Opinion ID: 1161659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substitution of Probate Court Judge

Text: It is incumbent upon the courts to meticulously avoid any appearance of partiality, not merely to secure the confidence of the litigants immediately involved, but `to retain public respect and secure willing and ready obedience to their judgments.' People v. District Court, 192 Colo. 503, 507-08, 560 P.2d 828, 831-32 (1977) (quoting Nordloh v. Packard, 45 Colo. 515, 521, 101 P. 787, 790 (1909)). If an appearance of partiality exists, it is incumbent upon a judge to disqualify herself from the proceedings. See generally C.R.C.P. 97; C.J.C. Canon 3. When a judge becomes embroiled in a running controversy with an individual being held in contempt, it becomes necessary for that judge to recuse herself and permit another judge to adjudicate the issue of contempt. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501-02, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974). Whether a judge evidences a lack of impartiality is a question of law; accordingly, our review is de novo. Cf. Wilkerson v. District Court, 925 P.2d 1373, 1376 (Colo.1996) (stating that trial judge's decision regarding legal sufficiency of motion for recusal is a question of law, subject to de novo review); see In re Marriage of Murray, 128 Wis.2d 458, 383 N.W.2d 904, 907 (App.1986). Here, we look at the transcripts of the two hearings held before the probate court to conclude that the probate judge adjudicating the contempt proceeding against Robinson prejudged Robinson's guilt [7] and allowed marked personal feelings toward Robinson to affect her judgment in the proceedings. Taylor, 418 U.S. at 503, 94 S.Ct. 2697; see also SEC v. Simpson, 885 F.2d 390 (7th Cir.1989) (holding disqualification warranted where a party's allegedly unruly conduct provoked the judge to become personally embroiled). At the beginning of the May 25 hearing, the judge stated to Robinson, [I]t's my belief that you may have stolen property from that estate, and we are going to recover that property. Then, a short time into in the hearing, the judge told Robinson, You are in an awful lot of trouble with me. And you are going to be in an awful lot of trouble with the District Attorney's office if we don't get this matter straightened up. These statements, voiced by the probate judge early in the contempt hearing, indicate that she prejudged Robinson's guilt before considering evidence presented by both sides. See Murray, 383 N.W.2d at 907. The transcript of the May 25 hearing also indicates that, in addition to having prejudged the case, the probate judge became personally involved in the dispute, telling Robinson twice to shut up and stating: I have been working on this estate for two years ... [and][w]e are going to get this money back.... I don't care whether you have to call everybody that you gave money to.... [U]ntil you free yourself from contempt, you are going to spend every night in jail until I get that money back. The record of the June 29 hearing also indicates that the probate judge had become personally embroiled in the controversy. For example, the probate judge stated to Robinson's new attorney that I have advised [Robinson] before that if I had stolen a hundred and two thousand dollars and had given it to friends or family or spent it ... I would make some effort to demonstrate ... that I was trying to get some of that money back, and I think she could easily get her hands on this money and that she has not. She has chosen not to do it out of spite toward her brother, and that is the basis of the Court order of contempt. Substitution is proper in this case not only on the grounds that the probate judge appeared personally involved in the controversy and had prejudged the case, but also because the judge referred the case to the district attorney for potential criminal prosecution. As a result of this action, the judge may become a witness in any criminal prosecution undertaken by the district attorney, raising concerns over a potential conflict of interest. Because the record in this case has raised an appearance of possible bias and prejudgment on the part of the probate judge, we hold that another judge be substituted to conduct contempt proceedings on remand.