Opinion ID: 777803
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The factual basis for Bennett's guilty plea

Text: 22 Bennett pled guilty to a violation of, or aiding and abetting the violation of, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which provides that it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... to ... possess with intent to ... distribute ... a controlled substance. The elements of this offense are that (1) the defendant knowingly; (2) possessed a controlled substance; (3) with intent to distribute. United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 424 (6th Cir.1999). To prove aiding and abetting, the government must show that [the defendant] knew that the principals possessed [the controlled substance] with the intent to distribute it, and that [the defendant] assisted in their plan to deliver [it]. United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636, 641 (6th Cir.1994). Bennett's mental state is thus an essential element of the offense to which he pled guilty. It is this element that Bennett claims was unsupported by the facts, because the district court neglected to ask Bennett directly whether he had the requisite knowledge and intent. 23 The only direct evidence of a defendant's mental state would be the defendant's own statement as to what he was thinking. United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 113 (6th Cir.1995). Unfortunately, the district court did not ask Bennett about his knowledge and intent. The district court's failure to do so, however, is not fatal to the effectiveness of Bennett's guilty plea. As this court held in Tunning, 24 [t]he ideal means to establish the factual basis for a guilty plea is for the district court to ask the defendant to state, in the defendant's own words, what the defendant did that he believes constitutes the crime to which he is pleading guilty. So long as the district court ensures that the defendant's statement includes conduct — and mental state if necessary — that satisfy every element of the offense, there should be no question concerning the sufficiency of the factual basis for the guilty plea. This ideal method is by no means the only method, however. We recognize that the district court may determine the existence of the Rule 11(f) factual basis from a number of sources, including a statement on the record from the government prosecutors as well as a statement from the defendant. 25 Id. at 112 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 26 Bennett's mental state, therefore, may be supported to the satisfaction of Rule 11(f) by circumstantial evidence establishing his knowledge and intent. But a bare statement from the prosecutor that he would have proven that the defendant acted with the [requisite] intent is not sufficient to support a guilty plea under Rule 11(f). Id. at 114 (holding that the defendant's guilty plea was not supported by a sufficient factual basis under Rule 11(f), because the government attempted to demonstrate the factual basis for the defendant's intent based on bare assertions... that evidence at trial would have established certain facts without any indication of what evidence supports those facts) (emphasis in original). 27 Because the district court did not elicit from Bennett the facts underlying his plea at the March 6, 2000 guilty plea hearing, the only facts before the court in support of Bennett's plea at that time were those contained in the plea agreement and the government's offer of proof. The plea agreement itself contained no facts supporting the plea, but the government's offer of proof consisted of the following statement: 28 Prior to April 13, 1998, the proof would have shown that the defendant Jeffrey Bennett obtained methamphetamine in Utah or California, brought the methamphetamine to Memphis, Tennessee, and sold it to persons, including Brandon Harris, Michael Wilson and Jeffrey Young. 29 On April 13, 1998, the Shelby County Sheriff's Office here in Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee conducted an undercover operation which led to the search and arrest, the search of Jeffrey Young's house at 1278 Dogwood and to his arrest. On that date, Dee Bowling acting as an undercover negotiated for sale or purchase of between one and three pounds of methamphetamine. At one time, the discussion centered around approximately one pound of methamphetamine and at another time they discussed three pounds, but, ultimately, Your Honor, the deal was for roughly one pound. 30 During the course of that operation, Mr. — Officer Bowling met with Jeffrey Young at that residence, along with another officer acing in an undercover capacity who showed a quantity of money to Mr. Young to show that they could, in fact, purchase what they were asking for. During the course of that operation, there was [sic] several Shelby County Sheriff's officers in the area conducting surveillance. And during that operation, the officers observed several vehicles, including a Cadillac and a Mitsubishi van, and the van belonged to Jeffrey Young. In one of those vehicles was Brandon Harris. In the other vehicle, the van, Jeffrey Bennett was driving that vehicle. The officers ultimately conducted a search of Jeffrey Young's house, and at that time, they found approximately three hundred grams of methamphetamine in the garage area of his residence. That is gross weight, Your Honor. There were some smaller quantities of methamphetamine found in his residence, but roughly, if memory serves, Your Honor, the net weight of the methamphetamine in the garage was somewhere in the two hundred and fifty gram range. The proof would have shown that the methamphetamine found in the garage came from Jeffrey Bennett. When Mr. Bennett was arrested in October of 1999, in Oregon, he admitted to the officers that he had been involved with a group of individuals in Memphis, Tennessee, and that he was involved in the distribution of methamphetamine. 