Opinion ID: 865216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: ¶7. When reviewing a case for sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (Miss. 2005) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). The evidence must show “beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction.” Bush, 895 So. 2d at 843 (quoting Carr v. State, 208 So. 2d 886, 889 (Miss. 1968)). Keeping in mind the reasonable doubt standard, if “reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense,” the evidence will be deemed to have been sufficient. Bush, 895 So. 2d at 843 (quoting Edwards v. State, 469 So. 2d 68, 70 (Miss. 1985)). 3 ¶8. Spann argues that the evidence cannot support a conviction for the sale of a controlled substance, and at most, the evidence could only support a conviction for possession. Specifically, Spann argues that “[t]here was no evidence produced at trial that [she] ever exchanged money or transferred cocaine for money from Mike Jernigan.” ¶9. To prove sale of a controlled substance, the State need not prove that the defendant personally placed the substance in the hands of the buyer or that the defendant personally profited from its sale. Sullivan v. State, 749 So. 2d 983, 993 (Miss. 1999); Turner v. State, 576 So. 2d 1340 (Miss. 1990). As long as the jury is given a proper instruction on aiding and abetting, the State need only prove “substantial knowing participation in the consummation of a sale or in arranging for the sale.” Williams v. State, 463 So. 2d 1064, 1066 (Miss. 1985). “Any person who is present at the commission of a criminal offense and aids, counsels, or encourages another in the commission of that offense is an ‘aider and abettor’ and is equally guilty with the principal offender.” Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 533 (Miss. 1996) (quoting Sayles v. State, 552 So. 2d 1383, 1389 (Miss.1989)). ¶10. In the present case, the jury was given the exact aiding and abetting instruction which this Court adopted in Milano v. State, 790 So. 2d 179, 185 (Miss. 2001), and there was sufficient evidence that Spann knowingly participated in the sale.1 It is uncontradicted that 1 The proper aiding and abetting instruction is as follows: The guilt of a defendant in a criminal case may be established without proof that the defendant personally did every act constituting the offense alleged. The law recognizes that, ordinarily, anything a person can do for himself may also be accomplished by that person through the direction of another person as his or her agent, by acting in concert with, or under the direction of, another person or persons in a joint effort or enterprise. 4 Spann had possession of the crack cocaine, that she handed the drugs to Holmes, who then gave them to Jernigan, and that she asked Jernigan if she could have a “drop” for “going through all that trouble.” Because she substantially and knowingly participated in the sale, it does not matter that she did not personally hand the drugs to Jernigan or receive any compensation. There was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Spann aided and abetted the sale, and therefore to render her liable as a principal. Therefore, this issue is without merit.