Opinion ID: 31514
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Human Resources Documents

Text: 24 Jackson and Taylor next direct the Court to two personnel documents authored by the City which Jackson and Taylor contend confer a general property interest upon all City employees that complete the probationary period. The first of these documents, dubbed the Policy Document, states: 25 Property Rights: Upon completion of the probationary period, an employee is said to have a property right to their [sic] position. This means that the City cannot remove you from your position without due process. Due process requires that an employee be given specific notice of the reason of termination or other disciplinary action affecting the employee's property right. 26 Jackson and Taylor point to this language and suggest that the City has created a blanket property interest. However, Jackson and Taylor overlook the relevant qualification contained in a section of the Policy Document germanely entitled Grievance/Disciplinary Appeal Process and which unequivocally states: 27 Specifics [regarding the steps of the appeals process] are noted in the City Personnel Rules in Section 34-38, Grievance and Appeal Procedures. 28 Rule 34-38 of the City Personnel Rules appears in the City Personnel Rules under Article VI, which governs the Discipline, Grievance, and Appeal Procedures for City employees. Rule 34-38 specifically addresses the Grievance and Appeal Procedures and provides in relevant part: 29 (A) Applicability. This section applies to every permanent city employee except: 30 (1) a department director, assistant department director or other managerial personnel designated by the city council in accordance with Section 11, Chapter XVI of the city charter. 31 Thus, the personnel rule which outlines the right of appeal for City employees is unequivocally consistent with Section 11, Chapter XVI of the City Charter in expressly excluding managerial level employees such as Jackson and Taylor from the general right of appeal. As the Policy Document incorporates Rule 34-38 by reference, we find that in authoring the Policy Document, the City consistently excluded managerial employees from the general right of appeal, and consequently the Policy Document cannot serve as a source for creating a property interest in managerial level positions. 32 Similarly, Jackson and Taylor direct the Court to another human resources document, dubbed the Kress Document, which also outlines the City's official personnel policies regarding the probationary period, and grievance and appeal processes. The Kress Document states: 33 The Dallas City Charter creates a property interest for employees who satisfactorily serve a probationary period. Having attained a property interest an employee is entitled to certain procedural protections before his employment may be terminated or seriously impacted. 34 However, the Kress Document, too, incorporates Rule 34-38 by reference in describing the appeal procedures. 5 Therefore we find that the Kress Document is also consistent with the bi-level approach adopted by Section 11 of the City Charter which excludes managerial employees from the right of appeal. 35 In sum, we find nothing in the sources presented us which vested Jackson and Taylor with a legitimate right to continued employment. Indeed we instead find that in each of the documents before this Court, the City has laudably balanced its obligation to inform its non-executive rank employees of their due process rights, while carefully and quite appropriately retaining the City's right to remove, without impediment, high-ranking officers. It is both proper and desirable that the City should preserve its ability to act as a political body and reorder its municipal leadership when the public welfare so requires, and the City certainly does not forfeit that right by extending a property interest to its non-executive employees. 36 Therefore, as the City did not act to confer a property interest to their executive-rank employees, we conclude that Jackson and Taylor were, at the time of their demotion, employees at-will, and the City was free to discharge them without cause. 6