Opinion ID: 2822106
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Amount of Grandparent Visitation Awarded

Text: Indiana has enacted legislation which recognizes that “a child’s best interest is often served by developing and maintaining contact with his or her grandparents.” K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 462 (quoting Swartz v. Swartz, 720 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). Yet, neither the Grandparent Visitation Act5 nor this Court has specifically set a standard for determining what amount of visitation is appropriate for a trial court to award, after it has been determined that courtordered visitation is merited.6 This Court has stated that “[t]he Grandparent Visitation Act contemplates only occasional, temporary visitation that does not substantially infringe on a parent’s fundamental right to control the upbringing, education, and religious training of their children.” K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 462 (internal citations and quotations omitted). This pronouncement recognizes that while parents have a constitutional liberty interest in the upbringing of their child(ren), Grandparents are not afforded the same legal rights as parents and do not have a constitutional liberty interest with their grandchildren. See Id. at 462. This broad constitutional protection does not require, nor do we think it would be wise to set, a strict guideline for grandparent visitation. Similarly, we do not read this constitutional protection to require crafting visitation schedules that in no way resemble visitation under the Parenting Time Guidelines, even though sole reliance upon the Guidelines is 5 Ind. Code §§ 31-17-5-1, -10 (2014). 6 “When a trial court enters a decree granting or denying grandparent visitation, it is required to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law,” and those findings and conclusions must address the four McCune factors. K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 462 (citing McCune v. Frey, 783 N.E.2d 752, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). We summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals analysis which held that court-ordered visitation was proper in this case, and we now only address what amount of visitation can be ordered. 8 impermissible.7 See Id. at 461-62. Rather, we continue to give substantial deference to the trial court’s determination of family law matters. See Kirk, 770 N.E.2d at 307. We also remain confident in the ability of our courts to determine when grandparent visitation would substantially infringe upon the custodial parent’s constitutional right to guide the upbringing of their child. See e.g. Hoeing v. Williams, 880 N.E.2d 1217, 1221-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (determining awarded visitation impermissibily impeded Mother’s ability to direct child’s religious upbringing). However, we reiterate that grandparent visitation is not to be confused with the rights of the custodial parent. The rights of grandparents to seek visitation is not rooted in common law, but is a product of legislation. See In Re Visitation of M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d 583, 585 (Ind. 2013). The Indiana legislature did not even pass a law allowing for grandparent visitation until 1982. See Ind. Code § 31-1-11.7-1, -8 (1982). Despite grandparents having some recognized right to visitation, the “natural parents have a fundamental constitutional right to direct their children’s upbringing without undue governmental interference . . . .” In Re Visitation of M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d at 586. Under the Grandparent Visitation Act, the trial court has authority to order visitation and set the amount of visitation, but nowhere within that legislation has the court been permitted to award grandparents the right to determine the child’s upbringing. See Ind. Code §§ 31-17-5-1, - 10. Even in cases involving parenting time of a non-custodial parent, Indiana courts have recognized that the custodial parent’s right to direct the child’s upbringing is “paramount” to the non-custodial parent’s right to visitation, as long as interference with the non-custodial parent’s visitation is reasonable. A.G.R. ex rel. Conflenti v. Huff, 815 N.E.2d 120, 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 7 We note the potential difficultly that would be imposed upon trial courts if we were to hold that grandparent visitation could not even resemble visitation that may be awarded under the Parenting Time Guidelines. It is likely that grandparents and children alike would want visitation to occur on birthdays, holidays, and when the child is on breaks from school, just as non-custodial parents would prefer. We decline to impose an unworkable standard that would require courts to fashion arbitrary visitation schedules in order to avoid the risk of the schedule looking too similar to the Parenting Time Guidelines. 