Opinion ID: 1059512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: competency evaluation during trial

Text: On the second day of trial during the playing of the audio-tape of Burns' September 26th statement, Burns' counsel moved, pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.1, to have the defendant evaluated for his competency to stand trial. [13] At that time, Burns' counsel proffered to the court that Burns had advised his counsel that he did not want to participate anymore, and wanted to leave the courtroom and return to the jail. After hearing argument of both counsel, the court questioned Burns about his wish to leave the courtroom. Burns repeatedly said that he did not want to remain in the courtroom even though the court advised Burns about the importance of his presence at his trial. The court then decided to recess for about one hour and twenty minutes. After the recess, Burns returned to the courtroom. His counsel proffered that Burns had expressed his willingness to remain in the courtroom throughout the proceedings but that Burns had indicated that he was having difficulty understanding what was transpiring. Burns' counsel then moved again for an evaluation under Code § 19.2-169.1. In doing so, counsel quoted from Dr. Stejskal's June 10, 1999 report, in which Dr. Stejskal stated that Burns'capacity to assist in his own defense is marginally intact. Before ruling on the motion for a competency evaluation, the court called the jail nurse, Bonnie Sager, to testify as a witness. Sager explained the medications that had been prescribed to treat Burns' anxiety and depression, and to help him sleep. She further stated that she had given Burns his medicine at noon that day and that the jail records indicated that Burns had been receiving his medications. Finally, Sager described Burns as having occasional mood changes when he became angry. The court then denied the motion and made the following relevant findings: On June 23rd, 1999, I determined that [Burns] competency had been restored, based on the opinion of Dr. Stejskal and the psychologist from Central State . . . . Now, while the psychologist from Central State did agree that Mr. Burns suffered from depression and did need medication, she had also found, during the course of the treatment, that he was malingering  that is, acting  for a period of time.... [T]here are letters from Mr. Burns, or at least one letter, where he admits to acting. I also note that Dr. Stejskal was appointed to be the Defendant's mentalhealth expert, and the Defendant has already given notice that he does not intend to use him in mitigation. Now, there can be a lot of reasons for that, but again, it would indicate to me that this problem that we are experiencing today, while it might have some background, is fairly sudden. He has prescribed medication. Dr. Stejskal suggested that, in order for him to be competent to stand trial, he must be given medication, as needed and as prescribed. We have evidence from the jail nurse that he is being furnished all of his medications, as prescribed. Mr. Burns' conduct in this trial, until this morning, until his statement, his audio statement to Mr. Gochenour was being played, was alert and attentive, he participated. I saw him, numerous times, talking with Counsel during voir dire. Certainly, he took notes at other times. During the course of this trial, he has taken notes and has interacted with Counsel, all of those things that I would expect him to do as the Defendant in this case. He did get upset, visibly upset, as the statement was being played, and there could be a whole number of reasons for that. It was obviously stressful to him at the time, he was emotional, at times, when giving the statement, and that stress may now be recalled. It may be that, hearing his statement today, he perceives it as being harmful to his case, and that could be a depressing event to anybody. And, perhaps, hearing the statement, and playing it, may bring this whole episode, and that, too, may be upsetting to him. Now, during the pendency of this case, Mr. Burns has written me a number of letters in chambers, all of which I have shared with Counsel. I am now making this part of this record, for this purpose: because I think those letters indicate that he does understand the proceedings against him. Many of the letters were challenging the officers' statements, as to what he told them and how he was treated, which is exactly the statements being played here today. And as I say, there are a number of things covered in the letters, but, by and large, it would indicate to me that he did indeed understand the proceedings against him, and understood just how important his own statements may be in the case against him. Earlier today, when I was asking him questions on the record, his responses were inaudible, not necessarily nonsensical. The bits and pieces that I could understand were responsive to my questions. All told, though, they were simply inaudible. The other thing I think is worthy of note that the attorneys have advised the Court, and Mr. Burns has advised the Court, that he has made the request, several times, not to be present at the trial. So his request earlier today is consistent with a request made pretrial, when there was no immediate question as to his competency. Code § 19.2-169.1 provides, in pertinent part, that [i]f . . . the court finds, upon hearing evidence or representations of counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Commonwealth, that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant lacks substantial capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in his own defense, the court shall order that a competency evaluation be performed . . . Upon our review of the record, we do not find probable cause to believe that Burns' mental state deteriorated to the point that he was no longer competent to stand trial. The jail nurse indicated that Burns had been receiving his medications, and until the tape of his September 26th statement was played for the jury, he had actively interacted with his counsel during the proceedings. As the circuit court observed, it is entirely understandable that Burns would become upset upon hearing his statement to Gochenour. Also notable is the fact that Burns had apparently expressed a desire to his counsel, even before the tape was played, not to be present at his trial. Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in refusing to order a competency evaluation during the trial of this case.