Opinion ID: 2599854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Double Counting Felonies

Text: Defendant contends that double counting the charged felonies  once to elevate the degree of the homicide to first degree murder and again to render him eligible for the death penalty (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17))  is improper. He concedes we rejected this precise argument in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 945-946, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676, but asserts we should reconsider that case in light of the number of special circumstance allegations now included in the law, rendering the narrowing function of the special circumstances ... a nullity. We conclude no grounds exist to revisit our decision in Marshall. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 158, 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357 [first degree murder liability and special circumstance findings may be based upon common elements without offending the Eighth Amendment]; see also People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 164, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990 [double counting argument has been rejected many times before given the manner in which our death penalty scheme permissibly narrows the class of death-eligible offenders and guides the sentencer's discretion]; Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231, 246, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 [that the aggravating circumstance duplicated one of the elements of the crime does not make [a death] sentence constitutionally infirm].)