Opinion ID: 347528
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Misuse of the CIA: Count 2

Text: 297 Appellants were also convicted on Count 2 of the indictment which charges them with obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. 256 They understandably make no claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Haldeman 257 does claim, however, that the convictions on this count should be reversed because of alleged discrepancies between the indictment, the proof, and the jury instructions. We disagree and affirm the convictions on Count 2. Measured against the applicable constitutional and statutory standards, the indictment is perfectly valid and its language easily accommodates both the evidence adduced and the trial court's charge to the jury. 298 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that prosecutions for serious crime may be instituted only by indictment. In implementing this constitutional guarantee the Supreme Court has recognized that the indictment as a charging instrument has two central purposes to apprise the accused of the charges against him so that he may adequately prepare his defense, 258 and to describe the crime with which he is charged with sufficient specificity to enable him to protect against future jeopardy for the same offense. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974), rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 885, 95 S.Ct. 157, 42 L.Ed.2d 129 (1975); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-764, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962); United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377-378, 74 S.Ct. 113, 98 L.Ed. 92 (1953). It has also been recognized that in order to satisfy the first purpose of giving the defendant notice of the charge against him the indictment must allege the essential elements of the offense. Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c) provides that: 299 The indictment    shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.    It need not contain    any other matter not necessary to such statement.    300 See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960); United States v. Debrow, supra, 346 U.S. at 376, 74 S.Ct. 113. 301 Count 2 of the indictment in question here clearly and fully serves both purposes. 259 Particularly clear is the ample notice with which the indictment provided appellants. Adopting the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, Count 2 states each of the essential elements of the obstruction of justice offense as well as alleging the period during which the obstruction was carried out, the instruments of justice that were obstructed, and certain of the means that the defendants used. The validity of alleging the elements of an offense in the language of the statute is, of course, well established. 260 Hamling v. United States, supra, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887; United States v. Debrow, supra, 346 U.S. at 377-378, 74 S.Ct. 113; United States v. The Brig Neurea, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 92, 94, 15 L.Ed. 531 (1856). Count 2, however, goes further and provides additional notice as to the details of the charge. 302 Nevertheless, Haldeman complains that there was an omission from Count 2 that renders it defective. Specifically, he objects to the fact that, although misuse of the CIA was not alleged in Count 2 as one of the means by which the offense was committed, the trial court admitted evidence concerning such misuse and included in the jury instructions the statement that a guilty verdict should be returned on Count 2 if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants had misused the CIA to obstruct justice. 261 Further, Haldeman rejects categorically the Government's contention that the evidence and the instructions to which he objects were fairly encompassed within the phrase by other means in Count 2's allegations of means by which the obstruction was carried out. 303 Haldeman's complaint seems to result, however, from a general misunderstanding of the purpose of the indictment and, especially, from an inflated notion of what must be included therein. Although an indictment must in order to fulfill constitutional requirements apprise the defendants of the essential elements of the offense with which they are charged, neither the Constitution, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor any other authority suggests that an indictment must put the defendants on notice as to every means by which the prosecution hopes to prove that the crime was committed. Impervious to this fact, however, it appears to be the intent of the appellants, abetted by the dissent, to ignore the present state of the law and countermand the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which were designed to eliminate technicalities in criminal pleading and are to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure. United States v. Debrow, supra, 346 U.S. at 376, 74 S.Ct. at 115. 304 The omission to which Haldeman objects here plainly offers no basis for reversing the Count 2 convictions. As discussed supra, the count begins by stating the elements of the offense in the language of the statute. It goes on to provide particulars of the alleged offense, including the instruments of justice obstructed and the means employed. Neither as a matter of common sense nor of legal principle could the defendants have been in any doubt as to the crime with which they were charged. 262 305 In asserting that Count 2 has omitted an essential element, it is most unclear what, if any, authority the dissent relies upon. Although Hamling v. United States, supra, is quoted, the dissent fails to acknowledge that, in that case, the Supreme Court affirmed the defendants' convictions which were obtained under indictments that, according to the Court, charged them only in the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (which makes it a crime to mail obscene or crime-inciting matter). 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. at 2907. The dissent also quotes from Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962), in which the Court reversed convictions under a statute which made it a crime for any person summoned to testify before a committee of Congress to refuse to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry. 2 U.S.C. § 192. The basis of the reversals was the indictments' failure to identify the question under inquiry and the fact that 306 the very core of criminality under 2 U.S.C. § 192 is pertinency to the subject under inquiry of the questions which the defendant refused to answer. What the subject actually was, therefore, is central to every prosecution under the statute. Where guilt depends so crucially upon such a specific identification of fact, our cases have uniformly held that an indictment must do more than simply repeat the language of the criminal statute. 307 369 U.S. at 764, 82 S.Ct. at 1047 (emphasis added). In this case, by contrast despite the fact that not even the appellants suggest that the means by which the obstruction of justice was carried out are as central to the prosecution as was the subject under inquiry in Russell other means were referred to in Count 2. 308 Rule 7(c), in fact, expressly sanctions indictments in the language to which Haldeman objects. The rule provides that (i)t may be alleged in a single count that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that he committed it by one or more specified means. Further particularization of the means encompassed in the allegations of Count 2 could have been sought by asking for a bill of particulars. 263 See Glasser v. United States, supra, 315 U.S. at 66, 62 S.Ct. 457. The record discloses, however, that after initially requesting a bill of particulars as to the meaning of the phrase by other means, the defendants did not press the request and apparently abandoned it altogether pursuant to an agreement with the Government. Doc. 181 at 21 and Attachment A. Appellants make no bill of particulars point on appeal. Moreover, they at no time moved to strike the phrase from the indictment. 264 309 The validity of similarly worded indictments has been upheld in two recent federal cases. In United States v. Caine, 441 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1971), the court, in affirming convictions of three defendants accused of violating federal mail and wire fraud statutes, rejected defendants' claim that the trial court had improperly permitted introduction of evidence concerning failure to give certain refunds a charge the defendants argued was not encompassed within the terms of either the indictment or the bill of particulars. The trial court had ruled that such evidence was admissible under the indictment which stated: 310 It was further a part of said scheme    that the said advertising, as the defendants well knew, would contain false, fraudulent and misleading statements    including among others    . 311 441 F.2d at 456 (emphasis added). Without deciding whether the trial court could properly have stricken among others from the indictment, the Court of Appeals held that the admission of the challenged evidence did not require reversal of the convictions. 312 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied chiefly on two factors. First, it noted that the introduction of the evidence in question did not constitute surprise, much less prejudicial surprise. Id. at 457. Second, the court emphasized the unlikelihood that the defendants had been convicted of charges either rejected or not considered by the grand jury. It stated: 313 The grand jury's failure specifically to mention fraud with respect to refunds was most likely due to the belief that further spelling out of defendants' fraudulent scheme was redundant. Given the substantial evidence mustered on the point at trial, it is particularly unlikely that the grand jury consciously rejected such a charge. 314 Id. 315 Each of these factors is clearly operative in the present case. That the evidence introduced under Count 2 did not surprise or prejudice the defendants is beyond question. All of the evidence about which Haldeman complains was admissible under Count 1 (see Part XI-C-1 supra ), and he does not even claim on appeal that appellants were surprised by the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury not to consider such evidence as regards the charges alleged in Count 2. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 83, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935); Jackson v. United States, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 276, 359 F.2d 260, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 877, 87 S.Ct. 157, 17 L.Ed.2d 104 (1966). Also, as in Caine, the possibility that the grand jury either rejected or did not consider the charges in question is negligible. 316 In United States v. Mayo, 230 F.Supp. 85 (S.D. N.Y.1964), a case cited with approval in Caine, Judge Weinfeld denied a motion to dismiss the second count of an indictment and rejected the argument that inclusion in the means paragraph of the phrase among others invalidated the indictment. Id. at 86. The court noted that, because the phrase was included in the means paragraph much as by other means is included in the allegation of means in the present indictment it went only to the matter of proof to sustain the charges. Judge Weinfeld expressly accepted the prosecution's position that the words among others were to be equated to allegations of overt acts in a conspiracy charge where the government is not required to set forth all the acts relied upon to effectuate the conspiracy. Id. at 86. 