Opinion ID: 2818270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Batson Claims

Text: Garcia requests a COA for a pair of claims that the state prosecution based its use of peremptory challenges on impermissible racial characteristics in violation of equal protection as articulated in Batson v. Kentucky. 72 Specifically, these claims relate to peremptory challenges used by the state during voir dire at the 1991 trial to strike from the venire potential jurors Hazel Holmes, an African American, and Albert Diaz, a Hispanic American. Viewing the voir dire process “in hindsight,” Holmes and Diaz were “the only two qualified racial minority members of the entire venire panel that came on individual voir dire.” 73 Garcia urges, as he must, that reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court’s conclusion that his Batson claims fall short under AEDPA’s deferential standard. 74 A Batson claim involves three steps. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing to the trial court that the prosecutor has exercised a peremptory strike at the defendant’s trial on the basis of race. 75 Second, if a requisite showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to produce a race-neutral explanation for striking the venireperson at issue and thus rebut the defendant’s prima facie case. 76 “At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” 77 Third, if the prosecution tenders a race- 72 476 U.S. 79, 95-98 (1986). 73 61 RR (1991) at 32-34 74 Miller-El I, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). For the district court’s reasoning and conclusion on these claims, see Garcia v. Director, TDCJ-CID, 2014 WL 5846377, at - (Nov. 10, 2014). 75 Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94, 96-97. 76 Id. at 94, 97-98. 77 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality op.). 19 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 20 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 neutral explanation, “the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his ultimate burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” 78 To be clear, Garcia does not argue that the state trial court unreasonably applied Batson. 79 Nor could he, as the trial court employed the proper steps in evaluating Garcia’s claims. 80 Rather, he claims that in light of the evidence presented the trial court unreasonably determined that the prosecutor offered legitimate and racially neutral reasons for striking Holmes and Diaz. 81 Garcia lodged objections to both of the state’s peremptory challenges before the trial court on grounds that the strikes were racially motivated. 82 In both cases, the trial court asked the prosecutor to state his reasons for the challenge. 83 Where a trial court has called on the prosecutor to provide raceneutral justifications for the use of its peremptory strikes, we assume for purposes of review on appeal that the defendant made the requisite prima facie showing under Batson step one. 84 We therefore consider: (1) whether the prosecution articulated race-neutral explanations for the exercise of its challenges and (2) whether the defendant demonstrated that those justifications were pre-textual and that the prosecutor engaged in purposeful discrimination. 78 Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 & n.18, 98). 79 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 80 36 RR (1991) at 3760 (Holmes), 39 RR (1991) at 4358-66 (Diaz); see Garcia, 919 S.W.2d at 394-95. 81 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 82 36 RR (1991) at 3759-60, 3765-67 (Holmes); 39 RR (1991) at 4366 (Diaz). Garcia unsuccessfully raised both claims on direct appeal to the CCA. Garcia v. State, 919 S.W.2d 370, 394-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (decision on rehearing). 83 Id. 84 United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 349 (5th Cir. 1998); see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (plurality op.) (“Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.”). 20 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 21 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 The state trial court ultimately found that the prosecution offered legitimate and racially neutral reasons for striking Holmes and Diaz, and that the challenges lacked a discriminatory intent. 85 Garcia faces a high hurdle under section 2254(d)(2), as we accord “great deference” to a trial court’s findings in these circumstances. 86 Were we to grant a COA and proceed to the merits, our role would be “to ‘determine whether the trial court's determination of the prosecutor's neutrality with respect to race was objectively unreasonable and has been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.’” 87
