Opinion ID: 1843760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the public purpose doctrine

Text: Chaney also argues that the public purpose doctrine prohibits the legislature from authorizing the expenditure of public funds for the basic education of students to private schools without adequate supervision and controls. Therefore, Chaney concludes that the MPCP violates the public purpose doctrine because the program lacks adequate supervision and controls. [17] Although the public purpose doctrine is not an express provision of the Wisconsin Constitution, this court has long held that public expenditures may be made only for public purposes. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d at 211. In Reuter, stated, [w]e need not go into the origin or the validity of the doctrine which commands that public funds can only be used for public purposes. The doctrine is beyond contention. Id. [18] In considering questions of public purpose, a legislative determination of public purpose should be given great weight because `the hierarchy of community values is best determined by the will of the electorate' and that `legislative decisions are more representative of popular opinion because individuals have greater access to their legislative representatives.' State ex rel. Bowman v. Barczak, 34 Wis. 2d 57, 65, 148 N.W.2d 683 (1967) (citations omitted). Without clear evidence of unconstitutionality, the court cannot further weigh the adequacy of the need or the wisdom of the method chosen by the legislature to satisfy the public purpose. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 414, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973). No party disputes that education constitutes a valid public purpose, nor that private schools may be employed to further that purpose. Rather, the parties dispute whether the private schools participating in the MPCP are under proper government control and supervision, as required by Wisconsin Indus. Sch. for Girls v. Clark Co., 103 Wis. 651, 668, 79 N.W. 422 (1899). Chaney and, particularly, Superintendent Grover contend the controls in the MPCP over participating private schools are woefully inadequate and insist that these schools be subject to the stricter requirements of sec. 121.02, Stats. MPCP advocates, on the other hand, believe the statutory controls applicable to private schools coupled with parental involvement suffice to ensure the public purpose is met. The circuit court agreed with the MPCP advocates' contention, as we do. [19] The present situation is similar to that faced by this court in Reuter. In Reuter, we upheld an appropriation of public funds to the Marquette School of Medicine for the purpose of providing quality medical education. Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d at 207. To test the propriety of expending public monies to a private institution for public purpose, this court must determine whether the private institution is under reasonable regulations for control and accountability to secure public interests. Id. at 215-16. Only such control and accountability as is reasonably necessary under the circumstances to attach the public purpose is required. Id. at 216. Chaney attempts to distinguish the present situation from Reuter in two main ways. First, Chaney argues that private schools participating in the MPCP may do whatever they want with the public money that they receive, whereas the funds in Reuter were earmarked for medical education, teaching and research. Chaney is facially correct in that no express limitations exist on the use of the funds paid to private schools through the MPCP. However, the private schools must still provide their students with an education. It simply does not matter how the school spends the money so long as it gives the participating student an education that complies with sec. 118.165, Stats., in return for the money. Public schools face a similar situation. While the use of certain state aid to school districts is limited under sec. 121.007, Stats., the public schools must continue to provide a basic education to its students regardless of how and to what extent its programs and investments are funded. Second, Chaney argues that private schools participating in the MPCP have no duty to demonstrate any institutional quality, whereas Marquette University was accredited by an independent national organization as well as federal and state agencies. See Reuter, 44 Wis. 2d at 217. In effect, Chaney is challenging the quality of education provided by the private schools participating in the program. The MPCP specifically allows participating students to attend a nonsectarian private school. See sec. 119.23(2)(a), Stats. Private school has an express statutory definition under sec. 115.001(3r), Stats., which requires the institution to meet all of the criteria under secs. 118.165(1) or 118.167, Stats. Under sec. 118.165, Stats., a private school must: (1) be organized to primarily provide private or religious-based education; (2) be privately controlled; (3) provide at least 875 hours of instruction each school year; (4) provide a sequentially progressive curriculum of fundamental instructions in reading, language arts, mathematics, social studies, science, and health; (5) not be operated or instituted for the purpose of avoiding or circumventing compulsory school attendance; and (6) have pupils return home not less than two months of each year unless the institution is also licensed as a child welfare agency. Even though private schools are not subject to the same amount of controls which are applicable to public schools, they are subject to a significant amount of regulation which is geared toward providing a sequentially progressive curriculum. This issue is uniquely complicated, however, by the underlying thesis of the MPCP that less bureaucracy coupled with parental choice improves educational quality. [20] Keenly aware of this potential problem, the legislature included within the MPCP sufficient supervision and control measures. The State Superintendent is required to annually report to the legislature comparing the students participating in the MPCP with students in the MPS. The report includes data on academic achievement, daily attendance, percentage of dropouts, and percentage of pupils suspended and expelled. The State Superintendent is authorized to conduct financial and performance audits on