Opinion ID: 2387024
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The detention and arrest of defendant, and the search of his vehicle

Text: Defendant moved in limine to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search and seizure conducted by United States Park Police Officer Robert Jansing on March 6, 1995, in San Francisco. The trial court denied the motion, without making express findings. Defendant contends his detention and arrest, and the subsequent search of his vehicle, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the evidence seized should have been excluded at trial. [6]
As recounted above, defendant was arrested on March 6, 1995, by Officer Jansing of the United States Park Police (Park Police). At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence, Jansing testified that he was assigned that day to patrol the northern end of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area, which includes Aquatic Park and Fort Mason. When on duty, Jansing drove his marked Park Police vehicle through the parking area of Gashouse Cove, a marina near Fort Mason. He testified that the parking area was owned by the San Francisco Recreation and Park District and was mainly ... for the yacht harbor, which was right next to the national recreation area. Jansing related that as he drove through the parking area, he noticed that the registration tag on the license plate of a brown Datsun sedan was not flat on the plate, indicating to Jansing that the tag might not belong to the plate to which it was affixed. Jansing estimated that the Datsun was parked approximately 100 yards from property owned by the federal government. As Jansing circled the parking area, he contacted his dispatch office to check the registration of the Datsun's license plate. In response, he was informed that the registration had expired in March 1994. Jansing testified that he returned to the Datsun and parked his patrol car behind it. He then exited from his vehicle and asked defendant, who was in the driver's seat of the Datsun, for his driver's license and vehicle registration. Jansing testified that he informed defendant his registration was expired, and defendant responded that he recently had purchased the vehicle and did not know the source of the 1995 registration tag. According to Jansing, defendant also stated that he had a valid driver's license but did not have it in his possession. Defendant provided Jansing with what Jansing described as some type of paperwork for the vehicle ...either a bill of salemight have been an old registration showing that [the Datsun] was still in the name of somebody out of Canoga Park. Jansing testified that defendant told him he did not have any photographic identification with him, but he gave Jansing a birth certificate in the name of Richard Redd and said that was his name. Standing next to the driver's door of defendant's vehicle and using his portable police radio, Jansing contacted his dispatch office to determine whether Richard Redd had a valid driver's license. Jansing was informed that there was no record of such a license. Jansing related that he informed defendant he believed defendant was not being truthful with respect to his name and that he wanted defendant's correct name, but defendant continued to claim his name was Richard Redd. Jansing testified that he then asked defendant to step out of his vehicle and put his hands behind his back. According to Jansing, he then placed handcuffs on defendant and informed him that Jansing would find out who he was. When asked at the hearing his reason for putting handcuffs on defendant at that point, Jansing responded that he was arresting defendant for three violationsproviding a false name, having no driver's license, and having an expired vehicle registration. When asked why he took defendant into custody, Jansing testified that the only way to determine defendant's identification to a certainty was to transport him in order to have his fingerprints checked. Jansing testified that after placing handcuffs on defendant, he searched defendant, discovered a wallet in his back pocket, and found inside the wallet a driver's license in defendant's name. Using his police radio, Jansing informed his dispatch office of the name on the driver's license. Jansing learned from the dispatch office that there were arrest warrants for defendant related to murder, attempted murder, robbery, and a parole violation. Jansing requested and received confirmation of the warrants, and then requested that defendant's vehicle be impounded, which his shift sergeant approved. Jansing testified that he impounded the vehicle because the owner was unknown and could not be contacted, the registration was expired, and Jansing did not know whether the vehicle had been