Opinion ID: 1711926
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: First Cause of Action: Right to Privacy.

Text: In his first cause of action, Polinski claimed that the employment-related drug test was a violation of his right to privacy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Sky Harbor on the first cause of action. On further review, Polinski assigns as error the Court of Appeals' determination that Polinski consented to the drug testing, that such consent is a statutory defense under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 20-205 (Reissue 1997), and that Polinski was precluded from claiming that his statutory right to privacy under § 20-203 had been violated. For reasons other than those articulated by the Court of Appeals, we affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals' decision which affirmed the order of the district court's granting summary judgment in favor of Sky Harbor on the first cause of action. For his first cause of action, Polinski alleged that his statutory right to privacy under § 20-203 had been violated by the acts of Sky Harbor. According to Polinski's deposition testimony, it was the accusation of the illegal conduct of drug use which was the specific humiliation suffered by Polinski for which damages were sought from Sky Harbor. Section 20-203 provides as follows: Any person, firm, or corporation that trespasses or intrudes upon any natural person in his or her place of solitude or seclusion, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, shall be liable for invasion of privacy. In Kaiser v. Western R/C Flyers, 239 Neb. 624, 477 N.W.2d 557 (1991), we considered the nature of an intrusion under § 20-203. In Kaiser, we described the invasion of privacy as one `consist[ing] solely of an intentional interference with [the plaintiff's] interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable man.' 239 Neb. at 631, 477 N.W.2d at 562 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652 B, comment a. (1977)). We listed the following examples from the Restatement as illustrations of the types of intrusions for consideration as an invasion of privacy under § 20-203: a reporter's entering a hospital room and taking the photograph of a person suffering from a rare disease; `window peeking' or wiretapping by a private detective; obtaining access to a person's bank records pursuant to a forged court order; or the continuance of frequent telephone solicitations. Kaiser, 239 Neb. at 631, 477 N.W.2d at 562. The taking of a specimen for drug testing purposes in accordance with § 48-1901 et seq. is not contrary to the provisions of § 20-203. The accusation of drug use at the workplace, without more, is not the form of interference into a person's solitude or seclusion that would rise to the level of being highly offensive to a reasonable person, such as might be actionable under § 20-203. See Kaiser, supra . At the summary judgment hearing, Sky Harbor offered evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment. The evidence demonstrated that the employment-related drug test at issue complied with § 48-1901 et seq. Polinski did not offer evidence which contravened Sky Harbor's evidence of compliance with § 48-1901 et seq. As the party moving for summary judgment, Sky Harbor had the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact existed, and it must have produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Daniels v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 261 Neb. 671, 624 N.W.2d 636 (2001). A prima facie case for summary judgment is shown by producing enough evidence to demonstrate that the movant is entitled to a judgment in its favor if the evidence were uncontroverted at trial. Morrison Enters. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 260 Neb. 634, 619 N.W.2d 432 (2000); Iwanski v. Gomes, 259 Neb. 632, 611 N.W.2d 607 (2000). After the movant makes a prima facie case, the burden to produce evidence showing the existence of a material issue of fact that prevents judgment as a matter of law shifts to the party opposing the motion. Id. In the instant case, Sky Harbor produced evidence demonstrating that it was entitled to a judgment in its favor if the evidence remained uncontroverted by Polinski. The burden to produce evidence showing the existence of a material issue of fact that prevented judgment as a matter of law shifted to Polinski, the party opposing the motion. Id. Polinski failed to produce evidence controverting Sky Harbor's evidence. Accordingly, there is no merit to Polinski's first assignment of error on further review, and we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sky Harbor on Polinski's first cause of action. Third Cause of Action: Disclosure of Drug Test Results. For his second assignment of error on further review, Polinski argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly determined that there was no material dispute in the record that Polinski had consented to the release of his drug test results to OAA prior to such release and that, therefore, his third cause of action must fail. For reasons other than those articulated by the Court of Appeals, we affirm that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Sky Harbor on Polinski's third cause of action. In his third cause of action, Polinski alleged that Sky Harbor impermissibly released the results of his drug test to the public, namely OAA, in contravention of § 48-1906. As stated above, OAA had provided Polinski with an identification badge required for Polinski's employment with Sky Harbor. Section 48-1906 provides in relevant part as follows: The employer or its, his, or her agents shall not release or disclose the test results to the public, except that such results shall be released ... to the employee upon request. On May 30, 1996, Polinski signed a document captioned Release, in which Polinski, who had already been informed of his test results, authorized Sky Harbor to release any and all information concerning his employment and separation from employment with Sky Harbor to OAA. The Court of Appeals reasoned that because Polinski requested the release of the information by Sky Harbor to OAA, the provisions of § 48-1906 against release were not violated, and that the district court had correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Sky Harbor on the third cause of action. Polinski contends that the release he signed on May 30 cannot justify the antecedent release of information by Sky Harbor in March to OAA, which in turn resulted in his loss of employment with United. Because we conclude that the release of the drug test results to OAA by Sky Harbor was not a release to the public under § 48-1906, we need not consider whether the May 30 release justifies the earlier disclosures. Section 48-1906 proscribes an employer from releasing drug test results to the public. Resolution of Polinski's second assignment of error, therefore, depends upon whether OAA is the public for purposes of § 48-1906. Interpretation of a statute presents a question of law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach a conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below. Foote v. O'Neill Packing, 262 Neb. 467, 632 N.W.2d 313 (2001). We conclude that Sky Harbor was not prohibited under the terms of § 48-1906 from releasing Polinski's drug test results to OAA. It is undisputed in the record that Polinski was required to have the OAA identification badge in order to work as a lineman for Sky Harbor and that when Polinski was terminated by Sky Harbor, Sky Harbor returned Polinski's identification badge to OAA. OAA was involved in Polinski's channel of employment and was not a member of the unrelated public. As a result, Sky Harbor's release of Polinski's drug test results to OAA was not a release of drug test results to the public for purposes of § 48-1906, and thus, Sky Harbor did not violate the provisions of § 48-1906 by releasing Polinski's drug test results to OAA. The Court of Appeals' decision affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sky Harbor on Polinski's third cause of action is affirmed.