Opinion ID: 513179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Required Finding of Unreasonable Risk

Text: 29 As to the first issue in this case, the standard of probability of an unreasonable risk to health, we find that Congress did not address the precise question in issue. Examining the EPA interpretation under the second prong of Chevron, we find it to be reasonable and consistent with the statutory scheme and legislative history. Consequently, we uphold the Agency's construction of TSCA as authorizing a test rule where EPA's basis for suspecting the existence of an unreasonable risk of injury to health is substantial--i.e., when there is a more-than-theoretical basis for suspecting that some amount of exposure takes place and that the substance is sufficiently toxic at that level of exposure to present an unreasonable risk of injury to health.
30 Both the wording and structure of TSCA reveal that Congress did not expect that EPA would have to document to a certainty the existence of an unreasonable risk before it could require testing. This is evident from the two-tier structure of the Act. In order for EPA to be empowered to regulate a chemical substance, the Agency must find that the substance presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. TSCA Sec. 6, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2605(a). The testing provision at issue here, by contrast, empowers EPA to act at a lower threshold of certainty than that required for regulation. Specifically, testing is warranted if the substance may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. TSCA Sec. 4, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2603(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Thus, the language of section 4 signals that EPA is to make a probabilistic determination of the presence of unreasonable risk.
31 The legislative history of TSCA compels a further conclusion. It not only shows that unreasonable risk need not be a matter of absolute certainty; it shows the reasonableness of EPA's conclusion that unreasonable risk need not be established to a more-probable-than-not degree. 32 A House Report on the version of the bill that eventually became TSCA underscores the distinction between the section 6 standard and the section 4 standard. To issue a test rule, EPA need not find that a substance actually does cause or present an unreasonable risk. 33 Such a finding requirement would defeat the purpose of the section, for if the Administrator is able to make such a determination, regulatory action to protect against the risk, not additional testing, is called for. 34 H.R.Rep. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1976). 8 35 The House Report also contains signals indicating that Congress expected EPA to act even when evidence of unreasonable risk was less than conclusive. According to that report, the word may in section 4 was intended to focus the Agency's attention on chemical substances about which there is a basis for concern, but about which there is inadequate information to reasonably predict or determine the effects of the substance or mixture on health or the environment. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). The Conference Committee Report reemphasized that the statutory language focused the Agency's attention on substances about which there is a basis for concern. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1679, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 4546. 36 These indications of congressional intent illustrate that EPA's reading of TSCA is a permissible one. Congress intended to authorize testing where the existence of an unreasonable risk could not yet be reasonably predicted. The Agency's determination that it is empowered to act where the existence of an unreasonable risk cannot yet be said to be more probable than not is entirely consistent with that expression of intent. The EPA interpretation is likewise consistent with the level of certainty suggested by the phrase basis for concern. To accept CMA's position would require the Agency to gather adequate information to make a reasonable prediction or determination of risk before issuing a test rule. To say the least, this is not mandated by the statutory history, which indicates Congress' desire that EPA act on the basis of rational concern even in the absence of adequate information that an unreasonable risk existed. 9 Section 4 may permissibly be read to authorize issuance of a test rule on the basis of less than more-probable-than-not evidence about a potentially unreasonable risk to health. 37 This conclusion is further bolstered by the legislative history underlying section 6. If CMA were correct that EPA must make a more-probable-than-not finding of risk under section 4's may present language, then it would logically follow that section 6--which contains the term presents or will present an unreasonable risk--must require an even stronger than more-probable-than-not demonstration of unreasonable risk. 10 Yet neither section 6 nor its legislative history indicate any such super-requirement of certainty. Indeed, section 6 states expressly that the Agency need only find a reasonable basis to conclude that an unreasonable risk exists. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2605(a). A reasonable basis requirement is certainly no more demanding than a more-probable-than-not requirement; indeed the phrase suggests a less demanding standard. This interpretation is confirmed by the House Report, which states that an EPA finding of unreasonable risk under section 6 is not expected to be supported by the same quantum of evidence as is customary in administrative proceedings. 38 A finding by the Administrator that there is such a reasonable basis must include adequate reasons and explanations for the Administrator's conclusion. It does not, however, require the factual certainty of a finding of fact of the sort associated with adjudication. 39 Id. at 32. In sum, the standard Congress set for section 6 regulation, that the chemical will present an unreasonable risk, is no more rigorous (and arguably is less rigorous) than a more-probable-than-not finding. It follows as a matter of course that section 4's may present language demands even less. 40 Of course, it is also evident from the legislative history that Congress did not intend to authorize EPA to issue test rules on the basis of mere hunches. The House Report states: 41 [T]he term may ... does not permit the Administrator to make a finding respecting probability of a risk on the basis of mere conjecture or speculation, i.e., it may or may not cause a risk. 42 H.R.Rep. No. 1341, supra, at 18. 