Opinion ID: 1952326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Were defendant's statements admitted in violation of his constitutional rights?

Text: In the course of investigation, the police took approximately six statements from defendant. The trial court separated the statements into three time frames: statements made prior to the arrest on January 23; statements made on January 23 at about 10:53 a.m.; and statements made on January 23 at about 6:00 p.m. [5] No party contests the admissibility of the statements made prior to January 23. Admission of the two statements of January 23 is contested. The State contests the trial court's finding that the 10:53 a.m. statement was inadmissible, and defendant contests the trial court's finding that the 6:00 p.m. statement was admissible. [6] The trial court found that defendant's request for his mother to contact his attorney, made in the course of his arrest on January 23 and in the presence of the police, was, although ambiguous, an invocation of defendant's right to counsel. Under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed. 2d 378 (1981), an accused cannot be subject to further interrogation unless counsel is present or the accused initiates further conversation after invoking the right to counsel. [A]ny indication of a desire for counsel, however ambiguous, will trigger Edwards protection. State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 253, 627 A. 2d 630 (1993). Because the request was ambiguous, the court found that the police should have clarified defendant's statement to protect his right to counsel. See State v. Elmore, 205 N.J. Super. 373, 500 A. 2d 1089 (App.Div. 1985) (stating, under Edwards and Miranda, that defendant's phone call to mother complaining that defendant was not allowed an attorney was sufficient invocation of right to counsel even though defendant had not requested one). Without that clarification, the court held that the 10:53 a.m. statement must be suppressed. The administration of Miranda warnings once police had taken defendant to the Ocean County Prosecutor's Office did not meet the Edwards requirement. See State v. McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 27, 446 A. 2d 1201 (1982). The court held that defendant's second statement, made after 6:00 p.m. on January 23, at the Woodbridge Police Station was admissible. The court found that defendant had initiated the conversation, that he had given a statement after a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his rights, and that the statement was not the fruit of the improperly obtained 10:53 a.m. statement. Therefore, the court found no constitutional violations. Defendant challenges the admission of the second January 23 statement. He argues that, after invoking his right to counsel, he did not initiate further conversation and he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel because he was misinformed by the police about the nature of the charges and subjected to severe conditions of confinement. Even if the Court finds that defendant's rights were not violated, defendant argues that the second statement was tainted by the earlier failure of police and investigators to honor scrupulously his initial invocation of the right to counsel.
New Jersey law governing the privilege against self-incrimination generally parallels federal constitutional doctrine. We paraphrase the summary of that law set forth in Reed, supra, 133 N.J. at 250-51, 627 A. 2d 630. In New Jersey, the right against self-incrimination is founded on a common-law and statutory  rather than a constitutional  basis. See State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 260, 511 A. 2d 80 (1986); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19; N.J.R.E. 502 and 503. Although lacking a constitutional provision expressly establishing the right, [t]he privilege against self-incrimination has been an integral thread in the fabric of New Jersey common law. Hartley, supra, 103 N.J. at 286, 511 A. 2d 80 (citing State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 435, 117 A. 2d 499 (1955)). Like the right embodied in the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution, the state privilege against self-incrimination is not self-implementing. Although the Constitution does not require any specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1636, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 732 (1966), the United States Supreme Court and this Court have developed mechanisms for safeguarding that right. Foremost among those mechanisms are the so-called  Miranda  warnings. Id. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed. 2d at 726; Hartley, supra, 103 N.J. at 262, 511 A. 2d 80. Miranda warnings inform a suspect not only of the basic right against self-incrimination, but of other ancillary rights that effectuate that basic right. The ancillary rights collectively give substance to the right against self-incrimination during a custodial police interrogation, Reed, supra, 133 N.J. at 251, 627 A. 2d 630, and are essential to preserve that right. New Jersey law in some circumstances affords greater protection of the right against self-incrimination than does federal law. For example, the Court has expanded ancillary rights in requiring readministration of Miranda warnings as a condition to continued interrogation after invocation of the right to remain silent. Hartley, supra, 103 N.J. 252, 511 A. 2d 80. The right to counsel has also been the object of special judicial solicitude. See Reed, supra, 133 N.J. at 251, 627 A. 2d 630 (finding under state privilege against self-incrimination that suspects undergoing custodial interrogation have additional ancillary right to be informed that counsel is attempting to reach the suspect); State v. Sanchez, 129 N.J. 261, 277, 609 A. 2d 400 (1992) (holding that after indictment and before arraignment State may not institute conversations with defendants without consent of counsel). Under Miranda, prior to any custodial interrogation, an accused must be advised of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning. Once an accused invokes the right to counsel, that right must be scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed. 2d 313, 321 (1975). Scrupulously honor[ing] the invocation of the right to counsel entails terminating all questioning until counsel has been made available [or] unless the accused [] initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1885, 68 L.Ed. 2d at 386. If an accused does initiate a conversation after invoking his rights, that conversation may be admissible if the initiation constitutes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the accused's rights. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed. 2d at 707. The State bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Hartley, supra, 103 N.J. at 260, 511 A. 2d 80; see also State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654, 628 A. 2d 735 (1993) (holding State must prove voluntariness of confession beyond a reasonable doubt).
