Opinion ID: 1382827
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: hartford's other contentions

Text: Hartford claims that the trial court's giving of a formula instruction on the issue of willfulness was prejudicial error as was its refusal to give Hartford's instruction on that issue. The issue of willfulness was submitted to the jury through a verdict form posing the following question: Was the death of Dr. Clemmer caused by a willful act of Dr. Lovelace? The jury, to aid it in answering this question, was instructed as follows: If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Lovelace had the mental capacity to intend to shoot and harm Dr. Clemmer when he caused his death, as well as the mental capacity to govern his own conduct, you will answer this question `Yes'. [¶] If on the other hand, you find that at that time Dr. Lovelace was suffering from a mental disease or defect of such magnitude that he could not form the mental state I have just mentioned, then you will answer the question `No'. It is contended that the giving of the foregoing instruction, and the refusal to give other instructions proffered by Hartford on the issue. [13] resulted in prejudicial error. (10) Hartford urges that the term willful as used in the question presented to the jury should have been defined not in terms of Dr. Lovelace's mental capacity and mental state (as the instruction given defined it) but rather in terms of conduct more blameworthy than the sort of misconduct involved in ordinary negligence (as Hartford's proffered instruction defined it  see fn. 13, ante ). The instruction given, Hartford asserts, had the effect of requiring the jury to find the existence of what amounted to a specific intent to kill in order to find willfulness. It is clear, however, that this argument not only ignores the specific language of the instruction  which speaks in terms of intent to shoot and harm, not in terms of intent to kill  but refuses to recognize the clear line of authority in this state to the effect that even an act which is intentional or willful within the meaning of traditional tort principles will not exonerate the insurer from liability under Insurance Code section 533 unless it is done with a preconceived design to inflict injury. ( Walters v. American Ins. Co. (1960) 185 Cal. App.2d 776, 783 [8 Cal. Rptr. 665]: see also Meyer v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 321, 327 [43 Cal. Rptr. 542]; see generally Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 273-274, fn. 12 [54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168], and cases there cited.) The instruction given by the trial court simply applied this principle to a situation in which the actor's capacity to harbor the requisite design was placed in issue through evidence bearing upon his mental state. There was no error in this respect. [14] Hartford's final argument  that it was entitled to have the judgment set aside and a new judgment entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 663 because the findings of the trial court compel a determination that plaintiffs are precluded from litigating the issue of willfulness  is but a reassertion of its collateral estoppel argument couched in procedural language, and we need not consider it further here.