Opinion ID: 3152697
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the State present a multiple acts case?

Text: In Count I, the State alleged Robinson took Trouten but did not specify the precise act that constituted the taking. At trial, the State presented evidence and made argument in support of two possible takings: (1) Robinson lured Trouten from Michigan to Kansas with false representations of employment and travel; and (2) Robinson took Trouten to his rural Linn County property with representations of fulfilling her sexual fantasy. Robinson contends that the two takings constitute multiple acts, and therefore, the district judge should have compelled the State to elect a single theory of taking to 296 submit to the jury or provided the jury with a special unanimity instruction requiring jurors to agree unanimously on the criminal act constituting the taking. Here, the two separate theories of Trouten's taking could support but one conviction for aggravated kidnapping. As the State points out in its brief, a crime is completed when every element of the offense has occurred. See Cox v. State, 197 Kan. 395, 405, 416 P.2d 741 (1966) (the crime of kidnapping in the second degree is complete when without lawful authority a person is forcibly seized with intent to secretly confine the person in this state against his or her will); K.S.A. 21-3106(6) (crime committed when every element occurs). The actual infliction of bodily injury is one of the essential elements of aggravated kidnapping. K.S.A. 21-3421. The State's evidence established that Robinson inflicted nonconsensual bodily injury only once—at the time of Trouten's murder. Any bodily injury Trouten may have sustained through consensual BDS&M sex could not, as a matter of law, support the bodily injury element of the aggravated kidnapping statute. See State v. Mason, 250 Kan. 393, 396-98, 827 P.2d 748 (1992) (court properly instructed that bodily injury must be against the victim's will under kidnapping statute). Because the State's two theories as to how Robinson took Trouten could support but one conviction, rather than two, Count I and the State's evidence supporting it did not constitute a multiple acts case. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to force the State to elect one theory or, alternatively, in failing to provide a special unanimity instruction to the jury. See State v. Colston, 290 Kan. 952, 961, 235 P.3d 1234 (2010) (multiple acts case exists when the State charges defendant with a single count and presents evidence of multiple acts—each of which, independently, is sufficient to support the crime charged). 297 10. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT—GUILT PHASE Robinson claims several instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced his right to a fair trial. In particular, he highlights the prosecutor's use of what he characterizes as imaginary scripts on closing argument; comments that allegedly undermined the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and right to remain silent; and the failure to disclose the State's theory regarding defendant's common scheme or course of conduct until the rebuttal portion of closing argument. Legal Framework and Standard of Review For many years, we have said that 'review of prosecutorial misconduct claims involves a two-step process. The court first decides whether the comments were outside the wide latitude a prosecutor is allowed, e.g., in discussing the evidence. If so, there was misconduct. Second, if misconduct is found, we have said the court must determine whether the improper comments prejudiced the jury and denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, 856, 281 P.3d 1112 (2012).' State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, 1012, 306 P.3d 244 (2013). State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 248, 331 P.3d 544 (2014), cert. granted in part 135 S. Ct. 1698 (2015). Use of Imaginary Scripts Robinson argues the prosecutor improperly utilized imaginary scripts: (1) during closing argument when the prosecutor advanced the rhetorical question, And one must wonder, did that poor, fat, disabled Debbie Faith, did she watch her mom get killed?; (2) during closing argument when the prosecutor said, We know that there he is grinning like a Cheshire cat; within hours of Lisa Stasi having that baby ripped from her arms.; and (3) during closing argument when the prosecutor made argument based on a letter Robinson purportedly sent to victim Lisa Stasi's brother, which was not admitted into evidence. 298 1. Did the prosecutor's suggestion that Debbie Faith witnessed her mother's death constitute prosecutorial misconduct? At the start of closing argument, prosecutor Morrison characterized Robinson's acts as sinister and provided examples of his conduct warranting the title. In the process, he commented, And one must wonder, did that poor, fat, disabled Debbie Faith, did she watch her mom get killed? Defense counsel objected, claiming the comment invited speculation from jurors. Judge Anderson did not clearly rule on the objection. Instead, he commented that I understand [the prosecutors] have a certain degree of latitude here. On the other hand, it's probably not a good thing for us to get too speculative. The defense requested a curative instruction, but the district judge felt it would draw the jury's attention to the remark. Robinson believes the comment was improper and prejudicial to his due process rights. Under the controlling framework, we first consider whether the remark fell beyond the wide latitude afforded prosecutors in discussing the evidence. State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1012, 236 P.3d 481 (2010). Prosecutors are granted wide latitude to argue cases because it is their duty to present them with 'earnestness and vigor and to use every legitimate means to bring about a just conviction.' State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 351, 204 P.3d 585 (2009) (quoting State v. Ruff, 252 Kan. 625, 634, 847 P.2d 1258 [1993]). 'Inherent in this wide latitude is the freedom to craft an argument that includes reasonable inferences based on the evidence.' King, 288 Kan. at 351 (quoting State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 507, 996 P.2d 321 [2000]). However, we have made clear that this wide latitude is not limitless, and prosecutors may not comment on facts beyond the evidence. King, 288 Kan. at 351; State v. Ly, 277 Kan. 386, 393, 85 P.3d 1200, cert. denied 541 U.S. 1090 (2004). For example, 299 [p]rosecutorial comments referring to what the victim was thinking are improper because they ask the jury to speculate on facts not in evidence. State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1113, 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002), overruled on other grounds by Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2006); see State v. De La Torre, 300 Kan. 591, 610, 331 P.3d 815, cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 728 (2014). Likewise, [i]t is improper for the prosecutor to create an 'imaginary script' in order to create and arouse the prejudice and passion of the sentencing jury. Kleypas, 272 Kan. at 1113. The evidence relevant to the prosecutor's comment established that Debbie Faith was a disabled minor who depended on her mother, Sheila Faith, as her primary caregiver. They left Colorado together to visit Robinson and were never seen alive again. Their bodies were found in two metal drums at Robinson's Raymore, Missouri, storage unit. The coroner testified both were killed by blunt-force trauma to the head. He could not determine if the blows rendered them immediately unconscious. Nor could he provide a precise date of death but said the decomposition was consistent with the State's theory that they had been murdered 6 years earlier. The State offered no direct evidence that Debbie Faith witnessed her mother's murder. Nor did the circumstantial evidence reasonably give rise to such an inference. The State did not prove which victim Robinson killed first or, for that matter, whether they were killed at the same time or location. It is speculative to presume from the record that Debbie Faith saw Robinson kill her mother. The form of the prosecutor's rhetorical question, One must wonder . . . , did just that and invited jurors to speculate about events unsupported by the evidence. As such, the comment exceeded the wide latitude afforded prosecutors in discussing the evidence. See State v. Flournoy, 272 Kan. 784, 796-97, 36 P.3d 273 (2001) (comment speculating about victim's final thoughts improper). 300 The State attempts to distinguish Flournoy, arguing the prosecutor's comments there were unsupported and concerned the victim's possible last thoughts rather than the events she may have witnessed. The distinction is one without a legal difference. In both instances, the State's evidence, and reasonable inferences from it, failed to support the events or scenario the prosecutor painted for the jury during closing argument. Having determined the comment was beyond the scope of the evidence, we next decide whether Robinson suffered prejudice as a result. See State v. Maestas, 298 Kan. 765, 774, 316 P.3d 724 (2014). In doing so, we consider: (1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct showed ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of jurors. 298 Kan. at 774. After careful consideration of these factors, we hold that the prosecutor's comment was not prejudicial to Robinson's right to a fair trial. Prosecutor Morrison's isolated, stray remark was not gross and flagrant. See State v. Adams, 292 Kan. 60, 68-69, 253 P.3d 5 (2011) (comments not gross or flagrant when the prosecutor only made a passing reference to the victim and did not dwell on or repeat the point); State v. Miller, 284 Kan. 682, 719, 163 P.3d 267 (2007) (accumulation of multiple comments may render them gross and flagrant). The record also confirms the absence of any ill will. After Robinson's objection, the prosecutor moved on to other issues at the district judge's urging and made no further reference to the subject. Cf. State v. McHenry, 276 Kan. 513, 525, 78 P.3d 403 (2003) (ill will exists where prosecutor expressed indifference to court's rulings, mocked the defendant, or engaged in repeated acts of misconduct), disapproved on other grounds by 301 State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 144 P.3d 647 (2006); State v. Washington, 275 Kan. 644, 672, 68 P.3d 134 (2003) (a few comments in lengthy transcript do not show ill will). Finally, we are convinced this isolated remark had little weight in the minds of jurors. The prosecutor did not argue Debbie Faith definitively witnessed her mother's murder. Because the form of the rhetorical question was equivocal, the potential impact on jurors was diminished. Moreover, this isolated remark was likely to have far less impact than the State's overwhelming and compelling evidence establishing that Robinson violently murdered this young, disabled teenager and her mother and, for years thereafter, reaped the financial benefits of his horrific acts by stealing their Social Security benefit payments. See Miller, 284 Kan. at 721 (prosecutor's improper comment held little weight in light of the overwhelming evidence against defendant). We find this isolated comment, uttered amongst thousands of pages of transcript, was not prejudicial to Robinson's right to a fair trial. 2. Did the prosecutor's remark about ripping Lisa Stasi's baby from her arms constitute prejudicial misconduct? During the rebuttal portion of the State's closing argument, the prosecutor responded to Robinson's argument challenging the State's evidence that Robinson murdered Stasi. As the prosecutor discussed the timeline of events, he commented, We know that there [Robinson] is grinning like a Cheshire cat, within hours of Lisa Stasi having that baby ripped from her arms. The district judge sustained Robinson's objection, instructed the jury to disregard the comment, and admonished the prosecutor not to comment on matters not in evidence. The prosecutor then clarified his argument, explaining to the jury: 302 Would a young mother. . . willingly give up her baby, willingly give her baby away to a stranger? I think we all know the answer to that question; don't we? I think we all know that she wouldn't just walk away from her baby. I think we all know what happened to Lisa Stasi for her baby. Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's argument as clarified. Robinson contends the prosecutor's suggestion that baby Tiffany was ripped from Stasi's arms was beyond the scope of the evidence. The record established that Stasi was hysterical and crying when she called her mother-in-law on the afternoon of her disappearance, explaining somebody was trying to have her sign papers and take baby Tiffany from her. The evidence showed that Robinson later returned to his home with a baby named Tiffany and gave the child to his younger brother in furtherance of what turned out to be his adoption ruse. The evidence did not establish that Robinson actually ripped baby Tiffany from Lisa Stasi's arms. Nor could one reasonably make such an inference from the evidence. The record simply contains no evidence describing how it came to pass that Robinson obtained physical control over baby Tiffany. We agree with Judge Anderson that the comment exceeded the scope of the evidence. Nevertheless, it did not prejudice Robinson's right to a fair trial. The lone, isolated remark was not gross and flagrant. Though technically improper, the remark did not land far beyond the wide latitude afforded prosecutors in discussing the evidence because Stasi's emotional response to the situation suggested she was unwilling to part ways with her baby voluntarily. See State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. 55, 65, 260 P.3d 86 (2011) (misuse of the word corroborate was not gross and flagrant misconduct or the product of ill will). 303 Nor was the comment motivated by ill will. After the ruling, the prosecutor immediately explained that the State's argument was that Stasi would not have voluntarily relinquished her parental rights—an inference reasonably supported by the evidence. Prosecutors made no further remark on the subject inconsistent with the district judge's ruling. Cf. McHenry, 276 Kan. at 525 (noting that ill will has been found in cases where the prosecutor expressed indifference to a court's rulings or engaged in repeated acts of misconduct). Finally, the comment would have supported little weight in the minds of jurors. The isolated comment paled in comparison to the State's overwhelming evidence establishing that Robinson created a sham charitable outreach program claiming to offer assistance to young, vulnerable women with newborn babies; he recruited young, Caucasian mothers without strong family connections to participate; he enticed Stasi into this program, and thereafter, murdered her and delivered her baby to his brother as part of a fraudulent private adoption scheme. See State v. Crawford, 300 Kan. 740, 757, 334 P.3d 311 (2014) (misconduct could not have been prejudicial in light of highly persuasive evidence incriminating defendant). In addition, whatever prejudicial impact the comment may have created was mitigated by the district judge's instruction to jurors to disregard the remark altogether. See State v. Warbritton, 215 Kan. 534, Syl. ¶ 1, 527 P.2d 1050 (1974) (improper remarks will not provide basis for reversal where jury instructed to disregard same, unless remarks are so prejudicial as to be incurable). The comment was not immune to such instruction. As such, we hold that the remark did not prejudice Robinson's right to a fair trial. 