Opinion ID: 2460175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dependency Order Was Void as to Jenkins

Text: ¶ 18 The key issue in this case is whether the State satisfied the statutory factor of proof that the child has been found to be a dependent child. RCW 13.34.180(1)(a). The problem is that the order finding K.N.J. dependent as to Jenkins was entered by a pro tempore judge without Jenkins' consent. A case in superior court may be tried by a judge pro tempore only if, among other conditions, the parties or their attorneys of record have consented in writing or in open court to trial before the judge pro tempore. Const. art. IV, § 7; RCW 2.08.180; Nat'l Bank of Wash. v. McCrillis, 15 Wash.2d 345, 356, 130 P.2d 901 (1942); State v. Belgarde, 119 Wash.2d 711, 719, 837 P.2d 599 (1992). Consent cannot be waived by defaulting. McCrillis, 15 Wash.2d at 358-59, 130 P.2d 901. This court has held that if the basis of the judge's appointment is consent of the parties and there has been no consent, the judge is without jurisdiction to hear the case, and the entire proceedings before him are void. Id. at 359, 130 P.2d 901. ¶ 19 Here, Jenkins did not consent to a judge pro tempore and thus the initial dependency order is void. Nevertheless, the trial court found the initial dependency order, entered by a judge pro tempore without Jenkins' consent, established RCW 13.34.180(1)(a) beyond any doubt. CP at 303 (Findings of Fact ¶¶ 1.12, 1.27). Despite the void dependency order, Jenkins' parental rights were terminated. The Court of Appeals correctly held the initial dependency order was void for lack of jurisdiction. [7] K.N.J., 151 Wash.App. at 308, 211 P.3d 483.