Opinion ID: 185696
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

Text: 14 The FSIA provides a basis for asserting jurisdiction over foreign nations in the United States. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443, 109 S.Ct. 683, 693, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989). The statute, which was originally enacted in 1976, confers immunity on foreign states in all cases that do not fall into one of its specifically enumerated exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607; McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d 1101, 1105 (D.C.Cir. 2001). These exceptions were crafted in order to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, under which immunity is generally limited to a foreign state's public or governmental acts ( jure imperii ) but withheld from its private or commercial acts ( jure gestionis ). See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1493 (11th Cir.1986). 15 The FSIA thus begins with a presumption of foreign sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1604, qualified by a list of specific circumstances in which that immunity is unavailable. These include cases in which the state has waived its immunity, id. at § 1605(a)(1), cases based upon various forms of commercial activity, id. at § 1605(a)(2), takings of property in violation of international law, id. at § 1605(a)(3), and torts committed in the United States, id. at § 1605(a)(5). The original FSIA was not intended as human rights legislation. See Jennifer A. Gergen, Human Rights and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 765, 771 (1996). Thus, no matter how allegedly egregious a foreign state's conduct, suits that did not fit into one of the statute's discrete and limited exceptions invariably were rejected. See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993) (holding that a claim arising from the detention and torture of an American citizen in Saudi Arabia was not based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States); Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that Libya retained its sovereign immunity for the bombing of Pam Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland); Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C.Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff could not recover for slave labor performed at Nazi concentration camps, because Germany's conduct was not commercial activity causing a direct effect in the United States and did not constitute an implied waiver of sovereign immunity); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that Argentina was immune from liability for acts of torture committed by the ruling junta); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Edwards J., concurring) (FSIA precludes jurisdiction over Libya for armed attack on civilian bus in Israel); cf. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 436, 109 S.Ct. at 689 ([I]mmunity is granted in those cases involving violations of international law that do not come within one of the FSIA's exceptions.). 16 Under the original FSIA, therefore, terrorism, torture, and hostage taking committed abroad were immunized forms of state activity. See H.R. REP. No. 103-702, at 4 (1994) ([T]he FSIA does not currently allow U.S. citizens to sue for gross human rights violations committed by a foreign sovereign on its own soil.). Indeed, in Nelson, the Supreme Court recognized that conduct of the sort alleged in the present case — wrongful arrest, imprisonment, and torture — amounted to abuses of police power, and however monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be, a foreign's state's exercise of the power of its police has long been understood for purpose of the restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature. 507 U.S. at 361, 113 S.Ct. at 1479; see also Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 403, 417-18 (1995) (observing that under the unamended FSIA efforts to persuade the courts to recognize a human rights exception to sovereign immunity had failed). 17 The mounting concern over decisions such as these eventually spurred the political branches into action. See John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission of International Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 34 (1999). In 1996, as part of the comprehensive Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act(AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221(a), 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), Congress amended the FSIA to add a new class of claims for which certain foreign states would be precluded from asserting sovereign immunity. Specifically, the amendment vitiates immunity in cases 18 in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources... for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency[.] 19 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). In enacting this provision, Congress sought to create a judicial forum for compensating the victims of terrorism, and in so doing to punish foreign states who have committed or sponsored such acts and deter them from doing so in the future. See Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F.Supp.2d 38, 50 (D.D.C.2000); Molora Vadnais, The Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 199, 216 (2000). 20 While such legislation had long been sought by victims' groups, it had been consistently resisted by the executive branch. See ALAN GERSON & JERRY ADLER, THE PRICE OF TERROR 212-26 (2001); H.R. REP. No. 102-900, at 3-4, 11 (1992). Executive branch officials feared that the proposed amendment to FSIA might cause other nations to respond in kind, thus potentially subjecting the American government to suits in foreign countries for actions taken in the United States. See Murphy, supra, at 35-37; H.R. REP. No. 103-702, at 12 (1994). Although these reservations did not prevent the amendment from passing, they nevertheless left their mark in the final version of the bill. 21 Section 1605(a)(7) has some notable features which reveal the delicate legislative compromise out of which it was born. First, not all foreign states may be sued. Instead, only a defendant that has been specifically designated by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism is subject to the loss of its sovereign immunity. § 1605(a)(7)(A). Second, even a foreign state listed as a sponsor of terrorism retains its immunity unless (a) it is afforded a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate any claim based on acts that occurred in that state, and (b) either the victim or the claimant was a U.S. national at the time that those acts took place. § 1605(a)(7)(B). In the present case, Libya has been designated as a sponsor of terrorism. See 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2001); Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 764 (2d Cir. 1998). Moreover, both plaintiffs are American citizens, and Libya does not contend that it has been denied a chance to arbitrate their claims. 22 If service of process has been made under § 1608, personal jurisdiction over a foreign state exists for every claim over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). In turn, the statute automatically confers subject matter jurisdiction whenever the state loses its immunity pursuant to § 1605(a)(7). See id. at § 1330(a). Personal jurisdiction determinations always have been made in this way under the FSIA. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 9 (1988) (commenting on this significant compression, whereby both competence [subject matter jurisdiction] and personal jurisdiction depend upon whether the foreign state is immune under the substantive rules in the act); see also Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F.Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (Weinstein, J.) (noting the way in which the FSIA collapses subject matter jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction, and sovereign immunity into a single inquiry). 23 Under the original FSIA, however, it was generally understood that in order for immunity to be lost, there had to be some tangible connection between the conduct of the foreign defendant and the territory of the United States. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 490 & n. 15, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 1969 & n. 15, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983); Lee M. Caplan, The Constitution and Jurisdiction over Foreign States: The 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 406-08 (2001); cf. McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 588 (9th Cir.1983) ([N]othing in the legislative history [of the 1976 Act] suggests that Congress intended to assert jurisdiction over foreign states for events occurring wholly within their own territory. Such an intent would not be consistent with the prevailing practice in international law.). In this way, the original statute's immunity exceptions prescribe[d] the necessary contacts which must exist before our courts can exercise personal jurisdiction. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13 (describing the Act's personal jurisdiction provisions as a kind of federal long-arm statute, one patterned after the District of Columbia's own long-arm law); see also Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits against Foreign States: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 11315, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1976) (statement of Bruno A. Ristau) (noting that this feature of the bill will insure that only those disputes which have a relation to the United States are litigated in the courts of the United States). 24 When Congress passed the original FSIA, it was assumed that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign states under the statute always would satisfy the demands of the Constitution. See Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffery Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction: Suing State Sponsors of Terrorism under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87 GEO. L.J. 675, 681-82 (1999). This assumption proved accurate. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1020 (2d Cir.1991); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1107 n. 5 (5th Cir.1985); cf. S & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that the `direct effects' language of § 1605(a)(2) closely resembles the `minimum contacts' language of constitutional due process and these two analyses have overlapped). Indeed, as some courts have noted, the nexus requirements imposed by the original FSIA sometimes exceeded the constitutional standard. See In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 253 (D.C.Cir.1998) (substantial contact required by § 1603(e) requires more than the minimum contacts necessary to ensure due process). 25 The antiterrorism amendments changed this statutory framework. Under § 1605(a)(7), the only required link between the defendant nation and the territory of the United States is the nationality of the claimant. Thus, § 1605(a)(7) now allows personal jurisdiction to be maintained over defendants in circumstances that do not appear to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause. See Caplan, supra, at 408 (Under its plain terms, the new law extends extraterritoriality much further than the traditional reach of the International Shoe [ Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)] standard.). 26