Opinion ID: 424713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Expedited Appellate Review

Text: 28 Section 35-1-58.5-2.5(d) provides that the juvenile court must rule on a petition for waiver within forty-eight hours of the filing of the petition. It specifies no procedures for appellate review of an adverse decision. The district court held that the statute's failure to make explicit provision for expedited appeal did not render the statute constitutionally deficient because, it said, the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure provide guidelines for appeals. 29 A judicial alternative to parental notice or consent must 'assure' that the resolution of this issue 'will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.'  Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct. at 2525 n. 16 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.)). Thus a parental notification statute that did not provide for prompt resolution of the waiver petition would be unconstitutional. 7 30 The Supreme Court recently discussed the necessary specificity of procedures a judicial bypass statute must have in order to be constitutionally sufficient. In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., the Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling that the challenged ordinance impermissibly failed to specify the procedures for determining whether a minor's abortion decision was informed. The Court noted that the ordinance, which required a minor to obtain a court order permitting an abortion in lieu of parental consent, creates no procedures for making the necessary determinations. 103 S.Ct. at 2498. Nor was it sufficient for the city to assert that the juvenile courts in Ohio might find that they had jurisdiction to make the necessary determinations. Id. at 2498 & n. 31. 31 On the same day, the Court in Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft upheld a Missouri statute requiring parental consent or judicial approval of a minor's decision to have an abortion. Unlike the Akron ordinance, the Missouri statute required an appeal from an adverse decision to be perfected within five days from the filing of the notice of appeal. In addition, the statute directed the state supreme court to promulgate rules to provide expedited appellate review of such cases. Justice Powell concluded that this section provides the framework for a constitutionally sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. 103 S.Ct. at 2525 n. 16 (opinion of Powell, J.). 32 The Indiana statute is far more analogous to the ordinance in City of Akron than to the statute in Ashcroft. Unlike the Missouri statute, section 35-1-58.5-2.5 does not even mention appeals, much less specifying the time in which they must be perfected or directing the Indiana Supreme Court to promulgate rules governing expedited appellate review. 33 The state contends, however, that expedited consideration is assured because Rule 62(D)(1) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure and Rule 6(B) of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure allow the appellate court to issue a stay of the trial court's decision in an emergency. Even assuming such stays are generally available in emergencies, we do not understand in what way a stay of a denial of a waiver petition would ensure expedited consideration of the appeal. The statute requires court approval of waiver, so staying the juvenile court's denial of waiver would still leave the minor unable to have an abortion without parental notification. A stay of the denial would not be equivalent to finding that the minor was mature or that an abortion would be in her best interests. 8 We conclude that the two cited rules are irrelevant to ensuring an expedited appeal of a denial of waiver. 34 The state also contends that other Appellate Rules would allow expedited appeals from the denial of waiver petitions. The appellees state that Rule 4(A)(10) allows an appeal filed with the court of appeals to be transferred to the Indiana Supreme Court if an emergency exists. This is inaccurate. The rule provides that a transfer is possible if the appellant makes a showing, under oath, that the appeal involves a substantial question of law of great public importance and that an emergency exists for a speedy determination (emphasis added). It is doubtful that an appeal from the denial of waiver would be deemed to involve a substantial question of law of great public importance, because the determination of maturity is largely an issue of fact and concerns only the minor, the parents, and the abortion providers. Also, the transfer is discretionary. 35 As the sole other statutory citation to support its contention that the Indiana courts will expedite appeals in these cases, the state cites Appellate Rule 4(F). The state says that the rule allows for expedition of an appeal where it involves matters of general public concern. In fact, however, the rule provides that [matters] of general public concern may ... be advanced by order of the court after they are fully briefed. 36 There are several difficulties with the application of this rule to expedited appeals in abortion cases. First, expedition is discretionary with the court, as shown by the use of the phrase may ... be advanced. Second, it is doubtful that a case involving waiver of notification is a matter of general public concern, because, as noted above, only the minor, the parents, and the abortion provider have an interest in the case. 9 For reasons of confidentiality, the public is not even supposed to know the identity of the minor. Third, the reference to full briefing suggests that the rule is inadequate for appeals by minors. For a minor without counsel, the requirement of full briefing would be an insuperable bar because minors are untrained in the law and would be extremely unlikely to have any idea of how to brief their cases. Even for minors with counsel, the requirement suggests delay in a situation in which a rapid resolution is required. 37 Finally, the state cites the unreported case of In re Infant Doe to show that Indiana courts allow expedited appeals in emergencies. The state says that in that case a child was born on Friday; a judge heard the case on Saturday, issued an order that night, and a written opinion on Monday. On Wednesday, the Indiana Supreme Court heard and decided the case. 38 We are not reassured by the state's citation of this case. In re Infant Doe is unreported and all of the decisions and orders have been sealed. The state does not even inform us as to the subject matter of the case. 10 That the Indiana courts gave expedited consideration to one case does not mean that, as a matter of course, abortion notification waiver appeals will be treated in a similar fashion. 39 For these reasons, we hold that the district court erred in holding that the statute was sufficiently specific about expedited appeals. As noted, a waiver statute must assure expeditious consideration of appeals. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 644, 99 S.Ct. at 3048 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.). If the statute had specified the procedure for appeals or at least directed the Indiana Supreme Court to promulgate rules governing expedited appeals, we would be satisfied. See Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct. at 2525 n. 16 (opinion of Powell, J.). As it is, however, the only assurance we have that Indiana courts will expedite appeals is the state's assertion that they will, yet we do not understand how, in the absence of legislation, the state has control over how the courts manage their dockets.