Opinion ID: 492031
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Double Jeopardy and Violation of Cooperation Agreement

Text: 79 As noted, prior to his indictment herein, Sami Annabi had been indicted in the Eastern District of New York in three counts which charged conspiracy to import, importation, and possession of heroin. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the government in 1983, Annabi pleaded guilty to the importation count, and the government agreed to dismiss the conspiracy and possession counts. The indictment in the instant case, filed in the Southern District of New York in 1985, charged Sami Annabi, inter alia, in Counts One and Three with conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846, and engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise beginning before his 1982 arrest until the return of the instant indictment in 1985, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848. 80 Sami Annabi now alleges that his convictions on Counts One and Three herein violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. Specifically, Annabi claims that the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated when evidence giving rise to a prior conviction is again presented to secure a second conviction under an umbrella statute which involves a continuing course of conduct such as a conspiracy or continuing criminal enterprise statute or the use of that evidence was so prejudicial as to deny appellant a fair trial. This argument is without merit. It is well settled that [t]o support a claim of double jeopardy, it must appear that the offenses charged were in fact and in law the same. United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 545 F.2d 785, 792 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 917, 97 S.Ct. 1331, 51 L.Ed.2d 595 (1977). An indictment, such as the instant one, which charges a wide-ranging conspiracy involving numerous illegal drug transactions and a continuing criminal enterprise differs substantially from one which charges only a single isolated transaction. Id. (conspiracy); United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir.1984) (continuing criminal enterprise), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855, 105 S.Ct. 180, 83 L.Ed.2d 114 (1984) & 472 U.S. 1007, 105 S.Ct. 2700, 86 L.Ed.2d 717 (1985). The instant charges cover conduct extending more than two years beyond the date of Annabi's prior conviction and require evidence different from and additional to evidence that would have been used to support Annabi's Eastern District substantive importation prosecution had he not pleaded guilty. That Annabi's prior Eastern District conviction arose from his importation of heroin in 1982 which act was also alleged as a minor part of the present conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise is not enough to establish a double jeopardy claim. United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 1697, 52 L.Ed.2d 389 (1977); see also United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1015 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980, 97 S.Ct. 493, 50 L.Ed.2d 589 (1976), 429 U.S. 1051, 97 S.Ct. 764, 50 L.Ed.2d 767 (1977), 429 U.S. 1066, 97 S.Ct. 796, 50 L.Ed.2d 783 (1977), & 430 U.S. 982, 97 S.Ct. 1677, 52 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977). 81 More troublesome is Annabi's claim that his rights under an unwritten cooperation agreement were infringed by the government's use against him of disclosures made by him to government agents and in court on the government's behalf. The cooperation agreement called for Annabi to cease his heroin dealings and to provide the government with full and complete information and testimony in exchange for the government's promise that anything Annabi told the government would not be used against him. Annabi claims that this cooperation agreement granted him informal immunity. See United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939, 97 S.Ct. 354, 50 L.Ed.2d 308 (1976). Therefore, he argues, citing United States v. Moss, 562 F.2d 155, 165 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914, 98 S.Ct. 1467, 55 L.Ed.2d 505 (1978) (whether immunized testimony is perjurious and therefore can be used against a witness requires some preliminary finding of fact or clear documentary evidence or later objective proof), that if the government in fact used Annabi's testimony against him without prior notice and without previously establishing that he had breached his part of the agreement, the government would have violated its part of the agreement. The government cannot rely on the jury's subsequent guilty verdict to prove that Annabi breached his part of the agreement and at the same time use disclosures made pursuant to that agreement to obtain the conviction. However, Annabi does not point to, and we are unaware of, any disclosures made by Annabi during his period of purported cooperation that actually were placed before the jury. Annabi's only specific allegations are that the government used his statements and in-court testimony to support an application for an order to place a wiretap on his phone before it was established that he had breached the cooperation agreement and that evidence obtained from this wiretap was used against him. As discussed above in section III, apart from Annabi's statements, there was enough independent evidence to establish probable cause for the wiretap, thereby rendering Annabi's disclosures cumulative. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that any of Annabi's statements, or evidence derived from those statements were admitted against him in violation of his cooperation agreement.