence over the statute; therefore, he was entitled as a matter of law to recover damages. Rule 14(a) is identical to § 73-3-345 above. Rule 14(b) provides in part: In an action separate and distinct from the disciplinary proceedings, the attorney may, by petition filed with the Clerk of the Court, seek a finding by the Court or its special master on the issue of malicious prosecution or abuse of process or malicious publication to persons not authorized to receive information pertaining to matters arising under these rules. If the Court finds or approves a finding by a special master that there appears to or may have been malicious prosecution, abuse of process, or malicious circulation to parties or persons not entitled to receive information pertaining to matters arising under these rules, the Court shall enter its order granting the right to sue, notwithstanding the immunity provided above. Such finding and right to sue shall constitute only a right to commence an action, not an adjudication as to whether or not there was, in fact, a waiver of the immunity provided above, and not a finding upon the merits of any action which the attorney may thereafter institute ... In other words, under the statute, civil claims may not be brought based on bar disciplinary proceedings, whereas under the Rule, claims may be brought based on such proceedings if permission is granted by this Court. Under the facts of this case, we need not address this apparent conflict between the statute and the Rule. The statute provides immunity from civil suit predicated on disciplinary proceedings. That is, it provides that no lawsuit predicated (on a bar complaint) may be instituted. Roussel contends that he is immune from Robbins' counterclaims under this statute. He is mistaken. Robbins' counterclaims were not predicated on disciplinary proceedings, nor were they part of a lawsuit instituted on the basis of a bar complaint. Rather, Robbins' counterclaims were predicated on the claims made by Roussel in the suit he filed in the Rankin County Circuit Court. Had Robbins filed a suit against Roussel solely on the basis of Roussel's bar complaint, Roussel might have a valid claim to immunity under the statute. However, after the bar complaint was dismissed, Roussel chose to pursue his claims against Robbins in court. Roussel, not Robbins, instituted the suit, and such action brought Roussel outside the scope of immunity provided by § 73-3-345. In its order dated January 25, 1990, this Court granted Robbins the right to file a counterclaim in Cause No. 15,910 filed in the Circuit Court of Rankin County for malicious prosecution and malicious circulation ... of confidential information pertaining to matters arising under the Rules of discipline. We hold that having initiated a lawsuit against Robbins in Circuit Court, Roussel enjoyed no immunity to such counterclaims. The trial judge properly allowed Robbins' counterclaims for malicious prosecution to go forward. 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE ISSUE OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO GO TO THE JURY Roussel contends that the trial court erred in allowing the malicious prosecution claim to go to the jury. He argues that the facts were undisputed that Robbins made misleading statements, and that there was no evidence ... that (he) filed the complaint for any reason other than believing that Robbins had attempted to mislead the Court. Robbins argues that he presented considerable evidence on the issue of probable cause, along with the other elements of malicious prosecution. He contends that the jury, not the judge, resolves questions of fact presented at trial, and therefore that the issue of probable cause was correctly sent to the jury. The elements of the tort of malicious prosecution are: (1) The institution of a proceeding (2) by, or at the insistence of the defendant (3) the termination of such proceedings in the plaintiff's favor (4) malice in instituting the proceedings (5) want of probable cause for the proceedings (6) the suffering of injury or damage as a result of the prosecution. See Benjamin v. Hooper Electronic Supply Co., 568 So.2d 1182, 1188 (Miss. 1990); Parker v. Game and Fish Comm'n., 555 So.2d 725, 728 (Miss. 1989); Royal Oil Co., Inc. v. Wells, 500 So.2d 439, 442 (Miss. 1986). Roussel's assignment of error concerns only the issue of probable cause, and whether it was correctly sent to the jury. On the question of whether the judge or the jury should determine the existence of probable cause, this Court has stated: When the facts are undisputed, it is the function of the court to determine whether probable cause existed. On the other hand, where the facts are in dispute, this Court has proclaimed that it becomes a jury question and it is for them to decide based on proper instructions. Benjamin, 568 So.2d at 1190 (citations omitted). Roussel contends that undisputed facts support his contention that Robbins had attempted to mislead the court, and therefore probable cause existed as a matter of law. He also asserts that there is no evidence to support an inference that he filed the complaint for any reason other than to mislead the court. This is an inaccurate depiction of the record, and/or a misunderstanding of the law of malicious prosecution. Robbins, naturally, disputes Roussel's contention that he attempted to mislead the Court with his Supplemental Abstract in the Allen appeal. Clearly, a question of fact exists as to whether Roussel had probable cause to bring suit. As stated above, the question of whether circumstances constitute probable cause is one for the jury. In sum, the judge properly sent the question of probable cause, along with the other elements of malicious prosecution, to the jury. B. AS A MATTER OF LAW, JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ENTERED FOR ROUSSEL ON THE LIBEL CLAIM. Roussel argues that the newspaper