Opinion ID: 2542376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: In any Event, the Intended Sentence, Designed to Escalate if Machniak Violated Probation, Was an Improper Sentence.

Text: Although unnecessary to the disposition of the case given that Machniak's three-year sentence in the written Judgment is controlling, we are compelled to explain that the intended escalating sentence, which was agreed to by the parties in the plea agreement and which the trial court attempted to impose, was an improper sentence. In short, even had the trial court or the Commonwealth correctly sought leave to amend the written Judgment under RCr 10.10 while the appeal was pending, the resulting sentence of three years if probated, but twenty years if probation is revoked could not be upheld by this Court. Kentucky's criminal sentencing scheme requires the trial court determine and set a defendant's punishment at the time of conviction. KRS 532.030 pertinently provides that when a person is convicted... he shall have his punishment fixed .... KRS 532.030 (emphasis supplied). The term fixed, as utilized in KRS 532.030, means to put into stable or unalterable form and to establish definitely. Webster's II New College Dictionary 423-24 (1999). See Galusha v. Commonwealth, 834 S.W.2d 696 (Ky.App.1992) ([W]hen one is tried for an offense, upon a finding of guilt, he is entitled to have his sentence fixed with certainty and finality. Constitutional restraints prevent subsequent enhancement.); Commonwealth v. Tiryung, 709 S.W.2d 454 (Ky.1986) (The statutory scheme requires imposition of a sentence of imprisonment or fine upon conviction....) (emphasis added). The requirement that a defendant receive a certain and stable punishment at the time of conviction, which may not be escalated based on something that occurs subsequently, is further reflected in KRS 532.110(1), which provides, when multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant... [the sentences] shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court shall determine at the time of sentence .... KRS 532.110(1) (emphasis supplied). KRS 532.030 and 532.110(1) simply do not give trial courts discretion to impose a sentence with alternating or escalating terms. On the contrary, the statutes mandate that trial courts fix a defendant's sentence at the time of conviction, i.e., fix a term certaina specific number of years for each offenseand then determine whether that sentence or those sentences must run consecutively or concurrently with each other or other outstanding judgments. Consistent with the statutory scheme, our case law makes clear that a trial court may not increase a defendant's punishment because of probation violations that result in revocation. Howard v. Ingram, 452 S.W.2d 410 (Ky.1970) ([A] circuit court is without authority to mete a greater sentence when revoking probation than the sentence which had been prescribed originally.) (quoting Hord v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 530 (Ky.1970)). In Hord, the trial court was asked to interpret a statute, now repealed, which could have been read to vest trial courts with the ability to increase a defendant's punishment on revocation of probation. 450 S.W.2d at 531. However, despite the permissible language of the statute, the Hord Court rejected the notion that a trial court could increase a punishment beyond that initially imposed, because to do so is repugnant to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Federal and State Constitutions.... Id. Nor may a trial court improperly increase a defendant's sentence by obtaining the defendant's consent. See Commonwealth v. Gaddie, 239 S.W.3d 59 (Ky. 2007); Stallworth v. Commonwealth, 102 S.W.3d 918 (Ky.2003); Galusha, 834 S.W.2d 696. As the Court recently explained in McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky.2010), a case in which the defendant agreed to a sentence that exceeded the statutory limits, a sentence that is contrary to the statutes is an improper sentence, the illegality of which is not neutralized by either a jury's recommendation or a defendant's consent. It is the sole province of the Kentucky General Assembly to establish a comprehensive and cohesive system of sentencing laws for the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Trial courts may not impose a sentence that is contrary to the dictates of the legislature, regardless of who suggested or consented to the sentence. Our courts must not be complicit in the violation of the public policy embedded in our sentencing statutes by turning a blind eye to an unlawful sentence. Id. In this case, Machniak's intended sentence was not fixed because it contained the potential for either concurrent or consecutive terms, with Machniak's sentence escalating to twenty years should his probation be revoked. Such a sentence is a clear violation of statutory and case law and could not be legitimized by Machniak's consent. Thus, had the trial court imposed the intended sentence in its original written Judgment or properly amended the written Judgment accordingly, the resulting sentence would not have been sustainable.