Opinion ID: 2631933
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Mental Incompetence Claim

Text: We agree with the People that, notwithstanding Allen, defendant has not carried his heavy burden of invalidating efforts to recommit him under the SVPA based on the trial court's refusal to decide his mental competence to stand trial. ( Otto, supra, 26 Cal.4th 200, 209.) Contrary to what both defendant and the dissent would have us conclude, Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, is distinguishable in material respects. The due process right to testify recognized there, and the considerations supporting it, are substantially different from those present here. No issue was raised in the SVP trial itself, or argued or addressed on review, that Allen was mentally incompetent to stand trial, such that he could not understand the proceedings or assist in his defense. The People therefore ask that we assess the relevant due process factors anew, guided by the general principles discussed in Allen, while considering the special concerns raised by the complete bar to trial asserted here. We do so now. (13) The liberty and dignitary interests affected by commitment under the SVPAwhich appeared first and fourth, respectively, on Allen 's listare no less significant here than in any other civil commitment case. To a greater or lesser extent, a mentally incompetent defendant may be in the position of filtering his contribution in an SVP proceeding through counsel, experts, and other witnesses. ( Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, 869.) Even so, the defendant in an SVP trial is entitled to a fair and accurate determination of his status as an SVP, under procedures assuring that his liberty and other personal rights are not erroneously impaired. Nevertheless, defendant overstates the risk of error in the present case. Defendant insists that only a mentally competent person can meaningfully contribute to his defense by providing counsel and mental experts with relevant firsthand information that could help show he is not mentally disordered or dangerous, and that could be used to rebut hearsay and other evidence used against him at trial. However, as Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, 866, made clear, the nature of the issues, evidence, and findings in an SVP proceeding prevents any defendant from playing much more than a supporting role. His account of his own history and conduct may supplement the foundation on which experts rely in forming their opinions. But it is the combined substance of such opinion evidence, including all the other information on which it is based, that resolves the critical question whether, as of the date of the trial, defendant had a mental disorder that made it likely he would engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. ( Id. at p. 873.) Thus, any chance that an SVP's mental incompetence would significantly impair his contribution to his defense seems relatively attenuated. Nor can we ignore the numerous procedural safeguards available to prevent an erroneous commitment in any SVP case, regardless of the contribution the particular defendant is willing or able to make. First, during trial, no defendant, including one who may be mentally incompetent, must proceed without the assistance of counsel, or without the right to retain experts or professional persons to perform an examination on his behalf. (§ 6603, subd. (a).) Even Allen recognized that, as a general rule, such mandatory representation, coupled with expert assistance, generally is beneficial to the defense. ( Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, 868.) Other heightened statutory requirements, like jury unanimity and the reasonable doubt standard of proof, help mitigate the risk that an incompetent person would be erroneously adjudicated as an SVP in the first place. Second, the circumstances underlying the SVP determination are monitored over time to determine whether a material change has occurred and whether continued commitment is warranted. Under the current scheme, persons adjudicated and confined as SVP'sincluding, presumably, those who may have been incompetent at trialmust have their mental condition examined at least once every year. (§ 6605, subd. (a).) An annual report on whether the person currently meets the definition of a sexually violent predator must be filed with the committing court. ( Ibid. ) Such defendant may petition for conditional release or unconditional discharge with, or without, the authorization or concurrence of the DMH. (See §§ 6605, subds. (b)-(d), 6608, subd. (a).) Defendants involved in this process are entitled to assistance from mental health experts and counsel. (See §§ 6605, subds. (a) & (d), 6608, subd. (a).) As a practical matter, such provisions mitigate the effects of any error in the commitment proceeding attributable to the reduced participation of a mentally incompetent SVP. For all these reasons, we cannot say that the risk-of-error factor weighs heavily toward finding the claimed due process right. The most critical factor, of course, involves the `government[al] interest[s]' that weigh against allowing SVP's to avoid being tried or committed while mentally incompetentan issue that Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, 866, did not confront or decide. Chief among these is the strong interest in protecting the public from sexually violent predators, and in providing treatment to these individuals. ( Ibid. ) As we have seen, such persons include those who have been convicted of qualifying sexually violent offenses, who have been diagnosed with mental disorders that seriously impair volitional control, and who present a substantial and credible risk that they will commit sexually violent predatory crimes if released. The Legislature has set forth comprehensive and detailed means for providing