Opinion ID: 2099336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Potential Impeachment Testimony

Text: The defendant's second argument on appeal is that the trial justice erred in excluding testimony by Lynn Saucier which defendant contends would have impeached Danielle Brueske's testimony wherein she denied having told Ms. Saucier that she was involved in kinky sex and that her fiancé (Jarret Ferreira) beat her. [11] The defendant contends that Ms. Saucier would have testified that Ms. Brueske did in fact make statements to her about both matters. With respect to the proposed testimony by Ms. Saucier that Ms. Brueske had informed her that she was involved in kinky sex, the trial justice stated that any probative value can be outweighed by the inflammatory nature to the jury. [12] See Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. In articulating his reasons for excluding the testimony that Ms. Brueske had told Ms. Saucier that her fiancé had beat her, the trial justice ruled that such testimony would have nothing to do with the efficacy of the charges against [defendant]. Moreover, he characterized that proposed line of questioning as a fishing expedition. The trial justice further characterized the proposed testimony as rank hearsay, and he stated that he would not allow it. The defendant contends that the just-referenced proposed testimony about the alleged beating of the complaining witness and about her alleged involvement in kinky sex should have been admitted pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence in that it would constitute prior inconsistent statements of the complaining witnessand therefore would not fall within the definition of hearsay. The defendant contends that the purported impeachment testimony was important to his theory of defense    that any marks upon [Ms. Brueske's] body were the result of consensual sexual activities engaged in with defendant or with Doyleor that such injuries were caused by her fiancé, with whom she had had a violent argument. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) provides that [a] statement is not hearsay if    [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is    inconsistent with the declarant's testimony. This Court has further expressly stated that prior inconsistent statements may be admitted as substantive evidence and may also be used to impeach a witness's testimony at trial. State v. Espinal, 943 A.2d 1052, 1059, 1060 (R.I.2008); see also State v. Pusyka, 592 A.2d 850, 853 (R.I.1991). However, it is unnecessary to determine whether Ms. Saucier's testimony could have been properly admitted as nonhearsay pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) because the ruling of the trial justice in excluding the testimony on other grounds was an appropriate discretionary evidentiary ruling. Pursuant to Rule 402 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, [a]ll relevant evidence is admissible   . Rule 401 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See State v. Carvalho, 892 A.2d 140, 148 (R.I.2006). This Court has consistently held that [d]ecisions about the admissibility of evidence on relevancy grounds are left to the sound discretion of the trial justice; this Court will not disturb those decisions on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Pena-Rojas, 822 A.2d 921, 924 (R.I.2003); see also Carvalho, 892 A.2d at 148; State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 505 (R.I.2004). Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence reads as follows: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. This Court has stated that a trial justice's discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403 must be used sparingly. State v. DeJesus, 947 A.2d 873, 883 (R.I.2008); see also State v. Patel, 949 A.2d 401, 412 (R.I. 2008). We have emphasized that [i]t is only when evidence is marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial that a trial justice must exclude it. DeJesus, 947 A.2d at 883; see also State v. Silvia, 898 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I.2006); see generally Wells v. Uvex Winter Optical, Inc., 635 A.2d 1188, 1193 (R.I.1994) (The determination of the value of evidence should normally be placed in the control of the party who offers it. Unless evidence is of limited or marginal relevance and enormously prejudicial, the trial justice should not act to exclude it.). We have also stated that, because [t]he ultimate determination of the effect of evidence lies in the discretion of the trial justice, this Court will not disturb such a determination absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Aponte, 649 A.2d 219, 223 (R.I.1994); see also DeJesus, 947 A.2d at 883; State v. Oliveira, 774 A.2d 893, 924 (R.I.2001). In the case at bar, we are unable to perceive an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial justice in his decision to exclude any testimony by Ms. Saucier as to Ms. Brueske allegedly having told her that she was into kinky sex and also allegedly having told her that her fiancé beat her. These rulings did not constitute an abuse of the discretion that is accorded to the trial justice pursuant to Rules 401, 402, and 403. The record reflects little to no attempt by defendant to have developed in any meaningful way either point as a part of the overall defense strategy. There was no evidence in the record to suggest that Ms. Brueske had sustained the injuries at issue from an altercation with her fiancé; indeed, there was no evidence presented that Ms. Brueske and her fiancé were near or in the presence of one another on the day of or in the days immediately preceding the alleged kidnapping and assaults. We further note that the trial justice appears to have been inclined to allow defendant to have elicited testimony from Ms. Saucier about kinky sex if defendant had proceeded to offer further evidence of the purple rope restraint having been used by defendant and Ms. Brueske in some consensual activity. Upon defense counsel's representation that there would be a connection drawn between the purple rope restraint, found in defendant's home, and the complaining witness, the trial justice stated: Well, I'd like to see that. If that is the case, maybe you can recall [Lynn Saucier], but I can't let this woman say, oh, yes, and she told me that she was into kinky sex, whatever that means   . The record is clear, however, that the defense did not offer any further evidence in that regard. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the potential that the proposed testimony of Ms. Saucier would have to confuse or to mislead the jury outweighed any probative value that such testimony may have possessed.