Opinion ID: 769431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Benedicto Diaz

Text: 17 Benedicto Diaz appeals the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea agreement, arguing that since his testimony fulfilled his side of the bargain by assisting the convictions of his co-defendants, the government breached the agreement by failing to file a downward departure motion for him under sec.5K1.1. 3 18 We review the district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Schilling, 142 F.3d 388, 394 (7th Cir. 1998). A court may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if the defendant provides any fair and just reason. Id. at 398 (citing United States v. Abdul, 75 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 1996)). And we will uphold the district court's findings about whether the defendant has provided a fair and just reason unless they are clearly erroneous. Schilling, 142 F.3d at 398. 19 In this case, Diaz's plea agreement provided in part: 20 I further understand that at the time of sentencing, in exchange for my cooperation, the United States of America will file a departure motion with the Court pursuant to guideline section 5K1.1 and Title 18, United States Code, Section 3353(e); I further understand that if the Court accepts this plea agreement and grants the government's 5K1.1 motion, the government will recommend a departure which places my final guideline sentencing range between level 1 to level 15 on the guideline sentencing table. However, I understand that this recommendation is based upon my continuing cooperation with the United States and my agreement to always provide truthful and complete information and testimony; I also understand that if I fail to provide complete, truthful and candid information and testimony as required by this plea agreement, the government will not be obligated to file the departure motion and I will not be allowed to withdraw my guilty plea. 21 (Plea Agreement para.9(i).) At his plea hearing, Diaz also acknowledged that if he failed to testify fully and completely and truthfully, the government would have no obligation to file the departure motion. Thus, under the terms of the agreement, the government validly conditioned its obligation to file the sec.5K1.1 motion on Diaz's complete, truthful and candid testimony. See United States v. Lezine, 166 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 1999). 22 At the trial, Diaz testified that he never really thought that the lottery was illegal. 4 The district court found that Diaz's trial testimony was inconsistent with earlier statements he made under oath, and bolstered the defense of his co-defendants. His trial testimony contradicted: 1) his plea hearing (where he admitted that he knowingly conspired to launder the proceeds of an illegal enterprise); 2) his earlier statements to co-conspirators about his fear of going to jail for participating in the lottery; and 3) his earlier admission to an FBI agent that he knew that the bolita was illegal after the FBI's March 30, 1993 search. And the fact that Diaz moved his collection operations to another bar after the FBI search further demonstrates that he knew that the lottery was illegal at that time. Moreover, his trial testimony supported Santos's defense theory that Santos and his co-conspirators had always thought that the lottery was legal. Therefore, the district court did not commit clear error in finding that Diaz failed to testify completely or truthfully. 23 The overarching theme of Diaz's plea agreement was his complete, truthful, and candid testimony. See United States v. Ramunno, 133 F.3d 476, 483 (7th Cir. 1998). Since he failed to fulfill his part of the bargain, and supported the defense of his co-defendants instead, the government was not required to move for a downward departure pursuant to sec.5K1.1. Diaz's breach of the plea agreement does not constitute a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion.