Opinion ID: 76568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of BellSouth's Appeal

Text: 14 Because we have jurisdiction to hear BellSouth's appeal, we now turn to a discussion of the merits of its appeal. In this discussion, we will (1) state the proper standard of review, (2) discuss federal question jurisdiction and BellSouth's argument for why it should have attached to Hill's two remaining state-law claims, and (3) discuss the filed rate doctrine and why we agree with BellSouth that this doctrine bars Hill's requested relief in this case.
15 The district court impliedly denied BellSouth's motion to dismiss Hill's two remaining state-law claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them based on its determination that those two claims did not give rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction. [T]he subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is a legal question that we review de novo.  Fogade v. ENB Revocable Trust, 263 F.3d 1274, 1285 (11th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). While usually [w]e review the district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion ...., [t]o the extent that the court's decision was based on conclusions of law, we review the legal conclusions de novo.  Engelhardt, 139 F.3d at 1351 n. 4.
16 Any claim that was originally filed in state court may be removed by a defendant to federal court if the case could have been filed in federal court originally. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Where, as here, there is no diversity of citizenship, the defendant must show that federal question jurisdiction is present. Id. § 1441(b). Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Whether a claim arises under a federal law is generally determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1310 (11th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). Thus, the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, free to avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading only state claims even where a federal claim is also available. Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir.1998). However, if the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law, federal question jurisdiction may nevertheless attach to the state-law claim. Smith, 236 F.3d at 1310. 17 BellSouth has argued, both before the district court and on appeal, that Hill's remaining two claims — based on the Georgia Unfair Trade Practices Act and fraud and negligent misrepresentation — should create federal question jurisdiction because they raise substantial questions of federal law. Specifically, BellSouth argues that resolution of these two claims implicates the filed rate doctrine, a judge-made creation of federal law. The district court did not consider this argument, and BellSouth now urges us to do so on appeal. Accordingly, we now consider the filed rate doctrine.
18 We conclude that federal question jurisdiction should have attached to Hill's two remaining state-law causes of action because they implicated the filed rate doctrine. Although our decision is not compelled by binding, on-point precedent, we reach our conclusion based on a consideration of persuasive authority and the two broader principles underlying the doctrine: nondiscrimination and nonjusticiability. We begin with a general discussion of the filed rate doctrine, then discuss related cases from two sister circuits, and conclude by discussing the two principles underlying the doctrine and how they are implicated by Hill's two remaining claims. 19
20 The filed rate doctrine (also known as the filed tariff doctrine) forbids a regulated entity to charge rates for its services other than those properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory authority. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577, 101 S.Ct. 2925, 2930, 69 L.Ed.2d 856 (1981). As it applies in the telecommunications industry, the filed rate doctrine dictates that the rates a carrier charges its customers, once filed with and approved by the FCC, become the law and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the carrier to the customer: 21 Not only is a carrier forbidden from charging rates other than as set out in its filed tariff, but customers are also charged with notice of the terms and rates set out in that filed tariff and may not bring an action against a carrier that would invalidate, alter or add to the terms of the filed tariff. 22 Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir.2000) (internal footnotes omitted). 23 Therefore, causes of action in which the plaintiff attempts to challenge the terms of a filed tariff are barred by the filed rate doctrine. See, e.g., id. at 840; Marcus, 138 F.3d at 58-59. A more difficult question is presented, however, when the plaintiff's claims — at least on their face — do not attempt to challenge a filed rate and thus do not appear to implicate the parties' rights and liabilities under that rate. Hill, for example, argues that her remaining claims do not directly challenge BellSouth's filed FUSF, but instead challenge BellSouth's representation of the FUSF to its customers. We begin by examining related precedents from two other circuits. 24
