Opinion ID: 3023355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Russo’s Mail Fraud Conviction.

Text: 5 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and our jurisdiction is grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 6 Russo has included more than 8,000 pages of exhibits and trial transcripts in the Appendix. However, only a small fraction of these pages were cited by the parties, making the majority of the Appendix unnecessary. Counsel also failed to include a table of contents at the beginning of the Appendix, as required by Rule 30. See Fed. R. App. P. 30(d) (“The appendix must begin with a table of contents identifying the page at which each part begins.”). 5 Russo’s first claim of error is that the District Court improperly interpreted the Mail Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1346, and because of that erroneous interpretation, incorrectly charged the jury. He further contends that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his request for the use of special verdict sheets. When a defendant challenges a jury instruction’s “statement of the legal standard, we exercise plenary review.” United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 779 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1995)). We review all other challenges to jury instructions for abuse of discretion. Id. Having not objected to the mail fraud jury charge at trial, however, we review Russo’s argument only for plain error. United States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1228 (3d Cir. 1994). To prove mail fraud, the Government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a defendant knowingly and willfully participated in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) used the mails in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir. 1984)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341. A “scheme or artifice to defraud” includes a plan to deprive another of his or her “intangible right of honest services.” Antico, 275 F.3d at 261; 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Thus, a person may be prosecuted for depriving citizens of their right to honest services performed by public officials. See id. at 262.
6 Russo first contends that the District Court erred by failing to instruct the jury that, in order to convict him of honest services mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the scheme or artifice must either lead to actual harm, or it must be proven that he intended actual injury.7 With regard to the required intent in mail fraud cases, it is well-established that, “[w]hen the ‘necessary result’ of the actor’s scheme is to injure others, fraudulent intent may be inferred from the scheme itself.” United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d. Cir 1994). However, “[w]here the scheme does not cause injury to the alleged victim as its necessary result, the government must produce evidence independent of the alleged scheme to show the defendant’s fraudulent intent.” Id. Russo acknowledges this standard but attacks the jury charge on intent as insufficient, claiming that the District Court failed to instruct the jury that either (a) a scheme must, by its nature, intend actual harm, or (b) if the natural result of a scheme was not harm to the victim, that the Government must present additional evidence of intent. We conclude to the contrary, and find that the District Court properly charged the jury. Indeed, we discern no error in the charge at all, let alone the high threshold of plain error that Russo must overcome on this point. The District Court instructed the jury with regard to intent necessary for mail fraud, as follows: “. . . [t]he second element of mail fraud is the defendant participated in the 7 The Government strenuously argues that it has never been disputed that it was required to prove intent to deceive, and we find no evidence to the contrary. 7 scheme knowingly, willfully and with intent to defraud. Intent to defraud means to act knowingly and with a specific intent to deceive for the purpose of causing some deprivation or loss to another of money, property, or honest services. . . . This question involves one’s state of mind. Direct proof of knowledge and fraudulent intend [sic] is almost never available. It will be a rare case where it could be shown that a person wrote or stated that at a given time he committed an action with fraudulent intent. Such direct proof is not required. The ultimate facts of knowledge and criminal intent, though subjective, may be established by circumstantial evidence, based upon a person’s outward manifestations, his words, his conduct, his acts and all the surrounding circumstances disclosed by the evidence and the rational or logical inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” (App. at 7460-61.) While we agree with Russo that this jury instruction does not use the phrase “actual injury,” we disagree that it is deficient as a matter of law. The District Court instructed the jury that, if they found that Russo’s scheme was intended to defraud the victim (in this case, the Marshal’s Service), the second element of mail fraud would be satisfied. This instruction is in line with the legion of cases explaining the requirements of mail fraud, and Russo’s claim of error casting doubt on the District Court’s decision to speak in terms of “intent to defraud” as opposed to “intent to cause actual injury” creates an issue where one does not exist.8 We are satisfied that the jury adequately understood that a scheme punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 must be one that envisions causing some measure of harm, and consequently the District Court did not 8 Fraud is “a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 685 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). 8 plainly err.9
Turning to the question of the verdict sheet used, we note as an initial matter that special verdict sheets are generally disfavored in criminal trials. See United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 416 (3d Cir. 1982) (“As a general proposition, special verdicts are generally disfavored in criminal cases, but there is no per se rule against them.”); see also United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1129 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that “there is the belief that in the long run special verdicts are not favorable to defendants because by a progression of questions each of which seems to require an answer unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted.”). However, they may be necessary in exceptionally complex cases. See, e.g., United States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 698 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Aside from these rare cases, we have held that a general unanimity instruction will suffice. United States v. Russell, 134 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 1998) (“While it is true that in most cases a general unanimity instruction is sufficient to support a conviction . . . a specific unanimity instruction is required ‘where the complexity of the case, or other factors, creates the potential that the jury will be confused.’”).10 A district court has 9 Of course, no actual harm need result in order for a defendant to be liable. See United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 601-04 (3d Cir. 2004). 10 The Government notes that Russo challenges only the District Court’s refusal to employ special verdict sheets. We respectfully disagree, as Russo’s brief alternatees between an argument for special verdict sheets (Brief at 35) and an argument for an 9 discretion in determining whether to submit special interrogatories to the jury regarding the elements of an offense, and accordingly we will review only for an abuse thereof. See United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 663 (3d Cir. 1993). At trial, the Government alleged alternative deprivations in support of Russo’s mail fraud indictment: an honest services violation (with regard to Dominick), a property violation (with regard to the Waretown property), and a money violation. Russo argues that the Government advanced one untenable legal theory (namely, the honest services violation), and that, without a special verdict sheet to confirm that Russo was not convicted on that charge, our holding in United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 144 (3d Cir. 2002), commands that his verdict be vacated. Having determined that the District Court’s jury charge was legally sufficient, however, we cannot say that one of the theories supporting Russo’s conviction was unconstitutional or legally untenable. See id. Moreover, the mere fact that the Government alleged alternative legal theories with regard to the mail fraud count does not necessitate the use of special verdict sheets. While Russo claims that it is unclear whether the jury unanimously convicted him of mail fraud under the honest services theory, the property theory, or the money theory, it is clear that the jury, at the very least, believed that he intentionally acted to deprive the Marshal’s Service of the use and benefit of the Waretown property, as it convicted him of unlawful conversion of the Waretown property pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 641. This provides augmented unanimity instruction. (Brief at 36.) Both concerns, however, can be addressed concurrently. 10 sufficient support for the Government’s property theory of mail fraud, making any error harmless. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993) (absent a showing that a trial court’s omission of a unanimity instruction “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” the failure to give such an order is harmless); cf. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1991) (holding that, when a defendant is convicted of a crime based on alternative theories, and the Government produces sufficient evidence to convict on one theory, a reviewing court need not consider whether the evidence is sufficient on the alternative ground). We therefore find no reversible error arising from the District Court’s decision to use a general verdict sheet or its decision to employ a general unanimity charge.