Opinion ID: 1998093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: opinion and order on default

Text: By Order dated November 19, 1991, the Board scheduled a hearing in this appeal to begin on Monday, March 23, 1992, and conclude by April 17, 1992. On Friday, March 20, 1992, at 6:00 p.m., on the eve of trial, the District of Columbia Government (District) filed a motion for continuance of the trial. The reason for the request was that lead counsel had submitted his resignation on that same date, March 20, 1992, and the two other attorneys for the District on the case were not prepared to fill the void created by lead counsel's resignation. The motion requested a three-month continuance. The motion for continuance was raised as a preliminary matter at the hearing on Monday, March 23, 1992. Appellants, A.A. Beiro Construction Co., Inc., and Fidelity and Deposit company of Maryland, opposed the motion. Appellants asserted that: (1) there have already been three or four continuances in this case; (2) the Board indicated in an Order issued on November 22, 1991, that no further continuances would be granted and that the dates set for hearing were final; (3) the default termination taken against them by the District was a drastic action and they wanted their day in court; (4) the two other counsel in the case had been involved for a long period of time and that the Section Chief representing the District at the hearing had been involved in the case longer than the lead counsel who resigned; (5) lead counsel had not really acted as load counsel in the case and never took one deposition; and (6) lead counsel has an obligation to continue his representation and should not be allowed to resign right brief trial. [1] In response, the Section Chief representing the District at the hearing [2] reiterated that the two counsel involved in the case together did not have a command of the entire case, and that the District is entitled to have the attorney that is best prepared to have the attorney that is best prepared to go forward to present its case. The District then cited Harris v. Akindulureni, 342 A.2d 684 (D.C.App.1975), for the proposition that when a Corporation Counsel attorney is unavailable for trial due to uncontrollable circumstances, it would be an abuse of discretion to deny the continuance that the government requests. (Tr., pp.8-10). The Board then denied the request for continuance and recited the litany of requests for delay made by the District, and the delays in the hearing that had been granted by the Board at the request of the District. The Board reasoned: The complaint in this case was filed on July 14, 1989. On October 11, 1990, the Board granted the District's request for a stay and delayed hearings at that time for six months. On January 28, 1991, the Board granted the District's second request for a stay and delayed hearings for four months. On October 11, 1991, the District moved for a stay which was denied. On March 17, 1992, the District moved for a continuance which was denied on March 18, 1992. Finally last Friday, on March 20, 1992, the District moved for a continuance of trial. The basis for this motion is the resignation of lead counsel and the requested delay is for three months. This is not the first request for delay based on the resignation of lead counsel. The Board is not happy with the procedural posture of this case. The Board is not happy with the District's continued requests for extensions, and the Board is not happy with the numerous failings of the District to meet Board deadlines and directives. The Board is sympathetic with the personnel constrains of the Office of the Corporation Counsel. However, that is not a problem that it appears will be resolved in the near term and that alone cannot determine the Board's calendar. The District's motion is denied. After the Board denied the request for continuance, the District's Section Chief announced that she was leaving because the District was not prepared to go forward. (Tr. 12) At that point, Appellants asserted that the Section Chief's withdrawal was an obvious ploy on the District's part because the two attorneys for the District who had been actively involved in the case were not present in the hearing room. (Tr. 13) Appellants then moved for a default ( Id. ). The Board, noting that the District had indicated that it was not prepared to go forward with the hearing, granted Appellants' motion for default and adjourned the hearing. Id. On March 25, 1992, Appellants filed a motion to set a hearing on Quantum for April 13, 1992, and for expedited ruling. In that motion, Appellants request an opportunity to present evidence to establish their damages for the record and assert that if the District wishes to appear and contest the evidence presented, it may do so. Appellants cite as support Firestone v. Harris, 414 A.2d 526, 528 (D.C.App.1980). Appellants continue that if the District declines to appear, the usual practice would be to permit proof of damages ex parte. Id. at 527. This case presents the first instance in the relatively short history of the Board, as constituted pursuant to the District of Columbia Procurement Practices Act of 1985 (PPA), D.C.Code § 1-1189, where the District has been found in default. This is a serious sanction in an important case, and this certainly is not an action that the Board takes lightly. However, the Board believes that the inordinate delay and extreme prejudice to Appellants which would have resulted from granting any further continuances justifies the finding of default. The Board's rules do not specifically set forth procedures concerning default, and so the Board will look to the District of Columbia Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance. [3] Superior Court Rule 55(a) provides that when a party fails to plead or otherwise defend, the Court shall enter the party's default. With regard to judgment by default, it may be entered by the Court where