Opinion ID: 844271
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Comments to Prospective Jurors During Jury Selection

Text: During jury selection, the prosecutor asked the court to explain the nature of the penalty phase to the prospective jurors. She was concerned that the juror questionnaires contained questions regarding the death penalty. She explained, A lot of times they answer the questions without a real basis or understanding of the system. And, then, we like to lock them in and we're unforgiving. The court asked the parties to try to agree informally on what it should tell the prospective jury members. Later, the court explained the basic nature of the trial to the first panel of prospective jurors. It said that if, and only if, the jury found defendant guilty of murder with special circumstances, the trial would go to a penalty phase. It told the jury it would tell you a little bit about the death penalty history of it just so you understand. Because some of you probably read a lot about it, talked about it, some of you haven't at all, and some of you may be a little of this here and there. It then discussed the recent history of the death penalty in California. It said that a prior law had been invalidated, and that some people no longer had the death penalty. It then explained that the 1978 law was tested, and it took a number of years for testing, to go up and down the appellate ladder, California Supreme Court, U.S. Supreme Court, and so forth, and [was] found constitutional. [¶] So a number of people have been convicted under that new law, and there are a number of people on death row in California right now, as well as other states in the United States. The court explained that if the case went to a penalty phase, there are just two options for the jury to choose, death penalty or life without possibility of parole. You are instructed now that those two sentences and what I just said are meaningful and that's what they mean. That's what the person would get. [¶] The reason I said that is that some people have different ideas of what happens and when it happens. It's true that sometimes people have their appeals going for a long period of time; but you also know that it's also true that after those appeals, certain things have happened in California and around the United States on this issue insofar as executions being carried out. The court also explained that in a capital case the difference between that and another case which isn't a capital case is that the jury decides death penalty or life without possibility of parole if the defendant is convicted. [¶] ... [¶] You would consider everything that you are entitled to consider, and you would be told what you can consider at the end of the case. And then you would make your decision based upon the additional information that was submitted to you. The court made comparable comments to the second and final panel of prospective jurors. Defendant contends that these comments violated the rule that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. ( Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 328-329 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 105 S.Ct. 2633].) Although he did not object to the comments at trial, the contention is cognizable because the trial predated the finality of our decision in People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 762 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302]. (See People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 17-18 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591].) The contention, however, lacks merit. (1) Defendant claims the court's statement that the prior death penalty had been invalidated and a number of people no longer had the death penalty reduced the jury's sense of responsibility. We disagree. The court also stated unequivocally that the current death penalty law had been held valid. Defendant also challenges the court's reference to the appellate process. Although mention of the appellate process is usually unnecessary and inadvisable, it is generally known that there is an appeal from a judgment of death. Certainly the mere mention of the appellate process, while ill-advised, does notstanding alonenecessarily constitute reversible Caldwell error. ( People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 18.) In deciding whether Caldwell error occurred, we do not consider the challenged statements in isolation but in the context in which they occurred. ( People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 905 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981].) Moreover,  Caldwell is relevant only to certain types of comment those that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision. ( Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 183, fn. 15 [91 L.Ed.2d 144, 106 S.Ct. 2464]; see People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 356 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545].) Viewing the comments in context, they did not mislead the jury or diminish its sense of responsibility. They were made during jury selection to explain the basic process to prospective jurors, not during the penalty phase itself when the jury's sentencing responsibility was the main focus. ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 182 [279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949].) At the penalty phase, the court instructed the jury that it should assume in your deliberations and decision that life without possibility of parole means the defendant will be in prison for the rest of his life, and the death sentence means the defendant would be executed, and that [i]t will be your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole, should be imposed on the defendant. These instructions made clear it was the jury's responsibility to determine the appropriate sentence. We see no reasonable likelihood the court's mention of appellate review during jury selection reduced the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict. ( People v. Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 906; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 186-187 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].)