Opinion ID: 1057569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Underlying Purposes

Text: The third and final factor is whether an implied right of action would be consistent with the purposes of the statute. The TTPA was enacted to establish a sound system of making title pledge loans through licensing of title pledge lenders, which included the creation of licensing requirements. Tenn.Code Ann. § 45-15-102(1)-(2). While the TTPA sought to [e]nsure financial responsibility to the public, it achieved that financial responsibility by [a]ssist[ing] local governments in the exercise of their police power. Id. § 45-15-102(3)-(4). The TTPA empowers local governments to exercise their police power by criminal sanctions. A knowing violation of any of the provisions of the TTPA is a class A misdemeanor, id. § 45-15-117, punishable by imprisonment and/or fine, id. § 40-35-111(e)(1) (2010). In addition to these criminal penalties, a knowing violation of rules concerning the issuance of standardized forms prior to executing a pledge agreement will result in the suspension and potentially the revocation of the lender's license. Id. § 45-15-117(b). In short, the TTPA was designed to regulate the title pledge lending industry, especially through the licensure of lenders, and was governmentally enforced through criminal and administrative sanctions. The courts of this state have refused to imply a private right of action in regulatory statutes enforced through governmental remedies. Our jurisprudence reflects the United States Supreme Court's maxim that it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it. Transam. Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979); see Ellison, 63 F.3d at 470 (describing courts as especially reluctant to imply additional remedies in a statute that expressly provides a remedy). Accordingly, in Premium Finance Corp., we determined that the Premium Finance Company Act was structured so as to evince a clear design to regulate the premium finance industry and accomplished that regulatory function through many of the same mechanisms used in the TTPA: requiring companies to be licensed, prescribing the contents of financial agreements, and setting interest rates. 978 S.W.2d at 94. The act's enforcement provisions were limited to criminal sanctions and administrative penalties. Id. Because the act as a whole provide[d] for governmental enforcement of its provisions, we declined to casually engraft means of enforcement of one of those provisions unless such legislative intent is manifestly clear. Id. We found no such manifestly clear intention and dismissed a premium finance company's claim under the act against the defendant insurers for failure to return unearned premiums. Id. Similarly, in Petty v. Daimler/Chrysler Corp., the Court of Appeals reviewed Tennessee's motor glass vehicle safety statute. 91 S.W.3d 765, 768 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002), perm. app. denied (Sept. 9, 2002). That statute was codified [a]s part of the equipment and lighting regulations for motor vehicles, required the use of safety glass in motor vehicles, and authorized the commissioner of the department of safety to approve particular types of glass as safety glass. Id. The statute's sole remedy lay with the commissioner, who had the authority to suspend the registration of a motor vehicle that did not comply. Id. Because [t]he only remedy provided by the statute [was] to be had by the State, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff car purchaser had no private right of action against the defendant car manufacturer. Id. Finally, in Reed v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc ., the Court of Appeals reviewed a provision of the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law concerning the commissioner of labor's establishment of a case management system to coordinate medical care. 4 S.W.3d 677, 689 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999), perm. app. denied (Oct. 4, 1999). The intermediate court explained that, [v]iewed in its entirety, the Workers' Compensation Law provides for governmental enforcement of its provisions, including the department of labor's establishment and collection of penalties for certain violations. Id. at 690. Therefore, even though the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the plaintiff employee was an intended beneficiary of the statute, it decline[d] to ... engraft additional requirements onto the enforcement scheme designed by the legislature. Id. Accordingly, the court held there was no implied private right of action against plaintiff's employer for negligent performance of case management duties. Id. [12] Like the statutory schemes analyzed in these cases, the TTPA is a regulatory statute enforced through governmental remedies. Accordingly, the implication of a private right of action would be inconsistent with the TTPA's purposes as set forth by the legislature.