Opinion ID: 2718562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence Relevant to Jones

Text: The wiretap of Mockabee’s phone also provided damaging evidence against appellant Jones. Specifically, this wiretap revealed six transactions in which Mockabee sold distribution quantities of crack cocaine to Jones. In the telephone conversations replayed at trial, Jones was overheard on November 25, 2009, telling Mockabee, “I was trying to see what the address was,” and later in the conversation, asking Mockabee for “one.” Once again, Detective Clark and Devon Hudgins interpreted these statements to signify that Jones had been trying to determine the amount of crack cocaine that his customer wanted, and eventually decided that he required one ounce of cocaine from Mockabee. Similarly, Jones was overheard on November 27, 2009, telling Mockabee, “I’m going to slide down there in a minute,” and “It’s all the same.” Detective Clark interpreted Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 13 these statements to mean that Jones intended to purchase the same one-ounce quantity of cocaine from Mockabee that he had purchased only two days before. No. 11-2267 App. Dkt. 78-2, 118-20. On December 2, 2009, Jones and Mockabee spoke again. In this conversation, Mockabee told Jones, “I got [to] fill that up for you man,” and “I had just got through taking the apron off.” Jones responded that he had “jumped up” and needed Mockabee to “give [him] the sing and a half.” Detective Clark believed that Jones was conveying to Mockabee that he wanted more cocaine than he had in his previous orders—one and a half ounces. At the same time, Mockabee was conveying to Jones that he was “getting the order together of crack cocaine” by “cooking” powder cocaine. No. 11-2267 App. Dkt. 78-2, 132-33. The next conversation between Mockabee and Jones introduced into evidence at trial came from five days later, on December 7, 2009, during which Mockabee asked Jones, “What’s the address?” and Jones responded, “Same.” Like all of the other address conversations, Detective Clark believed that Mockabee’s inquiry was about the amount of cocaine desired. Jones’s response, according to Clark, signified that he desired one ounce of crack cocaine. Id. at 141-42. Another conversation from December 11 was then played at trial, in which Mockabee again asked Jones for “the address,” and Jones responded “two” plus “some chez.” Clark testified that here, Jones was ordering two ounces of crack cocaine plus some marijuana from Mockabee. Id. at 149-50. The final conversation between Mockabee and Jones played at trial came from January 4, 2010, when Mockabee advised Jones that he was “back up running.” Clark believed this call 14 Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 signified that Mockabee “had obtained cocaine and was ready to sell” it to Jones. No. 11-2267 App. Dkt. 78-3, 38-39. In addition to these six wiretapped telephone conversations, the government introduced some physical evidence against Jones, most of which came from a house at 2713 Eagledale Drive in Indianapolis. Jones’s phone calls to Mockabee were critical in linking Jones with the Eagledale address. In all of his conversations with Mockabee, Jones had used a cell phone with the number 317-333-4974. After hearing the six conversations between Jones and Mockabee in which the two men appeared to discuss cocaine transactions, Detective Clark obtained a court order allowing his IMPD/FBI team to use GPS technology to locate this cell phone. Clark’s law enforcement team used the court order twice to locate the cell phone: first, on January 11, 2010, at 5:38 am, and second, on January 15, 2010, at 7:01 am. The team specifically chose these two particular times to locate the cell phone associated with Jones because “early morning hours[] are the time that an individual’s most likely to be in their true residence, that most people sleep.” Both times, the cell phone associated with Jones was traced to the 2713 Eagledale Drive address. No. 11-2267 App. Dkt. 78-6, 90-91. Moreover, on those same days, law enforcement observed a car registered to Jones parked in close proximity to the Eagledale address during the early morning hours. Based on these car sightings, the intercepted calls, and the two supporting GPS locations of the cell phone used by Jones, the IMPD/FBI team obtained a search warrant for the Eagledale Drive address. 2 Law enforcement executed the 2On appeal, Jones contests only whether the supporting affidavit submitted by Detective Clark, which identified 2713 Eagledale Drive as Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 15 search warrant during the early morning hours of January 20, 2010. Gov’t Appx. 3, 78. While executing the search warrant, law enforcement discovered Jones inside the house at 2713 Eagledale Drive and arrested him there. In addition, law enforcement found a variety of incriminating items throughout the house, including (1) several pieces of crack cocaine on a towel, amounting to 36.6 grams, located on the kitchen countertop behind a marijuana plant; (2) 7.8 grams of crack cocaine in a Pyrex measuring cup, located on the kitchen counter next to a digital scale with suspected (but apparently untested) cocaine residue; (3) 1.3 grams of crack cocaine, also located on the kitchen counter next to some money and a couple of cell phones; (4) 47.6 grams of crack cocaine contained within a Pyrex mixing bowl and covered with rags, located by an entertainment center in the living room; (5) a loaded .22 caliber Ruger pistol, located behind the entertainment center in the living room; (6) 6.8 grams of crack cocaine, located next to suspected (but apparently untested) marijuana on a mattress in the middle of the living room floor; (7) a MAK-90 semiautomatic assault rifle, located on the floor of the master bedroom with “clothing and items of personal belongings scattered near and on or about it”; (8) a .22 caliber Ruger rifle, also located on the floor of the master bedroom but obscured from view because it was underneath some clothes; (9) a digital scale containing cocaine residue, located inside a shoebox in the second bedroom; (10) another digital scale, located inside a clear plastic tub (that also contained many Jones’s “residence,” contained enough information to link Jones to the address, so we need not discuss any additional details of the eighty-four page affidavit. 