Opinion ID: 1158979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The District Court Order Awarding Attorney's Fees.

Text: We first consider whether the district court abused its discretion on remand by ordering UNLV to pay all of Tarkanian's costs, including attorney's fees, incurred in this litigation. To resolve this issue, we must initially look to the district court's fee award itself. The original order awarding fees provides, in pertinent part: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant to N.R.S. 18.005 et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 plaintiff is awarded the amount of $195,951.92 as costs including attorney's fees. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the award of costs including attorney's fees shall be apportioned among defendants as follows: (1) defendant NCAA shall be assessed and shall pay to plaintiff the amount of $176,356.73, which is equal to 90% of the award; and (2) defendant UNLV shall be assessed and shall pay to plaintiff the amount of $19,595.19, which is equal to 10% of the award. UNLV contends that this order should be read to have made UNLV and the NCAA severally liable for only the amount awarded against each, and the trial court accordingly abused its discretion when it construed the order to say otherwise. UNLV seeks support for its position from the decision in Koster v. Perales, 903 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir. 1990), which stated that a trial court may allocate the fee award between the responsible parties, setting the percentage for which each is liable where the claims against the defendants are separate and distinct or where culpability is significantly unequal, or it may hold the responsible parties jointly and severally liable for the fee award. Id. at 139 (citation omitted; emphasis added). UNLV argues that this or in the above-quoted language from Koster is disjunctive and stands for the proposition that a court may either allocate liability for a specific percentage of the award (thus indicating the imposition of several liability), or it may hold the parties jointly and severally liable for the entire amount awarded. A review of the case law addressing the issue of apportionment of attorney's fees reveals that UNLV's argument is not persuasive. As with most attorney's fee rulings, apportionment of attorney's fees by a trial court amongst section 1983 defendants is discretionary. See Koster v. Perales, 903 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir.1990); Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945 (1st Cir.1984). The Second Circuit put it thusly in Koster: The allocation of fee liability is a matter committed to the district court's discretion and will not be disturbed unless the determination evidences an abuse of discretion. Although the law governing apportionment of attorney's fees assessments remains relatively unsettled, district courts have appropriately considered a variety of factors in allocating fee liability including the relative culpability of the parties, and the proportion of time spent litigating against each defendant. Koster, 903 F.2d at 139 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Grendel's Den, the court acknowledged that the law concerning apportionment of fees assessments remains relatively unsettled and ... a number of theories for apportioning fees have been advanced. Grendel's Den, 749 F.2d at 959. The court discussed the simplest approach of dividing the award equally among the defendants, and the more sophisticated approaches of apportionment by degree of each defendant's liability ... and apportionment by relative time spent litigating against each defendant. Id. at 959-60 (citations omitted). The court noted [e]ach of these theories may be more or less valid in a given case. For example, where discrete injuries have been demonstrably caused by different parties, apportionment on the basis of degree of liability may be most practical and equitable. Id. at 960. In this case, there were no such discrete injuries, and thus the most common basis for fee apportionment does not exist here. Instead, Tarkanian's injury was singular and was caused by the combined actions of both the NCAA and UNLV. Justice White put it best when he observed that UNLV suspended Tarkanian because it embraced the NCAA rules governing conduct of its athletic program and adopted the results of the hearing conducted by the NCAA, as it had agreed it would. Under these facts, ... the NCAA acted jointly with UNLV. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 203, 109 S.Ct. 454, 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 469 (1988) (White, J., dissenting). Courts have traditionally imposed joint and several liability under such circumstances  that is, where two or more defendants combine to cause a single, indivisible injury, courts have generally held each defendant responsible for the entire amount of the judgment. See, e.g., Price v. Aztec Ltd., Inc., 108 Idaho 674, 701 P.2d 294, 297 (Ct. App.1985); Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 596 P.2d 460, 470 (Mont.1979); Powell v. Powell, 370 P.2d 909, 911 (Okla. 1962); see generally W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 52, at 347 (5th ed. 1984). While we recognize that fee liability is not altogether analogous to liability on the merits, we see no reason to prohibit the imposition of joint and several fee liability where the losing defendant has caused the plaintiff to suffer a single, indivisible harm. We accordingly agree with those courts that have afforded trial courts discretion to impose such fee liability. See, e.g., Smith v. Updegraff, 744 F.2d 1354, 1368 (8th Cir.1984); Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 712 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir.1983); and see Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorneys Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 Duke L.J. 435, 458 (1986). Specifically, we adopt in Nevada the following statement of the law: The only limitation on the district court's discretion to award fees jointly and severally is that it must do so consistently with the pre-existing background of substantive liability rules. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 171, 105 S.Ct. at 3108; Dean v. Gladney, 621 F.2d 1331, 1339-40 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 983, 101 S.Ct. 1521, 67 L.Ed.2d 819 (1981) (defendants must be joint tortfeasors). Of course, the district court should make every effort to achieve the most fair and sensible solution that is possible. Grendel's Den, 749 F.2d at 960. Thus, although apportionment may in some cases be a more equitable resolution, there is no rule in this circuit that requires it whenever possible.... Koster v. Perales, 903 F.2d 131, 139 (2nd Cir.1990) (emphasis added). Applying this rule here, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when it held UNLV responsible for the entire fee award, because UNLV helped cause Tarkanian to suffer a single, indivisible injury. We caution, however, that our opinion should not be construed to mean that the imposition of joint and several fee liability is required whenever joint and several liability is imposed. Rather, we emphasize that the matter is purely a discretionary one. UNLV also contends that a plaintiff who obtains relief against only one out of several defendants cannot recover a full fee award, which necessarily includes fees incurred litigating against the successful defendant. While there is some support for this position, see Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 713 F.2d 972, 979 (3rd Cir.1983), it does not represent a hard and fast rule. Ultimately, a trial court must award a reasonable fee, however the method upon which a reasonable fee is determined is subject to the discretion of the court. For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a district court has the discretion to reduce a lodestar [4] figure to account for a plaintiff's limited success. The court explained: In cases in which a plaintiff's success is limited, we have instructed the district court to apply a two-part analysis: First, the court asks whether the claims upon which the plaintiff failed to prevail were related to the plaintiff's successful claims.... If the unsuccessful and successful claims are related, then ... the court evaluates the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended. If the plaintiff obtained excellent results, full compensation may be appropriate, but if only partial or limited success was obtained, full compensation may be excessive. Corder v. Gates, 947 F.2d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1465 (9th Cir.1988)), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1087, 109 S.Ct. 2425, 104 L.Ed.2d 982 (1989), reinstated, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1838, 108 L.Ed.2d 966 (1990)). After emphasizing that the `purpose of a fee award is to encourage litigation and voluntary compliance with civil rights laws,' Corder, 947 F.2d at 379 (quoting Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir.1991)), the Ninth Circuit explained: In cases such as the present one, where a plaintiff brings an action against a large number of defendants, but manages to prevail only with regard to a few, perhaps an award granting 100% of the accrued attorney's fees encourages too much litigation. While it is true that the plaintiffs succeeded in proving a civil rights violation, they did so at the cost of forcing many individuals to bear the expense of defending against apparently meritless allegations.... Plaintiffs initially accused more than fifty defendants of violating their civil rights, yet obtained a verdict against three.... Obviously, then, the district court would have sound reasons for reducing a fee award in this type of a situation. On the other hand, our cases also make clear that the district court could have awarded plaintiffs the full lodestar amount. In Rivera v. City of Riverside, 763 F.2d 1580 (9th Cir.1985), aff'd on other grounds, 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986), plaintiffs sued thirty-two defendants, including thirty individual police officers. Plaintiffs prevailed against only six officers.... Nevertheless, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to reduce the attorney's fee award for limited success, despite the plaintiffs' failure to prevail against the majority of the original defendants. Thus, Cabrales and Rivera together indicate that district courts have considerable discretion in determining attorney's fees, a rule that is in conformity with the teachings of Blanchard [ Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989)] and Hensley [ Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)]. Corder, 947 F.2d at 379-80 (footnotes omitted). In Cabrales, the plaintiff was the mother of former inmate Sergio Cabrales, who brought suit against more than twenty sheriff's deputies and the county after her mentally ill son hanged himself while in solitary confinement. She succeeded only on her claim that the county maintained a policy of indifference to the safety and medical needs of the inmates. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's twenty-five percent reduction for limited success. Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1465 (9th. Cir.1988), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1087, 109 S.Ct. 2425, 104 L.Ed.2d 982 (1989), reinstated, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1838, 108 L.Ed.2d 966 (1990). Tarkanian could be considered a limited success plaintiff since he did not ultimately prevail on his claim against the NCAA. However, it is most significant that Tarkanian was given all the relief he sought under his section 1983 action. The Corder court stated: If a plaintiff ultimately wins on a particular claim, she [or he] is entitled to all attorney's fees reasonably expended in pursuing that claim  even though she may have suffered some adverse rulings. Corder, 947 F.2d at 379 n. 5 (quoting Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.1991)). Applying either a limited success analysis, or viewing Tarkanian as having prevailed on his claim despite some adverse rulings, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding one hundred percent of the fee award to Tarkanian against UNLV. We note that the original fee award was reduced for Tarkanian's ultimately unsuccessful first trial, and the award of fees for defending against the NCAA's appeal was vacated. Tarkanian was in fact ordered to pay some of the NCAA's fees on appeal. Thus, Tarkanian's unsuccessful claims have been considered at various points throughout this litigation, and the fees were accordingly reduced to arrive at a reasonable fee award. A logical construction of the order itself mandates the same result. As a general rule, judgments are to be construed like other written instruments and given the most reasonable and consistent construction as possible. See Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 217 P.2d 355 (1950). This court has previously stated: Where a judgment is susceptible of two interpretations, that one will be adopted which renders it the more reasonable, effective and conclusive, and which makes the judgment harmonize with the facts and law of the case, and be such as ought to have been rendered. Id. at 292, 217 P.2d at 365 (quoting Aseltine v. District Court, 57 Nev. 269, 273, 62 P.2d 701, 702 (1936)); see also Lindsay v. Lindsay, 52 Nev. 26, 280 P. 95 (1929). As discussed previously, the district court first found that Tarkanian was a prevailing plaintiff. It then awarded Tarkanian his statutory fees under section 1988 against both defendants. At the behest of the parties, the district court then apportioned the award. The apportionment of the attorney's fees was secondary and incidental to the finding of liability on the part of UNLV and the NCAA. There is also evidence in the record to indicate that the district court intended to impose joint and several liability on the NCAA and UNLV. The district court's original conclusions of law provide: 4. Both the Defendant NCAA and the Defendant UNLV have deprived the Plaintiff Tarkanian of procedural due process.... 5. Both the Defendant NCAA and the Defendant UNLV have deprived the Plaintiff Tarkanian of substantive due process.... [T]he decision by NCAA was arbitrary and capricious, and the decision of UNLV was vicariously so. The district court continued: (UNLV) carried out the real aim of the NCAA (severing Tarkanian), not out of respect for the NCAA's `Findings,' but due to fear of the seemingly omnipotent Enforcement Division of NCAA. Thus, a reasonable, effective, and conclusive interpretation of the judgment and award of attorney's fees supports joint and several liability for the fee award. UNLV argues that it is unfair to burden it with the entire fee award since Tarkanian litigated primarily against the NCAA, the true villain in this case. We recognize that this appeal involves a battle between two relatively innocent parties. Nonetheless, we are bound by the doctrine of law of the case; this court must adhere to the determination of the United States Supreme Court that the NCAA is not a state actor. Additionally, it must be remembered that UNLV did suspend Tarkanian, and the district court found UNLV violated Tarkanian's due process rights in so doing. It is not inequitable that UNLV pay the attorney's fees incurred in vindication of Tarkanian's civil rights, as the district court has unfailingly found that UNLV violated Tarkanian's civil rights. UNLV has consistently been a losing party in this civil rights litigation, and Tarkanian has consistently prevailed against UNLV. On remand, the district court was presented with the option of imposing responsibility for the payment of the attorney's fees on either a prevailing civil rights litigant or a losing defendant. We perceive no abuse of discretion in its choosing to impose the costs of this lawsuit on the latter. Moreover, this court is mindful of the purpose of the fee award in civil rights litigation. Attorney's fees under section 1988  are not awarded to punish defendants. Attorney's fees are awarded to encourage meritorious civil rights actions by ensuring reasonable compensation for victorious plaintiffs' attorneys. Corder v. Gates, 947 F.2d 374, 383 (9th Cir.1991). The basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights. Farrar v. Hobby, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978). In light of the express purpose of section 1988, the fact that Tarkanian obtained all the relief he sought under section 1983, and given a reasonable construction of the original judgment and order awarding and apportioning attorney's fees, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion on remand when it ordered that UNLV must pay all of Tarkanian's costs, including attorney's fees.