stolen. The officer acknowledged that the circumstance that defendant had been arrested also was a factor in deciding whether to impound the vehicle. According to Jansing, Park Police General Order No. 2501 required that an inventory of an impounded vehicle be conducted. He stated that General Order No. 2501 was applicable to all federal Park Police officers, regardless of the property they're on, as long as they're in the course of their official duties, impounding a vehicle pursuant to their arrest authority. Jansing identified the principal reason for the inventory requirement as potential liability for anything that might be in the vehicle. Pursuant to his understanding of what was required by Park Police policy, Jansing conducted a full inventory, including searching any compartments or closed containers, and also inspected the vehicle for damage. Jansing testified that, in the course of searching the vehicle, he found weapons and ammunition, which could not be allowed to remain in the vehicle while it was impounded. He also testified that because one of the arrest warrants had been issued an application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the FBI had a local presence, the Park Police requested that FBI agents respond to the scene, and the Park Police turned over the weapons and ammunition to the FBI to be stored in a secure facility. Other items were left inside the vehicle, and an FBI agent directed that it be stored in the United States General Services Administration's secure facility. After the vehicle, weapons, and ammunition were transferred to the FBI, Jansing transported defendant to the San Francisco County Jail, where defendant was booked on the arrest warrants. Although Jansing had prepared a citation relating to the Vehicle Code violations, he testified that he decided it wasn't worth it, because he believed officials in San Francisco would not file charges on these less serious matters in light of the circumstance that defendant would be transferred to another county to face more serious charges. Jansing also testified that he had received training to qualify him as a peace officer under section 832. He stated that he took an 832 course through Santa Rosa Junior College, and produced his certificate of completion of the course. Jansing further testified that on the date he arrested defendant, he was authorized to act as a peace officer in San Francisco. He produced a letter from San Francisco's Chief of Police, Tony Ribera, conferring authority upon all Park Police officers, under section 830.8, subdivision (b), to act as peace officers in San Francisco. Defendant testified at the hearing on his motion to suppress evidence that he had purchased the Datsun in early December 1994, and that he owned it at the time he was arrested. He also testified that after he gave Jansing the birth certificate, and after Jansing contacted someone on his radio, the officer demanded additional identification. In response, defendant testified, he looked through his wallet for some form of identification that would satisfy Jansing, at which time [Jansing] snatched [the wallet] out of my hand and went through the wallet on his own volition. Defendant did not recall whether Jansing took the wallet before or after he ordered defendant out of the vehicle, but recalled that Jansing took it before handcuffing defendant, and that the wallet had been in defendant's hand, not in his back pocket. Defendant also testified that he gave Jansing other documents in addition to those that were presented in court, and that defendant's name was on a handwritten bill of sale that was among the documents he gave to Jansing. Charles Trebbien, a parole agent with the California Department of Corrections, testified at the hearing that he was defendant's assigned parole agent from November 1993 to March 1995. Trebbien testified that defendant was involved in an incident in the City of Orange on May 31, 1994, in which a security guard was injured (presumably, the shooting of James Shahbakhti in front of the Vons market), which led Trebbien to request that a warrant be issued for defendant's arrest. On June 1, 1994, the Board of Prison Terms issued a warrant for defendant's arrest. Jerry Brakebill, a police officer with the City of Brea, testified at the hearing that he was the detective assigned to investigate the homicide of Timothy McVeigh on July 18, 1994, at the Alpha Beta market. On that date, he obtained a warrant for defendant's arrest in connection with the homicide. On March 6, 1995, the FBI notified Brakebill that defendant had been arrested in San Francisco. On March 7, 1995, a warrant to search the vehicle was issued in the County of Orange, and Brakebill traveled to San Francisco and searched the vehicle and its contents that same day.

