Opinion ID: 1161831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: federal rehabilitation act

Text: The plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in dismissing their claim based on section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. ง 794 (1982) (Federal Rehabilitation Act), which states in pertinent part: No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.... [20] We agree that dismissal was improper.
In ruling on the defendants' motions to dismiss in its order of July 7, 1982, the trial court concluded that certain remedies requested by the plaintiffs pursuant to their section 504 claim were not available and granted the motions as to the request for private rights and institutional reform, including the creation of programs. In its May 7, 1985, ruling, the trial court noted the earlier dismissal, entered by a previous judge, and apparently considered itself bound by that earlier order. The court found, however, that: [F]or the most part, Health and Hospitals' physical health and mental health programs are not designed for the severely, chronically mentally ill persons who, because of their illness, are unable to actively seek out or to pursue appropriate care and treatment for their mental health problems. The court then determined that mental health services were not equally accessible to all classes of chronically mentally ill persons and that in this respect the mental health program was both overtly and covertly selective and discriminatory. The court concluded that a possible remedy for such discrimination consistent with its July 7, 1982, order would be injunctive relief directing that the programs curtailed in 1981 be reopened or expanded to previously existing levels. Inexplicably, however, the court then ruled that the plaintiffs had not established a cognizable claim for relief under section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs contend that the failure to provide the more severely disabled persons access to services constitutes discrimination solely on the basis of particular handicaps, in violation of section 504. Other courts have determined that discrimination on the basis of severity of handicap violates the Federal Rehabilitation Act. See Plummer v. Branstad, 731 F.2d 574, 578 (8th Cir.1984) (we assume that the severity of the plaintiffs' handicaps is itself a handicap which, under section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, cannot be the sole reason for denying them [adult day care] funding); Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Memorial Center, No. 85-C-437-E (N.D.Okla. July 24, 1987) [available on WESTLAW, 1987 WL 27104] (institution for mentally retarded persons discriminated on basis of severity of handicap); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F.Supp. 171, 215 (D.N.H.1981) (same). We are persuaded that these cases correctly interpret section 504. The trial court's findings indicate that the mental health program discriminated against some members of the plaintiff class based on severity of handicap. The record contains evidence that only the higher functioning patients are able to travel to the facilities where day care, vocational rehabilitation, and other programs are located, while the more severely ill or lower functioning individuals are unable to participate. The record also contains evidence that outreach services are not available at most of the boarding houses and nursing homes in the northwest Denver catchment area, and that the services that are offered are limited in scope. Without outreach services, the most severely ill are effectively denied access to a variety of important programs. Finally, the record provides support for the plaintiffs' contention that the termination of certain programs in 1981 and the reorganization of others at the end of 1984 exacerbated the access problems of the more severely ill. This evidence in turn supports the trial court's finding of discrimination. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim under section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act. On remand the trial court should make specific factual findings concerning discrimination based on handicap and on the basis of those findings should determine whether the plaintiffs have established a violation of section 504.
The question of remedies available for violation of section 504 may be before the trial court on remand, and we elect to offer guidance on this issue. In its May 7, 1985, order, as noted above, the trial court suggested that a possible remedy would be injunctive relief directing the reopening or expansion of programs to provide the level of services available before cutbacks in 1981. The plaintiffs contend that the court was correct in its suggestion that injunctive relief would be available for the reopening of programs, but they assert that the court could have ordered broader relief to remedy past discrimination, including the development of new programs. They rely on Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Memorial Center, No. 85-C-437-E (N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987) [available on WESTLAW, 1987 WL 27104], in which the court concluded that there is a right to effective and integrated services under section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act and that the underdevelopment of a community services system by the Defendants constitutes a continuation of the original and continuing discrimination practiced by the State against retarded people; the affirmative development of community services is necessary to remedy this effect. Slip op. at 51. We conclude that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the broad injunctive relief they seek. In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979), the United States Supreme Court considered the meaning of section 504 in the context of a claim by a person with a serious hearing disability that the statute was violated by the denial of her application for admission to a college nursing program because of the physical limitations imposed by her disability. The court rejected the applicant's contention that the college was required under section 504 to modify its nursing program to permit her to participate, and concluded that neither the language, purpose, nor history of ง 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative action obligation on all recipients of federal funds. Id. at 411, 99 S.Ct. at 2361. The Court also determined that while reasonable modifications of a program may be required under section 504, the program need not be so substantially changed as to alter its fundamental nature. Similarly, in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985), the Court again discussed section 504, noting that Southeastern Community College v. Davis struck a balance between the statutory rights of the handicapped