Opinion ID: 1946872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is the Blumenthals' claim against GHA subject to mandatory arbitration?

Text: Notwithstanding that GHA is not a health care provider, the Blumenthals' claim against GHA falls within the provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act. Therefore the claim is subject to mandatory arbitration. The Blumenthals do not allege that GHA itself was negligent; instead, the complaint against GHA is based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Simply stated, the Blumenthals hope to prove that Dr. Barrows and other GHA employees were negligent in treating Mrs. Blumenthal, and that GHA as their employer is vicariously liable for that negligence. The mandatory arbitration provisions in § 3-2A-02 (a) of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act apply to [a]ll claims, suits, and actions, including cross claims, third-party claims, ... by a person against a health care provider. GHA asks us to construe this provision so that any claim based on the malpractice of a health care provider will be subject to arbitration. Essentially, GHA asserts that the word claims is broader than suits or actions and should be so interpreted. The Blumenthals, on the other hand, contend that the word claims in the Act refers only to cross claims and third-party claims. Preliminarily, we reject the contention that the Legislature intended to limit the scope of the word claims by the language including cross claims [and] third-party claims. Ordinarily the word including means comprising by illustration and not by way of limitation. See, e.g., United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 169, 98 S.Ct. 364, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977); Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 n. 1, 55 S.Ct. 60, 79 L.Ed. 232 (1934); Black's Law Dictionary, 905 (4th ed. 1968). See also Code (1982), § 1-101 of the Health-General Article. Thus we do not construe the reference to cross claims and third-party claims as indicating an exclusive listing of the claims subject to arbitration. The critical language in § 3-2A-02 (a) covers  all claims ... by a person against a health care provider for medical injury allegedly suffered by the person.... This language is sufficient to encompass a claim against a health care provider which also forms the basis for respondeat superior liability on the part of the health care provider's employer, whether or not that employer is itself a health care provider. We have previously pointed to the broad scope of the term claim. In distinguishing between a claim and a cause of action, the Court stated in White v. Land Homes Corporation, 251 Md. 603, 610-611, 248 A.2d 159 (1968): a `claim' ... has been defined as a `group or aggregate of operative facts giving ground or occasion for judicial action,' as distinguished from the narrow concept of a `cause of action.' 3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed. 1968) § 14.07 at 509. See also Brooks v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 261 Md. 278, 281-282, 274 A.2d 345 (1971); Edmonds v. Lupton, 253 Md. 93, 100-101, 252 A.2d 71 (1969); Harford Sands, Inc. v. Levitt & Sons, 27 Md. App. 702, 708-709, 343 A.2d 544 (1975). In the instant case, the Blumenthals' claim, that is the aggregate of operative facts giving rise to the action, is the alleged malpractice of Dr. Barrows and other employees of GHA. Although the Blumenthals seek to impose liability for their claim upon the employer GHA, the aggregate of operative facts is still the alleged malpractice of the health care providers. Additional support for a broad interpretation of the word claims may be found in § 5-109 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The section was enacted along with the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act by ch. 235 of the Acts of 1976. Section 5-109, prescribing the limitations period for medical malpractice actions, covers action[s] for damages for an injury arising out of the rendering of or failure to render professional services by a health care provider, as defined in § 3-2A-01. The final sentence of § 5-109 states that filing of a claim with the Health Claims Arbitration Office is equivalent to the filing of an action for limitations purposes. The Legislature clearly intended § 5-109 to encompass all claims subject to arbitration, yet the application of § 5-109 is not limited to actions in which a health care provider is a defendant. Instead, § 5-109 covers all actions arising out of the rendering of or failure to render professional services by a health care provider. Moreover, construing § 3-2A-02 (a) to cover the Blumenthals' claim against GHA comports with and furthers the legislative intent in enacting the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act. The legislative intent may be gleaned from the Medical Malpractice Insurance Study Committee Report to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. [6] This report delineates the primary object of the Committee's proposal ( id. at 3, emphasis added): The basic proposal of the Committee is the requirement that all health care malpractice claims over $5,000 shall be submitted to arbitration prior to the filing of suit. The goal of the Committee's proposals was to establish a mechanism to screen malpractice claims prior to the filing of suit. Report at 3. In the Committee's view, this would reduce the cost of defense by ferreting out unmeritorious claims which, in turn, would lower the cost of malpractice insurance and, potentially, overall health care costs. The Committee's proposed § 3-2A-02 (a) was enacted verbatim in ch. 235 of the Acts of 1976. As stated in its title, ch. 235 was for the purpose of providing for a mandatory arbitration system for all medical malpractice claims in excess of a certain amount. (Emphasis added.) In light of the legislative history and the title of ch. 235, it would appear that the Legislature contemplated a far-reaching requirement to arbitrate medical malpractice claims. [7] We therefore hold that § 3-2A-02 (a) encompasses a claim of malpractice by a health care provider, whether it forms the basis of a suit against that health care provider or a suit against a non-health care provider under the doctrine of respondeat superior.