Opinion ID: 789066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Electronic Communications Privacy Act

Text: 7 We review the district court's summary judgment dismissal of Hall's ECPA claim de novo. Perry v. Dowling, 95 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir.1996). We agree with the district court's conclusion that EarthLink did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) but write to further clarify the proper interpretation of this section. 8 Through the enactment of ECPA, Congress amended the Federal wiretap law in order to update and clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies. Sen. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555. ECPA is divided into Title I, which governs unauthorized interception of electronic communications, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, and Title II, which governs unauthorized access to stored communications, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711. Organizacion JD LTDA. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 124 F.3d 354, 356 (2d Cir.1997). This appeal concerns Title I exclusively. 9 Section 2511(1)(a) states that, except as otherwise provided, anyone who intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any ... electronic communication violates ECPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). The district court held that EarthLink did not intentionally intercept anything in violation of Section 2511(1)(a) because EarthLink merely received and stored e-mails precisely where they were sent-to an address on the EarthLink system. Hall, 2003 WL 22990064, at  2. The district court did not specify whether it based this holding on a determination that EarthLink's actions were not an interception, not intentional, or both. We hold that EarthLink's continued reception of e-mails sent to lot99 did not constitute an interception under ECPA because it was conducted as part of the ordinary course of [EarthLink's] business. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a). Because we hold that EarthLink did not intercept electronic communications in violation of ECPA, we do not need to decide whether EarthLink's acts were intentional. 10 EarthLink's act did not constitute an interception 11 ECPA defines the term intercept as the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any ... electronic ... communication 1 through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (emphasis added). ECPA provides an ordinary course of business exception applicable to this case within its definition of any electronic, mechanical, or other device. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a). [A]ny telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof ... being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business is not an electronic, mechanical, or other device, and therefore does not fall under the definition of intercept. Id. EarthLink acquired the contents of electronic communications but did so in the ordinary course of business and thus did not use any electronic, mechanical, or other device as defined by the statute. 12 Hall reads Section 2510(5)(a)'s ordinary course of business exception to apply only to an ISP 2 that uses telephone or telegraph instruments, equipment or facilities. Appellants' Reply Br. at 10 n. 6. EarthLink interprets the language to include ISPs that use any telephone or telegraph instrument or any equipment or facility. To resolve this issue, we look first to the plain language of Section 2510(5)(a). Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 290 (2d Cir.2002). The placement of the commas could suggest that the phrase telephone or telegraph modifies instrument, equipment, and facility. According to this reading, the ordinary course of business exception would apply only to an ISP using a telephone or telegraph. On the other hand, the placement of the commas could suggest that telephone or telegraph only modifies instrument. Accordingly, the ordinary course of business exception would also apply to an ISP using any equipment or facility. See generally United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 602-03, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995). 13 Because the plain language of Section 2510(5)(a) is arguably ambiguous and we do not find guidance from the statutory structure, we may look to the legislative history to clarify Congressional intent. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir.2001). The legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to apply Section 2510(5)(a)'s ordinary course of business exception to ISPs. To understand Congress' intent it is important to note that Internet technology has advanced significantly since Congress enacted ECPA in 1986. See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1051, 123 S.Ct. 2120, 155 L.Ed.2d 1095 (2003); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.2002). At the time ECPA was enacted in 1986, ISPs directed e-mail over telephone wires and were therefore included in the ordinary course of business exception. The Senate Report stated that [e]lectronic mail is a form of communication by which private correspondence is transmitted over public and private telephone lines.  Sen. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3562 (emphasis added). Congress' use of the term telephone was thus understood to include the instruments, equipment and facilities that ISPs use to transmit e-mail. Therefore, under both of the parties' interpretations, ISPs are included in Section 2510(5)(a)'s ordinary course of business exception. 14 Moreover, an interpretation that excludes ISPs from the ordinary course of business exception should be avoided because it would lead to an absurd result. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982) (Statutes should be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable results whenever possible.). If ISPs were not covered by the ordinary course of business exception, ISPs would constantly be intercepting communications under ECPA because their basic services involve the acquisition of the contents of electronic communication. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). Congress could not have intended this absurd result. Cf. Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 385-86 (2d Cir.2004). Thus, we hold that ISPs do not intercept if they are acting within the ordinary course of their businesses. 15 We must next determine, therefore, if there is a material issue of fact as to whether or not EarthLink was acting within the ordinary course of business when it continued to receive messages sent to lot99. EarthLink argues that it used its routers, servers and other computer equipment as part of its e-mail service to all customers, including Hall, in the ordinary course of its business. Appellee's Br. at 27. Hall asserts that intentionally seizing e-mail of someone who is no longer a customer is not within any ISP's ordinary course of business. Appellants' Reply Br. at 11. Hall, however, does not provide evidence to establish that EarthLink's actions were not part of its ordinary course of business. Hall presented evidence that his investigator sent an e-mail message to a fictitious EarthLink address, blot101@earthlink.net, and the message bounced back. This evidence, however, is not relevant to the ordinary course of business determination because the message was not sent to an e-mail address, such as lot99, that at one time existed on EarthLink's system. EarthLink, on the other hand, provided testimony that it was its practice at the time to continue to receive and store e-mails on the server's mail file after any account was cancelled. Moreover, EarthLink presented testimony that, at the time relevant to this action, it did not have the ability to bounce e-mail back to senders after the termination of an account. Because there is no evidence on the record that EarthLink was not acting within the ordinary course of its business, there is no material issue of fact and summary judgment was appropriate.