Opinion ID: 1875301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Free Speech Argument

Text: We turn next to Jones's contention that his rap song was protected speech under the Arkansas and U.S. Constitutions. As an initial point, we fail to see where Jones's counsel raised the Arkansas Constitution as an argument before the juvenile judge. Arguments, even constitutional arguments, are improperly raised for the first time on appeal. B.C. v. State, 344 Ark. 385, 40 S.W.3d 315 (2001) (holding, in juvenile delinquency adjudication, that juvenile's equal protection argument was not preserved when it was not raised before the trial court); see also Goff v. State, 341 Ark. 567, 19 S.W.3d 579 (2000); McGhee v. State, 330 Ark. 38, 954 S.W.2d 206 (1997). Because it is not preserved, we will not address his claim under the Arkansas Constitution. Whether Jones's rap song was protected speech under the U.S. Constitution was argued to the juvenile judge by both the prosecutor and defense counsel in closing arguments. The prosecutor contended that the rap song fell within an exception to protected speech because it was a threat. Defense counsel responded that Jones did not lose his First Amendment protection while in school and referred to a Pulaski County School District case where a rap song was found to be protected speech. [4] The prosecutor responded that Jones's rap song fell within the fighting-words exception to protected speech and that the Pulaski County School District case was distinguishable. The juvenile judge agreed and found that the rap song was not protected speech but fell within the fighting-words exception to First Amendment protection. Because the First Amendment and its exceptions were specifically argued to the juvenile judge, and her findings were based in part on constitutional principles, we deem the argument to be appropriately before us. Turning to his free-speech claim under the U.S. Constitution, Jones urges that neither the fighting words nor the true threat exception apply to his case and that his rap song was protected speech. We disagree. Preliminarily, we note that Jones is not mounting a facial challenge to our terroristic threatening statute (Ark.Code Ann. § 5-13-301(a)(1)(A) (Repl.1997)), as was the case with the statute at issue and the vagueness assertion in Shoemaker v. State, 343 Ark. 727, 38 S.W.3d 350 (2001), which Jones relies on. Rather, Jones contends that the application of the statute to his rap song is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The First Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). The United States Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), noted that its jurisprudence, over the years, has recognized several exceptions to blanket protection for expressive speech. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are `of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.') (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942)). Two of those categories of unprotected speech are at issue in this case. The first is the well-established fighting words doctrine. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); Shoemaker v. State, supra ; Johnson v. State, 343 Ark. 343, 37 S.W.3d 191 (2001). The second is the true threat exception. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir.1996) (In general, threats are not protected by the First Amendment.). Fighting words have been defined by the United States Supreme Court as those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra . Quoting the New Hampshire Supreme Court, the Chaplinsky Court alternatively described fighting words as those which have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed. Id. at 573, 62 S.Ct. 766. This court first recognized the fighting words doctrine in 1956 in the case of Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 226 Ark. 80, 288 S.W.2d 589 (1956) (quoting extensively from Chaplinsky and upholding, over striking workers' constitutional objection, an injunction against picketing). We have since applied it a number of times in different contexts. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, supra (assessing as-applied challenges to statute); Lucas v. State, 257 Ark. 726, 520 S.W.2d 224 (1975) (giving statute a narrowed reading); Shoemaker v. State, supra (declaring statute unconstitutional). We agree with the State that the fighting-words exception is not applicable to the facts of this case. The true threat doctrine was first announced in the United States Supreme Court case of Watts v. United States, supra . In Watts , the Court held that the defendant could not be prosecuted for a statement made at a political rally which, when taken literally, threatened President Lyndon Johnson's life. Instead, the Court directed that [w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399. However, the Court also held that the statute which makes a knowing threat against the president a crime was constitutional. The Court did not set out a test in Watts for distinguishing between a true threat and hyperbolic political comment. Since Watts , several federal circuit courts have disagreed on the applicable standards governing the assessment of whether a threat is true and, thus, not protected by the First Amendment. The question has been addressed by the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal and by various state supreme courts as well. The Circuit Courts disagree, however, on whether the appropriate focus should be on the declarant of the statement and what he should reasonably have foreseen, or rather on the recipient of the statement and what she reasonably would have believed. For example, the First Circuit has held that the appropriate standard is whether [the defendant] should have reasonably foreseen that the statement he uttered would be taken as a threat by those to whom it is made. U.S. v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir.1997). However, the Second Circuit has announced its test that a true threat exists when the language on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution. United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 122-23 (2d Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.1976)). The Second Circuit has further said: The test is an objective one namely, whether `an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the letter would interpret it as a threat of injury.' United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.1994) (internal citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, has said: Although it may offend our sensibilities, a communication objectively indicating a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm cannot constitute a threat unless the communication also is conveyed for the purpose of furthering some goal through the use of intimidation. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1495 (6th Cir.1997). See also United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir.1992) ([T]he standard ... is an objective standard, i.e., would a reasonable person consider the statement to be a threat.). The Ninth Circuit has set a slightly different objective test: [W]hether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault. Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775, 782 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir.1996)). The Eighth Circuit has taken a somewhat different approach from those of the other circuits in establishing an objective test. Rather than a brief verbal formulation of a test, the Eighth Circuit has outlined five factors which govern its review of whether a threat is true or hyperbolic. In United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir.1996), the Eighth Circuit said: When determining whether statements have constituted threats of force, we have considered a number of factors: the reaction of the recipient of the threat and of other listeners; whether the threat was conditional; whether the threat was communicated directly to its victim; whether the maker of the threat had made similar statements to the victim in the past; and whether the victim had reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in violence. This list is not exhaustive, and the presence or absence of any one of its elements need not be dispositive. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 925. The five Dinwiddie factors were recently applied in the Pulaski County Special School District expulsion case, which was argued before the juvenile judge and where a rap song was also at issue. In Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 263 F.3d 833 (8th Cir.2001) (panel decision vacated and en banc rehearing granted Nov. 5, 2001), a panel of the Eighth Circuit ruled the defendant school district's expulsion of a student for writing a threatening rap song to his ex-girlfriend unconstitutional. That panel's decision was subsequently vacated on November 5, 2001, and rehearing en banc was granted by the Eighth Circuit. At this writing, the rehearing en banc has not taken place. In Doe , the expelled student wrote his rap song during the summer months when school was not in session. He wrote the four-page song to his ex-girlfriend, K.G., with whom he was extremely angry because she had broken up with him in order to be with another boy. In the song/letter, Doe threatened to rape K.G., sodomize her, and kill her with a knife by hiding under her bed. A friend of Doe's found the rap lyrics in Doe's bedroom. Doe eventually told K.G. in a telephone conversation about the general content of the letter. During this conversation, she asked to see the letter, and he refused. Through the same friend who initially found the letter, she was later able to covertly obtain it. K.G. was frightened and worried about the contents of the letter, and one of her friends reported her concerns to school administrators. After this report, the letter came to light, and Doe was expelled by the school after an administrative process. No criminal charges were brought. Doe filed suit in federal district court to set aside the expulsion, and the district judge ruled the expulsion a violation of the First Amendment. In an unpublished disposition, the district court held that the letter did not constitute a true threat to K.G. The now-vacated Eighth Circuit panel affirmed that decision. That panel, in applying the Dinwiddie factors, particularly emphasized three factors. First, the panel found it significant that Doe did not show the letter to K.G. Secondly, K.G. had no knowledge of any past violent behavior on Doe's part. Finally, Doe and K.G. continued to see one another socially at church functions even after K.G. knew about the content of the letter. For these reasons, the panel affirmed the district judge's decision that the letter did not constitute a true threat to K.G. Turning to the case at bar, we observe that this court has never addressed the true threat doctrine, and, accordingly, has never adopted a test for what constitutes a true threat. In considering the various tests adopted by the circuit courts and various state supreme courts, we conclude that an objective test focusing on how a reasonable person would have taken the statement and using the Dinwiddie factors has the most merit. See also In re Kyle M., 200 Ariz. 447, 27 P.3d 804 (Ct. App.2001); State v. Perkins, 243 Wis.2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762 (2001); In re Steven S., 25 Cal.App.4th 598, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 644 (1994). As reported in Dinwiddie , those factors are not exclusive but provide initial guidance in groping with the question. Applying the five Dinwiddie factors to this case, we conclude that Jones's language constituted a true threat to Arnold. First, there was the reaction of Arnold to the threat. Her reaction to Jones's letter was immediate and unequivocal. Within minutes of receiving it, she asked permission to leave the classroom. She then proceeded to the principal's office where she reported the incident. She was intensely frightened and upset, by everyone's account, and she told the attending police officer that she believed Jones was capable of carrying out the threat because he had a criminal record and knew where her family lived. Secondly, the threat made was not conditional. The lyrics which Jones composed indicated that he was mad at Arnold, and he placed no conditions on his intended conduct. Thirdly, Jones communicated the threat directly to Arnold by handing the note to her. Finally, though Jones had not made similar statements to Arnold in the past, she clearly believed that he had the capacity to carry out his threat. She knew that he had been in and out of juvenile detention facilities for various offenses. And while Jones's offenses may have been nonviolentthe record on appeal does not reveal his criminal history Arnold was convinced that his juvenile record indicated a criminal disposition to make good his threat. Viewing these factors together, we conclude that a reasonable person in Arnold's position would have taken the rap song as a true threat. Moreover, there are several important factual differences between this case and Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., supra . Our review in the instant case is of a juvenile adjudication and not administrative action, as is the case in Doe . Also, unlike Doe , Jones wrote his rap lyrics and within hours gave the song directly to Arnold. Arnold also knew that Jones had a juvenile record for criminal offenses, and she immediately went to the authorities upon receiving the letter and ceased contact with Jones, unlike the Doe victim who continued to socialize with Doe for some time after learning about his rap song. We affirm the juvenile judge's decision. Although the judge based her decision on the fighting words doctrine, we can still affirm her decision because she reached the right result, albeit for the wrong reason. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 339 Ark. 35, 2 S.W.3d 768 (1999) (citing Dandridge v. State, 292 Ark. 40, 727 S.W.2d 851 (1987); Chisum v. State, 273 Ark. 1, 616 S.W.2d 728 (1981)). We hold that because Jones's rap lyrics constituted a true threat to Arnold, the rap song is not protected by the First Amendment. Affirmed. IMBER, J., not participating.