Opinion ID: 6496841
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Graham Factor One: Type and Amount of Force

Text: Used The first Graham factor considers the type and amount of force used. To evaluate this factor, courts consider the specific factual circumstances, id., including the “risk of harm and the actual harm experienced,” Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 879 (9th Cir. 2012). Generally, the greater the risk of harm and actual harm suffered, the greater the governmental interest must be to justify the use of force. See id. Here, de Vries accelerated the police SUV past Seidner, sharply and abruptly turned the SUV nearly perpendicular to the bicycle’s path of travel, and stopped suddenly. The majority decides this maneuver constituted intermediate 24 SEIDNER V. DE VRIES force, not deadly force. But “all force—lethal and nonlethal—must be justified by the need for the specific level of force employed.” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 825 (9th Cir. 2010). “Deadly force” refers to “force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 693 (emphasis added); see also Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Est. of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir. 1997) (same). Nearly forty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that deadly force is appropriate only when “it is necessary to prevent [an] escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (emphasis added). 3 Our court has acknowledged that an automobile can inflict deadly force. See Acosta v. City & County of San Francisco, 83 F.3d 1143, 1146 n.9 (9th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); United States v. Aceves-Rosales, 832 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987) (“It is indisputable that an automobile can inflict deadly force on a person and that it can be used as a deadly weapon.”). Other circuits agree. See, e.g., Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 473 (8th Cir. 1995); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 949–50 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that striking a motorcycle with a patrol car constituted “an application of deadly force” in part because there was a “greater likelihood of death or great 3 The Supreme Court has since tempered Garner’s holding, see Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 8 (2021) (explaining Garner’s standard is “cast ‘at a high level of generality’” (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004))), but this does not change the definition of what constitutes deadly force. SEIDNER V. DE VRIES 25 bodily harm resulting from a collision with a motorcycle, as opposed to a car”). Our court has had occasion to consider the meaning of “serious bodily injury” in the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia-Luna, 562 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2009) (relying on the Sentencing Guidelines’ definition). 4 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “serious bodily injury” as “[s]erious physical impairment of the human body; esp., bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any body part or organ.” Injury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3)). The Ninth Circuit’s model jury instructions define the phrase similarly: “bodily injury that involves (1) a substantial risk of death; (2) extreme physical pain; (3) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (4) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a body part, organ, or mental faculty.” Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Ninth Circuit § 8.8 (2022 ed., updated Mar. 2022) (Assault Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury). In the district court, de Vries argued that his maneuver did not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and he provided a declaration in support of his summary judgment motion in which he stated: (1) he did not intend to use the SUV as a roadblock or to stop Seidner; and (2) he left about thirty feet between the SUV and Seidner’s 4 The Sentencing Guidelines define “serious bodily injury” as an “injury involving extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(M). 26 SEIDNER V. DE VRIES bicycle before bringing the SUV to a stop and believed that the bicycle would not have collided with the SUV if it had working breaks. The majority correctly dismisses this argument. The first problem with de Vries’s argument is that the Supreme Court held in Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 598–99 (1989), that a roadblock does constitute a seizure. The Court clarified in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998), that a seizure occurs “only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Here, though de Vries stated that he did not intend to create a roadblock, it is clear that he was attempting to stop Seidner’s bicycle, and the video shows that he intentionally swerved the SUV into the path of the bicycle to do so. As such, this case falls outside the hypothetical the Supreme Court provided in Lewis, where a “‘pursuing police car sought to stop the suspect only by . . . flashing lights and continuing pursuit,’ but accidentally stopped the suspect by crashing into him.” Id. As the Eighth Circuit explained, “[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment seizure out of an objectively reasonable use of force, nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.” Hawkins v. City of Farmington, 189 F.3d 695, 702 (8th Cir. 1999). The second problem with de Vries’s argument is that his subjective intent or belief is not relevant to the qualified immunity analysis. See Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 911 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Brower, 489 U.S. at 598 (explaining that it is “not . . . practicable to conduct [] an inquiry into subjective intent . . . to distinguish between a roadblock that is designed to give [an] oncoming driver the option of a