Opinion ID: 2575291
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecution challenges for cause

Text: Defendant claims the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecutor to challenge four prospective jurors on the ground they were biased against the defense as a result of pretrial publicity. He contends that the prosecutor had no standing to make the challenges, and that the trial court erred in excusing the prospective jurors for cause. He also asserts that sustaining the challenges impaired his right to counsel under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and deprived him of a number of peremptory challenges equal to that allotted to the prosecution.

On his juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror L.R. wrote Yes, when asked whether he thought defendant was guilty of the charges. He also stated that he opposed the death penalty. On voir dire, the trial court asked L.R. whether he would be able to set aside your previous impressions and opinions and judge this matter solely on the evidence produced in this courtroom and on the arguments of the attorneys and on the body of law that the Court will instruct you? L.R. found the question very difficult to answer, and stated that I really don't know how I would behave as a juror since I have never been a juror. The court explained that he was not being asked to forget his opinions and impressions; rather, he would be called upon to set them aside and decide the case based upon what he heard in the courtroom. L.R. said he did not know whether he could do so. The prosecutor challenged L.R. for cause under People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1090 [259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659] ( Bittaker ), because he has not affirmatively said that he can set aside his opinions and deal only with the facts in the case as they are presented in the Court. Defense counsel asserted the prosecutor lacked standing to challenge a prospective juror for cause on this basis. In response to further questioning by the court, L.R. iterated that he did not know whether he could base his decision solely on the evidence presented in court, and stated he did not know whether he would be a fair and impartial juror. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's challenge, finding that this juror cannot be fair and impartial. This juror is equivocating to the point where I have absolutely no idea what his state of mind is. He has indicated to me that he cannot base his decision in this case solely on the evidence produced in this courtroom, and that he has been so impressed and influenced by the pretrial publicity that he cannot be fair and impartial. I'm making that finding. Defense counsel again opposed the challenge for the reasons ... stated before, and also argued that the attitudes expressed by [L.R.] ... are not necessarily indicative of his state of mind, but more indicative of a desire not to serve. I don't think that creates a situation where the Court can legitimately make a finding that he cannot be a fair and impartial juror. The court stated, I don't think he can be fair and impartial in this case. I have a duty to get fair and impartial jurors; he's not one of them.
On her juror questionnaire, when asked whether defendant was guilty of the charges, Prospective Juror C.S. wrote Yesat least some of the chargesthe murder charges, but I don't know if it's first degree. On voir dire, she repeatedly stated she did not know whether she could set aside her impressions and opinions about the case and base her decision upon the evidence presented in court. She stated her work in policy analysis did not involve arbitrarily setting aside information, and therefore she did not know whether she could set aside what she had heard out of court. The prosecutor challenged C.S. for cause under Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046, because she could not make an affirmative declaration that she could set aside the views she derived from pretrial publicity. Defense counsel objected, contending that the prosecutor lacked standing, and that C.S. in fact could set aside what she might know about the case and her conclusions about the case. My sense of listening to her and watching her is that the ambivalence that she has expressed doesn't have to do with her inability to go through the mental or intellectual exercise of setting things aside; it has to do more with the emotional level or the responsibility of making a decision involving someone else's life. The trial court sustained the challenge. With regard to this juror, the Court cannot get a clear indication of her state of mind based on her ambivalent and ambiguous answers. I don't think that she can be fair and impartial. She said that she cannot set aside her opinions of the Defendant's guilt. When I asked her if she would make every effort to set aside those opinions, she said she didn't know, she didn't know whether she could do it. Under those circumstances, her opinion is that the Defendant is guilty, and she would have a very difficult time setting aside those opinions, and so the Court will grant the challenge based upon her inability to be fair and impartial in this case.
On her juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror D.M. wrote in capital letters and underlined Yes, when asked whether she thought defendant was guilty of the charges. In response to the question, [H]ave you formed any opinions about this case, she wrote, Right now, my vote is for the [d]eath sentence. On voir dire, she stated she understood the law required that she presume defendant innocent, but she had difficulty applying the presumption of innocence to defendant. She stated that she had heard about the case in media reports, and she would find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon what she had heard in the press, without any evidence being presented. D.M. also noted she had changed her mind concerning the death penalty, and would not be able to at any time be responsible for putting anybody to the death sentence. At the conclusion of the court's questioning, D.M. confirmed she would presume defendant guilty unless the contrary was proved. The prosecutor challenged D.M. under Bittaker, noting: She has an opinion about guilt. She has opinions about penalty ... she's unfair to both sides .... Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor did not have standing to make a challenge for cause under Bittaker. The trial court sustained the challenge, stating: Counsel has the right to raise the issue of whether a juror can be fair and impartial, and this juror ... exhibits the presumption of guilt as to the defendant. I don't see it any way that she is fair and impartial.
