Opinion ID: 170799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Utah's Standing

Text: The Clingers first contend that Utah lacks standing to litigate the ownership of property above the lower meander line (established in 1874) and that, as a result, the district court erred in granting Utah's second motion for summary judgment and entering the final judgment quieting title against them. In support of their argument, the Clingers invoke alleged concessions made by Utah, statements in prior district court rulings, the Supreme Court's observations in Utah Division of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 205, 107 S.Ct. 2318, and a Utah statute regarding the public use of state lands. They also argue that Utah has improperly sought to assert claims on behalf of the United States and that the interests of a third party are insufficient to establish standing. We consider these contentions de novo. See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006). They are based upon Article III of the Constitution, which grants federal courts jurisdiction over cases and controversies. U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, cl. 1. Without a live, concrete controversy, a federal court lacks jurisdiction to consider the parties' claims. Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1253 (10th Cir.2007). Standing is a component of the case or controversy requirement. Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, Colo., 518 F.3d 1217, 1223 (10th Cir.2008). The requirement that a party have standing serves to ensure that the plaintiff is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). To demonstrate Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The injury must involve a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Id. Importantly, [s]tates are not normal litigants for the purposes of federal jurisdiction and are entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1454-55, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007). Although Article III standing is a question of federal law, state law may create the asserted legal interest. Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813-14 (10th Cir. 1984) (analyzing state law in a diversity case to determine whether the plaintiff had standing); see also Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 684 (9th Cir. 2001) ([S]tate law can create interests that support standing in federal courts.). Here, Utah's quiet title claim against the Clingers arises under Utah law. [A] quiet title action, as its name connotes, is one to quiet an existing title against an adverse or hostile claim of another. ... One seeking such equitable relief must allege title, entitlement to possession, and that the estate or interest claimed by others is adverse or hostile to the alleged claims of title or interest. Utah Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337-38 (Utah 1979). Applying these standards, we agree with the district court's analysis. Contrary to the Clingers' contention, Utah asserted a right to lands above the lower (1874) meander line in the Powell Slough throughout the district court proceedings. Although its initial contention was that its sovereign lakebed lands extended all the way to the upper (1856) meander line, Utah did not abandon its claim to lands above the lower meander line after its more ambitious, upper meander line argument proved unsuccessful. For example, in a memorandum in support of its second motion for summary judgment, Utah stated that [p]arcels surveyed below the upper meander line remain unpatented to this day ( part or all of which un-patented federal surveyed lands are subject to Utah's eventual sovereign lake-bed claim ). Aplt's App. vol. II, at 825 (emphasis added). That language indicates that Utah continued to assert an interest in land between the two meander lines. Importantly, the Clingers also asserted an interest in land between the two meander lines. They explained in their memorandum in support of their motion for partial summary judgment and in opposition to Utah's motion that they indeed claim[] lands, including but not limited to the Powell Slough area between the 1856 and 1874 meander lines. Id. vol. III, at 929. These competing claims to the land between the meander lines are sufficient to establish standing. See Santiago, 590 P.2d at 337. Additionally, we are not persuaded by the Clingers' contention that the district court ruled that Utah lacked an interest in the land between the meander lines. The ruling invoked by the Clingers (the December 2001 decision adopting the historic use and possession analysis of the Provo City cases) did not concern the Powell Slough. That ruling did not foreclose the claim at issue here-that the ordinary high water mark at statehood was above the 1874 meander line in the Powell Slough. The other authorities invoked by the Clingers in support of their standing argument are similarly unpersuasive. Contrary to their argument, the Supreme Court's opinion in Utah Division of State Lands, 482 U.S. 193, 107 S.Ct. 2318, does not bar[] [Utah] from any claim to the title for the lands above the 1874 meander line. Aplt's Br. at 17. The Court's decision describes the location of the property designated for sale by the federal government. It does not purport to define the boundary between Utah's lands and the Clingers' land. Indeed, the Court expressly stated that it was not establishing such a boundary. It explained that [o]ur point is not that the meander line was a `boundary' between the lands under the navigable waters and the adjacent lands granted by the Federal Government to private citizens, nor that this line settled the property rights of those who occupied exposed land within the meander line when Utah Lake receded. Utah Division of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 206 n., 107 S.Ct. 2318 The Court added that [t]he resolution of these issues is complex, depending in large measure on the facts of the specific survey[,] and it therefore expressed no opinion on those issues. Id. Similarly, the public use statute invoked by the Clingers, Utah Code Ann. § 23-21-4(1), does not undermine Utah's standing. The statute reserve[s] to the public the right of access to all lands owned by the state, including those lands lying below the official government meander line or high water line of navigable waters, for the purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing. Id. However, it does not identify a particular boundary between Utah's lakebed lands and the adjoining property. Finally, we agree with the district court that the fact that Utah has admitted that the United States holds property between the meander lines does not mean that Utah lacks standing to pursue its quiet claim against the Clingers. The United States' acknowledged interest in the unpatented land between the meander lines does not establish that it is the only party that has an interest there. As the district court reasoned, [a]lthough the United States may have been the owner of unpatented lands between the two meander lines, that does not automatically make it the owner to sovereign lake-bed lands if such lands are eventually determined to be above the lowest meander line at the time of statehood. Aplts. App. vol. III, at 1072. Here, Utah sought a determination that the United States, not the Clingers, was the owner of the property that adjoined the lake and was therefore the proper party with which to litigate the boundary issue. Despite the United States' interest, the adverse interests asserted by Utah and the Clingers to the property between the meander lines are sufficient to establish Utah's standing.