Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denying Motion to Dismiss for Loss of Police Personnel Records

Text: To aid his assertion of coercion, defendant also moved, as he did before his prior trial, to discover the personnel records of various South Gate police officers under authority of Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 537-538 [113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305]. We discern from the record that he renewed the motion made at his prior trial. That motion sought information regarding complaints against South Gate Police Department officers  including the four officers who had participated in [defendant's] postarrest interrogation. His motion requested the identity of individuals who had filed complaints `relating to unnecessary acts of aggressive behavior,... violence, and/or attempted violence, and ... excessive force and/or attempted excessive force' against 16 officers in the department. [Defendant] also sought discovery of investigative reports based on these complaints, including statements of witnesses interviewed, information concerning the officers' use of excessive force or violence contained in personnel files, statements of psychiatrists, psychologists, or other officers contained in such files, and findings of disciplinary actions taken against any officers as a result of their use of force and violence. The purpose of such information, it was alleged, was to enable appellant to bolster his claim that his confession had been coerced. ( Memro I, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658, 674.) In Memro I, we reversed the judgment because the court denied this motion. The court granted the motion to discover the personnel records of Officers Carter, Gluhak, Greene, and Sims  defendant's four interrogators. (Defendant later moved to discover the personnel records of four other members of the South Gate Police Department  the partners of defendant's interrogators. That motion was denied because the court found there was no showing of need and no nexus or connection between conduct complained of ... and those officers.) The prosecution informed the court and defendant that the officers' personnel files had been purged according to the terms of the department's document-destruction policy, governed by Government Code section 34090, which permits, and has permitted since 1975, that records two years old or older may be purged if no longer required.... The policy was to purge material from personnel files that was more than five years old. Defendant then asserted that the records were destroyed to conceal information relevant to his claim of coercion. He moved to dismiss the information, in essence as a proper sanction for their loss. He argued that the police knew a major issue on the appeal from the original judgment was denial of the motion to discover police personnel records and that the department destroyed the records notwithstanding the possibility of a reversal on that ground. In response, the prosecution introduced evidence of the procedure whereby the records were purged, and, to aid the court in ruling on the motion to suppress, secondary evidence of their contents. The South Gate Police Department's records custodian testified that police officers would be alerted to any citizen complaints placed in their personnel record. Each officer testified that his personnel file contained no such complaints at the times for which the information was sought, except for Officer Sims, who described one unfounded complaint in 1978 involving asserted use of excessive force during an arrest. The custodian also testified that the records were destroyed in accordance with the requirements of Government Code section 34090: he believed the police chief asked of and received from the city attorney permission to purge the ones that were at least five years old. However, records relevant to unresolved civil lawsuits were kept longer, and the department did not ask the district attorney or Attorney General to ascertain whether records might be needed for pending criminal cases. The court denied the motion for a sanction for destroying the records. It rejected the argument that the records were destroyed to conceal information relevant to defendant's assertion of coercion. It first ruled that defendant bore the burden of showing that the records were destroyed for an improper purpose. It then found that the only evidence of such a purpose was that oral argument in Memro I, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658, took place on May 7, 1984, and that permission to destroy the records was granted on July 3, 1984. It found this evidence insufficient to show that the records were destroyed in bad faith. Rather, it found that they were destroyed in good faith according to established procedure.
(13a) Preliminarily, we note that we review the court's decision to consider secondary evidence of the records' contents on a deferential standard. ( Mayo v. Mayo (1935) 3 Cal.2d 51, 57 [43 P.2d 535], overruled on other grounds in Stitt v. Stitt (1937) 8 Cal.2d 450, 453 [65 P.2d 1297].) There was no abuse of discretion: the court did not exceed the bounds of reason when it decided to hear testimonial evidence of the contents of the police officers' files. Defendant contends that due process was violated because evidence material to his defense was withheld. We agree with the People, however, that the question instead regards the failure to preserve evidence. Defendant also contends that the court erred in failing to impose a sanction for the records' destruction.
(14) In Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 58 [102 L.Ed.2d 281, 289-290, 109 S.Ct. 333], the federal high court held that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. Moreover, a trial court's inquiry whether evidence was destroyed in good faith or bad faith is essentially factual: therefore, the proper standard of review is substantial evidence. (See U.S. v. Stevens (3d Cir.1991) 935 F.2d 1380, 1387-1388 [applying clearly erroneous standard].) (13b) Under the holdings of Youngblood and Stevens, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the court's ruling. The burden was on defendant to show bad faith, and he did not meet his burden. Even if the records were potentially useful, the failure to preserve them did not violate due process.
(15) It is settled that trial courts `enjoy a large measure of discretion in determining the appropriate sanction that should be imposed' because of the failure to preserve or destruction of material evidence. [Citations.] ( People v. Sixto (1993) 17 Cal. App.4th 374, 399 [21 Cal. Rptr.2d 264]; see also People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 964 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704].) (13c) We find no abuse of discretion. Although defendant calls the circumstances surrounding the records' destruction suspicious because the court's denial of the motion to discover them was a major focus of his appeal from the original judgment and the records were destroyed two months after oral argument in that appeal, the court could reasonably conclude that (1) the evidence showed the records were destroyed according to the provisions of the Government Code  indeed, they were kept for three years beyond the two-year period after which Government Code section 34090, subdivision (d), permitted their destruction  and (2) the department, unschooled in the nuances of appellate procedure, did not realize that the records might be needed after the court in defendant's prior trial denied the motion to discover them. Nor, the court could reasonably conclude, was there an improper purpose behind the policy to keep personnel records relevant to civil cases while not attempting to determine whether criminal cases might still be unresolved: criminal cases rarely remain active after five years. We find no abuse of discretion and no violation of due process in the refusal to impose a sanction.