Opinion ID: 1787107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were they lying? Questions

Text: Morton asserts that during his cross-examination, the state asked were they lying questions on five occasions when Morton's testimony conflicted with other witnesses' testimony and official records. In State v. Pilot, we established that, as a general rule, were they lying questions are inappropriate. See 595 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Minn.1999). We indicated that when this type of question is asked of a defendant whose testimony conflicts with that of a witness, the defendant is required to state whether he believes that the witness was intentionally perpetuating a falsehoodand such a statement constitutes an improper comment on another witness' testimony. See id. at 516. We noted that were they lying questions are perceived as unfairly giving the jury the impression that in order to acquit, it must determine that the witness whose testimony contradicts the defendants testimony is lying. Id. Nevertheless, in Pilot we concluded that were they lying questions are permissible when the defendant [holds] the issue of the credibility of the state's witnesses in central focus. Id. at 518. In Pilot, the defendant argued that the state's witnesses were lying and that the evidence against him was fabricated as part of a vast conspiracy to convict him of a crime that he did not commit. Id. We concluded that because the state's were they lying questions could well have assisted the jury in weighing Pilots own veracity and in evaluating his conspiracy theory, the use of these questions during cross-examination did not constitute error. Id. Upon reviewing the facts and circumstances in the record before us, we conclude that the questions asked by the state on three of the five occasions cited by Morton do not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, when Morton's testimony was at odds with the Sprint calling card records, the motel telephone records, and the DNA evidence, the state made only a limited inquiry as to whether the evidence was wrong. First, the Sprint calling card records showed that a call was made on May 29 at about 3:00 a.m. from the AmericInn to a number in the 507 area code and the number belonged to Bernard Fenske. But Morton believed that this number belonged to Tanya Croy. When Morton denied attempting to call Croy at that time, the state asked him: so the Sprint Company is wrong, their information is wrong? Morton objected, and the state then asked: [a]re you saying that the Sprint number was wrong? Second, the motel telephone records showed that a call was made at 2:59 a.m. on May 29 to an 800 number that served as an access number for prepaid Sprint calling cards. Morton denied making that call, and the state asked him: [s]o the phone records of the motel are also wrong? The state rephrased the question after several objections were sustained and, after Morton again denied making the call, eventually succeeded in asking: [e]ven though it was your Sprint access number and your PIN number, is that right? Morton objected, but the court overruled his objection. Finally, the state asked Morton: did you hear that, that the DNA from the semen found in Ms. Klatt matches your semen, you heard that? When Morton responded yes, the state asked him: [a]nd you're saying that's wrong? Morton did not object to this question. Because Morton objected to the state's questions regarding the telephone records, we focus our analysis of these questions on whether the district court abused its discretion in permitting the state to ask them. We have established that [r]ulings on evidentiary matters rest within the sound discretion of the court, and we will not reverse such evidentiary rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn.2004) (quoting State v. Roman Nose, 667 N.W.2d 386, 392 (Minn.2003)). We will carefully scrutinize this line of questioning because it is not difficult to envision a scenario where the repeated use of questions such as are you saying that's wrong? could cross the line so that the cumulative effect of the questions is essentially the same as if the state asked the more objectionable were they lying? questions. Here, the state asked Morton if the facts were wrong, but did not ask him to comment on whether anyone responsible for the telephone records intended to perpetuate a falsehood. In other words, the state left open the possibility that the evidence could simply have been incorrect. While we do not condone the line of questioning used by the state, we conclude that, given the limited nature of the state's inquiry, the court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the state to ask these questions. Morton also raises similar concerns about the state's cross examination on the results of the DNA analysis. But Morton did not object at trial to these questions. If a defendant fails to object at trial to alleged prosecutorial misconduct or request curative instructions, we nevertheless may grant relief if we conclude that the state's conduct constituted plain error affecting substantial rights. See State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.1998). Under the plain error standard, a defendant may obtain relief upon demonstrating that: (1) there was error, (2) that is plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). Only if the three prongs of this test are satisfied will we assess whether we should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Id. We will then correct the error only if the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding