Opinion ID: 2611883
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asportation Standard Applicable to Section 208(d)

Text: The parties articulate somewhat different tests for determining whether the evidence of asportation is sufficient under section 208(d). Defendant contends that we should adopt the Daniels test for all kidnappings which involve an `associated crime' such as kidnapping for rape under section 208(d). The `substantial movement' test should only be retained where there is no `associated crime.' [A]n exception to the `substantial distance' test could be developed for the rare case in which the forcible movement resulted in the complete isolation of the victim for a substantial period of time. The Attorney General, relying on People v. Bradley, supra, 15 Cal. App.4th 1144, argues that the section 207 simple kidnapping asportation standard should apply to section 208(d), but suggests expanding this test to include evaluation of both the distance and character of the movement. Such a test would consider the actual distance and any environmental changes resulting from the move, and whether those changes increase risk of danger to the victim by decreas[ing] the likelihood of detection, rescue or escape.... It would not require a substantial increase in the risk of harm to the victim. We discern little meaningful distinction between these two tests. In effect the parties' disagreement is not over whether the simple or aggravated kidnapping asportation standard should apply, but over whether the increase in risk of harm to the victim must be substantial. We conclude that defendant has the better argument, and that the two-part Daniels asportation test should apply to section 208(d) kidnapping for rape. As noted above, section 208(d) provides that If the person is kidnapped with the intent to commit rape, oral copulation, sodomy, or rape by instrument, the kidnapping is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 5, 8, or 11 years. This language is strikingly similar to section 209(b), or kidnapping for robbery, which provides that Any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with possibility of parole. Where a statute is framed in language of an earlier enactment on the same or an analogous subject, and that enactment has been judicially construed, the Legislature is presumed to have adopted that construction. ( People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 [256 Cal. Rptr. 401, 768 P.2d 1078].) Thus, in using language parallel to that of section 209(b), which has been construed to require the two-part Daniels asportation test, the Legislature undoubtedly intended to incorporate a similar asportation requirement into section 208(d). In reaching our conclusion, we are mindful of the fact that we have previously declined to extend the Daniels test to either simple kidnapping or a kidnapping involving an associated crime other than robbery. Rather, as demonstrated above, we have applied the section 207 simple kidnapping standard in cases involving asportation for purposes of committing associated crimes such as rape and murder, People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pages 602-603, and assault, Cotton v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d at pages 463-465. However, in contrast to the section 207 language we construed in Stanworth, culpability under section 208(d) cannot occur in the absence of another crime, or an attempt to commit a crime. ( People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 600.) Rather, culpability under section 208(d) will always involve the associated crimes or attempted crimes of rape, oral copulation, sodomy, or rape by instrument. (§ 208(d).) Thus, the `movement' factor of the Daniels rule is uniquely suited to section 209 and section 208(d) because these forms of kidnapping by definition proscribe kidnapping for the purpose of committing a particular offense. (See People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 600.) We are also conscious of the fact that the only occasion in which the Legislature appears to have expressly adopted the Daniels risk of harm language is in section 209.5, which prohibits robbery of a vehicle or carjacking. The question arises, therefore, why, if the Legislature intended this risk of harm standard to apply to section 208(d), it did not use such explicit language here. We are guided by the fact that section 209.5 was enacted in October of 1993, or approximately three years after section 208(d). Within that time period, People v. Bradley, supra, 15 Cal. App.4th 1144, had been decided. As noted above, this case held that the asportation test for section 208(d) was that used for simple kidnapping. Thus, the Legislature may have concluded that more explicit guidance to the courts was necessary. The Legislature, of course, is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. ( People v. Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 329; People v. Hall, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 961-962.) Nor are we persuaded, as People v. Bradley, supra, 15 Cal. App.4th 1144, concluded, that we should continue to define the substantive asportation standard of a kidnapping statute solely on the basis of the punishment prescribed. Rather, our obligation is to construe the statute as a whole. We are disinclined to perpetuate[] dubious law for no better reason than that it exists.... ( Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 696 [34 Cal. Rptr.2d 386, 881 P.2d 1083] (dis. opn. of Arabian, J.).) Indeed, it is no longer clear that when the act of rape, oral copulation, sodomy, or rape by instrument is accomplished, the penalties between section 208(d), as we interpret it, and section 209 are that disparate. Rather, under the recently enacted section 667.61, when a defendant kidnapped the victim of the present offense and the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that level of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying offense in subdivision (c), the punishment of the crime is enhanced by an indeterminate term of 25 years to life. (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(2).) Thus, the standard of asportation for section 208(d) kidnapping requires that the movement of the victim be for a distance which is more than that which is merely incidental to the commission or attempted commission of rape, oral copulation, sodomy, or rape by instrument, and that this movement substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the commission or attempted commission of these crimes. Because we interpret section 208(d) to incorporate the aggravated kidnapping asportation standard, we need not reach the question of whether Caudillo 's rejection of certain factors other than the actual distance traveled should be revisited. We recognize that Caudillo 's narrow approach might be subject to the criticism that it fails to appreciate that a primary reason forcible asportation is proscribed by the kidnapping statutes is the increase in the risk of harm to the victim that arises from the asportation. (See People v. Williams, supra, 220 Cal. App.3d at p. 1171 [danger sought to be prevented by simple kidnapping statute realized when victim, who was driving, abandoned moving vehicle to escape, causing car to crash with another]; People v. Stender, supra, 47 Cal. App.3d at p. 423 [200 feet becomes more a substantial distance when it is considered it accomplished the purpose of removing the victim from the ready help of her mother]; cf. People v. Ford (1966) 65 Cal.2d 41, 58 [52 Cal. Rptr. 228, 416 P.2d 132] [simple kidnapping `inherently dangerous to human life'].) For purposes of this case, however, we simply note that if a factual scenario similar to that in Caudillo arose today, it would most likely be prosecuted under section 208(d). Contrary to our language in Caudillo, this evaluation would include review of such factors as the defendant's motivation to escape detection, and the possible enhancement of danger to the victim resulting from the movement. ( People v. Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 574.)