Opinion ID: 2293442
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stamenkovic's Investments in Real Estate

Text: Appellants argue that they should have been permitted to introduce evidence of Stamenkovic's real estate holdings to show that [his] private real estate activities were a source (if not the source) of the stress in his life, and that the crushing debt load that was caused by the purchase of five condominium units as investments could explain his motive for filing suit in the first place. Appellants claim that the trial court should have allowed them to further develop this line of questioning by providing details about the timing and sequence of his purchases and the severity of his debt and the strain that it placed him under. Stamenkovic's activities outside his employment with Campbell were relevant to his motive for suing; to the source of his claimed distress; [ ] to whether the purported harassment affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment; and whether he suffered any emotional harm at all while at Campbell-Crane. According to appellants, in limiting their ability to pursue this line of inquiry, the trial court committed reversible error. We agree with Stamenkovic that appellants overstate the effect of the trial judge's exclusionary ruling. The trial court initially granted Stamenkovic's motion in limine to preclude appellants from introducing any evidence of [Stamenkovic's] alleged wealth, debt, financial situation, and real estate holdings. At trial, Campbell testified that Stamenkovic had told her that the depression and anxiety he suffered were due to the stress of owning several condominium units. Stamenkovic confirmed this was so, but explained that he had lied to Campbell about the causes of his distress to hide the fact that it was actually her sexual harassment that was causing him anxiety. After this testimony, appellants asked the judge to reconsider the pretrial exclusionary order. The trial court then allowed questioning about Stamenkovic's anxiety and financial distress related to his real estate investments. In direct response to counsel's proffer, the trial judge allowed appellants to introduce evidence, as the trial judge informally put it, that Stamenkovic purchased five [condos], sold one, made some money, and he lied to [Campbell] about it. Campbell, for example, testified that Stamenkovic was interested in investing in real estate in New York. At one point, Campbell said, Stamenkovic was trying to get a third mortgage on three pieces of property and asked [Campbell] how he could get closer to $50,000, the cutoff point for refinancing his mortgages. However, she testified, he had never achieved a command of English enough to justify the kind of salary he needed for his mortgage; was very upset about his mortgages and very worried about his finances. Similarly, in appellants' cross-examination of Stamenkovic, he confirmed that he had owned five condominium units at one time, and still owned, at the time of trial, four condominium units, including one in Miami Beach, Florida. Notwithstanding the trial court's limitations, appellants were able to elicit evidence of Stamenkovic's worry over his real estate investments. Thus, even though the trial court restricted the amount of detail [10] appellants would have preferred, they were not harmed as they were able to introduce evidence from which the jury could inferas appellants' counsel urged them to do in closing argumentthat any emotional distress Stamenkovic suffered was due to causes other than Campbell's harassing conduct, or, alternatively, that the fact that Stamenkovic was involved in these activities showed he was not the emotional wreck he claimed to be as a result of Campbell's harassment.