Opinion ID: 1676576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Grace Appeal

Text: In her cross-appeal, Ms. Grace asserts error in the trial court's denial of her request for attorney fees incurred in prior contempt proceedings. In September of 1991, Ms. Grace filed a motion seeking an order of contempt against Mr. Lay. The trial court declined to hold Mr. Lay in contempt but did order him to return the couple's oldest child to Ms. Grace's custody. The court concluded the proceeding with the following statement: I would also say to you, Mr. Lay, if it had been requested, you would be paying considerable attorney fees because it's your conduct that brought everybody here. But it wasn't requested so I can't order it. The trial court in the present action refused to award Ms. Grace the attorney fees in relation to this previous proceeding because her motion for contempt was denied and those proceedings have concluded and this court does not have jurisdiction to do so. Ms. Grace asserts that the trial court possessed the jurisdiction and authority to award her necessary and reasonable fees. In affirming the trial court's decision, and being in agreement with the court of appeals' disposition of this issue, this Court sets forth verbatim and adopts the portion of the unpublished opinion of the court of appeals addressing the issue: Ms. Grace argues that she was entitled to obtain her attorney fees incurred for the prior proceedings in the current proceeding by virtue of the separation agreement. The agreement provided that if either she or Mr. Lay defaulted in the performance of any of the terms, provisions, or obligations set forth in the agreement such that it became necessary to institute legal proceedings to effectuate the performance of the agreement, then the party found to be in default would pay all expenses incurred in connection with the enforcement proceedings, including reasonable attorney fees. Ms. Grace directs this court's attention to Obermiller v. Obermiller, 795 S.W.2d 624, 625-26 (Mo.App.1990), which declares that stipulations as to attorney fees in settlement agreements are binding upon the courts unless they are found to be unconscionable. Ms. Grace correctly states the general rule. Indeed, a provision for attorney fees quite similar to the one in this case has been found to entitle the successful litigant to attorney fees and costs. See Gibson v. Gibson, 687 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Mo.App.1985) (where the separation agreement provided that each party would indemnify the other for all litigation expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by either party because of the failure of the other party to carry out the terms of the agreement). However, in none of the cases cited by Ms. Grace did the party seeking attorney fees pursuant to a separation agreement try to recover those fees in a subsequent proceeding. Ms. Grace is barred from obtaining attorney fees for the prior proceedings by the doctrine of res judicata and the related prohibition against splitting a cause of action. The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from contesting matters that the parties have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Fleming v. Mercantile Bank & Trust Co., 796 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. App.1990). Res judicata applies not only to points and issues upon which the court was required by the pleadings and proof to form an opinion and pronounce judgment, but to every point properly belonging to the subject matter of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. King Gen. Contr. v. Reorganized Church, 821 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Mo. banc 1991). The doctrine of res judicata takes on the character of the rule against splitting a cause of action. Id. As the court of appeals in Burke v. Doerflinger, 663 S.W.2d 405 (Mo.App.1983), noted: Res judicata and splitting a cause of action are closely related because both are designed to prevent a multiplicity of lawsuits. A cause of action which is single may not be split and filed or tried piecemeal, the penalty for which is that an adjudication on the merits in the first suit is a bar to a second suit. In general, the test for determining whether a cause of action is single and cannot be split is: 1) whether separate actions brought arise out of the same act, contract or transaction; 2) or whether the parties, subject matter and evidence necessary to sustain the claim are the same in both actions. The word transaction has a broad meaning. It has been defined as the aggregate of all the circumstances which constitute the foundation for a claim. It also includes all of the facts and circumstances out of which an injury arose. Id. at 407 (citations omitted). Res judicata has been applied in the context of a request for attorney fees in a dissolution action in which there were multiple proceedings. In Potter v. Desloge, 625 S.W.2d 927 (Mo.App.1981), a husband filed a motion to modify a decree of dissolution. In response, his former wife filed a motion for attorney fees, costs, and expenses to defend the husband's motion. The trial court dismissed the husband's motion to modify and awarded the wife costs, but did not grant or mention attorney fees or other expenses. Id. at 928-29. The husband then appealed the denial of his motion to modify. Id. at 929. Rather than file a cross-appeal on the court's failure to grant her motion for attorney fees for the modification, the wife filed another motion for attorney fees, requesting fees for both the original defense of the husband's motion to modify and for the husband's appeal. Id. After a hearing on the wife's motion, the trial court granted the wife $12,500 in attorney fees. Id. The husband appealed the award of attorney fees, contending that the first decision by the trial court in which the court did not grant or mention attorney fees was res judicata on the issue of attorney fees for the wife's defense of the motion to modify. The court of appeals agreed with the husband, noting that [u]nder the doctrine of res judicata a judgment between two parties is conclusive as to all issues of fact before the court whether or not a particular issue was actually considered. Id. The court of appeals found that [the wife's] first motion for attorney fees was properly before the trial court when it ruled on [the husband's] amended motion to modify. The trial court failed to grant attorney fees. It follows that the issue of attorney fees for the trial of the motion to modify had been adjudicated. Id. at 930. The separation agreement in the instant case provided that the party found to be in default in any enforcement proceedings would be responsible for reasonable attorney fees. Thus, Ms. Grace's motion for attorney fees in connection with the contempt proceedings arose out of the same act or event as her prior motion for an order of contemptMr. Lay's failure to abide by the terms of the separation agreement by refusing to return the parties' oldest daughter to Ms. Grace's custody. Both the contempt motion and the motion for attorney fees involved the same parties, and the subject matter and evidence necessary to sustain the claims were basically the same in both proceedings, as a finding that Mr. Lay had failed to abide by the agreement was vital to both actions. Ms. Grace was aware of all of the basic facts surrounding her claim for attorney fees incurred in the prior contempt proceedings at the time of those proceedings. It was incumbent upon her, and her attorney, to plead all grounds, theories, and counts in the first lawsuit. Adams by Northcutt v. Williams, 838 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Mo.App.1992). See also King Gen. Contr., 821 S.W.2d at 502-03, (Blackmar, J., concurring) (When a plaintiff makes claims based on a particular transaction, and the case goes to trial, the plaintiff is obliged to set forth all claims and variations arising out of the transaction. All other claims against parties to the litigation which could have been stated in the petition are precluded.). As the Southern District stated in S.M.B. by W.K.B. v. A.T.W., 810 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Mo.App.1991), [w]e know of no legal principle which empowers a court to award fees to an attorney in one case for work done in another case, without some demonstrated compelling reason to do so. Ms. Grace did not offer a compelling explanation for why she failed to ask for attorney fees in the prior proceeding. Her failure to request attorney fees during the prior proceeding precludes her from seeking such attorney fees. Id. at 605. In all respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. HOLSTEIN, C.J., BENTON, PRICE, LIMBAUGH, ROBERTSON, JJ., and GUM, Senior Judge, concur. WHITE, J., not participating because not a member of the Court when case was submitted.