Opinion ID: 1222574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act

Text: The Church appeals the district court's conclusion that the Ordinance does not violate state law: the FRFRA. The district court determined that the Church shares food during religious services pursuant to a sincerely held religious belief, but concluded that the Ordinance does not substantially burden the Church's exercise of that practice. We agree with the district court that the Ordinance imposes no substantial burden on the Church. We review the district court's factual findings for clear error, Mitchell v. Hillsborough County, 468 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir.2006); but we review de novo its ultimate conclusion about whether the Ordinance violates the FRFRA, see Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 511-12 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing the standard of review applicable under a similar federal statute). The protection afforded to the free exercise of religiously motivated activity under the FRFRA is broader than that afforded by the United States Constitution. Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So.2d 1023, 1032 (2004). Under the FRFRA, a neutral law of general applicability must satisfy strict scrutiny when it substantially burden[s] a person's exercise of religion. Id. An exercise of religion is an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief. Id. A burden on religious exercise is only substantial if a person is prohibited from engaging in protected religious conduct (or, if the exercise of religion is a refusal to act, the person is compelled to act). See id. at 1033. Laws that merely inconvenience the exercise of religion do not create a substantial burden. See id. at 1035. The party claiming a violation of the FRFRA bears the initial burden of showing that a regulation constitutes a substantial burden on his or her exercise of religion. Id. at 1034. The district court determined that, to comply with the Ordinance, the Church would need to limit its services to twice per year, or rotate the services among parks in the District, or move the services to a park outside of the District. [16] Although the district court's order is not entirely clear to us, the court appeared to focus on the feasibility of the Church rotating its services among parks within the District when deciding that the Ordinance imposed no substantial burden. The Church argued (and produced some evidence) that, if the services had to be moved, it is possible that some homeless members of the congregation would have difficulty learning of and traveling to the new location. But the district court found that the evidence at trial established that: (1) communication with the homeless is possible (by word-of-mouth); and (2) that the homeless have means of transportation available (bus service or walking). The district court considered the burden on the Church and its members significant, but not substantial. On appeal, the Church contends that the district court's factual findings about the feasability of communication and the availability of transportation are clearly erroneous in the light of the record. Even if the Church is correct (which we doubt) that the district court's two factual findings are clearly erroneous, we would still conclude that the Church has not carried its burden under the FRFRA: the ability of the Church to rotate its services among the District parks is only minimally pertinent to the Ordinance's validity. The FRFRA does not provide the Church with a right to conduct its services at any location it desires; it does not guarantee access to the City's most desirable park (or, for that matter, any park at all). [17] At most, what the FRFRA does is ensure that the City may not, without a compelling interest, affirmatively forbid the Church from feeding its members as part of its religious services. [18] We assume only for the sake of argument that a congregation of indigents might present a unique problem under the FRFRA because, if no public space is available to conduct religious services, a law may have the result, in fact, of prohibiting the congregation's religious exercise. But, in such a circumstance, the FRFRA at most might require the City to provide some alternative public place where religiously motivated feeding can occur that is minimally suitable to that function. See Abbott v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 783 So.2d 1213, 1214-15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (concluding that the trial judge, after determining that a park rule that prohibited feeding the homeless violated the FRFRA and ordering the city to provide an alternative space on public property where the feeding could occur, had the authority to determine whether the alternative space was minimally suitable for the purposes intended). The record in this case reveals that several parks outside of the Districtwhere the Ordinance is inapplicablecontain amenities that make those parks at least minimally suitable for feeding. [19] Conducting services at one fixed location outside of the District should alleviate the Church's concern about the communication difficulties associated with informing its indigent members of frequent location changes. And while using one of the nearby parks outside the District might result in some extra transit time for the Church's members (including requiring extra walking if transportation is, in fact, unavailable), we have earlier said that needing to travel some extra distance is insufficient to establish a substantial burden. [20] The record shows that several others parks are close to Langford Park. The Church does not contend, nor did the district court find, that these parks are not at least minimally suitable for the Church's services. The Ordinance does not forbid the Church and its members from engaging in their religious exercise; at most, the Ordinance imposes some inconvenience by requiring relocation outside the District. The district court was therefore correct to conclude that the Ordinance imposes no substantial burden, within the meaning of the FRFRA, on the Church.