Opinion ID: 2785417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellants’ Additional Arguments

Text: The Court also rejects Appellants’ additional argument related to the Controller’s use of related companies to administer the UPL. This argument is not supported by law or the alleged facts. The cases cited by Appellants are inapposite because here, the allegedly biased companies are not decision-makers and instead merely perform ministerial duties. Furthermore, Appellants do not sufficiently allege that the companies have failed to carry out the UPL’s notice procedures. [b]y using only the FTB database to notify owners of unclaimed property before their property is seized, the Controller purposely and by design fails to find current addresses of millions of Californians and other citizens who moved, permanently reside out-ofstate, and may never even have set foot in California, but have deposited their earnings in bank accounts, bought securities, opened safety deposit boxes and otherwise invested and safeguarded their properties by depositing said assets with banks, corporations, and financial institutions that [have] offices in California. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 70). Yet, when ruling the law constitutional, this Court was obviously aware that in sending pre-escheat notices, the Controller would utilize the last known address provided by the holders or alternative addresses from the FTB database. Moreover, Appellants’ argument undercuts their other argument that the Controller should be utilizing other databases, such as California’s Department of Motor Vehicles, to locate property owners. Those who simply maintained their assets in California banks and permanently reside out-of-state, such as Plaintiff Chris Lusby Taylor, likely do not have California driver’s licenses and would therefore likely not appear in a California DMV database. 24 TAYLOR V. YEE Appellants’ challenge to the Controller’s post-escheat procedure is not ripe because the Appellants failed to challenge the Controller’s action—or inaction—in superior court as required by Section 1541 and Appellants do not appeal the district court’s determination that the postescheat procedure provided by the UPL is reasonable. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734 (1997) (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985); Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of Carson, 353 F.3d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Williamson, 483 U.S. at 186)). 10 V. CONCLUSION For these reasons, this Court AFFIRMS the district court’s ruling. 10 Even if adequately raised, Appellants’ argument regarding the Controller’s post-escheat procedure is without merit. The UPL provides that within ninety days after the Controller’s denial of a claim, an individual aggrieved by the Controller’s decision may seek review in state court. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1541. The ninety day limitation is not inherently unreasonable. Indeed, ninety days is the same period in which a plaintiff must bring suit for discrimination under Title VII after the EEOC has issued its right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Moreover, any claim that the limitation period is unconstitutional is foreclosed by our prior decision holding the UPL facially constitutional. See Taylor III, 525 F.3d at 1289.