Opinion ID: 2470930
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prima Facie Case and Defenses

Text: We consider the Brennan Plaintiffs' Title VII claim first, leaving their constitutional claims to be considered later and only as necessary. See Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2672. In order to address the Brennan Plaintiffs' § 703(a) disparate-treatment claim in its present procedural posture, we must first determine which overall framework applies. Generally, § 703(a) claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting rules of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case, i.e., she must demonstrate the following: (1) she was within the protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 498 (2d Cir.2009); accord Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.2010); Aulicino v. N.Y. City Dep't of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir.2009). Once the prima facie case has been shown, the burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; accord Vivenzio, 611 F.3d at 106; Leibowitz, 584 F.3d at 498-99. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that [the defendant's] stated reason for [the adverse employment action] was in fact pretext. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817; accord Vivenzio, 611 F.3d at 106; Leibowitz, 584 F.3d at 499. Because the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Ricci [33] does not explicitly cite McDonnell Douglas or any other case in that line, one might reasonably ask whether some other framework ought to apply in reverse-discrimination cases of this sort. In our view, however, Ricci fits well within the McDonnell Douglas framework. As the Ricci Court explained, New Haven rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white. The question is ... whether the City had a lawful justification for its race-based action. Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2674. In other words, because the City's decision to reject the test results was explicitly based on a statistical racial disparity, it was beyond dispute that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case, so the burden shifted to the defendants to give a legitimate justification for the adverse employment action. The Court then held that, on summary judgment, the defendants had failed to provide a legitimate justification, id. at 2681; and so the pretext step of the inquiry was not reached. But if the Court had found a legitimate justification, it appears that a majority of the Justices would have proceeded to that step. Justice Alito's concurring opinion, joined by two other Justices, argued principally that a jury could find that [New Haven]'s asserted justification was pretextual. See id. at 2689 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 2683-84 (noting that [i]f an employer offers a facially legitimate reason for its decision but it turns out that this explanation was just a pretext for discrimination, the employer is again liable, and citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), a case applying McDonnell Douglas ). The four dissenting Justices disagreed with Justice Alito on whether a jury could find a pretext, but they did not seem to disagree that the burden would shift back to the plaintiffs to show pretext. See id. at 2709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (suggesting that New Haven might have been liable, even on the dissent's view of the law, if the city had been seeking to exclude white firefighters from promotion). We, therefore, conclude that Ricci does not impose a new § 703(a) summary-judgment burden-shifting framework, but instead constitutes, in this respect, a straightforward application of the first two steps of McDonnell Douglas. The earlier Supreme Court cases dealing with § 703(a) challenges to affirmative action plans further support the view that McDonnell Douglas is the appropriate framework for this case. Like Ricci, these cases reconcile the disparate-treatment provisions of Title VII with the statute's other goals by recognizing a defense which employers may raise when they are sued for disparate treatment. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the affirmative action defense, too, is properly raised at the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 626, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 94 L.Ed.2d 615 (1987) (This case also fits readily within the analytical framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green . Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that race or sex has been taken into account in an employer's employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision. The existence of an affirmative action plan provides such a rationale. (citation omitted)). We therefore apply McDonnell Douglas to the Brennan Plaintiffs' § 703(a) claim. And the first question we must address is whether the Brennan Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements for a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. [34] We easily conclude that the Brennan Plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case. All but one of the individual plaintiffs (not counting unnamed members of the class certified by the district court) are white males. [35] There is no dispute as to their qualifications. The City Defendants gave the Offerees retroactive seniority at the expense of the Brennan Plaintiffs. [36] And the 1999 settlement agreement was explicitly race- and sex-based, thereby giving rise to the required inference of discrimination. Cf. Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2674 (Whatever the City's ultimate aimhowever well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemedthe City made its employment decision because of race.). In sum, because the City Defendants' actions were explicitly race- and sex-based i.e., the grants of retroactive seniority were made because the three disputed exams and the recruiting process had resulted in racial and gender disparities among test-takers and test-passers [o]ur analysis begins with this premise: The [City Defendants'] actions would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense.... Without some other justification, this express, race-[ and gender-]based decisionmaking violates Title VII's command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual's race [or sex]. Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2673. [37] Taken together, the briefs of the Caldero and Arroyo Intervenors and the Government raise two defenses on behalf of the City Defendants. The first defense, raised only on behalf of the Caldero and Arroyo Intervenors, is that the City Defendants' voluntary implementation of the settlement agreement was a valid affirmative action plan. The second, raised or suggested in somewhat different ways as to various specific Offerees by all three of these parties, is the strong basis in evidence defense recognized in Ricci. There is no dispute that to the extent that the City Defendants' actions are not justified by one of these defenses, the City Defendants violated the Brennan Plaintiffs' § 703(a) rights to be free from disparate treatment. We will consider each defense in turn.