Opinion ID: 2262565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Gudaz Incident

Text: ¶ 41 The Gudaz incident was similarly divided into four discrete episodes (leaving aside the first time Gudaz saw the white van, when Kintz drove past her as she was jogging on the shoulder). These four episodes are again separated by a break in Kintz's contact with his target; this time, Gudaz. The first episode consists of Kintz's first stop next to Gudaz and his request for directions. It ended at the point Kintz drove away. The second episode includes Kintz's appearance in a driveway near Gudaz; his subsequent pass; his second stop and second request for directions; and his insistence that Gudaz draw him a map on the clipboard that he thrust out the window. It ended when Kintz again drove away, out of Gudaz's sight, leaving her pretty frustrated and pretty scared. VRP (June 28, 2006) at 113. The third episode encompasses Kintz's presence on the side of the road along which Gudaz was jogging; his third stop, when he pulled up next to Gudaz in the oncoming lane and parked within one foot her; his offer of a ride and money; and his continued travel in Gudaz's direction after she started running again. This episode ended when Kintz finally drove away. At this point, Gudaz, who was really scared and a mess, hid between a shed and a fence until she saw two bicyclists picking berries. Id. at 93. The fourth episode consists of Kintz's past, which left Gudaz freaked out. Id. at 95 ¶ 42 In our view, each of these episodes satisfies the statutory definition of following: deliberately maintaining visual or physical proximity to a specific person over a period of time. RCW 9A.46.110(6)(b). Each episode, moreover, was bounded by a break in contact between Kintz and Gudaz. Thus, the jury could reasonably find that together they make up two or more separate occasions of following. The jury could also find that they constitute two or more separate occasions of harassment. Episodes two, three, and four in particular represent courses of conduct directed at a specific person, Gudaz, which seriously alarmed her, served no lawful purpose, are such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and actually caused substantial emotional distress. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals' conclusion that sufficient evidence supported Kintz's conviction on the charge of stalking Gudaz. C ¶ 43 Before concluding, we address some of the arguments made by the dissent. The dissent attempts to show that the stalking statute is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations by claiming that separate occasion[] in RCW 9A.46.110(6)(e) very likely describes an interrelated series of events that comprises a single episode, and that this could just as well describe the totality of Kintz's interactions with Westfall or Gudaz as it could the microevents in the larger scheme of the same incident. Dissent at 483. The problem with this argument is that what the dissent refers to as the microevents that make up the two counts of stalking in this case, i.e., the episodes delineated in part B, are only interrelated to the extent that they involve the same victim, the same intent, and similar conduct; specifically, following and harassment. Of course, they must be interrelated in these ways, by definition, if they are to satisfy RCW 9A.46.110. The statute in question describes a crime made up of constituent partstwo or more occasionsthat are separate in one sense but necessarily related in others. The so-called microevents in this case are `[s]eparate,' meaning `kept apart,' ... `detached,' `isolated,' dissent at 483 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2069 (2002)), in one crucial respect: they are divided one from the other by periods of time in which Kintz was out of contact with his victims; periods that the dissent is very reluctant to acknowledge. Only by overlooking these can it be said that Kintz's interactions were not set or kept apart. Id. at 484. If these separate events can be said to comprise a single episode, it is because they comprise a single episode of stalking. ¶ 44 The dissent also says that the legislature has left courts rudderless by not defining separate occasions in RCW 9A.46.110(6)(e). Id. at 483. Clearly, the rudder the dissent has in mind is some measurement of time that must transpire between the first and second occasions of following or harassment. [12] Thus, the dissent accuses us of artificially deconstructing the events in [a] single pattern to create multiple patterns, and elsewhere of cleav[ing] a single course of conduct into multiple courses of conduct. Id. at 484. No artifice was necessary because the breaks in contact appear in the record. The dissent is simply unsatisfied with the length of those breaks and persists in its view that the totality of Kintz's contacts with Westfall or Gudaz constituted but a single occasion. The jury saw things differently. The dissent suggests that any breaks in contact here were too short as a matter of law, but never tells us where the line should be drawn; a line, we emphasize, that the legislature never drew. Our reading of RCW 9A.46.110 simply leaves it to a jury to determine whether such instances of following and harassment, divided by such breaks, were separate within the meaning of the stalking statute. ¶ 45 The dissent asserts that what it regards as our drastic broadening of the definition of follows has imprudent policy ramifications because it criminalizes situations in which breaks in contact have resulted in less contact between a stalker and his victims than there would have been had the stalker hovered closely around them without interruption. Id. at 487. In that case, there would be only one occasion of following, and [h]e would not be guilty of stalking. But because Kintz briefly lost visual contact and had to regain immediate proximity to the womenin effect having less contact with the individuals over the course of conductunder the majority's reasoning he is guilty of stalking. Id. The dissent's claim that [t]his makes no sense assumes that uninterrupted following is more criminal than following that is broken off and later resumed, i.e., repeated; but it is repetition, not duration, that the legislature has made the sine qua non of stalking: A person commits the crime of stalking if ... [h]e ... intentionally and repeatedly harasses or repeatedly follows another person; ... RCW 9A.46.110(1)(a) (emphasis added). ¶ 46 This is perfectly sensible because the repetition of contacts alerts the victim (and the trier of fact) to the stalker's criminal intent, i.e., that he is purposefully targeting the victim, as opposed to coming into contact with her by chance. Indeed, the record here reflects that Kintz's repeated contacts engendered progressively greater fear on the part of Westfall and Gudaz because, with each encounter, it became more apparent that the contacts were not accidental and innocent, but intentional and malevolent. Westfall became frightened when Kintz first followed her family in his van after trying to get her attention in the parking lot, but became very scared and angry when he repeated that conduct. VRP (June 28, 2006) at 221. Similarly, Gudaz was unconcerned the first time Kintz drove past her, but became a little bit nervous when he returned to ask for directions. She felt pretty scared when he came back again to have her draw him a map, grew really scared when it became clear that it was she and not directions to the freeway that he was afterneed a ride?and ultimately felt freaked out. Id. at 85, 113, 93, 91, 95. ¶ 47 Finally, in the service of its argument that no rational jury could have found the elements of stalking beyond a reasonable doubt, the dissent downplays the threatening nature of the contacts in this case. The dissent says that Kintz's conduct simply fell outside the norm. Dissent at 487. We disagree. Kintz's conduct was not just abnormal, it was threatening. Indeed, Westfall was frightened enough to look for a rock or brick with which to defend her family, and Gudaz at one point considered jumping in the lake to get away from Kintz. The dissent, nevertheless, equates Kintz's behavior to an ill-considered pickup line or getting into an argument with a customer in a coffee shop. Id. at 485. The dissent says that we are criminalizing commonplace interactions with the result that many Washingtonians will find themselves guilty of stalking in their everyday lives. Id. at 485. The dissent's minimization of the threatening nature of Kintz's behavior is belied by the defense's own expert witness, a clinical psychologist, who answered yes when asked if women reasonably fear harm or injury when stalked in the manner described in these police reports. VRP (July 3, 2006) at 405.