Opinion ID: 3003388
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Obstruction-Of-Justice Enhancement

Text: Mr. Anderson asserts that he should not have received a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which provides for a two-level enhancement when a defendant obstructs or attempts to obstruct the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the charged crime. Id. He maintains that his testimony at trial amounted to no more than a simple denial of guilt, which, he claims, cannot support the application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement. We review the factual findings underlying the district court’s application of the obstruction enhancement for clear error, and we review de novo whether those findings adequately support the enhancement. United States v. House, 551 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). As we previously have noted, a district court may impose an obstruction-of-justice enhancement based on its conclusion that a defendant committed perjury at trial. United States v. Williams, 553 F.3d 1073, 1081 (7th Cir.), No. 08-2925 19 cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2452 (2009).1 3 Thus, if a district court finds that a defendant “gave false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory,” the application of an obstruction enhancement is warranted. United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 949 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Before applying the obstruction-of-justice enhancement, the district court gave considerable thought to Mr. Anderson’s objection to the enhancement and conducted a review of its trial notes. The court then concluded that although, at first, Mr. Anderson was not apprised fully of the nature of First Capital’s activities, he nevertheless learned a great deal about First Capital, assisted the company and agreed to serve as its president. R.183 at 14. The court further concluded that Mr. Anderson “did know what [the] business was and became a part of it,” and it specifically “[found] that [Mr. Anderson] did in fact testify falsely at trial.” Id. at 15. Given these judicial findings, we cannot accept Mr. Anderson’s challenge to this enhancement. The court did not predicate its application of the enhancement on Mr. Anderson’s mere denial of guilt. Instead, after comparing Mr. Anderson’s testimony with the evidence presented by the Government, the district court 13 See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4 (“Note 4”) (listing “committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” as an “example[] of the type[] of conduct to which [the obstruction] adjustment applies”). 20 No. 08-2925 determined that Mr. Anderson testified falsely at trial. It therefore concluded that Mr. Anderson willfully obstructed justice by falsely denying any knowledge of the criminal nature of the enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Godinez, 110 F.3d 448, 457 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the defendant’s “denial of any knowledge that there was a cocaine transaction going on” was “not the same as a general denial of guilt” and rejecting the defendant’s sentencing challenge). Given the evidence against Mr. Anderson, we cannot say that this con- clusion was clearly erroneous. The district court properly identified the false testimony supporting the enhancement and made an independent finding of perjury; having done so, it was permitted to impose the enhancement. See United States v. Banks-Giombetti, 245 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the district court did not err in applying an obstruction-of-justice enhancement when it “credited the testimony of the [witnesses] over [the defendant’s] and found by a preponderance of the evidence that [the defendant’s] testimony was both false and material”); United States v. Ofcky, 237 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court “met all the standards required for the [obstruction-of-justice] enhancement” when it weighed the conflicting testimony and concluded that the defendant committed perjury).