Opinion ID: 772639
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Endangerment to the Safety of Flight 24 While in Flight

Text: 29 Mendoza argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that his actions endangered Flight 24 while in flight. The statute does not define endangering, and we have been cited no case law discussing the term as it is used in 18 U.S.C. 32(a)(6). 30 Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the statute. United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1999). If the text of the statute is clear, this court looks no further in determining the statute's meaning. See Id. Because the statute does not define endangering,  we `start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.'  Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983)) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)). 31 The ordinary meaning of the term endanger as used in this context is to bring into danger or peril of probable harm or loss: imperil or threaten to danger...: to create a dangerous situation. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) 748 (1961); see also Black's Law Dictionary 547 (7th ed. 1999) (defining endangerment as the act or an instance of putting someone or something in danger; exposure to peril or harm). Cases interpreting the term provide a similar definition. See Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding, in the context of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, that endangerment means a threatened or potential harm and does not require proof of actual harm); Marchese v. United States, 126 F.2d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 1942) (defining, in the context of the Espionage Act, the phrase endanger the safety to cover cases where no specific injury was done or intended, but only a dangerous condition created). We find nothing in the legislative history that dictates a different result and, therefore, presume that Congress intended its words to have their ordinary meaning. 32 Mendoza argues that, because the statute carries a possible sentence of twenty years, the term endangerment  must include a sufficient quantum of increased danger above and beyond the danger inherent in routine flying to justify conviction under the statute. The government produced such evidence. 33 At trial, Dongsup Park (Park), first officer and co-pilot on Flight 24, detailed Flight 24's activities on December 30, 1999, and the events that occurred once Flight 24 was alerted that there was a bomb on board. He testified: (1) the plane changed course to return to the airport; (2) the cabin crew was notified; (3) the extra crew was called to the flight deck; and (4) discussions were had on whether to dump fuel to reduce weight for an emergency landing and whether to maintain or lower the aircraft's altitude depending on their guess as to the type of detonation device the alleged bomb carried. He also testified that the reserve captain's hands were shaking and that, upon completion of the flight (the plane ultimately continued to Korea), he was personally exhausted from the stress of the situation and from having been so nervous. 34 In addition, Park testified, over defendant's objection, that he was sure that the bomb threat endangered the safety of the aircraft. 3 He explained that the safety of the aircraft was endangered because of the added stress on the pilots, as well as the additional flying time and work caused by the false report. 35 The danger to Flight 24 created by Mendoza's call was above and beyond the danger inherent in routine flying. The stress to the pilots, coupled with the increased flying time caused by the bomb scare, made for a situation seldom experienced on an aircraft and created a level of danger not normally present. The government produced sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Flight 24 was endangered while in flight.