Opinion ID: 196477
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the prosecutor act in good faith?

Text: 46 The court found that the prosecutor had made a good faith error in judgment. Such a finding depends in large measure on whether the prosecutor's explanation was credible and is therefore entitled to considerable deference. United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d 1002, 1013 (1st Cir.1995). In this case, the prosecutor's explanations for withholding the statement were both factual and legal. To the extent the court relied on the reasonableness of the prosecutor's legal arguments, we temper the usual deference accorded purely factual findings. Cf. RCI Northeast Servs. Div. v. Boston Edison Co., 822 F.2d 199, 203 (1st Cir.1987) (a finding of fact predicated upon, or induced by, a misapprehension of law is robbed of its customary vitality). We conclude that the trial court's finding of good faith was not supported by the facts or the law. 47 First, the court gave weight to the fact that the government had not received the statement until two months prior to trial. But because the government's obligation to disclose the defendant's recorded statements is a continuing one, Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(c), that was a factor militating against rather than in favor of a finding of good faith. Cf. Tajeddini, 996 F.2d at 1287 (no bad faith where prosecutor was unaware of defendant's statement until the day before he disclosed it to defense counsel three days before trial). Instead of disclosing the statement as soon as he received it from Agent Brosnan, two months prior to trial, the prosecutor never disclosed it at any time before using it before the jury. 48 Second, the court thought that there was a colorable question as to whether the statement had to be produced because it was a mixed statement by the defendant and a potential witness, so that the government only had an obligation to produce the statement to the extent it was a statement of Mr. Lanoue. But this theory, even if colorable, does not explain the prosecutor's actions. [S]tatements discovered by means of electronic surveillance are within Rule 16(a)(1)(A). Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 advisory committee's note. And the rule contains no exception for a defendant's recorded statements on the basis that they comprise one side of a conversation. The court's pre-trial order required disclosure of any statements subject to disclosure under Rule 16 and [w]hether the government counsel's file indicates that any wire or oral communications have been intercepted. Whether or not Carron's side of the conversation was required to be disclosed under Rule 16, the transcript in its entirety should have been disclosed for purposes of determining its admissibility before trial. See United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 864 (1st Cir.1989) (it was error for the government not to have provided defendant with tape recordings containing conversations between defendant and government witnesses). If the prosecutor genuinely believed that Carron's side of the conversation was not discoverable, the reasonable and only permissible course would have been to seek redaction of Carron's words. 4 See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(1). Because Rule 16 could not reasonably be read to allow the government to withhold Lanoue's side of the conversation, the mixed statement rationale did not support a finding of good faith. 49 Third, the court found that the prosecutor genuinely believed that the statement was not relevant within the meaning of Rule 16. The statement was relevant if it had any tendency to make the existence of any fact that [was] of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. Relevance is to be interpreted broadly in the context of Rule 16(a)(1)(A). See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 advisory committee's note (rejecting narrow interpretation of defendant's right to discover own statements). The rule gives a defendant virtually an absolute right to his own recorded statements in the absence of highly unusual circumstances that would otherwise justify a protective order. 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 253, at 46-47 (1982) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir.1982) (adopting broad interpretation of relevance as applied to defendant's statements as a matter of practicality); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 74 n. 80 (D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc) (disclosure of defendant's statements is practically a matter of right even without a showing of materiality), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct. 2641, 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977). 50 The statement obviously was relevant. Lanoue made statements about the Oldsmobile that were arguably both inculpatory and exculpatory. 5 He discussed the informant, who was a potential government witness, and made statements relevant to the defense theory that the government's case rested on false information provided by that informant. See United States v. Noriega, 764 F.Supp. 1480, 1494 (S.D.Fla.1991) (conversations of defendant recorded in prison about potential government witnesses were relevant within the meaning of Rule 16(a)). Even assuming that the government could not envision the statement's relevance before trial, it certainly understood its relevance when defense counsel outlined the defense theory in his opening statement. 