Opinion ID: 1220368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post Conviction Relief Issues

Text: After sentencing and conviction, Lankford brought an action for post conviction relief in the district court. After an extended hearing, the district court made findings denying this petition. A denial of post conviction relief will not be disturbed on appeal where there is substantial competent evidence supporting the denial. State v. Hinkley, 93 Idaho 872, 477 P.2d 495 (1970). After reviewing the record of the post conviction relief proceeding we find that there was substantial and competent evidence to support the district court's findings.
Lankford first argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Lankford raises twelve areas where it is claimed his trial attorney failed to provide effective assistance. Lankford argues that his trial attorney failed to: (1) file a motion for change of venue; (2) adequately prepare for and conduct the voir dire which would allow the selection of a fair and impartial jury; (3) fully investigate and prepare the factual and legal basis for the defendant's case; (4) file motions to suppress constitutionally infirm statements taken of the defendant; (5) file a motion for psychiatric or psychological evaluation; (6) file a request for discovery; (7) research and raise viable defenses; (8) object to the defendant being compelled to go to trial under heavy guard; (9) request a limiting instruction on the use of prior inconsistent statements; (10) object to irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial evidence; (11) request a limiting instruction on impeachment by prior felony conviction; (12) object to erroneous instructions. Lankford concludes that these errors and omissions of the trial counsel require a reversal of the defendant's convictions. However, we conclude that the record does not support the allegations. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be presumed by an appellate court. State v. Elisondo, 97 Idaho 425, 546 P.2d 380 (1976). We have examined an extensive record in which the parties explored in detail the basis for Lankford's allegations through witnesses and affidavits and through direct and cross examination. A review of this record clearly establishes that Lankford was not deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the test to be applied to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Also see Burger v. Kemp, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987). This issue has been extensively litigated in Idaho. In Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 725 P.2d 135 (1986), we summarized the existing law as follows: This Court has also addressed the question of what constitutes effective assistance of counsel. In short, a defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney. State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 8, 539 P.2d 556, 560 (1975). Accord Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. `A showing that defendant was denied the reasonably competent assistance of counsel is not sufficient by itself to sustain a reversal of the conviction. The defendant, in most cases, must make a showing that the conduct of counsel contributed to the conviction or the sentence imposed.' State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho at 4, 539 P.2d at 564 (1975); see also State v. Tisdel, 101 Idaho 52, 54, 607 P.2d 1326, 1328 (1980). We have also repeatedly stated that we will not attempt to second-guess strategic and tactical choices made by trial counsel. State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 233, 628 P.2d 1065, 1067-68 (1981); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho at 10, 539 P.2d at 562. These standards, articulated by both the United States Supreme Court and this Court, must be used to determine whether Estes received effective assistance of counsel. As the Supreme Court has stated, `A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The presumption in evaluating attorney effectiveness is that the attorney is competent and that his actions represent sound trial strategy. A defendant shoulders a difficult burden when he seeks to assert ineffective assistance of counsel. Estes v. State, 111 Idaho at 434, 725 P.2d at 139 (footnote omitted). At the post conviction relief hearing, Lankford's trial counsel testified that the extensive physical evidence, Lankford's numerous admissible confessions, and the verbal testimony which would be produced by the prosecution at trial was sufficient to convict Bryan Lankford of first degree murder. He stated that after evaluating this evidence he determined that Lankford's best opportunity to avoid a first degree murder conviction was to defend on the theory that Lankford was an accessory after the fact. All of the charges against Lankford's counsel are a direct result of the trial counsel's strategic and tactical choices to defend Lankford on the accessory after the fact defense. Because it is not the function of a reviewing court to substitute its judgment or that of a substitute counsel for the strategic and tactical choices of the trial counsel, State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 233, 628 P.2d 1065, 1067-68, Lankford's new counsel must do more than demonstrate that alternative strategies were available which might have been better. In sum, none of the numerous charges made by the defendant against his trial counsel demonstrate that (1) Lankford was denied the reasonably competent assistance of counsel, and (2) that the conduct of his trial counsel contributed to his conviction.
