Opinion ID: 163124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Dr. Bebensee's Expert Opinion Testimony

Text: 135 The next question presented for review is whether the district court erred in granting habeas relief on the basis of Petitioner's claim that the trial court unconstitutionally excluded the testimony of Dr. Bebensee. In both his state appellate briefs and his habeas petition, Petitioner asserted that the exclusion of Dr. Bebensee's testimony violated his right to present a defense under the Due Process and Compulsory Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. 136 The district court ruled that the state courts, by excluding Dr. Bebensee's testimony, had violated Petitioner's constitutional right to present a cogent defense, in violation of the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process clause of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mem. Op. and Order at 41. The court held that this exclusion resulted from the state courts' unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence received and excluded at the trial. Id. at 40 ( quoting § 2254(d)(2)). In so ruling, the district court stated: 137 The [appellate] court failed to recognize that the trial court's cumulative errors denied [Petitioner's] constitutional right to present a defense by generating sufficient skepticism about [the Victim's] testimony to create a reasonable doubt as to whether the assault occurred. The Court of Appeals repeated the errors of the trial court in separating the questions of the proper scope of cross-examination of the detective who verified the charge from the relevance of opinion testimony about the adequacy of the investigation. Accordingly, this court is not required to defer to the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals and must make an independent evaluation of the claims that [Petitioner] was convicted after a trial that was fundamentally unfair because he was denied the opportunity to present a cogent defense. 138 Id. at 40-41.
139 We take our principal guidance from the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998), which affirmed a military court's exclusion of polygraph evidence in a court martial. Before turning to Scheffer, however, we review three earlier Supreme Court decisions distinguished by Scheffer. Comparing these decisions to Scheffer is instructive. 140 The first of the three cases is Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). In Washington a defendant on trial for murder wished to call a witness who would have testified that he, not the defendant, had killed the victim. Id. at 16, 87 S.Ct. 1920. But because the witness had already been convicted in connection with the murder, the trial judge ruled his testimony inadmissible under a Texas statute that prohibited people charged as coparticipants in the same crime from testifying on each other's behalf. Id. at 16-17, 87 S.Ct. 1920. 141 The Supreme Court held that the disqualification of the witness violated the defendant's constitutional right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. Id. at 18, 87 S.Ct. 1920. The Court wrote: 142 The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. 143 Id. at 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920 (emphasis added). Pointing out that the Sixth Amendment was designed in part to make the testimony of a defendant's witnesses admissible on his behalf in court, id. at 22, 87 S.Ct. 1920, the Court explained that the Sixth Amendment bars arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief. Id. 144 In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), a defendant charged with murder attempted to show at trial that another man, McDonald, was the guilty party. Two evidentiary rulings prevented the defendant from fully developing this theory. First, the trial court held that Mississippi's voucher rule barred the defendant from cross-examining and impeaching McDonald, whom he had called as a witness. Id. at 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Second, the trial court excluded the testimony of three of McDonald's friends, to whom McDonald had confessed to the killing, on the ground that the testimony was hearsay. Id. at 298, 93 S.Ct. 1038. 145 The Supreme Court held that, taken together, the trial court's rulings denied [the defendant] a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process. Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. With regard to the application of the common-law voucher rule, the Court asserted that [t]he availability of the right to confront and to cross-examine those who give damaging testimony against the accused is so important that it should not be interpreted as hinging on the technicality of which party called the witness. Id. at 297-98, 93 S.Ct. 1038. As for the application of the hearsay rule, the Court wrote: 146 The testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic rationale of the exception for declarations against interest. That testimony also was critical to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. 147 Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. 148 The third decision, Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987), concerned the application of a rule barring hypnotically refreshed testimony. The defendant, charged with manslaughter following her husband's death from gunshot wounds, recalled certain exculpatory details about the shooting only after being hypnotized. The trial court limited the defendant's testimony to those facts that she remembered prior to hypnosis, id. at 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 2704, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed this decision, announcing a per se rule excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony. Id. at 48-49, 107 S.Ct. 2704. 149 Reviewing the Arkansas rule, the Supreme Court emphasized that while the right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation, a state's restrictions of a defendant's right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. Id. at 55-56, 107 S.Ct. 2704. The Court concluded that Arkansas had not shown that hypnotically enhanced testimony is always so untrustworthy and so immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility that it should disable a defendant from presenting her version of the events for which she is on trial. Id. at 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704. 