Opinion ID: 1716912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Instruct Jury on Negligent Homicide

Text: By two of his assignments of error defendant contends that the trial judge erred in refusing his special requested instructions relative to the law of negligent homicide and to the jury's duty to acquit if it found that defendant had committed that crime. He asserts that the trial judge was required to give the instructions because they were wholly correct and pertinent. La.C.Cr.P. art. 807, in relevant part, provides: A requested special charge shall be given by the court if it does not require qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly correct and pertinent. It need not be given if it is included in the general charge or in another special charge to be given. See also, State v. Atkins, supra . The State argues that the law of negligent homicide was not pertinent because that offense was not included among the applicable responsive verdicts. Although we have previously considered the issue, thus far it has not been clearly decided. In affirming a conviction of manslaughter, after a trial upon a murder indictment, in State v. Hopper, 251 La. 77, 203 So.2d 222 (1967) this Court stated that the trial judge was not required to instruct on the law of negligent homicide and criminal negligence because negligent homicide was not a responsive verdict under the indictment. However, the opinion in the case, which involved a homicide resulting from a barroom fight, does not indicate that there was any evidence which would have supported a finding of negligent homicide. On the other hand, in State v. Mart, 352 So.2d 678 (La.1977), after reversing a second degree murder conviction on other grounds, we stated that on retrial an instruction on negligent homicide should be given. Although there was ample evidence of negligent homicide, the opinion does not clearly indicate that a failure to so instruct necessarily would amount to reversible error. It is the duty of the trial judge to give a requested charge, which does not require qualification, limitation, or explanation and is not included in the general charge or another special charge, if it is wholly correct and pertinent to the case. La.C.Cr.P. art. 807. State v. Youngblood, 235 La. 1087, 106 So.2d 689 (1958); State v. Turner, 228 La. 202, 81 So.2d 861 (1955). This is a corollary of the trial judge's basic obligation to charge the jury as to the law applicable to the case, under which he is required to cover every phase of the case supported by the evidence whether or not accepted by him as true. La.C.Cr.P. art. 802; State v. Miller, 338 So.2d 678 (La. 1976); State v. Robichaux, 165 La. 497, 115 So. 728 (1928). It follows from these rules that the trial judge is required to charge the jury, in response to an otherwise proper request, as to the law applicable to any theory of defense which a jury could reasonably infer from the evidence. For example, this Court has reversed a conviction of embezzlement because of the clear prejudice and injury caused by the trial judge's refusal to give a correct special charge, not otherwise covered, when requested by defendant on the law pertaining to an accessory after the fact despite there being evidence to show that defendant was merely an accessory after the fact. State v. Robichaux, supra . In State v. Miller, supra , this Court reversed an attempted manslaughter conviction because the trial court failed to instruct on the law of justification and self defense, even though raised only by defendant's extremely doubtful version of the shooting. Similarly, evidence of extensive pre-crime drinking by an accused, from which the jury might have inferred his intoxication warranted the requested instructions that intoxication might preclude the specific intent required for the charged murder. State v. Mart, 352 So.2d 678 (La. 1977). See also, State v. Lentz, 306 So.2d 683 (La.1975) (charge relative to intoxication as affecting intent pertinent to simple burglary prosecution); State v. Montalbano, 257 La. 884, 244 So.2d 820 (1971) (instruction on self-defense pertinent to aggravated battery prosecution). Applying these principles to the instant case, we conclude that the requested special charges were wholly correct and pertinent. There was copious evidence, consisting of the testimony by Marse, the police officers and bystanders, from which the jury could have inferred that Marse was guilty of negligent homicide but not manslaughter or murder. The requested charges did not require qualification, limitation or explanation and were not included in other charges to be given. The trial judge fell into error, therefore, in not complying with his duty imposed by the statute to give the wholly correct and pertinent instructions requested on negligent homicide. We further conclude, however, that the errors do not warrant reversal of defendant's conviction and sentence. Although defense counsel's able arguments have persuasive powers, we cannot say that there has been a miscarriage of justice, prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused or a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right. La.C.Cr.P. art. 921. This is not a case in which the jury was improperly exposed to inadmissible evidence, improper courtroom conduct or erroneous jury instructions. Defendant's only claim to prejudice was the trial judge's failure to define the crime of negligent homicide and to instruct the jury that it must acquit in the event defendant's conduct amounted to no more than negligent homicide. Thus, the omission could have been prejudicial only if the jury had insufficient information to understand that if Marse was guilty only of negligent homicide it should find him not guilty of the charged offense. Cf. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977). A review of the record convinces us that the jury was adequately informed of its duty in the event it found defendant guilty only of the uncharged crime. The trial judge instructed the jury that negligent homicide was not a responsive verdict and that it must find the defendant not guilty if it had a reasonable doubt as to all grades of the offense charged. During his closing argument defense counsel, without objection or contradiction, told the jury that it must acquit the defendant if he were found guilty of no more than negligent homicide. [] The voir dire has not been transcribed for our review. However, remarks by defense counsel in closing argument indicate that he also discussed the jury's duty upon a finding of negligent homicide during voir dire of prospective jurors. Although it would have been preferable and more impressive if the trial judge had given the requested charges to the jury, the other instructions given by the trial judge coupled with defense counsel's closing argument and voir dire discussion sufficiently informed the jury of its duty to acquit defendant if the evidence warranted only a finding of negligent homicide. Accordingly, defendant's assignments of error are without reversible merit. For the reasons assigned, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed. AFFIRMED. SANDERS, C. J., and SUMMERS and MARCUS, JJ., concur. DIXON, J., dissents with reasons.