Opinion ID: 1924529
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mississippi Decisions.

Text: ¶ 68. In Kansas City S. Ry., v. Johnson, 798 So.2d 374 (Miss.2001), we recently recognized that damages for loss of enjoyment of life are recoverable as a separate form of damages apart from pain and suffering, in a personal injury action. This Court has never allowed hedonic damages in a wrongful death action. Nevertheless, the majority sanctions the availability of hedonic damages in the wrongful death context seemingly without concern about the differences between the two actions. This Court has addressed the issue of hedonic damages in three cases: McGowan v. Estate of Wright, 524 So.2d 308 (Miss.1988), Jones v. Shaffer, 573 So.2d 740 (Miss.1990), and Thomas v. Hilburn, 654 So.2d 898 (Miss.1995). ¶ 69. In McGowan, the widow of a passenger who died instantly in an automobile accident brought a wrongful death suit against the estate of the driver who caused the accident. McGowan, 524 So.2d at 309. The jury found that the only injuries suffered by the plaintiff were the funeral and ambulance expenses, and the plaintiff appealed on the issue of damages only. Id. We affirmed that judgment, holding that the jury was properly instructed to [take] into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all the damages of every kind to any and all parties interested in this suit, which was a proper statement of the damages allowed under Mississippi's wrongful death statute. Id. at 311. Justice James L. Robertson dissented from the denial of the petition for rehearing, joined by two other justices. In McGowan, Justice Robertson disputed the majority's holding that damages in a wrongful death case exclude the non-pecuniary value of the decedent's life. Id. at 312 (Robertson, J., dissenting). He went on to say: Plaintiffs argue that there is an intrinsic value to life and that its loss should be compensated. Without engaging in such metaphysics, we think that there is at the least a social and psychological (i.e., non-pecuniary) value to life over and above any pecuniary value. Id. Justice Robertson supported his argument that wrongful death compensation extended to non-pecuniary loss by citing three cases in which this Court had awarded non-pecuniary damages for loss of society and companionship. Id. [5] Nowhere in his dissent does Justice Robertson assert that hedonic/loss of enjoyment of life damages are appropriate. In fact, Justice Robertson seems to reject the plaintiffs' claim concerning an intrinsic value to life and declines to engage in such metaphysics. ¶ 70. In Jones v. Shaffer, 573 So.2d 740, 743 (Miss.1990), this Court addressed another wrongful death case in which the person died instantly. In the majority opinion, the entire discussion of hedonic damages was contained in a single footnote which construed the damages portion of the wrongful death statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13, and ultimately concluded that this issue was not properly before the Court. Jones, 573 So.2d at 743 n. 2. Unlike his dissent in McGowan, in Jones, Justice Robertson did expand his non-pecuniary recovery argument beyond loss of society and companionship to include recovery for diminution of the joys of living. Id. at 746 (Robertson, J., concurring). Justice Robertson's concurrence was joined by the same two Justices who joined his dissent in McGowan. Obviously, a concurring opinion joined by only two justices which addresses issues not before the Court cannot be considered to be binding precedent. ¶ 71. Finally, in Thomas, we affirmed a $300,000 damages award in the death of L.B. Hilburn, a seventy-five year old man who died six days after being in an automobile accident. In Thomas, the Court, speaking through Justice McRae, erroneously interpreted McGowan to extend wrongful death damages to include damages for loss of the enjoyment of life. However, as previously discussed, no such language is actually in McGowan, not even in Justice Robertson's dissent, which merely discusses non-pecuniary injuries such as loss of society and companionship. Compare Thomas, 654 So.2d at 903, with McGowan, 524 So.2d at 313. ¶ 72. In referring to Thomas, the majority states that: ... we have previously upheld an award of loss of enjoyment of life (hedonic damages) in a wrongful death suit. In so stating, the majority once again distorts the holding of a prior decision to find precedent where none exists. In affirming Hilburn's verdict, we clearly looked to the decedent's pain and suffering during the short time that he lived after the accident, but did not a include value placed on the life that he might have enjoyed had he lived. Thomas, 654 So.2d at 903. Since Thomas is devoid of any discussion of any hedonic damages actually suffered by Hilburn, our brief reference to such damages should be viewed as mere dicta, with no precedential value. See also Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 555 So.2d 713, 724 (Miss.1989)(affirming damage award in wrongful death case based on evidence of elderly decedent's pain, suffering and mental anguish before death, as well as the loss of society and companionship suffered by plaintiffs). ¶ 73. The majority interprets Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 to say that in a wrongful death case, the person bringing suit is entitled to recover all damages of every kind and nature which might have been awarded to the decedent had he lived.... Majority Op. ¶ 47 (emphasis in Majority Op.). That, in my opinion, explains why hedonic damages are not proper to be awarded in wrongful death cases. The decedent did not live; if he had lived, there would have been no hedonic damages because there was no loss of life. The law regarding the other types of damages available in wrongful death cases clearly contemplates awards to the beneficiaries for loss of future income of the decedent (adjusted by a consumption factor); loss of society and companionship; loss of enjoyment of life for the period of time between the injury and death; pain and suffering and mental anguish before death; and medical and funeral expenses. ¶ 74. Since the authority cited by the majority does not support its conclusion that this Court has previously upheld an award of hedonic damages in a wrongful death case, I can only conclude that the majority's conclusion is based on a faulty premise. The most recent case in which hedonic damages have been considered by this Court was Kansas City S. Ry., in which we said: We decide to follow other jurisdictions which have held that damages for loss of enjoyment of life compensate the injured person for the limitations placed on his or her ability to enjoy the pleasures and amenities of life.... Johnson has demonstrated that he is conscious of his lost enjoyment of life's pleasures, and our tort system should compensate him for these losses. Kansas City S. Ry., 798 So.2d at 380-81 (emphasis added). Kansas City S. Ry. was not a wrongful death case, as Mr. Johnson lived years enduring his painful and life-changing injuries. In Kansas City S. Ry., we placed emphasis not only on the fact that the plaintiff had suffered injuries, but also that he was conscious of the impact his injuries would have on his future enjoyment of life. One supposes that a plaintiff in a wrongful death suit could meet such a burden if the decedent survived for some length of time and could be shown to have suffered such losses. See KM. Leasing, Inc. v. Butler ex rel. Butler, 749 So.2d 310, 321 (Miss.Ct.App.1999)(interpreting Thomas to allow hedonic damages where decedent survived for some interval long enough to suffer hedonic damages). That burden, however, has not been met in the case sub judice, as the record reflects that Hailey did not regain consciousness before dying. As such, Hailey had no opportunity to appreciate any loss of future enjoyment of life. Pursuant to precedent, hedonic damages should not have been allowed in this case.