Opinion ID: 1773531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: custody action

Text: Based upon its conclusion that the consents were invalid, the trial court ruled that Moore and Dorning were entitled to the immediate custody of Justin. [67] The trial court then, however, assigned a hearing date to hear testimony regarding the fitness of [Moore and Dorning] .... Because the Asentes' custody claim remained pending, the appropriateness of the trial court's ruling that Moore and Dorning were entitled to immediate custody of Justin is questionable; [68] however, the trial court allowed custody to remain with the Asentes pending the fitness hearing, and consequently, the status quo of Justin's custody was maintained pending the final resolution of all custody issues. At the abbreviated fitness hearing, the trial court summarily ruled that the Asentes did not have standing to pursue custody of Justin and dismissed their custody claim. We find this ruling in error. Standing is [a] party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right, [69] or, in other words, the right to bring an action in the first instance. [70] In Kentucky, a nonparent's standing to bring a custody action is governed by KRS 403.420(4)(b), which provides in relevant part: (4) A child custody proceeding is commenced in the Circuit Court: .... (b) By a person other than a parent, by filing a petition for custody of the child in the county in which he is permanently resident or found, but only if he is not in the physical custody of one (1) of his parents[]. [71] This language appears rather straight-forward, i.e., a nonparent has standing if the child is not in the physical custody of a parent. And, in the present case, because Justin was living with the Asentes in their home, it would seem to follow logically that they had physical custody of him and therefore standing to maintain an action for his custody. However, several courts, including the Kentucky Court of Appeals, have rejected the argument that physical possession alone gives standing to the nonparent. In Williams v. Phelps, [72] a nonparent with whom a child was residing sought custody of the child, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals indicated that the nonparent's mere physical possession of the child did not confer standing on her but nevertheless held that the nonparent had standing [b]ased upon all of these facts, under the unique circumstances of this case. [73] In Henderson v. Henderson, [74] the Montana Supreme Court, in addressing a statute that authorized the commencement of a child custody proceeding by a person other than a parent only if [the child] is not in the physical custody of one of his parents, [75] held that `[p]hysical custody' is not limited to having actual, immediate control of the physical presence of the child ..., but [r]ather, this phrase relates to the custodial rights involved in the care and control of the child. [76] In explaining its ruling, the Court stated that [t]o interpret this phrase otherwise would allow a nonparent to file a petition for custody anytime the child is out of the physical presence of the parent or parents, even if for a few minutes, or under the watchful eyes of an authorized babysitter. [77] Twenty years later, in Girard v. Williams, [78] when the Montana Supreme Court again addressed the issue, it followed and further explained its earlier holding: `[P]hysical custody' for purposes of establishing standing... is not based simply on who has actual possession of a child at the time a custody proceeding is commenced. Rather, the `phrase relates to the custodial rights involved in the care and control of the child.' As a result, to establish standing, a nonparent must demonstrate that the child's parent has voluntarily relinquished his or her right to physical custody and must present evidence as to the duration of the separation between the parent and child. [79] Similarly, in In re A.W.J., [80] the court held that [t]he determination that a parent does not have physical custody of a child turns not on possession; rather, it requires a showing that the parent somehow has voluntarily and indefinitely relinquished custody of the child. However, not every voluntary turnover of a child will deprive the parent of physical custody. [81] The court then set forth factors to consider in determining whether a parent had physical custody. [T]he court must consider such factors as (1) who was responsible for the care and welfare of the child prior to the initiation of custody proceedings; (2) the manner in which physical possession of a child was acquired; and (3) the nature and duration of the possession. [82] The court in Webb v. Charles, [83] when construing a subsection that mirrors KRS 403.420(4)(b) almost to the word, held that `[p]hysical custody' as used in the statute relates to the custodial rights involved in the care and control of the child, [84] and [p]hysical custody in this sense does not equate to having actual, immediate control of the physical presence of the child, rather it is the legal right to control the child. [85] The phrase physical custody first appeared in KRS Chapter 403 with Kentucky's 1972 adoption [86] of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA). [87] The phrase was contained in subsection (d)(2) of the UMDA's jurisdictional section [88] (enacted in Kentucky as