Opinion ID: 880730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross Appeal: The Children's Benefits

Text: Travelers contends that the Workers' Compensation Court erred in holding that death benefits should be paid to the surviving children of the decedent. The children contend on the other hand that since the widow has waived any right to benefits, they are entitled to split her share, in effect, granting one-half interest in all benefits to each of the two surviving children. The Workers' Compensation Court had originally held that they vested only if the widow died or remarried prior to the expiration of 500 weeks after the death of Richard. On rehearing, the Court reversed itself stating: This Court's prior order was clearly erroneous in concluding that the surviving children are contingent beneficiaries only, since there was a surviving spouse. Though we acknowledge the fact that the term step-children is not defined in the Workers' Compensation Act, clearly the natural children of the deceased are the step-children of the surviving spouse and, accordingly, are entitled to benefits under the provisions of Section 723. The prior ruling of this Court, holding otherwise, is expressly modified. The statute which provides for division of benefits among beneficiaries is § 39-71-723, MCA, which states in part: Compensation due to beneficiaries shall be paid to the surviving spouse, if any, or if none, then divided equally among or for the benefit of the children. In cases where beneficiaries are a surviving spouse and stepchildren of such spouse, the compensation shall be divided equally among all beneficiaries. In construing the foregoing statute, we use the definitions provided in the statutes for terms used in § 39-71-723, MCA. Section 39-71-116, MCA, includes the definitions of child and of beneficiary. Under § 39-71-116, MCA, a child includes a child legally adopted prior to the injury. Under that definition, each of the children here involved is a child in the contemplation of the Workers' Compensation Act. Likewise, the word beneficiary includes an unmarried child under the age of 18 years. Section 39-71-116(2)(b), MCA. Each of the children here also qualify as a beneficiary. None of the statutes define a stepchild so we look to the common meaning of that term. A stepchild is a child of one's wife or husband by a former marriage. Websters' New Collegiate Dictionary (1981). In applying those terms and definitions to § 39-71-723, MCA, above, we determine that the beneficiaries in this case are surviving spouse Laurie, and Heather and Heidi, who are stepchildren of Laurie. As such, under the same statute, the compensation is to be divided equally among them. However, the widow, Laurie, has waived or abandoned the share to which she would be entitled under § 39-71-723, MCA. Counsel for the children contends that since a priority claimant has made no claim for compensation death benefits, the case should proceed as if that claimant had not existed. 2 Larson, Workers' Compensation Law, Section 64.34, at 11-231 through 11-232. Notwithstanding this argument, that would not be a proper result in this case. On the death of Richard, the right to benefits after a claim was properly filed vested in each of the beneficiaries entitled under § 39-71-723, MCA. That vested right is personal to each of the beneficiaries here involved. The fact that Laurie waived or abandoned her right to benefits does not operate to increase the benefits otherwise allocable to the children. The language of § 39-71-723 is clear that where beneficiaries are a surviving spouse and stepchildren of the spouse, compensation shall be divided equally among all the beneficiaries. Each child is entitled to one-third of the compensation under the facts of this case, an entitlement which is not affected by the waiver or abandonment by the spouse either to increase or to decrease that amount.