Opinion ID: 2354064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: constitutionality of criminal sodomy statute

Text: Sodomy is defined in K.S.A. 21-3501(2) to mean oral contact with genitalia; anal penetration by any body part or object; or oral or anal copulation or sexual intercourse between a person and an animal. Sexual intercourse is defined as any penetration of the female sex organ by a finger, the male sex organ or any object. K.S.A. 21-3501(1). Under K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(1), the misdemeanor version of criminal sodomy is defined as [s]odomy between persons who are 16 or more years of age and members of the same sex or between a person and an animal. In other words, the statutory provision under which Coman was convicted proscribes consensual homosexual conduct, as well as bestiality. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), the United States Supreme Court struck down a sodomy law as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, finding that a state cannot criminalize sexual practices between two mutually consenting adults conducted in private, even if those practices are common to a homosexual lifestyle. The Lawrence Court explicitly narrowed its holding and warned against any broader interpretation. 539 U.S. at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472. Nevertheless, Coman would have us read Lawrence as prohibiting states from legislating for moral purposes, which he believes includes prohibition of bestiality. As noted, the Court of Appeals declined to reach the merits of the constitutional argument because of procedural bars. Coman's review petition does not address the panel's decision on the procedural matters, opting instead to argue the merits of the undecided issue. We will review the issue as it was decided by the Court of Appeals, i.e., whether the statute's constitutionality is properly before the appellate courts.