Opinion ID: 3065342
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Fourth Amendment Wiretap Claim

Text: Forrester argues that, even if the necessity requirement was met, the application violated the Fourth Amendment standard set forth in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) because of a lack of exigent circumstances. In Berger, the Court held that: [The wiretap statute] permits uncontested entry without any showing of exigent circumstances. Such a showing of exigency, in order to avoid notice would appear more important in eavesdropping, with its inherent dangers, than that required when conventional procedures of search and seizure are utilized. Id. at 60. Berger did not create a bright-line exigency requirement. Rather, the Court was troubled that eavesdropping had been authorized without requiring probable cause, without a description of the conversations it sought to record, and without a termination date. Id. at 59-60. Here, probable cause was established, the wiretap was limited to one month, and the application described the conversations and information that it sought to “seize.” UNITED STATES v. FORRESTER 331 [19] Furthermore, the Supreme Court has routinely acknowledged that § 2518 “prescribes the procedure for securing judicial authority to intercept wire communications,” Giordano, 416 U.S. at 507, and was enacted specifically to “meet the constitutional requirements for electronic surveillance enunciated by [the Supreme Court] in [Berger] and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 532 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, we conclude that because the wiretap application met the standards set forth in § 2518, which do not require a showing of exigent circumstances, the application did not violate the Fourth Amendment.