Opinion ID: 1881529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to Prepare Mental Health Expert

Text: Stewart next argues that attorney Barbas inadequately prepared Stewart's mental health expert to testify at the penalty phase of Stewart's trial. As to this claim, we agree with the trial court, which found that counsel's preparation of the defense's mental health expert, Dr. Afield, was not deficient: In this ground, Defendant alleges that Dr. Afield was called in at the last minute as the defense's mental health expert and was not properly prepared. Dr. Afield testified that he had previously been certified as an expert in the fields of psychiatry, neuropsychology, and neurology several hundred times. According to Dr. Afield's bills, he testified that he interviewed Defendant three or four times prior to trial. On cross-examination, Mr. Chalu refreshed Mr. Barbas's recollection regarding the number of times Dr. Afield had seen Defendant prior to trial. Mr. Chalu reviewed Dr. Afield's testimony in the penalty phase transcript as to when Dr. Afield first met Defendant. Dr. Afield stated that he met Defendant the week of August 11th, and saw him three times prior to trial. Dr. Afield also reviewed numerous medical records and documents prior to trial. Mr. Barbas testified that Dr. Afield got his information about Defendant from his interviews with Defendant himself, from Mr. Barbas' interviews with friends and family members, and from the court testimony that Dr. Afield heard. Mr. Barbas also met with Dr. Afield before the [sic] testified at trial. In addition to his interviews of Defendant, he also did psychological and neurological testing of Defendant. Although he found Defendant to be disturbed, he found no evidence of brain damage or psychosis. He diagnosed Defendant as having major depression. He also testified that he was aware of Defendant's alcoholism and drug abuse, as well as Defendant's suicide attempts, major depression, and anti-social behavior. He testified that he was aware of the abuse and deprived childhood Defendant had suffered from birth to age 5, but Defendant never told him of the Scarpo abuse. Dr. Afield stated that his testimony to the jury was emphatic that Defendant's disturbed behavior and anti-social traits were caused by the years of abuse and were beyond his control. When asked if he had known about the years of the Scarpo abuse, whether it would have changed or modified his opinion or testimony at trial, Dr. Afield replied that he did not think so, it would have only served to confirm his opinion. Mr. Barbas testified that Dr. Afield stated in his trial testimony that Defendant was a sociopath and could not be rehabilitated. Mr. Barbas stated that Dr. Afield explained to him that Defendant's problems were due to Defendant finding out at age thirteen: that Mr. Scarpo was not his real father, his mother was a lesbian and committed suicide, the form of his uncle's death, and his real father was killed in a bar fight, along with all of the abuse that occurred prior to age five. Dr. Afield testified that when he stated that Defendant could not be rehabilitated, he meant that Defendant did not deserve the death penalty because he was a victim of some bad circumstances that were not his fault. After reviewing Defendant's Motion, the court files, and the trial and evidentiary hearing transcripts, the Court finds that Dr. Afield, after interviewing and testing Defendant and reviewing all available documentation concerning Defendant's psycho-social history, rendered adequate assistance on Defendant's behalf. Therefore, this ground is denied. Order Denying Defendant's Third Amended Motion to Vacate Judgments of Conviction and Sentence with Special Request for Leave to Amend at 21-23, State v. Stewart, Nos. 85-4025, 85-4825 (Fla. 13th Cir.Ct. Jun. 25, 1999).
Stewart next argues the trial court erred in denying Stewart's claim that the State failed to provide jail records to his attorney prior to trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). To be entitled to relief under Brady, a defendant must satisfy three elements: [1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued. Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 910 (Fla.2000) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). The evidence at the evidentiary hearing supports the trial court's conclusion that Stewart failed to carry his burden as to the second prong of his Brady claim: On cross-examination, Mr. Brody asked Mr. Skye if the State had ever obtained the Hillsborough County jail records. Mr. Skye stated that since there was no discovery for the penalty phase in 1985 or 1986, his recollection was that the State never obtained, thought about, or cared about those records. When asked if he thought the State had no Brady obligation to provide the jail records to the defense, Mr. Skye stated, I would say that's true because my understanding of the Brady [sic] is that the state attorney or the prosecutor doesn't have an obligation to go out and seek out exculpatory things [that] are equally available to the defendant. In view of the fact that the Hillsborough county jail records were equally available to [the] Defendant or anyone who subpoenaed them, the court finds that the State did not suppress or withhold those records. [15] Accordingly, the trial court was correct to deny Stewart's Brady claim. See Provenzano v. State, 616 So.2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1993) (There is no Brady violation where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution, or where the defense either had the information or could have obtained it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.) (citing Hegwood v. State, 575 So.2d 170, 172 (Fla.1991), and James v. State, 453 So.2d 786, 790 (Fla. 1984)).
In Stewart's remaining claim, he argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that his equal protection and due process rights were violated by his being shackled in front of the jury. On Stewart's direct appeal we determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove Stewart's shackles following a defense objection: Later, on Stewart's motion for a new trial, the court after hearing argument from both sides, ruled that the shackles were both unobtrusive and necessary. The judge pointed out that Stewart had remained stationary during the trial, thus giving the jury no opportunity to see him walk in shackles, and that the shackles were barely visible under the table. The judge was also aware that Stewart had on a previous occasion slipped off his manacles, and was facing charges of escape and attempted escape. The judge therefore had reason to believe that Stewart was a high risk prisoner who had previously tried to escape and thus presented a security risk. Though we recognize that shackling is an inherently prejudicial practice, the trial court, in this instance, properly exercised its discretion to ensure the security and safety of the proceeding. Stewart, 549 So.2d at 174 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court was correct in summarily denying this claim as it was procedurally barred. Medina v. State, 573 So.2d 293, 295 (Fla.1990).