Opinion ID: 883136
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the District Court err when it granted Sullivan's motion for a new trial limited to the issue of damages?

Text: Columbus argues that the District Court erred when it granted a new trial limited to the issue of damages. When we consider whether a district court imposed proper sanctions for a discovery abuse, we determine whether the district court abused its discretion. Eisenmenger v. Ethicon, Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 393, 402, 871 P.2d 1313, 1319. In this case, Sullivan moved for sanctions pursuant to Rules 11 and 37(d), M.R.Civ.P. Sanctions were imposed pursuant to Rule 37(d). However, we will affirm their imposition, if appropriate, under either of the above rules. Jerome v. Pardis (1989), 240 Mont. 187, 783 P.2d 919. This Court defers to the trial court because it is in the best position to know whether the party in question has disregarded the other's rights, and is in the best position to determine which sanction is most appropriate. Eisenmenger, 871 P.2d at 1319 (citing Dassori v. Roy Stanley Chevrolet Co. (1986), 244 Mont. 178, 179-80, 728 P.2d 430, 431). In Eisenmenger, 871 P.2d at 1320-21, we concluded that if one party does not properly respond to discovery and the other party suffers prejudice, a district court's decision to impose a default judgment as a sanction was proper. Columbus argues that ordering a new trial on the damages issue alone, and not ordering a retrial on liability, is the equivalent of a default judgment. While, according to our decision in Eisenmenger, the entry of default may be appropriate as a sanction for failure to candidly respond to discovery, we disagree that a default was entered in this case. Here, the jury rendered a verdict for Sullivan on the issue of liability. The District Court concluded that there was substantial evidence to support that verdict when it denied Columbus's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Columbus does not contest that conclusion on appeal. The sanction actually imposed was a new trial on the issue of damages which, for the reasons discussed in Eisenmenger, we conclude did not result from an abuse of discretion. Further, the District Court's order regarding a new trial was justified without regard to the issue of sanctions. Montana has long recognized that district courts are empowered to order a new trial on damages alone. Bohrer v. Clark (1978), 180 Mont. 233, 590 P.2d 117. In Bohrer, the district court found the jury's damage award insufficient and after plaintiffs moved to alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial, the court increased the jury's damage award. Both parties appealed and we held that Rule 59(a), M.R.Civ.P., provides for instances when a new trial on damages is appropriate. Bohrer, 590 P.2d at 122-23. We recognized that although infrequently necessary, the power of both trial and appellate courts to order such a limited trial is well recognized. Bohrer, 590 P.2d at 123. We relied partly on 58 Am.Jur.2d New Trial § 27, stating that when there is an error in the determination of damages, and the court is satisfied that the jury properly settled the liability issues based on sufficient evidence, and an error in damages requires setting aside the verdict, a new trial on damages may be proper. Bohrer, 590 P.2d at 123. We also recognized that it is generally within the district court's discretion to allow or refuse to allow a new trial on the grounds of inadequate damages. Bohrer, 590 P.2d at 122. In Bohrer, the district court concluded that the jury's award was inadequate. We stated, [u]nder these circumstances, an order granting a new trial limited to the issue of damages would have been within the court's discretion. Bohrer, 590 P.2d at 123. We indicated a preference for a new trial on the issue of damages, rather than an assessment of damages by the district court. After the newly discovered evidence appeared, Judge McCarvel and Judge Warner both found that the undisclosed information would have affected the damage award. We conclude that ordering a new trial limited to the issue of damages based on these findings was not an abuse of discretion. The District Court did not substitute its judgment for the jurors' decision regarding damages. Rather, the court properly ordered a new trial on damages so the jury could hear all evidence relevant to damages. There was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict on the issue of liability. Therefore, the District Court did not err when it declined to order a new trial on that issue. The order of the District Court granting a new trial limited to the issue of damages is affirmed.