Opinion ID: 3011150
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assorted Challenges

Text: Madamba raises a number of arguments on appeal. First, he contends that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the jury's finding of individual liability under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) was against the weight of the evidence. Implicit in this argument is Madamba's assumption that the jury returned a verdict of individual liability under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). We do not agree with this assumption. The district court's charge in this case clearly stated that the individual defendants were liable, if at all, for aiding and abetting the employer's violation of the Act. Hurley argues that supervisors may be individually liable as employers under the LAD. The New Jersey courts have not specifically addressed the issue. The dissent makes a cogent argument for individual liability, and it is clear that reasonable people can disagree on this point. But the New _________________________________________________________________ 24. On remand, the district court must determine whether Madamba was part of upper management. The ACPD claims that Madamba was a captain, along with numerous others with that rank. Although Madamba clearly was a supervisor of the personnel under his command, the ACPD contends that he did not establish policy and was not at the top tier of the department so as to be part of upper management. If a factual dispute should arise, however, the issue would be reserved for the jury. 45 Jersey decisions cited by the dissent, see Dissent at 74-77, did not rule on individual supervisory liability, and hence we do not find them controlling. Nor do we think the statutory text offers guidance. While an employer may be one or more individuals under N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(a), that does not necessarily mean that supervisors, themselves employed by individuals or corporations, are employers. Title VII defines employer to include a person . . . who has fifteen or more employees or any agent of such a person, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e(b), and it could be subjected to the same analysis the dissent uses to find individual liability possible under LAD. We also note that imposing direct liability on supervisors, who are likely to be substantially judgment-proof, will not significantly add to the force of anti-discrimination law, which already gives employers incentives to ban discrimination and monitor supervisors' activities. We think that there is insufficient reason to predict that New Jersey would diverge from the federal scheme on this point. See, e.g., Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1996). In sum, while the point is close, as well as unclear, we are simply not willing to predict that New Jersey would include supervisors in the statutory definition of employer.25 Second, Madamba joins the ACPD's evidentiary challenges and its attack on the hostile work environment charge, which we have already rejected. Third, he objects that the court permitted the jury to find liability against Madamba on four separate theories of liability when they should have only considered liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment. We do not agree, because the various theories of liability were properly submitted to the jury. There was sufficient evidence on all theories to go to the jury, and the instructions clearly indicated that the mere presentation of a possible theory to the jury did not mean that any defendant was liable on that theory, or on any theory. We reiterate that the instructions indicated that _________________________________________________________________ 25. Trends may change, however, and a panel looking at this issue a year from now might see New Jersey pursuing a different course on supervisory liability through section 10:5-5(a). 46 the individual defendants were liable, if at all, for aiding and abetting the employer's violation of the Act. 26 Fourth, Madamba argues that the court's compensatory damages charge failed to instruct the jury that it cannot award damages for any conduct that plaintiff was not subjected to, aware of, or with respect to Madamba, which occurred prior to 1990. Madamba Br. at 49-50. But the relevant section of the instructions adequately limited Madamba's exposure by setting forth the time limits on recovery and the purposes for which the jury could use evidence of acts not directed at Hurley, even though it did not specifically mention Madamba at that point. See supra Section II.B.