Opinion ID: 1513273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right of Petition.

Text: Plaintiffs seek to inject into the case a constitutional question. They refer to their petition to the Department of April 15, protesting against the construction of the proposed expressway, attacking the validity of the forthcoming public hearing, and asking a hearing to present objections to the Department. (Presumably their objection was to any route affecting their properties.) They say that the Department refused to accord them a formal hearing, and that such refusal was a violation of Art. I, Sec. 16, of the Constitution of the State of Delaware, Del.C.Ann., respecting the right of citizens peaceably to assemble and apply for redress of grievances by petition, remonstrance or other address; and a violation of the First Amendment to the federal constitution. Since the petition was received by the Department and presumably given such consideration as the Department thought fit, the contention comes to this: that the right of petition includes the right to be formally heard, in person and by counsel. Such a contention has the merit of novelty only. Only a moment's reflection will convince any reasonable person that no department of government could function if it were obliged to accord a formal hearing to every citizen choosing to protest any contemplated or completed official act. Historically, the right of petition means just what it says: the right to present to the sovereign a petition or remonstrance setting forth a protest or grievance arising out of governmental action, past or contemplated. It would be a perversion of the right to hold that it carries with it the right to debate in person or through counsel the subject matter of the remonstrance. We are cited to no legal authority supporting the contention. Professor Corwin, a distinguished student of the United States Constitution, has discussed the historic right of petition guaranteed by the First Amendment. He has written:    The constitutional right of petition today seems to be satisfied when a petition is officially received. E. S. Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today; quoted in Vol. IV, Dictionary of American History (1940), p. 256. We may add that the plaintiffs can have no just complaint that they were not heard. The record shows that the views and arguments of plaintiffs' attorneys were on numerous occasions presented with considerable vigor to or in the presence of representatives of the Department. Plaintiffs attempt to buttress this contention by arguing that the Department never held a public hearing because the April and May hearings were presided over by a private citizen. This is a mere quibble, since the Department called the hearing and its representatives were present. But all the criticism of the public hearings is beside the point. The state law requires no public hearing. The federal statute, as already noted, does require such a hearing. The State must comply with the federal law to obtain federal funds. It has so complied, because the project has been approved by the Bureau of Public Roads. The argument is beside the point. Finally, plaintiffs assail the validity of the hearings on the ground that the Department acted arbitrarily, capriciously and not in accordance with due process of law. Under this heading of formidable words and phrases plaintiffs set forth a mélange of various arguments, some of which have already been considered and others of which are completely refuted by the record, e. g., that the Chairman of the public meetings had no authority to preside; that the Department did not give proper consideration to questions of cost, and loss to the City of tax revenue, urban and regional planning; and so forth. The record before us completely refutes these charges.