We address first Garcia’s Batson claim with regard to prospective juror Hazel Holmes. The prosecution offered the following race-neutral explanations for striking Holmes: (1) her “unequivocal opposition to the death penalty” as stated in her initial juror questionnaire; (2) “that [she] had . . . a son who [had] been subjected . . . to multiple prosecutions[,] some of which occurred in [the instant county];” (3) that she “expressed at least once that she [felt] that her son was not fairly treated either by police officers or the criminal justice system;” and (4) that she vacillated in response to questioning 88 about whether she could ever answer “no” to the special mitigation question. 89 The prosecution noted further “that we requested that this juror be stricken for cause” and directed the court to its “prior reasons.” 90 85 36 RR (1991) at 3763-65 (Holmes); 39 RR (1991) at 4365 (Diaz). 86 Hoffman v. Cain, 752 F.3d 430, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2014). 87 Id. (quoting Murphy v. Dretke, 416 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2005)). 88 Although the prosecution referred to “special issue number two” in offering this explanation, 36 RR (1991) at 3764, it is clear from the record that he was referencing his colloquy with Holmes regarding special issue number three, the mitigation question. 36 RR (1991) at 3754-55. 89 Id. at 3763-64. 90 Id. at 3763. 21 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 22 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 The record amply supports each of the prosecution’s proffered explanations. 91 The trial court expressly found “that [these reasons were] legitimate and racially neutral” 92—a finding to which this court must accord “great deference.” 93 Moreover, during voir dire the prosecution attempted three times to strike Holmes for cause. 94 The trial court noted that, although it denied each for-cause challenge, the decision was “a close call.” 95 Garcia now claims that the prosecution singled out Holmes on the basis of her race and purposefully used a threatening Holocaust analogy to describe the role of a juror in handing down a death sentence—an analogy not used in questioning any other veniremember—to elicit responses unfavorable to the state’s position. The prosecution did in fact use a graphic Holocaust analogy in questioning Holmes. 96 And the Supreme Court has recognized that in some cases the disparate use of a “so-called graphic script, describing the method of execution in rhetorical and clinical detail . . . to prompt some expression of hesitation to consider the death penalty,” can constitute clear and convincing evidence that a prosecution’s proffered justifications are pretextual. 97 91 See id. at 3676-77 (unequivocal opposition to death penalty in questionnaire and testimony); id. at 3689 (Q: “Could you [answer questions that result in death sentence]?” A: “That’s a hard one to answer.”); id. at 3689-90 (indicating she would answer in such a way as to “make sure that the defendant received a life sentence and make sure that he is not executed”); id. at 3716 (“I do not believe in the death penalty.”); id. at 3734 (“I don’t feel like I can [answer the mitigation question ‘no’].”); id. at 3748 (son’s prosecution); id. at 3750-51 (unfairly treated; prosecuted in Collin County); id. 3754-55 (final vacillating answer); 61 RR (1991) at 35 (testimony regarding questionnaire). 92 36 RR (1991) at 3765. 93 Hoffman v. Cain, 752 F.3d 430, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2014). 94 36 RR (1991) at 3710; id. at 3745; id. at 3759. 95 Id. at 3765; see id. at 3759 (“[E]ven though [Holmes] has expressed continued opposition to the death penalty and although she has vacillated back and forth, depending on who was asking her the questions, I deny the State’s motion for challenge, because she essentially has answered, albeit reluctantly, that she could follow her oath and what she understands to be the law.”). 96 See id. at 3683-86. 97 Miller-El v. Dretke (“Miller-El II”), 545 U.S. 231, 255-60, 66 (2005). 22 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 23 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 Nevertheless, Garcia did not raise this claim in his second state habeas petition. 98 We hold therefore that Garcia failed to exhaust state court remedies with regard to this claim and it is consequently procedurally barred under AEDPA. 99
The prosecution offered several race-neutral explanations for striking Diaz: (1) Diaz “expressed a real concern with . . . participating in a capital murder case with a youthful defendant;” 100 (2) Diaz was hesitant about imposing the death penalty in a random 7-Eleven robbery situation; 101 (3) Diaz indicated—both “verbally” and by his “demeanor”—that he would impose an increased burden of proof at the punishment phase relative to the guiltinnocence phase; 102 (4) Diaz’s standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” was extremely high; 103 and (5) the defense “really like[d]” Diaz. 104 We address each proffered justification in turn. a. Diaz expressed concern about sentencing a youthful defendant to death. The prosecution’s first proffered justification was that Diaz “expressed a real concern with youth and participating in a capital murder case with a youthful defendant. For the record, our defendant is eighteen or nineteen. I don’t remember if he’s had a birthday since he’s been incarcerated, but we’re dealing with a youthful defendant. That concerns me.” 105 This justification 98 See 1 WR (40,214) at 297-306. 99 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . .”). 100 39 RR (1991) at 4359. 101 Id. at 4360. 102 Id. 103 Id. at 4361. 104 Id. at 4362. 105 Id. at 4359. 23 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 24 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 finds support in the voir dire transcript. When asked whether he might find it difficult to sentence a youthful defendant to death, Diaz expressed hesitation: I’d be strongly opposed to giving someone the death penalty and more prone to giving them life if that’s the law rendered under the facts, but I also have to say that I’m not one that feels much sympathy for hardship of upbringing or environment. I’m sensitive to it . . . Somebody very youthful, I would have a real hard time sentencing him to death, but if that person was so dangerous and the crime was such that it was so terrible, I would not have a problem doing it.” 106 Later, however, Diaz indicated that he would be able to do so, “[i]f necessary” to uphold the law: [Prosecutor]: So then you don’t have a bias or prejudice against a law that allows a youthful defendant to be executed? [Diaz]: No. I do not. [Prosecutor]: And you can see yourself honestly and realistically participating in a process that would lead to the execution of a youthful defendant? [Diaz]: If necessary. 107 Garcia asserts that because Diaz ultimately indicated that he would be able to participate in a capital murder trial involving a youthful defendant, the prosecution’s explanation is based on an “untrue” characterization of the record. 108 We disagree. We have upheld peremptory strikes as race-neutral on the basis of a prospective juror’s hesitation, even where the juror ultimately 106 Id. at 4290 (emphasis added). 107 Id. at 4291. 108 Application for COA at 45. 24 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 25 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 indicated he could vote to impose death. 109 It is not fairly debatable that Diaz’s earlier statement—“Somebody very youthful, I would have a real hard time sentencing him to death”—posed a legitimate reason for the prosecution’s strike, even taking into account his ultimate affirmative answer. b. Diaz was hesitant about imposing the death penalty in a random 7-Eleven robbery situation. The prosecution’s second proffered justification was that “[w]hile he stated that the death penalty for a random killing would be fine, he also state[d] a real concern about [the] death penalty in a 7-Eleven holdup. We are dealing essentially with . . . a beer and wine store, convenience store situation, very similar situation. That concerns me.” 110 Again, this justification finds support in the voir dire transcript. Diaz stated he “would be less inclined to sentence someone to death unless [that person] was really in [his] opinion a person who [he] felt was of extreme danger [judging] from the [person’s] acts,” but that it would “[j]ust depend[ ] on the facts.” Garcia asserts that the prosecution’s second justification is also “untrue,” but he offers no relevant evidence in support; he cites to an unrelated portion of the voir dire transcript dealing with the prosecutor’s discussion of mitigating circumstances. 111 Garcia cannot meet his burden. Reasonable jurists could not disagree as to whether Garcia has provided clear and convincing evidence to show that the trial court’s ruling was objectively unreasonable because Garcia has offered no relevant evidence whatsoever. c. Diaz indicated he would apply an increased burden of proof in the punishment phase relative to the guilt-innocence phase. 109 See Hoffman, 752 F.3d at 449 (upholding peremptory strikes as race-neutral where potential juror initially hesitated before giving a “very weak ‘I think I could’” when asked if he could consider a death penalty). 110 39 RR (1991) at 4360. 111 See Application for COA at 45 (quoting 39 RR (1991) at 4334). 