Opinion ID: 2520871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The General Assembly's Power to Redistrict

Text: We now turn to the question of whether SB 03-352 violates the Colorado Constitution. We hold that it does. We base our holding on Article V, Section 44, of the Colorado Constitution, which prohibits congressional redistricting more than once per decade. More specifically, Article V, Section 44:(1) requires congressional redistricting after a national census and before the ensuing general election; and (2) prohibits redistricting outside of this window. We recognize and emphasize that the General Assembly has primary responsibility for drawing congressional districts. But we also hold that when the General Assembly fails to provide a constitutional redistricting plan in the face of an upcoming election and courts are forced to step in, these judicially-created districts are just as binding and permanent as districts created by the General Assembly. We further hold that regardless of the method by which the districts are created, the state constitution prohibits redrawing the districts until after the next decennial census. We base our decision on the Colorado Constitution, but to put state law in context, we begin with a discussion of federal law. First, the U.S. Constitution does not grant redistricting power to the state legislatures exclusively, but instead, to the states generally. The state may draw congressional districts via any process that it deems appropriate. Second, the states' redistricting authority is not unfettered. Rather, it is circumscribed by federal law. Each state must draw congressional districts immediately after each federal census and before the ensuing general election. There must be one district per representative, and the resulting districts in any given state must be equal in size and comply with the Voting Rights Act. Third, like the U.S. Constitution, the Colorado Constitution does not grant the General Assembly exclusive authority to draw congressional districts. Redistricting can be accomplished by enacting a bill subject to gubernatorial approval, by voter initiative, and through litigation. Finally, the Colorado Constitution cannot relax the federal laws pertaining to redistricting; our constitution can only impose more stringent restrictions. Article V, Section 44, of the Colorado Constitution does just that. It restricts the timeframe in which Colorado may redistrict. The plain language of this constitutional provision not only requires redistricting after a federal census and before the ensuing general election, but also prohibits the legislature from redistricting at any other time. In conclusion, the state constitution limits redistricting to once per census, no matter which body creates the districts. Nothing in state or federal law contradicts this limitation. In fact this interpretation is supported by public policy, history, and the law of other states. The following subsections discuss these concepts in greater detail.
The Secretary of State and General Assembly argue that both the United States and Colorado Constitutions grant the General Assembly the exclusive authority to draw congressional districts. In support of this argument, they point to Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution, which says: The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state, by the legislature thereof.... U.S. Const. art. I, ง 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added). The Secretary of State and General Assembly assert that the word legislature in this clause means that the General Assembly is the only body with authority to draw permanent congressional districts, and that the court may not usurp this absolute power. This argument is flawed. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the word legislature in Article I to broadly encompass any means permitted by state law, and not to refer exclusively to the state legislature. A state's lawmaking process may include citizen referenda and initiatives, mandatory gubernatorial approval, and any other procedures defined by the state. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 52 S.Ct. 397, 76 L.Ed. 795 (1932) (gubernatorial approval); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 36 S.Ct. 708, 60 L.Ed. 1172 (1916) (referenda). The word legislature also extends to special redistricting commissions. Arizona, for instance, has a special commission that draws congressional districts and then submits the plan directly to the Secretary of State, thus bypassing the Arizona legislature entirely. See Ariz. Const. art. IV, part 2, ง 1; Rhonda L. Barnes, Redistricting in Arizona Under the Proposition 106 Provisions: Retrogression, Representation, and Regret, 35 Ariz. St. L.J. 575, 578-81 (2003). Other states with redistricting commissions include Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Jersey, and Washington. Tim Storey, Redistricting Spats Unlikely to Spread, Denver Post, Sept. 28, 2003, at 1E, 8E. Most importantly for our purposes, the word legislature, as used in Article I of the federal Constitution, encompasses court orders. State courts have the authority to evaluate the constitutionality of redistricting laws and to enact their own redistricting plans when a state legislature fails to replace unconstitutional districts with valid ones. See generally Growe, 507 U.S. 25, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388; Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F.Supp. 68 (D.Colo.1982). In fact, courts are constitutionally required to draw constitutional congressional districts when the legislature fails to do so. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 123 S.Ct. 1429, 1441, 155 L.Ed.2d 407 (2003). In such a case, a court cannot be characterized as usurping the legislature's authority; rather, the court order fulfills the state's obligation to provide constitutional districts for congressional elections in the absence of legislative action. As these examples reveal, Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution delegates congressional redistricting power to the states to carry out as they see fit, and not exclusively to the state legislatures. Hence, the U.S. Constitution does not grant absolute redistricting authority to the General Assembly as the Secretary of State and the General Assembly claim, and when courts are forced to draw congressional districts, they are not usurping the state legislature's power.
