Opinion ID: 2
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background and Travel

Text: While the facts surrounding the underlying offense are not complicated, the pre-trial procedural history of this case presents a maze of overlapping federal and state activity, a flurry of continuances, and a revolving door of withdrawn and newly appointed defense counsel.
The following facts were elicited at Dowdell's federal trial. -2- In the summer of 2001, several Massachusetts authorities launched a coordinated effort with the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to investigate drug trafficking in the area of a housing project in Roxbury. The investigation involved a task force of undercover officers who made controlled purchases of cocaine and crack cocaine from dealers operating in the project. One of these officers was Boston Housing Authority investigator Joao Monteiro. Posing as a construction worker, Monteiro drove an unmarked car with a concealed audio transmitter and a video camera that focused on the automobile's interior passenger compartment. On July 6, 2001, Monteiro observed Dowdell standing on the sidewalk with a man named Robert White, whom Monteiro recognized from previous encounters. Dowdell was wearing dark pants and a black shirt. He and White were counting cash. Monteiro signaled to White that he wished to purchase crack cocaine, and White went to talk to Dowdell. White then approached Monteiro's car and got into the passenger seat. White told Monteiro that Dowdell, at this point identified only as the darkskinned brother in the dark shirt, was a trustworthy dealer. After purchasing 1.1 grams of crack cocaine for $230, Monteiro asked White whether the dude in black was the person to see for future purchases if White were unavailable. White replied affirmatively and informed Monteiro that Dowdell went by the name -3- Smoke. Monteiro departed, after informing White that he would be returning in a short while to make another purchase. Some 45 minutes later, Monteiro returned to the project and saw Dowdell on a bicycle. Monteiro approached Dowdell, who asked Monteiro if he wanted anything. Monteiro responded that he was looking for White, and Dowdell then biked over to the spot where White was standing. White came over to Monteiro's car and, for the second time that night, sat down beside Monteiro in the passenger seat. Monteiro told White that he wished to purchase more drugs, as well as baggies for repackaging. White agreed and, after directing Monteiro to a parking area close to the spot of the first transaction, sold him 1.2 grams of crack cocaine and baggies for $210. Monteiro returned for a third buy on July 16, ten days after the first two. When he arrived, he saw Dowdell standing in a small group, wearing blue jeans and a blue checkered shirt. Monteiro again asked for White, who was unavailable. Monteiro asked for directions and drove away, making it appear that he was going off to search for White. After waiting long enough to give the impression that the search was unsuccessful, he returned to the project looking for Dowdell. He found Dowdell on the sidewalk, still wearing a blue checkered shirt. Monteiro called out Yo, Smoke, can I holler at you. Dowdell approached Monteiro's car, and the two of them proceeded to have a conversation through the -4- passenger-side window. Continuing to address Dowdell as Smoke, Monteiro asked for about $200 worth of crack cocaine. Dowdell left briefly to meet with another individual and then returned with six bags of crack cocaine, worth approximately $100. Seven more bags would eventually follow. The total weight of the thirteen bags was approximately 2.3 grams. During this whole encounter, Dowdell was only partially visible on the video that Monteiro's surveillance camera recorded. Driving away, Monteiro narrated a description of Dowdell for the surveillance recording. He stated, Smoke is the same kid as the last time.. [sic] he's got on a checkered shirt blue...blue checkered shirt umm and he was riding a bicycle. Later that day, Dowdell was arrested on an outstanding warrant unrelated to his transactions with Monteiro. He was brought to a Boston police station where a booking photo was taken. In the photo, Dowdell was wearing a blue checkered shirt, as Monteiro had described earlier in the day. Later, around four hours after completing the buy from Dowdell, Monteiro was shown the photograph and identified the depicted individual as Smoke. Monteiro reported that the individual in the photograph was the same person from whom he had purchased drugs that day and whom he had seen standing on the corner with White ten days beforehand. -5-
