Opinion ID: 1704512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Sprik's request to use N.G.'s juvenile records for impeachment purposes.

Text: On May 21, 1993, the trial court signed an Order permitting Sprik to inspect and/or photocopy all adjudicatory orders and other relevant Juvenile Court criminal files and records pertaining to the victim, N.G. After an in camera review of the records, however, the trial court denied Sprik's request for access. Sprik argues that the trial court's ruling denied him the opportunity to effectively cross-examine and confront N.G. and to impeach her credibility. Sprik's right to confront witnesses testifying against him is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article VI, § 7 of the South Dakota Constitution. State v. Bogenreif, 465 N.W.2d 777, 782 (S.D.1991). However, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Id. (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15, 19 (1985) (citations omitted; emphasis in original)). Exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. However, trial courts have broad discretion to impose limits on cross-examination of witnesses for potential bias. Id. (citations omitted). See State v. Grooms, 399 N.W.2d 358, 362 (S.D. 1987) (stating that a trial court may, in its good judgment, control the realm of cross-examination). Sprik must show that a reasonable jury probably would have a significantly different impression if otherwise appropriate cross-examination had been permitted. State v. Koepsell, 508 N.W.2d 591, 595 (S.D.1993) (citations omitted). Decisions on the cross-examination of a witness' juvenile record are governed by Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). State v. Layton, 337 N.W.2d 809, 813 (S.D.1983). The admission of juvenile adjudications is of constitutional dimension only where the witness is crucial to the prosecution's case. Id. (citing State v. Wounded Head, 305 N.W.2d 677, 681 (S.D.1981)). Because there were no witnesses to the rape, the testimony of N.G. was crucial to the State's case. The Missouri Supreme Court, in Missouri v. Russell, 625 S.W.2d 138 (Mo.1981) (en banc), interpreted Davis to allow a defendant to prove bias which could result from a juvenile witness's motive to lie because he is a suspect and subject to control of the juvenile authorities. Missouri v. Baker, 859 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Mo.Ct.App.1993) (citing Russell, 625 S.W.2d at 141). The Russell court found that Davis did not hold that a court must permit the general credibility of a juvenile to be attacked by a record of a juvenile adjudication or by unrestrained cross-examination concerning such adjudication or acts of misconduct. Id. This court interpreted Davis similarly in State v. Rough Surface, 440 N.W.2d 746 (S.D.1989). Noting that the juvenile witness in Davis was on probation for a burglary charge, we stated: The [Supreme] Court [in Davis ] distinguished between a general attack on credibility, which it characterized as an effort to infer that the witness' character is such that he would be less likely than the average trustworthy citizen to be truthful in his testimony[,] and a more particular attack on the witness' credibility, effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. Rough Surface, 440 N.W.2d at 752 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d at 353-54). The question which demanded cross-examination on the juvenile's record was whether he had testified to protect his probationary status or to shift suspicion away from himself. The opinion repeatedly referred to bias and prejudice. In that respect, we read the Davis court as limiting its holding.  In this setting we conclude that the right of confrontation is paramount to the State's policy of protecting a juvenile offender. Id. (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 319, 94 S.Ct. at 1112, 39 L.Ed.2d at 355) (emphasis added in Rough Surface ). The trial court conducted an in camera review of N.G.'s juvenile records and determined that the information was unrelated to the matters at issue in the criminal prosecution against Sprik. See Baker, 859 S.W.2d at 810 (court and counsel viewed the record in camera). Sprik failed to make an offer of proof which would have provided a record of N.G.'s juvenile records for appellate review. See Bogenreif, 465 N.W.2d at 782 (noting that defendant, who was contending that he was denied a full opportunity to question a key witness for the prosecution, made an offer of proof). Even without access to N.G.'s juvenile records, N.G. was subject to extensive cross-examination concerning her credibility. See Id. (defense counsel permitted to expose to the jury facts from which they could judge witness' credibility); Layton, 337 N.W.2d at 813 (since the witness was extensively cross-examined, the jury was well aware of the witness' criminal record). It appears from the record that Sprik wanted access to N.G.'s juvenile records to continue to impeach her credibility, rather than to conduct a more particular attack on [N.G.'s] credibility ... directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives... as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. Rough Surface, 440 N.W.2d at 752 (citation omitted). Sprik has failed to show that a reasonable jury probably would have had a significantly different impression of N.G.'s credibility if he had been allowed to use her juvenile records for impeachment purposes. Koepsell, 508 N.W.2d at 595; Bogenreif, 465 N.W.2d at 782. Therefore, he has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to use N.G.'s juvenile records for impeachment purposes. [2] Grooms, 399 N.W.2d at 362.