Opinion ID: 2070705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Continuance Denied Discretion Properly Exercised

Text: Stevenson's next argument relates to the Superior Court's denial of his request for a continuance. On the first day of jury selection, Stevenson personally requested a continuance to enable a private attorney, who was not a member of the Delaware Bar, to enter an appearance and represent Stevenson at trial. Apparently, the attorney had recently been paid a retainer by Stevenson's family. According to Stevenson, a continuance was not sought earlier because his mother had been saving money so that [she] could hire a private attorney to represent him in this case instead of being represented by a public defender. The Superior Court denied Stevenson's motion. In support of his argument that the Superior Court abused its discretion, Stevenson asserts a Fifth Amendment due process violation. Due process demands that a defendant be afforded an opportunity to obtain the assistance of counsel of his choice to prepare and carry out his defense. United States v. Kikumura, 3d Cir., 947 F.2d 72, 78 (1991). Due process is satisfied so long as the accused is afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to obtain particular counsel and there is no arbitrary action prohibiting the effective use of such counsel. Id. Stevenson also asserts a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to select and to be represented by private counsel. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. U.S. Const., amend. VI; United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d at 78. A defendant does not, however, have the absolute right to counsel of his or her choice. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988); United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d at 78; In re Kennedy, Del.Supr., 472 A.2d 1317, 1331 (1984). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: Desirable as it is that a defendant obtain private counsel of his own choice, that goal must be weighed and balanced against an equally desirable public need for the efficient and effective administration of criminal justice. The calendar control of modern criminal court dockets, especially in metropolitan communities, is a sophisticated operation constantly buffeted by conflicting forces. The accused's rights  such as those relating to a speedy trial, to an adequate opportunity to prepare the defense, and to confront witnesses  are constantly in potential or real conflict with the prosecution's legitimate demands for some stability in the scheduling of cases. The availability of prosecution witnesses is often critically dependent on the predictability of the trial list. That delays and postponements only increase the reluctance of witnesses to appear in court, especially in criminal matters, is a phenomenon which scarcely needs elucidation. United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 3d Cir., 409 F.2d 1210, 1214 (1969). In deciding if a continuance should be granted, in addition to considering the efficient administration of criminal justice, the State's position, and the rights of the moving defendant, the trial judge must also consider the rights of co-defendants who may be prejudiced by a continuance. United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d at 78. To permit a continuance to accommodate one defendant may in itself prejudice the rights of another defendant whose trial is delayed because of the continuance. Carey, 409 F.2d at 1214. In determining whether to grant a criminal defendant's motion for a continuance on the eve of trial, for the express purpose of obtaining new counsel, the Superior Court must consider all the circumstances present in the individual case at the time the request is denied. Riley v. State, Del.Supr., 496 A.2d 997, 1018 n. 27 (1985) (citing Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)). The United States Supreme Court has stated: The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel. Contrariwise, a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. at 589-90, 84 S.Ct. at 849-50 (citations omitted). The denial of a continuance for change of counsel on the eve of trial is not an abuse of discretion when: (1) there had been no previous complaint about counsel; (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to obtain substitute counsel; and (3) obtaining substitute counsel was uncertain and appeared to be a dilatory tactic. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1018. [16] The record reflects that there had been no complaint made about either of Stevenson's attorneys. Stevenson knew since January 22, 1996, the date of the Superior Court's scheduling order, that the jury selection would begin October 21, 1996 and the trial would begin October 28, 1996. Stevenson had approximately nine months in which to obtain private counsel. Stevenson waited until jury selection started to present a motion to replace his attorneys. Furthermore, in this case, Stevenson's co-defendant, Michael Manley, opposed Stevenson's application for a continuance. Under the circumstances of this case, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the defendant's request for a continuance. The timing of Stevenson's motion, on the first day of jury selection, prompted the Superior Court to state that the application just comes too late under the circumstances of this particular case. The record supports that conclusion. There was no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court's denial of Stevenson's motion for a continuance. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997.