Because the timing of particular pre-trial events is important to our legal analysis, we must delve into some detail in retracing the path on which this case traveled before it reached the jury. On March 25, 2002, eight months after the July 2001 encounters at the housing project, a Suffolk County grand jury indicted Dowdell, based on those events, for distributing a controlled substance in the vicinity of school property. At his arraignment, he pled not guilty and was released on bail, which was subsequently revoked in October 2003 due to a charge on an unrelated crime. On April 12, 2004, Dowdell's appointed counsel withdrew his representation and was replaced. That replacement would in turn withdraw in August of that year, and the court appointed a third attorney. On November 17, 2004, the federal government filed a criminal complaint against Dowdell based on the July 2001 events, charging him with distribution of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At that time, Dowdell was already serving a 27-month sentence in the Suffolk County House of Correction after a conviction on the unrelated charge that had triggered his bail revocation. One month later, in December 2004, the Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi on the March 25, 2002 indictment for distributing a controlled substance in the vicinity of school -6- property, effectively terminating its prosecution. Dowdell remained in state custody as he continued to serve his ongoing sentence on the unrelated charge, but from this point onward he faced only the federal distribution charge. On February 4, 2005, then unrepresented by counsel, Dowdell wrote a letter to a clerk for the magistrate judge overseeing the pre-trial proceedings in his federal case. The letter invoked his speedy trial rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3161. Nearly three weeks later, Dowdell followed this letter with a formal request under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, that he be transferred from state to federal custody as he awaited the resolution of the federal charge. On March 14, 2005, the federal government petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, and on March 22, 2005, Dowdell was brought into federal district court for his initial appearance, at which point he was assigned new representation. During the initial appearance, the prosecutor acknowledged that Dowdell's transfer into federal custody was pursuant to a writ based on the defendant's request under the interstate agreement on detainers. He proceeded to explain that Dowdell had no intention of waiving his IAD rights, which Dowdell's counsel confirmed. By preserving his rights under the IAD, Dowdell was to remain in federal custody and receive credit toward the fulfillment of his term of incarceration for the unrelated charge -7- in the state-court system, but receive no credit toward any eventual federal sentence for the distribution offense until the state-court sentence had fully elapsed. The next day, March 23, a federal grand jury indicted Dowdell, charging him with one count of knowingly and intentionally possess[ing] with intent to distribute and distribut[ing] a quantity of cocaine in violation of § 841(a)(1). Dowdell was arraigned on this charge on March 29, 2005. As in the state court proceedings, he entered a plea of not guilty. The court held an initial status conference on May 11, 2005, during which it set a deadline of June 23 for all dispositive motions. At Dowdell's request, that deadline was later extended to July 8. Dowdell filed a motion to dismiss the indictment at the new July 8 deadline, claiming a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, as well as violation of the Sixth Amendment.1 Specifically, Dowdell posited that prejudice had resulted from the pre-indictment delay in federal court.2 In an unsworn declaration, Dowdell contended that the Commonwealth had vindictively choreographed the delay and the eventual transfer to federal jurisdiction in retribution for his declining to testify before a 1 The Speedy Trial Act claim is not before us on appeal. 2 The constitutional provision that applies to pre-indictment delay is, in fact, the Fifth, rather than the Sixth, Amendment. See United States v. Marler, 756 F.2d 206, 209–10 (1st Cir. 1985). Dowdell's counsel appears to have corrected this point in a supplemental filing. -8- state grand jury in a shooting case in which he had apparently been the victim. The declaration claimed that the district attorney was upset at Dowdell's alleged inability to see the face of the shooter and had stated if you blow my case I am gonna get your drug case sent back to the feds. This alleged state-federal collusion, Dowdell argued, meant that the starting point for measuring any speedy trial violations ought to be the date of his state indictment, that is, March 25, 2002, rather than the federal indictment on March 23, 2005. The docket then lay dormant for four months. Although the government was required by rule to file its opposition to the motion to dismiss within two weeks, see D. Mass. R. 7.1(b)(2), it was not until November 7, 2005 that the government sought leave to file a late opposition. Apparently, the government had actually prepared the memorandum of law in July and assumed that it had been timely submitted. The motion for leave to file explained the delay as a simple error in performing the electronic submission. The district court granted this request, finding no evidence of bad faith on the part of the government. The next day, the government filed its opposition. On