Opinion ID: 1099739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in overruling the appellants' motion for a mistrial when the prosecution questioned Doc Caston about his wife.

Text: ś 53. The brothers next argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for mistrial. The brothers based their motion upon questions by the prosecution pertaining to the circumstances in which Doc's wife left him after Pool's death. ś 54. Whether to grant a motion for mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. The standard of review for denial of a motion for mistrial is abuse of discretion. Pulphus v. State, 782 So.2d 1220, 1222 (Miss.2001) (citations omitted); Spann v. State, 771 So.2d 883, 889 (Miss.2000); Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 784, 794 (Miss.1995); Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521 (Miss.1996). The failure of the court to grant a motion for mistrial will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion. Bass v. State, 597 So.2d 182, 191 (Miss.1992). ś 55. The record reflects the following testimony on direct examination of Doc by defense counsel: Q. Well, did you ever tell anybody at any time you ever killed anybody? A. No, sir, I have never told nobody; my wife, my children, or nobody else because I'd be lying on myself. I have never killed nobody and ain't intending to. On cross-examination by the State, the testimony was as follows: Q. Well, she [Doc's wife] left shortly after you murdered Rainey Pool, didn't she? A. No, she didn't. Q. And the reason that she left is because you told her one night during an argument that you had killed him and wouldn't mind doing it to somebody else, didn't you? A. No. ś 56. During a bench conference, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based upon a prior court ruling. The defense maintained that the prior ruling made any statements by Doc's wife inadmissible. The State argued that the order only prohibited calling the wife as a witness. Further, the State argued that the order did not prohibit asking Doc about the circumstances of the wife leaving, nor covering up the truth. The trial judge allowed the State to question Doc about whether he made the statement. The trial judge also gave the caveat that if Doc denied making the statement, then, the State could not question or state what the wife may have said in response. ś 57. Following the ruling, Doc testified as follows: Q. The truth about why your wife left is that you made that statement to her, didn't you? A. That is not a fact. I have never talked about this case to nobody; my children; my wife, or nobody else. ś 58. In the case sub judice, clearly, the defense opened the door for inquiry into the veracity of Doc's claim that he never told anyone that he had killed in the past. In Morgan v. State, 741 So.2d 246, 254 (Miss.1999), this Court has held that [w]here an accused, on direct examination, seeks to exculpate himself, such testimony is subject to normal impeachment via cross-examination, and this is so even though it would bring out that the accused may have committed another crime. Stewart v. State, 596 So.2d 851, 853 (Miss. 1992). [T]he prosecution's impeachment privilege may not exceed the invitation extended. Id. at 853. ś 59. Rule 613 of the Rules of Evidence states the following: (b) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2). M.R.E. 613(b). ś 60. The trial judge limited the questioning by the State. Once Doc denied making any statement to his wife, the State was not allowed to pursue further inquiry. Accordingly, the trial court was within its discretion to allow the State to inquire about the alleged statement by Doc to his wife in an attempt to impeach his prior testimony that he never told anyone that he had killed. The trial court limited the testimony and correctly ruled that if Doc denied making the statement then no further questions could ensue. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. This issue is without merit.