Opinion ID: 1188900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The proper legal standard for termination of parental rights

Text: The majority correctly states that a finding of parental unfitness is a constitutionally compelled predicate to termination of parental rights. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 422-423.) We have previously made this rule clear. ( Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 850-851 [4 Cal. Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216].) The majority, however, casts needless doubt on this rule when the majority subsequently states that, [A]t the point that the court is to hear a subsequent action for termination of parental rights, it is clear that the court may find that the child's interest in stability outweighs the parent's interest in the care and custody of the child. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 425.) This statement suggests that a finding of parental unfitness is not required and that termination is to be determined by the child's best interests. This creates an inconsistency in the majority opinion. It is also wrong. We have made clear that a parent's rights cannot be terminated absent a showing of unfitness. ( Adoption of Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th 816, 850-851 [ Kelsey S. ].) A showing of a child's best interest alone is not sufficient. ( Id., at p. 846.) [1] `Until the state has established parental unfitness it cannot assume that the interests of the child and his or her parents diverge and until such time parent and child share an interest in preventing an erroneous termination of the relationship.' ( Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 251 [19 Cal. Rptr.2d 698, 851 P.2d 1307], quoting In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal. App.4th 535 [11 Cal. Rptr.2d 891], italics added.) The United States Supreme Court appears to have held likewise. In Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th 816, we discussed in detail and relied on several high court decisions in reaching our conclusion that a particularized finding of unfitness was required. For example, in Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645 [31 L.Ed.2d 551, 92 S.Ct. 1208], the court explained, What is the state interest in separating children from fathers without a hearing designed to determine whether the father is unfit in a particular disputed case? We observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals [of protecting the child's best interest] when it separates children from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from his family. ( Id., at pp. 652-653 [31 L.Ed.2d at p. 559], italics added.) The high court subsequently reiterated the need for a particularized finding that the father was an unfit parent. ( Quilloin v. Walcott (1978) 434 U.S. 246, 247-248 [54 L.Ed.2d 511, 515, 98 S.Ct. 549], italics added.) As another state's high court aptly observed in a difficult case, As tempting as it is to resolve this highly emotional issue with one's heart, we do not have the unbridled discretion of a Solomon. Ours is a system of law, and adoptions are solely creatures of statute.... [W]ithout established procedures to guide courts in such matters, they would `be engaged in uncontrolled social engineering.' This is not permitted under our law; `[c]ourts are not free to take children from parents simply by deciding another home offers more advantages.' ( In Interest of B.G.C. (Iowa 1992) 496 N.W.2d 239, 241.) I believe the majority should eliminate its internal inconsistency regarding whether a finding of parental unfitness is constitutionally required.