Next, Lankford claims that the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to disqualify the court for prejudice. [8] Following conviction and sentencing, the defendant moved to disqualify for cause the trial judge from the post conviction relief proceeding pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(3) [9] and I.C.R. 25(b). [10] Lankford's attorney filed the affidavit of prejudice and no counter affidavit was filed. [11] The motion was denied. The parties later stipulated to facts which they believed the trial judge could testify to if called as a witness. [12] The stipulation (which was not based on actual testimony) stated that the judge had knowledge that Lankford's trial counsel had been arrested for DUI and that the judge had received a letter from the defendant requesting a new counsel based on allegations of alcohol abuse, and this letter led to the appointment of co-counsel. The stipulation was received into evidence and then defense counsel reargued its motion asserting that because of the stipulation the trial judge was now a material witness in the case and must be disqualified. This motion was also denied. Lankford argues that the affidavit and the stipulation were legally sufficient to show prejudice and that the case should be remanded with directions that the trial judge disqualify himself and the matter reassigned. In Idaho a judge cannot be disqualified for actual prejudice unless it is shown that the prejudice is directed against the litigant and is of such a nature and character that it would make it impossible for the litigant to get a fair trial. State v. Waterman, 36 Idaho 259, 210 P. 208 (1922). Lankford's affidavit claimed bias on the following grounds: (a) that the district court judge presided in the trial that found Lankford guilty of two counts of first degree murder; (b) that the judge had previously ruled on motions for continuance, new trial, alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, and sentencing; (c) that by presiding in the above matters it would be unreasonably difficult for the judge to impartially determine questions of fact raised in the affiant's petition for post conviction relief; (d) that in assessing the death penalty the judge made findings that Lankford is not a credible person; (e) that Lankford is a material witness in the post confiction relief action and because the judge has determined that he is not a credible witness he will not receive an unbiased determination of his credibility; (f) that Lankford had reason to believe that the district court judge may be a material witness to the factual allegations supporting the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; (g) that at the affiant's sentencing hearing the district court judge elicited testimony to support the court's findings of fact in a leading manner, and thereby showed his bias and prejudice against Lankford; (h) that the district court judge on his own motion caused testimony favorable to the affiant (results of polygraph examination which showed Lankford to be truthful on material facts) to be stricken and removed from the jury's consideration; (i) that there is extreme community hostility and prejudice toward Lankford in Idaho County and that this community feeling makes it unreasonably difficult for the judge, who is a resident of the community and an elected official, to impartially hear the affiant's petition; (j) that because the judge found the offenses of which Lankford was convicted to be heinous, atrocious, and exhibiting an utter disregard for human life he could not now determine the merits of Lankford's petition in a neutral, detached, dispassionate and impartial manner; (k) because the issues raised in the petition for post conviction relief directly affect the judgment of the district court judge, it is impossible for the trial court to be impartial; ( l ) that the district court judge has attached an emotional commitment to the correctness of his initial determination and cannot render an impartial determination on the merits of Lankford's position; and (m) that a trial court having presided at the trial and sentencing cannot reasonably be expected to determine matters raised relating to said conviction and sentence in an impartial manner. Lankford's allegations of bias do not show any actual prejudice on the part of the judge directed toward Lankford of such a nature and character that it would have made it impossible for Lankford to get a fair post conviction hearing. Many of the grounds listed above, stated separately or concurrently, do nothing more than state facts that simply explain the course of events involved in a criminal trial. The remaining grounds are mere allegations that, because the judge had made prior rulings adverse to Lankford, he was biased. Thus, we reject Lankford's claim that the district court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the judge. Finally, Lankford's allegation that the district court judge had become a de facto material witness in the case and was therefore barred from participation in the case is without merit. The record demonstrates that the district court judge was not subpoenaed as a witness and did not testify in the proceedings. A criminal defendant cannot turn the district court judge into a material witness by introducing a stipulation of facts which the parties believe that the judge might testify to if he was in fact called as a witness. Thus, we reject Lankford's claim that the district court judge had become a material witness in the post conviction relief proceeding.
Next, Lankford claims that the district court abused its discretion in the post conviction relief proceeding by denying two of Lankford's motions. First, Lankford moved to have the court order complete psychological and physical examinations conducted on himself. The court denied the motion. Then Lankford made a motion to compel an alcohol evaluation of the trial counsel. The court denied this request also. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions. The testimony clearly indicates that Lankford's trial counsel made the decision not to move for psychological and physical evaluation of the defendant based on the strategy of claiming that Lankford was not involved in the crime but was only an accessory after the fact. Such a tactical decision should not be reviewed in hindsight during post conviction relief. We find there was no abuse of discretion when the district court denied this motion. Regarding the motion to compel an alcohol evaluation of Lankford's trial counsel, there is no factual basis in the record for the court to order the alcohol evaluation. Lankford's trial counsel testified that he had not consumed alcohol while working on the case, and nothing in the record refutes this testimony. There is no factual basis in the record for such an unusual demand, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.