Opinion ID: 2388059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether in family court proceedings a prior juvenile adjudication constitutes a conviction for the purposes of section 11-47-5 of the rhode island general laws

Text: The second issue requires that we examine provisions of the Family Court Act in light of a general criminal statute. The General Assembly has provided the Family Court with a liberal grant of jurisdiction to adjudge a juvenile delinquent for  any offense which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a felony   . (Emphasis added.) Section 14-1-3(F), as amended by P.L. 1984, ch. 216, § 1. With this broad language in mind, we have stated that a criminal statute generally applies with equal force to both adults and juveniles unless a contrary legislative intent to exclude minors from its purview is clearly apparent from the face of the act itself. See In re Steven, 510 A.2d 955, 957 (R.I. 1986). The statute upon which the underlying petition rests, § 11-47-5, provides in pertinent part: No person who has been convicted in this state or elsewhere of a crime of violence    shall purchase, own, carry, transport or have in his possession or under his control any firearm. The act then prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence of two years and a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment. Violation of § 11-47-5, if committed by an adult, would therefore constitute a felony. G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-1-2, as amended by P.L. 1985, ch. 462, § 3. The statute does not expressly exempt minors from its operative ambit. At the motion hearing below and on appeal Bernard has argued that a juvenile could never be convicted of a previous crime of violence as mandated by § 11-47-5 and that, therefore, dismissal of the delinquency petition was required. We find this argument unpersuasive. Once again we are inclined to heed the mandates contained in § 14-1-40, which states in relevant part: Adjudication not having effect of conviction.  No adjudication upon the status of any child in the jurisdiction of the court shall operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from a conviction, nor shall any child be deemed a criminal by reason of such adjudication, nor shall such adjudication be deemed a conviction, nor shall any child be charged with or convicted of a crime in any court, except as provided in this chapter. In construing this provision of the Family Court Act, this court has consistently held that an adjudication of delinquency is not deemed a criminal conviction, except as it may be considered by a sentencing justice within the Family Court. See, e.g., In re Michael, 423 A.2d 1180 (R.I. 1981); In re Wilkinson, 116 R.I. 163, 353 A.2d 199 (1976); Taylor v. Howard, 111 R.I. 527, 304 A.2d 891 (1973). In these cases we recognized that the General Assembly intended to protect juveniles from the civil disabilities and the denigrating social and economic stigma which oftentimes accompanies a criminal record. Taylor v. Howard, 111 R.I. at 530, 304 A.2d at 893-94. Thus our past decisions focused on the express mandate of § 14-1-40 which prohibits the Family Court from establishing a record of one or more criminal convictions against a minor. Nothing in § 14-1-40, however, bars the Family Court from adjudging a child delinquent for violating a law in which a prior conviction is a necessary element to the crime charged. With a statute such as § 11-47-5, the Legislature has provided no indication that it intended to exclude minors from the act's purview. We believe that the term convicted in § 11-47-5 assumes its ordinary meaning for the purposes of Family Court proceedings. Black's Law Dictionary 301 (West 5th ed. 1979) defines conviction as the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the accused is guilty as charged. Under this definition, then, a juvenile adjudication is subsumed within the ordinary legal meaning of the term conviction. We therefore hold that a juvenile adjudication qualifies as a conviction within the context of § 11-47-5 for the exclusive purposes of Family Court proceedings. The decision reached today is entirely consonant with the special treatment historically afforded juveniles and with the Legislature's desire to protect children from the burdening impairments associated with a criminal record. See State v. Berard, 121 R.I. 551, 401 A.2d 448 (1979). Since the Family Court must determine whether Bernard violated § 11-47-5, it follows that a finding of guilty will only result in another adjudication of delinquency. No criminal record will result. The intent of the Legislature in enacting § 14-1-40 is therefore scrupulously honored. It is hoped that repeated adjudications of delinquency will operate as a red flag to the Family Court in furtherance of its objectives under § 14-1-2. It will assure the juvenile offender such care, rehabilitative guidance, and control as the court deems necessary in promoting the best interests of the child. For the above-enunciated reasons, the state's appeal is sustained. The judgment appealed from is reversed. The matter is remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.