Opinion ID: 2029119
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Nichols' Claim for Rent

Text: Generally, a claim for rent based on occupancy of property and a claim for trespass are mutually exclusive. See Hawkeye Land Co. v. Laurens State Bank, 480 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 1992) (citing 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 1116 (1970)). However, the Nichols' claim for rent in this case is not based solely on the trespass, but the implied-in-fact contract derived from its written demand to the City for the payment of $350 per month commencing April 1, 2000. An implied-in-fact contract requires mutual manifestation of assent. Frank Millard & Co. v. Housewright Lumber Co., 588 N.W.2d 440, 442 (Iowa 1999) (citing Ringland-Johnson-Crowley Co. v. First Cent. Serv. Corp., 255 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Iowa 1977)). Generally, silence or inaction does not constitute a manifestation of assent. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69 cmt. a; E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 3.14 (3d ed.1999) (stating it is a fundamental ... tenet that mere silence is not acceptance). There are exceptions to this general rule when: (1) an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that they were offered with the expectation of compensation, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69(1)(a); (2) the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason to understand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction, and the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept the offer, id. § 69(1)(b); (3) because of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that the offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to accept, id. § 69(1)(c); and (4) in some circumstances, when the offeree does any act inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property, id. § 69(2). None of these exceptions is applicable to the facts of this case. Thus, the City's silence and inaction in response to Mr. Nichols' offer to enter into a landlord-tenant relationship did not constitute acceptance. Accordingly, there was no contract for rent between the parties, express or implied-in-fact, and the City does not owe the Nichols rent.