Opinion ID: 3155944
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Hostile Work Environment

Text: Drawing upon case law from the employment discrimination context, McCall asks this court to “allow claims [under the WPA] based on acts which occur over time[,] creating a hostile environment.” “A hostile work environment claim is comprised of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute „one unlawful employment practice,‟” and thus “if an act contributing to the [hostile work environment] claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by the court for the purposes of 10 determining liability.” Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass’n, 830 A.2d 874, 890 (D.C. 2003) (citing Morgan, supra, 536 U.S. at 116-17) (quotation marks omitted, brackets in original). Ultimately, we conclude that the creation of a hostile work environment in retaliation for a protected disclosure constitutes a violation of the WPA. We also conclude that the complaint, fairly read, would permit a finder of fact to determine that an act contributing to that work environment occurred within the limitations period, thus bringing the entire continuing violation within the statute of limitations, and thus reverse and remand on this basis. As McCall contends, the retaliatory creation of a hostile work environment is a violation of the WPA. The Act forbids supervisors from taking “prohibited personnel action or otherwise retaliat[ing] against an employee because of the employee‟s protected disclosure.”5 A “„[p]rohibited personnel action‟ includes but is not limited to: recommended, threatened, or actual termination, demotion, suspension, or reprimand; involuntary transfer, reassignment, or detail; . . . or retaliating in any other manner against an employee because that employee makes a protected disclosure . . . .” D.C. Code § 1-615.52 (a)(5)(A) (emphasis added). Thus, although the statute lists examples of discrete retaliatory acts, there are 5 D.C. Code § 1-615.53 (a). 11 catch-all provisions in both the general prohibition on retaliation (“or otherwise retaliate”) and in the specific definition of a prohibited personnel action (“includes but is not limited to . . . retaliating in any other manner”) that demonstrate a legislative intent to forbid all retaliation against whistleblowers, regardless of the method of punishment adopted by a whistleblower‟s superiors. The very definition of a hostile work environment demonstrates that retaliation in this form is not an insignificant matter. Lively, supra, 830 A.2d at 888 (“a plaintiff . . . has a viable hostile environment claim if [he] can demonstrate (1) that [he] is a member of a protected class [here, whistleblowing employees as defined by the WPA], (2) that [he] has been subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) that the harassment was based on membership in the protected class, and (4) that the harassment is severe and pervasive enough to affect a term, condition or privilege of employment.”). Furthermore, as the foregoing quotation demonstrates, we have already applied the hostile work environment doctrine in the employment discrimination context.6 Similarly, other courts have held that a retaliatory hostile 6 Lively, supra, 830 A.2d at 890; see also Crawford v. District of Columbia, 891 A.2d 216, 221 (D.C. 2006) (referring to federal employment discrimination legislation as “comparable” to the WPA). 12 work environment may violate both state whistleblower protection statutes,7 and the whistleblower protection provisions included within several federal statutes.8 Accordingly, we now hold that a hostile work environment—if created in response to an employee‟s protected disclosure—constitutes retaliation in a form contemplated and prohibited by D.C. Code § 1-615.53. Having determined that a retaliatory hostile work environment is a violation of the WPA, we now turn to address the application of the statute of limitations to McCall‟s claim. D.C. Code § 1-615.54 (a)(2) requires plaintiffs to file “within 3 years after a violation occurs or within one year after the employee first becomes aware of the violation, whichever occurs first.” As we know from case law interpreting similar language in the employment discrimination context, a hostile work environment, by its nature, is a continuing violation that “cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years.” Lively, supra, 830 A.2d at 891-92 (“A hostile work environment claim is 7 Bodman v. Maine, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 720 F. Supp. 2d 115, 126 (D. Me. 2010) (Maine); Cokus v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co., 827 A.2d 1173, 1185 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002) (New Jersey). 