Opinion ID: 4119202
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Custody

Text: Section 672(a)(2)(B) requires the Cabinet to make maintenance payments only when “the child’s placement and care are the responsibility of . . . the State agency administering the State plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(B). Both parties agree that the Cabinet need only make payments on behalf of children that are in its custody. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the Cabinet obtained responsibility for the children when the family court removed them from their mother’s home. The issue is whether the family court discharged the children from the Cabinet’s care when it ordered the boys to live with the aunt and closed the case. The answer turns on Kentucky law. In Kentucky, “[i]f a child has been removed from the home and placed in the custody of . . . the cabinet, a judge of the District Court shall conduct a permanency hearing” on an annual basis. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 610.125(1) (West 2016). At the permanency hearing, the judge must decide, among other things, whether the child should be placed for adoption, placed with a permanent custodian, returned to the parent, or kept in foster care. Id. The Family Court Rules of Procedure and Practice provide that “[a]ny order of permanent custody” must be on form AOC-DNA-9. Fam. Ct. R. P. Prac. 22(4). Pursuant to that form, the court must affirmatively place the child in permanent custody and discharge the Cabinet of further responsibility. No. 16-5461 D.O., et al. v. Glisson Page 11 The parties proceeded below on stipulated facts because the family court records are sealed. The only facts regarding the children’s placement with the aunt are as follows:  “R.O. was granted temporary custody by the Fayette Family Court of D.O. on March 27, 2013.”  “R.O. also accepted placement of A.O. on February 21, 2014 via Order of Fayette Family Court where the DNA case of A.O. had also been transferred.”  “On September 10, 2014, the Fayette Family Court closed the DNA action of both boys by granting joint custody to R.O. and C.O. The children were Ordered to reside with R.O.”  “Although the [guardian ad litem] made a Motion [to Order the Cabinet to pay maintenance fees] on May 14, 2014, the Court declined to issue further Orders on May the 21st, indicating that permanency had been achieved.” Though the Cabinet avers that R.O. is the children’s permanent guardian, it has not identified evidence that the family court held a permanency hearing or discharged the children from the Cabinet’s care. For its part, the family contends that the Order granting R.O. custody “was issued in a DNA review hearing, not in a permanent custody hearing as required” by state law, and that the “order was simply written on the docket sheet. It was not entered on the AOCDNA-9 Order-Permanent Custody form as required by Rule 22.” In a supplemental memo and at oral argument, the Cabinet contended that the children must be in R.O.’s permanent custody because the family court closed the case. According to the Cabinet, if we find the children remain in state custody, it will create an “indeterminate legal purgatory” for children not in permanent custody, but also without an open family court case. But under Kentucky law, there is nothing indeterminate about the children’s status: foster children remain in the Cabinet’s custody until formally discharged by court order. The Cabinet also suggested that requiring strict adherence to state law elevates form over substance. We are unpersuaded. Requiring the Cabinet to abide by proper procedures promotes important interests—namely, certainty about the custody status of foster children. Thus, on remand the district court should determine whether the family court affirmatively discharged the children from the Cabinet’s custody. If the court finds no affirmative discharge, then the children remain the Cabinet’s responsibility. No. 16-5461 D.O., et al. v. Glisson Page 12