Opinion ID: 157419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reliability of the NFRTR Database

Text: The second basis of Rith’s Sixth Amendment challenge is that his right to confront his accusers was violated because the ATF certificate, admitted under 803(10), does not embody the sufficient guarantees of reliability that the Confrontation Clause requires. Out-of-court testimony satisfies the requirements of the Sixth Amendment if it constitutes a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or demonstrates particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. See White, 502 U.S. at 356-57 & n.8. Because this court concludes that the ATF certificate demonstrates particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, we need not address whether 803(10) constitutes a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Rith contends that the NFRTR is not endowed with particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Upon his objection to the admissibility of the ATF certificate, he submitted to the trial judge a set of discovery documents obtained from the government on March 22, 1996. 11 These documents include statements made by Tom Busey, then chief of the National Firearms Act Branch of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms during an October 18, 1995 training session for Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) inspectors and other investigative employees. Busey described the process by which ATF specialists search the NFRTR database for registration of Title II weapons. To 11 Rith did not offer his exhibit into evidence. -27- support his claim of unreliability, Rith points to Busey’s statements that sometimes information is missed “because there’s only so many minutes in an hour and so many hours in a day,” and because of error in inputting the serial numbers and conducting the search of the suspect’s name or the registration number. Busey also stated that “when I came in a year ago, our error rate was between 49 and 50 percent.” In Idaho v. Wright the Supreme Court stated that “‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ must be shown from the totality of the circumstances.” 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990). Though “courts have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors,” the relevant circumstances are those “that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief,” such that “the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.” Id. at 819-22. The following factors are appropriate to test the trustworthiness of 803(10) evidence: 12 whether cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal 12 The government urges us to employ the Dutton v. Evans “four-part analysis” to determine the reliability of the evidence. 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (the statement contained no express assertion about past facts; the declarant was in a position to have personal knowledge of the matters in the statement; the possibility that the declarant’s statement was founded on faulty recollection is extremely remote; and the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement were such that the possibility of misrepresentation was unlikely). Dutton’s factors are neither talismanic nor appropriate here. The Supreme Court itself has (continued...) -28- utility, id. at 819-20; whether the testimony concerns the results of a mechanically objective test, the notes were taken contemporaneously with the performance of the test, and a supervisor reviewed the tester’s methodology, see Minner v. Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (10th Cir. 1994); and whether the database from which the evidence comes is open to the public, increasing the probability that any errors will be found and corrected, see United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1203 (6th Cir. 1985). The record establishes that the NFRTR database has sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. According to Mr. Busey’s statements, a quality review team was instituted in 1994 and succeeded in reducing the critical-error rate to below three percent. 13 Additionally, the ATF 12 (...continued) expressly declined to “endorse a mechanical test” for determining reliability. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990). The Dutton factors are tailored to ascertain the reliability of a co-conspirator’s statement, viewed by courts as inherently unreliable. Cf. Wright , 497 U.S. at 805 (identifying factors tailored to assessing reliability of statements made by child witness in child sexual abuse cases) . Here we have a public official who has a legally enforceable duty to make the out-of-court statement. Cf. Warren v. United States, 447 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that presumption of trustworthiness in a ATF nonregistration certificate is warranted because “the declarant has a legally enforceable duty to maintain accurate records”). 13 In his remarks, Mr. Busey noted that the total error rate was lower than eight percent but that the critical-error rate was below three percent. A critical error, in contrast to a common error, is one in which a person’s name is misspelled, presumably thwarting a diligent search for a registration under that person’s name. A common error “is an error in the database entry, but it doesn’t (continued...) -29- discovery documents contain a copy of an audit performed by the Audit Services Division of the Department of the Treasury. The results of this February 7, 1996, audit shows that the critical-error rate of the database is no more than 1.5%. Furthermore, the accuracy of the registration check is buttressed by a second level review by a branch chief. In addition to the reliability of the NFRTR, there is little to be gained from cross-examining Mr. Marshall. If the essence of cross-examination is that the declarant’s memory, perception, bias, and narration will be tested, there is little likely benefit from cross-examination of an inspector who was hired for his skills and ability to perform the job of inspecting the NFRTR database and who does not personally know the defendant or any of his associates. See Minner, 30 F.3d at 1315 (discussing value of cross-examining police chemist in cocaine possession prosecution). Furthermore, Mr. Marshall undoubtedly conducts hundreds of registration searches in a year. It is unlikely that he would have any recollection of the Rith search and, consequently, he would be able to testify only as to his general search method. See id. (holding that unavailability need not be proved when chemist would likely not recall individual test and could testify only as to 13 (...continued) affect a lookup.” -30- standard laboratory procedure); Reardon, 806 F.2d at 41 (same). Crossexamination would be of marginal utility in this instance. The cases that Rith cites to support his claim are inapposite because the defendants were able to argue that the evidence was deficient as it applied to them. In United States v. Robinson the files upon which the testimony was based were incomplete, resulting in a casual or partial search. 544 F.2d 110, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1976). In United States v. Yakobov the defendant’s name was drastically misspelled on the ATF certificate, undermining any claim of “diligence” in the search. 712 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1983). In both cases the courts’ conclusions are unremarkable: evidence of a deficiency specific to the defendant in the search method or database may constitute sufficient evidence of unreliability. See, e.g., id. (holding that “‘if, in a particular instance, the circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness, the evidence should be excluded’”) (quoting Robinson, 544 F.2d at 110) (emphasis added). Here Rith alleges no defect in the NFRTR database search as it pertained to him. General claims of unreliability, particularly those that rely upon outdated information, are not sufficient to raise a constitutional deficiency. See also United States v. Regner, 677 F.2d 754, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding defendant’s claim that “possible motives” by a foreign government to lie were not cognizable absent some evidence of actual bias toward the defendant). -31- Seven other circuits allow the admission of the absence of public record or entry testimony to prove the nonexistence of some matter in the face of Confrontation Clause claims. Six of these circuits have specifically allowed the admission of NFRTR certificates. See United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 1992) (NFRTR); Metzger, 778 F.2d at 1202 (NFRTR); United States v. Herrera-Britto, 739 F.2d 551, 552 (11th Cir. 1984) (foreign certificate of nonregistration); United States v. Cruz, 492 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1973) (NFRTR); United States v. Mix, 446 F.2d 615, 1622-23 (5th Cir. 1971) (NFRTR); Warren v. United States, 447 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1971) (NFRTR); United States v. Thompson, 420 F.2d 536, 544-45 (3d Cir. 1970) (NFRTR). For the foregoing reasons, the admission of the ATF certificate into evidence did not constitute a violation of Rith’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.