Opinion ID: 844262
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excusal of Prospective Juror for Cause

Text: Defendant contends the for-cause excusal of Prospective Juror L.G. was error. [23] The claim fails. (11) Under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844] ( Witt ), we consider whether the record fairly supports the trial court's determination that L.G.'s views on the death penalty would have prevented or substantially impaired her performance as a juror. ( People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1233 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 574, 210 P.3d 1171] ( Bramit ); People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 845 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264, 200 P.3d 879] ( Bunyard ); People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th 646, 696.) We conclude it does. L.G.'s responses on the juror questionnaire unequivocally satisfied the Witt standard. Asked whether she would like to be a juror in this case, L.G. checked No, explaining that, I do not believe in the death penalty. Asked whether she had any biases, prejudices, or preconceived notions that might affect the way she decided this case, L.G. checked Yes, explaining that she was Against death penalty. Asked specifically what her feelings were regarding the death penalty, L.G. wrote, Against! Asked to rate her attitude towards the death penalty, L.G. checked Strongly oppose. Asked in what types of cases, if any, she felt the death penalty should be available, L.G. wrote N/A. Asked whether her moral, religious, or philosophical beliefs in opposition to the death penalty were so strong that she would be unable to impose the death penalty, regardless of the facts, L.G. checked Yes. Asked whether her opposition to the death penalty would so substantially impair her ability to do her duty as a juror that she would only vote for life in prison without possibility of parole, L.G. checked Yes. Asked whether she would automatically vote for life in prison without possibility of parole, no matter what evidence was presented at trial, she checked Yes. Asked whether she would listen to and consider all the evidence presented by both the People and the defense before reaching a penalty decision, she checked No. Asked whether there was any reason she would not be a fair and impartial juror in this case, L.G. checked Yes, giving prejudice and against death penalty as the reason. Against this record, defendant contends that, when questioned in open court, [L.G.] revealed that her opposition to the death penalty was not nearly as absolute as one might have gathered from reading her questionnaire. (12) `Generally, a trial court's rulings on motions to exclude for cause are afforded deference on appeal, for appellate courts recognize that a trial judge who observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that person's responses (noting, among other things, the person's tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the record. [Citation.]' ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 529 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076].) A finding of bias `may be upheld even in the absence of clear statements from the juror that he or she is impaired because many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made `unmistakably clear'; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. [ Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at pp.] 424-425. Thus, when there is ambiguity in the prospective juror's statements, the trial court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the venireman's] demeanor, is entitled to resolve it in favor of the State. Id., at 434.' ( Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 7 [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218]; see People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 779 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211, 187 P.3d 1041] ( Wilson ).) ( Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1235.) To the extent that the colloquies defendant relies upon created any ambiguity, the court was clearly entitled to resolve it in favor of excusal. The court asked L.G. whether she would provide for the death penalty if she were creating a system of law, L.G. responded that she probably would. Her full response offers defendant little support. In the same breath, L.G. said that in her legal system convicted felons would be quarantined, maybe up into space or something. The court pursued the matter, explaining that it was trying to determine whether you truly can approach this case with an open mind as a juror or, if you'll forgive me, whether you're telling me or us what you think we ought to hear. L.G.'s response was opaque. Well, I'm a truthful person and I'm going to give my honest opinion. I mean as a juror I'm just going to be openminded. And if those in this case are the two options, then it would have to depend on the outcome of us as jurors for whomever to be able, for me to really indicate death or life. So I couldn't be open if I was picked.  (Italics added.) Defendant asserts that L.G. later stated that she could change her mind. However, it is not clear that she was speaking about the death penalty. Her statement came in response to the court's followup questions regarding her answers to items on the questionnaire dealing with race. Question No. 106 asked whether the race of defendants and the victims would affect her decisionmaking. L.G. did not answer the question. Instead, she wrote Private. Question No. 107 asked whether the fact that defendant and his accomplice Nicole Halstead were involved in an intimate interracial relationship would affect her ability to sit as a fair and impartial juror. L.G. checked Yes. In the space provided for an explanation she wrote Prejudice. The court asked L.G. to [l]ook at questions 106 and 107 . . . and talk to us about your answers to those questions, please. L.G. said, Okay. There again, I put private because it's hard for me to know how I feel. I mean as an overall, I really don't believe in the death penalty. But then again, upon hearing facts and really going into detail, there's