Opinion ID: 1282015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Professional Conduct Issue

Text: In considering the merits of this case, we note that our standard for reviewing the Board's recommendations regarding the suspension of a lawyer for ethical violations is stated in Syl. pt. 1, Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 194 W.Va. 788, 461 S.E.2d 850 (1995): Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure, effective July 1, 1994, requires the Office of Disciplinary Counsel to prove the allegations of the formal charge by clear and convincing evidence. Prior cases which required that ethics charges be proved by full, preponderating and clear evidence are hereby clarified. Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure states: Standard of Proof. In order to recommend the imposition of discipline of any lawyer, the allegations of the formal charge must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See McGraw, 194 W.Va. at 796, 461 S.E.2d at 858, discussing the clear and convincing standard of proof. Recently in Committee on Legal Ethics v. McCorkle, 192 W.Va. 286, 452 S.E.2d 377 (1994), we noted that substantial deference is given to the Board's findings of fact. Such deference is appropriate because the Board hears the testimony of the witnesses firsthand and, being much closer to the pulse of the hearing, is much better situated to resolve such issues as credibility. [Footnote omitted.] McCorkle, 192 W.Va. at 290, 452 S.E.2d at 381. Because the Board's factual findings and conclusions are given substantial deference, [t]he burden is on the attorney at law to show that the factual findings are not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole adjudicatory record made before the Board. McCorkle, 192 W.Va. at 290, 452 S.E.2d at 381. In this case, the Board found that Mr. Cunningham's conduct violated Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3 and 1.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (1989). Rule 1.1 provides: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. Rule 1.2(a) provides: A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. Rule 1.3 provides: A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Rule 1.4(a) provides: A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. Based on Mr. Cunningham's acknowledgement that for four years he failed to move Mrs. Hunt's case forward, that he failed to request the circuit court to schedule a status conference or discover why no conference had been scheduled, and that he failed to review the circuit court file, the Board found a lack of thoroughness or preparation, a violation of Rule 1.1. Mr. Cunningham argues that other aspects of his representation of Mrs. Hunt demonstrate no disregard for the responsibility he owed to his client. Based on our independent review of the record, we find clear and convincing evidence in the record that there was a problem with Mr. Cunningham's thoroughness and preparation in regard to Mrs. Hunt's suit after December 1990. Based on the testimony of Mrs. Hunt, which the Board found to be creditable, that Mr. Cunningham failed to inform her of the December 1990 settlement offer, the Board found that Mr. Cunningham failed to consult with the client as to the means by which they [the client's objectives] are to be pursued, a violation of Rule 1.2. Mr. Cunningham asserts that he informed Mrs. Hunt of the $13,000 settlement offer; however, the parties agree that after the settlement offer, Mr. Cunningham did nothing about the settlement or the case. Given the testimony of Mrs. Hunt that she was not informed of the settlement offer, we find clear and convincing evidence to support the Board's conclusion that Mr. Cunningham violated Rule 1.2 by failing to inform Mrs. Hunt of the settlement offer. Mr. Cunningham's failure to return Mrs. Hunt's calls and failure to tell her the status of her case is also a violation of Rule 1.4(a). When the record is considered as a whole, we find clear and convincing evidence to support the Board's conclusion that Mr. Cunningham violated Rule 1.4(a). The parties agree that after December 1990, Mr. Cunningham undertook no action on behalf of Mrs. Hunt. Mr. Cunningham provided no explanation for the inaction. Rule 1.3 requires a lawyer to act diligently and we agree with the Board that the evidence is clear and convincing that Mr. Cunningham failed to act diligently. Although the Board's factual findings and conclusions are afforded substantial deference, [t]his Court reviews de novo questions of law and the appropriateness of a particular sanction. McCorkle, 192 W.Va. at 289, 452 S.E.2d at 380. Syl. pt. 3, McCorkle, states: A de novo standard applies to a review of the adjudicatory record made before the [Lawyer Disciplinary Board] as to questions of law, questions of application of the law to the facts, and questions of appropriate sanctions; this Court gives respectful consideration to the [Board's] recommendations while ultimately exercising its own independent judgment. On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the [Board's] findings of fact, unless such findings are not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. In accord Syl. pt. 2, McGraw, supra . We have long held that [t]his Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys' licenses to practice law. Syl. pt. 3, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 174 W.Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 1395, 84 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985). In accord Syl. pt. 2, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Sheatsley, 192 W.Va. 272, 452 S.E.2d 75 (1994); Syl. pt. 10, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Cometti, 189 W.Va. 262, 430 S.E.2d 320 (1993); Syl. pt. 1, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Craig, 187 W.Va. 14, 415 S.E.2d 255 (1992); Syl. pt. 6, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Farber, 185 W.Va. 522, 408 S.E.2d 274 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1073, 112 S.Ct. 970, 117 L.Ed.2d 135 (1992); Syl. pt. 1, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Charonis, 184 W.Va. 268, 400 S.E.2d 276 (1990). Some of the major factors to be considered in determining a disciplinary penalty were outlined in Syl. pt. 3, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Walker, 178 W.Va. 150, 358 S.E.2d 234 (1987), which states: In deciding on the appropriate disciplinary action for ethical violations, this Court must consider not only what steps would appropriately punish the respondent attorney, but also whether the discipline imposed is adequate to serve as an effective deterrent to other members of the Bar and at the same time restore public confidence in the ethical standards of the legal profession. In accord Syl. pt. 4, McCorkle, supra ; Syl. pt. 2, Craig, supra ; Syl. pt. 5, Committee on Legal Ethics by Roark, 181 W.Va. 260, 382 S.E.2d 313 (1989). We endeavor to make an individualized assessment of the sanction rather than follow a punishment schedule. In Syl. pt. 2, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W.Va. 647, 226 S.E.2d 427 (1976), overruled on another matter, Syl. pt. 11, Cometti, supra, we said: In disciplinary proceedings, this Court, rather than endeavoring to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action, will consider the facts and circumstances in each case, including mitigating facts and circumstances, in determining what disciplinary action, if any, is appropriate, and when the committee on legal ethics initiates proceedings before this Court, it has a duty to advise this Court of all pertinent facts with reference to the charges and the recommended disciplinary action. In accord Syl. pt. 4, Roark, supra; Syl. pt. 2, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Higinbothan, 176 W.Va. 186, 342 S.E.2d 152 (1986). One of the factors this Court considers in determining an appropriate sanction is whether the lawyer-respondent has received prior discipline. In Syl. pt. 5, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 177 W.Va. 356, 352 S.E.2d 107 (1986), we stated: Prior discipline is an aggravating factor in a pending disciplinary proceeding because it calls into question the fitness of the attorney to continue to practice a profession imbued with a public trust. See Cometti, 189 W.Va. at 272 n. 15, 430 S.E.2d at 330 n. 15; Syl. pt. 2, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Taylor, 190 W.Va. 133, 437 S.E.2d 443 (1993) ( per curiam ). After an independent review of the record, we find that the Board's factual findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. After careful consideration of the facts, the serious nature of Mr. Cunningham's conduct, and Mr. Cunningham's prior disciplinary record, we find that although the conduct demands to be sanctioned, the Board's recommended sanctions of a three-month suspension and review of cases by the Disciplinary Counsel are not appropriate given the facts and circumstances of this case. Rule 3.16 (1994) or the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure states: In imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, unless otherwise provided in these rules, the Court or Board shall consider the following factors: (1) whether the lawyer has violated a duty owed to a client, to the public, to the legal system, or to the profession; (2) whether the lawyer acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; (3) the amount of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors. Once these factors are applied to the case at bar, we find that the Board should have placed greater emphasis on remedial measures rather than punitive measures. [13] Accordingly, we find that Mr. Cunningham should be publicly reprimanded, that his practice should be supervised for at least two years [14] and that he be required to pay the costs of these proceedings. The office of Disciplinary Counsel should monitor Mr. Cunningham's supervision, which at a minimum, should include an immediate review of Mr. Cunningham's current cases and a periodic report to the Disciplinary Counsel's office. For the above stated reasons, Abishi C. Cunningham is publicly reprimanded, and is required to have his practice supervised for at least two years and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Public reprimand, two year supervised practice and costs. MILLER, Retired J., sitting by temporary assignment. ALBRIGHT, J., did not participate.