Opinion ID: 2998087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Monsanto/Pharmacia

Text: Counts I and IV of Mr. Magin’s complaint seek to recover under ERISA the benefits that Mr. Magin claims Monsanto/Pharmacia owes him under the Monsanto severance 3 plan. ERISA entitles a plan “participant or beneficiary” to file a civil action “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The statute provides that “[a]ny money judgment under this subchapter against an employee benefit plan shall be enforceable only against the plan as an entity and shall not be enforceable against any other person unless liability against such person is established in his individual capacity under this subchapter.” Id. § 1132(d)(2). Even though, in a suit for benefits, the plaintiff ordinarily “should name the plan as a defendant,” we have allowed suits against the employer in its role as plan administrator. Mein v. Carus Corp., 241 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996)). On appeal, Mr. Magin argues that he is entitled to enhanced benefits from Monsanto because he did not receive a comparable position at CP Kelco. This argument fails in several respects. First, the governing severance plan of Monsanto speaks simply in terms of an “offer of employ- 3 Nothing in Mr. Magin’s submission on appeal indicates that he challenges the district court’s conclusion that the Monsanto severance plan constitutes an ERISA plan for purposes of Counts I and IV, his claims against Monsanto/Pharmacia. Similarly, Mr. Magin has raised no challenge to the district court’s ruling that his alternative state-law claims against Monsanto/ Pharmacia are preempted by ERISA. No. 04-2997 13 ment.” While the summary plan description does use the term “comparable,” it does not employ the term as a distinguishing factor between enhanced and standard benefits. In any event, by acceptance of “Go with Buyer” benefits, which are conditioned on the employee receiving a comparable position with the purchaser, Mr. Magin is in effect estopped from making any claim to the contrary here. Mr. Magin also submits that the sale of the Kelco Division to CP Kelco triggered Monsanto/Pharmacia’s obligation to pay him benefits under the Monsanto severance plan. Specifically, he claims that he became eligible for severance benefits on the date of the sale because, even though he had no period of unemployment, his employment with Monsanto/Pharmacia was terminated in order for him to be 4 placed on the CP Kelco payroll. Monsanto/Pharmacia acknowledges that it released Mr. Magin from its employ- 4 To support his submissions, Mr. Magin relies on Anstett v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 203 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 2000). In Anstett, we held that the plaintiffs were entitled to severance benefits because they were “terminated” when the employer sold their division to another corporation, even though the plaintiffs had been reemployed immediately by the buyer. Id. at 502-03. Our conclusion rested on the specific language of the plan at issue and the particular facts, which included: (1) that the seller knew that a sale of a division could trigger severance benefits absent language in the policy limiting eligibility; (2) that the seller presumably had negotiated the purchase price based on the expectation that it would pay the separation benefits; and (3) that the buyer did not offer the employees a comparable separation benefits package. Id. at 505-06. In such circumstances, we noted, the seller would reap a windfall if not held to its obligation to pay severance. Id. at 506. Moreover, we were concerned that the employees be protected from the “possibly precarious employment future” with the buyer. Id. 14 No. 04-2997 ment on the day of the sale, September 28, 2000, so that he could commence his employment with CP Kelco. However, CP Kelco assumed the duty to pay severance to employees who were transferred to CP Kelco and whose employment CP Kelco terminated within twelve months of employment. CP Kelco specifically agreed to pay such employees severance benefits in an amount at least equal to the base severance pay that they would have received under the Monsanto severance plan. R.50, Ex.B at 32 (“Buyer shall pay to such Transferred Employee an amount at least equal to the base severance pay that such Transferred Employee would have received under Seller’s severance plan.”). Indeed, CP Kelco received a $20 million credit against the purchase price of the Kelco Division for the purpose of paying severance benefits to employees transferred from Monsanto/Pharmacia. It is undisputed that Mr. Magin’s employment was transferred to CP Kelco and that his “pay remained the same” at CP Kelco. R.76, Ex.B at 47. By contrast to Anstett, awarding severance would constitute a windfall to Mr. Magin when Monsanto/ Pharmacia sought to protect its transferred employees by requiring CP Kelco to provide them severance in exchange for a reduced sale price, when Mr. Magin suffered no period of unemployment, and when he received separation benefits from CP Kelco. In short, because CP Kelco contractually assumed the obligation to provide severance benefits to transferred employees who accepted employment with CP Kelco and were terminated within twelve months of their employment, CP Kelco alone is liable to Mr. Magin under the Monsanto severance plan. Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Count I was appropriate. Mr. Magin also contends that Monsanto/Pharmacia breached a fiduciary duty under ERISA by misrepresenting to him that he would receive enhanced severance benefits if No. 04-2997 15 he stayed employed through the sale of the Kelco Division. The district court properly dismissed this claim. “ERISA allows for an action to enforce and seek appropriate relief because of a breach of fiduciary duty.” Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 992 (7th Cir. 1993); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Recovery from such actions, however, must go to the plan as a whole, and not the individual beneficiary. Id. (citing Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985)). Mr. Magin correctly notes that he can maintain an individual cause of action for equitable relief, see Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 515; 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), but that is not what he seeks. Rather, he seeks to recover his personal enhanced severance benefits from Monsanto/Pharmacia.