Opinion ID: 174996
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Carpio-Pouret

Text: Carpio-Pouret moved for a judgment of acquittal in the district court on the ground that there was no evidence that he was the master, operator, or person in charge of the small vessel. 18 U.S.C. § 2237(a)(1). The district court denied that motion, and Carpio-Pouret properly appealed. In this court, however, Carpio-Pouret's attorney filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. The attorney stated that he had lost contact with Carpio-Pouret, who apparently returned to the Dominican Republic after completing his sentence. We denied the motion because the attorney had not shown that Carpio-Pouret affirmatively authorized the withdrawal of his direct criminal appeal. The attorney then filed a motion to adopt two of the arguments made in Santana-Pérez's appellate brief: the sufficiency of the evidence argument, discussed above, and an argument relating to the district court's aggressive questioning of witnesses during trial, discussed below. See Fed. R.App. P. 28(i). No separate appellate brief was filed on Carpio-Pouret's behalf. The rule in this circuit is clear: [a]doption by reference ... cannot occur in a vacuum; to be meaningful, the arguments adopted must be readily transferrable from the proponent's case to the adopter's case. United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 737 (1st Cir.1991). Santana-Pérez's argument relating to the district judge's questioning of witnesses is readily transferable to Carpio-Pouret's case. As noted, we address that argument below. It is less clear how Santana-Pérez's sufficiency of the evidence argument might be transferred to Carpio-Pouret's case. To the extent that Carpio-Pouret means to argue that he did not hear the order to heave-to, his argument fails for essentially the reasons discussed above. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to find that both defendants heard the order and knowingly disobeyed it. Other arguments that Carpio-Pouret might have been able to make on his own are forfeited. They would be unavailing in any event. The argument that Carpio-Pouret made to the district courtthat he was not the master, operator, or person in charge of the small vesselwas beside the point because the government's theory was that Carpio-Pouret aided and abetted Santana-Pérez's failure to heave-to. And the jury could reasonably have interpreted Carpio-Pouret's warning to Santana-Pérez that the Coast Guard was coming as the sort of encouragement that makes one an aider and abettor (as in, They're coming, let's get out of here!). See United States v. Mercado, 610 F.3d 841, 846 (3d Cir.2010) (One can aid or abet another through use of words or actions to promote the success of the illegal venture.). The district court did not err in denying Carpio-Pouret's motion for judgment of acquittal.