Opinion ID: 151423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Independent Authority of the GC

Text: The parties dispute at some length whether § 3(d) mandates a complete separation of the Board and the General Counsel. The Board points to the instruction in § 3(d) that the General Counsel shall exercise general supervision over all attorneys employed by the Board, and argues the Act mandates a clear division of authority over NLRB personnel into two separate and independent spheres, one headed by the General Counsel and one by the Board. The Authority counters with a different clause in § 3(d) that grants the General Counsel final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the [investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practice complaints]; it argues the latter clause shows the mandated separation is limited to ... investigative and prosecutorial functions. The Authority also points out that under § 4(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 154(a), the Board is authorized to appoint attorneys, a grant of authority it argues is inconsistent with the Board's complete separation theory. Each agency claims support for its position in the same bit of legislative history, a passage in the Conference Report explaining: [The General Counsel] is to have the final authority to act in the name of, but independently of any direction, control, or review by, the Board in respect of [the investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practice complaints]. H.R.Rep. No. 80-510, 541 (1947). Finally, the parties dispute whether the Board's interpretation of the Act is entitled to deference. We need not resolve whether § 3(d) mandates complete separation, as the Board claims and the Authority denies. The Board's argument on this front requires us to decide only whether § 3(d), in providing the General Counsel shall exercise general supervision over all GC-side attorneys, makes the General Counsel independent of the Board with respect to the conditions of employment that are subject to collective bargaining under § 7102(2) of the Statute. We hold it does. Whatever the precise meaning of general supervision, the term clearly contemplates authority over some conditions of employmentsuch as employee grievance procedures and whether an attorney may work at homethat are also mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7102(2), 7116(a)(5). The Authority conceded as much at oral argument. That is sufficient to establish that the General Counsel's statutorily-mandated supervisory independence is implicated by the Authority's unit determination. We turn, then, to whether that unit determination, by combining Board-side and GC-side employees in the same unit, impermissibly interferes with the General Counsel's independence.