Opinion ID: 770402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instruction Omission for Serious Bodily Injury

Text: 24 Count One of Taylor's indictment alleges that he violated subsection two of 18 U.S.C. sec. 2119, which reads in full: Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall 25 (1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, 26 (2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and 27 (3) if death results, be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any numbers of years up to life, or both. 28 In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251 (1999), the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. sec. 2119(1)-(3) comprises three separate offenses by the specification of distinct elements, each of which must be charged by indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict. Jones, 526 U.S. at 252. The Court explained further that serious bodily injury, as it appears in sec. 2119(2), represents an essential element, rather than a sentencing enhancement, of the independent offense defined by sec. 2119(2). See id. Taylor's indictment charged him under sec. 2119(2) as required, but Taylor's trial preceded Jones. Without contemporaneous objection from Taylor, the district court did not instruct the jury that serious bodily injury is an element of the carjacking offense. In light of Jones, however, Taylor and the government now agree that the district court erred by omitting a jury instruction on serious bodily injury. 29 Taylor argues that the absence of an instruction on serious bodily injury requires reversal on appeal. Seeking to avoid the burden of showing prejudice, Taylor claims that the omission of a jury instruction on an essential element of the charged offense is reversible per se, regardless of prejudice. Yet we are instructed otherwise by Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999), and Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997), both of which hold that omission of an offense element is not structural error that fundamentally infects the trial process and necessitates automatic reversal. See also California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996). Taylor's failure to object at trial to the incomplete jury instruction resulted in forfeiture of his claim on appeal, and we again review only for plain error. See United States v. Benitez, 92 F.3d 528, 533 (7th Cir. 1996). Under this standard, we affirm unless the error was not only clear in retrospect but also caused a miscarriage of justice, seriously affecting the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceeding. See United States v. Hughes, 213 F.3d 323, 328-29 (7th Cir. 2000). 30 Serious bodily injury is defined by the four categories described in 18 U.S.C. sec. 1365(g)(3): [a] bodily injury which involves (A) a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme physical pain; (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protracted loss and impairment of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. No prejudice, and thus no plain error, occurred if the jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor's victim suffered a bodily injury which fits within any of these four categories. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 8-9. In United States v. Johnson-Dix, we interpreted the same terms at issue here--serious bodily injury and extreme physical pain--although in the sentencing context under a different standard of review. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1312. Despite the absence of trial testimony that the victim's pain was extreme, we found the victim's gunshot injuries, which featured a fractured leg and entry and exit wounds, constituted serious bodily injury under U.S.S.G. sec. 2B3.2(b)(4)(B) because the injuries inflicted extreme physical pain. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1312. Although the government presented little direct evidence on the pain suffered by Taylor's victim, Lakesha Wade, it is clear here from the circumstances that the jury would have found that she suffered a bodily injury that involved extreme physical pain under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1365(g)(3)(B). 31 Gunshot wounds, produced by a .38-caliber bullet, fired at close range, that rips through the victim's arm and penetrates her breast, constitute a serious bodily injury that produces extreme physical pain. Here, the jury knew in detail the tight proximity of Wilson to Wade when he shot her, understood that the .38-caliber bullet shattered Wade's driver-side window and tore through her arm into her chest and heard that Wade was treated by paramedics and taken to the hospital for treatment. In addition, the government introduced into evidence color photographs displaying Wade's gunshot wounds just hours after the carjacking. After asking Wade about these pictures, the government asked apologetically, I know it sounds like a silly question, but did you experience pain from this? She answered succinctly in the affirmative and explained that her arm and breast were swollen and bruised up real bad. Wade did not testify directly that she was in extreme pain in those words (nor was she asked), but [j]uries may use common sense to evaluate the evidence and make reasonable inferences from it. United States v. Cunningham, 54 F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1995). A rational jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the gunshot wounds of Taylor's victim constituted a serious bodily injury that inflicted extreme physical pain. We find that the omission of a jury instruction on the issue was harmless under the circumstances.