Opinion ID: 1237820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: WAS HIIBSCHMAN'S INJURY A RESULT OF A FAILURE TO SKI WITHIN HER ABILITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF AS 09.65.135(c)(1)(G)?

Text: The superior court concluded as a matter of law that at the time of the accident Hiibschman was skiing beyond her ability, within the meaning of AS 09.65.135(c)(1)(G). Hiibschman argues that the trial court's reasoning produces absurd results, assumes the legislature intended to change tort liability, and is contrary to public policy. The City emphasizes that Hiibschman knew from personal observation what the jump entailed and knowingly assumed the risk. It argues that Hiibschman's alcohol consumption magnified any risk inherent in the jump. The ski area operator is not liable for injuries resulting from inherent risks listed by the statute, including skiing beyond one's ability. A trial court should grant summary judgment only if no genuine issue of material fact exists. Sea Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc., 787 P.2d at 116 (Alaska 1990). Here, a disputed issue of fact exists as to whether Hiibschman was skiing beyond her ability. We hold that the trial court erred in not submitting this issue to the jury. For skiing beyond one's ability to bar an action, the skier must subjectively know he or she is skiing beyond his or her ability, as an inherent risk of skiing must be necessary and subjectively obvious. On knowledge of risk, Prosser states, [H]e must not only know of the facts which create the danger, but he must comprehend and appreciate the nature of the danger itself... . The standard to be applied is, in theory at least, a subjective one, geared to the particular plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of the reasonable man of ordinary prudence who appears in contributory negligence. If because of age or lack of information or experience, he does not comprehend the risk involved in a known situation, he will not be taken to consent to assume it. His failure to exercise ordinary care to discover the danger is not properly a matter of assumption of risk but of the defense of contributory negligence. At the same time ... the plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been quite clear and obvious to him. Keeton, supra, at 487-88 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added); see also Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School Dist., 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198, 1204 (1981). Viewing the evidence most favorably to Hiibschman, we find that skiing this jump was within her ability level. The jump was located on a beginners' slope. The ski lift operator described Salmonberry Ridge as very beginner, very slow. There is no difficulty to the run. Hiibschman had taken some down-hill ski lessons before, and had evaluated how to take this jump. Hiibschman watched beginners taking the jump, some mastering it. Others who mastered it, like Aaron Kelly, had fallen the first three times he jumped it. She did not notice anything dangerous about the way the jump was designed or constructed. Although Hiibschman was drinking, she said it did not affect her that day. Moreover, evidence was presented that teenagers and beginner skiers are not as able to accurately assess a degree of risk presented by a dangerous condition. Because contrary evidence was presented, [15] a contested issue of material fact exists. The question of whether Hiibschman was skiing beyond her ability should have gone to the jury.