Opinion ID: 6496707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Deborah Jackson

Text: In addition, Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that counsel was deficient for failing to properly prepare Deborah Jackson to testify at trial and for failing to bring out testimony that would have ameliorated the effect of impeachment evidence. We disagree. At the evidentiary hearing, Deborah Jackson testified that counsel spent only 15 minutes with her in preparation for her trial testimony. In Jackson’s view, that amount of time was simply too short to meaningfully prepare her. However, Jackson has - 19 - marshalled no case showing that 15 minutes of trial preparation necessarily falls below objective standards of reasonable performance in all circumstances. And, based on our review of the record, we conclude that Jackson has not demonstrated that the advice given was unreasonable under Strickland. For one thing, Deborah Jackson’s trial testimony involved telling the jury a straightforward account as to Jackson’s whereabouts during the relevant time frame. For another, Jackson does not identify what additional testimony she could have given if counsel had simply spent more time with her or given her more thorough advice. Jackson also cannot demonstrate error in the court’s rejection of his subclaim pertaining to counsel’s not bringing out ameliorating circumstances surrounding Deborah Jackson’s badcheck conviction. That conviction was used to impeach her during trial. At the evidentiary hearing, Deborah Jackson testified that the conviction resulted from conduct occurring over 15 years before the trial. She also indicated that she wrote the bad check during a difficult time in her life and did so without any fraudulent intent. We agree with the circuit court that Jackson failed to show deficient performance or prejudice. Though Jackson is likely - 20 - correct that defense counsel could have brought out some circumstances that he deems ameliorating, the State properly notes that it would have been able on recross-examination to emphasize the elements of the crime—including the mens rea of “intentional dishonesty.” Cf. Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 373 (Fla. 2014) (noting that prosecutor may refute “false impression” witness gives about conviction (citing Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So. 2d 784, 791 (Fla.1992))); Rogers v. State, 964 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (discussing circumstances when prosecutor may bring out details about crime). Thus, if counsel had done what Jackson claims should have been done, the jury would likely have heard not only ameliorating circumstances but also additional evidence undermining her credibility. In light of the strong possibility that the State would have brought out additional evidence damaging her credibility, Jackson cannot show that “no competent counsel” would have refrained from eliciting the ameliorating evidence under the circumstances of this case. See Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289, 1324 (11th Cir. 2009). Thus, Jackson is not entitled to relief as to this claim. - 21 -