Opinion ID: 883736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Was Black afforded effective assistance of counsel?

Text: This Court has adopted the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, for determining whether counsel was ineffective. State v. Mahoney (1994), 264 Mont. 89, 99-102, 870 P.2d 65, 72-73. Under the first prong of that test, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient by demonstrating that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; under the second prong, a defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance so prejudiced him that he was deprived of the right to a fair trial. Mahoney, 870 P.2d at 72-73. Black's contention that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel is premised on two alleged deficiencies. Black relies first on State v. Denny (1993), 262 Mont. 248, 865 P.2d 226, in arguing that counsel's failure to interview witnesses who would have supported his alibi defense constituted deficient performance. In this regard, we note that the alleged failure to interview helpful witnesses cannot be either established or disproved on the record before us; as a result, that allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be addressed in this direct appeal from Black's conviction. Black also argues that counsel failed to follow up on discrepancies in the testimony of the State's witnesses. Here, we need consider only the first prong of the Strickland test to conclude that Black has not met his burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. The record before us establishes that counsel cross-examined each of the State's witnesses. The cross-examinations tested the witnesses' memory of events occurring some six years earlier and attempted to cast doubt on the witnesses' recollections and credibility. Black cites no authority in support of his general and conclusory allegation that more, or different, cross-examination was required. A strong presumption exists that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Denny, 865 P.2d at 228-29; citing Nealy v. Cabana (5th Cir.1985), 764 F.2d 1173, 1177-1178. Black's conclusory allegations do not begin to establish that counsel's performance was not reasonable under prevailing professional norms. See Denny, 865 P.2d at 228; citing Lawrence v. Armontrout (8th Cir.1990), 900 F.2d 127, 129 (citation omitted). We conclude that Black has not met the first prong of the Strickland test by demonstrating record-based deficient performance by counsel and, to that extent, we hold that he was afforded effective assistance of counsel. Affirmed. TURNAGE, C.J., and NELSON and WEBER, JJ., concur.