Opinion ID: 1264906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Indian Status Issues

Text: The Indian Major Crimes Act conferred federal jurisdiction to prosecute enumerated offenses that are committed by an Indian within the Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). The statute does not define Indian, but the generally accepted test adapted from United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572-73, 4 How. 567, 11 L.Ed. 1105 (1846)asks whether the defendant (1) has some Indian blood, and (2) is recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government or both. See United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir.2001), noting four circuits and state courts that apply this test. The parties agree that the first Rogers criterion is satisfied because Stymiest has three thirty-seconds Indian blood. Stymiest argues the district court made three errors in resolving the second criterionrecognition by a tribe or the federal governmentfailing to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction, erroneously instructing the jury regarding Indian status, and failing to grant judgment of acquittal because of insufficient evidence. A. The Motion To Dismiss. Stymiest first argues that the district court erred in refusing to dismiss the indictment because § 1153 is a jurisdictional statute. It is true that Stymiest's Indian status was the basis of federal criminal jurisdiction (because the victim was a non-Indian, unless Stymiest was an Indian, this major crime could only have been prosecuted in state court). For this reason, we treated Indian status as a jurisdictional issue in cases such as Lawrence, 51 F.3d at 154. But recent Supreme Court decisions including United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), have clarified that this type of issue, while essential to federal subject matter jurisdiction, is an element of the crime that must be submitted to and decided by the jury. Based on these decisions, we revisited the issue and held that a dispute over the defendant's Indian status does not affect the district court's jurisdiction over a prosecution under § 1153. United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 2005); see United States v. White Horse, 316 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir.) (same with a § 1152 prosecution), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 844, 124 S.Ct. 116, 157 L.Ed.2d 80 (2003). Thus, the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss and submitted the issue of Indian status to the jury as an element of the § 1153(a) offense. B. The Indian Status Jury Instruction. Stymiest next argues that, if Indian status is an element of the offense, the district court's jury instruction was an inaccurate and inadequate statement of the recognition part of the Rogers test. We review a challenge to jury instructions for abuse of discretion, focusing on whether the instructions as a whole accurately and adequately state the relevant law. United States v. Wipf, 397 F.3d 632, 635 (8th Cir.2005) (quotation omitted). Relying on the instruction quoted in United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 864, 105 S.Ct. 204, 83 L.Ed.2d 135 (1984), the district court instructed the jury: The second element is whether Matthew Stymiest is recognized as an Indian by the tribe or by the federal government or both. Among the factors that you may consider are: 1. enrollment in a tribe; 2. government recognition formally or informally through providing the defendant assistance reserved only to Indians; 3. tribal recognition formally or informally through subjecting the defendant to tribal court jurisdiction; 4. enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; and 5. social recognition as an Indian through living on a reservation and participating in Indian social life, including whether the defendant holds himself out as an Indian. It is not necessary that all of these factors be present. Rather, the jury is to consider all of the evidence in determining whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is an Indian. The court overruled Stymiest's objections that the instruction failed to instruct the jury to consider the factors in declining order of importance, giving most weight to tribal enrollment, and added two irrelevant factors, tribal recognition by tribal court jurisdiction and Stymiest holding himself out as an Indian. In granting post-conviction relief on this issue in St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D.1988), the court gleaned from case law factors to guide the analysis of the second Rogers criterion and listed the factors in declining order of importance: 1) enrollment in a tribe; 2) government recognition formally and informally through providing the person assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; and 4) social recognition as an Indian through living on a reservation and participating in Indian social life. In United States v. Driver, 755 F.Supp. 885, 888 & n. 7 (D.S.D.), aff'd, 945 F.2d 1410 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1109, 112 S.Ct. 1209, 117 L.Ed.2d 448 (1992), the court noted that tribal enrollment is the most important St. Cloud factor, [2] but it is not essential and its absence is not determinative. In affirming dismissal of the indictment in Lawrence, we considered the St. Cloud factors in declining order of importance only because the government did not object. 51 F.3d at 152. In Pemberton, 405 F.3d at 660, where the jury instruction was not an issue, we held the evidence sufficient to establish the defendant's Indian status without applying the Rogers test or even citing St. Cloud. A review of these authorities persuades us there is no single correct way to instruct a jury on this issue. In Torres, while the Seventh Circuit quoted the entire instruction, it affirmed because the jury was instructed that a person must have some degree of Indian blood and must be recognized as an Indian by the Indian tribe and/or the Federal government. 