Opinion ID: 6330774
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count IV (R.Q.J.)

Text: Count IV charged Keepseagle with child abuse of R.Q.J., in violation of South Dakota Codified Law § 26-10-1, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1153. At trial, R.Q.J. testified that Keepseagle pulled his hair while they were in the basement. The hair pull lasted approximately “a minute.” R. Doc. 118-1, at 110. Keepseagle “kept . . . pulling [R.Q.J.’s hair], and then [he] threw [R.Q.J.] down, and then picked [R.Q.J.] back up, and then threw [R.Q.J.] down.” Id. The hair pull “hurt” R.Q.J., and he “started crying.” Id. at 109–10. R.Q.J. testified that he “sat there crying” because “[t]hat hurt [his] head . . . bad.” Id. at 111. On appeal, Keepseagle argues that R.Q.J.’s testimony lacks credibility because (1) “[p]rior to trial, [he] confessed to a defense investigator that he and the others were being pressured by Quilt to make allegations against Keepseagle”; (2) although R.Q.J. later recanted his statement to the defense investigator, “it is difficult to ascertain from his trial testimony what exactly he recanted”; and (3) no one ever corroborated R.Q.J.’s testimony. Appellant’s Br. at 12–13. -17- At trial, Keepseagle’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine R.Q.J. on his recantation. It was for the jury to determine whether R.Q.J. was credible. See Never Misses A Shot, 781 F.3d at 1026. We will not disturb its determination. Keepseagle additionally argues that even if he “committed the alleged act as to R.Q.J., it was not child abuse.” Appellant’s Br. at 13 (emphasis omitted). “[T]o establish a conviction for felony child abuse under [Count IV], the government had to prove [Keepseagle], without just cause, abused, exposed, tortured, tormented, or cruelly punished [R.Q.J.] . . . .” Iron Hawk, 612 F.3d at 1036. Keepseagle argues that “there was no apparent injury to R.Q.[J.] based on Keepseagle’s conduct” and that R.Q.J.’s testimony that the hair pull hurt and that he cried was insufficient to “establish[] that the pain was intense or excruciating or that it was done with reckless indifference.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. Keepseagle relies on both South Dakota case law and this court’s precedent interpreting § 26-10-1 in support of his argument that any alleged injury that R.Q.J. suffered was not severe enough to constitute child abuse. Id. at 14–15 (citing United States v. Spotted Horse, 916 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v. White Plume, 847 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2017); Iron Hawk, 612 F.3d at 1031; State v. Morgan, 824 N.W.2d 98 (S.D. 2012)). In Morgan, the defendant, who was convicted of child abuse under § 26-10-1 for “grabb[ing] and squeez[ing] [the victim’s] face,” “argue[d] that the verdict [was] not sustained by the evidence and his actions were permissible discipline[, an affirmative defense].” 824 N.W.2d at 99, 100. The defendant’s conduct had caused “extensive bruising” and other injuries to the victim’s face. Id. at 102. After reviewing the trial testimony, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that sufficient evidence existed “from which the jury could find that [the defendant’s] actions, grabbing and squeezing [the victim’s] face, were not permissible discipline.” Id. -18- Morgan is inapposite. It does not discuss the level of injury necessary to sustain a conviction under § 26-10-1, nor do any of the other cases that Keepseagle relies on.4 Instead, the South Dakota Supreme Court in Morgan explained why under the specific facts of that case the evidence defeated the defendant’s affirmative defense of permissible discipline and supported the jury’s finding of child abuse. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Keepseagle “abused, exposed, tortured, tormented, or 4 Spotted Horse involved a defendant who was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and 113(a)(3), based on the same conduct underlying the defendant’s child abuse conviction under § 26-10-1. 916 F.3d at 689. It did not concern the sufficiency of the evidence or the level of injury necessary to sustain a conviction for child abuse. See id. at 691–94. White Plume concerned a defendant who was convicted of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(a)(6), based on the same conduct underlying the defendant’s child abuse conviction under § 26-10-1. 847 F.3d at 626. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on both counts. We held that “[t]he evidence sufficiently supports the verdicts” on both counts, citing the defendant’s admission that “the injuries were severe, acute, and non-accidental” and testimony that the defendant was “alone with [the victim] immediately before the injury.” Id. at 627. We did not discuss the level of injury necessary to sustain a conviction under § 26-10-1. See id. Iron Hawk likewise concerned a defendant convicted of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6), based on the same conduct underlying the defendant’s child abuse conviction under § 26-10-1. 612 F.3d at 1035. The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain both convictions. Id. Our sufficiency analysis focused primarily on the elements necessary to sustain the assault conviction. Id. at 1036. One of the elements of that conviction was that the assault “result[] in serious bodily injury” to the victim. Id. The defendant conceded that the victim suffered serious bodily injury but argued that insufficient evidence existed that he had caused such injury. Id. At no time did we discuss the level of injury required to sustain a conviction under § 26-10-1. See id. -19- cruelly punished [R.Q.J.].” Iron Hawk, 612 F.3d at 1036. R.Q.J. testified that Keepseagle’s act of pulling R.Q.J. up by his hair and throwing him down caused him severe pain; he testified that his head “hurt . . . bad” and that he cried from the pain that Keepseagle caused. R. Doc. 118-1, at 111. The district court did not err in denying Keepseagle’s motion for judgment of acquittal on Count IV.