Opinion ID: 352543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: parameters of ralpho's due process claim

Text: 34 Ralpho's basic claim, from which we have been so long distracted by questions in limine, is that the value study upon which the Commission ostensibly relied in assessing his damages was not made available in time to enable him to challenge it. An opportunity to meet and rebut evidence utilized by an administrative agency has long been regarded as a primary requisite of due process. 156 The more difficult question has been whether due process is implicated in a given case. To this effect we are directed to our 20-year-old decision in American and European Agencies, 157 on facts nearly identical to those here. A claimant was refused access to a staff memorandum to which the agency resorted in determining the value of his claim. 158 After construing the finality provision there in question, 159 the court assumed arguendo that review of constitutional questions was permissible and addressed the merits of the claimant's due process argument. The court acknowledged that if the claim for monetary relief amounted to the assertion of a right, the refusal to allow inspection of evidence crucial to the administrative decision would have been constitutionally impermissible, 160 and with so much of its logic we agree. 161 The court went on to find, however, that in its quest for war claims compensation the claimant sought a privilege, not a right; and thus it did not find all the trappings of due process to obtain. 162 35 While, as a panel, we have no general license to undercut prior holdings of this circuit, we obviously cannot blindly follow prior rulings in the face of clearly contradictory doctrine later enunciated by the Supreme Court. And as we have recognized, 163 the distinction drawn 20 years ago in American and European Agencies between a right and a privilege has given way to a far different definition of property interests under the Fifth Amendment. 164 The import of Goldberg v. Kelly 165 and its progeny 166 is unmistakable: a statute that bestows an entitlement must do so in accordance with the dictates of the due process clause. Goldberg itself dealt with the right to a hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits, and the Supreme Court held that the putative beneficiary must be given a fair opportunity to be heard before he is deprived of their enjoyment. 167 36 Here there is no question but that Ralpho is entitled to something under the Micronesian Claims Act; indeed, the Commission admits this much. We think he should have been given an opportunity to meet evidence which the Commission intended to consider in making its decision. To this extent, the holding of American and European Agencies must be seen as a victim of the shifting stands of due process adjudication.