Opinion ID: 4530980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Gomes first claims that the SJC unreasonably sustained his conviction for first-degree murder as a joint venturer because the trial evidence was insufficient to support a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly participated in the shooting and had or shared an intent to kill. He contends that indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.' Linton, 812 F.3d at 122 (alterations in original) (quoting Hensley, 755 F.3d at 731). Gomes appears to argue only that the challenged elements of the SJC's decision were unreasonable application[s] of clearly established federal law and not that they were contrary to it. - 12 - this insufficiency violated his constitutional due process right to be convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of a crime. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ([T]he Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.). The clearly established federal law governing direct review of sufficiency claims is provided by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Linton, 812 F.3d at 123. Jackson requires a reviewing court to ask the relevant question [of] whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 443 U.S. at 319. Further, a criminal conviction may be supported by circumstantial evidence alone. Id. at 324-25; see Magraw v. Roden, 743 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2014) ([U]nder Jackson, direct evidence is not necessary to sustain a conviction. . . . This principle is even more firmly established in connection with the deferential approach to state-court decisionmaking that federal habeas review demands. (citation omitted)). A federal court reviewing a habeas petition that raises a sufficiency claim under Jackson must apply a twice-deferential standard. Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012). - 13 - Specifically, on habeas review, we may not overturn an underlying state court decision rejecting a sufficiency challenge unless the decision is objectively unreasonable. Id. (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011)). Thus, we ask whether the state courts' ruling that the evidence is constitutionally sufficient was itself 'unreasonable.' Winfield v. O'Brien, 775 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting § 2254(d)(1)). 'Unreasonable' in this context means that the decision 'evinces some increment of incorrectness beyond mere error.' Id. (quoting Leftwich v. Maloney, 532 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2008)). With these principles in mind, we consider the SJC's rejection of Gomes's sufficiency challenge. Under Massachusetts law, [t]o succeed on a theory of deliberately premeditated murder as a joint venturer . . . the Commonwealth was required to prove that [Gomes] was (1) present at the scene of the crime, (2) with knowledge that another intends to commit the crime or with intent to commit a crime, and (3) by agreement, [was] willing and available to help the other if necessary. Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 910 N.E.2d 869, 875 (Mass. 2009) (third alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Green, 652 N.E.2d 572, 578 (Mass. 1995)), overruled in part on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Britt, 987 N.E.2d 558 (Mass. 2013). Further, the Commonwealth needed to prove that Gomes shared the mental state or intent for deliberately premeditated murder, which is malice, and, in particular, an intent to kill. Id. On direct review of - 14 - Gomes's conviction, the SJC explained that it would determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 'was sufficient to persuade a rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the crime[s] charged.' Gomes I, 61 N.E.3d at 447 (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lao, 824 N.E.2d 821, 829 (Mass. 2005)).6 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the SJC determined that: [A] reasonable jury could find that [Gomes] . . . was motivated by anger at the events that resulted from Evans's actions . . . that [Gomes] was the driver of the Impala that sped down Maywood Street . . . and stopped the vehicle directly parallel to the group of young men standing near where Evans's Maxima was parked; that [Gomes] remained stopped at that location while multiple shots were fired from two different weapons at the group of young men; that when the shooting ceased, [Gomes] sped off, quickly removing the shooters from the scene; and that the shell casings located in [Gomes's] vehicle were consistent with at least one casing found at the scene. Id. at 448. The SJC concluded that the evidence was more than 6 The Massachusetts standard cited by the SJC is consistent with Jackson and is thus entitled to the same deference under § 2254(d)(1). See Linton, 812 F.3d at 122 ([A] state-court adjudication of an issue framed in terms of state law is nonetheless entitled to deference under section 2254(d)(1) as long as the state and federal issues