Opinion ID: 53075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of State Attorneys

Text: Bevan next argues that the district court erred in dismissing the state attorneys. He asserts that they are not entitled to absolute immunity when they performed functions outside their roles as advocates for the state.3 Bevan points out that he submitted a video interview of John McSweeney, in which McSweeney stated that State Attorney D’Allasandro maintained a file on Bevan that he shared with the neighbor defendants. Additionally, Bevan argues that the State Attorney’s Office is in reality a county office, and its members are not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.4 A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for all actions he takes while performing his function as an advocate for the government. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2615-16, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 3 Bevan points to activities of the state attorneys that are outside their prosecutorial function, such as attending after-hours meetings with his neighbors and giving statements at a press conference. Bevan argues that immunity does not protect the state attorneys in their performance of those extra-prosecutorial activities. The state attorneys’ actions would fall either within the claim of malicious prosecution or one of Bevan’s other claims. The district court dismissed all claims against the state attorneys, except the malicious prosecution claim, based on Bevan’s failure to state a claim. Even though the district court addressed immunity issues with the claims of conspiracy, false arrest, slander, and libel, Bevan does not argue the district court erred in dismissing those claims for his failure to state a claim. Therefore, we need not address the dismissal of those claims. 4 Bevan also argues that Kyle was sued as an assemblyman and is liable is his capacity as an assemblyman. However, Bevan does not develop this argument or provide any legal support for his conclusion. Issues not developed on appeal may be considered waived. Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) 6 (1993). The prosecutorial function includes the initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecution, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424, 96 S.Ct. 984, 992, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), and all appearances before the court, including examining witnesses and presenting evidence, see Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1942, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). Because prosecutors are absolutely immune for actions taken while prosecuting criminal cases, the district court properly dismissed Bevan’s claim of malicious prosecution. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. at 2615-16. Bevan is correct to the extent he argues that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to the state attorneys in their individual capacities. See Jackson v. Georgia Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994).5 The state attorneys, however, are still afforded absolute immunity in their individual capacity for actions performed as an advocate of the government. The district court concluded that State Attorney D’Allasandro’s maintaining a file on a person against whom charges were pending was within his prosecutorial function, and thus, any possible liability that would stem from that action was barred by absolute immunity. Bevan does not dispute the district court’s conclusion that maintaining a file on him was within the prosecutorial function. Accordingly, the district court properly afforded 5 Bevan’s fourth amended complaint states that each defendant is sued in his or her individual capacity. 7 the state attorneys absolute immunity as to Bevan’s malicious prosecution claim. III. Granting Summary Judgment Prior to the Discovery Deadline Bevan next argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment two and one-half months prior to the discovery deadline and states that no case from our Circuit upholds such action. He also argues, based on cases from district courts in Tennessee and Ohio, that granting summary judgment prior to the end of discovery is premature. We review a district court's decision to rule on a summary judgment motion prior to the close of discovery for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir. 2000) (reviewing claim that court prematurely granted summary judgment before appellant had been able to obtain discovery and noting that we review the court’s “management of discovery in this context for abuse of discretion”). The appellant, however, must be able to show substantial harm from the court’s decision. See id. (“a party must be able to show substantial harm to its case from the denial of its request for additional discovery”). Moreover, the party opposing summary judgment is responsible for informing the court of any outstanding discovery. Cowan v. J.C. Penney Co., 790 F.2d 1529,