Opinion ID: 2616183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Must actions be filed in a reasonable time?

Text: While we answer this question in the affirmative, we wish to note at the outset that, with respect to this question and the two which follow, we are providing our answers in a legislative vacuum. The legislature is at liberty to answer all three questions in other ways, if it finds it appropriate to do so. In the absence of legislation, however, we are required to provide some judicial framework until the legislature provides a statutory one. In OEA v. Roberts, 301 Or. 228, 235, 721 P.2d 833 (1986), this court ruled that the Secretary of State has a duty, under Oregon Constitution, Article IV, section 1(2)(d), to examine proposed ballot measures for compliance with the one subject only rule and to refuse to accept or approve those that violate the rule. The duties of the Secretary of State with respect to ballot measures involve a series of decisions. State ex rel. Fidanque v. Paulus, supra, 297 Or. at 716 n. 5, 688 P.2d 1303; see also OEA v. Roberts, supra, 301 Or. at 232-35, 721 P.2d 833. Although, as noted, it was a mandamus action, we find the Fidanque analysis of this problem helpful. We therefore deal with that case at some length. We described the procedural history of the ballot measure in Fidanque this way: On September 28, 1983, a prospective petition that eventually became Ballot Measure Number 8 was filed with the Secretary of State's office. That office sent copies of the signature pages to Multnomah, Clackamas and Washington Counties for verification. [ORS 250.045(1).] The counties verified the signatures and returned them to the Secretary of State and on October 6, 1983, she sent two copies of the prospective petition to the Attorney General's office for preparation of a ballot title. On October 20, 1983, the Attorney General certified and returned to the Secretary of State a ballot title. ORS 250.065(3). On October 21, 1983, the Secretary of State issued a press release describing the proposed initiative. The ballot title was appealed to this court on November 9, 1983, and on January 24, 1984, this court certified a modified ballot title. Wells v. Paulus, 296 Or. 338, 675 P.2d 482 (1984). On July 20, 1984, the Secretary of State, after verifying that sufficient signatures had been collected, assigned Ballot Measure Number 8 to the initiative petition. On August 8, 1984, plaintiff-relators filed an application and petition for writ of mandamus in this court. 297 Or. at 713, 688 P.2d 1303 (footnote omitted). The first issue this court faced in Fidanque was: Assuming that the Secretary of State has a duty to consider whether a proposed initiative violates the one subject only rule of Oregon Constitution, Article IV, section 1(2)(d)an issue we would not answer affirmatively until the later case of OEA v. Roberts, supra when does that duty commence? Again, we quote from our opinion in Fidanque at length: Plaintiff-Relators argue that the Secretary of State breached her duty on July 20, 1984[,] when she certified the petition and assigned to it a ballot measure number. However, in light of the statutes and existing caselaw, we hold that if the Plaintiff-Relators' allegation that a duty was created is correct, that duty would have been breached when the prospective petition was approved under ORS 250.065(2) and was sent to the Attorney General for a ballot title.4 It is this determination that provides the first opportunity for the Secretary of State to exercise her official power with respect to the prospective petition. If    there is a constitutional duty to act, it would arise at this time. It is in approving a prospective petition which did not comply with the    requirements of Article IV, section 1, that the Secretary of State's authority under the constitution and statutes first would be exceeded and her duty breached. [Footnote omitted.] 4 The Secretary of State may refer questions to the Attorney General under ORS 180.060(2) upon any question of law upon which the State of Oregon may have an interest, or subsection (5) of ORS 180.060 wherein `the Attorney General shall, when requested, perform all legal services for the State or any department or officer of the State.' Thus, the Secretary of State could refer the question whether a proposed law `embraced one subject only and matters properly connected therewith' to the Attorney General at the time that the prospective petition was filed with the Secretary of State's office and forwarded to the Attorney General for preparation of a ballot title pursuant to ORS 250.065. In Holmes v. Appling, 237 Or. 546, 554-55, 392 P.2d 636 (1964), this court addressed the issue of when the duty of the Secretary of State to determine his constitutional authority arose. In Appling, Plaintiff-Relators were attempting to force the Secretary of State to furnish a ballot title for a proposed law. The Secretary of State refused to furnish the ballot title `because he had been advised by the Attorney General that the petition proposed a new constitution or a revised constitution and that the initiative power reserved to the people to amend the constitution does not permit the submission to the people of a revised or new constitution and that he was acting upon such advice.' Id., at 548, 392 P.2d 396. In essence, the Appling court said that the Secretary of State had the initial duty to determine if the constitution allowed the action being taken by the Plaintiff-Relators stating: `[T]he defendant [Secretary of State] necessarily was required to determine whether our laws granted him authority to pursue the course which the plaintiffs requested.' Id., at 554, 392 P.2d 396. Thus, it would be at the approval stage of the prospective petition that the Secretary of State has the duty to determine if the requested action was constitutional. 