Opinion ID: 1678008
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the failure of the court to determine the competency of Shorty constitutes plain error.

Text: ¶ 22. To determine if plain error has occurred, this Court must determine if the trial court has deviated from a legal rule, whether that error is plain, clear or obvious, and whether the error has prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Grubb v. State, 584 So.2d 786, 789 (Miss.1991); Porter v. State, 749 So.2d 250, 260-61 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). The Fifth Circuit has adopted a test to determine when a competency procedure is required: the existence of a history of irrational behavior, defendant's demeanor at trial, and a prior medical opinion. Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1261 (5th Cir.1980). ¶ 23. Rule 9.06, UCCCR, requires a court to conduct a mental examination of a defendant if there is a reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. This Court has held that [t]he determination of what is `reasonable' rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge because the judge sees the evidence first hand and observes the demeanor and behavior of the defendant. Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1248 (Miss.1993), overruled on other grounds, Weatherspoon v. State, 732 So.2d 158 (Miss.1999). In Conner, the trial court was aware that Conner was taking medication for schizophrenia, made a suicide gesture, allegedly heard voices, had a low average intellectual level, that his counsel complained about getting assistance for trial from the defendant, and that he recalled virtually no facts concerning the case. 632 So.2d at 1251. ¶ 24. We held that the trial court objectively considered all the facts and circumstances relative to Conner's competence to stand trial and that the record contained nothing to conclude that Conner could neither understand the proceedings or appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense. Id. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency hearing in that case. ¶ 25. Shorty argues that, at the beginning of the trial proceedings, the judge asked him if he was currently undergoing medical treatment. Shorty responded that he was currently being treated for paranoid schizophrenia. The judge then questioned Shorty further: Court: Paranoid schizophrenia, okay. Well, you know what you're here for today? Shorty: Yes, sir. Court: You know what's going on? Shorty: Yes, sir. Court: You understand the consequences of the trial here today? Shorty: Yes, sir. Court: You understand that if you're found guilty, you're likely to get some kind of jail time? Shorty: Yes, sir. ¶ 26. Shorty contends that the circuit court was presented with enough information to raise a reasonable doubt as to his competence to stand trial. He claims that the questions by the court did not probe into the history and present mental health status of the appellant but rather sought yes and no answers to surface questions regarding the ability to comprehend the appellant's presence in court. ¶ 27. Shorty correctly states that, where there is evidence indicating a reasonable probability that a defendant is incapable of making rational decisions, the court must order a mental evaluation. He cites as support Barr v. State, 359 So.2d 334 (Miss.1978); Pace v. State, 218 Miss. 614, 67 So.2d 521 (1953); and Shipp v. State, 215 Miss. 541, 61 So.2d 329 (1952). ¶ 28. The cases cited by Shorty are all distinguishable from the case at bar, as in each case, the appellate court had before it the testimony of multiple physicians certifying the defendants as insane. In Barr, the lower court had the sworn affidavit of the court's own appointed specialist which unequivocally stated that the defendant was not sane, in addition to a report from the Mississippi State Hospital in which at least one doctor agreeing with the court's specialist. This Court held that a reasonable probability existed that the defendant was not competent to stand trial, and it was incumbent on the trial court to conduct a competency hearing. 359 So.2d at 338. ¶ 29. Likewise, in Pace, the trial court had before it the testimony of two doctors who had treated the defendant, one of whom had been instrumental in committing the defendant to an insane hospital on two occasions. 67 So.2d at 521-22. Furthermore, the defendant was prone to fits in which he would foam at the mouth, was destructive and threatened violence without provocation, was bitten by a rabid dog and suffered adverse effects from the treatment, was severely injured when the bare rim of a car's wheel ran over his head, and inflicted severe wounds on himself prior to trial. ¶ 30. Finally, in Shipp, the defendant submitted the reports of two doctors certifying that Shipp was in need of mental treatment at an institution. He was committed to Whitfield, where eleven doctors diagnosed him as suffering from catatonic schizophrenia. Eventually, a total of seventeen doctors unanimously agreed that Shipp was insane. Approximately one year after his commitment, the trial court held that Shipp would stand trial without a preliminary hearing to determine his competency. 61 So.2d at 329-30. This Court reversed. ¶ 31. We have reversed cases due to the trial court's failure to conduct a physical or mental examination, but in those cases the trial court had before it medical evidence in support of the order. Richardson v. State, 767 So.2d 195, 203 (Miss. 2000). Shorty has evidenced no overt physical symptoms and has produced no statements from the doctors who have treated him for his condition. The circuit court therefore did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency hearing in this case.