December 17, 2005, before the court had taken any action on the pending motion to dismiss, Dowdell moved to withdraw his appointed counsel -- as he had done twice before in state court -- claiming a breakdown in communication. The court held an ex -9- parte hearing on February 14, 2006. It explained to Dowdell that appointing new counsel would further delay his case. Dowdell expressed that he would ideally like to resolve the case as soon as possible with his current counsel, but we seem to not be seeing eye to eye with each other, so I thought I had no choice but to do that. . . . I don't want to put it off anymore. I've told him that. But I just felt that my life is on the line here, and I just felt that I need a new attorney. The court granted Dowdell's request and allowed his attorney to withdraw. Dowdell and the government agreed that any time that elapsed between the withdrawal and an eventual ruling on the motion to dismiss would be excluded from the speedy trial calculation. On March 2, 2006, the court appointed new counsel, Victoria Bonilla. On June 16, 2006, after Bonilla had time to acquaint herself with the case, Dowdell moved to supplement the motion to dismiss. The court held a non-evidentiary hearing on the matter and, after setting a trial date of July 31, 2006, granted the motion to supplement. On June 30, Dowdell filed the supplemental memorandum, alleging, inter alia, infringement of Dowdell's due process rights.3 Neither the original motion nor the supplemental memorandum mentioned the IAD. The government filed its response on July 11, 2006. The response erroneously asserted that Dowdell had in fact waived his 3 The due process claim is not before us on appeal. -10- IAD rights at his initial appearance, rendering it inapplicable for purposes of the motion to dismiss. Regardless, the government claimed, no IAD violation had occurred. The court held a hearing on the motion on July 14, 2006. Bonilla, who had not been involved in the case when Dowdell first appeared, did not mention the IAD or contest the alleged waiver. As indicated in the following colloquy between Bonilla and the court, Dowdell's sole grounds for dismissal concerned the period prior to the federal indictment, rather than any post-indictment developments: THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now, turning more directly to your motion, the supplemental motion for -- to dismiss, do I understand, Ms. Bonilla, that the defendant is not contesting the time between the indictment, the federal indictment, in March of 2005, and today's date but that what you are concentrating on is the time between the November or December notice, December of 2004, and the indictment in March of 2005, as exceeding 30 days in violation of the statute? Is that -- MS. BONILLA: That's fair to say, your Honor. THE COURT: That's fair to say. So we're not concerned with anything that happened between March and the -- March of 2005 and the filing of the original motion to dismiss in July of 2005, and the snafu of the government in not responding to that motion until November of 2005, is that correct? MS. BONILLA: Yes, your Honor. My motion focuses on what happens before. The court ultimately denied the motion in its entirety, including Dowdell's constitutional speedy trial argument, and prepared to -11- move onward to the July 31 trial date. Dowdell, however, once again requested a continuance, this time because of the possibility that a prior state conviction might be expunged from his record in the interim (an occurrence that could affect plea negotiations). Michael Bourbeau, one of Bonilla's partners who was also representing Dowdell at the hearing, explained that we've talked about Mr. Dowdell's Speedy Trial rights. But the ramifications of this, I think, this prior [state conviction] -- the determination that can be made on that prior is, I think, very significant as to whether this case needs to go forward to trial. The government agreed with this representation. At that point, the court took pains to ensure that Dowdell understood the ramifications of any postponement: THE COURT: The Court's schedule is such that it couldn't be for probably three months. MR. BOURBEAU: We understand the Court's concern. We've had discussion with Mr. Dowdell. THE COURT: Yeah, I mean, this is the oldest case, I think, on my docket, maybe not in the docket number but with respect to the date of the alleged crime. It needs to be resolved. Your request, of course, is made on behalf of the defendant now who needs to have his rights -- MR. BOURBEAU: Yes. THE COURT: -- pursued and resolved. ... -12- THE COURT: All right. The Court will allow the defendant's motion to continue the trial until September 18th on the extraordinary circumstance that we all find ourselves in this case. It is something that is very much of concern to the Court that this matter be resolved sooner rather than later, but I understand the import of what Mr. Bourbeau is suggesting and that it may well inure to the benefit of not only counsel but of the Court in terms of judicial economy or economy of the Court's expenditure of time. So