733 F.2d at 456. That is the two-part Rogers test, and we agree it provides the essential elements of a proper instruction. Beyond that, the St. Cloud factors may prove useful, depending upon the evidence, but they should not be considered exhaustive. Nor should they be tied to an order of importance, unless the defendant is an enrolled tribal member, in which case that factor becomes dispositive. Here, the district court properly identified two other factors relevant on the facts of this case that the tribe exercised criminal jurisdiction over Stymiest, see United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2005), and that Stymiest held himself out to be an Indian, see United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 787 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099, 97 S.Ct. 1119, 51 L.Ed.2d 547 (1977). The court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Stymiest's objections to the instruction given. We have some concern that the instruction given would permit a jury to find Indian status without finding, as the second part of the Rogers test requires, that the defendant be recognized as an Indian by the tribe or by the federal government. Holding oneself out as an Indian by submitting to tribal court jurisdiction or seeking care at a tribal hospital or participating in tribal community activities is relevant to being recognized by the tribe, but it is not otherwise sufficient to satisfy the political underpinnings of the Rogers test. Compare United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir.2009) (minimal participation in Indian social life alone may be insufficient). However, this objection was not raised, and thus we have no difficulty concluding that the instruction as a whole was not an abuse of the district court's discretion. C. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Finally, Stymiest argues that the prosecution adduced insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that he is an Indian for purposes of § 1153(a). We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving evidentiary conflicts in the government's favor, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's verdict. See United States v. Sturdivant, 513 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir.2008) (standard of review). Stymiest is not enrolled in any tribe. But two Rosebud tribal officers testified that Stymiest identified himself on the night of the incident as an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe in Minnesota. When Stymiest was told the officers could not locate his enrollment, he suggested they look under Greene. Leech Lake Band officials responded that Stymiest was not enrolled under either name. Harry Greene, Stymiest's biological grandfather, is an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band. Debra Eason, Greene's daughter and Stymiest's mother, testified that she and her son are ineligible for enrollment in the Band because they lack the required one-quarter Indian blood. Stymiest's white adoptive parents testified they tried to register Stymiest with the appropriate tribe so he could receive educational benefits but were unsuccessful because he lacked the necessary quantum of Indian blood. Llewellyn Wright, records custodian at the Rosebud Indian Health Services (IHS) hospital, testified that Stymiest's records show that he made approximately ten emergency-type visits to the hospital for head trauma, seizures, and asthma attacks. Wright testified that IHS doctors must stabilize any patient in an emergency situation, regardless of Indian status, but that non-Indians are discharged or transferred once stabilized. Georgia Kills in Water, patient registration supervisor, testified that the records show the IHS facility treated Stymiest six times, five times in the emergency room and one follow-up visit to the outpatient clinic. At the clinic, Stymiest identified himself as an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band, making him eligible for treatment as an Indian. However, he did not respond to IHS's subsequent request for enrollment documents. Therefore, he was not eligible for free non-emergency services, but the hospital never billed him for the out-patient visit. The Rosebud tribal police chief testified that his officers have jurisdiction only over Indians. They ask an arrestee his status and turn him over to state or local authorities if he is not an Indian. When interviewed concerning this assault, Stymiest identified himself as an Indian, and police department records show he spent time in the Rosebud jail on three occasions. Jamie Ayers, a Rosebud tribal prosecutor, testified that her office prosecuted Stymiest three times in tribal court for tribal offenses. Each time, Stymiest pleaded no contest, did not appeal, and received a suspended sentence or spent time in the tribal jail. Ayers explained that the tribal code prohibits her office from prosecuting non-Indians, but it is possible for a non-Indian to be prosecuted and convicted in tribal court if he does not object. Although the Rosebud Tribe has no jurisdiction to punish anyone but an Indian, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978), its powers of self-government included the power to prosecute non-member Indians such as Stymiest, if he was a Leech Lake Band Indian. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2). The government also presented substantial evidence of Stymiest's social recognition and repeated self-identification as an Indian. Stymiest lived and worked on the Rosebud reservation during the year prior to the assault. Waylon Black Lance testified that he and Stymiest socialized and Stymiest said he was an Indian. Jerilyn Roubideaux testified that her sister Janelle was Stymiest's girlfriend; Jerilyn saw Stymiest almost ... every day during the year he lived on the reservation. Jerilyn's other sister, Marilyn, who was Hernandez's girlfriend, also testified that Stymiest said he was an Indian. Greene testified that he share[d] his heritage with Stymiest and that Stymiest lived with him for about six months in 2003 at his home in Minnesota. Applying the two-part Rogers test, and viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that Stymiest was an Indian for purposes of this § 1153(a) offense. Without question, he has the requisite Indian bloodhis grandfather is an enrolled member and medicine man in a Minnesota Band. By repeatedly submitting to tribal arrests and prosecutions, and by reporting to the IHS clinic he is an Indian, Stymiest held himself out as an Indian and received forms of official tribal recognition. See Lawrence, 51 F.3d at 152 n. 4; Cruz, 554 F.3d at 850; Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1226-27. He also lived and worked on the Rosebud reservation and repeatedly held himself out as a non-member Indian to his Indian girlfriend and in socializing with other Indians. Although not an enrolled member of any tribe, enrollment is not the only means [of establishing Indian status] nor is it necessarily determinative. Pemberton, 405 F.3d at 660; see Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 1395.