Opinion ID: 203934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: .ex post facto clause claim

Text: We turn to plaintiffs' appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth on the Ex Post Facto Clause arguments. There are no material facts in dispute in the record. Plaintiffs argue the Ex Post Facto Clause was violated because the only plainly discernible purpose for Article 120 was to seek to impose an additional measure of punishment upon those who had violated the laws of the Commonwealth. Plaintiffs point to the a transcript of the debates at the 1998 and 2000 Constitutional Conventions over the bill that ultimately became Article 120. Plaintiffs also rely on language from Acting Governor Cellucci's proposed amendment and his statements to the public, an amendment which was not accepted. These statements include: The time has come to tell would-be criminals in Massachusetts that committing crimes has serious consequences, and that [p]risons are a place for punishment. Even though his initial proposal was never in fact acted on by the legislature, we consider his comments as part of the background. Analysis of the Ex Post Facto Clause claim involves a two-part inquiry. The first asks whether the denial of the right to vote is a civil, regulatory measure within the meaning of the caselaw, or whether it is punitive. [W]here unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, the central question is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under Ex Post Facto Clause). Only a punitive measure can violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (holding preventative detention under the Bail Reform Act was permissible because it was regulatory and preventative, rather than punitive). The Supreme Court has stated that felon disenfranchisement provisions are considered regulatory rather than punitive. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958), the Court explained: [A] statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose.... The point may be illustrated by the situation of an ordinary felon. A person who commits a bank robbery, for instance, loses his right to liberty and often his right to vote. If, in the exercise of the power to protect banks, both sanctions were imposed for the purpose of punishing bank robbers, the statutes authorizing both disabilities would be penal. But because the purpose of the latter statute is to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, this law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise. Id. at 96-97, 78 S.Ct. 590; see also Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51, 79 S.Ct. 985, 3 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1959) (criminal record is an obvious factor that a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications of voters). Article 120 is no exception. Even if the Supreme Court had not already described such regulation of the franchise with respect to incarcerated felons as nonpenal, we would still find Article 120 to be a civil regulatory scheme. In examining Article 120 on its face, Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), there is no language indicating the Commonwealth's provision is penal. Article 120 is not in the Commonwealth's criminal code, but rather its civil constitutional and statutory voter qualification provisions. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, ([The State's] objective to create a civil proceeding is evidenced by its placement of the Act within the [State's] probate code, instead of the criminal code (citations omitted)). Article 120 also disenfranchises persons under guardianship, persons disqualified because of corrupt elections practices, and all persons under eighteen years of age, as well as incarcerated felons. And the disqualification is enforced civilly, not criminally. Article 120 does not involve a more general period of disenfranchisement because of commission of a felony; rather Article 120 is limited to the period of incarceration. Article 120 thus creates a temporary qualification on the right to vote coincident with imprisonment, rather than a long-term consequence for the commission of a crime. Article 120 is a constitutional amendment, which was later effectuated and extended by statute. The voters of Massachusetts ratified Article 120 in a statewide election. The Voter Guide read by the voters, which we described earlier, made no mention of any goal of punishing prisoners. The Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences. Smith, 123 S.Ct. at 1153. Secondly, even if the legislature intended to deem a particular law civil, courts must further inquire whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). `[O]nly the clearest proof' will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100, 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636). Plaintiffs fail to meet this standard. We review whether plaintiffs' allegations of punitive purpose meet the non-exclusive factors test set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), and followed in Smith, 538 U.S. at 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The Mendoza-Martinez factors are: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishmentretribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether there is a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554. The most relevant factors are whether felon disenfranchisement has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140. First, Article 120 does not impose any affirmative disability or restraint, physical or otherwise. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 100, 123 S.Ct. 1140 ([I]mprisonment... is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint.). Disenfranchisement during the period of incarceration imposes no additional term of imprisonment, see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960), and is not as enduring as permanent occupational debarment, which the Court has held is nonpunitive. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104, 118 S.Ct. 488; De Veau, 363 U.S. at 144, 80 S.Ct. 1146; Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898) (revocation of a medical license does not violate Ex Post Facto clause). Second, felon disenfranchisement has historically not been regarded as punitive in the United States, as the Supreme Court indicated in Trop v. Dulles . Indeed, in holding that felon disenfranchisement has affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54, 94 S.Ct. 2655, the Supreme Court noted the historical prevalence of state felon disenfranchisement laws and never characterized even California's broad disqualification of former felons as punitive. Id. at 55, 94 S.Ct. 2655. As to the third and fifth factors, Article 120 is effective regardless of a finding of scienter or the type of crime so long as it is a felony. That Article 120 may be tied to criminal activity is insufficient to render the statut[e] punitive. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 291, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996). The fourth Mendoza-Martinez factor considers whether felon disenfranchisement will promote the traditional aims of punishment, retribution and deterrence, to see whether plaintiffs have offered the clearest proof to overcome the statement of nonpenal purpose. Plaintiffs rely on some statements made by some legislators that could be viewed as retributive, such as that felons don't deserve to vote. To the extent the legislators' comments are relevant, they are sporadic and do not clearly evince a retributive purpose. More significantly, since Article 120 was put before the voters, the Information for Voters Guide is a better source of context. The Guide contained a balanced debate about the merits of allowing currently incarcerated felons to vote in state elections, noted the problem of prisoners being able to affect the laws under which they were confined by voting, and nowhere suggests an intent to punish prisoners. As to the sixth factor, there is an obvious rational nonpunitive purpose for disenfranchisement: as the Guide shows, voters were concerned about the influence of currently incarcerated felons in exercis[ing] control over [their] lives by voting from prison. See also Smith, 123 S.Ct. at 1147 (noting that even if the objective of the Act is consistent with the purposes of the [state] criminal justice system, the State's pursuit of it in a regulatory scheme does not make the objective punitive.). Finally, Article 120 is not excessive in accomplishing this purpose. Article 120 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.