Opinion ID: 3044691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Evidence of a Prior Conviction

Text: Mendoza contends that the District Court erred by allowing the government to introduce evidence of his prior drug conviction. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to admit evidence of a prior conviction. United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 95 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 2000)). Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 7 conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident ... .” The Supreme Court has established a four-part test for admission of Rule 404(b) evidence: “(1) the evidence must have a proper purpose; (2) it must be relevant; (3) its probative value must outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) the court must charge the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purposes for which it is admitted.” Givan, 320 F.3d at 460 (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)). In this case, the District Court found that the admission of evidence relating to Mendoza’s prior conviction met each part of the test. Independently, we conclude that evidence of Mendoza’s prior drug conviction was admissible under Rule 404(b) as evidence of his continuing relationship with his co-conspirators, since that conviction also involved Dan and Tim Bill. See United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2002) (“prior bad act evidence may be admitted for the purpose of demonstrating [defendant’s] knowledge of a conspiracy and relationship with one of its members”).