Opinion ID: 718193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Charge of Aiding and Abetting

Text: 14 It is Pipola's argument that the jury instruction with respect to aiding and abetting the use or carrying of a firearm was inconsistent with the rule laid down in United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40 (2d Cir.1994). Because Pipola did not object at trial to the charge he now challenges on appeal, his only hope for relief is in Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the plain error rule. But our authority to reverse for errors not urged to the trial court is narrow indeed. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-77, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). First, of course, there must be an error; absent a valid waiver by defendant, a trial judge's deviation from a legal rule is considered an error. Id. at 732-33, 113 S.Ct. at 1776-77. Second, the error must be plain, that is, one obviously wrong in light of existing law. Id. at 734, 113 S.Ct. at 1777-78. Third, the error must have affected the defendant's substantial rights, which ordinarily means that it must have prejudiced him. Id. The challenged instruction was as follows: 15 In Counts Three and Five the defendant is also charged with aiding and abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing or procuring the offense of carrying a firearm a [sic ] crime of violence. 16 .... I have already instructed you, in connection with the crimes charged in Counts Two and Four, on the requirements for finding a defendant guilty as an aider and abettor. 17 .... I instruct you that to find a defendant guilty as an aider and abettor of Counts Three and Five, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge that a firearm would be used or carried during and in relation to the crimes charged in Counts Two and Four. 18 Before giving this charge, the trial judge had instructed the jury regarding the counts of aiding and abetting the robberies (counts two and four), explaining, in substance, that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that someone other than the defendant committed the robberies and that the defendant aided and abetted the commission of such underlying crime. 19 The trial court went on to state that the defendant must have knowingly and willfully facilitated or encouraged the commission of the crime by some act or omission, and that the mere presence of the defendant at the scene of a crime or acquiescence ... in the criminal conduct of others, even coupled with the knowledge that the crime is being committed, is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting. It also set forth the substantive requirements for liability under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence.