Opinion ID: 1462522
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Totality of the Circumstances Test or Special Needs Test?

Text: Although the federal courts have reached uniform results, they have been divided regarding the most appropriate test to apply in scrutinizing a Fourth Amendment challenge to a DNA-indexing statute. Under the totality of the circumstances test, determining whether a search is reasonable requires assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2197, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001)); see also Conley, 453 F.3d at 679-80. In Samson, the Supreme Court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test in evaluating and upholding a suspicionless search of a parolee. The Court expressly observed that application of the totality-of-the-circumstances test rendered examination of the search under the special needs test unnecessary. 126 S.Ct. at 2199. Under the special needs doctrine, the Supreme Court has recognized that a warrantless, suspicionless search may be justified when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). While a general interest in crime control does not suffice, some special law enforcement concerns may justify a minimal intrusion during information-seeking efforts where the concept of individualized suspicion has little role to play. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424-25, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004). If a special need for the suspicionless search is identified, then the reasonableness of the search must be evaluated, balancing the gravity of the public interests, the degree to which the intrusion advances the public interests, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. Id. at 426-27, 124 S.Ct. 885. The special-needs test is thus a more stringent test, adding a threshold step to the totality-of-the-circumstances test and requiring the court to first identify some special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement before undertaking a balancing of interests. Amerson, 483 F.3d at 79 n. 6. In the wake of the Samson ruling, in which the Supreme Court upheld a suspicionless search of a parolee without bothering to identify any special need, courts have viewed Samson as affirmatively signaling that the totality-of-the-circumstances test is the appropriate test for assessing the reasonableness of suspicionless DNA collection requirements as applied to parolees and supervised releasees. Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 946-47;. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 9; Banks, 490 F.3d at 1185. But see Amerson, 483 F.3d at 78-79 (holding the special-needs test remains the proper framework for analyzing the constitutionality of a DNA-indexing statute when applied to probationers, whose privacy interests are not as diminished as those of parolees); Hook, 471 F.3d at 772-73 (applying special-needs test to the claim of a supervised releasee without mentioning Samson ). Wilson urges the court to apply the special-needs test, as the district court did below, but contends that the district court. misapplied the test. [3] Wilson contends Samson should be narrowly construed as applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test in lieu of the special-needs test only under circumstances where a suspicionless search of a parolee is expressly authorized by parole agreement and by state law. The argument is expressly refuted by Samson itself. It is true that Samson's parole agreement included a search condition that the Supreme Court viewed as demonstrating that Samson had a significantly diminished expectation of privacy as a parolee. Yet, the Court expressly declined to rest its holding on a consent rationale, expressly declined to address whether the search condition was justified as a special need, and expressly anchored its holding in general Fourth Amendment reasonableness principles. Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2199. Accordingly, we concludeconsistent with the conclusion reached by the Ninth Circuit in Kriesel, the First Circuit in Weikert, and the Tenth Circuit in Banksthat the Ohio DNA statute, as applied to Wilson, is properly evaluated under the totality-of-the-circumstances test. If, per Samson, the totality of the circumstances test affords sufficient assurance of the reasonableness of a suspicionless search of a parolee, who has less diminished privacy rights than a prisoner, then it clearly affords adequate protection to the rights of a prisoner. Wilson was a prisoner when corrections officials collected his DNA sample and when the district court evaluated the merits of his claim. Now, to the extent Wilson's Fourth Amendment claim may be considered to be premised on his slightly greater privacy interests as a parolee (challenging not the collection of the DNA sample, but the state's continued retention and potential abuse of both his DNA information and sample), Wilson's claim still falls squarely within the teaching of Samson. [4]