Opinion ID: 3009545
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: survival statutes

Text: The question whether federal maritime law displaces state survival statutes in the context of recreational boaters killed in territorial waters need not detain us long. As we have explained above, there does not appear to be any substantive federal policy addressing survival actions for non-seamen. Although DOHSA does not contain a survival provision, its absence does not show that Congress expressed an affirmative indication of an intent to preclude, see Moragne, 398 U.S. at 393, 90 S. Ct. at 1784, state survival statutes from operating in territorial waters for, as Tallentire tells us, Congress specifically limited the reach of DOHSA `so as to prevent the Act from abrogating by its own force the state remedies then available in state waters.' Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 224, 106 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 621-22, 98 S. Ct. at 2013).28 28 Indeed, as we have mentioned, Tallentire left open the question whether state survival statutes could provide a rule of decision even for death on the high seas. See also Miles, 498 U.S. at 34 n.2, 111 S. Ct. at 326-27 n.2; Dugas v. National Moreover, although Moragne does not recognize a survival action, we do not believe that the Court's post-Moragne case law reflects any intent to preclude survival actions based on state law. Quite the contrary, in its discussion of the possible existence of a general maritime survival remedy in Miles, the Court seemed to endorse (or at least not preclude) the practice of applying state survival statutes for deaths occurring within territorial waters. See 498 U.S. at 33-34, 111 S. Ct. at 326. In light of this case law, we hold that federal admiralty law, as articulated both by statute and by the federal common law, does not preempt the application of state survival statutes for deaths of recreational boaters (non-seamen) within territorial waters.29 Such a holding, we believe, is the one most consistent with federal/state conflict of law principles, particularly the presumption against preemption. See supra at typescript Error! Bookmark not defined.. In our view, a holding Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that in lawsuit premised on DOHSA, Pennsylvania survival statute could be applied concurrently). And the Fifth Circuit has held, in the wake of the Gaudet, Higginbotham, Tallentire, and Miles quartet, that DOHSA does not preempt a general maritime survival action. Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540, 1543 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 430 (1991); Graham v. Milky Way Barge, 824 F.2d 376, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1987). 29 We have alternated in our discussion between the terms recreational boaters and non-seaman, and we mean to use the terms interchangeably. We do not mean to intimate that crew members of a racing yacht or some other non-recreational vessel should be treated differently than someone in Natalie Calhoun's position. The applicable remedy depends on whether such crew members fall within the Jones Act as seamen. contrary to the one we reach would require the conclusion that federal admiralty law conflicts with state law in an area where neither Congress nor admiralty law has provided any rule of decision. Such a holding would ignore traditional conflicts principles. We also believe that our result is not inconsistent with the holding in Miles that future earnings, one of the major components of survival damages, are not available to a Jones Act seaman. Unlike DOHSA, the Jones Act does provide for a survival action, and under the Jones Act, recovery on a survival action is limited to losses suffered during the decedent's lifetime. See 45 U.S.C.A. § 59 (1986); Miles, 498 U.S. at 35, 111 S. Ct. at 327. As Miles recognized, Congress made the decision in the Jones Act to place a limit on a seaman's recovery, and hence the Supreme Court should not disregard Congress' ordered system of recovery, id. at 36, 111 S. Ct. at 328, by supplementing recovery, even if forceful policy arguments favored recovery of future earnings, id. at 35-36, 111 S. Ct. at 327 (There are indeed strong policy arguments for allowing [recovery of future earnings].). But the Jones Act applies only to seamen. And Yamaha has not demonstrated that Congress intended the limitation on damages in the Jones Act to extend beyond seamen. By its terms, the act is strictly limited to a certain class of plaintiffs. We believe that a state statute allowing recovery of future earnings would not be plainly inconsistent with the federal law, nor would it frustrate Congress' scheme of compensation for seamen, when it is applied to people who fall outside the scope of the congressionally mandated recovery scheme for maritime injuries and death.30 See also Garner v. Dravo Basic Materials Co., 768 F. Supp. 192, 195 (S.D. W. Va. 1991) (holding that Miles does not preclude loss of future earnings in death of a non-seaman because Jones Act does not extend to non-seamen).31 In sum, we hold that 30 The Second Circuit has stated that the Court's language in Miles did not limit its holding to Jones Act seamen. See Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus. Inc., 4 F.3d 1084, 1093 (2d Cir. 1993). The Second Circuit reached this conclusion by stating: The Court's analysis relied heavily upon the decedent's status as a seaman and the resultant applicability of the Jones Act, but the announced conclusion of its opinion (unlike the companion ruling as to loss of society) was not confined to seamen. Id. (internal citation omitted). However, the language from the conclusion in Miles -- We . . . hold that a general maritime survival action cannot include recovery for decedent's lost future earnings, 498 U.S. at 37, 111 S. Ct. at 328 -- clearly referenced the particular decedent involved in that case. The language did not say a decedent or any decedent. It simply said decedent. We believe that the Second Circuit's reading of the conclusion is not compelled by the language, and given that such a reading ignores the Court's rationale for denying future earnings, we decline to follow it. See also Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (criticizing Wahlstrom and declining to follow its denial of loss-of-society damages to nondependent parents). 31 Even assuming that the Miles holding extends beyond seamen, we are not sure that its rule against future earnings would extend to deny recovery of such earnings in the case at bar. The rule denying lost future earnings, implied from the exclusivity of the Jones Act, presupposes that the decedent had a livelihood and that his dependents would be entitled to damages for loss of support under the wrongful death provision. Apparently, the Jones Act denies recovery of lost future earnings only because, as Miles explained: Recovery of lost future earnings in a survival suit will, in many instances, be duplicative of recovery by general maritime law does not preempt state law survival statutes in survival actions based on the death of a nonseaman in territorial waters, and that such statutes consequently govern the instant case. We turn therefore to the question whether the federal maritime law displaces state wrongful death remedies.