Opinion ID: 3037393
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: to any labor organization,[5] or any

Text: officer or employee thereof, which repre- sents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of the employees of such employer who are employed in an industry affecting commerce . . . . 29 U.S.C. § 186(a). This general prohibition is not applicable, however, “with respect to money or other thing of value paid by any employer to a trust fund established by such representative for the purpose of . . . defraying costs of apprenticeship or other training programs.” Id. § 186(c)(6). Thus, while an employer may not pay any money directly to a labor organization or other employee representative, an employer may con- 5 A “labor organization” is defined by 29 U.S.C. § 152(5), which provides: The term “labor organization” means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. 5570 OREGON COLUMBIA BRICK MASONS v. GARDNER tribute to an apprenticeship trust fund established by such an organization or representative. If a trust fund is established to comply with the LMRA, then ERISA governs the implementation and governance of that fund. See Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 326. In general, the purpose of § 302(a) of the LMRA is to prevent “corruption of collective bargaining through bribery of employee representatives by employers, . . . extortion by employee representatives, and . . . the possible abuse by union officers of the power which they might achieve if welfare funds were left to their sole control.” Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1959). Its coverage extends not just to official bargaining representatives but to “any person authorized by the employees to act for them in dealing with their employers.” United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299, 302 (1956). [4] The appellants maintain that to comply with the LMRA, any approved Oregon apprenticeship training committee must establish a trust fund to defray the costs of apprenticeship training, even if its employee members are not members of collective bargaining units or traditional labor organizations. They point to no evidence, however, that any Oregon apprenticeship training committees not involving union representatives have in fact established LMRA trust funds, and we know from the record that at least sixty-one Oregon joint apprenticeships have not. We seriously doubt the viability of the appellants’ LMRA argument. The LMRA’s core purpose is to prevent corruption of employee representatives who are chosen by, and have a statutory duty to represent the interests of, other employees. Although the apprenticeship training committees that include collective bargaining representatives clearly fall within the definition of “labor organization” set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 152(5), those committees on which the employee representatives are not collective bargaining representatives do not. Employee representatives on committees that do not involve OREGON COLUMBIA BRICK MASONS v. GARDNER 5571 a collective bargaining agreement must only “be or have been a skilled practitioner in the particular trade or occupation that is the subject of the apprenticeship or training program administered by the local joint committee.” OR. REV. STAT. § 660.135(5) (emphasis added); see also OR. ADMIN. R. 839011-0074(1)(a)(B). Moreover, employee representatives need not be employees, and are chosen by the Council, not the employees themselves.6 See OR. ADMIN. R. 839-011-0074. The local joint committees, consequently, are not necessarily “organization[s] . . . in which employees participate,” 29 U.S.C. § 152(5), because none of its members need be “employees,” and employees do not “participate” in the sense that they select the members of the committees. Further, such committees do not raise the concern of corrupting the discharge of duties by employee representatives selected under the processes of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158, that is at the core of LMRA § 302. [5] In sum, whether a government-mandated committee composed of government appointed individuals is a “labor organization” for purposes of the LMRA is at least highly debatable. In any event, there is no reason in this ERISA preemption case to decide an entirely hypothetical question concerning a separate statute, the LMRA. If the operation of some or all of the unfunded plans in Oregon is illegal under the LMRA, that is a matter for LMRA enforcement. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(d)-(e) (providing for criminal penalties and injunctive relief). Nothing in Dillingham suggests that its approach to the preemption question depends on the validity of funded or unfunded plans on independent legal grounds. Instead, after observing in passing that § 302(c)(6) of the LMRA requires a separate fund for joint apprenticeship com- 6 The employers may nominate individuals to the committees, see OR. ADMIN. R. 839-011-0074(1)(a)(A), but the Council can disapprove nominees, see OR. ADMIN. R. 839-011-0074(1)(d). Also, if no individuals are nominated, “the Apprenticeship Representatives for the area may recommend members.” OR. ADMIN. R. 839-011-0074(3). 5572 OREGON COLUMBIA BRICK MASONS v. GARDNER mittees, Dillingham went on to identify “[t]he existence of that fund” — not whether the LMRA might be read to require the existence of a fund that in actuality does not exist — as the circumstance that “triggers ERISA coverage.” 519 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added). The Court in Dillingham stated with emphasis that “an employee benefit program not funded through a separate fund is not an ERISA plan,” once again concerning itself with on-the-ground actualities, not with disputed legalities. Id. As noted above, the record indicates that not all of Oregon’s apprentice training committees maintain trust funds: “[A]t least 68 [committees] are supported by a joint training trust fund. . . . [A]t least 61 . . . [committees] do not use a joint training trust fund, but are supported either directly by the participating employer or employers or have made contractual arrangement for the operation of their programs.” The statute and regulations governing Oregon’s needs requirement do not distinguish between funded and unfunded plans, but apply to all apprenticeship programs presented for approval. Thus, Oregon is “indifferent” to the outcome of the legal dispute between the parties as to whether § 302 of the LMRA does or does not require that the apprenticeship plans governed by the state-mandated local joint committees be funded. Either way, the Oregon statutory requirements will be the same. [6] Given the Oregon statutory and regulatory language and the record in this case, the Oregon statutory scheme cannot be said to “refer to” ERISA plans. Rather, as in Nunn, “there is no specific provision that makes ERISA plans essential to its operation or that acts immediately or exclusively upon ERISA plans.” 356 F.3d at 984. And, as in Dillingham, the Oregon statutes and regulations are “indifferent to the funding, and attendant ERISA coverage, of apprenticeship programs.” 519 U.S. at 328. [7] We conclude that Oregon’s needs requirement does not “refer to” ERISA plans. OREGON COLUMBIA BRICK MASONS v. GARDNER 5573