Opinion ID: 2080512
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Theories of Relief

Text: Appellants have been less than clear in framing justification for entitlement to the relief they have sought. Much of the pleadings and briefs relate an unhappy story of administrative and fiscal problems within a University community. The court is asked to intervene and tell everyone how the academic affairs should be ordered for the common good. After an evidentiary hearing of three weeks, the only legal theory of relief which could be discerned by the trial court was that the revenues and assets of the Law School are subject to a charitable trust, and that surrender of these assets to the University's central administration will result in a breach of that trust. Order, Conclusion No. 13. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence at this time is inadequate to support a conclusion that a special charitable trust exists with regard to the law school. . . ., Order, Conclusion No. 15; or that the trustees as fiduciaries of the University are aware of their fiduciary obligations to the law school, see Order, Conclusion No. 16. [11] On appeal, appellants argue that the evidence presented supported two additional bases for their likely success on the merits. First, they argue that commitments, which are asserted to be actual contractual agreements between the University and the law school, provide for an independent administration of the law school. They argue that a resolution passed by the Board of Trustees of Antioch University on December 5 and 6, 1975, established the basis for this conclusion. This resolution reaffirmed the Board of Trustees' commitment to a law school built around a teaching law firm and established an  interim governing structure pending a determination by the Board of Trustees of ultimate governance relationship between the School of Law and the College. (Emphasis added.) The resolution goes on to name a Board of Governors of the law school and to delineate its authority. The resolution specifies those matters over which the Board of Trustees of the University specifically reserves authority unto itself. And finally, the resolution expressly charges the law school Board of Governors to develop recommendations respecting the ultimate structure of relationships between the Law School and the College. . . . (Emphasis added.) Although the court understandably did not draw a specific legal conclusion concerning this presently asserted contractual basis for relief, the record clearly reflects its rejection of such a rationale. [12] See Warner Corp. v. Magazine Realty Co., D.C.App., 255 A.2d 479, 481 n. 4 (1969). Upon the basis of this record, we conclude that the trial court was amply justified in impliedly rejecting appellants' contractual argument based upon this resolution. The University is a not-for-profit corporation organized under the law of the state of Ohio. The University, as any corporation, is governed by the statutes of the state of its incorporation, its articles of incorporation and its bylaws. The law school is not organized as a corporation or other judicial entity. Concededly, it was established pursuant to a resolution of the Board of Trustees of Antioch College (the predecessor in name to Antioch University) dated December 3 and 4, 1971. Order, Finding No. 1. Resolutions adopted by the University in accordance with its articles of incorporation and bylaws effectuate the will of the corporation. See generally Brown v. National Loan & Investment Co., 139 S.W.2d 364 (Tex.Civ.App.1940). However, the plain meaning of this resolution bespeaks a delegation of power for the establishment of an interim governing structure of the law school as it relates to the University. It cannot be concluded that such a delegation deprived the Board of Trustees of the power given to them in Article III of the University's Articles of Incorporation, to wit: All of the rights and powers of the corporation and the entire control and management of its College, property and affairs shall be vested in and exercised by a Board of Trustees composed of twenty-five (25) persons. [13] In fact, a contract conveying such plenary power vested by corporation charter in the trustees would be void. See Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal.App.2d 157, 172, 260 P.2d 823, 832 (1953). [14] In the alternative, appellants urge us to apply the rationale of estoppel to hold that by the University's acquiescence in autonomous operation of the law school, the University is estopped to deny its autonomy at this time. This doctrine can have no relevance unless the party who seeks to invoke it is an independent entity from the one which is estopped. Thus, to apply the doctrine of estoppel on behalf of the Board of Governors or the law school, the trial court would have been required to find that these bodies are independent legal entities from the University. See generally 28 Am. Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 39 (1966). Appellant has not demonstrated that such was urged upon the trial court and it cannot be said that the record compels such a finding. The student-intervenors to this action have asserted their contractual rights to attend an institution accredited by the ABA and which maintains a teaching program as described in the law school brochure. See Galton v. College of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Columbia University, 70 Misc.2d 12, 332 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup.Ct.Spec. Term, New York County, Part I, 1972); Behrend v. State of Ohio, 55 Ohio App.2d 135, 379 N.E.2d 617 (1977). It is a general rule that the relationship between a university and its students is contractual in nature. It is also accepted that the terms set down in a university's bulletin become a part of that contract. Basch v. George Washington University, D.C.App., 370 A.2d 1364, 1366 (1977). However, we do not find error in the trial court's failure to make a finding on the nature of the students' contractual rights in this case since we conclude that the students would not be entitled to the relief they seek of a preliminary injunction affecting the fiscal affairs of the University and the authority of the Board of Trustees to govern the University. See The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 641 (1819); Splawn v. Woodward, 287 S.W. 677 (Tex.Civ.App.1926). Despite any contract rights the students have acquired, [t]he board of trustees has the jurisdiction to make the policy determination of the continued existence of the various departments with the university. Behrend v. State of Ohio, supra, 379 N.E.2d at 621. Thus, even if the University goes bankrupt and the law school fails, the students' remedy is not an interference in the trustees' control of the University. Instead, their remedy would be to seek damages for the harm that has befallen them due to lack of accreditation, professional certification problems, delay, etc. Id. The development and continuation of the university's courses of study should reside within the sound discretion of the university's board of trustees and the administrative officials. Id. We are satisfied that the trial judge did not err in concluding that appellants are not likely to succeed on the merits of the action, and alternatively, that the University is likely to succeed.