Opinion ID: 2718900
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Surrounding language

Text: Our original opinion looked first to the Extender Statute’s surrounding language to shed light on the scope of the term “statute of limitations.” We recognized the Extender Statute’s new limitations framework includes the concept of accrual, which is “generally associated with the narrow meaning of ‘statute of limitations.’” NCUA, 727 F.3d at 1260. But we further observed “the Extender Statute also includes the concept of repose.” Id. Specifically, the Extender Statute provides that the limitations period begins to run either (i) on “the date of the appointment of [NCUA] as conservator or liquidating agent” or (ii) when “the cause of action accrues.” See 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(B)(i) & (ii). Option (i) invokes the concept of repose because it is based on when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether the plaintiff is aware of the injury.11 The statute in CTS is completely different. Section 9658 exclusively adopts a discovery-based accrual framework and contains no such concept of repose, which _______________________ extender statute. See NCUA, 727 F.3d at 1258, 1266 n.20. Neither decision was critical to this panel’s conclusion that FIRREA’s Extender Statute, which is fundamentally different from CERCLA’s, employs “statute of limitations” in the broad sense. 11 Appellants argue the Extender Statute does not invoke the concept of repose because “a statute of repose is measured from the ‘last culpable act or omission of the defendant,’” rather than “an act of the plaintiff NCUA.” Aplt. Suppl. Br. at 12 (quoting and emphasizing CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2182). We disagree. Although a statute of repose may begin to run from the last culpable act or omission of the defendant, see CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2182, its distinguishing feature from a statute of limitation is that “the period specified in a statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.” 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 7 (2014) (emphasis added); see also 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1056 (3d ed. 2010) (observing that “the point of commencement for the applicable statute of repose is commonly the date of the last act or omission that caused the plaintiff’s injury” (emphasis added)). - 18 - suggests it can only be read to displace statutes of limitations and not statutes of repose. The provision defines the “federally required commencement date” as “the date the plaintiff knew (or should reasonably have known) about his or her injury.” See 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A). Statutes of limitations in state actions therefore begin to run under CERCLA’s time limits only “when a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that the harm in question was caused by the contaminant.” CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2180. The Court’s discussion in CTS about § 9658’s surrounding language does not change our original conclusion regarding the Extender Statute. i. Use of the singular to describe the relevant “period” In CTS, the Court observed that Congress’s use of a singular term—“period”—to identify the object (as opposed to objects) of federal preemption suggests how far it intended § 9658’s federal commencement date to reach. Because “describing the covered [state] period” modified by the federal commencement date “in the singular” “would be an awkward way to mandate the pre-emption of two different time periods with two different purposes,” the Court concluded Congress must have intended to leave state repose periods alone. Id. at 2186-87 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2186 (discussing “the applicable limitations period,” “such period shall commence,” and “the statute of limitations established under State law” (emphasis added)). In other words, if Congress had meant the federal commencement date to displace both statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, it would have used the term “periods” as the object of federal preemption. - 19 - The Extender Statute does not use the term “period” in a comparable way. Appellants nonetheless point to this passage: (A) In general ..... [T]he applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action brought by the [NCUA] as conservator or liquidating agent shall be— (i) in the case of any contract claim, the longer of— (I) the 6-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law; and (ii) in the case of any tort claim, the longer of— (I) the 3-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law. (B) Determination of the date on which a claim accrues For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which the statute of limitation begins to run on any claim described in such subparagraph shall be the later of— (i) the date of the appointment of the Board as conservator or liquidating agent; or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14) (emphasis added). Unlike § 9658, however, which employs the word “period” in the singular to describe the “applicable limitations period,” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (emphasis added), the Extender Statute refers generally to the “period applicable under State law,” 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(A)(i)(II) & (ii)(II), without using the word “limitations” to modify “period.” Moreover, unlike § 9658, which employs the term “applicable limitations period” to identify the state law time frame modified by the federal commencement date (that is, the specific object of federal preemption), the Extender Statute uses “period applicable under State law” to help construct a new exclusive time framework for NCUA - 20 - actions that replaces all pre-existing time limits (including repose periods). Whether the state period used to construct this framework is one of limitations or repose has no bearing on whether the new Extender Statute framework itself displaces statutes of repose. Finally, the Extender Statute’s remaining timing provisions, which do not appear in § 9658, should not be ignored. The “period applicable under State law” in the Extender Statute only applies if it is longer than three (or six, for contract claims) years from the later of (i) the date of the NCUA’s appointment as conservator or liquidating agent or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues. See 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(B).12 Because the Extender Statute provides this framework—which, as discussed above, includes the concept of repose—independent of the “period applicable under State law,” the use of the word “period” does not exclude statutes of repose from the Extender Statute’s scope. ii. Use of the term “civil action” The CTS Court also pointed to § 9658’s definition for the preempted “applicable limitations period”: “the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be brought.” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(2). Although the Court acknowledged that “in a literal sense a statute of repose limits the time during which a suit ‘may be brought’ because it provides a point after which a suit cannot be brought,” it found persuasive § 9658’s use of the term “civil 12 It plainly does not apply to the federal securities claims at issue in this case. - 21 - action,” which is a “‘civil suit stating a legal cause of action.’” 134 S. Ct. at 2187 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 32-33, 222 (9th ed. 2009)). A “statute of repose,” by contrast, “is not related to the accrual of any cause of action” and “can prohibit a cause of action from coming into existence.” Id. (quotations omitted). The Court therefore concluded the definition of the preempted “‘applicable limitations period’ . . . is best read to encompass only statutes of limitations, which generally begin to run after a cause of action accrues and so always limit the time in which a civil action ‘may be brought.’” Id. Here, unlike § 9658, the Extender Statute does not use the term “civil action”; it refers more broadly to “any action.” 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(A). The term “any action” also appears in § 9658, but the Court did not address the phrase “any action” in CTS, and we otherwise do not understand the CTS disposition to turn on the “civil action” point alone.13 The Court relied on several points for its analysis, including the accrual character of § 9658. As discussed above, § 9658’s surrounding language, unlike the Extender Statute, is cast exclusively in terms of the discovery rule for accrual, which applies to the narrow understanding of “statute of limitations.” We therefore do not think the “civil action” reference in CTS overcomes the reasons we have identified to show that 13 Other federal statutes describe “action[s]” that may be brought within repose periods. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that an “action under” DoddFrank’s whistleblower retaliation provision “may not in any circumstance be brought more than 10 years after the date on which the violation occurs”); 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (providing that “a private right of action” involving securities fraud “may be brought not later than the earlier” of “2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation” or “5 years after such violation”). - 22 - the time framework in the Extender Statute replaces other previously-applicable time periods, including repose limits. iii. Equitable tolling The CTS Court said “[a]nother and altogether unambiguous textual indication that § 9658 does not pre-empt statutes of repose is that § 9658 provides for equitable tolling for ‘minor or incompetent plaintiff[s].’” 134 S. Ct. at 2187 (quoting and altering § 9658(b)(4)(B)). Because a “critical distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose is that a repose period is fixed and its expiration will not be delayed by estoppel or tolling,” “the inclusion of a tolling rule in § 9658 suggests that the statute’s reach is limited to statutes of limitations, which traditionally have been subject to tolling.” Id. at 2187-88 (quotations omitted). Here, unlike § 9658, FIRREA’s Extender Statute does not mention equitable tolling.