the program, and the Legislative Audit Bureau is mandated to perform financial and performance evaluation. We believe that these detailed reports and evaluations in conjunction with the private school requirements under secs. 118.165(1) and 118.167, Stats., provide sufficient and reasonable control under the circumstances to attain the public purpose to which this legislation is directed. [21] Control is also fashioned within the MPCP in the form of parental choice. Parents generally know their children better than anyone. The program allows participating parents to choose a school with an environment that matches their child's personality, with a curriculum that matches their child's interest and needs, and with a location that is convenient. If the private school does not meet the parents' expectations, the parents may remove the child from the school and go elsewhere. In this way, parental choice preserves accountability for the best interests of the children. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the United States Supreme Court also recognized the importance and the strong tradition of parental choice in education. Using a balancing of interests test, the Yoder Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the state from compelling Amish parents to cause their children to attend formal high school to age sixteen. Id. at 234. In so deciding, it stated: Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility . . . yield[s] to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. Id. at 213. Yoder involved the protection of the Religion Clauses, whereas the present case involves purely secular considerations. However, the Yoder Court declared that purely secular considerations may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education. Id. at 215 (emphasis added). We have determined in this case that the reporting and private school requirements applicable to the MPCP provide sufficient and reasonable state control under the circumstances. [22] Further, the cost of education and the funds available for education are dependent upon the taxpayers' ability to fund an intensive public educational program. The amount of money allocated to a private school participating in the MPCP to educate a participating student is less than 40 percent of the full cost of educating that same student in the MPS. Each of the participating private schools is willing to accept the responsibility of educating a child for the $2,500 granted by the state. [23] In contrast, it costs the MPS an average of $6,451 to educate each student. [24] At most, $2.5 million of public funds will be appropriated to fund this experimental legislation. This amount is inconsequential compared to the more than $6.4 billion that is annually expended for public education in Wisconsin. [25] The amount of money to fund the MPCP represents only about four one-hundredths of one percent (.04 percent) of the public money allocated for public education throughout the state. Therefore, we hold that the MPCP does not violate the public purpose doctrine because the MPCP contains sufficient and reasonable controls to attain its public purpose. We conclude that the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program passes constitutional scrutiny in all issues presented before this court. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. LOUIS J. CECI, J. (concurring). Let's give choice a chance! Literally thousands of school children in the Milwaukee public school system have been doomed because of those in government who insist upon maintaining the status quo. The sacred cow of status quo has led to the terrible problems that manifest themselves as described in the majority opinion. The Wisconsin legislature, attuned and attentive to the appalling and seemingly insurmountable problems confronting socioeconomically deprived children, has attempted to throw a life preserver to those Milwaukee children caught in the cruel riptide of a school system floundering upon the shoals of poverty, status-quo thinking, and despair. The dissent by Justice Bablitch attempts to paint a difference in that the schools that these deprived children would attend under this experimental program would be the recipients of the state's largesse. Dissenting opinion at 569. IMAGINE THAT! If the expenditure of a mere $2,500.00 per child to teach the deprived children of the poor of the city of Milwaukee islargesse what foolishness are we engaged in when the taxpayers are spending approximately $5,000.00 for each of these same children in a failing public school system? The reason why the legislature adopted the classification of private schools specifically located in the city of Milwaukee is that the Milwaukee public school system evidently is viewed by the legislature as a failure despite the dedicated labors of its hundreds of teachers and administrators. Perhaps this experimental program will point the way for improvements that can be utilized throughout the public schools of this state. As recently as December 11, 1991, Dr. Howard Fuller, Superintendent of the Milwaukee Public Schools, addressing some of the awesome problems of the school system, stated in a television interview that he was unwilling to let things be as they were. In other words, the status quo must go. While not addressing the school choice program, he was attempting to address the problems that exist. More recently, the mayor of the city of Milwaukee has given his public voice of approval to the school choice program. The dissent opts for maintaining the status quo. Justice Bablitch obviously does not now trust the legislative process he claims to know so well. His dissent is replete with anecdotal statements not a part of this record, and it is improper that such purported information, known to him alone, be used. Unfortunately, the dissent does not want to attempt to give choice a chance. On February 22, 1989, less than two years ago, the dissent in Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 531, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989), stated: The fashioning of a constitutional system of public education is not only the legislature's constitutional prerogative, it is far better equipped than any court to do it. I am not unaware of the terrible political complexities involved in fashioning such legislation, but I have full confidence in the legislature's ability to resolve it.