Opinion ID: 584492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Secondary Matters

Text: 20 PASS now complains that the Authority should have issued a make-whole order requiring the FAA to redress employees who may have been harmed by the improperly implemented random drug testing program. PASS, however, did not present evidence to the Authority that any employees had been adversely affected by the testing. We therefore cannot fault the Authority for failing to provide make-whole relief. 21 PASS also contends that the DOT should be held responsible for implementing the random drug testing program without bargaining. PASS argues that the Statute places the duty to bargain, and therefore the liability for any unfair labor practices, on the agency, which is defined as an Executive agency, citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 7103(a)(3), 7114(a)(4) and (b), and 7116(a)(5). See Brief for Petitioner at 19. It then maintains that while the DOT is clearly an Executive agency, the FAA (in the words of the FLRA) is merely an operating administration within DOT. Id. (citing Order at 3). Consequently, in its view, the Authority erred when it found that the DOT had no duty to bargain with PASS. Id. at 19-20. 22 The Authority, however, interpreted the Statute as placing the duty to bargain at the level of exclusive recognition, which rests with the FAA, not the DOT. See Order at 16-17. Because we cannot conclude either that the Authority's interpretation conflicts with the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress or that it is unreasonable, we defer on this question of statutory interpretation. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 23 Finally, the Authority determined that the record does not support a conclusion that DOT interfered with the bargaining relationship between FAA and PASS. Order at 28. We reject PASS's contention that this determination was not supported by substantial evidence.