Opinion ID: 2321221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court erroneously allowed the government to question beepath-hardy without advising her of her spousal privilege

Text: The government urges us to reject Egbuka's objection to the trial court's refusal to instruct Beepath-Hardy that she had a spousal privilege not to testify against Egbuka because Egbuka lacks standing to assert Beepath-Hardy's privilege. We recognize that our cases typically hold that the marital privilege belongs to the witness spouse, and may not be asserted by the spouse against whom the testimony is being offered. Johnson v. United States, 616 A.2d 1216, 1222 (D.C.1992); see also Bowler v. United States, 480 A.2d 678, 685 (D.C.1984); Postom v. United States, 116 U.S.App. D.C. 219, 220, 322 F.2d 432, 433 (1963). Here, however, we believe the government's argument is too facile. Egbuka's position does not depend on his attempted assertion of Beepath-Hardy's privilege but, rather, on his objection to Judge Walton's ruling that he was not obligated to advise Beepath-Hardy that she could invoke the spousal privilege. Egbuka argues that Judge Walton based that ruling on an erroneous belief that the Intrafamily Offenses Act, D.C.Code § 16-1005(b) (1981), makes the spousal privilege inapplicable even when one spouse is called to testify against his or her marital partner in a criminal case. The Act provides that, notwithstanding the spousal privilege recognized in D.C.Code § 14-306 (1981), [3] one spouse shall be a competent and compellable witness against the other and may testify as to confidential communications, but testimony compelled shall be inadmissible in evidence in a criminal trial over the objection of a spouse entitled to claim that privilege. (Emphasis added.) We agree with Egbuka that Judge Walton would have been wrong to rule that the Act rendered Beepath-Hardy's spousal privilege unavailable in a criminal proceeding against Egbuka. On the contrary, the text of the Intrafamily Offenses Act provides just the opposite, and the prosecutor's notes of the trial called the basis for Judge Walton's ruling odd (although Judge Dixon did not mention that characterization in the Substitute Statement). Thus, if that was indeed the basis on which Judge Walton decided not to tell Beepath-Hardy of her privilege, he erred. Of course, as the government is forced to concede, we do not know why Judge Walton ruled as he did because the basis for his ruling, if he offered one at all, is contained in a portion of the transcript that is missing. For purposes of this appeal, however, we will assume, as do both parties, that Judge Walton decided not to tell Beepath-Hardy of her spousal privilege because of an erroneous reliance on the Intrafamily Offenses Act. Thus, the question becomes what should Judge Walton have done had he not misapplied the Act. On that point, our cases make clear that he should have told Beepath-Hardy of her spousal privilege not to testify. See, e.g., Bowler, 480 A.2d at 685 (quoting Postom, 116 U.S.App. D.C. at 221, 322 F.2d at 434 (1963) ([O]utside the presence of the jury, the trial judge should tell one who is called to testify for or against his spouse that his testimony cannot be compelled but may be received if volunteered.)); see also Jackson v. United States, 623 A.2d 571, 584 (D.C.1993) (Had the potential for [spousal] privilege been clear, it would have been incumbent upon the court to address the witness and to inform her that she could not be compelled to testify.). The trial judge did not so advise Beepath-Hardy but, as noted above, the government would foreclose Egbuka's challenge by arguing that he lacks standing. As this court recognized in Bowler, however, Egbuka's challenge should not be analyzed under the rubric of standing. Instead, the statutory privilege created by D.C.Code § 14-306 is violated when the privilege is not properly recognized. In Bowler, it was the prosecutor who violated the statute through his examination of the spouse without her knowing waiver of the right not to be compelled to testify against her husband, and here, too, the government's examination of Beepath-Hardy violated the statutory privilege protected by D.C.Code § 14-306. Thus, as in Bowler, the question is one of a statutory violation as it impacted upon the fairness of appellant's trial. 480 A.2d at 685. Appellant is allowed to raise that challenge here, as in Bowler, and we are obliged to consider whether the trial court's mistaken refusal to tell Beepath-Hardy of her privilege impacted the fairness of Egbuka's trial. We undertake that analysis under the harmless error framework in light of Egbuka's objection at trial to the failure to advise Beepath-Hardy of her privilege. [4] To find a trial court error harmless under the standard set out in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), this court must be able to state with fair assurance, that any such presumed trial court error did not substantially influence the [judge's] determination. Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 328-29 (D.C.1990) (citing Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239). Although we cannot be certain that Beepath-Hardy would have declined to testify had she been told of her privilege, [5] we have little hesitation in believing that Beepath-Hardy would have preferred not to testify at trial. From all that appears (again, we do not have this portion of the transcript), Beepath-Hardy suggested she had testified falsely before the grand jury and, fearing a prosecution for perjury based on conflicting testimony, refused to testify at trial until the government offered her use immunity. And, by the time of trial, Beepath-Hardy was married to Egbuka and about to deliver their child. Whatever may have happened between them on September 18, 1998, it is logical to infer that by the time of trial Beepath-Hardy wanted to put that incident behind them and protect her marriage and her ability to raise her child with Egbuka's support. Had the trial court explained to Beepath-Hardy that she was not required to testify, it is a fair assumption that she would not have done so. That, in turn, would have prohibited the government from impeaching her (non-existent) trial testimony with her grand jury testimony, given before she was married to Egbuka. That testimony would have been hearsay had the government sought to introduce it for a purpose other than impeachment of Beepath-Hardy's trial testimony. See D.C.Code § 14-102; see also Fed. Evid. R. 801(c) and (d). And it is clear from the transcript of Judge Walton's verdict (which is contained in a portion of the transcript that is available for our review) that he relied heavily on her grand jury testimony in deciding to convict Egbuka of the charges against him (I just don't believe what she told me during this trial and I believe what she said before the grand jury is what actually occurred.). Without doubt, the error in admitting Beepath-Hardy's trial and grand jury testimony had substantial influence on the outcome in this case. Thus, without Beepath-Hardy's grand jury testimony, the government would have been left with only the testimony of the eyewitness, Jemma Raymond, to prove the charges against Egbuka. Here again, our review is hampered by the absence of critical portions of the transcript of Raymond's testimony, including her entire direct examination and portions of her cross-examination. Taking the Substitute Statement at face value, however, we cannot say that Raymond's testimony alone would have been sufficient to convict Egbuka of the charges against him. At a minimum, absent Beepath-Hardy's grand jury testimony, the attempted threats count would be vulnerable because, even as related in the Substitute Statement, Raymond was unable to hear anything that Egbuka may have said to Beepath-Hardy. And Egbuka took the stand in his own defense, recounting a non-threatening and non-confrontational (albeit emotionally charged) encounter between himself and Beepath-Hardy very different from the one Raymond thought she saw. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the government has met its burden of showing that the admission of Beepath-Hardy's trial testimony was harmless error.