Opinion ID: 4558220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Photographs

Text: Defendant Sherrill next argues that the district court erred by denying his motion in limine seeking exclusion of photographs purportedly suggesting that he was affiliated with a gang, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Under that rule, a district court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” We review a district court’s decision not to exclude evidence under Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sassanelli, 118 F.3d 495, 498 (6th Cir. 1997). When applying this standard, we “take[] a maximal view of the probative effect of the evidence and a minimal view of its unfairly prejudicial effect, and will hold that the district court erred only if the latter outweighs the former.” Id. Considering first these photographs’ probative value, the government does not argue that Sherrill’s gang affiliation—or lack thereof—was probative to this case. Instead, the government asserts—and the district court found—that the photos were probative because they helped establish the relationship between the codefendants, as well as their identities. And indeed, taking the requisite “maximal view” of the photographs’ probative value, they are probative on both points—the fact that the codefendants were previously photographed together reasonably suggests that they had an ongoing relationship and that they therefore could have committed the instant crime together. Turning to the risk of unfair prejudice, “‘[u]nfair prejudice,’ as used in Rule 403, . . . refers to evidence which tends to suggest decision on an improper basis.” United States v. 2At oral argument, Somerville also asserted that the district court should have granted severance because the evidence presented against his codefendants generally tainted the jury’s consideration of his case. Somerville did not raise this issue in his briefing to this Court, and so it too is not adequately preserved for our review. See United States v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 331 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Generally speaking . . . a party does not preserve an argument by raising it for the first time at oral argument . . . .”). Even if it were, “a ‘spillover of evidence’ from one case to another ‘generally does not require severance,’ unless [the] [d]efendant can point to specific ‘substantial,’ ‘undue,’ or ‘compelling’ prejudice.” Fields, 763 F.3d at 457 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 309 F.3d 966, 971 (6th Cir. 2002)). Somerville has not done so. Nos. 19-5815/5817/5983 United States v. Sherrill Page 12 Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Sherrill contends that the photographs in question are unfairly prejudicial because they suggest that he was a part of a gang. We have cautioned trial courts to be particularly careful in admitting evidence of gang affiliation, “since most jurors are likely to look unfavorably upon a defendant’s membership in a street gang.” United States v. Tolbert, 8 F. App’x 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2001). Despite Sherrill’s argument, it is not clear that the photographs as admitted here actually suggested that he was affiliated with a gang. While it is true that Defendants were making gang signs in the pictures, their hands were redacted before the pictures were admitted into evidence. Sherrill argued at trial that the photographs should have instead been cropped to remove Defendants’ hands altogether. Indeed, this might have been preferable. As Sherrill pointed out at trial, “sometimes redactions can call more attention to what’s under” them. (Trial Tr., R. 280 at PageID #2884.) Perhaps another preferable course in this sense might have been to simply leave the photos unredacted, rather than drawing jurors’ attention to Defendants’ hands. Still, Sherrill conceded before the district court that the redactions “accomplishe[d] the purpose of what we sought to,” so he cannot now contend that those redactions themselves were improper. (Id.) Sherrill further notes that the individuals photographed were wearing colors associated with gangs. But even if true, the simple fact that a person was wearing a specific color in a photograph—especially when no evidence was presented as to any color’s significance—is not unfairly prejudicial. Altogether, when we take the appropriate “minimal view” of the photographs’ unfairly prejudicial effect, they apparently cause little to no unfair prejudice to Sherrill. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to find that their probative value therefore equaled or outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice, and we accordingly affirm the district court’s denial of Sherrill’s motion in limine.