16 Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 other items) in the second bedroom; (11) the cell phone that Jones had used to call Mockabee (corresponding to telephone number 317-333-4974); and (12) a substantial stack of cash. No. 11-2267 App. Dkt. 78-6, 32-77. With all this evidence in mind, we turn now to Jones’s particular claims of error with respect to the pretrial rulings. (Neither Drake nor Young alleges error with respect to pretrial motions). II. Pretrial Error Claims: Jones’s Motion to Suppress Before trial, Jones moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search of the residence at 2713 Eagledale Drive. The focus of his motion was whether Detective Clark’s affidavit supporting the search warrant provided sufficient information to link Jones to the Eagledale. Without that link to him and his wiretapped drug conversations, Jones argues, the police had no basis to search the house. The affidavit claimed that 2713 Eagledale Drive was Jones’s “residence”; the only support for this claim presented in the affidavit were the two early-morning GPS locations of Jones’s cell phone and two early-morning sightings of Jones’s car at that location. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Glover, --- F.3d ---, No. 2014 WL 2747124, at  2 (7th Cir. June 18, 2014). In his motion to suppress, Jones objected to the affidavit’s identification of 2713 Eagledale Drive as his “residence.” He pointed out that, first, nothing was presented to the magistrate judge issuing the search warrant about the ownership or rental of the house at 2713 Eagledale Drive. Second, nothing was presented linking the registration of Jones’s car or cell phone to that address. Third, nothing was presented to suggest that Jones himself had been seen at or around that Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 17 address. Fourth, nothing was presented to indicate that a drug transaction had been initiated or had taken place at that address. In spite of these four objections, the district judge con- cluded that there was probable cause to believe that 2713 Eagledale Drive was “if not Jones’s only residence, at least one location at which Jones resided.” Dkt. 643, 7. Emphasizing the fact that law enforcement both spotted his vehicle at the residence and located his cell phone during earlymorning hours, the judge noted that: most people are not usually at their place of employment or engaged in social activity at such early hours. … The fact that Jones’s vehi- cle and cell phone were within the residence at 2713 Eagledale Drive during those early morn- ing hours is sufficient to support the common sense conclusion that the address was a loca- tion at which Jones resided during the relevant time period and would thus probably be a lo- cation where contraband would be stashed. Dkt. 643, 7. Furthermore, the district judge determined that even if probable cause had not been present in the affidavit, the search was saved by the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (finding that a law enforcement officer’s good faith, “objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion” of evidence). The district judge accordingly denied Jones’s motion to suppress. 18 Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 Like the district judge, we, too, believe that Detective Clark’s affidavit contained sufficient information to support a finding of probable cause. Law enforcement officials have probable cause sufficient to support a search warrant when “the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). As the district judge correctly pointed out, the government’s burden of proof under the probable cause standard is lower than it is at trial. See Braun v. Baldwin, 346 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Probable cause is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even proof by a preponderance of evidence.”). Compounding Jones’s troubles is the fact that we “afford great deference to the decision of the judge issuing the warrant.” United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this deference, we must uphold the magistrate’s decision here so long as there was “a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of a crime.” Glover, 2014 WL 2747124, at . A magistrate judge issuing a warrant “is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense.” United States v. Orozco, 576 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991)). And “in the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live.” Id. (quoting Lamon). Jones does not contest these propositions. Nor does he contest whether there was probable cause to believe that he was a drug dealer. Instead, Jones challenges whether Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 19 the affidavit contained a substantial basis for concluding that he lived at 2713 Eagledale Drive. Ideally, Detective Clark’s affidavit might have supported its claim that 2713 Eagledale Drive was Jones’s “residence” through house rental, house sale, utility or car registration records. (Notably, Jones’s cell phone registration would not have helped law enforcement, since Jones’s phone was registered to a different address at 2545 Brittany Road.) Still, even in the absence of such proof, the affidavit provided some evidence that Jones had a substantial connection to the Eagledale address. The observations of Jones’s cell phone at, and his car in close proximity to, the address were sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood that Jones had spent the night there on at least two recent occasions. Of course, the fact that an individual spends the night at a location on two occasions does not necessarily make that location the individual’s residence. And law enforcement did have information, not presented to the magistrate judge, that 2713 Eagledale Drive might not have been Jones’s only residence since his cell phone was registered to a different address at 2545 Brittany Road. Nonetheless, the fact remains that both times that law enforcement tried to locate Jones during the early morning hours, he appeared to be at the Eagledale address. Given that law enforcement had some evidence suggesting that 2713 Eagledale Drive was one location (if not the only location) where Jones resided, the district court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Probable cause exists if the supporting