Opinion ID: 2625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does the PLCAA Require Dismissal of the City's Action?

Text: The Firearms Suppliers maintain that the PLCAA requires immediate dismissal of this suit, which is a qualified civil liability action under the statute. The PLCAA defines qualified civil liability action as a civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product [i.e. a firearm that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce],[ [3] ] or a trade association, for damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A). The PLCAA bars the commencement or the prosecution of qualified civil liability actions by providing as follows: (a) In general A qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal or State court. (b) Dismissal of pending actions A qualified civil liability action that is pending on October 26, 2005, shall be immediately dismissed by the court in which the action was brought or is currently pending. 15 U.S.C. § 7902. The Act also sets forth certain exceptions to the definition of qualified civil liability action, allowing suits to proceed that meet any of the following criteria: (iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product [i.e., a firearm that has been shipped or transported through interstate or foreign commerce] knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought, including  (I) any case in which the manufacturer or seller knowingly made any false entry in, or failed to make appropriate entry in, any record required to be kept under Federal or State law with respect to the qualified product, or aided, abetted, or conspired with any person in making any false or fictitious oral or written statement with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of a qualified product; or (II) any case in which the manufacturer or seller aided, abetted, or conspired with any other person to sell or otherwise dispose of a qualified product, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the actual buyer of the qualified product was prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm or ammunition under subsection (g) or (n) of section 922 of Title 18; 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). The City has predicated its claims in this case on the Firearms Suppliers' alleged violation of New York Penal Law § 240.45, Criminal Nuisance in the Second Degree, which provides: A person is guilty of criminal nuisance in the second degree when: 1. By conduct either unlawful in itself or unreasonable under all the circumstances, he knowingly or recklessly creates or maintains a condition which endangers the safety or health of a considerable number of persons; or 2. He knowingly conducts or maintains any premises, place or resort where persons gather for purposes of engaging in unlawful conduct. The City claims that its suit falls within the exception set forth in section 7903(5)(A)(iii) because New York Penal Law § 240.45 is a statute applicable to the sale or marketing of [firearms]. The Firearms Suppliers disagree, arguing that the predicate exception was intended to include statutes that specifically and expressly regulate the firearms industry. The District Court agreed with the City, finding that, [b]y its plain meaning, New York [Penal Law §] 240.45 satisfies the language of the predicate exception requiring a `statute applicable to the sale or marketing of [a firearm].' Beretta, 401 F.Supp.2d at 261. It is not disputed that New York Penal Law § 240.45 is a statute of general applicability that has never been applied to firearms suppliers for conduct like that complained of by the City.
Central to the issue under examination is what Congress meant by the phrase applicable to the sale or marketing of [firearms]. The core of the question is what Congress meant by the term applicable. We conclude, for the reasons set forth in subsection 1 below, that the meaning of the term applicable must be determined in the context of the statute. We find nothing in the statute that requires any express language regarding firearms to be included in a statute in order for that statute to fall within the predicate exception. We decline to foreclose the possibility that, under certain circumstances, state courts may apply a statute of general applicability to the type of conduct that the City complains of, in which case such a statute might qualify as a predicate statute. Accordingly, while the mere absence in New York Penal Law § 240.45 of any express reference to firearms does not, in and of itself, preclude that statute's eligibility to serve as a predicate statute under the PLCAA, New York Penal Law § 240.45 is a statute of general applicability that does not encompass the conduct of firearms manufacturers of which the City complains. It therefore does not fall within the predicate exception to the claim restricting provisions of the PLCAA.
