Opinion ID: 1666085
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Combination Murder Instruction

Text: Appellant, in his third allegation of error, argues that his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict was denied as a result of the trial court's combination jury instruction. Although we have reversed Appellant's conviction on other grounds, we will, nevertheless, explore the matter in hopes that upon retrial, the trial court will include separate form verdicts which allows the jury to distinguish its findings, or separate murder instructions, if the court determines the evidence does not support a combination instruction. At trial, the jury was given a combination murder instruction which permitted it to find Appellant guilty of either intentional or wanton murder. KRS 507.020(1). The instruction read: You will find the Defendant guilty of Murder under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about September 2, 2004, and before the finding of the indictment herein, he killed Michelle Benjamin by asphyxiation by strangulation. AND B. That in so doing: 1. He caused the death of Michelle Benjamin intentionally; OR 2. He was wantonly engaging in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the death of Michelle Benjamin under circumstances manifesting a grave indifference to human life. During guilt phase deliberation, the jurors submitted the following question to the trial judge: When deciding the charges for murder, do we have to select if we feel he committed the crime intentionally or wantonly, meaning our decision will read murder (1) or (2)? The trial judge sent a reply back which simply read, No. In Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Ky.1998), a case with quite similar factual circumstances, we refrained from finding reversible error in the combination jury instruction given, which was substantially identical to that above, noting the instruction followed the pattern set forth in 1 Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) § 3.24. However, we also warned, `[t]he danger of committing reversible error by giving this instruction can be avoided by using form verdicts requiring the jury to state whether guilt is found under section B(1) or B(2).' Id. ( quoting 1 Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) § 3.24, comment). The problem, of course, is that when questions as to the sufficiency of evidence to support both mental states arise, such an instruction brings into question the unanimity of a verdict if the jury is not allowed to distinguish its findings of guilt upon wanton or intentional murder. As we have repeatedly noted, `[a]n instruction of an alternative nature is proper only when either theory (intentional/wanton) is reasonably supported by the evidence.' Hudson, 979 S.W.2d at 109 ( quoting Barbour v. Commonwealth, 824 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky.1992)); cf. Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Ky. 1978) (holding that a verdict can not be successfully attacked upon the ground that the jurors could have believed either of two theories of the case where both interpretations are supported by the evidence and the proof of either beyond a reasonable doubt constitutes the same offense.). Therefore, when the evidence will support either mental state beyond a reasonable doubt, a combination murder instruction is certainly proper. However, in Hudson we cautioned, we strongly emphasize that, when intentional and wanton murder are included in a single instruction, the preferred practice is to include a form verdict that requires the jury to state whether guilt is found under the theory of intentional murder or under the theory of wanton murder, in hopes that trial courts would heed our request to curb the practice of utilizing form verdicts which do not require the jury to indicate under which theory guilt was found. Id. at 110. Alas, the practice has persisted in the Commonwealth and has reared its head before this Court on far too many occasions. Appellant argues that his combination instruction violated his substantive constitutional rights. In Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 2501, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991), the United States Supreme Court indicated that combination jury instructions implicate a criminal defendant's right to a unanimous verdict under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In its opinion, the Supreme Court reserved explicitly passing judgment on the permissible limits of defining criminal intent in a state's statutory scheme, noting such a question was more properly within the scope of state courts and legislatures. Id. at 636, 111 S.Ct. at 2499. The Court did note, however, [i]f, then, two mental states are supposed to be equivalent means to satisfy the mens rea element of a single offense, they must reasonably reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness or culpability, whereas a difference in their perceived degrees of culpability would be a reason to conclude that they identified different offenses altogether. Id. at 643, 111 S.Ct. at 2503. In the Commonwealth, we have not found that the use of two mental states as alternative notions to satisfy the mens rea for murder is repugnant to due process. See Wells, 561 S.W.2d at 87. Yet, the use of Due Process as a yardstick for verdict specificity supports the demands of fundamental fairness, and Kentucky has long followed this tradition. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 637, 111 S.Ct. at 2500. At common law, murder included killing with malice aforethought, and malice aforethought included both intentional and wanton mens rea. This is reflected in the Model Penal Code, which Kentucky has adopted. Thus, while history and current practice support the use of intentional and wanton mental states as being equivalent means to satisfy the mens rea element of KRS 507.020, we remain troubled by the improper utilization of combination verdict forms which do not require the jury to distinguish its findings when there is a question as to the sufficiency of evidence to support both. We do not, however, suggest that is the case here. Therefore, we reiterate our prior directive: when giving combination jury instructions reflecting distinct theories of culpability which bear equal punishment, trial courts should preliminarily determine if there is evidence to support a combination instruction; if the trial judge finds that the evidence is unlikely to support a combination instruction, the court should include separate verdict forms, and if the evidence suffices, the court may use a combination instruction which permits the jury to distinguish upon which theory it bases its findings. In the present instance, at trial, Appellant's counsel contemporaneously objected to the form of the verdict, asserting that the two mental states should be presented on separate pages. Here, the jury was confused by the combination instruction, as evidenced by their submission of a request for clarification to the trial judge. When the jury submitted their question, counsel asked for a mistrial, arguing that a unanimous verdict must be reached. The judge may have been correct in telling the jury they did not have to select a theory, as evidence may well have supported both theories. One could read the jury's request to suggest the jury was not unanimous, as did perhaps Appellant's counsel. On the other hand, the request may have just reflected jury confusion as to the proper manner of the verdict. We will refrain from making such determination here, as it is unnecessary. Nonetheless, it is better practice in these instances to either set forth the separate theories on separate verdict forms or when a combination instruction is given, require the jury to specify on the verdict upon which theory they find. Then the problem which arose here is alleviated.