Opinion ID: 3175087
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Forensic Interviewer

Text: [¶96] Mr. Griggs asserts that the forensic interviewer should not have been allowed to recount CM’s and JM’s statements about the abuse.8 Defense counsel repeatedly objected to the testimony, claiming it was hearsay, cumulative and amounted to vouching for the victims. The State asserts the statements were admissible as prior consistent statements because the children testified at trial and were subject to cross examination, and the defense alleged the children had fabricated the reports or were improperly influenced. The district court allowed the forensic interviewer to testify about the children’s prior consistent statements. [¶97] Under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), some prior consistent statements are not hearsay: (d) Statements which are not hearsay. – A statement is not hearsay if: (1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and, if offered in a criminal proceeding, was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent 8 The forensic interviewer did not interview SM. The State acknowledged at trial that SM’s prior consistent statements would not be admissible because she did not give any substantive testimony at trial. Consequently, it did not call SM’s forensic interviewer to testify at trial. 30 fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him[.] [¶98] There are four requirements for admission of a prior consistent statement under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B): (1) that the declarant testify at trial; (2) that the declarant be subject to cross-examination concerning the prior statement; (3) that the prior statement be consistent with the declarant’s trial testimony; and (4) that the prior statement be offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 17, 43 P.3d 80, 88 (Wyo. 2002). [¶99] The first element of the test is clearly satisfied as JM and CM testified at trial. With regard to the second element, both children were subject to cross examination at trial about the incident and their reports. During cross examination, defense counsel asked JM about “people you talked to about that experience.” JM said he had talked to a counselor but could not remember which one. Defense counsel also briefly questioned CM about reporting the incident. While the cross examination of the children was not extensive and did not yield much about their prior statements, the second element of the test is satisfied. See Tombroek v. State, 2009 WY 126, ¶ 9, 217 P.3d 806, 810 (Wyo. 2009); Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 27, 157 P.3d 923, 927 (Wyo. 2007) (second element of the test was satisfied because the declarant was subject to cross examination about the incident). [¶100] Under the third element of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the statements must be “consistent” with the declarant’s trial testimony. Lancaster, ¶ 17, 43 P.3d at 88-89; Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 374 (Wyo. 1995). A prior consistent statement cannot be used as a means of proving “new points not covered in the testimony” of the declarant. Curl, 898 P.2d at 374 (citation omitted). “[M]aterial information presented for the first time to support a prior ‘consistent statement’ has no antecedent with which to be consistent or inconsistent and is, therefore, inadmissible.” Id. See also Lancaster, ¶ 17, 43 P.3d at 89. However, the prior consistent statement does not have to be identical to the declarant’s trial testimony to be admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Lancaster, ¶ 17, 43 P.3d at 88; Curl, 898 P.2d at 374. Instead, the rule allows admission of a statement that is generally consistent with the trial testimony. Id. [¶101] JM testified that he saw Mr. Griggs touch his “sissies” private spots with his private spot. JM refused to demonstrate where the “private spot” was on his own body or 31 on a drawing of a person, although he did agree to tell the prosecutor when her hand was in front of that part of the body on herself. During that exercise, the prosecutor started with her hand at her feet and moved up her body. JM stopped her when her hand was in front of the pelvic area. [¶102] The forensic interviewer testified as follows regarding JM’s statements to her: Q. What did [JM] tell you Bryon had done to his sisters? A. He disclosed that Byron had put his privates on his sisters’, both of his sister’s . . . crotches. She also testified that JM demonstrated Mr. Griggs moving his privates in and out of his sisters by forming a circle with the fingers of one hand and moving the index finger of his other hand in and out of the circle. Although the forensic interviewer’s recitation of JM’s statement to her was not identical with his trial testimony, it was clearly consistent. [¶103] CM stated at trial that Mr. Griggs stuck “his pee-pee in my butt,” and “licked my bad area” with his tongue. CM also testified that Mr. Griggs’ abused her sister (SM) in the same way. At trial, the forensic interviewer testified that CM told her Mr. Griggs put his “pee-pee in her butt” and “licked her crotch.” She said that CM told her that he had done the same things to her sister. The interviewer also stated that CM demonstrated how Mr. Griggs had thrust his pelvis and licked during the abusive episodes. Like with JM, the forensic interviewer’s testimony about the statements made by CM was consistent with CM’s trial testimony even though it was not identical. [¶104] The fourth element of the test is the prior statement must be offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. With regard to the temporal requirement of a “recent” fabrication or improper influence in the fourth factor, we have said: A prior consistent statement may be used as substantive evidence if the alleged improper influence arose after the statement was made. Montoya, 822 P.2d at 367 (citing Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 71 (Wyo.1989)). However, if the prior consistent statement was made after the improper influence arose, then the statement may only be used for rehabilitative purposes. Id. When a prior consistent statement is admissible only for rehabilitative purposes, a limiting instruction must be given, but only if requested. Id. Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 751 (Wyo. 1993). 32 [¶105] Our approach is intentionally different from the federal courts’ application of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) which limits admission of consistent statements to those that were made prior to the alleged fabrication or improper influence or motive. Consequently, Wyoming courts allow a broader use of prior consistent statements than the federal courts do. See Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶¶ 14-17, 76 P.3d 805, 811-12 (Wyo. 2003); Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1024 (Wyo. 1999). Compare, Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 115 S. Ct. 696, 130 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1995) (reiterating common law rule that only consistent statements made before the alleged improper influence or motive to fabricate arose are admissible under FRE 801(d)(1)(B)). [¶106] Mr. Grigg’s general defense was that the children fabricated their stories as a result of improper influence by their biological mother (RM) and/or being exposed to inappropriate information such as pornography. He claimed the fabricated stories were perpetuated by various adults who employed improper interview techniques during the investigation. At trial, the prosecutor asserted the forensic interviewer’s testimony was admissible under the prior consistent statement rule because “[t]here’s definitely been assertions that the children were told what to say by [RM]. That was asked, I believe, both of [JM] and [CM] yesterday, and there [were] even indications that there – there were suggestions that there had been improper motives behind whether they had been told to say certain things.” 9 The district court noted that the defense had attacked the children’s credibility in its opening statement. The district court stated that, under those circumstances, the forensic interviewer could testify about CM’s and JM’s consistent statements. [¶107] The timing of the alleged improper influence in this case is difficult to discern. The prosecutor asserted that the defense had suggested RM told the children what to say both before and after the forensic interviews. The difficulty in specifically identifying the nature and time of the improper influence is part of the reason we have declined to follow federal precedent on the temporal requirement of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). See Lancaster, ¶ 16, 43 P.3d at 88, citing Makinen v. State, 737 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 1987) (stating “[i]n departing from federal precedent, this Court emphasized the inherent difficulty in determining when an improper motive may have arisen, and chose to leave such matters to the trier of fact”). Given Mr. Griggs’ general defense was the children were unreliable witnesses, had fabricated the accusations and were improperly influenced by RM and other adults who participated in the investigation, the fourth element of Wyoming’s Rule 801(d)(1)(B) test was satisfied. Mr. Griggs did not request an instruction limiting the 9 On appeal, Mr. Griggs claims the prosecutor indicated that she was not presenting the forensic interviewer’s testimony as a prior consistent statement. This assertion is a misstatement of the colloquy. The prosecutor was clearly relying on Rule 801(d)(1)(B). 33 purpose of the evidence to rehabilitation of the victims; thus, the district court did not err by failing to give one. Frenzel, 849 P.2d at 751. [¶108] Mr. Griggs’ argument that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the forensic interviewer to testify about the children’s statements also touches on another aspect of our law on prior consistent statements. He claims his case is like Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, 74 P.3d 699 (Wyo. 2003), where we ruled that the district court had misapplied the prior consistent statement rule. In that case, the victim testified first at trial. Thereafter, the victim’s mother, a law enforcement officer, the victim’s pediatrician, an emergency room nurse, and a forensic examiner were called as witnesses and they repeated all, or parts of, the victim’s allegations. We concluded the district court’s admission of the testimony was an abuse of discretion, reasoning: Wilde contends that AM fabricated at least part of her story, and that she told the same fabricated story to her mother, sister, police officer, physician, nurse, and “forensic interviewer.” Each of those witnesses then repeated AM’s “consistent” story without much variation. Thus, the circumstances presented here are more in the nature of several, more-or-less contemporaneous repetitions of a single statement, rather than prior consistent statements . . . . Id., ¶ 12, 74 P.3d at 707. [¶109] Although the Wilde opinion discussed the timing of the statements, our primary concern was that the State’s purpose in presenting numerous witnesses to repeat the victim’s statement was to