Opinion ID: 52838
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alternative Theory Claim

Text: Reed seeks a COA on his claim that due process forbade the trial court from allowing the jury to convict him under two alternative theories without requiring unanimity as to one. Reed notes that the jury in his trial was instructed that it could convict Reed of capital murder either under a theory of murder in the course of robbery or attempted robbery or under a theory of murder in the course of attempted aggravated rape. The relevant portion of the jury charge instructs the jury that if it decided that the defendant did then and there intentionally cause the death of the complainant in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery of the complainant or in the course of attempting to commit aggravated rape of the complainant . . . then it must find the defendant guilty of capital murder, as charged in the indictment. In his federal habeas petition, Reed argued that because the general verdict form offered the jury only the option of finding Reed guilty or not guilty of capital murder, without specifying whether he was guilty of murder in the course of robbery or in the course of aggravated rape, it is possible that the jury did not unanimously find Reed guilty either of murder in the course of robbery or murder in the course of aggravated rape. [6] Reed cited Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991), arguing that Schad held that where there is a material difference requiring separate theories of crime to be treated as separate offenses, the United States Constitution requires separate jury findings. See id. at 633, 111 S.Ct. 2491. Reed argued that, unlike that in Schad, his jury charge did not merely describe two different means of commission of the crime of murder, but rather described two separate offenses. See id. at 631, 111 S.Ct. 2491. Reed also relied on United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.1991), where this court addressed compound jury charges in a perjury trial. There, this court held that where a single count as submitted to the jury embraces two or more separate offenses, though each be a violation of the same statute, the trial court must instruct the jury that it must unanimously find that the defendant committed at least one of the offenses to return a guilty verdict. Id. at 927. Reed argued that his jury charge was analogous to the one found inadequate in Holley. The district court briefly disposed of Reed's claim. The court noted that Reed raised this claim on his direct appeal and that it was rejected by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The Texas court had concluded that [w]here a statute creates a single offense, such as Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03, the different acts by which that offense may be committed may be alleged in the same count of the indictment. The Texas court further explained that the jury in Reed's case was not charged with two separate offenses, but with two alternate means of committing the offense of capital murder. The district court noted that the Texas court's disposition of this issue was a disposition under the merits under AEDPA and therefore receives the deference required by AEDPA. Citing Schad, the district court held that the Texas court's determination did not conflict with the relevant Supreme Court precedent. The court therefore denied relief to Reed on this claim and also denied him a COA. We conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate that the Texas court's decision was a reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. While Reed attempts to distinguish his case from the circumstances in Schad, where the Supreme Court held that the jury instructions in question were constitutionally permissible, the two cases are actually quite similar. In Schad, the defendant was tried and convicted of first-degree murder under a statute that defined first-degree murder as: A murder which is perpetrated by means of poison or lying in wait, torture or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate or premeditated killing, or which is committed in avoiding or preventing lawful arrest or effecting an escape from legal custody, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape in the first degree, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, or mayhem, or sexual molestation of a child under the age of thirteen years. . . . 501 U.S. at 628 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2491. At Schad's trial, the prosecution advanced theories of both premeditated murder and felony murder. The trial court rejected the defendant's requested jury instruction, which would have required the jury to agree unanimously on one of the alternate theories of first-degree murder. The plurality opinion of the Supreme Court, by Justice Souter, characterized the problem thus: petitioner's real challenge is to Arizona's characterization of first-degree murder as a single crime as to which a verdict need not be limited to any one statutory alternative. . . . Id. at 630-31, 111 S.Ct. 2491. The plurality wrote that [o]ur cases reflect a long-established rule of the criminal law that an indictment need not specify which overt act, among several named, was the means by which a crime was committed. Id. at 631, 111 S.Ct. 2491. The plurality noted that while its earlier cases involved alternatives for proving the requisite actus reus,  Schad's case involved what can best be described as alternative mental states, the one being premeditation, the other the intent required for murder combined with the commission of an independently culpable felony. Id. at 632, 111 S.Ct. 2491. The plurality continued that [w]e see no reason, however, why the rule that the jury need not agree as to mere means of satisfying the actus reus element of an offense should not apply equally to alternative means of satisfying the element of mens rea.  Id. The plurality acknowledged that there are limits on a State's authority to decide what facts are indispensable to proof of a given offense. Id. at 633, 111 S.Ct. 2491. It stated that identifying these limits raised the problem of describing the point at which differences between means become so important that they may not reasonably be viewed as alternatives to a common end, but must be treated as differentiating what the Constitution requires to be treated as separate offenses. Id. The plurality declined, however, to formulate a single test for the level of definitional and verdict specificity permitted by the Constitution, and disapproved of this circuit's former test from United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.1977). Id. at 637. Instead, the plurality asked whether Arizona's definition of first-degree murder was consistent with the demands of due process and fundamental fairness. Id. In doing so, the plurality stated, we look both to history and wide practice as guides to fundamental values, as well as to narrower analytical methods of testing the moral and practical equivalence of the different mental states that may satisfy the mens rea element of a single offense. Id. Looking to history and current practice, the plurality found that Arizona's first-degree murder statute was derived from the traditional common law definition of murder and that numerous states defined first-degree murder very similarly to Arizona. Id. at 640-41, 111 S.Ct. 2491. The plurality noted that numerous state court decisions have held that it was unnecessary for all jurors to agree upon a particular theory of first-degree murder where more than one was presented. Id. at 641. The plurality concluded that [s]uch historical and contemporary acceptance of Arizona's definition of the offense and verdict practice is a strong indication that they do not `offen[d] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental.' Id. at 642, 111 S.Ct. 2491 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)). In the second prong of its analysis, the plurality concluded that a moral equivalence between premeditated murder and felony murder could reasonably be found, which is enough to rule out the argument that [a] moral disparity bars treating them as alternative means to satisfy the mental element of a single offense. Id. at 644, 111 S.Ct. 2491. [7] In the instant case, we are faced not with alternate theories of premeditated murder and felony murder but with alternate theories of murder in the course of a robbery and murder in the course of attempted rape. It is a reasonable application of Schad, however, to conclude that the same result obtains. Looking to the historical analysis prescribed in Schad, we note that numerous states have traditionally defined and continue to define first-degree or aggravated murder as including both a killing in the course of robbery and a killing in the course of rape or attempted rape. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (2007); N.C. GEN.STAT. § 14-17; OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (2006). Indeed, the Arizona statute upheld in Schad did so. Looking to Schad 's moral equivalence analysis, we conclude that a court could reasonably find a moral equivalence between murder in the course of robbery and murder in the course of attempted rape. Accordingly, we hold that reasonable jurists would not debate that the Texas court reasonably applied Schad when it rejected Reed's challenge to his jury instructions. We therefore deny Reed a COA on this issue.