Opinion ID: 678881
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does Section 212(c) Require the Board to Follow the

Text: 21 Suppression Provisions of the California Diversion 22 Scheme? 23 The federal government possesses plenary power over immigration. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11-13, 102 S.Ct. 2977, 2982-84, 73 L.Ed.2d 563 (1982); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766-67, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 2583-84, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972). And, the interpretation of the provisions of the INA is a question of federal law. See, e.g., Morales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that conviction within the meaning of the INA is a matter of federal immigration law, not a matter of state law); accord Kahn, 20 F.3d at 962; de la Cruz-Martinez v. INS, 404 F.2d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 955, 89 S.Ct. 1291, 22 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). Accordingly, the precise question we must answer is whether Congress intended that the BIA, in exercising its discretion under section 212(c) of the INA, must give effect to a state diversion regime such as California's. 5 24 We have found no published decision by the Board or the federal courts that addresses this question. However, a review of decisions in which the BIA has exercised analogous discretionary authority indicates that the Board consistently has held the view that, absent an expression of congressional intent to the contrary, in making discretionary determinations under the Act it may consider an alien's past conduct and legal consequences flowing from that conduct regardless of a state's policy to the contrary. Moreover, this circuit implicitly appears to have approved the Board's analysis. 25 The underlying concern was recognized as early as 1943. In In re Paoli, 49 F.Supp. 128 (N.D.Cal.1943), the court faced the question of whether the expunging of a conviction pursuant to section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code precluded the court from considering the conviction in determining good moral character for the purposes of establishing eligibility for citizenship. The court concluded that: 26 If the circumstances are such that a state is willing to expunge the record of a crime, this fact may be persuasive in enabling the court before which application is made for citizenship to determine whether the character of the applicant is sufficiently good to permit his admission to citizenship.... But it would hamper the court in the exercise of its discretion in determining the important question of moral character, if it were bound to disregard entirely the original act of the applicant in committing the crime. 27 Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added). 28 The Board adopted this principle in In re Gonzalez, 16 I. & N. Dec. 134 (BIA 1977). There, the BIA disagreed with the Third Circuit's decision in Giambanco v. INS, 531 F.2d 141 (3d Cir.1976). The Third Circuit had held that a state judicial recommendation against deportation pursuant to section 241(b) of the Act, 6 which prevented a conviction from serving as the basis for deportation, precluded the Board from taking that conviction into account in determining whether the alien should receive the discretionary relief of adjustment of status. See id. at 147-49. Although acknowledging that Giambanco was binding on it for cases arising in the Third Circuit, the Board argued that: 29 The Act nowhere states that the criminal activity and the conviction which resulted therefrom cannot be considered in connection with an application for discretionary relief..... [Accordingly,] all evidence of record including that conviction and the nature of the criminal activity, could be considered in determining whether the respondent is a person of good moral character and in exercising discretion under section 244(e) of the Act. Contrary to the view expressed by the [Giambanco] court, the interpretation suggested here is the same applied in those cases in which an expungement of the conviction has been obtained. 30 Id. at 136 (emphasis added). 31 In support of its position, the Board cited both In re H--, 6 I. & N. Dec. 619 (BIA 1955), and Paoli. These cases, however, were in some tension. H-- appeared to approve of a prior precedent in which the Board held that a full and unconditional pardon not only serves as a bar to deportation but also wipes out the crime insofar as discretionary relief is concerned. In re H--, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 626 n. 1 (citing In re Z--, No. E-072431 (BIA 1954)). Indeed, H--, and the cases that followed its reasoning, appeared to hold that an expungement pursuant to California Penal Code Sec. 1203.4 would not preclude further inquiry by the Board only because California did not recognize the statute as a full and unconditional pardon by the executive authority of the State of California. In re D--, 7 I. & N. Dec. 670, 673 (BIA 1958), overruled on other grounds by In re A-- F--, 8 I. & N. Dec. 429 (BIA 1959); see also In re H--, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 622 (noting that section 1203.4 does not completely obliterate the fact that the unlawful acts occur[red] (citing Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 34 Cal.2d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949)). By contrast, Paoli, also approved by the Board in a number of decisions, see, e.g., In re S-- R--, 7 I. & N. Dec. 495, 499 (BIA 1957); In re E-- V--, 5 I. & N. Dec. 194, 196 n. 4 (BIA 1953), made no distinction between the California statute and a full and unconditional pardon, and broadly asserted that [w]hether the offender was punished or forgiven, the act continues to exist as an indication of the character of the applicant. In re Paoli, 49 F.Supp. at 130-31. 