Opinion ID: 1407728
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Perpetuated Mistake of Law: Impeding Traffic

Text: The State has conceded on appeal that the North Carolina motor vehicle safety regulations, codified in Chapter 20 of the North Carolina General Statutes, do not prohibit impeding traffic. To the contrary, the statutory provision regulating motor vehicle movement at traffic signals provides: When the traffic signal is emitting a steady green light, vehicles may proceed with due care through the intersection subject to the rights of pedestrians and other vehicles as may otherwise be provided by law. N.C.G.S. § 20-158(b)(2a) (2007) (emphasis added). It is readily apparent that Officer Maltby's decision to stop defendant's vehicle was made under the misapprehension that impeding traffic constitutes a violation of North Carolina's motor vehicle safety regulations. This conclusion follows from the officer's response on cross-examination regarding whether defendant's left turn into the intersection of Coxe Avenue and Hilliard Avenue constituted a legal turn: The stop at a green light was impeding flow of traffic, yes, ma'am. The characterization of impeding traffic as a punishable offense also occurred during the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress when the prosecutor, who evidently lacked a clear understanding of the law, argued: [PROSECUTOR:] There's a crime of impeding traffic. [Defendant] did impede traffic, the officer's vehicle, was impeding traffic. The officer had a right to stop him, had probable cause to believe he's  that he was impeding traffic. I would ask Your Honor to deny the Defendant's motion in that regard. (Emphasis added.) Finally, the trial court perpetuated this mistake of law in its order denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop. The court's finding of fact was that defendant remained stopped [at the green light] for some 30 seconds without any reasonable appearance of explanation for doing so, and the officer observed that the [defendant] was impeding traffic, if nothing else.  (Emphasis added.) Based solely upon this finding of fact, the court made its conclusion of law that from the totality of the circumstances that a reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing on the part of the Defendant existed to warrant Officer Maltby's stop of the Defendant's vehicle in view of its prolonged existence at this intersection without any reason for doing so. The majority would have us believe that this mistake of law is wholly irrelevant, citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769, and State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 634-35, 517 S.E.2d 128, 131-32 (1999), for the proposition that courts are generally more concerned with the objective facts of a case than with an officer's subjective motivation. While it is true that [i]n examining the legality of a traffic stop, the proper inquiry is not the subjective reasoning of the officer, but whether the objective facts support a finding that the stop was constitutional, see Ivey, 360 N.C. at 564, 633 S.E.2d at 460-61 (citing McClendon, 350 N.C. at 635, 517 S.E.2d at 132), neither of the two decisions relied upon by the majority for this assertion involved a mistake of law. Indeed, since Whren was decided, federal circuit courts have widely held that a law enforcement officer's mistake of law concerning whether a traffic violation has occurred  as opposed to a mistake of fact  will generally render a stop unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276-79 (11th Cir.2003) (holding unconstitutional a traffic stop that was based upon the defendant's failure to have a rearview mirror affixed to the inside of his vehicle, which was not a requirement under city ordinance or Alabama law); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding unconstitutional a traffic stop that was based upon the defendant's failure to affix a registration sticker so that it was visible from the rear of his vehicle, which simply was not a violation of Baja California law); United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir.1999) (holding a traffic stop unconstitutional because no well-trained Texas police officer could reasonably believe that white light appearing with red light through a cracked red taillight lens constituted a violation of traffic law); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 276, 279 (5th Cir.1998) (holding unconstitutional a traffic stop that was based upon the defendant's flashing his vehicle's turn signal without turning or changing lanes, which did not violate the Texas Transportation Code); see also Ivey, 360 N.C. at 566, 633 S.E.2d at 462 (Because failure to give a signal, in and of itself, does not constitute a violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-154(a), nothing in the record suggests [the officer] had probable cause to believe any traffic violation occurred.). However, at least one federal circuit court has held that the constitutionality of the traffic stop might be based upon whether the defendant's actions gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, notwithstanding the officer's mistake of law. See United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 400-01 (3d Cir.2006) (citing generally Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89). But see Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d at 289 (But if officers are allowed to stop vehicles based upon their subjective belief that traffic laws have been violated even where no such violation has, in fact, occurred, the potential for abuse of traffic infractions as pretext for effecting stops seems boundless and the costs to privacy rights excessive.).