Opinion ID: 1301294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The joint employers test

Text: The regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor interpreting the FMLA also elaborate a test for joint employment under the Act. At its core, joint employment encompasses situations where two or more businesses exercise some control over the work or working conditions of the employee. 29 C.F.R. § 825.106(a). In a joint employer relationship the analysis assumes separate legal entities exist but that they have chosen to handle certain aspects of their employer-employee relationships jointly. Schubert v. Bethesda Health Group, Inc., 319 F.Supp.2d 963, 970 (E.D.Mo.2004) (citing NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Penn., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982)). Unlike integrated employers, which are treated as a single legal entity, joint employers may be separate and distinct entities with separate owners, managers, and facilities. 29 C.F.R. § 825.106(a). The regulations describe three employment relationships where joint employment will  generally . . . be considered to exist : (1) Where there is an arrangement between employers to share an employee's services or to interchange employees; (2) Where one employer acts directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer in relation to the employee; or, (3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employee's employment and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, because one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer. 29 C.F.R. § 825.106(a) (emphasis added). The second situation  in which one employer acts in the interest of another  describes the situation in the instant case: Bartech, a staffing agency responsible for providing specialized technical staff, is acting in USCAR's interests by managing Grace and ensuring that USCAR's staffing needs for its IT division are met. Furthermore, the regulations specifically state that  joint employment will ordinarily be found to exist when a temporary or leasing agency supplies employees to a second employer.  29 C.F.R. § 825.106(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the language from the Department of Labor's regulations indicates that Bartech and USCAR are joint employers. The district court agreed, finding that Bartech and USCAR were joint employers under the FMLA: [T]he FMLA regulations state that USCAR qualifies as a secondary employer because it contracted for Plaintiffs services through Bartech. . . . Grace, 2006 WL 2850357 at , 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72311 at -21. Limited case law addressing the issue of joint employment under the FMLA exists. [9] See, e.g., Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942 (9th Cir.2004); Mahoney v. Nokia, 444 F.Supp.2d 1246 (N.D.Fla.2006), aff'd 236 Fed.Appx. 574 (11th Cir.2007). In Moreau, Air France contracted with a number of companies, including an agreement with Dynair to provide ground handling services such as ramp and towing assistance, to service its planes at San Francisco International Airport. 356 F.3d at 948. The plaintiff argued that these relationships constituted joint employment for purposes of FMLA. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument and finding that no joint employment existed, the Ninth Circuit focused on the fact that Air France did not have the authority to `control' any of the workers of the companies providing the services. Id. at 950. Air France did not, for example, have the ability to hire or fire Dynair employees or even to determine the salaries of their employees; instead, Air France merely verified that Dynair's work complied with applicable airline regulations. Id. at 950-51. Conversely, in Mahoney, Nokia hired an employee from Spherion Atlantic Workforce to work at its Florida facility. Spherion managed the plaintiffs benefits and performed all payroll functions for the employees it leased to Nokia; moreover, the plaintiff specifically acknowledged that Spherion was his employer. Mahoney, 444 F.Supp.2d at 1248. However, Nokia also exercised considerable control over the employee: it supervised his day-to-day work, fixed his salary, and determined the number of hours that it needed the employee's services. Id. at 1249. In analyzing the situation as joint employment, the court noted, Nokia does not appear to contest the fact that joint employment existed and that the parties had essentially agreed that a joint employment relationship is assumed by the applicable regulation [29 C.F.R. § 825.106]. Id. at 1254. We believe that the instant case mirrors that in Mahoney. First, as in Mahoney but unlike in Moreau, USCAR and Bartech both exercised significant control over Grace. Bartech performs essentially the same roll as Spherion: it has loaned an employee to a client employer [10] ( i.e. USCAR v. Nokia ) and manages her payroll and benefits. Moreover, Grace specifically acknowledges that Bartech is her employer. JA 47. Also, as in Mahoney, the client employer in the instant case, USCAR, maintained significant control over Grace and did so for eight years, including supervising her day-to-day work and determining her salary and hours. It is undisputed, for example, that Flaherty, USCAR's Executive Director since January 2003, supervised Grace's everyday work responsibilities. See JA 933-34. Consequently, both employers exercise some control over Grace. And second, while both parties contest that they are employers under the FMLA definition, [11] they effectively concede that a joint employment would otherwise exist. See Br. of Defendant (USCAR) at 34 (discussing how it is not a secondary employer because Grace was not an eligible employee); Br. of Defendant (Bartech) at 2-3 (noting that it employed Grace and assigned her to USCAR). Hence, the joint employment definition elaborated by the Department of Labor provides the appropriate standard for analyzing the plaintiffs claims in the instant case.