Opinion ID: 687706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Stop of Plaintiffs' Car at the Roadblock

Text: 8 As a preliminary matter, we must acknowledge that the roadblock at issue here differed significantly from a roadblock stopping all motorists on an ordinary public thoroughfare. Because of its location, defendants' roadblock only stopped motorists attempting to enter the Dick Conner Correctional Center; it therefore served as an element of the prison's overall security operation. As a reviewing court, we must largely defer to the judgment of prison administrators in matters of institutional security. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). As the Supreme Court has stated, [p]rison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. Bell, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878. Prison administrators' responsibility for maintaining security includes the duty to intercept and exclude by all reasonable means all contraband smuggled into the facility. Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir.1982); see also Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir.1977) (stating that prison authorities' prime consideration is the preservation of the safety and security of the prison, which includes the duty to intercept narcotics and other harmful contraband being smuggled into the facility by visitors), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915, 98 S.Ct. 3144, 57 L.Ed.2d 1160 (1978). We therefore review the constitutionality of the detention of plaintiffs' car at the roadblock with significant deference to the judgment of prison officials. 9 The stop of a vehicle at a roadblock on a public thoroughfare is clearly a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). But the Fourth Amendment forbids only those seizures that are unreasonable. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In determining whether the stop of plaintiffs' vehicle was unreasonable, we must evaluate the circumstances of the stop and the relevant interests at stake. Our analysis is guided by the three-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450, 110 S.Ct. at 2485. Under Brown, the constitutionality of a stop depends on the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. at 2640. 10 In addressing the public concern served by the roadblock, the magistrate identified the relevant governmental interest as ensuring that no illegal narcotics enter its prisons. More broadly, the government's interest was to maintain the institutional security of the prison. These are unquestionably matters of significant public concern. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 546-47, 99 S.Ct. at 1877-78 (stating that maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals of prison administration). Thus, the first element of the balancing test weighs heavily in the government's favor. 11 The second prong of the Brown test requires us to evaluate the degree to which the stop of plaintiffs' car served these governmental interests. As a reviewing court, our task is to decide not whether the government chose the best possible alternative to advance its objectives but only whether the chosen method was reasonably designed to achieve those goals. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54, 110 S.Ct. at 2486-87. Moreover, we cannot  'substitute our judgment on ... difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration' for the determinations of those charged with the formidable task of running a prison. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2406, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (citation omitted) (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3233, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984)). In this case, there was a relatively close fit between the government's interrelated ends--drug interdiction and prison security--and the means it selected to effectuate them: The roadblock briefly detained each vehicle entering the prison only to facilitate a drug-sensing dog's sweep of the car and its occupants. In light of the deference we must afford prison officials in their efforts to preserve institutional security, we believe that the roadblock was reasonably designed to advance the government's interests. 12 Finally, we must consider the seizure's infringement on plaintiffs' personal liberty. Given the governmental interests at stake, the interference with plaintiffs' freedom was not significant. Again, only those vehicles attempting to enter the prison were stopped, and each car was detained for only a few minutes. Under these circumstances, the restriction of personal liberty was not substantial. 13 In sum, the three-part Brown balancing test clearly weighs in favor of the government: The public interest in keeping drugs out of prisons and maintaining prison security is substantial, the roadblock was reasonably tailored to achieve these objectives, and the interference with plaintiffs' individual liberty was not significant. The stop of plaintiffs' vehicle therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.