Opinion ID: 2148851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of Defendant's Waiver of a Jury for Sentencing

Text: Next, defendant claims that his waiver of his right to be sentenced by a jury was not knowing and intelligent because the trial court failed to admonish him that one juror could prevent the imposition of the death penalty. We disagree. This court has repeatedly held that a defendant need not be expressly advised of the nonunanimity rule, i.e., that the vote of a single juror will preclude the imposition of the death penalty. People v. Ramey, 152 Ill.2d 41, 59, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275 (1992); People v. Erickson, 117 Ill.2d 271, 295-96, 111 Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367 (1987). Moreover, we have further declined to impose a requirement that the trial court advise the defendant that the jury's decision to impose the death penalty must be unanimous. Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 59, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275; People v. Evans, 125 Ill.2d 50, 89-90, 125 Ill.Dec. 790, 530 N.E.2d 1360 (1988). Defendant raises no arguments which persuade us to reconsider these decisions. Our review of the record reveals that a valid jury waiver occurred insofar as the trial court explained to defendant that he was waiving the right to have the jury consider the capital sentencing issues and that the sentencing decision would, therefore, be made by the court alone. See Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 59, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275. Accordingly, we reject the defendant's jury waiver argument.