Opinion ID: 2630877
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Validity of Horizon's offers of judgment

Text: Next, we must determine whether Horizon's offers of judgment were valid and, thus, precluded the Albioses from recovering attorney fees if their verdict was less favorable than Horizon's offers of judgment. The Albioses argue that Horizon's offers of judgment were invalid to trigger the penalty provisions of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 because the offers were made to both plaintiffs but were not apportioned among them. [17] We disagree. [18] The pertinent provisions of NRCP 68(c)(3) state, An offer made to multiple plaintiffs will invoke the penalties of this rule only if (A) the damages claimed by all the offeree plaintiffs are solely derivative, such as that the damages claimed by some offerees are entirely derivative of an injury to the others or that the damages claimed by all offerees are derivative of an injury to another, and (B) the same entity, person or group is authorized to decide whether to settle the claims of the offerees. Under NRS 17.115, unapportioned offers made to multiple plaintiffs are not considered valid to mandate the attorney fees and costs penalties unless certain requirements are met. As spelled out in NRS 17.115(9), those sanctions do not apply to: (b) An offer of judgment made to multiple plaintiffs unless the same person is authorized to decide whether to settle the claims of all the plaintiffs to whom the offer is made and: (1) There is a single common theory of liability claimed by all the plaintiffs to whom the offer is made; (2) The damages claimed by one or more of the plaintiffs to whom the offer is made are entirely derivative of an injury to the remaining plaintiffs to whom the offer is made; or (3) The damages claimed by all the plaintiffs to whom the offer is made are entirely derivative of an injury to another person. (Emphases added.) The Albioses argue that the offers of judgment do not fall within the scope of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 because neither spouse sustained damages that are entirely derivative of an injury to the other spouse, nor did they sustain damages that are entirely derivative of an injury to another person. Additionally, the Albioses argue that Horizon must also demonstrate that the same entity, person, or group was allowed to settle the case. Addressing first the derivative damages argument, the Albioses are correct that under NRCP 68, an unapportioned offer of judgment made to multiple plaintiffs is invalid unless the damages are derivative; here the Albioses' damages are not derivative. NRS 17.115 has the same requirement, albeit worded slightly differently. However, NRS 17.115 includes an alternative requirement that can be met instead of the derivative damages requirementan unapportioned offer is also proper if there is a single common theory of liability claimed by all plaintiffs. This language does not appear in NRCP 68. [A]pparent conflicts between a court rule and a statutory provision should be harmonized and both should be given effect if possible. [19] We have previously addressed differences between NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 and concluded that when NRCP 68 is silent with respect to something addressed under NRS 17.115, it should be interpreted harmoniously with the more specific provisions and legislative policy of NRS 17.115. [20] Additionally, when possible, we construe statutes such that no part of the statute is turned to mere surplusage. [21] Under NRCP 68, the defendant must show that the plaintiffs' damages are derivative. NRS 17.115, on the other hand, allows the defendant to show that there is a single common theory of liability or that the damages are in some way derivative. To construe NRS 17.115 as requiring Horizon to show that the injuries were derivative would render NRS 17.115(9)(b)(1) mere surplusage. Therefore, reading NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 in harmony and giving effect to both, we conclude that Horizon was required to demonstrate either that the Albioses asserted a single common theory of liability against Horizon or that the damages were derivative. Because the Albioses jointly sued Horizon under the same constructional defect liability theory, Horizon satisfied the first requirement necessary for a valid offer of judgment involving multiple plaintiffs. Horizon was also required to demonstrate that the same person was authorized to decide whether to settle the claims of all plaintiffs. The Albioses owned their property in joint tenancy, and they argue that, therefore, each had a separate interest in the property and that one joint tenant cannot act on behalf of the other joint tenant in controlling the other's interest. [22] However, if it can be shown that one plaintiff is authorized to decide whether to settle the claims for all plaintiffs, joint tenancy will not preclude service of an unapportioned offer of judgment under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. In situations such as the case at bar, when a married couple jointly brings a claim under the same common theory of liability, concerning jointly owned property, we hold that as a matter of law, one plaintiff spouse is presumed to have authority to settle the claims for both plaintiff spouses. Thus, Horizon has satisfied the second requirement for serving an unapportioned offer, and its offers to the Albioses were valid. [23] Accordingly, we must next examine whether the Albioses' verdict exceeded Horizon's offers.