Opinion ID: 2573749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dismissal of Copeland and Ott Was an Abuse of Discretion.

Text: Copeland and Ott argue that the agency: (1) had an obligation to find willful noncompliance; (2) had an obligation to explore alternatives before dismissing them; and (3) failed to do either. They argue that there was no prejudice to the agency, noting that the record costs were still unascertained at the time of dismissal. DEC responds that this case is not about litigation-ending sanctions, but about Copeland and Ott's lack of diligence and failure to prosecute their appeal fully. We have previously expressed a policy favoring adjudication of cases on the merits, and we are reluctant to bar a litigant from his day in court where an alternative remedy would suffice to make the adverse party whole. [37] Before dismissing litigants, we have held that a courtor agencymust find that the violation of an order was prejudicial or otherwise unreasonable and must explore available alternatives to dismissal. [38] Copeland and Ott assert that their failure to meet the deadline was due to their confusion over the conflicting figures and fees, rather than to any willful violation. They point out that even at the time of the dismissal their questions about the scope, content and cost of the record remained unanswered. Given the lengthy correspondence over the record and the varying cost and page estimates, this argument is convincing. DEC has offered no evidence to countervail it. We are reluctant to uphold litigation-ending sanctions when there is no prejudice to the opposing party. [39] In this case there was no prejudice to DEC. The agency was not ready to gather and certify the record at the time of Copeland and Ott's dismissal, so the missed deadline had no actual effect on the agency. We do not require ... explicit findings concerning alternative sanctions, nor do we require ... examin[ation of] every single alternative remedy, but the agency's exploration of alternatives to dismissal must be reasonably thorough. [40] In this case the Commissioner outlined several options for payment of record costs and warned that if Lakosh, Copeland, and Ott did not take one of the actions listed, she would dismiss the adjudicatory hearing matter for failure of the requesting parties to proceed. But a prospective warning of dismissal is not functionally the same as exploring alternatives to dismissal after a party has failed to comply with an order. Because the agency easily could have reinstated Copeland and Ott once they submitted payment for the record and because there was neither prejudice nor evidence of willfulness on Copeland and Ott's part, we hold that their dismissal was an abuse of discretion. [41]