Opinion ID: 2252932
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was This Error Fundamental?

Text: The State argues that even if the instruction was in error, Greer waived this issue when he failed to object at trial. The State is correct that generally the failure to preserve an issue properly for appeal results in waiver. Ind.Crim.Rule 8(B). We will, however, remedy unpreserved errors where our failure to do so would render the trial unfair and violative of due process. See, e.g., Collins v. State (1991), Ind., 567 N.E.2d 798. Our case law makes clear that a trial court commits fundamental error when the instructions as a whole fail to inform the jury that the defendant must have intended to kill the victim. See Hill, 615 N.E.2d at 97; Price v. State (1992), Ind., 591 N.E.2d 1027; Hurt, 570 N.E.2d at 18. While we will review this issue despite the defendant's failure to object, we do differentiate between preserved and unpreserved errors in this context. Where the defendant objects at trial, giving the trial court an opportunity to correct the instruction, an erroneous instruction on the elements of attempt yields an automatic reversal. Cf. Jackson, 575 N.E.2d at 620-21 (upholding conviction but stating that reversible error may have followed had an objection to the instruction been overruled and a tender of a proper instruction been refused). If, on the other hand, the defendant fails to object, we look to the instructions as a whole to determine if they sufficiently informed the jury of the specific intent requirement for attempt. See Hurt v. State (1991), Ind., 570 N.E.2d 16. In the present case, Greer failed to object at trial so we will examine the instructions as whole. The State contends that the charging information in this case corrected the mistaken instruction. In Price v. State (1992), Ind., 591 N.E.2d 1027, we held that an information specifying that the defendant was charged with intending to kill the victim cured the failure of the trial court to instruct on specific intent. In that case, however, the jury instruction merely omitted the specific intent element. The trial court read the statutes for murder, general attempt, and culpability and presented the charging information. It did not forward an inaccurate list of the elements of attempted murder. In the present case, on the other hand, the trial court did incorrectly list the elements for attempted murder. The jury was told explicitly that the defendant could be convicted for taking a substantial step knowingly to kill the victim. Neither the information nor any other instruction acted to cure this misinformation.