Opinion ID: 748877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Applicable Standards for Courtroom Closure

Text: 25 The Sixth Amendment guarantees every person accused in a criminal prosecution the right to a public trial. U.S. Const. amend. 6. That basic right has a long and distinguished history. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-73, 68 S.Ct. 499, 504-08, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). It applies not only to the evidence phase of a criminal trial, see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2905, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979), but also to other adversary proceedings, such as a pretrial suppression hearing, see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 43, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2213-14, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). The explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is complemented by an implicit, qualified First Amendment right of the press and the public of access to a criminal trial. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 2740-41, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II ) (access to transcript of preliminary hearing); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I ) (access to jury selection); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982) (access to trial and pretrial hearings); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) (access to trial). 26 However, closure of a criminal trial courtroom may constitutionally occur under limited circumstances. The strict standards for closure were first enunciated by the Supreme Court, with varying formulations, in cases considering the First Amendment access rights of the press and the public. Thus, in Richmond Newspapers, closure was permitted only upon a showing of an overriding interest articulated in findings. Id. at 581, 100 S.Ct. at 2829 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.). In Globe Newspaper, the Court said that closure to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information required a showing that denial of public access is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 457 U.S. at 606-07, 102 S.Ct. at 2620. In Press-Enterprise I, the Court said, The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 464 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. at 824. 27 These rigorous standards were explicitly applied to limitations on a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial in Waller, 467 U.S. at 47, 104 S.Ct. at 2216 (In sum, we hold that under the Sixth Amendment any closure of a suppression hearing over the objections of the accused must meet the tests set out in Press-Enterprise [I] and its predecessors.). Waller reformulated the standards for courtroom closure into a four-factor test: 28 the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, 29 the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, 30 the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and 31 it must make findings adequate to support the closure. 32 Id. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216. 33 Shortly after Waller, in the context of closure of a preliminary hearing, ordered to avoid the adverse effects of pretrial publicity, the Court further refined the first factor to require a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent, Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14, 106 S.Ct. at 2743 (emphasis added), and repeated the third factor's requirement of a finding demonstrating that reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights, id. 34
35 As noted, the Supreme Court has used various formulations to describe the gravity of the interest that will justify courtroom closure, as well as the degree of certainty that the asserted interest will be harmed. The interest has been described as overriding, Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216-17; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581, 100 S.Ct. at 2829-30, compelling, Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. at 2620, and cause shown that outweighs the value of openness, Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. at 823. The Court has said that the asserted interest must be shown to be likely to be prejudiced, Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216, and has more recently required a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced, Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14, 106 S.Ct. at 2743. 36 Our Court has endeavored to reconcile the various formulations in the Supreme Court decisions by relating the gravity of the interest asserted to the degree of closure requested. Thus, in Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.1992), we ruled that only a substantial reason was required to justify exclusion from the courtroom of members of the defendant's family during a witness's testimony, after the witness reported that some of the family members had threatened her. See Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 775 (2d Cir.1996) (applying substantial reason standard for partial closure). Other circuits have taken the same approach. See United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir.1992) (as amended) (substantial reason for partial closure); Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753 (10th Cir.1989) (same); Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 533 (11th Cir.1984) (same). The burden on the movant [for closure] to show prejudice increases the more extensive the closure sought. United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir.1995). 37 It may be doubted whether trial judges can make meaningful distinctions between compelling and overriding interests or can distinguish between whether such interests are likely to be prejudiced or whether there is a substantial probability of prejudice. We believe the sensible course is for the trial judge to recognize that open trials are strongly favored, to require persuasive evidence of serious risk to an important interest in ordering any closure, and to realize that the more extensive is the closure requested, the greater must be the gravity of the required interest and the likelihood of risk to that interest. After all, a word like overriding is really not a calibrated measure of the gravity of an interest; it reflects a conclusion that a particular interest asserted, together with the likelihood of risk to that interest, is sufficient to justify the degree of closure sought. 38
