Opinion ID: 109669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality

Text: We come, then, to the question whether the Ohio labor dispute disqualification provision is constitutional. The statute does not involve any discernible fundamental interest or affect with particularity any protected class. Appellee concedes that the test of constitutionality, therefore, is whether the statute has a rational relation to a legitimate state interest. Brief for Appellee 29. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976). Our statement last Term in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307 (1976), explains the analysis: We turn then to examine this state classification under the rational-basis standard. This inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, [397 U. S. 471,] 485 [(1970)]. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be valid. Id., at 314. Appellee challenges the statute only in its application to persons in his situation. We find it difficult, however, to discern the precise nature of the situation that appellee claims may not be the subject of disqualification. His discussion focuses to a great extent on his claim that he is involuntarily unemployed, but he cannot be arguing that no person involuntarily unemployed may be disqualified, for he approves the draft bills' labor dispute provision. Brief for Appellee 53. That provision, as discussed above, would disqualify an involuntarily unemployed nonunion worker who opposed a strike but whose grade or class of workers nevertheless went out on strike. Appellee's claim of irrationality appears to be based, rather, on his view of the statute's broad sweep, in that it disqualifies an individual regardless of the geographical remoteness of the location of the dispute, and regardless of any arguable actual, or imputable, participation or direct interest in the dispute on the part of the disqualified person. [18] Id., at 34. Appellee thus focuses on the interests of the recipient of unemployment compensation. The unemployment compensation statute, however, touches upon more than just the recipient. It provides for the creation of a fund produced by contributions from private employers. The rate of an employer's contribution to the fund varies according to benefits paid to that employer's eligible employees. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.25 (1973). Any action with regard to disbursements from the unemployment compensation fund thus will affect both the employer and the fiscal integrity of the fund. Appellee in effect urges that the Court consider only the needs of the employee seeking compensation. The decision of the weight to be given the various effects of the statute, however, is a legislative decision, and appellee's position is contrary to the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 486 (1970). In considering the constitutionality of the statute, therefore, the Court must view its consequences, not only for the recipient of benefits, but also for the contributors to the fund and for the fiscal integrity of the fund. Looking only at the face of the statute, an acceptable rationale immediately appears. The disqualification is triggered by a labor dispute other than a lockout. In other words, if a union goes on strike, the employer's contributions are not increased, but if the employer locks employees out, all his employees thus put out of work are compensated and the employer's contributions accordingly are increased. Although one might say that this system provides only rough justice, its treatment of the employer is far from irrational. If the classification has some `reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification `is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. at 485. The rationality of this treatment is, of course, independent of any innocence of the workers collecting compensation. Appellants assert three additional rationales for the disqualification provision. First, they argue that granting benefits to workers laid off due to a strike at a parent company's subsidiary plant in effect would be subsidizing the union members. Brief for Appellants 12. The District Court correctly rejected this rationale, as applied to appellee and his class, because payments to appellee would in no way directly subsidize the striking coal miners, and the fact that appellee happened to be a member of a union (other than the striking union) is not a legitimate reason, standing alone, to deny him benefits. 408 F. Supp., at 1022. The court continued: Moreover, close scrutiny of the reasons for the State's classification reveals that what the state is actually intending to prevent is not the `subsidizing' of unemployed union members per se, but the subsidizing of union-initiated work stoppages (emphasis in original). Ibid. This statement of the State's purpose reflects its second proffered justification, namely, that the granting of benefits would place the employer at an unfair disadvantage in negotiations with the unions. The District Court rejected this justification on the grounds that payments of funds to the steelworkers could hardly be deemed to put the coal miners in a position to refuse to negotiate with the steel companies until the companies reached a financial crisis, thereby causing the companies to yield to the unreasonable and economically unsound demands of the coal miners to prevent bankruptcy. Ibid. Although the District Court was reacting to appellants' own hyperbole in speaking of financial crises and bankruptcy, it must be recognized that effects less than pushing the employer to bankruptcy may be rationally viewed as undesirable. The employer's costs go up with every laid-off worker who is qualified to collect unemployment. The only way for the employer to stop these rising costs is to settle the strike so as to return the employees to work. Qualification for unemployment compensation thus acts as a lever increasing the pressures on an employer to settle a strike. The State has chosen to leave this lever in existence for situations in which the employer has locked out his employees, but to eliminate it if the union has made the strike move. Regardless of our views of the wisdom or lack of wisdom of this form of state neutrality in labor disputes, we cannot say that the approach taken by Ohio is irrational. The third rationale offered by the State is its interest in protecting the fiscal integrity of its compensation fund. This has been a continuing concern of Congress and the States with regard to unemployment compensation systems. See Report of the Committee on Economic Security, cited supra, at 482; Hearing on H. R. 6900 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). It is clear that protection of the fiscal integrity of the fund is a legitimate concern of the State. We need not consider whether it would be rational for the State to protect the fund through a random means, such as elimination from coverage of all persons with an odd number of letters in their surnames. Here, the limitation of liability tracks the reasons found rational above, and the need for such limitation unquestionably provides the legitimate state interest required by the equal protection equation. The District Court's opinion contains a paragraph declaring that, in addition to violating the Equal Protection Clause, the disqualification denied appellee due process. 408 F. Supp., at 1022. There is, however, no claim of denial of procedural due process, cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), and we are unable to discern the basis for a claim that appellee has been denied substantive due process. The judgment of the District Court is reversed. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.