Opinion ID: 1103294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the convictions must be reversed because the trial court's instructions precluded the jury from considering the crime of manslaughter.

Text: ¶ 34. The Harrises primarily contend that Instructions 8, 9, 10 (depraved-heart murder instructions), 13, 13A, and 13B (manslaughter instructions) gave the jury no basis for distinguishing between depraved-heart murder and manslaughter because they did not define the degree of negligence associated with each. Furthermore, the Harrises assert that they were deprived of the defense of manslaughter since the jury was instructed that it must first find the defendants not guilty of murder before considering manslaughter. They also claim that their trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to that portion of the manslaughter instructions at trial. The State responds in two ways: by arguing the appellants waived any error here because they objected when the trial court instructed the jury on manslaughter, and by defining depraved-heart murder, malice aforethought, and heat of passion. It merely concludes that the two sets of instructions are sufficient to instruct the jury on the difference in murder and manslaughter. In reply, the Harrises argue that objecting to the manslaughter instructions does not waive any complaint when it incorrectly states the law and notes that the offered definitions are not helpful when the State does not discuss how they apply. ¶ 35. The first question we must answer is whether a jury must always be instructed on the difference between depraved-heart murder and manslaughter when both are available for conviction. This Court requires the jury to be instructed on how to determine the aforethought portion of malice aforethought or deliberation portion of deliberate design where a defendant is on trial for deliberate design murder but the jury is also instructed on manslaughter. See Williams v. State, 729 So.2d 1181, 1183 (Miss.1998). The Harrises argue that this Court should also require that a jury be instructed how to distinguish heat of passion from an act evincing a depraved heart. They claim the necessity to instruct the jury regarding the distinction in the later case is even greater than the necessity for the distinction in the former case. ¶ 36. This Court has held that a trial court is not required to instruct the jury sua sponte or give instructions in addition to those tendered by the parties. Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 60 (Miss.1998). Neither the prosecution nor, more importantly, Harrises offered an instruction to the trial court which would have instructed the jury on the difference between depravedheart murder and heat of passion manslaughter. The trial court cannot now be found in error because the tendered and given instructions do not differentiate between the two. Concerning the claim that it is necessary in every case to differentiate between depraved-heart murder and heat of passion manslaughter, the instructions given here contain different elements which sufficiently differentiate heat of passion from acts evincing a depraved heart and no further instruction was necessary. Since the instructions are different on their face and contain different elements, we find that the trial court's instructions fairly and sufficiently instructed the jury as to the elements of each. ¶ 37. The next question we consider is whether the jury instructions deprived the Harrises of their manslaughter defense by first requiring the jury to find the Harrises not guilty of murder. We have had one opportunity to rule upon this issue, but passed upon the chance once we found the defendant was procedurally barred from raising the issue on appeal because he did not object to the language at trial. See Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1256 (Miss.1995). Such is the case here. The trial court instructed the jury on manslaughter over the Harrises' general objection. The record reflects that the Harris brothers did not want the jury instructed at all concerning manslaughter. There is no specific objection in the record concerning the language of the instruction requiring the jury to first find the Harrises not guilty of murder before considering manslaughter. The procedural bar applies. ¶ 38. Finally, the Harrises claim that their trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to this language. The Harrises argue that this alleged ineffective assistance of counsel requires reversal because this case is extremely close on the issue of whether the killing was murder, manslaughter or self-defense. The State does not respond to the assertion that the Harrises received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. ¶ 39. Where ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged, the benchmark [] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In addition, the defendant must show that the counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In order to show prejudice under the Strickland standard, the Harrises must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A defendant must make both showings under Strickland, otherwise, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Jones v. State, 857 So.2d 740, 745 (Miss.2003) (quoting Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984)). We find that the Harrises failed to satisfy either prong of Strickland. Thus, this issue is without merit.