Opinion ID: 2037340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authority under Iowa statutory provisions.

Text: Defendants further contend that even if they are considered the legal owners of the property, the city failed to properly give them notice required under section 446.20(2) of the city's intention to seek abatement costs from defendants. The district court concluded that section 446.20(2) did not apply because the county, not the city, was the holder of the certificate of purchase at tax sale. The court also impliedly concluded that defendants were liable under section 364.12(4) for costs incurred by the city in abating the nuisance on defendants' property. 1. Upon our examination of section 446.20(2), we conclude that whether the city or the county was the holder of the tax certificate is not a relevant fact in this case. While it is true that section 446.20(2) does make reference to nuisance abatement costs on property purchased by a county at a tax sale, and that notice thereof shall be served at the same time and in the same manner as the notice of expiration of period of redemption, the statute also mandates that the notice state that costs of removal, dismantling, or demolition shall be assessed against the person in whose name the parcel is taxed. According to our reading of this language, section 446.20(2) does not give a city or county authority to pursue a personal judgment action against the property owner for nuisance abatement costs, but rather only allows the city or county to assess such costs in the same manner as a tax. [1] Additionally, section 446.20(2) is not applicable in this case because according to the language of section 446.20(2), the notice requirement thereunder is only triggered when the city or board (depending upon the body that seeks to recover costs of nuisance abatement) determines at the time (1994) that the notice of expiration of right of redemption is served, concerning property purchased at a tax sale, that such property constitutes a nuisance and requires removal, dismantling, or demolition. Iowa Code § 446.20(2). In this case, the city declared defendants' property to be a nuisance in 1996, two years after the 1994 notice was sent by the county to defendants concerning their right of redemption. Thus, assuming for purposes of argument that section 446.20(2) does give a city the right of personal judgment against a property owner for nuisance abatement costs, the city had no duty in this case to give such notice in 1994 because the city had not yet determined that defendants' property constituted a nuisance at the time the notice of expiration of redemption period was served on defendants by the county. Moreover, to adopt the interpretation of section 446.20(2) advanced by defendants, that a city or county could only seek nuisance abatement costs from a property ownereither through assessment or personal judgment actionif notice of the city or county's intention to seek such costs is served with the notice of expiration of period of redemption, would force cities and counties to purchase property at tax sales for purposes of ensuring a right to recover for possible, later nuisance abatement costs. Additionally, under defendants' interpretation, a city would be required to monitor all properties that are subject to tax sale for purposes of attaching a notice of potential abatement costs to the notice of expiration of right of redemption. Such a burden, we believe, does not seem reasonable, especially in light of the plain language of section 364.12(4), which we will discuss below. We therefore agree with the district court's conclusion that section 446.20(2) does not apply to this case, but for reasons different than those relied upon by the district court. 2. We now consider the applicability of section 364.12(4) to this case. We have noted in other cases that section 364.12(4) gives a city authority to abate a nuisance and seek reimbursement from the property owner for costs incurred therein. See City of Ottumwa v. Hill, 567 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Iowa 1997) (noting that section 364.12(4) give[s] broad powers to a city to collect the costs of a nuisance abatement); see also French v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 546 N.W.2d 911, 915 n. 3 (Iowa 1996) (noting that city may abate nuisance and recover abatement costs from offending property owner by bringing a civil action for damages under section 364.12(4); holding that district court acted illegally in entering judgment against property owner in contempt action brought by city when property owner failed to abate nuisance). We conclude that a plain reading of section 364.12(4) allows a city to seek a personal judgment against a property owner to recover nuisance abatement costs. We therefore need not look beyond the language of section 364.12(4) to conclude that the city properly pursued its remedy against defendants in this case. See Drahaus v. State, 584 N.W.2d 270, 274 (Iowa 1998) (when text of statute is plain and its meaning clear, court will apply the language of the statute as written and will not search for meaning beyond express terms of statute or resort to rules of statutory construction). We also point out that section 364.12(4) contains no requirement that the city give property owners notice of its intention to seek abatement demolition costs concerning a nuisance. Therefore, the city had no duty under section 364.12(4) to give defendants notice of its intention to later pursue a claim against defendants for demolition costs. The city did, however, give defendants a ten-day notice under the city ordinance to abate and remove the nuisance. Defendants took no action in response to the notice. Thereafter, the city lawfully exercised its authority under the city ordinance and under Iowa Code section 364.12 to abate the nuisance, demolish the building, and seek to recover the demolition costs from defendants. [2] Defendants raise no other legal obstacles to the city's exercise of authority under section 364.12(4) in pursuing its civil action against defendants to recover costs it incurred in abating the nuisance on defendants' property. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court holding defendants liable for the costs of demolition.