Opinion ID: 1795741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Parental Contact and Supervision

Text: First, Henyard argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting four witnesses to show Henyard suffered from a lack of parental contact and supervision. Initially, we would note that this specific claim was not made in Henyard's postconviction motion, and therefore it is procedurally barred. However, even if we were to address the merits, we would conclude that Henyard has not demonstrated a basis for relief. These four witnesses testified at the evidentiary hearing and, in general, their testimony demonstrated that Henyard had a difficult childhood. It was not clear from the evidentiary hearing whether the names of each of these individuals was given to Henyard's defense counsel. Although there was some dispute over trial counsel's attempts to contact one of the witnesses, all four testified that no one from Henyard's defense team had talked to them at the time of Henyard's trial. Nevertheless, even if we were to assume that Henyard's attorneys performed deficiently by failing to track down these four witnesses and present their testimony at the penalty phase, pursuant to the second prong of the Strickland test, Henyard did not suffer any prejudice because the testimony of the four witnesses was substantially similar to and cumulative with testimony that was actually presented during the penalty phase. [8] See Gudinas v. State, 816 So.2d 1095, 1106 (Fla.2002) (finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence in mitigation that was cumulative to evidence already presented in mitigation). The various witnesses at both proceedings testified to the fact that Henyard had a difficult childhood, often living in multiple households because his mother was not an adequate caregiver. Thus, even assuming that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to locate the additional witnesses that could have provided additional confirmation to the testimony that was presented at the penalty phase, Henyard has failed to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland, and hence is not entitled to relief on this subclaim. See, e.g., Sweet v. State, 810 So.2d 854, 863-64 (Fla.2002) (noting that the Court did not need to reach the issue of whether trial counsel was deficient in failing to have additional penalty phase witnesses testify, because the testimony of the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing did not establish prejudice where the majority of the testimony was cumulative with other witnesses' trial testimony).