Opinion ID: 760895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prosecutor's comments on potential defense alibi

Text: WITNESSES IN ITS OPENING STATEMENT 70 Hall's next challenge is that he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor began speculating in the government's opening statement about alibi witnesses the government expected Hall would call to testify on his behalf and the evidence the government would offer to rebut such testimony. Because we conclude that any potential harm from the prosecutor's comments regarding potential alibi witnesses was mitigated by cautionary instructions from the district court to the jury as well as the prosecutor's own prefatory statements, we reject Hall's argument that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial. 71 During the government's opening statement, the prosecutor stated that he expected the defense to present alibi evidence and that he would offer rebuttal evidence to discredit those alibis. Hall timely objected on the grounds that the prosecutor's remarks would have the effect of shifting the burden of proof to Hall. The district court overruled Hall's objection on the grounds that the prosecutor had a good faith basis for believing the alibi evidence would be presented and allowed the prosecutor to continue. The prosecutor suggested that Hall's father might testify that he was with Hall in Wabash, Indiana, on September 20, 1993, the date of the abduction. The prosecutor stated, [i]f they do that,... we will present evidence in rebuttal that the father falsified two documents to support that fact. The prosecutor also suggested that Hall's brother might testify that he was with Hall at an event in Rochester, Indiana on September 19, 1993. In that event, the prosecutor would present evidence to suggest that the brother told the FBI that it was possible that Larry Hall was in Georgetown on September 20, 1993. At the conclusion of the opening statements, the defendant requested a mistrial. The district court denied that motion. Hall never called his father or brother to testify at trial on his behalf. 72 We review the manner in which a district court conducts a trial for abuse of discretion. Testa v. Village of Mundelein, Ill., 89 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir.1996). A trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether, in the context of the entire trial, a defendant's motion for a mistrial should be granted. United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 902 (7th Cir.1988). 73 As we have previously stated, the purpose of an opening statement is to state what evidence will be presented, to make it easier for the jurors to understand what is to follow, and to relate parts of the evidence and testimony to the whole. Testa, 89 F.3d at 446. We begin by noting that at the time of his opening statement, the prosecutor had a reasonable basis for believing that Hall would introduce this alibi evidence. The alibi testimony the prosecutor referenced in its opening statement was admitted in Hall's first trial and the prosecutor had every reason to expect that it would be introduced in this trial. In fact, Hall filed a notice of alibi in which he gave notice that he will present the same alibi evidence and witnesses as in the original trial. 74 However, even in the unique circumstances presented by this case, we have serious doubts as to the appropriateness of a prosecutor commenting on potential alibi witnesses of a defendant. We believe it to be a rare situation where it would be appropriate for a prosecutor to comment on anticipated defense evidence because a defendant is under no obligation to put forward evidence on his or her own behalf. As Hall correctly points out, when the prosecution raises the spectre of a flawed alibi and the defendant chooses not to offer any alibi evidence, it may well leave the jury with an unfavorable impression of the defendant. In any event, whether it was improper for the prosecutor to comment on potential alibi witnesses under the facts of this case is an issue we need not reach in order to dispense with Hall's appeal because improper prosecutorial remarks standing alone cannot justify a new trial unless they undermined the fairness of the trial and contributed to a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); see also Mealy, 851 F.2d at 903 (recognizing that even if the prosecutor engaged in improper conduct, we must re-examine the improper remark in light of the entire record to determine whether the remark deprived the defendant of a fair trial) (citations and internal quotations omitted). We conclude that the prosecutor's comments, improper or not, were not so prejudicial as to deny Hall a fair trial. 75 We will not lightly overturn a conviction 'on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial.'  United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 521 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038). In determining whether the prosecutor's remarks amount to prejudicial error, a court must consider the probable effect the prosecutor's behavior would have on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly. Young, 470 U.S. at 12, 105 S.Ct. 1038. A careful review of the record in this case discloses that the prosecutor's comments did not have a prejudicial effect on the fairness of the trial. 76 As an initial matter, we note that the district court cautioned the jury prior to opening arguments that opening statements are not to be considered evidence and that the government bears the burden of proof. The prosecutor also attempted to blunt the potential prejudicial impact that might result from his remarks. The prosecutor prefaced his comments on the potential alibi evidence by stating: 77 First of all, I really don't know with precision what evidence they will offer, and keep in mind that they certainly don't have to bring any evidence forth at all. The burden of proof is completely on me. They don't have to prove or disprove anything. 78 The prosecutor closed his opening statement with the reminder that [t]he burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Larry Hall is guilty is totally upon me, and that's a burden I fully and freely accept. In addition, after ruling on defense counsel's initial objection to the prosecutor's statements, the district court addressed the jury and gave them instructions to reduce the potential prejudice of the prosecutor's references to the potential alibi witnesses in the event that Hall decided not to call them. 10 See generally Testa, 89 F.3d at 445 (reasoning that the exercise of a trial court's discretion includes determining whether giving a cautionary instruction, rather than ordering a mistrial, can prevent any possible prejudice); United States v. McClellan, 868 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir.1989) (A trial judge has broad discretion in determining when a cautionary instruction, as opposed to a mistrial, can prevent any possible prejudice.). Similarly, the court's final jury instructions stressed that [o]pening statements, closing arguments and other statements of counsel should be disregarded to the extent they are not supported by the evidence. Since we assume that the jury followed the court's cautionary instructions, see Mealy, 851 F.2d at 903, we have no reason to believe (and nothing in the record suggests) that the jury relied on the prosecutor's statements, or any inference to be drawn therefrom, in reaching its verdict. Thus, from the record, it appears that every effort was made to limit the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's comments on Hall's decision not to tender alibi evidence. Moreover, the prosecutor's brief remarks were made in a trial that lasted seven days and in a case in which the evidence was more than sufficient to sustain a conviction. 79 In light of the foregoing considerations, we conclude that, while the district court may well have erred in allowing the prosecutor to comment on this matter in its opening statement, the prosecutor's comments were not so prejudicial as to deny Hall a fair trial. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hall's motion for a mistrial.