Opinion ID: 1119472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Give Attempted Manslaughter Instructions

Text: Moore argues that the court erred when it failed, sua sponte, to instruct the jury on the included offense of attempted reckless manslaughter and the mitigating defense of attempted EMED manslaughter. When jury instructions or the omission thereof are at issue on appeal, the standard of review is whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent or misleading. State v. Kinnane, 79 Hawai`i 46, 49, 897 P.2d 973, 976 (1995) (quoting State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 514-15, 849 P.2d 58, 74 (1993)).
Under HRS § 701-109(5) (1993), if there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the included offense, the court must charge the jury with respect to the included offense, unless (1) the prosecution does not request that included instructions be given and (2) the defendant specifically objects to the included offense instructions for tactical reasons. State v. Kupau, 76 Hawai`i 387, 395, 879 P.2d 492, 500 (1994). Relying on State v. Tagaro, 7 Haw.App. 291, 757 P.2d 1175 (1987), Moore argues that attempted reckless manslaughter is an included offense of attempted second degree murder and that, having found a scintilla of evidence of recklessness to support a reckless endangering instruction, the court was also required to instruct the jury on attempted reckless manslaughter. In Tagaro, the ICA held that the crime of attempted [reckless] manslaughter under the circumstances of this case is an included offense of attempted murder, and the trial court in the instant case was required to, sua sponte, instruct the jury that it could find Defendant guilty of that included offense if it did not find him guilty of attempted murder. Id. at 297, 757 P.2d at 1179 (citation omitted). Our recent decision in State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i 27, 904 P.2d 912 (1995), however, disposes of Moore's argument. In Holbron, we unequivocally overruled Tagaro and held that, under the Hawai`i Penal Code, there can be no offense of attempted reckless manslaughter. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 45, 904 P.2d at 930. Attempted reckless manslaughter is not, therefore, an included offense of attempted second degree murder. The failure sua sponte to instruct the jury on attempted reckless manslaughter, therefore, was not error.
HRS § 707-702(2) (1993) provides, in pertinent part that: In a prosecution for murder in the first and second degrees it is a defense, which reduces the offense to manslaughter, that the defendant was, at the time he [or she] caused the death of the other person, under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation. Extreme mental or emotional disturbance is also a mitigating defense to attempted murder. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 45, 904 P.2d at 930; State v. Nizam, 7 Haw.App. 402, 771 P.2d 899, cert. denied, 70 Haw. 666, 796 P.2d 502 (1989). Thus, Moore was entitled to an instruction on every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence, provided such evidence would support the consideration of that issue by the jury, no matter how weak, inconclusive or unsatisfactory the evidence may be. State v. Agrabante, 73 Haw. 179, 196, 830 P.2d 492, 501 (1992) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. O'Daniel, 62 Haw. 518, 527-28, 616 P.2d 1383, 1390 (1980)). We need not decide whether the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the mitigating defense of attempted EMED manslaughter was plain error because the record in this case is entirely devoid of any evidence supporting a theory of attempted EMED manslaughter in the first instance. As the court stated in State v. Russo, 69 Haw. 72, 734 P.2d 156 (1987), `where evidentiary support for the asserted defense, or for any of its essential components, is clearly lacking, it would not be error for the trial court either to refuse to charge on the issue or to instruct the jury not to consider it.' Id. at 76, 734 P.2d at 158 (quoting State v. Horn, 58 Haw. 252, 255, 566 P.2d 1378, 1380-81 (1977) (citation omitted)); see also HRS § 701-115(2) (1993) (No defense may be considered by the trier of fact unless evidence of the specified fact or facts has been presented.). Moore asserts that the testimony by police officers, describing him at the time of his arrest as agitated, nervous, frantic, and anxious, as well as the hearsay statements of Mrs. Moore to Officer Daniels that I told him I was leaving and [h]e's distraught constitute substantial evidence supporting a finding that Moore was under the influence of an EMED. However, even if this evidence supported a conclusion that Moore was under the influence of an EMED when he was arrested, the relevant inquiry is whether he was under such influence at the time he shot Mrs. Moore and whether there was a reasonable explanation, viewed from Moore's standpoint, for the disturbance. Only two people had any knowledge of Moore's state of mind at the time he fired the shots, and neither of them testified. Thus, there is no evidence of whether Moore was under the influence of an EMED nor any evidence from which the jury could view[] the subjective, internal situation in which [Moore] found himself and the external circumstances as he perceived them at the time,... and assess[] from that standpoint whether the explanation for his emotional distress was reasonable[.] [8] State v. Dumlao, 6 Haw.App. 173, 184, 715 P.2d 822 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 68 Haw. 692, 715 P.2d 822 (1986), overruled in part by State v. Seguritan, 70 Haw. 173, 766 P.2d 128 (1988). [9] Moore's subsequent agitation or nervousness, when trying to convince the police that Mrs. Moore had been shot by an oriental male robber or when being placed under arrest, simply does not support a theory of EMED manslaughter. We therefore hold that there was no error in failing to instruct the jury on attempted EMED manslaughter because there was absolutely no evidentiary support for the mitigating defense.
