Opinion ID: 773961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Training on the High-Speed Scanner

Text: 8 Hoffman claims that Caterpillar's denial of training on the high-speed scanner violated the ADA. The ADA proscribes discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(a). As a threshold requirement, Hoffman must first establish that she has a disability as defined by the ADA. Disability is defined as (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12102(2). A plaintiff must also demonstrate that she is qualified for the position in question. An individual is qualified if she satisfies the pre-requisites for the position and can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired, with or without reasonable accommodation. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. sec. 1630.2(m)). 9 Once a plaintiff has established that she is a qualified individual with a disability, she may show discrimination in either of two ways: by presenting evidence of disparate treatment or by showing a failure to accommodate. See Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1997). Disparate treatment claims arise from language in the ADA prohibiting covered entities from limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee, 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(1), while failure to accommodate claims stem from language in the ADA defining discrimination in part as not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(5)(A). 10 A disparate treatment claim under the ADA is similar to disparate treatment claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a), and the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. sec. 623(a)(1) in that the plaintiff attempts to show that she was treated differently than other workers on the basis of a protected characteristic. As with other federal anti-discrimination statutes, an ADA plaintiff may prove disparate treatment either by presenting direct evidence of discrimination, or she may prove it indirectly using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). In order to prevail in the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case by showing that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she was meeting the legitimate employment expectations of her employer; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment. See Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2001). 11 In failure to accommodate claims, unlike disparate treatment claims, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach is not necessary or appropriate. See Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1997). Instead, the plaintiff, in addition to showing that she is a qualified individual with a disability, must show that the employer was aware of her disability and still failed to reasonably accommodate it. See Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1999). Reasonable accommodations may include: 12 (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and 13 (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 14 42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(9). 15 Hoffman claims that Caterpillar's denial of training on the high-speed scanner constitutes both disparate treatment and a failure to accommodate under the ADA. Because Caterpillar does not challenge Hoffman's claim that she is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA, we turn first to Hoffman's disparate treatment claim.
16 At the outset, we note that it is quite clear that Caterpillar is not obligated to train Hoffman on the high-speed scanner if she is not capable of running it. The ADA certainly does not require employers to allow employees to use equipment that they are unable to operate. Nor does anything in the ADA mandate that Caterpillar must tolerate a drop in productivity in order to allow Hoffman to run the high-speed scanner. Usually, the question of an employee's ability to perform a specific task will be decided at the outset of a disparate treatment claim in the context of determining whether the plaintiff is qualified under the ADA. In situations such as this one, however, where an employee can clearly perform the essential functions of the position but alleges disparate treatment as to some non-essential function, the employee's ability to perform the task in question becomes relevant at this later stage. 17 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hoffman, we find that there is an issue of fact as to whether Hoffman would be able to operate the high-speed scanner. Because Congress perceived that employers were basing employment decisions on unfounded stereotypes, Siefken v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1995), the ADA discourages employment decisions 'based on stereotypes and generalizations associated with the individual's disability rather than on the individual's actual characteristics.' Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting EEOC v. Prevo's Family Mkt., Inc., 135 F.3d 1089, 1097 (6th Cir. 1998)). The ADA recognizes that a non-disabled person's instincts about the capabilities of a disabled person are often likely to be incorrect. Therefore, a determination that two- handed people use both of their hands to operate the high-speed scanner, or even a determination that most one-handed people would be unable to run it, should not be the end of an employer's inquiry. In this case, it seems doubtful that Cripe made an individualized determination as to whether Hoffman could operate the high- speed scanner because he never gave her a chance to try it. Caterpillar claims that the primary reason that Hoffman lacks the capability to run the high-speed scanner is that she would be unable to effectively clear the frequent paper jams that occur. There is evidence in the record, however, that Hoffman clears paper jams from the copy machine without assistance, and Caterpillar presents no evidence to suggest that clearing paper jams from the high-speed scanner is somehow different. Nor does Caterpillar counter Hoffman's claim that she could use her left arm in a manner similar to a flat hand to hold down the paper as it is being fed into the machine. Therefore, drawing all inferences in favor of Hoffman, we must assume that she is physically capable of running the high- speed scanner. Thus, we move on to the substance of Hoffman's disparate treatment claim. 