Opinion ID: 421001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Capacity of the FDIC

Text: 18 SFC contends that the FDIC executed the escrow agreement in its corporate insurer capacity and thus has no right to make a claim to the escrow fund in its receiver capacity. The district court's factual finding that the FDIC executed the agreement in its receiver capacity may be overturned by this Court only if clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52. Under this standard, the factual findings of a trial court must be allowed to stand unless the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Morgado v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Civil Defense Corp., 706 F.2d 1184 (11th Cir.1983). 19 SFC relies principally on the fact that the escrow agreement was executed by the FDIC, a corporation under the laws of the United States of America and was signed on the FDIC's behalf by John B. Chandler, Jr., as attorney for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In so arguing, SFC relies on the statement of the Florida Supreme Court 7 in Luria v. Bank of Coral Gables, 106 Fla. 175, 142 So. 901 (Fla.1932) that a trustee can be held personally liable on a note he executed on behalf of the trust where 20 Neither the instruments themselves nor the signature showed that [the trustee] signed for or on behalf of anyone else ... Trustees and other fiduciaries may exempt themselves from personal responsibility by using explicit words to show such intention, but, in the absence of such words, they are held bound. 21 Id. 142 So. at 905. SFC also notes the analogous section of the Uniform Commercial Code which provides that a party who signs a note will be personally liable on the instrument if the instrument neither names the person represented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capacity. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 673.403(2)(a). 22 We need, however, look no further than the introductory paragraphs of the escrow agreement to discover a clear expression of intent by the FDIC that it intended to execute the escrow agreement in its capacity as receiver for the PSSB. The recital portion of the agreement states: 23 WHEREAS, F.D.I.C. as receiver of the Peoples State Savings Bank, has made a claim against Sumner in the amount of Three Hundred And Twenty-Six Thousand, Two Hundred Dollars ($326,200.00); and 24 WHEREAS, Sumner has raised the question of whether F.D.I.C., or some other party, is entitled to the $326,200.00; and 25 WHEREAS, Sumner is unwilling to deliver the $326,200.00 to F.D.I.C. until said question has been resolved ... 26 (Emphasis added.) Though such recitals are not an operative part of a contract, courts have noted that such whereas clauses may provide definitive evidence of the intent of the parties, particularly where there is no language in the operative portion of the contract which conflicts with the intent expressed in the recitals. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 549 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir.1976); Henry G. Meigs, Inc. v. Empire Petroleum Co., 273 F.2d 424, 428 (7th Cir.1960); Kingwood Oil Co. v. Bell, 136 F.Supp. 229, 240 n. 15 (E.D.Ill.1955), aff'd 244 F.2d 115 (7th Cir.1957). It thus appears clearly stated on the face of the escrow agreement that FDIC was asserting its claim to the escrow fund and executing the escrow agreement in its capacity as the PSSB's representative. Absent evidence to the contrary, this evidence alone is certainly enough to prevent us from holding that the district court clearly erred in its assessment of the capacity in which the FDIC executed the escrow agreement. 27 Moreover, the extrinsic evidence of the events leading up to the formation of the escrow agreement lend additional support to the district court's conclusion. As previously noted, Leon Holbrook, the attorney for SFC, called the receiver's office at the Bank on or shortly after April 18 and spoke with Myers Fisher, an FDIC official who was administering the receiver's office. Holbrook and Fisher discussed the monies which were ultimately deposited in the escrow fund, and Holbrook agreed to return the fund in exchange for a release by the Bank from any potential liability to the Bank. Fisher, clearly speaking on behalf of the Bank, refused the offer, and the escrow agreement was executed by Holbrook and FDIC representatives just a few days later. The record is absolutely devoid of any evidence that the FDIC in its corporate capacity had expressed any claim to the $326,200 at any time prior to the execution of the agreement or that Holbrook had any doubt as to the receivership capacity of the FDIC when the agreement was executed. 28 In sum, the language of the agreement itself and the circumstances surrounding its formation lend substantial support to the district court's conclusion. As noted by the Florida Supreme Court in Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Data Lease Finance Corp., 302 So.2d 404 (Fla.1974): 29 In the construction of written contracts, it is the duty of the court to place itself in the situation of the parties, and from the consideration of the surrounding circumstances, the occasion, and the apparent object to the parties, to determine the meaning and intent of the language employed. 30 Id. at 407. The district court has adequately applied this test to the evidence before it, and its determination must therefore be upheld.