Opinion ID: 2994102
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevant Burden of Proof

Text: We have held that a preponderance of the evidence is all that is required under the Sentencing Guidelines for a finding of fact. See, e.g., Porter, 23 F.3d at 1277. Despite our clear precedent, the Kroledges urge us to consider the argument that a heightened standard of proof must be met under some instances where a factual finding will result in a sentencing increase so great ’that the sentencing hearing can fairly be characterized as a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.’ United States v. Corbin, 998 F.2d 1377, 1387 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). In support, the Kroledges cite United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102 (3d Cir. 1990), in which the Third Circuit required the higher standard of proof in a case where the sentencing court raised the defendant’s sentence from about thirty months to thirty years. In Corbin, we acknowledged the possibility that a higher standard might be appropriate in those circumstances where the government appeared to use the sentencing hearing to retry the substantive offense. In such circumstances, the district court might use its discretion to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines in such a way as to effectively sentence a defendant to the term that would have been appropriate had she been convicted of the substantive offense. As we noted in United States v. Rodriguez, 67 F.3d 1312, 1322 (7th Cir. 1995), we have not yet been presented with an opportunity to consider whether, under a certain set of facts, such a heightened standard of proof may be appropriate. We are confident that these facts do not merit the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence standard. Here, the Kroledges were each acquitted of the charge of use of fire in the furtherance of a federal felony, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 844(i), which provides that any person who maliciously damages or destroys . . . by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property . . . shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years. Thus, if the Kroledges had been convicted of the federal arson charge, they would each serve between five and twenty years. Instead, by enhancing their sentences based on the relevant conduct of arson, each Kroledge is serving either twenty-seven or thirty-three months, which is roughly half of the minimum sentence that they would have received for the arson charge. As we noted in Porter, see 23 F.3d at 1277-78, we have in many instances refused to adopt the Kikumura standard in cases where the sentence enhancement was more drastic than the enhancement at issue here. See Rodriguez, 67 F.3d at 1323 (51-63 months enhanced to life imprisonment); Porter, 23 F.3d at 1276 (92-115 months enhanced to 137 months); United States v. Masters, 978 F.2d 281, 283-85 (7th Cir. 1992) (33-41 months enhanced to 40 years). Contrasting these cases with the facts of Kikumura, we find that this does not qualify as a rare instance where a higher standard might be justified.