Opinion ID: 403761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Related Claims

Text: 23 In light of our resolution of the segregation duty issue, we can dispose of several of Yeager's other claims in summary fashion. The extent of the segregation duty is a question of law; the DEA's Vaughn submissions were not deficient for failure to index the contested material under the assumption that disclosure-avoidance techniques applied. For the same reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to seek an independent expert opinion; as a question of law, the resolution was within the competence of the court. 24 Yeager's claims that the district court employed improper standards in finding the withheld NADDIS materials exempt must also fail. Yeager attacks the district court's finding that even if the material was compacted it would be exempt because some likelihood that release could result in identification of individuals would remain. Final Order at 8 n.7; App. at 60 n.7. We need not reach that question, however. The district court found that disclosure of the contested material, in its present form, could reasonably be expected to lead to the identification of subjects in the NADDIS system. Final Order at 6; App. at 57. This was the proper standard. The District Court has discretion to determine what information, other than name and address, poses a risk of identifying a(n) (individual) and how great that risk is. Neufeld v. Internal Revenue Service, 646 F.2d at 661, 665 (D.C.Cir.1981). It is the function of the district court to determine what degree of risk is acceptable in light of the purposes that underlie the creation of the exemption. The district court properly exercised that function in this case. 25 Yeager's argument that the district court improperly took account of the administrative burden associated with deletion in determining whether the contested material was exempt is similarly meritless. The basis for the court's judgment was that the material, as it exists in the DEA's records, is exempt and that the Act imposes no duty to employ compacting. The court compared the processes and results of deleting and compacting and determined that compacting involved a different and potentially greater burden than deletion. Final Order at 8; App. at 59. The district court's able analysis clearly questioned only whether compacting was a duty under the Act.