Opinion ID: 2174114
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The City's anti-nepotism policy was created to address and alleviate management problems that the City perceived to potentially exist when family members are working in the same department. Mainly, these problems are defined as: 1. Favoritism in job assignment, 2. Favoritism in job promotion, 3. Favoritism in additional employment, 4. Favoritism in pay increase, 5. Creation of morale problems, 6. Reduced work productivity, 7. Increased absenteeism, 8. Conflicts of interest, 9. Problems in the administration of discipline. Reliance by the City is placed on experts in the personnel management field who advise against allowing these family relationships to be created. We note at the outset that the procedural posture of this case is unlike the majority of our cases in this area, which have come from a review of a decision by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). See, e.g., Saydel Educ. Ass'n v. PERB, 333 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1983); City of Mason City v. PERB, 316 N.W.2d 851 (Iowa 1982); City of Fort Dodge v. PERB, 275 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1979). In the case at bar, PERB is not a party nor is it the adjudicating agency, the case having been processed from a declaratory judgment petition filed initially in the district court pursuant to Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 261-269. The thrust of plaintiffs' action is that the resolution condemning family relationships in departmental employment illegally interferes with their civil service employee rights, their freedom of association and marriage, and the right to bargain regarding promotion and job transfer procedures. None of these issues come from a grievance about a contractual provision involving the employees. We have been careful in our jurisdictional procedures to have disputes decided initially by the agency in whose field of expertise the case lies. Our case of Salsbury Laboratories v. Iowa Department of Environmental Quality, 276 N.W.2d 830, 836-37 (Iowa 1979), discussed our rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. We have returned jurisdiction to the agency when the procedure involved has avoided agency action although an adequate remedy was available through the agency. See City of Des Moines v. Des Moines Police Bargaining Unit Ass'n, 360 N.W.2d 729, 732-33 (Iowa 1985). Moreover, a district court's role is limited in reviewing agency action under section 17A.9 of our Code. In PERB v. Stohr, 279 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Iowa 1979), we held that the district court's authority allowed a review of PERB's refusal to issue a ruling but did not extend to deciding the merits of the controversy. At the same time, we have recognized that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has never been absolute. See Salsbury, 276 N.W.2d at 836; Matters v. City of Ames, 219 N.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Iowa 1974) (Exhaustion is not required before every court challenge.). If the agency is incapable of granting the relief sought during the subsequent administrative proceedings, a fruitless pursuit of these remedies is not required. Salsbury, 276 N.W.2d at 836; Matters, 219 N.W.2d at 719; 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 20.07 (1958). We have also held that the district court in a particular factual scenario may have concurrent jurisdiction with PERB. Norton v. Adair County, 441 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Iowa 1989) (action by employee against union alleging violation of statutory duty of fair representation). The Public Employment Relations Board generally has exclusive jurisdiction to determine negotiability issues under Iowa Code chapter 20. City of Des Moines, 360 N.W.2d at 732. It is appropriate for an agency in the first instance to interpret the statutes it administers. Id. When resolution of a controversy has been delegated to PERB, the district court has no original authority to declare the rights of parties or the applicability of any statute or rule. Stohr, 279 N.W.2d at 290. The district court's power to decide such issues is derived from and is dependent upon its authority to review PERB's action. Id.; see, e.g., City of Dubuque v. PERB, 444 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Iowa 1989) (court affirmed PERB's decision which concluded that evaluation procedure for police promotion was a mandatory subject of bargaining); City of Des Moines, 360 N.W.2d at 732 (court holds PERB is body to determine negotiability disputes in the first instance); Saydel Educ. Ass'n, 333 N.W.2d at 489 (court affirms PERB ruling that criteria including skill, ability, and experience to be considered by school district in connection with transfer or staff reductions was a mandatory subject of bargaining). Our cases have assumed that the administrative declaratory ruling remedy for negotiability disputes must be exhausted before resort to the courts. Id.; Stohr, 279 N.W.2d at 290. At trial, the associations argued that the anti-nepotism