Opinion ID: 1427135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to quash information for lack of probable cause.

Text: (14a) Defendant filed a pretrial motion under section 995 to set aside the information on grounds that the preliminary hearing had failed to establish probable cause. He challenges the court's refusal to strike on this ground the charge and special circumstance of kidnaping. (15) Illegalities in pretrial commitment proceedings, other than those which are jurisdictional in the fundamental sense, are not reversible error per se on an appeal from the subsequent trial. Rather, defendant [must] show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary examination. ( People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [165 Cal. Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941].) (16) Defendant suggests that a failure of evidence at the preliminary hearing is a jurisdictional defect. Such, of course, is not the case; were it so, the jurisdictional exception would swallow the rule. Prior to Pompa-Ortiz, People v. Elliot (1960) 54 Cal.2d 498 [6 Cal. Rptr. 753, 354 P.2d 225] had established that all material errors in pretrial commitment proceedings were jurisdictional, since they meant defendant had been illegally committed. In overruling Elliot, Pompa-Ortiz rejected the prior case's uncritical use of the term `jurisdiction' in the context of matters correctible by pretrial writ, rather than to mean legal power to hear and determine a cause. Under Pompa-Ortiz, only an absence of this latter kind of jurisdiction can furnish grounds for reversal per se after a fair trial. (27 Cal.3d at pp. 528-529.) An evidentiary deficiency at the preliminary hearing does not meet that standard. The statutes have long provided that lack of probable cause at the preliminary hearing is waived for all purposes if not timely pursued prior to trial. (§§ 995, 996, 999a; Elliot, supra, at p. 505.) It follows that a failure of probable cause is not an unwaivable jurisdictional defect in the commitment which warrants reversal, or a quashing of the information, even though defendant's trial was fair. [14] (14b) Defendant claims he was prejudiced at trial by the superior court's failure to strike the kidnaping charge for lack of probable cause. At the preliminary hearing, jail inmate Ricky Rodriguez provided the only direct evidence on the kidnaping charge; his description of alleged conversations with defendant suggested that Robin had not been kept in defendant's car by force or fear. The People urged to the magistrate that no proof of force or fear was necessary to show kidnaping. The magistrate demurred, correctly citing People v. Stephenson, supra, 10 Cal.3d 652, and People v. Camden, supra, 16 Cal.3d 808, but still bound defendant over on kidnaping charges. At trial, the People produced inmates Robert Dove and Herrera, who testified that defendant admitted keeping Robin in his car forcibly. Defendant urges that the People thus misled the magistrate, then improperly changed the facts at trial to fit the law. However, the People are not bound at trial by the factual theories, evidence, or testimony adduced at the preliminary hearing. (But cf., Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 [26 L.Ed.2d 387, 396-397, 90 S.Ct. 1999]; Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 588 [150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916] [general value of preliminary hearing as defense discovery tool].) Defendant does not claim he was surprised at trial by the use of Dove and Herrera rather than Rodriguez, or by their different testimony. If error occurred on the section 995 motion, we can find no prejudice.