Opinion ID: 1113445
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Acting in Excess of Jurisdiction

Text: As discussed above, the narrow view that habeas corpus addressed only strict jurisdictional issues has changed over the years. (13) California decisions make clear that the concept of fundamental jurisdictional error, for the purpose of a writ of habeas corpus, is no longer strictly limited to cases in which the trial court wholly lacks jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the subject matter of the proceeding; the concept encompasses any error of sufficient magnitude that the trial court may be said to have acted in excess of jurisdiction.  ( In re Sands (1977) 18 Cal.3d 851, 856-857 [135 Cal. Rptr. 777, 558 P.2d 863], italics added.) [12] As we explained in In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal.2d 666 [36 Cal. Rptr. 286, 388 P.2d 182]: Habeas corpus is available in cases where the court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction. [Citations.] For purposes of [the writ of habeas corpus], the term `jurisdiction' is not limited to its fundamental meaning, and in such proceedings judicial acts may be restrained or annulled if determined to be in excess of the court's powers as defined by constitutional provision, statute, or rules developed by courts. ( Id. at pp. 667-668.) This view is consistent with the statutory scheme governing habeas corpus, which provides that a prisoner may be discharged from custody When the jurisdiction of [the committing] court ... has been exceeded.  (§ 1487, subd. 1, italics added.) This aspect of habeas corpus jurisprudence has been invoked in the past by this court to review claims that a criminal defendant was sentenced to serve an illegal sentence. Thus, for example, where a defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term when the law provided for a determinate term, habeas corpus was available. ( In re Lee (1918) 177 Cal. 690 [171 P. 958].) The writ was likewise available to review a claim that the sentencing court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by imposing a sentence on the petitioner that was longer than that permitted by law. ( Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 16-17 [9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839]; see also In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 750 [48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948] [denial of parole consideration based on wrong statute].) More recently, we confronted a habeas corpus petitioner who claimed that, being a mentally disordered sex offender formerly confined in a treatment center, he was entitled to conduct or participation credits against a subsequent prison term for time spent in the center. The trial court denied the credits and the Court of Appeal affirmed that judgment. Although we ultimately rejected the substantive claim, we concluded the petitioner was entitled to renew the issue in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because his claim, if true, resulted in a sentence `in excess of the time allowed by law.' ( In re Huffman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 552, 555 [229 Cal. Rptr. 789, 724 P.2d 475].) We again invoked this rule in a case in which a habeas corpus petitioner claimed two enhancement provisions were improperly applied to lengthen his overall sentence. ( In re Harris (1989) 49 Cal.3d 131 [260 Cal. Rptr. 288, 775 P.2d 1057].) Although the petitioner in Harris had raised the issue unsuccessfully on direct appeal, we ruled he was entitled to renew the claim on habeas corpus because a misinterpretation of the penal statute would result in a longer sentence than was permitted by law, and imposition of the sentence was therefore in excess of the trial court's jurisdiction. ( Id. at p. 134, fn. 2.) (14) Thus, where a habeas corpus petitioner raises a legitimate claim that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, the Waltreus rule will not operate as a bar to a full airing of the grievance in a collateral proceeding. ( In re Harris, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 134, fn. 2; In re Huffman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 555.) Fundamental jurisdictional defects [i.e., acts in excess of jurisdiction], like constitutional defects, do not become irremediable when a judgment of conviction becomes final, even after affirmance on appeal.  ( In re Winchester, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 531, italics added.) [13] (15) Petitioner has not expressly contended that his case falls within the excess of jurisdiction exception to the Waltreus rule. Nevertheless, as explained above, because the superior court that tried and sentenced him may have acted in excess of its jurisdiction in doing so, we conclude he may raise the issue in a postappeal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In this case, petitioner contends he was only 15 years old at the time of his crimes. If so, he could not be sentenced to serve a term in state prison for his misdeeds, and was instead subject to only the various dispositional options available to the juvenile court, such as placement in the California Youth Authority. The state took the position that petitioner turned 16 years old on the day of the homicide-related crimes. This argument, accepted by the juvenile court, the sentencing court, and the Court of Appeal, resulted in a lengthy state prison term for petitioner. If he is correct that he was only 15 years old on the day of the crimes, it is manifest that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by sentencing petitioner to prison, for that dispositional choice was not available under any circumstances for those offenders less than 16 years old. Although we thus conclude that petitioner's claim falls within the excess of jurisdiction exception to the Waltreus rule, we emphasize the narrowness of this exception. In entertaining such claims in collateral challenges to final judgments, past cases have suggested it was significant that there [was] no material dispute as to the facts ( In re Zerbe, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 668), or that the judgment may be corrected without the redetermination of any facts. ( Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 17.) Viewed in the light of the state's strong interest in finality, this consideration makes sense. A rule providing for the postappeal review of legal issues that requires an appellate court to reopen factual issues already sifted, evaluated, and decided at trial both poses a significant threat to the legal repose of such judgments, and threatens to consume scarce judicial resources needlessly. In such cases, the state's interest in the finality of its judgments is strong. By contrast, where such review does not require a redetermination of the facts, and thus poses a strictly legal issue, the state's interest is reduced. In such circumstances, an individual's interest in obtaining judicial review of an allegedly illegal sentence cannot be ignored. In sum, we reiterate that a claim a court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, where such issue was raised and rejected on direct appeal (or could have been raised on appeal), may be entertained despite the Waltreus rule, provided a redetermination of the facts underlying the claim is unnecessary. In this case, there is no dispute over the facts. The People do not question the accuracy of the evidence showing petitioner was born on October 21, 1968. Likewise, petitioner does not dispute that he committed the crimes in question on the day before his 16th birthday, October 20, 1984. Presented with a pure question of law which may demonstrate the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, we conclude petitioner is not barred by the Waltreus rule from presenting the claim on his postappeal petition for a writ of habeas corpus.