Opinion ID: 1703923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Standards

Text: Defendant challenges the controlled substances act as an unconstitutional delegation of authority in that the Legislature failed to provide sufficient safeguards to prevent an abuse of legislative power. Defendant asserts that the standards provided in the act are deficient for two reasons. First, the standards fail to avoid a separation of powers problem: the final scheduling decision, he argues, is a policy determination improperly left to the discretion of the administrative agency rather than the Legislature. Second, or perhaps as a corollary to the first allegation, defendant asserts that the unfettered scheduling discretion of the agency is devoid of due process protection. We disagree with both conclusions. The criteria this Court has utilized in evaluating legislative standards are set forth in Dep't of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 309; 240 NW2d 206 (1976): While no hard and fast rule exists for determining whether a given statute has provided sufficient standards, a number of guiding principles have evolved in Michigan jurisprudence to assist in making a determination in this case. First, the act in question must be read as a whole; the provision in question should not be isolated but must be construed with reference to the entire act. Argo Oil Corp v Atwood [274 Mich 47, 53; 264 NW 285 (1935)]. Second, the standard should be as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits'. Osius v St Clair Shores, 344 Mich 693, 698; 75 NW2d 25; 58 ALR2d 1079 (1956).[7] The preciseness of the standard will vary with the complexity and/or the degree to which subject regulated will require constantly changing regulation.    Third, if possible the statute must be construed in such a way as to `render it valid, not invalid', as conferring `administrative, not legislative' power and as vesting `discretionary, not arbitrary, authority'. Argo Oil Corp v Atwood, supra, 53. Footnote 7 amplifies the second principle: A standard cannot be considered `as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits' if it does not satisfy due process requirements. See decision in State Highway Comm v Vanderkloot, 392 Mich 159, 169-178; 220 NW2d 416 (1974).