Opinion ID: 197525
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Gilday Injunction

Text: 32 Gilday argues that the DOC defendants violated the Gilday injunction by endeavoring to monitor and record his wire communications in violation of the state and federal wiretap statutes. The linchpin in this argument is that no authoritative decision specifically construes either the federal or state wiretap statute to permit the inmate-telephone system established under the MITS. In other words, Gilday argues that the injunction is violated absent an authoritative decision validating either the MITS regime itself or substantially similar practices in a comparable prison context. At its most particular level, this contention would necessitate an authoritative decision declaring the challenged MITS practices compatible with the applicable wiretap statutes. 33 We test this contention against the language employed in the Gilday injunction, viewed in its unique litigation context, including the particular circumstances surrounding its formation and the basic purposes it was designed to serve. See ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. at 238 (construing ambiguous language in consent decree in light of the circumstances surround ing [its] ... formation); see also Massachusetts Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. King, 668 F.2d 602, 607-08 (1st Cir.1981) (construing consent decree in light of its language, the circumstances surrounding its formation, and its basic purposes); Cornelius v. Hogan, 663 F.2d 330, 333 (1st Cir.1981) (noting that court construing ambiguous consent decree may inquire into the parties' intent and the circumstances surrounding the decree in order to select the most reasonable interpretation). 34 As a preliminary matter it is necessary to note, however, that no violation of the injunction can be found unless Gilday first established an interception, as defined under either the federal or Massachusetts wiretap statute, based on clear and convincing evidence, Kemp, 947 F.2d at 16 (citation and quotation marks omitted). See infra pp. 288-89, 290. Therefore, Gilday's insistent contention on appeal--that no MITS practice can ever be allowed under the Gilday injunction unless it has been specifically permitted beforehand by an authoritative decision--cannot succeed. 35 Moreover, even assuming Gilday were to demonstrate an interception, the injunction expressly excepts from its reach any practice specifically permitted under the wiretap statutes as construed in authoritative decisions, see supra pp. 280-81, and the term specifically permitted is susceptible to various reasonable interpretations. 10 On the one hand, specifically permitted may be read to require an authoritative decision that the MITS regime, as applied directly to Gilday, comports with the applicable wiretap statutes. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2187 (1986) (noting that term specific may connote restriction to a particular individual); see also Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 590, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 1111, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996) (noting that  '[s]pecifically' can mean 'explicitly, particularly, [or] definitively' ) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (6th ed.1990) (emphasis added)). Under such a reading, an authoritative decision would be unavailing to the DOC defendants unless it explicitly addressed the MITS monitoring and recording of wire communications involving Gilday. On the other hand, specifically permitted may contemplate simply an authoritative decision upholding interceptions involving some other DOC inmate or DOC inmates in general. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 2187 (noting that specific may merely restrict to a particular situation). Under these interpretations, therefore, Gilday would need to demonstrate simply an absence of authoritative decisions specifically permitting the challenged MITS practices as applied directly to him or to similarly situated inmates. See Langton, 71 F.3d at 935-37 (noting no reported decision holding that this type of prison telephone monitoring system meets consent exception to federal wiretap statute). 36 Alternatively, at a more universal level, specifically permitted may simply contemplate an authoritative decision upholding the general types or kinds of monitoring and recording practices prescribed by the MITS, without regard to whether the practices were employed in a prison context. See 2 The Oxford English Dictionary 2949 (Compact Ed.1987) (defining specifically as [i]n something of the same kind); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 2187 (defining specific as constituting or falling into the category specified); Webster's New World Dictionary of American English 1287 (3d ed.1988) (defining specific as being of a special, or particular, sort or kind); Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1132 (1989) (defining specific as sharing or being those properties of something that allow it to be referred to a particular category). Under the latter interpretation, of course, Gilday would need to demonstrate an absence of authoritative decisions vindicating the kinds of practices utilized under the MITS, without necessary regard to the exact context in which the practices were applied, thereby implicating any relevant authoritative decision addressing the applicable wiretap statutes. Thus, under the latter interpretation only unlawful MITS practices would be barred by the Gilday injunction. 