Next, the Secretary of State and General Assembly argue that the U.S. Constitution grants the General Assembly absolute, unfettered redistricting authority that the states cannot curtail. This is not so. Instead, this authority is limited by both federal and state law. Before turning to state law, we first describe the federal case law and statutes that control redistricting to illustrate that the General Assembly's redistricting authority is not unfettered as it claims. Although the U.S. Constitution grants the power to draw congressional districts to the states, the states have often abused their broad redistricting authority. Historically, some state legislatures have used redistricting to enhance the power of the majority (racial and/or political), and to suppress minorities. See generally Andrew Hacker, Congressional Districting: The Issue of Equal Representation 30-70 (1963) [hereinafter Hacker, Congressional Districting ]. The legislatures primarily disenfranchised voters either by gerrymandering or by neglecting redistricting duties altogether, thus allowing the sizes of the districts to become more and more unbalanced as populations shifted over time. The resulting size disparities were unfair because the representatives from larger population districts represented more citizens than representatives from smaller districts. This disparity among districts meant that the citizens in the smaller population districts had a relatively more powerful voice in Congress. As an example, in 1962, Colorado's largest congressional district had 3.3 times the population of the smallest district. Thus, one vote in the smallest district was the same as 3.3 votes in the largest district. Hacker, Congressional Districting at 3. Even though the population of Colorado was shifting from rural to urban and suburban areas, the rural counties still elected more than their proportional share of representatives. Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F.Supp. 471, 478 (D.Colo. 1962); see also Hacker, Congressional Districting at 22-26. Yet the Colorado legislature neglected its duty to draw new congressional districts for more than forty years between 1921 and 1964. Id. at 3. Because of this growing inequality among districts, the Supreme Court and Congress stepped in to protect the voters' rights. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court established the one-person, one-vote doctrine, requiring that every state make a good-faith effort to elect all representatives from districts of equal populations. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964) (interpreting U.S. Const. art. I, ง 2, cl. 1). Under this doctrine, states now have a constitutional obligation to draw congressional districts with equal numbers of constituents, or else justify any differences, no matter how small, with a legitimate reason. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983). When evaluating constitutionality under the one-person, one-vote doctrine, a court uses the national decennial census figures. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the legal fiction that these figures remain accurate for the entire ten years between censuses. Georgia v. Ashcroft, ___ U.S. ___, ___ n. 2, 123 S.Ct. 2498, 2516 n. 2, 156 L.Ed.2d 428 (2003). Consequently, according to this legal fiction, when states create same-size districts that adhere to one-person, one-vote standards at the beginning of the decade, these districts remain constitutionally valid on equal population grounds until the next census, even though the states' populations actually shift and change in the intervening years. Id. Conversely, new decennial census figures generally render the old districts unconstitutional, and states must redistrict prior to a subsequent election. Id. In sum, under federal constitutional law, each state must draw new congressional districts after a decennial census or risk having its districts declared unconstitutional prior to the next congressional election.