On her juror questionnaire, in response to the question of whether defendant was guilty of the charges, Prospective Juror D.R. wrote, Yeahprobably he did itbut why, what drove him to it, will he or could he be driven to it again? She also stated she could not handle knowing I was responsible for sending someone to the chair, or responsibility for the death penalty. She disclosed that her fiancé was in prison for murder, and expressed the opinion that her fiancé would not be there if he weren't poor, undereducated and Black. On voir dire, D.R. stated she did not know whether she would follow the law as instructed by the court. She stated that her recollection of the details of the case was hazy, but if something presented in court conflicted with something she recalled from media reports, she would question what had been presented in court. Defense counsel asked, If the court were to tell you that it's your responsibility as a juror to decide this case solely on the evidence presented here in court would you follow that instruction? D.R. answered, No. The prosecutor challenged D.R. under Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046. Defense counsel asserted that the prosecutor did not have standing to make this challenge, and also argued that D.R.'s hazy recollections would not in any way impinge on her ability to listen to the evidence. The prosecutor note[d] once again, that a fair trial is the providence of the court and everyone who knows what her opinions are like, they could impinge on the prosecution in terms of what magnificent little details she'd dredge up during the course of the trial. The trial court sustained the challenge. This juror has come in, expressed that attitude that defendant is guilty.... She has said that she ... doesn't believe people tell the truth in court. She has said she cannot follow the court's instructions, follow the evidence in court. She said she would take whatever she remembers over what she sees in court. She has said she doesn't believe in the court system. She thinks that too many people make deals, and she trusts her perceptions far more than what is told to her.... It's abundantly clear to me that she is just totally unqualified to be a juror. I couldn't for the life of me understand why the defense persists in thinking that she above all the other people we've ever interviewed in this case, is going to be able to set aside whatever miniscule specific facts that she might have pertaining to this case and be a fair and impartial juror. She just flat out can't be. I think it would be a travesty of justice to let her remain on this case.
(5) We held in Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 1090, that a prospective juror who has an opinion based upon media reports, is qualified only if he affirmatively declares that he can and will act impartially. A declaration that he will try to be impartial, but doubts that he can succeed, is insufficient. (Italics omitted.) [10] Defendant describes the issue in the present case as whether the prosecutor can make a Bittaker challenge to a juror on the ground that the juror has an opinion adverse to the defendant.  The prosecutor's challenges and the trial court's rulings were not based, however, solely upon the ground that the prospective jurors held opinions adverse to defendant. Rather, the Bittaker challenges and the court's rulings were based upon these individuals' inability to set aside what they knew or believed concerning the case and to decide the issues based upon the evidence and pursuant to the court's instructions. Although particular opinions and beliefs expressed by these prospective jurors during voir dire revealed bias against defendant with respect to the issue of guilt, their answers also established they could not declare that they would decide the issues fairly and impartially based upon the evidence presented in court. Clearly, the prosecution's case could be harmed by jurors who would decide issues based upon rumors or information received outside of court, and who would not follow the court's instructions. Therefore, the premise of defendant's claim that the prosecutor lacked standing to challenge these prospective jurorsnamely, that the prosecutor was not aggrieved by the prospective jurors' beliefs and attitudesis mistaken. Defendant's claim that the trial court erred in excusing the prospective jurors for cause also fails. On review of a trial court's ruling, if the prospective juror's statements are equivocal or conflicting, that court's determination of the person's state of mind is binding. If there is no inconsistency, the reviewing court will uphold the court's ruling if substantial evidence supports it. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 488 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754] ( Hillhouse ).) As noted above, L.R. and C.S. each repeatedly responded that they could not say whether they could set aside their impressions and opinions and decide the case based solely upon the evidence; D.M. stated she would decide based upon what she heard and saw in the press, unless the contrary was proven, and D.R. stated she would not follow an instruction that she decide the case solely upon the evidence presented in court. Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings that these jurors were not fair and impartial, and to the extent any of these jurors' responses were equivocal, the trial court's determination is binding. (6) Defendant contends the trial court's decision to excuse these jurors because they were biased against defendant interfered with defendant's right to have his counsel make tactical decisions, in violation of his right to counsel, and deprived him of a number of peremptory challenges equal to those allotted the prosecution. This claim is forfeited. In the trial court, defendant never conceded that these prospective jurors were biased with respect to the issue of guilt, or asserted that they nonetheless were desirable to defendant because of their stated views in other areas. Thus, People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765], upon which defendant relies, is inapplicable. Partida held that constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal are not forfeited if they do not invoke reasons different from those the trial court was asked to apply, but merely assert that the trial court's act or omission, to the extent erroneous for the reasons actually presented to that court, had the additional legal consequence of violating the Constitution. ( Id. at p. 435.) Here, the trial court never had the opportunity to consider whether defendant had the right to retain prospective jurors concededly biased with respect to the issue of guilt, but acceptable to the defense for other tactical reasons. (7) Moreover, as we have noted, these jurors properly were excused for reasons other than bias against defendant. Contrary to defendant's assertion, a trial court's proper grant of a prosecutor's challenge for cause neither confers upon the prosecution a greater number of peremptory challenges than the number to which it is entitled by statute, nor violates a defendant's right to counsel. Indeed, outside the context of challenges based upon juror views concerning the death penalty, a [d]efendant has a right to jurors who are qualified and competent, not to any particular juror. ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 656 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213].)