Opinion ID: 2762420
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Heller

Text: We begin with the Heller Court’s statements about whom the state may constitutionally restrict from possessing firearms. Most significant is the Court’s statement that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. These restrictions, the Court said, amount to “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” Id. at 627 n.26. Moreover, the right recognized in Heller concerns only “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens.” Id. at 635 (emphasis added). Thus, the Heller Court presumed that certain individuals may be “disqualified 6 See, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1146 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bea, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘who’ [of the Second Amendment] remains a sticking point.”); United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The right to bear arms, however venerable, is qualified by what one might call the ‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘where,’ ‘when,’ and ‘why.’ . . . Our issue concerns the ‘who.’”); see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1493–1515 (2009) (“‘Who’ Bans: Bans on Possession by Certain Classes of People”). No. 13-1876 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al. Page 10 from the exercise of Second Amendment rights.” Ibid. (emphasis added). These statements strongly indicate that the Second Amendment right to possess firearms does not extend to all individuals—or, at least, that the state may at times limit that right for certain groups of individuals consistent with the Constitution. Although these statements are dicta and not holding, the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), reiterated its view that the Second Amendment has its limits. According to the Court, Heller “made it clear” that the decision “did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted). The McDonald Court described that caveat as an “assuranc[e]” and “repeat[ed]” it in its decision. Ibid. The Court’s “assurance” that Heller does not cast doubt on prohibitions on the possession of firearms by the mentally ill does not resolve this case. For § 922(g)(4) prohibits firearm possession not just by the mentally ill but by anyone “who has been committed to a mental institution.” That these two categories are not coextensive is made clear by the very fact that the language of § 922(g)(4) expressly refers to two separate groups. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001) (presumption against redundancy). Although it is plausible that the two groups overlap, the point is that we presume they are not identical. Heller’s assurance that the state may prohibit the “mentally ill” from possessing firearms may provide solid constitutional ground for § 922(g)(4)’s restriction as to an individual “adjudicated as a mental defective,” but it is insufficient—by itself—to support the restriction as to individuals who have been involuntarily committed at some time in the past. Therefore, we cannot resolve this case by relying solely on Heller’s “assurances,” as we did in rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to a denial of an expungement motion in a case involving § 922(g)(1)’s bar on possession of firearms by felons. See United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 740–41 (6th Cir. 2010).