Opinion ID: 1305514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disability DiscriminationStatutory Framework.

Text: The Iowa Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified person with a disability because of the person's disability. Iowa Code § 216.6(1); see also Boelman v. Manson State Bank, 522 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Iowa 1994). The statute, however, only pronounces a general proscription against discrimination and we have looked to the corresponding federal statutes to help establish the framework to analyze claims and otherwise apply our statute. See Schlitzer v. Univ. of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics, 641 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Iowa 2002) (federal Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213, is instructive in applying our statute); Boelman, 522 N.W.2d at 79 (Federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, used as a guide in applying our statute). Like the ADA, to recover under the Iowa statute, a claimant must establish: (1) he or she is a disabled person; (2) he or she is qualified to perform the job, with or without an accommodation; and (3) he or she suffered an adverse employment decision because of the disability. [2] Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 530. Generally, if a claimant establishes these three elements, the burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 678 (1973); Boelman, 522 N.W.2d at 79-80. Once an employer proffers a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the claimant to show the reason proffered by the employer is pretextual. [3]
The civil rights statute broadly defines a disability as a physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial disability. Iowa Code § 216.2(5). We have previously recognized alcoholism to be a disability. See Consol. Freightways, Inc. v. Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Comm'n, 366 N.W.2d 522, 528 (Iowa 1985). Thus, like its federal ADA counterpart, alcoholism is covered under the statute as a disability. See Duda v. Bd. of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054, 1059 n. 10 (7th Cir.1998) (citing cases finding alcoholism is covered under the ADA); Evans v. Fed. Express Corp., 133 F.3d 137, 139 (1st Cir.1998) (same).
The second element of a discrimination claim under the statute requires claimants to establish they are qualified persons for the job by showing they can `perform the essential functions of [the position] with or without accommodation.' Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 530 (citation omitted); see Miller v. Sioux Gateway Fire Dep't, 497 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Iowa 1993) (a qualified person is one who can perform the essential functions of a job in spite of a disability). In Schlitzer, we recognized this showing requires the court to consider whether the claimant has ``the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.'' Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 531 (citation omitted). If the claimant proves he or she can perform the essential functions of the job, the qualified person element is met. Boelman, 522 N.W.2d at 80. If not, then an additional inquiry must be made to determine if a reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable [the claimant] to perform the essential functions. Id.; see Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 530 (applying the shifting burden analysis). An employer, under Iowa law, must make `a reasonable effort' to accommodate an employee's disability. Courtney v. Am. Nat'l Can Co., 537 N.W.2d 681, 687 (Iowa 1995) (citation omitted). We further emphasized in Schlitzer that the duty to reasonably accommodate a claimant applies not only to an existing job, but also includes a job the claimant desires. Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 530-31; see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000) (reasonable accommodation includes reassignment to a vacant position); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1161-63 (10th Cir.1999) (qualified individual under the ADA includes disabled employees who can perform a desired reassignment job, with or without an accommodation, though unable to perform their existing job); Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1300-01 (D.C.Cir.1998). Thus, like the federal ADA counterpart, our statute should not only protect a disabled person who can perform the essential functions of a position the person holds, with or without an accommodation, but also protect a disabled person who can perform the essential functions of a desired job, with or without an accommodation. Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 530-31. This means an employer has some obligation, based on the employee's initiation of the process, to reassign a disabled employee who has become disabled and can no longer perform the essential functions of his or her job as a reasonable accommodation. Id. We have not fully illuminated the parameters of this obligation to accommodate through reassignment, but it is clear it involves an interactive process that engages the employee and employer to work in concert to achieve a reasonable accommodation once the employee has expressed a desire for reassignment. See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1170-78. At the same time, an accommodation by reassignment does not require an employer to respond by creating a vacant position. Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 530. Additionally, an employee who seeks reassignment as an accommodation to a disability must identify a specific available job the employee is qualified to perform to ultimately recover under the statute. Id. at 530-32. Even if an employer fails to fully assist an employee in a request for reassignment, the employee must still show a specific position was available that he or she could have sought. See Burns v. CocaCola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 258 (6th Cir.2000); Smith, 180 F.3d at 1174. Without this showing, an employee cannot establish he or she is a qualified person. Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 530-32.
The final element requires the claimant to show he or she suffered an adverse employment decision because of his or her disability. Id. at 530. This element generally considers the existence of discrimination, and primarily focuses on the reasons for the adverse employment decision or action. Once a claimant establishes a prima facie case, this element considers the employer's proffer of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, as well as evidence that the employer's reason is a pretext for discrimination. See Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 366 (8th Cir.1996). Additionally, this element can properly consider the failure to make a reasonable accommodation. Under the ADA, the failure to make a reasonable accommodation for an otherwise qualified person with a disability constitutes discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Smith, 180 F.3d at 1167 (failure to reassign is an act of discrimination). Thus, the failure of an employer to make a reasonable accommodation can be a separate claim for recovery. See Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 237-38 (1st Cir.2002).