Opinion ID: 698173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: LACTC's Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: 10 Sprint's inverse condemnation claims turns on its ability to demonstrate that there has been a taking or damage to its property right by the government. Hilltop Properties v. State of California, 233 Cal. App. 349 (1965). LACTC claims that because the Easement Agreement defines the scope of the easement, it is entitled to summary judgment on the terms of the Easement Agreement: 11 Sprint owns an easement. But easements differ in terms of what they allow and what conditions they contain. The easement in question in this case contains several limitations and conditions. The relevant condition and limitation in this case is that Sprint must move its cable upon request under certain conditions and must bear some or all of the cost of such relocation. 12 Appellee's Brief at 7. LACTC maintains that it acquired the property by sale and the improvements were for railroad operations as defined by Section 5.05(a) of the Easement Agreement. 13 The district court found that Sprint's claim of inverse condemnation was without merit: 14 Sprint still has exactly the property right for which it bargained with Southern Pacific -- an easement subject to an obligation to move. If Sprint retains all of the property rights it bargained for, there can be no inverse condemnation. 15 ER at 186 (Judge Gadbois' Order of July 30, 1993, at 6). 16 We find that the district court did not err in concluding that the costs for which Sprint seeks reimbursement fall within the scope of the restrictions of the Easement Agreement. Thus, Sprint has no claim of inverse condemnation which would warrant denying LACTC's motion for summary judgment. We AFFIRM.