Opinion ID: 2330991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Abdication as Factfinder

Text: The Wards claim as their first point that the circuit court erred by abdicating its role as the finder of fact when it deferred to obiter dictum in Ward I, and, thus, failed to decide the matter on the proof presented at trial. In support of this claim, the Wards point to the circuit court's statements in its letter opinion and contend that the statements clearly demonstrate that the circuit court adopted the findings made by the Court of Appeals in Ward I. Williams responds that although the Court of Appeals may have overstepped its bounds by holding that there was an enforceable contract between the parties, the circuit court, on remand, permitted the Wards to put on their case in the second trial. The circuit court then reviewed all of the proof from both trials. Williams claims in his brief on appeal that the Wards' evidence confirmed that there was a contract for sale, not a lease, and that they had received more than the contract price. Williams further urges that the circuit court only considered the Court of Appeals' opinion as shifting the burden of persuasion to Ward and that both the circuit court's letter opinion and judgment demonstrate that the judge considered all the evidence. This court has made it clear that it is not bound by any conclusion stated as obiter dictum. See Burnette v. Perkins & Assocs., 343 Ark. 237, 33 S.W.3d 145 (2000). We have further held that while a decision will not be disturbed because it is law of the case, we are not bound by a conclusion stated as obiter dictum, even if couched in terms that imply the court reached a conclusion on a matter. See Clemmons v. Office of Child Support Enfcm't, 345 Ark. 330, 47 S.W.3d 227 (2001). Where discussion or comment in an opinion is not necessary to the decision reached therein, the discussion or comment is obiter dictum. See id. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals made the following statements in its unpublished opinion of February 23, 2000, regarding whether Williams had proven the making of an oral contract for the sale of land by clear and convincing evidence: The evidence demonstrates that the transaction at issue clearly had the requisite objective indicators of mutual agreement necessary to form a contract and that appellant established, by clear and convincing evidence, that an agreement was reached. Appellant established the property's purchase price, the amount of the down payment and the manner in which it would be satisfied, the amount of each monthly payment, and the term of the contract. In our view, appellant's actions in securing tenants, making repairs and improvements to the property, and securing insurance on it, along with the substantial amount of money he paid appellee, overwhelmingly demonstrate that both parties viewed this transaction as a sale. One cannot reasonably conclude that appellant's actions were those of a tenant. .... ... As discussed above, appellant paid a substantial amount of money to appellee, made improvements and repairs, and secured tenants, from whom he collected rent, for the property. Appellant's actions were more than sufficient to remove the contract from the statute of frauds. Ward I, 2000 WL 216318 at -. There is no doubt in our minds that these findings by the Court of Appeals are obiter dictum and were not binding on the circuit court. It is further radiantly clear that appellate courts do not make findings of fact but rather review findings of fact of the circuit court to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In deciding whether the grant of a motion for directed verdict was appropriate, appellate courts review whether there was substantial evidence to support the circuit court's decision. See, e.g., Woodall v. Chuck Dory Auto Sales, Inc., 347 Ark. 260, 61 S.W.3d 835 (2001). But our inquiry does not end there. The question is whether the circuit court deferred to or impermissibly relied on the obiter dictum of the Court of Appeals and, thereby, failed to satisfy its role as factfinder. We think not. Though the Wards correctly note that the circuit court did refer to the Court of Appeals opinion in Ward I in its letter opinion, we are persuaded by the circuit court's statement about the scope of its review. The court said: I have reviewed the proof from the hearings on January 25, 1998, and March 14, 2001, in the above referenced case as well as the plaintiff's Pre-Trial and Post Trial Briefs, the defendants' Post Trial Brief and the Opinion of the Arkansas Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2000. Without question, the circuit court did an independent review of the evidence. We are further influenced by the fact that the circuit court engaged in extensive questioning of counsel for the parties at the second bench trial, following counsels' closing arguments. In that colloquy, the judge delved into the terms of the contract but also alluded to the fact that he was going to read the transcript of the original hearing in which Williams presented his case and disregard any argument not supported by evidence: THE COURT: I need to go back and read the Court of Appeals opinion. What was your recollection of the Court of Appeals' opinion with respect to their reading of the case? As I remember, they said the proof was that there was an enforceable contract. COUNSEL FOR WILLIAMS: I think they said that. COUNSEL FOR WARD: At our last hearing we said that a fair reading of that is that the plaintiff made a prima facie case with respect to THE COURT: An enforceable contract. COUNSEL FOR WARD: An enforceable contract. THE COURT: If that's the case, then it seems to me the burden of proof is on you based on what they said. COUNSEL FOR WARD: Burden of persuasion. THE COURT: Okay. To change that. What I heard here today that I can say to the Court of Appeals: This is why it's not what you thought it was. COUNSEL FOR WARD: I don't think I can tell you with specificity what the terms of this contract were. THE COURT: I'm not too sure but what that was not my position before the Court of Appeals told me I erred. .... THE COURT: The truth is the Court of Appeals said there was enough there for a contract regardless of what problems we may have with it, they have said, There is a contract. It's enforceable. At least that's the way I read it. COUNSEL FOR WARD: There's a prima facie case. THE COURT: Which in my mind means it's not the burden of proof, it's the burden of persuasion shifts to you and I'm asking you what is it that I can rely on to tell me why there is not. .... THE COURT: I'm going to go back and read the original hearing and I'll disregard any argument that is not supported by the evidence. The judgment clearly and specifically makes findings of fact, as already noted in this opinion, without reference to the Court of Appeals opinion in Ward I. We hold that the circuit court did not abdicate its role as factfinder in this case. The dissent interprets what the circuit court did differently. We, however, take the circuit court at its word. The court in its colloquy with counsel at the end of the second trial stated it would go back and reread the original hearing and disregard any argument not supported by evidence. In its letter opinion, the circuit court confirmed it had reviewed the proof from both trials. And then in its judgment, the circuit court made its findings based on that proof and without reference to the court of appeals' decision in Ward I. Again, we conclude that the circuit court weighed the proof from both trials and made its decision accordingly.