Opinion ID: 106423
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the invalidity of the present compensatory payment provision.

Text: In light of the legislative history of § 8c (5) (G) we conclude that the compensatory payment provision of the New York-New Jersey Milk Marketing Order must fall as inconsistent with the policy expressed by Congress in that section. [20] Because it conflicts with § 8c (5) (G), the payment provision cannot be justified under the general terms of § 8c (7) (D), which prevents the inclusion of conditions that are inconsistent with express statutory provisions. Nor is the compensatory payment clause saved by the circumstance that in some instances it may also fortuitously operate to put the handlers of pool and non-pool milk on a competitive par. As has been pointed out (note 13, supra ), there are other means available to the Secretary for achieving this result, while affording protection to pool producers, without imposing almost insuperable trade restrictions on the entry of nonpool milk into a marketing area. The Government contends that the effect of § 8c (5) (G) may not be considered by this Court since that provision was not cited by the petitioners in the administrative proceeding in the Department of Agriculture. But even on the Government's premise that an unauthorized regulation should be upheld by this Court merely because the provision prohibiting it was not cited in the administrative proceeding in which it was attacked, this case presents no such instance. The administrative petition filed with the Department of Agriculture alleged that the effect of the compensatory payment clause amounted to establishing tariffs or barriers interfering with the free flow of milk across state lines, an obvious reference to the prohibition of § 8c (5) (G). In addition, the Government contends that the petitioners had the choice of joining the market-wide pool, in which case they would not have been subject to the compensatory payment provisions. Their election to stay out of the pool, it is argued, bars any attack on the consequences of their choice. However, such an election is surely illusory. The consequences of joining the pool would have been that petitioners would have been forced to pay the blend price to all their producers wherever located and account to the Producer Settlement Fund for all milk wherever sold. In these circumstances the election was not voluntary as in Booth Fisheries v. Industrial Comm'n, 271 U. S. 208, 211. It was coercive and, indeed, no election at all. Whether full regulation of the petitioners would be permissible under the Act is a question which we need not reach in this case. If the Secretary chooses to impose such regulation as a consequence of a handler's introducing any milk into a marketing area, the validity of such a provision would involve considerations different from those now before us. With respect to these petitioners, however, and with regard to the regulation here in issue, we conclude that the action of the Secretary of Agriculture exceeded the powers entrusted to him by Congress. The Secretary of course remains free to protect, in any manner consistent with the provisions of the statute, the blend price in this or any other marketing area against economic consequences resulting from the introduction of outside milk. We do not now decide whether or not any new regulation directed to that end could be made to apply retrospectively, or whether, if it could be validly so applied, the presently impounded funds could be resorted to pro tanto in its effectuation. Cf. United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183. What further proceedings the Secretary may see fit to take in the light of our decision, or what determinations may be made by the District Court in relation to any such proceedings, are not matters which we should attempt to forecast or hypothetically to decide. Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 23, 26. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.