Opinion ID: 729914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Snider

Text: 6 Dietzen's claims against Snider concern 1) Snider's direction to police before and during Dietzen's booking not to allow Dietzen a phone call until after Dietzen was taken before a magistrate and his bail bond was increased, and 2) Snider's allegedly conspiring with Mork to place Dietzen in solitary confinement until Dietzen accepted an illegal plea agreement.
7 The district court concluded Dietzen's phone call allegations were meritless given that he alleged no denial of the right to counsel or that compelled self-incrimination resulted from the lack of telephone privileges. Dietzen argues that the district court erred in concluding his rights were not violated as his claims are brought under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, rather than the Sixth Amendment. 8 Dietzen's federal constitutional rights were not violated by the temporary deprivation of telephone privileges. We decline to adopt Dietzen's assertion that he had an absolute constitutional right to a telephone call. See State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1145 n. 2 (7th Cir.) ([T]here is no constitutional requirement that a phone call be permitted upon completion of booking formalities.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 995 (1983); Harrill v. Blount County, 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1995) (The right to make a telephone call immediately upon arrest is not a recognized property right, nor is it a traditional liberty interest recognized by federal law.). Rather, the right to make a telephone call occurs only when certain constitutional rights are implicated, for example the right to consult with counsel. Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d 388, 390-91 (7th Cir.1991). Dietzen, however, expressly disclaims any Sixth Amendment claims. 9 Although we note that unreasonable restrictions on prisoner's telephone access may also violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, id. at 391, the restrictions here (given that Dietzen makes no claim of denial of access to counsel) were not unreasonable. See Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 169 (7th Cir.) (Although a prolonged confinement of an arrested person without a hearing to determine whether he is the person named in the warrant would be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law and thus violate the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no suggestion that 24 hours was unreasonable in the circumstances.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855 (1987). We also decline to find, as Dietzen urges, that Wisconsin's bail bond procedure gives him a federally-protected liberty interest in placing a phone call. Cf. Harrill, 55 F.3d at 1125. 10 Dietzen's claims regarding his Fourth Amendment rights must also fail. The Fourth Amendment mandates that a detainee arrested without a determination of probable cause be brought before a magistrate within a reasonable time, generally 48 hours. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975). Dietzen was brought before a magistrate approximately 24 hours after his arrest, thus satisfying constitutional requirements.
11 Dietzen further alleges that Snider conspired with Mork to place him in solitary confinement for fifty consecutive days in order to force him to accept a plea agreement. He contends that such treatment punished him in violation of his rights (as a pre-trial detainee) under the Due Process Clause. 2 12 As the district court recognized, Dietzen presents absolutely no factual support for these contentions. There is no indication that Snider had any involvement in the administration of the Waupaca County Jail or the circumstances of Dietzen's confinement.