Opinion ID: 2602478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Definition of Likely

Text: We must still, however, define the word likely in the context of the phrase likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release as stated in section 6602, subdivision (a) (italics added). We made clear in Ghilotti that the determination of likelihood of future dangerousness was an element that must be proved in addition to the existence of mental disorder in order to commit an individual as an SVP. ( Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 920-921, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949.) In that case, we defined the phrase likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate streatment and custody (italics added) in the context of the psychological evaluations required to initiate commitment proceedings under the SVPA under section 6601, subdivision (d). We held that an evaluator applying this standard must conclude that the person is `likely' to reoffend if, because of a current mental disorder which makes it difficult or impossible to restrain sexually violent behavior, the person presents a stibstantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk, that he or she will commit such crimes if free in the community. ( Ghilotti, supra, at p. 922, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949.) We specifically rejected the argument that, in order to meet the likely standard, an evaluator must determine there is a better than even [i.e., more likely than not] chance of new criminal sexual violence (id. at p. 895, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949). We declined to decide, however, whether the word likely, as used in section 6601, subdivision (d), is similar to the statutory standard for final commitment [citations]. ( Ghilotti, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 925, fn. 15, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949, italics omitted.) [14] By implication, therefore, we declined to decide whether likely had a similar meaning in the context of the SVPA probable cause hearing. The district attorney argues that likely has the same meaning at the probable cause hearing as it does in the provision of the SVPA outlining the requirements of the psychological evaluations upon which the initial petition for commitment must be based. Marentez offers no substantive argument in response. [15] We agree with the district attorney. We find no support in the statutory scheme or the legislative history for the notion that the Legislature intended a different definition of likely to apply at the probable cause determination. [A] word or phrase will be given the same meaning each time it appears in a statute.... ( Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 53, 210 Cal.Rptr. 781, 694 P.2d 1153; Chandis Securities Co. v. City of Dana Point (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 475, 486, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 481.) Furthermore, the determination at the probable cause hearing is based on the petition filed by designated counsel, which is, in turn, necessarily based on the two concurring psychological evaluations required by section 6601. (§ 6602, subd. (a) [A judge of the superior court shall review the -petition and shall determine whether there is probable cause.... (Italics added.)].) It would be illogical and impractical, therefore, for the psychological experts who based their conclusion on the Ghilotti definition of the term in their initial evaluations supporting the petition for commitment, to offer conclusions based on a different meaning at the probable cause hearing. We conclude, therefore, that at the probable cause hearing the superior court must find probable cause to believe that a potential SVP presents a serious and wellfounded risk of committing sexually violent criminal acts that will be of a predatory nature. We also conclude that a determination of the likelihood of future dangerousness at the probable cause hearing if such evidence has been presented must also take into account the potential SVP's amenability to voluntary treatment upon release. In Ghilotti, we noted that the likelihood determination to be made by the psychological evaluators, required by section 6601, subdivision (d), was qualified by the phrase without appropriate treatment and custody. ( Ghilotti supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 925, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949.) We interpreted this phrase to mean that the need for treatment and the need for custody are not always one and the same, and therefore, the evaluators must determine whether the person presents a substantial danger of reoffense if released without conditions, or whether instead he is safe only if restrained, supervised, and treated involuntarily [in] custody. (Id. at pp. 926-927, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949.) We noted that this qualifying factor to be applied to the dangerousness determination was required by both section 6601, subdivision (d) and the SVPA in general. (Id at p. 926, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949.) Section 6602, subdivision (a) does not expressly include the qualifying phrase without appropriate treatment and custody in defining the likelihood of sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon ... release. (Italics added.) Both phrases, however, similarly imply that the issue is whether the person is likely to reoffend without the confinement and involuntary treatment provided under the SVPA. Furthermore, as we observed with regard to the meaning of likely, it would be illogical, given the structure of the SVPA, to require psychological evaluators to provide a different estimation of the likelihood of reoffense at the probable cause hearing than that which formed the basis of the commitment petition. We hold, therefore, that the superior court at the probable cause hearing must also consider any evidence of the offender's amenability to voluntary treatment in determining whether the potential SVP poses a serious and well-founded risk of committing sexually violent predatory criminal acts upon release.