Opinion ID: 672905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Handgun

Text: 14 Barker contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress the handgun discovered by Officer Woronka during the protective sweep of his bedroom. He contends the denial of his motion to suppress was erroneous under Buie because Officer Woronka had no specific and articulable facts reasonably warranting a belief that the area swept held an individual or a weapon posing a danger to the officer or to others, and that therefore the officer should not have engaged in a protective sweep. 15 The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that suspects may injure police officers and others by virtue of their access to weapons, even though they may not themselves be harmed. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1048, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). [D]anger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. Id. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3481. In Buie, the Supreme Court stated that a protective sweep was a quick and limited search of a premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327, 110 S.Ct. at 1093. The court held that the Fourth Amendment permits protective sweeps if the searching officer 'possesse[d] a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[ed] the officer in believing' that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or others. Id. at 327, 110 S.Ct. at 1095 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-1050, 103 S.Ct. at 3481 and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 16 We review the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error. United States v. Arch, 7 F.3d 1300, 1302 (1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1123, 127 L.Ed.2d 431 (1994). Because the resolution of such a motion is typically fact-dependent, we must 'give particular deference to the district court that had the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the demeanor of the witnesses'. Id. (citing United States v. Edwards, 898 F.2d 1273, 1276 (7th Cir.1990)). 17 Contrary to Barker's assertion, Officer Woronka did possess a reasonable belief that the area swept harbored weapons and an individual posing a danger to the officer or others, as demonstrated in the following facts. Agent Newby had purchased cocaine at Abrams's and Barker's residence on four occasions; during the first transaction Barker held his arm behind his back, as if he was holding a weapon, and during the second buy, Barker actually handled the firearm in Special Agent Newby's presence. Moreover, during the second, third, and fourth buys, there were individuals on the premises other than Barker and Abrams. Thus, when serving the arrest warrant, the officers, including Officer Woronka, knew not only that a weapon had been seen inside the home, but also that people other than Barker and Abrams might very well have been within the house. (In fact, three individuals (one woman and two children) were discovered in Abrams's bedroom, as well as a second handgun and ammunition.) Based on Special Agent Newby's experiences inside the house, as communicated to Officer Woronka, we conclude that Woronka possessed specific and articulable facts which taken together with the rational inferences from those facts reasonably warranted the officer in believing that the area swept harbored weapons and an individual posing a danger to himself or others. Because the protective sweep was not in contravention of Buie, as well as Woronka having had an opportunity to observe Barker's holstered weapon in plain view on the shelf, we hold that the court's denial of Barker's motion to suppress was not clearly erroneous. 18 Barker also contends that the admission of the weapon at his trial was erroneous because the government had failed to establish a proper chain of custody at trial. As to a chain of custody for the proper admission of a physical exhibit, there must be a showing that the physical exhibit is in substantially the same condition as when the crime was committed. United States v. Kelly, 14 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir.1994). Barker, however, failed to adequately preserve this argument because when the government moved to admit the handgun at trial, the entirety of Barker's attorney's objection was as follows: Objection. Foundation. K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss International Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1155 n. 8 (10th Cir.1985) (object[ion] solely on the ground of a lack of foundation not specific and did not preserve allegation of error on appeal). As we stated in United States v. Wynn, 845 F.2d 1439, 1442 (7th Cir.1988), 19 To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a proper objection at trial that alerts the court and opposing party to the specific grounds for the objections. United States v. Laughlin, 772 F.2d 1382, 1391-92 (7th Cir.1985). An objection is proper only if 'a timely objection or motion to strike appears on the record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context....' Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). Neither a general objection to the evidence nor a specific objection on other grounds will preserve the issue for review. 20 Barker's attorney's objection on the basis of foundation was neither specific nor did it apprise the court of which of the many possible foundational defects he believed rendered the evidence inadmissible. Objections to evidence on the basis of foundation may take many forms. For example, proper foundations must be laid to introduce physical exhibits such as business records, public documents, and photographs, hearsay testimony, parol evidence, the opinions of expert witnesses, and the like. In each instance, the foundational requirements necessary for the evidence to be properly received will differ depending on the nature of the proposed evidence. Therefore, an objection based merely on foundation is far too general to alert the court to the specific shortcoming that is alleged, much less give the court or opposing counsel an opportunity to rectify the claimed defect. In this case, counsel for Barker did not specify which particular foundational aspect pertaining to the handgun he found lacking, and he certainly did not raise the aspect he now objects to, inadequate chain of custody. 21 Because Barker failed to preserve his objection properly, his only recourse lies in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which provides that [p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. To obtain relief under Rule 52(b), a defendant who has failed to make a timely assertion of a right must meet four requirements in all before he can receive relief under Rule 52(b): that there was an error, that the error was plain, that the plain error affected his substantial rights, and that the plain error that affected his substantial rights also seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 1393, 1407 (7th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1779, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). 22 We are convinced that the court did not commit error in admitting Barker's handgun, for the .357 Magnum handgun presented at trial was positively identified as being the same weapon that was discovered and seized from Barker's bedroom on September 9, 1991, and at trial the gun was in substantially the same condition as when it was found. Initially, we note that Barker himself testified that the gun introduced at trial was the same gun that was in his bedroom. Special Agent O'Kelly testified that he recognized the gun presented at trial as being the one discovered in Barker's room based on the serial number and the brand and model [of the gun,] as did Agent Newby, based on the exhibit tag she had previously placed on the weapon. Likewise, Officer Woronka identified the gun as the one he had discovered in Barker's bedroom, and stated at trial the gun was in substantially the same condition as it was when it was seized. Thus, we have no doubt that the gun introduced at trial was the same gun that was taken into custody following its discovery at Barker's residence, and that it was in substantially the same condition as when the crime occurred. We therefore hold the court did not err in receiving the handgun in evidence.