Opinion ID: 691027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Suppress: Validity of Search Warrant

Text: 8 Before trial Janus moved to suppress all evidence derived from the search on January 21, 1991, on the grounds that (1) Agent Lembke's underlying affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause to search Janus's premises and (2) the warrant was overbroad because it failed to state with particularity the things to be seized. The district court denied that motion following a hearing. 9 In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we must accept the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391, 1394 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1575, 128 L.Ed.2d 218 (1994); United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 968 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 482, 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993); United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1443 (10th Cir.1991). However, [w]e review de novo the 'ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.'  United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir.1993)). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Wicks, 995 F.2d at 969; Carr, 939 F.2d at 1443. 10 The Fourth Amendment provides that no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1436 (10th Cir.1990).
11 The existence of probable cause is a common sense standard. Wicks, 995 F.2d at 972. The Supreme Court has stated that probable cause is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. 12 A reviewing court must give great deference to the magistrate's determination of probable cause, United States v. $149,442.43 in United States Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 872 (10th Cir.1992), and we should uphold that conclusion if the totality of the information contained in the affidavit provided a substantial basis for finding there was a fair probability that evidence of criminal activity would be found at the Acapulco Smoke Shop. United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 887 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 437, 121 L.Ed.2d 357 (1992). 13 Janus argues that the only information the magistrate had suggesting that wrongdoing would be found in the Acapulco Smoke Shop was Agent Santelli's bald assertion that he saw drug paraphernalia. Janus claims that this mere conclusion, without specific examples of precisely what Santelli saw, is insufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant. 14 The affidavit in support of the January 21, 1991 search warrant indicates that Agent Santelli reported seeing a variety of items defined as drug paraphernalia under [the Drug Paraphernalia Statute] for sale at 3520 Brighton Boulevard. Although Agent Santelli's description was cast in statutory terms, attachment two of the application for the warrant recites subsection (d) of the statute which describes drug paraphernalia in great detail and provides several examples. 15 Moreover, the affidavit contained additional information providing further indicia supporting the conclusion that drug paraphernalia would be found on the premises. For example, the affidavit provided extensive background information related to the investigation of Rolling Stone Enterprises. It stated that the agents had lawfully searched Rolling Stone Enterprises, had seized drug paraphernalia, and had recovered information suggesting that Acapulco Smoke was a supplier for Rolling Stone and one of the largest distributors in Colorado. The affidavit provided specific examples of the paraphernalia found during the Rolling Stone investigation--indicating that the agents were in fact aware of what constitutes drug paraphernalia--and Agent Santelli stated that the drug paraphernalia he saw at Acapulco Smoke was substantially the same as that identified at Rolling Stone. R.Vol. 4 at 112. Furthermore, Agent Santelli's conclusion that there was drug paraphernalia on the premises was additionally buttressed by Janus's incriminating statement that he was trimming his shelves because the narcos are out. Id. at 114. Finally, the affiant's experience and expertise may also be considered in the magistrate judge's calculus, see Wicks, 995 F.2d at 972, which, in Agent Lembke's case, consisted of four years as a special agent for U.S. Customs, and assignment to lead Operation Pipe in Wyoming and Colorado--a program directed specifically toward the investigation of drug paraphernalia. 16 These facts provide sufficient probable cause to support the magistrate's determination that a fair probability existed that drug paraphernalia was for sale at the Acapulco Smoke Shop. Thus, we affirm the district court's conclusion that probable cause supported the issuance of the search warrant.
17 Janus next asserts that the warrant fails to meet the second part of the Fourth Amendment's requirement. He contends that the language regarding drug paraphernalia was mere boilerplate statutory language, and that the statute's catchall provision is so overbroad as to allow general rummaging through his property. He argues that the agents had no direction on how to tell what items were drug paraphernalia and which were not. Appellants' Br. at 18. 18 The Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant particularly describe the things to be seized prevents a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038-39, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), and  'makes general searches ... impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.'  Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S.Ct. 506, 512, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927)); see also United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir.1988); Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir.1985). The particularity requirement [also] ensures that a search is confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demonstrated probable cause. Id. at 404. We review de novo the legal question of whether a warrant is overbroad. Wicks, 995 F.2d at 973; United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 774 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir.1988). The test applied to the description of the items to be seized is a practical one. Id. A description is sufficiently particular when it enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized. United States v. Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750, 752 (10th Cir.1982). 19 The warrant in this case described drug paraphernalia in terms of subsection (d) of the Drug Paraphernalia Act. Subsection (d), which was reproduced as attachment number two to the warrant, defines drug paraphernalia extensively and includes a thorough list of various types of drug paraphernalia. See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 863(d). Moreover, although subsection (d) does contain a catchall provision which includes among drug paraphernalia any and all other equipment ... primarily intended for or designed for use in ... producing ... ingesting ... or otherwise introducing a controlled substance into the human body, the provision is sufficiently limited by the language primarily intended for and designed for use. Id. 20 We have previously stated that [a] warrant describing 'items to be seized in broad and generic terms may be valid if the description is as specific as circumstances and nature of the activity under investigation permit.'  Wicks, 995 F.2d at 973 (quoting Harris, 903 F.2d at 775). Moreover, where the subject of the search is related to the illegal drug business, we have repeatedly upheld search warrants cast in comparably broad terms. See id. (listing cases).  'When the circumstances of the crime make an exact description of the fruits and instrumentalities a virtual impossibility, the searching officer can only be expected to describe the generic class of items he is seeking.'  United States v. Emmons, 24 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting Harris, 903 F.2d at 775). The type of criminal activity under investigation in the present case--a drug paraphernalia business--makes it difficult to list with great particularity the precise items desired to be seized which evidence such activity. Consequently, we conclude that the warrant in question, although describing the paraphernalia in statutory terms, was sufficiently particular under these circumstances. It was limited to materials related to the use of illegal drugs, and to documents and other items that went to that intended use. The district court therefore correctly denied Janus's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.