Opinion ID: 2597489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Does the DOC have jurisdiction to expunge a prison infraction and conduct a rehearing of the infraction while petitioner's PRP challenging the infraction is pending in the appellate court?

Text: Petitioner claims the DOC lacked authority to expunge his infraction after he filed his PRP in the Court of Appeals challenging the infraction. He also argues that the DOC's rehearing violated his constitutional right to freedom from double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals has reached different conclusions over these issues. In re Pers. Restraint of Leland, 115 Wash.App. 517, 61 P.3d 357 (2003); In re Pers. Restraint of Goulsby, 120 Wash.App. 223, 84 P.3d 922 (2004). In Leland, a DOC hearing officer found the prisoner guilty of testing positive for unauthorized drugs. The prisoner then brought a PRP seeking relief from the imposed sanctions, including lost good time credit. Leland, 115 Wash.App. at 522, 61 P.3d 357. The DOC reheard the infraction while the prisoner's PRP was still pending rather than respond to the PRP on its merits. Id. at 524-25, 61 P.3d 357. The Court of Appeals, Division Three, focused on RAP 16.3(c) and RAP 16.11(b) in concluding that Title 16 RAP confers upon the Court of Appeals (1) original jurisdiction of personal restraint petitions, and (2) the authority to direct or order the steps necessary to decide the appropriate disposition of the petition. Id. at 527, 61 P.3d 357. In addition to RAP 16, the court relied on the principles of double jeopardy in holding that the DOC lacks jurisdiction or authority to summarily conduct a rehearing of a personal restraint petition pending in the Court of Appeals. Id. at 529-30, 532-33, 61 P.3d 357. Despite involving similar circumstances, the Court of Appeals, Division One, rejected the Leland reasoning. Goulsby, 120 Wash.App. at 225, 84 P.3d 922. There, the inmate, Charles Goulsby, was found guilty of arranging for controlled substance to be brought into prison. Id. Goulsby filed a PRP seeking to recover the good time credits he lost as a result of the infraction. Id. In response, the DOC expunged the infraction from the record and asked the court's permission to hold a rehearing. Id. The Goulsby court disagreed with Leland primarily because the Leland court failed to consider RAP 16.4(d) in its analysis. 120 Wash.App. at 228, 84 P.3d 922. Relying on RAP 16.4(d) and the distinctions between prison disciplinary hearings and criminal prosecutions, the Goulsby court held that the DOC had jurisdiction to conduct a rehearing and that neither double jeopardy principles nor due process principles were violated by the rehearing. Id. at 228-29, 84 P.3d 922. In the present case, the Court of Appeals, Division Two, in an unpublished order, also rejected Leland. The Higgins court specifically disagreed with the Leland court's position that double jeopardy principles applied to prison disciplinary hearings. In disagreeing with Leland, the Higgins court pointed to several federal cases that found that double jeopardy did not bar a rehearing of a prison proceeding where the evidence introduced at the initial prison hearing was insufficient. Petitioner argues that we should adhere to Leland and reverse the Court of Appeals. He argues that DOC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct a rehearing. The Leland court cited to RAP 16.3(c) and RAP 16.11(b). Leland, 115 Wash.App. at 526-27, 61 P.3d 357. RAP 16.3(c) provides: [t]he Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have original concurrent jurisdiction in personal restraint proceedings in which the death penalty has not been decreed. RAP 16.11(b) grants the chief judge the authority to determine at the initial consideration of the petition the steps necessary to properly decide on the merits the issues raised by the petition. While RAP 16.3(c) and 16.11(b) support the proposition that appellate courts have exclusive jurisdiction over PRPs, these two sections of RAP 16, however, do not address relief that can be granted outside of the personal restraint procedure. Goulsby, 120 Wash.App. at 228, 84 P.3d 922. For instance, RAP 16.3(c) and RAP 16.11(b) do not preclude other governmental agencies and departments from resolving petitioners' issues through alternative forms of relief. RAP 16.4(d), which the Leland court failed to consider, states that the appellate court will only grant relief by a personal restraint petition if other remedies which may be available to petitioner are inadequate under the circumstances. Here, the DOC's decision to expunge the record in response to petitioner's PRP and to hold a rehearing was an adequate remedy under the circumstances. We hold that a pending PRP does not operate to divest the DOC of jurisdiction or authority to conduct a rehearing of the infraction.