Opinion ID: 508416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: directed verdicts in the companion case

Text: 54 The district court directed verdicts for all of the defendant real estate boards in the 1973 case at the close of plaintiff's evidence. Plaintiff appeals three of these verdicts, those in favor of the Greater Boston, Eastern Middlesex, and Quincy/South Shore Boards of Realtors. 55 Wells filed its complaint against these boards on June 19, 1973. The four-year statute of limitations prescribed by 15 U.S.C. Sec. 15 limits Wells to damages sustained after June 19, 1969. Wells' sole office from 1969 onward was located in Billerica, within the provinces of the Greater Lowell Board. Wells did have offices in the Greater Boston and Eastern Middlesex areas prior to 1969, but closed them down permanently before the period applicable to this litigation. A wholly separate, though related, corporation, Wells Real Estate Of Braintree, Inc., operated an office within the jurisdiction of the Quincy/South Shore Board in the mid-sixties. It too was shut down before 1969. Mr. Livadas claims to have closed at least some of these branch offices because of the futility of competing with the allegedly illegal MLSs of the local boards. Wells sold a handful of houses in the Greater Boston and Eastern Middlesex areas after 1969, but the overwhelming preponderance of its business was concentrated in the Greater Lowell area. 56 We wholeheartedly agree with the trial court's dismissal of the claims against these defendants for the reasons articulated by the court. There was no evidence of a group boycott by the three boards against Wells. While it may have been futile for Wells to request access to the MLSs in those areas without agreeing to join the boards, Wells never asked for such access under any conditions. Indeed, there was some evidence that Mr. Livadas did not desire access to the MLSs--he merely wished to eliminate them. Appellant never complained to defendants, either formally or informally, about the conditions, rules, or practices attendant to the MLSs. No occasion existed for the defendants to have boycotted Wells. 57 The only evidence of conspiracy to monopolize seems to have been the boards' membership in the state and national associations. The district court correctly noted that this is not, in and of itself, sufficient to establish an illegal conspiracy to monopolize. See Federal Prescription Service, Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 265 (D.C.Cir.1981). Unlike in the case of the 1972 defendants, there was no evidence admitted concerning commission splits, fixed commission rates, etc. The jury could not reasonably have found a conspiracy to monopolize on the basis of the scanty evidence in the record regarding these defendants. Nor could the jury have found an improper tying arrangement, for the reasons discussed in Section III, supra. 58 Neither was there any dispositive evidence regarding what Wells' damages might have been as a result of the alleged boycott and conspiracy. The jury may have been able to decide that without the MLSs, Wells might have cornered a greater share of the markets in the three areas in question, but the district court properly found that specific damages would have been completely speculative. Although a private antitrust litigant is not required to prove the amount of its damages with mathematical certainty ..., this guiding principle does not shift the burden of proof and ... it is proper to indulge private antitrust plaintiffs only to the extent that there is evidence on the record from which a trier of fact could make a 'just and reasonable inference' regarding the amount of damages. If the plaintiff's proffered evidence permits no more than 'pure speculation and guesswork,' then the damage evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. Home Placement Service, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 819 F.2d 1199, 1205 (1st Cir.1987) (citations omitted) (quoting Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 780 F.2d 1049, 1062 (1st Cir.1985) (in turn quoting Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264, 66 S.Ct. 574, 579, 90 L.Ed. 652 (1946)). 59 The jury in this case had only Mr. Livadas' testimony that he might have continued to expand his business in those areas but for the growth of the MLSs. Wells made almost no attempt to retain any sort of market share in the areas in question. Even were we to assume that there was sufficient evidence of boycott and/or conspiracy, there is no way to draw any connection between those activities and Wells' injuries without pure speculation and guesswork.Finally, even if boycott and monopoly had been established by the plaintiff, there is no reason to think that the jury would have decided any differently in the 1973 case than it did in the 1972 case with regard to effect on interstate commerce. In fact, less evidence was presented regarding the scope of these defendants' activities.