Opinion ID: 3012195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Double Jeopardy and Due Process Claims

Text: McArthur argues that the District Court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the 841(a)(1) count on due process and double jeopardy grounds. First, the District Court held that there was no basis for dismissing count two on a due process theory. We agree. McArthur asserts that the Assistant United States Attorney brought the drug charge in this case to punish McArthur for refusing to plead guilty to a previous indictment. We recognize that prosecutorial vindictiveness can raise due process concerns. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372-84 (1982). However, McArthur lacks support for his claim and a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness is not warranted in this context. Id. at 384. As to double jeopardy, McArthur claims that the federal government may not prosecute him in federal court after the state court, at the State’s request, vacated his guilty plea for the same conduct. Even if we accept, however, that jeopardy attached when McArthur pled guilty to the state charge, the federal government was permitted to prosecute him for the same conduct under the dual sovereign doctrine. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 132 (1959). McArthur argues that this doctrine does not apply because the federal prosecution was a sham, but he does not support this claim. Consequently, we affirm the District Court’s decision.