Opinion ID: 889581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Political Committee Alternative

Text: ¶99 Section 227(1) states that “[a] corporation may not make a contribution or an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or 58 opposes a candidate or a political party.” Section 227(3), however, provides that “[t]his section does not prohibit the establishment or administration of a separate, segregated fund [known as a political committee or PAC] to be used for making political contributions or expenditures if the fund consists only of voluntary contributions solicited from an individual who is a shareholder, employee, or member of the corporation.” See Opinion, ¶ 4. ¶100 The Court asserts that, in Montana, political committees are “easy to establish,” “easy to use,” and an “effective alternative to direct corporate spending for engaging in political speech.” Opinion, ¶¶ 21, 47. The Supreme Court, however, stated: “A PAC is a separate association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from [the law’s] expenditure ban does not allow corporations to speak.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[e]ven if a PAC could somehow allow a corporation to speak—and it does not—the option to form PACs does not alleviate the First Amendment problems.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (emphasis added). ¶101 The Court ignores the Supreme Court’s holding that a PAC is “separate” from the corporation and, thus, is not a valid alternative to direct corporate expenditures. Indeed, the Court asserts that the Supreme Court rejected PACs “because of the burdensome, extensive, and expensive Federal regulations that applied.” Opinion, ¶ 12. This is false. Granted, the Supreme Court briefly noted that “PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897. Yet, even if federal PACs were as “easily implemented” as the Court says Montana’s PACs are, Opinion, ¶ 21, the fundamental problem with PACs still remains: 59 “A PAC is a separate association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from [the law’s] expenditure ban does not allow corporations to speak.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (citation omitted). Bottom line: “[Section 227(1)] is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation [as permitted under § 227(3)] can still speak.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897. The Court’s contrary holding is plainly wrong. B. Anticorruption and Restraining Corporate Influence ¶102 The Court cites various examples of “well-financed corruption” perpetrated by F. Augustus Heinze, the Anaconda Company, and W.A. Clark. Opinion, ¶¶ 23-28. Notably, some of these examples involved blatant bribery and quid pro quo corruption (i.e., dollars for political favors), but it is not clear that any of them involved independent expenditures (i.e., political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate) in exchange for political favors. In any event, the Court then proceeds to paint a dismal picture of the corporate “domination” and “influence” that has persisted in Montana. Opinion, ¶ 29. From this discussion, the Court concludes as follows. First, voters had a “compelling interest” to enact the challenged statute in 1912 because “the real social and political power [in Montana] was wielded by powerful corporate managers to further their own business interests,” and the voters were fed up with the “corrupt practices” and “heavy-handed influence” asserted by the special interests controlling Montana’s political institutions. Opinion, ¶ 36. Second, the statute “has worked to preserve a degree of political and social autonomy” from “shadowy” corporate figures who seek to promote their own interests. Opinion, ¶ 37. And finally, there is still a 60 sufficient interest to support the statute because “[i]ssues of corporate influence, sparse population, dependence upon agriculture and extractive resource development, location as a transportation corridor, and low campaign costs make Montana especially vulnerable to continued efforts of corporate control.” Opinion, ¶ 37. ¶103 It is patently unconstitutional, however, for the government to silence a speaker on the ground that the speaker might otherwise exert an undesired amount of “influence” or “control” in government and politics. Under such a rationale, any disfavored class of speakers could be censored if thought to be too “influential.” The Supreme Court unequivocally repudiated the notion that corporate political speech can be restricted “as a means to prevent corporations from obtaining an unfair advantage in the political marketplace by using resources amassed in the economic marketplace.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (internal quotation marks omitted). Austin’s holding was founded on the same concern expressed by the Court here: that “[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures.” Austin, 494 U.S. at 660, 110 S. Ct. at 1398. The Supreme Court in Citizens United, however, held that “Austin is overruled, so it provides no basis for allowing the Government to limit corporate independent expenditures.” 130 S. Ct. at 913. The Supreme Court “rejected the premise that the Government has an interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶104 “Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics,” and “[r]eliance on a generic favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First 61 Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (ellipses in original, internal quotation marks omitted). More to the point, the First Amendment prohibits “restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. “ ‘In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue.’ ” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85, 98 S. Ct. at 1420). The government may not bar corporations from contributing to the “open marketplace” of ideas. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906. “When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908. ¶105 The Court tries to distinguish Citizens United as “decided upon its facts” and involving only federal laws and federal elections, while this case “concerns Montana law, Montana elections and . . . Montana history.” Opinion, ¶¶ 11, 16. Yet, Bellotti involved a state law, and the Supreme Court in Citizens United expressly noted that [Bellotti] rested on the principle that the Government lacks the power to ban corporations from speaking. Bellotti did not address the constitutionality of the State’s ban on corporate independent expenditures to support candidates. In our view, however, that restriction would have been unconstitutional under Bellotti’s central principle: that the First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate identity. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (emphasis added, paragraph break omitted). 