Opinion ID: 161852
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Language of the Allen Charge

Text: 56 This court has emphasized that the language of a pure Allen charge approaches the ultimate permissible limits of a [trial court's] prerogative to guide and direct a jury toward a righteous verdict. Benscoter v. United States, 376 F.2d 49, 50 (10th Cir. 1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, we do not have a pure instruction but rather a substantial deviation from it, an instruction that varies from the pure not only in terms of omission but also in terms of embellishment. That the instruction here is a dramatic departure from the pure charge causes us much concern. As noted by the First Circuit, a proper Allen instruction should include all those elements of the original charge designed to ameliorate its coercive effect and avoid language which might heighten it. Flannery, 451 F.2d at 883 (emphasis added); see also Potter, 691 F.3d at 1277 (same). 57
58 We turn first to the omissions. Notably, the Allen instruction in the supplemental charge lacked any of the cautionary language employed in the pure charge: that no juror should surrender his or her conscientiously held convictions and that the burden of proof belonged to the government, not the defendant. While we are troubled by the omission of the latter, we recognize that this court has, in at least one prior case, approved of an Allen instruction that did not include a reminder as to the burden of proof. See Winn, 411 F.2d at 417 (noting the trial court's failure to remind the jury that the defendants were presumptively innocent and the Government had the burden of proving them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt but concluding, upon reviewing the instruction as a whole, that [w]e cannot say the words used were reversibly coercive). The same, however, cannot be said with respect to the other cautionary language employed in a pure Allen charge. 59 This court has never, at least not to our knowledge nor in any of the cases supplied by the government, approved of an Allen charge that failed to incorporate an admonition regarding the juror's conscientiously held convictions. 13 A review of Tenth Circuit case law explains why. Repeatedly, this court has stated that its approval of the Allen charge's use was predicated on the inclusion of that admonition. As Chief Judge Murrah stated in Elbel v. United States, 364 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1966): We have cautiously approved the so-called Allen instruction even when made to an apparently deadlocked jury, provided the jury is made to understand that [it is] free to follow [its] conscientiously held convictions. Id. at 135-36 (emphasis added). 60 Notably, this court's most recent Allen charge cases have adhered to Chief Judge Murrah's words upholding the Allen instructions given largely because they contained the proper cautionary language. See United States v. Arney, 248 F.3d 984, 988 (10th Cir. 2001) (Although the district court emphasized that a verdict was 'very desirable' and expressed an opinion that the case could not be tried better by either side, the remainder of the instruction properly and clearly emphasized that no 'juror should surrender his or her conscientious convictions' and that each juror should consider his or her opinion 'with a proper regard and deference to the opinion of [the others].'); Rodriguez-Mejia, 20 F.3d at 1092 ([T]he court emphasized in this case that the jurors should not surrender their honest convictions.); Porter, 881 F.2d at 889 (Here, although the judge did state his opinion that the case could not have been 'tried better or more exhaustively than it has been on either side,' the remainder of the instruction properly and clearly emphasized that no 'juror should surrender his or her conscientious convictions' . . . .). 61 This court is not alone in finding the admonition on conscientiously held convictions to be of great import. See Due Process, 53 Va. L. Rev. at 28 (Almost without exception the courts have required that the charge contain the statement that 'no juror should yield his conscientious conviction' or words to that effect.). According to the Second Circuit, [A] necessary component of any Allen-type charge requires the trial judge to admonish the jurors not to surrender their own conscientiously held beliefs. Smalls v. Batista, 191 F.3d 272, 279 (2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has commented that an Allen instruction stripped of its complementary reminder that jurors were not to acquiesce in the views of the majority or to surrender their well-founded convictions conscientiously held . . . might readily be construed by the minority of the jurors as coercive, Rogers, 289 F.2d at 435; the Sixth Circuit has said that the admonition is one of the most important parts of the Allen charge, Scott, 547 F.2d at 337; and the Ninth Circuit has stated that [i]t is essential in almost all cases to remind jurors of their duty and obligation not to surrender conscientiously held beliefs simply to secure a verdict for either party. United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 1981). 62 Given the significance of the admonition on conscientiously held convictions, its omission cannot be condoned. See Rogers, 289 F.2d at 436 (noting that, if slight additions can convert a proper charge into a prejudicial and erroneous one, how much more objectionable it is if the reminder that makes the Allen charge tolerable in the first place is omitted altogether). Because of the omission in this case, the coercive effect of the Allen instruction was substantially heightened. 63
