Opinion ID: 2637623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Erroneous Instruction Regarding Documentary Proof Introduced Under Section 969b

Text: At trial, the prosecution introduced a certified copy of defendant's prison records pursuant to section 969b as evidence of defendant's prior serious felony conviction. Defendant did not object to the admission of these records, but did object to the trial court's instruction that: If you are satisfied with the records, no other evidence or testimony is necessary to prove that a person being tried for a crime has been previously convicted of a felony other than the 969b records or copies of records of any state penitentiary when such records have been certified by the official custodian of those records. Defendant contends the instruction was defective because it created a mandatory and irrebuttable presumption that defendant had a prior felony conviction. We disagree. As a practical matter, ... prior convictions are normally proven by the use of documentary evidence alone. ( People v. Keating (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 172, 183, 173 Cal.Rptr. 286.) Once the prosecutor presents this prima facie evidence of conviction, the trial court is allowed to make reasonable inferences from the facts presented. If there is no evidence to the contrary, the trial court may consider the abstract and the facts of the particular case, and utilizing the official duty presumption, find a defendant was convicted of and served the term of imprisonment for the listed felony. ( People v. Haney (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 472, 475-76, 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 547.) In this case, the instruction given by the trial court correctly stated the law. The instruction properly informed the jury that the section 969b records were sufficient, by themselves, to prove that defendant had been previously convicted of a felony. (See People v. Keating, supra, 118 Cal. App.3d at p. 183, 173 Cal.Rptr. 286.) The instruction also expressly required the jury to be satisfied with the records before relying on them. Contrary to defendant's assertions, nothing in the instruction required the jury to find that defendant had a prior felony conviction. At most, the instruction permitted the jury to infer that defendant had a prior felony conviction if it was satisfied with the contents of the section 969b records. As such, it did not relieve the prosecution of its burden of persuasion (see People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 180, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150), and we find no error.
Defendant contends his convictions should be reversed because the prosecutor committed misconduct when she implied to the jury that she was precluded from presenting certain evidence in rebuttal. Like the trial court, we reject his contention.
After the defense rested, the prosecutor informed the court out of the presence of the jury that she intended to recall Detective Hopley. Defendant objected, and the trial court, after hearing the offer of proof, excluded the proffered testimony. The prosecutor then indicated that she had no other rebuttal witnesses. When the jury returned, the trial court informed the jury that there would be no rebuttal and asked the prosecutor, [d]o you have any other witnesses you wish to present? The prosecutor replied, [o]nly Detective Hopley, your honor. I have no other witnesses. Defendant then moved for a mistrial and argued that the prosecutor's reference to Detective Hopley constituted reversible misconduct. The prosecutor responded that she was surprised by the court's question and did not intend to mislead the jury. The trial court denied defendant's motion for a mistrial and refused to cite the prosecutor for contempt.
We begin by finding that defendant has waived the claim. As a general rule a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashionand on the same groundthe defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety. ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) Although defendant made an assignment of misconduct and suggested that the trial court hold the prosecutor in contempt, he did not request an admonition. Because an admonition would have cured any prejudice from the alleged misconduct, he cannot raise this claim on appeal. ( People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 373, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) Defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct also fails on the merits. `A prosecutor's ... intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.' ( People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199.) `Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves `the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.'' ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 427, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) Finally, when the claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion. ( People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) Here, the prosecutor's brief reference to an excluded witness in response to an unexpected question did not constitute an egregious pattern of misconduct and did not infect the trial with unfairness. (See People v. Gionis, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1214, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199.) Even assuming the alleged misconduct involved the use of ``deceptive or reprehensible methods'' ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 427, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442), there appears to be no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the prosecutor's inadvertent remark in an objectionable fashion, and nothing in the record suggests otherwise ( People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2). Accordingly, defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct fails.
