Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ajaj's Objection to the Jury Charge

Text: 280 Ajaj attacks the district court's jury charge on three additional grounds: (1) the court failed expressly to charge the jury that to convict Ajaj of conspiracy, the jury was required to find that Ajaj agreed to the essential nature of the plan; (2) with respect to Ajaj's vicarious criminal liability on Counts Two to Six and Eight to Ten, the district court charged the jury under a Pinkerton theory of liability despite the lack of evidence that Ajaj was a conspirator; and (3) the district court failed to instruct the jury on the issue of Ajaj's withdrawal from the conspiracy. 12
281 Ajaj argues that the district court failed to instruct the jury that to convict Ajaj as a member of the conspiracy, it had to find that he agreed to the essential nature of the plan. According to Ajaj, the essential nature of the plan charged in the indictment was a scheme to bomb a populated structure in an urban area. Ajaj argues that the court constructively amended the indictment by instructing the jury that Ajaj could be convicted of conspiracy if he shared in any of the conspiracy's four objectives and that this instruction rendered the conspiracy count duplicitous. See United States v. Aracri, 968 F.2d 1512, 1518 (2d Cir.1992) (An indictment is duplicitous if it joins two or more distinct crimes in a single count.). Ajaj's arguments are meritless and we conclude that the district court committed no error. 282 To convict a defendant on a conspiracy charge, the government must prove that the defendant agreed to the  'essential nature of the plan' ... and on the 'kind of criminal conduct ... in fact contemplated.'  Gleason, 616 F.2d at 16 (citations omitted). The defendant must be shown to have agreed to commit a particular offense and not merely a vague agreement to do something wrong. United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 44 (2d Cir.1980) (emphasis added; citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A court's jury charge comports with this rule when it sets forth the essential nature of the plan by accurately describing the essence of the [conspiracy's] underlying illegal objective[s], United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 690 (2d Cir.1992), and then instructs the jury that the government must demonstrate  'an agreement as to the objective[s] of the conspiracy,'  Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 63 (citation omitted); see United States v. Attanasio, 870 F.2d 809, 816-17 (2d Cir.1989). The government is not required to demonstrate that the defendant agreed to all of the conspiracy's objectives, as long as the defendant shared some knowledge of the [conspiracy's] unlawful aims and objectives. United States v. Heinemann, 801 F.2d 86, 93 (2d Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Gleason, 616 F.2d at 16 ([D]efendant need not know every objective of the conspiracy to be convicted as a member.). 283 Here, the court instructed the jury in accordance with these requirements. The court instructed: Before you can find that the defendant you are considering was a member of the conspiracy, you must conclude that you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and willfully associated himself with the intent to aid in the accomplishment of the purpose of the conspiracy. The district court then instructed the jury on the essential nature of the plan by tracking the language of the relevant bombing statutes that comprised the conspiracy's objectives. 284 And we know the purposes are to damage and destroy and attempt to damage and destroy by means of fire and explosives, buildings, vehicles and other real and personal property used in interstate commerce. To damage and destroy by means of fire and explosives, buildings, vehicles and other personal property, in whole or in part owned, possessed, or leased to the United States or departments and agencies of the United States, to transport in interstate commerce explosives with knowledge and intent that the explosives were to be used unlawfully to damage and destroy buildings, vehicles, and other real and personal property, and to damage, disable, destroy, and place and caused to be placed explosives and other destructive substances in, upon, and in proximity to motor vehicles which were used, operated, and employed in interstate commerce. 285 The district court then instructed the jury that the government was not required to prove that the defendant agreed to all of the conspiracy's objectives. Rather, the court instructed that to convict Ajaj of conspiracy, [w]hat is necessary is the defendant must have participated with knowledge of at least some of the basic aims and purposes of the conspiracy and with the intention of aiding in and accomplishing those unlawful ends. By accurately describing the essence of the underlying conspiratorial objectives as set forth in the indictment, the court guarded against the possibility that Ajaj would be convicted of merely entering into a general agreement to engage in unspecified criminal conduct. United States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir.1977); see United States v. Gallerani, 68 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir.1995) (instructions were erroneous when the jury could convict the defendant of conspiracy without finding that he had any of the objectives alleged in the indictment). The court also guarded against a constructive amendment of the indictment. See Wallace, 59 F.3d at 337. Contrary to Ajaj's argument, Count One of the Southern District indictment did not charge Ajaj with conspiring to bomb a populated structure in an urban area but with conspiring to secure four distinct criminal objectives. 286 We briefly dispose of Ajaj's remaining arguments. By charging the jury that Ajaj could be convicted as a member of the conspiracy if he shared some of the conspiracy's objectives, the court's charge did not thereby render the conspiracy count duplicitous. The court's instructions, as well as the indictment, charged Ajaj with membership in a single conspiracy with multiple criminal objectives. See Aracri, 968 F.2d at 1518 (The allegation in a single count of a conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous, for the conspiracy is the crime and that is one, however diverse its objects. (citation, internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Furthermore, the district court was not required to specifically instruct the jury, as an element of the conspiracy charge, that Ajaj could be convicted as a conspirator only if he agreed to the essential nature of the plan. See generally Edward J. Devitt et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 28.03 (4th ed.1990) (setting forth essential elements of conspiracy instructions). The court's careful jury charge apprized the jury of the essence of the conspiracy's underlying illegal objectives and instructed the jury that Ajaj could be convicted of conspiracy only if he agreed to one or more of the objectives. We therefore affirm those jury instructions.
287 Ajaj and Abouhalima each contend that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that they could be convicted on Counts Two to Six and Eight to Ten under a Pinkerton theory of liability. The court instructed the jury that [i]f in light of my instructions you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in Count One and, thus, guilty on the conspiracy count, then you may also, but you are not required, to find him guilty of any or all of the substantive crimes charged in Counts Two through Six and Counts Eight through Ten. 288 The district court then set forth the elements of the Pinkerton analysis: 289 First, the crime charged in the substantive count, that is, Counts Two through Six and Counts Eight through Ten was, in fact, committed. 290 Second, that the person or persons you find actually committed the crime were members of the conspiracy you found to have existed. 291 Third, that the substantive crime was committed pursuant to the common plan and understanding you found to exist among the conspirators. 292 Fourth, that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time the substantive crime was committed. 293 And, fifth, that the defendant could have reasonably foreseen the substantive crime committed by his co-conspirators. 294 Neither Ajaj nor Abouhalima object to the substance of the district court's Pinkerton charge but each offers slightly different criticisms of that charge. Ajaj argues that the charge was improper in light of the absence of independent evidence supporting his membership in the conspiracy. Lacking such evidence, Ajaj argues that the district court's Pinkerton instruction improperly invited the jury to engage in an inverse-Pinkerton  analysis whereby the jury inferred Ajaj's participation in the conspiracy from the commission of the substantive offenses. Abouhalima, offering a similar argument, contends that because there was insufficient evidence that he agreed specifically to bomb the World Trade Center, the court's Pinkerton instruction invited the jury to engage in an inverse-Pinkerton  analysis. Abouhalima's argument rests on the premise that the object of the conspiracy charged in the indictment was a scheme to bomb the World Trade Center. We disagree and affirm the propriety of the court's charge. 295 Under the Pinkerton doctrine, a jury [may] find a defendant guilty on a substantive count without specific evidence that he committed the act charged if it is clear that the offense had been committed, that it had been committed in the furtherance of an unlawful conspiracy, and that the defendant was a member of that conspiracy. United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191, 1208 (2d Cir.1975) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946)). We have cautioned that the Pinkerton charge should not be given as a matter of course and in particular where the evidence is such that the jury is required to resort to the inverse of Pinkerton and infer the existence of a conspiracy from the series of disparate criminal offenses. United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1050 (2d Cir.1976); see Gleason, 616 F.2d at 19; United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1342 (2d Cir.1974) (improper to give Pinkerton charge when the conspiracy ... must be inferred largely from the series of criminal offenses committed); United States v. Cantone, 426 F.2d 902, 904-05 (2d Cir.1970). 