Opinion ID: 2982994
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impeachment with Unrelated Judicial Opinion

Text: We generally review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Holden, 557 F.3d 698, 703 (6th Cir. 2009). Evidentiary rulings challenged as violating the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause are reviewed de novo. United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 829 (6th Cir. 2013). Richardson argues that the district court erred by refusing to permit him to impeach a government witness, Officer Herzog, with a prior judicial finding that Herzog’s testimony was not credible. Richardson contends that the court’s decision to disallow the introduction of this evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 608(b) and 403 violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. Nos. 13-2655/2656 United States v. Richardson Page 17 The extrinsic evidence at issue is a 2002 opinion in which the Honorable Denise Page Hood of the Eastern District of Michigan granted a motion to suppress evidence in an unrelated case (hereinafter “2002 case”). United States v. Nelson, No. 02-cr-80254, slip op. at 7, 9 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2002). In that opinion, the district judge determined that two officers, one of whom was Officer Herzog, lacked probable cause for a traffic stop. In reaching this decision, the district judge expressed skepticism regarding the credibility of the officers’ testimony. Although the opinion did not differentiate between the testimony of the two officers in making the subsequent credibility determination, it bears noting that the testimony of the officers differed substantially. While Officer Herzog’s partner testified that he saw a gun in the defendant’s waistband and that he saw the defendant urinating in a public alley, Officer Herzog testified that he did not see a gun in the defendant’s waistband, but that he did see the defendant urinating in public. The district judge found that, given the poor lighting in the alley, the officers would not have been able to see a gun in the defendant’s waistband from their location. This finding is not inconsistent with Officer Herzog’s testimony. With regard to the officers’ testimony about public urination, the district judge noted that “[t]he Court finds incredible that Defendant would urinate in public in the manner described by the officers.” Id. at 7. The district court in this case excluded the 2002 opinion as impermissible collateral evidence under Rule 608(b) and also under Rule 403, due to the concern that introducing this opinion would lead to jury confusion and prejudice to the government.
Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that “extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.” However, Rule 608(b) also provides that “the court may, on cross-examination, allow [these specific instances] to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of [a witness].” We have previously noted that Rule 608(b)’s prohibition on extrinsic evidence is “designed to prevent distracting mini-trials on collateral matters.” Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 744 (6th Cir. 2000). Rule 608(b) therefore places “within the discretion of the trial court” whether to permit cross-examination about specific conduct that may be probative of a witness’ truthfulness or lack therefore. Id. Nos. 13-2655/2656 United States v. Richardson Page 18 In this case, the district court determined that the judicial opinion Richardson sought to introduce on cross-examination: (1) was the type of evidence intended to be precluded by Rule 608(b), (2) was not clearly probative of the witness’ character for truthfulness, (3) would likely confuse or mislead the jury, and (4) could prejudice the government. The district court did not abuse its discretion in reaching these conclusions. As a preliminary point, a judicial opinion making a credibility determination does indeed appear to be the type of extrinsic evidence disallowed by Rule 608(b). See United States v. Taylor, 471 F. App’x 499, 521 (6th Cir. 2012) (opining that an opinion written by a district judge “may not be admitted as extrinsic evidence” under Rule 608(b)); United States v. Mendez, 303 F. App’x 323, 325 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that official reports of a witness interview were inadmissible under Rule 608(b) as extrinsic evidence of collateral matters). Moreover, the district court was within its discretion in determining both that the crossexamination sought by Richardson would likely lead to jury confusion and that it lacked probative value. The district court’s credibility determination in the 2002 case was generalized as to both testifying officers and seemed to relate to Officer Herzog primarily with respect to the question of whether a defendant urinated in an alley in a particular manner at a particular time of night. It was reasonable for the district court in this case to conclude that the previous district judge’s incredulity regarding Officer Herzog’s testimony was not probative of his general character for truthfulness. Additionally, given the context and nature of this credibility assessment, if the 2002 case were raised on cross-examination, the jury would need to be presented with detailed testimony regarding an entirely collateral matter in order to assess its probative value. This type of collateral “mini-trial” is precisely what Rule 608(b) is intended to prevent, and why the decision of whether or not to permit such cross-examination should be, and is, within the district court’s discretion. Richardson further contends that the district court erred in its application of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because Officer Herzog’s testimony was important to the government’s case. However, Richardson misconstrues the Rule 403 analysis. Rule 403 allows the district court to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury . . . .” The Nos. 13-2655/2656 United States v. Richardson Page 19 district court acted within its discretion in determining that the limited probative value of the 2002 case was outweighed by the danger that the jury would be confused or misled and the possibility of prejudice to the government.
Richardson also argues that the district court’s decision not to permit cross-examination regarding the 2002 case violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant “an opportunity for effective cross-examination.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (emphasis omitted). It does not guarantee the right to “cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Id. “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’s safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” United States v. Cunningham, 679 F.3d 355, 384 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). As has already been discussed, the district court’s decision to prohibit cross-examination regarding the 2002 case was based on prudential concerns that fall within the court’s “wide latitude” to impose limits on cross-examination, namely concerns about jury confusion, prejudice to the government, and interrogation that is only marginally relevant. See id. Accordingly, the district court did not violate Richardson’s right to cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause by prohibiting cross-examination regarding the 2002 case.