Opinion ID: 2807047
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of the 911 Call

Text: The plaintiff contends that the 911 call should have been excluded pursuant to various provisions of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. He argues that the 911 call was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, hearsay, and/or was made by a person lacking personal knowledge. We disagree. First, the caller’s statement–the “red truck, [it] pulled out in front of the vehicle”–is minimally probative to a determination of the proximity of the vehicles to one another and to the intersection. Because the plaintiff chose to offer a theory of liability that the plaintiff was already in the intersection and thus the defendant should have yielded regardless of who had the green light, the circuit court correctly ruled that this evidence was relevant and admissible under Rules 401 and 402 of the Rules of Evidence. See W.Va. R. Evid. 401 (providing that evidence is relevant if it tends to make fact more or less probable); W.Va. R. Evid. 402 (declaring that relevant evidence is admissible). 13 Second, the admissibility of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, thus the circuit court was not required to exclude it under Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence. See W.Va. R. Evid. 403 (providing that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice). In fact, the 911 call is fairly innocuous. The caller merely said that the truck pulled out in front of the car, and it is undisputed that the plaintiff did pull his pickup truck in front of the defendant’s car. Importantly, the 911 caller did not say who had the green light, who had the right-of-way, or whether either driver was speeding or driving in an otherwise unsafe manner. The plaintiff’s counsel was permitted to highlight these limitations in the 911 evidence for the jury, including during his cross-examination of the 911 official who authenticated the audio recording. Although the circuit court was previously concerned that the call might be to “some degree” prejudicial, that was based upon the court’s pre-trial understanding of the plaintiff’s theory of liability.6 Third, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when finding that the 911 caller’s statement was admissible under Rule of Evidence 803(1), the present sense impression exception to hearsay. This exception provided that “[t]he following [is] not 6 The plaintiff asserts that the 911 call was particularly prejudicial because it constituted the defendant’s entire case. However, the defendant had already testified at length as an adverse witness during the plaintiff’s case-in-chief. Although the defense did not call any additional witnesses, neither party has identified any other witnesses to the collision. 14 excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (1) Present sense impression.–A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.” W.Va. R. Evid. 803(1).7 The test for application of this exception is as follows: It is within a trial court’s discretion to admit an out-of-court statement under Rule 803(1), the present sense impression exception, of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence if: (1) The statement was made at the time or shortly after an event; (2) the statement describes the event; and (3) the event giving rise to the statement was within a declarant’s personal knowledge. Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Phillips, 194 W.Va. 569, 461 S.E.2d 75 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Sutherland, 231 W.Va. 410, 745 S.E.2d 448 (2013). Clearly, the 911 call was placed shortly after the accident. The call was made for the purpose of obtaining emergency responders to the accident scene, and the caller and the 911 operator discussed whether there were injuries. Furthermore, the statement about which the plaintiff complains–“the red truck, [it] pulled out in front of the vehicle”–is descriptive of the event. The plaintiff focuses on the third part of the Phillips test, arguing there is no evidence the 911 caller had personal knowledge of the accident. He suggests the caller might not have personally observed the collision and could have happened upon the scene post­ 7 This opinion quotes the version of Rule 803(1) that was in effect when this matter went to trial in 2013. Stylistic changes were made to the rule in 2014, but the substance remains the same. 15 accident. Having reviewed the transcript of the 911 call in the appendix record, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when rejecting this argument. The caller’s description of the scene, the drivers’ physical conditions, and the collision itself, all indicate that she had personal knowledge of the information she relayed to the 911 operator. Indeed, the plaintiff’s truck was spun around and resting in a different direction in the roadway from that in which it had been traveling, yet the caller was able to correctly recount that the truck had pulled in front of the car. As we have previously recognized, “if the statement is sufficiently descriptive, it may itself demonstrate the declarant’s knowledge.” Phillips, 194 W.Va. at 578, 461 S.E.2d at 84. Finally, the plaintiff asserts that if the 911 caller did not personally see the accident, then she would lack personal knowledge sufficient to allow her to testify about it–whether in person or via the audio recording of her telephone call. Rule 602 of the Rules of Evidence provided that “[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness’ own testimony.”8 We reject this argument for the same reason we rejected the plaintiff’s hearsay argument; the contents of the 911 call sufficiently establish that the caller had personal knowledge of the information she conveyed to the emergency operator. 8 This quote is of the version of Rule 602 in effect when the case went to trial. 16 Based on all of the above, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the audio recording of the 911 call into evidence.