Opinion ID: 1195119
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to Vote

Text: The Plaintiffs claim that the State Committee violated their fundamental right to vote in the referendum election by implementing LB 126 before the general election, thus nullifying their subsequent sufficient vote to repeal LB 126. The district court dismissed the right to vote claim based on res judicata, or claim preclusion, applying the equitable doctrine of virtual representation and concluding that the Nebraska Supreme Court conclusively decided this issue in the Pony Lake litigation. The application of res judicata is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 457 F.3d 766, 770 (8th Cir.2006). The res judicata effect of the first forum's judgment is governed by [the] first forum's law, id. (internal marks omitted), or Nebraska law in this case. Additionally, we review de novo the district court's interpretation and application of state law. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991). Under Nebraska law, [t]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of a matter that has been directly addressed or necessarily included in a former adjudication if (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) the former judgment was a final judgment, (3) the former judgment was on the merits, and (4) the same parties or their privies were involved in both actions. Ichtertz v. Orthopaedic Specialists of Neb., P.C., 273 Neb. 466, 730 N.W.2d 798, 804 (Neb.2007). The Supreme Court of Nebraska addressed and rejected the Pony Lake plaintiffs' constitutional claims, including the same right-to-vote claim brought by the Plaintiffs here. Thus, if applicable, res judicata prevents these Plaintiffs from relitigating the same claim in a second forum. The first three elements are not in dispute. The judgment in the Pony Lake litigation was issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; that judgment is final; and the judgment determined the merits of the Pony Lake plaintiffs' right-to-vote claim under the United States Constitution. Thus, the only contested issue is whether the Plaintiffs in the present case are in privity with the Pony Lake plaintiffs. State courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues, as long as the state's application of its preclusion doctrines complies with due process. Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 135 L.Ed.2d 76 (1996). Due process under the United States Constitution precludes giving a conclusive effect to a prior judgment against one who is neither a party nor in privity with a party therein. Id. at 797 n. 4, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (internal marks omitted). [A]lthough there are clearly constitutional limits on the `privity' exception, the term `privity' is now used to describe various relationships between litigants that would not have come within the traditional definition of that term. Id. at 798, 116 S.Ct. 1761. Finding a party to be a virtual representative for a nonparty to the suit is another way of saying that the nonparty was in privity with the party in the original suit. See Pirrotta v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 347, 396 N.W.2d 20, 22 n. 1 (Minn.1986) (noting that virtual representation appears to be no different from the traditional privity analysis). [V]irtual representation is best understood as an equitable theory rather than as a crisp rule with sharp corners and clear factual predicates, such that a party's status as a virtual representative of a nonparty must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 761 (1st Cir.1994) (internal citations omitted). As an equitable tool, courts weigh various factors in determining whether a party to a suit virtually represented a nonparty. The weight and identity of the factors vary from case to case, but a few common threads appear throughout the cases, indicating a handful of critical factors. This court has previously concluded that identity of interests between the two parties is necessary, though not alone sufficient. Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 455 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1166, 117 S.Ct. 1427, 137 L.Ed.2d 536 (1997). The Supreme Court has focused on notice (actual or constructive) and sufficient representation as minimum requirements before a nonparty can be bound by a prior judgment, particularly when a nonparty seeks to adjudicate private interests. See Richards, 517 U.S. at 805, 116 S.Ct. 1761; see also Gonzalez, 27 F.3d at 761 ([N]otwithstanding identity of interests, virtual representation will not serve to bar a nonparty's claim unless the nonparty has had actual or constructive notice of the earlier litigation, and the balance of the relevant equities tips in favor of preclusion.) (internal footnotes omitted). Other factors that may support a finding of virtual representation include a close relationship, participation by the nonparty in the prior litigation, apparent acquiescence, tactical maneuvering by the nonparty to avoid the