Opinion ID: 616525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cervantes-Coronado

Text: Cervantes-Coronado argues that the government failed to present any evidence that he knew of the relevant drug conspiracy on or about August 1, 2007. At most, he claims, the government established his presence in the hotel room where the drug transaction took place, but he notes that cases in this circuit have recognized that mere presence with conspirators does not establish participation in the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 15 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 1994); Pearce, 912 F.2d at 162. While the cases cited by Cervantes-Coronado support the legal contention he invokes, we reject his assertion that the government only established his presence at the drug deal. -6- Nos. 10-5419, 10-5808 United States v. Cervantes-Coronado; De La Torre Far from a passive bystander, the government’s evidence showed that (1) CervantesCoronado traveled a great distance to come to Asheville, North Carolina, on or about the date of the exchange; (2) he checked into the hotel room on the date of the exchange using his home address for the hotel registration form and his unemployment debit card for payment; (3) he observed the transaction from the hotel room bed; and (4) the cell phone he frequently used during this time period registered at least five calls with the methamphetamine supplier on the date of the exchange. The government also established that the address used on the hotel registration form in 2007 matched the address used by Cervantes-Coronado for a planned methamphetamine transaction in 2009, that he possessed methamphetamine at the time of his 2009 arrest, and that he sold methamphetamine to undercover law enforcement officials in 2005. This evidence readily satisfies the agreement, intent, and participation prerequisites for a conspiracy conviction, see Martinez, 430 F.3d at 330, and precludes us from finding the record “devoid of evidence pointing to guilt” as required to show a manifest miscarriage of justice, see Childs, 539 F.3d at 558. We note that in the context of his sufficiency argument Cervantes-Coronado obliquely objects to the district court’s admission of evidence that he committed other drug crimes. CervantesCoronado concedes, however, that he opened the door for the government’s presentation of some of this evidence. Because Cervantes-Coronado’s brief does not directly challenge the district court’s evidentiary rulings, does not identify the matter in his statement of issues, and treats the issue in a cursory manner without citation to any traditional legal authorities, we deem it forfeited. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 846 (6th Cir. 2006) (declining to consider an issue that did -7- Nos. 10-5419, 10-5808 United States v. Cervantes-Coronado; De La Torre not appear in the statement of issues and received only “perfunctory” treatment in the brief). As a sufficiency argument, Cervantes-Coronado’s objection lacks merit because sufficiency analysis entails consideration of both proper and improper evidence. United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 750 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Quinn, 901 F.2d 522, 530–31 (6th Cir. 1990).