Opinion ID: 1440777
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the award of costs and attorney's fees

Text: At the close of the trial the superior court declared its oral decision. With respect to attorney's fees the court stated, The plaintiff is the prevailing party in this litigation and is entitled to costs and attorney's fees. In its findings of fact the superior court again stated that [p]laintiff is the prevailing party herein, and is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees. The final judgment of the superior court awarded plaintiff costs in the amount of $1,224.91 and attorney's fees in the amount of $6,558.27. The superior court evidently based its award of attorney's fees and costs upon the prevailing party rule of Civil Rule 82 that normally governs the award of attorney's fees. However, divorce actions constitute an exception to this rule. AS 09.55.200(a)(1) regulates the award of attorney's fees and costs in divorce cases. Cooke v. Cooke, 625 P.2d 291, 293 (Alaska 1981); Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71, 76-77 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1048, 98 S.Ct. 896, 54 L.Ed.2d 800 (1978); Burrell v. Burrell, 537 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Alaska 1975). AS 09.55.200(a) provides in part: During the pendency of the action the court may provide by order (1) that one spouse pay an amount of money as may be necessary to enable the other to prosecute or defend the action; ... As noted in Sherry v. Sherry, 622 P.2d 960, 965 (Alaska 1981), the statute permits, but does not compel, the award of attorney's fees and costs. Nevertheless, according to the rule that a proper result will not be disturbed on appeal regardless of the reasoning employed below, [5] the superior court's erroneous reliance upon the prevailing party standard does not constitute reversible error if its distribution of attorney's fees and costs is justified under AS 09.55.200(a)(1). Burrell pronounced the standard for reviewing attorney's fees awards in accordance with AS 09.55.200(a)(1): Whether or not to make any award pursuant to AS 09.55.200(a)(1) as well as the amount of any such award, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The parties' relative economic situations and earning powers are relevant factors to be weighed in determining whether to order payment pursuant to AS 09.55.200(a)(1). 537 P.2d at 7 (emphasis added). Walter contends that the superior court abused its discretion because its award did not conform to this standard. Marilyn argues that despite the terminology used by the superior court the award was in fact consistent with the relative economic situations of the parties and, therefore, should not be reversed. Walter, a former teacher, is 57 years of age and receives $13,000.00 yearly as an early retiree. [6] In comparison, Marilyn is 34 and earns $32,600.00 per year as a school teacher. However, income is not the sole determinant of one's economic standing. We have recognized that other factors may have bearing on the relative economic standing of the parties and are reasonable factors for the trial court to consider. Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d at 77. Such factors may include whether the property was divided equally and whether an equal amount in attorney's fees was expended by the parties. Id. These other factors, however, do not offset the wide differential in current earnings between the parties. [7] Marilyn testified that because of Walter's delinquency she had to pay large debts and expenses relating to their marital property. [8] This is irrelevant in assessing the parties' present economic status. Further, these past payments were considered by the trial court in its award of property to the parties. The superior court's property division awarded Walter real property worth $130,000.00 compared to Marilyn's real property award valued at $108,500.00. This comparison is misleading, however, since some of Walter's property was encumbered. [9] Thus Marilyn received a substantial property award from which she could have paid her attorney's fees. In view of these circumstances, we conclude that the superior court's award of costs and attorney's fees was unreasonable and constituted an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we direct each side to bear their own costs and attorney's fees.