Opinion ID: 1058283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Recusal of Commission Chairman

Text: Judge Taylor argues that the Commission's chairman, Judge Willis of the Chesapeake Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, should have recused himself due to his status as complainant in a prior contact with the Commission. According to Judge Taylor, Canon 3E requires disqualification of the judge from any proceeding in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including instances in which the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding, is a party to the proceeding, or is likely to be a material witness. Judge Taylor contends that the proceedings before the Commission were tainted by Judge Willis' involvement and therefore seeks dismissal of the complaint. The Commission maintains that it can be reasonably inferred that Judge Taylor was aware of Judge Willis' involvement in a prior informal contact since 2006 and therefore knew of the purported grounds for Judge Willis' recusal at the outset of the Commission's evidentiary hearing in 2009, but failed to timely object to his participation. Judge Willis' role in Judge Taylor's 2006 prior contact with the Commission is reflected by an email dated January 26, 2006 from Judge Willis to Judge Deborah M. Paxson, who at the time was the chief judge of the Virginia Beach Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, regarding an issue of delays in that court which adversely affected proceedings in the Chesapeake Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court. The email did not name any judge responsible for the delays and expressly stated: I do not want any information about who the judge was . . . However, Judge Willis requested in his email that Judge Paxson notify the judges of the juvenile and domestic relations court of its contents. The Commission argues that it may be inferred that Judge Paxson did notify the judges, including Judge Taylor, of Judge Willis' complaint in 2006. We agree with the Commission's waiver argument, and hold that Judge Taylor did not timely object to Judge Willis' participation in the present proceedings. A motion for disqualification [of a judge] must be made when the movant learns the grounds upon which the motion is based; thereafter, the motion comes too late. Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 1098, 254 S.E.2d 116, 120 (1979). We therefore will not consider this issue. Rule 5:25.