Opinion ID: 1874397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Finding of a Mental Condition as Support for Termination.

Text: The court also found that termination for abuse and neglect and failure to rectify was supported by Father's mental condition that is permanent and has no reasonable probability of reversal. The court found this supported termination under section 211.447.4(2)(a) for neglect and under section 211.447.4(3)(c) because it is a condition of a harmful nature that still persists and is unlikely to be rectified soon. This Court notes that neither the initial petition taking custody of S.M.H. nor the petition to terminate Father's parental rights alleged that he had a mental condition that served as the basis for neglect or failure to rectify. The petition did make such allegations as to Mother, but as to Father alleged only a failure of support and failure to comply with the service plan and to adjust his circumstances to provide for S.M.H., as addressed earlier. A serious question exists whether it would be proper to terminate Father's rights where the petition did not make this assertion as to Father. Cf., J.M.S., 83 S.W.3d at 86-87; H.R.R., 945 S.W.2d at 88. But, this Court need not resolve this issue. Even were it appropriately considered as a basis for termination, the record fails to support the court's finding that Father had a mental condition of such a type as to support termination of his parental rights. A parent's mental state cannot constitute a basis for termination for abuse or neglect unless it rises to the level described by section 211.447.4(2)(a): a mental condition which is shown by competent evidence either to be permanent or such that there is no reasonable likelihood that the condition can be reversed and which renders the parent unable to knowingly provide the child the necessary care, custody and control.  (emphasis added). This provision requires a showing of more than merely the presence of mental or emotional instability or problems; the incapacity must be so severe that it renders the parent incapable of providing minimally acceptable care and the condition cannot be reversed or improved in a reasonable time. See K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 26, citing Mark Hardin and Robert Lancour, Early Termination of Parental Rights: Developing Appropriate Statutory Grounds, 14 (1996). The expert reports relied on by the court to terminate Father's parental rights based on a mental condition did not meet this standard. The report by Dr. Daus was prepared in June 2002 and provided the basis for taking jurisdiction of S.M.H. As K.A.W. specifically held, however, abuse or neglect sufficient to support termination under section 211.447.4(2) [must] be based on conduct at the time of termination, not just at the time jurisdiction was initially taken. K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 16. The second expert, Dr. Emmenegger, similarly examined Father just before and just after the court took jurisdiction of S.M.H. While she and Dr. Daus did express concern that Father had impaired judgment, lack of insight, and immaturity and displayed a personality disturbance that typically presents in anti-social attitudes and feelings of self-importance, and this would affect his parenting ability, they did not find he had any insurmountable mental disease or defect. It was proper for the court to consider this testimony in ultimately deciding whether to terminate, but neither expert provided a basis for the court's holding that Father could not improve or that his mental condition rendered him permanently, nor even temporarily, unfit to parent his child. [8] In fact, for most of the year following these doctors' reports, the court and the Division agreed that S.M.H. could appropriately be placed in her father's care, and she was placed with him. At the end of that period, far from concluding that Father's parental rights should be terminated, the Division recommended termination of the court's jurisdiction and termination of its own protective custody. As is evident, even in the eyes of the Division, the reports of Drs. Emmenegger and Daus did not provide the basis for the required finding that the mental condition at issue was permanent and could not reasonably be expected to be reversed and rendered the parent unable to knowingly provide necessary care to his daughter. The only major concern raised by Dr. Emmenegger as to Father's future behavior, that might make him an inappropriate guardian for his daughter, was whether the fact Father had a sexual relationship with Mother when she was only 16 meant he presented a risk of sexual abuse of his daughter. Dr. Emmenegger did not say he would be such a risk, but rather that an expert in the sexual offender field should examine him to explore this issue. Two experts did examine Father for this purpose. Both found that he would not present any sexual risk to his daughter and he was not a pedophile, he merely had a sexual relationship with a much younger woman. Drs. Daus and Emmenegger did not identify any other basis on which Father's rights could properly be terminated. Neither did the experts who examined Father, at Dr. Daus and Emmenegger's suggestions, in the year after the court took jurisdiction of S.M.H. They found that he exhibited clinical symptoms of narcissism, but did not suggest that this manifested itself in any danger to S.M.H., but in Father's being unduly self-oriented. While this might impede Father's ability to care for S.M.H. should he try to do so totally on his own, he recognized his own limitations and testified that he would rely on others to help him provide S.M.H.'s support. As noted, the caseworker testified this was insufficient, and recommended termination in large part because she thought the character traits that caused his inability to take care of S.M.H. without assistance made him an inadequate parent. But, as previously discussed, the fact that a parent's mental condition renders him unable to raise a child alone does not provide a basis for termination. A.S.W., 137 S.W.3d at 453. The law does not require parents to be perfect or be model parents. Poor conduct or character flaws are not relevant unless they could actually result in future harm to the child. K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 11. The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The evidence shows that, although Father may not be a model parent and has in the past made some bad choices and exhibited some poor behaviors, he will be able to knowingly provide S.M.H. the necessary care, custody, and control. This is all that is required.