Opinion ID: 2834607
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Discovery as to Jury Deliberations

Text: Castillo next cites Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 327(b) and Texas Rule of Evidence 606 in support of his position. Rule 327 is found in the “New Trials” subchapter of the Rules of Civil Procedure and is entitled “For Jury Misconduct.” It provides: a. When the ground of a motion for new trial , supported by affidavit, is misconduct of the jury or of the officer in charge of them, or because of any communication made to the jury, or that a juror gave an erroneous or incorrect answer on voir dire examination, the court shall hear evidence thereof from the jury or others in open court, and may grant a new trial if such misconduct proved, or the communication made, or the erroneous or incorrect answer on voir dire examination, be material, and if it reasonably appears from the evidence both on the hearing of the motion and the trial of the case and from the record as a whole that injury probably resulted to the complaining party. b. A juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. Tex. R. Civ. P. 327 (emphasis added). Rule of Evidence 606(b) is entitled “Competency of Juror as a Witness” and provides: Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment , a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the jury’s deliberations, or to the effect of anything on any juror’s mind or emotions or mental processes, as influencing any juror’s assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment. Nor may a juror’s affidavit or any statement by a juror concerning any matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be admitted in evidence for any of these purposes . However, a juror may testify: (1) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror; or (2) to rebut a claim that the juror was not qualified to serve. Tex. R. Evid. 606(b) (emphasis added). Noting that both rules provide jurors may not testify about matters or statements made during jury deliberations, Castillo urges they apply to protect the jury’s deliberations from all discovery. But, by their plain language, the rules apply to motions for new trials, reasons jurors voted for or against verdicts, and inquiries into the validity of verdicts or indictments. Tex. R. Civ. P. 327(b); Tex. R. Evid. 606 (b). Even when those types of issues are involved, the rules specifically allow jurors to testify about outside influence brought to bear on any of them. Tex. R. Civ. P. 327(b); Tex. R. Evid. 606(b). In this case, there was no verdict. Ford is not seeking discovery to impeach a verdict or to take testimony of jurors as to their votes on a verdict. And although the net effect of Ford’s success in having the settlement agreement set aside will be a new trial, Ford is not asserting error in the trial court’s denial of discovery as to a motion for new trial. So, although rules 327(b) and 606 do not strictly apply here, the policies inherent in those rules are implicated by this record and the positions of the parties. We have previously articulated some reasons underlying the prohibition of unfettered probing into jury deliberations: (1) keeping jury deliberations private to encourage candid discussion of a case, (2) protecting jurors from post-trial harassment or tampering, (3) preventing a disgruntled juror whose view did not prevail from overturning the verdict, and (4) protecting the need for finality. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson , 24 S.W.3d 362, 366-67 (Tex. 2000). Not all these reasons apply when no attempt is being made to impeach a verdict, but the overarching principles are the same any time discovery is sought as to what occurred during jury deliberations. Jurors are summoned to court to do public service and they should not be subjected to unfettered post-trial proceedings regardless of whether their deliberations resulted in a verdict. Discovery involving jurors will not be appropriate in most cases, but in this case there was more than just a suspicion that something suspect occurred—there was some circumstantial evidence that it did. Once the trial court discharges them, jurors are not prohibited from discussing what took place during deliberations. But there is a difference between jurors choosing to talk about their service and their being compelled to do so in discovery depositions and court hearings. We believe the better policy, in general, is to conform discovery involving jurors to those matters permitted by Rule of Civil Procedure 327 and Rule of Evidence 606. That is, discovery involving jurors should ordinarily be limited to facts and evidence relevant to (1) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, and (2) rebuttal of a claim that a juror was not qualified to serve. [3] And although we have determined that the trial court abused its discretion by entirely depriving Ford of discovery on the breach of contract claim, it remains within the trial court’s discretion to reasonably control the limits of discovery and the manner in which the discovery may be obtained. In re CSX Corp. , 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam ).