Opinion ID: 363087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: other crimes evidence and day

Text: 130 My colleagues correctly note that evidence of a crime or bad conduct other than that for which the accused is on trial is admissible if probative on a material issue unless the possibility that the jury will draw the prejudicial conclusion that, having once fallen into sin, a second slip is likely 4 outweighs the legitimate value of the evidence. 5 Thus the first question to be answered is what is the material issue here that the proffered facts of prior criminality support, and that involves a look not just at the issue but at the evidence as well, first to see what it suggests and then to see how strongly it does so. Additionally, this examination must be advertent to the full context of the case, for evidence that is merely cumulative, that only weakly supports a material contention or that goes solely to uncontested issues will seldom survive a balance against the ever-present and often compelling risk of prejudice. 6 On the other hand, evidence essential to the Government's prima facie case or to rebuttal of defenses set up by the accused will often tilt the scale in favor of admission. 7 131 As the court outlines more fully, the Government here contends in essence that evidence of two other crimes is relevant to two material issues in this prosecution. It is argued first that the Irving's robbery is probative of motive because, the Government believes, the homicide resulted from a dispute between Day and Williams partly over shotguns procured during the robbery. Beyond that, proof of the Irving's robbery and the automobile theft is sought to be introduced to show identity, since the death weapon and the car allegedly used in the murder and other shotguns whose barrels were shortened were all allegedly obtained by Day as a result of the earlier offenses. 132 Both identity and intent are fundamental elements of the prosecution's prima facie case, but both the Government and the court fail to realize that that is not the end of the matter. Before turning to the prejudice counterpoise, one must first ascertain whether the fact of prior crime, As opposed to a fact that is an ingredient of the crime but is neutral on its face, is indicative of either identity or intent. If not if the evidence can serve no purpose other than to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith 8 then we do not reach the stage of balancing prejudice. 9 Only when the criminal nature of the earlier occurrences is itself probative on material issues, 10 or when evidence of facts that were parts of those occurrences cannot adequately be presented in a manner free of the taint of associated criminality, 11 can it be said that a showing of the prior Crimes themselves seeks a permissible objective.
133 On the question of motive to commit murder, the Government wants to show that Day and Williams had been arguing prior to the shooting. That, of course, could be done without mentioning any prior criminality, 12 so it is suggested further that the two were bickering over the shotguns. But that fact, for all we have yet been shown, could be established without any reference whatever to the robbery. Though it is contended that the jurors need to know how the shotguns were acquired, I must simply ask why, and I have yet to hear a palatable answer. 134 The disagreement between Day and Williams was allegedly over guns And some coats And whether Williams should have asked Day why he was using drugs. Yet the Government apparently has no desire to show how the jackets were originally acquired, or for that matter how Day first started to use narcotics. Should the prosecutor undertake to prove that the coats over which Day and the victim had quarreled all had been lawfully purchased at a department store, would anyone dispute a ruling that the line of questioning was irrelevant? Surely not. The end promotable by evidence of the origin of the guns, and the Only end, is that knowledge of that illicit acquisition will poison the jury against Day. The District Judge quite properly noted that the dispute was not over the Irving's robbery or the theft of the automobile themselves, and I agree with him that the prosecutor did not demonstrate that there is a relationship between the robbery in terms of what he is actually endeavoring to show, namely, that there was ill will, a dispute or controversy between the decedent and the Defendant Day. 13 135 The court embraces the Government's argument on motive by reliance on the shibboleth that (t)hieves will out. 14 Under this theory, no competent evidence need be proffered or introduced to show that Day and Williams had a falling out stemming from one of their earlier criminal enterprises. Rather, prior criminal activity is considered ipso facto probative of motive, and the rule that evidence of the accused's past crimes is inadmissible to prove a general criminal disposition is swallowed by the motive exception in cases where the victim of the crime and the defendant were former colleagues in criminal endeavors. 15 136 The traditional rationale for the motive exception is that (e)vidence of other crimes is admitted to show that defendant has a reason for having the requisite state of mind to do the act charged, and from this mental state it is inferred that he did commit the act. 16 The court adopts an inverted view, reasoning that the motive may be inferred from the killing itself, (g)iven the criminal relationship between the parties and their theft of the guns and the car. 17 137 More troubling, no evidence of a disagreement between Day and Williams is required. The basis for the court's ruling is its theory of human behavior thieves are prone to fighting and killing each other. Thus boiled down, the court's thesis seems indistinguishable from the not unnatural jury inference that Rule 404(b) is designed to guard against: that an accused with a criminal past is probably guilty. 18 138 The majority also says that the evidence was admissible to prove intent because it is probative of a plan to commit the crimes with which Day is charged. A criminal, it is said, would want to saw off stolen shotguns since they then could not be traced to him through records attending legitimate purchases. Similarly, it is added, a person contemplating use of an automobile in a murder plot would want to use a stolen one to conceal his participation. I agree that the shotgun evidence might barely meet the minimal relevancy standards of Rule 401 for the purpose proposed by the court, but the District Judge would still have to determine whether its value was outweighed by its potential for prejudice. 19 And I am unable to accept at all the court's hypothesis with respect to the automobile theft, for I believe an inference of a murder scheme, in the absence of even a single piece of evidence thereof, is unwarranted. Any such deduction, though a possible analysis of human behavior, is not a substitute for probative evidence. 139 The court informs the District Judge that his inadmissibility-ruling on the ground of irrelevancy was both premature and overbroad 20 because the Government should have the opportunity to lay a proper foundation for the evidence. If the judge's action was premature, it was so simply because the Government requested a pretrial decision and did not fulfill Its burden of advancing adequate ground for the ruling desired. If the Government could have come up with better reasons, if could always have gone back before the District Judge and sought modification of the earlier order. I think it a serious waste of judicial resources for us to be called upon to do what the prosecution should have requested in the District Court. Furthermore, the rationale now advanced by the majority was never driven home to the District Judge. In my view, he was correct on every point upon which he passed but nonetheless he now is somehow being reversed in part.