Defendant contends his counsel was ineffective, in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. In support, defendant cites: (1) defense counsel's refusal to take a position on instructions for lesser included offenses and decision to rely on the trial court's sua sponte duty to give such instructions; (2) defense counsel's erroneous contention that rape was not a general intent offense and subsequent acknowledgment of his error; (3) defense counsel's withdrawal of his objection to CALJIC No. 6.20 because he could not remember the grounds for the objection; and (4) defense counsel's refusal to elaborate on his objection to CALJIC No. 8.80.1. As explained below, defendant's contention lacks merit. The standards for ineffective assistance of counsel claims are well established. We presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in making significant trial decisions. ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) To establish a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance, defendant must establish either: (1) As a result of counsel's performance, the prosecution's case was not subjected to meaningful adversarial testing, in which case there is a presumption that the result is unreliable and prejudice need not be affirmatively shown [citations] or (2) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors and/or omissions, the trial would have resulted in a more favorable outcome. [Citations]. ( In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 351-352, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 801, 926 P.2d 987.) As an initial matter, we reject defendant's contention that his counsel effectively abandoned him at trial. Even a cursory review of the transcript reveals that defendant's counsel actively participated in the trial, including the colloquy over jury instructions. Counsel presented numerous witnesses, objected regularly, proffered jury instructions, and objected to the prosecution's proposed instructions. The few derelictions of duty alleged by defendant do not establish that the prosecution's case was not subjected to meaningful adversarial testing. ( In re Visciotti, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 351, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 801, 926 P.2d 987.) In any event, none of the incidents cited by defendant support an ineffective assistance claim. For example, counsel's decision to forgo implausible arguments or objections does not constitute deficient performance. (See People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 435, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) Likewise, we cannot say that counsel's refusal to take a position on lesser included offenses establishes that his performance was deficient. Given that counsel correctly recognized that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094), and given the nature of the evidence presented, counsel could have had a tactical reason for taking that position. Moreover, defendant conveniently ignores those instances where defense counsel suggested that the court instruct on certain lesser included offenses or agreed to the inclusion of such instructions proffered by the prosecution. Likewise, defendant mischaracterizes counsel's position on CALJIC No. 8.80.1. The trial court had already considered and overruled defendant's objection. Thus, counsel's decision not to elaborate further does not establish ineffective assistance. Finally, defendant does not explain how the omission or inclusion of any instructions would have altered the outcome. Accordingly, defendant can show no prejudice, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.)

At the penalty phase, the trial court instructed the jury that it could only consider evidence of defendant's prior criminal activity if the prosecution established that defendant committed these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. The court did not, however, instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence, and the court gave CALJIC No. 8.84.1, which instructed the jury to disregard all instructions given at the guilt phase. Defendant contends the court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the presumption of innocence. We have rejected this contention in the past because the special rules governing the consideration of `other crimes' evidence in aggravation are `statutorily based' [citation] and `not constitutionally mandated' [citation]. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 810, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330.) According to defendant, however, Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584 [122 S.Ct. 2428], undermines our previous rulings rejecting his contention. We disagree. In Ring, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Arizona's death penalty scheme. Under Arizona law, the first-degree murder statute 'authorizes a maximum penalty of death only in a formal sense,' [citation], for it explicitly cross-references the statutory provision requiring the finding of an aggravating circumstance before imposition of the death penalty. ( Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 604 [122 S.Ct. at p. 2440].) Thus, `[a] defendant convicted of first-degree murder in Arizona cannot receive a death sentence unless a judge makes the factual determination that a statutory aggravating factor exists. Without that critical finding, the maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed is life imprisonment, and not the death penalty.' ( Id. at p. 596 [122 S.Ct. at p. 2436], quoting Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 538, 120 S.Ct. 2348.) Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense ' ( id. at p. 2443, italics added), the court held that the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury ( ibid. ). The same reasoning does not, however, apply to the penalty phase determination in California. [14] [U]nder the California death penalty scheme, once the defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and one or more special circumstances has been found true beyond a reasonable doubt, death is no more than the prescribed statutory maximum for the offense; the only alternative is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589-590, fn. 14, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Thus, in the penalty phase, the jury merely weighs the factors enumerated in section 190.3 and determines whether a defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750.) No single factor therefore determines which penaltydeath or life without the possibility of paroleis appropriate. While each juror must believe that the aggravating circumstances substantially outweigh the mitigating circumstances, he or she need not agree on the existence of any one aggravating factor. This is true even though the jury must make certain factual findings in order to consider certain circumstances as aggravating factors. As such, the penalty phase determination is inherently moral and normative, not factual.... ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 779, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113.) Because any finding of aggravating factors during the penalty phase does not increase[ ] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348), Ring imposes no new constitutional requirements on California's penalty phase proceedings. Accordingly, our rulings rejecting the need to instruct on the presumption of innocence during the penalty phase still control. (See, e.g., People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 810, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330.)
