Opinion ID: 2545905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miranda vis-a-vis Law Enforcement

Text: Although no prior decision of this Court has explicitly set forth who is required to give Miranda warnings, we have consistently declined to apply Miranda in cases where the interrogator is neither a law enforcement official nor acting as an agent of law enforcement. This policy is reflected in a trio of decisions from the 1980s: State v. Hathorn, 395 So.2d 783 (La.1981), State v. Phillips, 444 So.2d 1196 (La.1984), and State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543 (La.1986) State v. Hathorn, 395 So.2d 783 (La. 1981) is perhaps more closely factually on point than any other reported Louisiana decision. In Hathorn, the defendant poisoned her children and herself. While in the emergency room, a caseworker with the Child Protection Center interviewed the defendant, who admitted to poisoning her children. Id. at 784. Defendant later moved to suppress these statements based on the caseworker's failure to give Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and this Court affirmed: In the instant case, defendant had not been placed under arrest at the time of her interview with LeBlanc. Nor was LeBlanc a law enforcement officer with powers of arrest. Clearly, no Miranda warnings were required, as defendant's statements were made in a noncustodial situation and defendant was not being subjected to interrogation by a police officer. Moreover, the record affirmatively shows that the noncustodial inculpatory statements were freely and voluntarily made. Hence, the trial judge did not err in admitting the statements in evidence. Id. at 785. Although Hathorn focused on whether the interrogator is a law enforcement officer with the power to arrest, later decisions have made clear Miranda is not necessarily limited solely to active law enforcement officers. In State v. Phillips, 444 So.2d 1196 (La. 1984), the defendant, after being arrested and advised of his Miranda rights, exercised his right to remain silent and the interrogation ceased. Phillip's employers, Faucheaux and Brooks, later came to visit him in jail. Because they believed Phillips was innocent, they recommended he waive his right to remain silent and tell the police everything he knew. Id. at 1198. To Faucheaux and Brooks' surprise, Phillips confessed to armed robbery. Faucheaux worked part-time as an unpaid reserve police officer, and his duties included helping with crowd control at events and directing traffic. Id. at 1199 n. 6. Defendant argued Faucheaux was an agent of law enforcement under Miranda. This Court rejected that argument, and held: Although Simmons places great emphasis on Faucheaux's status as a volunteer reserve police officer, that fact is not of controlling significance. When Faucheaux and Brooks (who had no connection, volunteer or otherwise, with the police) encouraged Simmons to cooperate, they did so not as agents of the investigating officers, but rather as business associates who were acting in what they believed to be Simmons' best interest. Thus, this case does not involve a team effort to break Simmons' will to resist his interrogators' entreaties to make a statement. Id. at 1199. Phillips contains a somewhat broader test than Hathorn, as the Phillips court did not merely consider whether Faucheaux and Brooks were actual law enforcement officers with powers of arrest. Significantly, Phillips focused on whether they were acting as agents of the investigating officers and working as part of a team effort to interrogate the defendant. This test is set out even more clearly in State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543 (La.1986). Perry's aunt Zula Lyon visited him several times while he was incarcerated. During those visits, he confessed to five murders and gave his aunt a sheet of paper with the victims' names written on it. Id. at 553. Lyon turned this information over to the police. Defendant contended Mrs. Lyon served as an agent of the sheriffs office during her visits and was therefore required to give Miranda warnings. Id. The trial court ruled the testimony admissible, and this Court affirmed. The focus of the court's analysis was whether Lyon was working as an agent of the police officers  whether the police had sent her to talk with the defendant in order to interrogate him in their stead: It is evident from Mrs. Lyon's testimony she had motives in visiting defendant other than to solicit information for the sheriff. While she admitted she had asked defendant questions about the murders on some of her visits, she specifically stated she had not questioned him on September 16, 1983. The purpose of her visit on that date was to bring winter clothing to defendant in preparation for his transfer to the Feliciana Forensic Facility. She also expressly stated she had never been asked to question defendant. Similarly, the reason for her visit on September 30, 1983 was to visit him one more time before defendant left for Feliciana Forensic Facility, to see what his state of mind was and to see if he was in need of anything. It is clear Mrs. Lyon did not question him on that date. According to her testimony, the statement on that date was volunteered by defendant as Mrs. Lyon was getting ready to leave. Defendant alleges Mrs. Lyon received special treatment from the sheriffs office, implying this would not have been the case had she not been eliciting information with the intention of relaying it to the sheriff. While it is true on some of her visits to defendant Mrs. Lyon talked with him in the sheriffs office, her testimony also makes it clear she did on some occasions see him in his jail cell in solitary confinement. Also, although she admitted she talked with the deputies a number of times about the case, she maintained they never asked her what defendant had said to her. From Mrs. Lyon's testimony, it does not appear she was acting on behalf of the sheriffs office when she visited defendant and talked with him about the crimes. In particular, it should be noted neither statement was the result of questioning by her and both statements were instead unsolicited, spontaneous confessions of guilt. Id. at 553 (emphasis added). Hathorn, Perry and Phillips, when read together, clearly establish Miranda applies not to all state actors but only to persons who are either law enforcement officers or acting as an agent of law enforcement. We recognize this area of the law is potentially problematic. We further recognize this Court has not given the lower courts clear guidance as to an applied standard. We now do so. After studying the cases concerning this issue, we clearly and quickly see the proper resolution of this issue is a fact-driven determination. Simply stated, one size does not fit all; there is no bright line rule to be applied. Each case must be decided under its own set of facts. Trial courts will have to consider the unique circumstances of each case and balance the defendant's Miranda rights against both the necessity for a child protection officer to obtain a complete and clear record of the alleged child abuse or neglect and the Constitutional rights of a defendant who has been taken into custody.