Opinion ID: 754797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Chew's Claim for Qualified Immunity

Text: 19 We review the denial of qualified immunity de novo. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir.1993). When a law enforcement officer asserts qualified immunity from liability for Fourth Amendment violations, the district court must determine whether, in light of clearly established principles governing the conduct in question, the officer objectively could have believed that his conduct was lawful. Id. (internal citations omitted). Under Johnson, our review is limited to whether Officer Chew's conduct could have violated clearly established law. 515 U.S. at 317, 115 S.Ct. 2151. 20 Although the use of excessive force in effecting an arrest is a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment, Watkins' legal right cannot be so general as to allow him to convert the rule of qualified immunity ... into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). 21 Watkins argues that at the time of the incident the law governing the use of excessive force was clearly established. Officer Chew would confine the issue more narrowly to whether there was clearly established law at the time of the incident that the use of bite and hold by police dogs constituted excessive force. Following our prior decision in Chew, we agree with appellants that Oakland's bite and hold policy did not violate clearly established law concerning the use of excessive force at the time of the incident. See 27 F.3d at 1447 (Because of the current widespread acceptance of the practice of using police dogs to make arrests, and the absence of any contrary authority, we conclude that at the time of Volker's assault there was not clearly established law prohibiting the use of dogs in the manner permitted by the Los Angeles Police Department's policy.). Although Chew was based on the law as it existed in September of 1988, there had been no change in the law that would have alerted Officer Chew that his use of a police dog to search and bite was unconstitutional. 1 22 However, Watkins makes a different claim of excessive force than that described by Officer Chew. He argues that the duration and extent of force applied in effecting arrest after the officers caught up with Nero amounted to an unconstitutional application of force. See Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir.1994). In Mendoza, we explained: 23 We do not believe that a more particularized expression of the law is necessary for law enforcement officials using police dogs to understand that under some circumstances the use of such a weapon might become unlawful. For example, no particularized case law is necessary for a deputy to know that excessive force has been used when a deputy sics a canine on a handcuffed arrestee who has fully surrendered and is completely under control.... 24 We therefore hold that the deputies' use of the police dog is subject to excessive force analysis, and that this law is clearly established for purposes of determining whether the officers have qualified immunity. 25 Id. at 1362. We agree that it was clearly established that excessive duration of the bite and improper encouragement of a continuation of the attack by officers could constitute excessive force that would be a constitutional violation. Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Officer Chew on summary judgment. 26