Opinion ID: 2804365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Supreme Court's Rosemond Decision

Text: Rosemond involved a drug deal gone bad, after either the defendant (Rosemond) or his confederate (it was unclear who) fired a gun at the buyers, who had taken the drugs and run away without paying. 134 S. Ct. at 1243. Rosemond was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) by using a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense, or, in the alternative, aiding and abetting that crime under 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id. At trial, Rosemond contended that he took no action with respect to any firearm. Id. at 1246. More specifically, he did not buy, borrow, carry, or use a gun in connection with the alleged drug transaction. Id. Building on this factual premise, he argued -10- that he could be found guilty of aiding or abetting a § 924(c) violation only if he intentionally took some action to facilitate or encourage the use of the firearm, as opposed to the predicate drug offense. Id. at 1244 (internal quotation marks omitted). Disagreeing, the district court instructed the jury that Rosemond was guilty of aiding and abetting if (1) [he] knew his cohort used a firearm in the drug trafficking crime, and (2) [he] knowingly and actively participated in the drug trafficking crime. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rosemond was convicted by the jury, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.5 Id. at 1244. The Supreme Court vacated Rosemond's § 924(c) conviction. Id. at 1252. The Court first restated longstanding aiding and abetting law: [A] person is liable under § 2 for aiding and abetting a crime if (and only if) he (1) takes an affirmative act in furtherance of that offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense's commission. Id. at 1245. Regarding the affirmative act requirement, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court correctly instructed the jury that Rosemond could be 5 The jury's verdict form was general and did not reveal whether the jury found that Rosemond himself had used the gun or instead had aided and abetted a confederate's use during the marijuana deal. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1244. Even if the jury could have found that Rosemond himself fired the gun, the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court had to address his aiding and abetting argument because a conviction based on a general verdict is subject to challenge if the jury was instructed on alternative theories of guilt and may have relied on an invalid one. Id. at 1244 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). -11- convicted of aiding and abetting a § 924(c) offense even if he facilitated only the drug trafficking element, and not the use of the gun. Id. at 1247; see also id. at 1246 ([A] defendant can be convicted as an aider and abettor without proof that he participated in each and every element of the offense. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Regarding the intent requirement, the Court stated that a person must intend to facilitate the specific and entire crime charged. Id. at 1248; see also id. ([A]n aiding and abetting conviction requires . . . a state of mind extending to the entire crime. (emphasis added)). Therefore, with a § 924(c) offense, the aider and abettor must have knowledge of the full scope of the crime, that is, that the plan calls not just for a drug sale, but for an armed one. Id. at 1249; see also id. (stating that a defendant must intend to commit the illegal scheme in its entirety — including its use of a firearm). The Court further held that this knowledge has to be advance knowledge, meaning knowledge at a time the accomplice can do something with it — most notably, opt to walk away. Id. at 1249-50. The jury instructions at Rosemond's trial were in error because they did not require that Rosemond knew in advance that one of his cohorts would be armed. See id. at 1251. By instructing the jurors to consider merely whether Rosemond knew his cohort used a firearm, the district court failed to direct them to -12- determine when Rosemond obtained the requisite knowledge — i.e., to decide whether Rosemond knew about the gun in sufficient time to withdraw from the crime. Id. at 1251-52.