Opinion ID: 1660644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court err in allowing the state to present rebuttal testimony from ginny burrow about alleged prior sales of cocaine by sarah scott?

Text: ¶ 18. Scott asserts that the trial judge erred in allowing the State to present rebuttal testimony through Burrow regarding prior sales of cocaine by Scott. Scott testified on her own behalf. ¶ 19. Direct examination of Scott began with the following line of questioning: Q Ms. Scott, you have heard a lot of testimony about you today. A Yes, sir. Q And I'll just begin by asking you a question I think we all want to hear. On 12-4-97 when, if ever, did you sell drugs to anyone? A I did not. Q Are you absolutely certain? A I'm positive. ¶ 20. After Scott rested, the trial judge asked the State if it had any additional witnesses, to which the State responded that it had a rebuttal witness. Discussion between the trial judge and the attorneys regarding the proposed rebuttal testimony was as follows: (THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS HAD IN ABSENCE OF JURY.) BY MS. JONES: Your Honor, on direct examination Mr. Luckett asked Ms. Scott whether she had ever sold cocaine to Ginny Burrow before, and Ms. Scott replied in the negative. That was on direct examination. It's my intention now to put Ms. Burrow back on the Stand and have her testify about the other times when she in fact bought cocaine from Sarah Scott. I gave Mr. Luckett notice that she would be able to say that in the summary I gave him, I believe sometime last week. BY THE COURT: Mr. Luckett? BY MR. LUCKETT: Of course, Your Honor, we're going to object. BY THE COURT: What's the basis of your objection? BY MR. LUCKETT: Prejudicial, Your Honor, unduly prejudicial. Ms. Scott has been charged with sale or distribution of cocaine on December 4, 1997; any mention of any alleged drug sales anytime other than December 4, 1997 is certainly prejudicial to my client, Your Honor. If she's been indicted for that or there's another case pending, certainly this would prejudice her case, Your Honor. BY THE COURT: Ms. Jones, anything further? BY MS. JONES: Yes, sir. The crux of Ms. Scott's defense seems to be the case of mistaken identity, that Ms. Burrow was mistaken about who she is and whether or not she had a gold tooth in her mouth, and to show that Ginny had known her before, and also had a drug buying relationship with her is very probative of the fact that she was not mistaken as to who she is. BY MR. LUCKETT: And she's also testified, Your Honor, that the length of that relationship was approximately six months. So, if Ms. Jones insist(s) [sic] on this line of questioning, then we would restrict her to six months prior to this alleged incident. BY MS. JONES: That would be all she could testify to. I would ask her during the six months or so that you have known her, how many other occasions did you buy crack cocaine from her. BY THE COURT: Well, the only purpose for this testimony is to question the credibility of the Defendant. There will need to be a limiting instruction. The jury will need to be instructed that it is only being submitted for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the defendant. This is something that, this type of rebuttal has been bounced back and forth, I think currently the posture of the Supreme Court says it is proper, if the door has been opened and the statements were just plainly made thatthe questions were asked by the Defendant's attorney; so, the rebuttal would be proper for the purpose of attacking the credibility only, and, as I said, there will need to be a limiting instruction. That's the only purpose that the jury should consider this for. Ask the jury to come in, please. ¶ 21. Once the jury returned, Burrow was then questioned by the State. The testimony was as follows: Q Ms. Burrow, in the six so months that you have known Ms. Scott prior to December 4, 1997, during that time, how often, if ever, did you buy crack cocaine from her, other than December 4th? A Many, many times. Q And where would that take place? A At her house. ¶ 22. Scott cites M.R.E. 404(b) to support her contention that the rebuttal testimony should not have been allowed: RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES . . . . (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. . . . . M.R.E. 404(b). ¶ 23. Scott then refers to the Watts v. State, 635 So.2d 1364 (Miss.1994) where this Court discussed the interrelationship between M.R.E. 404(b) and the prejudice test contained in M.R.E. 403. The Court first noted that in order to pass muster under Rule 404(b), evidence must `be such that it satisfies some other evidentiary purpose beyond simply showing that [the defendant] is the sort of fellow likely to commit the crime charged....' If and when evidence clears the hurdle of Rule 404(b), however, it must still clear the test of Rule 403. The Jenkins court further reminded us: To be sure, evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) is also subject to the prejudice test of Rule 403; that is, even though the Circuit Court considered the evidence at issue admissible under Rule 404(b), it was still required by Rule 403 to consider whether its probative value on the issues of motive, opportunity and intent was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In this sense Rule 403 is an ultimate filter through which all otherwise admissible evidence must pass. Id. at 1368 (quoting Jenkins v. State, 507 So.2d 89, 93 (Miss.1987)). ¶ 24. M.R.E. 403 is as follows: RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. M.R.E. 403. ¶ 25. Scott believes the direct examination that was asked of her did not open the door to allow Rule 404(b) evidence (testimony of prior drug sales) to be admissible to attack her credibility. Scott contends that this testimony was highly prejudicial to her case and that the allowance of this testimony constitutes error sufficient to have this case reversed and remanded for a new trial. ¶ 26. The State correctly asserts that the rebuttal testimony regarding prior drug sales was admissible and that the testimony was offered to rebut falsehoods offered by the defendant with specific instances of her previous conduct. The trial judge properly gave a limiting instruction to the jury directing on how to consider appropriately the prior sales of cocaine and explained that this testimony was presented only for the purpose of attacking Scott's credibility. Scott's counsel opened the door when he asked Scott if she had sold drugs to anyone on 12-4-97 or ever. Also, Burrow's testimony was in contradiction to testimony offered by Scott and was limited for purposes of impeachment. This made the subsequent rebuttal testimony admissible. The trial judge did not err in allowing the State to present rebuttal testimony about alleged prior sales of cocaine by Scott.