effects of the first action, and whether the issue involves public or private issues. See Tyus, 93 F.3d at 455-56; Irwin v. Mascott, 370 F.3d 924, 929-30 (9th Cir.2004) (In short, a close relationship, substantial participation, and tactical maneuvering all support a finding of virtual representation; identity of interests and adequate representation are necessary to such a finding.). The Supreme Court of Nebraska has not had a specific occasion to apply the doctrine of virtual representation, so we are tasked with determining how and whether that court would apply the doctrine in this case. Applying federal claim preclusion law, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held nonparties to be in privity with parties to a prior suit, noting that privity requires, at a minimum, a substantial identity between the issues in controversy and showing the parties in the two actions are really and substantially in interest the same. VanDeWalle v. Albion Nat'l Bank, 243 Neb. 496, 500 N.W.2d 566, 573 (Neb.1993) (internal marks omitted) (holding that two brothers were collaterally estopped from litigating the ownership of a piece of property based on a prior suit brought by their parents). The Nebraska Supreme Court has quoted this language from VanDeWalle approvingly in subsequent cases applying Nebraska law. See, e.g., R.W. v. Schrein, 263 Neb. 708, 642 N.W.2d 505, 511 (Neb.2002) (holding that an insurer was not in privity with its insured where it had no duty to defend the insured on the claim that was the subject of the action); Torrison v. Overman, 250 Neb. 164, 549 N.W.2d 124, 132 (Neb.1996) (same). In addressing the privity prong of claim preclusion, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has stated that due process requires that the rule ... operate only against persons who have had their day in court either as a party to a prior suit or as a privy; and, where not so, that at least the presently asserted interest was adequately represented in the prior trial.  Gottsch v. Bank of Stapleton, 235 Neb. 816, 458 N.W.2d 443, 457 (Neb.1990) (emphasis added) (internal marks omitted). The Supreme Court of Nebraska has recognized, moreover, that the Nebraska class action statute, which allows a class representative to represent numerous parties with common interests, is analogous to the equitable doctrine of virtual representation. See Blankenship v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 195 Neb. 170, 237 N.W.2d 86, 89-90 (Neb.1976) (recognizing that a class representative's interests must be compatible with the interests of all class members by drawing an analogy to the doctrine of virtual representation). Given the broad application of privity allowed by the Nebraska courts and the equitable nature of the doctrine, we agree with the district court that the Nebraska courts would consider the doctrine of virtual representation in determining whether a subsequent party was in privity with a party to an earlier suit. We proceed to weigh the relevant factors. The interest asserted here is identical to the interests asserted in the Pony Lake litigation. The Plaintiffs here claim that the Committee's actions infringed upon their constitutional right to vote on the repeal of LB 126. The Pony Lake plaintiffs made the same constitutional claim, asserting their right to vote on the forced consolidation of the Class I school districts. Pony Lake, 710 N.W.2d at 622-23. The Plaintiffs here assert their rights as voters and members of the Class I districts, the same interests held by the plaintiffs in the Pony Lake litigation. The critical factor of similar interests required by Tyus is satisfied; indeed, the interests are identical. Although the right to vote is an individual right, the claim here is not that the Plaintiffs were prevented from voting  they were not. Rather, the Plaintiffs claim that the Committee's actions of consolidating the school districts (as mandated by LB 126) prior to the election deprived them of an effective vote. We view this claim as public in nature. The Committee's actions complied with Nebraska law, and it was the Nebraska Constitution that required implementation of LB 126 prior to the referendum election that resulted in the repeal of LB 126. The Plaintiffs' voting rights claim in this lawsuit in effect challenges the constitutionality of Nebraska's state constitution based referendum scheme that provides for implementation of challenged legislation prior to the referendum vote unless ten percent of registered voters sign the referendum petition. This is analogous to the facts of Niere, where nonregistered voters brought Equal Protection and First Amendment challenges to the Missouri legislative scheme that allowed the disincorporation of their town based on a petition signed by a supermajority of registered voters. See Niere v. St. Louis County, Mo., 305 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir.2002) (concluding that constitutional claims brought by nonregistered voters seeking to challenge the disincorporation of their town were