Opinion ID: 6221815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Changing Justifications for Termination

Text: The final argument we address is Litzsinger’s claim that the Coroner’s reasons for termination have changed throughout this litigation and that such inconsistences show the Coroner’s proffered reason for termination is pretextual. Contradictions or inconsistencies in an employer’s proffered reason for termination can be evidence of pretext. Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 994 (10th Cir. 2005). For instance, a jury can reasonably infer pretext when an employer provides one explanation for an adverse action but later affirmatively disclaims or otherwise abandons the rationale. Id. But pretext cannot be established by “the mere fact that the [employer] has offered different explanations for its decision.” Jaramillo v. Colo. Jud. Dep’t, 427 F.3d 1303, 1311 (10th Cir. 2005). Rather, “inconsistency evidence is only helpful to a plaintiff if ‘the employer has changed its explanation under circumstances that 17 Appellate Case: 21-1106 Document: 010110645319 Date Filed: 02/15/2022 Page: 18 suggest dishonesty or bad faith.’” Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 1002 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1310). During the probation meeting on August 30, the Coroner listed the many policy violations committed by Litzsinger and told her, “There are a million reasons to terminate you.” Ex. U (audio clip), at 00:01–07 (filed conventionally). The Coroner explained that Litzsinger could be fired for, among other things, “dereliction of duty, fraudulent records, [and] spending extensive worktime doing email/internet searches.” Id. at 00:09–21. Litzsinger agreed with the Coroner’s assessment and admitted to her that “you have every right to terminate me right now.” 6 Ex. V at 01:31–33. Instead of terminating Litzsinger, the Coroner placed her on probation and made it clear that while on probation, Litzsinger would only be allowed to use the Internet for work-related reasons. Less than two weeks after she was placed on probation, several co-workers reported that Litzsinger had visited personal websites during work hours. Litzsinger’s supervisors checked her Internet history and confirmed the report. Litzsinger admits that she briefly visited a utilities website to help her son with a 6 Litzsinger claims this comment lacked sincerity and that she only said it “to be subservient.” App., Vol. II at 143. But Litzsinger does not offer any evidence to contest the validity of any of the grounds supporting termination. Instead, Litzsinger admitted during her deposition that she violated numerous Coroner’s Office policies. The admitted violations include missing deadlines in violation of the case completion policy, App., Vol. I at 45–46, using the Internet for 60-90 minutes per shift for personal reasons in violation of the electronic media usage policy, id. at 47–48, and submitting erroneous timecards in violation of the time records policy, id. at 52–53. 18 Appellate Case: 21-1106 Document: 010110645319 Date Filed: 02/15/2022 Page: 19 power outage. She also admits that she visited a photography website to show co-workers photos from her photography business. 7 The Coroner terminated Litzsinger on September 16, 2018. The parties agree that on that day, the Coroner told Litzsinger that she was being fired for visiting personal websites at work in violation of her probation. Litzsinger says the Coroner “gave me no other reason for termination.” App., Vol. II at 143. Litzsinger concedes that the Coroner has never abandoned personal Internet use as the reason for termination. Instead, she argues that once litigation commenced, the Coroner gave additional reasons for termination, which raises the question of whether the Coroner’s initial proffered reason is legitimate or pretextual. Litzsinger first directs us to the deposition testimony of Chief Deputy Coroner Appleberry. During her deposition, Appleberry said that the Coroner terminated Litzsinger for violating the terms of her probation. Appleberry then explained that Litzsinger violated her probation by “using her computer for personal use,” “not working,” and “retaliating against her coworkers” for 7 While Litzsinger admits she visited these websites during work hours, she says she did not think the visits violated the terms of her probation. But the Coroner made it clear that while on probation, “You will not be on the internet doing anything other than work.” Ex. W (audio clip), at 00:13–16 (filed conventionally). The Coroner also told her, “You will follow every policy and procedure and directive as it is stated to you without inserting your own assumptions or interpretations of it. And if you have questions about what it means, you will ask.” Id. at 00:46–01:04. Given these clear terms, Litzsinger plainly violated her probation by visiting the utilities website and photography website. 