Opinion ID: 18273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Munera was observed descending from the

Text: Rodriguez and Munera claim a long list of landing. Police watched him make eye contact Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. We with Hernandez, who was then in handcuffs, review the district court’s findings of fact on and thereafter become visibly nervous. Police these issues for clear error and its asked Hernandez whether Munera was one of interpretation and application of law de novo. the friends he had spoken of; Hernandez United States v. Carrillo-Morales, 27 F.3d answered in the negative. 1054, 1060 (5th Cir. 1994). When asked by Fanning whether his name
Munera claims that his arrest at the asked to produce identification, Munera turned Sandspoint apartment parking lot was over his driver’s license, which portrayed his unconstitutional because it lacked probable name to be “Jorge Gustavo Munera-Uribe.” cause. Absent an exception, the fruits of an When asked why he had lied, Munera arrest lacking probable cause must be proclaimed “no hablo ingles,” despite the fact suppressed, which in this case would include that all previous communication had been in Munera’s statements, the personal property English and that police had overheard Munera found on him (the telephones, pager, and keys speaking in English on a cellular phone as he to apartments 1714 and 1716), and arguably passed them by. A pat down of Munera even the cocaine seized in apartment 1714 (to revealed a pager and a second cellular phone. the extent Munera can show that it would not Pagers and cell phones have been held by other have been uncovered but for his purportedly circuits to constitute tools of the drug trade. illegal arrest). United States v. Webster, United States v. Cleveland, 106 F.3d 1056, 162 F.3d 308, 324 (5th Cir. 1998), petition for 1061 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Sasson, cert. filed (U.S. Apr. 29, 1999) 62 F.3d 874, 886 (7th Cir. 1995). Under these (No. 98-9212). circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe that Munera was involved in the Probable cause exists if “the totality of facts drug conspiracy with Hernandez, and thus and circumstances within a police officer’s their arrest of Munera at that point was knowledge at the moment of the arrest are entirely lawful. sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was B. committing an offense.” United States v. Ho, Regardless of the lawfulness of his arrest, 94 F.3d 932, 935-36 (5th Cir. 1996). Munera asserts that the “statement” he made Additionally, imputed to the arresting officer’s to police at the Sandspoint apartment should knowledge are all the facts and circumstances have been suppressed. It is undisputed that known to all law enforcement officials. Munera was not informed of his rights under 7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Munera’s cohorts could be found.4 The facts until well after the search of apartment 1714. of the instant case call for the application of Nevertheless, the police asked him to show this “safety exception” to Miranda, and thus it them where his “friends’” apartment was, is of no consequence that the officers failed to prompting Munera to lead the officers to the apprise Munera of his rights. second floor landing, and thereafter pointing with his nose to apartment 1716. C. Munera is correct in noting that his gestures constitute “statements” for Miranda purposes. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). There are at least two reasons, however, why the acquisition of these statements in the absence of Miranda warnings does not undermine the jury’s verdicts against Munera. Firstly, as the government notes, any Miranda error is harmless in that the evidence gathered therefrom was not necessary to finding Munera guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Paul, 142 F.3d 836, 843 (5th Cir. 1998). In addition to the circumstances of his arrest (his recognition of Hernandez, his lying about his name, his lying about his ability to speak English, and his possession of instrumentalities of the drug trade), there is Munera’s subsequent confession, made after he had been read his rights. Additionally, the “fruits” of his purportedly unlawfully acquired statement would have been inevitably discovered by the police anyway: The officers were already aware of the landing from which Munera had descended, and they would most likely have searched apartment 1714 regardless of Munera’s gestures (which were misleadingly directed toward apartment 1716). See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1983); United States v. Lamas, 930 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir. 1991). Secondly, police may dispense with 4 Miranda warnings when necessary for their As mentioned, in this case, Munera originally led police to the wrong apartment number. This protection. