Opinion ID: 6341384
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Slim next argues insufficient evidence supported either conviction. We review the sufficiency of evidence from a bench trial with the same standard we use to review jury verdicts. United States v. Morris, 791 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 2015). We “review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction de novo, viewing -6- the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and reversing the verdict only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Shelledy, 961 F.3d 1014, 1019 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Ramos, 852 F.3d 747, 753 (8th Cir. 2017)). Applying this deferential standard, we conclude sufficient evidence supported Slim’s convictions on both counts. To prove attempt crimes, “the government must prove that the defendant intended to commit the predicate offense and took a substantial step in furtherance of the offense.” United States v. Hensley, 982 F.3d 1147, 1154 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 379 (2021). We turn first to Slim’s conviction for attempt to commercially sex traffic a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). We have held that a person intends to commit this offense when he subjectively intends “to engage in a commercial sex act with someone he believed to be a minor female,” even if that belief is mistaken. Wolff, 796 F.3d at 974–75. We have also held a person takes a substantial step in furtherance of this offense when he drives to a set meeting place with cash and condoms. See id. at 975. Here, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the district court’s verdict sufficiently showed Slim’s subjective intent to engage in a commercial sex act with someone he believed to be a minor. The evidence showed Slim initially contacted Russell in response to the ad; expressed his desire to see the alleged minor even after Russell told him she was fifteen years old; and he agreed to meet Russell at the gas station, bring condoms and cash to the meeting, and to refrain from hurting or bruising the alleged minor. The evidence also showed Slim drove to the meeting location with $200 cash and condoms in the car. This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict Slim of attempting to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). We next turn to Slim’s conviction for attempt to entice a minor for sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Violations “of § 2422(b) require[] proof that the defendant knowingly used a facility of interstate commerce with the intent to persuade or entice [a minor] to engage in illegal sexual activity.” United States v. Larive, 794 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 2015). We have held a person attempts to -7- commit this crime when he subjectively intends to entice a “fictitious minor female to engage in illegal sexual conduct” and takes “a substantial step towards commission of the offense by planning and ultimately driving to [a meeting spot] to meet the minor” and the meeting’s facilitator. Hensley, 982 F.3d at 1154–55. Here, the evidence viewed in the light most favorably to the district court’s verdict sufficiently shows Slim knowingly used two facilities of interstate commerce—the internet and a phone, see United States v. Strubberg, 929 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 2019)—to try to entice a fictitious minor female to engage in illegal sexual activity and then took a substantial step toward committing the offense by driving to the meeting spot. We thus affirm both of Slim’s convictions.