304 3. Did the prosecutor's comments on matters not in evidence constitute prejudicial misconduct? During the rebuttal portion of closing argument, while discussing evidence establishing that Robinson murdered Stasi, Morrison argued: You know what, he knew her car sat in front of Kathy Klingensmith's house and he thought, How am I going to explain that? What would Lisa say about that? So there's a part in the letter about it. He wrote to Marty, her brother, told him to let the bank take the car back. The payments are so far behind. She wants the money or the car. I don't have the money to pay the bank all the back payments. The car needs lots of work. A whole paragraph and a half trying to explain why she would leave her car there. Why, that car sat there day after day, week after week collecting dust. Why would she leave her car there? Because she's dead, because she's dead. The comments drew no objection from the defense. Robinson argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by discussing the letter sent to Stasi's brother, Marty Elledge, because it was not admitted into evidence. The State agrees the comments were improper but argues they were not prejudicial. Indeed, in discussing the letter sent to Elledge, the prosecutor improperly referenced a document that was not admitted into evidence. See State v. Peppers, 294 Kan. 377, 394, 276 P.3d 148 (2012) (prosecutors free to make argument, provided it is supported by admitted evidence). Even so, we find no prejudice. The prosecutor's comments were not gross or flagrant or motivated by ill will. He mentioned the letter on only one occasion, drawing no objection from the defense. See King, 288 Kan. at 349 (while not required to preserve issue on appeal, lack of objection can be relevant to prejudice analysis); Miller, 284 Kan. 305 at 720 (lack of objection relevant to whether comments motivated by ill will). The circumstances suggest the comment, or the failure to introduce the letter, resulted from a mere oversight by the prosecutor. The State admitted numerous letters that Robinson, posing as the victim, sent to the victims' families, including a letter to Stasi's mother-inlaw. The State also admitted a photocopy of an envelope with an affixed postage stamp addressed to Stasi's brother, seized during the search of Robinson's Olathe residence. Before referencing the letter, the prosecutor reminded jurors that all of these letters were in evidence, and he asked them to review this evidence during deliberations. Robinson believes the prosecutor should have known the letter was not in evidence because Judge Anderson had previously sustained defendant's hearsay objection after Stasi's aunt, Karen Moore, tried to testify to its contents. However, this objection was founded on Moore's attempt to testify to the contents of the letter, not to its admission of the letter itself. Also, the ruling was made 10 days before closing argument, in the midst of an extremely complex, multiweek criminal trial. It is unlikely this particular ruling was fresh in the prosecutor's mind during the rebuttal portion of closing argument. Finally, the comments would have supported little weight in the minds of jurors. Morrison made reference to this letter, among other evidence, to rebut the defense's closing argument that the evidence failed to establish that Stasi was dead or that she had fallen victim to Robinson's foul play. However, the State put on substantial evidence, independent of this letter, establishing the fact of Stasi's murder and Robinson's connection to it. Morrison's comments on the content of the letter to Elledge did little, if anything, to bolster this evidence. Moreover, the trial court instructed jurors to disregard any testimony or exhibit not admitted and that counsels' remarks were not evidence, further mitigating any risk of prejudice. 306 Based on the foregoing, we find the isolated remarks did not prejudice Robinson's right to a fair trial. Comments with Potential Impact on Defendant's Constitutional Rights Robinson also contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making comments that undermined his substantial rights. Specifically, he claims the prosecutor improperly: (1) commented on Robinson's silence; (2) shifted the burden of proof to the defense; (3) appealed to community interests; and (4) undermined the presumption of innocence during voir dire. 1. Did the prosecutor comment improperly on defendant's silence? The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, prohibits a prosecutor from making direct, adverse comments on a defendant's failure to testify on his or her own behalf. State v. McKinney, 272 Kan. 331, 347, 33 P.3d 234 (2001), overruled on other grounds by State v. Davis, 283 Kan. 569, 158 P.3d 317 (2006). An indirect comment may also violate the privilege where the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. McKinney, 272 Kan. at 347. During the rebuttal portion of closing, the State argued that Robinson's common scheme or course of conduct was characterized by four circumstances or elements, including similar methods of killing the victims and subsequent concealment of the bodies. In discussing these elements, Morrison said, Finally, concealment, the barrels hidden away or isolated. Of course, in Lisa Stasi's case a body not found. That's the ultimate concealment; isn't it? It's the ultimate concealment. 307 Robinson argues this remark was an indirect and impermissible comment on Robinson's right to remain silent. We disagree. The remarks were consistent with and within the scope of the evidence, which was sufficient to establish that Robinson murdered Stasi and five other women and that law enforcement officers conducted an extensive investigation that led to the discovery of all the victims' bodies, other than Stasi's. From this evidence, one could reasonably infer that Robinson had disposed of Stasi's body in a manner that prevented law enforcement from discovering the corpus delicti. Considering the record and argument in its totality, the prosecutor was addressing law enforcement's inability to find Stasi's body—not Robinson's failure to take the stand or to otherwise inform law enforcement of the body's location—as the ultimate concealment. Jurors would not have necessarily and naturally understood Morrison's remark as a comment on Robinson's postarrest silence, and, therefore, it was not improper. See State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 48, 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); see also McKinney, 272 Kan. at 346 (prosecutor free to draw reasonable inferences provided that the remarks do not indirectly draw an adverse inference regarding the defendant's failure to testify). 