Opinion ID: 2328716
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claims of Failure to Investigate

Text: Taylor raises three separate claims that flow from trial counsel's alleged inadequate pretrial investigation into Taylor's mental health and personal background. [12] First, Taylor contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in investigating and uncovering mitigating evidence to be presented during the penalty phase of the proceeding. That investigatory failure, Taylor urges, also rendered defense counsel's representation ineffective due to their failure to present an EED defense during the guilt phase. The standard by which we review these claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, [13] as most recently elaborated by this Court in Swan v. State. [14] In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court promulgated a two-part test for reviewing Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective counsel. First, the quality of counsel's representation must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Second, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. [15] Under Strickland's first prong, [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. [16] A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. [17] Accordingly, Taylor must: [I]dentify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. [18] Under Strickland's second prong, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer [19] including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidencewould have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. [20] A court making this prejudice determination must consider all the relevant evidence that the [sentencing judge] would have had before [him] if [counsel] had pursued a different path. [21] Taylor, not the State, has the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors. [22] Our inquiry is therefore objective: what a reasonable [sentencing judge] in these circumstances would have done when confronted with the evidence. [23] To support his ineffective assistance claims, Taylor argues that trial defense counsel should have interviewed other members of his family and associates, obtained additional medical records, and reviewed certain court records in order to present both an EED defense and an adequate mitigation case. Taylor relies on three United States Supreme Court cases, Williams v. Taylor, [24] Wiggins v. Smith [25] and Rompilla v. Beard, [26] and a Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Outten v. Kearney. [27] In those four cases, the courts found counsel's performance to be constitutionally deficient. We find those decisions inapposite, however. In this case, counsel's performance far exceeded the substandard level of counsel's performance in the above cited decisions. In Williams, defense counsel failed to conduct an investigation into the defendant's childhood records, based on counsel's erroneous belief that state law barred their access to those records. [28] No such erroneous belief affected counsel's performance here. In Wiggins, the United States Supreme Court evaluated defense trial counsel's performance under the professional standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989. [29] Here, Taylor neither identifies, nor attempts to apply, any authoritative Delaware standard comparable to the Maryland standard at issue in Wiggins. In Rompilla, defense counsel failed to review a critical prior conviction file containing mitigation leads, which counsel knew the prosecution would use to prove aggravating factors. [30] That file contained a range of mitigation leads that no other source had opened up, and would have prompted [f]urther effort [that] would presumably have unearthed much of the material postconviction counsel found. [31] Instead, defense counsel relied on statements by the defendant and his family that no mitigating evidence existed. [32] The United States Supreme Court held that such reliance did not excuse counsel from their duty to review the prior conviction file, which would have spurred a wider mitigation inquiry. [33] Here, in contrast, the mitigating evidence in the prior conviction files was not relevant to or probative of the new (postconviction) experts' evaluation of brain damage, ADHD and borderline personality disorder. [34] Nor would the (arguably) mitigating evidence about Taylor's prior convictions that those files did contain have changed a reasonable sentencing judge's ultimate sentence. [35] Lastly, in Outten, the Third Circuit held that defense counsel's representation was ineffective because counsel had neither obtained nor independently reviewed available school and medical records, and had relied solely on conversations with the defendant and his mother. [36] In Taylor's case, trial counsel performed an independent investigation that far exceeded the scope of the investigation conducted in Outten. New postconviction counsel also rely on the 1989 American Bar Association Guidelines [37] to support Taylor's current position. The Guidelines state that defense counsel's duty to investigate is unaffected by uncooperative clients who express a desire not to present mitigating evidence. [38] The Guidelines, however, are not the applicable constitutional standard. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has declined to adopt any set of detailed rules as a standard for defining the reasonableness of counsel's performance under Strickland. [39] This Court, moreover, has rejected criminal defendants' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in cases where from the outset those defendants had imposed limits on their lawyers' freedom of action. [40] The record before us establishes that, despite Taylor's insistence on presenting no mitigating evidence, trial counsel conducted a diligent investigation into potential mitigating factors on their client's behalf. As the Superior Court found, trial counsel considered and explored different avenues of action . . . . [but] [u]nfortunately for them and for Taylor, trial counsel were stymied at every turn. More specifically, Taylor's trial counsel retained a psychiatrist and a psychologist, multiple psycho-forensic evaluators, and a pastoral counselor. The investigation included interviewing Taylor's family members and gathering his school and Division of Family Services (DFS) records, among other information sources. [41] To the extent those experts did not have access to records that now are currently available, the trial court found that that was due more to the records' not being available and less to trial counsel's having been derelict. . . . The court further found that even with those records in hand, the original defense experts largely stand by their pretrial opinions. Taylor insists that his trial counsel should have, but did not, consider other avenues of inquiry. The postconviction hearing testimony of his trial defense counsel sharply controverts that claim. Although Taylor instructed his trial counsel to pursue an all or nothing actual innocence defense and present no mitigating evidence, counsel nonetheless retained two experts who questioned Taylor's truthfulness about possible mitigating factors. Trial counsel also strived to tease out an EED defense for Taylor, and explored potential defenses based on mental illness and drug addiction. But, the original defense experts did not detect any brain damage to which Taylor now points as missed evidence in mitigation. The trial court also found that the head trauma claims on which Taylor's new experts based their diagnosis were largely uncorroborated. Taylor's new postconviction defense experts, Drs. Dougherty and Mack, based their opinions on uncorroborated statements Taylor made to them. Expert opinions based on uncorroborated statements do not automatically render trial counsel's performance deficient. As the Superior Court properly held, trial counsel's mental health investigation and their mitigation investigation are not rendered inadequate `merely because the defendant has now secured the testimony of a more favorable mental health expert.' [42] Taylor's final investigation-related claim of ineffective assistance flows from his waiver of the right to present mitigation evidence during the penalty phase. Taylor argues that that waiver should now be invalidated. He claims that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent because of: (i) his mental disorders and counsel's ineffective mental health and mitigation investigations, (ii) defense trial counsel's conflict of interest, and because (iii) the United States and Delaware Constitutions do not permit waiver of a mitigation defense in capital cases. Taylor was required to, but did not, challenge the validity of that waiver on direct appeal. This claim is, therefore, procedurally barred unless Taylor can establish either ineffective assistance of counsel or some other colorable constitutional claim that implicates an exception to the Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 procedural default. As discussed in Section II infra of this Opinion, those claims are barred because Taylor has not discharged that burden. But, even on substantive grounds Taylor's waiver-related ineffective assistance claim fails. Trial counsel sought and reasonably relied on expert opinion regarding Taylor's mental state, including his competence to waive a mitigation defense. Dr. Carol Tavani specifically opined that Taylor was competent to waive a mitigation defense, and trial counsel acted reasonably in relying on that opinion. The trial court found that there was no legally cognizable `conflict of interest'. . . . Trial counsel and Taylor merely had a difference of opinion over what course was in Taylor's best interest as to sentencing. For these reasons, and because trial counsel conducted an objectively reasonable investigation into Taylor's mental health and into other potentially mitigating evidence, Taylor has not satisfied Strickland's first prong on those three claims. We therefore need not reach or address the prejudice prong issue under Strickland whether a reasonable sentencing judge would have sentenced Taylor differently if Taylor's new experts, Drs. Dougherty and Mack, had testified and if Taylor had not waived a full mitigation presentation. [43] Because trial counsel's investigation and limited presentation of mitigation evidence was reasonable, Taylor's first three Strickland claims cannot succeed.