Opinion ID: 3052207
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or dan-

Text: gerous instrument or a simulated deadly weapon. § 13-1904(A). Armed robbery under Arizona law involves the threat or use of force; therefore, that offense is a crime of violence pursuant to § 4B1.2(a)(1). [5] “[A]n attempt to commit a crime of violence is itself a crime of violence.” United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR 7567 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing USSG § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1). When the text of an attempt statute deviates from the federal definition of attempt, however, we must look to state caselaw to determine whether the state’s definition is coextensive with the federal definition, and therefore qualifies as an attempt for purposes of the USSG. Sarbia, 367 F.3d at 1085-86. [6] Arizona’s attempt statute provides that a person commits an attempt to commit a crime if he or she “[i]ntentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as such person believes them to be, is any step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in commission of an offense.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1001(A)(2). “At common law an attempt[ ] was defined as the specific intent to engage in criminal conduct and . . . an overt act which is a substantial step towards committing the crime.” Sarbia, 367 F.3d at 1086 (internal quotations omitted). The wording of the Arizona statute deviates from and is broader than the federal definition; therefore, we must look to Arizona caselaw to determine if section 13-1001(A)(2) is applied in a manner that is contrary to the federal or common-law definition of an attempt. [7] In State v. Fristoe, 658 P.2d 825, 830 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982), the Arizona Court of Appeals held twenty-six years ago that an attempt under Arizona law requires a substantial step, and that “the legislature merely intended to simplify the language of A.R.S. § 13-1001(A)(2) by using ‘any step’ as opposed to [a] ‘substantial step.’ ” Recently, Fristoe was cited for the proposition that “ ‘any step’ [is] equivalent to ‘substantial step’ ” for purposes of [Arizona’s] attempt statute.” State v. Johnson, 111 P.3d 1038, 1040 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). No case suggests that the Arizona Supreme Court would decide otherwise. [8] Therefore, based on a review of Arizona’s caselaw, it is clear that Arizona’s definition of attempt is coextensive with the federal definition. As a result, the district court prop7568 UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR erly concluded that Taylor’s attempted armed robbery conviction was a crime of violence pursuant to USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1). AFFIRMED.