Opinion ID: 2445108
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Parties Incorporated the Sentencing Guidelines by Reference.

Text: To show that Cuffley and his counsel knew, or should have known, the court could impose the sentence it did, we must analyze separately the two components of the sentencethe period of actual incarceration and the period of probation. As I explain below, the principle of incorporation by reference accounts only for the period of actual incarceration, while the reasonable person standard (the topic of Part IV.B, infra ) accounts for both periods. As such, I will discuss only the period of actual incarceration in this section, and both periods in the reasonable person section. When an existing document is `incorporated by reference' into a subsequent contract, it simply means that the [existing] document is made a part of [that subsequent contract], as if the [existing] document were fully set forth therein. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Associates, 109 Md.App. 217, 292, 674 A.2d 106, 142 (1996) (citing Wheaton Triangle Lanes, Inc. v. Rinaldi, 236 Md. 525, 531, 204 A.2d 537, 540 (1964)). Where incorporation by reference occurs, the existing documents and the contract are to be read and construed together as if they were one. Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 415, 559 A.2d 365, 369-70 (1989). The documents and the contract, in other words, all figure into what a reasonably prudent person in the same position would have understood as to the meaning of the agreement. Cochran, 398 Md. at 17, 919 A.2d at 710. In Wheaton Triangle Lanes, Inc., two brothers owned multiple bowling businesses. 236 Md. at 527, 204 A.2d at 538. These businesses were all indebted to one another in varying amounts. See id. After a rift developed between them, the brothers decided to divide their ownership interests. See id. To that end, they drafted and signed a settlement agreement that, in part, would help them resolve those inter-business debts. See id. Afterward, the brothers also executed general releases; however, the inter-business debts were left intact. See id. For present purposes, it is relevant only that this Court construed the documents together because the general releases referenced the settlement agreement. See Wheaton Triangle Lanes, Inc. at 531, 204 A.2d at 540. It was enough that the later general releases said the obligations assumed and the rights of indemnity arising out of the [earlier] settlement agreement should be fulfilled. Wheaton Triangle Lanes, Inc., 236 Md. at 528, 204 A.2d at 538. In the instant case, the plea hearing record shows that the participants all agreed to a sentence within the guidelines. The State and defense counsel noted, on the record, that they computed jointly the proper Sentencing Guidelines range. ([T]he State will recommend a sentence within the guidelines formulated by myself and Miss Casper[, defense counsel]....). Thus, it is clear the parties intended to (and did) incorporate the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Manual into their negotiations and final agreement. As in Wheaton, it is enough that the parties referenced the Guidelines and stated that their agreed-upon recommended sentence arose directly out of it. Therefore, in construing this plea agreement, we should consider that the parties were not creating their own nuanced definition of the word sentence, but rather were adopting the definition provided by the Guidelines. [6] The Guidelines make clear that a sentence within its range represents only non-suspended, or executed, time. Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8. 1, p. 36 (2001). [7] The law assumes that reasonable lay persons contract mindful of the existing law, Wright v. Commercial & Sav. Bank, 297 Md. 148, 153, 464 A.2d 1080, 1083 (1983), [8] and that includes incorporation by reference. We need not rely on this more generic assumption here, however; the record shows that a reasonable lay person in Petitioner's position is one represented by counsel, and, in the criminal context, we presume that counsel discuss the details of a plea with their clients. See State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 290, 424 A.2d 349, 360-61 (1981) (presuming that counsel explained enough about the nature of the charge to make the plea voluntary); Gilliam v. State, 320 Md. 637, 652, 579 A.2d 744, 751 (1990) (citation omitted) (presuming that where the accused has counsel... he has been informed of his rights, absent evidence to the contrary); State v. Kenney, 327 Md. 354, 363-364, 609 A.2d 337, 342 (1992) (citing Priet and Gilliam for the proposition that, when the defendant is represented, it should be presumed that [the] counsel gave [the defendant] full advice of his options). Thus, incorporation by reference accounts for the first component of the sentence, the period of actual incarceration. Moreover, as explained below, the reasonable person standard accounts for the second component, the period of probation (as discussed below). As a result, Cuffley knew, or should have known, that the court could impose the sentence it did.