Opinion ID: 795446
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Brock and McHood

Text: 63 Finally, the Smoaks claim that [d]ispatchers Brock and McHood are liable for their failure to protect [the Smoaks] from the use of excessive force and their unlawful arrest. Citing Bruner v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.1982), the Smoaks contend that [o]fficers must affirmatively intervene to prevent other officers from violating an individual's constitutional rights. In Bruner, a man found asleep in his car testified that he was severely beaten with a flashlight by one police officer while the others watched. The court in Bruner held that the onlookers could be held liable because it is not necessary, in order to hold a police officer liable under § 1983, to demonstrate that the officer actively participated in striking a plaintiff. Id. at 426. 64 Generally speaking, a police officer who fails to act to prevent the use of excessive force may be held liable when (1) the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used, and (2) the officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring. Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir.1997). Those present for an unconstitutional seizure can also be held liable for failure to protect. See Smith v. Heath, 691 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir.1982) (holding that an officer was directly responsible for and personally participated in the deprivation of the Smiths' constitutional rights because he was present while the other officers unlawfully searched the apartment and thereby violated the Smiths' rights). 65 In the present case, however, Brock and McHood were neither supervisory officers nor were they present at the scene. An unpublished case from this circuit indicates that at least one of these two factors would have to be satisfied in order to hold Brock and McHood liable for negligently alerting Andrews, Bush, and Phann to a possible robbery. See Sargent v. City of Toledo Police Dep't, 150 Fed.Appx. 470, 474 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished) (holding that supervisory officers who order a subordinate officer to violate a person's constitutional rights and non-supervisory officers present during a violation of person's civil rights who fail to stop the violation can be liable under § 1983); see also Barton v. Norrod, 106 F.3d 1289, 1299 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that a non-supervisory law enforcement officer present at a scene where other officers are violating a person's civil rights may have a duty to intervene) (emphasis added). 66 On the other hand, we have found no cases in this circuit where a nonsupervisory officer who was not present at the scene or did not actively participate in a constitutional deprivation was held liable for the failure to prevent the constitutional violation from occurring. In one case from the Northern District of Illinois, a dispatcher was held liable for incorrectly telling police officers in the field that a warrant had been issued for the arrest of a woman when in fact her sister was the subject of the warrant. Bibart v. Stachowiak, 888 F.Supp. 864 (N.D.Ill.1995). Bibart is distinguishable, however, because the dispatcher in that case was relaying incorrect information to the arresting officer about whether or not a warrant had been issued. Here, in contrast, the dispatcher drew a plausible inference that a possible robbery had occurred based on reports of a speeding station wagon and flying cash. The dispatcher in Bibart was a much greater participant in the arrest—and made a much graver error—than Brock and McHood. 67 We therefore hold, based on the facts before us, that the dispatchers are not liable for their negligent transmissions or their failure to ascertain more details before sending out BOLOs mentioning a possible robbery. In most contexts, negligence is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim, Brown v. Kordis, 46 Fed.Appx. 315, 317 (6th Cir.2002) (unpublished); see also Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730, 735 (8th Cir.2001) (holding that a dispatcher's mistake about the existence of an arrest warrant was not sufficient to render an arrest `unreasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). Given that there is no evidence of deliberate indifference or recklessness on the part of Brock and McHood, the Smoaks have not established a basis to hold the THP dispatchers accountable for a seizure in which they did not directly participate. See Brown, 46 Fed.Appx. at 317 (holding that, generally, negligence is insufficient to support a civil rights action).