Opinion ID: 2481410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of State's Seeking the Death Penalty

Text: Following defendant's first conviction and direct appeal, this court reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court for a new trial. Prior to trial, the State's Attorney notified defendant that she would again seek the death penalty. However, she did inform the court that if defendant agreed to plead guilty and accept a sentence of life without parole, she would not seek a death sentence. At the time the offer was made, defense counsel announced that at this time I think we are going to trial. Five years later, defendant pleaded guilty to several counts against him. By that time, the office of State's Attorney was occupied by a different individual. Both parties agree the guilty plea was in exchange for a dismissal of several other counts. However, defendant also claims that his guilty plea, in accordance with the former State's Attorney's initial plea offer, made him eligible for a sentence of natural life in prison but did not expose him to the possibility of a death sentence. The State did not agree and asked for a death penalty hearing. When defendant entered his guilty plea, he acknowledged that by pleading guilty he was possibly subjecting himself to a sentence of death. The court specifically admonished defendant that the minimum sentence he could receive was a term of natural life in prison and that the maximum sentence was a death sentence. The court accepted defendant's plea, a sentencing hearing was held, and defendant was again sentenced to death. Defendant now argues that the State's Attorney's decision to seek the death penalty was arbitrary and warrants his sentence being reduced to that of natural life in prison. At the outset, we note that the State argues that defendant has forfeited this issue by failing to object in the trial court or to raise the issue in a posttrial motion. The State also argues that although defendant's claim could be reviewed for plain error, defendant has failed to argue plain error in his opening brief. Defendant acknowledges that this issue was not properly preserved, but disagrees with the State that he has also forfeited plain-error review. In the absence of a plain-error argument by a defendant, we will generally honor the defendant's procedural default. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill.2d 539, 549, 342 Ill.Dec. 1, 931 N.E.2d 1184 (2010). However, although defendant did not argue plain error in his opening brief, he has argued plain error in his reply brief, which is sufficient to allow us to review the issue for plain error. People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306, 347-48, 250 Ill.Dec. 692, 739 N.E.2d 455 (2000). The first step in plain-error analysis is to determine whether a clear or obvious error occurred. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d 551, 565, 312 Ill.Dec. 338, 870 N.E.2d 403 (2007). Defendant argues it was error for the trial court to allow the State to seek the death penalty, because a prior State's Attorney had already offered to waive the possibility of a death sentence if the defendant were to plead guilty. Defendant's claim is a due process challenge in that he argues the decision of the State's Attorney to seek a death sentence was impermissibly arbitrary. Defendant cites People v. Walker, 84 Ill.2d 512, 50 Ill.Dec. 718, 419 N.E.2d 1167 (1981), and People v. Brownell, 96 Ill.2d 167, 70 Ill.Dec. 714, 449 N.E.2d 1318 (1983). In Walker, the defendant was charged with murder and entered into plea negotiations with the State. The parties agreed that the defendant would plead guilty to several other charges in return for the State's dropping a conspiracy charge and recommending a 60-year prison term for the murder. Walker, 84 Ill.2d at 514, 50 Ill.Dec. 718, 419 N.E.2d 1167. The court, in accepting the plea, incorrectly advised the defendant that the maximum penalty for the offense to which the defendant was pleading was 80 years. In fact, the indictment, as charged, justified a maximum penalty of death. The State failed to draw attention to the court's incorrect admonishments. Walker, 84 Ill.2d at 515, 50 Ill.Dec. 718, 419 N.E.2d 1167. The defendant later moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and wanted to plead not guilty because of mental incompetence. Defendant was allowed to withdraw his plea. When defendant later sought to plead guilty again, the State sought the death penalty and the defendant was eventually sentenced to death. Walker, 84 Ill.2d at 518, 50 Ill.Dec. 718, 419 N.E.2d 1167. The Walker court noted that defendants who make knowing, voluntary, and intelligent choices to risk an increased sanction rather than plead guilty pursuant to a plea bargain will be held to that choice. Walker, 84 Ill.2d at 522, 50 Ill. Dec. 718, 419 N.E.2d 1167. However, this principle applies only when the defendant can, in fact, make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent evaluation of the risks. Walker, 84 Ill.2d at 522, 50 Ill.Dec. 718, 419 N.E.2d 1167. In Walker, the court concluded that the State's failure to correct the trial court's admonishments meant that it adopted the court's position and notified defendant that death was not a possible penalty for his crimes. Walker, 84 Ill.2d at 523, 50 Ill.Dec. 718, 419 N.E.2d 1167. When weighing the decision to withdraw his plea, defendant was under the mistaken impression that he was risking only an additional 20 years of imprisonment and not a death sentence. Under these circumstances, when the State later sought the death penalty after the defendant's withdrawal of his guilty plea, the State sought to increase the severity of the sanction, without notice, after defendant's successful invocation of a right afforded by law. Walker, 84 Ill.2d at 523-24, 50 Ill. Dec. 718, 419 N.E.2d 1167. Thus, the defendant's sentence was reversed. The procedural history in Brownell was slightly different. In that case, the defendant was convicted by the trial court and sentenced to death. This court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the defendant was again sentenced to death. On appeal, however, defendant raised a new issue. Defendant argued that prior to his first sentencing the prosecutor had promised not to seek the death penalty if the defendant would