Opinion ID: 1580987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: does the private civil remedy violate the osterbergs' free speech and association rights?

Text: The Osterbergs also challenge the constitutionality of Election Code section 253.131, which allows an opposing candidate to enforce Chapter 253's prohibitions through a private civil action. The Osterbergs argue that section 253.131 is unconstitutional because it furthers only an opposing candidate's self-serving interests, instead of being narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. They assert that the interest of an opposing candidate is not the same as the state's because the opposing candidate has an interest only in revenge or financial gain. Peca responds that the purpose of the private civil action is not to allow revenge or provide compensation but to encourage enforcement, and that the statute provides a disincentive for frivolous or malicious private suits by awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant. Section 253.131 provides: (a) A person who knowingly makes or accepts a campaign contribution or makes a campaign expenditure in violation of this chapter is liable for damages as provided by this section. (b) If the contribution or expenditure is in support of a candidate, each opposing candidate whose name appears on the ballot is entitled to recover damages under this section. (c) If the contribution or expenditure is in opposition to a candidate, the candidate is entitled to recover damages under this section. (d) In this section, damages means: (1) twice the value of the unlawful contribution or expenditure; and (2) reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the suit. (e) Reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the suit may be awarded to the defendant if judgment is rendered in the defendant's favor. Tex. Elec.Code § 253.131. We disagree with the Osterbergs' contention that section 253.131 does not advance a sufficient state interest. When an individual breaks Texas's campaign finance laws, this section allows a candidate to enforce those laws by seeking civil damages as a penalty. We agree with the Fifth Court of Appeals, which recognized that section 253.131 is designed to deter violators and encourage enforcement by candidates and others directly participating in the process, rather than placing the entire enforcement burden on the government. Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 790 S.W.2d 77, 84-85 (Tex.App.-Dallas) (construing an earlier version of section 253.131), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex.1990). Because state resources for policing election laws are necessarily limited, in many cases section 253.131 is likely to provide the only viable means of enforcing reporting requirements. Preventing evasion of these important campaign finance provisions is a legitimate and substantial state interest. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68, 76, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (preventing evasion of valid contribution limits is a substantial governmental interest). Furthermore, that the person enforcing the law and receiving damages can be a private party rather than the State does not mean that section 253.131 adds additional restrictions on First Amendment rights. In Missouri Pacific Railway v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 522-23, 6 S.Ct. 110, 29 L.Ed. 463 (1885), the United States Supreme Court stated that it is not a valid objection that the sufferer instead of the State receives [damages].... The power of the State to impose fines and penalties for a violation of its statutory requirements is coeval with government; and the mode in which they shall be enforced, whether at the suit of a private party, or at the suit of the public, and what disposition shall be made of the amounts collected, are merely matters of legislative discretion. (emphasis added). More recently, Justice O'Connor explained,  Humes teaches us that the identity of the recipient of a monetary penalty is irrelevant for purposes of determining the constitutional validity of the penalty. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 299, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Regardless of Peca's motivations in bringing a private cause of action, and as with all of the statute's other enforcement mechanisms, ultimately it is the court, not an opposing party, who decides whether the Osterbergs acted unlawfully and thus could be subject to liability. Cf. Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F.Supp. 664, 676-77 (N.D.Tex.1998) (deciding whether the jury's verdictrather than the plaintiff's motivewas content neutral). The Osterbergs do not bring a First Amendment challenge to the severity of the damages section 253.131 provides; they only challenge the Legislature's decision regarding who can seek and receive damages. [24] The Osterbergs have not demonstrated how allowing a private party to help enforce the statute adds new and significant free-speech constraints independent of those already imposed by the statute's reporting requirements, which we have held are constitutional. Moreover, they submitted no evidence that the private enforcement provision had any chilling effect on the exercise of their First Amendment rights. The Osterbergs' challenge to section 253.131 thus misses the mark. Cf. Alexander v. Thornburgh, 713 F.Supp. 1278, 1290 (D.Minn.) (because the constitutionality of the underlying obscenity statute had been established, the defendant's assertion that prosecution under RICO unconstitutionally chilled protected speech was unfounded (discussing United States v. Pryba, 674 F.Supp. 1504, 1512 (E.D.Va.1987)), appeal dism'd, 881 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir.1989).