Opinion ID: 836303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: probation revocation in case 95-83

Text: Finally, the Bar contends that, because the accused violated DR 6-101(B) during the time when he was negotiating the stipulation for discipline in case 95-83, and during the beginning of his probationary period in that case, this court should revoke his probation and impose the previously stayed 120-day suspension. The accused responds that his probation was subject to a number of detailed terms and conditions, only one of which was violatedfailing to stay current on a single case out of about 130 cases. The accused further points out that, while his probation originally was to be for a two-year period, set to expire in December 1997, [11] he continued on probation until just before oral argument in this court in November 1999, complying with every term and condition thereof. [12] In the accused's view, the purpose of his probation has been met, and, therefore, there is no reason to revoke his probation and impose the stayed 120-day suspension. As noted, the accused was on probation from approximately December 1995 to November 1999a period encompassing almost four years. Moreover, the Bar effectively conceded at oral argument that the accused's term of probationary supervision had ended; however, it still seeks to have the 120-day suspension imposed. In the Bar's view, the accused must be held to his part of his agreement with the Bar, by serving the stayed suspension as a consequence for violating a condition of his probation. For the following reasons, we disagree. First, BR 6.2(a), which sets out the authority to impose probation, provides, in part: Upon determining that an accused should be suspended, the trial panel [13] may decide that the execution of the suspension shall be stayed, in whole or in part, and that the accused shall be placed on probation for a period no longer than three years. We have found nothing in the Bar Rules of Procedure that provides for an extension of probation beyond three years. Here, the accused served his probationary term for almost a year more than the maximum three-year term allowed under BR 6.2(a), and, according to the Bar, it no longer is supervising the accused. From those facts, any dispute concerning the accused's probation and the suspension stayed as a result of that probation arguably is moot. Even if the issue were not resolved on mootness grounds, the Bar Rules of Procedure do not require that a lawyer who violates a probationary term must, as a result of that violation, serve out the stayed suspension. Rather, BR 6.2(d) provides, in part: Disciplinary Counsel [of the Bar] may petition the    Supreme Court    to revoke the probation of any attorney for violation of any probationary term. The    court may order the attorney to appear and show cause, if he or she has any, why the attorney's probation should not be revoked and the original sanctions imposed. A petition for revocation of an attorney's probation shall not preclude the Bar from filing independent disciplinary charges based on the same conduct as alleged in the petition. (Emphasis added.) In short, the Bar is not entitled to a revocation of the accused's probation and imposition of the suspended sentence; rather, it is granted the discretion to petition for revocation, as it did in this case. Finally, the record demonstrates conclusively that, with the single exception of neglecting the Poch matter within the first six months of his probation, the accused has complied with the terms and conditions of his probation in every respect. Indeed, the accused willingly has taken all the steps to improve his mental health and his office practices that the Bar would encourage any lawyer in his position to take, including therapy, active solicitation and implementation of advice from the PLF and other lawyers for improving his office practices, cooperation with his supervising lawyers, and commendable candor and acknowledgment of the Bar's need to scrutinize his practice in every step of the process. In short, nothing in the record supports the conclusion that the previously stayed 120-day suspension now should be imposed, assuming that we would have the power to do so. To the contrary, we conclude that the accused's probation in case 95-83 should be terminated. This opinion shall serve that function.