Opinion ID: 522975
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: right to self representation

Text: 44 For self-representation, a defendant must (1) knowingly and intelligently forego counsel, and (2) request clearly and unequivocally to proceed pro se. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541; United States v. Harris, 683 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944, 98 S.Ct. 1526, 55 L.Ed.2d 541 (demand to proceed pro se must be unequivocal). A. Waiver of Counsel 45 The preferred procedure to determine whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel is for the district court to discuss in open court with the defendant each of three elements: (1) the nature of the charges against him, (2) the possible penalties, and (3) the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1487-88 (9th Cir.1987). 46 Defendants, having fired their attorney of choice and dissatisfied with court appointed counsel, moved to defend themselves pro se at the status conference a week before the first trial date of April 23, 1985. The district court judge, after ascertaining that none of the defendants had legal experience or had defended themselves before, cautioned them of the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation. He explained that the nature of the charges against them were a rather complicated and complex mail fraud case. The court warned them they would have to comply with the court procedures and rules and regulations of the court system. Although the court did not discuss on the record the possible penalties the defendants were facing, they had been advised that their case appeared to be a complicated and complex mail fraud case. 47 When the district court fails to discuss each of the three elements in open court, we can determine under a limited exception whether the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case including the background, experience and conduct of the accused show that the waiver was knowing and intelligent despite the absence of a specific inquiry in the record. Id. at 1488; Harris, 683 F.2d at 324. Finding waiver under the exception is to prevent automatic reversal by the failure of the district court to discuss each of the three elements of the preferred procedure, and should be applied only in rare cases. Balough, 820 F.2d at 1488; United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996, 1005 (9th Cir.1983); Harris, 683 F.2d at 324. 48 The inquiry focuses on whether the defendant fully understands the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation to waive his right to counsel with his eyes open. Balough, 820 F.2d at 1489. The district court here painstakingly explained the dangers of self representation: 49 Generally [pro se defendants] are convicted at a higher rate than those who are represented by counsel.... You will be up against ... [a] U.S. District Attorney who is an experienced lawyer and who will show you no mercy. They will be out to convict you and they will do everything that he or she legally can to attain that result.... You will be held to all the standards of lawyers as far as complying with the court procedures and rules and regulations of the court system. 50 Unlike the trial court in Rylander, the court explained and discussed with the defendants the nature of the charges and specific disadvantages with proceeding pro se and they understood them. Rylander, 714 F.2d at 1005. B. Unequivocal Demand to Proceed Pro Se 51 It is settled in this circuit that the demand to proceed pro se must be unequivocal. Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir.1985) citing Meeks v. Craven, 482 F.2d 465, 467 (9th Cir.1973). 52 The reason an unequivocal demand is required is that, otherwise, convicted criminals would be given a ready tool with which to upset adverse verdicts after trials at which they had been represented by counsel. 53 Meeks, 482 F.2d at 467 (citations omitted). In Meeks, when the trial court asked the defendant You still want to represent yourself? and the defendant answered I think I will, the panel found that the demand was a prototype of equivocation. Id. 54 Here, the posture of the defendants throughout the proceedings indicates they thought they should be represented by counsel. The defendants hired an attorney to represent them when they were first accused of criminal charges. This indicates their awareness that the charges were serious and complex and needed the attention of an attorney. Then, they had a falling out with the attorney and fired him. They proved they were indigent and requested appointed counsel. The court originally appointed joint counsel, then separate counsel for each defendant. When the trial court refused to appoint yet another set of lawyers of the defendants' own choosing, the defendants demanded to proceed pro se. The court allowed them to do so provided they complied with the procedural rules and not use their status to delay the trial. They requested and were appointed advisory counsel. However, later they used a jailhouse lawyer instead of the advisory counsel to file a motion to disqualify the judge, and then, blamed the procedural deficiencies in their affidavits on the jailhouse lawyer. 55 There are numerous other examples of their equivocation: The defendants filed their motion to disqualify the trial judge the day before they were to go to trial. Part of that motion alleges that the defendants did not properly waive counsel and that they were being denied their right to counsel. This prompted the government to request a hearing to determine if defendants properly waived counsel. The court stated: 56 You are here because it does appear that you are trying to cloud the record by on the one hand insisting on representing yourself and on the other hand saying that you were not able to represent yourself and that I didn't take a valid waiver from you in your right to counsel and you want counsel. 