Opinion ID: 1730359
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: administrative law principles

Text: We first conduct a historical examination of the right of agencies to appeal adverse decisions of other agencies in order to ascertain whether the legislature intended to give the Division the right to appeal a decision of the Commission. Prior to the enactment, and adoption by a majority of U.S. states, of the 1961 version of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, which specifically excluded agencies from being able to claim judicial review of decisions of other agencies, courts across the country faced the question of whether a subordinate official or agency had standing to challenge decisions of a superior administrative board or tribunal. Most of the earlier cases involved attempted appeals by tax assessors or other revenue officers from decisions of tax boards in favor of taxpayers, but some cases involved administrative agencies as well. In case after case, courts denied the officials or agencies standing to appeal. See In re Proposed Assessment of County Treasurer, 219 Iowa 1099, 260 N.W. 538 (1935); Ind. School Dist. v. Board, 230 Iowa 924, 299 N.W. 440 (1941); King v. Stark County, 72 N.D. 717, 10 N.W.2d 877 (1943); County Bd. of Educ. v. Parker, 242 Iowa 1, 45 N.W.2d 567 (1951); Dep't of Labor and Indus. v. Cook, 44 Wash.2d 671, 269 P.2d 962 (1954); Assessors of Haverhill v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 332 Mass. 357, 124 N.E.2d 917 (1955); Scearce v. Simmons, 294 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. App.1956); State ex rel. Belle-Bland Bank v. Donnelly, 287 S.W.2d 872 (Mo.1956); New York v. New York Univ., 3 A.D.2d 954, 162 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1957); State v. Donnelly, 365 Mo. 686, 285 S.W.2d 669 (1956); Sprague Oil Serv., Inc. v. Fadely, 189 Kan. 23, 367 P.2d 56 (1961); Fadell v. Kovacik, 242 Ind. 610, 181 N.E.2d 228 (1962). Over time, a number of exceptions developed, but invariably the exceptions arose in situations where the parties were truly adverse to one another. One such exception allowed a state agency to challenge the official ruling or action of another state agency where the interests represented by the agencies were geographically distinct or separate. See Milford v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 139 Conn. 677, 96 A.2d 806, 808 (1953). See also Moede v. Stearns County, 43 Minn., 312, 45 N.W. 435 (1890). [5] Moreover, prior to the enactment of the 1961 version of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, those states with statutory provisions requiring standing to appeal agency decisions, usually afforded relief to any person aggrieved but did not provide a technical definition of person. See Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 Act (U.L.A.) § 12 (superseded). Prior to the widespread adoption of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1961, the law across the country could have been summarized as follows: In common usage and in ordinary signification the term person does not include the sovereign, and in neither ordinary nor legal significance does the word embrace a government. The government ... and its agencies are not ordinarily to be considered as within the purview of a statute.... In general, the word person used in a statute will not be construed so as to include the sovereign.. or an agency thereof. See 70 C.J.S. Persons § 688 (1951) and 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 317 (1953). The original provisions of Louisiana's APA, enacted by Acts 1966, No. 382, were derived from the Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1961. The 1961 model act and the Louisiana APA contain identical definitions of person, as follows: any individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision, or public or private organization of any character other than an agency. (emphasis added). Professor Frank Cooper, in his treatise on state administrative law, explained the importance of the exclusion of agencies as follows: While the earlier version of the Model State Act contained no definition of the term person (nor, indeed, do most of the existing state administrative procedure laws), the Revised Model State Act, borrowing from the Federal Administrative Procedure Act incorporates a definition [of person] which is principally noteworthy in its exclusion of agencies from the term person. (Italics and bracketed matter added). The Revised Model State Act provides Section 1(6):  `Person' means any individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision, or public or private organization of any character other than an agency. This means, in net result, that while an agency is normally a party to the proceeding it is conducting, and while one agency may become a party to proceedings being conducted by another agency, still agencies are not as such entitled to the privileges which the Revised Model State Act creates for persons. This may become relevant in a number of connections. For example, Section 15 of the Revised Model State Act confers standing to claim judicial review on persons who are aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case. Basically, the concept is that there should be two categories: one for the agencies, and the other for all legal entities dehors the agencies. (emphasis added). Frank E. Cooper, State Administrative Law, p. 131 (1965). The widespread adoption of the Model Uniform Administrative Procedure Act of 1961 made it easier for state courts facing the issue of whether one agency could appeal an adverse decision by another agency. In Pritchard v. State, Div. of Voc. Rehab., 540 P.2d 523 (Wy.1975), Pritchard, an employee of the Wyoming Department of Health and Social Services (the department) was terminated. Pritchard sought review of the department's decision to terminate him with the Wyoming Career Service Council (CSC). After reviewing the case, the CSC reversed the department and ordered Pritchard reinstated. The department appealed the decision to a Wyoming state district court. Ultimately, the court reversed the CSC's order, and Pritchard appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court. On its own