Opinion ID: 278155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kemp's Violations

Text: 23 Turning from Makela to Kemp, we first consider the objections to the Board's finding that Kemp violated section 8(a) (5) and (1) by refusing to comply with the union's September 16 bargaining request. Kemp contends that the record contains no proof of the union's majority status at the time of the bargaining request. The Board's finding, however, was based on the theory that since Kemp's business operation was essentially the same as that of Makela, Makela's duty to bargain with the union would devolve upon Kemp. It has frequently been held that a mere change in ownership of a business is insufficient to alter a union's status as bargaining representative. N.L.R.B. v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1939); N.L.R.B. v. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1964); N.L.R.B. v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962); N.L.R.B. v. Auto Ventshade Corp., 276 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960); N.L.R.B. v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1954); N.L.R.B. v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952). If, because of essential similarity of operations, Kemp can properly be regarded as Makela's successor, the absence of proof of majority status at the time of the bargaining demand would not necessarily undermine the Board's finding. N.L.R.B. v. Lunder Shoe Corp., supra. The successor can, of course, offer reasonable grounds for believing that the union has lost its majority status. N.L. R.B. v. Downtown Bakery Corp., supra. Here, however, Kemp has made no attempt to do so. 24 The facts in this case amply support the conclusion that Kemp's business operation is essentially the same as that of Makela. Kemp is using Makela's former plant and equipment, and is filling orders for Makela's principal customer. Kemppainen and Sarri supervise the work of Kemp, as they had done for Makela. Kemp has assumed the accounts receivable of Makela, as well as certain of Makela's financial obligations. The majority of Kemp's employees had formerly been employees of Makela, and although Kemp's work force has been smaller than that of Makela, this factor alone would not preclude continued representation by the union. N.L.R.B. v. Armato, supra. 25 Kemp argues further that even if its business operations are essentially the same as those of Makela, it is not obligated to bargain with the union because the union was never certified following a Board-supervised election. It is true that most of the cases holding a successor employer to be obligated to bargain with the representative of its predecessor's employees involved a certified union, although our decision in N.L.R.B. v. Colten, supra, did not. Moreover, we have often observed that the determination of a union's majority status by authorization cards rather than by an election is a process of questionable reliability. E. g., People's Service Drug Stores, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 375 F.2d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 1967). On the facts of this case, however, we do not find that the absence of an election is sufficient reason to excuse Kemp from the obligation to bargain with the union. The time between the bargaining request directed to Makela (July 13) and that directed to Kemp (September 16) was relatively short and the record is devoid of evidence which would suggest that union representation was not desired by a majority of Kemp employees on the latter date. Finally, Kemppainen's admitted knowledge of the union's majority status at the time of the earlier request precludes any argument that union representation of Kemp employees would impose an unexpected or unjustifiable burden on that corporation. 26 Kemp objects to the Board's finding that it violated section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally increasing wages on the ground that it had no obligation to bargain with the union and on the further ground that no bargaining request was made until September 16, after many of the increases had already taken effect. We have already rejected Kemp's contention that it was under no obligation to bargain with the union. The record indicates that some wage increases were instituted after September 16, and at least with regard to those increases, the Board was correct in finding violations of section 8(a) (5) and (1). With regard to increases given prior to September 16, the absence of a bargaining request precludes a finding that 8(a) (5) has been violated but nevertheless permits a finding that there has been a violation of 8(a) (1). N.L.R.B. v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 189 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1951); Zall v. N.L.R.B., 202 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1953). But see Overnite Transportation Co. v. N.L.R.B., 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1967) (both sections violated). Although the Board's conclusion that each of Kemp's unilateral increases violated both sections of the Act may have been in error, no modification of the Board's order is called for, since the Board proposed no remedy for the 8(a) (5) violation based on unilateral wage increases over and above that proposed for the 8(a) (5) violation committed by Kemp in refusing to recognize the union on September 16. 27