11 37 Ambiguities in an injunctive decree are construed in the light most favorable to the alleged contemnor. See Kemp, 947 F.2d at 16; NBA Properties, 895 F.2d at 32; see also United States v. O'Quinn, 913 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir.1990); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 339 (2d Cir.1985); New York Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of America, 445 F.2d 39, 48 (2d Cir.1971); Ford, 450 F.2d at 280, 11 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2955, at 310 (1995 & Supp.1996) (same). For present purposes, therefore, the Gilday injunction would be construed as banning only unlawful interceptions. 38 The litigation context underlying the Gilday consent decree likewise commends the latter construction. See ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. at 238, 95 S.Ct. at 935 (construing ambiguous consent-decree language in light of circumstances surrounding [its] formation ...); see also King, 668 F.2d at 607 (similar). Throughout the district court action terminated by the consent decree, the DOC defendants steadfastly denied monitoring, recording, or intercepting any wire communication involving Gilday. Thus, implicit in the stance taken by Gilday now is the suggestion that the DOC defendants impliedly conceded prior violations of the relevant wiretap statutes simply by entering into the stipulation of dismissal, whereas the record flatly contradicts any such concession. Instead, the stipulation of dismissal substantiates the view that the DOC defendants simply agreed to an injunction which required their compliance with the applicable federal and state law governing interceptions. 12 39 Viewed in context, therefore, the Gilday consent decree--entailing no resolution of the central dispute as to whether the DOC defendants ever monitored or recorded, let alone intercepted, any Gilday wire communication--is most harmoniously construed as an agreement that the DOC defendants were to refrain from any interception violative of either wiretap statute, as determined under either existing or future authoritative decisions. That is to say, the Gilday consent decree bans only unlawful DOC monitoring and recording practices. See Settlement Stipulation: Claims Against Defendants Fair, Vose, Hall and Callahan, Gilday v. Fair, et al., Civ. A. No. 74-4169-C, discussed supra pp. 286-87 & n. 12; see also supra pp. 280-81. 40 The suggested construction comports with the Langton panel majority opinion as well, which held that the Langton injunction banned any interception absent a specific court order or legislative authorization to do so, except as specifically permitted by these statutes, ... as they have been construed in reported decisions that are binding in this Court or in the state courts of Massachusetts. Langton, 71 F.3d at 931 (emphasis added). Thus, the Langton panel majority reasoned that the consent decree was to be construed as requiring the DOC defendants to refrain, in perpetuity, from contesting the meaning of the relevant state and federal wiretap statutes as construed in reported decisions that [were] binding in [the federal district court] or in the state courts of Massachusetts at the time the Langton injunction was entered, see id. at 931, 933-35, as distinguished from merely requiring the DOC defendants to refrain from unlawful interceptions. As the Langton panel majority viewed the matter, any other approach threatened to render the terms of the Langton injunction illusory--stating nothing beyond what was already forbidden by law before the Permanent Injunction was entered. Id. at 933 (emphasis added); but see id. at 940 (Boudin, J., dissenting ); see also supra p. 284. 41 The panel majority relied as well on the final section in the Langton injunction, which stated in terms similar to the Gilday injunction, see supra p. 280, that the injunction shall not of its own force affect the rights of inmates of the Department other than William Langton and David LeBlanc. See Langton, 71 F.3d at 933. It reasoned that had the DOC promised merely to obey the law, no purpose would have been served by the quoted provision. See id. 42 Once again, however, the two cases presented themselves on appeal in materially different postures. First, as discussed supra pp. 284-85, the repeated observation by the Langton panel majority, see Langton, 71 F.3d at 933-37--that no then-existing authoritative decision specifically permitted the challenged MITS practices and that the Langton decree would be rendered meaningless were it to be construed as a mere promise to obey the law--is inapposite to the instant context. That is, central to the present analysis is the explicit language in the Gilday injunction (or may be construed in reported decisions), see supra p. 280 (emphasis added)--nowhere to be found in the Langton injunction, see 71 F.3d at 931--which in no sense purports to prohibit either (i) these parties from litigating open questions as to the meaning of the applicable wiretap statutes, or (ii) our consideration of later authoritative decisions upholding monitoring and recording practices of the kind prescribed by the MITS, see infra pp. 45-48. Second, since the settlement stipulation and the consent decree in Gilday were entered into while the parties in Langton were still litigating the initial action which led to the Langton injunction, paragraph 3 in the Gilday injunction (viz., [t]his Permanent Injunction ... shall not ... affect the rights of inmates other than William Gilday[,]) served the discrete purpose of not disturbing the rights of the Langton inmates whose initial action against the DOC was to remain in litigation for two months after the consent decree was entered in Gilday. 