Opinion ID: 2283054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Misinterpretation of Hoskins

Text: Appellant first argues, as though implicitly recognizing that he cannot meet either requirement, that Hoskins was an attempt to increase a court's discretion as to whether to grant a writ and that judicial economy, especially where constitutional rights are involved, is a sufficient reason to grant a writ. Under this approach, he argues, he is entitled to the writ because it would be more efficient to vindicate his constitutional rights to exculpatory evidence, to make a defense, and to due process by immediately giving him access to the sealed court record through a writ. Appellant's reading of Hoskins, however, is incorrect because that decision did not remove any requirements from the second class of writs. That decision did depart from the standard laid out in Southeastern United Medigroup, Inc. v. Hughes, 952 S.W.2d 195 (Ky.1997), to remove the requirement of no adequate remedy by appeal in the no-jurisdiction class of writs and, in so doing, worked to expand an appellate court's discretion to grant the first class of writs. But that expansion of discretion was very limited and did not apply to the second class of writs. To the contrary, this Court expressly retained the requirement of no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise in the second class. More importantly, this Court reaffirmed Bender v. Eaton , which made the requirements of the second class of writs a prerequisite for the mere availability of a writ. Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 10. This test requires a substantial showing, and it is specifically intended to be a hurdle to consideration of the merits of any alleged error. Cox, 266 S.W.3d at 795. As this Court explained, The writ of mandamus, like the writ of prohibition, is extraordinary in nature. Such a writ bypasses the regular appellate process and requires significant interference with the lower courts' administration of justice. The expedited nature of writ proceedings necessitates an abbreviated record. This magnifies the chance of incorrect rulings that would prematurely and improperly cut off the rights of litigants, if the process were not strictly scrutinized for appropriateness. As such, the specter of injustice always hovers over writ proceedings, which explains why courts of this Commonwealth areand should beloath to grant the extraordinary writs unless absolutely necessary. Because they fall outside the regular appellate process, especially when they are used as de facto interlocutory appeals (an increasing, undesired trend), writ petitions also consume valuable judicial resources, slow down the administration of justice (even when correctly entertained), and impose potentially unnecessary costs on litigants. Id. Thus, Appellant is simply wrong to assert that Hoskins allows the second class of writs to be granted for reasons of judicial economy.