Opinion ID: 1852214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Preemption by Iowa Civil Rights Statute.

Text: The defendants argue that Grimm's intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against McAllister is also preempted by the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code ch. 216, even though the statute does not apply to sexual orientation. See Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Iowa 1983) (holding the Iowa Civil Rights Act does not make transsexuals a protected class). The defendants contend that, because the legislature has given a statutory remedy to some claimants, it has impliedly preempted the whole field and has thereby denied a remedy to all others. Thus, with great timidity [the court] must defer to the legislature to establish the parameters of our common law as well [as statutory law]. Eddy v. Casey's Gen. Store, Inc., 485 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Iowa 1992) (Larson, J., dissenting). Grimm has not attempted to couch her claim as one for sexual orientation discrimination but rather one for intentional infliction of emotional distress. She alleges: 34. Defendant McAllister's discriminatory and malicious actions as set forth above were outrageous and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. 35. Defendant McAllister intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences inflicted upon Plaintiff severe emotional harm and distress. The defendants assert these claims are merely disguised claims of sexual-orientation discrimination, and the discriminatory and malicious actions of McAllister must be interpreted as sexual-orientation discrimination. However, it takes a significant amount of interpolation to make Grimm's emotional-distress claim a sexual-orientation claim, especially when we consider that the issues arose at the petition stage on a motion to dismiss. We have said a petition need only give fair notice of the incident giving rise to the claim and the general nature of the claim presented. Soike v. Evan Matthews & Co., 302 N.W.2d 841, 842 (Iowa 1981). Grimm could simply have alleged in general terms the elements of an intentional-infliction-of-emotional distress claim and survived a motion to dismiss. We cannot agree with the defendants that, at least at this preliminary stage, she has alleged a discrimination claim that is preempted by the civil rights statute. We therefore conclude the district court erred in dismissing Grimm's intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim on the basis it was preempted by the Iowa Civil Rights Act.