Opinion ID: 1362483
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court's Finding of Fact

Text: Bradford first challenges the district court's finding that Bradford sold heroin to J.H. We will affirm the district court's findings of fact on sentencing matters unless they are clearly erroneous. See Rita v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2471, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that appellate courts are to `give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses' and to `accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous') (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)). Bradford argues that the district court's factual finding is clearly erroneous because the government's sole witness linking him to J.H., Hoskins, was not credible. While a district court's credibility findings are virtually unassailable on appeal, United States v. Watson, 479 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted), there are three specific ways in which a finding based on credibility could be erroneous. United States v. Tucker, 243 F.3d 499, 506 (8th Cir.2001). First, the accepted testimony could be incoherent or facially implausible. Second, the testimony could be contradicted by extrinsic evidence. Third, the finding itself could be internally inconsistent. Id. (internal citation omitted). In support of his argument, Bradford contends that Hoskins's testimony was contradicted by extrinsic evidence and was incoherent [and] facially implausible. Id. Bradford first points to the extrinsic evidence of cell phone records that he claims are at odds with Hoskins's testimony at the sentencing hearing. Although Hoskins testified that she did not exactly remember the sequence and duration of the telephone calls between J.H. and B, she remembered there being several calls to and from B. She also testified that she and J.H. used both her phone and J.H.'s phone when making calls to B. The government introduced cell phone records for Hoskins, J.H., and the number alleged to belong to Bradford. [3] The records show three calls from Hoskins's phone to Bradford's phone on the night of June 10, 2004: a four-second call that went to voice-mail, a twenty-seven-second call that was answered, and a four-second call that was answered. According to Hoskins's testimony, the first two calls were made by Hoskins herself, and the third call was made by J.H. The records show no calls from Bradford's phone to either Hoskins's or J.H.'s phone. Bradford argues that this fact contradicts Hoskins's testimony and makes the district court's finding that Hoskins was credible clearly erroneous. Bradford also argues that Hoskins's version of events strains credulity for the following reasons: (1) a heroin dealer [would not] sell to an unknown buyer, J.H., based on a referral by a scam artist and a deadbeat[;] (2) the alleged deal was not consistent with Bradford's modus operandi; (3) Hoskins gave at least three different versions of the events of the night of June 10, 2004, to authorities[;] (4) Hoskins's identification of Bradford was made approximately a year-and-a-half after the alleged distribution of heroin to J.H; (5) Hoskins had limited ability to observe the transaction; (6) Hoskins's testimony was inconsistent with other evidence, including her own prior statements; and (7) Hoskins never saw anyone hand heroin to J.H. Therefore, Bradford contends that we must reverse the district court's factual finding. We disagree. We may reject the fact finder's choice between conflicting evidence only where there is something wrong with the choice. Id. at 506. We recognize, and are troubled by, the paucity of the evidence offered to prove that Bradford sold heroin to J.H. The only evidence offered was the testimony of Hoskins, who had previously told law enforcement officers two different stories. Hoskins's testimony, however, is not too implausible to support a finding that Bradford sold heroin to J.H. Id. at 506. Hoskins testified with certainty that Bradford was the dealer who sold J.H. heroin on the night preceding his death. She explained her previous stories as falsehoods intended to ensure a continued supply of heroin and to keep her and Callanan out of trouble. As for the inconsistencies between Hoskins's testimony and the phone records, the sentencing hearing took place two-and-a-half years after J.H.'s death, and it is reasonable for the court to conclude that Hoskins was honestly mistaken in her recollection about details of the phone calls made the night before J.H.'s death. Further, the district court's finding that Bradford's mother's story was not credible also lends support to the court's decision to believe Hoskins's story and not Bradford's. If the court believed that Bradford had lied by putting on a false alibi defense, it could have inferred that he was dissembling to cover up wrongdoing or guilt. United States v. Barraza Cazares, 465 F.3d 327, 333 (8th Cir.2006). While we cannot say that we would have come to the same conclusion as the district court, there is nothing wrong with the district court choosing to believe Hoskins's story instead of Bradford's. Tucker, 243 F.3d at 506; see Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.). Therefore, we must affirm the district court's finding of fact on this issue.