Opinion ID: 2982493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Eric Taylor’s Testimony

Text: Defendants argue that they were entitled to a mistrial based upon Eric Taylor’s prejudicial testimony. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to grant a mistrial. See Howard, 621 F.3d at 458. “Where a defendant argues that the district court should have granted a mistrial due to improper testimony, . . . we must first consider whether the challenged testimony was in fact improper.” Id. “If the district court did not err in admitting the 24 Nos. 12-5574/5611.6090, United States v. Coffrnan, et al. evidence, then the district court could not have abused its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.” Id. at 459 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the testimony was improper, we next determine whether the testimony “was so clearly improper and prejudicial to the defendants that the harm could not be erased by any instruction which the court might give.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendants first argue that the court abused its discretion when it failed to declare a mistrial after Eric Taylor testified that Milby verbally threatened him. Taylor was a Mid-America investor who had met with Milby in the Kentucky oil fields. Sometime later, Taylor became suspicious that Milby was misusing his investment, and contacted Milby. The prosecutor asked Taylor about his conversation with Milby, and Taylor responded: “Well,just imagine the word ‘MF.’ And, ‘If you keep talking smack and giving me problems, I will have some guys come up there with shotguns and jam it up your A-S-S.’ Things like that.... And guys will come up with baseball bats and break my kneecaps, stuff like that.” The defendants did not raise a contemporaneous objection to this testimony, and we review its admission for plain error. See Ham, 628 F.3d at 804; Un ited States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 920 (6th Cir. 1999). We find none. Milby’s conversation with Taylor concerned the alleged fraud at issue and Milby’s threatening Taylor in an attempt to end inquiry into it. This evidence is relevant to the commission of the fraud. Defendants also argue that the testimony constituted impermissible character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). This argument fails because “[wlhere the challenged evidence is intrinsic to, or inextricably intertwined with evidence of, the crime charged, Rule 404(b) is not applicable.” United States v. Marrero, 651 F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal 25 Nos. 12-5574/5611.6090, Un ited States v. Coffman, et al. quotation marks and citations omitted). The conversation between Milby and Taylor was directly relevant to Milby’s attempt to cover up the alleged fraud. The threats Milby made against Taylor are an intrinsic part of Taylor’s testimony that Milby attempted to cover up the fraud with which he was charged. Defendants then argue that the court abused its discretion when it failed to declare a mistrial after Eric Taylor testified that Coffman was hiding money in an off-shore bank account. But as we have already held, see supra at p. 16-17, any error in admitting this testimony was harmless at best. And in any event, later in the trial, the jury heard that Coffman transferred over two million dollars of investors’ funds to his account in Panama. There is no “reasonable possibility” “that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Bell, 516 F.3d at 447. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial.