Opinion ID: 2627584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Standing as a passenger

Text: [¶ 37] Ms. Yoeuth and Mr. Loo were charged in separate actions, and each filed a motion to suppress. Both consented to a joint hearing on their motions. As counsel for Ms. Yoeuth began her closing argument at the hearing, the district court asked if she believed that Ms. Yoeuth has standing to allege a violation of her rights? Counsel said yes, asserting that Ms. Yoeuth, a passenger in the rental car, had a sufficient expectation of privacy in the vehicle to support her standing. Moments later came this exchange: [COUNSEL]: However, where Mr. Loo's own stop and seizure would be illegal, Ms. Yoeuth should be allowed to basically carry on the backtails of that because it would not be in the interests of justice for Mr. Loo's evidence to be suppressed and Ms. Yoeuth would almost literally be left holding the bag, even though she was not the driver of the vehicle. There was no allegation that she was in violation of a Wyoming or federal law at the time of the stop. THE COURT: But hasn't the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled to the contrary? [COUNSEL]: That a passenger does have standing? THE COURT: Does not have standing. [COUNSEL]: Oh, does not have standing? . . . But she does have standing to argue her own detention. She was never told she was free to leave, and the testimony from the trooper is that they were about 17 miles east of Rawlins and about three miles shy of Walcott Junction. She was in an area where, as a passenger, she could not have gotten up and left. She was there. She was also told by the trooper to sit tight because the paperwork would be done shortly. Again, she was not told that she was free to leave . . . And she was also not told that it was only going to be a warning that was going to be issued. And it is for those reasons that Ms. Yoeuth is incorporated into Mr. Loo's argument that if his stop is deemed illegal and the search is deemed illegal, then hers  the evidence against her should be suppressed as well. And that's Ms. Yoeuth's argument for the suppression of the stop and search. [¶ 38] On appeal, Ms. Yoeuth contends that this exchange amounted to an oral ruling by the district court that she did not have standing to challenge the validity of Trooper Green's actions because she was only a passenger in the car. [5] If there was such a ruling, it was in error. A passenger who is rightfully present in a vehicle has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore has standing to challenge governmental invasions of that expected privacy: Dennis Parkhurst as owner of the vehicle which was searched had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his property, as would all property owners. And we find that Derrick Parkhurst as a guest in his brother's automobile could reasonably expect that the car in which he was a guest would be free from state encroachment. Thus, both appellants have standing to protest the search of the car's trunk under § 4, Art. I of the Wyoming Constitution. Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1374 (Wyo. 1981). The same is true under the federal constitution. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 259, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2408, 168 L.Ed.2d 132, 141 (2007). [¶ 39] However, our review of the transcript suggests that the district court was not making an oral ruling that she lacked standing, but was instead seeking clarification of whether Ms. Yoeuth asserted standing based upon alleged violations of her own rights, or of the rights of Mr. Loo. A person seeking to suppress evidence must claim a violation of her own rights, and cannot stand on the rights of others. Garvin v. State, 2007 WY 190, ¶ 12, 172 P.3d 725, 728 (Wyo. 2007); Parkhurst, 628 P.2d at 1374. This interpretation of the district court's questions and comments is consistent with defense counsel's response, an assertion that Ms. Yoeuth does have standing to argue her own detention. We agree, but we do not think the district court denied Ms. Yoeuth's standing simply because she was a passenger in the vehicle.