Opinion ID: 221722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Totality of the Circumstances Analysis

Text: The 2006 revision to the DNA Act expanded its scope to encompass both arrestees and pretrial detainees. Violence Against Women & Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-162, § 1004, 119 Stat. 2960, 3085 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A)). Mitchell was placed in pretrial detention following his arrest and was detained at the time that the Government sought to collect a sample of his DNA pursuant to the DNA Act and its implementing regulation. Thus the challenge currently before us implicates the collection of DNA from an individual who is both an arrestee and a pretrial detainee. As a threshold matter, we must tackle the question of whether Mitchell's attack on 42 U.S.C. § 14135a is in the form of an as-applied or a facial challenge. Following oral argument, this Court requested additional briefing to clarify this issue, which ultimately affects the burden on Mitchell. A party asserting a facial challenge must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). That is, Mitchell would have to show that the [statute] is unconstitutional in all of its applications. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095). This is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. On the other hand, [a]n as-applied attack ... does not contend that a law is unconstitutional as written but that its application to a particular person under particular circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right. United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir.2010). If the additional briefing makes one thing clear, it is that the parties dispute whether Mitchell's challenge was facial or as-applied. [17] In addition, the District Court did not specify what type of challenge it was considering, and the original briefs filed with this court are similarly ambiguous. Given that there is no consensus among the parties about the type of legal challenge being asserted, we will address both. In doing so, we adopt an approach similar to the one we took recently in Marcavage, 609 F.3d at 273, where after finding that there was some ambiguity about whether the defendant advanced an as-applied or a facial challenge, we addressed both. While we note that facial challenges are disfavored, Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184, the circumstances in this situation weigh in favor of addressing both challenges. We will begin with Mitchell's as-applied challenge. See Connection Distributing Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 327-28 (6th Cir.2009) (explaining that [t]he `usual judicial practice' is to address an as-applied challenge before a facial challenge) (citing Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484-85, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989)). In order to mount a successful as-applied challenge, Mitchell must show that under [these] particular circumstances [he was] deprived... of a constitutional right. Marcavage, 609 F.3d at 273.
When we analyze the reasonableness of a search by examining the totality of the circumstances, we begin `by assessing... the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy.' Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19, 122 S.Ct. 587 (quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297). The collection of DNA under § 14135a entails two separate searches. The first is the physical collection of the DNA sample. Neither party disputes that the collection of a DNA sample constitutes an invasion of privacy that is subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment, and we have so held. See Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 182 (concluding that giving a required blood sample for DNA analysis is a search); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (holding that [w]e have long recognized that a compelled intrusion into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search.... This physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. (internal quotation marks, citations, & some alterations omitted)). Mitchell contends that the act of collecting a DNA sample constitute[s] [a] significant invasion[] of an individual's bodily integrity and privacy. (Mitchell Br. 41.) This argument, however, is foreclosed by binding precedent. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not significant, since such `tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.' Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)); accord Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 184 ([T]he intrusion of a blood test is minimal.). Moreover, Schmerber recognized society's judgment that blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985). Thus, Mitchell's characterization to the contrary must fail. Furthermore, the test sanctioned in Schmerber was venipuncture, in which blood was drawn from the arm. 384 U.S. at 759-60, 86 S.Ct. 1826. [C]urrently the FBI provides kits that allow a blood sample to be collected by means of a finger prick, a far less invasive procedure. DNA-Sample Collection & Biological Evidence Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction (DNA-Sample Collection), 73 Fed.Reg. 74932, 74935 (Dec. 10, 2008). DNA samples may also be collected by swabbing the inside of the mouth (a buccal swab). Id. This method is likewise less invasive than venipuncture. Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that cheek swabs, although constituting a search, are less invasive than blood draws); cf. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (noting that breath tests are less intrusive than blood tests as they do not require piercing the skin and may be conducted safely outside a hospital environment). In light of this precedent, the act of collecting a DNA sample is neither a significant nor an unusual intrusion. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 12. Therefore, in balancing the interests required in our Fourth Amendment analysis, the intrusion occasioned by the act of collecting the DNA sample is minimal and does not weigh significantly in Mitchell's favor. The second search at issue is, of course, the processing of the DNA sample and creation of the DNA profile for CODIS. This search also has the potential to infringe upon privacy interests. See Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 182; Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85. Mitchell argues that this intrusion is significant and unreasonable given that the scope of information that can be obtained from a DNA sample is extraordinarily broad. (Mitchell Br. 34.) Furthermore, Mitchell speculates that the Government might disregard its policy of using only junk DNA and surmises that, with technological advances, junk DNA could reveal far more extensive information than it presently discloses. These concerns weighed heavily in the District Court's analysis and caused the District Court to conclude that DNA is an information science, not an identification science. Mitchell, 681 F.Supp.2d at 609. We are mindful of the vast amount of sensitive information that can be mined from a person's DNA and the very strong privacy interests that all individuals have in this information. Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85. Nevertheless, every one of our sister circuits to have considered the concerns raised by Mitchell has rejected them given their speculative nature and the safeguards attendant to DNA collection and analysis. See, e.g., Boroian, 616 F.3d at 66-69; Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 948 & n. 10. As the First Circuit held, the DNA Act offers a substantial deterrent to such hypothetical abuse by imposing a criminal penalty for misuse of DNA samples.... [O]n the record before us, the possibility that junk DNA may not be junk DNA some day also does not significantly augment [the defendant's] privacy interest in the present case. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13. Mitchell's concerns are not reflected in the record before us. The mere possibility of such misuse can be accorded only limited weight in a balancing analysis that focuses on present circumstances. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13; accord Banks, 490 F.3d at 1191. Mitchell also highlights the potential misuse of the information contained in the DNA profile. While Mitchell has not provided any evidence of misuse of a DNA sample or profile, we are also reassured by the numerous protections in place guarding against that possibility. As we explained earlier, the Act criminalizes the misuse of both the sample and the analysis generated from the sample. 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c). These criminal penalties offer a substantial deterrent to such hypothetical abuse of the kind advanced by Mitchell. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13. Additional protections exist. The Act provides that failure to comply with the quality control and privacy requirements can result in cancellation of access to CODIS. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(c). Access to the computer terminals/servers containing the CODIS software, which are located in physically secure space at a criminal justice agency, is restricted to those individuals authorized to use CODIS and approved by the FBI. CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited July 8, 2011). Moreover, the DNA profile may only be used for four limited purposes. 42 § 14132(b)(3). [18] Use of the profile for any other reason would violate the statute and be subject to the aforementioned criminal penalties. Congress's limited purpose in enacting § 14135a is evident in the history of the Act. See, e.g., DNA-Sample Collection, 73 Fed.Reg. at 74933 (These DNA profiles, which embody information concerning 13 `core loci,' amount to `genetic fingerprints' that can be used to identify an individual uniquely, but do not disclose an individual's traits, disorders, or dispositions.). These limits on the lawful use of the DNA profile are further insured by the method for creating a CODIS profile; that is, the policy of using only junk DNA in creating the DNA profile, which does not contain any individual genetic information. The Government further protects the identity of the sample donor by ensuring that no other potentially identifying information is contained in the CODIS database. The second scenario  in which scientific advances make it possible to extract more information from junk DNA  is not unforeseeable. