Opinion ID: 717171
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Personal Injury Provision

Text: 24 The personal injury provision in Brown's insurance policy with City Insurance states: 25 Personal injury means, (1) Bodily injury, (2) Any injury a natural person may suffer to his person, reputation, character or feelings, and (3) any injury to intangible property sustained by any organization, including but not limited to false arrest, false eviction, malicious prosecution, tortuous [sic] intereference [sic] with contractual rights, libel, slander or defamation; but the term Personal Injury does not include under subdivision (2) and (3) any injury arising out of discrimination by reason of race, color, or creed which is unlawful under State or Federal Law. 26 (Emphasis supplied.) 27 The district court reviewed the history of this provision, including language Brown drafted which later became part of the standard policy. It noted its sloppy draftsmanship and attempted to give a reasonable construction to its language. The district court interpreted the provision to mean that the causes of action listed after the injury to intangible property clause are meant only to relate to, and are therefore a limited extension of, those already enumerated. The district court rejected Brown's assertion that this provision covered any injury to intangible property sustained by any organization however caused. It did so because it interpreted the enumerated causes of action as claims based on injuries uniquely suffered by individuals rather than by organizations. According to the court, this interpretation was the only one which treats the enumeration as something more than mere surplusage, and recognizes that while the manuscripted endorsement did indeed expand the coverage beyond the original narrow version, it expanded it to a limited extent. 28 On Brown's motion for reconsideration the district court reaffirmed its ruling. It did not find the personal injury provision ambiguous in its original decision, but interpreted it according to standard rules of construction. Alternatively the lower court related how if it had found the provision ambiguous, it would be construed against Brown as the drafter, and how the record evidence established that the provision was not intended to cover an unlimited number of business torts suffered by organizations, as Brown had asserted. It thus again rejected Brown's contention that City Insurance had a duty to defend Brown in the underlying action. 29 On appeal Brown has offered a plethora of arguments in support of its conclusion that the personal injury provision covers Westowne's claims. We consider each in turn. 30
31 Brown asserts that the plain meaning of the personal injury provision (any injury to intangible property sustained by any organization) results in coverage and thus a duty to defend. For Brown the unambiguous definition of 'personal injury' includes the unmodified and unrestricted concept of injury to intangible property sustained by any organization. 32 Insurance policy language such as this provision is to be given a reasonable reading. Scottish Guarantee Ins. Co., Ltd., 19 F.3d at 309 (citing inter alia School Dist. of Shorewood, 488 N.W.2d at 88-89). The district court correctly concluded that no insuring provision could be so universal. No insurer would cover any conceivable business tort (including intentional wrongs) committed by a world-wide manufacturer and distributor as long as it caused injury to intangible property. The district court reasonably concluded that the phrase arising out of or as a result of qualified the list of enumerated causes of action but was incorrectly dropped from this poorly drafted provision. The lower court gave the including but not limited to language a reasonable reading to preserve the list of claims as representative while recognizing that the provision expanded coverage beyond the original version without doing so in an unlimited manner. The correctness of this conclusion is confirmed when contrasted to Brown's construction, which would render the balance of the provision surplusage. Standard contract construction principles preclude such a result. Olguin, 237 N.W.2d at 697. 33
34 Brown submits that whether or not the district court found the personal injury endorsement ambiguous, it improperly construed it against Brown as drafter of the provision. Brown relies here on the doctrine of contra preferentem, which construes a disputed phrase against its drafter. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 327 (6th Ed.). Brown in its motion for reconsideration, rather than the district court, introduced the concept of ambiguity into the contract analysis. The lower court stated it had not found the personal injury provision ambiguous. Even if the provision was vague, the lower court correctly concluded that Brown had drafted it. Moreover, Brown's status as a sophisticated business entity rendered it at least equal to City Insurance, rendering inapplicable the rationale for the doctrine of contra preferentem. For these reasons Brown cannot properly rely on this concept for insurance coverage. 35
36 Brown submits the district court limited coverage to causes of action specifically enumerated in the personal injury provision, improperly restricting the general term (coverage for any injury to intangible property sustained by any organization), notwithstanding the clear manifestation of contrary intent. See State v. Campbell, 102 Wis.2d 243, 246, 306 N.W.2d 272, 273 (Ct.App.1981). Brown contends that in doing so the district court improperly applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis. 37 The district court did not refer to the rule of ejusdem generis. As discussed above, we conclude the district court properly interpreted the including but not limited to language in the personal injury endorsement. Rather than rendering this phrase meaningless, the district court gave it a reasonable interpretation that preserved its plain meaning as well as that of the list of enumerated causes of action. We find no basis to conclude the district court even applied the rule of ejusdem generis, properly or otherwise. 38
39 Brown also asserts City Insurance has a duty to defend it because the factual allegations in Westowne's complaint support an arguable claim for tortious interference with contract, one of the offenses specifically enumerated in the personal injury endorsement. 40 Brown's argument rings hollow because, as it recognizes, a claim for tortious interference with contract appears nowhere in Westowne's complaint. The only contract of any type alleged in Westowne's complaint is a contract between Brown and Westowne. Although Wisconsin recognizes a cause of action for tortious interference with contract, one cannot tortiously interfere with one's own contract. Wausau Medical Center v. Asplund, 182 Wis.2d 274, 297, 514 N.W.2d 34, 44 (Ct.App.1994). Further, intent to interfere is a required element of this tort. Cudd v. Crownhart, 122 Wis.2d 656, 659-60, 364 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Ct.App.1985). Westowne never alleges that Brown intentionally interfered with third parties with whom Westowne was dealing. Therefore, Westowne did not allege facts to support a claim for tortious interference with contract. 41
42 Brown creatively contends City Insurance has a duty to defend it because the activity alleged in Westowne's complaint is like or related to the causes of action enumerated in the personal injury endorsement. The duty allegedly exists because Westowne's claims and those listed in the provision are all part of a wide range of activity known as 'unfair competition'. 43 Brown's argument must be rejected for three reasons. First, as we noted above, Westowne's allegations do not amount to a claim for common law unfair competition. Second, Brown identifies the cause of action by its label, which is improper for determining insurance coverage. Curtis-Universal, 43 F.3d at 1122. Third, even if we concluded that Westowne's allegations amounted to a claim for unfair competition, that umbrella concept is not necessarily similar to tortious interference with contractual rights, the cause of action recognized in the personal injury provision. 4