Opinion ID: 1169826
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Delay and Disruption of Proceedings

Text: The majority asserts that defendant invoked his constitutional right to self-representation to delay and disrupt the proceedings. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26.) The majority is wrong. The record shows that defendant asked to conduct his own defense because his attorney, contrary to defendant's strong opposition, sought a court order to compel defendant to submit to the withdrawal of blood and to provide saliva, fingernail, and hair samples. The wisdom of defendant's action is not at issue here. As I noted earlier, because a defendant wishing self-representation will bear the personal consequences of a conviction, the defendant must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834 [95 S.Ct. at p. 2541]; see also Thor v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 725, 736 [21 Cal. Rptr.2d 357, 855 P.2d 375] [right to refuse unwanted medical treatment not conditioned on assent of physician or others].) Nothing in the record indicates that defendant was seeking to delay or disrupt the proceedings when he asked to represent himself. From his arrest on April 13, 1986, until December 19, 1986, defendant was represented by counsel. Defendant conducted his own defense from December 19, 1986, until May 13, 1987, when he was again represented by counsel. The trial court granted three continuances while defendant was acting as his own attorney: one that the court invited defendant to request, when it granted defendant's motion for self-representation; one it had previously told defendant it would grant when an investigator was assigned to assist defendant; and one defendant requested to seek appellate review of an adverse trial court ruling. On February 23, 1988, when defendant made the request for self-representation at issue here, he did not ask for a continuance. Of the 13 continuances cited by the majority (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15-17,), 10 were secured by counsel. In its attempt to show that defendant's February 23, 1988, request to proceed without counsel was made to delay or disrupt the proceedings, the majority notes that between December 19, 1986, and May 13, 1987, when defendant was representing himself, he requested advisory or second counsel. Defendant had a right to make such requests. ( Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 430 [180 Cal. Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108]; see also Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46 [95 S.Ct. at p. 2541] [standby counsel may be appointed by the court even over the objection of the defendant].) The requests did not cause any delay. Nor were they evidence of vacillating. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 22, 27.) A vacillating defendant is one who alternates between requests for counsel and requests for self-representation in an attempt to manipulate or abuse the trial process. ( Williams v. Bartlett (2d Cir.1994) 44 F.3d 95, 101.) To my knowledge, the term has not previously been used to describe a defendant's request for associate or second counsel. Here, defendant represented himself for five months and then had counsel. It was not until 10 months later that defendant again invoked his right to self-representation. This is not vacillation. ( Adams v. Carroll, supra, 875 F.2d at p. 1443 [California criminal conviction vacated for violation of right to personal defense when defendant first requested counsel, then asked to represent himself when he became dissatisfied with [counsel], then requested counsel again and finally asked to represent himself again when [counsel] was reappointed ....].) And, contrary to the majority's assertion, the fact that defendant heeded the warnings and advice of the trial judge at his first court appearance by not pursuing a request for self-representation is not evidence of vacillation, delay, or abuse. The fact that [defendant] tried a lawyer at the urging of the court reflects both sound advice on the court's part and wise deference to that advice on the part of defendant; it does not signify waiver or suggest tactical abuse of the system. ( Williams v. Bartlett, supra, 44 F.3d at p. 101.)