150 The Court's recent decision in Scheffer differed from the preceding three cases in that it affirmed the exclusion of the disputed evidence. Of particular interest to our analysis, Scheffer was the first of this line of cases to address opinion evidence, rather than factual testimony. Scheffer held that the exclusion of polygraph evidence did not violate the accused's constitutional right to present a defense. The accused, an Air Force airman facing drug charges, maintained at his court-martial that he had not knowingly consumed any drugs. 523 U.S. at 306, 118 S.Ct. 1261. He sought to introduce evidence of a polygraph test that supported his contention, but the trial judge excluded the evidence under Military Rule of Evidence 707, which prohibits the introduction of polygraph results. Id. at 306-07, 118 S.Ct. 1261. 151 The Supreme Court began its discussion by noting that [a] defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions. Id. at 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261. A rule is suspect only if it is `arbitrary' or `disproportionate to the purposes [it is] designed to serve' and exclusion of evidence is unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it ... infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the accused. Id. ( quoting Rock, 483 U.S. at 56, 107 S.Ct. 2704). 152 The Court held that excluding polygraph evidence is a rational and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence. Id. at 312, 118 S.Ct. 1261. In addition, Rock, Washington, and Chambers were distinguishable in that the [t]he exclusions of evidence ... declared unconstitutional in those cases significantly undermined fundamental elements of the defendant's defense. Id. at 315, 118 S.Ct. 1261. In Washington, the Court noted, `the State arbitrarily denied [the defendant] the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed.' Id. at 316, 118 S.Ct. 1261 ( quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. 1920). In Rock, the rule [barring hypnotically refreshed recollection] deprived the jury of the testimony of the only witness who was at the scene and had firsthand knowledge of the facts and also infringed upon the particularly significant interest of the defendant in testifying in her own defense. Id. at 315, 118 S.Ct. 1261. As for Chambers, its holding was confined to the specific `facts and circumstances' presented in that case. Id. at 316, 93 S.Ct. 1038 ( quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 303, 93 S.Ct. 1038). 153 In contrast, said Scheffer, Rule 707 does not implicate any significant interest of the accused. Id. at 316-17, 118 S.Ct. 1261. At the court-martial, the court members heard all the relevant details of the charged offense from the perspective of the accused. Id. at 317, 118 S.Ct. 1261. The rule excluding polygraph evidence did not keep the defendant from introducing any factual evidence, but prevented him only from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility. Id.
154 Before applying these principles to the specifics of our case, we must examine further the nature of Dr. Bebensee's testimony: what would her testimony have been, and how would it have been relevant? Because defense counsel repeatedly referred to Dr. Bebensee's opinion that the investigation was conducted improperly, we begin by considering the relevance of such an opinion. 155 In the abstract, whether the government conducted a thorough, professional investigation is not relevant to what the jury must decide: Did the defendant commit the alleged offense? Juries are not instructed to acquit the defendant if the government's investigation was superficial. Conducting a thorough, professional investigation is not an element of the government's case. For an investigatory lapse to be relevant, there must be some specific reason why it raises doubt about the defendant's guilt. 156 This point may readily be overlooked because of the frequency with which investigative techniques are at issue. For example, when, unlike in this case, the chief issue at trial is whether the accused is the person who committed the crime, the defense may point to lapses in the investigation to explain why law enforcement officers failed to uncover evidence of the true culprit. Cf. United States v. Foster, 982 F.2d 551, 553-54 (D.C.Cir.1993) (Cross-examination to show that officer had not followed standard police surveillance techniques — such as use of camera — could suggest officer's motive to compensate for that failure by expressing excessive confidence in his identification of defendant). 157 Nevertheless, the common admissibility of inadequate-investigation evidence does not relieve the courts of making case-specific determinations of relevance. Sometimes such evidence is relevant; sometimes not. Thus, in the case at bar it would have been fair game for the Petitioner to argue at his trial that the failure of the police to autopsy the cat raises doubt about the Victim's account of how the cat died. But it is not apparent why it would be relevant whether the police filed charges without first conducting a thorough investigation. 158 Accordingly, when Petitioner complains about not being able to put on evidence that the investigation was improperly conducted, he must explain the relevance of the proffered-but-excluded evidence. It was not enough for Dr. Bebensee to state that she would testify that the investigation was not conducted in accordance with widely accepted standards. The Petitioner needed to explain what relevant inference could be drawn from that fact. All that defense counsel said at trial was that the faulty investigation indicated that the charge was invalid. The trial judge grappled with this issue in deciding whether to admit Dr. Bebensee's testimony. Ultimately, his understanding was that the purpose of Dr. Bebensee's testimony regarding the inadequacy of the investigation was to support her inference (based on an analysis of the Victim's statements, among other things) that the accusation was not valid; in other words, the purpose was to show that the Victim was not telling the truth. To repeat the trial judge's observations: 159 [T]he sum of this is that the proffered testimony really is not a matter for expert opinion. I think in very large part all it does is go to [the Victim's] credibility. I don't think that expert testimony is necessary to evaluate [the Victim's] credibility. It is certainly suspect. It's certainly an area of fair argument in this case. 160 There are lots of inconsistencies. There are lots of reasons why the jury might not think that his testimony was credible, but I don't think that it is at all appropriate or necessary for an expert witness to come in here and tell this jury what result they should reach. In other words, to tell the jury her conclusions that the information gathered is not credible. 