Opinion ID: 2100296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First Amendment and Overbreadth

Text: We now turn to the propriety of defendant's conviction under section 16-8, which makes it a crime to deal (for profit) in sound recordings or audio visual recordings if the labeling or packaging on the recording does not display the true name and address of the manufacturer and the name of the performer. These labeling requirements, defendant argues, compel all performers and manufacturers to reveal their identities, even those who prefer to keep their speech anonymousa protected first amendment right. Defendant seems to concede that the statute can be constitutionally applied to the particular conduct that he was charged with in this case, but he argues that the statute should be stricken on its face based on the doctrine of substantial overbreadth. A criminal law so broadly worded as section 16-8, defendant predicts, might force anonymous speakers to abstain from speech, particularly those who record unpopular messages and fear reprisal if their identities were known. We note that section 16-8 does not impinge upon pure speech. See Briggs, 281 Ga. at 331, 638 S.E.2d at 294. Rather, the statute at best regulates a combination of commercial conduct and speech. See Briggs, 281 Ga. at 331, 638 S.E.2d at 294. Compare McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) (anti-anonymity provision of political campaign literature held unconstitutional limitation on pure speech), with Anderson v. Nidorf, 26 F.3d 100 (9th Cir.1994) (statute which criminalizes the selling of unidentified recordings did not regulate pure speech). Under the test set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 672, 679-80 (1968), conduct that may have both speech and nonspeech elements may be regulated if the statute furthers a substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free speech and the incidental restriction on first amendment concerns is no greater than necessary to further the governmental interest. We further note that section 16-8, like any other statute, is presumed to be constitutional. People v. Sanders, 182 Ill.2d 524, 528, 231 Ill.Dec. 573, 696 N.E.2d 1144 (1998). The burden of rebutting that presumption is on the party challenging the law's validity. City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 224 Ill.2d 390, 406, 309 Ill.Dec. 770, 865 N.E.2d 133 (2006). Generally, a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied is not allowed to challenge the statute solely on the grounds that it could, in another context, be applied unconstitutionally to another person. People v. Holder, 96 Ill.2d 444, 449, 71 Ill.Dec. 677, 451 N.E.2d 831 (1983). The exception is in first amendment cases, where there is a concern that the constitutionally protected activity may be deterred or chilled, thus depriving society of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 2196, 156 L.Ed.2d 148, 157 (2003). However, this concern must be counterbalanced with the substantial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine when it blocks application of a law to constitutionally unprotected speech or conduct. (Emphasis in original.) Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119, 123 S.Ct. at 2197, 156 L.Ed.2d at 157. In order to maintain the appropriate balance, the Supreme Court has cautioned that a statute's overbreadth must be  substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, ___, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1838, 170 L.Ed.2d 650, 662 (2008). Invalidation for overbreadth is ``strong medicine'' that is not to be `casually employed.' Williams, 553 U.S. at ___, 170 L.Ed.2d at 662, 128 S.Ct. at 1838, quoting Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39, 120 S.Ct. 483, 489, 145 L.Ed.2d 451, 460 (1999), quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3360, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113, 1130 (1982). We begin our overbreadth analysis by noting that section 16-8 has features that significantly narrow its application. The first is that it applies only to for profit transactions. The statute therefore does not apply to transactions where a recording is distributed for free, or at a price-point geared only to cover the recording's production and distribution costs. See Anderson v. Nidorf, 26 F.3d 100, 103-04 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that commercial gain or private profit element in California's labeling law, which is nearly identical to section 16-8, significantly narrowed the statute's application). [2] The second narrowing feature is the limited nature of the disclosure requirement for performers and groups. The statutory scheme only requires that the name of the actual performers or groups be disclosed (see 720 ILCS 5/16-7(b)(5) (West 2004)), which means that artists may disclose whatever name they want to use as a performer or as a group on a recording. As written, section 16-8 undoubtedly permits the use of pseudonyms. The United States Supreme Court has deemed pseudonyms sufficient to maintain a speaker's anonymity. