Opinion ID: 76238
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: applying eleventh amendment factors

Text: 59 Having examined Georgia's law governing sheriffs, we now specifically apply the Eleventh Amendment factors to Sheriff Peterson's particular functions in issue. We need not, and do not, decide today whether Georgia sheriffs wear a state hat for Eleventh Amendment purposes for all of the many specific duties assigned directly by the State. We have recounted these duties as relevant Georgia law that reflects on the nature and character of the sheriff's office. We, however, must decide here only whether Sheriff Peterson is an arm of the State in establishing force policy at the jail and in training and disciplining his deputies in that regard.
60 The first factor in the Eleventh Amendment analysis is how Georgia law defines the sheriff's office. In Georgia, the office of sheriff is an elected constitutional office. Although a sheriff performs his duties mainly, although not always, within the geographical confines of a county, the essential governmental nature of his office is (a) to continue to perform his historical common law duties to enforce the law and preserve the peace on behalf of the sovereign State and (b) to perform specific statutory duties, directly assigned by the State, in law enforcement, in state courts, and in corrections. Most of those duties are an integral part of the State's criminal justice system and are state functions. 61 Moreover, the sheriff's office is a separate and independent office from both Clinch County and its governing body. Counties delegate no powers or duties to sheriffs. Sheriff Peterson and his deputies at the jail are not employees of Clinch County. Indeed, Georgia's Constitution precludes Clinch County from having any control over the sheriff's office. 62 Although the specific duties the State assigns to sheriffs shed considerable light on the character of the sheriff's office, we must focus on the nature of the particular function at issue here: force policy. The sheriff's authority to use force or the tools of violence, whether deadly or non-deadly force, and the sheriff's obligation to administer the jail are directly derived from the State and not delegated through the county entity. In addition, use of force and creating force policy are quintessential policing functions, exercised by sheriffs in initial arrests, in subduing inmates in sessions of state superior courts, or in quelling disruptive inmates in county jails. 63 While we must consider context, the location where the sheriff's policing function is performed does not automatically transmute the function into a state function or a county function. In administering the jail, the sheriff does not check his arrest powers or force authority at the door. Instead, he and his deputies bring them into the jail and exercise them in the jail setting. This case is not a case of feeding, clothing, or providing medical care to inmates, which necessarily occur within the jail. Instead, it involves Sheriff Peterson's force policy, which happens to be at issue in the jail context in this particular case. While the jail context is important, it likewise is significant that the sheriff's force policy is at issue in many settings and that location alone does not control. It is also material that the State uses the county jail to incarcerate not only pretrial detainees charged with state offenses, such as Manders, but also state offenders serving state sentences after conviction. 64 Based on our review of Georgia law, we conclude that the sheriff wears a state hat when he creates and implements force policy in the jail. 35 Thus, this first factor weighs heavily in favor of immunity.
65 The second factor of the Eleventh Amendment analysis examines where Georgia law vests control. In addition to mandating and controlling sheriffs' specific duties as outlined above, only the State possesses control over sheriffs' force policy and that control is direct and significant in many areas, including training and discipline. 66
67 The State requires annual specialized training of sheriffs in all counties by the Georgia Sheriffs' Association with the assistance of the Georgia Public Safety Training Center. 36 O.C.G.A. § 15-16-3. The annual training of sheriffs shall be generally devoted to contemporary law enforcement, investigation, judicial process, and corrections practices and specifically shall be germane to the ... office of sheriff in the several counties of this state. O.C.G.A. § 15-16-3(a). The purpose of this Code section [O.C.G.A. § 15-16-3] is to promote professionalism within the office of sheriff by ensuring the highest possible quality of law enforcement training is offered to each sheriff on an annual basis. O.C.G.A. § 15-16-13(a). It is reasonable to assume that such training includes instruction on force policy and hiring and training deputies. Sheriff Peterson testified that in preparing the force policy in his Manual he adopted some state policies. Furthermore, the Georgia Sheriffs' Association uses state funds (or federal funds distributed to the State) to cover all training costs. See O.C.G.A. § 15-16-3(d). 68 Notably, if a sheriff fails to comply with the annual training requirements, the Governor — the State's chief — may suspend the sheriff without pay for ninety days. O.C.G.A. § 15-16-3(e)(4). The State also mandates that a sheriff's failure to complete annual training requirements will result in the loss of arrest powers. O.C.G.A. § 15-16-3(e)(1),(4). Again, these rules are not laws of general application, but are specific statutes whereby the State directly requires annual training of all sheriffs, controls the training subject matter, pays for the training, and sanctions sheriffs for non-compliance. In contrast, counties have no control over sheriffs or their training.
