Opinion ID: 718270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Threat of Future Harm

Text: 16 Pacific Lumber argues the district court had no authority to issue the injunction because the ESA permits an injunction only when a person is alleged to be in violation of any provision of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A), meaning, according to Pacific Lumber, that the harm must have already occurred. Pacific Lumber contends this conclusion is compelled by the Court's holding in Sweet Home, which decision, it argues, nullified our opinion in Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir.1995). We disagree. 17 The purpose of the ESA is to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). To help achieve this purpose the ESA authorizes citizen suits to enjoin any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof.... 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A). 18 Section 1538(a)(1)(B) of the ESA makes it a violation of the Act for anyone to take an endangered species. Threatened species are also protected by this provision. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a). The term take is defined to mean to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). The Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) defines harass and harm as follows: 19 Harass in the definition of take in the Act means an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering. 20 Harm in the definition of take in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering. 21 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. 22 In this circuit, we have repeatedly held that an imminent threat of future harm is sufficient for the issuance of an injunction under the ESA. See e.g. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 783; National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington North. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir.1994); Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir.1988) (Palila II ). 23 In Rosboro, decided three months before the Supreme Court's decision in Sweet Home, an environmental group filed a citizen suit under the ESA seeking an injunction to prevent proposed logging which would impact the habitat of two spotted owls. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 783. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant Rosboro Lumber concluding the ESA requires a plaintiff to show either a past or current injury to a protected species. Id. We reversed, holding: 24 The district court's construction is antithetical to the basic purpose of the ESA to protect endangered and threatened species and prevent their further decline. The language and legislative history of the ESA, as well as applicable case law support our holding today that a showing of a future injury to an endangered or threatened species is actionable under the ESA. 25 Id. 26 This holding in Rosboro was not nullified by Sweet Home. In Sweet Home, parties dependent on the forest product industry brought an action for declaratory relief against the Secretary and the USFWS, facially challenging the Secretary's definition of harm. --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2410. The plaintiffs argued that Congress did not intend the word take to include habitat modification as the Secretary's harm definition provided. Id. 27 The Supreme Court determined that the text of the Act provided three reasons for concluding the Secretary's interpretation was reasonable. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2412. First, the ordinary understanding of the word harm supports an interpretation that does not require an act of direct violence to an animal. An indirect cause, such as habitat modification, also comes within the meaning of harm in the statute. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2412-13. Second, the broad purpose of the ESA supports the extension of protection to include habitat modification. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2413-14. Third, the permit system set up by the 1982 amendment to the ESA strongly suggests Congress understood the ESA to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2414. 28 Pacific Lumber relies on a footnote in the Sweet Home opinion in which the Court notes that the harm regulation was promulgated in 1975 and then amended in 1981 to emphasize that actual death or injury of a protected animal is necessary for a violation. --- U.S. at ---- n. 2, 115 S.Ct. at 2410 n. 2. Pacific Lumber contends this footnote means injunctive relief is allowed only against someone who has already violated the Act. We disagree. Nothing in the Court's footnote 2 purports to limit injunctive relief under the ESA to past violations. The Secretary amended the harm regulation to prevent a finding of harm from habitat modification alone, without any attendant harm to a protected species. As we explained in Rosboro: 29 because the Secretary was concerned that the old definition of harm could be read to mean habitat modification alone, the Secretary inserted the phrase actually kills or injures wildlife to preclude claims that only involve habitat modification without any attendant requirement of death or injury to protected wildlife. 46 Fed.Reg. 54748-49 (1981). 30 Nowhere does the re-definition of harm or its explanatory commentary require historic injury to protected wildlife. 31 50 F.3d at 784 (emphasis in original). 32 Pacific Lumber also relies on a passage in Sweet Home in which the Court stated: 33 Respondents' argument that the Government lacks any incentive to purchase land under § 5 when it can simply prohibit takings under § 9 ignores the practical considerations that attend enforcement of the ESA. Purchasing habitat lands may well cost the Government less in many circumstances than pursuing civil or criminal penalties. In addition, the § 5 procedure allows for protection of habitat before the seller's activity has harmed any endangered animal, whereas the Government cannot enforce the § 9 prohibition until an animal has actually been killed or injured. 34 Sweet Home, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2415 (emphasis added). Relying on this language, Pacific Lumber argues no injunction may issue until the death or injury of a protected species has actually occurred. We reject this argument. 35 The facts of Sweet Home did not require the Court to address the question whether a showing of a threat of future harm is sufficient for an injunction. The case involved a facial challenge to the Secretary's definition of harm. To the extent the Sweet Home opinion may be read to say past injury is required before an injunction may issue, such a statement is dictum. 36 Furthermore, the remainder of the Sweet Home opinion indicates that the Court did not intend to alter case law which held that an injunction may issue upon a showing of a threat of imminent harm. The Court explicitly found the Secretary's interpretation of the law reasonable. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2416. The Court paraphrased the Secretary's view that the § 9 prohibition on takings, which Congress defined to include 'harm,' places on respondents a duty to avoid harm that habitat alteration will cause the birds unless respondents first obtain a permit. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2412 (emphasis added). By finding this view reasonable, the Court approved an interpretation of the ESA which prevents activity that will cause future harm. This was our interpretation in Rosboro. 37 In a more recent opinion, we cited both Rosboro and Sweet Home as support for the proposition that the citizen suit provision of the ESA allows private plaintiffs ... to enjoin private activities that are reasonably certain to harm a protected species. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1512 (9th Cir.1995); see also Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia, 896 F.Supp. 1170, 1179-80 (D.Fla.1995). 38 We conclude that the Supreme Court's decision in Sweet Home does not overrule Rosboro. A reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species is sufficient for issuance of an injunction under section 9 of the ESA. Rosboro, 50 F.3d at 786; Burlington North. R.R., 23 F.3d at 1511; American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 166 (1st Cir.1993).