The City relies on the dictionary definition of applicable, which is, simply, capable of being applied. On the other hand, the Firearms Suppliers contend that the phrase statute applicable to the sale or marketing of [a firearm] in the context of the language in the entire statute limits the predicate exception to statutes specifically and expressly regulating the manner in which a firearm is sold or marketed  statutes specifying when, where, how, and to whom a firearm may be sold or marketed. We agree that the examples of state and federal statutory violations in the predicate exception itself refer to state and federal laws that specifically and expressly govern firearms. See 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(I)-(II). We also agree with the District Court's rejection of the Firearms Suppliers' argument that the predicate exception is necessarily limited to statutes that expressly regulate the firearms industry. However, for the reasons set forth below, we disagree with the District Court's adoption of the out-of-context plain meaning of the term applicable and its conclusion that the dictionary definition of the term applicable accurately reflects the intent of Congress. The meaning of the term applicable must be determined here by reading that term in the context of the surrounding language and of the statute as a whole. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.); see also Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995) (We consider not only the bare meaning of the word but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.); King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991) (holding that a statute is to be read as a whole, since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context (citation omitted)). Adhering to this principle, we have held that fundamental to any task of interpretation is the principle that text must yield to context. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 157 (2d Cir.2007). [4] Viewed in this light, the term applicable must be examined in context. The PLCAA provides that predicate statutes are those that are applicable to the sale or marketing of [firearms]. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). The universe of predicate statutes is further defined as including the examples set forth in subsections (I) and (II). As stated, we agree with the Firearms Suppliers that these examples refer to statutes that specifically regulate the firearms industry. Yet, as also stated, we do not agree that the PLCAA requires that a predicate statute expressly refer to the firearms industry. Thus the contours of the universe of predicate statutes  i.e., those statutes that are applicable to sale or marketing of firearms  are undefined and we can only conclude that the term applicable requires a contextual definition. Moreover, because both the City and the Firearms Suppliers rely on a reasonable meaning of the term applicable, we must look to the canons of statutory interpretation to help resolve the ambiguity. United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 262 (2d Cir.2000); see also Daniel v. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 423 (2d Cir.2005) (explaining that where ambiguity is found in the meaning of a statute, we resort first to canons of statutory construction and . . . [then] to legislative history).
We have previously observed that [t]he meaning of one term may be determined by reference to the terms it is associated with, and [that] where specific words follow a general word, the specific words restrict application of the general term to things that are similar to those enumerated. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 583 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir.1978). We have also determined that [w]here . . . examination of [a] statute as a whole demonstrates that a party's interpretation would lead to `absurd or futile results . . . plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,' that interpretation should be rejected. Yerdon v. Henry, 91 F.3d 370, 376 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 120, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988) (ellipsis in original)). Defendants contend that their view of the relevant exception is bolstered by [both of these] settled principles of statutory interpretation.
As we noted in United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257 (2d Cir.2000), the meaning of doubtful terms or phrases may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated words or phrases ( noscitur a sociis ). Id. at 262. In addition, where general words are accompanied by a specific enumeration of persons or things, the general words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated ( ejusdem generis ). Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 7903(5)(A)(iii) states that the exception set out therein includ[es]: (I) any case in which the manufacturer or seller knowingly made any false entry in, or failed to make appropriate entry in, any record required to be kept under Federal or State law with respect to the [firearm], or aided, abetted, or conspired with any person in making any false or fictitious oral or written statement with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of a [firearm]; or (II) any case in which the manufacturer or seller aided, abetted, or conspired with any other person to sell or otherwise dispose of a [firearm], knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the actual buyer of the [firearm] was prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm or ammunition under subsection (g) or (n) of section 922 of Title 18; The general language contained in section 7903(5)(A)(iii) (providing that predicate statutes are those applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms) is followed by the more specific language referring to statutes imposing record-keeping requirements on the firearms industry, 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(I), and statutes prohibiting firearms suppliers from conspiring with or aiding and abetting others in selling firearms directly to prohibited purchasers, 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(II). Statutes applicable to the sale and marketing of firearms are said to include statutes regulating record-keeping and those prohibiting participation in direct illegal sales. Thus, the general term  applicable to  is to be construed to embrace only objects similar to those enumerated by sections 7903(5)(A)(iii)(I) and (II). See Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 384, 123 S.Ct. 1017. We accordingly conclude that construing the term applicable to to mean statutes that clearly can be said to regulate the firearms industry more accurately reflects the intent of Congress. Cf. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961) (The maxim noscitur a sociis . . . is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress).
