Opinion ID: 1974323
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The entrapment instruction

Text: Finally, Minor contends that the jury should have been instructed on the defense of entrapment. He premises his argument on the fact that the government's evidence established that the undercover officer initiated the conversation and specifically asked about the availability of heroin. Minor is correct that, as a general proposition, a defense request for a jury instruction may be based on evidence offered by either the government or the defendant. See, e.g., Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 367 (D.C.1990); Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1103 n. 1 (D.C.1978). He is incorrect, however, when he suggests that the officer's instigation of the drug sale, without more, entitled him to an entrapment instruction. We agree with the trial court that there was no basis in law or in fact for any entrapment instruction in this case. A jury may be instructed on the affirmative defense of entrapment when there is sufficient evidence of government inducement of the crime and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in that criminal conduct. Mathews v. United States, supra, 485 U.S. at 63, 108 S.Ct. at 887. We are mindful that, as a general matter, the determination of whether entrapment has occurred is ordinarily an issue reserved for the fact-finder. E.g., German v. United States, 525 A.2d 596, 612 n. 34 (D.C.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944, 108 S.Ct. 331, 98 L.Ed.2d 358 (1987). We hold, however, that in this case the government's evidence was insufficient Minor presented no evidence of his ownto justify an entrapment instruction. The mere fact that the undercover officer initiated the conversation which led to the heroin sale did not entitle Minor to an entrapment instruction. The Supreme Court made this clear in Mathews: evidence that Government agents merely afforded an opportunity or facilities for the commission of the crime [is] insufficient to warrant such an instruction. 485 U.S. at 66, 108 S.Ct. at 888. As this court held almost twenty years ago, an entrapment instruction is not required by a showing of police conduct which purportedly induced or instigated the commission of a crime merely by offering an opportunity to do so or by `playing along' with one considering an illegal act. Williams v. United States, 342 A.2d 367, 369 (D.C.1975) (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973)); [11] see Kronstadt v. District of Columbia, 155 A.2d 76, 77 (D.C.Mun.App.1959). Thus, an agent deployed to stop the traffic in illegal drugs may offer the opportunity to buy or sell drugs, and, if the offer is accepted, make an arrest on the spot or later. Jacobson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 1541, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992). Moreover, the officer's conduct clearly was not entrapment as a matter of law. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372, 78 S.Ct. 819-821, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958) (Solicitation alone ... does not establish entrapment, nor is it illegitimate for the government to set a `trap for the unwary criminal' (footnote omitted)). Minor relies heavily on United States v. Rippy, 196 U.S.App.D.C. 243, 247, 606 F.2d 1150, 1154 (1979), which of course is not binding on this court. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971). Even if it were, it would not support Minor's argument. In Rippy the jury was instructed on the entrapment defense but nevertheless found the defendant guilty. He argued on appeal that he had been entrapped as a matter of law because the police had solicited the sale of drugs. Since Minor does not contend that he was entrapped as a matter of law, Rippy is inapposite here. Moreover, under District of Columbia law, before the court may give an entrapment instruction, there must be evidence that the defendant was wholly without criminal intent when he join[ed] the police in the commission of [the] crime, i.e., that he lacked a predisposition to commit the charged offense. Williams v. United States, supra, 342 A.2d at 369. Predisposition focuses on whether the defendant was an `unwary innocent' or, instead, an `unwary criminal' who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime. Mathews, supra, 485 U.S. at 63, 108 S.Ct. at 887 (citations omitted); accord, Riley v. United States, 298 A.2d 228, 233 (D.C.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840, 94 S.Ct. 96, 38 L.Ed.2d 77 (1973). The testimony was uncontroverted that Minor initiated the contact with Officer Marsh by approaching the officer's car, that Minor had to seek out two different sellers before he found one who had drugs for sale, that Minor asked Marsh how many bags of heroin he wanted and quoted the price per bag, that Minor accepted money from Beaner after the sale was consummated, and that he approached the officer a second time and asked if he needed any syringes. This evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the defense, simply does not permit a finding that Minor lacked a predisposition to participate in the distribution of illegal narcotics. We hold, accordingly, that there was no basis in the evidence for an entrapment instruction and that the trial court did not err in refusing to give one. Affirmed. TERRY, Associate Judge, concurring: I join fully in the court's opinion, but I would go one step further. I would hold that, as a matter of law, possession is not and can never be a lesser included offense of distribution because there is no overlap between the two offenses. A lesser-included offense instruction is only proper where the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element which is not required for conviction of the lesser-included offense. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 350, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 1009, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965) (citations omitted). More recently, the Supreme Court has refined this test by stating that the elements of the lesser offense must be a subset of the [greater] charged offense. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1450, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989). I understand this subset language to mean simply that in proving the greater offense, the government must also prove all the elements of the lesser offense. See Rease v. United States, 403 A.2d 322, 328 (D.C.1979). [1] I would hold that, under this test, possession (a misdemeanor) is not and cannot be a lesser included offense of distribution (a felony) because all the elements of possession need not be proved in order to convict someone of distribution. Although the mens rea is the same for both offenses (knowingly or intentionally), [2] the actus reus is altogether different. Possession is not defined by statute, but case law has established that it consists of either direct physical custody (actual possession) or the ability to exercise dominion and control over the thing possessed (constructive possession). Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 639 (D.C.1982); see Parker v. United States, 601 A.2d 45, 51-52 (D.C.1991); Bernard v. United States, 575 A.2d 1191, 1195-1196 (D.C.1990). Distribution, on the other hand, is statutorily defined as a change of possession, the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a drug from one person to another. D.C.Code § 33-501(9) (1988). To sustain a charge of distribution, the government must prove only a knowing or intentional transfer (or attempted transfer) of the drug; the act of possession before or after the transfer need not be proved because it is not part of the act of distribution. Hence, although such possession will be incidentally proved in most distribution cases, such proof is superfluous because possession is not an elementunder Schmuck, it is not a subsetof distribution. Minor contends that possession is a lesser included offense of distribution because one must invariably possess the controlled substance in order to distribute it. While that is usually true, this court's decision in Allen v. United States, 580 A.2d 653 (D.C. 1990), makes clear that the possession and the distribution are two distinct acts that occur in sequence, not simultaneously. We said in Allen: It is self-evident that every distribution of an unlawful drug is immediately preceded by possession of that same drug with intent to distribute it. Id. at 659 (emphasis added). We characterized the possession of the drug as the prologue to the distribution, suggesting that in theory, at least, the possession might even be charged as a separate offense. Id. [3] The same analysis defeats Minor's argument here. Under Allen, the possession ends at the instant the distribution begins, so that the two offenses can never overlap. It follows that possession is not, and cannot logically be, a lesser included offense of distribution, and that Minor's requested instruction was properly denied. [4]