Opinion ID: 1337448
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appealing an Order Granting a New Trial

Text: Dr. Sakhai argues that an order for a new trial is not the sort of order that may be appealed to this Court. In support of this contention, the appellant directs us to a change in the statute discussing appeals to this Court. The question of whether or not this Court has the authority to review an order granting a new trial implicates the basic powers of this Court. The West Virginia Constitution establishes those powers: § 1. Judicial Power The judicial power of the State shall be vested solely in a supreme court of appeals and in the circuit courts, and in such intermediate appellate courts and magistrate courts as shall be hereafter established by the legislature, and in the justices, judges and magistrates of such courts. § 3. Supreme Court of Appeals; Jurisdiction and Powers; Officers and Employees; Terms The supreme court of appeals shall have original jurisdiction of proceedings in habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. The court shall have appellate jurisdiction in civil cases at law where the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, is of greater value or amount than three hundred dollars. . . . W. Va. Const. art. VIII, §§ 1,3. [2] We believe that this Constitutional grant of authority has always permitted this Court to review orders of a lower court granting a new trial. Moreover, It is the constitutional obligation of the judiciary to protect its own proper constitutional authority by upholding the independence of the judiciary. Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Lambert v. Stephens, 200 W.Va. 802, 490 S.E.2d 891 (1997). We have also often discussed the inherent power of the Court: A court `has inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.' 14 Am. Juris. Courts, Section 171. Syl. pt. 3, Shields v. Romine, 122 W.Va. 639, 13 S.E.2d 16 (1940). We have repeatedly recognized this inherent power of the courts, and noted its application in a variety of settings: The concept of the inherent power of the judiciary is well recognized in this jurisdiction. In Syllabus Point 3 of Shields v. Romine, 122 W.Va. 639, 13 S.E.2d 16 (1940), this Court noted the general rule that, A court `has inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.' 14 Am. Juris., Courts, section 171. See also Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Haden, 157 W.Va. 298, 306, 200 S.E.2d 848, 853 (1973); Syl. pt. 2, Frazee Lumber Co. v. Haden, 156 W.Va. 844, 197 S.E.2d 634 (1973). This Court has acknowledged inherent judicial powers in a variety of contexts at both the appellate and trial court levels. Daily Gazette v. Canady, 175 W.Va. 249, 251, 332 S.E.2d 262, 264 (1985); Accord, State ex rel. Crafton v. Burnside, 207 W.Va. 74, 528 S.E.2d 768 (2000). [3] We believe that the inherent power of the judiciary also gives this Court the authority to hear the appeal of an order granting a new trial. Prior to 1998, our code specifically acknowledged that the Court had this power. That section read: When appeal or writ of error lies. A party to a controversy in any circuit court may obtain from the supreme court of appeals, or a judge thereof in vacation, an appeal from, or a writ of error or supersedeas to, a judgment, decree or order of such circuit court in the following cases: (a) In civil cases where the matter in controversy, exclusive of costs, is of greater value or amount than one hundred dollars, wherein there is a final judgment, decree or order; (b) In controversies concerning the title or boundaries of land, the probate of a will, or the appointment of a personal representative, guardian, committee or curator; (c) Concerning a mill, road, way, ferry, or landing; (d) Concerning the right of a corporation, county, or district to levy tolls or taxes; (e) In any case of quo warranto, habeas corpus, mandamus or prohibition; (f) In any case involving freedom or the constitutionality of a law; (g) In any case in chancery wherein there is a decree or order dissolving or refusing to dissolve an injunction, or requiring money to be paid, or real estate to be sold, or the possession or title of property to be changed, or adjudicating the principles of the cause; (h) In any case where there is a judgment or order quashing or abating or refusing to quash or abate an attachment; (i) In any civil case where there is an order granting a new trial or rehearing, and in such cases an appeal may be taken from the order without waiting for the new trial or rehearing to be had; (j) In any criminal case where there has been a conviction in a circuit court or a conviction in an inferior court which has been affirmed in a circuit court. Appeals shall not lie under subdivisions (g), (h) and (i) where pecuniary interests only are involved, unless the amount in controversy, exclusive of costs, exceeds one hundred dollars. W. Va.Code § 58-5-1 (1925) (emphasis added). In 1998, the Legislature made major changes to this statute, eliminating the laundry list of items subject to appeal. The statute now reads: A party to a civil action may appeal to the supreme court of appeals from a final judgment of any circuit court or from an order of any circuit court constituting a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims or parties upon an express determination by the circuit court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment as to such claims or parties. The defendant in a criminal action may appeal to the supreme court of appeals from a final judgment of any circuit