Opinion ID: 1446186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Gaunt IV

Text: Reddest argues that the evidence is insufficient to support Reddest's conviction for penetration of the genital opening under count IV of the indictment. Count IV charged Reddest with engaging in a sexual act with a person at least four years younger than him, who was over the age of 12 but under the age of 16; in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a). Consistent with one of four definitions of sexual act codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2), the indictment describes Reddest's particular sexual act on this occasion as penetration of the genital opening . . . by the finger . . . with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade and arouse and gratify the sexual desire of any person. (Indictment at 2.) The evidence at trial supporting count IV showed that on the night of this alleged sexual assault, Reddest was sleeping on M.Y.'s grandparents' livingroom floor, and M.Y. was sleeping nearby on the livingroom couch. M.Y.'s cousin was also sleeping in the room. M.Y. woke up to Reddest rubbing her leg. Reddest then reached inside her underwear to touch her, and he only stopped touching her when she called out her cousin's name. Specifically, M.Y. testified that Reddest's finger went [r]ight in myalmost close to my [hand gesture]. (Trial Tr. at 143.) The prosecutor then asked M.Y. what her circular hand gesture referred to, to which she replied, [m]y hole. ( Id. at 144.) M.Y. then affirmed that she considered her hole a part of her vagina, and affirmed that her hole was where a woman puts the tampon in. ( Id. ) On cross-examination, M.Y. testified that Reddest's hand was, inside her underwear. ( Id. at 195.) But in response to the question; He hadn't actually put any part of his hand in you, had he, she answered [n]o, [h]e touched my vagina. (Id.) And in response to the follow-up question: He just touched the outside of your vagina, M.Y. answered yes. ( Id. ) As further evidence of the incident, the Government introduced Reddest's prior statement in which he wrote: [M.Y.], I'm sorry what [sic] happened that night at the trailer. You had your legs on me that night and I pushed legs [sic] from me a couple of times and I accidentally touched your private part. I really sorry [sic] for that. Leroy. ( Id. at 377). Even when construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, this evidence is insufficient to prove penetration of the genital opening. This is so even if we were to give genital opening the construction urged by the Governmentan interpretive question we need not reach here. See United States v. Jahagirdar, 466 F.3d 149, 154-55 (1st Cir.2006) (holding that penetration of the labia majora is sufficient to prove penetration of the genital opening under § 2246(2)(C)). The only evidence that is arguably sufficient to prove penetration of the genital opening, however slight, is M.Y.'s statement that Reddest's finger went [r]ight in myalmost close to my [hole]. (Trial Tr. 143.) This description of the assault is ambiguous; it is not clear where Reddest's finger was or how close it was to the genital opening. Under the terms of the statutory provision charged by the Government, these facts matteryet the Government did little to clarify them further. See United States v. Plenty Arrows, 946 F.2d 62, 65 (8th Cir.1991) (recognizing the anatomical specificity of the definition of a sexual act, reviewing the evidence, and concluding that the complaining witness's testimony lack[ed] the necessary specificity to sustain the conviction). It is also not clear whether the second half of M.Y.'s statement (almost close to my [hole]) retracts, clarifies, or modifies the first half ([r]ight in my). We recognize that when read in isolation, M.Y.'s statement that Reddest's finger was in a vaguely identified location could imply at least slight penetration of M.Y.'s labium, But even when construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, this single, nondescript, internally inconsistent statement laden with ambiguity is insufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find Reddest guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on count IV. [W]e cannot sustain a conviction based on mere suspicion or possibility of guilt. Id. (internal marks omitted). The remaining evidence of the incident clearly fails to prove penetration of the genital opening. M.Y. affirmed that Reddest hadn't actually put any part of his hand in [her], and said that Reddest touched [her] vagina. (Trial Tr. at 195.) Immediately thereafter, she affirmed that Reddest just touched the outside of [her] vagina. ( Id. ) Not only does this testimony support Reddest's position, it also makes clear that M.Y. was not using the word vagina in its anatomically correct sense, and accordingly, M.Y.'s testimony that Reddest touched her vagina, or the outside of her vagina, is minimally helpful to the Government's position. We note that at oral argument before this court the Government suggested that when M.Y. made her circular hand gesture to show approximately where Reddest touched her, she placed her finger on the edge of the hole she made with her other hand. If substantiated, this may strengthen the Government's position. But nothing more than M.Y.'s circular gesture is documented in the transcript. It is elementary that we will not consider evidence that is not included in the record of the proceedings below. See Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 988 F.2d 61, 63 (8th Cir.1993) (Generally, an appellate court, cannot consider evidence that was not contained in the record below.). Accordingly, we are constrained from considering the Government's explanation of the particulars of M.Y.'s alleged demonstration. In sum, we conclude that the Government did not meet its burden of proof as a matter of law; no reasonable jury could find Reddest guilty of penetration of the genital opening beyond a reasonable doubt based on the ambiguous and nonspecific evidence produced by the government. See Johnson, 18 F.3d at 645-46 (standard of review). Attempting to salvage a conviction on count IV, the Government contends that Reddest's conviction should stand because even if the evidence did not establish penetration of the genital opening under § 2246(2)(C), the evidence did establish an alternative definition of sexual act codified at § 2246(2)(D): [T]he intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years. Even though the indictment did not allege § 2246(2)(D)'s definition in count IV, and in fact specifically alleged digital penetration as the crime committed, the Government argues that this variance between the proof at trial and the indictment did, not prejudice Reddest. The Government did not advance this argument before the district court when it was resisting Reddest's motions, and we believe that its conviction must rise or fall on the charge it chose to bring and on the instructions submitted to the jury, neither of which was predicated on the alternative definition it now proposes. We affirm Reddest's convictions under counts I, II, V, and VI. We reverse and vacate his conviction on count. IV and remand for entry of an amended judgment.