Opinion ID: 2639799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Competency Procedures under RCW 10.77.060

Text: ¶ 12 Heddrick argues that he was denied due process of law when the trial court failed to execute the procedures in RCW 10.77.060. An accused in a criminal case has a fundamental right not to be tried while incompetent to stand trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); In re Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 142 Wash.2d 853, 861, 16 P.3d 610 (2001). Washington law affords greater protection by providing that `[n]o incompetent person shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity continues.' Fleming, 142 Wash.2d at 862, 16 P.3d 610 (alteration in original) (quoting RCW 10.77.050). The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect this right is a denial of due process. State v. O'Neal, 23 Wash.App. 899, 901, 600 P.2d 570 (1979) (citing Drope, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966)). Chapter 10.77 RCW provides such a procedure. The [p]rocedures of the competency statute ... are mandatory and not merely directory, Fleming, 142 Wash.2d at 863, 16 P.3d 610 (citing State v. Wicklund, 96 Wash.2d 798, 805, 638 P.2d 1241 (1982)), and failure to observe these procedures is a violation of due process. Id. (citing O'Neal, 23 Wash.App. at 901, 600 P.2d 570). ¶ 13 The record is clear that the procedures outlined in RCW 10.77.060 [2] were not fully followed in either of Heddrick's cases. Both trial judges ordered the issuance of reports from two qualified experts pursuant to RCW 10.77.060(1)(a), but never entered any WSH report into evidence as would be required under RCW 10.77.065(1)(a)(i). Further, Dr. White never memorialized his findings into a report for distribution to the parties and to the court. Instead, the trial court relied on counsel Lapps's stipulations as to Dr. White's opinion when it found Heddrick to be competent. On these facts alone, it would seem that Heddrick did not receive due process under the law. [3] ¶ 14 However, because Heddrick's counsel withdrew any challenge, the State contends he waived any unrealized statutory procedures. Decisions from the courts in this state reveal a distinction between the substance of competency, which cannot be waived, and the procedures used in its determination, which may be waived in certain circumstances. Compare Fleming, 142 Wash.2d at 864, 16 P.3d 610 (incompetency cannot be waived), with State v. Israel, 19 Wash.App. 773, 779, 577 P.2d 631 (1978) (procedures under chapter 10.77 RCW are not mandatory and may be waived by the defendant). [4] ¶ 15 In Fleming, this court suggested that the condition of competency may not be waived. 142 Wash.2d at 864, 16 P.3d 610. There, the State argued that an entry of an Alford [5] plea constituted a waiver of competency. Id. This court rejected this argument, holding that incompetency cannot be waived, and that an incompetent person may not enter into any plea agreement. Id. The court found it apparent that a person found to be incompetent could not then be tried or enter into a plea agreement of any kind. Id. Underlying the court's concern was our traditional insistence that any waiver of a constitutional right be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Stegall, 124 Wash.2d 719, 724-25, 881 P.2d 979 (1994). It is axiomatic that a person incompetent to stand trial cannot affect a knowing or intelligent waiver. State v. Smith, 88 Wash.2d 639, 642, 564 P.2d 1154 (1977), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jones, 99 Wash.2d 735, 744, 664 P.2d 1216 (1983). ¶ 16 This court has stated that the statutory competency procedures are mandatory and not merely directory. Wicklund, 96 Wash.2d at 805, 638 P.2d 1241. In Wicklund, the court cited to Israel without disapproving of its waiver provisions. Id. Rather, the court noted that waiver was not at issue in the case of Mr. Wicklund. Id. Thus, the language in Wicklund suggests that waiver of the procedures has legal effect and does not violate due process. ¶ 17 In a recent case, this court added further heft to the statutory competency procedures. State v. Marshall, 144 Wash.2d 266, 27 P.3d 192 (2001). In Marshall, the defendant's competency became an issue when, against counsels' advice, the defendant stated his intent to change his plea to guilty. Id. at 269, 27 P.3d 192. The court engaged the defendant in a colloquy during a plea hearing and concluded that he was competent to enter a plea of guilty. Id. After the prosecutor decided to seek the death penalty, the defendant moved to withdraw the plea and presented strong evidence of the defendant's significant brain injury. Id. at 270-73, 27 P.3d 192. Despite the evidence, the trial court denied the motion without observing procedures compliant with the competency statute. Id. at 273, 27 P.3d 192. This court reversed, holding that where a defendant moves to withdraw [a] guilty plea with evidence the defendant was incompetent when the plea was made, the trial court must either grant the motion to withdraw ... or convene a formal competency hearing required by RCW 10.77.060. Id. at 281, 27 P.3d 192. ¶ 18 On the other hand, a defendant may waive completion of the procedures in chapter 10.77 RCW. Israel, 19 Wash.App. at 779, 577 P.2d 631. In Israel, after the prosecutor made a motion for competency determination, the trial judge did not appoint any experts to examine the defendant. Id. at 775, 577 P.2d 631. Instead, the court proceeded