Opinion ID: 1589244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of the Videotaped Statement

Text: Blake first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his recorded statement. The relevant facts are undisputed. Blake acknowledges that he made two statements to law enforcement after his arrest, the second of which was video tape recorded, and that Fun the videorecording Mr. Blake provided essentially the same factual recitation of the incident. The State agrees that Blake's statement was recorded secretly after he refused to give a taped statement. Blake argues that by asking him to agree to a taped statement, the detective implicitly promised that his refusal would be honored, rendering the recording involuntary. Therefore, the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress his videotaped statement. In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we accord a presumption of correctness to the determination of historical facts, but independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment and, by extension, article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 521 (Fla.2003) (quoting Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 608 (Fla.2001)). Many courts have held it permissible to record a confession without the defendant's knowledge or consent. See, e.g., Lester v. Wilson, 363 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir.1966) ([P]olice secrecy and deception in obtaining a tape recording of incriminating statements, unassociated with a right to counsel problem or other circumstance which would render such statements inadmissible, do not present a constitutional violation.); Bell v. State, 802 So.2d 485, 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (rejecting a claim that a videotaped statement must be suppressed because the defendant was not aware that his statement was being videotaped); Davis v. State, 271 Ga. 527, 520 S.E.2d 218, 219 (1999) (finding that the failure to inform defendant that his statement was being videotaped did not render the statement involuntary); State v. Wilson, 755 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Mo.Ct.App.1988) (Secret recordation of in-custody questioning of an accused, standing alone, is not unconstitutional.). Therefore, Blake acknowledges that the detectives could have simply recorded the statement without his consent. Nevertheless, he argues that because the detective asked him for permission and he refused, the videotaped confession was a result of an implied promise that it would not be taped. This is a question of first impression in this Court. In fact, our research has revealed only two cases addressing this issue: Woods v. McDonough, No. 8:03-CV2336-T-27MAP, 2007 WL 1017666. (M.D.Fla. Mar.30, 2007), a recent case from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida; and Wilson, 755 S.W.2d at 709, a Missouri appellate court case. Although it involved an audio rather than a video recording, the circumstances in Woods are nearly identical to those here. In that case, the defendant gave oral post-Miranda statements regarding his involvement in the crime. Woods, 2007 WL 1017666, at . A detective asked if he would give a taped statement, but the defendant said he preferred that it not be taped. Id. at . Another detective nevertheless recorded the defendant's statement secretly with a small hand-held recorder. Id. The recorded portion of the interview was a summary of what the defendant already had told detectives. Id. Rejecting essentially the same argument made here, the federal district court found that the Florida trial court properly denied the defendant's postconviction claim: At best, Petitioner alleges that he thought the detective's acceptance of his negative response when asked to give a recorded statement was an implied promise not to record the remainder of the interview. Standing alone, this is not sufficient to rise to the level of inducement or coercion warranting suppression of the taped interview. . . . Having knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights, and having agreed to the interview, Petitioner was not in a position to dictate the manner in which the detectives memorialized his statements. Id. at . Similarly, in Wilson, the defendant argued that his confession was involuntary because an officer told him the interrogation was not being recorded when in fact it was. 755 S.W.2d at 709. A Missouri appellate court rejected the claim, stating, We do not find this brand of trickery so offensive as to render defendant's confession involuntary. Id. at 709. For the reasons explained below, we likewise reject this claim. In Florida, lilt is well established that a confession cannot be obtained through direct or implied promises. In order for a confession to be voluntary, the totality of the circumstances must indicate that such confession is the result of free and rational choice. Johnson v. State, 696 So.2d 326, 329 (Fla.1997). [P]olice misrepresentations alone do not necessarily render a confession involuntary. Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 511 (Fla. 2005). [T]o establish that a statement is involuntary, there must be a finding of coercive police conduct. Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So.2d 857, 867 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 587, 166 L.Ed.2d 437 (2006); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.). [T]he salient consideration in an analysis of the voluntariness of a confession is whether a defendant's free will has been overcome. Black v. State, 630 So.2d 609, 614-15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). For example, confessions induced by promises not to prosecute or promises of leniency may render a confession involuntary. See, e.g., Samuel v. State, 898 So.2d 233, 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (finding a promise not to prosecute other fictional crimes rendered confession involuntary); Walker v. State, 771 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (Where there is an express quid pro quo, i.e., a promise of protection from prosecution for cooperation, the promise of leniency alone is sufficient to render a confession or inculpatory statement involuntary); see also Brewer v. State, 386 So.2d 232, 235 (Fla.1980) (finding a confession involuntary where the officers raised the spectre of the electric chair, suggested that they had the power to effect leniency, and suggested to the appellant that he would not be given a fair trial.). Similarly, a confession made in return for a promise of release is involuntary. See Brockelbank v. State, 407 So.2d 368, 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). However, not all police statements that arguably could be considered promises render a confession involuntary. For example, [t]he fact that a police officer agrees to make one's cooperation known to prosecuting authorities and to the court does not render a confession involuntary. Maqueira v. State, 588 So.2d 221, 223 (Fla. 1991). Similarly, a confession is not rendered inadmissible because the police tell the accused that it would be easier on him if he told the truth. Bush v. State, 461 So.2d 936, 939 (Fla.1984). Further, a promise alone is not sufficient to render a confession involuntary. There must also be a causal connection between the police conduct and the confession. See, e.g., Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164, 107 S.Ct. 515 (Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.). Before finding the confession inadmissible, Florida courts have repeatedly required that the alleged promise induce, be in return for, or be a quid pro quo for the confession. See, e.g., Bruno v. State, 574 So.2d 76, 79-80 (Fla.1991) (Statements suggesting leniency are only objectionable if they establish an express quid pro quo bargain for the confession.); Evans v. State, 911 So.2d 796, 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (finding admissible a confession following a statement that the agent was not there to arrest the defendant because the statement was not made with an intent to deceive or to induce a confession and was not the cause of the defendant's eventual confession where there was no quid pro quo for the alleged promise); Green v. State, 878 So.2d 382, 385 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (The comments here never rose to the level of an express quid pro quo bargain in return for appellant's confession.). Even if, as Blake argues, the request to tape was an implied promise not to tape without his permission, the totality of the circumstances do not suggest that the request constituted coercive police activity or that Blake's free will had been overcome. Before giving his initial statementwhich he concedes is essentially the same factual recitation of the incident reflected on the videoBlake was read his Miranda rights. [4] Asking for consent to tape a subsequent recitation of the same facts is not coercive or outrageous police conduct. While it would have been better to obtain a, written waiver of his Miranda rights, see Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992) (recognizing that where reasonably practical, prudence suggests a Miranda waiver should be in writing), Blake acknowledges on the video that he had been read his Miranda rights. Further, a review of the videotape reveals nothing in the demeanor of either Blake or of the detectives that suggests coercive conduct. Blake acknowledged that he had been treated well and that he told the truth because it was the right thing to do. Finally, we find no causal connection between the request to tape and the confession. Again, Blake already had confessed. Although he declined to have his statement recorded, he agreed to repeat the statement to the detectives knowing that the detectives would be able to testify about it. In fact, Blake testified at trial, I kn[e]w if I did get charged with anything it was my word against theirs. Therefore, the request to tape did not overcome Blake's will and induce his confession. For these reasons, we reject Blake's claim.