Opinion ID: 186091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count I: Low Performance Evaluations

Text: 23 Taylor first argues both her being made subject to a PIP and Hedlin's failure to complete her performance appraisals in a timely manner were adverse employment actions and were based upon her race. An adverse employment action within the meaning of McDonnell Douglas is a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). As we have noted before, formal criticism or poor performance evaluations are [not] necessarily adverse actions and they should not be considered such if they did not affect[] the [employee's] grade or salary. Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457-58 (D.C.Cir.1999). 24 Taylor did not present any evidence to the effect that either her being put on the PIP or the delay in receiving her 1996 and 1997 performance evaluations affected her grade or salary. Indeed, Taylor did not present evidence suggesting she suffered any significant change in [her] employment status. Taylor alleges only that Hedlin improperly placed [her] on a ninety day [PIP]; Hedlin refused to terminate the plan, even though [Hedlin] had orally informed [her] that [she] had successfully completed the plan; Hedlin did not execute a 1996 performance evaluation for Taylor until September 1997; and, due to the delay in removing Taylor from the PIP, Taylor did not receive performance standards and an evaluation for 1997 until May 1998. Taylor does not dispute, however, that Hedlin removed her from the PIP just two weeks after the plan was scheduled to end. In fact, Taylor's affidavit indicates that Hedlin informed Taylor she had successfully completed the PIP on May 3, 1997, the date on which the plan was scheduled to end. Even assuming there was a brief delay in removing Taylor from the PIP, she does not explain why we should consider that an adverse employment action. Nor did she claim any adverse effect caused by the delay in receiving her performance evaluations. We therefore conclude that neither Taylor's placement in the PIP nor the delay of her performance evaluations was an adverse employment action upon which Taylor may base a claim of discrimination. 25 Taylor next argues the district court erred in holding her erroneous performance rating — with its concomitant effect upon her bonus — was not an adverse employment action because Hedlin corrected the evaluation and paid the proper bonus before Taylor brought this suit. To be sure, loss of bonus money because of an improperly low performance rating may constitute an adverse employment action for the purposes of Title VII. See Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 819 (D.C.Cir.2001) (contrasting performance evaluations with bonuses). The issue whether an employer can cure a violation of Title VII and thereby avoid liability for the violation, however, is one of first impression in this circuit. 26 We agree with the four other circuits to have addressed the question: An employer may cure an adverse employment action — at least one of the sort here alleged — before that action is the subject of litigation. See White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., 310 F.3d 443, 452 (6th Cir.2002) (reinstatement that puts the plaintiff in the same position she would have been in absent the suspension constitutes the `ultimate employment decision,' thereby negating a potentially adverse intermediate employment decision), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 321 F.3d 1203 (2003); Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267-68 (11th Cir.2001) (no adverse employment action where plaintiff initially denied but shortly thereafter received promotion); Brooks v. San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 929-30 (9th Cir.2000) (retaliatory lowering of performance evaluation not adverse employment action where evaluation was on appeal and might have been corrected if plaintiff had not quit her job while appeal was pending); Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir.1998) (We need not address whether a mere delay in promotion constitutes an adverse employment action because [plaintiff] received the promotion with retroactive pay and seniority); cf. Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir.1981) (en banc) (there are many interlocutory or mediate decisions having no immediate effect upon employment conditions which were not intended to fall within the direct proscriptions of ... Title VII). As the district court reasoned: 27 Permitting employers the opportunity to correct workplace wrongs prior to litigation is the objective of the EEO process. If a plaintiff were permitted a right to sue even if his or her employer had corrected the grievance, there would be absolutely no incentive for employers to make adjustments for past conduct during the EEO process. 28 Mem. Op. at JA 60, citing Martini v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1338 (D.C.Cir.1999) (remanding to district court with instructions to dismiss plaintiff's suit as untimely because Title VII requires complainants to wait 180 days before suing in federal court so that the Commission may informally resolve as many charges as possible). Because Hedlin corrected her error in rating Taylor and increased Taylor's bonus accordingly before Taylor filed suit, there was no unremedied adverse employment action when the suit was filed and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Smithsonian on Count I.