Opinion ID: 2041031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Supreme Court Cases

Text: Two officers who had parked their car at the side of the highway decided to stop a vehicle to question the occupants about their citizenship and immigration status. They selected respondent's car solely because the occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent. The Supreme Court held that such roving patrols may stop vehicles with less than probable cause: ... because of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, we hold that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. 422 U.S. at 881, 95 S.Ct. at 2580. The Court announced this as an extension of the so-called Terry stop, which requires that the police officer be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant ... the belief that his safety or that of others is in danger. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906, 909 (1968). Approving roving patrol stops without requiring reasonable suspicion, the Court said, would subject lawful motorists to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways... . 422 U.S. at 882, 95 S.Ct. at 2581. Justice Powell wrote: We are not convinced that the legitimate needs of law enforcement require this degree of interference with lawful traffic, particularly because the nature of illegal alien traffic ... tend[s] to generate articulable grounds for identifying violators. 422 U.S. at 883, 95 S.Ct. at 2581.
The Court held that vehicle may be stopped at a permanent immigration checkpoint for brief questioning of the occupants even though there is no reason to believe that any particular vehicle contains illegal aliens. In this case, every car which entered the checkpoint was slowed to a complete, if not virtual, halt. 428 U.S. at 546, 96 S.Ct. at 3078. Those cars which the Border Patrol suspected carried illegal aliens were directed to a secondary stop where the occupants were asked to produce citizenship or immigration documents. Selection for this secondary investigation was completely discretionary and not based upon reasonable suspicion. The Court first examined the context in which the constitutional question of reasonable seizure arose. The national policy to limit immigration into the United States was frustrated by the flux of illegal aliens, 85% of whom came from Mexico. Moreover, the record indicated the effectiveness of the checkpoint based upon the rate of apprehension. [1] Recognizing the necessity and effectiveness of these operations, the Court noted the substantiality of the public interest in the practice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints.... 428 U.S. at 556, 96 S.Ct. at 3082. The Court balanced this interest against the limited intrusion (defined as the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection) upon a motorist's right to free passage. The objective intrusion was deemed equivalent to that experienced in Brignoni-Ponce, but checkpoint stops [are viewed] in a different light because the subjective intrusion  the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers  is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. 428 U.S. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at 3083. [2] Moreover, a permanent checkpoint reduced the degree of interference with the legitimate traffic, a distinction which separated this case from Brignoni-Ponce: Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. 428 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 3083. The Court concluded that the purpose of the stops is legitimate and in the public interest, and the need for this enforcement technique is demonstrated by the records in the cases before us. 428 U.S. at 562, 96 S.Ct. at 3085. However, Justice Powell made clear the limited nature of the decision: Our holding today, approving routine stops for brief questioning ... is confined to permanent checkpoints. We understand, of course, that neither longstanding congressional authorization nor widely prevailing practices justify a constitutional violation. 428 U.S. at 566 n. 19, 96 S.Ct. at 3087 n. 19.
A county patrolman stopped Prouse's car to check his license and registration without having observed traffic or equipment violations or any suspicious activity. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that he is violating some other law. Though accepting as vital the State's interest in promoting highway safety by apprehending unlicensed drivers, unregistered or stolen vehicles, and drug or alcohol intoxicated drivers, the Court said: The question remains, however, whether in the service of these important ends the discretionary spot check is a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests which such stops entail. On the record before us, that question must be answered in the negative. Given the alternative mechanisms available, both those in use and those that might be adopted, we are unconvinced that the incremental contribution to highway safety of the random spot check justifies the practice under the Fourth Amendment. 440 U.S. at 659, 99 S.Ct. at 1399. The Court concluded that the marginal contribution to roadway safety from spot checks did not justify subjecting the lawful motorist to this seizure: By hypothesis, stopping apparently safe drivers is necessary only because the danger presented by some drivers is not observable at the time of the stop. When there is not probable cause to believe that a driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations or other articulable basis amounting to reasonable suspicion that the driver is unlicense or his vehicle unregistered  we cannot conceive of any legitimate basis upon which a patrolman could decide that stopping a particular driver for a spot check would be more productive than stopping any other driver. 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400 (emphasis added).
Police on patrol noticed appellant walking in an alley located in an area with a high incidence of drug traffic. They stopped him and asked that he provide identification and explain what he was doing. The Court found that [i]n the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest, and appellant's right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference. 443 U.S. at 52, 99 S.Ct. at 2641. The Court noted that the State's interest, the prevention of crime, was a weighty social objective, but, even assuming that purpose is served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it. Id.