Opinion ID: 2570436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The superior court properly analyzed the appropriate factors for good cause deviation from ICWA adoptive preferences.

Text: C.L. and C.L. also claim that the superior court improperly analyzed the relevant factors in finding good cause to deviate from ICWA's preferences for adoption by family or tribal members. [17] The grandparents make two separate arguments: (i) that the superior court placed inordinate weight on J.G.'s bond with P.S., ignoring other relevant factors that favored adoption by the grandparents; and (ii) that the BIA guidelines set forth the only factors that the superior court should have considered. These arguments will be discussed in turn. First, the grandparents argue that the superior court placed inordinate weight on one factor, and failed to consider other factors that heavily favored the grandparents as adoptive parents. C.L. and C.L. note that the superior court heavily relied on a factor that favors P.S.specifically, the strong bond that has developed between P.S. and J.G. [18] The grandparents then claim that the superior court should have considered other factorsfactors that together outweigh the already existing bond between J.G. and P.S. Specifically, the grandparents claim that the superior court failed to recognize: (i) the need to raise the sisters together, in one household; (ii) DFYS's failure to consider the grandparents when searching for potential adoptive parents; (iii) the grandparents' particular ability to meet J.G.'s cultural needs as a Native child; and (iv) the fact that J.G. had no extraordinary physical or emotional needs that could only be met by her bond with P.S. However, the superior court did consider these factors, and concluded that, combined with the other factors, the weight of the evidence favored adoption by P.S. The superior court explicitly considered the desirability of keeping the sisters together; however, the court concluded that, because the sisters have not bonded with the same care giver, this consideration is outweighed by other factors. [19] And the grandparents were considered as potential adoptive parents by both the superior court and by social workers involved in the case. Also, the court considered the cultural needs of J.G. and concluded that P.S. has demonstrated a capacity to expose J.G. to Native culture, and that C.L. and C.L. will continue to play a role as grandparents in J.G.'s cultural exposure. Lastly, the court certainly considered the bond between J.G. and P.S. and its relationship to J.G.'s emotional and physical needs. [20] The four factors cited by the grandparents were fully considered by the superior court, and we cannot say that the court's analysis of these factors was an abuse of discretion. C.L. and C.L. separately argue that the only factors that the superior court should have considered are the factors listed in the Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines: (i) The request of the biological parents or the child when the child is of sufficient age. (ii) The extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child as established by testimony of a qualified expert witness. (iii) The unavailability of suitable families for placement after a diligent search has been completed for families meeting the preference criteria. [21] The grandparents cite a decision of the Montana Supreme Court, In re C.H., [22] in which that court considered whether there was good cause, in an adoption proceeding, to deviate from ICWA placement preferences. The court in C.H. held that, when ICWA applies, the three BIA factors exclusively control and that a court may not consider any other factors: The [BIA] guidelines provide that a determination of good cause to avoid the preferences shall be based on one or more of three stated factors.... [We agree] that, in light of the plain language used in the guidelines, the three expressly stated [BIA] factors cannot be interpreted as merely illustrative of the circumstances which may constitute good cause. Rather, they are the only circumstances constituting good cause to avoid the [25 U.S.C.] § 1915(a) adoptive placement preferences. We conclude the District Court erred in determining that the factors set forth in the guidelines and the BIA's related commentary are merely examples, and not an exhaustive listing, of circumstances which constitute good cause. [23] The court treated the bond between the child and the prospective adoptive parents as only relevant if it rose to the level of an extraordinary emotional need, under the second BIA guideline. [24] And the court in C.H. held that it was also improper to consider separately the best interests of the child because, under ICWA, it is presumed that the child's best interests are met by adherence to ICWA and the exclusive BIA guidelines. [25] However, we have rejected the rationale underlying the Montana Supreme Court's decision in C.H. We do not agree that the BIA factors are exclusively controlling. In In re Adoption of F.H., [26] we stated that the BIA Guidelines do not have binding effect, although a court may look to them for guidance. [27] Whether there is good cause to deviate in a particular case depends on many factors including, but not limited to, the BIA guidelines. [28] We recognize that child adoption proceedings are highly context-sensitive, and that different adoption cases will vary factually. As we have stated previously, the best interests of the child must be paramount in these proceedings. [29] Therefore, the superior court did not err by relying on a broad range of factors, including the BIA guidelines, and by primarily stressing J.G.'s best interests. [30]