Opinion ID: 200774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Ventura-Cruel's Confession

Text: 22 Ventura-Cruel's second claim is that the district court erred by admitting into evidence, at his subsequent trial, the letter confessing guilt which he wrote to his probation officer as part of the pre-sentencing process initiated after the court had accepted his guilty plea. He claims that the court's decision to admit the letter violated principles of basic fairness guaranteed by due process because he tendered this confession under a belief that he was not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. 23 Ventura-Cruel's plea agreement provided that he could receive a reduction in his sentence for acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. To receive such a reduction, the agreement required Ventura-Cruel to accept full responsibility for the offense committed. It also provided that he could receive an additional reduction under the safety-valve provision, see U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, if he provided truthful and complete information and evidence to the United States about his crime and related events. At the change of plea hearing, the district court explained to Ventura-Cruel these sentencing provisions and that by pleading guilty he was waiving his privilege against self-incrimination. 24 Faced with the requirement that he provide incriminating information to receive a shorter sentence and a belief that he was no longer protected against self-incrimination, Ventura-Cruel authored a letter of confession on May 23, 2000, to his probation officer. 9 The letter stated: 25 The first thing I want to tell you is that I accept full responsibility for what I have done in this case. During the early evening of April 23, 1998, I delivered some electronic equipment, a plane ticket, and $4,000 to a man in the airport in the St. Thomas, VI. This man was working for Juan Carlos Pion and was going to travel to St. Maarten. After this delivery, I received a call to pick up these items, since the trip to St. Maarten had been canceled. This electronic equipment was eventually seized during arrests that were made in July of 1998 for cocaine trafficking. 26 I do not blame anyone but myself for my activity in this case. I was wrong and I suffer every day for the mistakes that I have made in this case ... What I did in this case goes against everything I believe in. I promise that I will never violate the law again. I am very, very sorry for what I have done. I look forward to the time when this problem is behind me, but the pain in my heart for what I have done will never leave me. 27 The district court vacated Ventura-Cruel's guilty plea several months after he wrote this letter. 28 Ventura-Cruel moved to exclude the letter from his trial, but the district court denied his motion and admitted it over his objection. The court admitted the letter because it concluded that the rules of evidence only prohibited the introduction of statements made by a defendant as part of the plea negotiation process. See Fed. R.Evid. 410. In the court's view, the fact that Ventura-Cruel confessed after the plea negotiations had concluded rendered the letter admissible. 29 The admission of Ventura-Cruel's confession in these circumstances was erroneous. In similar circumstances, the Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction because it deemed that admitting the defendant's confession was fundamentally unfair. See United States v. Escamilla, 975 F.2d 568 (9th Cir.1992). In Escamilla, the defendant made incriminating statements as required by his plea agreement. Id. at 570. The plea agreement also required the defendant to take a polygraph test. Id. When the defendant failed the polygraph, the government withdrew from the agreement but used the defendant's incriminating statements against him at trial. Id. The court held that the trial court had erred by admitting the confession because of the fundamental unfairness of allowing the government to keep the benefit of its bargain while denying [the defendant] his. Id. at 572. It concluded that the only way to return the parties to the status quo ante is to bar the government from using [the defendant's] confession against him at trial. Escamilla, 975 F.2d at 571; see Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1156-57 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that it was fundamentally unfair and violation of privilege against self-incrimination to introduce incriminating statements made by defendant in reliance on subsequently withdrawn plea bargain); Gunsby v. Wainwright, 596 F.2d 654, 656-658 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that statement made pursuant to plea bargain which was later withdrawn by the government was inadmissible at subsequent trial because it violated self-incrimination privilege); People v. Jones, 416 Mich. 354, 331 N.W.2d 406, 408-10 (1982) (vacating conviction because trial court improperly admitted statement made by defendant pursuant to subsequently withdrawn plea bargain); State v. Nelson, 108 Wash.App. 918, 33 P.3d 419, 422 (2001) (holding that statement made by defendant in reliance on withdrawn plea agreement was inadmissible at subsequent trial); see also 5 LaFave, Israel, & King, Criminal Procedure § 21.5(f) at 220-21 (2d ed.1999) (stating that where accepted plea is later overturned, incriminating statements made by defendant in reliance on plea agreement should be excluded from defendant's subsequent trial). 10 30 We agree with the results reached in these cases, although in our view it is enough that the use of such statements is unfair under the circumstances, and we need not reach the constitutional grounds relied on by some of these cases. Ventura-Cruel believed, with reason, that the court had approved his plea and plea bargain. The plea agreement encouraged Ventura-Cruel to make incriminating statements in order to receive a shorter sentence. In light of these incentives, Ventura-Cruel offered such statements. He was then deprived of the benefit of his plea bargain but the government was permitted to use his statements made in reliance on the bargain against him at his subsequent trial. This was error. The parties should have been returned to their positions before the district court initially accepted Ventura-Cruel's guilty plea on February 7, 2000. Part of this return to the status quo ante should have included preventing the introduction of Ventura-Cruel's confession at trial. 11 The government contends that, even if the confession was improperly admitted, it was only a harmless error because of the overwhelming evidence against Ventura-Cruel. For an erroneous evidentiary admission to be harmless, we must conclude that it was highly probable that the result would have been the same if the disputed evidence had been excluded. 12 See United States v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir.1999). The burden of persuasion rests with the government to demonstrate harmless error. See United States v. Shea, 159 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir.1998). 31 The government introduced Ventura-Cruel's confession as part of its case-in-chief through the testimony of his probation officer. The government then highlighted the confession to the jury in its closing argument. In referring to the letter, the government argued: 32 There is no doubt that this is his signature... a letter ... that speaks louder than any evidence in this case, a letter that way back in the year 2000 was drafted for only one purpose ... to get a three level reduction for acceptance of responsibility ... I accept that I did what I did. I accept [that] I am guilty, I accept that this is what I have done, I did participate in this case. Just take a look at the very first sentence. The first thing I want to tell you is that I accept full responsibility for what I have done in this case. I do not blame anyone. No one, ladies and gentleman, no one ... I do not blame anyone but myself for my activity in this case. What is the case then that he participated in a conspiracy to possess in excess of 150 kilograms. 33 Confessions are by nature highly probative and likely to be at the center of the jury's attention. United States v. Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d 103, 112 (1st Cir.2000). This is especially so where the government emphasizes the confession in its closing argument because these are the last words spoken to the jury by the trial attorneys. United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 575 (1st Cir.1994). Moreover, the thrust of the government's case, in addition to the improperly admitted confession, consisted of testimony from a paid informant and from a co-conspirator testifying pursuant to a plea agreement, in the hope of receiving a lighter sentence because of his cooperation. Ventura-Cruel argues that both of these witnesses were motivated to provide testimony favorable to the government and therefore their testimony raises questions of credibility which militate against finding an erroneous evidentiary admission harmless. 34 The government contends that a conviction may be sufficient even where the government relies on the testimony of co-conspirators. This argument misses the point. The question here is not whether a conviction based on the testimony of co-conspirators may be sustained as minimally sufficient. The question instead is whether, after a review of the entire record, we are convinced that it is highly probable that the jury would have reached the same conclusion without the confession. Vigneau, 187 F.3d at 86; Shea, 159 F.3d at 40. Where the government claimed, in its closing argument, that the confession spoke louder than any evidence in the case and the other damaging evidence consisted of testimony from witnesses who may have had reason to fabricate or embellish their testimony, see Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1571 (1st Cir.1989), we cannot conclude that the admission of Ventura-Cruel's confession was a harmless error. 13