32 Because the BIA interpreted a recommendation against deportation pursuant to section 241(b) as the equivalent of a full and unconditional pardon, e.g., In re D--, 7 I. & N. Dec. at 673, under Z--, presumably a recommendation against deportation pursuant to section 241(b) would have demanded the result reached by the Giambanco court--that the recommendation against deportation precluded reliance on the conviction (and thus the conduct underlying it) in a discretionary determination. As the Gonzalez court reached the contrary conclusion, the Board clearly adopted the Paoli court's analysis. This conclusion is confirmed by the central concern articulated by the Board: 33 Had no criminal action been instituted against the respondent, the fact of his involvement in the criminal activity could have been brought out and considered in connection with an application for discretionary relief. The court's ruling in Giambanco places him a position superior to the person who has not been convicted of his crime. 34 In re Gonzalez, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 136-37 (emphasis added). 35 Gonzalez, of course, only considered the effect of section 241(b) on an adjustment of status determination. However, the Board's reasoning as well as its broad rejection of Giambanco, a case which appeared to apply to all forms of discretionary relief, 7 suggested that the general principle that Congress did not intend for state expunging regimes to bar consideration of either past conduct or the consequences that the state attached to such conduct in a discretionary determination was applicable elsewhere. This reading of Gonzalez appears confirmed by In re Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. 550 (BIA 1980), overruled on other grounds by In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), in which the Board held that, although a conviction expunged under a state expunging statute could not be considered an admission of commission of the crime for the purposes of barring eligibility for voluntary departure, the fact of the guilty plea properly could be considered as an adverse factor ... in deciding whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted, id. at 554. A broad view of Gonzalez also was advanced by the Seventh Circuit in Oviawe v. INS, 853 F.2d 1428 (7th Cir.1988). There, the court took Gonzalez to stand for the general proposition that, as long as Congress had not excluded factors from consideration, the BIA should not be precluded from considering all factors that bear on its exercise of discretion. Id. at 853 (emphasis in original). Adopting the BIA's reasoning, the Seventh Circuit held that it would be anomalous to conclude that the BIA is foreclosed from considering adverse information to balance against positive information when weighing the equities of a situation. Id. 36 Our circuit also implicitly has accepted a broad reading of Gonzalez. In Delgado-Chavez v. INS, 765 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam), we expressly rejected Giambanco, id. at 869-70, and held that a prior conviction that section 241(b) precluded from serving as a basis for deportation nonetheless may be considered as an adverse factor in deciding whether the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted, id. at 869 (citing In re Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (BIA 1980)). 8 Subsequently, we stated in Villanueva-Franco v. INS, 802 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.1986), that Delgado-Chavez stood for the proposition that the BIA may consider [an] alien's conviction and other adverse conduct in the exercise of [its] discretion, id. at 330. 37 The principle underlying Gonzalez plainly is applicable to section 212(c). Determining whether section 212(c) relief should be awarded involves the same type of balancing of equities the Board must undertake in the discretionary determinations considered in the adjustment of status and voluntary departure contexts. See Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1365 (stating that section 212(c) requires the Board to examine all the facts and circumstances of a particular case); In re Edwards, 1990 WL 385757, 1990 BIA LEXIS at  10 (The exercise of discretion in a particular [section 212(c) ] case necessarily requires consideration of all the facts and circumstances involved.); accord In re Buscemi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 628, 633 (BIA 1988); cf. Campos-Granillo v. INS, 12 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir.1994) (citing section 212(c) cases in discussing the factors relevant to a discretionary determination involving voluntary departure). Therefore, as long as the Board does not consider inappropriate or irrelevant factors, see Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1367-69; cf. Rassano v. INS, 492 F.2d 220, 227 (7th Cir.1974), we think that the breadth of the section 212(c) inquiry permits the Board to consider evidence of conduct that does not result in a conviction. Cf. Parcham v. INS, 769 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir.1985) (Evidence of an alien's conduct, without conviction, may be considered in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.), paraphrased in Villanueva-Franco, 802 F.2d at 330. 