Opinion ID: 4572792
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the ema

Text: The first question before this Court is whether the Governor possessed the authority under the EMA to renew her declaration of a state of emergency and state of disaster based motions to dismiss with only passing reference to the Eleventh Amendment to assert that plaintiffs are not entitled to monetary damages. Finally, defendants filed briefs-- and oral arguments were held-- regarding the certification of the issues to this Court, and never once was Eleventh Amendment immunity raised. Defendants did not raise this matter until they filed their motion for reconsideration after the federal district court indicated that it was going to certify the questions to this Court. 7 on the COVID-19 pandemic after April 30, 2020.6 MCL 30.403 of the EMA provides, in pertinent part: (3) The governor shall, by executive order or proclamation, declare a state of disaster if he or she finds a disaster has occurred or the threat of a disaster exists. The state of disaster shall continue until the governor finds that the threat or danger has passed, the disaster has been dealt with to the extent that disaster conditions no longer exist, or until the declared state of disaster has been in effect for 28 days. After 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation declaring the state of disaster terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension of the state of disaster for a specific number of days is approved by resolution of both houses of the legislature. . . . (4) The governor shall, by executive order or proclamation, declare a state of emergency if he or she finds that an emergency has occurred or that the threat of an emergency exists. The state of emergency shall continue until the governor finds that the threat or danger has passed, the emergency has been dealt with to the extent that emergency conditions no longer exist, or until the declared state of emergency has been in effect for 28 days. After 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation declaring the state of emergency terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension of the state of emergency for a specific number of 6 The parties do not dispute that the Governor possessed the authority under the EMA to issue executive orders concerning the COVID-19 pandemic prior to April 30, 2020. Moreover, as a general proposition, it cannot be denied that executive orders may be given the force of law if authorized by a statute that constitutionally delegates power to the executive or, indeed, as a function of any other constitutional authority, including that inherent within the executive power. Cunningham v Neagle, 135 US 1; 10 S Ct 658; 34 L Ed 55 (1890). However, not only has no such “other” or “inherent” constitutional authority been argued, but it cannot readily be imagined that such a basis of authority would exist in support of a broad and general exercise of legislative authority by the executive branch. We specifically reject the argument offered by amicus Restore Freedom that the Governor’s authority to issue executive orders is restricted to the circumstances contemplated by Const 1963, art 5, § 2, which provides that the Governor “may make changes in the organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units which he considers necessary for efficient administration.” 8 days is approved by resolution of both houses of the legislature. [Emphasis added.] Critically, MCL 30.403(3) and (4) provide that “[a]fter 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation declaring the state of [disaster/emergency] terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension of the state of [disaster/emergency] for a specific number of days is approved by resolution of both houses of the legislature.” Because the Legislature here did not approve an extension of the “state of emergency” or “state of disaster” beyond April 30, 2020, the Governor was required to issue an executive order declaring these to be terminated. While the Governor did so, she acted immediately thereafter to issue another executive order, again declaring a “state of emergency” and “state of disaster” under the EMA for the identical reasons as the declarations that had just been terminated-- the public-health crisis created by COVID-19. Given that MCL 30.403(3) and (4) required the Governor to terminate a declaration of a state of emergency or state of disaster after 28 days in the absence of a legislatively authorized extension, we do not believe that the Legislature intended to allow the Governor to redeclare under the EMA the identical state of emergency and state of disaster under these circumstances. To allow such a redeclaration would effectively render the 28-day limitation a nullity. The Governor argues that because MCL 30.403(3) and (4) provide that “[t]he governor shall, by executive order or proclamation, declare a state of [disaster/emergency] if he or she finds [a disaster/an emergency] has occurred or the threat of [a disaster/an emergency] exists,” the Governor had no choice here but to redeclare a state of emergency and state of disaster. However, when the cited language is read in reasonable conjunction with the language imposing the 28-day limitation, it is clear that the Governor only 9 possesses the authority or obligation to declare a state of emergency or state of disaster once and then must terminate that declaration after 28 days if the Legislature has not authorized an extension. The Governor possesses no authority-- much less obligation-- to redeclare the same state of emergency or state of disaster and thereby avoid the