Opinion ID: 775794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Evidence Presented on the Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: 27 Defendants argue that the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiffs received the ERJAC decision on May 10, 1999. In support of this position, they point to the language on the preprinted ERJAC form that was sent to the plaintiffs, which reads, in part, that a decision of the ERJAC will be final, conclusive and binding with no appeal and that neither party [would] attempt through any overt acts, to void the decision rendered. Since plaintiffs filed their claim on May 16, 2000, defendants argue that the six-month statute of limitations period had already run and the suit was time-barred. The District Court agreed with this conclusion, reasoning that the language in the ERJAC decision provided the required notice that the union would no longer proceed with the grievance. 28 Were this the only communication between the plaintiffs and the union prior to filing the present lawsuit in May 2000, the outcome would be clear. However, we believe that additional correspondence that was presented to the District Court and is in the appellate record creates an issue of material fact as to the time at which it became clear or should have become clear to the plaintiffs that further union appeals would be futile, thus commencing the statute of limitations period. The parties came to an agreement on the documents that were before the District Court on the motion to dismiss. This agreement states, in part, that [a]ll documents in or attached to Supporting Affidavits and Documents to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and [a]ll documents contained in or attached to Conformed Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Signed Supporting Affidavit Verifications of Plaintiffs were before the District Court. We find this satisfactory. Excluding the documents attached to the motion for reconsideration for the reasons discussed above, these documents comprise the record on appeal. 29 Among these documents are letters from some of the plaintiffs to Virtue. In particular, on May 16, 1999, plaintiff Snyder wrote to Virtue, stating in relevant part, I feel that my grievance contains different facts than the one it was placed and heard under, therefore I am requesting that you as my representative make any or all appeals that are offered to me as a union member under the contract of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. [A289]. On that same day, plaintiff Minich wrote a letter to Virtue with exactly the same request. [A252]. Most important in the record, on June 7, 1999, plaintiff Ramirez wrote to Virtue, stating Pursuant to a letter dated May 20, 1999, you forwarded my appeal to International.... please advise me immediately of my rights to a statement, presentation of evidence, and/or participating in this appeal process that I may have of right so as to enable to [sic] rectify the injustice imposed on me to date. [A337]. This letter indicates that Virtue told plaintiff Ramirez that his appeal had been forwarded for review. See supra note 4. 30 This letter was followed by a letter on June 9, 1999 from plaintiff Erdman to Virtue, which stated, Please be advised that by this letter I am formally requesting an opportunity to participate in the process of formulating an argument in support of my appeal.... Please inform me rightly as to what my rights are to personally defend myself in this appeal process as I have had bias [sic] representation to date and have been unjustly treated. [A198]. Plaintiff Welker sent two letters to Virtue on June 7 and June 25, 1999, which both stated that he was requesting an opportunity to participate in the process of formulating an argument in support of my appeal. [A304]. 31 From this correspondence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, in this case the plaintiffs, it is apparent that the plaintiffs reasonably believed that Virtue was undertaking an appeal for some of them. Moreover, subsequent letters from five other plaintiffs indicate that their appeals had been forwarded as well, as they requested the right to participate in those appeals. At all events, under the summary judgment standard it cannot be said that it was clear (or clear to the plaintiffs) that further union appeals would be futile when Virtue gave these plaintiffs the impression that their grievances were on appeal. We cannot conclude, therefore, that the ERJAC decision, even with the boilerplate language, was the end of the grievance process for these plaintiffs and a date certain from which we can calculate the statute of limitations. 9 32 In this regard, we also take note of the affidavits submitted to the District Court in opposition to the motion to dismiss. We are mindful that documents merely referred to in these affidavits, but which were not attached to such affidavits, cannot be considered either by the District Court or by this court. Pursuant to Rule 56(e), [s]worn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. (Emphasis added). However, we may consider the affidavits themselves, which do not entirely depend on the documents. In doing so, we note that the affidavits further elucidate what is suggested in the aforementioned correspondence. In plaintiff Snyder's affidavit, he states that, on May 20, 1999, Virtue replied to our request for any and all appeals sent. [A279]. Furthermore, in almost every affidavit presented in opposition to the motion to dismiss, the affiant states, My grievance followed the same grievance history and treated the same as Mr. Snyder's (i.e., it was denied as untimely by the company, referred to the Eastern Conference, it was denied by the Conference and then referred to Phil Young, Freight Director, it's on appeal and then referred to the NGB where it is pending at this time). (Emphasis added). [A 174, 186, 194, 229, 240, 247, 259, 277]. 33 Given this record, we cannot conclude that it was clear to the plaintiffs that further union appeals would be futile. 10 The requests made to Virtue evidence a sincere belief by the plaintiffs that appeals of their grievances were underway and, from the record, it appears that Virtue did undertake appeals on behalf of the plaintiffs (and that he had the authority to do so, notwithstanding the preprinted language on the ERJAC decision, see supra note 9). At the very least, he gave the impression that he did. Moreover, there is no evidence before us that suggests that these appeals have been resolved; the record does not indicate that he gave the plaintiffs any information on the progress of their appeals. Thus, it does not appear from the record that there exists a date certain on which we can say the statute of limitations began to run; it is not clear that the plaintiffs had notice that the union w[ould] proceed no further with the grievances. Hersh v. Allen Prods. Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1985). Hence, we cannot conclude that the Union was entitled to summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, and we will therefore vacate the summary judgment order of the District Court and remand for further proceedings.