Opinion ID: 2431350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Person vs. Property Dichotomy

Text: One of the fundamental issues the inquiry poses is whether the preembryos in this case should be considered persons or property in the contemplation of the law. The Court of Appeals held, correctly, that they cannot be considered persons under Tennessee law: The policy of the state on the subject matter before us may be gleaned from the state's treatment of fetuses in the womb... . The state's Wrongful Death Statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106 does not allow a wrongful death for a viable fetus that is not first born alive. Without live birth, the Supreme Court has said, a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the statute. See e.g., Hamby v. McDaniel, 559 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1977); Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Service, 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958). Other enactments by the legislature demonstrate even more explicitly that viable fetuses in the womb are not entitled to the same protection as persons. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201 incorporates the trimester approach to abortion outlined in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 [93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147] (1973). A woman and her doctor may decide on abortion within the first three months of pregnancy but after three months, and before viability, abortion may occur at a properly regulated facility. Moreover, after viability, abortion may be chosen to save the life of the mother. This statutory scheme indicates that as embryos develop, they are accorded more respect than mere human cells because of their burgeoning potential for life. But, even after viability, they are not given legal status equivalent to that of a person already born. This concept is echoed in Tennessee's murder and assault statutes, which provide that an attack or homicide of a viable fetus may be a crime but abortion is not. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-107 and 39-13-210. Junior Lewis Davis v. Mary Sue Davis, Tennessee Court of Appeals at Knoxville, No. 190, slip op. at 5-6, 1990 WL 130807 (Sept. 13, 1990). Nor do preembryos enjoy protection as persons under federal law. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), the United States Supreme Court explicitly refused to hold that the fetus possesses independent rights under law, based upon a thorough examination of the federal constitution, [17] relevant common law principles, and the lack of scientific consensus as to when life begins. The Supreme Court concluded that the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense. Id. at 162, 93 S.Ct. at 731. As a matter of constitutional law, this conclusion has never been seriously challenged. [18] Hence, even as the Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989), permitted the states some additional leeway in regulating the right to abortion established in Roe v. Wade , the Webster decision did no more than recognize a compelling state interest in potential life at the point when viability is possible. Thus, as Justice O'Connor noted, [v]iability remains the `critical point.' Id. at 529, 109 S.Ct. at 3062 (O'Connor, J., concurring). That stage of fetal development is far removed, both qualitatively and quantitatively, from that of the four- to eight-cell preembryos in this case. [19] Left undisturbed, the trial court's ruling would have afforded preembryos the legal status of persons and vested them with legally cognizable interests separate from those of their progenitors. Such a decision would doubtless have had the effect of outlawing IVF programs in the state of Tennessee. But in setting aside the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeals, at least by implication, may have swung too far in the opposite direction. The intermediate court, without explicitly holding that the preembryos in this case were property, nevertheless awarded joint custody of them to Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis, citing T.C.A. §§ 68-30-101 and 39-15-208, and York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.Va. 1989), for the proposition that the parties share an interest in the seven fertilized ova. The intermediate court did not otherwise define this interest. The provisions of T.C.A. §§ 68-30-101 et seq., on which the intermediate appellate court relied, codify the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. T.C.A. § 39-15-208 prohibits experimentation or research using an aborted fetus in the absence of the woman's consent. These statutes address the question of who controls disposition of human organs and tissue with no further potential for autonomous human life; they are not precisely controlling on the question before us, because the tissue involved here does have the potential for developing into independent human life, even if it is not yet legally recognizable as human life itself. The intermediate court's reliance on York v. Jones , is even more troublesome. That case involved a dispute between a married couple undergoing IVF procedures at the Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine in Virginia. When the Yorks decided to move to California, they asked the Institute to transfer the one remaining frozen embryo that they had produced to a fertility clinic in San Diego for later implantation. The Institute refused and the Yorks sued. The federal district court assumed without deciding that the subject matter of the dispute was property. The York court held that the cryopreservation agreement between the Yorks and the Institute created a bailment relationship, obligating the Institute to return the subject of the bailment to the Yorks once the purpose of the bailment had terminated. 717 F. Supp. at 424-425. In this case, by citing to York v. Jones but failing to define precisely the interest that Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis have in the preembryos, the Court of Appeals has left the implication that it is in the nature of a property interest. For purposes of clarity in future cases, we conclude that this point must be further addressed. To our way of thinking, the most helpful discussion on this point is found not in the minuscule number of legal opinions that have involved frozen embryos, but in the ethical standards set by The American Fertility Society, as follows: Three major ethical positions have been articulated in the debate over preembryo status. At one extreme is the view of the preembryo as a human subject after fertilization, which requires that it be accorded the rights of a person. This position entails an obligation to provide an opportunity for implantation to occur and tends to ban any action before transfer that might harm the preembryo or that is not immediately therapeutic, such as freezing and some preembryo research. At the opposite extreme is the view that the preembryo has a status no different from any other human tissue. With the consent of those who have decision-making authority over the preembryo, no limits should be imposed on actions taken with preembryos. A third view  one that is most widely held  takes an intermediate position between the other two. It holds that the preembryo deserves respect greater than that accorded to human tissue but not the respect accorded to actual persons. The preembryo is due greater respect than other human tissue because of its potential to become a person and because of its symbolic meaning for many people. Yet, it should not be treated as a person, because it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet established as developmentally individual, and may never realize its biologic potential. Report of the Ethics Committee of The American Fertility Society, supra , at 34S-35S. Although the report alludes to the role of special respect in the context of research on preembryos not intended for transfer, it is clear that the Ethics Committee's principal concern was with the treatment accorded the transferred embryo. Thus, the Ethics Committee concludes that special respect is necessary to protect the welfare of potential offspring ... [and] creates obligations not to hurt or injure the offspring who might be born after transfer [by research or intervention with a preembryo]. Id. at 35S. In its report, the Ethics Committee then calls upon those in charge of IVF programs to establish policies in keeping with the special respect due preembryos and suggests: Within the limits set by institutional policies, decision-making authority regarding preembryos should reside with the persons who have provided the gametes... . As a matter of law, it is reasonable to assume that the gamete providers have primary decision-making authority regarding preembryos in the absence of specific legislation on the subject. A person's liberty to procreate or to avoid procreation is directly involved in most decisions involving preembryos. Id. at 36S. We conclude that preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either persons or property, but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life. It follows that any interest that Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis have in the preembryos in this case is not a true property interest. However, they do have an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos, within the scope of policy set by law.