Legislature’s limitation on her authority under the EMA. As the Court of Claims correctly stated in Mich House of Representatives v Governor,7 unpublished opinion of the Court of Claims, issued May 21, 2020 (Docket No. 20-000079-MZ); slip op at 23-24: [A]t the end of the 28 days, the EMA contemplates only two outcomes: (1) the state of emergency and/or disaster is terminated by order of the Governor; or (2) the state of emergency/disaster continues with legislative approval. The only qualifier on the “shall terminate” language is an affirmative grant 7 In that case, the Michigan House of Representatives and Senate filed their own cause of action against the Governor, arguing that she lacked the authority under the EMA or the EPGA to renew her declaration of a state of emergency or state of disaster based on the COVID-19 pandemic after April 30, 2020, and that, if those statutes did grant her such authority, they are unconstitutional. The Court of Claims held that the Governor lacked the authority under the EMA to renew a declaration of a state of emergency or state of disaster after April 30, 2020, based on the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Court of Claims held that she did possess the authority under the EPGA to renew her declaration of a state of emergency after April 30, 2020, based on the COVID-19 pandemic and that the EPGA is constitutionally valid. The Court of Appeals subsequently held in a divided opinion that “the Governor’s declaration of a state of emergency, her extension of the state of emergency, and her issuance of related executive orders fell within the scope of the Governor’s authority under the EPGA” and that “the EPGA is constitutionally sound.” House of Representatives v Governor, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2020) (Docket No. 353655); slip op at 1. The Court of Appeals “decline[d] to address whether the Governor was additionally authorized to take those same measures under the EMA . . . .” Id. at 1-2. Judge TUKEL, in dissent, concluded that with regard to the EPGA, “at least in a case such as this involving an ‘epidemic,’ . . . the EMA’s 28-day time limit controls”; “the Governor’s actions violate the EMA”; and “the Governor’s actions violate the separation of powers . . . .” Id. at 3-4 (TUKEL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Legislature’s application for leave to appeal remains pending in this Court. 10 of an extension from the Legislature. There is no third option for the Governor to continue the state of emergency and/or disaster on her own, absent legislative approval. . . . To adopt the Governor’s interpretation of the statute would render nugatory the express 28-day limit and it would require the Court to ignore the plain statutory language. Furthermore, and contrary to the Governor’s argument, the 28-day limitation in the EMA does not amount to an impermissible “legislative veto.”8 Once again, MCL 30.403(3) and (4) provide that “[a]fter 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation declaring the state of [emergency/disaster] terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension of the state of [emergency/disaster] for a specific number of days is approved by resolution of both houses of the legislature.” These provisions impose nothing more than a durational limitation on the Governor’s authority. The Governor’s declaration of a state of emergency or state of disaster may only endure for 28 days absent legislative approval of an extension. So, if the Legislature does nothing, as it did here, the Governor is obligated to terminate the state of emergency or state of disaster after 28 days. A durational limitation is not the equivalent of a veto. 8 In Immigration & Naturalization Serv v Chadha, 462 US 919; 103 S Ct 2764; 77 L Ed 2d 317 (1983), the United States Supreme Court concluded that a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that authorized “one House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States” was unconstitutional. Id. at 923, citing 8 USC 1254(c)(2). And in Blank v Dep’t of Corrections, 462 Mich 103, 113; 611 NW2d 530 (2000) (opinion by KELLY, J.), a plurality of this Court applied the reasoning of Chadha to conclude that statutes purporting to “retain [in the Legislature] the right to approve or disapprove rules proposed by executive branch agencies” were unconstitutional. The statutes at issue in Chadha and Blank were described as imposing “legislative vetoes.” 11 As the Court of Claims again correctly explained in Mich House of Representatives v Governor, unpublished opinion of the Court of Claims, issued May 21, 2020 (Docket No. 20-000079-MZ); slip op at 25, “The Legislature has not ‘vetoed’ or negated any action by the executive branch by imposing a temporal limit on the Governor’s authority; instead, it limited the amount of time the Governor can act independently of the Legislature in response to a particular emergent matter.” Indeed, Immigration & Naturalization Serv v Chadha, 462 US 919, 955 n 19; 103 S Ct 2764; 77 L Ed 2d 317 (1983), itself expressly recognized that “durational limits on authorizations . . . lie well within Congress’ constitutional power.” That is exactly what the 28-day limitation establishes-- a durational limitation on an authorization. Nothing prohibits the Legislature from placing such a limitation on authority delegated to the Governor, and such a limitation does not render illusory in any way the delegation itself. For these reasons, we conclude that the Governor did not possess the authority under the EMA to renew her declaration of a state of emergency or state of disaster based on the COVID-19 pandemic after April 30, 2020.9