Opinion ID: 765406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Loss of Future Earnings

Text: 22 Reed also tendered IPI 30.07, which instructs the jury that a plaintiff may be entitled to earnings reasonably certain to be lost in the future as a result of the defendant's negligence as a separate element of damages. The district court also refused to give this instruction. The loss of future earnings as a separate element of damages compensates a plaintiff for the impairment of his future earning capacity. LaFever v. Kemlite Co. a Div. of Dryotech Industries, Inc., 706 N.E.2d 441, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). It is calculated by deducting what the plaintiff is capable of earning after his injury from the amount he would have been capable of earning but for his injury. Id. To be entitled to an instruction for the loss of future earnings, there must be reasonably certain proof that such a loss will occur. Brown v. Chicago and North Western Transp. Co., 516 N.E.2d 320, 327-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). All that is needed is some evidence in the record to justify the theory of the instruction. The mere fact that a plaintiff is earning the same amount, or even more, after the injury is not an adequate indication of earning power. Such information may be a factor, however, in helping the jury make its determination of the impairment of the plaintiff's ability to earn. Id. Illinois courts have held that the appearance of the plaintiff on the witness stand, his testimony as to the nature of his injuries and their duration is sufficient to take the question of impaired earning capacity to the jury. Antol v. Chavez- Pereda, 672 N.E.2d 320, 329 (1996) (quoting Patel v. Brown Mach. Co., 637 N.E.2d 491, 505 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)). 23 At trial, Reed testified that, at the end of 1996, his salary increased to $5.00 an hour (minimum wage at the time). He also testified that it has not gone down, but it has gone up each year, presumably in accordance with the minimum wage increases. In addition to his wage, he received overtime pay when warranted. He also testified that he planned to work at his current position until his boss passed away or no longer needed him. He said that, before the accident, he had plans to become a mechanic fixing farm machinery when no longer needed at Harris' ranch. According to Reed, he had done this type of work in the past, and earned the equivalent of $25.00 an hour for his work. 1 Because of his injuries, Reed does not think he will be able to fix farm machinery by himself, but he now thinks he will need a helper. 24 In addition to Reed's own testimony about his ability to work, all of the doctors testified that Reed would be able to work in some capacity, but disagreed about the extent of his abilities to perform physically. Dr. Raskas testified that Reed's injuries were permanent, and that his injuries would affect his employment because he would be precluded from performing heavy labor. Dr. Wayne testified that Reed would be able to return to his normal work duties, but that he would be limited in his ability to perform heavy labor. In addition to Reed's and the doctors' testimony, Vanbuskirk also testified about Reed's working abilities since the accident. Vanbuskirk, during cross examination, testified that Reed's duties and responsibilities have not changed significantly since the accident. However, Vanbuskirk did testify that there are certain jobs that Reed used to perform by himself which now require assistance. 25 In support of the district court's ruling not to instruct the jury about the loss of future earnings as a separate element of damages, Union Pacific relies heavily on Christou v. Arlington Park-Washington Park Race Tracks Corp., 432 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) and Wolkenhauer v. Smith, 822 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1987). In Christou, the plaintiff had been a bus-boy, but was unemployed at the time of his injury. Christou, 432 N.E.2d at 923. At trial, the plaintiff testified that he was training for a job as a bartender at the time he was injured, but, due to his injuries, he would be unable to perform that job. Id. He also said that his salary as a bartender would have been $200 to $250 dollars per week, but according to conversations he had had with other bartenders, he would have been making up to $450 per week by the time of the trial. Id. Furthermore, he testified that he had an ambition to own a restaurant one day. Id. At the trial, the court allowed testimonial evidence that the profitability of the average restaurant was $500 to $700 per week. Id. The appellate court, however, found that this evidence about the profitability of a restaurant was prejudicial to the defendant and should not have been admitted because it was too remote and speculative. Id. The appellate court reasoned that the plaintiff's desire to own a restaurant was merely an ambition which had never materialized and the jury should not have been permitted to consider such income as an item of decreased earning capacity. Id. The appellate court allowed the evidence that the plaintiff could have made up to $250 a week as a bartender, but his testimony that he could have made up to $450 a week as a bartender at the time of the trial was inadmissible speculation. Id. In light of the errors at trial, the appellate court ruled that a new trial on all of the issues was warranted. Id. 26 In Wolkenhauer, the district court ruled that any loss of future earnings was too speculative to be compensable. Wolkenhauer, 822 F.2d at 717. Although the plaintiff in that case was injured because of the negligence of the defendant, the court thought that there were too many other factors contributing to the plaintiff's decreased earning capacity aside from his injury, namely the bankruptcy of the trucking company for which he originally worked. Id. That case was a bench trial, and the issue of damages was left solely to the judge. 27 While merely speculative, remote, or uncertain evidence of loss of future earnings is not admissible, Christou, 432 N.E.2d at 923, evidence about what an injured plaintiff would have pursued but for his injuries is admissible so long as it is supported by competent evidence. See Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Air Illinois, Inc., 522 N.E.2d 146, 149 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). In this case, Reed testified that he planned to repair farm machinery when he was no longer needed by his current employer, and that repairing farm machinery would earn him significantly more money than he earns now. He claimed that he earned the equivalent of $25 an hour when he did this type of work, but it was possible to earn up to $35 an hour. Additionally, he said that he would now need a helper, whereas, before the accident, he had planned to pursue this occupation alone. There is medical testimony supporting the allegations that Reed's ability to perform heavy labor is now diminished because of his injuries. Arguably, this could affect his ability to fix farm machinery. Given that the district court allowed the evidence at trial as to what Reed had planned to do and the permanency of his injuries, it improperly took the decision away from the jury as to whether or not Reed was entitled to damages for the loss of future earnings. The evidence of decreased earning capacity may not be overwhelming, but [t]he quantum of proof necessary to prevail on a claim is different . . . from the measure of evidence needed to send an issue to the jury. LaFever, 706 N.E.2d at 455. Reed only needs to furnish some evidence to earn a jury instruction on the claim. Id. 28 This case is different from Christou in that Reed had repaired farm machinery in the past while the plaintiff in Christou was a bus-boy training to be a bartender and had absolutely no training in running a restaurant and had never tried opening one. There is a difference between a plaintiff's mere ambition to attain a goal and his ability to attain it. It would not have been irrational for the jury to conclude that Reed could have gone on to an occupation of repairing farm equipment but that his ability is now hampered by his injuries. We are not ruling on whether Reed is actually entitled to damages for loss of future earnings, and, indeed, it is a close call. However, the issue should have been left for the jury to decide. See Bernesak v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 409 N.E.2d 287, 294- 95 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (issue of lost earnings should have been decided by the jury and instruction on such should have been given). Reed did provide some evidence of the permanency of his injuries and that his future earning capacity could be diminished due to the injuries he sustained from the negligence of Union Pacific. The district court abused its discretion by not giving IPI 30.07.