court in which there has been a conviction or which affirms a conviction obtained in an inferior court. W. Va.Code § 58-5-1 (1998). Appellant's argument is that the new statute does not permit the appeal of an order granting a new trial. Focusing on the term final judgment in the statute, appellant points us to language in one of our earlier cases, to wit: [W]hen a trial judge vacates a jury verdict and grants a new trial, he or she does not enter a final judgment. Gonzalez v. Conley, 199 W.Va. 288, 292, 484 S.E.2d 171, 175 (1997) (footnote omitted) ( per curiam ). While this language, read with the changed statute, could be construed to mean what appellant suggests, we must disagree. [4] We acknowledge that many of our prior cases discuss when a judgment is final or whether a particular action of a circuit court may be considered a final judgment. See, e.g., James M.B. v. Carolyn M., 193 W.Va. 289, 456 S.E.2d 16 (1995) (A case is final only when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.); Coleman v. Sopher, 201 W.Va. 588, 499 S.E.2d 592 (1997) (order granting a new trial is interlocutory and destroys the finality of the judgment.); Gonzalez v. Conley, supra . [5] However, we hasten to point out that most all of these cases were authored when the old version of the statute was in effect and when this Court's power to hear an appeal of an order granting a new trial was not only unchallenged, but was specifically acknowledged by statute. Moreover, because there was no question whatsoever that this Court could hear such an appeal, the Court never had occasion to examine an order granting a new trial to determine if such an order was a so-called final judgment for the purposes of appealing the same. It simply went without saying that a party aggrieved by the granting of a new trial could appeal directly to this Court without waiting for the new trial to be had. In order to accept appellant's argument that the new statutory language strips this Court of its traditional review of orders awarding new trials, we would have to believe that the Legislature specifically intended to accomplish this. We have noted that: The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). Accord, West Virginia Health Care Cost Review Auth. v. Boone Memorial Hosp., 196 W.Va. 326, 472 S.E.2d 411 (1996). When faced with a question, we may look to the Acts of the Legislature for guidance: In construing an ambiguity in a statute, this Court will examine the title to the Act of the Legislature as a means of ascertaining the legislative intent, and the overall purpose of the legislation. Syl. pt. 2, City of Huntington v. State Water Comm., 135 W.Va. 568, 64 S.E.2d 225 (1951). When we examine the Acts for direction on the new version of the statute, we see that the Legislature stated that the legislation in question was an act, repealing provisions of law relating to appellate relief in the supreme court of appeals which are outdated, archaic, or not in conformity with rules of appellate procedure promulgated by the supreme court of appeals . . . . 1998 W. Va. Acts 110 (emphasis added). We see no evidence here that the Legislature intended a major departure from longstanding practice nor an intent to place a potentially unconstitutional limitation on the Court's powers. Surely appellant would not argue that, because of the new language, this Court may no longer hear cases of quo warranto, habeas corpus, mandamus, or prohibition. To agree with appellant's argument would be to believe that the Legislature sought to strip this Court of not only the right to hear an appeal of a new trial order, but also of our original jurisdiction in its entirety. We simply cannot leap to that conclusion. [6] Finally, we also look to the logic of allowing the appeal of such orders. It is clear that repeated attempts to interrupt a trial or lengthen a court battle by frequent interlocutory appeals is not permissible. If our appellate process is too indulgent, parties who might benefit from delay could drag out litigation indefinitely. By the same token, we do not wish to mistakenly promote delay in the name of judicial economy. Trials are enormously expensive undertakings and, depending on the docket of a given circuit court, there can be lengthy delays before the parties can get a trial date. While appealing a decision to this Court is not a brief process (this appeal taking about fourteen months), an appeal is often, if not usually, less expensive and less time consuming than conducting a new trial. There is also a hard to quantify emotional toll taken on the participants in undergoing a new trial, both plaintiff and defendant. One must add to these calculations the fact that in many instances, as in this case, the appellate court will overturn the grant of a new trial, and thus make the entire second trial an expensive exercise in futility. When we examine the logic of allowing the appeal in question, in light of the Court's constitutional authority, its inherent powers, and, to the extent we can discern it, the intent of the Legislature, we do not believe that W. Va.Code § 58-5-1 (1998) forecloses us from hearing the appeal of an order granting a new trial. Accordingly, we hold that one may appeal to this Court a circuit court's order granting a new trial and one may appeal such an order without waiting for the new trial to be had. To the extent that our previous cases such as James M.B. v. Carolyn M., 193 W.Va. 289, 456 S.E.2d 16 (1995), Coleman v. Sopher, 201 W.Va. 588, 499 S.E.2d 592 (1997), and their progeny suggest otherwise, they are hereby distinguished. B.