Opinion ID: 45968
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Humphrey is entitled to qualified immunity

Text: 55 Humphrey argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity because the FMLA was not clearly established at the time Modica's employment was terminated. Specifically, she argues that it was not clear whether the TCC was subject to the FMLA because it employs fewer than fifty employees. We are not persuaded. 56 As noted above, 29 C.F.R. § 825.108(d) provides: 57 All public agencies are covered by FMLA regardless of the number of employees; they are not subject to the coverage threshold of 50 employees carried on the payroll each day for 20 or more weeks in a year. However, employees of public agencies must meet all of the requirements of eligibility, including the requirement that the employer (e.g., State) employ 50 employees at the worksite or within 75 miles. 58 Humphrey's lack of knowledge that public agencies are subject to the FMLA regardless of the number of employees does not mean the law was not clearly established. See Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 831 ([I]t is well-settled that a public agency does not have to meet the 50 employee requirement to be considered an employer under the statute.). Thus, we agree with the district court that it was clearly established that public agencies were subject to the FMLA regardless of the number of employees when Humphrey terminated Modica's employment. Nevertheless, this does not end our inquiry. 59 Humphrey asserts that the rights and protections defined by the FMLA were not clearly established in 2003, therefore she should not be subject to personal liability for her decision to discharge Modica. But Humphrey does not argue that she is entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that she, as an employee of a public agency, is potentially liable as an employer to Modica for retaliation against her for exercising rights under the FMLA. Despite her failure to make this specific argument, we conclude that her qualified immunity assertion is not waived for two reasons. First, although Humphrey failed to develop an explicit legal argument on this ground, she raised the qualified immunity defense in response to Modica's FMLA claim; therefore, it was Modica's burden to prove that the law was clearly established. Atteberry, 430 F.3d at 253; cf. Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 797-98 (7th Cir.1993) (stating that where the defendants raised a qualified immunity defense with regard to the entirety of the [plaintiff]'s First Amendment claim, [t]he failure of the defendants to make a supporting argument regarding the state of the law on freedom of association should not result in waiver of the defendants' claim to qualified immunity on that issue). Second, in her motion for summary judgment, relying on Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 533, and Wascura, 169 F.3d 683, Humphrey asserted that Modica had not shown that the law was not clearly established that public officials could be liable in their individual capacities under the FMLA. Accordingly we consider whether Modica has shown that Humphrey's actions were objectively unreasonable in light clearly established law; we conclude that she has not. 60 As evidenced by the discussion above, individual public employee liability is a subject of much debate among the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 832; Wascura, 169 F.3d at 687; Darby, 287 F.3d at 681. Although today we join those courts that hold that public employees are subject to individual liability under the FMLA, in the absence of a prior ruling by the Supreme Court, this court, or a consensus among our sister circuits, we cannot say that the law was clearly established in 2003 when these events giving rise to Modica's allegations occurred. Cf. McClendon, 305 F.3d at 331-32 ([W]hile a number of our sister circuits had accepted some version of the state-created danger theory as of July of 1993, given the inconsistencies and uncertainties within this alleged consensus of authorities, an officer acting within the jurisdiction of this court could not possibly have assessed whether his or her conduct violated this right in the absence of explicit guidance from this court or the Supreme Court.). Therefore, Humphrey is entitled to qualified immunity against Modica's FMLA claim because it was not clearly established that public employees are subject to individual liability under the FMLA when Humphrey terminated Modica's employment, and the district court erred in failing to grant Humphrey's motion for summary judgment on this ground.