Opinion ID: 2046954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantial Neglect

Text: Section 1(D)(d) provides that a person may be declared an unfit parent upon proof of [s]ubstantial neglect of the child if continuous or repeated. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(d) (West Supp.1999). The Act does not define the terms substantial or neglect, but does contain a definition of neglected child: any child whose parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare withholds or denies nourishment or medically indicated treatment    or otherwise does not provide the proper or necessary support, education as required by law, or medical or other remedial care recognized under State law as necessary for a child's well-being, or other care necessary for his or her well-being, including adequate food, clothing and shelter; or who is abandoned by his or her parents or other person responsible for the child's welfare. 750 ILCS 50/1(Q) (West 1998). This definition provides a baseline for a finding of neglect, but does not distinguish neglect from substantial neglect. In the absence of a statutory definition indicating legislative intent, an undefined word must be given its ordinary and popularly understood meaning. C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 211, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030. Webster's defines substantial as consisting of, relating to, sharing the nature of, or constituting substance and as considerable in amount, value, or worth. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1986). Synonyms include consequential, considerable, material, meaningful, momentous, significant, and weighty. As an initial matter, we agree with the appellate court that the legislature's use of the term substantial neglect in section 1(D)(d) evidences a recognition that there are degrees of parental neglect, ranging from neglect to substantial neglect. While neglect may justify state intervention (see, e.g., 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1) (West 1998)), substantial neglect, if continuous or repeated, is grounds for the outright termination of parental rights (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(d) (West 1998)). In its effort to further clarify the meaning of substantial neglect, the appellate court contrasted section 1(D)(d), under which a parent's rights may be terminated outright, with certain provisions of the Juvenile Court Act under which the parent responsible for the neglect is given an opportunity to remediate the circumstances that gave rise to the neglect finding. 321 Ill.App.3d at 220, 254 Ill.Dec. 825, 748 N.E.2d 271. On the basis of this comparison, the appellate court concluded that the legislature's use of the modifier substantial in section 1(D)(d) manifests the legislature's belief that some cases of neglect are so heinous that a child's best interest can only be served by severance of parental rights without giving the parent the chance to remediate. 321 Ill.App.3d at 220, 254 Ill.Dec. 825, 748 N.E.2d 271. Undoubtedly, such cases do involve substantial neglect. However, the appellate court then extended this reasoning even further by concluding that when the State alleges unfitness under section 1(D)(d) of the Act, the instances of `substantial neglect' should be such that remediation would not be an appropriate option. 321 Ill.App.3d at 220, 254 Ill.Dec. 825, 748 N.E.2d 271. No authority was cited for this conclusion, which impermissibly reads into the statute a limitation that the legislature did not express. See In re D.L., 191 Ill.2d 1, 9, 245 Ill.Dec. 256, 727 N.E.2d 990 (2000). Although the appellate court has formulated one possible test of substantial neglect, it is by no means the only possible standard. For example, substantial neglect could be distinguished from neglect on the basis of harmneglect poses a risk of harm, while substantial neglect causes actual harm or, perhaps, permanent harm. The legislature could have defined substantial neglect in any, one of a number of ways, but has chosen not to do so. Instead, the legislature has apparently intended for a trial court to apply the ordinary meaning of the term substantial to the entire body of evidence before it. Thus, whether remediation was or might have been attempted and whether actual harm resulted from the neglect are factors to be considered when assessing the degree of neglect. Neither is a limitation or condition that constrains the trial court's judgment. The appellate court's rigid definition of substantial neglect also ignores the wide range of factual circumstances in which these cases arise. For example, the State might proceed initially by giving a parent the opportunity to remediate but discover as the case goes on that the neglect has been so extreme, or the consequences so grave, that it constitutes Substantial neglect. In another case, the State might recognize substantial neglect initially, but provide remedial services to the parent because the neglect, while substantial, has not yet been repeated or continuous. See D.D., 196 Ill.2d at 422, 256 Ill.Dec. 870, 752 N.E.2d 1112 (noting that in cases involving termination of parental rights, each case is sui generis ). We must conclude that the legislature intended for the trial court to determine whether neglect in