Opinion ID: 760837
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: District Court's Response to Jury Inquiry

Text: 73 The fourth of Sargent's five bases for appeal involves a challenge to the district judge's response to a request by the jury for certain exhibits during deliberations. The decision to deliver exhibits and information to the jury room is within the sound discretion of the court. See United States v. Gross, 451 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir.1971) (citation omitted); United States v. Guy, 924 F.2d 702, 708 (7th Cir.1991). We will disturb this decision only when the district court abused its discretion. Guy, 924 F.2d at 708 (citing United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404, 1425 (7th Cir.1987)). 74 While deliberating over Sargent's and McClellan's fate in this case, the jury requested further information in a note to the Judge reading, Please provide an exhibit list for the items presented, No. 27A, No. 24A, No. 27B. The court, after conferring with and giving the attorneys, including both defense counsels, an opportunity to express their views, interpreted this communication as a request for information as to where those exhibits come from and prepared a response, to wit: 75 Members of the jury, I have received your note requesting additional identifying information regarding three exhibits. According to the testimony during the trial, Exhibit 24A was identified as having been seized from Gary Johnson, Exhibits 27A and B were identified as having been seized from Defendant Otis McClellan. The jury must, of course, decide whether to credit that testimony and what weight, if any, to give to that testimony and/or these exhibits. I trust this is responsive to your request. 76 Sargent's attorney expressed his grave opposition to the judge's response. In his view, the court was prohibited from replying to the jury's request because it would overemphasize additional details regarding the exhibits. The judge disagreed, and sent the jury the above-quoted message, amended to include a sentence reminding the jury that it must, of course, decide whether to discredit that testimony, and what weight, if any, to give to that testimony and/or these exhibits. 77 Just what Sargent is attempting to argue on appeal is less than clear. He admits that the court's answer did not include facts not found in the record. Nor does he claim that the reply set forth a misstatement of law or fact. Sargent has devoted only three sentences of his brief to making an argument on this issue, whereby he posits that the trial court is obligated to respond to jury confusion with concrete accuracy and that the judge exercises significant influence over the jury. If he, in fact, is suggesting that the judge in this case did not respond to the jury request with concrete accuracy, he fails to explain why, and we are not in the business of formulating arguments for the parties. See Kurzawa v. Jordan, 146 F.3d 435, 447 (7th Cir.1998). Sargent has thus waived that facet of his claim on appeal. See Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 841, 854 (7th Cir.1998) (This court has refused to consider unsupported or cursory arguments.... [The plaintiff] has devoted all of three sentences to the argument on this issue. The matter is waived.) (citation omitted); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991) (We repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments ... are waived [on appeal].). And as for his observation that the jury accords great weight to the court's words and directions,  '[t]he Court presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely [to] the particular language of the trial court's instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them.'  United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 426 (7th Cir.1998) (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1976 n. 9, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)). Should the jury request clarification on a matter during deliberations, it is when the court responds with a misleading, incorrect, unclear or unresponsive (i.e., not with concrete accuracy) statement of law or fact, or with facts not in evidence, that we might have cause for concern. See United States v. Adcox, 19 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir.1994). As noted above, Sargent admits that the court's answer did not contain false or misleading information outside the record. And while a judge's response to a jury's question must not highlight one witness' testimony over another's, the nature of the jury's question at issue here (from whom or from where certain exhibits were seized) is not something that would benefit the Government at Sargent's expense. Finally, we add that the trial judge, before answering the jury's question, held a hearing and gave both prosecution and defense counsel an opportunity to express their opinions. The Supreme Court has previously held that a jury's question must be answered in open court and ... petitioner's counsel should have been given an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 2095, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975) (citations omitted). In complying with the dictates of Rogers, the trial judge reviewed the jury's question in open court and provided clear instructions to the jury that it was to decide for itself whether to credit or discredit the testimony and exhibits in question. See Adcox, 19 F.3d at 294. We hold that the judge's response to the jury's question was proper and not an abuse of discretion.