Opinion ID: 1356075
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The circuit court's jury instruction regarding attempted prohibited possession of a firearm

Text: The circuit court's jury instruction regarding the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm did not conform with our analysis supra in section III.A.1. Rather, the instruction purported to advise the jury, pursuant to HRS § 705-500(2), see supra note 2, that knowingly was a sufficient state of mind to establish criminal attempt liability in the present matter. In relevant part, the jury was instructed that: A person commits the offense of Attempted Prohibited Possession of a Firearm if having been previously convicted of committing a felony he attempts to intentionally or knowingly own, possess or control any firearm by intentionally engaging in conduct which under the circumstances as he believed them to be constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of the crime of Prohibited Possession of a Firearm. (Emphasis added.) The circuit court further instructed the jury that an element of the offense was that Valentine did attempt to intentionally or knowingly own, possess or control a firearm, (emphasis added). The only possible source of the circuit court's instruction that knowingly would satisfy the state of mind required to establish an attempt to commit the offense charged pursuant to HRS § 134-7(b) was HRS § 705-500(2), which provides in relevant part that,  [w]hen causing a particular result is an element of the offense, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime if . . . the person intentionally engages in conduct which is a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause such a result (emphases added), see supra note 1. Inasmuch as the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm does not include a result-of-conduct element and HRS § 705-500(2) does not, therefore, apply, see supra section III.A.1, we hold that the instruction erroneously defined the state of mind necessary to prove the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm as something less than intentional, as required by HRS § 705-500(1)(b). Because we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that Valentine was not convicted of the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm predicated upon a knowing state of mind, the error cannot be harmless. Thus, inasmuch as there is a reasonable possibility that the erroneous instruction may have contributed to Valentine's conviction  and, a fortiori, have affected his substantial rights  we vacate the circuit court's judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial on the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm, pursuant to HRS §§ 705-500(1)(b), 705-500(3), and 134-7(b).