Opinion ID: 2981256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hamilton’s Appeal

Text: On appeal, Hamilton argues that the district court erred by (1) not decreasing his offense level for acceptance of responsibility, (2) not decreasing his offense level for being a minor or minimal participant in the criminal activity, and (3) enhancing his offense level because he possessed a dangerous weapon. All of Hamilton’s claims lack merit.
The district court did not err in denying Hamilton’s request for a decrease in his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), which permits a two-level reduction when the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” Because the district court “is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,” its determination “is entitled to great deference on review.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 5. A defendant wishing to receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility must prove facts entitling him to such a reduction by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Bacon, 617 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2010). The district court could properly determine that Hamilton did not satisfy his burden. The Sentencing Commission has noted that a § 3E1.1(a) “adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 2. While Hamilton is correct that a “conviction by trial . . . does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction,” a defendant who is tried and convicted is - 17 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton entitled to credit for acceptance of responsibility only in “rare situations,” such as “where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct).” Id. Here, Hamilton argues that he admitted the essential factual elements of guilt and only went to trial to assert the “legal” defense of multiple conspiracies, claiming that while he may have conspired with Dugalic and Batlak to distribute cocaine, he was not a member of the large Dadanovic conspiracy. Although Hamilton argues that his multiple conspiracies defense “did not rest on issues related to factual guilt,” this court has repeatedly said that “‘[w]hether single or multiple conspiracies have been shown is usually a question of fact to be resolved by the jury.’” United States v. Smith, 320 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Schultz, 855 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir. 1988)). Indeed, in this case, the district court instructed the jury, in accordance with the Sixth Circuit’s pattern jury instructions 3.08 and 3.09, to consider a number of factors and determine whether a single or multiple conspiracies existed. The jury ultimately found that the Government proved the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment. In sum, while Hamilton characterizes his defense at trial as merely a legal challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct, the district court correctly found that he disputed a factual element of guilt and, therefore, was ineligible for a § 3E1.1(a) adjustment. Despite Hamilton’s claim to the contrary, this case is unlike United States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798, 806 (10th Cir. 1999), in which the defendant “admitted to all the conduct with which he was charged,” and “went to trial only to contest the legal element of intent.” Here, the Government charged Hamilton with conspiring with Dadanovic and eleven others to distribute cocaine, but - 18 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton Hamilton denied that charge and asserted at trial that he was only involved with Dugalic and Batlak. Thus, unlike the defendant in Gauvin, Hamilton expressly challenged the facts surrounding his guilt, making him ineligible for an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. Moreover, in Gauvin the appellate court upheld the district court’s grant of an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. Hamilton erroneously argues that the district court failed “to make any specific findings of fact as to whether he accepted responsibility for the crime for which he was convicted,” and that it “focused only on whether [his] choice to proceed to trial rendered him ineligible for an acceptance of responsibility adjustment as a matter of law.” The district court was only required to rule on the parties’ dispute over the application of § 3E1.1(a). FED . R. CRIM . P. 32(i)(3). The court did that, finding that Hamilton was ineligible for an acceptance of responsibility adjustment because “[h]e has disputed that he was a member of the Dadanovic conspiracy.” Thus, Hamilton’s suggestion that he was “punished for defending himself” is not supported by the record. Finally, Hamilton suggests that he should have received a § 3E1.1(a) adjustment because he cooperated with authorities during a search of his home, truthfully told officers that he had firearms in his house, and expressed remorse and contrition for his actions at sentencing. While this may be true, in light of Hamilton’s decision to go to trial and assert that he was not a member of the Dadanovic conspiracy, the district court did not err in denying his request for an acceptance of responsibility adjustment.
