Opinion ID: 1233313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: the court's charge

Text: The court explained the historical background and functions of the grand jury, and commented on the fact that it had been used so infrequently in this state that most people, even lawyers, were unfamiliar with its procedure and underlying purposes. The court then outlined the manner in which the grand jury was to perform its functions. The court stated the reasons for calling this grand jury as follows: We come now to the purpose of this grand jury and the reasons which the judges of this court thought sufficient to justify the expense to the county, and the inconvenience to and sacrifice by you, which this grand jury session will require. It seems unnecessary to review the recent testimony before a Senate Investigating Committee except to say that disclosures have been made indicating that officers of the Teamsters Union have, through trick and device, embezzled or stolen hundreds of thousands of dollars of the funds of that union  money which had come to the union from the dues of its members. It has been alleged that many of these transactions, through which the money was siphoned out of the union treasury, occurred in King County. Such crimes, if committed, cannot be punished under Federal law, or under any law other than that of the State of Washington, and prosecution must take place in King County. The necessary criminal charges can only be brought in this county upon indictment by the grand jury or information filed by the prosecuting attorney. The president of the Teamsters Union has publicly declared that the money he received from the union was a loan which he has repaid. This presents a question of fact, the truth of which is for you to ascertain. You may find that many of the transactions happened more than three years ago; this would raise the question of the statute of limitations, which ordinarily bars a prosecution for larceny after three years. There are some instances, however, where the period is extended. This is a question of law and you should be guided by the advice of the prosecutors on this and similar questions. Your investigation may conceivably result in the adoption of better standards of conduct for union officials. Some other inquiries suggested by the Senate investigation are the relationship between the officers of the Teamsters Union and a certain insurance broker; an alleged conspiracy between business men and Teamster officials in fixing prices; and the influence wielded by Teamster officers through campaign contributions to public officials. To completely investigate all of these items may be beyond the energy and endurance of yourselves, the prosecutors and their investigating staff. The financial burden of such a complete investigation may be beyond the resources of King County. I urge you to do all that you can within practical limitations to ascertain the truth or falsity of these charges. After designating the foreman of the grand jury, the court said: Now, members of the grand jury, that is all I have to say to you in the way of a formal charge. I think you all realize that your names have been selected right from the jury list which in turn is picked from the voters' registration books. You have a most serious task to perform and I know you realize it is being performed, and is to be performed, by a grand jury picked at random from among the citizens in this community, and thus we hope to keep the law close to the people. It is a tremendous responsibility, and I wish you well in your work. The court then introduced the prosecuting attorney, one regular deputy, two special prosecuting attorneys for the grand jury and the official court reporter, and terminated its charge. [6] While the charge contained this admonition, Your deliberations are secret and you are forbidden by law to disclose the vote, or even the discussion, on any question before you, no warning was given the jurors about refraining from reading newspaper or magazine articles relating to officers of the teamsters' union while they were serving as grand jurors; nor was there any admonition given the grand jurors about not listening to radio or television programs pertaining to the conduct of these officers. On the afternoon of the day that the grand jury was selected and sworn, two articles appeared in the Seattle Times concerning appellant. The headlines read: BECK OUSTED FROM A.F.L.-C.I.O. POSTS  TEAMSTER CHIEF FOUND GUILTY OF `VIOLATING TRUST.' Seattle Times, May 20, 1957. SOLON DENIES INFRINGING BECK'S RIGHTS. (`May I say that the committee has not convicted Mr. Beck of any crime, although it is my belief that he has committed many criminal offenses.') Seattle Times, May 20, 1957. The following morning, the Seattle Post Intelligencer carried this headline: McCLELLAN LAYS `MANY CRIMINAL' ACTS TO BECK. Seattle Post Intelligencer, May 21, 1957. Between that date (May 21, 1957) and July 12, 1957, when appellant was indicted, two nationally circulated weekly magazines published articles entitled: THE CASE AGAINST DAVE BECK AS SENATORS SEE IT. U.S. News & World Report, May 24, 1957. A CITY ASHAMED  DAVE BECK IS ON SEATTLE'S CONSCIENCE. Time, May 27, 1957. I shall now discuss the arguments of counsel relating to assignments of error No. 25 and No. 26. The motion to set aside and dismiss the indictment was based upon RCW 10.40.070, which provides that an indictment must be set aside when it appears: (4) That the grand jury were not