Opinion ID: 1910289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Amount and Duration of Spousal Support

Text: [¶ 5] Holly contends that the court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in awarding no more than $160 per week in spousal support for a period of five years, contending that the court did not properly consider Arnold's ability to pay a higher amount, or Holly's needs and limited opportunities. Holly also argues that the court did not give adequate consideration to the statutory provisions governing spousal support. See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5). [¶ 6] We review a trial court's award of spousal support for an abuse of discretion, see Payne v. Payne, 2006 ME 73, ¶ 7, 899 A.2d 793, 795, whereas the court's factual findings on which the spousal support are based are reviewed for clear error. Macomber v. Macomber, 2003 ME 1, ¶ 6, 814 A.2d 456, 457. [¶ 7] Trial courts have considerable discretion when awarding spousal support and we review spousal support awards with deference, vacating such awards only when the record reflects a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion. Id. The primary purpose of general spousal support is to provide financial assistance to a spouse with substantially less income potential than the other spouse so that both spouses can maintain a reasonable standard of living after the divorce. 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A). The spousal support statute does not create any presumption as to limitations on the duration of general spousal support when the marriage has lasted for more than twenty years, as it does for marriages of twenty years or less. 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A). Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5), the court must consider a number of factors in determining the amount and duration of an award of spousal support. [¶ 8] Although the court has a duty to make sufficient findings to inform the parties of the reasons for its conclusions, and to allow for effective appellate review, there is no requirement that a court detail the rationale it uses to reach each finding of fact or conclusion of law. See Miele v. Miele, 2003 ME 113, ¶ 11, 832 A.2d 760, 763. In this case, because the court addressed most of the factors set out in section 951-A(5), and because Holly did not move for further findings, we must assume that the court made all findings necessary to support the amount of spousal support. See Powell v. Powell, 645 A.2d 622, 623-24 (Me.1994). [¶ 9] The record also supports the court's limitation on the term of spousal support to five years. See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5)(O). Although Arnold was earning over $50,000 at the time of the divorce judgment, he made substantially less income during most of the marriage. Holly is expected to complete her bachelor's degree in two and a half years and, although both parties suffered from medical problems, none of those medical problems resulted in total disability. Holly also has a commercial driving license that could be used to derive income. Accordingly, the court did not err or abuse its discretion in limiting the duration of spousal support.