Opinion ID: 438684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Disclosure to Expert Witnesses

Text: 47 The district court concluded that showing the material to the witnesses did not waive the protection for attorney work product, a view we accept as supported by persuasive authority. See United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C.Cir.1980); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 612, at 612-41 to 612-42 (1982). 1 The district court held, however, that disclosure of the material was required first, because Rule 26(b)(3) is limited by a proviso that it is [s]ubject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) (covering discovery as to experts), and second, because a party who is examining [the] witness [should be able] to examine into the material which the expert witness had received. Tr. at 39, App.F. 48 We believe the district court misread the import of the proviso that introduces Rule 26(b)(3). A parsing of Rule 26(b)(3), which appears in the margin, 2 makes clear that the proviso does not expand discovery of work product in the manner the district court believed. The first paragraph of Rule 26(b)(3) consists of two sentences. As we discussed in section III of this opinion, the first sentence requires a showing of substantial need before work product must be produced. The second sentence requires protection against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party. The proviso introduces the first sentence of Rule 26(b)(3) (Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents ... prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial ...) and signifies that trial preparation material prepared by an expert is also subject to discovery, but only under the special requirements pertaining to expert discovery set forth in Rule 26(b)(4). The proviso does not limit the second sentence of Rule 26(b)(3) restricting disclosure of work product containing mental impressions and legal theories. Thus, it does not support the district court's conclusion that Rule 26(b)(3), protecting this category of attorney's work product, must give way to Rule 26(b)(4), authorizing discovery relating to expert witnesses. Tr. at 36, App.F. 49 Nor can we find any support in Rule 26(b)(4) for the district court's conclusion. The Advisory Committee Notes explain that this Rule, included for the first time by the 1970 amendments, was designed to overcome cases that had limited or prohibited discovery of information held by expert witnesses. The Committee describes this rule as intended to repudiate the few decisions that have held an expert's information privileged simply because of his status as an expert. The Rule rejects as ill considered the decisions which have sought to bring expert information within the work-product doctrine and instead adopts an approach that allows some discovery and gives the district court discretion to order further discovery, subject to sharing of costs. 50 Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) permits interrogatories to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions as to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each such opinion. There is nothing in Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) that can justify requiring production of the material at issue here. It is expressly limited to interrogatories. 51 Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) provides that the court may order further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such provisions ... of [the] rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate. The district court reasoned that since the opposing party is entitled to the substance of the facts and opinions as to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion, and since the attorney's thoughts and opinions given to an expert witness can constitute part of the grounds for the expert witness' opinion, discovery of counsel's opinion work product utilized by an expert witness is a necessary corollary of the right to examine into an expert's basis for forming his opinion. Tr. at 36, 37, App.F. We do not agree with the conclusion. 52 The thrust of Rule 26(b)(4) is to permit discovery of facts known or opinions held by the expert. Examination and cross-examination of the expert can be comprehensive and effective on the relevant issue of the basis for an expert's opinion without an inquiry into the lawyer's role in assisting with the formulation of the theory. Even if examination into the lawyer's role is permissible, an issue not before us, the marginal value in the revelation on cross-examination that the expert's view may have originated with an attorney's opinion or theory does not warrant overriding the strong policy against disclosure of documents consisting of core attorney's work product. 3 The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26(b)(3) state in part: 53 Rules 33 and 36 have been revised in order to permit discovery calling for opinions, contentions, and admissions relating not only to fact but also to the application of law to fact. Under those rules, a party and his attorney or other representative may be required to disclose, to some extent, mental impressions, opinions, or conclusions. But documents or parts of documents containing these matters are protected against discovery by this subdivision. Even though a party may ultimately have to disclose in response to interrogatories or requests to admit, he is entitled to keep confidential documents containing such matters prepared for internal use. 54 Thus, the Notes recognize that even if interrogatories may permissibly require disclosure that verges on mental impressions, opinions, or conclusions, the documents themselves should be protected.