selected, drawn, summoned, impaneled, or sworn as prescribed by law. It is appellant's contention that the grand jury was not impaneled as prescribed by law in that there was no interrogation by the trial court designed to enable it to determine whether or not any juror possessed a state of mind which would render him unable to act impartially and without prejudice. To this is added the further contention that the trial court's charge to the grand jury was prejudicial to appellant. My examination of the portion of the record relating to these matters convinces me that appellant's contentions are well taken. The statutes of this state relating to grand juries clearly demonstrate the legislative intent to adopt the principle that the grand jury must be impartial and unprejudiced. No complainant who may institute a prosecution shall be competent to be present at the deliberations of a grand jury, or vote for the finding of an indictment. RCW 10.28.140. Challenges to individual grand jurors may be made by such person for reason of want of qualification to sit as such juror; and when, in the opinion of the court, a state of mind exists in the juror, such as would render him unable to act impartially and without prejudice. RCW 10.28.030. In Watts v. Washington Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 409, this court, in overruling a challenge to the grand jury proceedings, pointed out that there had been no claim by the defendant that any of the grand jurors were biased or prejudiced. In State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 284, 144 Pac. 32 (1914), we upheld the right of the trial judge to excuse certain prospective jurors and stated: That it was the policy of the legislature to preserve the right to have an unbiased and unprejudiced jury and grand jury, and that no suspicion should attach to the manner of its selection in all cases, cannot be questioned.... (Italics mine.) In State v. Guthrie, 185 Wash. 464, 56 P. (2d) 160 (1936), this court, in denying a motion to quash an indictment, cited the Murphy case, supra, and the above quotation therefrom with approval and discussed the statute now codified as RCW 10.28.030 (quoted above) as follows: While this section may be said to relate to challenges made by interested persons, it is not to be construed as denying to the court the right, upon its own motion, to excuse a juror deemed to be disqualified or incompetent. To deny this right would be out of harmony with the policy of the law, which charges the court with the responsibility of insuring that qualified and impartial grand jurors are secured. (Italics mine.) Thus, our consideration of this case should be based upon the premise that appellant, as a matter of law, was entitled to an impartial and unprejudiced grand jury. Although the state in this case does not take issue with this premise, [7] the majority holds that appellant is not concerned with anything that takes place before his trial begins. In my opinion, we should view the circumstances of this case realistically and in a reasonable manner. As I read the record, a consideration of the facts of this case thus viewed can only lead to the conclusion that some, if not all, of the grand jurors had already formed certain unfavorable opinions regarding appellant's alleged conduct. To do otherwise, would seem to be contrary to all human experience. Yet, at no time were any of the prospective jurors asked if they had formed an opinion, and, if so, whether such fact would prevent them from participating fairly in an impartial investigation of the matters later referred to in the court's charge. Furthermore, no instruction was ever given them as to the legal significance to be attributed to the newspaper statements that appellant had invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege some two hundred fifty times in declining to answer questions before the Senate Committee. Yet, such fact was the subject of much comment in the various news media. As stated in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 1 L.Ed. (2d) 931, 77 S.Ct. 963, 62 A.L.R. (2d) 1344, where the court, in discussing the right to invoke this constitutional privilege, quoted from Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today: `Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege.' The failure of the court to interrogate the jurors for the existence of possible bias and prejudice against the officers of the teamsters' union constituted prejudicial error. The effect of this error was further magnified by the court's charge to the grand jury. The jurors were not instructed to base their deliberations solely upon the evidence presented to them during the course of their investigation. On the contrary, the court's charge seemed to indicate that the so-called disclosures of the Senate Committee were worthy of their consideration. Instead of instructing the jurors that they must wholly disregard the testimony before the Senate Committee, the court expressly brought it to their attention, and then stated the substance of the committee's conclusions as to appellant's conduct. Indeed, the language used implied that the court felt that the grand jurors must already be aware of these matters because of the widespread publicity accorded the Senate hearings. The court stated that the president of the teamsters' union had publicly stated that the sums received by him from the union were a loan, and that it was the function of the grand jury to investigate this matter and determine the truth in