Opinion ID: 431127
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Disability Benefits

Text: 8 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 423(d)(1) (West 1983) provides that individuals with disabilities may be entitled to monthly disability insurance benefits. The term disability is defined as follows: 9 Inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for continuous periods of not less than 12 months.... 10 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 423(d)(1)(A) (West 1983). 5 In filing a claim for benefits, a claimant has the burden of proving disability, Crosby v. Schweiker, 650 F.2d 777, 778 (5th Cir.1981), 6 and we will not disturb an agency finding of no disability unless the record lacks substantial evidence to support that conclusion, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 405(g) (West 1983); See, e.g., Allen v. Schweiker, 642 F.2d 799, 800 (5th Cir.1981), or the conclusion was derived from faulty legal premises. Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir.1983). 11 In the hearing before the ALJ, there was oral testimony from Vaughn and her sister, Ms. Ernestine Moore. Vaughn testified about her work and discussed her mental problems. Ms. Moore testified at length about Vaughn's mental illness, which manifests itself in hallucinations, moodiness, nervousness, and suspicion. 12 Three affidavits from medical experts were also considered and discussed. Paul Mandeville, a clinical psychologist, diagnosed Vaughn as having borderline intellectual functioning and residual schizophrenia in good remission. He determined that she had the understanding to cope with simple unskilled or familiar work routines, but did stress that the remission of her schizophrenia was due, in part, to the familiarity of her current daily routine. 13 Dr. S. Taylor, who has treated Vaughn on an outpatient basis, confirmed that she was schizophrenic. He had placed her on medication to aid remission and found no particular oddities in her behavior, except for occasional hallucinations. Finally, Martha Smith, a nurse who has treated Vaughn, explained that while the patient can perform simple or repetitive tasks, her mental impairment seriously affects her ability to perform complex tasks, to follow instructions, or to have frequent contact with other people. 7 14 After reviewing this evidence, the ALJ 8 concluded as follows: 15 [The] claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform simple, repetitive, unskilled or familiar work routines. Her past relevant work as a maid in private homes was unskilled and is familiar to her. Therefore, Regulation 404.1520 would require that she be found not disabled. 16 This conclusion states, in essence, that because Vaughn can perform her past work, she cannot be considered disabled. 17 It is undisputed that Vaughn's current job as a maid is not substantial gainful activity. Her work has always been compensated at a level significantly below the earnings level at which work becomes gainful. 9 In ruling that she was not disabled, the Administrative Law Judge inconsistently held that her past insubstantial gainful activity demonstrated her ability to perform substantial gainful activity. Because her past work has not been substantial, it was an error of law to conclude that her performance of it disqualifies her from receipt of disability benefits. 18 Having found that the ALJ incorrectly credited Vaughn's past relevant work as dispositive of the disability issue, we must remand to the Secretary for further proceedings. On remand, the appropriate question is whether, given Vaughn's capacity, age, education and work experience, she is able to do substantial work within the national economy. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520(f)(1) (1983). This substantial work must, of necessity, amount to more than she is currently performing. 10