Opinion ID: 2341803
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for ineffective assistance claims in CINA cases.

Text: In the Matter of K.L.J., we held that indigent parents in a termination proceeding have a constitutional right to appointed counsel. [58] In V.F. v. State, we held that the effective assistance of counsel is also constitutionally required. [59] In V.F. we applied the standard for ineffective assistance set out in the criminal context in Risher v. State . [60] In Risher we promulgat[ed] a two-pronged test: Before reversal will result, there must first be a finding that counsel's conduct either generally throughout the trial or in one or more specific instances did not conform to the standard of competence which we have enunciated. Secondly, there must be a showing that the lack of competency contributed to the conviction. If the first burden has been met, all that is required additionally is to create a reasonable doubt that the incompetence contributed to the outcome.[ [61] ] In State v. Jones, the Alaska Court of Appeals elaborated as follows: In evaluating trial counsel's conduct, the court must apply a strong presumption of competence. An integral component of the presumption of competence is the further presumption that trial counsel's actions were motivated by sound tactical considerations. The duty of rebutting this presumption is part and parcel of the accused's burden of proof: [T]he defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.[ [62] ] We have applied the Risher standard in two parental termination cases decided after V.F.: in S.B. v. State [63] and in P.M. v. State. [64] David invites us to abandon or alter the Risher standard for parental termination cases. David suggests that this court establish a new standard for the effective assistance of counsel which is specific to Child in Need of Aid Proceedings. David urges us to look to other jurisdictions, such as Oregon, which have done just that. We decline to do so. In V.F., we adopted the Risher standard as the appropriate standard for CINA cases. [65] We have stated that we will overrule a prior decision only when clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent. [66] David fails to make any argument that we should overrule our controlling precedent under this standard, and we perceive no reason to do so.