Opinion ID: 167150
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. LaVallee's and Mr. Schultz's Sentences

Text: 160 As noted above, the enhancement for acting under color of law, see U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(b)(1), is fully reflected in the jury's verdict. The same can be said of the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(a)(2) (offense committed by two or more people) because both Mr. LaVallee and Mr. Schultz were convicted of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 241, which requires two or more persons as an element of the offense. Accordingly, these enhancements do not constitute constitutional Booker error. 161 In addition, the facts giving rise to the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(a), which is predicated on a finding that the substantive offense was not the sole object of the conspiracy, see U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt. 4, are also implicit in the jury's verdict. The jury instructions provided that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government proved that the single overall conspiracy alleged in Count I of the superceding indictment existed. The superceding indictment alleged that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to (1) unjustifiably strike, kick, assault, injure, and physically punish inmates; (2) falsely justify uses of force against inmates by falsifying records and fabricating injuries; (3) threaten officers to secure their silence; and (4) perpetuate an environment within the prison allowing unlawful beatings and assaults against inmates to continue indefinitely and with impunity. Clearly, then, the jury's guilty verdict against Mr. LaVallee and Mr. Schultz on the conspiracy charge reflects the fact that the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the beating of Mr. Castillo was not the sole object of the conspiracy. Therefore, this enhancement is also not constitutional Booker error. 162 Accordingly, only the other two enhancements—one two-level enhancement for a vulnerable victim and another two-level enhancement for a restrained victim — potentially violate Booker. Without these enhancements, the sentencing range supported by the jury's findings was 33-41 months' imprisonment, based on an offense level of 20 rather than 24. The District Court exercised its discretion to depart downward two levels from 24 to 22, however, and thus calculated the applicable sentencing range to be 41-51 months; the court ultimately sentenced both Mr. LaVallee and Mr. Schultz to 41 months. We stated in United States v. Yazzie that: 163 Booker made clear that it is the actual sentence, not the sentencing range, that must not be increased based upon judge-found facts in order to violate the Sixth Amendment: Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Apprendi: Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 164 407 F.3d 1139, 1144 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756). Because the District Court's judicial fact-finding did not increase the sentence beyond that authorized by the jury's verdict, there was no constitutional error. Id.; see also United States v. Small, 423 F.3d 1164, 1188 (10th Cir.2005). 165 Nevertheless, it is clear on appeal that the District Court's mandatory application of the Guidelines still constitutes non-constitutional Booker error that is plain. We need not decide whether Messrs. LaVallee's and Schultz's substantial rights were affected, however, because they have failed to satisfy their burden on the fourth prong of plain error analysis. See Yazzie, 407 F.3d at 1146 (declining to conduct a substantial-rights analysis because defendant could not satisfy the fourth prong of plain-error review). We will not notice non-constitutional error unless it is both particularly egregious and our failure to notice the error would result in a miscarriage of justice. Id. The Appellants have made no such showing here.