Opinion ID: 2639408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial court's failure to admonish jury pursuant to section 1122

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred reversibly in failing to admonish the jury at each adjournment, pursuant to section 1122, [9] not to converse among themselves, or with anyone else, on any subject connected with the trial, or to form or express an opinion about the case until the cause was finally submitted to them. Indeed, defendant asserts the trial court never properly admonished the jury at any point during the trial. The Attorney General, however, cites three instances during the voir dire process in which the trial court admonished the jury venire along the lines of section 1122. The Attorney General also cites several instances in which the clerk's transcript refers to the jury's having been admonished although no corresponding language can be found in the reporter's transcript. Defendant relies on the principle that, where the clerk's and reporter's transcripts conflict, the latter controls when, under the circumstances, it is the more reliable (see People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599, 189 Cal.Rptr. 862, 659 P.2d 1152; In re Moss (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 913, 928, 221 Cal.Rptr. 645), while the Attorney General contends defendant has not met his burden of developing the record by resorting to whatever methods of reconstruction might be available. We agree with defendant that nothing before us suggests a lacuna in need of reconstruction by settled statement or other means, as opposed to a simple failure to admonish, and that the trial court thus erred. We depart from defendant, however, and conclude he has failed to show prejudice, as required for reversal. ( People v. Gastelum (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 205, 207, 46 Cal.Rptr. 743.) [10] First, we observe that the trial court did, during the voir dire process, several times admonish the venire in the spirit of section 1122. Second, none of the circumstances defendant cites as demonstrating prejudice actually establish that any juror violated the statutory admonition. In particular, Juror H.'s posttrial statement that he made up his mind to vote for death after hearing a rereading of testimony, which assertedly occurred only during guilt phase deliberations, is insufficiently specific to constitute an admission of misconduct and would appear inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a) in any event. And Juror H.'s alleged statement to trial counsel suggesting that H.'s taking another juror out to dinner during penalty phase deliberations enabled the jury to reach a verdict did not establish that defendant's case impermissibly served as a topic of conversation during the alleged dinner. The failure to show prejudice likewise dooms defendant's derivative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Reversal, therefore, is not required.