Opinion ID: 625909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Ordinance 2952 and the presumption against preemption

Text: In the field of immigration, the power to regulate is unquestionably exclusively a federal power. [17] The exclusivity of Congress's power stems from multiple constitutional sources, including the Federal Government's power `[t]o establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization,' . . . its power `[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,' . . . and its broad authority over foreign affairs. [18] It is clear from these sources of the federal power that immigration is inextricably tied to national interests in many areas, one of the most significant of which is foreign relations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that immigration and the governing national policy thereof are inherently part of foreign affairs: [T]he supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, including power over immigration, naturalization and deportation, is made clear by the Constitution. [19] Given the breadth of the Constitution's understanding of immigration as a domain of the federal government, state and local laws that attempt to affect aliens will, with limited exceptions, be preempted by the national interest. We therefore begin by considering the preemption doctrine. [20] By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, it is a `fundamental principle of the Constitution . . . that Congress has the power to preempt state law.' [21] Federal law will preempt a state or local regulation when (1) Congress expressly preempts state law; (2) Congressional intent to preempt may be inferred from the existence of a pervasive federal regulatory scheme; or (3) state law conflicts with federal law or its purposes. [22] A pervasive federal regulatory scheme may show that Congress intended to preempt the field, leaving no room for the states to supplement it. [23] Even if Congress has not occupied the field, however, a state law will be preempted where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law presents an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes of the federal law. [24] A state law will be presumed to be valid [i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied. [25] This presumption serves purposes of federalism because where Congress acts in a field traditionally occupied by the states, we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. [26] Nevertheless, this presumption against federal preemption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence. [27] A threshold question then is whether the Ordinance here stands in an area of traditional state regulation, entitled to a presumption of validity, or instead receives no benefit from the presumption because it attempts to legislate in an area of significant federal concern. As noted above, Congress has plenary power to regulate immigration. [28] Thus, Congress and the federal government historically have had a presence in the immigration field. However, the fact that aliens are the subject of a local regulation, standing alone, does not mean that the statute is a regulation of immigration that is preempted by federal law. [29] For example, in DeCanas, the State of California prohibited the employment of unlawful aliens in the state, and the Court held that this was a permissible attempt to strengthen [California's] economy by adopting federal standards in imposing criminal sanctions against state employers who knowingly employ aliens who have no federal right to employment within the country. [30] Thus, the Court viewed the state statute as an employment regulation, an area in which states have traditionally regulated, not a regulation of immigration. The Court further reasoned that the state statute was not field or conflict preempted because states retain broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State, and there was no indication that Congress intended to preclude states from regulating the employment of aliens. [31] Instead, at the time of the state regulation Congress had expressed at best only a peripheral concern with [the] employment of illegal entrants. [32] Rather than conflict with a Congressional act, the state law was consistent with a Congressional intent to allow states to regulate the employment of illegal aliens. [33] In the instant case, the City asserts that a presumption against preemption of the Ordinance applies because the Ordinance is a regulation of residential housing and the issuance of licenses to occupy rental units, which it argues is an area historically occupied by the states. According to the City, the Ordinance merely applies federal classifications consistent with federal law to achieve a purely local result. We disagree. The text of the Ordinance, and the circumstances surrounding its adoption, show that its purpose and effect are to regulate immigration, an area of federal concern, rather than to regulate housing. The preamble to the Ordinance specifically states that the Ordinance is intended to aid the enforcement of federal immigration law, not housing law. (Emphasis added). In fact, the Ordinance refers to federal immigration law either directly or by implication in seven of its eleven introductory whereas clauses. Moreover, the Ordinance ranges beyond landlord-tenant law because it conditions the validity of an occupancy license on the lawfulness of an occupant's immigration status, thereby expressly tying the Ordinance's criminal offenses to immigration rather than to some violation of the housing code. These facts belie the City's argument that the Ordinance is nothing more than a housing regulation. On the contrary, the Ordinance has virtually nothing to say about the housing rental market, except for boilerplate language referencing the City's police power to protect its citizens. The regulatory scheme created by the Ordinance has none of the indicia one would expect of a housing regulation. For example, the Ordinance says nothing about the location, design, construction, maintenance, ownership, or alteration of residential rental units. It also provides no regulation for the number of residents or the permitted uses of rental housing. The Ordinance creates an application process for an occupancy license, but the applicant is not required to submit information about his employment or credit history, his past residence information, or his criminal history. All that is required, besides standard information such as one's name and address, is one's citizenship information. Moreover, the only reason an occupancy license may be revoked is based on immigration status. On its face then the Ordinance hardly evinces a purpose to regulate rental housing in the City and instead points toward the real target of the regulationthe ferreting out and exclusion of undesirable illegal immigrants. This purpose of the statute is confirmed by the evidence in the record. Despite an assertion in the preamble that the Ordinance was intended to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare, the City points to nothing showing an effect on public welfare by illegal aliens' occupancy of rental housing. The mayor of Farmers Branch confirmed that the City conducted no studies on the effects of undocumented aliens on the value of property in Farmers Branch, the quality of its schools, the crime rate, or the availability of healthcare to its residents. One City Council member, Gary Greer, testified that there was no data showing whether undocumented immigrants commit more crimes than others in Farmers Branch. Still another council member, David Koch, agreed that the Ordinance was not directed in any way towards revitalization but rather was directed solely towards removing illegal immigrants. The removal of illegal immigrants is thus the precise and intended effect of the Ordinance. Although the Ordinance provides no express removal mechanism, removal is the practical result of the Ordinance because it regulates who may be an occupant based solely on immigration status. This functional denial to aliens of access to rental housing based on their immigration status is tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode, an area that is historically one of federal, not state, concern. [34] The Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in a case addressing a similar municipal ordinance that required prospective occupants of rental housing to obtain an occupancy license and provide proof of legal citizenship or residency. [35] As the Third Circuit noted, we cannot ignore the reality that the Ordinance seeks to affect directly the presence of aliens in Farmers Branch and to condition that presence upon the lawfulness or unlawfulness of their immigration status. [36] The reality is that all aliens who are deemed unlawfully present because of an absence of documentation are effectively excluded from Farmers Branch. But because the prerogative of deciding which aliens may live in the United States belongs to the federal government, the City's Ordinance does not regulate in an area historically occupied by the states, and the district court correctly declined to afford it a presumption of validity.