Opinion ID: 4427013
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Worthington’s Direct Threat Defense

Text: In Worthington’s final assignment of error as to the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, Worthington contends that the record shows that Siewertsen posed a direct threat. If Worthington can establish that he was, Siewertsen is not qualified to be a shipper, and Worthington is absolved of liability. See Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 401-03 (6th Cir. 2000). Worthington, however, did not establish that Siewertsen was a direct threat. “The term ‘direct threat’ means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3). To determine whether an individual poses a direct threat, an employer must undertake “an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). The “assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” Id. “[T]he factors to be considered include: (1) [t]he duration of the risk; (2) [t]he nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of the potential harm.” Id. In carrying out this analysis, courts should remain mindful of the underlying objective of the ADA: “‘[t]hat people with disabilities ought to be judged on the basis of their abilities; they should not be judged nor discriminated against based on unfounded fear, prejudice, ignorance, or mythologies; people ought to be judged on the relevant medical evidence and the abilities they have.’” Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 1998)). Employers are thus prohibited “‘from making adverse employment decisions based on stereotypes and generalizations - 13 - Case Nos. 16-4529/17-4135, Siewertsen v. Worthington Indus., Inc. associated with the individual’s disability rather than on the individual’s actual characteristics.’” Id. (quoting EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Mkt., Inc., 135 F.3d 1089, 1097 (6th Cir. 1998)). Here, a reasonable juror could have found that Worthington did not establish that Siewertsen posed a direct threat to the safety of others. Siewertsen testified that he had driven a forklift for Worthington for over ten years without having an accident. He described his daily safety protocols and how he communicated with others, and his testimony was buttressed by his expert witness, who testified that Siewertsen could operate a forklift safely. While Worthington did elicit testimony to the contrary, including opinions from experts and co-workers that Siewertsen was unsafe, we do not weigh evidence or gauge credibility. The question before us is whether the record contains sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found that Siewertsen did not pose a direct threat. It does. Accordingly, we affirm. C. Siewertsen’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Siewertsen appeals the district court’s denial of his motion under FRCP 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law as to all issues related to liability. Worthington argues that Siewertsen waived his right to appeal this claim because he did not file a post-trial motion under FRCP 50(b). Now that we have affirmed the denial of Worthington’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, this issue appears to be moot. To the extent it is not, we affirm the denial of Siewertsen’s motion for the same reason we affirmed above—both sides presented competent evidence to submit the issue of liability to the jury. - 14 - Case Nos. 16-4529/17-4135, Siewertsen v. Worthington Indus., Inc. D. The District Court’s Denial of Siewertsen’s Motion for a Punitive Damages Instruction “The ADA permits an award of punitive damages ‘if the complaining party demonstrates that the [employer] engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or with reckless indifference to [her] federally protected rights.’” Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 566, 583 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2), (b)(1)). “To be liable for punitive damages, ‘an employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law.’” Id. (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999)). During the trial on liability, Siewertsen never requested a jury instruction on punitive damages or a finding that Worthington acted maliciously or with reckless indifference. Siewertsen did request a punitive damages instruction prior to the trial on damages, however. The district court denied the motion, noting that the trial was bifurcated so that the evidence could be presented efficiently, and the trial on liability was the appropriate forum in which to litigate all issues related to Worthington’s conduct. The court found that it would undermine the purpose of the bifurcation to allow Siewertsen to put on further evidence of Worthington’s conduct during the trial on damages. Siewertsen appeals.6 Siewertsen frames this issue as simply a question of whether the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a punitive damages instruction. In reality, though, these facts present a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in determining the manner in which it tried the issues in the case, and if so, (2) whether the court abused its discretion in denying Siewertsen’s motion for the punitive damages instruction during the trial on damages. 6 Worthington argues that Siewertsen waived this issue because the district court actually granted Worthington’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and Siewertsen did not appeal the court’s order granting that motion. Worthington, however, overlooks docket entry number 178, in which the district court specifically states that Siewertsen preserved the punitive damages issue for appeal. While this is an unusual way to preserve an issue for appellate review, we will address Siewertsen’s argument. - 15 - Case Nos. 16-4529/17-4135, Siewertsen v. Worthington Indus., Inc. Siewertsen only perfunctorily addresses the first question, and it is dispositive as to the second. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in efficiently trying this case and therefore affirm its denial of Siewertsen’s motion. Under FRCP 42(b), a district court has broad discretion over whether to try issues separately and the manner in which it does so. See Yung v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 397, 400 (6th Cir. 1986). “[M]any courts have upheld cases bifurcated between liability and damages because the evidence pertinent to the two issues is wholly unrelated, and as a logical matter, liability must be resolved before the question of damages.” In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290, 309 (6th Cir. 1988). Siewertsen all but avoids FRCP 42 and whether the court appropriately bifurcated the trial. He argues only that he did not request a punitive damages instruction during the liability phase because the district court bifurcated the trial over his objection and that he would not need to re-litigate Worthington’s conduct because the same jury heard both trials. Such brief argument constitutes forfeiture of the district court’s decision to bifurcate the trial. United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 846 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is a settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed [forfeited].”). Therefore, we find the district court acted within its discretion in requiring all issues related to Worthington’s conduct be litigated during the trial on liability. To demonstrate that he was eligible to receive punitive damages, Siewertsen had to establish that Worthington acted with malice or reckless indifference. Bates, 767 F.3d at 583. It is axiomatic that these findings relate solely to Worthington’s conduct. Because Siewertsen did not seek a jury finding that Worthington’s conduct rose to maliciousness or reckless indifference during the liability phase of the trial, and the district court appropriately prohibited further - 16 - Case Nos. 16-4529/17-4135, Siewertsen v. Worthington Indus., Inc. litigation of Worthington’s conduct during the damages phase, Siewertsen was not entitled to a punitive damages instruction. E. The Exclusion of Siewertsen’s Damages Experts Prior to the damages phase of the trial, the district court granted Worthington’s motion to exclude Siewertsen’s damages experts, finding that their report was neither reliable nor relevant. Specifically, the court held that the report made invalid assumptions concerning Siewertsen’s lost opportunity for advancement and promotion and did not establish that the report was based on a reliable methodology. Siewertsen appeals, arguing that the court erred on both counts. Because the report is not reliable, we affirm. We review a district court’s decision to exclude the testimony of an expert for an abuse of discretion. Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999)). Admission of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702. It provides: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702. In short, the report must “rest[] on a reliable foundation and [be] relevant to the task at hand.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). When determining reliability, a district court should consider “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.” Id. at 592-93. While there is no “definitive checklist or test,” the Supreme Court has set forth a number of factors that generally “bear on the - 17 - Case Nos. 16-4529/17-4135, Siewertsen v. Worthington Indus., Inc. inquiry.” Id. at 593. These factors include “whether the theory or technique in question ‘can be (and has been) tested,’ whether it ‘has been subjected to peer review and publication,’ whether it has a ‘known or potential rate of error,’ and finally, whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” Best v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 177 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594). The inquiry is flexible and its “focus . . . must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that the [report] generate[s].” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Siewertsen’s position is that the district court cited the correct legal standard but applied it incorrectly. He also argues that the district court made clearly erroneous findings. We disagree. Siewertsen’s experts prepared a report wherein they calculated damages based on Siewertsen’s lost opportunity for advancement and promotion after he was removed from the shipper position. The district court found that the report was unreliable because Siewertsen’s experts did not explain certain methodologies or disclose others. The district court was within its discretion in making those determinations. To begin, Siewertsen’s experts calculated his earning power based on his average yearly income from 2011 to 2015. However, Siewertsen’s experts never explained why they used that formula, and they failed to explain why that formula was reliable or recognized as reliable. Additionally, the experts appended a “Worklife Probability” chart to the report in which they calculated that Siewertsen would sustain a future loss of $359,738.00 if he were not transferred back to the shipper position. But the only explanation offered as to the methodology underlying the chart is that it represents the difference in Siewertsen’s wages pre- and post-removal from the shipper position. Again, though, there is no explanation for why the calculation is reliable or even - 18 - Case Nos. 16-4529/17-4135, Siewertsen v. Worthington Indus., Inc. useful in this case. Therefore, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Siewertsen’s experts. F. Directed Verdict on Back Pay After the close of Siewertsen’s evidence in the trial on damages, the district court granted Worthington’s motion for a directed verdict as to back pay, finding that Siewertsen’s evidence was too speculative to support an award. We affirm. Back pay in this context is an equitable remedy, and therefore, an award is within the trial court’s discretion. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 2000e-5; Howe v. City of Akron, 801 F.3d 718, 744 (6th Cir. 2015); Szeinbach v. Ohio State Univ., 820 F.3d 814, 820 (6th Cir. 2016); Harris v. Richards Mfg. Co., 675 F.2d 811, 815 n.2 (6th Cir. 1982). Once a finding of discrimination has been found, back pay “should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). Even with this edict, however, “[t]o prevail on a claim for back pay . . . a plaintiff must establish the amount of back pay with reasonable certainty.” Szeinbach, 820 F.3d at 824 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing McMahon v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 870 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1989)). While a plaintiff need not prove damages “‘with the exactitude of lost profits in a breach of contract case, neither can such an award be appropriately founded on mere speculation.’” Hance v. Norfolk S. Ry., 571 F.3d 511, 520 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Christopher v. Stouder Mem'l Hosp., 936 F.2d 870, 880 (6th Cir. 1991)). In the district court, Siewertsen requested back pay for lost wages, lost overtime, lost profit sharing, and lost deferred profit sharing. All of Siewertsen’s proof at trial consisted of his previous payment records and his own testimony concerning calculations done by him and his attorneys. - 19 - Case Nos. 16-4529/17-4135, Siewertsen v. Worthington Indus., Inc. Because Siewertsen’s calculations were mere speculation with no grounding in fact, he did not carry his burden of establishing