Opinion ID: 1119516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the evidence for the premeditated murder and kidnapping charges

Text: Miller argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for premeditated murder and kidnapping. Miller told police that Luna shot the victim on Mt. Lemmon and then gave him the gun. Luna drove the victim down to the desert in the victim's car. Miller followed in Luna's truck. This evidence supports the kidnapping conviction. Once Luna stopped, Miller shot the victim five more times. Although Miller told the police the victim was dead, the evidence indicates otherwise. In addition, Miller gave Luna a loaded gun and followed him up Mt. Lemmon. His premeditated murder conviction is supported by the evidence. B. Sentencing Issues 1. Victim Impact Evidence Miller claims that the victim's parents should not have been permitted to address the court. The victim's parents testified that the murder had a terrible impact on their lives and that they did not believe Miller's new-found religion was genuine. Her father said that death was the appropriate punishment. The court allowed the parents to rebut Miller's videotaped statement, which he offered as mitigation. He said he was sorry for what happened and discussed his religious conversion. Ex. N (videotape). But the trial court found that Miller's remorse and religious conversion were mitigating. The court thus found that the victim's parents' statements did not rebut Miller's offer of mitigation. See infra, at 327, 921 P.2d at 1164. Moreover, at sentencing the court indicated that it did not consider the parents' statements, Tr. Dec. 20, 1993, at 13, and therefore there was no error. State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 292, 908 P.2d 1062, 1077 (1996). 2. Trial judge Miller argues that the trial judge was biased, and decided to sentence him to death at Luna's sentencing. The judge indicated that he considered rejecting Luna's plea because it excluded the death sentence. This does not show bias against Miller. Indeed, the judge spent a substantial amount of time deliberating on Miller's sentence. This claim is without merit. 3. Evidence of cruel, heinous, and depraved Miller argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove the existence of the § 13-703(F)(6) aggravating factor. He argues that his statement is unreliable. We disagree. It is sufficiently corroborated by other evidence in the case. State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 170, 654 P.2d 800, 806 (1982). a. Heinous and Depraved Miller challenges the court's finding of heinous and depraved. The court found that the murder was senseless because Miller did not know the victim and had the most flimsy of reasons to kill. Minute Entry, Dec. 1, 1993, at 4. Miller apparently does not challenge this finding. Miller claims that the court's finding that the victim was helpless is inconsistent with its finding that the victim was attempting to escape. This contention is patently meritless. By Miller's admission, Luna had already shot the victim. When Miller approached her, gun in hand, she was helpless. Miller challenges the finding that he inflicted gratuitous violence on two grounds. First, he claims that evidence discovered after sentencing  the fact that the victim's hair had been cut from her head rather than pulled  requires a new sentencing hearing. Second, he contends that removing hair from the victim is not gratuitous violence. Large clumps of the victim's hair had been removed. Miller told police he pulled her hair after he shot her to make it look like a madman committed the murder. After sentencing, Miller filed a motion under Rule 24.3, Ariz.R.Crim.P., claiming that the court relied upon erroneous information. Miller offered evidence that the victim's hair had been cut. The State stipulated that the hair had been cut, but argued it made no difference. The trial court assumed at sentencing that Miller pulled out her hair. The trial court relied upon this act to find heinous and depraved, and also to rebut intoxication as a mitigating factor. The court gave it special significance, telling Miller that this is what's going to put you in the gas chamber one day. Tr. Dec. 20, 1993, at 23. Miller interrupted the court during sentencing to assert that the hair had been cut, not pulled. The court responded that whether it was cut or yanked it demonstrates a lack of humanity about somebody. Id. at 22. The Rule 24.3 motion was properly denied. The court had already indicated that it made no difference whether Miller cut or pulled the victim's hair from her head. Miller also challenges the finding that cutting her hair constituted gratuitous violence. We disagree. Whether he cut her hair or pulled it out, he inflicted injury beyond that necessary to kill. State v. Brewer, 170 Ariz. 486, 502, 826 P.2d 783, 799 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 872, 113 S.Ct. 206, 121 L.Ed.2d 147 (1992). The heinous and depraved finding, based on senselessness, helplessness, and gratuitous violence, is proper. b. Cruelty Miller also challenges the cruelty finding. The evidence at the murder scene demonstrated that the victim must have experienced great mental and physical suffering. The court found that Miller's criminal liability attached from the moment he provided Luna the gun. Thus, Miller is responsible for the suffering the victim experienced after being shot on Mt. Lemmon and driven down to the desert, a period of time in which Miller had the gun. The victim clearly experienced even more mental and physical anguish at the desert. She struggled to escape. By Miller's admission, he shot the victim repeatedly once they stopped. The cruelty finding is proper. 4. Use of the presentence report On Miller's motion, the court agreed not to look at the presentence report until after it sentenced Miller on the murder count. Miller later offered his lack of a felony record as a mitigating circumstance. The State asked the court to take judicial notice of Miller's history in the presentence report. Miller did not object. Once Miller offered his lack of felony record in mitigation, the rest of his record was proper rebuttal. State v. Rossi, 171 Ariz. 276, 278-79, 830 P.2d 797, 799-800 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1003, 113 S.Ct. 610, 121 L.Ed.2d 544 (1992). See State v. Kemp, 185 Ariz. 52, 59-61, 912 P.2d 1281, 1288-90 (1996). 