Opinion ID: 755430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fairchild's ADEA Claim

Text: 11 The ADEA prohibits employers from engaging in discrimination because of [an] individual's age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), but limits the class of persons protected by the statute to those persons 40 years of age and older. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). To succeed in an ADEA claim, a plaintiff must establish that he would not have been terminated but for his employer's intentional age-based discrimination. See Konowitz v. Schnadig Corp., 965 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir.1992). 12 A plaintiff may prove age discrimination in two ways.  'She may try to meet her burden head on by presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that age was the determining factor in her discharge. Or, as is more common, she may utilize the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof for Title VII cases originally set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), ... and later adapted to age discrimination claims under the ADEA.'  McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1988)). 13 Fairchild does not contend that he has direct evidence of discrimination. Instead, he focuses on the McDonnell Douglas approach. In order to prevail under the burden-shifting approach, a plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case of discrimination. [T]he prima facie case requires 'evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion....'  O'Connor, 116 S.Ct. at 1310, 116 S.Ct. 1307 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)) (emphasis in O'Connor removed). To establish such a case under the ADEA, Fairchild must show (1) he was in the protected age group of 40 or older, (2) he was performing his job satisfactorily, (3) he was discharged, and (4) substantially younger, similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably. 1 See Maier v. Lucent Technologies, 120 F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir.1997); Denisi v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 99 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir.1996); see also O'Connor, 116 S.Ct. at 1310. 14 A successful prima facie showing creates a presumption of discrimination that obligates the employer to produce a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision. See Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir.1994). Production of this legitimate nondiscriminatory reason rebuts this presumption of discrimination, see Loyd v. Phillips Bros., Inc., 25 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir.1994), shifting the burden back to the employee to show that the employer's stated reasons for its action are pretextual. See Denisi, 99 F.3d at 864. A plaintiff can establish pretext by showing either that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or that the employer's explanation is unworthy of credence. See Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir.1993). 15 Despite these shifting burdens of production,  '[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.'  Saint Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). If the plaintiff is unable to meet this burden, his claim fails. See Sarsha, 3 F.3d at 1039. 16 The parties dispute whether Fairchild satisfies the second requirement of the prima facie case: whether Fairchild was performing his job satisfactorily. We need not resolve this dispute because we can decide this case on other issues. See EEOC v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 149-50 (7th Cir.1996) ([T]his court may advance to an ultimate issue in a summary judgment analysis and consider the discrimination question notwithstanding a dispute over a fact necessary for a prima facie case.); see also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant.); Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir.1985) ([T]he prima facie threshold is no longer a relevant issue once the defendant has come forward with evidence of legitimate reasons for its actions that would rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination.). Because we find that Forma has met its burden of articulating legitimate reasons for the discharge, we proceed directly to whether Fairchild presented evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to pretext. 17 Forma presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Fairchild's termination: faced with a mandate to reduce its sales and marketing budget, Bergen selected Fairchild for termination because of his consistent problems with performance, such as failing to meet quota. See Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d at 1125-26 (Employer does not violate ADEA by terminating employee to reduce costs.). Forma's production of this reason shifts the burden to Fairchild to prove that the stated reason is simply a pretext for age discrimination. 18 We first note that Fairchild has a tough row to hoe because he was terminated by a person six years older than he is. While persons of any age are capable of age discrimination, that the decision maker is older than the terminated employee is certainly significant in evaluating the evidence of discrimination. See Mills, 83 F.3d at 842. It is not, however, dispositive. See id. 19 Fairchild first attempts to show that Forma's reason is pretextual by disputing whether a reorganization occurred at all. Instead, Fairchild characterizes the occurrence as follows: a few employees were fired, and some territorial lines redrawn. As further evidence that there was no reorganization, Fairchild asserts that these changes were temporary and that the organization is back as it was at the time of Fairchild's departure. 