Opinion ID: 409623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: denial of right to proceed pro se

Text: 12 Wilson contends that the Sixth and Fifth Amendments together guarantee him a right to self-representation and access to a library prior to trial to prepare his defense. 13 Federal criminal defendants have both statutory and Sixth Amendment rights to waive counsel and represent themselves when they voluntarily and intelligently so elect. 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Wilson contends that, although he was ultimately given the right to participate in his trial to any extent he desired, denial until the day of trial of this right and of pretrial access to a law library effectively denied his Sixth Amendment right to proceed pro se. He argues that the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation recognized in Faretta implies a right of access to legal facilities and materials necessary to prepare legal arguments and documents. 14 We find a more narrow right to proceed pro se at trial implied from the Sixth Amendment by the Supreme Court in Faretta. The Faretta Court recognized that historically, with the brief exception of the Star Chamber, common law courts never have forced counsel upon unwilling defendants. Therefore, the assistance of counsel guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are not obligatory, but rather include a correlative right to reject counsel and to represent oneself. 15 In reaching this conclusion, the Court specifically recognized that a criminal defendant who exercises his right to reject counsel necessarily relinquishes many of the benefits associated with representation by counsel. Nowhere did the Faretta Court suggest that the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation implies further rights to materials, facilities, or investigative or educational resources that might aid self-representation. We decline to interpret the right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment to include a right to conduct one's own research at government expense. 16 Wilson argues further that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, which the Supreme Court has held requires some form of meaningful access to the courts, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), when combined with the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, requires that he be afforded library access to prepare a meaningful defense. 17 The Supreme Court, in requiring meaningful access to the courts, has been careful to note that providing access to law libraries is but one of a number of constitutionally permissible means of achieving that objective. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 830, 97 S.Ct. at 1499. This circuit has recently reiterated the rule. Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981). Availability of legal assistance at government expense, if required, is a constitutionally permissible means of access. Id. When such adequate access is provided, as was here, an inmate may not reject the method provided and insist on an avenue of his or her choosing. Id. at 1353. 18 A claim similar to the one at hand was presented in United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1973). That case involved an inmate who was convicted of charges arising out of a threatening letter the inmate had sent to a judge. The inmate indicated his desire to represent himself in pretrial proceedings, but claimed at trial that he could not proceed because he had not been permitted access to the penitentiary library to prepare his defense. Apparently, the defendant had been denied access to the available library because he was in segregated confinement. At trial, the defendant's motions for a continuance and an order permitting library access were denied. 19 In affirming the defendant's convictions, the Chatman court rejected the argument that Bounds v. Smith required library access, saying: 20 Bounds was concerned with the rights to equal protection and to access to the courts of prisoners who sought to invoke post-conviction relief. It held that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498. Bounds, of course, has no direct application to defendant. He was accused of crime and had an absolute right to counsel, which he validly waived; he had no present thought of pursuing post-conviction relief. But, even so, we do not read Bounds to give an option to the prisoner as to the form in which he elects to obtain legal assistance. The option rests with the government which has the obligation to provide assistance as to the form which that assistance will take. Thus, to the extent that it may be said that Bounds has any application to the instant case, the United States satisfied its obligation under the sixth amendment when it offered defendant the assistance of counsel which he declined. We so hold. Cf. United States v. West, 557 F.2d 151 (8 Cir. 1977). 21 584 F.2d at 1360. 