296 Contrary to Ajaj's argument, the government presented ample evidence of Ajaj's membership in the conspiracy that bombed the World Trade Center. The government presented evidence that: (1) Ajaj traveled to the Middle East to obtain terrorist training; (2) Ajaj and Yousef studied the construction of explosive devices in the Middle East; (3) Ajaj and Yousef conspired to enter the United States illegally in furtherance of their plot to bomb buildings and vehicles in the United States; and (4) Ajaj remained in close contact with Yousef after his incarceration. See infra Part VII.B. (discussing Ajaj's sufficiency of evidence argument). Given the ample evidence supporting Ajaj's conspiracy conviction, the district court's Pinkerton charge did not invite the jury to engage in an inverse-Pinkerton  analysis. See United States v. Harwood, 998 F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir.1993). Indeed, the district court cautiously instructed the jury that Ajaj could be found guilty of the substantive crimes only after the jury had concluded that he was a conspirator. 297 Furthermore, Abouhalima's argument is predicated on the flawed premise that the object of the conspiracy was to bomb the World Trade Center. The indictment, however, alleged four separate objectives, none of which required the government to prove that the defendant was aware of the specific target of the bombing conspiracy. Accordingly, Abouhalima's inverse-Pinkerton  argument is misplaced. Given the ample evidence of Abouhalima's knowing participation in the conspiracy's objectives, the court's Pinkerton charge was appropriate. See infra Part VII.C. (discussing Abouhalima's challenge to the sufficiency of evidence). 298
299 Ajaj argues that his arrest and incarceration on passport fraud charges approximately six months prior to the World Trade Center bombing entitled him to a jury instruction on withdrawal from the bombing conspiracy. Ajaj argues that the district court's failure to provide this instruction constituted plain error. We disagree. 300 A criminal defendant is entitled to have instructions presented relating to any theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, no matter how weak or incredible that evidence may be. United States v. LaMorte, 950 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir.1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Nava-Salazar, 30 F.3d 788, 799 (7th Cir.1994) (A defendant is entitled to a withdrawal instruction only if the evidence could sustain that claim.). Typically, to sustain a withdrawal defense, a defendant is required to present evidence of some affirmative action [taken] ... to disavow or defeat the purpose of the conspiracy. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912). Mere cessation of activity is not enough ...; there must also be affirmative action, either the making of a clean breast to the authorities ... or communication of the abandonment in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators. United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 (1964). 301 A conspirator who presents evidence of his imprisonment during the course of the conspiracy is entitled to a jury instruction on withdrawal. See United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 453 (2d Cir.1976) ([E]vidence that [defendant] had been incarcerated ... would have been enough to make his withdrawal a jury issue.); Borelli, 336 F.2d at 390 (concluding that although incarceration for a crime unrelated to the charged conspiracy does not entitle defendant to a directed verdict on withdrawal, the fact [of incarceration] ... raise[s] a question for the jury on the issue of ... withdrawal); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 839 (2d Cir.1962) (The law is clear ... that while arrest or incarceration may constitute a withdrawal from a conspiracy, it does not follow that in every instance it must.); see also United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 573 (2d Cir.1961). Whether a conspirator's imprisonment constitutes a withdrawal must be decided by the jury in light of the length and location of the internment, the nature of the conspiracy, and any other available evidence. Panebianco, 543 F.2d at 454 n. 5. 302 Ajaj, who was incarcerated during the course of the conspiracy, therefore was entitled to a jury instruction on withdrawal. Ajaj, however, did not raise this contention at trial and we therefore assess the court's instructions for plain error under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). We conclude that Ajaj has not met his burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the jury, properly instructed, would have found that Ajaj withdrew from the conspiracy. 303 Other than the fact of his incarceration, Ajaj presented no other evidence at trial to demonstrate that he withdrew from the conspiracy. The government, however, presented compelling evidence that Ajaj, through conversations with Abukhdeir and Yousef, retained a stake in the conspiracy during his six-month imprisonment. Ajaj discussed the bombing conspiracy in coded language and never affirmatively sought to distance himself from his coconspirators. In fact, during one such conversation, Ajaj agreed to convey the terrorist materials to Yousef. Therefore, in light of Ajaj's relatively short prison sentence on his passport fraud conviction, his internment in New York and the government's evidence demonstrating Ajaj's frequent contact with Yousef during the term of his incarceration, we conclude that the district court's failure to instruct the jury on withdrawal was not plain error.