Opinion ID: 664140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Rural Residential Designation

Text: 33 In adopting the general plan, the City advanced several objectives, including preserving the agricultural heritage of the City, providing for a range of housing types and densities, preserving the small town character of the City, and limiting development within the City to levels consistent with available resources. Our circuit and others have established that these are legitimate objectives. See Christensen, 995 F.2d at 165 (preserving agricultural uses of land); Smithfield Concerned Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239, 244-45 (1st Cir.1990) (density restrictions may enhance quality of life); Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834, 837 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894, 110 S.Ct. 242, 107 L.Ed.2d 193 (1989) (preserving bucolic atmosphere); Petaluma, 522 F.2d at 906 (preserving small town character). Moreover, designating seventeen acres for rural residential density is a reasonable means by which the City may reduce potential traffic problems and address the anticipated water shortage due to population growth. 34 The Kawaokas raise several challenges with respect to the density designation of their property. First, they argue that the general plan did not in fact designate their property RR and SF, but instead retained the agricultural designation until the Kawaokas prove such use is economically non-viable. We have already noted that while the language of the general plan suggests that the property was designated for agricultural use, the plan map, the City Council meeting minutes, and the statements of city officials all indicate that the property was designated RR and SF. See note 2, supra. Even the Kawaokas' real estate agent and potential purchaser appear to understand that the property has been designated for residential use, as demonstrated by their respective letters which object to the dual designation and offer less money for the property in recognition of the RR and SF designations. 35 The Kawaokas also contend that the ambiguity created by the plan's language and map render the plan unconstitutionally vague. The plan is not unconstitutionally vague, however, because consultation with city officials resolved any ambiguity regarding the meaning of the general plan. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (stating that regulations are not unconstitutionally vague where the regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 48-49, 86 S.Ct. 1254, 1263, 16 L.Ed.2d 336 (1966) (statutory definition of related person is not unconstitutionally vague when appellants have access to an agency process that will clarify the issue). 36 The Kawaokas next argue that designating half of their property RR is impermissible spot zoning because it is inconsistent with surrounding uses. Spot zoning occurs where a small parcel is restricted and given lesser rights than the surrounding property ... thereby creating an 'island' in the middle of a larger area devoted to other uses. 9 Consaul v. City of San Diego, 6 Cal.App. 4th 1781, 1801, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 (Cal.Ct.App.1992). 37 The Kawaokas' spot zoning challenge fails for several reasons. First, spot zoning refers to property that is small in size. See Hamer v. Ross, 59 Cal.2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal.Rptr. 335 (1963) (2.2 acres zoned for 1 unit per acre where all surroundings lots are much smaller); Ross v. City of Yorba Linda, 1 Cal.App. 4th 954, 960, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 (Cal.Ct.App.1991) (1.12 acre lot zoned for 1 unit per acre where surrounding lots generally half that size). On the facts presented, the Kawaokas' seventeen acre parcel is too large to be considered spot zoning. 38 Furthermore, this case is unlike spot zoning cases, in which  'a lot in the center of a business or commercial district is limited to uses for residential purposes.'  See Consaul, 6 Cal.App. 4th at 1801, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d at 775 (citations omitted); see also Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842 (1928) (zoning 100 foot strip of 3/4 acre lot for residential use where strip is surrounded by industrial use is unreasonable). The Kawaokas' property is surrounded by a variety of other types of residential property, including R-1 (single family residential), R-2 (duplex residential), and R-3 (multi-family residential). It will not be a small island amid land zoned for dissimilar uses. 39 Not only is there no support in the case law to find spot zoning in this case, but to define spot zoning to include zoning of parcels of this size would paralyze urban planners, who under certain circumstances need to draw lines and differentially zone much smaller areas of land than this. 40 The Kawaokas argue that the district court failed to consider their declarations, in which representations are made that there is adequate infrastructure to accommodate development at the density they requested. Even if this were true, the Kawaokas fail to state a due process violation because there is no law requiring the city to zone property for maximum use and density. Such an approach to land use planning would prohibit municipalities from zoning property for anything less than maximum development, an approach that has clearly been rejected.