Opinion ID: 2085682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instructions as to Negligence.

Text: The trial court in its instructions on the subject of negligence used the general definition respecting ordinary care. The plaintiffs contend that the court erred in not instructing the jury relative to the higher duty that an operator of a business establishment has to take greater precautions to secure the safety of his patrons. However, we note that after giving the general definition of negligence, the court went on to state as follows: In addition to this general definition of negligence, there are statutes enacted by the legislature for the safe maintenance of a place of employment such as the pavilion and parking lot in question. A person who fails to comply with such statutes is negligent as that term is used in the verdict and in the Court's instructions. The trial judge subsequently quoted sec. 101.06, Stats., which asserts the duty of an employer to furnish a place of employment which shall be safe for employes therein and for frequenters thereof . . . and shall do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety, and welfare of such employes and frequenters. When inquiring as to the negligence of an employer under sec. 101.06, Stats., the standard of care is different from that which applies to the negligence of a frequenter in Mrs. Petoskey's position. Bobrowski v. Henne (1955), 270 Wis. 173, 177, 70 N. W. (2d) 666. In Mullen v. Larson-Morgan Co. (1933), 212 Wis. 52, 57, 249 N. W. 67, the court held that the employer's compliance with common-law standards of ordinary care did not meet the requirements of the safe-place statute. In Krause v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Post No. 6498 (1960), 9 Wis. (2d) 547, 554, 101 N. W. (2d) 645, we recommended that in framing the question of the special verdict in a safe-place case, trial courts use the word negligent. In our opinion, the standards of required care were adequately asserted in the instant instructions. Perhaps even greater clarity could be obtained in the typical safe-place case: After giving the general definition of negligence (Wis J ICivil, Part I, 1005), the trial court might go on to state as follows: The definition of negligence which I have just given you applies to both the plaintiff and the defendant. However, in addition, the defendant as an employer also has the duty to comply with the provisions of the Wisconsin Statutes, which require an employer to maintain his premises as safely as the nature of the place reasonably permits. If the defendant fails to comply with such statutes, he is negligent, as that term is used in this verdict. The plaintiffs also contend that the instructions were defective in failing to reflect Mrs. Petoskey's status as an invitee. In view of the fact that sec. 101.06, Stats., uses the word frequenter and not the word invitee, we perceive no error in the trial court's having refused to give an instruction which was expressly directed toward business invitees. The duty owed to a frequenter under the safe-place statute (sec. 101.06 and sec. 101.01 (11)) is a higher duty than the common-law obligation to an invitee. In Prosser, Law of Torts (2d ed.), p. 459, sec. 78, the author states, The occupier is not an insurer of the safety of invitees, and his duty is only to exercise reasonable care for their protection. It was proper for the trial judge to use the statutory term frequenter in his instructions, and we are unable to find any valid objection to the instructions.