Opinion ID: 1433870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DISCUSSION.A Limiting Schwerb's cross-examination

Text: Beck first argues that the district court improperly precluded defense counsel from asking certain questions of Schwerb on cross-examination. We review a trial court's limitation of cross-examination only for abuse of discretion; we will reverse only if `there has been a clear abuse of discretion and a showing of prejudice to the defendant.' United States v. Barrett, 937 F.2d 1346, 1349 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Rubin, 836 F.2d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir.1988)); accord, e.g., United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir.1997); United States v. Caldwell, 88 F.3d 522, 524 (8th Cir.1996). In the spring of 2007, several St. Louis police officers were implicated in a scandal concerning Cardinals World Series tickets. The officers purportedly had seized tickets being sold by scalpers and used the tickets themselves or gave them to friends. Seven officers, including Schwerb, were demoted as a result of the scandal and suspended without pay for two weeks, although Internal Affairs never completed its investigation into the allegations. The Government moved in limine to exclude defense counsel from inquiring about Schwerb's involvement in the scandal, and the district court granted that motion. Beck contends this was error because attacking Schwerb's credibility was essential to his case. We disagree. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), specific instances of witness untruthfulness may be inquired into on cross-examination in the discretion of the court. [3] But such cross-examinationas with most evidenceis subject to exclusion if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. United States v. Beal, 430 F.3d 950, 956 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Fed. R.Evid. 403); see also United States v. Drapeau, 414 F.3d 869, 875 (8th Cir.2005) ([t]rial judges retain `wide latitude' to impose `reasonable limits' on cross-examination, particularly where the subjects inquired into might confuse the jury or be repetitive or only marginally relevant) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). Here, the district court properly considered the effect the proposed cross-examination would have had on the trial, noting that even if Schwerb's testimony were thoroughly discredited by the ticket scandal, such impeachment would have had no impact on the testimony of Chambers (who testified that Beck admitted the gun was his) or Long (who identified the gun and identified Beck as his assailant). Given that Schwerb's testimony was duplicative of, and corroborated by, the testimony of Chambers and Long, the exclusion of the proposed cross-examination had little impact on the Government's case. Accordingly, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in precluding this line of impeachment. For the same reason, even if the district court had erred, its error was harmless. See United States v. Santisteban, 501 F.3d 873, 879 (8th Cir. 2007) (harmless-error inquiry with respect to cross-examination depends on `the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case') (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431).