Opinion ID: 1246213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the fifth amendment shield

Text: Thomas' final argument is that he was denied his constitutional right of confrontation when the court allowed the undercover officer to refuse to answer a question because it might incriminate him. This curious role-reversal occurred because the officer was, at the time of trial, facing indictment for burglaries of the state's evidence lockers. Defense counsel questioned the officer as follows: Q. My question is, whether or not during your association with [the informer] you received any financial benefits coming directly or indirectly from this association? A. No. sir, I did not. ...... Q. Well, my question was, during the period of time that you worked for the police force, did you have occasion to obtain any sources of money, any sums of money, from other than legitimate sources. INTERJECTION BY OFFICER'S ATTORNEY: I advise the witness not to answer the question. DEFENSE COUNSEL: May we have a ruling on that, Your Honor? THE COURT: I said the witness may answer if he can and he's been advised by his attorney... . OFFICER'S ATTORNEY: Fine, I'll just advise... . . THE COURT: May I ask that you ... . . OFFICER'S ATTORNEY: ... . . the witness to exercise his rights under the 5th amendment of the constitution of the United States. THE COURT: Very well. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I would request for the court to direct the witness to answer the question in spite of [this] advice. THE COURT: I will not do so, [counsel]. You may answer if you wish or you may follow your attorney's advice if you wish. A. On the advice of my attorney I refuse to answer that question under the 5th amendment. Defense counsel then abandoned this line of questioning. There was no offer of proof to inform the trial court what was sought to be proved by these questions, nor has Thomas' counsel in this appeal suggested anything other than that trial counsel sought to impeach the general credibility of the witness by showing specific acts of misconduct. The conflict between a witness' privilege against self-incrimination [19] and the accused's right of effective cross-examination is an uncertain area of the law at this time. In Davis v. Alaska, ___ U.S. ___, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), rev'g 499 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1973), the United States Supreme Court held that an accused's right of confrontation was violated when a trial court of this state refused to allow exploration of a witness' juvenile adjudication and probationary status, where that status had significant potential for influencing the witness' testimony. As we noted in Gonzales v. State, Op. No. 1030, 521 P.2d 512 (Alaska April 12, 1974), the Davis decision must not be read so broadly as to totally abrogate the traditional right of trial courts to exercise discretionary control over the type and manner of evidentiary presentation. In Gonzales we concluded that, as a general rule, the trial court could properly refuse evidence of stale [20] convictions or juvenile adjudications [21] where these were offered for the purpose of discrediting the witness generally rather than to show some specific potential for bias or prejudice toward the defendant. We must assume that this case fits within the former category, because defense counsel made no attempt to show that the witness' alleged crimes, for which he had yet to be tried, had any tendency to motivate him to testify falsely in this apparently unrelated prosecution. Another factor which bears on this problem is the extent to which defense counsel can accomplish his objectives without infringing on the witness' privilege. In this case the court permitted questions revealing the witness had been discharged from the police department and was facing indictment for alleged burglaries. If defense counsel was attempting to suggest that the officer might lie at trial to void further straining his relations with the department, this goal was fully accomplished without exploring the details of the alleged crimes. The exposure of these basic facts thus substantially reduced any need to investigate the particulars of the offenses alleged, at least where defense counsel failed to demonstrate their special relevance to the prosecution at bar. Our weighing analysis thus leads us to hold that Thomas' right of confrontation was not infringed in this case. In a more compelling case, one where there was a true need to explore facts which were within the ambit of the witness' privilege against self-incrimination, it might be necessary, of course, to accord the defendant the right to require answers to potentially incriminating questions. In such a case steps could be taken to avoid any prejudice to the witness. All asserted errors having been decided adversely to the appellants Thomas and Crouch, the judgments are affirmed. CONNOR, J., not participating.