Opinion ID: 774782
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Devereaux's Arguments Before the District Court

Text: 19 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325; see also Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Celotex showing can be made by pointing out through argument -the absence of evidence to support plaintiff's claim). Once the moving party carries its initial burden, the adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but must provide affidavits or other sources of evidence that set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24; Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that once the moving party carries its initial burden of production, the nonmoving parties were obligated to produce evidence in response). 20 In their memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argued that there is no evidence that any of the defendant[s] actually believed plaintiff was innocent or that the children were lying when they participated in the interviews. On this basis (among others), Defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment. 21 In his memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Devereaux never expressly accepted or rejected the proposition that his §§ 1983 claim required a showing of dishonesty, and he never purported to have made such a showing. Most of his memorandum indicated that Devereaux was raising only an improper-interviewtechniques claim. For example, he asserted that Defendants failed to adhere to established guidelines and policies concerning the questioning of child witnesses, and that they departed from accepted professional judgment, practice, and standards. He also claimed that [w]hat is at issue for this action is the failure of the State Defendants to conduct and monitor these interrogations in a manner that would ensure the veracity of the information obtained. All of those allegations, even if supported by record evidence, are insufficient to support a deliberate-fabrication-of-evidence claim. Failing to follow guidelines or to carry out an investigation in a manner that will ensure an error-free result is one thing; intentionally fabricating false evidence is quite another. 22 Devereaux did, however, go on to claim that Defendants' intentional attempt to alter the testimony of alleged child victims was also at issue. He did not, however, expressly develop that issue or connect it with other, more specific factual allegations, or with any record evidence. His Statement of Material Facts in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment contains several descriptions of interviews of children in which the children initially denied abuse, were questioned further, and ultimately accused Devereaux of abusing them. These, as far as we can discern, are the only attempts to alter the testimony of alleged child victims to which Devereaux referred. 23 The problem with Devereaux's line of argument is that, as we noted earlier, interviewers of child witnesses of suspected sexual abuse must be permitted to exercise some discretion in deciding when to accept initial denials at face value and when to reject them (or withhold judgment on them) and proceed further. Consequently, an allegation that an interviewer disbelieved an initial denial and continued with aggressive questioning of the child cannot, without more, support a deliberate-fabrication-of-evidence claim, even if the allegation is amply supported by the evidence. What is required is an allegation or a showing that the interviewer knew or should have known that the alleged perpetrator was innocent, or that the interview techniques employed were so coercive and abusive that the interviewer knew or should have known that they would yield false information. Devereaux never even alleged facts of this sort, much less supported such allegations with citations to evidence in the record. 24 An example will illustrate the point. In his memorandum submitted to the district court, Devereaux emphasized the fact that in the August 3 interview of A.S., in which A.S. initially denied being a victim of abuse but later changed her story and accused Devereaux, Wood repeatedly admonished A.S. to tell the truth. It is difficult to see, however, how repeated admonitions to be truthful can amount to a constitutional violation for deliberate fabrication of evidence, in the absence of any independent allegations or evidence that Wood knew or should have known that Devereaux was innocent and that A.S., in testifying to that effect, had already told the truth. Because Devereaux never made that independent argument, his complaints about Wood's admonitions to the child to tell the truth cannot support a deliberate-fabrication claim. For similar reasons, the other incidents that Devereaux described before the district court also are inadequate to support such a claim. 25 Thus, to the extent that Devereaux's memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment did raise a deliberate-fabrication-of-evidence claim, he failed to make or support any factual allegations that were logically capable of supporting such a claim. The district court's decision to grant the motion was therefore proper.