Opinion ID: 1822801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ineffective Assistance in Failing to Request a Competency Hearing

Text: In his final postconviction claim, Lawrence alleges that the postconviction court erred in denying his claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to request a competency hearing during the penalty phase after Lawrence told his counsel that he was suffering hallucinations. In reviewing this claim, it is important to first review the record from the original trial. Specifically, while Janice Johnson, a crime scene analyst, was testifying about the pictures from the crime scene, defense counsel requested a bench conference and informed the court that Lawrence was reporting that he had hallucinations and flashbacks. The judge excused the jury, and Stitt elaborated that while the State's witness was discussing the crime scene, Lawrence began to have not only visual but auditory hallucinations and flashbacks. The judge granted the defense's request for a break, and after the parties returned, the judge inquired whether Lawrence was better. Lawrence replied that he was fine. After counsel was satisfied that Lawrence was ready to proceed, the jury was brought back in. Shortly thereafter, Lawrence's tape-recorded statement pertaining to the Livingston murder was introduced. During the playing of the statement, Stitt indicated to the court that Lawrence was having a problem, and a bench conference was called. Stitt informed the court that Lawrence indicated that he was beginning to hallucinate again and wanted to be excused for the playing of the tapes. After the jury was temporarily excused, the court questioned Lawrence about whether he understood that he had a constitutional right to be present during the entire trial and asked him whether he wanted to be excused during the playing of his prior statements. Lawrence stated that he understood and wanted to be excused. The court then clarified: THE COURT: And your counsel has used the word hallucination, but what we are actually talking about is flashbacks, remembering what happened? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Is that what is bothering you? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. It is bothering me pretty bad. The court ensured that his counsel had discussed the matter with Lawrence and then inquired whether Lawrence desired to be absent for the playing of the tape related to Livingston or if he also wished to be absent during the tape involving the Robinson murder. Lawrence and his counsel stated that he wished to be absent for both. The court then asked the State whether it wished to ask Lawrence any questions. After an off-the-record discussion, the State responded, The State does not have an objection if it is an issue of discomfort rather than competency, and Ms. Stitt and Mr. Killam assure me that it is. The judge then stated that he needed to clarify for the record and distinguish between hallucinations and flashbacks or remembering the event. He asked counsel to talk with their client, which they did. At that point, the following discussion took place: THE COURT: . . . Describe to me what is going on. THE DEFENDANT: Mainly rather not be here when they hear, I guess my own voice on there. MS. STITT: Tell me what you told me about it being the voice of your brother. THE DEFENDANT: I'd just rather not hear it. MS. STITT: Just a minute ago you told me that you were hearing the voice of your brother, your dead brother. THE DEFENDANT: That's what the tape sounds like. And I just don't want to hear it. MS. STITT: And did you say anything to me about having visual hallucinations? THE DEFENDANT: When I was back out in the field and I don't want to be out there. THE COURT: So what you are remembering is actually the event? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: What happened that night? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: As you are listening to your voice and it is being played you are reliving it in your mind, is that what you are talking about? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: But is it a true picture in your mind of what happened, is it just like a replay? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. It isit makes me real nervous and makes me sweat real bad. THE COURT: But you are not hearing other people's voices or things that are not replaying? I am trying to distinguish between your replaying in your mind what happened in the past as opposed to real strange things going on? THE DEFENDANT: I can't really explain it. THE COURT: Is it a replay of what happened? Is that what is troubling you or are you hearing other voices or THE DEFENDANT: I don't know for sure. THE COURT: Only you can tell me. THE DEFENDANT: I'm not real sure what to think, I guess that I could go sit back down or something MS. STITT: You just want to be excused? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. MS. STITT: Okay. THE COURT: And it's because you are uncomfortable hearing yourself describe what happened, is that the reason? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Is there any other reason other than you are just uncomfortable listening to yourself describe, describe what you did, is that the reason? THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head affirmative) I think so. The trial court then found that Lawrence freely, voluntarily, and knowingly waived his right to be present during the tapes, and the trial resumed. Again the next day, prior to the second statement being played, the judge again inquired as to how Lawrence was doing and asked if he was hearing any noises or anything in his head. Lawrence replied that he was not. The court asked him why he wanted to be excused, to which Lawrence replied, I guess I just have a hard time hearing myself talk. Stitt asserted that she thought this was in their client's best interest. The judge permitted Lawrence to leave during the playing of the second statement. On direct appeal, Lawrence asserted that the trial judge erred because he failed to order a competency hearing after he learned about Lawrence's hallucinations. After noting that no competency hearing was requested, this Court denied the claim, particularly in light of the fact that defense counsel informed the trial court that some time before, Lawrence had been found competent to proceed, and they thought he was still competent to proceed. Of further importance to this Court was the fact that the trial court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Lawrence and, based on his responses, found that