Opinion ID: 629092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Employee Benefits Claim

Text: 13 The district court granted summary judgment against Daughtrey on her claim for employee benefits for the period during which she served as a consultant on the ground that Daughtrey was an independent contractor, and thus not entitled to the benefits of an employee. The term employee as used in ERISA incorporates traditional agency law criteria for distinguishing an employment relationship from that of an independent contractor. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 1346, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992). The Court adopted, for ERISA purposes, the common-law test articulated in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989). 14 In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. 15 Darden, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1348 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52, 109 S.Ct. at 2178-79). 16 The district court relied heavily upon the consultant agreement, which states that Daughtrey was hired as an independent contractor. While the characterization of the hired party as an independent contractor or employee may be probative of the parties' intent, all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive. NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258, 88 S.Ct. 988, 991, 19 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1968). The employment status of an individual for the purposes of ERISA is not determined by the label used in the contract between the parties. Accord Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 832-33 (D.C.Cir.1979) (interpreting Title VII). 5 The district court stated, however, that even if the consultant agreement was not determinative, the court would find that Daughtrey was an independent contractor based on the specialized nature of her work, the lack of supervision by Honeywell, the fact that she was hired for a specific project, and the fact that she was not to receive annual leave or retirement benefits. In concluding that no aspect of the relationship between Daughtrey and Honeywell was inconsistent with her denomination as an independent contractor in the consultant agreement, the district court did not discuss several facts suggesting that Daughtrey served as an employee: Honeywell furnished all equipment and supplies and required Daughtrey to work at its facilities, Daughtrey was paid by hourly wage and did not hold herself out as providing computer programming services to others, either Daughtrey or Honeywell could terminate the consultant agreement at will without incurring liability, and Daughtrey was required to perform services personally. Moreover, with regard to the control exercised by Honeywell over the manner and means by which Daughtrey performed services, the district court resolved disputed issues of material fact against Daughtrey, the nonmoving party. Honeywell contends that Daughtrey and the Consultants were given broad discretion on the parameters of the work to be done.... and their progress monitored only sporadically. R3-78 (Brenner Aff. at 5). In her affidavit and an SS-8 IRS form, 6 however, Daughtrey states that the consultants were furnished with detailed user specifics requiring exact compliance, that she was instructed on programming specifics by Honeywell team leaders, that Honeywell established certain operating procedures for programmers, and that she reported each day to a Honeywell supervisor. 7 Further, she claimed that Honeywell provided training manuals and classes for her instruction, and that the flexible hours afforded to consultants were subject to Honeywell's approval. The facts were therefore disputed on the pivotal issue of the degree of control and supervision exercised by Honeywell over Daughtrey. The district court erred by resolving these disputed issues of fact against Daughtrey on Honeywell's motion for summary judgment. See Pitts v. Shell Oil Co., 463 F.2d 331, 335-36 (5th Cir.1972) (reversing determination on summary judgment that hired party was an employee, and not an independent contractor, where evidence as to degree of control and supervision was disputed). Daughtrey's claim for employee benefits for the period during which she performed services as a consultant is therefore remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 17 We note that, because several of the subsidiary facts underlying the ultimate determination of whether Daughtrey was an independent contractor or an employee were disputed, this case presents no opportunity to decide whether the district court's ultimate finding, if based on undisputed facts, would be treated on appeal as a question of fact, 8 a mixed question of law and fact reviewed only for clear error, 9 or a question of law. 10