265 Likewise, the reference to by other means in the indictment in question here goes only to the matter of proof and does not constitute a basis for asserting that the notice provided in Count 2 is constitutionally defective. 317 Haldeman claims, however, that, apart from the issue of sufficiency of notice, the indictment is defective in not performing the second function required of a valid indictment, that of protecting the defendant from the possibility of subsequent prosecution for the same offense. But, in truth, the specific phrase of the indictment about which Haldeman objects increases rather than diminishes the appellants' protection against double jeopardy. By alleging that the obstruction of justice with which the defendants were charged was carried out by other means in addition to those specified, the indictment effectively broadens the scope of the acts to which jeopardy attaches and correspondingly reduces the opportunity for subsequent prosecutions of these defendants for the alleged obstruction of justice during the lengthy period alleged in the indictment (June 17, 1972 through March 1, 1974). 318 Also, in raising the specter of double jeopardy, Haldeman ignores the fact that, by judicial decision and by statute, all defendants have been given recourse to the entire trial record should they ever have to plead former jeopardy. E. g., Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 764, 82 S.Ct. 1038 (1962); 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970). 266 Thus the fact that evidence as to misuse of the CIA was admitted to prove that appellants had obstructed justice could certainly be relied on even though Count 2 did not include, in so many words, reference to misuse of the CIA in the unlikely event of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 319 Along with the dissent, Haldeman further contends that, as regards misuse of the CIA, there is a fatal variance between the indictment on one hand and the evidence admitted and the jury instructions given on the other. The whole of the argument on this point rests, however, on an unrealistically narrow interpretation of the language of Count 2. It rests, in particular, on Haldeman's assertion that the phrase by other means in Count 2 must be construed in pari materia or, as the dissent prefers to style it, ejusdem generis with the means specifically alleged in Count 2 and that, as so construed, the phrase cannot be read as including misuse of the CIA. 320 Except for incanting these Latin phrases, however, neither Haldeman nor the dissent cites any authority for the related rules of construction they seek to apply to Count 2. Furthermore, examination of the phrase by other means in the context of the entire count demonstrates the inaccuracy of the asserted interpretations. For purposes of analysis, Count 2 can usefully be viewed as consisting of three parts: (1) the elements of the offense of obstruction of justice (stated basically in the words of the statute); (2) the objects of the defendants' obstruction (i. e., the investigation by the FBI and the United States Attorney's office, the grand jury, and the trial of those accused of the original Watergate break-in); and (3) the means by which the obstruction was carried out. 267 The third part of the count, in turn, alleges three different means: (a) by making cash payments; (b) by making offers of other benefits; and (c) by other means. The phrase by other means refers back to the other two parts of the count that is, other means by which the elements of the offense alleged in part one were used to obstruct the instruments of justice named in part two. There is no reason to think that the phrase was intended to be limited by an in pari materia or ejusdem generis construction to the other means specified in Count 2. Indeed, if it is so construed it adds little if anything to the second means named, i. e., offers of other benefits. 321 The present case is readily distinguishable from Stirone v. United States, supra, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252, the leading case on variance and one on which Haldeman relies. In Stirone the indictment charged the defendant with violating the Hobbs Act 268 by interfering with movement of sand from outside the State of Pennsylvania into the state (where it was to be used to construct a steel processing plant). The trial court, however, permitted the Government to offer evidence concerning not only the sand brought into Pennsylvania from other states but also concerning future steel shipments from the subsequently constructed steel plant in Pennsylvania into Michigan and Kentucky. Also, the trial judge instructed the jury that, as far as the interstate commerce aspect of the charge was concerned, Stirone's guilt could be rested on a finding either (1) that sand used to build the steel mill had been shipped from another state into Pennsylvania, or (2) that steel to be manufactured at the mill was to be shipped in interstate commerce from Pennsylvania into other states. The defendant was convicted, but the Supreme Court held that the variance between the pleading and the proof required a reversal. 