Opinion ID: 1758520
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Viability of Educational Malpractice Claims in Michigan

Text: Our own Court of Appeals has also considered and rejected claims of educational malpractice. In Johnson v. Clark, 165 Mich.App. 366, 367, 418 N.W.2d 466 (1987), the plaintiff, who had dyslexia and, as a high school graduate, could only read at the fourth-grade level, sued his teachers and the school psychologist, principal, and administrator, alleging that the defendants' failure to properly perform annual tests and evaluations required by ... statute and regulations promulgated thereunder resulted in plaintiff's failure to learn that he suffered from dyslexia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of the defendants on the ground that there was no common-law duty requiring teachers to properly test and evaluate special education students. Id. at 370, 418 N.W.2d 466. In Nalepa v. Plymouth-Canton Community School Dist., 207 Mich.App. 580, 583, 525 N.W.2d 897 (1994), aff'd. on other grounds 450 Mich. 934, 548 N.W.2d 625 (1995), [8] the plaintiffs' second-grade son committed suicide after viewing a movie at school in which a young boy attempts suicide by hanging himself. The plaintiffs' son hanged himself by a belt from the safety rail of the upper bunk bed in his bedroom. The plaintiffs sued various teachers and counselors, among others, alleging that they were negligent in showing such a film to second-graders. Dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint, the Court of Appeals held that allegations that teachers and faculty used improper materials and techniques to teach children amount to claims of teacher malpractice. Id. at 594, 525 N.W.2d. 897. The Court cited Johnson for the proposition that a teacher's common-law liability for a student's injuries caused by the teacher does not extend to educational malpractice. Id. In reaching its decision, the Nalepa Court relied on the same public policy grounds commonly cited by those courts that have refused to recognized claims of educational malpractice. The Court explained: The rationale for declining to recognize claims of teacher malpractice stems from the collaborative nature of the teaching process. See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F.Supp. 1319, 1328 (N.D.Ill., 1990), aff'd. in part and rev'd and remanded in part on other grounds 957 F.2d 410 (C.A.7, 1992). For a positive result to obtain, both teacher and student must work together. The ultimate responsibility for what is learned, however, remains with the student, and many considerations, beyond teacher misfeasance, can factor into whether a student receives the intended message. Id. Further, teaching methods vary, and what is considered appropriate by some, may be considered inappropriate by others. Thus, because both the educational process and the result are subjective, there exists a practical impossibility of proving whether the alleged malpractice caused the complained-of injury. Id. [ Id. at 594-595, 525 N.W.2d 897.] The Court also found several other policy considerations to be applicable: Even if the harm appears to flow from the alleged malpractice, for public policy reasons, we would still decline to recognize a duty. We agree with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's statement in another educational malpractice case: Even where the chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery may sometimes be denied on grounds of public policy because (1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden [on the defendant]; or (5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point. [ Wilson v. Continental Ins. Cos., 87 Wis.2d 310, 323-324, 274 N.W.2d 679 (1979), quoting Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 517-518, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).] [ Id. at 595, 525 N.W.2d 897.] We agree with and adopt as our own the reasoning employed by those courts that have declined to recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice, whether those claims are brought against public schools, institutions of higher learning, or private proprietary and trade schools. We therefore hold that claims sounding in educational malpractice, that is, claims alleging negligent instruction, are not cognizable in Michigan.