Opinion ID: 1377985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the conflicting interests

Text: What are the conflicting interests which are created by this retainer agreement? The agreement itself frankly acknowledges that it may create a conflict of interest between Maxwell and the lawyers, and that the provisions of this agreement may give the lawyers a monetary interest adverse to the interests of Maxwell. Interestingly, counsel in paragraph 14 in novel and clinical fashion describe three specific areas of conflict: a. The lawyers may have an interest to create publicity which would increase the money which they might get as a result of this agreement, even if this publicity hurt Maxwell's defense. b. The lawyers may have an interest not to raise certain defenses which would question the sanity or mental capacity of Maxwell because to raise these defenses might make this agreement between the lawyers and Maxwell void or voidable by Maxwell. c. The lawyers may have an interest in having Maxwell be convicted and even sentenced to death so that there would be increased publicity which might mean that the lawyers would get more money as a result of this agreement. Counsel then promise (¶ 14(d)), however, that they will not take advantage of defendant or pursue any adverse interests, but rather will diligently serve him. I have no doubt that they will try to do so. Moreover, I do not question their good faith in testing the permissible ethical limits of the instrument which they have drawn, although I deplore the very lengthy procedural delay thereby caused to the trial of the merits of this case. Nonetheless, the agreement crosses the line of propriety. The solemn assurances expressed in paragraph 14(d) to resist the commercial opportunities do not purge the instrument of its taint. Such promises are simply commitments to do what the law already requires, adding nothing to counsel's continuing, preexisting fiduciary duties. The opportunity for, and the appearance of, mischief are the twin evils here. The pressure of self-interest is generated by an agreement which provides that counsel's only compensation will come from the commercial exploitation of defendant's life story. This self-interest thus created at the inception of the contract is ever present to sway, if unconsciously, the numerous decisions of counsel both pretrial and during trial. Very recently a similar tension arising from divided loyalties prompted us in People v. Barboza (1981) 29 Cal.3d 375, 381 [173 Cal. Rptr. 458, 627 P.2d 188], to disapprove a contractual relationship which by its own terms created personal financial interests opposing professional obligation. We stressed that it is necessary that counsel avoid `any relation which would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his client's interests,'... ( Id., at p. 379, quoting Anderson v. Eaton (1931) 211 Cal. 113, 116 [293 P. 788].) In invalidating an agreement with a public defender we emphasized that the contract places him in a situation with grave consequences and implications for the administration of justice. Not only is there an `appearance of impropriety,' there is also a real and insoluble tension, created by the contract between the defender's conflicting interests. ( Id., at p. 381.) Similar reasoning applies where, as here, the personal financial interests of counsel are at stake. In like fashion, examining posttrial a similar literary agreement between counsel and client, the court in People v. Corona (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 684, 720 [145 Cal. Rptr. 894], reversed a conviction stating: [I]t is indisputable that by entering into the literary rights contract trial counsel created a situation which prevented him from devoting the requisite undivided loyalty and service to his client. From that moment on, trial counsel was devoted to two masters with conflicting interests  he was forced to choose between his own pocketbook and the best interests of his client, the accused. The scope of the conflicts built in to the agreement exceeds those acknowledged by the attorneys themselves in paragraph 14. The real vice of the arrangement appears most clearly in considering certain tactical decisions which may confront trial counsel. Suppose that before trial, through a plea bargain, defendant's life may be saved by an informed entry of a guilty plea to certain of the multiple counts, including murder, with which he is charged. Should counsel recommend such a bargain? Perhaps they should, but would they, knowing that the sales value of a book or television manuscript would decline if there was no dramatic trial testimony elicited? How really objective will counsel be in exploring the opportunities for avoiding trial without any attendant publicity if the commercial value of defendant's life story is thereby reduced or destroyed? If defendant is tried, should he be called as a witness to tell his story, or exercise his constitutional right to remain silent, thereby putting the prosecution to its proof? Surely, the sales value of defendant's story would be affected by the decision. If defendant takes the stand during trial would the areas of his direct examination be affected, however subtly, perhaps unknowingly, by counsel's financial interest in the drama and salability of his testimony? As anticipated in paragraph 14(b), would the existence of the contract affect a decision to assert an insanity defense with its inherent threat to the validity of the agreement? In summary, decisions and strategy may be affected by motives which are antithetical to defendant's basic right to effective counsel. Moreover, there is no clear evidence that defendant fully understands the legal implications of his purported waiver. The case is before us pretrial. Accepting counsel's good faith assurances that they will not exploit any opportunities afforded them by their agreement, how will we know if they so restrain themselves? The United States Supreme Court, focusing on the attorney's role in the plea bargaining function alone, noted in Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 490-491 [55 L.Ed.2d 426, 438, 98 S.Ct. 1173], [I]t would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. In similar fashion, how is a trial court, honestly and fairly, to identify and trace the motives, selfish or altruistic, hidden or express, behind the myriad decisions pretrial and at trial made by counsel in a multiple murder case? The inescapable fact is that defendant will have no way of knowing, and neither the trial nor appellate court is in a better position to judge. Rule 5-101, Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, binding on all California lawyers, provides in relevant part: Avoiding Adverse Interest. A member of the State Bar shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless (1) the transaction and terms in which the member of the State Bar acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in manner and terms which should have reasonably been understood by the client, (2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel of the client's choice on the transaction, and (3) the client consents in writing thereto. (Italics added.) The majority of the Court of Appeal rejected the present agreement and applied the fair and reasonable strictures of the foregoing rule 5-101 to the contract's paragraph 37 which recites: Maxwell does hereby agree to waive upon demand by Lawyers the so called attorney-client privilege and any and all other privileges and rights which would prevent the full and complete exercise and exploitation of the rights granted to Lawyers herein. The appellate court appropriately noted that paragraph 37 provides for an advance waiver [which] might well inhibit Maxwell from fully disclosing to his retained lawyers all information that could be helpful in his defense. The confidential relationship between attorney and client is at the heart of a proper functioning of our judicial system. A compelled waiver of this privilege for the purpose of advancing the fee interest of the attorney cannot be tolerated. Although the majority ( ante, p. 610, fn. 1) recites that counsel conceded that [¶ 37] ... overreaches, neither the extent nor the effect of the concession is clear. Moreover, paragraph 33 of the contract remains. In it defendant promises, covenants and agrees to assist the lawyers at any and all times and in any and all ways permissible by law in the protection, exercise, and exploitation of their rights to the Story. Defendant additionally agrees fully to disclose any relevant material to the lawyers or their designated agents to further the lawyers' rights to his story. Thus, there remains the substance of a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Further, I am unable to reconcile the language and spirit of paragraph 33 with the following mandate of Business and Professions Code section 6068: It is the duty of an attorney: ... [¶] (e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets, of his client. Finally, another inescapable fact remains  attorneys have agreed to represent Maxwell only during trial. What is to prevent them from publicly utilizing every bit of information that they have gleaned during trial preparation and trial at the same time that defendant is appealing from a judgment of conviction? The appellate briefs of the second attorney may be filed simultaneously with a book of the first attorneys aimed at the best seller list. Aside from the profound implications such a situation would have for the judicial system in general, what is there to protect defendant's rights during the appellate process and any subsequent retrial? At that point he will no longer be the owner of his life story, which will instead be in the hands of his former attorneys whose only remaining interest may be the promotion of sales.