2. Did the prosecutor improperly shift the burden of proof? During closing, the defense argued Robinson did not act alone, in hopes of creating reasonable doubt or, perhaps more likely, residual doubt for the penalty phase. To support the theory, counsel argued that the metal drums holding the bodies were too heavy for Robinson to move alone and that the unidentified fingerprint on the roll of duct tape stained with Lewicka's blood suggested others were involved. At the outset of rebuttal, the prosecutor told jurors he would address these specific issues, but first he wanted to remind them of the strength of the evidence of Robinson's guilt: 308 Before we spend a lot of time talking about whether or not there's a fingerprint on duct tape or why Izabela Lewicka didn't send letters, before we get caught up in those things, let's just remember one thing. Let's think about how intertwined the defendant's conduct with all these women was. And let's not forget the fact that these barrels with their bodies are on his farm. Think about that. Mr. O'Brien wants us all to think, gosh, this is a circumstantial case, look at all these questions here, questions here, questions there over 17 years, that's the best he can come up with. There are very few questions in this case that are unanswered, very, very few. (Emphasis added.) Robinson argues the comment that's the best he can come up with had the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. We disagree. The comment was clearly intended to remind the jury not to lose sight of the overwhelming evidence of Robinson's guilt when evaluating the defendant's reasonable doubt arguments. Moreover, the district judge properly instructed the jurors on the burden of proof. Viewing the remark in context, we find it to be within the wide latitude afforded prosecutors in discussing the evidence. See State v. Cosby, 293 Kan. 121, 137, 262 P.3d 285 (2011) (prosecutor's rhetorical question whether jury had heard any evidence to contradict the State's position constituted only a general question about the absence of evidence to rebut the State's witnesses, especially given district judge's instruction on burden of proof); McKinney, 272 Kan. at 347 (prosecutors may make inferences from the balance or lack of evidence presented at trial; comment suggesting that defendant failed to prove State's witness was lying was proper argument on lack of evidence where jury instructed properly on burden of proof). Robinson cites State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004), in support of his position. There we held the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof by questioning whether there was 'any evidence that [the crimes] didn't happen? Is there 309 any evidence that the things [the victim] told you didn't happen?' 278 Kan. at 92. However, in arriving at this holding, we noted the importance of considering the context in which the comments were made. The prosecutor not only made the challenged remark, but also suggested defendant's challenge of the victim's account was akin to 'rap[ing] her again,' and questioned why defendant would even do so, having confessed previously. 278 Kan. at 90, 92. When viewing the remarks together in context, we found the improper motive and effect of the comment was apparent. 278 Kan. at 92. In stark contrast, Morrison made the comment at issue here in the context of rehabilitating the State's evidence. He was responding directly to the challenges the defense had lodged to the State's theory during closing. In this context, the best they can come up with remark was not an attempt to shift the burden of proof. Tosh is distinguishable, and the remark was not improper under these facts. See City of Dodge City v. Ingram, 33 Kan. App. 2d 829, 837-38, 109 P.3d 1272 (2005) (prosecutor's comments that defense 'simply arguing smoke and mirrors' and '[g]rasping at straws' not improper). 3. Did the prosecutor improperly appeal to community interests? In his final remarks to the jury, the prosecutor said: Now is your opportunity to decide whether or not you want to hold the defendant accountable for his actions for all these years. I hope you do. Thank you. Robinson argues this comment improperly appealed to community interests. Whether a statement properly calls for a conviction based on the evidence or, instead, improperly appeals to larger community interests is a matter of degree and dependent on the nature of the remark and the context in which it is made. See, e.g., State 310 v. Anderson, 294 Kan. 450, 463, 276 P.3d 200 (statement that the victim's 'redemption' would come with a guilty verdict is an appeal to emotion that attempts to pressure a verdict from the jury out of pity for the victim, rather than the defendant's guilt, and is an attempt to divert the jury's attention from the evidence), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 529 (2012); but see State v. Finley, 273 Kan. 237, 244-45, 42 P.3d 723 (2002) (prosecutor's comments asking the jury not to let the defendant get away with the crime is in most instances permissible comment). A prosecutor's argument to convict based on the evidence is proper. In contrast, remarks that imply that an acquittal will result in adverse impact on the community or otherwise appeal to community-wide interests are improper. 273 Kan. at 245 ('[w]e don't want people making meth in our communities' and we need to prevent 'people from making meth in our community'); State v. Ruff, 252 Kan. 625, 636, 847 P.2d 1258 (1993) (arguing jurors had a duty to send a message to the community that charged conduct will not be tolerated). Here the prosecutor's closing remarks to the jury, on their face, did not invoke a plea for jurors to consider broader community-wide interests. Instead, after summarizing the relevant evidence and arguments, the prosecutor asked the jury to hold Robinson accountable for his actions by finding him guilty. Such a comment was not improper. 4. Did the prosecutor's voir dire comments undermine the presumption of innocence? Robinson believes the prosecutor undermined the presumption of innocence during jury selection by: (1) telling veniremembers that a juror should enter proceedings with no preconceived opinions of guilt or innocence; and (2) suggesting Robinson could be acquitted only if the prosecution did a bad job of presenting the case at trial. 311 A prosecutor's statements must accurately reflect the law. Tosh, 278 Kan. at 90. If not, they are deemed misconduct. State v. Raskie, 293 Kan. 906, 917-18, 269 P.3d 1268 (2012) (once misstatement of law established, analysis shifts to prejudice inquiry). a. Were the prosecutor's remarks about panelists' preconceived opinions improper? Robinson first argues the prosecutor misstated the law by saying jurors should enter the box without preconceived opinions of guilt or innocence. During the second phase of jury selection, Judge Anderson assigned veniremembers to small group panels for questioning on bias related to pretrial publicity and the death penalty. While questioning one of the small group panels, the prosecutor told Juror 342: Obviously, if somebody comes in with a notion then they know the whole story or they think that somebody is guilty, they think that somebody is not guilty, if they do have some of that baggage, they need to be able to set it aside. (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel objected, explaining the presumption of innocence allows jurors to believe defendant is not guilty unless or until proven otherwise. Morrison immediately responded, I didn't mean it in that context. Judge Anderson sustained the objection and instructed the panelists to disregard the statement. Notwithstanding the district judge's ruling, Robinson argues, the prosecutor continued to make the same comments. First, Robinson highlights the prosecutor's remarks to the twenty-second small group panel on September 25, 2002: Okay. And does everybody here understand that's really kind of why we're asking these questions, because the law . . . doesn't expect everybody to, you know, have a totally blank mind and not to have ever heard anything about a case. That's not really the issue. 