Opinion ID: 214362
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adverse Employment Action/Termination

Text: United argues that McInerney presented no evidence that United terminated her employment, and contends that she voluntarily resigned. United’s voluntary resignation argument misses the mark and speaks more to United’s reason (her failure to return to work) for ending McInerney’s employment, rather than whether United ended it. We must note that, from the outset of this case, the district court determined that this was a straightforward termination case. It did not instruct the jury regarding constructive discharge or non-termination adverse employment actions.2 Thus, we assume that United’s denial of McInerney’s requested leave of absence was not, itself, an adverse employment action.3 Nonetheless, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that McInerney suffered an adverse employment action because United terminated her employment. Termination of employment is “clearly an adverse employment action.” Fye, 516 F.3d at 1228. Throughout the trial, United contended that it did not terminate McInerney, but rather that she voluntarily resigned by failing to return to work on March 31, 2006. There is no evidence that McInerney told her employer that she was resigning. The 2 We address the jury instructions in Part III, infra. 3 This is not to say that the denials of leave are irrelevant. The jury could consider them as evidence of retaliation, and could consider them to the extent that they factored into Nelli’s assessment of McInerney’s situation and Nelli’s ultimate decision. The same is true for United’s designation of McInerney as not eligible for rehire. 12 evidence showed that McInerney did not intend to resign, and that she desperately wanted to keep working at United. Cf., e.g., Strickland v. United Parcel Svc., Inc., 555 F.3d 1224, 1227-29 (10th Cir. 2009) (determining whether employee intended to end her employment was a jury question where employee turned in her company laptop and informed her supervisor she was leaving, but testified that she did not believe she had quit or resigned at that time). This is not a case where an employee simply abandoned her position without any notice to or communication with her employer. Rather, there was ample testimony at trial that, after initially extending her return date, Nelli decided to end McInerney’s employment by “deeming” that McInerney had resigned. A jury could reasonably find that United terminated McInerney. In Wells v. Colorado Department of Transportation, 325 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2003), the employer claimed “he had no choice but to terminate Plaintiff because he had never received notice that [plaintiff] was able to return to work” after the expiration of her medical leave. Id. at 1212. We stated that the termination was an adverse employment action because “[i]t hardly requires stating that when an employer tells an employee that she no longer has a job, that employee’s job status has been significantly and materially altered.” Id. at 1216.4 We determined that there was an adverse employment action by the employer, 4 Each of the three district court cases that United relies heavily upon in its brief supports our conclusion. In each of these cases the plaintiff’s employment was terminated after the plaintiff failed to return to work upon the expiration of FMLA leave. In each case, the district court determined that the termination was an adverse employment action. See Johnson v. Cmty. Coll. of Allegheny Cnty., 566 F. Supp. 2d 405, 425, 432 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (finding that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment (continued...) 13 even though the termination was the natural consequence of the employee’s choice not to return to work. If, for example, an employer informed an employee that it would consider her late arrival at work to be a voluntary resignation, a jury could still reasonably find that the employer took an adverse employment action if it subsequently terminated her employment for tardiness. Cf. Roberts v. Park Nicollet Health Svcs., 528 F.3d 1123 (8th Cir. 2000) (assuming, without discussing, that an employee suffered an adverse employment action under similar circumstances). The same is true in this case. Whether or not it was a consequence of McInerney’s failure to return to work, a jury could reasonably find that United took the action that ended McInerney’s employment tenure by terminating her when it “deemed” she had resigned. McInerney did not report to work on her scheduled return date of March 25, 2006. However, McInerney’s failure to report to work on March 25 was not “deemed” a 4 (...continued) action when her employment was “brought to a closure” because she had not reported to work); Mitchell v. The Geo Gp., Inc., No. 05-cv-00197-PSF-CBS, 2006 WL 2711757, at  (D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2006) (“It is undisputed that plaintiff was terminated on or about May 20, 2003 when she did not return to work following an authorized leave of absence pursuant to her FMLA request, thus she was subject to an adverse employment action.”); Sweis v. Hyatt Corp., No. 98 C 7770, 2001 WL 619509, at  (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2001) (“Sweis suffered an adverse action by the employer when she was terminated from her position [after failing to return to work] with the Hyatt Corporation on July 27, 1995.”). The plaintiffs in these cases did not ultimately prevail because they could not rebut the employers’ proffered non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions: their return-to-work policies. United’s argument on this point speaks to whether McInerney can show pretext, and not whether she has made a showing of an adverse employment action. Cf. Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1183 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (analyzing whether the employer’s explanation that the plaintiff was terminated due to “job abandonment” was a pretext for discrimination, and not considering whether the termination was an adverse employment action). 14 resignation, and her employment did not end on that date. When asked, “did you at that point [on March 25] deem that she had resigned?” Nelli replied, “I kn[e]w she still wasn’t coming back to work. Based on our e-mails, I hadn’t quite deemed it that she had resigned at that point. I think I had sent her another e-mail after this point.” Id. at 221820 (emphasis added). On March 29, 2006, Nelli sent McInerney another e-mail stating: “[y]ou are expected to return to work within 2 days, March 31st, to your current position as a Supervisor in [the ramp] or as a Customer Service Representative, with the option of a 90 day LOA. If you do not return to either position within 2 days, we will consider you to have voluntarily resigned your employment at United Airlines. Please notify me of your decision.” Id. at 2493. When McInerney did not appear at work on March 31, 2006, Nelli determined that McInerney “had chosen not to come back to work” and deemed that McInerney resigned as of that date. Id. at 2223. McInerney’s employment with United ended when Nelli made that decision.5 5 This evidence reveals the fallacy of the dissent’s statement that Nelli did not have authority to extend McInerney’s leave and, by the same token, control the date of her termination. The broader question posed by the dissent, i.e., whether Nelli had the authority to grant McInerney “the lengthy leave of absence she desired” was not the focus of the evidence presented by either party. Dissent at 3. Rather, the parties’ arguments focused on whether McInerney was terminated, or whether she voluntarily resigned. Regardless of whether Nelli could have granted a leave of absence going forward, this evidence permits the inference that Nelli made the decision to terminate McInerney’s employment by declining to further extend her return date and deeming her to have resigned. The narrow issue presented here is whether McInerney presented enough evidence to satisfy the second element of her retaliation case: that she suffered an adverse employment action. The dissent suggests that our decision “imposes liability on United simply because it allowed Nelli a little wiggle room in enforcing company policy.” Id. at (continued...) 15 A jury could reasonably find that Nelli had the discretion to extend McInerney’s return date, even after McInerney failed to report to work on March 25, 2006. A jury could reasonably find that, on March 31, Nelli decided not to further extend McInerney’s return date and, instead, decided to end McInerney’s employment. Given this evidence, a jury could reasonably find that Nelli terminated McInerney’s employment on March 31, 2006.