Opinion ID: 199581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discriminatory Retaliation

Text: 17
18 Sullivan further claims that Raytheon violated his rights under chapter 151B, § 4(4) 4 by engaging in retaliatory discrimination in not reinstating him after he filed a charge of discrimination with the MCAD. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, Sullivan had to show that: (1) he engaged in conduct protected under Massachusetts or federal law; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action. McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 309 (1st Cir. 1998). Sullivan's claim falters on the third prong of this test. He has not demonstrated a causal connection between his protected conduct - filing a charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination in October 1996--and Raytheon's refusal to reinstate him to his position as a security guard in July 1996. Indeed, Sullivan concedes this chronology in the facts section of his brief when he states: When Sullivan was not given disability benefits, and was not reinstated to a suitable position at Raytheon, he filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination on October 9, 1996. Because Sullivan's protected action - filing a charge of discrimination - occurred after the adverse employment action, we affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Raytheon on the retaliation claim. 19
20 Sullivan also claims that the district court should not have dismissed his claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 75B. 5 Section 75B bars discrimination against qualified handicapped workers exercising their rights under the workers' compensation law, which includes procedures for filing claims for injuries, receiving payments, and determining re-employment. Fant v. New England Power Serv. Co., 239 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2001). The district court found that this state law claim was preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185. 6 We agree. 21 Section 301 [of the LMRA] completely preempts a state law claim, 'if the resolution of [the] state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement.' Magerer v. John Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525, 528 (1st Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988)). With respect to the Massachusetts workers' compensation statute, the protections of § 75B are subordinate to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement between Sullivan's union and Raytheon. Fant, 239 F.3d at 14. See also Magerer, 912 F.2d at 529 ([S]uch claims [under section 75B] are, by the express terms of the statute, subject to the terms of any applicable collective bargaining agreement.). The statute provides: In the event that any right set forth in this section is inconsistent with an applicable collective bargaining agreement, such agreement shall prevail. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 75B(3). We have said that this language 22 makes clear that to the extent that the collective bargaining agreement provides standards to govern the conduct underlying plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim, the claim will be governed by the standards of the agreement, rather than by the standards of ch. 152 § 75B. And to that extent, claims under section 75B will require interpretation of the agreement and, therefore, will be preempted by Section 301. 23 Magerer, 912 F.2d at 529. We need not find explicitly that the collective bargaining agreement at issue here is inconsistent with section 75B to find Sullivan's claim under that statute preempted. See Fant, 239 F.3d at 16. In similar circumstances, we have found claims under section 75B preempted not because the collective bargaining agreement is inconsistent with the state claims asserted, but because it may be so and requires interpretation. Martin v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 105 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Fant, 239 F.3d at 16 (finding retaliation claim brought under section 75B preempted by the LMRA). 24 Here, the collective bargaining agreement between Raytheon and the Union contained a management rights clause providing that the management and control of the Company's business and operations, working force and plant, as well as the direction, supervision and assignment of duties of the Guards, is vested exclusively in the management of the Company. This broad grant of supervisory discretion to Raytheon could conflict with the provisions of section 75B that place limits on Raytheon's ability to refuse to reinstate employees after they have filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Because we would have to interpret the agreement to determine whether this clause conflicts with section 75B, Sullivan's claim is preempted. See Martin, 105 F.3d at 43-44 (finding claim under chapter 75B preempted because of a potential conflict with the management rights clause of the collective bargaining agreement); Magerer, 912 F.2d at 530 (finding that management rights clause could be construed to govern the conduct underlying plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim). Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that Sullivan's section 75B claim was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. 25 We have recognized that this outcome - finding a claim under chapter 75B preempted because of a potential conflict with the management rights clause in a collective bargaining agreement - seems faintly troubling. Martin, 105 F.3d at 44. However, the union may bargain to avoid this outcome in the future: 26 If all else fails, the union is free to negotiate language that eliminates this issue the next time it renews its labor agreement. . . . All that it would take to prevent preemption is an explicit provision stating that nothing in the agreement is intended to create management rights inconsistent with any workers' rights under sections 75A and 75B. 27 Id. Moreover, even if we found that Sullivan's claim under chapter 75B was not preempted, no rational fact finder could infer a discriminatory animus on Raytheon's part because Raytheon refused to reinstate him more than two years after Sullivan filed for workers' compensation. See Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that period of nine months suggests the absence of a causal connection between the statutorily protected conduct and the adverse employment action).