Opinion ID: 2996511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fleming’s Confession & Bruton

Text: Although the decision to admit or deny evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, a district court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is a legal question that we review de novo. United States v. Hernandez, 330 F.3d 964, 972 (7th Cir. 2003). The use of a non-testifying criminal defendant’s confession against him during a joint trial risks violating the Confrontation Clause rights of the co-defendants. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123. If the confession incriminates the co-defendants, then those defendants are denied their rights under the Confrontation Clause to cross-examine the witnesses against them, and their trials must be severed if the confession is to be used. However, as the Supreme Court and this court have both recognized, there are ways to use the confession without incriminating the codefendants, and thus protect the rights of the co-defendants. Proper redaction of the confession to eliminate all references to the co-defendants, combined with a limiting instruction to the jury that it may not consider the confession against anyone other than the confessing defendant has been found adequate. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). Additionally, a redaction that replaces co-defendant names with neutral pronouns such 10 Nos. 02-1679, 02-1687 & 02-1739 that there is no obvious reference to the co-defendants will, along with limiting instructions, suffice to protect codefendants’ Confrontation Clause rights. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196 (1998) (validating, in dictum, the use of “a few other guys” as a replacement for names in a confession that would avoid a Bruton violation); Hernandez, 330 F.3d at 973; United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484, 501 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hubbard, 22 F.3d 1410, 1421 (7th Cir. 1994). It is clear that the court provided the appropriate limiting instructions to the jury regarding Fleming’s confession. But there is a dispute concerning the redactions of Brown’s and Sutton’s names from the confession. Fleming’s confession, as introduced through the testimony of the detective who solicited it, was edited by redacting the names of Brown and Fleming, and replacing their names with “another individual,” “other individual(s),” “other individual in Madison,” “other individual robber,” “an individual,” “the individual,” “this individual,” “two individuals,” “third individual,” “this person,” “that person,” “other person,” “the guy” and other combinations of these. R. 183 at 5-A-107 to 133. This kind of redaction is not a blank space deletion of the kind found improper in Gray. There, the witness read the confession into evidence, saying the word “deleted” or “deletion” whenever the co-defendants’ names appeared. Gray, 523 U.S. at 188. However, Sutton and Brown argue that the present case meets the larger, more general prohibition of Gray against redactions that replace names with “a symbol or other similarly obvious indications of alteration . . . that . . . so closely resemble Bruton’s unredacted statements that, in our view, the law must require the same result.” Id. at 192. Brown and Sutton rely on this court’s interpretation of Gray in United States v. Hoover, 246 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 2001), where the names of two gang leader defendants—one in prison, one not in prison—were replaced with “incarcerated Nos. 02-1679, 02-1687 & 02-1739 11 leader” and “unincarcerated leader,” respectively. The use of replacement words that fail to “avoid[ ] a one-to-one correspondence between the confession and easily identified figures sitting at the defense table” violates Bruton. Id. at 1059. Brown and Sutton also point us towards United States v. Eskridge, 164 F.3d 1042 (7th Cir. 1998), where this court found the replacement of the codefendant’s name with “another” was a Bruton violation, but was found to be harmless error. Unlike Hoover, there is no clear one-to-one correspondence between the replacement words, such as “another person,” and either of the defendants. In Hoover, “incarcerated leader” was the equivalent of using a nickname, and the immediate one-to-one correspondence to the defendant was unavoidable. Hoover, 246 F.3d at 1059. “Another person” and similar neutral words used in the present case create no such immediate identification, especially given that there were multiple people, identified and unidentified, involved in the various crimes detailed in Fleming’s confession. See Hubbard, 22 F.3d at 1421 (finding no Bruton violation when confession redacted and name replaced with “other person” and only connection to co-defendant is a “contextual implication” from other evidence). The connection of “another person” to either Brown or Sutton comes only through inference and the context of other evidence presented. The redaction attenuates that inference sufficiently for the purposes of Bruton, and makes the present case clearly distinguishable from Hoover. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208. While Sutton’s case presents no additional unusual circumstances, Brown argues that the references in the confession to the “after hours club” where the conspirators gathered and planned their crimes makes it clear that one of the “other persons” that the confession names must, necessarily, be Brown. Brown’s argument centers 12 Nos. 02-1679, 02-1687 & 02-1739 around the following testimony from Detective Dandurand concerning a planning session for one of the robberies. Q: Detective Dandurand, did Mr. Fleming in his interview statement tell you that a Stacy Pete was also at the club, that after hours club that evening? A: Yes, he did. Q: Did he indicate she was playing with a handgun at the after hours club? A: Yes. What Mr. Fleming explained was that at the club Stacy Pete had a handgun and she was wav- ing it around in jest and making some comments that she was going to knock off a bank. Dandurand Direct Testimony, R. 183, at 5-A-109. Brown argues that the ability of Stacy Pete to wave a gun around and talk of robbing a bank meant the club owner en- dorsed her behavior and must have been involved in the robberies. Therefore, the club owner must be one of the unnamed individuals. Other evidence specifically named Brown as the owner of the after hours club in question. We are unconvinced. None of the redactions replaced Brown’s name with “owner of the after hours club,” nor is the owner of the club mentioned in Fleming’s confession. In order to reach the conclusion argued by Brown, the jury would have had to pursue an extended inferential chain of reasoning: 1) Stacy Pete waved a gun and mentioned a bank robbery at a club; 2) She could only do that if the club owner endorsed her behavior; 3) If the club owner endorsed this behavior, he must be involved in the robberies; 4) If he was involved in the robberies, he must be a defendant; and finally, 5) because he is never expressly mentioned elsewhere in the confession, he must be one of the unnamed “individuals” in the confession. This inferential chain is far from the express identification involved in Hoover, where a jailed gang leader’s name was Nos. 02-1679, 02-1687 & 02-1739 13 replaced with “incarcerated leader.” Hoover, 246 F.3d at 1054. If Brown’s name had been replaced with “after hours club owner,” then his situation would be more comparable to that of Hoover. Eskridge is of limited use to the defendants because the government’s concession in that case that there was a Bruton violation and the court’s dominant focus on the harmlessness of the error resulted in a very cursory discussion of the redaction. Eskridge, 164 F.3d at 1044. We believe it is distinguishable from the present case principally because there were only two people involved in the crime altogether, and any reference to “another” person would necessarily refer to the co-defendant. In the present case there were drivers, gun suppliers and co-conspirators of all kinds, with different individuals being involved in different roles for different crimes. “Another individual” could refer to many people besides Brown and Sutton. There was, therefore, no Bruton violation in the redaction of Fleming’s confession. Additionally, to the extent that there was a violation, the substantial amount of other evidence incriminating Brown and Sutton, including significant testimony from various criminal collaborators, would render the error harmless.