Opinion ID: 1684540
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether The Tribunal's Imposition Of Lesser Sanctions Was Justified.

Text: The Board also argues, on the assumption that we would uphold the rule in Mann , which we do, that the tribunal's decision to reduce Cobb's sanction from termination to a public reprimand and suspension without pay for two years was arbitrary and not justified. The Board claims that the two charges the tribunal found Cobb guilty of were alone sufficient to terminate her contract, and that the tribunal did not find facts sufficient to authorize a reduction in Cobb's sanction. The standard of review of the tribunal's decision, when appealed by the board of education, is whether the decision was arbitrary. [30] Administrative action, such as that of the tribunal, is arbitrary if it is not supported by substantial evidence. [31] `Substantial evidence' means evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men. [32] When the circuit court heard the initial appeal of this case, it attempted  to borrow the Board's terminology  to rehabilitate the tribunal's decision to impose lesser sanctions. The circuit court noted that the tribunal found that Cobb was guilty only of two of the six factual allegations, that fault for the numerous conflicts between Cobb and the parents and staff was shared, and that the Board had committed major procedural errors in evaluating Cobb's performance served, in essence, as mitigators justifying the lesser penalty. The Board argues that this contradicts the clear mandate of Gallatin County Board of Education v. Mann [33] that the tribunal find specific substantial evidence to support reduction of the sanction imposed, which the Board reads as requiring a finding of mitigation whenever a lesser sanction is imposed. This is a misunderstanding of Mann and administrative proceedings in general, and it contradicts our holding above that the tribunal controls the sanction to be imposed. The Board is correct in pointing out that the Court of Appeals in Mann found that the tribunal's decision to impose a lesser sanction was not supported by substantial evidence, thus it was arbitrary. This does not mean, however, that the tribunal must find mitigating circumstances in order to impose a lesser sanction. To understand this seeming contradiction, we must examine the circumstances surrounding the Mann decision. The tribunal in Mann originally issued an order affirming the superintendent's decision to terminate the teacher's contract, but the teacher appealed to the circuit court, which remanded the decision to the tribunal because it failed to exercise the full scope of its authority, i.e., the power to impose lesser sanctions. [34] On remand, the tribunal adopted its prior findings of fact and conclusions of law, [35] including findings of fact sufficient to justify termination and a specific conclusion as a matter of law that [the][s]uperintendent... was justified in terminating ... [the] teacher['s] contract, [36] but only imposed a suspension on the teacher. In reversing this second tribunal decision, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the tribunal had found facts sufficient to authorize termination and, more importantly, had legally concluded that termination was justified. [37] The Court of Appeals was correct, then, in pointing out that in order for the tribunal to reduce the sanction once the tribunal [has] made a specific finding that [the][s]uperintendent... was justified in terminating [the teacher's] contract, it must determine that the disciplinary action recommended by the superintendent is arbitrary, unfair, discriminatory or disproportionate. [38] The discussion of mitigating factors following this language, however, is misleading. The Board urges us to require that the tribunal's decision not to impose certain sanctions be supported by substantial evidence, but we cannot. If the tribunal has the authority to decide the sanction, as we have held above, then it does not have to justify a reduced sanction. Holding otherwise would allow the superintendent to bind the tribunal. For example, in a case where there is no evidence to support the superintendent's proposed termination, it will be difficult to show mitigating evidence because it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove a negative. In such a case, there is nothing to mitigate because there simply is not sufficient evidence to support the superintendent's charges. A finding that a lower sanction is appropriate is, in effect, a finding that there is insufficient evidence to support a higher sanction. This is different than Mann where the tribunal specifically found that the higher sanction was justified. In such a case, the tribunal binds itself through its legal conclusions, rather than being bound by the superintendent's proposed sanction, and imposition of a lower sanction can only be justified by mitigating evidence. As such, absent a finding that the superintendent's proposed sanction is justified, a finding of mitigating factors or that the proposed sanction is arbitrary, unfair, discriminatory, or disproportionate is unnecessary. The Board still claims that this case meets the subtle distinction made in Mann because the tribunal found Cobb guilty of two of the six charges, each of which alone is sufficient to justify termination. This, however, confuses the findings of fact and conclusions of law. The mere fact that termination is an allowed sanction for a given act or series of acts does not mean that it is the necessary sanction. [39] Again, as discussed at length above, the superintendent's proposed sanction is not binding on the tribunal. As such, a finding of fact as to one or more charges sufficient to allow termination does not require that the tribunal choose termination. The tribunal in this case specifically found that a reprimand and suspension without pay were the appropriate sanction for Cobb's two violations of KRS 161.790. The tribunal did not find that the superintendent's proposed sanction was justified, thus a finding of mitigation was not necessary to justify the imposition of the lower penalty, and we cannot say that the tribunal's decision was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.