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-43, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 1516-17, 131 L.Ed.2d 426, 436-37 (1995). Thus, section 16-8 is a possible burden only to manufacturersand not all manufacturersbut only those who seek anonymity and profit. With respect to the competing social costs at stake, the State asserts, and we agree, that Illinois has a substantial governmental and public interest in protecting consumers from deceptive recordings within the commercial market, particularly when that market is susceptible to counterfeits. The defendant, on the other hand, argues that section 16-8 will deter the free speech of some performers and manufacturers who want to remain anonymous. We believe that in light of the narrowed application of the statute that any overbreadth is insignificant in light of the legitimate sweep of the statute, and defendant has therefore not met his burden to establish that the social costs swing in his favor. Nor has defendant met his burden to show that the incidental restriction on first amendment activity is greater than necessary to further the governmental interest at stake. We also note that every court to consider a first amendment challenge to a labeling statute has rejected it. Anderson, 26 F.3d at 103-04; Briggs, 281 Ga. at 331, 638 S.E.2d at 294-95. We find the federal court of appeals decision in Anderson to be particularly persuasive. There, the defendant was caught selling almost 5,000 pirated tapes and was convicted for failing to accurately disclose the true manufacturer of the tapes, in violation of California's truth-in-labeling law for sound recordings. The defendant raised a first amendment overbreadth challenge, arguing the rights of performers and manufacturers to maintain their anonymity. Anderson found the defendant's claim based on the anonymity rights of performers and manufacturers to be a peculiar argument considering that most of their lives are consumed in marketing their identity. Anderson, 26 F.3d at 104. Anderson further found that because one of the primary purposes of the statute is to prevent the piracy of the works of these performers and manufacturers, the probability that its disclosure requirement will exert a dreaded chilling effect on these performers and manufacturers is close to zero. Anderson, 26 F.3d at 104. The court concluded that the statute can be constitutionally applied in these many instances, and that on this ground alone the defendant's substantial overbreadth claim fails. Anderson, 26 F.3d at 104. Finally, the Anderson court noted that the defendant had cited some hypothetical examples of political or antiestablishment recordings from anonymous artists and manufacturers that could be chilled under the statute. But Anderson again explained that the statute applied only to recordings sold for commercial gain or private profit, thereby greatly limiting the amount of performers and manufacturers whose speech it may chill. Anderson, 26 F.3d at 104. The hypothetical speakers imagined by defendant, Anderson concluded, did not establish that the overbreadth of [the statute] is substantial in comparison with its legitimate sweep. Anderson, 26 F.3d at 104. Anderson makes clear that laws like section 16-8 can be applied constitutionally in most instances. Indeed, whenever the performer or manufacturer desires disclosureundoubtedly the normsection 16-8 operates without any burden on first amendment speech. Yet, to the extent that section 16-8 is overbroad, its burden on protected speech must be substantial compared to the legitimate applications. Defendant makes no showing to that effect. Instead, he cites hypothetical examples of legitimate, nonpirated recordings that would be subject to prosecution under the statute. The examples cited, however, fall under the same political or antiestablishment rubric that Anderson considered insubstantial in comparison with the legitimate sweep of the statute and in considering the statutes narrowing features. We agree with the assessment in Anderson. Finally, defendant contends that section 16-8 should be narrowly tailored to reach only those who distribute recordings without the consent of the owner of the work, or who distribute misrepresented recordings. But such a no-consent limitation, which might adequately serve the antipiracy interest (but which, by the way, would also subject it to a successful challenge based on federal preemption [3] ), would largely defeat its consumer protection interest. A consumer has no less a defective product because the copyright owner consented to its distribution, nor is the consumer in a better position to remedy the defect. Dealers could escape liability under section 16-8 if they simply omitted any information on the identity of the recording's manufacturer. Yet consumersthe persons section 16-8 is designed to protectare no better off. If the recording they have purchased is defective, they are without a reliable name or address to direct their complaints or seek redress. Equally troubling is defendant's explanation for limiting the statute's application to misrepresented recordings. Defendant offers little elaboration on what he means by misrepresented recordings, but presumably he means that section 16-8 would be better if it applied only to recordings that disclose information about a performer or manufacturer that is untruthful or inaccurate. Again, under defendant's proposal, dealers could escape liability by simply omitting any information on the identity of the recording's manufacturer, thereby leaving consumers in a lurch. Finally, defendant suggests that his own conduct did not involve any misrepresentation, explaining that the works he sold were what they were represented to be i.e., recordings of known artists who have contacts with record companies. But this argument is wrong and irrelevant because unless the recording companies disclosed on defendant's products actually manufactured the specific recordings he offered for sale  and the record shows that they did notthen defendant was in fact dealing in misrepresented recordings. At any rate, we find defendant's arguments unpersuasive for the reasons mentioned, and, therefore, we reject his first amendment claim.