Opinion ID: 1230089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Offsetting $40,000 settlement

Text: Hoovestol contends that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in offsetting the $40,000 settlement received from the credit life insurance company against the amount awarded in the jury verdict. We disagree. [A] party may not recover twice for the same injury simply because he has two legal theories. Merrill Iron & Steel, Inc. v. Minn-Dak Seeds, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 652, 656 (N.D.1983). In Zimprich v. Harvestore Systems, Inc., 461 N.W.2d 425 (N.D.1990), one defendant asserted that it was entitled to a set-off in the amount of the plaintiff's settlement with another defendant under the provisions of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 885(3). There were separate claims against the defendants for separate types of harm and we determined that the appellant had not demonstrated that it is entitled to a set-off against its liability for conversion in the amount of Zimprich's settlement with another defendant of separate claims for separate types of harm. Id., at 430. Hoovestol argues that Zimprich applies to prevent the off setting of the $40,000.00.... since the settlement with the Insurance Company was not for negligence because negligence was not yet an issue. Rather, the settlement was based upon the claims of estoppel and breach of good faith and fair dealing which are separate and distinct claims from the negligence claim against the BANK as determined by the jury. Hoovestol's reliance on Zimprich is misplaced. Hoovestol's initial complaint of February 16, 1989, contained the same allegations against both the Bank and the credit life insurance company and sought to impose joint and several liability on the defendants. By motion of February 6, 1990, Hoovestol sought permission to file an amended complaint again alleging the same claims and types of harm against both the Bank and the credit life insurance company and again seeking to impose joint and several liability on the defendants. Hoovestol settled with the credit life insurance company on March 16, 1990, for $40,000. On March 22, 1990, the trial court granted Hoovestol's motion to amend the complaint. In our view, the fact that the settlement occurred a few days before the trial court granted Hoovestol's motion to amend the complaint is irrelevant. The initial complaint alleged the same claims and types of harm against both the Bank and the credit life insurance company. The proposed amended complaint again alleged the same claims and types of harm against both defendants. We conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in reducing the award to Hoovestol by the amount of Hoovestol's settlement with the credit life insurance company. Affirmed. LEVINE, MESCHKE and HEEN, Surrogate Judge. HEEN, Surrogate Judge, sitting in place of ERICKSTAD, C.J., disqualified. Justice H.F. GIERKE III, a member of the Court when this case was heard, resigned effective November 20, 1991, to accept appointment to the United States Court of Military Appeals and did not participate in this decision.