Opinion ID: 779268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recognition of Such Right

Text: 16 Defendants concede that the Constitution in at least some circumstances protects familial relationships from unwarranted government interference. This protection derives, in part, from a broader constitutional right to association. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). In Roberts, the Supreme Court addressed the right to association in two forms: freedom of expressive association and freedom of intimate association. With regard to the latter right, which is the one at issue in this case, the Supreme Court stated such a right is constitutionally protected as a fundamental element of personal liberty. Id. at 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244. For this proposition it cited a number of substantive due process cases, and noted its long tradition of affording highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State. Id. at 618-19, 104 S.Ct. 3244; see also Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir.1999) (`parent's interest in the custody of a child [is] a constitutionally protected liberty interest subject to due process protection' (alteration in original)); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624 (1980) (providing the first discussion of a right to intimate association).