Opinion ID: 2367472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to permit an inquiry into possible jury misconduct.

Text: This claim of error arises from somewhat unique circumstances. There were two trials begun in this matter; the second, with a different jury chosen from the same general panel, immediately followed the first. Early in the first trial a witness made a statement which could be construed as indicating  the presence of liability insurance. Defendants' counsel, somewhat belatedly, moved for a mistrial. The trial court, evidently motivated largely by the fact that the general panel was still available, granted the motion, drew another jury, and commenced the trial de novo. From this circumstance, and the fact that there was some commingling of the first jury and the general panel when the second jury was drawn, the defendants argue that, in light of the size of the verdict, the court should have instituted an inquiry into possible jury misconduct. This argument is made in spite of the admission contained in their post-trial motion that there was no extrinsic evidence of jury misconduct, and that jury misconduct was not alleged. It is apparent from the record that the commingling complained of occurred before the second trial commenced, was apparent to counsel, but was not raised until the post-trial motions were filed. If grounds for mistrial were present, that was the time for the appropriate motion, and not after verdict. Moreover, the burden is upon defendants to show the existence of circumstances capable of prejudicing the deliberative function of the jury. State v. Brisson, 124 Vt. 211, 215, 201 A.2d 881, 883 (1964). This they have not done. The sterile vacuum with which we have sought to conceal from the jury the existence of liability insurance does not extend to cases where such insurance coverage is mandated by statute. The statute here gives a direct action in such cases, even though plaintiff here did not avail himself of it. 23 V.S.A. §§ 841, 842. And the existence of insurance coverage in such cases does not have the prejudicial effect attributed to cases where it is optional. The public has an interest in the contract and the injured person has been given a direct right of action against the insurer. The existence of insurance is not prejudicial in the legal sense to the insured or his surety. It is the plain requirement of the law. And we find no prejudice in the existence of a legal relationship which the public law contemplates and demands. Ploesser v. Burlington Rapid Transit Co., 121 Vt. 133, 137-38, 149 A.2d 728, 731 (1959). Far from being injured by denial of their post-trial motions based upon possible knowledge of insurance coverage, defendants received more than they were entitled to with the granting of the first mistrial. Not even the possibility of jury misconduct is made to appear.