Opinion ID: 146484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gary Wessel's Testimony

Text: Stenger first argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Gary Wessel to testify about inculpatory statements that Stenger made while he was in jail awaiting trial. Stenger contends that Wessel's testimony should have been excluded because the government did not inform Stenger that it intended to call Wessel as a witness until the afternoon of the last business day before trial. In reviewing the district court's refusal to exclude testimony on the basis of late disclosure, we consider (1) whether the Government acted in bad faith and the reason(s) for delay; (2) whether there is any prejudice to the defendant; and (3) whether any lesser sanction is appropriate to secure future Government compliance. See United States v. Lofton, 557 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir.2009) (internal quotation and alteration omitted). We find Stenger's argument unpersuasive. A federal criminal defendant generally has no right to know about government witnesses prior to trial. United States v. Altman, 507 F.3d 678, 680 (8th Cir.2007) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Fed. R.Crim.P. 16(a)(2)). Stenger's contrary argument relies on United States v. Davis, 244 F.3d 666 (8th Cir.2001), a case addressing the government's obligation to produce expert testimony regarding DNA evidence. Davis is inapposite, however, because under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the government has a special obligation to disclose the substance of expert witnesses' testimony at the defendant's request. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(G). That disclosure obligation does not extend to non-expert government witnesses, such as Wessel. Further, nothing in the record indicates that the government purposely withheld information about Wessel in order to create an unfair advantage at trial. To the contrary, the record reflects that the prosecutor did not know that Wessel had information about Stenger until shortly before the trial commenced. There is also no indication that Stenger was prejudiced by the lack of additional time to investigate the substance of Wessel's testimony. The government provided Stenger's counsel with copies of Wessel's plea agreement and presentence investigation report, and Stenger's counsel was able to conduct a thorough cross-examination. As Stenger's counsel highlighted in cross-examining Wessel, Stenger and Wessel were apparently alone when the inculpatory discussions took place, suggesting that there was little means of proving or disproving Wessel's characterization of the discussion. See Lofton, 557 F.3d at 597 (observing that the defendant was not prejudiced by the government's late disclosure of a witness in part because the inculpatory statements were made when no one else was in the vicinity of the conversation); cf. Davis, 244 F.3d at 671 (stating that the defendants were prejudiced by late disclosure of DNA evidence because DNA evidence is scientific and highly technical in nature, and evaluation of the evidence would have required thorough investigation by defense counsel, including almost certainly retaining an expert witness or witnesses). Given these circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stenger's motion to exclude Wessel's testimony.