Opinion ID: 2685504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Negligent Entrustment Theory.

Text: Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that FedEx was liable because it negligently entrusted its trailers to Velichkov. Under Nebraska law, it is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. DeWebster v. Watkins, 745 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Neb. 2008), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308. In opposing summary judgment, plaintiffs argued that FedEx had control of trailers it owned; that FedEx had a duty under § 380.113(a) of the FMCSR to ensure that Velichkov was certified and properly trained to operate a double trailer; and that FedEx’s breach of this duty gave rise to a claim of negligent entrustment. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing this claim, concluding that, even if Velichkov was not properly certified (a disputed fact), FedEx -7- had no duty to inquire into that fact because Velichkov’s employer, Fresh Start, not FedEx, was the motor carrier bound by the FMCSR regulations. On appeal, citing § 390 of the Restatement, plaintiffs argue that FedEx may be liable even though it entrusted its trailers to Velichkov indirectly through a third party, Fresh Start. But even if the Supreme Court of Nebraska would adopt this aspect of § 390, there was no evidence that FedEx was aware of facts permitting a reasonable jury to find that it knew or should have known Velichkov was not a properly certified driver. Thus, as the district court recognized, the negligent entrustment claim turned on whether FedEx as a “motor carrier” was duty-bound by § 380.113 of the FMCSR to ensure Velichkov’s certification. Once again, plaintiffs argue that FedEx was a “motor carrier” for purposes of § 380.113 simply because “it was engaged in the primary business of transporting goods for compensation.” As we have explained, we agree with the district court that this is an overly broad, impractical interpretation of regulations drafted for other purposes. We acknowledge there might be specific facts that would warrant imposing § 380.113 duties, as a matter of federal law, on a registered motor carrier using a power-only independent contractor to pull trailers owned by the carrier-shipper. As plaintiffs have not presented such facts and are using this federal regulation to support a claim of negligence under state law, we agree with the district court that the undisputed facts warranted the grant of summary judgment dismissing the claim. IV. The Unpleaded Claim -- Negligent Hiring of Fresh Start Count V of plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that FedEx negligently hired and trained Velichkov to operate the tractor-trailer, a claim foreclosed by the district court’s determination that Velichkov was an employee of an independent contractor, Fresh Start. The court’s scheduling order allowed the parties until April 9, 2010 to file motions to amend their pleadings. After the scheduling order was amended four times to extend the discovery deadlines, on November 30, 2011, plaintiffs moved for -8- leave to amend their complaint to add allegations that (i) FedEx knew or should have known of Mickey’s poor safety rating and Fresh Start’s association with Mickey’s, and therefore (ii) FedEx negligently hired, trained, supervised, and entrusted its trailers to independent contractor Fresh Start. Plaintiffs argued that these amendments were meant to “clarify” that their claims of negligence extended to FedEx’s relationship with Fresh Start as well as driver Velichkov. The district court denied the motion for leave to amend for two reasons. First, the proposed amended complaint “would add an entirely new theory of recovery.” Second, “more to the point,” Rule 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a showing of good cause to amend outside the court’s scheduling order, and “nothing in the plaintiffs’ briefs explains, or seeks to explain, why they only sought leave to amend their complaint over 17 months after the deadline for doing so had passed.” Harris v. Velichkov, Order of Feb. 21, 2012, at 2-3. On appeal, plaintiffs concede that Rule 16(b)(4) provides the governing standard and requires a showing of good cause. See Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008). They argue there was good cause for their tardy request for leave to amend because the evidence supporting the new theories in the amended complaint became available during a discovery process that was unusually protracted due to scheduling difficulties not attributable to the plaintiffs. We review the district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Id. “The primary measure of good cause is the movant’s diligence in attempting to meet the [scheduling] order’s requirements. . . . Our cases reviewing Rule 16(b) rulings focus in the first instance (and usually solely) on the diligence of the party who sought modification of the order.” Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 716-17 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). A district court acts “within its discretion” in denying a motion to amend which made no attempt to show good cause. Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 589 (8th Cir. 2003); see Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 907-08 & n.26 (6th Cir. 2003). -9- Here, plaintiffs seek to survive their lack of a good cause showing in the district court with a due-diligence argument not made to the district court -- that they learned the necessary facts in discovery after the scheduling order’s deadline had passed. It would be extraordinary to allow a party to establish on appeal an abuse of discretion by the district court based on an argument not timely made to that court in exercising its discretion. But assuming such a showing is theoretically possible, plaintiffs do not come close to making it here -- they provide no specific citations to the summary judgment record that would permit us to conclude, in the first instance, that they acted promptly when they first learned of newly discovered evidence that warranted the tardy assertion of new theories of FedEx liability that would undoubtedly have required further extensions of the discovery period to fully explore. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ untimely motion for leave to amend their complaint. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. ______________________________ -10-