Opinion ID: 351542
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process and Speedy Trial.

Text: 21 The Constitution provides two separate safeguards against delay in the different stages of the investigation and prosecution of a crime. In the pre-indictment or pre-arrest stage delay is tested by the general proscriptions of due process. Because of statutory safeguards in the form of statutes of limitation, the Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). Pre-indictment delay is permissible unless it violates fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). See also United States v. Lovasco, supra, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2049. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535, 4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884). 22 But once a person becomes accused the more stringent requirements of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right apply. One becomes accused when there is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge . . . . United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). (Emphasis added). At this stage, although standards are still imprecise, the courts have been more willing to find delay to be constitutionally impermissible. 23 This case is complicated because it presents issues of delay encompassing both the pre-arrest and the accused stages. After a normal investigation and prosecution of the case to trial, a mistrial and dismissal occurred. Then the process repeated itself, resulting in further investigation and a new trial, this time ending with a guilty verdict. Arnold asks us to lump together the delay incurred by him during his two trials and test the whole period under the stricter speedy trial standards. This we cannot do. The procedural history of this case breaks down into four distinct periods, bringing into play at varying points both the due process and speedy trial provisions of the Constitution. Our review of each period in turn shows that there was no delay or prejudice which justifies granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 24
25 On January 18, 1968, the crime took place and the original complaint against Arnold was filed. However, he was not accused in Sixth Amendment terms until about one year later, on January 2, 1969, when he was arrested and arraigned. Even though he was in custody on the unrelated murder offense during much of this time, the period prior to arrest or formal indictment is expressly not protected by the speedy trial provisions. United States v. Marion, supra at 321, 92 S.Ct. 455; United States v. Lovasco, supra, 431 U.S. at 788, 97 S.Ct. 2044. 26 Under the more lenient due process standard applicable to this period, proof of actual prejudice is necessary before a claim of pre-indictment delay is ripe for adjudication. United States v. Lovasco, supra, at 789-790, 97 S.Ct. 2044; United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 675 (9 Cir. 1977). There has been no showing of any actual prejudice to Arnold arising from the one-year delay between the commission of the crime and his first arrest. There is no constitutional harm to Arnold from the original pre-arrest delay. 27 2. Period 2: The Stage Between Arrest and the Dismissal (January 3, 1969 to November 4, 1969). 28 At this point Arnold was an accused who could (and did) claim a right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1971) defined the nature of the speedy trial test: 29 A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. (Footnote omitted). 30 The application of this test produces no error. First, the length of the delay was not so extreme that it requires the implication of prejudice by itself. Only nine months elapsed between the arrest and the trial. Periods much longer than this have been held permissible. See United States v. Penland, 429 F.2d 9 (9 Cir. 1970) (The mere delay of 17 months between indictment and trial, in the circumstances of this case, does not 'itself demonstrate a violation of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial.' ); United States ex rel. Solomon v. Mancusi, 412 F.2d 88, 90 (2 Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 936, 90 S.Ct. 269, 24 L.Ed.2d 236 (1969) (dismissal has rarely been granted for a delay of less than several years.). Compare United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403 (7 Cir. 1976) (A certain amount of prejudice must be presumed to flow from the approximately one year delay between arrest and trial.); United States v. Macino, 486 F.2d 750 (7 Cir. 1973) (Delay of 28 months in conjunction with shown prejudice held to impair right to speedy trial.); United States v. Holt, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 185-86, 448 F.2d 1108-09 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942, 92 S.Ct. 292, 30 L.Ed.2d 257 (1971) (The defense claim has prima facie merit if the lapse between arrest and trial is longer than one year.); United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2 Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880, 79 S.Ct. 118, 3 L.Ed.2d 109 (1958) (Delay of four years held to violate right to speedy trial even absent showing of prejudice.). 31 Furthermore, for the first two months of this period Arnold was engaged in preparing for and defending the unrelated murder trial. A trial on the robbery-assault charges at this time would have been impossible. After the murder conviction he demanded, and within seven months received, a trial on the robbery-assault charges. Without more this is not sufficient to show a speedy trial violation. 32 3. Period 3: The Time Between the Dismissal of Charges and Re-Arrest (November 4, 1969 to November 6, 1970). 33 When the mistrial was declared on November, 4, 1969, after the jury failed to reach a verdict in Arnold's first trial for robbery-assault, the prosecution moved to dismiss the charges. The dismissal was granted without prejudice. After the dismissal Arnold was no longer accused; he no longer had any right to demand a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. Any contention that he was prejudiced by delay between this dismissal and his second trial must be tested under the general requirements of due process. 34 Arnold remained totally free of the robbery-assault charges for almost exactly one year, until it was learned that he would also be set free on the overturned murder conviction. Then, on November 6, 1970, just two days after he was released from prison, a new complaint was filed on the robbery-assault charges and Arnold was returned to custody. 