Opinion ID: 1451365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: basis of cr 60.02 motion

Text: Appellant's current CR 60.02 motion concerns the transfer of his case from Franklin County to Rowan County. Appellant argues that circuit courts in Kentucky are courts of general jurisdiction, but such general authority does not extend beyond the geographic limits of each circuit. Thus, Special Judge William Mains, being appointed Special Judge in Franklin County, could only act within Franklin County, and any judgment rendered in Rowan County is void. According to Appellant, the subsequent transfer to Rowan County stripped Judge Mains of territorial jurisdiction to hear the case. Likening territorial jurisdiction to subject matter jurisdiction, Appellant claims that his motion is timely because jurisdictional defects cannot be waived and may be raised at any time. Appellant's arguments misconceive the concepts of venue and jurisdiction. [T]here are fundamental distinctions between the concepts of jurisdiction and venue, the former relating to the power of courts to adjudicate and the latter relating to the proper place for the claim to be heard. Dollar General Stores, Ltd. v. Smith, 237 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Ky.2007). Venue generally derives from a statutory mandate as to the proper county or counties in which a claim may be heard. Id. Venue in criminal proceedings is governed by KRS 452.210, et seq. and KRS 452.510, et seq. Subject matter jurisdiction is concerned with the power of the court to hear and issue a binding decision in particular types of cases. Wolfenbarger, 936 S.W.2d at 772. Kentucky's circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and, therefore, have jurisdiction to try felony cases such as Appellant's. Another facet of jurisdiction, however, involves the territorial jurisdiction of a particular circuit court. Constitutionally speaking, Kentucky has but one circuit court and all circuit judges are members of that court and enjoy equal capacity to act throughout the state. Richmond v. Commonwealth, 637 S.W.2d 642, 646 (1982). However, our statutes and this Court's rules place geographical boundaries on a court's power to hear a case. Wolfenbarger, 936 S.W.2d at 773 (In general, a court is only authorized to act within the geographical boundaries fixed by the statute that grants power to the court to hear a certain class of cases.). Accordingly, a circuit judge has jurisdiction within his own circuit and in any area outside his own circuit in a proceeding where he is appointed Special Judge. SCR 1.040(1). Though distinct concepts, both territorial defects and improper subject matter operate to strip a court of jurisdiction to hear a case. Here, Appellant argues Judge Mains lacked territorial jurisdiction in Rowan County because he had been appointed Special Judge in Franklin County. We disagree. Judge Mains was validly appointed Special Judge in Franklin County for the limited purpose of hearing Appellant's case. He simultaneously enjoyed jurisdiction in Rowan Circuit Court, his home district. SCR 1.040(1). Thus, Judge Mains validly obtained jurisdiction over Appellant's case by virtue of his special appointment. Further, Judge Mains did not exceed the bounds of his territorial jurisdiction, as he conducted the trial in Rowan County. The holding in Wolfenbarger does not alter this conclusion. In Wolfenbarger, the Boone Circuit Court conducted a trial in Kenton County for the convenience of the defendant, who was in the hospital; even though the defendant was indicted in Boone County and a Boone County jury was empanelled. The Court of Appeals determined that the Boone Circuit Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to conduct a trial in another circuit, absent authorization pursuant to SCR 1.040(1) to conduct proceedings elsewhere. In other words, the Boone Circuit Court acted outside its geographical boundaries by conducting Wolfenbarger's trial in adjacent Kenton County. Here, as a sitting circuit judge in Rowan County, Judge Mains was authorized to conduct proceedings in that county and, therefore, no defect in territorial jurisdiction arose. What Appellant has attempted to characterize as a jurisdictional defect, perhaps in an attempt to salvage a woefully tardy motion, is actually a question of venue. The prosecution of a charge in the circuit court of the wrong county is not a jurisdictional defect but one of venue, which can be waived. Chancellor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 438 S.W.2d 783 (1969). Lack of venue does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to hear a case. 8 Ky. Prac. Crim. Prac. & Proc. § 12:84 (2007-2008). Such judgments are considered voidable rather than void. Id. Thus, the sole question is whether Rowan County was a proper venue for Appellant's trial. In the present case, venue was originally proper in Powell County under KRS 452.510, which directs that unless otherwise provided by law, the venue of criminal prosecutions and penal actions is in the county or city in which the offense was committed, and under Ky. Const. § 11 which entitles a criminal defendant to a trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage[.] See Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 698 S.W.2d 832 (Ky.1985). However, it was determined that Appellant could not have a fair trial in Powell County, and venue was transferred to Franklin County under KRS 452.210. This statute allows for change of venue to an adjacent county where a fair trial can be had, or if a fair trial cannot be had in any adjacent county, to the most convenient county where a fair trial can be had. Here, the adjacent counties of Montgomery, Clark, Madison, Estill, Lee, Wolfe, and Menifee were not selected. The non-adjacent county of Franklin was determined to be the most convenient county in which a fair trial could be conducted. Once transferred under KRS 452.210, venue became proper in Franklin County. After Judge King recused himself and Judge Mains was appointed Special Judge, venue remained proper in Franklin County. Judge Mains thereafter transferred the case sua sponte to Rowan County, which Appellant claims was improper. However, any challenge to this second change of venue was unequivocally waived. Both the Commonwealth and defense counsel ultimately agreed to the transfer. For that reason, the issue is not preserved for our review. See Fritsch v. Caudill, 146 S.W.3d 926, 927 (Ky.2004) (holding that, unlike jurisdiction, venue may be conferred by waiver). Further, it cannot be ignored that the basis of Appellant's motion  the transfer of his trial to Rowan County  occurred over fourteen years ago, surely unreasonable within the meaning of CR 60.02. We remind counsel, yet again, that any challenge to venue could have, and should have, been raised in a direct appeal or any other of Appellant's prior requests for post-conviction relief. Our interest in the finality of judgments and the timely imposition of sentences is axiomatic. Both the patience and resources of this Court are stretched by repeated motions for post-conviction relief raising issues based on decade-old factual circumstances. Counsel is admonished, most forcefully and for a second time that this is an improper use of our post-conviction relief rules.