Opinion ID: 2109253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: applicability of indian child welfare act

Text: In her third assignment of error, K.M. contends that the juvenile court was required to transfer the proceedings to the Yankton Sioux Tribe. Although a court, after a proper petition for transfer of proceedings, is required to transfer to an Indian tribe's jurisdiction any proceeding to terminate parental rights, see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) and § 43-1504(2), availability of the right to transfer is contingent on application of the Indian Child Welfare Act to the proceedings sought to be transferred. In turn, applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act depends on whether the proceedings to be transferred involve an Indian child within the definition utilized in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) and § 43-1503(4).  `Indian child' means any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). Thus, a party to a proceeding who seeks to invoke a provision of the Indian Child Welfare Act has the burden to show that the act applies in the proceedings. Matter of Juvenile Action No. JS-7359, 159 Ariz. 232, 766 P.2d 105 (App.1988); Application of Angus, 60 Or.App. 546, 655 P.2d 208 (1982). For application of the Indian Child Welfare Act to proceedings for termination of parental rights, the proceedings must involve an Indian child within the purview of the act. Matter of Juvenile Action No. JS-7359, supra; In re Smith, 46 Wash.App. 647, 731 P.2d 1149 (1987). As pointed out in Application of Angus, supra , ICWA contains no definition of Indian tribe. However, we agree with the Oregon court's statement, In the absence of a Congressional definition, an Indian tribe has authority to determine its own membership. 655 P.2d at 212 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978)). Formal membership requirements differ from tribe to tribe, as do each tribe's method of keeping track of its own membership. There is thus no one method of proof of membership, but the testimony of a representative of tribal government would be probative evidence of membership. Application of Angus, supra at 655 P.2d at 212. We now summarize the evidence on the issue whether any of K.M.'s children is an Indian child within the Indian Child Welfare Act. Since none of K.M.'s children was a member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe, none of K.M.'s children was an Indian child within the definition of 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)(a) and § 43-1503(1)(a). Although K.M. was a member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe, the further question is whether any of K.M.'s children was eligible for membership in the Yankton Sioux Tribe. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)(b) and § 43-1503(4)(b). None dispute that, as the result of federal law, the Ponca Tribe of Native Americans of Nebraska has been dissolved or terminated as an Indian tribe in relation to federally recognized status as an Indian tribe eligible for services from the United States. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) and § 43-1503(8). The Yankton Sioux Tribe refused to recognize the Ponca blood of K.M.'s children in computing the blood degree of the children for eligibility in membership of the tribe, decided that K.M.'s children did not meet tribal criteria for membership in the Yankton Sioux Tribe, and, hence, concluded that all of [K.M.'s] children are not eligible for membership in the Yankton Sioux Tribe. For those reasons, and as a result of our de novo review of the record, we find that K.M.'s children are not eligible for membership in the Yankton Sioux Tribe and, consequently, the Indian Child Welfare Act did not apply to the proceedings to terminate K.M.'s parental rights. The State urges us to uphold the juvenile court's refusal to transfer the proceedings because P.M., the father of three of K.M.'s children, objected to the requested transfer. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) and § 43-1504(2). Other courts which have examined a parental objection to transfer of proceedings under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act have held that parental objection requires retention of the proceedings in a state court. See Matter of Juvenile Action No. JS-7359, 159 Ariz. 232, 766 P.2d 105 (App.1988); Matter of Welfare of R.I., 402 N.W.2d 173 (Minn.App.1987); In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168 (1982); Matter of S.Z., 325 N.W.2d 53 (S.D.1982). However, inasmuch as we have concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act is inapplicable to the present proceedings, consideration of parental objection is unnecessary. Hence, K.M.'s third assignment of error is without merit.