Opinion ID: 1058491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Appropriate Standard of Review and Due Process Under the Post-Conviction Procedures Act

Text: We now address petitioner's second main point  that the statutory dictates of the Post-Conviction Procedures Act work to deprive him, because of his unique circumstances, of a fair opportunity to litigate his claim that he is mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for capital punishment. The United States Supreme Court recommended, in Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 85 S.Ct. 1486, 14 L.Ed.2d 422 (1965), that the states create post-conviction procedures for addressing alleged constitutional errors occurring during the conviction process in order to supplement habeas corpus remedies. The General Assembly of Tennessee responded to that recommendation in 1967 by enacting the Post-Conviction Procedures Act. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-30-101 et seq. (2003); see also Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Tenn.1992). Under the Act, a prisoner may file a petition for post conviction relief with the clerk of the court where the conviction occurred, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-104(a) (2003), and [r]elief shall be granted when the conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment in any way of any right guaranteed by the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-103 (2003). In order for a hearing to be granted, the petition must assert a colorable claim. See Burnett v. State, 92 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tenn.2002). As previously discussed, a colorable claim is defined as `a claim that, if taken as true, in the light most favorable to the petitioner, would entitle petitioner to relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.' Id. (quoting Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 28 § 2(H)). If a petitioner makes this initial colorable claim to relief, an evidentiary hearing is held at which the petitioner must prove the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f) (2003). After a post-conviction proceeding has been completed and relief has been denied, as in this case, a petitioner may move to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief under the limited circumstances set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117 (2003). This statute provides only three grounds for reopening post-conviction proceedings: 1) a new constitutional right that is given retroactive application, 2) new scientific evidence of actual innocence, and 3) evidence of an improperly enhanced sentence. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(1)-(3) (2003); Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Tenn.2003). Additionally, the statute requires that [i]t appear[] that the facts underlying the claim, if true, would establish by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is entitled to have the conviction set aside or the sentence reduced. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(4) (2003). As can be seen, defendants petitioning for post-conviction relief are held to more stringent standards as they proceed further along in this process. They must present only a colorable claim to relief in an original petition, but in a motion to reopen a post-conviction proceeding they must present facts which would establish by clear and convincing evidence that they are entitled to relief. Id. These progressively higher standards attempt to balance the State's interest in maintaining the finality of judgments with a petitioner's interest in attacking a possibly unconstitutional conviction or sentence. In the present case, the petitioner has moved to reopen his post-conviction proceedings on the ground that he has a new constitutional right  the right of a mentally retarded individual not to be executed  and that this right was given retroactive application. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a) (2003); Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn.2001). In support of his motion to reopen, he filed the affidavit of Dr. Daniel Grant, who stated that the petitioner's scores on various I.Q. tests ranged between a low of sixty-two on the Stanford Binet Intelligence Test  Fourth Edition, to a high of seventy-five on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale  Third Edition. These scores, along with other factors, led Dr. Grant to opine that the petitioner was mentally retarded. Nevertheless, the trial court held that the petitioner had failed to make a prima facie showing that he was mentally retarded and denied him an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner argues that the trial court committed a constitutional error by applying the clear and convincing evidence standard in evaluating his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition instead of the colorable claim standard. Petitioner asserts that, because a person who now raises the issue of mental retardation for the first time in a petition for post-conviction relief is, under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 section 6(B)(6), held only to a colorable claim standard, he has been denied due process by being required to present clear and convincing evidence of mental retardation, when he had no notice prior to Van Tran and Atkins that a mentally retarded person was constitutionally ineligible to receive capital punishment. We have previously recognized that the State has no duty to enact post-conviction procedures and that the opportunity to collaterally attack constitutional violations occurring in the conviction process is not a fundamental right. See Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn.2000); Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 207. The fundamental right of due process is, however, an over-arching issue that has been recognized as a concern in post-conviction proceedings. See Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 207. What exactly is required in order to comply with due process in any given situation is often a difficult question. See Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn.2000) (stating that Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.) (quoting Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents, 863 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Tenn.1993)). We have recognized that due process requires a defendant have an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tenn.1995) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). Also, and perhaps most importantly, we recognize that due process embodies the concept of fundamental fairness. Seals, 23 S.W.3d at 277. This Court has previously carved out exceptions to the technical requirements of the Post-Conviction Procedures Act in order to protect petitioners' rights to due process. In Burford , we recognized that identification of the precise dictates of due process requires consideration of both the governmental interests involved and the private interests affected by the official action. 