Opinion ID: 2982690
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Batson Step 1

Text: To prevail under the first step, a petitioner must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 328 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97). First, “[Petitioner] must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of [his] race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (internal citation omitted). Next, Petitioner “is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Finally, [Petitioner] must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.” Id. In determining whether this last requirement is met, a court considers “all relevant circumstances,” including a “‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors” and the questions and statements made by the prosecutor during voir dire. Id. at 96-97. The Michigan trial court found a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. As to the first and second elements of the prima facie case, Petitioner is African American, and seven of the prosecutor’s nine excluded jurors were also African American.5 The trial court then found 5 Because one of these seven jurors has an Hispanic surname (“Gutierriez”) the Michigan Court of Appeals described her race as Hispanic rather than African American. The trial court, however, found that the prosecutor struck “six black women and one black male” and included 16 Nos. 12-2571/2573 that the third element of a prima facie case was met because the systematic exclusion of African American jurors and the mere exclusion of two white jurors was sufficient to establish an inference that the prosecutor impermissibly used race to exclude potential jurors. The Michigan Court of Appeals, on the other hand, concluded “that a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination was dubious at best” under the circumstances of this case. Drain, 2009 WL 127663, at . The court based this decision on the fact that the prosecutor excused two white jurors in addition to the seven African American individuals who were excused. Additionally, the court found compelling the fact that four African Americans remained on the final jury. Based on this evidence and relying especially on a Michigan Court of Appeals opinion purportedly applying Batson, People v. Eccles, 677 N.W.2d 76, 83 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred on this first step. Petitioner asserts two arguments as to how the Michigan Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the first Batson step was not met. First, he asserts that clearly established Supreme Court precedent applied in this case to render moot the preliminary issue of whether a prima facie showing was met. Second, he asserts that even if the mootness argument does not hold water, the facts established a prima facie case sufficient to raise an inference of discriminatory purpose. Petitioner’s argument regarding mootness is based on a Supreme Court plurality opinion and circuit court case law applying that opinion. In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 Ms. Gutierriez in its discussion of the “black jurors” struck by the prosecutor. We follow the trial court’s lead based in deference to its firsthand observations, though of course legally the issue is immaterial. Even if a defendant does not share the race of the stricken jurors, he or she has standing to assert a Batson claim on their behalf. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991) (“[R]ace is irrelevant to a defendant’s standing to object to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.”). 17 Nos. 12-2571/2573 (1991), a plurality of the Supreme Court stated that “[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a raceneutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.” The Supreme Court has subsequently relied upon the Hernandez plurality opinion in a number of cases. See, e.g., Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477; Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 324; Purkett, 524 U.S. at 767-69. The State asserts that the mootness discussion in Hernandez is dicta and cannot qualify as clearly established law under § 2254(d)(1). See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (Clearly established Federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.”) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). This Court has previously applied Hernandez’s mootness holding as clearly established law, Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d at 434-35 (2003), and we see no reason to treat it otherwise now. Therefore, according to Hernandez, because the prosecutor provided race-neutral explanations for her strikes, and the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, whether the prima facie showing was met is a moot question. Even setting aside the mootness argument, Petitioner still succeeds in establishing a prima facie case. The Michigan Court of Appeals’ sole reasoning for rejecting the trial court’s conclusion about the prima facie case was that the prosecutor struck two white jurors in addition to the seven black jurors, and that four black jurors remained on the jury. The Michigan appellate court’s analysis was premised on the following statement from People v. Eccles, 677 N.W.2d 76, 83 (Mich Ct. App. 2004): “That the prosecutor did not try to remove all blacks from the jury is strong evidence against a showing of discrimination.” 18 Nos. 12-2571/2573 But that case is manifestly contrary to clearly established federal law that “‘[a] single invidiously discriminatory governmental act’ is not ‘immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions,’” Batson, 476 U.S. at 95, and that a single racially discriminatory peremptory strike requires reversal, Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478. See also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 n.13 (1994) (“The exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and undermines public confidence in the fairness of the system.”). Nor does Supreme Court precedent allow a court to require any certain racial configuration of peremptory strikes at the prima facie stage, much less to find that failing to strike black jurors is “strong evidence” against discrimination. Cf. Eccles, 677 N.W.2d at 83. As the Supreme Court instructed in Batson, “[f]or evidentiary requirements to dictate that several must suffer discrimination before one could object would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” 476 U.S. at 95-96 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In light of this clear instruction, the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Supreme Court law to reject the prima facie showing of discrimination in this case merely because some black venirepersons remained on the panel. The Supreme Court has explained that “a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005). “[A] ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire” can, if present, “give rise to an inference of discrimination” establishing a prima facie case. Batson, 476 U.S at 97. Here, the prosecutor used seven of her nine peremptory strikes to remove minority venirepersons from the jury. The prosecutor peremptorily struck three minority jurors in a row before striking a Caucasian juror. The prosecutor then struck four more minority venirepersons before again 19 Nos. 12-2571/2573