Opinion ID: 2982321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 1999 Georgia Conviction

Text: As noted, to qualify as a career offender, a defendant must, inter alia, have “two prior felony convictions” for either a crime of violence or a controlled-substance offense. § 4B1.1(a). Section 4B1.1 does not define the term, but the application notes refer the reader to § 4B1.2 for a definition. See § 4B1.1 cmt. n.1. Section 4B1.2(c), in turn, defines “two prior felony convictions” this way: The term “two prior felony convictions” means (1) the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense (i.e., two felony convictions of a crime of violence, two felony convictions of a controlled substance offense, or one felony conviction of a crime of violence and one felony conviction of a controlled substance offense), and (2) the sentences for at least two of the aforementioned felony convictions are counted separately under the provisions of § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c). The date that a defendant sustained a conviction shall be the date that the guilt of the defendant has been established, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere. The definition is somewhat problematic. It provides that the predicate offenses must be “counted separately under the provisions of § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c),” § 4B1.2(c), but it does not specify 5 which prior convictions should count. Section 4B1.2(c)’s own application notes provide that “[t]he provisions of § 4A1.2 . . . are applicable to the counting of convictions under § 4B1.1.” § 4B1.2 cmt. n.3. Under the Manual, a defendant’s § 5A sentence range is a result of not just an offense level but also a criminal-history category, as determined by Part A of Chapter 4. See § 1B1.1(a)(6). The language from Part B, quoted above, indicates that a sentence that counts separately for purposes of determining a defendant’s criminal-history category also counts separately for career-offender purposes. This makes sense. Essentially, the definitions and sentence-counting methods of Part A also apply to Part B for career-offender purposes. Section 4A1.1 assigns a defendant criminal-history points based on the nature of a defendant’s prior sentences. A defendant receives three points for each “prior sentence of imprisonment” exceeding thirteen months, § 4A1.1(a); two points for each “prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days not counted in subsection (a), § 4A1.1(b); and one point for each “prior sentence” not counted in subsections (a) or (b), § 4A1.1(c). Section 4A1.1 uses the terms “sentence of imprisonment” and “prior sentence” differently. For one thing, § 4A1.1(a) and (b) assign points based on a prior “sentence of imprisonment,” whereas § 4A1.1(c) assigns points based on a “prior sentence.” More revealing, though, is that Part A provides separate definitions for “prior sentence” and “sentence of imprisonment.” See § 4A1.2. Thus, if Chatmon would receive criminal-history points for his 1999 Georgia conviction as a “sentence of imprisonment” under § 4A1.1(a) or (b) or as a “prior sentence” under § 4A1.1(c), then that conviction also counts as a predicate offense for career-offender purposes. 6
We first consider the meaning of “sentence of imprisonment.” Both Chatmon and the government agree that only a sentence for a which a defendant actually serves time counts as a “sentence of imprisonment.”2 But the district court held that “all that matters is the sentence imposed” and that “the length of time served is irrelevant.” i. “[M]ust have actually served a period of imprisonment” Part A indicates that “sentence of imprisonment” “means a sentence of incarceration and refers to the maximum sentence imposed.” § 4A1.2(b)(1). Additionally, to count, a sentence of imprisonment must have either “been imposed within fifteen years of the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense” or have “resulted in the defendant being incarcerated during any part of such fifteen-year period.” § 4A1.2(e)(1). The application notes state an additional requirement: “To qualify as a sentence of imprisonment, the defendant must have actually served a period of imprisonment on such sentence . . . .” § 4A1.2 cmt. n.2. This provision is unambiguous. A sentenced imposed—but one for which the defendant does not serve time, perhaps because of suspension or stay—does not count as a “sentence of imprisonment” for criminal-history purposes, under §§ 4A1.1(a), (b), and thus also does not count for career-offender purposes. The government agrees as much.3 The district court, however, determined that it is irrelevant whether a defendant actually serves time on a “sentence of imprisonment.” It relied on subsection § 4A1.2(b)(1), which 2 At sentencing, Assistant United States Attorney Christopher D. Poole was candid with the court in stating: “I, quite frankly, agree with [defense counsel’s] legal analysis on that issue.” 