Opinion ID: 2103784
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Protections Afforded the Right to Privacy

Text: Determining whether an asserted interest is fundamental is essential because fundamental rights receive special protection under both federal and state constitutions. Federal case law uniformly holds the government regulation of the exercise of fundamental rights is unconstitutional unless the regulations both serve a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). Tennessee courts have adopted this strict scrutiny approach in regard to fundamental rights without exception. See State v. Smoky Mountain Secrets, Inc., 937 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Tenn.1996). Under federal law, privacy interests involving matters of marriage, procreation, and child rearing have been held to be fundamental in nature. Fundamental rights have been described as those liberties that are `deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2844, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 503, 97 S.Ct. at 1938)). They have also been described as those rights that are `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that `neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.' Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92, 106 S.Ct. at 2844 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); accord Roe, 410 U.S. at 152, 93 S.Ct. at 726. Additionally, fundamental rights have been found to be those rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34, 93 S.Ct. at 1297 (context of equal protection challenge). Nevertheless, in Davis, we found the right to procreational autonomy to be inherent in our most basic concepts of liberty. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601. That test was essentially a restatement of the fundamental rights approach of Roe . Because a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and an individual's right to procreational autonomy are similar in nature, we find the Davis test to be most appropriate here. [7] Thus, a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is fundamental if it can be said to be inherent in the concept of ordered liberty embodied in the Tennessee Constitution. The dissent contends that the right to terminate a pregnancy as guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution is co-extensive with the similar right as guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and this Court should follow the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court as to the appropriate standard on which to judge abortion regulations. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876, 112 S.Ct. at 2820. The dissent's primary contention in this regard is that the historical backgrounds of the federal due process clauses and the Law of the Land clause in the Tennessee Constitution (Tenn. Const. art. I, § 8) are similar and that the textual differences of the clauses should be accorded little weight. The dissent also contends that historically the courts of this State have consistently viewed the Law of the Land clause as providing co-extensive protection to personal liberty as that provided by the federal due process clauses. Without question, the protections afforded Tennessee citizens by the Tennessee Constitution's Declaration of Rights share the contours of the protections afforded by the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600. This is due, in large part, to affinity of purpose. Both documents were written with the intent to reserve to the people various liberties and to protect the free exercise of those liberties from governmental intrusion. It is also due in part to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that the federal constitution is the ultimate Law of the Land. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. It essentially mandates that no Tennessee law, whether statute, rule, or constitution, may operate to deprive a Tennessean any right afforded by the federal constitution. See Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Tenn.1979). Therefore, Tennessee courts are rightfully reluctant to find greater protection from the text of the state constitution where the protections of the federal constitution suffice. As a result, more interpretive case law is generated in regard to the federal constitution. See Richard S. Wirtz, Foreward: Interpreting the Tennessee Constitution, 61 Tenn.L.Rev. 405, 406 (1994). Therefore, analysis of case law interpreting the federal constitution is often a first step in interpreting provisions of our own constitution that are similar in wording, intent, or purpose. It is equally without question, however, that the provisions of our Tennessee Declaration of Rights from which the right to privacy emanates differ from the federal Bill of Rights in marked respects. In Davis, we found that the right to privacy guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution sprang from the express grants of rights in Article I, sections 3, 7, 19, and 27, and also from the grants of liberty in Article I, sections 1, 2, and 8. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599-600. These protections contained in our Declaration of Rights are more particularly stated than those stated in the federal Bill of Rights. For example, the explicit guarantee of freedom of worship found under the United States Constitution occupies but sixteen words in an amendment generally guaranteeing freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to assemble, and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. See U.S. Const. amend. I. In contrast, the guarantee of worship under the Tennessee Constitution exists in its own paragraph constituting eighty-one words. It characterizes mankind's right to worship as a natural and indefeasible right and declares that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience. Tenn. Const. art I, § 3. This Court has said that the language of this section, when compared to the guarantee of religious freedom contained in the federal constitution, is a stronger guarantee of religious freedom. See Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 288 S.W.2d 718, 721 (1956). Tennessee's guarantees of free speech and free press are similarly more descriptive than the federal grant. The verbal expression of these basic freedoms in our constitution is infused with a strong sense of individuality and personal liberty: The free communication of thoughts and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 19. While these differences in language and expression have yet to give rise to recognition of a substantial difference in protection of speech, this Court has not foreclosed the possibility that our constitution might offer greater protection to speech in certain contexts. See, e.g., Davis-Kidd Booksellers, 866 S.W.2d at 525 (noting finding coextensive protection in obscenity context does not mean provisions are identical for all purposes); Leech v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 738, 745 (Tenn.1979) (holding Art. I, § 19 should be construed to have a scope at least as broad as that afforded those freedoms by the first amendment of the United States Constitution (emphasis added)). That this Court has seen fit to leave this door open speaks of our recognition of a potentially greater state protection. Some of our constitutional protections have been found to be identical to provisions of the United States Constitution in some respects. For example, this Court held in Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn. 6, 423 S.W.2d 857 (1968) that the Tennessee constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is identical in intent and purpose to the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution. Id. at 860. Identity in intent and purpose, however, does not necessarily correlate to coextensive degrees of protection. In fact, this Court's decisions applying the state constitution have been somewhat more restrictive than comparable federal cases in some search and seizure contexts. State v. Lakin, 588 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tenn.1979) (finding Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7 offered greater protection than U.S. Const. amend. IV in context of open fields doctrine); see also State v. Doelman, 620 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tenn.Crim.App.1981) (noting the Tennessee Constitution is somewhat more protective of private property rights). This difference in degree of protection afforded by the state and federal constitutions was due primarily to an explicit difference in wording between the two constitutional provisions. Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution protects possessions, a term not mentioned in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Lakin, 588 S.W.2d at 549 (construing protection of possessions to include occupied, fenced areas); see also Welch v. State, 154 Tenn. 60, 64, 289 S.W. 510, 511 (1926). We do not mean to suggest a qualitative difference in constitutional provisions simply because of a mere quantitative difference in words. Nor do we suggest that different expressions of intent preclude that intent being identical. Cf. Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 440 (Tenn.1979) (stating, We do not agree that the Tennessee prohibition against self-incrimination is broader or different in any application thereof because of the use of the word `evidence' instead of the word `witness'). Still, this Court is not free to discount the fact that the framers of our state constitution used language different from that used by the framers of the United States Constitution. No words in our constitution can properly be said to be surplusage, see Welch, 154 Tenn. at 62, 289 S.W. at 510 ([T]he word `possessions' was added [to our Constitution] for a purpose.), and differences in expressions of right are particularly relevant to determining the concept of liberty embodied in our constitution. Our constitution also contains specific provisions not found in the federal constitution, the most pertinent being Article 1, section 2, condemning the doctrine of nonresistence. This provision exemplifies the strong and unique concept of liberty embodied in our constitution in that it clearly assert[s] the right of revolution. Otis H. Stephens, Jr., The Tennessee Constitution and the Dynamics of American Federalism, 61 Tenn.L.Rev. 707, 710 (1994). It provides: That government being instituted for the common benefit, the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 2. In essence, this section recognizes that our government serves at the will of the people of Tennessee, and expressly advocates active resistence against the government when government no longer functions to serve the people's needs. There is no better statement of our constitution's concept of liberty than this audacious empowerment of Tennesseans to forcibly dissolve the very government established but one Article later in our constitution. That the protections afforded by some of these express provisions, including the Law of the Land clause, have been found to be practically synonymous with their federal counterparts is not dispositive of the issue of whether the collective concept of liberty embodied in our constitution is greater than the concept envisioned by the federal constitution. Indeed, this Court has recognized that practical synonymity does not necessarily correspond to coextensive expressions of liberty, even as to individual express guarantees under the constitution. For example, in Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. at 672, 288 S.W.2d at 721, we held that the freedom of worship clauses in the Tennessee and federal Constitutions are practically synonymous. Still, in that same breath, the Court noted, If anything, our own organic law is broader and more comprehensive in its guarantee of freedom of worship and freedom of conscience.... Id. Today, we remain opposed to any assertion that previous decisions suggesting that synonymity or identity of portions of our constitution and the federal constitution requires this Court to interpret our constitution as coextensive to the United States Constitution. [8] Tennessee constitutional standards are not destined to walk in lock step with the uncertain and fluctuating federal standards and do not relegate Tennessee citizens to the lowest levels of constitutional protection, those guaranteed by the national constitution. State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 193 (Tenn.1991) (Reid, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We have said time and again that: [A]s to Tennessee's Constitution, we sit as a court of last resort, subject solely to the qualification that we may not impinge upon the minimum level of protection established by Supreme Court interpretations of the federal constitutional guarantees. But state supreme courts, interpreting state constitutional provisions, may impose higher standards and stronger protections than those set by the federal constitution. It is settled law that the Supreme Court of a state has full and final power to determine the constitutionality of a state statute, procedure, or course of conduct with regard to the state constitution, and this is true even where the state and federal constitutions contain similar or identical provisions. Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d at 760 (emphasis added). We do not intend to divert from this principle. The concept of ordered liberty embodied in our constitution requires our finding that a woman's right to legally terminate her pregnancy is fundamental. The provisions of the Tennessee Constitution imply protection of an individual's right to make inherently personal decisions, and to act on those decisions, without government interference. A woman's termination of her pregnancy is just such an inherently intimate and personal enterprise. This privacy interest is closely aligned with matters of marriage, child rearing, and other procreational interests that have previously been held to be fundamental. To distinguish it as somehow non-fundamental would require this Court to ignore the obvious corollary.