Opinion ID: 220659
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Remarks at the League Meeting

Text: Dulin relied on the remarks made by Moore, Foster, and Malouf at the League meeting to show that race was a motivating factor in the Board's decision to terminate his contract. When evaluating whether race-based comments are sufficient evidence of discrimination, this court has held that: [The comments] must be (1) related [to the protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member]; (2) proximate in time to the [complained-of adverse employment decision]; (3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue; and (4) related to the employment decision at issue. Jenkins v. Methodist Hosp. of Dallas, Inc., 478 F.3d 255, 261 (5th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted); Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400-01 (5th Cir.2000) (concluding that alleged remarks by individuals affiliated with a hospital did not create a material fact issue on pretext or motivating factor). None of the comments made at the League meeting meet the second requirement, that of temporal proximity. The Board decided to replace Dulin in August 2006 and, in January 2007, selected a new Board attorney who began work in February. The Board continued to pay Dulin in accordance with his contract until April 2007. Dulin has not argued that comments made in August 2005, one year before the Board decided to replace him and nearly two years before it terminated his contract were proximate to the Board's employment decision. [4] In any event, comments made a year before a plaintiff's termination are not proximate. See, e.g., Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir.2010). The comments by Moore and other League members at the League meeting also fail the third prong: requiring the speaker to have authority over the employment decision at issue. Dulin argues that Moore's comments are relevant because he was capable of influencing the votes of three of the five Board members: Flaggs, Parker, and Foster. Even if the court were to assume that this attenuated connection is legally sufficient and to assume that Moore could influence Flaggs and Parker because he was a member of the Leflore County Board of Supervisors, [5] Dulin presents no basis for Moore's influence over Foster except for the fact that both men are black. The mere fact that individuals share a race is an improper basis on which to stake influence; Dulin's reliance on it is indicative of the weakness of his evidence. Further, Moore's, Flaggs's, Parker's, and Foster's uncontradicted testimony was that neither Moore nor the League (nor anyone else) influenced their decisions. [6] This testimony is corroborated by the statements of all five Board members at the August 2006 Board meeting at which they unanimously agreed to terminate Dulin's contract. [7] Finally, even if the court were to assume that the comments made by Board members at the League meeting were both temporally proximate to their decision to terminate Dulin's contract and race based, [8] they would fail the third prong because they could not have been made or adopted by a quorum of the Board (only two Board members attended the meeting). For all of these reasons, none of the comments at the League meeting can show that Dulin's race was a motivating factor in the Board's unanimous decision to terminate his contract.