Opinion ID: 4442257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Attorney Work Product Privilege

Text: The qualified privilege for attorney work product is designed to shield “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories concerning the litigation.” Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195 (2d Cir. 1998). The FOIA context is obviously more broad than litigation or the contemplation of it. Like the other civil discovery privileges,12 however, the protection afforded by the work product privilege “is not absolute.” United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975). A party waives the work product protection by taking actions inconsistent with this its purpose, such as disclosing work product to its adversary, In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993), or by placing privileged documents “at issue” in a litigation, John Doe Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 302 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A party . . . impliedly waives work product protection if it places the substance of the documents for which the protection is claimed at issue.”); see also Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 235 F.3d 598, 605‐06 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that a party waives the work product privilege by making “testimonial use” of the documents). These doctrines may 12 This Court has, on several previous occasions, discussed the waiver of the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 925 F.3d 576, 590-91 (2d Cir. 2019); Brennan Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 697 F.3d 184, 207 (2d Cir. 2012); In re County of Erie, 546 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2000). 26 apply in the Exemption 5 context much as they do in ordinary civil discovery. Just as Exemption 5 transplants the work product privilege into the FOIA context, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), so too does it import the judicially‐recognized doctrines governing the waiver of the privilege. See F.T.C. v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 26 (1983) (“By its own terms, Exemption 5 requires reference to whether discovery would normally be required during litigation with the agency.”) (emphasis omitted). It is not disputed here that Durham’s memoranda were attorney work product at the time they were drafted, in part because Durham prepared them in anticipation of possible criminal prosecutions. In their supplemental briefing, however, plaintiffs‐appellees argue that Holder’s public statements about these memoranda waived the privilege, thus subjecting them to disclosure under FOIA.13 13 Defendants-appellants argue that plaintiffs-appellees have forfeited any reliance on a waiver argument by not raising it in their initial brief. We disagree. The issue of waiver is “properly before the court” on the instant facts, and we are “not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties” in their initial briefs. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991). 27

Plaintiffs‐appellees first invoke the doctrine that a litigant waives the work product protection by voluntarily disclosing privileged material to its adversary. Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230; see also SEC v. Gupta, 281 F.R.D. 169, 171 (S.D.N.Y 2012) (“Work product protection . . . may be waived if the work product is voluntarily disclosed.”); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, No. 03‐MDL‐ 1570, 2013 WL 2641383, at  (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013) (work product protection is waived upon disclosure to an adversary or disclosure to a non‐adversary that “materially increases the likelihood that an adversary can gain access to that information”); Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Generally speaking, the work product privilege should not be deemed waived unless disclosure is inconsistent with maintaining secrecy from possible adversaries.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[A] party waives its work product protection in civil litigation if it discloses the privileged material to anyone without common interests in developing legal theories and analyses of documents.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 28 In the FOIA Exemption 5 context (where adversaries often do not exist), this doctrine provides that public disclosure of specific details from an otherwise privileged agency memorandum waives the work product protection with respect to those facts. The D.C. Circuit, for example, has previously evaluated in an Exemption 5 case whether selective quotation of privileged documents in a non‐privileged document waived the work product protection with respect to the privileged document. Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 235 F.3d 598, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Here, of course, we must evaluate the impact of verbal statements describing the content of privileged memoranda, rather than actual disclosure of the memoranda themselves. But we see no reason not to apply the same inquiry. We have previously looked to “common sense” to “define the limits of the work product doctrine,” Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 235 (2d Cir. 1993), and common sense suggests that verbal description of the contents of a document, if sufficiently specific, is as “inconsistent with the maintenance of secrecy,” Rockwell, 235 F.3d at 605 (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)), of that document as would be disclosure of the document itself. 29
