Opinion ID: 749568
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: He faced a maximum imprisonment of 40 years.

Text: 20 2. You have acknowledged in this [plea] agreement that no promises of any kind have been made to you in regard to your sentence and that that remains up to the court and the law to determine. 21 3. I should tell you also that no one .... not your attorney, not Mr. Bell, or me--can say now how the guidelines will apply in your case. 22 4. So anything Mr. West may, have told you, for example, about what he expects your sentence would be his best judgment. based on the information he has at this time, but can be only an estimate at this time. He can't tell you or no one else can tell you what your sentence will actually be. 23 5. No one has made any promise to you about what your sentence was actually going to be if you pled guilty. 24 6. [I]f the sentence that you actually get here is more severe than what you might expect, you're still bound by your plea once you plead guilty. You can't withdraw you plea just because you don't like your sentence. 25 Consistent with his affidavit, Carrington did change one on of his answers during the hearing, perhaps at the nudging of his counsel: 26 Q. Okay. Has anyone told you what your sentence would actually be if you pled guilty? 27 A. Yes, Your Honor. 28 Q. And have they--well-- 29 A. I mean, just like you say about the maximum amount and all this. 30 Q. Okay. But has anyone told you that you are going to get X number of years if you pled guilty? A certain number of years? 31 A. No. Not Exactly. 32 Q. Okay. You understand that no one can tell you that because no one knows for sure at this time? 33 A. Yeah. 34 Assuming the facts alleged in Carrington's affidavits are true, we agree with the district court that his claim fails. The general rule is that an inaccurate prediction of sentence by defense counsel does not entitle the claimant to relief under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim or on the theory that the guilty plea was involuntary. In such cases we have either held that the prediction does not fall below the wide range of professionally competent assistance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, or that the prediction does not meet the prejudice requirement of Strickland. 35 In Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.1990), the § 2255 petitioner argued that his counsel was ineffective in telling him that he would receive a sentence of not more than 12 years imprisonment, and lie received 15 years. The court held that the prejudice requirement of Strickland was not met, since prior to accepting his guilty plea, the court explained that the discretion as to what the sentence would be remained entirely with the court. Id. at 168. Similarly, in our case, at the Rule 11 hearing Carrington agreed with the court that he had acknowledged in this [plea] agreement that no promises of any kind have been made to you in regard to your sentence and that that remains up to the court and the law to determine. The agreement itself states that Carrington acknowledges that no promises of any kind have been made as to his sentence, and that the determination and imposition of an appropriate sentence remains Ln the discretion of the Court. 36 In United States v. Michlin, 34 F.3d 896 (9th Cir.1994), a direct appeal, the defendant claimed his guilty plea could not stand because his attorney failed to accurately inform him of the sentencing range he was facing. We rejected the claim, noting that an erroneous prediction by a defense attorney concerning sentencing does not entitle a defendant to challenge his guilty plea. Id. at 899 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346, 1348 (9th Cir.1990)). We recognized that an exception might arise in a case of gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome, Michlin, 34 F.3d at 899 (quoting Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir.198)), but that the appellant had not demonstrated a gross mischaracterization. 37 In Garcia, supra, the defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He claimed that his defense counsel had told him he would serve no more than 8 years, and he received a sentence of 235 months. We affirmed, noting that it is well established that an erroneous prediction by a defense attorney concerning sentencing does not entitle a defendant to challenge his guilty plea. Garcia, 909 F.2d at 1348. We further held that the plea was knowing and voluntary, noting that the defendant. had acknowledged in the plea agreement that the sentencing judge was free to impose a penalty of up to life in prison and understood that the court was not bound by any sentencing agreement. Id. 38 In United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir.1990), the § 2255 petitioner claimed that his counsel had assured him that he would spend no more that 36 months in prison, and he was sentenced to 12 years, We held that the erroneous prediction regarding parole was not sufficiently deficient to make his plea invalid. Id. at 1394. 39 In Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir.1989), the § 2255 petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel had told him that if he pleaded guilty the court would not consider his prior criminal record. Among other reasons for rejecting this claim, we noted that at the guilty plea hearing the petitioner stated that no promises or agreements about his sentence had been made with the government and that the judge told him he would determine the sentence after considering a probation report. Id. at 1159. Similarly, in our case the judge made clear to Carrington that he would decide the sentence based on the Sentencing Guidelines, and that no one--not your attorney, not [the prosecutor], or me--can say now how the guidelines will apply in your case. 40 Carrington relies on two cases, Iaea, supra, and Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir.1994). We conclude that the extreme facts of these cases distinguish them from the pending case. In Iaea, the habeas petitioner claimed that his counsel has misrepresented the consequences of pleading guilty. We held that counsel's assistance had been deficient, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of prejudice. We stated that [t]hough a mere inaccurate prediction, standing alone, would not constitute ineffective assistance, the gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome presented in this case, combined with the erroneous advice on the possible effects of going to trial, falls below the level of competence required of defense attorneys. Iaea, 800 F.2d at 865 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 41 Iaea recognized an exception to the general rule that inaccurate sentence predictions by defense counsel do not entitle the prisoner to habeas relief. The extreme facts of Iaea that distinguish it from the pending cause include at least the following: (1) in Iaea defense counsel told the defendant that by pleading guilty he stood a good chance of getting probation, id. at 863, while in our case Carrington does not show that counsel predicted probation; (2) in Iaea counsel threatened to withdraw and the defendant's brother threatened to withdraw the bail money he had posted if the defendant did not plead guilty, id., neither of which occurred in our case; (3) in Iaea counsel told the defendant that his chances of getting an extended sentence were almost zero, id., and he got a life sentence; (4) in Iaea counsel not only inaccurately predicted the guilty plea sentence, but misinformed the defendant of the consequences of going to trial, by incorrectly telling the defendant that he was subject to a minimum sentencing statute if he went to trial, id. at 864-65, while in our case Carrington does not demonstrate that counsel misrepresented the consequences of going to trial; and (5) in Iaea the record was replete with evidence that Iaea was very reluctant to plead guilty and that defense counsel and Iaea's brother had a great deal of trouble convincing him to do so, id. at 865, while in our case Carrington does not demonstrate that he was extremely reluctant to plead guilty. 42 Chacon, supra, is also distinguishable. In that case, the habeas petitioner claimed that an interpreter had deliberately mistranslated defense counsel's advice concerning his sentence if he pleaded guilty. The petitioner claimed that the interpreter told him he would only have to serve 3 months in prison, and he received a prison term of at least, 60 months. Chacon, 36 F.3d at 1460-61. We remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. We concluded that the disparity between the predicted and actual sentence was a gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome under Iaea. Id. at 1464 (quoting Iaea, 800 F.2d at 865). In Chacon, there was a claim of deliberate misrepresentation; the petitioner claimed that the interpreter had engaged in a pattern and practice of intentionally mistranslating court proceedings and inducing Spanish-speaking defendants to plead guilty involuntarily. Chacon, 36 F.3d at 1462. Carrington does not argue that his counsel intentionally misled him. Further, the actual sentence in Chacon was at least 20 times the prediction, a far greater disparity than in our case. And in Chacon there is no discussion of a plea colloquy such as we find in the pending case, where the court clearly and repeatedly advised the defendant that he should not rely on any promises or predictions from defense counsel or others as to the actual sentence he would receive. 43 Carrington has not met the prejudice requirement of Strickland. The general rule that an inaccurate sentence prediction by defense counsel does not invalidate a guilty plea applies here, since Carrington was repeatedly advised in the plea agreement and at the Rule 11 hearing that no particular sentence was guaranteed, and that he could not rely on his counsel's prediction.