Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to Harris

Text: Although defendant claims that he is entitled to be heard on his claim of mental retardation, defendant does not provide grounds to order a remand. If defendant submitted a reasonable basis for believing that he might have mental retardation, our opinion would not foreclose a PCR court from ordering a psychological examination of defendant to assess his claim of retardation. However, the current record contains sufficient evidence to refute defendant's mere assertion of mental retardation. Definitions of mental retardation include three components: (1) substantial intellectual impairment; (2) impact of that impairment on the individual's everyday life; and (3) appearance of the disability at birth or during the person's childhood. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 11, 13 (Jan./Feb.2003). The American Association on Mental Retardation's (AAMR) most recently published definition states: Mental Retardation is a disability characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. The disability originates before age eighteen. AAMR, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 1 (Ruth Luckasson ed., 10th ed.2002) (hereafter AAMR, Mental Retardation ). Definitions adopted by states that have passed Atkins legislation are not identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions set forth by the AAMR and the American Psychiatric Association. Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at 317 n. 22, 122 S.Ct. at 2250 n. 22, 153 L.Ed. 2d at 348 n. 22. The important components for our purposes are the limited intellectual functioning of persons with mental retardation, and evidence of the disability during childhood. As measured by standard IQ tests, limited intellectual functioning requires an individual's measured intelligence to be two standard deviations below the statistical mean. That, in turn, indicates that he or she scores in approximately the bottom 2 ½ percent of the population. Ellis, supra, 27 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. at 13; see also Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at 309 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 5, 153 L.Ed. 2d at 342, n. 5 (It is estimated that between 1 and 3 percent of the population has an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower, which is typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition.) (citing 2 Kaplan & Sadock's Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry 2952 (B. Sadock & V. Sadock eds. 7th ed.2000)). If the IQ score is valid, significant subaverage intellectual functioning will generally result in a score of approximately 70 to 75 or below. AAMR, Mental Retardation, supra, at 14. This upper boundary of IQs for use in classification of mental retardation is flexible to reflect the statistical variance inherent in all intelligence tests and the need for clinical judgment by a qualified psychological examiner. Id. at 11; see also American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41-42 (4th ed. Text Revision, 2000) (hereafter DSM-IV-TR ) (Thus it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with IQs between 70 and 75 who exhibit significant deficits in adaptive behavior.). In accordance with the mental health literature, some states have built into their statutes an IQ score as a threshold or as creating a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-15(d) (2003) (An intelligence quotient (IQ) of 75 or below is presumptive evidence of mental retardation.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (Banks-Baldwin 2003) (`Significant subaverage general intellectual functioning' is defined as an intelligent quotient of 70 or below.); MD. CODE ANN., Criminal law § 2-202(b)(1) (2002) (requisite intellectual deficits shown by an intelligence quotient of 70 or below on an individually administered intelligence quotient test); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2003) (IQ of seventy or below shall be presumptive evidence of mental retardation); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (West 2004) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.2 (2004) (an IQ above seventy is presumptive evidence of not having mental retardation). Defendant took several IQ tests as a child, and the results are in this record. The scores are relevant because the intellectual and adaptive deficits associated with mental retardation `manifest[] before age 18.' Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at 309 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 3, 153 L.Ed. 2d at 342, n. 3 (citing AAMR, Mental Retardation, supra, at 5). Defendant's childhood records formed the bases of the opinions of not only Dr. Friedman, but also of Dr. Gruen, who testified for the defendant at the penalty phase. Review of defendant's childhood records lead to the conclusion that he has not presented a bona fide claim of mental retardation. That said, two test results are emphasized by defendant. According to a probation report, defendant took an IQ test, noted as the Cal. M.M. Elementary test, when he was nine years old and achieved a score of seventy-two. Also, in 1969, when defendant was about seventeen years old, a psychological screening test at the State Home for Boys indicated an IQ of seventy-five. As noted, although significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is generally considered to reflect an IQ of seventy or below, there