Opinion ID: 1404721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the october 3, 1881 deed is ambiguous

Text: By virtue of its summary judgment, the trial court found there was no ambiguity in the October 3, 1881 deed from Henry M. Lewis to Silas Boggs. Citing the two separate references contained in the deed, allegedly limiting the conveyance to property on the right fork of Lewis Creek, the Hoskins Heirs assert that the court erred in not finding the deed to be ambiguous and in not considering extrinsic evidence offered as to the intention of the parties. The Boggs Heirs, on the other hand, contend the deed is not ambiguous and thus, the general description mutt yield to the particular description. In Letcher County Coal & Imp. Co v. Marlowe, 398 S.W.2d 870, 873 (KY. 1966), we noted: It is generally recognized that where a deed contains both a general and a particular description and contains no language indicating which description shall prevail, the general must yield [to] the particular. On the other hand, where it is manifest from the entire instrument that the general description, in view of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, most clearly reflects the intention of the grantor, the construction will be adopted which gives it full effect. (Internal citations deleted). See also Hatcher v. Virginia Mining Co., 214 Ky. 193, 282 S.W. 1102, 1104 (1926). Moreover, [i]n determining the intention of the parties, courts look at the whole deed, along with the circumstances surrounding its execution, and courts may also consider the acts of the parties following the conveyance. Arthur v. Martin, 705 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Ky.App.1986). Then, if the ambiguity is not resolved by extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions, [t]he rule is . . . well settled that the deed will be construed most strongly against the grantor and in favor of the grantee if it admits of two constructions. Franklin Fluorspar Co. v. Hosick, 239 Ky. 454, 39 S.W.2d 665-66 (1931). See also Croley v. Round Mountain Coal Co., 374 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Ky.1964)(Since we think the meaning of the reservation is plain, there is no occasion to apply the rule that in case of ambiguity a deed will be construed most strongly against the grantor.). A deed is ambiguous when its language is reasonably susceptible of different constructions. Blevins v. Riedling, 289 Ky. 335, 158 S.W.2d 646, 648 (1942). Of course, [t]he construction of a deed is a matter of law, and [absent an ambiguity,] the intention, of the parties is to be gathered from the four corners of the instrument. Phelps v. Sledd, 479 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Ky.1972). Thus, the court may not substitute what [a] grantor may have intended to say for what was said. Id. It is [however,] to be assumed that the parties to a deed intended each of its provisions to have some effect from the very fact that the words were used [and][t]he rule is well settled that words in a deed that are not technical must be construed as having their ordinary connotation. Id. Whether or not there is an ambiguity in this instance must be determined from a reading of the premises, granting, and habendum clauses of the October 3, 1881 deed to Silas Boggs. The premises clause describes the property as lying and being . . . on the right hand fork of Lewis Creek. . . . The granting clause consists of three tracts, the second of which describes the Henry M. Lewis 500 acre patent (Patent No. 8158), portions of which would otherwise extend over onto Rockhouse Creek. The third tract conveys Henry M. Lewis' interest in the land surveyed in the name Of Henry M. Lewis and Abner L. Pace on the Right hand of Lewis Creek. This survey, from maps of record, lies on the opposite side of the Henry M. Lewis 500 acre patent the side away from Rockhouse Creek and is basically centered in the middle of the right hand fork of Lewis Creek touching portions of Rockhouse Creek only on two tips of the patent or survey. Immediately following the grant of the third tract is the language this is to inclose [10] all the Land we own on the right hand fork from the Mill Seat up. The trial court, in finding no ambiguity, construed this language, and the subsequent habendum clause, to be part of the third tract grant paragraph, rather than a limitation upon the granting clause, including tracts one, two, and three. This construction would, of course, limit the habendum clause, i.e., the grant to Silas Boggs, his heirs and assigns forever, and we will warrant and defend the same with a general warrantee this day and date above witnesseth, to only the third tract, as opposed to its natural and normal reference, to all grants contained in the deed. More importantly, however, it is to be noted from the deed, maps, and testimony of record, that the grant in tract three, i.e., the Henry M. Lewis and Abner L. Pace survey aforementioned, did not include (or inclose) all the land Henry M. Lewis owned at the time on the right hand fork yrom the Mill Seat up.  