Opinion ID: 2087677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpretation of Section 6205(1)(B)

Text: [¶ 15] We turn then to the task of addressing the amendments to section 6205(1)(B) by which the Albany land was added to those properties that may become Indian territory. The difficulty presented by the Tribe's current effort to use the Albany land as Indian territory may be stated as follows: when the Legislature amended section 6205(1)(B) in 1992 to add the Albany land to those properties specifically named as eligible to become Indian territory, it did not amend the statute to extend the 1991 date by which the Secretary must acquire that Albany parcel land in trust and certify it as held for the Tribe's benefit. Although the land had been purchased by the Tribe before the bill was enacted, it had not been acquired by the Secretary nor certified as held for the Tribe's benefit, nor could it have been taken by the Secretary prior to legislative action in 1992. See 25 U.S.C. § 1724(d). [10] In other words, on the face of the statute, the Albany land could not become Indian territory without further legislative action. [¶ 16] LURC and the Tribe argue that the Legislature's intent in enacting the 1992 Amendment was to allow the Albany land to become Indian territory, within a reasonable period of time, without further action on the part of the Legislature. They urge us to effectuate that legislative intent either by declining to accept the plain language of section 6205(1)(B) or by augmenting that language to allow acceptance by the Secretary on the date the land was actually accepted. [¶ 17] The intervenors argue that we need not consider legislative intent because the language of the statute is plain on its face. Because the statute is neither ambiguous nor absurd on its face, they argue that the court properly confined its construction of the statute to the plain meaning of its words. In addition, they assert that, even if we were to look to legislative intent, it is not possible to discern the Legislature's intent with regard to the date by which the Secretary must certify the land.
[¶ 18] Because statutory construction is a matter of law, we review decisions regarding the meaning of a statute de novo. See Estate of Jacobs, 1998 ME 233, ¶ 4, 719 A.2d 523, 524. We have set forth the general rules for statutory construction as follows: We look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language as a means of effecting the legislative intent. Where the statutory language is ambiguous, we examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history. The statutory scheme from which the language arises must be interpreted to achieve a harmonious outcome. We will not construe statutory language to effect absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results. Coker v. City of Lewiston, 1998 ME 93, ¶ 7, 710 A.2d 909, 910 (citations omitted). `If the meaning of this language is plain, we must interpret the statute to mean exactly what it says.' Rowe v. Chapman Trucking, 629 A.2d 1224, 1226 (Me.1993) (quoting Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co., 411 A.2d 1017, 1020 (Me.1980)). Stated succinctly, when the language chosen by the Legislature is clear and without ambiguity, it is not the role of the court to look behind those clear words in order to ascertain what the court may conclude was the Legislature's intent. [¶ 19] These rules of construction are applied to effectuate several purposes. First, the court should give meaning to the language chosen by the Legislature to the greatest extent possible. See Opinion of the Justices, 460 A.2d 1341, 1346 (Me. 1982). Second, the court has no role in attempting to divine legislative intent where the words chosen by the Legislature are clear and unambiguous. See Rowe, 629 A.2d at 1226. And finally, only when the words are susceptible of multiple meanings, or render the enactment an absurdity or nullity, should the court explore indicia of legislative intent. See Coker, 1998 ME 93, ¶ 7, 710 A.2d at 910.
[¶ 20] Here, the language used by the Legislature is not ambiguous. It is not necessary to interpret the language of the provisions at issue in order to understand its meaning. Applying that language to the matter at hand, the Albany parcel met all of the conditions precedent to becoming Indian territory except one-it was not placed in trust with the Secretary and certified before January 31, 1991. [11] [¶ 21] We must decide, then, not whether legislative intent will bring clarity to an ambiguity, but whether the plain and unambiguous language of the Act, which appears not to have included the final amendment necessary to the transmutation of the land into Indian territory, may be augmented by the Court in order to complete the process. [¶ 22] The only circumstance where we may go behind the plain language of an unambiguous statute to discern the Legislature's true intent is where the language at issue renders the enactment absurd or a nullity. See Coker, 1998 ME 93, ¶ 7, 710 A.2d at 910; Struck v. Hackett, 668 A.2d 411, 417 (Me.1995). An enactment will be considered a nullity when it has no effect whatsoever. See Opinion of the Justices, 460 A.2d at 1346. That is not the case here. The action by the Legislature cannot be considered a nullity because the Albany land has, in fact, been identified and added to the list of lands that may become Indian territory upon the completion of other acts. Completion of the process may yet occur upon the Legislature's extension of the date by which the Secretary of the Interior must have accepted the land in trust. The Legislature knows how to amend that date; it had extended the date on multiple occasions prior to its addition of the Albany land to subsection 1. [12] It could have extended that date at any time following the enactment of the 1992 Amendment. That it has not done so to date does not render its original action a total nullity. [13] [¶ 23] For similar reasons, the provision does not constitute an absurdity. An absurdity may occur when the enactment is so contrary to the plain understanding of legislative intent and the entire statutory scheme within which the amendment falls that enforcement of the plain language would be wholly unreasonable. The enactment at issue simply did not contain a necessary step toward creation of Indian territory. Nothing in the language of the Act or the provisions of the federal Settlement Act persuades us that the omission of that step renders the enactment an absurdity. See Ballard v. Edgar, 268 A.2d 884, 887 (Me.1970) (recognizing the possibility that the language resulted from mere legislative inadvertence, but declining to disregard the plain language). [14] [¶ 24] Moreover, even if we were to accept the Tribe's argument that the missing extension of the deadline renders the language of section 6205(1) ambiguous or absurd, there is no basis in the record from which we could divine a new deadline for the Secretary's acceptance. In order to bridge the gap between the plain language of the statute and the result sought by the Tribe, we would need to read into the statute a particular date, somehow applicable only to the Albany parcel, [15] by which the Secretary of the Interior must have accepted the land in trust. Further, we would have to read out of the statute the existing date. In so doing, we would have to make assumptions about legislative intent regarding that date. Neither party has provided persuasive legislative history applicable to this particular point. There is no mention in the Statement of Fact accompanying the bill or other documents properly relied on for analysis of legislative intent of a date by which the Secretary's acceptance must have occurred. We would therefore have to speculate as to the Legislature's intent regarding such a date at the time of the enactment in 1992. [¶ 25] The difficulty of such speculation becomes evident upon asking the question: what date did the Legislature intend? In the absence of any guidance on that point, we would have to infer a logical date. If we inferred a date that was exactly one year from the enactment of the original addition of the Albany land to section 6205(1), the land would still not have become Indian territory because it was not accepted by the Secretary within that year. Similarly, if we inferred a date exactly two years from the date of the statute's enactment, the Tribe's desired result would still not have been accomplished. In the end we would be required, with the benefit of hindsight, to decide today that the Legislature meant to allow the Secretary of the Interior to accept the land more that two and one half years after the statute was enacted. [16] [¶ 26] Just as we are not free to interpret a statute so as to render a provision a surplusage, see Struck, 668 A.2d at 417, such as would be the case were we to read out of the statute the existing date of January 31, 1991, so too we are not free to substitute a different date for the existing one. Such speculation and legislative redrafting is wholly outside of our role as a court. [¶ 27] Although it is apparent that the Legislature intended to begin the process of creating Indian territory in the Albany parcel, it did not complete the steps necessary to accomplish that goal. It is the role of the Legislature, not this Court, to determine if, when, and under what circumstances the land should actually become Indian territory. Because the parcel has not yet achieved the status of Indian territory, the Superior Court did not err in concluding that the casino may not be built on that land. Accordingly, we need not address the challenges to LURC's approval of the application. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.