Federal statutes also restrict how the states may redistrict. The states' authority to regulate the times, places and manner of congressional elections is not absolute. Instead, the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to make or alter election regulations at any time. U.S. Const. art. I, ง 4, cl. 1 (The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each State, by the legislature thereof, but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations....). The times, places and manner clause was a very controversial provision in the U.S. Constitution. During the debates preceding ratification, the public expressed fear that Congress would usurp the states' powers to conduct elections. See I The Debate on the Constitution: Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters During the Struggle over Ratification 429 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). But the framers strongly believed that Congress must be empowered to step in and regulate elections if necessary to ensure that they are conducted fairly. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964); Hacker, Congressional Districting at 9, 12-14. Even so, the Constitution was silent regarding whether states were required to draw single-member districts, or whether they were allowed to elect their representatives in at-large, statewide elections. [7] Hacker, Congressional Districting at 40. After the states ratified the United States Constitution, many elected all of their members of Congress at large. Id. But in 1842, Congress exercised its authority to regulate elections and passed the Apportionment Act, which prohibited the winner-take-all, at-large elections, and required that states elect members of Congress from contiguous, single-member districts. Id. Congress allowed this requirement to lapse, however, and by 1962, many representatives were once again elected at large. Id. at 41. Shortly after the United States Supreme Court announced the one-person, one-vote doctrine in 1964, many lower courts began to implement that decision by replacing unconstitutional, disproportionate districts with at-large elections. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 123 S.Ct. 1429, 1439, 155 L.Ed.2d 407 (2003). These courts did so because they found they had no authority to draw new districts. Id. at 1439-40, 123 S.Ct. 1429. Congress disagreed, and in 1967 enacted 2 U.S.C. ง 2c, which once again required single-member congressional districts. Id. at 1441, 123 S.Ct. 1429. With this statute, Congress eliminated the option of at-large elections for states with more than one representative. [8] 2 U.S.C. ง 2c (2002). Thus, states must draw same-size, single-member districts. Another limitation on the General Assembly's freedom to redistrict is the Voting Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. งง 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2002); Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F.Supp. 68, 82 n. 36a (D.Colo.1982). Even while complying with Section 2c and the one-person, one-vote doctrine by drawing same-size, single-member districts, some state legislatures were able to discriminate against racial minorities by drawing their districts in such a way as to render minority votes ineffective. In an attempt to combat discrimination against minority voters, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act. Specifically, the Act forbids diluting the voting strength of a minority group sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. Sanchez v. State, 97 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir.1996) (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986)). Section 5 of the Act requires jurisdictions with a history of discrimination to obtain federal approval before making any changes to voting laws or procedures. 42 U.S.C. ง 1973c (2002). The process of obtaining approval is known as preclearance. See Branch, 123 S.Ct. at 1446-47. In Colorado, El Paso County was once a covered jurisdiction, requiring preclearance. Thus, prior to implementing any voting change in El Paso County, including redistricting, the General Assembly was first required to obtain approval from either the United States Attorney General or a three-judge panel from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Carstens, 543 F.Supp. at 82 n. 36a. As these examples demonstrate, the General Assembly has never had unfettered authority to create congressional districts. Under federal law, Colorado must redistrict after each federal census and before the ensuing election, must create single-member districts, must create racially neutral districts, and at certain times in the past, was required to obtain federal preclearance for its plan. Moreover, because the United States Constitution grants redistricting authority to the states, and not exclusively to the legislatures of the states, Colorado has the authority to further limit the power of its General Assembly through its laws or constitution. As we illustrate below, Colorado has done just that.
The Secretary of State and General Assembly argue that the Colorado Constitution grants the General Assembly unfettered power to redistrict. We are not persuaded. As discussed above, the federal Constitution, not the state constitution, is the source of the states' authority to redistrict, and the federal Constitution and federal statutes restrict the states' authority to redistrict. The Colorado Constitution can only further restrict the General Assembly's authority to draw congressional districts; it cannot expand it. We know this is true because the Colorado Constitution is not a grant of power, but an additional limitation upon all forms of state power, including the authority of the General Assembly. Reale v. Bd. of Real Estate Appraisers, 880 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Colo.1994) (The Colorado Constitution, unlike the federal Constitution, does not comprise a grant of but rather, a limitation on power.). Indeed, when our state constitution was ratified in 1876, there was a deep public distrust of the legislature due to Colorado's territorial history of scandal and corruption. Dale A. Oesterle & Richard B. Collins, The Colorado State Constitution: A Reference Guide 1-2, 20 n. 7 (2002). As a result, the delegates created a very detailed document specifically for the purpose of severely restricting the legislature's discretionary powers. Id. Given that the state constitution adds to the federal limitations on congressional redistricting, the crucial question is: Exactly how does Article V, Section 44, limit Colorado's authority to redistrict? We now turn to this question. Article V, Section 44, has always been in the Colorado Constitution. It originally said, in full: One Representative in the Congress of the United States shall be elected from the State at large at the first election under this constitution, and thereafter at such times and places and in such manner as may be prescribed by law. When a new apportionment shall be made by Congress, the general assembly shall divide the State into congressional districts accordingly. Colo. Const. art. V, ง 44. This original language meant that the state's single representative was to be elected from a state-wide district, but as the United States Congress assigned Colorado additional seats, the General Assembly was required to draw additional congressional districts. [9] In 1974, the General Assembly recommended and the people approved a change to Section 44. It now states, in full: The General Assembly shall divide the state into as many congressional districts as there are representatives in congress apportioned to this state by the congress of the United States for the election of one representative to congress from each district. When a new apportionment shall be made by congress, the general assembly shall divide the state into congressional districts accordingly. Colo. Const. art. V, ง 44. The first sentence states who must redistrictโthe General Assemblyโand what the General Assembly must doโcreate single-member congressional districts. The second sentence of Section 44 establishes when this redistricting shall take placeโafter a new congressional apportionment. Because the Attorney General's case turns upon the interpretation of Section 44, we will examine each of Section 44's sentences in turn.
