Opinion ID: 1807154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Commission jurisdiction to control erection of respondent's tower.

Text: What are the critical facts concerning the actual height of the tower in relation to the surrounding heights within a mile radius of that tower? At the request of the commission, Edgar J. Carrington, a professional consulting engineer, did a topographical survey of the area within one mile of respondent's tower. That survey revealed that the low point in the area was located at the edge of a creek in Irvine Park near Chippewa Falls, in the periphery of the one-mile radius. That point was 854 feet above mean sea level (MSL). The base of respondent's tower was 1,099.75 feet above MSL and the top of the tower was 1,462.04 feet above MSL. Thus, the tower measured 362.29 feet from its base to its top. George M. Sklom, also a consulting engineer, did a topographic survey of the same area and determined that the average terrain within one mile of the tower was 1,001.75 feet above MSL. Sec. 114.135 (7), Stats., prescribes the limits of the commission's power to control the erection of towers: For the purposes of sub. (6) the power and authority to control the erection of buildings, structures, towers and other objects by the state aeronautics commission shall be limited to those objects that would either extend to a height of more than 500 feet above the ground or surface of the water within one mile of the location of the object, or above a height determined by the ratio of one foot verticle to 40 feet horizontal measured from the nearest boundary of the nearest public airport within the state.... (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear that respondent's tower does not violate the 40 to one provisions of this section. The Eau Claire airport is located at 888 feet MSL, and the tower is 6.8 miles from the airport. Thus, the only question is whether the tower's top is more than 500 feet above the ground or surface of the water within one mile. The respondent asks us to uphold the trial court's determination that the 500 feet must be measured from the average terrain within one mile. The state contends that we should abide by the commission's interpretation which is that the 500 feet should be measured from the lowest point. Since the top of the tower is 460.29 feet above the average terrain and 608.04 feet above the low point, the base for measurement is crucial. It should be understood at the outset that this court has already determined in the first State v. Chippewa Cable Co. Case [6] that the distance of 500 feet is not to be measured from the highest point within one mile. However, we said there: Whether proper construction of the statute requires the measurement of 500 feet to begin at the lowest point in the area or at the average ground level in the area may depend on facts not now before the court. [7] Furthermore, when this controversy was before us the second time, [8] we stated that in light of this statute's apparent purpose we would be inclined to agree with the state's interpretation. Unless facts appearing upon the trial show a good reason for construing the statute to require the 500 feet to be measured from an average elevation, it will necessarily follow that it must be measured from the elevation of the lowest point within a mile. In either case the meaning will have been determined by resort to the ordinary rules of construction. [9] In Scanlon v. Menasha, [10] we observed: [W]e must ascertain the legislative intention as disclosed by the language of the statute in relation to its scope, history, context, subject matter, and the object intended to be remedied or accomplished. The history of sec. 114.135, Stats., shows that as originally enacted the section dealt only with keeping aerial approaches to any airport in a condition suited for safe operation of aircraft. [11] In 1955, the preamble to the section was amended to declare the public interest not only in keeping airport approaches safe, but also in keeping the navigable airspace over the state in a safe condition. At the same time, subs. (6) through (10) were added. [12] From this we can infer that subs. (6) through (10) were added for the purpose of protecting navigable airspace, and the provisions regarding the commission's authority must be interpreted in light of this. Respondent contends that since the Wisconsin statutes do not define the term navigable airspace, in determining its meaning, we should rely on federal authorities in effect at the time of enactment which did define the term. Sec. 180 of Title 49 of the 1951 United States Code provided that navigable airspace means airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA). That basic definition is now found in 49 USCA, sec. 1301 (24). The administrator of the FAA has the authority to prescribe rules governing flight of aircraft, including rules governing safe altitudes of flight. [13] The following rule has been prescribed pursuant to this authority: Minimum safe altitudes; general. Except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person may operate an aircraft below the following altitudes: ... (b) Over congested areas. Over any congested area of a city, town, or settlement, or over any open air assembly of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft. (c) Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In that case, the aircraft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure. [14] The area in which the tower is located is sparsely populated but it is just northwest of the city of Chippewa Falls which is considered a congested area. Respondent argues that