Opinion ID: 544601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: APPLICATION OF 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(e)

Text: 21 Rivera's last argument is that the district court erroneously interpreted 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(e) to apply to the instant case. 4 Appellant contends that the purpose of 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823 is to protect the FDIC from fraud, because it essentially provides that secret agreements are unenforceable as against the FDIC. See F.D.I.C. v. Ponce, 904 F.2d 740, 745 (1st Cir.1990). See also D'Oench, Duhme v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 62 S.Ct. 676, 86 L.Ed. 956 (1942). According to appellants, although the agreements were in writing, the FDIC refused to accept them as valid, and the district court failed to adequately analyze the evidence and to give reasons why the agreements failed to comply with statutory requirements. 22 The FDIC argues that the district court properly ruled that written agreements offered as evidence by appellants were not executed by the closed Girod Trust Company, not approved by its Board of Directors and were not part of the Trust Company's records. Thus, it avers, the documents are invalid as to the FDIC pursuant to 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(e). We agree. The district court found that [n]one of the seven release agreements dated April 13, 1984, on which defendants claim to have been released by GIROD was executed by GIROD. Moreover, two different United States Magistrates, as well as the district court, gave serious consideration and analysis to the written agreements offered in evidence by the appellants and they each concluded that the documents were unsigned by the closed bank and thus invalid as to the FDIC. Examination of the last page of the two agreements which appellants claim to have been signed by GIROD confirms that they contain no signature on behalf of GIROD. The district court did not err in concluding that the requirements of 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(e) were not met, and thus, that the agreements were invalid as to the FDIC.