13 43 Accordingly, unlike the corresponding provision in the Langton injunction, paragraph 3 in the Gilday injunction is entirely consistent with the view that the Gilday injunction simply contemplates that the DOC not violate the applicable wiretap statutes. For these reasons we conclude, notwithstanding their similarities, that the Gilday injunction is substantially less restrictive in scope than the Langton injunction, in that it unambiguously enjoins only unlawful recording and monitoring practices by the DOC. 14 A. The Massachusetts Wiretap Act 44 We must now consider whether Gilday demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, Kemp, 947 F.2d at 16, that the challenged MITS practices constitute unlawful interceptions under the applicable wiretap statutes, beginning with the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, bearing in mind that it was for Gilday to show that the DOC defendants violated a clear and unambiguous order that left no reasonable doubt as to what behavior was to be expected and that the defendants were  'able to ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden.'  Id. at 17 (quoting Drywall Tapers, 889 F.2d at 395). First, we inquire whether the monitoring, recording, and call detailing practices prescribed by the MITS Regulations are interceptions under the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4). Second, should Gilday successfully surmount the first hurdle, we determine whether any such interpretation is nevertheless permitted under any authoritative decision binding on the federal district court. Finally, we conclude that Gilday failed to prove either that the monitoring and recording practices conducted pursuant to the MITS constitute interceptions under the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, or that the MITS call detailing practices were clearly prohibited under the Gilday injunction. 1. Monitoring and Recording 45 We begin by noting that the Gilday injunction prohibits only interceptions under the applicable statutes and not call monitoring, recording, or detailing per se. The term interception, as used in the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, means to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record, the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any intercepting device.... Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (emphasis added). 46 The Massachusetts courts have interpreted this secrecy requirement literally. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 370 Mass. 502, 349 N.E.2d 337, 339-40 (1976) (holding that secrecy is essential to establishing a violation of Massachusetts Wiretap Act); see also District Attorney v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 Mass. 586, 399 N.E.2d 866, 869 (1980) (stating that secret recordation of incoming calls violates Massachusetts Wiretap Act). A secretive interception occurs under the Massachusetts Wiretap Act unless both parties to a wire communication had actual knowledge of the interception, see, e.g., Jackson, 349 N.E.2d at 340, which may be established by evidence that the parties were informed that their conversation was being intercepted, or by clear and unequivocal objective manifestations of knowledge ... sufficiently probative of a person's state of mind as to allow an inference of knowledge. Id. 47 As the district court correctly concluded, the recording and monitoring practices at issue here were in no sense surreptitious. Inmates are informed in advance, both by the MITS Regulations--a matter of public record--and the individualized PIN Request Form advisory as well, that their MITS calls will be monitored and recorded. Moreover, inmates are reminded by stickers affixed to each phone that all non-attorney calls are subject to the monitoring and recording practices prescribed by the MITS Regulations. Finally, a prerecorded message informs both parties--before the parties can communicate--that all call contents will be recorded. 48 Against this backdrop, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has decided that even inmates who have not consented to the [MITS] monitoring and recording--such as Gilday--nonetheless have been made aware of the procedure and its requirements. Cacicio v. Secretary of Public Safety, 422 Mass. 764, 665 N.E.2d 85, 91 (1996) (rejecting constitutional challenge to MITS Regulations). Therefore, the SJC held, [t]he [MITS] monitoring and recording is not surreptitious in any sense. Id. 15 49 Accordingly, we now hold that whatever recording and monitoring of oral communications takes place under the MITS regime does not constitute an interception under the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, as it is not secretly conducted. See Jackson, 349 N.E.2d at 339 (non-secret recordings not interceptions under Massachusetts Wiretap Act). 50 2. Call Detailing  51 The Massachusetts Wiretap Act defines the term interception as a secret acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any intercepting device .... Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (emphasis added). Elsewhere the statute explicitly excepts certain telephone equipment from its definition of intercepting device: 52 The term intercepting device means any device or apparatus which is capable of ... recording a wire or oral communication ... other than any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment, facility, or a component thereof ... being used by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business. 