Opinion ID: 785473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bi's Claims of Personal Injury

Text: 43 Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in ruling that an injury that manifests itself just weeks after one's exposure to a toxic substance can be considered latent, arguing principally that CPLR § 214-c applies only to injuries that do not manifest themselves for many years. It may be that the New York State Legislature's primary concern in enacting CPLR § 214-c was for persons whose injuries manifested themselves after the three-year limitations period provided by CPLR § 214(5) had expired, see generally Jensen v. General Electric Co., 82 N.Y.2d at 83-84, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 422-23, 623 N.E.2d 547. But as enacted, CPLR § 214-c speaks simply in terms of whether the effects of an exposure are latent, without specifying the length of time that must pass before those effects can be considered latent; and at least one New York appellate court has held that effects were latent within the meaning of § 214-c when the interval between exposure and first manifestation of injury was just a few weeks, see Crossman v. Harding Industrial Tool, 222 A.D.2d 1081, 635 N.Y.S.2d 397 (4th Dep't 1995) (mem.). 44 In Crossman, the plaintiff, a lathe operator, noticed a rash on his hands in January 1987, within a few weeks after his employer started using a certain substance as a machine coolant. Id. at 1081, 635 N.Y.S.2d 397, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 398. On the advice of the company doctor, the plaintiff temporarily ceased working on machines using the coolant; but after he resumed that work, additional skin eruptions and irritations appeared on his hands in March 1987. When the dermatitis continued to worsen, the company doctor on April 14, 1987, referred the plaintiff to a dermatologist. On April 30, 1987, the dermatologist informed the plaintiff that he suffered from chronic dermatitis as the result of direct hand contact with the coolant. See id., 635 N.Y.S.2d at 398-99. The plaintiff's action for damages for personal injuries caused by exposure to the coolant was commenced on April 17, 1990. The trial-level court dismissed the case on the ground that the action was preempted by a federal statute. See id., 635 N.Y.S.2d at 398. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, but it ruled that the complaint should have been dismissed instead on the ground that the action was barred by CPLR § 214-c's three-year statute of limitations for latent injuries, since [t]he record conclusively establishe[d] that plaintiff discovered before April 17, 1987 that he had sustained an injury. 222 A.D.2d at 1082, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 399. 45 The Crossman plaintiff's injury was thus found to be latent within the meaning of CPLR § 214-c when it manifested itself within a few weeks after his exposure to the coolant, 222 A.D.2d at 1081, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 398. Accordingly, in the present case, we see no error in the district court's ruling that the effects of Bi's alleged exposure to harmful substances emanating from the plant site are to be considered latent, notwithstanding that the interval between her exposure and the injuries' initial manifestation was not years but, in Bi's words, a few weeks. 46 Plaintiffs argue alternatively that the record does not indicate that there was any interval whatever between Bi's exposure to contamination from the former UCIL plant and the manifestation of her injuries. This contention is contradicted by the amended complaint and Bi's own affidavit. Plaintiffs alleged that waters in areas adjacent to the plant were contaminated by the mishandling of hazardous materials [d]uring the entire period that the Bhopal plant was in operation (Amended Complaint ¶ 98), a period that predated Bi's move to the immediate vicinity of the UCIL plant site (Bi Aff. ¶ 4). Bi stated in her affidavit that her injuries began to manifest themselves a few weeks after that move; that at least some of her symptoms appeared to be generally associated with drinking, cleaning, cooking or bathing with water taken from the handpump water well near where she lived; that there was simply no alternative source of potable water in the particular residential area of Bhopal where [her] family live[d]; and that [a]ll of the handpump wells in the nearby residential areas also seem to be contaminated.... ( Id. ¶¶ 5-8.) These statements by Bi as to the absence of any sources of water other than those that the amended complaint alleged were already contaminated can only mean that Bi was exposed to the contaminants upon her move. And given her statement that her injuries first manifested themselves within a few weeks after that move, plaintiffs' own assertions show an interval between Bi's exposure and the initial manifestation of her injuries. 47 We conclude that the district court properly ruled that CPLR § 214-c was applicable to Bi's personal injury claims and that, as her injuries manifested themselves in 1990 and she did not bring suit until 2000, those claims were therefore barred by § 214-c's three-year statute of limitations.