KRS 403.260 with subsection (d)(2) being enacted as KRS 403.260(4)(b)). Subsection (4)(b) of KRS 403.260 read exactly the same as the present KRS 403.420(4)(b), which is set out above. In 1980, however, Kentucky adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), [89] and the legislature repealed KRS 403.260 [90] in its entirety but retained the language of its subsection (4)(b), the nonparent standing provision, as a subsection added to the UCCJA's jurisdiction section, [91] but also adopted the remainder of the UCCJA section. [92] Thus, subsection (4)(b) of KRS 403.260, which was enacted originally as part of the UMDA, is now contained in subsection (4)(b) of KRS 403.420, which was enacted as part of the UCCJA. There is the rub. Physical custody was not defined in the UMDA, and accordingly, when the phrase first appeared in KRS 403.260(4)(b), it was not statutorily defined. However, the UMDA's requirement that the child not be in the physical custody of a parent was devised to protect the parental rights of custodial parents. [93] It was therefore logical for courts to define physical custody to mean more than mere physical possession. But, the UCCJA, which was not designed to protect custodial parents' parental rights, but rather to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of child custody, [94] did contain its own definition of physical custody. Under the UCCJA § 2(8), enacted as KRS 403.410(8), physical custody is defined as actual possession and control of a child[ ]. [95] And, thus, under a literal interpretation of the KRS 403.410(8) definition of physical custody, mere possession of a child may suffice. If this definition applies, then a nonparent with mere physical possession of a child would have standing to seek custody. We hold, however, that simple physical possession, standing alone, is insufficient to confer standing to contest child custody upon a nonparent. Kentucky's appellate courts have recognized not only that parents of a child have a statutorily granted superior right to its care and custody, [96] but also that parents have fundamental, basic and constitutionally protected rights to raise their own children. [97] And, because we would necessarily abrogate those rights if we were to resolve custody disputes on a best interest of the child standard after allowing the nonparent to obtain standing by mere possession of the child, we hold that physical custody for the purposes of establishing standing requires more than actual possession and control of a child at the time a custody action is commenced [98] i.e., a showing that the parent has somehow voluntarily and indefinitely relinquished custody of the child. This does not mean that every voluntary relinquishment will deprive a parent of physical custody and bestow standing upon a nonparent. In determining whether parents have relinquished physical custody in a manner that confers standing upon a nonparent, Kentucky trial courtslike other courts that have addressed this issueshould consider, among other factors: (1) how possession of the child was acquired by the nonparent, especially the intent of the parents at the time of their relinquishment of the child to the nonparent; (2) the nature and duration of the possession by the nonparent; (3) the age of the child when possession was acquired by the nonparent and the child's age when the parents sought the child's return; (4) any visits by the parents during the nonparent's possession of the child; (5) any financial support by the parents during the child's stay with the nonparent; (6) the length of time between the relinquishment and the parent's efforts to secure the child's return; and (7) what efforts the parents made to secure the child's return. Although we recognize that these factors cannot be applied mechanically as a formula to generate a conclusive answer as to the nonparent's standing, we believe these factors are useful analytical tools. We further recognize that although factors (1) and (2) will usually have the most importance, the other factors may also impact upon the determination. On the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred when it ruled that the Asentes lacked standing. Moore and Dorning voluntarily relinquished Justin to the Asentes for the purpose of adoption. In furtherance of the planned adoption, they filed an action to terminate their parental rights and to transfer Justin's custody to the Asentes. Although their consents to adopt are not enforceable and the TPR action was dismissed, these actions undoubtedly show that, when they handed Justin over to the Assentes, Moore and Dorning intended to relinquish custody indefinitely. Although Moore subsequently called and sought the return of Justin, she did not do so until over a month later, and Moore and Dorning did not file this action to regain Justin's custody until almost six (6) months after Justin's placement with the Asentes. Based on these facts, we hold that Justin was in the physical custody of the Asentes, not Moore and Dorning, at the time this custody action was commenced, and therefore, the Asentes have standing to pursue Justin's custody. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred when it held that the Asentes lacked standing to pursue custody of Justin, and we therefore remand this matter to the trial court for it to conduct a hearing to determine custody.
