Opinion ID: 691307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Plain Error Challenges

Text: 63 Mitchell raises several additional challenges to his sentencing, all, as he concedes, reviewable only for plain error because he failed to raise them below. An error is plain if (1) it is so obvious that  'the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it,'  and (2) it was prejudicial. Saro, 24 F.3d at 286 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)). For purposes of sentencing, a defendant can establish prejudice if he shows a reasonable likelihood that the sentencing court's obvious errors affected his sentence. Id. at 288.
64 Mitchell argues that the district court erred in denying him a reduction for accepting responsibility. The PSR initially recommended a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, but, upon the government's challenge, reconsidered. The PSR (and thus the sentencing court, because it offered no further discussion of the issue) explained this reconsideration on the grounds that Mitchell: 65 [ (1) ] did not make an effort to provide timely information to the government concerning his own involvement in the offense; [ (2) ] did put the government to its burden of factual proof at trial and therefore does not qualify for a reduction. 66 Addendum to the Presentence Report at 22. Mitchell argues that neither ground was acceptable. With respect to the first ground, he asserts that under the Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), timeliness is only relevant to whether an additional one-point reduction is warranted, not to whether the basic two-point reduction is warranted. This is incorrect. The Guidelines provide for a two-point reduction if the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1(a), and an additional one point reduction if the defendant timely provid[es] complete information to the government, U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1(b). The application notes, however, instruct that timeliness is also a consideration in determining whether the defendant qualifies for the initial two-point reduction. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(h)) (appropriate considerations for subsection (a) include the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility). 67 As to Mitchell's decision to go to trial, although we are not certain of the PSR's intent, it can be read as applying a per se rule that the decision to go to trial automatically precludes an acceptance of responsibility reduction. This understanding is plain error. Although this court has upheld the consideration of a decision to go to trial in determining where, within the range of reduction for cooperation, the defendant should be placed, see United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1476 (1993) (in banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 741, 126 L.Ed.2d 704 (1994), [c]onviction by trial ... does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1, comment. (n.2) (emphasis added). As the application notes explain: 68 In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial. This may occur, for example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct). In each such instance, however, a determination that a defendant has accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct. 69 Id. Thus, to the extent that the PSR applies a per se rule that the decision to go to trial bars a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, it does plainly err. However, we think it far from reasonably likely that Mitchell's case is one of the rare situations in which a defendant who proceeds through trial is entitled to a reduction for acceptance of cooperation. See Jones, 997 F.2d at 1487 (application note 2 explicitly tells judges that they normally should deny the two-point reduction to a defendant who does not plead guilty). Thus, because Mitchell has not shown that the PSR's error prejudiced him, he has not satisfied the second prong of the plain error test. See Saro, 24 F.3d at 288.
70 Mitchell also challenges the addition of points for engaging in criminal activity while on probation. Calculation of Criminal History under the Guidelines provides for the addition of two points if the defendant commits the instant offense while on probation. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.1(d) & comment. (n.4). Mitchell was placed on probation in June, 1992 for driving under the influence. The conspiracy of which Mitchell was found guilty was identified in the indictment and verdict form as lasting through July, 1992, but there was no evidence that Mitchell or others engaged in any acts in furtherance of the conspiracy after June, 1992, when Mitchell was placed on probation. 71 As this court has instructed, in establishing that one is no longer acting in a conspiracy, the defendant [has] the burden of proving that [he] affirmatively withdrew from the conspiracy. United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 854 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam) cert. denied, --- U.S. ---- & ----, 114 S.Ct. 286 & 650, 126 L.Ed.2d 236 & 607 (1993). Given this burden, it was not plain error to conclude that Mitchell participated in the conspiracy while on probation.
72 Mitchell argues that the district court erred in not giving him a downward adjustment as a minor or minimal participant under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.2. As Mitchell did not make this argument below, it is also reviewed for plain error. In addition, decisions not to depart downwards are generally reviewable only to the extent that they were imposed in violation of law or were imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Ortez, 902 F.2d 61, 63 (D.C.Cir.1990). U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.2 provides: 73 Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense level as follows: 74 (a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels. 75 (b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. 76 The notes explain that a minimal participant is intended to cover defendants who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group. Under this provision, the defendant's lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the activities of others is indicative of a role as minimal participant. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.2, comment. (n.1). A minor participant means any participant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.2, comment. (n.3). 77 During the sentencing hearing, the court made findings that would place Mitchell squarely in the minor participant category, concluding that Mitchell was less culpable than the other players: 78 It is my hope some day, Mr. Mitchell, that either through Congress['s] actions or otherwise under the guidelines if appropriate, that you could be back before this Court to receive some other consideration in the length of sentence you'll have to serve, because I think you have been caught up in this ring and that while you're legally responsible for the activities, as I found it, I believe that your level of culpability compared to others in this ring, including cooperating witnesses, who will get a lot less sentence than you will get, your level of culpability is not as great, but for whatever reasons, you went to trial in this case, and the jury is the one that made the determination after a lengthy trial. 79 Sentencing Tr. at 32-33. 80 Thus, the district court made an express finding that Mitchell was less culpable than others in the ring. The Guidelines, in turn, issue an unequivocal directive to decrease by 2 levels [i]f the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity and define a minor participant as any participant who is less culpable than most other participants. Although we do not now determine whether it might be possible to find that a defendant is less culpable than most other participants and nevertheless deny him the reduction due to minor participants, we do hold that it was plain error and an incorrect application of the Guidelines for the district court to fail even to consider Mitchell's eligibility for the reduction upon making the finding that he was less culpable than his co-conspirators. 7