Opinion ID: 1324064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Probable Cause Supported the Arrest and Prosecution of Williams

Text: Williams further charges defendants Bland and White with violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free of false arrest and malicious prosecution on account of their respective roles in his arrest and prosecution for trespass. Assuming that Williams had articulated a prima facie case against both Defendants Bland and White for claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution, the District Court concluded that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because they believed in good faith that their actions were lawful and not designed to deliberately violate the Plaintiff's constitutional rights. On that basis, the District Court ruled in defendants' favor on these claims. We agree that Williams's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims fail, but we arrive at this conclusion by a more direct route. In our view, there was probable cause to arrest Williams, who was therefore not deprived of any constitutional right. See Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir.2002) (In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show ... that a proceeding was commenced or continued against him, with malice and without probable cause, and was terminated in his favor.); Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.1995) (There can be no federal civil rights claim for false arrest where the arresting officer had probable cause.). Probable cause exists when [one] ha[s] knowledge of, or reasonably trustworthy information as to, facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 368 (2d Cir.2007). Such is the case here. A person of reasonable caution who (1) knew that Williams had been expelled from the Center and warned not to return without permission and (2) observed Williams return to the Center, apparently without having obtained that permission, would possess sufficient information to believe that Williams was trespassing on the Center's property. The reasonableness of this belief is not undermined by Williams's subsequent acquittal of trespass by the Town Court in light of the inadequacy of the police officer's oral warning. This is because a mistake about relevant factsin this case, the adequacy of the warningdoes not undermine the existence of probable cause. See United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir.2006) (The constitutional validity of a stop is not undermined simply because the officers who made the stop were mistaken about relevant facts.... [B]ecause the officers had a reasonable but mistaken belief that the SUV lacked license plates, stopping the vehicle was `justified at its inception.' (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))). [5] On the record before us, it was not unreasonable for Bland and White to believe that the police officer had provided Williams with adequate notice that he would be arrested for trespass if he returned to the Center. Accordingly, the belief of Bland and White that Williams had trespassed on the Center's property when they saw him return on December 30 was also reasonable. They therefore had probable cause to have Williams arrested and prosecuted for that offense.