Opinion ID: 772248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Forest Service's conduct here was discretionary.

Text: 23 The Forest Service's conduct--not requiring its contract pilots to have CRM training--was discretionary and, thus, the government satisfies the first prong of the Berkovitz test. The plaintiffs point to no statute, regulation, or policy that mandates the Forest Service to require such training. Rather, the plaintiffs point only to two sentences in the Accident Plan: 24 [A] concentrated effort must be placed on the human factor aspect of pilot performance. . . . [H]uman fac tor training must be identified as a significant aspect of the accident prevention plan. 25 Although the Forest Service highlighted CRM concepts at the one-half-day seminar and evaluated human factors during check rides, the plaintiffs argue that the Accident Plan provision mandated the Forest Service not only to require CRM training, but a specific type of CRM training; that is, some-thing more than CRM training in lecture format. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding that[t]he decision to identify and require `human factor' or`crew resource management' training is not discretionary. 26 The plaintiffs' argument, and the district court's conclusion, cannot be sustained. First and foremost, the Accident Plan provision does not mention CRM training, let alone require a specific type of CRM training. The provision merely requires the Forest Service to identif[y]  human factor training as a significant component of the accident prevention plan. The district court erred by treating human factor and CRM synonymously, and by substituting require[d] for identified. Moreover, the Accident Plan does not define human factor training; indicate what the Forest Service must do to comply with the provision; identify the nature or extent of the training; or indicate who must receive the training, who must provide it, or when it must do so. All of these matters are left to the Forest Service's discretion. 27 We have repeatedly held that a general regulation or policy, like the Accident Plan here, does not remove discretion unless it specifically prescribes a course of conduct. For example, in Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 1998), we held that the Forest Service's decisions regarding how to fight a fire in a multiple fire situation were protected by the discretionary function exception. Although various standards and procedures in Miller included mandatory language regarding requirements for fire suppression, they did not address the multiple fire situation or tell firefighters how to fight the fire. Id. at 595. We concluded that [t]he existence of some mandatory language does not eliminate discretion when the broader goals sought to be achieved necessarily involve an element of discretion. Id. at 595. 28 We have reached similar conclusions in other cases where broad mandates did not specify a course of conduct for the government to follow. See, e.g., Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that Park Service's actions were protected by the discretionary function exception where policy manuals outlined general policy goals regarding safety and mandated warning the public of hazards, but did not specify how to meet those goals or how or when to warn the public); Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1453 (9th Cir. 1996) ([T]he presence of a few, isolated provisions cast in mandatory language does not transform an otherwise suggestive set of guidelines into binding agency regulations.); Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that broad mandate to warn the public of hazards did not render conduct nondiscretionary because [the] guidelines can be considered mandatory only in the larger sense that they set forth broad policy goals attainable only by the exercise of discretionary decisions); Childers v. United States, 40 F.3d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that decisions as to the precise manner in which [the National Park Service] would warn the public . . . clearly fall within the discretionary function exception  despite safetymanual requirement that National Park Service warn public if it decided not to close certain trails). 29 Other circuit courts have also concluded that a broad mandate does not foreclose discretion. See, e.g. , Duke v. Dep't of Agric., 131 F.3d 1407, 1410 (10th Cir. 1997) (While the[ ] [Forest Service] manuals emphasize safety and appropriate warnings they are not specific enough to eliminate the Forest Service employees' choice regarding how to act in particular circumstances.); Rosebush v. United States , 119 F.3d 438, 442 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that Forest Service manual provision requiring Forest Service to prepare an `operation and maintenance' plan which gives health and safety related items the `highest priority' . . . vest[s] complete discretion in the Forest Service as to the development and implementation of that plan); Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1993) (concluding that National Park Service policy to make every effort . . . to recognize and report hazardous trees prescribed neither a particular method of inspection nor special rules for inspecting particular trees; [s]uch a general guideline is insufficient to deprive the federal government of the protection of the discretionary function exception). 30 Despite these cases, the plaintiffs argue that this case is governed by Berkovitz and Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1995). In Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 533, the Supreme Court addressed whether the discretionary function exception barred a suit based on the government's licensing of an oral polio vaccine and subsequent approval of the release of a specific lot of that vaccine. The Court noted that the Division of Biologic Standards (then part of the National Institutes of Health) (DBS) may issue a license only after examining the vaccine and determining that it complies with regulatory safety standards. Therefore, the Court concluded, if the plaintiffs claimed that the DBS licensed the vaccine either without determining whether it complied with regulatory standards or after determining that the vaccine failed to comply, the discretionary function exception did not bar the claim. Id. at 544. The Court stated, [w]hen a suit charges an agency with failing to act in accord with a specific mandatory directive, the discretionary function exception does not apply. Id. 31 We followed the Court's instruction in Faber, 56 F.3d at 1128, where we held that the discretionary function exception did not protect the Forest Service's failure to act in violation of a mandatory directive. In Faber, a Forest Service plan required specific action in response to an increase in accidents in the park: (1) develop a sign plan, (2) formulate a media program, and (3) provide a presence to verbally warn the public. Id. at 1126. The plan did not specify how to go about doing so. See id. The Forest Service, however, failed to take any of those actions. Id. Therefore, we held that the discretionary function exception did not apply: 32 The Forest Service had no choice but to follow the . . . plan. The plan did not give the Forest Service the option to do nothing . . . . To the contrary, the . . . plan listed three specific and mandatory measures that the Forest Service was to take in order to increase safety . . . . The Forest Service failed to implement all three . . . . Because the challenged conduct of the Forest Service was in direct contravention of a specifically prescribed federal policy, the discretionary function exception does not apply. 33 Id. (citation omitted); accord Childers , 40 F.3d at 976 (The discretionary function exception would not apply if the [National Park Service] ignored the safety manual's mandate that the public be `adequately warned.' ). 34 But the Forest Service here did not fail to act in violation of a specific mandatory directive. The Accident Plan mandated only that the Forest Service identify human factor training as a significant aspect of its accident prevention plan --it did not mandate the Forest Service to require its contract pilots to have CRM training. Indeed, the Forest Service did include human factors training as part of its accident prevention program. In short, the Forest Service had discretion whether to require CRM training, a specific type of training that includes aspects of human factors training. Therefore, the government satisfies the first prong of the Berkovitz test. 35