Opinion ID: 2338798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the trial court err in denying the post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal?

Text: [¶ 43] After trial, Ms. Benjamin filed a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 29(c), asserting that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she did not act in self-defense. The district court denied the motion, and Ms. Benjamin challenges that decision. She claims that the State failed to prove that she did not act in self-defense because it presented no evidence of Ms. Benjamin's state of mind at the time of the shooting. [¶ 44] Motions for judgment of acquittal should be granted when it may be said as a matter of law that there is no evidence of guilt whatsoever in the record or where there is no substantial evidence from which reasonable [jurors] may say that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Chavez v. State, 601 P.2d 166, 170 (Wyo. 1979). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in the context of a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we examine and accept as true the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard applies whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial. Najera v. State, 2009 WY 105, ¶ 5, 214 P.3d 990, 992 (Wyo. 2009), quoting Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 (Wyo. 2007) (citations omitted). [¶ 45] Ms. Benjamin correctly points out that the State had the burden of disproving her claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Olson v. State, 960 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Wyo. 1998). Consistent with this precedent, the district court properly instructed the jury that Before [Ms. Benjamin] may be convicted of any crime, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Ms. Benjamin] did not act in self-defense. The jury was also instructed: If [Ms. Benjamin] believed that she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, and that deadly force was necessary to repel such danger, and if a reasonable person in a similar situation seeing and knowing the same facts would be justified in believing that she was in similar danger, [then Ms. Benjamin] would be justified in using deadly force in self-defense. [¶ 46] Our review of the record confirms Ms. Benjamin's claim that the State presented no direct evidence of her state of mind at the time of the shooting. The only direct evidence of that was her own testimony that she feared Mr. Benjamin was going to hurt her, and that she acted to prevent that. We have previously observed, however, that in all cases, civil or criminal, turning upon the state of an individual's mind, direct evidence may be rare; usually the trier of facts is required to draw inferences of the state of mind at issue from surrounding acts, utterances, writings, or other indicia. MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830, 843 (Wyo. 1980) (emphasis omitted), quoting Widener v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 75 Cal.App.3d 415, 435, 142 Cal.Rptr. 304, 314 (1977), overruled on other grounds by McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal.3d 835, 846 n. 9, 231 Cal.Rptr. 518, 525 n. 9, 727 P.2d 711, 719 n. 9 (1986). The State claims that there was sufficient evidence of the surrounding facts and circumstances to allow a reasonable jury to draw the inference that Ms. Benjamin did not act in self-defense. We keep in mind, as we evaluate this claim, that we accept as true the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant. Najera, ¶ 5, 214 P.3d at 992. [¶ 47] The evidence viewed in this way was sufficient to disprove that Ms. Benjamin acted in self-defense. The prosecution presented evidence that Ms. Benjamin had been extremely angry and upset about the pending divorce from Mr. Benjamin and about his relationship with another woman. It presented evidence suggesting that Ms. Benjamin pressured Mr. Benjaminlured him, as the State put itto come to her home to pick up their daughter, even though Ms. Benjamin knew that the daughter was not there. A little more than an hour after Mr. Benjamin arrived, Ms. Benjamin shot him three times. Some of her testimony about the incident was inconsistent with the physical evidence. [¶ 48] In particular, as discussed above, she testified that she shot Mr. Benjamin when he grabbed the gun and tried to turn it on her. However, there was no gunpowder residue on Mr. Benjamin or his clothing, indicating that he had been shot from a distance of at least several feet. There was evidence that Ms. Benjamin had been the aggressor in past confrontations with Mr. Benjamin, and testimony that she was not afraid of him. Finally, we note that Ms. Benjamin delayed reporting the shooting for approximately sixteen hours. [¶ 49] This provided sufficient evidence for a jury to make reasonable inferences about Ms. Benjamin's state of mind. It provided an adequate basis for the jury to reject Ms. Benjamin's testimony that she believed she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm at the time of the shooting. The district court did not err in denying Ms. Benjamin's motion for a judgment of acquittal.