Opinion ID: 766509
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Equal protection - racial discrimination

Text: 52 Jackson alleges that he was discriminated against on the basis of race through the imposition of the gag and banishment orders and other acts of the City which were allegedly designed to force him from his position as the Chief of Police, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. §1983, and the Equal Protection Clause. To survive the City's motion to dismiss, Jackson's complaint must include factual allegations that provide direct evidence of a discriminatory motive or that support each element of a prima facie case under the criteria set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In order to establish a claim of racial discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, he must show that he (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the job, (3) suffered an adverse employment decision, and (4) was treated differently than similarly situated non-minorities.See Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir. 1996). 53 The district court correctly found that Jackson did not allege direct evidence of racial discrimination, stating that [t]he testimony suggests that Rice was concerned that plaintiff would attempt to undermine and jeopardize the integrity of the investigation by making unwarranted accusations of racism . . . . These statements do not patently demonstrate the existence of unlawful discrimination. On the other hand, the court held that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to employment discrimination claims brought under §§ 1981 and 1983 against government employers. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Todelo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to a discrimination claim brought under §§ 1981 and 1983). We fully agree with and adopt the district court's well-reasoned decision as to these points. 54 With regard to the McDonnell Douglas standard, the district court held that Jackson failed to allege that he suffered an adverse employment action (the third prong) and also failed to establish that similarly situated non-minority employees were treated differently (the fourth prong). Jackson has contested both of these issues on appeal. To sufficiently allege an adverse employment action, this court has held that the plaintiff must show a materially adverse change in the terms of . . . employment, [such as] termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, [or] significantly diminished material responsibilities . . . . Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885-86 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 55 Despite Jackson's claims of adverse action, the October, 1996 letters attached to his complaint do not contain any evidence suggesting that he was subjected to a termination of employment, a change in salary, demotion, loss of benefits, decreased work hours, or significantly diminished material responsibilities. We thus agree with the district court's conclusion that Jackson has not alleged that he suffered an adverse employment action. See Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 545-46 (6th Cir. July 7, 1999) (holding that a professor had failed to establish that she suffered an adverse employment action based on the dean's refusal to recommend her tenure when she successfully protested the action, eventually received tenure, and therefore suffered no final or lasting harm). 56 Jackson also argues that he adequately pled the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework by showing that he was replaced by a person outside of the protected class. See Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 582. This court has held, however, that an employee is not replaced when his or her former duties are redistributed among the remaining employees. See Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 752 (6th Cir. 1992). In this case, the Deputy Chief of Police, a white officer, served as the Acting Chief of Police for four days over a long weekend. We find that a four-day assumption of Jackson's duties by an existing officer is insufficient to constitute a replacement. 57 Jackson further contends that the complaint alleges that he was treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees. Jackson, however, fails to identify any such allegations. His statement that to his knowledge no other Columbus official or citizen has ever been subjected to a gag or banishment order is insufficient. As the district court stated, [p]laintiff must allege facts showing that non-minority employees who were similarly situated in all respects were treated differently . . . , not simply that plaintiff's circumstances were unique. 58 For all of these reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this claim.