Opinion ID: 200347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Amount of Crack Cocaine

Text: We review factual findings by the sentencing court as to drug quantity only for clear error. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1196. The sentencing court has broad discretion to determine what information is sufficiently dependable to be used in imposing sentence. United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1st Cir. 1992). Because of the impact of quantity on the length of sentence, the sentencing court must err on the side of caution. United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 1990). But if the record permits more than one plausible alternative, the district court's choice between them cannot be deemed clearly erroneous. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1989). A defendant convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances is not automatically burdened with the total weight of the drugs involved in the conspiracy. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1197. The defendant, instead, is responsible for all drugs he personally handled or he anticipated handling, and for drugs involved in additional acts that were reasonably foreseeable by the defendant and were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. Hence, the touchstone for drug weight calculations is -14- foreseeability. See United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 488-89 (1st Cir. 1993). Foreseeability is an inherently fact-bound determination, and requires a sentencing court to make an individualized inquiry into the details of the conspiracy known by the defendant, including his understanding of the object of the conspiracy and its foreseeable scope. See United States v. O'Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1026 n.11 (1st Cir. 1992). Based on the presentence report (PSR), the district court included the 19.68 grams from the November 17 transaction (which forms the basis of Carey's substantive charge) and the 23.7 grams from the October 19, 1998 transaction (for which Carey was not substantively charged) in its determination that Carey was responsible for 43.38 grams of crack cocaine. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant has a Base Offense Level of 30 when he his responsible for at least 35 grams but less than 50 Grams of Cocaine Base. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (c) Carey attacks his sentence by first arguing that a discrepancy exists between the jury's finding that he was responsible for between 5 and 50 grams of crack cocaine and the fact that he was charged only with the distribution of 19.68 grams of crack cocaine for the transaction on November 17, 1998. We fail to see any discrepancy. Carey also claims that because he was substantively charged for only one of the four transactions (the distribution of -15- 19.68 grams on November 17), the district court should not have used cocaine quantities from the October 19 transaction in calculating his sentence. He further argues that the jury did not find him guilty of the October 19 transaction. As we have done in the past, we reject this argument. See United States v. Amirault, 224 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2000) (From the standpoint of due process, a district court may properly consider uncharged conduct at sentencing as long as that conduct either is admitted or reliably proved by a preponderance of the evidence); see generally United States v. Batista, 239 F.3d 16, 21-22 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 850 (2001) (sentencing guidelines require consideration of uncharged amounts of drugs by including all amounts that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of the conviction, whether or not the defendant has been charged with those transactions). As we have already described, Carey was extensively involved in the October 19 transaction. Thus, drug quantities from that transaction were reasonably foreseeable. See Innamorati, 996 F.2d at 491. Affirmed. -16-