Opinion ID: 1702189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the aggravating factors elevating a charge to a capital offense must be included in the indictment.

Text: ¶ 57. This is one of several cases before the Court raising this same issue. Two articles have been helpful: Janice L. Kopec, Ring v. Arizona 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002) Allen v. United States 122 S.Ct. 2653 (2002) , 15 Cap. Def. J. 143 (2002), and Simon Cantarero, Who Makes the Call on Capital Punishment? How Ring v. Arizona Clarifies the Apprendi Rule and the Implications on Capital Sentencing, 17 BYU J. Pub.L. 323 (2003). ¶ 58. The indictment issued against Berry alleged in part: [That Earl Berry] ... willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and without the authority of law kill and murder Mary Bounds, a human being, while engaged in the commission of the crime of kidnaping of Mary Bounds by forcibly seizing and confining Mary Bounds, without lawful authority, with the intent to cause her to be secretly confined or imprisoned against her will, in violation of Section 97-3-19(2)(e) of the Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated, as amended ... indicted as an habitual criminal as under Section 99-19-81 ... He claims that there can be no dispute that the indictment lacks allegations of aggravating circumstances. [5] But the indictment did present the aggravating circumstances on which the State intended to rely on and satisfied the additional state notice requirement in capital matters. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-20 (2000). Despite this, we will analyze the issue assuming Berry's interpretation of the indictment. ¶ 59. The decisions in Ring and Apprendi did not address state indictments, and Jones was based on a federal criminal statute and the Fifth Amendment, which is not applicable to the states. Berry argues that his indictment was unconstitutional because it failed to include and specify the aggravating factors used to sentence him to death. For support, he relies on Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Because Ring is an intervening decision, this issue avoids the procedural bar. ¶ 60. In Jones, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the federal carjacking statute provided for three distinct offenses or a single crime with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of which were dependent on sentencing factors exempt from the requirements of charge and jury verdict. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229, 119 S.Ct. 1215. Finding that it provided for three distinct offenses with differing punishments based on the degree of violence employed or physical harm inflicted, the Court held that the aggravating factors necessary to trigger the escalating penalties fell within the province of the jury. Id. at 251-52, 119 S.Ct. 1215. Succinctly, the Court stated: [U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (emphasis added). ¶ 61. In Apprendi, the defendant was arrested after he fired several shots into the New Jersey home of an African-American family. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Subsequently, he was indicted on numerous state charges, including second-degree possession of a firearm. Id. He then was convicted of, inter alia, second-degree possession of a firearm, an offense carrying a maximum penalty of ten years. On the prosecutor's motion, the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime had been motivated by racial animus. As such, it triggered the state hate crime enhancement resulting in the judge sentencing the defendant to twelve years, two years over the maximum but for the enhancement. Id. ¶ 62. On certiorari, Apprendi argued, inter alia, that due process required that the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Relying in part on Jones, the Supreme Court agreed, stating: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. ¶ 63. Relevant to the instant appeal, the Apprendi Court noted, Apprendi has not here asserted a constitutional claim based on the omission of any reference to sentence enhancement or racial bias in the indictment.... We thus do not address the indictment question separately today. Id. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348. ¶ 64. Finally, in Ring v. Arizona , the Supreme Court considered whether the Arizona capital sentencing regime was still constitutional following its holding from Apprendi. Arizona law provided that after the defendant was convicted by a jury, the trial judge was required to conduct a hearing and make the final determination by a preponderance of evidence as to the presence of aggravating factors required for the imposition of the death penalty. Ring, 536 U.S. at 587, 122 S.Ct. 2428. [6] Finding it unconstitutional, the Court stated: [W]e overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. See 497 U.S. at 647-649, 110 S.Ct. at 3047. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.    The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.... If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth Amendment applies to both. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (citation omitted). ¶ 65. The practical function of the Ring decision was only to clarify the fact that in the functional equivalent doctrine, there was no distinction in capital matters and that under the Sixth Amendment any fact that is such must be found by a jury. ¶ 66. In the instant appeal, Berry argues that, because the Ring relied in part on the reasoning from Jones, which was subsequently relied on in Apprendi, states are now obligated to comply with its holding with the indictment requirement. We disagree for two reasons, which the Ring Court conveniently noted in footnote number four of the majority opinion. In it, the Supreme Court stated: Ring's claim is tightly delineated: He contends only that the Sixth Amendment required jury findings on the aggravating circumstances asserted against him.... Finally, Ring does not contend that his indictment was constitutionally defective. See Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 477, n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ( Fourteenth Amendment has not ... been construed to include the Fifth Amendment right to `presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury '). Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (emphasis added). ¶ 67. First, like Apprendi, the Ring Court specifically noted that its opinion did not address the constitutionality of the indictment; and therefore, it never spoke to whether states are required provide such charges in their indictments. ¶ 68. Second, Berry's argument requires reading together the decisions from Jones, Apprendi , and Ring. However, Apprendi and Ring were based on the guarantees contained in the Sixth Amendment. Jones addressed a federal statute and was based on, in addition to the Sixth Amendment's notice and jury trial guarantees, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, which does not apply to the states. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884). Thus, Berry's argument is without merit. ¶ 69. The State cites the same reasons why we should reject Berry's argument. In addition, the State argues that even if the Apprendi and Ring cases were applicable, they could not be applied retroactively. Because Berry's argument is without merit, analysis of potential retroactivity is omitted.