3 As Mr. Poole candidly acknowledged, “I was aware of that application note, and I do think it’s an issue, which is why I argued that [Chatmon] had actually served a sentence of imprisonment on the robbery cases . . . . [My] concern was that this would have to be an actual term of imprisonment, which is what the judgment says it is, four years’ imprisonment, in order for that sentence to be counted.” 7 provides that a “sentence of imprisonment” “refers to the maximum sentence imposed.” That is true, but that is not, as the district court found, “all that matters.” Application Note 2 clarifies and narrows the definition; it is not the case, as the district court found, that “the language of the guideline trumps the application note.” Application Note 2 discusses what constitutes a “sentence of imprisonment.” The first sentence states: “To qualify as a sentence of imprisonment, the defendant must have actually served a period of imprisonment on such sentence . . . .” § 4A1.2 cmt. n.2. The Note then states: “For purposes of applying §4A1.1(a), (b), or (c), the length of a sentence of imprisonment is the stated maximum . . . . That is, criminal history points are based on the sentence pronounced, not the length of time actually served.” § 4A1.2 cmt. n.2. Although the Note could better harmonize these three sentences, the first sentence would seem to control the determination of whether a sentence constitutes a “sentence of imprisonment” at all. The second and third sentences, in contrast, would seem to address how to determine the length of a sentence of imprisonment—a step subsequent to determining that a sentence even qualifies as a “sentence of imprisonment.” The length of a “sentence of imprisonment” is relevant because it determines whether a defendant receives 3 criminal-history points under § 4A1.1(a) or 2 criminal-history points under § 4A1.1(b).4 Before determining the length of a sentence of imprisonment, however, a court must determine whether a sentence even qualifies as a “sentence of imprisonment.” And as explained above, and as the government agrees, the Guidelines Manual unambiguously states that “[t]o qualify as a sentence of 4 The second and third sentences would seem important in a situation in which a defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years but only serves one year. In that case, the defendant would receive three criminal-history points under § 4A1.1(a) for a sentence exceeding thirteen months—not two criminal-history points under § 4A1.1(b) for a sentence of at least sixty days. 8 imprisonment, the defendant must have actually served a period of imprisonment on such sentence.” § 4A1.2 cmt. n.2. Binding circuit precedent also compels this approach. We have previously held that a “sentence of imprisonment” requires that a defendant actually serve time. See Hall, 531 F.3d at 419–20. At issue in Hall were a defendant’s two prior misdemeanor convictions, for which the defendant “was given full credit for time served on earlier unrelated offenses”—or as this court framed the issue, “whether time ‘actually served’ includes time previously served.” Id. at 416, 418. The defendant argued that these two convictions should not qualify as a sentence of imprisonment for the purposes of assigning criminal-history points. See id. at 416. We held that “a defendant who receives full credit for time served on an entirely separate conviction does not in fact ‘actually serve’ any time for the offense in question.” Id. at 419. As we said, “[i]mposing a prison sentence without requiring that any time be actually served, in other words is empty rhetoric for the purposes of the federal Sentencing Guidelines.” Ibid. We revisited the issue in United States v. Tutt, 432 F. App’x 469 (6th Cir. 2011). There, Tutt, at his 2007 sentencing for a check-counterfeiting scheme, received criminal-history points for a 2005 bank-fraud conviction for which Tutt was sentenced to “time served plus five years of supervised release.” Id. at 470–71. Subsequently, Tutt violated the conditions of his supervised release and received a sentence of 18 months. Ibid. Under these circumstances, the sentencing court added the 18-month term of imprisonment to Tutt’s 2005 sentence of time served, and it consequently assessed criminal-history points for the conviction. Ibid. This was proper because, as we said, a sentencing court must add a term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release to the original sentence imposed. Ibid. (citing § 4A1.2(k)(1)). 