31 (Emphasis added.) 32 The italicized passages represent the only information in the offer of proof that directly implicates Bennett. Although Bennett could have been driving Jeffrey Young's van innocently, and the methamphetamine that was traceable to Bennett does not establish his knowledgeable possession because he might have possessed it unwittingly, his admission that he was involved in the distribution of methamphetamine constitutes evidence of his intent to distribute and might permit an inference of his knowledgeable possession. We need not, however, decide this last question in light of the evidence contained in the PSR. 33 Even assuming for the sake of argument that Bennett's knowledge and intent were not supported by the government's offer of proof at the guilty plea hearing, a sufficient factual basis to support his plea under Rule 11(f) clearly existed by the time of the sentencing hearing. The factual record at Bennett's guilty plea hearing was supplemented at the sentencing hearing by the PSR described in Part I.B. above, as well as by the testimony of Michael Wilson, described above in Part I.C. Specifically, the PSR shows Bennett recruiting Wilson to partner with him in the methamphetamine trade, traveling from Memphis to Utah and California for the express purpose of obtaining methamphetamine, and then returning to Memphis in order to distribute the drug. The PSR contains several statements made by Bennett to government agents at the time of his arrest, wherein he boasted about his ability to sell drugs and his sophistication in concealing his activities. Wilson testified at the sentencing hearing that, in the spring of 1998, Bennett divided a thirteen-pound quantity of methamphetamine among several associates in order that it be distributed, and that Bennett collected debts from its sale. From these and other facts contained in the PSR and in Wilson's testimony, the district court could easily have inferred that Bennett had the required mental state to have knowingly possessed methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it. So despite the fact that the district court's plea colloquy pursuant to Rule 11(f) was far from the ideal means under Tunning, 69 F.3d at 112, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in entering judgment against Bennett on May 31, 2000. 34 B. The district court did not err in enhancing Bennett's sentence based upon its conclusion that Bennett was an organizer or leader of the criminal activity 1. Standard of review 35 Bennett argues that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.1(a), which provides that [i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels. (Emphasis in original.) The government must establish the facts supporting the enhancement for a defendant's aggravating role in an offense by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Gibson, 985 F.2d 860, 866 (6th Cir.1993). We will reverse a district court's factual findings regarding the defendant's role in a conspiracy only if they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 699 (6th Cir.2000). Whether these facts warrant a sentence enhancement pursuant to § 3B1.1(a), however, is a legal conclusion subject to de novo review. Id. 36 2. Bennett's status as an organizer or leader 37 A participant is defined in the application notes to § 3B1.1 as one who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 1. Bennett was indeed engaged in criminal activity that involved at least five such participants, including Bennett himself, Leo Gonzales (Bennett's supplier in Utah and California), and Brandon Harris, Jason Hawks, Robert O'Neal, Michael Wilson, and Jeffrey Young (Bennett's Memphis associates). Application Note 2 of the Commentary to § 3B1.1 provides: 38 To qualify for an adjustment under this section, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants. An upward departure may be warranted, however, in the case of a defendant who did not organize, lead, manage, or supervise another participant, but who nevertheless exercised management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization. 39 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 2 (emphasis added). Bennett, therefore, need not have been an organizer or leader of all four of the other participants, but only of one of them. 40 With the exception of Gonzales, who appears from the PSR to have functioned consistently as Bennett's supplier, the roles of the other participants were fluid. Bennett in fact did not always act as an organizer or leader. As an example of his low-level functioning, Bennett points out that the government's offer of proof at the guilty plea hearing described Bennett driving a van, conducting countersurveillance while Jeffrey Young negotiated a transaction with undercover officers. Bennett argues that an organizer or leader does not typically delegate negotiation and price-setting authority to his underlings while relegating himself the much riskier task of driving around the neighborhood, looking for law enforcement agents who were looking for countersurveillants. 