Opinion ID: 1752743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Causation: sufficiency of the evidence.

Text: Before considering the sufficiency of the evidence of causation in this case, we must address defendant's contention that this court should adopt a strict scrutiny standard in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal bench trial. A similar proposal was made by a defendant and rejected by this court in State v. Hall, 287 N.W.2d 564, 564-65 (Iowa 1980). In that case, this court held to the rule that in court-tried criminal cases, findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, have the same effect as a special jury verdict. Id. at 565. Defendant has shown no good reason why we should depart from this substantial evidence standard of review in bench trial cases. Accordingly, we will apply the usual rules for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, namely, that the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State; that all of the evidence must be considered, and not just that which supports the verdict; that the verdict must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence; and that substantial evidence means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 338-40 (Iowa 1980).
With the foregoing principles in mind, we review the evidence in this case. Testifying for the State were three witnesses who were driving in the vicinity on the morning of the accident, and two police department accident reconstruction experts who had been called to the scene. Defendant's only witness was a private investigator who, as a former police officer, also had accident reconstruction training and experience. In addition, the trial judge viewed the scene of the drag race and accident under the stipulation of both parties that anything he observed could be evidence in either the State's or defendant's case. On Saturday morning, April 5, 1980, a green car driven by Sulgrove was observed moving at a high rate of speed off the exit ramp of the MacVicar Freeway onto Southeast Fourteenth Street, a multi-lane city street. In making his exit, Sulgrove hit a curb, fishtailed, and then entered the southbound traffic on Southeast Fourteenth. Traffic was fairly heavy at this point, and Sulgrove moved from one southbound lane to another trying unsuccessfully to pass cars and get ahead. Farther down the street, which had narrowed to two northbound and two southbound lanes, Sulgrove's car was seen traveling at a fairly high rate of speed; it came up behind a red car driven by defendant, an acquaintance of Sulgrove's, just past the Gratis Street intersection. Defendant, traveling at an estimated speed of 40-47 m.p.h., had been in the left southbound lane until just before Sulgrove came up behind him; at that time, defendant pulled his car into the right southbound lane alongside a car in the left lane, thereby preventing Sulgrove from passing. Defendant's maneuver forced Sulgrove to brake suddenly, and Sulgrove's car again fishtailed. After getting past the vehicle which blocked the left lane, the red and green vehicles were observed engaging in what a witness described as a cat-and-mouse game: Defendant's red car, traveling generally in the right lane just ahead of Sulgrove's green car, repeatedly blocked Sulgrove's attempts to pass by moving partially into the left lane and then back to the right again when Sulgrove would change lanes. Starting at the Pioneer Street intersection, where the speed limit is 40 m.p.h., a witness who had some experience in drag racing under controlled conditions saw the two cars traveling head to head at an estimated speed of 70-75 m.p.h., with defendant in the right lane and Sulgrove in the left. The witness testified that when the two cars came upon a gold car in the left lane near the Lacona Street intersection, neither driver was willing to give up the [competitive] edge in order to negotiate the gold car until at the very last second, when Sulgrove braked, swerved into the right lane behind defendant, bounced off a curb, and passed the gold car. Sulgrove then got back into the left lane and the two cars continued southward at a high rate of speed. Because the two vehicles were traveling as a pair in a competitive manner, the witness concluded they were drag racing. Beyond the Lacona intersection, Southeast Fourteenth slopes upward and crests twice, the first crest being between Creston and King streets and the second crest being 1126 feet beyond the first. A witness named Jamison who was traveling behind the red and green vehicles testified that he watched both vehicles continue to speed and participate in cat-and-mouse activity up to the top of the second crest, where they dropped out of his sight. Just beyond the second crest, a pickup truck was traveling in the left southbound lane at a normal speed. The pickup driver testified that Sulgrove's car came around her truck at a high rate of speed in the right lane, lost control and skidded across the left lane in front of her. Sulgrove then crossed over the median and struck the northbound Ellis vehicle at a point 263 feet beyond the second crest. The pickup driver did not recall seeing defendant's red car. [2] When the police arrived, they found 84 feet of skid marks left by Sulgrove's vehicle. [3] It was determined from physical evidence that Sulgrove had been going about 80 m.p.h. just before he went into the skid. Defendant was present at the accident site, and his car was parked in the lot of Godfather's Pizza, which is located on the west side of the street. The southernmost driveway to this lot is 351 feet beyond the second crest. There were no skid marks left by defendant's car anywhere in the vicinity. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the foregoing evidence under both perspectives of causation, factual and legal. See State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 584-85 (Iowa 1980). Factual causation is determined under the sine qua non test: but for the defendant's conduct, the harm or damage would not have occurred. Id. at 585. Defendant argues that because Sulgrove was driving fast and recklessly even before defendant entered the picture, the accident would have occurred even without defendant's participation in the drag race. