Opinion ID: 1985051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Postconviction Claim

Text: Skinner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which he first raised in his Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief and which he raises in this appeal, is a refinement of the jury instruction issue regarding restraint, which was rejected by this Court in Skinner's direct appeal. However, a defendant is not entitled to have a court re-examine an issue that has been previously resolved simply because the claim is refined or restated. Riley v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 719, 721 (1990). As this Court has previously stated, Neither federal nor state courts are required to relitigate in postconviction proceedings those claims which have been previously resolved. Younger v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 556 (1990) (citing Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 445-55, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2622-28, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 7-22, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-81, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963)). Although this Court has not previously addressed Skinner's ineffectiveness of counsel claim, per se, our disposition of Skinner's challenge to the absence of a specific jury instruction on the issue of restraint in his direct appeal was, in fact, a substantive resolution of Skinner's present ineffectiveness of counsel claim. In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant in a postconviction proceeding must demonstrate that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that counsel's actions were prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 2068. See also Flamer v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753 (1990); Robinson v. State, Del.Supr., 562 A.2d 1184, 1185 (1989); Albury v. State, Del.Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 58 (1988); Stevenson v. State, Del.Supr., 469 A.2d 797, 799 (1983). Therefore, in his Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief before the Superior Court, Skinner was required to allege and establish the objective unreasonableness of his counsel's conduct and the prejudice resulting to him from that conduct. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Superior Court properly decided that this Court's holding in Skinner's direct appeal, that a specific jury instruction on the issue of restraint was not required, would preclude Skinner from establishing that he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to request such an instruction. [2] Consequently, the Superior Court's summary denial of Skinner's postconviction motion, pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4), was entirely correct. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court, denying Skinner's motion for postconviction relief, is AFFIRMED.