The Secretary of State and the General Assembly argue that three words in the state constitution grant the General Assembly exclusive power to draw Colorado's congressional districts: General Assembly shall. At first blush, this logic seems persuasive; however, this argument is not consistent with existing Colorado law. Although the first sentence of Section 44 says that the General Assembly shall draw congressional districts, the term General Assembly, like the term legislature in Article I of the U.S. Constitution, has been interpreted broadly. The term General Assembly encompasses the entire legislative process, as well as voter initiatives and redistricting by court order. The term General Assembly does not simply refer to the lawmakers who must pass a bill. Instead, it is a shorthand method of referring to the entire standard lawmaking procedure set forth in the Colorado Constitution. Carstens, 543 F.Supp. at 79 (Congressional redistricting is a law-making function subject to the state's constitutional procedures.). These procedures require a majority quorum, approval by a committee, and reading of the bill at length on two different days in each house. See, e.g., Colo. Const. art. V, งง 11, 20 & 22. The standard lawmaking procedure includes passage by both houses of the legislature as well as the governor's signature or approval by inaction. Carstens, 543 F.Supp. at 79. With a two-thirds vote, the General Assembly may pass a redistricting bill over the governor's veto. Colo. Const. art. V, ง 39. Standard lawmaking procedure in Colorado also includes voter initiative. In 1934, this court upheld a legislative redistricting plan that was created by voter initiative and also rejected a subsequent plan adopted by the General Assembly. Armstrong v. Mitten, 95 Colo. 425, 430, 37 P.2d 757, 759 (1934). Armstrong involved state legislative redistricting, which now is performed by a special commission. At that time, however, the relevant section of the state constitution called for the General Assembly to revise and adjust the apportionment for senators and representatives during the session next following a census. Id. at 426-27, 37 P.2d at 758. The legislature failed to enact a redistricting plan in the session following the 1930 census. As a result, the voters initiated and passed a plan in 1932. Then, in 1933, the General Assembly enacted its own plan. In Armstrong, we held that the initiated plan was valid and enforceable. In so holding, we reasoned that [t]he people are sovereign and they created the General Assembly as their agent. Id. Consequently, we rejected a literal interpretation of the term General Assembly, and instead held that General Assembly broadly encompassed all legislative processes, including voter initiative. Armstrong's holding applies to congressional redistricting as well. The term General Assembly in Section 44 also encompasses the courts, but only in the special instance when the General Assembly fails to provide constitutional districts for an impending election. In an early case, In re Legislative Reapportionment, this court said: [I]t is manifest that the triunity of our government is not invaded by acceptance of this litigation for decision. If by reason of passage of time and changing conditions the reapportionment statute no longer serves its original purpose of securing to the voter the full constitutional value of his franchise, and the legislative branch fails to take appropriate restorative action, the doors of the courts must be open to him. 150 Colo. 380, 384-85, 374 P.2d 66, 68-69 (1962) (quoting Village of Ridgefield Park v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation, 31 N.J. 420, 157 A.2d 829, 832 (1960)). Prior to the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court refused to interfere with redistricting issues. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct. 1198, 90 L.Ed. 1432 (1946). Instead, the Court deemed redistricting a political issue that was nonjusticiable. Id. In 1962, in Baker v. Carr , the United States Supreme Court reversed Colegrove and held that redistricting was a justiciable issue. 369 U.S. 186, 208-09, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Accordingly, in In re Legislative Reapportionment, the Colorado Supreme Court said that it would draw districts, but only if the legislature failed to act. 150 Colo. at 385, 374 P.2d at 69. In the forty years since Baker v. Carr , court involvement in redistricting has become more common. Although courts continue to defer to the legislatures, the courts must sometimes act in order to enforce the one-person, one-vote doctrine. Indeed, Congress enacted 2 U.S.C. ง 2c specifically for the purpose of forcing courts to draw valid redistricting plans rather than resorting to at-large districts. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 123 S.Ct. 1429, 1439, 1445, 155 L.Ed.2d 407 (2003). Hence, courts are heavily involved in ensuring that all federal, state, and local districts satisfy the one-person, one-vote criteria. When a court is forced to draw congressional districts because the legislature has failed to do so, the court carries out the same duty the legislature would have. Redistricting involves prospective rules for elections, rather than a retrospective decision based on past events. Thus, when redistricting, the court's task closely resembles legislation. See Saul Zipkin, Judicial Redistricting and the Article I State Legislature, 103 Colum. L.Rev. 350, 379-80 (2003). In so doing, the court gathers information regarding alternative plans, hears expert advice, weighs alternatives, and ultimately adopts the plan it deems the best for the state. See generally, e.g., Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642 (Colo.2002). In the end, the court's plan is just as effective as a law passed by the legislature: it supercedes the prior districts, and remains in effect until legally replaced at a later date. In sum, the term General Assembly in the first sentence of Article V, Section 44, broadly encompasses the legislative process, the voter initiative, and judicial redistricting. Regardless of which body creates the congressional districts, these districts are equally valid. Hence, judicially created districts are no less effective than those created by the General Assembly.
