Opinion ID: 1921367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We dispose first of the cross appeal by the administrator of decedent's estate. She relies on these three grounds for reversal:

Text: (1) Failure to submit an instruction on defendant's violation of a Webster City speed ordinance; (2) Failure to give the administrator's requested instruction dealing with the dangerous nature of the crossing; (3) Error in giving instructions relating to decedent's duty in approaching and crossing the intersection. II. It is difficult to understand the administrator's first objection since a proposed instruction on the city's speed ordinance was deleted by agreement of counsel. Under such circumstances, of course, that matter is not an issue here. III. The remaining two issues presented for review assail the trial court's instructions on the relative duties of the parties as they approached the crossing where the accident occurred. The administrator says, first, that it was error not to give her requested instruction on the defendant's duty at that time and place; and, second, she asserts the instructions which were given as to her decedent's obligation were erroneous. Without prolonged discussion, we hold these claims are without merit. The instructions as given adequately set out the duties of the parties. What the administrator really complains of is that the instructions did not emphasize the circumstances favorable to her. Of course, this is just what instructions should avoid. Hoyt v. C. R. I. & P. Railroad Co., 206 N. W.2d 115, 120 (Iowa 1973); Andrews v. Struble, 178 N.W.2d 391, 400 (Iowa 1970). We believe the requested instruction was properly refused. If given, it would have raised serious questions under the doctrine of those cases. We also believe the instructions dealing with decedent's duty to use due care as he approached the crossing are not open to fair criticism. Counsel seems to feel he could have said it better. Whether true or not, this does not make the instructions bad. If an instruction covers the legal principles involved as they are raised by the facts of the case, the trial court has the right to choose its own language to best accomplish that purpose. State v. Jones, 193 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Iowa 1972).