Opinion ID: 6333029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction-stripping provision

Text: The government contends we lack jurisdiction over Barros's petition because it comes from a denial of discretionary relief. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), we typically lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary remedy of cancellation of removal. See Tacuri-Tacuri v. Garland, 998 F.3d 466, 471 (1st Cir. 2021); see also Adeyanju, 27 F.4th at 36. But as a general proposition, we have jurisdiction over petitions for review from BIA denials of discretionary forms of relief if the petitions raise constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see Adeyanju, 27 F.4th at 36. As we said just recently, claims that the BIA misapplied (or failed to apply) the proper standard of review can give rise to legal questions. Adeyanju, 27 F.4th at 37; see also Perez-Trujillo v. Garland, 3 F.4th 10, 22 (1st Cir. 2021). We remain mindful, however, that the presence of a constitution or legal question is a 'matter of substance, not a function of labeling.' Tacuri-Tacuri, 998 F.3d at 471 (quoting Alvarado v. Holder, 743 F.3d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 2014)). Though the government contends that Barros's claims are attacks at the BIA's discretionary conclusion thinly veiled as claims of legal error, we are not convinced. Rather, after reviewing Barros's claim that the BIA misapplied the clear-error standard of review, we conclude it properly raises a legal question - 11 - over which § 1252(a)(2)(D) grants us jurisdiction. See Adeyanju, 27 F.4th at 37 (Just as a petitioner may not cloak her attacks on discretion in question-of-law garb, '[t]he BIA cannot reverse an IJ's findings and cloak its actions in the euphemistic language of reweighing.' (quoting Zhu v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 703 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2013))).