312 What the issue is, if you're going to be a juror on this case, jurors have got to be able to set that aside. Preconceived opinions or notions that you have about facts of the case, you've got to be able to say, 'I can check that at the door, I can . . . leave that outside the courtroom and not let that affect me.' Robinson also highlights the prosecutor's comments to the thirteenth small group panel on September 23, 2002, when he asked prospective jurors 85 and 87 if they could set aside the information they learned and any opinions formed as a result of exposure to pretrial publicity and decide the case based on the evidence presented at trial. The prosecutor's initial comment to the small group panel did not prejudice Robinson's substantial rights. The comment was made in the context of discussing pretrial publicity, not the appropriate burden of proof at trial. Moreover, the prosecutor immediately clarified that he had not intended for his remarks to be construed as a statement on the presumption of innocence. Judge Anderson also provided a curative instruction to the panelists, none of whom served on Robinson's jury. Likewise, neither of the later comments is objectionable or inconsistent with Judge Anderson's prior ruling. Each reflected the proper standard for juror qualification where media coverage has been widespread. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 81 L. Ed. 2d 847 (1984) (where juror exposure to publicity raises concerns of bias, relevant question is whether he or she can set information aside and judge case on the evidence). The prosecutor did not suggest to jurors that the goal of impartiality undercut or should subvert the presumption of innocence. 313 b. Was the prosecutor's hypothetical that assumed the State did a bad job presenting the case improper? At various times during small group voir dire, some panelists expressed uncertainty as to their ability to set aside pretrial publicity. In these situations, the prosecutor occasionally presented the panelists with a hypothetical question to the effect that assuming the prosecution did a horrible or bad job presenting the case and you had serious doubts that the State had met its burden, how would you vote, or would you vote to acquit? In doing so, Robinson believes the prosecutor implied that acquittal would be proper only if the prosecutors did a horrible job presenting the case. Contrary to Robinson's assertion, Morrison's use of this hypothetical question did not improperly shift the burden of proof or undermine the presumption of innocence. The prosecutor phrased the question as a hypothetical scenario for the purpose of establishing panelists' willingness and ability to set aside media facts and opinions formed as a result of exposure to them. The question was particularly appropriate, given that the entire purpose of small group voir dire during the second phase of jury selection was to explore potential bias created by exposure to pretrial publicity and panelists' death penalty views. Throughout the voir dire process, the prosecutor emphasized the applicable evidentiary burdens and legal presumptions to veniremembers. Viewing the voir dire record in its entirety, we hold the remarks were not misconduct. Timing of Discussion of State's Common Scheme or Course of Conduct Theory In Count II and III of the Fourth Amended Complaint, the State alleged that Robinson killed Suzette Trouten and Izabela Lewicka, respectively, as part of a common scheme or course of conduct that included the murders of Sheila Faith, Debbie Faith, Beverly Bonner, and Lisa Stasi. Robinson claims the prosecutors engaged in misconduct 314 by withholding the factual basis of or theory regarding the common scheme or course of conduct until the rebuttal portion of closing argument. 'As a general rule, [prosecutors] should not be allowed to develop new arguments on rebuttal, but should be restricted to answering the arguments put forth by defense counsel.' Hall v. United States, 540 A.2d 442, 448 (D.C. 1988) (quoting Moore v. United States, 344 F.2d 558, 560 [D.C. Cir. 1965]); see Supreme Court Rule 168(a)(2) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 276) (Plaintiff may not argue a general issue not discussed in the opening portion of plaintiff's closing argument, unless in rebuttal.) The general rule, however, is not applied in a rigid fashion and has evolved to give trial courts a modicum of discretion to allow a more substantial rebuttal which is not so narrowly tailored to the scope of defense counsel's summation. Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997, 1003 (Del. 1982); see State v. Rosa, 170 Conn. 417, 428, 365 A.2d 1135 (no rigid requirement that a prosecutor's final summation must be limited solely to rebuttal of matters raised in the defendant's argument.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 845 (1976). Robinson's argument fails for at least two reasons. First, it is unsupported by the record. At the outset of trial, during opening statements, the prosecutor told jurors that the evidence would demonstrate that Robinson employed a common scheme or course of conduct that included elaborate scams to exploit victims financially or sexually, kill them, and conceal their deaths. During its case-in-chief, the State put on evidence supporting the inference that Robinson's killings were linked together by common elements, including: luring victims with promises of financial benefit or travel, exploitation of the victims financially or sexually, similar methods of killing and disposal or concealment of the bodies, and acts of deceit and fraud to hide all of these crimes. During the first portion of the State's closing argument, prosecutor Morrison claimed that Robinson was the common thread that ran through the similar characteristics of all the murders, including 315 the bogus cover stories used to lure victims, the similar manner of killings, and the various efforts taken to conceal the deaths. Additionally, the defense opened the door to the State's rebuttal argument. Robinson devoted a substantial portion of his closing to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the existence of a common scheme or course of conduct. The prosecutor's challenged remarks were proper rebuttal to Robinson's closing argument. United States v. Sharp, 400 Fed. Appx. 741, 750-51 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor did not commit misconduct by referring to altered records during rebuttal argument where it replied to theory raised in defendant's closing argument); State v. Harrison, 631 So. 2d 531, 534 (La. App. 1994) (prosecutor's rebuttal argument proper where defense counsel opened the door during closing argument). Thus we hold the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by discussing the elements of Robinson's common scheme or course of conduct during the rebuttal portion of closing argument. Summary of Guilt Phase Prosecutorial Misconduct Issues In the end, we find the prosecutor made three isolated improper remarks during a jury selection process and guilt phase trial that continued for several weeks. In particular, the prosecutor made comments beyond the scope of the evidence when he: (1) speculated whether Debbie Faith witnessed her mother's murder; (2) suggested baby Tiffany was ripped from Lisa Stasi's arms; and (3) discussed the contents of a letter sent to Lisa Stasi's brother. Viewed together, the one-time-only nature of each of the comments does not demonstrate that they were gross and flagrant or motivated by ill will. Also, they would have held little weight in the minds of jurors, given the State's overwhelming evidence of Robinson's guilt. The cumulative effect of these statements 316 was not prejudicial to Robinson's fair trial rights. See State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1088, 40 P.3d 139 (2001) (even if instances of prosecutorial misconduct are harmless error in and of themselves, their cumulative effect must be analyzed), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002), overruled on other grounds by Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 165 L. Ed. 2d 439 (2006). 11. INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR—GUILT PHASE Robinson lodges three challenges to the district judge's guilt phase instructions. In particular, he argues the capital murder elements instructions were deficient in failing to define common scheme or course of conduct. Similarly, he contends the lack of such a definition rendered those terms unconstitutionally vague. Finally, he complains the venue instruction was incomplete and confusing. Failure to Define Common Scheme or Course of Conduct in Instructions The district judge provided a separate elements instruction for each capital murder count, Counts II and III of the Fourth Amended Complaint. The instructions were identical except for the name of the primary victim, Trouten or Lewicka, and the relevant dates of the offense. Each instruction informed the jury that, as one of the elements of the offense, the State had to prove the killing of Trouten or Lewicka, along with the killings of Bonner, Sheila Faith, Debbie Faith, and Stasi, were multiple acts or transactions constituting parts of a common scheme or a course of conduct. Robinson requested that the trial judge include the following definitions of common scheme and course of conduct for the jury: A common scheme exists between multiple acts if such acts are closely connected in time, place, occasion, and the nature of the activity. 317 A course of conduct is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Judge Anderson declined, finding the terms were not particularly difficult for a lay person to resolve. Robinson now contends the failure to define the terms was erroneous. 1. Standard of Review For jury instruction issues, the progression of analysis and corresponding standards of review on appeal are: (1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the appellate court must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). State v. Salary, 301 Kan. 586, Syl. ¶ 1, 343 P.3d 1165 (2015). 2. Did common scheme or course of conduct require definition? Because the reviewability of the issue is not in dispute, our inquiry focuses on the second step of the analysis—whether defendant's proposed instruction defining common scheme and course of conduct was legally appropriate. In assessing whether definition of instructional terms is legally appropriate, we have held that a trial court 'need not define every word or phrase in the instructions. It is only when the instructions as a whole would mislead the jury, or cause them to speculate, that additional terms should be defined.' State v. Norris, 226 Kan. 90, 95, 595 P.2d 1110 (1979). We further stated that '[a] term which is widely used and which is readily comprehensible 318 need not have a defining instruction.' 226 Kan. at 95. State v. Armstrong, 299 Kan. 405, 440, 324 P.3d 1052 (2014). The legislature has not defined the phrases common scheme or course of conduct. The Notes on Use to PIK Crim. 4th 54.020, the elements instruction for capital murder, suggest instructions on definitions of terms should be given as defined in PIK Crim. 4th 54.150 (homicide definitions), which does not define common scheme or course of conduct. We have not previously had occasion to address whether the phrases common scheme or course of conduct under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6) necessitate further definition. However, other state appellate courts have held that these or similar terms in their capital murder statutes are commonly understood and require no further elaboration. Duke v. State, 889 So. 2d 1, 31 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (terms one scheme and course of conduct could be understood by the average juror in their common usage), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds 544 U.S. 901 (2005); Sendejo v. State, 676 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tex. App. 1984) (no need to define pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct as the phrase includes terms of common understanding); State v. Yates, 161 Wash. 2d 714, 749, 168 P.3d 359 (2007) (common scheme or plan under Washington capital murder statute are words of common understanding requiring no definition); State v. Cross, 156 Wash. 2d 580, 617, 132 P.3d 80 (2006) (same). Robinson cites multiple dictionary definitions of the words common, scheme, course, and conduct in an effort to illustrate the terms have varied meanings and require further definition. The problem with this approach is that the meaning of the individual words is not at issue. Rather, the issue is whether the phrases common scheme and course of conduct are easily understood by lay jurors. The phrases use words in combination, not isolated definitions in combination, and, consequently, in 319 common usage are more precise than the sum of their parts. See K.S.A. 77-201 Second (words and phrases in a statute shall be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language); see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 170 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2008) ([M]eanings are narrowed by the commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis—which counsels that a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.); State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, ¶¶ 28-29, 174 P.3d 628 (Utah 2007) (statutory terms become clearer considered in context of the whole provision; the clarity of the whole of the statute is greater than the sum of its individual parts). Robinson also claims this court and the legislature have confused matters by using the terms in wide-ranging ways. He reviews various cases and statutes in which the phrases have been used and concludes that collectively they demonstrate no one meaning can be identified. But this argument also ignores context and relies on an unacknowledged and incorrect premise that the jurors asked to construe the phrases in this capital murder trial were aware of and confused by their use in other contexts. Robinson points to nothing in the record evidencing such confusion among Robinson's jurors. Neither the legislature nor the PIK Committee recommended a definition for common scheme or course of conduct in K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6), implying both believed the phrases were easily understood. Consistent with this view, other state courts have held that these or similar phrases in their capital murder statutes required no further definition. Defendant's proposed instruction defining common scheme and course of conduct was not legally appropriate, and we hold there was no error. 320 Common Scheme or Course of Conduct as Unconstitutionally Vague In a similar vein, Robinson suggests Judge Anderson's failure to define the terms common scheme and course of conduct rendered the capital murder statute unconstitutionally vague, in violation of his due process and Eighth Amendment rights. 