Opinion ID: 324541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Bribery Reference

Text: 51 John Sullivan testified that when Brewster's January, 1966, visitor said that she could get campaign funds from Anderson, Brewster suggested that Anderson contact Sullivan in that regard. Somewhat surprised by Brewster's reply, Sullivan continued, after the visitor's departure he inquired of Brewster about it. Sullivan then testified that Brewster responded, 'I know Cy Anderson and back when I was a Congressman he tried to bribe me and I threw him out of my office.' 52 On objection by Spiegel's counsel, the trial judge immediately instructed the jury to limit consideration of that statement to Brewster's fate alone. Anderson now contends that the statement was an impermissible hearsay reference to another crime--a reference which he could not explore by examination of Brewster, 114 and which the judge's limiting instruction could not completely meet. We do not find in these arguments a basis for reversal. 53 As we have had past occasion to admonish, 'evidence indicating the accused's commission of an offense not on trial, because of its potential for prejudice, is generally to be excluded.' 115 We have consistently recognized, however, that this rule is subject to exceptions 116 which may come into operation when the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potentially harmful effect. 117 A situation possibly justifying invocation of an exception arises when other-crimes evidence tends to prove an intent which is an essential element of the offense on trial. 118 54 Proof of the offense of bribery involves proof, among other things, of corrupt intent to influence or be influenced in official conduct. 119 The statement in question tended to show Brewster's prior knowledge of Anderson and Brewster's state of mind in accepting money from Anderson. So, upon a balance of that value against possible injury, the trial judge might properly have admitted the statement for the jury's consideration in connection with the bribery charges then pending against Brewster. 55 The greater concern, however, is not the admissibility of the statement against Brewster, but the effect of such admission upon Anderson, and in that regard Anderson lodges three complaints. One is that the statement, as to Anderson, was hearsay, and with that premise we readily agree. But the statement, as a purported admission by Brewster, was not hearsay as to him, and the trial judge instructed the jury to confine to Brewster alone any use it might mike of the statement. Another complaint registered by Anderson is that since, at the time of admission of the statement, Brewster could not have been examined by Anderson, 120 he was deprived of his constitutional right of confrontation. 121 That difficulty disappeared, however, when later in the trial Brewster took the witness stand himself and denied that he ever made the statement. 122 Anderson's remaining complaint is that the trial judge's limiting instruction did not give him adequate protection. We think the jury's willingness to heed instructions and its ability to keep separate the evidence against Brewster and Anderson, respectively, is amply shown by the discriminating verdicts it rendered. 123