Opinion ID: 1979111
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 9] In evaluating a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment, we view the evidence and inferences that may be drawn from the evidence from the perspective most favorable to the court's judgment. Pratt v. Spaulding, 2003 ME 56, ¶ 10, 822 A.2d 1183, 1186. This rule does not change when our review is based on a court-approved statement of the evidence rather than a transcript. See Tsoulas v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 454 F.3d 69, 75-76 (1st Cir.2006) (when parties have agreed to facts, and their dispute concerns inferences that might be drawn from those facts, the standard of review is clear error review). [¶ 10] To support its conclusion that harassment had occurred, the court had to find that there were at least three instances of harassment. For purposes of this appeal, the relevant definition of harassment is provided in 5 M.R.S. § 4651(2)(A) (2006), which states: 2. Harassment. Harassment means: A. Three or more acts of intimidation, confrontation, physical force or the threat of physical force directed against any person, family or business that are made with the intention of causing fear, intimidation or damage to property and that do in fact cause fear, intimidation or damage to property. [¶ 11] Thus the evidence must support a finding that at least three actions taken on Donahue's behalf were taken with the intention of causing fear or intimidation and did in fact cause fear or intimidation. Subsection 2 of section 4651 further states that: This definition does not include any act protected by law. However, even when an individual may have a legal right to do something, the manner in which a legal act is performed can constitute harassment. See Patane v. Brown, 2002 ME 47, ¶ 10, 792 A.2d 1086, 1089. [3] [¶ 12] Based on the evidence, the District Court could find that Cates was intimidated and made fearful by Donahue's agents' actions. She testified to those impacts, stating that she had changed her locks and installed a security system out of fear. The closer question is whether there was sufficient evidence of Donahue's agents' intent or purpose to cause Cates fear or intimidation. [¶ 13] This case presents the question of when conduct that may be protected by law, but is unwelcome in the eyes of the person against whom it is directed, crosses the line into the realm of unlawful harassment. See 5 M.R.S. § 4651(2)(A). [¶ 14] The answer lies in the requirement that in harassment proceedings the plaintiff must prove that it was the defendant's conscious object to harass the plaintiff. See State v. Hills, 574 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Me.1990). Proving this element can be difficult because a defendant seldom admits that he or she intended to harass the plaintiff. Courts are thus left to analyze this element of a harassment claim based on reasonable inferences that can be drawn from circumstantial evidence. A court properly considers the relationship between each of the three or more separate acts complained of when conducting this analysis. See id. [¶ 15] This is a close case because, apart from the deceptive telephone call and the drive-by after repossession had occurred, the acts complained of by Cates were consistent with Donahue's claim that it was his purpose to repossess Cates's Cadillac. Repossession was an act protected by law, assuming that Donahue was the rightful owner of the vehicle. However, the trial court was not bound to accept Donahue's assertion that his sole purpose was to repossess Cates's Cadillac. The court could have reasonably concluded that Donahue's initial act, a deceptive telephone call that was not protected by law, was performed with the conscious object to both intimidate Cates and cause her to drive her car to Home Depot to make it more readily accessible for repossession. Based on this finding, the court could have inferred that the events that took place over the next three days, including the drive-by after the car was taken, were related to one another and performed with the same intent to harass. Although this may be a close case, the outcome reached by the trial court is supported by the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. DANA, J., dissenting. [¶ 16] I respectfully dissent. [¶ 17] The law authorizes the peaceful repossession of an automobile when the debtor is behind in his payments. 32 M.R.S. § 11017(1) (2006); 4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 34-8 at 384-86 (5th ed. 2002). In order to accomplish a peaceful repossession, it is usually necessary to locate the vehicle when the debtor is not behind the wheel. Although a fact-finder might conclude that the creditor here caused the spouse of the debtor to be intimidated and fearful, in my view, such a fact-finder could not conclude that that was the creditor's intent.