Opinion ID: 162439
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Challenged Search

Text: Mr. Sanders first challenges the district court’s admission of the evidence obtained in the May 26, 1999 search of his trailer home and quonset hut. This evidence consists of: (1) physical evidence, including the sawed-off rifle, other firearms, and various forms of drug paraphernalia and (2) Mr. Sanders’s statements in response to the discovery of the sawed-off rifle. The government acknowledges both obtaining the challenged evidence via an illegal search of Mr. Sanders’s property and the fact that, ordinarily, such a violation of Mr. Sanders’s rights would render the given evidence inadmissible. The government does argue, however, that the district court correctly applied the doctrine of inevitable discovery to salvage the admissibility of both the physical evidence and Mr. Sanders’s statements. Mr. Sanders, on the other hand, counters that the inevitable discovery doctrine is not properly applicable to either type of challenged evidence. We consider, in turn, the admissibility of the physical evidence and the admissibility of Mr. Sanders’s statements. In so doing, we review the ultimate Fourth Amendment issues de novo; we review any relevant district court factual -7- determinations, however, only for clear error. See United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Although we review the ultimate Fourth Amendment question de novo, the district court’s factual determinations are reviewed only for clear error.”).
Regarding the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine to the admissibility of the relevant firearms and the evidence of Mr. Sanders’s drug use, Mr. Sanders argues that we may not apply the inevitable discovery doctrine unless, at the time of the illegal search, the government had already initiated the alternative investigation by which the government would have inevitably discovered the challenged evidence. Our decision in a case that Mr. Sanders fails to discuss – United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984 (10th Cir. 1997) –, however, expressly rejects this position. In Larsen, the police, suspecting that Mr. Larsen was dealing in stolen cars, illegally searched Mr. Larsen’s home. During the search, the police discovered evidence confirming Mr. Larsen’s illegal conduct. Given the illegal search, a judge suppressed the discovered evidence, effectively destroying the prosecutor’s case. The local police contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”), passing to the FBI evidence obtained in the illegal search. Simultaneously, the FBI received a second tip suggesting the need to investigate Mr. Larsen. The -8- second tip arose when a police officer who participated in the illegal search happened to mention, to a local banker, the police suspicion regarding Mr. Larsen’s title to certain vehicles. Fearing that Mr. Larsen may have defrauded the bank in securing loans based upon those car titles, the banker followed routine procedure in filing a report with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”); the FDIC, in turn, followed routine procedure in notifying the FBI. The FBI, in possession of two tips suggesting an investigation of Mr. Larsen, did so, eventually bringing charges against Mr. Larsen. Mr. Larsen moved to suppress the evidence gathered by the FBI as a fruit of the illegal search (absent the illegal search, the FBI would never have been led to investigate Mr. Larsen). We salvaged the admissibility of the FBI’s evidence by invoking the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Larsen panel indicated that, insofar as the FBI investigation depended upon the first tip (from the local police), the FBI investigation was the fruit of the illegal search, thus leaving the FBI’s evidence inadmissable. The panel continued, however, by further indicating that the second FBI tip (via the banker and FDIC) was not fruit of the poisonous tree because the suspicion of the local police (communicated to the banker) predated the illegal search. Since the record contained evidence that the FBI would have investigated based upon the second tip alone, the panel affirmed the district court’s application of the inevitable discovery doctrine: the FBI would inevitably -9- have discovered Mr. Larsen’s bank fraud and money laundering via an independent, legal means. For the Larsen panel, the fact that the FBI investigation (the lawful means of discovering the evidence) was not ongoing at the time of the illegal search was not controlling. The inevitable discovery doctrine does not necessarily require that the separate, lawful means of obtaining the challenged evidence be “already underway”; rather, the doctrine requires “only that the investigation that inevitably would have led to the evidence be independent of the constitutional violation.” Larsen, 127 F.3d at 987. The panel further explained: “The fact that another investigation was already underway when a constitutional violation occurred is strong proof that [the alternative investigation] was independent of the illegal investigation . . . . However, it is possible for an investigation that begins after the violation to be independent of the illegal investigation.” Id. In Larsen, then, we squarely rejected Mr. Sanders’s contention: “We conclude [that] the inevitable discovery exception applies whenever an independent investigation inevitably would have led to discovery of the evidence, whether or not the investigation was ongoing at the time of the illegal police conduct.” Id. at 986 (emphasis added); see also 3 C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT , F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 677, at 375 n.14.1 (2d ed. Supp. 2002) (citing Larsen for the proposition just quoted); S TEPHEN E. H ESSLER , -10- E STABLISHING I NEVITABILITY W ITHOUT A CTIVE P URSUIT : D EFINING THE I NEVITABLE D ISCOVERY D OCTRINE E XCEPTION TO THE F OURTH A MENDMENT E XCLUSIONARY R ULE , 99 M ICH . L. R EV . 238 (2000) (arguing against rigid application of an active pursuit element of the inevitable discovery doctrine). Applying Larsen to Mr. Sanders’s case dictates admission, via the inevitable discovery doctrine, of the physical evidence discovered during the May 26, 1999 search of Mr. Sanders’s property. 2
