Opinion ID: 2350429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying the Human Rights Act to the Endorsement Element of University Recognition

Text: The Human Rights Act does not require one private actor to endorse another. Georgetown's denial of University Recognition to the student groups did not violate the statute. There are two reasons why, as a matter of statutory construction, the Human Rights Act cannot be read to compel a regulated party to express religious approval or neutrality towards any group or individual. First, the statute prohibits only a discriminatory denial of access to facilities and services provided by an educational institution. D.C. Code § 1-2520 (1987). An endorsement is neither. The Human Rights Act provides legal mechanisms to ensure equality of treatment, not equality of attitudes. Although we fervently hope that nondiscriminatory attitudes result from equal access to facilities and services, the Human Rights Act contains nothing to suggest that the legislature intended to make a discriminatory state of mind unlawful in itself. Still less does the statute reveal any desire to force a private actor to express an idea that is not truly held. The Human Rights Act demands action, not words. It was not intended to be an instrument of mind control. Judge Braman's construction of the statute, as requiring an insincere expression of opinion, conflicts with its literal meaning. Second, as we have already pointed out, unless the language of the statute is plainly to the contrary, we must construe it so as to uphold its constitutionality. To read into the Human Rights Act a requirement that one private actor must endorse another would be to render the statute unconstitutional. The First Amendment protects both free speech and the free exercise of religion. [17] Its essence is that government is without power to intrude into the domain of the intellect or the spirit and that only conduct may be regulated. Interpreting the Human Rights Act so as to require Georgetown to endorse the student groups would be to thrust the statute across the constitutional boundaries set by the Free Speech Clause and also, where sincere religious objections are raised, the Free Exercise Clause. Nothing in the statute suggests, let alone requires, such a result. Because similar interests are often implicated, the Supreme Court has relied on both the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause to protect against government intrusion into the inner domain. The Court has made clear that the state is without power to regulate the intellect or the spirit; its rule is over actions and behavior only. In its initial decision interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the Court described the division between opinion and action as the true distinction between what properly belongs to the Church and what to the State. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 163, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878). With the adoption of the Free Exercise Clause, Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order. Id. at 164. The Court quoted with approval a statute drafted by Thomas Jefferson to protect religious freedom in Virginia: [i]t is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order. Id. (quoting 12 Hening's Stat. 84 (1784)). [T]o suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his [or her] powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty. Id. The Court concluded, as a matter of constitutional principle, that [l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Reynolds, supra, 98 U.S. at 166. [18] That principle has been emphatically reaffirmed in a later free exercise case: the Amendment embraces two concepts,  freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 18, 310 U.S. at 303-04, 60 S.Ct. at 903 (citations omitted). The principles embraced within the absolute core of the clause, freedom of conscience, thought and expression of religious belief, as sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165, 64 S.Ct. 438, 441, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), cannot be forced to jostle for position with other values regarded by the state as more deserving. A number of free speech cases have expanded the idea that government cannot force one to embrace a repugnant philosophy. Initially, these decisions implicated religious objections, but the Supreme Court has since made clear that the protection against forced speech also extends to matters of a secular nature. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), children attending public schools were required to salute the United States flag upon pain of expulsion and possible criminal penalties against their parents. This symbolic gesture was an affront to the religious beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses. To sustain the compulsory flag salute, observed the Court, we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his [or her] own mind left it open to public authorities to compel him [or her] to utter what is not in his [or her] mind. Id. at 634, 63 S.Ct. at 1183. The Constitution precludes such a result: the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcend[ed] constitutional limitations on their power and invad[ed] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our constitution to reserve from all official control. Id. at 642, 63 S.Ct. at 1187 (emphasis added). The state has no power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any statement of belief. Id. at 634, 63 S.Ct. at 1183. Only one member of the Court preferred to reach this result by emphasizing the religious nature of the objections: Official compulsion to affirm what is contrary to one's religious beliefs is the antithesis of freedom of worship. Id. at 646, 63 S.Ct. at 1189 (Murphy, J., concurring). In a later free exercise case concerning a Sunday closing statute challenged by Orthodox Jews, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion), the Court carefully distinguished Barnette before upholding the regulation. It stressed that [c]ertain aspects of religious exercise cannot, in any way, be restricted or burdened by either federal or state legislation.... The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute. Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. at 603, 81 S.Ct. at 1146 (emphasis added). A compulsory flag salute requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. Id. at 605-06, 81 S.Ct. at 1147 (quoting Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. at 633, 63 S.Ct. at 1183) (emphasis added in Braunfeld ). In contrast to the flag salute cases, however, the Braunfeld statute did not outlaw the holding of any religious belief or opinion, nor [did] it force anyone to embrace any religious belief or to say or believe anything in conflict with his [or her] religious tenets. Id. at 603, 81 S.Ct. at 1146; accord, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-55, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2486-89, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (the First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself [or herself] in accordance with the dictates of his [or her] own conscience); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1535, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (under the Religion Clauses beliefs are absolutely free from the state's control); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462, 91 S.Ct. 828, 842, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971) (the Free Exercise Clause bars `governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such' ... or interference with the dissemination of religious ideas (emphasis in original; citations omitted)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1793, 10 L.Ed. 2d 965 (1963) (The door of the First Amendment stands tightly closed against any government regulation of religious beliefs as such.... Government may neither compel affirmance of a repugnant belief... nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold views abhorrent to the authorities (emphasis in original; citations omitted)). Similarly, in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961), the Court held that a statute requiring a declaration of belief in God as a test for public office violated the Free Exercise Clause. The state regulation unconstitutionally invade[d] the appellant's freedom of religion and therefore [could not] be enforced against him. Id. at 496, 81 S.Ct. at 1684. The Court relied on broader free speech principles, as it had in Barnette, when it upheld the challenge of Jehovah's Witnesses whose religion forbade them from compliance with a governmentally compelled exhibition of vehicle license plates bearing the state motto Live Free or Die. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). The question there was whether the State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message. Id. at 713, 97 S.Ct. at 1434. The answer was no. Speech may no more be officially prescribed than it may be proscribed. The right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. Id. at 714, 97 S.Ct. at 1435. The Wooley Court explained that freedom from compelled expression is an essential element of a society dedicated to free speech. A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of `individual freedom of mind.' Id. at 714, 97 S.Ct. at 1435 (citing Barnette ). A state measure forcing one to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to a repugnant point of view invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which the First Amendment reserves from all official control. Id. at 715, 97 S.Ct. at 1435. The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the right against compelled expression came in a free speech case without religious overtones. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 903, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (plurality opinion). A public utility company was ordered by the California Public Utilities Commission to include in its billing envelopes the speech of a third party with whom the utility disagreed. The state regulation in Pacific Gas & Electric did not require the utility to voice any endorsement, but merely to serve as a vehicle for the views of a ratepayers' organization. Id. at 906-07, 911 n. 11. Furthermore, the utility's objections were not religiously based, so that only the Free Speech Clause and not the Free Exercise Clause was implicated. Id. at 908-10. Finally, the utility engaged primarily in commercial speech relating to its business interests, although its newsletter also carried recipes, stories about wildlife conservation and other matters of public concern. Id. at 907-08. Despite these limitations, the Court upheld the utility's objection to the challenged regulation. The degree of intrusion upon the utility's First Amendment rights was doubtless considerably less than Judge Braman's construction of the Human Rights Act would impose upon Georgetown. In contrast to a heavily regulated public utility, Georgetown's stock-in-trade is in ideas; as a private, nonprofit, religiously affiliated educational institution seeking to implement its own vision of education, it is entitled to favor particular views on moral, ethical, philosophical, political and social issues. For corporations as for individuals, wrote the Pacific Gas & Electric plurality, the choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say, id. at 912 (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 2840, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974)), because [c]orporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the `discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster, id. at 