Opinion ID: 692054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Clothing Seized From Randy Newell's Car

Text: 128 We next address Mr. Smith's claim the prosecution failed to disclose the clothes seized from Mr. Newell's car. As indicated above, there is no distinction in the prosecutor's obligation to disclose Brady material when the defense makes a general request as compared to when the defense makes no request at all. If the evidence in question has an obviously exculpatory character, then disclosure of that evidence is mandatory. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. at 2399. 129 In the present case, Mr. Smith argues the State was aware of the clothes prior to trial, that it suspected the substance on the women's underwear was blood but that it never tested the substance, and that it did not make the clothing available to the defense to allow it to test the substance. Thus, in the context of this case, given Newell's possible involvement in this case, Mr. Smith argues the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose the clothing. The State responds by arguing that any potential exculpatory value of the clothing is speculative since no testing was ever done, that the clothes were in the evidence room and were available upon request from Mr. Harris, and the magistrate judge found the clothing was not material. 45 130 As an initial matter, there can be no doubt if the prosecution had tested the clothing, the results of those tests would have to be disclosed pursuant to the court's discovery order. That order provided, in relevant part, that the district attorney's office shall disclose to the defense, inter alia, scientific experiments made in connection with this case, immediately, and shall continue to provide the copies to the defense counsel during the pendency of this action. The clothes, however, were never tested and no scientific reports ever produced before the clothes were destroyed. It is also undisputed both Ms. Ferrara and Mr. Anuskewicz knew these clothes existed prior to the start of the first trial in this matter; they had examined them at the evidence room in the Albuquerque Police Department. 131 The question thus becomes whether the prosecution had an obligation to disclose either the existence of these clothes, any testing of the clothes, or both, 46 to the defense, knowing that: they were seized from the vehicle of another suspect; everyone who examined the underwear said the substance might have been blood; the substance on the underwear was on the same side as the gunshot wound to Talton's leg; and Mr. Newell, a self-interested witness who was a suspect in these same crimes and who had been stopped in the vicinity where the bodies were found, indicated the substance was menstrual blood even though the substance was not in an area where menstrual blood would ordinarily be found. Under the unusual circumstances of this case, we believe the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements of Brady by not disclosing these clothes to the defense. 132 First, we once again reject the prosecution's reliance on its open file policy. The prosecution knew about the circumstances surrounding the seizure of these clothes, and Mr. Harris testified he was never made aware of their existence. He had no reason to know he should have asked to see these clothes since he did not know they existed. 47 While the clothes were marked in the evidence room with a tag, it stated Articles from vehicle accident, and nothing more. Because Mr. Harris was never given the police reports indicating clothing had been seized from Mr. Newell's car and because he otherwise had no way of knowing he should be looking for these clothes, the prosecution's failure to advise him specifically of their existence was faulty. 133 Second, we have no trouble concluding this evidence was favorable to Mr. Smith. Even without medical tests of the clothing to evaluate whether the substance was in fact blood, the mere fact that Mr. Newell had these clothes in his car would itself have been a subject for cross-examination. As for the lack of any testing, the State's argument that the potential exculpatory value of testing is speculative because none was ever done is not persuasive. The State possessed these clothes and at least Ms. Ferrara recognized the potential importance of the substance on the clothes, and she thus suggested tests be done. In spite of this initial decision, no tests were ever performed and the clothes were never made available to the defense to allow it to conduct independent tests. Under these circumstances, the State may not now claim that whatever exculpatory value the clothes possessed was speculative. 134 Finally, while the State asserts this evidence was not material, in reliance on the magistrate judge's conclusion, we again respectfully disagree with that ruling. Our de novo review of the entire record in this case convinces us the result of the proceeding could reasonably have been different had the clothes taken from Mr. Newell's car been disclosed to the defense. This evidence was highly probative with respect to Mr. Smith's defense at trial and could very well have resulted in the first jury returning an acquittal. Under the circumstances of this case, our confidence in the outcome of the proceeding has been undermined. We cannot say that the result of the trial would have remained the same had this evidence been disclosed. Therefore, we find this evidence was material for Brady purposes.