Opinion ID: 2632408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Conviction for Receiving Stolen Property

Text: In count 8 of the information, defendant was charged with receiving stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496, former subdivision (1), now subdivision (a). The gravamen of count 8 was defendant's possession of Dorsey's gun at the time of his arrest on March 25, 1991. The information also included a firearm enhancement in connection with this count, and specifically alleged that defendant personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The trial court denied defendant's motion pursuant to section 1118.1 to dismiss count 8 and the firearm enhancement as not being supported by sufficient evidence. The jury convicted defendant of count 8 and found the firearm-use allegation to be true. The trial court imposed a concurrent two-year prison term on count 8, but struck the firearm-use allegation, finding that there was insufficient evidence supporting the enhancement. Defendant contends that his conviction for receiving stolen' property should be reversed because he was incorrectly convicted of both stealing and receiving the same gun. The People concede that the trial court should have dismissed count 8, and we accept the People's concession. Common law has long established that a person may not be convicted of both stealing and receiving the same property. [10] ( People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 852, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984 P.2d 486; see, e.g., People v. Jaramillo, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 757, 129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706; People v. Tatum (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 179, 183, 25 Cal.Rptr. 832; People v. Bausell (1936) 18 Cal.App.2d 15, 18, 62 P.2d 774.) The Legislature later codified this principle. (§ 496, subd. (a) [[N]o person may be convicted both pursuant to this section and of the theft of the same property.].) In this case, defendant was convicted of both stealing Dorsey's gun and of receiving that gun as stolen property. During defendant's guilt phase trial, the prosecution argued that the robbery charged in count 4 of the information encompassed the taking of Dorsey's gun. The criminal act charged in count 8 was defendant's continued possession of Dorsey's gun at the time of his arrest. Accordingly, defendant's conviction on the charge of receiving stolen property must be reversed. Defendant additionally argues that his entire guilt phase trial was tainted by his improper conviction for receiving stolen property, and that evidence admitted to prove that count was highly prejudicial to the issues of guilt on the remaining counts, violating defendant's rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In particular, defendant focuses upon the evidence that defendant threatened Darrell Fuller and Jesse Smith with the gun in a menacing manner two days after the murders. However, the evidence that defendant contends was prejudicial to the remaining counts would have been properly admitted in the absence of the charge for receiving the stolen gun. At the guilt phase, the defense centered on a theory that defendant never fired Dorsey's weapon and that Joseph was the gunman. Accordingly, defendant's possession of the gun several days after the murders, as well as his use of it in a threatening manner, was highly relevant to both the murder and robbery charges. As defendant himself notes, his use of the gun two days later made it more likely he was the actual shooter. Because the evidence admitted in support of the charge of receiving stolen property was admissible to support the remaining charges against defendant, he has failed to show that the trial court's failure to dismiss the charge of receiving stolen property tainted the entire guilt phase trial.