Opinion ID: 70443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Landowner's Duty Under O.C.G.A. Sec. 51-3-1

Text: 15 Our determination that Coleman is an independent contractor means only that the United States is not directly or vicariously liable for any negligent or wrongful acts or omissions that Coleman may have committed. The United States can still, of course, be found liable for any tortious conduct committed by HUD. The FTCA provides that [t]he United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2674. As the allegedly negligent act or omission at issue here occurred in Georgia, we now turn to that state's laws. 16 The applicable statute, O.C.G.A. Sec. 51-3-1, states:Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, 2 he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe. 17 Therefore, the United States qua landowner may be liable to the Tisdales under Sec. 51-3-1 if the McPherson Avenue property was in an unsafe condition. It has been previously determined under Georgia law, however, that a landowner may relinquish possession and control of his property to an independent contractor and thereby be relieved of his duties to those who enter his property. E.g., Hodge v. United States, 310 F.Supp. 1090, 1098 (M.D.Ga.1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.1970); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 195, 351 S.E.2d 718, 720 (Ga.Ct.App.1986). Upon the landowner's delivery of possession and control of the property to an independent contractor, [t]he contractor then becomes the 'occupier' of the land within the meaning of the Georgia statute. Hodge, 310 F.Supp. at 1098 (citing Tyler v. Peel Corp., 371 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir.1967)). As the occupier of the land within the meaning of O.C.G.A. Sec. 51-3-1, the independent contractor thereby becomes potentially liable, in the landowner's stead, to invitees for damages caused by the unsafe condition of the premises. 18 Our review of this record convinces us that the United States had turned over possession and control of the McPherson Avenue property to Coleman. Possession may be defined as having personal charge of or exercising the rights of management or control over the property in question. Custody and control are the commonly accepted and generally understood incidents of possession. Hodge, 310 F.Supp. at 1098. The AMB contract at issue here specifically conferred managerial authority upon Coleman. As discussed above, Coleman was entrusted with the day-to-day decision-making regarding the McPherson Avenue Property. 3 That HUD retained the authority to ensure that Coleman was performing its obligations under the AMB contract is not sufficient, standing alone, to defeat the finding that Coleman was in possession and control of the McPherson Avenue property. 4 See id. at 1099 (finding that an independent contractor had possession and control over the portion of the roof under repair despite the fact that government inspectors visited the roof in order to see that contract specifications were being met). Therefore, the United States owed no duty to the Tisdales as a landowner under Sec. 51-3-1 at the time of Christopher's unfortunate accident. Since the United States did not owe the Tisdales a duty under Georgia law here, the United States cannot be found liable for Christopher's injury. E.g., Ramey v. E.S. Pritchett, 90 Ga.App. 745, 750-51, 84 S.E.2d 305, 310 (Ga.Ct.App.1954).