Opinion ID: 2596743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: is a k.s.a. 22-3437 certificate testimonial?

Text: Applying the principles adopted in Crawford, in Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a certificate prepared by a forensic laboratory analyst fell within the core class of testimonial statements. The issue arose in the same context as it does in this case. The prosecutor in Melendez-Diaz admitted into evidence several bags seized during the defendant's arrest plus three certificates prepared by laboratory analysts that reported the weight of the substance in each bag and stated that the bags `[h]a[ve] been examined with the following results: The substance was found to contain: Cocaine.' Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2531, 174 L.Ed.2d at 320. The certificates were sworn to before a notary. As in this case, the analysts did not testify at trial. Although the document reporting the laboratory analysis was labeled a certificate by the Massachusetts Legislature, the United States Supreme Court concluded such documents are quite plainly affidavits: `declaration[s] of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.' Black's Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed.2004). Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2532, 174 L.Ed.2d at 321. As affidavits, the certificates were, according to the Court, included in the `core class of testimonial statements' identified in the Court's decision in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, as the type of evidence which is subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The Court explained: The fact in question is that the substance found in the possession of Melendez-Diaz and his codefendants was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine  the precise testimony the analysts would be expected to provide if called at trial. The `certificates' are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing `precisely what a witness does on direct examination.' Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). Here, moreover, not only were the affidavits `made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,' Crawford, [541 U.S., at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354], but under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide `prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight' of the analyzed substance, Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, § 13. We can safely assume that the analysts were aware of the affidavits' evidentiary purpose, since that purpose  as stated in the relevant state-law provision  was reprinted on the affidavits themselves. [Citation omitted.] In short, under our decision in Crawford the analysts' affidavits were testimonial statements, and the analysts were `witnesses' for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Absent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to `be confronted with' the analysts at trial. [Citation omitted.] Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2532, 174 L.Ed.2d at 321-22. Similarly, in this case, a KBI laboratory analyst prepared a certificate that was labeled as a Certificate of Analysis Pursuant to Kansas Statutes [K.S.A.] 22-3437 and [K.S.A.] 53-601. In the body of the certificate, the laboratory analyst attested to the chain of evidence procedures and stated her qualifications and experience. She then explained that approved methodologies had been followed and properly functioning equipment had been utilized. The certificate ended with the following statements: I certify that I am the Forensic Scientist who analyzed the test results and attest that the conclusion(s) on said Laboratory Report are, with reasonable scientific certainty, accurate. I declare, verify and certify under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. The certificate, as its heading indicated, followed the form prescribed by K.S.A. 22-3437 and K.S.A. 53-601. K.S.A. 22-3437 authorizes the certificate, directs what the certificate must include, and establishes a procedure to be followed if a certificate is to be used as evidence. It states in part: In any hearing or trial, a report concerning forensic examinations and certificate of forensic examination executed pursuant to this section shall be admissible in evidence if the report and certificate are prepared by an analyst or technician employed by one of several listed governmental agencies, including the KBI. K.S.A. 22-3437(1). In addition, the statute directs that a certificate be prepared if requested by a law enforcement agency and further specifies the contents of the report, requiring the analyst to swear under oath to the following: The type of analysis performed; the result achieved; any conclusions reached based upon that result; that the subscriber is the person who performed the analysis and made the conclusions; the subscriber's training or experience to perform the analysis; the nature and condition of the equipment used; and the certification and foundation requirements for admissibility of breath test results, when appropriate. K.S.A. 22-3437(2). The certificate in this case complied with those requirements. The second statute listed in the heading of the KBI laboratory analyst's certificate, K.S.A. 53-601, provides that any matter stated in an unsworn statement may be supported, evidenced, established or proved with the same force and effect as a sworn statement, if the unsworn document includes a statement that `I declare (or verify, certify or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.' K.S.A. 53-601(a)(2). Because the KBI analyst used these words, even though she did not take an oath, the certificate was effectively a sworn statement and the legal equivalent of an affidavit. Therefore, we conclude that the KBI laboratory analyst's use of the language required by K.S.A. 53-601 and the form prescribed by K.S.A. 22-3437 along with the certificate's reference to those two statutes indicates the certificate was intended to be and was functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing `precisely what a witness does on direct examination' [, citation omitted,] and was `made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.' [Citation omitted.] Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2532, 174 L.Ed.2d at 321. As such, the KBI laboratory analyst's certificate was testimonial, giving rise to Laturner's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Consequently, absent a showing that the KBI analyst was unavailable to testify at trial and that Laturner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the analyst, Laturner was entitled to be confronted with the analyst at trial unless that right was waived. See Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2533, 174 L.Ed.2d at 322.