Opinion ID: 2538135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Trial Court Properly Denied Requested Instruction on Choice of Evils.

Text: Mullikan requested a jury instruction on the defense of choice of evils. The trial court denied these requests, but instructed the jury on self-protection defenses with initial aggressor and provocation qualifications. Mullikan contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give his tendered instruction on choice of evils. We agree with the trial court and the Commonwealth that Mullikan was not entitled to such an instruction because of the lack of evidence of a threat of imminent injury. KRS 503.030(1) provides that conduct that would otherwise be considered unlawful may be justified when the defendant believes it to be necessary to avoid an imminent public or private injury greater than the injury which is sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense charged.... But Mullikan's tendered jury instruction did not require the jury to find that Mullikan believed his conduct was necessary to avoid an imminent injury. Mullikan's tendered instruction simply asked the jury to find whether he believed his conduct was necessary to avoid an injury. We also believe the trial court properly denied an instruction on choice of evils based upon Senay v. Commonwealth, 650 S.W.2d 259 (Ky.1983), in which we clarified that evidence of a defendant's general fear stemming from earlier events was not sufficient to justify an instruction on choice of evils. To be more precise, to be entitled to a choice of evils instruction, the record must contain evidence that the defendant perceived an immediate threat of injury at a time very close toif not entirely contemporaneous withhis allegedly unlawful action. Id. at 261. Here, Mullikan may have generally feared that he would be poisoned or otherwise harmed by Fields or others at the time he attacked Fields, but there was no evidence that Fields had made any specific threats to Mullikan immediately before Mullikan grabbed him. Nor was there any evidence of any specific or imminent threat from Fryman or others, despite Mullikan's belief that perhaps Fryman was working with Fields to harm him. Furthermore, Mullikan's testimony that many of his actions were intended to frighten Fields and Fryman undercuts his argument that he believed his actions were necessary for the purpose of defending himself against an imminent physical threat. We agree with the trial court that Mullikan was not entitled to a choice of evils instruction.