Opinion ID: 1205096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Refusal to Give Lingering Doubt Instruction

Text: Defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury as follows: It is appropriate for you to consider in mitigation any lingering doubts you may have concerning defendant's guilt. Lingering doubt is defined as that state of mind between a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubt. On defendant's initial request, the trial court declined to give the proffered instruction, believing it to be unsupported in law. On his renewed request, the court refused it as esentially unsupported in fact. The trial court did, however, instruct the jury to consider [a]ny other circumstances which extenuates [ sic ] the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. [ถ] And, any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. [ถ] You must disregard any jury instruction given to you in the guilt or innocence phase of this trial which conflicts with this principle. (See ง 190.3, factor (k).) Despite the trial court's refusal of the requested instruction, defense counsel argued the issue of lingering doubt to the jury, immediately after discussing section 190.3, factor (k). (48) Defendant now urges that the trial court's refusal to give the instruction requires reversal of his conviction. We disagree. A defendant has no federal or state constitutional right to have the penalty phase jury instructed to consider any residual doubt about defendant's guilt. ( Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 173-174 [101 L.Ed.2d 155, 165, 108 S.Ct. 2320]; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 677-678 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351].) This is not to say that the jury's consideration of any such doubt is improper; defendant may urge his possible innocence to the jury as a factor in mitigation. (ง 190.3, factors (a), (k); People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159, 1168 [80 Cal. Rptr. 920, 459 P.2d 248]; People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 145-147 [37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381].) Indeed, defense counsel did so in final argument in this case. Defendant argues that the right to argue his possible innocence is but a hollow formality if instructions supporting the theory of the defense are not given. (Cf. Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302, 328 [106 L.Ed.2d 256, 284, 109 S.Ct. 2934] [finding Eighth Amendment error in failure to instruct jury that it could consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of defendant's mental retardation and abused background].) Here, this requirement of supporting instructions was met by the expanded factor (k) instruction. ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 488 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610].) The trial court did not err in declining to give a more specific instruction on lingering doubt as a mitigating circumstance. ( Ibid. )