Opinion ID: 854095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Review of the Ruling on Weatherford's Motion to Withdraw

Text: Weatherford made several arguments supporting his request to withdraw his sentencing agreement. (R. at 30-38.) On appeal, he offers three: 1) that his plea was made involuntary and unknowing by the trial court's failure to advise him of his rights; 2) that his plea was invalid because it lacked a factual basis; 3) that jury irregularities unknown to him at the time the agreement was made rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. A. Failure to Advise of Rights and Voluntariness of Plea. In the motion to withdraw, Weatherford argued that his sentencing agreement was made unknowingly and involuntarily because the trial court had neither advised him of his rights before accepting the plea, as required by Indiana Code section 35-35-1-2, [7] (Appellant's Br. at 6), or determined that the agreement was made voluntarily, as required by Indiana Code section 35-35-1-3(a), (Appellant's Br. at 9). Facially, these sections apply only to pleas of guilty or guilty but mentally ill. See Ind. Code Ann. § 35-35-1-2 (West 1998); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-35-1-3 (West 1998). Weatherford in effect argues that the formal requirements imposed by section 35-35-1-2 when accepting guilty pleas should apply when accepting sentencing agreements. [8] Unlike the procedures section 35-35-1-4(b) discussed above, little reason exists for wholesale application of the requirements of section 35-35-1-2 to sentencing agreements. A defendant like Weatherford for example, who has already been convicted, need not be informed that by entering into a sentencing agreement he waives his rights to a public and speedy trial by jury, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-35-1-2(a)(2)(A) (West 1998), or that he waives his right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-35-1-2(a)(2)(D) (West 1998). To be sure, when it appears to the trial judge that a sentencing agreement is the product of coercion or ignorance, the court would likely reach the conclusion that the agreement should be set aside to prevent a manifest injustice. It might also decide that this was a fair and just reason to permit withdrawal. In Weatherford's case, however, the trial court was well justified in refusing to set aside the agreement on these grounds. The record of the earlier proceeding reflected that some care had been taken. After inviting counsel's advice on how to proceed, the judge told the parties he intended to read the terms of the agreement aloud, and ask Weatherford whether he had read and understood them. (R. at 42-43.) Defense counsel responded, Mr. Weatherford said that would be fine with him, (R. at 43), and Weatherford himself responded, That is fine with me your Honor, ( Id. ). The judge then read the terms, and Weatherford responded that he had read and understood them all. (R. at 43-55.) At one point, Weatherford's counsel stopped the judge specifically to note that Weatherford did not admit that he personally shot the victim. (R. at 52.) When asked if he voluntarily waived his right to present mitigation evidence, Weatherford responded, Yes, I understand it and I agree with it. (R. at 55.) Throughout the questioning, Weatherford was apparently attentive and responsive. Weatherford's attempt to show that his sentencing agreement was involuntary and unknowing is insufficient to demonstrate that withdrawal of the agreement was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. The court's method of inquiry seems appropriate. It did not abuse its discretion in denying Weatherford's motion on those grounds. [9] B. Not the Triggerman. Weatherford argues that the trial court should not have accepted his guilty plea because he maintained at the sentencing agreement hearing that he was not the triggerman in the murder. [10] Weatherford cites cases holding that a defendant may not plead guilty and maintain his innocence simultaneously, such as Patton v. State, 517 N.E.2d 374 (Ind.1987), and Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420 (Ind.1983). Of course, one may still be guilty of murder without actually committing the act of deadly force. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 676 N.E.2d 1044, 1047 (Ind.1997). Weatherford admitted in the agreement that the victim ... was a person known by him to be a witness against him and the murder was committed with the intent to prevent [the victim] from testifying against Defendant.... (R. at 28.) Weatherford acknowledged in open court that he had read and understood this portion of the agreement. (R. at 45-46.) These were hardly grounds demonstrating that withdrawal of the agreement was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. C. Jury Irregularities. Weatherford asked the trial court to grant his motion to withdraw because of alleged jury irregularities. (Appellant's Br. at 24.) According to Weatherford, the jurors feared for their lives during his trial, a fact he did not discover until after sentencing. Weatherford raised these claims in his motion to withdraw his sentencing agreement. (R. at 34-35.) Thus, argues Weatherford, the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw despite these known irregularities. ( Id. at 25.) Weatherford apparently bases his arguments on a local newspaper article describing a fire alarm at the juror's motel, and anonymous jurors' claims of fear. (Appellant's Br. at 25; Appendix to Appellant's Br. at 10.) Weatherford can point to no other evidence of juror irregularities other than the newspaper article and his own assertions. The article and Weatherford's contentions, standing alone, are not a cogent argument as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7), nor are they sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity afforded the trial court's ruling on the motion to withdraw.