64 Were we confronted by the omission of cautionary language only, we would have before us a closer case. But here the instruction was not only problematic because of its omissions but also because of its embellishments. There are two embellishments deserving of special attention in the case at hand. 65 First, the district court repeatedly emphasized the desirability of a verdict and the court's desire to have a verdict reached. It noted at various points that we'd like to have a verdict in this case, that's the situation, Tr. at 2-3; [w]e may be doing this again and that's the reason I'd be very happy to have a verdict one way or the other, id. at 5; and [w]ell I--frankly, the Court would certainly like to have you try to reach a verdict in this case. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 66 These statements by the district court that it wanted a verdict might all too easily have led the jury to think it more important to achieve unanimity to please the district court rather to remain true to its honest beliefs--especially in the absence of the admonition on conscientiously held convictions. That the district court did not express a desire for a particular verdict does not affect our analysis. Simply because the district court did not favor one verdict over another does not mean the jury was not pressured, even if only inadvertently, into reaching a verdict instead of remaining deadlocked. 67 The district court's second embellishment--its statement about expense and danger--is also troubling. As noted above, the district court stated to the jury, I have received a note from the jury here that is very distressing to me because this has been one of the greatest major efforts made in time and attention and money that I have noted in my 24 years as being a judge. Tr. at 2. Subsequently, it pointed out to the jury, [T]he time and attention and the danger of this case has been, you know, a problem. We've had security here that was just I said to somebody we could have fought the Russian Army head on with what we've had here in this case. Id. at 6. 68 While this court has in prior cases approved of Allen instructions that discuss expense, see Rodriguez-Mejia, 20 F.3d at 1091 (holding that an Allen charge, which included the statement that [t]he trial has been expensive in time, effort[,] and money to both the defense and the prosecution, was not coercive), we do not accept the proposition that a comment on expense is always noncoercive. Instead, we agree with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the addition of a comment on expense does not necessarily make a charge more coercive but that it can. Mason, 658 F.2d at 1267 (emphasis added); see also id. (This court has long recognized that injection of fiscal concerns into jury deliberations has potential for abuse.). In Mr. McElhiney's case, we note that the district court did not make a simple reference to the expense of another trial (as, for example, in Rodriguez-Mejia); rather, the issue of expense was underscored, the district court stating, [T]his has been one of the greatest major efforts ever made in time and attention and money that I have noted in my 24 years as being a judge. Tr. at 2. Furthermore, the district court characterized this situation as being very distressing to me. Id.; see also Harris, 391 F.2d at 354 (noting that the judge's statement in regard to the expense and burden of conducting a trial is a questionable extension of the Allen charge, especially where this factor is unduly emphasized). 69 The district court's elaboration on expense, however, was not as problematic as its comment on danger. While a comment on expense has at least the potential to be innocuous, the same cannot be said of a comment on danger. Danger, unlike expense, is a loaded term, one more likely to catch a jury's attention and one more likely to prod the jury to action (i.e., unanimous agreement). 70 In denying Mr. McElhiney's motion for a new trial, the district court discounted the effect of its remark by noting that the danger was obvious to the jury: 71 [T]hese facts were well-known to the jury . . . . There were nineteen inmate witnesses. Every inmate witness . . . wore ankle chains in court. These were inmates who had served or were serving time in maximum or super-maximum security institutions. The serious criminal histories of some of these inmates were discussed. A violent prison murder . . . was a matter frequently discussed. Fear and retribution were common topics. Several times there was a tense atmosphere in the courtroom during cross-examination of adverse witnesses. There were numerous security personnel inside and outside the courtroom. None of this could have gone unnoticed by the jury. 72 Order at 10. In all likelihood, the district court was correct in stating that the danger could not have gone unnoticed by the jury. However, it is one thing for a jury to be cognizant of a fact and another for a court to draw attention to that fact, especially when the subject matter is so sensitive and the characterization so negative.