Opinion ID: 506592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Compliance With Fed.R.Crim.P. 32

Text: 5 Oddo challenged various statements contained in his presentence report. He now asserts that his sentence should be vacated because Judge Pratt failed to make specific findings of fact with respect to those challenges and to append such findings to the report, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D). We discuss the controverted statements seriatim.
6 The report contained the statement that defendant has provided no cooperation with respect to this investigation. Oddo objected to this statement on the ground that the district court may not enhance a sentence because of a defendant's failure to cooperate with the government, even though it may consider cooperation as a mitigating factor. United States v. Stratton, 820 F.2d 562 (2d Cir.1987). Judge Pratt specifically responded to this objection, stating on the record that he would not consider Oddo's lack of cooperation in determining sentence. Since the sentencing judge is not required to make any findings when he explicitly disavows any reliance on a controverted statement such as this one, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D)(ii), this omission was not a violation of Rule 32. United States v. Navaro, 774 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.1985) (per curiam). 7 We agree with Oddo that Rule 32 mandates that the district court append its determination regarding the challenged statement. Nonetheless, this technical violation does not require us to vacate the sentence. United States v. Santamaria, 788 F.2d 824, 829 (1st Cir.1986); see United States v. Ursillo, 786 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir.1986). Since this omission can easily be cured, we remand to the district court with instructions to append its determination to the presentence report.
8 Oddo contested the accuracy of various statements in the presentence report that identified him as the source of the cocaine sold to the undercover agent. In particular, the report contained the following assertions regarding his role: 9 Allo and Oddo are equally the most culpable defendants and the source of the cocaine. The case agent says that Allo received the cocaine from Oddo and then gave it to Montalvo for sale. 10 Agents characterized the defendant [Oddo] as a primary figure who served as the source for the two kilos [of cocaine].... [H]is role [would] seem to indicate a proprietary interest in the overall transaction.... 11 Oddo claimed that these statements were inaccurate because he played only a minor role in the deal, acting only as lookout for Allo. 12 On appeal, Oddo asserts that the court failed to make specific findings as to each of these controverted statements. This contention is without merit. Judge Pratt announced in open court at the conclusion of three days of hearings that he and Judge Mishler had reached a finding as to the roles played by the different defendants: We find that the cocaine was originally supplied here by Mr. Oddo, and his responsibility here was essentially to see that when it was sold it got paid for and the money would come back to him. We have no information as to where Mr. Oddo may have acquired it. We consider this statement to be sufficiently precise to comply with the requirement of Rule 32, since it directly addressed Oddo's challenge that these statements of his level of culpability are pure conjecture and that Oddo had a minor role and is the least culpable in what transpired with respect to the cocaine on November 4, 1986. Although the court again failed to order that its findings be appended to the report, this omission also can readily be cured on remand without requiring us to vacate the sentence. Santamaria, 788 F.2d at 829. 13 Prior to sentencing, Oddo also challenged the statement in the presentence report that Montalvo has previously mentioned [sic] received the cocaine from Oddo [sic]. The government now concedes that this statement is inaccurate because Montalvo did not assert that Oddo provided him with the cocaine; rather, he testified that Allo was his supplier and that he had not met Oddo prior to participating in this drug transaction. The government contends that the statement merely contained typographical errors. Under Rule 32, however, the district court was required to make findings as to the accuracy of the statement or to disclaim reliance upon it, but did not do either. Ordinarily, in such a situation, [u]nless the government can demonstrate that the disputed facts were not relied upon, the defendant must be resentenced. United States v. Eschweiler, 782 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir.1986); see United States v. Lawal, 810 F.2d 491, 492-93 (5th Cir.1987). 14 Although the statement in question misrepresents Montalvo's identification of his supplier, this inaccuracy was not prejudicial to Oddo. The court found that the cocaine was originally supplied here by Mr. Oddo.... As discussed infra at point C, we find that the testimony provided at the hearing was more than sufficient to sustain this finding; therefore, we do not believe that the failure to correct or to disclaim reliance upon the misstatement requires us to vacate the sentence. 15 Although the rule is designed to insure maximum clarity, on the record, of the sentencing judge's treatment of disputed matters, Ursillo, 786 F.2d at 71, this court does not apply the rule mechanically. Rather, where the inaccuracy is de minimis in the context of the case as a whole, or where the violation of the rule is technical or ministerial, resentencing is not required. United States v. Bradley, 812 F.2d 774, 782 (2d Cir.1987); see United States v. Castillo-Roman, 774 F.2d 1280, 1285 (5th Cir.1985); see also Ursillo, 786 F.2d at 71. 