Opinion ID: 1830403
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evens v. shiawassee county road commissioners

Text: However, I disagree with the conclusion in Evens that M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1) establishes an exception to governmental immunity involving only traveled portions of a roadbed actually designed for vehicular travel. This interpretation is myopic in that it fails to place M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1) in its proper statutory framework. It is erroneous, also, because the majority inserts its own meaning of the words improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1).
Had the Legislature intended to impose liability on county road commissions and the state for defects in the surface of roads, alone, it could have and would have said so. The plain meaning of the words improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel connotes a broader concept than just the surface of the road, itself. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the controlling intent of the Legislature. Lorencz v. Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 370, 376-377, 483 N.W.2d 844 (1992). When determining legislative intent, statutory language should be given a reasonable construction considering its purpose and the object sought to be accomplished. Wills v. Iron Co. Bd. of Canvassers, 183 Mich.App. 797, 801, 455 N.W.2d 405 (1990). As the majority hints, this Court has long struggled with the outrageously imperfect language of the highway exception to governmental immunity. Op., p. 715. That long struggle, alone, supports the conclusion that the language of the highway exception is far from plain. [3] However, the majority asserts that the language of the statute is plain, in the sense that it lacks ambiguity. I differ with the majority's conclusory assertion that the statutory phrase improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel has a plain meaning wilfully disregarded by this Court in Pick v. Szymczak, 451 Mich. 607, 548 N.W.2d 603 (1996). Standing alone, the phrase does not specify that the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel includes only the surface of the highway. For example, it leaves uncertain whether the space above the highway containing traffic lights is included. Because it does not, the words improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel might include traffic control devices. Beyond dispute, they constitute an improvement, inasmuch as they are placed on or above the highway by a government agency to improve vehicular travel. As we noted in Pick, vehicles do not travel solely on the two-dimensional length and width of the roadway, but in three dimensional space. Id. at 622-623, 548 N.W.2d 603. And for obvious reasons, it is impossible to place traffic control devices on the roadbed that the vehicles touch while traveling. Provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code support the conclusion that the Legislature envisioned traffic control devices as an integral part of the highway itself: The state highway commission shall place or require to be placed and maintain or require to be maintained such traffic control devices, conforming to said manual and specifications, upon all state highways as it shall deem necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of this chapter or to regulate, warn or guide traffic. [MCL 257.609(a); MSA 9.2309(a) (emphasis added).] The county road commission has a similar duty: Local authorities and county road commissions in their respective jurisdictions shall place and maintain such traffic control devices upon highways under their jurisdiction as they may deem necessary to indicate and carry out the provisions of this chapter or local traffic ordinances or to regulate, warn or guide traffic. All such traffic control devices hereafter erected shall conform to the state manual and specifications. [MCL 257.610(a); MSA 9.2310(a) (emphasis added).] [4] The Legislature's use of the word upon indicates that traffic control devices are on, not off highways. The Legislature appears to have intended that they become a part of the highway itself. Since we cannot determine from the phrase alone whether it includes improvements such as traffic devices, it is appropriate to analyze the provisions of the governmental immunity act as a whole.
In Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing ), [5] we recognized that the governmental immunity act was intended to provide uniform liability and immunity to both state and local government agencies. The preamble to the act notes that it is an act to make uniform the liability of municipal corporations, political subdivisions, and the state, its agencies and departments, officers, employees, and volunteers thereof, and members of certain boards, councils, and task forces when engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function, for injuries to property and persons; to define and limit this liability.... The highway exception is § 2 of the governmental immunity act, M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1). In it, the Legislature placed a general duty on each governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway to maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.... The next sentence imposes liability on a government agency having jurisdiction over a highway for failure to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel.... Thus, liability not only extends to highways in a state of disrepair, but to those in a condition not reasonably safe and fit for travel. The majority concludes that the Legislature did not intend to include traffic control devices within the purview of the highway exception. To reach that conclusion, it reads the first and second sentence of M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1) separately. The result is that it contradicts the Legislature's clear intent and renders the second sentence nugatory. The second sentence of M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1) provides: A person who sustains bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of a governmental agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency. In this sentence, the Legislature expressly provides that persons who are injured because a government agency failed to keep a highway in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may recover damages from that agency. The majority quotes Justice Riley's dissent in Pick, asserting