Opinion ID: 789302
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevance of Three Prior Convictions

Text: 12 Hazelwood next argues that three of his prior convictions were related, and that he thus should not have received separate criminal history points for each. The facts at issue in the three prior convictions are as follows: 13 First, on December 26, 1995, Hazelwood rented a kerosene heater from Philips Repair. However, he never made any of the required payments, and subsequently sold the heater to someone else without ever paying Philips. Philips Repair filed a criminal complaint in Marion County, Kentucky, on February 5, 1996. Second, sometime early that same month, Hazelwood test-drove a used Mercury Cougar, but did not return the keys to the vehicle at the end of the drive. On several occasions over the next two weeks, Hazelwood returned to the lot at night and took the car, always returning it before the lot opened the next morning. Finally, on February 13, 1996, Hazelwood and another man robbed a business in Springfield, Kentucky, using handguns. Part of the money handed over to Hazelwood was bait money with registered serial numbers. 14 The next day, Hazelwood was stopped in the Mercury Cougar for driving without a license plate. In his pocket, officers found some of the bait money. For the car theft, Hazelwood was charged in Marion County and convicted by a jury on June 20, 1996. For the theft of the heater, Hazelwood pleaded guilty in Marion County in July 1996, with the understanding that his sentence would run concurrently with his car theft sentence. For the robbery, Hazelwood pleaded guilty in Washington County pursuant to an agreement between the Marion and Washington County prosecutors that the sentences in all three cases would run concurrently. He then received (after some later amendments) a combined sentence of 14 years, including 14 years for the robbery and 5 years for the car theft, running concurrently. 15 Hazelwood argues that the car theft and robbery offenses were related under the Guidelines because they were part of the same course of conduct, because there was no intervening arrest, and because they were effectively consolidated for sentencing. In addition, he argues that the heater theft offense was effectively consolidated for sentencing, and thus that all three should be considered one felony offense for criminal history purposes. 16 Application Note 3 to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 defines related offenses for criminal history determination purposes as follows: 17 Prior sentences are not considered related if they were for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest.... Otherwise, prior sentences are considered related if they resulted from offenses that (A) occurred on the same occasion, (B) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for trial or sentencing. 18 We review a district court's determination of whether prior convictions are related for clear error, regardless of which prong of the relatedness test we are evaluating. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 355 F.3d 610, 612-15 (6th Cir.2004). For two convictions to be related due to having been part of a single common scheme or plan, they must have been jointly planned or the commission of one offense necessarily requires the commission of the other. See, e.g., United States v. Irons, 196 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir.1999). The burden of showing such relatedness falls on the defendant. Id. 19 As to the issue of whether the car theft and robbery offenses were related conduct, the district court found that the two offenses were separate, because the car had been taken from the lot on previous occasions not related to the robbery, because the two crimes involved different victims and trials, and because there was another man involved in the robbery who was in no way connected to the car theft. None of these facts are disputed; all that Hazelwood argues is that the day of the robbery was also the day he stole the car from the lot. The district court conceded that if the car had been taken only on the day of the robbery, the offenses would have been related. However, since the car was taken on multiple occasions, the court found that the two offenses could not be said to have been part of a single common scheme or plan. This is in line with our holding in Irons; since the commission of the robbery did not necessarily require a stolen car, and since no evidence has been presented by Hazelwood to indicate that the car was stolen specifically in preparation for the robbery, the offenses cannot be viewed as related. Id. As a result, the district court's determination on this point was not clear error. 20 Hazelwood also argues that all three of the relevant convictions here were functionally consolidated for sentencing, even if they were not explicitly consolidated. The Supreme Court has previously held that a district court's evaluation of the functional consolidation of two sentences is an inherently fact-specific determination and should be reviewed deferentially. Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 66, 121 S.Ct. 1276, 149 L.Ed.2d 197 (2001); see also Horn, 355 F.3d at 613 (noting that the level of deference required by Buford is clear error.). Though it is true that a formal consolidation order need not be entered in order for cases to be considered functionally consolidated for sentencing, see, e.g., United States v. Best, 250 F.3d 1084, 1095 (7th Cir.2001), this Court has held that sentences are not functionally consolidated when offenses proceed to sentencing under separate docket numbers, cases are not related, and there was no formal order of consolidation. United States v. McAdams, 25 F.3d 370, 374 (6th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Carter, 283 F.3d 755, 758 (6th Cir.2002) (The fact that judgment was pronounced on the same day with sentences to run concurrently, without more, does not establish that [the cases] were in fact consolidated.). 21 The district court noted that there was a guilty verdict in one case, as opposed to pleas in the other two, that each case proceeded to trial and sentencing under separate docket numbers, and that each case resulted in a separate, individualized sentence, despite the fact that they were to be served concurrently. As a result, the district court overruled Hazelwood's objection to the imposition of this enhancement. This conclusion was not clear error. 22