Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Florence Zappala

Text: Defendant also challenges the exclusion of prospective juror Florence Zappala, arguing that she was excluded because of her stated reticence about voting for a death sentence. However, Mrs. Zappala also indicated her inability properly to evaluate the testimony of police officers. Q. You were asked if you would believe the testimony of a police officer just because the party testifying was a police officer, and you said yes. Why is that? A. I think I would. I mean, I would be inclined to. Q. Do you think you would give more weight to the testimony of a police officer just because it's a police officer and you had a civilian telling you one thing and a police officer telling you something else? A. I think I would have to think about that a while. It's all according to the person, I think, too. Q. You can't have jurors who come in and say, Well, anything a police officer tells me I'm going to believe. We want jurors who will listen to the evidence and fairly evaluate the evidence? A. Balance. Q. Now, based on your answer to the question, we don't know if you can do that. Only you can tell us. A. I don't know. I mean, it would be a question I would think about, I'd be inclined to believe a police officer, but I don't know. You know, I should think he'd be telling the truth. The trial court stated its reasons for excusing prospective juror Zappala: The reason for excusing the juror is basically based upon her answers concerning the police officer. At several times she was asked and still in the final analysis she may just give a little more weight to that testimony of a police officer only because it was a police officer, and the reason I didn't look up to you for your objection earlier is because people spend as much time as they have here, I don't want to ask them one question and send them on their way. The trial court was certainly within its discretion in excusing Mrs. Zappala based on her remarks concerning the veracity of police officers. To summarize our findings about the adequacy of the voir dire, the trial court should have questioned the potential jurors about the effect that aggravating factor c(4)(g) (murder committed in the course of a kidnapping) would have had on their ability to impose the death penalty. However, given the otherwise-adequate scope of voir dire, we are satisfied that the trial court conducted a sufficiently-thorough questioning to probe into the potential biases of the prospective jurors. The trial court's questioning of the jurors was sufficiently calculated to produce a fair and unbiased jury. Dixon, supra, 125 N.J. at 247, 593 A. 2d 266. We further conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in excusing the three prospective jurors for cause.