Opinion ID: 1824861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: law i. direct appeal portion of rent

Text: The chancellor was correct in his holding that the commercial building housed Gates Cleaners, the income provider for both the Complainant and Defendant. Nor was he manifestly wrong in his holding that Gates was impliedly if not explicitly granted the right to continue to operate the cleaning business by the prior decree of divorce. The chancellor gave no reason for his further holding that Gladys was not entitled to a portion of the rent, and the express holding of the chancellor, in and of itself, was insufficient to deny her a portion of the rent. On appeal, however, all reasonable presumptions are in favor of the validity of the trial proceedings and judgment thereon, and it is our duty to affirm in the absence of some showing that the trial court erred. Rayner v. Lindsey, 243 Miss. 824, 138 So.2d 902 (1962). Moreover, [I]f the action of the trial judge can be upheld for any reason, we must affirm. Taylor v. F. & C. Contracting Co., Inc., 362 So.2d 625, 628 (Miss. 1978); Chatham v. Johnson, 195 So.2d 62, 64 (Miss. 1967). In DeFoe v. Great Southern Nat'l Bank, N.A., 547 So.2d 786 (Miss. 1989), we stated: This Court will generally affirm, even if it finds that the lower court has employed erroneous legal reasoning, provided only that the correct result has been achieved below. Shewbrooks v. A.C. & S., Inc., 529 So.2d 557, 564 (Miss. 1988); Allgood v. Bradford, 473 So.2d 402, 411 (Miss. 1985); Briggs v. Benjamin, 467 So.2d 932, 934 (Miss. 1985); Forman ex rel. District Attorney v. Oberlin, 222 Miss. 42, 48-49, 75 So.2d 56, 58-59 (1954). If this be so, the Court certainly must affirm where there is any ground disclosed by the record upon which the decision could have properly been reached, notwithstanding the lower court did not make explicit its grounds. Winfield v. Winfield, 203 Miss. 391, 394-95, 35 So.2d 443, 444 (1948); Securities Investment Co. of St. Louis v. Williams, 193 So.2d 719, 722 (Miss. 1967). Id. 547 So.2d at 788-89. We find, at least until the date Gladys filed her petition, that the chancellor acted within his equitable discretion in refusing to order Neville to pay Gladys any portion of the rent from this property. It needs first to be noted that it was from this commercial realty that Neville paid his alimony obligations to Gladys and supported himself. Moreover, the sole use to which this realty was put was to house the business owned and operated by Neville, which likewise was used to support Neville and pay his alimony obligations to Gladys. Their son, Ned, was living with Gladys at the time of the divorce and continued through this hearing living with his mother, although working for, and eventually purchasing Neville's business. Had Neville paid, or been directed to pay Gladys an additional sum as rent, this would have done two things: decreased his income and increased hers. This assuredly would have materially affected his alimony obligations to her. It would be inequitable to allow Gladys, after all these years of having collected alimony under the arrangement they made, to assert that she is additionally entitled to rent from this property. The formation of the corporation, and subsequent sale of the business to Ned did not alter Gladys's obligation to come forward and assert her entitlement to a portion of the rent. Insofar as the formation of the corporation to own the business, initially all corporate shares were owned by Neville, and it remained a one-man dry cleaning business owned and operated by him. It is inconceivable she did not know of the sale of the corporate shares to her son, Ned, who was living with her. It would be inequitable to allow her to retain all alimony and support benefits theretofore paid, and at the same time demand a portion of the rent which, had she received it, would most certainly have been a material factor in determining the amount of alimony and support due unto her. O'Neill v. O'Neill, 551 So.2d 228 (Miss. 1989); Perkins v. Kirby, 308 So.2d 914 (Miss. 1975). The chancellor was manifestly wrong, however, in his holding that Gladys was somehow forever precluded from asserting a claim for a portion of the rent from the building. As a joint owner of the building, she was legally entitled to one-half of the rent received by Neville.