51 The reasons proffered by the prosecutor in support of his belief that the statement was not relevant--that it was obtained in a separate investigation of alleged witness intimidation, that the conversation did not become relevant until Carron testified inconsistently with it, and that he did not expect Carron to testify about Laraviere--were without basis in fact or law. 52 Rule 16(a)(1)(A) contains no exception for a defendant's recorded statements if they are obtained in connection with a separate investigation, so long as they are relevant to the pending case. [A]cceptance of the language for just what it says is dictated by the fundamental fairness of granting the accused equal access to his own words, no matter how the government came by them. United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1353 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087, 96 S.Ct. 877, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976). Moreover, it appears that Agent Brosnan obtained the conversation in connection with his investigation of the pending case. For at least six months prior to trial, he had been attempting to obtain telephone conversations between Lanoue and Carron as part of his investigation of the case pending against Lanoue. The prosecutor stated that he knew about and approved that activity, and that immediately after obtaining the August 20 conversation, he subpoenaed Carron to testify against Lanoue in the pending case. It is therefore difficult to credit the separate investigation rationale. In any event, the conversation contained Lanoue's statements that were relevant to the charges pending against him and his defense to those charges. Those statements therefore were required to be disclosed by the plain terms of Rule 16. 53 As to the prosecutor's contention that the conversation did not become relevant until Carron testified inconsistently with it, the government's duty to disclose a defendant's relevant recorded statements does not hinge on whether or when the government uses the statement. Only an oral statement to a known government agent is required to be disclosed if the government intends to use that statement at trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(A). But even that type of statement is required to be disclosed regardless of whether the government intends to introduce it in its case-in-chief, use it for impeachment, or introduce it in rebuttal. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1991 amendment. Rule 16(a)(1)(A) is unequivocal that the government must disclose ... any relevant ... recorded statements made by the defendant. Even an illegally obtained inconsistent statement of a defendant that can only be used to impeach him (but not a defense witness), Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 313, 110 S.Ct. 648, 652, 107 L.Ed.2d 676 (1990), must be produced to him under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(A). See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 511 F.2d 798 (D.C.Cir.1975). The government's theory that Lanoue's statements were not relevant until a witness testified inconsistently with some part of the conversation was therefore erroneous, particularly where Carron was not cross examined about his own statements, but about Lanoue's. See United States v. Scafe, 822 F.2d 928, 935 (10th Cir.1987) (government violated Rule 16 by withholding defendant's letters and using them to cross examine defense witness). 54 The prosecutor's representations that he did not expect Carron to testify until the day before he testified, and that even then he did not expect Carron to testify about Laraviere's character, were irrelevant because, as explained, Rule 16(a)(1)(A) requires the government to disclose the defendant's recorded statements regardless of whether or when it intends to use them. Moreover, it is difficult to credit the government's representation. The recorded conversation itself and defense counsel's opening statement put the government on notice that Carron would testify about Laraviere. 55 Finally, the court noted that, although the prosecutor could have tried to conceal the violation, he did not. It is true that the prosecutor immediately admitted that he held a transcript of the defendant's recorded conversation in his hand and that he had not disclosed it, and conceded the next day, with a myriad of excuses, that he had violated Rule 16. We will not overlook a prosecutor's failure to know or follow the discovery rules on the basis that he did not try to hide the violation. 56 In any event, whether the prosecutor withheld the defendant's statements in good faith or intentionally has little to do with whether the court should have declared a mistrial, since prosecutorial good faith could have no mitigating effect on the prejudice flowing from the violation. See United States v. Padrone, 406 F.2d 560 (2d Cir.1969) (granting new trial where inadvertent non-disclosure of defendant's statement affected trial strategy).b. Were the purposes of Rule 16 subverted? 57 Rule 16's mandatory discovery provisions were designed to contribute to the fair and efficient administration of justice by providing the defendant with sufficient information upon which to base an informed plea and litigation strategy; by facilitating the raising of objections to admissibility prior to trial; by minimizing the undesirable effect of surprise at trial; and by contributing to the accuracy of the fact-finding process. See United States v. Alvarez, 987 F.2d 77, 84-86 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 147, 126 L.Ed.2d 109 (1993); Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 advisory committee's note. The trial court found that the government's discovery violation had not undermined the purposes of Rule 16 because it did not cause the defendant to unknowingly subject himself to impeachment; 6 Rule 16 was not intended to protect against surprising a witness with an inconsistent statement; and it may have actually assisted the accuracy of the fact-finding process by surprising the witness. 58 All of these reasons miss the point because the government cross examined Carron by referring to and reading Lanoue's, and not Carron's, words. Lanoue had a right under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to discover his recorded statements and to prepare for trial and devise a defense strategy based on the evidence disclosed. Alvarez, 987 F.2d at 85. The court's reasoning that surprising a witness with the defendant's statements promoted accuracy and therefore militated against remedial action turns Rule 16 on its head. Due to the nondisclosure, the defense was deprived of the opportunity to refresh Carron's recollection and to investigate the circumstances surrounding the conversation. This unfairly surprised the defense and deprived it of the opportunity to design an intelligent litigation strategy that responded to the statement. 