Opinion ID: 683902
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Restrictions and Monitoring of Communications

Text: 12 It is fundamental that [p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). The Supreme Court, however, has afforded considerable deference to the determinations of prison administrators who, in the interest of security, regulate the relations between prisoners and the outside world. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408 (1989). 13 Lee's complaint asserts that defendants violated his constitutional rights by (1) opening and censoring his incoming mail; (2) restricting his ability to communicate with family and friends; (3) offering money to fellow inmates to serve as informers; (4) providing only one room in which he could consult with his attorney; and (5) denying him meaningful access to the jail law library. Lee contends that the district court improperly dismissed these claims. We disagree. 14 It is well settled that a prison mail policy does not violate the Constitution if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Here, a review of the record demonstrates that Lee has failed to produce any evidence suggesting that the Jail's mail policy was unrelated to a legitimate penological interest. 4 As such, the district court appropriately granted summary judgment on this claim. 15 Lee also claims that he was denied the right to receive visitors and to otherwise communicate with people outside the Jail. But the record is devoid of any evidence discussing these allegations beyond the conclusory statements in Lee's complaint and motion papers. The district court therefore did not err in dismissing this claim on defendants' motion for summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (conclusory allegations, without more, cannot withstand a summary judgment motion). 16 Next, Lee asserts that defendants paid other inmates to eavesdrop on his conversations and to gather evidence against him. This allegation finds no support in the record. Indeed, during his deposition, Lee conceded that he had no proof that informants were placed in his jail cell. Lee's claim was therefore properly rejected on summary judgment. 17 Lee further stated during his deposition that a room was provided for prisoners to consult with their attorneys, but because the room was often in use, he had to consult with his attorney in an open area where other inmates and prison officials could hear the conversations. 5 However, Lee was unable to specify any conversations that were actually overheard, nor did he produce evidence that this alleged lack of privacy infringed his right to effective assistance of counsel. As such, the district court did not err when granting summary judgment on this claim. 18 The Constitution does not require unlimited prisoner access to law libraries. Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir.1985). Rather, prison officials may regulate law library access, including time, place and manner of access, taking into account the administrative needs of the institution. Lindquist, 776 F.2d at 858. Again, the only references in the record supporting this claim are Lee's general and conclusory allegations that he was denied law library access. Because Lee fails to specify the manner in which defendants restricted his access to the LPCJ law library, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for defendants.