voluntary stop . . . and a roadblock that is designed precisely SEIDNER V. DE VRIES 27 to produce a collision”). The objective evidence in this case is that the SUV blocked Seidner’s path of travel abruptly and without warning, and that Seidner’s bicycle was moving quickly. In other words, rather than using his patrol car to erect a roadblock that could be seen, anticipated, and avoided, de Vries rapidly accelerated ahead of Seidner and then sharply swerved in front of his path without warning. The maneuver he employed is akin to the one in Buckner v. Kilgore, 36 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 1994), where the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to an officer who used his squad car to erect a roadblock because some witnesses recounted that the officer pulled out in front of a motorcycle that had been traveling at a speed of up to 100 miles per hour just seconds before impact. Id. at 538–40. In roadblock cases, the failure to leave sufficient opportunity to avoid a collision makes all the difference. Id. The majority recognizes that the collision between Seidner’s bike and de Vries’s SUV happened almost immediately after the car swerved in front of the bike. Seidner had every incentive to avoid the SUV if it had been possible for him to do so, but yet his bicycle slammed into the SUV. De Vries’s bodycam video recording confirms that it was plainly visible Seidner was not wearing a helmet, making de Vries’s maneuver that much more dangerous. But even with protective equipment, the human body and a bicycle are no match for the metal behemoths that dominate our roads. Serious bodily injuries are entirely predictable when automobiles collide with cyclists. See, e.g., Surnow v. Buddemeyer, 380 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1061 (D. Haw. 2019). The vulnerability of cyclists is such that death or serious bodily injuries are foreseeable whether collisions are caused 28 SEIDNER V. DE VRIES by squad cars hitting bicycles or bicycles hitting squad cars. 5 A report issued by the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission explained that 486,703 emergencyroom visits in 2013 were attributed to bicycle accidents, and the mechanisms of injuries included bicycles being hit by cars, as well as bicycles hitting cars, bicycles colliding with other stationary objects, and cyclists flipping or being thrown over handle bars. 6 Under our precedent, swerving a vehicle to block the path of a quickly moving cyclist, without allowing sufficient distance for the cyclist to avoid a collision, constitutes deadly force because it creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. See Smith, 394 F.3d at 693. The majority agrees that the force de Vries used was capable of inflicting significant pain and causing serious injury, but “reject[s] the proposition that any collision with a person riding a bicycle without a helmet inherently creates a substantial risk of death or serious injury,” because “surrounding circumstances still matter.” This is incorrect. Surrounding circumstances can sometimes justify the use of 5 See Jennifer A. Brobst, Why Public Health Policy Should Redefine Consent to Assault and the Intentional Foul in Gladiator Sports, 29 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 10 (2015) (revealing that “[t]he highest number of sportsrelated deaths are from bicycle riding (head injuries from collisions with motor vehicles)”); NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: BICYCLISTS AND OTHER CYCLISTS 1–2 (Oct. 2021), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/ 813197 (stating that 846 pedalcyclists were killed in the United States in 2019, and an estimated 49,000 pedalcyclists were injured the same year, due to collisions with motor vehicles). U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, BICYCLE INJURIES SEEN 6 IN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS, 2013, at 3, 8 (May 13, 2016), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/BicycleInjuriesSeeninHospitalEmerg encyDepartments2013.pdf. SEIDNER V. DE VRIES 29 deadly force, but surrounding circumstances cannot change that this degree of force risks serious injury or death. The majority offers no response to the statistics published by the Department of Transportation and the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission showing that the highest number of sports-related deaths are attributed to bicycle riding, and explaining that some fatal accidents arise from bicycles hitting cars, some arise from cars hitting bicycles, and some arise from bicyclists flipping or being thrown over handle bars. These official statistics merely quantify a point that is virtually self-evident: Anyone who has ever flipped over the front end of a bicycle knows that doing so risks serious bodily injury. Because the amount and type of force de Vries used was substantially likely to cause serious bodily injury, it constituted deadly force. The first Graham factor requires the conclusion that de Vries’s maneuver can only be justified under the Fourth Amendment if the government had a significant need to use this degree of force. 2. Graham Factor Two: de Vries’s Interest in the Use of Force The second Graham factor looks to the government’s interest in the use of force. To assess this factor, courts consider: (1) the severity of the crime; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others; and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 443 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). This list is non-exhaustive. Rice, 989 F.3d at 1121. We consider the totality of the circumstances, including the availability of less intrusive alternatives to the force actually used and whether proper warnings were given. Id. at 1121–22. The most important consideration is “whether the suspect posed 30 SEIDNER V. DE VRIES an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.” Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith, 394 F.3d at 702).
