Opinion ID: 1864538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Certificate of Substantial Compliance

Text: Because appellee Dickerson asserts that the architect's Certificate of Substantial Compliance eliminates any genuine issue of material fact and because this Court has previously held that an appellee on appeal is entitled to raise any alternative ground based on the pleadings in the court below which would support the judgment here, Brocato v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 503 So.2d 241, 244 (Miss. 1987), this Court addresses this issue. However, this Court disagrees with the appellee's assertion. The architect for the project, Robert Parker Adams, signed an affidavit stating that any certificate of substantial compliance, final application for payment, or year-end inspection prepared by him did not certify, guarantee, or imply that there were no hidden defects in the building, or that Dickerson constructed the building in full compliance with all the plans and specifications. Additionally, the specifications and plans for the building state that the Certificate of Substantial Compliance does not relieve the contractor of his obligations under the contract. Finally, Sidney Patton, a licensed architect, stated by affidavit that he had examined the plans and specifications for the Riverview Building. In his opinion, Dickerson had failed to perform its construction work in strict accordance with the plans and specifications, and with the degree of workmanship normally possessed by those in the industry. Various legal commentators have addressed the question of what effect is to be given a certificate of compliance issued by an architect. The mere fact that an architect's or engineer's certificate is made a condition precedent to the liability of the owner does not establish necessarily the fact that the builder has fulfilled his main obligation to build according to the plans and specifications and in a workmanlike manner.  5 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 798, at 803 (3d ed. 1961) (Emphasis added). In a similar vein, it has been written that: The fact that the certificate of an architect or engineer is made a condition precedent to the duty to make payment does not in itself make that certificate final and conclusive on the parties. The presentation of the certificate satisfies the condition precedent to the duty to pay; but it does not deprive the other party of his right to damages for a nonperformance. 3A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 652, at 123 (1960). It has also been held that although parties to a building or construction contract may specifically agree that an architect's decision concerning quality and character of work is final, such a conclusion will be reached only where the language of the contract itself indicates that the parties intended such a result. O.K. Johnson Electric, Inc. v. Hess-Martin Corp., Inc., 204 Kan. 478, 464 P.2d 206, 210 (1970). See also, Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hensey, 205 U.S. 298, 27 S.Ct. 535, 51 L.Ed. 811 (1907); Mississippi Fire Ins. Co. v. Evans, 153 Miss. 635, 120 So. 738, 743 (1929). In the opinion of this Court, such an express intent of the parties is lacking in this case. By the language of the contract in the case sub judice, it appears that certain procedures were to be followed concerning final inspection and/or approval of the contractor's work and other procedures were to be followed for the issuance of the Certificate of Substantial Compliance. The substantial compliance language alone indicates that this certificate was not to be the final word relative to Dickerson's work. Compare, American Continental Life Insurance Co. v. Ranier Construction Co., Inc., 125 Ariz. 53, 607 P.2d 372, 374 [n. 2]-375 (1980) (Certificate of Substantial Completion vs. Final Certificate of Payment). A genuine issue of fact is presented here, making summary judgment on this ground improper. The burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists is on the movant. Smith v. Sanders, 485 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Miss. 1986). Furthermore, [w]hen doubt exists whether there is a fact issue, the non-moving party gets its benefit. Indeed, the party against whom the summary judgment has been sought should be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt. Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1983) (Citations omitted). The trial court properly denied the appellee's summary judgment motion on this ground. Not only did Dickerson fail to meet its burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists, it managed to clearly show that there are indeed many factual issues to be resolved here. There is no merit to this portion of the assignment of error.