Opinion ID: 1060830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 32

Heading: jury instructions at sentencing phase [13]

Text: The appellants contend that the jury instruction on reasonable doubt at the sentencing phase did not lend content to the moral certainty phraseology used by the trial court. Thus, they argue that there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction based on insufficient proof in violation of the standard set forth in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41, 111 S.Ct. 328, 329-30, 112 L.Ed.2d 339, and Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1247-48, 127 L.Ed.2d 583. Specifically, the appellants assert that the trial court's instruction on moral certainty failed to provide a minimum burden of proof that it purports to define. In this case, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: The burden of proof is upon the State to prove any statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily as to the certainty of your verdicts. Reasonable doubt does not mean a doubt that may arise from possibility. Absolute certainty is not demanded by the law, but moral certainty is required and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the verdicts. The law makes you, the Jury, the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence. Like the charge at the guilt-innocence phase, the terms of particular concern to the United States Supreme Court were not included in the trial court's charge to the jury at the sentencing phase. As cited earlier, in several cases, this Court has upheld similar instructions as consistent with constitutional principles. See Pettyjohn v. State, 885 S.W.2d 364, 365-66; State v. Hallock, 875 S.W.2d 285, 294. Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that the use of the phrase `moral certainty' by itself is insufficient to invalidate an instruction on the meaning of reasonable doubt. State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 734. Thus, the full charge given by the trial court at the sentencing phase, although containing the phrase moral certainty, did not violate the appellants' rights under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions. DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIM BASED ON CONVICTIONS FOR FELONY-MURDER AND UNDERLYING FELONIES The appellants argue that their multiple convictions for felony-murder, as well as for the underlying felonies, violated the double jeopardy provisions of both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 10 of the Tennessee Constitution. The appellants cite Briggs v. State, 573 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn.1978), and State v. Strouth, 620 S.W.2d 467 (Tenn.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1491, 71 L.Ed.2d 692 (1982). In State v. Blackburn, 694 S.W.2d 934 (Tenn.1985), the Supreme Court held that the imposition in a single trial of dual convictions for both felony-murder and the underlying felony does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. Id. at 936-37. Our appellate courts have continued to hold that dual convictions for felony-murder and the underlying felony does not violate double jeopardy provisions. See, e.g., State v. Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659, 671; State v. Zirkle, 910 S.W.2d 874, 890 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995); State v. Johnson, 781 S.W.2d 873, 884-85 (Tenn.Crim.App.1989). This issue is without merit.