the party entitled to judgment by default applies to the Court therefore. Rule 55(b). The party against whom judgment by default is sought shall be served with written notice of the application for judgmental least 3 days prior to hearing on such application. Rule 55(b). The Court may conduct such hearings as are necessary to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter. Rule 55(b) No judgment by default shall be entered against the District of Columbia unless the claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the Court. Rule 55(e). Our review of case law refusal of continuance rests within the trial court's sound discretion and is generally not subject to reversal, unless abuse of discretion is shown. Klein v. Rappaport, 90 A.2d 834, 835 (D.C.App.1952). The Board did not abuse its discretion in this case and the District's reliance on Harris v. Akindulureni, supra , is misplaced. In that case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found that the fact that the Assistant Corporation Counsel to whom the case had been assigned was unable, because of prior court commitments to appear at trial was, by itself, sufficient to require the granting of a continuance. Further, the Court of Appeals fond that the trial court erred in denying a continuance without an inquiry either into the possibility of rescheduling the case with a minimum of additional delay or of any specific prejudice which appellee might suffer by delay. In that case, the District's case was being tried with one counsel, and only one delay had been requested by the District prior to trial. We find the case before the Board factually distinguishable from Harris v. Akindulureni, supra . In the appeal before the Board, the District has been represented by numerous counsel and has requested numerous delays. The appeal was first docketed on July 14, 1989. On August 16, 1989, Frank E. Barber, Assistant Corporation Counsel, entered an appearance on behalf of the District, On September 28, 1990, the District requested a 30-day stay of proceedings because the District have recently assigned new counsel to the appeal. New counsel was Karen J. Krueger, Assistant Corporation Counsel. The request was granted by Board Order dated October 11, 1990. On December 17, 1990, the District requested a second stay of proceedings because Karen J. Krueger was retiring, and new counsel needed additional time to familiarize herself with the trial. New counsel was Maria Holleran-Riviera, Assistant Corporation Counsel. The District's request was granted by Board Order dated January 28, 1991, wherein the Board stated: This matter is before the Board on the motion of the District of Columbia for an order staying all further proceedings in this appeal, including discovery procedures, until February 19, 1991. The District cites under staffing and inability to employ attorneys as the reasons for its request. Within a span of five months, the District has been represented in this litigation by no less than three counsel; its present motion requests time to identify and employ a fourth. This case been before this board for some 18 months and two different hearing dates have already been set. The first date of November 26, 1990 could not be adhered to due to the resignation of the District's first counsel; and the present hearing date of May 1, 1991 appears unrealistic at this time because of the resignations of the District's two succeeding counsel. The objections raised by appellants are understandable for its appears to the Board that the failure of the District to provide continuity of counsel is adversely affecting appellants' ability to prepare their case. The hearing in the case is also affected by the delay. If the Board is to maintain control of its calendar so that cases may proceed in an orderly ad timely fashion, the District cannot be permitted to frustrate this process with impunity under the continuing guise of under staffing. Where the District is involved, those who do business with it in the marketplace have the right to expect that the District will set an example for fair dealings. Delays in resolving procurement disputes may be detrimental not only to the contractors involved, but to the general public as well. The Board is not unaware not unmindful of the funding problems facing the District and at this time is not inclined to deny its motion; however, the circumstances here do warrant the very strong admonition that the District risks the imposition of sanctions should its future conduct materially affect the orderly and tamely prosecution of this case to resolution. (emphasis added). Therefore, on February 28, 1991, the District entered the appearance of Eugene t. Austin, Assistant Corporation Counsel. By Order dated August 6, 1991, the Board directed that the hearing scheduled for September 14, 1991 be continued for 90 days or until such time as the new Chief judge may require, because of the retirement of two of the three judges on the Board. On October 11, 1991, the District moved to stay proceedings pending a pre-hearing conference because of the retirement of the then-presiding judge. On October 16, 1991, the Board issued an order prior to pre-hearing conference. Therefore, on November 19, 1991, the Board issued a pre-hearing conference report and order which scheduled hearings to begin on March 23, 1992. On November 22, 1991, the Bard granted the District an extension of time to submit its opposition to Appellants' motion for default judgment and stated: Contrary to the District's characterization, this case cannot be described as being accelerated in any way. The complaint in the case was filed on July 14, 1989. By Board Order dated October 31, 1990 hearings were scheduled to commence on November 26, 1990. At the request of the District, proceedings were stayed for 30 days by Board Order dates October 11, 1990. By Board Order dated October 30, 1990, discovery was extended to March 1, 1991 and hearings were