Opinion ID: 202065
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excludability as Charged

Text: 52 The Estradas' second line of attack goes to the IJ/BIA determination that they were in fact excludable as charged: they say that Estrada was not attempting a new entry and that the government did not properly revoke their immigrant visas before they commenced their journey to the United States. This presents the mixed standard of review: the factual determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence test, see Ang v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir.2005); the BIA's interpretations of law are reviewed with deference, see Elien, 364 F.3d at 396-97. 53
54 As to the new entry issue, the Estradas say that once Estrada was accorded protected registered class status under the ABC agreement after his initial entry in 1985, he kept that status intact when entering the United States subsequent to the ABC agreement preliminary approval date of December 19, 1990. The Estradas say that in light of Estrada's status as a registered ABC class member, his first and only entry was in October 1985, his 1995 arrival should not have been deemed a new entry, and the children's status is the same. They say their situation involved merely an innocent, casual, and brief departure. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462, 83 S.Ct. 1804, 10 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1963). Whatever the merits of this argument, the government points out that it was not raised before the BIA. Although the Estradas clearly invoked the ABC Agreement before the BIA, they did so only as to administrative closure, and they did not articulate an innocent, casual, and brief argument before the BIA. The argument is therefore waived. See Chen v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 151, 154 (1st Cir.2005). 55
56 The Estradas also argue that because their visas were not revoked prior to the commencement of their journey to the United States, they should have been allowed entry, and the BIA erred in holding them excludable as charged. 9 They say that once the government discovered that the letter presented to the consulate was a forgery, the appropriate response was to put the family in deportation proceedings; they also say this would have made them eligible for relief that was not available in exclusion proceedings. 57
58 The Estradas base their argument on former INA § 205, which, before the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546 (1996), provided that revocation of the approval of any visa petition will not have effect unless there is notice prior to the petition beneficiary's commencement of travel to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1994). Their argument is that the fact that withdrawal of the visa petition occurred after their journey had commenced (and indeed, not until well after they had been paroled into the United States) means that the withdrawal was not valid and did not result in revocation of the approval of their visa petition, and that they should have been put into deportation proceedings. 59 The Estradas' conclusion is contrary to the BIA's reasonable interpretation of the statutory text. 10 The last sentence of § 1155 then provided that [i]f notice of revocation is not so given, and the beneficiary applies for admission to the United States, his admissibility shall be determined in the manner provided for by sections 1225 and 1226 of this title. Id. The pre-IIRIRA versions of §§ 1225 and 1226 dealt with exclusion, not deportation, procedures. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226 (1994). It was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that the only consequence of failure to notify before travel was that the right to admission would be adjudicated in exclusion proceedings. 60 Furthermore, INA § 221(h) provided at the time that [n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to entitle any alien, to whom a visa or other documentation has been issued, to enter the United States, if, upon arrival . . . he is found to be inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(h) (1994). The IJ found that this is what happened here, and quoted this exact language. The BIA agreed with the IJ. We see no reason for overturning the BIA's decision that exclusion proceedings were proper. 61
62 The BIA's ultimate determination that the Estradas were excludable was, far from being manifestly contrary to law, based on reasonable statutory interpretations and ample factual support. The charged grounds of excludability were 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i) 11 and (a)(7)(A)(i)(I). 12 The BIA reasonably interpreted § 1155 and concluded that nothing about the timing of P & B's withdrawal of the petition rendered the Estradas' labor certifications or immigrant visas automatically valid. The BIA cited its decision in Matter of Alarcon, 17 I. & N. Dec. 574, which rejected the argument that since [the alien] was not notified that her visa petition was revoked before she came to this country, her visa petition and, therefore, her visa were still valid. Id. at 575. Instead, the BIA said, the IJ should examine[] the applicant's visa to determine its validity, reaching a decision inherently involv[ing] scrutiny of the underlying visa petition and the relationship on which it depends. Id. at 576. If [the IJ] determines that a flaw exists in that relationship such that the alien was not actually entitled to the status which was accorded to him by the visa petition, the [IJ] may conclude that the visa is invalid. Id. This can hardly be said to be an unreasonable interpretation of the immigration statutes. 63 The Estradas fare no better with respect to the BIA's factual findings and application of law to facts. The BIA agreed with the IJ that the visas, visa petition, and labor certification were based on fraudulent information and were invalid. Estrada conceded that he forged the letter from P & B stating that he was employed, and the IJ found that if the true information about Estrada's employment situation had been submitted to the consulate, neither the labor certification nor the employment-based visas would have issued. We are hardly compelled to conclude to the contrary on this record, and we see no basis for saying that the decision that the Estradas were ineligible for admission to the United States was manifestly contrary to law. The Estradas' theory implies that one whose fraud goes undetected for a short while is entitled, simply because the INS did not detect the matter right away, to enter the United States and stay here indefinitely with an unrevokable visa, whatever its actual invalidity. We reject this theory.