The district court also did not err in denying Hamilton’s request for a mitigating role reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, which authorizes a four-level reduction in offense level if - 19 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton the defendant is deemed a “minimal” participant in the criminal activity, a two-level reduction if he is deemed a “minor” participant, and a three-level reduction if he falls somewhere in between. In rejecting the minor-participant reduction, the district court cited several cases from this court holding that a defendant is ineligible for a mitigating role reduction if he is held accountable only for the quantity of drugs attributable to him. See, e.g., United States v. Hutchins, 334 F. App’x 748, 750-51 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bailey, 488 F.3d 363, 369-70 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Maynard, 94 F. App’x 287, 294 (6th Cir. 2004). We do not rely on these holdings today, however. They all rely, either directly or indirectly, on other case law interpreting an old version of the Sentencing Guidelines. Since November 1, 2001, the Sentencing Commission has said that a defendant is not precluded from being considered for a mitigating role reduction simply because he is held accountable only for the quantity of drugs attributable to him. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n. 3(A). We need not resolve the extent to which these cases have continuing validity, however, because the district court made sufficiently clear that it would have found that Hamilton was not entitled to a mitigating role reduction in any event. In response to Hamilton’s objection to being denied this reduction, the PSR stated that “it appears he played a crucial role in the organization’s drug trafficking activities as one of several regional-level distributors. While he held no position of authority or responsibility, he was not ‘substantially less culpable’ than his co-defendants in perpetuating the conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs.” At the sentencing hearing, when asked to award a reduction for being a minor participant, the court responded, - 20 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton Let me ask you this. If he—I would agree with you wholeheartedly, if he was held responsible, which I’m happy to do, for the 300 kilograms, and then give him a minor role, there's no question that's what probation's saying here, is that he's a regional level distributor, and he's less culpable than Mr. Dadanovic or the Dugalics. They say it appears he played a crucial role in the organization’s drugtrafficking activities as one of several regional level distributors. While he held no position of authority or responsibility, he was not substantially less culpable than his co-defendants in perpetuating the conspiracy. If he was held responsible for the entire quantity as a member of the conspiracy, then vis-a-vis Dadanovic and the Dugalics, there’s no question he should get a minor role. But if he’s only—and there's a lot of case law on this actually—if he’s only held responsible for his level of drugs, in other words, the regional level of drugs, which he was in charge of, just—I’m not saying he deserves an enhancement, then he would be—then there’s no—it doesn't seem to me there’s a minor role. And there’s all kinds of case law on this that I can cite to you. ... All of these [cases] hold that a defendant is ineligible for a mitigating role reduction if he is held accountable only for the quantities of drugs attributable to him. In some sense, I don’t know that I agree whole—I know they’re published; I know they’re binding, so I accept them. I don’t agree wholeheartedly that they can never get it because I think—this isn’t the situation, but there could be a situation where even though they’re held accountable for the drugs attributable to them, there is a situation where they have a minor role. In other words, a low level player who’s just dealing little chunks in a large conspiracy if—for example, Mr. Hamilton was held accountable, you could make an argument that it was reasonably foreseeable to him that all 300 kilograms. And then you could—I mean, I would say he was entitled to a minor role vis-a-vis the major conspiracy. But it doesn’t matter. That’s dictum; it has nothing to do with this case, so I won’t get into that. But I do recognize those holdings. I recognize they’re binding on me, and in any event, I think it’s appropriate here whether they were binding on me or not, and so that objection’s overruled. R. 657 at 13-16 (emphasis added). This excerpt shows clearly that the district court would have denied the minor participant reduction even if the cases in question were not applied. Thus, even if Hamilton was eligible for a mitigating role reduction, the district court still found that he was not - 21 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton a minor or minimal participant in the criminal activity. Since this finding is supported by the evidence, including but not limited to the testimony of Batlak, the district court did not err in denying Hamilton’s request for a mitigating role reduction.
The district court also did not err by enhancing Hamilton’s offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), which states that “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed, increase by 2 levels.” The Government bore the initial burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Hamilton possessed a dangerous weapon during the commission of the offense or other relevant conduct. United States v. Kimbrough, 376 F. App’x 592, 596-97 (6th Cir. 2010). The burden then shifted to Hamilton to show that it was “clearly improbable” that the firearm was connected to the offense. Id. at 596. While the Government met its burden, Hamilton failed to meet his burden. The Government proved that Hamilton possessed multiple firearms. On October 15, 2009, DEA agents arrested Hamilton, searched his residence, and seized three firearms, including a Romarm/Cugir Model SAR-1 7.62 mm rifle (in a case with two loaded magazines and 17 rounds of ammunition) and a Stag Arms Model Stag 15 5.56 mm rifle (in a case with two loaded magazines and 40 rounds of ammunition), as well as numerous boxes of 7.62 mm ammunition and a loaded 100-round magazine. Circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion that Hamilton possessed these weapons during the time of the conspiracy charged—from July 2007 “through on or about October 13, 2009.” It is certainly logical to conclude that Hamilton did not collect all of his weapons in the two days - 22 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton between October 13, 2009, when the conspiracy ended, and October 15, 2009, when DEA agents searched his residence. Moreover, the type of guns and amount of ammunition that Hamilton possessed strongly suggest that the weapons were for use in the drug trade. As the district court put it: this case “is far from the unloaded hunting rifle in the closet.” Thus, the district court did not err in finding that Hamilton possessed dangerous weapons during the commission of his offense. Lastly, Hamilton did not show that it was “clearly improbable” that the weapons he possessed during the conspiracy were used in connection with the offense. In determining whether a firearm was related to a particular drug offense for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), we consider several factors, such as the proximity of the weapon to the drugs, the type of firearm involved, whether it was loaded, and any alternative purpose for the gun’s presence. United States v. Moses, 289 F.3d 847, 850 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1486 (6th Cir. 1996)). These factors do not help Hamilton. First, Hamilton’s firearms were found within five feet of a small amount of marijuana. Although Hamilton was not charged with conspiring to distribute marijuana, the Government did introduce evidence that Dadanovic’s organization distributed large amounts of marijuana and that, in May 2009, Batlak delivered several pounds of marijuana to Hamilton at his residence. Second, Hamilton does not dispute that the type of guns and ammunition he possessed are commonly used in the drug trade. Third, while it is unclear if Hamilton’s firearms were loaded, several of his magazines were loaded. Finally, Hamilton offers no alternative explanation for the presence of these firearms in his residence. In sum, none of the foregoing factors helps Hamilton show that it is “clearly improbable” that his guns were related to the conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Thus, the district court did not err in imposing the two-level § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. - 23 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton