Opinion ID: 440207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 27 Benitez next argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Considering this challenge, we must view all the evidence, together with all logical inferences flowing from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the government. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). All credibility choices must be drawn in favor of the finder of fact. United States v. Miller, 693 F.2d 1051, 1053 (11th Cir.1982). Under these standards, we must decide whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence does not have to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 356, 103 S.Ct. 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 638 (1983). 28 Benitez argues that he was a mere bystander to the events in Colombia. The presence of the defendant, although it is not sufficient alone to support a conviction, is not inconsequential. See United States v. Kincade, 714 F.2d 1064, 1065 (11th Cir.1983). In this case, however, the mere presence doctrine is hardly involved. We have recited the facts of this case, established by the evidence, above. Benitez, accompanied by the other three Colombians, entered the agents' hotel rooms at gunpoint. Benitez searched the agents' belongings and found their official passports and DEA identification. Benitez was the last person seen with these documents, which are still missing. Benitez was an active participant in all of the illegal activity in the agents' hotel rooms, searching for and seizing the documents, identifying the agents as those sought by the conspirators, and actively participating in the kidnapping. The government certainly produced sufficient evidence to support the assault and robbery convictions. 29 Benitez contends that there was no evidence to prove that he knew that the other Colombians intended to assault and attempt to murder the agents. He characterizes such a conclusion as pure conjecture. We disagree. There was sufficient evidence at trial from which the jury could conclude that Benitez knew the object of the conspiracy. Benitez and his cohorts presented themselves as police officers and indicated to the agents that they were going to be taken to the police station. He was present when Rene told Martinez, You are not going to call the Embassy. This (his gun) is the only law in Colombia. He aided the other Colombians in removing the agents from the room; requiring them to exit the hotel onto the street where the car was parked. His departure before the agents were actually forced into the automobile to commence the death ride is his asserted defense. He was present when Rene told Martinez, You are not going to call the Embassy. This [his gun] is the only law in Colombia. Benitez' departure, after he aided the other Colombians in forcing the agents into the automobile to commence the death ride, is his asserted defense. He argues that the object of the conspiracy changed after he departed; therefore, he should not be held responsible for the acts of his coconspirators. In this case, however, there is no indication that the object of the conspiracy changed. Nothing intervened to cause the ride in the country to end with pistol shots. The agents did not provoke the Colombians by insulting or striking them before Rene shot Martinez. The ride started, proceeded to a secluded area, and stopped. The agents were ordered out of the car and shot. 30 When he took the stand, Benitez took the risk that he might bolster the government's case. See United States v. Contreras, 667 F.2d 976, 980 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849, 103 S.Ct. 109, 74 L.Ed.2d 97 (1982). Benitez testified that he was not present in the hotel rooms with the agents and the other Colombians. The evidence entitled the jury to find that Benitez was present at the start of a chain of events that led directly to the attempted murder of the agents. Instead of testifying that he did not realize that this was the purpose of the conspiracy, Benitez contended that he was not at all present. The jury obviously discredited Benitez' explanation. 31 We hold that the above evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Benitez was a member of the conspiracy and knew its objectives. See United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349 (11th Cir.1983). Indeed, the credible evidence belies Benitez' contention that he was a mere bystander. 32