Opinion ID: 1256305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contempt Powers

Text: Although Hawai`i case law provides some guidance, the law of civil contempt has not been fully articulated. In instances where Hawai`i case law and statutes are silent, this court can look to parallel federal law for guidance. Gold v. Harrison, 88 Hawai`i 94, 104, 962 P.2d 353, 363, (1998) (quoting State v. Ontai, 84 Hawai`i 56, 61, 929 P.2d 69, 74 (1996) (quoting Price v. Obayashi Hawai`i Corp., 81 Hawai`i 171, 181, 914 P.2d 1364, 1374 (1996))).
Neither the civil nor criminal contempt powers of the federal courts derive from statute. The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power. Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 86 U.S. 505, 510, 22 L.Ed. 205 (1873); see Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987). Likewise, the constitutional courts of Hawai`i possess the inherent power of contempt. Kukui Nuts of Hawai`i, Inc., 6 Haw. App. at 436, 726 P.2d at 271 (noting that the power to issue contempt sanctions is an inherent power of the trial courts to do those things necessary for the proper administration of justice); Application of Balucan, 44 Haw. 271, 353 P.2d 631 (1960) (holding that [t]he power of summary punishment for [criminal] contempt is an inherent power of a constitutional court (citing Onomea Sugar Co. v. Austin, 5 Haw. 604 (1886))). Although the power to punish for contempt is an inherent power of the courts, the legislature may establish alternative procedures and penalties that do not unduly restrict or abrogate the courts' contempt powers. See Young, 481 U.S. at 799, 107 S.Ct. 2124; Walker v. Bentley, 678 So.2d 1265, 1267 (Fla.1996) (holding that [a]ny legislative enactment that purports to do away with the inherent power of contempt directly affects a separate and distinct function of the judicial branch, and, as such, violates the separation of powers doctrine ... of the Florida Constitution); State ex rel. Lanning v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348, 4 N.W. 390 (1880), reaffirmed in State v. Lehman, 137 Wis.2d 65, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987); In the Interest of J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508 (Colo.1991) (holding that a statute that was amended to abrogate a court's power to incarcerate juveniles who act in violation of a court order was unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers doctrine); In re Baker, 71 Ill.2d 480, 17 Ill.Dec. 676, 376 N.E.2d 1005 (1978) (holding that a court may impose incarceration for contempt in juvenile proceedings despite statute requiring a different means of enforcing a court order); cf. Balucan, 44 Haw. at 277, 353 P.2d at 635 (noting that Revised Laws of Hawai`i § 269-5 (1955), required that the circumstances of contempt be set forth in the judgment and mittimus). In distinguishing criminal from civil contempt, a court's inquiry is focused upon the character and purpose of punishment and not upon the punishment itself. Hawaii Pub. Employment Relations Bd. v. United Public Workers, Local 646, AFSCME, AFLCIO, 66 Haw. 461, 479, 667 P.2d 783, 795 (1983) (citing Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369-70, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966) (quoting Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911))). In United Public Workers, this court adopted the Shillitani Court's test for distinguishing criminal contempt from civil contempt, i.e., What does the court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing sentence? 66 Haw. at 479, 667 P.2d at 795. The primary purpose of criminal contempt is to punish past defiance of a court's judicial authority, thereby vindicating the court. Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 369, 86 S.Ct. 1531. In contrast, civil contempt may be characterized as a court's desire to compel obedience to a court order, Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 370, 86 S.Ct. 1531, or to compensate the contemnor's adversary for injuries that result from noncompliance. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 448-449, 31 S.Ct. 492; see United Public Workers, 66 Haw. at 479, 667 P.2d at 795 (quoting Hawaii Pub. Employment Relations Bd. v. Hawaii State Teachers Ass'n, 55 Haw. 386, 392, 520 P.2d 422, 426-27 (1974) (citations omitted)). In other words, there are essentially two forms of civil contempt coercive and compensatory. See, e.g., United Public Workers, 66 Haw. at 479, 667 P.2d at 795. Although civil contempt is often associated with a purge provision whereby contemnors may purge themselves of a fine or sanction by complying with the court's order, a sanction or fine without a purge provision is also considered to be remedial and civil, and not punitive and criminal, if paid to the complainant and not to the court. See Poston v. Poston, 331 S.C. 106, 502 S.E.2d 86, 89 (1998); Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir.1946). A contempt adjudication is also considered to be civil in nature when the sanction is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public. McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64, 59 S.Ct. 685, 83 L.Ed. 1108 (1939); see Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 778 (9th Cir.1983). The confusion between civil and criminal contempt arises as a result of civil contempt often having the incidental effect of vindicating the court's authority, while, conversely, criminal contempt may permit the movant to derive the incidental benefit of preventing future noncompliance. See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443, 31 S.Ct. 492. However, these incidental effects do not change the primary purpose of either type of contempt. [8] Id.
