Opinion ID: 2722688
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: “In an appeal from a bench trial, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” Keys Youth Serv., Inc. v. City of Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001).2 The district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous only if they are “without factual support in the record, or if the appellate court, after reviewing all the evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. If there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” 2 Ms. Tabor does not address in her opening brief the standard of review applicable to each of her claims, as required by Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(B). - 10 - Curtis v. Okla. City Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1217 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The applicable standard of review for a claim of error in a disparate impact case “depends upon the basis of the alleged error.” Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1996). We review for clear error the district court’s factual determination that Hilti’s GDCP and interview processes are separate processes. See id. at 486-87 (applying clear error review to factual findings underlying the court’s disparate impact determination). We review de novo the district court’s holding that Ms. Tabor did not satisfy her burden to show a disparate impact because her statistical analysis failed to isolate the GDCP. See id. (holding appellate court reviews district court’s “method of analysis” de novo). 4. The District Court’s Finding that Hilti’s GDCP and its Interview Process are Separate Processes was not Clearly Erroneous Ms. Tabor asserts there is no evidence that the interview process and the GDCP are separate processes. She maintains that the interview is a component of the GDCP and that all GDCP components are interrelated through the Red Thread Dimensions. She fails, however, to show that the district court’s finding on this issue was clearly erroneous. Khesa Pinkard, a former Regional Manager with Hilti (and plaintiff’s witness), testified that the GDCP consists of the PMP and the SMD, intertwined with the Red Thread Dimensions. Aplt. App., Vol. III at 683-84; 689-90. She stated, as well, that - 11 - a document titled Hilti’s SMD & Red Thread Process Manual outlines the GDCP. Id. at 685. That process manual cautions employees that “[t]he SMD process never guarantees a promotion to an individual. The output is a ‘pool’ of potential candidates that will need to interview and compete for future jobs!” Id., Vol. II at 425. Ms. Tabor’s statistical analysis was intended to demonstrate a disparate impact on women caused by the GDCP. Her expert witness testified regarding his understanding of the GDCP, stating that it included “coaching,” “feedback,” and “evaluations.” Id., Vol. III at 984. He also indicated that the SMD & Red Thread Process Manual described what he understood to be the GDCP. Id. at 985. David Perkins, a director with Hilti, testified that the SMD process and the interview process are separate processes. Id., Vol. IV at 1275. Christy Graybill, another Hilti director, testified that the SMD is not a selection process; rather, “[i]t helps coach and develop our team members in their career path.” Id. at 1326. She stated that the outcome of the SMD process is to provide “a talent pool from which we’ve identified candidates who are ready to take on a next role and as soon as they’re able to interview for a next position.” Id. Addressing the SMD & Red Thread Process Manual, see id. at 1329, Ms. Graybill testified the process described in the manual is designed to help employees get into the interview pool for positions they are interested in, and that it does not impact who is actually selected for a competitive job, id. at 1331-32. She also made clear that, in addition to promoting - 12 - from within, Hilti also fills Account Manager positions through external hires. Id. at 1389. The district court found that the GDCP is made up of two components: the PMP and the SMD. It concluded that the SMD process outputs a pool of employees interested in promotion to other positions within Hilti, who “must interview and compete for future jobs. Thus, the promotional process for prospective Account Managers involves both the GDCP and a separate interview process. The SMD process and the interview process are different processes.” Id., Vol. V at 1571 (citation omitted). The court concluded further that “[t]he GDCP applie[s] only to internal applicants, and thus [does] not apply to all prospective Account Managers.” Id. at 1574. Based on the evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous. 5. Ms. Tabor Failed to Raise in the District Court her Contention that the GDCP and the Interview Process are not “Capable of Separation for Analysis” Title VII provides that a plaintiff must “demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). But the statute provides for an exception to that burden if the plaintiff can instead “demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis.” Id. In that case, “the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.” Id. - 13 - Ms. Tabor contends that, even if the GDCP and the interview process are separate processes, the district court erred by presuming that the interview process is capable of analytic isolation from the GDCP components. In that way it thereby erred in concluding that she failed to carry her burden to prove a disparate impact caused by the GDCP. She argues that all of the components of the GDCP and the interview process are interrelated and tightly integrated through the use of overlapping criteria, namely the Red Thread Dimensions. As a result, she maintains, the GDCP and the interview process are not capable of separation for analysis. See, e.g., Muñoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[W]here a promotion system uses tightly integrated and overlapping criteria, it may be difficult as a practical matter for plaintiffs to isolate the particular step responsible for observed discrimination.”). And she contends that the district court erred in presuming otherwise. Under § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i), it was Ms. Tabor’s burden to demonstrate that the GDCP and the interview process are not capable of separation for analysis and should be analyzed as one employment practice. She argued in the district court that the elements of the GDCP are not capable of separation for analysis, and she does not assert on appeal that the district court failed to treat the GDCP as a single employment practice. But she did not raise that contention with respect to the GDCP and the interview process. “[O]ur general rule is not to address arguments that were not first presented to the district court.” Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, - 14 - 1198 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to address contention that evidence was “sufficient to trigger subsection 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i),” when plaintiffs failed to show they raised that issue in the district court); see also Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 566 F.3d 1236, 1244 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e generally do not consider new theories on appeal—even those that fall under the same general category as one that was presented in the district court.”). We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, the final pretrial order for the bench trial on Ms. Tabor’s disparate impact claim identified the GDCP as the challenged employment practice, Aplt. App., Vol. II at 392, and listed as an issue to be tried: “Whether the elements of defendants’ decision-making process are capable of separation for analysis and, if so, whether the court should analyze the decisionmaking process as one employment practice,” id. at 394. Hilti argued in closing that the evidence showed the GDCP and the interview process are separate processes and that the GDCP is not a selection process. The district court indicated at that time that it was struggling with the question of what aspect of the GDCP Ms. Tabor contended was the cause of the disparate impact. Then, in her post-trial brief, Ms. Tabor described the GDCP as made up of the PMP, the SMD, and the Red Thread Dimensions. See id., Vol. V at 1539. She did not mention the interview process. Ms. Tabor acknowledged the district court’s request that she pinpoint what aspect of the GDCP caused the disparate impact. See id. at 1540. She argued that the court should characterize the GDCP as a single - 15 - employment practice because the GDCP is an overly subjective process lacking uniform criteria and providing supervisors with unbridled discretion. She continued by describing the overly subjective aspects of the SMD and the PMP, again not mentioning the interview process. See id. at 1540-42. Thus, Ms. Tabor did not indicate to the district court that she was “attempting to make the required showing of analytical inseparability,” Carpenter, 456 F.3d at 1198 n.2, specifically with regard to the GDCP and the interview process, and the district court did not make any ruling on that issue. We therefore decline to address her argument for the first time on appeal. We affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of Hilti on Ms. Tabor’s disparate impact claim.3