Opinion ID: 2048090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Give Self-Defense Instruction.

Text: The defense of self-defense is statutorily denominated as a defense of justification. The defense is codified in Iowa Code section 704.3, which provides: A person is justified in the use of reasonable force when the person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to defend oneself or another from any imminent use of unlawful force. Iowa Code section 704.6 sets forth the circumstances in which the defense is not available. The statute pertinently provides that it is not available to [o]ne who initially provokes the use of force against oneself by one's unlawful acts, unless: a. Such force is grossly disproportionate to the provocation, and is so great that the person reasonably believes that the person is in imminent danger of death or serious injury or b. The person withdraws from physical contact with the other and indicates clearly to the other that the person desires to terminate the conflict but the other continues or resumes the use of force. Iowa Code § 704.6(3). In any prosecution for assault the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in self-defense. State v. Sharkey, 311 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Iowa 1981). Substantial evidence in the record from any source justifies submission of a self-defense instruction. State v. Fisher, 246 N.W.2d 918, 920-21 (Iowa 1976). If there is such substantial evidence, the district court has a duty to give a requested instruction on the defense. See State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 733 (Iowa 1988). Dunson argues that there was substantial evidence that would justify submitting the defense, even though the jury could find that he initially provoked the force used against him. He relies on the two exceptions in section 704.6, which he asserts were supported by substantial evidence. He therefore concludes the district court erroneously refused his requested instruction on the defense. We agree. Brenda Houston, one of the witnesses to the fracas, testified that after Dunson swung his belt at O'Neal, Houston and her son separated the two. At this point, according to the witness, O'Neal went into the bedroom and returned with a glass vase. From there we pick up the action from Houston's testimony: Q. Now, later you said Lucille came out of the bedroom with a vase. A. Right. Q. And I believe at that time you said that she swung at him with that vase that was inside the house. Okay. Did she ever swing at him again with the vase or just once? A. Yes, she swung at him outside on the porch with it. That's when he took it from her. Q. So did she swing at him two times or more than two times? A. I didn't watch the whole incident. It could have been more than twice. I only know of twice, that's what I saw. .... Q. Did you have anopportunity to check Willie over after this occurred to see if he had any cuts orA. No. I didn't check Willie over. I was more concerned with my cousin, Lucille. But I could see, you know, that he had scratches and stuff and slight bleeding on his face. Q. Okay. That you believed to be from scratches from her fingernails. A. Yeah. Q. Well, now ... when would Lucille have had an opportunity to scratch Willie? A. While they were on the porch. Q. Were they close together? A. Yes. Q. And she was scratching or hitting at Willie, and he was hitting at her with the vase? A. Right. Q. So this was, I guess, not just Willie hitting her but it was back and forth between the two of them? A. Right. Under a proper instruction on self-defense, a jury could reasonably find that the force O'Neal used against Dunson was grossly disproportionate to his initial provocation. O'Neal admitted that the blow from the belt just stung and didn't hurt much. In contrast, she attacked Dunson with a glass vase. The jury could also reasonably find from Houston's testimony that after Dunson wrestled the vase from O'Neal, mutual combat broke out. O'Neal was hitting Dunson and scratching at his face while Dunson was striking her with the vase. In these circumstances, the jury could further find that the disproportionate force was so great that Dunson reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of serious injury. As to this latter issue, we agree with the following reasoning in People v. Chatman, 102 Ill.App.3d 692, 698, 58 Ill.Dec. 315, 320, 430 N.E.2d 257, 262 (1981): If some evidence is presented sufficient to raise the issue of self-defense, the State must prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt both as to that issue and each element of aggravated battery. However, if defendant unreasonably believed that the stabbing of the victim was necessary to prevent his own imminent death or great bodily harm, the assertion of self-defense cannot prevail. The trier of fact determines whether the use of force by the accused was based upon a reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily harm in light of his assessment of the situation at the time he used such force against another.... (Citations omitted.) See also State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah 1985) (although defendant had disarmed victim before assault, court found there was enough evidence in record to submit self-defense instruction). In short, under the facts here, it was the jury's and not the court's function to determine whether Dunson acted in self-defense. This case is far different from State v. Campbell, 214 N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1974), a case the district court and the State believe is controlling. Campbell and the victim were witnesses to a fist fight between two motorists. The victim, an off-duty police officer who failed to identify himself as such, pulled his service revolver to restore peace. Campbell and his friend disarmed the victim. Learning that the victim was a police officer, Campbell began beating him with the revolver. We said Campbell was not entitled to a self-defense instruction because there was no issue of it under the evidence. We noted that once the victim had been disarmed, there was no longer any threat of harm to Campbell and, absent that threat, no reason to beat the victim. Id. at 196-97. The critical difference between the two cases is the force used once the victim was disarmed. In Campbell, there uncontrovertedly was no such force. Here there was, and it was for the jury to determine whether the defendant was reasonable in using physical force to prevent further aggression. We also think there was substantial evidence as to the withdrawal exception in section 704.6(3)(b). This exception codifies the rule, recognized in State v. Huemphreus, that even though the defendant may have initially provoked combat, the defendant's right of self-defense will revive, and his or her actions will be held justified upon the ground of self-defense, if the defendant has withdrawn from combat in good faith as far as possible and has clearly announced a desire for peace. 270 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Iowa 1978). Notice of withdrawal may consist of either conduct or words sufficient to furnish reasonable grounds for the adversary to recognize an intention to call off hostilities. Id. at 461. On this point we again refer to Houston's testimony: Q. Now, when you stepped between Willie and Lucilleyou and your boy; is that right? A. Yes. Q. This was after Willie had swung the belt at Lucille? A. Right. Q. You were able to separate the two of them? A. Right. Q. And you were able to move Willie back onto the porch? Is that where he moved to? Or where did he go? A. He was still in the living room but passed the television is off to your left when you come into the door. Q. Did you have any problem separating the two of them? A. Not really. Q. You were able to just step between them and your boy tookA. No, I had to push him back a little bit, yes. But it didn't take a lot of force. Q. You said you're five two? A. I thought I was, but she's taller than me so. Q. Okay. Do you consider yourself a veryreal strong woman, meaning physically strong? A. I can hold my own. Q. Now, if Willie was mad and really wanted to get Lucille, do you think you would have been able to hold him off? A. No. Q. And he, in a sense, went with you when you separatedA. Right. Q. Now, later you said Lucille came out of the bedroom with a vase. A. Yes. From this testimony, we think the jury could have reasonably concluded two things: first, that Dunson was indicating to Lucille his intention to withdraw from further physical contact; and second, that Lucille was having none of that but wanted to continue the fight and get her licks in. Had Dunson wanted to continue, it is apparent from Houston's testimony that the defendant was strong enough to resist Houston's efforts and continue the fighting. Under the facts here, we think Dunson was clearly entitled to an instruction on self-defense. The district court erroneously refused his requested self-defense instruction, requiring reversal of Dunson's conviction.