Opinion ID: 204952
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chevron's Step Two

Text: Vásquez argues that, even if this court finds § 1229b ambiguous, the [BIA]'s interpretation is impermissible given the strict construction that should be given immigration statutes, particularly removal statutes. Again, we disagree. First, as the Third Circuit has observed, [i]n light of the INA's enormously broad delegation to the Attorney General, we would be extremely reluctant to hold that his interpretation of the INA is unreasonable. Mendez-Reyes, 428 F.3d at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying step two); see also Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 970 (We must also be mindful that `judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.' (quoting Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439)). Second, an expedited removal order is clearly intended to sever an alien's ties with this country for the five-year period during which it prohibits an alien from re-entering the United States. See § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i); Juarez-Ramos, 485 F.3d at 511. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to conclude that an alien's departure from the United States following such an order constitutes an interruption in that alien's continuous physical presence in the United States. In fact, a contrary rule would seem inconsistent with the congressional intent underlying the INA. See Juarez-Ramos, 485 F.3d at 511 (holding that expedited removal interrupts continuous physical presence because, in at least one important way, expedited and formal removals are similar. Both carry with them an explicit statutory bar to readmission for a period of five years. This statutory bar reflects a congressional intent to sever an alien's ties to this country. (internal citations omitted)); Tapia, 430 F.3d at 1002 (in distinguishing a border turnaround from a voluntary departure under the threat of removal, noting that, [t]o permit an alien who was removed or left pursuant to an administrative voluntary departure to continue to accrue physical presence would thwart Congress's clear intent that such an alien be inadmissible for years following the date of his departure). We are aware that upholding the BIA's decision might be seen as arbitrarily rewarding those aliens lucky enough to have a border official turn them around without placing them in the expedited removal process. See Juarez-Ramos, 485 F.3d at 512 (internal marks omitted). However, any construction of § 1229b will undoubtedly result in some seemingly arbitrary or unfair results, [9] and a line must be drawn somewhere. See id. The BIA was required to interpret the impact of expedited removal, which precludes an alien from returning to the country for five years, on eligibility for cancellation of removal, which authorizes relief for certain aliens who are inadmissible but have continuously lived in the United States for ten years. We cannot say that the way in which the BIA balanced the goals of these provisions of the INA was unreasonable, and we therefore defer to its construction of the statute.