Opinion ID: 1597377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The District Attorney's Statements During Closing Argument

Text: Musgrove and Rogers argue that, during the State's closing argument to the jury in the guilt phase of the trial, the prosecutor improperly commented on their failure to testify, thereby violating their constitutional rights and depriving them of a fair trial. Article I, § 6, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 states, in part, that the accused in a criminal prosecution shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. This constitutional right is the basis for the requirement that a criminal defendant's failure to testify shall not be commented upon by the prosecution. Ex parte Wilson, 571 So.2d 1251, 1261 (Ala.1990); Whitt v. State, 370 So.2d 736, 738 (Ala.1979). In Alabama, this right is also protected by statute: On the trial of all indictments, complaints or other criminal proceedings, the person on trial shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness, and his failure to make such a request shall not create any presumption against him nor be the subject of comment by counsel. If the district attorney makes any comment concerning the defendant's failure to testify, a new trial must be granted on motion filed within 30 days from entry of the judgment. Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-220.
Specifically, Musgrove and Rogers contend that the prosecutor's questions, What did you hear from the defense? and What did you hear from the Defendant?made during rebuttal closing argumentwere improper comments on their failure to testify. Following defense counsel's objections, the trial judge failed to give a curative instruction regarding the district attorney's statements to the jury. The prosecutor continued with the remainder of his closing argument. At a later request for a ruling on the objections, the trial judge indicated that the objections would be overruled, but also taken under advisement. The defendants argue that because they properly objected and moved for a new trial based on the prosecutor's statements and because no curative instruction was given to the jury, § 12-21-220 requires that they be granted a new trial. For reasons set forth below, we disagree.
Given another set of circumstances, this Court might find the defendants' argument compelling. Because even indirect comments on an accused's failure to testify have the potential to be highly prejudicial, a prosecutor must be careful not to step over the line and into a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. Ex parte Williams, 461 So.2d 852, 853 (Ala.1984); Whitt v. State, 370 So.2d at 739. However, under the particular facts of this case, we find that the prosecutor's statements were not comments on the defendants' failure to testify. When an accused contends that a prosecutor has made improper comments during a closing argument, the statements at issue must be viewed in the context of the evidence presented in the case and the entire closing argument made to the juryboth defense counsel's and the prosecutor's. Washington v. State, 259 Ala. 104, 65 So.2d 704 (1953); Stephens v. State, 580 So.2d 11 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), aff'd, 580 So.2d 26 (Ala. 1991). When the prosecutor's statements are viewed in the proper context, we conclude that they were permissible responses to comments made by the defendants' counsel during closing argument. See Stephens, supra; Merritt v. State, 571 So.2d 409 (Ala. Crim.App.1990). During closing argument, defense counsel made repeated attacks upon the prosecution's presentation of its case and the prosecution's motivation for obtaining a conviction. For example, defense counsel for Rogers criticized the prosecutors and argued: After October the 1st, 1986, there was a lot of efforts expended in this case, but those efforts were expended to obtain a conviction, not to find out what the facts were or find out what the truth is and there is a big difference, folks. .... No, they made up their minds on October the 1st, 1986, these two men were guilty and after that it didn't matter. The only thing they were interested in was taking a conviction, because look what they did. .... ... [Y]ou know, something concerns me about this case. When we get prosecutors that start harassing State's witnesses or defense witnesses ... You think that attitude is the kind of attitude that is interested in the truth or finding out what the facts are or listening to what she had to say about what she knows about this case? I don't think so.... They are not interested in the facts or the truth, they are interested in a conviction. .... And they don't know they were over there stealing a car, they want you to speculate these people into the electric chair. Among the concluding comments in Rogers's closing argument was the following statement: Was there something in those recordsI don't know whether theythere may have been nothing, it may have been just like he said, just an employment record, but it got thrown away anyway. It got thrown away, but it is a pattern of conduct, it started from