Opinion ID: 6498778
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Barseghyan’s ability to leave the country

Text: The IJ and BIA relied upon third a purported inconsistency about whether the police were looking for Barseghyan when he left the country. On direct examination, Barseghyan stated that the police wanted to “see” him again and said they would call him back for more questioning. On cross-examination, the government attempted to cast doubt on this statement by emphasizing that other government officials at the airport allowed him to leave the country. Barseghyan explained that at that time, the police were not actively looking for him, and he “could leave the country.” We agree with Barseghyan that this is not an inconsistency that supports an adverse credibility determination. The fact that the police were aware of Barseghyan’s phone number and address, and that he came to the police station for questioning the last time they called him, supports his answer that the police wanted to see him again but were “not looking” for him. In Chouchkov v. I.N.S., 220 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000), we held that substantial evidence did not support the BIA’s decision where the BIA assumed the Russian KGB and the police “are all on the same page and operate with seamless efficiency” and were working “in tandem.” Similarly here, that other government officials allowed Barseghyan to board a plane does not make his testimony inconsistent. 4. Barseghyan’s display of anti-government artwork The BIA also relied upon an inconsistency regarding whether Barseghyan distributed the anti-government 12 BARSEGHYAN V. GARLAND drawings at a bazaar or traveled around to many villages with the drawings. The BIA erred in relying on this inconsistency because the IJ did not rely on it. See Zumel v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 463, 475 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he BIA may review an IJ’s factual findings only to determine whether the findings are clearly erroneous . . . [T]he BIA may not make its own findings or rely on its own interpretation of the facts.”) (citation and internal quotation omitted). But even if we considered it, this inconsistency does not support the adverse credibility determination because it is not actually inconsistent. Barseghyan’s oral and written testimony describe that in the weeks leading up to the election, he was “going around and reminding people” of the government’s violence and corruption, and the first time that his anti-government drawings caused a problem was when he showed them at a bazaar on January 19, 2013. The government manufactures a discrepancy by characterizing the factual situation as an “either/or” situation: either Barseghyan traveled around to villages, or he showed the drawings at a single bazaar. On crossexamination, the government asserted that Barseghyan’s “written statement says that you just showed those [drawings] to people at the bazaar” and asked him to explain. Like with the first inconsistency, the government again added something to Barseghyan’s written declaration that is not actually contained in it. Barseghyan’s testimony consistently and sufficiently explained that in the weeks leading up to the election, he was going around and reminding people of the government’s corruption, and that the first time he had a problem showing the drawings was on January 23, a few days after showing them at a bazaar. This inconsistency does not support an adverse credibility determination for yet another reason: the BIA did BARSEGHYAN V. GARLAND 13 not provide a specific reason for rejecting Barseghyan’s reasonable explanation for it. Before relying upon a purported inconsistency to make an adverse credibility determination, the fact finder must provide the applicant with an opportunity to explain each inconsistency. Rizk, 629 F.3d at 1088. If the applicant gives a “reasonable and plausible” explanation, the fact finder must state a “specific and cogent” reason for rejecting it. Id. Here, the BIA explained that it “agree[d] with the Immigration Judge” that Barseghyan’s explanation “is not persuasive.” This mischaracterizes the record, as the IJ made no such finding. But even if the BIA had not relied upon a statement the IJ did not make, neither the BIA nor the IJ provided a “specific and cogent” reason for rejecting what appears to be a “reasonable and plausible” explanation from Barseghyan. Id.