Opinion ID: 1223875
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Open and obvious dangers

Text: At the outset, we deem it useful to address in general terms the parameters of a manufacturer's liability with respect to allegedly defective products, as a function of the extent to which their use necessarily entails open and obvious dangers. General principles of tort law, summarizing the results of many cases, suggest that a `failure to warn' amounts to `negligence' only where the supplier of a dangerous good has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition. Restatement of Torts (2d) § 388 (1965). Where a danger involved in using a product is obvious and apparent, discernible by casual inspection, a supplier is not negligent in failing to warn of that danger. Id., comment k. If this were not true, a manufacturer could not design and sell a pocket knife, axe, planer or gun. Indeed, if the law required suppliers to warn of all obvious dangers inherent in a product, the list of foolish practices warned against would be so long, it would fill a volume. Plante v. Hobart Corp., 771 F.2d 617, 620 (1st Cir.1985) (per Breyer, J.) (brackets and some citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although [t]he failure to warn of [the] inherent non-obvious limitations of a product can create an unreasonable risk of harm in that [persons] may be lulled into an unjustified sense of safety and fail to be forewarned, thereby generating a jury question as to whether such a failure to warn was negligent, Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726, 730 (1st Cir.1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), [w]here the risks of the product are discernible by casual inspection, such as the danger that a knife can cut, or a stove burn, the consumer is in just as good a position as the manufacturer to gauge the dangers associated with the product, and nothing is gained by shifting to the manufacturer the duty to warn. Id. at 730-31. See also Maneely v. General Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1997) (A manufacturer need not provide a warning when the danger, or potentiality of danger[,] is generally known and recognized. (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)). Thus, there is no bright line rule delineating products that present an open and obvious danger and those which are unreasonably dangerous. Toney v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 975 F.2d 162, 166 n. 2 (5th Cir.1992). [W]hether a product presents an open and obvious danger barring recovery is, in the first instance, a question of law for the court. If, as a matter of law, the danger is open and obvious, it follows that the product is not unreasonably dangerous .... Conversely, if the danger is not open and obvious as a matter of law, whether the product is unreasonably dangerous is for the jury. Id. at 166-67 n. 2 (citations omitted). See also Maneely, 108 F.3d at 1179 (Although the question of whether a duty exists is one of law, the question of whether a risk is obvious or generally known is one of fact and thus should be decided by the trier of fact when reasonable minds may differ.  (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)). In other words, when the danger posed by the product is patent, the unreasonableness of the danger is a question of law for the court to resolve. See Lamb v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir.1993) (While in many cases, the obvious and common nature of a peril will be a question for the jury, it may be determined as a matter of law in plain and palpable cases.). For a risk to be deemed obvious [as a matter of law] for purposes of a failure to warn claim, however, there must be general consensus within the relevant community. Metzgar v. Playskool Inc., 30 F.3d 459, 465 (3d Cir.1994). Accordingly, in Wagatsuma, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) took judicial notice of the fact that it is obvious to all that swimming pools are dangerous to young children[.] 10 Haw.App. at 570, 879 P.2d at 585. The Lamb court effectively reached the same result: Since the danger of drowning in a pool is an open and obvious danger, it is axiomatic that to alleviate or reduce the danger a person must erect a fence or some similar means of preventing access to the pool.... The danger of drowning presented by the pool, as well as the absence of a fence, was apparent to anyone viewing the pool and would not have been more apparent had [the seller] provided warnings. 1 F.3d at 1190 (footnote omitted). See also Hylton v. John Deere Co., 802 F.2d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that trial court's review of design of combine to determine whether it was dangerous to extent beyond that which would be contemplated by ordinary consumer and whether danger of climbing into bin was open and obvious was proper interpretation of Missouri law in design defect case); Maneely, 108 F.3d at 1180 (affirming summary judgment in pickup truck manufacturer's favor on basis that [i]f the public recognizes that travelling in the passenger compartment of an automobile without a seatbelt is dangerous, it only follows as night the day that the public also recognizes that riding in the cargo bed of a pickup, where seatbelts and other occupant packaging are conspicuously absent, presents even greater risks. Anyone getting into the cargo area of a pickup could not fail to recognize that it is neither designed nor equipped to transport passengers); Elliott v. Brunswick Corp., 903 F.2d 1505, 1507, 1510 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that manufacturer of motor installed in boat not liable under Alabama law for failure to design propeller guards because dangers inherent in motor's propellers should have been apparent to plaintiff who was injured after jumping at night from pier into water, the ordinary consumer clearly understand[ing] that a revolving propeller involves danger); Farnham v. Bombardier, Inc., 161 Vt. 619, 640 A.2d 47, 49 (1994) (affirming summary judgment in snowmobile manufacturer's favor on basis that the dangers of racing snowmobiles five abreast on a narrow strip of land at high speeds are manifestly within the common knowledge of the ordinary consumer); Menard v. Newhall, 135 Vt. 53, 373 A.2d 505, 507 (1977) (affirming summary judgment in BB gun manufacturer's favor because (1) manufacturer was not required to warn of patent dangers or those dangers which are generally known and recognized, and opining that a BB gun, if fired at a person, could injure an eye, is nothing that even a seven-year-old child does not already know).
