Opinion ID: 1855013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: asserted constitutional violations

Text: ¶ 25. Blueprint's next contention is that this statutory prohibition against nonlawyers signing and filing a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation is unconstitutional. We disagree. Blueprint's first constitutional argument is that the any suitor provision of art. I, sec. 21(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution entitles a corporation to represent itself. Our courts have already rejected this view. See S.Y. v. Eau Claire County, 162 Wis. 2d 320, 329, 469 N.W.2d 836 (1991). There we said that the phrase in proper person contained within art. I, sec. 21(2) merely means that an individual may prosecute or defend by personally representing himself or herself and no one else. In S.Y. we said nothing about the ability of a corporation to represent itself through a nonlawyer. [18] ¶ 26. The court of appeals has flatly stated that under art. I, sec. 21(2), every natural person in Wisconsin has an absolute right to appear pro se. Hlavinka v. Blunt, Ellis & Loewi, Inc., 174 Wis. 2d 381, 394, 497 N.W.2d 756 (1993). Blueprint's asserted construction of the term any suitor does not establish the right of a corporation to be represented by a nonlawyer before a court of law. A corporation is not a natural person, and therefore, Blueprint cannot fall within the term any suitor for purposes of corporate self-representation. ¶ 27. Blueprint also claims that a statute prohibiting corporations from self-representation would violate the constitutional rights to obtain justice freely, [17] to equal protection under the law, and to due process. [18] We disagree. Thirty years ago we faced similar assertions by a nonlawyer executor in probate proceedings. The executor had submitted matters to the county court for adjudication, and we agreed with the court that the executor's conduct was not an appearance merely on his own behalf, but was also a representation of others. State ex rel. Baker v. County Court of Rock County, 29 Wis. 2d 1, 18-19, 138 N.W.2d 162 (1965). The county court judge refused presentation of certain papers by the executor because under the circumstances, that presentation constituted the unauthorized practice of law. 29 Wis. 2d at 10-11. We affirmed the lower court's ruling because we viewed the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law as a reasonable regulation in the public interest of orderly judicial administration. Id. at 11. This reasoning also applied to the executor's claim that requiring representation by a lawyer violated the Equal Protection Clause. ¶ 28. In Baker, we also rejected the executor's claims that he was denied the right to obtain justice freely. The executor argued that he should not be forced to pay for counsel. We said that art. I, sec. 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not guarantee that a litigant will incur no expense, rather it prohibits bribes or arbitrary payments to officials in order to obtain justice. 29 Wis. 2d at 12. [19] ¶ 29. Contrary to Blueprint's assertions, it is not a violation of a corporation's due process rights when a court refuses to allow the corporation to be represented by a person not licensed to practice law in Wisconsin. See State v. Olexa, 136 Wis. 2d 475, 402 N.W.2d 733 (Ct. App. 1987) (due process rights not violated because only a member of the Wisconsin bar or someone accompanied by a member of the bar may appear on behalf of another in Wisconsin courts). Blueprint's constitutional arguments are without merit. Thus, we answer the first question in our two-step analysis Yes. A notice of appeal filed on behalf of a corporation must be signed by a lawyer. The notice of appeal is defective if it is signed by a nonlawyer on behalf of a corporation. To hold otherwise would condone the unauthorized practice of law, in contravention of our statutes.