Opinion ID: 2187184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tibor's Cross-Appeal

Text: Section 12.1-20-01(3), NDCC, reads: No prosecution may be instituted or maintained under sections 12.1-20-03 through 12.1-20-08 or section 12.1-20-12 unless the alleged offense was brought to the notice of public authority within three months of its occurrence or, where the alleged victim was a minor or otherwise incompetent to make complaint, within three months after a parent, guardian, or other competent person specifically interested in the victim, other than the alleged offender, learned of the offense. Tibor sought dismissal on the ground that his sister, who reported the offense, failed to report it within three months after learning of it, as is required by § 12.1-20-01(3). The impetus behind the Legislature's enactment of the prompt reporting requirement of § 12.1-20-01(3) can be found in the comments to the Model Penal Code [6] from which § 12.1-20-01(3) was derived: The requirement of prompt complaint springs in part from a fear that unwanted pregnancy or bitterness at a relationship gone sour might convert a willing participant in sexual relations into a vindictive complainant. Barring prosecution if no report is made within a reasonable time is one way of guarding against such fabrication. Perhaps more importantly, the provision limits the opportunity for blackmailing another by threatening to bring a criminal charge of sexual aggression. This objective is especially critical for those offenses involving consensual relations. The parents of an underage girl who has engaged in intercourse with an older male, for example, may forego public prosecution, which does nothing to enhance the reputation of their daughter, in favor of private gain. Requiring complaint within three months of learning of such an event reduces the ability of such persons to demand continuing payment for silence. Model Penal Code Comments to § 213. 6(4) (1980). See also House Judiciary Committee Minutes on Senate Bill 2049, 43rd Session (1973); House Social Services and Veterans Affairs Committee Minutes on House Bill 1169, 49th Session (1985). In enacting NDCC § 12.1-20-02(3), the Legislature did not envision situations where a minor is sexually abused and the parents, or other persons specifically interested in the minor, delay for over three months in reporting the incident to the authorities. Thus, § 12.1-20-01(3) provides no exception for incestuous or other situations where a parent or other specifically interested person is unable or chooses not to report the incident. See, Commonwealth v. Shade, 242 Pa.Super. 115, 363 A.2d 1187 (1976). [7] In such situations § 12.1-20-01(3) unwittingly accords greater protection to a hypothetically innocent defendant than to an actually victimized minor. By its plain language § 12.1-20-01(3) is a statute of limitation. [8] The State therefore has the burden to affirmatively prove that the charge was brought within the limitation period, or that the limitation period does not apply. State v. Hatch, 346 N.W.2d 268 (N.D.1964); State v. Tennyson, 73 N.D. 259, 14 N.W.2d 171 (1944); United States v. Gonsalves, 675 F.2d 1050 (9 Cir.1982); cert. denied, 459 U.S. 837, 103 S.Ct. 83, 74 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). In order to determine whether the State must prove compliance with the statute of limitation beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, we look to the policy reasons underlying statutes of limitation. Compliance with the statute of limitation is not an element of an offense but rather a jurisdictional fact. NDCC 12.1-01-03(1); State v. Tennyson, supra . While it is clear that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the offense charged, § 12.1-01-03, State v. Bohl, 317 N.W.2d 790 (N.D.1982), there is no concomitant requirement that it so vigorously prove timely institution of a charge or an exception to the mandate of a limitation statute. This is so because a statute of limitation does not go to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Rather it provides a safeguard against stale charges and stale evidence, John v. State, 96 Wis.2d 183, 291 N.W.2d 502 (1980); 1 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, § 26(a); against blackmail, People v. Zamora, 18 Cal.3d 538, 134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75 (1976); and against lackadaisical investigation and prosecution, People v. Zamora, supra . It is but an act of grace on the part of the Legislature which need not have provided any limitation. We insist on proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions because that operates to give `concrete substance' to the presumption of innocence to insure against unjust convictions and to reduce the risk of factual error in criminal proceedings. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (quoting In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1069, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). There is no such justification for proving compliance with a statute of limitation. We therefore conclude that the State must prove compliance with the statute of limitation by a preponderance of the evidence. The State must also bear the same burden to prove the existence of any exceptions to a statute of limitation which excuse its application. United States v. Gonslaves, supra; State v. Lester, 170 Ga. App. 471, 317 S.E.2d 295 (1984); Duncan v. State, 282 Md. 385, 384 A.2d 456 (Md.1978). In this case, Tibor properly raised his statute of limitation objections by written motion. Rule 47, NDRCrimP; Rule 12(b)(2), NDRCrimP. He supported this motion and the subsequent motion to reconsider with affidavits sufficient to raise the issue of the statute of limitation. The State resisted the motion by written brief alone, without affidavits, and without requesting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 3.2(c), North Dakota Rules of Court. Instead, the State argued as a matter of law that the aunt of the victim, who reported the alleged offense, was, by virtue of her blood relationship to the defendant, equally interested in him and therefore not specifically interested in the victim. The trial court apparently agreed. [9] For the reasons stated hereafter we conclude that the State's argument was legally unsound and that the trial court erred in accepting either it or the record as a basis for its denial of Tibor's motion. Section 12.1-20-01(3) does not define the phrase persons specifically interested in the victim. One of the statute's intended purposes is to protect the child, however imperfect the means, by extending the absolute three months from occurrence limitation, applicable to adult victims, to three months from acquiring knowledge of occurrence. We therefore interpret that phrase functionally to mean a person, interested in the child's welfare, who, by virtue of his or her relationship with the child and the confidence thereby enjoyed, is more likely than others to learn of the alleged crime. Proof of such an amorphous standard depends necessarily on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The nature of the relationship, the manner of learning of the offense, the reasons for reporting it or not, are but some of the facts to be established. A relative may qualify as may others. The State, by relying exclusively on the insufficient legal argument that a sister of the accused cannot be specifically interested in the alleged victim, failed to meet its burden of proving either compliance with the three-month reporting requirement or an exception to it. The trial court therefore erred in denying Tibor's motions on the ground advanced by the State or on the record which sufficiently raised the issue. Generally, interlocutory orders are not final, and thus may be reconsidered by the court on its own motion or upon motion by the parties. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (court may reconsider suppression motion); see generally Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d ¶ 676. The trial court's erroneous denials of Tibor's motions were not final orders and are therefore subject to reconsideration. We instruct that upon remand, pursuant to NDRAppP 35(d), an evidentiary hearing be held on the factual issues raised by Tibor's motion to dismiss for untimely reporting. The judgment of dismissal on the ground of unconstitutionality is reversed and the case is remanded for hearing on the motion to dismiss for untimely reporting and, if appropriate, for trial. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and VANDE WALLE and GIERKE, JJ., concur. MESCHKE, J., concurs in the result.