Opinion ID: 3194674
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Nurse April Williams

Text: For similar reasons, the district court properly decided that factual issues precluded the grant of qualified immunity to Nurse Williams. She contends that she did not see or hear “loud talking,” “fighting,” or anything out of the ordinary when she was making her rounds, and therefore could not have been aware of any substantial risk of harm to Horvath. But Richko presented testimony from three inmates stating the opposite: (1) that there were five or six thumps coming from Horvath’s cell during the time that Williams was in the ward; (2) that Williams stepped around water that was overflowing from Horvath’s cell into the ward; (3) that there was banging coming from Horvath’s cell and an individual repeatedly yelling “Let me out. Let me out”; and (4) that Gillespie verbally threatened to kill an inmate who called out to Horvath. Faced with this competing circumstantial evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Williams did in fact hear Gillespie’s assault on Horvath and elected not to respond. See Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that circumstantial evidence is important in a deliberate-indifference analysis because “government officials do not No. 15-1524 Richko v. Wayne Cty. et al. Page 16 readily admit” culpability). The district court therefore properly denied Williams’s motion for summary judgment based on her claim of qualified immunity. D. This court does not have interlocutory jurisdiction over Wayne County’s appeal We finally turn to Richko’s claim against Wayne County as a municipal defendant. The district court determined that there remained “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Wayne County had a policy that constituted indifference to inmate safety.” Richko v. Wayne Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, No. 12-CV-11232, 2015 WL 1498162, at  (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015). In particular, it found that Wayne County’s “de facto policy of not requiring a review” of an individual’s mental-health records during a MSE, coupled with the placement of that individual inside a cell with another inmate without further investigation, “may be considered a reckless disregard of the risk of harm to the other inmate, which is sufficient to satisfy the deliberate indifference standard.” Id. Wayne County argues that the district court erred in denying the County’s motion for summary judgment because the individual defendants did not violate Horvath’s constitutional rights. In other words, Wayne County contends that, because the individual defendants are not liable, it cannot be held liable. The County’s argument is not only unsound, see Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 365 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that “a municipality may not escape liability for a § 1983 violation merely because the officer who committed the violation is entitled to qualified immunity”), but is irrelevant in light of our conclusion that the liability of the individual defendants is an issue for the jury. “A [municipality] is not entitled to claim qualified immunity, and thus may not normally appeal the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to it.” Meals v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 493 F.3d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Under the collateral-order doctrine, “only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the underlying merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment” may be appealed immediately. Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). Wayne County’s interlocutory appeal fails Cohen’s third requirement. Whether its policy of not requiring the No. 15-1524 Richko v. Wayne Cty. et al. Page 17 review of mental-health records in the MH-WIN database amounts to deliberate indifference is an issue that is reviewable on appeal after the district court renders a final judgment. See id. at 43 (“An erroneous ruling on liability may be reviewed effectively on appeal from final judgment.”). Pendent appellate jurisdiction over Wayne County’s appeal is likewise inappropriate. A court may exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over only those decisions that are “inextricably intertwined with” or “necessary to ensure meaningful review of” qualified-immunity claims. Id. at 51 (noting that pendent jurisdiction is proper “[o]nly where essential to the resolution of properly appealed collateral orders” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Brennan v. Twp. of Northville, 78 F.3d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1996) (defining “inextricably intertwined” as “coterminous with, or subsumed in, the claim before the court on interlocutory appeal” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Richko’s claims against Stinson and Williams are plainly independent of and in no way implicate Wayne County’s mental-health screening policy. And although it may overlap, the resolution of Richko’s municipal-liability claim against Wayne County is not “essential to” the question of Cameron’s immunity from suit because Richko’s claim against Cameron is based on far more than Cameron’s review of Gillespie’s mental-health records. See Swint, 514 U.S. at 51. The “far more” consists of proof that Cameron was aware of a host of other factors indicating that Gillespie posed a substantial risk of serious harm to a fellow inmate. These factors included Gillespie’s self-report of having bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, his statements that he had been hospitalized six times and that he had not taken his medication in six days, and—perhaps most glaringly—the fact that he had been arrested for attempted assault with a dangerous weapon just a day earlier. Because Cameron’s appeal on the basis of qualified immunity is not coterminous with the issue of Wayne County’s municipal liability, we lack pendent jurisdiction over the County. Our conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s holding in Swint. There, the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s exercise of pendent jurisdiction, which was based on the theory of judicial economy, over a county commission’s appeal from the denial of summary judgment. 514 U.S. at 45. The Court held that the question of the county commission’s liability was not No. 15-1524 Richko v. Wayne Cty. et al. Page 18 “inextricably intertwined” with the individual defendants’ immunity from suit because the claim against the commission focused on whether one of the individual defendants qualified as a county policymaker, whereas the individual defendants’ claims were based on whether they had violated clearly established law. Id. at 51. Here, Wayne County’s potential liability is based on its alleged de facto policy of not reviewing an inmate’s mental-health records in the MH-WIN system. This issue is not inextricably intertwined with the decision to deny summary judgment to Cameron based on qualified immunity, and a review of the former issue is not necessary to ensure a meaningful review of the latter. We therefore decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Wayne County’s interlocutory appeal.