Opinion ID: 6495410
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The TRO Petition

Text: David alleges that Kaulukukui violated her and B.D.’s right to familial association by helping Keahiolalo file the Petition asking the family court to prevent David from having any contact with B.D., despite knowing that the Custody Order severely limited Keahiolalo’s rights related to B.D. Our caselaw clearly establishes that, as part of the right to familial association, parents and children have a “right to be free from judicial deception” in child custody proceedings and removal orders. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1034 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part on other grounds, 563 U.S. 692 (2011), 661 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2011). Indeed, we recently reiterated that by 2016, “well before” the events of this case, it was clearly established that “material omissions and misrepresentations with a deliberate disregard for the truth to a juvenile court would violate the Constitution.” Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1152; see also Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[D]eliberately fabricating evidence in civil child abuse proceedings violates the Due Process clause 14 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI of the Fourteenth Amendment when a liberty or property interest is at stake.”); Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing as “virtually self-evident” the constitutional due process right to not be subjected to criminal charges based on deliberately false evidence). In Greene, for example, the plaintiff alleged that her children were removed from her custody after a social worker intentionally included false statements in his petition for a protective custody order. 588 F.3d at 1018–19, 1034. We denied the social worker qualified immunity at summary judgment because, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court would not have granted the order and the plaintiff would not have lost custody of her children absent the social worker’s deliberately false statements. Id. at 1035–36. In doing so, we held that the right to be free from judicial deception in child custody proceedings was clearly established by our precedent, including numerous decisions in the Fourth Amendment context holding that officers who make false or misleading statements in an affidavit to a court are not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 1034–35 (citing Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007); Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002); Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1995)). More recently, in Hardwick, we denied qualified immunity to social workers who deliberately submitted false testimony to a court during a custody proceeding that ultimately resulted in the removal of the minor plaintiff from her mother’s custody. 844 F.3d. at 1114–15. There, the defendants argued that the right to be free from judicial deception had not yet been clearly established in civil child dependency proceedings, only in criminal proceedings against parents. Id. at 1117. We squarely rejected that DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI 15 argument, explaining that regardless of whether the proceeding occurred in the criminal or civil context, a reasonable official would have fair notice that “the knowing use of false evidence [is] absolutely and obviously irreconcilable with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of Due Process in our court.” Id. at 1119. In light of these decisions, the right to be free from judicial deception in matters of child custody “is beyond debate.” Id. at 1117. 3 To state a violation of the constitutional right to familial association through judicial deception, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a misrepresentation or omission (2) made deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth, that was (3) material to the judicial decision.” Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1147; see Greene, 588 F.3d at 1035. A misrepresentation or omission is “material” if a court “would have declined to issue the order had [the defendant] been truthful.” Greene, 588 F.3d at 1035. Here, David alleges that the Petition that Kaulukukui prepared omitted any reference to the Custody Order or its terms and that neither Keahiolalo nor Kaulukukui otherwise informed the family court of the Custody Order. David also alleges that Kaulukukui “acted in concert” with other Defendants to (1) “file and serve the [P]etition in the family court,” (2) “provide Defendant Keahiolalo with advice enabling him to obtain the protective order,” and in doing so, (3) “circumvent the existing [Custody Order].” She states that beginning on December 2, 2019—the day the Petition 3 Although Greene and Hardwick concerned affirmative false statements rather than omissions (as is alleged here), we have consistently held that judicial deception may occur through deliberate omission or affirmative misrepresentation. See Greene, 588 F.3d at 1035; KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). 