Opinion ID: 2595061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: As an initial matter, the State claims the Court of Appeals erred when it did not allow the State to challenge the trial court's findings of fact notwithstanding the State's failure to cross-appeal or to assign error to the challenged factual findings. The rules on appeal provide: A party seeking cross review must file a notice of appeal or a notice for discretionary review within the time allowed (RAP 5.1(d)); If a respondent is also seeking review, the brief of respondent must state the assignments of error and the issues pertaining to those assignments of error presented for review by respondent and include argument of those issues (RAP 10.3(b)); and A separate assignment of error for each finding of fact a party contends was improperly made must be included with reference to the finding by number (RAP 10.3(g)). The prevailing party need not, however, cross-appeal a trial court ruling if it seeks no further affirmative relief. It may argue any ground to support a court's order which is supported by record. McGowan v. State, 148 Wash.2d 278, 60 P.3d 67 (2002). Here the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting denial of Mr. Kindsvogel's motion to dismiss. In response to Kindsvogel's appeal the State claimed factual mistake, [1] but neither filed a notice of cross-appeal nor assigned error to the findings. Because the State did not seek affirmative relief, it was not required to file a notice of appeal. However the State failed to provide a separate assignment of error for each finding of fact it sought the Court of Appeals to review. It was therefore not error to refuse consideration of the State's factual challenges. Nevertheless, the State is not prejudiced by this oversight because its arguments in support of the trial court's order were not predicated on its factual challenges. [2] Moreover the facts were stipulated by the parties. Kindsvogel, 110 Wash.App. at 753, 43 P.3d 73; Clerk's Papers at 17, 25-54. On the merits CrR 3.3 grants a defendant out of custody the right to be brought to trial within 90 days of the arraignment, within 60 days if incarcerated. Failure to comply with the rule requires dismissal. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 130 Wash.2d 35, 48, 921 P.2d 1052 (1996). Where multiple charges stem from the same criminal conduct, the time for trial period begins on the date the defendant was held to answer on the first of these charges. State v. Peterson, 90 Wash.2d 423, 431, 585 P.2d 66 (1978). Two or more offenses must be joined if they are related. CrR 4.3.1. The purpose of the Peterson rule is to prevent: prosecutors from harassing a defendant by bringing successive charges over a long span of time even though all charges stem from the same criminal episode. When multiple charges stem from the same criminal conduct or criminal episode, the State must prosecute all related charges within the speedy trial time limits. State v. Lee, 132 Wash.2d 498, 503, 939 P.2d 1223 (1997) (quoting Harris, 130 Wash.2d at 43-44, 921 P.2d 1052). The ABA defines related offenses for the purpose of the defendant's right to a speedy trial as offenses based upon the same conduct, upon a single criminal episode, or upon a common plan. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice std. 13-1.2, at 13-9 (2d ed.1980). However, Lee holds only offenses based upon the same conduct or conduct involving a single criminal incident or episode are related offenses. 132 Wash.2d at 502, 503, 939 P.2d 1223. Merely because some of the allegedly criminal activity was the same [or forms a common scheme] is not enough to conclude all the offenses are based on the same conduct. Id. at 505, 939 P.2d 1223. Lee cited with approval the commentary to ABA Standards for Criminal Justice std. 13-1.2. Lee, 132 Wash.2d at 504 n. 2, 939 P.2d 1223. The commentary defines same conduct as offenses based on the same physical act or actions. It describes a hypothetical defendant shooting a single bullet that injures more than one person as the easy case that neatly falls within the definition of same conduct. As the less certain case the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice std. 13-1.2 commentary cites People v. Knox, 38 N.Y.2d 865, 346 N.E.2d 250, 382 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1976), in which an officer summoned to a domestic dispute placed the defendant under arrest for harassment and as he tried to restrain defendant, the latter slammed the officer's hand against a faucet in the kitchen sink. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, supra, at 13-9. The distinction between these examples seems to lie with the close logical and temporal proximity of the events. This case is not close. Fourth degree assault and possession of marijuana do not involve the same physical acts or actions. The actions underlying the two charges had different purposes and did not involve the same victim or victims. The alleged assault, which gave rise to Kindsvogel's conviction for disorderly conduct, involved actions directed at Ms. Kindsvogel for the purpose of harming her or putting her in apprehension of harm. The possession charge involved the custody or control of 26 marijuana plants for its own sakeno victim was involved. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice std. 13-1.2 commentary limits the acts that constitute a single criminal episode to offenses which occur in close proximity of time and place, where proof of one offense necessarily involves proof of the other. Id. at 13-10. To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance the State must prove the nature of the substance and the fact of the defendant's possession. RCW 69.50.401(d); State v. Staley, 123 Wash.2d 794, 798, 872 P.2d 502 (1994). To prove fourth degree assault the State must prove, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first, second, or third degree, or custodial assault, the defendant assaulted another. RCW 9A.36.041(1). Three definitions of criminal assault are recognized in Washington: (1) an attempt, with unlawful force, to inflict bodily injury on another person; (2) an unlawful touching of another with criminal intent; and (3) putting another in apprehension of harm, with or without the intent or capacity to inflict the harm. State v. Walden, 67 Wash.App. 891, 893-94, 841 P.2d 81 (1992). Because there are no overlapping elements in the crimes for which Kindsvogel was charged, the acts underlying the assault and possession charges do not constitute a single criminal episode. The trial court properly rejected Kindsvogel's motion to dismiss because the two convictions were not subject to a mandatory joinder and the State's subsequent prosecution of Kindsvogel for possession of marijuana did not therefore violate CrR 3.3. The Court of Appeals is reversed, and Kindsvogel's conviction for possession of marijuana is affirmed. WE CONCUR: ALEXANDER, C.J., and JOHNSON, MADSEN, IRELAND, BRIDGE, CHAMBERS, OWENS and FAIRHURST, JJ.