Opinion ID: 1468281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: R.C.P. 8(a) requires

Text: (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. The plaintiff's complaint as amended met the requirement of fair notice of plaintiff's claim and the grounds on which it rested. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Plaintiff's action against Beck is founded on the general premise that a municipal contract will be regarded as void if there was a lack of power or discretion on behalf of the municipal authorities executing it. 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations §§ 495, 502; 10 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 29.26 (3d. ed. 1966). It alleges that the contracts involved here are within the general rule because they were authorized in violation of charter provisions and the requirements of 1 V.S.A. chapter 5, subchapter 2, apparently consistent with each other, relating to executive sessions, actions which may be taken at such sessions, and required notice thereof to news media. In this case, the contracts in question were well within the apparent scope of the municipality's authority. Further, Beck had performed part of its obligations under both contracts. In situations of this sort, we feel that the better rule is that when a municipality has accepted the benefits wrought by performance of a contract invalid for failure to satisfy some formality in its execution, but within the apparent scope of the municipality's authority, it, or a taxpayer suing in its behalf, should not be allowed to recover any funds which have been paid. Town of New Haven v. Weston, 87 Vt. 7, 14, 86 A. 996 (1913); 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations § 517. An exception to the above rule, however, is generally held to exist in those cases where fraud, collusion, or like conduct on the part of the contracting party is made to appear. Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 397 (1970). In considering the propriety of judgments based on the failure of the complaint to allege a cognizable cause of action, we are mindful of the requirement of V.R. C.P. 8(a), supra. This directive clearly envisions the allegation of facts of sufficient clarity and certainty to enable the defendant to file a responsive pleading. Nishiyama v. North American Rockwell Corp., 49 F.R.D. 288, 293 (D.C.1970). There are no allegations made by the plaintiff concerning any bad faith on the part of Beck in its contractual relationship with the town. The cited exception does not, therefore, apply. Plaintiff's action against the Town of Springfield and its selectmen is grounded on the violation of the conflict of interest provision of the town charter and the right-to-know provisions of the state law contained in 1 V.S.A. chapter 5, subchapter 2, and the town charter. The relief requested is in the nature of an injunction against further payment by the Town and its selectmen. This Court concurrently issued its opinion today in Petition of Central Vermont Public Service Corporation, Vt., 378 A.2d 510, wherein we declared a violation of the right-to-know statute invalidated the vote of this municipality to construct a municipal electric plant. That holding would be controlling here, if the statutory violation, as alleged, is proven and would be the basis for enjoining any future Town activity under the purported contracts with Beck. Section 42 of the Town of Springfield Charter provides as follows: § 42. OFFICIAL INTEREST IN CONTRACTS No elective or appointive officer or employee of the town shall take part in a decision concerning the business of the town in which he has a financial interest, aside from his salary as such officer or employee, direct or indirect, greater than any other citizen or taxpayer in the town. Section 69 of the Town of Springfield Charter provides in part as follows: (d) Any authorization of payment or incurring of obligation in violation of the provisions of this charter shall be void and any payment so made illegal; such action shall be cause for removal of any officer who knowingly authorized or made such payment or incurred such obligation, and he shall also be liable to the town for any amount so paid. The complaint sets out a conflict of interest on the part of the defendant Lamb, alleged to be a partner of the town attorney and thus specifically benefited by the project and incidental contracts authorized by the Board. On the scanty record presented, we are not prepared to hold as a matter of law that sufficient conflict of interest is alleged to void the contracts in question, or to justify the redress sought. It is, however, inescapable that such an outcome might result after full factual development. Watson v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 85 So.2d 548 (Fla.1956). This development should not have been foreclosed by the order of dismissal. In each instance the remedy requested has been held available by this Court in E. B. & A. C. Whiting Co. v. City of Burlington, 106 Vt. 446, 175 A. 35 (1934).