Opinion ID: 1039276
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Impose Restitution Within 90 Days

Text: Section 3664(d)(5) provides that [i]f the victim's losses are not ascertainable by the date that is 10 days prior to sentencing, . . . the court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim's losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing. The district court violated this provision, Gushlak argues, because although it stated its intention at sentencing to enter a final restitution order within ninety days, it did not actually enter one until well past that deadline. This argument presents a question of law, so our review is de novo. Reifler, 446 F.3d at 120. The Supreme Court confronted the statutory deadline at issue here in Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533 (2010). Reasoning in part that the statute seeks speed primarily to help the victims of crime and only secondarily to help the defendant, id. at 2540, the court concluded that a sentencing court that misses the 90-day deadline nonetheless retains the power to order restitution -- at least where, as here, the sentencing court made clear prior to the deadline's expiration that it would order restitution, leaving open (for more than 90 days) only the amount, id. at 2537; see also United States v. Pickett, 612 F.3d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (applying Dolan's rule). On much the same rationale, though viewing the matter through the somewhat different prism of harmless- 13 error analysis, we have declined to reverse a restitution order because of a district court's failure to determine identifiable victims' losses within ninety days . . . unless [the defendant] can show actual prejudice from the omission. United States v. Zakhary, 357 F.3d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 2004); see United States v. Catoggio, 326 F.3d 323, 329-30 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying this rule). These authorities control here. In Dolan's words, the district court made clear prior to the deadline's expiration that it would order restitution -- it said so on the record at Gushlak's sentencing hearing, Sentencing Tr., Nov. 18, 2010, at 105, Joint App'x at 2142 -- and le[ft] open (for more than 90 days) only the amount, Dolan, 130 S. Ct. at 2537;4 see also Pickett, 612 F.3d at 149. And we find implausible Gushlak's assertion that the eighteen-month delay, when tacked on to the decade or so that had elapsed between the conduct that caused the 4 We reject Gushlak's attempt to distinguish Dolan on the grounds that the district court here stated its intention to enter its restitution order within ninety days, as opposed, the argument appears to suggest, to stating explicitly both that it would order restitution, and that it would not determine the amount until after the ninety days had elapsed. This argument misunderstands Dolan's proviso, the purpose of which, it seems to us, is to guard against a sentencing judge entering what appears to be a final sentence, thus relinquishing authority to order restitution, only then to impose restitution more than ninety days thereafter. Gushlak was at all times fully aware that the sentence announced at his sentencing hearing contained a blank space to be filled in with a dollar amount once restitution proceedings had run their course. We think this is what Dolan contemplates. 14 victims' losses and his sentencing, somehow hampered his ability to collect victim information, causing him prejudice. It is without evidentiary support. We therefore conclude that the district court was authorized to enter the restitution order despite section 3664(d)(4)'s ninety-day requirement.