Opinion ID: 202291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Firearm Sentencing Enhancement

Text: 13 We review a district court's interpretation of the guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Robinson, 433 F.3d 31, 35, 38 (1st Cir.2005). In this case, the district court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for firearm possession under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), noting that the defendant acknowledged that the police had found a loaded handgun in his apartment, and that the defendant stated that he bought the gun for personal protection after a series of armed home invasions in his area. The court also applied a two-level reduction under the safety valve provision of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. The defendant and the prosecution agreed that the provision was applicable, despite its requirement that the defendant show that he was not in possession of the firearm in connection with the offense. 14 The defendant argues that, because the government conceded that the safety valve applies, the district court erred in applying the two-level sentencing enhancement for gun possession. The district court found nothing contradictory about applying both the enhancement and the reduction, concluding that different standards apply for each. 15 We agree with the district court. The burdens for establishing the applicability of the safety valve reduction and the weapon enhancement are different. Section 5C1.2, the safety valve provision, permits a two-level reduction in offense level if the defendant and the offense meet certain enumerated criteria. See United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 500 (1st Cir.2005). Pertinent to this case, the safety valve is unavailable to a defendant who `possesses a firearm . . . in connection with the offense.' Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2). Thus, the defendant has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he did not possess the firearm in connection with the offense. See United States v. Miranda-Santiago, 96 F.3d 517, 529 n. 25 (1st Cir.1996). 16 Section 2D1.1(b)(1) permits a two-level enhancement [i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed. To garner this enhancement, the government has the initial burden of establishing that a firearm possessed by the defendant was present during the commission of the offense. United States v. McDonald, 121 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1997). Once the government has made that showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the factfinder that a connection between the weapon and the crime is clearly improbable. Id. (emphasis added); see also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), cmt. n. 3 (The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.). 17 Thus, the burden on the defendant is different for these two sentencing provisions. The application of the safety valve (which requires the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not possess the firearm in connection with the offense) does not necessarily mean that the defendant can meet the heavier burden, once the government shows that the firearm was present during the commission of the offense, of establishing that it was clearly improbable that the gun was used in connection with the offense. 18 Other courts have addressed similar arguments regarding the interaction of the safety valve adjustment under § 5C1.2 and the firearm enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1). 1 At least two circuits have concluded that the application of a firearm enhancement under § 2D1.1(b) does not necessarily preclude a safety valve reduction under § 5C1.2. 2 See United States v. Bolka, 355 F.3d 909, 915 (6th Cir.2004) (noting the different burdens of proof under the two sentencing provisions); United States v. Nelson, 222 F.3d 545, 551 (9th Cir.2000) (same). In other words, these courts held that the defendant's failure to meet the higher burden of proof set forth in the firearm enhancement provision of the guidelines did not necessarily preclude the defendant from meeting the lower burden of proof set forth in the safety valve reduction provision. 19 In support of his position that the application of the safety valve reduction precludes the application of the firearm enhancement in his case, Anderson relies primarily on United States v. Vasquez, 161 F.3d 909 (5th Cir.1998). In Vasquez, the Fifth Circuit stated that § 2D1.1(b)(1) and § 5C1.2(2) . . . should be analyzed analogously. Id. at 912. However, the Fifth Circuit's description of the government's burden under § 2D1.1(b)(1) differs from the analysis of that burden in our precedent. The Fifth Circuit states that [t]he government has the burden of proof under § 2D1.1 of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a temporal and spatial relation existed between the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). By contrast, as explained above, we have held that the government must show that a firearm was present during the commission of an offense. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that it is clearly improbable that the gun was used in connection with the offense. Because of these differing approaches, the Fifth Circuit's reasoning is inapplicable in this case. See Nelson, 222 F.3d at 550 n. 3 (distinguishing Vasquez based on its different approach to the burden under § 2D1.1(b)(1)). 20 We thus discern no legal error in the district court's application of the firearm enhancement given its acceptance of the safety valve reduction. Nor were the district court's findings related to the firearm enhancement clearly erroneous. The defendant conceded that there was a loaded gun in the home in which he sold drugs. On that basis alone, the government met its burden of establishing that the gun was present at the commission of the offense. See McDonald, 121 F.3d at 10 ([T]he prosecution need only prove that the defendant possessed the weapon during the currency of the offense, not necessarily that he actually used it in perpetrating the crime or that he intended to do so.). In his objection to the PSI and during sentencing, defense counsel argued only that Anderson bought the gun after a series of home invasions took place in his area. This fact does not establish that a connection between the weapon and the crime is clearly improbable. See United States v. Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d 724, 727 (1st Cir. 1992) ([W]hen the weapon's location makes it readily available to protect either the participants themselves during the commission of illegal activity or the drugs and cash involved in the drug business, there will be sufficient evidence to connect the weapons to the offense conduct.). Thus, we discern no error in the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement. 3