Opinion ID: 2370776
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Negligence: Failure to Warn

Text: WMATA contends that the trial court erred by denying its Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law because WMATA did not have a duty to warn, there was no dangerous condition that required a warning, and any failure to warn did not proximately cause Ms. Barksdale-Showell's injury, and thus, Ms. Barksdale-Showell failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence. Ms. Barksdale-Showell responds that because WMATA had superior knowledge of the unreasonably hazardous condition of the wet escalator, it had a duty to warn passengers, and sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find in her favor at trial. [7] We review the trial court's denial of WMATA's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law de novo. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Jeanty, 718 A.2d 172 (D.C.1998). Judgment as a matter of law may be granted only if, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party and there is only one conclusion that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Brown v. Nat'l Acad. Sci., 844 A.2d 1113, 1115 (D.C.2004) (citation omitted). The non-moving party is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence, and we must be cognizant that it is the responsibility of the jury (and not the judge) to weigh the evidence and to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 818 (D.C. 1998). Although the non-moving party is entitled to the benefit of all logical inferences, the jury may not be allowed to engage in idle speculation. District of Columbia v. Davis, 386 A.2d 1195, 1201 (D.C.1978). To prove a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a duty, and the breach of that duty proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. Davis, supra, 386 A.2d at 1200. In the District of Columbia, parties are charged with the duty to act with reasonable care under the circumstances. McKethean, supra, 588 A.2d at 712. Although there is no duty to warn when a danger is as well known to the plaintiff as it is to the defendant, if a certain danger is peculiarly foreseeable to the defendant but not the plaintiff, there is a duty to warn. See Ellis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 410 A.2d 1381, 1383 (D.C.1979). Knowledge of a dangerous condition implies not only that the condition is recognized, but also that the chance of harm and the gravity of the threatened harm are appreciated. Rest. (2d) of Torts § 342 cmt. a. (1965). Public utilities and government agencies may have special reason to anticipate that one who enters [their facilities] will proceed to encounter known or obvious dangers. Id. § 343A. The Restatement explains that the term known denotes not only knowledge of the existence of the condition ... but also appreciation of the danger it involves and that obvious means that both the condition and the risk are apparent to and would be recognized by a reasonable man, in the position of the visitor, exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment. Id. cmt. b. A public utility or government agency may have a duty to warn when there is reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk. Id. cmt. f. As a threshold matter, we agree with WMATA that Ms. Barksdale-Showell's testimony at trial along with other evidence demonstrated that she was or should have been aware of the open and obvious condition of the snow and ice on the ground and thus she should have  and did  exercise reasonable care in her journey from her home to the Anacostia Metrorail station. We disagree, however, with WMATA's contention that the condition of the escalators was open and obvious and known to Ms. Barksdale-Showell as it was to WMATA. Unlike WMATA, Ms. Barksdale-Showell was not aware of the prior slip and falls on that particular escalator or on other WMATA escalators. Her appreciation of the condition (the wet ground) was different than and distinct from her lack of appreciation of the unreasonably dangerous hazard risk that the condition posed on the escalator as opposed to other surfaces. Cf. Jones v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 742 F.Supp. 24, 27 (D.D.C.1990) (finding that a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would appreciate the danger and thus exercise extra care when wearing one-quarter-inch-wide high heels on an escalator with wide slots). This case is the converse of Ellis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 410 A.2d 1381, 1383 (D.C.1979), where this court held that the defendant store had no legal duty to warn the plaintiff of the physical attack she suffered because no such opportunity to warn existed prior to the attack, since the assailant's attack was spontaneous and there was no way defendant could have reasonably foreseen the criminal attack upon the plaintiff. The Ellis court noted that there is nothing to suggest that appellees know of the isolated attack on appellant in advance. Id. Here, on the other hand, WMATA had considerably more advance notice of the hazardous condition (and, thus, an opportunity to warn), the record demonstrates that escalator slip-and-falls were reasonably foreseeable because they had happened before (thus they were not an isolated and unforeseeable event), and, most significantly, it had the time and opportunity to warn Ms. Barksdale-Showell. Because WMATA failed to warn Ms. Barksdale-Showell, we must next analyze whether sufficient evidence existed for a reasonable jury to find that the breach of the duty to warn proximately caused Ms. Barksdale-Showell's injuries. Here, the jury heard Ms. Barksdale-Showell's testimony that there were no warnings of any kind and could reasonably infer that Ms. Barksdale-Showell, who had not encountered any problem during any other point in her walk from her home to the bus stop, exiting the bus, walking into the Metrorail station, and onto the escalator, was subjected to an unreasonably dangerous condition. Our holding in Wilson v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 912 A.2d 1186, 1189-90 (D.C.2006), is distinguishable because in that case no reasonable juror could have found that the dry sticky orange soda residue on the plaintiff's hand, which she noticed after the fall, caused her to fall when there was no evidence that orange soda was what she slipped on or was even on the steps. Id. at 1190. Additionally, this court's more recent decision in Mixon v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., is also distinguishable because there the plaintiff was unable to produce any evidence as to the cause of his fall or WMATA's knowledge of any substance being present on the escalator. 959 A.2d 55, 59 (D.C.2008) (affirming because the [a]ppellant simply has not shown, beyond his own speculation, that any act or omission by WMATA or its personnel had anything to do with his fall.). By contrast, Ms. Barksdale-Showell adduced evidence at trial  including WMATA's stipulation  that it was wet and slushy outside the station, that she used caution while walking, and that she fell only when she started to walk down the escalator. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Barksdale-Showell and drawing all inferences in her favor, a reasonable juror could find in her favor on causation. There was more than a scintilla of evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find in Ms. Barksdale-Showell's favor. The weight that should be accorded to the evidence and credibility determinations are for the jury, and we hold that the trial court properly denied WMATA's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Cf. Twyman v. Johnson, 655 A.2d 850, 851, 853 (D.C.1995) (holding that plaintiff's testimony did not tie her fall to a defective condition of the stairs, and her bare statement that she did not know what caused her to fall was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the conditions of the steps, as opposed to her lack of sure footing or some factor, caused her fall). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court. So ordered.