Opinion ID: 1288237
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Detective Guillermo's entrance was a search.

Text: Before we address the reasonableness of a given governmental activity, we first must determine whether the activity in question amounts to a search in the constitutional sense. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Kaaheena, 59 Haw. at 28, 575 P.2d at 466. In making this determination, we focus on the privacy expectations of the individual whose person or property is being examined. Kaaheena, 59 Haw. at 28, 575 P.2d at 466. Indeed, the primary purpose of both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. State v. Bonnell, 75 Haw. 124, 136, 856 P.2d 1265, 1272 (1993) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)). In ascertaining whether an individual's expectation of privacy brings the governmental activity at issue into the scope of constitutional protection, this court utilizes the following two-prong test, borrowed from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967): First, one must exhibit an actual, subjective expectation of privacy. Second, that expectation must be one that society would recognize as objectively reasonable. Bonnell, 75 Haw. 124, 139, 856 P.2d 1265, 1274 (1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted). There is no question that a person generally has an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in his or her home. Nor is there any question that the expectation of privacy in one's home is one that society recognizes as objectively reasonable. See United States v. United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) ([P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.). The prosecution concedes as much; [18] however, the prosecution contends that, because Detective Guillermo's entrance into the Hauanios' home was for a limited purpose, i.e., taking photographs, and pursuant to an ongoing criminal investigation  an investigation that the Hauanios voluntarily initiated by calling the police  the Hauanios' expectation of privacy in their house on the day in question was diminished. We disagree. The prosecution's argument seems to suggest that for some indefinite period of time the police could return to the Hauanios' home, reenter it without the Hauanios' permission, and take photographs with impunity, all in the name of the Hauanios' diminished expectation of privacy. This argument is without merit. By calling the police to report a robbery sometime around midnight on Friday, November 6, 1992, the Hauanios did not somehow voluntarily give Hawai`i law enforcement officials an implied license to enter their house, including their master bedroom, to take pictures and search for evidence relating to the criminal investigation while they were at a hotel. When the police initially entered the Hauanios' home to investigate the robbery that had just taken place, they did so with the Hauanios' permission. Thus, during the course of this initial investigation, the Hauanios' expectation of privacy in their home was, as the prosecution contends, diminished. However, that permission terminated when the police and the Hauanios closed the doors and left the Hauanios' residence. As soon as this occurred, the Hauanios' expectation of privacy in their home was completely restored. Indeed, after the police finished their initial investigation, Kelly informed them that she and Daniel were afraid to remain at their home and that her mother, who was present at the time, would know how to contact them. When the Hauanios gave the police the information necessary to contact them, it is reasonable to infer that they expected to be contacted if the police intended to reenter their home. The Hauanios and the police left the Hauanios' residence between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on Saturday, November 7, 1992. Before everyone left the premises, the front door, which had been damaged when the robbers first broke in, was barricaded shut and the door on the side of the house, which could not be locked, was closed. These actions are indicative of the Hauanios' intent not to allow uninvited persons to enter their home while they were at the hotel. We therefore reject the prosecution's argument and hold that Detective Guillermo's entrance into the Hauanios' home, whatever the purpose, over six hours after everyone had left was a search in the constitutional sense.