Opinion ID: 4544302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Excessive Sentence. We begin our analysis with Archie’s contention that he was given an excessive sentence. Archie does not and cannot dispute that his 18-to-20-year sentence was within the statutory limits; at the time of Archie’s offense, attempted first degree sexual assault was a Class III felony punishable by up to 20 years’ imprisonment. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-105 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2002), 28-201(4)(b) (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998), and 28-319(1)(c) and (2) (Reissue 1995). He claims instead that the district court abused its discretion by failing “to account for” Archie’s “rehabilitative progress” when sentencing him. Brief for appellant at 11. More specifically, Archie argues that the district court’s imposition of a nearmaximum sentence demonstrates that it did not consider his engagement in rehabilitative programs while incarcerated in the years between the offense and sentencing and letters from various individuals noting positive changes in Archie’s life during that same time period. [2,3] When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court is to consider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense, and (8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime. State v. Manjikian, 303 Neb. 100, 927 N.W.2d 48 (2019). However, the sentencing court is not limited to any mathematically applied set of factors. Id. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s life. Id. Given the foregoing standards, we do not disagree that, in fashioning a sentence, it would be appropriate for the district court to consider, along with other factors, whether and to what extent Archie had demonstrated rehabilitiation in the - 840 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. ARCHIE Cite as 305 Neb. 835 years following the offense at issue. We do disagree, however, with Archie’s argument that the district court did not consider them. To the contrary, at the sentencing hearing, the district court directly addressed Archie’s claim that he should receive a lenient sentence because of his efforts at rehabilitation. As quoted at length above, the district court rejected the argument, finding that any notion that Archie had been rehabilitated was undercut by the recorded telephone conversation between Archie and T.A. in which Archie, among other things, “proudly recalled specifics about having sex with a pre-­adolescent child.” A transcript of the recorded telephone conversation the district court alluded to is included within the presentence investigation report. Having reviewed the transcript, we do not disagree with the district court’s characterization of the call and certainly see no basis to say that the district court abused its discretion by assigning little to no weight to Archie’s rehabilitation argument in light of it. Neither do we see any other basis to say that the district court erred in sentencing Archie to 18 to 20 years’ imprisonment. The district court expressly stated that it considered the relevant sentencing factors, and we see no indication in the record that it considered improper factors. Among those relevant sentencing factors was Archie’s criminal history. Archie’s previous incarceration was due to convictions for first degree sexual assault of a child and incest. He had also previously been convicted of assault, attempted robbery, and other crimes. The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Archie. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. [4] Archie’s second assignment of error alleges that he “was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of his constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Nebraska Constitution.” This general assignment of - 841 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. ARCHIE Cite as 305 Neb. 835 ineffective assistance of counsel does not comply with our declaration last year in State v. Mrza, 302 Neb. 931, 935, 926 N.W.2d 79, 86 (2019), that “assignments of error on direct appeal regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel must specifically allege deficient performance, and an appellate court will not scour the remainder of the brief in search of such specificity.” After the State’s brief on appeal urged us not to consider Archie’s ineffective assistance claim because of his failure to comply with Mrza, Archie filed a reply brief. The reply brief includes a section titled “Restatement of Assignments of Error.” Reply brief for appellant at 1. In that section, Archie has reframed his ineffective assistance of counsel assignment of error to include several specific alleged instances of deficient performance by trial counsel. He argues that he has thereby “cured” any failure to comply with Mrza and that therefore, his ineffective assistance assignment of error should be considered. Reply brief for appellant at 2. He also contends that it should be considered because, even if his initial brief did not comply with Mrza, the specific instances of deficient performance he wished to assert could be discerned from the argument section of the brief. We are unpersuaded by Archie’s arguments for reasons we will explain. [5] First, an appellant cannot cure a failure to adequately assign error via a reply brief. We have often stated that the purpose of an appellant’s reply brief is to respond to the arguments the appellee has advanced against the errors assigned in the appellant’s initial brief and that errors may not be asserted for the first time in a reply brief. See, e.g., Linscott v. Shasteen, 288 Neb. 276, 847 N.W.2d 283 (2014). The ineffective assistance assignment of error in Archie’s initial brief did not comply with Mrza. Allowing Archie to raise a Mrza-compliant ineffective assistance assignment of error in his reply brief would not be meaningfully different than allowing him to assert a brand new assignment of error in a reply brief. We also disagree with Archie’s assertion that the - 842 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. ARCHIE Cite as 305 Neb. 835 only rationale for the Mrza requirement is to relieve appellate courts from having to scour the argument section of a brief to identify the specific allegations of deficient performance and that his “[r]estatement” of his assignments of error eliminates that concern. Another obvious benefit of the Mrza requirement is that, if followed, the specifically alleged deficient performance will be clearly identified so that the appellee can respond in its brief on appeal. A late attempt to comply with Mrza does not afford the appellee the same opportunity. We also decline Archie’s invitation to attempt to discern the specific alleged instances of deficient performance from the argument section of his initial brief. We did “synthesize a specific assignment from the argument section” in Mrza, 302 Neb. at 935, 926 N.W.2d at 86, but we also made clear we would not do so in subsequent cases. On that basis, we recently refused to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that was assigned generally in a brief filed 3 months after our opinion in Mrza was released. See State v. Guzman, ante p. 376, 940 N.W.2d 552 (2020). Archie’s initial brief was filed nearly 8 months after Mrza, and thus we will not consider his assignment of error alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.