Opinion ID: 196196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motions to Withdraw

Text: 20 Pierce next asserts that the district court's denial of the two motions to withdraw constituted an abuse of discretion and led to a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. To the extent that Pierce is taking issue with the adequacy of his representation after the denial of the motions, we think that his fact-specific argument should be more fully developed and presented to the district court in the first instance. Accordingly, we decline to address it at this time. See, e.g., United States v. Jadusingh, 12 F.3d 1162, 1169-70 (1st Cir.1994) (fact-specific ineffective assistance claims ordinarily ought first be presented to the district court in a 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 petition). We therefore limit our focus to whether, in light of the then-existing circumstances, the court erred in denying the motion. Cf. United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436, 440 (1st Cir.1986) (in evaluating the denial of a motion for a continuance to obtain new counsel, we must pay particular attention to 'the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied ' ) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849-50, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)) (emphasis supplied). We detect no error. 21 In the analogous context of a challenge to a denial of a defendant's motion to substitute counsel, we have stated that we will consider several factors, including the timeliness of the motion, the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint, and whether the conflict between the defendant and his counsel was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 92 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846, 107 S.Ct. 164, 93 L.Ed.2d 103 (1986). Of course, we are aware that the trial court has a superior vantage point for evaluating matters such as these; we therefore will reverse only if we perceive an abuse of discretion. See id. We also are mindful that when, as here, the granting of the defendant's request would almost certainly necessitate a last-minute continuance, the trial judge's actions are entitled to extraordinary deference. As the Supreme Court has stated: 22 Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons. Consequently, broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay violates the right to assistance of counsel. 23 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1615-17, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (quoting Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589, 84 S.Ct. at 849-50). 24 In view of all these considerations, the trial court's decisions pass muster. Taking first the final Allen factor, we note that, while Pierce has adduced proof that his relationship with Growe was beset with problems, he has not established a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. The record reveals that Growe and Pierce were conversing with one another and had some appreciation for the other's opinions and sensibilities at the time the motions were filed. We therefore have no basis to conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that the communication between the counsel and client was sufficient to allow a satisfactory defense. Cf. Allen, 789 F.2d at 92 (noting the discretion afforded to trial court determinations regarding substitution of counsel). 25 Furthermore, when presented with the motions, the court held hearings at which it questioned Growe and Pierce at some length regarding the nature of their problems with each other. We have read the transcripts of these hearings and find the court's inquiries to have been more than adequate. If there is a relative lack of specificity regarding the exact reasons for the difficulties between Growe and Pierce, it is a result of a lack of elaboration on their part. It certainly is not a result of insufficient questioning by the court. 26 Finally, the motions were, by any measure, untimely. Although we appreciate that the docket moves quickly in the District of Maine, the fact remains that Growe waited until the day before empanelment before notifying the court that there was a problem. More importantly, a quick docket does not alleviate the logistical problems engendered by a last-minute continuance. See Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12, 103 S.Ct. at 1616-17. Nor can it allay the legitimate concerns about witness intimidation the government may have when a criminal defendant is in possession of Jencks material well before the inception of trial. 27 In sum, because the circumstances here were not sufficiently compelling, the district court acted well within its discretion in declining to bring the proceedings to a halt on the eve of trial. We therefore reject Pierce's argument that the district court committed reversible error in denying the two motions to withdraw.