Opinion ID: 1145087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: constitutionality of delegation

Text: [1] Determination of crimes and punishment has traditionally been a legislative prerogative, subject to only very limited review in the courts. State v. Monday, 85 Wn.2d 906, 540 P.2d 416 (1975); State v. Cerny, 78 Wn.2d 845, 480 P.2d 199 (1971); Hendrix v. Seattle, 76 Wn.2d 142, 456 P.2d 696 (1969). A belief on the part of the judiciary that sentencing possibilities are inadequate goes to the wisdom of the dispositional standards and cannot be enough to overcome the legislatively prescribed range of punishment. [The statutory scheme] is sufficient flexibility for sentencing judges, and, if not, it is the function of the legislature and not the judiciary to alter the sentencing process. State v. Monday, supra at 909-10. Thus, it is clear, and the respondent State concedes, that legislative delegation of sentencing power to an administrative agency does not encroach on the judiciary's power. [2] Whether the legislature can constitutionally delegate its own power to define sentences depends on the standards and safeguards accompanying the delegation: The constitutional requirements for such a delegation are that: (1) the legislature provides standards defining generally what is to be done and what body is to accomplish it; and (2) procedural safeguards be established to control arbitrary administrative action. Polygon Corp. v. Seattle, 90 Wn.2d 59, 66, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978), citing Rody v. Hollis, 81 Wn.2d 88, 500 P.2d 97 (1972), and Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wn.2d 155, 500 P.2d 540 (1972). [3] Respondent State concedes the adequacy of standards in this case. RCW 13.40.030(1), (5), (6) and (7) provide an explicit set of standards governing the period of confinement or other supervision based on the offense committed and a wide range of other listed factors. The standards are at least as complete as those considered by this court in State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 66 P.2d 360 (1937), in which the indeterminate sentence act establishing the Prison and Parole Board to set sentences within legislatively prescribed maximums was upheld. For instance, RCW 13.40.030(1) provides that the sentencing standards must be established on the basis of a youth's age, the instant offense, and the history and seriousness of previous offenses, but in no case shall the period of confinement and supervision exceed that to which an adult may be subjected for the same offense(s). The section goes on to require that standards for sentencing serious offenders shall not be less than 30 days, and provides explicit restrictions on the possible lengths of time and sentencing alternatives that may be proposed. RCW 13.40.030(6) and (7) set out the permissible ranges of confinement in even greater detail. The Juvenile Justice Act also provides safeguards against abuse in administrative promulgation of dispositional standards. The legislature reserves the right to review, adopt, or require modification of the proposed standards. RCW 13.40.030(2) and (3). After the first set of standards, the proposed guidelines will always be before the legislature in a year in which a legislative session is mandated. Const. art. 2, § 12. Although delegation cannot justify otherwise arbitrary and capricious administrative action, there is no claim or argument in this case that DSHS acted inappropriately in establishing the sentencing guidelines. Sufficient safeguards exist in the statute; the statutory scheme proposed clearly does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative functions to an administrative agency.