Opinion ID: 561158
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: defendant garcia-gil

Text: 22 Garcia-Gil first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of the storage unit search. He claims that the customs agents seized him for Fourth Amendment purposes when they first confronted him and that this seizure was not justified by reasonable suspicion, much less probable cause. Because he gave his consent to search the unit only after an illegal investigative stop, the consent was tainted and therefore invalid. The district court found that [t]he initial contact between Agent Urbina and the three Defendants was merely the sort of consensual encounter that does not implicate Fourth Amendment rights. That is, Garcia-Gil was not seized until sometime after he had consented to the search of the storage unit. We affirm the district court's rulings. 1 23 According to the Supreme Court, the police can be said to have seized an individual 'only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.'  Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.)). The test has an objective standard--looking to the reasonable man's interpretation of the conduct in question. Id. at 574, 108 S.Ct. at 1980. In Chesternut, the Court decided that a suspect was not seized when he assertedly was chased by a squad car. It was important that [t]he record does not reflect that the police activated a siren or flashers; or that they commanded respondent to halt, or that they operated the car in an aggressive manner to block respondent's course. Id. at 575, 108 S.Ct. at 1980. Moreover, the fact that the officers' conduct could be somewhat intimidating does not mean a seizure has occurred. Id. 24 In Garcia-Gil's case, Agents Urbina and Compton showed their badges and announced that they were federal officers, but displayed no weapons. They parked far enough away from the storage unit that the automobile inside could have been driven out. When Agent Urbina asked to speak to the defendants, he motioned them outside the unit instead of barging into it. He twice asked Garcia-Gil to drop the pliers he was holding, but did not confiscate them. An officer of the El Paso Police Department was present, but only after the defendants had exited the storage unit. Even so, this officer did not join the customs agents in their conversation with the defendants. This record is similar to the record in Chesternut. In the context of an airport stop, United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), placed great weight on such factors as blocking an individual's path or otherwise intercepting him to prevent his progress in any way, retaining an individual's ticket for more than a minimal amount of time, and making statements that individuals are suspected of smuggling drugs. In Garcia-Gil's case, the agents did nothing analogous. 2 25 We conclude that the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that Garcia-Gil was not seized in his initial encounter with Agents Urbina and Compton. Because the officers' conduct did not implicate the Fourth Amendment, it need not have been justified by reasonable suspicion. Thus, Garcia-Gil's consent to the search of the storage unit was not tainted or invalid. The court correctly denied the motion to suppress.
26 Garcia-Gil's statement of the issues includes whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to [the offenses charged]. Yet his brief does not thereafter discuss the sufficiency issues at all, not even in the summary section. Garcia-Gil forfeits this point of error under the rule that any issues not raised or argued in the appellant's brief are considered waived and will not be entertained on appeal. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Champion Int'l Corp., 908 F.2d 1252, 1255 (5th Cir.1990).
27 The presentence report found that Garcia-Gil attempted to escape from the Law Enforcement Center in Pecos, Texas on July 11, 1989 while awaiting [trial] for the instant offense. It recommended that Garcia-Gil's offense level be increased by two levels pursuant to Sec. 3C1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, because he had attempted to impede the administration of justice during the prosecution of the instant offense. The district court accepted this recommendation. On appeal, Garcia-Gil challenges this increase, arguing only that [a]n escape attempt based on the paltry facts known below can hardly be said to come under the aegis of Sec. 3C1.1. Garcia-Gil has put forward nothing to convince us that the district court was clearly erroneous in finding that he attempted to escape from jail. Furthermore, we conclude that attempted or actual escapes do come under the aegis of Sec. 3C1.1. 28 At the time of Garcia-Gil's offenses, Sec. 3C1.1 covered defendants who willfully impeded or obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct, the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution of their offenses. Does this definition include attempted escape pending trial? For offenses committed after November 1, 1990, the answer is yes. Application Note 3(e) provides that Sec. 3C1.1 applies to attempting to escape from custody before trial or sentencing. Prior to amendment, the commentary did not list attempted escape as an example of covered conduct, but it specifically noted that the examples listed were not exclusive. Application Note 1 (replaced 1990). This non-exclusivity contemplates that the courts will scrutinize conduct for inclusion within Sec. 3C1.1 as situations arise. Having considered the situation in this case, we conclude that an escape or an attempted escape may constitute the willful obstruction of justice for sentencing offenses committed before November 1, 1990. That the Sentencing Commission now explicitly agrees with this conclusion provides more, not less, support for our holding. 29 If the administration of justice includes the ability of the government to produce for scheduled judicial proceedings those persons lawfully in its custody, then the administration of justice is practically obstructed or impeded when such persons escape from custody, presumably never to appear in court. It follows that an attempt to escape is an attempt to obstruct or impede. Other circuits have reached similar conclusions. See United States v. Teta, 918 F.2d 1329, 1334-35 (7th Cir.1990) (defendant's willful failure to appear); United States v. Perry, 908 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir.) (defendant who jumped bond before sentencing), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 565, 112 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990); United States v. Avila, 905 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir.1990) (defendant who absconded from supervised [pretrial] release and remained a fugitive for five months). If failing to appear, jumping bond, and absconding from pretrial release are obstructions of justice, so is escaping or attempting to escape from actual custody. The district court correctly applied Sec. 3C1.1 and increased Garcia-Gil's sentence. 30 Finding no errors in the proceedings below, we sustain both the convictions and the sentences of defendants Rugerio Valdiosera-Godinez and Alejandro Garcia-Gil. 31 AFFIRMED.