Opinion ID: 2826173
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Contemporary Standards of Decency

Text: The standard set forth in Boddie, which condemns Prindle’s alleged conduct, remains the same today. But in determining the application of that standard, the Eighth Amendment requires courts to “look beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We must therefore also recognize that particular conduct that might not have risen to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation 18 years ago may no longer accord with community standards, and for that reason may state a claim today. To ascertain contemporary standards of decency, courts begin by reviewing “objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). Subsequent enactments by state and federal legislatures show that standards of decency with regard to sexual 18 No. 14‐969‐cv abuse in prisons have evolved since 1997. At the time Boddie was written, 18 states and the District of Columbia expressly criminalized corrections officers’ sexual contact with inmates.5 Today, all but two states6 criminalize sexual contact between inmates and corrections officers.7 Moreover, many of the states that had enacted state laws proscribing officer‐inmate sexual contact prior to Boddie have, in the intervening years, adopted additional See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13‐1419; Cal. Penal Code § 289.6; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‐ 5 73a; D.C. Code § 22‐3014; Fla. Stat. § 794.011; Ga. Code Ann. § 16‐6‐5.1; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707‐732(e); Idaho Code § 18‐6110; Iowa Code § 709.16; La. Stat. Ann. § 14:134.1; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c (criminalizing sexual contact where the actor has authority over the victim); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:14‐2, 2C:14‐3; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30‐9‐11; N.Y. Penal Law § 130.05(3); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1‐20‐07; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11‐25‐24; S.D. Codified Laws § 22‐22‐7.6; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 39.04; Wis. Stat. § 940.225. 6 Since Boddie, 30 states criminalized sexual contact between corrections officers and inmates. See Ala. Code § 14‐11‐31; Alaska Stat. § 11.41.427; Ark. Code Ann. § 5‐14‐ 127(a)(2); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18‐7‐701; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11‐9.2; Ind. Code § 35‐44.1‐3‐10; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21‐5512; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.120; Me. Stat. Tit. 17‐A, § 255‐A; Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 3‐314; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 21A; Minn. Stat. § 609.345; Miss. Code Ann. § 97‐3‐104; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.145; Mont. Code Ann. § 45‐5‐502; Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28‐322; 28‐322.01; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 212.187; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 632‐A:3; 632‐ A:4; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14‐27.7 (criminalizing sexual contact where the actor has custody over the victim); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.03; Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.454; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3124.2; S.C. Code Ann. § 44‐23‐1150(c)(2); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39‐16‐408; Utah Code Ann. § 76‐5‐412; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2‐67.4; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3257; Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.170; W. Va. Code §§ 61‐8B‐2, 61‐8B‐7; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6‐2‐304. Delaware and Oklahoma only criminalize sexual intercourse or penetration, rather than sexual contact more broadly. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1259; Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(7). 7 Although the precise conduct prohibited varies by state, sexual contact is generally defined as intentional contact, for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse, of an inmate’s sexual or intimate areas by a corrections officer, or of an officer’s sexual or intimate areas by an inmate, or of the clothing covering either the inmate or officer’s sexual or intimate areas. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 14‐11‐30(3). 19 No. 14‐969‐cv laws and policies to prevent sexual abuse in prison.8 And in 2003, Congress unanimously passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601‐15609―the first federal law to address the sexual abuse of prisoners.9 These legislative enactments are the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not only the number of state laws that is significant, but “the consistency of the direction of change” in the law. Id. These laws and policies reflect the deep moral indignation that has replaced what had been society’s passive acceptance of the problem of sexual abuse in prison. They make it clear that the sexual abuse of Some states have enacted laws further prohibiting sexual abuse. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal 8 Law § 130.52 (“A person is guilty of forcible touching when such person intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, forcibly touches the sexual or other intimate parts of another person for the purpose of degrading or abusing such person; or for the purpose of gratifying the actor’s sexual desire.”). Other states have adopted additional prison policies and regulations. For example, the Michigan Department of Corrections “enacted cutting‐edge policies to curb sexual assault” in prisons after Congress passed the PREA. Maurice Chammah, Rape in the American Prison, The Atlantic (Feb. 25, 2015), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/rape‐in‐the‐american‐prison/ 385550/. 9 See Pat Nolan & Marguerite Telford, Indifferent No More: People of Faith Mobilize to End Prison Rape, 32 J. Legis. 129, 138‐39 (2006) (noting that the PREA was a model of bipartisan cooperation, which Congress passed unanimously). The PREA defines rape to include not only penetration, but oral sodomy, sexual assault with an object, and fondling. 42 U.S.C. § 15609(9). 20 No. 14‐969‐cv prisoners, once overlooked as a distasteful blight on the prison system, offends our most basic principles of just punishment. In light of this evolution, while the standard articulated in Boddie remains the same, “its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). Accordingly, conduct that might not have been seen to rise to the severity of an Eighth Amendment violation 18 years ago may now violate community standards of decency, and for that reason, we believe that the officer’s conduct in Boddie would flunk its own test today.10 Additionally, today―more so than 18 years ago―we recognize that a female 10 corrections officer is equally capable of sexually abusing a male inmate and the harm that can result from such abuse. See, e.g., David Kaiser and Lovisa Stannow, The Shame of Our Prisons: New Evidence, N.Y. Rev. of Books (Oct. 24, 2013), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/oct/24/shame‐our‐prisons‐new‐evidence/ (noting that past experience has shown that “many people do not take sexual abuse committed by women as seriously as abuse committed by men,” including “many corrections officers”); see also Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1197 (“A sexual assault on an inmate by a guard―regardless of the gender of the guard or of the prisoner―is deeply oﬀensive to human dignity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). There is also greater awareness of not only the physical but psychological and economic harms caused by sexual assaults in prisons. See, e.g., PREA, 42 U.S.C § 15601 (finding that sexual abuse in prison results in higher rates of suicide, post‐traumatic stress disorder, depression, HIV, AIDS, tuberculosis, recidivism, and violent crime, among other things); Sarah K. Wake, Note, Not Part of the Penalty: The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 32 J. Legis. 220, 223 (2006) (“[P]rison rape has a clear physical and economic impact upon everyone, not just those who are victimized.”). 21 No. 14‐969‐cv