Opinion ID: 19555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Activity Protected by the National Labor Relations Act

Text: 16 Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act guarantees employees the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. 157 (1998). The Supreme Court has often affirmed that the task of defining the scope of Section 7 'is for the Board to perform in the first instance as it considers the wide variety of cases that come before it,' NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829, 79 L. Ed. 2d 839, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984) (citing Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 568, 57 L. Ed. 2d 428, 98 S. Ct. 2505 (1978)), and, on an issue that implicates its expertise in labor relations, a reasonable constructionby the Board is entitled to considerable deference. 465 U.S. at 829-30 (citing NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350, 98 S. Ct. 651, 54 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1978)); see also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31, 88 L. Ed. 1170, 64 S. Ct. 851 (1944). The question for decision in the present case is thus narrowed to whether the Board's application of Section 7 to Pemberton's statements to his fellow employees is reasonable. 17 Although the term concerted activity is not defined in the Act, it clearly enough embraces the activities of employees who have joined together in order to achieve common goals. City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 831 (citing Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, at 3 (1984)). The precise manner in which particular actions of an individual employee must be linked to the actions of fellow employees in order to permit it to be said that the individual is engaged in concerted activity, however, must be elucidated by the Board and the courts. 465 U.S. at 829-31. 18 The phrase, to engage in concerted activities, does not refer merely to a situation in which two or more employees are working together at the same time and the same place toward a common goal. Id. at 831. Section 7 itself defines both joining and assisting labor organizations -- activities in which a single employee can engage -- as concerted activities. See id. Indeed, it is now well recognized that an individual employee may be engaged in concerted activity when he acts alone in several other situations: that in which the lone employee intends to induce group activity, and that in which the employee acts as a representative of at least one other employee, see id. (citing, e.g., Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3rd Cir. 1971)); that in which an employee honestly and reasonably asserts a right grounded in a collective bargaining agreement, see NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 79 L. Ed. 2d 839, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984); and individual employee action may also constitute concerted activity if it represents either a continuation of earlier concerted activities or a logical outgrowth of concerted activity. See Burle Indus., Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 498 (1990), enforced without op., 932 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1991); Jhirmack Enterprises, 283 N.L.R.B. 609 (1987); Rogers Envtl. Contracting, 325 N.L.R.B. No. 8, (1997); Every Woman's Place, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 413 (1986), enforced, 833 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1987). 19 Moreover, employees do not lose their protection under Section 7's mutual aid or protection clause when they seek to improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565, 57 L. Ed. 2d 428, 98 S. Ct. 2505 (1978). Thus, the mutual aid or protection clause protects employees from retaliation by their employers when they seek to improve working conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums. Id. at 565-66. 20 The fact that an activity is concerted, however, does not mean that an employee can engage in it with impunity. An employee may engage in concerted activity in such an abusive manner that he loses the protection of Section 7. See City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 837 (citing Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 1970); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 177, 181 (1980); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 57 L. Ed. 2d 428, 98 S. Ct. 2505 (1978); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 100 L. Ed. 975, 76 S. Ct. 679 (1956)). Also, some concerted activity bears a less immediate relationship to employees' interests as employees than other such activity. It can be assumed that at some point the relationship becomes soattenuated that an activity cannot fairly be deemed to come within the mutual aid or protection clause. The task of deciding when that boundary has been crossed is for the Board to perform in the first instance as it considers the wide variety of cases that come before it. See Eastex, 437 U.S. at 567-68 (citing, inter alia, Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798, 89 L. Ed. 1372, 65 S. Ct. 982 (1944); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194, 85 L. Ed. 1271, 61 S. Ct. 845 (1941)). For example, the Supreme Court has approved the Board's extension of the Republic Aviation rule to cover the distribution of literature by dissident employees advocating the displacement of a union, see Eastex, 437 U.S. at n.23 (citing NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 39 L. Ed. 2d 358, 94 S. Ct. 1099 (1974)), and recognizing other Board extensions of the rule to encompass non-organizational literature complaining about an incumbent union leadership or bargaining position. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 663 (1975), enf'd 546 F.2d 418 (3rd Cir. 1976)). 21 If an activity is both concerted and protected under Section 7 of the Act, Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) (1998); see Blue Circle Cement Co. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, to prove a violation of Section 8(a)(1), the General Counsel must establish that the employer interfered with, restrained, or coerced an employee in the exercise of a right to engage in an activity that was both concerted and protected under Section 7. See, e.g., Reef Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 952 F.2d 830, 836 (1991); Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing Welch Scientific Co. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 1965)(If the conduct complained of otherwise violated Section 8(a)(1), good faith is no defense. The cases clearly demonstrate that it is the tendency of an employer's conduct to interfere with the rights of his employees protected by Section 8(a)(1), rather than his motives, that is controlling.)). 22