Opinion ID: 897115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Minimum Benefit

Text: [¶ 11] Alternatively, Meljie asserts the Bureau erred in refusing to pay him a minimum disability benefit under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-09 equal to sixty percent of the average weekly wage in the state. The statute [2] provides, in relevant part: If an injury causes temporary total or permanent total disability, the fund shall pay to the disabled employee during that disability a weekly benefit equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the gross weekly wage of the employee, subject to a minimum of sixty percent and a maximum of one hundred percent of the average weekly wage in the state. If an employee is disabled due to an injury, that employee's benefits will be based upon the employee's wage and the bureau benefit rates in effect on the date of first disability. .... 2. The disability benefit or the combined disability benefit and dependency award may not exceed the weekly wage of the employee after deductions for social security and federal income tax. [Emphasis added.] [¶ 12] Meljie asserts that under this statute he is entitled to a benefit of at least sixty percent of the average weekly wage in the state, irrespective of the weekly wage he was receiving prior to his injury. He asserts the maximum benefit limitation under subsection 2, of one-hundred percent of the employee's net weekly wage, only applies when a claimant receives both a disability benefit and a dependency award. We disagree. [¶ 13] The interpretation of a statute is a question of law fully reviewable by this Court. Svedberg v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 181, ¶ 8, 599 N.W.2d 323. The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Ash v. Traynor, 2000 ND 75, ¶ 6, 609 N.W.2d 96. In ascertaining legislative intent, we look first to the words used in the statute, giving them their ordinary, plain-language meaning. Id. [¶ 14] Relevant to the issue in this case, we believe the statute is unambiguous. Under the clear language of the statute, the limitation under subsection 2 applies to a claimant receiving only a disability benefit and also applies to a claimant receiving both a disability benefit and a dependency award. The statute makes the benefit limitation under subsection 2 applicable to the disability benefit or to the combined disability benefit and dependency award, if the claimant receives both. The word or is defined as a function word to indicate an alternative and means either of alternative choices. Merriam-Webster Collegiate On Line Dictionary, www.m-w.com. We conclude, therefore, the maximum benefit limitation under subsection 2 applies to a claimant receiving only a disability benefit. [¶ 15] We construe statutes as a whole to give each provision meaning and effect. Little v. Traynor, 1997 ND 128, ¶ 37, 565 N.W.2d 766. Statutes must be harmonized to give meaning to related provisions and are interpreted in context to give meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence. Doyle ex rel. Doyle v. Sprynczynatyk, 2001 ND 8, ¶ 10, 621 N.W.2d 353. Harmonizing all parts of the statute together, it provides that the fund shall pay a disabled employee a weekly benefit equal to two-thirds of the employee's gross weekly wage, subject to a minimum of sixty-percent of the state's average weekly wage, but not to exceed one-hundred percent of the employee's preinjury net weekly wage, after deducting social security and federal income tax. [¶ 16] The treatise, 5 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 93.04[5], at 93-75 (2002), notes that in applying a minimum benefit there is also a proviso, something like `employee's actual average wage if less.' If this proviso has been omitted, as it has in some states, the danger of benefits exceeding actual wage is obvious, particularly as to part-time employment and as to partial disability. Our legislature has enacted a proviso to avoid the danger of benefits exceeding actual wages. Thus, under the clear wording of the statute, Meljie is entitled to receive from the fund a weekly benefit equal to two-thirds of his gross weekly wage. However, if that amount is less than sixty percent of the average weekly wage in the state, then Meljie is entitled to a larger benefit, but his benefit cannot exceed, under subsection 2, one-hundred percent of his preinjury net weekly wage, after deducting social security and federal income tax. The Bureau has completed the calculation. As determined under N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(5), Meljie's average weekly wage is $138. Two-thirds of that wage is a gross weekly wage of $92. For the period used in the calculation, one-hundred percent of the average weekly wage in the state was $417 and sixty percent of the average weekly wage in the state was, therefore, $250. According to the Bureau, and apparently not disputed by Meljie, Meljie's net weekly wage, after deducting social security and federal income tax, is $122. Applying the statute to these figures, Meljie is entitled to a maximum benefit equal to one-hundred percent of his net weekly wage of $122 per week. [¶ 17] When, as in this case, two-thirds of the claimant's weekly wage is less than sixty percent of the state weekly wage, the benefit is increased up to sixty percent of the state weekly wage, but not to exceed one-hundred percent of the claimant's preinjury average net weekly wage. This interpretation harmonizes the benefit provisions of the statute with the limitation provided under subsection 2 so that all parts of the statute are given meaning and effect. The objective accomplished by the clear and unambiguous wording of the statute is to provide the worker with a fair benefit, but not a windfall benefit. If two-thirds of the claimants' average weekly wage is less than sixty percent of the state's average weekly wage, the claimant will receive an increased benefit, but the claimant cannot receive more than one-hundred percent of his preinjury net weekly wage.