Opinion ID: 1830222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Failure to File Plea in Bar

Text: McCracken next contends, in his fifth assignment of error, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his trial attorney failed to file a plea in bar to preserve the issues raised by the State in the juvenile petition. The thrust of McCracken's claim is that he was placed in jeopardy before the juvenile court and then twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense when the State was allowed to dismiss the juvenile petition and immediately file an information in the district court. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part: [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The Nebraska Constitution provides similar protection in article I, § 12, where it is stated, No person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. The Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the U.S. Constitution and the Nebraska Constitution protect against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Spotts, 257 Neb. 44, 595 N.W.2d 259 (1999); State v. Howell, 254 Neb. 247, 575 N.W.2d 861 (1998). When the Double Jeopardy Clause applies, it is the second proceeding that is constitutionally endangered. State v. Franco, 257 Neb. 15, 594 N.W.2d 633 (1999). Thus, we must examine the nature of the proceedings before the juvenile court, as the critical inquiry in the instant case is whether McCracken had been placed in jeopardy before the juvenile court. In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the extent to which the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applied in juvenile proceedings. The Court explained that it is simply too late in the day to conclude... that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has committed acts that violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many years. (Emphasis supplied.) 421 U.S. at 529, 95 S.Ct. 1779. The Court elaborated that there was little distinction between an adjudicatory hearing and a traditional criminal prosecution and held that respondent was put in jeopardy at the adjudicatory hearing. Jeopardy attached when respondent was `put to trial before the trier of the facts' ... that is, when the [j]uvenile [c]ourt, as the trier of the facts, began to hear evidence. 421 U.S. at 531, 95 S.Ct. 1779. See, also, U.S. v. Parker, 989 F.2d 948 (8th Cir.1993). On July 13, 1993, the juvenile court inquired into whether McCracken understood his constitutional rights. Prior to proceeding to adjudication, the juvenile court ordered McCracken to undergo a preadjudication evaluation, which was requested by the State. On August 24, upon completion of the preadjudication evaluation, the juvenile court ordered further evaluations to determine if McCracken was competent to stand trial. After the further evaluations were ordered by the juvenile court, the State made a motion on November 3, 1993, to dismiss the juvenile petition. At the hearing on the State's motion, the juvenile court again refused to accept McCracken's proposed no contest plea and granted the motion to dismiss. The record reflects that the only inquiries conducted by the juvenile court were into McCracken's competency to stand trial and whether McCracken understood his constitutional rights. Under Breed v. Jones, supra , it is clear that McCracken was never `put to trial before the trier of the facts' and that the [j]uvenile [c]ourt, as the trier of the facts, [never] began to hear evidence. 421 U.S. at 531, 95 S.Ct. 1779. Thus, because McCracken's juvenile case did not proceed to adjudication, we determine that jeopardy had not attached in the juvenile court when the State's motion to dismiss was sustained. We therefore conclude that McCracken's subsequent murder trial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of either the U.S. Constitution or the Nebraska Constitution. Based upon the foregoing analysis, any plea in bar filed by McCracken's trial counsel would have been properly overruled by the district court. Consequently, McCracken has failed to establish how he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to file a plea in bar, and we determine that his fifth assignment of error is likewise without merit.