Opinion ID: 1161831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The first and eighth amendments to the United States constitution and its Colorado counterpart; and

Text: B. The Federal Community Mental Health Center Act and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of August 1981 (as to the request for private rights and institutional reform, including the creation of programs; but not as to the request for declaratory and injunctive relief); and C. The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1970 [sic] (as to the request for private rights and institutional reform, including the creation of programs); and D. ง 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act. The cases proceeded to trial before a different judge on the remaining claims. Prior to trial, it was agreed that the initial hearing would focus on the rights of the plaintiff class and that remedies would be addressed in a later proceeding. Fourteen days of trial were held over a three week period during September 1982. The judge then took the cases under advisement and more than two years passed without a decision. During this period, the municipal and state defendants developed a plan to reorganize mental health services in the northwest Denver catchment area. In August 1984 the Colorado Department of Institutions sent out a request for proposals seeking an organization to replace DHH as the provider of community health care services in northwest Denver. The Department of Institutions accepted the proposal of the Aurora Community Comprehensive Mental Health Center and a number of co-sponsors. DHH's contract with the state to provide community mental health services would be completed as of January 1, 1985, and at that point DHH would withdraw as a community mental health center, and the new organization would take over. However, Denver General Hospital would continue to serve as a long-term and short-term care facility, providing inpatient care. See งง 27-10-105 to -109, 11 C.R.S. (1982 & 1988 Supp.). In December 1984 the plaintiffs again moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. They requested that the court enjoin implementation of certain aspects of the reorganization plan scheduled to take effect on January 1, 1985, asserting that if the plan took effect there would be a sharp reduction in treatment and support services for the chronically mentally ill, thereby increasing the risk of psychotic episodes, which in turn could result in an increase in hospitalizations, incarcerations on criminal charges, and suicides. The plaintiffs argued that the transition plans and new programs were inadequate and therefore the class of chronically mentally ill would suffer immediate and irreparable injury if the court did not intervene. The court treated the motion as one for preliminary injunction and denied it after three days of hearings, noting that while there was a real possibility that mentally ill persons would be bruised in the transition process, it was not persuaded that the new plan would so drastically and demonstrably injure the plaintiffs that an injunction was warranted. The reorganization plan went into effect as planned on January 1, 1985. On May 7, 1985, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and declaratory judgment. The findings detailed the problems facing the mentally ill trying to live in the community, and reviewed the programs offered by the state and municipal defendants. The court determined that the Act for the Care and Treatment of the Mentally Ill, งง 27-10-101 to -129, 11 C.R.S. (1982 & 1988 Supp.) (Care and Treatment Act), creates a statutory right to appropriate treatment in the community for patients who have been voluntarily or involuntarily hospitalized, and that the defendants had violated this right by failing to provide an adequate continuum of coordinated community treatment and support services. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs had not established cognizable claims for relief based on section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. ง 794 (1982)), the common law duty of clinical care, or the United States or Colorado Constitutions. The order stated that lack of funding did not excuse the defendants from fulfilling the plaintiffs' statutory right to care and treatment in the community. The parties filed a number of post-trial motions, including the plaintiffs' motion for a determination of remedies and relief to implement the declaratory judgment, and the state and municipal defendants' motions to alter or amend the findings and judgment. The court's ruling on these post-trial motions made some minor alterations but left the May 7, 1985, order substantially unchanged. In December 1985 the court issued an order establishing the procedure for determining the appropriate remedies for the violation of the plaintiffs' rights under the Care and Treatment Act. The defendants were ordered to submit a plan for the delivery of appropriate community mental health services. The court also appointed independent experts to evaluate the remedial plan. The state defendants developed a remedial plan as required, but the municipal defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing them from future proceedings, arguing that since DHH was no longer providing community mental health services they no longer were necessary parties. The court heard arguments on this motion and denied it on May 9, 1986. Before the remedial plan was approved and implemented, the legislature passed Senate Bill 120, which amended the Care and Treatment Act by inserting the language subject to available appropriations in various sections of the statute. [5] Senate Bill 120 was signed by the Governor and became effective on May 3, 1986. Ch. 210, 1986 Colo.Sess.Laws 1010-11. The state defendants then asserted that under the amended act, the court no longer had jurisdiction to implement the remedial plan, and they moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief. The municipal defendants supported that position. On June 11, 1986, the court heard oral arguments on its jurisdiction to require a remedial plan, and it issued an order on July 11, 1986, stating that it no longer had jurisdiction to order injunctive relief. The court urged the state and municipal defendants to implement the remedial plan voluntarily and ordered the defendants to furnish semi-annual reports outlining the steps taken toward implementation of the plan. The court entered final judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b) on October 10, 1986, dismissing with prejudice all of the plaintiffs' claims except those for damages incurred for violation of the Care and Treatment Act prior to the passage of Senate Bill 120. [6] In an order issued on December 4, 1986, the court supplemented its final judgment, stating that the Care and Treatment Act provides neither an express nor an implied cause of action for damages and dismissing the damage claims. The plaintiffs appealed from the final judgment, and the state and municipal defendants cross-appealed. While the case was pending in the court of appeals, the plaintiffs petitioned this court for expedited review pursuant to C.A.R. 50 or for extraordinary relief under C.A.R. 21. We granted expedited certiorari under C.A.R. 50.