Opinion ID: 1206085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: county's capacity to sue

Text: We first address the state's contention that the county lacks authority to bring this action in ejectment against the state. The state bases its argument on the assertion that [t]he county is part of state government, the state's agent, with no legally distinct interests, and that [t]he title to the land arising out of a deed of foreclosure for delinquent taxes is vested nominally in the county in its capacity as the political agent of the state. Consequently, in the state's view, a dispute between the state and a county regarding tax-foreclosed lands is not justiciable. The state further insists that, even if the county possesses the capacity to bring the action, the state has not waived its sovereign immunity to an action in ejectment brought against it by a county. The Court of Appeals held that the county was capable of maintaining this action against the state. 75 Or. App. at 623, 707 P.2d 1243. We agree. This court recently discussed the nature of the county/state relationship as it pertains to county-owned lands in Tillamook County v. State of Oregon, 302 Or. 404, 415-16, 730 P2d 1214 (1986): The State asserts that the counties are `mere instrumentalities' of the state. We need not address, as a broad proposition, the relationship of counties to the state. With regard to the narrow issue of county management of county lands, the statutes dispose of the question. Under existing statutes, counties act independently of the state with respect to management of county lands. The legislature has granted counties various powers to manage and dispose of forest land acquired by tax foreclosure or otherwise. Counties have power to sell such land while keeping it on the tax roll, ORS 275.090, 275.110; to manage the land as a county forest, ORS 275.320; to convey the land to another governmental body for consideration, ORS 275.070; and to convey the land to the state `in consideration of the payment to such county of the percentage of the revenue derived from such lands as provided in ORS 530.110.' ORS 530.030(1). Counties have been given broad powers with respect to their tax-foreclosed lands. See ORS 203.035, ORS chs 271 and 275. Title to such lands is in the county, not the state. ORS 275.020. The county has the power to convey such lands `as the county governing body may deem to be for the best interests of the county.' ORS 275.070. Counties hold and assert their interest in county lands as corporate bodies. Counties have existed in corporate form with the power to sue and be sued since before statehood. ORS 203.010, originally enacted in 1854, General Laws or Oregon, chapter IX, § 1, p 672 (Deady 1845-1864), provides: `Each county is a body politic and corporate for the following purposes: (1) To sue and be sued; (2) To purchase and hold for the use of the county lands lying within its own limits and any personal estate; (3) To make all necessary contracts; and (4) To do all other necessary acts in relation to the property and concern of the county.' Under these statutes counties possess interests that may be asserted against the state. (Emphasis supplied.) In Tillamook, we held that a county's statutory entitlement to a percentage of revenue derived from land transferred to the state pursuant to ORS 530.030(1) was one such interest, and that it could be asserted through a declaratory judgment action. We now hold that a county's claim of right to possession of tax-foreclosed real property is another such interest, and that it may be asserted against the state through an ejectment action under ORS 105.005. ORS 105.005 reads: Any person who has a legal estate in real property and a present right to the possession thereof, may recover possession of the property, with damages for withholding possession, by an action at law. The action shall be commenced against the person in the actual possession of the property at the time, or if the property is not in the actual possession of anyone, then against the person acting as the owner thereof. The term any person, specifying who may bring the action, includes artificial as well as natural persons. State v. Duniway, 63 Or. 555, 558, 128 P. 853 (1912). The authority granted by ORS 203.010 to sue and to perform all other necessary acts in relation to the property    of the county provides a county with the capacity to initiate actions under ORS 105.005 to assert its possessory interest, acquired through a tax lien foreclosure, in real property. The state has waived its immunity to suits brought to determine title to real property. ORS 30.360. [3] The statute expresses the state's consent to be named a defendant and to have its rights or interests adjudicated in any suit    involving the title to real property where the state or a state agency has record title to contested real property. ORS 30.360(2). The state argues that, because this statute does not by its terms authorize a suit by a county, a county may not institute such a suit. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the phrase any suit, as it is used in this statute, contemplates an action brought by any party with the capacity to sue in ejectment. As we stated above, the legislature has granted the county that capacity. A number of statutes define the interests of a county in its tax-foreclosed properties and set out the means by which title may be transferred to the state. In addition to the types of conveyances described in Tillamook, supra, a county may donate land to the state, ORS 275.070, surrender to the state title to any land not needed for a public purpose, ORS 271.330, or engage in an exchange of lands with the state, ORS 275.100. The state cannot compel these transfers; the county initiates them. We agree with the Court of Appeals' statement that: [i]f we were to hold that the county could not maintain this action, the state would have unfettered license to do as it pleases with county property, and the counties could not be heard to complain. That result would fly in the face of the legislative grant of broad powers to counties over matters of county concern, ORS 203.010 and 203.035, and its policy that the county's title to real property acquired by foreclosure of tax liens `have the utmost stability.' ORS 312.214. Coos County v. State of Oregon, supra, 75 Or. App. at 623-24, 707 P.2d 1243. The state, through the legislature, has waived its immunity to suits involving contested title to real property. ORS 30.360. The state has empowered the counties to bring suit to defend their title to real property. ORS 203.010. The state has enacted a complex statutory scheme that establishes the legally distinct interests of the county and the state in tax-foreclosed land, the procedures which must be followed to transfer title from one entity to the other, and the rights and responsibilities which result from such a transfer. In short, the legislature has established the counties' judicially protectable ownership interests in tax-foreclosed lands, and has provided the counties with the capacity and the means to assert those interests, even against the state.