Opinion ID: 1443319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The order permanently enjoining Alfred.

Text: We hold that the court's permanent injunctive order is null and void for failure to state the reason for its issuance as required by NRCP 65(d). This court has held that NRCP 65(d) mandates nullification of a preliminary injunction due solely to failure of the court to include a statement of reasons in the injunctive order. Webster v. Steinberg, 84 Nev. 426, 429-30, 442 P.2d 894, 896 (1968). We have also held that, under NRCP 65(d), a permanent injunction is void, not merely voidable, where the injunction contains no statement of the reasons for its issuance, or the injunction fails to describe the acts to be restrained with adequate specificity. Director, Dep't of Prisons v. Simmons, 102 Nev. 610, 612, 729 P.2d 499, 501 (1986). In Simmons, however, the injunction was void both due to lack of a statement of reasons and due to failure to describe the acts to be restrained with adequate specificity. Contrary to our statements in Simmons, we hold that, taken alone, the lack of a statement of reasons does not necessarily invalidate a permanent injunction, so long as the reasons for the injunction are readily apparent elsewhere in the record and are sufficiently clear to permit meaningful appellate review. To the extent that Simmons or any other of our past cases to require invalidation of a permanent injunction solely for lack of a statement of reasons, these cases are overruled. Contrary to our holding in Webster, we further see no good reason why the same rule should not apply to preliminary injunctions as well; this question is not presently before us, however. As this case illustrates, the failure to include a statement of reasons will continue to mandate nullification wherever the reasons for the injunction are not readily apparent elsewhere in the record, or appellate review is otherwise significantly impeded due to lack of a statement of reasons. We stress that the better practice is complete compliance with the rule, and that injunctive orders not complying with the rule will be carefully scrutinized. Two principal reasons support the holding just stated. First, in interpreting the identical federal analogue rule to NRCP 65(d), upon which NRCP 65(d) is based, federal courts have adopted rules consistent with our holding. These courts have not viewed the mandatory language of this rule as jurisdictional, but, rather, as intended primarily to facilitate appellate review of injunctive orders. See, e.g., Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 810 (6th Cir.1954), cert. den., 349 U.S. 930, 75 S.Ct. 772, 99 L.Ed. 1260 (1955); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir.1983). These cases are strong persuasive authority, because the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure are based in large part upon their federal counterparts. Second, mandatory nullification of any injunctive order not containing a statement of reasons can operate to penalize parties with additional litigation due to failure by the trial judge to perform a duty which, in large part, is his or her responsibility. Even if, on remand, the district court simply enters an amended injunctive order, the parties are prejudiced by having to refile, and await the result of, another appeal. To construe NRCP 65(d) to mandate nullification as a matter of course would therefore violate the requirement that the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. NRCP 1. In the present case, the lack of a statement of reasons precludes meaningful review of the injunctive order. Under the rule adopted above, therefore, the injunctive order must be declared void. If the court had merely enjoined Alfred according to the terms of the covenant, the injunctive order would be reviewable and, hence, valid, because the reasons for its issuance are apparent elsewhere in the record and meaningful appellate review would be possible. Absent a statement of reasons, this court cannot meaningfully review the limitations on enforcement of the covenant imposed by the district court. Why the district court limited the radius of enforcement from 20 to 10 miles from LVN is especially unclear, given LVN's allegations and affidavits suggesting that some of LVN's important clients are located in Boulder City, between 10 and 20 miles from LVN. Because the permanent injunctive order is null and void, we need not reach the parties' remaining contentions concerning the legality and the proper scope of enforcement of the covenant. However, we note in passing that, both as drafted and as enforced by the court, the covenant does not appear overly broad or violative of public policy.