Opinion ID: 1171916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pursuit of Discretionary Appeals

Text: It is apparent that Keith holds a personal viewpoint of the appeal process in which he does not desire to pursue any appellate review unless required to do so by law. Keith has consistently maintained this viewpoint since at least April 2, 1986. Defense counsel Best attempted to withdraw because he believed he could not adequately represent Keith if he insisted on not pursuing all possible issues on appeal. On April 21, 1986 a motion was entered to appoint a next friend for Keith. Although the precise role of a next friend is not entirely clear, it appears that this individual would be given authority to assist, advise and make legal arguments and motions on Keith's behalf. Involved in this motion was Leo Driscoll, an attorney from Spokane, Washington, who at one time practiced law with Keith's father. On July 7, 1986, the District Court denied the motion for appointment of next friend and ordered additional psychiatric evaluations to determine whether Keith was competent to enter his guilty pleas. On November 12, 1986, the District Court held a hearing to determine Keith's competence to enter his guilty pleas. Testimony and reports were received by four experts and all concluded or strongly implied Keith was competent to enter a plea. No medical expert testified that Keith was not competent to enter his plea. On November 28, 1986, the District Court found that Keith was sufficiently competent to enter a plea and entered the following conclusions of law: 1. The Defendant, David Cameron Keith, does not suffer from any mental disease, disorder, or defect which substantially affects his capacity in the premises. 2. Defendant has the capacity to appreciate his position as a convicted and condemned person. 3. Defendant has the capacity to appreciate the penalty imposed upon him. 4. Defendant has the capacity to make rational choices with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation. 5. Defendant has the capacity to make rational choices with respect to acting or assisting in his own defense. 6. Defendant has the capacity to instruct his attorney to suspend all proceedings in the district court. Additionally, the District Court found that Keith requested a dismissal of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion was therefore dismissed in the order accompanying the District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Keith continued to insist that none of his discretionary appeals be pursued. On March 30, 1987 defense counsel Best again moved to withdraw. The District Court appointed Mayo Ashley as counsel for Keith on May 8, 1987, but retained Best as standby counsel. On May 5, 1987 this Court issued an order allowing defense counsel 45 days to determine whether any issues would be appealed besides those which were mandatory. On June 19, 1987, defense counsel Ashley entered a notice that it was Keith's intention to file only mandatory appeals. Ashley still suggested that this Court consider all of the issues contained in the appellant's two briefs. On July 14, 1987, this Court ordered that review be limited to only those issues which are mandatory and contained in § 46-18-310, MCA: Supreme court's determination as to the sentence. The supreme court shall consider the punishment as well as any errors enumerated by way of appeal. With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine: (1) whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; (2) whether the evidence supports the judge's finding of the existence or nonexistence of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in XX-XX-XXX and XX-XX-XXX; and (3) whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. The court shall include in its decision a reference to those similar cases it took into consideration. (Emphasis added.) After reviewing this issue, we conclude that our order on July 14, 1987 was correct and that defendant Keith has the right to limit his appeal to only those issues that must be reviewed according to § 46-18-310, MCA. Keith has clearly expressed his intent to pursue only those appellate issues which must be reviewed as a matter of law. Keith has been adjudged competent to make such a choice and we will not interfere with his choice. The issue is not what others would do if faced with this decision, but what defendant Keith desires to do. Keith's decision must be respected if it is made competently, voluntarily, intelligently, and with full knowledge of the consequences. Although this is an issue of first impression in Montana, we believe the results of cases originating in jurisdictions outside Montana support our decision. See, Gilmore v. Utah (1976), 429 U.S. 1012, 97 S.Ct. 436, 50 L.Ed.2d 632; and Judy v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 145, 416 N.E.2d 95. See also, Lenhard v. Wolff (9th Cir.1979), 603 F.2d 91; stay temporarily granted (1979), 443 U.S. 1306, 100 S.Ct. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 885; stay denied (1979) 444 U.S. 807, 100 S.Ct. 29, 62 L.Ed.2d 20. Based on the facts contained in the record, we hold that defendant Keith's decision was made competently, voluntarily, intelligently, and with full knowledge of the consequences.