Opinion ID: 2598353
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Default order

Text: Barry filed a motion to set aside the default order, which granted Lindner temporary child custody and allowances, under NRCP 60(b)(1)mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Barry argued that after meeting with Lindner and her attorney, he was under the impression that Lindner's attorney had given him an extension within which to respond to Lindner's motion. The district court denied Barry's motion, finding that Barry's failure to respond was not the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect because Barry was personally served with Lindner's motion, was faxed a letter explaining the length of time for him to respond, and was mailed a copy of Lindner's request for submission of the motion. On appeal, Barry contends that the district court erroneously denied his motion to set aside the default order because he had no intent to delay the proceedings, he was unaware of the procedural requirements, he believed he had an open extension of time to file an opposition, he did not have counsel when the default order was entered, he acted in good faith, and he had a meritorious defense to Lindner's motion. This court will not disturb a district court's decision regarding an NRCP 60(b) motion absent an abuse of discretion. [6] However, the district court's discretion is a legal discretion that cannot be sustained where there is no competent evidence to justify the court's action. [7] Under NRCP 60(b), the district court may relieve a party from an order on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. [8] The district court should consider the following factors when deciding whether to set aside a default: (1) a prompt application to remove the judgment; (2) the absence of an intent to delay the proceedings; (3) a lack of knowledge of procedural requirements; and (4) good faith. [9] A party requesting a district court to set aside a default need not show a meritorious defense. [10] But, the district court must consider the state's underlying basic policy of deciding a case on the merits whenever possible. [11] In applying the factors to set aside a default, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to set aside the default order. Certainly, Barry timely filed his motion to set aside the default order because he filed his motion less than a month after the district court entered the default order. And there is no evidence that Barry intended to delay the proceedings. However, Barry failed to present any facts establishing mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. As the district court found, Barry was personally served with Lindner's motion, he received a letter thereafter informing him that he had ten days to respond, and he received a copy of Lindner's request for submission of the motion.