Opinion ID: 1426895
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The district court's drug quantity findings

Text: Banks's final argument is that the district court failed to make adequate factual findings in support of the drug quantity attributed to him for sentencing purposes. Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the district court, for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter[to] rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B). We consider Rule 32 satisfied if the district court made clear at sentencing that it was relying on its impression of the testimony of the witnesses at trial, coupled with its specific rejection of the defendant's quantity objections. United States v. Flores, 73 F.3d 826, 835 (8th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). Factual findings help ensure meaningful appellate review and the fairness of the sentencing process. United States v. Scott, 91 F.3d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir.1996) (quotation omitted). At sentencing, the government summarized the testimony of various witnesses as it pertained to drug quantity, concluding that if the amounts to which the witnesses testified were added together, the total quantity would be about 2.8 kilograms of cocaine basewell above the 1.5 kilograms that the government sought to attribute to Banks. Because Banks had not seen the presentence report until the day of sentencing and because his counsel had neglected to file written objections (although the district court had granted him extra time to do so), the district court continued the sentencing hearing, stating, I recognize that public funds are being misused, but I have an affirmative duty to make sure that the defendant receives due process. A second hearing was held twenty days later. Banks filed written objections, in which he stated that relying upon testimony solicited from government witnesses at trial would be unconstitutional, and requesting that he be attributed only the amount of cocaine base reflected by the jury's verdict or the actual amount he possessed. At the second sentencing hearing, he also argued that the government's witnesses were unreliable and that he had been denied due process. In response, the government noted that the witnesses had testified under oath and had been subjected to cross-examination, and reiterated that the trial testimony sufficed to establish that the drug quantity was easily over one and a half kilos of crack cocaine. After affording Banks an opportunity to comment on the government's remarks, the trial judge stated that he had heard enough and overruled Banks's objections. Although the district court could have been more explicit, there can be little question, in light of the context, that the district court's drug quantity determination was based on the testimony at trial. Cf. United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 938, 950-51 (8th Cir.2006) (noting in the Rule 32 context that the district court's remarks at sentencing should be read in context). Moreover, given the circumstances, we cannot find fault with the district court's summary rejection of Banks's drug quantity objections. In sum, the record is sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review, and we can discern no unfairness springing from the absence of more explicit factual findings. Remanding this case for further sentencing proceedings would serve no useful purpose. The judgment is affirmed.