Opinion ID: 2630572
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unconstitutional Condition on Right to Allocute

Text: ¶ 121 Maestas further argues that admitting his allocution statement at his new trial creates an intolerable conflict between the Fifth Amendment and his right to allocute and appeal. That is, he contends that he was subject to an unconstitutional condition, namely, in order to exercise the right to allocute and get a fair sentence, he had to sacrifice his right not to incriminate himself, and with it, his prospects at his new trial. ¶ 122 For this proposition, Maestas relies on Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), a case dealing with a conflict between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In holding that the inculpatory statements from a suppression hearing were inadmissible, the Simmons Court reasoned that it would be intolerable to condition the right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim on the waiver of a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 394, 88 S.Ct. 967. ¶ 123 The State correctly notes that United States Supreme Court decisions following Simmons have cast serious doubt on the continuing viability of its reasoning concerning conflicting constitutional rights. The United States Supreme Court decision in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285-86, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (1998), epitomizes the Supreme Court's decreased reliance on the unconstitutional conditions analysis in the Fifth Amendment context. Indeed, although the Woodard defendant alleged an unconstitutional conflict between his right to seek clemency and his right against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court summarily rejected this argument in concluding the clemency interview did not violate the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 286, 118 S.Ct. 1244. [11] Having concluded that Maestas waived his privilege against self-incrimination and gave his statement voluntarily, I similarly reject Maestas's unconstitutional condition argument. Accordingly, Maestas's voluntary allocution statement is not rendered inadmissible because of any supposed conflict between his right to allocute and his privilege against self-incrimination.