Opinion ID: 2584939
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Factor (a) and Racial Bias

Text: Defendant argues that because section 190.3, factor (a) permits the jury at the penalty phase to consider the circumstances of the crime, but fails to provide guidance as to the scope of the factor, the jurors were impermissibly permitted to consider their own racial biases in deciding whether to return a death judgment against him. Specifically, defendant does not maintain that the vagueness of factor (a) renders the jury's decision unconstitutional. Instead, [his] argument is that because factor (a) is open-ended, when a jury bases its decision on racial grounds, as was very likely the case here, the resulting sentence is unconstitutional. In support of his supposition that it was very likely the jury in his case base[d] its decision on racial grounds, he points to the fact that Deputy Perrigo was White, whereas he is a member of a minority race (Hispanic). Defendant proposed no instructions in the trial court along the lines he now suggests should have been given to combat what he perceives was a likelihood of racial prejudice in the proceedings below. Nor does he specify on appeal exactly what, in the way of further guidance, should have been delivered to the jury through supplemental instructions directly concerning section 190.3, factor (a). Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1, has been found by the high court not to violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by allowing arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. ( Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 975-976.) This court likewise has repeatedly found that factor (a) is neither impermissibly vague nor overbroad, and does not result in an arbitrary and capricious penalty determination. ( People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 365; People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 574; Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 439; People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 394; Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1050-1053 [factor (a) provides adequate guidance to a jury in capital sentencing].) We perceive no basis on which to reverse the judgment based on defendant's largely speculative claim that further guidance in the way of supplemental instructions should have been provided to the jury with specific regard to section 190.3, factor (a).