Opinion ID: 180209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mr. Doe's claims under the Fourth Amendment and Ex Post Facto Clause

Text: We now consider Mr. Doe's claim that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his online identifiers and that requiring him to report these identifiers to the state of Utah violates his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. We touched on this issue in United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir.2008). In Perrine, Pennsylvania police officers obtained, without a warrant, subscriber informationincluding the IP addressassociated with the unique Yahoo! online identifier stevedragonslayer from Yahoo! (after an individual using that identifier showed pornographic videos of underage girls to another visitor in a Yahoo! chatroom). Id. at 1199. Using that IP address, the officers were then able to ascertain the defendant's name and residential address from Cox Communications, the internet service provider that had issued the IP address. Id. at 1199-1200. Following his conviction, the defendant challenged the officer's actions based, in part, on his argument that the police had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We rejected this argument and held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in information that he voluntarily transmitted to the third-party internet providers, Cox and Yahoo! Id. at 1204. On appeal, we see no reason why we are not bound by our earlier decision in Perrine. See In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir.1993) (We are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superceding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.). Although Mr. Doe now argues that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in online identifiers because it is not always the case that an individual can be identified from his identifier, even if police are in possession of the associated IP address, he has raised these arguments for the first time on appeal. Generally, we do not consider issues not presented to, considered and decided by the trial court, because an appellant's new argument gives rise to a host of new issues, and Appellee had no opportunity to present evidence it may have thought relevant on these issues. Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Russell, 518 F.3d 817, 828-29 (10th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Such is the case here; Mr. Doe's arguments raise a slew of new issues and evidentiary questions to which the State did not have a fair opportunity to respond. [6] However, even if Mr. Doe's arguments were not forfeited, as the district court correctly observed, there are no facts [in the record] from which the court can conclude that [Mr. Doe's] identities are shielded from [his] Internet service provider. (Appellant's App. at 293.) Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's ruling on Mr. Doe's Fourth Amendment claim. Finally, we consider Mr. Doe's contention that the district court erred by holding that Utah's statute is not an impermissible ex post facto law. [T]he threshold inquiry for assessing a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause in the present case is whether Utah's ... program constitutes additional criminal punishment for the crimes previously committed by those subject to its provisions. Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir.2000). Thus, [i]f the notification measures are deemed civil rather than criminal in nature, they present no ex post facto violation. Id. Even where, as here, neither party contests that the legislature intended to establish a civil remedy, we must still consider whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). However, [o]nly the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Id. at 100, 118 S.Ct. 488 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Femedeer v. Haun , after examining the same Utah statute at issue in this caseabsent the requirement that an offender disclose his or her internet identifiers we stated that the evidence did not come even close to the `clearest proof' necessary to overcome the civil intent of Utah's legislature. 227 F.3d at 1253. We then held that Utah's notification scheme imposes only a civil burden upon sex offenders and therefore does not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. Nevertheless, on appeal Mr. Doe argues that this new disclosure requirement provides `the clearest proof' that the notification scheme is an ex post facto law that is punitive in purpose and effect. (Appellant's Br. at 45.) Looking closely at Mr. Doe's argument on this issue, it seems clear that his contentions depend entirely upon his argument that the Utah statute would allow impermissible public disclosure of his internet identifiers, thereby destroying his right to anonymous speech. However, because we conclude that Utah's registration statute does not violate the First Amendment, we hold that the effect of the new disclosure requirements is not substantial enough to alter our original analysis of the statute in Femedeer. Thus, we hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Mr. Doe's claim under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Therefore, for these and the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's ruling vacating its earlier orders enjoining enforcement of the statute.