Opinion ID: 1696930
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Testimony of A.C. Hankins

Text: ¶ 64. Jordan's first assignment of error regarding A.C. Hankins is that he should not have been allowed to testify to the statement given by Jordan on April 28, 2005. Jordan alleges that no proper qualification of the statement was ever made. Jordan asserts that it was improper hearsay testimony for Hankins to read from the interview transcript of Jordan's statement. This assignment of error is without merit. A statement made by a defendant is a party-opponent admission, which qualifies as nonhearsay. Miss. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) states in relevant part: A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is his own statement. Miss. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). ¶ 65. Jordan also asserts that it was error for Hankins to be allowed to testify regarding the gunshot residue tests that he performed. Jordan's appellate attorney asserts that this testimony was hearsay. No contemporaneous objection was made when this testimony was given, so this claim is procedurally barred. Smith v. State, 729 So.2d 1191, 1205-06 (Miss.1998). ¶ 66. Finally, Jordan argues that it was error for the trial court to allow Hankins to give his opinion as to why Ms. Simpson gave the type of statement that she did. He also asserts that it was error for the trial court to allow Hankins to testify as to the truthfulness of the Defendant and of his statement. The testimony to which Jordan refers was elicited on cross-examination. It is a well-settled rule that a defendant cannot complain of the evidence which he himself brings out. Simpson v. State, 366 So.2d 1085, 1086 (Miss.1979) (citing Stone v. State, 210 Miss. 218, 49 So.2d 263 (1950)). Therefore, this assertion of error is lacking in merit.
¶ 67. Jordan asserts that the photographic lineup was highly prejudicial and requires reversal. In making his argument, Jordan asserts that the Defendant was the only person wearing civilian clothing, including a white t-shirt, and not wearing an orange jumpsuit or a black and white jumpsuit, and was the only one where you could see that he had on a plain white t-shirt. Of the six individuals pictured in the photographic lineup, one is clearly wearing a black and white jumpsuit and one is wearing an orange jumpsuit. The other four individuals pictured appear to be wearing civilian clothing. Therefore, we find this argument without merit. ¶ 68. Jordan further asserts that it was rank hearsay testimony by Oliver as to who identified Montrell Jordan, namely, Joey Netherland and Carlton Brown, when both of these witnesses were available to testify. A statement concerning an identification of someone after perceiving them is not hearsay if the declarant is subject to cross-examination. Culp v. State, 933 So.2d 264, 276 (Miss.2005); see also Miss. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C). In this case, Jordan's trial counsel objected that it was hearsay for Oliver to testify that he showed the photographic lineup to both Netherland and Brown, and that both identified Jordan as the shooter. The trial court properly overruled this objection. Both Netherland and Brown testified at trial and were subject to cross-examination regarding this identification procedure. Accordingly, we find this issue without merit. ¶ 69. Next, Jordan argues that it was inadmissible testimony for Oliver to give his opinion that the Defendant was `guilty' based on his investigation. Jordan's appellate counsel cites to three different pages in the record to support this contention. However, the record reveals that no such testimony was ever given by Oliver. Therefore, we find this issue to be without merit. ¶ 70. Lastly, Jordan argues that the trial court erred in admitting the ATF [2] Gun Trace and Trace Return documents into evidence. Jordan asserts that the documents were not properly authenticated under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 901. Miss. R. Evid. 901. Defense counsel did not object to the authentication procedure with regard to the ATF Gun Trace, which was admitted into evidence absent objection; therefore, Jordan is procedurally barred from raising this issue on appeal. Rubenstein v. State, 941 So.2d 735, 755 (Miss.2006). Defense counsel did, however, make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of the Trace Return, objecting on authentication grounds. ¶ 71. It is well-established that this Court reviews admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Sewell v. State, 721 So.2d 129, 138 (Miss.1998) (citations omitted). Furthermore, [e]videntiary rulings are affirmed unless they affect a substantial right of the complaining party. Sewell, 721 So.2d at 138 (citations omitted). Mississippi Rule of Evidence 901 requires that a document be authenticated before it is admitted, which is satisfied when there is evidence sufficient to support a finding that the document is what the proponent claims it is. Miss. R. Evid. 901. ¶ 72. In the instant case, Oliver's testimony revealed that he was familiar with the document, and that it was the document he received from the ATF in response to his ATF gun trace request for Montrell Jordan. This testimony, paired with the information on the face of the document, was evidence sufficient to support a finding that the document was what the prosecution claimed. Accordingly, we find that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion by admitting the Trace Return into evidence.