Opinion ID: 2162037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: law enforcement privilege

Text: Appellant clearly cannot prevail in his quest to depose Mr. Andary or to discover law enforcement records pertaining to the ongoing investigation against him. The law enforcement privilege is a qualified privilege recognized at common law that is designed to protect ongoing investigations from premature disclosure, disruption, and compromise. Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 564 F.2d 531 (D.C.1977). The purpose of the privilege is to protect the confidentiality of sources as well as law enforcement strategies and accumulated evidence. The privilege is a conditional one that must be asserted with particularity by a high official of the law enforcement agency who is both authorized to assert the privilege on behalf of the agency and who is in a position to know that the privilege is necessary. In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268 (D.C.Cir.1988). The assertion of the privilege must be formal and delineated. The party claiming the privilege must have [1] seen and considered the contents of the documents and [2] himself formed the view that on grounds of public interest, they ought not be produced, [3] state with specificity the rationale of the claimed privilege [namely, 3(a)] specifying which documents or class of documents are privileged and [3(b)] for what reasons. Sealed Case, supra, 856 F.2d at 271; Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., et. al., 738 F.2d 1336, 1342 (D.C.Cir.1984). Here, the trial judge recognized that the privilege was properly asserted by the F.C.C. in a formal document captioned Declaration and Formal Assertion of Privileges of Gary L. Stanford. [8] Mr. Stanford identified himself as the Associate Bureau Chief of the WTB, F.C.C., Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. He asserted that he was a high ranking official of the F.C.C. bureau that was responsible for, and undertook the investigation into the alleged violations by appellant of certain F.C.C. licensing regulations. Moreover, Mr. Stanford averred that he had familiarized himself with the investigation, the ancillary court proceedings, and the various legal privileges asserted here. Mr. Stanford acknowledged that he had been delegated the agency's authority to assert the privileges. Thereafter, as required, Mr. Stanford identified the documents and the areas of testimony that he claimed were privileged, what the specific privilege claims were, and the reasons why the privileges obtained. Once the privilege has been properly claimed, the burden shifts to the party seeking the documents and testimony to demonstrate a need for the materials and the lack of harm that would result from disclosure. Black, supra, 564 F.2d at 545; Friedman, supra, 738 F.2d at 1341. The court must then balance the public interest in nondisclosure against the need asserted. A list of factors to be considered by the trial judge in conducting this balancing process was identified in Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D.Pa., 1973) and has oft been cited since. Friedman, supra, 738 F.2d at 1342; Sealed Case, supra, 856 F.2d at 272. When weighing the competing interests, the trial court must evaluate: (1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes by discouraging citizens from giving the government information; (2) the impact upon persons who have given information of having their identities disclosed: (3) the degree to which governmental self-evaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled by disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or evaluative summary; (5) whether the party seeking discovery is an actual or potential defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether the police investigation has been completed; (7) whether any interdepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from the investigation; (8) whether the appellant's suit is non-frivolous and brought in good faith; (9) whether the information sought is available through other discovery or from other sources; (10) the importance of the information sought to the appellant's case. Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, supra, 59 F.R.D. at 344. The trial judge carefully considered each and every factor appropriate to the analysis. She found that appellant made only a minimal showing of need for the deposition of Mr. Andary. In fact, appellant all but admits that he has no idea what, if anything, Mr. Andary would say in a deposition that would be relevant at all to the California litigation. He relies on no more than a written, but unelaborated response to a single interrogatory that Mr. Andary, among others, might have information pertinent to the defense in the California litigation. Without more, appellant's proffer of need depends entirely on the merits, substance, and legitimacy of the interrogatory answer. At a minimum, appellant might have inquired further of the California defendant in an effort to establish the need and scope, ab initio, of the subpoena that he served upon Andary. The trial judge's conclusion that appellant made a minimal showing of need was clearly not an abuse of her discretion. On the related issue of harm that might result from the disclosure of information during a deposition of Andary, the trial judge found, as has every other judicial officer who has analyzed the relationship between appellant and the F.C.C., that disclosure of the information sought by the subpoena would interfere with the ongoing F.C.C. proceeding as well as future law enforcement efforts by the agency. The judge concluded further that disclosure would reveal confidential sources, risk witness intimidation and compromise F.C.C. strategy in the current and other proceedings. This conclusion that particularized harm would obtain from a deposition of Andary was likewise supported by the record. The ultimate decision granting the motion to quash appellant's subpoena, therefore, was a careful and reasoned exercise of discretion. Accordingly, the order is affirmed. Affirmed.