Opinion ID: 2995616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Employment Issue

Text: Dr. Hojnacki maintains that she was either an employee or a loaned employee of the DOC. In determining whether a person is an employee, we apply a common- law test that involves general principles of agency. Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) (applying common-law test to determine whether a person is an employee as defined by the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act). The test requires us to consider five factors: (1) the extent of the employer’s control and supervision over the worker, (2) the kind of occupation and nature of skill required, (3) which party has responsibility for the costs of operation, such as the provision of equipment and supplies and the maintenance of the workplace, (4) the source of payment and benefits and (5) the duration of the job. See Alexander, 101 F.3d at 492 (quoting Ost v. W. Suburban Travelers Limousine, Inc., 88 F.3d 435, 438 (7th Cir. 1996)). Of these factors, the extent of control and supervision over the worker is the most significant in determining the employment status. See id. at 493. In this case, consideration of the last four factors does not indicate conclusively whether Dr. Hojnacki was an employee of the DOC. The second and fourth factors tend to show that she was not an employee of the state; the fifth factor tends to show that she was an employee; the third factor is inconclusive. The DOC’s lack of control over the performance of Dr. Hojnacki’s duties suggests, however, that Dr. Hojnacki was not a DOC employee. Beginning with the second factor, Dr. Hojnacki did not derive her medical skills from her employment with the DOC. With regard to the costs of operation, the DOC supplied and maintained the space, equipment, furniture, fixtures and other items required for the efficient operation of the health care unit . . . . R.23, Ex.17, para. 4.12(a). Addus, however, supplied clothing for in-patient prisoners and [a]ll medical supplies, which the contract with the DOC defined as medical equipment with a unit cost of $100 or less. Id., para. 4.12(b), (e). The third factor, then, does not weigh heavily in favor of either possibility. A consideration of the fourth factor indicates that Dr. Hojnacki was not an employee of the DOC, because it was Addus, and not the DOC, that paid Dr. Hojnacki’s wages and provided her with employment benefits. In fact, the contract between Addus and the DOC stated explicitly that Addus employees were not entitled to participation in any retirement or pension plan, group insurance program, or other programs designed to benefit employees of the State of Illinois, Department of Corrections. R.23, Ex.17, para. 4.1. The duration of Dr. Hojnacki’s job, however, lends some support to a determination that she was a DOC employee. Dr. Hojnacki worked at the Dwight Correctional Facility for three years even while the DOC twice changed correctional healthcare providers. Dr. Hojnacki signed her initial employment contract in 1996 with Coastal Correctional Healthcare, Inc. In 1997, Coastal was replaced by Correctional Healthcare Solutions, and Dr. Hojnacki signed an employment contract with that provider. In 1998, the DOC contracted with Addus, with which Dr. Hojnacki signed an employment contract as well. Dr. Hojnacki’s presence at Dwight as medical director of the HCU for three years while the DOC cycled through three different healthcare providers suggests that she was an employee of the DOC. Consideration of the most important factor, however, confirms that she was not an employee. The DOC did not control the performance of Dr. Hojnacki’s duties. The contract between Addus and the DOC provided that Addus, not the DOC, shall supervise all persons employed by it during the performance of their work within said institution, and they shall be employees of the Contractor and not employees of the Department of Corrections. R.21, Ex.B, at para. 2.0(E). Under the heading Professional Ethics, the manual setting out the policies and procedures of the health care unit at Dwight provided that [a]ll medical, psychiatric and dental matters involving clinical judgment are the sole province of the physician or dentist responsible for the care of inmates at Dwight Correctional Center . . . . R.29, Ex.D, at 7. Dr. Hojnacki suggests that the manual’s statement of professional ethics is mere surplusage because it simply reiterates the ethical standard that all doctors adopt with the Hippocratic Oath, and no doctor would allow a lay person to overrule her clinical judgment. Even so, the statement reflects a policy of deference in all matters involving clinical judgment. As medical director, Dr. Hojnacki was to plan, implement, direct and control all clinical aspects of the health care program. R.23, Ex.17, para. 4.8(o). The contract between Addus and the DOC also specified that [i]n addition to administrative responsibilities, the on- site Medical