69 In addition, the Governor has broad investigation and suspension powers regarding any misconduct by a sheriff in the performance of any of his duties. O.C.G.A. § 15-16-26. 37 If a sheriff's policy permits excessive force in the county jail, plainly the Governor may discipline the sheriff. If a sheriff fails to take custody of state offenders in the county jail, plainly the Governor may discipline the sheriff. The State legislature expressly has made Sheriff Peterson answerable to the Governor for his conduct and policies. 70 Specifically, the Governor may initiate an investigation of any suspected misconduct by any sheriff and may suspend the sheriff. O.C.G.A. § 15-16-26(a), (c). The Governor selects two sheriffs, who along with the State Attorney General, conduct the investigation for the Governor. O.C.G.A. § 15-16-26(a). The State funds the investigation. Id. 71 If the Governor's committee recommends suspension to the Governor, the Governor may suspend the sheriff for sixty days and extend that suspension for thirty additional days. O.C.G.A. § 15-16-26(c). This disciplinary procedure is direct, substantial, and immediate state control over the sheriff's acts. If Sheriff Peterson permits excessive force, all the Governor must do is have a committee immediately investigate and report, and the Governor can suspend him. 38 72 Moreover, if the Governor believes the sheriff should be removed from office, the Governor is authorized to request the district attorney of the county of the sheriff's residence to bring a removal petition against the sheriff based upon the evidence reported by the Governor's investigation committee. 39 Id. The Governor may order additional investigation by the committee, by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, by other law enforcement agencies ... or by any special committee appointed by the Governor for such purpose. O.C.G.A. § 15-16-26(c).
73 In contrast, counties have no authority, control over, or involvement in Sheriff Peterson's force policy at the jail, or his training and disciplining of deputies in that regard. While Georgia counties have obligations involving the jail structure and inmates' food, clothing, and medical necessities, such duties involve wholly separate and distinct matters from the sheriff's force policy at the jail and his training and disciplining of deputies in that regard. 40 74 Because of the State's direct and substantial control over the sheriff's duties, training, and discipline and the county's total lack thereof, this control factor also weighs heavily in favor of Sheriff Peterson's entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 41
75 The third factor in the Eleventh Amendment analysis is where the entity derives its funds. The State funds the annual training of sheriffs, funds the Governor's disciplinary procedure over sheriffs for use of excessive force, and pays for certain state offenders assigned to the county jails under the sheriff's supervision. 42 Thus, state funds are involved to some extent in the particular functions of Sheriff Peterson at issue. 76 While Clinch County bears the major burden of funding Sheriff Peterson's office and the jail, it is because the State so mandates. By state statutes, Clinch County must (1) maintain the jail structure, (2) appropriate funds for necessities to inmates (such as food, bedding, clothing, electricity, and sanitation) and the salaries of Sheriff Peterson and his deputies, and (3) pay the premium for the Sheriff's official bond. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-9-5, 42-5-2(a), 15-16-20, 45-4-7. 77 Manders relies on O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a), which provides, in part, that it shall be the responsibility of the governmental unit, subdivision, or agency having the physical custody of an inmate to maintain the inmate, furnishing him food, clothing, and any needed medical and hospital attention. 43 But Manders does not allege that Sheriff Peterson denied him necessities in O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2. Rather, Manders challenges only Sheriff Peterson's force policy at the jail and the training and disciplining of his deputies. 78 Furthermore, Clinch County's financial control is attenuated because (a) the State mandates Sheriff Peterson's minimum salary and official bond amount, and (b) Clinch County sets the total budget but cannot dictate how Sheriff Peterson spends it. The Georgia Supreme Court has held that counties must provide reasonably sufficient funds to allow the sheriff to discharge his legal duties, and that the county commission may not dictate to the sheriff how that budget will be spent in the exercise of his duties. Chaffin v. Calhoun, 262 Ga. 202, 203-04, 415 S.E.2d 906 (1992); 44 see Boswell v. Bramlett, 274 Ga. 50, 52, 549 S.E.2d 100 (2001). Georgia's Constitution further prevents counties from taking any action affecting any elective county office or the personnel thereof. Ga. Const. art. IX, § 2, ¶ 1(c)(1). 79 Payment of Sheriff Peterson's budget, when required by the State, does not establish any control by Clinch County over his force policy at the jail or how he trains and disciplines deputies. 45 By virtue of State mandates, both state and county funds are involved in the particular functions in issue. This state involvement is sufficient to tilt the third factor of the Eleventh Amendment analysis toward immunity. 80
