Opinion ID: 1977406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Presiding Trial Judge Giving Undue Weight to Jury's Death Recommendation Claim

Text: Gattis's final argument is that the presiding trial judge gave undue weight to the jury's non-unanimous vote favoring the death sentence. Gattis rests this claim on a letter the presiding trial judge wrote about his contact with the jury, which states: Any happenstance encounter I may have had with any Gattis juror had absolutely no influence upon me with regard to my sentencing determination. Of great weight, however, was the jury's 10 to 2 recommendation that Gattis be sentenced to death. Without such a lopsided recommendation, I was fully prepared to impose a life sentence. The State argues that the claim was waived because it was not properly raised in the lower court. In turn, Gattis responds that the claim was presented to the court when he argued the State misled the [presiding] trial judge by arguing that the jury's sentencing recommendation be given great weight is the claim that the judge in fact followed that recommendation and gave undue weight to the jury's sentencing recommendation. [79] Further, Gattis argues that to the extent that the claim was not presented, he could not brief it because the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying Gattis the additional briefing space necessary to adequately present this argument below. Notwithstanding the merits of the State's argument that Gattis was free to structure his argument within the constraints of the page limitations as he saw fit, and notwithstanding that we have already found no abuse of discretion by the Superior Court in denying the request for an extension of the page limitation for a brief, we address the issue as though it was not waived. Gattis argues that the presiding trial judge's comments imply that he independently made the judgment that a life sentence was more appropriate than the death penalty, and that only when the jury recommended death by a vote of ten to two did he change his mind and impose the jury's recommendation. In turn, the State responds that the decision to impose the death penalty is a collaborative effort between the jury and the trial judge, and the trial judge could consider the jury's views in coming to his decision about the appropriate penalty for the murder. The State's argument is correct. In Garden v. State, [80] this Court held the judge must give the jury's determination `great weight,' but the judge may override the jury's recommendation in appropriate cases. [81] As we noted, where the jury recommends death, the trial judge may reject that recommendation and impose life. [82] However, the Delaware death penalty procedure requires a record of the exact vote of the jury and that the advice will be given `great weight' because it is the `conscience of the community.' [83] Additionally, in Garden, when the jury voted ten to two for a life sentence, this Court stated, one cannot overlook the overwhelming vote of the jury. [84] Gattis argues that the General Assembly's amendments to the death penalty laws in the wake of Garden requires reversal of his sentence, relying on the synopsis of the bill that provides that a judge shall not be bound by the recommendation, but instead shall give it such weight as he or she deems appropriate under the circumstances present in a given case. [85] Gattis, however, overlooks that he was sentenced in 1992 and the amendments apply only to all defendants tried, retried, sentenced or re-sentenced after July 15, 2003. [86] In addition to the fact that the statute has no bearing on his case, the record does not indicate that the presiding trial judge gave the jury's recommendation any more weight than he deemed appropriate. Gattis's argument that the presiding trial judge gave undue weight to the jury's recommendation lacks merit.