I'm going to allow that motion for continuance. Thus, at Dowdell's own behest, the trial was pushed back an additional month and a half. The September 18th trial date met the same fate as the preceding July 31st date -- postponement. For the second time since his federal indictment, and for the fourth time overall, Dowdell's attorney moved to withdraw representation. In a motion dated August 8, 2006, Bonilla informed the court that Dowdell believed there to have been an irreparable breakdown in communications. The court held an ex parte hearing on August 16, 2006, after which it denied the motion. But on September 8, Dowdell sent the court a pro se, handwritten motion to reconsider its denial. On September 18, 2006, the court held another ex parte hearing, after which it determined that the best course was indeed to allow Bonilla to withdraw. The trial date was once again pushed back to December 11, 2006, and a new attorney, Mark Shea, was appointed on October 31, 2006. -13- As with his predecessors, Shea's tenure as Dowdell's counsel would terminate prematurely, though this time not at Dowdell's request. On November 28, 2006, Shea informed the court that he had a conflict of interest that compelled withdrawal. The court allowed another change in representation. The trial date was rescheduled for February 27, 2007. Dowdell's new attorney (now his fourth since the federal indictment and seventh overall) was granted a requested continuance on December 18, 2006 in order to acquaint himself better with the case. Trial was set for April 9, 2007. On March 15, 2007, Dowdell's attorney once again requested a continuance, this time both in order to ensure effective assistance and because of a personal conflict. The court granted this final continuance. The trial commenced on May 29, 2007 -- nearly six years from the date of the offense.
We briefly depart from our chronological march through the events and take several steps back to August 2006, when the trial was still scheduled for the following month. On August 30, the government filed a motion to advise the court of a potential variance between the text of the indictment and the proof to be adduced at trial. The indictment did not refer to cocaine base or crack cocaine, as had the federal complaint and accompanying affidavit, the petition for habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the -14- testimony before the grand jury, the magistrate judge's colloquy with Dowdell at his initial appearance, and various discovery documents that Dowdell had previously been provided. Instead, it simply read cocaine, potentially suggesting the powder form of the substance. Arguing that modifying the text from cocaine to cocaine base would not constitute a material change requiring a superseding indictment, the government asked the court to declare the original indictment suitable for trial. The government professed an inability to explain why the indictment did not specifically allege distribution of cocaine base, but sought to clarify the matter prior to trial and avoid unnecessary jury confusion over the controlled substance allegedly distributed. Recognizing that a variance, by definition, can only be determined after the presentation of evidence, the court chose to treat the government's pre-trial motion as one to amend the indictment.4 It then analyzed whether the proposed correction would rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court granted the government's motion, reasoning that Dowdell had been well apprised all along of the fact that he was charged with 4 We have explained the difference between a variance and an amendment as follows: A constructive amendment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are altered, either literally or in effect, by prosecution or court after the grand jury has last passed upon them. A variance occurs when the charging terms remain unchanged but when the facts proved at trial are different from those alleged in the indictment. United States v. Fisher, 3 F.3d 456, 462–63 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (offering similar distinction). -15- distribution of cocaine base and not cocaine powder. It further noted that the particular drug type alleged (whether cocaine base or cocaine powder) was not actually an element under § 841(a)(1) and did not have any effect on the evidence the government intended to proffer at trial. Therefore, the court concluded, the amendment was akin to a permissible typographical correction. See United States v. Dowdell, 464 F. Supp. 2d 64, 68 (D. Mass. 2006).
At trial, Dowdell's primary argument was misidentification. He claimed that he was not the Smoke referred to in surveillance recordings and that the video footage was inconclusive as to whether a man with a blue checkered shirt was actually involved. In order to corroborate Monteiro's identification of Dowdell as Smoke, the government introduced, inter alia, two items that Dowdell had unsuccessfully attempted to exclude through pre-trial motions in limine: the booking sheet from the July 16 arrest and several of White's July 6 statements captured on videotape.
