Opinion ID: 2635594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Speedy Trial Protections under Article I, Section 22

Text: ¶ 14 Article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution provides that [i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right... to have a speedy public trial. Because we have not previously determined what a speedy public trial requires under our constitution, it is useful to review the speedy trial protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as a backdrop to the analysis of our own constitution. See State v. Fortune, 128 Wash.2d 464, 474-75, 909 P.2d 930 (1996) (noting that while federal cases are not binding for purposes of interpreting our state's constitution, they can be `important guides' in our analysis (quoting State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 61, 720 P.2d 808 (1986))). ¶ 15 The Sixth Amendment reads in relevant part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to a speedy trial `is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment.' Barker, 407 U.S. at 515 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (quoting Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967)). If a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial is violated, the remedy is dismissal of the charges with prejudice. Id. at 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 16 It is recognized that some pretrial delay is often inevitable and wholly justifiable. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686. However, the nature of the speedy trial right, which has been described as `amorphous,' `slippery,' and `necessarily relative,' makes it difficult to articulate at what point too much delay has occurred. Vermont v. Brillon, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 1290, 173 L.Ed.2d 231 (2009) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182). As the United States Supreme Court noted: It is ... impossible to determine with precision when the right [to a speedy trial] has been denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate. As a consequence, there is no fixed point in the criminal process when the State can put the defendant to the choice of either exercising or waiving the right to a speedy trial.... Thus ... any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case. Barker, 407 U.S. at 521-22, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). To provide guidance, the Court in Barker adopted an ad hoc balancing test that examines the conduct of both the State and the defendant to determine whether speedy trial rights have been denied. Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 17 As a threshold to the Barker inquiry, a defendant must show that the length of the delay crossed a line from ordinary to presumptively prejudicial. [3] Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686; Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. This inquiry is necessarily dependent on the specific circumstances of each case. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2182. For example, the Court noted that a tolerable delay for trial on an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge. Id. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Because drawing the line is a fact-specific inquiry, the Court expressly rejected the notion that the constitutional speedy trial right can be quantified into a specific time period. Id. at 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Moreover, a showing of presumptive prejudice cannot, by itself, prove a speedy trial violationmore is required. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655-56, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315, 106 S.Ct. 648, 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986)). ¶ 18 Under the Sixth Amendment analysis, once the defendant demonstrates a delay is presumptively prejudicial, that showing triggers the remainder of the Barker inquiry, which then examines the nature of the delay to determine if a constitutional violation occurred. See id. at 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Some of the factors relevant to this determination are the length and reason for the delay, whether the defendant has asserted his right, and the ways in which the delay cause prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. These are not the exclusive factors, as other circumstances may be relevant in the inquiry. Id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Nor are any of the factors, by themselves, necessary or sufficient. Id. ¶ 19 The first factor in the Barker inquiry, the length of the delay, focuses on the extent to which the delay stretches past the bare minimum needed to trigger the Barker analysis. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686. ¶ 20 The second factor in the inquiry is the reason for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. `[D]ifferent weights [are to be] assigned to different reasons' for delay. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (first alteration in original) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182). If the defendant asks for the delay or agrees to the delay, then the defendant is deemed to have waived his speedy trial rights as long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Barker, 407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. 2182. On the other hand, a deliberate delay caused by the government to frustrate the defense will be weighted heavily against the State. Id. