Opinion ID: 2534266
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Buckel's Argument against Donna Cromeans's Affidavit.

Text: ¶ 12. To satisfy his burden as the movant for summary judgment, the Commissioner had the burden of demonstrating there is no genuine issue of material fact.... Buchanan v. Ameristar Casino Vicksburg, Inc., 957 So.2d 969, 975 (Miss. 2007) (citations omitted). The Commissioner sought to establish the nonexistence of an element essential to Buckel's case. Watson Quality Ford, Inc., 999 So.2d at 833 (citing Bullard, 941 So.2d at 814). Specifically, under Mississippi Code Section 25-61-3(b) (Rev.2010), the Commissioner attempted to set forth facts showing that MID did not possess the public records Buckel had requested. Public records shall mean all books, records, papers, accounts, letters, maps, photographs, films, cards, tapes, recordings or reproductions thereof, and any other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, having been used, being in use, or prepared, possessed or retained for use in the conduct, transaction or performance of any business, transaction, work, duty or function of any public body, or required to be maintained by any public body. Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-3(b) (Rev.2010) (emphasis added). The Commissioner provided Cromeans's affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment. Cromeans's affidavit stated that she had searched diligently, but MID did not possess the documents Buckel had requested. ¶ 13. Buckel argues for the first time on appeal that Cromeans's affidavit in support of the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment should not have been assigned evidentiary value. He states in his brief that the Chancellor clearly awarded some credence to the affidavit of the commissioner, finding that MID was not in possession of the information which Buckel sought. Citing this alleged error by the chancellor, Buckel argues that the Commissioner failed to prove that no genuine issue of material fact existed. ¶ 14. Buckel, however, failed to contest this affidavit in the trial court and, therefore, may not contest it for the first time on appeal. Bd. of Educ. of Calhoun County v. Warner, 853 So.2d 1159, 1164 (Miss. 2003) (citing Brown, 444 So.2d at 365 (Miss.1983)). In Warner, this Court refused to allow a party to attack an affidavit for the first time on appeal: Where the party against whom a motion for summary judgment is made wishes to attack one or more of the affidavits upon which the motion is based, he must file in the trial court a motion to strike the affidavit. Id. Failing to attack the affidavit constitutes waiver of any objection to the affidavit. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 748 So.2d 725, 731 (Miss.1999). ¶ 15. Assuming arguendo that this Court were to allow Buckel to contest this affidavit on appeal, Buckel still would not be entitled to relief. This Court has articulated its standard for the admissibility of affidavits in accordance with Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e): [s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matter stated therein. Stuckey v. The Provident Bank, 912 So.2d 859, 868 (¶ 20) (Miss. 2005). However, [a] conclusory, self-serving affidavit, unsupported by material facts relevant to the proposition at issue, is insufficient as a basis to grant summary judgment. Dalton v. Cellular S., Inc., 20 So.3d 1227, 1233-34 (Miss.2009). ¶ 16. Here, the chancellor did not err in allowing and considering Cromeans's affidavit. Her affidavit was based on personal knowledge and was not conclusory. She did not simply suppose that MID did not possess the records. The affidavit clearly stated she had conducted a search at MID for the records requested and had supervised others in the search as well. This testimony as to the absence of the records at MID was material to this case, and Buckel has presented no evidence that the affidavit is self-serving, except for the fact that Cromeans worked at MID. ¶ 17. Nonetheless, Buckel argues that an interested witness's affidavit should not be considered under United States Supreme Court precedent. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citations omitted). In Reeves, the Supreme Court stated that when making determinations regarding summary judgment, courts should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that `evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.' Id. Based on Reeves, Buckel asserts that Cromeans was an interested witness, and thus her affidavit should not have been considered by the chancellor in determining the issue of whether to grant summary judgment. ¶ 18. This Court has not specifically adopted the Reeves test, instead relying on its own well-articulated standards for determining the admissibility of affidavits. Dalton, 20 So.3d at 1233-34. Reeves dealt with employment discrimination, not the dissemination of public records. Moreover, as the Commissioner correctly argues, without the testimony of his employees, the other avenues by which to prove the existence or nonexistence of documents would be costly and perhaps also subject to this same interested-party analysis. ¶ 19. In light of these problems, when following the Reeves disinterested-witness requirement, the Fifth Circuit, among other courts, has not strictly applied this requirement: [T]he definition of an interested witness cannot be so broad as to require us to disregard testimony from a company's agents regarding the company's reasons for discharging an employee. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Traylor v. Brown, et al., 295 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2002), to so hold would foreclose the possibility of summary judgment for employers, who almost invariably must rely on testimony of their agents to explain why the disputed action was taken. Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 898 (5th Cir.2002). The Fifth Circuit has also held that a decision-maker does not constitute an interested person without further evidence of the witness's interest. Wiley v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 287 Fed.Appx. 335, 339 (5th Cir.2008). ¶ 20. This Court refuses to apply Reeves in the context of today's case. Buckel has not provided further evidence of Cromeans's interest. She is a regular employee, not a decision-maker. Thus, we find the chancellor did not err in assigning evidentiary value to Cromeans's affidavit and in finding that the Commissioner had satisfied his burden as the party moving for summary judgment.