Opinion ID: 2495848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in its rulings on L.R.'s motions in limine.

Text: ¶ 23. L.R. argued pretrial that evidence of consent was barred by criminal statute. See Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-65(2) (Rev. 2006); Miss. R. Evid. 403. The trial court rejected this argument and denied the motion. In her arguments post-trial and on appeal, L.R. added a hearsay argument. Federation argues that L.R. has cited no relevant authority, thus, this Court need not review this issue. Federation asserts that: (1) the criminal statute is irrelevant to this civil suit; and (2) the hearsay argument comes too late and is not supported in the record. ¶ 24. This issue is a bit misleading, as Federation never attempted to disprove a crime occurred. It acknowledged throughout the trial and in jury instructions that L.R. was the victim of rape. Criminal statutes do not control evidentiary rulings in a civil trial, absent authority within the rules themselves. There being no such exception, the Rules of Civil Procedure control admissibility of evidence in this civil trial. Criminal and civil proceedings have different purposes. See Cynthia M. v. Rodney E., 228 Cal.App.3d 1040, 279 Cal.Rptr. 94, 97 (1991). Deterrence and punishment for criminal conduct are within the general province of our criminal law. The public's interests are sufficiently protected by imposition of criminal sanctions. See Zysk v. Zysk, 239 Va. 32, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1990). The dissent fails to address the fundamental unfairness of permitting civil litigants to obtain monetary judgments against nonperpetrators of the crime, while preventing the triers of facts from considering relevant evidence regarding damages and credibility. See LK v. Reed, 631 So.2d 604, 607 (La.Ct.App.1994); Doe v. Orangeburg County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 335 S.C. 556, 518 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1999). Civil actions for damages should be left to proceed under tort-law principles, addressing fault, damages, and credibility issues. See Doe v. Mama Taori's Premium Pizza, LLC, 2001 WL 327906, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Apr. 5, 2001). ¶ 25. L.R. asserts the following regarding hearsay: The only evidence that [Federation] presented that the relationship was consensual were the claims of the perpetrator. . . and inadmissible hearsay statements of neighbors of an `I thought . . .' nature as well as statements from therapy sessions where [L.R.] allegedly said that Tony Kelly told her he loved her. Under. . . [rules] 801 and 802 this testimony should have never been admitted. (Emphasis in original.) No hearsay objections were made during Kelly's deposition testimony, and the trial record reveals no objections when the deposition was read to the jury. The only neighbors to testify were Morris and Rev. Brown. Prior to Morris's deposition, the attorneys reserved all objections, except as to the form of the question. However, the trial record reveals no objections when Morris's deposition was read to the jury. Rev. Brown testified about the time Kelly and L.R. were in his apartment, but claimed he could not remember what anyone said. He was then asked about a signed police statement in which he stated that Kelly told him that L.R. liked Kelly. The trial court overruled a hearsay objection, as this was impeachment based on a prior inconsistent statement, but sustained an objection to admitting a copy of the statement into evidence. During Bishop's testimony, the trial court sustained two hearsay objections when Federation asked what L.R. had told another CAC employee. Thus, L.R.'s hearsay argument has no support in the record. ¶ 26. `[T]he burden is on the appellant to demonstrate why the lower court was in error[,]' and `we presume that the decisions of the lower courts are correct. . . .' Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C. v. Seay, 42 So.3d 474, 491-92 (Miss.2010) (quoting Oakwood Homes Corp. v. Randall, 824 So.2d 1292, 1294 (Miss.2002)). The well-recognized rule is that a trial court will not be put in error on appeal for a matter not presented to it for decision. Mills v. Nichols, 467 So.2d 924, 931 (Miss. 1985). ¶ 27. Federation argues that this Court should affirm the trial court ruling that allowed the evidence related to causation and relevant to damages. ( See supra ¶ 12.) Federation stresses that it is not asking this Court to hold that consent by a minor who is a victim of statutory rape constitutes an absolute defense to civil liability. (Emphasis in original.) Federation has chosen wisely, for the same public-policy argument made by Justice Kitchens in his dissent would dictate that Federation would fail in such an endeavor, as it conflicts with the majority view. See Bjerke v. Johnson, 727 N.W.2d 183, 193-94 (Minn.Ct.App.2007) (collecting cases). ¶ 28. However, its admissibility in a civil trial is a different issue. A New York court has held that, as statutory rape has no consent element, a defendant who has pleaded guilty to that crime should not be estopped from claiming consent at a civil trial. Stavroula S. v. Guerriera, 193 A.D.2d 796, 797, 598 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (N.Y.App.Div.1993). The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, collected cases showing the range of views on this issue. See Mama Taori's, 2001 WL 327906, at . Some jurisdictions have adopted a per se civil-liability rule that would prevent a trier-of-fact from considering consent. Id. at  n. 13. Other jurisdictions have held that a plaintiff's consent is relevant in civil proceedings and that the defendant may introduce evidence and cross-examine the plaintiff regarding this issue. [3] Id. at . Others go further and hold it fundamentally unfair to permit a civil litigant to obtain money damages while preventing the trier-of-fact from considering relevant evidence regarding damages and credibility. [4] Id. ¶ 29. This Court has held that a relationship between a perpetrator and a victim may be relevant in premises-liability cases, requiring the plaintiff to show that the landowner did more than provide the condition for the crime, but also to show that it impelled the crime. See Newell v. S. Jitney Jungle Co., 830 So.2d 621, 623-24 (Miss.2002); Davis v. Christian Bhd. Homes of Jackson, Miss., Inc., 957 So.2d 390, 405 (Miss.Ct.App.2007); Martin v. Rankin Circle Apartments, 941 So.2d 854, 864 (Miss.Ct.App.2006). The nature and extent of their overall relationship is in dispute (although no dispute exists as to the illegality of the rape). Given the conflicting evidence of the events before and after the sexual encounters, evidence of the acts and conduct of all involved was probative and relevant to liability, the duration and extent of damages claimed by the plaintiff, and credibility. ¶ 30. All can agree that L.R. suffered injury as a proximate result of the criminal acts of Tony Kelly, a nonparty. The jury found Federation liable, an issue not appealed. We can all agree that the issue of consent was irrelevant in the prosecution of Kelly for the crime of statutory rape. We can all agree that consent by a minor cannot be a bar to recovery, nor can it be posited as an affirmative defense. The acts and conduct surrounding the crimes were relevant to Federation's defense that it was not negligent and to prove that others' fault led to the plaintiff's damages. The trial judge was correct when he found that consent was not pertinent to the duty owed by the landowner, for rape was committed on the premises. Thus, he properly allowed the evidence and instructed the jury to determine whose conduct proximately caused L.R.'s injury and the nature and extent of L.R.'s damages. The jury heard conflicting testimony that L.R. not only called Kelly, but let him enter a back (or side) door to the building, as opposed to L.R.'s assertion that Kelly entered an unlocked door and subsequently threatened bodily harm to her father. Federation argues that it was within the exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the rape and accompanying claim of threats of violence to her father were less psychologically damaging. It was within the jury's exclusive province to reject L.R.'s claim of being unable to have sex after these encounters, based on evidence presented at trial. The disposition proposed in Justice Chandler's dissent would allow the jury to hear only the plaintiff's version of events and damages, and would preclude the defendants from presenting testimony to mitigate damages. ¶ 31. Jurors normally are instructed, as this jury was, that they are required and expected to use [their] common sense and sound honest judgment in considering and weighing the testimony of each witness. . . . The decision of the jury, exercising its common sense and sound honest judgment regarding the evidence it saw and heard firsthand, should not be overturned by a Court, assuming that evidence supporting the verdict is found in the record and that the jury is properly instructed. See Miller Transporters v. Guthrie, 554 So.2d 917, 918 (Miss.1989). ¶ 32. Without adopting a blanket rule allowing such evidence in all civil trials, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in determining that the actions and conduct of all involved were appropriate for consideration, given that the defendants did not plead consent: (1) as a bar to the action; (2) as an affirmative defense; or (3) to disprove that a crime occurred. The conflicting events leading up to and following the rapes were presented to the jury and were both relevant and probative to causation, damages, and credibility. Thus, we find no error by the trial court.
¶ 33. L.R. argued pretrial that this evidence should be excluded, as it violated Rule 412. See Miss. R. Evid. 412. In her post-trial motion and on appeal, she adds relevance arguments. The trial court denied the motion in limine, holding that Rule 412 applies only to criminal trials, and further, that the evidence was relevant to L.R.'s claim of damages. Federation argues that relevance need not be considered by this Court, as an objection on only one ground (Rule 412) waives objection on all other grounds (including Rule 403). See Burns v. State, 729 So.2d 203, 219 (Miss.1998), abrogated on another issue by Pitchford v. State, 45 So.3d 216, 246 (Miss. 2010); Gary v. State, 796 So.2d 1054, 1056 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). ¶ 34. Rule 412(a) is as follows: [I]n a criminal case in which a person is accused of a sexual offense against another person, reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such sexual offense is not admissible. Miss. R. Evid. 412(a) (emphasis added). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion on this ground. ¶ 35. Federation asserts waiver for failure to argue relevance pretrial. However, a trial court is to consider relevance in all evidentiary decisions. Even were we not to apply the procedural bar, L.R.'s argument still misses the mark, for L.R. argues that this evidence is irrelevant to Federation's duty to secure the building, an issue not raised on appeal. Federation argued and the trial court ruled that the evidence was relevant to L.R.'s damages. In neither her post-trial motion nor her appellate brief does L.R. address its relevance vel non to damages. We find that L.R. failed to (1) argue the issue, (2) cite relevant authority, or (3) overcome the presumption of a correct decision. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, the evidence here was relevant. The jury received the testimony of L.R.'s psychiatric expert that the prior molestation had not harmed her and that all of her psychiatric problems had resulted from Kelly's actions. However, the jury was not bound by this testimony. Credibility and weight accorded to expert testimony, like all witness testimony, is a decision for the jury. See Smith v. State, 925 So.2d 825, 839 (Miss.2006). The jury, exercising its common sense and sound honest judgment could have found the prior molestation to be relevant to the determination of L.R.'s damages. Thus, we find that L.R.'s assertion of error is without merit, as a prior injury is relevant to damages if pertinent to a plaintiff's damage claim. See Boyd v. Smith, 390 So.2d 994, 998 (Miss.1980).
¶ 36. L.R. asserts that the trial court erred by denying her motion. The trial court granted the motion. Testimony regarding L.R.'s subsequent sexual history was introduced by L.R. during her direct examination of Dr. Wood Hiatt. This Court need go no further in reviewing this assignment of error. ¶ 37. We find no error.