We next consider the district court’s failure to suppress Mr. Sanders’s statements suggesting his ownership of the sawed-off rifle. Here we assume, though without deciding, both that (1) Mr. Sanders’s statements are suppressible as the product of the illegal search of his quonset hut and (2) that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to those statements, see, e.g., United States v. 2 While Mr. Sanders does not raise this point, we have, in a case postdating Larsen, referred to “steps taken to obtain a warrant prior to the unlawful search” as “prerequisite” to application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Souza, 223 F.3d at 1205. The ‘prerequisite’ description, however, constitutes dicta – and probably inadvertent dicta at that – in an opinion that, in another part, explicitly acknowledges, without challenging, the holding of Larsen. See id. at 1203 n.7 (“Larsen focused solely on whether the inevitable discovery rule requires proof of a separate investigation ongoing at the time of the constitutional violation.”). In any case, we are bound by our holding in Larsen until that holding is called into question by Supreme Court precedent or reviewed by our court en banc. See Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 900 & n.4 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[W]hen faced with an intra-circuit conflict, a panel should follow earlier, settled precedent over a subsequent deviation therefrom.”). -11- Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1998). Having assumed error in the admission of the contested statements, we hold that error harmless. The government, during briefing, neglected to raise the prospect of harmless error. 3 This failure requires us to pause to consider whether we remain free to raise that issue sua sponte. Where the government has failed to raise the prospect of harmless error, we enjoy a considerable degree of discretion in deciding whether to address that prospect. See United States v. Samaniego, 187 F.3d 1222, 1224-26 (10th Cir. 1999) (declining to apply harmless error review where the government failed to raise the issue); United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Lufkins v. Leapley, 965 F.2d 1477, 1481-82 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying harmless error review despite the government’s failure to raise the issue). In Samaniego and Torrez-Ortega, the respective panels considered three factors in deciding whether to apply harmless error review: “(1) the length and complexity of the record; (2) whether the harmlessness of the errors is certain or debatable; and (3) whether a reversal would result in protracted, costly, and futile proceedings in the district court.” 4 Samaniego, 187 F.3d at 1225; see also Torrez- 3 At oral argument, when thrown the rope, the government assured us that it did favor application of harmless error review. 4 In Samaniego, 187 F.3d at 1225 n.2, we questioned the utility of the third factor (whether a reversal would result in protracted, costly, and futile (continued...) -12- Ortega, 184 F.3d at 1136-37. Here, the trial record is not extraordinarily complex. Mr. Sanders’s trial involved a single defendant charged in a three-count indictment; the trial lasted three days. Nor is the outcome of the harmlessness inquiry, if undertaken, in serious doubt. As we explain below, that inquiry strongly suggests the harmlessness of the admission of Mr. Sanders’s statements. Finally, a reversal would require a retrial. In light of these considerations, we elect to exercise our discretion to reach the harmlessness inquiry. Because our case presents a constitutional error, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-660 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to evidence admitted in a state case), we review Mr. Sanders’s claim of error under the standard developed in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Where the error is constitutional, Chapman requires that the government demonstrate that the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. Here, Mr. Sanders’s possession of the sawed-off rifle was an important element of both of his convictions. Certainly the improperly admitted statements suggested Mr. Sanders’s possession of that firearm. Nevertheless, we are convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the admission of the statements did (...continued) 4 proceedings in the district court). -13- not “contribute[] to the conviction” of Mr. Sanders. Id. The firearm, was, afterall, discovered inside Mr. Sanders’s quonset hut. Even absent Mr. Sanders’s statements, he could not have seriously contested his possession of the sawed-off rifle. Thus, we hold harmless the improper admission of Mr. Sanders’s statements.