Opinion ID: 708223
Heading Depth: 7
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Relevance of Other Distinctions Among Resident Aliens

Text: 85 We reject the government's contention that we apply gradations of First Amendment protection parallel to the rational distinctions that are permissible pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause in determining which citizens and aliens may receive particular government benefits. See, e.g. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83-84, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1893-94, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976) (upholding a five-year residency requirement for medicare benefits for aliens); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100-101, 96 S.Ct. 1895, 1903-04, 48 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976) (holding that an arbitrary regulation barring aliens from employment in the federal civil service violates due process, though suggesting that a classification based on a legitimate overriding national interest would not violate equal protection). Ordinary equal protection analysis requires only that the government bestow benefits in accord with classifications that rationally satisfy the stated government objective. See, e.g., Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2291-93, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979). In contrast, to deny citizens or aliens some measure of their admitted rights to First Amendment associational freedom would be to nullify the right in its entirety. The Government begs the question in asserting that differential treatment is merited because these six aliens with technical visa violations are at the bottom of the sliding scale of alien connections to this country; underlying this contention is the assumption that the Government can use the pretext of technical violations to expel aliens on the basis of their group affiliations. That is the heart of the selective enforcement claim under consideration. 86 The aliens have provided evidence of disparate impact and of impermissibly motivated enforcement of the immigration laws. The aliens' First Amendment rights are subject to irreparable harm because of the prosecution, and they have a strong likelihood of success on their claim that the INS has selectively enforced the immigration laws in retaliation for their exercise of constitutionally protected rights. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction against continued deportation proceedings for the Six. 87