Opinion ID: 196811
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Substantial Risk ...

Text: 66 Leaving aside the question of knowledge for the moment, we conclude first that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Appellant created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to any person other than a participant in the offense. The district court based its finding primarily on the PSR, which indicated, inter alia, that the presence of gasoline created the potential for a fire or explosion. According to the PSR, a fuel air explosion could have occurred had a heat source been introduced within a specific danger range between the place where the gasoline was poured and anyplace within the building where the odor of gasoline was detected, (PSR, at 22), and that because the gasoline was poured in a confined area which contained electrical outlets, an electrical spark or other heat source could have ignited the vapors in the confined area at any time, (PSR, at 23). Although the evidence indicates that Appellant only planned to ignite the fire after the restaurant closed, the district court concluded that the potential for a fuel air explosion or for a fire to start accidentally created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to the occupants of the building at the time of the pouring of the gasoline in the attic as well as to firefighters and others who would respond to the incident. 67 We find no clear error in this finding of substantial risk to patrons and firefighters. It was properly based on both the PSR and the sentencing judge's common sense understanding--which Appellant conceded during the sentencing hearing was appropriate--of the risks associated with pouring an accelerant to start a fire in an occupied building where there was the potential for a fuel air explosion to occur or for a fire to start accidentally. See Medeiros, 897 F.2d at 20 (relying on common sense in finding under earlier arson guidelines that defendant conspired to cause the kind of fire that recklessly would endanger others.). As the district court correctly noted in response to Appellant's insistence that there was no risk created because no fire actually occurred, (Sentencing Transcript, pages 19-22), the Guidelines speak of risk. The fact that fortuitously no one was injured and extensive damage did not result [because no fire or explosion actually occurred] does not further [A]ppellant's contention that he did not ... create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. United States v. Honeycutt, 8 F.3d 785, 787 (11th Cir.1993). 68 Furthermore, in light of the federal arson guidelines' commentary, see U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4, Application Note 2, we find no clear error in the district court's finding of substantial risk given its finding that firefighters could have been blown to smithereens had a spark ignited the gasoline vapors (Sentencing Transcript, at 20). See, e.g., Turner, 995 F.2d at 1365; Grimes, 967 F.2d at 1471. While all fires present some danger to firefighters required to extinguish it, ... [w]here a spectacular fire is planned near an occupied building, a finding of reckless endangerment to firefighters would be based on a common sense understanding of the risks of putting out a major fire when rescue attempts are likely to be necessary. Medeiros, 897 F.2d at 20. Similarly, here, although there is no evidence that Appellant planned a spectacular fire, the sentencing judge's finding of substantial risk in this case was based on his--and, again, our--common sense understanding of the risks associated with using an accelerant in an occupied building to start a fire where there was the potential for a fuel air explosion to occur or for a fire to start accidentally. 27