Opinion ID: 654644
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Bruton Violation:

Text: 95 Carl Veltmann maintains that pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), his Sixth Amendment right to Confrontation was violated when David Meehan, Chris' cellmate, was permitted to testify about statements Chris made to him that directly inculpated Carl. Chris did not testify, thereby robbing Carl of the opportunity to cross-examine him as to Meehan's allegations. The government apparently concedes that a Bruton violation occurred, but responds that the cumulative admissible evidence of guilt was so overwhelming, and Chris' comments so insignificant by comparison, that admission of Meehan's testimony was harmless error. We do not agree that the error was harmless, and reverse. 96 In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the admission of a statement made by a non-testifying defendant which inculpates a co-defendant violates the co-defendant's right to confront a witness. Only those statements by a non-testifying defendant which directly inculpate a co-defendant give rise to the constitutional violation. United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1142 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2979, 125 L.Ed.2d 676 (1993), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 3062, 125 L.Ed.2d 744 (1993), citingUnited States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 100, 116 L.Ed.2d 71 (1991). Bruton violations are subject to harmless error analysis. Beale, 921 F.2d at 1425; United States v. Petit, 841 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1237, 108 S.Ct. 2906, 101 L.Ed.2d 938 (1988). In some cases the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's admission is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the admission was harmless error. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972). 97 David Meehan's testimony directly inculpated Carl. According to Meehan, Chris stated that his father started the fire in the foyer with paper and lighter fluid, took the tops off all the batteries, and left the home after seeing the wallpaper 32 catch fire. Meehan also testified that Chris told him that Carl flew to Montana, in contradiction to all other evidence about Carl's trip. It is difficult to imagine how a defendant might be more prejudiced by the testimony of a witness about what a co-defendant allegedly said when precluded from cross-examining the declarant due to declarant's decision not to testify. This is precisely the predicament giving rise to the rule. Accordingly, we have no difficulty agreeing with Carl's contention that a Bruton violation took place. 98 We find the government's argument that the error was harmless without merit. The entire case against Carl was circumstantial. Stripped of the erroneously admitted previous fire evidence, the government's case rests on disputed evidence about the condition of the smoke detectors and alarm, estimates of burn time relative to Carl's departure from the house, testimony of an alibi witness that he was not anticipating a visit from Carl, allegations of Carl's cellmate about Carl's admissions that were at least partially without factual accuracy, 33 Carl's suggestion that an acquaintance could burn down his own property, investigators' skepticism about Carl's emotional reactions, and the happenstance of a previous fire of unknown origin at the cottage owned by the Veltmanns. The government urges that Carl's testimony was inherently incredible and constituted positive evidence in favor of the government. It points to Carl's theory, given in the civil deposition, that someone burglarized the residence and committed arson to cover up the crime. This position is admittedly contrary to the suicide defense proffered at trial. We will not attempt to plunder the depths of Carl's psyche to determine why he might have suggested burglary to the insurers. We have no difficulty deciding that the suicide defense was not only plausible, but was supported by credible evidence. 99 In this case, the properly admitted evidence of guilt is less than overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's statements is so significant in comparison, that it is clear that admission constituted harmful error. David Meehan's testimony of Chris' statements about Carl, given Chris' decision not to testify, deprived Carl of this Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, and constituted prejudicial error necessitating reversal and remand for a new trial. 100 In summary, we hold as follows on defendants' claims of evidentiary error: (1) we reverse the trial court's exclusion of Carl Engstrom's video deposition; it was admissible as state of mind evidence under Rule 803(3); (2) we affirm the trial court's admission of Chris' statement to the police sergeant and the sergeant's testimony about the 1985 fire; (3) we reverse the admission of defendants' statements to the insurance investigator; they were not made in furtherance of the crime, comprised improper character evidence, and did not come within Rule 404(b); (4) we affirm the trial court's admission of portions of Carl's civil deposition pertaining to the 1985 fire; the statements were an admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) that were not unfairly prejudicial pursuant to Rule 403 analysis; (5) we find that David Meehan's testimony constituted a Bruton violation that was not harmless error, requiring reversal.