Opinion ID: 2457222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extra-judicial identification

Text: Mr. Monk argues that both the photo lineup and the physical lineup procedures were unnecessarily, and unconstitutionally, suggestive. Prior to discussing those procedures, however, we note that Mr. Monk has cited Synoground v. State, 260 Ark. 756, 543 S.W.2d 935 (1976), for the proposition that identity cannot ordinarily be established by evidence of an extrajudicial identification as original evidence. The decision in the Synoground case was based on Trimble v. State, 227 Ark. 867, 302 S.W.2d 83 (1957), in which we held that evidence of extrajudicial identification could not be used to buttress unimpeached testimony of a witness making an in-court identification. We have strong doubts whether those cases apply here in view of the fact that the victim made no in-court identification subsequent to the omnibus hearing, and her identification at the omnibus hearing was certainly impeached. In any event, the objection raised at the trial was not on the basis of the rationale expressed in the Synoground and Trimble cases, so we need not consider it here. Penn v. State, supra ; Campbell v. State, 319 Ark. 332, 891 S.W.2d 55 (1995). From the constitutional perspective, the admissibility of testimony concerning pretrial identification is determined on standards similar to those applied to identification testimony offered in court. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 381, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). A pretrial identification violates the Due Process Clause when there are suggestive elements in the identification procedure that make it all but inevitable that the victim will identify one person as the criminal. Bishop v. State, 310 Ark. 479, 839 S.W.2d 6 (1992). Even if the identification technique used was impermissibly suggestive, however, testimony concerning it is admissible if the identification was reliable. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); Bishop v. State, supra . The factors to be considered in the determination of reliability are: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the prior description; (4) the level of certainty; and (5) the time lapse between the crime and the confrontation. We do not reverse a ruling on the admissibility of an identification unless it is clearly erroneous, and we do not inject ourselves into the process of determining reliability unless there is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Bishop v. State, supra .