Opinion ID: 741743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Evidentiary Exclusions

Text: 25 In order to prevail on a hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish two elements. First, she must prove that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405-06, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1213, 114 S.Ct. 2693, 129 L.Ed.2d 824 (1994); Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, 890 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir.1989). The incidents must be more than episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive. Id.; see, e.g., Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir.1992); Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1189 (2d Cir.1987). [O]ne of the critical inquiries in a hostile environment claim must be the environment. Evidence of a general work atmosphere ...--as well as evidence of specific hostility directed toward the plaintiff--is an important factor in evaluating the claim. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir.1987) (emphasis in original). 26 Second, the plaintiff must show that a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer. See, e.g., Murray v. New York University College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir.1995); Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d at 779; Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F.2d at 63. When harassment is perpetrated by the plaintiff's coworkers, an employer will be liable if the plaintiff demonstrates that the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it. Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d at 780 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F.2d at 63. 27 The same showings must be made in order for a plaintiff to prevail on a hostile environment sexual harassment claim under the Vermont FEPA. See, e.g., Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1239 (2d Cir.1995) (FEPA is patterned on Title VII, and the standards and burdens of proof under state law are identical to those under federal law). 28 The trial court has broad discretion over the admission of evidence, see, e.g., Healey v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 619 (2d Cir.1991), and its evaluation of relevance is entitled to substantial deference, see, e.g., George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.1990) (district court's determination of relevance will not be disturbed unless it evidences an abuse of discretion). Evidentiary rulings ordinarily will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Healey v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 947 F.2d at 620; United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990); In re Martin-Trigona, 760 F.2d 1334, 1344 (2d Cir.1985) (evidentiary rulings generally not to be disturbed unless  'manifestly erroneous,'  quoting Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 1122, 8 L.Ed.2d 313 (1962)). 29 Further, even an erroneous evidentiary ruling will not lead to reversal unless affirmance would be inconsistent with substantial justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 61; see also Fed.R.Evid. 103(a) (Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which ... excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected....); Phoenix Associates III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 95, 104-05 (2d Cir.1995); Healey v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 947 F.2d at 620. We will not conclude that a substantial right was affected unless it is likely that in some material respect the factfinder's judgment was swayed by the error. Phoenix Associates III v. Stone, 60 F.3d at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); Hynes v. Coughlin, 79 F.3d 285, 291 (2d Cir.1996). 30 In the present case, Perry complains of the In Limine Ruling's exclusion of (a) evidence of harassment that occurred before January 1989, and (b) evidence of harassment not witnessed personally by Perry. We find the latter ruling more troubling than the former, but neither requires reversal. 31 The court's temporal limitation on the events that Perry could present was not an abuse of discretion. Absent a continuing violation, the statute of limitations ordinarily would have barred any recovery by Perry under Title VII or FEPA for harassment that occurred prior to July 1990; and the earliest harassment alleged by Perry in her EEOC charge occurred in June 1989. The court allowed Perry to present evidence of an environment of sexual harassment, to the extent that she observed it, dating back to January 1989, i.e., six months earlier than any harassment of Perry herself. Given the facts that Perry was on maternity leave from August to December 1988, and that she did not allege that she was the victim of any harassment either from the time of her return from maternity leave until June 1989 or at any time before she took maternity leave, it was well within the court's discretion to conclude that events earlier than January 1989 should be excluded on the ground that they were too remote to have probative value. 32 Moreover, Perry points to only one pre-1989 incident as to which she would have liked to testify, namely that on one occasion someone had placed a condom in plain view on a piece of machinery at which she worked. This additional piece of evidence, though relevant to the nature of the harassment to which she was subjected, was not material to the outcome of her case. On the FEPA claim, since the jury found that Perry had satisfactorily established that she was subjected to sexual harassment, the exclusion of the condom testimony was plainly immaterial. And on both the state and federal claims, the respective factfinders found that Ethan Allen had responded promptly and properly to Perry's complaint; since the latter conclusion alone required dismissal of those claims, the exclusion of the condom incident did not affect her case in any material way. 33 The propriety of the court's exclusion of post-1988 evidence of sexual harassment not witnessed personally by Perry is more questionable. Since one of the critical inquiries with respect to a hostile environment claim is the nature of the environment itself, evidence of the general work atmosphere is relevant. Thus, as the district court itself noted, [i]n a hostile workplace case, the trier of fact must examine the totality of the circumstances, including evidence of sexual harassment directed at employees other than the plaintiff.... In Limine Ruling at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). We are puzzled, therefore, by the court's view that if there was sexual harassment of other women Ethan Allen employees but that harassment was not witnessed by Perry, the evidence was irrelevant. Id. at 4. And since