Opinion ID: 1926659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the brewer and the distributor

Text: The plaintiffs claim that the brewer and the distributor should be held vicariously liable for the actions of the tavern, allegedly in violation of § 3-8-1, relying on a theory of agency. They contend that the statutory scheme regulating the distribution of alcoholic beverages in the state created an agency relationship between the tavern and each of the other two defendants. We disagree. Agency has been defined as the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act. Restatement (Second) Agency § 1(1) (1958). Thus, the three elements required to show the existence of an agency relationship include (1) a manifestation by the principal that the agent will act for him, (2) acceptance by the agent of the undertaking, and (3) an agreement between the parties that the principal will be in control of the undertaking. Id. at § 1(1) comment b. It is essential to the relationship that the principal have the right to control the work of the agent, McLaughlin v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 164 Conn. 317, 322, 321 A.2d 456, 459 (1973); Arcell v. Ashland Chemical Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 494, 378 A.2d 53, 65 (1977); and that the agent act primarily for the benefit of the principal. Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg, 118 R.I. 596, 605, 376 A.2d 1, 5 (1977). The plaintiffs neither alleged specific facts nor submitted affidavits relevant to the existence of any of these factors between the tavern and the brewer or the distributor. Both the brewer and the distributor submitted affidavits stating that they had never entered into an agreement either written or oral with the tavern, either for the sale of their products or for any other reason; that they never authorized the tavern to take any action on their behalf or as a representative of their companies; that they had no beneficial interest in the tavern; and that they had no knowledge of the tavern ever purporting to act on their behalf, and that if it had done so, such occurrence would have been without their consent. Nor are the factors determinative of agency to be found within the statutory distribution scheme alleged by plaintiffs to create such a relationship. The scheme merely directs the licensed wholesaler, that is, the distributor, to purchase the particular product it desires only from the manufacturer of that product and the licensed retailer to purchase only from licensed wholesalers. G.L. 1956 (1976 Reenactment) §§ 3-6-16 and 3-7-18. [3] In fact, as is noted by plaintiffs themselves, the scheme is designed to prevent any influence by a manufacturer over a wholesaler, or by a manufacturer or wholesaler over a retailer, see §§ 3-6-15 and 3-7-22  thus prohibiting in effect the very control critical to an agency relationship. [4] Consequently, plaintiffs' claim of vicarious liability against the brewer and the distributor fails. The grant of summary judgment to each of them was accordingly appropriate. [5]