Opinion ID: 2211077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Question of Estoppel.

Text: Since the Uniform Conditional Sales Act does not apply to the buy-sell agreement, it is necessary to find what law did apply in order to determine the plaintiff's remedy when the buyer defaulted on the installment contract. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act applies to all stock transfers when the stock certificates were issued after June 9, 1913. [9] However, the act does not specify any particular remedies in the case of a stock buyer's default. Sec. 183.17, Stats. 1963, would then control. 183.17 Law merchant controls. In any case not provided for by this chapter the rules of law and equity . . . shall govern. Thus the general principles of law governing the performance of contracts must be applied to the original buy-sell agreement. When the defendant defaulted, the plaintiff tried to find the defendant, but the defendant was out of town for the weekend. The plaintiff then immediately repossessed the insurance agency. The original contract between the parties provided: That in case of default in any of the payments of the principal or interest, when due as above specified, the said Clyde L. Boutelle, seller shall thereupon forthwith have the right to declare this Contract at an end, and with or without notice, to take immediate possession of said above described property . . . . Although defendant never objected to the retaking, he now contends that the plaintiff never first declared the contract at an end. Defendant suggests that such a retaking was in violation of the terms of the contract and the governing principles of common law. Defendant then points out that sec. 122.16, Stats. 1963, [10] of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act permits a retaking without first declaring the contract to be terminated. The conclusion is that the plaintiff must rely on the provisions of the act to support his retaking and that he should be estopped from denying the application of the act to his remedies upon default. This case is not a proper one to apply estoppel. The defendant never changed his position in reliance on the Uniform Conditional Sales Act nor did the plaintiff ever rely on the act in retaking. Neither party was represented by an attorney until after the retaking. There is nothing in the record to indicate that either of the parties was even aware of the act or its provisions. Moreover, there was another provision in the original contract which supported plaintiff's retaking: And in case the said seller shall at any time deem the said property or the said debt insecure, [he is] hereby authorized and empowered to take immediate possession of said property or any part thereof and to sell and apply the proceeds as above provided. The plaintiff's retaking consisted of taking some checks payable to the insurance agency on July 2d. These checks were returned following a meeting with the defendant on July 5th. The trial court determined that within ten days the parties entered into a voluntary settlement contract. . . . after breach of the original contract the claim for damages may be discharged by the performance of a new agreement or by the mere making of the new agreement, where that is its meaning, or by the acceptance of benefits under the new contract. . . . 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, pp. 965, 966, sec. 493. We now reach appellant's real source of complaint. His objection is that he never received a consideration for the settlement contract. He contends that the vendor chose to repossess the property and that having made that choice he could no longer get a deficiency judgment. If the seller could not get a deficiency judgment, then what did he give as consideration for the settlement contract wherein the buyer returned the insurance agency and still had to pay over $6,200? In the light of this contention by the appellant, it is necessary to determine what the vendor's remedies were upon the vendee's default. It must be conceded, of course, that this buy-sell agreement was a conditional sales contract even though it was not subject to the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Therefore, the rules of law and equity pertaining to conditional sales are particularly applicable: It is a general rule that under the ordinary contract of conditional sale, which does not expressly confer upon the seller the right to recover the balance of the purchase price after reselling the property for a sum less than that remaining unpaid, if the seller takes possession of the property upon default of the buyer, and does so as owner, and as such owner sells or otherwise uses the property, he cannot recover any portion of the unpaid purchase price. Annot. 37 A. L. R. 91, supplemented by annotations at 83 A. L. R. 959, 960; 99 A. L. R. 1288, 1289; 49 A. L. R. 2d 15, 20. This rule was adopted in this state by Singer v. Millard (1920), 171 Wis. 637, 177 N. W. 893, to the extent that a vendor could not retake the property, use it as his own, and still hold the vendee to the purchase price. The general Wisconsin rule was well`set out in Defiance Machine Works v. Gill (1920), 170 Wis. 477, 481, 482, 175 N. W. 940. This court stated: . . . his contention being that a vendor of goods, upon a contract of a conditional sale, must elect whether he will retake the goods or sue for the purchase price, and that when he resorts to one of these remedies he waives his right to resort to the other . . . This is not the law of this state. It was held in Wiedenbeck-Dobelin Co. v. Anderson, 168 Wis. 212, 169 N. W. 615, that the two remedies were not inconsistent, and that by pursuing one the vendor did not waive his right to the other. In all fairness, however, in the case cited above the vendor sued on the contract and then repossessed. Here it is important to show that although the vendor repossessed, he could still have resold and sued for a deficiency judgment. [11] However, in Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Mandarin Co. (1922), 178 Wis. 185, 188 N. W. 639, the vendor repossessed and then sued on the contract. After first finding that the contract involved was a conditional sales contract, the court said at pages 189 and 190: . . . They also argue that in such contracts as the one involved the vendor may, on default by the vendee to comply with the conditions, retake the property, or may treat the sale as absolute and bring an action for the price, but that the assertion of either right is a waiver or abandonment of the other. . . . There is undoubtedly considerable authority in other states for this construction .... But no elaborate discussion of the subject seems necessary, since this court has adopted the rule that under similar contracts the remedies are cumulative and the assertion of one right is not a waiver of the other.... A combined reading of the Singer, Defiance Machine Works and Rudolph Wurlitzer Cases, [12] supra, indicates that a deficiency judgment can be obtained in Wisconsin outside the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, [13] by taking possession of the property, selling it and applying the proceeds to the indebtedness. The point of the previous discussion is that Mr. Boutelle did not waive his right to resell the insurance agency by repossessing. He could have sold the agency, applied the proceeds to the indebtedness, and held Mr. Winne liable for the deficiency. In effect, this is exactly what happened in the settlement agreement. Mr. Boutelle bought back the business at the price agreed on by the parties before the accountant. The price was deducted from the remainder due on the original contract, and Mr. Winne agreed to pay the deficiency. There was obvious consideration for the settlement contract. This is the effect of the trial court's finding and it is amply supported by the evidence. By the Court.  Judgment affirmed.