Opinion ID: 3014824
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Decision to Activate SERT

Text: We agree with the District Court that all officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the decision to activate SERT. We stressed in Smith I that a decision to employ a SWAT-type team can constitute excessive force if it is not “objectively reasonable” to do so in light of “the totality of the circumstances.” 318 F.3d at 515. As we noted, the question whether the use of force is “objectively reasonable” is determined by analyzing several factors. We looked to the factors listed in our decision in Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1997), as well as those in the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). In Sharrar we held that a reasonable officer must consider: the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. . . [whether] the physical force applied was of such an extent as to lead to injury . . . the possibility that the persons subject to the police action are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time. 12 128 F.3d at 821-22 (internal quotations omitted). Sharrar was decided two years before the events at issue in this case. Therefore, it is appropriate for us to rely on that decision in our analysis of whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, as the contours of the right at issue here—as set forth in Sharrar—were “clearly established” at the time the troopers decided to activate SERT. A reasonable officer would be guided by the Sharrar factors in determining whether to use overwhelming force in a given situation. Thus, if an officer applies the Sharrar analysis in an unreasonable manner, he is not entitled to qualified immunity. Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the troopers applied the Sharrar factors in an unreasonable manner in choosing to activate SERT. We held in Smith I that the Smiths had offered sufficient evidence to make the question whether “the decision to activate SERT . . . [was] objectively reasonable,” see 318 F.3d at 516, appropriate for resolution by a jury, and we do not disturb that conclusion today. We do find, however, that, even if the decision to activate SERT was objectively unreasonable, a reasonable officer would not have thought his conduct to be unlawful. Thus, even if the troopers violated Smith’s constitutional rights in activating SERT, they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to that decision. As the District Court noted, the troopers believed that Smith was armed and that he had targeted a police officer with a laser-sighted weapon.6 Thus, at the time the decision to activate SERT was made, the troopers could reasonably have believed that Smith posed a serious threat. In addition, the troopers apparently made the decision to activate SERT without full knowledge of Smith’s medical condition. While Marasco and Scianna had some understanding of Smith’s health problems, there is no evidence that they were involved in the decision to activate SERT. The troopers who were responsible for the decision to activate SERT—which involved M. Rodriguez, 6 The Smiths submit that there is evidence in the record suggesting that the laser sight actually came from somewhere in the wooded area behind Smith’s house, rather than the house itself. This does not change our analysis in any meaningful respect. 13 Fetterolf, and Hall, among the remaining defendants—had limited knowledge of Smith’s condition at the time the decision was made. Thus, it was not unreasonable for them to conclude that the display of force entailed in the activation of SERT was not “of such an extent as to lead to injury.” 7 The Smiths suggest that, because others in the Troop were aware of Smith’s health problems, we can impute this knowledge to the entire troop. We disagree. In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against multiple defendants, a plaintiff must show that each individual defendant violated his constitutional rights. Thus, to the extent that knowledge of Smith’s medical condition would alter the excessive force inquiry as to individual defendants, the Smiths must point to some evidence from which we could conclude that those particular defendants had knowledge of Smith’s condition. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to this aspect of the Smiths’ claim.