Justified by Seidner’s Minor Traffic Infraction. The majority concedes that the most important Graham factor, whether Seidner posed a safety threat, favors Seidner, and it is uncontested that de Vries did not suspect Seidner of committing a serious crime when he activated the SUV’s overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop. De Vries admitted in his declaration that he turned on the SUV’s overhead lights only because Seidner was riding his bicycle without the proper lighting equipment, a non-jailable traffic violation in Arizona. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-121(B), 28-817, 281598. De Vries’s interest in stopping Seidner was further reduced because Seidner’s infraction was a non-jailable violation carrying a maximum penalty of $250. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1598. As the majority recognizes, de Vries’s bodycam video recording confirms that Seidner was riding in a well-lit area. De Vries argues that Seidner also violated section 28-622 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, a class 2 misdemeanor that criminalizes the failure to comply with an officer’s lawful order, because Seidner rode past the patrol SUV after de Vries activated its overhead lights. But in deciding that Seidner “fled,” the majority improperly construes the video in the light most favorable to de Vries. The video shows that Seidner was pedaling hard, but it does not show that he sped up or took evasive action after de Vries passed him and the overhead lights were activated. The district court observed, “[i]n the video, [Seidner] is riding up the street and does not appear to be attempting to flee into an area that [de Vries] could not access with his car.” Though the majority SEIDNER V. DE VRIES 31 describes the video as “unchallenged,” turning on the overhead lights and passing Seidner, without more, left some ambiguity in de Vries’s intent. Was he taking off in response to a call from dispatch? Was he signaling another vehicle that was outside Seidner’s view? This ambiguity could have been avoided if de Vries had verbally commanded Seidner to stop. Because the record is inconclusive on this point, the majority’s interpretation that Seidner was fleeing is improper at the summary judgment stage. See Rice, 989 F.3d at 1120 (holding courts of appeals must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party unless record evidence “clearly contradicts” the non-moving party’s version of the facts). There is no question that the police have a significant interest in apprehending those who violate the law, but it is also undeniable that this interest decreases with less serious violations. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (holding “that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it”); Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23 F.4th 863, 872 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that Ninth Circuit case law makes clear “officers must reassess use of force in an evolving situation as the circumstances change”); Bryan, 630 F.3d at 825 (observing that “all force . . . must be justified by the need for the specific level of force employed”). Traffic laws and laws ensuring people comply with officers’ lawful orders are important, but Seidner’s traffic violation—riding a bicycle without a light in a well-lit area—was about as minor as they come, and we have cautioned that traffic violations rarely justify the use of significant force. See Bryan, 630 F.3d at 828. In sum, because Seidner disputes that he intended to flee and we construe disputed facts in the light most favorable to 32 SEIDNER V. DE VRIES him, the most that can be said concerning this factor, even after considering the video evidence, is that Seidner was pedaling hard before the patrol car’s lights were activated and he did not stop when the lights came on. Consideration of the offense(s) in this case did not justify the use of deadly force.
Vries or Others. De Vries makes no attempt to argue that Seidner posed a safety threat to him by riding a bicycle without proper lighting on what appears to have been a deserted street. At oral argument, de Vries conceded that Seidner posed at most a “minimal” threat to others, and only because de Vries gave chase after Seidner pedaled past the SUV. If Seidner had fled from the police, the foreseeable pursuit could have endangered the safety of bystanders—except there were no bystanders. Seidner was on a deserted street at midnight. The majority agrees the evidence unambiguously established that Seidner did not pose an immediate safety threat to anyone. Thus, Graham’s most important factor weighs against de Vries’s use of force that, in my view, very apparently risked serious bodily injury or death.
The parties dispute whether Seidner fled, but there is no dispute that he pedaled past de Vries after the SUV’s overhead lights were activated. Unless we view the video in the light most favorable to de Vries, we cannot assume that Seidner resisted arrest or fled, but even if the applicable standard of review permitted that inference, this factor cannot justify the use of deadly force because Seidner was suspected of only a minor infraction and he posed no safety SEIDNER V. DE VRIES 33 threat. See Bryan, 630 F.3d at 825 (holding all force must be justified by its need).
