Opinion ID: 463541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Title VII

Text: 11 The application of Title VII to the employment practice before us would definitely give rise to serious constitutional questions. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952); Pacific Press, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.1982); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.1985); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S.Ct. 132, 34 L.Ed.2d 153 (1972). However, we conclude that Congress has clearly expressed the intention that Title VII apply to the present circumstances. 12 Fremont Christian argues that the exemption created by Section 702 of Title VII, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-1 (1982), for religious institutions extends beyond hiring practices and encompasses all other employment practices (e.g., the health insurance compensation program). Both the language and legislative history of Title VII, however, indicate that the statute exempts religious institutions only to a narrow extent. Section 702 provides: 13 This subchapter shall not apply ... to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities. 14 To be sure, Sec. 702 prohibits some forms of state involvement in ecclesiastical decisions of employment. See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166. If, for example, a religious institution were to present 'convincing evidence' that an employment practice favored members of one faith or denomination over another, 'Sec. 702 deprives the EEOC of jurisdiction to investigate further to determine whether the religious discrimination was a pretext for some other form of discrimination.'  Id. (quoting EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 3143, 69 L.Ed.2d 994 (1981)). 15 While the language of Sec. 702 makes clear that religious institutions may base relevant hiring decisions upon religious preferences, religious employers are not immune from liability [under Title VII] for discrimination based on ... sex.... Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1276. Furthermore, Congress and this court have specifically rejected proposals that provide[ ] religious employers a complete exemption from regulation under the [Civil Rights] Act [of 1964]. Id. 16 The legislative history reinforces the plain meaning of the statutory text. The original Act passed by the House in 1964 excluded religious employers from coverage altogether. H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, 2355, 2391, 2402. The final version excluded such employers only with respect to discrimination based on religion, and then only with respect to persons hired to carry out the employer's religious activities. P.L. 88-352, Title VII, Sec. 702, 78 Stat. 241 (July 2, 1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 287, 304. In 1972 the statute was amended to delete the word religious, P.L. 92-261 Sec. 3, 86 Stat. 103 (March 24, 1972), but Congress specifically rejected proposals to broaden further the scope of the exemption. Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the United States Senate, Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (Comm.Print 1972), at 1229-1230, 1258-1260. To the contrary, the analysis pertaining to Sec. 702 states clearly that [s]uch organizations remain subject to the provisions of Title VII with regard to race, color, sex or national origin. Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R.1946, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, reprinted in id. at 1844, 1845. 17 Fremont Christian further argues that it is exempted from application of Title VII under the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exemption, Sec. 703(e), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e). This exemption provides that it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to admit or employ an individual on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. Fremont Christian contends that its health insurance compensation program is just such a BFOQ. 18 It has been noted that this exception does not apply to the full range of possibly discriminatory employment actions. See 1 L. Larson, Employment Discrimination Sec. 13.00 (1985). It uses only the words 'to hire and employ,' while the earlier section [Sec. 703(a) ] detailing unlawful employment practices lists, in addition, such specific acts as 'to discharge' and ... includes a catchall phrase, 'or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.'  Id. at 4-1 to 4-2. While this disparity between the description of the offense and the defense has caused little litigation, it should not be overlooked, since the oversight might tempt a defendant mistakenly to invoke the BFOQ exception in a case involving, say, discrimination in pay. Id. at 4-2 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we conclude that the BFOQ exception does not apply to the discriminatory provision of benefits involved here. 19 Fremont Christian's final statutory argument is that its health insurance compensation program does not violate the Equal Pay Act because it is based on any factor other than sex, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(d)(1)(iv); in this case, religious beliefs. The EEOC claims that because the head of household refers only to men, the health insurance compensation program could not be based on any other factor but sex. 20 Sometimes differentials in pay to employees performing equal work are said to be based on the fact that one employee is head of a household and the other, of the opposite sex, is not. In general, such allegations have not been substantiated. Experience indicates that where such factor is claimed the wage differentials tend to be paid to employees of one sex only, regardless of the fact that employees of the opposite sex may bear equal or greater financial responsibility as head of a household or for the support of parents or other family dependents. Accordingly, ... the general position of the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator is that they are not prepared to conclude that any differential allegedly based on such status is based on a 'factor other than sex' within the intent of the statute. 21 29 C.F.R. Sec. 800.149. We are equally unwilling to conclude that this exception to the Equal Pay Act applies to the particular circumstances of this case. 22 We now turn to the constitutional questions.