Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assault as a Lesser Included Offense of Attempted Rape

Text: Defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to find that, because of his intoxicated state, he was unable to form the specific intent to commit rape, precluding conviction on the attempted rape charges. But because his intoxication cannot negate the general intent required for simple assault, defendant argues, the jury should have been instructed on the offense of assault as an intoxication based lesser included offense of attempted rape. Although defendant did not request the trial court to instruct the jury on the crime of assault as a lesser included offense, he claims on appeal the court violated its alleged duty to so instruct on its own motion, and this failure violated his state and federal constitutional rights. (See Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094; Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 ( Beck ).) We disagree. It is clear, as a matter of state constitutional law, that trial courts are required to give instructions on all lesser offenses necessarily included within the filed charges, when there is substantial evidence supporting a conviction for a lesser offense, regardless of whether the parties request such instructions or even oppose them. ( Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 154-155, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) As we explained in Breverman, however, the related federal constitutional right is more circumscribed, prohibiting only in capital cases those situations in which' the state has created an artificial barrier preventing the jury from considering a noncapital verdict other than a complete acquittal and thereby calling into question the reliability of the outcome. ( Id. at pp. 166-168, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094, citing Beck, supra, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392, Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555, and Hopkins v. Reeves (1998) 524 U.S. 88, 118 S.Ct. 1895, 141 L.Ed.2d 76 ( Reeves ).) Defendant contends the trial court's failure to give an assault instruction violated the rule of Beck, because the jury was forced into an all-or-nothing situation in which the choice on the attempted rape charges essentially was between the death penalty and acquittal, due to the felony-murder rule and the attempted-rape special circumstance allegations. (See Beck, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382.) For several reasons, defendant's assertion is incorrect. First, the jury was not forced to choose between convicting defendant of crimes he did not commit (assertedly, the attempted rapes and associated first degree felony murder and attempted-rape special circumstance findings) and a complete acquittal. The jury had the option of finding that defendant did not form the intent to have sexual relations with the victims until after they were dead (and therefore of acquitting him of the attempted rape charges), but nonetheless of findingif this was supported by sufficient evidencethat defendant murdered the victims with premeditation and deliberation, as well as the associated multiple-murder special circumstance, rendering him still eligible for the death penalty. In addition, the jury had the option of finding him' guilty of some lesser degree of noncapital homicide for one or both of the murders, instead of issuing a complete acquittal. Second, as discussed in Reeves in the context of Nebraska law, there is a structural difference in California's death penalty statute distinguishing this case from Beck. Under Alabama law applicable to Beck's trial, if the jury convicted the defendant of capital murder, it was required to impose the death penalty, a circumstance that threatened to make the issue at trial whether the defendant should be executed or not, rather than `whether the State ha[d] proved each and every element of the capital crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( Reeves, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 98, 118 S.Ct. 1895.) In California, as under Nebraska law, a guilty verdict of first degree murder with true special circumstance findings does not require the jury automatically to set defendant's punishment at death. Defendant's jury was instructed that if its verdict at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial made defendant eligible for the death penalty, it then would consider whether a sentence of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole should be imposed. The jury, therefore, when considering defendant's guilt or innocence, was not placed in the position of determining whether or not he should be executed instead of whether his guilt had been adequately proven. Thus, for both these reasons, there is no likelihood the lack of an instruction on assault as a lesser included offense of attempted rape affected the reliability of the jury's verdict, in violation of defendant's federal constitutional rights. (See Reeves, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 95, 118 S.Ct. 1895.) Additionally, there is a third reason why defendant's federal constitutional claim must fail, also disposing of his state constitutional claim: assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted rape in the present case. ( Reeves, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 96, 118 S.Ct. 1895; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) We apply the statutory elements and accusatory pleading tests to determine whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another. ( People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227-1228, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 353, 137 P.3d 184 ( Reed ).) First, under the elements test, we look to the two statutes to determine whether in the defendant's commission of the greater offense, his or her actions necessarily would satisfy all of the elements of the lesser offense. ( Ibid. ) One who has committed the crime of attempted rape has not necessarily committed an assault, because an essential element of assaultthe present ability to inflict harmis not necessarily present in an attempted rape. In order to commit an attempted rape, a person must form the intent to rape and perform a direct but ineffectual act, beyond mere preparation, leading toward commission of a rape. (§ 21a; Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 387, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another. (§ 240.) Although there is no doubt that a rape is a violent injury to another, an attempted rape is not necessarily also an assault, because the attempt to commit a rape does not require that the perpetrator ever progress to the point of having the present ability to commit a rape. As we previously have noted, although in a criminal attempt the underlying conduct completing the attempt may be remote from the completion of the intended crime, in an assault that underlying conduct must immediately precede the commission of the violent injury; that is, `[t]he next movement would, at least to all appearance, complete the battery.' ( People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 786, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197; see ibid. [Indeed, our criminal code has long recognized this fundamental distinction between criminal attempt and assault, by treating these offenses as separate and independent crimes]; cf. People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362, 368-369, 60 Cal. Rptr.3d 31, 159 P.3d 507 [assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) is not a lesser included offense of shooting at another person from a vehicle (§ 12034, subd. (c)), because the latter offense does not include the element that the shooter have the present ability to inflict a violent injury on the target]; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 38-39, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262 [the crime of battery (§ 242)an unlawful touching of the victimis not a lesser included offense of attempted rape, because the victim of attempted rape might never be touched].) [31] Because a person who has committed an attempted rape has not necessarily committed an assault, assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted rape under the elements test. Second, in the present circumstances, assault also is not a lesser included offense under the accusatory pleading test. Nothing in the information's charges of attempted forcible rape alleged defendant possessed the present ability to inflict injury upon the victims. (Cf. Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1228, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 353, 137 P.3d 184 [charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm was a lesser included offense of the charges of carrying a concealed firearm and carrying a loaded firearm in a public place under the accusatory pleading test (but not the elements test) when the information alleged in all counts that defendant was a convicted felon].) Because under the elements and accusatory pleading tests assault is not a lesser included offense of the charges that defendant attempted to forcibly rape Garcia and Sorensen, the trial court had no duty on its own motion to instruct on the crime of assault.