In order to resolve the issues raised by Leander and the LeMays, we must first address whether the district court erred in concluding that Leander had alleged civil contempt as a matter of law. The LeMays argue that the district court erred in concluding that Leander had even alleged contempt in the first instance. Without pointing to any supporting authority, the LeMays insist that Leander's OSC motion was brought exclusively under HRS § 604-10.5 for the simple reason that the Injunction form provided that it was issued pursuant to HRS § 604-10.5. The LeMays also contend that construing Leander's pleading as one for civil contempt would eviscerate the enforcement provisions of [HRS § ] 604-10.5 and would run contrary to the intent and authority of [HRS § ] 604-10.5. The LeMays' arguments demonstrate the current confusion over the relationship between HRS §§ 604-10.5 and 710-1077. The original text of HRS § 604-10.5(h) (Supp.1987) demonstrates that violations of injunctions issued pursuant to this statute were treated as either criminal contempt under section 710-1077 or civil contempt. See HRS § 710-1077(6) (recognizing the courts inherent power of contempt). Until amended in 1992, HRS § 604-10.5(h) (1991) specifically stated that wilful violations of orders issued under this section shall be punishable as criminal contempt under HRS § 710-1077. In 1992, the Legislature amended HRS § 604-10.5 by deleting the cross-reference to HRS § 710-1077 and, in its place, made knowing violations of an injunction issued pursuant to HRS § 604-10.5 a misdemeanor offense with mandatory penalty provisions for second and subsequent violations of that injunction. 1992 Haw. Sess. L. Act 291, § 1 at 751-52 (codified as amended at HRS § 604-10.5(h)). [9] The purpose of the amendment was to eliminate the district court's discretion to treat violations of HRS § 604-10.5 injunctions as petty misdemeanors and to mandate that such violations be dealt with as full misdemeanors. See Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 45, in 1992 House Journal, at 809; Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 68-92, in 1992 House Journal, at 921; Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2577, in 1992 Senate Journal, at 1151. Therefore, the amendment, codified as amended at HRS § 604-10.5(h), designated the violation of an injunction issued pursuant to HRS § 604-10.5 as a criminal offense wholly separate from criminal contempt under HRS § 710-1077. See Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai`i 217, 221-22, 941 P.2d 300, 304-05 (1997) (noting that `[a] rational, sensible and practicable interpretation [of a statute] is preferred to one which is unreasonable or impracticable' (brackets in original) (quoting State v. Lobendahn, 71 Haw. 111, 112, 784 P.2d 872, 873 (1989)); cf. HRS §§ 586-4 (Supp.1998), 586-5.5 (Supp.1998), and 586-11 (1993) (charging criminal defendants who violate the temporary restraining orders and protective orders of the family court with a criminal offense in violation of chapter 586, not criminal contempt in violation of HRS § 710-1077). Inasmuch as the legislature has chosen to criminalize knowing violations of HRS § 604-10.5 injunctions and to allow the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney to prosecute such violations under HRS § 604-10.5(h), we will not interfere with such legislative decisions. See Trustees of OHA v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 172, 737 P.2d 446, 456-57 (1987) (recognizing the inappropriateness of judicial intrusion into matters which concern the political branch of government (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we hold that, because only the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney is vested with the authority to enforce the criminal provisions of HRS § 604-10.5(h), Leander, as a private party, could not have brought an enforcement action under HRS § 604-10.5(h). [10] Notwithstanding the legislature's amendment of HRS § 604-10.5, the courts' inherent contempt powers to find violators of its orders in civil contempt were not and cannot be abrogated or unduly restricted. See, e.g., Young, 481 U.S. at 799, 107 