Opinion ID: 787203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Challenge to Johnson's Enhancement

Text: 27 Johnson argues that the District Court erred by considering the Riddick murder as relevant co-conspirator conduct when resentencing him, because the Court failed to satisfy both prongs of the Studley test. We agree, and upon further consideration, including an examination of the record and a review of the District Court's findings on remand, we hold that Johnson may not be sentenced taking into account the Riddick murder. 28 It is well established that a district court may consider the relevant conduct of co-conspirators when sentencing a defendant. See, e.g., Mulder, 273 F.3d at 118 (citing United States v. Molina, 106 F.3d 1118, 1121 (2d Cir.1997) ([R]easonably foreseeable acts ... of others in furtherance of [a] conspiracy may be taken into account to determine a defendant's sentence. (internal quotation marks omitted))). It is equally well established that this Court requires a district court to make two particularized findings before a defendant may be held accountable for his co-conspirators' acts. [I]in order to hold a defendant accountable for the acts of others, a district court must make two findings: 1) that the acts were within the scope of the defendant's agreement and 2) that they were foreseeable to the defendant. Studley, 47 F.3d at 574; accord Mulder, 273 F.3d at 118.
29 To satisfy the first Studley prong under our original mandate, the District Court could not find that Johnson's agreement with Mulder included the Riddick murder just because Johnson had knowledge of [Mulder's] criminal acts, Studley, 47 F.3d at 575 — here, Mulder's act of murdering Riddick. Nor could the District Court find that Johnson's agreement included the Riddick murder on the basis that Johnson was aware of the scope of the overall operation and therefore should be held accountable for the activities of the whole operation, id. Rather, a finding by the District Court that Johnson's agreement with Mulder included the Riddick murder would have to be based upon a particularized finding that the murder was within the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the ... agreement, id. (emphasis added). 30 The District Court attempted to make a particularized finding that Johnson's agreement with Mulder included murdering Riddick. The Court found that (1) Mulder worked for Johnson; (2) Johnson often instructed Mulder to page him with updates; (3) Johnson had instructed Mulder to ensure protection of BFB interests in any way necessary; (4) Mulder informed Johnson that there was trouble at the Queens work site (at which Mulder subsequently killed Riddick) over a period of two years; (5) Mulder told Johnson, on an occasion unrelated to the Riddick murder, that he was at a work site with his machine gun and that if he killed someone, it would be to solve someone else's problem; and, most notably, (6) there was talk of an offer of payment, from Johnson to Mulder, for the Riddick murder. See August 8, 2002 Transcript, at 27-30. 31 Among this list of particulars, the most salient is the last: that Johnson offered a fee to Mulder in exchange for Mulder murdering Riddick. Judge Casey referred to this offer of payment and fee for the murder during the resentencing proceeding, noted that he had presided over the trial in which Mulder testified to the fee, and observed that he found Mulder's testimony on this issue convincing, compelling and credible. Thus, [Judge Casey found] that the scope of the agreement... is broad enough to include the Riddick murder. See August 8, 2002 Transcript, at 29-30. 32 We review the District Court's factual findings relevant to a sentencing determination for clear error. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); see also Mulder, 273 F.3d at 116. In order to vacate such findings, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and nevertheless find to be impermissible the factual determinations based upon that favorably-viewed evidence. See United States v. Ruggiero, 100 F.3d 284, 291-92 (2d Cir.1996) 33 We are mindful that we owe the District Court strong deference when reviewing findings based on credibility determinations. See, e.g., United States v. Monzon, 359 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.2004). However, Mulder's testimony, even if credited, cannot establish that Johnson ever offered to pay a fee for the Riddick murder. The testimony on which the District Court based its findings, as quoted and recounted by the District Court, reveals only that, well after Mulder had murdered Riddick, a third party — not Johnson — had recommended to him that he approach Johnson to ask for a fee. See August 8, 2002 Transcript, at 29-30. Crediting this testimony cannot support a finding that Johnson ever offered anyone a fee directly or that he indirectly orchestrated the third party's approach to Mulder. Indeed, there is not even a suggestion in the record that Johnson was aware of the third-party recommendation, let alone designed, condoned, or failed to condemn it. The District Court, in relying on Mulder's testimony, clearly erred in finding that Johnson was part of an agreement to murder Riddick. 34 As noted, the District Court made other particularized findings in support of its ultimate determination that the scope of Johnson's agreement with Mulder included the Riddick murder. We hold that, in the absence of support in the record for a finding that Johnson offered to pay Mulder for the murder, those other findings are not sufficient to satisfy the first Studley prong. For example, that Mulder informed Johnson of two years of trouble at the Queens work site (where Riddick was eventually murdered), or that Mulder made hypothetical comments explaining what his reasons would be if he had to kill someone, does not permit a determination that the murder of Riddick was within the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the ... agreement between Johnson and Mulder, Studley, 47 F.3d at 575.
35 We instructed the District Court on remand that, in order to find that the Riddick murder was foreseeable to Johnson, there had to be some closer link than that Johnson was aware that, in the past, various BFB members had used violence as means to further BFB ends. Mulder, 273 F.3d at 119. The District Court responded by relying on (1) conversations between Mulder and Johnson in which Mulder reported having a machine gun and contemplated the possibility of killing someone; (2) Johnson's awareness of Mulder's propensity for violence; and, of course, (3) the offer of payment testimony discussed above. 36 As with the first Studley prong, a review of the transcript of the resentencing proceeding reveals that while the District Court listed various facts to support its finding of foreseeability, Johnson's purported offer of payment was the most salient among them. Because we have determined that the finding of an offer of payment is not supported by the record, and because we conclude from our review of the record that, absent sufficient evidence of an offer of payment, the District Court had no sound basis for its determination that the Riddick murder was foreseeable to Johnson, we hold that the District Court erred when it found that the second Studley prong had been satisfied. 37 In light of our conclusion that the record cannot support the satisfaction of either Studley prong, we hold that the District Court erred in resentencing Johnson. Accordingly, we vacate Johnson's sentence and remand the cause to the District Court with directions to resentence Johnson, a third time, without considering the Riddick murder. On remand, the District Court may consider whether to apply other appropriate enhancements to Johnson's sentence.