Opinion ID: 844288
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excusals based on views concerning the death penalty

Text: (6) Defendant contends the trial court erred by excusing Prospective Juror O.A. due to her expressed views concerning the death penalty, thereby violating his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The high court has established the legal standard for excusing jurors due to their views on the death penalty, first in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770], and then in Wainwright v. Witt [, supra , ] 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844]. In Witt, the Supreme Court explained that a prospective juror may be excused in a capital case if `the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Id. at p. 424.) We apply the same standard under the state Constitution. ( People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 192 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496].) `There is no requirement that a prospective juror's bias against the death penalty be proven with unmistakable clarity. [Citations.] Rather, it is sufficient that the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case before the juror.' [Citation.] `Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The trial court must determine whether the prospective juror will be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case. [Citation.] A juror will often give conflicting or confusing answers regarding his or her impartiality or capacity to serve, and the trial court must weigh the juror's responses in deciding whether to remove the juror for cause. The trial court's resolution of these factual matters is binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] [W]here equivocal or conflicting responses are elicited regarding a prospective juror's ability to impose the death penalty, the trial court's determination as to his true state of mind is binding on an appellate court.' ( People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 192-193.) In her questionnaire, when she was asked to describe her opinions about the death penalty, O.A. wrote: I could not agree on a death penalty. I could agree with life in prison. She indicated she felt the death penalty was imposed Too often, that it served no purpose, and there was no type of case in which she thought it ought to be imposed. She indicated she would automatically refuse to vote for the death penalty and that she would automatically always vote for life in prison without the possibility of parole. Her answers during individual voir dire were less certain than those expressed in her questionnaire, but nonetheless expressed at least a distinct predisposition to favor life over death. In response to the trial court's question whether or not she could consider both penalties, she responded: No, I don't think that I can. When the trial court immediately followed this answer by inquiring if she was predisposed to one penalty, O.A. stated: Yes. [¶] ... [¶] Life imprisonment. In response to further questioning by the trial court, however, O.A. indicated she thought she would probably follow the court's instructions. In response to the trial court's question whether, after she had heard all the evidence, arguments, and court's instructions she concluded death was the appropriate penalty, she would vote for death, she stated: Probably. I think so, yes. O.A. then explained, I think [the] reason I am hedging more is because I feel thatI would have a difficult time doing it, but I would follow the court's instruction. After the trial court again asked if you felt that [death] would be the appropriate penalty, despite it being difficult and despite maybe you not liking it, you would vote [for] the death penalty, is that true, ma'am? O.A. responded, Yes. [¶] ... [¶] That's true. After a few additional questions from the prosecutor and the trial court, O.A. explained that, based on her personal beliefs, which derived in part from religion, she believed the death penalty was not right and that therefore she could not make the decision to impose death. Defense counsel did not ask O.A. any questions. The prosecutor challenged O.A. for cause, defense counsel submitted the matter without argument, and the trial court excused her. In light of O.A.'s answers to the jury questionnaire, as well as her equivocal answers on voir dire, we defer to the trial court's implicit determination regarding her state of mind and conclude substantial evidence supports the court's ruling the juror's views on the death penalty would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as a juror in accordance with [her] instructions and [her] oath.' ( Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424; see People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 779 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211, 187 P.3d 1041].) Defendant next contends the trial court applied disparate standards in evaluating pro-life Prospective Juror O.A. and pro-death Prospective Juror B.S., claiming B.S. testified unequivocally that he believed the death penalty should be `automatically' imposed on anyone who intentionally killed another person. This unequal treatment, defendant claims, violated his rights to a fair and impartial jury and to due process. Defendant's characterization of B.S.'s view on automatic imposition of the death penalty is misleading. B.S. indicated that despite his religious belief in an eye for an eye, he could set aside that belief and follow the law and the court's instructions. O.A. did not make such a clear statement. Further, unlike O.A., B.S. indicated without equivocation that he could consider and impose both penalties. In light of the clear differences in the expressed views of these two prospective jurors on their ability to impose the death penalty, we reject defendant's claim that the trial court applied disparate standards in evaluating their answers.