Opinion ID: 2766467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Uncharged Conduct

Text: Having determined that the Guidelines error in this case was harmless, we now consider Rodriguez’s contention that the district court based its calculation of his non-Guidelines sentence on improper factors under § 3553(a). At sentencing, Rodriguez did not object to either the PSR or the district court’s reasons for concluding that a sixty-month sentence was appropriate without the Guidelines. Before this Court, Rodriguez argues that “the district court relied upon unreliable uncharged conduct in sentencing him to 60 months’ imprisonment.” 3 As noted, we review Rodriguez’s non-Guidelines sentence for plain error. See Williams, 620 F.3d at 493–94. A defendant challenging his sentence on plain-error review must demonstrate that “(1) the district court committed error, (2) the error was plain or obvious, [and] (3) the error affected his substantial rights.” Id. If all three elements are met, this Court has discretion could not] glean from the record) that it would impose the same sentence if there had not been a 16-level enhancement based on the prior crime of violence”). 3 Rodriguez also cites this Court’s rule that bare arrest records, i.e., “arrests, standing alone, do not constitute reliable information for sentencing purposes.” Johnson, 648 F.3d at 276 (internal quotation marks omitted). But to call the PSR’s descriptions of Rodriguez’s uncharged conduct “bare” is misleading. A bare record contains the “mere fact of an arrest— i.e., the date, charge, jurisdiction and disposition—without corresponding information about the underlying facts or circumstances regarding the defendant’s conduct that led to the arrest.” Harris, 702 F.3d at 229. Here, in contrast, the least descriptive of the PSR’s arrest reports reads: “On June 26, 2008, Tyler Police Department officers were dispatched to a hit and run accident. The victim reported the defendant backed up and hit a vehicle in the driveway and then drove away. On July 11, 2008, the victim advised he did not want to press criminal charges. The case was cleared due to lack of prosecution.” Because the PSR contained more than the “mere fact” of Rodriguez’s arrests, his challenge is properly construed as going to the underlying reliability of the PSR’s factual content. 10 Case: 13-51021 Document: 00512887770 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/02/2015 No. 13-51021 to correct the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 731–32. Rodriguez argues that the district court erred in taking into account the uncharged conduct listed in his PSR. As we have previously held, “[a] district court’s consideration, at sentencing, of prior arrests [is] plain error.” United States v. Earnest Jones, 489 F.3d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Robert Jones, 444 F.3d 430, 436 (5th Cir. 2006). That error would have affected Rodriguez’s substantial rights if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the court would have imposed a lesser sentence.” Earnest Jones, 489 F.3d at 682 (citing United States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 364 (5th Cir. 2005)). 4 Here, as in Williams, 620 F.3d at 494, “the district court’s lengthy . . . discussion of other significant, permissible factors” undermines the claim that the error affected Rodriguez’s substantial rights. The district court enumerated several reasons why the fifteen- to twenty-month range was inadequate. It mentioned Rodriguez’s past convictions for stalking, enticing a child, and driving under the influence, as well as “the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for the offense, [and] the need to deter future criminal conduct and to protect the public.” Furthermore, on plain-error review, we have taken district courts at their word when, as here, they disclaim reliance on improper factors. See 4 This Circuit has occasionally applied a different standard to this prong of plain-error review, asking instead whether the district court could impose the same sentence on remand. See Earnest Jones, 489 F.3d at 682 (citing United States v. Ravitch, 128 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 1997)). There is some doubt as to whether Ravitch’s objective test survived United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See United States v. Davis, 602 F.3d 643, 647 n.6 (5th Cir. 2010). Because here, as discussed above, the § 3553(a) factors would permit the district court to impose the same sentence on remand, this element of plain-error review is satisfied under either standard. We need not decide the continuing validity of the Ravitch test. 11 Case: 13-51021 Document: 00512887770 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/02/2015 No. 13-51021 United States v. Gonzalez-Achondo, 493 F. App’x 539, 540 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Although the district court mentioned Gonzalez– Achondo’s numerous prior arrests, the record reveals that the district court did not base its sentence exclusively on those arrests nor did it give significant weight to Gonzalez–Achondo’s arrest record.”). The district court in this case explicitly stated, “I’m not . . . taking uncharged conduct in terms of the commission of a crime per se into account.” Because the district court both disclaimed reliance on Rodriguez’s uncharged conduct and justified the sentence it imposed with permissible factors, we conclude that there is no reasonable probability that, but for the error, it would have selected a lesser sentence. The error therefore did not affect Rodriguez’s substantial rights.