Opinion ID: 1451436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: .Preemption by CERCLA

Text: Federal preemption is an affirmative defense upon which the defendants bear the burden of proof, and we review de novo a district court's determination that federal law preempts a state law or municipal ordinance. See Fifth Third Bank v. CSX Corp., 415 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2005). Although the district court seems to have concluded that it was divested of jurisdiction by section 113(h), its opinion might be read as holding that, more generally, CERCLA preempted the Village's claims. Even if we were to assume that Exxon so contends, it has not met its burden of proving that CERCLA preempted the Village's claims. CERCLA's preemptive scope is not total. The statutory text states expressly, in several provisions, that at least some claims under state law are permitted to proceed. Section 114(a) states that [n]othing in this chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances within such States. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a). Section 302(d) states that [n]othing in this chapter shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect to release of hazardous substances or other pollutants or contaminants. . . . Id. § 9652(d). CERCLA contemplates action[s] brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility. Id. § 9658(a)(1). Section 310(h) states that [t]his chapter does not affect or otherwise impair the rights of any person under Federal, State, or common law, except with respect to the timing of review as provided in section 113(h) of this title or as otherwise provided in section 9658 of this title (relating to actions under State law). Id. § 9659(h). Finally, section 113(h) itself applies to bar jurisdiction only over federal-law challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 or any order issued under section 9606(a). Id. § 9613(h). The precise contours of CERCLA preemption over state environmental cleanup actions or municipal ordinances that affect federal removal or remedial actions are not easy to discern. [9] We need not address this area in any comprehensive way, however, because Exxon has not met its burden of showing that there is any federal law or effort with which the Village's nuisance ordinance could conflict. Exxon's sole argument is that section 113(h) bars the Village's claims because those claims challenge a CERCLA remedythe Consent Order previously entered by the state court. The Consent Order was instituted by the Illinois EPA, however, not by the federal government, and the IEPA's role in the lawsuit and Consent Order was conducted pursuant to its own authority under the [Illinois Act]. R.1, Ex. 1 pt.1 at 28. Exxon has failed to point to any challenge[ ] to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to any order issued under section 9606(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). In fact, Exxon has failed to show that any CERCLA-authorized remediation effort or, indeed, any federal involvement whatsoever is implicated in this case with which the application of the Village's nuisance ordinance could conflict. Exxon therefore has failed to carry its burden of proving federal preemption of the Village's claims. See Fifth Third Bank, 415 F.3d at 745.