Opinion ID: 1541378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Chocorua's Cross-appeal

Text: In its cross-appeal, Chocorua argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the Agreement created an enforceable first refusal contract between the parties. Specifically, Chocorua asserts that the trial court's finding that the Agreement represent[ed] a `meeting of the minds' as to the subject first refusal right(s), is incompatible with the court's determination that the parties . . . intend[ed] to execute a separate document conveying the first refusal right(s) that could have contained additional terms. Chocorua argues that, at most, the Agreement represented an agreement to enter into a contract, which it contends is unenforceable in these circumstances. We disagree. A valid, enforceable contract requires offer, acceptance, and a meeting of the minds on all essential terms. Durgin v. Pillsbury Lake Water Dist., 153 N.H. 818, 821, 903 A.2d 1003 (2006). A meeting of the minds is present when the evidence, viewed objectively, indicates that the parties have assented to the same terms. Syncom Indus. v. Wood, 155 N.H. 73, 82, 920 A.2d 1178 (2007). The question of whether a `meeting of the minds' occurred is a factual question to be determined by the trier of fact, Fleet Bank-NH v. Christy's Table, 141 N.H. 285, 288, 681 A.2d 646 (1996), as is the issue of whether a valid contract was created, Gulf Ins. Co. v. AMSCO, 153 N.H. 28, 43, 889 A.2d 1040 (2005). Accordingly, on these issues, we will sustain a trial court's findings and conclusions unless they are lacking in evidentiary support or tainted by an error of law. Syncom Indus., 155 N.H. at 82, 920 A.2d 1178. In this case, after considering all of the evidence  including Chocorua's assertion that it would have requested that additional terms be incorporated into the contemplated right of first refusal contract  the trial court concluded that the Agreement encompassed the rights and obligations placed on each respective party and represented a `meeting of the minds' as to the subject first refusal right(s). There is ample evidence in the record to support this conclusion. See 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 57 (2004) (Courts liberally find right-of-first refusal clauses to be specific enough to be enforced, even if they are missing some important terms.). First, the Agreement contains a description of the property affected by the rights of first refusal. Second, the Agreement contains provisions describing the nature of the right of first refusal  that is, a covenant against the Masonian lots  and the period of time in which the rights would remain in effect  that is, a period of twenty years, extendable to eighty years upon Glick's election. Third, as noted above, the Agreement also contains language describing, in detail, how the rights would be triggered and how they would be exercised. And finally, despite the fact that the parties contemplated the execution of a separate first refusal document, the Agreement explicitly states that all obligations and rights under this [A]greement shall survive the delivery of the deeds contemplated in th[e] Agreement. Chocorua's argument that the trial court erred in finding that the Agreement created a first refusal contract appears to be premised upon an erroneous reading of the trial court's order. Despite Chocorua's assertions to the contrary, the trial court did not find that the Agreement failed to contain all terms that the parties regarded as material to rights of first refusal. (Emphasis added.) Rather, the court merely found that the parties did indeed intend to execute a separate document conveying the first refusal right(s) and that possibl[y], perhaps probabl[y], . . . additional terms would have been included in that document. (Emphasis added.) Nothing in this language suggests that the trial court believed that those additional terms were material. See Lower Village Hydroelectric Assoc. v. City of Claremont, 147 N.H. 73, 75, 782 A.2d 897 (2001) (explaining that [a] written memorandum is sufficient to establish a contract if it demonstrates that the parties have manifested their intent to be bound to the essential terms of a more detailed forthcoming agreement (emphasis added)). To the contrary, this language, when considered in light of the court's determination that the Agreement encompassed the rights and obligations placed on each respective party, indicates that the court found the purported additional terms proffered by Chocorua to be minor details. See id. at 76, 782 A.2d 897 (explaining how a contract can exist regardless of whether the parties contemplated further negotiations of minor details). Because we disagree with Chocorua's interpretation of the trial court's order, we cannot find that the court erred in holding that the Agreement created an enforceable contract. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on this issue. Reversed in part; affirmed in part; and remanded.