41 On the other hand, the PSR and the testimony of Wilson describe Bennett as recruiting Wilson to collect drug debts, and making trips to Utah and California to procure methamphetamine. Recruitment of accomplices is one characteristic of an organizer or leader listed in the comments to § 3B1.1. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 4. Bennett contends that he did not recruit Wilson for the purposes of § 3B1.1(a) because Wilson had already been involved in the drug trade through Ricky Fuller. But nothing in the Guidelines suggests that recruitment of accomplices is significant only when the accomplice is convinced to break the law for the first time. Bennett took the initiative in seeking out Wilson as a partner in his methamphetamine trade and, as a result of Bennett's efforts, Wilson became involved with larger quantities and new lines of supply. The influence Bennett exercised over Wilson in organizing trips to Salt Lake City and California to procure methamphetamine shows that Bennett acted as the organizer of Wilson's activities. 42 Bennett is also described in the PSR as organizing the procurement in California, the transport to Memphis, and the repackaging and distribution there of a thirteen-pound quantity of methamphetamine. Both the PSR and Wilson's testimony at the sentencing hearing support the finding that Bennett was in charge of distributing this quantity, and of exercising management and control over four other participants when he allocated it among Hawks (two pounds), O'Neal (two pounds), Harris (two pounds), and Wilson (one pound), before the remaining six pounds were taken to a storage unit. These instances of Bennett's organizational initiative and management power are such that it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to determine that Bennett was an organizer or leader of the criminal activity of one or more participants. For the above reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err in enhancing Bennett's sentence four levels pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.1(a). 43 C. The district court did not err in failing to make specific factual findings regarding the amount of methamphetamine for which Bennett was responsible 44 Bennett argues that the district court did not comply with the requirements of Rule 32(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, because it failed to make specific factual findings regarding the amount of methamphetamine for which Bennett was responsible. The rule provides that 45 [a]t the sentencing hearing, the court... must rule on any unresolved objections to the presentence report.... For each matter controverted, the court must make either a finding on the allegation or a determination that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing. 46 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1). Rule 32(c)(1) prohibits a court faced with a dispute over sentencing factors from adopting the factual findings of the presentence report without making factual determinations of its own. United States v. Parrott, 148 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir.1998) (citation omitted). The primary purpose for this rule is to ensure that sentencing is based on reliable facts found by the court itself after deliberation, not on the delegation of the factfinding process to the probation officer or the prosecution. Id. We require literal compliance with Rule 32(c)(1). United States v. Tackett, 113 F.3d 603, 613 (6th Cir.1997). 47 Bennett's written objection to the PSR's recommended base offense level of 36 constituted an objection to the PSR's factual determination of the amount of methamphetamine attributable to him because, under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1, the base offense level is arrived at solely on the basis of the amount of methamphetamine at issue. Despite Bennett's written objection, which was in the record before the court at the sentencing hearing, the district court said nothing about the amount of methamphetamine attributable to Bennett. 48 The district court did not run afoul of Rule 32(c)(1), however, because Bennett waived his written objection at the sentencing hearing. After a lengthy discussion about whether Bennett should be considered an organizer or leader of the conspiracy for the purposes of the four-point enhancement, the court asked Bennett's counsel whether there was anything else from defense counsel? To this direct question from the court, Bennett's counsel replied, Your Honor, we have no — we still have the objection to the four point enhancement. By failing to reiterate his objection to the base offense level when asked by the district court whether there was anything else that needed to be considered, Bennett waived his right to object to the amount of methamphetamine attributable to him. See United States v. Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826, 830 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that the government waived its ability to object to a downward departure when it failed to voice its objection in response to the district judge's question, at the close of the sentencing hearing, whether there was anything else he should do with regard to the sentence). At this point in the sentencing hearing, the amount of methamphetamine attributable to Bennett ceased to be a controverted sentencing matter under Rule 32(c)(1). The district court was therefore entitled to adopt the recommendation of the PSR regarding the amount of methamphetamine attributable to Bennett without making its own factual findings.