the issue was not whether Perry had notice of the harassment of others but whether there was a pervasive hostile environment, it is unclear why the court would not allow the other women themselves to testify as to the harassment directed at them. 34 In making its exclusionary ruling with respect to the post-1988 period, the district court stated that the evidence of harassment of women other than Perry, insofar as it either was not observed by Perry or was not related to Perry, was more prejudicial than probative on [Perry's] specific claims of sexual harassment. Id. Rule 403 allows the trial court to exclude relevant evidence on the ground of prejudice to the party against whom it is offered if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403. As the terms of the Rule indicate, for relevant evidence to be excluded on this basis, the imbalance must be substantial, and the prejudice must be unfair. The prejudice that Rule 403 is concerned with involves some adverse effect ... beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence. United States v. Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133, 1139 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir.1980) (same); Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir.1977) ( '[U]nfair prejudice' as used in Rule 403 is not to be equated with testimony simply adverse to the opposing party.... The prejudice must be 'unfair.' ), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996, 98 S.Ct. 1648, 56 L.Ed.2d 85 (1978). Although any evidence that tends to establish liability is prejudicial to the interests of the defendant, the prejudice is unfair only if the evidence has an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis. Fed.R.Evid. 403 Advisory Committee Notes (1972). 35 Evidence of the harassment of women other than Perry, if part of a pervasive or continuing pattern of conduct, was surely relevant to show the existence of a hostile environment at Ethan Allen and could have been found probative of the company's notice of that environment within the period that the district court viewed as relevant. The district court did not identify any respect in which the prejudice that might result from such probative evidence would have been unfair. 36 Nonetheless, we conclude that, in all the circumstances, the error in excluding evidence of sexual harassment experienced by Ethan Allen employees other than Perry, to wit, Moulton, Willis, Dufour, and Martell, was harmless. For example, although Perry complains that she was not permitted to offer evidence that Moulton was subjected to unwelcome sexual comments and touching by co-workers (Perry brief on appeal at 14), in fact Moulton herself was allowed to testify that Austin touched her once and that she told him to knock it off. Thus, that incident was in evidence, and the excerpts of Moulton's deposition presented to us do not mention sexual harassment by anyone else. Further, to the extent that the issue was the company's knowledge of harassment, that incident seems of minimal value since Moulton did not report it to Ethan Allen's management. As to harassment directed at Willis, although Willis herself was not allowed to testify about her 1988 complaint to a supervisor regarding harassment by Austin and about the ostracism she suffered as a result of her complaint, Perry was allowed, as described in Part I.B. above, to testify to those events. Thus, that information too was in evidence. 37 As to Dufour and Martell, Perry indicates that they could have testified, respectively, that Dufour had had  'not completely consensual'  sexual contact with Bowen, and that Martell had been poked in the breasts by a male employee and had complained to 'a boss'  but that nothing had been done. (Perry brief on appeal at 15.) However, as we noted above, the jury found that Perry had established that she had been sexually harassed through exposure to a hostile work environment; what was fatal to her case was that she did not establish to the satisfaction of either factfinder that Ethan Allen management failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action in response to Perry's own complaint. 38 As to the latter finding, Perry contends that evidence of pre-1989 harassment of the other women would have shown that Ethan Allen had notice of the harassing environment and failed to take action to correct it, and that that evidence would have persuaded the jury that the company's same-day response to Perry's own complaint in December 1990 was not prompt. For example, she states that 39 [a]fter Barry Austin made offensive remarks to Lisa Willis about her breasts, the remarks were reported to Ethan Allen management, namely, Daniel Kurzman.... This is the same Daniel Kurzman upon whom defendant relied for its principal defense of prompt remedial action. Had the evidence been admitted, the so-called prompt action would not have appeared prompt at all, but woefully delayed. 40 (Perry brief on appeal at 14.) Even assuming arguendo the validity of the legal premise implicit in Perry's position--i.e., that an employer who had notice of prior incidents of sexual harassment is liable for the sexual harassment of another employee even if it takes corrective action immediately after that employee first complains to management--Perry's factual assertion that Willis would have testified that Willis had complained to Kurzman about Austin and that the company made no remedial response is unsupported by the record. Willis, when questioned at her deposition, did not identify Kurzman as the supervisor to whom she had complained, and she indicated that Austin had thereafter been confronted by the supervisor to whom she did complain. Willis testified as follows: 41 Q. Has anyone ever sexually harassed you at Ethan Allen? 42 .... 43 A. .... Yes. 44 Q. Okay. Did you complain about it at Ethan Allen? 45 A. Yes. 46 Q. To whom did you complain? 47 .... 48 A. .... Dave Thompson. 49 Q. Who was he? Who is he? 50 A. He was the head supervisor over the other supervisors. Like he was the head supervisor over Robin Beaton, Richard Geoffroy and Ray Fairbrother. 51 Q. When did you make a complaint? 52 A. I believe it was sometime in '88. 53 .... 54 Q. What was his response to the complaint, did he say anything to you in the meeting after you made the complaint? 55 A. Dave Thompson? 56 Q. Yes[.] 57 A. He said something like I'm sorry and I'll take care of it. 58 Q. Okay. Do you know if anything was done about it? 59 A. I believe Barry was brought in the office. 60 (Deposition of Lisa Willis at 17, 19-20.) In light of Willis's deposition testimony, we can only conclude that the exclusion of her testimony at trial was entirely harmless insofar as Perry sought to show prior unresponsiveness by the company in general or by Kurzman in particular.