Defendant contends Jansing, as a federal officer, lacked authority to detain and arrest defendant on property owned by the City and County of San Francisco. We disagree, concluding that Jansing acted within the authority set forth in section 830.8, subdivision (b): Duly authorized federal employees who comply with the training requirements set forth in Section 832 are peace officers when they are engaged in enforcing applicable state or local laws on property owned or possessed by the United States government, or on any street, sidewalk, or property adjacent thereto, and with the written consent of the sheriff or the chief of police, respectively, in whose jurisdiction the property is situated. Defendant urges us to reject the application of section 830.8 on four grounds: (1) the prosecution did not attempt to justify the seizure on the ground that it occurred adjacent to federal property, and therefore cannot rely upon this theory on appeal (2) the arrest did not occur on property adjacent to federal property, (3) the prosecutor failed to prove that the head of Jansing's agency certified Jansing's relevant training, and (4) Jansing did not have authority to use a marked police vehicle to enforce state laws. First, it is clear the prosecution contended that the arrest was effected on property adjacent to federal property, as authorized by section 830.8, subdivision (b). In its opposition to the motion to suppress, the prosecution stated that Jansing had peace officer status because he had completed the training under section 832, and that the Park Police had the written consent of the chief of police to act as peace officers in San Francisco. In support of this contention, the prosecution cited section 830.8, subdivision (b). It was not required that the prosecution address in the trial court every factor set forth in subdivision (b) in order to rely upon this provision on appeal. Second, defendant contends the parking lot in which he was arrested is not adjacent to federal property, because the parking area is separated from Fort Mason by a yacht harbor, and because the driving distance between the entrance to Fort Mason and the location where defendant was arrested is, according to counsel's calculations on appeal, 595 yards. He asserts [t]he Legislature's intent was to limit the reach of federal officers to streets, sidewalks and similar property where offenders might stand and do damage to federal property. Defendant did not challenge Jansing's authority on this basis in the trial court. Therefore, he has forfeited this issue. (See People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 129 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52] ( Williams ) [when defendants move to suppress evidence under section 1538.5, they must inform the prosecution and the court of the specific basis for their motion].) (1) Even if defendant had preserved this contention, his argument would fail. The legislative history of section 830.8, subdivision (b), establishes that the term adjacent was not intended to restrict the area within which duly authorized federal employees act as peace officers to locations on nonfederal property that are within striking distance of federal property. The extension of federal officers' authority to adjacent property was proposed in Assembly Bill No. 3874 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 3874) during the 1984 legislative session. A report of the Senate Committee on Judiciary concerning this proposed legislation stated that [t]he purpose of the bill is to allow U.S. Park Police officers patrolling the Golden Gate National Recreation Area to make valid arrests in the surrounding community. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3874 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 6, 1984, p. 2.) The report explained that [t]he U.S. Park Police patrolling the Golden Gate National Recreation Area spend a considerable amount of time driving on city streets and highways in marked police vehicles. Consequently, these officers are often called on for assistance by the general public and have many times apprehended criminal suspects outside of their primary area of responsibilityi.e., the federally-owned property. [7] (Sen. Com. on Judiciary Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3874, supra, at pp. 2-3.) Based upon Jansing's testimony that the parking area where he arrested defendant served Gashouse Cove, which was right next to the national recreation area, the arrest clearly was made on property adjacent to federal property within the meaning of section 830.8. [8] (2) In a related contention, defendant asserts that section 830.8, subdivision (b) is unenforceable because the term adjacent thereto is vague. He relies upon the statement in Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352 [75 L.Ed.2d 903, 103 S.Ct. 1855], that [w]here the legislature fails to provide ... minimal guidelines [to govern law enforcement], a criminal statute may permit `a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.' [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 358.) Kolender was referring to minimum guidelines concerning the elements of a crime. As Kolender explained, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Citations.] ( Id. at p. 357, italics added.) In the present case, the alleged vagueness is unrelated to the definition of any crime. Third, defendant complains that the prosecution failed to prove that Jansing was certified by [his] agency head[] as having satisfied the training requirements of Section 832 .... (§ 830.8, subd. (a).) Although defendant asserted in his motion to suppress that the prosecution was required to establish that Jansing has satisfied the training requirement or its equivalent of both §§ 830.8(a) and (c), he raised no issue concerning certification by Jansing's agency head. Therefore, defendant has forfeited this issue. (See Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 129.) Even if defendant had preserved this contention for appeal, it would fail. The requirement that the agency head certify that the officer has satisfied the training requirements is found in subdivision (a) of section 830.8, which sets forth various circumstances