38 The fact of arrest, insofar as it bears upon whether an alien might have engaged in underlying conduct and insofar as facts probative of an alien's bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident arise from the arrest itself, plainly can have relevance in performing the analysis required by section 212(c). 9 Furthermore, we believe that to permit the California expunging regime to limit the section 212(c) inquiry by barring evidence of the fact of an alien's arrest might result in the very anomaly identified in Gonzalez--the arrest actually could improve an alien's position: if the alien in question is not arrested, for instance, but merely stopped by the police, an account of the relevant events could be elicited from him; but if the alien instead is arrested and the California diversion regime is respected, then the INS would be precluded from questioning the alien concerning the arrest or from introducing a record of the same, with the likely outcome that the tribunal undertaking the section 212(c) determination never would learn of relevant facts. 39 Like the Board in Gonzalez, we do not think Congress intended to mandate such anomalies. And, as this circuit stated in interpreting the term conviction in the INA: Deportation is a function of federal and not state law.... 'It would defeat the purposes (of federal law) if provisions of local law, dealing with rehabilitation of convicted persons, could [defeat federal policy].... We do not think Congress intended such a result.'  de la Cruz-Martinez, 404 F.2d at 1200 (quoting Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804, 809 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 88, 15 L.Ed.2d 81 (1965) (alternations added)); cf. Kahn, 20 F.3d at 962 (holding that the BIA's conclusive adoption of state definitions of marriage was not rationally related to the INA's purpose of ensuring  'a uniform federal [immigration] policy'  (quoting Rosario v. INS, 962 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir.1992))). Consequently, as long as Congress has not implicitly demanded adherence to section 1000.5, we believe that to require the Board to give effect to that provision would impair impermissibly the BIA's ability to undertake the particularized assessment that section 212(c) demands. 40 Here, we do not find that Congress implicitly has prohibited the INS from considering Petitioner's arrest or a record of that arrest. It is true that Congress, in what became known as the Federal First Offender Statute (FFOS), 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844(b)(1), and its successor provision codified at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3607, has provided a mechanism very similar to the California diversion program. 10 A first-time narcotics offender, upon a determination of guilt by the court, may have the entry of judgment of guilt withheld and may be placed on probation for up to one year. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844(b)(1). That provision further provides that, upon successful completion of probation, the charges will be dismissed without court adjudication of guilt, but a nonpublic record shall be retained by the Department of Justice solely for the purpose of use by the courts in determining whether or not, in subsequent proceedings, such person qualifies under this subsection. Id. 41 More importantly, the statute also contains a provision suppressing the record of arrest almost identical to that found in section 1000.5. It provides that upon successful completion of the probationary period, the court shall enter an order: 42 expung[ing] from all official records ... all recordation relating to his arrest, indictment, or information, trial, findings of guilty, and dismissal and discharge pursuant to this section.... The effect of such order shall be to restore such person in the contemplation of the law, to the status he occupied before such arrest or indictment or information. No person as to whom such an order has been entered shall be held thereafter under any provision of any law to be guilty of perjury or otherwise giving a false statement by reason of his failures to recite or acknowledge such arrest, or ... in response to an inquiry made of him for any purpose. 43 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3607(c) (providing a materially indistinguishable mechanism). 44 We think that if section 844(b)(2) or its substantially identical successor were applicable to Petitioner, he would have a compelling argument that Congress intended to preclude from the section 212(c) analysis state statutes that were the equivalent of this provision. The BIA itself has long interpreted other provisions of the INA with an eye toward eliminating disparities in treatment among aliens that results merely from the fortuity of whether a criminal prosecution has been brought by federal or state authorities. For instance, in the context of determining the meaning of the term conviction in the INA, the BIA has held that state statutes that are the equivalent of both the FFOS and the now-repealed Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA), 18 U.S.C. Secs. 5005-26 (1982), repealed by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, Sec. 218(a)(8), 98 Stat. 1837, 2027 (effective Oct. 12, 1984), should have the same effect as their federal counterparts. See, e.g., In re Werk, 16 I. & N. Dec. 234, 235-36 (BIA 1977) (holding that state equivalents of the FFOS are entitled to the same effect as the federal provision); In re Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. 651, 652 (BIA 1974) (holding the same with respect to the FYCA). 11 ThenSolicitor General Bork described the rationale behind this interpretation of the INA as follows: 45 Expungement statutes concerning youth offenders, perhaps even more than other expungement laws, reflect a policy of providing a clean start which would be virtually negated if deportation under federal law were still a consequence of an expunged state marihuana conviction of a youth..... 46 Thus, [not to give effect to state equivalents of the FYCA] would tend to produce the anomalous situation where, for example, a youth offender prosecuted federally and convicted of a serious marihuana offense would not be deportable if the conviction were expunged, while one prosecuted in state court and convicted on a trivial marihuana offense would therefore be deportable, even if the conviction were expunged. 47 Quoted in Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 658-59 (emphasis added). 48 Consequently, we assume arguendo that section 212(c) must be interpreted to minimize the effect of diluting federal policy that arises from the mere fortuity that the state, and not the federal government, prosecutes an alien for a particular offense. Cf. Kahn, 20 F.3d at 962; Jaramillo v. INS, 1 F.3d 1149, 1155 (11th Cir.1993) (approving the Board's interpretation of section 212(c) in part because it furthered a uniform nationwide application of the immigration laws). Accepting this premise, it stands to reason that Congress did not intend that a first-time narcotics offender should be denied the benefit of section 1000.5 when, had the federal government undertaken the prosecution, an equivalent suppression provision would have been triggered. 49 Section 844(b)(2) and its successor provision found in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3607(c), however, are both limited by their terms to those persons under twenty one years of age at the time of the offense. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844(b)(2); 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3607(c) (same). It is apparent from this limitation that Congress did not intend to confer the same privilege to first offenders over that age. Petitioner was 28 at the time of the arrest in question. Accordingly, it cannot be concluded that Congress, through the FFOS, impliedly has required giving effect to section 1000.5 in this case. 50 Petitioner maintains that, even if an implied partial repeal of section 212(c) by the FFOS is not sufficient to require the BIA to respect section 1000.5, the requisite expression of congressional intent can be found in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844a. Section 844a provides for the imposition of a civil penalty for simple possession if the offender previously has not been convicted of an offense relating to a controlled substance. Id. Sec. 844a(a), (c). Like the FFOS, it contains an expunging provision that is tied to successful completion of certain conditions. Id. Sec. 844a(j). However, unlike the FFOS but as in section 1000.5, section 844a(j) is not limited to youthful offenders. Relying on this fact as well as the observation that, under the California regime, pretrial diversion suspends all criminal proceedings, Petitioner maintains that a California court's decision to divert a defendant is equivalent to the Attorney General's decision to seek a civil penalty under section 844a as opposed to undertaking a criminal prosecution that would permit expunging only pursuant to the FFOS. Based on this premise, Petitioner reasons that the California diversion regime is the state equivalent of section 844a, and therefore, that the BIA must give effect to section 1000.5 in this case. 51 Petitioner's argument is flawed in one fundamental respect: we do not believe that any implied partial repeal of section 212(c) that might be required by section 844a would prohibit the BIA from inquiring into past arrests. There are significant differences between the expunging provisions contained in the FFOS and section 844a(j). As discussed above, the FFOS's expunging provision, by its express terms, evinces the broad, rehabilitative purpose of restor[ing] [an arrestee] to the status [that person] occupied before such arrest and the institution of criminal proceedings. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3607 (emphasis added). Consequently, it provides for the expunging of all references to [the] arrest for the offense, id. (emphasis added), and permits the person to deny that the arrest that led to the criminal proceedings ever took place, see id. 52 By contrast, the expunging provision contained in section 844a(j) is more modest in scope. Significantly, it lacks language evincing the goal of completely restoring the offender to his pre-arrest status. In line with a more limited objective, section 844a(j) does not expressly call for the expunging of records of arrests, but contemplates merely that a person who successfully completes the prescribed conditions may not be held thereafter ... to be guilty of perjury ... by reason of his failure to recite or acknowledge a proceeding under this section or the results thereof. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844a(j) (emphasis added); see also 28 C.F.R. Sec. 76.41(c) (1993) (same). Similarly, the statute's implementing regulations provide only for the expunging of official Department records created  for the purposes of the civil proceeding. 28 C.F.R. Sec. 76.41(a) (emphasis added). A preexisting record of an arrest, although it can be made part of the record of the proceeding if introduced as an exhibit, see id. Sec. 76.34(c), clearly is not among the official Department records created pursuant,  id. Sec. 76.41(a) (emphasis added), to section 844a(j)'s implementing regulations. 53 Finally, we observe that section 844a was enacted subsequent to, and against the background of, the FFOS. We therefore cannot conclude that the differences between the language contained in the expunging provision was inadvertent. Congress clearly knew how to draft an expunging provision that permitted denying the fact of arrest when it desired that result. See National Sec. Archive v. Department of Defense, 880 F.2d 1381, 1384 (D.C.Cir.1989); cf. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1588, 1593, 128 L.Ed.2d 302 (1994); King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. 570, 574-75, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991). 54 In light of the above, we conclude that Congress did not intend for expunging pursuant to section 844a(j) to have the same breadth as under the FFOS. Specifically, we hold that Congress did not intend that an arrestee who is not prosecuted criminally, but merely is assessed a civil penalty, would be entitled to an expunging of a record of arrest and the privilege of denying that the arrest took place. 12 Section 844a(j), then, would have no application to this case, which involved the initial eliciting from the petitioner of the fact of his arrest. Accordingly, even if we believed that the California diversion regime constituted the state equivalent of section 844a for some purposes, a question we do not decide, the resulting implied partial repeal of section 212(c) would not extend to barring the BIA from permitting the introduction of records of arrest, or the questioning Petitioner concerning such an arrest. Absent special circumstances, see, e.g., Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1368-69 (refusing to find that Congress delegated to the INS the authority to inquire into and 'punish' private consensual sexual conduct), an implied partial repeal will be found only in the face of an  'irreconcilable conflict,'  Estate of Bell v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir.1991), or clear repugnancy, United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453, 108 S.Ct. 668, 676, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988); accord Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 156, 96 S.Ct. 1989, 1994, 48 L.Ed.2d 540 (1976), between the statutory schemes at issue. Because section 844a(j) does not contemplate the expunging of a record of arrest, we cannot find the requisite degree of incompatibility between that provision and the interpretation of section 212(c) supplied by the BIA in this case. 55 Finally, Petitioner relies upon United States v. Hidalgo, 932 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir.1991), for the proposition that, as a matter of federal law, the BIA must give effect to the diversion regime. Hidalgo, however, involved the question of whether a sentence had been expunged within the meaning of U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2(j). Although the court appeared to acknowledge that the meaning of expunged was itself a question of federal law, see id. at 807, it also recognized that determining whether a conviction was expunged necessarily required assessing the effect of a state expunging regime, see id. Section 212(c), by contrast, does not require the Board, in defining a term, to examine the legal effect that a state attaches to conduct or proceedings. See Kahn, 20 F.3d at 962. Moreover, nothing in the scant legislative history suggests an intent on the part of Congress to make the application of section 212(c) dependent on state law. Cf. Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313, 317 (7th Cir.1974) ([A]bsent an express contrary intention, the scope of a federal statute normally is not dependent on state law. (citing Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104, 63 S.Ct. 483, 485-86, 87 L.Ed. 640 (1943) (emphasis added))), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972, 95 S.Ct. 1392, 43 L.Ed.2d 652 (1975). 13 Accordingly, Hidalgo is inapposite. 56 We are cognizant that this is a case in which the policies of the two governments are at loggerheads: The state wishes to give the defendant a clean slate, yet federal law makes the record indelible. United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 782 (9th Cir.1987) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). However, given the breadth of the section 212(c) inquiry, the federal policy must trump that of California. Absent a federal policy to the contrary, state law cannot  'rewrite history for the purposes of [federal law].'  United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir.1979) (quoting Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977, 981 (9th Cir.1978) (quoting United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883, 887 (9th Cir.1975) (en banc) (Sneed, J., concurring))). Accordingly, in the case of this particular alien, we hold that the Board was not required to give effect to the California diversion scheme in undertaking its section 212(c) analysis. 57