Opinion ID: 2384508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Case Against Appellant Savage.

Text: Savage made a motion for a directed verdict in his favor, but the court denied the motion and submitted his case to the jury. It was noted above that White admitted he did not stop at the stop sign; and it is obvious, from uncontroverted evidence, that he failed to yield the right of way. The duties and obligations placed upon the driver of a vehicle under subsections (a) and (b) of Section 233 are so similar that we think our decisions under subsection (a), the so-called boulevard law are apposite here. Of course, the statutes do not relieve the favored driver of all duty to use care. Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174; State v. Marvil Package Co., 202 Md. 592; Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24; Green v. Zile, 225 Md. 339; Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487. The only purported act of negligence on Savage's part was that he was cutting the corner, that is he was close to the curb on the Texaco property as he approached E. Church Street; and appellee and White argue this act of negligence was a contributing cause of the accident. We do not find the argument persuasive. We stated in Dunnill v. Bloomberg, 228 Md. 230, that although the duty of the unfavored driver is not absolute, it is rigorous and only in rare instances is it proper to submit to the jury the issue of negligence or contributory negligence on the part of the favored driver. Again, in Zeamer v. Reeves, 225 Md. 526, Judge Sybert, for the Court, stated: The unfavored driver may not relieve herself of the duty of yielding the right of way by simply claiming that the favored driver was exceeding the speed limit. In Sun Cab Company, Inc. v. Cusick, 209 Md. 354, the favored driver was charged with three alleged acts of negligence. In disposing of one of them, the Court said: However, even if it is a fact that he [the favored driver] was driving in the center of the avenue, he could not be charged with negligence for so doing, because such fact was not the direct and proximate cause of the accident, as there might have been a collision even if the cab had been traveling upon the right half of the avenue. Moreover, there was testimony to the effect that because of the bend in the passageway and its width (it will be noted the width varies from 19.5 feet at the middle of the curve to 30 feet where it enters E. Main Street and to some 18 feet as it gets close to E. Church Street; and the whole passageway is but some 40 feet long), there was not room for two cars to pass at all points therein, although cars used it regularly for traffic going both ways. The general rule that a motor vehicle should keep to the right of the center of a road does not apply where the width of the road is too narrow for the rule to be observed. Code (1957), Article 66 1/2, Section 217 (a); Longenecker v. Zanghi, 175 Md. 307. In the case at bar, we think that White's admitted failure to stop at the stop sign and his admitted failure to yield the right of way were the direct and proximate causes of the collision. Had he stopped in obedience to the duty placed upon him by the statute, and then proceeded slowly so as to be able to yield the right of way, the other duty placed upon him by the statute, he, undoubtedly, would have seen the Savage car in time to have averted the collision, whether the Savage car was close to the curb or not. Under these circumstances, even if we assume Savage was close to the curb as he proceeded through the passageway, we do not believe that that fact was a proximate cause of the accident. The trial court, therefore, should have granted his motion for a directed verdict.