Opinion ID: 1608537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Ground for Terminating C.R.B.'s and R.D.L.'s Rights

Text: In the present case, only the State has discussed in any detail whether it met its burden of proving one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. See La. Child. Code arts. 1015 and 1035. Presumably, this is because no party or court has disputed that the children will not be returned to either of their parents' permanent custody. We agree with the State that it sustained its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the ground for termination found under La. Child.Code art. 1015(5), which provides: Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed since a child was removed from the parent's custody pursuant to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent's condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child's age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home. Both the children in this case have been continuously in foster care since the fall of 1998. Neither parent substantially complied with his or her respective case plan. R.D.L. did not maintain the required contact with OCS and stopped all visitation with the children after six months. Additionally, R.D.L. stipulated that he would never be able to take care of the children due to his heart condition. C.R.B. missed meetings, including mental health appointments, did not take her medication as required, continued to maintain contact with a known child molester, and never fully acknowledged the reasons her children were taken into State custody. The trial court found that there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in C.R.B.'s mental condition or conduct in the near future, which finding is clearly supported by the expert testimony of Dr. Buxton and Dr. Bergeron. [3] Dr. Buxton, an expert in clinical psychology, testified that C.R.B.'s inability to act as a primary care-giver was due to a combination of factorsher mental disability, her cognitive limitations, her lack of education, and her dependent personality. He testified that, while there was no question that she loved her children, she was unable to provide a stable home for them and that the children would be at risk for neglect and abuse if returned to her care. Dr. Bergeron, an expert in family clinical pychology, similarly testified that C.R.B. was unable to function as a primary care-giver to the children because of her mild mental retardation and her bi-polar disorder. Both experts agreed that C.R.B. might be able to give some kind of limited secondary care to the children and that C.R.B.'s inability to act as a primary care-giver was through no fault of her own. Thus, the State satisfied its burden of proving at least one ground for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence, as there was no dispute that either parent would regain custody or be able to provide a stable home for the children. However, as discussed above, in order to terminate parental rights, the trial court is not only required to determine whether the State has proved a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, but also to decide whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. See La. Child. Code art. 1037(A); State in the Interest of C.J.K. and K.K., supra ; State in Interest of ML & PL, supra .