Opinion ID: 2356557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proper route of appeal from the board of taxation

Text: RSA 79-A:9 (VI) (Supp. 1975), entitled Appeal, provides as follows: Either party aggrieved by the decision of the board of taxation may, within thirty days after notice in writing of the decision of the board of taxation, file notice of appeal to the supreme court specifying all the grounds upon which such party bases his objections. For the purposes of such appeal, the findings of fact by said board shall be final and any such appeal shall be limited to questions of law. An election by an applicant to appeal in accordance with this paragraph shall be deemed a waiver of any right to petition the superior court in accordance with RSA 79-A:11. RSA 79-A:11 (Supp. 1975), entitled Appeal to Superior Court, provides in relevant part: If the assessing officials deny ... any application ..., the applicant, having complied with the requirements of RSA 79-A:5, II may, within six months after notice of denial ..., apply by petition to the superior court of the county, which shall make such order thereon as justice requires. Any appeal to the superior court under this section shall be in lieu of an appeal to the board of taxation pursuant to RSA 79-A:9. It is undisputed that, at the least, these provisions accomplish the following: (1) provide for an appeal from the board of taxation, as ultimate finder of fact, to the supreme court; and (2) provide in lieu of a fact-finding proceeding before the board of taxation for a fact-finding proceeding in the superior court. The taxpayer argues that the provisions of RSA 79-A:9 (VI) (Supp. 1975) do not explicitly prohibit, and therefore must be said to allow, an appeal from the board to the superior court, if in fact no appeal is taken to the supreme court. The argument is made that the section provides the applicant with a choice of proceeding either directly from the board to the supreme court or from the board to the superior court. To arrive at this conclusion reliance is placed on the last sentence of RSA 79-A:9 (VI) (Supp. 1975) which provides [a]n election by an applicant to appeal in accordance with this paragraph shall be deemed a waiver of any right to petition the superior court in accordance with RSA 79-A:11. Arguing that the phrase an appeal in accordance with this paragraph refers to an appeal to the supreme court, the taxpayer reasons that it has an election of remedies: (1) in accordance with this paragraph to the supreme court at which time the right to appeal from the board to the superior court is lost or; (2) since it is not explicitly prohibited by RSA 79-A:9 (VI) (Supp. 1975), an appeal from the board to the superior court. [1] If the taxpayer is correct in his statutory interpretation, we would be forced to conclude that the last sentence of RSA 79-A:9 (VI) (Supp. 1975) is mere surplusage, since it can hardly be supposed that under any circumstances appeal would lie from the board to the supreme court and then to the superior court. We are inclined to believe that the legislature did not so waste its words. See 2A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973). [2] The evident purpose of the legislation is clear: to provide for an original fact-finding procedure in either the board of taxation or the superior court, with the appeal of questions of law running to the supreme court. Under taxpayer's theory, the appeal to the superior court would inevitably be duplicativeeither of the fact-finding role of the board or, if confined to questions of law, of the review function of this court. The statute does not explicitly authorize such a role for the superior court, and we cannot presume that such duplication was intended. [3] However, our primary reason for rejecting taxpayer's argument is found in the same last sentence of the statutory provision on which the taxpayer relies. The right to petition the superior court in accordance with RSA 79-A:11 is the right to an original fact-finding hearing before the superior court, and it is this right which an applicant may elect to waive. Accordingly, the election to which RSA 79-A:9 (VI) (Supp. 1975) refers must be the election as to which body (the board or the superior court) will be the trier of factnot as taxpayer contends, the election to appeal to the supreme court. See 18 N.H.B.J. 105, 109 (1976). [4] We conclude that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 1974 Plainfield and Cornish applications. Since the time for taking an appeal from the board to the supreme court has long since expired, the adverse decision of the board on these two applications must be considered final.