Opinion ID: 1408147
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Triem Committed the Violations Found by the Hearing Committees in the Lubin, Zorich, and McCarty Matters.

Text: Triem and Bar Counsel stipulated to the facts in the Lubin matter. Therefore, if Triem cannot provide a justifiable excuse for his failure to return or account for the funds, Triem committed the ethical violations charged. At the committee hearing, Triem testified about an exculpatory conversation with Lubin. This conversation was not included in the statement of stipulated facts. After hearing additional testimony on the issue, the committee found that Triem's testimony was not credible and concluded that Lubin's account of the events was credible. As a general rule, ... we ordinarily will not disturb findings of fact made upon conflicting evidence. In re West, 805 P.2d at 353 n. 3 (quoting In re Simpson, 645 P.2d at 1227). The record evinces no reason to depart from this general rule. Triem has not carried his burden of showing that the committee's factual findings are erroneous. Therefore, we accept the committee's findings and hold that Triem violated DR 9-102(B)(3) and DR 9-102(B)(4). Disciplinary Rule 9-102(A)(2) dictates that disputed fees may not be withdrawn from a trust account until the dispute is finally resolved. [20] Our independent review of the record reveals that the committee accurately summarized the controlling facts when it stated: Under Triem's agreement and practice with Lubin, attorney fees and costs were not due until 10 days after Triem issued Lubin a statement itemizing the charges. Triem did not issue Lubin a statement itemizing the charges before withdrawing the fees from his trust account. Accordingly, the money should not have been withdrawn from the trust account because the fees were not yet due. Moreover, because Triem believed Lubin would dispute the fees, he should not have withdrawn the money from the trust account until the dispute was resolved. Therefore, we hold that Triem improperly deducted attorney's fees from Lubin's earnest money payment in violation of DR 9-102(A)(2). After an independent review of the appropriate sanction, we conclude that these violations warrant a public censure. The ABA Standards state that [s]uspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client. ABA Standards § 4.12. The commentary to this rule reveals that commingling of client and personal funds and the failure to remit client funds promptly are the most common circumstances for which suspension is imposed. ABA Standards § 4.12 commentary. The commentary to ABA Standards § 4.13, however, recognizes that courts typically impose the lesser sanction of reprimands when lawyers fail to maintain adequate trust accounting procedures or do not return clients' property promptly. ABA Standards § 4.13 commentary. Triem failed to promptly return or provide an accounting of Lubin's money, but he did not convert client funds to his own use or commingle personal and client funds. When Lubin objected to the deduction of fees, Triem redeposited the money and maintained it in his trust account during the pendency of these proceedings. Therefore, we hold that public censure is the appropriate sanction. In addition, we note that Lubin was denied the opportunity to earn interest on his money during the period it was improperly withheld by Triem. Therefore, pursuant to Bar Rule 16(c)(1), we order that Triem pay restitution for lost interest from November 3, 1989, when Triem received official notice of Lubin's inability to secure financing, to January 12, 1990. Although we hold that Triem's deduction of attorney's fees from the trust account was an ethical violation warranting public censure, neither Lubin nor Bar Counsel have argued that the fees were neither justified nor appropriate. Consequently, we decline to order reimbursement of the deducted fees.
Triem and Bar Counsel stipulated to the basic facts in the Zorich matter. As in Lubin, the only dispute concerns what Triem discussed with his client about his representation. The committee heard conflicting testimony about whether Triem discussed and obtained approval for an alternate strategy of clearing title. The committee found Zorich's testimony consistent and credible, and found Triem's testimony not credible. As stated above, factual findings made in the face of conflicting evidence ordinarily will not be disturbed. In re West, 805 P.2d at 353 n. 3. Triem has not shown that the committee's findings with respect to this issue are erroneous. Additionally, Triem's general lack of diligence in his representation of Zorich supports and makes more plausible Zorich's account of the facts. [21] Therefore, we find that Triem violated DR 6-101(A)(3), neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him. Triem's neglect of the Zorich matter occurred while Triem was on probation for ethical violations involving neglect and conduct that adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law. Therefore, Triem has proven that public censure or a period of probation is not effective in influencing his conduct. ABA Standards § 4.42 states that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services or engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client. Although disbarment is recognized as the appropriate sanction in more egregious cases, [22] the cases cited in support of suspension reflect a level of misconduct in line with Triem's violations. ABA Standards § 4.42 commentary (citing cases involving failure to appear in court, failure to file pleadings, and failure to prosecute). Consequently, we order that Triem be suspended from the practice of law for a period of ninety days. We recognize that the ABA Standards disfavor suspensions of less than six months on the theory that such suspensions are a less effective means of rehabilitation. Commentary to ABA Standards Rule 2.3. However, in our view, under the circumstances of this case a ninety-day suspension will impose considerable hardship and will be a significant sanction for Triem, a solo practitioner in a small community. Additionally, we adopt the committee's recommendation that Triem be placed on probation and required to participate in continuing legal education on time and practice management. We remand for imposition of appropriate probationary terms and conditions.
The relevant facts in the McCarty matter are not contested. The only issue is whether Triem's failure to notify McCarty that he had taken actions to render his earlier statements false constitutes dishonesty in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4). In finding a violation, the committee concluded that: a statement is no less false because it was rendered false after the statement was made. Mr. Triem intentionally rendered his statement to Mr. McCarty false by his act of retrieving the discovery materials from the mail. By so doing, he had the affirmative duty to contact Mr. McCarty and correct his statement. Triem contends that Bar Counsel failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the essential element of intent to commit dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Triem argues a contract theory to explain the exchange between himself and McCarty. He argues that his offer to send the discovery materials was rejected when McCarty responded with a nonconforming demand that the materials be faxed by noon that day. Given this explanation, Triem contends, Bar Counsel has failed to show that Triem acted with dishonest intent. We have held that intent is required to find a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4). In re West, 805 P.2d at 353. However, it is permissible to infer that an accused intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her knowing actions. Calantas v. State, 608 P.2d 34, 36 (Alaska 1980). Triem's contract explanation of his actions in McCarty is unpersuasive. Triem's letter to McCarty did not offer to send the discovery materials; it stated that Triem already had sent them in yesterday's mail. In his postscript to the letter, Triem offered to fax the materials. The dishonesty found by the committee was not the failure to fax the materials, but Triem's retrieval of them from the post office and his failure to notify McCarty of this fact. It is reasonable to infer that Triem intended to render his earlier statement false when he retrieved the discovery materials and did not notify McCarty of this fact. [23] Therefore, we hold the record provides substantial evidence that Triem had the necessary intent to be act dishonestly in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4). Under the ABA Standards, false statements, fraud, and misrepresentation can be sanctioned by disbarment, suspension, reprimand, or an admonition. ABA Standards § 6.1. Reprimands are generally reserved for cases in which lawyers negligently make false statements or fail to take remedial actions when material information is withheld. ABA Standards § 6.13. Although we hold that Triem acted with intentional dishonesty, we impose the sanction of public censure. We note that Triem did not submit false documents to the court and that although his failure to comply with discovery could be broadly interpreted as the withholding of material information from the court, Triem was penalized for this discovery abuse by the trial court's entry of a default judgment against him and the other defendants. Nonetheless, as the committee observed, integrity is, and ought to be, the cornerstone of attorney ethics. Deceit to gain monetary advantage is no more or less culpable than to gain emotional satisfaction or retribution. Conduct such as Triem's contributes to the perpetuation of the stereotype of lawyers as unscrupulous and unprincipled. To combat this stereotype, we hold that public censure of Triem is warranted. [24]