article describing his lawsuit against Robbins cannot serve as a basis for a libel or defamation claim because 1) his comments were true, and truth is a defense to a claim of defamation; 2) his comments were made in connection with judicial proceedings, and were therefore subject to immunity; 3) his comments were statements of opinion, which are not actionable for libel or defamation, and; 4) Robbins was a public figure, and therefore was required to prove that Roussel's statements were made with actual malice. Robbins argues that the immunity Roussel enjoys for the complaint cannot be extended to cover his comments to the newspaper, and that he (Robbins) is not a public figure. Robbins also contends that the jury was properly instructed on the elements of defamation, and its findings should not be disturbed. This Court has stated that in defamation actions, the threshold question is whether the published statements are false, for truth is a complete defense to an action for libel. Blake v. Gannett Co., Inc., 529 So.2d 595, 603 (Miss. 1988); Fulton v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 498 So.2d 1215, 1217 (Miss. 1986). The article upon which Robbins' claims for libel, slander, and emotional distress were based read in relevant part: In a Monday afternoon telephone interview, Roussel said that Robbins had allegedly changed the meaning of sentences included in the abstract of record, by eliminating certain words. Because of that, I lost to the Supreme Court, Roussel said. Even though my lawyer filed, saying that it was misleading, they (Supreme Court) let it stand. I feel like that I would have won. Roussel contends that his statements merely described the contents of his lawsuit; that is, they were a true statement about the content of a public record. Since true, he argues, the statements could not be defamatory. The sentences of the paragraph are an expression of Roussel's opinion. Therefore, because these were opinions, Roussel defends Robbins' libel claims by relying upon what this Court stated in Meridian Star, Inc. v. Williams, 549 So.2d 1332, 1335 (Miss. 1989), citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974): Expressions of opinions, however unreasonable or vituperative, cannot be the subject of a defamation suit ... We have recognized the importance of the free expression of opinions and have held that when criticism and comment are in the form of opinion, the statement will be privileged and no action for defamation will lie ... Roussel's reliance upon Meridian Star, Inc. is misplaced as was this Court's reliance when Meridian Star, Inc was decided. Subsequent holdings and interpretations of Gertz by the United States Supreme Court clearly illustrate this incorrect interpretation. In Gertz, it was stated by the United States Supreme Court that, Under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40, 94 S.Ct. at 3007. This Court took the above language from Gertz and used it in Meridian Star, Inc., 549 So.2d at 1335, to say that Expressions of opinions, however unreasonable or vituperative, cannot be the subject of a defamation suit. Statements of opinion are entitled to absolute immunity from defamation suit under the first amendment to the United States Constitution ... . . [T]hus, ideas and opinions, although incorrect or faulty in their premise, are protected by the United States Constitution and cannot support a defamation action. Shortly thereafter in 1990, the United States Supreme Court addressed the above mentioned Gertz language in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-21, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2705-07, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). The Milkovich Court found that the Gertz language relied upon in Meridian Star, Inc., was mere dictum. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court found that it never intended to create still another First Amendment-based protection for defamatory statements which are categorized as `opinion' as opposed to `fact.' Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18, 110 S.Ct. at 2705-06. The Milkovich Court further stated that, Thus, we do not think this passage from Gertz was intended to create a whole sale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled `opinion.' Id. [3] Milkovich's explanation of the nonexistent opinion exception has been interpreted and properly explained by Keohane v. Wilkerson, 859 P.2d 291 (Colo. App. 1993), aff'd, Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293 (Colo. 1994), and cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 936, 130 L.Ed.2d 882 (1995). Keohane held that Prior to Milkovich, statements of `pure' opinion were recognized as having constitutional privilege and thus were not actionable for defamation in Colorado. See Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351 (Colo. 1983); Bucher v. Roberts, 198 Colo. 1, 595 P.2d 239 (1979). This privilege was premised on dictum in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-340, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 805 (1974). Keohane, 859 P.2d at 295. However, in Milkovich, the Supreme Court rejected the constitutional distinction between opinion and fact. Id. Thus, after Milkovich, whether a statement is characterized as a `fact' or `opinion' is no longer a relevant inquiry in determining whether it may be constitutionally privileged. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the statement could be reasonably understood as declaring or implying a provable assertion of fact. Keohane, 859 P.2d at 296. A statement, even if phrased as an opinion, will not enjoy constitutional protection if the court concludes that its substance or gist could reasonably be interpreted as declaring or implying an assertion of fact. Id., at 297. In light of the unambiguous explanation of libel law by the United States Supreme Court, our nation's final and highest court, this Court is left with no alternative but to overrule and vacate Meridian Star, Inc. and any cases relying thereon and Gertz. Therefore, Roussel's reliance upon Meridian Star, Inc. is incorrect. Accordingly, Roussel was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the libel claim. C. A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED IN THIS CASE Roussel argues that the judge erroneously permitted the jury to hear prejudicial and inflammatory evidence concerning the allegations, motives, and amount demanded in his original complaint. Roussel contends that he is entitled to a new trial for this reason. Robbins argues that there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of Roussel's motion for a new trial, and that the evidence at trial  testimony as to Robbins' personal and professional difficulties after the filing of the bar complaint  fully supports the jury's verdict and the amount awarded. This Court has held that a new trial may be granted when the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, or when the jury has been confused by faulty jury instructions, or when the jury has departed from its oath and its verdict is a result of bias, passion and prejudice. Bobby Kitchens, Inc. v. Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass'n., 560 So.2d 129, 132 (Miss. 1989); Motorola Communications & Electronics v. Wilkerson, 555 So.2d 713, 723 (Miss. 1989). This Court will reverse a trial judge's denial of a request for a new trial only when such denial amount to an abuse of that judge's discretion. Kitchens, 560 So.2d at 132. See also C. & C. Trucking Co. v. Smith, 612 So.2d 1092, 1099 (Miss. 1992); Odom v. Roberts, 606 So.2d 114, 118 (Miss. 1992). In this case, the jury heard several days' testimony concerning the alleged basis of the bar complaint, and the bar complaint itself. They had ample basis on which to determine whether Robbins had proven the necessary elements of malicious prosecution and other charges. Robbins, his wife, and a treating psychiatrist testified concerning Robbins' mental and emotional health after initiation of the bar complaint. They spoke of depression and rekindled post-traumatic stress disorder, which produced appetite disorders, nightmares and other symptoms. Robbins testified that his law practice suffered and he was compelled to dismiss his staff. It does not appear that the jury's verdict for Robbins was against the overwhelming weight of such evidence. Roussel has not alleged, nor is there any indication that the jury was improperly instructed on the elements of malicious prosecution or other issues. The question of whether the verdict for Robbins was the result of bias, prejudice, or passion may be answered in two parts. First, there is the finding for Robbins, as distinguished from the amount of the award. As stated above, there is no indication that the jury's decision in Robbins' favor was the result of bias. As to the amount of the damages, this question will be addressed in the section below on remittitur. In sum, there was no abuse of discretion by the judge in denying Roussel's motion for a new trial. D. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL AS TO DAMAGES AND A REMITTITUR Roussel alternatively argues that the jury's verdict of $150,000 is excessive, and that he is entitled to a new trial as to damages only. Roussel contends that Robbins presented no evidence of lost earnings, and evidence of only $200.00 in medical bills. Robbins argues that damage awards should be overturned as excessive only where they shock the conscience, and that his does not. He submits that the evidence of his emotional and professional difficulties supports the jury's award. He suggests that the award is further justified because he will continue to suffer anguish and emotional distress. This Court's scope of review in reviewing an award of damages was stated in a malicious prosecution case: Our general rule is that a damage award may be altered or amended only when it is so excessive that it evinces passion, bias and prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the conscience. We are not authorized to disturb a jury verdict regarding amount of damages because it seems too high or seems too low. Motions challenging the quantum of damages and seeking a remittitur are by their very nature committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Where the trial judge acts upon these matters, we reverse only if he has abused or exceeded his discretion. C. & C. Trucking Co. v. Smith, 612 So.2d 1092, 1106. See also Jesco, Inc. v. Shannon, 451 So.2d 694, 705 (Miss. 1984). Robbins counterclaimed against Roussel for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel and slander. Evidence was presented regarding loss of earnings and emotional distress. The jury did not characterize the damages for the loss of earnings specifically, but returned a general verdict. Rule 49 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides for general verdicts and special verdicts: (a) General Verdicts. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, jury determination shall be by general verdict. The remaining provisions of this rule should not be applied in simple cases where the general verdict will serve the ends of justice. (b) Special Verdict. The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact ... From the general verdict, it is not apparent which claim(s) the award is based upon. It was the damages that occurred from any or all of the causes Robbins set forth in his complaint that entitled him to the award, not only the loss of earnings as suggested by Roussel. The damages awarded are not so excessive that it evinces passion, bias and prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the conscience. Therefore, the trial judge has not abused or exceeded his discretion. The jury award of damages is affirmed.