Custody contests between a parent and a nonparent who does not fall within the statutory rule on `de facto' custodians are determined under a standard requiring the nonparent to prove that the case falls within one of two exceptions to parental entitlement to custody. One exception to the parent's superior right to custody arises if the parent is shown to be `unfit' by clear and convincing evidence. A second exception arises if the parent has waived his or her superior right to custody. [99] Under the first exception, the nonparent must first show by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has engaged in conduct similar to activity that could result in the termination of parental rights by the state. [100] Only after making such a threshold showing would the court determine custody in accordance with the child's best interest. [101] Under the second exception, however, if a waiver has been shown by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court shall determine custody between the parent and nonparent based on the best interest of the child. [102] Waiver requires proof of a `knowing and voluntary surrender or relinquishment of a known right.' [103] However, waiver may be implied by a party's decisive, unequivocal conduct reasonably inferring the intent to waive, [104] as long as statements and supporting circumstances [are] equivalent to an express waiver. [105] Kentucky's appellate courts have recognized two circumstances that constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of a parent's superior right to custody. Van Wey v. Van Wey [106] and Boatwright v. Walker [107] held, respectively, that once (1) a voluntary petition to terminate parental rights to permit an adoption or (2) a voluntary, knowing consent to adoption, have been executed, withdrawal, while permissible, nevertheless waives the parent's superior right to child custody, `and the best interests of the child [then] takes precedence.' [108] Whether a parent has waived his or her superior right to custody under KRS 405.020 is a fact-specific determination that should be made after consideration of all relevant factors. Here, based on the undisputed material facts in this case, we conclude that Moore and Dorning waived their superior rights to custody of Justin. Although their consents to Justin's adoption were held invalid because of their mistaken belief that they had until the TPR hearing to withdraw them, the consents were otherwise voluntarily and knowingly signed by them. Their mistake as to when they could revoke their consent was cured when the trial court, in effect, allowed them to revoke their consents to the adoption. But the fact remains that Moore and Dorning voluntarily signed consents with the knowledge and the intent that the consents would facilitate Justin's adoption. That was their intention when they signed the consents and it was their intention when they signed the petition to terminate their parental rights. Even if they had effectively revoked their consents within the statutory twenty-day cut-off period, under the circumstances of this case, we would hold that Moore and Dorning had waived their superior rights because they contacted the Asentes, not once but twice (and on occasions that were several months apart), about the adoption. This was neither a spur of the moment nor a coerced decision by Moore and Dorning. They signed the necessary forms for Justin's placement with the Asentes for the express purpose of his adoption by them, and when placement was finally approved, they delivered Justin to the Asentes. At that time, the intentions of Moore and Dorning to permanently change the legal custody of Justin to the Asentes were clearly defined. [109] Moore and Dorning were unquestionably and knowingly proceeding with a course of action that would result in Justin being considered for purposes of inheritance and succession and for all other legal considerations, the natural child of the [Asentes], the same as if born of their bodies, and terminating all legal relationship[s] between [Justin and Moore and Dorning]. [110] Thereafter, they voluntarily and knowingly signed a petition for the termination of their parental rights and for the transfer of custody to the Asentes for the purpose of his adoption upon the termination of their parental rights. Moore did not notify the Asentes of her change of heart regarding Justin's adoption until 37 days after Justin had physically been delivered to the Asentes. And, Moore and Dorning did not file this action to regain Justin's custody until almost six (6) months after turning him over to the Asentes. Under the circumstances, Moore and Dorning not only waived their superior right to the custody of Justin but are estopped from claiming otherwise. [111] We therefore hold that, upon remand, the trial court shall determine custody in accordance with Justin's present best interest.