that regard. As stated in Fuller v. State, 85 Miss. 199, 37 So. 749: ... every man, whether accused or not, is entitled to the presumption of innocence until legally convicted. This presumption is binding upon the petit jury, and stands as a witness in favor of the defendant when on trial. It guards him before the grand jury until their investigations have produced proof believed by them which overthrows it. It protects him from the circuit judge in his charge to the grand jury, and forbids that any word from that high station, so apt, on account of its dignity and importance, to influence by its slightest utterance, should prejudice the grand jury when it enters upon the consideration of violations of the law. (Italics mine.) The last assignment which it is necessary to notice is No. 28, which relates to the alleged misconduct of the prosecuting officers before the grand jury during the examination of the witness, Fred Verschueren, Jr., who was bookkeeper for the Joint Council of Teamsters No. 28. The testimony of this witness before the grand jury covers one hundred eighty six pages of the record and is too long to paraphrase in this opinion. Suffice it to say that he was subpoenaed and first testified on June 20, 1957, regarding the handling of certain funds. He was excused after completing his testimony on that day. On July 10, 1957, he voluntarily appeared and asked to correct some errors in his testimony. He said he did so at the suggestion of his own counsel. In his testimony on this occasion he told about having in his custody two envelopes containing currency which he was holding for appellant. He was excused temporarily to go back to his office and bring these envelopes to the grand jury room. He did so, and the contents of each envelope was counted. There was $3,100 in one envelope and $3,500 in the other. Included in one envelope were two $500 bills. Mr. Verschueren's recollection was rather vague on some details, and his explanations regarding the change in his testimony since his June 20th appearance irked the three prosecuting officers who took turns cross-examining him. Each of them threatened the witness in various ways: (1) With prosecution for perjury four times (penalty fifteen years in the penitentiary  there is no reason for you to go to the penitentiary for somebody else); (2) invited him to take a lie detector test; (3) threatened to send the envelopes to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to find out if the witness were lying about having sealed and unsealed them. Another instance of badgering this witness was when one of the prosecuting officers said to the witness that he (the interrogator) knew that one could not get a $500 bill from a teller's window at a bank except by special request, and that we are going to assume ... that is correct. At another point, a prosecutor stated to the witness: ... nobody in the room [being the grand jury and four prosecuting officers] believes one word you say. The affidavit of appellant's counsel states on information and belief that there was such loud talking in the grand jury room that it was audible in the hall outside. The State Grand Jury Handbook, prepared under the auspices of the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association (1959), states as follows regarding the interrogation of witnesses before grand juries by prosecuting officers or jurors: All questioning should be impartial and objective, without indicating any viewpoint on the part of the questioner. The questioning of the witness Verschueren in this case could hardly be described as objective. Neither was the viewpoint of the interrogator concealed when he attempted to testify as to the only possible way to get a $500 bill at a bank and further stated, in effect, that no member of the grand jury believed a word the witness said. In order that there may be no assertion that the above described comments on the conduct of the prosecuting officers are not accurate, the pertinent portions of Mr. Verschueren's examination are set forth in Appendix A below. The functions of a prosecuting officer with respect to the grand jury are limited to the giving of legal advice (upon request) and the examination of witnesses. Our statute and the decisions from other jurisdictions indicate the scope of these functions and are discussed below. RCW 10.28.070 provides: The prosecuting attorney shall attend on the grand jury for the purpose of examining witnesses and giving them such advice as they may ask. I do not think that the phrase examining of witnesses includes threats, arguments, and comments upon the evidence such as were made in this case. In United States v. Wells, 163 Fed. 313, the court, in speaking about the duties of the prosecutor with respect to the grand jury, stated: ... the provision that the prosecuting attorney may at all times appear before the grand jury for the purpose of giving information or advice relative to any matter cognizable by them, was meant to confine him to those traditional duties of giving advice concerning procedure and the like, to the examination of witnesses, as expressly provided, and not to the expression of opinions or the making of arguments.... Nor is it proper for the prosecutor to state facts which have no relevancy to the guilt or innocence of the person under inquiry ( Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N.E. 407 (1922)); or to pass on the credibility of witnesses ( People v. Benin, 61 N.Y.S. (2d) 692, 186 Misc. 548 (1946)); or in any