57 When the judge questioned the Flewitts about their waiver of counsel they continued to show dissatisfaction with their appointed lawyers, not a desire to proceed pro se. 58 Scott Flewitt: However, as I mentioned initially, we had little alternative but to request a pro se status in this particular case because we weren't happy at all with the advice that we were getting from court-appointed counsel. 59 The Court: You haven't been satisfied with anybody connected with this case, not the four attorneys that have been assigned to represent you, and you had criticisms of the government attorneys, not to mention the court. So you are not happy with anybody that has been assigned to help you in this case or assigned to the case itself. 60 Scott Flewitt: Well, that is true, your honor. I think the record would support that too. 61 Later in the discussion between the court and the three Flewitts, Miles Flewitt stated, 62 I have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. I have not received that yet ... I have been denied that right so far and I wish to proceed pro se. 63 The court stated that he had a right to counsel and a right to represent himself and which of these did he prefer? Miles stated, I choose at this time to represent myself. (Emphasis added.) Todd's waiver at the time was also equivocal, It might be just a simple waiver or there might be other circumstances involved that we have to have time to prepare to argue either orally or in papers; and we are saying that we just weren't given time to present our side of the story. These statements are even more equivocal than the statements the panel in Meeks found to be a prototype of equivocation. Meeks, 482 F.2d at 467. 64 The record clearly shows the defendants were equivocal in their assertion of their pro se right. They had retained counsel, appointed counsel, advisory counsel, jailhouse counsel, and standby counsel. The majority correctly states that the judge took a valid waiver from the defendants at the September 9th hearing. [Opinion at 6] In fact, this was the second time the judge took a waiver from defendants. The September 9th hearing was necessary as the defendants asserted in their motion to disqualify the trial judge that they were denied counsel and that the trial judge took an invalid waiver of counsel from them. At the hearing, they recanted and asserted this wasn't what they meant, and asserted that they still wanted to proceed pro se. 65 The trial judge attempted to satisfy the defendants demands for right to counsel by appointing first joint then separate counsel, by appointing advisory counsel and by retaining appointed counsel as standby counsel. At the same time, the trial judge attempted to accommodate their requests to proceed pro se by allowing them pro se status at the first trial date of April 23rd, by taking another waiver of counsel at the September 9th hearing (which the majority cites) and finally by offering them the opportunity to gain the discovery they wanted at the September 30th hearing. 66 All along, the judge recognized that the defendants did not want to proceed pro se. What they wanted, and apparently what they did, was to put error on the record for appeal, no matter how the judge ruled. In fact, the paragraph of the transcript which proceeds the September 9th waiver cited by the majority, the trial judge states:I know what you are doing with respect to the record. You are trying to fuzz it up so that either way the court rules you can complain to the appellate courts. I will just make the best decision I can and then we will try the case and see what happens. 67 [Tr. at 155] Later, when he revoked their pro se status during the September 30th hearing (a week before the third trial date), he reiterates this observation: 68 Based upon your conduct to date in this case I still entertain the strong suspicion that you are really trying to foul up the record of the proceedings in this court so that you have a basis for appeal. 69 That's what it looks like to me with all of the things that you have said and all of the affidavits that you have filed. 70 I remember your motion to disqualify this court to Judge Keller recited that you were denied counsel and an ineffective waiver of your right to counsel had been taken and you desperately need counsel; and then when I brought you in here and asked you about that, even though you signed those affidavits, you said, Well, somebody else at the Terminal Island wrote those. That didn't really express our opinion. ... 71 Well, you have had four attorneys and you are not satisfied with any of them so--... I am going to find that you are incapable of effectively representing yourselves. You are bright individuals. I don't know if it is the complexity of the case or whether you are, as I suspect, maybe attempting to make a record that will bring a successful appeal. 72 But I am going to rule that you are not capable of further self-representation. I am going to terminate your representation of yourselves, and I am going to reappoint standby counsel. 73 [Tr. at 197-98]. (Emphasis added.) Whether or not the judge took a valid waiver April 23rd or September 9th is irrelevant in the context of the chain of events that lead to the judge's conclusion that the defendants were trying to put error on the record, and never meant to assert their right to proceed pro se. There is no magic moment in these pre-trial proceedings at which we can say, that defendants never really wanted counsel (which they requested and received at least four separate times) or that defendants unequivocally demanded to proceed pro se, which they asserted, then denied then reasserted, all the while in the same breath denouncing their counsel. What the trial judge sensed by their actions in hiring and firing counsel and from what they had said in their motions was that they were trying to put error on the record for appeal. See United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir.1981) (Romero was following the scenario used by other tax protestors in discharging appointed counsel and then contending unknowing waiver of counsel.); Meeks, 482 F.2d at 467. The court did not err under these circumstances in finding defendants incapable of representing themselves.