1. Standard of Review When the application of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, this court exercises an unlimited, de novo standard of review. State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 676, 923 P.2d 1024 (1996), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118 (1997). We presume that legislative enactments are constitutional and resolve all doubts in favor of a statute's validity. State v. Wilkinson, 269 Kan. 603, 606, 9 P.3d 1 (2000). We will not declare a statute unconstitutional as applied unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute infringes on constitutionally protected rights. See 269 Kan. at 606. State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 766, 768, 187 P.3d 1283 (2008). 2. Are the Phrases common scheme or course of conduct unconstitutionally vague? We apply a two-part test in analyzing whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: First, the [statute] must give adequate notice to those tasked with following it. More specifically, the [statute] must 'convey sufficient definite warning and fair notice as to the prohibited conduct in light of common understanding and practice.' Steffes, 284 Kan. at 389 (citing [City of Wichita v.] Hackett, 275 Kan. [848,] 853-54[, 69 P.3d 621 (2003)]). We have recognized that [a statute] that 'requires or forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application is violative of due process.' Hackett, 275 Kan. at 853 (citing State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418, 662 P.2d 1286 [1983]); see Connally v. Gen. Constr. 321 Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926). But on the other hand, Kansas has long held that [a statute] is not unconstitutionally vague if it employs words commonly used, previously judicially defined, or having a settled meaning in law. Hackett, 275 Kan. at 853-54 (citing City of Wichita v. Lucero, 255 Kan. 437, 451, 874 P.2d 1144 [1994]). In the second prong of our inquiry, we require that [a statute]'s terms must be precise enough to adequately protect against arbitrary and discriminatory action by those tasked with enforcing it. Steffes, 284 Kan. at 389 (citing Hackett, 275 Kan. at 854); see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 147 L. Ed .2d 597 (2000). We acknowledge that a law is invalid if it violates either prong. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1999). However, 'the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983) (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574-75, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 [1974]). And in analyzing this second prong for vagueness, we are further mindful that '[t]he standards of certainty in [a statute] punishing criminal offenses are higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanctions for enforcement.' Steffes, 284 Kan. at 389. City of Lincoln Center v. Farmway Co-Op, Inc., 298 Kan. 540, 545-46, 316 P.3d 707 (2013). See City of Wichita v. Hackett, 275 Kan. 848, 853, 69 P.3d 621 (2003). In elaborating further on the second part of the framework, we explained: '[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.' 276 Kan. at 822 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 [1972]). 322 A vagueness challenge based on the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution is subject to a substantially similar analysis. See Kleypas, 272 Kan. at 1025 (when statutory language challenged as unconstitutionally vague, court must decide whether language is too vague to guide discretion of jurors regarding the sentencing process); see also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-62, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1988) (claims of vagueness under Eighth Amendment assert inadequate notice failing to limit a sentencer's discretion). Robinson makes clear his challenge arises under the second part of the framework, arbitrary enforcement. As such, we must decide whether the failure of the trial judge to define common scheme and course of conduct for the jury rendered the language susceptible to arbitrary and capricious or discriminatory application by the jury. Robinson believes the statutory language was susceptible to arbitrary application because his case lies at the boundaries of the concepts of common scheme and course of conduct, and, therefore, it was difficult for the jury to determine whether his conduct fell within them. The Supreme Court rejected the very premise of Robinson's argument in Williams, 553 U.S. 285, where it reviewed a due process vagueness challenge to a statute criminalizing the pandering or solicitation of child pornography. The Eleventh Circuit had held language in the statute void for vagueness, concluding that under certain hypothetical scenarios it demanded close calls on whether conduct fell within the statute's prohibition. This meant innocent individuals could be prosecuted under the law. The Supreme Court disagreed: 323 [T]he Eleventh Circuit's . . . basic mistake lies in the belief that the mere fact that close cases can be envisioned renders a statute vague. That is not so. Close cases can be imagined under virtually any statute. The problem that poses is addressed, not by the doctrine of vagueness, but by the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363[, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368] (1970). What renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is. Thus, we have struck down statutes that tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant's conduct was 'annoying' or 'indecent'—wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings. See Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614[, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214] (1971); Reno [v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844,] 870871, and n.35[, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1997)]. Williams, 553 U.S. at 30506. Williams makes clear the pivotal question here is not whether it might be difficult for the jury to determine if Robinson's conduct constituted a common scheme or course of conduct, but rather whether the jury can apply those concepts in a reasoned, nonarbitrary way to the evidence it received. Courts have consistently found that common scheme, course of conduct, and similar terms are not unconstitutionally vague. Sheriff v. Smith, 91 Nev. 729, 731-32, 542 P.2d 440 (1975) (the phrase common plan or scheme interpreted to mean a single plan or scheme contemplating two or more offenses before the plan has been completed, did not violate due process); State v. Perez, 124 Ohio St. 3d 122, 156 ¶ 233, 920 N.E.2d 104 (2009) (rejecting course-of-conduct specification as unconstitutionally vague); Corwin v. State, 870 S.W.2d 23, 28-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (same scheme or course of conduct in capital murder statute not unconstitutionally vague; fact that marginal cases may make it difficult to determine whether offense committed not grounds to find statute unconstitutionally vague); Ross, 174 P.3d at 633-34 (incident to one act, scheme, course 324 of conduct, or criminal episode not unconstitutionally vague on due process grounds); State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d 628, 662, 904 P.2d 245 (1995) (common scheme or plan is not unconstitutionally vague because jury instructions and verdict forms could be understood by an average person). This authority also suggests Robinson's jury could apply the concepts in a reasoned, non-arbitrary fashion. Accordingly, we hold that the phrases common scheme and course of conduct are not unconstitutionally vague. Robinson's citation to State v. Locklear, 105 Wash. App. 555, 560-62, 20 P.3d 993 (2001), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. State v. Rodgers, 146 Wash. 2d 55, 43 P.3d 1 (2002), do not dissuade us from this ruling. In Locklear, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction under a state drive-by shooting statute it found to be unconstitutionally vague. However, on appeal, defendant argued the intermediary appellate court erred by reversing his conviction on constitutional grounds rather than on the basis of insufficient evidence supporting the conviction. Citing the well-established rule of judicial restraint that the issue of the constitutionality of a statute will not be passed upon if the case can be decided without reaching that issue, 146 Wash. 2d at 60, the Washington Supreme Court, sitting en banc, noted: It seems obvious that one is not in the immediate area of a vehicle that is parked two blocks away from the place where that person discharges a firearm and held that the evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction under the drive-by shooting statute. 