Opinion ID: 184917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Columbia's Challenge to the Third Report and Order

Text: 19 The Commission may not base a decision to designate a band of frequencies for a particular use upon the expectation of Federal revenues from the use of a system of competitive bidding. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(7)(A). Columbia claims the Commission did just that, however, when it designated for commercial use the channels covered by the four licenses at issue in this case. For this it relies exclusively upon the videotape of a meeting at which the five-member Commission voted unanimously to approve the notice of proposed rulemaking that led a year and one-half later to the Third Report & Order. See Second Memorandum Opinion and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 188 (1995). 20 At that meeting two of the five Commissioners mentioned the expectation of federal revenues. Commissioner Susan Ness elicited from the Commission staff the estimate that proceeds of an auction would be in the neighborhood of a quarter-billion dollars. She also commented that the 33 remaining original applicants include some of the largest U.S. Companies--AT&T, UPS, GE to name a few. These national companies can afford to return to the U.S. taxpayer a little of the value of the spectrum. Chairman Reed Hundt stated, I suppose we could hold an auction. I suppose we could hold a comparative hearing, too, ... on the following basis. The one who wants to give us the most money wins the hearing. Columbia argues that these statements show the Commission violated § 309(j)(7)(A), that is, designated the licenses to commercial use based principally, if not exclusively, [upon] the FCC's commitment to convert the nationwide 220 MHz spectrum into federal revenues. 21 The Commission claims it did not base its decision upon the expectation of revenues. It points out that the Third Report and Order makes no mention of such impermissible considerations, but rests solely upon legitimate justifications, such as promoting efficient nationwide communication services at reasonable prices, promoting the development of new technologies, and ensuring that licenses go to those who value them most. See 12 F.C.C.R. 10,943, pp 47, 202. 22 It is fundamental that [a]gency opinions, like judicial opinions, speak for themselves. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Rendered at the conclusion of all the agency's processes and deliberations, they represent the agency's final considered judgment upon matters of policy the Congress has entrusted to it. Accordingly, [w]here an agency has issued a formal opinion or a written statement of its reasons for acting, transcripts of agency deliberations at Sunshine Act meetings should not routinely be used to impeach that written opinion. Kansas State Network v. FCC, 720 F.2d 185, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 23 We do not think the evidence that two Commissioners initially flirted with an impermissible rationale suffices to demonstrate that the permissible rationale given a year and one-half later in the Commission's published opinion was a mere pretext. Otherwise, it would seem, almost any slip of the tongue during an agency's decision making process could be fatal, contrary to the settled principle that [u]p to the point of announcement, agency decisions are freely changeable, as are the bases of those decisions. Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 489. 24 Columbia next claims that Chairman Hundt prejudged the question whether to assign the licenses by auction. In August 1995, before the Commission issued the Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Chairman unveiled in a speech the Commission's lineup of upcoming auctions, including the auction in the third quarter of 1996 of the licenses at issue here. The Washington Legal Foundation then petitioned the Commission requesting that the Chairman recuse himself from voting upon the auction issue on the ground that he would be unable to give meaningful consideration to the public comments opposing an auction and favoring a lottery.Chairman Hundt did not recuse himself, and indeed voted to adopt the Third Report and Order, as did all the Commissioners. 25 The day after the public release of that order Chairman Hundt responded to the WLF's petition. He explained that his 1995 statements indicated only his preliminary views, that his announcement of tentative auction dates included all potential services to be licensed by auction in 1996, and that the Commission must begin to plan for an auction well in advance of any final Commission decision to authorize [one].Letter from Chairman Hundt to Washington Legal Found. (March 13, 1997). 26 Generally, we are unable to view the motivations of an agency official except as through a glass, darkly, and the glass may be tinted not by the official's unalterable prejudgment but by legitimate policy preconceptions; in a particular instance, the cause may be exceedingly difficult to discern.In order to avoid trenching upon the agency's policy prerogatives, therefore, we presume that policymakers approach their quasi-legislative task of rulemaking with an open mind--but not an empty one. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Agency decisionmakers are appointed precisely to implement statutory programs, and so inevitably have some policy preconceptions); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (An administrative official is presumed to be objective [and] mere proof that [he or] she has taken a public position, or has expressed strong views, or holds an underlying philosophy with respect to an issue in dispute cannot overcome that presumption). 27 Columbia's burden is to make a clear and convincing showing that [Chairman Hundt had] an unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the proceeding.Association of Nat'l Adver. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979). That it has not done. Even if we assume Chairman Hundt was predisposed in favor of auctions as a matter of policy, that alone would not imply that he was unwilling to consider arguments to the contrary. 28 In sum, Columbia has not shown that the Commission decided to auction the licenses based upon the impermissible expectation of federal revenues. Neither has it shown that Chairman Hundt should have disqualified himself because he had unalterably decided to vote for an auction even before the period for public comment had opened.