269 322 Among the significant distinctions between Stirone and the present case, the most obvious is that the indictment in Stirone alleged that the offense was committed by only one particular means while the evidence admitted and the jury instructions given allowed the defendant to be convicted for committing another offense by another, quite different, means. Here, by contrast, there was no variance. The indictment's allegation of other means made it more general, fully comporting with the evidence and the instructions. In Stirone, in fact, the Court actually suggested that if the indictment had been more general, Stirone's conviction would not have been reversed. The Court observed, It follows that when only one particular kind of commerce is charged to have been burdened a conviction must rest on that charge and not another, even though it be assumed that under an indictment drawn in general terms a conviction might rest upon a showing that commerce of one kind or another has been burdened. 361 U.S. at 218, 80 S.Ct. at 274. 323 When an indictment is drawn in the general terms suggested by Stirone, it is often difficult to know exactly what evidentiary allegations were considered by the grand jury. Here, however, some indication of what was before the grand jury with respect to the CIA and what was intended by the phrase by other means in Count 2 is provided by the language of the conspiracy charge in Count 1 and the evidence admitted without objection in support thereof. 270 Both Counts 1 and 2 allege as their purpose concealment from the FBI and the grand jury of the persons responsible for the Watergate break-in. The evidence clearly shows that appellants endeavored to use the CIA in two ways to accomplish this purpose: (1) by providing CIA funds for hush money, and (2) by having the CIA limit the FBI investigation by suggesting that its continuance might uncover some operation of the CIA in Mexico and thereby jeopardize this country's national security. Count 2 specifically charges the hush money means of obstructing justice. The limitation of the FBI investigation means, though not specifically alleged, certainly fits comfortably under other means of obstruction just as it does under the general language of Count 1. In fact, the allegations of conspiracy to obstruct justice and to defraud the United States in Count 1 are the basis of the allegations of the substantive offense of obstruction of justice in Count 2. In response to a request which read: State whether the allegations of obstruction of justice in (Count 2) are encompassed within the obstruction of justice alleged in Count One, the Government said in its bill of particulars, The substantive violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 alleged in Count 2 was among the offenses which were the objects in the unlawful agreement alleged in Count 1. Doc. 177 at 5. 271 Appellants did not challenge this response. 324 Also, the variance in Stirone, as the Supreme Court stressed, went to the question of jurisdiction. The two essential elements of a Hobbs Act violation are, the Court stated, interference with commerce and extortion. The charge that interstate commerce is affected is critical since the Federal Government's jurisdiction of this crime rests only on that interference. 361 U.S. at 218, 80 S.Ct. at 274. The inconsistency in the pleadings, the proof, and the instructions made it impossible to determine on appeal whether the jury convicted Stirone of the charge laid in the indictment. 325 In this case the basis for federal jurisdiction of the obstruction of justice charge is unambiguous. The indictment explicitly charged that each element of the offense had been committed in connection with an investigation being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, and in connection with the trial of Criminal Case No. 1827-72 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia   . Appellants do not even claim that the evidence or the jury instructions departed from these jurisdictional elements. The evidence amply showed that appellants endeavored to use the CIA to obstruct the FBI investigation. 326 Stirone is further distinguishable in that the variance there in question involved a material time differential. The indictment, that is, alleged interference with interstate commerce as regards past shipments of sand, but the evidence and instructions also referred to future and contingent shipments of steel from a nonexistent steel mill. 361 U.S. at 219, 80 S.Ct. at 274. Here the payments, offers of other benefits, and misuse of the CIA were alleged to have occurred during the same period. Unlike Stirone, this case most definitely did not involve a grand jury that heard evidence only as to past events while the trial also involved evidence as to future events. 272 327 Accordingly, we find Haldeman's objections to Count 2 and to the jury instructions given on that count to be without merit. XII. THE MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE SIRICA 328 Well prior to trial, Ehrlichman and Mitchell joined in an affidavit 273 charging Judge Sirica with bias and prejudice and urging his recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144. 274 The affidavit further asserted that the judge also had a disqualifying interest in the outcome of the cases, and disqualifying relationships to the Special Prosecutor and two defense attorneys, within the contemplation of 28 U.S.C. § 455 as it then stood. 275 An accompanying motion for recusal 276 asked that the matter be referred to the District Court's Calendar Committee for disposition. 277 Other defendants associated themselves with the attempt to disqualify, 278 relying on either that affidavit or another of like nature subsequently filed. 279 329 Judge Sirica refused the request for referral and, deeming the affidavits legally wanting, rejected the motion. 