Opinion ID: 1919675
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was the defendant denied her sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by counsel's failure to request a manslaughter instruction, and his failure to object to prejudicial and inflammatory remarks made in the prosecutor's closing argument?

Text: In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency was so substantial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-69, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Wilcher v. State, 479 So.2d 710, 713 (Miss. 1985); Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss. 1984). The deficiency and any prejudicial effect are assessed by looking at the totality of circumstances. Carney v. State, 525 So.2d 776, 780 (Miss. 1988); Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832, 839 (Miss. 1983). Hiter first complains that her attorney was deficient in failing to request a manslaughter instruction. The analysis begins with the strong but rebuttable presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Carney, 525 So.2d at 780; Gilliard v. State, 462 So.2d 710, 714 (Miss. 1985). Appellate review of counsel's performance is highly deferential. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. It is clear from the record of facts that there was an evidentiary basis for a manslaughter instruction. Despite the strong evidentiary basis for the submission of such an instruction, it is equally clear from the record that counsel purposefully prevented the jury from considering the lesser included offense. When questioned by the court about a potential request for a manslaughter instruction, defense counsel stated, There's no request for one. We find that this reply was the equivalent of an affirmative demand that the jury be denied a jury instruction on the crime of manslaughter. Counsel's decision to refuse a manslaughter instruction, coupled with his decision to employ a defense based entirely on self-defense, was apparently his chosen strategy of representation. Attorneys are permitted wide latitude in their choice and employment of defense strategy. Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590, 597 (Miss. 1993). In Faraga v. State, 514 So.2d 295, 308 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 894 (1988), this Court held that the defense's strategy of conceding murder but arguing against capital murder did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Woodward v. State, 635 So.2d 805, 808-09 (Miss. 1993) (finding similar strategy within range of competent representation). Hiter's defense appeared to follow the opposite route. Her defense strategy left the jury with no middle ground. Instead, it forced the jury to either convict the mother and wife of murder or to conclude that her actions were justified as self-defense. We find that Hiter has failed to rebut the presumption that this chosen strategy of defense was sound or to demonstrate that her attorney failed to provide her with professional assistance. Consequently, there is no Sixth Amendment violation in the case at hand for refusing a manslaughter instruction. Hiter next complains of her attorney's failure to object to statements made by the prosecution in their closing argument. The following statements were made by the prosecution in closing: Then you can see that she was angry, and she knew exactly what she was doing when she shot Bubba, and she knew exactly where she was shooting him. Now, Bubba is not here. The only two people who know exactly what happened inside that car is Tracy Hiter and Bubba, and Bubba's not here, and he can't testify today. The only two people that know whether or not he wanted her to get an abortion is Bubba and Tracy, and Bubba's not here, and he can't tell you how he felt about the baby that she's carrying.       Does Bubba Hiter deserve to die because she smelled the alcohol? She told you a number of things about her relationship with Bubba and about his feelings and about her feelings, but as I told you, Bubba is not here. He can't tell you his side of the story. Attorneys are given wide latitude in arguing their cases to the jury. Ivy v. State, 589 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Miss. 1991). On the other hand, the prosecutor is not permitted to use tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial and reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury. Acevedo v. State, 467 So.2d 220, 226 (Miss. 1985); Forrest v. State, 335 So.2d 900, 903 (Miss. 1976); Craft v. State, 271 So.2d 735, 737 (Miss. 1973). The remarks made by the prosecution clearly fell within the allowable scope of closing argument. The statements merely stated a fact which had been established at trial by the defendant's own admission. Bubba was, in fact, not present at trial to explain the events of that afternoon because Tracy shot him. We find it reasonable for the prosecutor to argue that the victim was no longer in existence as this was a murder trial where the jury was required to determine whether the killing was justified. It was not overly prejudicial or inflammatory since the prosecution was essentially urging the jury to reconsider the credibility of Tracy's testimony presented at trial in light of the fact that her husband was not capable of refuting Tracy's claims about their relationship. Therefore, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.