Opinion ID: 2816613
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mistrial Motion and Prejudice

Text: We review the denial of a Rule 16(d)(2) motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. De La Rosa, 196 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1999). In addition, we will not disturb a ruling on a Rule 16 sanctions motion absent a showing of prejudice. Id. at 715-16. It is firmly established that a defendant is prejudiced under Rule 16 when he is “unduly surprised and lacks an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense.” Id. at 716. Mackin argues that he was denied an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense because he formed his trial strategy relying on the incomplete evidence that had been provided by the government. The government argues that Mackin did not suffer any prejudice. We agree with Mackin that he suffered prejudice under the particular facts of this case—specifically relating to the interstate movement of the firearm. As previously described, Mackin stipulated to the fact that he had been convicted of a qualifying felony. So the government, in order to secure a conviction, had to prove two elements: (1) that Mackin possessed a firearm; and (2) that the firearm had been possessed in or affecting commerce, or that the firearm had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. The government’s evidence regarding his possession of a firearm was strong. So it appears to us that the government’s primary burden at trial was to prove the firearm’s link to interstate commerce. (That nexus is, after all, what makes this a federal offense.) The government would seek to prove that element, as is the case in most felon-in-possession cases, through the ATF’s analysis of the weapon’s manufacture and No. 14-3602 13 sale. Mackin, for his part, then had to undermine the gun’s link to interstate commerce. He sought to do so by casting doubt on law enforcement’s handling of the evidence, and in particular, its storage and handling by the Fort Wayne Police Department and the ATF. By pointing out gaps in the weapon’s chain of custody, Mackin could alter the weight assigned to the firearm evidence. See United States v. Tatum, 548 F.3d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 2008). That includes the weight assigned to the firearm exhibit itself, if admitted into evidence, as well as potential challenges to the ATF’s analysis of the firearm. Mackin argues that had the government disclosed the correct continuity form, he would have known that his defense strategy was implausible. Had the government disclosed the completed form, he contends, he would have known that the weapon’s chain of custody had been correctly documented, and he would have had no basis upon which to raise a chain-of-custody defense. Because the government’s own error raised the very possibility of the defense he attempted to assert at trial, Mackin argues, the Rule 16 violation “unduly surprised” him and deprived him of the “opportunity to prepare a defense.” Id. We find instructive the case of United States v. Lee. 573 F.3d 155. The appellant there was charged with possessing a quantity of crack cocaine that had been found in a hotel room on January 7, 2005. Id. at 158-59. During discovery, the government disclosed to Lee a photocopy of the front side of the hotel room’s registration card. Id. at 159. The photocopied portion indicated that an individual named “Omar Martin,” who shared Lee’s home address, checked in on January 3 for a one-night stay. Id. at 158. 14 No. 14-3602 Lee argued at trial, based on the registration card, that “Martin” (presumably Lee) had checked out of the hotel room days before the drugs were found. Id. at 159. Therefore, Martin/Lee could not be proven to have possessed the drugs. When the case went to the jury, the jurors were provided with the trial exhibits for their deliberations. Id. at 160. These exhibits included the original registration card. Id. Several hours after beginning to deliberate, the jury asked the court, “What is the information on the back of the registration card in pencil?” Id. Until that time, neither the prosecution nor the defense was aware that the back of the registration card contained additional notations. Id. The back of the card contained dates (written by an unidentified person) indicating that “Martin” had extended his stay at the hotel through January 7—the day that the drugs were found. Id. at 158. Lee moved for a mistrial, since the prosecution had failed to disclose the information on the back of the card prior to trial. Id. at 160. The judge denied the motion, instead in- structing the jury to ignore the notations on the back of the card. Id. Lee was ultimately convicted. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that Lee had been prejudiced by the government’s nondisclosure and that mistrial was the appropriate remedy. Id. at 164-65. To begin, the court noted that the information contained on the back of the card would “entirely defeat Lee’s defense argument.” Id. at 161. The court concluded that Lee “was deprived of any opportunity to prepare meaningfully for trial [or] to design an intelligent trial strategy.” Id. at 165. The court held that: No. 14-3602 15 [a]bsent the discovery violation, Lee would have likely crafted a different trial strategy that might have proven more effective in light of the information on the back of the registration card. Finally, Lee might have chosen to enter into plea negotiations with the Government if he had accurate information about the strength of its case. Id. So it is with Mackin’s case. The incomplete continuity form led Mackin to believe that he had a viable chain-ofcustody defense. Had the government disclosed the correct form, Mackin would have known that he was wrong. Instead, he proceeded to trial believing that he could show that the proper evidence-handling procedures had not been followed, because that is what the evidence disclosed by the government itself suggested. He developed his trial strategy based on the information provided by the government— information that proved, mid-trial, to be at best incomplete. The government argues that Mackin was not prejudiced by this belated disclosure because he could have changed his strategy mid-trial. According to the government, Mackin’s opening statements “did not reference continuity or chain of custody and did not commit him to any particular line of defense.” But, as Mackin argues (without any rebuttal from the government), this was his only possible line of defense— however weak it may have been. This is especially true because the court had already denied his only other defense strategy: his proposed jury instruction regarding duress. Mackin did his best to “plow through,” as the trial court told him to do, after the disclosure. He cross-examined the 16 No. 14-3602 witnesses concerning the two versions of the continuity slip. But “plowing through” was not enough to cure the damage caused by the government’s nondisclosure. Mackin’s whole strategy going into trial was based on the absence of a complete and correct continuity form. Once the government belatedly produced a complete form, no amount of crossexamination could have helped Mackin. See United States v. Noe, 821 F.2d 604, 607 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that the government’s failure to turn over discoverable evidence “is so serious a detriment to the preparation for trial and the defense of serious criminal charges that where it is apparent, as here, that the defense strategy may have been determined by the failure to disclose, there should be a new trial.” (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.2d 649, 651 (11th Cir. 1986)