Opinion ID: 741450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Statute to NASA's Flight Research Center

Text: 8 Appellant's first argument is that she did not enter the Flight Center for a recreational purpose because her purpose in entering and using the premises [was] necessarily coordinate to NASA's statutorily prescribed purpose in allowing her to enter--i.e., the dissemination of information concerning its activities and the results thereof, 42 U.S.C. § 2473. 1 This argument is not well-taken. First, California courts have found that the recreational purpose referred to in the statute is the purpose of the individual in entering upon the property, not the landowner's purpose in allowing public use of his or her property. See, e.g., Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1100, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d at 597, 847 P.2d at 563. 9 Second, a person who enters another's property need not enter with only one purpose (e.g., recreation) in mind. The language of the statute itself suggests that activities which may be characterized as both educational and recreational-such as viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological ... or scientific sites--fall within the ambit of Section 846. As Appellant conceded before the district court that she was visiting Dryden for recreation, Section 846 would apply even if some part of Appellant's purpose in visiting the Center was educational. 10
11 The activities listed in Section 846 as examples of entering land for a recreational purpose are primarily outdoor activities. Although the list is non-exclusive, and other recreational uses similar to those listed fall within the purview of the statute, Vallardes v. Stone, 218 Cal.App.3d 362, 369, 267 Cal.Rptr. 57, 61 (1990), Appellant argues that viewing aircraft in the museum-like setting of an aircraft hangar is not the type of recreational use of land that Section 846 was intended to reach. 12 We disagree. California courts have found the language of Section 846 to be written broadly, and they have interpreted the statute to apply equally to natural and artificial conditions, Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 699, 706-07, 190 Cal.Rptr. 494, 499, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173 (1983) (in bank), and to rural and urban land, Vallardes, 218 Cal.App.3d at 369, 267 Cal.Rptr. at 61. Surveying the broad range of activities listed as examples, the Ornelas court noted that they do not appear to share any unifying trait which would serve to restrict the meaning of the phrase 'recreational purpose,'  and that the statute is not limited to activities which take place outdoors. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1101, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d at 597-98, 847 P.2d at 563-64. This language strongly suggests that the California Supreme Court would not recognize the distinction that Appellant seeks to draw between the tour of aircraft and NASA's facilities and those activities expressly covered by Section 846. Cf. Ravell, 22 F.3d at 962. Because a tour of the Flight Research Center may fairly be characterized as recreational and may also be characterized as viewing and enjoying a scientific site, we hold that Section 846 does apply to Appellant's visit to the Center. 13