Opinion ID: 747168
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Environmental Crimes

Text: 21 Defendants were convicted of violating the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., by (1) severing a 250-ton concrete and rebar block from the stern of Witconcrete II, a ferrous concrete barge, and dumping it into Krum Bay, St. Thomas; (2) severing approximately one hundred pieces of rebar and attached concrete from the stern of Witconcrete II and dropping it into Krause Lagoon; and (3) conducting sandblasting operations on a floating barge that projected sand and paint chip residue into Krum Bay. The Clean Water Act generally prohibits discharging pollutants into the navigable waters of the United States without a permit. But it only regulates discharges of pollutants from a point source. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1362(12). 8 Defendants contend as a matter of law their conduct did not constitute discharge of a pollutant from a point source. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876 (3d Cir.1994). 22 Barges are floating craft, expressly included within the definition of point source. 33 U.S.C. 1362(14). 9 Discharges include any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source. Defendants concede that Krum Bay and Krause Lagoon are navigable waters of the United States. Rebar, concrete, sand and paint chips fall within the Clean Water Act's broad definition of pollutant. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). 10 Therefore, cutting off pieces of a ferro-concrete barge and dumping them in Krum Bay and Krause Lagoon, or conducting sandblasting on a floating craft and allowing the residue to fall into Krum Bay, constitutes making an addition of a pollutant to navigable waters of the United States from a point source. Defendants' conduct fell within the applicable statutory definitions. 23 Appellants' reliance on United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245, 114 S.Ct. 2764, 129 L.Ed.2d 878 (1994), does not alter our conclusion. There, defendant removed containers loaded with blood vials from his office, transported them in his car, and carried them to the Hudson River, where he deposited them during low tide in a bulkhead separating his home from the river. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to consider defendant a point source. But Plaza offers no guidance here because it focused almost exclusively on the application of the Clean Water Act to human beings: 24 As the parties have presented the issue to us in their briefs and at oral argument, the question is 'whether a human being can be a point source.' 25