Opinion ID: 852396
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statute of Limitation Runs from ELA's Enactment.

Text: A statute of limitation does not begin to run against a cause of action before that cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to the plaintiff. Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1284 n. 12 (Ind.1999). The substance of a cause of action, rather than its form, determines the applicability of the statute of limitation. Shideler v. Dwyer, 275 Ind. 270, 417 N.E.2d 281 (1981). Cooper asserts that South Bend had several ways to sue exactly the same parties for the same contamination under the same (or more stringent) standards long before the ELA amendments. (Appellant's Br. at 21). In particular, Cooper cites Indiana's Underground Storage Tank Act, Ind.Code § 13-23-13-8; the Petroleum Release Statute, Ind.Code § 13-24-1-4(b); the catch-all environmental statute, Ind.Code § 13-30-1-1; and the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. ( Id. ) If the ELA simply amends, for clarification or other purposes, pre-existing environmental claims, any change would apply strictly on a prospective basis. Cf. Bourbon Mini-Mart v. Gast Fuel and Serv., Inc., 783 N.E.2d 253, 262 (Ind.2003) (because an amendment to the USTA expanded both the class of corrective action for which owners and operators could seek recovery, and the class of third persons from whom recovery could be sought, the statute as amended should be applied retroactively). On the other hand, if the ELA creates an entirely new action, no cause of action could have existed until its effective date. ELA seems to fall somewhere in the middle. As South Bend points out, the USTA and the Petroleum statutes provide only a right of contribution, whereas the ELA does not so limit seeking cost recovery from another party. See Taylor Farm LLC v. Viacom, 234 F.Supp.2d 950, 962 (S.D.Ind.2002). Furthermore, each of these are limited by the type of damage done. As such, the limitation found in the ELA's § 6 would only have a narrowing effect in those cases involving sufficient facts to support a claim under the USTA. If such facts existed, the plaintiff would have to choose between the ELA and the USTA. As to Ind.Code § 13-30-1-1, it allows declaratory and equitable relief only, requires a citizen suit notice of six months, and prohibits seeking relief when IDEM is also seeking declaratory relief. (Appellees' Br. at 33). Finally, CERCLA's § 107(a) would require South Bend to prove it was an innocent landowner, while the ELA explicitly permits recovery without regard to the plaintiff's part in causation of the damage. Cooper argues that the substance of a cause of action, rather than the form, determines the applicability of the statute of limitations, meaning South Bend's claim would accrue when a substantively similar claim would accrue. (Appellant's Br. 20-21, quoting Rice v. Strunk, 632 N.E.2d 1151, 1153 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), aff'd, 670 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind.1996). also citing King v. Terry, 805 N.E.2d 397 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).) For instance, Cooper cites both Shideler v. Dwyer and Rice, in which the plaintiffs had malpractice claims but crafted their complaints in a way to describe claims carrying a longer statute of limitation than the more obvious claim of malpractice. The courts in both cases found that, in fact, the underlying claims were actually for malpractice, and the two-year limitation for malpractice actions should apply. We think the case law Cooper cites on this point addresses the question of how parties characterize facts in their pleadings, not with a change in the underlying law. Here, if any similar spin has occurred on South Bend's part, it has a limited effect, for at least some of South Bend's claims could not have been brought before February 28, 1998. If the reverse were true and South Bend could have brought the substance of its claims before the end of an applicable statute of limitation but did not, the Shideler rule might bar the City's recovery. In this case, however, South Bend did not have a complete cause of action until the ELA became effective. Therefore, the statute of limitation could not have begun to accrue until that date. Cooper further asserts that the statute of limitation should have run against South Bend in accord with standard discovery rule principles  when it knew or should have known of the injury. (Appellant's Br. at 13-17.) This misses a broader point about applying statutes of limitation: a statute does not run until a cause of action is complete. The discovery rule may tell us when there was sufficient knowledge about facts, but it does not apply at all to the completion of the underlying law to a cause of action, except to the extent that the law depends on the claim being factually complete. Indiana courts have held consistently that the discovery of a legal theory will not serve as the accrual date, but not that a cause of action can accrue before the law provided for such kind of claim. [8] Cooper claims that under this logic a claim could be brought based on facts known for a hundred years. Such a claim still must be brought, however, within the applicable statute of limitation from the point of a new cause of action's effective date. In other words, any opening of the floodgates would have a time limit. That time for the ELA passed either on February 28, 2004 or February 28, 2008, depending on which statute of limitation applies. Parties who newly discover ancient contamination and seek to recover costs will be in the same position under the ELA as they would be under the USTA: the statute of limitation will begin to run on the earlier date of actual discovery or when a reasonable person would discover the facts. Though the parties join in debate over whether South Bend has agreed that the property damage statute of limitation applies in this case, we will adopt six years as the applicable time period. [9] Six years from the accrual date was February 28, 2004. Because South Bend filed this action March 19, 2003, it filed within even the shortest arguable limitation. Because we understand the ELA as addressing the issue of brownfields, that the legislature did not intend to bar cities from bringing these actions, and that the statute of limitation did not run until the cause existed, we hold that South Bend may proceed with its ELA claims.