Opinion ID: 1381947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Edwards' competence to stand trial

Text: Edwards' eighth point is that the motion court clearly erred in finding that trial counsel adequately investigated whether he was competent to stand trial. He alleges that counsel were ineffective because they did not seek a competency evaluation. To show that his counsel were ineffective, Edwards must demonstrate, first, that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Second, Edwards must show that this deficiency prejudiced him, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Counsel's performance is presumed to be reasonable. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Under Missouri law, [n]o person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the incapacity endures. Section 552.020.1, RSMo 2000. Edwards is presumed to be competent and bears the burden of proving that he is incompetent. State v. Anderson, 79 S.W.3d 420, 432-33 (Mo. banc 2002). A defendant is competent if he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding  and . . . has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Johns, 34 S.W.3d 93, 104 (Mo. banc 2000). None of the three pretrial experts found Edwards incompetent to stand trial or any significant mental disease or defect. Even though counsel had difficulty communicating with Edwards, there was no reason to seek a competency evaluation after receiving the opinion of these experts. The failure to discover a psychiatrist who would find a defendant incompetent to stand trial is not ineffective assistance. State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 923 (Mo. banc 1997). Edwards claims that his attorneys did not provide a sufficient social history to the pretrial experts. As discussed above, the social history investigation was adequate. Even if it were not, however, Edwards does not explain how this evidence would be relevant to a determination of whether, at the time of trial, he met the standard for competency. The record reflects that many of the communication problems were caused by Edwards' desire to control the defense. When counsel did not do what he wanted, he would tell his family not to cooperate or would threaten to withhold the names of witnesses or exculpatory evidence that he claimed to have. When he was pleased with counsel, he would provide information that was useful in preparing the defense. This demonstrates that Edwards was capable of cooperating with his counsel when he chose to do so. While these behaviors may have been frustrating to counsel, and certainly were not always beneficial to Edwards' defense, they were not necessarily irrational or the result of mental incompetence. Edwards claims that the motion court applied the wrong standard for competency because it only found that he understood the proceedings, but did not find that he was capable of communicating rationally with his attorneys. This assertion is belied by the motion court's judgment. The motion court judge, who was also the trial judge, noted that he had personally observed Edwards throughout the trial, and at no time did this Court observe any difficulty in communication occurring between [Edwards] and his Trial Counsel. When the judge personally addressed Edwards, he did not appear confused, unresponsive, or disconnected. When Edwards testified, his answers were responsive to the questions asked. Although Dr. Logan testified, after trial, that he thought that Edwards was incompetent at the time of trial, the motion court did not find this evidence persuasive. This determination was not clear error. Where there is a disagreement among experts, it is the duty of the trial court to determine which evidence is more credible and persuasive. Johns, 34 S.W.3d at 105.