Defendant requested the trial court instruct the jury that: Any mitigating circumstance presented to you may outweigh all the aggravating factors. The trial court refused, and gave CALJIC No. 8.88. [15] Defendant now contends the court's refusal to give the requested instruction was erroneous and violated his Eighth Amendment rights. He also contends CALJIC No. 8.88 is defective because it creates a presumption of death and is incomplete and misleading. He is wrong. First, the trial court properly refused to give the requested instruction. (See People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1068-1069, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Second, we have repeatedly upheld CALJIC No. 8.88 against similar challenges. (See, e.g., People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 452, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78; People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81,174, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) Nothing in Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584 [122 S.Ct. 2428], casts doubt on these prior rulings, and we decline to reconsider them here.
In instructing the jury on the criminal acts that could be considered as aggravating circumstances under section 190.3, factor (b), the trial court gave the jury a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.87. After listing and describing the applicable criminal acts, the modified instruction stated that: It is alleged that these acts involve the express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence. Defendant now contends the modified instruction was erroneous and warrants reversal of his judgment of death. As explained below, this contention is meritless. As an initial matter, we reject the People's contention that defendant invited the error. The doctrine of invited error bars a defendant from challenging an instruction given by the trial court when the defendant has made a `conscious and deliberate tactical choice' to `request' the instruction.  ( People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 723, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248, italics added.) In this case, defendant first objected to the entire instruction and asked the court to eliminate it. After the court overruled this objection, defendant objected to specific aspects of the instruction. Although defendant did acknowledge that the modifications improved the instruction, he did not make a conscious and deliberate tactical choice to request the instruction. (See id. at pp. 723-724, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248.) Indeed, defendant never requested the instruction in the first place. Thus, defendant did not invite the alleged instructional error. Although defendant's contentions are reviewable, they are not meritorious. First, we reject his contention that the modified instruction somehow implied that the jury did not have to find that the unadjudicated criminal acts involved force or violence. Although the instruction stated that the listed acts involve the express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence, it carefully noted that this statement was an allegation and not a fact. Thus, the instruction did not require the jury to find that the unadjudicated criminal acts involved force or violence. Moreover, Ring does not require the jury to unanimously make such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. (See ante, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 46-47, 66 P.3d at pp. 1146-1148.) Thus, the instruction did not err by failing to so require. In any event, no reasonable juror could have found that defendant committed the unadjudicated criminal acts identified in the instruction without finding that the acts involved force or violence. Second, we reject defendant's contention that the instruction's use of the phrase express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence was erroneous. Although section 190.3, factor (b) uses a slightly different phraseology use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violencewe see no practical difference between the instruction's and statute's language. Indeed, the instruction's language is arguably narrower than the statute's language because it may not encompass the attempted use of force or violence. In any event, we do not see how the jury could have misconstrued this instructional language to defendant's detriment. People v. Anzalone (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1074, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 969 P.2d 160 is inapposite. In Anzalone, we merely held that an implied threat of violence did not constitute a use of force or violence as understood in section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)(P)which authorized the continued confinement of prisoners with a severe mental disorder. (See Anzalone, at pp. 1080-1081, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 969 P.2d 160.) We did not distinguish between the implied use of force or violence and the use or attempted use of force or violence. Accordingly, we reject defendant's challenges to this instruction.
In People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782 ... we held that section 190.3 `expressly excludes evidence of criminal activity, except for felony convictions, which activity did not involve the use or attempted use of force or violence or which did not involve the express or implied threat to use force or violence.' ( People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 960, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571.) Consistent with Boyd CALJIC No. 8.87 contains the following admonition: A juror may not consider any evidence of any other criminal [act[s] [activity]] as an aggravating circumstance. (CALJIC No. 8.87 (5th ed.1988).) The version of CALJIC No. 8.87 given by the trial court, however, omitted this admonition. Defendant contends this omission constituted prejudicial error because the jury may have improperly considered certain evidence as an aggravating circumstance. Specifically, defendant identifies his numerous verbal threats against Figueroa and his escape from a Youth Authority facility as two incidents the jury may have improperly considered in imposing death. As explained below, defendant's contention is meritless. First, most of the threats defendant made against Figueroa constituted circumstances or continuous criminal activity properly considered in aggravation. Under section 190.3, factor (b), the jury may consider not only the existence of criminal activity by defendant involving the use or attempted use of force or violence but all the pertinent circumstances surrounding it [citation], and these circumstances may be shown through testimonial evidence. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 663, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) [A]ll crimes committed during a continuous course of criminal activity which includes [the use of] force or violence may be considered in aggravation even if some portions thereof, in isolation, may be nonviolent. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 841, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) Thus, the jury's consideration of any threats defendant made in connection with the throwing incident involving his daughter and his physical attacks on Figueroa did not violate People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782. Second, to the extent the erroneous instruction may have caused the jury to improperly consider threats defendant made against Figueroa and defendant's escape from a Youth Authority facility, the error was harmless. The properly admitted evidence of defendant's violent criminal actswhich included his shooting of three victims and his numerous assaults on and rapes of Figueroawas overwhelming. In light of this evidence, we are not disturbed by any improperly considered verbal threats. Likewise, the evidence of defendant's escape was not prejudicial. The prosecution introduced the testimony about defendant's escape to rebut defense testimony that defendant would adjust well to prison life; it did not ostensibly introduce the escape as an aggravating factor. In light of the circumstances of the charged crimes and the volume of evidence of prior criminal activity that was properly admitted, there can be no reasonable possibility that any improperly [considered] evidence was prejudicial. ( People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 963, 4 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571, fn. omitted.)
