Opinion ID: 867378
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Baldwin Error

Text: ¶ 65 The trial court also instructed the jurors that the defendant has the burden to prove that the mitigation evidence is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. This instruction, as the State concedes, conflicts with Baldwin's holding that A.R.S. § 13-703(E) does not impose an affirmative duty on the defendant to prove that mitigation is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. 211 Ariz. at 472 ¶ 12, 123 P.3d at 666. Tucker contends that this error is structural or, at the very least, fundamental. ¶ 66 A structural error is one that affect[s] the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end, and thus taint[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds. Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 565 ¶ 12, 115 P.3d at 605 (quoting State v. Anderson ( Anderson I ), 197 Ariz. 314, 323 ¶ 22, 4 P.3d 369, 378 (2000) (internal quotations omitted)). It deprive[s] defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for guilt or innocence. Id. (quoting Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 552 ¶ 45, 65 P.3d at 933 (internal quotations omitted)); see also State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 53 ¶ 74, 116 P.3d 1193, 1213 (2005) (noting in dicta that instruction that improperly reduces state's burden of proof in penalty phase of capital trial is structural error), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1576, 164 L.Ed.2d 308 (2006). We have recognized structural error in only a few instances. See Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 552-53 ¶ 46, 65 P.3d at 933-34 (noting structural error when trial judge biased; defendant denied counsel, access to counsel, self-representation, and public trial; reasonable doubt instructions defective; and jurors excluded because of race or views on death penalty). ¶ 67 In assessing the nature of the Baldwin error, we find relevant the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Marsh. There, the Supreme Court stated that as long as the method of allocating the burdens of proof does not lessen the State's burden to prove every element of the offense charged or aggravating circumstances alleged, the state may place on the defendant the burden of proving mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. 126 S.Ct. at 2523 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 650, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona ( Ring II ), 536 U.S. 584, 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002)). ¶ 68 The Baldwin error now challenged by Tucker was therefore not of constitutional magnitude, but instead misstated the statutory requirements of A.R.S. § 13-703(E). We do not find the error structural because it did not reduce the State's burden of proof or preclude the jurors from considering relevant mitigation evidence during the penalty phase. Instead, the instruction indicated that Tucker had a burden with respect to an issue (the propriety of a death sentence) on which Baldwin stated that neither party bears a burden, but that the Supreme Court held could be placed on the defendant. ¶ 69 We also reject Tucker's argument that the error is fundamental. Although assigning such a burden to Tucker was inconsistent with A.R.S. § 13-703(E), this case does not qualify as one of the rare cases in which the error goes to the foundation of the case or the defendant was denied his right to a fair trial or a right essential to his defense. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d at 607.