Opinion ID: 606336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: other appearances of same

Text: 48 The majority cites 21 U.S.C. § 453(y), 3 and argues that because Congress used same in section 453 to mean identical, and sections 453(y) and 466(d) both fall within the PPIA, Congress also meant same in section 466(d) to mean identical. Maj. Op. at 1363-1364. But, even if same means identical in other sections of the PPIA, 4 this does not mean that Congress chose between identicality and equivalence in section 466(d). A statutory term can have various meanings even within a single statute. The Supreme Court recently held that allowed secured claim in 11 U.S.C. § 506 means something different in subsection (d) than it does in subsection (a). Dewsnup v. Timm, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. 773, 778-79, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992). The Court did not presume that allowed secured claim must mean the exact same thing in subsections of the same statute. Instead, the Court looked to the practical effect of the different possible interpretations, pre-Bankruptcy-Code practice, and the absence of any evidence of congressional intent to change pre-Code practice. Id. A majority of the Dewsnup Court rejected Justice Scalia's articulation of the very argument that the majority here attempts to resuscitate. 49 Nonetheless, I wish to discuss Justice Scalia's Dewsnup dissent because it shows that even if the Dewsnup Court had chosen to follow the authority cited by Justice Scalia, that authority does not support the majority's view of this case. Justice Scalia accuses the Dewsnup majority of ignoring the normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning, and lists cases in which the Court developed this rule. Id. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 780-81. 50 The Court first explicitly adopted the identical-language rule from English jurisprudence in Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 608-09, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932). But the Atlantic Cleaners Court did not stop with the portion cited by Justice Scalia and relied upon by the majority here. It continues, 51 the presumption [that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning] is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent. Where the subject-matter to which the words refer is not the same in the several places where they are used, or the conditions are different, ... the meaning well may vary to meet the purposes of the law, to be arrived at by a consideration of the language in which those purposes are expressed, and of the circumstances under which the language was employed. 52 Id.; accord Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 85, 55 S.Ct. 50, 51, 79 L.Ed. 211 (1934). 5 53 The majority's application of the identical-language rule cannot withstand Atlantic Cleaners analysis. In section 466(d), Congress used same to state which substantive standards foreign poultry producers must meet. The majority relies upon same in section 453(y), where Congress used same as a shorthand way to define terms. 6 The subject matter to which ['same' ] refer[s], see id., in section 466(d) is dissimilar to the subject matter to which same refers elsewhere in the PPIA. 7 Even if the identical-language rule espoused by Justice Scalia survives Dewsnup, the majority fails to explain how that rule can apply in this case, where no evidence links congressional intent in choosing same for sections 453(y), 454(c), and 460(e), with its intent in choosing same for section 466(d). 54 To support its use of the identical-language rule, the majority exclusively relies upon Ardestani, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 519. Assuming arguendo that Ardestani remains good law after Dewsnup, Ardestani does not control this case. The Ardestani Court rejected an undocumented woman's claim that she was entitled to attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 521. EAJA funds are only available to parties who prevail against the government in adversary adjudications, which 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) defines as adjudications conducted under section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Immigration proceedings are not governed by the APA, but they are required by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to be determined on the record after opportunity for a hearing. This record hearing requirement of the INA is similar to the record hearing requirement in APA § 554(a). Ardestani argued that the phrase 'under section 554' encompasses all adjudications 'as defined in' § 554(a), even if they are not governed by the procedural provisions established in the remainder of that section. Ardestani, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 519 (emphasis added). The Court rejected this argument after holding the phrase under section 554 unambiguous within the context of the EAJA. Id. 55 The majority relies on the Ardestani Court's brief allusion to the identical-language rule, which I quote in its entirety: 56 As one court has observed, the word under appears several times in the EAJA itself, and [i]n other locations, no creative reading is possible--'under' means 'subject [or pursuant] to' or 'by reason of the authority of.'  57 Id. (quoting St. Louis Fuel and Supply Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446, 450 (D.C.Cir.1989)). In a footnote, the Court lists three appearances of under within the EAJA where under means subject to. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 519 n. 2. 58 The majority relies on this language to hold that [w]hen only one meaning of a word can be used consistently throughout the statute, that meaning is plain and unambiguous. Maj. Op. at 1363 (exclusively citing Ardestani ). But the Ardestani Court never states such a broad proposition; nothing in Ardestani indicates that the identical-language rule was dispositive of the ambiguity question in that case. In fact, several other factors entered into the Court's decision that under in section 504(b)(1)(C)(i) means subject to, not as defined by. First, the Court stressed that the plain and ordinary meaning of under as used in the EAJA is subject to. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 519. Unlike this case, the alternate definition of under urged by Ardestani--as defined in--is not readily apparent from any dictionary definition of under. See WEBSTER'S at 2487. Second, Ardestani asked the Court to construe under section 554 to mean as defined in section 554(a), thus ignoring the procedural provisions established in the remainder of [section 554]. Ardestani, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 519. Thus, as a matter of context--because Congress said 554 and not 554(a)--the Court could not credit Ardestani's definition of under. Finally, the Court relied on the rule that sovereign immunity waivers must be strictly construed in favor of the United States in holding that under means subject to. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 520. These alternate reasons for the Court's decision, coupled with the absence of any indication of how much the Court relied on its allusion to the identical-language rule, render Ardestani incapable of supporting the majority's dispositive use of the identical-language rule. 59 Even assuming arguendo that Ardestani rests entirely upon the identical-language rule, Ardestani still does not help the majority. The Ardestani Court demonstrates that Congress used under for a consistent purpose throughout the EAJA: to limit the operation of EAJA rules to EAJA awards. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 519 n. 2. Neither the majority nor the plaintiffs make any attempt under Atlantic Cleaners to show that same is used in the PPIA with a consistent purpose. 60 For all of these independent reasons, the majority errs in holding that the identical-language rule is dispositive of Chevron's threshold question. The rule has no application in this case, where Congress understandably uses a common word for several different purposes. 61