Opinion ID: 1690675
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: legal definition of intent.

Text: One of the causes of action Frey brought was for intentional assault or battery. After the defense rested, counsel and the trial court settled jury instructions. Neither plaintiff nor defendant offered a jury instruction defining the element of intent. After a noon recess, the court informed counsel it had put in a jury instruction defining the word intentionally. The instruction given is found in the South Dakota Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions. See S.D. Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction No. 1-11-1. Frey's attorney objected to the instruction, pointing out that it was inconsistent with our ruling in VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Products . Frey's counsel informed the trial court of the definition set out in the VerBouwens decision (discussed infra ). The court then asked Frey's counsel, where's your proposal to replace the one that defines intent that I utilized? You don't have one? Frey's counsel admitted he did not have a prepared instruction to define the term intentional. The trial court then stated, In the absence of either side presenting me with a proposed instruction pursuant to the statutory procedure for settling instructions, I'm going to overrule your objection to the one... that the court has used and you may be right in your definition, but we're about ready to commence argument and you don't have a proposal or a copy with your sources for me to use, so you are late. We must initially determine whether Frey adequately preserved this issue for appeal. Kouf relies on the fact Frey failed to offer a proposed written instruction to the trial court defining intent, and argues Frey, having failed to follow the prerequisites of SDCL 15-6-51(a) [1] has not preserved this issue for appeal. However, this assertion misapprehends Frey's argument. Frey is not objecting because the trial court rejected a proposed jury instruction. Cf. Ballard v. Happy Jack's Supper Club, 425 N.W.2d 385, 387 (S.D.1988) (handwritten instruction could have formed basis for amendment of court's jury instruction). Rather, Frey is objecting to the instruction adopted by the trial court. In Schmidt v. Wildcat Cave, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 114 (S.D.1977) we held failure of a court to correctly or fully instruct the jury is not reviewable unless an objection or exception to the instruction identifying the defect therein with sufficient particularity was taken or a written instruction correctly stating the law was requested. Id. at 116 (citing SDCL 15-6-51) (emphasis added). Further, in Glanzer v. St. Joseph Indian School, 438 N.W.2d 204, 211 (S.D.1989), we held an objection to an instruction need not be accompanied by a proposed instruction... to place the objected-to instruction before this Court on appeal. See also Aschoff v. Mobile Oil Corp., 261 N.W.2d 120, 125 (S.D.1977). Frey's counsel specifically objected to the intent instruction and informed the trial court of what he believed was the correct definition of intent. During settlement, counsel must specify the particular ground or grounds upon which the giving or rejecting of any instruction is objected to. SDCL 15-6-51(b) (1984). We have held that no particular formality is required when objecting to instructions; the objection is sufficient if the judge was informed of the possible error so that he might have the opportunity to make corrections. Hogg v. First Nat. Bank of Aberdeen, 386 N.W.2d 921, 925 (S.D.1986); Schmidt, 261 N.W.2d at 116. We conclude the trial court was adequately informed of the possible error, and Frey's counsel adequately preserved the matter for review pursuant to SDCL 15-6-51(b). [2] We now turn to the merits of Frey's argument. Initially, the court instructed that jury battery is defined as any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another and assault and battery is an unlawful touching of the person of another.... The trial court then instructed the jury that wilfully means intentionally. Then, as noted previously, the trial court, using the criminal pattern jury instruction, defined the word intentionally as follows: The word `intentionally' or any derivatives thereof as used in these instructions means a specific design to cause a certain result. (Emphasis added). In VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Products, 334 N.W.2d 874 (S.D.1983) we held: [I]ntentional tortious conduct is when an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person would believe an injury was substantially certain to result from his conduct.... To establish intentional conduct, more than the knowledge and appreciation of risk is necessary; the known danger must cease to become only a foreseeable risk which an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person would avoid (ordinary negligence), and become a substantial certainty. Id. at 876 (citing Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So.2d 815 (Fla.1972)) (emphasis changed). [3] Accord, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965). [4] In a battery cause of action, it is not necessary to prove the actor had a specific design to cause bodily contact. The intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm. [5] Rather it is an intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law forbids. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 36 (5th Ed.1984) (footnote added). [6] Here that result is an application of force upon the plaintiff's person. Intent extends not only to those consequences which are desired, but also to those which the actor believes are substantially certain to follow from what the actor does. Id. at 35. Accord Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A. By way of example, an actor who fires a bullet into a crowded room may desire that no one be hit, but if he knows it is substantially certain someone will be hit, the actor intends that consequence. Prosser and Keeton, supra, at 35. Intent is an essential element in an action for assault and battery. 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery § 9 (1975). Thus, the definition of intent was crucial in determining Kouf's liability for battery. The jury was instructed that, to find Kouf liable, it must find Kouf had a specific design to cause the injury to Frey. That was an incorrect statement of the law. Instead, the jury should have been instructed that, to find Kouf liable, it need only find that Kouf acted with substantial certainty that bodily contact with Frey would occurthat Frey would be struck with the glass. See VerBouwert, 334 N.W.2d at 876; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 8A, 13. Here, Kouf testified he was only six feet away from Frey. He admitted the moment was one of the angriest moments in his life and that he hurled the glass in Frey's direction while looking down. However, Kouf testified he did not desire to harm Frey, but merely wished to get his attention. Moreover, Frey also testified he did not think Kouf would intentionally harm him. Indeed, the defense concentrated on proving Kouf was not a malicious person and did not mean to hurt Frey. The jury found for Kouf on the intentional tort theory. It is apparent the jury's focus was improperly deflected from the true intent requirement set out in Ver-Bouwens, that is, whether a reasonably prudent person would have been substantially certain that bodily contact would result from Kouf's conduct. For this court to set aside a civil verdict because of an erroneous instruction, prejudice must be established.... The appellant must demonstrate that under the evidence the jury might have, and probably would have, returned a different verdict if a correct instruction had been given. Glanzer, 438 N.W.2d at 209. See also Schelske v. South Dakota Poultry Co-op., 465 N.W.2d 187, 190 (S.D.1991); Schmidt 261 N.W.2d at 119. A jury utilizing the VerBouwens standard of intent might have, and probably would have, concluded Kouf was liable for battery. Thus, the instruction given by the trial court was not only erroneous but was prejudicial as well.