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. could have had disastrous consequences for the 649, 655 (1984); Webster, 162 F.3d at 332. officers, should criminal occupants of 1714 have The dangers that law enforcement officials decided to ambush the officers as they searched the face from drug dealers and the like are well wrong apartment. It was precisely to guard against known, and it was important for the officers to such risks that the officers needed to know what identify precisely the apartment in which room Munera’s comrades were in. 8 Munera challenges the legality of the search Exigent circumstances do not, however, of apartment 1714 on the ground that the enable the police to conduct a full-fledged officers lacked a warrant. See United States v. search. Instead, they are permitted to conduct Richard, 994 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1993). only a “protective sweep,” limited to searching We find the lack of a warrant unproblematic in those areas where a suspect might be hiding. this case, as it fits squarely within the well- See Kirkpatrick, 870 F.2d at 282. The record established “exigent circumstances” exception reflects that this is exactly what they did. to the warrant requirement.5 See Kirkpatrick v. Butler, 870 F.2d 276, 281 (5th Cir. 1989). Munera argues next that any exigency was created by the officers, and this precludes them Exigent circumstances justify an exception from engaging in a warrantless search on this to the warrant requirement if officers have basis. In support of this, Munera refers us to “cause to believe either t hat evidence in the United States v. Richard, 994 F.2d 244, 248 house may be destroyed or removed, or that (5th Cir. 1993). The facts of Richard do the lives of police officers or other persons parallel, to some extent, those here: Police may be endangered by persons inside of the had announced their presence outside of an house.” Kirkpatrick, 870 F.2d at 281 apartment door and thereafter feared what the (footnote omitted). Each of these exigencies apartment’s occupants might be doing. Id. at was present. 246-47, 248. We did not find police-created exigency as a matter of law in Richard, but Based on their surveillance and the rather we merely affirmed the finding of confessions of Hernandez and Munera, the police-created exigency under the clear-error officers had strong reason to believe that drugs standard of review. Id. at 248-50. and drug dealers were located in either apartment 1714 or 1716. The officers testified In the instant case, the court held precisely that they “fear[ed] for their safety when the opposite, and did so without error in light Rodriguez bolted” from the living room, and of the particular facts and circumstances. they feared that “Rodriguez may have been Unlike the situation in Richardson, where armed or was trying to flee.” Additionally, “[t]he agents had secured [the room] from the they feared that Rodriguez might be outside, successfully and covertly,” id. at 249, attempting to destroy evidence. in this case the police were trying to figure out which of two apartments was the one Moreover, whether exigent circumstances exist is a question of fact for the district court, whose findings we review for clear error. Id. (...continued) Given that the officers needed to protect Rodriguez-Estupinan, who they believed was still against both the destruction of contraband and in the apartment and could pose a threat to the potential harm to themselves, the court was officers’ safety.” not clearly erroneous in finding exigency.6 Rodriguez also asserts that a finding of exigency under these circumstances (that is, 5 following the arrests of Munera and Hernandez) is Although there is evidence that Hurtado may incorrect as a matter of law, relying on Maryland have consented to the initial search of apartment v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). Rodriguez 1714, we decline to resolve this issue on such a misconstrues when the exigency attached: It did disputed factual ground. not attach when the arrests of Munera and Hernandez were made, but rather when officers 6 Rodriguez asserts that the district court did witnessed Rodriguez flee from the living room. not make a factual finding of exigency. This Had Rodriguez not fled, but instead remained in contention is incorrect, as the district court plain view, and if the officers had secured explicitly noted that “[t]he officers engaged in a apartment 1714, then a warrantless arrest (absent proper protective sweep to look for and to locate consent) might have been inappropriate. But those (continued...) are not the facts of this case. 9 containing contraband and coconspirators. powder was indeed cocaine. Additionally, we have no evidence Secondly, the doctrine of inevitable regarding how well secured the apartments discovery dispenses with Rodriguez’s were or what their means of ingress and egress argument in that the officers obtained were. Further still, the events of Richardson voluntary consent to search the apartment transpired in the