Opinion ID: 2570523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Proposed jury instruction on child abuse causing substantial bodily harm, a felony

Text: During the settling of the jury instructions, Collman requested an instruction on child abuse causing substantial bodily harm, a felony, but the district court refused to give the instruction. Collman contends that the court erred. In Moore v. State, 105 Nev. 378, 383, 776 P.2d 1235, 1239 (1989), this court held that the trial court must give a defendant's proffered jury instruction on a lesser related offense if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the lesser offense is closely related to the offense charged; (2) defendant's theory of defense is consistent with a conviction for the related offense; and (3) evidence of the lesser offense exists. [5] Here, child abuse causing substantial bodily harm is closely related to first-degree murder from child abuse and is supported by evidence presented by the State. We conclude, however, that the second condition is not satisfied. In Moore v. State, 109 Nev. 445, 446-47, 851 P.2d 1062, 1063 (1993), the jury was instructed on a lesser related offense at the state's request and convicted the defendant of the lesser related offense. This court reversed the conviction because the lesser related offense was inconsistent with the defendant's theory of defense, a complete denial of culpability. This court concluded that the defendant must admit to some conduct which constitutes the lesser crime before the jury may be instructed on the lesser related offense. Id. at 447, 851 P.2d at 1063; see Johnson v. State, 111 Nev. 1210, 1213-14, 902 P.2d 48, 50 (1995). Collman contends that admitting to some conduct which constitutes the lesser crime violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Accordingly, he argues that he should not have to admit to any action which caused Damian substantial bodily harm to get the lesser related offense instruction. This argument clearly lacks merit. Collman was not compelled to admit to criminal conduct. He was merely required to demonstrate that his theory of defense was consistent with his proposed instruction. He had no right to an instruction which was inconsistent with his complete denial of culpability. Again, all of Collman's defense theories consisted of denying any wrongful action on his part. He asserted that Damian fell down the stairs, choked on bubble gum, or died from Stach's abuse. None of these defenses are consistent with Collman's claim of inflicting substantial bodily harm upon Damian on January 19, 1996. The district court therefore did not err by refusing to give the requested instruction.