Opinion ID: 795097
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Elimination of the Plaintiffs' Positions

Text: 36 On their claim that their positions were eliminated because of their age, Hecht's admits that the Plaintiffs have met the first three factors of their prima facie case. The parties disagree, however, on the fourth factor—whether the Plaintiffs were singled out based on their age. 37 The Plaintiffs rely primarily upon statistical evidence to show that they were singled out. In determining whether there is a question of fact, we must first identify the proper group of employees with which to compare against the Plaintiffs. In other words, in comparison to which group were the Plaintiffs purportedly singled out? Identifying this group is not always a simple task, especially in cases involving a companywide workforce reduction affecting numerous divisions with different decisionmakers. 38 The Plaintiffs argue that we should look only at the Nashville-area DSMs. This is a relatively small sample, and the Plaintiffs were older than all of the employees whose positions were not designated for elimination. There are, however, no sound reasons for limiting the review group to this small sample. On the other hand, Hecht's suggestion that we should look to all eighty one of its department stores also falls short. 39 Hecht's used different criteria in determining whether to eliminate DSM positions than it did for other positions (e.g., ASM positions). There were also various decisionmakers looking at different positions across Hecht's and The May Stores. Accordingly, we must insure that any observed disparity in the treatment received by the Plaintiffs versus other employees is not the result of legitimate differences in how the company selected other positions for elimination or how a particular decisionmaker who had no voice in the Plaintiffs' positions made certain recommendations on other positions. In essence, the group must provide a consistent benchmark to gauge whether the Plaintiffs were singled out. Cf. Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1468 (6th Cir.1990) ([W]e cannot say that it is illogical to include all of the employees who could have been considered by the management personnel involved in the decision); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1274 (D.C.Cir.1984) (adopting an analytic method to ensure that a plaintiff's statistics measure disparities among comparably qualified workers, rather than disparities in qualifications). Logically, therefore, the relevant group must include: (1) the Plaintiffs' positions; (2) all of the positions slated for elimination that were reviewed by the same decisionmaker(s); and (3) all equivalent, but only the equivalent, positions of those held by the Plaintiffs—i.e., the group consists only of DSMs. The group which satisfies all three conditions will consist of all (but only) DSM positions, including the Plaintiffs', which were actually reviewed for possible elimination by the same decisionmakers. 40 There were five persons involved in determining whether the Plaintiffs' positions were to be eliminated. Of the five, Grafton had the narrowest scope of responsibility—his region. All of the other decisionmakers had some involvement in reviewing positions outside Grafton's region. 41 Focusing on Grafton's region, Hecht's presented convincing evidence that it reviewed all DSM positions within the region for possible elimination, and the Plaintiffs have offered no contrary evidence. Thus, this group—DSMs within Grafton's region—satisfies the criteria set out above: (1) it includes the Plaintiffs' positions; (2) the same decisionmakers were involved; and (3) it includes each and every DSM position within Grafton's region. 42 In focusing on Grafton's region, it becomes clear that Hecht's did not discriminate against the Plaintiffs by slating their positions for elimination. Again, as the Plaintiffs have no direct evidence of discrimination, they must rely on statistical and circumstantial evidence of discrimination to support their prima facie case. As for the first type of evidence, 43 Appropriate statistical data showing an employer's pattern of conduct toward a protected class as a group can, if unrebutted, create an inference that a defendant discriminated against individual members of the class. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir.1975). To do so, the statistics must show a significant disparity and eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparity. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1274 (D.C.Cir. 1984). 44 Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1466 (emphasis added). Here, the relevant statistical evidence does not show such a disparity: 45 &#x2022; the average age of all the DSMs within Grafton's region just prior to the workforce reduction was 41.7 years; 46 &#x2022; the average age of the eight DSMs whose positions were eliminated was 43.4 years; and 47 &#x2022; of those eight DSM positions, three were held by persons below 40 years of age, and five were above that age. 8 48 The slight difference in average ages in DSMs positions eliminated compared to the pre-elimination DSMs—1.7 years—is not significant. Nor do these statistics counter the most obvious explanations for the position eliminations—i.e., low sales volume at certain stores and lower proficiency among certain DSMs. See id. (noting that the most obvious explanations for the discharge of any one employee are lower proficiency and/or random chance). The Plaintiffs argue that their statistical evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact, but their evidence is derived solely from the Nashville-area stores, not Grafton's entire region, and therefore has little consequence. 49 The Plaintiffs likewise offer little in terms of circumstantial evidence. Rafferty argues that his position should not have been eliminated because, at the time of the restructuring, Hecht's had plans for a new store in his area, one with projected sales exceeding the $26m threshold. Yet, the new store was not completed until approximately fifteen months after the workforce reduction. A company is not obligated to retain an employee otherwise subject to a workforce reduction because it expects to have an opening in the not-too-distant, but not immediate, future. If an employer is under no duty to transfer an employee subject to a workforce reduction, Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir.1999), an employer is certainly under no duty to retain an employee until another position opens up. 50 The Plaintiffs have not shown by statistical or other evidence that they were singled out by Hecht's because of their age. Accordingly, they have not met their prima facie burden on their position-elimination claim. Although the district court granted summary judgment on a different ground, we can affirm judgment on a ground other than the one considered by the lower court. Hoge v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 384 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir.2004).