under which federal criminal investigators and law enforcement officials may exercise the powers of arrest of a peace officer. ... As explained above, Jansing was authorized to act pursuant to subdivision (b), which provides that duly authorized federal employees are peace officers when they enforce state and local laws in specified areas. As originally enacted, subdivision (b) applied only where the enforcement of state or local laws occurred on property owned or possessed by the federal government, with the written consent of the local sheriff or chief of police; the original version did not include any training requirement. When the Legislature amended subdivision (b) to extend its reach to federal employees who engage in law enforcement on property adjacent to federal property, the Legislature restricted the subdivision's reach to federal employees who comply with the training requirements set forth in Section 832. ... It did not, however, include the requirement imposed in the circumstances addressed in subdivision (a)that the investigators and officers shall have been certified by their agency heads as having satisfied the training requirements of Section 832.... Thus, in order to establish Jansing's status as a peace officer under subdivision (b), the prosecution was not required to establish that his agency head certified he satisfied the training requirements set forth in section 832. [9] Fourth, defendant contends Jansing did not have authority to use a marked police vehicle to enforce state laws, citing an opinion of the Attorney General. (80 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 297 (1997).) Defendant did not advance this contention in the trial court, and therefore has forfeited it. (See Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 129.) Even if defendant had preserved this contention on appeal, it would fail. The Attorney General opinion upon which defendant relies focused upon subdivision (a) of section 830.8, and concluded that Federal Protective Service (FPS) officers are not peace officers as that term is defined in sections 830 to 832.9. (§ 830.8, subd. (a).) Nothing in section 830.8 authorizes FPS officers to use marked police vehicles or other emergency equipment when enforcing state or local laws. (80 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. at p. 305.) As noted above, Jansing was not merely exercising arrest powers under section 830.8, subdivision (a); rather, he was a peace officer under subdivision (b). Furthermore, as the legislative history set forth above reflects, a principal focus of the amendment was federal officers who spend a considerable amount of time driving on city streets and highways in marked police vehicles. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Report on Assem. Bill 3874, supra, pp. 2-3, italics added.) Accordingly, it is clear that among the federal employees whose actions were to be ratified by the amendment to subdivision (b) were those who carried out their duties in marked police vehicles. For these reasons, we reject defendant's contention. Because we conclude Jansing had authority under section 830.8, subdivision (b), to act as a peace officer when he arrested and searched defendant, we need not address whether Jansing also may have acted properly pursuant to subdivision (a) of section 830.8, or as a private citizen.
(3) A defendant may move to suppress evidence on the ground that [t]he search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable. (§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a legal justification for the search. ( Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th 119, 127.) The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.] ( People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729] ( Glaser ); see People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718 [195 Cal.Rptr. 503, 669 P.2d 1278].) [10] As explained below, we conclude the prosecution established that the search of defendant and his vehicle was reasonable. (4) Vehicle Code sections 4462 and 12951 long have required that the person in the immediate control of an automobile present evidence of registration and a driver's license upon proper command of a peace officer. ( In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60, 67 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 581, 38 P.3d 433], fn. omitted.) Upon defendant's failure to provide a valid registration and his provision of false identification of himself as Richard Redd, Jansing had authority to place defendant under arrest. (See § 148.9, subd. (a) [any person who falsely identifies himself to a peace officer upon lawful detention or arrest to evade his proper identification by the investigating officer is guilty of a misdemeanor]; Veh. Code, § 4000 [no person shall leave standing in an offstreet public parking facility any vehicle unless it is registered].) Moreover, Jansing had authority to search defendant incident to this arrest. ( United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 235 [38 L.Ed.2d 427, 94 S.Ct. 467] (5) [A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.].) [11] Defendant asserts, however, that Jansing's testimony concerning the arrest was not credible, and that this court should accept defendant's version of the events, which established that Jansing seized the wallet before checking on the identification offered by appellant. Defendant's testimony does not establish defendant's version of the events. [12] Instead, defendant bases his assertion upon trial counsel's calculation that only 26 seconds elapsed between the time the dispatch office stated that there was no record of Richard Redd, and the time Jansing informed that office of defendant's true identity and driver's license number. Because 26 seconds assertedly was too short a period of time for Jansing to have ordered defendant out of his vehicle, placed him in handcuffs, found defendant's driver's license in his pocket, and relayed the information to the dispatch office, defendant concludes Jansing must have seized the wallet before Jansing learned there was no record of a driver's license for Richard Redd and before he arrested defendant. In light of the circumstance