Opinion ID: 2582616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: phalp's statements

Text: Deal argues that the trial court erred when it allowed Phalp's father to testify regarding statements Phalp made to him shortly after the J.R. incident. The admission or exclusion of hearsay evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Humphrey, 267 Kan. 45, 55, 978 P.2d 264 (1999); State v. Thomas, 252 Kan. 564, 572, 847 P.2d 1219 (1993). At trial, the State questioned Phalp's father about conversations he had with Phalp shortly after the J.R. incident. Deal made timely objections on the basis that any testimony concerning statements Phalp had made to her father were inadmissible hearsay. The trial court overruled the objections and allowed Phalp's father to discuss the conversations he had with his daughter. The trial court admitted the evidence pursuant to K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 60-460(d)(2). K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 60-460(d) governs contemporaneous statements by an out-of-court declarant as a form of admissible hearsay if: the judge finds [the statement] was made (1) while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition which the statement narrates, describes or explains, (2) while the declarant was under the stress of nervous excitement caused by such perception or (3) if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, by the declarant at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by the declarant and while the declarant's recollection was clear and was made in good faith prior to the commencement of the action and with no incentive to falsify or to distort. Phalp's father testified that at about 12:30 p.m. on July 28 or July 29, 1998, Phalp spoke to him on the telephone. Phalp related to him that J.R. had just beaten her up, held a knife to her neck, and demanded money. Phalp told her father that Deal was there and stated, Don't do that, that's too messy. Just snap her neck and toss her in the back of my truck. It's much cleaner that way. Phalp's father further testified that after he received the phone call he drove about 5 miles to Phalp. He testified that she had a laceration on her right shoulder, was bruised, and was having difficulty breathing. Phalp's father also testified that there was some damage to the drywall. Deal contends that the admission of Phalp's out-of-court statements to her father violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Specifically, Deal argues that Phalp's father's testimony was inadmissible hearsay and that it bore no indicia of reliability. Furthermore, Deal argues that there was no showing or finding that Phalp had no incentive to falsify or distort the statements that she made to her father. This argument is without merit. In State v. Bratt, 250 Kan. 264, Syl. ¶ 1, 824 P.2d 983 (1992), this court analyzed the admissibility of hearsay statements and the possible conflict with the Confrontation Clause. We stated: The Confrontation Clause operates in two ways when determining the admissibility of hearsay statements. First, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case, the prosecution must either produce or demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant. Second, once a witness is shown to be unavailable, the witness' statement is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Reliability can be inferred where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. If the evidence does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the evidence must be excluded absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. (Emphasis added.) The excited utterance exception is a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See Conner v. State, 748 So.2d 950, 956 (Fla. 1999) (excited utterance is one of several firmly rooted hearsay exceptions); State v. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d 435, 445 (Iowa 2001) (excited utterance is firmly rooted hearsay exception); State v. Gates, 615 N.W.2d 331, 336-37 (Minn. 2000) (excited utterance is firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfying constitutional requirements); State v. Salgado, 126 N.M. 691, 696, 974 P.2d 661 (1999) (excited utterance is uniformly considered a firmly rooted hearsay exception and comports to Confrontation Clause requirements); State v. Dennis, 337 S.C. 275, 286-87, 523 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1999) (excited utterance exception has been used and approved of for over 200 years and is a firmly rooted hearsay exception). Firmly rooted hearsay exceptions are so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its reliability. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357, 116 L. Ed.2d 848, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992). Reliability is, therefore, inferred without any further showing. The trial court also found the victim was under stress when the statements were made. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Phalp's father's testimony pursuant to K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 60-460(d)(2). As a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the statements were reliable, and the admission of such did not violate Deal's rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or the Kansas Constitution.