9 In Tutt, we distinguished Hall on the ground that it involved time-served sentences in misdemeanor cases, rather than felony cases. Ibid. Because § 4A1.2(c) provides that “[s]entences for all felony offenses are counted,” we determined that Tutt’s 2005 bank-fraud conviction “still counts” even though it “did not involve a term of imprisonment.” Ibid. Although Hall and Tutt are not directly contradictory, these cases stand in tension. Tutt, unlike Hall, was an unpublished, non-binding decision. We now clarify that the fact that Hall involved misdemeanor convictions is a distinction without a difference. Nothing in Hall indicates that its reasoning should be limited to misdemeanor convictions. We affirm that the Guidelines unambiguously state that a “sentence of imprisonment” requires that a defendant “actually serv[e] a period of imprisonment on such sentence,” § 4A1.2 cmt. n.2—without differentiating between misdemeanor and felony sentences. Because we determined that Tutt’s 2005 bank-fraud conviction was properly counted in light of the actual term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation, our statement that the felony status of Hunt’s 2005 conviction was sufficient to count the conviction was essentially dicta. It is true that § 4A1.2(c) says that “[s]entences for all felony offenses are counted.” But in Tutt, we quoted this provision out of context. In the context of § 4A1.2, subsection (c) clearly speaks to what kinds of offenses count. Section 4A1.2(c) means that all felony offenses are eligible to be counted. Section 4A1.2’s other subsections unambiguously impose additional requirements on whether to count an offense. For example, § 4A1.2(d) instructs that sentences imposed for offenses committed prior to the defendant’s eighteenth birthday, not resulting from an adult conviction, are generally excluded; § 4A1.2(e) instructs that sentences imposed outside certain time frames are excluded; and § 4A1.2(h) instructs that sentences from foreign convictions are excluded. Absent the term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation, would we have counted 10 Tutt’s original 2005 sentence if it resulted from a juvenile conviction committed thirty years ago in France? Of course not—even though it was felony offense. So too a “sentence of imprisonment” must satisfy § 4A1.2(b)’s definition of that term, as clarified by Application Note 2. Although the government agreed with Chatmon’s reading of Hall and Tutt,5 the district court’s confusion on this point is understandable. As we explain below, however, a defendant may still receive criminal-history points under § 4A1.1(c) for a sentence for which no time is actually served; but that sentence is not a “sentence of imprisonment,” and so no criminal-history points may be assigned pursuant to § 4A1.1(a) or (b). ii. Chatmon’s Case The parties dispute whether Chatmon actually served a period of imprisonment on the 1999 Georgia conviction. Chatmon’s chief argument is that he “served no time for the [Georgia] robbery conviction.” Appellant Br. 6. At sentencing, the government contended that Chatmon “was in custody for a week” while awaiting sentence and that this constituted time served. Chatmon’s presentence report indicates that his 1999 Georgia conviction resulted in a “total term of 4 years, with credit for time served in Case No. 95CR17604.” The reference to “95CR17604” is to another Georgia sentence, imposed in 1996, for which Chatmon was paroled on August 30, 1999. Eight days later, on September 7, 1999, Chatmon was convicted of robbery6 and received his sentence of 4 years “with credit for time served” in the earlier case. The government contends that Chatmon remained in custody after being paroled on August 30 but before his conviction on September 7. 5 Mr. Poole candidly acknowledged to the court that he was “familiar with the Tutt case” but did not rely on it for his argument because he did not feel it was relevant. His position that a defendant must actually serve time was based “upon [his] reading of the Tutt case,” and his agreement with Chatmon’s legal analysis was based on his “reading of Hall and Tutt and the guidelines.” 6 To be clear, it is this robbery conviction that we refer to as the “1999 Georgia conviction.” 11 We said in Hall that “[c]ommon sense dictates that time served awaiting trial for the offense in question, and not time served for a wholly separate offense, should be considered time ‘actually served’ under the Guidelines . . . .” Hall, 531 F.3d at 419. The government argues that Chatmon served one week in custody awaiting disposition of the robbery offense and that this counts as “time served” on his 1999 conviction. At sentencing, Chatmon argued that he did not serve another day in jail after being paroled on August 30, 1999. “Cold reality informs us that a defendant who receives full credit for time served on an entirely separate conviction does not in fact ‘actually serve’ any time for the offense in question.” Hall, 531 F.3d at 419. Thus, whether Chatmon’s 1999 conviction counts as a “sentence of imprisonment” turns on 1) whether he was, in fact, in custody for the one week between