Opinion ID: 1795715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Paragraphs 8-10

Text: We first address the defendants' contention that the trial court erred in ordering relief in paragraphs 8-10 of its order based on an issue never joined by the parties, namely, the constitutionality of § 177(b). We recognize the rule that a final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party's pleadings. Ala. R. Civ. P. 54(c). However, the rule has its limits: `A court may not, without the consent of all persons affected, enter a judgment which goes beyond the claim asserted in the pleadings. . . . Unless all parties in interest are in court and have voluntarily litigated some issue not within the pleadings, the court can consider only the issues made by the pleadings, and the judgment may not extend beyond such issues nor beyond the scope of the relief demanded. `. . . . `The foregoing rules are all fundamental and state nothing more than the essentials of due process and of fair play. They assure to every person his day in court before judgment is pronounced against him.' Central Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Ambrose, 435 So.2d 1203, 1206 (Ala.1983) (quoting Sylvan Beach, Inc. v. Koch, 140 F.2d 852, 861-62 (8th Cir.1944)). The question thus resolves itself to whether the relief given by the trial court is based upon issues that were in the case.  435 So.2d at 1207 (emphasis added). In this same connection, it hardly bears repeating that without specific statutory authority not here applicable Alabama courts are not empowered to decide abstract or hypothetical questions or render purely advisory opinions. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 293 Ala. at 651, 309 So.2d at 429. Thus, aside from creating the due-process problems discussed in Ambrose, if a trial court undertakes to decide a question, other than one presented by the parties, it enters the area of the abstract or hypothetical and therefore acts beyond its authority. The rationale for the relief granted in paragraphs 8-10 can be syllogized as follows: (1) § 177(b) purports to disfranchise convicted felons on the basis of whether the felony of which they are convicted involves moral turpitude; (2) disfranchisement is part of the punishment for the crime of which they were convicted; (3) the definition of moral turpitude is vague as applied on a case-by-case basis; (4) that vagueness creates confusion among voters and registrars as to who is entitled to the franchise; (5) the confusion may result in the disfranchisement of voters convicted of nondisqualifying felonies; (6) the disfranchisement deprives qualified voters of due process; therefore the deprivation can be cured only by a complete catalog of disqualifying crimes supplied in due course by the legislaturethe only body empowered to define crimes and to set the punishment therefor. The trial court effectively held that the courts of Alabama have no power to decide whether a crime involves moral turpitude. Whatever merit this syllogism might have in the abstract, it has no application to this case. This is so, because this case does not involve a dispute about how to distinguish between felonies that involve moral turpitude and those that do not; instead, it involves the secretary of state and Hunter, acting upon direction from the secretary of state, ignoring the distinction altogether and not attempting to apply the clear language of § 177(b). This fact is amply illustrated by the plaintiffs' pleadings in the trial court and Gooden and Thomas's arguments in this Court. Although Gooden and Thomas have adapted their arguments in this Court to support the trial court's holding that legislative direction is required, their pleadings extol the direction provided by the attorney general in his opinion. In paragraph 12 of the original complaint, for example, Gooden lauded the attorney general's opinion of March 18, 2005, as providing  clear direction  and states that,  notwithstanding [that] clear direction, the secretary of state instructed Hunter and other registrars not to register people with felony convictions whether or not the felony involved moral turpitude. (Emphasis added.) In paragraph 17 of the complaint, Gooden alleged that the secretary of state had directed Hunter not to register individuals with felony convictions . . . irrespective of whether or not such felony convictions involved moral turpitude, and that he was not permitted to register notwithstanding the fact that his conviction was expressly identified in the attorney general's opinion as [a] non-disqualifying crime. (Emphasis added.) Those allegations were repeated in substantially identical terms in the last amended complaint. In addition, the last amended complaint alleged that Thomas would have been registered but for the illegal policy of the defendants to disfranchise all persons convicted of any felony. (Emphasis added.) The relief sought in paragraphs 100, 101, and 102 of the last amended complaint essentially mirrors the relief sought in the paragraphs 31, 34, and 35 of the original complaint, namely, that the court declare individuals convicted of felonies not involving moral turpitude, as enumerated by the attorney general . . ., are eligible to vote (emphasis added), and issue an injunction requiring the secretary of state to direct Hunter and other registrars promptly to permit individuals with felony convictions not involving moral turpitude to register to vote. Conspicuously absent is any allegation that Gooden, Thomas, or any putative class member was disfranchised as a result of any confusion over the particular nature of their felony. There was no allegation, for example, that any felon was erroneously allowed to vote notwithstanding that he or she had been convicted of a disqualifying felony. Similarly, in their brief to this Court, Gooden and Thomas contend that the [l]ongstanding practice of the registrars was that of categorically disfranchising individuals who had any felony conviction. Gooden and Thomas's brief, at 13 (first emphasis added). They argue that [b]y categorically disfranchising every person with a felony conviction without considering whether the felony in question involved moral turpitude, the Defendants have . . . disregarded the substantive mandate of Section 177 of the Alabama Constitution. Gooden and Thomas's brief, at 17 (emphasis added). Significantly, Gooden and Thomas concede that paragraph 7 of the trial court's order provided precisely the relief they sought. Gooden and Thomas's brief, at 49 n. 13 (emphasis added). However, the relief afforded in that paragraph was limited to (1) a declaration that the policy and practice previously . . . employed by the defendants of denying voter registration to an individual . . . who had been convicted of any felony (emphasis in original) violated the Alabama Constitution, and (2) an order that the defendants cease and desist in refusing voter registration on [ that] basis  (emphasis added). [7] All matters relating to confusion over the meaning of the phrase moral turpitude were addressed in paragraphs 8-10 of the order. Gooden and Thomas's concession as to the sufficiency of paragraph 7 belies any argument that they were complaining about the inability of the registrars to understand, that is, to correctly apply, the definition of moral turpitude. Finally, there was no evidence indicating that anyone has been disfranchised as the result of a decision on the merits applying the definition of moral turpitude. On the contrary, it is undisputed that Gooden, Jones, and Thomas had been denied the right to register without any concern as to the specific nature of their felonies. Consequently, we can only conclude that this action did not arise out of, and does not involve, the constitutionality of § 177 as applied; any matters relating to the trial court's syllogistic reasoning; or the purported evils that were the focus of paragraphs 8-10. Because this case was never about the definition of moral turpitude, it involved no issue regarding the proper entities to apply the definition of that term to any particular felony. In addressing such issues, the trial court fundamentally recast the character of this case. In so doing, it entered the forbidden territory of the abstract and hypothetical and thereby exceeded its authority. It follows that paragraphs 8-10 of the trial court's order are therefore void. [8]