Opinion ID: 2356925
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Accomplice Liability Instruction Was Erroneous

Text: ¶ 39 Because we reverse Jeffs' convictions on the basis of the erroneous consent instructions, his remaining claims of error are not dispositive and we need not reach them. We nevertheless address his claim that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury with regard to the mens rea element of the accomplice liability statute in order to guide the trial court on remand. See IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., 2003 UT 5, ¶ 10, 73 P.3d 320 (considering nondispositive argument for guidance of the parties on remand). ¶ 40 Jeffs asserts that he could not be convicted as an accomplice to the rape of Wall unless the State proved that he intended that Steed rape Wall. At trial, Jeffs unsuccessfully requested a jury instruction stating that, in order to reach a conviction, the jury must find that Jeffs intended that the result of his conduct would be that Allen Steed rape Elissa Wall. We agree with Jeffs that he was entitled to the requested instruction. ¶ 41 The trial court instructed the jury on party liability as follows: To convict Warren Jeffs as an accomplice to the crime of rape, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime: 1. That the defendant, Warren Jeffs: a. intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly solicited, requested, commanded, or encouraged another I. to have sexual intercourse ii. with Elissa Wall without consent; or b. intentionally aided another I. to have sexual intercourse ii. with Elissa Wall without consent; and 2. Allen Steed had sexual intercourse with Elissa Wall without consent. ¶ 42 Jeffs argues that one cannot be found guilty as an accomplice unless he has the required mental state for the underlying crime to be committed. In this case, Jeffs argues that the jury was not adequately instructed of this requirement. The State disagrees, pointing out that the instruction properly informed the jury of the mental state required which, in the case of rape, is an intentional, knowing or reckless mental state. State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1987); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 ([W]hen the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility.). The problem, however, is that the instruction only indicated that the reckless, knowing, or intentional mental state attached to the actions of solicited, requested, commanded, or encouraged, not to the underlying criminal conduct of rape. ¶ 43 We addressed the requisite mental state under the accomplice liability statute in State v. Briggs. 2008 UT 75, 197 P.3d 628. There, we stated that [a]n accomplice must... have the intent that the underlying offense be committed. Id. ¶ 14. Intent, as used in this context, is a legal term of art that means [t]he state of mind accompanying an act. Black's Law Dictionary 881 (9th ed. 2009). It should not be confused with the mental state designated as intentionally. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1). To restate the essential principle, accomplice liability adheres only when the accused acts with the mens rea to commit the principal offense. State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ¶ 64, 55 P.3d 573. ¶ 44 The accomplice liability statute reflects this principle in the requirement that the defendant act with the mental state required for the commission of [the] offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. This mandates that the defendant, in this case one who acts as an accomplice to rape, undertake his actions intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. But intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly in regard to what? The obvious answer is that he must act intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly as to the results of his conduct. And in order for criminal liability to attach, the results of his conduct must be a criminal offense. ¶ 45 This principle is further clarified by the statutory definitions of the possible mental state[s] required for the commission of rape. Id. A person acts [i]ntentionally ... with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Id. § 76-2-103(1). Under this mental state, the accomplice desires to cause rape. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 76-2-103(2). Under this mental state, the accomplice knows that his conduct will most likely cause rape. Finally, a person acts [r]ecklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. Id. § 76-2-103(3). Under this mental state, the accomplice recognizes that his conduct could result in rape but chooses to proceed anyway. Thus, in specifying that the accomplice act with the mental state required for the commission of the underlying offense, the accomplice liability statute clearly contemplates that the accomplice is aware of, at a minimum, the substantial and unjustifiable risk that his actions will result in the commission of a crimein this case rapeby another person. ¶ 46 The State urges an alternate interpretation of the accomplice liability statute, under which one could act intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly in the abstract and incur criminal liability if his actions resulted in soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally aiding another in committing a crime. We reject this alternate interpretation because it would sweep in too much innocent behavior. Taken to its logical extreme, this interpretation could result in accomplice liability attaching to a person who leaves his house unlocked, leading to the theft of his own personal property inside the house. But we have been careful to avoid expanding the law to this extent. ¶ 47 In State v. Comish, we held that a security officer who purchased marijuana in a sting operation could not be considered an accomplice for testimonial purposes because [u]nder [the] statute and under the generally accepted meaning of the term, ... `accomplice'... does not include a person who ... merely provides an opportunity for one who is disposed to commit a crime. 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Utah 1977). ¶ 48 And we have also held that even less innocent behaviors do not appropriately categorize an individual as an accomplice if that individual had no intention that the underlying crime be committed. In State v. Schreuder, for example, we held that a man who knew that a woman wanted to kill her father and who concealed the murder weapon after the crime was committed was not an accomplice. 726 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Utah 1986). In so holding, we stated that [p]rior knowledge does not make a person an accomplice when that person does not have the mental state required for the underlying crime. Id. While there were clearly other crimes with which the defendant in Schreuder could have been charged, there was insufficient evidence to establish that he ... had the mental state required to commit the crime [of murder], and thus he was not an accomplice. Id. ¶ 49 We clarify that an accomplice need not act with the same intent, or mental state, as the principal. Party liability under section 76-2-202 does not require that the persons involved in the criminal conduct have the same mental state. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994). A defendant can be criminally responsible for an act committed by another, but the degree of his responsibility is determined by his own mental state in the acts that subject him to such responsibility, not by the mental state of the actor. State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983) (emphasis omitted). [I]t is not necessary for the accomplice to have the same intent that the principal actor possessed as long as the accomplice intended that an offense be committed. State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, ¶ 14, 197 P.3d 628. ¶ 50 Jeffs was also entitled to his requested instruction for the independent reason that it was necessary to clarify the intentionally aids portion of the accomplice liability statute. In those cases where the defendant solicits, requests, commands, or encourages another to commit an offense, the accomplice liability statute incorporates the default mental state of recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally. However, in those cases where the defendant is charged with aiding another in the commission of the offense, the accomplice liability statute requires that the defendant's aiding be intentional. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. ¶ 51 While the jury instruction used in this case did incorporate the phrase intentionally aided, it was nevertheless confusing with respect to the issue of intent. As we explained in Briggs, To show that a defendant is guilty under accomplice liability, the State must show that an individual acted with both the intent that the underlying offense be committed and the intent to aid the principal actor in the offense. 2008 UT 75, ¶ 13, 197 P.3d 628. This is precisely the alternate instruction that Jeffs requested, but was denied. ¶ 52 Without Jeffs' proposed instruction as to intent, the jury could have convicted Jeffs if it found that Jeffs intentionally did some act, and such intentional act unintentionally aided Steed in having nonconsensual sexual intercourse with Wall. For example, even if Jeffs never intended for Steed to rape Wall, the jury instruction allowed for the possibility that he would be found guilty simply because he intentionally performed the marriage ceremony and the existence of the marriage aided Steed in raping Wall. For this reason, the jury instruction was also erroneous.