Opinion ID: 2521277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Penalty Phase Factors

Text: Defendant asserts that the factors set forth in section 190.3 to guide the jury's determination whether to impose the death penalty are unduly vague. We rejected this contention in People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347. Specifically, defendant contends that factor (a) of section 190.3, which directs the jury to consider the circumstances of the offense, is unduly vague. The United States Supreme Court held otherwise in Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-980, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Defendant contends it was error to instruct the jury without specifying which factors were aggravating and which were mitigating, and without limiting the possible aggravating factors to those listed. We have rejected these contentions. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Defendant, arguing that the court's instructions permitted the jury to consider his youth as an aggravating factor, points to the prosecutor's argument that defendant was certainly old enough to know better. Chronological age, however, is neither aggravating nor mitigating, `but is used in the statute as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience ... .` [Citation.] The prosecutor's argument here that defendant was old enough to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct is a permissible age-related inference. ( People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th 130, 190, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150, italics omitted.) Defendant faults the instruction directing the jury to consider extreme mental or emotional disturbanceboth because it fails to specify that this is a mitigating factor, and because it precludes the jury from considering as a mitigating factor a mental or emotional disturbance that is less than extreme. The United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of this instruction in Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. 967, 976-977, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Defendant contends that the jury should have been required to find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following: the existence of any factor in aggravation, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, and that death was the appropriate penalty. We rejected these arguments in People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347. Defendant contends the jury should have been required to return unanimous written findings supporting its verdict. We have rejected this contention. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Defendant contends California should require intercase proportionality review to determine whether the death verdict in the present case is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. We have rejected this contention. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 602, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Repeating previous arguments, defendant claims California's death penalty laws are unconstitutional because they fail to contain certain safeguards, such as requiring written, unanimous findings beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, that they outweigh the mitigating factors, and that death is the appropriate penalty. We have considered and rejected each of these contentions above. ( Ante, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 504-05, 47 P.3d at pp. 285-86.) Defendant contends that California's death penalty law fails to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, because the special circumstances included in section 190.2 are so numerous and broad in scope as to include nearly every first degree murder. We have rejected this contention. ( People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) Defendant argues that it is improper for a special circumstance also to constitute an aggravating factor. We have rejected this argument. ( People v. Millwee, supra, 18 Cal.4th 96, 164, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990.) Defendant contends the California death penalty law is unconstitutional because it vests complete discretion in the prosecutor to determine whether to seek the death penalty. We rejected this contention in People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 905, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15.