Opinion ID: 2967883
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Previous Conviction of a Violent Felony

Text: Involving a Firearm Higgs next challenges the district court’s submission as a statutory aggravating factor the fact that Higgs had been previously convicted of a violent felony involving a firearm. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c)(2). The aggravating factor was based upon Higgs’s participation in the December 1995 Cherry Lane shooting. Higgs pleaded guilty in Maryland state court to assault and reckless endangerment for the offense in April 1997. During the plea colloquy, which was admitted into evidence in Higgs’s sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor stated that Higgs had fired a .38 caliber handgun and Haynes had fired a 9 mm handgun during the incident. In response, Higgs claimed that he didn’t have a .38. It was the other way around. J.A. 1104. On appeal, Higgs argues that the court must take a categorical approach to determining whether a prior felony conviction involved the use of a firearm, i.e., the court may only look to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the crime of conviction to determine whether a firearm was involved, not to the particular facts of the case. Cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588-89 (1990) (holding that courts must employ a categorical approach when determining whether burglary was a predicate crime of violence for armed career offender status under 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)); United States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that, in determining whether a state felony offense of taking indecent liberties with a child falls within the federal definition of a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the court must employ a similar categorical approach, which takes into account only the definition of the 44 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS offense and the fact of conviction). According to Higgs, because use of a firearm is not a specific element of the Maryland offenses of assault and reckless endangerment, the crimes to which he pled guilty, and he did not specifically admit the use of a firearm during the Cherry Lane incident, the prior conviction did not involv[e] the use or attempted or threatened use of a firearm . . . against another person as required by § 3592(c)(2). We reject this claim as well. Higgs correctly points out that the Supreme Court has called for such a categorical approach when Congress has specified that a predicate offense have certain elements. See, e.g., Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588; Pierce, 278 F.3d at 286; United States v. Ward, 171 F.3d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1999). However, this same approach is not required under § 3592(c)(2) of the federal death penalty scheme. Section 3592(c)(2) provides, as a statutory aggravator, the fact that the defendant has previously been convicted of a Federal or State offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year, involving the use or attempted or threatened use of a firearm (as defined in section 921) against another person. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c)(2) (emphasis added). Because the language quite plainly requires only that the previous conviction involv[e] the use or attempted or threatened use of a firearm, it authorizes and likely requires the court to look past the elements of the offense to the offense conduct. See United States v. Chong, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 (D. Haw. 1999). Additionally, whereas the court in Taylor noted that the categorical approach was proper to avoid the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach, Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601, the Court has made it clear that an individualized determination is required in the death penalty context, Zant, 462 U.S. at 877-79. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in submitting the challenged statutory aggravating factor to the jury for its consideration. UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 45 Volume 2 of 2 3. Previous Conviction of a Serious Federal Drug Offense Higgs next claims that the district court erred in refusing to strike as an aggravating factor the fact that he had previously been convicted of a serious drug offense carrying a potential sentence of five years or more. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c)(12). 46 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS The federal drug offense at issue involved Higgs’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, which arose from the drugs seized during the search of his apartment on March 21, 1996. Higgs pled guilty in May 1997 to the drug offense, and judgment was entered in December 1997. Higgs argues that, for purposes of the death penalty statute, a defendant has been previously convicted of a federal drug offense only if the predicate drug conviction occurred prior to the conduct giving rise to capital murder. Had Congress intended to include any conviction prior to the sentencing hearing, the argument goes, it would have framed the issue as whether the defendant has been convicted of a predicate offense, rather than had previously been convicted of a predicate offense. Because his drug arrest and conviction for a serious drug offense occurred after the murders, Higgs asserts that the statutory aggravator was improperly submitted for consideration by the jury. The district court disagreed, ruling that the aggravator refers to any conviction for a serious drug offense that occurred prior to sentencing and, therefore, denied the motion to strike the factor. As support for their respective interpretations of the language of the statute, the parties direct us to analogous language and practice under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The government, for example, points us to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 (2002), which provides that, for purposes of calculating a defendant’s criminal history category under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a prior sentence includes any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense. As correctly pointed out by the government, the commentary makes clear that [a] sentence imposed after the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense, but prior to sentencing on the instant offense, is a prior sentence if it was for conduct other than conduct that was part of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.1. For purposes of establishing whether a defendant is a career offender, however, the guidelines are equally clear that prior convictions only count if they occurred before commission of the federal crime. