Opinion ID: 222688
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Alleged Abuse Violated a Constitutional Right

Text: If the plaintiffs' allegations of torture are true, there was a violation of their constitutional right to substantive due process. [10] Substantive due process involves the exercise of governmental power without reasonable justification.... It is most often described as an abuse of government power which `shocks the conscience.' Tun, 398 F.3d at 902, quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). The physical or mental torture of U.S. citizens, as the district court concluded, is a paradigm of conduct that shocks the conscience. Vance, 694 F.Supp.2d at 966. The Supreme Court has long held that certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985); see also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136, 25 L.Ed. 345 (1878) (concluding that it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture ... are forbidden by ... the Constitution). The defendants do not argue that the plaintiffs' allegations, if pled correctly, do not amount to a violation of a constitutional right. See Def. Br. at 50-51. Doing so would be futile. The defendants instead argue that plaintiffs have not alleged more than vague, cursory, and conclusory references to [their] conditions of confinement, without sufficient factual information from which to evaluate their constitutional claim. This argument, which is more of a pleading argument to extend Iqbal and Twombly than an argument about qualified immunity, is not persuasive. The defendants argue, for example, that while the plaintiffs allege that their cells were extremely cold, they provide no factual context, no elaboration, no comparisons. At this stage of the case, we are satisfied with the description of the cells as extremely cold. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 84 and Forms 10-15 (sample complaints that illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate). The defendants also suggest that the plaintiffs did not detail in their Complaint whether they sought and were denied warmer clothing or blankets. Even if it was not necessary, the plaintiffs actually specified the clothing and bedding that was available to each of them  a single jumpsuit and a thin plastic mat. The defendants also argue that plaintiffs did not specify how long they were deprived of sleep. That level of detail is not required at this stage, but a fair reading of this Complaint indicates that the sleep deprivation tactics were a constant for the duration of their detention, as was the physical and psychological abuse by prison officials. As the defendants acknowledge, a substantive due process inquiry requires an appraisal of the totality of the circumstances rather than a formalistic examination of fixed elements. See Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 570 (7th Cir.1998) (reversing summary judgment for defendants). The plaintiffs have alleged sufficient details to conclude at this stage of the proceedings that, if true, their treatment, when considered in the aggregate, amounted to torture in violation of their right to substantive due process. [11] Though Vance and Ertel were never charged with, let alone convicted of, any crime, our precedents concerning the abuse of convicted criminals help guide our thinking about whether the alleged abuse violated a constitutional right. As the Supreme Court concluded recently, [p]risoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. Brown v. Plata, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) (citations omitted); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency... against which we must evaluate penal measures) (citations omitted). It is important to keep these fundamental concepts in mind as we focus on the claims before us. See Forrest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cir.2010) (borrowing Eighth Amendment standards to analyze pre-trial detainee's claim). Examining the plaintiffs' claims against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's decisions on prison conditions of confinement and prison treatment cases, we remember that abuse in American prisons was once authorized and even thought of as part of the punishment of prisoners. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (detailing authorized state practice of chaining inmates to one another and to hitching posts in the hot sun); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 nn. 4-5, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), citing Talley v. Stephens, 247 F.Supp. 683 (E.D.Ark.1965) (describing the lashing of inmates with a wooden-handled leather strap five feet long and four inches wide as part of authorized corporal punishment program) and Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F.Supp. 804 (E.D.Ark. 1967) (describing the use of a Tucker telephone, a hand-cranked instrument used to administer electrical shocks to various sensitive parts of an inmate's body in prison that authorized the use of a strap to punish prisoners), remanded with orders for broader relief, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.1968) (Blackmun, J.). Today, the idea that a prisoner in a U.S. prison might be abused in such a manner and not have judicial recourse is unthinkable. While the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, ... neither does it permit inhumane ones. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (citations omitted) (noting that the Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and ... `take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates'). If a prisoner in a U.S. prison had his head covered and was repeatedly walled, or slammed into walls on the way to interrogation sessions, we would have no trouble acknowledging that his well-pled allegations, if true, would describe a violation of his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (concluding that the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even where prisoner is not seriously injured). If a prisoner was kept awake as much as possible, kept in insufferably cold conditions, and not given sufficient bedding or clothing, we would likewise believe that there could well have been a violation of his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (clarifying that [ s ] ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation `in combination' when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise  for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets). If a U.S. prisoner with a serious medical condition is denied medical attention or has necessary medicine withheld, that too can violate the prisoner's constitutional rights. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. 285 (concluding that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs states a claim under the Eighth Amendment); Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 480-81 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that allegations of dental problems constitute objectively serious harm under the Eighth Amendment). The plaintiffs in this case, detained without charges, have pled in detail allegations of such severe conditions and treatment, the likes of which courts have held unconstitutional when applied to convicted criminals in U.S. prisons. The allegations of abuse state claims for violations of the constitutional right not to be deprived of liberty without substantive due process of law.