Opinion ID: 1265966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Dismissal for violation of the IAD may be with or without prejudice

Text: Assuming, for the sake of argument, that this Court had found that an IAD violation could be brought in a habeas proceeding, we would have reversed the lower court's dismissal with prejudice and ordered the case dismissed without prejudice. West Virginia became a signatory to the IAD in 1971 when it was enacted into law by our Legislature. One year earlier, in 1970, the United States Congress adopted the IAD on behalf of the federal government. 18 U.S.C.App. 2 § 1, et seq. (1970). The United States and its territories are defined as a State in both the federal and West Virginia enactment. 18 U.S.C.App. 2 § 2, Art. II(a); W. Va.Code § 62-14-1, Art. II(a). In the introductory paragraph of our statute, the Legislature stated that the IAD was hereby enacted into law and entered into by this State with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows[.] W. Va.Code § 62-14-1. The same language is included in the federal statute. 18 U.S.C.App. 2 § 2, Art. I. In 1988, Congress amended the federal IAD to include a new provision affecting dismissals for violation of the IAD. This provision, codified at 18 U.S.C.App. 2 § 9, provides: Notwithstanding any provision of the agreement on detainers to the contrary, in a case in which the United States is a receiving State  (1) any order of a court dismissing any indictment, information, or complaint may be with or without prejudice. In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: The seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the agreement on detainers and on the administration of justice; and (2) it shall not be a violation of the agreement on detainers if prior to trial the prisoner is returned to the custody of the sending State pursuant to an order of the appropriate court issued after reasonable notice to the prisoner and the United States and an opportunity for a hearing. [Emphasis added.] This provision, by its terms, alters the IAD mandatory dismissal provisions, by providing that a dismissal may be with or without prejudice and by setting forth the factors to consider in considering the prejudice determination. The state's IAD does not provide for dismissal without prejudice. This Court held in Syllabus Point 4 of Moore v. Whyte, 164 W.Va. 718, 266 S.E.2d 137 (1980), that pursuant to our IAD statute, [i]f West Virginia obtains custody of a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged and returns him to the original place of confinement before trying him, the charges must be dismissed with prejudice. [40] The decision in Moore was decided prior to the amendment of the federal IAD, which now permits dismissal without prejudice. In light of the amendment to the federal IAD and for the reasons set out below, the decision in Moore is hereby overruled. To begin, under our rule-making authority . . . rules promulgated by this Court have the force and effect of law and will supersede procedural statutes that conflict with them. State v. Davis, 178 W.Va. 87, 90, 357 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1987), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. R.L. v. Bedell, 192 W.Va. 435, 452 S.E.2d 893 (1994). See W. Va. Const. Art. VIII, § 3 (The court shall have power to promulgate rules for all cases and proceedings, civil and criminal, for all of the courts of the State relating to writs, warrants, process practice and procedure, which shall have the force and effect of law.). The issue of dismissing an indictment is a procedural matter that this Court has the exclusive constitutional authority to address. See, State v. Arbaugh, 215 W.Va. 132, 138, 595 S.E.2d 289, 295 (2004)(Davis, J., dissenting) (a statute governing procedural matters in [civil or] criminal cases which conflicts with a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court would be a legislative invasion of the court's rule-making powers.) (Internal citations omitted). For example, Rule 48(b) of our Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that if there is unnecessary delay in prosecuting a defendant, a trial court should dismiss the indictment without prejudice. [41] Although Rule 48(b) addresses a specific type of delay in prosecuting a defendant, it articulates the position of this Court that [n]ormally . . . when a trial court dismisses a case . . . the dismissal [should be] without prejudice. State ex rel. Brum v. Bradley, 214 W.Va. 493, 497, 590 S.E.2d 686, 690 (2003). See e.g., State ex rel. Pinson v. Maynard, 181 W.Va. 662, 383 S.E.2d 844 (1989)(requiring dismissal without prejudice for witness misconduct). [42] Insofar as the mandatory dismissal provision of our state IAD is inconsistent with Rule 48(b) and the general dismissal principles of this Court, such provision is of no force or effect in IAD proceedings. See, Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Wallace, 205 W.Va. 155, 517 S.E.2d 20 (1999)(The West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure are the paramount authority controlling criminal proceedings before the circuit courts of this jurisdiction; any statutory or common-law procedural rule that conflicts with these Rules is presumptively without force or effect.). Accordingly, we find it necessary to adopt the 1988 federal amendments to the IAD into the laws of this State and hold that in a case in which West Virginia is a receiving State pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, W. Va.Code § 62-14-1, et seq. (1971), any order of a court dismissing any indictment, information, or complaint may be with or without prejudice. In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the agreement on detainers and on the administration of justice. It shall not be a violation of the agreement on detainers if, prior to trial, the prisoner is returned to the custody of the sending State pursuant to an order of the appropriate court issued after reasonable notice to the prisoner and the State of West Virginia and an opportunity for a hearing. Applying the amendments to Pethel's case, the factors for determining whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice indicate that any dismissal should have been without prejudice. Mr. Pethel was charged with very serious crimes involving the sexual abuse and exploitation of children. His return to Ohio, while a technical violation of the IAD, did not prejudice his ability to prepare a defense and was effected without his clear objection or mention of the IAD. Finally, the administration of justice would have been severely harmed by dismissing the charges against him with prejudice. As we previously indicated, we need not reverse the circuit court's dismissal with prejudice and order dismissal without prejudice because we have found that an IAD claim may not be brought in a habeas proceeding. [43]