Opinion ID: 2446257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The dissent's remaining arguments.

Text: We now turn to the arguments advanced in the dissent that we have not addressed already. The dissent begins by suggesting (though not firmly deciding) that AUD does not do business in the District through Goldstein for the purposes of the Diploma Mill Act. In reaching this conclusion, the dissent places heavy reliance on cases decided around the time that the Diploma Mill Act was enacted that interpreted the term doing business for the purposes of deciding whether service of process was effective. See Post at 193-94. We do not believe that those cases provide a useful point for analysis, and not simply because, as the dissent acknowledges, see id. at 194, those cases were implicitly rejected by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The reason, rather, is that the dissent is mixing apples and oranges. In service of process and personal jurisdiction cases, doing business is a term of art; the question in those cases, in the words of a decision cited by the dissent, is whether the level of business that a defendant conducts in the jurisdiction where it is sued is of such nature and character as to warrant the inference that the defendant by its duly authorized officers or agents is present within the state or district where service is attempted. People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 86, 38 S.Ct. 233, 62 L.Ed. 587 (1918). Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century cases took a narrow view of doing business in this context because traditional notions of jurisdiction were based on a territorial conception that permitted actions to be brought against a defendant only in the jurisdiction in which he was found and personally served with process. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1066, at 352 (3d ed. 2002); see also generally id., at § 1064. The dissent does not explain why § 29-618 comes with this crabbed reading, and we find no indication in the statute that Congress intended to limit it to those entities that were doing business in the District within the meaning of cases such as People's Tobacco. Rather, the prohibition in § 29-618 is worded broadly, and applies equally to entities that were incorporated in the District as well as to entities that were incorporated outside of the District and that undert[ook] to do business in the District or to confer degrees or certificates therein. 45 Stat. 1505, ch. 523 (Mar. 2, 1929). In view of this sweeping language, we see no reason to import service of process case law into the analysis whether an entity is undertaking to do business for the purposes of § 29-618. [15] Nor are we persuaded by the dissent's analysis of legislative history discussing the 1934 amendment to the Diploma Mill Act. See Post at 194-95. The dissent hones in on the following passage from a House Committee Report accompanying that amendment: So far as the committee can determine, there was no intent to forbid the use of the word American in the titles of institutions of learning in foreign lands where the word served solely to indicate place of origin, such as the American Academy at Rome, the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, the American University at Beirut, and other well-known schools and colleges abroad. H. Rep. No. 1040, 73d Cong., 2 Sess. 2 (Mar. 23, 1934). If Congress thought that American University at Beirut was okay, the reasoning goes, see Post at 194-95, then what can be wrong with American University in Dubai? The Committee Report does not cause us to alter our reading of the act. As we mentioned above, we do not find resort to legislative history in this case helpful because we think that the Diploma Mill Act is clear on its face. See Beaner, 845 A.2d at 534. Moreover, we do not find the dissent's reading of the Committee Report persuasive because the report itself is rather tentative on the matter (So far as the committee can determine). Finally, assuming arguendo that the dissent is correct that the Committee Report shows that Congress though it unnecessary to amend the statute to grandfather institutions such as American University in Beirut, this congressional inaction strikes us as too shaky a foundation to rely on in this case. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287, 122 S.Ct. 1414, 152 L.Ed.2d 437 (2002). The dissent also suggests that our analysis is wrong because it would lead to peculiar results in cases involving not-for -profit institutions. Post at 196. AUD, however, is a for -profit institution, and the dissent does not suggest that there is anything peculiar about the result we reach as to AUD. We thus do not believe that an allegedly peculiar result in a hypothetical case involving a not-for-profit institution has any relevance here. This is especially so because the Diploma Mill Act in fact treats not-for-profits differently than for-profits: § 29-618 gives the Commission discretion, under certain circumstances, to waive the prohibition of that section for not-for-profits, but does not authorize the Commission to make such a waiver in respect to for-profits.