Opinion ID: 1467862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the sentencing argument

Text: The majority argues next that in rejecting the entire agreement the assistant judges focused only on its sentencing aspect. The obvious flaw in this argument is that the case was not yet at its dispositive phase. The majority and the amicus brief filed on behalf of the assistant judges seem unable to make this distinction. At the point the lay judges saw fit to act as they did, the only issue before the court was the acceptance or rejection of the agreement. But this issue involved questions of law, whether mixed or not, as well as legal principles. See § I, supra. There is nothing magic about the lay judges' focus on a phase of the case that had not been reached that exempts their action from the ruling in Dunkerley prohibiting their participation in rulings on matters of law. It is true that the acceptance of a plea agreement by the presiding judge acting alone may dilute in whole or in part, depending on the terms of the agreement, the sentencing powers of the assistant judges (assuming they exist). [3] However, their analogous powers to make findings of fact are likewise diluted by the exclusion of evidence by the presiding judge that they might have chosen to hear. To hold that assistant judges have the powers claimed here merely because of another power which may arise at a later time is equivalent to saying that they must equally have the discretionary power to rule on the admissibility of evidence simply because they would, thereafter, have the power to base findings of fact on that evidence. I disagree with this, and with any attempt to break down the acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement into separate compartments based on law and fact (or a mixture thereof), or on focus, considered in a vacuum. A ruling on a plea agreement incorporates the entire agreement and all of its aspects. Because such a ruling involves a mixed question and an act of judicial discretion, the person(s) making the decision must possess, above all, the qualifications to interpret, and apply the law and legal principles. However much they may protest, lay judges do not have that essential qualification; lacking that, they lacked the power to rule as they did. Their action was contrary to our holding in Dunkerley, and a violation of V.R.Cr.P. 54(c)(1)(ii). III.