Opinion ID: 1567972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory authority to contract.

Text: ¶ 29. The Hospital agreement clearly states: Owner and Agent agree to offer for sale or long term lease both the Greene County Rural Health Center Skilled Nursing Facility and Hospital Facility to CMI, or an entity designated by CMI, on or before October 30, 2007. Owner and Agent agree to complete such sale or long term lease on or before December 31, 2007. If Owner and/or Agent and CMI cannot agree to sale or long term lease terms on both facilities addressed in this agreement, Owner and/or Agent hereby agree to enter into a management contract with CMI on or before December 31, 2007 for a period not less than five (5) years. If such long term management contract for both facilities is entered into, Owner and/or Agent agree that such long term management contact will be renewable at the sole discretion of CMI or a company designated by CMI, at the end of the initial five (5) year term and each and any successive term for successive five (5) year periods. ... Owner and Agent further agree to grant CMI, or a company designated by CMI, the first right of refusal to purchase both Greene County Rural Health Center Skilled Nursing Facility and Hospital Facility should the Owner/Agent desire to sell, lease or discontinue management and/or operation of any one of the facilities at any time in the future prior to or after October 30, 2007. Owner/Agent and CMI further agree CMI shall have the option to extend the October 30, 2007 purchase date for a period of one (1) year and extend any management contract of which CMI and Greene County Rural Health Center Skilled Nursing Facility and Hospital Facility are parties to for successive one year increments until such time as CMI or an entity designated by CMI shall purchase the facilities or give written notice to Owner/Agent of the desire not to purchase the Skilled Nursing Facility and Hospital Facility. (Emphasis added.) We find this language clearly involves the sale or lease of the community hospital. Thus, the question becomes whether the Trustees had the statutory authority to enter into them without the Supervisors' approval. ¶ 30. In finding that the Trustees had such authority, the chancellor relied on Mississippi Code Section 41-13-35(5)(g), which states, in pertinent part, that the trustees have authority: (g) To contract by way of lease, lease-purchase or otherwise, with any agency, department or other office of government or any individual, partnership, corporation, owner, other board of trustees, or other health care facility, for the providing of property, equipment or services by or to the community hospital or other entity or regarding any facet of the construction, management, funding or operation of the community hospital or any division or department thereof, or any related activity, including, without limitation, shared management expertise or employee insurance and retirement programs, and to terminate said contracts when deemed in the best interests of the community hospital. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-13-35(5)(g) (Rev. 2005). ¶ 31. Although the statute grants the Trustees authority to acquire property, we find nothing in its plain language that provides the Trustees authority to alienate property. Thus, we find the chancellor erred in concluding that the Trustees had authority to enter into the Agreements  which provided for the alienation of real property  without the Supervisors' approval. ¶ 32. Furthermore, even if the statute granted the Trustees authority to enter into the contracts, to Trustees failed properly to do so. The statutory language provides that the Trustees must contract in their own capacity and, in this case, the Trustees chose not to exercise that authority, but rather to sign the contracts as agents for the Supervisors. [12] ¶ 33. The record contains no evidence that the Board of Supervisors voted on the contracts or spread them on its minutes. This Court has clearly stated, on numerous occasions, that any act by a Board of Supervisors must be evidenced by an entry in its minutes in order to be valid. For instance, in Burt v. Calhoun, 231 So.2d 496 (Miss.1970), this Court stated: It is manifest that the board of supervisors of a county can only enter into an express contract by an order spread upon its minutes, and that there can be no such thing as a verbal or oral order of this board. No contract can be implied or presumed, it must be stated in express terms and recorded on the official minutes as the action of the board of supervisors. The responsibility is placed on each person, firm or corporation contracting with a board of supervisors to see that the contract is legal and properly recorded on the minutes of the board. Id. at 499 (quoting Smith County v. Mangum, 127 Miss. 192, 89 So. 913, 914 (1921) and citing Lee County v. James, 178 Miss. 554, 174 So. 76 (1937)); see also Jackson Equip. & Serv. Co. v. Dunlop, 172 Miss. 752, 160 So. 734 (1935); Pearl Realty Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 170 Miss. 103, 154 So. 292 (1934). See also Gilchrist-Fordney Co. v. Keyes, 113 Miss. 742, 74 So. 619 (1917); Lamar County v. Tally, 116 Miss. 588, 77 So. 299 (1918); Marion County v. Foxworth, 83 Miss. 677, 36 So. 36 (1904). ¶ 34. Greene County submits, and CMI does not deny, that neither the Nursing Home Agreement nor the Hospital Agreement were ever properly spread upon the minutes of the Board of Supervisors. Thus, because neither the Supervisors nor the Trustees properly entered into the contracts with CMI, all other points on appeal, with respect to the merits of the case, are moot.
¶ 35. Although not necessary for disposition of the merits of this case, we now address the chancellor's order removing I.D. Brown from the Board of Trustees and reinstating Larry Brown. One holding public office may not be removed from his or her position by an action to which he is not a party. In Jackson Redevelopment Authority v. King, Inc., 364 So.2d 1104 (Miss.1978), this Court stated: It is a very ancient and salutary principle of the common law, where a person claims to hold an office, his title shall not come in question in an action to which he is not a party; but while he holds the office de facto, his acts and doings therein will be deemed good. ... The incumbent cannot be impeached collaterally and indirectly; if he is in possession of the office, discharging its ordinary functions, his official acts are conclusive as to all persons interested or affected by them. Id. at 1109-10. See also Upchurch v. City of Oxford, 196 Miss. 339, 17 So.2d 204, 205 (1944); Rosetto v. City of Bay St. Louis, 97 Miss. 409, 52 So. 785, 785 (1910); Cooper v. Moore, 44 Miss. 386, 392-93 (1870). ¶ 36. CMI argues, nevertheless, that the chancellor had the right to reinstate Larry Brown to his position because the Supervisors' removal of him was unlawful. It argues that the Supervisors, and specifically Supervisor Marion Pierce, usurped the power of the GRHC Board of Trustees by coercing Larry Brown into resigning. ¶ 37. Even assuming arguendo the Supervisors did usurp the Trustees' power, the State, not CMI, had authority to seek removal of I.D. Brown and reinstate Larry Brown. This Court has stated: For the usurpation, or unlawful holding, or exercising its functions without lawful right, the person may be dealt with, and punished at the suit of the state .... If he is a usurper in possession without right, the state, whose authority he abuses, can move directly for his ejection and punishment. Cooper v. Moore, 44 Miss. 386, 392-93 (1870) (emphasis added). ¶ 38. It is undisputed that neither the State of Mississippi nor I.D. Brown was a party to the underlying action, and neither is a party to this appeal. Thus, the chancellor erred in removing I.D. Brown from the Board of Trustees.
¶ 39. The chancellor held CMI and the Trustees in contempt, finding that  by entering the October 15, 2007, contract  they interfered with the court's December 31, 2007, deadline concerning the possible sale or lease of the hospital. The chancellor's deadline, however, emanated from agreements which we have found to be unenforceable. Furthermore, the order holding the Trustees and CMI in contempt did not provide for any sanctions. It merely held that they were in contempt of the final order and that they were to cease and desist from entering into any further management contracts.... [13] ¶ 40. Because we find today that the contracts were not binding, and because the contempt order resulted in no sanctions, we find the issue moot.