Opinion ID: 883736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the charging document provide a sufficient basis for a conviction of the offense of sexual assault?

Text: Black asserts that the information charging him with the offense of sexual intercourse without consent did not provide him with notice sufficient to enable him to prepare his defense to the uncharged offense of sexual assault. His argument is not persuasive. Section 46-11-401, MCA, sets forth the requirements which must be contained in the charging document. Here, the information charging Black with sexual intercourse without consent meets the statutory requirements; Black does not contend otherwise. He argues that he could not be convicted of the offense of sexual assault because that charge was not specifically included in the information and, as a result, he did not have sufficient notice of the possibility of a conviction of that offense. As discussed above, § 46-16-607(1), MCA, unambiguously and expressly authorizes a defendant's conviction of an offense included in the charged offense. The statute itself provides the notice that a conviction for a lesser included offense is possible. Because we assume for purposes of this case that sexual assault is a lesser included offense of sexual intercourse without consent, Black had notice via the information and § 46-16-607(1), MCA, that he could be convicted of the lesser included offense. While we have not previously addressed the precise issue of notice vis-a-vis § 46-16-607(1), MCA, the California Supreme Court did so succinctly in People v. Lohbauer (Cal. 1981), 173 Cal. Rptr. 453, 627 P.2d 183. There, the California court determined that the requisite notice is afforded where an offense is necessarily included within the statutory definition of the charged offense and a conviction of the included offense is statutorily authorized. Lohbauer, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 454, 627 P.2d at 184. Nor do the Montana cases on which Black relies support his position. State v. Kills on Top (1990), 243 Mont. 56, 71, 793 P.2d 1273, 1283, State v. Matson (1987), 227 Mont. 36, 43, 736 P.2d 971, 975, and State v. Longneck (1981), 196 Mont. 151, 154, 640 P.2d 436, 438, all state the general rules regarding the necessity of reasonably apprising the accused of the charges against him in the information so that a person of common understanding would know what offense is being charged. None of those cases involved the issue now before us regarding notice of lesser included offenses vis-a-vis § 46-16-607(1), MCA. Black also advances arguments, as he did in challenging the District Court's authority to convict him of the lesser included offense, premised on cases involving a trial court's jury instructions on lesser included offenses. Here too, as above, those cases are inapplicable to this case which was tried to the District Court sitting without a jury. Finally, Black argues that the main case on point is State v. Copenhaver (1907), 35 Mont. 342, 89 P. 61. He urges that our statements in Copenhaver, 89 P. at 62, that the defendant was charged with one crime and convicted of another. The judgment must therefore be reversed ... are equally applicable here. His reliance on Copenhaver is misplaced. In Copenhaver, the defendant was charged with burglary in the nighttime or, as defined by statute, burglary in the first degree; he was convicted of burglary in the daytime, or burglary in the second degree. We reversed on appeal, concluding that burglary in the nighttime clearly did not include burglary in the daytime. Copenhaver, 89 P. at 62. Thus, unlike the present case, Copenhaver did not involve a conviction of a lesser included offense; it involved a conviction of a separate, independent offense which was not a lesser included offense. Indeed, we specifically noted in Copenhaver that § 2147 of the Penal Code  a predecessor to § 46-16-607(1), MCA  would have authorized a conviction for an offense included in the charged offense. Copenhaver, 89 P. at 62. The information charged Black with sexual intercourse without consent. For purposes of this case, we assume that sexual assault is a lesser included offense of sexual intercourse without consent. Section 46-16-607(1), MCA, expressly authorizes a conviction for an offense included in the charged offense. For these reasons, we conclude that the charging document provided a sufficient basis for Black's conviction of the offense of sexual assault.