Opinion ID: 1135884
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Procedural History Motions to Sever, Redact, or Exclude

Text: Before the first trial, Moord's counsel moved to sever Moord's trial from that of codefendant Fletcher on the basis that admission of Fletcher's out-of-court statements at a joint trial at which Fletcher did not testify would violate Moord's constitutional right of confrontation. The trial court denied the severance motion; it indicated it would decide at trial any issue regarding the admissibility of Fletcher's jailhouse confession. At trial, Moord's counsel requested that evidence of Fletcher's jailhouse confession be edited to remove all references to Moord and also that the jury be instructed to consider the evidence only against Fletcher. Moord's counsel also argued that any reference to a second person being with Fletcher at the time of the shooting would be prejudicial to Moord, even if the statement did not refer to Moord by name, because other evidence placed Moord with Fletcher at the crime scene. The trial court ordered that during testimony about the jailhouse admissions, any references in those admissions to a second person be by way of a pronoun or as another person. The trial court also admonished the jury that any statement by codefendant Fletcher could not be used in any way against defendant Moord. Kramer testified at the first trial that Fletcher had said that they were using the ruse of needing a jump ... to get people to stop and that Fletcher had admitted shooting a woman who stopped her car. Before the retrial, counsel for defendant Moord again moved to sever Moord's case from that of codefendant Fletcher. The trial court again denied the motion. During the retrial, Moord's counsel renewed the severance motion, which the trial court again denied. As noted above, Kramer testified at the second trial that [Fletcher] told me that he and a friend were on a freeway ramp and had a cab or a vehicle  like there was a cab or something there, and they were using jumper cables or some kind of ruse to get people to stop and that they were doing that so when people would stop that they could rob them, take their money. The trial court instructed the jury that this testimony was admissible against Fletcher but not against Moord. The jury at the second trial convicted Moord and Fletcher of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189) and attempted second degree robbery ( id., §§ 211, 212.5, 664). As to Fletcher alone, the jury found true the special circumstance of murder in the commission of an attempted robbery ( id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The court sentenced Fletcher to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for the murder and to an additional and consecutive determinate term for an unrelated offense and for certain enhancements. The court sentenced Moord to a term of 25 years to life for the murder, and it imposed an additional and consecutive determinate term for certain unrelated offenses and enhancements. Both defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal consolidated the appeals for argument and disposition. As to Moord, the Court of Appeal reversed his convictions for murder and attempted robbery and affirmed his convictions for unrelated offenses. The reversal was based on the Court of Appeal's conclusion that admission of Fletcher's statements to Kramer violated Moord's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. [2]