Opinion ID: 1844273
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Heading: issues

Text: The issue before us is whether Harper's declaratory-judgment complaint sufficiently stated a bona fide justiciable controversy so as to withstand BSR's motion to dismiss. Section 6-6-221, Ala.Code 1975, states that the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respects to rights, status, and other legal relations and is to be liberally construed and administered. Section 6-6-222, Ala. Code 1975, gives trial courts the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. We also have recognized that one of the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to render practical help in ending a controversy that has yet to reach the stage where legal relief is immediately available and to enable parties between whom an actual controversy exists or those between whom litigation is inevitable to have the issues speedily determined when a speedy determination would prevent unnecessary injury caused by the delay of ordinary judicial proceedings. Ex parte State ex rel. Lawson, 241 Ala. 304, 307, 2 So.2d 765, 767 (1941). Stated another way, declaratory-judgment actions are designed to set controversies to rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs. Id. See also Berman v. Wreck-A-Pair Bldg. Co., 234 Ala. 293, 175 So. 269, 274 (1937). A declaratory-judgment action requires only that there be a bona fide justiciable controversy. Creola Land Dev., Inc., 828 So.2d at 288 (citing Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553, 557 (Ala.1979)). A controversy is justiciable where present `legal rights are thwarted or affected [so as] to warrant proceedings under the Declaratory Judgment statutes.' Creola Land Dev., Inc., 828 So.2d at 288 (quoting Town of Warrior v. Blaylock, 275 Ala. 113, 114, 152 So.2d 661, 662 (1963)). We have recognized that a justiciable controversy is one that is `definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of the parties in adverse legal interest, and it must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a [judgment].' MacKenzie v. First Alabama Bank, 598 So.2d 1367, 1370 (Ala.1992)(quoting Copeland v. Jefferson County, 284 Ala. 558, 561, 226 So.2d 385, 387 (1969)). A declaratory-judgment action will not lie for an anticipatory claim. Creola Land Dev., Inc., 828 So.2d at 288 (citing City of Dothan v. Eighty-Four West, Inc., 738 So.2d 903, 908 (Ala.Civ. App.1999)). However, we have also held that a party should not be forced to wait until the event giving rise to the claim occurs before a court may determine the party's rights and obligations. Creola Land Dev., Inc., 828 So.2d at 288 (citing City of Dothan, supra; Morton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 486 So.2d 1263, 1269 (Ala.1986)). Furthermore, declaratory relief was intended to be an alternative relief and not to be dependent upon the absence of another adequate remedy. City of Dothan, 738 So.2d at 909 (citing Ex parte Jim Dandy Co., 286 Ala. 295, 239 So.2d 545 (1970)). The trial court's ruling in a declaratory-judgment action carries no presumption of correctness; we must view the allegations in Harper's complaint as true and view them most strongly in his favor. Creola Land Dev., Inc., supra, and Nance, supra. Therefore, we must assume, as Harper alleged, that BSR mentioned Harper's individual liability during his December 2000 deposition and that BSR's attorney told Harper's attorney in February 2001 that BSR believed Harper was personally liable for the judgment against Harper Sales in the Jefferson Circuit Court. Furthermore, we need only determine whether Harper could have possibly prevailed in his declaratory-judgment action. Based upon the specific statements of BSR's attorney and the actions taken by BSR before Harper filed the complaint in his declaratory-judgment action, we hold that Harper could possibly have prevailed on that action. The sole issue presented in this case is whether a justiciable controversy existed between Harper in his individual capacity, and BSR at the time Harper filed the declaratory-judgment action. While BSR correctly recognizes that a declaratory-judgment action will not lie for an anticipatory claim, it fails to recognize that one of the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to enable parties between whom litigation is inevitable to have the issues speedily determined to prevent unnecessary injuries. The facts in this case indicate that a lawsuit by BSR against Harper was inevitable. Four things happened before Harper's declaratory-judgment action was filed that could lead one to believe that BSR intended to sue Harper in his individual capacity. First, there was the judgment in the Jefferson Circuit Court for BSR in the amount of $113,155.34, against Harper Sales, a company with which Harper was closely affiliated. Second, there was Harper's postjudgment deposition in which BSR's attorney indicated that Harper may be personally liable for the judgment against Harper Sales. Third, there was the rendering of the judgment against Harper Sales in the Probate Court of Mobile County, where Harper resides. Fourth, there was the statement by BSR's attorney to Harper's attorney on February 2, 2001, in which BSR's attorney stated that he thought Harper was personally liable for the judgment against Harper Sales on the breach-of-contract claim. All of these factors, viewed together, indicate that BSR's suing Harper was inevitable. BSR also asserts that a justiciable controversy exists only after a legal action has been filed. However, a controversy is also justiciable where an individual's legal rights are frustrated or affected and a controversy does not require the filing of a legal action. To require the actual filing of a lawsuit before a declaratory-judgment action could be filed would thwart the primary purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act, which is to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to the rights, status, and other legal relations of parties. Furthermore, the Declaratory Judgment Act is to be read liberally, which also militates against the narrow interpretation BSR advocates. Harper sought to have a court clarify the uncertain issue whether he could be individually liable for the judgment in the Jefferson Circuit Court against Harper Sales. Based upon the relationship and legal history between BSR and Harper Sales and upon Harper's involvement in that relationship, there appeared to be a definite and concrete controversy regarding the legal relationship between BSR and Harper. Additionally, all of the facts giving rise to the claim BSR eventually filed against Harper in September 2001 occurred before the declaratory-judgment action was filed. Harper was not required to wait until BSR sued him to have his rights and obligations determined. Harper's declaratory-judgment action was an alternative relief available to him, it was not dependent upon the absence of another adequate remedy. Motions to dismiss are rarely appropriate in a declaratory-judgment action; this is one of those cases in which such a motion is not appropriate. Thus, the trial court's dismissal of Harper's declaratory-judgment action was reversible error.