Opinion ID: 869748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The District Court’s Consideration of

Text: Evidence During Sentencing Finally, we consider Ciavarella‟s challenges to his sentence. He argues that the District Court relied on improper evidence and made findings of fact that were inconsistent with the jury verdict, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.19 Contrary to Ciavarella‟s contention, his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is not implicated by fact finding during a sentencing proceeding unless those facts increase the statutory maximum punishment. Apprendi v. New 19 We review a district court‟s factual findings for clear error. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). We “consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In evaluating the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we consider “whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Grier, 475 F.3d at 561. 53 Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); Grier, 475 F.3d at 562 (“Once an individual has been convicted by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the predicate facts of illegal conduct, triggering a statutory maximum penalty, a court may impose any sentence on the individual up to that maximum.”). Here, the total sentence imposed was 336 months‟ imprisonment, less than the maximum statutory penalties, which total 137 years‟ imprisonment, excluding Count 7. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1341, 1956(a), 1962(c),(d), 1963; 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Ciavarella‟s argument that the District Court relied on improper evidence in sentencing him is also without merit. He asserts that the District Court should not have considered Powell‟s testimony, any payments by Powell, or the 2005 and 2006 payments by Mericle, which the jury had rejected. Additionally, because the jury rejected the bribery charges and the notion of a conflict of interest, according to Ciavarella, the District Court improperly increased his sentence based on his failure to disclose that conflict of interest to juvenile offenders. But “a jury‟s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997). “[T]he jury cannot be said to have necessarily rejected any facts when it returns a general verdict of not guilty.” Id. at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the District Court considered Powell‟s testimony and evidence of additional payments from Powell and Mericle, and it found the relevant conduct was proved by a preponderance of the evidence. We find no clear error in the District Court‟s factual findings because there is sufficient evidence in the record to 54 support the finding of multiple payments and an ongoing conflict of interest. Additionally, Ciavarella‟s challenge to the District Court‟s consideration of letters from the public also fails because a “court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). While Ciavarella asserts that the letters lack reliability, he fails to provide any basis for this conclusion sufficient to establish a violation of his due process rights. See United States v. Matthews, 773 F.2d 48, 51 (3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that a court determines whether a defendant‟s due process rights have been violated by the sentence court relying on “misinformation of a constitutional magnitude”). Finally, Ciavarella argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Ciavarella‟s advisory Guideline range was life imprisonment. The District Court considered the arguments of both parties, including the defense‟s arguments for a sentence less than life imprisonment. It ultimately imposed a below-Guideline sentence of 336months‟ imprisonment having “taken into account . . . the factors [it was] obliged to consider under Section 3553(a).” App. 1504. When a sentence is outside of the Guidelines range, we “give due deference to the district court‟s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Here, the 336-month belowGuidelines sentence, while significant, is permissible. We are assured that the District Court properly evaluated the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 219 55 (3d Cir. 2009) (“A sentencing court need not discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors . . . .”). We hold that the sentence is substantively reasonable.