Opinion ID: 1111148
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court err in refusing to allow darby to present his defense of self-defense in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution?

Text: Darby asserts that the following errors committed by the trial court prevented him from effectively establishing his defense of self-defense. The appellant argues that the trial court refused to allow Roy Tatum to testify as to what he heard Darby say after Darby allegedly ran away when Richardson shot between his legs on another date. The testimony to which Darby is referring is the testimony of Roy Tatum which appears in the record as follows: A. We  like I said, I be around the flats and I was hanging around the flats and one night, you know, we were all hanging around and Darby, you know, he was down there with me. Well, we wasn't together, but we were, you know, around, kind of kicking it around. So he came down and parked his car and left walking, you know. I guess about twenty or thirty minutes later a lot of guys outside of the place, we heard a shot and next thing we know we saw Darby running the opposite way, you know, and by the time I caught up with him he had told me then that  BY MS. BENNETT: We object to hearsay. BY MR. MOORE, Continuing: Q. You can't tell what he said. You can tell, and I wish you would, tell the Jury what was his condition. A. When I saw him he was scared. He had told me that the guy  BY MS. BENNETT: I object to what he told him. BY THE COURT: Sustained. A. Well, you could see it, you could see  BY MR. MOORE, Continuing: Q. That's what I want you to tell about, what you could see, rather than what you heard Darby say. A. You could see he was scared and he had been running and he was sweating a lot. The appellant is apparently arguing that he was precluded from presenting evidence that Richardson had shot at him on a previous occasion, that Tatum knew of this matter and that that event had given rise to a reasonable apprehension of harm on Darby's behalf of which Tatum had personal knowledge. In Jackson v. State, 426 So.2d 405, 408 (Miss. 1983) we recognized that much flexibility should be given to defendants in presenting prior harassments, threats and assaults directed toward them. Such evidence is material to the motives of both defendant and the victim. Id. See also Gates v. State, 484 So.2d 1002 (Miss. 1986). The appellant also argues that by initially excluding evidence that Richardson and Yvonne Tynes were trading food stamps for drugs the trial court prejudicially affected the credibility of Darby's testimony when Darby was later allowed to testify to those same matters. The testimony was eventually elicited from Darby in the presence of the jury and there was no evidence that Darby's credibility was discounted. The appellant also argues that the trial judge informed the defense counsel that if he brought up Darby's status as a police informer that the court would allow the State to go into all of Darby's prior crimes. Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence applies because the record reflects that the attorney for the State asked a question about a long record of prior crimes to which nothing has happened on most of them. Rules 608 and 609 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence apply only to other criminal convictions to be used for impeachment purposes. Vick v. Cochran, 316 So.2d 242 (Miss. 1975). Rule 404(b) states: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. According to United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1978), where other crimes or acts of the defendant are offered into evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), a two-step test must be applied. It must first be determined that the evidence possesses probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its potential for undue prejudice, and must meet the other requirements of Rule 403. The other requirements being that before an exception to the general rule excluding evidence of other crimes from admission in criminal cases can be invoked, the trial court must be satisfied that 1) there is plain, clear and convincing evidence of a similar offense, 2) the offense is not too remote in time, 3) the element of the similar crime for which there is a recognized exception is a material issue in the case, and 4) there is a substantial need for the probative value of the evidence. The danger of prejudicial effect inherent in the use of similar acts evidence is such that all prerequisites must be met before the evidence may be admitted. United States v. Silva, 580 F.2d 144 (5th Cir.1978). In the case sub judice the trial judge stated no reasons for his ruling that all prior crimes committed by Darby (but not necessarily for which he was convicted) would be subject to exploration on cross-examination. The reason Darby wanted to testify to his status as a police informer was to show that Darby knew about Richardson's involvement in illegal activity and that Richardson had reason to fear that Darby would expose the illegal activities. This testimony was obviously relevant to Darby's defense of self-defense since Darby conceivably could have had a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm by Richardson because Richardson knew Darby was an informer. The general rule in Mississippi is that in criminal trials, with certain exceptions, proof of other criminal conduct by the accused is inadmissible. Tobias v. State, 472 So.2d 398, 400 (Miss. 1985); Donald v. State, 472 So.2d 370, 372 (Miss. 1985); Mason v. State, 429 So.2d 569, 572 (Miss. 1983). Our cases recognize certain limited exceptions to the rule. According to Tucker v. State, 403 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Miss. 1981): Proof of another crime is admissible where the offense charged and that offered to be proved are so connected as to constitute one transaction, where it is necessary to identify the defendant, where it is material to prove motive and there is an apparent relation or connection between the act proposed to be proved and that charged, where the accusation involves a series of criminal acts which must be proved to make out the offense, or where it is necessary to prove scienter or guilty knowledge. See, Smith v. State, 223 So.2d 657 (Miss. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1030, 90 S.Ct. 1274, 25 L.Ed.2d 542 (1970); Cummings v. State, 219 So.2d 673 (Miss. 1969), cert. den. 397 U.S. 942, 90 S.Ct. 954, 25 L.Ed.2d 122 (1970). ([ Gray v. State ], 351 So.2d [1342] at 1345 [Miss. (1977)]). The cases hold that admission of proof of other crimes which do not fall into these exceptions must be reversed. Tobias v. State, 472 So.2d 398, 400 (Miss. 1985). The main question raised in this case is whether or not the court's ruling prevented the appellant, Darby, from presenting his defense. We find that the trial court erred in ruling that the State could explore prior crimes of the defendant for which he had not been convicted. This rule is settled in Mississippi by Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence and numerous decisions of this Court discussed above. Rule 103 of Mississippi Rules of Evidence states that error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected and a timely objection is made or the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by an offer of proof or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. We find that the right of a defendant to put on evidence that he acted in self-defense is a substantial right as mandated by Rule 103. The right to due process mandates that the defendant be allowed to show what facts he relied on to give him a reasonable apprehension of immediate harm. Here the defendant was an informer. The victim was engaged in unlawful activity. The victim knew Darby was an informer and the victim knew Darby knew of his involvement in food stamp fraud. Richardson, the victim, had even previously threatened Darby. By informing defense counsel that the court would allow other crimes evidence to be put in evidence the court made an erroneous evidentiary ruling which seriously affected the appellant's rights to due process by preventing him from putting on his defense. The appellant also argues that the trial court erred when it sustained an objection by the State when defense counsel asked Richardson if he used a gun in committing an auto burglary. Rule 608(b) Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides that specific instances of conduct of a witness are admissible on cross-examination of a witness if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness but only where the character trait of truthfulness or untruthfulness is being explored. This was not the case here. The defense counsel was simply attempting to impeach the witness' testimony. Therefore, since the witness' character trait for truthfulness was not in issue the court did not err in sustaining the State's objection. However, we find that the trial court did prevent Darby from putting on his defense of self-defense in ruling that the State could explore prior crimes committed by Darby for which he was not convicted. The right to raise defenses and to put on evidence in support of these defenses is a substantial right  that of due process. Therefore, we reverse and remand on this assignment of error.