Opinion ID: 1404645
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standard of Review applied under the Base Load Review Act

Text: Initially, Appellant contends this Court should apply a new standard of review to the analysis of the Commission below, because this is the first combined application the Commission has decided under the Base Load Review Act. [5] Appellant maintains a new standard of heightened scrutiny is the appropriate standard this Court should apply to decisions of the Commission under the Base Load Review Act. We disagree. Ordinarily, the Court's application of varying degrees of scrutiny is limited to those cases where a statute's constitutionality is being challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; S.C. Const. art. I, § 3. The application of heightened, or strict scrutiny is warranted in cases where a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage .... Fraternal Order of Police v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 352 S.C. 420, 431, 574 S.E.2d 717, 722 (2002) (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976)). Appellant cites no authority for the proposition that application of this level of scrutiny is necessary to review the utility regulation decisions of the Commission, and moreover fails to identify a fundamental right that has been abridged. At the core of Appellant's argument is its assertion that the Base Load Review Act so fundamentally changes the landscape of Commission review of a company's proposal, a heightened level of scrutiny is necessary on the front end of the review process. We find Appellant's claim unsubstantiated and against the plain reading of the Base Load Review Act. Section 58-33-240(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2009) specifically provides that [e]xcept as otherwise specified in this article, all procedural requirements that apply to general rate proceedings by law or regulation shall apply to proceedings and combined proceedings, to revised rates proceedings, and to the judicial review of orders issued under this article. (emphasis added). As a result, we find no basis for the application of a heightened level of scrutiny to appeals under the Act. Consequently, [t]his Court employs a deferential standard of review when reviewing a decision of the Public Service Commission and will affirm that decision when substantial evidence supports it. Duke Power Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of South Carolina, 343 S.C. 554, 558, 541 S.E.2d 250, 252 (2001) (citing Porter v. South Carolina Public Service Comm'n, 333 S.C. 12, 507 S.E.2d 328 (1998)). In applying a substantial evidence test, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, unless its findings or conclusions are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981); S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp.2009). Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla; rather, it is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the agency. Lark at 135-36, 276 S.E.2d at 306-07. Furthermore, the Court may not substitute its judgment for the Commission's on questions about which there is room for a difference of intelligent opinion. Duke Power Co., 343 S.C. at 558, 541 S.E.2d at 252. Because the Commission's findings are presumptively correct, the party challenging a Commission order bears the burden of convincingly proving the decision is clearly erroneous, or arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion, in view of the substantial evidence on the whole record. Id.