35 Arguably, the one-year delay between the dismissal and the renewal of the charges could have resulted in some prejudice due to the death of the victim-witness, Walthers, before the second trial. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1971); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970); United States v. Macino, 486 F.2d 750 (7 Cir. 1973). 36 The due process test for impermissible pre-accusation delay requires a delicate balance of the circumstances of each case. See United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at 324-25, 92 S.Ct. 455; United States v. Lovasco, supra, 431 U.S. at 796-797, 97 S.Ct. 2044; United States v. Mays, supra at 677. Primarily, we must compare the gravity of the actual prejudice shown to the reasons for the delay. 1 United States v. Lovasco, supra, at 789-79, 97 S.Ct. 2044. 37 On the facts of this case, even assuming that some prejudice was caused to appellee by the failure of Walthers to testify in person at the second trial, the gravity of such prejudice is not serious. Proof of actual prejudice due to loss of a witness must be definite and not speculative, United States v. Mays, supra at 677. The assertion that a missing witness might have been useful does not show the 'actual prejudice' required by Marion. United States v. Mays, supra at 677, quoting United States v. Galardi, 476 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9 Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 and 856, 94 S.Ct. 90, 38 L.Ed.2d 75 (1973). 38 No evidence was lost because the entire record of the testimony from the first trial was admitted in the subsequent trial. This included extensive cross-examination of Walthers by Arnold's attorney. Furthermore, Arnold had the right to introduce the record from either of the two preliminary hearings at which Walthers also testified. The sole prejudice claimed by appellee is the lost opportunity for the jury to observe the demeanor of the witness. Allegedly the demeanor of the witness was not favorable to the prosecution because in the first trial the jury could not reach a verdict while in the second they could. However, this is speculation in light of the additional evidence adduced at the second trial which was not presented at the first. 2 No specific instances or explanations of why Walthers' demeanor made him unbelievable have been presented. Although some prejudice may be imputed, a more specific showing is necessary before we will find it to be substantial. 39 Moreover, the prosecution had two good reasons to defer the indictment of Arnold. First, there was no need to waste public time and resources on a trial of a man who was already sentenced to life in prison. Any new sentence would have been cumulative. Second, the prosecution fairly exercised its prosecutorial discretion to delay indictment until sufficient evidence existed to obtain a conviction. In Lovasco, supra, 431 U.S. 790-791, 97 S.Ct. at 2049, the Court explained: 40 It requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from 'fundamental conceptions of justice' when they defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause to believe an accused is guilty; indeed it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable cause. It should be equally obvious that prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists, but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To impose such a duty 'would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself,' United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 at 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627. 41 The only difference between this case and that in Lovasco is that here the prosecution had already brought appellee to trial, resulting in a hung jury. It then realized that its case was too weak to justify continued prosecution. However, if the demands of the proscription against double jeopardy are satisfied (see section III B, infra ) then the same policies which justify prosecutorial discretion in the first instance justify such discretion in the event that the charges become dismissed without prejudice. The suspect is no longer accused and may be relieved of any further burden to defend the charges if sufficient evidence to convict cannot be found. Economical use of crowded judicial time and facilities is facilitated. And the public is protected from having to be satisfied with bringing doubtful prosecutions or no prosecutions at all. See United States v. Lovasco, supra. (This opinion by Justice Marshall undertakes a useful review of the justifications for broad prosecutorial discretion regarding the timing of indictments.) 42 We hold that the prosecutor has discretion within the bounds of double jeopardy to choose to dismiss improvident charges pending further investigation even if the suspect's defense might be somewhat prejudiced by the delay. See United States v. Lovasco, supra, at 795, 97 S.Ct. 2044. In the facts of this case the prejudice shown by Arnold was not so substantial that the second trial violates fundamental conceptions of justice. 43 4. Period 4: Between the Second Arrest and the Retrial (November 6, 1970 to July 26, 1971). 44 After his arrest on November 6, 1970, Arnold's new trial was scheduled for February 17, 1971. However, due to extended litigation over his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds and his petition for a Writ of Prohibition against retrial, the trial could not be held until July 26, 1971. 45 Once again he was entitled to his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. However, six of the eight months' delay during this stage of the prosecution was directly caused by his own repeated efforts to forestall or prevent the second trial. The state was making every good faith effort to proceed timely to trial. There was no impermissible delay.5. Conclusion. 46 Arnold suffered no constitutionally impermissible prejudice due to delay during the investigation and prosecution of his case. During each of the two periods in which he had a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, the state made every good-faith effort to pursue the charges. During the two periods in which only the less stringent due process standards applied, the state had valid reasons for the delay, which resulted in no substantial prejudice to Arnold. 47