Opinion ID: 2062476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Argue Involuntariness of Gilliam's Confession at Trial

Text: Gilliam also claims Daneman's representation was deficient because, after the denial of the motion to suppress Gilliam's confession, Daneman did not raise the issue of voluntariness again at trial. Even if this was an oversight on Daneman's part, it in no way prejudiced Gilliam's defense. Judge Fader was the trier of fact both at the suppression hearing and at trial. Judge Fader can be presumed to know the law and to know, even without Daneman reminding him, that a confession cannot be considered by the trier of fact unless it is found to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brittingham v. State, 306 Md. 654, 665, 511 A.2d 45, 49-50 (1986). As Strickland points out: The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision. 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. We should assume that Judge Fader did not need to be reminded that he could not consider Gilliam's confession unless he found that confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Daneman's failure to argue this issue in no way prejudiced Gilliam's defense. We might also note that, in light of the facts, there was little Daneman could argue to Judge Fader in challenging the voluntariness of Gilliam's confession.