Opinion ID: 751894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the jury panel represent a fair cross-section of the community?

Text: 6 Appellants argue that an under-representation of Hispanics by 3.9 percent in the 1995 jury wheel for the Southern District of California violated the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. 1 The district court found that a 3.9 percent absolute disparity between the proportion of Hispanics in the community and the proportion in the jury pool was legally insufficient to state a Sixth Amendment claim. 7 The Supreme Court has mandated a three-pronged test for establishing a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement: 1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; 2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and 3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668-69, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). 8 It is undisputed that Hispanics are a distinctive group for purposes of Sixth Amendment analysis. Thus, appellants satisfied the first prong of the Duren test. However, the district court held that appellants did not satisfy the second prong. 9 This court has held that [t]he second prong of the Duren test requires proof, typically statistical data, that the jury pool does not adequately represent the distinctive group in relation to the number of such persons in the community. United States v. Esquivel, 88 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 442, 136 L.Ed.2d 339 (1996). This court measures representation by the absolute disparity between the proportion of the group in the community population and the proportion represented on the master jury wheel. See United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir.1989). Previous Ninth Circuit cases have held that absolute disparities even greater than the one present here did not violate the second prong of the Duren test. See Esquivel, 88 F.3d at 727 (holding that a 4.9 percent absolute disparity was insufficient to make out a Sixth Amendment violation); United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir.1982) (holding that a 7.7 percent absolute disparity was insufficient to make out a Sixth Amendment violation). Thus, the absolute disparity in this case is insufficient to make out a prima facie claim under the Sixth Amendment. 2 II. Did the district court misinterpret or misapply the Hobbs Act? 10 Appellants were convicted for the robberies under the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs Act provides federal criminal penalties for [w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce by robbery, extortion, or physical violence. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). 11 Appellants argue that after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), the Hobbs Act is only violated if the government shows a substantial effect on interstate commerce. However, this court has expressly held that the Lopez decision did not overturn the Ninth Circuit's rule that the government need only show a de minimis effect on interstate commerce for purposes of federal jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1096, 137 L.Ed.2d 229 (1997). 3 Moreover, a de minimis standard is consistent with the language of the Hobbs Act, which mandates penalties for whoever in any way or degree obstructs interstate commerce. 12 Applying the de minimis standard, we find that the government has met its evidentiary burden. 4 Each J. Jessop's Jewelry store was a commercial business actively engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the robberies. Trial testimony established that J. Jessop's stores conducted approximately 95 percent of their business with out-of-state firms. Over 90 percent of the merchandise sold by J. Jessop's was manufactured outside the state of California. J. Jessop's itself is owned by a company incorporated in Delaware, and its parent company is based in Toronto, Canada. 5 The robberies had at least a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. 13