11 Congress obviously intended section 4 to empower EPA to issue a test rule only after it had found a solid basis for concern by accumulating enough information to demonstrate a more-than-theoretical basis for suspecting that an unreasonable risk was involved in the use of the chemical. 43 CMA, curiously, insists that this very passage in the legislative history indicates that Congress embraced a more-probable-than-not standard for section 4. CMA Br. 21-22; CMA Reply Br. 5-6. CMA arrives at this conclusion by underlining the words probability of a risk in the quoted sentence and reading the phrase as being synonymous with a risk that is more probable than not. This reading, however, wrenches the targeted phrase out of its immediate context and puts the legislative history as a whole on the rack. Standing alone, the term probability of a risk might conceivably be read to describe a risk that is at least 51 percent certain. Within its host sentence, however, the phrase probability of a risk clearly refers to any degree of probability except for the one set out in the phrase immediately following it. Thus, the sentence says only that the Agency must make a finding respecting probability of a risk, and that finding must be based on more than conjecture and speculation. The distance between the conjectural-speculative degree of probability foreclosed by Congress and the more-probable-than-not standard that CMA advances was clearly meant to be bridged by EPA's discretion and expertise. The Agency's reading of TSCA is a reasonable accommodation of the conflicting policies Congress committed to its care--specifically, the need to gather information about suspect chemicals without mandating expensive tests based on little more than a hunch. In sum, the legislative history fails to undermine EPA's choice of a standard for section 4.
44 We note that EPA's interpretation of section 4 is consistent with the views of the only other two courts of appeals that have examined its may present language. See Ausimont U.S.A., Inc. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.1988); Shell Chemical Co. v. EPA, 826 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.1987). 45 In Ausimont, the Third Circuit held that EPA could not require testing based on little more than scientific curiosity. 838 F.2d at 97. A test rule could not be sustained, the court stated, if the existence of exposure were merely a remote possibility founded on theoretical factual situations. Id. The Agency, it said, can validly require testing only when an existing possibility of harm raises reasonable and legitimate cause for concern. Id. The court, however, recognized that the Agency's burden in the review of a section 4 test rule differs substantially from the normal standards of review applied to agency factfinding. See id. at 96 (Agency's burden is to demonstrate not fact, but doubt and uncertainty as to the existence of an unreasonable risk). Thus, we find nothing in the Third Circuit's interpretation of section 4 that is inconsistent with EPA's reading of the statute. 46 The only other circuit which has considered section 4 remanded the case without reaching any decision as to its correct interpretation. In Shell Chemical Co. v. EPA, 826 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir.1987), the record showed that production of the chemical in question took place in an enclosed, controlled environment where potential exposure ... [was] very limited. Id. at 297-98. During oral argument, an EPA lawyer asserted that some additional evidence of exposure had come to light after promulgation of the rule. Id. at 298. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the Agency to explore the additional evidence, observing that, without it, the case was a close one. Id. The Shell court did not decide how strong the evidence of unreasonable risk must be to merit a test rule. Despite industry efforts to cite it to advantage, see CMA Reply Br. 10 & n. 9, Shell offers little guidance in our case. See Ausimont, 838 F.2d at 97 (The holding in Shell Chemical ... is inconclusive and of no real assistance in the dispute before us.). 47 CMA cites other cases interpreting language identical or similar to the may present term of section 4 as requiring a more-probable-than-not finding of risk. These opinions are of scant assistance, however, because in the main they involve provisions authorizing the regulation or prohibition of substances, rather than mere testing. 12 Such interpretations can hardly be transplanted into the statutory scheme of TSCA, where Congress has self-consciously created a lower threshold for testing rules than for rules regulating chemical substances. See Ausimont, 838 F.2d at 96 (distinguishing between evidence required for test rule and evidence required for regulation under TSCA); H.R.Rep. No. 1341, supra, at 14 (same).
48 We have determined that Congress did not address the precise nature of the finding of unreasonable risk of injury to health that must underlie a section 4 test rule. EPA's interpretation of the statutory standard is consistent with the statutory scheme and its legislative history, and it is a reasonable accommodation of the conflicting policies that Congress entrusted to the Agency's care. We therefore uphold the Agency's interpretation, under which EPA is empowered to issue a test rule where, in light of the evidence before it, the existence of an unreasonable risk of injury to health is a substantial (i.e., more than theoretical) probability. Since unreasonable risk of injury to health is a function of toxicity and exposure, this standard can be restated as follows: A test rule is warranted when there is a more-than-theoretical basis for suspecting that some amount of exposure occurs and that the substance is sufficiently toxic at that exposure level to present an unreasonable risk of injury to health. Under the second prong of Chevron, we uphold the Agency's interpretation of section 4's standard for issuing a testing rule. 49