Opinion ID: 3158047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tiedemann’s Appeal

Text: We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009). Tiedemann is a pro se litigant, so we view his filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But we will not serve as Tiedemann’s attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). The district court correctly dismissed Tiedemann’s lawsuit. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, among other things, that the defendant was 1 The remaining case, Tiedemann v. Salt Lake Cty. Adult Det. Ctr., No. 2:08CV-00298-DAK, was dismissed for a failure to prosecute. We noted in Hafed that a dismissal for failure to prosecute would not necessarily count as a strike because the dismissal would not be for grounds listed in § 1915. 635 F.3d at 1179. But we assessed a strike for a dismissal based on failure to prosecute because the Seventh Circuit also had determined that Hafed’s appeal was frivolous. Id. at 1179. Here, the district court did not determine or state that Tiedemann’s case was frivolous, was malicious, or failed to state a claim. Thus, this dismissal cannot count as a strike. See id.; Butler v. Dep’t of Justice, 492 F.3d 440, 442–44 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding that a dismissal for failure to prosecute was not a strike because such a dismissal was made without regard to the merits, and each of the three strike categories in § 1915(g) involve dispositions looking to the merits). 5 acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). This requires a defendant to have exercised power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” Id. (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Tiedemann did not allege in his complaint how the plaintiffs acted under color of state law. Even liberally construing his appellate pleadings, we discern no coherent argument challenging the district court’s dismissal. Instead, we see Tiedemann reiterating that the defendants are endangering his soul (and defining what the “soul” means) and asserting that the district judge’s religious beliefs led him to an incorrect decision. Tiedemann has not raised a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts, and we dismiss his appeal.