Opinion ID: 200574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Consequences of Failure to Bring a Timely State Claim

Text: 21 Pascoag did not satisfy the Williamson County prerequisites for a federal claim. We have stated that takings claims are unripe until the potential state remedy has been more fully pursued. 7 Gilbert, 932 F.2d at 65. The situation here is different. As the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted, there is a fatal flaw in Pascoag's claim: it is too late for any state law cause of action. Williamson County requires the pursuit of state remedies before a taking case is heard in federal court. Adequate state remedies were available to Pascoag; it simply ignored those remedies until it was too late. By failing to bring a timely state cause of action, Pascoag forfeited its federal claim. 22 We assume for purposes of this appeal that a taking claim may arise when the government acquires property rights by adverse possession or prescription. Reviewing the dates as determined by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the state and the public began using the land and water in a manner that was open, actual, notorious, hostile, adverse, continuous, and under a claim of right in 1965. Pascoag State Decision, 774 A.2d at 834. Property rights were acquired by the state and the public in 1975. Id. at 838. The state court decision was issued in 2001. 23 Relying on United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947), Pascoag argues that the circumstances surrounding the taking had not stabilized until the Rhode Island Supreme Court's final decision, and the statute of limitations did not begin to run until that time. See id. at 749, 67 S.Ct. 1382. We find Dickinson distinguishable. There, the government caused plaintiff's land to be flooded, and the water level rose over a period of years. Id. at 747, 67 S.Ct. 1382. The government did not use condemnation proceedings, but left the taking to physical events. Id. at 748, 67 S.Ct. 1382. The Court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run when flooding commenced, but only when physical events stabilized, Id. at 749, 67 S.Ct. 1382. This ensured that damages could be ascertained and that res judicata would not bar recovery for future damage. Id. 24 While Pascoag points to facts suggesting that the situation regarding ownership of the Reservoir was not certain as late as 1997, the State Supreme Court found that the State's use satisfied all the adverse possession requirements by 1975. At that time a final account could be struck, and nothing in the State's use of the Lake changed over time, so piecemeal litigation would not result. There was continuous occupancy by the State for ten years at which point property rights were acquired by operation of law and, if compensable, must be countered by a state court suit within the period allowed by the state statute of limitations. 25 Pascoag also asserts that its claim was not ripe until the decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. We disagree. First, Pascoag's argument is at odds with the state court's finding of adverse possession and prescription, which is binding on Pascoag and requires open and notorious possession by the adverse party. That determination means, assuming arguendo that a taking claim could be made for acquisition by adverse possession or prescription, Pascoag should have known that a taking was in progress and brought suit under state law at that time (within the relevant statute of limitations). 8 The statute of limitations for a state taking claim is, at most, 10 years (for all civil actions not otherwise limited), and likely 1 year (for assessment of damages in state condemnation proceedings). R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-36 (2002). Pascoag's claim was ripe under state law at least by 1975, when Pascoag, assuming it had any claim at all, could have brought suit for recovery in state proceedings. If it had done so and the state had denied a remedy in violation of the Constitution, then a § 1983 claim would have ripened at the time of the denial. To its detriment, Pascoag did not file suit, but instead waited until the state sought judicial remedies in 1998. 26 Second, while the Williamson County requirements typically reveal a claim to be premature, they may also reveal that a claim is barred from the federal forum. See Vandor, Inc. v. Militello, 301 F.3d 37, 39 (2d Cir.2002); Harbours Pointe, 278 F.3d at 706; Gamble, 5 F.3d at 286; Harris, 790 F.2d at 681. The Williamson County ripeness requirements will never be met in this case, because the state statute of limitations has run on Pascoag's inverse condemnation claim. By failing to bring its state claim within the statute of limitations period, Pascoag forfeited its federal claim. Gamble, 5 F.3d at 286; accord Vandor, 301 F.3d at 39. The state provided a remedy, but plaintiff[] failed to pursue it. [It] cannot obtain jurisdiction in the federal courts simply by waiting until the statute of limitation bars the state remedies. Harris, 790 F.2d at 681. 27 In Gamble, the plaintiff filed suit in federal court alleging that she had been denied just compensation by a zoning plan. Gamble, 5 F.3d at 285. The Seventh Circuit, citing Williamson County, asked whether she had exhausted her remedies for obtaining a compensation award or equivalent relief from the state. Id. at 286. Among the options available to the plaintiff under state law was the ability to bring an inverse condemnation suit. Id. However, the statute of limitations barred plaintiff from raising that issue in the state courts. Id. Analogizing to other situations where exhaustion of remedies is required, the court held that the failure to pursue state compensation remedies in a timely fashion forfeited plaintiff's federal claim to just compensation. Id. 28 Similarly, Pascoag's failure to bring a timely suit for compensation under state law has led to the forfeiture of its federal taking claim. Even making all reasonable inferences in favor of Pascoag — that a taking claim can stand when the state acquires land by adverse possession, that the claim did not accrue until the state assumed property rights in 1975, and that the Rhode Island statute of limitations for such a claim is 10 years — Pascoag's state claim was time-barred in 1985. [A] claimant cannot be permitted to let the time for seeking a state remedy pass without doing anything to obtain it and then proceed in federal court on the basis that no state remedies are open. Id. Pascoag's failure to assert a timely state claim has foreclosed its federal cause of action. Litigants who neglect or disdain their state remedies are out of court, period. River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 165 (7th Cir.1994).