Opinion ID: 654201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: 19 The award of post-judgment interest is governed by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(a), which provides in relevant part: 20 Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.... Such interest shall be calculated from the date of entry of judgment.... 5 21 The purpose of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961  'is to compensate the successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for the loss from the time between the ascertainment of the damage and the payment by the defendant.'  Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835-36, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1576, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990) (quoting Poleto v. Consolidated Rail Co., 826 F.2d 1270, 1280 (3d Cir.1987)). 22 The statute, however, clearly provides that the court may only accrue post-judgment interest from the date of the entry of judgment, [e]ven though denial of interest from verdict to judgment may result in the plaintiff bearing the burden of the loss of the use of the money from verdict to judgment. Id. 23 The district court, satisfied that this court had in essence reinstated the original judgments, awarded post-judgment interest from the date of their first entry. The defendants, however, contend that there were no legally enforceable February 1987 judgments from which interest could accrue. They submit that the February 1987 judgments were defective when entered in that they were founded on an incorrect verdict of RICO liability and contained serious flaws in the assessment of damages. Additionally, they note that the judgments were vacated by the district court on December 22, 1987, and were never formally reinstated. 24 Defendants also assert that the February 1987 judgments cannot serve as the basis for the accrual of post-judgment interest because those judgments failed to reflect any meaningful resolution of fundamental issues in the case. In their submission, basic questions of liability on the federal RICO claims and availability of punitive damages were hotly disputed by plaintiffs and defendants alike, were resolved several different ways by the district court and were not meaningfully resolved until this court entered judgment in December 1991. Moreover, they contend that not even the plaintiffs viewed the judgments as enforceable or as settling fundamental issues because they moved for class certification well after the February, 1987 judgments had been vacated. Finally, defendants point out that judgment was never entered on the malpractice claims because the district court granted judgment n.o.v. as to that claim before entry of the judgments. 25 In sum, the defendants maintain that inasmuch as: (1) the 1987 judgments were properly vacated and never reinstated; (2) this court affirmed the district court's holding that the RICO judgments were insufficient as a matter of law; and (3) basic issues remained unresolved between February, 1987 and December, 1991, no judgment upon which interest could accrue existed before December 20, 1991, when this Court issued its mandate ordering the district court to reinstate the jury award. Our scope of review of the district court's challenged order is plenary. Dawson v. United States, 894 F.2d 70, 72 (3d Cir.1990).