Opinion ID: 755376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Post-Arrest Statement

Text: 24 Burrous attributes error to the district court's admission of his post-arrest statements to police, arguing that the statements were taken in violation of the parental notification requirements of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, and that, in any event, his signed waiver was not knowing and voluntary. 25
26 Burrous first argues that the parental notification requirement of section 5033 4 is mandatory, and that the failure of federal law enforcement personnel to notify his parents or guardian of his arrest requires suppression of his post-arrest statements. The government contends that, even if successful notification is not accomplished, statements taken incident to the arrest should not be suppressed if the arresting agents first made reasonable efforts at parental notification. The government notes that the agents made numerous efforts to obtain contact information, but to no avail, and that Burrous' lack of cooperation hindered their notification effort. 27 In support, the government cites the Ninth Circuit's dictum in United States v. Doe, 862 F.2d 776, 779-80 (9th Cir.1988). That case involved the inculpatory statements of a detained alien juvenile whose parents apparently resided in Mexico. The government had made no effort to contact either the detainee's parents or the Mexican consulate. The government's failure either to make an effort to notify or to show why notification would not have been feasible was held to constitute a violation of the statute requiring suppression of the juvenile's statements. In so holding, however, the Doe court took the view that section 5033 would be satisfied by reasonable efforts at notification. Id. at 779. 28 The structure of section 5033 reinforces the government's argument. The statute requires not only immediate parental notification, but also that the detained juvenile be taken before a magistrate forthwith. 18 U.S.C. § 5033. Read literally, these requirements could conflict. The delay incurred in accomplishing parental notification, which might be considerable, might prevent realization of the forthwith arraignment. Notwithstanding its categorical terms, we do not read the statute as requiring the government to chose between violating one of the two potentially incompatible requirements, or as requiring the government to forego questioning of the detained suspect if it is unable after reasonable efforts to notify the parents. See United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 707, 710-12 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986, 99 S.Ct. 581, 58 L.Ed.2d 659 (1978)(where literal reading of juvenile statute would have led to anomalous result, court chose construction which best serve[d] the intended purpose of the statute.). 29 In view of this tension, we decline to decide whether, and if so, when, a failure to notify may give rise to a suppression remedy under section 5033. We hold only that Burrous' statements, taken after a repeated and fruitless good faith inquiry designed to locate the detained juvenile's parents, were admissible in evidence. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress his statements.
30 As an alternative to his section 5033 argument, Burrous contends that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. This court will affirm a district court's conclusion that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights if any reasonable view of the evidence supports it. United States v. Spencer, 995 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 923, 114 S.Ct. 323, 126 L.Ed.2d 269 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the case of interrogation of a juvenile, we examine the totality of the circumstances culminating in the waiver. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). This approach requires an 31 inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. 32 Id (citation omitted). 33 Based upon a review of the record, this court holds that the district court did not err in finding that Burrous knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights. Burrous was sixteen years of age at the time of the arrest and had been arrested approximately one month earlier on similar charges. Though not well-educated, Burrous is fluent in spoken English. Agent Shiner read Burrous his rights in their entirety at least twice. Burrous indicated he understood them, and witnessing officers testified that he appeared to comprehend what was being read to him. Burrous thereafter signed a written waiver of his rights, less than an hour after police arrived at his apartment just prior to his arrest. Though he waived his rights against self-incrimination, Burrous consistently maintained his innocence. Given the complete absence of evidence of coercion or compulsion, we hold that Burrous' waiver was both knowing and voluntary, rendering his subsequent statements admissible in his criminal trial. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 726-27, 99 S.Ct. 2560 (upholding validity of waiver by 16-year-old suspect who had experience with police, was of sufficient intelligence to understand rights and consequences of waiver, and had not been worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit.). We accordingly find no error in the district court's admission of Burrous' statement to police. 34