the beginning and it progressed all the way through the trial. A pattern of conduct that we want a conviction regardless of what the facts are or regardless of what the evidence is and that is very sad, folks, it is very sad. I'm not saying that they did it with that in mind, consciously, you know, said the end justifies the means. People say I'm right so therefore what I do[,] although it may not be proper[,] justifies what I'm doing. I may not say that, but it is consciousness like Hitler justified killing 6,000,000 Jews, he obviously thought it was the thing to do. He thought he was protecting the world. Killed 6,000,000 people. The end justifies the means? And there were plenty of examples, that just happened to come to mind. Does the end justify the means when we are talking about justice and fairness and people's lives? (Emphasis added.) It was only thereafter, during the prosecution's rebuttal closing argument, that the statements at issue on this review were made. In the first part of that closing argument, the prosecutor discussed at length the evidence presented by the State. Then he outlined the evidence presented by the defense and contested its merit. Finally, the prosecutor began an ending summary of the State's, and then of the defense's, case. [DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: The evidence I state to you in argument, ladies and gentlemen, shows that they are murderers. And there is no honor. Now the case is going to be yours. What did you hear from the defense? [COUNSEL FOR ROGERS]: And I'm going to object on the grounds of both the Alabama Constitution and the U.S. Constitution based on [the district attorney's] comments and respectfully ask for a mistrial. THE COURT: I will have to rule on that at the end of the closing argument. [COUNSEL FOR ROGERS]: Judge, we are asking for a mistrial on his unconstitutional statements [based] on both the Alabama and U.S. Constitution. THE COURT: At this point in time, I will have to take it under advisement. [DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: What did you hear from the Defendant? [COUNSEL FOR ROGERS]: Again, I'm going to object on both the constitution of ... Alabama and the U.S. Constitution and [COUNSEL FOR MUSGROVE]: And we would like a continuing objection and [COUNSEL FOR ROGERS]: And ask for a mistrial. THE COURT: I will take it under advisement at this time. [DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Think about that last question and the answer is what you heard. Adolph Hitler and 6,000,000 Jews. You heard [counsel for Musgrove] talk about the electric chair in his opening statement. Opening statement is supposed to be for the purpose of outlining what you expect the evidence to show. When you hear [counsel for Rogers] talking about the electric chair and Adolph Hitler killing 6,000,000 Jews and that is right after he talked about the State letting the guilty party go free, they are not interested in the truth, just getting a conviction, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Folks, he is right, I'm wanting a conviction, I have worked hard for the last year and a half on this case and ask my wife about this, the evidence shows that those men gunned down Coy Barron in his house with his wife and baby standing by. The Court of Criminal Appeals wrote concerning the second statement at issue: [This comment,] when viewed in the context of the entire argument, did not refer to the appellants' failure to testify, but was rather the prosecutor's opening into a summary of the case presented by the defense. The comment was clearly not a direct reference to the appellants' failure to testify because it was not `manifestly intended to be, or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be, a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.' [Citations omitted.] Nor was this comment an indirect reference to the appellants' failure to testify and there was no `close identification' of the appellants as the exact people who did not become witnesses. [Citation omitted.] This statement by the prosecutor was merely a general opening statement to a recapitulation of the defense's case.  Musgrove and Rogers v. State, 638 So.2d 1347, 1359 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). We agree. A prosecutor has the right to point out to the jury that certain parts of the State's evidence have not been contradicted. Ex parte Williams, 461 So.2d at 853; Windsor v. State, 593 So.2d 87, 91 (Ala.Crim.App.1991). Further, a prosecutor has the right to fairly reply in kind to statements made by defense counsel in the defense's closing argument. Davis v. State, 494 So.2d 851 (Ala.Crim.App.1986). We conclude that, when viewed in the context of the closing arguments of both the defense and the State, the statements at issue were not a reference to the defendants' failure to testify, but rather were a reply to the argument made by Rogers's counsel comparing the State's efforts to convict the defendants to the actions of Adolph Hitler in killing millions of Jews. Accordingly, we find no error in the statements that would warrant a reversal of the defendants's convictions.