Opinion ID: 605
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mahender Sabhnani's Statutory Challenge to the Forfeiture of the Office

Text: Mahender makes two points with regard to the forfeiture of his office. First, he argues that the jury was improperly instructed that the forfeiture statutes allow for forfeiture of property even if only part of the property was used to commit or facilitate the crimes. Second, he argues that his office was outside the scope of the applicable forfeiture statutes because it was not part of the actual property used to commit or to facilitate the Sabhnanis' offenses. Mahender's Br. 83. We, like the district court, reject the premise of Mahender's argument specifically that the office is a separate piece of property from the house itself and that the district court therefore should have determined separately whether it was subject to forfeiture. The office is not detached or separate from the house, and it is not separately owned; nor does it have a separate address. United States v. Sabhnani, 566 F.Supp.2d 148, 156-57 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (district court's forfeiture opinion). There is no separation of the office from the main house, as it is accessible directly from a kitchen within the house. The only evidence in the record that would arguably support the contention that the office is separate property is Deborah Litras's statement that the office is accessible via a separate entrance from the outside of the residence. Litras went on to testify, however, however, that the office can be accessed from the house by a single door. The district court did not err, therefore, in submitting to the jury the question whether the house as a whole was subject to forfeiture. Even if we accepted Mahender's invitation to subdivide the parts of the Sabhnanis' house and determine whether each of them was separately subject to forfeiture, moreover, we have no difficulty concluding that the office was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of the crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 1594(d)(1). Under Fed. R.Crim.P. 32.2, the court may determine whether a property is subject to forfeiture based on evidence already in the record, Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(B), including testimony at the earlier trial. The testimony at trial establishing that Samirah and Enung cleaned the bathroom of the office on Mahender's instructions, washed the office floor, and served Mahender drinks in the office, demonstrates that some of the labor the maids were forced to do took place in the office. Moreover, because the maids were concealed within the residence and they entered the office on occasion, the office was also used to conceal them in violation of the harboring statute. Consequently Mahender's office was used to commit the crimes at issue, and it was properly included in the forfeiture.