907 (quoting First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1419, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978)). The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas.... There is necessarily ... a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect. Id. at 909 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 2230, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985) (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 778, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968) (emphasis in original)). The Public Utilities Commission therefore could not compel the public utility to assist in disseminating the speaker's message or to associate with speech with which [the public utility] may disagree. Id. at 911. [19] In Pacific Gas & Electric the Supreme Court clarified the line between compelled expression and mere accommodation of another's speech. It distinguished Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980), in which the owner of a shopping center set up as a public forum was required by state law to admit pamphleteers. Notably absent from Prune Yard,  said the Court, was any concern that access to this area might affect the shopping center owner's own right to speak: the owner did not even allege that he objected to the content of the pamphlets; nor was the right of access content-based. Prune Yard thus does not undercut the proposition that forced associations that burden protected speech are impermissible. Pacific Gas & Electric, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 910. In sharp contrast to the threatened endorsement here, the Prune Yard Court had stressed the unlikelihood that the pamphleteers' views would be identified with those of the shopping center owner and also emphasized that no specific message was being dictated by the government in that case. 447 U.S. at 74, 100 S.Ct. at 2037. But Georgetown's scheme of University Recognition cannot be analogized to a public forum, nor can its campus be equated with a business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please. Id. Far from Prune Yard 's required accommodation of another's speech, this case raises the specter of compelled expression in violation of the First Amendment. A grant of University Recognition by Georgetown includes an endorsement of student groups it considers broadly compatible with Roman Catholic doctrine. To that extent, University Recognition is speech. Government compulsion to grant University Recognition would threaten both the free speech and free exercise guarantees of the First Amendment. Although a compelling state interest may justify regulation of religiously motivated conduct, nothing can penetrate the constitutional shield protecting against official coercion to renounce a religious belief or to endorse a principle opposed to that belief. The very purpose of a Bill of Rights is to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majority and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. at 638, 63 S.Ct. at 1185. Georgetown's right to express opinions based on Roman Catholic teachings includes the right to do so by way of granting University Recognition to groups it regards as consonant with that belief system. Individuals will not always agree with Georgetown's choices as to what groups are deserving of its approval, but its right to freely express its views is nonetheless protected by the First Amendment. Freedom of expression is a right to which we all lay equal claim, irrespective of the content of our message. This is easily illustrated. Suppose that the Gay University of America (GUA) is established as a private educational institution. Part of its mission is to win understanding and acceptance of gay and bisexual persons in an intolerant society. Although open to everyone, regardless of sexual orientation, GUA does expect its faculty, staff and students to maintain a sympathetic attitude towards gay practices and the philosophies that support them. GUA has, as the trial court finds, a system of University Recognition through which it expresses its approval or tolerance of various student groups desiring that status. But the GUA administration refuses to grant University Recognition to the Roman Catholic Sexual Ethics Association (RCSEA). In that situation, the Human Rights Act's ban on discrimination based on religion could not avail the Catholic student group, for the simple reason that the statute does not require GUA to give expressions of approval or tolerance. Insincere statements of opinion are not what the Human Rights Act requires. On the other hand, the statute would require equal distribution of any attendant tangible benefits if GUA's denial of these was based on the religion of RCSEA members. Georgetown's protection against compelled expression is no more and no less. The trial court's construction of the Human Rights Act would transform the statute into a violation of the First Amendment. It would compel Georgetown to endorse the student groups despite the Supreme Court's warning that a religious actor may not be forced to say ... anything in conflict with [its] religious tenets. Braunfeld, supra, 366 U.S. at 603, 81 S.Ct. at 1146. This construction of the Human Rights Act is required neither by its language nor by its purpose of ensuring equal treatment  treatment concretely measured by access to facilities and services, not by the educational institution's expressed approval of the purposes and activities of recipient student groups. [20] Georgetown's obligation under the statute is not to express a particular point of view. It is to make tangible benefits available to its students without regard to their sexual orientation. The Human Rights Act does not require Georgetown to grant University Recognition and its accompanying intangible endorsement to the student groups.