Opinion ID: 1057758
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Apprendi and Blakely to Consecutive Sentences

Text: Defendants in many other states (and in federal courts) have raised Apprendi and Blakely challenges to their consecutive sentences. When considering sentencing schemes that, unlike Tennessee's, do not require judicial fact-finding to rebut a presumption of concurrent sentences, the vast majority of these jurisdictions have rebuffed these challenges. See, e.g., Black, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 569, 161 P.3d at 1145 (concluding that defendant's constitutional right to jury trial was not violated by the trial court's [discretionary] imposition of consecutive sentences); Hall v. State, 823 So.2d 757, 764 (Fla.2002) (affirming discretionary consecutive sentences and holding that [b]ecause the sentence for each of Hall's offenses did not exceed the statutory maximum, we conclude that Apprendi is inapplicable); State v. Jacobs, 644 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Iowa 2001) (holding that  Apprendi has no application to the [defendant's consecutive sentences] because all of the sentences imposed on defendant were within the limits of the basic sentencing statutes for those offenses of which he was found guilty [and][t]he imposition of consecutive sentences did not depend on the finding of a statutorily prescribed fact); State v. Bramlett, 273 Kan. 67, 41 P.3d 796, 797-98 (2002) (refusing to apply Apprendi to discretionary consecutive sentences on the basis that it does not address that issue); State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 878 A.2d 746, 755-57 (2005) (holding that, where defendant had no statutory presumption to concurrent sentencing, Apprendi and Blakely are not violated even where common law requires trial court to apply certain criteria when determining whether to impose consecutive sentences); Barrow v. State, 207 S.W.3d 377, 380 (Tex. Crim.App.2006) (holding that because culminating individual sentences does not implicate discrete fact finding that affects the `statutory maximum' punishment, it does not activate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination); Gould v. State, 151 P.3d 261, 268 (Wyo.2006) (finding Apprendi and Blakely inapplicable to discretionary imposition of consecutive sentences), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 125, 169 L.Ed.2d 88 (2007). The federal courts have likewise refused to apply Apprendi or Blakely to consecutive sentences ordered pursuant to the federal Sentencing Reform Act. See, e.g., United States v. Fifield, 432 F.3d 1056, 1067 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that, [b]ecause, under [section] 3584 [of the federal Sentencing Reform Act], a district court need not find any particular fact to impose consecutive sentences, the imposition of [federal sentences] consecutive [to state] sentences does not violate the Sixth Amendment), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1122, 126 S.Ct. 1937, 164 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006); United States v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that  Apprendi does not prohibit a sentencing court from imposing consecutive sentences on multiple counts of conviction so long as each is within the applicable statutory maximum), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 925, 124 S.Ct. 330, 157 L.Ed.2d 225 (2003). More significantly, in those jurisdictions that, like Tennessee, require judicial fact-finding prior to ordering consecutive service, the majority of courts have also rejected Apprendi / Blakely challenges. See, e.g., Vandergriff v. State, 125 P.3d 360, 363 (Alaska Ct.App.2005) (holding that when a sentencing judge applying the [common law] rule assesses whether a composite term to serve exceeding the maximum term for the defendant's single most serious crime is necessary to protect the public, the judge is not required to submit this issue to a jury); People v. Clifton, 69 P.3d 81, 86 (Colo.Ct.App.2001) (concluding that Apprendi was not violated where the trial court imposed consecutive sentences after finding that both offenses were part of an ongoing transaction because consecutive sentences did not have the effect of increasing the penalty for the underlying crimes beyond the maximum provided for each offense), reaff'd in part, 74 P.3d 519, 521 (Colo.Ct.App.2003); State v. Kahapea, 111 Hawai'i 267, 141 P.3d 440, 452 (2006) (deciding to aphoristically dismiss[] the proposition that either Blakely or Apprendi proscribes consecutive term sentencing); People v. Wagener, 196 Ill.2d 269, 256 Ill.Dec. 550, 752 N.E.2d 430, 442 (2001) (holding that [b]ecause consecutive sentences remain discrete, a determination that sentences are to be served consecutively cannot run afoul of Apprendi , which only addresses sentences for individual crimes), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1011, 122 S.Ct. 498, 151 L.Ed.2d 408 (Oct. 29, 2001); Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 686 (Ind.) (holding that [t]here