affidavit “allege[s] specific facts and circumstances to allow the judge to reasonably conclude that the items sought to be seized are associated with the crime 20 Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 and located in the place indicated.” United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, Detective Clark provided two observations of both Jones’s cell phone and car to support the claim that 2713 Eagledale Drive was Jones’s “residence.” Perhaps law enforcement could have done more to connect Jones to the house on Eagledale Drive; however, they did enough to support a search warrant for the house. Furthermore, even if Detective Clark’s affidavit had not been sufficient to support a search warrant for the house under the probable cause standard, the search of 2713 Eagledale Drive would nonetheless be saved under Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Leon and its progeny require us to treat Detective Clark’s decision to obtain a search warrant “prima facie evidence that he was acting in good faith.” United States v. Garcia, 528 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 2008). As a result, Jones can only defeat this good-faith exception by showing: “(1) that the issuing judge abandoned the detached and neutral judi- cial role; (2) that the officer was dishonest or reckless in preparing the affidavit; or (3) that the warrant was so lacking in probable cause that the officer could not reasonably rely on the judge’s issuance of it.” United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2012). Jones does not contest the issuing magistrate judge’s neu- trality; indeed, Jones seems to concede that the issuing judge made an understandable decision given the affidavit presented to him by Detective Clark. According to Jones’s brief, the affidavit’s use of the term “‘residence’” to describe 2173 Eagledale Drive “is a highly meaningful assertion to any issuing magistrate” and “carries with it unique inferences that do not exist with other types of physical locations.” Instead, Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 21 Jones attempts to defeat the good-faith exception by arguing that (1) Detective Clark was reckless in preparing the affidavit by labeling 2713 Eagledale Drive as Jones’s “residence” and by failing to mention the 2545 Brittany Road address, and (2) law enforcement officers could not have reasonably relied on the magistrate judge’s issuance of a search warrant as it was based on only two observations of Jones’s car and cell phone at that location. We agree with Jones that Detective Clark’s affidavit could have been more complete. If the affidavit had mentioned that the cell phone was billed and the automobile was registered at 2545 Brittany Road, the magistrate judge could have weighed those facts against the early-morning GPS and car-sighting results. Given the limited information that Clark had about Jones’s link to 2713 Eagledale Drive, it would have been more accurate to describe the Eagledale address as “a place where Jones appears to reside” or even “one of Jones’s residences.” Nevertheless, Detective Clark’s affidavit need not be either airtight or flawless in order to hold up under the good-faith exception. Under our precedent, the presumption that law enforcement was acting in good faith by seeking a search warrant is so strong that we will uphold the presumption as long as there is “some indicia” of criminal activity on the property that can support a finding of probable cause. Koerth, 312 F.3d at 870. For instance, although we found that the officer’s affidavit in Koerth had failed to establish probable cause for issuing a warrant to search the defendant’s “residence,” we nonetheless refused to suppress the fruits of the search under the good-faith exception. Id. at 867–71. The affidavit in that case referenced a tip from a confidential informant indi22 Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 cating that Koerth resided at the property to be searched and that illegal drug activity had previously occurred there. Id. at 870. We also did not believe that the judge issuing the search warrant had been misled by the affidavit. Id. at 871–72. As a result, we concluded that the affidavit “provided the type of facts that, if corroborated or explained in greater detail, might very well have been sufficient to establish probable cause,” and upheld the district court’s refusal to suppress the evidence recovered during the search. Id. at 870. In the present case, the observations of Jones’s cell phone and car at the Eagledale address during the early morning hours certainly provided some indicia that Jones was residing at that address. Moreover, these observations indicated that illegal drug activity was occurring on the property since the cell phone traced through GPS to the Eagledale address was the very same cell phone that Jones had used to make incriminating phone calls to Mockabee. Although Detective Clark’s affidavit did not make clear whether 2713 Eagledale Drive was Jones’s only “residence,” as opposed to one of his several residences, at the very least it suggested that Jones was regularly and recently spending the night there. Consequently, we do not believe that Detective Clark’s failure to mention that Jones may have had other residences besides 2713 Eagledale Drive was reckless. Nor do we believe the magistrate judge issuing the search warrant was misled by Clark’s failure to mention that Jones might have had other residences. Including the address to which Jones’s cell phone was registered probably would not have changed the magistrate judge’s determina- tion that there was probable cause to search 2713 Eagledale because his car and cell phone were observed there on two Nos. 11-2267, 11-2288, 11-2535 & 11-2687 23 different occasions in the early morning hours. As the district court correctly pointed out: “Because of the fungible nature of cell phones, it is not at all uncommon for individuals to reside at an address other than that listed in their cell phone subscriber records.” The observations of Jones’s cell phone and car at the Eagledale address cited in the affidavit were more than sufficient for a law enforcement officer to reasonably rely upon when executing the warrant, and thus were more than sufficient to satisfy the good-faith exception. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Jones’s motion to suppress.