9 2004); See also Periquet-Febres v. Febres, 659 N.E.2d 602, 606 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Likewise, in the case of grandparent visitation, the custodial parent’s right to direct the upbringing of the child remains paramount. In light of this understanding regarding the scope of grandparent visitation rights, we seek to address the specific issue presented in this case: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the amount of visitation that Grandparents were awarded? After examining this Court’s precedent, we do not find that the amount of visitation awarded in this case was an abuse of discretion under the Grandparent Visitation Act. In K.I., this Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting grandparents visitation in the context of a custody modification proceeding, and in awarding the amount of grandparent visitation pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. 903 N.E.2d at 462. Even though the case was a grandparent visitation dispute, “it was not litigated under the Grandparent Visitation Act.” Id. Rather, the trial court treated the case as a custody modification, and visitation was ordered pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Id. After considering that the Parenting Time Guidelines repeatedly reference only parents, this Court suggested that the Parenting Time Guidelines “have no mandatory application to grandparent visitation disputes.” Id. at 461 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court provided no specific standard for determining the proper amount of visitation, but only concluded that the Court could not treat grandparent visitation as a custody modification and solely rely on the Parenting Time Guidelines in setting a visitation schedule. In the present case, it is not disputed that the trial court properly relied upon the Grandparent Visitation Act when it ordered visitation and set the amount of visitation. We recognize that the Court of Appeals expressed the concern that the trial court’s order was “very similar to the parenting time schedule a non-custodial parent would have.” In Re Visitation of L- A.D.W., 24 N.E.3d at 515. However, the present case is unlike K.I., where the trial court explicitly relied upon the Parenting Time Guidelines in granting the amount of visitation. Here, the Court 10 of Appeals only determined that the ordered visitation appeared similar to a parenting time schedule. We are not persuaded that similarity alone would require finding an abuse of discretion. Nor are we persuaded that cases from our Court of Appeals support finding an abuse of discretion. The holdings from the few prior cases that have specifically addressed the amount of grandparent visitation appear to have been case specific. As such, we glean from these cases that abuse of discretion is best determined upon the specific circumstances of each case. The brief analysis of the two cases below demonstrates the fact-sensitive nature of grandparent visitation. In Swartz, the mother had been the child’s primary caregiver due to the father’s military career. 720 N.E.2d at 1220-21. After the parents dissolved their marriage, the mother disputed the amount of grandparent visitation that had been awarded to the paternal grandparents. Id. at 1221. The Court of Appeals considered a variety of factors in determining that the awarded amount of visitation was not in the child’s best interest. Id. at 1222-23. The case-specific circumstances which persuaded the court included: 1) under the order, the child would be living among four different household on alternating weekends, running counter to the goal of “stability” for the child; 2) the order prohibited the mother from involving the child in any activities that would take place on the grandparents’ weekends without the mother first receiving permission; 3) having the child live outside the home seventy-three days per year would alter the close, healthy, and loving relationship the child had with the mother;8 4) the father at any time may also decide to exercise his own visitation rights, which could even further increase the amount of time the child would be shuttled from one home to the next; and 5) the ordered visitation was unnecessary 8 As in the present case, we note that the court in Swartz considered the total number of days that the grandparents were awarded visitation. We do not seek to imply that the number of days awarded is not a relevant factor in assessing the appropriate amount of grandparent visitation. Rather, we only seek to emphasize, as the Court of Appeals does in Swartz, the number of days awarded is only one fact to be considered in light of all of the circumstances. 11 where mother had never denied the grandparents access to the child and all the parties had a good relationship. Id. at 1222. The court recognized that awarding extensive overnight visits, when grandparents had never previously been permitted to keep the child overnight and mother otherwise granted unlimited, unsupervised visitation, effectively gave grandparents the rights of a parent. Id. at 1221-1223. In Hoeing, the trial court specifically ordered reasonable grandparent visitation, and determined that if the “parties cannot agree to a visitation schedule, the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines shall apply [except for midweek].” 