Opinion ID: 2451028
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Heading: The Validity of the Search

Text: We turn to the issue whether the arrest having been made upon probable cause, the search and seizure of the controlled substances in the refrigerator was permissible. The Fourth Amendment as applicable to the States protects the right of the people to be secure in their residences by providing that search warrants shall be obtained upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. Despite the clear preference of the law for searches authorized by search warrants and despite the general principle that in order to search and seize, a warrant is to be obtained from a neutral and detached magistrate, there have been carved out a few well-delineated exceptions. One well-recognized exception is that a search may be made of the person and the immediate area when the search is incident to a lawful arrest. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925). In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), the Supreme Court of the United States held, It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. But when we deal not with a search of the person, but with the immediate area, there are recognized limitations. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), police officers armed with a warrant of arrest but no warrant to search went to the defendant's home and searched the house of the defendant. The Supreme Court held the search invalid, stating: When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. . . . In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.. . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area `within his immediate control'construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which the arrest occurs or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.. . . 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040. In finding the search incident to an arrest unjustified, the Supreme Court further stated, The search here went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him.. . . The scope of the search was, therefore, `unreasonable' under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the petitioner's conviction cannot stand. 395 U.S. at 768, [2] 89 S.Ct. at 2043. When the arrest took place in this case, the individuals were in the living room, and later Gary Moore followed the officers to the doorway of the kitchen. There is no showing that the persons were so near the refrigerator that the search and seizure of the controlled substances could be a lawful search incident to the arrest. We are compelled to hold under the authorities that when a search and seizure is made incident to a lawful arrest and no search warrant is obtained, the search may be made of the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control, meaning that immediate area from within which the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Pursuant to Chimel, supra , and the other authorities, we believe the search was, under the record here, beyond the area of permissible search and was overbroad. However, we do not believe that Chimel, supra , disposes of the case before us. The circumstances contained in this record are such that the search here may be justified within another well-recognized exception to the search warrant requirement. That exception to the warrantless search is that of exigent circumstances. When there are certain exigent circumstances, a warrant for search may be dispensed with. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1943); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) (recognizing principle). This exception was thoroughly discussed in United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3rd Cir. 1973), a controlled substances case. That case involved a situation where there was reason to believe a quantity of hashish in a dwelling was threatened to be removed or destroyed. The court traced the cases dealing with the exception, and concluded that when . . . agents, however, have probable cause to believe contraband is present and, in addition, based on the surrounding circumstances or the information at hand, they reasonably conclude that the evidence will be destroyed or removed before they can secure a search warrant, a warrantless search is justified. 474 F.2d at 268. The court listed a number of relevant circumstances to determine when the doctrine may be applied and among the number included a reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be removed. 474 F.2d at 268. The court upheld the warrantless search. The evidence in this record shows that the officers and the prosecutor were in the process of preparing papers in order to obtain a warrant. Lieutenant Stover testified that it takes a period of time to prepare the papers and obtain a warrant; the officers had information that the parties would soon leave the apartment after the meal was finished in order to proceed to Illinois in order to sell the substances. The whole episode from the time of the first information to the time the officers knocked on the door of the apartment took about two hours. When the officers entered the apartment, Lieutenant Stover went directly to the refrigerator and took out the controlled substances. We do not believe Chimel and its progeny control the situation here. The thrust of Chimel was that the arrest of a person at home could not justify a routine search. Chimel did not involve a situation where the officers, having certain information, searched a particular area for particular evidence. In Chimel , there was no indication of circumstances which indicated to the officers that removal or destruction of the evidence was imminent or threatened. Nowhere in the opinion does the Court suggest that exceptional circumstances existed by which evidence was threatened to be removed or destroyed. In this case there was evidence that such circumstances existed when the officers had to determine whether to proceed without warrant or wait until a warrant could be obtained. Under all the evidence we believe that the exceptional circumstances existed and therefore the search and seizure of the controlled substances was not an unreasonable onethe ultimate test under the Constitution as to whether the search and seizure was impermissible. Appellant relies on State v. Funk, 490 S.W.2d 354 (Mo.App.1973) where the Kansas City District held that a search of the residence of the defendant, including a dresser drawer in the bedroom, was unjustified. Relying on Chimel , the Court held the search and seizure of drugs was impermissible. Funk is distinguishable. In Funk , (1) the search was not sustained because the search preceded the arrest, thus violating the classic statement of the exception permitting a warrantless search incidental to an arrest includes a flat requirement that the arrest precede the search in point of time, 490 S.W.2d at 358; (2) the officers entered the house for the precise purpose of making a search, not for the primary purpose of making an arrest; and (3) a thorough search was made of the entire house, as well as the dresser in the bedroom where the defendant was present and drugs were found. Here the search of the refrigerator was made subsequent to an arrest and there was no search of the entire premises. There was not even a search of the persons in the residence. The officers went directly to the refrigerator and seized the controlled substances. The validity of the search and seizure in these limited circumstances may be sustained upon another ground. An analogy can be made to those decisions in which officers are entitled to take a suspect to a victim of an offense for immediate viewing and an immediate confrontation. In Grant v. State, 446 S.W.2d 620 (Mo.1969) for example, in such a situation, our Supreme Court stated, The officers had the responsibility of ascertaining the identity of the criminal. Their attention having been directed to appellant, and he having been taken into custody, it was important in those early moments of the investigation that he either be detained as the suspect or released and the investigation continued. . .. 446 S.W.2d at 621. In the case at bar, the officers had information concerning a violation of the law; much of the information was verified and much of it was innocuous. The key information was the specific location of the controlled substances in the refrigerator. As in Grant, supra , and other decisions, it was important in these early moments after the arrest that the defendant and others either be detained or released and the investigation continue, if the information concerning the location of the substances proved to be false. It was reasonable therefore for the officers to immediately examine the one location to which their attention had been directed to verify the accuracy of the information. We hold, therefore, under the restricted fact situation here, that when the informant provided information concerning the exact location of the substances, a search of that location was not unreasonable. We do not, however, determine that had the information of the location of the substances been more general, such as in the apartment, that a search of the entire apartment or even of the entire room would have been warranted without a search warrant. We merely say that under the restricted circumstances here we do not find the action of the officers to have been unreasonable. Under the totality of the circumstances presented in this record, we cannot conclude, therefore, that the search and seizure of the controlled substances found in the refrigerator was an unreasonable one.