Opinion ID: 149531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence for Violation Findings

Text: King next argues that insufficient evidence supports three of the district court's violation findings. On a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a supervised release revocation, we ask whether, `viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements' of a violation by `a preponderance of the evidence.' United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). First, King challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the district court's finding that the federal prison inmates with whom King communicated by phone and e-mail were felons (rather than federal misdemeanants). But King's probation officerwhom the district court found credibletestified that King specifically admitted having been in telephonic and email contact with convicted felons and that on three other occasions King generally admitted all of the allegations in the petition. Additionally, King's probation officer testified that the Bureau of Prisons records she received indicated that King had been in regular telephonic and e-mail contact with a number of incarcerated felons. No evidence in the record indicated that any of the inmates with whom King communicated were not felons. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational judge had ample room to find that the federal inmates with whom King communicated were felons. Second, King argues that the district court lacked sufficient evidence to find that at the time of the alleged violation, he knew that his employer, Anna Moore, was a felon. At the revocation hearing, King's probation officer testified that King specifically admitted failing to report his knowledge that Moore was a felon and generally admitted all of the allegations in the petition on three other occasions. Moreover, King's probation officer testified that when she later confronted him about the violation allegation, he responded that Moore's status as a felon was `common knowledge.' [1] Finally, although Moore testified that she never told King that she was a felon, a rational judge could have concluded that King learned of her felon status from other sources namely, from King's close friend and Moore's ex-husband and drug trafficking co-conspirator, Kevin Moore, who helped King secure his job as her assistant. This evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient for the district court to find that King knew at the time of the violation that Moore was a felon. Third, King contends that the district court lacked sufficient evidence to find that his misrepresentation to his parole officer that he worked directly for Coldwell Bankerrather than for Moore, an independent contractor for Coldwell Bankerwas intentional. At the revocation hearing, King's probation officer testified that King specifically admitted to having misrepresented his position with Coldwell Banker and generally admitted all of the allegations in the petition on three other occasions. And King never produced any documentation suggesting he worked directly for Coldwell Banker; instead, the pay stubs he produced were from 123 Investment Inc. and signed by Anna Moore. King emphasizes that Moore testified that she considered herself to work for Coldwell Banker, but Moore never claimed to have told King that he worked for Coldwell Banker. Although perhaps open to other interpretations, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, this evidence was sufficient to support the district court's finding that King's misrepresentation was intentional. Thus, King's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges fail.