81 The fourth factor is the source of the funds that will pay any adverse judgment against Sheriff Peterson in his official capacity. Before applying this factor, we discuss three recent cases addressing it. 82 In Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 35-39, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994), the Supreme Court denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to an interstate railway-port authority, created under the U.S. Constitution's Interstate Compact Clause and controlled by the federal government and two states. Because the federal government was one of the multiple creator-controllers, the five-justice majority in Hess concluded that the states had ceded a portion of their sovereignty to Congress and that having the Compact Clause entity respond in federal court did not affront the dignity of the states. Id. at 47, 115 S.Ct. 394. Hess further concluded that both legally and practically neither state was obligated to pay any judgment against the entity. Id. at 51-52, 115 S.Ct. 394. Rather, the entity was financially independent, with funds from private investors, tolls, fees, and investment income. Id. at 36, 49-50, 115 S.Ct. 394. Although weighing this source-of-payment factor heavily, Hess never suggests that for Eleventh Amendment immunity a state treasury drain is required per se and Hess notes that current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence emphasizes the integrity retained by each State in our federal system. Hess, 513 U.S. at 39, 115 S.Ct. 394. 46 83 The focus of the Supreme Court in Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430-31, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997), was on potential legal liability and the risk of adverse judgments, as opposed to requiring that state funds actually pay the judgment. In Regents, the federal government indemnified a state university, and the litigation had no impact on the state treasury. Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court determined that this full indemnity did not affect the university's immunity. Id. The Supreme Court emphasized that [t]he Eleventh Amendment protects the State from the risk of adverse judgments even though the State may be indemnified by a third party, and it is the entity's potential legal liability, rather than its ability or inability to require a third party to reimburse it, or to discharge the liability in the first instance, that is relevant. Id. at 431, 117 S.Ct. 900. 47 84 Thereafter, this Court applied these principles in Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc. v. Beech Street Corp., granting immunity to private corporations that contracted with the state to administer its health insurance program and to provide a network of medical services. 208 F.3d at 1310-11, 1313. We stated that although these are private corporations that are neither controlled nor funded by the state, they are protected by governmental immunity when they are clearly acting as agents of the state. Id. at 1311. Noting that other circuits had not adopted an approach of total or no immunity, Shands looked to the relief sought and whether the judgment against the private corporation would implicate the state treasury or interfere with the administration of [a] state ... program. Id. Given that the State could be sued for the negligence of the agent corporations in untimely paying claims, we determined that the judgment against the private corporations would implicate state funds and that the private corporations would indemnify the state was immaterial. Id. at 1313. 85 Applying these principles to this case, we first determine that under Georgia law Clinch County would not pay a damages award against Sheriff Peterson. Georgia courts speak with unanimity in concluding that a defendant county cannot be held liable for the tortious actions or misconduct of the sheriff or his deputies and is not required to pay the resulting judgments. 48 Likewise, Georgia courts have concluded that counties are not liable for, and not required to give sheriffs money to pay, judgments against sheriffs in civil rights actions. See Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Warren, 236 Ga. 150, 152, 223 S.E.2d 133 (1976) ([A] county has no liability in connection with the violations of the civil rights of any person by a county officer.). The Georgia Supreme Court in Warren quoted a Georgia statute stating that [a] county is not liable to suit for any cause of action unless made so by statute. Id. at 151, 223 S.E.2d 133 (quotation marks omitted). 49 Thus, by statute, the county was not liable. In addition, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that there is no duty of the county to furnish the sheriff with money to settle a civil rights judgment entered against him. Id. at 152, 223 S.E.2d 133. 50 86 Although Clinch County is not required to pay and although Sheriff Peterson argues that the `legal liability' for sheriffs in Georgia rests with the State of Georgia, not individual counties, we can locate no Georgia law expressly requiring the State to pay an adverse judgment against Sheriff Peterson in his official capacity. Sheriff Peterson thus apparently would have to pay any adverse federal court judgment against him in his official capacity out of the budget of the sheriff's office. In turn, this payment would reduce his budget, and the practical reality is that Sheriff Peterson must recoup that money from somewhere. If a significant adverse judgment occurs, both county and state funds are implicated because Sheriff Peterson would need to seek a greater total budget from the county for his office and a greater daily rate from the State for felony offenders serving their state sentences in the county jail. 87 Never has the Supreme Court required an actual drain on the state treasury as a per se condition of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 51 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55; Hess, 513 U.S. 30, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245; Shands, 208 F.3d 1308. This is because the Eleventh Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, and a purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is to accord[] the States the respect owed them as members of the federation and not to affront the dignity or integrity of a state by requiring a state to respond to lawsuits in federal courts. Hess, 513 U.S. at 39-40, 115 S.Ct. 394 (citation and quotation marks omitted). [C]urrent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence emphasizes the integrity retained by each State in our federal system. Id. at 39, 115 S.Ct. 394. The State's integrity is not limited to who foots the bill, and, at a minimum, the liability-for-adverse-judgment factor does not defeat Sheriff Peterson's immunity claim.