Opinion ID: 1615231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Minnesota's Constitution Prohibits Cash Only Bail

Text: Our next step is to determine whether the phrase sufficient sureties as used in Minnesota's Constitution is ambiguous and whether it prohibits cash only bail. We conclude that this phrase is unambiguous and that it prohibits cash only bail. We base our conclusion on the plain meaning of the word surety. Our conclusion is supported by the definition of surety, its historical usage, our decision in Pett, and the holdings of other courts. Dictionary definitions demonstrate both historic and contemporary consistency in the meaning of the word surety. The Oxford English Dictionary defines surety as [a] formal engagement entered into, a pledge, bond, guarantee, or security given for the fulfillment of an undertaking. 2 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 285 (1987). At the time the Minnesota Constitution was drafted, surety was defined as: One who is bound for another who is primarily liable and is called the principal. One who engages to be answerable for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another; one who undertakes to do some act in the event of the failure of another to do it, and as security for it being done. 2 Alexander M. Burrill, New Law Dictionary and Glossary, 959 (N.Y.1850). The modern definition is not substantially different. Black's Law Dictionary defines the word both as [a] person who is primarily liable    for the performance of another's obligation and as [a] formal assurance; esp., a pledge, bond, guarantee, or security given for the fulfillment of an undertaking. Black's Law Dictionary 1455-56 (7th ed.1999). These definitions of surety denote a third person assuming the responsibility of another and the assurance for something being done. Surety can encompass a broad array of undertakings, often by a third person, that provide adequate assurance for the performance of an obligation. It is here that we agree with the state and amicus, Minnesota County Attorney's Association, that surety has a broad meaning, but we disagree with their argument that this broad meaning gives the district court the discretion to limit the form of acceptable surety to cash only bail. As we have previously concluded, surety as used in Minnesota's section 7 Bail Clause is for the protection of the accused rather than the court. We further conclude that surety encompasses a broad array of options and forms of security to satisfy the monetary bail amount deemed necessary by the court to assure appearance. Therefore, it is improper to interpret the section 7 Bail Clause as allowing the court to limit an accused to cash only bail. Construing surety broadly is consistent with its historical usage. The concept of surety, from its inception in early England to its use in the modern bail system, has involved the concept of a third party assuming responsibility for an accused's appearance. Accordingly, the guarantee of sufficient sureties must, at the very least, protect an accused's access to helpful third parties. But the better definition of surety in the context of the section 7 Bail Clause is more expansive. It encompasses a broad array of methods to provide adequate assurance that an accused will appear as the court requires. Applying a narrower definition would create a rule vulnerable to abuse. If judges have unlimited discretion to specify the form of acceptable bail, they would, for example, be able to set bail payable only by real property. If the accused in such a case does not own any real property, he is in essence being denied bail when he may be able to provide adequate assurance by some other means. As a result, the accused's constitutional right is violated. Similarly, cash only bail orders can be used to deny bail to those accused who have other means of providing sufficient surety. This reasoning is consistent with that used by other appellate courts which have held cash only bail orders impermissible. Our conclusion about the meaning of the phrase sufficient sureties is also supported by our holding in Pett and our reliance on that phrase's roots in Pennsylvania law. In construing the section 7 Bail Clause, we held that our constitution guarantees broader protection than the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution by providing that all crimes are bailable. In reaching this conclusion in Pett, we relied on the history of Pennsylvania's bail clause which evinces a clear intent to limit government power and to protect an accused's right to bail prior to trial. Finally, to the extent that we conclude that the section 7 Bail Clause prohibits the court from setting a monetary bail amount that can be satisfied only by a cash deposit in the full amount of bail set by the court, our conclusion is consistent with the purpose of Rule 6.02. Rule 6.02 de-emphasizes monetary bail and encourages release on the least restrictive conditions. We emphasize, however, that this case addresses only the issue of the constitutionality of cash only bail and does not involve release conditions. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Article I, Section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution prohibits a court from setting a monetary bail amount that can be satisfied only by a cash deposit in the full amount of bail set by the court. Therefore, Brooks' rights under our constitution were violated because his bail order limited him to posting cash bail for the full amount of bail set by the court, thereby restricting his right to post bail by providing alternative forms of sufficient surety. We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand this matter to the district court for any further proceedings necessary for the actions of that court to be consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.