Opinion ID: 2630189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues on Petition

Text: Next, we turn to those issues presented for our review by the People. The People first argue that their use of hearsay evidence to prove alleged violations of Loveall's SOISP was proper under the circumstances. Second, the People argue that, were we to find their use of hearsay evidence was improper, the remaining, non-hearsay evidence was sufficient to support revocation.
We begin by considering whether the People's use of hearsay evidence, undertaken by the People without timely providing Loveall with the names of the declarants, constitutes a denial of his constitutional right to due process. Under the facts here presented, we hold that it does. In Morrissey v. Brewer , the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations. 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (extending Morrissey holding to probation revocation hearings). The lower standard for due process available in revocation hearings was justified, according to the Court, by the State's overwhelming interest in returning an individual to prison without the burden and associated costs of mounting a new criminal trial, provided there was sufficient evidence that the individual failed to abide by the conditions of his probation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483, 92 S.Ct. 2593. The Morrissey Court avoided creating a code of procedure for revocation hearings. Id. at 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (We cannot write a code of procedure; that is the responsibility of each State.). Instead, the Court set forth the minimum requirements such proceedings must follow to comply with due process. Id. at 488-89, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Among the rights afforded probationers is that to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation). Id. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Soon after Morrissey was announced, the General Assembly answered the Court's call, establishing the procedure required for revocation hearings in Colorado. See § 16-11-206, C.R.S. (2009). In Colorado, the prosecution can admit hearsay evidence at a revocation hearing provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut hearsay evidence. § 16-11-206(3). Since section 16-11-206(3) was enacted, the court of appeals has attempted to clarify what a fair opportunity to rebut hearsay entails. Loveall cites two of these cases, People in Interest of T.M.H., 821 P.2d 895 (Colo.App. 1991), and People v. Thomas, 42 Colo.App. 441, 599 P.2d 957 (1979), to argue that he was entitled to greater due process. In T.M.H., the court of appeals held that, where the prosecutor is unable to produce any corroborating documentary evidence and the only witness lacks personal knowledge of the essential incriminating facts, the probationer is not provided a fair opportunity to rebut hearsay testimony. 821 P.2d at 896-97. Similarly, in Thomas, the court of appeals held that hearsay evidence presented via a probation officer's testimony does not provide a fair opportunity to rebut even where the probationer stands ready to take the stand and deny the accusation. 599 P.2d at 958. We find these cases distinguishable. The violations of probation alleged by the prosecution in T.M.H. and Thomas were additional criminal acts allegedly perpetrated by the probationers. T.M.H., 821 P.2d at 895-96; Thomas, 599 P.2d at 957-58. As such, they are not subject to the preponderance of evidence standard, which is applicable here, but to the more stringent, beyond a reasonable doubt standard. § 16-11-206(3); see also People v. Kelly, 919 P.2d 866, 868 (Colo.App. 1996) (applying similar analysis to distinguish Thomas and T.M.H. ). Nor do we find it necessary to determine whether a probation officer's testimony, based solely on hearsay evidence, can ever establish a violation of probation beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, we find it sufficient to hold that hearsay evidence may be used to establish a probation violation other than an alleged crime provided minimum due process requirements are met. [8] On multiple occasions, the court of appeals wrestled with the due process requirements set forth by the Morrissey Court and the General Assembly. [9] From this line of cases, we discern a workable standard: where revocation is based on a violation other than an alleged crime, the defendant's due process right is satisfied by subjecting the probation officer to cross-examination about proffered hearsay and affording the [probationer] an opportunity to present witnesses and testify in his or her own behalf. Manzanares, 85 P.3d at 610. However, the impact of these techniques is greatly diminishedif not eradicated entirely where the defendant is given little or no opportunity to test the accuracy of the hearsay evidence or the credibility of the declarants from whom it was gleaned. See Singletary v. Reilly, 452 F.3d 868, 874-75 (D.C.Cir. 2006) (ordering new parole revocation hearing where declarants of hearsay evidence relied upon by prosecution were never cross-examined nor were their identities even revealed for purposes of evaluating their credibility). Here, the prosecution failed to provide Loveall's defense counsel the nurses' letters, Woodard's narrative describing her phone conversation with Mann, or any other document containing the nurses' names until shortly before the probation revocation hearing. The trial court sustained Loveall's initial objection as to the letters, holding that the prosecution denied Loveall a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the nurses, but admitted Woodard's narrative regarding the phone conversation without regard for its late disclosure. The trial court then went on to hold that defense counsel could not use Mann's letter to impeach Woodard's narrative without first admitting the letter into evidence in its entirety. [10] In so deciding, the trial court presented Loveall's defense counsel with a Hobson's choice: either to admit Mann's letter into evidence in order to impeach the narrative, which stated only that Loveall was present at the hospital, or to proceed without admitting the letter only to leave Woodard's narrative, which contained Mann's highly damaging accusation that Loveall actually held the baby, unchallenged. [11] Under these circumstances, we do not find that defense counsel's decision to admit Mann's letter into evidence prevents him from later raising a due process claim. Thus, we hold that, under the facts of this case, the prosecutor's decision to withhold the names of the declarants until shortly before the hearing prevented Loveall from receiving the minimum due process rights owed him.
