Opinion ID: 1374138
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Procedural and evidentiary grounds for reversal

Text: We set forth, finally, our reasons for rejecting plaintiff's third basic proposition: that procedural errors invalidated the judgments in that (1) the evidence at the administrative proceedings failed to show that the beverages involved in the accusations against plaintiff were in fair and open competition; (2) the trial court erroneously prevented plaintiff from adducing evidence of unfair competition submitted to the court by the affidavit filed with plaintiff's motion for a new trial; and (3) the evidence before the department did not support the finding that the retail prices had been properly published. [22] As to plaintiff's first contention, we note that the department submitted evidence that all of the brands set forth in the accusations were in fair and open competition with alcoholic beverages of the same general class produced by others (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 24750). In the proceedings which resulted in the first three judgments, plaintiff offered no evidence to rebut this showing. It now seeks to explain its omission on the ground that such proceedings all occurred prior to the decision in DeMartini v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1963) 215 Cal. App.2d 787 [30 Cal. Rptr. 668]. The DeMartini decision, however, did not change the law; plaintiff in each of the proceedings in question was clearly entitled to produce evidence to rebut that offered by the department. Since it did not do so, we cannot uphold its contention. In the proceedings involved in the fourth judgment, plaintiff did attempt, without success, to overcome the department's evidence of fair and open competition; plaintiff now complains of four rulings which supposedly curtailed that attempt. [23] First, plaintiff argues that the hearing officer improperly quashed a subpoena duces tecum by which plaintiff sought to compel the production of certain documents possessed by the department. The officer quashed the subpoena in its entirety only with respect to brands of alcoholic beverages set forth in those counts of the accusations which were subsequently dismissed, thereby rendering moot the validity of this portion of the ruling. [24] Regarding matters pertinent to the other counts of the accusations against plaintiff, the officer granted the motion to quash only with respect to certain records of departmental investigations which had not resulted in any official action. We need not decide whether the involved records contained communications made [to a public officer] in official confidence and thus became privileged (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 5; Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court (1960) 54 Cal.2d 548, 566 [7 Cal. Rptr. 109, 354 P.2d 637]), since we hold that the ruling did not effect such prejudice as to require reversal. The matters in question were relevant, at best, to the possibility that persons other than plaintiff might have engaged in certain unfair trade practices. Even if plaintiff had shown that others were guilty of such illegal conduct, the record would still have amply supported the conclusion that there are on the market commodities produced by others which are so similar in character ... that they provide competition which is not hampered by unlawful trade restraints. ( Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs etc. Drug Stores, supra, 45 Cal.2d 881, 889; see also DeMartini v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, supra, 215 Cal. App.2d 787, 807-808.) [25] Second, plaintiff argues that the hearing officer improperly refused to permit the examination of a witness as to his knowledge of secret rebates which allegedly encouraged unfair competition by retailers. To the extent that the testimony would not have been hearsay, as well as merely cumulative of documentary evidence already subpoenaed by plaintiff, it would, at best, have yielded evidence which plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought to obtain by subpoena. Having properly quashed the subpoena, the officer acted within his discretion in preventing plaintiff's effort to circumvent the prior ruling. [26] Third, plaintiff argues that the hearing officer improperly refused to grant a continuance in order that plaintiff might obtain copies of press releases issued by the director of the department in connection with disciplinary action taken against various licensees. Since plaintiff moved for the continuance one year after the date of the filing of the accusations and six months after the commencement of the hearings, and since nothing indicates that the press releases would have disclosed any evidence that plaintiff had not already obtained by its subpoena, we find no abuse of discretion in the ruling of the hearing officer. [27] Fourth, plaintiff argues that the hearing officer erroneously excluded an article from a trade journal containing excerpts from a speech which allegedly referred to unfair practices in the sale of unspecified brands of alcoholic beverages. Although relevant hearsay evidence may be admitted at an administrative hearing if it is the kind of statement upon which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs (Gov. Code, § 11513, subd. (c); Mast v. State Board of Optometry (1956) 139 Cal. App.2d 78, 85 [293 P.2d 148]), the speech in question attained neither the relevance nor the character required by the rule. Moreover, such evidence could have furnished no more than slight corroboration for the documentary evidence already obtained by subpoena. Accordingly, the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion by excluding the article. Plaintiff's second procedural contention is that the trial court erroneously prevented it from producing additional evidence of unfair competition, which it brought to the attention of the court by an affidavit filed with its motion for new trial. [28] Yet in a mandate proceeding under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the recognized rule precludes the introduction of evidence which the proponent neglected to offer before the administrative agency. ( Housman v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 84 Cal. App.2d 308, 312-313 [190 P.2d 653, 192 P.2d 45].) Plaintiff's third and final procedural contention is that the evidence before the department failed to support the finding that the retail prices of alcoholic beverages involved in the accusations had been properly published. Even if this contention had been seasonably advanced, [23] we would doubt its validity. At the time plaintiff committed the acts involved in the various accusations, section 24755 of the Business and Professions Code contained no requirement of publication and rule 99 called only for publication in a trade journal or industry price book. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 4, § 99, subd. (d).) In 1961 the Legislature amended section 24755 to provide that any person filing a minimum retail price schedule should cause such schedule to be published in a manner which will result in each retailer affected by such schedule being advised of the contents of such schedule prior to the effective date thereof. (Stats. 1961, ch. 635, § 4.) Rule 99, as repromulgated in 1961, has continued to require publication in a trade journal of general circulation in the trading areas affected. (Cal.Admin. Code, tit. 4, § 99, subd. (k).) Plaintiff concedes that all of the above requirements have been met. [29] Government Code section 6040, upon which plaintiff predicates its argument that the prices must be published in a newspaper of general circulation, does not apply to this case; that section operates only when the matter in question is required by law to be published in a newspaper; no such requirement existed at any time relevant to the instant proceedings. [30] Nor do we find any basis for plaintiff's remaining argument that the person filing the minimum retail price schedule must publish it personally and must keep it current. Having concluded for the reasons set out above that the retail price maintenance provisions possess no constitutional infirmity, that section 24755.1 does not apply to the present case, and that plaintiff's evidentiary and procedural objections cannot stand, we must affirm the judgments. The judgments are affirmed.