Opinion ID: 449289
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction on Mitigating Circumstances

Text: 11 After listing the statutory aggravating factors which could be used by the jury in considering the death penalty, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows: 12 If you do not find that there existed any of the aggravating circumstances which have been described to you, it would be your duty to recommend a sentence to life imprisonment. 13 Should you find one or more of these aggravating circumstances to exist, it will then be your duty to determine whether or not sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist. The mitigating circumstances which you may consider, if established by the evidence, are these: [list of statutory mitigating factors]. 14 Proffitt contends that the instruction, when considered with the other comments made by the prosecutor and the trial judge, limited the jury's consideration to the statutory mitigating factors in violation of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), which held that the sentencing body must be allowed to consider any aspect of the crime or the defendant's character that the defendant presents as a basis for rejecting the death penalty. Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964. He also claims that he was entitled to a specific instruction on the jury's freedom to exercise mercy. He concedes, however, that there was no objection to the instructions at trial. 15 Despite petitioner's attempts to distinguish among them, we conclude that this case is controlled by Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 201, 78 L.Ed.2d 176 (1983), and the cases following it. 4 In Ford, the en banc court considered a similar challenge 5 to virtually identical instructions, see id. at 812. The court noted that Ford's failure to object to the instruction at trial precluded consideration of his claim unless he could demonstrate sufficient cause for the omission and actual prejudice from the jury instruction under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). The court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of cause because it held that Ford's claim was barred due to his failure to demonstrate actual prejudice. Ford, 696 F.2d at 812-13. Although the circumstances are not identical, we can discern no principled distinction between the instructions in Proffitt and Ford which would permit us to conclude that Proffitt has demonstrated actual prejudice in any greater degree than the petitioner in Ford. We therefore hold that this claim is barred under Ford for failure to object.