Opinion ID: 8704062
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plaintiffs’ Petition is Untimely

Text: The fourteen-day time period for filing motions for attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 was intended, among other things, to align the resolution of fee requests with the time for appealing the merits of a case. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 54 Advisory Comm. Note (1993 Amendments) (“One purpose of this provision is to assure that the opposing party is informed of the claim before the time for appeal has elapsed.”). The rule was intended to allow a court to decide any claims to attorney’s fees “in time for any appellate review of a dispute over fees to proceed at the same time as review on the merits of the case.” Id. The time limit was also designed, like a statute of limitations, to promote the finality of closed cases and prevent disputes about stale facts by “afford[ing] an opportunity for the court to resolve fee disputes shortly after trial, while the services performed are freshly in mind.” Id. Understanding that the fourteen-day filing requirement is triggered by a final and appealable resolution of a case, the law in this Circuit is that “dismissal of an action — whether with or without prejudice — is final and appeal-able.” Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 666 (D.C.Cir.2004); accord United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 794 n. 1, 69 S.Ct. 824, 93 L.Ed. 1042 (1949) (“That the dismissal was without prejudice to filing another suit does not make the cause unappealable, for denial of relief and dismissal of the case ended this suit so far as the District Court was concerned.”). The plaintiffs argue that a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) “is not a final order subject to appeal which triggers the fourteen-day requirement.” Pis.’ Pet. at 5. In making this argument, the plaintiffs rely heavily on Castro County v. Crespin, 101 F.3d 121, 128 (D.C.Cir.1996), which held that an order dismissing an action without prejudice did not trigger the fourteen-day filing requirement under Rule 54. The order in Castro County, however, dismissed the case without prejudice to allow the parties to pursue settlement negotiations, but it was not a “final decision” because, “it contemplated not only further settlement negotiations by the parties, but the possibility that the case would be litigated further in the event that settlement talks failed.” Id. at 128. Furthermore, “it would have been impossible for any court to order fees ... because both the results in the case and the amount of fees that would be incurred remained unknown.” Id. In other words, the order at issue in Castro County was “a conditional. order” because it “stated that the case would be reopened if settlement negotiations failed.” St. Marks Place Hous. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 610 F.3d 75, 80 (D.C.Cir.2010) (citing Castro County, 101 F.3d at 123); see also Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Harvey, 400 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C.Cir.2005) (“[T]he conditional nature of the district court’s approval of the settlement agreement means that the agreement will not be final unless and until the future action contemplated ... takes place.”). By contrast with Castro County, the Order dismissing this case was not conditional and did not contemplate any further proceedings. The plaintiffs made it clear that they were abandoning this case in favor of other, more cost-effective endeavors, and the Court therefore dismissed the action in its entirety, albeit without prejudice to the filing of a new action arising out of the same operative facts. In such a situation, the litigation on the merits has ended, “leaving] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” St. Marks, 610 F.3d at 79 (quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)). The Court’s March 26, 2012 Minute Order was thus final and appeal-able, triggering the fourteen-day filing requirement under Rule 54. 1 This result seeks to “to avoid piecemeal appeals of merits and fee questions.” Weyant v. Okst, 198 F.3d 311, 315 (2d Cir.1999). Additionally, a contrary result would, as the defendant points out, permit a plaintiff to wait several years after voluntary dismissal to file a fee petition, see Def.’s Opp’n at 5. n. 3, but fairness to defendants and the need for courts to retain reasonable control of their dockets requires more finality than the plaintiffs’ proposed construction of Rules 41(a) and 54 would allow.