Opinion ID: 2066094
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Investigate: Pretrial Suppression Hearing

Text: Defendant contends that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel at a pretrial suppression hearing. Defendant alleges that trial counsel failed to investigate and introduce evidence: (1) that defendant is, in the words of his post-conviction counsel, mentally retarded and, consequently, incapable of understanding his Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694); (2) from a neighbor who heard police officers beat defendant during his arrest; and (3) that Chicago police officers stationed at Area 2 headquarters had a pattern and practice of using brutality in extracting inculpatory statements. Prior to trial, trial counsel moved to suppress defendant's inculpatory statement. At the hearing on the motion, defendant and his wife, Carol Mahaffey, testified in favor of the motion. Their testimony was essentially as follows. On September 2, 1983, at approximately 5:40 a.m., defendant, his wife, and their two daughters were asleep in their apartment. A knock at the door awakened them. Carol opened the door, and Chicago police officers pushed their way into the apartment with their pistols drawn. Carol and the children were soon thereafter taken downstairs. During his arrest, police punched defendant in the face, causing his nose to bleed; threw him against a wall and put a gun to his head; kicked him in the groin, causing him to collapse and curl up in a ball; and, while he was incapacitated, kicked him twice in the ribs. The officers then tightened a plastic garbage bag over defendant's head until he could not breathe. Defendant's pajamas were bloodied during the beating, so they were removed. Wearing different clothes, defendant was handcuffed and taken to Chicago police department Area 2 headquarters. In a squad car en route to Area 2, police threatened defendant with death. At the station, defendant was threatened with death if he did not tell the officers what they wanted to know. No one informed defendant of his constitutional rights. After speaking with an assistant State's Attorney, at 1 p.m., defendant gave an inculpatory statement. It was subsequently typed; an assistant State's Attorney read only the first page of the statement to defendant. Having attained only the eighth grade, defendant signed the statement without reading it. The State's case, consisting mostly of the testimony of Chicago police officers and assistant State's Attorneys, was essentially as follows. Detectives Boffo, Grunhard, and Gutrich, Sergeant Byrne, and Officer Lotito arrested defendant. Defendant was given Miranda warnings. They did not beat, kick, or otherwise abuse defendant. They allowed him to change his clothes prior to taking him to Area 2 Headquarters. Detective Kajari interviewed defendant at Area 2 headquarters. He initially gave defendant Miranda warnings. After reading each warning, Detective Kajari asked defendant whether he understood that warning. Defendant responded that he did. Defendant subsequently admitted his involvement in the crimes. Assistant State's Attorneys Irving Miller and George Velcich subsequently interviewed defendant, after giving him Miranda warnings, and took an inculpatory statement from him. The statement began with defendant again being given Miranda warnings. After each warning, defendant again stated that he understood each. After the typed statement was shown to him, defendant stated that he could read English, but asked that the statement be read to him. Defendant initialled every page of the statement and signed it at the end. A photograph of defendant taken on that day did not reveal any facial bruises, scars, or other signs of abuse. The next day, defendant was taken to Cermak Health Service. Emergency medical technician Muralles did not observe any signs of recent physical abuse. At the close of the suppression hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress his inculpatory statement. After reviewing the evidence, the court found that the great weight of the evidence showed that defendant was not abused at the time of his arrest or questioning leading up to his statement. Further, the court found that there is no substantial evidence to support the claims of brutality and there is overwhelming evidence to refute them. The court also found by overwhelming evidence that defendant was given Miranda warnings, which he understood, at each and every appropriate occasion, and that no one coerced defendant. The trial court concluded that defendant gave his statement knowingly, freely, and voluntarily. Now, in this post-conviction proceeding, defendant contends that trial counsel was constitutionally deficient in failing to investigate and introduce evidence that defendant is mentally challenged, that he was beaten during his arrest, and that police officers at Area 2 headquarters had a pattern of using brutality in extracting inculpatory statements. Defendant submits that there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted the motion to suppress had trial counsel introduced this evidence. We disagree. We conclude that defendant fails the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Thus, we need not address whether trial counsel was deficient under the first prong. See Eddmonds, 143 Ill.2d at 511-12, 161 Ill.Dec. 306, 578 N.E.2d 952. The first alleged deficiency relates to defendant's mental capacity to understand his Miranda warnings. Defendant relies on an affidavit by a clinical psychologist, who examined defendant. The psychologist opined that defendant has very low intelligence, a full scale IQ of 67, and a borderline personality disorder. He further opined that it was highly probable that [defendant] could not understand his Miranda rights when they were presented. The introduction of this evidence at the suppression hearing would not have created a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted defendant's motion to suppress. In determining whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her Miranda rights, a court considers the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the defendant and the details of the interrogation, without any one factor or circumstance controlling. ( People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 54-55, 143 Ill. Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174.) Evidence of a defendant's limited intellectual capacity, by itself, does not indicate that a defendant is incapable of waiving his or her constitutional rights and making an inculpatory statement. That is only one factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances under which the statement was made. People v. Murphy (1978), 72 Ill.2d 421, 437, 21 Ill.Dec. 350, 381 N.E.2d 677. Intelligent knowledge in the context of Miranda: need not mean the ability to understand far-reaching legal and strategic effects of waiving one's rights, or to appreciate how widely or deeply an interrogation may probe, or to withstand the influence of stress or fancy; but to waive rights intelligently and knowingly, one must at least understand basically what those rights encompass and minimally what their waiver will entail. ( People v. Bernasco (1990), 138 Ill.2d 349, 363, 150 Ill.Dec. 155, 562 N.E.2d 958.) Thus, where the record shows that a defendant's subpar intellectual capacity does not interfere with his or her ability to comprehend the meaning of Miranda warnings, the defendant's inculpatory statements will not be suppressed. See People v. Leiker (1983), 115 Ill.App.3d 752, 757, 70 Ill.Dec. 824, 450 N.E.2d 37. In the present case, the trial court reviewed the totality of the circumstances under which defendant made his inculpatory statement. In addition to the trial court's findings, we note that defendant has had many prior contacts with the criminal justice system, including six prior convictions. These prior contacts indicate a familiarity with police procedure, including Miranda warnings. Further, the trial judge personally observed defendant during the suppression hearing. Even if trial counsel had presented evidence of defendant's limited intellectual capacity, the trial court need not have accepted the psychologist's conclusions. The trial court was in the best position to evaluate defendant's ability to understand his rights. See People v. Rogers (1986), 141 Ill.App.3d 374, 380-81, 95 Ill.Dec. 660, 490 N.E.2d 133; People v. Racanelli (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 124, 131-33, 87 Ill.Dec. 187, 476 N.E.2d 1179; People v. Ellison (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 985, 991-94, 81 Ill.Dec. 222, 466 N.E.2d 1024. The trial court found by overwhelming evidence that defendant understood his Miranda warnings, which were given at every appropriate occasion. Thus, in terms of the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, we conclude that the introduction of this evidence would not have created a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted defendant's motion to suppress. The second alleged deficiency relates to defendant's being beaten during his arrest. Defendant relies on an affidavit by a neighbor who lived in the apartment directly above that of defendant. The neighbor, if asked, would have testified as follows. He knew defendant and recognized his voice. On the morning of defendant's arrest, the neighbor was awakened by the sound of fighting coming from defendant's apartment. The neighbor heard defendant screaming and the voice of a stranger screaming Get up! This evidence corroborates the testimony of defendant and his wife. However, the trial court found by the great weight of the evidence that defendant was not brutalized. Consequently, the introduction of the neighbor's testimony would not have created a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted defendant's motion to suppress. The third alleged deficiency relates to an alleged pattern and practice of Area 2 police using brutality in extracting inculpatory statements. Defendant offers the affidavit of a worker at a citizen's watchdog group. If asked, she would have testified as follows. During her work with this organization, she reviewed numerous complaints of police brutality at Area 2 between 1982 and 1984. Based on these complaints, she opined that Area 2 police engaged in a pattern and practice of brutality in extracting inculpatory statements. She further opined that defendant's allegations of brutality were consistent with this pattern and practice of brutality at Area 2. This affidavit is inadequate to show that defendant's inculpatory statement was involuntary. The affiant was privy to allegations of police brutality. However, she does not name any particular person stationed at Area 2. More specifically, she does not name any of the officers who arrested and interrogated defendant. Even if she did, it does not follow that those officers brutalized this defendant in this case. Thus, the affidavit fails to establish, generally, that police brutality exists at Area 2 and, specifically, that defendant was brutalized into giving an inculpatory statement. In terms of the Strickland test, this allegation fails both prongs. Regarding the first prong, trial counsel was not constitutionally deficient for failing to introduce this evidence because such evidence does not exist; the proffered affidavit is inadequate to show that defendant's inculpatory statement was involuntary. Regarding the second prong, defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to introduce this evidence because it would properly have been rejected as irrelevant to his particular case. Thus, there is no reasonable probability that the introduction of this evidence would have resulted in the granting of defendant's motion to suppress. After carefully reviewing the record, we cannot say that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress was unreliable or unfair.