18 Hoffman's supervisor, Cripe, admits that he refused Hoffman's requests for high- speed scanner training because of her disability. Notwithstanding this admission, the district court granted summary judgment for Caterpillar. The court determined that because Hoffman failed to show that the denial of training affected her compensation, benefits, hours worked, job title, or ability to advance within Caterpillar, she had not shown a materially adverse employment action--one of the elements of the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. See Hoffman v. Caterpillar Inc., No. 98-1062 , slip op. at 7 (C.D. Ill. July 12, 1999) (citing Spencer v. AT&T Network Sys., No. 94 C 7788, 1998 WL 397843, at  (N.D. Ill. July 13, 1998) (finding that denial of training was not a materially adverse employment action because plaintiff's pay, hours, job title, and quality of her responsibilities were not significantly affected); Needy v. Vill. of Woodridge, No. 96 C 5188, 1997 WL 461093 at  (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8 1997) ([D]eprivations of training opportunities do not constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII.)). 19 On appeal, Hoffman argues that, because she has direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the district court erred in determining that she must proceed using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach. Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, will prove the particular fact in question without reliance upon inference or presumption. Plair v. E. J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). In the vast majority of disparate treatment claims, the plaintiff does not have direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of some protected characteristic. Our cases establish that making out a prima facie case using the McDonnell Douglas approach is an alternative to showing direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Beatty v. Wood, 204 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2000). The purpose of the McDonnell Douglas burden- shifting approach is to allow a plaintiff to raise an inference of discrimination even in the absence of direct evidence. See Lynch v. Belden & Co., 882 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir. 1989). It would be redundant to require a plaintiff to utilize the burden-shifting method to raise a presumption of discrimination if he or she possesses direct evidence of discrimination. Our determination that Hoffman need not use the McDonnell Douglas approach does not necessarily mean, however, that Hoffman need not show that she has suffered a materially adverse employment action. We must consider whether demonstrating a materially adverse employment action, aside from being an element of the prima facie case, is a separate substantive requirement of a disparate treatment claim under the ADA. 20 Caterpillar contends that it is clear that an alleged denial of training must materially affect an individual's employment for it to be actionable. However, none of the authorities that Caterpillar cites for the proposition that a denial of training must be materially adverse, see Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 407 (5th Cir. 1999); Spencer v. AT&T Network Sys., 1998 WL 397843, at ; Needy v. Vill. of Woodridge, 1997 WL 461093, at , with the exception of Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 2000), 2 deal with denials of job training under the ADA; rather, they address failure to train claims under Title VII and the ADEA. This distinction is relevant because the ADA specifically prohibits discrimination in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(a) (emphasis added), while the parallel provisions of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a), and the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. sec. 623(a)(1) do not specifically include the term job training among the prohibited actions. If, as Caterpillar suggests, a plaintiff must show that a denial of job training was materially adverse, the inclusion of the words job training in the ADA are mere surplusage because it is clear that a materially adverse denial of job training would fall under the statute's prohibition of discrimination in other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(a). Such a finding would violate the interpretive principle that, every word or provision of a statute must, if possible, be given some effect. Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 942 (7th Cir. 2000). 