16 We likewise see no reason to vacate a sentence where, as here, the error could not have been relied upon to the defendant's detriment. See United States v. Ryan, 810 F.2d 650, 657 (7th Cir.1987); Eschweiler, 782 F.2d at 1390. After considering Oddo's arguments, we are satisfied that, in view of all of the other evidence presented regarding Oddo's involvement in the transaction, this particular statement was inconsequential. Indeed, Judge Pratt's explicit finding that Mr. Montalvo was acting as a go between, between ... the under cover [sic] officer and Mr. Allo from whom Mr. Montalvo believed he would be able to obtain the cocaine, clearly indicates that he was not misled as to the chain of supply. Under these circumstances, it would be inappropriate to upset the sentence imposed based on these omissions alone. However, even if a misstatement is harmless and does not require resentencing, it must still be corrected or clarified, see Eschweiler, 782 F.2d at 1390; see also Bradley, 812 F.2d at 782, and we therefore remand to the district court for compliance with Rule 32. 17 We also note and draw the attention of the district court to the fact that the presentence report submitted to this Court under seal as part of the record on appeal has been modified and varies from the one that Oddo challenged. In the version that we have examined, some of the statements that Oddo contested have been corrected, although in other instances, only grammatical changes have been made. One of the significant modifications that we have discovered involves the alteration of the sentence that, according to the government, had contained typographical errors. It now reads: Montalvo, as previously mentioned, received the cocaine from Allo (changes underlined). 18 While it appears that the government may have made a good faith effort to correct prior errors, we disapprove of the alteration of documents in this manner. Though it may have been appropriate for the government to request permission to submit two versions of the report--the original plus a corrected report marked to show changes--it is improper to submit on appeal a record that differs from that which was actually before the district court. Upon remand, in order to fulfill the purposes of Rule 32, the district court should compare the two versions of the presentence report and ensure that the version considered by the district court to be correct is made available to appropriate prison and parole authorities.
19 Both the original report and the modified one contain the disputed statement Oddo was arrested as he started to run towards the [Roosevelt Field] Mall. Oddo insists that he was walking, not running. Even though the district court failed to make the required finding with respect to this statement, the accuracy of this representation is immaterial to the propriety of the sentence. Consequently, this alleged misstatement provides no basis to upset the sentence imposed; but since any errors in the report should be corrected, we instruct the district court to comply with Rule 32 on remand with respect to this dispute.
20 The original report contained the controverted statement that defendant played what authorities described as a primary role in multiple cocaine transactions. Oddo asserted in the district court that this statement contained the unwarranted implication that he was a persistent drug dealer who participated in many different drug transactions. He contended that the evidence only demonstrated his involvement in the one transaction to which he had pleaded guilty. The government responded that the report merely alluded to the fact that the transaction was supposed to involve five kilograms of cocaine, to be sold in two exchanges, and that the two-kilogram sale for which Oddo was arrested was only the first installment. Judge Pratt neither addressed this challenge nor disclaimed reliance upon it before imposing sentence. The subject statement is ambiguous and misleading, and we note that this wording has also been changed in the modified version of the report that is now before us. The modified report says the defendant played what authorities describe as a primary role in a multi-kilo cocaine transaction.... 21 Our review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing suggests that Judge Pratt based Oddo's sentence primarily on his finding that Oddo was the source of the cocaine. There is no indication that the court understood that Oddo was involved in any other drug transaction or that the sentence imposed was in any way affected by the ambiguous statement in the report. However, we cannot rely upon conjecture as to what statements the district court may have considered or ignored; pursuant to Rule 32, resentencing is warranted whenever the court may have considered a material controverted statement and did not first make a finding as to its accuracy. See Eschweiler, 782 F.2d at 1389, 1390 n. 11 ([W]here it is unclear whether the sentencing judge relied on the contested information, resentencing would resolve the matter.); United States v. Velasquez, 748 F.2d 972 (5th Cir.1984) (defendant convicted on one count of aiding and abetting transportation of illegal aliens entitled to be resentenced because court may have considered statement that he was a notorious alien smuggler); cf. Bradley, 812 F.2d at 782, 783 n. 10 (resentencing not required if, on remand, judge can disclaim reliance on controverted statement containing only de minimis inaccuracy). Since the statement in Oddo's report about multiple cocaine transactions, if considered by the court, may have affected the sentence imposed, we are constrained to vacate the sentence and to remand for resentencing.