Opinion ID: 320562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: De Jure Segregation

Text: 4 (Nos. 71-1877, 71-1878, 71-2163, and 71-2189) 5 District-wide integration has been the goal of the School Board for some time, and the plan under which it is now operating had been designed by it, prior to commencement of the instant suit, as a long-range plan to be accomplished gradually over a period of years. The question before us is not the desirability of district-wide integration, but whether the constitutional rights of the litigants necessitate immediate, court-ordered desegregation. 6 More particularly, this appeal presents the question whether the district court applied correct standards in determining that acts of de jure segregation were committed by the defendants. Since this case does not involve a statutorily created dual school system, we delayed taking submission of the case until the filing of the opinion of the Supreme Court in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973). In Keyes, as here, the contention was that the 'School Board alone, by use of various techniques such as the manipulation of student attendance zones, school site selection and a neighborhood school policy, created or maintained racially or ethnically (or both racially and ethnically) segregated schools throughout the school district, entitling petitioners to a decree directing desegregation of the entire school district.' 413 U.S. at 191, 93 S.Ct. at 2689. In discussing the standards for determining whether de jure acts of segregation had been committed by a school board, the Court states: 7 'We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure and socalled de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann (v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 17-18, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971)) is purpose or intent to segregate.' 8 413 U.S. at 208, 93 S.Ct. at 2697. 9 This court, in Soria v. Oxnard School District Board of Trustees, 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973), has construed Keyes as requiring for any finding of unconstitutional segregation a 'determination that the school authorities had intentionally discriminated against minority students by practicing a deliberate policy of racial segregation.' 488 F.2d at 585. 1 10 Keyes and Soria were filed after the decision by the district court in this case. Quite understandably, therefore, the district court made no finding as to whether the School Board possessed the requisite segregatory intent. On the contrary, the district court treated proof of such intent as unnecessary. 'In the context of segregation,' it held, '(the term de jure)    means no more nor less than that the school authorities have exercised powers given them by law in a manner which creates or continues or increases substantial racial imbalance in the schools. It is this governmental action, regardless of the motivation for it, which violates the Fourteenth Amendment.' 339 F.Supp. at 1319. As Keyes and Soria have now made clear, the district court thereby applied an erroneous legal standard in determining that a constitutional violation had occurred. 11 Although the record contains evidence relevant to the question of the School Board's intent, it is not at all clear that the evidence is sufficient to permit a fair resolution of this issue. Because the litigants, like the district court, did not focus upon the issue of intent, we cannot be confident that all of the relevant and reasonably available evidence is now before us. The case must be remanded to afford an opportunity to reexamine the record on the issue of intent. Upon remand the district court will permit the parties to offer such additional evidence as they may desire pertaining to that issue. 12 The school district has been operating under the court-ordered desegregation plan since September, 1971. As in Soria, 'we shall not at this time undo that result.' 488 F.2d at 588. Therefore, the injunction shall remain in effect until the final resolution of the litigation, unless the district court in its discretion modifies it. 13 Nos. 71-1877, 71-1878, 71-2163, and 71-2189 are vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973), and Soria v. Oxnard School District Board of Trustees, 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973), and in accordance with the views here expressed. 2