public in nature); see also Tyus, 93 F.3d at 457 (characterizing First Amendment challenge as raising an issue of public law where the plaintiffs [did] not allege that they `ha[d] a different private right not shared in common with the public') (quoting Stromberg v. Bd. of Educ. of Bratenahl, 64 Ohio St.2d 98, 413 N.E.2d 1184, 1186 (Ohio 1980), which found a taxpayer's challenge to the dissolution of a school district to be public in nature and precluded by an earlier suit brought by the school board for the district). The due process concerns that limit the application of the res judicata doctrine to nonparties are lessened when the rights asserted involve issues of public concern rather than private rights. See Richards, 517 U.S. at 803, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (distinguishing between public and private interests and noting that States have wide latitude to establish procedures ... to limit the number of judicial proceedings that may be entertained in cases raising public issues); Tyus, 93 F.3d at 457 (noting that the due process concerns attendant with a broad application of preclusion are lessened in cases raising public issues). In Tyus, the court noted that the nonparties to the first suit would have benefitted if the named parties had won, but, absent preclusion, the nonparties were not harmed by the named party's loss. Thus, there was no incentive to intervene in the original action, and the lack of preclusion actually promoted fence sitting. Tyus, 93 F.3d at 457 ([H]olding preclusion inapplicable assures that a party would not intervene, for it would allow various members of a coordinated group to bring separate lawsuits in the hope that one member of the group would eventually be successful, benefitting the entire group.). The same is true here. When the Pony Lake plaintiffs were unsuccessful, a new group of voters and taxpayers brought this suit, raising the same claims. If preclusion is not proper here and the Plaintiffs in this case are not successful, nothing will prevent the next group of voters who voted to repeal LB 126 from filing another suit. This entails a significant cost to the judicial system and discourages the principles and policies the doctrine of res judicata was designed to promote. Id. Although none of the Plaintiffs in this case were named plaintiffs in the Pony Lake litigation, one of these Plaintiffs is the spouse of one of the litigants in Pony Lake, and the Plaintiffs here are represented by the same counsel as the Pony Lake plaintiffs. See Tyus, 93 F.3d at 457 (noting that the presence of the same counsel suggested that the parties were closely related); VanDeWalle, 500 N.W.2d at 573 (noting that the sons and parents had a close relationship with respect to the property at issue in holding that the judgment in the parents' prior suit barred the sons' later suit); see also Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 923-24 (9th Cir.1996) (applying virtual representation to a daughter's excessive force claim related to the death of her father where the decedent's mother (the plaintiff's grandmother) had already brought a wrongful death claim, based in part on the identical interests in seeing the officers punished and on the employment of the same attorney), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1117, 117 S.Ct. 1249, 137 L.Ed.2d 330 (1997). While these factors are not dispositive nor sufficient alone to establish privity, they do tend to tip the scale toward a finding of privity. The Supreme Court has noted the importance of notice before a nonparty is precluded by a prior suit. Richards, 517 U.S. at 805, 116 S.Ct. 1761. The Plaintiffs do not assert that they were unaware of the Pony Lake litigation, and the inclusion of at least one of the Plaintiffs' spouses as well as employment of the same counsel in this suit, filed less than one month after the Supreme Court of the United States denied the Pony Lake plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari, satisfy us that the Plaintiffs were on sufficient notice of the prior suit that their due process rights would not be unduly hindered by application of res judicata to this suit. Nor do the Plaintiffs assert that the Pony Lake plaintiffs failed to vigorously pursue the voting rights claim or that they otherwise ineffectively presented the claim. Cf. Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965, 974-75 (D.C.Cir.2007) (considering the use of the same counsel as at least relevant to the issue of whether the nonparty was adequately represented in the prior suit as strongly suggest[ing] satisfaction with the attorney's performance in the prior case), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 977, 169 L.Ed.2d 800 (2008). The Plaintiffs argue only that they should have their own day in court. Based on the factors discussed above, we believe that the Nebraska courts would find these Plaintiffs to be in privity with the Pony Lake plaintiffs. The district court properly applied res judicata to preclude the Plaintiffs' right-to-vote claim.