Opinion ID: 2584111
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: part iv. analysismr. dallas.

Text: ¶ 29 The question involving Mr. Dallas is controlled by § 2004.1(C)(3)(b)(2), rather than § 3226, because he was not and has not been retained by either party in anticipation of litigation or for trial preparation. Section 2004.1(C)(3)(b)(2), the statute relating to an unretained expert, provides in pertinent part: If a subpoena ... requires disclosure of an unretained expert's opinion or information not describing specific events or occurrences in dispute and resulting from the expert's study made not at the request of any party, the court may, to protect a person subject to or affected by the subpoena, quash or modify the subpoena. However, if the party in whose behalf the subpoena is issued shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship and assures that the person to whom the subpoena is addressed will be reasonably compensated, the court may order appearance or production only upon specified conditions. The Oklahoma Comment to the 1993 Revision of § 2004.1 [found in OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 12, § 2004.1 (2003 pocket part, Thomson/West) ] provides in regard to such an individual as follows: The court is also authorized to impose appropriate conditions on a subpoena that seeks disclosure of ... opinions from an unretained expert who is not a fact witness. For example, a court may determine that a physician who has not been retained as an expert by any party nor has any personal knowledge of the facts of the case should not be compelled to respond to a subpoena without assurance of reasonable compensation and an explanation why the opinion could not be obtained from another physician who was voluntarily retained. See Advisory Committee Notes to 1991 Amendments to Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(B). The prime reason for the rule is to protect the intellectual property of the unretained expert and does not apply to an expert retained by a party. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1991 Amendments to Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(B), provide in pertinent part: Clause (c)(3)(B)(ii) provides appropriate protection for the intellectual property of the non-party witness; it does not apply to the expert retained by a party, whose information is subject to the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4). A growing problem has been the use of subpoenas to compel the giving of evidence and information by unretained experts. Experts are not exempt from the duty to give evidence, even if they cannot be compelled to prepare themselves to give effective testimony, e.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir.1972), but compulsion to give evidence may threaten the intellectual property of experts denied the opportunity to bargain for the value of their services. See generally Maurer, Compelling the Expert Witness: Fairness and Utility Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 GA.L.REV. 71 (1984); Note, Discovery and Testimony of Unretained Experts, 1987 DUKE L.J. 140. Arguably the compulsion to testify can be regarded as a taking of intellectual property. The rule establishes the right of such persons to withhold their expertise, at least unless the party seeking it makes the kind of showing required for a conditional denial of a motion to quash as provided in the final sentence of subparagraph (c)(3)(B); that requirement is the same as that necessary to secure work product under Rule 26(b)(3) and gives assurance of reasonable compensation. The Rule thus approves the accommodation of competing interests exemplified in United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc., 666 F.2d 364 (9th Cir.1982). See also Wright v. Jeep Corporation, 547 F.Supp. 871 (E.D.Mich.1982). As stated in Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 822 (2d Cir.1976), the district court's discretion in these matters should be informed by the degree to which the expert is being called because of his knowledge of facts relevant to the case rather than in order to give opinion testimony; the difference between testifying to a previously formed or expressed opinion and forming a new one; the possibility that, for other reasons, the witness is a unique expert; the extent to which the calling party is able to show the unlikelihood that any comparable witness will willingly testify; and the degree to which the witness is able to show that he has been oppressed by having continually to testify.... 28 U.S.C., Fed.R.Civ.P. 45, app. (1988 Ed., Supp. III 1991). ¶ 30 Rather than being concerned with fairness between the litigants to the underlying litigation, § 2004.1(C)(3)(b)(2), as plainly set out in the above-quoted Advisory Committee Notes, has as its purpose fairness to or protection of the unretained, non-occurrence expert, i.e., it seeks to protect the intellectual property of said expert. The trial judge's order in regard to Mr. Dallas seems to acknowledge that Mr. Heffron is only interested in obtaining facts from him concerning what he did in relation to investigation of the fire, rather than obtaining his expert opinion on the cause of the fire. Mr. Heffron presumably already knows the OKCFD fire investigator's opinion for, as noted above, Mr. Dallas testified at Mr. Heffron's criminal preliminary hearing. [20] Also, Mr. Dallas himself seems to admit in his trial court response to Mr. Heffron's motion to compel that Mr. Heffron may depose him as to matters concerning what he did in regard to his fire investigation at the scene, i.e., what he smelled, sensed, observed, etc., without paying him an expert witness fee. The trial judge acknowledged that only facts were soughtwhich presumably are relevant to issue(s) in the lawsuitbut ordered the deposition could be taken only on payment of a $3,000.00 fee to Mr. Dallas. [21] ¶ 31 Further, we must note that nothing in the materials before us indicates that Mr. Dallas conducted any part of his investigation as an employee of Dallas & Associates Fire & Explosion Consultants, Inc., the private company specializing in fire cause and origin analysis, fire reconstruction, and other fire-related expert services. Instead, the materials presented to us rather plainly indicate that Mr. Dallas' investigation of the involved fire was conducted in the public interest as part of his regular job duties with the OKCFD. We, thus, fail to see how allowing his deposition as to what he did in regard to investigation of the fire or what his expert opinion is as to its cause or origin, would impact in any significant way his intellectual property as an expert in the field of fire investigation. Very simply, Mr. Dallas has no proprietary interest in the investigation of the particular fire involved in the instant litigation in his capacity as a fire investigator with the OKCFD or in the expert opinion formed by him as to the cause and origin of said fire in that same capacity. ¶ 32 As we view the matter, because the underlying nature of the suit involves litigation to recover on an insurance policy and Emcasco's alleged bad faith in handling Mr. Heffron's claim, Mr. Dallas' role in investigating the cause of the conflagration in his capacity as an OKCFD fire investigator and in imparting information, if any, to Emcasco (or its agents) prior to denial of the insurance claim, makes Mr. Dallas a participant to specific events and occurrences particularly relevant to the lawsuit. [22] Mr. Heffron is entitled to inquire of him as to said specific events and occurrences without payment of an expert witness fee. Therefore, based on the materials presented to us it is clear the trial court exceeded its authority in requiring Mr. Heffron to pay a $ 3,000.00 fee to Mr. Dallas, as opposed to the ordinary witness fee of $10.00. To the extent Mr. Heffron seeks to inquire of Mr. Dallas concerning the specific events and occurrences related to the investigation of this particular fire; his expert opinion of its cause and origin and the rationale behind the opinion; and what information, if any, Mr. Dallas may have told or imparted to Emcasco (or its agents) prior to the latter's denial of Mr. Heffron's insurance claim, only the ordinary witness fee is mandated. Such information is discoverable in the particular circumstances of this case via Mr. Dallas' deposition for no more than the $10.00 per day ordinary witness fee. [23]