Opinion ID: 73336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exercise

Text: Wilson complains that both outdoor and indoor exercise were unavailable to him while he was housed at MCJ. It is undisputed that MCJ has no space or provision for outdoor exercise for its inmates. Additionally, Wilson contends that he was unable to exercise inside MCJ because of the lack of space resulting from the number of inmates there. In contrast to a sentenced prisoner, whose conditions of confinement are analyzed under the Cruel and Unusual 11 We further note that MCJ has built a new law library for prisoners since this appeal was filed, which Wilson's appellate counsel acknowledges could render this issue moot. Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 9. 17 Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the proper inquiry [for a pretrial detainee] is whether [confinement] conditions amount to punishment of the [unadjudicated] detainee under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872 & n.16 (1979); see Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 207 (11th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that confinement of pretrial detainees is a necessary restriction to ensure their presence in court). Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to punishment in the constitutional sense, however. . . . And the fact that such detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into punishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. In analyzing confinement conditions about which a pretrial detainee complains, a court must decide whether the detention officials intentionally imposed the restriction for a punitive purpose or whether it is reasonably incidental to a legitimate government objective. See id. at 538-39, 99 S.Ct. at 1873-74; see Villarreal, 113 F.3d at 207. If a 18 restriction is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal--if it is arbitrary or purposeless--a court may infer that the purpose of the government action is punishment. Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1463 (11th Cir. 1984). Additionally, our court evaluates particular pretrial detainee complaints against the totality of confinement conditions to determine if there is constitutional deficiency. See Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575-76 (11th Cir. 1985). As we have explained, there is no evidence in this record to show that Blankenship or Hall had any authority or ability to create a secure space at MCJ for outdoor exercise for inmates. Principally, this is because the local government is responsible for appropriating the funds for building such jail outdoor exercise space. Under the analysis prescribed by Bell, there is no evidence whatsoever in the record that Wilson or any other inmate at MCJ was denied outdoor exercise by Blankenship or Hall as punishment. Instead, these wardens were implementing the legitimate government purpose of housing federal detainees 19 pursuant the terms of the intergovernmental agreement between the Marshals Service and the local government. The Court's decision in Bell considered the relatively short stay of federal pretrial detainees at a facility such as MCJ. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 543, 99 S.Ct. at 1876. Following Bell, the former Fifth Circuit accorded no relief at a similar institution housing federal pretrial detainees where [t]here was no outdoor exercise.12 Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir. Jan. 1981) (en banc). We conclude that not only does the record fail to show that Blankenship and Hall, as wardens at MCJ, had discretionary authority to provide outdoor exercise for Wilson or that the lack of such exercise was to 12 In a case that predated Bell, we are cognizant that the former Fifth Circuit found that pretrial detainees should not be incarcerated continuously in an institution designed to punish, where outdoor recreation is reasonably possible. Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 750 (5th Cir. 1977). Rather than mandating immediate outdoor recreation, however, the Miller court recognized that such outdoor exercise may not be immediately attainable because of lack of resources and stated that this was a goal toward which the jail authorities should strive. Id. Thus, Miller did not require that every pretrial detainee have an automatic constitutional right to outdoor exercise, and continuous incarceration is distinct from brief detention periods. We further note that the defendants in Miller were the county sheriff as well as city and state officials charged with oversight of the prison system and appropriation of local and state funds for building prisons and improvements to existing prisons and not the warden, who is charged with the daily administration of the prison. See id. at 744 & nn. 2 & 3. Furthermore, because it predated Bell, which instructs that courts must analyze confinement conditions of pretrial detainees to determine if the intent is to punish or if the condition is incidental to a legitimate government purpose, Miller was not considered under Bell, which directs our review in this case. 20 punish him, but also that no clearly established constitutional law required that Wilson have immediate access to outdoor exercise during the time that he was at MCJ, where no such facilities existed, and his confinement at MCJ was brief. Wilson also complains that he was unable to exercise inside MCJ in the limited space available to him. Hall's affidavit explains that Wilson and other inmates were released from their cells into a larger, open area, or dayroom, containing a telephone and television for inmates' use, at 5:00 A.M. and that they remained there until 10:00 P.M., when they returned to their cells for the night. See R1-14, Hall Affidavit at 1-2. This open area provides space where the inmates may participate in exercises such as push-ups, sit-ups and limited jogging, etc.13 Id. at 2; see Jones, 636 F.2d at 1373 (noting that there was limited room for indoor exercise and that inmates did push-ups as their only form of 13 A Marshals Service inspection report states there is ample room in the day room areas for inmates to do exercises. Government Exh. 1-7. Additionally, federal detainees, like other inmates housed at MCJ, also engage in indoor work detail, which involves sweeping, mopping, and scrubbing their cells, the common areas, and hallways that they occupy on a daily basis. See R1-14, Exh. B at 10 (MCJ Standard Minimum Rules and Regulations). We note that these activities provide some exercise. 