Opinion ID: 775562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of Gun Possession

Text: 70 Crispin argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for gun possession. As we recounted above, Crispin was discovered by the police crouched down in the car he had been driving, and when he was ordered out, he threw the keys inside the car, then locked the door. He then told an officer who had arrived that there was a gun under the seat. Forensic testing linked that gun to the crimes at issue in the instant case. 71 Crispin argues that the government failed to prove that he possessed the gun as required by 14 V.I.C. S 2253(a): 72 Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, has, possesses, bears, transports or carries either, actually or constructively, openly or concealed any firearm,... [and any] such person [who was previously] convicted of a felony in any state, territory, or federal court of the United States, or if such firearm or an imitation thereof was had, possessed, borne, transported or carried by or under the proximate control of such person during the commission or attempted commission of a crime of violence, as defined in subsection (d) hereof, then such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment.... 73 We must determine whether the jury could have rationally found that the elements had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Lake, 150 F.3d at 272. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1288. 74 We note that, here, the operative language of the Virgin Islands statute encompasses not only possession, but covers anyone who bears, transports or carries... actually or constructively. 14 V.I.C. S 2253(a). Prior to November 1996, section 2253(a) made it unlawful for a person to have a firearm under his control in any vehicle. 14 V.I.C. S 2253 (1996). This phrase was deleted, however, and now, where a defendant had, possessed, bore or carried a firearm in his automobile, the statute no longer requires that it be under his control. No court has yet construed the implication of this alteration. 75 While the language has changed, we have defined the concept of constructive possession so as to make the issue of control still a central theme. We have stated that constructive possession exists if an individual knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons. United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 883 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1047 (5th ed. 1979)). Here there is no question that Crispin had knowledge of the gun since he actually told the police officer that the gun was in the car. But, could the jury have found that he had the power and intention to exercise control over the gun? 76 We think the facts present here could easily justify the inference the jury may have drawn in favor of Crispin's constructive possession of the gun; these include, his operation of the vehicle, his admitted knowledge of the firearm's presence in the car, and its location underneath the car's front seat and therefore within his reach. In United States v. Iafelice, we found constructive possession of drugs in the car's trunk, placing considerable weight on the defendant's ownership and operation of the car, but also stressing the need for these facts to be considered in the context of the surrounding circumstances. 978 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1992). 77 We previously upheld the finding of constructive possession under the former version of 2253(a), where we determined the firearm was under the control of the defendants. In McKie, the driver and two passengers of the car were found to have the firearms under their control, so as to possess them where the guns were all in plain view inside the compact car. United States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 1997). In Xavier, the driver was found to have possession of a gun held by a passenger exiting the car, because it was within his grab area when it was in the passenger cabin. Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1289. We believe that the operative language of the current statute is, if anything, broader than the previous language applied in McKie and Xavier in that the concept of possession is expanded. Further, it is coupled with other verbs that could apply here as well -- has,... bears, transports or carries. 78 Crispin relies on United States v. Chairez, 33 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 1994), to support his argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of a firearm. However, Chairez is readily distinguishable. First, the court was only considering whether the defendant possessed a gun as required by the portion of the statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. S 924(c). The court opined that [a] defendant must know of the firearm's existence in order to have possession or control of it. Chairez, 33 F.3d at 825. Chairez was sitting in the passenger seat of a car containing marijuana. Id. at 824. After the police and DEA agents stopped the car and had the driver and passenger get out, they discovered a gun six inches under the passenger seat. Id. Chairez successfully appealed his conviction for possessing a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense by demonstrating that there was insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the gun. Id. at 825. The court found that the governmentfailed to produce even a shred of evidence that Chairez knew about the gun or had ever carried a firearm. Id. Here, Crispin's knowledge is well established in the record based on Pemberton's testimony that Crispin told him that the gun was under the seat. 79 Clearly, the jury could have rationally found that the government established that Crispin had, possessed, bor[e], transported, or carried the firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we reject Crispin's claim that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of a firearm. 80