Opinion ID: 166620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal for Lack of Subject-matter Jurisdiction-Sovereign Immunity

Text: 7 We review de novo the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Marcus v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir.1999). Because the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited, there is a presumption against our jurisdiction, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. Id. (quotation omitted). In attempting to meet this burden, Mr. Delgado contends that federal subject-matter jurisdiction lies pursuant to (1) U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; (2) the Fifth Amendment; (3) 28 U.S.C. § 1331; (4) the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)(APA); and (5) various international treaties. 3 Defendants respond that none of those authorities effects a waiver of sovereign immunity. 8 It is elementary that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980) (quotation omitted). In general, federal agencies and officers acting in their official capacities are also shielded by sovereign immunity. Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1225 (10th Cir.2002). A waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed. Mitchell, 445 U.S. at 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349 (quotation omitted). 9 We first reject Mr. Delgado's claims that the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 waive sovereign immunity. The statute conferring general federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, grants the district courts original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, but does not waive the government's sovereign immunity. Consequently, district court jurisdiction cannot be based on § 1331 unless some other statute waives sovereign immunity. Neighbors for Rational Dev., Inc. v. Norton, 379 F.3d 956, 960-61 (10th Cir.2004) (quotations and citation omitted). 10 Mr. Delgado next contends that the APA provides a waiver of sovereign immunity. The APA contains a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity. City of Albuquerque v. United States Dep't of Interior, 379 F.3d 901, 907 (10th Cir.2004) (quotation omitted) (referring to 5 U.S.C. § 702). But before any review at all may be had, a party must first clear the hurdle of [5 U.S.C.] § 701(a). Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). 11 Mr. Delgado relies on § 701(a)(1), which provides for review of agency action except to the extent that statutes preclude judicial review. According to his argument, no statute, including the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 & 1491, precludes judicial review, so § 701(a)(1) operates to confer jurisdiction. 4 Mr. Delgado's argument ignores § 701(a)(2), which makes review of agency action unavailable if agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. Accordingly, we examine whether defendants' determination that Mr. Delgado would not receive flight training was committed to agency discretion by law. 12 In directing a flight school not to provide the requested flight training, the Attorney General was charged by law with assessing whether an alien presents a risk to aviation or national security. Under § 701(a)(2), review of an agency decision is not available in those rare circumstances where the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) (quotation omitted); see also Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649 (holding § 701(a)(2) precludes review even where Congress has not affirmatively precluded it, where statute provides no meaningful standard for judging agency's discretionary decision). 13 Here, as in Webster, the statute gives no basis on which to assess the agency's decision, [s]hort of permitting cross-examination of the [Attorney General] concerning his views of the Nation's security and whether the [plaintiff] was inimical to those interests, an inquiry the court will not undertake. Webster, 486 U.S. at 600, 108 S.Ct. 2047. Moreover, a judgment concerning aviation or national security must be made by those with the necessary expertise, and it is not reasonably possible for an outside nonexpert body to review the substance of such a judgment. . . . Nor can such a body determine what constitutes an acceptable margin of error in assessing the potential risk. Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988); see also Beattie v. Boeing Co., 43 F.3d 559, 565 (10th Cir.1994) (stating that Egan's application to the Merit Systems Protection Board of the rule that security-clearance decisions are the province of the Executive Branch also applies to federal courts). This court has recognized that it is an `outside nonexpert body' unqualified to second-guess the judgment of the President, acting through his officials in the Executive Branch, on whether to grant or deny a security clearance. Beattie, 43 F.3d at 565. We reach the same result in this case because we do not see a significant difference between a decision to deny a security clearance and a decision to deny flight training due to a risk to aviation or national security. 14 The fact that the challenged statute concerns national security provides additional support for our conclusion that judicial review is unavailable. It is rarely appropriate for courts to intervene in matters closely related to national security. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). [T]he President has constitutional authority to protect the national security and . . . this authority carries with it broad discretion. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 581, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2675, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus, unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs. Egan, 484 U.S. at 530, 108 S.Ct. 818. Congress has not provided specifically for judicial review of the agency's decision to deny flight training to an alien. Accordingly, we hold that no review is available.