Opinion ID: 1353139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Allegedly Prejudicial Evidence from Appellant's First Trial

Text: Next, Appellant enters a general challenge to virtually all evidence admitted by the Commonwealth. Relying on Old Chief v. United States, [29] Appellant argues that all evidence of the crime beyond a recitation of the elements to which he confessed is inadmissible. In Old Chief , the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that, when a defendant has offered to stipulate to a prior conviction, evidence of the conviction is still relevant, though its relevance was outweighed by undue prejudice and therefore inadmissible under FRE 403. Appellant further argues that the guidelines set forth in Boone v. Commonwealth [30] require the trial court to prohibit any evidence of Appellant's crimes beyond the description of the crimes, including the elements, and the fact that Appellant had pled guilty to said crimes. Appellant's reliance on both Old Chief and Boone is misplaced. Both cases involved situations in which a guilt phase trial was held, thus providing the court with a certain body of evidence from which to extract evidence for purposes of sentencing. Here, no guilt phase trial ever occurred, as Appellant pled guilty. While the types of admissible evidence delineated in Boone are guidelines for the trial court, we do not agree with Appellant that Boone should be read as a strict limitation on the types of evidence admissible in a penalty phase trial where the defendant has pled guilty. Nor does Boone itself purport to create such a strict limitation: the Court in Boone provided a list of what types of evidence might be pertinent. [31] Here, because no guilt phase trial occurred, the types of admissible evidence set forth in Boone alone were insufficient in this case to adequately apprise the jury of the nature of Appellant's crimes. As noted in Boone itself, the sentencing jury cannot be expected to fix punishment in a vacuum without any knowledge of the defendant's past criminal record or other matters that might be pertinent to consider in the assessment of an appropriate penalty. [32] With that principle in mind, the trial court must use its discretion in admitting relevant evidence that will sufficiently inform the jury of the crimes committed, while avoiding undue prejudice. Here, we conclude that the trial court violated neither Boone nor Old Chief in admitting evidence of Appellant's crimes. The evidence admittedincluding the testimony of pathologist Roberta Conrad to which Appellant objects particularlywas relevant and reasonably calculated to inform the jury of the nature of the crimes and did not unduly prejudice Appellant. Accordingly, we find no error.