Opinion ID: 2584939
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Murder of Peace Officer Special Circumstance

Text: Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(7), defines the special circumstance of intentional murder of a peace officer while engaged in the performance of his or her duties as follows: The victim was a peace officer ... who, while engaged in the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer ... and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties. Deputy Perrigo was, of course, a peace officer, within the meaning of the special circumstance statute, working his shift at the Burney substation, and in full uniform in his patrol car when killed by defendant while transporting defendant and Estrada toward the main jail at Redding. Defendant cannot, and does not, contend that these essential elements of this special circumstance finding were not established on these facts. (13) However, it is also a well-established rule that when a statute makes it a crime to commit any act against a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, part of the corpus delicti of the offense is that the officer was acting lawfully at the time the offense was committed. ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1020 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044] ( Jenkins ), citing In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 815 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 941 P.2d 880]; see People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159] [applying the rule to § 190.2, subd. (a)(7)].) Defendant contends that his arrest by Deputy Perrigo for a violation of section 647(f) (public intoxication) was unlawful because (1) he was not intoxicated at the time of his arrest, but was instead found asleep (along with Estrada) in the station wagon where he was staying in front of the Sanchez residence when first located by the deputy, and (2) the station wagon itself was on private property and not in a public place. Claiming his arrest for a violation of section 647(f) was therefore unlawful, he argues the murder of a peace officer special circumstance must be reversed. We disagree. Section 647(f), provides, in pertinent part, Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor: [¶] ... [¶] (f) Who is found in any public place under the influence of intoxicating liquor ... in a condition that he or she is unable to exercise care for his or her own safety or the safety of others, or by reason of his or her being under the influence of intoxicating liquor ... interferes with or obstructs or prevents the free use of any street, sidewalk, or other public way. (14) Contrary to defendant's assertions, at the pretrial hearing held to determine the validity of his arrest, it was established, through both testimony and photographic evidence, that the station wagon in which Deputy Perrigo found defendant and Estrada sleeping sometime between midnight and 1:00 a.m. was parked in a public place, on the dirt shoulder adjoining Highway 299, and well outside the fence separating Edna Sanchez's property from the highway. [W]hether a particular location is a `public place' depends upon the facts of the individual case. ( People v. White (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 886, 892 [278 Cal.Rptr. 48].) A public place includes the area outside a home in which a stranger is able to walk without challenge. ( People v. Olson (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 592, 598 [96 Cal.Rptr. 132].) Moreover, sitting in an automobile while intoxicated does not, as a matter of law, prevent one from being arrested for intoxication in a public place. ( People v. Belanger (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 654, 658 [52 Cal.Rptr. 660].) Nor does being found asleep in a vehicle prevent an arrest for public intoxication under section 647(f). ( People v. Belanger , at p. 656; see Mardis v. Superior Court (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 70, 72 [32 Cal.Rptr. 263] [arrest under § 647(f) valid where defendant found asleep in car 30 feet from paved roadway].) At the pretrial hearing, Edna Sanchez testified that when she went outside of her residence about midnight to tell defendant and Estrada to stop making noise by racing the station wagon engine, defendant was pretty drunk and slurred his words. Defendant was arrested within an hour of Sanchez's observations. An inebriated person behind the wheel of a car ... poses a greater danger to himself or herself and others than the same person lying on a park bench. ( People v. Lively (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1373 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 368].) Moreover, although defendant would have us draw an inference that the station wagon in which he slept was not drivable, such fact was not conclusively established either at the pretrial hearing or at trial, and indeed the record facts instead support an inference that once a good battery was installed the vehicle's engine ran loud and strong. We conclude the validity of defendant's arrest for public intoxication, a violation of section 647(f), was properly established at the pretrial hearing conducted for that purpose. Alternatively, defendant contends that even if the legality of his arrest was properly established at the pretrial hearing, the evidence thereafter presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's implicit finding that his arrest for a violation of section 647(f) was lawful, as an element of the murder of a peace officer special circumstance required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Once again, we disagree. Fry testified at trial that she observed defendant holding an open beer in one hand and a partial 12-pack of beer in his other hand just before midnight when he and Estrada appeared at the front door of Wadsworth's house. Both Fry and Wadsworth testified at trial that defendant was intoxicated; Wadsworth opining that defendant was pretty drunk, Fry adding that both men were slurring their words. Defendant and Estrada left with the battery taken from Miguel's car and were located and detained by Deputy Perrigo less than an hour later in front of the Sanchez residence. Indeed, all of defendant's inebriated and belligerent conduct, from the time he and Estrada were brought to Wadsworth's house by Deputy Perrigo, to the time he was returned to the front of Sanchez's house along with Fry, Wadsworth, and Miguel to identify the battery that had been taken from Miguel's car, lends additional support to the jury's implicit finding that defendant was intoxicated a short time earlier, at around midnight, when he was located in the station wagon by Deputy Perrigo and placed under arrest. (15) We conclude that defendant's arrest for a violation of section 647(f) was lawful, and that the evidence is sufficient to support all the requisite elements of the murder of a peace officer special circumstance finding.