motion, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the department's appeal of the CSC order, and reversed the district court judgment. The court made that decision after recognizing that because the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act's [6] definition of person specifically excluded agencies, an agency could not be a person aggrieved or adversely affected and therefore could not appeal to the district court from an adverse ruling of the CSC. The court noted: We recognize the concept which holds that if an agency is given a specific right to appeal to the court, such a grant is within the power of the legislature and must be honored. But there must be an applicable appeal procedure spelled out in the statute. It cannot be inferred and, as here, where the statute specifically excludes an agency's right of appeal, there cannot be any question but that the agency enjoys no such appellate privileges. Id. at 529. Other decisions from across the country express this same view. See Williams v. Haw. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 71 Haw. 545, 798 P.2d 442 (1990); In re Eric G., 65 Haw. 219, 649 P.2d 1140 (1982); Iowa Dep't of Revenue v. Iowa St. Bd. of Tax Review, infra ; Mead v. State Dep't of Health, 91 Nev. 152, 532 P.2d 611 (1975); Ramsay v. Sarkas, 110 R.I. 590, 295 A.2d 416 (1972); Mortensen v. Pyramid Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 53 Wis.2d 81, 191 N.W.2d 730 (1971); State ex rel. Broadway Petroleum Corp. v. Elyria, 18 Ohio St.2d 23, 247 N.E.2d 471 (1969); Fadell v. Kovacik, 242 Ind. 610, 181 N.E.2d 228 (1962); E. Tenn. Health Improv. Council, Inc. v. Tenn. Health Facil. Comm'n, 626 S.W.2d 272 (Tenn.App.1981). While Louisiana's version of the APA maintains the definition of person from the 1961 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, the Model State Administrative Procedure Act was revised in 1981. The 1981 version of the model act defines person as: an individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision or unit thereof, or public or private organization or entity of any character, and includes another agency. See Model State Administrative Procedure Act, § 1-102(8), 15 U.L.A. 11 (1981). (emphasis added). [7] Unlike the 1961 definition, the 1981 definition of person acknowledges that an administrative agency may be considered a person under the model act's provisions. This definition is broader than the 1961 Revised Model Act definition ... because it includes an agency other than the agency against whom rights under this Act are asserted by the person. Inclusion of such agencies and units of government insures, therefore, that other agencies or other governmental bodies can, for example, petition an agency for the adoption of a rule, and will be accorded all the other rights that a person will have under the Act. Comment to Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 1-102, 15 U.L.A. 14 (1981) (emphasis added). In Hawaii, Dep't of Finance v. Haw. Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 77 Hawai'i 396, 885 P.2d 1137 (App.1994), a Hawaii county employee who unsuccessfully applied for employment with the county department of finance appealed the department's selection decision to the Hawaii County Civil Service Commission. The commission reversed the department, and the department appealed. The court held that under the pre-1993 statute governing appeals from administrative agency adjudicative decisions, [8] only a person (as opposed to an agency) could appeal an adverse decision by the commission, itself an agency. In deciding the case, the court held that under the statute in force at the time the appeal was taken (a statute almost identical to our statute) an agency was not a person who could appeal the decision of another agency. The court's conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction was based upon its examination of the wording of the Hawaii statute, which was based on the 1961 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, and by comparing it to the 1981 version of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act. After comparing the two statutes, the court concluded that the change in the Model State Administrative Procedure Act supported its denial of jurisdiction. The court noted: Hence, whereas the present definition of persons would preclude an agency ... from appealing an adverse decision to the circuit court, the revised definition of person, if adopted in Hawaii, would clearly permit the agency to file such an appeal, because the definition of a person entitled to judicial review under HRS § 91-14(a), would include an agency. Thus, the 1981 revision clearly establishes that the 1961 model act definition of persons which is like our own, did not permit a party agency to appeal an adverse order issued by an adjudicating agency. County of Hawaii, 885 P.2d at 1140. While the 1981 revision of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act would permit an agency, like the Division, to appeal an adverse decision of the Commission, the Louisiana Legislature did not enact the 1981 version of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act. It is undeniable that the Division is an agency as defined under Louisiana's APA. Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:951(2): [A]s used in ... [the Administrative Procedure Act] [a]gency means each state board, commission, department, agency, officer, or other entity which makes rules, regulations, or policy, or formulates, or issues decisions or orders pursuant to, or as directed by, or in implementation of the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution and statutes of Louisiana, except the legislature or any branch, committee, or officer thereof, any political subdivision, as defined in Article VI, Section 44 of the Louisiana Constitution, and any board, commission, department, agency, officer, or other entity thereof, and the courts. Under this definition, the Division is clearly an agency because, by virtue of its authority under La.R.S. 4:517 and 4:518, it makes rules, regulations, and policies in addition to formulating and issuing orders. Because the Division is an agency as defined in the APA, the Division is excluded from the APA's definition of person.