Opinion ID: 1383099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether willfulness is a requisite element of direct criminal contempt.

Text: AS 09.50.010 sets forth certain acts and omissions which constitute contempt. The statute provides in part that: The following acts or omissions in respect to a court of justice or court proceedings are contempts of the authority of the court: (1) disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court, tending to impair its authority or to interrupt the course of a trial or other judicial proceeding. [54] This portion of Alaska's contempt laws furnished the basis for Judge Brewer's adjudication of contempt. For in his certificate of contempt, [55] Judge Brewer states in part that: I queried the defendant as to his actions and thereupon found his actions contemptuous of the court's authority, dignity, and decorum and tending to disrupt the proceedings therein; That I found the defendant in contempt of court under AS 09.50.010 and sentenced him to six months in jail therefore under AS 09.50.020, after having advised the defendant of his rights and after reading both statutes into the record and explaining them to him. [56] The issue is one of first impression since no Alaska state cases are directly in point. [57] Taylor v. District Court, 434 P.2d 679, 681 (Alaska 1967), relied upon by Browder, involves an indirect contempt of court. Taylor involved an attorney who failed to appear in the district court for trial. This court held that willful disregard or disobedience of the authority or orders of the court was a necessary element of indirect contempt. A number of territorial cases which have considered the question uniformily hold, or proceed on the assumption, that intent or willfulness is a necessary element for direct criminal contempt. In In re Stabler, 7 Alaska 186, 187, 190-191 (1924), an Assistant United States Attorney had made remarks challenging the honesty and integrity of the court. Appeal from conviction of contempt was based partly on the ground that there had been no contempt because none had been intended. Although the appellate court found that the language used by the attorney was questionable, it reversed the conviction on the grounds of lack of intent appearing from the record: Had the order stated that the remarks were made with an intention to cast reflections on the integrity of the court,    the order then might have been sufficient. This action is in the nature of a criminal action, and, according to the authorities, the construction placed on words used    should be favorable to the defendant.    There is no finding that the remarks were made otherwise than respectfully or properly, or with an intention to reflect upon or give offense to the judge of the court. Paul v. United States, 36 F.2d 639 (9th Cir.1929), involved a summary contempt conviction of a lawyer who had filed an affidavit the trial court believed contained false allegations. The Ninth Circuit reversed his conviction finding that Paul had acted in good faith (i.e., that he had not entertained an intent to make a false affidavit). In Tjosevig v. United States, 255 F. 5 (9th Cir.1919), both an attorney and his client were cited for contempt as a result of an attempt to obtain a change of venue on the grounds that the trial judge was prejudiced. The Ninth Circuit considered two defenses, one of which was that the facts did not indicate the intention of the accused to commit a contempt. The court upheld this defense, finding that the attempt to change venue was a good faith attempt on the part of the attorney to protect the rights of his client. It is apparent that these territorial cases furnish Alaskan precedent for the proposition that willfulness is a required element of direct contempt. We believe this territorial view is reflective of sound jurisprudence and merits retention. Our study of the authorities on both sides of this issue has left us with a firm conviction as to the efficacy of maintaining willfulness as a requisite element of direct criminal contempt. The soundness of such a requirement is vividly demonstrated in the case at bar. The record in the case at bar reveals an ambiguous factual setting which is susceptible of varying interpretations. [58] In such circumstances we deem it highly appropriate that the judge, if the matter is tried to the court without jury, in his certificate be required to make a finding that the conduct constituting the contempt was willful, or if the matter is tried to a jury that it be proven the accused was willfully contumacious. [59] We use willfully here in the sense that an act is done willfully if done voluntarily and intentionally, that is, with the intent to disobey or disregard the law. The superior court's judgment reversing Browder's contempt conviction and remanding the matter to the district court for trial by jury is affirmed.