Opinion ID: 2801081
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Compel Disclosure

Text: On appeal, Moore argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to compel the government to disclose the identity of the confidential informants (CIs) whom investigators utilized during their investigations into the underlying drug conspiracies. Moore contends that the court improperly disregarded his argument that an “independent defense investigation” had uncovered that one of the CIs had a significant criminal history, which suggested that this CI or other CIs may have falsely implicated Moore in the crack-cocaine conspiracy. Moore also contends that, although protection for the CI must be considered in any request to disclose a confidential source’s identity, that factor should have been weighed against the right to confrontation. We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant. United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490 (11th Cir. 1991). In determining whether the government must disclose an informant’s identity, a court must conduct a balancing test, focusing particularly on three factors: (1) “the extent of the informant’s participation in the criminal activity”; (2) “the directness of the relationship between the defendant’s asserted defense and the probable testimony of the informant”; and (3) “the government’s interest in nondisclosure.” United 3 Case: 14-12980 Date Filed: 05/15/2015 Page: 4 of 14 States v. Tenorio-Angel, 756 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th Cir. 1985). The defendant has the burden of showing that a CI’s testimony “would significantly aid in establishing an asserted defense.” Gutierrez, 931 F.2d at 1491 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Moore fails to demonstrate how disclosure of the CIs’ identities would “significantly aid in establishing [his] asserted defense.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, in his motion to compel disclosure, Moore only made the conclusory statement that the disclosure would be relevant to his defense. See id. (“Mere conjecture about the possible relevance of [the CI’s] testimony is insufficient to compel disclosure.”). As for his argument that the CI’s criminal history suggests that a CI falsely implicated him in the underlying crack-cocaine conspiracy, this claim also does not rise above “[m]ere conjecture” that the CIs have been untruthful. See id. Further, there is no blanket requirement for the defendant to confront every CI utilized in an underlying investigation; this is not one of the three factors that courts balance in deciding whether to override the government’s privilege to keep sources confidential. See Tenorio-Angel, 756 F.2d at 1509. Also, Moore’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment refers to confronting witnesses against him, and thus would apply to CIs only if the government presented them as witnesses or otherwise presented their testimony. 4 Case: 14-12980 Date Filed: 05/15/2015 Page: 5 of 14 See U.S. Const. amend VI; McAllister v. Brown, 555 F.2d 1277, 1278 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (rejecting the argument that the state’s failure to disclose an informant’s identity violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him). 1 Here, the CI statements were used by the government for the limited purpose of demonstrating why investigators believed they had established probable cause in order to apply for a Title III wiretap. 2 Thus, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Moore’s motion to disclose the identity of confidential informants.