Opinion ID: 200784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Drug Testing Requirement

Text: 32 Meléndez claims that the district court impermissibly delegated its authority to a probation officer when it allowed the officer to decide how many drug tests he would be required to undergo. Since he failed to object to this aspect of his sentence below, we review for plain error. Allen, 312 F.3d at 514. 9 33
34 The oral and written orders in these appeals conflict regarding the amount of discretion the court delegated to the probation officer. The written sentencing orders in both cases stated: The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release on supervised release and at least two (2) periodic drug tests thereafter, when so requested by the U.S. Probation Officer. The oral orders did not include the provision requiring at least two (2) periodic drug tests thereafter. The oral order in Appeal No. 01-2386 stated: The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of controlled substances and shall submit to drug testing within 15 days of release on supervised release and thereafter whenever so required by the probation officer. The oral order in 01-2397 was virtually identical. Therefore, pursuant to the written orders, the probation officer had to require at least two additional drug tests after the initial drug test within fifteen days of release; however, under the oral orders, the probation officer could forego any additional drug tests after the initial test. Although there is a conflict between the oral and written orders as to the number of drug tests required, we do not have to decide if this is a material conflict requiring a ruling that the oral order controls. See supra Section II.C.1.a. That is so because both the oral and written orders suffer from the same delegation infirmity. 35
36 Both a statute and the United States Sentencing Guidelines require the sentencing court to order that the defendant refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to a drug test within 15 days of release on supervised release and at least 2 periodic drug tests thereafter ( as determined by the court ) for use of a controlled substance. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2000); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a)(4) (emphasis added). 10 The court may only waive this requirement if the defendant's presentence report or other reliable sentencing information indicates a low risk of future substance abuse by the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(5); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a)(4). Meléndez claims that the inclusion of the words as determined by the court means that the court, not the probation officer, must decide how many tests a defendant should be forced to undergo. 37 As noted, both the statute and the Guidelines state that following the initial drug test within 15 days of release, there must be at least 2 periodic drug tests thereafter (as determined by the court) for use of a controlled substance. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2000); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a)(4). If there is any ambiguity in this text, it does not relate to the responsibility of the court to make the determination referenced in the statute. That responsibility could not be more explicit. But what is the determination that the court must make? The determination assigned to the court could either be the time frame for the two periodic drug tests mandated by the statute, or the number of additional drug tests to be required beyond the initial drug test within 15 days of release and the two periodic tests required by the statute. As a matter of language, the phrase at least establishes a minimum and implies that a maximum remains to be determined. As a matter of common sense, we do not think that Congress would require courts to become involved in the scheduling of drug tests. However, Congress could reasonably assign to courts the responsibility for deciding the maximum number of drug tests to be performed beyond the minimum of three mandated by Congress. See United States v. Bonanno, 146 F.3d 502, 511 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that  18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) requires that the court determine the number of drug tests to which the defendants must submit) (emphasis in original). Indeed, there is symmetry in the Congressional approach because both the statute and the Guidelines give the court the authority to waive the testing requirement completely upon a finding of a low risk of future substance abuse by the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(5); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a)(4). To respond to concerns about a high risk of future substance abuse, the court can also establish the maximum number of drug tests to be performed. 38 This responsibility does not mean that the court has to specify the exact number of tests to be performed. Consistent with the statutory language, it may specify a range, allowing probation officers to exercise discretion on the number of drug tests to be performed within that range. See United States v. Guy, 174 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir.1999) (concluding that a condition requiring the defendant to submit to `random drug tests as ordered by the Probation Office, not to exceed 104 tests per year' did not constitute plain error). The court may not, however, vest the probation officer with the discretion to order an unlimited number of drug tests. 39 The government, arguing that this plain text reading of the statute and Guidelines should not control, requested that we uphold the condition by following the reasoning of the court in United States v. Smith, 45 F.Supp.2d 914 (M.D.Ala.1999). The Smith Court evaluated a drug testing condition similar to the one in this case and rejected the defendant's delegation claim. 40 The Smith Court rested its holding on three arguments: 1) the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the 1994 Act), Pub.L. 103-322, which set forth the (as determined by the court) language in Section 3583(d), only used that language to describe the minimum of three tests that a court must impose pursuant to the plain language of § 3583(d), and to give courts discretion to reduce the minimum number of drug tests below three without requiring courts to set the maximum number of tests; 2) probation officers had the discretion to order drug tests prior to the passage of the 1994 Act and nothing in that act manifested Congress's intention to withdraw that discretion; and 3) limiting the probation officers' discretion could limit the number of tests that a probationer is required to undergo and undermine the efficiency of the supervised release system. 