In the present case, the plaintiffs allege that the Series 510 straddle carrier was defective with respect to the configuration of its cab and engine housing, which created a blind zone vis-a-vis adjacent areas. The resulting visual impairment did not arise under particular circumstances only, but was constant and discernible to anyone seated in the driver's position. Thus, the straddle carrier's potential, during operation, for striking an object or person located in the blind zone would be obvious and manifestly within the common knowledge of any ordinary person who had driven any large vehicle. But we are not dealing here with ordinary members of the driving public. It is uncontroverted that the only operators of the enormous straddle carriers utilized at the loading dock of Pier 52 were trained drivers who navigated within specially designated areas that were circumscribed precisely because of the dangers, including limited visibility, posed by those very straddle carriers. That the dangers presented were obvious, apparent, and discernible by casual inspection is underscored by the fact that all witnesses, including Tabieros, who had ever occupied the straddle carrier's cab, testified that they were aware of the blind zone and its attendant risk of harm to anyone in the vicinity. Indeed, the photographic exhibits introduced into evidence  both by Clark and the plaintiffs  make plain and palpable the visual restrictions to which anyone atop the straddle carrier would be subject, as well as the dangerousness of piloting such a vehicle through an occupied or minimally congested area. [19] Given the occupations of the ordinary consumers of the Series 510 straddle carrier and the bystanders foreseeably in its vicinity  trained straddle carrier operators and dock workers , the self-evident characteristics of the vehicle, and the patent nature of the danger posed by the blind zone, we hold, as a matter of law: (1) that the danger involved in using [the straddle carrier was] obvious and apparent, discernible by casual inspection, Plante, 771 F.2d at 620, and generally known and recognized, Maneely, 108 F.3d at 1179; and, therefore, (2) that Clark was not negligent in failing to warn of that danger, Plante, 771 F.2d at 620. We emphasize, however, that although our holding impacts a manufacturer's strict product liability, see infra at section III.C.2.a, and duty to warn, see infra at section III.C.2.b, it neither completely shields a manufacturer under Hawai`i law from strict product liability, see Wagatsuma, 10 Haw.App. at 566, 879 P.2d at 583-84, nor from negligence liability, see id. at 565, 879 P.2d at 583. With respect to the former, the following [risk-utility] factors [are] relevant to determine whether a product is defective: (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product  its utility to the user and to the public as a whole[;] (2) The safety aspects of the product  the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury[;] (3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe[;] (4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility[;] (5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product[;] (6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the exercise of suitable warnings or instructions[; and] (7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance. Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 74 Haw. 1, 23-24 n. 6, 837 P.2d 1273, 1285 n. 6 (citing J. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973)), reconsideration granted in part and denied in part, 74 Haw. 650, 843 P.2d 144 (1992). And with respect to the latter, we reaffirm the proposition that [t]he creation of any unreasonable danger is enough to establish negligence, even though the danger is obvious. Brown, 62 Haw. at 539, 618 P.2d at 273 (citation omitted). Accordingly, liability may be established by way of a theory of negligent design. See generally Ontai, Brown, and Wagatsuma, supra . We therefore analyze the circuit court's jury instructions regarding a manufacturer's duty to warn with these principles in mind.