Opinion ID: 1819502
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether termination of father's parental rights was the least restrictive alternative based upon all the facts and circumstances of this case.

Text: The trial court, in its dispositional findings of fact, in part, found as follows: # 7 Reasonable efforts to provide appropriate services to the natural father would be unavailing both during and after his incarceration. # 11 The natural father is unfit as a parent and it is contrary to the best interests and welfare of the child to relinquish her to the care of the natural father for the following reasons: [1] # 15 The least restrictive alternative available to commensurate with the best interests and welfare of the child, and with due regard to the parental rights of the natural father, requires termination of all parental rights of the natural father, ... in respect to his child, A.D. Father argues that the above three findings are clearly erroneous and unsubstantiated by the evidence. This court's review is governed by the well established clearly erroneous standard. SDCL 15-6-52(a); People in Interest of S.L.H., 342 N.W.2d 672 (S.D.1983); In re Estate of Hobelsberger, 85 S.D. 282, 181 N.W.2d 455 (1970). Under this standard, this court shall not set aside findings of fact unless found to be clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. SDCL 15-6-52(a). In Hobelsberger, supra, this court explained the application of the clearly erroneous standard: In applying the clearly erroneous standard we must bear in mind that our function is not to decide factual issues de novo. The question for the appellate court is not whether it would have made the same findings the trial court did, but whether on the entire evidence it is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 181 N.W.2d at 459. The United States Supreme Court has stated that natural parents do have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). While this court has noted that parents have a fundamental right to their children, that right is not absolute or unconditional. Matter of S.H., 337 N.W.2d 179 (S.D.1983); In re K.D.E., 87 S.D. 501, 210 N.W.2d 907 (1973). It is important to remember that children have a right as sacred and secure in the law as parents have. People in Interest of S.L.H., supra . Furthermore, the law must not abandon children, but must permit them to grow and flourish. Matter of J.M.A., 286 N.W.2d 324 (S.D.1979). More importantly, in determining whether to terminate parental rights, the paramount consideration is whether the termination is in the best interest of the child. SDCL 26-8-36. Matter of M.S.M., 320 N.W.2d 795 (S.D.1982). The United States Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231, 237 (1960) stated: In a series of decisions this court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. This principle has been referred to at times as the least restrictive alternative. Consequently, in a termination of parental rights at a dispositional hearing, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest and the state must show that there is no narrower means of providing for the best interests and welfare of the child. Santosky v. Kramer, supra ; Matter of S.H., supra ; Matter of N.J.W., 273 N.W.2d 134 (S.D.1978); Matter of J.Z., 410 N.W.2d 572 (S.D.1987). It is very important to note that while this court recognizes that the fundamental nature of parental rights to their children mandates at least a reasonable effort to aid them in maintaining their offspring, it must be remembered that the best interest of the child must always prevail. People in Interest of T.H., 396 N.W. 2d 145 (S.D.1986); Matter of S.M., 384 N.W.2d 670 (S.D.1986). As noted above, in the decision to terminate parental rights, the paramount consideration is the best interest and welfare of the child. Id. Furthermore, termination of parental rights is not conditioned on the exhaustion of every possible form of assistance. People in Interest of T.H., supra . Nor are services mandated in every case. Id.; Matter of B.E., 287 N.W.2d 91 (S.D.1979). The court may also consider evidence of a parent's past conduct and present incarceration as guidelines in determining whether to terminate parental rights. In discussing these guidelines in People in Interest of T.H., supra , Justice Sabers quoted Justice Henderson's concurring opinion in Matter of A.M.L., 371 N.W. 2d 358 (S.D.1985). There Justice Henderson indicated that the more enlightened rule followed today is that while parental rights should not be terminated for the sole reason of conviction of a crime or incarceration, the fact of incarceration may be considered along with other factors in determining whether parental rights should be terminated. The other factors should include general fitness of the parent and the length of incarceration. The best interests of the child require that some certitude and stability enter a child's life. People in Interest of T.H., supra ; People in Interest of J.S.N., 371 N.W.2d 361 (S.D. 1985). A child should not be required to wait for his parents to acquire parenting skills that may never develop; he is entitled to a stable, healthy environment now. People in Interest of M.J.B., 364 N.W.2d 921 (S.D.1985). At the dispositional hearing, the trial judge, in carrying out his responsibility to view the entire record from the standpoint of what was in the best interest and welfare of A.D., saw a bleak picture for A.D. if the parental rights of father were not terminated. A.D.'s natural mother had given up her parental rights and was no where to be found at the time of the father's dispositional hearing. She was still married to a man other than father, and was in no condition to provide any support to the child. The trial judge, in viewing father's potential to provide the minimum skills and nurturing for A.D. as a single parent, concluded that the future for A.D. appeared stark with father based on his current status and past history. He saw a 26 year history where father, in his early child home, had very little, if any, example of a role model to learn the basic skills of coping with life, not to mention those of parenthood. Since his thirteenth birthday, father was either on probation, in foster homes, group homes, juvenile detention centers, county jails or state penitentiaries. During his free periods, there is no evidence of responding to rehabilitation opportunities, but only a pattern of violating probation and a philosophy of wine, women and criminal activities. His psychological history evidenced a personality that gave little hope of quick change or adjusting to responsibility of parenthood, let alone the skills to adequately carry out such duties at the time of the hearing or in the near future. In addition, father, due to his criminal conduct, found himself in the early stages of a 30-month prison sentence at the time of the dispositional hearing. The sad realities of prison life in our society are such that funds are not provided for intense alcoholic and drug treatment. Nor are there intensive character changing courses or programs that would teach parenting skills. Faced with such evidence, the trial judge concluded that A.D. needed an atmosphere where love and nurturing could take place now or in the immediate future. Furthermore, he found that father's likelihood of being able to provide that which was in the best interests and the welfare of the child was so very unlikely, that termination of parental rights was in A.D.'s best interest. The fact of father's incarceration, along with all the other evidence and circumstances of his life, does not leave this court with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court was mistaken when it terminated father's parental rights. Therefore, this court affirms the judgment of the lower court to terminate father's parental rights as to A.D.