Opinion ID: 541986
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court's admission of evidence of other crimes.

Text: 27 This Court will not review the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' interpretation of state law. Burrus, 808 F.2d at 581. 1. Offer to Dismiss 28 The trial court ruled that Stomner's counsel could not ask Detective Grann whether Grann, another detective and the deputy district attorney had made an offer to Stomner which he did not accept. According to Stomner, the offer was to dismiss the charges against him if he testified to a link or connection between Hecht and Wheeler. Stomner argued that the jury should have this information. The jurors could infer from it that Stomner was truthful when he declined the offer, since had Stomner been able to provide the link, he would have been a fool not to do so. 29 State v. Stomner, 141 Wis.2d 973, 414 N.W.2d 318 (Wis.Ct.App.1987). The trial court determined that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay concerning a prior consistent statement. The state has the power to apply evidentiary rules which serve the interests of fairness and reliability. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986). In addition, the evidence was inadmissible evidence of a plea bargain under Wis.Stat. Sec. 904.10. The exclusion of this evidence did not result in a fundamentally unfair trial. 2. Psychiatric Testimony 30 The accused has a fundamental right to present witnesses in his own behalf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). This right does not require a trial court to permit any proposed defense expert to take the stand. Burrus, 808 F.2d at 581. Stomner wanted to rebut an inference that he had discussed the proposed murder in a series of telephone calls with Hecht. Stomner proffered the testimony of a psychiatrist on the characteristics of Hecht's personality. The trial court excluded the evidence because Stomner proposed to use the evidence to support an inference regarding the subject matter of conversations held years before the psychiatrist had treated Hecht. State v. Stomner, 141 Wis.2d 973, 414 N.W.2d 318 (Wis.Ct.App.1987). The court concluded that the evidence would confuse the jury and invade the jury's role of assessing Hecht's credibility. Id. We cannot find that the exclusion resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. 3. Other Crimes Evidence 31 On direct examination, Stomner testified that he had no prior knowledge that Hecht could be hired for criminal activity. On cross-examination the state asked Stomner whether he had hired Hecht in 1982 for a car burning incident; Stomner responded in the negative. We find that this questioning did not create a fundamentally unfair trial. The introduction of improper evidence of other crimes will not support a grant of the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus. See United States ex rel. Searcy v. Greer, 768 F.2d 906, 910 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 996, 106 S.Ct. 412, 88 L.Ed.2d 363 (1985). 32 Finally, Stomner argues that the cumulative effect of the three evidentiary rulings deprived him of a fair trial. None of the three rulings, when considered in isolation, resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. We find no merit in the contention that the three innocuous rulings, when considered cumulatively, resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial of constitutional dimension.