21 exercise in the jammed cells and day rooms). Wilson states that the dayroom consisted of approximately 240 square feet of floor space, which he shared with fifteen inmates, affording approximately fifteen square feet of floor space per man. See R135-1; id. App. B, Wilson Affidavit at 1. He further represents that even if it would be feas[i]ble to ex[er]cise in this area, it would only annoy the individuals using the phone, and obstruct the others['] v[ie]w of T.V. and could easily escalate into violent physical confrontations, R1-35-1, and that [t]his area was sever[e]ly over cro[w]ded under the Federal Regulations, id. App. B, Wilson Affidavit at 1. Despite Wilson's contentions of overcrowding, we note that he does not represent that there were more than sixteen inmates in the dayroom, which was the maximum number specified in the intergovernmental agreement between the Marshals Service and the local government. Furthermore, we have not granted relief for more crowded conditions than Wilson experienced at MCJ in a facility that housed both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. 22 See, e.g., Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1569 (During Hamm's incarceration there, the jail's population at times exceeded the facility's design capacity.). In Bell, the Supreme Court clarified that the relative brevity of pretrial detainees' confinement allows spacial confinement that involves genuine privations and hardship, which might be questionable under the Due Process Clause if they continued over an extended period of time. Bell, 441 U.S. at 542, 99 S.Ct. at 1876. The Court also stated that federal court decisions concerning minimum inmate space requirements as well as purported standards recommended by various groups with expertise in correctional institutions may set goals, but that they simply do not establish the constitutional minima.14 Id. at 543 n.27, 99 S.Ct. at 1876 n.27. Recognizing the Bell mandate, we set no space standards, Jones, 636 F.2d at 1376, in a similar institution where the dayroom sometimes afforded little more than six square 14 Even recommendations of the Federal Corrections Policy Task Force of the Department of Justice regarding conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees are not determininative of the requirements of the Constitution. Bell, 441 U.S. at 543 n.27, 99 S.Ct. at 1876 n.27 (emphasis added). Consequently, the Marshals Service MCJ inspection report, relevant to the time that Wilson was at MCJ, does not show a constitutional violation when it notes that the dayroom was not in compliance with 35 square feet per inmate recommended by the Marshals Service. See Government Exh. 2 at 2. 23 feet per inmate. Id. at 1374. Our court further has concluded that [i]t is equally clear that the due process clause does not purport to regulate the general conditions and quality of life in the country's jails, and that the courts should not attempt to make 'judgment calls' to determine which of various marginally different conditions might be more appropriate. Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1573. Rather than complaining that fifteen square feet per inmate is insufficient space to do exercises such as push-ups, sit-ups, or jogging in place, Wilson speculates that such exercises may annoy the other inmates with the potential for physical confrontations. There is no evidence in this record that any altercation occurred as a result of Wilson's attempted indoor exercising during his stay at MCJ. Thus, Wilson has presented no documented reason that he could not have engaged in indoor exercises while he was at MCJ, and he has not shown that Blankenship or Hall prevented him from doing so for a punitive purpose. To the extent that Wilson represents that he developed high blood pressure because of the lack of an ability to exercise at MCJ, his medical history, attached to 24 the special report filed on behalf of the wardens and correctional officers, shows that he was suffering from high blood pressure when he entered MCJ. His medical records while at MCJ further evidence that he received medication and was treated for his ailments while there. Thus, Wilson's high blood pressure was not caused by his detention at MCJ and his alleged inability to exercise there. In addition to having no discretionary authority to fund and to build an secure outdoor exercise facility at MCJ or to deviate from the specifications of the intergovernmental agreement between the Marshals Service and the local government as to the number of federal detainees housed at MCJ with the resulting implications for inmate space there, Blankenship and Hall violated no clearly established law in not providing Wilson outdoor exercise while he was at MCJ or affording him more space for indoor exercise. Applying the Bell standard to confinement conditions, such as space, is exceedingly difficult and does not provide clear results, which makes qualified immunity appropriate. Hamm, 774 F.2d at 25 1573. Moreover, states, not wardens, can improve the quality and quantityof such conditions by increasing and properly administering the amount of money they spend on a detention facility; courts in most instances may not interfere with a state's decision to provide detainees with a reasonable level and quality of food, living space, and medical care. Id. Additionally, under a totality of confinement conditions analysis, Wilson's complaints are few in comparison to other cases where we have not given relief because we determined that the confinement conditions were not constitutional violations. See, e.g., id. at 1569-70 (noting that objectionable confinement conditions at county jail included overcrowding, sleeping on tables or the floor, unsanitary floor and linens, occasional foreign objects in the food). On the facts of this case, Blankenship and Hall are entitled to qualified immunity.15 15 We note that our decision would be the same under an Eighth Amendment analysis applicable to the brief time that Wilson returned to MCJ after his conviction and before he was moved to his designated federal penitentiary to serve his sentence. Our court has held that the minimum standard of the Due Process Clause relative to basic necessities, such as living space, is the same as that allowed by the eighth amendment for convicted persons. Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1574. The Supreme Court . . . has not set forth a standard for determining what level of necessities the due process clause absolutely requires. Id. Consequently, in addition to having no ability to create exercise space at MCJ as part of their discretionary responsibilities, Blakenship and Hall violated no clearly established law under the Eighth Amendment with 26