that Jansing was communicating with the dispatch office by way of a portable radio while he stood next to the door of defendant's vehicle, we do not find it incredible that only 26 seconds (according to trial counsel's calculations) may have elapsed between the time Jansing ordered defendant out of his vehicle and the time he radioed defendant's true name to the dispatch office. We also reject defendant's contention that we should question Jansing's credibility because he could not recall various facts, such as whether other vehicles in the parking area were occupied, whether he used a key to open the vehicle's trunk, and whether he contacted the FBI before opening the trunk. None of these asserted lapses of memory suggests that Jansing was untruthful with respect to the facts he recalled. Therefore, we accept the trial court's implied finding that the search was conducted during or after the arrest, a finding supported by Jansing's testimony. (See Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 362 [We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.].) In any event, even if Jansing had seized the wallet before he began effecting the arrest, the evidence thereby obtained would not be subject to exclusion. It is undisputed that Jansing already had contacted his dispatcher concerning the birth certificate. Therefore, Jansing would have learned, without the information gained from the wallet, that defendant was not Richard Redd. Thus, the wallet inevitably would have been discovered in the search of defendant incident to the arrest that Jansing effected based upon the Vehicle Code violations and defendant's having provided a false name. ( Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 444 [81 L.Ed.2d 377, 104 S.Ct. 2501].) Accordingly, even under defendant's factual theory on appeal, the exclusionary rule would not apply. Because Jansing had arrested defendant, and because the vehicle's registration had expired more than six months earlier, Jansing had authority under state law to impound defendant's vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 22651, subds. (h)(1) [an officer may remove a vehicle when the officer effects a valid arrest of the person in control of the vehicle] & ( o )(1) [a peace officer may remove a vehicle found on an off-street parking facility with a registration expiration date in excess of six months prior to the date the vehicle is found].) Having impounded the vehicle, Jansing had authority to conduct an inventory of the vehicle's contents aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents. ( South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 373 [49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 96 S.Ct. 3092].) [13] The record establishes that Jansing's inventory was conducted for the purpose of securing and protecting the vehicle's contents. Jansing testified that he followed Park Police General Order No. 2501, which states: Inventory procedures serve to protect an owner's property while it is in the custody of the Force, to ensure against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized property, and to protect officers from danger. A vehicle should not be released to a crane service until it has been inventoried. The impounding officer shall conduct a thorough inventory of the vehicle as soon as possible after it is impounded. The officer shall open closed containers whose contents the officer is unable to ascertain from the container's exterior and characteristics. ( Id., § 2501.06(A), p. 6.) This testimony also established that the inventory was conducted pursuant to standard criteria, and that Jansing was not allowed so much latitude that [the search could turn] into `a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime,' [citation]. ( Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4 [109 L.Ed.2d 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632] ( Wells ); see also Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 374, fn. 6 [93 L.Ed.2d 739, 107 S.Ct. 738] ( Bertine ) [Our decisions have always adhered to the requirement that inventories be conducted according to standardized criteria.].) (6) Defendant asserts that because the search occurred on city and county property, the People were required to establish that the local authorities had a property inventory search policy and that Jansing complied with that policy. He fails to cite any pertinent authority in support of this contention. Moreover, the reasons supporting the requirement that an inventory search be conducted pursuant to an established policy support the conclusion that Jansing satisfied this constitutional requirement by following the policy of the Park Police. The requirement of established procedures is based on the principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. The policy or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory. ( Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 4.) In addition, in rejecting an argument that the police should weigh whether a thorough inventory is appropriate, the United States Supreme Court has observed that `[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.' [Citation.] ( Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 375.) The purpose of countering general rummaging does not require that the Park Police follow the policy of the jurisdiction in which they temporarily act as peace officers; the purpose of providing a single familiar standard is served by a rule requiring that the Park Police follow the federal policy in all circumstances. Defendant provides no reason to impose a different requirement. (7) Because the warrantless arrest and search of defendant and the warrantless search of his vehicle were lawful, we need not address the question whether the affidavit supporting issuance of the search warrant obtained the following day by the Brea police would have supported issuance of a search warrant, absent the information obtained through Jansing's search. In light of our conclusion that Jansing's actions were a lawful response to defendant's failure to provide a valid driver's license and vehicle registration, we need not address whether the officer's actions also were justified by defendant's parole status.