Opinion ID: 2585384
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: terms of the injunction

Text: ¶ 69 DPSI claims that the two injunctions issued were defective because they were not specific in their terms. In particular, DPSI contends that the district court erred by enjoining DPSI from operating its facility in such a manner that odors emanating from said facility become or constitute a nuisance as defined in the Wellsville City Ordinances Sections 8.28.010, 8.28.020, 8.28.210, and as set forth in the Notice initially served upon [DPSI] and which formally initiated the proceedings in this matter dated September 25, 1996. DPSI claims that the district court is precluded from including references to the Wellsville City Ordinances and the original notice. In addition, DPSI postulates that this injunction must clarify the definition of nuisance so that DPSI knows what it is specifically enjoined from doing. Further, DPSI argues that the injunction enjoining it from operating without a business license is in error unless the court lists the legitimate requirements of a business license. ¶ 70 Wellsville counters that when read with the memorandum decision, the injunctions substantially comply with the rules regulating the form of injunctions. Alternatively, Wellsville argues that the matter can be remanded only so that the language complained of can be struck and replaced with the actual language of the referenced documents. ¶ 71 First, we have already discussed Wellsville's authority to regulate businesses through business licenses and ordinances. Since DPSI raises no other specific issues with the way Wellsville has written its business licensing ordinances, we hold that the injunction enjoining DPSI from operating without a business license is sufficient. ¶ 72 Next, the Rules of Civil Procedure provide that [e]very ... order granting an injunction ... shall be specific in terms and shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained. Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(d). Therefore, the references to the Wellsville City Ordinances and the original notice are in error. We remand to have those references replaced by the actual language of the documents. ¶ 73 Finally, with regard to DPSI's remaining complaint that the district court must define what constitutes a nuisance, a defendant who wants to operate a plant which has been declared to be a nuisance should offer evidence to the court as to how the plant could be used without creating a nuisance before he complains that the court did not tell him how he could use his plant. Draper v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 567, 570-71, 244 P.2d 360, 362 (1952). The Draper court held that it would place an undue burden on a judge to expect the judge to determine how an offending defendant could correct a nuisance. See 121 Utah at 571, 244 P.2d at 362. That court found the injunction sufficient that enjoined a defendant from operating its gravel pit so as to create a nuisance from objectionable noise, dust, and flashing lights. See 121 Utah at 569-70, 244 P.2d at 361. Likewise, we hold that the injunction regarding nuisance in this case, once the specific language of the ordinances violated is incorporated, is sufficiently definite to apprize DPSI of what it may or may not do with regard to producing odors.