Opinion ID: 157748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Federal Residence Warrant

Text: 47 Le also challenges the federal warrant issued later in the afternoon of July 2, based on what TPD officers, the K-9 team, and the ATF agents had seen at the residence earlier that day, authorizing federal agents to search the house for explosives. Le argues that this warrant was not sufficiently particular, in light of the fact that its underlying affidavit specifically mentioned only one type of explosive device, and that the warrant itself did not specifically refer to any particular types of explosive devices; Le also argues that the executing officers exceeded the scope of the warrant.
48 When federal agents went to a U.S. Magistrate Judge on the afternoon of July 2 to request a federal search warrant for Le's residence, they were already aware of some of the specific types of explosives stockpiled in Le's garage. Indeed, at least one ATF agent had personally viewed the explosives and heavy weaponry when he was called in, for officer safety reasons, during the TPD search for drugs. Still, the affidavit submitted to the magistrate judge specifically mentioned only one type of explosive device discovered in the residence--HE M383 explosive grenades. Appellant's App. at 66. The warrant signed by the magistrate judge authorized a search for 49 [a]ny explosives, explosive materials and parts that can be readily converted into destructive devices, any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into a destructive device capable of expelling a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, any and all firing mechanisms to include grenade launchers, launchers and/or any device designed for use as a weapon, as a signaling pyrotechnic, lin throwing, safety, or similar device. 50 Appellant's App. at 71. Le argues that because the federal agents had more specific information at the time they asked the magistrate judge for a warrant, the warrant should have been more specific. 51 In general, a warrant meets the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement when it enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized. United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 775 (10th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). Consistent with this standard, we have sustained warrants phrased in [b]road and generic terms of description in certain cases, for instance in searches for drugs and related paraphernalia, because the nature and characteristics of some criminal operations do not easily lend themselves to specific descriptions of things to be seized. Richardson, 86 F.3d at 1544; see also United States v. Janus Indus., 48 F.3d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir.1995); Harris, 903 F.2d at 775. This is because even warrants phrased in generic terms can, under some circumstances, still  'allow the executing officers to distinguish between items that may and may not be seized.'  United States v. Finnigin, 113 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 602 (10th Cir.1988)). 52 We have previously sustained a generically phrased warrant in an explosives case. See Finnigin, 113 F.3d at 1187; see also United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1219 (8th Cir.1984) (sustaining a search warrant in an explosives case where the warrant authorized a search for any and all firearms, ammunition, grenades, crossbows, rocket launchers, and other explosive devices). In Finnigin, on facts similar to the case before us here, where the officers had some specific knowledge of the type of explosive devices thought to be on the premises, we stated that a warrant authorizing a search for [a]ny and all unlawful explosives, components or materials thereof was sufficiently particular to properly 'allow the executing officers to distinguish between items that may and may not be seized.'  Finnigin, 113 F.3d at 1187 (quoting Leary, 846 F.2d at 602). 53 The warrant issued in this case, worded almost identically to the warrant condoned in Finnigin, authorizing a search for any explosives, explosive materials and parts, is therefore sufficiently particular to allow the searching officers to distinguish between items that may or may not be seized, even though the officers may have had more specific information regarding the type of some of the explosive devices. The federal residence warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. 5
54 Next, Le argues that the federal agents who executed the federal residence warrant so grossly exceeded the scope of the warrant as to manifest a flagrant disregard for the warrant's terms, thus converting the warrant into an unlawful general warrant. Le argues, therefore, that all evidence discovered pursuant to this warrant should be suppressed, citing Medlin and Foster. 55 The search was clearly not the type of search condemned in Medlin and Foster. During the course of the search, federal agents confiscated approximately 50 items, only eight of which can, even under an interpretation of fact and law highly favorable to Le, be considered unrelated to explosives. Those eight items include a furniture receipt, a video receipt, an envelope addressed to Rachell Harper, and several flares. Appellant's App. at 73-74. Even assuming, arguendo, that the seizure of those eight items was entirely unlawful, such action does not come close to the type of flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant found in our prior cases. Thus, Le's remedy would be suppression of the wrongfully seized items, not a blanket suppression order. 56 In any event, Le's argument is moot because Le was never prosecuted for possessing any of the eight items. He was prosecuted for possessing drugs, guns, and explosives, all of which were seized lawfully. Thus, we decline to remand the case to the district court for a meaningless determination of whether the eight items were unlawfully seized.