Opinion ID: 766381
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Uniformity Clause

Text: 70 Turning again to state law issues, Plaintiffs assert that H.B. 269 violates the Uniformity Clause, Article II, Section 26, of the Ohio Constitution, which ensures that all laws within Ohio are applied uniformly: 71 All laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the State; nor, shall any act, except such as relates to public schools, be passed, to take effect upon the approval of any other authority than the General Assembly, except, as otherwise provided in this constitution. 72 In reviewing legislation under the Uniformity Clause, Ohio courts use a two-part test: (1) whether the subject matter at issue is one of general or special nature, and, if one of general nature, (2) whether the legislation operates uniformly throughout Ohio. See Desenco, Inc., 706 N.E.2d at 330. Both parties agree that the subject matter of H.B. 269, public schools, is one of general nature. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 213 (Ohio 1999) ([S]chools are a subject of general nature.). Because H.B. 269 thus invokes the Uniformity Clause, we must determine whether the statute applies uniformly throughout the State. 73 In State ex rel. Zupancic v. Limbach, 568 N.E.2d 1206, 1213 (Ohio 1991), the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the Uniformity Clause applies to those localities or entities that meet a specified set of common characteristics, so long as the law is applied to those localities or entities uniformly. See also Desenco, 706 N.E.2d at 331. Although many schooldistricts in Ohio may never qualify as a municipal school district, H.B. 269 need not apply to all school districts in Ohio, but rather must apply uniformly to those that fall within its limits. See Goff, 711 N.E.2d at 213; State ex rel. Stanton v. Powell, 142 N.E. 401, 401-02 (Ohio 1924) (holding that a statute that applies only to those counties having two or more common pleas judges does not violate the uniformity clause, even though [t]he fact that the majority of the counties of the state have only one common pleas judge [and] therefore nothing upon which the act can operate.). 74 Moreover, it is immaterial that Cleveland is the only school district that currently falls within the provisions of H.B. 269 so long as it . . . may apply to cases similarly situated in the future 15 . See Goff, 711 N.E.2d at 213 (citing Limbach, 568 N.E.2d at 1213). Simply because the Ohio Legislature drafted H.B. 269 with Cleveland as its target does not suggest that the legislation will not apply uniformly to other school districts that fall under a federal court order and thus fit within the definition of a municipal school district. As with the similar school voucher statute at issue in Goff, the Ohio Legislature had a rational basis for enacting the school board legislation here and for specifically targeting the Cleveland City School District, which is the largest in the state and arguably the one most in need of state assistance. Goff, 711 N.E.2d at 214. We conclude that the Ohio General Assembly did not arbitrarily or unnecessarily restrict the operative provisions of the statute from applying to other similarly situated school boards throughout the state. See id. (That other school districts also have significant problems does not mean the distinction between school districts under state supervision by order of a federal court and other school districts is not real.). Accordingly, we hold that H.B. 269 operates uniformly throughout Ohio.