Opinion ID: 6341841
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Intervene Claim

Text: As with every § 1983 claim, to survive summary judgment, Grinnell must have pleaded that every Defendant committed some constitutional violation. Fazica, 926 F.3d at 292. “Fazica merely relieves the plaintiff of the summary-judgment burden to pinpoint which specific officer committed which specific unconstitutional act.” Pineda, 977 F.3d at 493 (emphasis in original). The usual way to ensure that all defendants may be liable for some constitutional violation is by 8 No. 21-2748, Grinnell v. City of Taylor, Mich., et al. bringing a failure to intervene claim. In Pineda, we expressed concern as to “whether a plaintiff can raise this type of failure-to-intervene claim in summary-judgment briefing without adequately pleading it in a complaint.” Id.; see also 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2723 (3d ed. Supp. 2005) (“A non-moving party plaintiff may not raise a new legal claim for the first time in response to the opposing party’s summary judgment motion. At the summary judgment stage, the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the complaint in accordance with Rule 15(a).”). Defendants argue that because Grinnell did not specifically enumerate a failure to intervene claim in his complaint, no such claim has been pleaded. Consequently, according to Defendants, without a failure to intervene claim, Grinnell fails Fazica’s first element. The district court considered this argument and concluded that in addition to his claims of excessive force, “Grinnell also states a claim for the officers who failed to intervene to stop this allegedly excessive force.” (Op. & Order, R. 80., Page ID # 2231.) From the commencement of a lawsuit through discovery, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “provide for liberal notice pleading.” Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps., 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). But once discovery closes and a party moves for summary judgment, “the liberal pleading standards under . . . [the Federal Rules] are inapplicable.” Id. (quoting Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)). Instead, when a party is alleged to be asserting a new claim at the summary judgment stage, the inquiry is whether the party is attempting to expand the claims already brought. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 508 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2007) (“To the extent [a party] seeks to expand its claims to assert new theories, it may not do so in response to summary judgment.”). To help assess whether a party is seeking to expand its claims, 9 No. 21-2748, Grinnell v. City of Taylor, Mich., et al. courts consider whether the allegedly new claim causes “unfair surprise” to the defendant. Tucker, 407 F.3d at 788. In the present case, Grinnell is not attempting to expand his complaint to include a failure to intervene claim. In at least two instances, Grinnell alleged in his amended complaint that Defendants did not intervene. First, he alleged that Defendants “were obligated to stop [the officers] from the brutal, unjustified physical attack inflicted on Plaintiff.” (Am. Compl., R. 48, Page ID #668.) A few paragraphs later, Grinnell reiterated this allegation, pleading, “none of the other officers at the scene came to the rescue of Plaintiff, nor did they attempt to restrain the assaulting officers . . . .” (Id., Page ID #671.) Although Grinnell did not use the phrase “failure to intervene,” he alleged conduct that, for all intents and purposes, put Defendants on notice that he intended to bring a failure to intervene claim. See Bard v. Brown County, 970 F.3d 738, 750 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding plaintiff did not “expand” her complaint when “the parameters of her § 1983 claim . . . were the same at summary judgment as they were when she filed her Amended Complaint.”). Thus, when Grinnell mentioned a failure to intervene claim in his opposition to summary judgment, he was not seeking to expand his complaint to include a new claim; he was referring to a claim that was alleged in his amended complaint. Nor does reading his complaint to include a failure to intervene claim cause Defendants unfair surprise. During Grinnell’s first deposition, counsel for Defendants clarified that Grinnell intended to bring a failure to intervene claim: Q: The question is: Did she do anything wrong? And if so, what did she do? GRINNELL: She didn’t speak up and stop it when I was handcuffed. She should have said hey, he’s handcuffed. ... Q: Your complaint is that she didn’t try to stop what was happening? GRINNELL: Yes. 10 No. 21-2748, Grinnell v. City of Taylor, Mich., et al. (Grinnell Dep. I, R. 72-9, Page ID #1317.) Like his amended complaint, Grinnell did not use the phrase “failure to intervene.” Nevertheless, the record is quite clear that he intended to bring such a claim, and that Defendants had notice of his intent. It was only when seeking summary judgment that Defendants decided to question whether such a claim was actually raised. Accordingly, we hold that Grinnell has pleaded a failure to intervene claim. Accepting that Grinnell has pleaded a failure to intervene claim, the question then becomes whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on such claim. An officer may be liable for failing to intervene when, “(1) the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used, and (2) the officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.” Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997)). Because the Defendants all testified that they were in a close enough proximity to intervene, the most important consideration in this appeal is how long the application of excessive force lasted. “[W]here the ‘act of excessive force unfolds in a matter of seconds, the second requirement is generally not satisfied.’” Alexander v. Carter for Byrd, 733 F. App’x 256, 265 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Pennington v. Terry, 644 F. App’x 533, 548 (6th Cir. 2016)). In Pineda, we held that “an excessive use of force lasting ten seconds or less does not give a defendant enough time to perceive the incident and intervene to stop such force.” 977 F.3d at 493 (quotation omitted). But of course, the longer a defendant is alleged to have used excessive force, the more likely other officers will have had an opportunity to intervene. For example, in Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314, 329 (6th Cir. 2015), we held a twentyone second tasing followed by an additional five-second tasing was long enough for other officers to intervene. 11 No. 21-2748, Grinnell v. City of Taylor, Mich., et al. Because this is an appeal of a denial of qualified immunity, the Court should adopt Grinnell’s theory of events. See Jefferson v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 454, 459 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]o bring an interlocutory appeal of a qualified immunity ruling, the defendant must be willing to concede the plaintiff’s version of the facts for purposes of the appeal.”). However, when a party’s recollection of the facts is contradicted by undisputed video or audio records, the Court need not accept the non-movant’s version of events. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007); Coble v. City of White House, 634 F.3d 865, 869 (6th Cir. 2011) (extending Scott’s holding to audio recordings). Grinnell testified that the assault lasted as long as one-and-a-half minutes. His testimony consistently states that the one-and-a-half-minute timeframe began “as soon as [he] got off [his] stairs.” (Grinnell Dep. I, R. 72-9, Page ID #1315.) Defendants try to whittle down the duration of the assault by claiming the audio recording captured by the Taylor Police Department proves that for approximately one minute of the one-and-a-half-minute timeframe, Defendants were not assaulting him. Therefore, according to Defendants, all acts of excessive force must have occurred in, at most, thirty seconds. This misconstrues the evidence and ignores Grinnell’s testimony. It is undisputed that for a span of approximately one minute after Grinnell exited his home he was not being assaulted. Grinnell does not challenge the authenticity of the audio recording, which irrefutably proves this. Where Defendants err, however, is claiming that the audio recording and Grinnell’s recollection of events contradict. The audio recording captured events that occurred before Grinnell stepped off his front stairs. We know the audio recording captured sounds from before Grinnell stepped off his stairs because after Grinnell told Corporal Brinker over the phone that he would go outside, there were a few seconds of silence. Corporal Brinker then asked Grinnell, “where ya at, on the porch?” (Audio Recording, R. 72-2, 34:51–34:52.) Grinnell replied, 12 No. 21-2748, Grinnell v. City of Taylor, Mich., et al. “yeah, I’m walking on the porch.” (Id., 34:52–34:54.) Finally, at the very end of the audio recording, just before the recording ends, sounds of a struggle can be heard. Inferring the facts in Grinnell’s favor, the one-and-a-half-minute assault began just as the recording ended. Because the audio recording only captures a few seconds of the assault, the recording cannot be said to “blatantly contradict” Grinnell’s theory that the assault went on for 90 seconds. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81. Therefore, we adhere to the facts as Grinnell has alleged them and presume the assault lasted one-and-a-half minutes. Besides the argument that the events unfolded rapidly, Defendants offer no reason that they could not intervene during the prolonged use of excessive force. One-and-a-half minutes is surely enough time to perceive the use of excessive force and intervene. Thus, accepting Grinnell’s theory of events, and even accounting for the undisputed audio recording, Defendants may be liable for failing to intervene.