Opinion ID: 2543619
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Law Preemption in General and As Applied to Gun Control

Text: The general principles governing preemption analysis were summarized in Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534 ( Sherwin-Williams Co. ), as follows: Under article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, `[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.' `If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void.' [Citations.] [¶] `A conflict exists if the local legislation `duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.'' [Citations.] [¶] Local legislation is `duplicative' of general law when it is coextensive therewith. [Citation.] Similarly, local legislation is `contradictory' to general law when it is inimical thereto. [Citation.] Finally, local legislation enters an area that is `fully occupied' by general law when the Legislature has expressly manifested its intent to `fully occupy' the area [citation], or when it has impliedly done so in light of one of the following indicia of intent: `(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the' locality. [Citations.] ( Sherwin-Williams Co., supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 897-898, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534, fn. omitted.) A review of the gun law preemption cases indicates that the Legislature has preempted discrete areas of gun regulation rather than the entire field of gun control. The seminal case to advance this proposition is Galvan v. Superior Court (1969) 70 Cal.2d 851, 76 Cal.Rptr. 642, 452 P.2d 930 ( Galvan ), in which this court considered a San Francisco gun law that required all firearms within San Francisco, with certain exceptions, to be registered. We observed that Penal Code section 12026, as it was written at the time, provided that `no permit or license to purchase, own, possess, or keep any [concealable] firearms at [the owner's] place of residence or place of business shall be required ....' ( Galvan, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 856, fn. 2, 76 Cal.Rptr. 642, 452 P.2d 930, italics omitted.) We distinguished between licensing, which signifies permission or authorization, and registration, which entails recording `formally and exactly' ( id. at p. 856, 76 Cal.Rptr. 642, 452 P.2d 930), and therefore declined to find express conflict between the statute and the ordinance. ( Id. at pp. 856-859, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 452 P.2d 930.) Neither did we find preemption by implication according to the three-part test discussed above, which had originally been articulated in In re Hubbard (1964) 62 Cal.2d 119, 41 Cal.Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809. ( Sherwin-Williams Co., supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534.) In Galvan, we found the San Francisco ordinance did not meet the first test, i.e., that the subject matter had been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it had become exclusively a matter of state concern. (See Sherwin-Williams Co., supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534.) Although [plaintiff] cites a great number of statutes relating to weapons, these statutes do not show that the entire area of gun or weapons control has been so fully and completely covered by general law ... `as to clearly indicate that [the subject] has become exclusively a matter of state concern.' [Citation.] There are various subjects that the legislation deals with only partly or not at all.... [¶] Further, there are some indications that the Legislature did not believe that it had occupied the entire field of gun or weapons control. Thus, the Legislature has expressly prohibited requiring a license to keep a concealable weapon at a residence or place of business. (Pen.Code, § 12026.) Such a statutory provision would be unnecessary if the Legislature believed that all gun regulation was improper. ( Galvan, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 860, 76 Cal.Rptr. 642, 452 P.2d 930.) Nor did we find the San Francisco ordinance preempted under the second test, i.e., partial coverage by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern would not tolerate further or additional local action: The issue of `paramount state concern' also involves the question `whether substantial, geographic, economic, ecological or other distinctions are persuasive of the need for local control, and whether local needs have been adequately recognized and comprehensively dealt with at the state level' [Citation.] [¶] That problems with firearms are likely to require different treatment in San Francisco County than in Mono County should require no elaborate citation of authority.... ( Galvan, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 863-864, 76 Cal.Rptr. 642, 452 P.2d 930.) As for the third test of implied preemption, we found that the San Francisco gun law places no undue burden on transient citizens.... The law, applicable to firearms possessed by persons in San Francisco, provides for a seven-day exemption and thus excludes those transients who might otherwise be burdened. [¶] The law ... interferes less with transients than, for example, the Fresno ordinance prohibiting the consumption of alcoholic beverages on the street [citation], the Los Angeles gambling ordinance [citation], or the Los Angeles loitering ordinance [citation]all of which were found not preempted by state law, and all of which apply to anyone within the geographic confines of the city, and not merely to residents. ( Galvan, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 864-865, 76 Cal.Rptr. 642, 452 P.2d 930, italics & fn. omitted.) We concluded that the San Francisco registration law was not preempted by state law. ( Id. at p. 866, 76 Cal.Rptr. 642, 452 P.2d 930.) As was recognized in Olsen v. McGillicuddy (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 897, 93 Cal. Rptr. 530 ( Olsen ), the Legislature's response to Galvan was to adopt former Government Code section 9619, the predecessor to current Government Code section 53071, which made clear an intent `to occupy the whole field of registration or licensing of ... firearms.' ( Olsen, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d at p. 902, 93 Cal.Rptr. 530, italics omitted.) Noting Galvan's strong statement concerning the narrowness of state law firearms preemption, the Olsen court found the Legislature's limited response to Galvan to be significant: Despite the opportunity to include an expression of intent to occupy the entire field of firearms, the legislative intent was limited to registration and licensing. We infer from this limitation that the Legislature did not intend to exclude [localities] from enacting further legislation concerning the use of firearms. [¶] It also does not appear that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the [locality]. ( Ibid., italics omitted.) The Olsen court thus concluded that a Petaluma ordinance that prohibited a parent having care of a minor to permit the minor to possess or fire a BB gun was not preempted by state gun laws. As pointed out in California Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1315, 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 591: In response to Olsen, the Legislature enacted Government Code section 53071.5 ... which expressly occupies the field of the manufacture, possession, or sale of imitation firearms. [1] Thus once again the Legislature's response was measured and limited, extending state preemption into a new area in which legislative interest had been aroused, but at the same time carefully refraining from enacting a blanket preemption of all local firearms regulation. (Italics added.) As the court further explained: This statute is expressly limited to imitation firearms, thus leaving real firearms still subject to local regulation. The express preemption of local regulation of sales of imitation firearms, but not sales of real firearms, demonstrates that the Legislature has made a distinction, for whatever policy reason, between regulating the sale of real firearms and regulating the sale of imitation firearms. ( California Rifle & Pistol Assn., supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1312, 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 591, italics omitted.) The court accordingly upheld a municipal ordinance banning the sale of so-called Saturday Night Specials. ( Id. at pp. 1308-1309, 1331-1332, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 591; see also Suter v. City of Lafayette (1997) 57 Cal. App.4th 1109, 1118-1119, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 [upholding city's ability to confine firearms dealerships to certain commercially zoned areas but striking down provision regarding firearms storage covered by the detailed provisions of Pen. Code § 12071, subd. (b)(14) ].) On the other hand, a restrictive San Francisco firearm ordinance was held to be preempted in Doe v. City and County of San Francisco (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 509, 186 Cal.Rptr. 380 ( Doe) . The ordinance outlawed the possession of handguns within the city but exempted those persons who obtained a license to carry a concealed weapon under Penal Code section 12050. Reviewing Galvan and Olsen, the court acknowledged that these decisions suggested the Legislature has not prevented local government bodies from regulating all aspects of the possession of firearms. ( Doe, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d at p. 516, 186 Cal.Rptr. 380.) Nonetheless, the ordinance directly conflicted with Government Code section 53071 and Penal Code section 12026, the former explicitly preempting local licensing requirements, the latter exempting from licensing requirements gun possession in residences and places of business. Thus, the effect of the San Francisco ordinance is to create a new class of persons who will be required to obtain licenses in order to possess handguns in residences and places of business ( Doe, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d at p. 517, 186 Cal.Rptr. 380), which the two statutes forbid ( id. at pp. 517-518, 186 Cal.Rptr. 380). In sum, a review of case law and the corresponding development of gun control statutes in response to that law demonstrates that the Legislature has chosen not to broadly preempt local control of firearms but has targeted certain specific areas for preemption. With this framework in mind, we turn to California law regulating gun shows to determine whether and to what extent the Legislature has preempted this area of the law.