Opinion ID: 781597
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Cases Construing Similar Language in Other Treaties

Text: 55 Prior cases involving similar language in other treaties further illustrate that vague and general references to the law of the Requested State in treaties must be carefully construed in the context of all the language of the Treaty and cannot simply be read in mechanical fashion as the appellees contend. This Circuit in Martin v. Warden, Atlanta Pen, 993 F.2d 824, 829 (11th Cir.1993), dealt with similar language in an extradition treaty between the United States and Canada. In Martin, Canada failed to seek Martin's extradition for over seventeen years. Recognizing that there is no direct constitutional right to a speedy extradition, Martin argued that language in the treaty incorporated United States law, including the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, by providing that the person whose extradition is sought shall have the right to use all remedies and recourses provided by the law of the Requested State. Id. The court rejected Martin's attempt to read the language to incorporate either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment, i.e., the substantive law of the Requested State. Id. Accord Murphy v. United States, 199 F.3d 599, 603 (2d Cir.1999) (construing same language not to entitle a fugitive to the constitutional protections that underlie a United States statute of limitations). The Ninth Circuit has reached similar conclusions in two separate cases. That court rejected the argument that the treaty provision entitles the fugitive to invoke the protections that the requested state's laws afford defendants in domestic prosecutions. Matter of Extradition of Kraiselburd, 786 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.1986) (Kennedy, J.); Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.1984). 56 A district court opinion from 2000 explains the reasoning behind interpreting this type of treaty language as failing to incorporate wholesale the substantive law of the requested state. In Elcock v. United States, 80 F.Supp.2d 70, 77 & n. 10 (E.D.N.Y.2000), the extradition treaty provided that [e]xcept where this Treaty provides, the law of the Requested State shall be applicable with respect to provisional arrest, extradition, and transit. The court acknowledged that this reference to the `law of the Requested State' in connection with `extradition' might be read to suggest that the Treaty incorporates the substantive domestic law of the Requested State into the extradition provision of the Treaty. Id. at 77 n. 10. But, looking to ratification history, the court concluded that the treaty provision referred to the Requested State's procedures rather than its substantive law. Id. The court also noted that United States courts have consistently ruled that similar provisions in other treaties do not import substantive constitutional or statutory protections into the extradition context, citing Murphy, Martin, Kraiselburd, and Kamrin. The court concluded that: 57 Had the parties intended that each would apply its own [substantive] law in determining whether the requested extradition would violate double jeopardy principles, they could have clearly stated as much.... In the absence of such a provision, a court may not simply rely on the meanings the terms of the treaty have in the context of domestic law. 58 Id. at 77. 59 We recognize that all of these extradition cases involve factual scenarios and treaties that are quite distinguishable from the case we decide today. But, given that the seven appellees in this case are relying upon similar language to make the same type of argument that has been consistently rejected, we find these cases instructive. These cases make clear that vague and general treaty language referring to the law of the Requested State should not be read in a mechanical fashion and automatically interpreted as incorporating the substantive law of the Requested State, but should rather be read in full context of the purposes and objectives of the Treaty as a whole. 8 60