The second sentence of Article V, Section 44, says when redistricting may take place: [w]hen a new apportionment shall be made by congress. [10] a Colorado statute, enacted in 1999, defines new apportionment. ง 2-2-901(1)(a), 1 C.R.S. (2002). It says that a new apportionment occurs after each federal decennial census. Id. Moreover, the one-person, one-vote doctrine firmly requires redistricting after each national census. Georgia v. Ashcroft, ___ U.S. ___, ___ n. 2, 123 S.Ct. 2498, 2516 n. 2, 156 L.Ed.2d 428 (2003). Thus, the second sentence requires that redistricting must take place when there is a census: at least once per decade. The crucial question for us, however, is whether redistricting may occur more often than once per decade. The Secretary of State and General Assembly argue that the General Assembly may redistrict at any time, even more than once per decade. They do not interpret the second sentence to constrain the General Assembly in any way. We reject this construction. Our decision turns upon the interpretation of the second sentence in Article V, Section 44. In construing our constitution, our primary task is to give effect to the framers' intent. Grant v. People, 48 P.3d 543, 546-47 (Colo.2002). To ascertain this intent, we begin with the plain meaning of Section 44. Id. at 546. Then, by way of confirmation, we proceed to examine Section 44 in light of its context within the state constitution. Next, we review similar cases from other states, and find that they comport with our holding. Finally, we demonstrate that custom, history, and policy support our holding as well. The second sentence of Section 44 places a temporal restriction on redistricting. In the sentence [w]hen a new apportionment shall be made by Congress, the general assembly shall divide the state into congressional districts accordingly, the word when is used as a subordinating conjunction. It indicates the relationship of redistricting and apportionmentโredistricting shall take place when apportionment occurs. When, in this context, means just after the moment that, at any and every time that, or on condition that. Webster's Third New World International Dictionary of the English Language 2602 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1993) [hereinafter Webster's Dictionary ]. All of these definitions indicate that in Section 44, the word when means that redistricting may only occur after a new apportionment. Applying this language in the instant case: a new apportionment is a condition for redistricting; redistricting must take place any and every time a new apportionment occurs; and, redistricting must take place just after a new apportionment. Conversely, redistricting may not happen spontaneously or at the inducement of some other unspecified event; it must happen after and only after a new apportionment. Because section 2-2-901(1)(a) defines new apportionment to be synonymous with a federal census, redistricting must take place after and only after a census. Furthermore, as other states have found, when the constitution specifies a timeframe for redistricting, then, by implication, it forbids performing that task at other times. People ex rel. Mooney v. Hutchinson, 172 Ill. 486, 50 N.E. 599, 601 (1898) (Where there are provisions inserted by the people as to the time when a power shall be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption that it should be exercised at that time, and in the designated mode only; and such provisions must be regarded as limitations upon the power); Denney v. State ex rel. Basler, 144 Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929, 931-32 (1896) (The fixing, too, by the constitution, of a time or a mode for the doing of an act, is, by necessary implication, a forbidding of any other time or mode for the doing of such act.). Here, Section 44 specifies the time for redistrictingโjust after a new apportionmentโand the logical conclusion is that redistricting is forbidden at other times. We also look to the text of Section 44 as it was originally written to confirm our interpretation of the current language. When ratified in 1876, Section 44 said that although there was then only one United States Representative from Colorado, the General Assembly should create more districts when the state received more seats. This clear mandate did not give the General Assembly unfettered authority to create new districts. It is absurd to imagine the General Assembly drawing districts before Congress gave a second seat in the House of Representatives. Instead, the second sentence requires that congressional apportionment be a necessary and logical trigger for the General Assembly to perform its task. Unfettered authority is especially unlikely in light of the limited authority the Colorado Constitution originally gave to Colorado's General Assembly. In its brief and during oral argument, the General Assembly strongly asserted that the 1974 changes in Section 44 were technical changes intended to eliminate obsolete language. They assure us that no substantive changes were made in Section 44. Thus, the second sentence of Section 44, as it was originally written, placed a temporal restriction on redistricting, and the temporal limitation remains in the most recent version of Section 44. To read the second sentence to mean otherwise would render it superfluous. The first sentence of Section 44 says: The General Assembly shall divide the state into as many congressional districts as there are representatives in congress ... for the election of one representative to