Opinion ID: 40371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of Post-Booker Guidelines Sentence

Text: 8 Alonzo's reasonableness challenge to his post- Booker Guidelines sentence is also based upon the district court's use of his relevant conduct to calculate his Guideline range. Specifically, Alonzo contends that his guidelines sentence is unreasonable due to the fact that he was sentenced not for what he pled guilty to, but solely for relevant conduct. 9 In Mares, this Court recognized that [t]he Guideline range should be determined in the same manner as before Booker/Fanfan.  402 F.3d at 519. As previously set forth, Booker contemplates that a sentencing judge will determine facts relevant to sentencing, including relevant conduct. This is Alonzo's sole basis for arguing that his sentence is unreasonable. Alonzo has failed to argue, much less demonstrate, that his sentence was improperly calculated under the Guidelines. If the sentencing judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range, in our reasonableness review we will infer that the judge has considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines. Mares, 402 F.3d at 519. Here, we need not make such an inference because the district court explicitly stated that it had considered the Guidelines and the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the sentence reflects as much. 10 Given the deference due the sentencing judge's discretion under the Booker/Fanfan regime, it will be rare for a reviewing court to say such a sentence is `unreasonable.' Id. Furthermore, when a sentencing judge imposes a properly calculated Guidelines sentence, we will give great deference to that sentence. Id. at 520. The Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have determined that properly calculated sentences are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Gonzalez, 134 Fed.Appx. 595 (3rd Cir. June 20, 2005) (unpublished); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717-18 (8th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Washington, 404 F.3d 834, 850 (4th Cir.2005) (Luttig, J., dissenting) (opining that because the sentence is in accordance with the Guidelines it is presumptively reasonable). 3 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has opined that ordinarily we would expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784 (11th Cir.2005). However, in a summary order, the Second Circuit has expressly declined to afford a presumption of reasonableness to Guidelines sentences. United States v. Spencer, 150 Fed.Appx. 15 (2d Cir.2005) (unpublished). 11 We agree with our sister circuits that have held that a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range is presumptively reasonable. In stating this, we do not intend to add to a defendant's burden of demonstrating that a sentence is unreasonable; instead, we are simply recognizing that our language in Mares comports with subsequent precedent from other circuits. In other words, there does not seem to be a practical difference between the burden of rebutting a presumption of reasonableness afforded a properly calculated Guideline range sentence and the burden of overcoming the great deference afforded such a sentence. Indeed, the Second Circuit apparently perceives the burdens as similar because it cited Mares in the context of discussing other circuits that employ a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Spencer, at . 12 Additionally, the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have rejected deeming a sentence in an applicable Guideline range reasonable per se. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 385 n. 9 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786-87 (11th Cir.2005). We likewise decline to find a properly calculated Guidelines sentence reasonable per se. To say that a sentence within the Guidelines range is `by itself' reasonable is to ignore the requirement that the district court, when determining a sentence, take into account the other factors listed in section 3553(a). Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. 13 In the instant case, the district court properly took into consideration Alonzo's relevant conduct in determining his sentencing range under the Guidelines. Thus, Alonzo's sole argument is without merit. He has failed to demonstrate that his properly calculated Guidelines sentence, which was at the lowest end of the range, was unreasonable. He is not entitled to relief. 14 For the above reasons, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.