Opinion ID: 3050907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the “Domestic

Text: Relations Exception” [1] Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that “[t]he maternal aunt has no standing [in Tribal Court] to petition for custody of the child” and that the Tribal Court’s order is “a substantive violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional right to parent his child.” In other words, Plaintiff alleges that “a tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction.” Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 853 (1985). “Non-Indians may bring a federal common law cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to challenge tribal court jurisdiction.” Boozer, 381 F.3d at 934 (citing Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 850-53). Federal courts therefore have subject matter jurisdiction under the federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because the case arises under federal common law.2 Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 853. [2] Both in his complaint and before the district court, Plaintiff asserted subject matter jurisdiction on two grounds: federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The district court expressly declined to decide “whether this Court has federal question or diversity jurisdiction” and held that, regardless, the “domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction” applied. The Supreme Court has long recognized that, when the relief sought relates primarily to domestic relations, a doctrine referred to as the domestic relations exception divests federal courts of jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858). 2 Because we have subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331, we need not determine whether an alternative basis for jurisdiction also exists. See Boozer, 381 F.3d at 934 n.2 (holding that jurisdiction exists under federal common law and declining to address the plaintiff’s alternative jurisdictional theory). ATWOOD v. FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT 697 Plaintiff argues that the domestic relations exception does not apply in this case, because subject matter jurisdiction exists under the federal question jurisdiction statute, § 1331, and the domestic relations exception applies only to the diversity jurisdiction statute, § 1332. We agree. The Supreme Court discussed the nature of the domestic relations exception at length in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992). The Court traced the history of the exception and concluded, first, that the exception is not of constitutional dimension. Id. at 695. That is, “the Constitution does not exclude domestic relations cases from the jurisdiction otherwise granted by statute to the federal courts.” Id. But, the Court held, the diversity jurisdiction statute does exclude such cases. In reasoning to that conclusion, the Court examined the text and history of the diversity jurisdiction statute. Id. at 698. The Court held that the exception derived from Congress’ intent to exclude domestic relations cases from the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. at 700. When Congress later amended the diversity statute, it meant to leave in place the domestic relations exception. Id. at 700-01. The Court concluded that, in cases falling within the scope of the exception to § 1332, federal courts lack jurisdiction. Id. at 701-03. [3] In sum, Ankenbrandt held that the domestic relations exception was not of constitutional dimension, but rested on Congress’ intent in enacting the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Although Ankenbrandt did not address whether the exception applies to the federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court’s reasoning plainly does not apply to that statute. We therefore join the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in holding that the domestic relations exception applies only to the diversity jurisdiction statute. See United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1231 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 1984) 698 ATWOOD v. FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT (reaching the same conclusion in a case pre-dating Ankenbrandt). Our holding today is driven by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ankenbrandt, but it also is consistent with our cases pre-dating Ankenbrandt. See Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Thus, domestic relations cases are within the Article III judicial power of the federal courts, but outside the power bestowed by Congress in the diversity statute.”). Of note, the First Circuit mistakenly identified the Ninth Circuit as the only circuit to hold the opposite: that the domestic relations exception applies to more than diversity actions. See Mandel v. Town of Orleans, 326 F.3d 267, 271 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)). We disagree with the First Circuit’s characterization of Thompson. In that case, we looked to the policies underlying the domestic relations exception for guidance in answering a statutory interpretation question; we did not apply the exception at all. 798 F.2d at 1558. In any event, we clarify today that the domestic relations exception applies only to the diversity jurisdiction statute. [4] In conclusion, subject matter jurisdiction exists in this case under § 1331 and federal common law. The domestic relations exception does not apply.