Opinion ID: 2633344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: More Harm than Good Would Result from Overruling Zerbe.

Text: Even if there had been a sea change in federal law, this alone would not be sufficient to overrule Zerbe. The second prong of this court's stare decisis rule forbids overruling a prior case unless the court is clearly convinced... that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent. [18] We have applied this standard repeatedly in a number of different areas of law. [19] The court's half-hearted attempt to address this pronga single paragraph relegated to a footnoteis both perfunctory and tautological. To support its claim that overruling Zerbe would do more good than harm, the court argues that the decision is outmoded in light of Justice Kennedy's rationale in Sheridan, and that failing to overrule it would continue to cause outcomes that are contrary to the legislative requirement that certain categories of torts may not be maintained against the state. [20] The claim that, unlike the majority of the United States Supreme Court, we should adopt Justice Kennedy's view of the independent duty doctrine is no more than a restatement of the court's argument that Zerbe is no longer sound in light of federal case law. Similarly, the claim that Zerbe cause[s] outcomes that are contrary to the legislative requirement that certain categories of torts may not be maintained against the state, [21] is nothing more than a restatement of the court's conclusion that Zerbe was wrongly decided. [22] And this conclusion is also unsupported by the state's experience since 1978. Alaska courts have not been faced with a deluge of claims based on prison officials' failure to release inmates on time, [23] and they continue to reject claims arising from the torts listed in AS 09.50.250(3). [24] If liability for negligence prevented DOC from fulfilling its function, as liability for false arrest might do in the context of law enforcement, overruling Zerbe might be beneficial. But when DOC is responsible for releasing a prisoner on a predetermined date, its duties are almost synonymous with avoiding negligence. Such a release, based on a decision made by a sentencing court and kept on file by DOC, presents very little room for discretion: either the prisoner's sentence has ended or it has not. [25] For this reason, there is no set of choices analogous to proper arrest decisions that could be chilled by imposing liability on DOC for negligently miscalculating inmates' sentences. Finally, overruling Zerbe could do significant harm, because it would eliminate an incentive for DOC to fulfill its duties in a non-negligent manner. As the court's opinion concedes, DOC's conduct in the present case has been abhorrent, [26] and if the miscalculation had been greater, it would be even more abhorrent. [27] But, by shielding DOC from liability for negligent record keeping, the court's opinion invites more misconduct. The most likely practical consequence of overruling Zerbe is therefore an increase in negligence on the part of DOCand future miscalculations may involve periods of unjust imprisonment longer than seven days. In sum, the court's decision to overrule Zerbe does not comply with our rule of stare decisis. Changes in federal case law have not rendered Zerbe a remnant of abandoned doctrine, [28] the legislature has made no effort to override the case by statute, and the main foreseeable consequence of abandoning this precedent is an increase in negligent misconduct with regard to DOC's most basic duties. I therefore respectfully dissent.