Opinion ID: 2621411
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The superior court's protective order struck a reasonable balance between DeNardo's right to discovery and Bax's right to be protected from unduly intrusive discovery.

Text: The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it limited DeNardo's discovery to facts relevant to his defamation claim. DeNardo's defamation claim centered on whether Bax made defamatory statements to her coworkers that she was worried DeNardo was stalking her and whether these statements were made with malice. The superior court's order confining discovery to whether Bax ever informed witnesses that she had been stalked or harassed by DeNardo, what such stalking or harassment consisted of, and the basis for Bax's stated belief, struck a reasonable balance between DeNardo's right to discovery on his claim, and Bax's right to be protected from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. [12] The superior court's order that DeNardo was not permitted to elicit information about Bax's personal life or social relationships and was not entitled to Bax's address also achieved a reasonable balance. In seeking a protective order, Bax informed the trial court that she was gravely concerned about disclosing her current address to Mr. DeNardo for the very reason that has become the subject of this lawsuit: Mr. DeNardo followed her on several occasions in the past, eavesdropped on her private conversations at work, and reportedly has shown up unexpectedly near the residences of at least two of their former female co-workers. Given the nature of the controversy  a defamation claim based on Bax's expression that she was worried DeNardo was stalking her, which was only brought to DeNardo's attention in an affidavit in support of a motion seeking a secure location to conduct a deposition for fear that DeNardo was carrying a weapon  the court was well within the bounds of its discretion in limiting access to this personal and only tangentially relevant information. Because of the nature of the dispute, the court also reasonably prohibited DeNardo from contacting Bax's young daughter. Moreover, there is no indication from the record that Bax's daughter would be likely to provide any relevant evidence. DeNardo's arguments that the court's protective order restricted the presentation of facts on summary judgment, and that Bax's family members, former husband, former employers, and neighbors basically were ruled out of bounds are unpersuasive in light of both the reasonableness of the superior court's order and the fact that DeNardo made no effort to depose any witnesses to support his claim within the sensible parameters drawn by the superior court. We therefore conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it crafted a protective order designed to balance Mr. DeNardo's right to the discovery of relevant information against Ms. Bax's right to privacy and her fears for the personal safety of herself and her daughter.