Opinion ID: 701770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Government Intimidation of Witnesses

Text: 58 Tackett contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for a new trial based upon government intimidation of the witnesses. Tackett never raised the issue of governmental intimidation during trial, and therefore, according to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), we review for plain error. 9 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15-16, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Under the plain error doctrine, we determine if any errors below  'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'  Id. at 15, 105 S.Ct. at 1046 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)). To review for plain error, we look to the entire record and determine if the alleged act resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 16, 105 S.Ct. at 1046-47. 59 After reviewing the record as a whole, we find that the alleged government intimidation did not result in a miscarriage of justice. Tackett's conviction rested, at least in part, on the jury's rejection of Tackett's claim that he had been in Ohio on the weekend of the fire. Tackett presented witnesses who said he was at his brother's football game in Findlay, Ohio. Tackett claims that the jury would have accepted his alibi if he had been able to present all of the witnesses and evidence that confirmed his story. He contends that the government deprived him of two alibi witnesses, Tucker Ballinger and Joseph Spalding, by intimidating them during special court-ordered interviews before they were to testify. 60 Review of the procedural circumstances that lay behind Tackett's alibi defense reveals why the government was interviewing witnesses during trial. The government originally asked Tackett to declare his alibi defense in a pretrial motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1. Tackett eventually responded and revealed his planned alibi defense. The government reciprocated and revealed its list of rebuttal witnesses. Immediately before trial, however, Tackett officially abandoned his alibi defense. The United States quickly changed its strategy, in order to avoid prejudicing Tackett by mentioning his alleged alibi. Tackett once again renounced his alibi midway through trial. 61 At trial it became clear that Linda Tackett would produce an alibi defense. 10 She revealed that her alibi was identical to Brian Tackett's alibi. Brian Tackett reversed directions one more time. Tackett's indecisiveness placed the district court in a very difficult situation, and the district court could have barred Tackett from using his alibi defense altogether. See United States v. Tinker, 985 F.2d 241, 243 (6th Cir.1992) (the district court has substantial discretion in determining whether to hold parties to their pre-trial agreement). The district court chose not to follow this strict course, because the United States had prior knowledge of Tackett's alibi and the witnesses he might use. (J.A. at 321.) In order to be fair, the district court allowed the government an opportunity to prepare, and allowed the prosecution to interview Tackett's alibi witnesses before they took the stand. 62 Ballinger and Spalding both testified at post-trial proceedings that the interviewing officials had treated them roughly. 11 Two representatives of the United States interviewed each witness separately in the government's office. 12 63 The officials interviewed Ballinger first. At the post-trial hearing, Ballinger revealed that the government officials accused him of lying when he recounted that he remembered seeing Tackett on the night of the football game. The officials apparently suggested that Ballinger would face perjury charges if they found out his testimony was false. The encounter was loud enough for Spalding, who was in the next room, to hear. Ballinger said the officials had not physically intimidated him, but left him kind of scared. Ballinger's willingness to testify on Tackett's behalf, however, was unshaken. One of the defense attorneys, however, told him his testimony was not needed and sent him home. 64 Spalding claims a similar encounter with the officials. He alleges that one of the officials terminated the interview by snapping, Just get ... the hell out of here, and the next time we see you we don't want to see any bitching from you. Spalding says he was very frightened. Despite this treatment, Spalding claims he still would have testified on Tackett's behalf. The defense attorneys, however, also sent him home without using him as a witness. 65 Linda Tackett's attorney verified this, stating that he had sent them home because he felt their testimony was not essential. Furthermore, both witnesses admitted they were not sure whether Brian Tackett attended the football game. We find it peculiar that the defendants did not bring this intimidation to the Court's attention during the trial. Instead, defense counsel just dismissed both witnesses, once he apparently heard what happened. 13 66 The right of a defendant to establish a defense by presenting his own witnesses is a fundamental element of due process. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (per curiam). Courts have held that a variety of prosecutorial and judicial actions aimed at discouraging defense witnesses from testifying deprive the criminal defendant of his right to due process. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (per curiam) (The judge admonished the defense witness, telling him that if he lied the judge would personally see to it that his case went to the grand jury and he would be indicted for perjury. The witness chose not to testify and the Supreme Court found reversible error.); United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334, 335 (6th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (Secret Service agent approached witness before he was to testify and told him that if he testified he would be prosecuted for misprision of a felony. The Sixth Circuit held this was reversible error, where unnecessary ex parte communications between agent of prosecutor and witness appear to intimidate witness.). Webb, however, does not stand for the proposition that merely warning a witness of the consequences of perjury demands reversal. United States v. Smith, 997 F.2d 674, 679 (10th Cir.1993). Judges and prosecutors do not necessarily commit a Webb type violation merely by advising a witness of the possibility that he or she could face prosecution for perjury if his or her testimony differs from that he or she has given previously. Id. at 680. In fact, the government has an obligation to warn unrepresented witnesses of the risk that the testimony they are going to give can be used against them. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 847 (7th Cir.1991). Where, however, the substance of what the prosecutor communicates to the witness is a threat over and above what the record indicates is necessary, and appropriate, the inference that the prosecutor sought to coerce a witness into silence is strong. Id. 67 In the present case, it does not appear that the official's interrogation, while inappropriate, mandates reversal. The fact that the prosecutor's agents became belligerent and hostile towards the defense witness is not dispositive. The defense must show that the contact substantially interfered with any free and unhampered determination the witness might have had as to whether to testify. Smith, 997 F.2d at 680. 68 In this case, both witnesses were willing to testify after the interrogation. The interviews were not completely unnecessary or without purpose. Moreover, the district court allowed the interviews, and the defense counsel never objected to them. Although the interviews left Ballinger and Spalding understandably agitated, the interrogations did not affect their ability to testify or alter the probable outcome of the trial. Therefore, the government's actions did not result in error in this case.