congress from each district. The second sentence says: When a new apportionment shall be made by congress, the general assembly shall divide the state into congressional districts accordingly. If the second sentence did not place a time constraint upon redistricting, then all that would remain of this sentence would be a directive for the General Assembly to divide the state into single-member districtsโexactly what the first sentence in Section 44 already requires. We will not assume that the 1974 technical changes to Section 44 rendered the second sentence superfluous. See, e.g., Welby Gardens v. Adams County Bd. of Equalization, 71 P.3d 992, 995 (Colo.2003) (saying that [i]n construing a statute, interpretations that render statutory provisions superfluous should be avoided); Grant v. People, 48 P.3d 543, 547 (Colo.2002). Instead, we interpret Section 44 to mean that the General Assembly (or voters by initiative, or the courts) must create as many congressional districts as there are congressional representatives, and it must do so at a specific timeโafter a census. The framers' intent to limit the frequency of congressional redistricting is evident when the congressional redistricting language in the original 1876 Constitution is compared with the legislative redistricting language from 1876. Section 44 originally limited the timeframe for congressional redistricting, as it still does, to when a new apportionment shall be made by Congress. Section 47, however, originally said that [s]enatorial and representative districts may be altered from time to time, as public convenience may require.  Colo. Const. art. V., ง 47 (amended 1974) (emphasis added). From time to time means occasionally or once in a while. Webster's Dictionary at 2395. In Armstrong v. Mitten , this court assumed without deciding that this language allowed legislative redistricting more than once per census period. 95 Colo. 425, 428, 37 P.2d 757, 758 (1934). The contrast between these two sections clearly demonstrates that the framers intended to restrict the frequency of congressional redistricting to once per census. If the framers had intended to allow the General Assembly to draw the congressional districts at will, without temporal limitation, they would have used the from time to time language that they used in Section 47. Our interpretation is supported by history and custom. We have never been called upon to interpret Section 44 in the past because the General Assembly has never before drawn congressional districts more than once per decade. Just the opposite is true. As we discussed earlier in this opinion, the legislature has only redistricted six times when it should have done so thirteen times. [11] The legislature has been so reluctant to draw new districts that it allowed at-large elections for newly created seats in 1902-1912. [12] And it did not act at all during the four decades between 1921 and 1964. This reluctance to redistrict is even more significant in light of the fact that state political control has changed hands many times over the years. Since 1915, when the Colorado session laws began listing the party affiliation for the state legislators, [13] political control of the General Assembly and governorship has been in the hands of a single political party quite often. The state was entirely in Republican hands in 1915-16, 1921-22, 1925-26, 1943-46, 1951-54, 1963-64, 1967-74, 1999-2000, and 2003. And Colorado was controlled by Democrats in 1917-18, 1933-38, and 1957-62. Yet since 1915, the General Assembly only redistricted four times: 1921, 1964, 1971, and 1992. If the General Assembly has always understood the state constitution to allow redistricting more than once per decade, there should be some evidence that it exercised that power. Yet there is none. Even when the party in control changed, there was no new redistricting of congressional seats. This is the tradition in many other states as well. As one author put it, politicians understand that a census is a necessary prerequisite for redistricting: [T]here is no denying that when a new party gains a legislative majority in mid-decade it does not redistrict the state's congressional delegation right away but waits until the next Census. This is another of the rules of the game in legislative life, for everyone wants to avoid violent seesaws in policy. Hacker, Congressional Districting at 66. The 1999 General Assembly also interpreted the state constitution to limit congressional redistricting to once per decade when it enacted section 2-2-901. See Ch. 170, sec. 1, ง 2-2-901, 1999 Colo. Sess. Laws 559, 559-60. Subsection 2-2-901(1)(a) says that congressional redistricting occurs after each federal decennial census. Subsection 2-2-901(1)(b), regarding legislative redistricting, similarly states that legislative redistricting occurs after each federal census. It is undisputed that the state constitution now limits legislative redistricting to once every ten years, so we find it significant that the Colorado General Assembly used the same language to describe the timeframe for both legislative and congressional redistricting. [14] This statute is yet another indication that the Colorado Constitution requires congressional redistricting once and only once per decade. In sum, the plain language of Section 44, the General Assembly's past redistricting customs, and the General Assembly's own interpretation of Section 44 all demonstrate that the framers of the Colorado Constitution intended that congressional districts must only be drawn once per decade.
