Opinion ID: 1922039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Entry of Judgment as a Discovery Sanction

Text: [¶ 8] Soley first challenges the court's imposition of a judgment against all defendants on all claims of liability as a sanction, pursuant to M.R. Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C), [7] for discovery related conduct. Soley argues that the court abused its discretion by imposing the ultimate sanction without providing the defendants another chance to comply with the discovery order, and without issuing a warning that the court was contemplating the entry of judgment as a sanction. [8] [¶ 9] We review the imposition of sanctions for discovery violations for an abuse of discretion, but will more closely scrutinize sanctions such as dismissal or default. See Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 61, ¶ 6, 708 A.2d 281, 283. Nevertheless, [a]lthough we recognize the constitutional implications of dismissal and give greater scrutiny to the decision to dismiss than we would give to a lesser sanction, we will not lightly overrule the trial court's decision. Orlandella v. O'Brien, 637 A.2d 105, 106 (Me.1994) (citing Fallon v. Casco-Northern Corp., 462 A.2d 53, 56 (Me.1983); Reeves v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 421 A.2d 47, 50 (Me.1980)); see also Pelletier v. Pathiraja, 519 A.2d 187, 190 (Me.1986). [9] [¶ 10] A court that is called upon to determine an appropriate sanction for a discovery violation must understand the facts at issue, the factors and the law material to its decision, and must weigh the factors accordingly. The factors to be weighed when the court considers imposing sanctions for discovery violations include, but are not limited to, the purpose of the specific rule at issue, the party's conduct throughout the proceedings, the party's bona fides in its failure to comply, prejudice to other parties, and the need for the orderly administration of justice. [10] Baker's Table, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2000 ME 7, ¶ 17, 743 A.2d 237, 243. The court must also consider the purposes to be served by imposing sanctions, including penalizing the noncompliant party, remedying the effects of the noncompliance, and deterring similar conduct by the offending party, as well as by others. See Pelletier, 519 A.2d at 190; Reeves, 421 A.2d at 50. [¶ 11] When the court has determined the facts without error and has understood the factors and law material to the decision at hand, we defer to the trial court and will find an abuse of discretion only where the court makes a serious mistake in weighing the applicable factors. See West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 1997 ME 58, ¶ 7, 691 A.2d 1211, 1213. [¶ 12] In the matter before us, the court had before it evidence that Soley failed at every turn to comply with Rule 26, failed to cooperate in good faith in providing access to the apartment, failed to make witnesses reasonably available for deposition, and ultimately failed to comply with the court's order compelling compliance with the rules. By the date first scheduled for hearing on the tenants' motion for discovery sanctions  over seven months after the service of the complaint and first request for documents, two days short of the close of discovery, and more than a month after the date by which compliance had been ordered by the court  Soley had produced not a single document, the apartment had not been made available for inspection, and only one deposition had been taken. [11] [¶ 13] As a result of the delay occasioned by Soley's conduct, discovery had barely begun on the day that the court had set for the close of discovery. The tenants and their attorneys were required to spend unnecessary time and money setting up and canceling depositions, writing letters, scheduling conferences with the court, and attending hearings. The tenants were effectively prevented from preparing their case and on the eve of trial had received almost no meaningful discovery. It is difficult to imagine a more unprincipled approach to the discovery process. [¶ 14] Soley argues, nonetheless, that the defendants should not have been exposed to the ultimate sanction for two reasons: first, Soley argues that the court was unaware of whether his attorney had kept him informed on discovery issues, and second, Soley insists that the defendants only engaged in a clear violation of one court order. [12] Both arguments lack merit. [¶ 15] Regarding Soley's first argument, it is well settled that the knowledge of trial counsel is imputed to plaintiff. Orlandella, 637 A.2d at 106 n. 1. The conduct of discovery constitutes no exception to that rule. Soley's complete failure to comply with his discovery obligations, regardless of his relationship with his attorney, requires that the defendants be held fully accountable. [¶ 16] Soley's second argument, that default judgment was an inappropriate sanction given the fact that the defendants only failed to comply with one court order, demonstrates a critical misapprehension of the rules of discovery. Our discovery rules are designed to eliminate the sporting theory of justice. Reeves, 421 A.2d at 50, and are based on concepts of voluntary cooperation. [13] A party to a lawsuit has a duty to comply with the rules regarding discovery throughout the litigation. [¶ 17] Recourse to the authority of the court for orders compelling compliance with the rules must be the exception rather than the rule. Ordinarily, the court's intervention in discovery matters should be necessary only where there is a legitimate dispute regarding the responsibility of one party to provide certain discovery. When one party forces another to obtain a court order merely to enforce an obligation that is not legitimately in dispute, that party wastes the court's resources, causes unnecessary expense to the opposing party, and delays the ultimate resolution of the suit. Hence, a party's failure to cooperate in discovery prior to the entry of a court order compelling compliance constitutes conduct throughout the proceeding that may be considered by a court in determining an appropriate sanction for purposes of M.R. Civ. P. 37(b). Baker's Table, Inc., 2000 ME 7, ¶ 17, 743 A.2d at 243. [¶ 18] There can be no question on the record of this case that Soley failed to comply with the rules of discovery, caused additional expense and delay by his conduct, and failed to comply with the court order requiring his compliance. The court acted well within the bounds of its discretion when it entered judgment in favor of the tenants on all claims as a discovery sanction.