280 This court en banc, one member dissenting, thereafter denied a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Sirica's disqualification, 281 and the Supreme Court declined a review of our action. 282 In due course the cases proceeded to trial before Judge Sirica, and the controversy over recusation is renewed on these appeals. 283 No more now than previously are we impressed by the arguments for disqualification, or by those critical of the methodology by which Judge Sirica addressed and resolved the issue. 284 A. The Methodology of Resolution 330 We perceive no basis upon which it could be held that Judge Sirica erred in ruling on the legal adequacy of the affidavits himself. We are mindful that the Government did not oppose the movants' effort to get the matter before the Calendar Committee, 285 and we are aware of instances in which motions invoking Section 144 have been submitted to fellow judges for decision. 286 That course, however, was at most permissive. It is well settled that the involved judge has the prerogative, if indeed not the duty, of passing on the legal sufficiency of a Section 144 challenge. 287 Moreover the motion in suit urged not only bias and prejudice under Section 144 but also a vitiating interest and disabling connections under Section 455, and for those connections the latter section required Judge Sirica's recusal only if it was improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the litigation any longer. 288 As the judge pointed out, (o)nly the individual judge knows fully his own thoughts and feelings and the complete context of facts alleged. It follows that only he can be certain of the most equitable resolution. 289 B. The Section 144 Claims 1. Earlier Judicial Activity 331 Turning to the affidavits, upon which the endeavor to disqualify was grounded, 290 we examine the claim of bias with an awareness that for present purposes all facts stated with particularity 291 are to be taken as true. 292 There are, first, numerous allegations of activities by Judge Sirica in relation to earlier Watergate proceedings, 293 all of which allegations share a common legal deficiency. Section 144 expressly specifies a personal bias or prejudice for recusal, 294 and the courts have uniformly accepted that language for what it plainly demands:  'Personal' is in contrast with judicial, said the First Circuit in 1927, it characterizes an attitude of extrajudicial origin, derived non coram judice. 'Personal' characterizes clearly the prejudgment guarded against. It is the significant word of the statute. 295 And as much more lately the Supreme Court has declared, (t)he alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. 296 332 The allegations to which we have referred do not survive this requirement. 297 Every complaint they register derives from judicial acts by Judge Sirica during his tenure as the officer presiding over a series of criminal proceedings emanating from the Watergate affair. 298 The attitude for which Section 144 mandates recusal is not indicated by prior judicial rulings, 299 or in-court comments prompted by developments in the case or prior legal proceedings, 300 or the exercise of related judicial functions. 301 Nor can a disabling prejudice be extracted from dignified though persistent judicial efforts to bring everyone responsible for Watergate to book. 302 We do not mean to suggest that a judge's activities during the course of judicial proceedings can never reflect a disqualifying state of mind. 303 We do say that it is not evidenced by the events cited here. 2. Extrajudicial Statements 333 Another branch of the claim of bias stems from references in the Ehrlichman-Mitchell affidavit to alleged extrajudicial utterances by Judge Sirica. One is that the judge was guest of honor at a party given by the press honoring him on his 70th birthday, at which he conducted interviews with reporters in which he made statements concerning this case. 304 Another is that (i) n a televised interview Judge Sirica was quoted as saying he was confident that affiants could get as fair a trial in the District of Columbia as anywhere in the United States, thus prejudging any motion for change of venue which affiants may make. 305 It cannot be gainsaid that public comment bearing specifically upon pending or impending litigation is an activity that judges should scrupulously avoid. 306 In our view, the averments of the affidavit were insufficient to trigger a disqualification in this case. 334 Section 144 specifies that (t)he affidavit supporting a motion thereunder shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, 307 and it does so for the best reasons. This provision, like the accompanying mandate that counsel of record certify that the affidavit is made in good faith, 308 was designed to guard against groundless claims and the impositions they would inflict on the judicial process. 309 To achieve that end, the courts have consistently held that the affidavit must meet exacting standards. It must be strictly construed; 310 it must be definite as to time, place, persons and circumstances. 311 Assertions merely of a conclusionary nature are not enough, 312 nor are opinions or rumors. 313 And the affidavit must give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment. 314 335 It is clear enough that the allegation that at the birthday party Judge Sirica made statements concerning this case 315 fell short of these requirements. It is completely lacking in specificity; not even the substance of the claimed statement is supplied. 316 The further allegation that (i) n a televised interview Judge Sirica was quoted as making another statement is not only hearsay with no indication as to its source, 317 but it also lacks the definiteness as to time, place, persons and circumstances that is demanded of an affidavit under Section 144. 