Opinion ID: 1118476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: does the alaska savings statute, as 09.10.240, apply to cases dismissed for failure to prosecute?

Text: The Smiths contend that since the action was refiled within a year of the superior court's dismissal of their action for failure to prosecute, the savings statute should apply. Stratton disagrees, asserting that a case which has been dismissed for failure to prosecute does not fall within the ambit of the savings statute, which requires that the case be dismissed upon the trial or upon appeal. AS 09.10.240. [5] The Alaska savings statute, AS 09.10.240, provides in pertinent part: If an action is commenced within the time prescribed and is dismissed upon the trial or upon appeal after the time limited for bringing a new action, the plaintiff ... may commence a new action upon the cause of action within one year after the dismissal or reversal on appeal. The applicability of the savings statute depends on the interpretation of the phrase upon the trial or upon appeal. The Smiths assert that the Alaska Legislature adopted the Oregon savings statute and rely on City of Fairbanks v. Schaible for the proposition that the legislature also adopted the Oregon common law interpretation of the statute. 375 P.2d 201, 207 (Alaska 1962). [6] In this regard the Smiths argue that the Oregon courts' interpretations were adopted with the statute and that, therefore, the interpretation of the statute in White v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. controls. 168 Or. 371, 123 P.2d 193, 195 (Or. 1942), overruled by Fuller v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 258 Or. 131, 481 P.2d 616 (Or. 1971). White states in dictum that the Oregon savings statute applies to an action dismissed for want of prosecution. The Smiths further argue that since the savings statute is a remedial statute it should be given a liberal construction. Stratton relies on Andreanoff v. State for the proposition that the presumption is not conclusive and Alaska's courts may adopt a variant interpretation if convinced that the plain language of the statute, common sense and public policy require it. 746 P.2d 473, 476 n. 3 (Alaska App. 1987) (citing Beckley v. State, 443 P.2d 51, 55-56 (Alaska 1968)). After Alaska's savings statute was adopted in 1962, the Oregon court decided Fuller v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 481 P.2d 616 (Or. 1971). In Fuller, the court held that the savings statute did not apply to a case dismissed for lack of prosecution and overruled White. [7] We have often stated that statutory interpretation begins with examination of the language construed in light of its purpose. Vail v. Coffman Eng'rs, Inc., 778 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1989); J & L Diversified Enter. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 736 P.2d 349, 351 (Alaska 1987). Here resolution of the issue turns upon construction of the language upon the trial or upon appeal. In our view trial and appeal should be interpreted to mean trial court level and appellate court level respectively. Any other construction of these terms would be unreasonable. We are reluctant to impute an irrational intent to the legislature in its use of the phraseology upon the trial or upon appeal. It is not rational to assume that the legislature intended to exclude from the savings statute causes of action which are dismissed before trial and not those which (for the same reasons) are dismissed after commencement of trial. Nor does it make sense to distinguish a dismissal which is entered after a notice of appeal has been filed from one which occurs subsequent to submission of the appeal on its merits or one which occurs at oral argument. Thus, we conclude that AS 09.10.240 applies to all actions which have been dismissed, other than on their merits, at both the trial court and appellate court levels. [8]