morning, whereas the events (from Hurtado) following Rodriguez’s arrest. of the matter before us transpired in the more See Nix, 467 U.S. at 448; Lamas, 930 F.2d at treacherous setting of nighttime. Lastly, in 1102. Thus, even if Thomas did not have Richardson the police at least knew that the probable cause to believe that the white apartment’s occupants were not attempting to powder was cocaine, he validly seized and flee, id.; in the case before us, the police examined it following his receipt of permission witnessed Hernandez’s attempted escape. to search the apartment. See United States v. Thus, if the creation of exigency can be Kirk, 111 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1997). attributed to any particul ar person, responsibility would lie with Rodriguez, whose E. suspicious act of bolting from view alarmed Rodriguez denies that the officers received the officers. In sum, the district court did not valid consent to search apartment 1714. commit clear error in reaching its Because the plain view doctrine allows the determination that exigent circumstances introduction into evidence of the cocaine in the justified the warrantless search of apartment clear plastic bag, the only evidence that could 1714. be excluded via this argument is the cocaine contained in the closet’s gym bag. D. Rodriguez independently challenges the As Rodriguez correctly explains, for seizure of a clear plastic bag containing consent to be valid, it must be freely and cocaine found in the closet of apartment 1714. voluntarily given by someone with authority to He rejects the government’s assertion of the consent. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, doctrine of “plain view,” arguing that Thomas, 181 (1990). Rodriguez concedes that the who came upon the cocaine, “could not be consent by Hurtado was given freely and sure that the white powder residue found was voluntarily; his dispute is over whether she had cocaine.” Rodriguez cites United States v. authority to consent to a search of the Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 826 n.6 (5th Cir. apartment. 1995), in which we noted that “the mere presence of white powder residue in a plastic Hurtado identified herself as a resident of bag, by itself, will [not] always give rise to apartment 1714. Defendants have introduced probable cause.” no evidence challenging this. So, the officers came to the objectively reasonable conclusion The white powder was easily in Thomas’s that Hurtado had the authority to consent to a plain view; the only question is whether he had search. See United States v. DeLeon-Reyna, probable cause to believe that it constituted 930 F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1991) (per cocaine. See id. at 826. As we explained in curiam) (en banc) (holding that “officers' belief Buchanan, whether such probable cause exists that they had consent, in light of all the depends on the “totality of the circumstances.” circumstances,” comports with Fourth Id. This was not a case of the “mere presence Amendment if “objectively reasonable”). of white powder in a plastic bag, by itself,” id., but rather of white powder found in an The court did not commit clear error in apartment already suspected of containing ratifying the officers’ conclusions. The extent drugs and under suspicious circumstances of Hurtado’s knowledge of Rodriguez’s (namely, Rodriguez's flight and Hurtado's wrongdoingSSsomething Rodriguez considers deception). For these reasons, Thomas had important in ascertaining Hurtado’s authority probable cause to believe that the white to consentSSis irrelevant to this inquiry. See 10 id. argument. F. IV. Munera argues that the court erred in Munera contends that Fanning perjured failing to suppress a statement he made to a himself on the stand and that the government DEA agent, because “no evidence was knowingly sponsored this perjury. If true, presented that defendant waived his Miranda such a finding on our part would merit a warning at the time he was questioned and that reversal of Munera’s conviction. Munera he was not informed of his right to carries the burden of proof on this tall communicate with consular or diplomatic accusation. See United States v. Lochmondy, officers of his country as required by Vienna 890 F.2d 817, 822 (6th Cir. 1989). Convention treaty and INS regulation.” It is black letter law that a defendant’s waiver of To prevail, Munera must demonstrate that his Miranda rights must be knowing, (1) Fanning’s testimony was actually false, id. intelligent, and voluntary. United States v. at 822; and (2) that the government Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1994). This “knowingly sponsored” it, United States v. is a question of fact for the district court that Harrison, 103 F.3d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1997). we review for clear error. Id. at 99. Inconsistent testimony, by itself, does not meet Government witnesses testified that this burden. See United States