Opinion ID: 172400
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impartial Process

Text: Riggins also contends the defendants violated his constitutional right to a fair tribunal because the City's decisionmakers were biased. He contends the City's investigatory and adjudicative functions were combined in the same personnel; he emphasizes that the same individuals approved the initial decision to terminate him and then presided over the hearings contesting the decision. He argues they had already made up their minds that he should be terminated prior to presiding over the hearings. [7] Impartiality of the tribunal is an essential element of due process. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). We have held, though, that a substantial showing of personal bias is required to disqualify a hearing officer or tribunal.... Corstvet v. Boger, 757 F.2d 223, 229 (10th Cir.1985). Indeed, a person claiming bias on the part of an administrative tribunal must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456. Due process is violated only when `the risk of unfairness is intolerably high' ... there must be some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with respect to factual issues being adjudicated. Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 746-47 (10th Cir.1991); see also Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1220 (10th Cir.2004). The role of city employees in the process with some knowledge of the matter does not ordinarily create concern. Mere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an agency in the performance of its statutory role does not ... disqualify a decisionmaker and demonstrate actual bias. Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 493, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir.1986). Moreover, an administrative tribunal member is not disqualified because that member has ruled strongly against a party in a prior hearing or because he or she may have participated in the initiation of the proceedings. Hicks, 942 F.2d at 750-51. In many small public agencies human resource personnel wear multiple hats. Thus, the contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a ... difficult burden of persuasion to carry. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456. The fact that [an agency] had entertained ... views as the result of its prior ex parte investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of its members were irrevocably closed on the subject.... Id. at 48, 56-58, 95 S.Ct. 1456 (citation omitted). Thus, our case law generally rejects the idea that a combination of adjudicatory and investigatory functions is a denial of due process. Id. at 51, 56-58, 95 S.Ct. 1456; see also Hicks, 942 F.2d at 748. Otherwise, almost anytime an employee in a small bureaucracywhere everyone knows everyone elseclashes with his superiors, the body elected to make disciplinary decisions will be constitutionally disqualified from doing so. This contravenes the Supreme Court's clear desire to leave such decisions in the hands of the bodies duly elected to make them. Hicks, 942 F.2d at 748 (citations omitted). We also will not indulge a presumption against a public employer merely because of his ultimate personnel decision. See id. Personal bias may be shown by prior statements going to the merits or animus that establish the decisionmaker cannot be fair. In McClure v. Independent School District Number 16, 228 F.3d 1205, 1215-16 (10th Cir.2000), for example, bias was established where decisionmakers publicly stated their intent to terminate [] McClure's employment prior to the hearing at which the matter of her termination was to be decided. And in Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908, 914 (10th Cir. 1977), bias was shown when three of five school board members made statements prior to the hearing that the superintendent should be fired. We emphasized the firm public statements before the hearing by a defendant who publicized his pledge to seek a new administration and to change the superintendent, and who advertized that two other defendants had publicly said that no progress could be made without a new superintendent. Id. In those circumstances, statements on the merits by those who must make factual determinations on contested fact issues of alleged incompetence and willful neglect of duty, where the fact finding is critical ... left no room for a determination that there was a decision by a fair tribunal, with the appearance of fairness. Id. at 914-15. Neither situation applies here. Riggins's evidence includes only his and his attorney's affidavits, with their statements of belief that the defendants were biased. [8] Riggins also refers to Goodman's initial decision to terminate Riggins, his request for approval to terminate Riggins, the Human Resources Director's and City Manager's approval of Goodman's recommendation, and an email the Human Resources Manager sent to Goodman with a draft letter attached. We see none of these allegations alone or together as creating an inference of bias to overcome qualified immunity. First, Riggins's and his attorney's affidavits contain only conclusory allegations of bias. A complaint that contains conclusory allegations of bias, without alleging factual support, however, is insufficient to establish a due process violation. Tonkovich, 159 F.3d at 520. Beyond conclusory allegations, Riggins's claim relies on the fact that the same individuals made or approved the initial recommendation to terminate him and then presided over the hearings. But under our cases, that alone is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. As we have explained, it is typical, especially in smaller jurisdictions, to combine investigatory and