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. If the State is merely negligent or the delay is due to overcrowded courts, the delay will still be weighed against the State, though to a lesser extent. Id. And a valid reason, such as a missing witness, may justify a reasonable delay. Id. ¶ 21 The third factor is the extent to which the defendant asserts his speedy trial right. Id. The Court in Barker recognized that a defendant is more likely to complain the more serious the deprivation is. Id. Therefore, the defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight. Id. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The defendant's assertions, however, must be objectively examined in light of the defendant's other conduct. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 314, 106 S.Ct. 648. If the defendant fails to assert the right, it will be more difficult to prove a violation. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 22 The fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay. Id. Prejudice generally involves (1) `oppressive pretrial incarceration,' (2) `anxiety and concern of the accused,' and (3) `the possibility that the [accused's] defense will be impaired' by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (alteration in original) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182). Pretrial incarceration disadvantages the accused because it often means job loss and disruption to family life. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. It also has a practical effect of hampering a defendant's preparation of his defense because he cannot gather evidence or contact witnesses on his own behalf. Id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 23 While impairment to the defense is the most serious form of prejudice, it is often the most difficult to prove because what has been forgotten [or lost] can rarely be shown. Id. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant is not required to substantiate actual prejudice to his ability to defend himself because excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Courts presume this prejudice to the accused intensifies over time. Id. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686. ¶ 24 With the federal law backdrop in mind, we turn to the parties' Gunwall analyses. [4] Iniguez and amicus WACDL argue that article I, section 22 offers greater protection than the Sixth Amendment. For support, they point to the longstanding time for trial rules in this state, providing that incarcerated criminal defendants must be tried within 60 days of commencement of the action. See former RCW 10.46.010 (1909), repealed by Laws of 1984, ch. 76, § 29; CrR 3.3(b). ¶ 25 The State responds that article I, section 22 was not intended to grant broader speedy trial rights than the Sixth Amendment, emphasizing that the texts of the state and federal provisions are almost identical. Additionally, the State argues that our prior case law adopts the language of the federal balancing test, which is proof that state speedy trial rights track rights under the Sixth Amendment. ¶ 26 To determine whether article I, section 22 should be interpreted to provide greater protection than the Sixth Amendment, we consider six nonexclusive, neutral criteria: (1) [t]he textual language of the state constitution; (2) [s]ignificant differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions; (3) [s]tate constitutional and common law history; (4) [p]reexisting state law; (5) [d]ifferences in structure between the federal and state constitutions; and (6) [m]atters of particular state interest or local concern. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 61-62, 720 P.2d 808. ¶ 27 Here, the first two factors do not favor recognizing greater protection under article I, section 22 because the language of the two provisions is almost identical. As noted above, the Sixth Amendment provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Washington Constitution article I, section 22 states that [i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a speedy public trial. Any textual differences between the two provisions are minor and do not provide a basis for reading article I, section 22 more expansively than the Sixth Amendment. ¶ 28 Likewise, the third factorstate constitutional and common law historydoes not suggest greater protection under article I, section 22. First, neither Iniguez nor amicus WACDL provides any historical evidence that the framers of the Washington Constitution intended a different scope of speedy trial rights than under the Sixth Amendment. Second, as we have said in another context, this factor might lean more toward independent analysis if the language of the state and federal provisions differed in any meaningful way. See State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 60, 882 P.2d 747 (1994) (noting that the third Gunwall factor would have much greater significance if article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution used language that differed in any great degree from the language used in the Fifth Amendment). ¶ 29 Neither does the fourth factor preexisting state lawsupport finding greater protection under article I, section 22. Iniguez and amicus WACDL argue that the long-time existence of statutes and court rules imposing restrictive time lines for trial indicate that article I, section 22 provides greater protection than the Sixth Amendment. However, Iniguez and amicus misinterpret the