Opinion ID: 1886434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lancaster

Text: As noted, Lancaster's only argument is that there was insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of armed robbery. He focuses his challenge on the sufficiency of the identification evidence to link him to the crime. We find no merit to his challenge. In considering sufficiency of the evidence when identification is at issue, we must focus on the reliability of the identification. If, as here, there was only one eyewitness to the crime, the test is whether a reasonable person could find the identification convincing beyond a reasonable doubt, given the surrounding circumstances. Beatty v. United States, 544 A.2d 699, 701 (D.C.1988), citing Malloy v. United States, 483 A.2d 678 (D.C.1984); Smith v. United States, 389 A.2d 1356 (D.C.1978). And we of course view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, and making no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005), quoting Gathy v. United States, 754 A.2d 912, 917 (D.C. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). In Beatty, we examined the reliability of a one-eyewitness identification by looking at several factors deemed probative of the witness's ability to make a meaningful identification. We took into account the witness's opportunity to observe and the length of time of the observations, the lighting conditions, the length of time between the observations and the identification, the stimuli operating on the witness at the time of the observation, and the degree of certainty expressed by the witness in making the identification. 544 A.2d at 701. In this case, Greene was able to observe Lancaster and the other robbers at close range during the robbery and he saw the men pull out their guns. Although there was no trial testimony about the lighting conditions in the apartment, Greene described the apartment as open and testified that there were no doors on the closet into which he was pushed. Greene was able to describe Lancaster's build, complexion, and clothing when he gave an account of the robbery to police about thirty minutes after the robbery took place. Greene did acknowledge that he was jittery during the robbery, and that he was losing it, but he testified that he was able to observe Lancaster and described not only the way Lancaster loaded his gun and pointed it at Greene's head, but also the types of guns each robber used. Finally, Greene expressed no uncertainty when identifying Lancaster on the street later the same night of the robbery. As he rode by in the unmarked police car, Greene pointed out Lancaster and said, Well, that's the gentleman right there. Later the same evening, Greene identified Lancaster on the street. Based on these facts, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could convict Lancaster of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. As we held in Hill v. United States, 541 A.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C.1988), the identification testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient to sustain a conviction and, as was the case in Hill, we find nothing in Greene's testimony or the circumstances surrounding the robbery that render Greene's identification of Lancaster so unreliable that the case should not have gone to the jury. Id. Given Greene's opportunity to observe Lancaster during the robbery and the description Greene gave of Lancaster to the police, we find there was sufficient evidence of Lancaster's identity. The trial court's denial of Lancaster's motion for judgment of acquittal was correct.