Opinion ID: 2006639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prosecution's Theories

Text: Monica was prosecuted separatelyabout a year before defendant's trialon the theory that she was guilty, as the shooter, of intentional first degree felony murder (Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [vii]) in the course of and in furtherance of first degree kidnapping, in a noncapital trial. The jury acquitted her of that count but convicted her of second degree felony murder and first degree kidnapping. At his trial, defendant sought to preclude the prosecution from arguing in his case that he was the shooter, on the ground that the People previously dismissed that theory in Monica's case. The trial court rejected defendant's claim, determining that at defendant's trial, the People were free to argue alternatively that either defendant or Monicacommanded by defendantpulled the trigger. The court concluded that the People are merely intending to argue reasonable views of the evidence that could be drawn from the testimony and physical evidence (177 Misc 2d 817, 818 [Monroe County Ct 1998, Connell, J.]). Defendant claims that by advancing purportedly inconsistent theories, the People corrupted the truth-finding function of the trial. It is settled that a prosecutor may not knowingly present admissible but false information to a jury ( People v Pelchat, 62 NY2d 97, 105 [1984]). Of course, in the circumstances of this case, where defendant and Monica implicated not only themselves but also each other, the People could not know who the shooter wasonly defendant and Monica knew. Defendant contends that at the separate trials, the prosecution presented diametrically opposed versions of his role in the shooting. To be sure, at Monica's trial for first degree felony murder, the prosecutor argued that Monica shot Matos. But at defendant's trial, the prosecutor presented that very same proposition, again arguing that Monica intentionally shot him, albeit under defendant's orders. Defendant was not resculpted from a mere sideliner to a main participant ( cf. United States v Salerno, 937 F2d 797, 812 [2d Cir 1991], revd on other grounds 505 US 317 [1992]). In both trials, defendant was portrayed as the driving force behind the crime. Additionally, the People maintained that, based on defendant's own written statement, it was also reasonable to conclude that he was the one who pulled the trigger. Thus, defendant's jury considered the same argument that the prosecutor presented at Monica's trial, and also considered a theory supported by defendant's own words. In assessing this claim, we find Nguyen v Lindsey (232 F3d 1236 [9th Cir 2000]) persuasive. There, an innocent bystander was killed in the crossfire of a shootout between two rival gangs; two combatants were charged with murder and separately tried. At the trial of defendant Phung, the prosecutor presented evidence that Phung shot first. At the trial of defendant Nguyen, the prosecutor introduced Nguyen's own statement to police that a cohort in his car, Cholo, had fired first. The Ninth Circuit held that the prosecutor did not pursue fundamentally inconsistent theories in violation of due process, even though different evidence was presented at each trial ( id. at 1241). Although the prosecutor made divergent arguments at each trial as to who fired the first shot, the court concluded that these arguments were consistent with the evidence actually adduced at each trial ( id. at 1240). Here, as in Nguyen, the evidence against Monica at her trial was her own statement that she killed Matos after defendant gave her the gun and whispered in her ear to shoot him in the head. [7] The evidence at defendant's trial was his self-incriminating admissions that he intended to execute the victim, and either shot the victim or commanded Monica to do so. Nguyen also distinguished Thompson v Calderon (120 F3d 1045 [9th Cir 1997] [en banc] [plurality op], revd on other grounds 523 US 538 [1998]), relied on by defendant. In Thompson, separate trials were conducted of two suspects in the rape and murder of Ginger Fleischli. Testimony by jailhouse informants at a preliminary hearing revealed that defendant Leitch wanted Fleischli dead because she was interfering with his attempts to reconcile with his ex-wife (120 F3d at 1055). On the night of the murder, defendant Thompson allegedly had consensual sex with Fleischli. Afterward, Leitch arrived and he and Thompson killed her. At Thompson's trial, the prosecution presented other witnesses who testified that Thompson had confessed to raping and killing Fleischli before Leitch got home, and that he killed her to prevent her from reporting the rape ( id. at 1056). Thompson was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Then, at Leitch's trial, the prosecutor called mostly defense witnesses from Thompson's trial, who testified about Leitch's motive for killing Fleischli, his threats against her and his violent disposition. A plurality of the court concluded that in Leitch's trial, the prosecutor returned to his original theory and discredited the very evidence he had previously offered in Thompson's trial, so that Thompson, rather than Leitch, suffered from the due process deprivation ( id. at 1059). In Nguyen, by contrast, the court found it compelling that both defendants could be found guilty of the same crime because of its nature (232 F3d at 1240). The circumstances of defendant's case are closer to Nguyen than Thompson. The prosecutor never discredited the central evidence he previously offered to convict Monica, but instead used that evidence to prove that defendant commanded her to shoot Matos. Thus, as the People sought to prove, both defendants could have been guilty of first degree murder. The argument that defendant was the shooter was also properly adduced at trial, based on his admissions. In these circumstances, the People should not have to choose one defendant over the other to prosecute as the shooter. Defendant also argues that at Monica's trial, she was portrayed by the People as acting with free will, whereas at defendant's trial, the evidence showed that she was abused and acted at defendant's command. These positions are not inherently inconsistent. At Monica's trial, the People were countering her duress defense, and sought to show that she was capable of freely committing the murder. The prosecution acknowledged that Monica was abused, but argued that the abuse did not mean she could establish duress: What was the abuse? What did it consist of? . . . [W]hat effect does it have on this case? . . . [Y]ou're going to hear that Angel Mateo was a bad man, and I anticipate you are going to hear that he was the driving force here, but I also anticipate you are going to hear that Monica Szlekovics was involved. At defendant's trial, by contrast, duress was not in the case. The People were entitled to show that, fearful or not, Monica could have willingly followed defendant's command.