Opinion ID: 1753213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the lower court erred in failing to grant appellant's motion for a continuance.

Text: Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-1-1(d) (Supp. 1985), states the pertinent part of the conspiracy statute: (d) To cheat and defraud another out of property by any means which are in themselves criminal, or which, if executed, would amount to a cheat, or to obtain money or any other property or thing by false pretense; ... In James v. State, 481 So.2d 805 (Miss. 1985), the Court said: Since a conspiracy to commit a crime is different from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy, the first necessarily involves joint action while the other does not. By its very nature conspiracy is a joint or group offense requiring a concert of free will. The union of the minds of at least two persons is a prerequisite to the commission of the offense, or, stated differently, at least two persons must agree for a conspiracy to exist. [ Moore v. State ] 290 So.2d [603] at 604, [Miss. 1974]. See also Griffin v. State, 480 So.2d 1124, 1126 (Miss. 1985); Norman v. State, 381 So.2d 1024, 1028 (Miss. 1980). 481 So.2d at 808. For an individual to be a co-conspirator, there must be a recognition on his part that he is entering into some kind of common plan, and knowingly intends to further its common purpose. Griffin v. State, 480 So.2d 1124, 1126 (Miss. 1985); McDonald v. State, 454 So.2d 488 (Miss. 1984). After considering all the evidence in this five-volume case most favorable to the State, which includes the detailed facts set out hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the prosecution not only made a prima facie case against the appellant, but the evidence is overwhelming as to his guilt. Therefore, assigned error I is rejected. Appellant complains that the lower court erred in refusing to grant his motion for a continuance. On December 6, 1985, appellant appeared before the court with counsel and was arraigned. The trial date was set for February 24, 1986. On February 20, 1986, the appellant filed a motion to substitute counsel because of attorney/client differences. On February 21, 1986, the trial court permitted appellant to substitute counsel after citing the history of the proceedings since December 6, 1985. The substitution was permitted by the lower court upon the representation of Attorney Vanderburg that there would be no problem with his being ready for trial on the February 24, 1986, trial date. We are of the opinion that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant the motion for continuance. Gates v. State, 484 So.2d 1002 (Miss. 1986); Speagle v. State, 390 So.2d 990 (Miss. 1980); Shaw v. State, 378 So.2d 631 (Miss. 1979). The assigned error II is rejected.