Opinion ID: 162851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Applies to the Oklahoma State Court's Judgment.

Text: 14 Initially, plaintiffs argue that the Rooker-Feldman does not apply to the Oklahoma state-court judgment in this case. We construe plaintiffs' argument to be twofold. First, plaintiffs contend that Rooker-Feldman does not apply where the state-court judgment under consideration is not that of the state's highest court. Second, plaintiffs argue that Rooker-Feldman does not apply where the state-court judgment at issue is not an appealable or final order. We reject both contentions. 15 1. Whether Rooker-Feldman Applies Where the State Court Judgment Under Consideration Is Not That of the State's Highest Court. 16 Plaintiffs contend that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to this case because the Oklahoma state-court judgment at issue is not that of the state's highest court. We disagree. Although the Supreme Court has never decided the question, we have previously applied the Rooker -Feldman doctrine to judgments of intermediate state courts. See, e.g., Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 542-43 (10th Cir.1991) (applying Rooker -Feldman to the decision of an intermediate state-court judgment); Anderson v. Colo., 793 F.2d 262, 263-64 (10th Cir.1986) (same). Thus, in the Tenth Circuit, Rooker -Feldman applies to all state-court judgments, including those of intermediate state courts. Accord Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n. 3 (9th Cir.1986) ([T]he Feldman doctrine should apply to state judgments even though state court appeals are not final.); Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir.1986) (We hold no warrant to review even final judgments of state courts, let alone those which may never take final effect because they remain subject to revision in the state appellate system.). 17 2. Whether Rooker-Feldman Applies Where the State-Court Judgment Under Consideration Is Not an Appealable or Final Order. 18 According to plaintiffs, the Oklahoma state court issued only temporary injunctive relief and made no findings or orders beyond such interim measures. Plaintiffs contend that the absence of a final state-court order renders the Rooker-Feldman doctrine inapplicable. We reject plaintiffs' contention for two reasons. 19 First, we disagree with plaintiffs' characterization of the Oklahoma state court's order. The March 22, 1999 order states that it is granting Union City's Motion for a Temporary and Permanent Injunction. A permanent injunction is a final judgment under Oklahoma law. Morse v. Earnest, Inc., 547 P.2d 955, 957 (Okla.1976) (A permanent injunction is the final judgment in an action; the final disposition following a hearing on the merits.). Further, plaintiffs' contention that the Oklahoma state-court injunction forced them to sell their magnesium belies their characterization of the state court's order as temporary. Under Oklahoma law, a temporary injunction operates to preserve the status quo. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 827 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Okla.1992). Its function is not to change the position of the parties. Weis v. Renbarger, 670 P.2d 609, 611 (Okla.Ct.App.1983); cf. Stuart v. Titus, 400 P.2d 797, 800 (Okla.1965) (characterizing a permanent injunction as a remedy... compelling the alteration, destruction, or removal of property) (emphasis added and quotations omitted). Finally, even if the state court granted only a temporary injunction, a temporary injunction is an appealable order under Oklahoma state law. 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 993 (When an order ... grants a temporary or permanent injunction ... the party aggrieved thereby may appeal the order to the Supreme Court without awaiting the final determination in said cause.). Accordingly, whether the injunction was temporary or permanent, we are satisfied that the state court's judgment in this case was a final, appealable order under Oklahoma state law. 20 Second, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine — unlike res judicata — does not distinguish between temporary and final orders. On this question, our prior decisions applying Rooker-Feldman to intermediate state-court judgments are instructive. See Facio, 929 F.2d at 542-43 (applying Rooker-Feldman to an intermediate state-court judgment); Anderson, 793 F.2d at 263-64 (same). We have already rejected plaintiffs' argument that Rooker-Feldman does not apply where the state-court judgment at issue is subject to modification on appeal by a superior state court. It would be highly illogical to embrace the similar argument that Rooker-Feldman does not apply where the state-court judgment at issue is subject to modification by the rendering state court. 21 Moreover, all the factors counseling against lower federal-court review of intermediate state-court judgments apply equally to non-final state-court judgments. On this point, the Second Circuit's discussion in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.1986) rev'd on other grounds 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987), warrants repeating: 22 Allowing lower federal courts to review the judgments of state lower courts is as intrusive and as likely to breed antagonism between state and federal systems as allowing federal court review of the judgments of the states' highest courts. Indeed, if Rooker-Feldman only barred federal review of judgments which had been fully appealed through the state system, it would foster federal/state rivalry by creating incentives for disappointed state court appellants to forum-shop, jumping over to federal courts instead of appealing their cases to the states' highest tribunals. 23 Id. at 1142-43. With these considerations in mind, it is inconceivable that Congress intended any such distinction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Under Rooker-Feldman, lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (quoting Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970)). This prohibition extends to all state-court decisions — final or otherwise. 3. Conclusion 24 For these reasons, we reject plaintiffs' contention that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to the Oklahoma state-court judgment in this case. Accordingly, we proceed to consider plaintiffs' federal-court claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 25