22 We agree with the above rationale. The offer of court-appointed counsel to represent Wilson satisfied the Fifth Amendment obligation to provide meaningful access to the courts. Wilson rejected that offer of representation and insisted throughout that he be permitted to personally conduct his own research, even though the local county facility in which he was being held had no library. He never requested that his court-appointed attorney or anyone else perform research for him. Even when the District Court indicated on the day of trial that Wilson would be permitted to represent himself, he did not ask for a continuance so that he or anyone else could perform the research. Instead, Wilson chose to have his court-appointed counsel represent him. 23 Wilson intimated during the trial that the primary issue which he wanted to research was his claim that he was entitled to leave his place of confinement because his sentence, when properly calculated, had been completed. Although Wilson's court-appointed counsel indicated that Wilson's argument was not supported by the record, the District Court offered to permit Wilson access to a law library if he was convicted so that he could research this legal issue and file a post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal. 24 After his conviction, Wilson was in fact permitted access to a law library, but he did not file the post-trial motion. He claims now, for the first time, that he was prevented from filing the motion because prison officials seized his legal papers after trial. There is no support in the record for this claim. Wilson does not contend that he informed the District Court of the seizure when he was sentenced or at any other time. The claim is therefore not properly before us, and we decline to consider it. 25 On this record, we cannot say that Wilson was deprived of all avenues of meaningful access to the court. Wilson contends, however, that his conviction must be reversed because the District Judge, the Judge's clerk and Wilson's court-appointed lawyer deliberately deprived him of his right to represent himself by entering into a plan to delay the District Court's ruling on his motion to represent himself until the day of trial. 26 Wilson had filed with the District Court a notice of his intent to appeal the Magistrate's initial denial of his request to represent himself. This document indicated that Wilson intended to appeal the Magistrate's ruling directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. No such direct appeal is available; an appeal from a Magistrate's ruling must be to the District Court in the first instance. The District Judge's calendar clerk proposed in a memorandum to the Judge that Wilson's request be placed in the file and ignored until the time of trial. The Judge wrote O.K. in the margin beside this suggestion, and the clerk sent a copy of the memorandum to Wilson's court-appointed attorney along with a note which said see attached so that you will know what the plan is. 27 The above scenario of the District Court's approved clerk's memorandum and the clerk's notation to court-appointed counsel to see the attached memorandum so that you will know what the plan is might well be viewed in two separate lights. Appellate counsel can see a diabolical conspiracy between the court, clerk and counsel to deprive Wilson of some right, while we can see a busy calendar clerk's hand in an attempt at calendar control for a very busy District Court. 28 While we certainly do not condone this procedure, we do not think that it requires reversal in this case as we cannot find any resulting prejudice to Wilson. Properly, the District Court should have ruled on the motion in advance of trial. However, because Wilson was not entitled to pretrial access to a law library, in light of the offer of representation by appointed counsel, the delay until trial in ruling on his motion to represent himself did not deprive him of any constitutionally protected rights. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Wilson was prevented from preparing himself as best he could, absent access to a library, for the eventuality that the District Court would ultimately grant his motion to represent himself. When the District Court granted the motion, Wilson did not ask for more time to prepare or for any aid in preparing his case. Instead, he opted to be represented by counsel. We find no constitutional violation. 29 II. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE FALSE IDENTIFICATION AND STATEMENTS MADE TO THE U. S. MARSHALS PRIOR TO THE ARREST 30 Wilson next contends that he was in custody but had not been given the Miranda warnings at the time he gave the marshals two pieces of false identification and a false story explaining his presence at the apartment complex where he was arrested. He argues that it was, therefore, reversible error for the District Court to admit this evidence. 31 The record indicates that this objection was not properly preserved for appeal. United States v. O'Brien, 601 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1979); Vitello v. United States, 425 F.2d 416, 423 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822, 91 S.Ct. 43, 27 L.Ed.2d 50 (1970); Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). When the first marshal testified, neither Wilson nor his attorney objected to the testimony concerning Wilson's statements at the time of his arrest. Wilson's attorney did object to the testimony about the false pieces of identification on the grounds that it was irrelevant and immaterial, but the objection was overruled. When the Government offered photocopies of the false I.D. into evidence, Wilson's attorney stated that he had no objection. 32 During the Government's examination of the second marshal, Wilson's attorney objected to any testimony regarding the false identification on the grounds that it was irrelevant and immaterial, and it was a violation of the defendant's rights. The objection was overruled, but the Government did not pursue the line of questioning. On cross-examination, the second marshal testified that he had both a physical description and a photograph of Wilson when he first approached him and that he was sure it was Wilson at that time, before Wilson was asked for any identification or had made any statements. Furthermore, the marshal responded in the negative to the defense counsel's question of whether the defendant was advised of his rights at the time he was asked to identify himself. Neither Wilson nor his counsel, however, used this testimony to renew the objection to the disputed evidence or to ask that it be stricken as violative of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. 