Opinion ID: 4540115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal and State Wiretap Statutes

Text: Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, known as the Federal Wiretap Act, provides the standards and procedures for the use of electronic surveillance. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et. seq. The Act subjects to criminal sanction anyone who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, -4- No. 19-1716, City of Grand Rapids, Mich. v. Grand Rapids Police Officers, et al. oral, or electronic communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). It excludes from liability “inadvertent interceptions.” Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736, 743 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744, 748 (10th Cir. 1992)); see also First v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 234 F.3d 1268, at –5 (6th Cir. 2000) (Table). Similarly, the Michigan Eavesdropping Act prohibits “willfully us[ing] any device to eavesdrop upon [a private] conversation without the consent of all parties thereto.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.539c. The terms willful and intentional are synonymous. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988). After hearing from eleven live witnesses and reviewing depositions and over fifty exhibits at trial, the district court found that the City recorded Line 3407 inadvertently. The evidence revealed that, when CDW implemented the Cisco telephone system in 2010, it configured Line 3407 not to record telephone calls, and independent contractors and CDW employees tested and confirmed that the line would not record. The City subsequently hired IT subcontractors to make upgrades to the system, including switching to a virtualized system in 2013. That change, according to contractor Pointer and City IT administrator Tim Becker, may have allowed for human error in reconfiguring telephone settings. See Sanders, 38 F.3d 742–43 (refusing to find intentionality where recordings were a “result of design defect and was not known to anyone”). No City or Police Department employee testified that he or she knew or was aware that the Cisco system was recording phone calls on Line 3407 until December 7, 2016, when the Police Department investigated its officers’ handling of the car accident. Following extensive discovery, Janiskee provided no evidence showing that anyone intentionally recorded Line 3407 or had any reason to do so. See First, 234 F.3d 1268, at  (dismissing wiretap claim at summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to proffer any evidence that the defendant “‘intended’ to record personal -5- No. 19-1716, City of Grand Rapids, Mich. v. Grand Rapids Police Officers, et al. conversations”). The record supports the district court’s finding that the City recorded the phone calls inadvertently. Janiskee argues that the district court erred in relying on Becker’s testimony because it was not based on personal knowledge and he was not admitted as an expert. Becker served as the City’s networks and operations administrator between December 2008 and June 2016 and in that position, participated in the day-to-day operation and implementation of the multiple technological updates to the Police Department’s Cisco telephone system. He testified that in switching to a VoIP system, Pointer designed the software; he “analyzed” it; the CDW implemented it; and he “follow[ed] up and ma[d]e sure the contractor got done what needed to be done.” The record demonstrates that Becker had personal knowledge of the system upgrades because he participated in that process. At a minimum, his testimony is “rationally based on [his] perception” of those upgrades. United States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 701). The district court did not err in allowing and relying on Becker’s testimony. Janiskee also argues that the district court disregarded the “Recording Access by User” report, generated by the City’s telephone system, that provided evidence of secret downloads. The report demonstrated that Line 3407 had been accessed a handful of times, innocently and in the course of unrelated work. At trial, Janiskee showed that one can access and download recordings without leaving a trace on the access report; thus, the report did not foreclose the possibility that someone intentionally recorded and accessed the recordings of Line 3407. That inference is unavailing. Despite significant discovery, Janiskee failed to offer any specific evidence demonstrating intentionality; ample grounds support the district court’s finding that the City recorded Line 3407 inadvertently. See First, 234 F.3d 1268, at . That the court’s finding of inadvertence was related only to the five phone calls, moreover, does not undermine its -6- No. 19-1716, City of Grand Rapids, Mich. v. Grand Rapids Police Officers, et al. determination because it was based on the full timeline of development of the Cisco telephone system. Janiskee also points to Issue 61, which allowed for the recording of Line 3407 when a call was put on hold and a call from Line 3604 was answered. Issue 61, however, disappeared when the Police Department upgraded its phone system in 2013. And Janiskee has not shown that the City intentionally implemented that initial configuration or that such a configuration leads to the conclusion that the City intentionally recorded the five phone calls at issue. Though the City’s two-year retention policy prevents access to any Line 3407 phone call recordings prior to February 21, 2014, that does not detract from the ample record evidence supporting the district court’s inadvertence determination. The district court’s determination that the City recorded the phone calls inadvertently is supported by the record and was not an abuse of discretion. That finding resolves the federal and state statutory wiretap claims.