25 Two of our sister circuits have considered the effect of the filed rate doctrine on claims similar to Hill's, and both found the claims to be barred under the doctrine. In Marcus, appellants, in claims similar to Hill's, alleged that AT&T's advertising and billing practices were false and misleading because the carrier did not disclose its practice of rounding-up the length of customer's long-distance calls to the next full minute. 138 F.3d at 51. The Second Circuit, however, held that fraud or misrepresentation claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine because, when monetary damages are requested, such claims have the effect of challenging the filed rate. Id. at 60-63. 26 The Ninth Circuit in Evanns faced similar claims to those presented in Marcus and those presented by Hill in this appeal. 229 F.3d at 840-41. Evanns challenged AT&T's collection of its USF pass-through fee as unlawful on the two grounds that (1) AT&T should have disclosed to its customers that the USF is, in fact, a pass-through charge and (2) the USF pass-through is not a charge required by the government to be paid by consumers. Id. Because AT&T had filed its USF tariff with the FCC, the Ninth Circuit concluded that any claim that AT&T had an obligation to Evanns  beyond those set out in the filed tariffs, i.e., that [AT&T] had a duty to disclose the fact that the USF assessment was a pass-through charge, is ... barred by the filed-rate doctrine. Id. (emphasis in original). The filed rate doctrine bars any claim, whether couched in terms of federal or state law, attacking the defendants' collection of the USF assessment in compliance with the terms of the filed tariffs. Id. (emphasis in original). 27
28 Both the Marcus and Evanns courts relied on the two principles underlying the filed rate doctrine: (1) nondiscrimination — preventing carriers from engaging in price discrimination as between ratepayers and (2) nonjusticiability — preserving the exclusive role of federal agencies in approving rates for telecommunications services that are `reasonable' by keeping courts out of the rate-making process ..., a function that the federal regulatory agencies are more competent to perform. Marcus, 138 F.3d at 58. Based on these two principles, the doctrine is applied strictly to prevent a plaintiff from bringing a cause of action even in the face of apparent inequities whenever either the nondiscrimination strand or the nonjusticiability strand underlying the doctrine is implicated by the cause of action the plaintiff seeks to pursue. Id. at 59. We address each principle and its effect on Hill's claims in turn. 1. Nondiscrimination 29 The purpose of the nondiscrimination principle underlying the filed rate doctrine is to ensure that all telecommunications customers are charged the same rate for their service — the rate filed with and approved by the FCC. The filed rate doctrine prevents carriers from negotiating a lower rate with some customers and then charging others the rate filed with the FCC. AT&T Co. v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 223, 118 S.Ct. 1956, 1963, 141 L.Ed.2d 222 (1998). The nondiscrimination principle explains why the filed rate doctrine bars any challenge that, if successful, would have the effect of changing the filed tariff. Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., Inc., 277 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.2002). Even if such a challenge does not, in theory, attack the filed rate, an award of damages to the customer-plaintiff would, effectively, change the rate paid by the customer to one below the filed rate paid by other customers. See, e.g., Marcus, 138 F.3d at 60 (Plaintiffs who were able to prove their claims and recover damages would effectively receive a discounted rate for phone service over other AT&T customers.). 30 In this case, Hill's two remaining state-law causes of action implicate the nondiscrimination principle because, in effect, she seeks recovery of BellSouth's undisclosed charges in excess of its contributions to the [USF]. Hill, 244 F.Supp.2d at 1325. Such compensatory damages would have the effect of retroactively reducing Hill's rate for telecommunications service, and BellSouth would, in essence, be forced to refund to [Hill] the amount allegedly overcharged. Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1491 (11th Cir.1992) (en banc). Like all other BellSouth customers, Hill is presumed to have notice, via BellSouth's filed tariffs, of the basis for BellSouth's FUSC. Evanns, 229 F.3d at 841. And to permit her to recover on her claims that BellSouth had an obligation to disclose to its customers — beyond the disclosures already made in its filed tariffs — that the FUSC BellSouth levied recouped an amount in excess of its required contribution to the USF would be to allow her to receive a discounted rate for phone service over other [BellSouth] customers. See, e.g., Marcus, 138 F.3d at 60; Evanns, 229 F.3d at 841. 2. Nonjusticiability 31 The purpose of the nonjusticiability principle underlying the filed rate doctrine is to preserve the FCC's primary jurisdiction over determinations regarding the reasonableness of rates charged by regulated carriers. Arkansas Louisiana Gas, 453 U.S. at 577-78, 101 S.Ct. at 2930. This principle prevents more than judicial rate-setting; it precludes any judicial action which undermines agency rate-making authority. Marcus, 138 F.3d at 61. Thus, even if a claim does not directly attack the filed rate, an award of damages to the customer that would, in effect, result in a judicial determination of the reasonableness of that rate is prohibited under the filed rate doctrine. 32 In this case, Hill's two remaining state-law causes of action implicate the nonjusticiability principle because she seeks only monetary damages as relief. Hill, 244 F.Supp.2d at 1325. Were we to award Hill the relief she seeks, we would be retroactively determining that the FUSC originally levied by BellSouth, that was filed with and approved by the FCC, was unreasonable. The fact that Hill challenges BellSouth's representation of the FUSC — rather than the FUSC itself — does not alter our analysis: [a] regulated entity's alleged fraud does not create a right to a reasonable rate that exists independently of agency action. Taffet, 967 F.2d at 1494-95. Thus, Hill's remaining two claims are also barred by the nonjusticiability principle underlying the filed rate doctrine. 33 We therefore hold that Hill's two remaining claims implicate the filed rate doctrine because she seeks purely monetary damages as relief. Thus, these two claims raise substantial questions of federal law, and federal question jurisdiction should have attached. For that reason, the district court erred when it denied BellSouth's motion to dismiss these claims and instead remanded them to their state court of origin.