Opinion ID: 2302820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Extent of Burden

Text: As noted by the hearing justice in her bench decision, imposing a duty upon an adult driver to prevent the intoxicated adult that he or she has agreed to transport from operating a vehicle, or causing other injury, places an uncertain duty upon friends, co-workers, acquaintances and even public transportation providers. We agree with this astute observation by the hearing justice. Defining the scope of such a duty escapes practicality, particularly in light of the innumerable factual nuances pervading this species of circumstance. Undoubtedly, questions of duration, adequacy of action, and subjectivity arise in considering the imposition of such a duty. When does the duty conclude? How assertive an attempt must one make to prevent the subsequent injurious conduct of an intoxicated passenger upon drop-off? How is a driver to gauge the passenger's level of inebriation? These are mere examples of the myriad of consequent inquiries each member of the community would have to consider before extending a friendly offer of transportation to an individual who has consumed alcohol prior to the fulfillment of that overture. Accordingly, we construe the potential burden far too onerous to impose upon Mr. Clukey or others similarly situated. Such concerns have been likewise expressed by courts in other jurisdictions that have declined to impose a duty upon a designated driver to control the conduct of his or her passenger to prevent injury to an innocent third party. See, e.g. Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 251 Wis.2d 171, 641 N.W.2d 158, 169 (2002) (Even if [the defendant] had assumed a duty to drive [the intoxicated motorist] home, [he] could not reasonably have been expected to maintain the amount of control over [the intoxicated motorist] necessary to prevent [him] from ever leaving on his own to drive.). [21] Particularly disquieting is the almost certain chilling effect upon the practice of designated driving that would result from the placement of such a heavy burden upon the public. See Mulvey v. Cuviello, 180 Misc.2d 139, 687 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (N.Y.Sup.1999) (it would be    both paradoxical and violative of public policy to recognize the viability of the underlying causes of action [exposing a `designated driver' to liability], for were life breathed into the fabric thereof, it would likely discourage and deter others from serving in that capacity). This public policy concern, among others, is discussed below. 6