Opinion ID: 222920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lisa Lamb's Appeal

Text: Lamb appeals both her conviction and sentence. The challenge to her conviction presents a closer question. We do not doubt that the jury reasonably concluded that Lamb did destroy evidence of her and Johnson's criminal conduct when confronted by federal agents with a search warrant for the Westmoreland residence. There is also little doubt that this conduct likely violated other statutes more precisely targeting the obstruction of federal investigations and search warrants. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (obstructing a federal agency's investigation); and § 2232 (destruction or removal of property to prevent seizure). The more interesting, and difficult, question is whether that conduct also violated the statute with which she was charged, to wit: corruptly  alter[ing], destroy[ing], mutilat[ing], or conceal[ing] a record, document, or other object, or attempt[ing] to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1). Lamb attacks her conviction on two fronts  the proper reach of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) and the sufficiency of the evidence even under the government's interpretation. We review each of Lamb's challenges in turn. [3]
Lamb's primary contention is that she was mischarged under a statute that does not apply to the conduct alleged or proved, and thus that her conviction must be thrown out. This argument is purely legal. The provision in question, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1), was added to the statute as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-204, § 1102. Lamb claims that the law is confined to the destruction of documents and other records in the context of white-collar corporate fraud and does not extend to the destruction of drug contraband in anticipation of discovery by the authorities. Put differently, is the government overreaching by using a statute targeting white-collar crime to punish ordinary criminal conduct not envisioned by Congress when it passed the statute? Section 1512(c)(1) applies to the destruction of any record, document, or other object. Lamb argues that we should not interpret other object to include any and every object imaginable, but solely those objects similar to records or documents. This follows from an application of the principle of statutory construction often known by its Latin descriptor ejusdem generis  literally translated of the same kind. According to it, [w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001). Applied to this case, it would mean that only an other object that is similar in nature to records or documents would fall within § 1512(c)(1)'s scope. Lamb argues that this interpretation is bolstered by the fact that Congress added § 1512(c)(1) in 2002 with Sarbanes-Oxley and meant to address the problem of white-collar financial crimes. The proof of such crimes often depends significantly on information contained in records and documents, which may be easy to shred or otherwise destroy in anticipation of an investigation. Therefore, it makes sense that Congress would specifically single out records and documents for special protection. Thus, according to Lamb, the purpose of the statute confirms that record, document, or other object must be limited to items similar to records or documents that would evince the white-collar crimes that Congress targeted with Sarbanes-Oxley. While it is not entirely unpersuasive, two principal defects ultimately doom Lamb's argument. First, Lamb's characterization of § 1512(c)(1) as limited to the narrow, white-collar context that prompted Sarbanes-Oxley does not square with the broader history of § 1512 and the statutory phrase at issue. When § 1512 was first enacted in 1982, it was not limited to the white-collar crime context. Rather, it was a general statute addressing witness tampering and intimidation. It criminalized any use of intimidation or physical force (or its threat), to cause or induce any person to withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object from an official proceeding [or] alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding. Pub.L. 97-291, § 4 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)). The statute has been modified numerous times since then, but has always continued to prohibit intimidating or corruptly persuad[ing] a witness to withhold ... a record, document, or other object or to alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal such an object. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(A), & (b)(2)(B). These other provisions were enacted well before Sarbanes-Oxley and there is no indication that Congress intended to limit their use to the white-collar context. The vast majority of prosecutions under § 1512 appear to have involved tampering with witnesses' testimony, and that aspect of the statute clearly applies in any criminal context. See, e.g. United States v. Murphy, 406 F.3d 857, 860 (7th Cir.2005) (conviction under § 1512(a)(2)(A) for using physical force against a witness with intent to prevent testimony in crack cocaine case). And where § 1512 has been used to prosecute efforts to encourage others to withhold or destroy evidence, courts have had no hesitation in reading other object broadly. See, e.g., United States v. England, 555 F.3d 616 (7th Cir.2009) (hiding car); United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679 (3d Cir.1999) (painting over blood splattered on stone wall). While § 1512(c)(1), in particular, was added to the statute in 2002 by Sarbanes-Oxley, the phrase record, document, or other object was taken directly from the original statutory text. The repetition of the same language tells us nothing of what Congress intended, or did, in 2002. Given the history of § 1512, it is not surprising that this and a number of other courts have applied the same language in § 1512(c)(1) just as broadly, reaching the destruction of evidence other than records or documents and outside the white-collar context  including contraband. In United States v. Matthews, we upheld the conviction of a police chief who destroyed a firearm that was to be used as evidence in a case against his friend who was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. 