Opinion ID: 2817831
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Behavior Suggesting Greene Owned the Marks

Text: To support his first contention, that MGH behaved as if he owned the CPS Marks, Greene points to three alleged facts: (1) MGH was aware of and endorsed his use of the Marks in unaffiliated enterprises; (2) MGH allowed the Center to share space with the Institute; and (3) MGH did not object when, in 2002, Greene registered one of the CPS Marks in his own name on the USPTO supplemental register. Drawing all reasonable inferences in -12- Greene's favor for summary judgment purposes, but mindful that Greene has the burden of proving his estoppel defense, we cannot find that any of this conduct amounted to a representation that Greene owned the CPS Marks. Greene's participation in activities that took place outside of MGH, in which he nevertheless made use of the CPS Marks, was consistent with MGH's ownership of the Marks. Greene always, to MGH's knowledge, identified himself by his MGH affiliation. By identifying himself as an MGH affiliate, Greene rendered his uses harmonious with MGH's ownership of the Marks because Greene's selfidentification with MGH served to identify the Marks with MGH as well. Also, Greene's own account of conversations he had with MGH about his external uses suggests that he sought MGH's approval to use the Marks in outside contexts.11 These interactions are entirely consistent with MGH's position as owner because, even on Greene's telling of events, he used the Marks at MGH's pleasure. Nor does MGH's acquiescence to Greene's use of the Marks in the names of his private corporations amount to a representation 11 According to Greene, he informed MGH as to how he was using the Marks to describe and brand his non-MGH activities and . . . the hospital representatives agreed to that use. Greene Br. 31 (emphasis added). Greene also writes that MGH endorsed and supported [his use of the Marks]. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). Finally, Greene stated in his affidavit that he discussed his private use of the Marks with Dr. Rosenbaum during negotiations for the creation of the Institute, and Dr. Rosenbaum did not object to Greene's continued private use of the Marks. A. 2329 ¶ 32. -13- that Greene owned the Marks.12 These private corporations, the Clinic and the Center, shared physical space with the Institute but, unlike the Institute, were not formally affiliated with MGH. Use of the Marks in the names of both Greene's private corporations and the MGH-affiliated Institute would ordinarily suggest a common source for those services. In one sense, that was entirely accurate, for Greene and Ablon were the principals in all three organizations. Furthermore, even when used in Greene's private enterprises, the Marks represented the same service, namely, the methodology Greene developed. But MGH, as owner of the Marks, would want to avoid confusion as to the source of CPS services whenever the Marks were used in a context not affiliated with MGH. See Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. AASTAR Mortg. Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1996) (The purpose of trademark laws is to prevent the use of the same or similar marks in a way that confuses the public about the actual source of the goods or service.). That is precisely what MGH did. In an email from its Office of General Counsel, MGH required Greene to make clear to the public that his private corporations were not associated or affiliated with MGH in any way. Thus, MGH both 12 For Greene's use of the Marks in his private corporations to support his argument about MGH's representations, MGH would have to know that Greene was using the Marks in this manner. The record supports the inference that MGH was, indeed, aware of this use of the Marks. See A. 1542 (identifying Greene's private practice as the CPS Clinic in an email from Greene to the MGH Office of General Counsel). -14- allowed Greene to promote the CPS Approach and behaved in a manner consistent with the notion that the trademark ordinarily -- i.e., absent a disclaimer to the contrary -- stood for services associated with MGH. Such behavior falls far short of representing that Greene owned the Marks. Greene's two remaining arguments pertaining to MGH's behavior are equally unavailing. First, while Greene points to the fact that his private corporation, the Center, shared space with the MGH-affiliated Institute, we fail to see how co-tenancy translates into a representation about ownership of the Marks. Second, although Greene argues that MGH did not object to his 2002 registration of a CPS service mark in his own name with the USPTO, Greene does not assert that MGH knew about that registration until this action began.13 In his reply brief, he tries to shift the burden to MGH and accuses MGH of failing to cite any evidence in the record to show that it did not have knowledge of Greene's registration. But the burden to produce evidence of MGH's 13 Greene also contends that the chief of the MGH Department of Psychiatry demanded that he relinquish the Marks. However, such a statement does not support Greene's estoppel defense because the alleged statement was not made until 2008, long after the Institute was founded and after Greene had signed every one of his employment agreements. By 2008, Greene had already ceded ownership of the Marks to MGH through years of affiliating the Marks with the Institute and using MGH's financial infrastructure. Consequently, even if we treated this statement as a representation about Greene's ownership, it would be impossible for Greene to show the necessary detrimental reliance. -15- knowledge, and thereby render MGH's failure to object meaningful, rests with Greene.