is no constitutional problem with consecutive sentencing so long as the trial court does not exceed the combined statutory maximums), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 976, 126 S.Ct. 545, 163 L.Ed.2d 459 (Oct. 31, 2005); Keene, 927 A.2d at 408 (concluding that the principles underlying Apprendi do not apply to consecutive sentences because a judge's decision on how two separate sentences for two distinct crimes shall be served is entirely different from the jury's determination of whether the elements of a crime, necessary for a particular sentence for that crime, have been committed); State v. Senske, 692 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn.Ct. App.2005) (concluding that unless there is a basis to also require the jury to determine the permissibility of multiple sentences, we find no grounds on which to apply Blakely to permissive consecutive sentencing). A few courts, however, have upheld challenges to schemes that allow a trial court to order consecutive service only after making post-verdict factual findings. See State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 845 N.E.2d 470, 491 (2006) (holding that because the total punishment increases through consecutive sentences only after judicial findings beyond those determined by a jury or stipulated to by a defendant, [Ohio's consecutive sentencing statute] violates principles announced in Blakely ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 442, 166 L.Ed.2d 314 (2006); Ice, 170 P.3d at 1059 (acknowledging the majority rule that Apprendi and Blakely are inapplicable to consecutive sentencing but disagree[ing] fundamentally with the proposition that the Apprendi rule is a narrow one and holding that the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences based on its own fact-finding was Sixth Amendment error); In re VanDelft, 158 Wash.2d 731, 147 P.3d 573, 579 (2006) (holding that, where the defendant had a presumption of concurrent sentences pursuant to the statutory provision under which he was sentenced, the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences based on judicial fact-finding violated Blakely ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2876, 167 L.Ed.2d 1172 (2007); but see State v. Cubias, 155 Wash.2d 549, 120 P.3d 929, 931 (2005) (holding that  Apprendi does not have any application to consecutive sentences [and that] to conclude otherwise would extend Apprendi 's holding beyond the narrow grounds upon which it rested). The Ice case, now before the United States Supreme Court, produced a 5-2 decision in the Oregon Supreme Court with the dissenting judges asserting that [n]either the holding in Apprendi nor its reasoning supports extending that decision to the question of consecutive sentencing, and opining that the rule in Apprendi serves only to provide a nonsubjective means of determining when the legislature's efforts to redefine the elements of a single offense will stay within constitutional bounds. 170 P.3d at 1059, 1062 (Kistler, J., dissenting). We are persuaded to join the majority of courts on this issue and hold that Apprendi and Blakely should be construed narrowly such that they do not apply to Tennessee's statutory scheme for imposing consecutive sentences. As recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court, a state court is not bound to extend the decisions of the [United States Supreme] Court to arenas which it did not purport to address, which indeed it specifically disavowed addressing, in order to find unconstitutional a [state] law. Wagener, 256 Ill.Dec. 550, 752 N.E.2d at 442 (construing Apprendi ). We also agree with the analysis used by the Supreme Court of Maine in Keene in rejecting an Apprendi challenge to consecutive sentences: The threshold question is whether the [sentencing] court has impermissibly increase[d] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum by using factual determinations not found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, other than from a prior conviction, a guilty plea, jury verdict, or admission by the defendant. The court's decision to require that separate sentences be served consecutively in no way increases the penalties for the individual crimes. . . . . Consecutive sentences are separate punishments for different offenses, and two sentences do not become a single sentence by virtue of their running consecutively. Thus, the principles underlying Apprendi do not apply to consecutive sentences because a judge's decision on how two separate sentences for two distinct crimes shall be served is entirely different from the jury's determination of whether the elements of a crime, necessary for a particular sentence for that crime, have been committed. Although a defendant has a constitutional right to have a jury determine whether all the elements of a crime have been committed, including those relevant to an elevated sentence, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to serve concurrent sentences for multiple violent offenses. Keene, 927 A.2d at 407-08 (citations omitted).