Opinion ID: 2466731
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of Appellant's Post-Arrest Silence

Text: For her third point for reversal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to declare a mistrial when Investigator Luter testified about Appellant's initial decision not to give a statement, after she had been informed of her Miranda rights. She relies on the Supreme Court's holding in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), and asserts that the State deliberately brought her post-arrest silence to the jury's attention. The State contends that the testimony elicited by the prosecutor is not violative of the holding in Doyle , as Appellant's post-arrest silence was not used to impeach her testimony at trial. The record reflects the following direct examination of Investigator Luter by the prosecutor: BY MR. RAMEY: Q. [D]id you have occasion to sit in on a statement by Ms. Bell? A. Yes, I did. Q. Before this statement was given was Ms. Bell advised of her, what we call Miranda Rights? A. Yes, she was. Q. Could you describe to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what the Miranda Rights are? A. Ms. Bell was advised that she had the right to remain silent, she had the right to consult an attorney and have an attorney present if sheif she could not afford one, one would be appointed for her at no cost. And basically, her rights were explained to her. Q. Did she voluntarily talk with you or did she decide to exercise her Miranda Rights? A. The first time she didn't want to make a statement. BY MR. KIRK: Your Honor, may we approach? At that point, the following colloquy occurred at the bench, out of the hearing of the jury: BY MR. KIRK: I object to the bringing out of her post duress [ sic ] silence in front of the jury. We talked about this the other day and the State specifically agreed to tell their officers not to bring that up. BY MR. RAMEY: ... agreed to any instruction by the Court to disallow any statement. BY MR. HOLT: Or disregard the last BY MR. RAMEY: Or, disregard the last comment. And I'll pass by all that, Your Honor. BY MR. KIRK: Well, I'd move for a mistrial based on that statement. BY THE COURT: Which statement are you referring to? BY MR. KIRK: That the first time she refused to give a statement to him the first time she was asked. BY THE COURT: Okay. Your motion for mistrial is denied. I will instruct the jury to disregard the witness's last statement. Will that meet your objection? BY MR. KIRK: All right. Thank you, Your Honor. Following the conversation at the bench, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the witness's last statement. There was no further mention of Appellant's post-arrest silence during the remainder of the trial. Appellant now contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her motion for mistrial. We disagree. A mistrial is a drastic remedy that should be granted only where the error is so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial or where the fundamental fairness of the trial itself has been manifestly affected. Williams, 329 Ark. 8, 20, 946 S.W.2d 678, 684 (citing Peeler v. State, 326 Ark. 423, 932 S.W.2d 312 (1996)). The trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a motion for mistrial, and a mistrial will not be declared when the prejudice can be removed by an admonition to the jury. Id. In Numan v. State, 291 Ark. 22, 722 S.W.2d 276 (1987), this court discussed the Supreme Court's holding in Doyle that questioning a defendant about his or her silence during and after receiving Miranda warnings violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held: [W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. [Footnote omitted.] Id. at 24, 722 S.W.2d at 277 (quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240) (emphasis added). Where, however, a comment on the defendant's post-arrest silence is not an attempt to impeach the defendant, it is not the type of comment prohibited by the Court in Doyle, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91. Ferrell v. State, 325 Ark. 455, 929 S.W.2d 697 (1996). In Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987), the Court held that there was no Doyle violation where a question was asked by the prosecutor that touched upon the defendant's post-arrest silence, but was followed by an immediate objection sustained by the trial court and an admonishment to the jury that it should disregard any questions to which objections were sustained. In further distinguishing Doyle , the Court stated that the prosecutor was not allowed to impeach the defendant with the silence, nor was the prosecutor otherwise permitted to call attention to the defendant's silence. Here, the only reference to Appellant's post-arrest silence was made by a witness in response to one question by the prosecutor. The silence was not used to impeach Appellant's testimony, and there was no further reference made by the prosecutor, either during examination of the witnesses or during closing argument, concerning Appellant's initial decision to invoke her Miranda rights. Moreover, once the objection was made, the trial court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the witness's answer. As such, we conclude that there was no Doyle violation. Moreover, Appellant's counsel indicated below that the trial court's decision to admonish the jury to disregard the statement satisfied the objection to the testimony. The record reflects that when the trial judge informed defense counsel that he would instruct the jury to disregard the officer's last statement, he specifically asked counsel if that instruction would meet counsel's objection. Defense counsel then stated, All right. Thank you, Your Honor. This court has repeatedly stated that it adheres to the familiar principle that a defendant may not agree with a ruling by the trial court and then attack that ruling on appeal. McGhee v. State, 330 Ark. 38, 954 S.W.2d 206 (1997); Goston v. State, 326 Ark. 106, 930 S.W.2d 332 (1996); Meadows v. State, 324 Ark. 505, 922 S.W.2d 341 (1996).