Opinion ID: 2995520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the outer limits of

Text: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT Though I agree that this case should be dismissed, I have reservations about the author of the majority’s overbroad, categorical statement that a citizen must be victimized by physically abusive governmental conduct in order to state a constitutional claim for damages. Ante at 7. The presence or absence of physical injuries, of course, is an important factor in determining whether the police have acted reasonably. Indeed, in cases like this one, when the police have probable cause to arrest suspects who are fleeing from custody and may possibly be armed and dangerous, a Fourth Amendment claim raised by victims who have suffered no physical injuries should be deemed frivolous. Yet, based on the record and the question posed by the Supreme Court’s remand, I see no need to reach an issue that is not before us, possibly create tension with decisions in Jones, 214 F.3d 836, and Williams, 1997 WL 264361, and leave the impression that an excessive display of force, when divorced from its actual use, can never rise to the level of a freestanding Fourth Amendment violation. Accordingly, I must dissent from the majority’s opinion to the contrary. In Gumz, 772 F.2d at 1401, we expressly declined to hold that some type of bodily injury is an absolute requirement to sec. 1983 liability based on an excessive force claim. Indeed, our own precedents suggest that there may arise exceptional circumstances that could conceivably produce a successful Fourth Amendment claim absent any use of force. For example, the majority in Jones opined that a suspect would have had a serious likelihood of success in a Fourth Amendment damages claim when the police, after complying with the knock-and-announce rule, took a battering ram to the suspect’s front door and temporarily stunned the suspect by detonating a flash-bang device in the room where the suspect was standing and a child may have been present./11 Jones, 214 F.3d at 837-38 ([i]f this were a damages action seeking compensation for injury to the occupants or the door, the claim would be a serious one.) Id. at 838. It made no difference to the majority that a flash- bang inflicts no physical injuries and is only a-non-lethal device that produces a flash and a gunshot-type noise that stuns and disorients for about six to eight seconds. Id. at 840 n.4 (Coffey, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). Similarly, in Williams, 1997 WL 264361 at , the district court denied a motion for qualified immunity when the record recounted that an officer held a gun to the head of an arrestee and threatened to ’blow his brains out’ if he caused trouble, even though the man was unarmed, handcuffed, and cooperative at the time. The arrestee had been taken into custody in Georgia; the officer was transporting the man to Illinois and became unreasonably angered and took unacceptable action when the man stated that he had neither received an extradition hearing nor waived his right to the same. Id. at . Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989), which is cited in the majority opinion for the proposition that a simple display of force . . . does not violate the Fourth Amendment, ante at 6, relies on outdated case law and is arguably inapposite. Wilkins cites a series of Fifth Circuit cases suggesting that physical injuries are required when the allegedly excessive force occurs during an otherwise proper arrest. Id. at 193-94. These cases, however, were decided under the pre-Graham shocks the conscience standard, which we have noted constitutes an even higher burden for plaintiffs than the objective reasonableness test. McDonald, 966 F.2d at 294. More recent Fifth Circuit authority has limited the cases cited by Wilkins, recognizing that a citizen can possibly succeed on a Fourth Amendment claim, even when he or she suffered no physical injuries and was seized on probable cause. Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 907-09 (5th Cir. 1998); Richard, 6 F. Supp.2d at 573-74. And, in any event, our holding in Wilkins was that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to claims of police abuse occurring during the time frame transpiring between a suspect’s arrest and conviction. See Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1018 n.14 (7th Cir. 2000); Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1996). Graham’s totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry accounts for the fact that officers frequently are called upon to make split-second decisions, and are entitled to draw their weapons in a manner reasonably calculated to protect their own safety and the safety of the general public, when called upon, in order that they might carry out their lawful duties in a proper manner. We must take into consideration the officer’s knowledge, experience, and understanding of the law, analyzing the officer’s actions in light of all relevant factors, including but not limited to: the seriousness of the crime and the existence of probable cause; the officer’s knowledge of the suspect’s police record and previous behavior upon encountering the police; the presence ofresistance or flight; the age of the suspect (child or adult); the appearance of the officer (undercover, in assault gear, or standard uniform); the time of day and place of the arrest; the manner in which the weapons were displayed; the use of verbal threats or profanity; and the presence and number of suspects or bystanders. See, for example, McDonald, 966 F.2d at 294-95; Gumz, 772 F.2d at 1397-98; Williams, 1997 WL 264361 at -7; Holland, 268 F.3d at 1192-95; Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1997); and Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1981)--all of which have applied these factors in cases involving allegations of an excessive display of force. To support its argument that there can be no Fourth Amendment violation without the use of physical force, the majority’s author cites to decisions interpreting FELA and the Bankruptcy Code. Ante at 6-7. I fail to understand the relevancy of these decisions, advanced without any elaboration by the majority, for these statutes are intended to guard against entirely separate and distinct evils than does the Fourth Amendment, and thus are far removed from our Fourth Amendment analysis or discussion. FELA’s central purpose is to protect workers from physical invasions or menaces, Conrail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 556 (1994), and the Bankruptcy Code’s protection is financial in character; it is not protection of peace of mind, Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir. 2001). By comparison, [t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); see also Holland, 268 F.3d at 1179 (the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment include a person’s ’sense of security’ and individual dignity.) When Officer Coffey attempted to arrest the McNairs, and they were foolishly attempting to flee from him in the dark of night, the responding officers had grounds to establish probable cause and to seize the McNairs using whatever reasonable means were necessary. However, I am reluctant to agree with the author of the majority opinion, in the absence of additional facts and without the benefit of briefing and oral argument by the parties, that the immediate risk of serious injury or death due to the slip of a finger, a stumble, or some other mishap can be cavalierly disregarded. See, e.g., Jones, 214 F.3d at 837-38; Williams, 1997 WL 264361 at . At the same time, I am troubled with and, thus, cannot accept the full implications of Judge Cudahy’s statement that there is no distinction, as a matter of principle, between the use of force and its display, provided that the suspect submits. Ante at 9. Nor do I agree with his re lated argument that a suspect’s subjective reaction to an officer’s display of force is probative evidence that an officer behaved in an objectively unreasonable manner. Although Judge Cudahy believes that [t]he mental state of the terrorized is at least one measure of the objective reasonableness of the terror applied, id. at 8, plaintiffs can all too easily fabricate claims of mental anguish and emotional trauma, and I am of the opinion that a suspect cannotestablish constitutional injury if he is unable to corroborate his self-serving allegations with objective evidence, such as medical testimony or outward manifestations of harm. See Richard, 6 F. Supp.2d at 573-74.