Opinion ID: 203822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grandfathering

Text: The Santanas may apply for adjustment of status only if grandfathered as a result of the revoked, special immigrant visa petition that was filed on behalf of Vasti. The relevant regulation is 8 C.F.R. § 245.10, which provides that an alien may qualify for grandfathering if he is physically present and is the beneficiary of a visa petition. [3] § 245.10(a)(1)(i)(A). The visa petition relied upon by the alien must have been (i) filed before April 30, 2001, (ii) properly filed, [4] and (iii) approvable when filed. Id. at (a)(1)(i)(A); (a)(2)(i); (a)(3). To be considered approvable when filed, a visa petition, on the date it was filed and under the circumstances that existed at the time it was filed, must have been: properly filed, meritorious in fact, and non-frivolous ('frivolous' being defined [] as patently without substance). Id. at (a)(3). Under § 245.10(a)(3), if the visa petition at issue has met all three of the requirements listed above (properly filed on or before April 30, 2001 and approvable when filed), it may be relied upon for grandfathering purposes, even if it was later withdrawn, denied, or revoked due to circumstances that have arisen after the time of filing. Id.; Echevarria, 505 F.3d at 19. As to what may constitute circumstances that have arisen after the time of filing, § 245.10 cross-references § 205.1 as providing guidance. § 245.10(a)(4) (Circumstances that have arisen after the time of filing means circumstances similar to those outlined in § 205.1(a)(3)(i) or (a)(3)(ii) of this chapter.). [5] An alien seeking adjustment of status while in removal proceedings bears the burden of proving eligibility for such adjustment. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d); De Acosta, 556 F.3d at 18. The Santanas argue that the BIA erred in concluding that they failed to prove that they qualified for grandfathering. Specifically, they contend that they qualified for grandfathering under § 245.10(a)(3), arguing that Vasti's petition met all three grandfathering requirements but was later revoked due to circumstances that arose after the time of filing. This argument must be rejected, because the BIA's determination that the petition did not satisfy all three of the grandfathering requirementsfailing the approvable when filed requirement in particularis supported by substantial evidence. In concluding that the Santanas failed to establish that the petition filed on Vasti's behalf was approvable when filed, the BIA relied on evidence in the record that the petition was not meritorious in fact when it was filed. This evidence included a 2003 notice of revocation of the petition. In identifying the reasons for revocation, the revocation decision incorporated by reference an earlier notice of intent to revoke. This notice of intent to revoke identified derogatory information that cast the validity of the petition into doubt and that indicated that the petition might be fraudulent. Although the notice of intent to revoke offered the AOG an opportunity to submit countervailing evidence to refute this information, the AOG did not submit any. When the petition was ultimately revoked, the AOG did not appeal that revocation. Given this sequence of events, the BIA was entitled to rely on this record evidence in ruling that the petition filed on Vasti's behalf was not approvable when filed. See Echevarria, 505 F.3d at 19-20. The Santanas' argument that this record evidence cannot be relied upon to deny them grandfathering amounts to an attempt to shift their burden of establishing eligibility for grandfathering to one requiring the agency to disprove eligibility for grandfathering. As we have said, the burden was the petitioners' to bear. De Acosta 556 F.3d at 18. Moreover, even if the petition filed on Vasti's behalf had been approvable when filed, the Santanas have not established that the petition was revoked due to specific, later arising circumstances as required by § 245.10(a)(3). At no point have the Santanas identified what the later arising circumstances were in Vasti's case, and they certainly have not described any circumstances similar to those outlined in [8 C.F.R.] § 205.1, such as death of the petitioner or termination of the marriage. This is likely because, as the revocation notice implies, the petition filed on Vasti's behalf was revoked because the AOG failed to establish that it was approvable when filed. As a result, the later arising circumstances clause never came into play.