This Court has also held that a party waives the work product protection over a document by placing that document “at issue” or by making “testimonial use” of that document. Specifically, “in certain circumstances a party’s assertion of factual claims can, out of considerations of fairness to the party’s adversary, result in the involuntary forfeiture of privileges for matters pertinent to the claims asserted.” John Doe Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 302 (2d Cir. 2003). We have said that this kind of unfairness may arise when “a party[] advance[es] a claim to a court or jury (or perhaps another type of decision maker) while relying on its privilege to withhold from a litigation adversary materials that the adversary might need to effectively contest or impeach the claim.” Id. at 303; see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239‐40; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[I]mplied waiver may be found where a privilege holder ‘asserts a claim that in fairness requires examination of protected communications.’”) (quoting United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292) (1991)). The archetypal example of a situation where this doctrine applies is that of United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). There, the Supreme Court identified 30 a “testimonial” use of work product by a criminal defendant that would be sufficiently unfair to the prosecution so as to waive the privilege. At the underlying trial, the prosecution had called two eye witnesses who identified the defendant as the perpetrator of a bank robbery. Before trial, an investigator for the defense had interviewed these two witnesses, elicited statements that seemed to undermine their credibility, and memorialized these statements in a written report. When the defense sought to call this investigator to testify at trial, the government demanded that the investigator’s written report be produced. Id. at 227‐30. The defense objected, citing the work product privilege. Id. at 236‐40. But the Supreme Court agreed with the government, holding that the defendant “can no more advance the work product doctrine to sustain a unilateral testimonial use of work product materials than he could elect to testify in his own behalf and thereafter assert his Fifth Amendment privilege to resist cross‐examination on matters reasonably related to those brought out in direct examination.” Id. at 239‐40; see also John Doe Co., 350 F.3d at 303 (discussing Nobles). As the plaintiffs‐appellees note, we have sometimes “used broad language in describing [this] doctrine, such as generalizing about the incompatibility of using . . . assertions as a ‘sword’ while using privileges attaching to related 31 matter as a ‘shield.’” John Doe Co., 350 F.3d at 302. We have subsequently clarified, however, that implied waiver of the work product privilege based on the “fairness” or “at‐issue” doctrine is not nearly so broad. To find implied waiver, we look for specific instances of unfairness that undermine the adversarial process, and this is inherently a case‐by‐case determination. Id. (citing In re Grand Jury, 219 F.3d at 193).
We first evaluate whether Holder’s public statements about the memoranda were specific enough to have effectuated disclosure of parts of the memoranda and accompanying exhibits, thereby waiving the work product privilege with respect to those parts. The defendants argue that there is “no basis” to believe that the government waived the work product privilege, while the plaintiffs point to several statements by Holder that they believe waive the privilege. Specifically, in his June 30, 2011 statement, Holder explained that “Mr. Durham examined any possible CIA involvement with the interrogation of 101 detainees who were in United States custody subsequent to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a number of whom were determined by Mr. Durham to 32 have never been in CIA custody” (emphasis supplied). Then, in his July 11, 2012 public statement, Holder said again that Durham “determined that a number of the detainees were never in CIA custody.” We find these statements to be sufficiently specific that they are tantamount to public disclosure of the parts of the relevant memoranda that relate to this finding. Accordingly, we hold that the government waived the privilege over the sections of the memoranda and exhibits relating to the conclusion that a number of the detainees investigated were not in CIA custody. Because Holder referenced this fact in both of his public statements, our holding applies to all five of the memoranda and associated exhibits. However, the fact that the government waived the work product privilege with respect to these parts of the documents does not automatically mean that the government waived the privilege with respect to the whole documents. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. Kempthorne, 652 F. Supp. 2d 345, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (surveying case law and concluding that “the production of a document in redacted form does not automatically waive the protection as to its whole or to related documents”). Moreover, we have held in the “express adoption” context that a limited citation to and quotation of a privileged report does not waive 33 Exemption 5 protection over the rest of the document. Tigue v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 312 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 2002). The Times points to three additional parts of Holder’s public statements, arguing that these statements also waived the privilege over the parts of the relevant memoranda relating to these statements: first, Holder’s discussion of the legal standard Durham employed in deciding whether to prosecute (“Based on the fully developed factual record concerning the two deaths, the Department has declined prosecution because the admissible evidence would not be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”); second, Holder’s statement that he directed Durham not to prosecute anyone who acted in good faith (“I made clear at that time that the Department would not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation of detainees.”); and third, the statutory authority that guided Mr. Durham’s analysis (“In reaching this determination, Mr. Durham considered all potentially applicable substantive criminal statutes as well as the statutes of limitations and jurisdictional provisions that govern prosecutions under those statutes.”). 