53 Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, § 99(B)(3)(b). Thus, no interception occurs under the Massachusetts Wiretap Act if the device used to acquire the contents of a wire communication comes within the ambit of the telephone equipment exception. 16 54 The MITS employs a sophisticated network of computers and associated telephone equipment, including controller boards--electronic call processing devices attached to each prison telephone--supplied, installed, and maintained by NET. 17 The NET equipment automatically screens approved outside telephone numbers from unapproved numbers, routes inmate calls to approved telephone numbers outside the prison, plays the prerecorded message to both parties, and identifies calls placed to listed attorneys so as to preclude their monitoring and recordation. All call detail is recorded automatically by the NET telephone equipment in order to generate billing reports and safeguard the NET equipment against fraudulent use by inmates (i.e., inter alia, unapproved long distance and collect calls). 18 55 The monthly revenue statements NET provides under its contract with the DOC reflect detail on all inmate calls placed, including the number dialed, the length of the call, and other billing-related and revenue-related information. In addition, the NET site administrator at each prison facility regularly generates a so-called Fraud Report, listing all outside telephone numbers to which the total number of calls placed by inmates within the reporting period exceeded a specified level. The Fraud Report is forwarded to NET and the DOC for use in investigating fraudulent telephone usage. 19 56 Within the above-described evidentiary framework, we now inquire whether the MITS call detailing conducted by NET is excepted from the Massachusetts Wiretap Act definition of intercepting device in § 99(B)(3)(b). See supra pp. 289-90. First, we note that NET is a communication common carrier within the contemplation of § 99(B)(3). See District Attorney for Plymouth Dist. v. Coffey, 386 Mass. 218, 434 N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (1982). Second, Gilday does not contend that the processor computers and controller boards used by NET for billing-related purposes are not equipment ... being used in the ordinary course of [NET's] business. See Reply Brief for the Plaintiff, Appellant at 6 n. 8 (Gilday does not argue that NET is precluded from using call detail for billing purposes.). Nor does any authoritative decision suggest that a communication common carrier which details calls in order to generate billing reports or protect its equipment from fraudulent abuse, does not do so in the ordinary course of its business. 20 Thus, Gilday has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, see Kemp, 947 F.2d at 16, that any call detailing conducted by NET for its own billing-related purposes falls outside the § 99(B)(3)(b) exception for equipment used by it in the ordinary course of its business. Accordingly, no interception occurs under the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, at least by reason of the billing-related detailing conducted by NET. 21 57 Gilday nonetheless insists, however, that the injunction precludes the DOC defendants from acquiring access to any call detail information and that NET therefore may not aid and abet the DOC by affording access. See Reply Brief for Plaintiff, Appellant at 6 n. 8. Under the Regulations and the MITS Procedural Statement--a DOC operations guideline which supplements the MITS Regulations--authorized DOC officers may request both standard and custom call detail reports from NET personnel for investigative purposes, or, after receiving training from NET personnel, print out such call detail reports themselves. Moreover, these standard reports may, at the DOC's option, be configured to provide call detail relating to an individual inmate's PIN, a particular group of inmate PINs, specific prison telephones used to place calls, or particular telephone numbers dialed. Finally, since the record discloses no limitation on the domain reserved for the so-called custom reports, we assume, at the summary judgment stage, see Velez-Gomez, 8 F.3d at 874-75, that NET is obligated to provide the DOC with any and all call detail requested. Notwithstanding its advantageous summary judgment posture, however, the Gilday call detailing claim fails in relation to the DOC defendants as well. 58 Gilday claims that the DOC violates the injunctive ban against intercepting or endeavoring to intercept his wire communications, see supra pp. 280-81, simply by applying the MITS requirements to him; in particular, by making his consent a prerequisite to utilizing the MITS. The claim is premised on several rationales: first, the MITS requirements cannot be applied to him, since the Gilday injunction bans all interceptions of his calls, absent a relevant court order, legislative authorization, or authoritative decision specifically permitting the challenged MITS practices in their prison context; second, since he has never consented to the MITS regime, DOC call detailing cannot meet the two party consent exception under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4), even assuming consent by the party called; 22 and third, even assuming he were found to have given implicit consent by utilizing the MITS, the injunctive ban on interceptions is infringed by DOC call detailing, because it secretly records the outside number dialed by the inmate before the other party can consent; for example, should the outside phone not be answered. All these contentions likewise fail. 59 As with monitoring and recording, see supra pp. 288-89, virtually all call detailing conducted under the MITS regime is thoroughly advertised. In addition to the MITS Regulations, the Number Request Form itself discloses that all inmate calls are subject to call detailing. Moreover, the recorded message heard both by the inmate and the call recipient advises that their entire conversation and all call detail will be recorded. Thus, whatever detailing occurs after the call recipient is so advised by the recorded message comports with the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, as both parties have been fully informed in advance that their entire oral communication, as well as all call detail, will be recorded. See Jackson, 349 N.E.2d at 339 (non-secret recordings not interceptions under Massachusetts Wiretap Act). 