Opinion ID: 788479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ALJ's RFC Assessment

Text: 15 Eichelberger next contends that the ALJ improperly assessed her Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). Pursuant to the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration follows a sequential evaluation process when determining disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see also Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 580 (8th Cir.2002). During the five-step process, the ALJ considers (1) whether the claimant is gainfully employed, (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment, (3) whether the impairment meets the criteria of any Social Security Income listings, (4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past relevant work, and (5) whether the impairment necessarily prevents the claimant from doing any other work. Id. If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled. Id. The fourth step in this analysis requires the ALJ to determine a claimant's RFC. The thrust of Eichelberger's argument is that the ALJ erred in making an RFC determination without the support of medical evidence. 16 A disability claimant has the burden to establish her RFC. Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 737 (8th Cir.2004). The ALJ determines a claimant's RFC based on all relevant evidence, including medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant's own descriptions of his or her limitations. Id. We have held that a claimant's residual functional capacity is a medical question. Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir.2001). [S]ome medical evidence must support the determination of the claimant's RFC, Dykes v. Apfel, 223 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam), and the ALJ should obtain medical evidence that addresses the claimant's ability to function in the workplace. Nevland v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir.2000). 17 Eichelberger points us to Nevland, where we reversed an ALJ's decision because he relied on non-treating, non-examining physicians who formed an opinion solely by reviewing the reports of treating physicians. In that case, however, the claimant established that he was unable to do past relevant work under step four of the sequential disability process. Id. In contrast, the ALJ in this case concluded that Eichelberger, at step four, failed to establish an inability to do past relevant work. Id. The burden is on the claimant to demonstrate that he or she is unable to do past relevant work. Id. Only when the claimant establishes the inability to do past relevant work does the burden of proof shift to the Commissioner. The Commissioner must then prove, first that the claimant retains the RFC to do other kinds of work, and, second that other work exists in substantial numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able to perform. Id.; Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir.2001). Nevland is thus inapposite. 18 An ALJ may determine that a claimant is not disabled when he or she can still perform the actual duties of a past relevant job. Stephens v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir.1995). The ALJ acknowledged Eichelberger's various ailments, but concluded that she could perform light, nonstressful physical or mental job tasks. The ALJ discounted Eichelberger's subjective claims of pain after finding that they were not supported by medical evidence. Specifically, no physician placed significant limitation upon Eichelberger's work activities. Additionally, the ALJ credited the testimony of a vocational expert who testified that Eichelberger's past work was light and unskilled. When asked a hypothetical question approximating Eichelberger's circumstances, the vocational expert testified that Eichelberger should be able to perform her past duties both as she performed them, and as they were performed on the national scale. The ALJ further looked to the medical notes of Dr. Luallin, Eichelberger's orthopedic specialist, who opined that she had good strength in her shoulder. The ALJ noted that Eichelberger gained relief from physical therapy and that despite her pain she could still perform work activities. Thus, Eichelberger failed to meet her burden of establishing that she was unable to do past relevant work, including work as a bench assembler. See Metz v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 374, 378 (8th Cir.1995). 19 As indicated above, the ALJ's conclusion under step four is supported by substantial evidence. Nonetheless, Eichelberger argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently develop the record when considering her RFC. An ALJ has the duty to develop the record independent of the claimant's burden in the case. Snead v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir.2004). However, the burden of persuasion to prove disability and to demonstrate RFC remains on the claimant. Id. Here, no crucial issue was left undeveloped; rather, Eichelberger simply failed to show that she was unable to perform her past work. See Kisling v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1255, 1257 n. 3 (8th Cir.1997) (The record itself, however, is sufficiently developed; the documents and testimony simply fail to support Kisling's claims.).