Opinion ID: 2218934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Residual Exceptions

Text: However, that determination does not settle whether the statements made at the hospital were otherwise admissible. Section 27-803(22) provides that even though the declarant is available as a witness, a statement not specifically covered by the other exceptions to the hearsay rule enumerated in that statute but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is nonetheless admissible if the court determines that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (b) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (c) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. Section 27-804(2)(e) provides a like residual exception to the hearsay rule as to a statement made by a declarant who is unavailable as a witness. While we have said that the residual hearsay exception is to be used rarely and only in exceptional circumstances, State v. Plant, 236 Neb. 317, 461 N.W.2d 253 (1990), we have also ruled that where the declarant is dead, the specific exceptions of both §§ 27-803(22) and 27-804(2)(e) are applicable in determining the existence of equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. State v. Beam, 206 Neb. 248, 292 N.W.2d 302 (1980). There is no dispute that the plaintiff-appellee State gave the requisite notice, and it is manifest that Hopper's statements were offered as evidence of a material fact, i.e., by whom was she shot. Furthermore, the record establishes that the statements were more probative on that point than any other evidence the State could procure through reasonable efforts in that, other than the perpetrator, she was the only person who could identify the killer, if anyone could do so. Thus, the critical issue is whether the circumstances surrounding the making of the hearsay statements by Hopper provided the guarantees of trustworthiness comparable to the other hearsay exceptions in the Nebraska Evidence Rules. At least one jurisdiction, Georgia, has taken the position that where want of knowledge does not appear either from the statement itself or from other evidence in the case, it becomes a question for the jury to determine whether the declaration represented the primary knowledge of the declarant or merely the declarant's opinion. Wright v. State, 254 Ga. 484, 330 S.E.2d 358 (1985); Bland v. State, 210 Ga. 100, 78 S.E.2d 51 (1953); Strickland v. State, 167 Ga. 452, 145 S.E. 879 (1928). However, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), in dealing with admissibility of hearsay in a criminal case, wrote: [A] statement is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Later, in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3149, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court stated, We think the `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' required for admission under the Confrontation Clause must likewise be drawn from the totality of circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief  (emphasis supplied), and concluded: To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.... A statement made under duress, for example, may happen to be a true statement, but the circumstances under which it is made may provide no basis for supposing that the declarant is particularly likely to be telling the truthindeed, the circumstances may even be such that the declarant is particularly un likely to be telling the truth. In such a case, cross-examination at trial would be highly useful to probe the declarant's state-of-mind when he made the statements; the presence of evidence tending to corroborate the truth of the statement would be no substitute for cross-examination of the declarant at trial. In short, the use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement's particularized guarantees of trustworthiness would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility. 497 U.S. at 822-23, 110 S.Ct. at 3150. Thus, testimonial accuracy and a witness' perception, memory, and narrative ability are practical concerns regarding any hearsay used for conviction of a defendant. Aside from the several requirements which must be satisfied for admission of a statement under a residual exception, either § 27-803(22) or § 27-804(2)(e), the absolutely basic requirement is the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. According to 2 McCormick on Evidence § 324 at 362-64 (John W. Strong 4th ed. 1992): In applying the residual exceptions, the most important issue is whether the statement before the court offers equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to those offered by the various other specific hearsay exceptions. In making the admissibility determination, courts frequently employ the technique of comparing the circumstances surrounding the statement at issue to the closest hearsay exception. Courts also focus on particular factors suggesting trustworthiness of those statements.... Among these factors are: whether the declarant had a motivation to speak truthfully or otherwise, whether the statement was under oath, the duration of the time lapse between event and statement, whether the declarant had firsthand knowledge, and other factors going to the declarant's credibility. (Emphasis supplied.) See, also, Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 803.24 at 941 (3d ed. 1991) (criteria which court should consider include assurance of personal knowledge of the declarant of the underlying event). As expressed in § 27-803(22) and § 27-804(2)(e), these rules of evidence, that is, the Nebraska Evidence Rules, as contained in chapter 27 of our statutes, also include Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 27-104, 27-602, and 27-701 (Reissue 1989). Section 27-104 in part provides: (1) Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the judge, subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section. (2) When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the judge shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition. Section 27-602 provides: A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to the provisions of section 27-703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. Section 27-701 states: If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. As stated in 1 McCormick on Evidence § 10 at 37-40 (John W. Strong 4th ed. 1992): The common law system of proof is exacting in its insistence upon the most reliable sources of information. This policy is apparent in the Opinion rule, the Hearsay rule and the Documentary Originals rule. One of the earliest and most pervasive manifestations of this attitude is the rule requiring that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact. The same requirement, in general, is imposed upon declarations coming in under exceptions to the hearsay rule, that is, the declarant must so far as appears have had an opportunity to observe the fact declared. .... The burden of laying a foundation by showing that the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe is upon the party offering the testimony.... .... One who has no knowledge of a fact except what another has told him cannot, of course, satisfy the present requirement of knowledge from observation. According to Graham, supra, § 602.1 at 392-93, under the rule embodied in § 27-602: Admissible testimony is limited to matters of which the witness has acquired personal knowledge through any of [the witness'] own senses.... ... [T]o be admitted pursuant to an exception contained in Rule 803 or 804, the declarant of the extrajudicial statement must also be shown to have personal knowledge as to the matter related. 1 McCormick on Evidence § 53 at 215 states that under the rule stated by § 27-104, [t]he judge is not, however, eliminated from the picture but divides his responsibility with the jury in the following manner. The judge requires the proponent to bring forward evidence from which the jury could find the existence of the preliminary fact. The opposing party may then bring in disputing evidence. If on all the evidence the judge determines that the jury could not find the existence of the preliminary fact, he excludes the evidence. Otherwise, the question is for the jury. Thus, whether a witness had the opportunity to observe and did actually observe the subject matter of the witness' testimony is a preliminary question of admissibility determined by a trial court pursuant to § 27-104. Sections 27-602 and 27-701 require that a witness testifying to objective facts must have had means of knowing the facts from the witness' personal observation. Federal courts, applying Fed.R.Evid. 104(b), have held that a trial court has an obligation to make a rule 104 preliminary determination regarding admissibility before admitting evidence pursuant to the rule found in the federal counterpart to § 27-602. See, United States v. Davis, 792 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964, 107 S.Ct. 464, 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (the proponent of testimony has the burden to show that the testimony represents a witness' personal knowledge); U.S. v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1240 (D.C.Cir.1989) (analysis of admissibility under section mirroring § 27-602 proceeds under the rubric of Federal Rule of Evidence 104); M.B.A.F.B. Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc., 681 F.2d 930 (4th Cir.1982) (evidence is inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 602 if a trial court finds that the witness could not have actually perceived or observed the subject matter of the witness' testimony). Accord, Hallquist v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Un., 843 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Owens, 699 F.Supp. 815 (C.D.Cal.1988), aff'd, 889 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1989). State courts, applying the counterparts of the rule contained in § 27-602, have held that a rule 104 determination is necessary for a witness' testimony under the rule embodied in § 27-602. E.g., State v. Ranieri, 586 A.2d 1094, 1098 (R.I.1991) ([i]n deciding whether a witness is competent for purposes of Rule 602, the trial justice must determine whether a witness had a sufficient opportunity to perceive the subject matter about which he is testifying); Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Hood, 802 P.2d 458, 468 (Colo.1990) ([t]he personal-knowledge requirement of Rule 602 is `a specialized application of the provisions of Rule 104(b) on conditional relevancy,' quoting rule 602 advisory committee's note). Regarding opinion testimony under § 27-701 from a witness who is not an expert, we excluded a police officer's testimony regarding the speed of automobiles involved in a collision, since the officer did not observe the collision and his basis of testifying as to unsafe speed cannot be said to be based on any rational perception of the facts. Belitz v. Suhr, 208 Neb. 280, 285-86, 303 N.W.2d 284, 288 (1981). At least one federal court has held that a rule 104 determination by the trial court is necessary before admitting evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 701. See U.S. v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1216 (2d Cir.1992) ([t]he questions of whether the proffered opinion