Opinion ID: 2076252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excused Juror

Text: The trial judge granted the State's motion to exclude for cause prospective juror Herman Meyer. Meyer was a cousin of the attorney who represented Hunt on his first appeal. Meyer described his relationship with his cousin as close, but he did not indicate that he knew that his cousin had represented Hunt. The prosecutor did not object to Meyer during voir dire, but later, after becoming aware that the cousin had represented Hunt, he moved to dismiss Meyer. A trial judge should not excuse prospective jurors for cause simply because of the juror's abstract beliefs. King v. State, 287 Md. 530, 539, 414 A.2d 909, 913 (1980). We agree that excusing jurors for cause because of their abstract beliefs is an abuse of discretion because it exclude[s] from the panel a significant part of the community. Id. But Meyer was excused not because of any abstract beliefs, but rather because of his close personal relationship with someone having a strong personal interest in [the case's] outcome. Cf. Bristow v. State, 242 Md. 283, 285, 219 A.2d 33, 34 (1966). The judge made that clear, saying: I felt that the relationship where the cousin works right on this very same brief, has [intimate] knowledge of the case and the close relationship, I felt that it was grounds for excluding this person as a juror. It is not an abuse of discretion when the judge makes a considered decision to excuse a juror based on potential personal prejudice. It was within the judge's broad discretion to exclude Meyer. Hunt also contends that it was error to excuse Meyer without making further inquiry of the juror. The judge was faced with a dilemma. Further inquiry might be helpful in determining whether Meyer could be impartial, but the questioning itself could have tainted the juror by informing him directly or indirectly about the prior appeal and about his cousin's representation of Hunt. The judge's failure to further interrogate Meyer was not an abuse of discretion. Even if the judge abused his discretion in this case, we would not hold that the abuse constituted reversible error. `[I]t is not reversible error for the Court of its own motion to exclude a juror, even for insufficient cause, if an unobjectionable jury is afterwards obtained (emphasis supplied).' King, 287 Md. at 538, 414 A.2d at 913 (quoting Bluthenthal & Bickart v. May Co., 127 Md. 277, 285-86, 96 A. 434, 438 (1915)). This principle is applicable where, as here, the reason for excusing a juror is related to the particular juror and not to a general class of people. Id. The exclusion of Meyer, even if for insufficient cause, would not constitute reversible error where, as here, the jurors who were selected were not objectionable.