Opinion ID: 2551439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Disclose Bail Inducement

Text: The applicant next argues that the state failed to reveal the withdrawal of its objection to Ms. Holman's release on bail, in exchange for her testimony at his bail hearing and trial, and that this undisclosed inducement violated the obligation of full disclosure set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The applicant contends that the evidence he presented clearly and convincingly establishes that the state had a quid pro quo agreement to withdraw its objection to Ms. Holman's bail in return for her testimony at applicant's bail hearing and trial; he further contends that the nondisclosure of this agreement prevented [him] from establishing [Ms.] Holman's freedom on bail/liberty inducement to the jury. He insists that the magistrate was clearly wrong in finding that no evidence of such an agreement existed. He further asserts that the August 7, 1997 cooperation agreement does not disclose this agreement to withdraw the objection to bail and that the magistrate's alternative finding that it was included in the cooperation agreement was both contradictory and clearly wrong. In accordance with Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, this Court has recognized that if a prosecutor has suppressed evidence that would be favorable to the accused and the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, the defendant's due-process rights have been violated and a new trial must be granted. State v. McManus, 941 A.2d 222, 229-30 (R.I. 2008). In the case of an inadvertent nondisclosure, however, Brady is not implicated. McManus, 941 A.2d at 230. When this occurs, we need consider only whether there was procedural prejudice to the opposing party. Id. To demonstrate sufficient prejudice, a defendant must show there is a significant chance that the use and development of the withheld evidence by skilled counsel at trial would have produced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction. Id. (quoting State v. Brisson, 619 A.2d 1099, 1103 (R.I.1993)). Although we afford the magistrate's factual findings great deference, we believe it is necessary to disturb his findings here. In light of the affidavit of the former special assistant attorney general and the state's own verbal concession that she apparently did neglect to include the [s]tate's withdrawal of objection to bail in the cooperation agreement, we conclude that the magistrate erred in finding that there was no evidence of an agreement concerning Ms. Holman's bail release. Although applicant does not specifically articulate the remedy to which he claims entitlement, he refers us to our opinions in State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907 (R.I.1986), and State v. Evans, 668 A.2d 1256 (R.I. 1996). We observe, however, that unlike in Wyche, 518 A.2d at 910-11, where there was a purposeful withholding of information, there is nothing in the record of the instant case indicating that this was a deliberate nondisclosure. Rather, it appears to have been, at most, an inadvertent or negligent nondisclosure in contravention of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. [9] Thus, we need not consider due-process concerns as set forth in Brady. Our focus need only be on the extent of prejudice to applicant. See McManus, 941 A.2d at 230. We undertake this analysis mindful that applicant knew Ms. Holman had been released on bail after she agreed to cooperate with law enforcement. In examining prejudice, we acknowledge that in Evans, 668 A.2d at 1258-60, this Court did find negligent nondisclosures sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. Those nondisclosures, which were not revealed until midtrial, consisted of a complete failure to divulge any of the promises and inducements made to the primary witness as well as a failure to provide a complete criminal record of the witness. Id. In contrast, in this case, applicant was provided with the detailed cooperation agreement between Ms. Holman and the state, which he was able to present at trial and use to impeach Ms. Holman. Although the agreement failed to address the state's withdrawal of its objection to Ms. Holman's bail, this Court does not believe that the additional factor that she was released on bail because of her cooperation would have produced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction. See McManus, 941 A.2d at 230. In our opinion, this apparent inadvertent nondisclosure does not rise to the level of prejudice that would merit a new trial, and accordingly we affirm the magistrate's denial of postconviction relief on this issue.