Opinion ID: 178833
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Warrantless Arrest of Webster

Text: Probable cause to make a warrantless arrest exists when, considering all the circumstances, police have trustworthy information that would lead a prudent person to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. United States v. Parish, 606 F.3d 480, 486 (8th Cir.2010). In making this determination, [l]aw enforcement officers have substantial latitude in interpreting and drawing inferences from factual circumstances. United States v. Henderson, 613 F.3d 1177, 1181 (8th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, rather than an actual showing of criminal activity, the police need not have amassed enough evidence to justify a conviction prior to making a warrantless arrest. United States v. Mendoza, 421 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir.2005) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Jones, 535 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.2008). The district court held, under the circumstances, the officers had ample reason to believe Webster was involved in criminal activity when they effectuated his arrest. The court noted the officers had observed the informant make two previous controlled buys from Webster, known to the informant as Harold Smith, and they had tested and confirmed drugs were sold in those transactions. In the transaction leading to the arrest, the court recognized, Webster and the informant arranged to meet at the Family Dollar store, and the informant used the agreed-upon signal of walking toward the store to indicate the officers should make the arrest. The court held the informant was sufficiently reliable for the officers to establish probable cause because of the two previously observed and confirmed drug buys, as well as the details of the third transaction being effectuated as the informant said it would. On appeal, Webster concedes the officers had enough information to conduct an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), but he argues there was not reliable information, i.e., probable cause, to arrest him. Webster first emphasizes the informant believed he was buying drugs from Harold Smith, a different person. He also notes differences between the controlled purchases that occurred on October 6, October 20, and October 28, the date Webster was arrested. For instance, the vehicles driven by Webster varied between the three transactionsa burgundy Cadillac was used during the October 6 transaction, a black Isuzu SUV was driven during the October 20 transaction, and a red or maroon Ford truck was driven during the October 28 transaction. Webster also challenges the reliability of the informant's information, arguing Walters did not have confirmation or independent corroboration from any reliable source as to Webster having drugs in the vehicle. Moreover, Webster contends Walters did not observe any drugs being transacted, i.e., any criminal activity. Instead, Webster argues, all the officers had to indicate drugs were in the truck was the visual signal of the informant walking away from the vehicle. Finally, Webster challenges the basis for the arrest, as his attorney stated in an affidavit one of the arresting officers indicated Webster was arrested for being parked the wrong way on the street. Under these circumstances, Webster claims the officers did not have probable cause for his arrest, and he argues for the suppression of all fruits of the illegal arrest, including his statements and all evidence found thereafter. Upon careful review, we conclude the officers had probable cause to arrest Webster. First, the fact the officers may not have known Webster has been rejected by this court as a reason to invalidate probable cause. United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 760, 765 (8th Cir.2010) (Probable cause does not require certainty regarding [a defendant's] identity.) (citing United States v. Muhammad, 604 F.3d 1022, 1027-28 (8th Cir.2010)). Thus, Webster's allegations regarding Walters' inability to positively identify Webster prior to the arrest are of no effect. Second, the officers were justified in relying on the informant in their probable cause determination. See United States v. Morrison, 594 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir.2010) (holding an informant who has provided reliable information in the past may suffice to support a probable cause determination). Information from a confidential informant is reliable if the informant has a history of supplying reliable information or if the information provided by the informant is independently corroborated. United States v. Neal, 528 F.3d 1069, 1073 (8th Cir.2008). Here, the informant had a history of supplying reliable information in the past because he had successfully completed two prior controlled buys with Webster within the prior month. See id. ([T]he confidential informant ... had successfully completed one controlled buy from [the defendant].); United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1346, 1349 (8th Cir.1995) (An informant may establish the reliability of his information by establishing a track record of providing accurate information.) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). Additionally, Webster arrived at the predetermined place and time for the controlled buy, as agreed upon with the informant. See United States v. Rodriguez, 414 F.3d 837, 843 (8th Cir.2005) (concluding probable cause was established, in part, by the defendant's arrival at the right time and place as scheduled by the informant). The fact Webster's conduct in arriving at the Family Dollar store involved innocent behavior does not diminish the value of the informant's information; rather, it increases the probability the informant was also correct regarding Webster's criminal behavior. Brown, 49 F.3d at 1349 (holding the informant's prediction that the defendant would arrive at a KFC restaurant increased the probability that other aspects of the information concerning criminal activity were also correct). Under these circumstances, the information provided by the informant was sufficiently reliable to support a finding of probable cause. Finally, even though the officers may not have witnessed actual criminal activity between the informant and Webster, there was a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, which we have held is sufficient to support a probable cause determination. United States v. Jones, 535 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.2008). After two prior controlled buys, Webster arrived at the scheduled place and time for a third controlled purchase, he discussed the deal with the informant, and the informant provided the visual signal of walking toward the Family Dollar store to indicate to the officers that Webster possessed crack cocaine. These circumstances are sufficient for a finding of probable cause, and thus we reject Webster's claim that the warrantless arrest was invalid.