The booking sheet contained both the photograph of Dowdell in the blue checkered shirt on which Monteiro had based his identification, as well as a textual description of Dowdell's clothing as including a blue plaid shirt. Dowdell argued that the document was inadmissible because a provision of Federal Rule -16- of Evidence 803(8), the so-called law-enforcement exception, forbids the introduction of police reports against criminal defendants. The government countered that a booking sheet should not run afoul of the exception because it contained merely rote, routine administrative information. The district court concluded that the document was admissible pursuant to both Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1) (because the document formed the basis of a witness's identification) and Fed.R.Evid. 803(8) (because the document reflects routine procedures based upon information from the defendant himself and not observations, conclusions or opinions of police officers which are normally contained in police reports). In sum, the document possesses the requisite indicia of trustworthiness to be admissible under more than one of the Federal Rules of Evidence. At trial, the government proffered an edited version of the booking sheet. All information relating to the charges against Dowdell was redacted, while the sections describing clothing and appearance remained. In addition, the government introduced the photograph separately, unaccompanied by the booking sheet. It was on the basis of this photograph, rather than the booking sheet, that Monteiro would testify he had made his identification of Dowdell as Smoke.
Dowdell had also objected in limine to the introduction of White's videotaped statements from the two transactions on July 6, 2001. There were two tapes at issue, one from each transaction. -17- The first showed White telling Monteiro who Smoke was and confirming that he was reliable. The second showed Monteiro approaching Dowdell and asking him to summon White, which Dowdell then did. Dowdell challenged the admissibility of the statements on two distinct grounds. First, he argued that the statements constituted proof of prior bad acts that would be barred by Rule 404(b). The government responded that the statements were not offered as prior bad acts so much as intrinsic evidence of the specific crime alleged. It posited that the jury would not be able to understand fully the July 16th transaction without knowing what had occurred on July 6th. Dowdell's second argument was that there was insufficient evidence to treat White as a co-conspirator under Rule 802(d)(2)(E), and hence White's statements should be deemed inadmissible hearsay. The government not only contested Dowdell's insufficiency claim, but also argued that the statements would be independently admissible as relating to the basis for Monteiro's identification. Under this alternative theory, White's statements could at least be introduced for the impact that they had on Monteiro and his subsequent identification of Dowdell as Smoke, if not for the truth of the matter asserted. The district court rejected both of Dowdell's objections during the final pre-trial conference. With respect to the Rule 404(b) claim, it found that the transaction with Robert White is -18- directly and instrinsically relevant to the charge against Mr. Dowdell in this case. As for the hearsay claim, the district court adopted both of the government's theories of admissibility. During the course of the pre-trial conference, Dowdell argued that even if a transcript of the statements would be admissible, the videotape itself would be unfairly prejudicial. The government insisted that it was entitled to use the video to prove its case, as only the video showed what sort of opportunity Monteiro had to actually see Dowdell from the car. Again, the district court rejected Dowdell's argument, finding that the videotape was the best evidence. Though ordering two minor edits to the video and the corresponding transcript,5 the court ruled that the videotaped statements were otherwise admissible in their original form.
On May 31, 2007, after three days of trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Under § 841(b)(1)(c), Dowdell would normally have faced a maximum sentence of 20 years. Mention of this 20-year maximum had arisen earlier in the pre-trial proceedings, when Dowdell had challenged the government's attempt to amend the indictment. Dowdell had initially claimed that the change in drug type was 5 The two edits were (1) changing the Defendant's name in the transcript from Dowdell to Smoke and (2) deleting a statement by White that Dowdell was his cousin. -19- material because it might increase the sentence length to which he would be exposed. The government had responded that because drug type was not an element in this case, the maximum would remain at 20 years regardless. In making this point, the government had stated in writing that it was not seeking (and cannot seek) a sentence in excess of 20 years. The district court cited this language in allowing the amendment. Nevertheless, in April 2007, the government filed an information to establish a prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 851, which increased the statutory maximum from 20 to 30 years (and the guideline range from 210–262 months to 262–327 months). At sentencing, the government recommended a 262-month sentence, at the bottom end of the guideline range but well over the original 20year statutory maximum. The court ultimately sentenced Dowdell to 198 months, followed by six years' supervised release. Dowdell did not object to the sentence.