Opinion ID: 1561306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: GRAVES'S COUNSEL, McDUFFIE/FURMAN & THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Text: At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that McDuffie and Furman, with whom the Commonwealth had cut a deal in exchange for testimony, considered invoking their rights to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, the Commonwealth introduced evidence: (1) that an unknown person approached McDuffie and suggested that he plead the Fifth, after which McDuffie went to see Graves's attorney, Mr. Stewart; and (2) that McDuffie tried to persuade Furman to take the Fifth Amendment. In addition, the Commonwealth asked Furman whether when Aaron [McDuffie] was talking to you about pleading the Fifth, did he suggest that you go talk to Mr. Graves' attorney like he wanted to go talk to? Furman answered in the negative. Finally, in closing argument, the prosecution underscored this testimony by reminding the jury that people have come and talked to [McDuffie] about taking the Fifth ... there's been a lot of pressure on him by others not to testify. The majority addresses Graves's claim of error by stating, Although McDuffie did not identify who had urged him to refuse to testify, the clear implication was that it was someone connected with Graves. We have held this kind of evidence admissible as inconsistent with a defendant's innocence. However, the Commonwealth introduced absolutely no evidence to connect appellant Graves or his counsel with any attempt to get McDuffie or Furman to refuse to testify. The Commonwealth conceded that Mr. Stewart did not speak with McDuffie or Furman, and the attempt to connect this evidence to Graves cannot be supported even by a reasonable inference based on the evidence at trial. It is a rule ... in this jurisdiction that evidence that a witness has been threatened or otherwise influenced in an attempt to suppress his testimony is admissible in a criminal prosecution only where the threat was made by, or on behalf of the accused. Campbell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 564 S.W.2d 528, 531 (1978). Where there is no evidence to connect the defendant with the attempt to suppress testimony, the testimony is clearly inadmissible. Id. Without question, evidence and commentary of this type is highly prejudicial and inflammatory. The majority opinion recognizes this in labeling this type of evidence inconsistent with a defendant's innocence. Particularly in a case such as this one, where the case for trafficking in cocaine is premised on accomplice liability and circumstantial evidence, I cannot conclude that this inadmissible evidence was harmless as to the first degree trafficking in a controlled substance conviction. The evidence of guilt on the charges of wanton endangerment, criminal mischief, speeding and disregarding a traffic control device is overwhelming, and, with respect to those convictions, I believe the inadmissible evidence and commentary regarding McDuffie's and Furman's thoughts about invoking the Fifth Amendment was harmless error as contemplated in RCr 9.24. I would, however, reverse Graves's conviction for first degree trafficking in a controlled substance. I would reverse appellant Thomas's conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance first degree and both of his wanton murder convictions, appellant Woods's convictions for wanton murder, and both appellant Graves's conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance first degree and his wanton murder convictions. I would remand all three appellants' cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JOHNSTONE and STUMBO, JJ., join this dissent.