Opinion ID: 1372315
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Does SEPA conflict with other State and Federal Environmental Laws?

Text: ASARCO contends the EIS provision of SEPA so irreconcilably conflicts with the requirements of the Washington Clean Air Act, RCW 70.94, that SEPA is inapplicable to variance decisions made pursuant to that Act. RCW 70.94.181(7), enacted in 1974, states: An application for a variance, or for the renewal thereof, submitted to the department of ecology or board pursuant to this section shall be approved or disapproved by the department or board within sixty-five days of receipt unless the applicant and the department of ecology or board agree to a continuance. (Italics ours.) ASARCO claims, PCHB accepted and the trial court found that preparation of an EIS would have taken a minimum of 5 months. Therefore, ASARCO contends, compliance with both the 65-day limitation in RCW 70.94.181 and SEPA is impossible. [6] [9, 10] First, ASARCO contends the EIS requirement of SEPA was impliedly repealed by RCW 70.94.181(7). We do not agree. As we said in Stephens v. Stephens, 85 Wn.2d 290, 295, 534 P.2d 571 (1975): Statutes are impliedly repealed by later acts only if (1) the later act covers the entire subject matter of the earlier legislation, is complete in itself, and is evidently intended to supersede prior legislation on the subject; or (2) the two acts are so clearly inconsistent with, and repugnant to, each other that they cannot be reconciled and both given effect by a fair and reasonable construction. The above stated rule does not support repeal by implication in the instant case. The later act, i.e., the Washington Clean Air Act, does not cover the entire subject matter of SEPA since it is designed to prevent destruction or degradation of air quality alone. There is no evidence the legislature intended the Washington Clean Air Act to supersede SEPA's broad environmental protection requirements. As will be discussed below, the two acts can be reasonably reconciled so as to give effect to both. Second, ASARCO contends the variances sought under RCW 70.94.181 are exempt from EIS requirements under the reasoning of Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 49 L.Ed.2d 205, 96 S.Ct. 2430 (1976). We do not agree. The issue in Flint Ridge was whether the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 et seq. (NEPA) required the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to prepare an EIS before it could register a disclosure statement filed by a private developer. The disclosure statement was required to be filed pursuant to the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act and automatically became effective 30 days after filing unless the Secretary determined it was incomplete or materially inaccurate. The court held in Flint Ridge, at page 791, that where a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists, NEPA must yield. A number of distinctions between Flint Ridge and the instant case support a result contrary to that urged by ASARCO. First, the Federal Disclosure Act did not leave the Secretary discretion to suspend the effective date of the statement except in the sole event it was either incomplete or inaccurate. In contrast, PSAPCA has considerable discretion in the disposition of a variance application. The application can be granted, denied, or a continuance granted. RCW 70.94.181. Second, the Federal Disclosure Act is designed to prevent false and deceptive practices in the sale of unimproved tracts of land. The Washington Clean Air Act is designed to secure and maintain beneficial levels of air quality. Therefore, PSAPCA is prepared to deal with environmental issues where HUD is not. Finally, while NEPA and SEPA are substantially similar in intent and effect, we have held that the public policy behind SEPA is considerably stronger than that behind NEPA. The right ... to a healthful environment is expressly recognized as a fundamental and inalienable right by the language of SEPA. The choice of this language in SEPA indicates in the strongest possible terms the basic importance of environmental concerns to the people of this state. It is a far stronger policy statement than that found in the National Environmental Policy Act which reads only that The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment ... 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c). Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn.2d 271, 279-80, 525 P.2d 774 (1974). In light of these distinctions, we hold there is not a clear and fundamental conflict between PSAPCA's statutory duties under SEPA and the Washington Clean Air Act. RCW 70.94.181(7) requires PSAPCA to take action on a variance request within 65 days of the time a completed application is submitted. The 65-day rule must be read in the full context of RCW 70.94.181. That statute clearly outlines how such variance requests are to be sought and for what reasons, under what circumstances variance requests may be granted, and what factors the agency reviewing the request is to consider. RCW 70.94.181(1) not only requires the filing of a variance application, but also states: The application shall be accompanied by such information and data as the department of ecology or board may require. The statute further mandates that a public hearing be held or due notice provided before a variance decision is made and that the agency make specific findings regarding the broad effects of granting a variance request. RCW 70.94.181(1)(a), (b). It is clear from a careful reading of RCW 70.94.181 and of the Washington Clean Air Act as a whole that the legislature intended the consideration of variance requests to be a thoughtful and deliberate process. Such an intention can be reconciled with the 65-day requirement. Where PSAPCA determines that a variance sought, if granted, will require the preparation of an EIS, it may proceed in either of two ways under RCW 70.94.181. It may treat the application for a variance as incomplete, pursuant to the agency's authority under RCW 70.94.181(1), until such time as the information necessary for completion of an EIS accompanies the application. The 65-day requirement would begin to run only when the application, complete with such required supplementary information, is filed. Second, the agency may request a continuance under RCW 70.94.181 until such time as an EIS can be prepared. By allowing the agency an opportunity to consider thoroughly all information available on the environmental, technological and economic effects of granting a variance from its air pollution regulations, the strong policy behind both SEPA and the Washington Clean Air Act is furthered. We note the Council on Environmental Policy, created by the legislature to adopt rules for the implementation of SEPA, promulgated guidelines effective July 1976. One such guideline exempts from the requirements of SEPA variances under the state Clean Air Act which are for 1 year or less. WAC 197-10-170(13). While this guideline is not applicable to the instant case, it will solve any question that might be raised in the future concerning the interrelationship of the EIS requirements of SEPA and the 65-day requirement of