505 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir.2007). And Lamb's own brief confirms that Matthews is not an outlier: ten out of the twenty-seven prosecutions under § 1512(c)(1) across the country that she cites in her brief  just over thirty seven percent  have involved an other object that would not meet Lamb's limited reading. [4] See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 220 Fed.Appx. 13, 17 (2d Cir.2007) (car); United States v. Thompson, 237 Fed.Appx. 575, 576 (11th Cir.2007) (gun, money, and crack cocaine). While it is true that Matthews (nor, for that matter, any court to our knowledge) was presented with the same argument that Lamb makes, the uncontroverted impression of several courts cuts against her attempt to narrow the statute. Second, ejusdem generis is no more than an aid to construction and comes into play only when there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). Because the statutory text is clear, we have no need of recourse to ejusdem generis. And even assuming, arguendo, that the meaning of other object is somehow unclear, application of ejusdem generis does not particularly aid the statutory construction. In this case, the specific preceding terms record and document are nearly as general as other object. Lamb points to corporate files, papers, diskettes, a computer hard drive, or any other object used to document or memorialize some other events as an example of an other object within the reach of her interpretation of § 1512(c)(1). But a reasonable interpretation of record and document might include all these examples, leaving other object void of meaning in Lamb's interpretation and thereby violating another principle of construction. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001). Rather than clarify an ambiguous statute, application of ejusdem generis would thus confuse the clear meaning of the text. For these reasons, we hold that § 1512(c)(1) criminalizes the alteration, destruction, mutilation, or concealment of any object, including contraband.
Conviction under § 1512(c)(1) also required proof that Lamb destroyed the evidence with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding. Interpreting this provision in Arthur Andersen v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707-08, 125 S.Ct. 2129, 161 L.Ed.2d 1008 (2005), which involved document shredding, the Court admonished that it is one thing to say that a proceeding `need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,' and quite another to say a proceeding need not even be foreseen. Lamb argues that her conviction cannot stand because there was insufficient evidence to prove that she believed her actions would affect a foreseeable official proceeding. And failing that, she argues that her conviction should be vacated (presumably for a new trial) because the jury was not adequately instructed that Lamb had to have foreseen an official proceeding to act corruptly under the statute. We consider first the question of the jury instructions. Because Lamb did not object to the jury instructions or request the specific Forseeability instruction she now urges, we review the instructions only for plain error. United States v. Ye, 588 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir.2009). Lamb argues that she was entitled to an explicit Forseeability instruction. She apparently leaves it to us to fashion the appropriate instruction, as she did not request such an instruction below and does not propose any specific language now. The district court in this case gave a Forseeability instruction. Specifically, it instructed the jury that to convict on the obstruction of justice charge, it must find that Lamb attempted to destroy or conceal an object and acted with the intent to impair the object's availability for use in an official proceeding.  It also specified that this official proceeding was the federal grand jury or a proceeding in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, but need[ed] not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense. We approved virtually identical jury instructions in Matthews, 505 F.3d at 704-05. Here, just as in Matthews, the instructions clearly informed the jury that it could only convict Lamb if it found that she attempted to destroy or conceal the crack cocaine with the intent to prevent its use in a federal grand jury or criminal proceeding in the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. See id. at 708. Thus, the jury could not have convicted Lamb unless it found that she foresaw such a proceeding. The instructions adequately conveyed § 1512(c)(1)'s nexus requirement; there was no error. Next, we turn to the sufficiency of the evidence. We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and will reverse only if no rational trier or fact could have found [the defendant] guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Williams, 553 F.3d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. DeSilva, 505 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 2007)). Lamb