Opinion ID: 2584523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Position of Authority

Text: [¶ 16] Faubion contends that the language contained in the definition of position of authority cannot be stretched to reach the conduct at issue in these cases. We iterate that language here: that position occupied by a parent, guardian, relative, household member, teacher, employer, custodian or any other person who, by reason of his position, is able to exercise significant influence over a person. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(iv). [¶ 17] In a case which involved sexual conduct between a student and her coach/teacher we addressed a vagueness claim directed at this same statute. We find that discussion to be instructive here as well: Section 6-2-303(a)(vi), W.S.1977 makes it criminal for any person in a position of authority over a victim to use that position to cause the victim to submit. Position of authority is further defined as:    [T]hat position occupied by a parent, guardian, relative, household member, teacher, employer, custodian and [or] any other person who by reason of his position is able to exercise significant influence over a person. Section 6-2-301(a)(vi). The State did not rely separately on appellant's position as a teacher, although that relationship was obviously a factor in appellant's status. Rather, the State prosecuted and appellant was convicted under the last phrase of the definition: any other person who by reason of his position is able to exercise significant influence over a person. It is this phrase which appellant challenges for vagueness. Appellant argues that under this statute it is a crime for anyone to convince another to have sex with him by using emotional involvement, and extends this construct to apply to numerous hypothetical situations, including the marriage relationship. We do not find appellant's characterization of the law persuasive, since common sense will be applied by this court to the statutory language. Dover v. State, supra [664 P.2d 536, 540 (Wyo.1983)]. First, this court follows the principle announced by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975), that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand. Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031, 1034 (1979); Sears v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 946, 951 (1981). This case involves a very young woman, then in high school, who was in large part controlled by the attention and demands of appellant as her teacher, coach and confidant. It is not necessary, nor does the law permit us to examine the constitutionality of the statute by inventing situations in which the law's application might seem absurd or invalid. Sanchez v. State, supra, 567 P.2d 270; In re Romer, Wyo., 436 P.2d 956 (1968). Second, the words employed by the legislature in announcing the law must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. McArtor v. State, Wyo., 699 P.2d 288, 292 (1985); Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 (1985). It is helpful to look to Burton's Legal Thesaurus, which defines authority as: [J]urisdiction, legal power, legitimacy, prerogative, right to adjudicate, right to command, right to determine, right to settle issues, rightful power. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (1979) defines authority as: Permission. Right to exercise powers; to implement and enforce laws; to exact obedience; to command; to judge. Control over; jurisdiction. Often synonymous with power. From these sources it is apparent that the legislature used the word authority to mean an externally granted power, not a self-generated control. One in a position of authority is a person who acquires that status by virtue of society and its system of laws granting to him the right of control over another. For example, society grants to a jailer power over his prisoner, and, therefore, the jailer is in a position of authority over the prisoner. Likewise, the teacher or coach is vested with power by a grant from society. The legislature enacted the statute to prohibit persons in such positions of authority from using those positions to cause any individual who might be subject to authoritative power to submit to sexual acts. In this case, appellant was the victim's teacher and coach. As reposed in our educational system, society vested him with an authoritative status over her. Even though, in the criminal prosecution, the State did not rely on his employment as a teacher, his authority devolved from that ascribed status. Appellant, however, seems to argue that his position as a teacher is somehow separable from his holding a position of authority. We think it is not. The State's structural positing of this case, in not relying on the fact that appellant was a teacher to show that he was in a position of authority over MBS, does not somehow negate the fact that appellant indeed occupied that position. Absent the fact that appellant was the victim's teacher, none of the events for which appellant was charged and convicted would have occurred. In light of these facts, we decline appellant's invitation to strike the statute as void for vagueness. A plethora of trial evidence comprehensively demonstrated that appellant was in a position of authority over MBS. A person of ordinary sensibilities in appellant's position clearly should have known that his conduct was forbidden. Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1042-43 (Wyo.1987). [¶ 18] We think that line of reasoning applies to the issue Faubion raises here. Chiropractic practice is governed by statute. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-10-101 through XX-XX-XXX (LexisNexis 2009). Chiropractic is declared not to be the practice of medicine.... Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-10-117; also see § 33-10-109. Although chiropractic is not the practice of medicine under Wyoming law, we note that the legal encyclopedia American Jurisprudence 2d discusses chiropractors under the category Physician, Surgeons, and Other Healers. 61 Am.Jur.2d Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers, §§ 5 and 37 (2002). There is a fiduciary or trust relationship between a patient and her healers and transactions between them are closely scrutinized by the courts. Id., §§ 142-143. We take judicial notice that chiropractors govern themselves by a variety of ethical codes and at least one of them advises practitioners of Practices of Questionable Propriety which includes that such practitioners shall not take physical advantage of any patient. See, http://chiropractic.org/ica/ethics.htm. We concur with the representations of both Faubion and the State that this case appears to present a case of first impression, certainly in this Court, but with respect to both state and federal law generally. The subject is given fairly comprehensive coverage in B. Anthony Morosco, The Prosecution and Defense of Sex Crimes, § 8.02[5] (Sexual Contact in Therapist-Patient Relationships (Age of Complainant Irrelevant)), also see § 8.03[2] (Position of Trust or Authority) (2008). [¶ 19] It appears that Wyoming's statute is exceptionally inclusive both as written and as construed in Scadden. See, e.g., Morosco, The Prosecution and Defense of Sex Crimes, supra, §§ 8.02[1] (Protected Special Relationships) and 8.03[1] (Issues of Legal Sufficiency of Evidence, Terms and Conditions Within Criminal Offenses); State v. Denton, 149 S.W.3d 1, 17-20 (2004) (Tennessee statute criminalizing acts committed by person using terms authority figure or supervisory or disciplinary power does not encompass physician/patient relationship); also see generally, Annotation, Jay M. Zitter, Conviction of Rape or Related Sexual Offenses on Basis of Intercourse Accomplished under the Pretext of, or in the Course of, Medical Treatment, 65 A.L.R.4th 1064 (1988 and Supp. 2009). We are satisfied that the challenged statute's language encompasses the circumstances presented here. Neither Faubion's testimony, nor that of the expert witness called to testify on his behalf, can serve to rebut the testimony of his victims that they were, indeed, victims of a chiropractor who exceeded the bounds of the statute that was applied to prosecute him for his criminal acts. We are also satisfied that the evidence presented by the complaining witnesses is sufficient to sustain the convictions entered by the district court.