Opinion ID: 2448503
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rice waived his right to a further hearing on the issue of his alleged accounting misconduct.

Text: Rice argues that the Hearing Committee improperly truncated [his] evidentiary hearing on [August 3, 2009] by receiving evidence only from the Bar but not from Rice[ ]thus denying Rice his `day in court,' and his opportunity to be heard. The Bar contends that the Committee did not deny Rice a hearing; rather, Rice elected to not testify or present any further defense, agreeing by his silence with the conclusion in the Bar's status report that further hearings were unnecessary. Under Alaska Bar Rule 22, a responding attorney is entitled to a hearing on disciplinary allegations and is generally not required to request the opportunity to examine witnesses or present evidence. The exchanges between Rice's attorney and the Hearing Committee chair at the August 3 hearing tended to suggest that a follow-up hearing would occur: Rice's attorney said, I do think that it's inevitable that we're going to need at least some time [with] all of us together again in a live hearing, so that I can put on my defense. The Hearing Committee chair replied: You have the right to put on a live witness, present your defense. We will never deny you that. At the same time, the Hearing Committee made it clear that Rice and the Bar were to report back later that month, after reviewing the late-produced discovery and gathering additional evidence, so that the Hearing Committee could determine whether further hearings were necessary. On August 31 the Bar submitted a status report indicating that it was resting its case: the report claimed that the evidence in the record already proves the violations charged in the petition for formal hearing and concluded, the Bar does not intend to further examine Rice ... [or] to call any other witnesses or introduce any evidence beyond what is submitted and discussed with this report. The Bar does not request any further hearings and withdraws all previous requests for hearings. By declining to request a hearing and arguing that the Hearing Committee could reach a decision without additional evidence, the Bar's status report put Rice on notice that he would need to request a hearing if he wanted one. But Rice did not do so. Nor did he file his own status report in the month before the Hearing Committee issued its findings and conclusions, or otherwise respond to the Bar's claim that the evidence in the record was sufficient to prove its case against him. If the failure to verify whether Rice wanted to continue the hearing before the Hearing Committee issued its recommendations did constitute a due process violation, Rice waived any due process claim by neglecting to raise it until midway through his appeal to the Disciplinary Board. The Hearing Committee issued its findings and conclusions and requested briefing on sanctions on October 2, clearly indicating that it had made its decision and did not plan to hold another hearing. Rice did not file an objection to the issuance of the decision. The Bar filed a sanctions brief; Rice did not respond. After the Hearing Committee issued its recommendation on sanctions at the end of October 2009, Rice filed a motion for reconsideration of the sanctions recommendation. This motion did not raise the due process issue. The motion was denied and Rice appealed to the Disciplinary Board. His opening brief before the Disciplinary Board did not raise a due process argument. In fact Rice did not, at any of these stages, even hint at due process concerns arising out of the Hearing Committee proceedings. His due process claims appeared for the first time in his opposition brief to the Disciplinary Board, filed on January 8, 2010. Because that briefing schedule called for simultaneously filed opposition briefs, Rice's due process argument was first raised at a time when the Bar had no opportunity to respond. We conclude that raising due process claims at this late stage, after the Bar had filed its final brief to the Disciplinary Board, was not sufficient to preserve Rice's due process argument. [11] Rice's attorney acknowledged to the Disciplinary Board that due process was a new issue, first raised in his opposition brief. But he argues that the due process argument was not waived because the Hearing Committee's actions constituted plain error. [12] We acknowledge it would have simplified matters if the Hearing Committee had issued explicit notice that unless Rice requested a hearing, it would go forward and consider the merits of the Bar's position. But we hold that the Hearing Committee's instructions were adequate. Further, the Disciplinary Board allowed Rice to submit any additional evidentiary support or testimony he wished to have considered. Any due process violation at the Hearing Committee level was waivedand rendered harmless by the additional due process offered by the Board.