Opinion ID: 52838
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Circumstantial Evidence Instruction Claim

Text: Reed seeks a COA regarding his claim that the trial court's decision to deny him the Texas circumstantial evidence instruction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. At the time of Reed's offense, Texas law required an instruction on the law of circumstantial evidence. In Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.Crim. App.1981), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined that such an instruction was unnecessary. Reed sought a circumstantial evidence instruction at trial, but it was denied. On direct appeal, Reed argued that the denial of a circumstantial evidence instruction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, stating simply that [j]ury instructions on circumstantial evidence are no longer required under Texas law. Reed renewed his argument before the state habeas court, which rejected his claim, explaining in its findings of fact and conclusions of law that the procedural rule announced in Hankins did not increase applicant's liability for any acts he committed, did not increase the punishment for his crime, and did not deprive him of any defense that was available at the time the crime was committed. Reed argues that the state habeas court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law because it misinterpreted the scope of protection under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Reed contends that the state court's analysis ignored the fourth class of ex post facto protections recognized by the Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) . . . and reaffirmed in Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000) and Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 615, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003). According to Reed, [t]his fourth category prohibits retroactive application of a lesser quantum of proof to an offense committed prior to the change in the law. Reed claims that the change in jury instructions implemented by Hankins did permit a lesser quantum of proof for convictions based on circumstantial evidence. Because his conviction was based in part on circumstantial evidence, Reed argues that the failure of the trial court to give the pre- Hankins jury instruction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court concluded that Reed's federal habeas petition had failed to show that the state court's legal analysis `resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.' (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). We find that conclusion not subject to debate by reasonable jurists. Reed correctly states that Carmell reaffirmed the fourth category of ex post facto violation stated in Calder, which consists of [e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 522, 120 S.Ct. 1620 (quoting Calder, 3 Dall. at 390, 1 L.Ed. 648) (emphasis removed). While Calder spoke of alterations in the rules of evidence, the Court has stated, relying on Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 71 U.S. 277, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1867), that the fourth category also includes changes to the burden of proof. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 540-41, 120 S.Ct. 1620. The Court declared that we think there is no good reason to draw a line between laws that lower the burden of proof and laws that reduce the quantum of evidence necessary to meet that burden; the two types of laws are indistinguishable in all meaningful ways relevant to concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 541, 120 S.Ct. 1620. Accordingly, Reed has identified a possible analytic error by the state habeas court in failing to address the fourth category of ex post facto violations in response to Reed's claim. However, under § 2254(d), we review only the state court's ultimate decision, and not its reasoning in reaching that decision. Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc). We find that Reed has failed to show that the state court's ultimate decision was contrary to clearly established federal law. Reed has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's decision to omit the circumstantial evidence instruction falls into Calder 's fourth category of ex post facto violation, for he has not shown that the omission of this instruction resulted in a lesser quantum of proof being required. Reed argued in his habeas petition that the Hankins court acknowledged that omitting the circumstantial evidence instruction would result in a lesser quantum of proof being required. He claimed that the Hankins court had found that the instruction in question had imposed a higher burden than that required for direct evidence, citing the court's statement that the instruction erroneously suggest[ed] `that proof of circumstantial evidence is subject to a more rigorous standard than is proof by direct testimonial evidence.' Hankins, 646 S.W.2d at 198 (quoting State v. LeClair, 425 A.2d 182 (Maine 1981)). This quotation is ambiguous: it could mean, contra Reed, that the court found that the instruction suggested a separate standard of proof without actually creating such a standard, and that this suggestion was erroneous because the proper standard of proof was elsewhere established. We believe that a full reading of Hankins reveals that the Texas court concluded not that the circumstantial evidence instruction had established a separate and distinct burden of proof, but rather that it confused the jury as to the proper burden. The Hankins court stated firmly that there is but one standard of proof for criminal convictions and where the jury is properly instructed on that standard, a charge on circumstantial evidence is valueless and invites confusion. Id. at 199. The court reiterated that [t]he constitutionally required burden of proof of criminal cases `is that the State establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id. (quoting Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978)). The court further declared that [r]ather than aiding jurors in applying the reasonable doubt standard, an additional charge on circumstantial evidence focusing on the `reasonable hypothesis' theory serves only to distract jurors from examining the proper standard of proof as the primary focus of their deliberations. Id. Thus the court emphasized that there has been only one standard of proof for direct and circumstantial evidence  beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also emphasized that the circumstantial evidence instruction confused jurors and potentially distracted them from applying this single standard. Thus the Hankins court clearly represented that its decision on jury instructions did not effect a substantive change in the law. While we are not bound by the Hankins court's characterization of the effect of its decision, see Carmell, 529 U.S. at 544 n. 31, 120 S.Ct. 1620, we find that characterization to be persuasive. There can be no ex post facto violation where a court merely clarifies the law without making substantive changes. See Thompson v. Nagle, 118 F.3d 1442, 1449 (11th Cir.1997) (When a court clarifies but does not alter the meaning of a criminal statute, the Ex Post Facto Clause is not implicated.); see also United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 197 (3d Cir.2003); Smith v. Scott, 223 F.3d 1191, 1194-96 (10th Cir.2000). We therefore conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate that the district court correctly decided that the state court did not reach a decision contrary to clearly established federal law in rejecting Reed's ex post facto claim. Accordingly, we deny Reed's request for a COA on this issue.