Opinion ID: 2218880
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Heading: Informer's privilege and the defendants' challenge to probable cause.

Text: This is an interlocutory appeal from a motion to suppress evidence based on an alleged lack of probable cause to issue search warrants. Because the challenge is on constitutional grounds, we review the case de novo. State v. Todd, 468 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Iowa 1991); State v. Weir, 414 N.W.2d 327, 329 (Iowa 1987). Doubtful or marginal questions regarding whether an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause are usually resolved by the preference to be accorded warrants. Todd, 468 N.W.2d at 466; State v. Leto, 305 N.W.2d 482, 485 (Iowa 1981). The State is privileged to withhold the identity of a person who furnishes information relating to violations of the law. Todd, 468 N.W.2d at 467; State v. Luter, 346 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Iowa), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 830, 105 S.Ct. 116, 83 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). This privilege is premised upon the public interest in maintaining the flow of information essential to law enforcement. State v. Webb, 309 N.W.2d 404, 410 (Iowa 1981); State v. Lamar, 210 N.W.2d 600, 602-03 (Iowa 1973). We have cited the compelling reasons for recognizing this privilege: A genuine privilege, on ... fundamental principle ... must be recognized for the identity of persons supplying the government with information concerning the commission of crimes. Communications of this kind ought to receive encouragement. They are discouraged if the informer's identity is disclosed. Whether an informer is motivated by good citizenship, promise of leniency or prospect of pecuniary reward, he will usually condition his cooperation on an assurance of anonymityto protect himself and his family from harm, to preclude adverse social reactions and to avoid the risk of defamation or malicious prosecution actions against him. The government also has an interest in nondisclosure of the identity of its informers. Law enforcement officers often depend upon professional informers to furnish them with a flow of information about criminal activities. Revelation of the dual role played by such persons ends their usefulness to the government and discourages others from entering into a like relationship. That the government has this privilege is well established, and its soundness cannot be questioned. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2374, at 761-62 (1961); see Luter, 346 N.W.2d at 810; State v. Nelson, 395 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa App.1986). To be weighed against the informer's privilege, however, is the defendant's right to prepare and present a meaningful defense. State v. Byrd, 448 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Iowa 1989); State v. Kantaris, 280 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Iowa 1979). The defendant bears the burden of showing the necessity for disclosure of the informant's identity. Todd, 468 N.W.2d at 467. In those cases in which the defendant requests disclosure of the informant's identity, we balance the State's interest in the privilege against the defendant's need for the informant's identity. Id.; Webb, 309 N.W.2d at 410. When a defendant requests disclosure at trial, the defendant's need is weighed against the State's privilege, in light of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case, considering (1) the nature of the offense charged, (2) defenses raised, and (3) potential significance of an informer's testimony. Id.; Lamar, 210 N.W.2d at 602-03. Paramount among the considerations in determining whether disclosure is required to ensure a fair trial is whether the informant was a witness or participant in the crime for which the defendant is charged. Kantaris, 280 N.W.2d at 391. Generally, the identity of an informant must be disclosed when the informant participated in or witnessed the crime charged. Id.; Lamar, 210 N.W.2d at 603. But even if the informant is a witness or participant, mere speculation that the informant may be helpful in preparing the defendant's defense is not enough to overcome the public interest in protection of the informant. State v. Sheffey, 243 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 1976). With the backdrop of these controlling principles, we first note that this problem arises in two contexts; disclosure at trial of the informant's identity, and disclosure at the pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress the evidence obtained under the search warrants. Luter, 346 N.W.2d at 809. In Luter, we stated that there is a significant distinction between participation in the events giving rise to the current criminal charges and, on the other hand, participation in actions that constitute incidents recited in the informations provided for search warrants. Id. at 810. In McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62, reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 1042, 87 S.Ct. 1474, 18 L.Ed.2d 616 (1967), the United States Supreme Court established this distinction when it ruled on whether the prosecution must disclose the identity of a confidential informant who supplied information to establish probable cause for a warrantless search. The Court stated: We must remember also that we are not dealing with the trial of the criminal charge itself. There the need for a truthful verdict outweighs society's need for the informer privilege. Here, however, the accused seeks to avoid the truth. The very purpose of a motion to suppress is to escape the inculpatory thrust of evidence in hand, not because its probative force is diluted in the least by the mode of seizure, but rather as a sanction to compel enforcement officers to respect the constitutional security of all of us under the Fourth Amendment. Id. 386 U.S. at 307, 87 S.Ct. at 1060, 18 L.Ed.2d at 68 (quoting State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 386, 201 A.2d 39, 44 (1964)). The Court goes on to state: [T]he Fourth Amendment is served if a judicial mind passes upon the existence of probable cause. Where the issue is submitted upon an application for a warrant, the magistrate is trusted to evaluate the credibility of the affiant in an ex parte proceeding. Id. When the question of an informant's credibility arises in a motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search pursuant to a warrant, and a judicial officer has passed on veracity and probable cause, the defendant's interests in disclosure are less compelling. Therefore, in the context of a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, the burden upon the defendant to establish that disclosure is needed to ensure a fair hearing on the probable cause issue is even greater than when a motion for disclosure is made at trial or at a suppression hearing for evidence obtained from a warrantless seizure. We find that the defendants have failed to meet their burden for the following reasons. First, the magistrate who issued the search warrant stated her finding that the informant was reliable because the informant had provided reliable information in the past and because the informant's information had been partially corroborated with subsequent police investigation. These findings if supported by proper evidence are sufficient to support the validity of the magistrate's decision to find probable cause based on the informant's information. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77 L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983); Luter, 346 N.W.2d at 807. Second, we see no basis in the record from the suppression hearing to indicate that the information given by the informant has proven untrue. In fact, the information given by the informant that was used in the affidavit to support probable cause was either corroborated with subsequent police investigation before the search warrant was granted or was consistent with the evidence actually seized pursuant to the warrant. Finally, all of the errors in the warrant alleged by the defendants are errors at least facially committed by the swearing officer. The defendants did not controvert any of the informant's information during the suppression hearing. We find no basis to question the informant's veracity. The result of disclosure would be a fishing expedition by the defendants for information that may be helpful in the preparation of their defense, a result that we have repeatedly declined to permit. Todd, 468 N.W.2d at 467; Webb, 309 N.W.2d at 410; State v. Howell, 290 N.W.2d 355, 359 (Iowa 1980). Second, if disclosure is granted, we run the risk that the State cannot afford to reveal its source and must therefore suppress evidence that was otherwise constitutionally seized.