Opinion ID: 2518032
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct in Cross-examination of Defendant

Text: Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct while cross-examining him, and that the alleged misconduct violated various state and constitutional rights. [7] In most instances, however, defendant either failed to object or to object adequately. (See People v. Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 952.) We reject his argument that objecting would have reinforced the inadmissible content of the prosecutor's comments and questions. This argument would constitute an exception that would swallow the rule, for that could be true in nearly every case in which a defendant fails to object. ( People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 800-801 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211, 187 P.3d 1041].) Finally, even if he had preserved his misconduct claims, they would fail either on the merits or because defendant was not prejudiced. The prosecutor asked a series of questions about defendant's telephone conversations with Silvia Gomez after his arrest. The prosecutor noted Gomez testified that defendant told her on Sunday, January 26, that the murder was supposedly committed while he was at her house. The following colloquy between the prosecutor and defendant ensued: Q: Now, how did you know the murder had happened while you were at her house? A: I did not know at that point in time. Q. Then how could you possibly tell her that? A. I don't believe that I did tell her that on that date. Q. Then she is lying also, right? A. I believe she is mistaken of what telephone call she actually got the information from me. Q. Mr. Collins, only the murderer would have known that the murder occurred sometime between 5:00 and 6:30 or 5:00 and 7:00. Only the murderer and the people who heard the shots. Defense counsel objected that no question was pending and asked that the prosecutor's comment be stricken. The trial court did not rule on the objection, but struck the comment as requested. Defendant first argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking him to comment on whether Gomez was lying. Having failed to object and request a curative admonition, his claim is forfeited. Moreover, it lacks merit. In People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 621, 133 P.3d 534], we explained: [C]ourts should carefully scrutinize `were they lying' questions in context. They should not be permitted when argumentative, or when designed to elicit testimony that is irrelevant or speculative. However, in its discretion, a court may permit such questions if the witness to whom they are addressed has personal knowledge that allows him to provide competent testimony that may legitimately assist the trier of fact in resolving credibility questions. ( Id. at p. 384; see People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 97 [92 Cal.Rptr.3d 330, 205 P.3d 245].) Here, by choosing to testify, defendant put his own veracity at issue. He acknowledged telephone conversations with Gomez. Because defendant's testimony contradicted Gomez's, the prosecutor's question appropriately assisted the jury in resolving the issue of whose testimony was more credible. There was no misconduct. Defendant also complains that during this same portion of cross-examination the prosecutor improperly commented that the timing of the murder would be known only by the killer and those who heard the shots. Although the comment was argumentative, it was brief and any possibility of prejudice was negated when the trial court, pursuant to the relief requested by defendant, struck the comment. Next, defendant testified in direct examination that on the day he took Rose's car, he had recently gotten out of prison and my values were not too straight as far as staying clean. In her cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant to identify any time in his life when his values were straight, and defendant responded, Around 13, 14. Defendant additionally answered, [W]ell, I had made a lot of mistakes as a youngster. I went to prison behind some of those mistakes. He acknowledged that he had been out of prison one month before he took Rose's car. The prosecutor asked, In that whole month you were trying to do well, right? Defendant replied yes. The prosecutor asked, And you lasted a month before you got in this car, right? After defendant said yes, the prosecutor asked, That's a pretty good record for you, isn't it? Defendant replied, Not for me. That's what happened at the time. Defendant complains that the prosecutor's question regarding a pretty good record improperly conveyed to the jury that defendant had a history of criminality in which he re-offended shortly after being released, and improperly alluded to his juvenile record. Absent an objection and request for admonition, defendant has forfeited a misconduct claim. Moreover, in view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, any error in the prosecutor's question was harmless. In another incident, the prosecutor asked defendant why he had not stopped for gas at the Chevron station very near the McDonald's instead of driving to the gas station on Moorpark Street in North Hollywood. Defendant gave several different responses. He said that he was eating; that the area around the McDonald's was busy; and also that he might have seen the gas station near McDonald's but assumed he had enough gas to get to Bakersfield. The prosecutor asked, Or maybe you wanted to go right by the murder scene to be sure the cops had found the body, yes? Defense counsel objected that no question was pending, and the court sustained the objection. The trial court's ruling is puzzling because the prosecutor did ask a question. She proposed an alternative for defendant's conduct and asked if it was true. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the question was not misconduct. In view of the proximity of the gas station to the murder scene, defendant's earlier explanations that he had not been to North Hollywood in three and a half years and his multiple explanations for going near the murder scene, the prosecutor's question was legitimate. Defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by gratuitously commenting on several of his answers. In one incident, the prosecutor responded by stating, A quick thinker, aren't you, Mr. Collins? Defense counsel made an argumentative objection, which the trial court sustained. In another incident, the prosecutor stated, Pretty sharp thinking, pretty smooth. Defense counsel stated, Strike that from the record. There's no question pending. All afternoon long, she's been making editorial comments without questions. The trial court did not strike the comment, but advised the jury that statements of counsel are not evidence. In the first instance, defendant did not request that the jury be admonished. In the second instance, defendant did not object, but simply asked that the comment be stricken. Even if we assume defendant's claims are preserved, he suffered no prejudice. The prosecutor's comments, though gratuitous, were de minimis. ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 695 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640].) On two similar occasions defendant made no objection when the prosecutor commented on his answers, and has forfeited his misconduct claims. In the first instance, defendant answered a question posed by the prosecutor by recalling an earlier statement made by her. The prosecutor asked, You remember almost every word in this case, don't you? Defendant answered, My life is on the line. The prosecutor responded, So was Mr. Rose's. In the second instance, defendant explained that he tried to withdraw more than $200 using Rose's ATM card because he once had a card with no withdrawal limit. In a retort mocking this likelihood, the prosecutor asked, Was that account in the name of Scott Rockefeller? Even if defendant had preserved his claims, the prosecutor's comments were de minimis and could not have prejudiced defendant. ( People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 695.) We have rejected most of defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and found any arguable misfeasance nonprejudicial. Accordingly, we reject his argument that a pattern of pervasive misconduct excused his failure to object. ( People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 157 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 454, 180 P.3d 224].) For the same reason, we reject his further claim that the cumulative impact of the alleged misconduct resulted in prejudice and deprived him of a fair trial.