Opinion ID: 2610199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The land description in the option agreement was sufficiently definite.

Text: Defendants contend that the description in the option agreement referring to the approx. 2 acre parcel located directly North and contiguous to 17905 (corrected to 19705) S.W. Boones Ferry Rd.  Tualatin, Oregon was not sufficiently definite to satisfy the statute of frauds, ORS 41.580. More specifically, although defendants concede that a less strict rule is applicable to real broker's contracts under Sherwood v. Gerking, 209 Or. 493, 509, 306 P.2d 386 (1957) (involving a listing agreement), defendants contend that it is nevertheless required that such a description be sufficient to enable one, with the aid of extrinsic evidence, not only to locate the property, but to identify it. Thus, defendants contend that while descriptions referring to my or his property or to the Harold Gerking Ranch may be sufficient under the decisions of this court, the option agreement in this case contains no such language, but is substantially the same as the description held to be insufficient in Coast Business Brokers, Inc. v. Hickman, 239 Or. 121, 396 P.2d 756 (1964). That case held the following description to be insufficient: Also two tracts of land, one of 5 acres and one of 7 acres, adjoining Honeyman park, south of Florence. In Coast, however, the direction of the tracts involved from Honeyman Park was not stated and there may well have been more than two tracts of land adjoining that park. In this case, on the contrary, the parcel in question was referred to as the approx. 2 acre parcel located directly North and contiguous to a tract located at a specific address on a named road and community in Oregon. Furthermore, extrinsic evidence showed that the two acre parcel in question was the only parcel of land directly north of and contiguous to the tract located at that address. Under these facts we hold that our previous decision in Coast is not controlling in this case, but that the option agreement sets forth a sufficiently definite description within the rules previously established by this court. In Burns v. Witter, 56 Or. 368, 108 P. 129 (1910) (although involving a description which referred to my farm containing 40 acres), this court (at p. 373, 108 P. at p. 131) quoted with approval from Lente v. Clarke Adm'x, 22 Fla. 515, 519, 520, 1 So. 149, 151, the following rule: `The rule is that the contract or memorandum must identify or point out a special tract of land as within the minds of the parties, and intended to be conveyed. It must so describe the land as it can be found, or located, or in other words, there must be such a description as can be applied to a particular piece of land as the subject of the contract. A detailed description is not necessary. Where the description shows that a particular tract as distinguished from other lands is meant, then parol evidence can be resorted to, to apply the description, or identify or locate the land, though the description be somewhat general. However precise the description, a resort to parol evidence for such purpose is always necessary.   ' (Emphasis added) Subsequently, in Sherwood v. Gerking, supra, 209 Or. at p. 510, 306 P.2d at p. 394, (although involving a description referring to the Harold Gerking Ranch) we also quoted (at p. 510, 306 P.2d at p. 394) with approval a similar rule, as stated in Gifford v. Straub, 172 Wis. 396, 179 N.W. 600 (1920): It has been many times decided in cases arising under the statute of frauds that an indefinite description does not render the contract invalid if by extrinsic evidence the land conveyed can be made certain. The writing relied on to establish the contract need not describe the land which is subject to sale otherwise than by a reference therein to some extrinsic fact by means of which the land can be known with sufficient certainty.  (Emphasis added) More recently, In Higgins v. Insurance Co. of North America, 256 Or. 151, 469 P.2d 766 (1970), we sustained the description in an earnest money receipt in which the space provided for a description of the property was filled in as follows: description to be furnished, North 70' of description in Title Policy. In doing so, we reviewed the authorities on this subject, including other cases in which the words my or his were not used and said (at pp. 156, 157, 469 P.2d at p. 769): The fact that the property was not properly described in the writing does not necessarily mean that as between the parties the contract was unenforceable. In deciding disputes between the parties to a land sale contract, courts, including this one, have often held that evidence showing that both parties clearly understood what land was intended, or that the seller had put the purchaser into possession of a particular tract, would cure uncertainties in the contract description of the land. (Emphasis added.) In this case Mrs. O'Callaghan, one of the defendants, expressly admitted on cross-examination that there was no question in (her) mind as to what property it referred to. This testimony was uncontradicted, since her husband, Mr. O'Callaghan, the other defendant, did not testify, and plaintiff testified to the same effect. Moreover, where, as in this case, there was only one parcel of approximately two acres located directly north of and contiguous to a definitely specified location, we see nothing more indefinite in this description than in descriptions conceded by defendants to be sufficient in which property was described as my 15 acre farm located one mile north of Woodburn, Marion County, Oregon, and as his 5 acre residence property lying west of the Catholic Church (Bogard v. Barhan, 52 Or. 121, 96 P. 673 (1908)). The primary significance of the reference to my or his farm or residence in these cases was to exclude the possibility of more than one farm or residence north or west of a definitely specified location. In this case it is just as clear that there was only one parcel of approximately two acres directly north of and contiguous to the definitely specified location. Accordingly, we hold that the agreement in this case set forth a sufficiently definite description of the tract of land subject to the agreement to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds, as previously construed by this court. See also 4 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed) 114-117, § 997; 6 Thompson on Real Property (1962 Replacement) 446-450, § 3022; 6 Powell on Real Property 200-204, § 888, and Note, 25 Or.L. Rev. 192 (1946). We have also considered defendants' final contention that the real estate broker, Mr. Harris, did not have authority to act as agent on behalf of defendants to sell the property involved and to receive the proceeds (although that contention was not presented by proper assignment of error). In this case, however, the agreement was in writing and was personally signed by both parties. (See ORS 41.580(6) and Johnson v. Davis, 252 Or. 472, 475, 450 P.2d 758 (1969)). In addition, we find, after examining the entire record, that there was ample evidence to establish that Mr. Harris had such authority. See Cascade Warehouse Co., Inc. v. Dyer, 91 Or.Adv.Sh. 159, 474 P.2d 325 (1970). For all of these reasons, the decree of the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed.