Opinion ID: 1927268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jones' failure to ascertain the purpose of the survey, and Bell's failure to inform him

Text: Bell's first theory of liability was that Jones failed to exercise the reasonable care of a surveyor of ordinary prudence when he neglected to ascertain the precise type of survey he was being asked to perform. Jones asserted in defense that Bell was contributorily negligent in failing to advise him of the intended uses of the survey. The trial court found that both parties were negligent under this theory and denied recovery to Bell. We affirm this ruling. The finding that Jones was negligent in failing to ascertain the use to which Bell intended to put the survey was supported by the evidence. A surveyor must exercise that degree of skill and care which a surveyor of ordinary skill and prudence would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. Rodney Hansen, Bell's expert surveyor witness, testified that an ordinarily prudent surveyor would ask his or her client what the purpose of the survey was. Other evidence showed that Jones failed to do so. It follows that there was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find that Jones was negligent. See Psychiatric Institute v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 623-625 (D.C.1986); Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173, 175-179 (D.C.1977); see also Rich v. District of Columbia, 410 A.2d 528, 532 (D.C.1979) (the law requires only that the evidence, when viewed most favorably for the plaintiff, indicate a reasonable probability of negligence on the part of the defendant (citations omitted)). The finding of contributory negligence on the part of Bell was also supported by the evidence. Specifically, the court found that Bell failed to exercise the reasonable care of an architect of ordinary prudence when he failed to advise [Jones] of the intended uses of the survey. . . . Bell contends that this finding is erroneous because no standard of care exists in the practice of architecture which requires an architect to inform a professional engineer or surveyor of the particular uses which he or she intends to make of a survey, and because he did inform Jones in any event that he was using the survey for construction purposes. We reject Bell's contentions and uphold the trial court's finding. In the District of Columbia, [a]rchitects are held to a standard of performance which requires them to employ that degree of skill and care ordinarily used by their colleagues. Noble v. Worthy, supra, 378 A.2d at 676 (citations and footnote omitted); see also 5 AM.JUR.2D Architects § 8 (1962). At trial Jones' expert architectural witness, John Saulton, was asked whether a prudent architect [would] inform his surveyor, when he is ordering a survey, of the use to which the architect intended to put the survey; to that question he replied, Yes. Yes. The fact that Saulton went on to say that when he himself orders a survey from an engineer, he tells the engineer what he wants on the survey [15] does not detract from his testimony that a reasonably prudent surveyor would do the same thing. Earlier Saulton was asked whether there was a practice with respect to determining what information will be contained on [a] topographical survey in the District of Columbia. He answered, It's a practice for the architect to say or indicate what information . . . he desires. We hold that Mr. Saulton's testimony, considered as a whole, was sufficient to prove that a reasonably prudent architect would inform a surveyor of the uses to which he or she intends to put the survey. Bell argues that the existence of certain drawings, which indicate that Jones included some information on the plat of survey which was unnecessary for a title survey, proves that he did tell Jones that he intended to use the survey for construction purposes. We cannot agree. Bell testified that he could not recall specifying the type of survey he requested from Jones or informing Jones of the purpose for which he intended to use the survey. Jones testified, however, that he understood the survey was to be used for title purposes only. On this point the trial court evidently accepted the testimony of Jones, finding that it was Jones' understanding . . . that [Bell] intended to use the survey solely for mortgage financing and title purposes rather than as a basis for architectural or construction drawings. We must accept the court's resolution of factual disputes and uphold its findings unless they are clearly erroneous. D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1981); see Edmund J. Flynn Co. v. LaVay, 431 A.2d 543, 546-547 (D.C.1981). Given Jones' testimony, we cannot overturn the court's findings on the basis of the drawings on which Bell relies. We limit our affirmance, however, to the finding that Bell was contributorily negligent in November 1978 when he failed initially to tell Jones the intended purpose of the survey. Bell asserts that in January 1979, and again in February 1979, he made known to Jones that the survey was being used for construction purposes, and that on each occasion Jones made some revisions in the survey. Whether the mention of working drawings, coupled with the request for more information about the carriage house and the rear wall, was sufficient to alert Jones in January (before any of the construction delays occurred) that the survey was being used for the preparation of construction plans [16] might be a critical issue in other circumstances. In this case, however, we need not decide the issue, because we hold as a matter of law that Bell was not contributorily negligent in relying on Jones' certification of the survey.