Opinion ID: 2799544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Programs Includable in Title I Contracts

Text: The Board determined that even if the October letter constituted a Title I proposal no contract could have arisen from it. J.A. 6. The Board held that a self- YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR 9 determination contract can only cover programs that the Bureau is already providing. J.A. 6. It then determined that no contract could have been formed for the programs discussed in the Tribe’s October letter because the government is not currently administering those programs for the Tribe. J.A. 6. We do not agree. Self-determination contracts are not limited to programs the government is currently providing. Section 450f(a)(1) lists five categories of programs that can be included in a self-determination contract. Sec- tion 450f(a)(1)(B) permits self-determination contracts to be awarded for any programs “the Secretary is authorized to administer for the benefit of Indians under the Act of November 2, 1921.” (emphasis added). The language “is authorized to administer” plainly includes any program the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Health and Human Services could authorize under the Act of November 2, 1921. See 25 U.S.C. § 450b(i). There is no exclusion for programs that either Secretary “is authorized to administer” under the Act of November 2, 1921, but is not currently providing. Other language from § 450f further supports this plain meaning. Sec- tion 450f(a)(1)(C) permits self-determination contracts to be awarded for all programs “provided by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under the Act of August 5, 1954.” (emphasis added). The statute’s language reflects Congress’s deliberate choice. In the first instance, with regard to the Act of November 2, 1921, it used the broad “authorized to administer,” whereas with regard to the second Act, it used the more narrow “provided by.” We assume that Congress uses language carefully and purposefully. We thus must give weight to the distinction drawn by Congress in § 450f and will not read a limitation into § 450f(a)(1)(B) that self-determination contracts are limited to programs the government is currently providing. 10 YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla & Cupeño Indians v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2013), the government argues that a selfdetermination contract cannot be awarded in this case. Los Coyotes, however, is factually distinct. There, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Secretary properly declined a contract on the basis that the Bureau was not providing the programs for which the tribe was requesting funding. Id. at 1028. Los Coyotes does not absolve the government’s inaction because it could have declined the proposal. Despite the clear authorization language of § 450f, the government claims that § 450b(j) prevents issuance of a self-determination contract in this case. Section 450b(j) defines “self-determination contract” as a contract “between a tribal organization and the appropriate Secretary for the planning, conduct and administration of programs or services which are otherwise provided to Indian tribes and their members pursuant to Federal law.” The government argues that the definition’s use of “otherwise provided” means that self-determination contracts are limited to programs the Bureau is already providing to the particular tribe in question. The provision, however, only indicates that a contract can encompass programs that the government provides to tribes. The Tribe requested funding for law enforcement and court programs. The government provides these programs to other tribes. Oral Argument at 18:16–18:23, available at http:// oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20141529.mp3. It appears that the government has awarded self-determination contracts that encompass these types of programs. And the government provides some funding for the Yurok Tribe’s law enforcement programs already pursuant to another contract with the Tribe. Section 450b(j) does not prohibit the government from entering into an agreement with this Tribe for the requested funding. YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR 11 The government also asserts that §§ 450j-1(a)(1) and 450f(a)(2)(D) limit self-determination contracts to programs that the government is currently providing. Section 450j-1(a)(1) states that “[t]he amount of funds provided under the terms of self-determination contracts entered into pursuant to this subchapter shall not be less than the appropriate Secretary would have otherwise provided for the operation of the programs or portions thereof for the period covered by the contract.” The government argues that because it is not providing the programs requested by the Tribe, the current funding level is zero and the government need not contract for any funding. Section 450j-1(a)(1), by its clear terms, sets a floor, not a ceiling, on the amount of money that a Tribe can receive in a self-determination contract. Section 450j- 1(a)(1) does not prohibit the government from including funding for the requested programs in a self- determination contract. Section 450f(a)(2)(D) authorizes the Bureau to decline a contract proposal where “the amount of funds proposed under the contract is in excess of the applicable funding level for the contract, as determined under section 450j-1(a).” The government argues that allowing the Tribe to receive funding in excess of the current funding level would render this section meaningless because it would prohibit the Secretary from declining proposals. This, however, is not a case where the Secretary declined the proposal under § 450f(a)(2)(D). The government’s discretion to decline a proposal is irrelevant to what programs can be included in a contract where the government fails to act. Neither section § 450j- 1(a)(1) nor § 450f(a)(2)(D) support the government’s claim that self-determination contracts are limited to funding for programs the government currently provides to the requesting tribe. The statutory language is clear: “The Secretary is directed, upon the request of any Indian tribe by tribal resolution, to enter into a self-determination contract . . . 12 YUROK TRIBE v. INTERIOR to plan, conduct, and administer programs . . . which the Secretary is authorized to administer” and “shall, within ninety days after receipt of the proposal, approve the proposal and award the contract unless the Secretary provides written notification to the applicant” declining the proposal. 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a). Because the government failed to respond to the Tribe’s proposal and the proposal covers programs that the Secretary is authorized to administer, the statute directs the Secretary to enter into a contract. We thus cannot affirm the Board’s dismissal on the second ground it found.