The declared purposes of the statute include: To prohibit causes of action against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition products, and their trade associations, for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearms products or ammunition products by others when the product functioned as designed and intended. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1). In drafting the PLCAA, Congress found: Businesses in the United States that are engaged in interstate and foreign commerce through the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, importation, or sale to the public of firearms or ammunition products that have been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce are not, and should not, be liable for the harm caused by those who criminally or unlawfully misuse firearm products or ammunition products that function as designed and intended. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(5). We think Congress clearly intended to protect from vicarious liability members of the firearms industry who engage in the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, 30 distribution, importation, or sale of firearms. Preceding subsection (a)(5), Congress stated that it had found that [t]he manufacture, importation, possession, sale, and use of firearms and ammunition in the United States are heavily regulated by Federal, State, and local laws. Such Federal laws include the Gun Control Act of 1968, the National Firearms Act, and the Arms Id. Control Act. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(4). We think the juxtaposition of these two subsections demonstrates that Congress meant that lawful design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, importation, or sale of firearms means such activities having been done in compliance with statutes like those described in subsection (a)(4). This conclusion is supported by the interpretive principle that statutory exceptions are to be construed `narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [general rule].' Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989)), overruled on other grounds by Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). In the broader context of the statute as a whole, Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, resort to the dictionary definition of applicable  i.e. capable of being applied  leads to a far too-broad reading of the predicate exception. Such a result would allow the predicate exception to swallow the statute, which was intended to shield the firearms industry from vicarious liability for harm caused by firearms that were lawfully distributed into primary markets.
We are mindful that [c]ontemporaneous remarks of a sponsor of legislation are by no means controlling in the analysis of legislative history. Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1574 (2d Cir.1985). Nevertheless, we find that the legislative history of the statute supports the Firearms Suppliers' proffered interpretation of the term applicable. United States Senator Larry E. Craig, a sponsor of the PLCAA, named the case at bar as an example[ ]. . . of exactly the type of . . . lawsuit[ ] this bill will eliminate. See 151 Cong. Rec. S9374-01, 9394 (2005) (statement of Sen. Craig). United States Representative Clifford B. Stearns, the sponsor of H.R. 800, the House version of the PLCAA, inserted similar comments into the PLCAA's legislative history so that the Congressional Record [would] clearly reflect some specific examples of the type of. . . lawsuit[ ] the PLCAA would preclude. 151 Cong. Rec. E2162-03 (2005) (statement of Rep. Stearns). Indeed, the Central District of California found in a strikingly similar case, Ileto v. Glock, 421 F.Supp.2d 1274 (C.D.Cal. 2006), that comments by the bill's proponents consistently referred to firearms-specific statutes when discussing the scope of the predicate exception. For example, Senator Craig stated: Let me again say, as I said, if in any way they violate State or Federal law or alter or fail to keep records that are appropriate as it relates to their inventories, they are in violation of law. This bill does not shield them, as some would argue. Quite the contrary. If they have violated existing law, they violated the law, and I am referring to the Federal firearms laws that govern a licensed firearm dealer and that govern our manufacturers today. Id. at 1292 (quoting 151 Cong. Rec. S9087-01 (statement of Sen. Craig)) (alterations omitted). United States Senator Jefferson B. Sessions stated: This bill allows lawsuits for violation of contract, for negligence, in not following the rules and regulations and for violating any law or regulation that is part of the complex rules that control sellers and manufacturers of firearms. 151 Cong. Rec. S9374-01, S9378 (daily ed. July 29, 2005). The Ileto court also noted the defeat of attempts to expand the predicate exception to include laws of general applicability. For example, when United States Senator Carl M. Levin sought to include cases in which a firearms supplier's gross negligence or recklessness is a proximate cause of injury or death, Ileto, 421 F.Supp.2d at 1294 (citing 151 Cong. Rec. S9087-01 (statement of Sen. Levin)), the bill's proponents attacked this amendment, primarily because they believed that it would effectively `gut' the Act. Ileto, 421 F.Supp.2d at 1294 (citing, e.g., 151 Cong. Rec. S9374-01 (statement of U.S. Sen. John R. Thune)). Recognizing the limited weight owed to such statements, we think that the statements nevertheless support the view that the predicate exception was meant to apply only to statutes that actually regulate the firearms industry, in light of the statements' consistency amongst each other and with the general language of the statute itself. Cf. Murphy v. Empire of Am., FSA, 746 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir.1984) (explaining that isolated remarks, particularly when unclear or conflicting, are entitled to little or no weight). In sum, we hold that the exception created by 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii): (1) does not encompass New York Penal Law § 240.45; (2) does encompass statutes (a) that expressly regulate firearms, or (b) that courts have applied to the sale and marketing of firearms; and (3) does encompass statutes that do not expressly regulate firearms but that clearly can be said to implicate the purchase and sale of firearms. [5]