Opinion ID: 1752969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Commission's Finding of Discrimination

Text: This leads us, then, to the second issue: Reviewing the Commission's decision, is its finding of discrimination unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted? We agree with the trial court that the necessary evidentiary support is lacking and that the complaint should therefore be dismissed. All parties agree, correctly, that this claim of discrimination under the St. Paul ordinance is governed by the standards developed under Title VII Laws, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Minn.1978); Lamb v. Village of Bagley, 310 N.W.2d 508 (Minn.1981). Consequently, the case has three stages: If the employee makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer must then articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the action taken. If the employer does so, then the employee must prove that the proffered justification is in fact a mere pretext for discriminatory action. The employer need only raise a genuine issue of fact to rebut the prima facie case and the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. [2] It appears Garcia may have made out a prima facie case. He showed that he was a member of a protected minority; that he applied for and was apparently qualified for the warehouse position; and that he was rejected for the position, after which the employer continued to seek applicants. Fisher Nut Company then asserted, however, a nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting Garcia, namely, that he failed to receive a favorable recommendation from his supervisor. This assertion raises the real issue here, whether the adverse recommendation as to Garcia's work qualifications was really a pretext for discrimination. Fisher Nut Company had set up five criteria for the job openings. [3] The fifth requirement was that the applicant be recommended by his or her supervisor as capable and deserving of the job. Palmer Peterson, Garcia's top-level supervisor, told the company's Human Resources Director that Garcia might not be able to get along with his new supervisor because he had a chip on his shoulder, and he felt that Garcia did not have a good attitude about cooperation with supervisors and would not be able to work without close supervision. At the hearing, Peterson testified that Garcia was not the kind of person to do any more work than he had to, and Peterson cited a time when Garcia told his immediate supervisor that he was not going to do certain work because he did not get paid enough money and that the supervisor should send a less senior employee instead. Peterson said he might have had a personality difference with Garcia, but he did not know. Peterson understood that the warehouse job required a person who would maintain productivity without constant supervision and that, based on Peterson's observations, he could not give Garcia a positive recommendation. The complainant countered with the testimony of Jack Zemlicka and Ronald Wethammer, who had been his immediate foremen, both of whom testified that Garcia was basically a good worker and competent for the warehouse job. Neither Zemlicka nor Wethammer had been consulted during the hiring process, but Fisher said this was because it considered them both union foremen and not company supervisors. Both foremen conceded there were a few minor incidents of Garcia's working a bit slowly or being in a sullen mood. Another general supervisor, Jerry Early, testified at the hearing that Garcia needed supervision and would not work any harder than he had to. Garcia conceded he could have said he was going to work slowly because he was not paid more, and while he also claimed he had little personal contact with Peterson, he conceded Peterson could have observed his work. Garcia argues that the subjective nature of the criteria used by Fisher makes its hiring procedure suspect. Fisher, on the other hand, argues it properly limited interviews to those who deserved the promotion. It argues that it is a legitimate business practice to reward with promotion only those employees who work extra hard, and thus while Garcia may have been capable of performing the new job's tasks, he did not necessarily deserve the promotion. Within this deserving factor, such things as work attitude become more critical. From this perspective, examples of Garcia's lack of initiative and his admitted occasional conflicts with supervisors would suggest some kind of attitude deficiency. While we have previously recognized that a subjective evaluation procedure has the potential to mask discriminatory selection, Kaster v. Independent School District No. 625, 284 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1981), there was no evidence that such was the case here. The supervisor's evaluation was grounded in specific factors and fairly well-defined criteria of attitude and behavior. The complainant's case was only an attempt to show that Garcia was in fact qualified for the job and that the supervisor's recommendation lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation. There was no attempt, however, to show that Peterson's adverse recommendation was, in truth, a pretext for his or anyone else's ethnic prejudice. Similarly, there was no proof that nonminority persons with employment records similar to Garcia's received better treatment by the employer. If anything, the evidence was to the contrary. Three white employees who, like Garcia, had no disciplinary write-ups were also denied interviews because of Peterson's evaluation of their work. Wethammer, the foreman who testified for Garcia, stated flatly that Garcia had not been discriminated against on the basis of race, and this evidence was never directly rebutted. Thus, as the trial court found, there was no substantial evidence that Fisher Nut Company's reasons for denying Garcia the warehouse position were a pretext for discrimination. Affirmed.