Opinion ID: 3133219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: R.C.P. 60(b) states:

Text: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than six (6) months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. Such motion does not require leave from the 11 aside or vacate a child support order by exercise of the court’s equitable powers. Waller v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 239, 192 P.3d 1058, 1063 (2008). For example, in Miller v. Miller, 96 Idaho 10, 523 P.2d 827 (1974), the Court reversed the trial court’s order modifying the child custody provision of a divorce decree as an improper collateral attack. Id. at 13, 523 P.2d at 830. The Court reasoned that the order allowed the mother to use the motion to modify as a collateral attack of the finding in the divorce decree that the child was the issue of the marriage. Id. The Court held that the mother “was precluded by the pleadings and the decree of divorce from raising the issue of paternity in this action to modify the custody provision of the divorce decree.” Id. The Court explained that “unless [the mother] can show a basis for reopening the action as provided in I.R.C.P. 60, she will be bound by the original judgment of the trial court which found that the child was the issue of the marriage.” Id. Likewise, in Levin v. Levin, 122 Idaho 583, 836 P.2d 529 (1992), the Court recognized that the magistrate court partially based its decision to modify child support on its characterization of the original child support award as “overly restrictive” and “not giving adequate weight” to the Guidelines. Id. at 588, 836 P.2d at 534. The Court determined that these considerations by the magistrate court “amounted to a collateral attack on the earlier court’s judgment which had not been appealed.” Id. Thus, the Court vacated the order modifying child support “because the magistrate’s finding of a material, permanent and substantial change in circumstances was based partially upon its erroneous collateral attack upon the prior court’s [original] support order.” Id. In this case, Monica could have timely objected prior to the entry of the original judgment, moved for reconsideration under I.R.C.P. 11(2)(B), filed a motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b), or appealed the judgment under I.A.R. 11. She failed, however, to use any of these remedies. Instead, she now uses her appeal of the magistrate court’s order denying her motion for modification to collaterally attack the original judgment on public policy and legal grounds. This appeal is not the proper mechanism to challenge the original judgment. Monica filed her motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(c), which provided the procedure for modifying child support Supreme Court, or the district court, as the case may be, as though the judgment has been affirmed or settled upon appeal to that court. This rule does not limit the power of a court to: (i) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding, or (ii) to set aside, as provided by law, within one (1) year after judgment was entered, a judgment obtained against a party who was not personally served with summons and complaint either in the state of Idaho or in any other jurisdiction, and who has failed to appear in said action, or (iii) to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. 12 orders. However, a person may only employ that procedure “upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances.” I.C. § 32-709(1). No such showing has been made here. Monica’s motion under I.R.C.P. 60(c) only allows a party to move for modification of the child support order based on a substantial and material change in circumstances. It does not allow the parties to re-litigate issues or raise new errors in the initial determination of the child support award in the original judgment. Based on Monica’s failure to properly challenge the original judgment, I believe that the Court should not reverse or vacate the magistrate court’s order denying modification based on some alleged error with the original judgment. I am also not persuaded by Monica’s suggested interpretation of Section 5 of the Guidelines and Idaho Code section 32-709(1). Idaho Code section 32-709(1) provides: “The provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification and only upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances.” I.C. § 32-709(1) (emphasis added). “The party petitioning for the modification bears the burden of proving that a substantial and permanent change has occurred.” Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223, 226, 254 P.3d 1219, 1222 (2011). [W]hether a change in conditions is “material” or “substantial” depends upon the impact of the change upon the child. . . . [T]he best interests of the child must take precedence in any analysis regarding a material change in circumstances. Likewise, the trial court must not only look to the substantial and permanent nature of any change in conditions proved by the proponent, but also thoroughly explore the ramifications of any such change vis-a-vis the children’s welfare. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The decision whether to modify an order of child support because of a substantial and material change of circumstances is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown.” Id. (quoting Noble v. Fisher, 126 Idaho 885, 888, 894 P.2d 118, 121 (1995)). To avoid the application of Idaho Code section 32-709(1), Monica offers various exceptions to the statute. I am convinced, however, that the legislature intended to enact a single, exclusive standard for child support modification. The legislature’s enactment of a specific standard in Idaho Code section 32-709(1) to allow modification of child support indicates its intent to provide for only one standard. “The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.” State v. Doe, 156 Idaho 13 243, 246, 322 P.3d 976, 979 (2014) (quoting State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007)). Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the statute. Pocatello v. State, 145 Idaho 497, 500, 180 P.3d 1048, 1051 (2008). Here, Idaho Code section 32-709(1) provides: “The provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified . . . only upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances.” I.C. § 32-709(1) (emphasis added). Based on this plain language, the legislature’s use of the word “only” unambiguously indicates the legislature’s intent to provide the single, exclusive standard for modification. The Court cannot create a public policy exception or apply an equitable remedy in light of this unambiguous statute. Similarly, Section 5 of the Guidelines does not allow Monica to circumvent the requirement of a substantial and material change in circumstances in Idaho Code section 32709(1). Section 5 provides: The amount of child support provided for under these Guidelines may constitute a substantial and material change of circumstances for granting a motion for modification for child support obligations. A support order may also be modified to provide for health insurance not provided in the support order. Idaho Child Support Guidelines (I.C.S.G.) § 5. Monica argues that Section 5 provides for a substantial and material change in circumstances any time there is a disparity between the child support ordered by the trial court and the child support recommended by the Guidelines—even if that disparity existed at the time the trial court ordered the child support. I decline to read Section 5 in a manner that renders Idaho Code section 32-709(1) obsolete. Idaho Code section 32-709(1) is essentially nullified by adopting Monica’s proposed interpretation. Under Monica’s interpretation, a party can return to court at any time to modify the amount of child support if that amount differs from the award recommended under the Guidelines. According to Monica, that disparity in and of itself is the substantial and material change in circumstances under Idaho Code section 32-709(1). This ability to modify child support without an actual change in circumstances plainly conflicts with Idaho Code section 32709(1). Contrary to Monica’s proposed interpretation, Section 5 does not allow a party to modify an award of child support without a substantial and material change in circumstances. Here, Monica and Christopher, with the representation and advice of counsel, entered into a private agreement to resolve their child custody and child support dispute. Because the parties were 14 represented by counsel, it must be assumed that the attorneys informed their clients of the Guidelines and the amount of child support recommended under the Guidelines. As found by the magistrate court, Christopher agreed to less visitation with the children in exchange for a lower child support payment, and Monica agreed to less child support in exchange for more custodial time with the children. After this private agreement was in place, Monica objected to Christopher’s motion to modify the judgment to alter the visitation schedule. She argued that there was no substantial and material change in circumstances. Now Monica wishes to modify the judgment to receive an increase in child support without altering the visitation schedule. Rather than a substantial and material change in circumstances, Monica’s reason for modification is simply that she has changed her mind on the terms of the private agreement. The magistrate court did nothing to create this agreement or dictate its terms. I believe that the Court should reject Monica’s proposed interpretation of Section 5 and decline to apply it to her motion for modification. To be sure, I recognize and appreciate the policy concerns expressed in the majority opinion. But they do not apply here. There is a distinguishing factor between this case and the run of the mill divorce case. In this case, there is no evidence in the record that the children are not being adequately taken care of by their parents. There is no evidence of financial hardship. There is no evidence that the children are deprived of the necessities. If there were such evidence, that may be a substantial and material change in circumstances to permit modification. But, in the absence of such evidence, there is no statutory basis for the Court to modify the award of child support. Moreover, there is no public policy basis, as submitted by this Court in the majority opinion, to void the original judgment because the evidence indicates that the children in this case are financially supported by their parents, despite the fact that Christopher pays only fifty dollars a month in child support. The parents entered into a private agreement for child support, child custody, and property division. This Court is not free to modify that agreement absent evidence of a substantial and material change in circumstances—which could include financial hardship on the children, but the Court was not presented with that issue here. In this case, after the parties reached an agreement that substantially benefited Monica, she simply changed her mind regarding the child support for no other reason demonstrated in the record, moving to modify the child support. I agree with the magistrate and the district judge, both of whom felt there was no justification for such modification and denied her motion. 15 16