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, however, we find there was substantial evidence from which trial court could conclude that Sulgrove's speed and recklessness both increased once he entered the heat of competition with defendant, [4] and that the accident would not have occurred but for their joint racing. Defendant next asserts that proof of proximate or legal causation was lacking because there was no credible evidence that defendant continued to race beyond the first crest of the hill. Witness Jamison, mentioned earlier, testified unequivocally that he observed the red and green cars go over both crests of the hill. He said: Well, there is two small hills there as you are going up that hill, and I never lost sight of them over the first hill because it is high enough up that I could see them, and the last hill, whichever one it is where they go over the crest was where I saw them last. Jamison was the only witness who claimed to have observed defendant's activity between the first and second crests. Defendant attempted to discredit that testimony by proving that Jamison could not have observed the cars once they passed over the first crest. It was shown that a person sitting in a stationary vehicle at the Lacona intersection can see only the first crest, and that traffic disappears from sight as it goes over that crest. When a person in a moving vehicle comes within 150 feet of the first crest, however, he can see over that crest all the way to the second crest. Thus, adding 150 feet to the distance between the crests, it can be seen that Jamison would have had to be no more than 1276 feet behind the red and green cars in order to watch them go over the second crest. Jamison estimated that he was roughly ¼ to ½ mile (1320 to 2640 feet) behind the two cars when they went over the second crest, but he also disclaimed any ability to estimate distance accurately. Indications that the distance was not great included Jamison's testimony that he saw dust rise over the hill ahead of him when the collision occurred, and that he arrived at the accident site just as defendant was getting out of his car in the Godfather's lot. Even if Jamison did only see the cars go over the first crest, the evidence of proximate causation would not be insufficient. As noted earlier, the distance between the two crests is 1126 feet. Evidence presented at trial concerning the number of feet per second traveled at various speeds indicates to us that it would take less than 10 seconds to go from crest to crest at 80 m.p.h. and less than 13 seconds at 60 m.p.h. There was substantial evidence that defendant and Sulgrove were traveling in the 60-80 m.p.h. range when they topped the first crest. Based on this evidence, trial court could find that it would have been impossible for defendant, in such a short period of time, to effect a timely withdrawal which would have allowed Sulgrove an opportunity to slow down and avoid the accident. As stated in a civil drag-racing case: [R]acing on a highway is hazardous to all other persons upon the highway and... the actor participates at his peril.... One who does participate in setting in motion such hazardous conduct cannot thereafter turn his liability off like a light switch. From the authorities cited we conclude that one who participates in setting such hazardous conduct in motion cannot later be heard to say: Oh! I withdrew before harm resulted even though no one else was aware of my withdrawal. It would be a reasonable probability that the excitement and stimulus created by this race of several miles had not dissipated nor, in fact, terminated at all, in the fraction of a minute in time between the act of passing and the accident. The state of mind of the participants was material. We cannot gauge that state of mind to the point of saying that the stimulus or intent had ended. The evidence warrants a finding that it did continue. It would be for the jury to decide if the racing were the cause of the accident. Lemons v. Kelly, 239 Or. 354, 360, 397 P.2d 784, 787 (1964). Thus, even if defendant had started to slow down between the first and second crests, as his counsel argues he did, trial court could find that any such last-minute effort to withdraw would not break the chain of causation set in motion by the drag race. See also Jones v. Northwestern Auto Supply, 93 Mont. 224, 229-31, 18 P.2d 305, 306-07 (1932). For the same reason, trial court could find that the lack of skid marks from defendant's car into the Godfather's parking lot failed to create a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. A defense expert testified that it would have been impossible for defendant to turn into that lot without leaving skid marks if he, like Sulgrove, was traveling 80 m.p.h. as he came over the second crest. From what we have said in the preceding paragraph, however, it was not necessary for the State to prove that defendant was going 80 m.p.h. when he topped that hill. One of the accident reconstruction experts who testified for the State theorized that defendant and Sulgrove continued to race almost side-by-side until they neared the second crest and saw the pickup truck ahead blocking Sulgrove's path, at which point defendant slowed down to allow Sulgrove into the right lane. This theory would explain why the pickup driver did not notice defendant's car, and would also be one explanation for the lack of skid marks from defendant's car. [5] We have examined defendant's remaining complaints concerning asserted flaws in the State's case and in trial court's findings. We conclude that the few flaws or errors which do exist are nonprejudicial and that the remainder of defendant's assertions are without merit. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that the record contains substantial evidence that defendant's participation in a drag race with Sulgrove was a concurring proximate cause of the accident in which Sulgrove and Faith Ellis were killed. We therefore affirm defendant's convictions.