60 At summary judgment, however, Gilday proffered unrebutted evidence that the outside number dialed by the inmate is recorded before the call is answered; in other words, before the prerecorded message announcing the MITS monitoring/recording regime has been heard by the party who answers the call. Thus, the number called by the inmate will have been subjected to call detailing, whether or not the party called answers the phone or withholds consent to the MITS recording and call detailing procedure subsequently announced in the prerecorded message. 23 Gilday therefore contends that defendants violate the injunction by endeavoring to record call detail during the interim between the dialing of the outside number by the inmate and before the call can be answered and accepted--what we shall refer to as interim call detailing. 61 Gilday relies heavily on a line of SJC decisions, see, e.g., District Attorney for Plymouth Dist. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 Mass. 586, 399 N.E.2d 866 (1980), treating with pen registers and call traps, telephone equipment consisting of electronic devices which surreptitiously record, respectively, the number called or the number from which an incoming call was placed. These authoritative decisions hold that such electronic devices do record call contents, within the meaning of the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, since they acquire  'information concerning the identity of the parties to such communication or the existence ... of that communication.'  Id., 399 N.E.2d at 869 (quoting Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, § 99(B)(5)). Thus, [e]ven if the call is not completed, the caller has initiated a wire communication ... which is intended to cause ... [the call recipient's] telephone to ring and the existence of that communication is recorded by an intercepting device. Id. Be this as it may, however, it gains Gilday nothing. 62 First of all, it is important to note that the SJC's definition of wire communication, see id., would not encompass an attempt by an inmate to call a number not on the preapproved MITS list, since the MITS regime automatically prevents such calls from getting past its host processors, the computers which control the outflow of inmate calls from the prison. Consequently, inmate attempts to dial numbers not approved under the MITS regime cannot cause an outside telephone to ring, because the call cannot be connected to the point of reception. Accordingly, there can have been no wire communication, which is defined as any communication ... by the aid of wire, cable or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, § 99(B)(1). (Emphasis added.) Second, should an inmate initiate a call through the MITS regime, he will already have completed the Number Request Form, thereby divulging in advance to the DOC--the very entity which previously advertised its intention to monitor and record all outgoing inmate calls to nonattorneys--both the telephone number and the name and relationship of the family member or friend to whom the call is directed. See supra p. 281. Third, no reported Massachusetts decision has ever involved sufficiently similar circumstances so as to constitute an authoritative decision that call detailing in the present context is unlawful. Cf., e.g., Jackson, 349 N.E.2d at 338-40 (discussing residential telephone subscriber's interceptions of incoming calls to ascertain calling number and identity of unknown caller); District Attorney for Plymouth Dist., 399 N.E.2d at 867, 869-70 (discussing judicial power to compel telephone company, pursuant to warrant, to assist installation of cross-frame-unit trap on particular telephone line in order to record telephone numbers from which incoming calls were made in circumstances where callers' numbers and identities had not already been divulged by callers in advance); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. District Attorney For Norfolk Dist., 374 Mass. 569, 373 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1978) (discussing judicial power to order telephone company to assist installation of pen register to determine telephone numbers dialed from particular phone); District Attorney for Plymouth Dist. v. Coffey, 386 Mass. 218, 434 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (1982) (discussing warrantless interception by telephone company of calls to residential line to ascertain previously unknown telephone numbers from which incoming, harassing telephone calls were being made). 