Opinion ID: 1124226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Except for the statement Toni Brown testified she heard Dedeaux make at the very beginning of the trouble that evening that he (Dedeaux) was going to whip him (Turner), the uncontradicted evidence shows that Turner was the aggressor, and continued the aggressor throughout the difficulty until he was shot. [1] The record is also uncontradicted that Turner while armed with a pistol had made previous threats against the life of Dedeaux. Because Dedeaux was authorized under the law to act upon reasonable appearances as well as actual danger, the fact that Turner was unarmed does not deprive him of his claim of necessary self-defense. Bond v. State, 249 Miss. 352, 162 So.2d 510, 512 (1964); Lee v. State, 232 Miss. 717, 723, 100 So.2d 358, 361 (1958). Did Dedeaux have good reason to be afraid for his life that night? Unless we ignore uncontradicted testimony, he certainly did. The majority ignores the rule of law that it is not incumbent upon an accused to prove that he acted in necessary self-defense, but to the contrary the burden is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the slaying he did not act in necessary self-defense, and if there is a reasonable doubt thereasto, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. In Scott v. State, 203 Miss. 349, 34 So.2d 718, 719 (1948), we held: It was not required of appellant to prove that he acted in justifiable self-defense, but only that he raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt of the charge against him, unjustifiable homicide. In Sloan v. State, 368 So.2d 228, 229 (Miss. 1979), we held: The burden of proof in a criminal case never shifts from the State to the defendant. The State is required to prove every material element of the indictment beyond reasonable doubt. Likewise, the defendant is not required to prove that he acted in self-defense, and, if a reasonable doubt of his guilt arises from the evidence, including the evidence of self-defense, he must be acquitted. Accord Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 843 (Miss. 1991). The dubious testimony of Brown that Dedeaux made the initial threat does not deprive Dedeaux of a claim of self-defense, because the undisputed testimony of all witnesses is that following this initial statement, Dedeaux was in continuous retreat from Turner. Nor, as above stated, does the fact that Turner was in fact unarmed deprive Dedeaux of such claim. Carolyn D. Lee's statement to the police on the night of the slaying, offered into evidence on cross-examination, suggests that Dedeaux was fed up with Turner. According to this statement, during the affray, Dedeaux asked her for the keys to her trunk, and when she asked why, he said, I'm tired of this guy picking on me, way he picks at me so. Unfortunately for the State, Lee's unsworn pretrial statement cannot be considered as substantive evidence. This was the law prior to our adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Hall v. State, 250 Miss. 253, 264, 165 So.2d 345, 350 (1964): [E]vidence of extra judicial statements made by a witness who is not a party ... is admissible only to impeach of discredit the witness and is not competent as substantive evidence of the facts to which such statements relate... . Wilkins v. State, 603 So.2d 309, 317 (Miss. 1992); Moffett v. State, 456 So.2d 714, 719 (Miss. 1984). The Mississippi Rules of Evidence make no change in this evidentiary rule as to out of court unsworn statements. Miss.R.Evid. 613; Jordan v. State, 513 So.2d 574, 581 (Miss. 1987). See also, U.S. v. Martin, 694 F.2d 885 (1st Cir.1982); Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834 (5th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Palacios, 556 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir.1977). [2] If you gave Mrs. Lee's testimony at trial no weight whatever, tore it out of this record, the uncontradicted evidence of lawful self-defense remains. Mrs. Lee as a witness testified that her son had not asked for her keys, and when confronted with the pretrial statement, said she was nervous and upset on the night of the shooting and did not recall what she had told the police. The pretrial statement, while at the most bearing upon the credibility of Mrs. Lee's trial testimony, cannot be considered as substantive evidence in opposition to the testimony of other witnesses. Dedeaux positively denied asking his mother for the car keys, or that he unlocked Mrs. Lee's car trunk. The majority seizes upon discrepancies understandable under the circumstances between Mrs. Lee's testimony at trial and the detailed statement she related to the police the night of the slaying. These discrepancies in no way negate a claim of self-defense: neither the pretrial statement nor the trial testimony suggest anything other than a valid claim of self-defense. But, as above stated, even if her pretrial statement diminished in some way Dedeaux's claim of self-defense, it cannot under our rules of evidence constitute substantive evidence of guilt. It can only go to Mrs. Lee's credibility as a witness. The majority tells us, The jury obviously did ignore her prior statement. Majority Opinion, p. 31. The majority is quite correct. The jury obviously did consider this statement, but under the law this Court cannot consider it as substantive evidence of guilt, which is precisely what the majority does to reach its conclusion. The majority sprinkles facts from the unsworn pretrial statement as substantive, positive evidence of Dedeaux's guilt; e.g. Dedeaux unlocked the trunk to his mother's car according to her statement,  and  [A]ccording to Carolyn's statement, Dedeaux actually had his hands on the gun prior to her getting it away from him and firing the first shot. Majority Opinion, p. 33. [3] All the substantive evidence in this record reveals the following: 1. Turner had made prior threats to Dedeaux to kill him, and on one occasion was armed with a pistol when he made the threat; 2. On the night of the slaying, Turner was the aggressor, chasing Dedeaux around tables inside the building, and then following Dedeaux when he left to go outside and leave; 3. Carolyn D. Lee got her pistol and shot it (either into the air or into the ground) in an effort to get Turner to stop. Turner did not stop his pursuit of Dedeaux, and Dedeaux got the pistol from his mother, and verbally warned Turner to stop. 4. Turner did not stop but continued towards Dedeaux, and he shot him. He testified that when he did so he was scared Turner was about to kill him. As already noted, the threat Brown alleged Dedeaux initially made which dissipated instantly, and the fact that Turner was in fact unarmed does not deprive Dedeaux of his claim of self-defense. Nor does Lee's pretrial statement to the police constitute substantive evidence, for the reasons stated. I have at considerable pain set forth the facts from this record. I have not only set forth the facts precisely as related in the State's brief, which presumably would be as favorable to the State as possible, but have set forth every factual basis upon which a homicide could be predicated. There is nothing in this record to show that Dedeaux did not believe, and did not have reasonable ground to apprehend Turner was about to put his threats against his life into effect, as he testified. Any other hypothesis is conjecture.