Opinion ID: 1477292
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standards of Constitutional Review for Article 24 Challenges based on the Concepts of Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection.

Text: In addition to Appellees' claim that Family Law § 2-201 discriminates on the basis of sex in violation of Article 46, the same-sex couples seeking to marry challenged Family Law § 2-201 as violative of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. [32] Appellees' Article 24 challenge has three facets: (1) Family Law § 2-201 should be subject to strict scrutiny under principles of equal protection [33] because it discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, a classification that the Appellees claim is suspect or quasi-suspect; (2) Article 24 mandates that strict scrutiny be applied to Family Law § 2-201 because the statute prevents same-sex couples from exercising their fundamental rights to marry while allowing, at the same time, opposite-sex couples to do so; and (3) the statute burdens unconstitutionally the exercise of the same-sex couples' fundamental due process rights to marry. Before proceeding, we pause to reiterate the three levels of constitutional scrutiny employed in our jurisprudence when a legislative enactment is challenged under either the due process or equal protection concepts embedded in Article 24. As we explained in Waldron, [t]he top tier of [constitutional] review contemplates that when a statute creates a distinction based upon clearly `suspect' [34] criteria, or when that enactment infringes upon personal rights or interests deemed to be `fundamental,' then the legislative product must withstand a rigorous, `strict scrutiny.' 289 Md. at 705-06, 426 A.2d at 941; Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 641, 458 A.2d at 781; Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 601, 380 A.2d 1052, 1057 (1977) (Equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.). When utilizing this most-demanding standard of constitutional review, we deem unconstitutional a challenged legislative classification unless the distinction formed by it is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 641, 458 A.2d at 781; Goodsell, 284 Md. at 286, 396 A.2d at 1037 (quoting Wheeler, 281 Md. at 601, 380 A.2d at 1057); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). In other words, the statute must be justified by a compelling state interest, and drawn sufficiently narrowly that it is the least restrictive means for accomplishing that end. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1287-88, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). To no one's great surprise, classifications subject to strict scrutiny rarely survive the legal glare. Hargrove v. Bd. of Trustees of Md. Retirement Sys., 310 Md. 406, 428, 529 A.2d 1372, 1383 (1987) (explaining that the constitutionality of a particular classification often depends on the level of review under which it is analyzed because a statute subject to strict scrutiny is nearly always struck down under an analysis that [has historically been] `strict in theory and fatal in fact') (quoting Waldron, 289 Md. at 707-08, 426 A.2d at 942 (citations omitted)); see also Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317-27, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2568-73, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (Marshall, J. Dissenting). In contrast, we generally employ the least exacting and most deferential standard of constitutional review when the legislative action under review neither interferes significantly [35] with a fundamental right nor implicates a suspect classification. Under this rational basis level of scrutiny, the classification will pass constitutional muster so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Murphy, 325 Md. at 355-56, 601 A.2d at 108; [36] City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.). In other words, we will uphold the statute under rational basis review unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [the court] can only conclude that the [governmental] actions were irrational. Id. (citations omitted). Statutes reviewed pursuant to this level of scrutiny are presumed constitutional, and will be invalidated only if the classification is clearly arbitrary. Murphy, 325 Md. at 356, 601 A.2d at 108; Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 352, 499 A.2d 178, 185 (1985) (holding that a statute reviewed under the rational basis test enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality, [and] can be invalidated only if the classification is without any reasonable basis and is purely arbitrary); Waldron, 289 Md. at 707, 426 A.2d at 942 (holding that a statute will be upheld generally unless the classification is wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) and McDonald v. Bd. of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 809, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1408, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969)). [A] classification [subject to rational basis review] having some reasonable basis need not be made with mathematical nicety and may result in some inequality so long as the state can produce any conceivable state of facts to justify the distinction. Whiting-Turner, 304 Md. at 352, 499 A.2d at 185; City of New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. at 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 ([R]ational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 187 (`Abstract symmetry' is not demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment.). A statute subject to rational review often passes constitutional muster. Hargrove, 310 Md. at 428, 529 A.2d at 1383 (explaining that legislation subject to rational basis review almost always has received minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact) (quoting Waldron, 289 Md. at 707-08, 426 A.2d at 942 (citations omitted)). A third level of review has arisen to leaven the rigid two-tiered constitutional framework by which courts review the constitutionality of government action. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 708-10, 426 A.2d at 942-44. A heightened level of scrutiny, otherwise known as intermediate scrutiny, is triggered when the challenged action creates a classification which ha[s] been subjected to a higher degree of scrutiny than the traditional and deferential rational basis test, but which ha[s] not [yet] been deemed to involve suspect classes or fundamental rights. Murphy, 325 Md. at 357-60, 601 A.2d at 109-11 (explaining the Supreme Court's evolving application of heightened scrutiny or rational basis with bite to certain intermediate classifications); [37] Hargrove, 310 Md. at 428, 529 A.2d at 1383 (explaining the evolution of the traditional two-tiered approach into the current three-tiered constitutional framework); Waldron, 289 Md. at 709-11, 426 A.2d at 943-44 (explaining the Supreme Court's treatment of sex-based classifications as an active review of legislation not implicating rights previously determined to be `fundamental' or involving classifications held to be `suspect.'). [38] This middle-tier scrutiny may be implicated to review a quasi-suspect classification. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-42, 105 S.Ct. at 3254-55, 87 L.Ed.2d 313. In order to survive this intermediate level of scrutiny, the statute in question must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Murphy, 325 Md. at 358, 601 A.2d at 110 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 457, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976)); Thomas v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing, & Regulation, 170 Md.App. 650, 668-69, 908 A.2d 99, 109-10 (2006).