Opinion ID: 2571717
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Gilbert's First Case

Text: The superior court dismissed Gilbert's first case because it found that both parties had failed to comply with any part of the pretrial scheduling order. On appeal Gilbert challenges this ruling, claiming that the superior court failed to take proper account of her pro se status. [1] Gilbert contends that [she] followed the rules to the best of her understanding and as far as she was physically able and that her failure to fully comply with the scheduling order resulted in large part from her inability to receive the discovery she had requested from Nina Plaza. Gilbert claims that she informed the superior court on several occasions that the defendants were withholding discovery and that, until the court informed her at trial that she should have filed a motion to compel, she was unaware of this legal procedure. The record supports Gilbert's assertions, revealing that the superior court failed to provide appropriate guidance to Gilbert in consideration of her pro se status. It is well settled that in cases involving a pro se litigant the superior court must relax procedural requirements to a reasonable extent. [2] We have indicated, for example, that courts should generally hold the pleadings of pro se litigants to less stringent standards than those of lawyers. [3] This is particularly true when lack of familiarity with the rules rather than gross neglect or lack of good faith underlies litigants' errors. [4] We have further indicated that a court should inform a pro se litigant of the proper procedure for the action he or she is obviously attempting to accomplish [5] and should also inform pro se litigants of defects in their pleadings. [6] In return, we have stressed, the pro se litigant is expected to make a good faith attempt to comply with judicial procedures and to acquire general familiarity with and attempt to comply with the rules of procedureabsent this effort, [the litigant] may be denied the leniency otherwise afforded pro se litigants. [7] Here, Gilbert made several efforts to notify the court that she was having discovery problems and needed help. At the trial setting conference on January 6, 2000, Gilbert alerted the trial court that she needed additional time to prepare her case, in part because she had not yet received any of her requested discovery from Nina Plaza. The trial court set the case for trial on June 26, 2000, but, despite Gilbert's expressed concern, it did not attempt to explain the available procedures for compelling discovery. On June 23, three days before trial, Gilbert sought to postpone the trial, filing a motion to reschedule in which she stated that she needed extra time to prepare her case because Nina Plaza continued to deny her access to the condominium records and because her disabilities had made it difficult to prepare. On the day of trial, Gilbert again indicated that she had not received discovery. Although Gilbert said that she would be able to proceed with what she had, she emphasized that she would prefer a continuance. The record confirms Gilbert's claims that Nina Plaza failed to comply with discovery requirements, in spite of being represented by counsel. Yet the superior court found both parties equally blameworthy and dismissed both their cases. The only time the court explained Gilbert's procedural options was when it dismissed the case, stating if you didn't get discovery on a certain date, you should have filed a motion to compel. So there's nothing the court can do about that. Because Gilbert was a pro se litigant and made it clear early on that she was having trouble with discovery, we hold that it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss her case without explaining the basic steps she could take to comply with the pretrial orderincluding the option of filing a motion to compel discoveryand without then allowing her a reasonable opportunity to take those steps. We therefore reverse the order dismissing Gilbert's first complaint. [8]