Opinion ID: 1983434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appellant's Right of Confrontation, Cross-Examination, or Impeachment of Witnesses.

Text: As his second argument on appeal, appellant claims that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution with respect to rulings it made concerning his proposed cross-examination of Donneitha Bradford. He also appears to argue under this point that the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights a second time by improperly limiting his presentation of evidence that he claims would have further impeached Larry Black. Before Bradford testified, the prosecution moved in limine to prevent appellant from asking her what sentence she received for pleading guilty to the first-degree murder of Lester Frazier on the ground that her sentence was irrelevant. Appellant responded that he should be able to impeach her and attack her credibility by exploring why she would plead guilty and accept a forty-year sentence for a murder that she claimed she did not commit. The prosecution, in turn, argued that, if appellant did ask such questions, then the State should be allowed, on redirect, to ask Bradford about having been found guilty by a jury of Frazier's capital murder, a conviction that was reversed and remanded. After further discussion, the trial court stated that appellant [c]ertainly and [o]bviously could ask Bradford why she pled guilty to a crime that she claimed she did not commit. It also ruled that it would not prohibit questions about her sentence, but that if appellant asked questions about her sentence, then the prosecution would be entitled, on redirect, to ask her whether she accepted such a sentence to avoid receiving a harsher sentence, such as she had received after her jury trial. Appellant responded that, although the court's ruling allowed him to ask what he wanted, it put him in an unfair position[.] During his cross-examination of Bradford, appellant asked her whether she pled guilty to first-degree murder. He did not, however, ask her why she pled guilty to a crime she maintained that she did not commit or what sentence she received. The prosecution did not conduct a redirect examination of Bradford. On appeal, appellant claims that the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine Bradford by ruling that, if he asked her about her sentence on cross-examination, then the prosecution could, on redirect, ask her about having been convicted of the capital murder of Frazier. This argument is without merit. The trial court did not in any way restrict appellant's cross-examination of Bradford. It ruled, rather, that he could ask her all of the questions he proposed, including why she would plead guilty to a crime she claimed that she never committed or accept a forty-year sentence. Appellant never asked Bradford the former question, even though the trial court ruled that his asking it would not open the door to any questions by the prosecution. His failure to do so was his own strategic decision and did not stem from any alleged error by the trial court. While the trial court's ruling concerning the cross-examination of Bradford about her sentence no doubt left appellant with a tough decision to make, the court in no way restricted his cross-examination, much less in violation of the Confrontation Clause. In the case of Watson v. State, 318 Ark. 603, 887 S.W.2d 518 (1994), this Court assumed, without deciding, that barring a defendant from asking his codefendant what sentence she received after pleading guilty violated the Confrontation Clause. The instant case, however, does not present the question left undecided in Watson because the trial court here did not prohibit appellant from asking Bradford about her sentence. Appellant is effectively asking this Court to conclude that the Confrontation Clause protects criminal defendants from having to make strategic decisions about the extent of their cross-examination and bars the prosecution from exploring issues raised on cross-examination during redirect. That, however, is contrary to existing authority. See, e.g., United States v. Strothers, 77 F.3d 1389 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 956, 117 S.Ct. 374, 136 L.Ed.2d 263 (1996)(holding that district court's ruling that, if appellants asked about subject on cross-examination, then government could elicit related information on redirect, did not violate Confrontation Clause because appellants' failure to ask about subject was strategic choice and not limitation on cross-examination); see also generally Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985)(explaining that Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish[])(emphasis in original). Appellant's claim with respect to his proposed impeachment of Larry Black similarly lacks merit. Three weeks before he was murdered, Lester Frazier reported to police that a camcorder had been taken during a burglary of his home. During appellant's cross-examination of Larry Black, he asked Black whether he had ever received a camcorder from Frankie Milton after Lester Frazier's murder or whether Milton owed him any money around the time of the murder. Black testified that he could not recall receiving a camcorder from Milton, but he denied that Milton owed him money at the time. Appellant called Milton as a witness. Although Milton testified about various matters, the trial court excluded, as collateral, his proffered testimony that, just before Lester Frazier's murder, he gave Black a camcorder, allegedly Frazier's, as payment for a debt and that Black, in turn, gave him a rock of crack cocaine. Appellant's only argument for admission of the evidence was that its purpose was to impeach the testimony of Larry Black. On appeal, appellant claims that the trial court committed reversible error by barring his proposed questioning of Milton because the line of inquiry was not collateral. Appellant's argument, however, is not preserved for appellate review because he never challenged below the trial court's assertion that the proposed questioning of Milton was collateral. See, e.g., Hubbard v. State, 328 Ark. 658, 946 S.W.2d 663 (1997). For all of the above reasons, we find no error in the trial court's rulings with regard to appellant's right to confront witnesses.