Opinion ID: 2419583
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Heading: Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of Chancery Court

Text: Appellants correctly state the general rule that a chancellor has no criminal jurisdiction. State v. Vaughan, 81 Ark. 117, 98 S.W. 685 (1906). Further, it is correct that except in narrow circumstances ... equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime because the remedy at law is adequate. Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 93, 793 S.W.2d 788, 791 (1990). However, there are circumstances to which we refer in Bates and other cases where both criminal and equitable relief are appropriate. In a case involving an erroneously granted exception to the provisions of a city ordinance prohibiting the erection of a nonfireproof building, the chancery court refused to issue an injunction against the prohibited structure because the ordinance prescribed criminal punishments of a fine for each day of violation. Meyer v. Seifert, 216 Ark. 293, 225 S.W.2d 4 (1949). The appellees in that case argued that the criminal penalty was exclusive. We disagreed and reversed, stating in the words of Justice Robert A. Leflar: That equity will not act to restrain ordinary violations of the criminal law, but will leave the task of enforcing the criminal laws to courts having criminal jurisdiction, is basic learning in our legal system. But it is equally basic that if grounds for equity jurisdiction exist in a given case, the fact that the act to be enjoined is incidentally violative of a criminal enactment will not preclude equity's action to enjoin it. Id. at 296-97, 225 S.W.2d at 6. In State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Karston, 208 Ark. 703, 187 S.W.2d 327 (1945), we decided that the chancery court erred in refusing to entertain jurisdiction of an injunction proceeding brought by the Attorney General seeking to enjoin the operation of a gambling house and stated: The chancery court held that it had no jurisdiction in this case. We have repeatedly recognized that equity has authority to abate a public nuisance. In Ross et al. v. State, 184 Ark. 385, 42 S.W.2d 376, we quoted from Marvel v. State, 127 Ark. 595, 193 S.W. 259, 5 A.L.R. 1458, as follows: The Legislature has not conferred the jurisdiction upon the chancery court to abate public nuisances. This jurisdiction they have always had.  Id. at 710, 187 S.W.2d at 330 (emphasis added). We also quoted with approval the statement from 39 Am. Jur. 410, as follows: Where the act is both a public nuisance and a crime, the state may suppress it by a suit in equity, or resort to a criminal prosecution, or may do both.... To warrant an injunction where the nuisance is also a crime, there must be proof of what that law denominates a nuisance as distinguished from a mere crime. Id. at 711, 187 S.W.2d at 330. In an earlier case involving the same gambling house, Albright v. Karston, 206 Ark. 307, 176 S.W.2d 421 (1943), we reversed the local chancellor's decree protecting the gambling house from interference by the state police. We pointed out that a gambling house was a public nuisance at common law, and the operation of a gambling house has by statute been made a felony in Arkansas. Id. at 311-312, 176 S.W.2d at 423. In State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Karston, supra , we cited many decisions declaring a gambling house to be a public nuisance at common law, determined that the Attorney General has the power and duty under common law to institute equitable proceedings to enjoin the nuisance, and summed up as follows: [B]y the weight of authority, equity may act to suppress a public nuisance, even though the maintenance of the nuisance is a crime, where there is alleged in addition to the public nuisance, some facts which show the remedy at law, by prosecution of the criminal, is inadequate and incomplete to effect relief. Id. at 712, 187 S.W.2d at 331. In the case under consideration we note that the stipulation of facts, considered together with the principles we have reviewed, support the chancery court's following conclusions of law: That each of the bingo halls at issue in this case have operated (openly, publicly, repeatedly, continuously, persistently, and intentionally) on a regular basis for an extended period of time, notwithstanding any potential application or enforcement of any criminal statutes. It appears to this court that, whatever remedy may exist at law, it has proved to be inadequate. (Emphasis added.) We will not reverse the findings and conclusions of a chancery court unless they are clearly erroneous. Osborne v. Power, 318 Ark. 858, 890 S.W.2d 570 (1994). We conclude that the findings are not clearly erroneous, and agree with the chancery court's conclusion of law that this Court, as a court of equity, has jurisdiction to abate a public nuisance. We hold that the chancery court has subject-matter jurisdiction.