Opinion ID: 1441324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: W.R.C.P. 12 Dismissals

Text: The district court found that a motion to dismiss should be granted against Davis on two of her causes of action because the causes of action did not state claims for which relief could be granted. When reviewing a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court accepts all facts stated in the complaint as being true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. We will sustain a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal only when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any facts which would entitle him to relief. Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487, 490 (Wyo. 1992) (citation omitted). See also Veile v. Board of County Commissioners of Washakie County, 860 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo.1993). R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 28 (Wyo.1994). In cause of action 6, Davis asserted a claim under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990), and the corresponding Wyoming provisions. [4] She contended that, as a qualified disabled person, she was entitled to have relief under those laws because the State and the Insurance Board did not afford her due process at her administrative hearing and because they did not provide her with appropriate insurance coverage. The district court granted a summary judgment against Davis as to the portion of her claim which contested the formalities of the hearing. Consistent with our earlier rulings on the collateral estoppel issue, we affirm the district court's determination. The district court granted a motion to dismiss as to the portion of Davis's ADA claim which pertained to the appellees' duty to provide her with appropriate insurance coverage. We conclude that the district court properly dismissed Davis's claim because the relevant portions of the ADA did not become effective until after the events which are at issue in this case occurred. The administrative hearing was held in December 1991. The relevant portions of Titles II and III of the ADA did not become effective until January 1992, and the pertinent parts of Title I did not go into effect until July 1992. [5] Act of July 26, 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 337 (Title I, effective 24 months after enactment), 104 Stat. 338 (Title II, Subtitle A, effective 18 months after enactment), 104 Stat. 346 (Title II, Subtitle B, Part I, effective 18 months after enactment), 104 Stat. 353 (Title II, Subtitle B, Part II, effective 18 months after enactment), 104 Stat. 365 (Title III, effective 18 months after enactment). The district court also dismissed Davis's cause of action 8. In that claim, Davis sought attorney's fees pursuant to § 26-15-124(c). Section 26-15-124(c) provides as follows: (c) In any actions or proceedings commenced against any insurance company on any insurance policy or certificate of any type or kind of insurance, or in any case where an insurer is obligated by a liability insurance policy to defend any suit or claim or pay any judgment on behalf of a named insured, if it is determined that the company refuses to pay the full amount of a loss covered by the policy and that the refusal is unreasonable or without cause, any court in which judgment is rendered for a claimant may also award a reasonable sum as an attorney's fee and interest at ten percent (10%) per year. The Insurance Board determined that the insurance contract did not cover Davis's excess treatments. The district court, therefore, properly dismissed cause of action 8 because, under the plain language of § 26-15-124, the statute does not apply when the policy does not cover a loss. Since we have concluded that the district court was correct in holding that Davis was not entitled to receive actual damages on any of her causes of action, we also affirm its ruling that her punitive damages claim in cause of action 12 should be dismissed. See Sannerud v. Brantz, 879 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1994). Our rulings in this case are dispositive; therefore, we do not need to determine whether governmental immunity principles applied.