are for all practical purposes synonymous and the state standard is at least as protective of the defendant's rights as its federal counterpart. (alteration in original) (quoting Foxworth v. St. Amand, 570 F.3d 414, 426 (1st Cir. 2009))); Commonwealth v. Latimore, 393 N.E.2d 370, 374-75 (Mass. 1979) (concluding that this standard conforms to the federal constitutional requirement announced in Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19). - 15 - sufficient to permit a reasonable fact finder to infer that [Gomes] knowingly participated in the shooting incident and had or shared an intent to kill. Id. In support, the SJC cited several precedential cases standing for the proposition that the requisite knowledge and intent under a joint venture theory may be inferred from certain actions undertaken by a defendant. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 661 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Mass. 1996) (holding, on direct review of first-degree murder conviction, that [j]oint venture may be proved by circumstantial evidence, including evidence of flight together); Commonwealth v. Giang, 524 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Mass. 1988) (holding that knowing and intentional participation in principals' crime may be inferred where defendant drives getaway vehicle); Commonwealth v. Cintron, 759 N.E.2d 700, 707 (Mass. 2001) (holding that defendant's intent to kill and knowing participation could be inferred where defendant knew of prior violent history between brother and victim, chased victim alongside brother, and encouraged brother to shoot victim), abrogated in part on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Hart, 914 N.E.2d 904 (Mass. 2009); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 506 (Mass. 1979) (holding, on direct review of first-degree murder conviction, that [t]he jury may infer the requisite mental state from the defendant's knowledge of the circumstances and subsequent participation in the offense)). - 16 - Gomes presents a tripartite argument that the SJC's determination was unreasonable. He first contends that it was unreasonable for the SJC to rely on the post-facto discovery of the shell casings in his rented vehicle that matched one found at the scene of the shooting to support an inference that he was aware, prior to the shooting, that his passengers were armed and intended violence. We reject this argument. The fact of the shell casings being present in Gomes's rented vehicle was only one factor that the SJC listed before stating that the collective evidence permitted a reasonable factfinder to infer that Gomes had the requisite intent to kill and knowledge of the shooting. The mere inclusion of that fact, even if it does not speak to knowledge and intent prior to the shooting, does not evince[] some increment of incorrectness beyond mere error in the SJC's determination. Winfield, 775 F.3d at 8 (quoting Leftwich, 532 F.3d at 23). Gomes next argues that the SJC's sufficiency determination was unreasonable because there was no other evidence from which a rational jury could infer that he had prior knowledge of and intent to join a shooting. He submits that the evidence may have allowed a rational jury to infer that he was searching for Evans, but not that he was aware or intended that the search would morph into a fatal shooting targeting a group of people that - 17 - did not include Evans. This contention is unpersuasive. On habeas review of a state-court conviction for evidentiary sufficiency, we may not freely reweigh competing inferences but must accept those reasonable inferences that are most compatible with the jury's verdict. Magraw, 743 F.3d at 7. Here, the SJC reasonably concluded that a rational jury, viewing the collective evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, could infer that Gomes was motivated by anger at Evans and that accordingly, as the driver of the vehicle from which the shooting emanated who kept the car stopped throughout the shooting before speeding off, he knowingly participated in the shooting and had or shared an intent to kill. Finally, Gomes argues that the SJC unreasonably relied on Williams, 661 N.E.2d 617, and Giang, 524 N.E.2d 383, in determining that a rational jury could infer his prior knowledge of the shooting from the fact that he quickly drove the car from the scene of the shooting. He contends that Williams is distinguishable from this case because it involved a defendant fleeing on foot with the principal, and that Giang is distinguishable because the defendant in that case waited in a getaway vehicle for the fleeing principals to enter before driving off. - 18 - This argument too fails. Williams, 661 N.E.2d at 625, and Giang, 524 N.E.2d at 386, hold that the knowledge and intent necessary to convict on a theory of joint venture may be inferred from concerted action between the defendant and a principal, specifically, joint flight from the scene of the crime. The SJC was not objectively unreasonable in determining that