Opinion ID: 3003741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process

Text: Gallo-Moreno argues that Tovar’s identification of him as Carrion violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. He contends that the government “primed” Tovar to identify him as Carrion by telling Tovar that Carrion was in custody and that Tovar understood that he was expected to make a positive identification. GalloMoreno also claims that the identification was based on unduly suggestive procedures and was unreliable under the totality of the circumstances, violating his dueprocess rights. The district court rejected Gallo-Moreno’s Fifth Amendment argument, and we review the district 10 No. 06-1696 court’s decision de novo. United States v. Hawkins, 499 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2007). In the context of witness identifications, the Supreme Court has explained that “[i]t is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant’s right to due process.” Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972). Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), holds that an identification based on a suggestive identification procedure does not automatically establish a constitutional violation. Id. at 109. Instead, the ultimate question is whether the identification was nonetheless reliable, which “is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.” Id. at 114. The Court in Brathwaite identified several factors that inform the determination of an identification’s reliability: The factors to be considered [in determining reliability] . . . include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. Id. (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200). In reviewing a due-process challenge to an identification, we undertake a “well-settled, two-pronged analysis: (1) whether the [out-of-court identification] process was unduly suggestive, and (2) if so, whether the identification was nevertheless sufficiently reliable.” United No. 06-1696 11 States v. Recendiz, 557 F.3d 511, 524 (7th Cir. 2009); accord Hawkins, 499 F.3d at 707. “Our role . . . is to determine whether the identification was so unreliable that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial should have precluded its admission.” Recendiz, 557 F.3d at 524. We need not address whether the procedures underlying Tovar’s identification were unduly suggestive because “under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was nonetheless reliable.” Hawkins, 499 F.3d at 707. As the Second Circuit has observed, “[w]itnesses who listen to a crime that has been memorialized on tape are in a position to offer uniquely reliable testimony.” Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 786 (2d Cir. 1981) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). That observation is fully borne out in this case. Applying the factors set forth in Biggers and Brathwaite, we note first that Tovar spent four to six hours listening and relistening to 30 minutes’ worth of tape recordings of Carrion’s voice. This exhibits a lengthy opportunity to observe and a high degree of attention on Tovar’s part—well above that of the typical crime victim or witness. Tovar studied the tapes knowing that the government expected him to attempt a voice identification and that he would be subjected to cross-examination if he positively identified “Carrion.” Further, Tovar’s status as a DEA agent bolsters our conclusion about his degree of attention, see Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 115; United States v. Jones, 454 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir. 2006), as does the fact that Tovar “ha[d] the luxury of listening to the tape in an office, where [he] can devote [his] full attention to it,” Brown, 666 F.2d at 786. Also, Tovar immediately 12 No. 06-1696 expressed certainty that Gallo-Moreno was Carrion after hearing his voice. Finally, a mere day elapsed between his review of the tapes and the subsequent identification. That Tovar did not describe Carrion’s voice prior to his identification does not undermine the strength of the other reliability factors. We reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801, 809-11 (7th Cir. 1988). There, FBI agents spent hundreds of hours listening to a defendant’s voice on tape before identifying the defendant. We held that under the Biggers factors the identification was reliable, and therefore we rejected the defendant’s dueprocess challenge to the agents’ identifications. GalloMoreno tries to distinguish Alvarez by observing that the agents in Alvarez spent hundreds of hours reviewing the tapes while Tovar spent only four to six hours reviewing Carrion’s tapes. This is not a meaningful distinction. Four to six hours of careful study is plenty of time to become familiar with a voice on a tape; hundreds are not needed for the identification to pass constitutional muster. Our recent decision in United States v. Recendiz, 557 F.3d 511, also supports our holding. There, a DEA agent was instructed to listen to a six-minute call “in order to do a voice recognition.” Id. at 527. Applying the Biggers factors, we likewise rejected the defendant’s dueprocess challenge to the identification. We said that the sixminute call had offered the agent “a clear opportunity to listen to the [defendant’s] voice.” Id. at 528. We also noted that the “special agent [knew] his recollection No. 06-1696 13 would be subject to close scrutiny at trial, [so he] devoted proper attention to the call, making him nothing like ‘a casual or passing observer.’ Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 115.” Id. The same reasoning applies to the identification at issue here. Accordingly, we reject Gallo-Moreno’s Fifth Amendment challenge to the admissibility of Tovar’s identification.