Opinion ID: 1795232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mora as Co-counsel and Mora Addressing the Jury

Text: Mora's next argument on appeal consists of two subclaims. The first subclaim is that the trial court erred by granting Mora co-counsel status, and the second subclaim is that the trial court further erred by allowing Mora to address the jury during closing. With regard to the first subclaim, Mora argues that there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation and that Mora did not make an unequivocal request to be his own attorney. Therefore, according to Mora, the trial court abused its discretion by offering to Mora the ability to become co-counsel even though there was significant testimony that Mora had a mental disorder. We agree with Mora that there is no constitutional right for hybrid representation at trial. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984); State v. Tait, 387 So.2d 338, 340 (Fla.1980). But where a trial court allows a defendant to act as co-counsel, such decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Bell v. State, 699 So.2d 674, 677 (Fla.1997). In the instant case, Mora previously had indicated his general disapproval of his counsel's strategy and counsel's conduct of the trial but had never made a clear and unequivocal request to represent himself. [13] The trial court granted Mora co-counsel status after Mora made a clear request to become co-counsel. The trial court granted the request near the conclusion of the trial and after Mora testified. While the trial court did not conduct a contemporaneous Faretta [14] inquiry, the trial court had on several previous occasions found that Mora satisfied the elements of Faretta. Cf. Bell, 699 So.2d at 677 (indicating that Faretta inquiry is not required in trial court's decision of whether to appoint defendant as co-counsel). Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mora to become co-counsel. See id. Similarly, Mora argues in the second subclaim that the trial court erred in allowing Mora to address the jury during closing arguments after his counsel had addressed the jury. We likewise find no merit in the second subclaim. A trial court's decision whether to allow a defendant who is represented by counsel to address the jury is subject to the abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Tait, 387 So.2d 338, 340 (Fla.1980). Even when the defendant acts as co-counsel, the trial court's decision as to whether the defendant may address the jury is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Cf. Davis v. State, 586 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 1216, 112 S.Ct. 3021, 120 L.Ed.2d 893 (1992). Here, the trial court engaged Mora in an extensive colloquy before allowing him to give a closing statement. During that colloquy, the trial court asked Mora what issues he was going to talk about, limited Mora to new issues not raised by Dennis Colleran, and suggested to Mora again not to give a closing statement. Mora stated that his attorney had advised him not to give a closing argument. In this situation, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mora to give a brief closing statement.