According to defendant, the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could consider three unadjudicated crimeschild endangerment (§ 273a), witness intimidation (§ 136.1) and weapon possession while in custody (§ 4574)as aggravating circumstances under section 190.3, factor (b). Citing People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 841, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865, defendant contends these three offenses do not constitute aggravating circumstances, because they do not inherently involve force or violence. (See § 190.3, factor (b) [evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity is admissible as an aggravating circumstance only if it involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence].) Defendant is wrong. In People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 777, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297, we held that Section 190.3, factor (b) ... does not require that any specific crime inherently involve force or violence, only that the actual criminal activity be violent. Although defendant concedes that Livaditis rejected his contention, he contends Livaditis conflicts with the following sentence in Cooper: Upon request by either party, the court should instruct on the elements of alleged other crimes [citation], but only those that in and of themselves involve violence within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (b). ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 841, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) Defendant, however, misreads the sentence. The sentence did not state that the unadjudicated crimes must inherently involve force or violence. Rather, the statement merely states that the actual acts must in and of themselves involve violence. ( Ibid. ) Cooper is therefore consistent with Livaditis. Thus, the trial court properly instructed the jury that it could consider defendant's alleged commission of child endangerment (§ 273a), witness intimidation (§ 136.1), and weapon possession (§ 4574) as aggravating circumstances. In committing child endangerment, defendant allegedly threw his daughter three to four feet. As such, the actual criminal act undoubtedly involved violence. Likewise, defendant's alleged threats to kill Figueroa if she reported the child-throwing incident clearly involved the threat of violence. Finally, `[i]t is settled that a defendant's knowing possession of a potentially dangerous weapon in custody is admissible under [section 190.3,] factor (b).' ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1002, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err.
In instructing the jury on the specific intent element of a section 136.1 violation, the trial court stated in relevant part that: The crime of Intimidation of a Witness requires the specific intent to prevent or dissuade another person from reporting any victimization. Defendant contends the instruction was prejudicial because it created the misleading impression that an intent to dissuade reporting the victimization to anyone, even someone not affiliated with law enforcement, would satisfy the requirements of section 136.1. This contention is meritless. As an initial matter, we reject the People's contention that defendant waived any errors in the instructions on the elements of unadjudicated crimes introduced as aggravating factors by failing to object. Although there is no sua sponte duty at the penalty phase to instruct on the elements of `other crimes' introduced in aggravation [citation], when such instructions are given, they should be accurate and complete. ( People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 942, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277; see also People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 49, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249.) The right to correct instructions on crimes introduced in aggravation at the penalty phase stems from the right to have the penalty jury consider such crimes only if it finds them true beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Montiel, at p. 942, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277.) Because defendant had the right to correct instructions on the elements of other crimes introduced in aggravation, and because courts may review instructional errors that affect the substantial rights of the defendant (§ 1259), defendant did not waive these errors by failing to object. The People urge us to reconsider our holdings in Montiel and Malone, but offer no compelling reason for us to do so. Nonetheless, defendant's contention fails because he ignores the other instructions. In another instruction given before the specific intent instruction, the trial court informed the jury that: Every person who attempts to prevent or dissuade another person who has been the victim of a crime or who is a witness to a crime, from making any report of such victimization to any law enforcement officer or prosecuting agency or to any judge is guilty of the crime of violation of Penal Code section 136.1, intimidation of a witness. Read together, the two instructions are not misleading and clearly state that a violation of section 136.1 occurs only if a defendant prevents or dissuades a witness from reporting a crime to the authorities. [16] Thus, the instructions were proper.