On November 22, 1995, following our decision in Holbron, Moore filed a motion for leave to file an amended brief modifying his first point on appeal (and the argument in support thereof) by urging reversal if [sic] his attempted murder conviction because Judge Aiona's [sic] violated State v. Kupau and failed to speak with defendant about included offenses or tender instructions for First Degree Assault [10] and Second Degree Assault. [11]  The motion was denied. We are not, however, precluded from addressing the issue. Assuming, without deciding, that assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree are lesser included offenses of attempted murder under HRS § 701-109(4) (1993), [12] we hold that Moore was not entitled to instructions on those offenses. Kupau makes clear that the trial court's duty to, sua sponte, instruct the jury on lesser included offenses applies only to those instructions that are supported by the evidence. 76 Hawai`i at 395, 879 P.2d at 500. The court is not obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the included offense. HRS § 701-109(5). The relevant distinction between attempted murder in the second degree, on the one hand, and assault in the first degree or assault in the second degree under HRS § 707-711(1)(a) or (d), on the other, is the result caused by Moore. Therefore, the only rational basis for a verdict acquitting Moore of attempted murder and convicting him of assault under HRS §§ 707-710, -711(1)(a), or -711(1)(d) would be evidence that it was not Moore's conscious object, see HRS § 702-206(1)(c) (1993), or that he was not aware that it was practically certain, see HRS § 702-206(2)(c) (1993), that his conduct would cause the death of Mrs. Moore, but, rather, that it was his conscious object or that he was aware that it was practically certain that his conduct would cause her only serious or substantial bodily injury. There is no evidence in the record, however, from which a reasonable juror could rationally infer that Moore contemplated a result other than Mrs. Moore's death. [13] As outlined more fully in section II.B., infra, the evidence at trial established that Moore fired at least six shots at Mrs. Moore from point-blank range with a .32 caliber revolver, causing five gunshot wounds to her upper body, three of which were to vital areas. Further, the evidence supported the inferences that shots were fired at two distinct geographic locations and that Moore waited thirty minutes to get help for Mrs. Moore, during which time she lost approximately half of her blood volume while he made no attempt to administer first aid. There is, therefore, no rational basis in the evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that it was Moore's conscious object or that he was aware that it was practically certain that his conduct would cause only serious or substantial bodily injury to Mrs. Moore, rather than death. Assault in the second degree, as defined by HRS § 707-711(1)(b), is committed when a person recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another. A rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting Moore of attempted murder and convicting him of assault in the second degree under HRS § 707-711(1)(b) would require some evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Moore was not at least aware that it was practically certain that shooting Mrs. Moore six times from point blank range with a .32 caliber revolver would cause her death, but that he merely consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that repeatedly shooting her in the upper body would cause Mrs. Moore serious bodily injury. HRS § 702-206(3)(c) (1993). On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, we hold, as a matter of law, that a reasonable trier of fact could not so conclude. [14] Consequently, Moore was not entitled to instructions on assault because the instructions were not supported by the evidence.