21 Although we acknowledge that several of our cases contain language suggesting that an employee must always make a separate affirmative showing of a materially adverse employment action in all ADA cases, see, e.g., Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662, 670 (2000); 3 Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000), none of these cases confront the issue of whether an ADA plaintiff alleging denial of job training was also required to present evidence that the denial was adverse. In addition, a close reading of our past employment cases reveals that the cases suggesting that plaintiffs must show an adverse employment action in every case are not dealing with any specifically articulated prohibition, but rather with other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. See, e.g., Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) ([A] materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.); Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 1989) (To establish a violation of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that she suffered a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of her employment.). We do not require a plaintiff who is alleging discrimination with respect to hiring, discharge, or the other enumerated actions to also show that the action was materially adverse. 22 In Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000), we noted that [t]he idea behind requiring proof of an adverse employment action is simply that a statute which forbids employment discrimination is not intended to reach every bigoted act or gesture that a worker might encounter in the workplace. Id. at 653. While we agree that Congress did not intend the ADA to reach every bigoted act or gesture, we must believe that Congress did intend to reach conduct that it specifically prohibited in the statute. Thus, with respect to employment actions specifically enumerated in the statute, a materially adverse employment action is not a separate substantive requirement. We agree with Hoffman that, because the ADA specifically prohibits discrimination in regard to job training, and she has direct evidence of discriminatory intent, she need not show that the denial of training was materially adverse. 4 See Lane v. Wal- Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ. CCB-99-763, 2000 WL 1481638, at  n. 13 (D. Md. Aug. 28, 2000). Hoffman is not asking for special training because of her disability, on the contrary, she is merely asking for the same training that is available to all other employees who request it. Cf. Williams v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 253 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. June 7, 2001). 23 As a practical matter, the class of potential ADA plaintiffs affected by today's holding is quite small. Direct evidence cases, like this one, are very rare in the employment discrimination context because employers are generally very careful to avoid statements that suggest discriminatory intent--whether their true intentions are discriminatory or not. Most plaintiffs only possess indirect evidence of discrimination, and therefore must proceed using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method. Even if the plaintiff is able to make out a prima facie case for a denial of training claim, the defendant will be able to avoid liability by articulating a legitimate business reason for the denial of training. 24 Therefore, because the ADA specifically prohibits discrimination in the area of job training and Hoffman has direct evidence of discrimination, we find that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant on this issue. In order to recover, Hoffman must show that she is physically capable of running the high-speed scanner, but she is not required to make a separate showing that the denial of training was a materially adverse employment action. Accordingly, we will remand in order to allow Hoffman to attempt to prove her disparate treatment claim for denial of training on the high-speed scanner.
25 We next turn to Hoffman's failure to accommodate claim. At issue is whether Caterpillar must accommodate Hoffman in order to allow her to operate the high- speed scanner if she is unable to do so without accommodation. As we noted above, Hoffman has already been accommodated in order to perform the essential functions of her job. She now requests (assuming she needs it) accommodation so that she may operate the high-speed scanner--a non-essential function of her position. While it is admirable that Hoffman wants to perform job tasks that Caterpillar does not require her to perform, [i]t is the employer's prerogative to choose a reasonable accommodation; an employer is not required to provide the particular accommodation that an employee requests. Jay v. Intermet Wagner, Inc., 233 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Schmidt v. Methodist Hosp. of Ind., 89 F.3d 342, 344 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that [r]easonable accommodation does not require an employer to provide literally everything the disabled employee requests). Caterpillar has chosen to accommodate Hoffman's disability by letting other employees run the high- speed scanner, and; if Caterpillar is correct that Hoffman is unable to run the high-speed scanner without assistance, we will not disturb Caterpillar's chosen method of accommodation. The ADA requires an employer to make whatever accommodations are reasonably possible in the circumstances to perform the functions essential to his position, Miranda v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1996), including removing nonessential functions from the job, see United States E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995), but nothing in the statute requires an employer to accommodate the employee so that she may perform any nonessential function that she chooses. Nor is Caterpillar required to provide an accommodation if the costs are disproportionate to the benefits. See Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that an employer is not required to expend enormous sums in order to bring about a trivial improvement in the life of a disabled employee). Therefore, we agree with the district court's determination that Caterpillar is not required to accommodate Hoffman in running the high-speed scanner if she is unable to operate it by herself.