Opinion ID: 542860
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claim for Summary Eviction

Text: 38 Steinegger contends that under Connecticut law it is entitled to have summary process to evict a tenant if the tenant has failed to pay the appropriate rent, and that since the district court ruled that Prime breached the lease through its miscalculation of the percentage rents due, this ruling in and of itself proved defendants' entitlement to a judgment of possession, and the court should have upheld its claim for summary eviction of Prime. We see no basis for reversal. 39 Connecticut's summary eviction statute provides, in pertinent part, that a lessor of real property who wishes to regain possession of the premises on account of nonpayment of rent may give the lessee eight days' notice to quit the property. Conn.Gen.Stat. Sec. 47a-15a; see id. Sec. 47a-23(a). If, after the expiration of the eight days, the lessee has not quit possession, the lessor may file a summary process complaint to obtain immediate possession, id. Sec. 47a-23a, and [i]f, on the trial of a summary process complaint it is found that the defendant is the lessee of the complainant and holds over after the termination of the lease or rental agreement ... and that notice to quit has been given as provided in this chapter, yet that the defendant holds possession or occupancy after the expiration of the time specified in such notice to quit, ... the court shall forthwith enter judgment that the complainant recover possession, id. Sec. 47a-26d. In the summary process suit, then, the lessor must prove the underlying allegations in order to obtain a judgment of eviction. Housing Authority of East Hartford v. Hird, 13 Conn.App. 150, 155, 535 A.2d 377, 380-81, app. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433 (1988). 40 In the present case, the district court apparently found that Steinegger did not adequately prove that it was entitled to summary process under the statute. Though Steinegger claimed entitlement to such process because of Prime's non-payment of rent, the court viewed Prime's conduct not as nonpayment but rather as an underpayment based on [t]he parties disagree[ment] over an accounting mechanism used to police a lease provision. We see no clear error in the district court's finding that there had not been nonpayment within the meaning of the statute.