Opinion ID: 1507191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Presidential Group Candidate Petition

Text: The Populist Party argues that the trial court's interpretation of Ark.Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B) was unconstitutional. We agree. Judge Fox determined that the petition forms, used by the Populist Party, failed to comply with the technical requirements of Ark.Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B), which states: (B) A political group desiring to have the names of its candidates for President and Vice President printed on the ballot shall file a petition with the Secretary of State by noon on the first Monday of August. The petition shall contain at the time of filing the names of one thousand (1,000) qualified electors of the state declaring their desire to have printed on the ballot the names of their candidate for President and Vice President. The Secretary of State shall verify the sufficiency of the petition within ten (10) days from the filing of the petition. If the petition is determined to be insufficient, the Secretary of State shall notify in writing the political group through its designated agent and shall set forth his or her reasons for so finding. When notice is delivered, the sponsors shall have an additional ten (10) days in which to do any or all of the following: (i) Solicit and obtain additional signatures; (ii) Submit proof to show that the rejected signatures or some of them are good and should be counted; or (iii) Make the petition more definite and certain. Ark.Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B)(Supp.2003). Judge Fox found that the petitions were insufficient because petitioners did not state on the petition that Nader and Camejo were their candidates. Rather, the petitions stated a desire to have the particular candidates on the ballot. Specifically, the petition stated: We, the undersigned, propose the name of Ralph Nader and Pete Miguel Camejo as President and Vice President to be placed on the ballot as Presidential group candidate in the General Election to he held on November 2, 2004, and each of us for himself or herself says: I have personally signed this petition; I am a legal voter of the State of Arkansas, and my printed name, date of birth, residence, city or town of residence, and date of signing are correctly written after my signature. However, there is no statutory requirement that each person who signs the nominating petition be a member of the group circulating the petition. Ark.Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B) only requires that those persons signing the petition express their desire to have the group's candidates on the ballot and that the petitioners be qualified electors who are registered voters under Ark.Code Ann. § 7-1-101(22). Moreover, the Populist Party is not required to use either of the two forms contained in the 2004 Candidate Information handbook published by the Secretary of State's Office because Ark.Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B) does not prescribe a certain form. Under Ark.Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B), the Secretary of State's Office is required to accept any form that contains at the time of filing the names of one thousand (1,000) qualified electors ... declaring their desire to have printed on the ballot the names of their candidates for President and Vice President. Ark.Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B). The petition used here by the Populist Party, and its candidates, clearly met this requirement Further, there is no specific requirement that the petitioners declare their intention to actually vote for the candidate on the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dealt with this issue in Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir.1981). In that case, the court found a Kentucky petition-signature statute unconstitutional. The court wrote: Of course, the desire to vote provision is not precisely analogous to the factual situations previously discussed. However, this provision, as did the lack of partitions and the thin ballots, results in publicizing the way one intends to vote. Certainly, it can be claimed that the latter two were actual revelations for whom the subscriber voted, while the former is only a declaration of one's desire and intention to vote in a future election. However, we refuse to adopt such an artificial distinction because all such practices jeopardize the right to secrecy of the ballot. The declaration operates to discourage citizens from participation in the electoral process simply because they do not wish people to know how they will vote. Such a revelation invokes the fears sought to be quelled by the secrecy of voting laws in this country, and subjects an elector to the pressure of his neighbors, employers, and social peers. Since the declaration abridges the right to a secret ballot in such a direct and unacceptable manner, it cannot stand. Id. at 608-609. We agree with the rationale of the Sixth Circuit that a law may not require an electorate to name their candidates for President and Vice-President. Further, a petitioning law may only require that the signers state their desire that the named candidate, or named party, appear on the ballot. Id. Otherwise, a party who is uncertain about whom he will support in the general election, but has an interest in the candidate, would be unable to sign the petition because of the requisite declaration. Id. Furthermore, the possibility of having new candidates with unusual and creative political philosophies is greatly reduced. As a result this requirement fosters a system which favors the status quo, while discouraging independent candidates and new political parties. Id. at 609. Our own court has recognized that the right to become a candidate for public office is, under our form of government, a fundamental right, which should not be in any manner curtailed without good cause. Fisher v. Taylor, 210 Ark. 380, 196 S.W.2d 217 (1946). Any law or party rule, by which this inherent right of the citizen is diminished or impaired ought always to receive a liberal construction in favor of the citizen desiring to exercise the right. Id. Statutes are not only presumed to be constitutional, but a court must construe a statute as constitutional if at all possible. Bunch v. State, 344 Ark. 730, 43 S.W.3d 132 (2001). As the Supreme Court has recognized, trial courts cannot impose a restriction that denies a group their right to associate or denies them access to the ballot unless narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974). Here, the manner in which the trial court's interpretation of Ark.Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B) leads not only to an absurd result, but also renders the provision unconstitutional. This unconstitutional reading of the petitioning provision at issue infringes upon one of the fundamental civil liberties of our democracy, that of the secret ballot. Anderson, 664 F.2d 600. In sum, section Ark.Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B) does not state that an electorate name their candidate for President or Vice President. The statute only requires that the signer of the petition state their desire that the named candidates appear on the ballot. Having vacated the writ of mandamus, we need not address the other issues raised in this appeal, such as the trial court's interpretation of Ark.Code Ann. § 7-1-101(18) or whether the Secretary of State should be ordered to verify Nader and Camejo on the ballot. For the reasons stated above, the writ of mandamus is vacated. Our September 23, 2004, order to the Secretary of State advising the County Board of Election Commissioners to not initiate the further printing of ballots relating to the presidential election is hereby dissolved. The mandate shall issue immediately and the Secretary of State's Office is ordered to certify the ballot with the names of the Populist Party of Arkansas, Presidential Candidate Ralph Nader, and Vice Presidential candidate Peter Miguel Camejo. BROWN, J., concurs. GLAZE, IMBER, and HANNAH, JJ., dissent.