the Washington Clean Air Act. Next ASARCO contends that preparation of an EIS would prevent the improvement of air quality contrary to the express purpose of the Washington Clean Air Act, RCW 70.94.011, and federal law. The federal Clean Air Act directs each state to submit to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) a state implementation plan which must contain certain regulations designed to attain and maintain particular national air quality standards. PSAPCA's regulations are included in Washington's plan which was accepted by the EPA in 1972. ASARCO contends its compliance with PSAPCA's regulations was required in order for ASARCO and PSAPCA to comply with federal law. ASARCO argues that unless the variance was granted or the plant shut down, it could not have complied with federal law. ASARCO's argument fails to recognize that PSAPCA's 5-year variance also does not comply with federal law. The improvements required by the variance, while diminishing the level of pollution, will not bring the smelter into compliance with either PSAPCA's regulations or with federal law. As we will discuss in detail later, the requiring of an EIS does not assure the granting or denial of a variance. An EIS simply assures that the environmental costs will be fully considered when the ultimate decision is made by PSAPCA. Thus, it has little real impact on the question of compliance with either the federal or state Clean Air Act. Finally, ASARCO contends PSAPCA's variance decision is exempt from SEPA because the procedures mandated by the Washington Clean Air Act are the functional equivalent of an EIS. The trial court made a finding to this general effect. In support of this contention, ASARCO cites a number of federal cases which hold that the EPA is not subject to the EIS requirements of NEPA because the federal Clean Air Act requires that the EPA perform the functional equivalent of the EIS procedures. Amoco Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 722, 740 (D.C. Cir.1974); Buckeye Power, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir.1973); Duquesne Light Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.1973). The rationale behind these holdings is that duplicative efforts would be expensive, time-consuming and serve no general purpose. ASARCO argues that the same reasoning should be employed here since PSAPCA must investigate the technological, economic and environmental implications of the variance as well as assess any dangers to public health, safety and property. RCW 70.94.181. We do not agree. We have not heretofore adopted the doctrine of functional equivalency and, in light of the facts presented here, we do not adopt it at this time. PSAPCA is an air pollution control agency. The agency's jurisdiction is limited to air pollution, yet the requested variance may have long-term effects on the land and water of the region as well as on the air. The EPA has much broader environmental responsibility than PSAPCA and therefore is equipped to evaluate the full range of potential environmental effects of air pollution. Thus the federal cases are not applicable to the issue before us. PSAPCA's Regulation I and SEPA's requirement of an EIS were designed to protect the public and the environment from the effects of pollution. Throughout each stage of this proceeding ASARCO has argued that any delay caused by the preparation of an EIS could result in closure of its plant. ASARCO even suggests parenthetically that full compliance with Regulation I might cause the same result in any event. Thus, ASARCO seems to argue that it must be permitted to violate basic environmental regulations or it may close its plant because of the high cost of compliance. This, it is asserted, will cause attendant economic dislocation both within the plant and throughout the Tacoma area. It is of interest, however, that ASARCO has devoted little attention to any real discussion of whether compliance with Regulation I and SEPA is beyond the technological knowledge of the industry. Almost total emphasis is placed on the economic impact ASARCO may suffer if it complies as well as the possible economic impact on the Tacoma area if ASARCO's wishes are not granted. This singular type of approach does not solve the problem under either Regulation I or SEPA. [11] Our holding that an EIS is required in the instant case does not mean the variance cannot be granted. The most important aspect of SEPA is full consideration of environmental values, RCW 43.21C.030(2)(b) and this policy is carried out by the EIS procedure. However, the need for an EIS does not mean a proposed project cannot be built. It merely assures a full disclosure and consideration of environmental information prior to the construction of the project. Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wn.2d 78, 89, 569 P.2d 712 (1977); Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wn.2d 267, 272, 552 P.2d 674 (1976). Nor does the requirement that environmental costs of the proposed action be fully disclosed and evaluated preclude the consideration of other important factors, including the economic costs of denying the variance request. The Washington Clean Air Act expressly provides for evaluation of the financial impact of a variance decision. RCW 70.94.181(1)(a), (b). SEPA does not expressly articulate the need to weigh economic as well as environmental factors. It requires that a detailed statement of environmental impact be available to and considered by the decision makers. It does not require that those evaluating a proposed action consider environmental factors alone. Rather, the essential factors balanced frequently are the substantiality and likelihood of environmental cost and economic cost. [The environmental impact statement] is the basis upon which the responsible agency and officials can make the balancing judgment mandated by SEPA between the benefits to be gained by the proposed major action and its impact upon the environment. Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, supra at 272-73. Having held that an EIS is required, it is not our role to balance these factors. This responsibility lies with PSAPCA. When PSAPCA has before it an EIS which includes all information required by RCW 43.21C.030(2)(c), it may grant or deny the requested variance based upon full knowledge of the consequences. For the first time it will be able to consider all environmental and economic effects of the proposed variance, not just those related to air pollution. We note further that the preparation of an EIS now may not take the 5 months originally estimated at the time the variance was sought. Both PSAPCA and ASARCO have had nearly 5 years to study and evaluate the environmental effects of the high-level emissions from the ASARCO plant. In fact, in oral argument before the trial court, ASARCO's counsel stated: as a gesture of good faith and to satisfy the public and environmentalists, ASARCO is in the process of preparing an EIS. It is in full schedule, PSAPCA agrees, and we are working with PSAPCA. The information contained in ASARCO's EIS should considerably lessen the amount of time necessary for PSAPCA to prepare the formal EIS. The trial court is reversed on this issue.