Opinion ID: 211752
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver—Analysis

Text: 34 The initial step in our waiver analysis is to compare Ericsson's appellate and trial court arguments. Harris alleges that Ericsson never argued in front of the district court for the two-step claim construction it advances now. Ericsson argues that its positions before the district court were basically the same as the ones it maintains now. Neither side is entirely correct. Ericsson's claim construction brief to the district court shows that it did indeed advance a two-step claim construction, but on a different theory than that on which its appeal is premised. Ericsson contended in its claim construction brief that selecting discrete decisions is a required step separate from the function of the time domain processing means, which is to produce nondiscrete estimates of the originally transmitted information signals. Ericsson also proposed an alternative construction in which the function of the time domain processing means is to implement a two-step algorithm. This argument evidences a requirement of two steps, but Ericsson never characterized both steps as part of the corresponding structure of that limitation. Thus, Ericsson's claim construction theory on appeal is at least slightly different—in form if not in ultimate conclusion—from its position below. 35 The next question is whether the change in Ericsson's argument is so insubstantial that it represents the same concept that Ericsson raised before the district court, in which case there would be no waiver. See Gaus, 363 F.3d at 1288. An appellate court retains case-by-case discretion over whether to apply waiver. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Interactive Gift, 256 F.3d at 1344. Gaus provides a useful guide to the exercise of that discretion. In Gaus, the appellant had argued prior to trial that a pair of probe networks in a hair dryer's automatic shut-off mechanism for preventing electrical shocks in bathtubs required 36 two corresponding things designed for use together the functioning of which are independent of the other voltage carrying portions of the hairdryer to be protected and which are configured such that the trigger switch current will respond before the penetrating water reaches any other voltage carrying portions of the hairdryer, such as the heating coil. 37 Id. On appeal, the appellant changed its phrasing to a pair of probe networks that is separate and operates independently from any voltage carrying part of the apparatus and which will effect a current shut off (upon entry of water) before water touches any voltage carrying part of the apparatus. Id. The court in that case articulated a single concept that these two phrasings expressed: that the probe network must contain two conductive elements that are separate or independent from the voltage-carrying portions of the hairdryer. Id. Such a characterization applies to the present case, too: Ericsson's claim construction now, as it was before the district court, is that the asserted claims require a two-step algorithm of producing nondiscrete estimates and deriving discrete decisions therefrom. Thus, we conclude that Ericsson is arguing the same concept as it argued before the district court. 38 It strains credulity for Harris to argue that Ericsson is raising a wholly new claim construction on appeal. Ericsson could not have stated any more clearly before the district court that it was advocating a two-step claim construction; the only difference between its district court and appellate arguments hinges on whether the two steps are found in the claimed functions or the corresponding structure. The slight change in claim scope that results from Ericsson's alteration of the rationale for its claim construction does not affect our view in this case. Shifting from a function theory to a structure theory modifies the claim scope in one minor way: equivalent structure infringes literally (as long as the equivalent structure was a technology that was available prior to the issue date of the patent), whereas an equivalent function would infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. See Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2001); Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed.Cir.1999). This change is not significant enough to bring the case outside the same concept rule of Gaus. We have been presented with no argument that this technical distinction in the type of infringement makes any practical difference in this case. Because Ericsson is advocating the same concept as it did in the district court, we hold that Ericsson's district court claim construction arguments do not preclude its WMS Gaming argument on appeal. 2 39 Harris argues that another basis for applying waiver is Ericsson's failure to object to the jury instructions on infringement. We disagree, because Ericsson has appealed the district court's denial of JMOL. JMOL can be granted either before or after the jury has rendered a verdict, and it does not depend on how the jury was instructed. The test is whether there is a legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party under the controlling law[.] Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). The longstanding test for appeals of the denial of JMOL under Fifth Circuit law is whether the evidence presented can suffice, as a matter of law, to support a jury verdict, and review of [a] JMOL-denial is not restricted to the law as stated in the jury instructions. Arsement v. Spinnaker Exploration Co., 400 F.3d 238, 248 (5th Cir.2005); cf. Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142 (Fed.Cir.2004) (in an appeal of a denial of a motion for a new trial, precluding an appellant's claim construction argument that was not raised in objections to jury instructions). Here, the controlling law is the legal interpretation of the asserted claims. Thus, irrespective of any jury instructions, the JMOL decision is based on whether a reasonable jury could find that Ericsson infringed the properly construed claims based on the evidence presented. 3