39 The Ayala panel ruled that the third Waller factor, requiring consideration of reasonable alternatives to closure, imposed on a trial judge an obligation to consider alternatives sua sponte. In considering this issue, we gain some understanding of the Supreme Court's requirement by first recalling that the Court said that the standards enunciated in prior First Amendment cases apply to the Sixth Amendment right at issue in Waller, and then by examining what the Court meant by alternatives in those First Amendment cases. In Press-Enterprise I, after noting that the trial judge had closed an incredible six weeks of voir dire without considering alternatives to closure, 464 U.S. at 513, 104 S.Ct. at 825, the Court suggested two possibilities: (1) [t]hose parts of the transcript reasonably entitled to privacy could have been sealed without such a sweeping order, id., and (2) the trial judge might have disclose[d] the substance of the sensitive answers while preserving the anonymity of the jurors involved, id. The import of the Court's concern appears to be that the trial judge erred in not considering alternatives to complete closure. See id. ([T]here was also a failure to consider alternatives to closure and to total suppression of the transcript.). Similarly, in Press-Enterprise II, the Court faulted the California Supreme Court for its failure to consider whether alternatives short of complete closure would have protected the interests of the accused. 478 U.S. at 14, 106 S.Ct. at 2743 (emphasis added). 40 Some, but not all, members of the majority are of the view that Waller appears to indicate that alternatives to complete closure are what the Court required trial judges to consider sua sponte when First Amendment closure standards are applied in the Sixth Amendment context. After noting that the trial judge had not made findings to justify closure of the entire hearing, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216, the Court pointed out that the trial judge had not considered the alternatives of (1) directing the government to provide more detail about its need for closure, in camera if necessary, id., and (2) closing only those parts of the hearing that jeopardized the interests advanced, id. at 48-49, 104 S.Ct. at 2217. 41 Since none of the alternatives that the Supreme Court identified in Press-Enterprise I, Press-Enterprise II, or Waller had been suggested by any of the parties, it is arguable that the Court expects trial courts to consider lesser alternatives sua sponte only before taking the extreme step of closing an entire proceeding. That is the conclusion recently reached by the New York Court of Appeals. See Ramos, 90 N.Y.2d at 500-06, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 744-48, 685 N.E.2d at 497-501. 42 Moreover, even if the Supreme Court has imposed an obligation upon a trial judge to give sua sponte consideration to alternatives to complete courtroom closure, the Court has never held that a criminal case defendant who has not requested a more limited alternative has a right to a new trial, just because the trial judge failed to consider this or other alternatives sua sponte. The First Amendment cases did not require a new trial for any criminal defendant, and Waller, which ordered only the partial relief of a new suppression hearing, did so on review of the conviction of a defendant who had objected to the complete closure of the hearing that had occurred in that case. Until the decision of the Ayala panel, no case of which we are aware had ever reversed a criminal conviction because the trial judge failed to consider an alternative to courtroom closure (whether complete or partial) that had not been requested by the defendant. 1 There is certainly no automatic basis for doing so. Though the right of the public and the press to attend a criminal proceeding absent circumstances justifying closure is of undoubted importance, the reversal of a criminal conviction for a trial judge's failure to consider an alternative not requested by a defendant is arguably too high a price to pay to protect that right. 43 In the pending cases, however, we need not decide whether a sua sponte obligation to consider alternatives to complete closure exists because the trial judges in these cases took the far lesser step of closing the courtroom only during the testimony of one witness, albeit an important one. Whether or not a sua sponte obligation exists to consider alternatives to complete closure, we see nothing in the First Amendment cases or in Waller to indicate that once a trial judge has determined that limited closure is warranted as an alternative to complete closure, the judge must sua sponte consider further alternatives to the alternative deemed appropriate. At that point, it becomes the obligation of the party objecting to the trial court's proposal to urge consideration of any further alternatives that might avoid the need for even a limited closure. This too is the conclusion reached by the New York Court of Appeals. See Ramos, 90 N.Y.2d at 500-05, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 744-48, 685 N.E.2d at 497-501. 44 The pending cases well illustrate the hazard of obliging a trial judge, who has already considered the alternative of partial closure during the testimony of one witness, to have a further obligation sua sponte to consider alternatives to the alternative. The petitioners suggest that among the further alternatives that the judge should have considered were disguising the undercover officer or placing a screen between the witness and the courtroom spectators. Yet refinements such as these encounter substantial objections. Disguising the witness risks lessening the jury's opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor and assess credibility, and a screen risks implying to the jury that the family or friends of the defendant in attendance are likely to be dangerous. Even if Waller requires a trial judge to consider alternatives to complete closure, we do not believe that the Supreme Court wanted trial judges selecting the alternative of limited closure to consider further alternatives that themselves pose substantial risks to a fair trial for the defendant. Of course, if some further alternative is suggested by the defendant or the prosecution, the trial judge should give it consideration. 45