This could lead one to conclude that the statement referenced all three tracts contained in the granting clause. That being said, if it was intended to be a part of, and thus limited in its reference, to only the third tract, such logic would necessarily limit the habendum clause to the third tract, inconsistent with all normal rules of construction and drafting. Of course, one might speculate that in 1881, thirty-six years after the original survey, Henry M. Lewis and his children did not yet know the Patent lapped over into Rockhouse Creek, but one might find this to be inconsistent with subsequent land transfers in the area by the Henry Lewis Heirs and others, as is suggested by the 1985 Stoll, Keenon & Park title opinion. Moreover, the suggested limitation appears in the deed in two separate places and lilt is to be assumed that the parties to a deed intended each of its provisions to have some effect from the very fact that the words were used. Phelps, 479 S.W.2d at 896. The Boggs Heirs cite Marlowe, 398 S.W.2d at 873, Hatcher, 282 S.W. at 1104, and Bland v. Kentucky Coal Corporation, 306 Ky. 1, 206 SW.2d 62, 63 (1947), in arguing that a particular description of property always controls over a general description. We have previously cited Marlowe to the contrary and further note the following quote from Hatcher : That general rule, however, like most others in the law, is subject to exceptions, chief among which is that, if it appears from the conveying instrument, the surroundings of the parties, and their interpretation of it afterwards, it was the intention of the parties to give effect to the general description, and for it to prevail over the particular one, then that interpretation will be administered. . . . Id. at 1104. Bland deals only with the general rule, not the exceptions. Bland, 206 S.W.2d at 64. Thus, because the deed is reasonably susceptible of differing constructions, we conclude that the deed at issue in thi.s case is ambiguous, and that the court erred in not so finding. Having thus erred, it should consider on remand any admissible extrinsic evidence [11] concerning the ambiguity in determining the intent of the parties as to what was to be conveyed, prior to, or in aid of, determining the appropriate rules of constructions to be applied. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ALSO IMPROPER BECAUSE THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT We noted in First Federal Savings Bank v. McCubbins, 217, S.W.3d 201 (Ky.2006), that: The proper standard of review on appeal When a trial judge grants' a motion for summary judgment is whether the trial judge correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. CR 56.03. It has long been held that a trial judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and summary judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists and then the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to produce at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial. Id. at 203 (Citations omitted). Although the parties disagree whether the judgment of the court was in fact a summary judgment or a judgment on the merits, we note from the court's order on November 13, 2001, that the scheduled trial date of November 14, 2001, was cancelled as the court had been advised by the parties of their belief that the case could be disposed of by the cross-motions for summary judgment presently pending with the court. The case was then set for judgment conference. Moreover, in its Conclusions of Law, the court noted there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the execution, delivery, or recordation of the 1881 deed to Silas Boggs, as well as, the construction of a deed is a matter of law with the intention of the parties to be gathered from the four corners of the instrument. [12] The court then adjudged that the heirs of Silas Boggs are the owners of the portion of [the] patent lying on Rockhouse. Creek, although the October 3, 1881 deed to Silas Boggs could have only conveyed title to him, not to his heirs. The fact that they were the owners of this interest, had it passed to Boggs, requires a separate finding which was not addressed by the court as was contended for by the Hoskins Heirs in their Supplemental Authority in Support of [their] Motion for Summary Judgment. This is also the point of some of the extrinsic evidence offered, the admissibility of which was not addressed due to the determination of no ambiguity. There being genuine issues of material fact existing at the time, the entry of summary judgment was therefore in error.