Opinion ID: 1044024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: DNA Analysis Under the Act

Text: The Act provides that a person convicted of certain enumerated offenses, including aggravated rape, may at any time, file a petition requesting the forensic DNA analysis of any evidence that is in the possession or control of the prosecution, law enforcement, laboratory, or court, and that is related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the judgment of conviction and that may contain biological evidence. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-303. In consequence, there is no statutory time limit on requests for testing and the right to DNA analysis under the Act may not be waived by implication. Griffin v. State, 182 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tenn.2006). Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-304 is mandatory, providing that once the prosecution has been notified and given the opportunity to respond, the court shall order DNA analysis if it finds that: (1) A reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA analysis; (2) The evidence is still in existence and in such a condition that DNA analysis may be conducted; (3) The evidence was never previously subjected to DNA analysis or was not subjected to the analysis that is now requested which could resolve an issue not resolved by previous analysis; and (4) The application for analysis is made for the purpose of demonstrating innocence and not to unreasonably delay the execution of sentence or administration of justice. (Emphasis added). The Act also contains a discretionary provision, directing that, after the prosecution has been notified and given the opportunity to respond, the post-conviction court may order DNA analysis if it finds that: (1) A reasonable probability exists that analysis of the evidence will produce DNA results that would have rendered the petitioner's verdict or sentence more favorable if the results had been available at the proceeding leading to the judgment of conviction; (2) The evidence is still in existence and in such a condition that DNA analysis may be conducted; (3) The evidence was never previously subjected to DNA analysis, or was not subjected to the analysis that is now requested which could resolve an issue not resolved by previous analysis; and (4) The application for analysis is made for the purpose of demonstrating innocence and not to unreasonably delay the execution of sentence or administration of justice. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-305 (emphasis added). Under either the mandatory or discretionary provision, all four elements must be met before DNA analysis will be ordered by the court. See Alley v. State, No. 2004-01204-CCA-R3-PD, 2004 WL 1196095, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. May 26, 2004) ( Alley I ); Buford v. State, No. M2002-02180-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 1937110, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. Apr. 24, 2003). Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-310 provides that, when DNA testing is warranted, a court shall select a laboratory that meets the standards adopted pursuant to the DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14131 et seq., a federal statutory provision that, among other things, provides for the development and issuance of standards for testing the proficiency of forensic laboratories, and forensic analysts, in conducting analyses of DNA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14131(a)(1)(C) (West 2005). [18] The Act also allows a post-conviction court, in its discretion, [to] make such other orders as may be appropriate. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-311. The pertinent provision for purposes of this appeal, however, is section 40-30-302, which defines DNA analysis as the process through which deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in a human biological specimen is analyzed and compared with DNA from another biological specimen for identification purposes. Our Court of Criminal Appeals has held that this language limits [the statute's] reach to permit only the performance of a DNA analysis which compares the petitioner's DNA samples to DNA samples taken from biological specimens gathered at the time of the offense if all four statutory criteria are met. Crawford v. State, E2002-02334-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 21782328, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. Aug. 4, 2003); see also Alley II, 2006 WL 1703820, at  (The statute does not authorize the trial court to order the victim to submit new DNA samples years after the offense, nor does the statute open the door to any other comparisons the petitioner may envision.). We must determine whether this interpretation is in accordance with the legislature's intent and purpose. The petitioner argues that the interpretation in Crawford, which forecloses any demonstration of the guilt of a third-party offender through a database hit, conflicts with the plain text and legislative history of the Act. He asserts that the purposes of the Act are not only to identify the wrongly accused, but also to find the actual perpetrators of crimes, and that the most effectiveif not the onlyway to conclusively prove another person's guilt through DNA evidence is to afford the prisoner a limited procedural right to access a DNA database. Unlike the Court of Criminal Appeals, we do not read section 40-30-302 to so clearly limi[t] [the] reach of the Act. Crawford, 2003 WL 21782328, at . The key terms, which mandate a comparison between the DNA contained in a human biological specimen with another biological specimen, are general in nature. The only limitation relating to the evidence sought for testing is that it must be in the possession or control of the prosecution, law enforcement, laboratory, or court and must be related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the judgment of conviction and that may contain biological evidence. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-303. There is nothing in these provisions limiting the DNA analysis to the extent set out in Crawford, particularly when they are read in conjunction with the General Assembly's broad grant of discretionary authority to make such other orders as may be appropriate. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-311. If the comparison between a DNA profile developed from crime scene evidence and a petitioner's DNA profile does not return a match, and uploading the crime scene DNA profile into a database has the potential to establish a petitioner's innocence and identify the true perpetrator of the crime, then the trial court may issue an order providing for such a comparison. This would not run afoul of section 40-30-302. DNA databases contain DNA profiles developed from biological specimen[s] taken from both crime scenes and criminal defendants. When a DNA profile is entered into a database, a comparison occurs between the DNA profile derived from that biological specimen and those profiles already in the database, albeit at a rapid pace. The broad language employed by the General Assembly authorizes a comparison between the DNA profile developed from crime scene evidence that does not match the petitioner's profile, which is DNA in a human biological specimen, with DNA from another biological specimen. Our interpretation is that this includes a comparison with other profiles contained in the database.
