Opinion ID: 1856886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compliance with section 340A.6

Text: While it is undisputed the board did not consider salaries for comparable offices in the federal government and other states, we believe such an omission does not itself amount to an illegality. The apparent purpose of section 340A.6, like all prevailing wage statutes, is to ensure that public officers who perform services substantially similar to those performed in other public offices and private industry receive substantially equivalent wages. See Melendres v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App.3d 718, 728, 115 Cal.Rptr. 409, 416 (1974); see also C. Rhyne, The Law of Local Government Operations § 13.25, at 252 (1980). The determination of a prevailing wage is not, however, an exact science and there is more than one reasonable way of determining such a wage. Gottlieb v. Department of W. and P. of Los Angeles, 63 Cal.App.3d 202, 208, 133 Cal.Rptr. 614, 617 (1976). A consideration of salaries for comparable offices in the federal government would be of little help; there is no federal equivalent of Iowa's part-time county attorney's office and while there might be other states with similar offices, none have been brought to our attention by the plaintiff. The board substantially complied with the mandate of section 340A.6 by its consideration of other factors. Indeed, substantial compliance is now the standard legislatively imposed on counties in implementing the home rule amendment to our constitution. See Iowa Code Supp. § 331.301(5) (1981) ([a] county shall substantially comply with a procedure established by a state law for exercising a county power unless a state law requires otherwise.). The district court was correct in finding no illegality in the board's failure to follow literally the mandates of section 340A.6.