Opinion ID: 1932899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Grant of a Second Trial on the Issue of Contributory Negligence.

Text: The Cowees argue, on Cross-Appeal, that the Superior Court abused its discretion in granting the second trial. [32] We agree. After the jury in the first trial found that Country Club was negligent and that its negligence was the proximate cause of Mrs. Cowee's injuries, the Superior Court granted a new trial limited to the issue of contributory negligence of Mrs. Cowee. In the first trial, the jury found Mrs. Cowee negligent in her failure to stop prior to entering Route 52 but in a response to a Jury Instruction Form found that her negligence was not a proximate cause of her injuries. [33] The Superior Court granted a new trial as to this issue because it held that there was an inherent contradiction between the finding of the jury on the Jury Instruction Form that Mrs. Cowee was negligent and the finding that her negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. [34] We find that the Superior Court was incorrect in determining that a finding of negligence must result in a corollary finding of proximate cause. This Court, in Duphily v. Delaware Electric Cooperative, [35] held that a finding of negligence does not, ipso facto, translate to or include a finding of proximate cause, and that such an ipso facto rule would improperly transform a finding of negligence to one of absolute liability. Consequently, we follow a traditional but for definition of proximate cause. Proximate cause exists if a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. [36] A jury verdict will be upheld unless the verdict is contrary to law or against the great weight of the evidence. [37] The Superior Court therefore erred in granting a second trial.