Opinion ID: 1221868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State's Instruction Number Five

Text: The State's instruction number five read: The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, Glen N. Bowman, Sr., shot, wounded and killed Thomas Freeman Hart, and that he, the said Glen N. Bowman, Sr., relies upon self-defense to excuse him from such act, the burden of showing such excuse is on the defendant, and to avail him of such defense he must prove to the satisfaction of the jury by a preponderance of the evidence, or it must appear from all the evidence and circumstances in the case that at the time he shot and wounded the said Thomas Freeman Hart he believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of the said Thomas Freeman Hart, for the purpose of protecting himself from such apparent danger, believing and having reasonable grounds to believe at the time he shot and wounded the said Thomas Freeman Hart that said shooting and wounding was necessary in order to protect himself from death or great bodily harm at the hands of the said Thomas Freeman Hart, but the Court instructs the jury that the defendant acted at his peril, as the jury must pass upon all his actions in the premises, from all the facts and circumstances of the case. This instruction, relating to self-defense, was disapproved for the first time by this Court in State v. Kirtley, W.Va., 252 S.E.2d 374 (1979), where we held, at syllabus point 4: Once there is sufficient evidence to create a reasonable doubt that the killing resulted from the defendant acting in self-defense, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. The disapproval of the type of instruction given at Bowman's trial was based, however, on a reinterpretation of the appropriate judicial balance of the burden of proof of self-defense. 252 S.E.2d at 380. We made it clear that the rule announced in the case was not bottomed on constitutional due process principles. 252 S.E.2d at 381. We also explicitly held that the decision was not to be applied retroactively. 252 S.E.2d at 381, 382. We recently reaffirmed this holding in State v. Gangwer, W.Va., 283 S.E.2d 839 (1981), where we said: Clearly, the discussion in Kirtley regarding retroactivity was designed to preclude `full retroactivity' so that the Kirtley rule could not be applied by way of a collateral attack in habeas corpus on a final conviction. 283 S.E.2d at 842. [2] We abide by those decisions today and find, therefore, that the instruction here complained of, although erroneous under current law after State v. Kirtley , is not a basis upon which post-conviction relief may be properly granted under W.Va.Code, 53-4A-1(d) [1967]. [3] The trial judge's dismissal of this contention was, therefore, proper. State v. Kirtley was not based on the federal or state constitution and was not intended to be applied retroactively.