Opinion ID: 2060424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Order refusing to require production of documents pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.

Text: December 16, 1970, in the action for slander, a subpoena duces tecum was served upon the defendant Perle, together with the summons in the case, the complaint, and a copy of the notice of taking the examination, otherwise than as a witness on the trial, and under the provisions of section 887.12 of the Wisconsin Statutes, before a court commissioner. December 18, 1970, and in the same action, a subpoena duces tecum was served upon Summers as an officer, director, agent and employee of the defendant, Wisconsin Tobacco. The subpoenas requested Perle and Summers to bring with them to the examination all the books, records and other recordings of Wisconsin Tobacco relating to the alleged inventory shortage, including the minute or corporate books of Wisconsin Tobacco. Prior to the dismissal of the litigation as to Wisconsin Tobacco and Scotten, Dillon, there were intervening proceedings relating to the adverse examination and subpoena duces tecum, which, in our opinion, are not relevant to this appeal. However, December 9, 1971, the defendants filed a motion with the trial court to rescind all prior orders as to discovery and production of certain documents and for return of the documents of Wisconsin Tobacco theretofore filed with the clerk of court. The affidavit in support of defendants' motion averred that Perle was no longer an agent or representative of either Wisconsin Tobacco or Scotten, Dillon, and is not authorized to produce or control any of the documents or records of said companies, and that Wisconsin Tobacco, as of September 30, 1971, had been dismissed as a party defendant. June 22, 1972, the trial court ordered: ... That the prior order of the court dated June 18, 1971, looking toward the production by the then defendant, Wisconsin Tobacco Company, of additional documents to which the plaintiffs felt they were entitled and the then contemplation by the court of a memorandum order as to any such documents as it would require the then defendant, Wisconsin Tobacco Company, Inc., to produce be and the same is hereby withdrawn and rescinded. ... That those records presently on deposit with the court submitted pursuant to court order for examination by the plaintiffs are to remain in the custody of the Clerk of the Circuit Court at Viroqua, Wisconsin, pending further order of this court. ... That the subpoenas previously directed to the defendant, David Perle, and Mr. Ernest Summers remain in full force and effect and the parties are directed to agree upon a time mutually convenient for the examination of said Perle and Summers; in the absence of such an agreement the court will upon appropriate presentation to the court direct a specific time for their appearance. The order of the trial court strikes from the subpoenas the direction that Perle and Summers produce upon their examination certain books and records of the defendant corporation. Such an order is, in effect, an order which limits the scope of an examination. While orders that completely suppress such an examination have been held appealable, Condura Construction Co. v. Milwaukee Building & Construction Trades Council (1959), 8 Wis. 2d 541, 549, 99 N. W. 2d 751; Estate of Briese (1941), 238 Wis. 6, 8, 298 N. W. 57, an order which merely limits the scope of an examination, as this one does, is not appealable. Quality Outfitters v. Risko (1958), 4 Wis. 2d 341, 90 N. W. 2d 638; Dobbert v. Dobbert (1953), 264 Wis. 641, 60 N. W. 2d 378; Will of Block (1953), 264 Wis. 471, 59 N. W. 2d 440; Hyslop v. Hyslop (1940), 234 Wis. 430, 291 N. W. 337. Plaintiffs cite Fanshaw v. Medical Protective Asso. (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 234, 190 N. W. 2d 155, for their contention that the order is a denial of a provisional remedy and, therefore, appealable. [1] In Fanshaw, supra, this court held that an order denying a motion for the production of documents, pursuant to sec. 269.57, Stats., [2] is an order which is appealable in that it refuses a provisional remedy. [3] An order granting or refusing to grant inspection requested under sec. 269.57, Stats., is not to be confused with an order which refuses to limit or limits an adverse examination. The right to adverse examination is granted by statute and not by an order of the court. In Quality Outfitters, supra, the appellant appealed from an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena in that part which required the production of documents. This court held such an order not appealable. At pages 344 and 345, this court stated: ... appellant submits that the subpoena requires a production of books and papers and permits their inspection by the adverse party and an order to that effect is appealable. An order to that effect, obtained under sec. 269.57, Stats., is appealable as we have frequently held. Hudson v. Graff (1948), 253 Wis. 1, 33 N. W. (2d) 174. That order is issued only upon notice and hearing. It is quite a different thing in its origin and effect from a subpoena duces tecum. As we said in Appleton v. Sauer (1956), 271 Wis. 614, 616, 74 N. W. (2d) 167, the two proceedings are not to be confused. The plaintiffs have appealed from an order quashing that part of subpoena which required the production of documents and not an order denying a motion under sec. 269.57, Stats. Such an order is not appealable. The only jurisdiction of this court is to dismiss the appeal from this particular order. [4]