41 We frankly find Smith's reading of the statutory language difficult to follow. The phrase as determined by the court is unnecessary to achieve Congress's evident intent in Section 3583(d) to require courts, in the ordinary case, to require a minimum of three drug tests. Remove the language as determined by the court from Section 3583(d) and the requirement that there be a minimum of three drug tests is still there. If courts, in the exceptional case, want to disregard the requirement of Section 3583(d) that three drug tests be performed, and to order fewer or no tests, they already have that authority pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(5). 11 Again, the as determined by the court language in Section 3583(d) is unnecessary to achieve the purpose attributed to it by the Smith Court. If this language is unnecessary to impose the requirement of three drug tests as the norm or to give courts the discretion to reduce or eliminate that minimum in exceptional cases, the as determined by the court language can only mean that the court is required to determine the maximum number of drug tests to be performed beyond the three that are required. Otherwise, the language is superfluous. See, e.g., Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1117 (1st Cir.1988) (`It is the duty of the court to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.') (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 147, 152, 2 S.Ct. 391, 27 L.Ed. 431 (1883)). 42 The Smith Court says that the as determined by the court language gives the court discretion to alter the maximum number of drug tests but does not require it to do so, leaving intact the authority of probation officers to determine the maximum number of drug tests to be performed. This reading simply ignores the plain language of Section 3583(d), which gives the courts the responsibility to determine the maximum number of drug tests beyond three that would be required. Courts cannot fulfill this Congressionally-assigned responsibility by assigning it to probation officers. To the extent that the Smith Court makes a fair policy point that it is impractical to expect courts to decide years before a defendant is released exactly how many drug tests would be required after the defendant's release from prison, Smith, 45 F.Supp.2d. at 918, the authority of courts to set a range of drug tests to be performed pursuant to the statutory language meets this practical concern. 43 While it is true that, prior to the passage of the 1994 act, probation officers had discretion to order tests independently of any directive from the court, see Smith, 45 F.Supp.2d at 917 (noting that probation officers had broad discretion to administer drug tests, without specific authorization from the sentencing court), we conclude that Congress's refusal to include probation officers in the section of the 1994 Act that became 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) manifests its intent to alter the existing practice. Congress explicitly referred to the chief probation officer in each district in another section of the 1994 Act and conferred upon those officers the responsibility of establishing a drug testing program. See Section 20414 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3608). 12 Congress clearly understood the role of probation officers in providing for and administering drug programs, yet Congress included no reference to probation officers in the drug testing language of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); instead, it referred only to courts determining the number of drug tests. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208, 113 S.Ct. 2035, 124 L.Ed.2d 118 (1993) (`[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another...[,] it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.') (citation omitted). 44 Furthermore, the general statutory provisions in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, P.L. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat.2002 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3603), relied on by the Smith Court as evidence that Congress gave probation officers the authority to require drug tests, were superceded by the more specific provision in the 1994 Act that explicitly gave that power to courts. According to the Smith Court, three provisions in the Sentencing Reform Act grant probation officers authority to determine the maximum number of drug tests to be performed: 45 Section 3603 ... provides that probation officers shall keep informed, to the degree required by the conditions specified by the sentencing court, as to the conduct and condition of ... a person on supervised release, who is under his supervision, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3603(2), use all suitable methods, not inconsistent with the conditions specified by the court, to aid ... a person on supervised release who is under his supervision, and to bring about improvements in his conduct and condition, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3603(3), and keep informed concerning the conduct, condition, and compliance with any condition of probation ... of each probationer under his supervision. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3603(7). These provisions clearly grant probation officers significant discretion in the means they use to accomplish a court's order. 46 Smith, 45 F.Supp.2d at 919. Notably, these responsibilities are framed in general terms, and none of the cited provisions explicitly reference drug testing. Moreover, the specific drug testing language of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) post-dates the Sentencing Reform Act by ten years. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A., 824 F.2d 1258, 1278 (1st Cir.1987) ([T]he most recent and more specific Congressional pronouncement will prevail over a prior, more generalized statute.). We reject the government's invitation to use the general language of the 1984 act as a justification for ignoring Section 3583(d)'s plain, explicit text. 47 To be sure, there is some force to the Smith Court's concerns about the policy advantages of a supervised release system that allows probation officers to decide the extent of drug testing. Legislative history does not reveal why Congress chose to go in a different direction. But we cannot be faithful to the Congressional choice if we allow any policy reservations to control our reading of statutory language. By its plain terms, Section 3583(d) requires courts to determine the maximum number of drug tests to be performed beyond the statutory minimum of three, with probation officers permitted to decide the number of tests to be performed within the range established by the court. 13 48 Since we conclude that the sentencing court's drug testing condition delegated its sentencing authority in violation of a clear Congressional mandate, and that this disregard of the Congressional mandate was plain error, we must vacate the drug testing provisions in Meléndez's sentences and remand for re-sentencing.