Opinion ID: 1670672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: contentions of the defendant-appellant

Text: The defendant contends that the appropriate procedure upon remand to the trial court is a new trial upon the issues of guilt, whereupon the jury could be instructed as to the appropriate Range II possible penalties; rather than simply have a new sentencing hearing to set Range II sentences. It is the position of the defendant that knowing the applicable possible punishments is an appropriate and necessary matter of information for the jury to have and consider on the issue of guilt, where a motion has been made by the defendant under the provisions of T.C.A. Section 40-35-201(b) asking the court to instruct the jury on the possible punishment for all offenses charged in the indictments and all lesser included offenses. The defendant submits that the erroneous failure of the trial judge to charge the jury correctly as to the possible punishments involves the deprivation of a substantial statutory right that probably affected the jury's judgment. Defendant argues that had the jury been instructed on the correct sentencing range, since under Article I Section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution they were judges of both the law and the facts, they could have exercised their discretion to convict of a lesser included offense. Since they were misinstructed that the consequences of their verdicts were less severe than they actually are, defendant states that this could have had a dramatic effect on their verdict. Defendant argues that the range of punishment instruction upon motion was specifically retained by our Legislature in spite of the fact that jurors no longer retain the sentencing function, except in limited cases. Defendant cites in support of his position from Raybin, Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 11, Section 30.73, p. 157: The Tennessee requirement of a range of punishment instruction, notwithstanding that the jury no longer retains the sentencing function, is contrary to most jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the instruction reflects the reality that jurors will consider punishment anyway and without direction may speculate to the possible detriment of a defendant. If nothing else, the instruction impresses upon the jurors the consequences of a guilty verdict. The defendant states that the erroneous instructions violated his right to a correctly charged jury and impaired his constitutional right to trial by jury. And he notes that had the jury exercised its discretion and found guilt of a lesser included offense because it deemed the punishment appropriate, this has historically been sanctioned by our appellate courts even where there was no evidence to establish the technical elements of the lesser offense found if the evidence supported conviction of a higher crime, per such cases as State v. Davis, 751 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988), and the cases cited therein. The defendant asserts that the erroneous jury instructions violated the defendant's due process right to a fair trial by a fair tribunal and his right to trial by jury. He submits that a basic requirement of due process is a fair trial in a fair tribunal, citing Hearn v. Pleasure, 624 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tenn. App. 1981). He argues that a jury that is affirmatively misinformed as to the correct sentence range cannot satisfy the constitutional right to trial by jury and the due process requirements of a fair tribunal, that due process and fundamental fairness should prevent this fundamental error from being described as harmless. Defendant cites Rule 36(b), Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides for relief from error that would result in prejudice to the judicial process. Defendant argues that this error is clearly prejudicial to the judicial process, so cannot be said to be harmless.