Opinion ID: 462307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process and Transient Jurisdiction

Text: 13 It is an historical truism that the transitory presence of an individual in a state to which he had no attachment or connection other than a momentary pause in his movement to other places sufficed to justify a state's exercise of personal jurisdiction. This notion developed in the days when travel was difficult and a plaintiff seeking to sue a defendant had to choose between traveling to the defendant's state or waiting to catch his prey in the unlikely chance that he wandered into the plaintiff's state. 14 We find it somewhat ironic that we are asked today to discard the rule in these modern times of elastic, expansive, and inexpensive travel. Nonetheless, while changes in the technological landscape have lessened the rule's harsh impact, the legal landscape has changed as well. Theories of jurisdiction grounded on notions of state sovereignty, which undergirded the rule, have been eroded by theories premised on defendants' due process rights. 15 The transient rule of personal jurisdiction has been much maligned by the commentators. 5 After Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), in which the Supreme Court extended the due process requirements of International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), to the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction, commentators sounded the rule's death knell. 6 Even those commentators who had supported the rule expressed considerable doubt as to its continuing viability. 7 16 The source of the commentators' gloom rests principally on the following statement in Shaffer. We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny. 433 U.S. at 212, 97 S.Ct. at 2584 (emphasis added). We concede that this sweeping assertion undermines the correspondingly categorical claim that [i]t has long been black letter law that personal service within its geographical area establishes a court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Donald Manter Company, Inc. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419, 420 (1st Cir.1976). However, while Shaffer may have rendered the black letter gray, we do not think the letter of the law has become so pale that it can be read only with conjurer's glasses. 8 17 All but one of the cases in which the Supreme Court has required an International Shoe minimum contacts analysis have involved in one way or another substituted service of process within the state, or service of process outside the state. 9 In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952), on the other hand, the Court was faced with the question whether the courts of Ohio could exercise jurisdiction in a cause of action unrelated to a corporation's activities in Ohio when that corporation had been served in Ohio through its president and when its contacts with Ohio were continuous and systematic. In holding that the Due Process Clause did not compel a decision either way on the question of jurisdiction over the corporation, the Court also left undisturbed Ohio's practice of permitting a complainant to maintain a proceeding in personam in its courts against a properly served nonresident natural person to enforce a cause of action which does not arise out of anything done in Ohio. Id. at 441, 72 S.Ct. at 416. 18 If we look to International Shoe, as Shaffer instructs us to do, we find that 19 due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 20 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Thus, International Shoe itself creates an exception to minimum contacts analysis where the defendant is present within the forum state. 21 However, in light of Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982), we must still assess the propriety of an assertion of personal jurisdiction against the due process clause. 10 While jurisdiction flows from a state's sovereignty, the requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction rests ultimately on the due process clause. 11 22 In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, the court upheld a finding of personal jurisdiction as a sanction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) for defendants' refusal to comply with discovery orders relating to the jurisdictional question. In doing so, it did not alter the requirement that there be 'minimum contacts' between the nonresident defendant and the forum state. Rather, [the holding dealt] with how the facts needed to show those 'minimum contacts' can be established.... Id. at 2104 n. 10. 23 However, the court upheld the continuing validity of consent--which by itself can overcome the absence of minimum contacts--as a basis of personal jurisdiction, 12 and proceeded with an analysis in which the lower court's alternative finding of minimum contacts played only a minor role: 24 The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty. Thus, the test for personal jurisdiction requires that the maintenance of the suit ... not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'  25 102 S.Ct. at 2104. 26 Recognizing this test as our guidepost, we conclude that there was nothing unfair or unjust in Amusement's play. Mordelt was properly served while present in New Orleans. When the defendant is present within the forum state, notice of the suit through proper service of process is all the process to which he is due. In this case, Mordelt's presence in New Orleans gave rise to a risk of his being haled into court, which, particularly in light of his knowledge that Amusement had intended to display Heimo's goods at the convention, was not so unpredictable as to be unfairly burdensome. 13 By entering Louisiana, he subjected himself to sovereign powers from which, had he remained outside the state, he was otherwise protected. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 102 S.Ct. 2104 n. 10; see note 11 supra. 14 27 Given that a traditional notion of fair play and substantial justice has been that presence alone is sufficient to support personal jurisdiction, the facts of Mordelt's presence and proper service are decisive. Shaffer v. Heitner's admonition that  'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage, 97 S.Ct. at 2584, does not cause us to reach a contrary conclusion. Insofar as the due process clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment ... against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations, id. at 2586 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 160), our holding is clearly not to the contrary. 15 28 It could be argued that these facts are merely fortuitous, and that substantively, this case is no different from one in which Mordelt leaves Louisiana and subsequently receives service by mail. Analytically, however, there is a significant difference. While the due process clause necessarily restricts the state's sovereign power, no case has yet held that it eliminates that power altogether. That the requirement of personal jurisdiction rests in all cases on the due process clause does not weaken the proposition that the exercise of jurisdiction, as distinguished from its limitation, is a sovereign act. If there is anything that characterizes sovereignty, it is the state's dominion over its territory and those within it. Fairness does not operate in a vacuum. To abstract it from context and elevate it blindly over sovereign prerogatives is ultimately to free the individual from the obligations inherent in a statist system. 29 Wholly apart from the significance of the service of process, other factors strengthen our view that personal jurisdiction here is just and fair. 16 First, defendant's presence within the forum state was purposefully related to his business existence. This is not a case in which Mordelt, in a purely personal capacity, visited New Orleans just to see relatives or to enjoy the cooking of Antoine's. Rather, the conclusion is undeniable that Mordelt was present in New Orleans on business for the purpose of representing Heimo and drumming up business for it at the convention of the IAAPA, of which Heimo was a member. 30 Second, we note that had this suit been brought in Florida, a strong case could be made that jurisdiction would have been proper under McGee v. International Insurance Co., supra, since the cause of action apparently arose out of business transacted with persons in Florida. 17 The fact that the risk of being haled into a Louisiana court was significantly less than the risk of defending this suit in a Florida court takes on far less importance when the international nature of the transaction is considered. If Mordelt is to be subjected to the jurisdiction of a United States court, it matters little in weighing the burdens and inconveniences to Mordelt that the court is in Louisiana rather than Florida. 18 31 Finally, Mordelt is not without protection against the inconveniences and burdens of litigating several blocks from the French Quarter. These protections include forum non conveniens, 19 change of venue, 20 and choice of law rules. 21 Although it is unavailing here, Mordelt may also move to quash service on the grounds that his presence in the forum state was procured by fraud, Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir.1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664, 58 S.Ct. 831, 82 L.Ed. 1122 (1938), and he can, where permitted, protect himself in the future with forum selection clauses. M/S Bremen and Unterweser Reederei v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972). 22