Opinion ID: 786183
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statute Clearly Proscribes Perez's Outrageous Behavior

Text: 31 The Due Process Clause requires that laws be crafted with sufficient clarity to `give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited' and to `provide explicit standards for those who apply them.' Gen. Media Communications, 131 F.3d at 286 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) (explaining that the due process doctrine of vagueness.... incorporates notions of fair notice or warning [and] requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent `arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement'). We have clearly held, however, that a statute or regulation is not required to specify every prohibited act. See Rock of Ages Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, 170 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.1999) ([R]egulations need not achieve `meticulous specificity' and may instead embody `flexibility and reasonable breadth.' (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294)). Limitations inherent in the English language often prevent the drafting of statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159-60, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe. 5 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). 32 The evaluation of whether section 4022.13 is vague as applied to Perez must be made with respect to Perez's actual conduct and not with respect to hypothetical situations at the periphery of the [regulation's] scope or with respect to the conduct of other parties who might not be forewarned by the broad language. diLeo v. Greenfield, 541 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that statute that permitted termination of teachers for due and sufficient cause was not vague as applied); see also United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.2003) ( in banc ) (explaining that as-applied vagueness challenges involve examination of the specific facts of the case at hand) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, although the prohibition against any action detrimental to the best interests of racing is admittedly flexible, and officials implementing this standard will undoubtedly exercise some discretion in interpreting and applying the regulation, our primary focus must be on whether the specific conduct at issue in this case falls with sufficient clarity within the ambit of the regulation. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.); Allen v. City of Greensboro, N.C., 452 F.2d 489, 491 (4th Cir.1971) (While the argument that the regulation prohibiting conduct `unbecoming an officer and a gentleman' is so vague as to provide no guidance to police officers in ascertaining the proper standard of conduct may well be valid under other circumstances, the argument is without merit where the plaintiff admitted making improper advances toward a young woman during an official investigation.). 33 In evaluating Perez's vagueness claim, we must consider the context in which the regulation was enforced, i.e., we must evaluate Perez's underlying conduct by reference to the norms of the racing community. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 754, 94 S.Ct. 2547 (finding military's conduct unbecoming provision was not void for vagueness and noting that further content may be supplied to areas of uncertainty in the provision by less formalized custom and usage); Rock of Ages, 170 F.3d at 156 ([R]egulations satisfy due process as long as a reasonably prudent person, familiar with the conditions the regulations are meant to address and the objectives the regulations are meant to achieve, has fair warning of what the regulations require.) (emphasis added); San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1137 (3d Cir.) (finding that professor's as-applied vagueness challenge to regulation requiring that professors engage in sound scholarship and competent teaching failed because he knew that his conduct violated the mores of the academic community), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908, 113 S.Ct. 305, 121 L.Ed.2d 228 (1992); Finucan v. Maryland Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance, 380 Md. 577, 846 A.2d 377, 386-87 (Md.2004) (A statute prohibiting unprofessional conduct or immoral conduct, therefore, is not per se unconstitutionally vague; the term refers to conduct which breaches the rules or ethical code of a profession, or conduct which is unbecoming a member in good standing of a profession.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cranston v. City of Richmond, 40 Cal.3d 755, 221 Cal.Rptr. 779, 710 P.2d 845, 851 (1985) (rejecting vagueness challenge to conduct unbecoming statute) ([W]here the language of a statute fails to provide an objective standard by which conduct can be judged, the required specificity may nonetheless be provided by the common knowledge and understanding of members of the particular vocation or profession to which the standard applies.). 34 We believe that there could be no misunderstanding by a veteran of the horse-racing industry like Perez — indeed, by any reasonable person — that banging on tables, repeatedly shouting obscenities and threatening to choke a racing official at an official Stewards' meeting would impede the Stewards' efforts to investigate Perez's very serious allegations — that Lakow was fixing races by manipulating race entries — and, thus, constitute conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing generally. See Hadges v. Corbisiero, 739 F.Supp. 792, 793 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an experienced horseman and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited); cf. LeRoy v. Illinois Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir.1994) (observing that although regulation prohibiting improper language and improper conduct might be seriously deficient as a norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs, the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131, 115 S.Ct. 2555, 132 L.Ed.2d 809 (1995). Although Perez attempts to cast his misconduct as merely the use of inappropriate language or some sort of mild decorum violation, the record does not support his characterization of events. 6 Each of the Stewards testified that Perez's conduct was so disruptive that the meeting had to be adjourned. In light of Perez's outrageous behavior, which effectively precluded investigation of his very serious charges against Lakow, we have little difficulty finding, as the District Court and the Racing Board did, that Perez's actions, taken together, qualify as conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing generally. 35 In addition, although section 4022.13 could be read to apply to a wide range of conduct (that is not at issue in this case) and despite the fact that the Stewards are invested with broad discretion under the regulation, we do not believe that these features provide a basis for a vagueness finding under the facts of this case. Section 4022.13 and the other regulations that outline the Stewards' authority do channel the discretion of the Stewards. See Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 143. Those regulations provide the Stewards with general oversight of all aspects of the race meetings at which they preside but they also provide more specific authority including, e.g., reviewing any complaints against officials, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4022.7 (2000), supervising race entries, id. § 4022.10, and regulating the conduct of officials, owners, trainers, jockeys, grooms and other horsemen, id. § 4022.11. Here, Perez made serious allegations against Lakow that, if true, implicated one of the Stewards' core concerns: the integrity of the races being run at the meeting. Perez's disruptive conduct prevented the Stewards from investigating those weighty charges and their decision to fine him for his behavior does not represent an abuse of the discretion afforded the Stewards under the regulations. 7 36