Opinion ID: 1171979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Degree of Discipline.

Text: (6a) Petitioner does not dispute the degree of discipline imposed. We have the ultimate authority to decide upon the degree of discipline, but the review department's recommendation is entitled to great weight. ( Beery v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 802, 815 [239 Cal. Rptr. 121, 739 P.2d 1289].) (7a) Petitioner's record of prior discipline weighs heavily against him. ( Mepham v. State Bar (1986) 42 Cal.3d 943, 949 [232 Cal. Rptr. 152, 728 P.2d 222].) Indeed, under new standard 1.7 of the State Bar Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct (eff. Jan. 1, 1986) [4] it is arguable that petitioner should be disbarred, since he has been disciplined on two prior occasions. We have permitted the use of these new standards as guidelines in assessing appropriate discipline for conduct predating the new standards. (See Greenbaum v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 543, 550 [237 Cal. Rptr. 168, 736 P.2d 754]; see also Kapelus v. State Bar, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 198, fn. 14, and cases cited.) Violations of rule 5-101 and former rule 4 have resulted in discipline ranging from private reproval, in Ames v. State Bar, supra, 8 Cal.3d 910 to two years' actual suspension in Krieger v. State Bar (1954) 43 Cal.2d 604 [275 P.2d 459] and Beery v. State Bar, supra, 43 Cal.3d 802. (6b) We must, of course, decide each case on its own facts, as there are no fixed standards as to the appropriate penalty. ( Alberton v. State Bar (1984) 37 Cal.3d 1, 14 [206 Cal. Rptr. 373, 686 P.2d 1177].) (7b) We regard petitioner's history of discipline with concern, and see further evidence in aggravation in petitioner's attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings. Also, petitioner not only failed to comply with rule 5-101, he misled his clients about the time they had in which to meet the obligation secured by the deeds of trust, and he changed the terms of the first agreement after Mr. Mederos had already executed it. In mitigation, petitioner presented the testimony of a superior court judge, a chief assistant public defender, and three district attorneys who had observed petitioner practicing for many years, and who uniformly praised his ability as an attorney and his dedication to his clients. One witness also described petitioner's zeal in undertaking pro bono work. Petitioner also testified in mitigation that he thought that the Mederoses had understood the terms of what he considered self-explanatory promissory notes. Petitioner's mitigating evidence, and the fact that we have not previously held that an attorney who takes a note secured by a deed of trust automatically acquires an interest adverse to his client, make petitioner's conduct in this matter less reprehensible than would be a violation of a more clear-cut and well-established rule. Accordingly, we adopt the recommendation of the review department. It is ordered that petitioner Richard Hawk be suspended from the practice of law for four years. Execution of suspension is stayed and petitioner is placed on probation for four years, with actual suspension of six months. Petitioner is ordered to comply with the other conditions of probation set forth in the review department's order. It is further ordered that petitioner comply with the requirements of rule 955 of the California Rules of Court and that he perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) of that rule within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the effective date of this order. We further order that petitioner take and pass the Professional Responsibility Examination within one year of the effective date of this order. ( Segretti v. State Bar (1976) 15 Cal.3d 878, 891, fn. 8 [126 Cal. Rptr. 793, 544 P.2d 929].) This order is effective 90 days after finality of this opinion.