Opinion ID: 1191763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Confrontation Clause Argument

Text: Defendant makes a secondary argument concerning the Woods testimony. He argues that Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), constitutionally entitled him to introduce the September 8 statements (presumably without the risk of the state introducing the November 20 statements) because those statements were exculpatory as to Fong. This argument misses the mark for several reasons. First, defendant continues to ignore the fact that the September 8 statement was at least partially inculpatory as to Fong. As noted above, Woods told police on September 8 that McCrimmon and Minnitt said Cha-Chi was a former employee of the El Grande Market. See supra Trial Issue I.A. This, in effect, excluded Martin Garza, who, the defense claimed, was the real Cha-Chi, but included Fong. Second, this case does not raise a Chambers problem because defendant was not prevented from introducing exculpatory evidence. No one sought to prevent defendant from using the September 8 statement. The trial judge simply ruled that if portions of the August conversation were introduced, the state would not be precluded from introducing other explanatory portions. Finally, we believe defendant reads Chambers too broadly. Chambers did not hold that trial judges must always admit exculpatory hearsay. Instead, in Chambers, the Court was careful to point out that the hearsay statements which should have been admitted by the trial court in that case were offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability. 410 U.S. at 300, 93 S.Ct. at 1048. What defendant ignores is that in Chambers, as in Williamson, the reliability inquiry is focused on the hearsay declarants. Id. Defendant's position, that McCrimmon and Minnitt were reliable in only those statements that assist defendant's case, has no factual or legal basis. Defendant proceeds to attack Woods' credibility, but this inquiry misses the mark as well. Even if Woods were the hearsay declarant, what defendant would need to demonstrate (and what he attempted to show in his brief and at argument) is that Woods was unreliable in his later statements but reliable on September 8. Defendant fails in this regard because the factors to which defendant points as demonstrating Woods' unreliability apply to all of Woods' statements; not simply those defendant seeks to exclude. [4] II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying defendant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the newly discovered evidence being McCrimmon's testimony at his own, later trial? Defendant claims Christopher McCrimmon's testimony at his trial one month after Fong's trial constituted newly discovered evidence and the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate judgment based on this evidence. Defendant argues that the following areas of McCrimmon's testimony constitute newly discovered evidence: McCrimmon denied involvement in the El Grande shootings .... acknowledged borrowing Queen E.'s car earlier that evening [to purchase drugs], abandoning it at a location a few blocks from the El Grande.... McCrimmon testified that he was by himself at the time Queen E. loaned him the car ... that he knew [Fong] as simply an acquaintance ... [and] denied that [Fong] was known as Cha-Chi.... McCrimmon did admit knowing a person named Cha-Chi .. . [and] stated that he had taken Woods ... to Cha-Chi's house [for drugs] and that Cha-Chi lived close by. Defendant points out that, although McCrimmon was convicted at his own trial, defendant's jury need not be convinced of McCrimmon's innocence in order to consider his testimony to acquit [Fong]. Both parties acknowledge that McCrimmon would still be able to claim a valid Fifth Amendment privilege at any retrial in this case and that McCrimmon intends to exercise the privilege, if necessary. However, defendant contends he would still be able to introduce McCrimmon's prior recorded testimony under Rule 804(b)(1). We do not reach the merits of that contention. Motions for new trials based on newly discovered evidence are disfavored, and we grant them cautiously. Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial judge's determination that a new trial for newly discovered evidence is not necessary. State v. Serna, 167 Ariz. 373, 374, 807 P.2d 1109, 1110, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 875, 112 S.Ct. 214, 116 L.Ed.2d 172 (1991) (citation omitted). The requirements for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are: (1) the motion must show that the evidence relied on is, in fact, newly discovered; (2) the motion must allege facts from which the court can infer due diligence; (3) the evidence relied on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence must be material to the issue involved; and (5) it must be evidence which, if introduced, would probably change the verdict if a new trial were ordered. Serna, 167 Ariz. at 374, 807 P.2d at 1110. The trial court is in the best position to evaluate the potential effect upon the jurors of newly discovered evidence. State v. Medrano, 173 Ariz. 393, 399, 844 P.2d 560, 566 (1992). It was well within the trial court's discretion to have determined that McCrimmon's testimony would probably not have changed the verdict. See State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 251, 686 P.2d 750, 774, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1066, 105 S.Ct. 548, 83 L.Ed.2d 436 (1984) ([I]f the motion [for new trial] relies on the existence of a witness willing to testify and present the new evidence at a new trial, such witness must appear to be credible to the trial judge hearing the motion.). Defendant's strategy at trial was to show that he was not involved in the murders or the robbery of the market. McCrimmon's testimony (apart from that which is cumulative, discussed infra ) was that he was by himself when Ray loaned him the car, he was not involved in the shootings, he was in the area to purchase drugs, and he knew Fong only as an acquaintance. McCrimmon's denials amounted to nothing more than a repetition of defendant's own position that he was not involved in the crime in any way. McCrimmon's jury rejected his testimony and found him guilty of murder and robbery. More importantly, McCrimmon's testimony did not offer anything new in the way of support as to why defendant's theory of the case was the one the jury should accept. At least a portion of McCrimmon's new testimony was cumulative. Testimony that Fong was not known as Cha-Chi and that Cha-Chi was Martin Garza was introduced at Fong's trial. Fong's family and friends testified that he was not known as Cha-Chi, and Garza himself testified that he was known as Cha-Chi and that he sold drugs. Fong's jury was presented with substantial evidence of Fong's guilt. This evidence included: (1) Fong's fingerprints on items found on the counter and floor where the murders took place; (2) Ray's testimony that Fong was with McCrimmon and Minnitt when she loaned them the car found near the scene of the murder and was with them when they returned shortly after the murder; (3) Woods' testimony that the third murderer was Martin, the Mexican dude, who used to work there; (4) the uncontested fact that Fong was a former employee of the market; and (5) the testimony that the store was closing at the time of the crime and only a person recognized by the victims could have gained admission. [5] McCrimmon's complete denial of involvement, essentially nothing more than a repetition of Fong's unsuccessful trial strategy, would probably not have swayed the jury. We certainly cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.