Opinion ID: 1035358
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Exclusion of Khrushchev's Testimony

Text: Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that [a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion if his scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). This evidence, even if it passes the requirements of Rule 702, remains subject to Rule 403's balancing test. See United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Fed. R. Evid. 403 (permitting court to exclude -10- relevant testimony if probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of, inter alia, unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading jury). The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of demonstrating its admissibility. See Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 981 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the proponent must explain to the trial judge why the expert's testimony meets the requirements of Rule 702, so that the court can make an appropriate assessment of its admissibility. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant who seeks the admission of expert testimony must make an on-the-record detailed proffer to the court, including an explanation of precisely how the expert's testimony is relevant to the [issues in dispute]). Tetioukhine's sole defense was that he lacked the requisite intent to be guilty of misappropriating MacEoghan's identity. To advance this defense, he testified to his belief that McCoon had legally adopted him and that he was unaware of the true Fionghal MacEoghan's existence. Under these circumstances, he genuinely believed that the purported adoption lawfully permitted him to take on a name, birth date, and background different from those related to his own birth, and that he was therefore telling the truth as he knew it when he represented himself as MacEoghan to the world. -11- Recognizing that this theory might seem implausible to a jury, Tetioukhine argued to the court that Khrushchev's cultural context testimony would have shown that his beliefs were subjectively reasonable. We take this assertion to mean that a reasonable person who shared his nationality and cultural background would have also shared his view of his adoption.2 Accepting, for the purposes of evaluating his evidentiary claim, that Tetioukhine's subjectively reasonable beliefs would have been probative of his lack of the requisite intent, we note that defendant's initial written disclosures did little to elucidate the link between Tetioukhine's defense and Khrushchev's subjects of expertise. The supplemental letter sent in August 2011 contained more specifics regarding Khrushchev's proposed testimony. Once again, however, its broad statements regarding American propaganda in the former Soviet Union and the experience of a Russian Jewish immigrant to Rhode Island bore only a slender connection to the key disputes in the case. Of course, the relevance of expert testimony regarding cultural matters is context-dependent and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The one grain of relevance we perceive in 2 Tetioukhine does not fully explain how the subjective reasonableness of his beliefs fits into his defense. Whatever labels he affixes to his theory of the case, however, we take his core contention to be that he believed he was acting lawfully when he used MacEoghan's identifying information as his own. As the parties do not dispute that such a belief would serve as a defense to all charges, we accept the proposition for present purposes. -12- Khrushchev's proposed testimony concerned Russian adoption law, custom, and practice. Testimony about this subject might have buttressed Tetioukhine's purported belief that, once adopted by McCoon, he could lawfully use MacEoghan's identifying information as his own. Given the vagueness of defendant's pretrial disclosures, Tetioukhine's oral proffer afforded him a critical opportunity to focus on this aspect of Khrushchev's proposed testimony. Instead, the oral proffer was larded with the same general references to cultural differences described in the written disclosures. Counsel's attempts to explain the significance of American propaganda available to people in the Soviet Union, and the supposed perception of the friendly and welcoming nature of American society, often devolved into unhelpful abstractions that failed to build the crucial bridge to the issue of Tetioukhine's intent. The following exchange was emblematic of the proffer's murkiness: MS. MCELROY: Your Honor, [Khrushchev] can also testify about the expectations that he had as an individual, but also the differences -- THE COURT: That who had? MS. MCELROY: That Professor Khrushchev had, the differences between the culture that he experienced in the Soviet Union and the culture that he experienced when he came here and his education in both of those cultures both before and since his emigration to the -13- United States and how those cultures work differently. THE COURT: Specifically? MS. MCELROY: Specifically that some of the propaganda . . . was that America was a society with little or no bureaucracy; that America was a free country where foreigners were welcome at all -- you know, always welcome; . . . that particularly Jews were welcome in the United States. As the district court correctly noted, Russian culture is a very broad topic with little evident probative value, and counsel's statements regarding the different workings of the two cultures and the Soviet perception that America was a free country did little to establish the relevance and helpfulness of Khrushchev's testimony. Thus, based on the information presented, the district court was within its discretion to conclude that Khrushchev's proposed testimony was largely irrelevant and unhelpful. Cf. United States v. Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2001) (concluding that trial judge did not abuse discretion in excluding testimony regarding cultural tribal traits and customs due to its tenuous connection to issues in case). Despite defense counsel's unfocused exposition of Khrushchev's proposed testimony, the district court did address the relevance of expert testimony concerning Russian adoption practices. The court ultimately characterized that testimony as irrelevant because Khrushchev would speak to child adoption practices, whereas Tetioukhine was adopted as an adult. To the extent that Khrushchev had any relevant testimony to offer on the -14- subject of adoption, however, we discern an independent basis for excluding it. See Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp., 670 F.3d 21, 31 n.4 (1st Cir. 2012) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony on basis other than district court's rationale); see also United States v. Wintermute, 443 F.3d 993, 1000 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that appellate court may affirm district court's decision to admit expert testimony on any ground supported by the record, even if that ground was not a basis for the district court's ruling). Specifically, there was little, if anything, in Khrushchev's background that would qualify him to offer opinions about adoption practices at all. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a) (requiring expert to have scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge). His stated areas of competence and his publication record focus heavily on world affairs and national security issues, rather than family law and adoption customs in the former Soviet Union. Indeed, his avowed knowledge in the latter area was purely anecdotal, United States v. Giambro, 544 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), the simple result of having lived in the former Soviet Union. Tetioukhine himself was equally capable of testifying to these matters, as he did. There was no basis for according Khrushchev the imprimatur of an expert in an area where he lacked specialized knowledge. -15- For these reasons, we see no basis for overturning the district court's exclusion of Khrushchev's testimony.3 B. The Admission of Tetioukhine's 1996 Conviction A party may introduce evidence to impeach a witness's specific testimony by contradiction. See United States v. Norton, 26 F.3d 240, 244 (1st Cir. 1994). Where this evidence is used to contradict material false testimony injected into the trial by [the defendant] himself, the general strictures of Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403 govern. Id.; see also Fed. R. Evid. 402 (stating that relevant evidence is admissible unless U.S. Constitution, federal statute, or rules say otherwise); id. 403 (allowing exclusion of relevant testimony if its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of, inter alia, unfair prejudice). The defendant may open the door to such evidence even if it is otherwise inadmissible. See Landry, 631 F.3d at 605. This principle applies to the admission of prior convictions. Federal Rule of Evidence 609 sets the limits on the admissibility of a conviction to impeach a witness's overall character for truthfulness, particularly if, as here, the 3 Khrushchev was present during the proffer and defense counsel offered to let the court voir dire him in order to clarify any uncertainty regarding the specific subjects of his testimony. Tetioukhine does not argue, however, that the court abused its discretion in relying only on his oral proffer. Moreover, [t]he trial court enjoys broad latitude in executing its gate-keeping function; there is no particular procedure it is required to follow. United States v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255, 261 (1st Cir. 2006). -16- conviction was obtained or the defendant was released from incarceration over ten years ago. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)(1) (allowing admission of conviction ten years or older only if its probative value . . . substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect). Nevertheless, Rule 609 does not address the admissibility of prior convictions when they are offered for another purpose, such as contradicting specific testimony. Norton, 26 F.3d at 243. Thus, a defendant can . . . open the door to evidence about prior convictions under Rules 402 and 403, Landry, 631 F.3d at 605, regardless of whether the conviction meets Rule 609's requirements, see United States v. Gilmore, 553 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2009) ([P]rior felony convictions more than ten years old may be used to impeach by contradiction even if they do not satisfy Rule 609's balancing and notice conditions.).4 Here, we address two separate door openings. The district court concluded that the first door opened after Tetioukhine portrayed himself as a law-abiding person with a solid work history. The court permitted a limited line of questioning regarding the facts of Tetioukhine's termination from the jewelry company, but did not admit the conviction itself. The second door 4 The balancing tests of Rules 403 and 609 differ. Under Rule 609(b), the probative value of the prior conviction must substantially outweigh[] its prejudicial effect to justify admission. Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)(1). Rule 403, by contrast, permits the court to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of, inter alia, unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. Id. 403. -17- opened when the government inquired about the circumstances of his departure, and Tetioukhine downplayed the nature of his conduct. The court then deemed the conviction itself admissible as well. The main issue in dispute is whether the district court correctly concluded that Tetioukhine opened that first door when it stated that [Tetioukhine] said that he wanted to follow the law. Defendant argues that this ruling was based on a flawed recollection of the testimony. We disagree. Tetioukhine testified that he obtained a position at the jewelry company, where he worked for roughly about four or five months. His counsel then asked whether he at some point [got] a different job, to which Tetioukhine replied Yes. He then spoke about obtaining a position with an inventory supply company, which later closed, requiring him to find work with a different inventory company. He also testified regarding the paperwork he submitted to verify his eligibility to work in the United States, which, among other things, was necessary to withhold taxes from his paychecks. Tetioukhine is correct that he never stated expressly that he left his position with the jewelry company for innocuous reasons. We also do not adopt the government's view that his testimony about his attempts to follow rules relating to employment[ and] immigration was sufficient to open the door to his conviction, given that this evidence was merely consistent with his overall defense that he had lawfully adopted MacEoghan's -18- identity. Nevertheless, Tetioukhine invited questioning about the circumstances of his departure from the jewelry company when he introduced specific testimony about his employment for the apparent purpose of enhancing his self-portrayal as a law-abiding citizen. His statements left the jury with the impression that he had an unproblematic work history, and that he had quit his job with the jewelry company simply to find another position. The omission of facts that did not fit into this narrative thus created a false impression that made the circumstances of [his] termination relevant. Landry, 631 F.3d at 605. The opening may have been slight, but we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in permitting a limited line of questioning regarding the reason he left the jewelry company. See United States v. Balthazard, 360 F.3d 309, 317 (1st Cir. 2004) (By seeking to create an impression in the minds of jurors that Balthazard had had only limited prior contacts with law enforcement, Balthazard's counsel opened the door to questioning about additional reports that linked Balthazard to other criminal activity.); see also United States v. LeAmous, 754 F.2d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 1985) (By painting a picture of himself . . . as a protector of young girls who encouraged alternatives to prostitution, the defendant invited cross-examination concerning particular instances of his conduct to the contrary during the relevant time frame.). -19- Tetioukhine then opened the second door largely unprompted. The government asked Tetioukhine whether the jewelry company had fired him. He acknowledged that it had, but attempted to reduce the seriousness of his misdeeds: Q: You were fired for taking things from your employer, correct? A: That's correct. Q: Gold; correct? A: Yes. It was a tiny piece of gold, yes. When the truth of this last assertion was challenged, Tetioukhine responded that he wasn't arrested for his misconduct, the matter never went to [] court, that he just talk[ed] to policemen, and they promised [] to basically drop the case. All of these statements were patently false. Indeed, most of these statements were volunteered, rather than directly elicited by the prosecutor's questions. Tetioukhine's repeated attempt[s] to minimize the conduct for which he was convicted, United States v. Baylor, 97 F.3d 542, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1996), were more than sufficient to open the door to further cross-examination on this subject. On appeal, Tetioukhine unpersuasively maintains that the government's line of questioning should have ceased immediately after he admitted that he had been terminated for taking things from [his] employer. After that acknowledgment, the government asked only a brief clarifying question that inquired whether Tetioukhine had stolen gold. Tetioukhine then began digging himself into a hole by stating that he had stolen only a tiny -20- piece of gold, leading to the succession of untruths that opened the door fully to the admission of his larceny conviction.