Opinion ID: 1223776
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rights to Self-representation, Compulsory Process, Confrontation, and Due Process

Text: Defendant allegedly filed a motion to proceed in propria persona on the same day that his motion for new counsel was denied. The court never received the motion, so defendant renewed it orally at the resentencing hearing. He argued that in order to adequately represent himself he needed (1) a three to four week continuance; (2) the prosecutor's assistance in contacting and securing witnesses named in his list of mitigating factors; (3) access to the state's documentary and photographic evidence; and (4) advisory counsel to help prepare for resentencing. The judge denied each request, stating I am simply not willing to allow you to come in on the very beginning of this hearing and cause it to be delayed.... He then asked defendant if he wanted to go forward in propria persona. Defendant declined and now argues that the court deprived him of his right to self-representation by denying him the time and resources necessary to prepare an adequate defense. A death-eligible defendant may represent himself at sentencing. Henry, 176 Ariz. at 585, 863 P.2d at 877. Here, however, defendant again failed to make an unequivocal request. See State v. Rickman, 148 Ariz. 499, 503, 715 P.2d 752, 756 (1986). As with the removal hearing, we cannot conclude from the record that defendant would have been committed to representing himself had the court granted his conditions. The unequivocality requirement was designed to guard against such ambiguity. See State v. Hanson, 138 Ariz. 296, 300, 674 P.2d 850, 854 (App.1983). In any event, we would uphold the court's ruling even if defendant had properly invoked this right. Motions for self-representation must be balanced against the government's right to a `fair trial conducted in a judicious, orderly fashion....' State v. De Nistor, 143 Ariz. 407, 412, 694 P.2d 237, 242 (1985) (citation omitted). In this case, defendant appears to have abused the protections afforded to accuseds by his repeated attempts to manufacture error and delay the proceedings. The record is replete with his frequent interruptions, lengthy digressions, and repeated requests for substitute counsel or self-representation. Given this history and the fact that defendant had a lawyer present who announced that he was ready for the hearing, there was no need for further delay. Defendant further asserts that the court violated his rights to compulsory process, confrontation, and due process by preventing him from obtaining witnesses and materials needed for the hearing. These claims are equally meritless. He was not entitled to hybrid representation, Rickman, 148 Ariz. at 503, 715 P.2d at 756, and he was represented by counsel.