Opinion ID: 2565043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether prosecutorial misconduct caused Weber prejudice requiring reversal of his convictions

Text: ¶ 32 To prove prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the prosecuting attorney's conduct was both improper and prejudicial. State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 561, 940 P.2d 546 (1997) (citing State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 85, 882 P.2d 747 (1994)). In order to prove the conduct was prejudicial, the defendant must prove there is a `substantial likelihood the misconduct affected the jury's verdict.' In re Pers. Restraint of Pirtle, 136 Wash.2d 467, 481-82, 965 P.2d 593 (1998) (quoting State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d 628, 672, 904 P.2d 245 (1995)). Reversal is not required `unless, within reasonable probabilities, the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected had the error not occurred.' State v. Bourgeois, 133 Wash.2d 389, 403, 945 P.2d 1120 (1997) (quoting State v. Tharp, 96 Wash.2d 591, 599, 637 P.2d 961 (1981)). ¶ 33 If the defendant does not object to alleged misconduct at trial, the issue of prosecutorial misconduct is usually waived unless the misconduct was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that it evinces an enduring and resulting prejudice that could not have been neutralized by an admonition to the jury. State v. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d 668, 719, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997) (citing State v. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d 570, 596, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995)). Weber did not object to the first two alleged instances of misconduct. VRP (June 25, 2003) at 9-11. At the Court of Appeals, the State argued that Weber did not need to object to the prosecuting attorney's improper questions because the court had already granted Weber's motion in limine to exclude the admitted testimony, citing Fenimore v. Donald M. Drake Construction Co., 87 Wash.2d 85, 92, 549 P.2d 483 (1976), and State v. Smith, 189 Wash. 422, 65 P.2d 1075 (1937). Br. of Resp't at 11 n. 4. However, in this court, the State changes its position and argues that defense counsel failed to object, which it interprets as an indication that any possible prejudice was minimal. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 29. Because the State changed its position and its original argument reflects a misreading, or at least an overstatement, of the law, we resolve the issue of whether or not Weber's failure to object should be held against him. ¶ 34 The State's argument at the Court of Appeals reflects a misreading of Fenimore and a possible overstatement of the rule from Smith. Fenimore stands for the proposition that when a trial court properly denies a party's motion to exclude evidence and instructs that party to object to the evidence when offered at trial, the party is not relieved of the burden of objecting to evidence which he believed to be inadmissible. 87 Wash.2d at 92, 549 P.2d 483. Following Fenimore, this court held that a party losing a motion to exclude evidence has a standing objection to the admission of that evidence at trial unless instructed by the court to continue to object. State v. Kelly, 102 Wash.2d 188, 193, 685 P.2d 564 (1984) (citing State v. Koloske, 100 Wash.2d 889, 676 P.2d 456 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wash.2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988)). These cases do not guide the determination of whether Weber was required to object because Weber's motion to exclude evidence was granted, not denied. ¶ 35 In a 1937 case, this court held that a party's failure to object to evidence already excluded by a pretrial motion was not controlling and did not prevent the defendant from receiving a new trial. Smith, 189 Wash. at 429, 65 P.2d 1075. However, the Court of Appeals has concluded that the rule from Smith should apply only in limited circumstances because in that case the State demonstrated a deliberate disregard for the pretrial order and because an objection was likely more damaging than almost any answer in that case. State v. Sullivan, 69 Wash.App. 167, 173, 847 P.2d 953 (1993). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the complaining party must continue to object because even if the trial court has determined that certain evidence is inadmissible, the court may not have considered how prejudicial the evidence is or what the remedy for its admission should be. Id. at 172, 847 P.2d 953. