Opinion ID: 2038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Physicians' Causation Testimony Properly Excluded.

Text: Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. It states, in relevant part, that [i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact . . . a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion. . . . It also requires that: (1) the testimony must be based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) it must be the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the witness must have applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Id. Rule 702 requires the district court to perform a gatekeeping function before admitting expert scientific testimony in order to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Before considering whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue, a district court must make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid. Id. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Supreme Court has identified the following factors as pertinent to this inquiry: (1) whether the theory has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether it has been generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Happels first argue that Dr. Bringewald's experience treating Heidi and other MS patients qualified him as an expert under the Daubert test. [4] But the district court excluded Dr. Bringewald as an expert witness because the Happels had not properly disclosed him as an expert nor rendered the required expert report. We review de novo whether the district court applied the appropriate legal standard in making its decision to admit or exclude expert testimony, and we review for abuse of discretion the district court's choice of factors to include within that framework and its ultimate conclusions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. Winters v. Fru-Con, Inc., 498 F.3d 734, 742 (7th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Here, we do not reach the question of whether Dr. Bringewald is qualified because of the more glaring problemthe plaintiffs' failure to disclose him as an expert witness during pre-trial discovery. Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the proponent of expert testimony to disclose the witness's identity, along with a written report that contains, among other things, a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them. [5] The sanction for failure to comply with this rule is the automatic and mandatory exclusion from trial of the omitted evidence, unless non-disclosure was justified or harmless. Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 869 (7th Cir.2005) (citation omitted). The Happels do not challenge this ruling; they did not even mention it in their opening brief. See Bodenstab v. County of Cook, 569 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that appellant waived arguments that were not developed until the reply brief). So we cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Bringewald's opinion testimony. As to Dr. Hirsch, the Happels argue that his academic credentials and practical experience qualified him as an expert on the effects of stress on MS. [6] However, the district court found that Dr. Hirsch's opinion that psychological and physical stress exacerbated Heidi's MS was unreliable because it lacked a sufficient basis. The district court concluded that Dr. Hirsch's qualifications rendered him capable of testifying about Heidi's depression, headaches, psychiatric and psychological issues, PTSD, seizures, and schematic brain functions based on his research and publications relating to those types of issues. But Dr. Hirsch was not qualified to testify about Heidi's MS, the exacerbation of her MS, or other related physical ailments because he had very limited experience with MS patients (most of whom sought his expertise specifically for the treatment of smell disorders or mouth pain) and the opinion was not supported by relevant medical literature. In addition to his lack of experience in treating patients with MS, Dr. Hirsch offered no experimental, statistical, or other scientific data to support his theory that stress from anaphylactic shock exacerbated Heidi's MS. Some physicians rely on treatises, medical tests, and laboratory findings to reach their causation conclusions, while others conduct a differential diagnosis [7] to rule out the least plausible causes of illness. See Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1209 (10th Cir.2002). However, Dr. Hirsch does not cite any of these methodologies in his attempt to demonstrate the causal relationship between stress and MS; rather, he relies solely on his past experience and the temporal proximity of Heidi's allergic reaction and recurring MS symptoms. This does not an expert opinion make. To the extent that Dr. Hirsch does rely on medical literature to support his theory, the articles to which he cites stop short of reaching the same conclusion. Indeed, one of the articles directly contradicts his theory, stating the association between stressful life experiences and changes in immune function do not establish a causal link between stress, immune function, and disease. See Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 459 (5th Cir.2009) (It is axiomatic that causation testimony is inadmissible if an expert relies upon studies for publications, the authors of which were themselves unwilling to conclude that causation had been proven.). At best, Dr. Hirsch's testimony would have amounted to an inspired hunch, and the district court certainly did not abuse its discretion in excluding it. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir.1996).