Opinion ID: 2454056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is the attenuation doctrine compatible with article I, section 7?

Text: ¶ 30 The dissent contends that the attenuation doctrine is incompatible with article I, section 7 for a number of reasons. It says that the attenuation doctrine fails to infuse the fruits of an illegal seizure with the authority of law. Dissent at 189. This argument overlooks the fact that, as we have just noted, Eserjose's confession was obtained with the requisite authority of law, the deputies having the legal authority based on probable cause developed independently of the illegal arrest to keep Eserjose in custody and to question him about the burglary. Under Harris, our analysis would end there; but to satisfy article I, section 7, it is necessary to determine whether the confession, though the direct product of lawful custodial interrogation, was the indirect product of the prior arrest, which lacked the authority of law. As we said in Gaines, the exclusionary rule applies equally to evidence seized during an illegal search [or seizure], and evidence derived from an illegal search [or seizure] under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Gaines, 154 Wash.2d at 716, 717, 116 P.3d 993 (emphasis added). The dissent maintains that Eserjose's confession was the fruit[ ] of an illegal seizure, dissent at 189; but a suspect's confession is not the fruit of an illegal arrest simply because the suspect would not have been in custody but for that arrest. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not operate on a but for basis. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. 407. As we explained in Vangen, the illegal seizure must `have been an operative factor in causing or bringing about the confession.' Vangen, 72 Wash.2d at 555, 433 P.2d 691 (quoting Traub, 151 Conn. at 250, 196 A.2d 755). [13] The record shows that it was not in this case. ¶ 31 The dissent also says that we are duty bound to reject the attenuation doctrine in order to preserve the heightened protections of article I, section 7. Dissent at 188. [14] It compares the attenuation doctrine to the inevitable discovery doctrine and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, which we have rejected under article I, section 7. See Winterstein, 167 Wash.2d at 631, 220 P.3d 1226; Afana, 169 Wash.2d at 184, 233 P.3d 879. Those doctrines, however, are fundamentally different from the attenuation doctrine. The inevitable discovery doctrine allows the admission of evidence that was seized illegally if it would have been seized legally eventually. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule permits evidence that was seized illegally to be admitted if the seizure was objectively reasonable at the time. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In both contexts, the evidence is obtained without authority of law, in violation of article I, section 7 and, consequently, we have not approved of the doctrines under our state constitution. In contrast, the attenuation doctrine admits evidence that is obtained with the authority of law, provided that the evidence was not `come at by the exploitation' of a prior illegal act. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. 407 (quoting Maquire, supra, at 221). Two of the attenuation factors are the passage of time and the presence of intervening circumstances. If evidence is obtained without authority of law, i.e., while the violation is ongoing, no time will have passed and no circumstances will have intervened, in which case the evidence will not be attenuated. Thus, the attenuation doctrine applies only to evidence obtained legally. Unlike the inevitable discovery doctrine and good faith exception, the attenuation doctrine complies with article I, section 7's authority of law requirement. ¶ 32 The dissent claims, finally, that the attenuation doctrine, like the inevitable discovery exception, is too speculative to pass constitutional muster. Dissent at 189. But unlike inevitable discovery, the attenuation doctrine focuses on events as they actually happened in order to determine whether police misconduct produced the evidence in question. There is nothing troublesome about this sort of causal analysis. The independent source exception, which this court has repeatedly upheld under article I, section 7, is, if anything, more speculative. Under that exception, evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant is admissible, even though the warrant recites information tainted by an unconstitutional search, provided the warrant contains enough untainted information to establish probable cause. See Gaines, 154 Wash.2d at 719, 116 P.3d 993. Before a court can pronounce the warrant lawful, however, it must find that police would have sought the warrant anyway, even without knowing the information revealed by the unconstitutional search. Id. at 721, 116 P.3d 993 (citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)). ¶ 33 The dissent accuses us of abandoning the rule that `whenever the right of privacy is violated, the remedy [of exclusion] follows automatically.' Dissent at 187 (quoting Afana, 169 Wash.2d at 180, 233 P.3d 879). The rule assumes, however, that the violation produced the evidence the defendant seeks to exclude. If, after applying the attenuation factors, it appears that the evidence is not the product of the violation, it should not be suppressed. Properly understood, the attenuation doctrine is perfectly consistent with our rule. [15] While we share the dissent's concern for the warrant requirement, our decision in no way removes the incentive for police officers to secure a warrant before invading a citizen's home. Dissent at 186. The attenuation doctrine considers the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254. If the record shows that police disregarded the warrant requirement for the purpose of securing a confession, the confession will be suppressed. Similarly, if the record shows that an illegal arrest induced the confession, the confession will be excluded. The dissent would replace the categorical rule adopted in Harris with an equally categorical rule and exclude a suspect's confession solely on the basis that the suspect would not have been in custody but for an illegal arrest. Such a rule would be unprecedented. Even the states that have rejected Harris have done so in favor of attenuation. See, e.g., Mariano, 114 Hawai`i at 281-82, 160 P.3d 1258. No jurisdiction has applied the exclusionary rule on a but for basis. Such an approach is not only inappropriate; it far exceeds anything article I, section 7 requires.