Opinion ID: 1183892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the trial court err in excluding a prior inconsistent statement attributed to a material prosecution witness?

Text: At trial the son, a material prosecution witness, not only positively identified the defendant as his assailant but also testified in detail as to what occurred between his father and the defendant: Q. (By the Prosecution) Now, what then happened after the defendant started striking you with the gun in one hand and the screwdriver in the other hand; what if anything happened? A. After he struck me a number of times, I was aware of my father's arms reaching out and grabbing him from the rear and pulling him away from me. Q. And what if anything was your father saying? A. He was telling him, There's no need to hurt anyone. Take the money and go. He mentioned this about three times in a row. Q. What if anything happened then? A. The next view I had of the two while they were facing each other, my father had his arms outstretched as if holding him away, still making those statements that I just mentioned. ...... Q. Now, what  would you describe the activity between your father and the defendant that occurred that you observed? A. As I mentioned, I saw my father holding his arms outstretched as if holding him away or breaking up a fight. And I saw the defendant swinging at him with both his arms. Q. Then what if anything do you recall next happened? A. I had risen to my  upright on my knees at this point by holding on to the shelf, Shelf No. 1. I made the remark, Please don't kill him. And I momentarily passed out. I fell back on the floor. ...... Q. Okay, now, what was the next thing that you recall happening? A. I woke again, lying face down on my stomach on the floor... . I turned my head to the side and I saw my father lying on the floor very still, not moving. On cross-examination defense counsel attempted to lay the foundation for an alleged prior inconsistent statement of the son relative to what occurred between the defendant and the father: Q... . Now, Mr. Lavelee [the son], as a result of this incident at Floyds of Hawaii, it is correct, is it not, that you were interviewed and gave statements to several police officers, is that correct, in the course of their investigation of the incident? A. One police officer. Q. Okay, do you recall that this interview with the police officer happened or occurred at the hospital, Castle Memorial Hospital? A. Yes. Q. Do you recall the date this interview happened? A. No, I would say it was probably about four or five days after the incident. Q. Do you recall who the officer or detective was? A. Detective Kruse. Q. George Kruse? A. Yes. Q. If Detective Kruse in his report of this incident stated that on September 18, 1974, at about 8:30 a.m., while you were at the hospital, Castle, he interviewed you, would this probably be correct? A. Yes. ...... Q. Okay, do you recall him asking you questions and you making statements throughout? A. Yes. Q. Okay, would it be correct to say that you gave a detailed statement or you talked quite at length in this course? A. I gave a general statement. Q. Do you recall stating to Detective Kruse that you had no idea what happened to your father prior to seeing him laying on the floor in the shop next to him, that you could not recall hearing [your] father talking and was struggling with the gunman? Do you recall making that statement? A. I recall telling him what my father had said to the attacker, and also saying that I did not see what happened to my father. Q. Do you recall making the statement that I said that you stated  A. Well, you have said in that statement that my father did not say anything. I don't recall making this statement to the detective, I seem to recall that I did tell him that my father did make some statement to him as he pulled him off of me. Thereafter, in order to impeach the credibility of the son, the defendant sought to introduce the prior inconsistent statement by way of testimony of Detective George Kruse. [4] However, the trial court disallowed the introduction thereof. The prosecution in its brief on appeal contends that the trial court did not err in its ruling because the son did not deny making the statement and his testimony in court [was not] directly contradictory and inconsistent with the statement sought to be introduced. We are of the opinion that the record herein shows that defendant had sufficiently complied with the statutory requirements of HRS § 621-23. [5] State v. Pokini, 57 Haw. 26, 548 P.2d 1402 (1976). Pokini, as in the instant case, dealt with the foundational requirement and admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement made by a key prosecution witness. We expressly held therein that: Where the circumstances accompanying the making of the supposed statement have been called to the attention of the witness upon cross-examination, and he denies having made the statement, or fails to admit it distinctly, or says that he does not remember, the foundation requirements for the impeaching evidence have been satisfied. Id. at 29, 548 P.2d at 1405. We further stated in Pokini that The foundation requirement is for the purpose of rekindling the witness' memory, and substantial compliance is all that is necessary. Id. at 29, 548 P.2d at 1405. Thus, the trial court erred in excluding the prior inconsistent statement attributed to the son, a material prosecution witness. State v. Pokini, supra . It is incumbent upon this court now to determine whether the exclusion of such testimony amounted to prejudicial error. State v. Pokini, supra . In Pokini, supra, we concluded that the exclusion of competent testimony designed to impeach the credibility of a material witness for the State was error that infringed upon a constitutional right of the accused. Though we did not in Pokini specify which constitutional right was infringed upon, it is clear that the right of an accused to be convicted only upon proof by the prosecution of all of the elements of the crime charged against him beyond a reasonable doubt is a constitutionally protected right. