Opinion ID: 679513
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of Sentencing Enhancement Statutes

Text: 61 Williams argues that the statues pursuant to which his sentence was enhanced, 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(b)(1)(A) and 851(e), are unconstitutional.
62 Williams' equal protection challenge to section 841(b)(1)(A) is precluded by the law of this circuit. See United States v. Williams, 978 F.2d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1606, 123 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993); Harding, 971 F.2d at 412-14. Williams argues that this statute, which punishes offenses involving 50 grams or more of cocaine base to the same extent as offenses involving 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, violates equal protection, but in Harding we rejected a nearly identical equal protection challenge. We stated that [s]ection 841(b)(1) implicates neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right. The statute permissibly differentiates on the basis of type of the drug and quantity, providing higher penalties for offenses involving cocaine base than for offenses involving similar amounts of powder cocaine. Harding, 971 F.2d at 412 (citation omitted). After determining that an equal protection challenge to the statute was subject only to rational basis scrutiny, we further stated that 63 Congress's decision to punish the sale of crack more severely than the sale of powder cocaine was based on a broad and legitimate basis. Although crack and powder cocaine are different forms of the same drug, the routes of administration, their physiological and psychological effects, and the manner in which they are sold set the two forms of the drug apart.... [C]rack offers an easy, relatively inexpensive, and potent means for first time users as well as addicts to experience a temporary high which leaves them craving more. While powder cocaine was the drug of choice for the affluent, crack has brought cocaine to the streets, catering to the habits of both rich and poor in epidemic proportions.... [T]he penalties embodied in [section 841(b)(1)(A) ] further the legitimate government interest of eliminating controlled substance distribution and abuse.... If the extent of the problem posed by the sale of crack and the need for more severe penalties than for powder cocaine are not clearly evident, these issues are at least highly debatable. This is enough to prevent invalidation of the statutory classification. 64 Id. at 413-14 (citations and footnotes omitted). 65 In addition to Harding, we have held in other cases that section 841(b)(1)(A) is constitutional. See Williams, 978 F.2d at 1136; Shaw, 936 F.2d at 416; Van Hawkins, 899 F.2d at 854; United States v. Malone, 886 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Savinovich, 845 F.2d 834, 839 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943, 109 S.Ct. 369, 102 L.Ed.2d 358 (1988). And, as we noted in Harding, every circuit having addressed a claim similar to Williams' has rejected it. See United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 755 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. House, 939 F.2d 659, 664 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Avant, 907 F.2d 623, 627 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 39-40 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248-49 (D.C.Cir.1989); United States v. Solomon, 848 F.2d 156, 157 (11th Cir.1988). Thus, Williams' argument that section 841(b)(1)(A) is unconstitutional is completely foreclosed by precedent.
66 Section 851(e) provides that [n]o person who stands convicted of an offense under this part may challenge the validity of any prior conviction which occurred more than five years before the date of the information alleging the prior conviction. Because Williams had been convicted of a felony drug conviction on April 30, 1986, the mandatory minimum sentence he could have received under section 841(a)(1)(A) was twenty years instead of ten. As this prior conviction became final more than five years before the government filed its information on July 6, 1992, section 851(e) precluded Williams from contesting its validity. 67 Williams argues that 21 U.S.C. Sec. 851(e) violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Constitution because it subjects him to increased punishment without any opportunity to challenge the validity of prior convictions. In United States v. Vea-Gonzales, 986 F.2d 321, 327 (9th Cir.1993) (construing U.S.S.G. Secs. 4A1.2, 4B1.2) we held that the Constitution requires that defendants be given the opportunity to collaterally attack prior convictions which will be used against them at sentencing. Section 851, in conjunction with 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841, determines how sentencing courts should consider prior federal drug convictions for purposes of enhancing sentences. Because this statutory scheme closely relates to the use and purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, a majority of this panel was initially persuaded that our holding in Vea-Gonzales applied. Applying Vea-Gonzales, we were persuaded that Section 851(e) impinged on a criminal defendant's due process rights without a compelling government interest. 68 Since submission of this case, however, the United States Supreme Court has handed down the case of United States v. Custis, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994), which seriously undermines the validity of Vea-Gonzales. In Custis the Court refused to recognize a constitutional right to collaterally attack prior convictions used for sentence enhancement, except for convictions obtained in violation of a plaintiff's right to counsel. --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1738. Custis notes, citing 21 U.S.C. Sec. 851 as an example, that Congress can create a statutory right to collaterally challenge a prior conviction at sentencing. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1736. Custis establishes that Congress has the power to provide, or not provide, the opportunity to challenge prior convictions which might be used to enhance a sentence. We must now concede that any right to such challenges, except in cases where the alleged constitutional violation rises to the level of a jurisdictional defect resulting from the failure to appoint counsel at all (id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1738), is a statutory right and not a right derived from the Due Process Clause. Moreover, the decision of Congress to place a time limit on the statutory right to challenge a prior conviction at sentencing does not create a suspect classification, thereby avoiding any concerns about equal protection. Accordingly, Section 851(e) need only have a rational basis in order for us to find that it is constitutional. 69 It is clear to us that barring challenges to prior convictions has a rational basis. There are costs associated with keeping court records indefinitely. Without section 851(e)'s five year limitation period, records of prior convictions, going back many years ... would have to be preserved. United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 673 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Cirillo v. United States, 666 F.Supp. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y.1987)) (internal punctuation omitted). There are evidentiary concerns. The likelihood is that those persons who played a role, whether on behalf of the prosecution, defense or witnesses, no longer would be able to give direct testimony as to alleged events attendant upon the entry of the plea under attack. Id. And there are thorny procedural difficulties as sentencing hearings take on the burden of coping with strategic uses of challenges. See U.S. v. Vea-Gonzales, 986 F.2d 321, 328 (9th Cir.1993). For these reasons the Eleventh Circuit, in Williams, supra, held that Section 851(e) is wholly reasonable, both to effectuate the legitimate purposes of enhanced sentencing for recidivists, and to eliminate a host of practical problems with respect to ancient records absent such a provision. 954 F.2d at 673; cf. United States v. Kinsey, 843 F.2d 383, 391-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1223, 108 S.Ct. 2882, 101 L.Ed.2d 916 (1988) (finding that sections 841(b)(1) and 851(e) did not violate defendants' right to a jury trial on the validity of their prior convictions because the statutes merely set forth aggravating circumstances the presence of which require a trial court to increase the sentence of a habitual offender). 70 In light of Custis, we must now agree with the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Williams, supra, that it is reasonable for Congress to set a five-year limit on the ability of a recidivist to attack the validity of a prior conviction. Since Williams does not contend that the prior conviction now being used to enhance his sentence resulted from a jurisdictional defect resulting from the failure to appoint counsel at all, his constitutional challenge to Section 851(e)'s time limit fails, and we affirm his sentence. 71 Davis' and Williams' convictions are AFFIRMED. Williams' sentence is AFFIRMED. Davis' sentence is VACATED and REMANDED to the district court for resentencing.