Opinion ID: 1943879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Obstruction Count Jury Instructions and Burden of Proof

Text: Appellant argues that the jury instructions on the obstruction count unconstitutionally diminished the government's burden of proof below the beyond a reasonable doubt standard because, as part of the instruction on the definition of witness, the court instructed that there must have been a  reasonable expectation  that Wiseman would testify. A jury instruction which lowers the standard of proof below the reasonable doubt standard is unconstitutional and subject to reversal. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278-81, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). However, we do not have that situation before us. The jury instructions at appellant's trial explicitly set the appropriate standard of proof for the obstruction statute and the meaning of the term witness pursuant to Smith. The trial judge instructed the jury that it had to find each of the elements of obstruction of justice beyond a reasonable doubt, including: [t]hat the defendant knew or believed that Takisha Wiseman was a witness. The term witness means a person who knows or is supposed to know facts material to the case then pending, and who may be called to testify. The government need not prove that the person was certainly going to be called but must prove that there was a reasonable expectation.... [Emphasis added.] Moreover, the trial judge emphasized the importance of the jury's finding that Wiseman was a witness by specifically instructing them, If you have a reasonable doubt that Takisha Wiseman was a witness (as defined in the obstruction of justice instruction), you must find the defendant not guilty of obstruction of justice. [11] The fact that the instruction referred to a reasonable expectation does not render that instruction improper because that phrase refers strictly to the expectation within the mind of appellant as to whether Wiseman would at some point testify. The jury was still required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had such an expectation. It would certainly be possible for a defendant to obstruct the testimony of a person within the meaning of the statute, even under a belief that the person was only somewhat likely to testify against him (as, for example, if the person were a loyal friend), so long as the defendant's belief rose to the reasonable expectation level. See Smith, supra, 591 A.2d at 232 (whether the person `may' be called to testify; whether there is a reasonable expectation [by the defendant] to that effect). Because the given jury instructions required the jury to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had a reasonable expectation that Wiseman was a witness, the requisite standard of proof was not diminished in this case.