Opinion ID: 595552
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Date of Collection

Text: 18 In its January order, the district court required that AFDC parent class members shall receive notice specifying the actual (not necessarily the legal) date of collection, and the amount of each collection. The class challenges this element of the court's order on the ground that only the federally specified collection date can allow custodial parents to determine whether the IV-D agency has erred in denying them a pass-through payment. 19 California uses several different methods to collect child support payments from absent parents. For example, the state can order wages withheld, intercept a tax refund or lottery winnings, or withhold unemployment or state disability benefits. For each of these methods of collection, the date of collection is defined by federal regulations. For many methods of collection, the date of collection is not the date that the IV-D agency receives the payment. For example, where the collection takes the form of withholding from wages, unemployment benefits, or state disability benefits, the date of collection is the date of withholding, regardless of the date that the funds reach the IV-D agency. See 45 C.F.R. § 302.51(a)(4) (1991). The date of collection for support payments collected in another state is the date that the payment is received by the collecting agency in the sister state, regardless of when the payment is transferred to the California IV-D agency. Id. § 302.51(a)(5). 20 In Vanscoter v. Bowen, 706 F.Supp. 1432 (W.D.Wash.1988), aff'd in part rev'd in part sub nom. Vanscoter v. Sullivan, 920 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir.1990), a class action raising notice issues similar to those involved in the present case, the district court held that then-existing notice procedures that failed to indicate amounts received or how they were allocated violated due process: 21 [W]ithout being told the total amount of support collected or how it is allocated, the recipient has no adequate opportunity to contest the agency's decision. Unless informed as to when the payments are made and in what amounts, the recipient cannot assess whether allocation has been made in accordance with the distribution scheme required by 42 U.S.C. § 657(b). 22 Id. at 1439 (emphasis added). The court held that [d]ue process requires that the recipients be given sufficient notice to permit them to determine whether they are receiving the support to which they are entitled. Id. We affirmed the district court's holding on the notice issue, interpreting the lower court opinion as requiring the state to provide, among other things, prompt notice of the date support payments are collected. Vanscoter v. Sullivan, 920 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir.1990) (emphasis added). 3 23 Notice of the legal date of collection is imperative if AFDC custodial parents are to be able to spot erroneous denials of pass-through payments. These class members are entitled to receive the first $50 of any support payment collected in the month when due, even if the IV-D agency's receipt of the funds is delayed. 45 C.F.R. § 302.51(b)(1) (1991). For example, if the state, using the date of collection as defined in the regulations, collects $125 in May and $125 in June for current child support, the parent is entitled to two $50 pass-through payments even if the IV-D agency actually receives both $125 payments in June. If the state collects the entire $250 in June and nothing in May, however, the custodial parent receives only one $50 pass-through. 24 The date of collection is also important to custodial parents who are no longer receiving AFDC. Except for tax refund intercepts, any money collected during a month is treated as payment of the support obligation for that month, up to the court-ordered amount of current support. 45 C.F.R. § 302.51(a)(1) (1991). The state may retain the remainder as reimbursement for past AFDC payments. Id. § 302.51(b)(2). If the absent parent's wages are withheld in both April and May but the local IV-D agency does not receive the money until June 1, the custodial parent should receive current child support payments for both April and May. If the custodial parent is only informed of the date of receipt, it will appear as if she is entitled to only one support payment for June and none for April or May. 25 Due process mandates notice that provides the kind of information necessary to evaluate the timing and accuracy of the distributions. See Vanscoter v. Bowen, 706 F.Supp. at 1439. Notice of the actual date of receipt, rather than the federally defined date of collection, fails to satisfy this standard. The statute authorizes a pass-through of the first $50 of any payments for a month received in that month, and the first $50 of payments for each prior month received in that month which were made by the absent parent in the month when due. 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1) (1988). As we observed in Vanscoter, this language on its face distinguishes the date a support payment is 'received' from the date on which it is 'made.'  Vanscoter v. Sullivan, 920 F.2d at 1449. Because only the various official dates of collection are relied on in determining eligibility for pass-through payments, the actual date of receipt is of no use at all to class members attempting to spot errors or delays and determine the payments due them. Providing class members with the date of collection, on the other hand, is of great value in reducing the risk of erroneous nonpayments and underpayments of child support. 26 Finally, we recognize that DSS is already required by law to determine the federally defined date of collection for its own use in distributing payments. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 302.51(a)(4) (1991) (if employer fails to report date of wage withholding, the IV-D agency must reconstruct that date) (emphasis added). Thus, under a balancing of the Mathews factors, there is no significant administrative burden to outweigh the probable value of this procedural safeguard. In fact, the government has failed to make a showing of any hardship, however minimal, from being required to inform class members of the federally defined date of collection. Under these circumstances, we hold that the federally defined collection date is necessary to ensure meaningful notice that sufficiently protects appellants' property interests.