to ask questions of the defendant and allowed the prosecutor to question her. Id. Defense counsel asked no questions but asked that the court find her competent at the close of the perfunctory examination. Id. at 775-76, 577 P.2d 631. While the court acknowledged that the Washington statute... speak[s] in mandatory language, id. at 777, 577 P.2d 631, it held that the statutory requirement that two experts be appointed to examine a defendant is not a constitutional right but is statutory and may be waived by counsel. Id. at 779, 577 P.2d 631; see also State v. Brooks, 16 Wash.App. 535, 538, 557 P.2d 362 (1976) (holding that the defense's presentation of two psychiatrists' testimony constituted an election of the procedure and a waiver of the specific statutory procedures). ¶ 19 Despite the propriety of waivers in earlier cases, Heddrick asserts that competency cannot be found by waiver or stipulation. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 6-8. Heddrick cites to Pate for the proposition that a person whose competency is in doubt cannot waive his right to have the court properly determine his capacity to stand trial. Id. at 7. Pate is factually distinguishable from Heddrick's case because the defendant never demanded a hearing. Thus, the court's reasoning focused on the duty of the court and the impropriety of an implied waiver by failure to raise the issue. Moreover, Pate is emblematic of a line of cases standing for the proposition that competency in substance cannot be waived. See also Fleming, 142 Wash.2d at 864, 16 P.3d 610; Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir.2001); Silverstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir.1983) (reasoning that conflicting psychiatry reports triggered a trial court's duty to conduct a competency hearing). While we recognize the legal weight of these authorities, we believe a distinction exists between substantive competency and the procedures used to discern a defendant's competency with regard to waiver or abandonment of a competency challenge. ¶ 20 Therefore, we hold that the statutory competency procedures may be waived, and Heddrick effected a waiver at trial when his counsel Lapps withdrew the challenge to competency. Heddrick's case more closely resembles Israel than Marshall and Fleming because Heddrick expressly withdrew his competency challenge. Marshall is distinguishable on the grounds that counsel in that case contested competency before the guilty plea was entered as well as during motion proceedings to withdraw the plea, and the latter contest was supported by extensive evidence of incompetence. 144 Wash.2d at 279-80, 27 P.3d 192. Heddrick's counsel contested competency early in the proceedings but withdrew the contest after Dr. White's report revealed Heddrick to be competent. Fleming is similarly distinguishable because although waiver was an issue, any waiver in that case would have been merely implied by the entry of the defendant's Alford plea. Heddrick entered an express waiver after psychological examination revealed evidence of competence. In Fleming, evidence of incompetence existed but was not brought to the attention of the court before the plea because of counsel's negligence. No question of negligent representation or ineffective assistance of counsel appears before this court. [6] ¶ 21 Heddrick argues that, despite the withdrawal by his counsel, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to complete the statutory proceedings on its own initiative. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 8. A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a conclusion on untenable or unreasonable grounds. While it is true that a court has the authority to order and complete competency proceedings on its own motion, a court must do so only when there is reason to doubt a defendant's competency. RCW 10.77.060( l )(a). Thus, stipulations to competency and counsel's representations of medical findings can erase doubt in the court's mind. Nothing presented here demonstrates that counsel's representations were erroneous or counter to some overriding fact. Rather, Dr. White's analysis, and probably that of WSH staff, supported a finding of competency. Without showing otherwise, Heddrick's requested relief amounts to empty formality. ¶ 22 In addition, the State counters effectively that complaining now that the court should have proceeded despite Heddrick's withdrawal of his competency challenge amounts to invited error. A party invites error when a party sets up an error at trial and then claims such error on appeal. In re Dependency of K.R., 128 Wash.2d 129, 147, 904 P.2d 1132 (1995). This doctrine applies even to errors of constitutional magnitude that can be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Henderson, 114 Wash.2d 867, 869-70, 792 P.2d 514 (1990). From the facts at bar, any putative error was invited by the defendant's conduct. ¶ 23 In keeping with Israel and O'Neal, we hold that so long as a defendant maintains a challenge to competency, the chapter 10.77 RCW procedures are mandatory to satisfy due process. However, this process may be waived by a defendant when satisfied with the evidence of competence. [7] Further, a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it accepted Heddrick's waiver. We affirm the Court of Appeals on grounds of waiver but reject the use of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), balancing in deciding due process issues in criminal proceedings.