Opinion ID: 4528536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miller v. Kim

Text: 16In addition, Dr. Blackwell testified that the placement of a scalp electrode, the Barneys' other proffered alternative, was not necessary in order to meet the standard of care. 14 No. 2017AP1616 ¶28 Both the court of appeals and the Barneys maintain that Dr. Mickelson's decision to continue with the external monitor was a decision to do nothing that rendered the alternative methods instruction improper, pursuant to the court of appeals' decision in Miller. In Miller, a jury found that a doctor was not negligent in his failure to perform a spinal tap on an infant who subsequently suffered permanent brain damage from undiagnosed meningitis. 191 Wis. 2d 187. The Millers contended that the circuit court committed prejudicial error when it gave the alternative methods instruction because all of the experts testified that a spinal tap is the only reasonable method of diagnosis for a young child with symptoms of spinal meningitis. Id. at 191. ¶29 The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court erred when it gave the alternative methods instruction because the doctor's claim that individualized observation was an alternative diagnostic technique did not conform with the unanimous expert testimony presented at trial. Id. The court reasoned: [t]he alternative method instruction is optional and is only to be given by the trial court when the evidence allows the jury to find that more than one method of treatment of the patient is recognized by the average practitioner. The trial court's amendment of the pattern instruction would have been appropriate had there been medical expert testimony that there were available to the average practitioner alternative methods of diagnosing [the child's] spinal meningitis. 15 No. 2017AP1616 Id. at 198. Because the alternative methods instruction probably misled the jury, the court remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 190. ¶30 To fit this case into the Miller framework, the court of appeals ignored the testimony of Dr. Mickelson's experts as to alternative methods.17 The court focused solely on Dr. Bryan's testimony and reasoned that since there were signs that the external fetal monitor may not have been reliably tracing the fetal heart beat, Dr. Mickelson's continued reliance on the external fetal monitor, was not an acceptable 'alternative diagnostic technique.' Barney, No. 2017AP1616, ¶19 (quoted source omitted). ¶31 However, as discussed above, the experts in this case disputed whether the external monitor failed to accurately monitor London's heart rate in the last 90 minutes of labor. Unlike Miller, where the experts were unanimous that only one diagnostic method existed, this record contained substantial expert testimony 17 Dr. Mickelson asks us to overrule Miller v. Kim, 191 Wis. 2d 187, 528 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1995), because its analysis and reasoning allows Courts to engage in critical fact finding that should be left to the jury. On several occasions, Wisconsin courts have reviewed the applicability of the alternative methods instruction and a plaintiff's assertion that their case was akin to Miller. See, e.g., Weborg v. Jenny, No. 2010AP258, unpublished slip op., ¶20 (However, here, unlike Miller, there was evidence of alternatives.); Finley v. Culligan, 201 Wis. 2d 611, 625-26, 548 N.W.2d 854 (Ct. App. 1996) (Thus, this case is not like Miller because this is not a case where all of the experts, including the defense experts, testified at some point that performing a biopsy was the only way to definitively diagnose a solid tumor as being cancerous.). Similarly, the facts in this case are distinguishable from Miller and therefore, overruling Miller is unwarranted and unnecessary. 16 No. 2017AP1616 on which the jury could find that Dr. Mickelson's choice to continue with the external monitor was a reasonable alternative method of monitoring London's heart rate and was not analogous to doing nothing. Therefore, we conclude that there is ample evidence in this record to support the circuit court's decision to give the alternative methods instruction. See Lutz v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Wis. 2d 743, 750, 235 N.W.2d 426 (1975) (It is error for a court [] to refuse to instruct on an issue which is raised by the evidence . . . .); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Osborne-McMillan Elevator Co., 26 Wis. 2d 292, 305, 132 N.W.2d 51 (1965) (Where there is a conflict in the evidence and inconsistent theories on the cause of the event are advanced, we believe instructions encompassing both theories should be given.). ¶32 It is important to remember that [i]t is the function of the trier of fact, and not of an appellate court, to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 506, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Any dispute in testimony regarding the complex medical issues in this case was for the jury, not the court of appeals or this court, to weigh and ultimately resolve. Based on all of the expert testimony presented at trial, the circuit court properly gave the jury the alternative methods instruction.