Opinion ID: 1273686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Circuit Court Properly Limited The Scope of Its Review.

Text: The lower court properly refused to review the merits of the Board's decision because of the limited nature of the writ and the availability of an alternative mode of review. [1] The writ was issued pursuant to sec. 80.34, Stats. (1973). [3] Review is limited to irregularities or legal questions growing out of the proceedings of the supervisors provided the alleged errors appear upon the record or in the return. The court may not, upon a common law writ of certiorari, go beyond defects appearing upon the record to review questions of fact. Morris v. Ferguson, 14 Wis. (), 288, 291 (1861). The trial court stated that since the statute does not enlarge the scope of review and power of the court, it must be assumed that the scope is co-extensive with the Common Law writ rather than enlarged by statute. At oral argument counsel for Mr. Berschens cited Browndale International, Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment for the County of Dane, 60 Wis.2d 182, 208 N.W.2d 121 (1973) cert. den. 416 U.S. 396. Browndale International relied in part on the distinction between common law and statutory certiorari as explained by this court in Lakeshore Development Corporation v. Plan Commission of Village of Oconomowoc, 12 Wis.2d 560, 107 N.W.2d 590 (1961). It was said in Browndale, 60 Wis.2d at 182: In Lakeshore Development Corp., this court stated at page 565: `The writ of certiorari at common law was limited in scope and a motion to quash, either before or after the return to the writ was made, usually raised only questions of jurisdiction or excess power set forth as errors in the petition although other errors might appear in the return. Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 204, sec. 178. The return was taken as conclusive if responsive to the petition and could not be impeached by collateral affidavits. After the return was made the court could dismiss or quash the writ or enter a judgment of affirmance. `The scope and purpose of the writ of certiorari has been enlarged by statute and it is now used as a method of appeal to determine not only the jurisdiction of a municipal board or agency but also to review the action of such a board as arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory and sometimes to decide the merits of the action....' The scope of statutory certiorari, it was said, sometimes includes a decision on the merits. But brief review of the pertinent statute and cases shows that the statutory review by certiorari considered in Browndale Inter national and Lakeshore Development Corporation is unlike the reference to certiorari in sec. 80.34 (2). In Lakeside Development Corporation, the village plan commission rejected the corporation's preliminary plat setting out a proposed development and subdivision plan for homesites. The corporation petitioned the circuit court for review, in part under sec. 62.23 (7) (e)10 to 13, Stats. (1959). [4] The latter statute empowered the court to issue a writ to the zoning board of appeals; unlike the common law certiorari proceeding, this statute expressly authorized the court to hear testimony and take additional evidence. The court was given the power to reverse, affirm, wholly or in part, and to modify the decision of the zoning board of appeals. It was therefore held in Lakeshore Development Corp., inter alia, that a motion to quash could consider facts outside the petition. Court review under a common law writ of certiorari, by contrast is limited to a review of matters appearing in the petition for the writ and the return. 12 Wis.2d at 565. In Browndale International the Dane County Zoning Supervisors determined Browndale's proposed homes for emotionally disturbed children were single family dwellings within the meaning of a zoning ordinance. The Dane County Board of Adjustment modified that determination and ruled that site approval was necessary to operate the homes. The circuit court reversed, deciding the homes were single family dwellings if limited to five children each. On appeal the board objected that the circuit court improperly considered matters beyond the record and conducted a de novo review. 60 Wis.2d 193. The first question was whether the circuit court exceeded its jurisdictional scope of review by certiorari. This court held that the scope of review as authorized by statute was explicit on its face. Specifically, sec. 59.99 (10) through (13), Stats., provided that (a) in preparing the return to the writ the board could include not only the original papers acted upon by it, but also other facts as may be pertinent and material, sub. (12); (b) the court could hear testimony, take evidence or appoint a referee to take such evidence, sub. (13); (c) the court could reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or modify the decision brought up for review. [5] This court held the circuit court did not err by taking additional evidence and acting thereon. 60 Wis.2d at 199. [6] In the instant case, the statutory reference to certiorari in 80.34 Stats. contains no such provisions which expand the scope of review. [2] Certiorari proceedings under this statute are limited to matters raised by the petition and return; on a motion to quash the return is taken as a verity. State ex rel. Paulson v. Town Board of Perry, 230 Wis. 76, 78-80; 283 N.W. 360 (1939). The significance is that these principles are characteristic of the common law writ of certiorari. Lakeshore Development Corp., supra, 12 Wis.2d at 564, 565. The statutes in both Lakeshore Development Corp. and Browndale International, supra, allowed the court to conduct its own factual inquiry; that is not true under the applicable statutes here. [3] Under sections 80.17, [7] 80.18 and 80.19, Stats. (1973), the denial of the application by the Town Board may be challenged on the merits before commissioners appointed by the court and consisting of three disinterested persons, resident freeholders of the county. The only question remaining is whether there can be de novo review in the instant situation. Can the court, upon certiorari to the town board, make a de novo consideration of whether to lay out a road when the commissioners are bypassed? We hold the answer is no. The lower court was correct in refusing to exercise a discretion expressly delegated to the Town Board. In Master Disposal, supra, 60 Wis.2d at 657, the court quoted State ex rel. Martin v. Juneau, 238 Wis. 564, 568, 300 N.W. 187 (1941) as follows: `This court has repeatedly held that where a specified method of review is prescribed by an act creating a new right or conferring a new power, the method so prescribed is exclusive and if review is sought that method must be pursued.' Citing State ex rel. Attorney General v. Fasekas, 223 Wis. 356, 362, 269 N.W. 700; Corstvet v. Bank of Deerfield, 220 Wis. 209, 263 N.W. 687. The commissioners are empowered to reverse the decision of the Board. Sec. 80.21. While the circuit court is limited to reviewing legal errors under the writ of certiorari, the commissioners may review determinations of fact. The Commissioners are confined, on the appeal, to an examination of the case upon the meritsthat is, the necessity or propriety of laying out the road, assuming all the previous steps taken to have been regular. They are not to review legal questions, or irregularities, which might exist in the preliminary steps. Morris, supra, 14 Wis. at 290. The lower court correctly limited the scope of its review. For purposes which concern us here, that review concerned the overlong adjournment, under the statutes, of the Town Board.