The first question is whether defendant's anticipatory request to his mother to call his attorney was sufficiently clear to trigger Edwards protection. The trial court concluded that the request was sufficiently clear and suppressed the 10:53 a.m. statement. The State advances the threshold argument that even if defendant did intend to invoke his right to counsel, defendant was not yet entitled to Edwards protection. The State argues that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and the procedural safeguards established under Miranda, do not attach until defendant is both in custody and about to be interrogated. Questioning must at least be imminent for the protection to apply. The State relies on Alston v. Redman, 34 F. 3d 1237 (3d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1160, 115 S.Ct. 1122, 130 L.Ed. 2d 1085 (1995), and United States v. LaGrone, 43 F. 3d 332 (7th Cir.1994) to support its contentions. [7] Both cases rely on McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed. 2d 158 (1991), which held that an accused's invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a judicial proceeding does not invoke the Miranda right to counsel for any other, non-related offense. Id. at 177-78, 111 S.Ct. at 2208-09, 115 L.Ed. 2d at 168. We find that Alston, LaGrone, and McNeil do not alter the trial court's analysis. McNeil concerned whether an invocation of the right to counsel after the administration of Miranda warnings for one offense can extend to other unrelated offenses unknown at the time the Miranda warnings were first given. LaGrone held Miranda warnings given for one purpose cannot be extended to another purpose. And Alston concerned the invocation of the right to counsel via a form letter while the defendant was in custody but not in the presence of the police, according to a pre-established procedure designed to facilitate future police interrogation. Those circumstances are not present here. In State v. Wright, we held that [i]f the individual indicates in any manner at any time prior to or during questioning that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. 97 N.J. 113, 119, 477 A. 2d 1265 (1984) (rejecting State's argument that request for counsel during polygraph examination was insufficient to invoke Miranda rights precluding later questioning and finding that such examination constitutes custodial interrogation) (emphasis added). Even assuming that the request by defendant was timely, the State argues that the statements were ambiguous and urges the Court to follow Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed. 2d 362 (1994), which holds that when a suspect makes a reference to counsel that is insufficiently clear to invoke the Edwards prohibition on further questioning, an interrogating officer need not suspend questioning to clarify the remark. Because the right to counsel is so fundamental, an equivocal request for an attorney is to be interpreted in a light most favorable to the defendant. Reed, supra, 133 N.J. at 253, 627 A. 2d 630; Wright, supra, 97 N.J. at 119, 477 A. 2d 1265. [8] When a suspect makes a statement that arguably amounts to an assertion of Miranda rights and the interrogating agent recognizes that the statement is susceptible to that construction, questioning should cease and the police should inquire of the suspect about the correct interpretation of the statement. Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 136, 548 A. 2d 887; Wright, supra, 97 N.J. at 120, 477 A. 2d 1265. Given the narrow balance for the Davis majority's analysis, we believe it prudent to continue to apply our precedent. We thus agree with the trial court that defendant's request that his mother contact his attorney was an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel that had to be clarified before questioning could take place. Later administration of Miranda warnings did not serve to clarify the earlier equivocal assertion of counsel. Wright, supra, 97 N.J. at 122, 477 A. 2d 1265 (holding inadmissible confession given after request for counsel, despite new Miranda warnings). The second question is whether defendant initiated the conversation with the police at 6:00 p.m. and made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. In Oregon v. Bradshaw, the United States Supreme Court found that inquiries evinc[ing] a willingness and a desire for a ... discussion about the investigation ... [or that] could reasonably have been interpreted by the officer as relating generally to the investigation, constitute initiation. 