Opinion ID: 293842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequacy of Legal Representation

Text: 5 Kent's primary contention is that he was not adequately or competently represented by counsel from the Public Defender's Office of Philadelphia. In this connection he asserts first that he was not informed or notified of his right to appeal. The Commonwealth does not contend that he was so notified and there is nothing in the record to contradict his statement. This matter was not directly discussed in the opinion of the District Court. 6 Kent also alleges that his trial counsel did not examine the facts of his case or prepare for trial until the day of trial. The appellee asserts, on the other hand, that an appearance had been entered for Kent by the Public Defender some months before the trial. There is, however, an hiatus in the proof. The fact that an appearance was entered by the Public Defender some months before the trial does not demonstrate that there was serious preparation for trial on the date of the filing of an appearance or at any time thereafter. Kent asserts as additional proof of inadequate representation that though Walls was examined at a Philadelphia hospital immediately following the alleged rape neither the Commonwealth nor Kent's own counsel offered the hospital report in evidence and he insists that the report should have been put in the record. We do not have the hospital report before us and nothing in the record informs us as to its contents. There may indeed be various reasons why it was not offered by either party but surmise cannot take the place of proof. 7 In United States ex rel. Mathis v. Rundle, 394 F.2d 748 (3 Cir. 1968), this court adopted the doctrine that an untimely appointment of counsel will create a presumption that the defendant was prejudiced and shift to the State the burden of showing the contrary. In Moore v. United States of America, 432 F.2d 730 (3 Cir., 1970, Ct. en banc ), this court stated: We    overrule Mathis to the extent it adopted the presumption doctrine. In Moore, it was also said: The adequacy of the representation which petitioner [relator] received, which is the real issue in this case, can only be decided upon an evaluation of the services rendered on his behalf, and further, Whether an indigent is represented by an individual or by an institution, he is entitled to legal services of the same level of competency as that generally afforded at the bar to fee-paying clients. In both cases, therefore, the standard of adequacy of legal services as in other professions is the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place. [Footnotes omitted.] An examination of the record in the instant case demonstrates a similarity to the circumstances of Moore and leads us to the conclusion that the standard set by Moore should be applied here. It follows that the case must be remanded to the District Court to determine whether that standard was complied with by Kent's counsel in the State trial court. 2 8 We bear in mind that the case at bar differs from Moore in that Kent seeks relief by way of habeas corpus from a state court judgment, while in Moore the post-conviction proceedings were had after the defendant had been convicted under a federal bank robbery statute. See 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. But there is useful dictum in Moore which we feel should be applied here, as follows: While a distinction might be attempted between attacks on state convictions under the Fourteenth Amendment and those on federal convictions under the Sixth Amendment, we believe the increased recognition of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel requires that the standard which prevails in federal cases under the Sixth Amendment should be applied equally to state convictions, to which the same guarantee is made applicable by the Fourteenth Amendment under Gideon v. Wainwright [372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799]. The standard of normal competency [footnote omitted] applies equally in each case. This standard also makes it clear that the ultimate issue is not whether a defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's act or omission, but whether counsel's performance was at the level of normal competency. That the client was prejudiced by a failure in performance is of course evidentiary on the issue. 3