Opinion ID: 2708446
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Opinions of Drs. Brill and Banyash

Text: The ALJ placed “great weight” on the opinion of Dr. Brill, who reviewed Ms. Beardsley’s records and concluded that she was capable of performing a range of light work. The judge gave only “some weight” to Dr. Banyash’s report al- though he examined Ms. Beardsley in person on behalf of the agency. As a general rule, an ALJ is not required to credit the agency’s examining physician in the face of a contrary opinion from a later reviewer or other compelling evidence. Not even the claimant’s treating physician, who presumably is the expert most familiar with the claimant’s condition, is given such complete deference. See Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 376–77 (7th Cir. 2006); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). But rejecting or discounting the opinion of the agency’s own examining physician that the claimant is disabled, as happened here, can be expected to cause a reviewing court to take notice and await a good explanation for this unusual step. See Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003) (“An ALJ can reject an examining physician's opinion only for reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record; a contradictory opinion of a non-examining physician does not, by itself, suffice.”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1), 416.927(c)(1) (“Generally, we give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined you than to the opinion of a source who has not examined you.”). The problem in this case is that the ALJ did not provide a valid explanation for preferring the record reviewer’s analysis over that of the agency’s examining doctor. The ALJ considered Dr. Brill’s opinion more persuasive because it was “consistent with the record as a whole.” But 10 No. 13-3609 as explained above, Ms. Beardsley’s daily activities and reported capabilities were inconsistent with Dr. Brill’s recommendations. Beyond noting that Ms. Beardsley exhibited normal range of motion in her joints, Dr. Brill provided no explanation for thinking that she was able to spend so much time on her feet (let alone climbing, operating foot controls, or crouching down). The ALJ’s conclusory statement that these findings were consistent with the record when in fact they are contradicted by it was not enough to justify elevating Dr. Brill’s opinion over all others. See Gudgel, 345 F.3d at 470. The record also does not support the ALJ’s explanation for discounting Dr. Banyash’s opinion: that the doctor seemed not to have considered the full extent of the care Ms. Beardsley provided for her mother. Although it is unclear what exactly Dr. Banyash knew about Ms. Beardsley’s mother, his report shows he was aware that Ms. Beardsley prepared meals, shopped, washed dishes, swept, and did a number of other chores. These limited activities were the most demanding that Ms. Beardsley undertook. They fell well short of an ability to do full-time light work. Since Dr. Banyash knew of these tasks, it would not have mattered whether he was also aware that Ms. Beardsley spent time at her mother’s house performing less strenuous activities such as watching television. His knowledge or ignorance of Ms. Beardsley’s care for her mother thus does not support giving less weight to Dr. Banyash’s views. See Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313–14 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The ALJ must give substantial weight to the medical evidence and opinions submitted, unless specific, legitimate reasons constituting good cause are shown for rejecting it.”). No. 13-3609 11