Opinion ID: 2226424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Single Subject and Title Requirement.

Text: Article III, section 29 of the Iowa Constitution provides: Every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title. We outlined the rationale and mechanics of this constitutional provision in State v. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d 472 (Iowa 1990). There we said the provision serves a threefold purpose: (1) to prevent logrolling, the combining of unrelated bills so that unfavorable legislation rides in with more popular legislation; (2) to facilitate the legislative process by reducing surprise or fraud when legislators are uninformed; and (3) to keep citizens informed of legislation being considered. Id. at 473; see also State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 410 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Iowa 1987). Article III, section 29 has four requirements: First, the act may have only one subject together with matters germane to it. Second, the title of the act must contain the subject matter of the act. Third, any subject not mentioned in the title is invalid. Last, an invalid subject in the act does not invalidate the remaining portions that are expressed in the title. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d at 474 (citations omitted). This does not mean that any two subjects in a multifaceted piece of legislation must, in isolation, demonstrably relate to each other for the bill to pass constitutional muster. It is only necessary to show that all subjects relate to a single purpose. Miller v. Bair, 444 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Iowa 1989). We have uniformly held that the single subject and title rule should be liberally construed so that one act may embrace all matters reasonably connected with the subject expressed in the title and not utterly incongruous thereto. Long v. Board of Supervisors, 258 Iowa 1278, 1283, 142 N.W.2d 378, 381 (1966). A. Timeliness of challenge. Once a bill is codified, any constitutional defect relating to title or subject matter is cured. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d at 475. There is a window of opportunity, however, measured from the date a bill is passed until it is codified, during which a constitutional challenge may lie. Id. A successful challenge invalidates the defective portion of the legislation, a result that inures to the benefit of others adversely affected. Tabor v. State, 519 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Iowa 1994). The State concedes that Taylor has timely and properly preserved his constitutional challenge. He raised the single subject and title defect by way of a motion to adjudicate law points filed after the law's effective date, July 1, 1994, but before its codification in 1995 as Iowa Code section 724.16A (1995). B. Merits. Taylor's conviction for trafficking in weapons was based on Senate File 2319, a bill entitled Juvenile Justice. See 1994 Iowa Acts ch. 1172. The bill contains seventy-four sections embracing a variety of initiatives, all but six of which expressly relate to juveniles. [1] The legislation calls for training gang-affected youth in racial and cultural awareness, id. § 1; prohibits supplying or distributing alcohol, tobacco, and drugs to juveniles, id. §§ 2-10, 37, 38, 60, 61; sets up procedures for enforcing juvenile offenses, id. §§ 11-26, 32-35, 39, 40, 62; establishes community programs to support at-risk juveniles through intervention, prevention, and education, id. §§ 27-33; combats child abuse and sexually predatory acts, id. §§ 41-52, 59; creates weapon-free school zones, prohibits selling guns and ammunition to minors, and provides punishment for juveniles using firearms, id. §§ 53, 56, 64; appropriates money to fund juvenile programs and services, id. §§ 65-72; and calls for a study of juvenile delinquency, including patterns of recidivism and rehabilitation, id. § 73. By contrast, the section with which Taylor was charged criminalizes the act of trafficking in stolen weapons without reference to juvenile justice concerns. The section provides: A person who knowingly transfers or acquires possession, or who facilitates the transfer, of a stolen firearm commits a class D felony for a first offense and a class C felony for second and subsequent offenses or if the weapon is used in the commission of a public offense. However, this section shall not apply to a person purchasing stolen firearms through a buy-back program sponsored by a law enforcement agency if the firearms are returned to their rightful owners or destroyed. 1994 Iowa Acts ch. 1172, § 55. Nevertheless the district court found, and the State urges on appeal, that any weapons law could have an impact on juveniles and, hence, section 55 is in some reasonable sense auxiliary to juvenile justice. We find the argument unpersuasive. Such reasoning would bring within its orbit virtually any new crime whether germane to the subject of juvenile justice or not. Indeed the single-subject infirmity of section 55 is illustrated by comparing it to section 56 of the same act. That section states in pertinent part: [A] person who sells, loans, gives, or makes available a rifle or shotgun or ammunition for a rifle or shotgun to a minor commits a serious misdemeanor for a first offense and a class D felony for second and subsequent offenses. Id. § 56(1) (emphasis added). Other sections in the act make wide use of descriptive terms such as child, youth, and juveniles. Section 55 contains no reference to juvenile crime or juvenile justice so as to connect it to the general subject of the legislation. In other words, it is not germane to the rest of the act's multifaceted effort to promote juvenile justice. See Miller, 444 N.W.2d at 490. Nor is the title of the act sufficient under article III, section 29 to adequately identify section 55 as a topic governed by its provisions. A title is sufficient, even though it is broad, if it gives fair notice of a provision in the body of an act. Western Int'l v. Kirkpatrick, 396 N.W.2d 359, 365 (Iowa 1986). But as an act's provisions become more disjointed and less obviously related to each other, the legislature's obligation to provide greater specificity in the act's title necessarily increases. Iowa Dist. Ct., 410 N.W.2d at 688. The ambitious legislation under consideration tackled numerous aspects of juvenile justice in seventy-four separate sections. Its full title described the legislation as follows: AN ACT relating to juvenile justice by establishing or enhancing penalties for delinquent acts which may be committed by juveniles, establishing or enhancing penalties for public offenses relating to juvenile justice, authorizing searches of student lockers in a school without advance notice under certain circumstances, delaying the repeal of the interception of communications law, providing for the commitment of persons determined to be sexually violent predators, and making related appropriations and providing effective dates. 1994 Iowa Acts ch. 1172. Taylor argues that, on its face, the title suggests legislation that applies only to offenses involving juvenile delinquency. We cannot agree. Section 53, which enhances penalties for firearm offenses committed in weapon-free zones near schools and parks, reveals adult offenses that are fairly embraced by the term public offenses relating to juvenile justice. The title is deficient, however, in its failure to indicate that the legislation addresses a weapons law which bears no specific relationship to juveniles. Thus to the extent the act embraces, in section 55, a subject not expressed in its title, it is void and unenforceable. Tabor, 519 N.W.2d at 379-80. Taylor's conviction based on section 55, now codified at Iowa Code section 724.16A, must be reversed.