Opinion ID: 2634522
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requisite of being a participant remains despite statutory definitions of performance of service and retirement pension

Text: Respondents nonetheless direct our attention to the statutory definition of the terms [r]etirement pension and performance of service, which they claim permit eligibility for members of fire departments who engage in solely administrative and clerical work. Retirement pension is statutorily defined as retirement payments for the performance of service, as provided under RCW 41.24.170, 41.24.172, 41.24.175, 41.24.180, and 41.24.185. RCW 41.24.010(12). [P]erformance of service broadly includes, inter alia,  any work in and about company quarters. RCW 41.24.010(5) (emphasis added). In addition, respondents further rely on RCW 41.24.020(2), which permits a fire district to allow[ ] any member of its fire department to enroll under the retirement pension provisions of the Act. (Emphasis added.) Thus, respondents argue, both are eligible to participate in the retirement pension provisions of the Act because they are members of their fire departments and their clerical and administrative duties qualify as any work in and about company headquarters. Both the definition of [r]etirement pension in RCW 41.24.010(12) and the language in RCW 41.24.020(2) referencing member[s] of its fire department were added in 1999. LAWS OF 1999, ch. 148, §§ 1-2. Section 2 of the 1999 act amended RCW 41.24.020(2) from permitting [a]ny municipal corporation... [to] make provision by appropriate legislation whereby any fire fighter may enroll under the pension provisions of this chapter, former RCW 41.24.020(2) (LAWS OF 1989, ch. 91, § 9) (emphasis added), to permitting [a]ny municipal corporation ... [to] make provision by appropriate legislation allowing any member of its fire department to enroll under the retirement pension provisions of this chapter. LAWS OF 1999, ch. 148, § 2(2) (codified at RCW 41.24.020(2)) (emphasis added). Isolating the new definition of [r]etirement pension in conjunction with section (2)'s amending language might lead one to conclude the legislature intended to expand the Act's reach to permit any member of a fire department, whether such person is a fire fighter, to be eligible for pension benefits. The existence of this alleged legislative intent is undercut by examining the remainder of the statutory definition of [r]etirement pension, which was added simultaneous to the provisions upon which respondents so heavily rely. Id. § 1(12). Though [r]etirement pension broadly includes retirement payments for the performance of service, the remainder of the statutory definition references RCW 41.24.170, 41.24.172, 41.24.175, 41.24.180, and 41.24.185 as the statutory sections for determining who is entitled to pension benefits and to how much benefit such person is entitled. RCW 41.24.010(12). These sections unequivocally limit pension eligibility to participant[s], a requisite the 1999 amendment did not alter. See RCW 41.24.170 (quoted supra ); RCW 41.24.172 (allowing participant to select from two options how he or she will be paid upon retirement); RCW 41.24.180 (directing local board of trustees to direct payment to a participant or select beneficiaries if participant is deceased). [7] RCW 41.24.170, the statutory provision at issue, is particularly instructive since it expressly requires the person be a participant in addition to being a member to earn eligibility for pension benefits. Membership in a fire department alone is therefore insufficient; rather the person must also be a fire fighter if that is the type of participant he or she claims to be. And to be a fire fighter, one must possess fire fighting duties. See supra Part I.A. As such we do not read any ambiguity in the Act to allow persons who do not possess fire fighting duties to be eligible for pension benefits. A court may look beyond a statute's language when it is ambiguous, meaning its text is susceptible to two or more interpretations, In re Sehome Park Ctr., Inc., 127 Wash.2d 774, 778, 903 P.2d 443 (1995), but a statute is not ambiguous simply because different interpretations are conceivable, Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash.2d 91, 105, 26 P.3d 257 (2001). Construing fire fighter to include a fire department's clerical and administrative personnel might be conceivable, but such construction runs afoul of a fire fighter['s] principal duty, which is to extinguish fires. Thus it is not reasonable to assume a secretary is a fire fighter merely because of membership in a fire department. [8] Finally respondents claim, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that adopting the Board's interpretation of the Act would wrongfully eliminate supervisory personnel and administrators whose activities are directly related to fire fighting but outside the realm of fire suppression. See Schrom, 117 Wash.App. at 550 n. 4, 72 P.3d 239; Resp'ts' Br. at 21-22. Respondents argue such a construction is absurd and therefore impermissible. See J.P., 149 Wash.2d at 450, 69 P.3d 318. This argument ignores the fact that pensions of supervisory fire district personnel are governed by the LEOFF Act. RCW 41.26.030(4)(c) (including supervisory fire fighter personnel within the definition of fire fighter under LEOFF Act); RCW 41.26.090, .430 (delineating retirement benefits for fire fighters under LEOFF Act). Excluding such persons from retirement benefits under chapter 41.24 RCW is not only outside the scope of absurdity but also is entirely logical. [9] In sum, the unambiguous dictionary definition of fire fighter controls our analysis and the conclusion we reach. City of Seattle v. Shepherd, 93 Wash.2d 861, 866, 613 P.2d 1158 (1980). A person claiming pension eligibility under chapter 41.24 RCW must possess fire fighting duties if he or she claims to be a fire fighter under the Act. [10]