way influence or direct the grand jury in its findings. Williams v. State, 188 Ind. 283, 123 N.E. 209 (1919). The responsibility of the prosecutor in the trial of a criminal matter is discussed in State v. Case, 49 Wn. (2d) 66, 298 P. (2d) 500 (1956), where we quoted from People v. Fielding, 158 N.Y. 542, 547, 53 N.E. 497 (1899) these words: `Language which might be permitted to counsel in summing up a civil action cannot with propriety be used by a public prosecutor, who is a quasi -judicial officer, representing the People of the state, and presumed to act impartially in the interest only of justice. If he lays aside the impartiality that should characterize his official action to become a heated partisan, and by vituperation of the prisoner and appeals to prejudice seeks to procure a conviction at all hazards, he ceases to properly represent the public interest, which demands no victim, and asks no conviction through the aid of passion, sympathy or resentment.' See, also, State v. Reeder, 46 Wn. (2d) 888, 285 P. (2d) 884 (1955), and cases cited therein. Thus, if it is the duty of the prosecutor to conduct himself as a quasi -judicial officer in a contested criminal trial in the presence of a judge, how much more essential it is that he do so in a secret and uncontested grand jury proceeding before seventeen laymen without the presence of a judge. The conduct of the prosecuting officers in this case can hardly be characterized as quasi -judicial. Rather it is best described in the following quotation from United States v. Wells, supra , which involved a grand jury proceeding: ... a commendable zeal, which gathered force as it progressed, finally expanded into an exaggerated partisanship wholly inconsistent with the semijudicial duties of a public prosecutor, and entirely unnecessary in the execution of the powers reposed, ... The only case I have found which even remotely resembles the one at bar, in so far as it pertains to misconduct of prosecuting officers before the grand jury, is Commonwealth v. Bane, 39 Pa. Dist. & Cy. Rep. 664. There the defendants themselves were the witnesses before the grand jury, and the court quashed the indictment because the investigation was conducted by the Commonwealth's counsel in a prejudicial manner, in that the testimony of the defendants was openly derided and they were denounced as hypocrites and liars and were exhorted to repentance and confession in a highly emotional and dramatic manner, the court stating: While it is the duty of the Commonwealth's counsel, as well as his privilege, to attend upon the grand jury with matters upon which they are to pass, to aid in the examination of witnesses, and to give such general instructions as they may require, any attempt on his part to influence their action or to give effect to the evidence adduced is grossly improper and impertinent: ... The difference between the misconduct in the Bane case, supra, and that before us here is one of degree only. The witness Fred Verschueren, Jr., on his second appearance before the grand jury, was giving testimony favorable to appellant. His credibility was for the grand jury to pass upon without any comment from the prosecuting officers. It could well be that his testimony was disbelieved by the grand jury solely as a result of the conduct of the prosecuting officers as shown in Appendix A. Whether such conduct, in and of itself, would be sufficient to invalidate the indictment or not, it is not necessary to determine. However, it could only serve to further prejudice the grand jury, and, when taken in conjunction with the other errors previously discussed, deprived appellant of the right to an unprejudiced and impartial grand jury as contemplated by the law of this state. The errors on the part of the court in impaneling and charging the grand jury were no doubt due, in large part, to the infrequent occasions when grand juries have been called in this state. The court itself commented on this fact in its charge to the grand jury when it said that most people, even lawyers, are generally unfamiliar with grand jury procedure. [8] However, the fact remains that appellant, be he guilty or innocent, was entitled to a fair and impartial investigation of his conduct in accordance with the forms of the law before a valid indictment could be found against him. I am of the opinion that this right was denied him. As the supreme court of the United States said, in United States v. Hoffman, 341 U.S. 479, 95 L.Ed. 1118, 71 S.Ct. 814: The signal increase in such litigation emphasizes the continuing necessity that prosecutors and courts alike be `alert to repress' any abuses of the investigatory power invoked, bearing in mind that while grand juries `may proceed, either upon their own knowledge or upon the examination of witnesses, to inquire ... whether a crime cognizable by the court has been committed,' Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65 (1906), yet `the most valuable function of the grand jury ... [has been] not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between the prosecutor and the accused,' id. at 59. Enforcement officials taking the initiative in grand-jury proceedings and courts charged with their superintendence should be sensitive to the considerations making for wise exercise of such investigatory power, not only where constitutional issues may be involved but also where the noncoercive assistance of other federal agencies may render it unnecessary to invoke the compulsive process of the grand jury.