Opinion ID: 774850
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the 1998 oregon traffic stop

Text: 31 We now turn to the more troublesome area concerning drug items seized and admitted into evidence at the trial itself. On June 15, 1998, Bishop and Youngs were involved in a traffic stop and subsequently arrested in the State of Oregon. 5 The trial court found that the evidence seized in the Oregon stop was relevant to the overall conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. 6 The evidence seized was not admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but as direct evidence at the trial itself. 32 Bishop argues that the June 1998 stop of his car in Oregon was invalid, and as such the district court erred by not suppressing the evidence seized during the search of Bishop's car. The Government now concedes that the 1998 search was illegal. See United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000). 7 In Twilley, this court found that an officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop a car bearing only a rear license plate simply because he erroneously believed the law required both a front and rear license plate. Id. at 1096. Nonetheless, the Government argues that the error committed by the district court was not prejudicial because the evidence was cumulative to other independent evidence presented at trial regarding Bishop's criminal activity. 33 On direct appeal, we apply the harmless-error rule of Chapman v. California, which requires the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 8 This court must be convinced that the improperly admitted evidence did not contribute to the verdict. See United States v. Lucas, 963 F.2d 243, 246 (9th Cir. 1992).Review for harmless error requires not only an evaluation of the remaining incriminating evidence in the record, but also the most perceptive reflections as to the probabilities of the effect of [the] error on a reasonable trier of fact.  United States v. Harrison, 34 F.3d 886, 892 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). 34 The Government argues that the admission of the evidence from the Oregon stop was harmless in view of the fact that there was other evidence, particularly the testimony of Holmes and Youngs, that supported the evidence of a conspiracy. Bishop, however, contends that the testimony from Deputy Layng and the evidence from the search of Bishop's vehicle provided powerful corroboration of Holmes' and Youngs' testimony about Bishop's methamphetamine activities. Bishop also asserts that the testimony from Youngs and Holmes about the June 1998 stop was not admissible, as it was fruit of the poisonous tree. See United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989). Alternatively, Bishop asserts that their testimony was brief and vague and was not cumulative of the testimony from Deputy Layng and the evidence seized from Bishop's car. 35 In examining the testimony of Holmes and Youngs, we find that their credibility was seriously challenged at trial and was quite limited as to the evidence seized during that Oregon stop. Holmes testified at trial that in June 1998, Bishop called him from the scene of his Oregon arrest and indicated he might be going to jail. Holmes asked him is there stuff in the car? and Bishop's response was yes. There was no further conversation about what was in the car. Holmes said that Bishop asked him to remove items from his home in Washington and take it to a storage place. 9 Holmes stated that he then went to Bishop's home and removed certain items, such as precursor chemicals, glassware that would compose a methamphetamine lab, receipts, and incriminating paper work. Holmes allegedly removed this material from Bishop's home and took it to the storage unit, the unit he disclosed to Detective Hess when he turned in Bishop. 36 Youngs testified at trial that he was arrested at the Oregon stop for a probation violation. Youngs explained that he had placed several items in Bishop's car without Bishop's knowledge, and that at the county jail Bishop told him all the items in the car had been confiscated. 37 The testimony provided by Holmes and Youngs about the Oregon stop provided little, if any, evidence of Bishop's methamphetamine activities. However, the evidence obtained from the Oregon stop provided ample proof that Bishop and Youngs were involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The testimony from Officer Layng and the stipulation 10 listing the items seized in Bishop's automobile, provided corroboration of the testimony from Holmes and Youngs, who were receiving deals from the Government in exchange for their cooperation. Of course, the credibility of Holmes' and Youngs' testimony was for the jury to decide. Nonetheless, we find their testimony about the Oregon stop was limited and vague. 38 In that sense, in the overall review of the record, we cannot say that the jury's consideration of the illegal Oregon stop did not materially affect its verdict on the conspiracy count as well as on the substantive conviction of Bishop for the establishment of a methamphetamine operation. The evidence seized at the illegal Oregon stop provided independent verification of the fact that Bishop had not only conspired with Youngs to manufacture methamphetamine, but that Bishop had established a methamphetamine operation at his home. Under the circumstances, this court cannot say this evidence did not influence the jury on both counts. Accordingly, under the rule of Chapman v. California the introduction of this evidence at trial was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In view of this holding, regardless of the admissibility of Holmes' and Youngs' testimony concerning the Oregon stop, even though such testimony might be considered admissible, it was not sufficient to overcome the prejudicial effect of the evidence seized at the Oregon stop and the stipulation of the items seized.