Opinion ID: 2061648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: As to Reed:

Text: We hold that the photographs were not taken during an unlawful detention. Reed was formally charged with the robbery at 2:00 a. m. Reed's detention thereafter, and during the following day when the photographs were taken, was a legal detention. Compare Vorhauer v. State, Del.Supr., 212 A.2d 886 (1965); Webster v. State, Del.Supr., 213 A.2d 298 (1965); and Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102, 90 S.Ct. 291, 24 L.Ed.2d 299 (1969). Reed also contends that he was entitled to the presence of counsel when the victim identified him from the photographs; that, as a consequence, both the evidence of the photographic identification and the in-court identification were inadmissible. Reed relies upon United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) in which it was held that a suspect or accused had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a post-indictment police line-up in which he appeared, if a subsequent in-court identification, influenced by that line-up, is to be admitted in evidence. We decline to extend the Wade rule to the examination by the victim of photographs of the accused and an out-of-court identification therefrom in the absence of the accused, as in the instant case. Under the growing weight of authority, there is no constitutional right to counsel at a post-arrest showing of photographs at which the defendant is not present; it being held that such photographic identification proceeding is not such confrontation or exhibition of the accused vis a vis the witness as to come within the rule of Wade and the related cases of Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). See People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal.3d 273, 93 Cal.Rptr. 204, 481 P.2d 212 (1971); People v. Martin, 47 Ill.2d 331, 265 N.E. 2d 685 (1970). We recognize that in some jurisdictions, including our own Third Circuit Court of Appeals, it has been held that there is no substantial difference between a line-up of photographs of persons in custody and a line-up of the persons themselves, insofar as the constitutional safeguards required by Wade are concerned; that, otherwise, the line-up requirements of Wade are subject to easy evasion. See United States v. Zeiler (3 Cir.) 427 F.2d 1305 (1970) [4] ; Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970); United States v. Marson (4 Cir.) 408 F.2d 644 (1968); Thompson v. Nevada, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704 (1969). We prefer, however, the reasoning of the more recent decisions of the Supreme Courts of California and Illinois in Lawrence and Martin, supra, and of United States v. Ballard (5 Cir.) 423 F.2d 127 (1970); United States v. Robinson (7 Cir.) 406 F.2d 64 (1969); McGee v. United States (10 Cir.) 402 F.2d 434 (1968), cert. den. 394 U.S. 908, 89 S.Ct. 1020, 22 L.Ed.2d 220 (1969); and United States v. Bennett (2 Cir.) 409 F.2d 888, cert. den. Haywood v. United States, 396 U.S. 852, 90 S.Ct. 113, 24 L.Ed.2d 101 (1969), wherein Judge Friendly stated:    to require that defense counsel be allowed or appointed to attended out-of-court proceedings where the defendant himself is not present would press the Sixth Amendment beyond any previous boundary. None of the classical analyses of the assistance to be given [an accused] suggests that counsel must be present when the prosecution is interrogating witnesses in the defendant's absence even when, as here, the defendant is under arrest; counsel is rather to be provided to prevent the defendant himself from falling into traps devised by lawyers on the other side and to see to it that all available defenses are proffered   . We agree with the rationale of the latter line of cases and conclude that a photographic identification proceeding, unattended by the defendant, is not such confrontation or exhibition as to come within the rule of the Wade case. In Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall, the police exhibited the accused to witnesses in person. At such corporeal exhibitions, the accused may be required to move about, speak, wear certain clothes, or do other things that may incriminate him. Not so at a photographic identification proceeding unattended by the accused. The rule of the Wade case, in our opinion, does not encompass identifications made in the absence of the accused. We decline to extend it that far. We recognize, of course, that the possibility of unfairness exists in photographic identifications as well as in corporeal identifications. However, as was stated in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 the danger that use of the technique may result in convictions based on misidentification may be substantially lessened by a course of cross-examination at trial which exposes to the jury the method's potential for error. For this purpose, it is important that the photographs from which the witness made the out-of-court identification be preserved and made available to defense counsel at trial so that the possibility of prejudice may be revealed and the out-of-court identification may be impugned. People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal.3d 273, 93 Cal.Rptr. 204, 481 P.2d 212 (1971). Accordingly, we hold that Reed's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by the absence of counsel at the out-of-court identification. The determinative issue, then, is the due process question of whether, in the light of the totality of the circumstances, the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, (1968); or so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to violate due process, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). See also Redden v. State, Del. Supr., 269 A.2d 227 (1970). In Simmons, although the Court recognized the hazards of initial identification by photograph, it declined to prohibit the practice either in the exercise of its supervisory power or as a matter of constitutional right, holding that a conviction based on an eye-witness identification at trial, following a pre-trial identification by photograph, will be set aside only if the photographic identification proceeding was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Applying the Simmons rule to the totality of the circumstances in the instant case, we hold that the photographic identification proceeding was not impermissibly suggestive within that rule. The details of the out-of-court identification were presented in evidence by the State, and the fairness of the photographic identification was made subject to cross-examination by the defendant and consideration by the court and jury. [5] Ten photographs were shown to the victim, eight being photographs of others and two being photographs of the defendants. The evidence shows that, without aid or hesitation, the victim quickly identified the defendant's photographs as those of his assailants. The defendant contends that impermissible suggestion arose from the fact that his photograph and that of Hawkins bore the dates they were taken on the day after the offense, whereas the other photographs bore dates of earlier years. When queried on voir dire about the dates on the photographs, the victim testified: I never gave it a thought, never bothered to look at that. He further testified: As long as I am standing here and sworn on that Bible, I didn't see that. I didn't pay no attention to that. And to the statement Of the batch given you, only two of them had a recent date on them, the victim testified: I didn't know that at the time. I just found that out. That is the first time I am hearing or realizing it is put on that way. I didn't know that at the time. I didn't know until you pointed it out now. Considering the totality of the circumstances of the photographic identification in the instant case, we are satisfied that the proceeding was not so impermissibly suggestive as to violate due process under the rule of the Simmons case. We hold, therefore, that there was no error in the admission of the evidence of the out-of-court identification, and that there was no resultant taint upon the in-court identification, for either of the assigned constitutional reasons. Compare People v. Lawrence, supra . In view of these conclusions, we do not reach the question of whether the in-court identification had an independent origin; i. e., whether the State established by clear and convincing evidence that the victim, in making the in-court identification, was not influenced by a prior improper confrontation. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 240, 242, 87 S.Ct. at 1939, 1940. Finally, Reed contends that he was entitled to trial separately from Hawkins. No such application was made before or during the trial. Reed was represented throughout by able counsel. The idea comes too late. In this connection, we have considered the defendant's argument that Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) requires a new trial. We find no merit in this contention.