Opinion ID: 2118853
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was there an enforceable trust?

Text: Trial court found the evidence to be clear, satisfactory and convincing that the family members, and particularly Grace, entertained no intention of depriving Carrie of the farm share her father wanted her to have but that for reasons known to him he could not devise to her. Trial court elsewhere noted it could be suspected financial stress facing Carrie and her spouse could have been the reason for Drennan's ambivalent will. Trial court had before it Grace's statement to Mead she was holding the share for Carrie, coupled with the 1935 agreement signed by Grace and her husband which the court deemed a written recognition of the trust obligation. While that instrument is subject to several interpretations, its overall thrust is to appoint F. O. Akin agent and successor trustee, and it apparently was designed to protect Carrie's share from creditors. Because the trust was memorialized in writing and unrepudiated in her lifetime, trial court held there was no violation of section 557.10, The Code 1977 (creation of trusts in real estate must be executed in the same manner as deeds), relying on Andrew v. State Bank of Blairsburg, 209 Iowa 1149, 1152, 229 N.W. 819, 820 (1930), and Albright v. Albright, 153 Iowa 397, 133 N.W. 727 (1911). In Butler v. Butler, 253 Iowa 1084, 1113, 114 N.W.2d 595, 612 (1962), we held: The facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, [a] statement of intentions by one of [the] settlors, conduct and actions of the parties, especially the donee. . . all taken together [can] establish the existence of a trust relationship. All the evidence taken together, including the agreement, and giving efficacy to the situation and relation of the parties, the nature and situation of the property, and the purposes or objects which the settlor had in view, indicates Grace probably intended to create a trust. Id. at 1114, 114 N.W.2d at 612 (quoting I. J. Perry, A Treatise on the Law of Trusts and Trustees § 99, at 124 (7th ed. R. Baldes 1929)). Under Drennan's will she held an additional one-fourth undivided vested remainder interest in the farm which obviously was the subject of the later agreement. Of course she was aware of the will and her ownership when the agreement was executed. It apparently contemplated, however, conveyances to Carrie or Akin when the life estate terminated, but Grace predeceased the life tenant. Whether the agreement itself could be considered a part performance in order to avoid the statute of frauds is a question we need not reach as the district court's decree may be sustained on the ground examined in division II. However, see Butler, where, quoting from McDiarmid v. McDiarmid, 368 Ill. 638, 642, 15 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1938), we stated: [T]he statute of frauds has been complied with if the trustee makes a memorandum or writing showing that the property is held in trust. The details and terms of the trust may be established aliunde and even by parol evidence . . . . The writing need not be an instrument expressly framed for the purpose of acknowledging the trust. It is sufficient if the recognition or admission of the trust be incidentally made in the course of correspondence, and almost any memorandum will suffice. The letter or memorandum need not be addressed to the cestui que trust and may be written after title has been acquired by the trustee. Butler, 253 Iowa at 1114, 114 N.W.2d at 612 (emphasis supplied and in original). See also 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 38, at 765 (1955), which provides: The writing declaring or manifesting the existence of the trust need not be executed contemporaneously with the transfer of the legal title and the creation of the trust, but may be executed subsequent thereto. (Emphasis added.) Accord, 37 C.J.S. Statute of Frauds § 171a, at 647 (1943) (The memorandum required by the statute of frauds may be made at the time of, or subsequently to, the making of the contract, and at any time before action is brought.). We thus turn to the issue whether title was established by adverse possession.