this relevant precedent supported its conclusion that a reasonable factfinder could have inferred that Gomes -- who drove to the scene of the shooting, waited there while it occurred, and then quickly sped off with the shooter or shooters in tow -- knowingly participated in the shooting and had or shared an intent to kill.7 Accordingly, the SJC was not objectively unreasonable in determining that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Gomes knowingly participated in the shooting and had or shared an intent to kill 7 Attempting to neutralize the fact of joint flight, Gomes asserts that the more probable inference is that he was surprised by the shooting but could not order the shooters to exit his vehicle until he had driven off and recovered from his surprise. We decline this invitation to elevate a conflicting inference over the reasonable inference, credited by the SJC and more compatible with the verdict, that Gomes knew of the shooting beforehand and had or shared an intent to kill. See Magraw, 743 F.3d at 7; Linton, 812 F.3d at 123 ([A] federal habeas corpus court faced with a record . . . that supports conflicting inferences must presume . . . that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution. (alterations in original) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326)). - 19 - as necessary to sustain his conviction for first-degree murder as a joint venturer. Gomes's first claim to habeas relief therefore fails. C. Admission of Evidence Allegedly in Violation of Due Process Gomes next claims that the SJC unreasonably determined that the trial court's admission into evidence of certain items, including money, drugs, and guns, recovered from the Langdon Street apartment building did not constitute error. He argues that the admission denied him his constitutional due process right to a fair trial. This claim is unavailing. An erroneous evidentiary ruling that results in a fundamentally unfair trial in state court may violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and merit a federal writ of habeas corpus. See Lyons, 666 F.3d at 55-56; Coningford v. Rhode Island, 640 F.3d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Such relief is elusive, as the Supreme Court has defined the category of infractions that violate 'fundamental fairness' very narrowly. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). To warrant habeas relief, the state court's application of state law must be 'so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process . . . violation.' Coningford, 640 F.3d at 484 (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). That is, for there [t]o be a constitutional violation, [the] state evidentiary error - 20 - must so infuse the trial with inflammatory prejudice that it renders a fair trial impossible. Lyons, 666 F.3d at 56 (quoting Petrillo v. O'Neill, 428 F.3d 41, 44 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005)). Minding these tenets, we turn to the SJC's rejection of Gomes's argument that the trial court's admission of the challenged evidence was prejudicial error. Under Massachusetts law, evidence of uncharged criminal acts or other misbehavior is not admissible to show a defendant's bad character or propensity to commit the charged crime, but may be admissible if relevant for other purposes such as 'common scheme, pattern of operation, absence of accident or mistake, identity, intent or motive.' Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400, 407 (Mass. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Marshall, 749 N.E.2d 147, 155 (Mass. 2001)). In Gomes's case, the SJC explained that: The trial judge admitted the evidence challenged by [Gomes] for the limited purpose of proving [Gomes's] knowledge, motive, or intent. The evidence was relevant with respect to all three of these issues, where the Commonwealth's theory was that [Gomes] (and Emmanuel), based on loyalty to family and friends, sought to retaliate against Evans for Evans's pursuit of Anthony and the family members' subsequent disruption and loss of valuable items (the cash, guns, and drugs in the basement) due to police action . . . . This evidence provided a possible explanation for [Gomes's] clear agitation about the presence of the police in his family's apartment building and more directly showed the extent of the loss to [Gomes's] family members and friends, which may have fueled [Gomes's] desire to retaliate over and above Evans's threatening conduct toward Anthony. - 21 - Gomes I, 61 N.E.3d at 449 (citing Commonwealth v. DaSilva, 27 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Mass. 2015) (holding that evidence of uncharged conduct may be relevant to show motive to retaliate)). In response to Gomes's argument that the connection between him and the evidence was attenuated, the SJC reasoned that the link between the over-all inconvenience to [Gomes's] family and his alleged motivation to commit the crime was certainly strong enough to satisfy the threshold requirement of relevance. Id. at 449 (citing Commonwealth v. Ashley, 694 N.E.2d 862, 866 (Mass. 1998) (There is no requirement that evidence [of motive] be conclusive in order to be admissible. (alteration in original))). The SJC did, however, comment on factors that diminished the probative value of the challenged evidence, such as that Gomes did not live on Langdon Street, and was not present when the incident involving Evans and Anthony took place, and that he was not charged with any crimes related to the items seized from the two apartments. Id. at 450. The SJC also observed that the evidence presented the possibility of prejudicially paint[ing] [Gomes] generally as a violent man connected to a violent family and involved in a life of crime and being used improperly by the jury as evidence of bad character and criminal propensity. Id. Deeming [t]he question whether the evidence was more prejudicial than probative to be close, the SJC recognize[d] that the trial judge is in the best position, and consequently - 22 - possesses substantial discretion, to resolve the question. Id. (citing L.L. v. Commonwealth, 20 N.E.3d 930, 943 n.27 (Mass. 2014) (holding that abuse of discretion occurs only where the judge made 'a clear error of judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives (citation omitted))). The SJC ultimately concluded that there was no error in the admission of the challenged evidence, [p]articularly in light of the judge's instruction, given during trial when the evidence was admitted and repeated in his final jury charge, that the evidence was offered for a limited purpose and the jury were not to consider the evidence for the purpose of 'criminal propensity' or 'bad character.' Id.8 Gomes does not present, and we do not find, any clearly established Supreme Court precedent holding that the admission of nearly prejudicial but ultimately probative and relevant evidence of uncharged criminal activity accompanied by a proper limiting instruction violates due process rights.9 The absence of an on- 8The SJC further noted that even assuming that the evidence should not have been admitted, the admission would likely not qualify as prejudicial error warranting reversal, given the strength of the evidence that [Gomes] knowingly participated in the Maywood Steet shooting incident with the requisite intent to kill. Gomes I, 61 N.E.3d at 450 n.17. 9The closest that the Supreme Court apparently has come to addressing this type of claim was to expressly decline[] to determine 'whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause - 23 - point pronouncement from the Supreme Court leaves hanging by the slimmest of threads the petitioner's claim that the state court's admission of the [challenged] evidence can be deemed an unreasonable application of the broader fair-trial principle. Coningford, 640 F.3d at 485. Thus, Gomes summarily argues that the admission of this evidence infused the trial with inflammatory prejudice and deprived him of a fair trial. See Lyons, 666 F.3d at 56. We reject this argument. Reviewing the trial court's ruling, the SJC carefully reasoned in accordance with Massachusetts and federal law that the challenged evidence was relevant and that the trial judge was best positioned to determine whether its probative value outweighed its potential prejudicial effect. See Gomes I, 61 N.E.3d at 449-50. The SJC's affirmance of the trial court's decision, whether or not an unarguably correct evidentiary ruling, was well within the universe of plausible evidentiary rulings. Coningford, 640 F.3d at 485. The SJC also reasonably determined that the trial court's limiting instruction that the jury consider the challenged evidence for a circumscribed purpose, and not for the purposes of criminal personality or bad character, weighed against a [of the Fourteenth Amendment] if it permitted the use of prior crimes evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime.' Coningford, 640 F.3d at 484-85 (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5). - 24 - finding of prejudicial error. See Gomes I, 61 N.E.3d at 450; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 740 (1993) ([It is] the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions. (alteration in original) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987))). Accordingly, the SJC implicitly concluded that Gomes's trial was not infused with inflammatory prejudice in violation of constitutional due process. See Lyons, 666 F.3d at 57 (finding that the SJC made such an implicit conclusion under similar circumstances). Gomes does not now challenge the efficacy of that limiting instruction. Overall, Gomes fails to establish that the SJC's ruling on his claim was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. The SJC did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in determining that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in admitting the challenged evidence and that Gomes's trial was not unfair in violation of constitutional due process. Gomes's second claim to habeas relief thus fails.