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13. Nevertheless, our sister circuits have declined to factor this future risk into their assessment of the constitutionality of the DNA collection program as it exists at present. See Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85 n. 13 (Should the uses to which `junk DNA' can be put be shown in the future to be significantly greater than the record before us today suggests, a reconsideration of the reasonableness balance struck would be necessary.); Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 948 n. 10; Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13. The First Circuit recently rejected this same argument: [S]cientific advances might make it possible to deduce information beyond identity from the junk DNA that forms the thirteen-loci profiles stored in CODIS. Future government uses of the DNA profiles in CODIS could potentially reveal more intimate or private information about the profile's owner and depart from the uses for which the profiles were originally lawfully created and retained. In this case, however, these are merely hypothetical possibilities.... As in Weikert, the possibility that junk DNA may not be junk DNA some day... does not significantly augment [Boroian's] privacy interest in the present case. Boroian, 616 F.3d at 69 (internal citations omitted). We agree with this analysis. While we acknowledge the seriousness of Mitchell's concerns about the possible misuse and future use of DNA samples, we conclude that these hypothetical possibilities are unsupported by the record before us and thus do not have any substantial weight in our totality of the circumstances analysis. Should technological advancements change the value of junk DNA, reconsideration of our Fourth Amendment analysis may be appropriate. Cf. City of Ontario v. Quon, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2629, 177 L.Ed.2d 216 (2010) (The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.). At this juncture, however, we consider the amount and type of personal information to be contained in the DNA profile to be nominal. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 838 (As currently structured and implemented ... the DNA Act's compulsory profiling of qualified federal offenders can only be described as minimally invasive-both in terms of the bodily intrusion it occasions, and the information it lawfully produces.). Next, contending that a DNA profile is used for far more than identity, Mitchell attempts to distinguish a DNA profile from conventional fingerprints. [19] The District Court agreed, holding that to compare the fingerprinting process and the resulting identification information obtained therefrom with DNA profiling is pure folly. Mitchell, 681 F.Supp.2d at 608. Yet many of our sister circuits have expressly adopted just this analogy: To be sure, genetic fingerprints differ somewhat from their metacarpal brethren, and future technological advances in DNA testing (coupled with possible expansions of the DNA Act's scope) may empower the government to conduct wide-ranging DNA dragnets that raise justifiable citations to George Orwell. Today, however, ... CODIS operates much like an old-fashioned fingerprint database (albeit more efficiently). Johnson, 440 F.3d at 499 (internal citations omitted); Boroian, 616 F.3d at 65 (Under the DNA Act, DNA profiles currently function as identification records not unlike fingerprints, photographs, or social security numbers.); accord Banks, 490 F.3d at 1192 (These restrictions allow the Government to use an offender's DNA profile in substantially the same way that the Government uses fingerprint and photographic evidence.... Only here, DNA provides a more advanced and accurate means....); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559 (9th Cir.1995) (The information derived from the blood sample is substantially the same as that derived from fingerprinting  an identifying marker unique to the individual from whom the information is derived.), overruled on other grounds, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000), and Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001); Jones, 962 F.2d at 307 (The governmental justification for this form of identification ... relies on no argument different in kind from that traditionally advanced for taking fingerprints and photographs, but with additional force because of the potentially greater precision of DNA sampling and matching methods.). Like fingerprints, at least in the current state of scientific knowledge, the DNA profile derived from the [individual's] blood sample establishes only a record of the [individual's] identity. Amerson, 483 F.3d at 85; accord Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 947. Given the protections built into the DNA Act, the Government's stated practice of only analyzing junk DNA, and the current limits of technology, the information stored in CODIS serves only an identification purpose. Moreover, the regulations of the 2006 amendment to the DNA Act confirms the intention to use DNA profiles as sanitized `genetic fingerprints' that can be used to identify an individual uniquely, but do not disclose an individual's traits, disorders, or dispositions. DNA-Sample Collection, 73 Fed.Reg. at 74937. Given the record in front of us today, we conclude that a DNA profile is used solely as an accurate, unique, identifying marker  in other words, as fingerprints for the twenty-first century. Considering a DNA profile as a tool for establishing identity, the issue becomes the degree to which an individual has an expectation of privacy in his or her own identity. In Sczubelek, we considered this issue with respect to individuals on supervised release and noted that they `do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.' 