Opinion ID: 2633731
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Specific Jurisdiction and Minimum Contacts

Text: Next, we turn to Hydramatic's argument that specific jurisdiction is lacking because it did not purposefully direct Dunn's conduct at Colorado's residents, it was unaware that Dunn had traveled to Colorado with Goettman, and Dunn's tortious conduct was outside the scope of his employment. The minimum contacts analysis regarding specific jurisdiction is a two-part inquiry involving: (1) whether the defendant purposefully directed his activities at the residents of the forum state; and (2) whether the litigation arises out of the defendant's forum-related conduct. Keefe, 40 P.3d at 1271. A single act is sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. Id. We have previously held that the commission of a tort, in itself, creates a sufficient nexus between a defendant and the forum state that satisfies the due process inquiry and establishes specific jurisdiction. Classic Auto Sales, 832 P.2d at 237. In such cases, there is no need for further minimum contacts analysis because the defendant is so connected with the forum state that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are not offended by the forum state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. In this case, therefore, the two-part minimum contacts analysis is collapsed into one question: whether Dunn's tortious conduct was sufficiently connected to Hydramatic's business. We again note that to defeat Hydramatic's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the documentary evidence need only establish a reasonable inference of the connection between Dunn's conduct and Hydramatic's business. Hence, we evaluate the documentary evidence not under the burden of proof for substantive liability but rather under this light jurisdictional standard. In her amended complaint, Goettman alleges that Dunn, up to and at the time of the fatal automobile accident, was a traveling employee acting within the course and scope of his employment and that Hydramatic, as Dunn's employer, is vicariously liable for Dunn's tortious conduct. In particular, Goettman alleges that Hydramatic sent Dunn to the United States on its behalf to service Hydramatic products; that Dunn, during his trip, traveled to and worked in not only Pennsylvania, but also Colorado, Utah, and wyoming; that Hydramatic anew Dunn would rent cars, stay in motels, and eat in restaurants during his trip to the United States; and that Hydramatic paid for such costs and expenses, including those Dunn incurred in Colorado. Goettman further alleges that Dunn traveled to Colorado for the specific purpose of training Michael Goettman on how to service Hydramatic's mining equipment. In contrast, Hydramatic's affidavits show that Hydramatic sent Dunn to the United States at ARO's request; that although Hydramatic's finance director, Paul Pittard, authorized Dunn's trip to the United States, he did not have any input as to where Dunn would go or what he would do; that even though Pittard knew that Dunn might visit an ARO customer in Utah, he did not know, until the time of the accident, that Dunn was traveling to Colorado; that Dunn, while in the United States, performed tasks and services at the direction of ARO's vice president, Paul Spedding; that Dunn volunteered to go to Colorado after learning that Goettman was traveling there; and that Spedding agreed to allow Dunn to accompany Goettman to Colorado. Hydramatic argues that it did not purposefully direct Dunn's conduct at Colorado's residents because it neither knew that Dunn was going to Colorado nor participated in the decision to send him there. Hydramatic further argues that it did not purposefully direct Dunn's conduct at Colorado's residents because Dunn's tortious conduct was wholly unrelated to servicing Hydramatic's products, and that it is impermissible, as a matter of law, to construe Dunn's negligent and reckless operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated to be within the scope of his employment. In support of its argument, Hydramatic cites Pacesetter Corp. v. Collett, 33 P.3d 1230 (Colo.App.2001), in which the court of appeals held that an employee was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because he was not acting within the scope of his employment when he became intoxicated and crashed his car while on a business trip. Id. at 1234. However, Pacesetter Corp. supports the proposition that in Colorado, the question of whether an employee's consumption of alcohol is outside of the scope of his employment depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. at 1233-34; see also Raleigh v. Performance Plumbing & Heating, 130 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Colo.2006) ([T]he question of whether an employee is acting within the scope of the employment is a question of fact.). Another example of this proposition is found in Wild West Radio, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 905 P.2d 6 (Colo. App.1995), where the court of appeals held that an employee, who was injured after crashing her car while intoxicated, had deviated from the scope of her employment when she consumed alcohol, but that the deviation had ceased when she returned to her car for the purpose of driving to a business appointment. Id. at 8-9. The court rejected the argument that intoxication prevents an employee from performing any service on behalf of the employer until the employee attains sobriety. Id. at 74. Moreover, under Colorado law, a traveling employee need not be engaged in the actual performance of work to be considered engaged in the course of his employment. See, e.g., Hynes v. Donaldson, 155 Colo. 456, 460, 395 P.2d 221, 223 (1964) ([A traveling employee, when] lodging in a public accommodation, preparing to eat, or while going to or returning from a meal, is performing an act necessarily incident to his employment.); see also Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp. v. Dunn, 395 So.2d 1295, 1296 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (holding that the allegations in the complaint constituted a prima facie showing of an agency relationship sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident company, notwithstanding documentary evidence that: (1) at the time of the automobile accident, the company's employee was in the United States for the sole purpose of learning English and acquiring American culture; and (2) the employee was driving a borrowed car and returning from a personal shopping trip to the grocery store). Here, Goettman alleges that Hydramatic authorized Dunn to travel to the United States to assist ARO with service issues regarding Hydramatic's products, and that Dunn, during that time, traveled to Colorado for the specific purpose of training Michael Goettman on how to service Hydramatic's mining equipment. Goettman argues that Dunn was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred because he was a traveling employee who was returning to his motel after a meal, activities that she alleges were necessarily incident to his employment. Goettman's argument is supported by the Pennsylvania workers' compensation ruling on Goettman's fatal claim petition for compensation benefits. In that case, the workers' compensation judge approved the award of compensation benefits based on his finding that Michael Goettman was a traveling employee acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his death. We note that the judge also found that Michael Goettman's intoxication was unrelated to his death because Dunn, not Goettman, was driving the car at the time of the accident. In this case, Goettman's allegations must establish a reasonable inference that Dunn's tortious conduct was sufficiently connected to Hydramatic's business. Guided by this standard, we conclude that the jurisdictional facts alleged by Goettman support a reasonable inference that Dunn was Hydramatic's agent up to and at the time of the accident. We acknowledge that at this early stage of litigation, there are conflicts between the jurisdictional facts regarding the scope of Dunn's employment. However, for the purpose of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, we must resolve these conflicts in Goettman's favor. Accordingly, we conclude that Goettman's allegations support a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction over Hydramatic.