Opinion ID: 882631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statements 1 and 2: Admissions Against Interest.

Text: The District Court ruled that statements 1 and 2 fell within the hearsay exclusion of Rule 804(b)(3), M.R.Evid., which allows the admission of statements made by an unavailable declarant which so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. Defendant contends that the witnesses' account of the statements were inaccurate, mischaracterized, and did not subject Foster to criminal liability. The State contends that any statement which indicates an insider's knowledge of or participation in a crime tends to subject the declarant to criminal liability. United States v. Alvarez (5th Cir.1978), 584 F.2d 694, 700. Here, Foster's description of Russell McCord's wound and death indicate an insider's knowledge of or participation in the murder. This further suggests that the statement subjected Foster to criminal liability and would come within the statement against interest portion of Rule 804(b)(3). We conclude the court properly admitted statement 1 into evidence under Rule 804(b)(3), M.R.Evid. In a similar manner, we conclude Foster's statement that he loved Russell McCord and did not mean to do it indicated knowledge of or participation in the crime and tended to subject him to criminal liability. At the time Foster made this statement, he knew the police considered him a suspect in the homicide. Two days prior to Foster saying that he did not mean to do it, police had extensively questioned him and swabbed his hands for powder residue. Given these circumstances, a reasonable man in Foster's position would not have made this statement unless he believed it to be true. Thus, we conclude statement number 2 was properly admitted into evidence under Rule 804(b)(3), M.R.Evid. Next, defendant contends Foster's statements admitted as statements against interest are inculpatory, unreliable, and untrustworthy. In Rule 804(b)(3) A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. State v. Powers (1988), 233 Mont. 54, 57, 758 P.2d 761, 763. The defendant asks us to expand this rule and exclude uncorroborated inculpatory declarations against interest. [I]nculpatory declarations against interest requires corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement ...       Under Rule 804(b)(3), trustworthiness is determined primarily by analysis of two elements: The probable veracity of the in-court witness, and the reliability of the out-of-court declarant. Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701. We do not find it necessary to determine whether or not uncorroborated inculpatory declarations may be admitted. Here the State provided extensive corroboration. The corroboration includes the following: Russell McCord's body was in his home with no sign of forced entry; the wound was consistent with a weapon owned by the decedent, kept in the family safe which police never found; Foster and defendant had access to the home and the safe; Dennis testified that Foster and the defendant were having an affair; Russell McCord had informed Foster he would have to move out; and finally Foster was aware that the decedent would find out about the bleak financial situation. Further, in Alvarez the in-court witness was a co-conspirator who turned state's evidence in exchange for a lesser sentence. Here, Dennis and Grace McCord, the principal witnesses, had no similar motive to testify falsely, and were extensively cross-examined by defendant. We conclude the evidence clearly corroborated Foster's statements. Finally, defendant contends that statements 1 and 2 violate her right to confrontation guaranteed by Article II, § 24 of the Montana Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This Court has examined several factors in addressing confrontation clause violations. State v. Weinberger, (1983), 204 Mont. 278, 665 P.2d 202. In Weinberger, the Court examined Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, and held that testimony did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation where the statement was not critical to the prosecution, incriminating only in conjunction with other facts, and did not demonstrate a co-defendant's recognized motivation to shift blame to others. Weinberger, 204 Mont. at 298, 665 P.2d at 213. Next in examining Dutton v. Evans (1970), 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213, Weinberger added: ... [T]he statement did not contain an express assertion about past fact; ... [the declarant's] personal knowledge of the identities and roles of the other murder participants had been abundantly established by other evidence; and, that the possibility ... [the declarant's] statement was founded on faulty recollection was remote in the extreme. Finally, the circumstances provided widely recognized indicia of reliability where, as here, the statement was spontaneous and where it was against .. . [the declarant's] penal interest to make it. Weinberger, 204 Mont. at 303, 665 P.2d at 215. We conclude Foster's statements meet the requirements contained in Weinberger. First, the statements were not crucial to the State's case in light of other evidence. The statements here did not incriminate the defendant, but rather tended to incriminate Foster. Until linked by other evidence to the defendant, the primary thrust of the statements was to link Foster to the homicide. Of itself, that did not establish that the defendant was also linked to the homicide. Additional evidence was required and was submitted by the State to establish that link. The statements were made by Foster within the two-day period after the homicide and the statements were spontaneous and against Foster's interest. We hold the trial court did not violate Rules of Evidence or the defendant's right to confrontation by admitting statements 1 and 2 in evidence.