Opinion ID: 883306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denial of Motion to Call Witness

Text: Third, Moody's argues that the District Court erred when it denied Moody's oral mid-trial motion to call Cheryl Rathbun as a witness. Moody's states that Rathbun was originally identified by Guertin as a witness but was later withdrawn from the witness list, but because she was originally listed in the pre-trial order and Moody's had reserved the right to call any of Guertin's witnesses, it should have been able to call Rathbun. Guertin rebuts Moody's argument, stating that she had to delete Rathbun from her witness list and therefore, Moody's should not be able to argue that it should have been able to call Rathbun as a witness. Cheryl Rathbun was originally listed as a witness for Guertin on the pre-trial order of August 25, 1993. However, the pre-trial order also provides that Moody's objected to the plaintiff calling Rathbun on the basis of the fact that no disclosure whatsoever was made in answer to discovery of the Plaintiff's intention to call the [witness]. On September 2, 1993, Moody's filed a motion to continue the trial because Guertin failed to disclose certain witnesses. Moody's attempted to locate the witnesses and depose them before trial but one of the witnesses was going to be out of state and Moody's would not be able to depose her before the scheduled trial date. In an effort to maintain the trial date as scheduled, Guertin, on September 3, 1993, responded to Moody's motion, stating that she would delete the names of the three late witnesses from the potential witness list for her case in chief. Cheryl Rathbun was one of the witnesses deleted from the potential witness list. Guertin did, however, reserve the right to call Cheryl Rathbun and the other deleted witnesses as rebuttal witnesses, if necessary. Finally, in an order dated September 7, 1993, the District Court denied Moody's motion to continue the trial and deleted the names of Cheryl Rathbun and two other witnesses from the list of plaintiff's witnesses in her case in chief. Our standard of review for discretionary trial administration rulings is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Steer Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 475, 803 P.2d 601, 603-604. In the present case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Moody's motion to call Cheryl Rathbun as a witness. In response to Moody's motion to call Rathbun, the trial judge stated that Cheryl Rathbun as a witness, she is not now among those of plaintiff's witnesses that the defendant has a right to call under the catch-all provision of `any and all of plaintiff's witnesses... .' Further, the trial judge ruled that Moody's could call Rathbun as a rebuttal witness if that was appropriate but: Surrebuttal by the defendant is limited to the scope of rebutting any new material that is raised by the plaintiff in her rebuttal. If she puts on no rebuttal, there is absolutely nothing in the nature of new material which would entitle the defendant to surrebuttal. The trial judge was correct in denying Moody's motion. Cheryl Rathbun was deleted from Guertin's list of potential witnesses to preserve the trial date and Moody's accepted this decision. At that point, Moody's no longer retained the right to call her under the catch-all provision from the witnesses' list, particularly since the name was deleted due to Moody's motion to continue the trial. The trial judge was also correct in stating that Rathbun could have been called as a rebuttal witness only if new material was raised by Guertin in her rebuttal. Massman v. City of Helena (1989), 237 Mont. 234, 243, 773 P.2d 1206, 1211. Whether proposed testimony is admissible as rebuttal testimony is within the sound discretion of the District Court. Massman, 773 P.2d at 1211. Moreover, when the trial judge denied Moody's motion to call Rathbun as a witness, Moody's should have made an offer of proof concerning the testimony that would have been elicited by Rathbun. Rule 103(a)(2), M.R.Evid., provides: (a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and       (2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. Moody's made no offer of proof, thereby not properly preserving the objection to the excluded testimony. In view of the fact that Rathbun was deleted from Guertin's witnesses list, the opportunity to be called as a surrebuttal witness did not arise and in view of the fact that Moody's did not properly preserve its objection by an offer of proof, we hold that the District Court did not err in denying Moody's motion to call Rathbun as a witness.