Opinion ID: 2460196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Claims Against Local Governments Act

Text: The Claims against Local Government Act, KRS 65.200 et seq., offers no relief for the Burns Estate in this case. The specific language of KRS 65.2001(2) provides [n]o provision of KRS 65.2002 to 65.2006 shall in any way be construed to expand the existing common law concerning municipal tort liability as of July 15, 1988, nor eliminate or abrogate the defense of governmental immunity for county governments. Here the alleged cause of action arose in 1989 and when this Court considers the effect of KRS 44.073(14), which was enacted in 1986 in connection with the philosophy expressed in Withers regarding the abrogation by statute of case law, we must conclude that O'Bannon, Wigginton , Kestler, and Dunlap are not applicable to this situation in any respect. KRS 65.150 only allows a county to purchase insurance to cover the liability of employees and officials. The statute obviously does not include the purchase of insurance covering the liability of a county itself, consequently, Dunlap, Kestler , and Green River , even if given application, do not result in a waiver of the immunity of the county from suit. Finally, reliance by the Court of Appeals on the decision in Lee v. McCracken Co. Fiscal Court, Ky.App., 872 S.W.2d 88 (1993), is misplaced. The holding by the Court of Appeals that KRS 65.150 indicates an intention to waive county immunity is incorrect both in this case and in Lee, supra . The statute merely permits a county to insure its employees, officials and property and not the county itself. This type of insurance would be available for such persons who would have no individual sovereign or governmental immunity and would have no official immunity for possible negligence in the performance of their ministerial duties. There is no finding of an express legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity in such a statute. We must also observe that the complaint of the Burns Estate fails to specify any individual capacity in the heading or in the body of the complaint and it does not seek judgment against any individual in the concluding demand for relief. Thus we believe the complaint failed to state a separate cause of action for personal liability against any particular person. Calvert Investments, Inc. v. Louisville and Jefferson Co. Metropolitan Sewer District, supra . This case must follow the philosophy set out in Withers , in which a majority of this Court, by a 4 to 3 decision, extended sovereign immunity to a medical malpractice claim against the University of Kentucky and its Medical Center on the basis that the school was engaged as a teaching hospital. Withers announced that the enactment of KRS 44.070 was an abrogation of the decision in Dunlap and other related cases. Although some may disagree originally with the thrust of Withers in light of Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Berns, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 327 (1991), Withers is now the law of the Commonwealth. There is some significance to the fact that Withers was not challenged by a motion for rehearing. It could be argued that Withers , like Berns , was an extension of the pure governmental function. However, in this case there is clearly a government responsibility and a discharge of that responsibility although it is claimed to have been negligent. Accordingly, because the particular case before us involves a clear governmental duty, and this Court has chosen to extend the protection of sovereign immunity to even possibly marginal claims of governmental activity, we must conclude that the protection of sovereign immunity against civil lawsuit is available to the parties sued in this action. The only possible recourse for those who believe they are injured or damaged in some way by the activities of the government or its agents is a resort to a proper claim before the Board of Claims. Section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution is commonly referred to as providing immunity, but a reading of the exact language of the constitutional section indicates that it provides a direction for those who have claims and a method by which they can seek some limited redress of such claims. Questions about the adequacy of such compensation in relation to the provisions of the Kentucky Constitution set out in Berns are not before this Court and we cannot decide them. The adequacy of compensation is primarily a responsibility of the legislative branch of government. The interpretation of the Constitution as applied to particular legislative acts is the province of this Court. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the summary judgment of the circuit court is reinstated dismissing all claims. STEPHENS, C.J., and COOPER, JOHNSTONE, GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. LAMBERT, J., files a separate opinion dissenting in part, concurring in part, in which STUMBO, J., joins.