Opinion ID: 1594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: False Evidence

Text: Petitioners contend that the prosecution presented false evidence and failed to correct false testimony in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). To prevail on a Napue claim, the petitioner must show that (1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony [or evidence] was actually false, and (3) that the false testimony [or evidence] was material. United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir.2003). False evidence is material if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false [evidence] could have affected the judgment of the jury. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). We find that McLoren did not testify falsely, and, as such, his statements do not factor into the materiality analysis which follows our discussion of prosecutorial misconduct. There are two parts to petitioners' claim. First, that the testimony of the State's principal witness, McLoren, was false. Second, the manner in which Deputy District Attorney Michael Latin (Latin or DDA Latin), who shared trial duties with Semow, questioned McLoren was misleading and could be characterized as presenting false evidence. Regarding Latin's line of questioning, petitioners especially take issue with his failure to specifically ask McLoren about the July 10 letter. As to McLoren's testimony, although a few of McLoren's statements at trial were incomplete, the critical point of McLoren's testimony, to wit, that he could still be prosecuted for marijuana possession or sale, was true. To the extent that McLoren failed to mention the July 10 letter, his testimony, viewed in its entirety, conveyed to the jury an accurate picture of his legal situation (i.e., that, although he would probably not be prosecuted, he was not given transactional immunity). Similarly, Napue imposed no duty on Latin to clarify McLoren's answers to open-ended questions about his willingness to be a witness or to specifically question him about the July 10 letter. On appeal, as they did below, petitioners highlight seven statements of McLoren that they claim were false. [8] Because McLoren was given only use immunity and was never specifically asked whether his trial testimony or the statements he gave to the authorities after July 10, 1995, could have been used against him, none of these statements were false. According to petitioners, McLoren testified falsely by asserting that: (1) he still faced potential prosecution and (2) he was willing to testify even though some of his testimony would incriminate him. First, on cross by Lansing, Hein's trial counsel, McLoren testified about what Detectives Tauson and Neumann told him about their intentions to prosecute him: [Lansing]:And at that time they basically told you that they weren't going to prosecute you if you admitted selling, if you admitted  [McLoren]:They said they didn't have an interest in prosecuting me. [Lansing]:And what did you take that to mean? [McLoren]:That I wasn't the priority. [Lansing]:That you wouldn't be prosecuted; is that right? [McLoren]:Not that I wouldn't be, that I probably wouldn't be. They reserved the option. [Lansing]:But they suggested to you that that probably wasn't going to happen; is that correct? [McLoren]:Yes. Lansing revisited the issue on re-cross: [Lansing]:Was it your state of mind that the things you told Detective Neumann and Detective Tauson would not be used against you? [McLoren]:No. [Lansing]:You hired a lawyer; is that correct? [McLoren]:Yes. .... [Lansing]:And did that lawyer give you any assurances in terms of whether you would be prosecuted or not? [McLoren]:No, not really. [Lansing]:And have you been prosecuted? [McLoren]:No. As an initial matter, McLoren's testimony regarding his understanding that his statements to Detectives Tauson and Neumann could have been used against him was clearly not false. Because McLoren had not been given any immunity at the time of the interview with the detectives on May 26, 1995, this question is irrelevant to the issue of whether he gave false testimony about the July 10 letter. Next, McLoren's testimony about whether he faced potential prosecution was not false because he was given only use immunity. The plain language of the July 10 letter supports this conclusion. The agreement explicitly promised McLoren that nothing he tells [Semow] or the investigating officers about marijuana will be used in any way against him. [9] Although McLoren understood and admitted at trial that charges for marijuana dealing were unlikely, the prosecution did not promise that it would never prosecute McLoren for it. Therefore, McLoren accurately testified that the State reserved the option to prosecute him and there is no basis for saying that he was lying when he testified that his lawyer never assured that he would not be prosecuted. Petitioners next allege that McLoren's testimony citing altruistic reasons for being candid with DDA Semow was false. Several times, on direct and redirect, McLoren was asked, with varying specificity, what had spurred him to be more forthcoming with DDA Semow than when initially questioned by Detectives Tauson and Neumann. On direct examination, McLoren testified that he understood, from representations made by Detective Tauson at the hospital, that the State did not want to prosecute him for marijuana. McLoren was then asked: [Latin]:Since that initial interview with Detectives Neumann and Tauson, when questioned by either