Opinion ID: 404985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: intervention by the united states

Text: 25 The district court, acting sua sponte, on April 12, 1974, determined that the public interest will be served by the participation of the United States and ordered the United States to appear as amicus curiae and to participate in this case with the full rights of a party. W. J. Estelle, the Director of TDC, was then the only defendant. After appearing as amicus curiae, the United States moved in December 1974 to intervene as a party plaintiff under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(2), and also sought leave to file a complaint in intervention adding new causes of action, and adding the Texas Board of Corrections and its individual members as additional defendants. The United States relied upon the inherent authority of the United States, through its Attorney General, to sue to remedy severe and widespread deprivations of constitutional rights. The motion was granted ex parte and TDC's later motion to dismiss the United States both as plaintiff-intervenor and as amicus curiae was denied. 51 26 Whether or not the United States had inherent or implied authority to sue or to intervene in suits to protect the constitutional rights of individual citizens at the time the intervention was filed, 52 Congress has since enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1997-1997j (West 1981) (the Act), which became law on May 23, 1980. The Act authorizes the Attorney General to initiate, id. §§ 1997a-1997b, or intervene in, id. § 1997c, civil actions on behalf of persons confined in specified state institutions, including jails, prisons, and other correctional facilities. 27 An appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision unless there is statutory language or legislative history to the contrary, or unless doing so would cause manifest injustice. 53 It must apply that law even where (the statute) does not explicitly recite that it is to be applied to pending cases. 54 The law at issue in this case is the Act, particularly § 1997c, which deals with intervention by the United States. 28 That section of the Act comprises two elements: a substantive provision authorizing the Attorney General to intervene in lawsuits, and procedural provisions with which the United States must comply before it may intervene. Nothing in the Act or its legislative history suggests that we should not apply the substantive provision of § 1997c to this case. If anything, the legislative history reinforces the presumption that we should apply it. The Senate Report notes that the Justice Department has intervened in many suits 55 and expresses approval of such intervention. 56 Moreover, the Senate Report, 57 the dissent from the Senate Report, 58 and the House Conference Report 59 all express the view that the United States already had the authority to intervene in such cases, and that the Act merely gave it explicit statutory sanction. 60 We cannot read this legislative history as expressing hostility to pre-Act intervention by the United States. To do so would achieve a result at odds with the understanding of both the supporters and the opponents of the Act. 61 We conclude, therefore, that the substantive provision of § 1997c applies in this case. 29 The legislative history of the Act does, however, lead us to conclude that we should not apply the procedural provisions of § 1997c in this case. The Senate Report explicitly states that the Act aims to preclude, inter alia, the possibility that suits in which the United States is currently participating as amicus or plaintiff-intervenor will be disrupted by defendant(s') motions to dismiss the United States as a party. 62 Moreover, in discussing other sections of the Act, the legislative history notes other goals of the Act: making Justice Department resources available in lawsuits challenging the conditions of confinement in state institutions, 63 improving the lives of persons confined in state institutions, 64 encouraging state officials to take action to safeguard the rights of these persons, 65 achieving efficient use of Justice Department resources, 66 and ensuring conservation of judicial resources. 67 To dismiss the United States at this state in the litigation, 68 when it could simply initiate a new lawsuit, 69 and thereby duplicate its previous, massive efforts, would do violence to all of these goals. We decline to cause great disruption by forcing the parties ... to begin anew a case that all parties agree could eventually be decided under the new law. Congress did not intend the enactment of the new law to cause such tribulation. 70 30 Furthermore, considering the identity of the parties in this case, the nature of their rights, and the impact of the change in law upon those rights, 71 we find that no manifest injustice results from our application of the Act to this case. 72 31 For these reasons, we affirm the district court's order permitting intervention. 32