Opinion ID: 2044555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Present Testimony of Victim's Coworker

Text: Petitioner first claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview or present the testimony of Brenda Grubisch, a coworker of Cogler and one of the last people to see her alive. At trial, Grubisch was called by the State and testified but was not called by the defense. Petitioner's theory at trial was that his sexual relations with Cogler just prior to her murder were consensual. Petitioner never denied murdering Cogler, but argued that he did not commit aggravated criminal sexual assault, and thus no such conviction could serve as the basis for his death penalty eligibility. The jury rejected this argument. In an affidavit attached to the post-conviction petition, Grubisch states that on the night of Cogler's murder, she, Cogler and petitioner were at a bar where she and Cogler worked, and that she witnessed Cogler and petitioner acting like a couple for the night. Grubisch further states that she saw petitioner and Cogler leave the bar together and return about an hour later, where they stayed until closing time. Petitioner argues that this information corroborates his version of the events that took place prior to Cogler's murder, namely, that the two engaged in consensual sex the first time they left the bar together, thereby supporting his defense that they engaged in consensual sex again after the bar closed, and that only after this consensual sex did petitioner murder Cogler. Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Grubisch or to call her as a witness. According to petitioner, had the jury heard the evidence presented in Grubisch's affidavit, there is a reasonable probability its verdict would have been different and he would not have been sentenced to death. In order for petitioner to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different without counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); People v. Simms, 168 Ill.2d 176, 213 Ill.Dec. 576, 659 N.E.2d 922 (1995). A reviewing court may reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by finding that petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel's representation without determining whether counsel's performance was deficient. People v. Erickson, 161 Ill.2d 82, 90, 204 Ill.Dec. 231, 641 N.E.2d 455 (1994). In the instant case, even if defense counsel had contacted Grubisch prior to trial and elicited the statements contained in her affidavit, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial and sentencing would have been different. Evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly indicated that Cogler was sexually assaulted before petitioner strangled her, a finding upheld by this court in petitioner's direct appeal. People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill.2d 483, 506, 190 Ill.Dec. 744, 622 N.E.2d 774 (1993). Specifically, petitioner told police that he strangled Cogler with a fan belt while lying on top of her in the back seat of Cogler's car and that she did not put up a fight, facts supported by the gross disparity in size between petitioner and the victim. The fan belt was still around Cogler's neck when her body was found. Fresh bruises and abrasions, however, were found on Cogler's forehead, elbow, knees and thigh, suggesting the use of force. The headliner and visor in Cogler's car were torn, also indicating a struggle took place in the front seat of the car. Most damning, however, was the other-crimes evidence produced by the State at trial showing a common design or plan by petitioner to sexually assault and strangle several women in Cogler's car within the space of a few hours of Cogler's murder. The jury further heard evidence of petitioner's initial statement to police regarding the Cooney sexual assault and murder in which he also claimed to have engaged in consensual sexual intercourse before killing her. See Cloutier, 156 Ill.2d at 500-06, 190 Ill.Dec. 744, 622 N.E.2d 774. Furthermore, Grubisch's statements that petitioner and Cogler were acting like a couple for the night and that they left the bar together once earlier add nothing new to Grubisch's testimony for the State at trial that the two were on friendly terms before leaving the bar. Specifically, Grubisch testified that Cogler voluntarily left with petitioner at closing time and planned to drive him home. Nevertheless, the jury still found that petitioner sexually assaulted Cogler in her car. Thus, petitioner was not prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to bring forward Grubisch's additional testimony now contained in her affidavit. Finally, petitioner suffered no prejudice during his sentencing hearing because he was found death-eligible on the independent basis of having murdered more than one person. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1994). The outcome of petitioner's sentencing thus would have been no different even if the jury had found that petitioner did not commit Cogler's murder in the course of another felony.