his parole date and conviction date and also on, 2) if he was in custody, whether that one week would count as time served on the 1999 Georgia conviction under the circumstances. Chatmon entered into the record various documents as evidence in support of his position. First, Chatmon’s online profile from the Georgia Department of Corrections lists his “actual release date” as August 30, 1999 and his “incarceration end” date as the same. Second, Chatmon’s discharge order from the state pardon board lists August 30, 1999 as his parole date. A county sheriff’s report shows that immediately after Chatmon was paroled, he was rearrested at the state prison and transported to the sheriff’s department. Eight days later, on September 7, 1999, Chatmon pleaded guilty to the robbery conviction. That same day, the state court entered its judgment, sentencing Chatmon to “four (4) years with credit for time served in 95CR17604.” Two months later, the county sheriff’s department signed an affidavit as “part of the official record of the trial” that indicated that “[t]he defendant spent a total of 0 days in jail . . . prior to date sentence was imposed.” 12 Chatmon relies on this evidence to argue that after being paroled, he did not spend additional time in jail. At sentencing, he highlighted that his jail-credit sheet for the robbery offense indicated that he served zero days in jail prior to the date the sentence was imposed. 7 Additionally, Chatmon also emphasized that the judgment in his 1999 robbery conviction specifically awarded him “credit for time served in Case No. 95CR17604” (emphasis added)— not for time served awaiting conviction for the robbery offense. The government, in turn, disputed Chatmon’s assertion that he was not in custody after receiving parole. At sentencing, the government argued that “the defendant . . . was in custody on the robbery case until he pled on September 7th.” It pointed to no evidence in the record to support this. The prosecutor argued that the jail-credit sheet, indicating zero days served in jail, was “just an error” because “[Chatmon,] clearly, was in custody for a week.” On appeal, however, the government’s principal argument is not that Chatmon’s 1999 conviction qualifies because he was in custody; 8 rather, the government addresses this issue in only one sentence in a footnote: “Because the defendant was released on parole for his other offense on August 30, but remained in custody for the robbery until September 7, he served at least one week in custody for the robbery.” Appellee Br. 9 n.1. We offer one final observation on Chatmon’s 1999 jail-credit sheet. As noted, the document indicates that Chatmon spent zero days in jail prior to the imposition of his sentence. In addition, the lieutenant who completed the sheriff’s department’s custodian affidavit 7 Interestingly, defense counsel also appeared to concede, at times, that Chatmon actually spent the week in custody. At one point, he stated: “[T]he uncertainity here – well, what happened to the seven days that he was in custody? And we don’t know.” We are unsure what counsel meant. 8 Rather, the government’s chief argument on appeal is that Chatmon’s 1999 conviction qualifies as a “prior sentence” because Chatmon’s 1999 sentence was imposed within ten years of the commencement of the present offense. See Appellee Br. 8. 13 handwrote the following in the “comments” section: “in jail 05-29-96 out to DC 02-18-97 / in from Lee State Prison 05-22-97 out 06-12-97 / in 08-31-97 [sic9] out 09-07-99.” The reference to “out 09-07-99” may be the basis for the government’s belief that Chatmon remained in custody following his parole. Because the district court applied an incorrect definition of “sentence of imprisonment,” it did not determine whether Chatmon actually was in custody and if so, whether that time counts as time served. After the court ruled, Chatmon expressly asked the district court if it were ruling about whether Chatmon served a sentence of imprisonment. The district court stated that it “has no way of determining that.” The parties did not have a full opportunity to offer evidence on the issue, and we decline to assess the factual record in the first instance. On remand, the district court should allow the parties to offer evidence and to develop arguments on the issue. “The government bears the burden of proof with regard to the various penalties it seeks to have imposed under the sentencing guidelines.” United States v. Cowart, 90 F.3d 154, 159 (6th Cir. 1996). If the district court again determines that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Chatmon served time on the 1999 conviction, then the government will not have met its burden and the conviction cannot serve as a “sentence of imprisonment” for either criminal-history or career-offender purposes. We remand to allow the district court to address this issue.
