Opinion ID: 753332
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gallo's Due Process Claim

Text: 26 Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process, a prosecutor may not suppress evidence favorable to an accused upon request ... where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1962). A prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory evidence rises to the level of a constitutional violation, however, only if there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of the evidence would have altered the result of the proceeding. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). If there is only a mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, there is no due process violation. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). 27 In the present case, the district court determined that the prosecution's failure to disclose a portion of a recorded interview with Wright was not a constitutional error. The court found the withheld evidence to have been largely cumulative: Wright admitted on the tape that her memory was poor, and that fact was readily apparent from other evidence presented at trial. 28 On appeal, Gallo contends that the district court misperceived the value of the evidence. He points out that Wright also admitted on tape that a letter to her brother written in February 1983 contained things that I remembered. A lot more than I do now in it . He argues that the tape recording indicates that Wright's memory was at its best in February 1983, which is when her first police report was filed. He also cites a sworn declaration by Gallo's trial counsel, Brauer, in which Brauer stated that he likely would have introduced the other evidence of Wright's prior inconsistent statements had he been aware of the tape. Gallo argues that the suppression of the tape-recording consequently deprived him of his only defense to the sexual offense charges. 29 Gallo's arguments, however, do not suffice to demonstrate a reasonable probability that disclosure of the tape would have changed the outcome of the trial. First, while Wright admits on the tape that her letter to her brother contained things that I remembered. A lot more than I do now in it, the letter to which she refers discusses only her first beating. It makes no reference to the sexual offenses. It also contains details regarding what specifically Gallo said to Wright and how exactly he abused her--details that very normally would tend to fade over time. The letter consequently does little to prove that Wright's memory of the sexual offenses had diminished over time to a greater extent than would be expected. 30 Second, the possibility that disclosure of the tape might have encouraged Brauer to present the evidence of Wright's prior inconsistent statements does little to bolster Gallo's argument. As discussed above, that impeachment strategy itself had little chance of success. 31 Accordingly, we reject Gallo's due process argument.