Opinion ID: 2514511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Late Direct Appeal

Text: The right to appeal is entirely statutory and is not found in either the United States Constitution or the Kansas Constitution. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), reh. denied 351 U.S. 958, 76 S.Ct. 844, 100 L.Ed. 1480 (1956); State v. Smith, 223 Kan. 47, 48, 574 P.2d 161 (1977). Accordingly, no appeal may be perfected absent compliance with the statutes conferring jurisdiction on the appellate courts. Since the filing of a timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional, the failure to file a notice of appeal in a criminal case within the 10-day period fixed by statute ordinarily compels dismissal of the appeal. See K.S.A. 22-3608. A limited exception, Ortiz, 230 Kan. at 735-36, 640 P.2d 1255, may allow a late appeal if a criminal defendant (1) has not been informed of his or her right to appeal, (2) has not been furnished an attorney to perfect an appeal, or (3) has been furnished an attorney who failed to perfect an appeal. State v. Patton, 287 Kan. ___, ___, 195 P.3d 753 (2008). Barr relies on the first ground for granting an Ortiz exception: his ignorance of his appeal rights. In Patton, filed this day, we hold that the first exception is grounded in the procedural due process aspect of fundamental fairness. When a court is faced with a claim that a late appeal is permitted by the first exception, the first concern is the content of the statements of the sentencing judge. Patton, 287 Kan. at ___, 195 P.3d 753. [A] district judge must inform a criminal defendant at sentencing, regardless of whether the defendant has entered a plea or gone to trial, that: (1) a right to appeal the severity level of the sentence exists; (2) any such appeal must be taken within 10 days [citations omitted]; and (3) if the defendant is indigent, an attorney will be appointed for the purpose of taking any desired appeal. Patton, 287 Kan. at ___, 195 P.3d 753. The evidentiary burden of showing that the district judge failed to communicate one or more of these three pieces of information at sentencing is on the defendant, who must demonstrate deficiency from the transcript of the sentencing hearing. Patton, ___ Kan. at ___, 195 P.3d 753. If the defendant discharges this burden, the State may still prevent a late appeal by proving that the defendant possessed actual knowledge of all of the required information by some means other than the district judge's oral statements at sentencing. The source of such actual knowledge may be ... the wording of an agreement signed by the defendant ...; but the State bears the evidentiary burden on this point. If the sentencing transcript demonstrates that the district judge did not adequately inform the defendant orally and the State is unable to demonstrate that the defendant had actual knowledge of the required information from other source, the defendant must then prove that, had he or she been properly informed, a timely appeal would have been sought. This evidentiary burden rests on the defendant. Patton, 287 Kan. at ___, 195 P.3d 753. In this case, Barr was explicitly informed by his plea agreement that he retained a limited right to appeal his sentence, including the accuracy of the crime severity level determination. He was informed of the 10-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal. And he was told that, if he could not afford an attorney or the cost of an appeal, the court would appoint counsel for him and order that all necessary transcripts of the proceedings be provided. At his plea hearing Barr acknowledged to the court that he read the plea agreement and understood his rights described in it. He stated that he understood that the presumptive sentence for his crime, if the court accepted his plea, would be incarceration in the penitentiary. Barr directs us to the statement in his plea agreement in which he acknowledged: I also understand that if the sentence imposed is that agreed to in the plea agreement, the appellate court will not review my sentence. While this is a correct paraphrase of K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(2), it is incomplete because it fails to note K.S.A. 21-4721(e)(3), which permits appellate review of, among other things, an error in ranking the severity level of a crime. Its incompleteness renders it inaccurate. It is also irrelevant. The portion of the plea agreement Barr relies upon warns of the limits on the appeal rights of a defendant who is sentenced in accordance with a plea agreement. Barr's plea agreement called for the State to ask the court to impose the low range presumptive sentence for Barr's crime. The presumptive sentence for Barr's crime was imprisonment. In accordance with the agreement, the State recommended imprisonment for the shortest presumptive duration. However, the sentencing court granted Barr probation, a departure sentence. Thus, this statement in the plea agreement does not apply to Barr's sentence, which was not a sentence agreed to in the plea agreement. Although appellate cases in which a criminal defendant has invoked the first exception to allow a late appeal may require remand to determine relevant facts needed to decide the issues under our decision in Patton, this case is not one of them. The record on appeal contains all any court would need to know to rule on whether the first exception can be applied. Even assuming that Barr's sentencing judge did not inform him of each of the three items of essential information Patton requires, Barr already had actual knowledge of each from the unambiguous and explicit language in the plea agreement he admitted that he reviewed, understood, and signed. In other words, the State would have no trouble carrying its evidentiary burden, defeating Barr's effort to invoke the exception. Barr is not entitled to take a late direct appeal from his sentence on manufacturing methamphetamine.