59 We also note that it is far from clear that the cross examination assisted the accuracy of the trial. The government opened its cross examination by accusing Carron of threatening Laraviere. At sidebar the prosecutor stated that Carron had threatened Laraviere, but proffered nothing to support the accusation other than to say that the document from which he read corroborated his questions. The conversation contained no mention of threats. In it, Lanoue told Carron that Laraviere was the informant, that his lawyer was putting an investigator on Laraviere, that he should not warn Laraviere, and that he should be wary of Laraviere. We doubt that this was a sufficient basis for asking Carron whether he had threatened Laraviere, and it plainly was an insufficient basis for asking if he had ever threatened anyone. Cf. United States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d 300, 306 (1st Cir.1992) (prosecutor's explanation for asking question was plausible where he had in hand a judicial opinion finding appellant was not a credible witness); United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847, 857 n. 5 (1st Cir.1990) (expressing doubt that prosecutor's questions to defense witness about whether he was under investigation for drug smuggling were improper since the prosecutor volunteered to call witnesses to attest to the foundation of the questions), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074, 111 S.Ct. 801, 112 L.Ed.2d 862 (1991); United States v. Madrid Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125, 129 (1st Cir.1976) (appellant not prejudiced by question to defense witness about prior offense because it was based on an actual conviction). Carron apparently was not charged with threatening Laraviere. The government did not present evidence in its rebuttal case to refute Carron's description of the FBI agents' visit in which he said that the agents pressured him to testify against Lanoue, not that they accused him of threatening Laraviere. The government was free to show through admissible evidence that its informant had been threatened, but it offered no such evidence. Nonetheless, the jury may well have received the impression from the prosecutor's improper questions that Laraviere did not testify because Carron had threatened him. If Lanoue's counsel had been able to refresh Carron's recollection with the transcript of the conversation, the jury would have been warranted in reaching the conclusion that Laraviere did not testify because his testimony would not have helped the government. 60 The prosecutor's failure to disclose the conversation at any time before using it also subverted Rule 16's purpose of facilitating the fair and efficient pre-trial determination of the admissibility of Lanoue's statements. Although an evidentiary hearing was held, it was not until after the prosecutor had already used the statements before the jury. Moreover, we think the hearing was unfairly truncated due to the government's late disclosure. After Agent Brosnan testified, defense counsel attempted to obtain the presence of the Wyatt Detention Center employee who provided Agent Brosnan with the conversation in order to explore whether it was intercepted as a result of monitoring directed specifically against Lanoue, which was relevant to its admissibility under Title III. Ms. Egan, Director of Programs at the facility, responded that the employee would not attend the hearing because it was his day off. The court refused the defendant's request for a recess during which the prosecutor could convince Ms. Egan of the importance of the employee's attendance. If the conversation had been disclosed two months prior to trial when it should have been, defense counsel could have obtained any necessary witnesses. The incomplete mid-trial hearing necessitated by the prosecutor's failure to disclose was neither fair nor efficient. 61 c. Was Lanoue prejudiced? 62 The court found that Lanoue had not been prejudiced for the following reasons: although the government had done an effective job of impeaching Carron, the statement played little role in that process because it was peripheral to Carron's testimony and the defense theory; Carron denied that Lanoue made the statements; and the statements had not been introduced into evidence. 63 The improper questions based on Lanoue's statements were not peripheral to Carron's testimony and the defense. At the close of the government's case-in-chief, the evidence concerning the stolen vehicle charge was that the Oldsmobile was reported stolen on December 21 and that Lanoue was driving it on December 19 and again on December 23. The defense, consisting of Lanoue's and Carron's testimony, was that Lanoue had purchased the car from Laraviere, who had represented that the car was his to sell and then falsely informed the FBI that Lanoue was planning to steal the car in order to obtain favorable treatment on pending theft charges. If the jury believed that testimony, it would have had grounds for acquitting Lanoue of the stolen vehicle charge. 64 A key element of the defense, argued in both opening and closing, was that the informant upon whose information the government's entire case rested did not testify at trial. Indeed, the government clearly recognized that Laraviere's absence and the implication that he had provided false information could defeat its case. The government objected when the defense attempted to elicit the informant's name and the exact information he had provided, and urged the jury in closing argument to ignore Laraviere's absence. Yet it offered no evidence to explain his absence, other than the improper questions accusing Carron of threatening Laraviere and insinuating that the threat stemmed from a conversation with Lanoue. As the government intended, these questions had a detrimental effect on a defense that was otherwise uncontradicted. Cf. United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1340 (1st Cir.1994) (no prejudice to the defense due to government's delayed fingerprint analysis because there was ample evidence to refute and none to support the defendant's theory that he was framed). 