62 ¶106 Like its “influence” rationale, the Court’s “corruption” rationale is also untenable. Regardless of the history of “bribery,” “control,” and “naked corporate manipulation” recounted by the Court, Opinion, ¶¶ 23, 25, 28, plaintiffs here do not challenge the statutory prohibition on corporate contributions. Rather, they challenge the prohibition on corporate expenditures. And the Supreme Court stated very clearly “that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909. “When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909. “The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]ndependent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption. In fact, there is only scant evidence that independent expenditures even ingratiate. Ingratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (citation omitted). ¶107 As for the Court’s fear that invalidation of § 227(1)’s prohibition on independent expenditures by corporations will return Montana to its pre-1912 days of corruption and corporate domination, the Supreme Court answered this concern as follows: If elected officials succumb to improper influences from independent expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for concern. We must give weight to attempts by [the legislature] to seek to dispel either the appearance or the reality of these influences. The remedies enacted by law, however, must comply with the First Amendment; and, it is our law and our 63 tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing rule. An outright ban on corporate political speech . . . is not a permissible remedy. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (emphases added). C. Citizen Protection ¶108 The Court observes that allowing unlimited independent expenditures of corporate money into the Montana political process would “drastically change campaigning by shifting the emphasis to raising funds.” Opinion, ¶ 30. Direct political spending by corporations could also “significantly affect the outcome of elections.” Opinion, ¶ 32. The Court explains that Montana has a small population and enjoys political campaigns marked by person-to-person contact and a low cost of advertising compared to other states. Opinion, ¶ 30. Thus, the infusion of unlimited corporate money in support of or opposition to a targeted candidate would leave the average citizen candidate “unable to compete against the corporate-sponsored candidate.” Opinion, ¶ 38. ¶109 Furthermore, Montana voters feel they do not really “count” in the political process unless they can make a material financial contribution; and they are concerned, therefore, that special interests hold sway. Opinion, ¶ 31. The percentage of campaign contributions from individual voters is much less in states that do not have restrictions on corporate spending. Opinion, ¶ 33. At present, the individual contribution limit for Montana House, Senate, and District Court races is $160 and for Supreme Court elections is $310. Opinion, ¶ 38. Thus, with the infusion of unlimited corporate money in support of or opposition to a targeted candidate, “Montana citizens, who for over 100 years have made their modest election contributions meaningfully count[,] would be effectively shut 64 out of the process.” Opinion, ¶ 38. “Clearly the impact of unlimited corporate donations creates a dominating impact on the political process and inevitably minimizes the impact of individual citizens.” Opinion, ¶ 41. The State “has an interest in encouraging the full participation of the Montana electorate.” Opinion, ¶ 38; accord Opinion, ¶ 41. ¶110 While I understand the Court’s desire to protect the ability of citizen candidates to compete, and the ability of citizens to meaningfully participate and be heard in the political process, this rationale has been rejected. “ ‘[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.’ ” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (brackets in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49, 96 S. Ct. at 649). The Court’s reasoning is essentially a repackaged version of the antidistortion rationale, which the Supreme Court answered as follows: Austin sought to defend the antidistortion rationale as a means to prevent corporations from obtaining “an unfair advantage in the political marketplace” by using “resources amassed in the economic marketplace.” But Buckley rejected the premise that the Government has an interest “in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.” Buckley was specific in stating that the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns could not sustain the governmental prohibition. The First Amendment’s protections do not depend on the speaker’s financial ability to engage in public discussion. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted). “The rule that political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905. The Court’s citizen-protection theory is invalid under Citizens United. 65 D. Elected Judges ¶111 The Court next discusses Montana’s interests in “protecting and preserving its system of elected judges,” providing “an independent, fair and impartial judiciary,” and “preserving the appearance of judicial propriety and independence.” Opinion, ¶¶ 39-40. The Court fears that “Montana judicial elections would be particularly vulnerable to large levels of independent spending, both in terms of fairness and in terms of the public perception of impartiality.” Opinion, ¶ 44. The Court cites Sandra Day O’Connor’s recent observation that the “ ‘crisis of confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is real and growing.’ ”9 Opinion, ¶ 45. Noting that Montana is not immune from the influence of corporate-funded “super spender groups,” the Court concludes that Montana “has a compelling interest in precluding corporate expenditures on judicial elections based upon its interest in insuring judicial impartiality and integrity, its interest in preserving public confidence in the judiciary and its interest in protecting the due process rights of litigants.” Opinion, ¶ 45. ¶112 While I share some of the Court’s concerns,10 I do not believe the Supreme Court will allow a state to single out corporations as a group and prohibit them from speaking in judicial elections. First of all, as noted already, the First Amendment prohibits “restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not 9 It is somewhat ironic that the Court would cite Justice O’Connor in the context of discussing Montana’s “interest in protecting and preserving its system of elected judges,” given that she has been openly critical of this form of selecting judges. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-92, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2542-44 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 10 See James C. Nelson, Keeping Faith with the Vision: Interpreting a Constitution for This and Future Generations, 71 Mont. L. Rev. 299, 311 (2010). 66 others.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. More to the point, “the First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate identity.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903. ¶113 Secondly, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), which the Court cites at ¶ 43, is of no assistance. Caperton held that a judge was required to recuse himself “when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.” 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64. As the Supreme Court later explained in Citizens United, “[t]he remedy of recusal was based on a litigant’s due process right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge. Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned.” 130 S. Ct. at 910 (citation omitted). In other words, recusal is the remedy for the concern with “protecting the due process rights of litigants” (Opinion, ¶ 45), not banning corporate speech.