Opinion ID: 4469548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rights of Custody

Text: The Convention provides that rights of custody “include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence.” Hague Convention, art. 5. The kinds of rights that give rise to rights of custody may vary from country to country and from child to child depending on a variety of factors, including each country’s domestic law, decisions by a country’s courts about rights relating to a particular child, or any agreements made among parents or others about those rights. See Hague Convention, art. 3 (stating that rights of custody “may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of” country where child was “habitually resident” at time of removal). Here, Ogawa and Kang agree that the twins were habitually resident in Japan at the time of their removal to the United States. Thus, to determine if Ogawa’s rights are rights of custody, we first look to Japanese law “to determine the content of [his] right[s].” Abbott, 560 U.S. at 10. And because the parties agree that the Divorce Agreement governs their custody arrangement, we more specifically determine Ogawa’s rights under the Divorce Agreement as interpreted under Japanese law. See 7 Hague Convention, art. 3 (providing that rights of custody “may arise . . . by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of” country); Minpō [Civ. C.] art. 766, para. 1 (“If parents divorce by agreement, the matters of who will have custody over a child . . . shall be determined by that agreement.”). Then, we look to the “text and structure” of the Hague Convention—as opposed to dictionary definitions or “traditional notions of physical custody”—to determine whether Ogawa’s rights under the Divorce Agreement and Japanese law constitute rights of custody under the Convention. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 10, 12 (explaining that this “approach ensures international consistency”). We begin with the terms of the Divorce Agreement. It provides that Kang “shall obtain parental authority over” the twins and Ogawa “shall obtain custody of” the twins. App. 45. That same section also instructs Ogawa to “hand over” the twins to Kang no later than March 31, 2017, but notes that he “shall continue to maintain the right of custody” after that date. Id. at 46. Another section requires Ogawa to begin paying child support to Kang in April 2017, after he “hand[s] over” the twins to Kang. Id. Finally, the Divorce Agreement allows either parent to visit the twins once a year, and it obligates Ogawa to purchase the plane tickets for those visits. Ogawa argues—by relying on American legal principles of contract interpretation—that according to the “plain meaning” of the word “custody” in the Divorce Agreement, he “had custody rights under Japanese law.” Aplt. Br. 19. But it is the Convention’s definition of rights of custody and the content of Japanese law that guide us, not “our somewhat different American concepts of custody.” Furnes v. 8 Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 711 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1 (2014); see also Abbott, 560 U.S. at 12 (explaining that Convention “forecloses courts from relying on definitions of custody confined by local law usage, definitions that may undermine recognition of custodial arrangements in other countries or in different legal traditions”). And Ogawa does not tell us what “content” the word “custody” in the Divorce Agreement has under Japanese law or how that might fit within the Convention’s definition. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 10. In contrast to Ogawa’s undefined “custody” right, the Divorce Agreement specifically grants Kang “parental authority.” App. 45. And Japanese law delineates which rights are included in “parental authority”: for example, under Japanese law, a parent with “parental authority” over a child has authority to determine that child’s “[r]esidence.” Minpō [Civ. C.] art. 821. Thus, “parental authority” under Japanese law falls squarely within part of the Hague Convention’s definition of rights of custody—a definition that specifically includes, “in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence.” Hague Convention, art. 5 (emphasis added). And the Divorce Agreement grants parental authority only to Kang; it nowhere states that Ogawa also has parental authority. Yet Ogawa argues “that even minimal rights . . . are nevertheless ‘rights of custody’ under the Convention.” Rep. Br. 7. In support, he relies on Abbott. There, the Supreme Court held that a father had rights of custody under the Convention even though the mother had sole custody and the father had visitation rights. See Abbott, 9 560 U.S. at 5–6. But critically, the father also had a ne exeat right—which, under the relevant country’s domestic law, gave the father “the authority to consent before the other parent may take the child to another country.” Id. at 5. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded in part that because the ne exeat right gave the father “the joint ‘right to determine the child’s place of residence,’” it met the definition of rights of custody under the Convention. Id. at 11 (quoting Hague Convention, art. 5). But here, the Divorce Agreement did not grant Ogawa a ne exeat right. That is, the Divorce Agreement does not provide that Ogawa has any authority to prevent Kang from taking the twins to a different country. Cf. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 6, 10 (holding that “ne exeat right is a right of custody under the Convention”). Thus, Abbott does not help Ogawa. Of course, the authority to determine a child’s place of residence is not the only type of right that meets the Convention definition for rights of custody. The Convention also provides that rights of custody include “rights relating to the care of the person of the child.” Hague Convention, art. 5. To determine whether Ogawa had such rights, we turn again to the Divorce Agreement, which specifically provided only Kang with parental authority. And parental authority, under Japanese law, includes not only the authority to determine a child’s place of residence, but also a broad collection of other rights including, among others, the rights to “care for and educate the child,” Minpō [Civ. C.] art. 820, to discipline the child, id. at art. 822, to handle the child’s money, and to take legal actions on behalf of the child, id. at art. 824. These rights “relat[e] to the care of the person of the child.” Cf. Altamiranda 10 Vale v. Avila, 538 F.3d 581, 584, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that even though mother had physical custody of child, father had rights of custody because he had right to make decisions about child’s care, education, and property). Despite the Divorce Agreement’s broad designation of rights to Kang, Ogawa maintains that the word “custody” in the Divorce Agreement carries with it some of these same rights. But Ogawa’s briefing points to nothing in Japanese law to support his assertion that the use of the word “custody” carries with it any of the same “rights relating to the care of the person of the child” that accompany parental authority. Hague Convention, art. 5. Relatedly, Ogawa argues that even if Kang’s rights were “greater” than his, a child’s removal is wrongful “whenever the left-behind parent had any custody right.” Rep. Br. 8 (emphasis added). But for our purposes, the contours of the right or rights that the “left-behind” parent retains are critical: that parent must have some kind of right that meets the Convention’s definition of rights of custody. Aplt. Br. 2. Thus, the question at hand is not whether Kang’s rights were “greater” than Ogawa’s, Rep. Br. 8; it is merely whether Ogawa’s rights fall within the Convention’s definition of rights of custody. Indeed, simply because Ogawa had some rights to the twins does not automatically mean that the content of those rights amounts to rights of custody under the Convention. For instance, the Convention itself recognizes that not all of a parent’s rights qualify as rights of custody: it also recognizes “rights of access.” Hague Convention, art. 5 (“‘[R]ights of access’ shall include the right to take a child 11 for a limited period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual residence.”). While a parent with only rights of access cannot invoke the return remedy, see Abbott, 560 U.S. at 9, that parent may nevertheless use other Convention mechanisms to enforce rights of access, see, e.g., Hague Convention, art. 21 (explaining that signatory countries must “promote the peaceful enjoyment of access rights” by “remov[ing], as far as possible, all obstacles to the exercise of such rights” and “may initiate or assist in . . . proceedings . . . to organiz[e] or protect[] these rights”). Thus, even if the Divorce Agreement gave Ogawa some rights, Ogawa must nevertheless demonstrate those rights are rights of custody as defined by the Convention. This he fails to do.3 In sum, Ogawa has not carried his burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he has rights of custody as the Convention defines them. See 3 Although the parties have focused their arguments on rights of custody rather than rights of access, the content of Ogawa’s rights after the handover may well amount to rights of access under the Convention. Under the Divorce Agreement’s terms, Kang held the rights included in “parental authority” and Ogawa held the rights included in “custody.” App. 45–46. The Divorce Agreement contemplated that no later than March 31, 2017, Ogawa would “hand over” the daily physical control of the twins to Kang and then begin paying child support. Id. at 46. After that handover, Ogawa would “continue to maintain the right of custody,” but Kang would have daily physical control of the twins along with the broad collection of rights that Japanese law places in the parent with parental authority. Id.; see Minpō [Civ. C.] art. 820–22, 824 (giving examples of rights included in parental authority). The Divorce Agreement further provides that after the handover, Ogawa would have the right to visit the twins once per year and to communicate with the twins. In any event, we need not and do not decide the exact nature of the rights Ogawa does have because whatever those rights are, he has not shown that his rights after March 2017 are rights of custody “relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence.” Hague Convention, art. 3. 12 § 9003(e)(1)(A); Abbott, 560 U.S. at 5. Indeed, instead of explaining what his rights are under the Divorce Agreement, Ogawa insists simply that because he has some rights—no matter what those rights actually are—their “nature and extent” is “irrelevant.” Rep. Br. 3. But only by understanding the nature and extent of his rights under Japanese law can we evaluate whether the content of his rights is within the Convention’s definition of rights of custody. See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 10. Ogawa offers little support for the argument that his rights are Convention rights of custody, and we find none.