Opinion ID: 223689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff's COBRA Claim

Text: Under COBRA, an employer  through its healthcare administrator  must notify an employee of his right to continue his healthcare coverage after the termination of his employment. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1163(2), 1166. The employer must notify its healthcare administrator of the employee's termination within 30 days, § 1166(a)(2); and the administrator then must notify the employee of his continuation right within 14 days, § 1166(a)(4)(A), (c). So, after Plaintiff's termination on 19 March 2007, Defendant had up to 44 days to notify Plaintiff of his continuation right: until 2 May 2007. Plaintiff says  and Defendant does not dispute for purposes of this appeal  that he never received a notification about his COBRA continuation right. The issue we must decide is whether Plaintiff's improper-notice claim was timely filed. A one-year limitations period applies to COBRA improper-notice claims. [4] The parties disagree about when this limitations period began to run. They present us with a choice between two start times. Plaintiff argues that his claim did not accrue until he became aware of his injury  that is, until he learned that Defendant had failed to send him notification of his COBRA continuation right. Plaintiff says he learned of this fact in a meeting with his lawyer on 20 March 2008. Defendant, however, argues that the limitations period began to run on 3 May 2007: the day that Defendant's time for notifying Plaintiff expired (and so the first day that Defendant was entitled to sue for improper notice). Plaintiff filed this action on 24 July 2008, which is within the one-year limitations period if that period began on 20 March 2008 but not if it began on 3 May 2007. Federal law determines when a federal cause of action, such as Plaintiff's COBRA claim, accrues. See, e.g., Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir.2003) (section 1983 suit); see also Thompson v. Ret. Plan for Emps. of S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 651 F.3d 600, 2011 WL 2463550,  (7th Cir.2011) (ERISA benefits claim) [5] . In certain contexts, we  and other courts  have applied a federal common-law rule under which a claim accrues when a plaintiff either knows or should know that he has sustained an injury. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir.2003) (section 1983 and 1985 suit); Bowling v. Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175, 1178 (11th Cir.1985) (civil RICO claim); Thompson, 651 F.3d at 604-05, 2011 WL 2463550 at  (ERISA claim); Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., 609 F.3d 404, 408 (6th Cir.2010) (same). We conclude that this rule for claim-accrual applies to COBRA improper-notice claims. Notice is of enormous importance. The COBRA notification requirement exists because employees are not expected to know instinctively of their right to continue their healthcare coverage. To begin the statute of limitations when the notification period expires, as Defendant urges, would create the possibility that the limitations period will run out before a plaintiff even knows he has been injured. We will not adopt such a rule. Instead, we conclude that a COBRA improper-notice claim accrues when the plaintiff either knows or should know the facts necessary to bring an improper-notice claim: specifically, that his former employer has failed to provide him with the required notice of his continuation right. [6] Defendant does not allege that Plaintiff actually knew of his injury  the lack of notice about his continuation right  before Plaintiff's meeting with his lawyer on 20 March 2008. Nor has Defendant shown any reason that Plaintiff should have known of his injury before that date: the mere expiration of the notification period on 3 May 2007, without more, was insufficient to give Plaintiff reason to know his notification right had been violated. So, Plaintiff's claim did not accrue until 20 March 2008, when he learned from his lawyer that he should have received notice of his continuation right from Defendant. Plaintiff's suit was therefore within the one-year limitations period when it was filed on 24 July 2008. The district court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff's improper-notice claim; because that claim was timely, the court should have considered the claim on the merits. We therefore VACATE the district court's entry of summary judgment on this issue and REMAND to the district court so that the parties can proceed on Plaintiff's COBRA claim (and only on that claim). We AFFIRM the district court's entry of summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff's EPPA claim. AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.