Opinion ID: 1473259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 7-101a

Text: Section 7-101a, as initially adopted in 1971, mandated that municipalities protect and save harmless any member of any board, committee or commission of such municipality from financial loss and expense, including legal fees and costs, if any, arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason of alleged negligence on the part of such member while acting in the discharge of his duties as such member. Public Acts 1971, No. 726. In 1975, this statute was extended to local council members and included protection for alleged infringement of any person's civil rights. Public Acts 1975, No. 75-408. In 1977, the statute was amended further by extending coverage to include any full-time municipal employee. Public Acts 1977, No. 77-399. This amendment became effective October 1, 1977. The 1977 amendment to § 7-101a is substantive in nature. By extending coverage to full-time municipal employees it imposed on municipalities obligations which they did not have under this statute prior to its amendment. The rule of construction in such cases is that the statute is to be given prospective application only. General Statutes § 55-3; Heffernan v. Slapin, 182 Conn. 40, 51, 438 A.2d 1 (1980); Muha v. United Oil Co., 180 Conn. 720, 729, 433 A.2d 1009 (1980). The plaintiffs argue that no new obligations were created with respect to municipal employees in 1977 because such obligations existed by virtue of the amendment to § 7-465 in 1975. We shall discuss the applicability of the latter statute below. It is sufficient to observe at this point that in May, 1977, § 7-101a indemnified only members of municipal boards, committees, councils or commissions and even these individuals were not indemnified for conduct involving infringement of civil rights which occurred before 1975. It did not then indemnify municipal employees for any type of misconduct, let alone infringement of civil rights. Therefore, to apply § 7-101a to the plaintiffs' conduct in this case would require giving the statute retroactive effect both with respect to the persons and transactions covered by the statute. [2] The trial court was thus in error in premising an award to the plaintiffs on § 7-101a.