S.Ct. 2124; Walker, 678 So.2d at 1267. The LeMays fail to recognize the well settled principle that violation of a court order or injunction may always be addressed as civil contempt of court. [11] See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 319 (6th ed. 1990) (Contempt of court is committed by one, who being under the court's authority as a party to a proceeding therein, willfully disobeys its lawful orders or fails to comply with an undertaking which he has [been] given.). Leander's OSC motion, despite being inartfully pled, alleged a violation of the Injunction, which, by definition, is the functional equivalent of contempt. Pursuant to its inherent power of contempt, the district court could address whether the LeMays were in contempt for alleged violations of the Injunction, but was not required to address the issue as a criminal offense in violation of HRS § 604-10.5. The LeMays' argument, therefore, is without merit. We further point out that Leander's OSC motion petitioned the district court to order the LeMays to pay the costs of the... survey, his attorney's fees and costs, and further sanction[s] by the [district court] as the [c]ourt deems proper and just. Normally, in determining whether a contempt proceeding is, as a matter of law, civil contempt and not criminal contempt, an appellate court does not rely upon the district court's or parties' characterization, but rather must undertake de novo review based upon the character and purpose of the remedy or punishment. Hawaii Pub. Employment Relations Bd. v. United Public Workers, Local 646, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 66 Haw. 461, 479, 667 P.2d 783, 795 (1983) (citations omitted). Although the district court did not issue a contempt citation in this case, the record, in our view, demonstrates that Leander primarily sought reimbursement for the cost of the survey as his primary remedy. In addition, because Leander requested that the fine be paid to him, and not the court, there is little doubt that the requested relief, if granted, was solely compensatory and, thus, remedial in nature. See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 449, 31 S.Ct. 492; United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 304, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947) (noting that, where compensation is intended, the fine imposed is payable to the contemnor's adversary). Applying the principles of contempt to Leander's primary prayer for relief, it is clear that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it construed Leander's pleading as one for civil contempt. Although the district court found that Leander's pleading alleged civil contempt, Leander contends that the district court erred in concluding that its authority for civil contempt derives from HRS § 710-1077. HRS § 710-1077, entitled Criminal Contempt of Court, prescribes the procedures and penalties governing criminal contempt. [12] Contrary to the district court's conclusion in this case, HRS § 710-1077 does not provide the remedy or procedures for civil contempt, nor does it grant or limit the court's civil contempt powers. See HRS § 710-1077(6) (Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the court's power to punish civil contempt.). However, to the extent that HRS § 710-1077 purports to grant courts either criminal or civil contempt powers, the statute is merely a legislative restatement of the courts' existing powers. Cf. Kukui Nuts of Hawaii, 6 Haw.App. at 438, 726 P.2d at 272 (holding that HRS § 603-21.9(6), which provides that the circuit courts have the power to enter judgments, decrees, orders, and mandates necessary to carry into full effect the powers given to them by law, was merely a legislative restatement that trial courts possess the inherent power, including contempt, to do those things necessary for the proper administration of justice). Therefore, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that its authority to sanction the LeMays for their alleged civil contempt arose under HRS § 710-1077 and not its inherent powers. However, we further hold that such error did not affect the outcome of the civil contempt proceeding.