318 The affidavit omitted altogether the fact that the televised episode transpired very shortly after appellants' indictment, 319 during this circuit's 1974 Judicial Conference, 320 in an apparently unscheduled and unsought interview, before any motion for change of venue was before the court. Nor does it mention that the statement pertained generally to the quality of justice in the District of Columbia rather than to appellants' case in particular. 336 Even if we assume that the interview is properly before us, it provides no basis for a finding of bias or prejudice. Judge Sirica candidly acknowledges that he was asked, (i)s there any doubt in your mind about (the defendants') abilities to get fair trials? 321 In reply the judge said, I think they can get just as fair a trial in the District of Columbia as any federal court in the United States. I have no doubt about that. Thank you. 322 Later during the interview, the judge added, (w)ell, in my opinion, any defendant, any person who happens to be a defendant in this jurisdiction, in my opinion can get just as fair a trial here as any jurisdiction in the country. 323 337 These statements were substantively insufficient to establish bias or prejudice within the meaning of Section 144. By Judge Sirica's appraisal, (f)airly interpreted, these comments address the quality of the federal judiciary in the District of Columbia and do not concern changes of venue, let alone constitute a prejudgment on motions for change of venue    ; 324 (e)ven, however, construed in the light most favorable to defendants' conclusion, the reported statements reveal only a then current and general impression which existed, as is always the case, in the context of an assumption that an unbiased jury may be found in the district. 325 This appeals to us as an accurate characterization of the import of what was said. 338 A fundamental premise of our jurisprudential system is that, save in the most extraordinary circumstances, an impartial jury expectably may be convened anywhere in the Nation. Another is that the capability of doing so is always to be presumed until the contrary appears. The thrust of Judge Sirica's remarks, obviously based on extensive contacts with juries over his many years as a trial judge, was an opinion that juries in the District of Columbia are fair-minded. Thus, while these thoughts were voiced in an extrajudicial setting the interview the informational source upon which they drew the judge's experience as a judge was distinctly judicial. 326 And, all circumstances considered, particularly the time at which the comments were made, 327 we think they were not reasonably interpretable as a prejudgment on any issue that might arise in the case. The interview took place very shortly after the prosecution was launched by the indictment, and when it had hardly gotten under way. 328 No motion for change of venue had then been filed; by the same token, no occasion to ponder or focus on grounds therefor had been presented. The statements reflected no assessment of the possible impact of Watergate pretrial publicity, nor any inability or indisposition on the judge's part to objectively weigh and act upon a request to relocate the place of trial should it develop that an unbiased jury could not be assembled in the District of Columbia. 339 To be sure, Judge Sirica's televised remarks are not completely free of ambiguity, and it is possible to impart into the first of his two answers a tinge of prejudgment on the forthcoming venue question in this case. 329 But the same may be said for countless other equivocal expressions by judges over the years, which have been held to provide no cause for recusal. 330 And we think that any tendency to attribute bias to Judge Sirica's first answer is fairly dispelled when it is read conjunctively with the second, which manifestly was a generalized observation on the time-proven objectivity of the jury process in the District of Columbia. 331 Equally importantly, a judge's comment is disqualifying only if it connotes a fixed opinion 332 a closed mind on the merits of the case. 333 Though susceptible to differing interpretations, 334 an utterance summons disqualification to avoid either the fact or the appearance of partiality only when it give(s) fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment. 335 It cannot be said that, viewed together in context for their intrinsic revelation, Judge Sirica's statements rise to that level. C. The Section 455 Claims 1. The Alleged Interest 340 As we have previously indicated, 336 there are two additional theses for disqualification, each sought to be rested on old Section 455, 337 the pre-1974 version applicable to these cases. 338 As to the first of these, the Ehrlichman-Mitchell affidavit refers to the extensive press and media coverage of Judge Sirica's activities in connection with the supervision of the Grand Jury and the trial of the 1973 Watergate case and concludes therefrom that Judge Sirica's public image and reputation have become inextricably intertwined with the prosecution of the Watergate matter, a fact of which he is not unaware. 339 The affidavit then attributes to Judge Sirica, as a further result, a personal interest in the outcome of this case which affiants believe will make it impossible for him to conduct their trials in the required atmosphere of judicial impartiality. 340 This argument misinterprets the statute and mischaracterizes the judge. 341 341 To be sure, pre-1974 Section 455 commanded recusal in any case in which the judge had a substantial interest. 