Opinion ID: 2357746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: -(d -

Text: Finally, those who suggest an abuse of discretion standard seem not to appreciate the complexity of the appellate process that has been developed under the rubric, broad scope of review. They seem to imagine only two, very different, alternatives: either we must reverse only for abuse of discretion, or we will find ourselves on some sort of uncharted sea, where we must make an unguided independent judgment. The reality is quite different. Perhaps the most useful way to think of the appellate process in a child custody case is as proceeding in four stages. The first stage may be described as the procedural stage; the second, as the fact-finding stage; the third, as the conclusion of law stage; and the fourth, as the inferences and deductions stage. At the first, procedural, stage of the appellate process, the appellate court examines the record to determine whether the trial court has satisfied the several procedural requirements incident to the entry of a custody award. To enable the appellate court to exercise its independent judgment, the trial court must make a complete record. Garrity v. Garrity, 268 Pa.Super. 217, 407 A.2d 1323 (1979); Augustine v. Augustine, 228 Pa.Super. 312, 324 A.2d 477 (1974). This means that the record must contain testimony adequate to illuminate the circumstances of the parties. Sipe v. Shaffer, 263 Pa.Super. 27, 396 A.2d 1359 (1979); Gunter v. Gunter, 240 Pa.Super. 382, 361 A.2d 307 (1976). There should be testimony by interested and disinterested witnesses alike. J.F.G. v. K.A.G., 278 Pa.Super. 25, 419 A.2d 1337 (1980); Lewis v. Lewis, 267 Pa.Super. 235, 406 A.2d 781 (1979). The testimony must describe the parties' respective homes, and sometimes expert testimony is necessary. Rupp v. Rupp, 268 Pa.Super. 467, 408 A.2d 883 (1979) (remand for psychiatric testimony and disinterested testimony on homes). If, at the procedural stage, the appellate court determines that the record is incomplete, ordinarily the case will be remanded to the trial court for further hearing. This very case illustrates such a remand. When it was first appealed to this court, we remanded because the record [was] totally devoid of any evidence regarding the nature and quality of the children's foster placements, the degree of attachments which the children have formed in foster care, and the effect which return of the children would have on them. In Re Donna W., 284 Pa.Super. 338, 349, 425 A.2d 1132, 1137 (1981). The appellate court also considers at the procedural stage whether the trial court has filed a complete and comprehensive opinion, including findings of fact and reasons for the award. Strapple v. Strapple, 263 Pa.Super. 187, 397 A.2d 809 (1979); Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa.Super. 229, 312 A.2d 58 (1973). If the record is otherwise complete, it may not be necessary to remand for a comprehensive opinion, Commonwealth ex rel. Husack v. Husack, 273 Pa.Super. 192, 417 A.2d 233 (1979), Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, supra , but often remand is necessary to enable us to exercise our independent judgment, Strapple v. Strapple, supra ; Commonwealth ex rel. Forrester v. Forrester, 258 Pa.Super. 397, 392 A.2d 852 (1978). Once satisfied that the trial court has made no procedural errors requiring remand, the appellate court proceeds to the second, fact-finding, stage of the appellate process. At this stage the appellate court examines the trial court's findings of fact. As has already been discussed, the appellate court is bound to accept the trial court's findings, see e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Harry v. Eastridge, supra , but this of course assumes that the findings are supported by evidence of record. Generally, they are. But if examination discloses that findings determinative of the award are unsupported by the record, it may be necessary to reverse. [2] Jon M.W. v. Brenda K., 279 Pa.Super. 50, 420 A.2d 738 (1980). If no procedural errors requiring remand have occurred, and the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the record, the appellate court proceeds to the third stage of the appellate process. At this stage the appellate court determines whether the trial court has committed an error of law. For as is true in all appeals, not only in child custody cases, the appellate court is never bound by the trial court's conclusions of law. Thus, the trial court's award will be reversed where based on the tender years presumption, Haraschak v. Haraschak, 268 Pa.Super. 173, 407 A.2d 886 (1979), or on the application of an improper burden of proof, Ellerbe v. Hooks, supra ; In Re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa.Super. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977). Where the trial court commits an error of law, the appellate court will usually remand to allow the trial court to rectify its error, Schall v. Schall, 251 Pa.Super. 262, 380 A.2d 478 (1977), but in some cases, depending on the evidence, the appellate court may make an award without remand, In Re Custody of Hernandez, supra . It is only if no errors requiring remand are disclosed at any of the first three stages of the appellate process that the appellate court proceeds to the fourth stage. It is at this fourth stage that the appellate court must consider what inferences and deductions to draw from the facts as found by the trial court. In doing this we are not bound by the inferences and deductions of the trial court, as we are bound by its findings of fact. Rather, as the Supreme Court and this court have said: Our scope of review in a custody matter is of the broadest type, and we are not bound by deductions or inferences made by a trial court. Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 295, 368 A.2d 635, 637 (1977). We must exercise an independent judgment based on the evidence and make such an order on the merits of the case as right and justice dictate. Adoption of Farabelli, 460 Pa. 423, 433, 333 A.2d 846, 851 (1975); Snellgrose Adoption Case, 432 Pa. 158, 163, 247 A.2d 596, 599 (1968). Commonwealth ex rel. Pierce v. Pierce, supra, 493 Pa. at 295-297, 426 A.2d at 557. And see: Commonwealth ex rel. Newcomer v. King, supra ; Robert H.H. v. May L.H., 293 Pa.Super. 431, 439 A.2d 187 (1981). This process of an appellate court drawing its own inferences and deductions is illustrated in Snellgrose Adoption Case, discussed supra at p. 48-49. See, concurring opinion by Chief Justice BELL 432 Pa. at 168-169, 247 A.2d at 601, explaining reason for the Court's reversal: An appellate Court is not bound to accept so-called findings of fact which are in reality deductions, inferences and conclusions found by the lower court. . . . (citations omitted). It is also illustrated in In Re Custody of Temos, 304 Pa.Super. 82, 450 A.2d 111 (1982), where this court, exercising its independent judgment, drew its own inferences and deductions and reversed the order of the trial court. The case involved a custody dispute between the parents of two minor children. The trial court, in awarding custody to the father, relied on three factors: that the mother maintained a close relationship with a married man; that the mother was involved in two questionable financial transactions; and that since the parties' divorce, the mother has become increasingly career-oriented [and] has placed heavy reliance on babysitters. Id., 304 Pa.Superior Ct. at 85, 450 A.2d at 112. This court examined each factor and concluded that none of them supported an award of custody to the father. We therefore reversed, awarded custody to the mother, and remanded the case so that the trial court could provide for the father's visitation.