v. Bortnovsky, (1) Munera was read his rights, in Spanish, and 879 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1989). (2) Munera affirmatively requested to make a statement to the DEA and was permitted to do According to Munera, at the suppression so. From this evidence, the district court hearing Fanning testified that he knew to head could and did properly conclude that Munera’s for apartment 1714, because “Officer Thomas statements did not run afoul of Miranda. had watched Jorge Munera-Uribe walk from his apartment complex, from the door, the Munera presses, however, that his Miranda 1714.” When pressed with the question “Is it warnings were not repeated at the DEA possible that you saw him come from the holdover jail cell where his confession was landing where there were two apartments 1714 tendered. But because the DEA agents did not and 1716?”, Fanning responded: “It is recommence questioning of Munera at the jail, possible.” He then elaborated, stating: a second set of warnings was not required; instead, Munera voluntarily initiated the telling We did not know the apartment of his story. See Moore v. Dugger, 856 F.2d doorSSI must correct myself. Officer 129, 133 (11th Cir. 1988). Thomas said he saw some, the landing up there, that we wereSSthat’s when we, Munera’s Vienna Convention argument is that was the reason for taking Jorge meritless in light of existing precedent. Munera-Uribe up to the landing, is for Although his rights under the Convention may him to knock on the door or show us have been violated, he has not adequately the door that his friend was in, Carlos. explained how this may have prejudiced his defenseSSa critical predicate were we to When asked whether Munera did indeed show fashion a remedy for him under the him the door he had come out of, Fanning Convention.7 We accordingly reject this testified: “No, he didn’t.” 7 See Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lombera- (...continued) Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1999) to contact his consulate, the defendant in a criminal (“Upon a showing that the Vienna Convention was proceeding has the initial burden of producing violated by a failure to inform the alien of his right evidence showing prejudice from the violation of (continued...) the Convention.”). 11 At trial, Fanning testified that “to determine (5th Cir. 1997). The offending comments what apartment these two individuals [Munera were as follows: and Hernandez] had come from . . . [he] asked Mr. Munera-Uribe which apartment his friend 1. “Mr. Ash [Rodriguez’s attorney] was in.” Fanning continued, explaining that would have you think that the Gestapo Munera pointed to apartment 1716 for them. had showed up at the door to 1714 at 8300 Sandspoint, that it was this Contrary to Munera’s characterization, massive show of force that caused poor Fanning’s suppression hearing and trial [Rodriguez] to jump from the couch, testimony are not “in direct conflict.” Munera run to the back of the apartment, hide blazons the fact that in his suppression hearing under a mattress.” testimony, Fanning failed to mention that Munera gestured toward the landing for the 2. “If you recall the testimony, officersSSindicating the apartment from which [Rodriguez] was gone on the knock.” he came. But Fanning was never specifically asked that and was available to Munera’s 3. “[T]he officers and agents had no attorney for cross-examination. Instead, reason to get on the stand here and lie to Fanning was asked whether Munera accurately you.” identified apartment 1714 for himSSMunera did not (instead motioning with his nose to None of this deprived Rodriguez of a fair trial. apartment 1716), and Fanning testified as such. The first comment accurately captured Rodriguez’s theory of the case: He had At trial, Fanning reiterated that he turned to argued that the presence of a large force of Munera for help in locating the correct armed police officers gathered on his balcony apartment, and that Munera pointed the alarmed him and caused him to flee. To officers toward apartment 1716. This hardly characterize the image conjured up by constitutes perjury: Fanning’s testimony at the Rodriguez’s explanation as a “gestapo” force suppression hearing was at most is not extraordinary. We do not find the word incompleteSSit did not, however, contradict “gestapo” to be so inflammatory as to destroy anything he later told the court. the fairness of a trial. In fact, the term has taken o n a generic meaning in modern usage Secondly, even if Fanning can be said to and no longer refers solely to the secret police have perjured himself, Munera has brought of Nazi Germany. See WEBSTER’S THIRD nothing to our attention purporting to show NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 952 that the government sanctioned such (1986). testimony, the second vital element of his claim. For these reasons, there was no error The second comment is also an accurate portrayal of events: Rodriguez indeed fled