Opinion ID: 159242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Mr. Pearson's request for lesser included offense instructions

Text: 148 Mr. Pearson asked the district court to instruct the jury on second degree murder and manslaughter as lesser included offenses to felony murder. The district court refused. We engage in de novo review of the legal question of whether an offense for which an instruction is sought actually qualifies as a lesser included offense of the offense charged. United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911, 914 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1389 (1998). However, we review the district court's decision as to whether there is enough evidence to justify a lesser included offense instruction for an abuse of discretion. Id. 149 Mr. Pearson was entitled to an instruction on these lesser included offenses if: (1) he made a proper request; (2) the lesser included offenses included some but not all of the elements of the offense charged; (3) the elements differentiating the lesser included offenses from the charged crime are in dispute; and (4) a jury could rationally convict the defendant of one of the lesser offenses and acquit him of the greater offense. United States v. Moore, 108 F.3d 270, 272 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Fitzgerald v. United States, 719 F.2d 1069, 1071 (10th Cir. 1983)). Applying this standard, we conclude that the district court properly denied Mr. Pearson's requested lesser included offense instructions because both fail the first half of the fourth requirement: a jury could not rationally convict him of either second degree murder or manslaughter. 150 The first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) defines first degree murder. The second paragraph describes second degree murder as [a]ny other murder. Replacing the word murder with its definition, found in the first sentence of 1111(a), results in the reconstituted statutory expression of second degree murder as any other unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.However, we must again look to the common law to find the definition of malice aforethought as a term of art used to satisfy second degree murder. Malice aforethought as an element of second degree murder is, as in felony murder, a type of constructive or implied malice. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law, at 606-07 (2d ed. 1986). Although commission of the specified felony supplies the constructive malice necessary to satisfy the malice aforethought element of § 1111(a) felony murder, second degree murder's malice aforethought element is satisfied by: (1) intent-to-kill without the added ingredients of premeditation and deliberation; (2) intent to do serious bodily injury; (3) a depraved-heart; or (4) commission of a felony when the crime does not fall under the first degree murder paragraph of § 1111(a). See id. 151 Under the facts of this case, a jury could not rationally convict Mr. Pearson of second degree murder because the robbery and accidental killing do not satisfy any of the types of implied malice aforethought required to prove that crime. Mr. Martin testified, and neither Mr. Pearson nor the government disputed, that he accidentally fired the shot that killed Ms. Montgomery. Thus, the only reason the government was able to convict Mr. Pearson of first degree felony murder was because Mr. Pearson's commission of the robbery constructively supplied the malice aforethought required to satisfy the definition of murder in § 1111(a). While the underlying robbery is constructive malice aforethought for first degree felony murder, neither the robbery nor the accidental killing constitutes the type of constructive malice aforethought required to prove second degree murder. Because Mr. Pearson's criminal acts do not satisfy any of the types of constructive second degree murder malice aforethought, Mr. Pearson cannot be guilty of that crime. 152 Mr. Pearson's requested manslaughter instruction also fails to describe an offense of which he could have been rationally convicted. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1112 defines manslaughter as follows: 153 (a) Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of two kinds: 154 Voluntary--Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. 155 Involuntary--In the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death. 156 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). 157 The accidental discharge of the gun in the commission of the robbery (1) could not constitute voluntary manslaughter because there was no sudden quarrel or heat of passion; and (2) could not constitute involuntary manslaughter because robbery is an unlawful act that is a felony. Thus, a jury could not rationally convict Mr. Pearson of either type of manslaughter. 158 Because we conclude that both of Mr. Pearson's requested lesser included offense instructions fail Moore's fourth requirement, we need not consider whether they satisfy Moore's other prongs. The district court did not err in refusing to submit to the jury Mr. Pearson's requested lesser included offense instructions.