Opinion ID: 73339
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the State Court Order

Text: Brand asserts that the state court order forming the basis of his CSRA conviction is invalid for two reasons. First, he argues that the order is unconstitutionally vague because it did not specify the amount owing as his support obligation for purposes of his compliance with the CSRA. Second, Brand contends that the state court order was void because its language-i.e., Husband shall pay [$2,500] per month provided that the [$3.935 million] ha[s] in fact been paid (emphasis added)-indicates that Brand's payment of the lump sum was a condition precedent to his obligation to pay the monthly child support. Brand's argument in this respect boils down to the assertion that his deliberate noncompliance with the lump sum obligation relieved him of all responsibility for child support payments, thereby giving the government no basis for prosecuting him under the CSRA. Brand's collateral attack of the state court order is not cognizable.8 The language of the CSRA merely requires the existence of a past due support obligation. The Act's terms do not require that such an obligation be valid. The Supreme Court used similar reasoning in Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994), which held that a defendant in federal sentencing proceedings has no right to challenge the validity of previous state convictions that are used as the basis for a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The Court observed that the statute focuses on the fact of the conviction and nothing suggests that the prior final conviction may be subject to collateral attack for potential constitutional errors[.] Custis, 511 U.S. at 490-91, 114 S.Ct. 1732. Within the context of a Tenth Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of the CSRA, this court recognized that the [Act] does not require federal courts to issue, modify, or otherwise 8 Even if it were, however, his arguments are entirely devoid of merit. First, the 1992 order is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Brand. In the general sense, [v]oid for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). Brand's vagueness challenge fails for the same reasons his argument on the willfulness element fails: the plain language of the order was sufficient to put Brand on notice that he was minimally obligated to pay $2,500 per month, and his conduct following entry of the order indicates that he was aware of this duty. Second, Brand's argument that the order is void for failure of a condition precedent simply defies reason. The only interpretation of the order that makes sense is that Brand's child support payments would only be $2,500 per month if he paid the $3.935 million lump sum, i.e., Brand's failure to pay the lump sum could result in an increase to the monthly child support figure. In fact, the state circuit judge later confirmed this to be her intent during the 1996 hearing to clarify the financial distribution portion of the underlying order. consider divorce, alimony and child custody or support decrees. Williams, 121 F.3d at 620. See also United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454, 463 (7th Cir.1997) (the CSRA does not permit a federal court to revise the domestic relationship adjudicated by the State courts or to modify any part of a State court decree (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1327, 140 L.Ed.2d 489 (1998); United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 (1st Cir.1997) ([T]he CSRA comes into play only after a state court issues a child support order, and it does not authorize a federal court to revise the underlying decree.); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir.1996) (same as Black ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 784, 136 L.Ed.2d 727 (1997). As our predecessor circuit reasoned in United States v. Bailey: A CSRA prosecution turns only on the defendant's violation of a state court order. It does not turn on the fairness of the order, the reasons underlying the state court's issuance of the order, the defendant's relationship with his children or former spouse, or any other matter involving relitigation of a family law issue. Moreover, there is no language in the CSRA allowing the federal court to look beyond the four corners of the state child support order or permitting the defendant to collaterally attack the state court order in federal court. 115 F.3d 1222, 1232 (5th Cir.1997) (rejecting appellant's contention that CSRA offends principles of federalism and comity), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 866, 139 L.Ed.2d 764 (1998).9 Further supporting our conclusion that Brand is now barred from collaterally attacking the state court order is Brand's failure to contest the order in state court. Brand did not seek modification or clarification of the order, nor did he appeal from it. For this reason, and because the state court order was the culmination of a judicial proceeding, our refusal to entertain Brand's collateral attack in this case does not implicate due process concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839-40, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987) (relying on due 9 But see United States v. Lewis, 936 F.Supp. 1093, 1101-03 (D.R.I.1996) (concluding that the CSRA does allow relitigation of the merits of the underlying state court order and reasoning that the statute was ambiguous on this point). process principles to permit defendants charged with reentering country after deportation to challenge validity of underlying deportation orders because the administrative deportation proceedings had effectively eliminate[d] the right of the alien[s] to obtain judicial review); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 482-83 (4th Cir.1997) (finding that CSRA defendant could not use Mendoza-Lopez to challenge underlying support order where he failed to directly appeal or collaterally attack the order in state court), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 258, 139 L.Ed.2d 185 (1997).