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 115, 488 P.2d 322, 325 (1971). Further, it is elementary that the right of an accused to confront witnesses against him is a constitutionally protected right. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931). We believe that, in a criminal case, implicit in defendant's right to confront witnesses against him, is his right to cross-examine and to impeach the confronted witness. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895); State v. Hashimoto, 47 Haw. 185, 389 P.2d 146 (1963); Territory v. Gusman, 36 Haw. 42 (1942); Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 5, § 1365 (1974). When an error which is challenged on appeal constitutes an infraction of a substantial constitutional right of the accused, the error will rarely be considered harmless error. [6] Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Pokini, supra ; State v. Cuevas, supra . However, the United States Supreme Court recognized that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and so insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring automatic reversal of the conviction. Chapman v. California, supra at 22, 87 S.Ct. at 827. But before such a constitutional error will in fact be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at 24, 89 S.Ct. at 828; State v. Cuevas, supra ; State v. Pokini, supra , for if there is a reasonable possibility that the matter complained of might have contributed to the conviction, the error must give rise to a reversal. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963); see State v. Pokini, 55 Haw. 640, 646, 526 P.2d 94, 101 (1974); State v. Kahinu, 53 Haw. 536, 550, 498 P.2d 635, 644 (1972). The defendant does not contend, nor do we find, that the supposed prior inconsistent statement infected all of the convictions. The defense, however, submits that there was prejudicial error as to his convictions of murder and of attempted murder in that there was no other evidence, other than the testimony of the son, leading to the complicity of the defendant in the murder of the father. This contention is without merit: (1) The prior inconsistent statement has no relevancy as to defendant's conviction of attempted murder. (2) As to defendant's conviction of murder, the record shows as follows: Dr. Alvin Majoska, forensic pathologist, testified regarding the wounds received by the father and the manner in which they might have been inflicted. His findings were essentially consistent with the manner in which the son alluded in his testimony as to how his father had met his death. Haili testified that the defendant and Kam had planned the robbery earlier that evening; that the defendant asked Haili for guns; that Haili went home and gave the b-b pistol to the defendant. Haili also testified that he saw the defendant, the son and the father in the back room and that he saw the defendant stabbing someone with a screwdriver. James Passos (Passos), a friend of the defendant, testified that he had received a phone call from the defendant about 8:00 p.m., on September 11, 1974; that the defendant visited his home soon thereafter; and that they had a conversation relating to what had happened earlier that evening at Floyds of Hawaii: Q. (By the Prosecution) Now, after you received the call, he [Napeahi] did come over, is that correct? A. Right. ...... Q. Okay, and what if anything happened when the defendant came? A. He came over, he sat down and he told me, oh, what he did. And at first I thought he was just joking. You know, how he said, oh, some guy hit him with a chair and he stabbed him. Q. Now, what did he tell you he did? ...... A. Okay, you know, he sat down on the chair. And I told him, Hey, what's the matter? He said, Oh, man, I blew it, man. This guy hit me and I started stabbing him. Q. Okay, and did he indicate how many times he stabbed the person? A. All he said was oh, you know, Uh, uh, that's it. A few times. ...... Q. Now, did he indicate during the course of his conversation with you the number of persons? A. Two. Q. He had indicated two? A. (Witness nodded his head in the affirmative.) ...... Q... . Now, at the time at your residence, when he told you about having stabbed these two guys, did he indicate how many times he had stabbed these two guys? ...... A. He just made the motion quite a few times. You know, I just didn't count. ...... Further, the defendant asked Passos to pick up a package at a pool hall near Floyds of Hawaii. Upon entering the pool hall and asking for the package, Passos was told by a person, behind a counter in the pool hall, to tell the defendant that one of the guys died. The foregoing testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution, apart from the testimony of the son, constitute clear, independent, and overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt of the murder of the father. We believe that, in the setting of the totality of this case, where the guilt of defendant is not questionable, it is not reasonably possible that the error herein contributed to defendant's conviction of murder. Thus, we are of the belief that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.