Opinion ID: 697751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Exemption 7(C): Information Invading Privacy

Text: 35 The district court ordered the disclosure of some pre-cutoff FSM documents notwithstanding government requests to exempt them under exemption 7(C). 6 See 761 F.Supp. at 1450-54. After the district court issued its opinion, the government moved for the court to reconsider its 7(C) rulings in light of Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989), which was decided after the parties submitted their papers on the cross-motions for summary judgment. 36 The government appeals from the district court's denial of the reconsideration motion. It also asks us to reverse portions of the district court's ruling in light of Department of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 112 S.Ct. 541, 116 L.Ed.2d 526 (1991), which was decided on or after the district court's order denying reconsideration. Instead of appealing from orders to disclose individual documents, the government argues that the district court applied the law erroneously in three respects, and that these errors require us to reverse the disclosure orders for many documents. Before we consider these alleged errors, which all go to the privacy interests at stake for individual documents, we review the public interest at stake for all the documents. 37 Exemption 7(C) requires us to balance the privacy interests of the individuals protected by the nondisclosure against the public interest at stake. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762, 109 S.Ct. at 1476. The sole cognizable public interest for FOIA is the interest to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny, to inform the citizenry about what their government is up to. Id. at 772, 773, 109 S.Ct. at 1481, 1481-82 (internal quotations omitted). 38 We agree with the district court that this interest exists here. It certainly serves FOIA's purpose to disclose publicly records that document whether the FBI abused its law enforcement mandate by overzealously investigating a political protest movement to which some members of the government then may have objected. 39 The government argues that the issue here is the extent of the public interest in knowing the identities of the subjects of these documents, not the interest in the other contents of the documents. The government's point comports with Supreme Court precedent. In Ray, 7 the Court analyzed the interest in public access to interviews the Department of State conducted with repatriated Haitian refugees. The Department of State conducted these interviews to determine whether Haiti's government was retaliating against the returnees for having attempted to leave the country. Ray, 502 U.S. at 167-69, 112 S.Ct. at 544. The Court recognized that the public interest was whether the State Department ha[d] adequately monitored Haiti's compliance with its promise not to prosecute returnees. Id. at 177-79, 112 S.Ct. at 549. The Court was convinced, however, that this interest could be served without releasing the names of the interviewees. Id.; see also Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773-74, 109 S.Ct. at 1481-82; Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1604, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976). 40 We conclude that this precedent is distinguishable because the public interest in this case may not be served without disclosing the names of the investigation subjects. The public interest in this case is knowing whether and to what extent the FBI investigated individuals for participating in political protests, not federal criminal activity. Disclosing the names of the investigation subjects would make it possible to compare the FBI's investigations to a roster of the FSM's leadership. Therefore, disclosing the names of investigation subjects promotes the public interest of this FOIA request. 41 In light of this strong public interest, we consider the government's arguments about the district court's weighing of privacy interests. The government first asserts that the district court erred in giving minimal weight to the privacy interests of the subjects of its investigations, contrary to Reporters Committee and Ray. We find nothing in the record to suggest that the district court made such an error. None of the court's findings as to the FSM documents denied a 7(C) exemption because the only privacy interest was the interest of an investigated third party in keeping the investigative report confidential. See 761 F.Supp. at 1450-54. 8 We see no basis here to disturb the district court's rulings. 42 The government also argues that the district court erred by concluding that the passage of time diminished investigation subjects' interest in keeping secret the events reported in the investigation. However, having reviewed the specific rulings that the government would have us reverse on this basis, FSM Docs. 42 and 402, we note that this argument incorrectly characterizes the district court's use of the passage of time. In Doc. 42, the court ordered a police officer's name disclosed, but not the police unit where he was stationed. Id. at 1450. The court reasoned that [d]ue to the ... passage of time, it is unlikely that disclosure of the unit would lead to the identity of the officer. Id. In FSM Doc. 402, the court ordered the disclosure of a party's name because the name is only a first name, and a common one at that, and because [r]elease would not identify the person, especially given the passage of time. Id. at 1453. 43 The district court in each of these cases respected the document subject's privacy by refusing to order the disclosure of the subject's name. The court ordered the disclosure of information that might in some circumstances lead to the identity of the person. However, the court found in each case as a matter of fact that the information was not likely to identify the party, in part because it would be impracticable to conduct an identity search more than twenty-five years later. The district court accommodated, not disregarded, the subjects' privacy. 44 Last, the government argues that the district court erred by affording less weight to the privacy interests of the subjects of some documents, because those subjects were well-known to have been active in the FSM. The government did not specifically identify for us the documents affected by this alleged error. We presume from our review of the district court's opinion that the government is appealing from the orders to disclose names in FSM Docs. 42, 342, 352, and 371 on this basis. See 761 F.Supp. at 1450-53. The court overruled the requests to withhold names in these documents because the individuals in question engaged in activities which made it very likely that the FBI would take an investigative interest in them. Confirmation that the FBI did take such an interest adds little or nothing to whatever consequences the already-public knowledge of their activities may have. Id. at 1450. 45 On this issue, we share the government's concern that the district court's characterization of the subjects' privacy interests may be cramped. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763, 109 S.Ct. at 1476-77. Disclosing the names of an investigation subject would not merely confirm that the FBI took an investigative interest in that person. The contents of the investigation file might exceed the scope of the FSM investigation. For instance, the file could contain highly personal information, the disclosure of which could prove embarrassing. See Ray, 502 U.S. at 175-77, 112 S.Ct. at 548. Furthermore, the investigative reports could contain information indicating that the subject was involved in criminal activity unrelated to the FSM. The subjects' high profiles in the FSM would not lessen their interest in keeping secret this separate information. We have held that it is better to err on the side of subjects' privacy interests even in cases where they may have held themselves out. Cf. Church of Scientology Int'l v. IRS, 995 F.2d 916, 920-21 (9th Cir.1993) (declining to construe subjects' oral waiver to objection to disclosure of the information at issue as an actual waiver). 46 We remand the district court's judgment as to FSM Docs. 42, 342, 352, and 371. The district court should determine whether these documents contain information, relating to individuals whose names have been withheld, that exceeds the scope of FSM criminal investigations. We cannot make this determination because it is factual in nature. If the documents have no such information, the district court's rulings on them may stand. If the documents do contain information unrelated to the FSM, the district court should determine how much release of this information would invade the privacy of individuals whose names have been withheld, and balance this interest against the strong public interest in access to the individuals' identities. We affirm the district court's rulings on exemption 7(C) requests in all other respects. 47