bolster the victim’s testimony by “piling on” consistent statements. Id., ¶ 14, 74 P.3d at 707-08, quoting 4 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, § 405 (2nd ed. 1994 and Supp. 2002). This Court addressed a similar issue in Seward where the district court permitted a forensic interviewer to testify about the victim’s statements. We noted that prior consistent statements may be admissible to provide the jury with the entire picture so it can determine if there is any real inconsistency in the victim’s accounts. However, [p]rior consistent statements are governed by the general principles of relevancy found in W.R.E. 401, 402, and 403, and are not admissible without limitation. Further, repetitious testimony of prior consistent statements offered for rehabilitative purposes is not always admissible: 34 If the corrupting influence did in fact precede the statements, probative value is greatly diminished. “    Evidence which merely shows that the witness said the same thing on other occasions when his motive was the same does not have much probative force ‘for the reason that repetition does not imply veracity.’ ” Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 72 (Wyo.1989) (quoting 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence, ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01] at 803-150 to -151 (1987)). Seward, ¶¶ 14-17, 76 P.3d at 811-12 (footnote omitted). [¶110] We explained the procedure which should be followed by the district court in such cases: [W]here there is a proper objection, the trial court should consider whether having numerous authority figures trained to recognize sexual abuse appear at trial is actually a trial strategy of preparing a multitude of self-serving, biased, inflammatory, video, audio, and written statements for trial; having the witness testify; and then introducing into evidence these consistent statements made prior to testifying. See Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 882 (Wyo.1987) (Cardine, J. and Urbigkit, J., specially concurring). Such a trial strategy could render the statements irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, particularly if the consequence of repeating the same testimony several times unduly emphasizes that testimony over all other testimony in the case. Seward, ¶ 16, 76 P.3d 811-12. [¶111] We provided additional explanation of the issues which may arise with prior consistent statements and distinguished Seward and Wilde in Tombroek, ¶¶ 14-15, 217 P.3d at 811-12: Our concern in Seward was not so much the repetitious nature of the testimony, as it was the State using W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) as a tool for impermissible trial tactics by having a victim repeat accusations to authority figures for the 35 direct purpose of using those statements later at trial as prior consistent statements. Id. . . . We did . . . acknowledge that W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) is susceptible to abuse and we take this opportunity to repeat that concern. Id. at ¶ 16 n. 6, at 812 n. 6. In fact, we even cautioned district courts regarding admitting this type of testimony without first considering why the interviews occurred and the probative value of admitting such evidence. Id. at ¶ 17, at 812. However, the concerns that we discussed in Seward do not exist here. The victim made her statements to the witnesses in a manner that would be expected from a victim in the early stages of a typical sexual assault investigation, rather than in a manner resembling trial preparation tactics, as was our concern in Seward. Accordingly, the prior consistent statements were properly admitted. The appellant also relies upon Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶¶ 11–14, 74 P.3d 699, 706–08 (Wyo.2003), wherein we reversed a conviction under somewhat similar circumstances. A reading of that entire opinion reveals, however, that the focus of our concern was, as in Seward, the vouching nature of the questioned testimony, and its resultant prejudice. Furthermore, the nature of discretionary review emphasizes “the question of the reasonableness of the trial court’s choice.” Id. at ¶ 13, at 707. [¶112] Unlike in Wilde and Seward, Mr. Griggs has not demonstrated that the State procured the forensic interviews for the purpose of presenting them at trial to bolster the children’s statements. Instead, as in Tombroek, the children made their statements to the forensic interviewer shortly after the initial report in a manner that would be expected in the early stages of a typical investigation. In fact, the interviewer in this case was part of the DFS team that initially went to the biological mother’s home after receiving a call from the school about the children’s lice infestation and concerns about a dirty home. She testified about the conditions in the house and the children’s chronic lice infestation and stated that DFS took the children into protective custody because of the problems. The forensic interviewer also testified about medical concerns with the children, which led to appointments with health care providers. Clearly, the forensic interviewer’s participation in the case was not for the direct purpose of bolstering the children’s testimony. Furthermore, the State did not show the jury videotape of the interviews, which lessened the prejudicial impact of the evidence. Compare Seward, supra. 36 [¶113] The district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the forensic interviewer to testify concerning JM’s or CM’s consistent statements. The testimony was properly admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(B).