Opinion ID: 786296
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting research with respect to controlled substances.

Text: 87 (3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances. 88 (4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws relating to controlled substances. 89 (5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and safety. 90 28 U.S.C. § 823(f). The Ashcroft Directive is invalid, the majority argues, because General Ashcroft made no effort to solicit input from the State of Oregon before issuing the interpretive rule. 91 Contrary to the majority's assertion, the Ashcroft Directive does not sidestep subsection 823(f)'s five-factor inquiry. The Justice Department has yet to initiate an enforcement action against any individual physician pursuant to section 824, so the hour has not arrived for the Attorney General to consider subsections 823(f)(1)-(4) (i.e., the state licensing board's recommendation and physicians' relevant experience and criminal record). The Ashcroft Directive merely cautions that a physician who prescribes controlled substances to assist suicide  may `render his registration... inconsistent with the public interest,' Ashcroft Directive, 66 Fed.Reg. at 56,608 (emphasis added); it does not declare that assisting suicide shall render a physician's registration inconsistent with the public interest. This word choice is significant, because it conclusively refutes the majority's contention that assisting suicide automatically renders a physician's registration inconsistent with the public interest under the Ashcroft Directive. Even if assisting suicide is not a `legitimate medical purpose' within the meaning of 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2001), the Attorney General remains free to consult all of section 823's five factors — including the recommendation of Oregon's licensing board or disciplinary authority — before making a final decision whether to suspend or revoke a particular physician's registration. 92 Significantly, the Ashcroft Directive's warning that assisting suicide could prompt Controlled Substances Act enforcement actions comports with fundamental administrative law principles: 93 When a governmental official is given the power to make discretionary decisions under a broad statutory standard [e.g., the public interest], case-by-case decisionmaking may not be the best way to assure fairness. Here the [Attorney General] ... sought to define the statutory standard ... by the use of his rulemaking authority. The decision to use objective rules in this case provides [physicians] with more precise notice of what conduct will be sanctioned and promotes equality of treatment among similarly situated [individuals]. 94 Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977). The Controlled Substances Act facilitates adherence to these principles by expressly authorizing the Attorney General to promulgate and enforce any rules, regulations, and procedures which he may deem necessary and appropriate for the efficient execution of his functions under this subchapter. 21 U.S.C. § 871. Thus, General Ashcroft acted well within the scope of his statutory authority in declaring that assisting suicide does not serve a legitimate medical purpose under 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) and that this practice may `render [a physician's] registration ... inconsistent with the public interest' and therefore subject to possible suspension or revocation under [section] 824. Ashcroft Directive, 66 Fed.Reg. at 56,608.