25 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 26 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 The prosecution’s third proffered justification was that Diaz verbally and by his demeanor indicated that he would apply an increased burden of proof in the punishment phase relative to the guilt-innocence phase; Diaz indicated that his definition of “beyond a reasonable doubt” was “a very extreme standard. I don’t know if any prosecutor could meet it[,] especially at the punishment phase of a trial.” 112 Again, this justification finds support in the voir dire transcript. The prosecutor engaged in an extended back-and-forth discussion with Diaz regarding Diaz’s conception of the prosecution’s burden of proof. 113 First, as to the guilt-innocence phase, Diaz stated that he “would not feel like it has to be proved perfect certainty[,] . . . [b]ut if it was of extreme certainty. . . . I would be very much inclined to feel very certain the facts that somebody was guilty.” 114 Subsequently, as to the punishment phase: [Prosecutor]: [B]ut when we get into the punishment phase . . . my question to you is are you one of those people in the punishment phase of a capital murder case. Does my burden of proof go up? [Diaz]: Absolutely. [Prosecutor]: Okay. I want to make sure we’re communicating. [Diaz]: I would -- I would feel that it would be of much more importance for me to have a strong feeling about each one of those questions so I would have to say that it is of a higher degree of concern to me that I feel very strongly about each one of those three questions being beyond a reasonable doubt. [Prosecutor]: Okay. Again I’m not sure if we’re miscommunicating or not so I want to press you a little bit. Are you telling me that . . . I would have to convince you with 112 39 RR (1991) at 4360-61. 113 See id. at 4308-17. 114 Id. at 4309. 26 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 27 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 one hundred percent certainty in the punishment phase . . . that the answer should be yes before you would be willing to return a yes verdict on this? [Diaz]: Not with a hundred percent certainty. No sir. [Prosecutor]: All right. Will you recognize my burden of proof in [the guilt and punishment phases is] . . . [t]he same legal standard? [Diaz]: Yeah. I realize that beyond a reasonable doubt is in my mind just as important at every phase but emotionally I would probably feel -- not probably. I would feel a lot more inclined to say that my degree of beyond a reasonable doubt would increase. 115 Although Diaz ultimately indicated that he “would try to maintain the same measurement standard” in both phases, 116 we have upheld as legitimate similar explanations proffered by the prosecution in similar circumstances. 117 Moreover, we also take into consideration the prosecution’s additional justifications related to Diaz’s “demeanor”: [H]is initial responses indicated that he would, and from his demeanor, which is not reflected in the record, while I understand that intellectually he will do it, it was apparent that there was that more concern going and that argument going on in his brain. It could be read in his eyes. I was standing five feet away from him when he said it. I certainly—I am convinced that my burden of 115 Id. at 4311-14 (emphasis added). 116 Id. at 4314. 117 See Jackson v. Dretke, 181 F. App’x 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Even though [the prospective juror] softened his statement that he would require proof of guilt to a certainty, the state was entitled to conclude that he might require it to prove guilt by an elevated standard even if that burden were something less than metaphysical certainty.”); see also White v. Thaler, 522 F. App’x 226, 229-30 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (upholding dismissals for cause where prospective jurors indicated that they would “hold the [s]tate to a higher burden of proof with regard to punishment”). 27 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 28 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 proof will increase in the punishment phase of a trial versus a guilt-innocence phase. 118 In Wainwright v. Witt, 119 the Supreme Court observed that “determinations of demeanor and credibility” in the voir dire context “are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” 120 This court later underscored this principle: A stranger to the trial reading the bare transcript is left with incomplete sentences and elliptic answers with no reconciling theme. Yet one present at trial may well have had a quite different picture. Inflection of voice and body movements of each cast member, absent from the transcript, are present at trial. 