Opinion ID: 1201220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Reappointment of Attorney George Franks

Text: Defendant's first argument is that the trial court erred in not removing George Franks as his counsel or, in the alternative, by not holding a hearing to determine whether there was a conflict of interest between defendant and Franks. We disagree. Following defendant's arrest, Ray Colton Vallery was appointed by Indigent Defense Services (IDS) to represent defendant on 22 October 2001. Following a Rule 24 conference held on 16 September 2002, IDS appointed George Franks as second chair on 19 September 2002. On 23 September 2002, defendant filed a pro se motion requesting that Vallery be withdrawn as counsel, stating that Vallery had failed to communicate with defendant and had not been diligent in his investigation of the case. The trial court heard argument on the motion on 10 October 2002. After defendant was asked whether he wanted both Vallery and Franks to be removed, the following colloquy took place: THE DEFENDANT: I barely know him. MR. FRANKS: Your Honor, I prefer to be removed as well so if he has counsel, he can have a clean slate, Your Honor. I have worked with Mr. Vallery, known him for years. He is a good attorney. THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. FRANKS: If he's going to have trouble with Mr. Vallery, he's going to have trouble with me. I'm getting too old for trouble. The trial court allowed defendant's motion and removed both attorneys, stating that IDS would need to make new appointments. IDS appointed Carl Ivarsson on 8 November 2002 and reappointed Franks as second chair on 19 December 2002. Around the date of defendant's February 2003 arraignment, defendant wrote two letters, one to the clerk of court and the other addressed to Superior Court Judge Weeks. Defendant's 10 February 2003 letter to Judge Weeks stated: My name is Eugene Johnny Williams and the reason why I'm writting you is we seem to have a problem. My O.C.A. File record is # XXXX-XXXXX, and Mr. Williams is charged with two counts of First Degree Murder and in September 2002, Mr. Williams filed a motion for attorney to be withdrawn from his case. In October 2002 Mr. Williams was brought back in front of you and my motion was granted, but now it seems to have another issue, One of two lawyers, Mr. Franks was present at Mr. Williams court hearing on 02/02 And he said he was still one of my attorneys. But in October 2002, he stated in front of Mr. Weeks the Judge overlooking the case, and said, He and protege Mr. Vallery, he wanted to step down from my case since Mr. Williams didn't want Mr. Vallery to represent him. But now he only said three words to me while I was in court a few days ago, and the other attorney, Judge Weeks Mr. Williams doesn't even know his name or nothing at all about him. The main reason why Mr. Williams is writting this letter is because this is my life that is on the line. Mr. Williams truly understand that a court-appointed attorney will only go by his guidelines on jailed clients. But at the same time my life is on the line, or another words in someone's elses' hands. But Judge Weeks I never received a copy of any judgement on your ruling for new attorneys, and I am writting to Bar association so Mr. Williams can receive a pair of attorneys that will truly represent Mr. Williams in his case. Mr. Williams will receive the fair shake of the judicial system if attorneys and clients don't work together. Then last but not less none of my attorneys keep in touch no matter that the case may be. . . . [sic] Defendant's 18 February 2003 letter to the Clerk of Court read: I Eugene Johnny Williams, hereby state and request the following. That on or about the 24, day of October 2002, the Honorable Judge Greg Weaks pursuant to GS15A-144, granted Mr. Williams request for removal of counsel. at said hearing Judge Weaks allowed Attorney Raymond Vallery to redraw as counsel for Mr. William, at which point Mr. Williams co counsel Mr. Franks, requested that he also be allowed to withdrawl, This Too was granted. I hereby contend, that Judge Weaks at this time guaranteed Mr. Williams new appointment of counsel, whereby Mr. Franks was reinstated, as co-counsel against Mr. Williams request. Co-counsel along with Mr. Franks was never made known To Mr. Williams. It is hereby requested That due To The severity of the charges charged against Mr William, it is most important That he contact counsel appointed by This court, whereby Mr. William Respectfully request the name address and phone number, of counsel and co-counsel for Mr. Williams pursuant To File # OCA 2001-14056. Now before This court. [sic] Judge Weeks wrote defendant, informing him that Ivarsson was appointed as first chair and Franks was reappointed as second chair. Judge Weeks indicated that he had spoken to Ivarsson and Franks and also was providing them a copy of the letter sent by defendant requesting that his attorneys keep in touch with him. Defendant asserts the trial court erred by not removing Franks once again or conducting a hearing on whether defendant was entitled to substitute counsel. We disagree. Defendant argues that two legal principles compel us to rule in his favor. First, defendant argues that once a Superior Court Judge has issued a ruling in a case, the ruling becomes the law of the case. Thus, defendant asserts that IDS's reappointment of Franks as second chair counsel violated Judge Weeks's order to have IDS appoint new counsel in the case. To the contrary, Judge Weeks's order consisted solely of the following: All right. Motion is allowed. Judge Weeks simply allowed defendant's motion to have counsel removed from his case. After the order allowing the motion, Judge Weeks began to address who would be appointed to represent defendant, and Franks indicated that the decision would go to IDS. The trial court agreed and simply stated as fact to defendant that [i]t goes back to IDS which means your case is going to be further delayed which means this case has to go back up to them and they have to make new appointments. Judge Weeks's order allowing defendant's motion to remove counsel did not, implicitly or explicitly, order that Franks not be reappointed as counsel. Thus, we cannot agree that IDS violated the trial court's order. Second, defendant argues that when faced with a request for substitute counsel, a trial court has an obligation to conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine if the defendant is entitled to the appointment of substitute counsel. Defendant relies on State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 271 S.E.2d 252 (1980), for this proposition. In Thacker this Court stated: [W]hen faced with a claim of conflict and a request for appointment of substitute counsel, the trial court must satisfy itself only that present counsel is able to render competent assistance and that the nature or degree of the conflict is not such as to render that assistance ineffective. Id. at 353, 271 S.E.2d at 256 (emphasis added). We do not agree with defendant that his letter to the trial court clearly constitutes a request for substitute counsel. Instead, defendant's letter indicates uncertainty on his part regarding why Franks was still his attorney. Had defendant wished to have Franks removed as counsel, defendant could have filed another motion to have his attorney replaced. Defendant obviously possessed the ability to do so, as evidenced by his prior pro se motion that was allowed by Judge Weeks. Thus, in the absence of a request for the appointment of substitute counsel, the trial court was not required to hold any hearing. Even if we were to conclude that a hearing should have been held, we are not persuaded that any alleged conflict of interest would have been sufficient to remove Franks from the case. The issue would have been whether Franks was able to render competent assistance and that the nature or degree of the conflict is not such as to render that assistance ineffective. Id. Defendant was not entitled to counsel of his choice, 301 N.C. at 351-53, 271 S.E.2d at 255, nor was he constitutionally entitled to second chair counsel, State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 357, 368 S.E.2d 377, 382 (1988) (explaining that the right to the appointment of additional counsel in capital cases is statutory, not constitutional). Even had defendant been constitutionally entitled to a second attorney, there is no indication that any conflict with Franks would rise to the level of rendering Franks's assistance ineffective. Defendant never asked for Franks to be removed, but rather, Franks was initially removed on his own request. Defendant did not make any formal motion or inform the trial court in any way that he had a potential conflict of interest with Franks. We do not agree with defendant that any potential conflict that existed between defendant and Franks would have been apparent to the trial court, such as to compel the trial court to ex mero motu conduct a hearing on the matter. We also disagree with defendant's alternative argument that he is entitled to present his concerns to the trial court on remand to establish his allegations if this Court finds that a new trial is not warranted. Accordingly, defendant's assignments of error are overruled.