Opinion ID: 2009241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Cross-Examination of David Crater

Text: The trial court limited appellant's cross-examination of the state's key witness, David Crater, then under indictment for other unrelated crimes, to questions about that witness' role in the Ritchie incident. Crater's testimony gave the prosecution its case against Evans and Nolen. Crater alone could place the boys at Ritchie's Bar that night. The patrons present during the robbery failed to identify either Nolen or Evans, and could not even state with certainty the robbers' race or sex. Appellants presented an alibi defense. Evans took the stand and denied any connection with the Ritchie incident. Without Crater's testimony, the prosecution had little evidence to link the boys to the crime. Thus, the Commonwealth's case rose and fell on Crater's testimony. At the time Crater testified against the boys, he faced not only charges in the Ritchie case but also some 10 to 15 additional felony charges for burglary and conspiracy. Those charges had been filed in Dauphin County. All fell within the jurisdiction of the Dauphin County District Attorney's Office. All lay undisposed when Crater took the stand. The trial court refused to allow appellant to question Crater about these other crimes. Finding that the prosecution had promised Crater nothing for his testimony, the court stated: The defense would ask this Court to expand the exception to the general rule even further by allowing the jury to engage in idle speculation as to whether or not Crater might have an expectation of leniency in exchange for testimony. Lower court opinion at 8 (emphasis added). The court declined to take that step. The general rule bars admission of a witness' unconvicted bad acts. Stout v. Rassel, 2 Yeates 334 (Pa. 1798); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 475 Pa. 604, 381 A.2d 438 (1977). The rule no more than restates the fundamental principle that a person is innocent until proven guilty. An arrest or indictment does not establish guilt. As Wigmore explains, the fact of arrest or indictment is quite consistent with innocence . . . . 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 980a (Chadborn rev. 1970). Danger inheres that the fact-finder might mistake the allegations for acts, and confuse the acts with the man. Impeachment by unconvicted bad acts carries the injustice of subjecting the witness to suspicion without giving him an opportunity to clear it away. Id. Nevertheless, proof of a witness' unconvicted bad acts may come in to establish the witness' interest in the immediate matter. Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 170, 252 A.2d 661, 663 (1969); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 311 A.2d 896 (1973). [T]he jury should be allowed to evaluate whether the witness testified for the prosecution to gain favorable treatment in his own case. 454 Pa. at 452, 311 A.2d at 898. A court will condition admission on two requirements: the existence of an indictment against the witness and evidence that the prosecutor could promise leniency. Commonwealth v. Joines, 264 Pa.Super. 281, 399 A.2d 776 (1979). The court below concluded that appellant's proffered cross-examination of Crater failed to stand muster on that second requirement. Lower court opinion at 8. The first requirement, existence of an indictment, serves to fix the witness' interest in the matter. See Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 252 A.2d 661 (1969). The second, proof that the prosecutor could offer leniency, tests the basis of a witness' expectations. A simple illustration is the case of a Commonwealth witness facing indictments in federal court. Admission of these federal indictments is disallowed for the purposes of impeachment in the state prosecution. Because the federal courts operate independently of their state counterparts, the state prosecutor lacks power to ensure leniency in the federal system. See Commonwealth v. Mulroy, 154 Pa.Super. 410, 36 A.2d 337 (1943). The trial court reads a further stricture into this second requirement by demanding proof of a deal struck or favor won. Finding none, the lower court ruled that evidence of unconvicted bad acts could not come in against the witness Crater. The lower court relied on a line of Pennsylvania cases: Commonwealth v. Joines, 264 Pa.Super. 