Opinion ID: 2974332
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ten-point enhancement for number of firearms

Text: As discussed above, the district court gave Duckro a ten-point offense level enhancement with regard to the theft of firearms offense for the number of firearms involved in the crime. In addition to his Blakely/Booker objection to this enhancement, Duckro contends that it amounts to double counting, prohibited by the Sentencing Guidelines. Although Duckro’s Sixth Amendment challenge to this enhancement was unavailing, we still review the application of the guidelines for purposes of our section 3553(a) inquiry. In that regard, the district court did not commit double counting with this enhancement. Duckro’s argument on this point is based on the commentary to section 2K2.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which provides that “[i]f a sentence under this guideline is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, do not apply any specific offense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm when determining the sentence for the underlying offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, cmt. 4. Duckro’s sentence under this guideline was for the offense of the theft of firearms. His sentence for the use of firearms in drug trafficking was imposed in conjunction with the theft offense, and he claims that it is an underlying offense as provided in this comment, such that the enhancement constitutes prohibited double counting. He is wrong. This Court has explained that double counting under this provision occurs where the two offenses in question are in fact for the same criminal act, and an enhancement for one count is applied even though the basis for the enhancement is the same as the basis for the accompanying count. For example, where a defendant is convicted of transporting stolen firearms as well as being a felon in possession of firearms for the same act of possession, it would be double counting to apply an enhancement for stolen firearms to the felon in possession count. See United States v. Sanders, 162 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 1998). Conversely, where a defendant brandishes a gun in a bank robbery and is convicted of the bank robbery, an enhancement for brandishing the gun is appropriate if he is not separately convicted for the use of a gun in a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. §924(c). If he is separately convicted under section 924(c), the enhancement would not be appropriate. United States v. Griffis, 282 F.3d 443, 446-47 (6th Cir. 2002). The Court’s focus is on whether there is a “separation of time . . . or distinction in conduct,” between the two offenses in question. Sanders, 162 F.3d at 400. Here, there clearly is a separation in time and conduct between the two offenses, and the enhancement was not double counting. The theft of firearms count arose from the burglaries of the firearms dealers in Ohio. The use of a gun in a drug trafficking crime arose from the subsequent exchange of guns for drugs in New York City. Not only is one offense not the underlying offense for the other, but moreover, the number of firearms is not a basis for either count. Accordingly, for purposes of calculating an advisory guideline range pursuant to section 3553, this enhancement did not amount to double counting. 2. Two-point enhancement for the use of stolen guns The district court’s two-point enhancement for the use of stolen guns does not pose a constitutional problem because Duckro pled guilty to stealing the guns in question. However this enhancement does appear to have constituted double counting under the rationale of Sanders and Griffis. The district court made clear that it was applying this enhancement only to the theft of firearms offense. Not only does this Court’s precedent dictate that the enhancement for stolen Nos. 05-3379/3381 United States v. Duckro Page 7 firearms to a sentence for the theft of firearms would be double counting, but the comment to the Sentencing Guideline explicitly provides: [i]f the only offense to which § 2K2.1 applies is 18 U.S.C. § 922(i), (j), or (u) . . . (offenses involving a stolen firearm or stolen ammunition) and the base offense level is determined under subsection (a)(7), do not apply the adjustment in subsection (b)(4) unless the offense involved a firearm with an altered or obliterated serial number. This is because the base offense level takes into account that the firearm or ammunition was stolen. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. 9. This provision is controlling here, as the offense in question was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u), Duckro’s twelve-point base offense level was from subsection (a)(7), and the enhancement was under subsection (b)(4). Thus the guideline itself explicitly states that the enhancement in question was prohibited double counting. It is difficult for us to determine how this mistake impacted Duckro’s eventual sentence. On the one hand, given the district court’s combination of the sentences for both counts and its downward departure, Duckro’s sentence included what amounted to six months for the theft of firearms count, along with sixty months for the use of firearms in a drug trafficking offense. Because the sixty month sentence is based on a mandatory minimum, only the six months for the theft of firearms was affected by this departure. Duckro is thus left quibbling with a six month sentence for the offense of stealing guns from three separate firearms dealers. This is a fairly lenient sentence for his offense under the sentencing guidelines. Even without any enhancements, Duckro’s base offense level was