policy affected promotion and transfer procedures, which the associations argue are mandatory subjects of bargaining pursuant to Iowa Code section 20.9. See City of Dubuque, 444 N.W.2d at 497; Saydel Educ. Ass'n, 333 N.W.2d at 489. As mandatory subjects of bargaining, the associations argue that the City was required to negotiate in good faith with them pursuant to Iowa Code section 20.9. Failure to do so, they argue, is a prohibited practice and invalidates the policy. Iowa Code § 20.11. We have dealt with similar language used in sections 20.7 and 20.9 in several cases. See Northeast Community Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 408 N.W.2d 46, 50-51 (Iowa 1987); Aplington Community Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 392 N.W.2d 495, 498-99 (Iowa 1986); Saydel Educ. Ass'n, 333 N.W.2d at 489. Recently, in City of Dubuque, we discussed what is involved in deciding if a topic is subject to the mandatory bargaining directives of section 20.9. There, we said: We recognize that in some situations we will look at the predominant characteristics of a proposal in determining if it is a mandatory bargaining subject under Iowa Code section 20.9. However, our recent decisions in Northeast, Aplington and Saydel clearly establish that the identification of criteria used by the employer to determine staff reduction and transfer falls within the mandatory subject of evaluation procedures. Our analysis and reasoning in these decisions is equally applicable to this case involving the criteria and procedures used by the employer to determine promotion. 444 N.W.2d at 497. The criteria considered in City of Dubuque come from a memorandum put out by the City for use in selecting persons for promotion to the position of police corporal. The memorandum detailed an extensive list of points for grading by police supervisors of a candidate's performance and specified how much supervision was required to evaluate a candidate. We held that these detailed procedures and listing of criteria for judging performance were evaluation procedures included by section 20.9 as matters subject to mandatory bargaining. Our cases of Northeast, Aplington and Saydel support the reasoning that a listing of criteria establishes an evaluation procedure under section 20.9 that thereby mandates consideration of the issue through mandatory bargaining. In all three cases a comprehensive statement of factors to be considered in reaching a decision on an issue was included. These cases differ in this regard from the case at bar. There are no criteria set up by the City of Sioux City that would constitute an evaluation procedure or a transfer procedure under the provisions of section 20.9 for implementing the anti-nepotism resolution. The resolution's predominant characteristic is that it is self-acting. If an employee marries or cohabits with another employee, the resolution automatically determines the result. There is nothing to negotiate on how the policy would be applied to a particular situation or what factors should be included in a determination of the outcome in a given case. The result of violating the anti-nepotism resolution does not depend on the input from any other employees or any outside source. Because of the nature of the topic, it is not subject to the mandatory bargaining provision of section 20.9. Consequently, we hold that the resolution here falls within the provisions of section 20.7, in which the legislature has granted to public employers the exclusive power to hire, transfer and discharge public employees. Our holding on this point removes this case from the exclusive jurisdictional sphere of PERB wherein issues of mandatory bargaining are reserved. Our next concern is whether PERB is the most appropriate tribunal to hear this case. Plaintiffs' challenge to the anti-nepotism policy is heavily based on statutory and constitutional arguments. They claim the policy violates the Iowa Constitution as in excess of home rule powers, is an unconstitutional restraint on the right to marry, and is unconstitutionally overbroad. It is apparent that the ultimate relief sought by the plaintiff associations is not to negotiate procedures to implement the anti-nepotism policy, but to have the policy declared invalid. That decision is properly for the courts to decide rather than PERB. This case presents exactly the kind of fruitless pursuit of unavailable remedies that necessitates an exception to the exhaustion doctrine. See Salsbury, 276 N.W.2d at 836. PERB cannot provide an adequate remedy for the issues raised by plaintiffs. Cf. City of Des Moines, 360 N.W.2d at 731-32 (concerned validity of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement). Plaintiffs are correct in invoking the district court jurisdiction initially by means of a declaratory judgment action. Cf. Hollinrake v. Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, 452 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 1990) (academy's establishing minimum vision requirements for police officer position did not constitute disability that invokes Civil Rights Commission jurisdiction).