Opinion ID: 1966588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: regulation or taking

Text: Article I, § 16, N.D. Const., provides that [p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. It is broader than the guarantee of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Donaldson v. City of Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808 (1942). It was intended to secure to owners, not only the possession of property, but also those rights which render possession valuable. Id., Syllabus ¶ 1. In Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 507 (N.D.1983), we explained the state's power to regulate land use and the point at which regulation becomes a taking: The state, acting through its police power, has broad authority to enact land use regulations without compensating landowners for restrictions placed upon their property, and a zoning ordinance, one type of land use regulation, does not constitute a taking for which compensation must be paid merely because it diminishes the value of the regulated property or disallows the best and highest use of the property. Eck v. City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D.1979); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741 (N.D.1978). However, governmental regulation which prohibits all or substantially all reasonable use of the regulated property constitutes a taking of the property for public use which entitles the landowner to just compensation through an inverse condemnation action. See, Kraft v. Malone, 313 N.W.2d 758 (N.D.1981). In determining whether a restriction constitutes a taking, courts look to the effect of the restriction on the parcel of land as a whole, rather than to the effect on individual interests in the land. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1248, 94 L.Ed.2d 472, 496 (1987) [quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2662, 57 L.Ed.2d 631, 652 (1978)]:  `Taking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole here the city tax block designated as the landmark site. '  In our view, prohibiting a landowner, and thus his lessee or grantee, from constructing any electrical supply or communication line, gas, oil or water or other pipeline within 100 feet of the center line of a state highway without the Commissioner's consent (§ 24-01-42, N.D.C.C.) upon pain of removal at the expense of the utility, when such removal is required for purposes of highway expansion (§ 24-01-43, N.D.C.C.) does nothing more than regulate one particular future use of property while leaving available to the property owner all other uses. Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741, 758 (N.D. 1978). Thus, the statutes do not prohibit all or substantially all reasonable uses of the regulated property as a whole. Traill argues that it can hardly be argued that the 100-foot restriction is based on any safety considerations or that it has a reasonable relationship to any other matter of general public welfare and that the legislature enacted these statutes simply to reduce the cost of possible future highway expansion. While safety considerations may not be as great in the case of a buried water line as with some of the other types of lines restricted by the statutes, we are not prepared to say the statute is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or public welfare. Soderfelt v. City of Drayton, 79 N.D. 742, 752, 59 N.W.2d 502, 507 (1953). The statute tends to promote sound and efficient highway planning, safety, and the public welfare. In limited circumstances, reducing the cost of possible future highway expansion is a permissible objective. See State v. Manders, 2 Wis.2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469, 473 (1957) (protection of economic interests of the general public falls within the scope of promotion of the general welfare, and thereby affords a basis for the exercise of the police power). See also Vangellow v. City of Rochester, 190 Misc. 128, 71 N.Y.S.2d 672, 678 (1947) (quoted by the court in State v. Manders, supra ) where the court said: [P]rovided that it can be accomplished without materially diminishing the value or usefulness of the premises, constitutional law does not prevent the City, in the exercise of the police power pursuant to the enabling act, from requiring that the new building be erected in such manner as to minimize the damage thereto which will result when and if, in the future, the City shall decide to widen West Main Street. It does not appear to us that the 100-foot restriction on the installation of utility lines has materially diminished the value or usefulness of the premises as a whole. As in State v. Manders, supra, 86 N.W.2d at 475, [w]e cannot spell out ... any legislative motive to depress existing property values. Traill's reliance on cases such as Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v. City of Tyler, 348 S.W.2d 537 (Tex.Civ.App.1961); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. La. Dept. of Highways, 104 So.2d 204 (La.App.1958); and Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613, 55 S.Ct. 563, 79 L.Ed. 1090 (1935), is misplaced. Unlike this case, those cases did not involve pipelines installed after the enactment of a regulation similar to §§ 24-01-42 and 24-01-43, N.D.C.C. We also do not deem Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987) and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987), to be particularly helpful in resolving this issue. While those are important decisions, the underlying facts in them are readily distinguishable in significant respects. In Nollan, the conditioning of a building permit upon Nollan's transfer to the public of an easement across their beachfront property (107 S.Ct. at 3143) was held to be a permanent physical occupation (107 S.Ct. at 3145) constituting a taking requiring compensation. The instant case does not involve a permanent physical occupation. In First English, the complaint alleged that the ordinance in question denied appellant all use of its property. (107 S.Ct. at 2389). The statutes involved in this case do not deny all use or substantially all use of the property as a whole. We conclude that Traill has not shown that §§ 24-01-42 and 24-01-43, N.D.C.C., effect an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. Under the circumstances of this case, those statutes constitute reasonable land-use regulations not requiring compensation for removal of a water line which was installed without the consent of the Commissioner.