Next, we consider whether the court of appeals erred by reversing the revocation despite the existence of additional, non-hearsay evidence demonstrating that Loveall violated a condition of his SOISP. We hold that reversal was proper under the circumstances. Where one or more bases for revoking probation are set aside on appeal, the revocation remains valid provided at least one violation is sustained. See People v. Howell, 64 P.3d 894, 897 (Colo.App.2002) (upholding revocation after finding that evidence independent of hearsay testimony given by probation officer supported revocation of SOISP); cf. People v. Broga, 750 P.2d 59, 62 (Colo.1988) (upholding aggravated sentence, reasoning that [w]here the sentencing court finds several factors justifying a sentence in the aggravated range, only one of those factors need be legitimate to support the sentencing court's decision). Thus, it is undeniably true that any single probation violation could justify a district court's decision to revoke; however, it is substantially less clear whether the probation officer would exercise his or her discretion to seek revocationor, for that matter, whether the district court would remain willing to revokebased solely on the remaining violation. See State v. Ojeda, 159 Ariz. 560, 769 P.2d 1006, 1007 (1989). The Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged the infirmities inherent in the rigid approach espoused by the People. The [rigid rule], although supportable in a purely technical sense, ignores the realities of the probation process. If some of the alleged violations do not hold up on appeal and the revocation is affirmed without remand, a significant chance exists that the defendant's probation may be revoked for a violation that, by itself, would not have caused the probation officer to petition for revocation or the judge to revoke. Id. The Ojeda court recognized that, when a probation officer petitions for revocation, he or she generally will include every alleged violation, whether serious or merely technical. Id. Where a serious violation falls through, the probation officer is left only with technical violations that he or she may have decided against presenting separately. Id. Thus, the Ojeda court reasoned: We should affirm without remand only where the record clearly shows the trial court would have reached the same result even without consideration of the improper factors. Id. at 1008. [12] We adopt the Ojeda rule and apply it here. Loveall admitted that he was unemployed at the time of the revocation hearing. Thus, while it is clear that Loveall violated the conditions of his SOISP by failing to secure employment, it is substantially less clear whether Ryan would have petitioned for revocation based on the unemployment violation alone. Ryan petitioned for revocation three times. Each petition included allegations that Loveall violated the conditions of his SOISP by failing to secure employment, enroll in an offense-specific treatment program, and, on the final occasion, avoid contact with children. The filing of all three petitions corresponded with his termination from treatmentnot the deadline imposed for finding employment. On cross-examination, Ryan described a conversation she had with Loveall's courtesy probation officer regarding his probation. Q: Did [the probation officer] ever say she was going to revoke his probation for not finding a job? A: She expressed concern to me about it, yes, because it was part of the court order when he was reinstated to probation that he find employment. Q: Right. But she also indicated he was seeking employment but found none in Cañon City. A: Correct. Q: Based on that, she wanted him to expand his search. A: Correct. Q: Never did say to you though that he had not tried to find a job. A: No. Q: Even though he was unemployed, he was current in his fees, costs, and restitution; is that correct? A: That's correct. Based on the foregoing, we are unable to conclude that the record clearly shows the trial court would have reached the same result even without consideration of the improper factors. Ojeda, 769 P.2d at 1008. Accordingly, we hold that the prosecutor's decision to withhold the names of the declarants until shortly before trial failed to accord Loveall the minimum due process rights owed him under Morrissey. Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment below and remand to the court of appeals with instructions to remand to the district court for a new hearing [13] to be conducted consistent with this opinion.