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c). Higgs, for his part, points us to the case of United States v. Barton, 100 F.3d 43 (6th Cir. 1996), which interprets a more ambiguous provision of a now-defunct guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, which provided UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 47 for an increase in the base offense level for a firearms offense if the defendant had one prior felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2000). The Barton court held that the use of the words had and prior reflected an intent to only encompass predicate convictions occurring prior to the conduct which formed the basis for the federal offense. See Barton, 100 F.3d at 46. Those circuits that have addressed the issue of whether use of the past-tense verb had when referring to prior convictions under § 2K2.1 encompassed post-offense convictions, however, ultimately reached differing results. Compare United States v. Oetken, 241 F.3d 1057, 1058-60 (8th Cir. 2001) (reaching same conclusion as Barton court), with United States v. Laihben, 167 F.3d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that post-offense convictions do count as prior felony convictions for purposes of § 2K2.1); United States v. Pugh, 158 F.3d 1308, 1309-1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Gooden, 116 F.3d 721, 724-725 (5th Cir. 1997)(same); United States v. McCary, 14 F.3d 1502, 1505-06 (10th Cir. 1994)(same). In 2001, the Sentencing Commission put an end to the difference of opinion, amending § 2K2.1 to provide that a defendant’s base offense level would be increased where the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(2001) (emphasis added). Thus, the Sentencing Commission adopted the minority view, but it did not make that view retroactive. See Cofske v. United States, 290 F.3d 437, 442 (1st Cir. 2002) (adopting the minority view for purposes of sentencings which occurred prior to the amendment, but noting that [o]ne could as easily call [the change] a revision as a clarification). In the end, we find the parties’ reliance upon the sentencing guidelines to be of limited utility. We hold that the § 3592(c)(12) statutory aggravating factor encompasses all predicate convictions occurring prior to sentencing, even those occurring after the conduct giving rise to the capital charges. In short, we can discern no basis upon which to conclude that Congress intended that the prior serious drug offense aggravator encompass only drug offenses or convictions that occurred prior to the conduct giving rise to the murder or kidnapping charges. Unlike others contained within § 3592(c), the aggravator does not 48 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS concern matters directly related to the death penalty offense. Rather, it is concerned with the characteristics of the offender as of the time that he is sentenced. Although it easily could have done so, Congress did not specify that either the prior offense or conviction had to occur before the death penalty offense. On the contrary, the entire section speaks in terms of those things that must be considered when the death sentencing hearing is conducted and the petit jury begins its weighing process. And, we note that where Congress has intended a different practice in other circumstances, it has made that intent clear. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2003) (providing for an enhanced penalty [i]f any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final; 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2000) (stating [i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted . . . to [commit specified violations]). At bottom, Higgs’s argument is that the prior drug conviction aggravator of § 3592(c)(12) is to be treated differently than every other prior conviction aggravator because it directs us to inquire as to whether the defendant had previously been convicted, (i.e., uses the past-perfect tense), rather than has previously been convicted (as does every other statutory, prior conviction aggravator contained within § 3592(c), as well as § 3592(b) and (d)).8 This grammatical difference is far too tenuous a basis upon which to conclude that Congress intended that the prior serious drug offense aggravating factor for homicide was to be treated differently than every other prior conviction aggravating factor and every other prior serious drug offense aggravating factor for other crimes under the FDPA.9 8 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(b) and (d) address aggravating factors for espionage and treason and the aggravating factors for drug offense death penalties. They contain identical aggravators for a previous conviction of a serious drug offense, but use the term has instead of had when referring to them. 9 Higgs contends that this reading of § 3592(c)(12) would be inconsistent with Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), because statutory aggravators must be found by the grand jury and included within the indictment. Because we have concluded that prior convictions need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proven beyond a reasonable doubt, see Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27, we need not interpret § 3592(c)(12) as requiring prior convictions to be prior to the grand jury’s indictment in order to pass constitutional muster. UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 49 Finally, even if the aggravator was improperly submitted for consideration, the error was harmless. The prior drug offense aggravator was only one of six aggravating factors submitted to and found by the jury, and the jury found only three mitigating factors (and only one of these unanimously — that Higgs was not the sole proximate cause of the deaths). Accordingly, Higgs would not be entitled to relief on this basis. 4. Multiple Killings Finally, Higgs contests the district court’s denial of his motion to strike multiple killings in a single criminal episode as a statutory aggravating factor, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c)(16), because reliance upon the aggravating factor violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the aggravating factor was not a substantive change because it did not increase the punishment that was available when the murder was committed. As discussed earlier, we agree that the multiple killings aggravator was improperly submitted to the jury as a statutory aggravating factor. Reliance upon a statutory aggravating factor that was added to the death-penalty statute after a murder is committed would run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause if the aggravating factor served as the sole aggravating factor that rendered the crime death-eligible because it would clearly increase the punishment for [the] criminal acts. Morales, 514 U.S. at 504; see Carmell, 529 U.S. at 521-525. It does not follow, however, that Higgs’s death sentences are infirm. In Higgs’s case, the jury found the existence of four statutory aggravators for the first-degree murder convictions and three statutory aggravators for the kidnapping conviction. Accordingly, although the district court’s submission of the multiple killings aggravating factor as a statutory aggravating factor was error, its submission as such was harmless error. