Opinion ID: 1771239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prescription and liability of blood bank

Text: This cause of action arose on January 10, 1981, when Marna Shortess was advised she had contracted transfusion hepatitis. A claim against Touro was filed with a medical review panel on December 21, 1981, but suit was not filed until May 31, 1983. Prescription against a qualified health care provider, such as Touro, is interrupted during the deliberations of a medical review panel. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47, subd. A. [7] This medical review panel did not render its decision until March 9, 1983. Suit was timely filed against Touro within ninety days. However, the Blood Center for Southeast Louisiana, Inc., is not a qualified health care provider. Under LSA-R.S. 40:1299.41(D), [8] as interpreted in Ferguson v. Lankford, 374 So.2d 1205 (La.1979), the timely claim against Touro did not interrupt prescription against the Blood Center. Plaintiffs urge the application of contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio, i.e., prescription does not run against a person unable to bring an action. Since one is not bound to do the impossible, a party excusably ignorant of a claim is not barred by prescription. 5 Civil Law Translations at p. 465. The doctrine is discussed at length in Plaquemines Par. Com'n Council v. Delta Dev., 502 So.2d 1034 at 1054 (La.1987). Excusable ignorance exists when the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable. Plaquemines, supra, at p. 1056. Corsey v. State Dept. of Corrections, 375 So.2d 1319 (La.1979); Penn v. Inferno Manufacturing Corporation, 199 So.2d 210 (La.App. 1 Cir.1967), writ den. 202 So.2d 649. In sustaining the Blood Center's exception of prescription, the Court of Appeal stated that: ... the identity of the blood supplier was readily discernable from the records of the hospital. [9] This statement is misleading. Marna Shortess' medical records do not reveal that the blood administered to her came from any source other than the Touro Infirmary blood bank, which cross-matched the blood, and billed her for it. Because Marna Shortess did not know the transfused blood had been purchased from the Blood Center, she was unable to bring suit against that party. [P]rescription does not run against one who is ignorant of the existence of facts that would entitle him to bring a suit, when such ignorance is not wilful and does not result from negligence. Simply because these facts may have been obtained at a particular place or in a particular manner, and the plaintiffs did not happen to make a search in that particular place and especially since they had never been put on notice and were wholly ignorant of the existence in any place of the facts upon which to base an action, this Court does not think their ignorance is wilful nor the result of any negligence on their part. Walter v. Caffall, 192 La. 447, 188 So. 137 at 143 (1939). Not only were plaintiffs unaware that the Blood Center furnished the blood, the Blood Center itself, in answer to Touro's request for admissions on April 14, 1986, claimed insufficient information known or readily obtainable for the Blood Center to admit furnishing Marna's blood. Since plaintiffs could not have reasonably known the source of the blood represented to be Touro's until Touro's revelation on December 22, 1982, suit against the Blood Center on May 31, 1983, was timely. It was filed within three years of the November 26, 1980, operation. LSA-R.S. 9:5628. [10] The blood bank is liable for damages sustained by the plaintiff and intervenor under the DeBattista rationale.