Opinion ID: 1704647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Giglio and Napue

Text: Next, Davis alleges that Detective Iverson's testimony at the original suppression hearing was fundamentally untrue and that the State knowingly allowed this false testimony to remain on the record. Davis alleges that this act was a violation of Giglio and Napue. The postconviction court denied relief under this claim. First, the court observed the standard for Giglio and Napue violations: To establish a Giglio violation, one must show that `(1) some testimony at trial was false; (2) the prosecutor knew that testimony was false; and (3) the testimony was material.' Postconviction Order at 11 (quoting Suggs v. State, 923 So.2d 419, 426 (Fla.2005)); see also Guzman v. State, 941 So.2d 1045, 1050 (Fla. 2006) (stating the requirements of Giglio ). The court then considered Iverson's allegedly false testimony from the suppression hearing: Q. [TRIAL COUNSEL] Is there any strategy decision or procedure you were following in that case to avoid [giving Miranda warnings]? A. [IVERSON] No, sir, I just didn't think it was necessary during that initial time. If I was going to use what he said at that point in time against him, you know, then I probably would have needed to do that. Q. [TRIAL COUNSEL] So it was never your intention to use the initial portion of the interview then? A. [IVERSON] That's correct. Postconviction Order at 9-10. The postconviction court concluded that Davis had not established that Iverson's testimony at the suppression hearing was false. We agree. Iverson testified at the postconviction hearing that he was only trying to establish a rapport with Davis and that he was not trying to avoid giving Davis his Miranda warnings. This testimony is consistent with Iverson's above-quoted testimony from the suppression hearing. Thus, Davis did not establish that Iverson testified falsely. Further, Davis did not establish that the prosecutor knew any testimony was false. Instead, the prosecutor testified at the postconviction hearing that it was absolutely not the case that the State knowingly presented false testimony. Postconviction Order at 12. To establish a Giglio or Napue violation, Davis had to show that some testimony was false and that the prosecutor knew it was false. Guzman, 941 So.2d at 1050. Davis did not do so. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of this claim.