a given case, proven by clear and convincing evidence ( D.D., 196 Ill.2d at 417, 256 Ill.Dec. 870, 752 N.E.2d 1112) and based on the totality of circumstances, is substantial. We note that trial courts are not unfamiliar with the concept of substantiality. A glance at Black's Law Dictionary reveals, among other entries, the substantial-capacity and substantial-step tests in criminal law, the substantial-certainty test and the substantial similarity-standard in copyright law, the substantial-continuity doctrine in corporate law, the substantial-factor test in tort law, and the doctrine of substantial performance in the law of contracts. Black's Law Dictionary 1442-43 (7th ed.1999). The adjective substantial is not in need of precise and inflexible definition. Substantial neglect is a matter of degree, and one which the trial court, as the finder of fact, is in the best position to assess. We find, therefore, that the appellate court's unduly restrictive definition of the statutory term substantial neglect is in error. There being no need for the creation of a bright-line rule to divide neglect from substantial neglect, the proper role of a reviewing court in this case is to determine whether the trial court's finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 208, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030. A determination will be found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident ( C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 208, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030) or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented ( Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill.2d 83, 106, 212 Ill.Dec. 968, 658 N.E.2d 450 (1995)). Under a manifest weight of the evidence standard, we give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and the witnesses and has a degree of familiarity with the evidence that a reviewing court cannot possibly obtain. A reviewing court, therefore, must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn. In re A.P., 179 Ill.2d 184, 204, 227 Ill.Dec. 949, 688 N.E.2d 642 (1997). The trial court, in its comments from the bench, stated that its finding of substantial neglect was based on four factors: (1) the unsanitary conditions in respondent's home, (2) D.F.'s failure to thrive, (3) respondent's withholding E.K. and T.K. from their father for several years, and (4) respondent's manipulation of T.K. into making false accusations of physical abuse against Karen K. The implication was that even if no single one of these, standing alone, constituted substantial neglect, the cumulative effect of all four was substantial and affected all three children. Neglect may take many forms. The statutory definition of a neglected child mentions, inter alia, lack of proper nourishment, denial of needed medical care, lack of education, failure to provide adequate clothing and shelter, and abandonment. 750 ILCS 50/1(Q) (West 1998). Section 1(D)(d) does not require that one single form of neglect be proven to be substantial. We agree with the trial court that substantial neglect may result from the cumulative effect of several forms of neglect. As this court observed many years ago, [n]eglect    is the failure to exercise the care that the circumstances justly demand. It embraces wilful as well as unintentional disregard of duty. It is not a term of fixed and measured meaning. It takes its content always from specific circumstances, and its meaning varies as the context of surrounding circumstances changes. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 624, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952). Respondent argues, however, that of the four bases relied on by the trial court, only the second, failure to thrive, was relevant to D.F. The first reported instance of environmental neglect occurred prior to her birth, so that her exposure to unsanitary conditions in the home was neither continuous nor repeated. She also asserts that the third and fourth bases relate only to the older girls. Similarly, she argues that D.F.'s failure to thrive cannot be considered a factor in assessing the degree of neglect of T.K. and E.K. D.F.'s situation differed from that of her half-sisters in several respects. She alone was diagnosed with nonorganic failure to thrive syndrome and was in need of SPICE services to overcome her developmental delay. She was too young to have been directly affected by respondent's habit of lying and of inducing her children to lie on her behalf. This court has never had occasion to consider whether evidence supporting a finding of unfitness as to one of a parent's children may serve as a basis for a finding of unfitness as to another child. We agree with the numerous appellate court decisions that have concluded that such evidence may be relevant. See In re G.V., 292 Ill.App.3d 301, 307, 226 Ill.Dec. 303, 685 N.E.2d 406 (1997) (evidence that respondent failed to protect child who was killed by her paramour could serve as basis for termination of parental rights to other child); In re S.H., 284 Ill.App.3d 392, 400-01, 219 Ill.Dec. 895, 672 N.E.2d 403 (1996) (evidence of respondent's sexual abuse of one child may serve as basis for terminating of parental rights to other children, even when the evidence relates to events that occurred prior to