Opinion ID: 853115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Give Reckless Homicide Instruction

Text: The defendant next claims that the trial court erred when it refused to give her tendered instructions on reckless homicide. She argues that reckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder, and that there is a serious dispute in the evidence regarding whether the defendant acted with a knowing or reckless mens rea. When a defendant requests an instruction covering a lesser-included offense, a trial court applies the three-part analysis set forth in Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566-67 (Ind.1995). The first two parts require the trial court to determine whether the offense is either inherently or factually included in the charged offense. Id. If so, the trial court must determine whether there is a serious evidentiary dispute regarding any element that distinguishes the two offenses. Id. at 567; see also Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010, 1019 (Ind.1998). If, in light of such a dispute,  `a jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater, then it is reversible error for a trial court not to give an instruction, when requested, on the inherently or factually included lesser offense.' Brown, 703 N.E.2d at 1019 (quoting Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567). When a trial court has made an express finding that there is no serious evidentiary dispute, its ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Brown, 703 N.E.2d at 1020. The defendant asserts, and the State agrees, that reckless homicide is an inherently lesser-included offense of murder. Only the level of culpability required distinguishes the crimes of reckless homicide and murder. As charged in this case, a conviction for murder requires that the defendant had a knowing level of culpability, i.e., that the defendant was aware of the high probability that her conduct would result in the death of another when she engaged in the activity. Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2(b); Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1. Reckless homicide, however, requires a reckless level of culpability, i.e., that the defendant engage[d] in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct. Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2(c); Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1. In ruling upon the defendant's tendered instructions on reckless homicide, the trial court expressly found no serious evidentiary dispute. Record at 3851-52. Although not presented to the trial court, the defendant argues on appeal that there is nothing in what [the defendant told the police investigators] that negates the possibility that she started the fire recklessly. Br. of Defendant Appellant at 52. The defense argues: Nothing she said would preclude a jury finding that she started the fire with the intent of getting [her husband] (who had threatened just the week before to burn the house down) in trouble; getting the insurance money from the house being burned up to solve her financial problems; and that she and [her boyfriend] would be looked upon as heroes for saving the kids from the fire that [her husband] started, but the fire got out-of-hand too quickly. Id. We decline to infer the existence of a serious evidentiary dispute based on speculation from the absence of evidence. The undisputed evidence at trial was that flammable liquid was poured and ignited around the bedroom in which the children had been locked. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. There was no serious evidentiary dispute that these actions were done with an awareness of the high probability that the actions would result in the death of the children. See Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2(b).