Opinion ID: 852101
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Benefits and Absence of Fault

Text: The employee also contends that her just cause discharge should not warrant a denial of her unemployment benefits because the purpose of the Indiana Unemployment Compensation Act is to provide benefits to persons unemployed through no fault of their own. Appellant's Br. at 11-12. She argues that [t]he Review Board's decision to find her ineligible, even though passing the driving test was beyond her ability, stands in direct conflict with this Court's recent opinion in Giovanoni. Id. at 12. Giovanoni involved an appeal from a Review Board decision denying unemployment insurance benefits on grounds that the claimant-employee was discharged for just cause because of absences from work in violation of the employer's no-fault attendance rule. 927 N.E.2d. at 908-09. There, the relevant statutory bases bearing on whether the discharge was for just cause were (a) an employee's knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer, and (b) an employee's unsatisfactory attendance, if the individual cannot show good cause for absences or tardiness[.] Id. at 909 (citing Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(2)-(3)). In Giovanoni, we held that a `no-fault' attendance policy ... may form an appropriate basis for discharge from employment but that eligibility for unemployment benefits following such discharge must consider whether, under the totality of circumstances, an employee's absenteeism is the result of circumstances beyond that employee's control. 927 N.E.2d at 912. We concluded that disqualification from benefits is appropriate only if [a]t a minimum, the claimant ... performed some volitional act or ... exercised some control over the circumstances resulting in the discharge from employment. Id. at 910. In contrast to the just cause bases for discharge in Giovanoni, both of which included express consideration of an employee's intent, Recker was discharged on grounds of breach of duty to her employer, which does not expressly require a finding of intent. Compare Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(2) (requiring a knowing violation of an employer rule to constitute a discharge for just cause), and Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(3) (requiring that an employee show good cause to exclude absences or tardiness from constituting a discharge for just cause) with Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(9) (defining just cause as any breach of duty without any corresponding reference to the employee's intent). In Giovanoni, we held that `just cause' determinations, as they pertain to an employee's discharge, must be consistent with the legislative purpose underlying the [Unemployment Compensation] Actto provide financial assistance to an individual who ... [is unemployed] through no fault of his or her own. 927 N.E.2d at 910. We were concerned only with a discharge for the violation of an employer's attendance rule, id. at 909, not with a discharge based upon an employee's breach of duty. Thus, we did not address whether the General Assembly intended to provide unemployment benefits to persons who unintentionally breach a duty to their employer. Unlike the grounds for discharge in Giovanoni, there is no specified statutory intent for discharges for breach of duty. [7] As noted in Giovanoni, a claimant is not eligible for unemployment benefits when the individual has performed a volitional act or ... exercised some control over the circumstances resulting in her discharge. Id. at 910. We find that Recker's unsuccessful attempts to properly back up a truck were matters over which Recker had some control under the Giovanoni analysis. The ALJ's findings adopted by the Board acknowledge that Recker believed that her first two failures to pass the driving test in Oklahoma were the result of clogged ears, but the Board did not find this contention to be significant. Unlike the claimant in Giovanoni, who suffered from seizures and debilitating migraines, id. at 908, Recker makes no appellate claim that her inability to meet the job requirements was affected by a demonstrable impediment. It was reasonable for the Board to find that Recker was discharged for just cause and is therefore ineligible for benefits.