Lawrence was simply uncomfortable hearing certain portions of the evidence. Lawrence, 846 So.2d at 448. Accordingly, this Court denied the claim that the trial court abused its discretion in proceeding with the penalty phase without first ordering a competency hearing. Id. The State contends that because Lawrence already challenged the failure to hold a competency hearing, Lawrence's current claim is procedurally barred. We disagree. The only question that this Court faced on direct appeal was whether the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte order a competency evaluation. This is an entirely different legal question than whether defense counsel should have requested the hearing. Defense counsel has a different obligation to their client than the judge and has a much broader base of knowledge upon which to rely in determining whether a defendant may be incompetent. In this case, it is clear that in making his decision, the trial judge relied significantly upon counsel's representations and counsel's discussion with Lawrence as to whether Lawrence was truly experiencing hallucinations or flashbacks. In order to resolve such a claim, this Court would need evidence pertaining to what Lawrence's counsel knew, including what they learned from their mental health experts, whether Lawrence's behavior changed during their representation, conversations counsel had with their client, and numerous other factors which would not be apparent on the face of the record at that time. Accordingly, Lawrence could not have raised his current ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. See, e.g., Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 63 n. 14 (Fla.2001) (A claim of ineffectiveness can properly be raised on direct appeal only if the record on its face demonstrates ineffectiveness.); Desire v. State, 928 So.2d 1256, 1257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (As a general rule, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not ordinarily cognizable on direct appeal. The exception is when the error is apparent on the face of the record, which is rarely the case.) In turning to the merits of this case, the postconviction court denied this claim as follows: In the instant case, Mr. Killam testified that based on his conversations with the Defendant and his experience that the Defendant was not having a competency problem; he was having a bout with his conscience. As such, Mr. Killam testified that based on his experience and what was observed during the penalty phase hearing he did not think the Defendant was incompetent thus there was no need for a competency evaluation. Ms. Stitt testified that after consultation with co-counsel it was determined that the Defendant was not hallucinating but he was experiencing flashbacks thus she did not request a competency hearing at that point. However, Ms. Stitt testified that in hindsight she would have requested a competency hearing. Hindsight analysis of what actions should have been taken is not the appropriate standard in determining deficiency, the question rests on what the circumstances were at the time that the particular decision was made. The decision not to seek a competency evaluation at the time of the alleged hallucination was based on counsels' interaction with the Defendant, as discussed previously, his demeanor remained constant throughout the representation, discussions with the Defendant following the alleged hallucinations, and approximately 50 years of combined litigation experience. Therefore, the Court finds counsels' decision not to request a competency hearing was based on reasoned professional judgment. Moreover, the Defendant has failed to establish that but for counsel's alleged deficient conduct there is a reasonable probability the results would have differed. In fact, Justice Bell testified that having dealt with the Defendant in juvenile court and through the process he made the informed decision the Defendant was not hallucinating but disturbed by flashbacks of what happened during the victim's murder. Consequently, this claim is denied. (Citations omitted.) While postconviction counsel has provided additional information, including Stitt's testimony that she was concerned about Lawrence's competency all along and that she regretted her decision not to request a competency hearing, such hindsight doubts are insufficient to show deficient performance. Lawrence has failed to show any error. A complete review of the record, including both the evidence shown at the evidentiary hearing and the testimony at trial show that it was difficult to determine whether Lawrence was truly experiencing hallucinations or whether he was bothered by the portions of the evidence which were being presented. Lawrence was asked directly about this, and his counsel consulted with him at the time he was reporting these problems. Stitt never stated that the reported hallucinations made her question Lawrence's competency. Instead, counsel asserted that Lawrence's behavior did not change from the initial time when two experts found him competent until the trial was completed. Although both Stitt and Killam had the opportunity to talk with their client immediately after the incidents, the postconviction evidentiary hearing did not reveal any additional information which would have compelled counsel to seek a competency hearing. Finally, Deputy Jarvis testified during the hearing as to his conversation with Lawrence immediately after Lawrence reported his problems. While Deputy Jarvis noted that Lawrence was more upset than he had ever seen him, Lawrence told him that he did not like hearing the tapes because it seemed like the crime was happening all over againsimilar to statements that he made on the record to the judge. Based on the above, there is competent, substantial evidence to support the postconviction court's factual findings, and Lawrence has not shown that the trial court's conclusions of law are erroneous. Lawrence's concluding contention is that the cumulative effect of the procedural and substantive errors deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial. Because Lawrence has failed to prevail on the merits of any of his individual claims on direct appeal, in this appeal, or in his petition for a writ of a habeas corpus, we deny his claim that he was deprived of a fundamentally fair trial on the basis of cumulative error. See Morris v. State, 931 So.2d 821, 837 (Fla. 2006) (denying claim based on cumulative error where the individual claims making up the cumulative claim were either procedurally barred or without merit).