Opinion ID: 791779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Chevron Step One: Eligibility and Discretion

Text: 59 We turn to the first prong of the Chevron analysis. We do so because Zheng and amicus argue that the statute does not grant the Attorney General any discretion to determine eligibility for adjustment of status. They argue instead that, while the Attorney General may issue regulations regarding the adjustment process, and while he certainly has discretion over the final decision to grant adjustment, Congress has explicitly spoken on the issue of eligibility for adjustment, and the Attorney General thus has no power to modify the statutory eligibility requirements. This argument was endorsed by the First Circuit in Succar, which found the statute unambiguous and struck down the regulation under the first prong of the Chevron test. See 394 F.3d at 24, 30. 60 This argument begins from the text of INA section 245(a), which, to repeat, provides: 61 The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States ... may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is filed. 62 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Zheng and amicus argue that the plain text of this provision allows any alien inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States to make an application to adjust status, although it leaves the ultimate discretion to grant adjustment in the hands of the Attorney General. 63 Zheng's argument draws further support from the structure of the adjustment provisions in the INA. Section 245 does not stop with the general adjustment provision quoted above; rather, it goes on to exclude several categories of aliens from eligibility for adjustment. Section 245(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c), provides that subsection (a) shall not apply to alien crewmen, aliens who accept unauthorized employment or are in unlawful immigration status, aliens deportable for engaging in terrorist activities, and certain aliens with visa defects or other problems with their immigration status. 13 And subsection (e) provides that the Attorney General may not adjust the status of an alien who marries during removal proceedings and who seeks adjustment based on that marriage. 64 The First Circuit found this long list of statutory exclusions to be compelling evidence that Congress unambiguously reserved to itself the determination of who is eligible to apply for adjustment of status relief. Succar, 394 F.3d at 24. That court noted that when Congress desired to limit the ability of a non-citizen who might otherwise have been eligible to apply for adjustment of status under 1255(a), it has done so explicitly by defining several categories of aliens as not eligible to apply. Id. at 25. From the statutory text and structure, the court discerned two themes: 65 First, Congress explicitly rendered ineligible a certain category of aliens to apply. Second, that category of excluded aliens included some in removal proceedings, but Congress chose not to disqualify from eligibility all of those aliens inspected and admitted or paroled in removal or other judicial proceedings. In those limited circumstances when the involvement in proceedings works to hamper an individual's ability to adjust status, Congress has explicitly said so. 66 Id. These themes gave the First Circuit a clear sense of congressional intent, id. at 22 (quoting Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., 540 U.S. at 600, 124 S.Ct. 1236), and led it to conclude that the statute unambiguously precluded the Attorney General from imposing further restrictions on eligibility to apply for adjustment of status. 67 The First Circuit conceded that the statute grants the Attorney General broad discretion to grant or deny adjustment of status. But it found an important distinction between eligibility to apply for adjustment and the substantive relief of a grant of adjustment. In drawing this distinction, the court relied on INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). In that case, the Supreme Court considered the asylum standard of well-founded fear of persecution, which the Attorney General had interpreted as incorporating the withholding of removal standard that the alien be more likely than not to be persecuted. The Court noted that the Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to eligible refugees, but nonetheless rejected his interpretation of the standards for eligibility. See id. at 443-44, 449, 107 S.Ct. 1207. The First Circuit took this to mean that [t]he Supreme Court ... has ruled that the two questions of discretion as to the ultimate relief and discretion as to eligibility exclusions are distinct. Succar, 394 F.3d at 23; see also INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 30, 117 S.Ct. 350, 136 L.Ed.2d 288 (1996) (While [8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(H)] establishes certain prerequisites to eligibility for a waiver of deportation, it imposes no limitations on the factors that the Attorney General ... may consider in determining who, among the class of eligible aliens, should be granted relief.). 68 The Eighth Circuit, disagreeing with Succar, pointed out that Cardoza-Fonseca need not be read for the proposition that discretion to grant substantive relief and discretion to restrict eligibility are unrelated. Cardoza-Fonseca concerned the Attorney General's interpretation of a statutory standard, while the regulation at issue here does not purport to interpret statutory eligibility standards, but rather rests on the discretionary authority that Congress explicitly gave the Attorney General to grant adjustment-of-status relief. Mouelle, 416 F.3d at 929-30. The court asked rhetorically, [W]hy should the Attorney General be forced to exercise his discretion through rules that speak only to the ultimate relief rather than eligibility? Id. at 928-29. Relying on Lopez, which allowed an agency to exercise its discretion via general rulemaking rather than by individual determinations, the Eighth Circuit concluded that it makes little sense to invalidate this regulation simply because it speaks in terms of eligibility. Id. While the question is close, we cannot agree with the First Circuit that the statutory text and structure indicate a clear intent to preempt the field of eligibility. The fact that Congress declared some categories of aliens ineligible for adjustment by statute does not in itself conclusively prove that the Attorney General cannot declare other categories ineligible by regulation. Indeed, in Lopez, the prisoner argued that, by identifying a class of inmates ineligible for sentence reductions under § 3621(e)(2)(B), i.e., those convicted of a violent offense, Congress has barred the Bureau from identifying further categories of ineligible inmates. 531 U.S. at 239, 121 S.Ct. 714. This argument is essentially identical to that adopted by Succar: that statutory eligibility standards cover the field and prevent an agency from further regulating eligibility. But the Supreme Court rejected this argument in Lopez, and we are unwilling to follow it here. 14 See also Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973) (Respondent argues that, in requiring disclosure as to some transactions, Congress intended to preclude the [agency] from imposing similar requirements as to any other transactions. To accept respondent's argument would undermine the flexibility sought in vesting broad rulemaking authority in an administrative agency.). 69 We therefore find that, under the first step of the Chevron analysis, INA section 245 is ambiguous as to whether the Attorney General may regulate eligibility to apply for adjustment of status.