Opinion ID: 1624316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Defense Psychiatrist (EED)

Text: The trial judge did not improperly limit the penalty phase testimony of a defense psychiatrist regarding extreme emotional distress at the time of the murders. On avowal, Dr. Meyers expressed the opinion that the offenses were committed while Wheeler was under EED at the height of his substance dependence on cocaine. The trial judge properly limited the testimony of the defense psychiatrist as to the effects of substance abuse. Further, she did not err in prohibiting testimony that there was EED in October 1997, or on the weighing of the mitigating and aggravating factors. Citing Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 542 (1995), the trial judge correctly determined there was no evidence of a triggering event of any kind. Thereafter, the psychiatrist was permitted to testify. Among other things, he stated that chemical abuse was not an excuse and that he had only one contact with Wheeler. Following his testimony, the psychiatrist testified by avowal, stating that the mitigation outweighed the aggravating factors and that although not an excuse for the offenses, the crimes were committed while Wheeler was under EED caused by the dependency craving. Evidence only of drug dependency is not sufficient to justify an instruction for EED. Stopher v. Commonwealth, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 787, 803 (2001); Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 112, 115 (1990). The limitation on the testimony of the defense psychiatrist did not violate Wheeler's right to present a defense, a fair trial, due process or to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under either the state or federal constitutions.