297 Or. at 715-16, 392 P.2d 396. (Emphasis in original). This court also stated: One can visualize a time line in the submission procedure involved in the initiative process. No initiative petition may be circulated without the approval of the Secretary of State and the issuance of a ballot title. ORS 250.045(1), ORS 250.065(2), (3) and (4). Approval by the Secretary of State is conditioned not only upon verification of the required number of sponsor signatures, but also upon determination that the use of the initiative power in each case is authorized by the Constitution. Holmes v. Appling, supra . Once this initial determination is made, that decision is then reviewable by the courts. It is at this point that the process of submitting initiated measures to the people begins. If the Secretary of State has made an error in determining the extent of her constitutional authority, the clock for timeliness of review begins ticking at this initial step. The next step is issuance of the ballot title. This is the second discrete step in the submission process. That decision is also reviewable by the court and any challenge must be made within 20 days or the right to challenge is lost.    The third discrete step in the submission process is the verification of signatures and certification of the measure for ballot. Again, but not until the action is taken by the Secretary of State, the process is open for court review of the action taken. State ex rel Sajo v. Paulus, 297 Or 646, 688 P2d 367 (1984). Therefore, in the submission process, a series of decisions must be made. As each decision is made, it becomes susceptible to challenge. 297 Or. at 715-16 n. 5, 392 P.2d 396. After the foregoing discussion in Fidanque, this court turned to a consideration of the effect a late challenge to a ballot measure would have on the initiative process. We first noted that, if eleventh-hour challenges were entertained,    the organizers and proponents of    [a] measure    [will have] in essence wasted their time, energy and money to obtain sufficient signatures to be certified for placement on the ballot. 297 Or. at 718 n 6, 668 P.2d 1303. We further said, Besides being prejudicial to    the petition circulators,    delay puts an unreasonable burden on the court. The matter could have been litigated in the circuit court with ample time for the narrowing and clarification of issues through the normal judicial process.   To wait until the last moment places the court in a position of having to steamroll through the delicate legal issues in order to meet the deadline for measures to be placed on the ballot. In light of the great value ascribed to the exercise of the initiative power by the people, by the Oregon Constitution, and the courts and the substantially negative impact that rushed, last minute reviews would have on the exercise of the initiative power, this court has been and should be very wary of last minute challenges. 297 Or. at 718, 688 P.2d 1303. Our remarks were made in the context of a mandamus proceeding in Fidanque, but they have an equal place here. The present measure was first filed with the Secretary of State on April 30, 1985. Petitions were approved for circulation on August 16, 1985over 13 months ago. On July 16 of this year11 months after circulation of petitions beganthe Secretary of State certified Ballot Measure 11 for the November ballot. On July 24, these plaintiffs made written demand on the Secretary of State that she remove Ballot Measure 11. The present action was commenced on July 31, 1986. The trial court hearing that led to the judgment under consideration here occurred 22 days later. The rest of the hurried history of this case has already been chronicled. One thing is clear: An eleventh-hour action in the trial court leaves no more time for the narrowing and clarification of issues through the normal judicial process than did the eleventh-hour petition for writ of mandamus in Fidanque. If these actions are not brought within a reasonable time after they first could have been brought, meaningful judicial review will be difficult, if not impossible. We hold that actions like the present one must be brought within a reasonable time. We adopt this statement from Fidanque:    [R]eview under the `single subject only' language of Article IV, section 1(2)(d)    must be commenced within a reasonable time after approval by the Secretary of State and the submission to the Attorney General for a ballot title. This will allow participants in the initiative process to rely on the finality of such determinations so far as the attempts to collect signatures are concerned and at the same time provide potential challengers of the proposed measure adequate time to bring suit. 297 Or. at 718, 688 P.2d 1303.