that a duty to keep the highway in a condition reasonably safe for travel does not exist. However, the assertion is refuted by the second sentence of the highway exception, itself. It is illogical to conclude that the Legislature would impose liability where there is no duty. It is a maxim of statutory construction that every word in a statute should be read to give the word meaning. Also, a court should avoid a construction that would render any part of a statute surplusage or nugatory. In re MCI Telecommunications, 460 Mich. 396, 414, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999); Altman v. Meridian Twp., 439 Mich. 623, 635, 487 N.W.2d 155 (1992). The majority violates these principles by reading the first sentence of the highway exception, but ignoring the second. It renders meaningless the Legislature's intent to allow damages to those injured when a government agency fails to keep a highway under its jurisdiction reasonably safe for public travel. Keeping the highway in a condition reasonably safe for public travel includes maintaining traffic control devices in working order. The majority maintains that traffic control devices are not implicated in the definition of highway under the highway exception to the governmental immunity act. I disagree. Under subsection 1(e) of the governmental immunity act, M.C.L. § 691.1401(e); MSA 3.996(101)(e), Highway means a public highway, road, or street that is open for public travel and includes bridges, sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, and culverts on the highway. The term highway does not include alleys, trees, and utility poles. As the majority concedes, this definition of highway is broad. Op., p. 719, n. 30. In defining it, the Legislature specifies what is excluded: alleys, trees, and utility poles. Notably, it did not exclude traffic control devices. The majority usurps the Legislature's role by adding traffic control devices to the list of exclusions. This broad definition of highway explains the presence of the fourth sentence of M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1): The duty of the state and county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability for that duty, extends only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and does not include sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. This sentence relieves county road commissions and the state from liability for installations outside the improved portions of the highway. But the Legislature did not completely bar recovery when an individual is injured because of a defect in a portion of a county highway outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, including a sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk or other installation. MCL 691.1402a(1); MSA 3.996(102a)(1). Instead, the act places liability for those accidents on municipal corporations. MCL 691.1402a(1); MSA 3.996(102a)(1). If a municipal corporation knew about a defect thirty days before a plaintiff's injury and the defect is the proximate cause of the injury, then the corporation is liable. [6] MCL 691.1402a(1)(a) and (b); MSA 3.996(102a)(1)(a) and (b). Under the statutory scheme created by the governmental immunity act, state and county road commissions are liable for defects in the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1). When a municipal corporation knows or should know about the existence of a defect outside the improved portion of the highway, it is liable for injuries caused by the defect. MCL 691.1402a; MSA 3.996(102a). Maintaining traffic control devices is a governmental function delegated to county road commissions and the state. MCL 257.609(a); MSA 9.2309(a), M.C.L. § 257.610(a); MSA 9.2310(a). The governmental immunity act was intended to make uniform the liability of government agencies when, in the discharge or exercise of certain government functions, persons were injured. One of the functions is maintaining highways in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Hence, the act includes the highway exception, which is found at M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1). Defective traffic control devices make highways hazardous for vehicular traffic. It is therefore logical to conclude that the Legislature intended to include traffic control devices in the duty to maintain highways in a condition reasonably safe for public travel. However, the majority has decided that traffic control devices are located outside the improved portions of roads, shifting liability for defective control devices to municipal corporations. I find this conclusion illogical, particularly when county road commissions and the state have the duty to place and maintain traffic control devices on highways. MCL 257.609(a); MSA 9.2309(a); MCL 257.610(a); MSA 9.2310(a). Shifting liability for defective traffic control devices to municipal corporations when it is the county road commissions or the state that have the duty to maintain them is simply senseless.
In support of its construction of M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1), the majority points to certain public policy considerations. Specifically, it is concerned about the costs taxpayers might sustain if we determine that the use and maintenance of traffic control devices are part of keeping highways safe for public travel. Contrary to the majority's predictions, the inclusion of traffic control devices would not make county road commissions and the state responsible for every instance of injury arising from automobile accidents. Instead, they would be liable only for injuries caused by their failure to maintain the improved highways in a condition reasonably safe for vehicular travel. In terms of public policy, one could argue that the taxpayers desire the reasonable use of traffic control devices to make roads safer. One could also argue that they intend compensation for those injured when an agency fails to keep roads safe, as expressly provided in the second sentence of the highway exception. There has been no evidence that, before Pick, a dearth of traffic control devices existed, creating vastly unsafe highways.... Op., p. 720, n. 34. By the same token, there is no evidence that, since Pick in 1996, state coffers have been drained by a flood of lawsuits alleging injuries from unsafe traffic control devices. [7] Indeed, if it were the case that Pick resulted in an unbearable financial strain on the state, then surely the Legislature would have rewritten the governmental immunity act. [8]