Opinion ID: 795105
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 1991 Civil Rights Act and Desert Palace

Text: 29 Individual disparate-treatment claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, are often categorized as either single-motive claims, i.e., when an illegitimate reason motivated an employment decision, or mixed-motive claims, when both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the decision, Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). The Supreme Court first recognized the mixed-motive theory in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, where the Court held, in a plurality opinion, that a plaintiff could shift the burden of proof to the employer to prove an affirmative defense upon a showing that the protected characteristic `played a motivating part in an employment decision.' Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 93, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion)). The employer would then be held liable unless it `prov[ed] by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken plaintiff's [protected trait] into account.' Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775). 30 Then, in an attempt `to eliminate the employer's ability to escape liability in Title VII mixed-motive cases by proving that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motivation,' Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 n. 8 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir.2004)), Congress enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act (the 1991 Act), which amended Title VII, Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). One of the new statutory provisions codified the mixed-motive alternative for proving that an `unlawful employment practice' has occurred. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). The provision states that a plaintiff can raise a mixed-motive Title VII claim by demonstrat[ing] that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). If the plaintiff makes such a showing, she is entitled to relief. However, the 1991 Act also provides that the employer's liability will be limited to injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney fees and costs if the employer can establish that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The declaratory and injunctive relief may not include an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii). 31 After Price Waterhouse, despite Congress's attempt to clarify the standard to prove a mixed-motive claim, the question lingered as to whether direct evidence was required to establish a mixed-motive claim. We held that direct evidence of discrimination was required to present a mixed-motive claim. Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 315 (6th Cir.1989). This more stringent requirement for presenting a mixed-motive claim kept such claims distinct from claims analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework, which was applied when the plaintiff relied on circumstantial evidence. Then, in 2003, the Supreme Court unanimously interpreted the 1991 Civil Rights Act to allow plaintiffs to bring mixed-motive discrimination claims based solely on circumstantial evidence, Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02, 123 S.Ct. 2148, thereby overruling our decision in Gagne. 32 Prior to Desert Palace, we did not require a plaintiff to present a prima facie case or follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to get to the jury on a mixed-motive claim. See, e.g., Cesaro v. Lakeville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 953 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir.1992). Rather, the employee only needed to show that the illegitimate reason was a motivating factor in an employment decision, and then the employer [could] avoid liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not considered the plaintiff's gender. Id. However, now that such mixed-motive claims can be brought based on circumstantial evidence, the question arises as to the effect of Desert Palace on the analysis of mixed-motive claims at the summary judgment stage. 4 What is clear from Desert Palace, regardless of its impact on the McDonnell Douglas framework, is that to succeed on a mixed-motive claim, the plaintiff must adduce evidence that the protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the employer's adverse employment decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). The ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was a victim of intentional discrimination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 153, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Applying Desert Palace and the 1991 Act to this standard, the ultimate question at summary judgment on a mixed-motive case is whether the plaintiff has presented evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a reasonable jury could logically infer that [a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor in [the defendant's adverse employment action against the plaintiff]. Harris v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 133 Fed.Appx. 288, 297 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished opinion) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir.2003).