specialized treatment to persons adjudicated and committed as SVP's. In the process, as the SVPA provides, they are housed in secure facilities specifically dedicated to the confinement and treatment of persons whose mental disorders make them likely to commit violent predatory sexual offenses. The state's interest in enforcing these procedures, and in protecting the public, would be substantially impaired if an alleged SVP could claim, based on his diagnosed mental disorders, that he was too incompetent to undergo a trial leading to such targeted confinement and treatment. Indeed, as the exhibits supporting defendant's writ petition suggest, we can reasonably assume that significant potential overlap exists between those mental disorders that qualify someone for commitment as an SVP, on the one hand, and those that produce an inability to comprehend the proceedings or assist in one's defense on the other. Here, all three experts diagnosed defendant with a similar condition (bipolar and/or schizoaffective disorder with paranoid delusions, mood disorders and psychotic features). Two of them linked this disorder to his SVP diagnosis, while the third one found it affected his competence to stand trial. To allow anyone and everyone in this situation to seek a competence determination could require unknown numbers, possibly scores, of SVP commitment trials to be stayed indefinitely, and perhaps permanently, unless and until competence was restored under circumstances not involving confinement and treatment under the SVPA. Such concerns weigh heavily, and in fact dispositively, against recognition of a due process right of this kind. We are not the first court to reach this result. Similar public safety concerns have been expressed in an unbroken line of cases from other statesstates with commitment schemes that closely resemble the SVPA. These cases make clear that mentally incompetent persons may be tried, confined, and treated as SVP's. No due process right to avoid trial on mental competence grounds has been found. Unlike the instant Court of Appeal, we do not read the out-of-state cases as relying solely on the civil nature of the proceedings, or believe their views can be ignored. (See Nieves, supra, 846 N.E.2d 379, 385-386; In re Commitment of Fisher (Tex. 2005) 164 S.W.3d 637, 653-654; In re Commitment of Luttrell (2008) 754 N.W.2d 249, 251-252; In re Detention of Ransleben (2006) 135 Wn.App. 535 [144 P.3d 397, 398-399]; State ex rel. Nixon v. Kinder (Mo.Ct.App. 2003) 129 S.W.3d 5, 8-10 ( Kinder ); see also In re Detention of Cubbage (Iowa 2003) 671 N.W.2d 442, 445-448; cf. In re Commitment of Branch (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2004) 890 So.2d 322, 326-328 [declining to find general due process right not to be tried as mentally incompetent SVP, but preventing state from relying solely on hearsay evidence of uncharged crimes to commit such persons as SVP's].) Two of these decisions are particularly instructive. In Nieves, supra, 846 N.E.2d 379, which the trial court invoked in the present case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts balanced the competing interests, as we do here, to determine whether due process prevented a defendant who had been found mentally incompetent from being tried and civilly committed under the state's Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. The liberty interests were deemed substantial, especially since the scheme contemplated commitment for an indefinite term. Nevertheless, the court held that due process was not offended by requiring the mentally incompetent defendant, while represented by counsel, to undergo a commitment trial: [T]he defendant's interest must, with appropriate safeguards, yield to the Commonwealth's paramount interest in protecting its citizens. We see no reason why the public interest in committing sexually dangerous persons to the care of the treatment center must be thwarted by the fact that one who is sexually dangerous also happens to be incompetent. ( Nieves, supra, at p. 385.) For similar reasons, the appellate court in Kinder, supra, 129 S.W.3d 5, held that trial should not have been stayed under Missouri's version of the SVPA to determine the defendant's mental competence. The court noted that the very nature of civil commitments is to provide treatment for those who are dangerous to themselves or others because they suffer from a mental disorder that prevents them from comprehending and responding to reality. ( Kinder, at p. 8.) The court observed that due process permits the civil commitment and confinement of criminal defendants found chronically incompetent to stand trial. ( Id. at p. 10, citing Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715, 738 [32 L.Ed.2d 435, 92 S.Ct. 1845].) Kinder thus found nothing wrong with allowing a mentally incompetent person whose disorders involve sexual dangerousness to be committed, not for incompetence, but as an SVP, to afford him the most appropriate treatment and provide the public with the greatest protection. A contrary approach, the court said, would thwart the proper exercise of legislative authority for the health and welfare of the state's citizens .... ( Kinder, at p. 10.) For these reasons, Kinder held, the SVP defendant there failed to show that he had a due process right not to be tried while mentally incompetent. No California case addresses whether a mentally incompetent person can be tried and committed as an SVP. However, in People v. Angeletakis (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 963 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 377] ( Angeletakis ), the Court of Appeal declined to find such a due process right under closely related circumstances. There, the defendant had been found not guilty by reason of insanity of a felony offense, and committed to Patton State Hospital. Several years later, during a hearing to