8 Sassé v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 409 F.3d 773, 782 (6th Cir. 2005) (whistleblower protections in the Clean Air Act, Solid Waste Disposal Act, and Federal Water Pollution Control Act); Williams v. Administration Review Bd., 376 F.3d 471, 477 (5th Cir. 2004) (whistleblower protections in the Energy Reorganization Act). 13 comprised of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one „unlawful employment practice.‟”) (quoting Morgan, supra, 536 U.S. at 115, 124).9 Accordingly, “[a]ll of the component acts comprising the hostile work environment claim need not have taken place within the one-year period . . . but at least one „act contributing to the claim‟ must occur within that period in order for the filing to be timely.” Id. (quoting Morgan, supra, 536 U.S. at 117). Thus, McCall would have one year from the last act contributing to the hostile work environment to file his claim for relief. Based on our review of McCall‟s complaint, we conclude that McCall has alleged sufficient facts to permit a finding that a retaliatory hostile work environment extended into the limitations period.10 The alleged “campaign of 9 This is in direct contrast to “[a] discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act [which] „occurred‟ on the day that it „happened.‟” Morgan, supra, 536 U.S. at 110. 10 As neither the trial court nor the parties before us have questioned whether McCall made the requisite “[p]rotected disclosure,” we have no occasion to address that question here. See D.C. Code § 1-615.52 (a)(6) (A “[p]rotected disclosure” is “any disclosure of information . . . that the employee reasonably believes evidences . . . [g]ross mismanagement . . . [a]buse of authority . . . violation of a . . . law, rule, or regulation . . . or . . . [a] substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety.”). As we indicated, however, McCall prepared a standard statement setting forth in detail what happened on January 5, 2011, and he repeated his statement and complaints about what occurred on that date to Lieutenant Villines and to Nicole Mason, an attorney with DCHA. 14 harassment” against McCall included an attempt to have an officer incriminate him in the original mishandling of contraband, excessive scrutiny, unfounded accusations that he was frequently late to work, isolation from the assistance of other officers, and a death threat specifically linked to his whistleblowing activity. Most significantly for statute of limitations purposes, McCall alleges that when the harassment created physical and mental health problems that rendered him unfit to work, Lieutenant Villines insisted that he return to work (despite a physiciancertified need to refrain), and refused to fill out employer-side worker‟s compensation forms—a refusal which, it can be inferred, persisted through McCall‟s termination on October 21, 2011.11 Because McCall filed suit on October 19, 2012, Villines‟s insistence that he work and refusal to assist him in 11 McCall cannot recover for discrete acts of retaliation (such as his suspension and termination) under the rubric of a hostile environment claim. Morgan, supra, 536 U.S. at 110 (because “a discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act „occurred‟ on the day that it „happened,‟” the statute of limitations runs from “the date of the act.”); see also id. at 114-15 (distinguishing between “[d]iscrete acts such as termination,” and “[h]ostile environment claims”); Sassé, supra note 8, 409 F.3d at 783 (“[plaintiff‟s] May 2000 suspension was a discrete act that cannot properly be characterized as part of a continuing hostile work environment”). However, these discrete violations of the statute are available as “background evidence” for his hostile environment claim. Morgan, supra, 536 U.S. at 113 (“an employee [may use] the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim”); Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 893 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (“discrete acts still may be considered for purposes of placing nondiscrete acts in the proper context”); Huynh v. Damota, 61 F. App‟x 976, 978 n.4 (7th Cir. 2003). 15 obtaining allegedly deserved worker‟s compensation plausibly constitutes a retaliatory act “comprising the hostile work environment claim” within the statutory period. See Lively, supra, 830 A.2d 874, 891. Although the fact-finder might eventually determine that McCall has “failed to identify an act of discrimination with which to anchor his hostile work environment claim” within the limitations period, Sassé, supra, 409 F.3d at 783, at this stage his complaint contains “sufficient facts to establish the elements of a legally cognizable claim.” Woods, supra, 63 A.3d at 552-53. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on McCall‟s claim that he was subjected to a hostile work environment in violation of the WPA.