Director shall also provide primary health care services on a routine basis. Id. Implementing all clinical aspects of the health care program and providing primary health care services would undoubtedly involve clinical judgment and would therefore be the sole province of Dr. Hojnacki. Dr. Hojnacki submits, however, that the DOC controlled her work through the various policies and procedures with which the DOC required her to comply. For example, the DOC required Dr. Hojnacki to complete some training, though Dr. Hojnacki does not specify what kind; the DOC required Dr. Hojnacki, as medical director, to serve on a Quality Improvement Committee, which was to sit monthly, perform audits and report to a governing body headed by the warden, all in an effort to assure that high quality patient care is delivered in a cost efficient, safe and appropriate manner, R.29, Ex.D, at 18; the DOC required Dr. Hojnacki to perform a monthly review of mortality cases; the DOC specified what information should be included in admission and discharge forms; and the DOC specified how often to perform physical examinations of prisoners, what kind of questions to ask the inmates and to observe an inmate’s behavior, appearance and mental status. For an employer-employee relationship to exist, however, the employer must have the right to control and direct the work of an individual, not only as to the result to be achieved, but also as to the details by which that result is achieved . . . . Alexander, 101 F.3d at 493. The procedural requirements that Dr. Hojnacki has put forward as examples of the DOC’s control over her merely specify her duties as medical director; they do not control the manner in which she is to perform those duties. We considered similar procedural requirements over a purported employee in EEOC v. North Knox School Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1998). We determined that bus drivers were not school district employees even though the district set the precise route and schedule of each driver, limited the number of times and for what reasons a driver could be absent, and required drivers to enforce its disciplinary policies but did not allow them to administer punishment or set their own rules for appropriate behavior. See id. We observed that one can ’control’ the conduct of another contracting party by setting out in detail his obligations; this is nothing more than the freedom of contract. This sort of one-time ’control’ is significantly different than the discretionary control an employer daily exercises over its employees’ conduct. Id. Here, too, the DOC’s contract with Addus requires Addus’ employees to abide by the DOC’s rules and regulations. The DOC’s manual, which Dr. Hojnacki characterizes as the most important evi dence in her case, Appellant’s Br. at 23, merely details Dr. Hojnacki’s obligations. As in North Knox, the requirements are significantly different than the discretionary control an employer daily exercises over its employees’ conduct. Id. Dr. Hojnacki also submits that the DOC controlled her by setting her working hours and requiring her to be on call. We rejected a similar argument in Ost v. West Suburban Travelers Limousine, Inc., 88 F.3d 435, 438 (7th Cir. 1996), in which we held that limousine drivers were not the employees of their dispatchers even though the dispatcher determined the drivers’ starting times, because the details concerning performance of the work remained essentially within the control of the driver. Id. at 438-39. For the same reason, we also rejected the argument that a hospital’s requirement that a doctor remain on call rendered the doctor an employee of the hospital. See Alexander, 101 F.3d at 493. Dr. Hojnacki’s arguments meet with no more success here because such constraints did not amount to control of the details of her performance. After considering the relevant factors, especially the lack of control that the DOC exercised over the performance of Dr. Hojnacki’s duties, we conclude that Dr. Hojnacki was not an employee of the DOC. Nor did Addus loan Dr. Hojnacki to the DOC as an employee. The loaned servant doctrine is a principle of agency law in which the first principal ’loans’ his agent to a second principal, giving the second principal a heightened degree of control over the agent, along with the corresponding responsibility for the agent’s acts and omissions. Williams v. Shell Oil Co., 18 F.3d 396, 400 (7th Cir. 1994). The control requirement applies to loaned employees as well. See Williams v. Grimes Aerospace Co., 988 F. Supp. 925, 936 (D.S.C. 1997) (Under the common law, ’[a] dual employment relationship may exist if more than one individual or company has the right to control or direct an employee in the performance of the work.’) (quoting 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship sec. 5 (1996)). Therefore, because the DOC did not control Dr. Hojnacki in the performance of her duties, she was not the DOC’s loaned employee.