Opinion ID: 2635220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the jury was misinformed about the mens rea element of escape?

Text: [¶9] We have a well-established standard for the review of jury instructions, which standard incorporates the test to be applied when there was no trial objection: Jury instructions should inform the jurors concerning the applicable law so that they can apply that law to their findings with respect to the material facts, instructions should be written with the particular facts and legal theories of each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any one of several instructional options may be legally correct, a failure to give an instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction, and the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed. Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo.2001) (citing Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 23, 29 P.3d 76, 83 (Wyo.2001) and Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 908 (Wyo.2000)). We analyze jury instructions as a whole and do not single out individual instructions or parts thereof. Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo.2001). We give trial courts great latitude in instructing juries and `will not find reversible error in the jury instructions as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire set of instructions sufficiently covers the issues which were presented at the trial.' Id. (quoting Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 (Wyo.1997)). Brown v. State, 2002 WY 61, ¶ 9, 44 P.3d 97, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2002). Finally, we have indicated that when an appellant does not object at trial to the jury instructions, or request that a certain instruction be included, our review of this issue follows our plain error standard: First, the record must clearly present the incident alleged to be error. Second, appellant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way. Last, appellant must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice against him. Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 9, 34 P.3d 271, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2002) (quoting In Interest of CB, 749 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Wyo.1988)); see also Brown, ¶ 10. Leyva v. State, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d 873, 876 (Wyo. 2005). [¶10] The appellant did not object at trial to the jury instructions that were given, and did not offer any additional instructions. Therefore, we review this issue under our plain error standard. Succinctly stated, the appellant now contends that plain error occurred here because the district court failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crimeintentwhich is a fundamental error requiring reversal. See Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 940 (Wyo. 1997). [¶11] Nine instructions were read to the jury, two of which bear upon this issue. Instruction No. 2, in pertinent part, set forth the elements of the charged crime: 1. On or about July 3, 2004. 2. In Laramie County, Wyoming. 3. The Defendant, Brian Seymore. 4. Escaped from official detention. 5. While being detained as the result of a conviction for a felony. In turn, Instruction No. 3 defined the term escape in the context of an adult community correctional facility: A person placed at an adult community corrections facility is deemed to have escaped from that facility if, without proper authorization, the person fails to return to the facility within the time prescribed. The Frontier Corrections facility at which Mr. Seymore was placed is an adult community corrections facility. The parties have stipulated that Mr. Seymore was placed by the District Court at Frontier Corrections facility as a result of his conviction for a felony offense. [¶12] All first-year law students are taught that, as a general rule, every crime must contain two elements: an actus reus and a mens rea. Those terms are defined in Black's Law Dictionary 39 and 1006 (8th ed. 2004), respectively, as follows: [The] actus reus [is] the wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with mens rea to establish criminal liability; a forbidden act actus reus for theft is the taking of or unlawful control over property without the owner`s consent>.  Also termed deed of crime; overt act. Mens rea [is] the state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness mens rea for theft is the intent to deprive the rightful owner of the property>. Mens rea is the second of two essential elements of every crime at common law, the other being the actus reus.  Also termed mental element; criminal intent; guilty mind. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, ¶ 19, 86 P.3d 851, 858 (Wyo. 2004) (malice as the mens rea element of second-degree murder); Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶ 28, 64 P.3d 104, 113 (Wyo. 2003) (malice as the mens rea element of first-degree arson); Mitchell v. State, 865 P.2d 591, 596, 599 (Wyo. 1993) (physical intrusion as the actus reus and sexual arousal, gratification or abuse as the mens rea of second-degree sexual assault); and Mondello v. State, 843 P.2d 1152, 1163 (Wyo. 1992) (agreement as the actus reus in conspiracy). [¶13] In his brief, the appellant contends not only that the jury should have been instructed as to a mens rea element, but that it should have been instructed that escape is a specific intent crime. Not too long ago, we addressed the historical attempt to distinguish between specific intent and general intent crimes: Appellant`s claimed logical impossibility arises from the intent elements of these respective statutes. In the past, crimes have commonly been categorized by whether they require a specific intent or a general intent. For many years, Wyoming had several pattern jury instructions defining and explaining the two terms, and yet, the differences between the concepts were not always readily discernible. Realizing that the distinction between a specific intent crime and a general intent crime is apparently troublesome, we can perhaps clarify it by stating it in a somewhat different way. When the statute sets out the offense with only a description of the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed act. Such intention is general intent. When the statutory definition of the crime refers to an intent to do some further act or attain some additional consequence, the offense is considered to be a specific intent crime and then that question must be asked of the jury. Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo.1978). Following that logic, an attempt is a specific intent crime in that the attempt statute requires that one act with the intent to commit the object crime. On the other hand, we have held that second-degree murder is a general intent crime, because it requires proof only that the act was done voluntarily or deliberately, not that there was a specific intent to kill. Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 493 (Wyo.1992); Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822, 830 (Wyo.1991). We have acknowledged a trend in the law to dispense with the pattern jury instructions defining and explaining intent due to their vagueness and general failure to enlighten juries. Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo.1997). Instead, juries should be instructed as to the appropriate intent that is an element of the particular crime; it is more important that the jury understand what exactly they [are required] to determine. Id. This is consonant with our recent holding that the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed. Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo.2001). The point is that attempting formally to distinguish between specific intent and general intent, beyond the substantive elements of the crime, may not be the surest way to define the nature of the intent that must be proven. Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, ¶¶ 8-9, 55 P.3d 1259, 1262-63 (Wyo. 2002) (footnote omitted.). [¶14] It is the appellant`s argument that the specific intent element of escape is that a defendant must have specifically intended to evade the due course of justice by avoiding confinement. We cannot, however, find any indication in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206(a)(i) or Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-112 that the legislature intended there to be a specific intent element to the crime of escape, and we previously have said that escape is a general intent crime. Slaughter v. State, 629 P.2d 481, 483 (Wyo. 1981). Therefore, the appellant is not correct in arguing that the district court`s failure was the failure to include a specific intent element in the instructions detailing the elements of the crime of escape. [¶15] The fact that the appellant`s argument misses the mark does not, however, fully answer the intent question. The instructions were inadequate, but for a different reason: even a general intent crime requires a showing that the prohibited conduct was undertaken voluntarily. Rowe v. State, 974 P.2d 937, 939 (Wyo. 1999) ( citing Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 52 (Wyo. 1986)). The law of intent, as applied to the facts of this case, required the State to prove that the appellant voluntarily failed to return to FCS at the required time. Unfortunately, the jury was not instructed that it had to find the failure to return to have been voluntary. Without voluntary conduct, there is no mens rea. No crime has been committed, for instance, if an adult community corrections resident fails to return to the facility because of disabling injuries suffered in an automobile accident or a natural calamity. As we stated in Reilly, quoting from Dorador, [w]hen the statute sets out the offense with only a description of the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed act . Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d at 1262 (quoting Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1978)) (emphasis added). That was not done in this case, and we have repeatedly stated that it is fundamental error requiring reversal for a trial court to fail to instruct on an essential element of the charged crime. Leyva, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d at 876; Lapp v. State, 2004 WY 142, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d 862, 865 (Wyo. 2004); Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 2001); and Compton, 931 P.2d at 940.