Opinion ID: 202656
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prong Two: Whether the Law Was Clearly Established

Text: 83 The second prong of the qualified immunity analysis asks whether the constitutional right . . . was `clearly established' at the time of the incident such that it would `be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.' Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Pimpare, 392 F.3d 55, 65 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151). We consider whether existing case law gave the defendants fair warning that their conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Suboh v. Dist. Attorney's Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir.2002). In other words, the law is clearly established either if courts have previously ruled that materially similar conduct was unconstitutional, or if a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law [applies] with obvious clarity to the specific conduct at issue. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). We therefore consider whether materially similar cases or general Fourth Amendment principles gave Jones fair warning that it was unconstitutional for police officers to increase their use of physical force after an arrestee who has been resisting arrest stops resisting for several seconds and warns them that they are hurting his previously injured ankle. 84 We conclude that Jones had such notice. In Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir.1997), the Eleventh Circuit denied qualified immunity to a police officer accused of breaking the plaintiff's arm while putting on handcuffs. 17 According to the plaintiff, he was at his mother's house when a uniformed police officer, acting on a tip from an informant, entered the yard. The plaintiff then raised [a] baseball bat in a threatening posture and ignored the officer's order to drop it. Id. at 1418. When the officer threatened to shoot, the plaintiff fled. He soon encountered the police officer again, and then plaintiff docilely submitted to arrest upon [the officer's] request for him to `get down.' Id. In the process of putting on handcuffs, the officer bent the plaintiff's arm in a way that caused discomfort. Id. When the plaintiff complained, the police officer, with a grunt and a blow—but no sign of anger, broke his arm so severely that it required surgery for multiple fractures. Id. The court concluded that such use of force would be excessive and that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. 85 Although Smith helps to demonstrate that the law protecting Jennings from Jones' increased use of force was clearly established, our conclusion does not depend on this strikingly similar case. Instead, Smith emphasizes the obvious unconstitutionality of increasing the force used on an arrestee to such a degree that a broken ankle results, after the arrestee has ceased resisting for several seconds and stated that the force already used is hurting his previously injured ankle. The Supreme Court has explained that 86 general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though `the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.' Lanier, 520 U.S. at 271, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that Jones' conduct was such an obvious violation of the Fourth Amendment's general prohibition on unreasonable force that a reasonable officer would not have required prior case law on point to be on notice that his conduct was unlawful. Indeed, even in Smith, which was decided six years before the incident at issue here, the court concluded that the law was clearly established against the use of increased force on a suspect no longer offering resistance because the unlawfulness of the conduct is readily apparent even without clarifying caselaw. 127 F.3d at 1420. 18 87 Other circuits have rejected qualified immunity without a prior case exactly on point. In Rice v. Burks, 999 F.2d 1172 (7th Cir.1993), the Seventh Circuit noted that a plaintiff can defeat a qualified immunity defense 88 without identifying a closely analogous case if he show[s] that the force used was so plainly excessive that the police officers should have been on notice that they were violating the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, police officers should not be shielded from liability just because their excessive use of force happens to be original. 89 Id. at 1174 (internal citations omitted). Similarly, other courts have found that case law is not required where the constitutional violation is obvious. See, e.g., Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir.2006)(rejecting qualified immunity for handcuffing compliant nine-year-old girl because [e]ven in the absence of factually similar case law, an official can have fair warning that his conduct is unconstitutional when the constitutional violation is obvious); Smith, 127 F.3d at 1419 (stating that law is clearly established when the official's conduct lies so obviously at the very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of case law); Casteel v. Pieschek, 3 F.3d 1050, 1053 (7th Cir.1993) (stating that plaintiffs may show that the violation was clearly established using either a closely analogous case or evidence that the defendants' conduct is so patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable officials would know without guidance from the courts). 90 Although the dissent professes to accept, arguendo, that Jones increased the force he used to restrain Jennings after Jennings had ceased resisting for several seconds, it continues to describe a different version of events with the cases it cites to show that the law was not clearly established. Some of these cases involve the use, rather than the increase, of force. 19 Others are inapplicable because the arrestee was still resistant. 20 Critically, these cases do not address the key conduct at issue here: the increased use of force on a previously resisting but now non-resisting arrestee. 21 The dissent's reliance on such cases demonstrates its refusal to acknowledge that Jones' increased use of force was integral to Jennings' excessive force claim and that, consistent with our obligation to take the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, we must accept this version of the facts in evaluating qualified immunity. 91 When an individual has been forcibly restrained by several officers, has ceased resisting arrest for several seconds, and has advised the officers that the force they are already using is hurting a previously injured ankle, we cannot think of any basis for increasing the force used to such a degree that a broken ankle results. At the time of Jones' action, both existing caselaw and general Fourth Amendment principles had clearly established that this use of force was excessive in violation of the Constitution. 92