Opinion ID: 8704909
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District of Columbia Long Arm Statute

Text: Where subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the District’s long arm statute determines whether there is a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendants. D.C.Code § 13^23 (2001); Crane, 894 F.2d at 455. The long arm statute provides, in relevant part, that “[a] District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly, or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s ... transacting any business in the District of Columbia[.]”. D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(l) (2001). For a plaintiff to establish personal jurisdiction, she must establish that both the forum state’s jurisdictional statute confers such jurisdiction, and that such exercise is in accord with the due process standard. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(l)(A); Lewy v. S. Poverty Law Ctr., Inc., 723 F.Supp.2d 116, 122 (D.D.C.2010). The District’s long arm statute is coextensive with the constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction, Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C.Cir.1987), and thus requires that “non-resident defendants have certain minimum contacts with the forum state, so that the exercise of jurisdiction does hot offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 205 (D.C.Cir.2004); Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 382 (9th Cir.1990). Section 13-423 further provides that “[wjhen jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only claims for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.” § 13 — 423(b). In the District, for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction under the “transacting business” provision in § 13-423(a)(l) and in accordance with the extensive application of the long arm statute under the due process clause, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the District. Because § 13-423(a)(l) is limited by § 13-423(b), this court is limited to exercising specific jurisdiction in that § 13-423(b) disallows “claims that do not relate to the acts that form the basis for personal jurisdiction.” Brunson v. Kalil & Co., Inc., 404 F.Supp.2d 221, 227 (D.D.C.2005) (citing Schwartz v. CDI Japan, Ltd., 938 F.Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C.1996)). Under the general jurisdiction conferred by the long arm statute, the plaintiff must meet a three-pronged test as to not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice. The plaintiff must prove that that the defendant (1) transacted business in the District; 4 (2) that the claim arose from the business transacted in the District; and (3) that the defendant “had minimum contacts with the District of Columbia such that the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 786 F.Supp. 65, 71 (D.D.C.1992), overruled on other grounds, (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154). The minimum contacts test will only be satisfied if the defendants “purposefully avail[ed]” themselves “of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum,” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985), and if litigation in the forum is consistent with fair play and substantial justice, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).