Opinion ID: 1345760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Correction of verdict.

Text: On the morning of Wednesday, November 21, 1984, the jury returned verdicts on the guilt and special circumstance issues. The forms signed by the foreman indicated a verdict of guilty of first degree murder (count I) and a true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance. After the verdicts were announced and the jury was polled, the jurors were admonished, told to return for commencement of the penalty trial the following Tuesday, and released. Neither counsel objected to the form or regularity of the verdicts while the jurors remained present. On the afternoon of November 21, the jurors having departed, court and counsel realized that the jury had signed and returned no verdict, one way or the other, on count II, the robbery charge. Over defense counsel's objection, the court took the position that it had not discharged the jurors, and thus still had jurisdiction to recall them to correct the verdict. In the court's view, it could direct the jurors either to record any decision they had already reached on the robbery count, or to resume deliberations on that issue. The nine available jurors and the two alternates were recalled to the courtroom the same afternoon; the remaining three jurors could not be found. Juror Obara, the foreman, insisted in open court that the jury had indeed reached a decision on the robbery count. However, Obara recounted, no verdict form had been signed because the jurors had misinterpreted the court's response to an earlier question as meaning that if they found the murder and special circumstance charges true, they did not have to return a verdict form on the robbery charge. Juror Patten agreed with Obara's account, and no juror present demurred. Nonetheless, the court decided it was not possible to proceed further without all jurors present. The court indicated the jury would therefore be asked to return next Tuesday morning on that matter [i.e., the robbery count] as well as the others [i.e., the penalty phase]. Those present were again admonished not to discuss the case further or to form any opinion or conclusion that hasn't already been reached by you, in your deliberations. [ถ] In other words, please go no further than your state of mind as of this moment. Whatever that is.... The full jury returned as ordered on Tuesday, November 27. The court directed the jury to resume its deliberations on the robbery count, and the jury retired at 10:12 a.m. Eleven minutes later, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on count II. (12) Defendant urges that this procedure was erroneous and void because the jurors, once discharged from their guilt phase responsibilities and released from the court's custody and control, could not be recalled to clarify or complete their verdict. However, we recently held the contrary under substantially similar circumstances. In People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757 [257 Cal. Rptr. 895, 771 P.2d 844], the jury in a capital case returned guilty verdicts on charges of murder and burglary, and also found true a burglary-murder special circumstance. However, because a necessary verdict form was mistakenly not furnished, the jury failed to specify the degree of the murder as the law requires. (See ง 1157.) The defect was not immediately noticed; the jury was admonished, told to return for the penalty trial, and released. The next day, a Friday, defense counsel brought the problem to the court's attention. Over counsel's objection, the court ordered the jury to reassemble the following Monday, in advance of the penalty trial, to determine the degree of the murder. Within minutes, the jury returned a finding that the murder was in the first degree. In an extended discussion, we upheld this procedure. We explained that jurors in a capital case are neither discharged, nor beyond the court's control, once they have completed guilt phase deliberations. Where, as here, further proceedings are to take place, the jury has not been discharged, the jurors have been specifically instructed that they are still jurors in the case, they have been admonished not to discuss the case with anyone nor to permit anyone to discuss the case with them, and they have been directed not to read anything about the case, the jurors have not thrown off their character as jurors nor entered the outside world freed of the admonitions and obligations shielding their thought processes from outside influences. Clearly, the jury here remained within the court's control [citations], their verdict was incomplete, and the court was authorized to reconvene the jury to complete its verdict. (48 Cal.3d at p. 773.) Similarly, the jury in this case rendered an incomplete guilt verdict, since it failed to find on all charged offenses. Nonetheless, before they were released pending the penalty trial, all the jurors were admonished to avoid exposure to all publicity about the case; to refrain from reading or listening to anything about the case; not to discuss this matter with anyone or allow anyone to discuss it with them; and not to discuss the matter among yourselves or with anyone else. Under these circumstances, as in Bonillas, supra, the panelists had not lost their status as jurors nor entered the world free of court-imposed restrictions on outside influences. The court was therefore authorized to recall them to complete their verdict. [16] Defendant urges that if the jurors could be reconvened for this purpose, at least they should have been instructed clearly to begin their robbery deliberations anew. He asserts that the nine jurors who heard the ambiguous colloquy between the court and Juror Obara on the afternoon of November 21 could reasonably have inferred the court's tacit acceptance of Obara's claim that a robbery verdict had already been reached, and that no further deliberations were necessary. Hence, he implies, the subsequent jury proceedings were fatally infected with improper judicial coercion, as evidenced by the speed of the final robbery verdict. We see no impropriety. In the first place, when all the jurors returned on November 27, they were clearly told to resume deliberations. (Italics added.) Second, the colloquy of November 21 had no coercive import. Indeed, though Juror Obara argued that the jury had merely failed to sign the verdict form, he acknowledged in open court he was sure that won't be accepted.... The court promptly responded, That's right. After hearing further from Obara, the court again stated, Well, sir, I'm sorry. Without the presence of all of the members of the jury, it's just not possible for us to proceed. Nothing in this exchange could reasonably be construed as the court's agreement that no further deliberations were necessary. Nor was it error for the court to suggest, as it did on both November 21 and 27, that the jury should take up robbery deliberations wherever they had left off. The 12 jurors who reconvened on November 27 were the same panelists who had deliberated on November 20 and 21. Thus, it was not necessary that deliberations begin anew in order to afford defendant his right to deliberations which are the common experience of each of the jurors. (Compare People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 692-693 [131 Cal. Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742].) Finally, defendant argues that if the robbery conviction is invalid on the grounds asserted, the robbery-murder special circumstance must also fall because the former is a necessary condition of the latter. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 59.) Our finding that the robbery conviction was proper makes it unnecessary to address the special circumstance issue.