Opinion ID: 2229251
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of tort principles.

Text: In this tort action grounded on negligence we also view the pleaded circumstances and implications necessarily inferred therefrom in light of ordinary tort principles. Defendant's assertions that there is no statutory or common-law duty governing the presence of these geese on the roadway should not becloud an analytical overview of the parties' respective rights. Appropriate here is what we said in Wittrup v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 226 N.W.2d 822, 823-824 (Iowa 1975): In absence of a statutory obligation, to state there is or is not a duty is merely to state a result, a conclusion that plaintiff's interests are or are not entitled to legal protection against defendant's action or lack thereof. MacLean v. Parkwood, Inc., 247 F.Supp. 188, 191 (D.N.H.1965), affirmed 354 F.2d 770 (1 Cir. 1966). `It is better to reserve duty for the problem of the relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other  . In other words, duty is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty is always the same, to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk. `   It is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis itself.    [I]t should be recognized that duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.' (Emphasis added.) Prosser, The Law of Torts § 53, pp. 324-26. See also 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts § 18.8, pp. 1058-61 (`Another and sounder objection to the duty analysis is that it is unnecessary and simply duplicates the inquiry into negligence.' Id. p. 1060). In short, there is a place in our negligence law for a designation of duty: as a statutorily imposed obligation or as a label to signify a relationship between the parties, e. g., owner-licensee, carrier-passenger, manufacturer-consumer, employer-employee, in which the law recognizes a potential liability for harmful conduct. But as a label it carries with it no combination to unlock this issue: whether, applying logic, sound reason, and enlightened public policy, this railroad should be immune from liability to plaintiff, if it failed to act in a situation clearly entailing foreseeable harm or damage to plaintiff and others driving through the underpass. The asserted right to permit geese to run at large must be examined in light of the common-law obligation of every person to use that reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid injury to another which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in a like situation. Symmonds v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 242 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Iowa 1976) (We have always recognized the rule that negligence may be predicated upon a statute violation or upon the common law rule of `ordinary care under the circumstances.' It may be based upon acts of commission or omission.); Lindquist v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 239 Iowa 356, 360, 30 N.W.2d 120, 122 (1947); Shatto v. Grabin, 233 Iowa 46, 50, 6 N.W.2d 149, 151 (1942).