Opinion ID: 184903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Need for a Final Order

Text: 6 We must first determine whether or not we have jurisdiction to hear this petition for review. Subject to a few limited exceptions, appellate review of administrative action is restricted to final agency orders. See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778, 103 S.Ct. 2187, 76 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983) (The strong presumption is that judicial review will be available only when agency action becomes final.). We have held repeatedly and across agency contexts that an order will be considered final to the extent that it imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes some legal relationship, usually at the consummation of an administrative process. Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 59 F.3d 222, 226 (D.C.Cir.1995) (quoting State of Alaska v. FERC, 980 F.2d 761, 763 (D.C.Cir.1992)). See also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 75 F.3d 685, 690 (D.C.Cir.1996); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 939 F.2d 1021, 1027 (D.C.Cir.1991). Here, the Commission's order reinstating the miners' complaints and remanding the matter to the ALJ for further record development clearly falls outside the heartland of final action. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 329 (D.C.Cir.1989) (as a general rule, district court order remanding matter to administrative agency is not a final order); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 43 F.3d 912, 914-15 (4th Cir.1995) (Secretary of Labor's order remanding matter to ALJ is not a final order and so not subject to judicial review); Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. OSHRC, 545 F.2d 1384, 1385-86 (4th Cir.1976) (per curiam) (Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission decision reversing ALJ's summary judgment and remanding for trial on the merits is not a final order). Cf. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 824 F.2d 94, 95 (D.C.Cir.1987) (per curiam) (Department of Labor Benefits Review Board decision remanding case to ALJ for determination of damages and further fact-finding is not final and hence not immediately appealable). 7 Seeking to avert the finality norm, petitioners first contend that the Mine Act provides a specific, congressionally sanctioned exception. The anti-discrimination provision at issue herein--section 105(c)(3)--states that [a]ny order issued by the Commission under this paragraph shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with [section 106 of the Mine Act]. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(3). Section 106(a)(1) itself provides that [a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order of the Commission issued under this chapter may obtain a review of such order in ... the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.... 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1). Petitioners find this language significant for two reasons. First, in contrast to numerous other statutory review provisions, the Mine Act expressly refers to orders rather than to final orders. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (granting courts of appeals jurisdiction to review a final order of the [NLRB] responding to unfair labor practice allegations); 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (granting courts of appeals jurisdiction to review final orders of the Federal Communications Commission); 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (providing for review of final orders from the Benefits Review Board). Secondly, the Mine Act itself also distinguishes orders from final orders, as section 106(b), in contrast to section 106(a)(1), provides that [t]he Secretary may also obtain review or enforcement of any final order of the Commission.... 30 U.S.C. § 816(b) (emphasis added). Petitioners contend that Congress, by omitting the modifier final in section 106(a)(1), signaled an express intent to allow for the review of other than final orders. According to petitioners, the statutory reference to persons adversely affected or aggrieved by Commission orders explicitly provides an alternative limiting principle to that of absolute finality, requiring that a party suffer some concrete consequences before seeking judicial review. 8 Despite petitioners' valiant efforts at semantic reconstruction, we do not discern any exception to the principle of finality within the Mine Act's judicial review provisions. While a direct expression of Congress' will would necessarily control, we do not believe that the statute contains any directive to depart from the background norm of administrative law that judicial review awaits completion of the administrative process. If anything, the legislative history accompanying passage of the Mine Act bespeaks the opposite. Both the Senate Report and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference describe section 106(a)(1) as providing for the review of final orders; no mention is made of earlier review and no distinction is drawn between the Secretary and other persons. See S.Rep. No. 95-181, at 13 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3413 (Persons adversely affected by the Commission's final order may obtain a review of such order in any appropriate U.S. court of appeals. The Secretary may also obtain review or enforcement of any final order....) (emphases added); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-655, at 53 (1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3485, 3501 (describing the conference substitute as conforming to the Senate bill, which itself provides for a uniform procedure [for judicial review] applicable to all final orders of the Commission) (emphases added). In the absence of any clear evidence that Congress intended a more generous review than the norm, we join our sister circuits in holding that section 106(a)(1) of the Mine Act limits appellate review to final agency action. See Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 920 F.2d 738, 743-44 (11th Cir.1990); Monterey Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 635 F.2d 291, 292-93 (4th Cir.1980).