161 ROA, Vol. 16 at 194. 162 A different trial judge may have viewed the proffer differently, or at least may have found a component of Dr. Bebensee's proposed testimony that was being offered as something other than the basis for an expression of opinion on the Victim's credibility. But the trial judge's view of the proffer, which was seconded by the Colorado Court of Appeals, is entitled to great deference. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1): 163 In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 164 There was ample support in the record for the trial judge's decision that Dr. Bebensee's proposed testimony amounted to an expression of opinion on the Victim's truthfulness in making his accusation against Petitioner. The clear import of the proffer of Dr. Bebensee's testimony is that she had examined the statements of the various witnesses, reviewed the conduct of the investigation, and concluded that the charge was not a valid one. Her assessment was not founded on any physical evidence, but on an analysis of what was said. In the context of this case, her assertion that the charge was not valid was tantamount to asserting that the Victim was not truthful. Dr. Bebensee would not be testifying to a conclusion from which the jury could infer that the Victim was lying; no inference would be necessary here, only the mental task of translating the statement that the charge is not valid into the plain English statement that the Victim is not telling the truth. The task of translation was made easier for the trial judge by various comments by defense counsel: Ultimately, she will be asked to give an opinion on how this case was investigated and whether or not this case points towards a valid accusation or a false allegation or accusation (opening statement); Dr. Bebensee will give an opinion on whether or not she believes that this is a valid accusation, and it's my — I anticipate she will be telling you that this is not a valid claim, that the story, the statements don't track (opening statement); Dr. Bebensee will give her opinion on the stand ... whether the information that is provided through the investigation indicates a valid claim of sexual assault or not (pre-proffer). Dr. Bebensee herself echoed this characterization of her testimony: [T]he purpose of the criteria [is] to determine better if the child is credible or is not credible (proffer). 165 Petitioner's brief to this court actually supports the trial judge's view because it clarifies (unintentionally) that the thrust of Dr. Bebensee's testimony was to challenge the Victim's veracity. For example, the brief asserts, Pointing out discrepancies among statements that are significant in light of accepted criteria may cause a factfinder to question one or more of the statements, but it does not tell the factfinder which account to believe. Aple. Br. at 38. The accepted criteria, however, are no more than criteria for determining whether the person who made the statements is being truthful. To assert that an inconsistency is significant is functionally equivalent to asserting that a blood pressure reading on a polygraph is significant. Testimony regarding the criteria can be contrasted with, say, an engineer's testimony that a witness's account of an accident is inconsistent with the laws of physics. When Dr. Bebensee states that an inconsistency between two statements is significant, she is simply using shorthand to say that someone who utters such an inconsistency is probably lying; she is not saying that the statement is inconsistent with other evidence concerning the events at issue or violates some scientific principle. (To the extent that she is saying that her validation techniques are scientifically based, we address that matter later. That is a different issue from the issue of whether her opinion is, in essence, an opinion regarding the Victim's veracity.) 166 The trial judge's characterization of the nature and purpose of Dr. Bebensee's proposed testimony was a factual determination. See Davidson v. Bowersox, 288 F.3d 1076, 1078 (8th Cir.2002) (viewing state court's determination of content of proffer as a factual finding). Therefore, applying § 2254(e)(1), we adopt the trial judge's characterization of the proffer, because Petitioner has failed to point to clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumed correctness of the trial judge's fact finding. 167 Characterizing Dr. Bebensee's testimony as an expert opinion on the Victim's credibility does not end our inquiry. To be sure, it ended the inquiry under Colorado law. Both the trial judge and appellate court ruled that Dr. Bebensee's testimony must be excluded under Colorado Rule of Evidence 608 if it amounts to an opinion regarding the victim's truthfulness. (This ruling is consistent with the weight of authority. See United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1267 (10th Cir.1999) (Most courts that have considered the issue have concluded that expert testimony, based on the statements of the alleged victim, that sexual abuse in fact occurred is inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 702 (or similar military or state evidentiary rules) because, in such cases, the expert offering the opinion is merely vouching for the credibility of the alleged victim.).) A state evidentiary rule, however, must sometimes yield to the constitutional right to present a defense. We now turn to that issue.