since navigable airspace does not begin until at least 500 feet above the ground, measurement from the low point within one mile is not necessary to protect that airspace. From this the respondent reasons that the commission's interpretation of sec. 114.135 (7), Stats., goes beyond the purpose stated in the preamble and consequently could not be the one intended by the legislature. But this argument ignores the fact that 14 CFR, sec. 91.79, also states that aircraft may not operate closer than 500 feet to any structure. If we accept respondent's premise that navigable airspace includes only the space where planes are legally permitted to fly, no structure intrudes into it, and no structure can be regulated under sec. 114.135, Stats. This could not have been the legislature's intent. Respondent argues that we are dealing with a statute in derogation of the common law which should be strictly construed so as to give the landowner the maximum use of his land. Specifically, respondent relies on the common-law rule that a property owner owns airspace above his land. [15] The legislature has made this right subject to the right of flight over the land, though the right of flight is, in turn, limited to the extent that it interferes with the existing use of the land. [16] Thus, the legislature has made it clear that a balancing of the right of flight and common-law ownership rights is necessary. This court's construction of the statute must not ignore the legislature's intent to strike such a balance. Respondent also contends that the statute is penal and, therefore, should be construed so as to minimize its penal character. [17] Lang was a negligence action in which the defendant railroad requested an instruction as to the effect of plaintiff's violation of certain safety standards applicable to motor carriers regarding stopping at railroad crossings. Plaintiff was a motor carrier but he was operating his vehicle for his own private purposes and carrying only his own property at the time of the accident. We conceded that the statute, if read literally, would apply to plaintiff, but found that the case did not come within the purpose of the statute. We also observed that the statute carried a penalty and we held that it should be read so as to minimize rather than extend its penal character. The policy behind this canon of construction is to provide a standard which, if followed, will avoid penalty. [18] Although there are penalties attached to sec. 114.135, Stats., it does not require a person to put up his tower and take the risk of being prosecuted. If in doubt about the necessity of a permit, he can request one and if his request is denied he can appeal that determination under the procedures provided in ch. 227. He need not take any risk in order to get a final decision on what standards apply to him, and therefore there is no need for application of this canon to protect him. Finally respondent cites similar statutes from other jurisdictions which expressly provide that high structures should be measured from the highest point within one mile for purposes of determining whether they can be erected. [19] These statutes have little weight, since we can assume that if the legislature had based sec. 114.135 on them, it would also have expressly provided for measurement from the highest point. In support of the commission's interpretation of sec. 114.135 (7), Stats., the state emphasizes that the commission's interpretation is consistent with the objective of protecting navigable airspace and has been consistently applied by it since the time of enactment of the statute. In Mednis v. Industrial Comm. [20] we stated: The construction and interpretation adopted by the administrative agency charged with the duty of applying the law is entitled to great weight in the courts. There we accepted the industrial commission's interpretation of the term pre-existing disability. [21] In Milwaukee Transformer Co. v. Industrial Comm. [22] we said that the mere fact that a determination by the industrial commission is a conclusion of law does not mean that this court will make an independent determination of what the conclusion should be. ... If several rules, or several applications of a rule are equally consistent with the purpose of the statute, the court will accept the agency's formulation.... [23] In that case we upheld the commission's interpretation of the term misconduct [24] within the meaning of sec. 108.04 (5), Stats. Our principal reason for relying on the agency's interpretation of a statute is found in the comparative qualifications of the court and the agency. [25] The court is reluctant to substitute its own judgment for the agency's where the statute in question requires application of the agency's expertise. Although the agency's interpretation of a jurisdictional statute, as here, is entitled to less weight than its interpretation of other statutes, we must observe here that the commission (Division of Aeronautics) is made up of experts in the field of aviation safety who we may assume are knowledgeable about the problems (both existing and prospective) in the field. The commission has concluded that exercise of the maximum jurisdiction possible under the statute is necessary to permit it to adequately protect navigable airspace and it is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the legislature must have intended to grant such jurisdiction. We conclude that the commission's interpretation of sec. 114.135 (7), Stats., is correct and that the height of respondent's tower was correctly measured in relation to the lowest point within a radius of one mile from the base of the tower.