still twelve, which would have corresponded to a sentencing range of twelve to eighteen months. Nevertheless, where a district court makes a mistake in calculating a guidelines range for purposes of determining a sentence under section 3553(a), we are required to remand for resentencing “unless we are certain that any such error was harmless — i.e. any such error ‘did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed.’” United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f) (“If the court of appeals determines that the sentence was imposed . . . as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court considers appropriate.”). This rule continues to apply after the Supreme Court established in Booker that the guidelines are advisory only. See United States v. Williams, 411 F.3d 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that Booker’s “remedial majority did not excise 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f) and (g), and both remain valid law”); Crawford, 407 F.3d at 1178. The record does not compel the conclusion that the error in calculating the guideline range here was harmless, requiring us to remand for resentencing on this basis. With the ten-point and two-point enhancements, Duckro’s combined offense level was 24, before the consideration of any downward departures. Without the two-point enhancement, this number would have instead been 22. The district court then subtracted three points for acceptance of responsibility, arriving at 21 (with the two-point enhancement) instead of 19 (without the two-point enhancement). Next, the district court added the corresponding range for an offense level of 21 (41-51 months) to the sixty months required by section 924(c), reaching a combined offense level with a range of 101-111 months. Had it instead used the range for an offense level of 19 (33-41 months), the combined offense level range would have been 93-101 months. Translating this range back into a combined offense level, it presumably would have chosen 28 (87-108 months), as this is the closest corresponding offense level, as opposed to 29, which the district court instead selected. Had it again departed downward four levels, as it did initially, the district court would have reached a revised combined offense level of 24 instead of 25, which would have corresponded to a range of 57-71 Nos. 05-3379/3381 United States v. Duckro Page 8 months, as opposed to the range of 63-78 months that it instead selected from (with the caveat that it could not go below the 60 months mandated by the violation of section 924(c)). Because the district court selected from the low end of the 63-78 month range that it believed to be correct, it stands to reason that it might choose an even lower sentence when presented with a 57-71 month range. Thus, the mistake cannot be said to be harmless, and a remand is warranted. At resentencing, the guideline range will merely be advisory, and the district court could give Duckro the same sentence — or even a higher sentence — should it determine that this would be an appropriate result in applying section 3553(a), including the consideration of the advisory guideline range. Duckro asserts, however, that given the district court’s willingness to depart downward in his case, without this erroneous enhancement it would have sentenced him to even less than six months for his theft of firearms, and that we should correct the mistake and remand to make possible such an opportunity. Whatever the merit of Duckro’s prediction might be, section 3742 provides him with this opportunity to pursue a lower sentence due to the district court’s mistake in calculating the guidelines range. 3. The District Court’s refusal to adjust Duckro’s offense level downward for a reduced role in the offense Duckro next argues that the district court committed “reversible error” by refusing to adjust his offense level downward for a reduced role in the offense under U.S.S.G. §3B1.2. That guideline provides “a range of adjustments [from two to four points] for a defendant who plays a part in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the average participant.” Id. cmt 3. We review refusals to make such an adjustment for clear error. See United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir. 2005). The defendant has the burden of proving this reduced role by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Duckro argues that he was entitled to the adjustment because he lacked a supervisory role in the larger conspiracy of trading guns for Ecstasy, and “received little in return.” We have rejected absence from the planning of a conspiracy as the basis for a reduced role. United States v. Miller, 56 F.3d 719, 720 (6th Cir. 1995). More significantly, Duckro only argues that he had a reduced role in the offense of using firearms in a drug trafficking offense. The downward adjustment he requested was only available for the sentencing determination for the other offense, the theft of firearms. Duckro’s lack of leadership in planning to trade the guns for Ecstasy has little bearing on his role in the burglaries, and he and only one other individual burglarized the three firearms dealers without involvement from the other participants. The district court was correct to reject this adjustment. 4. Criminal history point for prior “drug abuse” conviction The district court added a point to Duckro’s criminal history based on a prior guilty plea to a drug abuse offense under Ohio law. Duckro claims that it was an error to assign this point because there is no evidence that he had counsel or waived his right to counsel on this charge. The Supreme Court has directly addressed this issue in the Sentencing Guidelines context, noting that it is “constitutionally permissible to consider a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction” in enhancing a defendant’s criminal history. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 (1994). Nichols is controlling authority supporting the district court’s decision here. 5. Criminal history point for prior “obstruction of official business” conviction The district court also added a point to Duckro’s criminal history for a conviction under the Ohio law of “obstruction of official business.” Duckro contends that this was inappropriate under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c), which provides that certain offenses, including “[f]alse information to a police officer” are not to be used to calculate criminal history unless they are similar to an instant offense, Nos. 05-3379/3381 United States v. Duckro Page 9 the defendant served 30 or more days in jail, or the defendant was given probation of at least one year. Duckro only served ten days in jail for this conviction, and it is not similar to an instant offense. The government contends, however, that “obstruction of official business,” is a different offense than “false information to a police officer.” We have held that “district courts considering the issue of similarity under § 4A1.2(c) should consider the similarity between the ‘essential characteristics’ of the activity underlying the offense of prior conviction and those underlying the listed offense.” United States v. Cole, 418 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 2005). The district court should look to the state law defining the defendant’s prior conviction and compare it with federal law on the offense specified in §4A1.2(c).3 Id. at 598. Although there is not significant federal precedent on providing false information to a police officer, such an offense appears essentially different than the Ohio law that Duckro pled guilty to violating. The Ohio courts have held that “a deliberate misstatement is not an ‘act’” for purposes of the criminal statute in question, and “the making of a false, unsworn statement to a police officer cannot be the basis for a charge of obstructing official business under the statute.” State v. Huron, 70 Ohio App. 3d 414, 416 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). Given this higher standard of conduct required for an offense of obstructing official business, it is not essentially the same as providing false information to a police officer. The district court did not err in applying this offense to raise Duckro’s criminal history level. 6. Failure to make specific findings regarding facts that Duckro objected to in PSR Duckro claims that the district court erred by failing to make findings of fact with regard to the facts set forth in the pre-sentence report, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(b). Specifically, he argues that based on his objections to the pre-sentence report, the district court should have made a factual determination as to the number of firearms involved in his offenses, his reduced role in the crimes committed, and the criminal history points he was given. Rule 32 requires that when faced with a disputed factual issue in a pre-sentence report, a district court must “rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(b). Duckro objected to the facts in question, arguing that they could not be considered as they were not incorporated into his guilty plea. As discussed in Section II-A above, this objection was rendered irrelevant for Sixth Amendment purposes, given the six months Duckro received for the theft of firearms offense. Duckro had to do more than challenge the legal significance of the facts in order to require the district court to make factual findings on a disputed issue under Rule 32. He had to produce some evidence of his own to call those facts into question, which he did not do. United States v. Lang, 333 F.3d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] defendant who challenges factual allegations in the PSR [presentence report] has the burden of producing some evidence beyond a bare denial that calls the reliability or correctness of the alleged facts into question.”). Given Duckro’s approach at sentencing, the district court’s acceptance of the uncontested facts from the pre-sentence report was appropriate. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(a) (providing that the sentencing court “may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact”). 3 The parties have not cited, nor has our research revealed, any federal case law or statute that provides a meaningful description of the offense of “false information to a police officer.” The government has compared the Ohio law of obstruction of official business with a separate statute for providing false information to a police officer. Given the requirement that we look to federal law, the government’s comparison of two Ohio statutes is not particularly relevant, and it makes the most sense to examine the offense based on its facial description in §4A1.2(c). Nos. 05-3379/3381 United States v. Duckro Page 10 In sum, the district court incorrectly calculated Duckro’s guideline range because the twopoint enhancement for the possession of stolen guns amounted to impermissible double counting, even though the determination of the range was otherwise correct. Typically, because the guideline range is only part of this Court’s reasonableness review, we would also look to the other factors articulated in section 3553(a). This remaining portion of our review is not necessary here, however, as the incorrect guideline calculation requires us to reverse Duckro’s sentence.