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals noted, there is great potential for abuse when a party does not object because [a] party so situated could simply lie back, not allowing the trial court to avoid the potential prejudice, gamble on the verdict, and then seek a new trial on appeal. Id. In this case, the Court of Appeals considered Sullivan in determining whether Weber was required to object despite winning his pretrial motions. Weber, slip op. (unpublished portion) at 15-16. ¶ 36 We follow the common sense approach of the Court of Appeals and consider Weber's failure to object even though he received pretrial orders that allegedly excluded the admitted evidence. Without an objection, the trial court never had an opportunity to determine whether the evidence would even have been covered by the pretrial motions, or if it was covered by the motions, whether the court could have cured any potential prejudice through an instruction. Thus, even when the trial court has already excluded evidence through a pretrial order, the complaining party should object to the admission of the allegedly inadmissible evidence in order to preserve the issue for review, unless an unusual circumstance exists that makes it impossible to avoid the prejudicial impact of evidence that had previously been ruled inadmissible. Sullivan, 69 Wash.App. at 173, 847 P.2d 953. Examples of such unusual circumstances are when the other party's questions were in deliberate disregard of the trial court's ruling, or an objection by itself would be so damaging as to be immune from any admonition or curative instruction by the trial court. Id.; see Smith, 189 Wash. at 428-29, 65 P.2d 1075. Here, it is not clear that the State's questions were in deliberate disregard of the court's ruling or that an objection from Weber would have been so damaging that an instruction would not have cured any prejudice. ¶ 37 Weber maintains that the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct that constitutes reversible error in three ways. First, the prosecuting attorney disregarded a pretrial order by soliciting evidence that Detective Alvarez had previously met Weber while investigating his brother for a crime. Pet. for Review at 19. Second, the prosecuting attorney disregarded another pretrial order by introducing evidence of gang membership. Id. at 20. Third, the prosecuting attorney made improper arguments during rebuttal closing argument. Id. at 21-22. Finally, Weber argues that even if each individual instance of misconduct does not constitute reversible error, the cumulative error doctrine applies. Id. at 23. The State concedes that the prosecuting attorney did commit misconduct in the three instances identified by Weber but asserts that the misconduct was not prejudicial and, therefore, does not constitute reversible error and that Weber's cumulative error claim fails. Br. of Resp't at 11, 15, 17, 21.
¶ 38 Weber asserts that the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by disregarding a pretrial order that excluded evidence that Detective Alvarez met Weber while investigating his brother as a suspect in a stabbing incident. Pet. for Review at 19. During the prosecuting attorney's direct examination of Detective Alavarez, the following exchange occurred: Q. Who was that? A. Charles Webber [sic]. Q. Did that name mean anything to you? A. Yes, it did. Q. Explain why. A. Approximately a year prior to that, I was investigating or assisting with an investigation of a stabbing incident where Charles's brother was the prime suspect. And I had contacted Charles during the course of that investigation. VRP (June 25, 2003) at 9. ¶ 39 In a pretrial hearing, the trial court excluded evidence that Detective Alvarez had previously met Weber while investigating a crime involving Weber's brother. VRP (June 11, 2003) at 25. However, the court explicitly did not exclude evidence that the detective had previously met Weber. Id. The State concedes that Detective Alvarez's testimony violated the pretrial order but argues that Weber still must prove that the error likely affected the jury's verdict. Br. of Resp't at 11-12. ¶ 40 At trial, Weber's attorney failed to object to the error, request a curative instruction, or move for a mistrial. The Court of Appeals determined that the prosecuting attorney did not deliberately disregard the pretrial order. Weber, slip op. (unpublished portion) at 17. We agree that the prosecuting attorney did not so clearly act in deliberate disregard of the pretrial order that Weber was excused from objecting. The pretrial order did not exclude evidence that the detective had previous contact with Weber, and the prosecuting attorney's questions conceivably could have been targeted only at soliciting that information. ¶ 41 Additionally, even if we do not hold Weber's failure to object against him, Weber has failed to prove that the prosecutor's questions caused him prejudice that affected the outcome of his trial. As the State notes, the content of Detective Alvarez's testimony may have been more helpful to Weber than prejudicial. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 29. During the pretrial hearing, the trial court observed that if the jury heard that Alvarez had previous contact with Weber, the jury might make the inference that Alvarez knew Weber from previous arrests or criminal activity. VRP (June 11, 2003) at 18. Defense counsel agreed and acknowledged that he might later choose to introduce the context in which he knows Mr. Webber [sic]. Id. ¶ 42 Weber failed to preserve the error on appeal by not objecting. He also failed to carry his burden of proving that there is a substantial likelihood that the prosecutor's misconduct affected the jury's verdict. As a result, we hold that the prosecuting attorney did not commit misconduct warranting a new trial in this instance.
