Opinion ID: 762600
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements of Predicate Offense

Text: 6 Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) in 1996, providing: It shall be unlawful for any person ... who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence ... to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm. Section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) defines misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as one that has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, ... [or] by a person with whom the victim shares a child. The government concedes that § 921(a)(33) requires the predicate misdemeanor crime to ha[ve], as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force. (See Appellee's Br. at 6.) Smith contends that the predicate misdemeanor must also have, as an element, a domestic relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, and argues that his predicate offense of simple assault does not contain this element. 7 In construing a statute, we look first to the plain meaning of the words of the statute. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 118 S.Ct. 469, 474, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997). Only if the statute is ambiguous do we look to the legislative history to determine Congress's intent. See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 1035, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997). In the statute at issue, the singular term element modifies the phrase the use or attempted use of physical force.... If Congress meant the predicate misdemeanor to have two elements, it would have used the plural form of element. See United States v. Green, 902 F.2d 1311, 1312 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943, 111 S.Ct. 353, 112 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990). We find the language of the statute to be unambiguous, and look to the legislative history only to bolster our conclusion: [C]onvictions for domestic violence-related crimes often are for crimes, such as assault, that are not explicitly identified as related to domestic violence. 142 Cong.Rec. S11872-01, S11878 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). In recognizing that domestic violence-related crimes often involve crimes which are not necessarily so designated, Congress evinced its intent that the predicate offense need not contain a domestic relationship as an element. Thus, we hold that while § 921(a)(33) requires proof of a domestic relationship, it requires the predicate misdemeanor to have only one element: the use or attempted use of physical force (or its alternative, the threatened use of a deadly weapon, a situation not here presented). 8 Smith pleaded guilty to simple misdemeanor assault under Iowa Code § 708.2(4). The Iowa assault statute distinguishes between aggravated misdemeanor assaults, serious misdemeanor assaults, and simple misdemeanor assaults based on the level of intent and whether a dangerous weapon was involved. See Iowa Code § 708.2(1)-(4). All assaults are defined by reference to § 708.1, which defines assault as occurring when a person does any of the following: 9 (1) Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another.... 10 (2) Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive.... 11 Thus, a generic assault in Iowa may include, as an element, placing another in fear of imminent physical contact. If Smith pleaded guilty to § 708.1(2), then he was not convicted of an offense that has, as an element, the use or attempted use of force . 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). 12 When statutory language dictates that predicate offenses contain enumerated elements, we must look only to the predicate offense rather than to the defendant's underlying acts to determine whether the required elements are present. See United States v. Wright, 957 F.2d 520, 522 (8th Cir.) (construing United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 4B1.2(1)(i), which defines crime of violence as an offense that has as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S.Ct. 167, 121 L.Ed.2d 114 (1992). We may expand our inquiry under this categorical approach to review the charging papers and jury instructions, if applicable, only to determine under which portion of the assault statute Smith was convicted. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). 13 This case is quite similar to Taylor, which involved a sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) for prior burglaries. The Supreme Court read § 924(e) as requiring the predicate burglary offense to contain the elements of generic burglary, precluding a court from looking to the defendant's underlying conduct. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-01, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Court noted that the federal sentencing court could go beyond the mere fact of conviction, for example, and look to the charging papers and jury instructions to determine if the jury was required to actually find the elements of generic burglary in order to convict the defendant. Id. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Supreme Court remanded Taylor because the Court could not determine, from the record before it, under which subsection of the Missouri burglary statute the defendant had pleaded guilty and been convicted. Id. On remand, the government produced the charging papers, which detailed the elements of the crimes to which the defendant had pleaded guilty, though the papers did not include a reference to the specific section of the state burglary statute. See United States v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 703, 707 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 888, 112 S.Ct. 247, 116 L.Ed.2d 202 (1991). On appeal from the remand, we held that it was appropriate under the Supreme Court's ruling in a case where the predicate convictions were the result of a guilty plea, to look to the charging papers to determine to which section of a statute a defendant pleaded guilty. See id. at 707-08. See also United States v. Einfeldt, 138 F.3d 373, 378 (8th Cir.) (looking to the information's specific allegations where the defendant pleaded guilty to a predicate act of burglary to determine if the predicate act was generic burglary under Taylor; district court can look to the charging document as a whole), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 126, 142 L.Ed.2d 102 (1998). 14 The state court complaint accused Smith of commit[ting] an act which was intended to cause pain or injury to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute said act. (Appellee's App. at 20.) The complaint recited that Smith grabbed Lorenson by the throat, and did also push her down. (Id.) Thus, Smith was charged under Iowa Code § 708.1(1), for committing an act intended to cause pain, injury, or offensive or insulting physical contact, rather than § 708.1(2), for placing one in fear of such contact. As such, Smith was charged, and pleaded guilty to, an offense with an element of physical force within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). 2 15