Opinion ID: 1091606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: constitutional and procedural issues

Text: Respondent contends that the investigation and the investigatory hearing conducted by the Commission violated his constitutional right to due process. His three primary arguments are (1) that the Commission held a hearing on April 7, 1983 and received the testimony of four witnesses without notifying him or affording him the right to cross-examine the witnesses, (2) that the Commission failed to provide him timely with the required notice of the investigation and of the nature of the charges, and (3) that he was not given sufficient notice of out-of-state depositions. The procedure for the Commission's investigation and hearing into charges against a judge is established by La.S.Ct. Rule XXIII, which provides that the Commission, upon receiving a complaint which is not obviously frivolous or unfounded, shall make a preliminary investigation to determine whether a hearing should be held. See Section 3(a). The Commission may also initiate a preliminary investigation on its own motion. Section 3(b) requires that the judge be notified of the investigation, of nature of the charge, and of the name of the person making the complaint or of the fact that the investigation is on the Commission's own motion. The judge must also be afforded reasonable opportunity in the course of the preliminary investigation to present relevant and material matters as he may choose. Section 4 provides that if the Commission concludes after the preliminary investigation that a hearing should be instituted, the judge must be informed of the charges. Prior to the hearing, the judge and the Commission are entitled to discovery to the extent available in civil proceedings. Section 9 provides that the judge shall have the right and the reasonable opportunity to subpoena witnesses and documents and defend against the charges by introduction of evidence, representation by counsel, and cross-examination of witnesses. Section 21 authorizes the Commission to establish rules of procedure for the hearing so as to provide a full and fair hearing. Pursuant to this authorization, the Commission has adopted the Rules of the Judiciary Commission which provide that complaints of misconduct or disability of a judge must be in writing, must specify the misconduct or disability, and must be signed by the complainant. Rule III allows the Commission to consider any alleged misconduct or disability from whatever source and on its own motion. Rule VI allows the Commission to make a preliminary investigation in any manner proper to determine whether a hearing should be held. The Commission, which is not bound by the technical rules of evidence, is authorized to administer oaths and to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence. Nevertheless, preliminary investigation and subsequent hearing into charges against a judge, like a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney, is not a criminal prosecution, but is in the nature of a civil action. In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So.2d 469 (1970). Further, because the Judiciary Commission is not a court, and because its only power is to investigate disciplinary cases within the judiciary and to recommend disciplinary action, it need not afford the full due process rights required in a criminal prosecution. In re Haggerty, above. The Judiciary Commission need only provide the minimum standards of due process contained in the Supreme Court Rules and its own rules for a full and fair hearing. In this case, the Commission began its investigation of respondent after receiving a complaint from Charles Michels. The Chairman of the Commission notified respondent of the nature of Michels' complaint by letter dated February 1, 1983. During its preliminary investigation, the Commission discovered other information which led to further investigation. On October 13, 1983, the Commission requested respondent to appear at an informal hearing to discuss Michels' complaint, as well as his conduct in a criminal case involving John Bynog. The Commission also notified him of ten other areas of inquiry. After this hearing, the Commission notified respondent that it had concluded that he had mishandled the Bynog matter, but that it had decided to close all matters listed in the October 13 letter. On March 16, 1984, however, the Commission notified respondent that it had initiated an investigation on its own motion into the charges which form the basis of the present proceeding. He was requested to appear at an April 7 meeting of the Commission. When his counsel could not attend that meeting, the Commission granted him a continuance as to his appearance until May 19. However, the Commission at its regularly scheduled meeting date on April 7 heard the testimony of four witnesses, three of whom later testified at the formal hearing. Respondent contends that the Commission's taking this testimony without his presence was a violation of due process. The Commission, being only an investigatory and accusatory body, may take testimony within the course of a preliminary investigation without the presence of the respondent. Although La.S.Ct. Rule XXIII § 3(b) provides that a judge is to be given reasonable opportunity in the course of the preliminary investigation to present such relevant and/or material matters as he may choose, there is no requirement that he be allowed to cross-examine witnesses who appear before the Commission during the preliminary investigation. Counsel for respondent relies on In re E.L. Bubba Henry, 448 So.2d 143 (La. App. 1st Cir.1984), to argue that the taking of the testimony of the four witnesses violated his right to due process. In that case, the Ethics Commission heard testimony of witnesses, including Henry, but would not allow him to cross-examine the witnesses or provide him with a transcript of the proceedings. The First Circuit held that the proceeding, although classified as an investigation, was really a private hearing at which Henry was entitled to cross-examine witnesses and to present his own witnesses and evidence under the Commission's procedural rules, which had been enacted by the Legislature. In this case, there were not procedural rules which required the Judiciary Commission to afford the right to cross-examine witness during the investigatory proceedings. Moreover, the Ethics Commission, unlike the Judiciary Commission, is an adjudicatory body. While we might agree that the testimony of witnesses before an adjudicatory body without the protection of cross-examination could have substantially prejudiced respondent, the Judiciary Commission does not make binding findings. [4] The Judiciary Commission is authorized only to investigate, to hold hearings and to make recommendations to this court, which is the court of original jurisdiction in these matters. Respondent was not denied due process because he was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses at that particular point in the investigation. Respondent's second due process argument is that the Commission failed to inform him properly of the investigation, the nature of the charges, and the name of the person making the complaint, as required by Rule XXIII § 3(b). In this case, the only complaint was made by Charles Michel, and respondent was fully informed of the charges and supplied with a copy of Michels' complaint on February 1, 1983. During the investigation of these charges, other matters came to the Commission's attention. By letter dated September 2, 1983, respondent was informed that the Commission was investigating this additional information on its own motion to determine whether it was frivolous or unfounded. In a letter dated October 13, 1983, the Commission requested respondent's appearance at a December 3 meeting and outlined the eleven areas to be discussed. Although the Commission closed that investigation after the hearing, it decided to begin another investigation on its own motion and informed respondent on March 16, 1984. That letter, which contained the charges that form the basis for this disciplinary hearing, indicated that the investigation was initiated on the Commission's own motion. Thus, the Commission substantially complied with the requirements of Rule XXIII § 3(b). After the rescheduled informal hearing was held on May 19, 1984, formal charges were filed on June 5, 1984 and the formal hearing was scheduled for July 27, 1984. As of July 3, respondent's counsel was furnished with copies of all statements of witnesses in the Commission's possession. Respondent was permitted discovery prior to the formal hearing, and he was permitted at the hearing to subpoena documents and witnesses, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. Rule XXIII § 9. Respondent finally contends that he was not afforded sufficient notice of the depositions of Paul Grappe in San Francisco and Jeanie Adams in Kansas City. These depositions were taken on videotape for the purpose of introduction into evidence at the formal hearing. The letter notifying respondent's counsel of the out-of-town depositions on July 12 and 13 was dated July 2, 1984. There were conversations in late June relative to the scheduling of these depositions, but the parties disagreed as to the outcome of the conversations. In fact, the Commission's refusal to pay respondent's counsel's expenses was a serious area of contention. Nevertheless, while the fact that the testimony of Jeanie Adams, a critical witness, was taken without respondent's cross-examination is disturbing, this court has rejected her testimony as not credible, as will be discussed later. Furthermore, the testimony of Paul Grappe was virtually neutral. Respondent has therefore suffered no prejudice from his counsel's failure to attend and participate in the depositions.