¶ 43 Second, Weber asserts that the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by violating a pretrial order excluding evidence of gang membership. The following exchange also occurred during the prosecuting attorney's direct examination of Alavarez: Q. Have you ever in your contacts with anyone as a patrol officer, ever observed anyone besides the defendant Charles Webber [sic] with a 206 tattoo on the back of his neck? A. No. Q. What about during the course of your duties as a special enforcement agent in investigating gangs, have you ever come across another individual with the tattoo of a 206 on the back of his neck? A. Not of that size, no. VRP (June 25, 2003) at 10-11. ¶ 44 In a pretrial hearing, the trial court excluded all evidence of gang membership but did not exclude evidence of any marks that may have been observed by any witness or testimony of any marks that may currently be present on Mr. Webber [sic]. VRP (June 10, 2003) at 147; VRP (June 11, 2003) at 10. The State concedes that the prosecuting attorney's question violated the pretrial order but argues that it was not so prejudicial that it likely affected the jury's verdict. Br. of Resp't at 15. ¶ 45 Again, Weber's attorney failed to object to the error, request a curative instruction, or move for a mistrial. And again, the record does not so clearly indicate that the prosecuting attorney deliberately disregarded the pretrial order as to excuse Weber's failure to preserve the error on appeal. The pretrial order did not exclude evidence of marks that may have been observed by any witness, and the prosecuting attorney's questions conceivably could have been targeted only at soliciting that information. ¶ 46 Previously, Alvarez testified that he primarily handle[s] gang cases or gang incidents. VRP (June 25, 2003) at 7. It is clear from the record that the prosecuting attorney's questions about the tattoos were targeted at establishing how common 206 tattoos are in the effort to identify Weber as the shooter. The questions were not clearly targeted at establishing that Weber was a gang member. Additionally, Alvarez's answer indicated that he had not seen a 206 tattoo the size of Weber's in his work investigating gangs, an answer that resulted in minimal, if any, prejudice. ¶ 47 Moreover, as the State notes, Alvarez's testimony that he primarily investigates gang incidents was not the subject of a motion in limine, nor was it objected to. Br. of Resp't at 16; VRP (June 25, 2003) at 7. Several other witnesses testified regarding the tattoo on Weber's neck, including Manzo, who testified without objection that the 206 tattoo stood for the area that you live in. VRP (June 18, 2003) at 131-32. The admission of testimony that is otherwise excludable is not prejudicial error where similar testimony was admitted earlier without objection. Ashley v. Hall, 138 Wash.2d 151, 159, 978 P.2d 1055 (1999). ¶ 48 Thus, even if we do not hold Weber's failure to object against him, Weber has failed to prove that Alvarez's testimony affected the outcome of his case. This is particularly true in light of the other testimony that the trial court admitted regarding 206 tattoos and gang activity, and in light of the other evidence presented against Weber at trial. As a result, we hold that Weber has failed to prove that the prosecutor's questions caused him prejudice that affected the outcome of his trial.
