Opinion ID: 2994956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Remaining Elements of the Prima Facie

Text: Case
The district court not only determined that Mr. Lawson’s claim failed because he could not demonstrate that he was disabled under the ADA, but it also noted that it d[id] not believe Lawson has sufficiently established the remainder of his prima facie case. R.60 at 43 n.18 (italics omitted). Yet the court provided no discussion of its determination in that regard; it explained that, because in its view the case could be decided on the disability prong of the test, it would not attempt to resolve the disputes as to the remainder of the elements of Mr. Lawson’s prima facie case. Id. Despite the lack of specific findings by the district court, we may affirm its grant of summary judgment on any ground supported by the record. See Conley v. Village of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2000). We cannot do so here, however, because the record demonstrates that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Mr. Lawson can satisfy the remainder of his prima facie case. The second prong of the prima facie case requires Mr. Lawson to show that he was qualified for the position of conductor trainee at CSX. A determination as to whether a person is qualified for an employment position under the ADA involves a two-step inquiry: (1) the employee must possess the appropriate educational background, employment experience, skills, licenses, etc. and (2) he must also be able to perform the essential functions of the position held or desired, with or without reasonable accommodation. Bay v. Cassens Trans. Co., 212 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. sec. 1630.2(m)); see also Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996). CSX does not claim that Mr. Lawson cannot handle the physical demands of the conductor position; instead it asserts that he cannot satisfy the first step of this inquiry because he did not possess a work history evidencing responsibility, safety and dependability. An employer may define the job in question, in terms of both its essential scope and the qualifications required for it, Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 676 (7th Cir. 1998), as long as such qualifications are job-related and consistent with business necessity, Bay, 212 F.3d at 974 (quoting 42 U.S.C. sec. 12113(a); 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.15(b)(1)). There is, on this record, a jury question as to whether an employment history demonstrating responsibility, safety and dependability was a genuine requirement for the position of conductor trainee at CSX. The record shows that such a work history was not among the prerequisites listed on CSX’s job description for conductor trainee that it provided to interested applicants at Cincinnati State. Additionally, CSX had no guidelines defining this unstated qualification, and the district court noted that the company not infrequently made exceptions to this criterion by hiring persons with limited or unskilled employment experience, applicants whose employment could not be verified, applicants without a high school diploma or GED, and even applicants with criminal records including unresolved felony convictions. R.60 at 44. Moreover, not only has CSX submitted the applications of a number of people hired for the conductor trainee position who seem not to have possessed this CSX prerequisite, see supra note 8 and accompanying text, but Ryan also admitted that it was not unusual for her to hire people who did not have a solid employment background. Her description of the variety of exceptions to this requirement calls into question whether it was actually an essential feature for a conductor trainee applicant: There is an exception here that business ownership can be substituted for employment. Part-time work with concurrent volunteer community service can substitute for full-time employment. Part-time work while attending college can substitute for full-time employment. Acceptable explanations for gaps in employments or layoffs or downsizing [also qualifies as an exception]. . . . If someone has been in school and doesn’t have a solid verifiable work history, then we’ll look at their college, what type of school work they’ve been doing . . . . R.39, Ex.3 at 77. Ryan went on to describe one applicant who did not have a solid work history but whom she hired because he had done significant volunteer work in high school; when questioned whether she asked Mr. Lawson if he had such volunteer experience, Ryan admitted she had not, explaining that it was up to the applicants to sell themselves. Id. at 77-78. CSX relies upon our decision in Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co., 618 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980), for the proposition that even though a job qualification may not be published, it may still be a requirement for an employment position. Holder was a Title VII case involving the question of whether a plaintiff was qualified under the terms of that statute for an unskilled mining position. Id. at 1200. There the plaintiff had argued that because the job in question was labeled unskilled, it required no particular qualifications, and thus she was necessarily qualified for the position. See id. We held that, although the