argues that if we sustain her conviction, we endorse the idea that mere knowledge of a criminal investigation is enough to trigger § 1512(c)(1) and she insists that this cannot be what Congress intended because it has enacted separate statutes that more precisely address the conduct at issue here. Section 1519, for example, criminalizes the obstruction of a federal investigation, and § 2232 criminalizes the destruction or removal of property to prevent its lawful seizure. She asserts that such an extension of § 1512(c)(1) would drag in all sorts of run-of-the-mill obstructive conduct  from tossing drugs or money out of a car window during pursuit by the police to flushing evidence down the toilet at the first sign of a police investigation. Lamb's argument appears to invoke the rule of lenity, where criminal statutes must be construed narrowly. But we cannot accept this argument. Lamb would have us read the statute more narrowly than its plain terms suggest and the rule of lenity does not require this. See United States v. LaFaive, 618 F.3d 613, 618 (7th Cir.2010) (declining to apply rule of lenity where statute was unambiguous). Further, there is no suggestion that Congress could not include even the most mundane destruction of evidence. Clearly, such obstructive conduct is illegal under other statutes. Nor is there any rule that two statutes cannot overlap, even significantly. The fact that Lamb's conduct would also violate statutes more tailored to her specific actions does not mean that it does not also violate the more general provisions of § 1512(c)(1). Moreover, it cannot be that the government needed to prove that Lamb knew that her conduct would affect a particular official proceeding: § 1512(f)(1) instructs us that [f]or purposes of this section an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense. It simply needed to provide enough evidence that Lamb foresaw that the contraband might be used in an official proceeding and destroyed it with the intent of preventing that use. But why else would Lamb aggressively destroy contraband while authorities were attempting to exercise a search warrant, other than to prevent the discovery of that evidence? And why would she want to prevent that discovery, if not to minimize or eliminate the evidence that could be used against her in a criminal prosecution? There was evidence that Lamb was aware of, and perhaps deeply involved with, Johnson's cocaine dealing. Given her level of involvement, it was not unreasonable for a jury to assume that Lamb was aware of how much difference the type and quantity of the drugs discovered could make, and that she destroyed the cocaine base with the intent to minimize the evidence against her and Johnson at their eventual criminal prosecution. And this is not a case of a suspect panicking and tossing contraband out the window of a fleeing vehicle. Rather, when threatened with a search warrant, Lamb slammed closed the metal door, then while the police were attempting to force their way into the house, she spent over 20 minutes deliberately eradicating evidence of her and Johnson's criminal activity. Possibly at first Lamb did not believe that the people at the door were really police. But the ensuing activity of federal agents as well as local police and firefighters should have convinced her otherwise. This was enough evidence for the jury to conclude that Lamb foresaw criminal prosecution and used the last few minutes before they gained entry to minimize the evidence against her and Johnson. The evidence may not have been overwhelming. But that is often the case when attempting to prove what was in a defendant's mind. The jury could have believed, as Lamb urged, that she acted out of panic or because she believed the cops were crooked and out to steal the drugs. The jury was not required, however, to accept Lamb's version of events. Given Lamb's knowledge of Johnson's cocaine dealing and the quantities involved, the jury could reasonably believe that Lamb foresaw that any contraband discovered in the search would be used against her and Johnson in official proceedings. Therefore, the jury could reasonably conclude that she foresaw proceedings in the federal grand jury or the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, and destroyed cocaine base to prevent that use. [5]
Finally, Lamb argues that the district court incorrectly applied the accessory-after-the-fact cross-reference under Federal Sentencing Guideline § 2X3.1. We review the calculation of the sentencing guidelines range de novo, but the district court's underlying findings of fact only for clear error. United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir.2010). There is no question that § 2X3.1 applies here. Section 2J1.2, the guideline applicable to § 1512(c)(1), clearly instructs district courts that [i]f the offense involved obstructing the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, apply § 2X3.1 in respect to that criminal offense.  Rather, Lamb's contention is that the underlying offense for purposes of the § 2X3.1 cross-reference should have been possession of cocaine base rather than Johnson's cocaine distribution conspiracy. But given the evidence that Lamb was aware of and involved with Johnson's cocaine distribution, the district court did not clearly err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Lamb destroyed evidence at the Westmoreland residence to obstruct the investigation and prosecution of the broader conspiracy, not merely her own possession. Based on that finding, the district court correctly applied the guidelines using the conspiracy as the underlying criminal offense that Lamb sought to impede.