Opinion ID: 1706325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the circuit court erred in refusing Dampier's Instruction D-4.

Text: ¶ 30. Proposed Instruction D-4 provided that: [e]ach fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance on which the inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The State objected, arguing that [Instruction] S-1 [22] requires us to prove each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent that this tries to do anything more than this, it is inappropriate. The circuit court refused Instruction D-4 because I believe it's cumulative. But also relative to that last paragraph, I think that's an incorrect statement of the law. (Emphasis added). ¶ 31. Dampier asserts that Instruction D-4 addresses inference testimony and was denied, while Instruction S-5, [23] effectively stating that an inference can be drawn that [Dampier] participated in the capital murder because he may have been in possession of a stolen vehicle[,] was granted. As such, Dampier argues that the circuit court committed reversible error by allow[ing] the [S]tate to argue that possession of a stolen vehicle gives the inference, but . . . not allowing] [Dampier] the opportunity to argue that all inferences have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The State responds that Dampier's argument is without merit, as the substance of Instruction D-4 was fairly covered in other instructions, and Instruction S-5 was identical to the approved instruction in Harris v. State, 908 So.2d 868, 872 (Miss.Ct.App.2005). [24] ¶ 32. This Court has stated that: [w]hen considering a challenge to a jury instruction on appeal, we do not review jury instructions in isolation; rather, we read them as a whole to determine if the jury was properly instructed. Burton ex rel. Bradford v. Barnett, 615 So.2d 580, 583 (Miss.1993). Similarly, this Court has stated that [i]n determining whether error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 782 (Miss.1997) (quoting Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918 (Miss.1997)). In other words, if all instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law, no error results. Milano v. State, 790 So.2d 179, 184 (Miss. 2001) (emphasis added). This Court finds that the reasonable-doubt standard was adequately addressed in Instruction S-1, which required each capital murder ele ment to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As Instruction S-1 fairly announce[s] the law on reasonable doubt and, therefore, create[s] no injustice, Coleman, 697 So.2d at 782, this Court concludes that the circuit court did not err in refusing Instruction D-4 as cumulative. [25] Accordingly, this issue is without merit.