Opinion ID: 1445244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jairor Bias

Text: The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a verdict by impartial, indifferent jurors. The bias . . . of even a single juror would violate [Defendant's] right to a fair trial. Dyer, 151 F.3d at 973 (citation omitted); see also McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). We have analyzed juror bias under two theoriesactual bias and implied bias. See Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir.2002). Actual bias is, in essence, `bias in fact'the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality. United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). If a Defendant can show that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause, then Defendant is entitled to a new trial. United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1121(9th Cir.2001). The presence of a biased juror is a structural error not subject to harmless error analysis. Dyer, 151 F.3d at 973 n. 2. The determination of whether a juror is actually biased is a question of fact, and thus accorded deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d at 1103. Here, the trial court held a hearing and found that neither Juror No. 12 nor Juror No. 8 was actually biased. The state courts found that Juror No. 12's discomfort at signing her affidavit after the verdict, because of the thought of facing the victim's family, did not mean that she dishonestly answered questions during voir dire when she disclosed her relationship to the decedent's family and represented that she could judge the evidence fairly. Similarly, the state courts found insufficient evidence that Juror No. 8 intentionally concealed an actual bias during voir dire when he disclosed his mother's murder and represented that he could judge the evidence fairly. We cannot say that either of those factual determinations was unreasonable. Additionally, in extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the circumstances. Dyer, 151 F.3d at 981(citations omitted). We have indicated four instructive fact situations where juror bias might be implied. In Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass'n, we discussed the following scenarios: (1) where the juror is apprised of such prejudicial information about the defendant that the court deems it highly unlikely that he can exercise independent judgment even if the juror states he will, (2) the existence of certain relationships between the juror and the defendant, (3) where a juror or his close relatives have been personally involved in a situation involving a similar fact pattern, and (4) where it is revealed that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the underlying transaction. 112 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir.1997). Two of the four situations could apply here. One is the existence of certain relationships between the juror and the defendant, as applied to Juror No. 12. The second is where a juror or a close relative has been personally involved in a situation involving a similar fact pattern, as applied to Juror No. 8. Compare Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 529(9th Cir.1990) (declining to find implied bias in rape trial where a juror had counseled rape victims because neither the juror nor a close relative had been a rape victim), with United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding implied bias in heroin conspiracy trial where juror's sons were serving prison terms for heroin-related crimes). Implied bias presents a mixed question of law and fact which is reviewable de novo. Dyer, 151 F.3d at 979. Still, even considering the theory of implied bias, Estrada's claims are unavailing. We cannot say that Juror No. 12's relationship to the Morgan family put her in an extreme situation, as she was not related to any members of the victim's immediate family. The state appellate court's determination that Juror No. 12 was not impliedly biased was therefore not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. [13] See Smith, 455 U.S. at 222-23, 102 S.Ct. 940(O'Connor, J., concurring). Regarding Juror No. 8, even considering that he discussed his mother's murder in the deliberations, we cannot say that such evidence would render unreasonable or contrary to law the determination that Juror No. 8 answered his voir dire questions honestly. [14] In that regard, this case differs from Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d at 979-81, in which the juror in question was found to have lied repeatedly to gain a seat on the jury. Because a hearing was unlikely to change the final result, the state court's determination was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it declined to hold a hearing. Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S.Ct. at 1940. AFFIRMED.