Opinion ID: 159644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Amended Judgment

Text: 1) Standard of Review 19 In the Order granting Shaw's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment on Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Litigation Expenses (motion to amend), a portion of the fees awarded by the district court was for time spent in post-judgment collection proceedings. Shaw's counsel's hours included time spent objecting to Defendants' motion to stay execution and preparing for execution and garnishment proceedings. Defendants argue on appeal the district court erred 1) in awarding Shaw attorney's fees for this time; and 2) in granting Shaw's motion to amend without conducting a second evidentiary hearing. This court reviews the district court's grant of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion. See Wolfe, 28 F.3d at 1058-59. Factual resolutions are reviewed for clear error; the statutory interpretation and legal analysis supporting the district court's decision are reviewed de novo. See id. 20 2) Award of Fees for Post-judgment Collection Activities 21 There is no precedent in this circuit nor authority from other circuits resolving whether attorney's fees can be awarded under the FCA for post-judgment collection activities. Cases addressing claims for post-judgment fee awards under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988(b), and the citizen suit attorney's fee provision of the Clean Air Act, id. 7604(d), however, are instructive. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 558-60 (1986). 22 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act states the court, in its discretion, may allow . . . a reasonable attorney's fee. 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). The Clean Air Act citizen suit attorney's fee provision provides the court may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate. Id. 7604(d). Similarly, the FCA qui tam attorney's fees provision states that one who successfully brings an FCA action shall . . . receive . . . reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(2) (emphasis added). The FCA wrongful discharge attorney's fees provision likewise states that a plaintiff shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole . . . [including] reasonable attorneys' fees. 31 U.S.C. 3730(h) (emphasis added). All four provisions share the requirement that attorney's fees awards must be reasonable. 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(2), (h); 42 U.S.C. 1988(b); id. 7604(d). The only significant difference between the FCA and the attorney's fees provisions in the other statutes is that the FCA provisions are mandatory on their face. See 32 U.S.C. 3730(d)(2), (h). 23 Courts interpreting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act and the citizen suit attorney's fee provision of the Clean Air Act have consistently allowed attorney's fees for post-judgment enforcement and collection activities. See, e.g., Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 558-60; Wolfe, 28 F.3d at 1059. 6 In Delaware Valley, the court noted that both of these statutory provisions were enacted to encourage citizen enforcement of important federal policies. See 478 U.S. at 560. The FCA is also intended to encourage citizen enforcement of important federal policies. Two of the FCA's main goals are to enhance the government's ability to recover losses resulting from fraud and to encourage individuals who know of government fraud to come forward with that information. See S. Rep. 99-345, at 1, 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266, 5271; United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir. 1992). The FCA attorney's fees provisions are central to the implementation of these policies. As noted in the FCA's legislative history, [u]navailability of attorneys fees inhibits and precludes many private individuals, as well as their attorneys, from bringing civil fraud suits. S. Rep. 99-345, at 29 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5294. 24 We see no reason why the attorney's fees provisions of the FCA should be applied differently than those of the civil rights laws or the Clean Air Act. This court thus concludes that both FCA attorney fee provisions allow the award of attorney's fees for time spent in post-judgment collection activities. See 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(2), (h). 25 3) Failure to Hold a Second Evidentiary Hearing 26 Defendants argue the district court erred when it did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on Shaw's motion to amend. Defendants, however, did not request such an evidentiary hearing. See Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1286 (Ordinarily, a district court does not abuse its discretion in deciding not to hold an evidentiary hearing when no such request is ever made.) Additionally, this court notes that in Defendants' response to Shaw's motion to amend, Defendants made no factual challenges which would have necessitated an evidentiary hearing. Defendants instead asserted two purely legal issues: 1) that the district court had resolved all the matters presented in the motion to amend at the original March 13, 1998 hearing, and these resolutions became the law of the case and 2) the FCA does not authorize an award of attorney's fees for post-judgment collection activities. An evidentiary hearing, however, was unnecessary to resolve these legal issues. Defendants certainly did not assert below, as they do on appeal, that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to distinguish time spent on post-judgment collection activities from time which was not contested by Defendants or to allow Defendants the opportunity to cross-examine Shaw's counsel as to the reasonableness of the additional hours claimed. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in not conducting the hearing. See id.; King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1091 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999).