Opinion ID: 1441344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Level of Scrutiny

Text: [¶ 27] Because the parents assert that they have been denied the equal protection of the laws, we must first address the level of scrutiny to be given to the State's action. If a challenged statute infringes a fundamental constitutional right or involves an inherently suspect classification such as race or religion, it is subject to analysis under the strict scrutiny standard. School Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Commissioner, Dep't of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 857 (Me.1995) (emphasis added). Strict scrutiny requires that the challenged action be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. See Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court, 611 A.2d 987, 992 (Me.1992). [¶ 28] In contrast, if a challenged statute does not involve either a fundamental right or a suspect class, different treatment accorded to similarly situated persons need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. School Admin. Dist. No. 1, 659 A.2d at 857. When a statute is reviewed under the rational basis standard, it bears a strong presumption of validity. See id. [¶ 29] The tuition statute, 20-A M.R.S.A. § 2951(2), explicitly excludes only those private schools with religious affiliations. As the Supreme Court has stated [j]ust as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny laws that make classifications based upon race ... so too we strictly scrutinize governmental classifications based on religion. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n. 3, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (citations omitted). [¶ 30] Notwithstanding the obvious disparate treatment of religious schools under Maine's tuition statute, the defendants advocate the use of the rational basis standard. The defendants first contend that we must view Equal Protection claims, when accompanied with a Free Exercise claim, as a reprise of the Free Exercise argument. See Blount v. Department of Educ. and Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1385-86 (Me.1988) (holding that the State's prior approval of educational choices for children, including home-schooling, did not violate Free Exercise or Equal Protection). Reliance on Blount, however, is misplaced. In Blount, we characterized the Equal Protection claim as a reprise of the Free Exercise claim because, based on the facts, review of the Equal Protection claim dictated rational basis scrutiny. The statute [h]aving already survived strict scrutiny under the First Amendment could readily pass rational basis scrutiny. See id. Here, however, we do not reach an analysis of the statute under the Free Exercise compelling interest standard. Thus, an Equal Protection analysis is not redundant. Furthermore, nothing we stated in Blount eliminated the possibility that, in some circumstances, Equal Protection may provide more protection than the Free Exercise Clause. Blount is therefore not applicable to the present scenario. [¶ 31] Second, the defendants contend that there is no basis for an Equal Protection challenge based upon school funding. Here they rely on Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973), where the Court addressed such a challenge in another context. It has never been held that if private schools are not given some share of public funds allocated for education that such schools are isolated into a classification violative of the Equal Protection Clause. It is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection, receive state aid. Id. at 462, 93 S.Ct. 2804. [18] The general proposition set forth in Norwood, however, does not reach the more narrow question presented in the matter before us. The question is not whether the State must support religious schools in general. The question is whether, having decided to create a tuition program that allows parents to choose private schools, the State may exclude private religious schools from receipt of state funds. [¶ 32] Thus, the defendants' contention that rational basis scrutiny applies is incorrect. Ultimately, however, the debate over the level of scrutiny is purely academic. The State offers only one justification for the statutean effort to comply with the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, it makes little difference whether we classify the level of scrutiny as strict or requiring only a rational basis. If the State's justification is based on an erroneous understanding of the Establishment Clause, its justification will not withstand any level of scrutiny.