402 F.3d at 184 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587). In light of this restricted liberty right, we held that Sczubelek, as an individual on supervised release, has a reduced right to privacy  and in particular to privacy of identity. Id. Our analysis relied heavily on Sczubelek's status as a convicted felon on supervised release; as such, it cannot be adopted wholesale in the present case, as Mitchell correctly argues. Instead, the critical question is whether arrestees and pretrial detainees who have not been convicted of felonies have a diminished privacy interest in their identity. A useful analogue is case law assessing the validity of fingerprinting arrestees and pretrial detainees as part of a routine booking process. [20] In an early case, the Second Circuit held that fingerprinting is a means for the identification of prisoners so that they may be apprehended in the event of escape, so that second offenders may be detected for purposes of proper sentence where conviction is had, and so that the government may be able to ascertain ... whether the defendant has been previously convicted. United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir.1932). Acknowledging that [a]ny restraint of the person may be burdensome, the court held that [t]he slight interference with the person involved in finger printing seems to us one which must be borne in the common interest. Id. The court emphasized that fingerprinting arrestees is for the purpose of identification: Finger printing seems to be no more than an extension of methods of identification long used in dealing with persons under arrest for real or supposed violations of the criminal laws. It is known to be a very certain means devised by modern science to reach the desired end, and has become especially important in a time when increased population and vast aggregations of people in urban centers have rendered the notoriety of the individual in the community no longer a ready means of identification. Id.; accord United States v. Krapf, 285 F.2d 647, 650-51 (3d Cir.1961) ([Fingerprinting] is a means of identification which is useful in many circumstances some of which relate to the enforcement of our laws.). The court upheld the booking procedure based on the general right of the authorities charged with the enforcement of the criminal law to employ finger printing as an appropriate means to identify criminals and detect crime. [21] Kelly, 55 F.2d at 70. Suspicionless fingerprinting of all citizens would violate the Fourth Amendment. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 813-18, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969). Nevertheless, it is elementary that blanket fingerprinting of individuals who have been lawfully arrested or charged with a crime does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Smith, 324 F.2d at 882. The universal approbation of fingerprinting as a method of identifying arrestees despite the invasion of privacy is not surprising when we consider that probable cause had already supplied the basis for bringing the person within the criminal justice system. With the person's loss of liberty upon arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to personal privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment. Jones, 962 F.2d at 306; see also Kincade, 379 F.3d at 864 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (Arrestees' privacy interests ... appear to be significantly reduced.). This analysis rests on two foundational principles  the presence of probable cause to arrest and the use of fingerprints as a method of identification: [W]hen a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim privacy in it. We accept this proposition because the identification of suspects is relevant not only to solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future crimes. Jones, 962 F.2d at 306. Moreover, we permit such fingerprinting whether or not the proof of a particular suspect's crime will involve the use of fingerprint identification. Id.; accord Rise, 59 F.3d at 1559-60. This logic extends to the collection and analysis of DNA samples from arrestees and pretrial detainees. See Anderson v. Virginia, 274 Va. 469, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (2007) (A DNA sample of the accused taken upon arrest, while more revealing, is no different in character than acquiring fingerprints upon arrest.). DNA collection occurs only after it has been determined that there is probable cause to believe that the arrestee committed a crime. In light of this probable cause finding, arrestees possess a diminished expectation of privacy in their own identity, which has traditionally justified taking their fingerprints and photographs. [22] Likewise, because DNA profiles developed pursuant to the DNA Act function as genetic fingerprints used only for identification purposes, arrestees and pretrial detainees have reduced privacy interests in the information derived from a DNA sample. Mitchell raises an additional concern with the DNA Act and its implementing regulations: the potential indefinite retention of the sample itself. Nothing in the statute instructs the Government what to do with the DNA sample when an individual is no longer under correctional supervision. However, federal law does mandate the expungement of the DNA profile when the FBI receives a certified copy of a court order showing that a conviction is overturned or when, if the sample is taken following an arrest, no charge is filed, the charge is dismissed, or results in an acquittal. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A). Ultimately, to the extent that Mitchell submits that the potential future indefinite retention of his sample implicates privacy concerns, that issue is not before us now. Mitchell remains arrested, indicted, and detained. His DNA sample has not yet been collected and he therefore has not sought expungement. Therefore, he is not in a position to challenge the retention of his sample. Cf. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 3 (Because the appellant is currently on supervised release and will remain so ... we do not resolve the question of whether it is also constitutional to retain the DNA profile in [CODIS].). We leave for another day the question of whether an individual may challenge the Government's retention of his DNA sample or profile. In light of the restrictions built into the DNA profiling process, Mitchell's arguments that it constitutes a significant invasion of privacy are unavailing. Relying on the District Court's opinion, Mitchell argues that collection of DNA from arrestees and pretrial detainees cannot be justified on the basis of probable cause as they have not yet been convicted of any offense and thus have the benefit of the presumption of innocence. See Mitchell, 681 F.Supp.2d at 607. The District Court properly declined to elevate a finding of probable cause to the level of a proper determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 606. Nonetheless, it acknowledged that an arrestee or pretrial detainee, who is brought into the criminal justice system on the basis of probable cause, has a diminished expectation of privacy in his identity. Id. at 608. The District Court nevertheless concluded that the presumption of innocence outweighed this diminished expectation of privacy because of the complex, comprehensive, inherently private information contained in a DNA sample. Id. As we discussed above, however, this conclusion is based on a flawed premise  that because DNA samples may reveal private information regarding familial lineage and predisposition to over four thousand types of genetic conditions and diseases [as well as] genetic markers for traits, the DNA profiles entered into CODIS also contain this information. Id. (emphasis added). DNA profiles, as opposed to DNA samples, reveal only identity, in which arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy. [23] In sum, at present DNA profiling is simply a more precise method of ascertaining identity and is thus akin to fingerprinting, which has long been accepted as part of routine booking procedures. The traditional fingerprinting cases emphasize that arrestees and pretrial detainees have a diminished expectation of privacy in their identity. None of Mitchell's arguments compels us to conclude that the same diminished expectation of privacy should not apply to DNA profiling.
The second step in the totality of the circumstances analysis is to assess the degree to which [the search] is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). The Government's interests in this case are not as great as those identified in Sczubelek, as the interests in supervising convicted individuals on release and deterring recidivism do not apply to arrestees or pretrial detainees. 402 F.3d at 186. Nevertheless, the other key interest recognized in Sczubelek  collecting identifying information to aid law enforcement  applies with equal force to arrestees and pretrial detainees. Id. at 185 (The interest in accurate criminal investigations and prosecutions is a compelling interest that the DNA Act can reasonably be said to advance.). Mitchell acknowledges that DNA profiling serves important law enforcement interests, but he argues that these interests can be equally well served by collecting DNA samples post-conviction. It is true, as Mitchell asserts, that the information contained in a DNA sample does not change over time and cannot be concealed; thus, there is no need for the Government to act quickly to prevent the destruction of evidence. Nevertheless, the Government argues that there are other legitimate interests that weigh in favor of pretrial DNA collection. We agree. Most compelling is the Government's strong interest in identifying arrestees. [W]hen a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest. Jones, 962 F.2d at 306. Given the potentially greater precision of DNA sampling and matching methods, DNA profiling serves this interest better than fingerprinting. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 186 (quoting Jones, 962 F.2d at 307); accord Banks, 490 F.3d at 1190 (While fingerprint evidence might often be sufficient, we have always recognized the Government's compelling need to accurately identify offenders.). Moreover, DNA may permit identification in cases without fingerprint or eyewitness evidence. As we explained in Sczubelek: It is a well recognized aspect of criminal conduct that the perpetrator will take unusual steps to conceal not only his conduct, but also his identity. Disguises used while committing a crime may be supplemented or replaced by changed names, and even changed physical features. Traditional methods of identification by photographs, historical records, and fingerprints often prove inadequate. The DNA, however, is claimed to be unique to each individual and cannot, within current scientific knowledge, be altered. The individuality of the DNA provides a dramatic new tool for the law enforcement effort to match suspects and criminal conduct. Even a suspect with altered physical features cannot escape the match that his DNA might make with a sample contained in a DNA bank, or left at the scene of a crime within samples of blood, skin, semen or hair follicles. 