Although we determine that the Act contemplates the type of DNA analysis sought by the petitioner, [w]here, as here, the parties derive different interpretations from the statutory language, an ambiguity exists, Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926, [19] and it is proper to look beyond the text to determine the statute's meaning. State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn.2008). When the statutory language is ambiguous, the legislative history often offers guidance in discerning the General Assembly's purpose and intent. See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 836 (Tenn.2008). House Bill 770 was introduced in the House Judiciary Committee on April 18, 2001. During the committee hearing, the bill's sponsor, Representative Briley, asked that attorney Ken Irvine, who at the time served as the president of the Tennessee Innocence Project, be allowed to testify. [20] Irvine described what the bill was designed to do and pointed to the increased prominence of DNA exonerations: [21] I think it's . . . important . . . to the person [who] is serving the time [who has] been innocent all along . . . but it's also important to all the citizens of our state because . . . someone's in [prison who] hasn't committed the crime [and] the person that committed it may still be out there . . . we need that person off the streets, we need the right person in prison, not the wrong one, so it's important to all of us. Hearing on H.B. 770 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 2001 Leg., 102d Sess. (Tenn. 2001) (statement of Ken Irvine, President, Tennessee Innocence Project). The bill passed out of the Judiciary Committee and was referred to the House Finance Budget Subcommittee. On May 15, 2001, Senate Bill 796 was introduced in the Senate Judiciary Committee. Senator Cohen, [22] the bill's sponsor, provided the committee members with two news articles profiling criminal defendants who had recently been declared innocent as a result of exculpatory DNA evidence. He observed that, in those cases, the true perpetrators of the crimes had been free for all these years because DNA testing had not been previously performed to show that they had the wrong person. Hearing on S.B. 796 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2001 Leg., 102d Sess. (Tenn.2001) (statement of Sen. Steve Cohen). Senator Cohen went on to state that imprisoning an innocent person was the worst thing the State could ever do, not only because it resulted in the wrongful deprivation of a person's liberty, but also because it would result in letting a criminal out there prey on others. Id. He expressed his belief that this is one of the most important bills . . . we can [pass] in this General Assembly because you're talking about freedom, you're talking about apprehending the right person, and not incarcerating somebody wrongly. Id. The bill was passed unanimously out of the Judiciary Committee. On May 31, 2001, the Senate bill was heard in the Senate Finance, Ways and Means Committee. While this committee's focus was upon the potential costs of DNA analysis and how the measure would be funded, Senator Cohen made the following statement in support of the legislation: If it frees people [who] are unlawfully and improperly jailed, it's the best thing we can do, because these people are having their liberty taken from them unlawfully and unjustly, and then we can also go out and find the right person because there's a guilty person out in society, so it's a law-enforcement measure as well as a liberty and justice measure. . . . that will help both the victims, and the innocent, and justice in general. Hearing on S.B. 796 Before the S. Fin., Ways & Means Comm., 2001 Leg., 102d Sess. (Tenn.2001) (statement of Sen. Steve Cohen). When the bill first went before the full Senate for a vote, Senator Cohen again emphasized that the bill not only allowed those who are wrongfully convicted to prove their innocence, but also would also help identify the real perpetrator of the crime, which was particularly important where recidivist crimes, such as rape and sexual offenses, were involved, as the true perpetrator would likely commit additional crimes if not apprehended. See S. Sess. June 7, 2001 (statement of Sen. Steve Cohen). [23] This legislative history indicates that the bill's sponsors viewed the Act as serving two purposes: first, to aid in the exoneration of those who are wrongfully convicted and second, to aid in identifying the true perpetrators of the crimes. DNA analysis that only compares a petitioner's profile with a profile developed from biological material found at a crime scene cannot effectuate this second purpose. When, however, uploading the latter into a DNA database can potentially identify the person responsible for the crime, the Act also serves a law-enforcement, or justice-finding, purpose: the apprehension of criminals who may still be at large.