confess in writing. This promise occurred at 10 p.m. The defendant, after consulting counsel, did not accept the offer. Later that night, the defendant spoke to a pair of police detectives. At 1 a.m., when the meeting ended, the defendant still declined to make any confession. An hour later, however, at 2 a.m., the defendant asked to talk to the police and confessed. Based on these facts, and relying on Walker, this court vacated the defendant's sentence. We concluded that once the State's Attorney made a conscious decision to agree not to seek the death penalty if the defendant would provide him with a confession, it was incumbent on the State's Attorney to abide by the agreement absent a change in circumstances. Brownell, 96 Ill.2d at 174-75, 70 Ill.Dec. 714, 449 N.E.2d 1318. In the five hours between the State's Attorney's offer and defendant's written confession, nothing had changed, yet the State's Attorney had chosen to continue to seek the death penalty. This court concluded that this type of reversal creates an appearance of a vindictive motive on the part of the prosecutor. Brownell, 96 Ill.2d at 175, 70 Ill.Dec. 714, 449 N.E.2d 1318. The State, in turn, relies on People v. Yates, 98 Ill.2d 502, 75 Ill.Dec. 188, 456 N.E.2d 1369 (1983), and People v. Davis, 144 Ill.2d 349, 162 Ill.Dec. 63, 579 N.E.2d 877 (1991). In Yates, defendant approached the prosecutor and asked if he would agree not to seek the death penalty in exchange for a guilty plea and recommended sentence of natural life imprisonment. The State agreed to make the offer, but the defendant turned it down and went to trial. Defendant was convicted and the State successfully sought the death penalty. On appeal, this court concluded that the case was unlike Walker, in that the defendant was not misadvised of the maximum possible sentence he faced. Brownell was also distinguished because the State did not renege on its promise after getting what it bargained for. In Davis, the defendant rejected a plea offer from the State. Nevertheless, the State filed a motion to waive its right to request a death penalty hearing. Before the court took any action on that motion, however, a new State's Attorney was sworn into office, withdrew the motion and proceeded to request a death penalty hearing. The defendant argued that Walker required the State to demonstrate some factual circumstance that changed between the filing of the motion and the successor State's Attorney's withdrawal of the motion. This court rejected that argument, concluding that no misrepresentations were made to the defendant about the seriousness of the punishment he could receive and the decision to seek the death penalty was based on the prosecutorial discretion of a new State's Attorney. Therefore, defendant had not suffered any deprivation of rights. Here, defendant argues that the only distinction between Walker and Brownell and this case is that, in this case, the occupant of the State's Attorney's office changed between the time the State first offered a deal and the time the defendant ultimately entered a guilty plea. We disagree and conclude this case differs in other significant ways. The first distinction is with Walker. Unlike Walker, defendant was, at all times, aware of the potential punishment he faced. The State sought a death sentence at his first trial. Later, in pleading guilty, defendant acknowledged that a death sentence was a possible result. This was true even though defendant knew that the State had made a previous offer to refrain from seeking a death sentence. As we stated in Yates, Walker is not implicated when the defendant does not labor under a misconception that death is not a possible sentence. Yates, 98 Ill.2d at 534, 75 Ill.Dec. 188, 456 N.E.2d 1369. Here, defendant was not misled by the court or the prosecutor and, therefore, cannot maintain a claim based on Walker. A second distinction relates to Brownell, and specifically relates to the particular timing of the State's offer and defendant's eventual plea. In Brownell, a mere four hours passed between the State's initial offer not to seek a death sentence and the defendant's agreement to write a confession. Even though defendant expressly rejected the deal at the time, it is evident he began rethinking that decision soon after, ultimately choosing to talk to police mere hours later. In this case, defendant's decision to plead guilty came not four hours after the State's offer, but rather five years after the offer. Although the Brownell court concluded that there had not been any change in circumstances in those four hours, it is far more difficult to conclude that nothing changed over the five years in which the parties were preparing for a retrial. Until April 2007, defendant continued to pursue a trial, risking the more serious penalty of death. This time line refutes any suggestion by defendant that the State's Attorney reneged on the bargain made by his predecessor. After five years of proceedings, there was no bargain between defendant and the State. Although we do not construe offers such as this in strict contractual terms ( Brownell, 96 Ill.2d at 176, 70 Ill.Dec. 714, 449 N.E.2d 1318), the fact that defendant rejected the State's offer and prepared for trial for five years reflects the absence of any bargain. Unlike Brownell, defendant could not have reasonably believed that the earlier offer was still open, particularly when he acknowledged, in entering his guilty plea, that death was a possible sentence. A contrary holding would allow the defendant to seek a plea offer from the State, reject it, and pursue a trial, forcing the State to spend the time and money to prosecute the case. Then, at the last possible moment, perhaps facing a conviction, the defendant could force the State to adhere to its side of the bargain. Under this scenario, a prosecutor likely would be hesitant to risk making such a plea offer for fear of being bound indefinitely, even if the defendant initially rejected it. In Brownell, this court concluded that the proper question is whether circumstances changed between the time the State's offer was made and the time that the defendant complied with the State's conditions. In this case, we answer that question in the affirmative and hold that the State's decision to again seek a death sentence did not violate defendant's right to due process.