Opinion ID: 1113782
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the enhancement procedure

Text: The defendant was sentenced under Section 30-16-2, N.M.S.A. 1978, which reads as follows: Robbery consists of the theft of anything of value from the person of another or from the immediate control of another, by use or threatened use of force or violence. Whoever commits robbery is guilty of a third degree felony. Whoever commits robbery while armed with a deadly weapon is, for the first offense, guilty of a second degree felony and, for second and subsequent offenses, is guilty of a first degree felony. The statute provides no procedure for determining whether the defendant had previously been convicted of armed robbery, nor does it state how the defendant is to be informed of the possible sentence that he is facing if convicted. Since it is a procedural matter, it is within the province of the court to determine how this is to be accomplished. We first address the issue of whether the filing of the notification of enhancement after conviction violates the defendant's rights. The defendant argues that he is entitled to notice that he may be sentenced to life imprisonment as a second offender before he is tried on the robbery offense, claiming that anything else denies him due process. This Court has previously held that a defendant is entitled to notice of the charges by some pleading being filed and an opportunity to be heard before sentence is imposed. In State v. Rhodes, 76 N.M. 177, 181, 413 P.2d 214, 217 (1966) we stated: [E]ssential fairness requires that there be some pleading filed by the state, whether it be by motion or otherwise, by which a defendant is given notice and opportunity to be heard before an increased penalty can be imposed. The defendant in Rhodes appeared for sentencing and was questioned by the court as to whether he had previous convictions for narcotics violations. When the defendant admitted a prior conviction, the court immediately sentenced him as a second offender. On appeal, this Court held that there was a denial of due process in that procedure and that a pleading must be filed before enhancement could occur. Rhodes did not address the issue as to whether filing of the pleading after conviction would violate due process. On this point, we see no difference between the procedure followed in the instant case and the filing of an habitual criminal proceeding under the habitual criminal statute. The separate enhancement proceeding has been approved by the United States Supreme Court in Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962). The Court held that if the state uses two separate proceedings, due process does not require notice before trial that an enhancement proceeding will follow conviction. It is our opinion that the defendant was not denied due process by the manner in which the enhancement proceeding was prosecuted. The state is not required to give the defendant notice before trial on the substantive offense that enhancement may be sought after conviction. By filing a pleading seeking to enhance the defendant's sentence, the state has complied with the guidelines set out in Rhodes, supra.