law enforcement officers or district attorneys, have you ever made any effort to hide the fact that you possessed or sold marijuana? [McLoren]:No. .... [Latin]:Are there any other reasons other than what Detective Tauson told you at the hospital that caused you to no longer want to hide the fact that you had marijuana? .... [McLoren]:Yes. My grandma told me just to take the drug charge and just bust them. Later, while McLoren was still on direct, the following exchange occurred: [Latin]:As you sit here and testify in this court, do you feel inhibited or deterred in any way from talking about your prior dealings with marijuana? .... [McLoren]:No. I feel fine talking about it. [Latin]:Why? Can you explain why? [McLoren]:Because it is something that I have to do. [Latin]:Why? [McLoren]:Because I want to get these guys that stabbed me and killed my best friend. Then, on redirect, after he was asked why he felt ready to talk to the authorities about marijuana, the following exchange occurred: [Latin]:What brought that about? [McLoren]:My lawyer told me I wasn't going to be able to get these guys until I tell the whole truth. [Latin]:Who did you talk to first ... ? [McLoren]:Jeff Semow .... [Latin]:You didn't know for sure whether you could trust Semow? [McLoren]:Yes. Finally, while still on redirect, McLoren testified: [Latin]:Do you still feel uncomfortable talking about [your involvement with marijuana]? [McLoren]:Somewhat. [Latin]:Why are you talking about it anyhow? [McLoren]:Because it's more important to get these guys than drugs. Contrary to petitioners' contentions, none of these statements are false  and certainly not perjurious. McLoren was asked a series of open-ended questions about why he decided to be forthcoming on and after July 10, 1995 (e.g., [What reasons] other than what Detective Tauson told you at the hospital [caused you to come forward]?; Can you explain why [you decided to come forward]?; What brought that about?; Why are you talking about it anyhow?). None of these questions specifically addressed immunity, and McLoren's failure to mention use immunity cannot be described as false. Assuming that the grant of use immunity was one reason McLoren decided to speak to Semow, he never denied receiving it. Instead, he listed alternative reasons for his willingness to be a witness, none of which are facially false. Therefore, even if McLoren's failure to mention that use immunity played a role in his decision is viewed with some skepticism, petitioners fail to demonstrate its falsity. Moreover, because the July 10 letter was addressed to Sorkin, McLoren's lawyer, and not to McLoren, and McLoren's awareness of it was not established by the state or district courts, we do not assume McLoren knew of the letter's existence. [10] Although it is possible that Sorkin informed McLoren about the gist of the letter, the record is silent on exactly what, if anything, was communicated to McLoren. [11] Arguably, the most colorable claim of falsity concerns McLoren's statement that his grandmother told him just to take the drug charge and just bust petitioners, but this claim fails as well. Petitioners do not contend that McLoren's grandmother never offered this advice. Rather, they appear to take issue with McLoren's testimony because, according to petitioners, it suggested that McLoren could have exposed himself to liability by speaking to Semow, which would not have been true. A broader look at the exchange in which the statement appeared is instructive. McLoren was asked what, other than Detective Tauson's assurance, caused[him] to no longer want to hide the fact that [he] had marijuana. The question is vague as to time. Thus, if McLoren's grandmother offered the advice before July 10, 1995, McLoren could still have been risking criminal liability. But even assuming the statement was made after July 10, McLoren's answer was still not false because, as noted earlier, his understanding as to the existence of the July 10 letter has not been established. Moreover, McLoren's statement did not foreclose or diminish the possibility that he was granted use immunity. Thus, McLoren's testimony was not false. Finally, petitioners interpret McLoren's statement that it was more important to get these guys than drugs to mean that he was willing to risk prosecution for marijuana crimes if it meant bringing petitioners to justice. However, in the context of McLoren's testimony about Detective Tauson's representation, a more plausible interpretation of McLoren's answer is that McLoren was stating that he was testifying at trial because the prosecution was concerned only about the murder and did not care about his relatively minor drug crimes. This interpretation comports with McLoren's testimony that he was told that he was not a priority. Turning to Latin's examination, neither his questions nor his failure to expand upon McLoren's answers were improper and may not have even been deliberate (at least in the case of his direct examination). As none of McLoren's answers to Latin's open-ended questions were false, Latin had no duty to clarify McLoren's answers or to question McLoren specifically about the use immunity he received. Moreover, since Latin had reason to believe that the letter was in the hands of the defense (and clearly was in the case of Miliotti), he might well have expected defense counsel to raise use immunity on cross if they thought it appropriate. Accordingly, we reject petitioners' claim that the prosecution knowingly presented false evidence.