¶ 49 Third, Weber argues that the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by making prejudicial statements in rebuttal closing argument. Weber asserts that although prosecuting attorneys have some latitude to argue facts and inferences from the evidence, they are not permitted to make prejudicial statements not supported by the record. State v. Rose, 62 Wash.2d 309, 312, 382 P.2d 513 (1963) (citing State v. Heaton, 149 Wash. 452, 271 P. 89 (1928); Rogers v. Kangley Timber Co., 74 Wash. 48, 132 P. 731 (1913)). However, even improper remarks by the prosecutor are not grounds for reversal if they were invited or provoked by defense counsel and are in reply to his or her acts and statements, unless the remarks are not a pertinent reply or are so prejudicial that a curative instruction would be ineffective. Russell, 125 Wash.2d at 86, 882 P.2d 747 (citing State v. Dennison, 72 Wash.2d 842, 849, 435 P.2d 526 (1967); State v. Graham, 59 Wash.App. 418, 428-29, 798 P.2d 314 (1990)). ¶ 50 The State concedes that the prosecuting attorney's remarks in rebuttal closing argument were improper but asserts that they were unlikely to have affected the jury's verdict. Br. of Resp't at 17. In rebuttal closing argument, the prosecuting attorney, Andy Colasurdo, made the following statements: Now, there are cases that go before court all the time, like murders where there is no victim to explain what had happened. No eyewitness to the crime. Yet, we prove those. In another unit in my office, SAU, the Special Assault Unit where you deal with sex crimes Mr. Hall: Objection, your honor. There is no foundation for that type of evidence. The court: Overruled. Mr. Colasurdo: You deal with crimes against small children, crimes where a child has been molested. Mr. Hall: Objection, your honor. Also, no foundation for that type of argument. The court: Why don't you move on. Mr. Colasurdo: It's a legitimate argument, your honor. The court: Move on, counsel. Mr. Colasurdo: There are times for which there are no witnesses and for which there are, as I just mentioned, no evidence. Yet people are convicted of those crimes all the time. Why? Because a jury finds someone credible. VRP (June 30, 2003) at 70-71. However, defense counsel, Randall Hall, made the following statements in his earlier closing argument: Ladies and gentlemen, please take just 20 seconds and imagine, if you can, someone that you are very close to being accused of committing an awful crime, and what you would expect the jury to hear as evidence. Well, you would certainly expect to hear from eyewitnesses, wouldn't you? This case had eyewitnesses as well. But did you hear from them? No. . . . . That is the state's obligation to bring these witnesses in. Id. at 47-48 And defense counsel continued: Well, besides witnesses, wouldn't you like to hear or see something about physical evidence. . . . What didn't you see? You didn't see a gun. You didn't see fingerprints. . . . . How about a thorough search. . . . . They didn't do it. Why? They either didn't want you to have the information or they were negligent about how they conducted the investigation. The end result is the same. You don't have the information that you need to be able to make a decision in this case. Id. at 49-51. ¶ 51 The State argues that the prosecuting attorney's argument, although improper, was made in response to defense counsel's argument about the type of evidence that the State was required to produce. Br. of Resp't at 18. The State cites State v. Farr-Lenzini, 93 Wash.App. 453, 471, 970 P.2d 313 (1999), in which the prosecuting attorney responded to defense counsel's argument that the defendant did not fit the profile of an eluder by stating that Ted Bundy did not fit the profile of a mass murderer. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecuting attorney's remarks were a rhetorical overreaction to a defense argument but that they did not deny the defendant a fair trial because they were addressed through the jury instructions. Id. ¶ 52 In this case, the prosecuting attorney's argument was clearly a response to defense counsel's argument. Additionally, the court instructed the jury to base its decision only on the testimony of witnesses and exhibits in the case and that the attorneys' arguments were not evidence. CP at 45-46. As a result, we hold that Weber has failed to prove that the prosecuting attorney's remarks were so prejudicial that they could not be cured by the jury instructions.
¶ 53 Finally, Weber asserts that the cumulative error doctrine applies to the prosecutor's misconduct. Cumulative error may warrant reversal, even if each error standing alone would otherwise be considered harmless. State v. Greiff, 141 Wash.2d 910, 929, 10 P.3d 390 (2000). The doctrine does not apply where the errors are few and have little or no effect on the outcome of the trial. Id. As discussed above, Weber has failed to prove how each alleged instance of misconduct affected the outcome of his trial. Similarly, Weber has not indicated how these combined instances of misconduct affected the outcome of his trial. As a result, we hold that Weber's cumulative error doctrine claim fails in this case and that the prosecuting attorney did not commit misconduct that constituted reversible error.