As an aggravating factor, the prosecution alleged that defendant possessed deadly weaponstwo shanks while in jail, in violation of section 4574, subdivision (a). The trial court instructed the jury that: Every person who, while lawfully confined in jail[,] possesses any deadly weapon is guilty of the crime of violation of Penal Code section 4574. The remainder of the instruction defined deadly weapon and actual and constructive possession. Defendant contends the instruction was deficient because it did not require the jury to find that he knew of the weapon's presence and nature as a [deadly weapon]. (CALJIC No. 7.34.02; cf. People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 332, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52 [holding that a defendant is guilty of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger only if he knows he is carrying the weapon and the concealed instrument may be used as a stabbing weapon].) Even assuming the instruction was deficient, the error was harmless. [17] The shanks were six to seven inches long and had sharpened ends and cloth handles. The shanks were hidden under defendant's bunk in a cell accessible only to defendant and sworn personnel. Defendant admitted that he possessed the shanks for protection. Defendant presented no evidence suggesting that he did not know of the shanks' presence in his cell and their nature as deadly weapons. Given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's knowledge, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 49-50, 252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249.)
The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.84, which states in relevant part that: It is the law of this state that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder of the first degree shall be death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole in any case in which the special circumstances alleged in this case have been specially found to be true. [¶] Under the law of this state, you must now determine which of said penalties shall be imposed on the defendant. Citing Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (plur. opn. of Blackmun, J.) ( Simmons ), defendant contends CALJIC No. 8.84 does not adequately inform the jury that life without possibility of parole means confinement for life without the possibility of parole. (See also Kelly v. South Carolina (2002) 534 U.S. 246, 248, 122 S.Ct. 726, 151 L.Ed.2d 670 [when `a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel']; Ramdass v. Angelone (2000) 530 U.S. 156, 165, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) [same].) Since Simmons, we have, however, held that CALJIC No. 8.84 adequately informs the jury of the defendant's ineligibility for parole. ( People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1009, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) Although defendant acknowledges our post- Simmons decisions upholding CALJIC No. 8.84, he contends Shafer v. South Carolina (2001) 532 U.S. 36, 121 S.Ct. 1263, 149 L.Ed.2d 178, casts doubt over these decisions. Contrary to defendant's contention, Shafer is distinguishable. In Shafer, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the instruction that `life imprisonment means until the death of the defendant' did not satisfy Simmons because the instruction did not clearly eliminate the possibility of parole and because many jurors may not know `whether a life sentence carries with it the possibility of parole.' ( Shafer, at p. 52, 121 S.Ct. 1263.) The court also found the instruction ambiguous because the judge also instructed the jury that `[p]arole eligibility or ineligibility is not for your consideration.' ( Id. at p. 53, 121 S.Ct. 1263.) The latter instruction did nothing to ensure that the jury was not misled and may well have been taken to mean `that parole was available but that the jury, for some unstated reason, should be blind to this fact.' ( Ibid., quoting Simmons, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 170, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (plur. opn. of Blackmun, J.).) By contrast, CALJIC No. 8.84 does not suffer from the same deficiencies. Unlike the jury in Shafer, the jury [in this case] expressly [was] informed of the defendant's ineligibility for parole by the instruction that it must choose between death or `confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole.' ( People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1009, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) The term `life without the possibility of parole' is clear and unambiguous and does not require a sua sponte definitional instruction. ( Ibid. ) Moreover, none of the other penalty phase instructions given by the trial court suggested that defendant would somehow be eligible for parole if the jury did not sentence him to death. Accordingly, Shafer is inapposite, and defendant's contention fails.
Defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury that [i]n determining whether to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or to death, you may decide to exercise mercy on behalf of the defendant. The trial court refused, and defendant contends its refusal violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and warrants the reversal of his judgment of death. We have, however, rejected this contention in the past (see, e.g., People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 393, 110 Cal. Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34), and defendant offers nothing to compel our reconsideration of these prior rulings. In any event, the rejected instruction was cumulative. [18] (See Lewis, at p. 393 [holding that CALJIC No. 8.85 adequately covers the mercy instruction].) Accordingly, defendant's contention is meritless.