Opinion ID: 78439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jury Separation Claim

Text: Ferguson contends that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel because his counsel failed to raise on appeal the issue of the separation of the Hialeah jury during its deliberations. He first raised this argument during the state habeas proceedings, and it was rejected by the Florida Supreme Court. The court noted that such a claim would not be cognizable unless there had been a contemporaneous objection by trial counsel, assuming the judge gave the jury adequate cautionary instructions. It found that Ferguson's trial counsel failed to make such an objection and that the trial judge had instructed the jury not to discuss the case. In combination with the judge's other cautionary instructions during the trial, these facts rendered Ferguson's claim meritless. The district court agreed with the Florida Supreme Court's rationale and concluded that the failure to raise the argument would not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Since Ferguson's state appellate counsel could be ineffective for not raising the jury separation claim only if that issue had been preserved for appeal, we must determine whether the issue was waived. See Rose v. Dugger, 508 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla.1987) (finding appellate counsel not deficient when jury separation issue was not preserved for appellate review). Under Florida law, in a capital case, after the jury's deliberations have begun, the jury must be sequestered until it reaches a verdict or is discharged after being ultimately unable to do so. Livingston v. State, 458 So.2d 235, 239 (Fla. 1984); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.370(c). It is per se reversible error to permit a jury to separate over an objection by defense counsel. See Pope v. State, 569 So.2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam). Because this per se rule is merely prophylactic in nature, counsel must make a contemporaneous objection at trial to the separation when the court gives cautionary instructions to the jury. Id. at 1244. As a result, if defense counsel either makes no contemporaneous objection to separation or affirmatively consents to it, the error is deemed waived if adequate cautionary instructions were given and there is no other showing that the defendant's right to a fair trial was compromised. Id. In this case, it is undisputed that defense counsel made no contemporaneous objection to the jury separation, and Ferguson does not argue that his right to a fair trial was compromised. Accordingly, the error would be waived if we find that the judge gave adequate cautionary instructions to the jury. Throughout the course of the Hialeah trial, the judge gave the jury repeated cautionary instructions about not discussing the case with anyone and not consulting outside sources. [37] Immediately prior to the jury's beginning their deliberations, the judge instructed them as follows: You may now retire to the jury room. My earlier discussions with you about not talking about this case you can forget about and you can talk about it all you want. App. LL, Vol. 6 at 1419. The jury deliberated for a few hours and then made a request to go home for the evening, which the trial judge granted. Before they left, he gave them the following instructions: There are some special admonitions that, of course, I think are appropriate. The case ought to stay here. Forget about it. Relax for the evening .... [In the morning] I would like everybody in here ready to go by nine and I would like you to report here rather than upstairs.... Come directly into the courtroom .... Go directly into the jury room and do not discuss the case until I am with you and tell you to do so. Id. at 1425-26. We find the judge's cautionary instructions to be adequate, especially in light of his earlier repeated admonitions. There is scant Florida case law discussing what would constitute an adequate cautionary instruction. The most analogous case is Engle v. State, 438 So.2d 803 (Fla.1983) (per curiam), which involved the failure to instruct the jury, immediately before it separated for deliberations, that it was not to visit the scene of the crime. The judge in that case gave the jury such an instruction only at the beginning of the trial, which was three days before the jury separation. See id. at 809. The Florida Supreme Court found there to have been no reversible error due to the separation since the jury would have been capable of remembering and heeding the judge's admonition not to visit the scene of the alleged crime without the necessity of repeating the same every time that the jury separates. Id. The logic in Engle applies equally here. The Hialeah trial judge repeatedly advised the jurors not to discuss the case when they left the courtroom, and we find it reasonable to infer that the jury kept these warnings in mind at the end of the trial. Ferguson argues that these admonitions were undermined by the instruction immediately prior to the commencement of deliberations for the jury to forget about the earlier warnings. However, any such subversion would have been cured by the judge's instruction immediately prior to separation that the jurors should not discuss the case until he was with them and told them they could do so. Since the instructions likely were adequate and Ferguson's counsel did not object to the separation, we find that this issue was waived. As a result, Ferguson's appellate counsel would not be ineffective for failing to raise the issue on appeal. We therefore conclude that the district court correctly denied Ferguson habeas relief with respect to this claim.