Opinion ID: 411995
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Meaning of Day v. Mathews

Text: 18 It is only after discrimination has been proven or conceded pursuant to McDonnell Douglas/Burdine that Day v. Mathews may come into play. To apply Day before liability has been established would be contrary to the well-established principle that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. 19 Day v. Mathews has nothing to do with whether a defendant is guilty of discrimination, but instead focuses on the question of remedy. Day derives from Title VII principles applied in disparate impact cases in which the plaintiff class establishes liability based on some employment policy that has had the effect of discriminating against the entire class. Once the class establishes liability in such cases, a discrete remedy phase begins. Any individual class claimant may raise a presumption that he is entitled to relief upon a prima facie showing of class membership. The burden of proof then shifts to the employer to rebut that presumption in each individual case. 13 Day applies the same burden-shifting principle in the Title VII disparate treatment context. 20 Day's application of this principle simply recognizes that a plaintiff whose right to protection from discrimination has been violated still may be denied a full remedy. See Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981) (citing Day for the proposition that this court has recognized that the questions of statutory violation and appropriate statutory remedy are conceptually distinct). For example, if two employees are denied the same job promotion for concededly discriminatory reasons, the employer may nonetheless establish that one of the claimants is not entitled to a promotion under Day v. Mathews by offering clear and convincing evidence that there was only one job opening and that the other applicant was more qualified. Since only one of the two victims of discrimination would have been promoted but for the discrimination, the other would not be entitled to an award of the job notwithstanding the unlawful reason for the denial. Cf. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 773 n. 32, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1268 n. 32, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (evidence that no vacancies were available at the time class member applied for job relevant to whether employer has satisfied burden of proving that claimant was not in fact a victim of previous hiring discrimination). 14 21