Opinion ID: 167707
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 16 It is well-established that a criminal defendant does not have the absolute right to plead guilty. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). Instead, [t]his phase of the process of criminal justice, and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. Id. These safeguards are contained in Fed. R.Crim.P. 11, which requires, inter alia, the district court to ascertain whether the defendant understands the charges against him as well as his rights not to plead guilty and to a jury trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1). 17 Significant to this case, the Rule also requires the district court to determine that a factual basis supports the guilty plea. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(3); United States v. Barker, 681 F.2d 589, 592 (10th Cir.1982). The factual basis for the plea need not come solely from the defendant's statements at the plea hearing. See Howard v. United States, 135 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir.1998) (stating that any finding of an adequate factual basis at the initial plea hearing is necessarily preliminary). Rather, the district court may look to answers provided by counsel for the defense and government, the presentence report, `or . . . whatever means is appropriate in a specific case'—so long as the factual basis is put on the record. United States v. Smith, 160 F.3d 117, 121 (2d. Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1524-25 (2d Cir.1997)). 18 Rule 11 also contemplates the existence of the factual basis for the plea both when the court accepts the plea, and when it enters judgment on it. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(3) ( Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.) (emphasis added); Smith, 160 F.3d at 121 (the district court's obligations under Rule 11[(b)(3)] continue until it has entered judgment.). In this way, the Rule permits the district court, once it has accepted a plea, to reject it after the discovery of facts inconsistent with the plea. See United States v. Ventura-Cruel, 356 F.3d 55, 60-61 (1st Cir.2003) (affirming vacated plea when the district court discovered that the defendant disavowed an element of the crime after pleading guilty to it); see also 1A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 174 at 207 (3d ed. 1999) ([I]f a plea has been accepted and the court should later decide that it is not satisfied that there was a factual basis for the plea, it should vacate the plea and then enter a plea of not guilty on behalf of the defendant.); Smith, 160 F.3d at 121 (If [the court] decides there was no factual basis for a guilty plea after accepting it, the court should vacate the plea and enter a plea of not guilty on behalf of the defendant.); United States v. Keiswetter, 866 F.2d 1301, 1302 ([w]hen it is determined that a plea of guilty is improvidently accepted by a trial court without full compliance with Fed. R.Crim.P. 11, the plea must be vacated.). 19 We will not reverse a district court's determination as to the existence of facts supporting a guilty plea unless that determination is clearly erroneous. See United States v. Barnhardt, 93 F.3d 706, 710 (10th Cir.1996). Such a determination is clearly erroneous only if it is without factual support or if we are definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Barnhardt, 93 F.3d at 710. We find no such error here. After accepting Mr. Moran's guilty plea but before entering judgment on it, 3 the District Court learned that Mr. Moran was not only protesting his innocence but also claiming that the prosecutor and his own attorney had coerced him into pleading guilty. The District Court held a hearing on the matter, and the only two witnesses called to testify confirmed what the District Court had been told. Moreover, Mr. Moran himself has never disputed that he did, in fact, make such statements. Instead, Mr. Moran contends that he was embarrassed by the publicity surrounding his case and was only trying to make himself look better when he told his counselor and the detective that he had nothing to do with marijuana that day. Nevertheless, Mr. Moran chose not to testify himself at the February 14 hearing on the matter. Under these circumstances, the District Court concluded that Mr. Moran had not been truthful when he pleaded guilty to the information charging him with possession of marijuana on May 18, and, accordingly, that there was not a sufficient factual basis to support his plea. Given the record in this case, we do not find the District Court's determination to be clearly erroneous. 20 To the extent Mr. Moran argues that his subsequent conviction for being a user of marijuana in possession of ammunition on May 18 necessarily means that he also possessed marijuana on May 18, we reject that contention as well. It is clear that the former conviction does not require proof that he was using—and, presumably, possessing—marijuana at the exact time he possessed the ammunition. Rather, the Government need only show that the drug use was contemporaneous with the possession of the firearm or ammunition to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). United States v. Bennett, 329 F.3d 769, 776-777 (10th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Edmonds, 348 F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir.2003) (adopting approach set forth in Bennett ). Given Mr. Moran's admitted extensive use of marijuana, as well as his positive test results even while on pre-trial supervision, the Government has met its burden here. See Edmonds, 348 F.3d at 953 (extensive drug use history coupled with positive test results after the offense while on bond supports finding that drug use was contemporaneous with possession of firearm). The District Court, then, did not clearly err when it rejected Mr. Moran's guilty plea to possessing marijuana but accepted his plea to being a user of marijuana in possession of ammunition.