Opinion ID: 2976220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invalid Waiver of Right to Counsel (Claim Two)

Text: Wilson argues that he did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel and elect to proceed pro se because the trial court effectively forced him to choose between representing himself or being represented by allegedly unprepared and incompetent counsel. Wilson maintains that he repeatedly told the trial court that he did not want to represent himself and did not know how to do so and repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the attorneys who had volunteered to represent him. After briefly recounting the convoluted history of Wilson’s relationship with his counsel, we turn to the relevant federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, and conclude that Wilson’s claim fails.
Wilson’s defense team changed several times during the pre-trial period. In July 1987, the state trial court appointed two attorneys to represent Wilson, Clyde Richardson and Steve Megerle. In October 1987, Wilson filed a motion to act as co-counsel, invoking his “right to participate fully in his own defense including acting as counsel.” (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)). Around that time, Megerle withdrew, and the court appointed Kevin McNally from the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy (KDPA) in November 1987. In February 1988, McNally secured a continuance, shifting the trial date from March to September of that year. In May 1988, McNally requested permission to withdraw from the case, stating that he had already tendered his resignation from the KDPA in January 1988, had been pushing back his termination date because of Wilson’s case, and was exhausted. Richardson remained as counsel, but had told the judge that he was simply not able to lead a capital defense. At this point, Judge Lape, the state trial judge, posted a notice outside his courtroom seeking volunteer counsel to represent Wilson. Sharon Sullivan responded to the notice and volunteered to act as a research assistant. Around the same time, John Foote volunteered to work on the case doing “leg work,” but not to act as lead attorney, and William Hagedorn volunteered and was appointed as lead counsel. No. 05-5191 Wilson v. Parker Page 6 Almost immediately, issues arose between McNally and Hagedorn. Once McNally had withdrawn and Hagedorn had volunteered to take on Wilson’s case, the two attorneys met in early June 1988. After that meeting, McNally apparently developed some concerns about Hagedorn’s ability to handle Wilson’s case. McNally refused to turn over Wilson’s case file to Hagedorn without explicit permission from Wilson. McNally’s colleagues at the KDPA undertook an investigation of Hagedorn’s qualifications and past conduct in other cases. McNally shared the information gathered with Wilson and told Wilson not to authorize the transfer of files until Judge Lape had been apprised of the information regarding Hagedorn. On June 17, 1988, Wilson filed a “Motion for Justice and Fairness” expressing his dissatisfaction with Hagedorn and Richardson and requesting that Judge Lape dismiss all volunteer and appointed counsel and appoint lawyers “experienced in handling ‘Capital Death Penalty’ cases.” Judge Lape granted Richardson’s motion to withdraw on July 6, 1988. In response to McNally’s continued visits and communication with Wilson, Judge Lape ordered that such visits stop. Around this same time, Hagedorn visited Wilson in jail, but could not convince him to turn over the case file. In response to Wilson’s motion to disqualify Hagedorn and Foote, Judge Lape held a hearing on August 16, 1988. According to Judge Lape, the purpose of the hearing was to “put on qualifications – as to what qualifications a party should have to handle a case such as this.” Mario Conte, Chief Trial Attorney for the Federal Public Defenders Office in San Diego, California, appeared to argue the motion on Wilson’s behalf. Wilson, Brenda Humphrey, Humphrey’s counsel, and Hagedorn were also present. Hagedorn objected vehemently to the hearing, stating that Conte was jeopardizing Wilson’s case and that the court had no authority to conduct such a hearing. Conte began to outline the role of the capital defense attorney and then proposed to discuss Hagedorn’s “unethical behavior regarding stolen property” and “regarding a malpractice suit.” Judge Lape stated that he was not going to hear any evidence regarding Hagedorn’s background and would not “do anything in the form of character assassination . . . .” Judge Lape then terminated the hearing. No further inquiry or review into the qualifications of Hagedorn and Foote was undertaken. At the beginning of trial on September 2, 1988, a series of colloquies took place in chambers between Wilson, Judge Lape, Hagedorn, and Commonwealth Attorney Donald Buring, the prosecutor. During these colloquies, Wilson gave conflicting statements about whether he wanted to continue pro se. Wilson reiterated his belief that his appointed attorneys were incompetent to represent him, that he had no confidence in his attorneys’ ability to represent him, and that Hagedorn and Foote did not speak for him. Judge Lape then informed Wilson, “If you wish to represent yourself, under the Constitutional Amendments you have indicated to me, sir, you certainly have that right, and I will certainly let you do that.” “I do,” replied Wilson. Ibid. However, Wilson then stated, “And I don’t want to proceed pro se. I can’t ‘cause I don’t know how to proceed pro se.” The colloquy continued as follows: JUDGE LAPE: That’s right, you don’t. So based upon that statement then, Mr. Hagedorn and Mr. Foote then will continue because you say that you cannot pro se. DEFENDANT WILSON: So you’re saying you’re forcing Mr. Hagedorn and Mr. Foote upon me then as counsel. JUDGE LAPE: I am appointing, sir, Mr. Hagedorn and Mr. Foote to represent you, sir. DEFENDANT WILSON: I oppose Mr. Hagedorn and Mr. Foote. JUDGE LAPE: I know you do. That’s certainly evident. DEFENDANT WILSON: They’re not competent. No. 05-5191 Wilson v. Parker Page 7