Opinion ID: 77184
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Jean's Claim for Failure to Exhaust Remedies

Text: 18 The district court dismissed Jean's complaint pursuant to the provision of the TVPA stating that, a court shall decline to hear a claim if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(b). We reverse the district court's determination for several reasons. 19 First, the exhaustion requirement does not apply to the ATCA. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.1995); Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F.Supp.2d 907, 910 (N.D.Ill.2003); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F.Supp.2d 1116, 1132-1135 (C.D.Cal.2002); see also Jama v. I.N.S., 22 F.Supp.2d 353, 364 (D.N.J.1998) (There is nothing in the ATCA which limits its application to situations where there is no relief available under domestic law.). Accordingly, the exhaustion requirement should not have been applied to Jean's ATCA claim against Dorélien. 20 Second, the exhaustion requirement pursuant to the TVPA is an affirmative defense, requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proof. 5 See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 778, n. 5; Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1267 (N.D.Ala.2003) (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 WL 319887, at -56 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002); Sinaltrainal v. The Coca Cola Co., 2003 WL 1846195 (S.D.Fla. March 31, 2003)). This burden of proof is substantial. The Senate Report to the TVPA specifically stated: 21 [T]he committee recognizes that in most instances the initiation of litigation under this legislation will be virtually prima facie evidence that the claimant has exhausted his or her remedies in the jurisdiction in which the torture occurred. The committee believes that courts should approach cases brought under the proposed legislation with this assumption . . . . 22 More specifically, . . . [the exhaustion requirement] should be informed by general principles of international law. The procedural practice of international human rights tribunals generally holds that the respondent has the burden of raising the nonexhaustion of remedies as an affirmative defense and must show that domestic remedies exist that the claimant did not use. Once the defendant makes a showing of remedies abroad which have not been exhausted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile. The ultimate burden of proof and persuasion on the issue of exhaustion of remedies, however, lies with the defendant. 23 S.Rep. No. 102-249, at 9-10 (emphasis added); see Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 892 (7th Cir.2005) ([T]o the extent that there is any doubt . . . both Congress and international tribunals have mandated that . . . doubts [concerning the TVPA and exhaustion are to] be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs.); Barrueto v. Larios, 291 F.Supp.2d 1360, 1365 (S.D.Fla.2003) (citing Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1347 n. 30 (N.D.Ga.2002)); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at  (holding that defendant raising TVPA exhaustion defense did not meet initial burden of demonstrating that plaintiffs had not exhausted alternative and adequate remedies in Nigeria); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F.Supp. 1189, 1197 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (noting that the legislative history of the TVPA indicates that the exhaustion requirement was not intended to create a prohibitively stringent condition precedent to recovery under the statute); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 178 (D.Mass.1995) (holding that when foreign remedies are unobtainable, ineffective, inadequate, or obviously futile, exhaustion pursuant to TVPA is not required) (quoting S.Rep. No. 102-249 (1991)). 24 In finding that Jean had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the district court relied exclusively on an affidavit reflecting that Jean had obtained a legally binding judgement in Haiti against Dorélien. However, the district court failed to consider Jean's allegations and assertions that this judgment is ineffective and currently unenforceable in Haiti. Jean alleges that several years after the removal of the military regime in late 1994, Haiti established a tribunal to try those responsible for atrocities during the military regime. In this tribunal, Dorélien was tried in absentia for the Raboteau Massacre, in which the Haitian army and paramilitary groups attacked the civilian population in Raboteau, Haiti. During this attack, the military opened fire, as Jean's husband, Michel Pierre, and others tried to flee by boat. Michel Pierre and at least twenty-six unarmed civilians were killed and more than fifty homes were destroyed. In November 2000 a Haitian court found Dorélien liable for the Raboteau Massacre. 25 However, Jean claims that events have changed drastically since the November 2000 judgement against Dorélien. In 2004, a violent rebellion broke out, in which Dorélien was freed from prison 6 and returned to a position of power. Jean alleges that the house of the prosecutor who prosecuted Dorélien for the Raboteau massacre was burned and armed men attacked the Haitian judge who presided over the Raboteau Massacre trial. Jean also cited an Amnesty International report finding that former members of the military regime, including Dorélien, threaten the current rule of law in Haiti. 26 In his brief, Dorélien does not dispute that there was a recent violent rebellion, that Dorélien was freed during the rebellion or that Dorélien was returned to a position of power. Moreover, he does not dispute that those involved with prosecuting him for the Raboteau Massacre have been targets of violence, nor does he assert that the political structure is such that Jean could presently file her claims in Haiti and be successful. In short, Dorélien has not in any way met the requisite burden of proof to support an affirmative defense of nonexhaustion of remedies and the district court erred in failing to require him to do so. Moreover, the motion at issue was a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), not a motion for summary judgement. 7 For these reasons, we reverse the district court's dismissal of Jean's complaint.