Opinion ID: 202547
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Weapons in the Conspiracy

Text: 14 Vázquez also argues that the court had insufficient evidence to support the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a dangerous weapon (including a firearm). We have held that a defendant charged with conspiracy is accountable for all `reasonably foreseeable' conduct undertaken by others in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Bianco, 922 F.2d 910, 912 (1st Cir.1991). Thus, to determine whether the sentencing enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon can be imposed, the sentencing court may consider not only whether Vázquez personally possessed a dangerous weapon, but also whether it was reasonably foreseeable that a co-conspirator would possess a gun in furtherance of the [conspiracy to distribute cocaine]. United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 129 (1st Cir.2004). 15 The sentencing court had the following evidence about the involvement of firearms in the conspiracy. First, Alberto Negrón-Constantino testified that he sold firearms to Hiram, who was a runner for the drug point managed by Vázquez. Second, Alexander Figueroa testified that he gave a shotgun to the person in charge of storing firearms at the drug point. Third, David Sánchez Ortiz, who sold drugs to Vázquez through his brother, testified that he regularly carried a firearm for protection. Lastly, Edwin Meléndez-Negrón, who purchased cocaine from Vázquez, testified that he also carried a firearm for protection. 16 We find that this is sufficient evidence to establish the use of firearms to further the conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Further, we believe that the evidence presented is sufficient to allow an inference that Vázquez, who was the manager of the drug point, was likely aware or could have foreseen that many of the people who worked for him carried or used firearms. As we have noted before, a defendant's awareness of the inner workings of a conspiracy in which he is participating . . . frequently will suffice to prove the defendant's ability to foresee the acts of coconspirators. United States v. LaCroix, 28 F.3d 223, 229 (1st Cir.1994). As Vázquez has conceded, testimony at trial showed that Vázquez allegedly exercised decision making authority to facilitate the delivery of narcotics, was in charge of buying, processing, and distributing the narcotics to the peddlers, and he would be responsible for retrieving the proceeds, verifying the status of the inventory and supervising the day-to-day operation of the drug point. Appellant's Br. 10. Given Vázquez's intimate involvement in the operations of the drug point, the court did not err in concluding that Vázquez could have foreseen that many of his employees and suppliers were armed.