20 We do[ ] not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decisions. Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir.1986). Our job is to determine whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior. Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 560 (7th Cir.1987). Establishing whether Forma's actions are properly labeled a reorganization does not assist us in this inquiry. Fairchild does not challenge the fact that Bergen was asked to reduce his budget; assuming this is true, it makes little difference to Fairchild's age discrimination claim whether the way Bergen carried out this mandate was through a reorganization properly so called or through firing a couple people and temporarily redrawing territorial lines. 21 Fairchild next argues that his performance problems were exaggerated in the company documentation, and therefore the performance issues could not have been dispositive in his termination. In his deposition, Fad stated that toward the end of Fairchild's employment, he was feeling pressure to fire Fairchild, so his written criticisms did not necessarily reflect the way he really felt about Fairchild's performance. Even if we assume this is true, Fairchild must still contend with his poor reviews from previous years (i.e. those that were not toward the end of his employment) and the fact that while he managed the Central Region it always placed last in the company. These two reasons by themselves are sufficient to support Bergen's decision to terminate Fairchild instead of one of the other managers or sales staff. Fairchild cannot establish age discrimination simply by suggesting that, in the final months of his employ, his performance was not as bad as his reviews may suggest. 22 Fairchild also tries to minimize the importance of his performance problems by pointing to Fad's statement that he was a competent manager, that he received annual salary increases, and that his region was historically difficult. Again, these statements do not suggest that Bergen's reason for terminating him were pretextual. Being competent does not necessarily establish that the employee is doing his job well, or even up to the employer's legitimate expectations. An employer may give annual salary increases as an incentive for future performance, and therefore the fact Fairchild received such increases does not suggest that he was performing adequately. Finally, regardless of whether the Central Region was historically a difficult region to manage, Forma could legitimately expect a certain level of success which Fairchild consistently failed to meet. This evidence does not establish that Fairchild did not have performance problems such that Bergen's reason for firing Fairchild was pretextual. 23 Fairchild's final argument regarding his performance revolves around Bergen's statement that he was not fired for cause. Fairchild's argument is that if he was not fired for cause, then he must not have been having performance problems that would justify a termination, so Bergen's reason must be pretextual. It is at least possible that Fairchild would not have been fired absent the impetus of a shrinking budget. However, this conclusion does not assist Fairchild. In a reduction in force, someone has to go. It is usually the least qualified or least productive employee. Fairchild's performance problems made him the most eligible candidate for termination when Bergen compared him to other employees. That Bergen may not have fired Fairchild absent the financial pressure does not establish that his reason for terminating Fairchild was pretextual. 24 Fairchild offers one other piece of evidence to suggest that Forma's reasons for firing him were pretextual. He alleges that Forma had a company-wide policy of treating older employees less favorably than younger ones. As evidence of this policy, Fairchild cites to his deposition, where he states that the CEOs of affiliated companies, as well as the President of Forma, were all around the age of forty. Additionally, Fairchild stated that he knew of someone a year or two older than he who was let go. It seemed like the trend was to go with the younger people and, therefore, I felt that that was somewhat discriminating. Fairchild Dep. at 76. Fairchild also stated that Fad told him that he (Fairchild) needed to hire younger people. Fairchild acknowledged that Fad denied saying this, and later in his deposition Fairchild suggested that it might have been a misunderstanding. 25 This evidence does not persuade us that Bergen's reason for firing Fairchild was pretextual. Fairchild does not connect this alleged trend with Bergen's decision to terminate him. While Fairchild may believe that the trend is evidence of age bias, subjective beliefs of the plaintiff ... are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. McMillian v. Svetanoff, 878 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir.1989). Even were we to believe that Fad suggested to Fairchild that Fairchild should hire younger employees, this statement also does not assist him. Assuming Fad did make the statement, it would be probative as to whether Fad harbored some kind of age animus. However, Fad did not terminate Fairchild. Bergen terminated Fairchild, and there is no evidence that Bergen shared Fad's view. See Hoffman v. MCA, Inc., 144 F.3d 1117 (7th Cir.1998) (Statements of nondecision makers do not create genuine issues of material fact absent proof that non-decision maker's statement somehow tainted employment decision.). 26 Fairchild has given us no reason to believe that Forma's reason for terminating him is pretextual. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.