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 884 ([A] death sentence supported by at least one valid aggravating circumstance need not be set aside . . . simply because another aggravating circumstance is ‘invalid’ in the sense that it is insufficient by itself to support the death penalty.); United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1001 (8th Cir. 2000) (consideration of inapplicable statutory aggravator was harm50 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS less error where jury found two other statutory aggravators existed). Because the jury found the existence of at least one intent factor and at least one other properly-submitted statutory aggravating factor, the murder was death-eligible. Any additional statutory and nonstatutory aggravating factors did not increase the available punishment and were, instead, appropriately considered by the jury in determining whether to impose the death sentence. B. Constitutional Challenges to the Nonstatutory Aggravators The government submitted two nonstatutory aggravating factors for the jury’s consideration — victim impact and obstruction of justice — after having given appropriate notice to the defendant.10 On appeal, Higgs asserts that the statute’s authorization of the jury’s consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors is unconstitutional for four separate reasons. We also review these challenges de novo. See Helem, 186 F.3d at 454. 1. The Consideration of Nonstatutory Aggravators by the Jury First, Higgs argues that the FDPA violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution because the submission of nonstatutory aggravating factors at the penalty phase allows for the random and unguided imposition of the death penalty by jurors. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987) (providing that the jury’s decision to impose death must be guided by carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer’s discretion). We disagree. Once a defendant has been rendered eligible for the death penalty by the jury’s finding of a statutory aggravating factor, the use of nonstatutory aggravating factors serves only to individualize the sentencing determination.11 See Zant, 462 U.S. at 878-79 (holding that the use of 10 Prior to the start of the penalty phase, the government withdrew future dangerousness, for which notice had also been given, as an additional nonstatutory aggravating factor. 11 A nonstatutory aggravating factor is improper if it is not relevant to the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 967 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). Higgs does not claim that either of the nonstatutory aggravating circumstances submitted to the jury was invalid on this basis. UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 51 nonstatutory aggravating factors is appropriate after the jury finds the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor that narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1106-07 (10th Cir. 1996) (The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of non-statutory aggravating factors in state capital punishment statutes and has held the use of non-statutory aggravating factors permissible.). Thus, we reject the contention that the FDPA is unconstitutional merely because it allows the sentencing jury to weigh nonstatutory aggravating factors when deciding whether to impose the sentence of death upon a defendant convicted of a death-eligible offense. 2. Proportionality Review by the Court Higgs next claims that the FDPA is facially unconstitutional because it does not require proportionality review of a death sentence. Although acknowledging that the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment does not require state courts to conduct such a review, see Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43 (1984), Higgs asserts such review is required when a death penalty scheme allows a jury to weigh nonstatutory aggravating factors in deciding whether to impose a death sentence. Higgs bases this argument on two cases in which the Supreme Court observed that proportionality review is a useful safeguard against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 890; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976). Neither case, however, holds that proportionality review is mandated, and both predate the Court’s decision in Pulley. As noted by the Court in Pulley, that some schemes providing proportionality review are constitutional does not mean that such review is indispensable. . . . Examination of our [prior] cases makes clear that they do not establish proportionality review as a constitutional requirement. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44-45. Nor are we persuaded by Higgs’s attempt to distinguish Pulley because it did not deal with a death penalty scheme involving nonstatutory aggravating factors. See Jones, 132 F.3d at 240-41 (rejecting attempt to distinguish Pulley from application to the FDPA on this basis, and holding that the Constitution does not mandate proportionality review when the capital sentencing scheme permits the jury to consider nonstatutory aggravating factors as long as the 52 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS statute provides for other safeguards against an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty); see also United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 760 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the FDPA has sufficient safeguards —notably the requirements that a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one statutory aggravating factor and at least one of four requisite levels of specific intent on the part of a defendant, not to mention various other procedural protections—such that proportionality review is not required in order for the FDPA to pass constitutional muster), vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953 (2002). Accordingly, we reject Higgs’s claim that the FDPA violates the Eighth Amendment because it does not require proportionality review.