Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Termination of Liability of Aider and Abettor

Text: At defendant’s request and over the prosecution’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury on CALJIC No. 3.03 37 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. (“Termination of Liability of Aider and Abettor”). The instruction provided, in part, that to withdraw from participation of a crime and avoid liability as an aider and abettor, a defendant “must do everything in his power to prevent” the crime’s commission. In closing argument, defense counsel pointed out that before Pamela was murdered, defendant had repeatedly demanded Moya give back the $25,000 defendant had already paid him after Moya missed four previous opportunities to kill Pamela, i.e., “four clean hits” defendant admitted that he had “set up.” The prosecution countered that under CALJIC No. 3.03, defendant “has to do everything in his power, everything in his power, everything in his power to prevent the commission of the murder. So let’s look at what Mr. Fayed did to prevent the murder. Nothing. He didn’t do anything. Not a darn thing.” On appeal, defendant argues that CALJIC No. 3.03 erroneously stated that a defendant must do “everything in his power” to withdraw as an aider and abettor in the crime, rather than requiring a defendant to do what was “practicable” or “reasonable,” as suggested in the corresponding CALCRIM instruction. (See CALCRIM No. 401 [defendant must do “everything reasonably within his or her power to prevent the crime from being committed” (italics added)].) Defendant points out that in 2005, the Judicial Council endorsed CALCRIM and urged courts to use CALCRIM instead of CALJIC. The Attorney General counters that defendant forfeited the argument by failing to object that CALJIC No. 3.03 misstated the law. Even assuming that defendant did not forfeit the claim that CALJIC No. 3.03 misstates the law, his claim lacks merit. In 2008, three years after the Judicial Council’s adoption and 38 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. endorsement of CALCRIM, this court explained that CALJIC No. 3.03 “is a correct statement of the law.” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1022; see People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 294.) Further, even under CALCRIM No. 401 (defendant must do “everything reasonably within his . . . power”), defendant does not assert, nor is there anything in the record to suggest, that defendant did anything—apart from demanding his money back from Moya—to stop the commission of Pamela’s murder. Thus, his withdrawal claim would fail under either standard. Even assuming instructional error, defendant fails to show prejudice. (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 495 [instructional error is harmless when, beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not contribute to the verdict].) On a related point, defendant underscores that while the trial court used this CALJIC instruction for aiding and abetting, it used CALCRIM No. 521 for first degree murder. He argues that the intermingling of CALJIC and CALCRIM instructions on this issue was improper. We conclude defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object on this ground and that the claim in any event lacks merit. (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 944, fn. 6 [“trial court may modify any proposed instruction to meet the needs of a specific trial, so long as the instruction given properly states the law and does not create confusion”].)