Opinion ID: 203123
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retaliatory Actions in Career Position

Text: While Maymí's status as a trust employee bars any claims regarding her dismissal, she also argues that she suffered retaliation after her reinstatement as an Attorney III, a career employment position. [9] Specifically, she asserts that she was assigned inferior duties, denied benefits, not provided with reasonable work accommodations, and deprived of her full salary. She contends that those adverse employment actions were undertaken in retaliation for her exercise of protected speech. A government employee who does not occupy a policy-making position of confidence and trust is protected from adverse employment decisions based on political affiliation. See Figueroa-Serrano, 221 F.3d at 7. A plaintiff bringing a political discrimination claim bears the burden of producing sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence from which a jury reasonably may infer that [the plaintiff's] constitutionally protected conduct . . . was a `substantial' or `motivating' factor behind his adverse employment action. Acevedo-Díaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir.1993). Proving that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor requires more than `merely juxtaposing a protected characteristicsomeone else's politicswith the fact that the plaintiff was treated unfairly.' Peguero-Moronta v. Santiago, 464 F.3d 29, 45 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Padilla-García v. Guillermo Rodríguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir.2000)). The mere fact that an adverse action was taken after an employee exercises First Amendment rights is not enough to establish a prima facie case. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 685, 116 S.Ct. 2342, 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996). After review of the facts on the record, we conclude that Maymí has failed to allege sufficient facts to support her claim of political discrimination. Maymí specifically alleges that it was Valle, acting in concert with Soto-Lacourt, who instructed that her salary be reduced as a result of discriminatory animus. She further alleges that Valle prevented her from receiving appropriate salary increases (uncorrected and allowed by Soto-Lacourt). A significant thrust of her claim is that the animosity stems from prior litigation in which Maymí successfully defended the Ports Authority against Valle. There is also evidence, indicating that Soto-Lacourt denied Maymí's requests for bonuses, leave payouts, and a flexible working schedule. [10] Even taking the evidence in as favorable a light as possible, the most that her allegations support is either a finding that Valle had a personal vendetta against her or that she was treated unfairly. Those claims of personal conflict and unfair treatment, absent a showing that political affiliation was a substantial motivating factor, however, are insufficient to allege a claim of political discrimination. Maymí must establish evidence in the record which would permit a rational fact finder to conclude that [her dismissal] stemmed from a politically based discriminatory animus. LaRou v. Ridlon, 98 F.3d 659, 661 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting Rivera-Cotto v. Rivera, 38 F.3d 611, 614 (1st Cir.1994)). Maymí's cursory allegations regarding Valle and Soto-Lacourt are insufficient to support her contention that the alleged adverse employment actions occurred as a result of her political opinions.