Opinion ID: 722407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims of Copyright Infringement

Text: 10 To establish copyright infringement, MiTek must prove (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1296, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991); see also Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1541 (11th Cir.1996). To satisfy Feist 's first prong, plaintiff must prove that the work as a whole is original and that the plaintiff complied with applicable statutory formalities. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir.1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 804, 133 L.Ed.2d 610 (1996). The Copyright Act provides that [i]n any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1996). Once the plaintiff produces a certificate of copyright, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate why the claim of copyright is invalid. Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1541. 11 In this case, Feist 's first prong is not at issue, because ArcE does not contest the validity of the copyright registrations for the three versions of the ACES program. What is at issue is Feist 's second prong, namely whether ArcE has copied constituent elements of the ACES programs that are original. As the Tenth Circuit stated, [t]his question involves two separate inquiries: 1) whether the defendant, as a factual matter, copied portions of the plaintiff's program; and 2) whether, as a mixed issue of fact and law, those elements of the program that have been copied are protected expression and of such importance to the copied work that the appropriation is actionable. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 832 (10th Cir.1993). 12 A proof of copying as a factual matter, may be shown either by direct evidence, or, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be inferred from indirect evidence demonstrating that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that there are probative similarities between the allegedly infringing work and the copyrighted work. Id.; see also Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1541. Even if the court finds that the putative infringer copied portions of the copyright owner's program, that is not the end of the inquiry. Copyright infringement occurs only if one copies protected elements of a copyrighted work; in other words, the portion of the copyrighted work that is copied must satisfy the constitutional requirement of originality as set forth in Article I, § 8, cl. 8. Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1542; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-46, 111 S.Ct. at 1287-88 (noting that [t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality, as well as emphasizing that it is a constitutional requirement). As the Court in Feist noted, the mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be protected. Id. at 348, 111 S.Ct. at 1289. 13 Significantly, the Copyright Act expressly states that: 14 In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. 15 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1996) (emphasis added). Thus, in order for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, the court must find not only that the portion of the work copied is original and thus protectable but also that the copying of copyrighted material was so extensive that it rendered the offending and copyrighted works substantially similar. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 813. In this case, the key inquiry is determining whether the elements of the program that allegedly were copied are original and hence protectable.