5. Mitigating circumstances Miller sought to prove intoxication in mitigation under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). He also sought to prove the following non-statutory mitigating factors: the more culpable party did not receive a death sentence; Miller has no prior felony record; Miller admitted his guilt; Miller cooperated with the police; Miller had become religious; Miller lacked the intent to kill; Miller was sexually and emotionally abused as a child. a. Intoxication Under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1), intoxication is mitigating when it impairs [t]he defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Miller argues the court erred in failing to find his intoxication mitigating. He claims that he had consumed a large amount of alcohol and had taken a number of Percocets, a narcotic painkiller, before the murder. His roommates told the police that he had consumed a large quantity of alcohol. In rejecting intoxication as mitigating, the court relied on Miller's criminal history, the removal of the victim's hair, and his ability to drive down Mt. Lemmon at night at a high rate of speed. The presentence report indicated that Miller once assaulted a group of students with a .22 caliber handgun. Because Miller claimed that his lack of felony record was mitigating, his criminal history was proper rebuttal to this and other mitigating circumstances. A.R.S. §§ 13-703(C) & (G). Miller claimed that he was not violent toward people and the murder would not have happened had he not been intoxicated. This prior act tended to refute Miller's claim. The court also reasoned that Miller's act of removing hair from the victim showed his intoxication was not mitigating. Miller argues that the trial court's findings on when the victim's hair was pulled out are inconsistent. The court, in its finding of heinous and depraved, described the victim as either dead or past the point of realistically surviving. Minute Entry, Dec. 1, 1993, at 3. Nineteen days later, in rejecting intoxication as mitigating (and in its weighing of aggravation and mitigation), the court indicated that the victim was alive and suffered additional pain from having her hair pulled. Minute Entry, Dec. 20, 1993, at 4. But this discrepancy is irrelevant to the issue of intoxication. In rejecting intoxication as mitigating, the court gave the most weight to Miller's ability to drive down Mt. Lemmon, at night, at a high rate of speed. He had the only gun at that point. He pulled the living victim from the vehicle, pulled or cut her hair, and shot her 5 times. Id. at 3-4. We agree with the trial court that Miller's intoxication did not impair either his ability to conform his conduct to the law or his appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct. As we said in State v. Kiles, [w]e refuse to equate defendant's unwillingness to control his actions with his inability to do so. 175 Ariz. 358, 374, 857 P.2d 1212, 1228 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1058, 114 S.Ct. 724, 126 L.Ed.2d 688 (1994). We thus affirm the trial court's finding that intoxication was not a statutory mitigating circumstance. b. Luna's sentence Luna pleaded guilty to first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The court found this mitigating, but not sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency. Miller argues that Luna's life sentence renders his death sentence fundamentally unfair. We disagree. A difference in sentences between co-defendants through appropriate plea bargaining is not mitigating. State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 523, 898 P.2d 454, 472 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 787, 133 L.Ed.2d 737 (1996). Moreover, Miller committed the murder in a cruel, heinous, and depraved manner, making his sentence appropriate notwithstanding Luna's less severe sentence. See State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 57, 859 P.2d 156, 167 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1026, 114 S.Ct. 640, 126 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (noting that where the murder is especially cruel, heinous or depraved, unexplained disparity has little significance.). c. Miller's lack of a felony record Although Miller had not been convicted of a felony, he did have a substantial criminal history. The court found that his lack of a felony record was not mitigating. We agree. State v. Rossi, 171 Ariz. at 278-79, 830 P.2d at 799-800. d. Admission of guilt and cooperation with the police Although admission of guilt and cooperation with the police can be mitigating, there was no evidence of that here. The court found that these mitigating factors did not exist, and we agree. Miller repeatedly lied, and only inculpated himself when confronted with evidence of his lies. He denied shooting the victim while she was alive despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. e. Miller's religious conversion Miller became religious after his arrest. The court found that this was mitigating. The court also found, sua sponte, that Miller's remorse was mitigating. f. Miller's intent to kill Miller claimed that the evidence showed he lacked the intent to kill. The court found that this mitigating factor did not exist, and we agree. The jury verdict and the evidence indicate Miller intended to kill. g. Miller's early abuse Miller claimed he suffered abuse as a child. The court agreed and found this to be mitigating. The court noted that his brother and sister were the most severely abused. The court also found that Miller's abuse was much less severe than that experienced by other defendants. It concluded that Miller was not influenced by his childhood abuse at the time of the murder, and we agree. h. Mitigating factors argued for the first time on appeal Miller argues that the trial court failed to consider specific instances of non-statutory mitigation, which he now raises for the first time on appeal. Specifically, he claims the following are mitigating: intoxication as non-statutory; duress; impulsivity; low intellectual functioning and learning disability; the personality of a follower; and, supportive family. But the trial court said that it considered all statutory and non-statutory mitigation, including mitigation Miller did not offer. Minute Entry, Dec. 20, 1993, at 1. Moreover, these alleged mitigating factors are not supported by the record. Finally, Miller argues that the trial court did not give some mitigating factors the weight they deserve and failed to weigh the mitigation cumulatively. Both contentions are without merit. The court gave weight to Luna's sentence, which is not mitigating. In addition, the court gave the right weight to the other mitigating circumstances. It even found a mitigating factor, remorse, that had not been argued. While the court did weigh each mitigating factor against the aggravating factor, it also indicated it weighed all the mitigation cumulatively. 6. Weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors The court found one aggravating factor and four mitigating factors (Luna's sentence, remorse, religious conversion, and abuse as a child). Miller argues that the court double-weighed the (F)(6) factor by finding that the murder was especially cruel, and also heinous and depraved. But weighing aggravation is not simply the counting of factors. Although (F)(6) could only be counted once, a finding that an offense is both cruel and depraved does not mean that it has been counted twice. State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 71, 906 P.2d 579, 604 (1995) (In weighing, we do not simply count the number of aggravating or mitigating factors. The quality and strength of each must also be considered.). Weighing is both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Miller argues that the court's findings on whether the victim was alive when her hair was yanked or cut are inconsistent. As we have already noted, the court found that removing the victim's hair, was an act of needless violence to a woman who was either already dead or past the point of realistically surviving. Minute Entry, Dec. 1, 1993, at 3. At the sentencing hearing held nineteen days later, the court, in rejecting intoxication as a statutory mitigating circumstance, indicated that the victim was alive when her hair was removed. See supra, at 325-326, 921 P.2d at 1162-63. In the court's balancing of aggravation and mitigation, it found that Miller had dragged the wounded victim from the car, pulled a hank of hair from her head, an act requiring great force and determination, and then pumped five bullets into her body. Minute Entry, Dec. 20, 1993, at 6. The court's aggravation finding clearly indicates that it relied on the removal of the victim's hair only to prove heinous and depraved, and not cruelty. Whether she was alive is thus not relevant to the heinous and depraved finding. Although the special verdict appears inconsistent, the findings were made nineteen days later and did not modify the court's cruelty finding which did not rely on the hair incident. The court rejected intoxication as a mitigating circumstance, primarily because Miller was able to drive down a difficult mountain road at night at a high rate of speed. The court referred to the hair incident as an act of great force and determination to rebut Miller's claim of intoxication. Minute Entry, Dec. 20, 1993, at 6. We do not believe the trial court's findings indicate that Miller's sentencing was defective. The special verdict indicates that the trial court spent a considerable amount of time deliberating and thoughtfully considered all of the aggravation and mitigation. The court's sentence was unaffected by the timing of the hair incident. In order to resolve any ambiguity, on independent review we find and rule that the removal of the hair is relevant to the heinous and depraved prong of the (F)(6) factor, and the consideration of mitigating evidence. We do not use it for the cruelty finding. 7. Independent review We have independently reviewed the facts that establish the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and agree with the trial court that the mitigation here is insufficiently substantial to call for leniency. A.R.S. § 13-703.01(A). 8. Proportionality review Miller argues he is entitled to a proportionality review of his sentence. This court no longer conducts proportionality reviews of death sentences. State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 844 P.2d 566. 9. Denial of motion to strike death notice As required by Rule 15.1(g)(1), Ariz. R.Crim.P., the State timely filed a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. Miller filed a motion to strike the death notice because Luna's plea agreement included a stipulated life sentence. Miller argues that the denial of the motion was error. We disagree. Rule 15.1(g)(1) is procedural. See State v. Jackson, 186 Ariz. 20, 24, 918 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1996); State v. Lee, 185 Ariz. 549, 555, 917 P.2d 692, 698 (1996). We see no relationship between the death notice and Luna's plea. We also reject Miller's argument that the State's offer of a plea with life imprisonment for Luna  which was also offered to and refused by Miller  was an unconstitutional exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. at 411, 844 P.2d at 578. 10. Other arguments Miller raises ten other sentencing claims that have been previously rejected by this court: judge sentencing violates equal protection; failure to channel the sentencer's discretion; unguided prosecutorial discretion; cruel and unusual punishment; discriminatory application of the death sentence; failure to prove that death is appropriate; preclusion from weighing evidence of mitigation; placement of burden of proof upon capital defendant; right to jury determination of sentencing factors; and vagueness of cruel, heinous, or depraved aggravator. We summarily reject them.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Miller's convictions and sentences. FELDMAN, C.J., ZLAKET, V.C.J., MOELLER, J., and EHRLICH, Judge, concur. Because of the retirement of Justice ROBERT J. CORCORAN, Judge EHRLICH of the Court of Appeals, Division One, was designated to sit and participate in the determination of this case, pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 3.