Opinion ID: 2648786
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sanction against Wright

Text: 6 On brief and in oral argument, Larry acknowledged that Shebelskie's oral argument before the court at the August 2011 hearing did not constitute a motion under Code § 8.01-271.1. Instead, Larry contends that the circuit court sanctioned Shebelskie for the post-hearing letter to the circuit court that he signed. That letter, however, was not the basis for the court's decision to sanction Shebelskie. In its final order, the circuit court specifically identified the Show Cause Response Brief and the oral argument at the August hearing as the bases for the imposition of sanctions. We will thus not address whether the post-hearing letter qualifies as a pleading or other paper under Code § 8.01-271.1. 12 In light of our holding with regard to Shebelskie and the fact that Wright also did not make any motions at the August 2011 hearing, our analysis now is limited to the question whether the circuit court erred in finding that Wright violated Code § 8.01-271.1 by presenting the arguments set forth in the Show Cause Response Brief. The circuit court concluded that Wright violated the statute by arguing in that written submission that Betty did not have to comply with the April 2011 Order because it did not state payment had to be in cash, did not set a date or deadline for payment, and was an interlocutory order. At the August hearing, the court again characterized Wright's argument as being that there is no requirement to comply with interlocutory orders or preliminary orders. In its November 2011 order, the circuit court stated that Wright argued that the April 2011 order was interlocutory and Betty did not have to comply with it because it could not be appealed. The court also stated: The [c]ourt has not yet received any legal authority supporting the position that parties do not have to comply with court orders [if they] are interlocutory, or do not state payment had to be in cash, or do not set a date or deadline for payment. These findings misstate Wright's argument. Wright never contended that Betty did not have to comply with the April order 13 because it was interlocutory. 7 Wright also never argued that an order lacking an amount to be paid, a deadline for payment, or a manner of payment did not have to be obeyed. Rather, Wright argued that an order lacking such specificity could not be the basis of a contempt finding. In the Show Cause Response Brief, Wright argued the following: It is hornbook law that contempt lies only for failure to abide by an order's definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed . . . and the command must be expressed rather than implied. Winn v. Winn, 218 Va. 8, 10, 235 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1977)[.] Since no definite term of the [April o]rder requires [Betty] to have paid in cash on demand by [Larry], [Betty] has not violated any definite term of the [April o]rder. . . . . The [April o]rder does not confer on [Larry] any right to unilaterally fix the form and time of payment. It does not address these subjects at all. Since the interlocutory [April o]rder sets no deadline and specifies no method of payment, under the rule of Winn, [Betty] cannot be in contempt simply because she has offered payment, before the [April o]rder is even final, by an alternative method of payment that reduces [Larry's] debt to her. 7 In fact, neither Wright nor Shebelskie made that argument or an argument that Betty could not be held in contempt because the April order was interlocutory. In response to the circuit court's perceived mischaracterization of the argument, Shebelskie, in his post-hearing letter to the circuit court, expressly acknowledged that many interlocutory orders could indeed be enforced by contempt. 14 Because the April order was an interlocutory order that did not contain express terms with regard to the total amount due, the date payment was to be made, and the manner of payment, Wright argued, it lacked the specificity required to be enforced by contempt. 8 Under well-established Virginia jurisprudence, contempt only lies 'for disobedience of what is decreed, not for what may be decreed.' Petrosinelli v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 273 Va. 700, 706-07, 643 S.E.2d 151, 154 (2007) (quoting Taliaferro v. Horde, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 242, 247 (1822)). '[B]efore a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order must be in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him and the command must be expressed rather than implied.' Id. at 707, 643 S.E.2d at 151 (quoting Winn, 218 Va. at 10, 235 S.E.2d at 309). [F]or a proceeding in contempt to lie, there 'must be an express command or prohibition' which has been violated. Id. (quoting French v. Pobst, 203 Va. 704, 710, 127 S.E.2d 137, 141 (1962)). These principles arise from the recognition that the 'judicial contempt power is a potent weapon.' Id. at 706, 643 S.E.2d at 8 At the August hearing and in the post-hearing letter, Shebelskie likewise argued that established law . . . proscribes a finding of contempt unless an order has definite terms as to the duties. 15 154 (quoting International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967)). In Winn, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement in which the husband agreed to maintain for two years an existing health insurance policy covering his wife, or a similar policy containing comparable benefits. 218 Va. at 9, 235 S.E.2d at 308. After the entry of the divorce decree that incorporated the agreement, the husband maintained the existing policy, but the insurer refused to cover the wife's medical expenses because her divorce had become final. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). She thus sought to hold the husband in contempt for failing to comply with the terms of the divorce decree. Id. The trial court agreed with the wife and held the husband in contempt. Id. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment. Id. at 10-11, 235 S.E.2d at 309. We concluded that the husband had not violated a clearly defined duty imposed upon him by the agreement and the decree and thus was not in contempt. Id. We explained: It may well be that [the parties] intended the husband's obligation to be absolute – if intervention of the divorce should have the effect of voiding the wife's coverage under the [existing] policy, it was his duty to procure other insurance guaranteeing her substantially the same benefits she had as his undivorced wife. But if this was the husband's duty, it was not expressed in 16 definite terms in the agreement, as incorporated into the divorce decree. If the duty existed at all, it arose only by implication. Id. Similarly, in Petrosinelli, the Court held that an attorney was not in contempt because the orders at issue did not contain an express command or prohibition. 273 Va. at 709, 643 S.E.2d at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted). There, the trial court consolidated two cases for trial, but in three separate orders denied motions by a defendant in the second action to consolidate the cases for discovery. Id. at 703, 643 S.E.2d at 153. With knowledge that the plaintiff had scheduled the deposition of a particular witness in the first action, the defendant's attorney issued a subpoena to depose that witness in the second action on the same date and time but at a different location. Id. In response, the plaintiff filed a petition for a rule to show cause in the second action as to why the defendant's attorney should not be held in contempt for violating the court's orders denying consolidation of the two cases for discovery. Id. at 705, 643 S.E.2d at 153. Finding that the attorney had violated at least one of its orders, the trial court held the attorney in contempt. Id. at 705-06, 643 S.E.2d at 154. 17 On appeal, this Court concluded that the three orders denying consolidation of the two cases for discovery did not contain an express prohibition on the issuance of a subpoena to [the witness] by [the defendant] or any other party. Id. at 708, 643 S.E.2d at 156. We further concluded that the orders did not expressly command or prohibit [the attorney] from acting to depose a witness and the attorney issued the subpoena in only the second action. Id. Continuing, we explained that a duty that arises by implication cannot sustain a finding of contempt. If there was any prohibition upon [the attorney] against subpoenaing [the witness], such a duty was, at best, an implication from general remarks of the court . . . . [The attorney] was never explicitly prohibited by a court order from issuing the . . . subpoena. Mere implication of a duty cannot form the basis of a contempt judgment. Id. at 709, 643 S.E.2d at 156 (citation omitted). Thus, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment. Id. In the case now before us, the April order imposed several express duties with regard to the closing on the sale of the real property. The order also directed Betty to pay the attorney fees and costs associated with her motion to approve the assignment of the Contract to her, including those incurred for two prior hearings on the matter. But the April order did not express[] in definite terms, Winn, 218 Va. at 10, 235 S.E.2d at 309, the total amount to be paid by Betty and 18 express[ly] command[ed] only that Betty pay Larry an additional $12,500. Petrosinelli, 273 Va. at 707, 643 S.E.2d at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted). The order also failed to specify when Betty was to pay the undetermined amount, and the order was not final. Irrespective of whether Wright was actually correct that his client's obligation to pay a certain amount by a specific date ar[ose] by implication and thus could not sustain a finding of contempt, Petrosinelli, 273 Va. at 709, 643 S.E.2d at 156, we conclude that Wright after reasonable inquiry, could have formed a reasonable belief that the arguments set forth in the Show Cause Response Brief were warranted by existing law governing contempt. 9 Gilmore, 259 Va. at 466, 537 S.E.2d at 43536; see also Winn, 218 Va. at 10, 235 S.E.2d at 309 (If the duty existed at all, it arose only by implication.); Petrosinelli, 273 Va. at 707, 643 S.E.2d at 154 ([T]here must be an express command or prohibition which has been violated for contempt to lie) (internal quotation marks omitted). By misconstruing Wright's argument, the circuit court considered 9 In arguing that Wright knew what the April order required, Larry raises several factual and circumstantial issues not stated in the order itself. It is the violation of a court's order, however, that is the proper subject of contempt, not implications arising from other circumstances of the case. See Petrosinelli, 273 Va. at 709, 643 S.E.2d at 156 (stating that a court's contempt power encompasses the written and oral orders, commands and directions of the court) (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 an irrelevant or improper factor and arrived at the erroneous legal conclusion[] that Wright's arguments were not warranted by existing law. Landrum, 282 Va. at 352, 717 S.E.2d at 137; Lawlor, 285 Va. at 213, 738 S.E.2d at 861. Thus, the court abused its discretion by holding that Wright violated Code § 8.01-271.1.