Opinion ID: 2454804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Penalty PhaseClosing Argument

Text: Deck next alleges that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to make improper comments during penalty phase closing argument. The trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing argument and the court's rulings will be cause for reversal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the defendant. State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 851 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 2387, 141 L.Ed.2d 753 (1998). In order for a prosecutor's statements to have such a decisive effect, there must be a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the error not been committed. State v. Barton, 936 S.W.2d 781, 786 (Mo. banc 1996).
The first particularized claim is that the prosecutor stated that the jury should impose the death penalty because that was the only sentence [the jury could] impose to show justice and to show mercy to those people, to the people in the courtroom. Defense counsel objected to the statement and requested a mistrial. The trial court sustained the objection, but overruled the motion for a mistrial. The trial court then granted the prosecutor permission to rephrase the comment, but did not advise the jury that the objection had been sustained. Deck argues that the trial court's inaction violated his rights to due process of law, a fair trial, reliable sentencing, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 10, 18(a) and 21 of the Missouri Constitution. Deck's argument focuses on the fact that the trial judge did not advise the jury that the objection had been sustained. However, Deck never requested that the trial court advise the jury that the objection was sustained, and, instead, the trial court took sufficient curative action on its own initiative and properly instructed the prosecuting attorney to rephrase his argument. The need for curative action assumes, of course, that the prosecutor's mercy argument was improper in the first place. Prosecutors may discuss the concept of mercy in their closing arguments because mercy is a valid sentencing consideration, Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 851, and in that connection may argue that the defendant should not be granted mercy. Prosecutors cannot, however, argue that the jurors may not lawfully grant a defendant mercy by imposing a life sentence. Id. In this case, the prosecutor did not argue that the jurors could not lawfully grant mercy on appellant; thus, Deck's argument has no merit.
Deck also claims that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to personalize his penalty phase closing argument. The prosecutor told the jury that while they were deliberating, they should count out ten minutes and you think about how long that is and then think about somebody pointing a gun at your head at the same time. No objection was made to the prosecutor's argument; therefore, Deck requests plain error review. Relief should rarely be granted on an assertion of plain error in closing argument. State v. Silvey, 894 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Mo. banc 1995). The reason, as this Court has explained, is that in the absence of objection and request for relief the trial court's options are narrowed to uninvited interference with [the closing argument] and a corresponding increase of error by such intervention. Id. In order to be entitled to relief, appellant must make a substantial showing that manifest injustice will result if relief is not granted. State v. Wood, 719 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Mo. banc 1986). Deck argues that the prosecutor's comment urging the jurors to put themselves in the place of the victim was the same kind of improper personalization this Court condemned in State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 901 (Mo. banc 1995). In Storey , the prosecutor told the jurors to put themselves in the victim's place and then graphically described the crime to the jurors as if they were the victims. This Court concluded that the prosecutor's argument was improper because it could only arouse fear in the jury, id., and moreover, arguments that inflame and arouse fear in the jury are especially prejudicial when the death penalty is at issue. Id. (citing State v. Tiedt, 357 Mo. 115, 206 S.W.2d 524, 529 (Mo. banc 1947)). The prosecutor's argument in this case is distinguishable from the prosecutor's argument in Storey . Here, the prosecutor's comments were brief and isolated and did not involve graphic detail, and as such, they did not result in manifest injustice. The point is denied.