Opinion ID: 1946081
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of the Contract and Breach

Text: [¶ 12] The parties agree that they began the project pursuant to an express agreement, notwithstanding their failure to enter into a final written contract. [8] Walsh does not dispute the factual findings regarding the breach; rather, it asserts, in essence, that the parties' entire relationship was controlled by the contract because any breach on its part was not material to the contract. [¶ 13] A material breach `is a non-performance of a duty that is so material and important as to justify the injured party in regarding the whole transaction as at an end.' Associated Builders, Inc. v. Coggins, 1999 ME 12, ¶ 6, 722 A.2d 1278, 1280 (quoting Down East Energy Corp. v. RMR, Inc., 1997 ME 148, ¶ 10, 697 A.2d 417, 421). Whether a material breach has occurred is a question of fact that we review for clear error. Forrest Assocs. v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 2000 ME 195, ¶ 9, 760 A.2d 1041, 1044. A trial court's factual finding is clearly erroneous if there is no competent evidence in the record to support it. VanVoorhees v. Dodge, 679 A.2d 1077, 1080 (Me.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). [¶ 14] The record supports the trial court's findings regarding the materiality of Walsh's breach. There was evidence that the drawings for the project were often incorrect and lacked sufficient information; the project conditions were not proper for installing drywall; and the drywall work began before there was a tight roof on the building. Because there is competent evidence to support the court's determination that Walsh materially breached the express agreement by failing to maintain the necessary working conditions at the project, Jenkins was justified in regarding the whole transaction as at an end and was not required to continue to perform pursuant to the terms of the express agreement. See Associated Builders, Inc., 1999 ME 12, ¶ 6, 722 A.2d at 1280.