Opinion ID: 1150403
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for Custodial Interrogation:

Text: In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), the Supreme Court relied on the sixth amendment to exclude a confession because the police refused Escobedo's request for counsel made during interrogation; the interrogation occurred after the investigation had focused on the defendant. The case could be read narrowly or broadly, and a broad reading made focus of the investigation on the defendant the touchstone for sixth amendment, right to counsel, protection. [9] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706 (1966), held that the privilege against self-incrimination applied to informal police coercion as well as formal coercion [10] and required that a suspect be advised of his fifth and sixth amendment rights before custodial interrogation: By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706. The footnote to this definition of custodial interrogation states: This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused. Id. at 444 n. 4, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 n. 4, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706 n. 4. [11] Some courts, familiar with the focus concept from Escobedo, required Miranda warnings because the investigation had focused on the defendant, without requiring a separate finding of custody. [12] Most courts and scholars, however, early recognized that Miranda made custody, not focus, the test for advising suspects of their rights, [13] and as time passed, most courts rejected the focus test. [14] It was not until 1976, in Beckwith v. United States , that the Supreme Court expressly indicated that focus of the investigation on the defendant, with nothing more, did not require Miranda warnings. [15] In Peterson v. State, 562 P.2d 1350, 1362 (Alaska 1977), we left as open whether `the principle of Miranda ... should be extended to cover interrogation in noncustodial circumstances after a police investigation has focused on the [subject].' We now hold that focus, per se, is not the proper test for Miranda warnings. Focus was and is still relevant, but it is relevant to a determination of custody. [16] The shift from focus to custody still leaves the courts with the far from easy task of determining whether questioning was initiated after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir.1969) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990, 90 S.Ct. 1123, 25 L.Ed.2d 398 (1970). The determination of custody is [p]robably the most difficult and frequently raised question in the wake of Miranda. Kamisar, Custodial Interrogation within the Meaning of Miranda, in Criminal Law and the Constitution, 335 (Reed et al. eds. 1968). [17] Here, the Supreme Court has given little express guidance. The Court's four major post- Miranda decisions on custody, like many state decisions, basically restate the Miranda definition and find custody or not on the particular facts. [18] Courts and commentators that have explicitly considered how to define custody have analyzed two approaches: a subjective test, whether this defendant thought he was in custody or whether the police officer thought the defendant was in custody; and an objective reasonable person test, whether a reasonable person would have thought he was in custody. [19] Most authority supports the objective, reasonable person test. [20] California's statement of this test in People v. Arnold, 66 Cal.2d 438, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 121, 426 P.2d 515, 521 (1967) (Tobriner, J.) is typical: [C]ustody occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived. We agree that the objective, reasonable person perspective is the proper standard for determining custody. The custody determination must be made on a case-by-case basis, but the inquiry, as expressed by the court in United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d at 545, is whether: in the absence of actual arrest something ... [is] said or done by the authorities, either in their manner of approach or in the tone or extent of their questioning, which indicates [to the defendant] that they would not have heeded a request to depart or to allow the suspect to do so. [21] This requires some actual indication of custody, such that a reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off police questioning. At least three groups of facts would be relevant to this determination. [22] The first are those facts intrinsic to the interrogation: when and where it occurred, how long it lasted, how many police were present, what the officers and the defendant said and did, the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door, and whether the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or as a witness. Facts pertaining to events before the interrogation are also relevant, especially how the defendant got to the place of questioning  whether he came completely on his own, in response to a police request, or escorted by police officers. Finally, what happened after the interrogation  whether the defendant left freely, was detained or arrested  may assist the court in determining whether the defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the questioning. [23] We believe a reasonable person test for custody is faithful to the basic concerns of Miranda. The Court required a standardized set of warnings to counteract the coercive effect of custodial interrogation on the person being questioned and to tell police officers how to protect a suspect's rights during such interrogation. [24] A reasonable person test for custody gives effect to the purpose of the Miranda rules; it is not solely dependent either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers or the defendant nor does it place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies of every person whom they question. People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 (1967) (citation and footnote omitted). [25] Some commentaries have interpreted Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam), as foreclosing, as far as federal constitutional guarantees go, the reasonable person standard for custody and adopting an actual custody or custody in fact standard. [26] We think this is a misinterpretation. In Mathiason, a police officer suspected Carl Mathiason, a parolee, of involvement in a burglary and left a note asking Mathiason to call him. When Mathiason called, the officer asked where it would be convenient to meet. Mathiason had no preference, and the officer suggested the state patrol office. When Mathiason arrived, the officer told him he was not under arrest. They talked for five minutes in a closed room, and during their conversation, the officer said the police believed he was involved in the burglary and falsely stated that his fingerprints had been found at the scene. Mathiason sat for a minute or so and then said he had taken the property. After advising Mathiason of his Miranda rights and taking a taped confession, the officer told him he was not under arrest and Mathiason left. The officer said he was referring the case to the district attorney who would determine whether to bring charges. [27] The Oregon Supreme Court had excluded the statements, finding they occurred in a coercive environment. 549 P.2d at 675. The United States Supreme Court, without oral argument or full briefing by the parties, summarily reversed in a short per curiam opinion, finding on the facts before it: [T]here is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent's freedom to depart was restricted in any way. He came voluntarily to the police station, where he was immediately informed that he was not under arrest. At the close of a 1/2-hour interview respondent did in fact leave the police station without hindrance. It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714, 50 L.Ed.2d at 719. [28] The Court in Mathiason does not articulate a test for custody. It cites the Miranda definition, refers to Orozco and Mathis, [29] and concludes that the questioning of Mathiason was not custodial. It does state that the police officer's lie to the defendant about his fingerprints was irrelevant to determining custody, [30] but to infuse into that sentence an analysis and rejection of the reasonable person perspective on custody is a highly questionable reading of the opinion. We decline to attribute to the United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam summary reversal, a definitive ruling on probably the most difficult question of Miranda implementation  the definition of custody  and a sub silentio overruling of a host of federal and state decisions. [31] In a well-reasoned post- Mathiason decision, State v. Paz, 31 Or. App. 851, 572 P.2d 1036 (1977) (en banc), the court, after taking due note of Mathiason, followed the reasonable person test for custody and Miranda warnings. We think Chief Judge Schwab's characterization of Mathiason is accurate: The Court there simply held that policestation interrogations of a defendant were not inherently coercive, thus requiring Miranda warnings. Id. at 1042-43. Furthermore, the new test attributed to the Court is illusory. [32] The idea that after Mathiason, all we have to do is determine actual custody or custody in fact and the implication that this is a new test is disingenuous. The Miranda test has always been custody. The problem has always been custody, or its equivalent, and how to define it. The genesis of the new test seems to be the phrase in Mathiason that the defendant's freedom to depart was not restricted during the questioning. [33] The disputed cases of custody will be, of course, those situations in which the defendant did not try to leave. The courts still must determine how they will judge whether the defendant was free to leave: do they evaluate whether these particular police officers would have allowed the defendant to leave, whether this particular defendant thought he could leave, or what a reasonable defendant, reacting to the words and actions of the police officers and the situation of the interrogation, would have believed? [34] Any new label, be it custody in fact or actual custody, cannot banish the very real problem of perspective. [35] Like many courts, we have not before explicitly delineated a test for custodial interrogation, but our previous decisions are consistent with a reasonable person standard. [36] In Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 805 (Alaska 1970), [37] this court said: The courts must determine, therefore in each case whether the atmosphere and setting of an interrogation are of such coercive effect or indicate such significant restraint as to trigger the need for a Miranda warning. The standard we enunciate today provides a way to make that determination.