121 Here, the trial judge, who oversaw and observed the voir dire proceedings, accepted as legitimate the prosecution’s explanation that Diaz indicated he would apply a higher standard of proof at the punishment phase 122—an explanation based in part on the prosecution’s assertion that it was supported by Diaz’s demeanor. In doing so the trial judge emphasized that he had “listened carefully, particularly carefully . . . to [Diaz’s] voir dire.” 123 The district court’s conclusion is thus bolstered by the language of Witt and Ruiz, both of which emphasize the trial judge’s peculiar ability to discern such things. Garcia offers no rebuttal evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could disagree as to whether the district court’s conclusion was objectively reasonable. d. Diaz indicated he would require a significant track record of violence. 118 39 RR (1991) at 4360. 119 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 120 Id. at 428; see id. at 428 n.9 (“[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen [by the trial court below], but cannot always be spread upon the record.”) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1879)). 121 Ruiz v. Quarterman, 460 F.3d 638, 646 (5th Cir. 2006). 122 39 RR (1991) at 4365. 123 Id. at 4364. 28 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 29 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 The prosecution’s fourth proffered justification was that Diaz “expressed a . . . willingness to answer questions that would lead to the death penalty if there was a significant track history of violence. I don’t know what he meant by that. I can certainly show some violent acts, but I don’t know if it will certainly meet his extreme definition beyond a reasonable doubt.” 124 Garcia again asserts that this explanation is “untrue,” and that “Diaz said just the opposite . . . .” 125 This justification finds some support in the voir dire transcript. Diaz indicated that he favored rehabilitation up to a point where “there’s enough certainty that there’s some type of hope,” and that no such hope would exist “if there’s such a track record and such a history of tremendous violence and crime in [a] defendant’s past.” 126 When read in context, however, these statements do not overwhelmingly indicate that Diaz would have required the prosecution to show a significant track record of violence in order to vote for a death sentence: [Prosecutor]: Along the line of rehabilitation, how much importance do you place on the mindset of the individual to be rehabilitated? Do you think that that plays a role if any in the process and if so how big a role? [Diaz]: I’d probably weigh that the heaviest that if someone is at a point in their life where they can be rehabilitated and there’s enough certainty that there’s some type of hope then absolutely but if there’s such a track record and such a history of tremendous violence and crime in their past I’d be a little bit concerned that there’s not a lot of hope for rehabilitation at least not that person to be rehabilitated and put back in society. So I guess what I’m trying to say is that I believe everybody should 124 39 RR (1991) at 4361. 125 Application for COA at 45. 126 39 RR (1991) at 4293. 29 Case: 14-70035 Document: 00513120094 Page: 30 Date Filed: 07/17/2015 No. 14-70035 be tried to go through extreme rehabilitation but not everybody should be given the right to come back in society. 127 But even so, in light of the reasons discussed above and below, which provide strong support for the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that the strike was legitimate and race neutral, no reasonable jurist could conclude that the trial court’s acceptance of this justification was objectively unreasonable. e. Defense counsel liked Diaz. The prosecution’s fifth and final proffered justification was that the defense “obviously like[d] [Diaz]. They spent thirty minutes questioning him and did not ask him really any . . . serious questions along the lines to develop anything . . . close to a challenge for cause. The questions that I [had] asked [him would have provided] a viable reason . . . to develop a challenge for cause if [d]efense counsel was so inclined . . . [But they didn’t.] . . . [T]hat indicates to me that they really like this guy . . . Anyone that a defense attorney wants that much and feels will be favorable to the defense, I have a serious problem with.” 128 Garcia asserts that this “is not a race-neutral reason” because “[i]f the reason the defense liked Diaz was because he shared the same race as Garcia, or could appreciate Garcia’s family experiences, then liking the juror is confirmation that race motivated the [prosecution’s] strike.” 129 Garcia’s argument is without merit and in any event he offers no relevant countervailing evidence. As the prosecutor explained from the stand at the Batson hearing, this justification was tied to strategy and tact. The trial