Opinion ID: 2160038
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absence of Ms. Orshansky from the Hearing

Text: We turn next to the fact that the probate court accepted Ms. Castro's waiver of Ms. Orshansky's presence at the hearing [17] despite the provisions in the Guardianship Act that expressly required her presence unless good cause is shown for the absence. D.C.Code §§ 21-2041(h), - 2054(e). No party to the proceeding, not even Ms. Pollack, objected to going forward without Ms. Orshansky. Even on appeal, Ms. Pollack has not raised this as a ground for reversal. Nonetheless, given the concerns we have expressed above concerning the adequacy of Ms. Orshansky's representation in this matter, we cannot ignore this departure from what the law commands for the protection of the fundamental rights of the subject of the petition. Perhaps good cause existed for going forward with the hearing in Ms. Orshansky's absence, but it was not set forth on the record and we fail to perceive it. We do not believe that in and of itself the January 28 order of the New York Supreme Court directing that Ms. Orshansky not be removed from New York constituted good cause to proceed in the District of Columbia without her. The parties seeking to go forward in this jurisdiction could have asked the New York court to modify its order so as to allow Ms. Orshansky to be brought back to the District for the hearing here. If anything, the pendency of an intervention proceeding in the jurisdiction in which Ms. Orshansky then was located and in which all her family resided  a proceeding, moreover, in which all interested parties were participating  might weigh against the need to hold any hearing at all in the District of Columbia, or to make any appointments here. Although Ms. Orshansky had lived in the District and had property here, and thus had substantial and arguably greater ties to this jurisdiction, this does not appear to be a situation in which her legitimate interests or those of any other party were being prejudiced by avoidance of judicial review or forum shopping, or in which deference to the New York court would have amounted to rewarding a party for its wrongdoing. Cf. In re B.B.R., 566 A.2d 1032, 1042 (D.C.1989) (Schwelb, J., concurring) (discussing duty of courts in interstate child custody litigation to guard against attempts by parties to create jurisdictional facts through wrongful conduct and thereby prejudice their adversaries). Thus, on remand it would be appropriate for the court to reexamine the desirability of going forward, given the presence in New York of Ms. Orshansky and her family and the pendency of a guardianship and conservatorship proceeding there. Nor did the evidence of Ms. Orshansky's incapacity demonstrate good cause for her absence from the proceeding. Incapacity for purposes of the Guardianship Act does not equate to inability to participate meaningfully at a hearing. The court made no finding that Ms. Orshansky was incompetent in that sense, nor would the evidence have permitted such a finding. The conclusory examiner's report that accompanied the Hospital's petition was not authored by a psychiatrist or gerontologist and did not address Ms. Orshansky's overall competence. The diagnosis of dementia did not provide enough information to answer the question, and the record contains no other expert evaluation of Ms. Orshansky's mental condition. At best, judging by the testimony of Mr. Jordan and Ms. Pollack, there existed a genuine factual dispute over Ms. Orshansky's competence to weigh in on the issues before the court. Although Mr. Jordan reported that Ms. Orshansky was unable to comprehend what was going on, Ms. Pollack testified that her aunt could and did understand and express herself coherently. Without either Ms. Orshansky's presence or an expert evaluation, it is difficult to see how the issue of Ms. Orshansky's competence fairly could have been resolved. [18] Similarly, the evidence did not establish that subjecting Ms. Orshansky to a return trip to the District of Columbia to attend the hearing would have been deleterious to her health. The court evidently did not think so, since it directed Mr. Jordan to bring Ms. Orshansky back to the District in its final order. But if Ms. Orshansky's frail health did counsel against requiring her to travel for the hearing here, that would count as another reason for deferring to the proceeding in New York. We do not reverse simply because the hearing was held without Ms. Orshansky. If that were the only flaw in the proceeding, it conceivably might be cured on remand by a retrospective determination that good cause in fact did exist to excuse Ms. Orshansky's absence. But the flaws in the proceeding ran deeper.