Opinion ID: 2626014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Janice Failed To Appeal the Bifurcation of the Divorce Proceedings in a Timely Manner, and the Decision to Bifurcate Was Harmless Error.

Text: Janice argues that the trial court's bifurcation order that allowed the legal marriage to be dissolved while reserving all issues of equitable division of the marital estate failed to meet the requirements listed in AS 25.24.155. Janice contends that [n]o finding of any kind was entered by the court [in] reference to the benefits of bifurcation..., which amounts to an abuse of discretion. For an issue of property division to be reserved, AS 25.24.155 requires that the court make a finding that the interests of a party opposing the motion will not be jeopardized by the delay or reservation. [7] We begin our analysis with the threshold question whether Janice's appeal of the bifurcation is timely. Although Janice objected to the bifurcation of the divorce during the February 1, 2008 hearing, she did not appeal the divorce decree itself. Other than her initial objection, there was no indication that Janice intended to challenge the bifurcation until she filed a motion to amend her points on appeal on January 30, 2009. To determine whether Janice's appeal of the bifurcation was timely, we must first consider whether a divorce decree dissolving a legal marriage is a final and appealable order that disposes of the entire case and ends the litigation on the merits [8] when associated issues of equitable division have been reserved. [9] If the divorce decree was final and appealable, the current appeal is untimely, as Janice failed to file a notice of appeal within the thirty-day window available under Alaska Appellate Rule 204(a)(1). [10] Alaska Statute 25.24.155 authorizes trial courts to reserve custody decisions or issues of property division, thus creating a mechanism to allow the final legal resolution of some issues before others in a divorce proceeding. When the resolved issue is the dissolution of the legal marriage itself, parties have a strong interest in finality, rather than having the issue of their marital status reopened at some undetermined future date. This finality provides the parties with certainty as to their marital status for purposes such as tax filings and remarriage because the divorce decree serves as proof of the legal termination of the marriage and the date on which termination occurred. [11] Further, once a divorce decree is issued, there are no further steps for a court to take to dissolve the legal marriage  the union between the parties has been permanently broken. We therefore conclude that the divorce decree issued on February 18, 2008 dissolving the legal marriage between the Husseinis was final and appealable. This appeal is thus untimely. Alaska Appellate Rule 521 provides this court with some flexibility to relax or dispense with the Rules of Appellate Procedure where a strict adherence to them will work surprise or injustice. [12] We recognize that the rule that a divorce decree dissolving a legal marriage is a final judgment, even when some issues have been reserved, had not been announced prior to this decision. Because it would be unjust and unrealistic to expect a pro se litigant to have anticipated this ruling in order to make a timely appeal, we go on to consider the merits of Janice's claim. We begin our analysis by agreeing with Janice's contention that it was error for the trial court to reserve issues of equitable distribution of marital property over her stated objection without making any findings that her interests would not be jeopardized by the delay or reservation. [13] The trial court failed to make the findings required by statute, and there is no indication in the record that Jalal moved for bifurcation and demonstrated good cause. Because bifurcation cannot be granted without a showing of good cause by the moving party and without a finding that the opposing party's interests would not be jeopardized, we hold that the superior court's decision to bifurcate the divorce proceedings was an abuse of discretion. Our next consideration concerns whether this error harmed or prejudiced Janice. Because the bifurcation in this case only resolved the issue of the legal marriage, there was no showing that the early dissolution of the marriage worked any harm by impacting the outstanding property issues. Janice's brief explains that her objection to the bifurcation was based upon her allegation that Jalal had been wasting assets and had refused to obey court orders regarding mortgage payments and discovery. Janice does not explain how the early dissolution of the legal marriage impacted either of these outstanding issues, as her challenge seems more closely related to the trial court's interim order granting Jalal the sole and exclusive authority to manage and operate the Husseinis' business, Alaska Water Systems, during the pendency of the divorce proceeding. Further, vacating the dissolution of the marriage and declaring the parties to again be married seems an inappropriate form of relief at this time. [14] Accordingly, we conclude that while the trial court erroneously granted the bifurcation in this case, this error was harmless.