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835, 77 L.Ed. 2d 405, 412 (1983). Inquiries incidental to the custodial relationship, such as requesting to use the bathroom or requesting a drink of water, do not initiate further conversation concerning the interrogation. The Bradshaw plurality found that the defendant's statement to the police  Well, what is going to happen to me now?  made after he was placed in a police vehicle for transport to another location, initiated further contact. Id. at 1043-44, 103 S.Ct. at 2834, 77 L.Ed. 2d at 411. Defendant urges that the Court accept the Bradshaw dissent, which reasoned that a court should not presume a defendant invited further interrogation unless the defendant engages with the police regarding the subject matter of the criminal investigation. Id. at 1053, 103 S.Ct. at 2839, 77 L.Ed. 2d at 418 (Marshall, J., dissenting). We have acknowledged that these are separate tests, but have not flatly chosen one or the other. State v. Fuller, 118 N.J. 75, 82, 570 A. 2d 429 (1990). We perceive little difference between the tests and shall apply the minority's phrasing, which we understand to ask whether the accused was inviting discussion of the crimes for which he was being held. Id. at 82, 570 A. 2d 429. It is clear to us that the facts satisfy this test. It is of course clear, as the trial court found, that defendant unambiguously invoked his right to counsel at 12:50 p.m. on January 23. He was not questioned after that point. At about 6:00 p.m., defendant asked to speak with Geoff (Detective Kerwin). Defendant was crying, and asked Kerwin what he was facing. Kerwin told him. Defendant then asked Kerwin if he would visit defendant in jail. When defendant said that he went off on Ms. Bowman, Kerwin stopped defendant, sought the assistance of another investigator, read defendant his rights, and took a taped statement. These facts demonstrate that defendant was inviting discussion of the crimes for which he was being held, Fuller, supra, 118 N.J. at 82, 570 A. 2d 429, and thus initiated the conversation. Once proper initiation has been established, the State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 447, 605 A. 2d 1097 (1992); State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 118, 549 A. 2d 792 (1988). The determination of a valid waiver is based on the facts and circumstances of each case. Adams, supra, 127 N.J. at 448, 605 A. 2d 1097. The circumstances that a court may consider include the duration of the interrogation, the advice as to constitutional rights, defendant's age, intelligence, level of education, and the length and conditions of the detention. Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 135, 548 A. 2d 887. Defendant argues that there should be fresh Miranda warnings after initiation of contact and that a failure to re- Mirandize a suspect before the suspect makes an inculpatory statement should be an important factor in assessing whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent. Defendant in effect asks us to establish a per se rule that whenever a defendant initiates a conversation, police should immediately re- Mirandize lest the defendant make an incriminating statement. The trial court found that defendant was a forty-one-year-old male with over twenty arrests in his adult life. He had familiarity with the workings of the criminal justice system. After requesting to speak with his attorney, defendant was provided a phone and not questioned after that point. He received some medication, specifically Flexeril, a muscle relaxant, at about 5:45 p.m. When informed of possible penalties for murder, defendant unilaterally continued the conversation with Kerwin. Hartley requires renewed Miranda warnings prior to police-initiated questioning; it would be anomalous to require renewed warnings prior to defendant-initiated conversation. Upon initiation, it is prudent for the police to readminister the Miranda warnings if the police resume questioning. That was done here. Defendant further argues that because the police misinformed him about the possible penalties for murder, his statement was not voluntary. He alleges he was deliberately tricked by being informed that he faced a thirty-year term of imprisonment, or possibly a lesser sentence. The death penalty was not mentioned. Although we are troubled by Kerwin's failure to mention the death penalty, the use of misleading or incomplete statements do not per se preclude a finding of voluntariness. See Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 655, 628 A. 2d 735. The applicable test is whether the techniques for extracting the statement[] ... are compatible with a system that presumes innocence [and] whether the defendant's will was ... overborne. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116, 106 S.Ct. 445, 452-53, 88 L.Ed. 2d 405, 414-15 (1985). There are certain interrogation techniques that so offend the system of justice that they must be condemned. Id. at 109, 106 S.Ct. at 449, 88 L.Ed. 2d at 410. Here, however, Kerwin did not stray into impermissible conduct or a shadowy area. Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 655, 628 A. 2d 735. We note that Kerwin was not then aware that the c(4)(d) factor would apply. Nor is defendant's back problem sufficient cause to question the voluntariness of the statement. Defendant was made as comfortable as possible and given pain medication while he was in police custody. Given the totality of circumstances surrounding the second interrogation and confession, we agree that the State has shown defendant's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Finally, defendant disputes the trial court's conclusion that the taped statement, given at 6:00 p.m. on January 23, was sufficiently independent of and not tainted by the 10:53 a.m. statement. The trial court provided a thorough and reasoned analysis concerning taint, concluding that defendant's second statement of January 23, 1993 is not tainted by the illegality of the first. The statements are not inextricably entwined, nor are they part of one continuous process. I find that the second statement was not the fruit of the poisonous tree. I therefore admit both statements made by defendant on January 23, 1993 after the 6.05 p.m. meeting between defendant and Kerwin. The court reviewed the admissibility of the 6:00 p.m. statement under criteria set forth in Hartley, supra, 103 N.J. at 279, 511 A. 2d 80. The Hartley Court described two alternative inquiries to evaluate whether an illegally obtained statement had tainted a subsequent, voluntary, and knowing statement. The first inquiry questions whether the second statement was so inextricably entwined with the first interrogation procedure as to be part of that same procedure. Ibid. The second inquiry treats the two interrogation processes as separate, and turns on whether the earlier, illegally obtained statement was the result of a constitutional violation or a violation of defendant's ancillary rights. [9] Id. at 281, 511 A. 2d 80. If the first statement stemmed from a constitutional violation, the second statement is evaluated under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Id. at 282, 511 A. 2d 80. The trial court found that, although under the constant custody and watch of Woodbridge police, five hours and twenty minutes passed between the two statements. This provided a sufficient break in time between the statements so that they were not part of the same procedure or process of interrogation. [10] Id. at 279, 511 A. 2d 80. Under the second taint inquiry, the State must demonstrate that the second statement was not the product of the first ... or that the `taint' of the first statement was attenuated. Id. at 283, 511 A. 2d 80. A primary concern in this analysis is whether defendant made the statement because he felt that as a result of the first statement, the cat was already out of the bag. Id. at 282, 511 A. 2d 80 (citing United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 1398, 91 L.Ed. 1654, 1660 (1947) (finding that the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed underlie taint analysis)). Factors relevant to this determination include the time between confessions, any intervening circumstances, whether there was a change in place, whether defendant received an adequate warning of his rights, whether the defendant initiated the second confession, the effect of his having previously made a confession, and the purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct. [ Id. at 283, 511 A. 2d 80 (internal quotations and citations omitted).] The trial court found that the cat had not been let out of the bag at 10:53 a.m., that the final statement was a marked departure in terms of culpability from the earlier statement on that date, and that it was not provoked by any action on the part of the State. Defendant revealed his involvement in the crime in bits and pieces over the course of the day. With the additional information defendant obtained from the police, he was able to make an informed assessment whether to give another statement. See Kennedy, supra, 97 N.J. 278, 478 A. 2d 723 (holding incriminating statement admissible even though it was made moments after the officers had responded to the defendant's question about what would happen if the defendant failed to make a statement and after the defendant's request for counsel). The court found as intervening circumstances that defendant learned that murder charges had been filed against him and that Crystal and Helen had altered their statements to incriminate defendant. In addition, defendant was moved between the Ocean County Prosecutors Office, the site of the first statement, and the Woodbridge Police Station, where defendant gave his second statement. Finally, the court found that although Detective Kerwin erred in not clarifying defendant's request for counsel at the time of the arrest and in interrogating defendant at 10:53 a.m., he did not then act purposefully or flagrantly. Rather, Kerwin simply did not believe defendant requested counsel. The court also noted that Kerwin did not attempt to question defendant after defendant's clear invocation of his rights at 12:50 p.m. Had defendant not requested him, Kerwin would never have spoken to defendant again on January 23, 1993. The trial court employed the proper analysis and reached the proper conclusions in evaluating the admissibility of defendant's statements. Therefore, we hold that: (1) a defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel precludes further questioning by the police, even if such invocation occurs immediately after the defendant's arrest and prior to the onset of interrogation; (2) defendant's call to his mother as he was being arrested for her to call his attorney was an invocation of his right to counsel, or, at a minimum, was an ambiguous request for counsel that required further clarification as a condition for further questioning; (3) defendant's 6:00 p.m. inquiry regarding the charges he was facing initiated contact with the police, and further interrogation of him was proper and admissible; and (4) defendant's 6:13 p.m. taped statement was not a fruit of the illegally obtained 10:53 a.m. statement.