Opinion ID: 1329866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Overturning Established Law without Saying So

Text: The majority opinion, without saying so, overturns settled West Virginia law that has protected farmers, businesses, and landowners for 85 years. In Dulin v. Ohio River R. Co., 73 W.Va. 166, 80 S.E. 145 (1913), this Court ruled that a railroad is not a public highway for purposes of the law of adverse possession. [1] We held in Syllabus Point 5 of Dulin that: The doctrine of adversary possession is applicable to land acquired by a railroad company for its right of way. (Emphasis added.) In so holding, the Dulin majority stated that the right of a railroad company does not stand on a par with public highways generally.... 73 W.Va. at 171, 80 S.E. at 147. Coincidentally, it is Syllabus Point 5 of the majority opinion in the instant case that adopts the directly opposite position from Dulin; it states in pertinent part: ... neither adverse possession, prescriptive easement, nor equitable estoppel may lie against... the trackway of a railroad ... so long as the trackway continues to be used for railroad purposes. (Emphasis added.) The majority opinion in the instant case is simply not being honest in its claim to be put[ting] an end to any latent ambiguity remaining as a result of Dulin .... 203 W.Va. at 193, 506 S.E.2d at 636. Syllabus Point 5 of Dulin is not ambiguous, latently or otherwise. As the foregoing quotations demonstrate, Syllabus Point 5 of the majority opinion directly overrules Syllabus Point 5 of Dulin, a settled rule of West Virginia property law that has guided our circuit courts and our property owners for 85 years. Justice Neely, in Kline v. McCloud, 174 W.Va. 369, 380, 326 S.E.2d 715, 727 (1984) (Neely, J., dissenting) quoted language that is appropriately applied to the majority opinion in the instant case: If the Court deems it necessary to disregard precedent, let it boldly overrule a prior decision and not, with passionate intensity, manoeuvre interstitially among the lines of cases written only yesterday. I am reminded of Lord Holt's protest, in 1704: ... these scrambling reports ... will make us appear to posterity for a parcel of blockheads. Slayter v. May, 2 Ld.Raym. 1072 [1704]. Notably, our law requires us to have particularly strong reasons for overturning decisions that are related to established property rights. We stated in Hock v. City of Morgantown, 162 W.Va. 853, 856, 253 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1979): Predictability is at the heart of the doctrine of stare decisis, and regardless of what we think of the merits of this case, we must be true to a reasonable interpretation of prior law in the area of property where certainty above all else is the preeminent compelling public policy to be served. The majority opinion, by pretending not to overturn the rule established in Dulin, ignores this fundamental principle of law. B.