Although certainly not binding authority, we have looked to other states for guidance. The constitutions of our sister states vary. Some set forth detailed schedules for redistricting immediately following each decennial census. See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. IV, part 2, ง 1. Other states simply require redistricting in the legislative session immediately following a decennial census. See, e.g., Utah Const. art. IX, ง 1. Still others allow congressional redistricting at any time or from time to time. See, e.g., S.C. Const. art. VII, ง 13; Wyo. Const. art. III, ง 49. Finally, some state constitutions do not address congressional redistricting at all. See generally, e.g., Tex. Const. Despite the differences in state approaches to congressional redistricting, we have found no decision by any state's highest court that has interpreted its constitution to allow redistricting more than once per decade. To the contrary, many have concluded that congressional redistricting may only occur once per census period. For example, in 1983, California emphatically reinforced its prior holdings that the state constitution prohibits redistricting more than once per decade. Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal.3d 658, 194 Cal.Rptr. 781, 669 P.2d 17 (1983). Article 21, Section 1, of the California Constitution provided: In the year following the year in which the national census is taken ... the Legislature shall adjust the boundary lines of the Senatorial, Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization districts. . . . In Deukmejian, the California Supreme Court recounted over seventy-five years of cases consistently upholding the once-a-decade rule. Id. at 22-24. The first California case so holding was Wheeler v. Herbert, 152 Cal. 224, 92 P. 353 (1907). Wheeler also cited and discussed similar holdings from several other states, including New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Virginia, and North Carolina. Deukmejian, 194 Cal.Rptr. 781, 669 P.2d at 23. Since Wheeler, California courts have been consistently emphatic in holding that congressional redistricting can only occur once per decade. There are only two authorities to the contrary that we have found or that were noted in the numerous briefs filed in this redistricting case. The first case was from South Carolina, which has a constitutional provision very different from Colorado's. In 2002, the South Carolina General Assembly was unable to pass a congressional redistricting bill. Colleton County Council v. McConnell, 201 F.Supp.2d 618 (D.S.C.2002). Because the redistricting plan in effect in 2002 had been enacted prior to the 2000 census, the Federal District Court for South Carolina declared the existing plan unconstitutional and drew its own districts. Id. The federal court, however, was careful to say that its plan was only effective until and unless the state General Assembly enacted a plan. Id. at 670-71. This reasoning was in light of the specific language in the South Carolina Constitution saying that the General Assembly may at any time arrange the various Counties ... into Congressional Districts.... S.C. Const. art. VII, ง 13. This at any time language allows the South Carolina General Assembly much greater freedom to draw congressional districts than the Colorado Constitution allows the Colorado General Assembly. The Colorado Constitution only allows redistricting when there is a census. The second authority was from a federal district court in Florida. Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F.Supp. 1529 (N.D.Fla.1995). Prior to Johnson, the Florida legislature had failed to pass a congressional redistricting plan for the 1992 election, so a federal three-judge panel created a plan instead. Id. at 1533; DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F.Supp. 1076 (N.D.Fla.1992). Subsequently, the Johnson court held that the three-judge panel had no authority to create a permanent redistricting plan, [15] and that the state legislature had authority to replace the judicial plan with its own plan at any time. 915 F.Supp. at 1544. Before reaching its conclusion, the court acknowledged three federal cases that have adopted permanent redistricting plans. Id. In the first, Connor v. Coleman , the United States Supreme Court ordered a district court to adopt a permanent reapportionment plan for the Mississippi Legislature. 425 U.S. 675, 96 S.Ct. 1814, 48 L.Ed.2d 295 (1976). Then, in Garza v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit upheld a lower court's adoption of a permanent plan for county supervisor districts. 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir.1990). Finally, in Kimble v. County of Niagara, a federal court in New York adopted a permanent plan for elections to the county legislature. 826 F.Supp. 664 (W.D.N.Y.1993). Notwithstanding these cases, the Johnson court held that two opposing cases constituted the clear weight of authority that courts cannot create permanent districts. Neither of these two cases is relevant to the case at hand, however. Neither involved the question of whether a legislature could redistrict in the same census period after a prior court-imposed plan; neither is factually similar to the instant case; neither examined a state constitution; and certainly neither interpreted constitutional provisions similar to Colorado's. Instead, both cases involved legislatively adopted plans. In Burns v. Richardson , the Hawaii senate redistricting plan was expressly adopted to bridge the time gap until a constitutional convention could be convened to amend state constitutional provisions regarding redistricting. 