Opinion ID: 1239238
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The district court's denial of Townsend's motion to amend

Text: Finally, Townsend argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to amend his complaint and name Warden Farrey as a defendant. The district court concluded that such an amendment would be futile because Townsend's proposed claims against Farrey would not survive summary judgment. See King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 819 (7th Cir.2007); Sound of Music Co. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 477 F.3d 910, 923 (7th Cir.2007). That decision was one left to the district court's discretion, Trustmark Ins. Co. v. Gen. & Cologne Life Re of Am., 424 F.3d 542, 553 (7th Cir.2005), which, we cannot say, the court abused. It would, indeed, be futile for Townsend to include Warden Farrey as a defendant on his due-process claim; as explained earlier, Townsend had no liberty interest in avoiding placement in TLU, and thus his claim would fail regardless of whom he named as a defendant. See King, 496 F.3d at 819; see also Lekas, 405 F.3d at 607. And Townsend failed to establish that Farrey had direct control over the unsanitary conditions in TLU. The most that Townsend asserts is that Farrey should have known about the conditions in his cell because, as the ultimate decision-maker at New Lisbon, she knew that inmates were double-celled in TLU and had to sleep on the floor. But because Townsend points to no evidence showing that Farrey either observed Townsend's cell personally or was informed of his specific situation, he would be unable show that she acted with deliberate indifference by failing to remedy the conditions in his cell. See Galdikas v. Fagan, 342 F.3d 684, 693 (7th Cir.2003) (`An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in [the] alleged constitutional deprivation.'  (quoting Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir.1983))); Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that it would be futile to add Farrey as a defendant to Townsend's Eighth Amendment claim, see King, 496 F.3d at 819, and was right to deny his motion to amend.