extended to May 1, 1991. The District again requested a stay of proceedings on December 17, 1990. The Board granted this stay on January 28, 1991 and by Order dated March 15, 1991, the Board extended discovery through August 12, 1991 and reischeel hearings to September 18, 1991. By Order dated August 6, 1991 the Bard continued these proceeds because of the retirement of two of its three judges. On October 11, 1991 the District moved to stay proceedings pending the next status conference. On October 16, 1991 the Board issued its Order prior to pre-hearing conference. Thereafter, by Order dated November 19, 1991 the Board has rescheduled procedural dates with discovery to conclude on February 14, 1992 and for hearings to begin on March 23, 1992. The parties should consider the dates set forth in the Board's November 19, 1991 Order to be final. The Board doe snot anticipate granting any further requests for extension by the District, and only grants the instant request because it will not affect the procedural dates for discovery and hearing, and because of the importance of the issue to be addressed in the District's response. [4] As the language in this Order indicates, the Board has previously continued hearings for ten months from November 26, 1990 to September 18, 1991 as the result of two requests for delay from the District. The District's fourth request to continue hearings was filed on March 17, 1992 and denied on march 18, 1992. That request was for a two-week continuance, and the stated basis was that responding to numerous pretrial motions had hindered the District in preparing its case. As the above-recited litany of change of counsel and requests for continuance shows, this appeal is factually distinguishable from Harris v. Akindulureni, supra . In this case, the District has previously requested and been granted two continuances because its lead counsel left the employ of the Office of Corporation Counsel. Further, the District was not represented by only one lawyer in this case. Just prior to trial the District was represented by attorneys Austin, Nash, Krueger and Holleran-Rivera. [5] Further, attorneys Krueger and Holleran-Rivera, who returned to District service as a legal consultant and section chief, respectively, had worked on the appeal prior to lead counsel Austin, whose resignation prompted the fourth and final request for continuance. Moreover, unlike the trial court in Harris v. Akindulureni, supra , the Board has considered the amount of delay which would have resulted as well as prejudice to Appellants if the continuance were granted. The three months of delay requested by the District, if granted, would have resulted in a scheduling conflict with appeal CAB No. D-839 which is currently scheduled for five weeks of hearing calendar cannot accommodate four weeks of hearing until late September 1992, or a delay of six additional months. The prejudice to Appellants is obvious in that Beiro Construction Co. Inc., has gone bankrupt during the course of these proceedings. [6] The Board believes that the District's reliance on Harris v. Akindulureni, supra , is misplaced because the Court of Appeals could not have meant to give the Office of Corporation Counsel carte blanche to demand a continuance whenever a lawyer in that officer cannot appear at trial; and that if the continuance is denied, the lawyers in that office can withdraw on the date of trial with impunity and the assurance that a new taail will be granted on appeal. [7] The Board further believes that the extreme circumstances recited above justify the Board's denial of the continuance and granting the motion for default. Turning to the Appellants' March 25, 1992, motion to set hearing on quantum, the Board finds that Appellants' reliance on Firestone v. Harris, supra , is partially misplaced. That is so because the appeal before the Board is in a very different procedural posture than the matter in Firestone. The appeal in Firestone arose from a default judgment entered for failure to comply with the trial court's discovery order. Thus, the case in Firestone was not at issue, as is the appeal pending before this Board. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has consistently held that where a case is at issue, it is essential to require proof on liability as well as damages where the defendant has filed an answer. D.C. Transit System Inc. v. Young, 293 A.2d 488, 490 (D.C.App. 1972). In D.C. Transit, the court explained that where a defendant appears at trial and refused to proceed when his request for continuance is denied, the plaintiff must be put to his proof. One who has knowledge of a definite date for trial must know that if the fails to appear ready for he runs the risk of the trial proceeding without him, or even of having judgment entered against him where there is a verified complaint A defendant who appears on the trial date but refuses to proceed is not in much better position than one who fails to appear. However, a default should not have been entered since the defendant in pleading, a confession of liability cannot be inferred and the plaintiff must be put to his proof. (footnotes omitted) Id. at 489. This reasoning has been followed in Taylor v. Washington Hospital Center, 407 A.2d 585, 590 (D.C.App.19799) and Milton Properties, Inc. v. Newby, 456 A.2d 349, 354 (D.C.App. 1983). See Klein v. Rappaport, supra . With these cases as guidance, the Board will grant Appellants' motion in part. However, at the April 13, 1992 hearing, Appellant must be prepared to come forward with proof of both entitlement and quantum. Appellants will also be required to provide a court reporter for the hearing. [8] The District may participate in the hearing, however; if the District chooses not to, the Board will proceed ex parte. [9] See Firestone v. Harris, supra . SO ORDERED. [10] DATE: March 30, 1992 /s/ Zoe Bush ZOE BUSH Chief Administrative Judge /s/ Terry Hart Lee TERRY HART LEE Administrative Judge