Opinion ID: 1865750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: WHETHER THE HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF SDCL CH. 3-21 AS A DEFENSE? SDCL ch. 3-21 sets forth specific notice requirements that must be satisfied as a prerequisite to maintenance of a tort action against a public entity. Finck v. City of Tea, 443 N.W.2d 632 (S.D.1989). SDCL 3-21-1(1) defines the term public entity to include, all ... legal entities that public entities are authorized by law to establish[.] Municipalities are authorized to establish hospitals in SDCL 34-9-1: every city shall have power ... [t]o establish, construct, purchase, and maintain hospitals and medical clinics and to regulate the same[.] (emphasis added). The hospital was, in fact, established by the City of Brookings in 1964 by Chapter 18, Article I, § 18-1 of its ordinances: The Brookings Municipal Hospital is hereby created and established in and for the city. (emphasis added). Based upon these provisions, it is clear that the hospital is a public entity as contemplated by SDCL ch. 3-21. SDCL 3-21-2 requires a plaintiff in a tort action against a public entity to give written notice to the entity of the, time, place and cause of the injury ... within one hundred eighty days after the injury. The notice must be given to the attorney general and, in a case such as this, to the chief executive officer or secretary of the governing board of the public entity. SDCL 3-21-3(5). During the course of the hearing on this matter, Hanson conceded her failure to comply with the notice requirements of SDCL 3-21-2. Based upon this failure, the trial court dismissed Hanson's action. Hanson asserts that the hospital should have been estopped from raising the notice requirements of SDCL ch. 3-21 as a defense because the hospital has in no way held itself out as a public entity. She asserts that the only record evidence indicating that the hospital is a public entity is an affidavit of the hospital's counsel in the settled record and a city ordinance referring to the creation of a hospital board. Hanson's arguments are partially resolved by the record. During the hearing on this matter, the trial court explicitly took judicial notice of Brookings, ordinance number 18-1. As previously quoted in this decision, Ordinance No. 18-1 specifically states that it creates and establishes the Brookings Municipal Hospital. The only person during the hearing on this matter to refer to an ordinance merely creating a hospital board was Hanson's own counsel. However, that is a separate Ordinance No. 18-18 which was not judicially noticed by the trial court. Moreover, the enactment of the ordinance establishing the hospital forestalls any contention by Hanson that the hospital does not hold itself out as a public entity. Individuals are presumed to know the law. Hieb v. Opp, 458 N.W.2d 797 (S.D.1990); Johnson v. Graff, 68 S.D. 562, 5 N.W.2d 33 (1942). The law includes municipal ordinances. SDCL 1-1-22; SDCL 1-1-23(7). Thus, Hanson must be presumed to have had knowledge of the ordinance establishing the hospital and, therefore, the existence of the public entity status of the hospital. Furthermore, mere innocent silence or inaction will not work an estoppel unless one remains silent when he has a duty to speak. Matter of Estate of Williams, 348 N.W.2d 471 (S.D.1984); Willadsen v. Crawford, 75 S.D. 161, 60 N.W.2d 692 (1953). Generally, to work an estoppel, there must be some intended deception in the conduct or declaration of the party to be estopped. In re Cancel. of Stabio Ditch Water Right, 417 N.W.2d 391 (S.D.1987). The conduct must have induced the other party to alter his position or do that which he would not otherwise have done to his prejudice. Estate of Williams, supra . Here, Hanson has failed to point to any particular act or conduct on the part of the hospital that induced her to believe it was not a public entity. The argument she raises merely points to silence or inaction on the part of the hospital in failing to affirmatively notify her that it is a public entity. She asserts that nowhere in the hospital's letterhead, correspondence, billing statements or release forms did the hospital reference the city's ownership. Yet, she fails to provide any authority that the hospital is under a duty to advise patients of the city's ownership in any such manner. Moreover, she ignores that the name of the hospital itself implies municipal participation in its operation. Finally, she fails to cite any evidence that the failure of the hospital to note its municipal ownership in the forms and documents she received was an intended deception as opposed to a standard operating procedure. Based upon these considerations and the rule that estoppels against the public are little favored and should be used sparingly, Hanson's attempt to raise an estoppel against the hospital must be rejected. Sioux Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Tripp County, 404 N.W.2d 519 (S.D.1987).