Opinion ID: 2626021
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is failure to register an alternative means crime?

Text: ¶ 9 Peterson claims that the various deadlines and entities with which an offender must register represent alternative means of committing the crime. He claims his right to jury unanimity was violated because substantial evidence did not support each alternative means of failure to register. ¶ 10 An alternative means crime is one that provide[s] that the proscribed criminal conduct may be proved in a variety of ways. State v. Smith, 159 Wash.2d 778, 784, 154 P.3d 873 (2007). [W]hen the crime charged can be committed by more than one means, the defendant does not have a right to a unanimous jury determination as to the alleged means used to carry out the charged crime or crimes should the jury be instructed on more than one of those means. . . . But, in order to safeguard the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict as to the alleged crime, substantial evidence of each of the relied-on alternative means must be presented. Id. at 783, 154 P.3d 873 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403, 410-11, 756 P.2d 105 (1988)). ¶ 11 The legislature has not statutorily defined alternative means crimes, nor specified which crimes are alternative means crimes. This is left to judicial determination. [T]here simply is no bright-line rule by which the courts can determine whether the legislature intended to provide alternate means of committing a particular crime. Instead, each case must be evaluated on its own merits. State v. Klimes, 117 Wash. App. 758, 769, 73 P.3d 416 (2003). An example of an alternative means crime is theft because it may be committed by (1) wrongfully obtaining or exerting control over another's property or (2) obtaining control over another's property through color or aid of deception. State v. Linehan, 147 Wash.2d 638, 644-45, 647, 56 P.3d 542 (2002). ¶ 12 Peterson argues that failure to register is an alternative means crime because it can be accomplished in three different ways: (1) failing to register after becoming homeless, (2) failing to register after moving between fixed residences within a county, or (3) failing to register after moving from one county to another. This is too simplistic a depiction of an alternative means crime, as a comparison between theft and failure to register makes plain. The alternative means available to accomplish theft describe distinct acts that amount to the same crime. That is, one can accomplish theft by wrongfully exerting control over someone's property or by deceiving someone to give up their property. In each alternative, the offender takes something that does not belong to him, but his conduct varies significantly. In contrast, the failure to register statute contemplates a single act that amounts to failure to register: the offender moves without alerting the appropriate authority. His conduct is the samehe either moves without notice or he does not. The fact that different deadlines may apply, depending on the offender's residential status, does not change the nature of the criminal act: moving without registering. ¶ 13 The mere use of a disjunctive in a statute does not an alternative means crime make. In re Pers. Restraint of Jeffries, 110 Wash.2d 326, 339, 752 P.2d 1338 (1988). Here, the different deadlines in the statute, while presented in the disjunctive, do not implicate alternate criminal acts. There is only one method by which an offender fails to register, and that is if he moves from his residence without notice. ¶ 14 Our analysis differs from the Court of Appeals'. It seemed to conclude that failure to register is an alternative means crime, but that the different deadlines based on various residential scenarios are not themselves alternatives, but rather define the requirements for amending the registration upon moving. Peterson, 145 Wash.App. at 678, 186 P.3d 1179. It may be that in making this statement, the Court of Appeals was guided by our observation that [d]efinition statutes do not create additional alternative means of committing an offense. Linehan, 147 Wash.2d at 646, 56 P.3d 542. But it is not necessary to draw a distinction between alternatives and definitions of alternatives where the crime at issue is not an alternative means crime at all. We hold that the failure to register is not an alternative means crime. [6]