Opinion ID: 2537211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The trustees' standing to file a claim on the payment bond under NRS 339.035

Text: With regard to the trustees' standing to file a claim against the payment bond under NRS 339.035, subsection 1 of that statute provides that any claimant who has performed labor or furnished material in the prosecution of the work provided for in any contract for which a payment bond has been given ... and who has not been paid in full may bring an action on the bond. (Emphasis added.) Subsection 2 of NRS 339.035, read in accordance with federal interpretations, further limits claimants to those persons who have either a direct contractual relationship with the general contractor or a direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor and who provide notice to the general contractor. See, e.g., MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 108, 64 S.Ct. 890, 88 L.Ed. 1163 (1944). Here, the trustees provided no labor or materials and have no direct contractual relationship with Richardson; their relationship with Desert Valley at best renders them third-party beneficiaries of the labor agreement between Desert Valley and Local 872. See Lipshie v. Tracy Investment Co., 93 Nev. 370, 379, 566 P.2d 819, 824-25 (1977) (noting that an individual obtains third-party-beneficiary status when contracting parties demonstrate a clear intent to benefit the individual, a third party, by their contract). While the parties agree that the trustees are third-party beneficiaries and that their status as such impacts their standing to bring claims under NRS 339.035, they disagree on how their third-party-beneficiary status affects their standing. Hartford and Richardson essentially argue that the trustees stand in the shoes of the laborers. The trustees, on the other hand, contend that they are preferred third-party beneficiaries, given their role under ERISA to protect employee pensions and vacation and health benefits, meaning that they have special standing to bring NRS 339.035 claims, broader than that of the employees that they represent. We agree that the trustees are third-party beneficiaries under the memorandum agreement. But while we have recognized that a third-party beneficiary has a direct right of action against the promisor in contract, Hemphill v. Hanson, 77 Nev. 432, 436 n. 1, 366 P.2d 92, 94 n. 1 (1961), that right is not necessarily carried forward to claims against a nonparty surety, which are allowable by statute. See Morelli v. Morelli, 102 Nev. 326, 329, 720 P.2d 704, 706 (1986) (providing that, while a third-party beneficiary is generally subject to the defenses that would be valid as between the parties, the notion that a third-party beneficiary steps into the shoes of a contracting party is a misstatement of the law); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 309 cmt. c (1981) (providing that a third-party beneficiary's right to enforce a contract is direct, not merely derivative). Thus, their third-party-beneficiary status alone is insufficient to confer the trustees with standing under NRS 339.035.