Opinion ID: 2112722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doctrine of Lis Pendens

Text: Lis pendens, a doctrine with deep roots in the English courts of chancery, apparently can be traced to around 1618 during Sir Francis Bacon's time serving as Lord Keeper of the Great Seal. This doctrine is discussed in a multitude of cases and is formally defined as: 1. A pending lawsuit. 2. The jurisdiction, power, or control acquired by a court over property while a legal action is pending. 3. A notice, recorded in the chain of title to real property, required or permitted in some jurisdictions to warn all persons that certain property is the subject matter of litigation, and that any interests acquired during the pendency of the suit are subject to its outcome. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 950 (8th ed. 2004). Its essence, then, is one of notice to an otherwise unknowing party. Lis pendens has no specific separate existence apart from its basic function to advise a person who seeks to acquire an interest in property subject to a lis pendens that he will be bound by the outcome of the noticed litigation. It was argued in an earlier case that -`The principle of lis pendens is, that the specific property must be so pointed out by the proceedings as to warn the whole world that they meddle with it at their peril.' Feigley v. Feigley, 7 Md. 537, 556 (1855) (citing 1 Strob. Eq. Rep., 182, Lewis v. Mew ). The Court apparently accepted the argument, stating that The doctrine of lis pendens has no application whatever to this case. As well might a pending action at law, to recover an ordinary debt, be a lis pendens as to the property of a debtor, as a proceeding like the present, the purpose of each being to subject the property of the debtor to the payment of debts. Lis pendens is a proceeding directly relating to the thing or property in question.  Id. at 563; see also Green v. White, 7 Blackf. 242, 243, (Ind.1844) (The principle is now too well settled to be even doubted, that a lis pendens, duly prosecuted, is notice to a purchaser, so as to affect and bind his interest by the decree.). Thus, a party who purchases while the litigation ensues is deemed a purchaser pendente lite.  See also Applegarth v. Russell, 25 Md. 317, 321 (1866); First Midwest v. Pogge, 293 Ill.App.3d 359, 363, 227 Ill.Dec. 713, 716, 687 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (1997); Admiral Builders Corp. v. Robert Hall Village, 101 Ill.App.3d 132, 136, 56 Ill.Dec. 627, 631, 427 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (1981). The rule of lis pendens generally arises in the context of disputes in which one or more parties have possession of real property and the potential of premature, precipitous, undue or untoward alienation of that property needs to be avoided. Some states limit its application to disputes affecting only title to real property while others allow application of the rule of lis pendens more generally to any dispute that touches on the possible alienation of property. In our state, the lis pendens doctrine has its foundations in common law and remains mostly there. In our state the only procedural reference to lis pendens is set out in Md. Rule 12-102, which contains no substantive modification of the common law. Except for the statute in respect to divorce cases above noted, the Maryland General Assembly has not seen fit to enact further statutes modifying lis pendens as other states have done. Accordingly, Maryland's jurisprudence in respect to lis pendens generally has been developed through our case law. In Angelos v. Maryland Casualty Co., 38 Md.App. 265, 268, 380 A.2d 646, 648 (1977), this State's intermediate appellate court explained: The chancellor entered judgment on behalf of Maryland Casualty Company under the doctrine of lis pendens. Lis pendens literally means a pending action; the doctrine derives from the jurisdiction and control which a court acquires over property involved in an action pending its continuance and until final judgment is entered. Under the doctrine, one who acquires an interest in the property pending litigation relating to the property takes subject to the results of the litigation. It is clear that the doctrine has no application except where there is a proceeding directly relating to the property in question, or where the ultimate interest and object of the proceeding is to subject the property in question to the disposal of a decree of the court.  (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, it is clear in Maryland that generally, prior to judgment, the nature of the action must be such that it directly involves the property, if the property is to be subject to a lis pendens. As early as Applegarth v. Russell, 25 Md. 317, 327 (1866), involving an action in the county where the real property was located, we began to apply limits to the doctrine's application. In that case, appellee argued that  [l]is pendens begins from the moment the bill is filed, but the Court held to the contrary, upholding a conveyance where the bill, at the time of the purchase, did not disclose with sufficient certainty the land sought to be charged by it. Id. at 328. Much later, in DeShields v. Broadwater, 338 Md. 422, 659 A.2d 300 (1995), also a case where the pending action was in the county where the property was located and thus did not involve a formal notice of lis pendens because the action itself was required to be indexed in that county and was itself the lis pendens and not a mere notice, this Court discussed lis pendens in the context of a constructive trust. There we noted: The doctrine of lis pendens is well-established in Maryland. It literally means a pending lawsuit, referring to the jurisdiction, power, or control which a court acquires over property involved in a lawsuit pending its continuance and final judgment. Under the doctrine, an interest in property acquired while litigation affecting title to that property is pending is taken subject to the results of that pending litigation. Thus, `[u]nder the common-law doctrine of lis pendens, if property was the subject of litigation[ [8] ], the defendant-owner could transfer all or part of his or her interest in the property during the course of litigation, but not to the detriment of the rights of the plaintiff.' Janice Gregg Levy, Comment, Lis Pendens and Procedural Due Process: A Closer Look After Connecticut v. Doehr, 51 Md.L.Rev. 1054, 1056 (1992). This Court stated the same proposition thusly, in Inloes' Lessee, 11 Md. at 524 (quoting I Story Eq.Jur. §§ 405, 406): `A purchase made of property actually in litigation, pendente lite, for a valuable consideration, and without any express or implied notice in point of fact, affects the purchaser in the same manner as if he had such notice; and he will accordingly be bound by the judgment or decree in the suit....' See [ Permanent Financial Corp. v. ] Taro , 71 Md.App. [489,] 492, 526 A.2d [611,] 612 [(1987)]. ...  