Opinion ID: 534912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Late Plea Bargains

Text: 28 The trial court, in a pretrial order, had stated that any plea bargains must be completed no later than four working days prior to the beginning of the trial. Nevertheless, after the jury had been empaneled, opening statements had been made, and the first witness had testified, two of the co-defendants, the Phillips brothers, made a plea agreement with the government. This plea agreement was disclosed to the jury. Several days later, they were called to the witness stand to testify against their former co-defendants. The appellants moved for a mistrial and objected to the testimony given by these two former defendants. They now claim that it was reversible error for the trial court to permit this testimony. 29 Appellants have not called to our attention any case in which this precise issue has been decided by any court. They rely, however, on cases in which evidence is introduced showing that a co-defendant in the alleged crime has previously entered a guilty plea. See United States v. Harrell, 436 F.2d 606 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846, 93 S.Ct. 49, 34 L.Ed.2d 86 (1972), and United States v. King, 505 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.1974). 30 This Court in United States v. Edwards, 716 F.2d 822 (11th Cir.1983), decided that it was not error for the trial court to have permitted the government to admit testimony by a former co-defendant that he had entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, we stated: The governing standard [as to when it is appropriate to admit evidence of such a plea] was enunciated in United States v. King, supra: 31 [W]e must carefully examine all the facts and circumstances of the case in their proper context. The presence or absence of an instruction is an important factor, but it is also essential to consider other factors, such as whether there was a proper purpose in introducing the fact of the guilty plea, whether the plea was improperly emphasized or used as substantive evidence of guilt, whether the introduction of the plea was invited by defense counsel, whether an objection was entered or an instruction requested, whether the defendant's failure to object to the testimony could have been the result of tactical considerations, and whether, in light of all the evidence, the failure to give an instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 505 F.2d at 608 (footnotes omitted). 32 716 F.2d at 825. 33 Considering the similarity between this case and Edwards, we note that the first factor discussed in the King opinion, is the presence or absence of an instruction. Here, the court gave an instruction to the jury that was agreed to by the defendants. The court also instructed the jury properly in its final charge to the jury. As to the second factor, the government's purpose in introducing the evidence, the purpose was to counter the anticipated contention by the defendants that the Phillipses had pleaded guilty in order to benefit themselves by receiving a less serious sentence, thus establishing bias against the remaining defendants in the case. This corresponds with the facts in Edwards where the court said: The district court did not err in allowing the Government to rebut the inference of Lowe's bias by informing the jury that Lowe had already been convicted and sentenced before trial. 716 F.2d at 825. Thus, as we held in Edwards, there was a proper purpose in introducing the fact of the guilty plea. Although in Edwards, the evidence was given in rebuttal by the United States, here, it was justified on direct because of a statement made by counsel for Rush in his opening statement to the jury. There, he stated: 34 I suggest to you that the evidence in this case will show, almost without exception, that everyone of these government witnesses who have cut a deal, who have bought their freedom, Williams, Hildebrandt, Ponton, Roxie, Tipton, on and on and on, that they have had motives above and beyond perhaps their agreement with the government. 35 This clearly placed the government on notice that the defendants intended to show an improper motive in the Phillipses' plea bargain. 36 Defendants do not now claim that the pleas were improperly emphasized or used in any way by the United States as substantive evidence of guilt. Moreover, as indicated above, the introduction of the plea was invited by defense counsel. 37 Thus, in all matters here relevant, the action of the trial court fully comported with the standards enunciated in United States v. King, supra, as repeated in United States v. Edwards, supra. 38 We conclude therefore that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting this evidence to come before the jury.