something that could change my mind. Her answer was not responsive. It did not clarify her answers to items Nos. 106 and 107 on the questionnaire. It is unclear whether L.G. wished to discuss her answers in private, whether she considered her views private, or whether she was attempting to convey some other unclarified meaning. Later on during voir dire, the court asked L.G., do the convictions themselves close your mind or make the decision for you as to what sentence should be imposed? L.G. responded, No. The only thing I have to say on that is that a life imprisonment sentence is a way to make a person that's guilty suffer longer, but that's just before knowing the circumstances leading up to this. The court followed up by asking L.G. if she felt that death was the just and appropriate result after she deliberated, could she support that verdict and announce it publicly here in the courtroom? Her answer was again opaque. Truthfully, with all the circumstances and if it led up to that, where knowing all the facts, if all the facts were there, it's hard for me to make that decision right now because I'm not there. (13) Defendant complains that the court's question was misconceived. He argues that, [a]t the end of a penalty trial, jurors are not required to stand up, look at the defendant, and say `I sentence you to death.' However, that was not what the court was asking. The predicate of the question was sound. Jurors must be prepared to affirm their verdicts.[ [24] ] ( Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1235.) Defendant next contends the trial court never asked [L.G.] the fundamental question that is at the heart of [ Witt ] death qualification of jurors, namely `whether a prospective juror's views on capital punishment . . . would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'' ( People v. Stewart [(2004)] 33 Cal.4th [425], 441, fn. 3 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271].) The defense never requested such a question. Further, the court's failure to ask that question in so many words was not error. ( People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 134 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 186 P.3d 437].) The record reflects a focused inquiry on the topic. In light of the questionnaire and the inquiries made by the court during voir dire, it was quite clear that the court discharged its responsibilities and that L.G. was impaired under the Witt standard. ( Ibid. ) (14) Defendant contends that questions remarkably similar to those asked here were found to be insufficient to meet the [ Witt ] standard for disqualification in People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425. Defendant's reliance on Stewart is misplaced. In Stewart, the court excused five prospective jurors solely on the basis of their answers on a written questionnaire. The court largely relied on the jurors' responses to the question whether their views would `prevent or make it very difficult . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [t]o ever vote to impose the death penalty.' ( Id. at pp. 442-443, italics added.) We concluded that the court erred in excusing the prospective jurors on this basis because the questionnaire answers provided insufficient information about the jurors' states of mind. ( Id. at pp. 446-452.) As Stewart explains, `the circumstance that a juror's conscientious opinions or beliefs concerning the death penalty would make it very difficult for the juror ever to impose the death penalty is not equivalent to a determination that such beliefs will substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror under Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412.' ( Stewart, supra, at p. 447; see also People v. Avila[, supra, ] 38 Cal.4th 491, 530 . . . [`mere difficulty in imposing the death penalty does not, per se, prevent or substantially impair the performance of a juror's duties'].) This is so because individuals who firmly oppose the death penalty `may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they clearly state that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.' ( Stewart, supra, at p. 446, quoting Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176 [90 L.Ed.2d 137, 106 S.Ct. 1758].) ( People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 832-833 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 244, 234 P.3d 501].) Unlike Stewart, the trial court here thoroughly questioned L.G., both in writing and in person, to determine whether her views regarding the death penalty would substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror. (15) Defendant's final argument is that the trial court erred because it failed to expressly find that L.G.'s views on the death penalty would substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror. It is true that the court failed to couch its finding in the Witt formula. However, the gravamen of the court's finding was clearly that L.G. was impaired under the Witt standard. The prosecutor challenged L.G. for cause, arguing that as many times as the court tried to get her to commit to whether or not she could, in fact, vote for either option, she just simply would not answer the question. The court granted the motion, saying I am satisfied that the challenge for cause ought to be sustained, that [L.G.] exhibits a very strong implied, if not actual, bias against the death penalty based upon her questions in open court and mindful of her written answers to the questionnaire inquiries. The defense did not object to the reasons the court gave. Witt has long been the law and it is clear the court was aware of the appropriate standard to apply. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court knows and applies the correct statutory and case law. ( People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081], overruled on another ground in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618]; see Evid. Code, § 664; People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 49 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388]; Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913 [141 Cal.Rptr. 133, 569 P.2d 727].)