Opinion ID: 1562759
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Adequately Investigate and Develop Certain Claims

Text: Appellant first claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's failure to call, or re-call, certain witnesses, and investigate and/or develop specific points. We approach appellant's laundry list of claims mindful of Strickland's teaching to avoid hindsight evaluations of counsel's conduct. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Specifically, appellant claims that trial counsel failed to investigate and/or better develop: (1) the alleged cancellation of appellant's meeting with a friend, Susan Blackburn; (2) the alleged meeting with the victim away from The Finishing Touch; (3) possible evidence with which to impeach the Commonwealth's jailhouse informant Michael Ferry; (4) an alibi defense; (5) evidence challenging the Commonwealth's theory that twine from The Finishing Touch was used to strangle the victim; and (6) evidence that another person could have been the murderer. Without apparent awareness of the irony in his sincere flattery, appellant cites this Court's criticism of appellate counsel's shotgun approach to challenging trial counsel's performance as proof of appellate counsel's own ineffectiveness. Appellant declares that, although appellate counsel attempted to raise claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness in post-verdict motions and on direct appeal, appellate counsel failed to take the necessary steps to develop and litigate the claims. Appellant also declares without elaboration that his current claims have not been previously litigated because they supposedly rely on facts other than those presented on direct appeal. And, as with all of his claims, appellant attempts to satisfy Strickland and McGill with a mere boilerplate statement that any waiver is overcome by the ineffective assistance of all prior counsel. Appellant's Brief at 46. The Commonwealth counters that these claims have been previously litigated because the same issues were raised on direct appeal and, after reviewing the entire record, this Court held all of appellant's claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness to be meritless. See Tedford I, 567 A.2d at 626. Assuming, arguendo, that the claims concerning trial counsel ineffectiveness are new, continues the Commonwealth, then they are waived precisely because they were not pursued on direct appeal, when trial counsel no longer represented appellant. The Commonwealth also asserts that appellant cannot present new theories concerning the same claims by simply framing them as claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The PCRA court determined that these claims were previously litigated on direct appeal and, citing Commonwealth v. Senk, 496 Pa. 630, 437 A.2d 1218 (1981), concluded that appellant is attempting to relitigate these issues under the guise of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The PCRA court also found this Court's comment regarding appellate counsel's shotgun approach insufficient on its own to prove appellate counsel ineffective. Because appellant was represented by counsel other than trial counsel in post-verdict motions and on direct appeal, and because appellant's direct appeal was litigated under the Hubbard rule, which obliged new counsel to promptly raise claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness, appellant presently forwards the sort of collateral, layered claims described in McGilli.e., claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim or claims sounding in trial counsel ineffectiveness. However, as we have noted earlier, it is important to remember that there may be claims that sound purely in appellate counsel ineffectiveness, unrelated to accusations against trial counsel. For example, trial counsel may have preserved a claim by objection, which appellate counsel did not pursue on appeal. Or there may be an extra-record claimfactual or case-law relatedwhich arose after the trial. Or there could be a claim respecting the manner in which appellate counsel litigated a claim. In this case, it cannot be disputed that direct appeal counsel in fact litigated dozens of claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. Given this record, and given the procedural restrictions of the PCRA which oblige appellant to plead and prove that his current claims are neither previously litigated nor waived, in order to prevail appellant has to account for what occurred on direct appeal. It is not this Court's duty to cull the direct appeal record and determine which of appellant's current claims, premised upon supposed deficiencies in trial counsel, are mere repeats of, or variations of, claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness which were actually litigated on direct appeal. And, of course, if any of those claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness were in fact litigated on direct appeal, then today's derivative layered claim necessarily failsunless appellant proves deficiency in the manner in which appellate counsel litigated the claim on direct appeal. Appellant's Brief does not append, summarize, or reference the over 50 pages of trial counsel ineffectiveness claims raised on direct appeal by incorporation. Because appellant has not satisfied his burden of distinguishing between claims which were waived and claims which were previously litigated, he has failed to take the necessary first step in proving appellate counsel to have been ineffective. Appellant instead makes generic assertions that appellate counsel was ineffective for either failing to raise claims or, less often, for the manner in which he litigated the claims he in fact raised. Appellant, however, has not attempted to demonstrate why appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate the claims he declined to raise on direct appeal or how appellate counsel's performance on direct appeal was defective pursuant to the requirements of Strickland/Pierce. Appellant merely attaches a boilerplate layered ineffectiveness assertion to a nested trial counsel ineffectiveness claim. Therefore, appellant has failed to prove appellate counsel ineffective. In any event, mindful of McGill, we look to these claims, and reject them on the merits.
Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Susan Blackburn and discover that appellant's date with Blackburn had first been changed from a dinner date to a lunch date and that it was Blackburn, not appellant, who had cancelled their January 10th (day of the murder) date. Blackburn, however, testified both at trial and at the post-verdict hearing, and each time stated that it was appellant who cancelled their January 10th engagement. Trial counsel also testified at the post-verdict hearing and stated that he did indeed interview Blackburn. Any further investigation on counsel's part would have been fruitless. Therefore, this claim lacks arguable merit.
Next, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a copy of a UPS log that would have shown that a delivery was made to The Finishing Touch, which appellant signed for, on the morning of the rape and murder. If obtained, argues appellant, the log, along with telephone records, would have demonstrated that appellant could not have had time to meet the victim away from The Finishing Touch, where her car was found. [14] Appellant, however, fails to explain the significance of such information. At trial, appellant stated that the victim was in The Finishing Touch on the day of the murder and that he had consensual sexual intercourse with her on that date. Appellant also stated that the UPS delivery was made at approximately 10:00 a.m. While the introduction of the UPS log may have disrupted the Commonwealth's timeline of events preceding the rape and murder, it would not call into question the Commonwealth's overall theory of the case. Furthermore, at the post-verdict hearing, trial counsel stated that he drove the distance in question and did not believe that that aspect of the timeline was an issue. Trial counsel is not obliged to argue every quibble, or pursue every triviality associated with human memory. This claim is without merit.
Next, appellant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Michael Ferry, a fellow inmate. Ferry stated that appellant admitted, on multiple occasions, to raping and murdering the victim, providing a great deal of detail concerning the crimes. Appellant contends that trial counsel should have further discredited Ferry's version of events and should have called Timothy Sunday as a witness at trial to discredit Ferry. Appellant maintains that Sunday would have testified that Ferry provided false testimony in exchange for a deal on his pending sentence with the Commonwealth. This issue is discussed and rejected infra.
Next, appellant maintains that [t]rial counsel should have used available testimony and evidence to explain for the jurors how the known locations and distances, and the established time-line of [appellant's] alibi, demonstrated his innocence. Appellant's Brief at 42. Such is the extent to which appellant briefs this claim. It fails for lack of explication.
Next, appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the prosecution's theory that twine found in The Finishing Touch was the murder weapon (the victim was killed by strangulation). Appellant argues that trial counsel should have investigated to determine if the Commonwealth's striation analysis and report had ruled out twine as the murder weapon. Appellant also argues that trial counsel could have accounted for the twine fibers found on the victim by explaining that the fibers could have come from something elsewhere in the shop. In making this claim, however, appellant ignores that, at trial, the forensic pathologist testified that the ligature marks on the victim's neck could have been made by the twine in question. Appellant also ignores the fact that no testimony was offered by either trial counsel or the prosecution regarding a striation analysis and that trial counsel did indeed challenge the twine-murder weapon theory at trial. Without more, appellant's speculation fails to establish a predicate to call into question trial counsel's effectiveness.
Next and finally, appellant maintains that reasonable counsel would have investigated and presented evidence that the victim was killed by another person. Appellant believes that that effort should have focused on the victim's husband, James Revak, as the most logical suspect. However, besides generally opining that James Revak behaved suspiciously, appellant merely argues that [c]ompetent counsel would have investigated these facts in order to make a reasoned decision whether or not to introduce such evidence in support of [appellant's] defense. Appellant's Brief at 44. This is utter speculation. Appellant's argument fails to specifically describe how trial counsel was ineffective in this regard. Furthermore, appellant ignores the fact that trial counsel did in fact present evidence to suggest that James Revak was his wife's murderer. [15] Accordingly, this claim lacks arguable merit. For the foregoing reasons, appellant's skeletal claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness are without merit.