he was entitled to back-pay damages. Siewertsen first asked for a total of $28,542.00 in lost wages. He testified that he calculated this total by taking the average hourly wage of similar shipping department employees from 2011 through 2016 and subtracting what he believed his hourly wage would have been during that time. He determined that the difference was around ten percent and thus multiplied his total earnings by ten percent for those years. However, Siewertsen’s numbers were incorrect, inconsistent, and based on pure speculation. First, he based his entire damages calculation on an initial, unreasonable raise—a methodology for which he had no explanation. Second, he admits that he did not receive a decrease in pay upon being transferred out of the shipping department and that he continued to receive raises. His theory of damages therefore is that he would have received higher raises if he would have been allowed to remain in the shipping department, but Siewertsen admitted that raises at Worthington were dependent on employees’ evaluations and other budgetary factors and thus were not predictable. He also testified that he had no evidence of the rate of yearly raises for his shipping-department comparators, and he did not know their evaluation scores, how long they had worked in the shipping department, or what jobs they had previously held. Accordingly, Siewertsen submitted no proof from which a reasonable juror could discern whether Siewertsen’s actual raises were less than what he would have received had he remained in the shipping department. The district court’s decision to grant Worthington’s motion for a directed verdict did not frustrate the purpose of the ADA because there was no competent proof to support such an award.7 Szeinbach, 820 F.3d at 824 (“The plaintiff cannot rest her entitlement to back pay on 7 Because Siewertsen’s claims as to profit sharing are derivative of his claim for back pay, he is also not entitled to damages stemming from any alleged lost profit sharing. - 20 - Case Nos. 16-4529/17-4135, Siewertsen v. Worthington Indus., Inc. ‘mere speculation’ about what she would have earned in the absence of discrimination.”) (citation omitted). Siewertsen made similar errors in regard to his claim for lost overtime. He argued that he was entitled to $46,999.00 in lost overtime compensation. He based that number solely on the difference in the amount of annual overtime pay he earned in 2010 versus 2011 through 2016. However, Siewertsen admitted that his overtime compensation in 2010 was an outlier because the plant was short-staffed. He also conceded that he was unaware of the total amount of available overtime hours in the shipping department versus the packaging department from 2011 through 2016 and that the shipping department actually had less overtime available to be worked than did the packaging department. Moreover, Siewertsen testified that he was unaware of any other shipping-department employee who earned as much in overtime from 2011 through 2016 as Siewertsen had in 2010. Therefore, Siewertsen’s loss-of-overtime evidence was based on pure speculation. G. Siewertsen’s Post-Trial Motion for Declaratory Judgment On September 27, 2016, the district court granted in part and denied in part Siewertsen’s motion for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. In its order, the court granted Siewertsen’s motion insofar as the court mandated that Worthington “return [Siewertsen] to the shipper position by September 30, 2016; remove the restriction that [he] may not operate a forklift or similar “powered industrial equipment”; and remove restrictions, if any, limiting [his] application for positions in the manufacturing department. The court also stated that, “[s]hould [Siewertsen] believe that [Worthington] has violated this Order, [Siewertsen] may file an appropriate Motion or Complaint.” Siewertsen, however, also sought a declaratory judgment that Worthington’s blanket policy preventing deaf people from operating certain motorized equipment violates the ADA and Ohio - 21 - Case Nos. 16-4529/17-4135, Siewertsen v. Worthington Indus., Inc. law. The district court denied this portion of his motion, opining that such relief is overbroad, unnecessary, and unsupported by the jury’s verdict. Siewertsen appeals that denial. We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for declaratory relief for an abuse of discretion. Found. for Interior Design Educ. Research v. Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, 244 F.3d 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2001). In doing so, we consider the following factors: 1) whether the judgment would settle the controversy; 2) whether the declaratory judgment action would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; 3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race for res judicata;” 4) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase the friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach on state jurisdiction; and 5) whether there is an alternative remedy that is better or more effective. Id. (quoting Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Roumph, 211 F.3d 964, 967-68 (6th Cir. 2000)). We address the factors seriatim. As to the first factor, the controversy has been settled. Siewertsen alleged that Worthington violated the ADA and Ohio law by refusing to allow him to work as a shipper. A jury found in his favor, and he has been returned to that position. We have now affirmed that verdict on appeal. Therefore, a broader judgment would not assist in settling the controversy. As for the second factor, declaring that the blanket policy violates the ADA and Ohio law would not further clarify the legal relations between the parties. The district court has already ordered that Siewertsen be returned to his shipper position and that Worthington remove any restrictions limiting him from applying for other positions within the manufacturing department. Moreover, Worthington has conceded that the district court’s order encompasses Worthington as a company, not just its Delta Plant. Lastly, the court instructed Siewertsen to file a motion with it if he believed Worthington violates its order. The relationship between the parties is sufficiently clear without need for a further ruling. - 22 - Case Nos. 16-4529/17-4135, Siewertsen v. Worthington Indus., Inc. Finally, as to the fifth factor,8 Siewertsen has not submitted argument demonstrating that a broader declaration would be more effective. As above, the controversy has been settled, and the legal relations between the parties have been sufficiently established. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue a declaratory judgment that Worthington’s blanket policy violated the ADA and Ohio law.