Opinion ID: 202869
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Availability of Contract Damages for Pain and Suffering Under Puerto Rico Law

Text: The district court resolved an unsettled issue of Puerto Rico law when it instructed the jury, without any qualification, that it could award damages for pain and suffering for breach of an employment contract in an ordinary civil case that involved no claim of violation of anti-discrimination laws or civil rights laws. [9] The parties have framed the issue as follows. Ordinarily, under Puerto Rico law, damages for pain and suffering are not recoverable in an action for contract. See, e.g., Mattei Nazario v. Vélez & Asoc., 145 D.P.R. 508, 1998 WL 313060, Offic. Trans. at 8 (1998) (With regard to mental anguish and sufferings, we have repeatedly held that, ordinarily, they do not lie in actions for breach of contract. . . .); González Mena v. Dannermiller Coffee Co., 48 P.R.R. 590, 598, 1935 WL 5709 (1935) (Any damages for mental suffering suffered by the plaintiff are certainly not recoverable in this action, which is based on a breach of contract.). In some cases, when the defendant in breach of contract has on the same facts also committed a tort and foreseeably and necessarily caused pain and suffering damages, such damages are allowable. Camacho v. Iglesia Catolica, 72 P.R.R. 332, 341, 1951 WL 7653 (1951). Stiefel stresses that there is no claim that it engaged in tortious activity and so argues that no emotional distress damages may be awarded. Stiefel separately argues that Muñiz's wife was not a party to the contract, and so she is not entitled to such damages in any event. The plaintiffs stress that it was foreseeable that the loss of expected employment would indeed cause pain and suffering, particularly given the difficulty of finding a job in Puerto Rico at Muñiz's age. The plaintiffs point out that Muñiz indicated in his letters to Pattullo that he was very concerned about his ability to find other employment in Puerto Rico. The district court essentially adopted the view that it is foreseeable in most employment termination cases, and in this one, that the employee and his or her spouse will experience emotional distress, and that they will therefore be able to seek damages for pain and suffering. Because the court believed that Stiefel's breach of the contract was tortious and the plaintiffs' resulting emotional distress damages foreseeable, it permitted recovery. Stiefel's two arguments  that emotional distress damages are not available at all and that even if they are available to Muñiz, they are not available to his wife  are questions of local policy, which are best addressed by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in the first instance. See VanHaaren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993) (Absent controlling state court precedent, a federal court sitting in diversity may certify a state law issue to the state's highest court. . . .). The rules of that court permit certification. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, app. III, Rule 53.1(f). We will remand with instructions to the district court to certify the questions of whether emotional suffering damages are available to Muñiz and his wife, unless the parties resolve the matter in the interim.