Opinion ID: 1279862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: bridge repair

Text: CSX argues that the admission before the jury of evidence relevant only to the bridge replacement issue, and Plaintiff's use of this evidence in closing argument, were so prejudicial that reversal is mandated. We agree. We have previously referred to the bridge repair testimony from numerous witnesses, none of which was remotely relevant to the negligence issues before the jury. In addition, Plaintiff's closing argument posited the question, Where is the beginning for [decedent's] death? and answered it in this way: For Susan Webb though, the real beginning was 1998, July 12th, 1998. The date is when the bridge that provided access to their little community burned. And CSX had a legal obligation because the law required it. Code section 58-15-3420[sic] required them, if the railroad came there and there was a street there and the railroad crossed that street and the street had to come over it; and if they built a bridge, which they did, they had the legal obligation to repair that bridge. And you know, the bridge burned July 12th and CSXand I'm going to get my glasses out, because I can't see that screen without itthe bridge burned at that time. And the newspaper reported that Mr. Clark, you remember Tom Clark, the CSX bridge engineer said they had a legal obligation to repair that bridge. And the article states that July 12thThe bridge burned July 12th and would be rebuilt, CSX Railroad's bridge engineer said Monday. Materials to reconstruct the bridge at Lopez and Green Streets to original specifications have been ordered and should be available in 30 days. And you will recall that the testimony was that Mr. McClure, as it states there in the article, asked them to replace this bridge and talked with them, talked with the bridge engineer or bridge department. And they said that after you asked it, they apparently changed their mind. He said it wasn't in the budget. They weren't going to do it, even though they acknowledged their legal duty, the statute required them to do it, they decided, we're not going to do it. They even went so far as to have this material shipped to Pelzer. It was on a side track there to Pelzer to repair the bridge. Then they made a decision not to do it. They weren't going to do it. Why do you think they weren't going to do it? Because of money. They didn't want to spend the money. They took this money and put it elsewhere when they could have provided the access, the ingress and egress to that community that would not have required them to use this dangerous railroad crossing that was .2 miles away. Now, they had had athe railroad, the testimony was, if you will recall the testimony, wanting to get out of their obligation to maintain railroad bridges, which the law required them to do. They can get out of it by making a settlement with the county as they did with the SCDOT. They pay the money, get out of this obligation. But they didn't want to pay any money, but they didn't want the obligation.... Although the jury was not charged on 3420, its advisory interrogatory indicates it was profoundly and prejudicially affected by the bridge repair evidence and by Plaintiff's closing argument. The trial judge's ultimate correct conclusion that the failure to replace the bridge was not a proximate cause of the accident renders all this evidence and argument irrelevant, to the extreme prejudice of CSX. We hold that these circumstances require a new trial absolute, but briefly address the merits of several of CSX's other appellate issues, which involve issues that may arise on retrial.