Opinion ID: 1271967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conclusiveness of the Probate Decree

Text: Appellants argue that the 1948 probate decree is conclusive and res judicata as to the parties' interests in U.S. Survey 1432. They assert that the administrator made no distinction between the north and south portion of the survey in distributing the remainder interest, [5] and thus each of Charles Brower's children hold a 1/14th remainder interest, in fee, to the entire parcel. Appellees counter that the northern half of the survey was conveyed by the testator prior to his death and, therefore, was unavailable for distribution by the probate court. Before we reach the issue of the scope of the 1943 deeds, we must first determine whether the superior court erred in going beyond the face of the probate decree to adjudicate the respective interests in the land. Appellants correctly state that a decree of a United States Commissioner, sitting in probate, is entitled to the same finality as judgments by other courts. First National Bank v. Martin, 16 Alaska 313, 323-24 (1956). [6] As a general rule such decrees are conclusive and not subject to collateral attack absent mistake, fraud or collusion. Grant v. National Surety, 7 Alaska 179, 185 (1924). [7] There is, however, an additional exception to this rule which allowed the trial court to review the 1948 decree. This exception is based on the jurisdictional argument that the decree cannot distribute rights in property not owned by the decedent, Charles Brower. Appellees thus argue that if the decree purports to grant appellants a remainder interest in both the south and north portion of U.S. Survey 1432 it cannot be res judicata, since the 1943 deeds conveyed out of Charles Brower's estate that northern portion of the survey area used in the partnership's business. There is ample support for this position. [8] The recent case of Matter of Estate of Swandal, 587 P.2d 368 (Mont. 1978), provides a factually analogous example. In that case the probate court's decree of settlement of final account and distribution of estate granted each heir a fractional interest in certain lease and mineral rights previously conveyed out of the estate. Nine months after the executor was discharged and the estate was closed, the executor petitioned to reopen the estate and amend the final decree. The heirs objected on the ground that the decree was res judicata, since no appeal was taken. The trial court rejected the argument, took evidence regarding the prior conveyances, and amended the order of distribution to the extent that it disposed of property not within the estate. In affirming, the Montana Supreme Court stated: upon principles of res judicata, the order of distribution is binding on everyone, even if the court has committed manifest error  except ... that it is not binding as to property not owned by the decedent. ..... Manifestly, if the decedent does not own the property, which is the situation in the case at bar, the decree of distribution does not pass title. ..... The District Court here was without power or authority to distribute items which were not properly included in the inventory of the estate. (citations omitted, emphasis in original). Id. at 370-71. The court subsequently allowed the original order of distribution to be amended under the authority of its Civil Rule 60, analogous to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60. Appellants argue, however, that by failing to use limiting language in its order of distribution, the probate court necessarily adjudicated title to the entire parcel. Even if the question of title was fully litigated during the probate proceedings, [9] the order of distribution could not distribute interests in realty no longer in Charles Brower's estate. To the extent that property was conveyed out of the estate, such a conveyance worked a pro-tanto reduction of the devise of the remainder; that is, a portion of the specific devise was adeemed. [10] After considering the evidence, the superior court found that the estate's administrator believed that the northern portion of the survey was not within the assets of Charles Brower's estate, and, furthermore, that the testator's intent was to leave each child a remainder interest in that portion of the survey not necessary to the partnership's operation. A review of the record fails to indicate that these findings are clearly erroneous. Thus, we conclude that the superior court properly reached the question of whether the 1943 deeds conveyed a portion of Survey 1432.