is seriously affected. State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Minn.2004), reh'g denied (Minn. Mar. 11, 2004). Using much the same analytical approach to the questions about the DNA analysis as we did with the telephone records, we conclude that, because the nature of the state's inquiry was limited, the district court did not err in permitting the state to ask these questions. Further, having reached the foregoing conclusions, it then follows that the state did not engage in misconduct when it used Morton's responses to these questions during closing argument in a manner consistent with the manner in which they were used during cross examination. Morton makes a stronger case with respect to the questions the state asked of Morton when he contradicted the testimony of two AmericInn employees. First, AmericInn employee Janet Spencer testified that Morton talked to her a couple of days before Klatt's death and asked her if he could camp at the fairgrounds to save his boss some money because he did not like sharing a room. Morton denied having this conversation, and the state asked him: [s]o Janet Spencer wasn't telling the truth when she was on the stand? Second, AmericInn employee Catherine Cox testified that Morton asked her about the motel conference room and whether it could be used to watch a race that was on television. Morton denied talking with Cox, and the state asked him: [s]o Catherine Cox is not telling the truth? Similarly, during closing argument, the state used Morton's responses to these questions to advance the argument that the jury would have to believe that Spencer and Catherine Cox were mistaken in order to believe Morton. Morton did not object to the state's use of were they lying questions regarding the testimony given by Spencer and Catherine Cox during cross examination, nor did he object during closing argument; accordingly, we review this issue using a plain error analysis. We have previously expressed our concern with were they lying questions, and stated that as a general rule, they are inappropriate. See Pilot, 595 N.W.2d at 517. We have indicated that such questions are permitted in the circumstance when the defendant [holds] the issue of the credibility of the state's witnesses in central focus. Id. Unlike the defendant in Pilot, Morton did not hold the credibility of Spencer or Catherine Cox in central focus. Though he contradicted their testimony, he did not state or insinuate that they were deliberately falsifying any of it. That Morton denied having committed the crime of raping and killing Klatt, or even that he denied having had these conversations with Spencer and Catherine Cox, is not enough to justify the state's use of were they lying questions here because Morton did not put the witnesses' credibility at issue. We conclude that the state provided no assistance to the jury in evaluating Morton's credibility by asking the were they lying questions, and in fact the questions constituted an improper request for Morton to comment on the credibility of Spencer and Catherine Cox. By asking were they lying questions on these occasions, the state shifted the jury's focus by creating the impression that the jury must conclude that these two witnesses were lying in order to acquit Morton. The state then emphasized this impression when it referred to Morton's answers during closing argument. Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that these questions constituted error, and that the error was plain. Our conclusion that the state's use of were they lying questions on the two foregoing occasions was error and that the error was plain means that we must proceed to the third prong of our plain error test, under which we assess whether the error affected Morton's substantial rights. In order to satisfy the third prong, the defendant must show that the error was prejudicial and that it affected the outcome of the case. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741. We consider this to be a heavy burden. Id. Error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury. See id. (citing State v. Glidden, 455 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn.1990)). After reviewing the evidence submitted at trial, we conclude that the jury would have reached the same verdict even if the state had not asked Morton the two were they lying questions when his testimony contradicted that of Spencer and Catherine Cox. The evidence against Morton is strong: he made several inconsistent statements to the police; the telephone records obtained from the motel and Sprint contradict Morton's testimony; and Morton's testimony as well as that of other witnesses puts him in physical proximity to the crime scene. The state's physical evidence strongly links Morton to the crime: semen and hair were found in multiple places on and around Klatt's body and the BCA's analysis shows that the DNA present in that evidence was a match to Morton's DNA. When Morton testified, he did not present any alternative explanation for how his semen and hair ended up on Klatt's body; nor did he refute the testimony of several witnesses indicating that he was awake and in the motel at the time of the murder. The foregoing evidence would lead a reasonable jury to render the same verdict. Therefore, we conclude that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict would have been significantly affected had the state not asked the were they lying questions. Thus, we hold that Morton's substantial rights were not affected, and the third prong of the plain error test has not been satisfied.