Opinion ID: 793980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Award for Pain and Suffering

Text: 57 The defendants submit that the jury's award of $240,000 for pain and suffering is excessive and not in line with comparable cases. The district court denied the defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial on this ground. The court applied the federal standard for review of compensatory damages, asking whether the award is monstrously excessive; whether there is no rational connection between the award and the evidence, indicating that it is merely a product of the jury's fevered imaginings or personal vendettas; and whether the award is roughly comparable to awards made in similar cases. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1285 (7th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). The court held that the award was not monstrously excessive and that the defendants had failed to establish that such an award was out of line with comparable cases. R.208 at 3-4. 58 Because Ms. Naeem was awarded damages solely on her state-law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Illinois law governs review of that award. Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 106 F.3d 1388, 1397 (7th Cir. 1997). That conclusion is mandated by Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996), in which the Supreme Court held that a federal district court must defer to state standards of review of damages for state law claims because Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), precludes a recovery in federal court significantly larger than the recovery that would have been tolerated in state court. A federal appellate court must review the district court's determination only for abuse of discretion. Id. at 438, 116 S.Ct. 2211. 59 Under Illinois law, the evidence need only tend to show a basis for the computation of damages with a fair degree of probability. Medcom Holding Co., 106 F.3d at 1398 (citation omitted). A damages award will not be subject to remittitur if it falls within the flexible range of conclusions which can be reasonably supported by facts because the assessment of damages is primarily an issue of fact for jury determination. Id. (citations omitted). Illinois courts, in applying this standard, have traditionally declined to make... comparisons [with amounts awarded in other cases] in determining whether a particular award is excessive. Richardson v. Chapman, 175 Ill.2d 98, 221 Ill.Dec. 818, 676 N.E.2d 621, 628 (1997) (citing cases); see also Tierney v. Cmty. Mem'l Gen. Hosp., 268 Ill.App.3d 1050, 206 Ill.Dec. 279, 645 N.E.2d 284, 294 (1994) (holding that [w]ith regard to defendants' arguments that the jury's verdict should be compared to other similar awards and thereby found to be excessive, this is simply not the law in Illinois) (citing cases). 60 In this case, the district court failed to apply the Illinois standard for review of damages. It compared the award to Ms. Naeem with awards to other plaintiffs in other cases in the Seventh Circuit and other federal courts around the nation. Although making such comparisons is the federal standard for review of compensatory damages, it is not the established methodology employed by Illinois courts. By using such a standard, a district court may allow a larger recovery than would be allowable under Illinois law, or, conversely, it may preclude an award that would be allowable under Illinois law. Gasperini prohibits such a result. 518 U.S. at 431, 116 S.Ct. 2211. Indeed, Gasperini stresses that substantial differences between federal and state court damage awards may result if the federal court does not apply state standards. See id. at 430-31, 116 S.Ct. 2211. The possibility of such differences is even more pronounced in this case because the district court compared the damage awards to cases outside the state of Illinois and even outside the Seventh Circuit. Therefore, we must conclude that, in employing this methodology, the district court committed error. However, after a review under the correct Illinois standards, we must conclude that the district court's error was harmless. 61 In reviewing damage awards, Illinois courts give great deference to the jury. Illinois law makes clear that it is the jury's function to consider the credibility of witnesses and to determine an appropriate award of damages. Richardson, 221 Ill.Dec. 818, 676 N.E.2d at 628. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Illinois has stated that an award of damages will be deemed excessive if it falls outside the range of fair and reasonable compensation or results from passion or prejudice, or if it is so large that it shocks the judicial conscience. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, et al., 179 Ill.2d 367, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1079 (1997) (citations omitted). In this case, Ms. Naeem presented evidence of her pain and suffering, including: testimony from family members about her emotional state and diminished capabilities, testimony from her psychiatrist and her own testimony regarding her emotional state while employed at McKesson and after her termination. The jury had ample evidence to form the basis of their award of $240,000, and we cannot say that such an award shocks the conscience. See id.