the birth of some of the children); In re Henry, 175 Ill.App.3d 778, 792, 125 Ill.Dec. 413, 530 N.E.2d 571 (1988) (even though two of the respondent mother's eight children were born after she had been found unfit with regard to older children, the trial court properly considered her earlier neglect as a basis for finding her unfit with regard to the infants). We conclude that depending on the type of neglect alleged, evidence of neglect toward one child may be relevant to the question of a parent's fitness with respect to another child. In the present case, E.K. and T.K. lived in extremely unsanitary conditions, twice resulting in DCFS intervention. The testimony regarding filthy floors, spoiled food, and cat feces throughout the home on two separate occasions, several years apart, supports a finding that the environmental neglect was not only severe, but was, at best, repeated, and at worst, continuous. They had poor personal hygiene that resulted not only in dirty hair and skin, but offensive body odor. Their dental needs were neglected to the point that T.K. had an abscessed tooth and several that were bordering on that condition. The dentist stated that she must have been in extreme pain. Indeed, when dental care was finally provided to her by her father, respondent interfered. In addition, respondent deliberately kept E.K. and T.K. hidden from their father for four years, during which she moved seven times. She married a convicted sex offender and remained with him despite being informed of the risk to the girls. Only after an incident of domestic violence and a second notification by DCFS of his status as a sex offender did she separate from her second husband. Respondent pressured T.K. to make a false accusation against her stepmother. The record also demonstrates that she was in the habit of making the girls lie for her, as when E.K. would be sent to answer the door to falsely tell caseworkers that her mother was not at home. The trial court concluded that these various forms of neglect, considered as a whole, constituted substantial neglect over a period of years. Having reviewed the record in detail, we cannot say that the trial court's determination of substantial and continuous neglect of E.K. and T.K. was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. We, therefore, reverse the appellate court, and hold that the trial court properly found respondent unfit as to E.K. and T.K. on the basis of section 1(D)(d) of the Act. Respondent argues, however, that the evidence at the fitness hearing was not sufficient to support the judge's finding that she withheld E.K. and T.K. from their father for four years and that, therefore, this particular form of neglect cannot be considered part of a pattern of overall neglect. We disagree. Karen K., whom the trial court specifically found to be a credible witness, testified regarding the efforts she and John K. made from 1993 to 1997 to locate his daughters. She described eventually having to resort to the pretext of a class reunion and having a third party contact respondent's mother, who had previously denied knowing respondent's whereabouts. Karen's testimony was corroborated, in part, by respondent's own testimony in which she acknowledged frequent moves and name changes and admitted that she did not notify the circuit court of Du Page County, which had retained jurisdiction over issues related to her divorce from John, of her address changes. In addition, the trial court took judicial notice of relevant portions of the case file, which further corroborated Karen's testimony regarding their unsuccessful efforts to locate the girls for several years. And, finally, the trial court found that respondent lied on repeated occasions to caseworkers, therapists, and to the court, thus making her denials on this issue unworthy of belief. Her refusal, as late as August of 1998, to allow E.K. and T.K. to speak on the telephone to their father, and her telling the girls that she was doing so because there was a court order prohibiting it, further undermined her credibility when she disclaimed any deliberate hiding of the girls from their father. In the end, the trial court's findings of fact with regard to this particular form of neglect were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As to D.F., even if the other grounds affecting her sisters are not considered, her failure to thrive combined with the horrendous conditions of the home could be deemed substantial neglect. At the time D.F. was diagnosed with nonorganic failure to thrive, her weight was so low that it was below the first percentile on the weight charts. After respondent was instructed on the proper way to feed the baby, she was still in the habit of leaving D.F. in the walker with a bottle, expecting the child to feed herself. After being instructed to get rid of the walker, respondent continued to use it, hiding it when caseworkers or service providers were in the home. On one occasion, after D.F. was placed in foster care, respondent, during supervised visitation, placed the baby on her back on a table and handed her a bottle. Not until the caseworker intervened, pointing out that the formula was draining down the baby's neck onto the table, did respondent pick her up to feed her properly. Respondent's neglect of D.F.'s nutritional and bonding