Opinion ID: 1374377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Verdict, Sentence, and Appeal

Text: On 8 March 2006, following defendant's trial, the jury returned its verdict finding defendant guilty of second-degree rape and one count of second-degree sexual offense but not guilty on the other count of second-degree sexual offense. Also on 8 March 2006, the trial court held a brief sentencing hearing, during which the prosecutor and defense counsel both gave statements but no witnesses were called. Afterward, the court stated its intention to sentence defendant within the presumptive range for the two convictions and stated further, I am going to impose a significant sentence against you, which is what the law calls for. The court then pronounced a sentence of 100 to 129 months imprisonment for the second-degree rape conviction, with credit given for time already served, and a sentence of 100 to 129 months imprisonment for the second-degree sexual offense conviction, with no credit given for time already served, all of the prior credit having been awarded in the first case. However, the court failed to specify whether these sentences were to run consecutively. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.15(a) (2007) (Unless otherwise specified by the court, all sentences of imprisonment run concurrently with any other sentences of imprisonment.). After the trial court complete[d] the matter and defendant was taken out of the courtroom, some discussion took place between the trial judge and the assistant clerk of superior court which was not transcribed nor made a part of the record. Following this exchange, the trial judge then stated: Madame Clerk, [defense counsel], that was a consecutive sentence. I want to make sure that was on the record with the defendant present. The clerk advised me that I did not say that was consecutive, and that was my intention. Defendant was escorted back into the courtroom, after which point the court stated that defendant's two sentences were to run consecutively, meaning defendant's sentence for second-degree sexual offense would not begin until the expiration of his sentence for second-degree rape. Judgment was entered accordingly. Defendant subsequently gave notice of appeal, and on 3 July 2007, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals found no prejudicial error in his sentencing, although the dissenting judge would have vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the case for the trial court to enter judgment imposing concurrent sentences. [1] Defendant now appeals to this Court as of right on the basis of the dissent.