Opinion ID: 2546861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: APPELLANT WAIVED HER PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE UNDER KRE 507(c)(3)

Text: Appellant argues that she is entitled to a writ of prohibition against Judge Stevens because he erroneously ordered her medical and psychiatric records open to discovery by the Real Parties in Interest. Appellant argues that her records are absolutely privileged per KRE 507, the psychotherapist-patient privilege. KRE 507(b) provides that: A patient, or the patient's authorized representative, has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's medical condition, between the patient, the patient's psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family. However, there are three exceptions to the privilege: (1) In proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness. . . . (2) If a judge finds that a patient, after having been informed that the communications would not be privileged, has made communications to a psychotherapist in the course of an examination ordered by the court, provided that such communications shall be admissible only on issues involving the patient's mental condition. (3) If the patient is asserting that patient's mental condition as an element of a claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of a claim or defense. KRE 507(c). While Judge Stevens did not specifically cite KRE 507 in his order denying Appellant's motion to prevent the discovery of her records, he did state that her physical and mental conditions are at the heart of her claims against the Defendants and that [b]y commencing this action, she has placed her medical conditions in dispute. Thus, he held that Appellant's medical and psychiatric records are discoverable to the extent that their production may lead to admissible evidence. We agree with Judge Stevens's conclusion because Appellant waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege per KRE 507(c)(3) by asserting a claim implicating her mental condition. Appellant's complaint states that as a result of the Real Parties in Interest's alleged negligence she has incurred various damages as well as mental, physical and emotional pain and suffering and a loss of the enjoyment of life. By requesting damages for her mental pain she has clearly asserted [her] mental condition as an element of [her] claim. KRE 507(c)(3). A party claiming damages in the form of mental anguish stemming exclusively from the alleged negligent act must anticipate that the opposing party will be allowed to fairly present mitigating evidence of his mental state before the incident. However, Appellant presents several arguments to refute this conclusion. First, Appellant argues that Judge Stevens and the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted mental condition as interchangeable with emotional condition. Appellant argues that her claim against the Real Parties in Interest is for garden-variety emotional damages stemming directly from the alleged negligent treatment and not her overall mental condition. She argues that by reading and construing KRE 506, the counselor-client privilege, and KRE 507 in pari material the conclusion is compelled that emotional condition has a different definition than mental condition. Since KRE 507(c)(3) refers only to the assertion of one's mental condition as a waiver of the privilege, Appellant concludes that her assertion of her emotional condition does not waive the privilege. However, we need not address the merits of this argument because as previously stated, she asserted her mental condition as part of her claim and thus waived her privilege per KRE 507(c)(3). Second, Appellant argues that we should narrowly construe the implied waiver found in KRE 507(c)(3) and hold that a litigant only waives the privilege by alleging a specific mental condition or psychiatric diagnosis as a basis for their claim. She cites the following cases from various jurisdictions adopting such a conclusion. See e.g. State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561 (Mo.2006); Desclos v. Southern N.H. Med. Ctr., 153 N.H. 607, 903 A.2d 952 (2006); Hoffman v. Brookfield Republic, Inc., 87 P.3d 858 (Colo. 2004); Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526 (N.D.Ill.1999); Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D.Mass.1997). However, other jurisdictions have held that seeking damages for even garden-variety emotional distress waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir.2006); Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000); Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396 (9th Cir.1994); Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443 (10th Cir.1990). We find the latter cases are more persuasive than the former. Appellant's claim for mental pain caused by the alleged negligence, put into question her mental state at the time the medical treatment occurred. It would be fundamentally unfair to permit Appellant to allege and prove mental anguish caused by the negligence while denying the Real Parties in Interest from reviewing her mental health records for the possibility of pre-existing mental conditions. Thus, we reject Appellant's argument. Finally, Appellant argues that the Real Parties in Interest failed to present evidence that her medical and psychiatric records fell within an exception to KRE 507. She notes that the party opposing a claim of privilege bears the burden of showing that the privileged materials fall within a recognized exception. Stidham v. Clark, 74 S.W.3d 719, 727 (Ky.2002). She also argues that since the Real Parties in Interest did not satisfy their burden, Judge Stevens should not have summarily found that her records were discoverable. However, as stated previously, since Appellant's own complaint requests damages for mental pain, we find that the Real Parties in Interest's satisfied their burden and Judge Stevens did not err by denying her motion for a protective order.