Opinion ID: 427081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Preemption of Railroad Crossing Warning Devices

Text: 25 Appellee contended at trial that the railroad was negligent in failing to provide a more adequate warning device at the crossing in question. Appellee's expert testified that the crossbuck, a sign with an X-shaped warning, was inadequate for the crossing, considering the multiple tracks, the possibility of two trains at the crossing, the use of high speed trains, and certain possible restrictions on sight distance. He testified that an automatic gate with flashing lights should have been installed at the crossing. 26 Burlington argues that evidence of the adequacy of its crossing should have been excluded because federal law also preempts this aspect of common law negligence. Burlington's preemption argument here is based solely on the Railroad Safety Act, since it is clear that the Boiler Inspection Act is not applicable. The question is whether the state is trying to regulate the same subject matter already regulated by the Secretary. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 434 (1976). 27 The Railroad Safety Act requires the Secretary to study and develop solutions to problems associated with railroad grade crossings. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 433 (1976). The Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub.L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (1966) (as amended, codified at 23 U.S.C. Secs. 401-404 (1982)), directs the Secretary to develop uniform standards and to approve state-designed highway safety programs that comply with them, which are then eligible to receive federal financial assistance. 23 U.S.C. Sec. 402 (1982). The Secretary, through the Federal Highway Administration, prescribed procedures to obtain uniformity in highway traffic control devices and adopted the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices on Streets and Highways, see 23 C.F.R. Sec. 655.601 (1981), which also was adopted by Montana, see Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 61-8-202 (1981). The manual prescribes that the selection of devices at grade crossings and the approval for federal funds is to be made by local agencies with jurisdiction over the crossing. Thus, the Secretary has delegated federal authority to regulate grade crossings to local agencies. 28 The locality in charge of the crossing in question has made no determination under the manual regarding the type of warning device to be installed at the crossing. Until a federal decision is reached through the local agency on the adequacy of the warning devices at the crossing, the railroad's duty under applicable state law to maintain a good and safe crossing, Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 69-14-602 (1981), is not preempted. Evidence concerning the adequacy of the warning device at the crossing in question was properly admitted.III. Jury Instruction 29 To establish Kenneth Marshall's contributory negligence, Burlington requested the trial court to instruct the jury on the duty of motorists under Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 61-8-349(1) (1981), adopted in 1919. Appellee argued that this provision had been overruled or modified by Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 61-8-347 (1981), adopted in 1955, which prescribed a less strict standard. The district court agreed with appellee and gave the latter instruction. Burlington contends the district court erred in interpreting Montana law, and urges that according to O'Brien v. Great Northern R.R. Co., 148 Mont. 429, 421 P.2d 710 (1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 920, 87 S.Ct. 2034, 18 L.Ed.2d 974 (1967), the earlier statute remained in effect after the enactment of the more recent statute. 30 Each of the statutes in question sets forth the duty of motorists to stop in certain situations at uncontrolled grade crossings. The earlier statute sets forth a duty to stop whenever a moving train is within sight. Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 61-8-349(1) (1981). The more recent statute sets forth a more circumscribed obligation that requires a stop when a train by reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing, is an immediate hazard. Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 61-8-347 (1981). Under these circumstances, we find no error in the district court's finding that the more recent statute establishes the applicable duty of motorists. To hold otherwise would render the provisions of the more recent enactment nugatory. 31 In the circumstances of this case, moreover, the difference in duty imposed by the 1919 and 1955 statutes is not significant. In light of the district court's instruction on Marshall's common law duty to exercise reasonable care, which included a duty to take reasonable precautions to satisfy himself by actual observation that there was no danger from any train at the crossing and a duty not to chance known hazards, we hold that the jury was fully and properly instructed regarding Marshall's duty of care.