Opinion ID: 1129339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Issues in Mathis's Complaint Required Transfer of the Case to Circuit Court.

Text: ¶ 12. ERA argues, based on a recent line of cases from this Court, that the chancellor was without jurisdiction to hear this matter, was required to transfer this case from chancery to circuit court, and committed reversible error in failing to grant a transfer. See, e.g., Copiah Med. Assocs. v. Mississippi Baptist Health Sys., 898 So.2d 656 (Miss.2005); Crosby, 870 So.2d 1175; Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Smith, 854 So.2d 1045 (Miss.2003); Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So.2d 948 (Miss.2000); Southern Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So.2d 1088 (Miss.1999). This argument is based in large part on the fact that in those cases, as here, punitive damages were sought, a strong indicator that the matter is a legal action rather than an equitable one. Crosby, 870 So.2d at 1179 (stating that where a complaint seeks both actual and punitive damages, the remedy is clearly legal rather than equitable in nature.). ERA's position is also based on this Court's prior recognition that if some doubt exists as to whether a complaint is legal or equitable in nature, that case is better tried in circuit court since circuit courts have general, rather than limited, jurisdiction. Burnette, 770 So.2d at 952. ¶ 13. ERA claims that Crosby, a case in which we reversed a chancellor for failing to transfer to circuit court, is substantially indistinguishable from the instant case and should be considered as controlling law. In Crosby, Jacqueline Crosby and more than 350 other plaintiffs filed suit in chancery court against various insurance companies and their agents for selling them insurance policies using allegedly fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise improper sales practices. Crosby, 870 So.2d at 1178. The plaintiffs raised claims of fraud, fraudulent inducement, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, assumpsit, unjust enrichment, negligence, gross negligence, [ ] and conversion and requested relief in the form of a constructive trust, accounting, injunctive relief, actual damages and punitive damages. Id. at 1178-79. In finding that the chancellor erred in refusing to transfer the action to circuit court, we stated that [t]he record clearly shows that each and every one of Crosby's claims, even the equitable claims of unjust enrichment and constructive trust, arise from the sale and alleged breach of an insurance contract and that her claims were tied to the existence of a contractual relationship. Id. at 1182. We also reasoned in Crosby that it is more appropriate for a circuit court to hear equity claims than it is for a chancery court to hear actions at law since circuit courts have general jurisdiction but chancery courts enjoy only limited jurisdiction, especially in light of the fact that it is in circuit court that the constitutional right to a jury trial is preserved. Id. (Citations omitted). ERA also contends that Copiah, which was handed down after Crosby, affirmed the reasoning of Crosby in mandating a transfer from chancery to circuit court. [4] ¶ 14. Mathis attempts to prevent the application of our holding in Crosby to the present case by arguing that his complaint is a mixture of equitable and legal issues, but we find that Mathis's causes of action are primarily issues stemming from contractual obligations he contends were not met by the defendants. Breach of contract issues are best heard in circuit court. See Union National Life Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 870 So.2d 1175, 1180 (Miss.2004) (citing Southern Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So.2d 1088, 1089 (Miss.1999)). While we have allowed a chancery court to retain jurisdiction over cases involving questions of both law and equity, our more recent cases have held that equitable claims are more appropriately brought before a circuit court when they are connected to a contractual relationship or other claims tied to questions of law. See Copiah Med. Assocs'n v. Mississippi Baptist Health Systems, 898 So.2d 656 (Miss.2005); Crosby, 870 So.2d at 1175; RE/Max Real Estate Partners v. Lindsley, 840 So.2d 709 (Miss.2003). In addition, ERA would also be denied the opportunity for a jury trial if Mathis's claims are adjudicated by a chancery court, and plaintiffs should not be allowed to deprive defendants of their constitutional right to a jury trial simply by a choice of forum. See Crosby, 870 So.2d at 1182. The combination of factors pointing to a circuit court as a better choice than a chancery court for the case to be heard convinces us that the chancellor erred by denying the defendants' motion to transfer the case.