Opinion ID: 196165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Dog Show.

Text: 88 Appellant faults the district court for admitting evidence that Bosco von Schleudersitz (Bosco), a nine-year-old German shepherd trained to detect narcotics, 17 alerted to the presence of drugs in bundles of cash brought to local banks by appellant's henchmen. At trial Bosco's handler, Sgt. Edward Conley, testified that he took Bosco to a bank in Cranston, Rhode Island on March 23, 1990. Bosco searched several areas of the bank, such as the vault and teller stations, and did not react. Conley then took Bosco to a room in which a bag containing $9,000 was located, and, when he instructed Bosco to search for drugs, the dog showed a strong, positive aggressive alert, shaking the bag, ripping it apart, grabbing the money in his mouth, and ripping the money. According to Conley, a similar search, with similar results, took place on April 20, 1990, at a different bank in Johnston, Rhode Island. In each instance, the currency to which Bosco reacted had been brought to the bank by appellant's associates in order to purchase cashier's checks. 89 To meet this testimony, appellant called two experts who attacked the reliability of Bosco's response. One of these witnesses, Thomas Knott, testified that the manner in which Conley orchestrated the sniff tests did not properly control against the possibility of a false alert. The second expert, Dr. James Woodford, criticized the testing protocol because the sniff tests were not verified by chemical field tests. Woodford also testified as to the widespread contamination of United States currency with illegal drugs and the tenuous nature of the link between a canine alert and a conclusion that particular currency derived from narcotics trafficking ([I]f there were drugs on that money, it doesn't mean that it is drug money.). 18 90 Appellant insists that the probative value of the dog sniff evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and that the district court erred in refusing to exclude the evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 403. This claim deserves serious attention, for recent decisions about the evidentiary value of a trained dog's alert to currency are not uniform. Compare, e.g., United States v. U.S. Currency, $30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039, 1041-43 (9th Cir.1994) (noting widespread contamination and concluding that the probative value of a positive dog alert in currency forfeiture cases in Los Angeles is significantly diminished); United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1215 (3d Cir.) (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that a substantial portion of United States currency now in circulation is tainted with sufficient traces of controlled substances to cause a trained canine to alert), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 742, 130 L.Ed.2d 643 (1994); and Jones v. DEA, 819 F.Supp. 698, 721 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (suggesting that continued reliance of courts and law enforcement officers on dog sniffs to separate 'legitimate' currency from 'drug-connected' currency is logically indefensible) with, e.g., United States v. $67,220.00 in U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d 280, 285-86 (6th Cir.1992) (noting that a positive dog reaction [to currency] is at least strong evidence of a connection to drugs); United States v. $215,300 U.S. Currency, 882 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir.1989) (upholding forfeiture based in part on a canine alert to currency), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005, 110 S.Ct. 3242, 111 L.Ed.2d 752 (1990); and United States v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1583 (11th Cir.1986) (finding canine sniff evidence to be both probative and helpful to the jury in concluding that laundered money constitutes drug proceeds). 91 In the end, we reject appellant's asseveration. We do not think that the district court, based on the information of record in this case, abused its discretion in admitting the canine sniff evidence. 19 92 Even though widespread contamination of currency plainly lessens the impact of dog sniff evidence, a trained dog's alert still retains some probative value. Ordinary experience suggests that currency used to purchase narcotics is more likely than other currency to have come into contact with drugs. Here, moreover, the evidence supports an inference that Bosco's frenzied reaction was caused by more than a mere trace of contamination. 93 The record contains corroboration of Bosco's olfactory evidence. Several witnesses testified that ordinary human senses could detect something unusual about the money that appellant's associates brought to the banks. One teller testified that he occasionally noticed that the money felt dusty ... almost floury from pizza dough, that type of feeling. Another teller reported that she noticed an odor or fragrance, akin to that of an orchid. This evidence, along with Conley's testimony that the dog did not react in other areas of the banks, buttressed the lower court's belief that the dog sniff evidence had probative force. 94 Conversely, though the dog sniff evidence likely bolstered the prosecution's case and served to inculpate the defendant, we are not convinced that it presented a substantial risk of unfair prejudice. See generally Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d at 156 (By design, all evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is only unfair prejudice which must be avoided.). After all, the court allowed appellant to call two expert witnesses who debunked Bosco's reaction to the currency. If, on one hand, the jury believed the experts, it doubtless discounted the value of the canine alert. If, on the other hand, the jury disbelieved appellant's experts, it was entitled to place a greater value on the canine sniff. See, e.g., Quinones-Pacheco v. American Airlines, Inc., 979 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1992) (explaining that expert opinion testimony, even if not directly contradicted, is not ordinarily binding on a jury). 95 In any event, considering the high degree of deference we owe to a district court's balancing of probative value against unfairly prejudicial effects, see Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d at 156, we cannot say that the trial court abused its wide discretion in admitting the evidence of Bosco's reaction to the currency delivered by appellant's associates. 96