402 F.3d at 185 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted); accord Banks, 490 F.3d at 1190. Thus, DNA collection furthers the Government's interest in accurately identifying arrestees and pretrial detainees, an interest that would be lost if the Government waited until conviction to take a DNA sample. [24] The Government's ability to accurately identify a person through their DNA profile cannot be entirely substituted by other means of identification, such as fingerprints or photographs. DNA analysis enables the Government to identify a person who has changed their appearance, either permanently or temporarily. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 14 (Even a suspect with altered physical features cannot escape the match that his DNA might make with a sample contained in a DNA bank, or left at the scene of a crime.) (citing Amerson, 483 F.3d at 87); accord Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 185. Similarly, an arrestee who has altered his or her fingerprints in order to avoid detection could also be identified with certainty through their DNA. Therefore, the use of CODIS in the law enforcement process assures greater precision in the identification of arrestees. Moreover, there are two components to a person's identity: who that person is (the person's name, date of birth, etc.) and what that person has done (whether the individual has a criminal record, whether he is the same person who committed an as-yet unsolved crime across town, etc.). Haskell v. Brown, 677 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1199 (N.D.Cal.2009). The second component  what a person has done  has important pretrial ramifications. Running an arrestee's DNA profile through CODIS could reveal matches to crime-scene DNA samples from unsolved cases. Whether an arrestee is possibly implicated in other crimes is critical to the determination of whether or not to order detention pending trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (stating that factors to be considered in the bail determination include a person's past conduct and criminal history). To the extent that DNA profiling assists the Government in accurate criminal investigations and prosecutions (both of which are dependent on accurately identifying the suspect), it is in the Government's interest to have this information as soon as possible. Collecting DNA samples from arrestees can speed both the investigation of the crime of arrest and the solution of any past crime for which there is a match in CODIS. Moreover, use of CODIS promptly clears thousands of potential suspects  thereby preventing them from ever being put in that position, and advancing the overwhelming public interest in prosecuting crimes accurately.  [25] Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839 n. 38 (plurality op.) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). The assistance provided by CODIS is not hypothetical: as of May 2011, CODIS ha[d] produced over 144,400 hits assisting in more than 138,100 investigations. FBI, CODIS-NDIS Statistics, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited July 8, 2011). While Mitchell draws our attention to a backlog in the analysis of DNA samples, the evidence he cites in support does not point to any backlog in the federal system. Finally, we note that the other factors we identified in Sczubelek as weighing in favor of the reasonableness of the search apply with equal force in the present case. While the DNA Act permits the Attorney General to collect DNA samples from arrestees and pretrial detainees, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A), the implementing regulation mandates such collection, 28 C.F.R. § 28.12. Thus, once the Attorney General has determined that DNA must be collected, there is no room for law enforcement officials to exercise (or abuse) discretion by deciding whether or not to collect a DNA sample. Moreover, as we discussed more thoroughly above, the statutory structure contains safeguards to prevent the improper use of DNA profiles and to ensure the removal of DNA records from CODIS following a dismissal or an acquittal. We therefore hold that 42 U.S.C. § 14135a is constitutional as applied to Mitchell. For that reason, we also find that Mitchell's facial challenge to the statute fails. Because the statute is constitutional as applied to Mitchell, he has not shown that there is no set of circumstances under which the statute may be applied constitutionally. [26] In sum, under the totality of the circumstances, given arrestees' and pretrial detainees' diminished expectations of privacy in their identities and the Government's legitimate interests in the collection of DNA from these individuals, we conclude that such collection is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the District Court incorrectly prohibited the Government from collecting a sample of Mitchell's DNA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14135a and 28 C.F.R. § 28.12.