Opinion ID: 208286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim Arises Under Federal Law

Text: This case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District 3 This malpractice suit, where the patent owner is the plaintiff, is not a case to which 35 U.S.C. § 293 applies, where jurisdiction over a foreign patentee is provided for proceedings affecting the patent. 2008-1229 11 of Virginia. Appellees argued that the case raised a federal question. Touchcom, No. 07-CV-114, slip op. at 6 (arguing subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338). Thus, for the district court to have possessed subject matter jurisdiction over Touchcom’s claim, the claims must necessarily have arisen under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (conferring original jurisdiction to federal district courts over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” (emphasis added)); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (stating that U.S. district courts possess subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions that “aris[e] under any Act of Congress relating to patents” (emphasis added)). We agree with the district court that it possessed subject matter jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. As a consequence of that decision, Touchcom’s claims necessarily arise under federal law for purposes of Rule 4(k)(2). The Supreme Court has held that § 1338 jurisdiction extends to any case “in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded complaints.” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988). In Immunocept, we held that a malpractice claim necessarily involved a substantial question of patent law because the claim required the court to determine the scope of the patent claims at issue. 504 F.3d at 1284-85. We noted in Immunocept that “state claims that involve a comparison of patent applications and the proof of invalidity” are within the jurisdiction of federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. Id. at 1285 (citations omitted). 2008-1229 12 Just as in Immunocept, this case concerns state malpractice claims that involve analysis of patent claims and proof of invalidity. Touchcom will be required to show that, had appellees not omitted a portion of the source code from its application, the resulting U.S. patent would not have been held invalid. See Stewart v. Hall, 770 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that Virginia law requires malpractice plaintiffs to prove “but for” causation); White v. Morano, 452 S.E.2d 856, 858 (Va. 1995) (stating that “but for” causation is proven by conducting a “trial within a trial”). In this case, such a showing necessarily requires an analysis of patent validity. Thus, following Immunocept and Christianson, we agree with the district court that the court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over Touchcom’s claims. Because we agree with the district court that Touchcom’s claims arise under federal law, the first requirement of Rule 4(k)(2) has been met.