34 We think that none of these statements divulges the content of the memoranda with enough specificity to constitute waiver of the work product privilege. The first statement is not a statement about the content of the report at all, but rather an acknowledgement that DOJ, after considering the report, concluded that the admissible evidence would not be sufficient to obtain a conviction. Although we infer from the context of this statement that Durham may have concluded as much in the report, we do not read Holder’s statement as being functionally equivalent to disclosing parts of the memoranda. The second statement plaintiffs identify is likewise not a statement about the contents of the memoranda, but a statement about what Holder told Durham. The third statement, although it does broadly outline how Durham approached his investigation, is too vague and general to have effected waiver of the work product privilege. A private litigant who described her attorney’s work product to her adversary in such broad and nonspecific language could not be said to have effectively disclosed that work product. We therefore hold that none of these additional statements identified by plaintiffs waived the work product privilege over any part of the memoranda. 35 We next consider whether Holder placed the contents of Durham’s memoranda “at issue” through his public statements, thus impliedly waiving the privilege. Plaintiffs‐appellees argue that Holder did so by citing Durham’s investigation as part of a public relations offensive. In Plaintiffs’ view, Holder relied on the memoranda to “mute criticisms about the decision not to prosecute,” but then “stood on privilege to shield the actual analysis employed by Mr. Durham, leaving the public unable to asses whether the Attorney General’s assurances of thoroughness were warranted.”14 In our view, Holder’s references to Durham’s reports, although clearly spoken with an intent to explain the Department’s decision not to prosecute, do not constitute “testimonial use” of the reports and therefore do not waive the work product privilege over the documents. The D.C. Circuit allowed that “[i]t is conceivable that a case might arise in which testimonial use of work product documents would in effect lead to a general waiver of the privilege” negating the application of Exemption 5, Rockwell, 235 F.3d at 607, but we need not consider that hypothesis here. First, while there is little precedent within this Circuit on 14 Plaintiffs-appellees also raise this argument to support the proposition that Holder “expressly adopted” Durham’s reports, but for the reasons explained above, we find this doctrine inapplicable here. 36 how the “testimonial use” waiver doctrine applies within the Exemption 5 context, two other circuit courts have held that an agency’s decision to cite privileged documents in an effort to explain government action and get public support does not necessarily waive any privilege over those documents. See Appleton Papers, Inc. v. E.P.A., 702 F.3d 1018, 1026 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that “the district court erred by allowing the government to use the portions of the consultant’s opinions that it believes are helpful, while hiding the analysis and the complete opinions from the public view”); Rockwell, 235 F.3d at 607 (the agency “made no testimonial use of the attachments . . . but instead deployed them . . . in the ensuing struggle for public opinion”). In any event, Plaintiffs’ argument treats as suspect (or as adversarial) the essential function of any government to explain its position and secure public understanding and support. Moreover, we find independently that the fairness concerns of the type and magnitude we identified in John Doe Co. are not present here. In John Doe Co., we wrote that at‐issue waiver may occur when a party “advance[es] a claim . . . while relying on its privilege to withhold from a[n] . . . adversary materials that the adversary might need to effectively contest or impeach the claim.” 350 37 F.3d at 303. In this situation, we do not believe that Holder’s decisions would be incontestable. Although the DOJ referenced Durham’s work in an effort to explain the reasoning for its decisions not to prosecute, Holder never presented the final decisions as anything other than an exercise of judgment by him and his agency. In his June 2011 statement, for example, Holder explained that “Mr. Durham has advised me of the results of his investigation,” but added that “I have accepted his recommendation” (emphasis supplied). And in July 2012, Holder credited Durham with conducting a thorough investigation, but then explained that “the Department has declined prosecution” (emphasis supplied). No one hearing these statements would think anything other than that Eric Holder was explaining the propriety of his policy decisions. Accordingly, we find that Holder’s use of Durham’s memoranda was not so unfair as to implicate our concerns in John Doe Co.