19 Appellate Case: 21-1106 Document: 010110645319 Date Filed: 02/15/2022 Page: 20 reporting her behavior. App., Vol. II at 149. Litzsinger contends that these additional reasons for termination conflict with what the Coroner told Litzsinger on the day she was terminated, which is that she was being terminated for her personal Internet use. We disagree. The additional justifications are not inconsistent with the Coroner’s proffered reason for termination—rather, they are part of the same violation. Litzsinger was “not working” because she was on the Internet for personal reasons. And Litzsinger retaliated against her co-workers because they reported her for using the Internet instead of working. The fact that the Coroner provided additional reasons for termination resulting from the underlying cause for termination does not show pretext. See Matthews v. Euronet Worldwide, Inc., 271 F. App’x 770, 774 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“[T]here is no support for a finding of pretext if the employer does not give inconsistent reasons, but instead merely elaborates on the initial justification for termination.”). Litzsinger next points us to the Coroner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, where the Coroner explained that it “had several legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for the termination,” including Litzsinger “falsifying her timecards,” being “chronically behind on her work,” “creat[ing] extra work for her coworkers,” and “caus[ing] delays for funeral homes and the families of the deceased.” App., Vol. I at 38. We are not persuaded that these additional reasons show pretext. Reading the motion as a whole, it is apparent that these reasons were simply bolstering the 20 Appellate Case: 21-1106 Document: 010110645319 Date Filed: 02/15/2022 Page: 21 Coroner’s claim that Litzsinger’s termination was justified. The motion does not say that Litzsinger was terminated for the additional reasons, 8 only that Litzsinger could have been justifiably terminated for any number of reasons. These reasons provide support for the Coroner’s statement in the August 30 meeting that there were “a million reasons” to terminate Litzsinger. Ex. U, at 00:01–07. Thus, the additional reasons are not inconsistent with the Coroner’s reason for termination and do not show pretext. Litzsinger analogizes the Coroner’s shifting explanations to those of the employer in Fassbender. But the employer’s conduct in Fassbender is distinguishable. Here, the Coroner told Litzsinger that she was being terminated for her personal use of the Internet while on probation and the Coroner has never abandoned that initial explanation for termination. The Coroner has always maintained that it fired Litzsinger for improper use of the Internet. Although the Coroner offered additional explanations for why probation and termination were justified, Litzsinger has not shown why these additional reasons undermine the Coroner’s proffered legitimate reason for termination. Litzsinger takes issue with the district court’s statement that to demonstrate pretext, “Plaintiff must show contradictions in Defendant’s legitimate reasons.” See App., Vol. II at 218. Litzsinger contends “there is no rule that the various 8 In the motion, the Coroner’s Office does not abandon its claim that Litzsinger was fired for violating the terms of her probation. And the only probation violation discussed in the motion is Litzsinger’s personal use of the Internet. Id. at 35, 39. 21 Appellate Case: 21-1106 Document: 010110645319 Date Filed: 02/15/2022 Page: 22 reasons for termination contradict each other to raise an inference of incredibility. The differing reasons only need [to] show a lack of credibility.” Aplt. Br. at 25. Litzsinger is correct that different reasons for termination do not have to be contradictory to show pretext—they only need to undermine the credibility of the employer’s proffered reason for termination. But this point of law provides no help to Litzsinger because she fails to demonstrate how any of the Coroner’s reasons for termination show a lack of credibility. Providing additional justifications for termination without abandoning the primary reason for termination does not, without more, establish pretext. To support an inference of pretext, the additional justifications must “suggest dishonesty or bad faith.” Twigg, 659 F.3d at 1002 (citation omitted). While it is true that the Chief Deputy Coroner noted additional probation violations in her deposition and the motion for summary judgment included a list of other policy violations that could have supported termination, the Coroner’s Office never deviated from its initial justification for terminating Litzsinger—her Internet use. Litzsinger provides no evidence to show why the additional reasons—which are supported by the record—demonstrate that Litzsinger’s probation violation is too “weak, implausible, inconsistent, incoherent, or contradictory” to believe as the legitimate reason for termination. See Fassbender, 890 F.3d at 890 (quoting Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1179 (10th Cir. 2006)). 22 Appellate Case: 21-1106 Document: 010110645319 Date Filed: 02/15/2022 Page: 23