65 Lanoue also was prejudiced because the failure to disclose his statements deprived him of the opportunity to effectively prepare for trial and to design an intelligent trial strategy. See Alvarez, 987 F.2d at 85; United States v. Hemmer, 729 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1218, 104 S.Ct. 2666, 81 L.Ed.2d 371 (1984); Gladney, 563 F.2d at 494. If the conversation had been disclosed two months before trial as it should have been, Lanoue would have known that Agent Brosnan obtained it in connection with a separate investigation of witness intimidation. Lanoue's counsel would then have been able to investigate whether there was such an investigation and, if so, what came of it, enabling him to either prepare Carron for cross examination on that subject or make an intelligent decision not to call him as a witness. 66 Carron's denial that Lanoue made the statements militates in favor of rather than against a finding of prejudice because defense counsel was deprived of the opportunity to refresh Carron's recollection about the content of the conversation. See United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.2d 649, 654 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant's denial of the existence of undisclosed items bolstered rather than weakened his claim for a mistrial because it deprived him of the opportunity to support the denial or refresh his recollection, thus defeating purposes of the discovery requirement). Carron answered no, and then finally I don't remember that to questions asking him if Lanoue had made statements about Laraviere, while the prosecutor referred to, read from, and brandished a document obviously containing those statements. The defense should have been able to refresh Carron's recollection about what Lanoue said to him. 67 Furthermore, Carron was thoroughly unnerved by the prosecutor's use of specific dates while referring to the transcribed conversation. To be sure, he was uncertain about specific dates and time frames throughout his testimony. This may or may not have detracted from his overall credibility but when the prosecutor began to brandish the transcript, it received a major blow. Thereafter, Carron refused to directly answer any question concerning dates, and eventually any question at all, expressing fear of being trapped into committing perjury. If defense counsel had had access to the transcript, he could have attempted to refresh Carron's recollection. Failing that, he could have decided not to call Carron as a witness at all. Instead, the government was able to destroy, with the defendant's own statements, the credibility of the only defense witness who testified to the defense theory other than the defendant himself. 68 That the statement was not actually introduced in evidence does not show lack of prejudice. An improper question alone can require a mistrial or other potent remedy if it causes prejudice. See Rodriguez, 799 F.2d at 654 (district court erred in denying mistrial on the basis that the undisclosed material was not introduced into evidence where the government's use of the material in questioning defendant was just as effective as if it had been introduced); Padrone, 406 F.2d at 560 (although undisclosed statement was not introduced, district court erred in failing to grant mistrial where defendant's direct testimony was inconsistent with the statement). Here, the government's failure to disclose the conversation and its questions based on the conversation could well have led to the destruction of Carron's credibility and undermined the defense theory. That the conversation was not introduced in evidence did not erase or mitigate the prejudice. 69 d. Did the trial court take appropriate action to cure and 70 prevent prejudice? 71 When a party fails to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 16, the court is empowered to order that party to comply with the rule, grant a continuance, exclude the evidence, or enter other just relief. Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(2). What remedy should be applied depends on the seriousness of the violation and the amount of prejudice to the defendant. Gladney, 563 F.2d at 494. Here, the violation was serious and likely to have caused serious prejudice. Because the statement was not disclosed at any time before the government used it, or in enough time that the defense could make use of it, a mistrial was the only appropriate remedy. We do not decide whether the court would have acted within its discretion if it had taken more forceful measures than it did, but we note that the court could have stricken the questions, given an immediate and explicit curative instruction, granted the defendant's request for a recess, and even halted the cross examination and then allowed redirect. 72 Moreover, the court did not act to prevent further prejudice. Although the prosecutor had represented that he would not refer to the conversation again, he reminded the jury of the statements he had read four days earlier by asking Carron whether he had had any conversations about Laraviere with the defendant after the defendant's arrest. Defense counsel's objection was overruled, and Carron again answered that he did not recall. By overruling the objection, the court tacitly approved the improper question in the jury's presence. See United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 575 (1st Cir.1994). 73 The government argues on appeal that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it eventually gave Lanoue's counsel the opportunity to review the statement with Carron to determine whether he wished to recall him. The court ignored defense counsel's immediate request for a recess and to be given the statement. The court denied his request for a recess at the conclusion of Carron's cross examination so that he could prepare him for redirect. Instead, the court permitted Lanoue's counsel to meet with Carron for the first time during a later recess in the middle of Lanoue's direct testimony, ruling that he could recall Carron to the witness stand if his reasons for doing so were sufficient. 