Opinion ID: 2384358
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay Medical Testimony

Text: In Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380 (1990), this Court adopted FRE 803(4), now codified in Kentucky as KRE 803(4). Id. at 384. The rule announced in Drumm , also a child sexual abuse case, controls the admission of hearsay medical testimony like the doctor's report in this case. Under the law that prevailed before Drumm , the admissibility of hearsay medical testimony turned on whether the physician to whom an out-of-court statement was made, received the information in the capacity of a treating or non-treating (or testifying) physician. The purpose behind the distinction can be traced to a simple idea. Where statements are made to a physician responsible for actual diagnosis and treatment of a patient, not only can the professional objectivity of the physician be said to be greater, but more importantly, the veracity of the declarant's statements can uniformly be thought of as more reliable. Id. at 384-5 (citing Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 952 (4th Cir.1988)). The rationale is obvious. In Drumm , this Court maintained the distinction between treating and nontreating physicians, but diminished its role in the trial court's analysis of admissibility. Rather than serving as the bright-line element which is solely determinative of admissibility, the motivation behind such declarations becomes a primary factor in the court's determination of reliability. See, Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, Ky., 825 S.W.2d 612, 615 (1992). A trial judge is to [make] a judgment as to whether prejudicial effect outweighs . . . probative value, taking into account that when such statements are not made for the purpose of treatment they have `less inherent reliability than evidence admitted under the traditional common-law standard underlying the physician treatment rule.' Id. See KRE 403. The medical report erroneously admitted in the present case contains not simply hearsay declarations, but hearsay upon hearsay. The statements of Dr. Martz reporting the statements A.C. made to her, are singularly subject to Drumm . However, from this record, it is impossible to state positively whether the medical report of Dr. Martz reflects the notes of a treating or testifying physician. The sexual abuse charged in the indictment allegedly occurred in November, 1989. A.C. was examined by Dr. Martz on January 30, 1992, one day after appellant was arrested on these charges. The timing of the examination and the over two-year gap between the charged offense and the physical examination is strong evidence that Dr. Martz's report, as it relates to sexual abuse, was prepared for the purpose of prosecuting appellant. On the other hand, appellant was also charged with assaulting A.C. on or about January 24, 1992, only a week before the examination of the child took place. Thus, there is reason to believe that the portion of the medical report that discusses swelling of the nose as well as bruising underneath the eyes are the notes of a treating physician. Also, the medical report did indicate a bump near the victim's rectum, which lends support to the argument that Dr. Martz was a physician treating for sexual abuse. However the record fails to answer relevant questions such as, How long had the bump been present? or Why was A.C. not examined for sexual abuse until the day after appellant's arrest? The conflicting evidence of the capacity in which Dr. Martz was acting demonstrates the absolute necessity of her testimony at trial. In short, this fact scenario provides a text-book example for application of the Drumm scheme of analysis: the judge must engage in an individual assessment for reliability, of any hearsay declarations contained in proposed medical testimony. We direct the trial court to decide the hearsay question regarding each of the various out-of-court statements . . . Id. at 385. Only if Dr. Martz had been called as a witness for the prosecution could the trial court have conducted the analysis required by law.