Opinion ID: 2581377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the defendant's driving and medical records

Text: Last, Jenkins argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to use (1) the DOR's records on Jenkins' physical or mental condition; and (2) other medical records. As stated above, the standard of review for admission of evidence is abuse of discretion. Lumley, 266 Kan. at 950. To the extent the analysis requires statutory interpretation, the standard of review is unlimited. Babe Houser Motor Co. v. Tetreault, 270 Kan. 502, 506, 14 P.3d 1149 (2000). Jenkins first argues the trial court improperly admitted the DOR's records pertaining to his physical or mental condition. He relies on K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 74-2012(b), which provides in relevant part: All records of the division of vehicles relating to the physical or mental condition of any person ... shall be confidential. The parties have not cited and we have not found in our independent research any opinions that have interpreted K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 74-2012. The State has three responses to the K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 74-2012 argument. First, the records belong to the DOR, not Jenkins; thus, only the DOR has standing to protest a violation of K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 74-2012. Second, the disclosure of the records was necessary to prove the commission of a felony. And third, Jenkins referred to the facts contained in the records, thus rendering the disclosure not prejudicial. The statute requires all records relating to a person's physical or mental condition to be confidential. K.S.A. 74-2012(b). One way of approaching this issue is to consider what the legislature meant by making the information confidential and whether the legislature meant for the information to be both confidential and privileged. The statutory provisions for the spousal and lawyer-client privileges found at K.S.A. 60-423(b) and K.S.A. 60-426 respectively provide a privilege for a communication that is otherwise confidential. Confidential means meant to be kept secret or characterized by trust and a willingness to confide in the other. Black's Law Dictionary 294 (7th ed. 1999). Privilege means a special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons; an exception to a duty. Black's Law Dictionary 1215 (7th ed. 1999). Upon further reading of the statute, it becomes clear the section is concerned with the disclosure of the information to third parties. For example, K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 74-2012(c) prohibits the selling of information, presumably to marketers. In this case, the information, while becoming public as a result of the court case, was not directly disclosed to third parties but, instead, used in a court case directly involving Jenkins. Jenkins argues the legislature's provision of specific exceptions to the general confidentiality rule in K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 74-2012(b) for photographs or digital images should be read to strictly prohibit this court from finding any further exceptions. While this is a strong argument, the court must also interpret a statute in such a way as to carry out the legislative intent: It is a general rule of construction that the courts have no authority to create, and will not create, exceptions to the provisions of a statute not made by the act itself. Where the legislature has made no exception to the positive terms of a statute, the presumption is that it intended to make none. No rule of public policy is available to create exceptions to a statutory rule. It is especially true that the power to create exceptions may not be exercised where the words of the statute are free from ambiguity. On the other hand, there are some cases in which exceptions to the general provisions of a statute may be implied by the courts, such as where the exceptions are necessary to give effect to the legislative intent. Of course, exceptions must appear plainly from the express words or necessary intendment of the statute. 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes § 213. Assuming the DOR violated K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 74-2012, the remaining issue is the remedy for this case. The question becomes whether it was the legislative intent to shelter a person submitting medical forms with false information from prosecution under K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 74-2012. The State argues the information belongs to the DOR and only the DOR has standing to complain of a violation. Jenkins seems to assume any violation of K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 74-2012 requires a reversal of his conviction. Neither party cited authority to support their respective positions. [E]rrors that do not affirmatively cause prejudice to the substantial rights of the complaining party do not require reversal when substantial justice has been done. State v. Clark, 263 Kan. 370, 376, 949 P.2d 1099 (1997). The purpose of the confidentiality rule in K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 74-2012(b) must be to encourage the honest disclosure of medical information, not to protect a person from submitting false information. Jenkins did not have a substantial right to submit false information, and the error in admitting the records, if there was one, was harmless. Jenkins also argues the trial court erred in admitting his medical records produced by Dr. Hassan. Jenkins concedes our state law does not prohibit the use of such records, but argues the trial court violated federal statutes and regulations. The federal law cited, 42 U.S.C. 290dd-2(a) (1994) provides in relevant part: (a) Requirement. Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any patient which are maintained in connection with the performance of any program or activity relating to substance abuse education, prevention, training, treatment, rehabilitation, or research ... shall ... be confidential and be disclosed only for the purposes and under the circumstances expressly authorized under subsection (b) of this section. (Emphasis added.) Beyond pointing out that Dr. Hassan admitted in testimony that his clinic was a federal medical provider Jenkins does not explain how his involvement with Dr. Hassan was related to substance abuse; thus, the federal law appears inapplicable in this case. However, assuming that the federal statute was applicable and that it was violatedwhat is the proper remedy? The Supreme Court of Montana, in a divided opinion, held that the fine contemplated in 42 U.S.C. § 4582(f) (1970), which has been transferred and replaced by 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(f) (1994), was the sole remedy, not suppression of the evidence: The fact that a remedy is provided in the legislation indicates that Congress considered the possibility of a violation and determined the appropriate remedy for that violation. If Congress had intended that suppression and dismissal were the appropriate remedies for a violation of a confidentiality it would have so provided. State v. Magnuson, 210 Mont. 401, 408, 682 P.2d 1365 (1984). The court did not err in admitting Jenkins' driving and medical records. Affirmed. DAMS, J., not participating. BRAZIL, Chief Judge Retired, assigned. [1]