Opinion ID: 1426055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Supreme Court's Opinion in Bowles Requires Overruling Zhong Guang Sun

Text: We first consider whether Bowles requires us to re-evaluate our Court's holding in Zhong Guang Sun, which permits the BIA to hear untimely appeals in extraordinary or unique circumstances. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 461 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir.2006) (While `as a general rule, one panel of this Court cannot overrule a prior decision of another panel[,] an exception to this general rule arises where there has been an intervening Supreme Court decision that casts doubt on our controlling precedent.' (alteration in original) (quoting Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees v. INS, 336 F.3d 200, 210 (2d Cir.2003))). In Bowles, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the statutory origin of the time limits for appealing a district court's judgment in a civil case. See, e.g., 127 S.Ct. at 2362 (In this case, a District Court purported to extend a party's time for filing an appeal beyond the period allowed by statute.); id. at 2364 (Although several of our recent decisions have undertaken to clarify the distinction between claims-processing rules and jurisdictional rules, none of them calls into question our longstanding treatment of statutory time limits for taking an appeal as jurisdictional.); id. at 2365 (Jurisdictional treatment of statutory time limits makes good sense.). The Court distinguished court-promulgated rules from limits enacted by Congress, and it explained that [b]ecause Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them. Id. at 2365. Thus, when Congress forbids federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate `class of cases' after a certain period has elapsed from final judgment, the effects are the same as when a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a class of cases. Id. at 2366. Because Bowles was concerned exclusively with congressional limitations on judicial authority, we must consider what, if any, statutes impose the time limits at issue in the instant case. As an initial matter, we note that the time limits here are for administrative appeals (not judicial appeals as in Bowles ) and that administrative agencies have broad discretion to interpret the statutes they are charged with implementing. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Yet even if the jurisdictional principles articulated in Bowles apply to statutory time limits placed on administrative appealsa question on which we intimate no viewwe find no such relevant statutes in petitioner's case. Neither the BIA's May 31, 2006 order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration at issue here, nor the BIA's earlier order dismissing petitioner's appeal, relied on any statutory provisions governing time limits for appeals to the BIA. Rather, when discussing the relevant time limits, the BIA cited only the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38. See note 2 ante (quoting relevant portions of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38). Moreover, our Court in Zhong Guang Sun made no mention of any statutes undergirding those regulations. See Zhong Guang Sun, 421 F.3d at 107-08 & n. 4. The Government's principal brief to our Court likewise did not indicate that there exists a statutory basis for the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal. Surprisingly, in its supplemental brief to our Court, the Government argues that the time limits for appeals to the BIA are statutory. As support for this proposition, the Government draws to our attention the statutory scheme governing asylum applications, which instructs the Attorney General to establish a procedure for the consideration of asylum applications, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(1), and mandates this procedure to provide that any administrative appeal shall be filed within 30 days of a decision granting or denying asylum, or within 30 days of the completion of removal proceedings before an immigration judge . . ., whichever is later, id. § 1158(d)(5)(a)(iv). Yet the instant case does not involve an asylum application; and although the petitioner in Zhong Guang Sun did appeal to the BIA from a denial of his application for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158, the petitioner in that case also appealed from denials of his application for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) which does not specify a time limit for filing an appealand for relief under the Convention Against Torture under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c) and 1208.17(a). Thus, Zhong Guang Sun 's interpretation of the regulations governing general administrative appeals to the BIA (such as appeals of decisions on applications for withholding of removal and CAT relief) would survive, even if 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(a)(iv) could be read to place a jurisdictional bar on untimely appeals to the BIA from decisions made on asylum applications. [4] Accordingly, we do not see how Bowles could cast[ ] doubt on our controlling precedent in this petitioner's case. Meacham, 461 F.3d at 141. Zhong Guang Sun remains good law (at least with respect to non-asylum claims), and upon timely filing of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner was not jurisdictionally barred from establishing extraordinary or unique circumstances that would excuse his untimely appeal. II. Whether the BIA Considered the Standard for Exceptions to Timeliness Under Zhong Guang Sun Having determined that Bowles does not upset our Court's precedent in the instant case, we now turn to whether the BIA erred (or abused its discretion) in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. See Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir.2006) (The BIA's denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse of discretion.). The BIA abuses its discretion in dismissing an appeal as untimely when it does not consider whether the reasons given for an untimely appeal constitute extraordinary or unique circumstances. See Zhong Guang Sun, 421 F.3d at 111. We do not lightly infer such omissions on the part of administrative adjudicators or, for that matter, district courts. Cf. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that an IJ is presumed to have considered all of the evidence before him unless the record compels otherwise); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir.2006) ([W]e presume, in the absence of record evidence suggesting otherwise, that a sentencing judge has faithfully discharged her duty to consider the statutory factors [under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)].). We think, however, that remand is warranted in this particular case, given sufficient indicia that the BIA did not consider the limited equitable exceptions to the timely filing of appeals discussed in Zhong Guang Sun. In its May 31, 2006 order, the BIA neither mentioned the standard for equitable exceptions articulated in Zhong Guang Sun, nor cited any case law applying that standard. Additionally, the BIA referred to its February 10, 2006 order as dismissing [petitioner's] appeal for lack of jurisdiction as it was untimely filed. Such jurisdictional language suggests that the BIA assumed there were no equitable exceptions to the time limits for appeals provided by regulation. Finally, although the BIA concluded that FedEx had not erred with respect to delivery of petitioner's appeal package, Zhong Guang Sun does not state that extraordinary or unique circumstances exist only when overnight carriers commit errors. If the BIA concludes that petitioner's justification for untimely filing does not present extraordinary or unique circumstances, it must provide a reasoned explanation for why this is so. See Zhong Guang Sun, 421 F.3d at 111. This explanation need not be elaborate or extensive, but it should at least acknowledge the availability of relief in appropriate circumstances. The combination of the above factors convinces us that we should permit the BIA to consider whether petitioner's motion for reconsiderationwhich describes petitioner's counsel as dropping off petitioner's appeal package at FedEx with the understanding that it would be delivered on timeestablishes extraordinary or unique circumstances allowing the appeal to be heard under Zhong Guang Sun. [5] For the reasons stated above, the petition for review is GRANTED, the BIA's May 31, 2006 order is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the BIA for proceedings consistent with this opinion. In view of our disposition, petitioner's motion for a stay of deportation is DENIED as moot.