Opinion ID: 223052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Electronic Surveillance Device Offenses

Text: Simels seeks reversal of his convictions on Counts Twelve and Thirteen, contending that the relevant statutes punishing importation and possession of certain electronic surveillance devices do not apply to inoperable equipment. The equipment that formed the basis of Counts Twelve and Thirteen consisted primarily of a device referred to at trial as a base (or sometimes a chaise) and also two laptop computers. Peter Myers, a co-director of the company that manufactured the base, testified, on questioning by the prosecutor, that the base permits surreptitious interception of radio signals between phones and cell towers and decodes the signals so that their content can be stored on a computer. Referring to the base seized from Simels's office, the prosecutor asked Myers, It wouldn't work as it sits here today? to which Myers answered No. The reason, he explained, could be a blown fuse or a component broken or something doesn't work. He also stated that, even if operational, it was [u]nlikely that the base would work in the United States without the cellular system that the base requires, a system that he said is no where [ sic ] in America. Simels testified that the head of Guyana Telephone and Telegraph had told him that the company changed from analog to digital signals in 2004 or 2005. With respect to the two laptops seized from Simels's office, Simels testified that the Guyanese government had given them to Khan to be used to store intercepted conversations and that a conversation involving David Clarke, a potential witness against Khan, was on one of the laptops. Simels also stated that he had the laptops shipped from Guyana and, in response to Government requests, turned over compact disks containing recorded conversations that he anticipated introducing into evidence at Khan's trial. With respect to the base, he testified that after the Government requested information as to how the recordings were made, he arranged for the base to be shipped from Guyana to his office because we would have to produce it for inspection for the prosecutors. The issue is whether importation and possession of an inoperable device violates section 2512. The Government contends that the statute covers such a device because it punishes importation and possession of any electronic, mechanical, or other device, knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(a), (b) (emphasis added). However, as the Appellant contends, even if the design of a device would render it useful for surreptitious interception of communications, the statutory definition of electronic, mechanical, or other device is any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication [with exceptions not relevant to this case]. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (emphasis added). Because the base was inoperable, which the Government does not dispute, it was not a device within the meaning of section 2512(1)(a), (b). The Government resists this textual argument by analogizing to cases that have sustained convictions for firearms offenses despite the fact that a firearm was inoperable. See United States v. Rivera, 415 F.3d 284, 286 (2d Cir.2005) (inoperable firearm qualifies as firearm because it is designed to fire a projectile); United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 891 (8th Cir.1987) (same). The analogy fails because a firearm is statutorily defined as any weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (emphases added). Apparently concerned with the dangers that might arise from any gun that is designed to expel projectiles, Congress included such a gun in the statutory definition in addition to a gun that will do so. However, with respect to electronic devices, Congress covered only those which can be used to intercept communications and added, as a mens rea requirement, that the device be known to have been designed for the purpose of surreptitious interception. For these reasons the convictions on Counts Twelve and Thirteen must be vacated. Because the District Court sentenced Simels to time served and no subsequent supervised release on these two counts, [3] their vacation does not require a remand for resentencing. Nor is a retrial on the remaining counts required, as Simels contends, on a theory of retroactive misjoinder because of prejudicial spillover from evidence introduced on the vacated counts. The Appellant has not met the extremely heavy burden of demonstrating that there was prejudicial spillover necessitating a new trial. See United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir.2002). It will suffice to remand for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the dismissal of Counts Twelve and Thirteen. [4]