Opinion ID: 1060830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: felony-murder aggravating circumstance

Text: The appellants contend that it was error to allow the state to use felony-murder as an aggravating circumstance at the sentencing hearing after they had been convicted of murder in the perpetration of first-degree burglary. See State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 346 (Tenn.1992). We agree, however, under State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 259-62, we find that this error was harmless. The felony-murder aggravating circumstance is set forth in T.C.A. § 39-2-203(i)(7)(1982): The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing, or was an accomplice in the commission of, or was attempting to commit, or was fleeing after committing or attempting to commit, any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; In Middlebrooks , the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the state is precluded from using felony-murder as an aggravating circumstance when the underlying conviction is felony-murder. Id. at 346. However, in State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn.1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 133, 136 L.Ed.2d 82 (1996), the Supreme Court held: Where, as in the instant case, a felony not underlying the felony murder conviction is used to support the felony murder aggravating circumstance, there is no duplication. Furthermore, under these facts the aggravating circumstance as applied restricts the sentencer's discretion to those who kill while in the perpetration of multiple felonies, a class of murderers demonstrably smaller and more blameworthy than the general class of murderers eligible for the death penalty ... Under these circumstances, where a felony other than that used to prove the substantive offense is used to establish the aggravating circumstance, there is no constitutional prohibition against the use of the aggravating circumstance in § 39-2-203(i)(7) to support the imposition of the death penalty for felony murder. Id. at 583. The Court also stated that the felony underlying the conviction in this case is clear, as is the use of the two different and additional felonies to establish the aggravating circumstance found by the jury. Id. In the present case, the appellants were convicted for the murder of Mrs. Vester during the perpetration of first-degree burglary. Also in relation to the Vesters, the appellants were convicted of first-degree burglary, grand larceny, and petit larceny. The state argues that because the jury could have relied on one of these other felonies in applying the felony-murder aggravating circumstance, there is no Middlebrooks violation. We find that the holding in Hines requires something more. During its opening statement at the sentencing phase, the state read the felony-murder aggravating circumstance to the jury and then stated [i]n our circumstances, we'll be talking about burglary. That's felony murder, the aggravated circumstance. Moreover, during closing argument, the state told the jury I believe the Judge will charge you, the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing or was attempting to commit or was an accomplice in the commission of several crimes. And that has been found by your verdict that these defendants committed murder while perpetrating the crime of first degree burglary. Later the state argued to the jury that [t]here's no question and you found it in your first verdict, that these murders were committed while the defendant, these defendants and their cohort in this case were burglarizing, and robbing the Vesters and taking their car. No one would question that, and there's no doubt about it by your original verdict. When the jury returned its verdict, it did not specify which felony or felonies it was relying on in applying this aggravating circumstance, thus, we are left to speculate as to the basis of the jury's decision. Middlebrooks was released after this case was tried, but before the motions for new trial were heard. At the hearing on the motions for new trial, the trial court ruled: I'm going to rule that ifthat the felony murder was harmless error in this caseI don't think the jury even considered it, I think we've got something to look at to show they didn't ... What I'm saying is, in this case we've got here, it's different. I'm not going to grant a new trial. I've thought about this and thought about it and read the Middlebrooks case two or three times, I just feel like this case is different. Because of the way they found in Mr. Vester's case as opposed to Ms. Vester's case, every aggravating circumstance that could have been used in both cases exceptit's no different, they escaped, felony murder, everything used in Mr. Vester's case was used in Ms. Vester's case. And they ruled that it was not a death penalty case in Mr. Vester's case, ruled it was in hers. You could only come down to the final conclusion that the atrocious and cruel part of the charge was what they considered and I'm going rule it like that and that's it. On the record before us, the Court cannot determine which felony or felonies the jury relied on in applying the felony-murder aggravating circumstance. The trial court did not limit its jury instruction on this aggravating circumstance to the felonies involved in this case. As with the charge, the jury's verdict included all the felonies listed in the statute. This Court cannot assume that the jury relied on a felony other than first-degree burglary, especially in light of the prosecution's argument to the jury. Thus, use of this aggravating circumstance is invalid under Middlebrooks and Hines . However, as stated earlier, we find that application of this circumstance was harmless error under State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 259-62.