Opinion ID: 867213
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consolidation of Cases and Flight Evidence

Text: ¶ 9 Cota argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his flight from the police and by joining the two indictments for trial. Cota, however, twice consented to the joinder. He first did so months before trial and again early in the trial when the judge entered a formal consolidation order. ¶ 10 Before joining the indictments, the trial court had granted the State's motion to admit evidence of Cota's flight in the murder case. When the indictments were formally consolidated, defense counsel preserved an objection to the flight evidence, but said that in light of the court's previous adverse ruling on that issue, Cota had decided to consent to the joinder for strategic reasons. Thus, the only relevant question is whether the flight evidence was properly admitted. We review for abuse of discretion. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 592, 858 P.2d 1152, 1195 (1993). ¶ 11 Evidence of flight is admissible to show consciousness of guilt when the defendant flees in a manner which obviously invites suspicion or announces guilt. State v. Weible, 142 Ariz. 113, 116, 688 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1984). Cota does not dispute this general principle, but argues that the eight days between the murders and his flight rendered the evidence inadmissible. Remoteness of flight in relation to the commission of the crime, however, goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Bible, 175 Ariz. at 592, 858 P.2d at 1195; see also State v. Edwards, 136 Ariz. 177, 184, 665 P.2d 59, 66 (1983) (holding flight evidence properly admitted when defendant fled from police fifteen months after the crime was committed). ¶ 12 Cota also contends that the flight evidence was inadmissible because he may have been fleeing because he had violated parole and had drugs in the car. But [m]erely because a defendant is wanted on another charge ... does not make evidence of flight per se inadmissible. Bible, 175 Ariz. at 592, 858 P.2d at 1195. The circumstances here justify an inference that Defendant was fleeing from some other, more serious crime. Id. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the flight evidence and instructing the jury as to its limited use with respect to the murder counts. [3]