Opinion ID: 1994045
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of G.L. 1956 Chapter 19.1 of Title 45

Text: The city argues that the language of the Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters statute limits its application to a municipality that participates in the optional retirement plan for police officers and fire fighters provided in [45-21.2] and that, because the city does not participate in the optional retirement program, its firefighters are not entitled to benefits under the provisions of the Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters statute. Local 850 contends that the language, any fire fighter within the Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters statute should be construed to include any firefighter in any city or town regardless of whether that city or town participates in the optional retirement program. Section 45-19.1-1, entitled Legislative findings, provides: (a) The general assembly finds and declares that by reason of their employment: (1) Fire fighters are required to work in the midst of, and are subject to, smoke, fumes, or carcinogenic, poisonous, toxic, or chemical substances; (2) Fire fighters are continually exposed to a vast and expanding field of hazardous substances through hazardous waste sites and the transportation of those substances; (3) Fire fighters are constantly entering uncontrolled environments to save lives and reduce property damage and are frequently not aware of potential toxic and carcinogenic substances that they may be exposed to; (4) Fire fighters, unlike other workers, are often exposed simultaneously to multiple carcinogens, and the rise in occupational cancer among fire fighters can be related to the rapid proliferation of thousands of toxic substances in our every day environment; and (5) The onset of cancers in fire fighters can develop very slowly, usually manifesting themselves from five (5) years to forty (40) years after exposure to the cancer-causing agent. (b) The general assembly further finds and declares that all of the previously stated conditions exist and arise out of or in the course of that employment. Section 45-19.1-2 entitled, Definitions, provides: The following terms when used in this chapter have the following meanings: (a) `Disability' means a condition of physical incapacity to perform any assigned duty or duties in the fire department. (b) `Fire department' means service groups (paid or volunteer) that are organized and trained for the prevention and control of loss of life and property from any fire or disaster. (c) `Fire fighter' means an individual, paid or volunteer, who is assigned to a fire department and is required to respond to alarms and performs emergency action. (d) `Occupational cancer' means a cancer arising out of his or her employment as a fire fighter, due to injury from exposures to smoke, fumes, or carcinogenic, poisonous, toxic, or chemical substances while in the performance of active duty in the fire department. Section 45-19.1-3 entitled, Occupational cancer disability for fire fighters, provides: (a) Any fire fighter, including one employed by the state, or a municipal fire fighter employed by a municipality that participates in the optional retirement for police officers and fire fighters, as provided in chapter 21.2 of this title, who is unable to perform his or her duties in the fire department by reason of a disabling occupational cancer which develops or manifests itself during a period while the fire fighter is in the service of the department, and any retired member of the fire department of any city or town who develops occupational cancer, is entitled to receive an occupational cancer disability, and he or she is entitled to all of the benefits provided for in chapters 19, 21 and 21.2 of this title and chapter 10 of title 36 if the fire fighter is employed by the state. (b) The provisions of this section apply retroactively in the case of any retired member of the fire department of any city or town. It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings. Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I.1996); see also State v. Greenberg, 951 A.2d 481, 489 (R.I.2008). The plain meaning of the statute is the best indication of the General Assembly's intent. Park v. Rizzo Ford, Inc., 893 A.2d 216, 221 (R.I.2006). Therefore, when a statute is unambiguous on its face we do not search behind the language to determine legislative intent. Angell v. Union Fire District of South Kingstown, 935 A.2d 943, 946 (R.I.2007). It is only when a statute is ambiguous and susceptible to more than one interpretation does this Court have the responsibility to glean the intent and purpose of the Legislature `from a consideration of the entire statute, keeping in mind [the] nature, object, language, and arrangement' of the provision to be construed. Algiere v. Fox, 122 R.I. 55, 58, 404 A.2d 72, 74 (1979). Upon a reading of the statute, it is evident that the General Assembly intended to ensure that firefighters diagnosed with cancer receive injured on-duty benefits in accordance with the IOD statute, § 45-19-1, the Retirement of Municipal Employees statute, chapter 21 of title 45, the Optional Retirement for Members of Police Force and Fire Fighters statute, G.L. 1956 chapter 21.2 of title 45, and the Retirement SystemContributions and Benefits statute, G.L. 1956 chapter 10 of title 36. The enactment of the Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters statute specifically designated cancer among firefighters as an on-duty illness, based on the General Assembly's findings that firefighters are exposed to a vast and expanding field of hazardous substances and that the rise in occupational cancer among fire fighters can be related to the rapid proliferation of thousands of toxic substances. Section 45-19.1-1(a)(3)-(4). Simply put, the Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters statute acknowledges the unfortunate fact that in the performance of their duties, firefighters develop cancer at a disproportionate rate, and provides a partial remedy by entitling them to all of the benefits provided for in chapters 19, 21 and 21.2 of this title and chapter 10 of title 36. Section 45-19.1-3(a). The city's argument that the General Assembly intended to restrict the Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters statute to firefighters participating in the municipal retirement system is inconsistent with the express language of the statute. Nothing in § 45-19.1-3 restricts the statute's application to firefighters participating in the optional retirement plan. Indeed, the statute uses the all inclusive phrase, any fire fighter. We find no merit in the city's contention that the statutory language, including [a firefighter] employed by the state, or a municipal fire fighter employed by a municipality that participates in the optional retirement for police officers and fire fighters, limits its application. The word, any, followed by the term, including, is all encompassing. This language does not indicate any intent on the part of the General Assembly to restrict these cancer benefits to only certain firefighters. Had the General Assembly intended to limit the statute's application to municipal firefighters participating in the optional retirement program, it could have done so. See Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Co. v. Dean, 89 R.I. 108, 116-17, 151 A.2d 354, 358 (1959) (if the language of a statute is free from ambiguity and expresses a definite and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the one which the legislature intended). Thus, we conclude that the language of the Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters statute expressly provides injured on-duty benefits provided by chapters 19, 21, and 21.2 of title 45, and chapter 10 of title 36. In light of our reading of the Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters statute, we conclude that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in finding that the city is obligated to provide injured on-duty benefits to Chief Moniz. The Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters statute explicitly provides injured on-duty benefits as governed by § 45-19-1 to firefighters who are diagnosed with cancer. Because of Chief Moniz's cancer diagnosis, he is entitled to have the forty-four days of sick leave at issue restored to him in accordance with § 45-19-1.