Opinion ID: 1593590
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of a Right of Selection

Text: Although the evidence introduced at trial amply supports the premise that Dr. Ware had the right of control over Nurse Hayes's actions, it does not support the premise that Dr. Ware, in his individual capacity, chose Nurse Hayes for Brandi's surgery. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that the right of selection of a CRNA to assist Dr. Ware resided in Anesthesiology & Pain Medicine of Montgomery, P.C. When describing his work relationship with the CRNAs employed by Anesthesiology & Pain Medicine of Montgomery, P.C., Dr. Ware testified that he and a CRNA would both be assigned to a case. Timmons did not introduce any evidence rebutting Dr. Ware's statement. Both Dr. Ware and Nurse Hayes also testified that their involvement in Brandi's operation was in the course and scope of their employment with Anesthesiology & Pain Medicine of Montgomery, P.C. Further, the jury instruction Timmons proposed, which she argued was based on uncontroverted evidence, stated that [b]oth [Dr. Ware] and [Nurse Hayes] were at all times working within the line and scope of their employment with Anesthesiology & Pain Medicine of Montgomery, P.C. These pieces of evidence permit  if they do not compel  the rational conclusion that Dr. Ware's right of control over Nurse Hayes's conduct arose from his supervisory position as her co-employee at Anesthesiology & Pain Medicine of Montgomery, P.C. The Restatement (Second) of Agency expressly rejects the idea that co-employees are vicariously liable for one another's torts: The agent of a disclosed or partially disclosed principal is not subject to liability for the conduct of other agents unless he is at fault in appointing, supervising, or cooperating with them. § 358(1). The commentary to § 358(1) illustrates this rule in the context of a supervisor-subordinate relationship, stating that [t]he doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to create liability against an agent for the conduct of servants and other agents of the principal appointed by him, even though other agents are subject to his orders in the execution of the principal's affairs. The requirement of consent negates the finding of a respondeat superior relationship as between co-employees. As Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 123 S.Ct. 824, 154 L.Ed.2d 753 (2003), explains: The Restatement § 1 specifies that the relevant principal/agency relationship demands not only control (or the right to direct or control) but also the `manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf . . ., and consent by the other so to act.' (Emphasis added [in Meyer ].) 537 U.S. at 286, 123 S.Ct. 824. In the co-employee context, each employee manifests a consent to enter into a relationship with the employer. However, it is the employer that establishes each employee's relationship with the other employees. Thus, because co-employees do not individually agree to act on one another's behalf, their relationship to one another is not consensual. Therefore, as a matter of law, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not hold supervisors, as co-employees, vicariously liable for the torts of their subordinates. Supervisors lack the ability to willingly choose to enter into a relationship with their subordinates; likewise subordinates do not have the ability to choose to enter into a relationship with their supervisors. He who relies upon the doctrine of respondeat superior to fasten liability for tort has the burden of proving the relation of master and servant. . . . Alabama Power Co. v. Key, 224 Ala. at 287, 140 So. at 233. At a minimum, Timmons's failure to introduce evidence bearing on whether Dr. Ware, in his individual capacity as the supervising anesthesiologist, had a right of selection prevents the conclusion that Dr. Ware, in that capacity, chose Nurse Hayes to assist in Brandi's operation. Thus, Timmons failed to meet her burden of proving that Dr. Ware, in his individual capacity, satisfies the common-law definition of a master. The trial court said when it overruled Dr. Ware's objection to the instruction on Dr. Ware's vicarious liability for Nurse Hayes's actions: Well, [Dr. Ware] took over [Brandi's] care . . . I understand. So whichever one was in that place, was [Nurse Hayes's] supervisor. The trial court's decision to charge the jury that Dr. Ware was vicariously liable for Nurse Hayes's conduct apparently was based on the belief that a reserved right of control was the only factor Timmons needed to prove to establish that Dr. Ware was Nurse Hayes's master. Timmons reinforces that conclusion when she argues in support of the trial court's instruction that Dr. Ware, as the supervising or directing anesthesiologist, necessarily must be liable in respondeat superior for the [CRNA] he is directing. However, if Dr. Ware merely controlled Nurse Hayes's acts in his capacity as a co-employee of Nurse Hayes, and as her supervisor, he is not by virtue of that relationship vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.