is a measurement error of approximately 5 points in assessing IQ, although this may vary from instrument to instrument.... Thus, it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with IQs between 70 and 75 who exhibit significant deficits in adaptive behavior. DSM-IV-TR, supra, at 41-42; Weatherspoon v. Massanari, 228 F.Supp. 2d 1041, 1047 (E.D.Mo.2002) (quoting DSM-IV-TR ). However, defendant's record includes many other IQ test results. Defendant's scores strongly suggest that if his results of seventy-two and seventy-five do not reflect his intellectual capacities, it is because they underestimated his abilities; the other results and comments from examiners reflect greater intellectual abilities. In February 1961, defendant was administered the Cal. M.M. instrument and obtained a score of eighty-eight. In April 1962, when defendant was about ten years old, he took the Wechsler Intelligence Scale of Children (WISC) test and achieved the following scores: eighty-one on the verbal scale, ninety-three on the performance scale, and eighty-five on the full scale. In an accompanying report, the examining psychologist wrote: Ambrose is functioning in the average range. Two of the five subtest scores are in the dull normal range and two are in the average range. The vocabulary subtest is in the defective range. This test gauges language development which is influenced by cultural opportunities. The report concludes: Ambrose is functioning in the average range and is retarded a year below mental maturity.... It would seem that though Ambrose's intelligence is low he is not anywhere near educable class placement. Another school record (date illegible) reports that a psychologist administered an IQ test to defendant and found defendant's functioning to be declining. He received a seventy-nine for verbal, eighty-two for performance, and a seventy-eight on the full scale. Those scores are also above the range of mental retardation. Moreover, the examining psychologist wrote that the quality of [defendant's] responses on a Rorshach would indicate that the previous [higher] test results are closer to his intellectual potential. Based on his discussions with defendant, the psychologist concluded, Ambrose's poor test results may be tied in with his feeling more threatened and anxious during the testing procedure. A June 1962 letter from a school social worker indicates that defendant had been previously placed in an educable class because he was a disturbing influence in the regular fourth grade and unable to function on the same level as the others. The letter does not justify defendant's placement based on retardation. In fact, the social worker, after conducting a psychological examination, concluded that Harris could function at a low average level. In January 1964, just before defendant turned twelve years old, the WISC test was again administered to him, and he obtained a full-scale IQ score of eighty. Six months later, another school psychologist administered the WISC test, and defendant obtained the following results: eighty on the verbal scale, eighty on the performance scale, and seventy-eight on the full scale. Finally, the State Home for Boys administered another WISC test to defendant in 1966, and his performance indicated an IQ of eighty-three, which was deemed probably dull normal by the evaluator. Even more compelling is the assessment of defendant's institutional records by his own mental health expert testifying at the penalty phase of defendant's trial. Dr. Gruen, a child psychologist testifying for defendant, strongly disagreed with any diagnosis of mildly mentally retarded made of defendant when he was a child. Gruen testified that he could not fathom such a diagnosis because the [IQ] scores that [he] saw were not mildly mentally retarded. He testified, I believe in historical perspective, the mentally retarded classes in the early '60's were dumping grounds for every kind of behavior and underachievement problem that faced the public schools. Gruen testified that placing defendant in classes with mentally retarded children would cause conflict and anger within him. We realize that records attached to cases on post-conviction review will vary, depending on the issues raised at trial and at the penalty phase. In the present matter, we combed the record for some evidence to support defendant's bare assertion that a psychological evaluation is needed to determine whether he has mental retardation. The record, including the opinion of defendant's own expert at the penalty phase, provides no support for his claim that a psychological examination is necessary; indeed, the record speaks against his claim. Cf. State v. Grell, 205 Ariz. 57, 66 P. 3d 1234, 1238-41 (2003) (ordering remand for trial court to conduct hearing where childhood records showed IQ scores of 72, 67, 69, 70, 57, and 65, and defense experts at penalty phase testified that defendant had retardation); Goodin v. State, 856 So. 2d 267, 277-78 (Miss.2003) (allowing PCR defendant to proceed on Atkins issue where pre-trial IQ scores ranged from fifty to sixty-five). Indeed, defendant has not provided any affidavit from a qualified psychologist who reviewed defendant's childhood records and his letters and who concluded that it is even an open question as to whether defendant has mental retardation. Without a reasonable basis for defendant's request for a psychological examination, we conclude that he is not entitled to a hearing on his claim of mental retardation.