Opinion ID: 1707155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court err in sustaining the appellee malcolm l. latour's motion to dismiss the appellant's cause of action based on the appellant's failure to comply with discovery?

Text: Rule 37 of the Miss.R.Civ.Proc. addresses the imposition of sanctions for failure to make or cooperate in discovery. Following a party's motion for an order to compel discovery, the trial court may in its discretion impose sanctions on the non-cooperative party. Rule 37(b) addresses the failure to comply with the court's order and is as follows: (b) Failure to Comply With Order (1) Sanctions by Court. If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to do so by the court, the failure may be considered a contempt of court. (2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action Is Pending. If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rules 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify in behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under subsection (a) of this rule, the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following: (A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; (B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence; (C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; (D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any orders. In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition, thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Although Rule 37(b)(2)(C) allows the dismissal of the pending action as a form of sanction, it is obviously the most drastic sanction available. Resort to such a remedy has been described by various courts as Draconian or a remedy of the last resort, Nissho-Iwai American Corporation v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1304 (5th Cir.1988); therefore, it has generally been held that a trial court should dismiss a cause of action for failure to comply with discovery only under the most extreme circumstances. Under certain circumstances, this Court has held that dismissal of a cause of action for failure to comply with discovery is appropriate, Williams v. Puryear, 515 So.2d 1231 (Miss. 1987); however, this Court has also held under certain circumstances, that dismissal for failure to comply with discovery was not proper. White v. White, 509 So.2d 205, 209-210 (Miss. 1987). Although trial courts are authorized to dismiss cases when such action is justified, their reason for doing so must always be examined by an appellate court. Any failure to disclose, regardless of the reason for it, brings the sanctions of Rule 37 into play, but the reason for the failure is an important consideration in determining what sanction to impose. If the failure is because of inability to comply, rather than because of willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of the party, the action may not be dismissed, nor a default judgment given, unless severe sanctions are the most that can be invoked. 8 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2284 (1970). A recent decision by the Fifth Circuit is very helpful in assessing what sanctions should be imposed for failure to comply with discovery. In determining whether a district court abused its discretion, our precedent has addressed a number of considerations. First, dismissal is authorized only when the failure to comply with the court's order results from wilfulness or bad faith, and not from the inability to comply. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club ] 427 U.S. [639] at 640, 96 S.Ct. [2778] at 2779 [49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976)]; see also Marshall v. Segona, 621 F.2d 763, 767, n. 8 (5th Cir.1980). Next, dismissal is proper only in situations where the deterrent value of Rule 37 cannot be substantially achieved by the use of less drastic sanctions. Marshall, 621 F.2d at 768. Another consideration is whether the other party's preparation for trial was substantially prejudiced. Finally, dismissal may be inappropriate when neglect is plainly attributable to an attorney rather than a blameless client, or when a party's simple negligence is grounded in confusion or sincere misunderstanding of the court's orders. Marshall, 621 F.2d at 768; Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 586 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir.1978). Batson v. Neal Spelce Associates, Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1985). See also White, supra . Based on the facts of this case, this Court holds that dismissal was not proper under these circumstances. Although it is true that the appellant appears to have failed to comply with discovery in a timely manner, there also appear to be other factors at work which explain her partial lack of compliance. It appears to be well established under both caselaw and other sources, that dismissal for failure to comply with discovery is not proper when this failure to comply with discovery is at least partially predicated upon an inability to comply. Appellant claims that he had threatened to kill her if she did not return the diaries to him. Also, unknown parties had broken into the appellant's trailer and ransacked it, apparently looking for something; certain items were stolen from the trailer as well. The appellant claims that she sent the diaries to Ireland because she feared for her safety. Although she appears to have been unreasonable at times in her reasons for failing to comply with discovery, she undisputedly did make a trip to Ireland to attempt to retrieve the diaries, but her family refused to return them to her. Thus the appellant's claim would fall squarely under the inability to comply language of Batson. The appellant and William Hapgood were divorced on May 11, 1984. She sought the divorce on grounds of cruel and unusual treatment. As part of her evidence in the case, she introduced certain portions of her husband's diary into evidence. He admitted that the copies of the diary introduced into evidence in that case were true and accurate representations of the diary. In the event that the appellant was unable to retrieve the original portions of her ex-husband's diary for the lawsuit pending against Dr. Latour and the hospital, it would seem that the copies of the diary introduced into evidence in the divorce action could be retrieved for use in this case, especially in light of the fact that William Hapgood admitted their accuracy and authenticity. (These copies are apparently in the custody of the court that granted the divorce). It should also be noted that portions of this diary appear in the record of this case, and appear to be mostly legible. Batson also notes that another consideration for determining what sanctions are proper for failure to comply with discovery is whether or not the other party's preparation for trial was substantially prejudiced. Id. at 514. In the case sub judice, the appellees have introduced no evidence showing why they needed the original portions of the diary, and although they claimed at one point during a hearing that they did have their reasons, they never elaborated upon them. Therefore, there is no evidence before us in the record to indicate in exactly what manner the appellees would be burdened by the introduction of copies of the diary instead of the originals. It should be noted that the appellant was given until May 1, 1986, to retrieve the original copies of William Hapgood's diary. The appellant flew to Ireland on May 5, 1986, in an effort to retrieve the diaries. Although this was past the deadline granted by the court, there appears to have been justification for doing so. The appellant's passport apparently had been stolen, and she did not receive a new one until April 30, 1986, only two days before the discovery deadline cut-off point. Although her attorney probably should have filed for an extension of time to enable her to comply with the discovery request, he did not do so. In fact, he filed a motion to replace himself as counsel on May 1, 1986, a motion which was eventually granted by the court. Nonetheless, the appellant should not be punished for her attorney's failure to secure an extension of the discovery deadline. See Batson, supra, at 514. In summation, although the appellant does not appear to be without blame in this case there also appears to have been some justification for her failure to comply with discovery in a timely manner. Therefore, this Court holds that the trial court erred in granting the appellee's motion to dismiss, especially in light of the fact that there were several unique extenuating circumstances present in this case. This assignment of error is meritorious and should be granted by this Court.