Opinion ID: 2106543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alibi Rebuttal.

Text: Mr. Tucker contends that he was denied due process because the state failed to include the names of George Wigman and Virgil Tronset in the list of people who were to be called at trial to rebut Tucker's alibi. Wigman and Tronset testified as part of the state's case in chief and Wigman identified Tucker as one of the people running from the scene of the crime. The state contends that it was not required to provide Wigman's name because he was called in the case in chief. Sec. 971.23 (8) (d), Stats. 1975 provides that within ten days after the district attorney receives the defendant's notice of alibi, . . . the district attorney shall furnish the defendant notice in writing of the names and addresses, if known, of any witnesses whom the state proposes to offer in rebuttal to discredit the defendant's alibi. . . . In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 26 L. Ed.2d 446 (1970) the U. S. Supreme Court upheld a notice of alibi statute which provided for reciprocal disclosure of prosecution witnesses to the defendant. The court described the function of the statute as follows: Florida's notice of alibi rule is in essence a requirement that a defendant submit to a limited form of pretrial discovery by the State whenever he intends to rely at trial on the defense of alibi. In exchange for the defendant's disclosure of the witnesses he proposes to use to establish that defense, the State in turn is required to notify the defendant of any witnesses it proposes to offer in rebuttal to that defense. Both sides are under a continuing duty promptly to disclose the names and addresses of additional witnesses bearing on the alibi as they become available. The threatened sanction for failure to comply is the exclusion at trial of the defendant's alibi evidenceexcept for his own testimonyor, in the case of the State, the exclusion of the State's evidence offered in rebuttal of the alibi. Williams at 399 U.S. 80. In Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472, 93 S. Ct. 2208, 37 L. Ed.2d 82 (1973) the court held that the . . . Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants. Under the Oregon statute a defendant was required to give a notice of alibi or lose the right to present an alibi defense. The statute made no provision for reciprocal discovery for the defendant. In striking down the Oregon statute the court reasoned that criminal discovery is a two-way street and that, It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State. Wardius at 412 U.S. 476. The present Wisconsin alibi statute is sec. 971.23 (8), Stats. [4] The reciprocity provision of the statute was added by Ch. 196, Laws of 1973. Sec. 971.23 (8) (d) was originally 1973 Assembly Bill 1224, requested by the Judicial Council. The Judicial Council's Note to the bill reads as follows: The U. S. Supreme Court in Wardius v. Oregon, 93 S. Ct. 2208 (decided June 11, 1973) stated, in striking down the Oregon alibi statute: `. . . the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants.' This proposal adds to the present alibi statute the reciprocity provisions required by Wardius. The proposed statutory addition is [based on] the reciprocity provision of the Florida alibi statute, which received the approval of the U. S. Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In this case the state contends that when sec. 971.23 (8) (d), refers to . . . any witnesses whom the defendant proposes to offer in rebuttal to discredit the defendant's alibi . . . the word rebuttal refers only to the rebuttal portion of the trial. Mr. Tucker contends that due process requires that rebuttal be interpreted to refer to any prosecution witness who rebuts the alibi, even if called during the case in chief. [1] In Williams at 399 U.S. 80 the court stated that . . . the State in turn is required to notify the defendant of any witnesses it proposes to offer in rebuttal to that (alibi) defense. (Emphasis added.) Wardius at 412 U.S. 476 referred to criminal discovery as a two-way street. The Judicial Council's note to sec. 971.23 (8) (d), Stats. referred to the reciprocity provisions in the new statute. Discovery under sec. 971.23 (8) (d), Stats., must be reciprocal. When the defendant gives the names and addresses of people who will testify that he was not at the scene of the crime, the state must reciprocate by providing the names of people who will testify that the defendant was at the scene of the crime. This result is required regardless of when during the trial the state's witness is called. [5] Any other interpretation would allow the state to escape the reciprocity requirement of the statute by calling their identification witnesses during their case in chief. [2] Mr. Wigman's name should have been provided to defense counsel because he identified Tucker as being at the scene of the crime. Mr. Tronset's name did not have to be included in the list of alibi rebuttal witnesses because he did not identify Tucker at the scene of the crime. It remains to be determined what the proper remedy is for the state's failure to provide Wigman's name to the defense. Sec. 971.23 (8) (d), Stats., provides that the defendant is to be given the names of witnesses and that, In default of such notice, no rebuttal evidence of the alibi issue shall be received unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise. Sec. 971.23 (7), Stats., provides in pertinent part that, . . . The court shall exclude any witness not listed or evidence not presented for inspection or copying required by this section, unless good cause is shown for failure to comply. The court may in appropriate cases grant the opposing party a recess or a continuance. We point out when an error is claimed amounting to noncompliance with or abuse of the witness-list requirement, the error or abuse may in some cases be cured by the court granting the other party a continuance so he can adequately prepare for trial, People v. White, 123 Ill. App.2d 102, 259 N.E.2d 357 (1970); Gallegos v. State, 84 Nev. 608, 446 Pac.2d 656 (1968), or by recessing for a period sufficient to allow counsel to interview the witness. . . . People v. Armour, 133 Ill. App.2d 126, 263 N.E.2d 885 (1970); People v. Knox, 94 Ill. App.2d 36, 236 N.E.2d 384 (1968). The granting of a continuance or recess is to be favored over striking the witness. Williams v. State, 264 So.2d 106 (Fla. District Court of Appeal 1972). In order to qualify for a continuance or recess, most courts require the continuance be requested in a timely fashion and that the defendant be surprised and prejudiced by the testimony. People v. White, supra ; State v. Gaines, 6 Ariz. App. 561, 435 Pac.2d 68 (1967). Irby v. State, 60 Wis.2d 311, 321, 323, 210 N.W.2d 755 (1973). In Irby there was no reversible error where the prosecution called an unlisted witness, but the defense was given an opportunity to interview the witness during the trial and prior to the witness testifying. At a hearing on motions after verdict on January 6, 1975, the assistant district attorney in this case stated that he did not know that Wigman could identify Mr. Tucker until one-half hour before Wigman testified. The district attorney's ignorance of Wigman's testimony may have been good cause for granting a recess or continuance under sec. 971.23 (7), Stats., rather than excluding the testimony. Granting a continuance so that defense counsel could question Mr. Wigman would have been the favored remedy in this case. That continuance should have been granted unless there was no good cause for providing the name earlier, which does not appear to be the case here. Even if there was no reason for not providing the name, the more drastic and less favored remedy is to exclude the witness' testimony. [3, 4] Trial counsel in this case bypassed both of these remedies and instead moved for a mistrial at the end of the state's case. By this point the remedies of continuance or striking the witness were no longer possible. Under these circumstances an objection to the testimony of Wigman must be deemed to have been waived. Defense counsel may not procure a mistrial by objecting late to the testimony of witnesses. This is especially true where a timely objection would only have resulted in a continuance or striking of the witness' testimony. [5] There is no showing that the receipt of Wigman's testimony because of defense counsel's failure to timely object . . . substantially affected the defendant's right to a fair trial. McClelland v. State, ante, p. 145, 267 N.W.2d 843 (1978). See also Virgil v. State, ante, p. 166, 267 N.W.2d 852 (1978). We conclude that no plain error has been demonstrated in this case.