We must also construe the Act in light of two other statutes dealing with the subject of DNA evidence, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 38-6-113 (2010) and 40-35-321 (2010). See Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926 (Statutes `in pari materia'those relating to the same subject or having a common purposeare to be construed together.). Section 38-6-113 establishes the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation's DNA database, while section 40-35-321(b) mandates that persons convicted of certain enumerated offenses must provide a biological specimen for the purpose of DNA analysis and that the specimen shall be forwarded by the approved agency or entity collecting the specimen to the Tennessee bureau of investigation, which shall maintain it as provided in § 38-6-113. See also Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-321(c)(e). Sections 38-6-113 and 40-35-321, which were passed in 1991, see Act of May 29, 1991, ch. 480, §§ 1-2, 1991 Tenn. Pub. Acts 815, 815-16, define DNA analysis in the exact same manner as the Act. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 38-6-113(a) (defining DNA analysis as the process through which deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in a human biological specimen is analyzed and compared with DNA from another biological specimen for identification purposes); Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-321(a) (same). A court interpreting a statute must presume that a legislative body was aware of its prior enactments and knew the state of the law at the time it passed the legislation. Leggett v. Duke Energy Corp., 308 S.W.3d 843, 852 (Tenn.2010). Because the Act was passed in 2001, we must presume that the Legislature's use of the same definition for DNA analysis as that contained in the statutes creating Tennessee's DNA database means that DNA analysis under the Act contemplates the use of a DNA database. In State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 615-18, 622 (Tenn.2006), this Court analyzed the purpose of these statutory provisions in the context of determining whether extracting blood from a felon for DNA analysis pursuant to section 40-35-321 violated the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. While holding that the collection and analysis of the defendant's blood was a reasonable search under both the federal and state constitutions, this Court addressed the competing interests involved, including the importance of the governmental interest sought to be furthered by the statutes, and made particular note of the government's obvious interest in correctly identifying those who have broken its laws, observing that `[t]he individuality of . . . DNA provides a dramatic new tool for the law enforcement effort to match suspects and criminal conduct.' Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d at 620-21 (quoting Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992)). Additionally, this Court recognized the government's interest in increasing the accuracy of criminal investigations and prosecutions and noted that DNA databases would help to solve future crimes, but `[e]qually important, the DNA samples will help to exculpate individuals who are serving sentences of imprisonment for crimes they did not commit.' Id. at 621 (quoting United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir.2005)). Based upon these factors, the opinion in Scarborough concluded that, by enacting the statutes mandating the collection and storage of DNA evidence, our legislature has put into place a method of more accurately identifying those who commit and are convicted of felonies, thereby enabling law enforcement personnel to more quickly and accurately exonerate the innocent and prosecute the perpetrators. Id. The purposes of sections 38-6-113 and 40-35-321 are twofold. Their primary purpose is the identification of those who commit crimes. Their secondary purpose, however, is to exonerate those who have not committed crimes. Construing the Act to allow a petitioner to access a DNA database in order to analyze a DNA profile developed from biological material found at a crime scene that does not match his or her own profile clearly effectuates both these purposesa positive hit would not only cast considerable doubt on a petitioner's guilt of the crime for which he or she was convicted, but also could potentially identify the true perpetrator and subsequently prove a petitioner's innocence. [24] In Banks, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a constitutional challenge to the federal statute requiring certain offenders to submit a DNA sample for inclusion in the national DNA database. 490 F.3d at 1180. As in Scarborough, the Banks court, while addressing the reasonableness of the search, noted the government's interest in collecting offenders' DNA profiles so that it could solve crimes, observing that a DNA database . . . help[s] exonerate innocent defendants and convicts. While a criminal defendant may submit his or her own DNA sample for comparison with the sample discovered at a crime scene, a negative result would not necessarily exculpate the defendant. If other evidence ties the defendant to a crime, even though the defendant is innocent, the government would be free to argue that two perpetrators committed the crime. The government could easily explain the evidence: the DNA came from the defendant's accomplice and the other evidence points to the defendant's participation. Because the negative DNA test does not eliminate this possibility, and because the other evidence will tie the defendant to the crime, a jury might convict the defendant despite his actual innocence and a negative DNA-test result. With a comprehensive database like CODIS, however, the DNA discovered from the crime scene might match with a previously unsuspected individual, whom the innocent defendant might be able to show acted alone. The defendant will at least have a better opportunity to create reasonable doubt about whether the government indicted the guilty person. Id. at 1188-89. The Banks decision lends credence to an interpretation of the Act, as well as sections 38-6-113 and 40-35-321, such that they serve to effectuate the dual purposes of exonerating those who have been wrongfully convicted and identifying the real perpetrators of the crimes. Based upon the foregoing authority, we hold that the General Assembly intended to allow petitioners proceeding under the Act to access a DNA database if a positive match between the crime scene DNA profile and a profile contained within the database would create a reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if the exculpatory results had been previously available or that DNA analysis would have rendered the petitioner's verdict or sentence more favorable. Because we have concluded that the Act contemplates the use of DNA databases to establish third-party guilt based upon non-constitutional grounds, it is unnecessary to address the petitioner's challenge on constitutional due process grounds. See Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926 ([U]nder Tennessee law, courts do not decide constitutional questions unless resolution is absolutely necessary for determination of the case and the rights of the parties. If issues in a case can be resolved on non-constitutional grounds, courts should avoid deciding constitutional issues. (citations omitted)).