Opinion ID: 77975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Based on

Text: The Supreme Court has declared that in hostile work environment cases, `[t]he critical issue . . . is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.' Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 1002, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25, 114 S.Ct. 367, 372, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). Thus, to satisfy the based on element, a plaintiff must essentially show `that similarly situated persons not of [her] sex were treated differently and better.' Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1302 (alteration in original) (quoting Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1254 n. 3 (Edmondson, J., concurring)). The specific question that faces us here is whether harassment in the form of offensive language can be based on the plaintiff's membership in a protected group even when the plaintiff was not the target of the language and other employees were equally exposed to the language. We noted in Baldwin that sex specific profanity, including words such as bitch, tramp, and slut, is more degrading to women than to men and thus may be considered, for whatever weight [it has] on the sexual harassment scales. Id. at 1302. [1] Though we have never explicitly held that such sex specific language satisfies the based on element in a sexual harassment hostile work environment case even when the language does not target the plaintiff, we do so today in light of our race-discrimination cases. It is well established that racially offensive language need not be targeted at the plaintiff in order to support a Title VII hostile work environment claim. For example, in Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir.1982), the plaintiff, a black male, who had just begun working as a trainee at a car dealership, claimed that other employees repeatedly used offensive racial epithets, including references to poorly repaired cars as nigger-rigged and to the salesman with the lowest sales volume as the black ass. Id. at 1358. We concluded that the fact that many of the epithets were not directed at Walker was not determinative because the offensive language was often used in Walker's presence after he had voiced objections. Id. at 1359 n. 2. [2] The harassment that Walker experienced was based on his race because the race specific language that was used was particularly offensive to him as a black male, regardless of whom the language targeted. [3] Our Walker reasoning can correctly be extended here. The language in the CHRW office included the sex specific words bitch, whore, and cunt that, under Baldwin, may be more degrading to women than men. The subject matter of the conversations and jokes that allegedly permeated the office on a daily basis included male and female sexual anatomy, masturbation, and female pornography, all of which was discussed in a manner that was similarly more degrading to women than men. The radio programming that Reeves claims was also similar. Therefore, even if such language was used indiscriminately in the office such that men and women were equally exposed to the language, the language had a discriminatory effect on Reeves because of its degrading nature. Accordingly, just as the language in Walker was sufficient to support Walker's hostile work environment claim because it particularly offended Walker as a black man, we hold that the evidence Reeves presented was sufficient to survive summary judgment on the based on element here. CHRW argues that we should not look to race cases here because, race is different than sex. In the Title VII context, however, CHRW's argument is simply misplaced. We have made it abundantly clear that [s]exual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir.1982). The Supreme Court, moreover, drew upon race discrimination cases when it held that Title VII covered hostile work environment claims and has followed the lead of such cases in attempting to define the severity of the offensive conditions necessary to constitute actionable sex discrimination under the statute. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2283, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted that it is proper for us as we decide sexual harassment cases to draw on standards developed in cases involving racial harassment. Id. at 787 n. 2, 118 S.Ct. at 2283 n. 2. Accordingly, we see no reason to analyze the based on element differently here than we would in a race discrimination case. Having concluded that Reeves satisfied the based on element, we turn to the severe or pervasive element.