Opinion ID: 4016912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Excluded Expert Testimony

Text: Paolino-Issa allege that the trial judge erred in excluding from evidence a portion of the expert testimony of Dr. Roseen as a result of Paolino-Issa's tardiness in filing Dr. -7- Roseen's revised expert report. This claim faces a high bar and falls well short. When reviewing a district court sanction regarding a discovery violation, this court will be deferential to the trial judge. See Macaulay v. Anas, 321 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2003). When a party aspires to disclose expert evidence out of time and the trial court opts to exclude it, we review that determination for abuse of discretion. Santiago-Díaz v. Laboratorio Clínico y De Referencia Del Este, 456 F.3d 272, 275 (1st Cir. 2006). Under the abuse of discretion standard, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the district court unless left with a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment. Schubert v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 148 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954)). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(1): A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a) -- or who has responded to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission -- must supplement or correct its disclosure or response: (A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing; or (B) as ordered by the court. -8- Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). Pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1), reports that are not disclosed in a timely manner are automatically excluded and may not be used to supply evidence . . . unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). In Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., this court stated that when reviewing a district court's decision to preclude expert testimony, it will consider: (1) the history of the litigation; (2) the sanctioned party's need for the precluded evidence; (3) the sanctioned party's justification . . . for its late disclosure; (4) the opponent-party's ability to overcome the late disclosure's adverse effects . . . ; and (5) the late disclosure's impact on the district court's docket. 590 F.3d 72, 78 (1st Cir. 2009). We find that, far from an abuse of discretion, the district court's decision to exclude the untimely supplement to Dr. Roseen's report passes the five-factor Esposito test easily. Regarding the history of the litigation, Paolino-Issa repeatedly missed deadlines for discovery and motions. See Esposito, 590 F.3d at 79. While Paolino-Issa contend that the information is crucial to their case, Paolino-Issa presented numerous other forms of evidence as well as nine other witnesses; moreover, Dr. Roseen was allowed to testify -- only the untimely portion of his report was excluded. Paolino-Issa claim their tardiness owed to -9- Defendants' refusal to permit them entry onto the property. But Paolino-Issa concede that they did not file a motion to obtain an order to inspect the Property -- as opposed to a request for entry -- until February 19, 2014, though experts' reports were to be disclosed by February 28. Moreover, Paolino-Issa did not retain Dr. Roseen until early February, further undermining PaolinoIssa's asserted justification for their tardiness. As to the fourth Esposito factor, as the district court noted, PaolinoIssa's motion to serve a revised expert report [came] months after the deadline for expert disclosures had passed and only after the Defendants . . . had filed their motion for summary judgment. Defendants had already relied on the original report from Dr. Roseen in drafting their motion for summary judgment. To grant the request to supplement Dr. Roseen's report on June 13 would have substantially affected both Defendants, who had tangibly relied upon that initial disclosure, and the district court. See Santiago-Díaz, 456 F.3d at 277; Gagnon v. Teledyne Princeton, Inc., 437 F.3d 188, 197-99 (1st Cir. 2006). Paolino-Issa's Esposito-based fatal sanction argument likewise fails. In Esposito, the plaintiff's need for the expert was so great that the magistrate judge's decision to preclude the expert, although technically not a dismissal of Esposito's case, effectively amounted to one. 590 F.3d at 78. Granted, when -10- preclusion carrie[s] the force of a dismissal, the justification for it must be comparatively more robust. Id. at 79; see Young v. Gordon, 330 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2003). But here the preclusion of a portion of an expert witness's report in this case following discovery, rather than before a successful motion for summary judgment, did not constitute a de facto dismissal. Dr. Roseen was still allowed to testify, along with other witnesses, and the dismissal cannot be attributed to the exclusion of the supplement to Dr. Roseen's tardily tendered report. We thus find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exclude the revised report.