146 Wash. 2d at 62. Locklear appears to be of questionable authority even in Washington, and we find it unpersuasive here. Defendant's Challenge to Venue Instruction The trial court's instructions on the capital murder counts, along with the lesser included offense instructions, provided that the jury must find that the murders occurred in Johnson County, Kansas. However, the bodies of the capital murder victims, Trouten 325 and Lewicka, were discovered in Linn County. To assist jurors on the venue issue, the district judge gave the following instruction: INSTRUCTION NO. 11 If you find that the defendant committed criminal acts in one county which were a substantial and integral part of an overall continuing crime plan, and which were in partial execution of that plan, the prosecution may be in any county in which any of such acts occur. Robinson neither objected to the venue instruction nor offered an alternative. He now complains that Instruction No. 11 was confusing and erroneous and that the trial court should have given an additional instruction informing the jury of the presumption contained in K.S.A. 22-2611 that [d]eath shall be presumed to have occurred in the county where the body of the victim is found. 1. Standard of Review Because Robinson failed to object to the venue instruction or request an alternative instruction, we review the challenge for clear error. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3); State v. Briseno, 299 Kan. 877, 882, 326 P.3d 1074 (2014). We apply a two-part test to determine whether a jury instruction is clearly erroneous. First, 'the reviewing court must . . . determine whether there was any error at all. To make that determination, the appellate court must consider whether the subject instruction was legally and factually appropriate, employing an unlimited review of the entire record.' State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1121, 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (quoting State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, Syl. ¶ 4, 286 P.3d 195 [2012]). If error is found, we next conduct a reversibility inquiry, where 326 'the court assesses whether it is firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the instruction error not occurred. The party claiming a clearly erroneous instruction maintains the burden to establish the degree of prejudice necessary for reversal.' Williams, 295 Kan. 506, Syl. ¶ 5. Herbel, 296 Kan. at 1121. 2. Was the venue instruction erroneous? Venue must be proved to establish the jurisdiction of the court; it is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, albeit the existence of jurisdiction is a question of law, subject to unlimited appellate review. State v. Hunt, 285 Kan. 855, 859, 176 P.3d 183 (2008). Being tried in the proper venue is a right granted by the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, § 10. K.S.A. 22-2602 states that [e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the prosecution shall be in the county where the crime was committed. However, in some instances, it may not be apparent where a crime was committed. The legislature has developed a number of rules to address more complicated venue questions. Relevant to this case is K.S.A. 22-2603, which provides [w]here two or more acts are requisite to the commission of any crime and such acts occur in different counties the prosecution may be in any county in which any of such acts occur, and K.S.A. 222611, which provides that [i]f the cause of death is inflicted in one county and the death ensues in another county, the prosecution may be in either of such counties. Death shall be presumed to have occurred in the county where the body of the victim is found. The district judge's venue instruction failed to incorporate either statutory provision. Instruction No. 11 is similar to the language of K.S.A. 22-2603, but there are significant differences. The statute requires two or more acts that are requisite to the commission of the crime. The instruction, on the other hand, focuses on acts that are a substantial and integral part of an overall continuing crime plan. Instruction No. 11 327 does not focus on a crime, which is problematic because the instruction is intended to assist jurors in deciding where the crimes occurred. Furthermore, Instruction No. 11 failed to include the statutory presumption under K.S.A. 22-2611 altogether. The failure to do so is particularly troubling given that the prosecution occurred in Johnson County, but the bodies of Trouten and Lewicka were found in Linn County. See Hunt, 285 Kan. at 859-60 (State had burden to prove venue proper; jury should have been instructed that it must find murder occurred in venue of prosecution and further instructed that death presumed to occur in county where victim's body found under K.S.A. 22-2611). Instruction No. 11 was modeled after language from State v. Grissom, 251 Kan. 851, 889, 840 P.2d 1142 (1992), where we held that the Johnson County District Court had territorial jurisdiction to prosecute defendant because [t]here [wa]s evidence from which a jury could find that Grissom committed criminal acts in Kansas which were a substantial and integral part of an overall continuing crime plan and which were in partial execution of the plan. 251 Kan. at 889. The district judge's reliance on this language was misplaced. Grissom was a territorial jurisdiction case, not a venue case. 251 Kan. at 88990 (Kansas court has jurisdiction over murder prosecution involving victims who had disappeared after last being seen in Missouri). Moreover, the statutory venue rules, particularly K.S.A. 22-2611, were not helpful in Grissom because the victims' bodies were never found. Here, territorial jurisdiction was not an issue, and K.S.A. 22-2603 and 22-2611 were directly applicable to the evidence developed at trial. Finally, we believe the language in Instruction No. 11 concerning where the prosecution may be must have been confusing to the jury. Nowhere else in the instructions does it matter where the prosecution may be, and it is reasonable to believe that a juror would conclude that issue had long since been decided. Cf. State v. Rivera, 42 328 Kan. App. 2d 1005, 1011, 219 P.3d 1231 (2009) (A juror might conclude that Instruction No. 9 was supposed to modify Instruction No. 4 so as to allow the crime to have been committed either in Kingman County or its neighboring county. That apparently was the district court's intention. But that's a pretty confusing way to express that concept to lay jurors.), rev. denied 290 Kan. 1102 (2010). The trial court's capital murder elements instructions, requiring the jury find facts supporting venue, were appropriate. See Rivera, 42 Kan. App. 2d at 1010. However, the venue instruction was incomplete, inaccurate, and confusing. As such, we find that Instruction No. 11 was erroneous.