Available and No Warnings Were Given. The reasonableness of de Vries’s vehicle maneuver is not assessed with 20/20 hindsight, Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, but courts do consider “the availability of less intrusive alternatives to the force employed and whether proper warnings were given,” Rice, 989 F.3d at 1122. De Vries did not verbally command Seidner to stop, and he gave no warning to Seidner before suddenly swerving in front of the bicycle. De Vries argues that blocking the roadway with the SUV was “the least forceful way he could have stopped [Seidner],” but this is clearly not the case. Nothing prevented de Vries from pulling beside Seidner and ordering him to stop. See Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining “the absence of a warning of the imminent use of force, when giving such a warning is plausible, weighs in favor of finding a constitutional violation”). Most important, nothing prevented de Vries from stopping the SUV farther in front of Seidner to reduce the chance of a collision. This factor weighs heavily against the use of deadly force because at least two notably less intrusive alternatives were readily available to de Vries’s sudden swerve in front of Seidner’s bicycle. 3. Graham Factor Three: There is Little to Balance. The final step in the Graham analysis requires balancing the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against the government’s need for that intrusion. See Rice, 989 F.3d at 1121. De Vries’s use of his vehicle to effectuate a traffic stop of Seidner’s bicycle constituted the use of deadly force 34 SEIDNER V. DE VRIES because it created “a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.” See Smith, 394 F.3d at 693. But that only accounts for Graham’s first factor: the type and amount of force used. Depending on the government’s need for the intrusion, the use of deadly force is sometimes justified. Under the circumstances of this case, however, the other Graham factors provide a woefully insufficient counterweight to justify the use of this degree of force. We have made clear that any force must be balanced by the need for that force. See Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Bryan, 630 F.3d at 825 (explaining that “all force . . . must be justified by the need for the specific level of force employed”). De Vries argues that his use of force was reasonable because “far more serious uses of force” have been found reasonable to stop fleeing motorists. But Seidner was not a fleeing motorist. (Indeed, under the appropriate standard of review, our court is not even permitted to treat him as a fleeing bicyclist.) De Vries primarily relies on two out-of-circuit cases, neither of which aid his cause. See Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 2007); Coitrone v. Murray, 642 F. App’x 517 (6th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). 7 In Abney, an officer tried to stop a motorcyclist for a traffic violation, but the motorcyclist failed to stop and proceeded to run another car off the road. 493 F.3d at 414. The motorcyclist wove through oncoming traffic, on a highway and other roads, in a chase that went on for eight miles. Id. at 413–14. The 7 The Coitrone case is unpublished, but the Sixth Circuit “permits citation of any unpublished [cases],” Sixth Circuit Rule 32.1(a), and may find them persuasive, see United States v. Keith, 559 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2009). Unpublished Sixth Circuit cases have no precedential authority. See id. SEIDNER V. DE VRIES 35 parties in Abney disputed whether the officer intentionally used his vehicle to stop the motorcyclist, but their vehicles collided and the motorcyclist brought a § 1983 claim. Id. at 413–15, 417 n.1. The court deemed the officer’s use of deadly force justified because, even if the officer had intentionally used his vehicle to stop the motorcyclist, the motorcyclist’s flight endangered the lives of others. Id. at 420–21. Coitrone involved similarly dangerous surrounding circumstances that justified the use of deadly force. An officer tried to pull over a motorcyclist after running his license plate and discovering outstanding warrants for kidnaping, rape, and other serious crimes. Coitrone, 642 F. App’x at 518. The motorcyclist failed to stop and exceeded the speed limit as he traveled in and out of the wrong lane to pass vehicles. Id. The parties in Coitrone disputed whether a second officer intentionally used his car to stop the motorcyclist, but their vehicles crashed. See id. at 519–20. Whether the police car struck the motorcycle or the motorcycle struck the police car, the driver was launched into a cement culvert. See id. at 519. The motorcyclist recovered from a coma and brought a § 1983 claim. Id. Not surprisingly, the court determined that the officer’s potentially intentional use of deadly force was objectively reasonable because Coitrone led the police on a chase that substantially and immediately risked serious physical injury to others. Id. at 521. The circumstances surrounding Seidner’s arrest were nothing like those in Abney or Coitrone. Far from weaving in and out of oncoming traffic on a motorcycle, exceeding the speed limit, and causing a chase that endangered other lives, Seidner was riding a bicycle on a well-lit deserted street, posing no safety threat to anyone. 36 SEIDNER V. DE VRIES At the time de Vries stopped Seidner, it was clearly established that a seizure occurs when the government terminates freedom of movement through means intentionally applied. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844. This includes the use of roadblocks where suspects in motorized vehicles do not have an opportunity to avoid a collision. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596–99. On appeal, de Vries wisely abandons the argument that he did not intend to seize Seidner, but he continues to argue that the force he used was reasonable. I agree with the majority that we have no case law addressing the use of a police car to stop a bicycle, but we have an obligation to provide guidance where it is possible to do so, and I do not see room for debate about whether using an SUV to block the path of a bicycle, without allowing sufficient distance for the bike to avoid a collision, “creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.” I would so hold. I would also rule that de Vries’s use of force was constitutionally excessive as a matter of law given application of the Graham factors to the surrounding circumstances. 8 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s Fourth Amendment excessive force analysis. 8 “Summary judgment at the appellate level is proper even though the prevailing party on the appeal did not move under Rule 56.” Wright & Miller, 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2716 (4th ed.). Indeed, we have ruled that an officer’s use of force was excessive even when the plaintiff did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001) (determining that an officer’s deadly force was excessive on appeal); see also Donovan, 17 F.3d at 949–51 (same).