Opinion ID: 182275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ANALYSIS Speedy Trial Act

Text: The Speedy Trial Act was enacted to effectuate the Sixth Amendment's right to a speedy trial in criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 53 (1st Cir.2001); H.R.Rep. No. 96-390, at 2-3 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 805, 807. The Act provides at 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) that [i]f a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit established elsewhere in the Act, then the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant. Because the parties agree that Franklin was not timely brought to trial, the issue here is whether dismissal with prejudice is necessary under the Act. The Act at § 3162(a)(2) speaks to this issue directly: In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: [1] the seriousness of the offense; [2] the facts and circumstances of the case which led to dismissal; [3] and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice. In considering the other factors adverted to in the Act, this court has hewn to the principle that any such factors must be rationally related to the balancing objectives of the tripartite test. United States v. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920, 924 (1st Cir. 1988). Thus, these factors may include the length of the delay and the prejudice to the defendant stemming from the violation (or conversely, the absence of prejudice). Id. Indeed, we have come to describe prejudice to the defendant as the fourth factor for courts to consider. See United States v. Barnes, 159 F.3d 4, 16 (1st Cir.1998). In the end, however, one policy underrides our analysis: dismissal with prejudice is a last and rare resort. United States v. Dessesaure, 556 F.3d 83, 85 (1st Cir.2009). Our standard of review is abuse of discretion, see id., but the district court's decision is sound enough to withstand even significantly more searching scrutiny; indeed, it is sufficiently well-constructed to stand on its own. Nevertheless, we will briefly expound on each of the factors set forth above. First, Franklin concedes that his crime was serious, and rightly so. Both common sense and court precedent command the conclusion that the possession on multiple occasions of large quantities of drugs and ammunition is serious. See, e.g., id. at 86. Second, Franklin argues that the facts and circumstances of the delay in this case are like those in United States v. Stayton, 791 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.1986), where the Second Circuit held that a 23-month delay between voir dire and swearing in the jury warranted a dismissal with prejudice. [4] Applying the second factor, the Stayton court noted that the [district] court ignored the persistent prodding of the government to decide ... outstanding motions and proceed to trial. Id. at 21. Given that specific context, the court held that the enormity of the delay was enough to tip th[e] second factor in favor of dismissal of the indictment with prejudice. Id. at 22. The government argues that this case is controlled by Scott, 270 F.3d 30, where we held that a 124-day wait for an order on a motion to suppress warranted only dismissal without prejudice. Among the factors supporting dismissal without prejudice was our determination that the facts and circumstances of the delay do not show any bad faith on the part of the government; instead, [t]he delay was largely due to the district court, which acted without clear guidance by the law on the point. Id. at 58. Scott's holding reflects our practice of looking to whether there is government culpability as the focus of our facts-and-circumstances analysis. See United States v. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920, 925 (1st Cir.1988). The government is correct: Scott controls, and Stayton does not. There are many reasons for this, not least of which is that Scott is binding in this circuit while Stayton is not. Additionally, Scott is squarely on point here: in both cases, the delay stemmed from the court's belated decision to hold an evidentiary hearing and then require more briefing and not from any government misconduct. See Scott, 270 F.3d at 54. We made clear in Scott that these circumstances favor dismissal without prejudice. Id. at 58. Stayton, on the other hand, is not only non-binding but also inapplicable here because of its vastly different facts. In Stayton, there was no indication that the defendant bore any responsibility for the delay, for which the reviewing court could not discern a single justifying reason. Stayton, 791 F.2d at 20. Here, Franklin's responsibility was twofold: he requested a continuance and later remained silent about the delay until he filed the motion to dismiss. See Dessesaure, 556 F.3d at 86 (reversing dismissal with prejudice where the defendant was as well-placed to remind the judge [about the delay] as was the prosecutor). Additionally, in Stayton the delay was 23 months; here, the delaywhether 180 days, as the district court found, or 234, as Franklin argues was far shorter. In the end, then, Scott controls, Stayton is wholly inapposite, and the facts and circumstances of the delay strongly favor the government. Third, Franklin suggests that dismissal without prejudice would disrupt the administration of justice and of the Speedy Trial Act by effectively extracting the Act's teeth. This argument ignores the Act's specific inclusion of dismissal without prejudice as a sanction, and that sanction's several teeth: the cost to the government in bringing a new prosecution, the possibility of statute of limitations issues, the chance of failure to re-indict, and the risk of losing evidence and witnesses over time; the argument has therefore been roundly repudiated by both this court and the Supreme Court. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 342, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (1988) (Dismissal without prejudice is not a toothless sanction.); Barnes, 159 F.3d at 17-18 (quoting same). We need say no more on that. Fourth and finally, Franklin does not suggest how he might have been prejudiced by the delay, instead espousing the proposition that where serious enough delay occurs, it [i]s unnecessary to determine the extent to which the defendant ha[s] actually been prejudiced. But the delay here was not extreme, and it resulted at least in part from Franklin's own request for a continuance and subsequent inaction. More importantly, Franklin's suggestion that we bypass prejudice belies a glaring weakness in his argument: there is nothing in either the record or the briefs to indicate that he actually was prejudiced in any way by the district court's delay. Accordingly, the fourth factor tips the scale still further in the government's favor. Thus, the record reveals a serious crime, a somewhat lengthy but innocuous delay, a just sanction, and no harm to Franklin. Far from being an abuse of discretion, the district court's dismissal without prejudice was utterly appropriate.