Opinion ID: 4026373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mapdd intervention

Text: ¶25. Finally, Kinney claims that the chancery court erred in granting MAPDD’s motion to intervene. In Madison HMA, Inc. v. St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital, 35 So. 3d 1209, 1214-5 (¶¶14-17) (Miss. 2010), the Court clarified the standard of review regarding permissive intervention and intervention of right. First, permissive intervention receives an abuse-of-discretion review because the trial court “may permissively grant or deny a motion to intervene, provided there is a common question of law or fact and the motion was timely filed.” Id. at 1215 (¶16). However, intervention of right receives a de novo review because the Court is reviewing a question of law. Id. at (¶17). In the present case, the chancery court granted MAPDD’s motion to intervene as a matter of right; therefore, de novo review is appropriate. ¶26. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) provides that a party may be permitted to intervene as of right when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene or when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 15 Kinney claims on appeal that MAPDD did not have a legally protectable interest in Kinney’s suit and, even if it had an interest, MAPDD failed to show that the interest could not be represented adequately by the District. According to Kinney, his suit was “not directed at any aspect of MAPDD as an entity unto itself, and MAPDD “cannot show that its interest is such that MAPDD itself ‘will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.’” (quoting Defenders of Wildlife v. Jackson, 284 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2012)). Simply, even if the chancery court ruled in Kinney’s favor, he claims that “MAPDD would still be in a position in which it could continue to support both the [District] as well as the additional nine (9) planning and development districts represented by MAPDD.” Additionally, Kinney claims that MAPDD did not have an interest that was not adequately protected and represented by the District because there was no argument that a diversity of interests, collusion, or nonfeasance existed. See Bush v. Viterna, 740 F. 2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1984). In fact, Kinney claims that MAPDD failed to take any position contrary to or different from the District. ¶27. The party seeking intervention, particularly where intervention of right is claimed, should receive the benefit of the doubt. Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So. 2d 377, 385 (Miss. 1987) (citation omitted). The Court has outlined a four-prong test to analyze a party’s intervention of right: (1) he must make timely application, (2) he must have an interest in the subject matter of the action, (3) he must be so situated that disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect his interest, and (4) his interest must not already be adequately represented by existing parties. 16 Id. at 381. In addressing an intervening party’s interest in the subject matter of litigation, the Court in Pittman, 501 So. 2d at 384 (internal citation omitted), held: The wording of Rule 24, in our view, calls for an interpretation based in common sense and practicality. Legalistic formalism and mechanical jurisprudence simply do not fit the language or philosophy of the rule. All that is necessary is that GNIC establish an interest in the rights that are at issue in the litigation. GNIC has written a liability policy by virtue of which it may be called upon to pay Pittman’s damages. . . . [W]hether the Pittman judgment against Hardin stood made quite a difference to GNIC. This gave GNIC an interest in the transaction which is the subject matter of the pending action adequate to the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2). However, as the Court stated in Perry County v. Ferguson, 618 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Miss. 1993), “more than a mere economic interest” must be shown. In Pittman, the Court addressed whether GNIC would be at a disadvantage in protecting its interest if it was not allowed to intervene. Pittman, 501 So. 2d at 384. The Court explained that “[t]he rule is satisfied whenever disposition of the present action would put the would be intervenor at a practical disadvantage in protecting his interest.” Id. at 384. Lastly, the Court addressed whether GNIC’s interest could be protected adequately by another party’s representation. The Court recognized that GNIC and Hardin had similar interests; however, the attorney representing Hardin, though paid for by GNIC, had “an absolute and uncompromisable ethical duty” to protect the party she represented, even if such representation harmed GNIC. Id. at 385. Ultimately, the Court concluded that GNIC should have been permitted to intervene in the suit. Id. at 386. ¶28. In the present case, MAPDD claims its interest is based on its status as the “trade organization” of all the planning and development districts in Mississippi, and a disposition 17 in Kinney’s favor would impair or impede MAPDD’s ability to protect the other planning and development districts from also being declared public bodies. According to MAPDD, if the District is declared a public body and all of the other planning and development districts are then deemed public bodies, then all of the contracts, agreements, and actions taken by all of the planning and development districts since their creation are at issue, because all were based on the premise that the planning and development districts were private nonprofit corporations. Additionally, MAPDD claims that there would be significant constitutional issues involving the separation of powers based on the elected officials serving on the planning and development districts’ boards of directors. MAPDD submits that, though the District is a part of MAPDD, all of the planning and development districts are unique and different from one another; therefore, MAPDD properly was permitted to intervene to protect all of the planning and development districts’ interests. ¶29. We hold that the chancery court did not err in allowing MAPDD to intervene in the present case.