168 As previously stated, United States v. Scheffer is closely in point. In that case, eight members of the Court affirmed the exclusion of a polygrapher's testimony regarding the truthfulness of the subject of a polygraph test. See 523 U.S. at 317 n. 13, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (emphasizing that polygraph testimony is opinion testimony, not factual evidence). But the Court did not hold that rules of evidence could always bar expert opinion on veracity. That is not to say that the Court did not come close to so ruling. Justice Thomas's plurality opinion, joined on this matter by three other justices, said: 169 It is equally clear that Rule 707 [barring polygraph evidence] serves a second legitimate governmental interest: Preserving the court members' core function of making credibility determinations in criminal trials. A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that the jury is the lie detector. United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (C.A.9 1973) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959, 94 S.Ct. 1976, 40 L.Ed.2d 310 (1974). 170 Id. at 312-13, 118 S.Ct. 1261. 171 This view, however, did not muster majority support. The basis for the majority opinion — the portion of Justice Thomas's opinion joined by seven other justices — was that exclusion of the polygraph testimony was constitutionally permissible for a combination of two reasons. One, exclusion of the evidence did not implicate any significant interest of the accused. Id. at 316-17, 118 S.Ct. 1261. Two, the reliability of the evidence was questionable. Id. at 309-12, 118 S.Ct. 1261. 172 We therefore examine those factors here. We begin with the first factor — failure to implicate any significant interest of the accused. The term significant interest is used in a special sense in Scheffer. In ordinary usage, a party's inability to use favorable polygraph testimony would be considered an injury to a significant interest of the party. The discussion in Scheffer, however, indicates that the significant interest of concern is the right to put on factual evidence. Scheffer emphasizes that the court members [at the court-martial] heard all the relevant details of the charged offense from the perspective of the accused and the accused was not precluded from introducing any factual evidence. Id. at 317, 118 S.Ct. 1261. The Court particularly stressed that Scheffer was not restricted in testifying on his own behalf. Id. All that Scheffer was precluded from presenting was merely ... expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility. Id. In contrast, the defendant in Washington was denied the opportunity `to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed[,]' id. at 316, 118 S.Ct. 1261 ( quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. 1920); in Rock the defendant was prohibited from testifying to her own version of events, id. at 315-16, 118 S.Ct. 1261; and in Chambers the defendant was barred from supporting his contention that the true culprit was a man named McDonald by cross-examining McDonald or questioning the men to whom McDonald had allegedly confessed, id. at 316, 118 S.Ct. 1261. 173 Under the Court's meaning of significant interest, we doubt that any significant interest of Petitioner was implicated by exclusion of Dr. Bebensee's testimony. Dr. Bebensee had no fact-based knowledge; in fact, she apparently had not even talked to anyone with firsthand knowledge. All she could contribute was opinion testimony — opinion testimony that amounted to a conclusion that the Victim's account was not credible. 174 Moreover, in determining whether there has been a violation of the right to present a defense, the significance factor must be weighed against the second factor — the reliability of the evidence. An astrologer or palm reader may have testimony that could sway the jury, but no court could say that a defendant has the constitutional right to present such evidence. 175