Opinion ID: 1768496
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unreasonableness of Risk

Text: The defendants argue that conditions on the causeway did not present a risk of harm that was unreasonable when measured against the burden that governmental entities would face if the County and TxDOT could be held liable in this case. They contend that allowing the plaintiffs' claims to proceed will effectively require governmental entities to either light every stretch of public roadway or remove all lighting, because any unexpected illumination change might constitute a premises defect for which they may be held liable. Governmental entities could face liability, they claim, for every streetlight that might flicker or go out. But our holding is not so broad. A governmental unit's sovereign immunity is not waived for failure to install lighting, which is a discretionary decision, or even for not repairing lighting that has been installed if an unreasonably dangerous condition is not thereby created. Our decision rests upon the causeway's unique characteristics and the nature of the particular dangerous condition alleged. The County analogizes the dangerous condition alleged here to visual obstructions along roadways caused by overgrown vegetation. We have recognized that holding counties liable for failing to remove such obstructions could impose a significant burden on counties. See Jezek v. City of Midland, 605 S.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Tex. 1980). But the County misconstrues the plaintiffs' pleadings. Unlike Jezek, the condition alleged here is not simply a naturally occurring one that causes a visual obstruction, but rather a malfunctioning block of artificial lighting that the defendants failed to maintain, causing a sudden and unexpected change in driving conditions.