Opinion ID: 2334525
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Lenkart's Trial Counsel Rendered Deficient Performance

Text: ¶ 27 In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must [first] show that counsel's performance was deficient. [16] This requires a defendant to show that counsel made very serious errors. [17] Indeed, a defendant must identify specific acts or omissions which, under the circumstances, show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. [18] To determine whether counsel's performance was objectively reasonable in light of all the circumstances, we look to prevailing professional norms. In accordance with these norms, our cases recognize that counsel has an important duty to adequately investigate the underlying facts of the case. [19] This is because investigation sets the foundation for counsel's strategic decisions about how to build the best defense. [20] ¶ 28 A review of the record reveals that Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel failed to fulfill his duty to conduct an adequate investigation of the facts and evidence in this case, and thus, his performance was deficient under the first prong of the Strickland standard. We have repeatedly held that one of criminal defense counsel's most fundamental obligations is to investigate the underlying facts of a case. [21] This duty is not optional; it is indispensable. As we stated in Taylor, failing to investigate because counsel does not think it will help does not constitute a strategic decision, `but rather an abdication of advocacy.' [22] ¶ 29 Mr. Lenkart has demonstrated that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate his case and that had his counsel done so, he would have been able to present exculpatory physical evidence at trial for the jury to consider. Shortly after hiring counsel to defend him, Mr. Lenkart asked his counsel to investigate the physical evidence in the case. A Code R kit was collected on the night of the sexual encounter and Mr. Lenkart wanted its contents analyzed. In a sworn affidavit, Mr. Lenkart states that he suggested to his attorney that he pursue testing and expert analysis of all the physical evidence in the case, because [he] believed it would confirm the truthful testimony [he] would provide in court. In response, trial counsel stated that he would consult his own experts if he thought it was necessary. However, it is undisputed that prior to trial, the physical evidence from the Code R kit was never analyzed and the results of the post-trial analysis were never presented to the jury. The reason for counsel's decision not to investigate this evidence is unclear. ¶ 30 At trial, the State called the Code R nurse to testify. Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel did not call any experts to contradict or otherwise question her testimony. The Code R nurse told the jury that during the Code R examination, she observed vaginal tearing and that K.H. had complained of tenderness. The nurse also told the jury that she had to remove a tampon from K.H.'s vagina with tweezers. The Code R nurse testified that in her opinion, these observations were consistent with the occurrence of rape. ¶ 31 Mr. Lenkart's attorney questioned the Code R nurse on cross-examination. And although the Code R nurse admitted it was possible that K.H.'s injuries could have been the result of consensual intercourse, Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel did not present any additional evidence or expert testimony to corroborate this conclusion. Thus, as to the physical evidence, the jury considered only the testimony of the Code R nurse, which strongly weighed in support of K.H.'s accusations. ¶ 32 The rest of the evidence presented to the jury primarily consisted of he-said-she-said statements from the parties involved, thus presenting a credibility contest between Mr. Lenkart and K.H. Mr. Lenkart told the jury his version of the events, and K.H. presented her conflicting testimony. The parties' testimony differed on two key points. First, was the issue of consent. Mr. Lenkart admitted to engaging in many of the same sexual acts K.H. described, but testified to the jury that K.H. consented to them. In contrast, K.H. testified that none of the acts were consensual, and that she asked Mr. Lenkart on numerous occasions to stop what he was doing. Second, although the parties agreed that they engaged in many of the same sexual acts, their testimony conflicted as to whether the parties engaged in oral sex, the act which formed the basis of Mr. Lenkart's sodomy charge. Mr. Lenkart testified that no oral sex occurred. K.H.'s testimony was the direct opposite. At trial, she stated that she specifically remembered that Mr. Lenkart put his mouth on [her] genitals and that she told him to stop. The jury must have believed K.H. because they found Mr. Lenkart guilty of all charges. ¶ 33 After trial, Mr. Lenkart fired his trial counsel and hired new counsel to prepare his motion for a new trial. His new counsel investigated the facts of the case and requested that the physical evidence be tested. The Code R kit was analyzed and Mr. Lenkart's new counsel submitted an affidavit from a reputable medical expert who concluded that the results of the Code R kit were more consistent with consensual rather than nonconsensual intercourse. Perhaps most significantly, the Code R test came back negative for the presence of salivary amylase, which directly supported the claim that no oral sex occurred. ¶ 34 The State counters that trial counsel's decision not to investigate or present physical evidence was a strategic decision. The State argues that trial counsel reasonably could have concluded that asking the state crime lab to test the Code R kit would have undermined Defendant's consent defense because if the results came back positive [] it would have constituted irrefutable proof that [Mr. Lenkart] lied about not having oral sex with [K.H.]. The State also argues that Mr. Lenkart's expert would not have added anything at trial because the Code R nurse already admitted on cross-examination that the Code R evidence was also consistent with consensual intercourse. We are unpersuaded by these arguments. ¶ 35 We cannot imagine a circumstance in which trial counsel could justify declining to test physical evidence that his client reasonably believes would be exculpatory. Mr. Lenkart asked his attorney to test the physical evidence because he was confident it would support his version of the events. Trial counsel had no reason to disbelieve Mr. Lenkart and had little to lose in performing the investigation. The decision of Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel not to investigate this evidence cannot constitute a strategic decision. ¶ 36 We conclude that Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel rendered deficient performance when he failed to seek testing of the physical evidence in this case. His trial counsel should have made an adequate inquiry into the facts and available evidence in the case before making a reasonable decision on how to proceed. ¶ 37 Having concluded that Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel's performance was deficient, we now turn to the question of whether this deficient performance resulted in prejudice. We conclude that it did.