Opinion ID: 2154803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plans Submitted by the Parties

Text: We have reviewed each submitted plan against the neutral constitutional principles set forth above.
The petitioners assert their plan is a least change approach, in which they endeavored to maintain constituency consistency to the greatest extent practicable. They aver that the overall range of deviation from the ideal senate district population in their plan is 4%. The petitioners' plan is flawed because it does not rest entirely upon the federal census data, as required by law. Our State Constitution establishes only one yardstick as a legislative guide in making an apportionment. That yardstick is the last general census of the inhabitants of the state taken by authority of the United States or of this state. McGovern v. Secretary of State, 138 N.H. 128, 131, 635 A.2d 498 (1993) (quotation omitted). While data from the federal census (referred to as PL 94-171 census data) reflects ward populations based upon the ward lines in effect as of April 1, 2000, some of the data used by the petitioners reflect ward populations based upon the ward lines changed after April 1, 2000. Some of the ward populations used by the petitioners are not the same as the ward populations contained in the PL 94-171 census data. For example, the petitioners use an adjusted population of 9,088 for Manchester ward 6, while the population for Manchester ward 6 is 10,678 in the PL 94-171 census data. Thus, there are some discrepancies between the petitioners' ward populations and the PL 94-171 census data ward populations. The petitioners used the PL 94-171 census data for all city wards except those in the cities of Claremont, Rochester, Manchester, Keene, Nashua and Dover. When the PL 94-171 data is substituted for those cities, the overall range of population deviation is actually 7.92%. In addition, the petitioners' plan changes the senate districts for 32.89% of the State's population (406,493 citizens) and district 7 is no longer comprised of contiguous territory. The senate president argues that the petitioners' plan artificially divides the cities of Concord, Laconia and Dover for partisan political advantage. The senate president also argues that some of the districts in the petitioners' plan are oddly shaped and are not comprised of contiguous territory for the sole purpose of protecting Democrat incumbents and targeting Republican incumbents. For instance, one district contains both a ward of the city of Manchester and a ward of the city of Nashua, even though these wards do not touch by land, but instead border a common waterway. Even if the senate president's criticisms are accurate, we note that while these types of political considerations may be permissible in legislatively-implemented redistricting plans, they have no place in a court-ordered remedial plan. See Wilson, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 379, 823 P.2d at 576-77; see also Wyche v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 769 F.2d 265, 268 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam).
The senate president has proposed two alternative plans for the court's consideration. The first plan is a compromise plan, which the senate president asserts is the next closest plan to the legislature's intent. According to the senate president, the compromise plan represents the results of weeks of negotiation between the senate Republicans and Democrats. It is said to combine elements of SB 1, the plan supported by the Republicans, and of the plan supported by the Democrats and submitted by the petitioners, and is alleged to have an overall range of population deviation of 9.83%. The second plan is a deviation plan, which the senate president asserts has an overall range of deviation of less than 4% from the ideal district population. Both plans are flawed for the same reasons as are the petitioners' plans. Like the petitioners, the senate president did not rely solely upon federal census data, but instead relied upon ward population data that differed from the data reported in the federal census. The senate president's compromise plan used the PL 94-171 census data base for all city wards except for those in Manchester and Nashua. When the PL 94-171 data is substituted for those cities, the overall range of population deviation is actually 9.2%, and the plan changes the senate districts for 24.10% of the State's population (297,846 citizens). The senate president's deviation plan used the PL 94-171 census data base for all city wards except those in Manchester, Nashua and Concord. When the PL 94-171 data is substituted for those cities, the overall range of population deviation is actually 5.4%, and the plan changes the senate districts for 34.74% of the State's population (429,310 citizens). As with the petitioners' plan, the plans submitted by the senate president embody political considerations. Although the senate president claims the compromise plan is a product of weeks of negotiation between senate Republicans and Democrats, it was not adopted. The deviation plan is similarly laden with political considerations. Although SB 1 was modified to achieve a lower overall range of deviation, the plan is in many respects similar to the plan supported by senate Republicans and rejected by senate Democrats.
The senate has submitted the plan contained in SB 1, with some minor modifications. We do not adopt the senate's proposed plan for the same reasons that we do not adopt the other submitted plans. The senate's proposed plan does not rest entirely upon federal census data. When the PL 94-171 data is substituted, the senate plan's overall range of population deviation is actually 9.66%. Like the other submitted plans, the senate's plan changes the senate districts of a significant portion of the State's population. It changes the districts for 31.10% of the State's population (384,391 citizens). Also, like the other submitted plans, the senate's plan seeks partisan advantage. It is most similar to SB 1, the plan supported by senate Republicans and opposed by senate Democrats.
The senate and senate president argue that we must either order elections to take place pursuant to SB 1 or use it as our starting point in devising a redistricting plan of our own. We decline both options for the reasons set forth below. We do not adopt SB 1 as the court's plan because, like the other plans submitted by the parties, it fails to comply with the neutral constitutional criteria required of court-ordered remedial plans. Like the plans submitted by the parties, SB 1 does not rely exclusively upon PL 94-171 census data. SB 1 relies upon ward population data that differs from the data reported to the federal census. Additionally, like the plans submitted by the parties, SB 1 represents the culmination of very specific political and, in some cases, individual agendas. Colleton County Council v. McConnell, 201 F.Supp.2d 618, 652 (D.S.C. 2002). For these same reasons, we also decline to use SB 1 as our template, although as with the plans submitted by the parties, we examined it for evidence of State redistricting policy. Even though SB 1 was passed by the legislature, it did not become law, and, thus, while it is some evidence of State redistricting policy, it is not entitled to the judicial deference accorded fully enacted redistricting plans. See Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F.Supp. 859, 867 (W.D.Wis.1992). Only fully enacted plans have the virtue of political legitimacy. Id. For all of the above reasons, we conclude that none of the submitted plans is appropriate for adoption by the court. As explained above, each plan relies upon different data. Each plan has calculated partisan political consequences (the details of which are unknown). We have no principled way to choose [among] the plans, especially knowing that we would be endorsing an unknown but intended political consequence by the choice we make. Wilson, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 379, 823 P.2d at 576-77. Accordingly, the court has devised a redistricting plan consistent with neutral State and federal constitutional principles.