Opinion ID: 2525464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Failing to challenge prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument in the penalty phase

Text: Evans contends that his counsel failed to respond effectively to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument in the penalty phase. We agree that some of the prosecutor's remarks were erroneous and prejudicial. First, the prosecutor made a number of comments that Evans says expressed personal opinion and lacked factual support. The prosecutor offered his view that the penalty hearing was not a rehabilitation hearing and asserted that its purposes were retribution and deterrence of Evans and others. He argued that when a person kills four people in a systematic way as in this case, in my view, based upon this evidence, such a person has forfeited the right to continue to live. He also asked when the death penalty could be appropriate if not this case. We perceive no error in these remarks. A prosecutor in a penalty phase hearing may discuss general theories of penology, such as the merits of punishment, deterrence, and the death penalty. [48] And statements indicative of opinion, belief, or knowledge are unobjectionable when made as a conclusion from the evidence introduced at trial. [49] The prosecutor also deplored an era of mindless, indiscriminate violence perpetrated by persons who believe they're a law unto themselves. He argued that Evans is one of these persons. This is his judgment day. Federal courts have held that it is improper for a prosecutor to urge the jury to convict in order to solve a social problem. [50] This court has similarly condemned comments in the penalty phase of a murder prosecution that diverted jurors' attention from their correct task, which is the determination of the proper sentence for the defendant before them, based upon his own past conduct. [51] The remarks here inappropriately invoked circumstances beyond the case at hand, but we believe that they were not extreme and did not, standing alone, divert the jury from its proper task of sentencing Evans for his own crimes. Other prosecutorial remarks were excessive and unacceptable and should have been challenged at trial and on direct appeal. In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor asked, do you as a jury have the resolve, the determination, the courage, the intestinal fortitude, the sense of commitment to do your legal duty? Asking the jury if it had the intestinal fortitude to do its legal duty was highly improper. [52] The United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor erred in trying to exhort the jury to `do its job'; that kind of pressure ... has no place in the administration of criminal justice. [53] There should be no suggestion that a jury has a duty to decide one way or the other; such an appeal is designed to stir passion and can only distract a jury from its actual duty: impartiality. [54] The prosecutor's words hereresolve, determination, courage, intestinal fortitude, commitment, dutywere particularly designed to stir the jury's passion and appeal to partiality. The question is whether the prosecutor's improper remarks prejudiced Evans by depriving him of a fair penalty hearing. [55] Again, considered alone, perhaps they did not, but the prosecutor erred further. Commenting on penalty phase evidence that Evans was involved in cocaine trafficking and convicted of leaving the scene of a car accident, the prosecutor told the jury: Ms. Erickson argues that you can't consider or discuss that evidence unless you find that aggravating circumstances had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. And it may be a semantical thing again, but regardless of the punishment you select, it doesn't seem inappropriate to have all the information you can get about the character of a defendant. I just take issue with the remark that you have to wait until a certain point in the deliberation to consider that someone has two prior felony convictions, and that he made his living by selling poison. It seems to me regardless of the punishment that ought to be a factor, as reasonable men and women, that you can consider. (Emphasis added.) This argument was absolutely incorrect. To determine that a death sentence is warranted, a jury considers three types of evidence: evidence relating to aggravating circumstances, mitigating circumstances, and `any other matter which the court deems relevant to sentence.' [56] The evidence at issue here was the third type, other matter evidence. In deciding whether to return a death sentence, the jury can consider such evidence only after finding the defendant death-eligible, i.e., after it has found unanimously at least one enumerated aggravator and each juror has found that any mitigators do not outweigh the aggravators. [57] Of course, if the jury decides that death is not appropriate, it can still consider other matter evidence in deciding on another sentence. [58] The State contends that the prosecutor was simply amending a statement by defense counsel, who told the jurors that they could not consider the other matter evidence introduced by the prosecution unless they first found an aggravating circumstance. The State maintains that the prosecutor's argument was therefore proper. We disagree. Defense counsel's argument was incomplete in that she did not tell the jurors that they could also consider the other evidence if they decided that death was not an appropriate sentence. [59] However, even if we assume that the prosecutor's improper argument was an attempt to cure the omission, it failed to do so. Instead, it incorrectly informed the jurors that they did not have to wait until a certain point in the deliberation to consider the other evidence. This was incorrect and in no way remedied defense counsel's incomplete argument. Nor does it appear that defense counsel was trying to mislead the jury or somehow gain an unfair advantage when she failed to address the use of other matter evidence in the event that the jury rejected death and considered a lesser sentence. She was understandably concerned with the possibility of a death sentence and wished to prevent the other evidence from improperly influencing the jury's finding of statutory aggravating circumstances. Her argument was correct in that regard, as was her concernthe jury returned a death sentence and never reached the stage of considering sentences less than death. Of course, if the prosecutor was concerned that the jury might reach that stage, he had a right to inform the jury of the omission in the defense argument; instead, however, he made an incorrect argument that introduced affirmative error. The State also asserts that the jury received proper written instructions. The instructions were accurate as far as they went but did not explain the restricted use of other matter evidence. Thus, they did not cure the error introduced by the incorrect argument. [60] For future capital cases, we provide the following instruction to guide the jury's consideration of evidence at the penalty hearing: In deciding on an appropriate sentence for the defendant, you will consider three types of evidence: evidence relevant to the existence of aggravating circumstances, evidence relevant to the existence of mitigating circumstances, and other evidence presented against the defendant. You must consider each type of evidence for its appropriate purposes. In determining unanimously whether any aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you are to consider only evidence relevant to that aggravating circumstance. You are not to consider other evidence against the defendant. In determining individually whether any mitigating circumstance exists, you are to consider only evidence relevant to that mitigating circumstance. You are not to consider other evidence presented against the defendant. In determining individually whether any mitigating circumstances outweigh any aggravating circumstances, you are to consider only evidence relevant to any mitigating and aggravating circumstances. You are not to consider other evidence presented against the defendant. If you find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating circumstance exists and each of you determines that any mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating, the defendant is eligible for a death sentence. At this point, you are to consider all three types of evidence, and you still have the discretion to impose a sentence less than death. You must decide on a sentence unanimously. If you do not decide unanimously that at least one aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt or if at least one of you determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating, the defendant is not eligible for a death sentence. Upon determining that the defendant is not eligible for death, you are to consider all three types of evidence in determining a sentence other than death, and you must decide on such a sentence unanimously. In this case, we conclude that Evans's trial and appellate counsel were deficient in not challenging the prosecutor's improper argument, and we conclude that Evans was prejudiced as a result. This court has recognized the heightened need for reliability in capital cases and the tremendous risk that improperly admitted character evidence will influence a jury in setting a punishment for a convicted defendant. This risk is unacceptably high when the defendant has been convicted of murder and faces the death penalty. [61] Although the evidence here was not improperly admitted, the prosecutor directed the jury to consider it improperly to determine death eligibility. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution requires a capital sentencing process to `genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.' [62] A sentencing scheme must direct and limit the sentencer's discretion to minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious action. [63] It must provide a principled basis for the sentencer to distinguish defendants who deserve capital punishment from those who do not. [64] In Nevada, the finding of enumerated aggravators is essential to this narrowing function, and so is the weighing of such aggravators against any mitigating evidence. If the jurors relied prematurely on other matter evidence to find or give weight to enumerated aggravators, then the narrowing contemplated by the Nevada statutes and required by the federal Constitution did not occur. [65] A new penalty hearing is therefore required.