to be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their programs: while a grantee need not be required to make fundamental or substantial modifications to accommodate the handicapped, it may be required to make reasonable ones. The balance struck in Davis requires that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers. The benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled; to assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit may have to be made. Id. 469 U.S. at 300-01, 105 S.Ct. at 719-20 (citation omitted). Other courts construing section 504 have emphasized that the statute requires only reasonable changes in programs. As the court stated in Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397, 1409 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3529, 87 L.Ed.2d 653 (1985): We do not interpret [section 504] to force states to create special programs for handicapped children.... [Section 504] protects a handicapped person from being denied the same benefit ... as a normal person but does not require the state to devote extra resources to bringing the handicapped up to the level of the normal. See also Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F.Supp. 171, 209 (D.N.H.1981) (under section 504, there is no statutory or regulatory mandate to states and their agencies to expend substantial funds or assume excessive administrative burdens for the purpose of removing barriers to the handicapped); New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. State of New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 855 (10th Cir.1982) (modification of existing programs may be required where the financial burden would not be excessive and the accommodation would enable the handicapped children to realize the benefits of the ... program). In considering the scope of any injunctive relief to be ordered on remand, the trial court should follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis and Alexander v. Choate and require the defendants to make only those accommodations reasonably necessary to assure meaningful access to the mental health programs available in the northwest Denver catchment area for those members of the plaintiff class who can realize the benefits of such programs. [21] The named plaintiffs in Arevalo also argued to the trial court that damages should be available as a remedy for violation of section 504, but the court rejected that contention. While there is a consensus that section 504 creates a private right of action for declaratory or injunctive relief, federal courts are divided on the question of whether a damages remedy is available for violation of section 504. The courts holding that there is no damages remedy generally have relied on legislative intent. Longoria v. Harris, 554 F.Supp. 102 (S.D.Tex.1982); Carter v. Independent School Dist. Number 6, 550 F.Supp. 172 (W.D.Okla.1981); Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F.Supp. 1104 (N.D.Cal.1979). Some of these courts have pointed out that there is an explicit administrative remedy for violations of the Federal Rehabilitation Actโtermination of federal funds. 45 C.F.R. ง 80.8 (1987). They have also concluded that a damages remedy would frustrate the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act, which is to promote and expand opportunities for handicapped individuals. As the court stated in Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Independent School Dist., 532 F.Supp. 460 (S.D.Tex.1982): [T]he implication of a damage remedy would portend a potentially massive financial liability upon recipients of federal funds.... This exposure could serve as a significant disincentive to the solicitation or acceptance of federal financial assistance, and hence a significant deterrent to the promotion and expansion of opportunities for handicapped individuals.... Id. at 473. See also Manecke v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 553 F.Supp. 787, 789 (M.D.Fla.1982), rev'd on other grounds, 762 F.2d 912 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1062, 106 S.Ct. 809, 88 L.Ed.2d 784 (1986). The courts holding that damages are available under the Federal Rehabilitation Act conclude that Congress intended to allow for enforcement through actions for damages, noting that the Act does not expressly limit the availability of damages. Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 769 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir.) (damages are particularly appropriate where injunctive relief will not remedy the harm), rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 936, 106 S.Ct. 300, 88 L.Ed.2d 277 (1985); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 977-78 (8th Cir.) (damages available as necessary remedy for discrimination), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909, 103 S.Ct. 215, 74 L.Ed.2d 171 (1982); Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F.Supp. 369, 382 (E.D. Penn.1983) (the availability of a damage remedy increases the deterrent effect of the non-discrimination law.), aff'd, 732 F.2d 147 (3rd Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188, 105 S.Ct. 955, 83 L.Ed.2d 962 (1985); Hurry v. Jones, 560 F.Supp. 500, 509-12 (D.R.I.1983) (compensatory damages available since administrative remedies inadequate); Gelman v. Department of Education, 544 F.Supp. 651, 654 (D.Colo.1982) (compensatory but not punitive damages available); Gregg B v. Board of Education of Lawrence School District, 535 F.Supp. 1333, 1339-40 (E.D.N.Y.1982) (purpose of act furthered by availability of damages); Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F.Supp. 933, 937-39 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (money damages appropriate where this is the only way to compensate a victim of past discrimination); Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Education, 490 F.Supp. 948, 949 (D.N.J. 1980) (for plaintiffs, injunctive relief would come too late to be an effective remedy). We make no definitive determination concerning the availability of damages to remedy a violation of section 504 for the purpose of the present case at this time because of the unsettled state of the law. The United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized this issue but has not had the occasion to set it to rest. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1020 n. 24, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3472 n. 24, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984) (Without expressing an opinion on the matter, we note that courts generally agree that damages are available under ง 504,...). On remand, in absence of a controlling decision by the United States Supreme Court, the trial court should consider all the authorities available to it at the time it rules on the issue and should make its ruling informed by the reasoning of those authorities.