Opinion ID: 547055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of the New Ordinance

Text: 20 Denver's new ordinance prohibits off-site commercial signs within 660 feet of a freeway. On-site commercial and noncommercial signs are permitted. National first argues that this partial ban illegally regulates commercial speech. 21 Commercial speech receives less First Amendment protection than other constitutionally safeguarded expression. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). To determine whether regulation of commercial speech is consistent with the First Amendment, the Court in Central Hudson has provided a four-part inquiry: (1) the speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) the asserted governmental interest in regulating must be substantial; (3) the regulation must directly advance the governmental interest asserted; and (4) the regulation may not be more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Id. at 566, 100 S.Ct. at 2351. See also Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490, 499-500 (10th Cir.1983) (applying Central Hudson four-part test), rev'd on other grounds, Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 81 L.Ed.2d 580 (1984). 22 National's facial attack does not implicate the first part of the Central Hudson test since we deal here with no particular example of commercial speech. The governmental interests asserted, preserving aesthetic values and traffic safety, are clearly substantial within the meaning of the second part. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (traffic safety and appearance of city are substantial governmental interests). National contends, however, that these interests are not directly advanced under the third part because permitting on-site commercial and noncommercial signs next to freeways already frustrates the asserted regulatory purposes. The Court in Metromedia addressed this argument: 23 [F]irst ..., the prohibition of offsite advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics. This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive because it permits onsite advertising. Second, the city may believe that offsite advertising, with its periodically changing content, presents a more acute problem than does onsite advertising. 24 Id. at 511, 101 S.Ct. at 2894. In addition, the preference for noncommercial over commercial advertising under the new ordinance is the kind of underinclusiveness the First Amendment tolerates. 25 The final inquiry in Central Hudson is whether the prohibition is more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted interests. Rejecting a strict least restrictive means standard, the Court in Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989), noted that the Central Hudson test must reflect the relatively limited measure of protection afforded commercial speech. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 3033. The Court therefore required only a reasonable fit between legislative ends and means. Id. at 3033-35. The fit need not necessarily [be] perfect, ... but one whose scope [must be] 'in proportion to the interest served.'  Id. at 3035 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203, 102 S.Ct. 929, 937-38, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982)). A narrowly tailored regulation which does not 'burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests'  will suffice. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 3034 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2758, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989)). 26 Denver's new ordinance easily satisfies this requirement by prohibiting substantially less speech than a total ban, which National concedes is a constitutional alternative. 2 Even if something less than the prohibition of off-site commercial billboards might serve the same safety and aesthetic purposes, the limited prohibition here is certainly the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508, 101 S.Ct. at 2893. We therefore conclude that the new ordinance, considered facially, permissibly regulates commercial speech. 27 National also contends that the distinction between noncommercial and commercial speech which Denver must make to apply the new ordinance makes it invalid on its face. According to National, the new ordinance's failure to make a clear distinction between the two types of speech will result in the unconstitutional prohibition of noncommercial speech. The new ordinance also gives Denver's zoning authorities unfettered discretion to make content-based decisions, National maintains, concerning where to draw the line between commercial and noncommercial speech. 28 We agree with National that Denver's attempt to distinguish the two types of speech is not a model of clarity. Denver first defined commercial speech by adopting language implicitly approved by the Supreme Court in Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808, 99 S.Ct. 66, 58 L.Ed.2d 101 (1978) (dismissed for want of substantial federal question); see also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 499, 101 S.Ct. at 2888 (approving Suffolk language). 3 Noncommercial speech was then defined as embracing any speech not within the definition of commercial speech. We cannot agree, however, that the new ordinance's failure to define the distinction with total clarity makes the ordinance facially invalid. 29 The Supreme Court and other courts have approved of statutes, orders, ordinances and the like which require a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. See, e.g., Board of Trustees, 109 S.Ct. at 3034-35 (resolution prohibiting only commercial speech subject to less constitutional scrutiny); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 344, 106 S.Ct. 2968, 2978, 92 L.Ed.2d 266 (1986) (validating regulations prohibiting advertising aimed at residents); National Advertising Co. v. City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.1988) (billboard ordinance construed as limiting only off-site commercial messages valid); Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 173-74 (4th Cir.1988) (same); Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (same); Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1272 (4th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102, 107 S.Ct. 1334, 94 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (same). 30 Furthermore, Supreme Court decisions have provided ample guidance concerning the common-sense distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1918-19, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 2879-80, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (defining commercial speech). We agree with the Fourth Circuit that 31 sufficient guidance is given for such determination by City officials by the various decisions of the Court relating to billboards and commercial speech.... '[N]o codification of these terms is necessary, since the Supreme Court has already defined them....' Although an occasional marginal case might arise raising the question of whether on the particular facts the definition of commercial speech would be correct, such an infrequent possibility should not in itself justify a generalized charge that the ordinance itself is vague, given the guidance afforded by court decisions in the area. 32 Major Media, 792 F.2d at 1272-73 (citation omitted). 33 Our conclusion that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague also forecloses National's argument concerning city officials' unfettered discretion to determine what is regulated commercial speech. Far from being unfettered, Denver is bound by judicial precedent in determining what is commercial speech. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2299-00, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (judicial precedent relevant in construing words of statute in vagueness challenge). 34 National's argument that the ordinance will overreach to prohibit noncommercial speech also cannot stand. Where expressive conduct is involved, 'the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.'  ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 835 F.2d 735, 742 (10th Cir.1987) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 605, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2912, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). The requirement of substantial overbreadth avoids invalidation of a statute where, despite some possibly impermissible application, the 'remainder of the statute ... covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable ... conduct....'  Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 964-65, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2851, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-81, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2897-98, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973)). Even with the guidance contained in the judicial definitions, some speech admittedly will be difficult to categorize. 4 But National has failed to show in this case that more than a small percentage of conceivable applications will raise serious definitional questions. Absent such a showing, National must demonstrate that the ordinance as applied to it is unconstitutional. ACORN, 835 F.2d at 742. National has not attempted to launch an as applied attack. Accordingly, we conclude that the new ordinance is facially consistent with the First Amendment. 5 35