Opinion ID: 2810874
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevant Law and the District Court’s Ruling

Text: Statements obtained during a custodial interrogation cannot be used against a defendant unless the government demonstrates the defendant was properly informed 14 of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 2008). A person is in custody when her “freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’” United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)). Courts consider several factors to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have understood her situation as one akin to formal arrest. United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008). Those factors include (1) whether the suspect was aware that she could refrain from answering questions or end the interview at will, (2) whether the questioning was prolonged and accusatory, and (3) whether the questioning took place in a policedominated atmosphere. Id. at 1240. Following a hearing, the district court denied the Zars’ suppression motion, concluding the Zars were not subject to a custodial interrogation. The court reasoned, There are two aspects—well, actually three aspects that are troublesome. The first is that the questioning went on for a period of three hours. The second is that the agents failed to advise that this was a consensual conversation. And the third is that the agents failed at any point to advise the interviewees that they had a right to seek counsel. None of these factors are dispositive, and they are outweighed, in my view, by all of the other aspects of the interrogation which reflect a consensual conversation: The agents approached the house, requested an opportunity to enter. When [Derek] Zar answered the door, he was advised of their credentials and their purpose of being there. He closed the door. At that point, he knew he did not have to talk to them. When he reopened the door, he chose to talk to them. And although I would agree with some courts that have observed the failure to reaffirm that this was a consensual conversation is probably not 15 good practice on the part of the investigating agents, it doesn’t change the fact that Mr. Zar invited them into the house after he had previously closed the door to evaluate the situation. One of the implications that’s been raised in the questioning is that the Zars were unacquainted or uninformed or ill-equipped to deal with two law enforcement officers. There is no evidence to support that. The inquiry with regard to Mr. Zar and his formal education reveals that the agent knew that he had not completed high school and, although he was 28 years old, he did not have a GED. Any concerns about that, however, I believe are relieved by the fact that his mother was present during the entirety of the interview, and there has been no information as to her inability to perceive or be familiar with what was going on during the interview. Applying the objective standard, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, I find that a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and to ask the agents to leave. Hr’g Tr., Oct. 18, 2011, Doc. 279, at 64-66.