Opinion ID: 1113765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Senate Amendments to Engrossed Substitute House Bill 615

Text: The Senate referred the engrossed bill to the judiciary committee. Certain amendments were considered by the Senate, as reflected in the Senate Journal, 45th Legislature (1977) (Senate Journal). The most dramatic change made, however, was the motion to Strike everything after the enacting clause [of Engrossed SHB 615] and insert the following. At this juncture, a comprehensive Senate amendment comprising the Senate's death penalty scheme was attached onto the House's engrossed bill (No. 615); Senate Journal, at 1984. The House bill was dead. The Senate amendments passed in that chamber, and subsequently in the House. It was ESHB 615 as completely amended by the Senate amendments which was enacted into law and is now known as RCW 10.94.010, 10.94.020, 10.94.030, 10.94.900, 9A.32.040, 9A.32.045, 9A.32.046, and 9A.32.047. The majority grounds its determination of legislative intent on the omission of one section of HB 615 from SHB 615. To this end, the majority adopts the concurring opinion of Justice Horowitz in State v. Martin, 94 Wn.2d 1, 614 P.2d 164 (1980), to wit: [T]he legislative history of the present death penalty statute shows that the legislature expressly rejected a proposed provision that would have authorized the impaneling of a capital sentencing jury in cases in which the defendant pleads guilty. House Bill No. 615, the original version of the statute, provided that: If the trial jury has been waived, or if the defendant pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree, the death penalty proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose and such jury cannot be waived. House Bill No. 615, ง 68. In enacting the bill, the legislature eliminated this provision. (Italics mine.) Martin, supra at 19 (Horowitz, J., concurring). In other words, by omitting section 68, which was found in the prior draft of the death penalty statute, the majority reasons that the legislature must have intended to limit the applicability of the death penalty sentencing procedures to those defendants who plead not guilty. Justice Horowitz called this omission an express rejection of section 68. I cannot agree. First, if prior drafts of an act have any meaning whatsoever, they must be prior drafts of the law which was finally enacted. As has been shown, only the Senate death penalty scheme, attached to the House bill number, was before the legislature. I see no arguments by defendants or the majority here that prior drafts of the enacted law support their position that a defendant who pleads guilty is to be exempted from the statutory scheme. Second, no substantive provisions of HB 615 appear in the House or Senate Journals. For the text of both HB 615 and SHB 615, reference must be made to the State of Washington Printed Bills of the Legislature, Forty-fifth Session, House, 601-715, 1977, Regular and Extraordinary Sessions (Printed Bills). It is obvious that the Printed Bills were relied on both by Justice Horowitz in Martin, supra, and the majority in the subject case, although neither opinion mentions them. Going behind the journals is not reliable for determination of legislative intent, Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wn.2d 441, 536 P.2d 157 (1975), particularly in the case of an omission in a subsequent draft, 82 C.J.S. Statutes ง 355, at 752-53. Even if the Printed Bills are proper sources of legislative intent, the majority's position is unsupported. We may draw a number of inferences from the exclusion of section 68. They are: (1) the exclusion was inadvertent, (2) in substantially paring HB 615 from its 116 sections down to the 10 sections substituted as SHB 615, the judiciary committee felt that section 68 was superfluous in the light of RCW 10.49.010, or (3) the committee wished a defendant who pleaded guilty to escape the imposition of the death penalty, marking a radical change in the existing law. Whatever was the reason for the omission of section 68, it cannot stand as a statement of legislative intent. We know that not a single legislator ever voted for or against section 68 or any other section of HB 615. Furthermore, the House Journal fails to show that any of the legislators, when considering SHB 615, were directed to this supposedly intentional and certainly radical departure from long-established Washington law of providing for a sentencing jury after a defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder. No inquiry is reflected in either the House or Senate Journal which indicates that the legislators considered that such a change in the law was before them. I submit that no such departure was before either legislative chamber. This court has previously cautioned against over-emphasis and over-reliance upon the fact or happenstance of successive drafts as an absolute determinant, rule, or tool for interpreting a statute. Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., supra at 449. The challengers of this statute have failed to meet the burden imposed upon them by law. A statute is presumed to be constitutional. In re Harbert, 85 Wn.2d 719, 538 P.2d 1212 (1975). To overcome this presumption, the challenge must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Sator v. Department of Revenue, 89 Wn.2d 338, 572 P.2d 1094 (1977). This simply means that if there is any reason to hold a statute constitutional, the courts cannot find it unconstitutional. By harmonizing the two subject statutes, RCW 10.94.020 with RCW 10.49.010, which I believe was the legislature's intent, there is no need to hold the 1977 death penalty statutes unconstitutional. As noted above, there is more than one reasonable explanation for section 68's exclusion from SHB 615. It has not been proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the omission of section 68 was for the purpose of allowing defendants who plead guilty to escape the imposition of the death penalty procedures. The majority concludes that the legislature intended a different punishment for aggravated murder, depending on whether a defendant pleaded guilty or not guilty. If this were true, is it not logical that, as SHB 615 and ESHB 615 moved through the legislative halls toward enactment, a sponsor or member would have advised the legislators that capital punishment under the provisions of the bill would only apply to aggravated murder in the event defendant pleaded not guilty and was, subsequently, convicted, and that if such defendant pleaded guilty, the maximum he could receive by way of punishment would be life with the possibility of parole. The House and Senate Journals reflect that this death penalty bill was thoroughly debated, numerous amendments were offered โ some were accepted and some were rejected; numerous questions were asked and points of order were raised and disposed of. Is it not strange that no mention was made of the type of punishment to be administered in the event a defendant pleaded guilty of an aggravated murder as opposed to not guilty? A permissible inference from such absence of such inquiry is that the legislators were well aware of RCW 10.49.010 which provided for sentencing procedures for defendants who plead guilty to murder. It is unthinkable for this court to legislate against the intent of the legislature. Finally, the statute itself indicates that the legislature intended to make no distinction between those defendants who plead guilty and those who plead not guilty. Legislative intent is to be gleaned, first, if possible, from the statute itself. In re Estate of Lyons, 83 Wn.2d 105, 515 P.2d 1293 (1973). Section 6 of the enacted scheme, codified at RCW 9A.32.047, reads as follows: In the event that the governor commutes a death sentence or in the event that the death penalty is held to be unconstitutional by the United States supreme court or the supreme court of the state of Washington the penalty under RCW 9A.32.046 shall be imprisonment in the state penitentiary for life without possibility of release or parole. A person sentenced to life imprisonment under this section shall not have that sentence suspended, deferred, or commuted by any judicial officer, and the board of prison terms and paroles shall never parole a prisoner nor reduce the period of confinement. The convicted person shall not be released as a result of any type of good time calculation nor shall the department of social and health services permit the convicted person to participate in any temporary release or furlough program. Life without possibility of parole, then, is the resulting sentence if a death sentence is commuted by the Governor or if the statutory scheme enacting the death penalty is held invalid by the courts. If defendant A pleads guilty to first degree murder and defendant B pleads not guilty to first degree murder, they must be treated equally before the law. If defendant B could be sentenced to life without possibility of parole, but defendant A could only face the lighter sentence of life with possibility of parole, the equal protection clause of the constitution would be violated. The legislature is presumed to act constitutionally thereby creating the presumption that an act is constitutional. In re Harbert, supra . In that RCW 9A.32.047 makes no distinction between the pleas of defendants (whether they plead guilty or not guilty) and that statute is presumed to be constitutional, that section demonstrates strong legislative intent that the death penalty scheme is to be triggered by either a plea of guilty or not guilty. Also to be noted is the effect of RCW 9A.32.047 in the light of the majority opinion. The majority of this court has found the death penalty to be unconstitutional. The above cited section will operate to change the sentences of those now on death row to life without possibility of parole. The legislature had the foresight to enact a severability clause. RCW 10.94.900. III Justice Utter's concurring and dissenting opinion states that RCW 10.94.020 and RCW 10.49.010 cannot be read in pari materia because to do so violates Const. art. 2, ง 37, which reads: No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length. I disagree with Justice Utter's conclusion. RCW 10.94, as discussed in section I of this dissent, neither revises nor amends RCW 10.49.010. The death penalty statute is complete in itself. The enactment of the latter statute has no effect on the operation of the former statute. They both concern the sentencing for a defendant convicted of murder. However, RCW 10.49.010 merely allows the provisions of RCW 10.94.020 to be triggered if a defendant pleads guilty to the charge. Const. art. 2, ง 37 has not been read in the past to bring within its ken all statutes which are read in pari materia. I see no reason to now make that change. IV I concur in the majority's disposition of issues III and IV. As to issue III, however, I feel that a fifth question should be put to the jury: Shall the defendant be sentenced to death? to be answered simply with a yes or a no. This final determination of imposition of the death penalty should not be taken from the province of the jury. V I concur in Justice Rosellini's dissent as to issue V, whether death by hanging violates the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. Additionally, I note that the legislature is better equipped to determine the mode of execution to be imposed. I take judicial notice of the fact that this very subject is currently before the Washington State Legislature. Unlike the legislature, this court can neither hear live testimony nor conduct hearings on this issue. VI