extend his commitment for the third time (see Pen. Code, § 1026.5), the defendant claimed through counsel that he was mentally incompetent to proceed. Without hearing any evidence on the issue, the trial court rejected the claim. At the ensuing trial, several experts testified that the defendant was a paranoid schizophrenic, that he was delusional and dangerous, and that his deteriorating condition was not always helped by medication. The jury found that the defendant presented a substantial danger of physical harm to others if placed in an unsupervised setting. Commitment was extended for two years. ( Angeletakis, supra, at pp. 966-967.) On appeal, the court rejected any suggestion that the defendant was entitled to the same statutory procedures or constitutional rights that applied to mentally incompetent persons being tried in a criminal case. Rather, the court examined and weighed the factors generally deemed relevant for determining the nature of due process protections in civil commitment proceedings. The court perceived little risk of error in light of the procedural safeguards available under the particular statutory scheme, including the right to counsel. The court also observed that such provisions provided for confinement and treatment under conditions designed to address the defendant's mental health concerns. On balance, no due process right to prevent recommitment on incompetence grounds was found. Only minimal protection would be gained by suspending trial until the defendant could understand the nature of the proceedings and assist in the conduct of his `defense.' ( Angeletakis, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th 963, 971.) Finally, we observe that substantial administrative burdens and practical difficulties appear to arise if a convicted sexually violent offender who qualifies as an SVP cannot be tried and committed as such while mentally incompetent. ( Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, 867.) It bears emphasis that the SVPA includes no provisions for incompetency proceedings in the context of commitment trials. The People thus contend that if the defendant is found incompetent to stand trial, and all proceedings under the SVPA are suspended as a result, courts are left without clear statutory guidance on such issues as the nature and length of any permissible placement, the provision of any treatment while the person remains incompetent, and the availability of civil commitment under another statutory scheme if competence is never regained. The People suggest that, while the Court of Appeal sought to fill the gap by adopting procedures reminiscent of those used for incompetent criminal defendants under Penal Code section 1367 et seq., its decision largely provides no satisfactory answers to these questions. We agree that any effort to apply Penal Code section 1367 et seq. under circumstances suggested by the Court of Appeal only serves to highlight the uncertainty that would arise were we to recognize a due process right not to be tried as an incompetent SVP. For example, the nature of any placement under the statutory scheme for incompetent criminal defendants depends in large part upon the charges pending against the person when the incompetence finding is made and criminal proceedings are suspended. It is uncertain how such a nature of charges distinction would apply to SVP defendants, who have already been convicted of, and imprisoned for, one or more sexually violent crimes. It also is not clear where incompetent SVP defendants would be confined pending their restoration to competency, or what treatment, if any, they would be offered during that time. We note that an incompetent criminal defendant charged with a violent felony may not be placed in a state hospital or other treatment facility unless it either has a secured perimeter or is locked and controlled, and the court finds that public safety will be protected in the particular case. (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(D).) Here, the Court of Appeal ordered that defendant be moved to a state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered if he was found incompetent to undergo another SVP trial. However, neither the Penal Code provisions on which the Court of Appeal so loosely relied, nor the provisions of the Court of Appeal's order, track the definition of secure facility under the SVPA, including its exclusions and limitations on the state mental hospitals that may be used to house SVP's both during and after trial. (§ 6600.05.) Nor do the criminal incompetency statutes provide for special treatment protocol[s], as set forth in the SVPA. (§ 6606, subd. (c).) These strict standards and protocols, whose purpose is to keep the community safe from the sexually predatory propensities of persons who qualify as SVP's, also help protect patients and workers inside the state mental hospital system. The danger to these groups would be enhanced if persons allegedly too incompetent to be tried and committed as SVP's were to be housed indefinitely, and perhaps permanently, in places not designed and staffed to deal with the peculiar risks they pose. Thus, as the People suggest, we would have no relevant template if we allowed SVP defendants to avoid trial while incompetent. These concerns seem particularly troubling where, as here, the defendant has already been committed under the SVPA, probable cause has been found that he is likely to reoffend, he has been ordered to remain in a secure facility pending trial, and proceedings to recommit him and continue his placement are underway. [16] (14) Balancing all the foregoing factors, and placing special weight on the paramount interest in public safety, we conclude that due process does not require mental competence on the part of someone undergoing a commitment or recommitment trial under the SVPA. ( Nieves, supra, 846 N.E.2d 379, 385.)