Opinion ID: 48719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the Deputies' Conduct Objectively Unreasonable in Light of Clearly Established Law?

Text: 31 We next consider whether the deputies' conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of their actions. Because qualified immunity protects officers who reasonably but mistakenly violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights, the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable person in their position would have believed that [their] conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to [them] and the clearly established law. Goodson, 202 F.3d at 736. 8 Thus, our task is to determine whether reasonable officers in the deputies' position could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Freeman. 32 No reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Freeman. As we noted above, Texas Penal Code Ann. § 38.15, Interference with Public Duties, clearly and plainly excepts from the reach of the statute conduct that consist[s] of speech only. Viewing the facts found by the district court in the light most favorable to Freeman, her actions clearly fall within the speech exception to the statute, and, as a result, no reasonable officer would believe that there was probable cause to arrest Freeman for Interference with Public Duties. 9 Further, as previously explained, no reasonable officer would believe that there was probable cause to arrest Freeman for the offense of Hindering Apprehension. The deputies' argument that they could reasonably have thought that Freeman came outside and confronted the officers as a way of warning her son Kevin, inside the house, of impending discovery, is simply too strained and counterintuitive to accept on these facts. Finally, any reasonable officer would recognize that, under clearly established law, Freeman's refusal to consent to a warrantless search of her home could neither itself justify an arrest nor create probable cause to arrest Freeman for another offense. See, e.g., Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213-14, 101 S.Ct. 1642; Fletcher, 196 F.3d at 54; 1 LaFave, supra, § 3.5(d), at 235. Accordingly, we conclude that no reasonable officer would have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Freeman, and we therefore affirm the district court's decision to deny summary judgment on Freeman's wrongful arrest claim.