Opinion ID: 868100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Colque.

Text: 2013 WI 43 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 2011AP1240 (L.C. No. 1988FA73) STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT Patricia A. Johnson, Petitioner–Appellant FILED v. MAY 17, 2013 Michael R. Masters, Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Supreme Court Respondent–Respondent APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Kathryn W. Foster, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded. ¶1 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2009-10). It concerns a dispute over the enforceability of a pension award in a divorce judgment. The specific question we address is whether the circuit court erred when it denied Patricia Johnson's motion for the entry of a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) on the grounds that the motion was barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.40, a statute of No. 2011AP1240 repose,1 which states that action upon a judgment or decree . . . shall be commenced within 20 years after the judgment or decree is entered or be barred. Johnson had filed a motion on September 13, 2010, seeking to compel Michael Masters to provide pension information so that the necessary QDRO could be prepared and his Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS) pension could be divided in accordance with the judgment of divorce. The judgment in the divorce had been filed more than 20 years before, on July 20, 1989. With regard to the pension benefits, the judgment had awarded Johnson half of the value accrued during the span of the marriage and stated that a QDRO shall be submitted to secure these rights. ¶2 This court has upheld the application of Wis. Stat. § 893.40 in a family law context.2 We see no evidence for the argument that the legislature intended for family law judgments to be categorically exempted from its application though we recognize the realities of family court judgments and see some 1 We address the question as presented in the certification by the court of appeals and as briefed by the parties. We do not attempt to answer questions not raised by the certification. 2 That case involved an action by the State to enforce payment of child support that had been ordered in a divorce judgment. We held that Wis. Stat. § 893.40 governed the case. We said, [U]nder the statute, an action brought to enforce a child support judgment must be commenced within 20 years of the date when the judgment is entered. The period of limitation begins to run upon entry of judgment, irrespective of whether any payment under that judgment has been missed. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, ¶4, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832. 2 No. 2011AP1240 evidence that this court has made certain accommodations for the ongoing obligations that are common in that area. There is a twist in this case, however, that we consider dispositive of the question, and that is the fact that even though the 1989 judgment required the filing of a QDRO, the WRS was not authorized under statute to accept a QDRO related to this divorce until May 2, 1998. ¶3 In order to interpret the relevant statutes to avoid absurd or unreasonable results,3 and in order to constru[e] each in a manner that serves its purpose4 as we are bound to do, we hold that Johnson's motion is not barred by the operation of Wis. Stat. § 893.40. The judgment contained a provision that required the filing of a QDRO with the WRS, and it was not until 1998 that legislation authorized WRS to accept such orders for marriages such as this one that were terminated in 1989. It would be absurd and unreasonable to construe the statute of repose in such a way that it would begin to run at the time of a judgment with regard to a provision that assigned Masters' interest contrary to existing law, which was and continued for the next nine years to be that WRS pension interests were not assignable.5 Construing the statute as starting to run as to the 3 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 4 State v. Szulczewski, 216 Wis. 2d 495, 503, 574 N.W.2d 660 (1998). 5 Wis. Stat. § 40.08(1)(1987-88), in effect at the time of the 1989 divorce judgment, stated: 3 No. 2011AP1240 pension provision at the point when the provision was no longer contrary to law is a way to retain the statute's limiting function in a manner that serves its purpose. Under the circumstances present in this case6 where a statute precludes a provision in a judgment, the statute of repose cannot begin to run as to that provision until the legislature changes the law such that the provision can be carried out. In this case, that change went into effect on May 2, 1998, and the statute of repose will bar actions on such a provision only after May 1, 2018. We therefore reverse the order of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.