Opinion ID: 1252842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disparate sentence as gender discrimination in violation of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment

Text: ¶ 36 Defendant acknowledges that this issue was raised in his first appeal and decided by this court in White I. He nevertheless argues that new facts adduced at the hearings held in this matter in the post-conviction relief proceedings require that the claim be renewed. He argues that the trial court violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by sentencing him to death and his codefendant to two consecutive terms of 25 years each (essentially a fifty-year sentence). While the mitigation statute is facially neutral on the question of gender, defendant contends the trial court's findings as to him, compared to the findings as to Susan, are not neutral. He relies on Hammond's testimony that he and Susan were similarly culpable and that the mitigation factors found to exist were equal. Defendant claims that gender is therefore the only reason that Susan's mitigating factors resulted in a life sentence, while his mitigating factors left him death eligible. ¶ 37 To establish the claim, defendant points directly to the findings at his resentencing that he had re-established contact with his children and had been able to help one of them, making him the equivalent of a caring father. The trial court in Susan's case found that she was a caring mother and used that finding, along with the devastation to her children should she be put to death, as two of six mitigating factors. Defendant claims that failure to find that he was a good and caring father and that his death would be devastating to his daughter denied him equal protection when the trial court found the same facts as mitigating circumstances for Susan Johnson. We disagree. ¶ 38 The issue the defendant raises is whether he is a member of a recognizable class, singled out by law or by practice for distinctive treatment without a rational basis. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 421-27, 94 S.Ct. 700, 38 L.Ed.2d 618 (1974). In White I we quoted State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 354, 464 P.2d 793, 799 (1970): ¶ 39 Equal protection of the laws here means only that the death penalty may be applied to all persons in the State in a like position. And, in Arizona, all persons charged with murder in the first degree face possible imposition of the extreme penalty. Equality of treatment does not destroy individualization of sentencing to fit the crime and the individual. Persons convicted of the same crime can constitutionally be given different sentences. 168 Ariz. at 514, 815 P.2d at 883. In comparison, the defendant and Susan were not similarly situated for the clear reason that White alone pulled the trigger that resulted in David Johnson's death. ¶ 40 Moreover, Judge Hancock's review of the evidence did not lead to a finding that White is a caring father. Arizona law offers no clear test establishing the requirements of a caring father (or caring mother). See State v. West, 176 Ariz. 432, 451, 862 P.2d 192, 211 (1993) (rejecting claim that defendant's contact with small child was mitigating factor where contact was minimal); State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 529-30, 809 P.2d 944 (1991) (trial court found defendant an adequate family man as one of five mitigating factors; not sufficient to justify leniency). Renewing contact and helping his daughter from prison is not the equivalent of caring father. His own testimony demonstrates that of his six children he had no contact or association with the three youngest and of the other three he had very limited contact. ¶ 41 We decline to hold that White's sentence is a violation of equal protection. Evidence justifying disparate treatment, for reasons other than gender, is clear on this record.