defendant had not listed any job requirements for the position, that did not mean that it did not look for certain qualifications in its applicants. See id. However, the decision in that case turned on the fact that the defendant, in hiring unskilled workers, primarily sought persons who had operated mobile equipment or had worked with heavy equipment and consistently sought applicants for unskilled positions with mining related experience, qualities the plaintiff did not possess. Id. at 1200 & 1202. Additionally, we explained that the term unskilled worker, in the context of the defendant’s line of work, was also simply a way for the company to describe a job that was not a skilled position. A skilled position was one that required technical ability, defined as a minimum of six months experience as a dragline operator, shovel operator, machinist, electrician, welder, mechanic, bulldozer operator, overburden driller, or overburden shooter. Id. at 1200-01. We also noted that the evidence fail[ed] to show that [the] defendant ever sought or hired anyone with experience comparable to plaintiff’s. Id. at 1202. In contrast to the plaintiff in Holder, we believe that Mr. Lawson has put forward enough facts to create a jury question as to whether CSX consistently required applicants to have a responsible, safe, and dependable work history. Additionally, he has shown that the company hires persons with employment histories that are not significantly different from the limited experience he possessed./11 As to the fourth element/12 of the prima facie case, whether the circumstances surrounding the company’s decision make it more likely than not that Mr. Lawson’s disability was the reason why CSX did not hire him, we also believe that a jury question exists on these facts. Mr. Lawson informed Ryan and Layne that he was a diabetic, a condition that previously had rendered him unable to work and for which he had been receiving SSDI benefits for a number of years. CSX then failed to hire Mr. Lawson as a conductor trainee, despite the fact that he completed the training program at Cincinnati State with a high quiz average and met the listed requirements for the position in the job description that CSX provided to the school. The evidence also shows that CSX was not a particularly selective employer with regard to its hiring from programs like Cincinnati State’s. Indeed, it hired 98% of all successful program participants, and it hired every other member of Mr. Lawson’s program class. CSX claimed that Mr. Lawson’s sparse work history was the reason it did not hire him. However, as we have noted, there is a serious question as to whether such a work history was truly a job requirement for CSX, and Ryan’s admission that she had significant discretion in making exceptions to this requirement particularly calls into question the importance of this criterion to the company. These facts, considered together, could support a jury’s determination that CSX more likely than not refused to hire Mr. Lawson as a conductor trainee because it knew that he was an insulin- dependent diabetic. As a result, Mr. Lawson has demonstrated a genuine issue of fact with regard to each element of his prima facie case of discrimination.
CSX did come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its refusal to hire Mr. Lawson. As discussed previously, it claimed that he lacked a prerequisite for the conductor trainee job because he did not have a work history evidencing responsibility, safety or dependability and because he offered CSX no reason to make an exception to that rule. Mr. Lawson must then be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that this reason was a pretext for discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993). Mr. Lawson may succeed in his demonstration of pretext by offering evidence that CSX’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2106 (citation omitted). For many of the same reasons why Mr. Lawson has created a genuine issue of fact regarding the elements of the prima facie case, there is also sufficient evidence to permit a jury to conclude that the reason given by CSX as to why it did not hire Mr. Lawson was pretextual./13 See Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2106 (noting that the trier of fact may still consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff’s prima facie case and inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual) (citation and internal quotations omitted). These facts are sufficient to allow a jury to disbelieve CSX’s proffered nondiscriminatory explanation for its action and to believe [Mr. Lawson’s] explanation of intentional discrimination. Id. at 2108 (emphasis and citation omitted). Ultimately, Mr. Lawson has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether discrimination regarding his status as an insulin-dependent diabetic was the true motivation for CSX’s employment decision--one that made Mr. Lawson that exceedingly rare employee who passed CSX’s training program for the position of conductor trainee with flying colors, met all of the qualifications CSX listed for the position, and yet was not hired by the company. We express no view on whether Mr. Lawson ultimately will be successful at trial, but we believe the evidence in the record demonstrates that his case deserves to be heard by a jury.