Opinion ID: 38
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Present Action and District Court Decision

Text: Plaintiffs filed their complaint on February 1, 2007, the date on which the new rules were to take effect. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief from several of the new rules, including all those set forth above. Plaintiffs contended that these rules infringed their First Amendment rights because the rules prohibited truthful, non-misleading communications that the state has no legitimate interest in regulating. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the rules, and Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for, inter alia, lack of standing. The District Court (Scullin, J. ) reserved decision on Plaintiffs' motion and denied Defendants' cross-motion. Alexander v. Cahill, No. 5:07-cv-117, 2007 WL 1202402, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29823 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2007). Thereafter, the parties stipulated to a set of facts and exhibits that became the basis for competing motions for summary judgment. On July 23, 2007, the District Court filed its Memorandum-Decision and Order granting partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs and partial summary judgment to Defendants. Alexander v. Cahill, 634 F.Supp.2d 239 (N.D.N.Y.2007). Principally, the District Court found unconstitutional the disputed provisions of § 1200.50(c) set forth above, while concluding that the thirty-day moratorium provisions survived constitutional scrutiny. [4] Throughout its opinion, the District Court applied the test for commercial speech set forth in Central Hudson, which considers whether (1) the speech is protected by the First Amendment; (2) there is a substantial state interest to be achieved by the restriction; (3) the restriction materially advances the state interest; and (4) the restriction is narrowly drawn. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564-66, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). The District Court rejected Defendants' claim that the State of New York could ban attorney advertising that was `irrelevant, unverifiable, [and] non-informational' without reference to the Central Hudson test. Alexander, 634 F.Supp.2d at 246 n. 4. It concluded: Defendants have provided no legal support for this proposition, and the Court finds none. Although these characteristics may be evidence that an advertisement is misleading, they do not by themselves constitute a justification for banning commercial speech in the form of attorney advertising. Id. Turning to the amendments that restricted potentially misleading advertisements, including the disputed provisions of § 1200.50(c), the District Court found that Defendants' stated interest in protecting consumers from misleading attorney advertisements was a substantial one. Id. at 247-48. Under Central Hudson 's penultimate prong, which requires that the regulation materially advance the state's interest, however, the District Court concluded that the record was notably lacking. Id. at 248. The District Court gave considerable weight to Defendants' reliance on the New York State Bar Association's Task Force Report on Lawyer Advertising, but concluded that the Report provided sufficient support only for two amendments: the prohibition on the portrayal of judges in attorney advertisements, and the prohibition on the use of trade names that imply an ability to get results. Id. at 248-49. As to the remaining disputed portions of § 1200.50(c), the District Court emphasized that the Task Force Report had recommended disclosure and invigorated enforcement of existing rules, rather than any new content-based restrictions. Id. at 249. Finally, the District Court found that the two amendments that materially advanced New York's interest in preventing misleading advertising did not do so in a sufficiently narrowly tailored fashion. The District Court criticized Defendants for failing to produce any evidence that measures short of categorical bans would not have sufficed to remedy the perceived risks of such advertising being misleading. Id. at 250. The District Court therefore concluded that all of the disputed portions of § 1200.50(c) failed the Central Hudson test. With regard to the thirty-day moratorium on contacting victims, the District Court reached the opposite conclusion. The District Court recognized that New York's moratorium is broader than the Florida moratorium sustained by the Supreme Court in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995). Florida's moratorium was limited to direct-mail solicitation, while New York's provisions extend by their plain language to television, radio, newspaper, and website solicitations that are directed to or targeted at a specific recipient or group of recipients. Alexander, 634 F.Supp.2d at 253. Nonetheless, the District Court concluded that New York's moratorium materially advanced state interests in protecting the privacy of citizens and guarding against the indignity of being solicited for legal services immediately following a personal injury or a wrongful death event, and did so in a reasonably proportionate manner. Id. at 253-55. The District Court relied on an emerging consensus among authorities, state and federal, regarding the desirability of some form of moratorium, citing the Task Force Report's review of direct-mail moratoria in Florida and eight other states, the federal airline disaster moratorium (which prohibits not only direct-mail solicitation, but unsolicited communications generally for a forty-five day period, 49 U.S.C. § 1136), and the Supreme Court's opinion in Florida Bar. Alexander, 634 F.Supp.2d at 254. The District Court also noted the existence of `ample alternative channels' for the public to receive information concerning legal services during the moratorium period  namely, general advertisements in any media, provided they do not reference a specific tragedy. Id. (quoting Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 633-34, 115 S.Ct. 2371).