adjudicatory processes in one body. [I]nvolvement of tribunal members in earlier proceedings in the same case does not overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity. Hicks, 942 F.2d at 748; see also Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46-52, 95 S.Ct. 1456. And `exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness' of a later adversary hearing. Mangels, 789 F.2d at 838 (citation omitted). Nor does procedural due process require access to professional hearing officers or hearing officers not employed by the governmental body or agency taking the adverse action. Tonkovich, 159 F.3d at 519-20. Our cases, moreover, do not require a process where reviewing personnel are completely divorced from or blinded to the underlying nature of the reasons for dismissal. In both Staton, 552 F.2d at 914, and McClure, 228 F.3d at 1216, the decisionmaker made statements going to the merits of the matter or which demonstrated animus before the due process hearing. Riggins's allegations here, however, do not demonstrate any personal animus or bias with respect to the factual matters to be determined in the appeals process. Cf. McClure, 228 F.3d. at 1216 ([I]n Hicks [we] reiterated our holding that public statements by a decisionmaker prior to a termination hearing that demonstrate actual bias with respect to the factual matters to be adjudicated, raise a genuine issue of fact on a claim that a plaintiff was deprived of the right to an impartial tribunal. (citing Hicks, 942 F.2d at 746-48)). In contrast, neither the Police Chief, the Human Resources Manager, nor the City Manager made statements demonstrating bias prior to the initial investigation or during the three-step process. Rather, the record shows to the contrary. Goodman followed City personnel policies by undertaking an extensive evaluation of Riggins's continued employment as a police officer, formulating a preliminary recommendation to terminate Riggins, and seeking the appropriate approvals necessary to implement his recommendation. Goodman then notified Riggins that he had initially decided to terminate him, but also that Riggins had an opportunity to convince him otherwise at a meeting before any decision would become final and before the proposed termination would go into effect. To the extent Riggins complains that Goodman as Police Chief made the initial termination recommendation and then presided over Riggins's first pre-termination hearing, we see no constitutional problem. Riggins's allegations do not establish that Goodman was actually biased. The mere showing that a supervisor initially recommended a dismissal and then met with the employee prior to that employee's termination is ordinarily insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See West, 967 F.2d at 368 (finding that a meeting with the supervisor, who ultimately terminated the employee, provided sufficient notice and opportunity to respond to satisfy the pretermination due process requirements); see also Seibert, 867 F.2d at 598-99 (finding that meetings with a foreman concerning plaintiff's insubordination which led to foreman firing plaintiff were sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements). Moreover, Goodman's role was only to conduct an initial pretermination hearing; Simmons and Boyd presided over hearings after the hearing conducted by Goodman. See 2 Isidore Silver, Public Employee Discharge & Discipline § 17.06 (3d ed. 2001) (The supervisor officiating at the [initial pretermination] meeting need not be impartial. Indeed, it is often assumed that the supervisor who best knows the charges (and who perhaps has even brought them) is the most appropriate initial decision-maker.); see, e.g., Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 173-74 (2d Cir.2001) (collecting cases and concluding that a neutral adjudicator is not a necessary component of due process at a pretermination hearing, so long as the plaintiff is afforded a hearing before a neutral adjudicator after termination). And although City policy required the Human Resources Manager and City Manager to initially approve the process going forward, these officials held subsequent proceedings where Riggins contested Goodman's recommendation. Those hearings allowed Riggins to challenge the recommendation and the basis for it, including the opportunity to present evidence and his own testimony. These City officials are entitled to a presumption of integrity, Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, and Riggins does not overcome that. As explained above, exposure to evidence or involvement in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness' of a later adversary hearing. Mangels, 789 F.2d at 838; see also Hortonville, 426 U.S. at 493, 96 S.Ct. 2308; Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46-52, 56-58, 95 S.Ct. 1456; Hicks, 942 F.2d at 748. At no time during these proceedings did Riggins or his counsel ever complain that the City personnel were not impartial. Rather, the record shows these officials had no personal or financial stake in the decision that might create a conflict of interest, and there is nothing in the record to support charges of personal animosity. Hortonville, 426 U.S. at 492, 96 S.Ct. 2308. Under the circumstances, no clearly established law would advise reasonable decisionmakers that the appeals process and their role in it, as alleged here, transgressed clearly established constitutional rights. See Gann, 519 F.3d at 1092; Milligan-Hitt, 523 F.3d at 1233. In conclusion, Riggins's allegations do not establish a constitutional violation or that under clearly established law the City's appeals process and decisionmakers were biased. The defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.