Opinion ID: 695142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Traffic Stop and Search.

Text: 18 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.... U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Amendment imposes a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Because an ordinary traffic stop constitutes a limited seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653, 99 S.Ct. at 1395-96, such action must be justified by probable cause or, at least, reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct, based upon specific and articulable facts. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In the context of automobile stops and searches, a court must look to objective circumstances in determining the legitimacy of police conduct under the Fourth Amendment. Mitchell, 951 F.2d at 1295. 19 In claiming that this court should adopt the would have test for determining whether objective circumstances exist to warrant an automobile stop and subsequent search, appellants argue that pretextual stops are objectively unreasonable because, under the same circumstances, an officer without ulterior purposes would not have stopped the offenders. However, [e]ven if we agreed that the stop was a mere pretext for a search, that does not mean that a violation of the Fourth Amendment has occurred. Mitchell, 951 F.2d at 1295. 20 Mitchell provides strikingly similar facts to this case. In Mitchell, a D.C. police officer, Stone, observed the two defendants, Mitchell and Zollicoffer, drive at a high rate of speed, stop suddenly, and turn sharply without signalling. Id. at 1293. Stone gave chase and pulled their car over after brief pursuit. When Stone went to the window of the car, he had not yet decided whether to issue a citation. As he returned to his car to run a check on the driver, an assisting officer noticed Zollicoffer leaning forward in the passenger seat with his hands inside his coat, as if holding a weapon. The officer ordered the defendants out of the car, searched them, and found weapons on each. Id. at 1293-94. Mitchell and Zollicoffer moved to suppress tangible evidence recovered during the stop, but the trial court denied their motions to suppress. Id. at 1294. 21 Against appellants' arguments that the stop was an unlawful pretext to search, this court affirmed. Id. at 1299. We reasoned that [t]he Fourth Amendment does not bar the police from stopping and questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a violation of traffic laws, even if the offense is a minor one. Id. at 1295. Officer Stone had observed two of the violations observed by Officer Soto in this case: speeding and turning without a signal. Id. Like Officer Soto, Officer Stone had not yet decided whether to issue a citation, but we held that his indecision does not vitiate the justification for the initial stop. Id. In applying the objective circumstances test, we noted that [e]ven a relatively minor offense that would not of itself lead to an arrest can provide a basis for a stop for questioning and inspection of the driver's permit and registration. Id. (quoting United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875, 880 (D.C.Cir.1977)). Presented with the fact that the officer had observed the traffic violations, the court concluded that objective circumstances clearly justified stopping the car. Id. 22 In holding that a traffic stop is reasonable as long as the officer has observed traffic violations by the defendant, Mitchell implicitly adopts the standard embraced by the majority of courts which have considered the pretext issue. That is, regardless of whether a police officer subjectively believes that the occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation. See United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d at 784 ([W]here the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred or was occurring in the officer's presence, and was authorized by state or municipal law to effect a custodial arrest for the particular offense, the resulting arrest will not violate the fourth amendment.); United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 730 ([W]hen an officer observes a traffic offense or other unlawful conduct, he or she is justified in stopping the vehicle under the Fourth Amendment.); United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir.1993) (in banc) ([T]raffic stops based on probable cause, even if other motivations existed, are not illegal.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 97, 130 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994). 23 We thus reject appellants' suggestion that we adopt the more open-ended would have standard of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 709 (11th Cir.1986); see also United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517 (10th Cir.1988). The objective could have standard provides a more principled method of determining reasonableness for two primary reasons. First, it eliminates the necessity for the court's inquiring into an officer's subjective state of mind, in keeping with the Supreme Court's admonitions that Fourth Amendment inquiries depend on an objective assessment of the officers' actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time ... and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985). At the same time, in response to appellants' legitimate concerns regarding police conduct, the could have test provides a principled limitation on abuse of power. Officers cannot make a traffic stop unless they have probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred or a reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct based upon articulable facts--requirements which restrain police behavior. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400. 24 Applied to the facts of this case, the objective test adopted in Mitchell suggests that Officers Soto and Littlejohn had sufficient grounds to stop appellants. The District Court credited the testimony of Soto, who observed three traffic violations when appellant failed to give full time and attention to his driving, see Title 18 D.C.M.R. Vehicle and Traffic Regulations Sec. 2213.4, turned without signalling, see id. at Sec. 2204.3, and drove away at an unreasonable speed. That factual finding is not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1553 (D.C.Cir.1993) (district court's findings of fact reviewed for clear error). Having seen those violations, Soto had the articulable and specific facts necessary to establish probable cause to stop appellants. See Mitchell, 951 F.2d at 1295; Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 729-30; Scopo, 19 F.3d at 781. Our inquiry goes no further. 25 We wish to make one point clear in applying the Mitchell standard. The Mitchell test ensures that the validity of the traffic stop is not subject to the vagaries of police departments' policies and procedures. Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 392. That is, whether a stop can be made depends on whether the officers had an objective legal basis for it, not on whether the police department assigned the officer in question the duty of making the stop. See Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 730 (rejecting defendant's argument that stop was unreasonable because particular arresting officers were plainclothes officers assigned to narcotics duty, not traffic duty). In this instance, it is of no moment that Soto and Littlejohn were vice officers patrolling for drug violations rather than traffic police. When they observed a traffic violation, they, as officers of the law, were constitutionally justified in stopping appellants. 26 Accordingly, we reject appellants' Fourth Amendment arguments. Because appellants challenge only the stop and not the subsequent search of the Pathfinder, we need inquire no further. We conclude that the District Court properly denied appellants' motions to suppress. 27