24 63 Furthermore, Gilday has never alleged an intention to call a telephone number or party not listed by him on the required MITS Number Request Form, see supra p. 281, even assuming he were to elect to utilize the MITS. Instead, since there can be no secretive acquisition of information already provided to the DOC, see supra pp. 288-89 (noting that secretive interceptions presume lack of knowledge), Gilday simply assumes, sub silentio, that any putative number(s) and person(s) he might call would not already have been known to the DOC before the call was placed. Absent evidence on this critical point, however, there can have been no prima facie showing that any surreptitious or secretive interception would occur, let alone did occur, within the meaning of the Massachusetts Wiretap Act. See Jackson, 349 N.E.2d at 340 (holding that a secretive interception has occurred unless both parties to the call had actual knowledge of the intrusion). In all events, as noted above, see supra p. 292, were Gilday to continue to withhold consent but attempt to place a call--or consent, yet attempt to call a number not previously approved by the DOC--the MITS computers would screen out the attempted call. Thus, under Massachusetts law, no wire communication could occur. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, § 99(B)(1) (defining wire communication as any connection between the point of origin and the point of reception ) (emphasis added); see also District Attorney for Plymouth Dist. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 Mass. 586, 399 N.E.2d 866, 869 (1980). 25 64 In conclusion, any attempt to dial a number not previously disclosed by an inmate on the Number Request Form: (i) results in no wire communication to the person called, as it cannot proceed beyond the prison, see supra p. 292; and (ii) voluntarily discloses to the DOC the number called, without any wire communication having taken place. Thus, interim call detailing under the MITS regime is neither secretive within the meaning of the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, nor an interception within the scope of the Gilday injunction. Accordingly, the district court supportably determined that the challenged MITS practices did not violate the Massachusetts-law component in the Gilday injunction. 65 Moreover, there is no basis for the conclusory contention that the Gilday injunction is violated simply by the MITS regulatory requirement that he, like any other inmate, consent to the MITS regime, including call detailing, as a prerequisite to utilizing the MITS--hence, that the consent requirement constitutes a coercive endeavor to intercept Gilday's wire communications in violation of the injunction. See supra pp. 290-91. First, its unstated premise that Gilday is entitled to utilize prison phones even though he withholds consent is groundless. As a prison inmate, Gilday can identify no federal or state right--constitutional or otherwise--to utilize a prison phone on his own terms. See, e.g., Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir.1994) (stating that a prisoner's right to telephone access is 'subject to rational limitations in the face of legitimate security interests of the penal institution' ) (quoting Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.1986)); see also Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 374 (1st Cir.1978) (stating that the right of pretrial detainees to make telephone calls, while not free from doubt[,] is subject to reasonable restrictions); Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 92 (upholding MITS limitations on inmate telephone access as constitutional, and citing Bellamy v. McMickens, 692 F.Supp. 205, 214 (S.D.N.Y.1988), for the proposition that prisoners have no right to unrestricted telephone use). Second, the Gilday injunction does not purport to ban call detailing lawfully conducted under federal and state law. See supra pp. 280-81, 286-88. And since MITS call detailing cannot occur absent inmate consent--a prerequisite to access to the MITS, see supra pp. 281-82--the very least that can be said is that there is no clearly-defined, see Kemp, 947 F.2d at 17, interception under either federal or state law, see supra pp. 292-93; infra pp. 296-98. Third, the verb endeavor, meaning to work with set purpose, or make an effort to accomplish a particular purpose, see Webster's Third New International Dictionary 748 (1986)--here, allegedly, to conduct unlawful interceptions of Gilday's wire communications--cannot bear the weight he places on it. Given the uncontroverted evidence that extensive inmate fraud and criminal activity necessitated the MITS, see supra p. 280, Gilday cannot demonstrate that the establishment of the MITS--universally available exclusively to inmates who consent to its terms (including Gilday, should he elect to participate)--constituted an endeavor to detail Gilday's telephone calls unlawfully, and thus constituted a clear violation of the Gilday injunction, see Kemp, 947 F.2d at 17. 66 Once again we emphasize the obvious simply because it is so consistently elided by Gilday, both below and on appeal: The Gilday injunction grants Gilday no right or privilege to place any telephone call, nor has Gilday cited any authoritative decision indicating that conditioning prison-telephone utilization on informed prisoner consent to reasonable prison-security safeguards violates a federal or state right. See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (stating: at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute about whether DOC defendants are authorized by law to require prisoner consent to MITS regime) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that implied consent is inferred from circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to surveillance)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison may impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including subjecting inmates to MITS-type system); Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 747 (prisoner's right to telephone access subject to reasonable restrictions); Feeley, 570 F.2d at 374 (right of pretrial detainees to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions); Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding MITS as reasonable security measure). But cf. United States v. Cheely, 814 F.Supp. 1430, 1443-44 (D.Alaska 1992) (rejecting argument that prison may deem consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones a necessary price for prison security), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir.1994). 