Opinion ID: 1735237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Allegation of Equal Protection Violations

Text: ¶ 14. Judge Byers alleges that the Commission has recommended discipline against African-American judges in 24% of the total reported cases while they hold less than 12% of the judgeship positions and that this is proof of its racial discrimination. In support of this allegation, Judge Byers cited, and this Court has taken judicial notice of, various documents relating to race and judgeships in Mississippi and elsewhere. In response, the Commission argues that the documents presented to this Court for judicial notice are, by no means complete or necessarily accurate .... they have no probative value whatsoever and in no way suggest any violation of equal protection ... It should be noted that the order of this Court which granted judicial notice of the various documents does not state nor infer that the fifteen documents, consisting of more than 340 pages, had been reviewed or accepted as authoritative by this Court. ¶ 15. Judge Byers's counsel admits that she does not have a factual basis for the racial discrimination allegation, but argues that this is caused by the inherent difficulties in obtaining such facts due to the confidential nature of the Commission's records. The Commission points out that prior to trial, Judge Byers made no attempt, through discovery or otherwise, to support her claims of discrimination and only raised the issue at the close of her case at the formal hearing, in response to a Commission member's question regarding her motion to dismiss. The Commission asserts that Judge Byers' motion to dismiss is essentially based upon a claim of selective prosecution .... ¶ 16. Judicial performance proceedings are civil in nature but both Judge Byers and the Commission cite a criminal case, United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-65, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 1486, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), as their primary authority on this issue. In Armstrong, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the standard for selective prosecution claims is a demanding one and that the standard for a criminal defendant to prove the claim demands clear evidence to displace the presumption that a prosecutor has acted lawfully. The standard set forth in Armstrong would require a showing that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted. Id. at 1486-87. Judge Byers's recitation of various statistics from various publications, and her interpretation of the numbers in her references to Mississippi cases fall far short of the Armstrong standard. ¶ 17. Proceedings before the Commission begin either by submission of a written complaint or upon the Commission's own motion based on information received. Thus, the process of prosecution or investigation of a judge begins when information is received by the Commission. Each complaint is evaluated. Unless the complaint is dismissed at this point, the Commission's procedures require notice to the judge in question, who is given full opportunity to respond and be heard. ¶ 18. If the judge appeals the Commission's decision, this Court renders an independent judgment following a de novo review based on clear and convincing evidence. Spencer, at 174. The record in this case presents minimal proof in support of Judge Byers's claim that her equal protection rights were violated. There has been no proof presented that warrants a finding of abuse of prosecutorial discretion based on race or gender. ¶ 19. There is no indication in this case that the procedural safeguards established by the legislature were abused or that the judge's rights were violated. Judge Byers admitted that she had, in fact, done the acts which resulted in the formal complaints, including applying an incorrect statute to sentence a defendant; improperly modifying or extending a defendant's probation contrary to law and having a reporter arrested for direct contempt and jailed without bond, thereby not applying proper procedures. In each of these incidents, the fact that these actions occurred is not disputed by Judge Byers. No proof was presented to show that judges of other races who were accused of these kinds of violations were not disciplined. The record simply does not support this claim by Judge Byers; and therefore, the Commission was not in error in denying the motion to dismiss.