74 This is not a case of merely delayed disclosure where the critical inquiry is ... whether the tardiness prevented defense counsel from employing the material to good effect. United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 757 (1st Cir.1991). The government's use of the conversation without disclosing it at all precluded Lanoue's counsel from using it to any effect. When he twice requested a recess in an attempt to mitigate the harm already done, those requests were denied. Cf. Hodge-Balwing, 952 F.2d at 609 (defendant failed to show prejudice where court ordered the government to hand over the case report before the witness testified and defendant failed to seek a continuance); Hemmer, 729 F.2d at 13 (defendants failed to show prejudice where they received reports, used them in their defense, and failed to seek a continuance). We do not fault Lanoue's counsel for declining to recall Carron at a point when he was in shambles as a witness as the result of the government's violation of the rules and the trial court's utter failure to send a message to the witness, the jury or counsel that the government's questions were improper. 75 Count V is vacated and remanded for a new trial because Lanoue plainly was prejudiced in defending against the stolen motor vehicle charge. There was no prejudice with respect to Count VI because Carron's testimony did not touch on whether Lanoue knowingly transported a firearm with an obliterated serial number. 76 Although it is a more difficult question, we believe that Lanoue also suffered prejudice as to Count I, the conspiracy count. The jury was instructed that it could convict Lanoue of conspiracy if it found he conspired to commit any one or more of six object offenses: (1) interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2312; (2) possession of a stolen motor vehicle that had crossed state boundaries, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2313; (3) interstate transportation of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1); (4) using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to an attempt or conspiracy to commit robbery, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1); (5) interstate possession of a stolen firearm (referring to Meade's revolver), 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(j); or (6) interstate transportation of a firearm with an obliterated serial number (referring to Lanoue's revolver), 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(k). The object offenses best supported by the evidence were the two relating to the stolen Oldsmobile, with respect to which Lanoue was prejudiced. Unless we can conclude with fair assurance that the jury relied on one of the other four objects, we must reverse the conspiracy conviction. Cf. United States v. Morrow, 39 F.3d 1228, 1236 (1st Cir.1994) (erroneously admitted evidence was harmless where it was used to prove an object of the conspiracy to which defendant was never tied and it was a virtual certainty that jury convicted him for his involvement in the other object offense), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1328, 131 L.Ed.2d 208 (1995). 77 The evidence of a conspiracy to commit any of the latter four object offenses was not overwhelming, and the jury's verdicts give us little confidence that it relied on any of them to find Lanoue guilty of conspiracy. The jury necessarily rejected all of them as objects of an agreement by Cole or Meade when it acquitted them of Count I. Although we could not conclude from this that there was insufficient evidence of a conspiracy, United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir.1990), the question we address here is not what a rational jury could conclude but rather what effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision in this case. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1247, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). 78 The fourth object offense, using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, was charged as a substantive offense in Count IV. The court instructed the jury that it could find a defendant guilty of Count IV if it found that he (1) committed either the Hobbs Act attempted robbery or the Hobbs Act conspiracy to commit robbery, and (2) knowingly used or carried a firearm during or in relation to that crime or those crimes; or if it found that he aided and abetted that offense. The jury found all three defendants not guilty of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to an attempt or conspiracy to commit robbery, and of aiding and abetting that offense; not guilty of Count II, the Hobbs Act conspiracy; and not guilty of Count III, the Hobbs Act attempt, and of aiding and abetting that offense. Under these circumstances, we think that the jury necessarily rejected, as an object of the Count I conspiracy, using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to an attempt or conspiracy to commit robbery. 7 79 The third and fifth object offenses, interstate transportation of a firearm by a convicted felon (Lanoue), and interstate possession of a stolen firearm (Meade's), were not charged as substantive offenses against any of the defendants. The sixth, interstate transportation of Lanoue's firearm with an obliterated serial number, was charged as a substantive offense in Count VI against Lanoue alone, and the jury found him guilty of it, but there was no evidence that any co-conspirator knew that the serial number was obliterated. 8 Given the dearth of evidence that Lanoue conspired with anyone else who possessed the requisite knowledge and intent to commit these offenses, and the fact that the jury rejected each of them as a basis for a conspiracy conviction against Cole and Meade, we think that the likelihood is remote that the jury found that Lanoue conspired with anyone else to commit them. 80 The object offenses best supported by the evidence were the two relating to the stolen car. From what we can glean of the jury's reasoning in this case, it is likely they either rejected the other object offenses, or found a conspiracy to transport a stolen car and did not attempt to reach agreement on the other object offenses. We cannot conclude that the erroneous use of Lanoue's statements did not substantially sway the jury's conspiracy verdict, Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765, 66 S.Ct. at 1248, and therefore vacate and remand Count I for a new trial.