Opinion ID: 1908937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Legitimate Reasons Why The Testimony Was Inadmissible

Text: As noted, there are two adequate reasons why Jasmine's question, sought to be admitted through the testimony of her mother, was inadmissible: it did constitute hearsay, for which no exception was available; and it emanated from a declarant who likely would have been incompetent as a witness. Rejection of Wright and Waters does not necessarily exclude implied assertions from the operation of the hearsay rule. It simply means that a court may not treat as a statement, for purposes of the hearsay rule, an alleged assertion that rests solely on an implication from verbal or non-verbal conduct unless the actor either intended that such an assertion arise from his or her conduct or that such an intent is necessary to the relevance of the evidence. If the court finds from the circumstances that the actor intended his or her out-of-court conduct to imply the proffered assertion or that the relevance of the evidence hinges on an assumption of that intent, the implied assertion does constitute a statement, and if that statement is offered for its truth, it constitutes hearsay. That, indeed, is precisely the case here. Jasmine's question, whether Erik will get her, has no direct relevance to whether Stoddard murdered Calen, and it was not offered as having such relevance. It was offered, in conjunction with the evidence of the behavioral changes, to show that Jasmine was afraid that Stoddard might get her, but the relevance of even that inference is, at best, dubious. The true, and only relevant, purpose for admitting the question was to show that there was a basis for the child's fear, and that the basis was her observation of what Stoddard had done to Calen. The prosecutor made that clear. In this circumstance, however, given that Jennifer had not discussed the matter with the child, that purpose would necessarily require the jury to assume that Jasmine had not only, in fact, observed that occurrence but that her fearful question was intended, even if implicitly, to convey that fact to her mother. If that intent was not to be assumed, the question had no relevance. Because the assertive nature of the question was most likely intended by the child but, in any event, had to be assumed for the evidence to be relevant, it did constitute a statement that was being offered for its truth and therefore constituted hearsay. As it fell within no exception, it was inadmissible hearsay. Maryland Rule 5-601 creates a presumption that every person, including a child, is competent to be a witness. Maryland Code, § 9-103 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article supplements the Rule with the statutory provision that, in a criminal trial, the age of a child may not be the reason for precluding a child from testifying. Although the Rule and the statute preclude a categorical finding of incompetence based on age, they do not remove the discretion of the trial court, upon a challenge, to determine whether a particular child witness is, in fact, competent to testify. In Perry v. State, 381 Md. 138, 148-49, 848 A.2d 631, 637 (2004), we observed that the test for determining the competence of a child witness is not age but rather `whether the witness has intelligence enough to make it worthwhile to hear him [or her] at all and whether he [or she] feels a duty to tell the truth.' (quoting from Brandau v. Webster, 39 Md.App. 99, 104, 382 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1978)). Quoting then from Jones v. State, 68 Md.App. 162, 166-67, 510 A.2d 1091, 1094 (1986), we noted that [t]he trial court must determine the child's `capacity to observe, understand, recall, and relate happenings while conscious of a duty to speak the truth.' We adopted as the test for a child's competency the factors set forth in 2 Barbara E. Bergman and Nancy Hollander, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 7:16 (15th ed.1998): [I]ntelligence; an understanding of the obligation to tell the truth; knowledge of the nature of an oath; ability at the time of the occurrence to accurately perceive it; ability to remember the occurrence; capacity to actively communicate the memories; and ability to understand and respond to simple questions about the occurrence. It is not necessary that the child be able to define an oath. The child need only understand that, upon taking an oath, the child has promised to tell the truth. When a facially valid challenge is presented, the court must make some inquiry, sufficient to allow it to determine whether the witness, including a child witness, is competent. Perry, at 146-47, 848 A.2d at 636, citing United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104 (4th Cir.1984) and United States v. Gerry, 515 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975). Although there is no pre-fixed minimum age for competency, the issue will necessarily arise with respect to infants and toddlers, whose capacity to meet the test may be inherently suspect. We are aware of no case in which a two-year-old child has been found competent to testify as to positive assertions that would constitute statements for purposes of the hearsay rule, and, indeed, there is considerable psychological evidence that children of such tender age lack the ability to distinguish meaningfully between truth and lies. See Jean Piaget, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965); Lawrence Kohlberg & Elliot Turiel, Moral Development and Moral Education, in PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE (G. Lesser ed., 1971); J.G. Smetana & J.L. Braeges, The Development of Toddler's Moral and Conventional Judgments, 36 Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 329 (1990); Laura E. Berk, CHILD DEVELOPMENT 475 (4th ed.1997); Roger V. Burton & Abigail F. Strichartz, Children on the Stand: The Obligation to Speak the Truth, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL & BEHAVIORAL PEDIATRICS 121, 123 (1991). Had Jasmine been called as a witness to testify to what she may have observed, her competence would surely have been challenged, and the trial court would have been required to conduct a reasonable inquiry in order to determine the issue. We certainly can express a healthy skepticism whether the two-year-old child would have been permitted to testify under oath to events she witnessed when she was eighteen months old. Notwithstanding Stoddard's objection to the reliability of the hearsay statement attributed to Jasmine, no such inquiry was made. The question is then raised whether, if Jasmine herself would have been precluded from testifying as to what she observed, an out-of-court implied assertion that she saw Stoddard harm Calen can be admitted through the testimony of her mother. Does the repetition of the statement by the mother give it any greater reliability? The answer has to be no. It is important to note that we are not dealing here with an excited utterance or other spontaneous statement, the reliability and admissibility of which rests upon its spontaneity. The incompetence of the declarant in that situation has not been regarded as an impediment. See Moore v. State, 26 Md.App. 556, 561-62, 338 A.2d 344, 347 (1975), cert. denied, 276 Md. 747 (1975) (excited utterance of three-and-a-half year old admitted); Jackson v. State, 31 Md.App. 332, 356 A.2d 299 (1976) (excited utterance of four-year-old admitted); Johnson v. State, 63 Md.App. 485, 492 A.2d 1343 (1985), cert. denied, 304 Md. 298, 498 A.2d 1185 (1985) (excited utterance of insane person admitted); Annotation, Admissibility of testimony regarding spontaneous declarations made by one incompetent to testify at trial, 15 A.L.R.4th 1043 (1982). [12] The general rule is that out-of-court statements may not be admitted under a hearsay exception unless the declarant would have been competent to testify directly with respect to the statement. The rationale for that rule, which would seem to be self-evident, was articulated in an 1881 English case, Dysart Peerage Case [1881] L.R. 6 App. Cas. 489, 504, where Lord Blackburn concluded that it is impossible that if a person said something, and could not himself, if alive, have been permitted to give testimony to prove it, he can, by dying, render that statement admissible. Wigmore elaborated: The hearsay rule is merely an additional test or safeguard to be applied to testimonial evidence otherwise admissible. The admission of hearsay statements, by way of exception to the rule, therefore presupposes that the assertor possessed the qualifications of a witness in regard to knowledge and the like. These qualifications are fundamental as rules of relevancy. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (Chadbourne rev. 1974) § 1428, p. 255 (emphasis in original). McCormick agrees: As a general proposition, the competency standards apply to hearsay declarants as well as in-court witnesses. If a person would be incompetent to testify on the stand, his hearsay statement is usually inadmissible. 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra, § 61, n. 3 at 266-67. See also Clifford S. Fishman, 4 JONES ON EVIDENCE, § 28:6 at 617 (7th ed.2003) (a witness may testify only if he or she is competent, and the same rule applies with regard to a hearsay declarant). Most courts have also expressed that view. See State v. Ryan, 103 Wash.2d 165, 691 P.2d 197, 203 (1984) (the declarant's competency is a precondition to admission of his hearsay statements as are other testimonial qualifications); In re Basilio T., 4 Cal. App.4th 155, 166, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 450 (Cal. App.1992) (we apply the general rule that if a declarant would have been disqualified to take the stand by reason of infancy or insanity his extrajudicial statements must also be inadmissible), superseded by statute as recognized by In re Lucero L., 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239-42, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56, 998 P.2d 1019 (2000); South Carolina Dept. of Social Services v. Doe, 292 S.C. 211, 355 S.E.2d 543, 548 (App.1987) (it is impossible that a child who is incompetent to make statements as a witness can, by absenting himself from court, render those statements admissible. Generally, if the declarant was not competent at the time of making the statement, it may not be admitted into evidence through hearsay repetition). We would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals on the ground that Jennifer's repetition of Jasmine's question to her was inadmissible, for the reasons noted in this opinion. We would not, however, cling to the antiquated and largely discarded view of Baron Parke regarding implied assertions, but, on that issue, would join the rest of the country in holding that an alleged assertion implied solely from verbal or non-verbal conduct does not constitute a statement for purposes of the hearsay rule unless either the declarant intended to make such an assertion or the admission of the evidence requires an assumption of such an intent. Judge BATTAGLIA and Judge GREENE join in this concurring opinion.