Opinion ID: 1837616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Trial Judge erred in refusing to recuse himself from sitting on the case.

Text: The Bryans, through their counsel, made a Motion for Recusal asking the chancellor to recuse himself from the case when the hearing was reconvened on January 3, 1990. This motion was based upon alleged: (1) ex parte contacts between the chancellor and the Holleman firm which originally represented the conservatorship; (2) ex parte contacts between the chancellor and the attorney representing court-appointed conservator Holzer; and, (3) the chancellor's sua sponte appointment of an independent accountant. The court Order Discharging and Replacing Conservator was filed December 15, 1987, and was signed by W.L. Stewart, the same chancellor who heard the case at hand. It recites in part: THERE CAME to be heard on September 15, 1987, the Motion for Hearing Requesting of Conservator A Report and Status of the Conservatorship of Beatrice Irene Bryan, filed by Boyce Holleman, ..., and after a hearing the evidence presented and considering same, the Court finds... . III. Due to delays in filing acceptable accountings and inventories with the Court, that it would be in the best interest of the Ward that JAMES A. BRYAN be removed as Conservator... . The legal standards pertaining to judicial conduct come primarily from three sources. The Mississippi Constitution mandates: No judge of any court shall preside on the trial of any cause, where the parties or either of them, shall be connected with him by affinity or consanguinity, or where he may be interested in the same, except by the consent of the judge and of the parties... . Miss. Const. art. 6 § 165 (1890). The statutes of this state also regulate judicial conduct and provide an additional instance which requires a judge to disqualify him or herself from presiding over a case, when the judge may have been of counsel. Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-11 (1972) provides: The judge of a court shall not preside on the trial of any cause where the parties, or either of them, shall be connected with him by affinity or consanguinity, or where he may be interested in the same, or wherein he may have been of counsel, except by the consent of the judge and of the parties. In addition to the constitutional and statutory provisions regulating judicial conduct, the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(1), requires disqualification of a judge under the following conditions: (1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding: Whereas here, the conduct of a judge or chancellor is being examined under the dictates of a canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Canon enjoys the status of law such that we enforce it rigorously, notwithstanding the lack of a litigant's specific demand. Collins v. Dixie Transport, Inc., 543 So.2d 160, 164 (Miss. 1989); Jenkins v. Forrest County General Hospital, 542 So.2d 1180, 1181 (Miss. 1989); Jenkins v. State, 570 So.2d 1191, 1192 (Miss. 1990). The standard by which this Court determines if a judge should have disqualified him or herself, is an objective standard under Canon 3. A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality. Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1986); Jenkins, 570 So.2d at 1192; Collins, 543 So.2d at 166. The presumption is that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased. To overcome the presumption, the evidence must produce a `reasonable doubt' (about the validity of the presumption) [.] Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 678 (Miss. 1990). When a judge is not disqualified under the constitutional or statutory provisions, the propriety of his or her sitting is a question to be decided by the judge and is subject to review only in case of manifest abuse of discretion. Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312 at 317 (Miss. 1985) (quoting McLendon v. State, 187 Miss. 247, 191 So. 821, 823 (1939)); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 587 So.2d 892 (Miss. 1991); Turner, 573 So.2d at 677. In the case sub judice Canon 3 provides the only applicable grounds for possible recusal. Under the appropriate standard, the judge is presumed qualified and unbiased. This presumption may only be overcome by evidence showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge was biased or not qualified. If a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would doubt the judge's impartiality, the judge is required to recuse him or herself from the case; but, the decision not to recuse is reviewed by this Court under a manifest abuse of discretion standard. Under the evidence adduced at the hearing, the only ex parte contacts between the chancellor and the Holleman firm were connected with the motion and hearing to remove Bryan as conservator. The ground for the motion was Bryan's slow responses in providing conservatorship records. Leslie Holleman testified he had not communicated any suspicions about problems with the conservatorship funds. The court's order removing Bryan and appointing Holzer stated the basis for the action was the excessive delays in Bryan turning the books over to the Holleman firm, and in providing accountings. The attorney representing Holzer testified there had not been any ex parte contact with the chancellor prior to filing the suit. He did have extensive contact with the Holleman firm. After the suit was filed, the only ex parte contact he had with the chancellor involved the fee the court-appointed conservator, Holzer, had to pay the court-appointed auditor/accountant. There had been some tangential mention that, since the case would probably be appealed, the chancellor might ask for assistance in preparing the findings of fact, if any funds were found missing. This limited evidence and these limited contacts do not overcome the presumption of impartiality beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither does the court's appointment of an independent expert to review the conservatorship meet this burden and show the court was biased. The decision to recuse or not to recuse is one left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, so long as he applies the correct legal standards. Cf. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Evans, 553 So.2d 1117, 1119 (Miss. 1989). In the case at hand, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself from the case.