Opinion ID: 1389650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Coconspirator Statements

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting coconspirator statements under ER 801(d)(2)(v). Specifically, he asserts that unless conspiracy is charged in the information, coconspirator statements are inadmissible. We hold otherwise. [1] By its terms, ER 801(d)(2)(v) does not restrict its application only to criminal cases in which conspiracy has been charged. [1] Prior to the rule, the availability of the coconspirator exception did not depend on whether a criminal conspiracy was charged. State v. Wappenstein, 67 Wash. 502, 121 P. 989 (1912). Under the federal rule comparable to ER 801(d)(2)(v), the federal courts uniformly allow admission of coconspirator statements in criminal cases, whether or not conspiracy has been charged. See, e.g., United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 859 (1980); United States v. Lyles, 593 F.2d 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); see generally Annot., 44 A.L.R. Fed. 627 (1979). Defendant implies that State v. Goodwin, 29 Wn.2d 276, 186 P.2d 935 (1947) overruled State v. Wappenstein, supra . The issue in Goodwin was the admission, in a joint trial, of a codefendant's written confession apparently made after his arrest. Despite ambiguous language, the holding does not apply to coconspirator statements made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. ER 801(d)(2)(v) is entirely consistent with the concerns in Goodwin that statements made after the conspiracy has ended should not be admitted. Defendant further argues that the trial court erroneously found a prima facie case of conspiracy, failed to find that the statements were made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and failed to determine that the declarants were members of the conspiracy. The record belies defendant's contentions. [2] The general rule is that prior to admitting coconspirator statements, the trial court must determine whether the State has shown, with substantial independent evidence, a prima facie case of conspiracy, and at least slight evidence of defendant's participation. United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.1982). A conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence if, in the opinion of the trial court, it tends to establish the fact of conspiracy. State v. Culver, 36 Wn. App. 524, 675 P.2d 622 (1984). During the pretrial hearing in this case, the trial court indicated the independent evidence upon which it relied. The court found that substantial evidence, independent of the statements, showed the existence of a conspiracy to promote gambling. Defendant's remaining claims are similarly meritless. The record indicates that the trial court, on several occasions, was concerned with establishing that the conspiracy was still ongoing after the killings, and had not yet ended when the statements were made. The trial court found that the coconspirator statements furthered the continuing conspiracy because they were implied threats made in connection with collecting the gambling proceeds. On several occasions during the offer of proof, the court requested and was given information regarding each alleged conspirator's involvement in the conspiracy. We find no abuse of discretion in admitting the coconspirator statements.