Opinion ID: 748851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Act as Used by the Defense

Text: 22 In an effort to muster nine more days of nonexcludable time from the record to establish a violation of the Speedy Trial Act and obtain a reversal of his conviction, Shetty focuses on three of the six continuances to which he stipulated. 23
24 Following an informal status conference on May 22, 1995, the court granted a continuance of the trial which had been set to commence on June 6. On June 12, 1995, the parties filed a Stipulation and Order Re[:] Excludable Time Under the Speedy Trial Act, and pursuant to that stipulation, the court subsequently entered an order on June 13, 1995, which continued the trial to October 3. Also by stipulation of the parties, the order entered by the court expressly found: 25 [T]he ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, in that the failure to grant the continuance would deny the government continuity of counsel, and would deny newly associated defense counsel a reasonable period of time to adequately prepare for trial. 26 Order Re[:] Excludable Time Under the Speedy Trial Act, filed June 13, 1995, p 4 at 2. Shetty makes a variety of arguments related to this continuance, but we discuss only the two primary arguments emphasized on appeal. 1 27 First, to substantiate his position that the trial was delayed due to court congestion, Shetty emphasizes that the district court's order expressly states that [t]he court's next available trial date is October 3, 1995. Id. p 3, at 1. 28 This argument does not establish a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. We note that the order entered by the district court was drafted and proposed by the parties themselves and submitted with their stipulation. And, while it is true that court congestion cannot serve as a basis for a continuance, United States v. Engstrom, 7 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir.1993), where a trial date is set and later changed at the request of the parties, district courts certainly cannot be required to reset cases in unworkable or unavailable time slots. Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the defense ever requested an earlier trial date or that it withdrew its stipulation to continue the trial to October 3, 1995. Absent notice that the defendant was withdrawing from the stipulation or requesting an earlier trial date, the district court had no reason to reset the trial on an earlier date. 29 In his second major argument related to this continuance, Shetty points out that on September 11, 1995, a status conference was held during which the district court ruled upon discovery motions filed by the defense. Contending that the time between September 11 and October 3, 1995, should not be excludable, Shetty essentially maintains that once the discovery motions were ruled upon, it was incumbent on the trial court to disregard the earlier stipulation of the parties, as well as its own order, and reset the trial on a date earlier than October 3, 1995. More specifically, in his opening brief, Shetty states that [t]here is no indication that counsel, who were both available for the conference, were unable to proceed on September 11th. The trial could have been scheduled for that date. (Brief of Appellant at 30.) 30 In hindsight and for purposes of arguing that the Speedy Trial Act was violated, the defense contends it was ready to try the case on September 11. This argument, if successful, might earn Shetty extra days of nonexcludable time under the Speedy Trial Act, but it completely discounts the realities associated with prosecuting, defending and conducting a criminal trial. Until September 11, 1995, the defense did not know the outcome of its discovery motions. Moreover, to call a jury, let alone witnesses, takes time. Had the court unexpectedly moved the trial date up from October 3 to September 11, 1995, counsel for both sides would likely have argued that they were being prejudiced and needed more time to prepare. 31 Under the circumstances, the ends of justice served by the continuance [to the scheduled trial date of October 3, 1995] outweigh[ed] the best interest of the public and the defendant in [an earlier trial date]. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). In addition, there is no indication in the record that the defense withdrew its earlier stipulation to continue the trial until October 3, 1995, and/or requested an earlier trial date at any time following the outcome of the September 11 hearing and before the scheduled trial date of October 3, 1995. Absent notice that the defense was withdrawing from the stipulation or wanted an earlier trial date, the district court had no reason to reschedule Shetty's trial on an earlier date. 32
33 When the district court advised counsel that the trial set on October 3 would have to trail another trial for one to two weeks, leading to a variety of unavoidable delays, such as the unavailability of counsel and essential witnesses, the Government and Shetty jointly sought a continuance in a Stipulation and Order Re[:] Continuance of Trial Date and Excludable Time Under the Speedy Trial Act. Subsequently, and pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the district court entered an order continuing the trial. 34 Now, on appeal, the defense would like to go back and attribute the entire continuance to calendar congestion and treat the entire period as nonexcludable under the Speedy Trial Act. This argument once again ignores the fact that both Shetty and his counsel stipulated to the facts underlying the district court's findings of excludable time, and at no time, either orally or in writing, did they attempt to withdraw their stipulation and/or request an earlier trial date between October 3 and November 28. Therefore, based on the totality of the record before us, we find no violation of the Act with respect to this continuance. 35
36 Pursuant to a Stipulation Re: Continuance of Trial Date, Excludable Time Under the Speedy Trial Act, and Disclosure of Jury Panel (RE 105-09), the district court continued the trial from April 16 to June 11, 1996. (RE 110-12.) This continuance receives the most attention from Shetty. 37 Approximately two weeks prior to the April 16 trial date, the Government requested that a deposition be taken of Connie Hansen, a witness who was scheduled for major surgery on April 11, 1996, for which she would require six to eight weeks of recuperation. Hansen had worked in Shetty's office and he did not want to give up his right to confront her in front of a jury. During the hearing on the motion to take Hansen's deposition, defense counsel specifically said, I'd be remiss if I didn't, on behalf of my client, request a continuance of the trial until that witness is available. Tr. at 6 (April 4, 1996) (emphasis added). And, although the Government indicated it was willing to proceed to trial without Hansen, it also indicated that it would absolutely like to have her testify. Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added). 38 Ultimately, the district court determined that the trial should be continued. The court specifically asked: Okay. I gather from what I am hearing that there is no defense objection to putting it over to June, correct? Id. at 30. Both defense counsel answered: Correct. Id. at 31. In addition, defense counsel further stated: 39 I did speak with [the AUSA] off the record, and for purposes of Speedy Trial Act, I am prepared to enter into a stipulation on behalf of the defendant, and the defendant and [co-defense counsel] will also sign the stipulation to the effect that there is excludable time based on the unavailability of that particular witness, and that would be from the date of the proposed surgery, if I'm not mistaken ... to the date of trial including her recovery period as well. 40 Id. 41 Then, during the same hearing, when issues related to the selection of a new jury panel and the compilation of audit information arose, the AUSA requested an additional six weeks continuance. And, as to that request, the district court specifically inquired: Does the defense counsel disagree with any of the grounds [for the continuance] that counsel has stated? Id. at 41. Defense counsel responded: No, your honor. Id. 42 Despite Shetty's arguments that he was not the moving force behind the granting of the continuance or that Connie Hansen was neither an unavailable nor an essential witness, we find no violation of the Speedy Trial Act. We reject these arguments largely because even when given two direct opportunities to object to a continuance of the trial, the defense voiced no objection and affirmatively represented that the unavailability of a particular witness provided grounds for a finding of excludable time. In addition, we reject Shetty's arguments based upon the following items in the record: the Stipulation Re[:] Continuance of Trial Date, Excludable Time Under the Speedy Trial Act, and Disclosure of Jury Panel filed by the parties on April 19, 1996; the district court's corresponding order filed April 23, 1996; the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, filed June 12, 1996; and the Minute Order filed July 1, 1996 (incorporating the Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, filed June 24, 1996). Finally, we note that after Shetty and his counsel stipulated to the facts underlying the district court's findings of excludable time, at no time, either orally or in writing, did the defense attempt to withdraw its stipulation or request a trial date earlier than June 10, 1996. 43