Opinion ID: 3006257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: begay v. united states

Text: In an effort to show his counsel’s performance nevertheless was objectively unreasonable, Denson points to Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), and to this Court’s application of Begay in United States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2010). Begay was decided about a year before Denson was sentenced. In Begay, the Supreme Court concluded that a New Mexico 5 Case: 14-10211 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 6 of 10 driving under the influence offense was not a “violent felony” under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 553 U.S. at 141-42, 128 S. Ct. at 1584. The ACCA’s residual clause defines the phrase “violent felony” using language virtually identical to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2’s residual clause defining a “crime of violence.” Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Begay explained that an offense that “involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another” is a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s residual clause only if it is “roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed” to the ACCA’s enumerated crimes, burglary of a dwelling, arson, extortion, or unlawful use of explosives. Id. at 143, 128 S. Ct. at 1585. McGill was decided almost a year after Denson’s sentencing and involved whether the same Florida offense at issue here—possession of a short-barreled shotgun—was a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s residual clause. See McGill, 618 F.3d at 1274. In McGill, this Court applied Begay and determined that, while possession of a short-barreled shotgun presented a serious risk of physical injury to another, the risk was “not ‘similar in kind’ to ‘use of explosives,’ its closest enumerated analog” in the ACCA. Id. at 1277. Thus, Florida’s short-barreled shotgun offense is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA. Id. at 1279. 6 Case: 14-10211 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 7 of 10 Denson maintains these cases show that his Florida short-barreled shotgun offense should not have been deemed a “crime of violence,” and, had his counsel made a Begay-like objection, the sentencing court would not have designated Denson a career offender under the guidelines. Denson’s argument is foreclosed by our recent precedent in United States v. Hall. Like Denson, the defendant in Hall relied upon Begay and McGill to argue that “the analysis for the term ‘crime of violence’ is exactly the same because the two definitions are virtually identical” and, therefore, possession of a shortbarreled shotgun cannot be a crime of violence under the career-offender guideline. Hall 714 F.3d at 1273. This Court rejected that argument based on United States v. Stinson, in which the Supreme Court “made clear that ‘commentary in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.’” Id. at 1272 (quoting Stinson, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993)) (brackets omitted). In Hall, this Court concluded that because “Stinson controls,” and the guidelines commentary designating the possession of a short-barreled shotgun as a crime of violence is authoritative and binding, the usual “categorical approach” used in Begay and McGill to determine if an offense falls within the residual clause does not apply. Id. at 1274. We further determined that the commentary 7 Case: 14-10211 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 8 of 10 did not fall within “Stinson’s stringent exception requirements, as the commentary provision violates neither the Constitution nor any other federal statute, and it is not inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, the guideline text itself.” Id. Although Denson attempts to distinguish Hall on its facts, Hall’s legal conclusion—as to the binding effect of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2’s commentary—controls the outcome of Denson’s ineffective assistance claim. We also reject Denson’s argument that Hall was undermined to the point of abrogation by Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). Contrary to Denson’s contention, Hall did not employ the modified categorical approach addressed in Descamps, and this panel remains bound by Hall. In any event, to the extent Denson contends that Hall is wrongly decided, reasonably effective representation does not include a requirement that trial counsel make arguments or objections based on predictions as to how the law may develop. See Marquard v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corrs., 429 F.3d 1278, 1313 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that counsel’s performance was not ineffective for failing to contemplate a future Supreme Court decision).