Opinion ID: 187282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Relatedness of Prior Convictions

Text: Under section 4B1.1, two prior felony convictions are treated as one if related within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). See § 4B1.2(c)(2). Regardless of any factual similarities or differences between them, two convictions are related in this technical sense if they are for offenses that were not separated by an intervening arrest and (A) occurred on the same occasion, (B) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for trial or sentencing. § 4A1.2 cmt. n. 3 (2005). As it is undisputed that appellant's crimes were neither separated by an intervening arrest nor committed on the same occasion or as part of a common scheme or plan, the question boils down to whether the sentences were for offenses that were consolidated for trial or sentencing. Our sister circuits disagree about whether formal consolidation, i.e., an actual consolidation order, is required, or whether offenses may still be found functionally consolidated without such an order. Compare, e.g., United States v. Adams, 509 F.3d 929, 933 (8th Cir.2007) (requiring a formal consolidation order), with United States v. Best, 250 F.3d 1084, 1095 (7th Cir.2001) (allowing functional consolidation when there is an indication that the trial court considered the cases sufficiently related to be treated as one). This circuit has yet to rule on the issue, which turns out to have little prospective importance given that the current Guidelines jettison the concept of consolidation. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) (2007). Nor need we answer the question for purposes of this case. Whether consolidation is assessed formally or functionally, the district court was correct in finding that appellant's convictions were never consolidated. As the Superior Court entered no formal order of consolidation, appellant's convictions were unquestionably never formally consolidated. Nor would appellant fare any better under a functional consolidation standard. Although appellant offers several reasons why he thinks he would prevail if we adopted such a standard, none is persuasive. Appellant first argues that the district court erred by applying a formal test. To be sure, were we to adopt a functional consolidation standard, it would have been error for the district court to have applied a formal test. But we see no evidence that it did. At the first sentencing hearing, the district court noted an out-of-circuit precedent that it took to apply a formal consolidation test and adjourned the sentencing to consider this authority. Sent'g Tr. at 16-17 (Feb. 24, 2006). In doing so, the district court cautioned that it was unlikely to adopt a formal consolidation test because it thought the reality of what happens, the substance of what happens, should govern consolidation findings. Id. at 17. At the beginning of the second hearing, the district court said it needed no further argument to determine whether appellant was a career offender, stating, The Court finds that [appellant] is a career offender because he has been convicted in the past, and the evidence of that is sufficient. He has been convicted in the past twice of committing crimes of violence. And the evidence is sufficient, in this Court's view, to show that. Sent'g Tr. at 3 (July 26, 2006). Pressed by defense counsel, the court elaborated: [The convictions] are completely unrelated, in my view, I so find. I made that  I made  I made that finding as a matter of law based upon, frankly, what is undisputed by you or anybody else. Id. at 4. Appellant insists that the district court's matter of law comment signals that it adopted a formal test after all, but we read the remark differently. The lengthy dialogue surrounding the statement makes clear that the district court based its finding on the facts the defendant himself set forth in his papers and in court  the dates of appellant's offenses, separated by over a month  not the simple absence of a formal order. See id. at 9-10 (agreement between the court and defense counsel on the relevant dates). This exchange, combined with the district court's finding that the convictions were completely unrelated, id. at 4, and its previous rejection of a formal test, demonstrates that the district court used a functional standard. Appellant next argues that even if it used a functional test, the district court failed to make a finding that the offenses were not functionally consolidated. We disagree. Though terse, the district court's statement that the convictions were completely unrelated amounts to a factual finding. In arguing otherwise, appellant ignores the fact that his trial counsel, following a lengthy dialogue on precisely this point, essentially admitted that the court had satisfactorily explained the basis for its finding. Id. at 10. Appellant claims that he would prevail under a functional consolidation standard for a third reason: even if the district court found that the offenses were not functionally consolidated, it clearly erred in doing so. Reviewing the district court's finding deferentially, we see no grounds for disturbing it. See Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 66, 121 S.Ct. 1276, 149 L.Ed.2d 197 (2001) (holding that functional consolidation findings are subject to deferential review on appeal without deciding whether functional consolidation is the proper standard). Given the undisputed fact that the two convictions were for offenses involving different victims on different dates and the absence of any affirmative evidence that the Superior Court treated the two convictions as one, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, United States v. Seiler, 348 F.3d 265, 268 (D.C.Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).