Opinion ID: 172956
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Manufacturer Liability

Text: Before trial, Minter filed a motion arguing Prime was a manufacturer of the lift on account of its “extensive modifications to the scissor lift.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. V at 7 The Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions state the injury must be “directly caused” by the defective product. Okla. Uniform Jury Instructions (Civil) § 12.1. “Direct cause means a cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces injury and without which the injury would not have happened.” Id. at § 12.4. 8 Unlike assumption of risk, contributory negligence is not recognized as a defense in a product liability case. See Thomas v. Holliday By & Through Holliday, 764 P.2d 165, 169-71 (Okla. 1988) (discussing the distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence); see also McMurray v. Deere & Co., Inc., 858 F.2d 1436, 144041 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding the trial court erred in giving instruction on assumption of risk where there was no evidence the plaintiff had knowledge of the risk); Smith v. FMC Corp., 754 F.2d 873, 876 (10th Cir. 1985) (same). -7- 845.) The court denied Minter’s motion, explaining: “It is admitted by all parties that no case from an Oklahoma court has found a seller or reseller to be transformed [in]to a manufacturer . . . . Absent such specific case authority from the State of Oklahoma, this Court will not do so either.” (Id. at 977.) The court then held that because Prime is not a manufacturer, it cannot be held to the standards of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).9 [Id. at 978] The court also held Minter could not introduce OSHA regulations because Prime was not Minter’s employer.10 [See id.] Minter contends the trial court’s refusal “to attempt to predict what the state’s highest court would do” prevented him from presenting evidence comparing the safety of the guardrail to the dual chain entry “in the context of feasible alternative design and state of the art.”11 (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 30-31.) However, as the district court recognized, “the issue of manufacturer compliance with industry standards is generally considered to be irrelevant in a strict liability case. Rather, it relates to the question of the manufacturer’s duty of care under a negligence theory.” Rexrode, 674 F.2d at 831. This was not a negligence case. Minter voluntarily dismissed his negligence claim against Prime prior to the first trial. Thus, whether Prime exercised ordinary care to avoid injury 9 “The American National Standards Institute is an organization which publishes national nonmandatory standards for various products.” Rexrode v. Am. Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826, 831 n.14 (10th Cir. 1982). 10 OSHA regulations impose mandatory standards on employers and employees. See Rexrode, 674 F.3d at 831 n.15. 11 Comparative safety evidence can also be admitted to prove consumer expectations. See Robinson v. Audi Nsu Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, 739 F.2d 1481, 1486 (10th Cir. 1984). Minter does not argue he sought to introduce the evidence to prove consumer expectations. -8- is irrelevant. While evidence regarding industry standards and state-of-the-art designs may be admitted “to try to show the feasibility of other safer alternatives,” Robinson, 739 F.2d at 1486, the fatal flaw in Minter’s argument is that Prime never argued it was not feasible to have a solid top guardrail on the lift. Such an argument would make no sense considering the lift was originally manufactured with the guardrail. Thus, the feasibility of the alternative design was not at issue. Even if the court had deemed Prime to be a manufacturer, Minter would not have been able to introduce evidence of the lift’s compliance with ANSI standards. In opposing Minter’s motion, Prime asserted whether it was a manufacturer was “irrelevant.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. V at 914.) Prime argued: If Plaintiff successfully proves the lift as sold by Prime was defective and unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary consumer, caused the fall and plaintiff did not assume the risks of a known defect, there is liability against Prime whether they are deemed a manufacturer, a retailer, a seller or a ham sandwich. (Id. at 915.) We agree with Prime that “it is irrelevant whether Prime was identified as the manufacturer or retailer for the purposes of this litigation.” (Appellee’s Br. at 35.) In Oklahoma, there is no distinction between a manufacturer and a retailer for purposes of a product liability suit. See id at 1487-88 (“That [the defendant] did not design or manufacture the allegedly defective product is not consequential in a product liability suit in Oklahoma . . . . [T]he seller of a product stands in the same shoes as the manufacturer in an Oklahoma products liability action and is subject to admission of the same evidence regarding alleged defects and the resultant unreasonable danger.”); see -9- also Braden v. Hendricks, 695 P.2d 1343, 1350 (Okla. 1985) (“In a strict liability action it is immaterial to the plaintiff’s case that the defect in the product was not caused by the distributor. The liability of a manufacturer and distributor is co-extensive . . . .”). If the court erred, its error was harmless.