Opinion ID: 2519351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: m.h.-o.

Text: ¶ 5 Like Y.H., M.H.-O. was found by the Yakima County Juvenile Court to be a dependent child and placed in foster care. She also ran away from her placement at least six times in 2003 and 2004, two of these times within a day of promising the court she would not run again. After each of the first four of these disappearances, the juvenile court found M.H.-O. in contempt and sentenced her to four to seven days in detention, with the option to purge her contempt. Once, she was released after merely promising not to run again. After the third time M.H.-O. ran, Commissioner Inouye warned her that he might have to resort to the court's inherent contempt power to impose greater sanctions if she ran again. ¶ 6 The fifth time M.H.-O. ran away, DSHS moved for the juvenile court to exercise its inherent contempt power. Commissioner Inouye set a trial date, advised the parties that the contempt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and warned M.H.-O. that detention imposed under inherent contempt power could last until she turned 18 and carried no option to purge the contempt. M.H.-O. stipulated that she had run as alleged, in exchange for a recommended sentence of 30 days. CP (23211-5-III) at 86. Sentencing M.H.-O. to 30 days, with no option to purge the contempt, Commissioner Inouye found: [M.H.-O.] has repeatedly promised not to run, and repeatedly broken those promises. Given this recent history, a new purge promise not to run could not be believed. There is reason to believe that an inherent contempt consequence with no purge option could achieve what a purgeable 7 days of civil contempt consequence could not. It will afford [M.H.-O.] a longer period of time to stabilize under the influence of a home where she is not on the streets and on the run. It will give her an opportunity to reflect and become more accustomed to a lifestyle which includes school and continuity. Id. at 87. ¶ 7 A week after M.H.-O. was released from detention, she ran away again. DSHS again moved for the court to use its inherent contempt power to impose an appropriate sanction upon M.H.-O. After being advised of the potential consequences of the contempt motion and of her rights, M.H.-O. again stipulated that she had violated a court order by running away. Id. at 76. In determining a proper sanction for M.H.-O.'s sixth contempt, Commissioner Inouye stated: This court has attempted to persuade [M.H.-O.], through use of the usual civil contempt remedies, to begin following court orders and live in a safe manner. These efforts have failed, repeatedly. . . . . [M.H.-O.] has repeatedly demonstrated that this limited consequence does not deter her from choosing to run. . . . . . . . Hopefully [M.H.-O.] will grow out of this phase, before she suffers further serious or irreparable harm. Eventually a civil contempt sanction may have some actual coercive effect for her. . . . At present, the court is unable to assure the basic safety of [M.H.-O.] without resort to the inherent contempt powers[.] The legislatively provided tools have proven inadequate. Id. at 78. Commissioner Inouye went on to explain that there was a reasonable basis for believing that some other specific period of detention will achieve what seven days will not, because M.H.-O. was asking for help with in-patient drug treatment, and he believed that [a] more extended period of time under the auspices of juvenile detention would give a more significant opportunity for her to experience being drug free in a more structured environment including an education component. Id. at 79. Commissioner Inouye decided to give M.H.-O. a more extended sentence than he had prior to that time, because that prospect is likely to have a greater deterrent effect. Id. Accordingly, he sentenced M.H.-O. to 60 days in detention, with no purge option. ¶ 8 M.H.-O. moved for revision of both orders. A judge of the Yakima County Superior Court upheld the commissioner's use of inherent contempt power to impose both the 30-day and 60-day sentences. M.H.-O. appealed to the Court of Appeals.