Opinion ID: 1841302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summation: All Bets Are Off

Text: ¶ 117. As a result of the majority opinion, the Tribe's payment to the State of $34.125 million due on June 30, 2004, need not be paid. [1] Almost $207 million of direct tribal payments to the State, upon which the legislature relied in adopting the budget, are in jeopardy, as is approximately $100 million annually thereafter. [2] Employment in the State will also be dramatically affected by the majority opinion. The Tribe estimates that gaming compacts have created 35,000 jobs in the State to date and that the 2003 amendments will add 20,000 more jobs and a billion dollars in new investments. ¶ 118. The majority opinion's ruling against Indian gaming not only will have an enormous effect on the state and local economies but also will interfere with federal and state policies promoting the economic welfare of the Indian tribes and Indian education. [3] ¶ 119. In its desperation to save the 1992 compact and the 1998 amendments, and yet to invalidate the 2003 amendments, the majority has gone well beyond the issues originally presented in this case. ¶ 120. The majority has imported the Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle [4] issue into the case at hand, namely whether Wisconsin Constitution Article IV, § 24 prohibits the 1998 amendments as well as any extension or renewal of the 1992 compact. The majority opinion swings from saying it does not decide this issue [5] to nearly saying that the 1998 amendments negotiated by Governor Thompson are valid. [6] The majority opinion states that no persuasive argument has been presented invalidating the 1992 compacts and the 1998 amendments, [7] but also states that the durability of the 1992 compact is a separate unanswered question, turning in part on the impairment of contracts clauses and IGRA. [8] ¶ 121. It is difficult to reconcile the opinion of the justices in the majority in the present case with their position in Dairyland. [9] Dairyland attacked the continued validity of the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments in light of the 1993 constitutional amendment. [10] The circuit court in Dairyland concluded that the compacts and 1998 extensions were still valid despite the 1993 constitutional amendment. [11] When the Dairyland case reached this court, three members of the majority voted to reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and one member in the majority recused himself altogether. Those same justices now appear to be reversing their reversal and signaling that the compacts and the 1998 amendments are still permissible. Yet the reasoning of the majority opinion invalidating the 2003 amendments invalidates the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments. Where do these contradictory signals emitted by the majority leave the court of appeals when on remand it must decide Dairyland? ¶ 122. In sum, the majority's analysis cannot withstand scrutiny. Why is it unconstitutional for Governor Doyle to negotiate the 2003 amendments authorizing games outlawed by the 1993 Wisconsin constitutional amendment and yet it was constitutional for Governor Thompson to have negotiated the 1998 amendments authorizing games similarly outlawed? In light of the majority opinion, if any Indian gaming whatsoever is to be permitted in Wisconsin in the future, it may be only because of the intervention of the federal courts. ¶ 123. The majority opinion correctly concludes that Wis. Stat. § 14.035, which authorizes the Governor to compact with the tribes, is constitutional. Nevertheless, ignoring the fact that the Wisconsin Constitution charges the governor with the responsibility to expedite matters as may be resolved by the legislature and to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, the majority strikes down three provisions of the compact: the duration of the compact; the addition of new games; and the provision regarding sovereign immunity. ¶ 124. In contrast, we conclude that the Governor properly exercised his power pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 14.035. Likewise, the duration provision is valid, as similar provisions are commonplace and recognize the government's need to enter into long-term contracts. Furthermore, the majority's application of the 1993 Wisconsin constitutional amendment to outlaw certain gaming substantially impairs the contractual relationship between the State and the Tribe and violates the federal and state constitutional impairment of contracts clause. Finally, the issue of sovereign immunity is not ripe and fails on the merits. Thus we conclude that the 2003 amendments are valid and that the majority opinion raises substantial federal issues, rendering this court a stopping point on the parties' way to the federal courts. ¶ 125. To assist the reader we set forth a table of contents to this dissent: II. Facts: ¶¶ 13-15 III. Constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 14.035: Delegation of Power: ¶¶ 16-57 IV. Validity of Duration Provision: ¶¶ 58-80 V. Validity of Adding Games: Wis. Const. Art. IV, § 24 & the Impairment of Contracts: ¶¶ 81-122 VI. Federal Issues: ¶¶ 123-137 VII. Sovereign Immunity: ¶¶ 138-142 VIII. Conclusion: ¶ 143 Appendix: IX. Severability: ¶¶ 144-156 X. Appropriations: ¶¶ 157-165