Opinion ID: 199563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: framing the threshold legal issue

Text: 20 In this case, it is undisputed that Pfizer was a covered employer, that the appellant was an eligible employee, that Hernandez was over eighteen years of age, and that 29 U.S.C. § 2611(12)(B) governed the appellant's claim of entitlement to the requested leave. Hence, the appellant's case depends upon whether her daughter (1) had a serious health condition, (2) was incapable of self-care, and (3) was so incapacitated because of a mental or physical disability. For summary judgment purposes, the first two steps in this pavane have been satisfactorily executed, but the third is problematic. 21 We start with the existence vel non of a serious health condition. This phrase can denote an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves . . . continuing treatment by a health care provider. Id. § 2611(11). The regulations promulgated for the FMLA by the Secretary supply further insight: one way to demonstrate a serious health condition based on continuing treatment by a health care professional is to show that the underlying condition involves a period of incapacity due to pregnancy or for prenatal care. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(ii). 22 The appellant's evidence suffices to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her adult daughter was in the throes of a serious health condition. The doctor's certification, which plainly indicates that Hernandez's incapacity was tied to her pregnancy, serves this purpose. It follows that the appellant has made a showing adequate to withstand summary judgment on the first of the three required inquiries. See, e.g., Pendarvis v. Xerox Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55-56 (D.D.C. 1998) (denying summary judgment to employer in an FMLA case on the ground that any pregnancy-related period of incapacity, including morning sickness, constitutes a serious health condition). 23 We turn next to the question of whether Hernandez was able to care for herself. An individual is incapable of self-care if she requires active assistance or supervision to provide daily self-care in three or more of the 'activities of daily living' (ADLs) or 'instrumental activities of daily living' (IADLs). 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(1). The same regulation defines ADLs to encompass adaptive activities such as caring appropriately for one's grooming and hygiene, bathing, dressing and eating. Id. IADLs include cooking, cleaning, shopping, taking public transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, using telephones and directories, using a post office, etc. Id. 24 Considering the broad sweep of these definitions, the doctor's note appears sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to Hernandez's capability to care for herself. After all, her physician confined her to bed for the remainder of her pregnancy. At a bare minimum, such a prescription would appear to signal the patient's need for active assistance or supervision in the performance of everyday activities such as cooking, cleaning, shopping, and doing housework. Cf. Bryant v. Delbar Prods., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 799, 803 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) ([I]t is only logical to conclude that [plaintiff's son] could not cook, clean, shop or take public transportation . . . while he was in the hospital.). It follows that the appellant has made a showing adequate to withstand summary judgment on the second of the three required inquiries. 25 The district court appropriately analyzed the case to this juncture. It then pondered the third inquiry and ruled that the appellant had alleged no facts sufficient to support a reasoned conclusion that her daughter's impairment qualified as a disability (and, therefore, that the appellant had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding her eligibility for FMLA leave). Navarro Pomares, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 214. This is the nub of the case, and it presents a question of first impression at the appellate level. We approach this question -- the meaning of the term disability under 29 U.S.C. § 2611(12) -- mindful that the crucial moment for determining if a particular condition qualifies as a disability for FMLA purposes is the time that leave is requested or taken. See, e.g., Bryant, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 804.