384 U.S. 73, 80, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966). We have no similar issue here. In the other case, Wise v. Lipscomb , there is no majority opinion. 437 U.S. 535, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978). The plurality opinion states that a federal court may devise and impose a reapportionment plan pending later legislative action. Id. at 540, 98 S.Ct. 2493 (opinion of White, J., with Stewart, J., concurring). However, the statement is dicta because the plan involved in that case was found to be a legislative plan, not a court-imposed plan. Our decision today is based upon Article V, Section 44, of the Colorado Constitution. Because Wise and Burns do not interpret any state constitution or statute involving redistricting, we do not find these cases persuasive or even relevant to our analysis. Even if we assume without deciding that the federal Constitution does not prohibit middecade congressional redistricting, our state constitution does not allow it and this is a question of state law.
Our holding today not only is consistent with custom, precedent, and other states' laws, but also rests upon solid policy foundations. The framers of the United States Constitution intended the House of Representatives to have an immediate dependence upon, and sympathy with the people. Joseph Story, Story's Commentaries on the Constitution ง 291 (1833) [hereinafter Story's Commentaries ]. Unlike the Senate, the House should emanate directly from the American people and guard their interests, support their rights, express their opinions, make known their wants, redress their grievances, and introduce a pervading popular influence throughout all the operations of the government. Id. For this to be true, according to Justice Story, the representatives' power, influence, and responsibility must be directly tied to the constituents. Id. at ง 292. A fundamental axiom of republican governments, he said, is that there must be a dependence on, and a responsibility to, the people, on the part of the representative, which shall constantly exert an influence upon his acts and opinions, and produce a sympathy between him and his constituents. Id. at ง 300. The framers knew that to achieve accountability, there must be stability in representation. During the debates over the frequency of congressional elections, James Madison said: Instability is one of the great vices of our republics, to be remedied. I 1787: Drafting the U.S. Constitution 212 (Wilbourn E. Benton ed., 1986) (notes of Mr. Madison). At the same time, the framers recognized that as the new union evolved, the population of the states would shift and grow and require changes in the distribution of congressional seats. Id. at 376. This fundamental tension between stability and equal representation led the framers to require ten years between apportionments. Armstrong v. Mitten, 95 Colo. 425, 433-34, 37 P.2d 757, 761 (1934) (citing with approval People ex rel. Snowball v. Pendegast, 96 Cal. 289, 31 P. 103, 105 (1892), which says the framers of the state constitution must have consciously balanced the upheaval associated with redistricting with the need for equal representation). This ten-year interval was short enough to achieve fair representation yet long enough to provide some stability. Our interpretation of Article V, Section 44, of the Colorado Constitution supports these notions of accountability and fairness. Limiting redistricting to once every ten years maximizes stability. In its brief, the General Assembly, however, argues that it should be allowed to redistrict two, or even ten times in a single decade. If the districts were to change at the whim of the state legislature, members of Congress could frequently find their current constituents voting in a different district in subsequent elections. In that situation, a congressperson would be torn between effectively representing the current constituents and currying the favor of future constituents. Moreover, the time and effort that the constituents and the representative expend getting to know one another would be wasted if the districts continually change. See James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C. L.Rev. 1237, 1242 (saying that [a] boundary that is continually moving is one that is unlikely to serve as any kind of imaginative focal point for communal identity ... and [r]edistricting thus flattens identity within a jurisdiction by preventing subcommunities from enjoying the kind of stability and sense of permanence that are necessary ingredients for communal self-identification and, ultimately, differentiation). Instead, we find that the framers of the Colorado Constitution intended to balance stability and fairness by both requiring and limiting redistricting to once per decade. [16] Had they wished to have more frequent redistricting, the framers would have said so. They did not.