281, 399 A.2d 776 (1979); Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 311 A.2d 896 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 252 A.2d 661 (1969). On their facts, these cases support the lower court's reading. In Joines, for instance, the Commonwealth's key witness had pleaded guilty to fraud in an unrelated matter. During the pendency of the Joines trial, that witness was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea in order to participate in an ARD program. Similarly, in Coades, the defendant faced indictments for burglary, robbery and larceny and conspiracy. In exchange for testimony, his co-defendant was allowed to plead guilty only to conspiracy, a misdemeanor. His remaining felony indictments were nol prossed. [1] Appellant contends, It does not matter that the defendant cannot prove an actual plea bargain with the witness or any sort of executory promise of favorable treatment. It is the witness's expectation and hope of leniency which create the motive. Appellant's Brief at 15-16. He draws support from broad language in the cases: Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. at 452, 311 A.2d at 898 ([W]e permit a jury to infer that a co-indictee's testimony is biased because he may receive favorable treatment.. . .); Commonwealth v. Joines, 264 Pa.Super. at 285, 399 A.2d at 779 ([N]ot only was the prosecutor able to promise [the witness] leniency, he provided him with leniency.); see Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Min. Co., 221 Pa. 626, 629, 70 A. 884, 885 (1908) (It is always the right of a party against whom a witness is called to show by cross-examination that he has an interest direct or collateral in the result of the trial. . . .). Appellant asks us to apply that language to the facts of this case. We agree with Wigmore that the pendency of any indictment against a witness indicates indirectly a . . . possibility of his currying favor by testifying for the state. 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 967 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (emphasis in original). However our research has failed to uncover a single case in which a Pennsylvania court has allowed cross-examination about a witness' unconvicted bad acts  merely to establish that witness might hope for leniency. [2] Absent some showing of a bargain struck or favor won, [3] the trial judge did not err in limiting the scope of cross-examination to questions about Crater's role in the instant case. Although we ground our decision in state evidentiary law, we recognize the constitutional dimensions of the problem. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments confer the right to cross-examine a prosecution witness about his vulnerable status as a probationer. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority: We cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge of the credibility of a witness, would have accepted this line of reasoning had counsel been permitted to fully present it. But we do conclude that the jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them so that they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on [witness'] testimony which provided a crucial link in the proof of petitioner's act. The accuracy and truthfulness of [witness'] testimony were key elements in the state's case against petitioner. The claim of bias was admissible to afford a basis for an inference of undue pressure because of [witness'] vulnerable status as a probationer. . . . 415 U.S. at 318-319, 94 S.Ct. at 1111 (citations omitted). However, Davis does not mandate wide-open cross-examination in every case. See id. at 321, 94 S.Ct. at 1112 (Stewart, J., concurring). Appellant has a right to a fair trial, not a perfect one. We are satisfied that, if an error were made by the court below, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 408, 383 A.2d 155, 163 (1978). Appellant had one reason for attempting to cross-examine Crater about the other burglaries. He wished to alert the jury to Crater's possible motives for testifying. Reviewing the record, we find ample warnings to the jury to weigh Crater's testimony carefully. The jury heard the role Crater played in the Ritchie incident. They knew he had participated in both the Herring and Brubaker burglaries. Most importantly, the court warned the jury that Crater's testimony should be viewed with caution: First, Crater's testimony should be looked upon with disfavor as coming from a corrupt and polluted source. Experience has indicated that a person who is involved in the commission of a crime may falsely blame others because of some corrupt or wicked motive. On the other hand, the law recognizes that sometimes such a person may tell the truth about he and others committed a particular offense together so that the jury is cautioned that they should regard Crater's testimony as coming from a polluted source. He has indicated his involvement in this case as an accomplice and there may be some question about what he thinks he may be charged with, but that is not the issue in this case. The fact is that he is an accomplice and at his trial we will decide what to do about him, but now it is sufficient to say that he is involved in these matters and you should regard his testimony as coming from a polluted source, and you should weigh it carefully, what he says to you in regard to what happened and after weighing his testimony you should accept it if you find it truthful only after employing caution and care. N.T. 606. Compare Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. at 453-454, 311 A.2d at 898 (the trial judge erred in refusing to charge the jury that prosecution's key witness was the accused's accomplice).