needs resulted in her very low weight and in developmental delay that required therapy. Again, we cannot say that the trial court's determination of substantial neglect based on respondent's responsibility for D.F.'s failure to thrive and on the unsanitary conditions under which D.F. lived for several months, at a time when she was old enough to be crawling on filthy, feces-strewn floors, was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. The neglect was also continuous, beginning in D.F.'s infancy, before the diagnosis of failure to thrive was made, and continuing even during supervised visits with the child. Respondent argues, however, that the State should be estopped from relying on the diagnosis of failure to thrive as a basis for finding her unfit. Citing no authority for such an application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, she asserts that because the trial court dismissed the allegation of neglect based on D.F.'s failure to thrive as part of the original neglect adjudication, the State may not now use that allegation as a basis for finding her unfit. She claims that, in effect, she gave up her right to litigate this claim when she stipulated to the allegations of environmental neglect in return for the State's agreement to dismiss the failure to thrive allegation. She is mistaken. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies only when the point or question at issue was fully litigated in a previous case and there was a final judgment on the merits. The doctrine is not applicable to other matters that might have been litigated. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill.2d 381, 390, 258 Ill. Dec. 782, 757 N.E.2d 471 (2001). The dismissal of the initial allegation of neglect based on failure to thrive did not constitute a decision on the merits. See In re Chilean D., 304 Ill.App.3d 580, 237 Ill.Dec. 601, 710 N.E.2d 24 (1999) (the State voluntarily withdrew the petition to terminate parental rights after the finding of unfitness, but before consideration of the best interests of the child; thus, the unfitness finding was not a final adjudication on the merits and the parent cannot be estopped from relitigating fitness in the future). In any event, the doctrine of collateral estoppel requires two separate and consecutive cases arising on different causes of action. Nowak, 197 Ill.2d at 389, 258 Ill.Dec. 782, 757 N.E.2d 471. The present case, although taking place in several stages, does not meet this requirement for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Respondent next argues that the environmental neglect cannot have been substantial because the State did not act immediately to remove all three children from the home. Respondent cites no authority for this assertion and we find none. We conclude that the fact that the children were left, for a time, in respondent's home despite its appalling conditions goes to the weight the finder of fact might give to this information. As we observed earlier, even if the environmental neglect, standing alone, was not substantial, it was part of an overall pattern of neglect that was substantial. Respondent also asserts that she has remedied the environmental conditions that gave rise to the initial adjudication of neglect, pointing to the trial court's ruling that the State failed to prove that she had not made reasonable progress. If a finding of substantial neglect is based on her dirty house, she argues, then the provisions in the Act relating to reasonable progress and reasonable efforts (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)), would be rendered superfluous because a parent could make both reasonable progress and reasonable efforts, but still be found unfit based on section 1(D)(d). The finding of substantial neglect was not based entirely on the condition of the house. Rather, the environmental neglect was one of several factors that contributed to the trial court's finding of substantial neglect. In any event, respondent's argument about the interplay between sections 1(D)(d) and 1(D)(m) is without merit. The grounds for a finding of unfitness contained in section 1(D) of the Act are listed in the alternative. Thus, the legislature clearly intended that a parent could make both reasonable efforts and reasonable progress, defeating allegations of unfitness pursuant to section 1(D)(m), and still be found unfit based on one of the other listed grounds. 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998). Reasonable efforts and reasonable progress are not affirmative defenses that can be raised by a parent to refute an allegation of neglect under one of the other subsections of Section 1(D). Rather, lack of reasonable efforts and reasonable progress are separate and distinct bases for a finding of unfitness. A parent in respondent's position, who has been found unfit on another ground, may certainly argue to the trial court at the best interests stage that her efforts and progress demonstrate that it would be in the best interests of the children for her to retain parental rights. In sum, we find that the trial court's judgment that respondent is unfit based on her substantial and continuous neglect of E.K., T.K., and D.F. is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the trial court's ruling on this matter, is reversed.