16 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI was filed—Kaulukukui (and the other defendants) “worked together at every step with Defendant Keahiolalo to assist with and prepare documents that deliberately misled the Family Court.” (emphasis added). In order to “circumvent” the Custody Order and “deliberately misle[ad] the Family Court,” Kaulukukui necessarily must have known of the Custody Order and intentionally decided not to discuss it in the Petition or bring it to the family court’s attention. 4 Accordingly, based on these allegations, we conclude that the FAC plausibly alleges that Kaulukukui deliberately made a “misrepresentation or omission” to a court of law. 5 Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1147. 4 Notably, in her opening brief, Kaulukukui acknowledged that “the [C]omplaint essentially alleges that . . . [she] conspired at every step to circumvent the terms of the [Custody Order] . . . by intentionally omitting reference in the TRO application to the [Custody Order], in order to deliberately mislead the family court into issuing a TRO, and using the TRO to pry B.D. from Ms. David’s custody.” Op. Br. at 14–15 (emphasis added). Although she pointed out in a footnote that the district court held that the FAC plausibly alleged that she knew about the Custody Order prior to filing the Petition, or shortly thereafter, she did not challenge the district court’s conclusion on this point until her reply brief. Therefore, in addition to being unpersuasive for the reasons stated above, this argument is likely waived. See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 672 F.3d 1160, 1166 n.8 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 5 Our caselaw also clearly establishes that judicial deception may occur when an omission or misrepresentation of material information is made “recklessly.” Greene, 588 F.3d at 1035. However, because the FAC alleges that Kaulukukui’s omission of the Custody Order from the Petition was deliberate, we need not address whether it was reckless. DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI 17 Additionally, David alleges that “had the presiding judge in the Family Court been informed of the [Custody Order], Defendant Keahiolalo’s application for a temporary restraining order would not have been granted as to B.D.” In other words, she claims that but-for Kaulukukui’s misrepresentation or omission, David would not have been deprived of custody over B.D., meaning that the omission was material. See Greene, 588 F.3d at 1035. Thus, we conclude that David has successfully stated a claim for violation of her and B.D.’s right to familial association based on judicial deception. In arguing otherwise, Kaulukukui contends that the altercation between David and Keahiolalo made it reasonable for her to believe that she could assist Keahiolalo in filing the Petition on B.D.’s behalf given the plain language of the Hawaii Domestic Violence Protective Orders statute and the “Compelling Emergency” provision of the Custody Order. Moreover, she asserts that no statute or caselaw affirmatively required her to address the Custody Order in the Petition. Thus, she argues that it was not clear to a reasonable official in her position that assisting a noncustodial parent in obtaining a protective order without informing the family court of the Custody Order was unlawful. Kaulukukui’s arguments fail for two reasons. First, regardless of Hawaii’s generally applicable Protective Orders statute, the Custody Order that defined David’s and Keahiolalo’s parental rights deprived Keahiolalo of the ability to seek judicial relief related to B.D. absent a “compelling emergency that affects [her] health or safety.” There is no indication that Kaulukukui was led to believe there were any circumstances presenting an emergent risk to B.D. Additionally, as the district court noted, Kaulukukui's 18 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI reliance on the Compelling Emergency provision necessarily admits that she knew when she filed the Petition that (1) David had sole custody of B.D., (2) Keahiolalo lacked any custody or visitation rights, and (3) Keahiolalo was generally prohibited from seeking relief on B.D.’s behalf. Nevertheless, Kaulukukui deliberately chose not to inform the family court of the Custody Order’s terms. Second, regardless of whether there is specific authority requiring that a custody order be included in a petition for a protective order, the FAC alleges more than just that Kaulukukui prepared and filed the Petition on Keahiolalo’s behalf; it alleges that Kaulukukui knowingly and deliberately omitted material custody information from the Petition to mislead the family court into issuing the TRO that allowed Defendants to deprive David of custody. While Kaulukukui’s arguments focus on whether a reasonable official could believe that the terms of a custody order are not affirmatively required to be included in a petition for a protective order, they do not address whether an official may reasonably believe she can deliberately conceal material custody information from a court for the purpose of depriving a custodial parent of her child. We conclude that any reasonable official would understand that the latter behavior—if proven—violates the law. As such, it is “hardly conduct for which qualified immunity is either justified or appropriate.” See Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1119.