Opinion ID: 752071
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court's Exercise of Supplemental Jurisdiction

Text: 43 The Marcus appellants next contend that, even if the district court properly denied their motion to remand, the district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over their remaining state law claims. We disagree. 44 We review the decision of the district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for an abuse of discretion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Bleiler v. Cristwood Constr., Inc., 72 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir.1995). In reviewing such a decision to retain jurisdiction we consider factors such as judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1191 (2d Cir.1996). In general, where the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well. See Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir.1994); Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 843 F.2d 658, 664-65 (2d Cir.1988). Dismissal of the pendant state law claims is not, however, absolutely mandatory even where the federal claims have been dismissed before trial, and [o]ne factor that may sometimes favor retaining pendant jurisdiction is when a state claim is closely tied to questions of federal policy and where the federal doctrine of preemption may be implicated. Id. at 665. Because the remaining state law claims implicate the doctrine of preemption, we cannot say that the district court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in this case was an abuse of its discretion. We turn, therefore, to an examination of whether the remaining causes of actions were properly dismissed. 45