Opinion ID: 1130366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Review of Arbitration Award

Text: In granting his award, the arbitrator made the following findings: 1. The grievance is arbitrable. 2. The District violated Article 19, Section B (1) (a-f) with regard to [District's decision not to reelect Gritts]. 3. As a remedy, the District is directed to comply with the procedural requirements of Article 19, Section (B) (1) (a-f), except that the District is not required to reinstate [Gritts] prior to providing the notice required therein. The District is further directed, within 30 days after written notice of the matters described in subsections (c) and (d), to reconsider the decision declining renewal of [Gritts's] teaching contract and to grant a request by [Gritts] and/or the Association to address the Board of Education with respect to the renewal or non-renewal of [Gritts's] contract. (1a) Our first inquiry is whether the arbitrator's award enforcing specific procedural provisions of the collective bargaining agreement is a proper subject of judicial review. Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 sets forth limited grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award and the only one that may apply here is contained in subdivision (d). Pursuant to that subdivision, a court shall vacate the award if the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers in making the award and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (d).) As the Court of Appeal observed, we have made it clear that in light of the strong public policy in favor of private arbitration, judicial review of an arbitrator's award is quite limited. In Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pages 8 through 13, we articulated the general rule that the merits of an arbitration award, either on questions of fact or of law, are not subject to judicial review. Moncharsh limited judicial review to the statutory grounds set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 or 1286.6 (correction of award). ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 13.) We further explained, We recognize that there may be some limited and exceptional circumstances justifying judicial review of an arbitrator's decision when a party claims illegality affects only a portion of the underlying contract. Such cases would include those in which granting finality to an arbitrator's decision would be inconsistent with the protection of a party's statutory rights.  ( Id. at p. 32, italics added.) We further delineated the standard for measuring the scope of the arbitrators' authority in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 581, 885 P.2d 994] ( Advanced Micro Devices ). There we held that the deference due an arbitrator's decision on the merits of the controversy requires a court to refrain from substituting its judgment for the arbitrator's in determining the contractual scope of those powers. ( Id. at p. 372.) We noted, however, that the deference accorded an arbitrator's decision under the arbitration agreement is not unrestricted, and indeed, is limited by the agreement to arbitrate. ( Id. at p. 375.) We also recognized that courts retain the authority to overturn arbitration awards as beyond the arbitrator's powers, whether for an unauthorized remedy or [a] decision on an unsubmitted issue. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal acknowledged the limitations placed on judicial review of an arbitration award, but held that because Association's collective bargaining agreement did not conflict with section 44929.21(b), the arbitrator did not exceed his power in providing an award. By negative implication, however, this analysis suggests the arbitrator would have acted in excess of his powers had he concluded the collective bargaining agreement provisions at issue were inconsistent with the Education Code. (2) The Court of Appeal failed to recognize that the question of the reviewability of the arbitrator's award must be independent of its conclusion whether the award should be upheld. (1b) Thus, the question remains whether we have the authority, in light of our decisions in Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1, and Advanced Micro Devices, supra, 9 Cal.4th 362, to review the arbitrator's award. Association argues that deference to an arbitrator's decision must be even stronger in the labor-management field and that courts are more constrained in their power to vacate an arbitration award in the labor context than in other types of arbitration. (See Social Services Union v. Alameda County Training & Employment Bd. (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1458, 1464 [255 Cal. Rptr. 746]; see also That Way Production Co. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc. (1979) 96 Cal. App.3d 960, 966 [158 Cal. Rptr. 475].) The restriction on the power to vacate an arbitration award in the labor context, Association claims, is based on the policy of promoting peaceful employer-employee relations. (See Delta Lines Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1977) 66 Cal. App.3d 960, 965-966 [136 Cal. Rptr. 345].) Association concludes that because deference must be accorded an arbitrator's award in the context of labor negotiations, Moncharsh and Advanced Micro Devices provide no ground for vacating the present arbitration award. As we observed in both Moncharsh and Advanced Micro Devices, however, there may be exceptional circumstances justifying judicial review of an arbitrator's decision, including cases in which granting finality to an award would be inconsistent with a party's statutory rights. ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 32; Advanced Micro Devices, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 375; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (d).) In this case, District asserts both that: (1) it had the statutory right under the Education Code not to retain a probationary teacher without cause or a right to a hearing, and that (2) the entire reelection issue cannot, pursuant to the Government Code, be made the subject of collective bargaining. Therefore, District argues, the subject of the reelection of probationary teachers was improperly included in the collective bargaining agreement at the outset, and thus was never properly subject to the arbitration provisions of the agreement. In short, District asserts the arbitrator exceeded his powers, as that phrase is used in Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (d), by granting relief pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement that violated District's specific statutory rights as set forth in the Education and Government Codes. Although we adhere to our holding in Moncharsh that arbitrator finality is the rule rather than the exception, we agree that  if District is correct concerning the scope of its statutory rights under the Education and Government Codes  this case presents the exceptional circumstance that allows for judicial review of the arbitrator's decision. Should District's interpretation of the law prevail, we would be faced with an explicit legislative expression of public policy that issues involving the reelection of probationary teachers not be subject to arbitration. (See discussion, post, at pp. 284-285.) This expression of public policy would thus conflict with the expressed legislative intent to limit private arbitration awards to statutory grounds for judicial review. Thus, rigidly insisting on arbitral finality here would be inconsistent with the protection of a party's [i.e., District's] statutory rights. ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 32; see Advanced Micro Devices, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 378.)