Opinion ID: 1940539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: giving the tipsy coachman free rein

Text: The Fourth District described the issue in this case as being whether, after an officer looked at appellant's license during a consensual encounter, the encounter became non-consensual when the officer retained the license and called in to check for outstanding arrest warrants. Baez v. State, 814 So.2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). The Fourth District determined that because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave at that point, Baez was detained. See id. The Fourth District also stated in passing that the detention was without founded suspicion. Id. at 1151. The State has never contended that there was founded suspicion for a detention. Instead, the State has argued that no detention occurred because the officer did not act in any way to make a reasonable person believe that he could not end the encounter at any time. [6] The majority does not directly address the issue decided below and argued by the State. Instead, the Court concludes that the officer had a reasonable basis and reasonable suspicion to investigate Baez further by retaining his license to run a computer check. This terminology is difficult to square with our prior precedent, and appears to split the difference between consensual encounters and investigatory detentions. However, because there is no need for reasonable suspicion justifying further investigation in a consensual encounter, I infer that the Court is stating that the encounter did not remain wholly consensual when the officer retained the license. See Morrow v. State, 848 So.2d 1290, 1292 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (A reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is not necessary if the contact is merely a consensual encounter.) (citing Popple, 626 So.2d at 186). Therefore, evidently the Court is holding that Baez was validly detained based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. [7] I believe the Court errs in quashing the Fourth District decision on this basis. Under the tipsy coachman rule, an appellate court may affirm a lower court ruling for any reason supported by the record, see Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 907 (Fla.2002), but I can find no authority for using the rule to quash or reverse a lower court decision on a theory not argued by the party challenging the ruling in the reviewing court. Cf. Jenkins v. State, 747 So.2d 997, 999 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (declining to reverse trial court on issue not raised on appeal). The flawed decision reached in this manner illustrates the inadvisability of innovating grounds for quashing a lower court decision. I explain my specific concerns below.