nature and purpose of those statutes and court rules. ¶ 30 While the statutes and court rules governing speedy trial rights were enacted for the purpose of enforcing the constitutional right to a speedy trial, they are not themselves a guaranty of constitutional rights. State v. Brewer, 73 Wash.2d 58, 62, 436 P.2d 473 (1968) (interpreting CrR 3.3's precursor, RCW 10.46.010). Instead, CrR 3.3 provides a framework for the disposition of criminal proceedings without establishing any constitutional standards. [5] 12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1207, at 256 (3d ed.2004). As a result, a violation of the rules is not necessarily a constitutional deprivation. State v. Fladebo, 113 Wash.2d 388, 393, 779 P.2d 707 (1989) (citing State v. White, 94 Wash.2d 498, 501, 617 P.2d 998 (1980)). ¶ 31 Further, the early versions of the time for trial rules did not necessarily indicate an intent to create a rule more stringent than the Sixth Amendment. Laws of 1909, chapter 249, section 60, codified as former RCW 10.46.010, provided that a dismissal for a violation of the time for trial provision did not bar the State from refiling charges, so long as the statute of limitations had not run. Brewer, 73 Wash.2d at 62-63, 436 P.2d 473. In contrast, a constitutional speedy trial violation results in a dismissal with prejudice. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182; see State v. Christensen, 75 Wash.2d 678, 688, 453 P.2d 644 (1969) (noting that dismissal with prejudice was not the appropriate remedy where there was no constitutional speedy trial violation). We previously emphasized that in enacting these time-for-trial rules, the legislature did not conceive []or contemplate that the limitation so established should become an inflexible yardstick by which the constitutional guarantees to a speedy trial of felony charges would be measured. Brewer, 73 Wash.2d at 62, 436 P.2d 473. ¶ 32 Additionally, our case law has never viewed speedy trial rights under our state constitution any differently from those under the federal constitution. [6] For instance, in State v. Alter, 67 Wash.2d 111, 406 P.2d 765 (1965), we had to determine whether a 10-year pretrial delay due to the defendant's commitment at Western State Hospital violated article I, section 22. In our analysis, we noted that whether a trial has been speedy `must be determined in the light of the circumstances of each particular case.' Id. at 119, 406 P.2d 765 (quoting State ex rel. Orcutt v. Simpson, 125 Wash. 665, 666, 216 P. 874 (1923)). In determining that the delay was not unconstitutional, we gave great consideration to federal case law, as well as case law from New York and Minnesota. Id. at 120-21, 406 P.2d 765. Importantly, we relied upon a federal case, United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir.1963), which laid out four factors a court should use to determine a speedy trial violation: `the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to defendant, and waiver by the defendant.' Alter, 67 Wash.2d at 120, 406 P.2d 765 (quoting Fay, 313 F.2d at 623). In adopting that federal analysis for a challenge under article I, section 22, we in no way indicated that the state constitution offered different or greater protection than the Sixth Amendment. ¶ 33 Similarly, in Brewer, we cited to Alter and applied the same federal four-factor test used there. Brewer, 73 Wash.2d at 62, 63-64, 436 P.2d 473. Again, in Christensen, we looked to the four-factor test as cited in Brewer to conclude there was no constitutional speedy trial violation. Christensen, 75 Wash.2d at 686, 453 P.2d 644. As before, we looked to federal case law to explain the four factors. Id. at 686-87, 453 P.2d 644. There was no mention in either Brewer or Christensen of any difference between the protections offered by the state constitution and the federal constitution. [7] ¶ 34 Turning to the fifth factor, differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions, we have previously noted that this factor generally supports greater protections under our state constitution. Russell, 125 Wash.2d at 61, 882 P.2d 747. The state constitution limits powers of state government, while the federal constitution grants power to the federal government. Id. (citing Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 66, 720 P.2d 808). ¶ 35 And lastly, the sixth factormatters of particular state interest or local concern does not suggest greater protection under article I, section 22. Iniguez and amicus again point to the long-standing statutes and court rules governing time for trial as evidence that this state has a particular interest in ensuring speedy trials. However, as discussed above, neither has shown that the State intended any of these rules to create a more stringent constitutional standard. As we previously observed, the choice of 60 days as the cut-off for bringing a defendant to trial is `arbitrary,' Brewer, 73 Wash.2d at 62, 436 P.2d 473 (quoting 5 RONALD A. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1912 n. 2 (Supp.1964)), in the sense that it reflects a policy choice made by the legislature and later this court. It does not dictate the Washington constitutional analysis or suggests that article I, section 22 protects speedy trial rights differently from the Sixth Amendment. ¶ 36 Accordingly, we hold that article I, section 22 requires a method of analysis substantially the same as the federal Sixth Amendment analysis and does not afford a defendant greater speedy trial rights.