880 N.E.2d at 1220 (footnote omitted).9 The Court of Appeals explained that the grandparents had not filed an appellee’s brief in response to mother’s appeal, requiring the mother to only have to demonstrate prima facie error. Id. at 1221. Due to that, the court concluded that granting visitation rights equivalent to those of a non-custodial parent was sufficient to establish prima facie error. Id. Yet even more significantly, the mother was a Jehovah’s Witness and wanted to limit visitation in accordance with her religious beliefs against celebrating Christmas and other holidays. Id. at 1222. The court explained that the grandparents had “no statutory authority to ask the court to limit the custodial parent’s right to raise that child as the parent sees fit.” Id. Although the trial court discussed that the schedule was similar to that of a non-custodial parent, this was not the sole standard the court relied upon when determining that the ordered visitation was inappropriate. In the present case, the trial court considered the extensive role that Grandparents played in L-A’s life from the time she was born, which far exceeded the “traditional” role of a grandparent. While living in Mother and Father’s home, Grandparents largely carried out parental duties, such 9 It would appear that now this order would be an obvious abuse of discretion since this Court’s opinion in K.I. determined that the Parenting Time Guidelines alone cannot be used to establish a grandparent visitation schedule. 12 as cooking meals, doing L-A’s laundry, taking L-A to and from school, helping with homework, reading to L-A before she went to sleep, and attending L-A’s extracurricular activities. All on a daily basis. After Mother’s death, Grandparents still never missed L-A’s extracurricular activities. Now, Grandparents also serve as one of L-A’s only connections to her deceased Mother. Even though it is not disputed that since Mother’s death, Father has spent more time with L-A and developed a closer relationship with her, Grandparents were heavily involved in raising L-A up until that point. Thus, it is reasonable that the trial court would view a more involved visitation schedule as appropriate for this family. Furthermore, the record indicates that the trial court attempted to follow the visitation schedule that Ellsworth had recommended, and both parties had arguably agreed to previously.10 Only minor differences can be seen between the schedule recommended by Ellsworth and that ordered by the trial court. For example, during the proceedings Grandmother expressed that she would like to see L-A on her own birthday. The trial court’s order reflects this request and grants visitation for four hours on each of the Grandparents’ birthdays. The trial court also increased the amount of time L-A would spend with Grandparents on Mother’s birthday from four hours to eight hours. In addition, the trial court specified that weekend visitation should fall on Father’s on-call weekends, seemingly in an attempt to not impede upon time that Father could be with L-A. Given the uniqueness that pervades different family units, strict standards on the amount of permissible visitation under the Grandparent Visitation Act would be difficult to craft. As such, 10 We recognize that this recommended schedule was only Ellsworth’s preliminary recommendation in order to help L-A transition into the primary care of her Father. It was within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether a similar schedule was still in L-A’s best interest. Moreover, as discussed in greater detail below, we are also mindful that extensive visitation may not always be in L-A’s best interest as she matures and develops a closer relationship with Father. 13 trial courts should be able to consider the various circumstances presented in each individual case to determine what is in the child’s best interest. Moreover, the current order on visitation is not permanent. The Grandparent Visitation Act contemplates that the best interest of the child may change over time. Under Indiana Code § 31-17-5-7, “[t]he court may modify an order granting or denying visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child.” While a more extensive visitation schedule may be warranted when a child is younger and requires greater supervision, as a child matures, his or her increased involvement in academics, extracurricular activities, friends, hobbies, and jobs may warrant a more modest visitation schedule. See e.g. In Re Guardianship of K.T., 743 N.E.2d 348, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (after considering variety of individuals that loved child and wanted to be part of her life, in addition to “changed circumstances since the original visitation order was entered,” no abuse of discretion when the court “determined that it would be appropriate to reduce [child’s] court-ordered visitation with [Grandparents]”). Thus, while the awarded visitation in the present case may be appropriate given L-A’s age and the extensive role Grandparents have played in her life, as she becomes more involved in other activities and develops a closer relationship with Father, modification may be warranted.