Opinion ID: 1192652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: A district court may modify a defendant's sentence only as provided by statute. United States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir.2001) (The authority of a district court to resentence a defendant is limited by statute and is expressly prohibit[ed]... beyond those exceptions expressly enacted by Congress.). Congress has provided that a district court has the discretion to reduce a sentence based upon a change in the Sentencing Guidelines affecting a defendant's sentencing range in accordance with the relevant Guidelines policy statement: [I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added). In § 1B1.10 of the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission has identified those amendments that may be applied retroactively pursuant to the above policy statement and has also articulated the proper procedures for implementing the amendment in a case already concluded. On December 11, 2007, the Commission issued a revised version of § 1B1.10, which emphasizes the limited nature of relief available under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Revised § 1B1.10(a), which became effective on March 3, 2008, provides in pertinent part as follows: (1) In General. In a case in which a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual listed in subsection (c) below, the court may reduce the defendant's term of imprisonment as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). As required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), any such reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment shall be consistent with this policy statement. (2) Exclusions. A reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment is not consistent with this policy statement and therefore is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if (A) None of the amendments listed in subsection [§ 1B1.10](c) is applicable to the defendant; or (B) An amendment listed in subsection (c) does not have the effect of lowering the defendant's applicable guideline range. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a) (amended Dec. 11, 2007). In addition, § 1B1.10 directs that the court shall substitute only the amendments listed in subsection (c) for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 (b)(1). The amendment in question in this case is Amendment 706, effective November 1, 2007, which reduced the base offense level for most crack offenses. Amendment 706 was further amended by the technical and conforming amendments set forth in Amendment 711, also effective November 1, 2007. Amendment 706 is one of the amendments listed in § 1B1.10(c) as having retroactive effect. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c).
Johnson argues that the district court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(e). He reasons that the retroactive amendment regarding crack cocaine had the effect of lowering his applicable Guidelines range from 235-293 months to 188-235 months. Although he concedes that he is subject to the statutory mandatory-minimum term of 240 months, Johnson argues that the district court never actually applied the mandatory minimum because it imposed a below-minimum, 108-month sentence in response to the government's motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). In sum, Johnson contends that, [b]ecause the guideline range has been reduced and the sentence imposed was based upon a guideline range that has since been reduced, the district court should have determined that it had authority to reduce the sentence. Johnson's argument lacks merit because he was not in fact sentenced based on a Guidelines range that was subsequently reduced. Rather, his sentence was based on the mandatory minimum imposed by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which remained unchanged by Guidelines Amendment 706. Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guidelines range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b); accord United States v. Goff, 6 F.3d 363, 366-67 (6th Cir.1993) (As the guidelines themselves recognize, where a statutory mandatory minimum sentence and the guidelines conflict, the guidelines must yield, and the statutory minimum sentence prevails.). Thus, if Johnson were resentenced today, the amended Guidelines would still require a sentence of 240 months, and the court would be departing from this same 240-month baseline if again presented with the government's substantial-assistance motion. [T]he appropriate starting point for calculating a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) is the mandatory minimum sentence itself. United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 332 (6th Cir.2002) (rejecting the claim that, once the government filed a § 3553(e) motion, the sentence could be based on the initial Guidelines range rather than the higher statutory mandatory minimum). This means that the district court properly concluded that, [b]ecause [Johnson] was subject to a statutory mandatory minimum term of 240 months, Amendment 706, even if it had been in effect at the time of the defendant's sentencing, would not have lowered the applicable guidelines range. Nor did the district court, as Johnson claims, conflate the concept of a Guidelines range with that of a Guidelines sentence. Where a mandatory minimum sentence exceeds the otherwise applicable Guidelines rangeas it would were Johnson to be resentenced todayit replaces that Guidelines range. See, e.g., United States v. Mooneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 294 (6th Cir.2007) (because of a mandatory minimum sentence, the applicable guideline range was effectively 120 to 137 months although it would have otherwise been 110 to 137 months) (emphasis added); United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 881, 882 (8th Cir.2008) (The top of Mr. Jones's originally calculated guidelines range was less than the statutory mandatory minimum sentence for the quantity of crack involved in his conviction, so that his final originally calculated guidelines range was the statutorily required minimum sentence of 120 months.) (emphasis added). If we were to accept Johnson's argument, we would afford him a double benefit by first permitting [him] to avoid a higher mandatory minimum sentence and then granting a departure from an even lower sentencing guidelines range. Stewart, 306 F.3d at 332. Finally, even assuming for the sake of argument that the district court had discretion to modify Johnson's sentence, no such reduction was warranted. A reduction is not automatic; instead, the district court has discretion within the limits of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. [T]he court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). To succeed on this point, Johnson must show that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a sentence reduction. United States v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir.2004) (noting that this court reviews a district court's denial of a motion to reduce sentence under the abuse-of-discretion standard). But the district court did not abuse its discretion. Its opinion makes clear that it considered and rejected the factors proffered by Johnson on the ground that they did not warrant any further sentence reduction, stating that even if the Court ha[d] such authority, this Court would, after consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and public safety considerations, exercise its discretion and deny the motion for reduction of sentence. The district court therefore properly denied Johnson's motion for a reduction of his sentence.