Opinion ID: 2618807
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Compulsion and Restraint

Text: Compliance with the registration requirement of section 290 involves only the barest minimum intrusion or restriction upon personal freedom or privacy. Under section 290, the registrant simply must provide a written statement containing identifying information, together with his fingerprints and photograph (subd. (d)). Upon changing his residence, the registrant must notify the appropriate agency of his new address. This may be done by mail (subd. (e)). All information furnished by the registrant is deemed confidential and may be disclosed only to law enforcement officers (subd. (h)). The majority conjures a series of hypothetical circumstances, suggesting that registration entails command performances at lineups, along with other, unspecified compulsion and restraint. This frightening, but fictional, scenario is wholly unsupported by the record. Nothing contained in section 290 requires that registrants cooperate with police, or attend compulsory lineups, or otherwise waive their constitutional rights. Any compulsion and restraint experienced by a registrant is attributable to other factors unrelated to the registration process, such as a prior probation condition requiring his cooperation, or the existence of probable cause to detain or arrest him. The registration laws require neither arrest nor detention. They do aid in assuring that, once cause to detain or arrest is shown, the suspect may be located without undue effort. In short, the record simply does not support the majority's suggestion that the registration requirement by itself leads to undue police harassment and, as previously noted, we cannot presume such a consequence. Moreover, as the majority concedes, the obligation to register and re-register may be terminated upon completion of probation or in the interests of justice. (§ 1203.4.) Yet, my colleagues bemoan the fact that there appears to be no statutory method for expunging one's registration, thereby relieving him of the lifelong burden of remaining a statistic in the police files. ( Ante, p. 921.) Any such theoretical burden does not amount to cruel or unusual punishment in a constitutional sense. The majority also suggests that section 290 penalizes registrants by allowing employers to require disclosure of the arrest records of prospective employees. ( Ibid. ) Not so. The majority misrepresents the scope of the statute. As I have previously noted, section 290 requires that registration information be kept confidential  there are no exceptions for employers. Another provision, Labor Code section 432.7, subdivision (e)(1), permits employers at health care facilities to require applicants for positions with regular access to patients to disclose their prior arrests for registrable offenses. But, contrary to the majority, the section does not apply to all employers, and in any event does not require disclosure of any information registered under section 290.