Opinion ID: 1401004
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prosecutor's Invocation of Sympathy for the Victim and the Victim's Family

Text: Mr. Wilson next argues that the prosecutor went too far when he invoked sympathy for the victim and the victim's family in his sentencing phase closing argument. The prosecutor asked the jury to put [themselves] in the victim's shoes. Each and every day you get up, you put on your clothes, and you go to work. You tie your shoes, you get offyou get off to work, you kiss your wife and your kids, if you have any, goodbye. And you don't know what the day might bring. You only have hope. And he left that particular night, on the 25th, hoping it to be just like an ordinary day in terms of what he would do. He didn't have the chance to tell Angela goodbye. He didn't have the chance to tell his two sons goodbye. . . . And if you find this man guilty, I submit to you he'll have more than 2 minutes and 11 seconds to ponder his death, much more than Richard Yost. Tr. trans. 2/20/97, at 30. Later on, in his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor stated I'm sorry that [Mr. Wilson's] mother has to wait 20 minutes to see him in jail. But you know what? Ms. Dorn right over there, guess how long she gets to wait to see her son [Mr. Yost] . . . [t]he rest of her life, she gets to wait to see Richard. Id. at 49. Mr. Wilson argues that these statements encouraged the jury to sentence him to death based on sympathy for the victim. Defense counsel failed to object to these statements, and so the OCCA reviewed for plain error. The OCCA held that [t]he State should not encourage the jury to impose the death penalty out of sympathy for the victims. This Court has specifically condemned many of the comments made in second stage, stating `[t]here is no reason for them and counsel knows better and does not need to go so far in the future.' No amount of mitigating evidence can counter this argument, and if the jury agrees they may not even consider mitigating evidence. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 470, (quoting Le v. State, 947 P.2d 535, 554-55 (Okla.Crim. App.1997) (alterations omitted)). However, while the OCCA found that the comments were error, they did not rise to plain error because Wilson has not shown that the jury improperly weighed the mitigating evidence in his case. Id. at 471. We do not condone prosecutorial remarks encouraging the jury to allow sympathy to influence its decision. Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1172 & n. 11 (10th Cir.1999) (prosecutor implored the jury to bring back a death verdict out of love for the [victims and parents] of the world and the future and the past victims of [petitioner]. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The jury should make decisions based on the strength of the evidence, and not on raw emotion, though we recognize that some emotional influence is inevitable. However, the OCCA's determination that these statements did not rise to the level of plain error was not an unreasonable application of clearly established law. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 470. The jury was instructed to consider only the evidence, and not sympathy, sentiment or prejudice in reaching its verdict. R. Vol. II, at 360, Jury Instruction 35. We assume, without more, that the jury followed this instruction. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (plurality opinion); see also Moore, 195 F.3d at 1173. Additionally, given the weak nature of the proffered mitigating evidence, we cannot say that the outcome would have been different had the prosecutor refrained from these inflammatory remarks. Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 795 (10th Cir.1998).