Opinion ID: 1405799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did Hanset v. General Construction Company change or expand the law in Oregon?

Text: The quick answer to the above question is No. The Barneses throughout this case have assumed that because this court quoted from comment b to Restatement of Torts Section 929 (1939) in Hanset, we had approved the comment as well as the entire black letter section that preceded it. In oral argument before this court the Barneses repeatedly argued that their case was a logical extension of comment b. They focus their attention on the following sentence of that comment: On the other hand, if a building such as a homestead is used for a purpose personal to the owner, the damages ordinarily include an amount for repairs, even though this might be greater than the entire value of the building. The Barneses' reason that if an owner whose house is partially destroyed by a tort is allowed damages for repairs that exceed the entire value, then they should be allowed $228,000 for new construction to replace their 28-year-old home with a building of the same design and size. The Barneses' reliance on Restatement of Torts Section 929 (1939), or its successor, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), or comment b is misplaced for the following reasons. First, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 929 has a condition precedent which may keep it from applying to the Barneses' situation. The section begins with this language: If one is entitled to a judgment for harm to land resulting from a past invasion and not amounting to a total destruction of value, the damages include compensation for:   . (Emphasis added.) It could be argued that land means only the earth, ground or soil, but the comments to the section clearly demonstrate that the editors intended that the term should include buildings and other structures affixed to the land. [6] The Barneses have maintained that their house was totally destroyed in the sense that it must be razed and rebuilt from the ground up. They have also argued that the damage to their house was temporary because the injury was to a structure on the land and not an injury to the land itself. They contend that the new house will be merely a replacement or restoration of the old one. Although the Barneses contend that this turns upon whether the damage to their house was temporary or permanent, that distinction does not control the application of Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 929. If the damage was temporary or permanent as to a portion of the building, then the Barneses may have that section of the Restatement available to them. On the other side of the coin, if the damage amounts to a total destruction of value of their house, then Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 929 kicks out of gear and is not available to them. The Barneses cannot have it both ways. In Hudson v. Peavey , supra, this court said that the injury need not last forever to qualify as permanent damage. 279 Or. at 10, 566 P.2d 175. If there are degrees of permanence, then the damage to the Barneses' house is more permanent than the damage suffered by the plaintiffs in Hudson v. Peavey . If a house is completely torn down so that a new house can be built in its place, the old house is gone forever. In the context of this case we hold that there was total destruction of the value of the Barneses' house and that therefore Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 929 cannot apply. [7] The second reason that the Barneses may not recover under Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 929 is as follows. The mere fact that this court in Hanset quoted comment b of Restatement of Torts Section 929 (1939) in full and then went on to elaborate on it does not necessarily mean that we have approved it as a part of the Oregon law. In Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or. 435, 455 n. 12, 600 P.2d 398 (1979), this court said: Although this court frequently quotes sections of the Restatements of the American Law Institute, it does not literally `adopt' them in the manner of a legislature enacting, for instance, a draft prepared by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, such as the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. In the nature of common law, such quotations in opinions are no more than shorthand expressions of the court's view that the analysis summarized in the Restatement corresponds to Oregon law applicable to the facts of the case before the court. They do not enact the exact phrasing of the Restatement rule, complete with comments, illustrations, and caveats. Such quotations should not be relied on in briefs as if they committed this court or lower courts to track every detail of the Restatement analysis in other cases. The Restatements themselves purport to be just that, `restatements' of law found in other sources, although at times they candidly report that the law is in flux and offer a formula preferred on policy grounds. This court in Hanset, after quoting comment b, went on to say: This comment, particularly the second paragraph, reveals that the Restatement supports plaintiffs' position. True, the comment does state a rule of proportionality under which a plaintiff's damages may be limited to the diminution in value of his property. However, this rule does not apply where `there is a reason personal to the owner for restoring the original condition.' As the comment goes on to clarify, where the owner does have a personal reason for restoring the property, as he would where the building is a homestead, `the damages ordinarily include an amount for repairs, even though this might be greater than the entire value of the building.' 285 Or. at 106, 589 P.2d 1117. It is possible that this court under the above-quoted analysis in Brewer v. Erwin may have held that at least a part of comment b corresponds to Oregon law. If so, then such a holding could be independent, separate and apart from Restatement Torts Section 929. We are referring to the portion of the comment which states that the measure of damages for a homestead ordinarily includes repairs even though they might be greater than the entire value of the building. To determine this question it is necessary to re-examine Hanset. A close reading of Hanset shows that this court actually decided the case on the basis of Ore. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Mathis, supra , and quoted it for the proposition that: since the allowance of damages is to award just compensation without enrichment, there is no universal test for determining the value of property injured or destroyed and    the mode and amount of proof must be adapted to the facts of each case. 285 Or. at 104, 589 P.2d 1117. The Hanset court continued: In Ore. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., supra, we identified several factors that make repair cost, and not diminution in value, the proper measure of damages, including whether the property can be repaired; whether the damage is to an improvement as opposed to damage to the land itself; and whether the determination of the diminution in value would be difficult and uncertain. 215 Or at 226 [334 P.2d 186]. Under the facts of this case, these factors show that the proper measure of damages in this case is repair cost, not diminution in value. 285 Or. at 105, 589 P.2d 1117. It is obvious that at that point this court had decided Hanset and no further explanation was necessary, but the court in an apparent afterthought to bolster or reinforce its decision, went on to quote comment b to Restatement Torts Section 929 (1939) in full and wrote the paragraph which is set out at 847-848 above without applying it to the case. The language by this court concerning comment b to Restatement of Torts Section 929 (1939) was unnecessary to the decision in Hanset. There is nothing in the opinion or the briefs filed in this court to show that the plaintiffs in Hanset recovered damages for repairs that were greater than the entire value of the building. The Hansets paid $5,000 for the shell of the building, made extensive improvements prior to the tort and were awarded $5,000 by the jury for damages resulting from the defendants' blasting. True, the plaintiffs did seek $12,000 as the cost of repair, but we have no way of knowing if that amount was greater than the value of the building, because there was no evidence of the value immediately before the blasting. Unlike Caeser's Gaul, Hanset is only divided into two parts  the necessary part and the unnecessary one. The first half of the opinion ends with the necessary holding that the proper measure of damages in this case is repair cost, not diminution of value. It merely followed and applied the law previously announced in Ore. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Mathis, supra . The second half of the Hanset opinion is an intellectual discourse and is interesting but unnecessary to the decision. Hanset did not attempt to change the law in Oregon as to the measure of damages for tortious injury to real property. Whether or not this court in a proper case will agree with and apply the principles of law set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 929 and comment b thereto is an open question. [8]