33 It appears that neither Wilson nor his counsel complied with the requirement of Fed.R.Crim.P. 51 that a party make known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and the grounds therefor .... Rules of Evidence require that the grounds for an objection be specifically stated, and if no objection is made at the time the evidence is offered and received, its admissibility generally cannot be challenged on appeal. Vitello v. United States, 425 F.2d at 423; Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). Similarly, if a general objection is overruled when a specific objection should have been made, the party is precluded from asserting the proper objection on appeal. United States v. O'Brien, 601 F.2d 1067. 34 Despite the defendant's failure to preserve his objection properly for appeal, however, we will review his claim of error arising from the District Court's admission of the evidence in question if the unobjected-to error rises to the level of plain error as contemplated by Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b): Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. 35 A custodial interrogation occurs, for purposes of triggering the requirement of a Miranda warning, when law enforcement officers initiate questioning after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. at 1629. Wilson contends that he was effectively in custody when he was approached by the U. S. Marshals and asked to identify himself, and that the pieces of I.D. and the statements regarding his identity were, therefore, obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The Government, on the other hand, claims that the evidence was obtained during an investigatory stop which was initially non-custodial in nature. This court has held that, in the context of an investigatory stop, a mere request for written identification of a person does not necessitate a Miranda warning, even where the person is a suspect, so long as the questioning does not occur in a police-dominated or a compelling atmosphere. United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir. 1975). 36 Whether the evidence in question was admissible at trial depends on the District Court's determination of when the defendant was significantly deprived of his freedom of action-that is, of whether the marshal's initial questioning of Wilson about his identity constituted a custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. While the question of whether the request for identification amounted to a custodial interrogation is a close one, we conclude that it was not plain error for the District Court to admit the two pieces of false identification. We, therefore, decline to review Wilson's claim on appeal that the admission of the I.D. violated his Fifth Amendment rights. 37 After Wilson produced the false pieces of identification, however, the marshals advised him that unless he could better identify himself, they would have to detain him. In response, Wilson told the marshals the story of his intended visit to John. On these facts, it appears that Wilson's freedom was significantly restricted when he made the statements about John and that Miranda warnings should have been given at that time. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the admission of those statements clearly violated Wilson's Fifth Amendment rights and thus rises to the level of plain error as contemplated by Rule 52(b). 38 The standard of plain error, however, goes only to the issue of reviewability and not to the issue of whether a reversal is warranted. Thus, an error unobjected to at trial may be so plain as to warrant review under Rule 52(b); yet the error may be harmless and, therefore, not justify a reversal. United States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1978). In cases involving errors of constitutional dimension, we should reverse unless we are able to declare a belief that (the error) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); United States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d at 685. In applying the Chapman standard, we must judge the magnitude of the error in light of the evidence as a whole to determine the degree of prejudice to the defendant resulting from the error. United States v. Larsen, 596 F.2d 347, 348 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d at 685. 39 In this case, while the statements in question appear to have been obtained in violation of Miranda, we conclude that their introduction at trial does not require reversal. Although the Government never made clear its purpose in eliciting the testimony concerning the false I.D. and false statements, the evidence was relevant to prove that Wilson possessed the state of mind required for conviction under the escape statute as defined by this Circuit-that his failure to remain with the limits of, or timely return to, confinement was willful or blameworthy. United States v. Jones, 569 F.2d 499 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 2243, 56 L.Ed.2d 407 (1978). The fact that Wilson had willfully failed to return to the West Glenn Center was clearly established by the fact that he provided false identification, which implies that he was attempting to avoid detection by the authorities. Additionally, the Government presented evidence establishing that Wilson had signed out of the West Glenn Center and had failed to return by the designated time. In view of the substantial, independent, and credible evidence of defendant's guilt presented at trial, our review of the record as a whole convinces us that the error in admitting the defendant's statements of visitation with John and the fruitless search for John was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.