Opinion ID: 1825851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Initially entertained is the last above stated issue.

Text: By process of a modification of the original divorce decree Sharon, as aforesaid, acquired the policy of insurance on William's life and he, in exchange, was relieved of all responsibility for payment of attendant premiums. This means that if William had thereafter died leaving a substantial estate but owing accrued child support, the children as named beneficiaries would have been entitled to the insurance proceeds. Further, in such event, Sharon could still recover from William's estate all past due child support arrearages absent any offset for proceeds derived from the policy on William's life. It therefore follows that trial court, as an adjunct of the contempt proceeding, essentially modified the divorce decree by revesting in William all rights in the insurance proceeds realized from the same insurance policy of which he had fully divested himself. But the court below was not confronted with a proceeding under the last sentence of section 598.21, The Code 1973, for modification of any prior decree. Consequently, disregarding substantive and procedural due process requirements not presently raised, trial court overreached in converting a contempt citation into a modification proceeding. Roach v. Oliver, 215 Iowa 800, 804-805, 244 N.W. 899, 901-902 (1932). See also Jennings v. Jennings, 56 Iowa 288, 291, 9 N.W. 222, 223 (1881). On this issue alone equity dictates a reversal. II. The same precept, precluding modification in a contempt hearing alone, comes into play with equally dispositive force as to trial court's unjustifiable cancellation of past due child support owing by William. Briefly stated, Anthony v. Anthony, 204 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 1973), relied upon by William, is factually inapposite. Furthermore, had this appeal stemmed from a modification of decree proceeding, trial court possessed no authority to exonerate liability for any or all then past due and accrued decretal support payments. As aptly articulated in Wren v. Wren, 256 Iowa 484, 489, 127 N.W.2d 643, 646 (1964): Modification of a decree for support payments operates prospectively and not retrospectively. The right to modify does not authorize the court to divest the parties of rights accrued under the original decree. Delbridge v. Sears, 179 Iowa 526, 530-533, 160 N.W. 218; Kell v. Kell, 179 Iowa 647, 651, 161 N.W. 634. Even where a decree is modified and a change is made the payments that have accrued up to that time cannot thereby be affected. Walters v. Walters, 231 Iowa 1267, 1270, 3 N.W.2d 595; Kell v. Kell, supra; Horn v. Horn, 221 Iowa 190, 197, 265 N.W. 148. See also Pucci v. Pucci, 259 Iowa 427, 431, 143 N.W.2d 353, 356 (1966); Guthrie v. Guthrie, 429 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Ky.1968); Kinsella v. Kinsella, 181 N.W.2d 764, 770 (N.D. 1970). Here again error attended the presently controverted portion of trial court's adjudication.