845 S.W.2d at 207 (citing Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975)). We held that the petitioner's interest in attacking his conviction and sentencing on constitutional grounds was greater than the state's interest in preventing litigation of stale or fraudulent claims where the petitioner was forced to wait to bring his post-conviction claim until underlying convictions were declared invalid, at which time the three-year statute of limitations for bringing post-conviction claims had already run. Id. at 209. See also Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d at 812 (holding that considerations of fundamental fairness required that the petitioner have a meaningful opportunity to raise his substantive constitutional claim despite being contrary to the technical mandates of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act and Supreme Court Rule 28 governing waiver of issues); Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn.2001) (holding that attorney misrepresentation may toll the post-conviction statute of limitations despite the presence of statutory language stating that the statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason); Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn.2000) (mental incompetency may toll statute of limitations despite anti-tolling language). In these prior cases, we have balanced the State's interest against the private interest at stake. In Seals we observed that in determining what procedural due process protections a particular situation demands we should consider: 1) the private interest involved; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest; and 3) the government's interests, including fiscal or administrative burdens. Seals, 23 S.W.3d at 277. In this case, the State has a legitimate and strong interest in the finality of judgments, particularly at this point in the post-conviction process. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 987 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Tenn.1999); State ex rel. Stewart v. McWherter, 857 S.W.2d 875, 876-77 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992). However, the petitioner's interest is even stronger  his interest in protecting his very life. As in Burford , Williams , and Seals , the petitioner in this case has been confronted with circumstances beyond his control which prevented him from previously challenging his conviction and sentence on constitutional grounds. For these reasons, we find the petitioner's individual interests to outweigh those of the state under the specific facts of this capital case. The State correctly points out that a defendant has no fundamental right to collaterally attack a conviction on constitutional grounds. See Seals, 23 S.W.3d at 277. Further, the State asserts that unless a fundamental right is involved, the test for determining whether a statute comports with substantive due process is whether the legislation bears a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary or discriminatory. Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105, 110 (Tenn.1994). The State contends that the statute at issue complies with substantive due process as it is not arbitrary or discriminatory in its treatment of post-conviction petitioners  they all must meet the clear and convincing threshold requirement to reopen post-conviction proceedings. However, this argument misses the point. The central issue before us today is not whether the petitioner has a fundamental right to attack the conviction, but is instead whether he has been afforded a fair opportunity to prove he is mentally retarded and therefore assert his right not to be executed. In Van Tran we held that executing mentally retarded individuals violated prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment as contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and also Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. See Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d at 809. We had previously expounded upon our Eighth Amendment and Article I, § 16 jurisprudence in Burford , in which we determined that applying a statute of limitations to bar a post-conviction attack would deny the petitioner of a fundamental right. We stated in Burford : If consideration of the petition is barred, [this petitioner] will be forced to serve a persistent offender sentence that was enhanced by previous convictions that no longer stand. As a result, [he] will be forced to serve an excessive sentence in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution, which, by definition, are fundamental rights entitled to heightened protection. Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 209. If an excessively lengthy sentence implicates a fundamental right, as in Burford , then certainly a death sentence would as well. Therefore, contrary to the State's analysis, we find the case before us today does involve a fundamental right. We reject the State's attempt to frame the question as one of a right to attack a conviction rather than a right to be free from unconstitutional punishment. Also, while there is merit to the argument that procedural due process and substantive due process are conceptually different, we find that both encompass the central idea of fundamental fairness. If the petitioner in the present case is found to be mentally retarded, then he has a fundamental right not to be executed. Due process requires he be given a fair opportunity to litigate this claim in order to protect this right. Therefore, we hold that under these specific and narrow circumstances in which a post-conviction petitioner files for relief for the first time under Van Tran or Atkins , requiring the petitioner to plead mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence in his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process. Because the petitioner was not able to previously advance his claim of mental retardation as a challenge to his eligibility to receive the death penalty, we find that he should be held to the lower colorable claim standard instead of requiring him to plead facts to show his mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence.