Opinion ID: 1655090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the State's expert witness Dr. Charlton Stanley was unqualified to render an opinion on the mental state of Paul Woodward.

Text: ¶ 27. Woodward argues that the prosecution's expert witness was not qualified to render an opinion regarding Woodward's mental state. During the defense's case-in-chief, Dr. Thurman testified that Woodward had a longstanding emotional problem, dating back to his teen years, and that Woodward was and is emotionally disturbed. Dr. Thurman testified that, at the time of the crime, Woodward's ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was impaired, that Woodward's capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired, and that Woodward was a mentally disturbed individual. In rebuttal, the prosecution called Dr. Stanley, who was accepted as an expert witness in the areas of forensic psychology and counseling psychology. Dr. Stanley testified that he did not agree that Woodward had a longstanding mental disorder, nor could he find data to suggest that Woodward was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime. Dr. Stanley also testified that he thought Woodward's ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and his ability to conform his conduct at the time of the crime were not impaired. ¶ 28. Woodward asserts that none of Dr. Stanley's opinions were reduced to writing, nor did Dr. Stanley interview Woodward. Woodward argues that an expert may not testify based solely on the opinions and testimony of other experts. Woodward contends that Dr. Stanley's testimony was inadmissible because his opinions could not pass the reasonable certainty test. Woodward also argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to Dr. Stanley's testimony and that the failure of trial court to exclude the testimony was prejudicial to the defense. ¶ 29. The State correctly points out that Woodward failed to object to Dr. Stanley's testimony both at trial and on appeal. Therefore, Woodward's claim that the admission of the testimony was error is barred from consideration by Miss.Code. Ann. § 99-39-21. Without waiving that bar, the State argues that this issue is also without merit, as is Woodward's contention that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the testimony. This Court agrees. ¶ 30. Woodward contends that Dr. Stanley's opinions were not reduced to writing nor discovered by the defense prior to trial. Woodward asserts that his right to confrontation and cross-examination was violated. However, Dr. Stanley testified for the prosecution during Woodward's first trial and, since Woodward had the transcript from that proceeding, he cannot now claim that he was surprised by the testimony. ¶ 31. Woodward argues that since Dr. Stanley never personally interviewed Woodward, Dr. Stanley's opinions about Woodward could not have the degree of certainty required for admission as expert opinions. Dr. Stanley based his opinions about Woodward on the documents in Dr. Thurman's file, audiotapes of Dr. Thurman's interviews with Woodward, and Woodward's videotaped and written confessions. Woodward argues that Dr. Stanley's failure to interview him makes his testimony objectionable. M.R.E. 703 states, The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. This Court has held that there is no requirement that a mental health professional actually examine the defendant before testifying. This Court has stated, there is no merit to McGilberry's claim that Dr. Maggio was required to examine personally the defendant and/or speak with defense counsel. An expert's opinion may be based on facts or data made known to him at or before the hearing. M.R.E. 703. Furthermore, his opinion may be based on the testimony of others which he heard while sitting in the courtroom. Id. Likewise, Mississippi's case law supports the position that an expert may base his opinion solely on the testimony of others he has witnessed. See Collins v. State, 361 So.2d 333, 334 (Miss.1978) (expert witness may remain in courtroom and base his testimony upon the prior testimony of other witnesses). This method is particularly useful in criminal cases. Id. McGilberry v. State, 741 So.2d 894, 918 (Miss.1999). See also McCaffrey v. Puckett, 784 So.2d 197, 203 (Miss.2001); Sibley v. Unifirst Bank for Sav., 699 So.2d 1214, 1219 (Miss.1997). Woodward's contention that Dr. Stanley had to interview Woodward for his testimony to be admissible is without merit. ¶ 32. Woodward finally argues that his trial counsels' failure to object to the admission of Dr. Stanley's testimony was error and prejudiced the defense. Any objection defense counsel might have raised would have been properly overruled. Woodward has failed to show that his counsels' performance was deficient and has failed to show any prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. This issue is also without merit.