67 In sum, the Gilday injunction does not purport to entitle Gilday to utilize the MITS without acceding to lawful restrictions founded upon reasonable prison-security measures. Furthermore, inmates who voluntarily withhold their consent retain their constitutional right to communicate with their attorneys (and with family and friends) through prison visitations and the mail. Thus, it is unfounded supposition to suggest that the DOC has endeavored to do anything other than afford inmates the opportunity to utilize the MITS, subject to reasonable restrictions designed to preclude fraud, crime, and misuse of the prison telephone system. Accordingly, the claim that the DOC is endeavoring to detail Gilday's telephone calls in violation of the Gilday injunction fails. 26 68 Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that Gilday were to overcome all other hurdles, in fine his call detailing claim engenders substantial justiciability concerns not addressed by the parties. Article III, section 2, of the United States Constitution confines federal court jurisdiction to actual cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Article III was designed to ensure that federal courts decide only disputes of a Judiciary nature, M. Farrand, 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 430 (1911), thereby prohibiting advisory opinions, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1950, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). In order to satisfy the case or controversy requirement, the plaintiff must demonstrate  'a personal stake in the outcome[,]'  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)), and the complaint must present a controversy neither conjectural [n]or hypothetical, but both real and immediate, see id. at 102, 103 S.Ct. at 1665, without regard to the type of relief sought, see Skelly Oil v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S.Ct. 876, 878-79, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950). 69 Among the showings required under the case or controversy requirement is ripeness, which governs when a proper party may bring a justiciable action consistent with Article III. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 3332, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) ( '[R]ipeness is peculiarly a question of timing.' ) (quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140, 95 S.Ct. 335, 357, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974)). The basic rationale underlying the ripeness doctrine is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 200, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1720, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983) (same). The ripeness determination thus turns on  'the fitness of the issues for judicial decision' and 'the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.'  Id. at 201, 103 S.Ct. at 1720 (quoting Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. at 1515); Lincoln House, Inc. v. Dupre, 903 F.2d 845, 847 (1st Cir.1990) (same). As we have explained, [p]erhaps the most important consideration in determining whether a claim is ripe for adjudication is the extent to which 'the claim involves uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.'  Id. (quoting 13A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532.2, at 141 (1984)). See also Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1282, 1289-90 (D.C.Cir.1982); A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckles Rederi v. Tidewater Construction Corp., 559 F.2d 928, 932 (4th Cir.1977). 70 As Gilday has never utilized the MITS regime, there can have been no call detailing of any Gilday wire communication. Accordingly, no Gilday wire communication could have been subjected to interception by NET, ATT or the DOC; consequently, there can have been no endeavoring to intercept. Moreover, as Gilday gives no indication that he intends to consent, any DOC detailing of a potential wire communication remains entirely hypothetical. Nor can it simply be presumed that the DOC will detail unlawfully any call to which Gilday might be a party in the future, nor even that he would dial a number which might prompt a call detail report. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 200, 103 S.Ct. at 1720. Thus, the call detailing claim, in fine,  'involves uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.'  Lincoln House, 903 F.2d at 847 (quoting 13A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532.2, at 141 (1984)). 71 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the claims premised on the Massachusetts Wiretap Act are unavailing. B. Title III 72 Although the Federal Wiretap Act (Title III, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (Title III)) generally forbids interceptions of wire communications absent prior judicial authorization, it expressly provides that [i]t shall not be unlawful ... for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where ... one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). (Emphasis added.) The consent exemption under Title III is  'construed broadly'  as encompassing implied consent. Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir.1987)); see also United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693-94 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 319, 136 L.Ed.2d 233 (1996); S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2182 (same). 73 Under the MITS regime, the following prerecorded message is heard by both parties immediately after the recipient responds to an inmate call and before the parties can communicate: 74 NYNEX [or AT&T for long distance calls] has a collect call from [name of inmate], an inmate at the [name of correctional facility]. To refuse this call, hang up. If you use three-way calling or call waiting, you will be disconnected. All call detail and conversation, excluding approved attorney calls, will be recorded. To accept this call, dial 1 now. 75 (Emphasis added.) Thus, upon dialing 1 the party reached at the number dialed by the inmate consents to the MITS regime prior to any communication with the inmate. 76 Although Gilday points out that he has never consented--either explicitly or implicitly--to the MITS regime, the federal wiretap statute as well as relevant authoritative decisions indicate that the requisite consent under the Federal Wiretap Act may be provided by either party. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (no impermissible interception where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception); see also United States v. McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004, 1006 (1st Cir.1990) (finding no Title III bar to telephone interceptions based on unilateral consent); United States v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 986-87 (1st Cir.1990) (finding unilateral consent adequate to permit interception under federal law). Thus, MITS call detailing and recording does not offend Title III. 27 77 Moreover, it is settled law in the First Circuit and elsewhere that Title III affords safe harbor not only for persons who intercept calls with the explicit consent of a conversant but also for those who do so after receiving implied consent. Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 116; see also Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 281 (1st Cir.1993) (same). Accord United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 276, 136 L.Ed.2d 199 (1996); United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124, 1126 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir.1988) (citing Amen, 831 F.2d at 378); Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir.1983). Implied consent may be inferred from ... language or acts which tend to prove ... that a party knows of, or assents to, encroachments on the routine expectation that conversations are private. Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 116-17 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, a reviewing court must inquire into the dimensions of the consent and then ascertain whether the interception exceeded those boundaries. Id. at 119 (emphasis added). 78 The prerecorded MITS message explicitly advises that [a]ll call detail and conversation, excluding approved attorney calls, will be recorded, see supra p. 296 (emphasis added), thereby informing the call recipient that the entire contents will be intercepted. Consequently, notwithstanding the absence of explicit notice of the lesser intrusion represented by possible monitoring of call content, 28 the recipient is fully informed of the greater intrusion; viz., that the entire conversation, as well as all call detail, will be intercepted and recorded. See id.; see also Williams, 11 F.3d at 281-82 (discussing elements of implied consent). Thus, since the MITS records the entire conversation, any concurrent aural monitoring by authorized DOC officials in no sense exceeds the dimensions of the broad implied consent given to record all call content, including call detail. See Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 114, 116-19 (finding implied consent to interceptions, consisting of concurrent aural monitoring and recording of telephone conversations, after plaintiff had been informed of the recording only and no restrictions had been placed on the scope of the interceptions); see also Williams, 11 F.3d at 282 (stating that implied consent obtains where party to conversation was provided with at least minimal knowledge of scope of interception). Therefore, based on the relevant authoritative decisions, it is at the very least an open question whether the express prior consent provided by MITS-call recipients to the recordation of all call content constitutes implied consent to monitoring. 29 79 Finally, as this is a civil contempt proceeding it was for Gilday to prove that the DOC defendants violated a clear and unambiguous order that left no reasonable doubt as to what behavior was to be expected and that the DOC was  'able to ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts ... [were] forbidden.'  Kemp, 947 F.2d at 17 (quoting Drywall Tapers, 889 F.2d at 395). Since the Gilday injunction bans only unlawful practices by the DOC defendants, see supra pp. 286-87 and authoritative decisions supportably indicate--at the very least--that the challenged MITS practices constitute lawful monitoring, Gilday has not demonstrated a clear and unambiguous violation of Title III. 30 Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Gilday failed to establish a violation of the Gilday injunction, either by the DOC or by its putative aiders and abettors, NET and AT&T.