Opinion ID: 2176366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: cited violation: absence of a fire door

Text: A fire door in the boiler room is required by both UFC § 10.402(a) and Appendix I-A § 7. As to whether the absence of a fire door in the boiler room constituted negligence per se, we consider the facts of this case in light of the established two-part test: are the property owners within the class of persons the requirement is designed to protect and is the underlying purpose of the UFC to prevent the type of damages the property owners suffered here? Pacific Indemnity Co., 260 N.W.2d at 558-59. The answer is clearly yes. The fire code was plainly intended to protect against damage to property in and around the source of the fire. See UFC § 1.102; Minn.R. 7510.0200 (1983). Furthermore, there is nothing in the code to suggest that a breach of the provisions is limited to only prima facie evidence of negligence. The UFC establishes the applicable standard of care in this case, therefore a violation of the fire door requirement is negligence per se. See Pacific Indemnity, 260 N.W.2d at 559; Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Balaton, 320 N.W.2d 892 (Minn.1982). [7] But does UFC § 1.103(b), the grandfather clause, exempt Roberts from liability for this violation and thus negate the application of the negligence per se doctrine? We conclude it does not. Under any possible interpretation of the grandfather clause, a nonconforming condition which is specifically cited by a fire official and is not brought into compliance cannot be excused. After Chief Hannon's order to install a fire door in the boiler room, pursuant to UFC § 10.402(a), the absence of the fire door was clearly an unexcused violation of the UFC and therefore constituted negligence per se. As a result, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that Roberts' fire door violation of the UFC was negligence per se. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 885 (Minn.1986); Raymond, 282 Minn. at 113, 163 N.W.2d at 54. We affirm the court of appeals' decision on this issue.