Opinion ID: 2625875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion to Recuse the District Attorney's Office

Text: Before trial, defendant moved to recuse the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office as prosecutor, claiming that the expected receipt of testimony from two deputy district attorneys employed by that office, Gerald Haney and John Krayniak, made prosecution by the district attorney's office improper under section 1424. Haney was the deputy who prosecuted defendant on the Koll pharmacy robbery. Krayniak was, at the time of the killing, a Pasadena police officer involved with the investigation, but he had since joined the district attorney's office as a prosecutor. [11] Both ultimately did testify at trial. Neither Haney nor Krayniak was claimed to be participating in the murder prosecution. Rather, defendant claimed that the testimony of both these witnesses ... is so subject to colored interpretation as to vitiate the defendant's rights to a fair trial.... In argument on the motion, defense counsel claimed that because of the camaraderie in the district attorney's office the prosecutors could not but have a zealous approach to this particular case beyond that ordinarily shown in an evenhanded manner in an ordinary case. The court denied the motion, finding the defense had not shown that a conflict of interest in our present case would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. We recently reiterated the applicable principles in Hambarian v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 826, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 725, 44 P.3d 102 ( Hambarian ). The standard for a motion to disqualify the prosecutor is set forth in Penal Code section 1424: `The motion may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.' We detailed the history of this statute and the associated legal principles in [ People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310], where we explained that a `conflict,' for purposes of section 1424, `exists whenever the circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable possibility that the DA's office may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner.' ( Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 592, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310, quoting People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 148, 193 Cal.Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5.) However, `the conflict is disabling only if it is so grave as to render it unlikely that defendant will receive fair treatment' during all portions of the criminal proceedings. ( Eubanks, supra, at p. 594, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310.) The statute thus articulates a two-part test: `(i) is there a conflict of interest?; and (ii) is the conflict so severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting?' ( Ibid. ) ( Hambarian, supra, at p. 833, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 725, 44 P.3d 102, fn. omitted.) Defendant argues the trial court applied the wrong standard: according to him, the court was called upon only to determine whether there was a `reasonable possibility' that the D.A.'s office might not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner. Defendant is clearly wrong: such a determination would satisfy only the first part of the two-part test outlined in Eubanks and Hambarian. The trial court correctly refused to recuse the district attorney's office without a showing that prosecution by that office would render fair treatment unlikely. ( Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 833, 118 Cal. Rptr.2d 725, 44 P.3d 102.) [12] As defendant does not contend the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion (see People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 594-595, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310) under what we have explained is the correct legal standard, we need not decide that question. We note, however, that recusal of an entire district attorney's office, especially a large one such as Los Angeles County's, has generally not been held required merely because one or more employees of that office are witnesses in the case. (See People v. Hernandez (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 674, 678, 286 Cal.Rptr. 652; Trujillo v. Superior Court (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 368, 370, 373, 196 Cal.Rptr. 4; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 180, 191-192, 205-212, 150 Cal.Rptr. 156.)