Opinion ID: 198097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Cross-Examination Errors

Text: 37 Patrick next asserts that his constitutional right to effective cross-examination was infringed by the district court's decision to restrict a certain line of cross-examination on hearsay grounds. At numerous times during the trial, Patrick's counsel questioned witnesses on cross-examination as to whether DeCato had ever told them that he had made $1 million as a result of his investment in the recovery of silver bars from the shipwreck Atocha. The district court consistently sustained the government's objections, finding that the questions called for hearsay. Patrick asserts on appeal, as he did in the district court, that he was not attempting to establish the truth of the matter asserted--that DeCato's funds came from salvaging efforts--but instead that DeCato had a pattern of misrepresenting to others that his money came from legitimate sources. It would follow, then, that DeCato would have used a similar line on the Cunans. Thus, Patrick urges, restriction of this line of cross-examination so infringed Cunan's rights to present a defense that a new trial is warranted. 38 Patrick's argument is based on United States v. Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d 983 (1st Cir.1997), where we reversed a conviction and remanded for a new trial on the basis of the district court's refusal to permit certain cross-examination, id. at 993. We reiterated that [t]he Sixth Amendment, and thus the constitutional minimum that must be allowed a criminal defendant before a trial court's discretion to limit cross-examination adheres, includes the ability to develop and present a defense. Id. at 992. Crucial to our decision was the fact that in Mulinelli-Navas, the district court's limitation foreclos[ed] the introduction of any testimony to support Mulinelli's theory of defense. Id. (emphasis in original). 39 Patrick's argument turns initially on whether the district court's restriction of cross-examination foreclosed his ability to present this particular defense. We think it did not. The record reveals that there was ample evidence generated by the government's case to support Patrick's theory of defense. Numerous witnesses testified throughout the trial that DeCato represented to them that he was either in the construction business, or an investor in property, or a condominium manager, or a collector of precious metals. We do not think it particularly relevant that this evidence came in during the government's direct examination as opposed to the Cunans' cross-examination. It was testimonial evidence which directly supported the defense theory. It provided an evidentiary basis for Patrick to urge the jury to infer that DeCato had similarly misrepresented the source of his income to the Cunans. Mulinelli-Navas is therefore largely inapposite to this case. 40 Because there was sufficient evidence before the jury from which to present this defense, the trial court's discretion to limit cross-examination adhere[d]. Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d at 992. The district court ruled that if Patrick wanted to introduce evidence suggesting that DeCato had made a considerable amount of money due to his involvement with the Atocha, he had to do so with competent evidence, not hearsay. Similarly, the trial court ruled that if the Cunans wanted to introduce evidence as to what DeCato had told others about the Atocha in order to prove that the Cunans thought they were dealing with treasure ship money rather than drug money, they would first have to show some communication about the Atocha treasure from DeCato to the Cunans. The court was clear that it would be receptive to such evidence. We detect no abuse of discretion in the restriction of cross-examination. 41 In a related vein, Patrick asks us to note that the district court somehow failed to assist Patrick in compelling the appearance of Mel Fisher, the head of the Atocha salvage operation. At the end of the fifteenth day of trial, the Cunans' attorney asked the district court what the procedure would be for compelling the appearance of Fisher. The district court responded that it would first have to determine whether it had the power to order Fisher to appear, before holding a hearing on whether to exercise that power. Patrick takes issue with the district court's comment, I rather doubt that I have the power to order someone who is a resident in Florida [to] present themselves in Massachusetts. The next day, however, the Cunans' counsel stated that we will not be getting into the Atocha. Accordingly, no hearing was ever held, and there was no request that Fisher be compelled to appear.