Opinion ID: 187447
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Timeliness of T1 Airlines' objection

Text: An air carrier may appeal to the DOT for review of an airport charge per 49 U.S.C. § 47129(a)(1)(B), as follows: The Secretary of Transportation shall issue a determination as to whether a fee imposed upon one or more air carriers... by the owner or operator of an airport is reasonable if ... a written complaint requesting such determination is filed with the Secretary by an affected air carrier within 60 days after such carrier receives written notice of the establishment or increase of such fee. When the T1/T3 Airlines filed their complaint, only the T3 Airlines had received notice that their non-airfield rent would be based upon FMV. The City did not give notice to the T1 airlines until after the complaint had been filed. The ALJ advised the T1 Airlines that because the complaint had already been filed, it was unnecessary to revise the complaint in order for the T1 Airlines to join the T3 Airlines' arguments against the City's use of FMV. Upon review, however, the DOT held [t]he reasonableness of the market method [as applied] to the T1 Carriers ... is outside the scope of this proceeding. Final Decision, 2007 DOT Av. LEXIS 437, at  n. 5. In support of their petition for review by this court, the T1 Airlines argue the ALJ's invitation equitably tolled the 60 day requirement. The DOT responds that the 60 day requirement limits the agency's jurisdiction and therefore could not be equitably tolled. As the Supreme Court has observed, the law typically treats a limitations defense as an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise at the pleadings stage and that is subject to rules of forfeiture and waiver .... [and] permit[s] courts to toll the limitations period in light of special equitable considerations. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 128 S.Ct. 750, 753, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008). Some statutes of limitations however, seek not so much to protect a defendant's case-specific interest in timeliness as to achieve a broader system-related goal.... The Court has often read the time limits of these statutes as more absolute, ... forbidding a court to consider whether certain equitable considerations warrant extending a limitations period. As a convenient shorthand, the Court has sometimes referred to the time limits in such statutes as jurisdictional. Id. (internal citations omitted). In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, the Supreme Court held the statute that required filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not jurisdictional because it does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 455 U.S. 385, 394, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). Nor does § 47129(a) speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the Secretary's authority. The statute simply requires the Secretary to issue a determination upon receiving a timely-filed written complaint; it is silent as to whether the Secretary may, in his discretion, act upon a complaint that does not meet all the formalities. Cf. Wilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 676-78 (D.C.Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding jurisdiction where agency, in its discretion, accepted appeal four years after deadline). The DOT argues its interpretation of the statute is owed deference pursuant to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694: If the Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, then we must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress, id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778; if instead the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, then we defer to the DOT's interpretation so long as it is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. Here the statute is silent as to whether the Secretary may exercise his jurisdiction without having received a timely-filed complaint. But the DOT's interpretation is not based upon a permissible construction of the statute because it ignores both John R. Sand & Gravel and Zipes. The former case teaches that a statute of limitations ordinarily serves only as an affirmative defense, 128 S.Ct. at 753, the latter that a statute of limitations is jurisdictional only if it speaks in jurisdictional terms. Consequently we hold the 60-day time limit in 49 U.S.C. § 47129(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement but is rather the type of limitation that, when raised as an affirmative defense, is subject to rules of forfeiture, waiver, and equitable tolling. Accordingly, on remand the DOT must consider any argument the T1 Airlines have preserved that the 60-day limitation ought not be enforced against them.