As explained above, a sentence counts as a predicate conviction for career-offender purposes if it would be counted separately for criminal-history purposes under Part A of Chapter 4. See § 4B1.2(c). Subsection 4A1.1(c) assigns criminal-history points not for a prior “sentence 9 Based on Chatmon’s online Corrections Department profile, the discharge order, and the sheriff’s report, it appears that Chatmon was rearrested and transported to the sheriff’s department on August 30, 1999—not “08-31-97.” 14 of imprisonment” but for a “prior sentence.” If Chatmon’s 1999 Georgia conviction qualifies as a “prior sentence” under § 4A1.1(c), then the conviction could still count as a predicate offense. Part A defines “prior sentence” as “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense.” § 4A1.2(a)(1). Thankfully, the Guidelines are clear that a defendant need not actually serve time for a “prior conviction” to count. They provide that “[a] conviction for which the imposition of sentence was totally suspended or stayed shall be counted as a prior sentence under §4A1.1(c).” § 4A1.2(a)(3). As with “sentence of imprisonment,” however, there is a time-period constraint. To count as a “prior sentence,” a sentence must have been imposed “within ten years of the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense.” § 4A1.2(e)(2); see § 4A1.1 cmt. n.3. That is, any sentence within ten years (that meets § 4A1.2’s other requirements) counts. Even if Chatmon prevails with respect to whether his 1999 Georgia conviction was a “sentence of imprisonment,” he must also prevail on the timeframe issue in order to avoid counting the sentence as a predicate offense. Here, Chatmon’s Georgia robbery sentence was imposed on September 7, 1999. The parties, however, contest when Chatmon’s instant offense commenced. On appeal, the government’s principal argument is that the cocaine conspiracy began “in or about September 2009” and was, therefore, within the ten-year window. See Appellee Br. 8. The government cites Chatmon’s indictment, but it offered no evidence at the sentencing hearing regarding the commencement of the offense. In the district court’s colloquy at sentencing, it did not make an express finding as to the date Chatmon’s instant offense commenced. But the district court did expressly find that the presentence report—which determined that the instant 15 offense commenced on January 21, 2010, the date of the first overt act—correctly stated the facts.10 The government had a chance to object to the presentence report, and it did not do so. This appeal is not the first time that the offense-commencement date has been addressed. The initial version of Chatmon’s presentence report appears to have suggested that the offense commenced prior to January 21, 2010. Chatmon objected, asserting that the first overt act occurred on January 21, 2010. The probation officer agreed, noting that “[Chatmon] is correct and the Presentence Report has been revised accordingly.” Even after the issue of the offensecommencement date was flagged, the government did not object. Thus, this does not appear to be a case in which the government is blindsided by an argument on appeal that it did not have an opportunity to address below. Further, Chatmon’s plea agreement, which the prosecutor signed, lists January 21, 2010 as the earliest date. On appeal, the government cites the plea agreement as evidence that the drug conspiracy began “in or about September 2009,” but the plea agreement does not appear to support that proposition.11 Nonetheless, the government may not have anticipated the significance that the offensecommencement date would play at sentencing. The parties should be allowed to offer evidence as to the time of the commencement of offense. We remand to allow the government, if it chooses, to introduce evidence that Chatmon’s instant offense commenced on or before September 7, 2009, and so that the district court may address the issue in the first instance. 10 Even if the government’s assertion—that the instant offense commenced “in or about September 2009”—is correct, it will not have met its burden. The government would need to establish that Chatmon’s instant offense commenced on or prior to September 7, 2009. 11 The plea agreement does, however state: “[These facts] do not necessarily constitute all of the facts in the case. Other facts may be relevant to sentencing. Both the defendant and the United States retain the right to present additional facts to the Court to ensure a fair and appropriate sentence in this case.” 16