Lis pendens has no applicability, therefore, except to proceedings directly relating to the title to the property transferred or in which the ultimate interest and object is to subject the property in question to the disposal of a decree of the court. A ` lis pendens is a general notice of an equity to all the world,' not notice of an actual lien. Consequently lis pendens proceedings do not technically prevent alienation; they place a cloud on title to the property.... . . . Thus, when, after the complaint has been filed, the defendant transfers his or her interest in the property which is the subject of the lawsuit, lis pendens applies to subject that property to the result of the pending litigation whether or not the plaintiff is aware of the transfer.... DeShields, 338 Md. at 432-36, 659 A.2d at 305-06 (footnotes omitted) (some internal citations omitted). See also Warfel v. Brady, 95 Md.App. 1, 7, 619 A.2d 171, 174, cert. denied, 331 Md. 88, 626 A.2d 371, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 977, 114 S.Ct. 470, 126 L.Ed.2d 422 (1993); Permanent Fin. Corp. v. Taro, 71 Md.App. 489, 492, 526 A.2d 611, 612, cert. granted, 311 Md. 193, 533 A.2d 670 (1987), appeal dismissed, January 26, 1988; Angelos v. Md. Cas. Co., 38 Md.App. 265, 268, 380 A.2d 646, 648 (1977); Creative Dev. Corp. v. Bond, 34 Md.App. 279, 284, 367 A.2d 566, 569 (1976); Corey v. Carback, 201 Md. 389, 403-04, 94 A.2d 629, 638 (1953); Hall v. Jack, 32 Md. 253, 263-64 (1870); Tongue v. Morton, 6 H. & J. 21, 23-24 (Md.1823). But see Price v. McDonald, 1 Md. 403, 412 (1851) (observing that claim of lis pendens was unavailing where the parties had prosecuted the case in an exceedingly dilatory manner). We have detected a general admonition that lis pendens must be carefully executed in order to achieve its notice aims. To this end several states have imposed  either by statute or by common law  conditions upon the doctrine that must be satisfied if it is to be invoked (as indicated, Maryland has not enacted by a statute relating generally to all cases, any limitations on the general application of the doctrine.) [9] A delay between the defendant's filing of a notice of lis pendens of his suit to collect from his wife the proceeds of the sale of the home and the recording of the notice was pivotal in the case of Aldridge v. Aldridge, 527 So.2d 96 (Miss.1988). At least three days elapsed after the notice was filed before the clerk actually recorded the notice in The Lis Pendens Records, during which time the notice languished in the Instruments Left for Recording file and the wife conveyed the property to purchasers whose lender had not found any notices or encumbrances upon the property. Id. at 98. In declining to enforce the husband's lien and determining that the buyers were bona fide purchasers, the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated that Mississippi case law clearly illustrates that a lien is not obtained by the mere filing of a Lis Pendens Notice. Id. at 99. The court then examined Mississippi's several relevant lis pendens statutes, among them Miss.Code Ann. § 11-47-3 (1972), which stated: When any person shall begin a suit in any court, whether by declaration or bill, or by cross-complaint, to enforce a lien upon, right to, or interest in, any real estate, unless the claim be founded upon an instrument which is recorded, or upon a judgment duly enrolled, in the county in which the real estate is situated, such person shall file with the clerk of the chancery court of each county where the real estate, or any part thereof, is situated, a notice containing the names of all the parties to the suit, a description of the real estate, and a brief statement of the nature of the lien, right, or interest sought to be enforced. The clerk shall immediately file and record the notice in the lis pendens record, and note on it, and in the record, the hour and day of filing and recording. In addition, the Aldridge court noted a Mississippi statute that imposes liability on a clerk's failure to perform his duties, and went on to conclude that the clerk failed to comply with the statute, holding a lis pendens notice must be actually recorded in The Lis Pendens Records to constitute notice. Aldridge, 527 So.2d at 100. In Lawing v. Jaynes, 285 N.C. 418, 206 S.E.2d 162 (1974), the plaintiffs allegedly had exercised their recorded option to purchase the defendant's property pursuant to the terms of the option, but when the defendant refused to convey the land, the plaintiffs instituted an action for specific performance. The plaintiffs recorded with the clerk of the court a notice of lis pendens, but there was a nearly seven-year delay between the time of its filing and the time it was cross-indexed by the clerk in the Record of Lis Pendens. In the interim the defendant conveyed the land to a third party. The applicable North Carolina statute provided that the cross-indexing of the notice of lis pendens provided constructive notice to a purchaser of the affected property. Id. at 422, 206 S.E.2d at 165. Since the cross-indexing was not accomplished until after the conveyance to a third party, the court determined that the cross-indexing did not constitute constructive knowledge to them. Id. at 426, 206 S.E.2d at 167; see also ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Jackson, 159 Ohio App.3d 551, 824 N.E.2d 600 (2005); Gene Hill Equip. Co. v. Merryman, 771 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.App.1989); McWhorter v. Brady, 41 Okla. 383, 140 P. 782 (1913). Based on our summary review of the cases it seems clear that, at a minimum, the amalgamated requirements for a notice of lis pendens call for the notice to state the names of the party against whom the lis pendens is claimed, to describe accurately the affected property, and to explain the nature of the lien right or the interest that the person filing the notice seeks to enforce and that it be properly recorded  and indexed.