140 The attempt to use the prior misconduct to show identity is somewhat more justifiable, but not by a wide margin. The Government represents that it does not have an eyewitness to the shooting or the altering of the shotguns who can identify Day in court. 21 It does have, however, what it considers to be the weapon used in the killing and the automobile in which the shooting occurred. That gun, as well as other sawed-off weapons and the discarded portions of their barrels, were all found at the house in which Day was arrested; the car was found parked nearby, and its keys were seized from the room in which Day was sleeping just before his capture. Also found in the bedroom were hacksaws and pants stained with blood of the victim's type. The same kind of blood was also found on the murder weapon and the car. 141 A jury could surely draw an inference of identity from these direct post-offense links tending to connect Day with the car and the shotguns, including the murder weapon. 22 Unsatisfied, however, the Government would undertake to demonstrate that Day had possession of all of these just a day or two prior to the murder. That would obviously be relevant evidence, and the District Judge did nothing to preclude proof of exactly those facts. 23 The problem is that the Government wishes to go further than showing mere possession; it wants to show how control was acquired that is, through the commission of certain other crimes. But why is that pertinent? I say that it is not relevant, 24 and certainly not highly probative, 25 and that the how could serve only to tar the accused's character. The blood-stained pants, just as the gun and the car, link Day to the homicide, but the Government has manifested no disposition to show how Day originally came into possession of those pants perhaps because the acquisition did not involve any known impropriety. 142 In sum, under the District Judge's pretrial rulings the prosecution can offer evidence tending to establish a number of facts growing out of the commission of other crimes: that Day and the victim had a dispute over the shotguns and that Day acquired the death weapon and the automobile a few days before the shooting. More than that will unnecessarily and unfairly sully the accused with the aura of other criminality. Showing How the guns and the car were acquired as opposed to the fact That they were possessed would justifiably be ruled irrelevant had the acquisitions been perfectly innocent. 26 No different result should follow when that evidence is prejudical in nature. 27 143 I am thus unable to perceive any justification at all for injecting the spectre of the automobile theft into this case. The Irving's robbery might make some small contribution toward one specific issue, 28 but even were it necessary to reach the step of balancing prejudice against this quantum of probative value, I could not concur in the court's unmistakable instruction that admission should probably be the result. 29 In the first place, balancing is traditionally left to the discretion of the trial court, 30 and discretion fettered so narrowly as by the strong language of the majority opinion here is no discretion at all. Having balanced, the court remands for balancing. 144 Nor do I agree with the directions given. Whatever limited relevance one sees in the evidence of Day's other sins pales in comparison to its potential for prejudice. Though the court seemingly has a difficult time in perceiving what that prejudice might be, 31 I have no problem at all. The possibility of prejudice inheres in all other-crimes evidence: Evidence of a prior crime 'is Always . . . prejudicial to a defendant (because it) diverts the attention of the jury from the question of the defendant's responsibility for the crime charged to the improper issue of his bad character.'  32 Though the other crimes here do not overshadow the grave offenses for which Day will actually stand trial, it takes no great familiarity with human nature to know that jurors might well reason that a person who commits armed robbery and steals weapons and an automobile is capable of homicide, and that if a murder occurs and is linked to him in any way he probably is responsible. 145 Similarly, I am unable to see the importance of the fact that Day knows the nature of the evidence and cannot contend that it is unreliable because he pleaded guilty to the other crimes. 33 The immateriality of those considerations becomes obvious when one recalls the purpose of the other-crimes rule. We are not concerned with whether the accused actually engaged in prior wrongdoing but with whether he is innocent or guilty of the offense with which he is currently charged. No matter how certain we are that the accused committed crime X, we are not permitted to conclude from that knowledge that he committed crime Y.