Opinion ID: 1229632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the qualified immunity defense.

Text: Farnworth asserts that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment on his federal civil rights claim against Femling under the First Amendment on the basis of qualified immunity. We agree. We first note that Farnworth's lack of a right to continued employment is immaterial to the viability of his First Amendment claim. Regardless of the nature of the employment, a public employer may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes [the person's] constitutionally protected interests  especially, [the person's] interest in freedom of speech. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 72, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 2736, 111 L.Ed.2d 52, 65 (1990) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570, 577 (1972)). In Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 854 P.2d 242 (1993), the Court stated a three-part test to determine whether a party asserting qualified immunity is entitled to the defense: 1. Was there a clearly established law? 2. Did the conduct of the party asserting qualified immunity violate a clearly established right of the party claiming the violation? 3. Was the conduct of the party asserting qualified immunity reasonable? Id. at 904, 854 P.2d at 247. In this case, there was a clearly established law. A public employer may not enforce conditions of employment that infringe on an employee's constitutional right of free speech. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 716-17 (1983); Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 933, 719 P.2d 1185, 1193 (1986). Whether Femling's conduct violated Farnworth's First Amendment rights depends on whether Femling took adverse action against Farnworth because Farnworth exercised these rights. The resolution of this question first requires us to examine whether Farnworth's speech that was noted by Femling in his charges against Farnworth was speech protected under the First Amendment. Whether Farnworth's speech was constitutionally protected entails a balancing of the interests of Farnworth in commenting upon matters of public concern against the employer's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1735, 20 L.Ed.2d 811, 817 (1968). Under this analysis, Farnworth has the initial burden to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected. Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471, 484 (1977). In Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada Cty. Hous. Auth., 124 Idaho 450, 860 P.2d 653 (1993), the Court recently noted: [I]t is clearly settled law that government officials cannot terminate public employees for exercising their First Amendment rights to speak on a matter of public concern except in limited circumstances. Id. at 465, 860 P.2d at 668. Citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 n. 3, 88 S.Ct. at 1735 n. 3, 20 L.Ed.2d at 818 n. 3, the Court stated: [D]ismissal for the exercise of First Amendment rights might be permissible in cases where the need for confidentiality is great or in cases where the relationship between the superior and subordinate is of such a personal and intimate nature that certain forms of public criticism would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working relationship between them. Lubcke, 124 Idaho at 465, 860 P.2d at 668. The Court also noted that [t]he inquiry into the protective status of the speech is one of law, not fact. Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. at 1690 n. 7, 75 L.Ed.2d at 720 n. 7). In deciding whether Farnworth's speech was protected, we must first determine if Farnworth's speech involved a matter of public concern. If it did, we must decide whether there were genuine issues of material fact concerning the four factors set out in Pickering: 1. the effect of Farnworth's speech on the discipline and harmony among co-workers; 2. the employer's need for confidentiality; 3. whether the speech impeded Farnworth in competently performing his daily duties; and 4. the need to encourage a close and personal relationship involving loyalty and confidence between Farnworth and Femling. Lubcke, 124 Idaho at 465, 860 P.2d at 668. We conclude that Farnworth's speech concerning the type of sheriff the county needed was a matter of public concern. Farnworth's statements about a sheriff for all of the county and a hard working and honest sheriff relate to matters about which the public is concerned  the type of office holder a candidate for public office will be. Although there is evidence indicating some disruption in the sheriff's department because of some other conduct and speech of Farnworth, there is no evidence that Farnworth's statements about electing a sheriff for all the county and a hard working and honest sheriff created any disruption. Therefore, on the basis of the record now before us, employing the Pickering factors, we conclude that this speech was protected by the First Amendment, and it was not reasonable for Femling to take adverse action against Farnworth based on these statements. For this reason, the trial court should not have granted summary judgment to Femling on the basis of qualified immunity. For guidance to the trial court on remand, we point out that once a public employee has established that the employee's activity was constitutionally protected, the employee then has the burden of showing that the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision of the public employer to take adverse action against the employee's employment. If the employee carries this burden of going forward, the burden of going forward then shifts to the employer, who may avoid liability by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have been made absent the constitutionally protected conduct. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576, 50 L.Ed.2d at 484.