Opinion ID: 2107127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: William Thomas's Testimony Concerning His Guilty Plea

Text: The defendant next argues that the trial justice committed reversible error by permitting William to testify that he pled guilty to having committed certain crimes with defendant. It is defendant's contention that the trial justice clearly erred when he allowed the jury to hear that testimony because said testimony constituted improper substantive evidence of defendant's guilt on the basis of a co-conspirator's guilty plea; for this reason, defendant contends that a reversal is warranted. It is a basic principle of our criminal law that use of a coconspirator's guilty plea or conviction as substantive proof of a defendant's complicity is not admissible in evidence. State v. Parente, 460 A.2d 430, 434 (R.I.1983); see also State v. Braxter, 568 A.2d 311, 316 (R.I.1990); see State v. Riendeau, 448 A.2d 735, 738 (R.I.1982). However, such evidence is admissible and is deemed not to be unduly prejudicial when it is introduced to impeach a previously convicted defendant testifying in the trial of his codefendant. Parente, 460 A.2d at 434; see also Riendeau, 448 A.2d at 738. This Court's opinion in Parente, 460 A.2d at 435, quotes with approval the following passage from United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981): [W]hen the prosecution examines the codefendant as its witness in support of its case-in-chief, a question about the guilty plea is legitimate as the purpose is to support the reasonableness of the witness' claim to firsthand knowledge because of admitted participation in the very conduct which is relevant. The fact [that] a witness has formally admitted personal responsibility enhances the circumstances adding up to that witness' believability. (Brackets in original.) At the same time, however, it should be emphasized that, when such evidence is introduced, the trial justice has a paramount responsibility to instruct the jury on the limited evidentiary use of the guilty plea or conviction. Parente, 460 A.2d at 435. [31] As guidance for the trial courts, we would state that we consider it highly desirable that such a curative instruction should be given at the time that the jury is first exposed to the evidence as well as at the time of final jury instructions. In the course of his direct examination of William, the prosecutor asked him whether he had pled guilty to robbery in the first degree along with Roy Diefenderfer, Patricia Diefenderfer and Michael Sparfven. He then proceeded to question William with respect to the other counts to which he had pled guilty; and each time the prosecutor named Roy Diefenderfer, Patricia Diefenderfer, and Michael Sparfven as being the persons with whom William had committed the crimes in question. William answered these questions in the affirmative. During the prosecutor's just-summarized extensive questioning of William with respect to his guilty pleas, defense counsel simply stated objection or objection to the form of the question when the questions were posed. The trial justice overruled those objections. At no point did defense counsel articulate with any specificity the contention that he now seeks to raise on appealnamely, that it is improper for an alleged co-conspirator to testify that he pled guilty to committing various offenses with a defendant who is charged as a co-conspirator. It is well settled that, pursuant to our raise-or-waive rule, we do not consider issues at the appellate level which have not been properly presented to the trial court. State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 828-29 (R.I.2008) (It is well settled that a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it was not raised before the trial court.); see also State v. Palmer, 962 A.2d 758, 766 (R.I. 2009); Merida, 960 A.2d at 236; State v. Forand, 958 A.2d 134, 141 (R.I.2008). [32] It should be borne in mind that, in order to satisfy the strictures of our raise-or-waive rule, an evidentiary objection must be sufficiently focused so as to call the trial justice's attention to the basis for said objection   . State v. Warren, 624 A.2d 841, 842 (R.I.1993); see State v. Gautier, 950 A.2d 400, 407 (R.I.2008) (It is well settled that issues that were not preserved by a specific objection at trial, sufficiently focused so as to call the trial justice's attention to the basis for said objection, may not be considered on appeal.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Toole, 640 A.2d at 972-73 ([I]ssues that were not preserved by a specific objection at trial, sufficiently focused so as to call the trial justice's attention to the basis for said objection, may not be considered on appeal.) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Flori, 963 A.2d 932, 942 (R.I.2009); State v. Day, 925 A.2d 962, 979 (R.I.2007). [33] When we look to the instant case and consider defense counsel's quite unspecific utterances (objection or objection to the form of the question), it is clear that the issue that defendant seeks to raise on appeal ( viz., the propriety of naming defendant as one of those with whom the testifying witness had conspired) has not been preserved. Quite simply, there was insufficient specificity at the trial court level.