Opinion ID: 2146046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: .IV. Authority to Decide Case.

Text: On remand, the chief judge will be faced with the task of assigning this case to a judge for decision. Making that assignment requires consideration of the authority of judges other than Judge Irvin to rule on this matter. Our case law establishes that a judge does not have authority to rule upon a matter that is under advisement to another judge who presided at the trial. Dunkelbarger v. Myers, 211 Iowa 512, 515, 233 N.W. 744, 745 (1930). In Dunkelbarger, one judge presided over the trial, but before he had issued a ruling, a second judge dismissed the case. Id. at 513, 233 N.W. at 744. We held that when a judge takes a case under advisement, he exclude[s] all other judges in his district from making any order which in any way would affect the substantial rights of the parties. [2] Id. at 515, 233 N.W. at 745. We implicitly overruled earlier cases that had permitted one judge to hear a matter and another judge to rule on its merits. See Reed v. Lane, 96 Iowa 454, 468, 65 N.W. 380, 384 (1895); Hull v. Chicago, Burlington & Pac. Ry., 65 Iowa 713, 716, 22 N.W. 940, 941 (1885). Thus, the rule in Iowa is that a successor judge has no power to render a judgment based on testimony and evidence heard by his or her predecessor. [3] Dunkelbarger, 211 Iowa at 515, 233 N.W. at 745; accord Central Bank, 873 S.W.2d at 674; Hinman v. Hinman, 443 N.W.2d 660, 661 (S.D.1989); Bexar County Ice Cream Co. v. Swensen's Ice Cream Co., 859 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex.App.1993), overruled on other grounds by Barraza v. Koliba, 933 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 (Tex.App.1996); Atlas Fin. Corp. v. Oliver, 129 Vt. 216, 274 A.2d 687, 689 (1971); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 30, at 152-53 (1994) (In some jurisdictions, a successor judge may complete only those acts left incomplete by his or her predecessor that do not require the successor to weigh and compare testimony.... [A] judge usually cannot finish the performance of a duty already entered upon by his or her predecessor where that duty involves the exercise of judgment and the application of legal knowledge and judicial deliberation to facts known only to the predecessor.); 48A C.J.S. Judges § 67, at 651 (1981) (where issues remain undetermined by [one judge], his successor cannot decide or make findings in the case without a trial de novo); see J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Power Of Successor Or Substituted Judge, In Civil Case, To Render Decision Or Enter Judgment On Testimony Heard By Predecessor, 22 A.L.R.3d 922, 925 (1968). Although there are exceptions to this rule, none of the exceptions apply here. Under the first exception, a successor judge may sign a judgment or order prepared, but not signed, by the judge to whom the matter has been submitted. Hartig v. Francois, 519 N.W.2d 393, 394 (Iowa 1994); accord 48A C.J.S. Judges § 67, at 653. In Hartig, a motion for summary judgment had been argued and submitted to the court. Hartig, 519 N.W.2d at 394. The judge who heard the motion dictated a proposed order, but left on vacation before signing it. Id. A second judge, apparently concerned about an approaching trial date, located the order and signed it. Id. We rejected a challenge to the signing judge's jurisdiction. Id. The purely ministerial act of signing the order was not deemed the exercise of jurisdiction inconsistent with the power of the judge who had the matter under advisement. See id. This exception is inapplicable here because there is nothing in the record to show that Judge Connolly signed a decree prepared by Judge Irvin to be his ruling in the case. The second exception to the Dunkelbarger rule is Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 367(b). If a judge becomes disabled [4] or dies while a matter taken under advisement remains undecided, rule 367(b) provides a mechanism for another judge to rule on any pending issues, so long as one of the alternative methods outlined in the rule for concluding the case is followed. [5] Hunter v. Union State Bank, 468 N.W.2d 456, 458 (Iowa 1991). The procedure to be followed under these circumstances varies under the rule: In the event of the death or disability of a judge who has under advisement an undecided motion, or case tried to him without a jury, any other judge of the district may be called in, or a judge from another district may be appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court to consider the same, and, if by review of the transcript or a reargument he can, in his opinion, sufficiently inform himself to enable him to render a decision, he shall do so; otherwise he may order a continuance, declare a mistrial, or order a new trial of all or any of the issues, or direct the recalling of any witnesses, or make such disposition of the matter as the situation warrants. Iowa R.Civ.P. 367(b). There is nothing in the record, however, showing Judge Irvin is dead or is disabled from ruling; consequently, rule 367(b) does not apply. Technically, this matter is still under advisement by Judge Irvin. We conclude, therefore, that upon remand, Judge Irvin should issue a ruling; only if he is unable to rule should a successor judge be appointed. See Paragon Group, Inc. v. Hoeksema, 475 So.2d 244, 246 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (on remand, original judge should rule unless he or she is unavailable; if first judge is unavailable, case should be reassigned to another judge for retrial); In re Whisnant, 71 N.C.App. 439, 322 S.E.2d 434, 436 (1984) (same).