342 We know that pecuniary interests were encompassed 343 and it may be that some types of economic interests also were. But we have been referred to nothing, nor have we found anything, suggesting that the statute embraced any interest of the sort laid to Judge Sirica by the affidavit. 344 We cannot believe that it did, for unless confined to interests emanating from extrajudicial sources, the prohibition would have had a reach far beyond anything Congress could rationally have contemplated. Judge Sirica's public image was achieved by dint of his judicial activity and, like any other judge, he obviously had an interest in maintaining his hard-earned reputation. If that interest were disqualifying, no judge who has achieved acclaim as a judge would ever sit again. 345 It matters not that in the public eye Judge Sirica may be a judicial activist. Already we have, in another context, commended his quest for truth, 346 and what we said then applies equally now. 2. Past Relationships With Counsel 342 The remaining argument under old Section 455 is predicated on past relationships between Judge Sirica and attorneys who were to actively participate in the trials under review. Nearly a decade ago, while United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, Mr. David G. Bress, one of trial counsel for defendant Mardian, opposed petitions for writs of mandamus attacking the judge's rulings in three cases. 347 Much more lately, Mr. John J. Wilson, one of appellant Haldeman's counsel, appeared at this court's request on a criminal appeal as amicus curiae in support of action taken by Judge Sirica, 348 and sought rehearing en banc following a panel's decision adverse to that action. In 1974 the Special Prosecutor, who has represented the Government throughout the instant litigation, opposed a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition directed toward Judge Sirica's release of a secret grand jury report and accompanying evidence to the House of Representatives. 349 The statutory basis for this effort to disqualify is said to be the provision of pre-1974 Section 455 requiring a judge to step down when he is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial    or other proceeding therein. 350 By our lights, none of the cited episodes involved such a relationship between counsel and Judge Sirica as to necessitate the result contended for. 343 The petition seeking a writ of mandamus or prohibition to control a ruling of a District Judge is a relatively frequent occurrence in this circuit. Active defense of the ruling by counsel for the litigant favored is commonplace, 351 and we have discerned no reason to discourage the practice. Although the petition in such a proceeding ordinarily names the involved judge as sole respondent, where its sole purpose is to obtain a determination on the intrinsic merits of a judicial act, we have recognized that the judge is at most only    a nominal party with no real interest in the outcome. 352 It is ostensibly in that view that the Federal Appellate Rules provide that (a)ll parties below other than the petitioner shall also be deemed respondents for all purposes, 353 and that (i)f the judge or judges named respondents do not desire to appear in the proceeding, they may so advise the clerk and all parties by letter   . 354 344 Similarly, on widely scattered occasions when no party to an appeal from the District Court undertakes to support the decision under review, this court may appoint an attorney as amicus curiae to defend that decision. The whole purpose in doing so is to give the court the benefit of the District Judge's wisdom on the point at issue. In no sense is the judge placed in the position of a litigant, nor is his situation significantly different from what it is when the defense is undertaken by counsel for one who is already a party to the litigation. 345 We do not find the relationship normally existent between judges and counsel in those instances any need for recusal upon resumption of the litigation in the District Court. 355 So far as we are aware, it has never been suggested that a judge participating in a case prior to a contested appeal should step out of post-appeal proceedings simply because counsel include one or more who endeavored to rescue the judge in this court. We are unable to detect any real difference between that everyday event and those for which Judge Sirica's disqualification is now urged. 356 346 Then, too, recusal of a judge for a relationship to or connection with counsel for a litigant was, in the language of old Section 455, to occur only when it was such as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial    or other proceeding therein. 357 It is well settled that the question of disqualification on that account was a matter basically committed to the judge's conscience. 358 A decision contrary to recusal, so grounded in the judge's personal view of his continuing ability to act impartially, is reviewable on appeal only if it amounts to an abuse of sound judicial discretion. 359 We find nothing of that sort here, nor justification for the complaint of Judge Sirica as the trial judge. 360 XIII. CONCLUSION 347 Having considered all of the arguments raised by each of the appellants, we conclude that there was no reversible error in this case. We therefore affirm the convictions of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mitchell for conspiracy as charged in Count 1 and obstruction of justice as charged in Count 2. We also affirm the individual convictions of Mitchell under Counts 4, 5 and 6; Haldeman under Counts 7, 8 and 9; and Ehrlichman under Counts 11 and 12. 348 Affirmed. 349