Opinion ID: 2450124
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excluded Juror

Text: Since as early as 1880, it has consistently been recognized that racially-based juror exclusions affect and injure the integrity of the justice system. See e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 55 S.Ct. 784, 79 L.Ed. 1500 (1935) (per curiam); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 67 S.Ct. 261, 91 L.Ed. 181 (1946); Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970). For over one hundred years, discrimination in the jury selection process has constituted a federal criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1969). More recently, in a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the injury inherent in discriminatory juror selection taints the judicial process and extends beyond that inflicted on the [litigant] and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1718, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The exclusion undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. Id. at 87, 106 S.Ct. at 1718. Thus, in Batson v. Kentucky , the Court held that a criminal defendant could challenge the exclusion of racial minorities on equal protection grounds. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). There a black criminal defendant challenged the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to exclude all the black members of the venire. The United States Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause guarantees defendant that the State will not exclude members of defendant's race from the venire on account of race. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24. The Batson Court outlined the appropriate procedure for raising the equal protection challenge. First, defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Defendant may make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Id. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721. This showing may include proof of systematic exclusion, substantial underrepresentation on the venire, or the selection methods and results solely in the present case. Id. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722. [5] As to the purposeful requirement, defendant is entitled to rely on the nature of the peremptory challenge  that it permits `those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562, 73 S.Ct. 891, 892, 97 L.Ed. 1244 (1953)). In the end, defendant must establish that a consideration of all the relevant circumstances raises an inference of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Once defendant makes a prima facie showing, the state is required to demonstrate a neutral explanation for the exclusion. Id. The explanation need not reach the level of a for cause challenge, but neither may it be so scant as to rely on assumed bias on the part of the excluded juror because of race or to conclusively assert universal good faith on the part of the prosecutor. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24. If a race-neutral explanation is given, the trial court must determine whether, given all the circumstances, defendant has established purposeful discrimination. If so, the juror may not be excluded. After reviewing these standards, the Batson Court remanded the case to allow the trial court to evaluate the facts. While the holding in Batson focused on defendant's rights, it also referenced the negative effects that race-based exclusions have on the excluded juror and the community. Id. at 87-89, 106 S.Ct. at 1718-19. Five years later, in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), the Court expanded Batson in a case that emphasized the importance of the excluded juror's rights. In Powers , a white defendant was deemed to have third party standing to challenge the exclusion of a black juror. [T]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the State's peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury solely by reason of their race, a practice that forecloses a significant opportunity to participate in civil life. An individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 409, 111 S.Ct. at 1370. Further, race is irrelevant to the defendant's standing to object to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Id. at 416, 111 S.Ct. at 1373. The same year, the Court applied the Batson rationale to civil cases holding that [r]acial discrimination has no place in the courtroom, whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc, 500 U.S. 614, 630, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2088, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991). Since [t]he selection of jurors represents a unique function delegated to private litigants by the government and attributable to the government for purposes of invoking constitutional protections ..., id. at 627, 111 S.Ct. at 2086, the Court found state action in the civil action forum. Therefore, a private litigant's use of peremptory challenges in a civil case constitutes state action; it is unconstitutional to use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors because of race. Additionally in Edmonson the Court reiterated its concern for the system itself: Race discrimination within the courtroom raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted there. Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic government from becoming a reality... . To permit racial exclusion in this official forum compounds the racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by the color of his or her skin. Id. at 628, 111 S.Ct. at 2087 (citations omitted). As a result of the principles announced in this triad of cases, we know that jurors, as well as civil and criminal litigants, regardless of their race, have standing to contest racially-based peremptory challenges. We know that the party raising the issue must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination and that, upon such a showing, the burden shifts to allow the opposing party an opportunity to offer a neutral explanation for the exclusion. Finally, we know that among the interests which the cases aim to protect is the integrity and respect for the justice system. While speaking profoundly about the import of the constitutional principles in these cases, the Supreme Court declined to offer practical guidance to judges and lawyers who must apply the abstract principles to the practical reality of the courtroom. The Court concluded, for example, that [i]t remains for the trial courts to develop rules, without unnecessary disruption of the jury selection process, to permit legitimate and well-founded objections to the use of peremptory challenges as a mask for race prejudice. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 416, 111 S.Ct. at 1374; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. at 631, 111 S.Ct. at 2089 (we leave it to the trial courts in the first instance to develop evidentiary rules for implementing our decision); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 99 n. 24, 106 S.Ct. at 1725 n. 24. Perhaps that absence of practical guidance from the high Court combined with the relative newness of Batson challenges in civil cases and the numerous unresolved procedural issues produced the unusual posture of this case. By virtue of the procedure used, the trial judge announced that the juror was excluded before counsel had an opportunity to object. After counsel objected, the court required counsel to write down the reasons for exclusion. Then, upon reflection, the court invited the juror to unexcuse himself. He, quite understandably, declined. Under Batson , in addition to objecting to the peremptory challenge, counsel must make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. As guidance on this issue, the Supreme Court stated that all relevant circumstances should be considered, including any pattern of strikes, questions and statements during voir dire, and the recognized inference that peremptory challenges create an atmosphere which allows discrimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-24. In Edmonson , the Court reiterated that this same approach applied in the civil context. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, Inc., 500 U.S. at 631, 111 S.Ct. at 2088-89. Following the showing, the burden shifts to allow counsel to explain the legitimate reason for the challenge. Then, objecting counsel must be given an opportunity to show that the reason given is pretextual or inadequate. Thereafter, the court must evaluate all the facts and circumstances to determine whether racial exclusion has been demonstrated. The crux of the Supreme Court's totality approach is the Court's reliance on and confidence in the trial court to make these fact-based determinations: We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances ... create[] a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Given the variety of jury selection methods, the Court made no attempt to instruct [trial] courts how to implement [the] holding... . Id. at 99 n. 24, 106 S.Ct. at 1725 n. 24. Thus, it remains for the trial judge to devise a method to accomplish the mandates of the cases. In our supervisory role over our state trial courts, we are obliged to assist our trial judges in devising voir dire methods which allow counsel to object to potential peremptory challenges before the court announces the exclusion of the juror. Once an objection is voiced, the court should require the objecting party to detail how a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination has been established. The judge should state clearly on the record, outside the jury's presence, the facts relied upon for finding the presence or absence of a prima facie showing. If, and only if, the judge finds that a prima facie showing has been made, then the party seeking to exclude the juror must be given an opportunity to offer neutral, nondiscriminatory explanations for the exercise of the challenge. Thereafter, the judge must determine, based on all the evidence, whether purposeful discrimination has been established. Here, there is no record of previous systematic exclusions, or underrepresentations, in the venire. Defendants excused the sole black member of the venire. The voir dire of the excused juror is not revealing, but is somewhat cryptic. While the procedure used by the trial judge created difficulties, we must conclude that the trial judge determined that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination had been established. Otherwise, the court would not have required defendants to explain the challenge. [6] Additionally, and again in the face of a somewhat skewed procedure, we must conclude that the trial judge rejected defendants' explanation [7] and concluded that plaintiff had established purposeful discrimination based on the totality of the circumstances. Otherwise, the judge would not have been authorized to disallow the exercise of the challenge and invite the juror to return to the panel. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-3-105(a) (1994 Repl.) (right to four peremptory challenges in civil cases). Thus, implicit in the judge's actions and his order is the finding that defendants' exercise of the peremptory challenge to exclude the minority juror violated the equal protection clause. Having concluded that the trial judge found purposeful discrimination, we must determine whether the trial judge erred in offering the juror the choice of serving or not serving on the jury. We conclude that offering the juror the choice of serving was error. In Tennessee, all adult citizens not excluded by law are required to serve on a jury if summonsed and selected. Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-1-101 (1994 Repl.). To allow a juror to decide whether he or she complies with the statutory requirement would potentially destroy the jury system. Jurors summonsed for duty or called to the box could simply decline to serve. Additionally, allowing the juror to choose to opt out of service would elevate the juror's interest  a viable, but not exclusive interest  above the interests of the litigants, the community, and the preservation of the integrity of the system. Albeit with varying degrees of emphasis, the Supreme Court repeatedly echoed the trilogy of rights it sought to protect. While the litigant's rights were important, they were not superior to the jurors. Neither were the juror's rights more important than the litigants. The integrity of the system, the sanctity of jury service, the perception of the community were interests equally important to those of the litigant and the juror. Guided by the Court's decisions, we, therefore, conclude that the juror's rights cannot subvert the equally significant rights of the litigant and the aura of the system. Therefore, if a court finds that a party has engaged in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory challenge, the juror cannot negate the constitutional injury by agreeing not to serve under circumstances in which a juror is not otherwise entitled to decline to serve. The challenged juror in Tennessee cannot excuse her or himself. If no statutory exemption applies, a juror is competent and must serve unless challenged peremptorily or for cause. Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-1-102-106 (1994 Repl.). A racially discriminatory peremptory challenge is a nullity. Once the court concluded that defendants' challenge was racially discriminatory, the trial judge was required to return the challenged juror to the panel or invoke some other remedial method. [8] The juror had no right to decline to serve. The judge had no right to honor that declination. Once discrimination in jury selection has occurred, the harm is done. The system, the litigant, and the juror have already sustained injury. The litigants are harmed by the risk that the prejudice which motivated the discriminatory selection of the jury will infect the entire process. The community is harmed by the state's participation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our justice system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1427, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). Offering the right to serve does not remove the taint; enforcing the right does. In future cases, judges must utilize procedures to assure that the process is carefully followed. First, the court must provide an opportunity to counsel to object to potential peremptory challenges before the court announces the exclusion and excuse of challenged jurors. This procedure may be outlined before trial, detailed in the pretrial order, or described in the court's local rules. For example, counsel could be required to submit challenges in writing to opposing counsel before presenting them to the clerk or judge. Prior to reading the names of the excluded jurors, the judge might inquire as to objections or might simply pause to allow objections. Counsel desiring to contest a challenge on discrimination grounds could do so at the bench or in a jury-out conference. Secondly, after the objection is raised, the court must ascertain whether a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination has been established. This proffer or discussion should also occur outside the presence of the jury. If the court finds that a prima facie case has been established, the court must give the opposing party the opportunity to rebut the prima facie case by establishing a neutral reason for the exercise of the challenge. [9] The objecting party must be allowed to respond as to why the reason is pretextual or inadequate. Thereafter, the court must determine, by considering all the facts and circumstances, whether the totality of the circumstances support a finding of purposeful discrimination. The ... ultimate burden of persuasion rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. Purkett v. Elem, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d at 839. The trial judge must carefully articulate specific reasons for each finding on the record, i.e., whether a prima facie case has been established; whether a neutral explanation has been given; and whether the totality of the circumstances support a finding of purposeful discrimination. The trial court's factual findings are imperative in this context. On appeal, the trial court's findings are to be accorded great deference and not set aside unless clearly erroneous. See In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. App. 1994). Thus, specificity in the findings is crucial. If the court concludes that a prima facie case has not been established, no explanation may be required. If the court, however, determines that a prima facie case was established but that the explanation is sufficient, or that the totality does not support a finding of purposeful discrimination, the juror should be excluded and the strike counted against the excluding party. If the court finds that the totality of the circumstances warrant a finding of purposeful discrimination, the juror should remain, his or her name should not be announced, and the excluding party should be restored to the peremptory challenge. Alternatively, if the court finds that purposeful discrimination has been established, the court can exclude the entire venire and begin selection with a new panel. In any event, having found purposeful discrimination based on the totality of the circumstances, the court cannot allow the exercise of the challenge. To do so not only permits racial discrimination in jury selection, it endorses the wrong with the imprimatur of the court. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial in this case.