Opinion ID: 1204963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding of unavailability

Text: (4) Defendant challenges, on substantial evidence grounds, the trial court's finding that Crappa was unavailable. We find this contention to be without merit. In response to thorough questioning by the prosecution and the trial court, Crappa testified unequivocally that she had lost all memory of relevant events. Although the trial court was not required to credit Crappa's testimony, the court made clear that it found her credible and believed that she lacked recollection. On this basis, we reject defendant's argument that Crappa's own testimony at the Evidence Code section 402 hearing, attesting to her total inability to recall any relevant information, did not constitute substantial evidence in support of the trial court's finding of unavailability. Defendant contends the total memory loss to which Crappa testified fails to constitute a mental infirmity within the meaning of Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(3). We cannot agree. The unusual situation presented here, in which a witness who testifies in considerable detail at one trial, but  ostensibly due to the intervening onset of memory loss  claims a complete inability to recall relevant events at retrial, is analogous to that presented in People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540 [125 Cal. Rptr. 357, 542 P.2d 229, 92 A.L.R.3d 1127], a case in which a witness who testified at one trial refused to testify at retrial based upon an intervening fear of retaliation. In Rojas, supra, 15 Cal.3d 540, we affirmed the trial court's ruling admitting the witness's former testimony under Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a), after the trial court found that the witness's fear rendered him unavailable to testify under Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(3). (15 Cal.3d at p. 552.) In that situation, we held that a witness's fear of retaliation permitted a trial court to find that the witness suffered from a mental infirmity, which we defined as `a defect of personality or weakness of the will.' ( Id., at p. 551, citing Webster's Third New. Internat. Dict.; see also People v. Francis (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 579, 587 [245 Cal. Rptr. 923] [witnesses, who refused to testify despite trial court's extensive efforts to persuade them to testify, found to be unavailable]; People v. Quaintance (1978) 86 Cal. App.3d 594, 596 [150 Cal. Rptr. 281] [witness who had seen `seven deaths' while in the state prison ... feared he would meet the same fate if he allowed a `snitch jacket' to be placed on him by giving testimony].) We adopted the view, set forth in People v. Gomez (1972) 26 Cal. App.3d 225, 229-230 [103 Cal. Rptr. 80], that the showing required to establish unavailability based on illness or infirmity must be left to the trial court's discretion. ( People v. Rojas, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 550-551.) Similarly, in the situation presented here, Crappa's professed inability to remember any relevant information  an inability that postdated defendant's first trial, and had compelled Crappa to seek a medical diagnosis for purposes unrelated to the present case  does not offend the Rojas definition of mental infirmity. The referenced colloquy between the prosecution and Crappa revealed the witness's unequivocal refusal or inability to provide relevant testimony. (See fn. 14, ante. ) Although Crappa's professed loss of memory was factually distinct from the fear of retaliation experienced by witnesses in Rojas, Francis, and Quaintance, the result was identical: the prosecution was precluded from obtaining requested testimony from a witness present in court, and the court thus was justified in determining that Crappa was unavailable. Defendant's reliance on People v. Sul (1981) 122 Cal. App.3d 355 [175 Cal. Rptr. 893] is misplaced. In Sul, the witness voluntarily declined to testify, leading the trial court to find him in contempt, send him to jail, and declare him to be unavailable. ( Id., at pp. 358-359.) The appellate court concluded the trial court should have taken further action to coerce the witness to testify before ruling as to his availability. ( Id., at pp. 365-367.) By contrast, the trial court in the present case participated in extensive questioning of Crappa and observed her closely in order to determine whether she possessed any relevant recollection. The trial court believed her memory loss to be genuine and not of her own choice. In view of the trial court's finding, the ability of Crappa to testify in the present case  unlike that of the witness in Sul  would not have been influenced by any amount of coercion from the court. Defendant further contends, however, that even if Crappa's condition constituted a mental infirmity within the meaning of the statute, such mental infirmity could be established only by expert medical evidence, and not by the testimony of Crappa, herself. We reject this contention. In Rojas, supra, we upheld a finding of witness unavailability on the basis of the witness's mental infirmity in the absence of expert medical testimony. (15 Cal.3d at pp. 548-552.) Other decisions have similarly so held. (See, e.g., People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 516-517 [194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 668 P.2d 738] [Reviewing courts have typically and properly required either expert testimony on the witness's present condition, or the witness's own express refusal to testify at trial. (Italics added.)]; compare People v. Bojorquez (1880) 55 Cal. 463, 463-464 [undersheriff's testimony that witness was unwell and not able to leave his room held insufficient to permit introduction of witness's deposition]; People v. Rinesmith (1940) 40 Cal. App.2d 786, 790 [105 P.2d 1021] [police officer's testimony that witness was too ill to attend the trial insufficient to permit introduction of witness's preliminary-examination testimony]; see also Sanchez v. Bagues & Sons Mortuaries (1969) 271 Cal. App.2d 188, 193 [76 Cal. Rptr. 372] [elderly witness's deposition statement regarding his physical infirmity could not be used to establish his own unavailability because witness's condition at time of deposition was not proof of his physical infirmity at time of trial, and no medical testimony was presented indicating that the witness was unable to appear in court].) Accordingly, we conclude that Crappa's own testimony at retrial, believed by the trial court, was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that she was unavailable to testify. Thus, we need not reach defendant's contention that the testimony of Dr. Staiti, who had interviewed Crappa one year prior to defendant's retrial, was not sufficiently probative with regard to Crappa's mental condition at the time of the second trial to support the trial court's finding that Crappa was unavailable. Under the facts of this case, Dr. Staiti's medical testimony was not required. (See People v. Stritzinger, supra, 34 Cal.3d 505; People v. Rojas, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 550-551; People v. Gomez, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 230.)