Opinion ID: 2145030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Sentence Enhancement

Text: The defendant's final contention is that the trial court relied on improper statutory aggravators in enhancing his sentence to sixty years and, therefore, his sentence must be vacated and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The trial court identified five circumstances in imposing an enhanced sentence: (1) the defendant is in need of correctional or rehabilitative treatment that can best be provided by a commitment to a penal facility; (2) history of minor juvenile activity; (3) imposition of a reduced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime; (4) the family of the victim recommends an enhanced sentence; and (5) the defendant's own statements as to past history. The trial court also noted that the only mitigating circumstance was age. Two of the aggravating circumstances cited by the trial court are inappropriate for use here. The statutory aggravating circumstance that imposition of a reduced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime is used only to support a refusal to reduce the presumptive sentence. Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (Ind.1996); Ector v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1014, 1015 (Ind.1994); Evans v. State, 497 N.E.2d 919, 923 (Ind.1986). There is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court was considering a reduced sentence. Therefore, the use of this aggravating circumstance was improper. As we noted in Mayberry, to enhance a presumptive sentence by reason of the statutory aggravating circumstance that defendant was in need of correctional and rehabilitative treatment that could best be provided in a penal facility, the trial court must provide a specific or individualized statement of the reason why this defendant was in need of correctional and rehabilitative treatment that could best be provided by a period of incarceration in a penal facility in excess of the presumptive sentence term. Mayberry, 670 N.E.2d at 1271. The trial court did not provide such a statement and, consequently, the use of this aggravating circumstance was improper. See also Newhart v. State, 669 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Ind.1996). These errors notwithstanding, there are other circumstances found by the trial court which are sufficient to justify an enhanced sentence. Even when the trial court improperly applies an aggravator to a particular case, a single proper aggravator may suffice to sustain an enhanced sentence. Gregory-Bey v. State, 669 N.E.2d 154, 159 (Ind.1996). The Indiana Code allows the court to consider the fact that [t]he person has a history of criminal or delinquent activity  as an aggravating circumstance. IND.CODE § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(2) (1993) (emphasis added). Interpreting this statutory provision, we have held that [a] juvenile history detailed in a pre-sentence report filed with the trial court may suffice as evidence of a criminal history, and thus constitute an aggravating circumstance. Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 410 (Ind.1987). See also Evans, 497 N.E.2d at 923. As we previously noted, when asked whether he had reviewed the pre-sentence report, the defendant responded that he had, stating we reviewed the background information in this report and believe that it is factually accurate. Record at 697. The trial court recognized the existence of this report in its sentencing order and found that the defendant had a history of minor juvenile activity. Record at 125. The pre-sentence report contained information indicating that on August 22, 1992, the defendant was placed on informal probation for tampering/ riding in a stolen vehicle. On December 19, 1992, the defendant was placed on continued informal probation for third degree assault. On May 6, 1993, the defendant was adjudicated a third time for a probation violation. In addition, the defendant admittedproudly that he had sold heroin, crack and pot on a daily basis while living in St. Louis. The trial court's reliance on this history was sufficient to enhance the sentence. See, e.g., Pruitt v. State, 622 N.E.2d 469, 474 (Ind. 1993) (finding that the defendant's history of crimes while a juvenile and his admission that he engaged in dealing illegal drugs was sufficient in and of itself to impose an enhanced sentence). We affirm the trial court. SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN and SELBY, JJ., concur. BOEHM, J., concurs as to Parts 2 & 3 and concurs in result as to Part 1.