is rationally based on the witness's knowledge and whether it will be helpful are, like all preconditions to the admissibility of evidence, determinations to be made by the trial judge). A number of federal courts have held that a declarant's personal knowledge of the facts composing the subject matter of a witness' testimony is a factor in determining whether an out-of-court statement is sufficiently reliable to be admitted under the residual hearsay exception to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which closely mirrors Nebraska's residual exception. See, U.S. v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 654 (1st Cir.1990), questioned on other grounds, U.S. v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.1991) (declarant's testimony concerned matters within her personal knowledge); United States v. Marchini, 797 F.2d 759, 764 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1288, 94 L.Ed.2d 145 (1987), questioned on other grounds, U.S. v. Gomez-Lemos, supra (declarant's testimony related strictly to facts within her observation and personal knowledge); United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 962 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945, 103 S.Ct. 2124, 77 L.Ed.2d 1304 (1983), questioned on other grounds, U.S. v. Gomez-Lemos, supra (declarant's testimony conveyed information of which she had personal knowledge); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2174, 53 L.Ed.2d 224 (1977), criticized on other grounds, United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.1982) (declarant was relating facts ... of which he possessed firsthand knowledge). Other courts have reasoned and held that a hearsay statement, as is the situation in any in-court testimony, is inadmissible unless sufficient evidence shows that the declarant has personal knowledge regarding the subject matter of his or her testimony. In other words, the exceptions to the hearsay rule are subject to the conditions imposed for admissibility under other rules of evidence, such as the rule contained in § 27-602 (witness competency and personal knowledge) and § 27-701 (exclusion of opinion evidence and an inference by a nonexpert witness who lacks perception for the testimony). For example, in State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 665 P.2d 972 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 204, 78 L.Ed.2d 178, the Arizona Supreme Court held that it was error to admit hearsay statements regarding the identity of the person who had placed a bomb under the declarant's car, since there was no showing that the declarant had personal knowledge of the bomber's identity. The court found error despite its belief that the statements otherwise qualified as both excited utterances and dying declarations. According to the court: There is ... a general requirement imposed on declarations coming in under all exceptions to the hearsay rule that the declarant, like witnesses, must have had an opportunity to observe or personal knowledge of the fact declared. State v. Mincey, 130 Ariz. 389, 636 P.2d 637 (1981); State v. Dixon, 107 Ariz. 415, 489 P.2d 225 (1971); Ariz.R.Evid. 602. State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. at 255, 665 P.2d at 977. According to the Adamson court, the declarant's statements that `the mafia was responsible' and `Adamson did it' should not have been admitted because the statements were not `based on events perceived by [the declarant] through one of the physical senses.' Id. (quoting from 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 602[01] (1992)). See, also, Jones v. State, 52 Ark. 345, 12 S.W. 704 (1889) (when the declarant could not and, therefore, did not see who shot him, statement identifying the shooter was properly excluded); State v. Weir, 569 So.2d 897, 900 (Fla.App.1990), decision quashed, holding approved, 591 So.2d 593 (Fla.1991) (evidence showing the declarant did not accurately observe the facts recounted is allowed, and can be the basis for a court's exclusion of the dying declaration altogether); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 313 at 331 (John W. Strong 4th ed. 1992) ([i]f it appears that the declarant did not have adequate opportunity to observe the facts recounted, the declaration will be rejected for lack of firsthand knowledge); 5 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1445(2) at 304 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1974) ([t]he declarant must have had actual observation or opportunity for observation of the fact which he relates). Cf. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970) (in reference to the Confrontation Clause, it was inconceivable that cross-examination could have shown that the declarant was not in a position to know whether the defendant participated in the murder which was the subject of the declarant's out-of-court statement). The failure of anyone to inquire of Hopper whether she saw or otherwise perceived Jacob leaves the record in doubt as to whether the statement that Jacob did the shooting was an expression of Hopper's knowledge or merely an expression of her opinion. What we do know is that the shooting occurred at approximately 3:45 in the morning and that the premises were dark when the police arrived approximately 15 minutes later. Under these conditions, the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness requirement has not been met; it cannot be said that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility. Consequently, the statements Hopper made in the hospital on August 2 and 3 are not admissible under the residual exceptions to the hearsay rule.