Opinion ID: 815418
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Haskell’s Automatism Defense

Text: Haskell argues that his Due Process rights were violated because Michigan required the presentation of an automatism defense through the framework of its insanity statute. He contends that automatism is fundamentally distinguishable from insanity because it negates key elements of 8 No. 10-1432 Haskell v. Berghuis, Warden the criminal charge by “plac[ing] the individual in a state of unconsciousness or semiconsciousness.” (Appellant Br. 12-13.) Because Haskell was allegedly unconscious—and therefore unable to control or direct his actions—he argues that he was incapable of forming the actus reus and mens rea of the crimes for which he was charged. (Id. at 13.) Haskell argues that placing the burden of proving his defense on him was contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established constitutional principles. It is not obvious that Haskell may bring this Due Process claim. At oral argument the parties were asked to demonstrate that Haskell attempted to raise his automatism defense as anything other than an insanity defense, but was barred by the state trial court from doing so. Haskell directs us to a single passage in the pretrial transcript discussing how the jury will be instructed about shifting burdens of persuasion of Haskell’s insanity defense. See R. 9-9 (Trial Tr. at 9-10) (Page ID # 178889). This passage provides, at best, weak support for the claim that the trial court prevented Haskell from raising his defense in the manner preferred–viz., as a challenge to mens rea and actus reus, rather than as an affirmative defense. Nevertheless, assuming that Haskell was actually prevented at trial from raising automatism as a defense independent from an insanity defense, he has since properly exhausted his claim. See Haskell, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 590 (“Petitioner raised the issue in his supplemental brief on direct appeal as issue ‘X’, and raised it in his application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court as issue ‘VI’. . . . The Court will review the issue de novo.”). In Haskell’s supplemental brief to the Michigan Court of Appeals, he “challenge[d] outright [] as violative of the Fourteenth 9 No. 10-1432 Haskell v. Berghuis, Warden Amendment’s due process clause the actual or apparent requirement of Michigan law that any mental-incapacity defense must be presented as an ‘insanity’ defense.” (See Def.’s Supp. Br. 49, ECF No. 9-35) (emphasis in original). He relied on “federal cases employing constitutional analysis” and phrased his claim “in terms of constitutional law or in terms sufficiently particular to allege a denial of a specific constitutional right.” Whiting v. Burt, 395 F.3d 602, 613 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). He supported his brief by “facts well within the mainstream of constitutional law” and attached exhibits and articles from medical journals on CPS. Id. “This is not an instance where the habeas petitioner failed to ‘apprise the state court of his claim.’” Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1, 3-4 (2005) (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995) (per curiam)). The exhaustion requirement “cannot turn upon whether a state appellate court chooses to [address] in its opinion” a constitutional claim; it must turn on what the party actually argued. Id. at 3 (citing Smith v.