Opinion ID: 2830302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of Taylor’s Sentence

Text: Post-United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), this Court reviews a district court’s sentencing determination under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard for reasonableness. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). “Sentences in criminal cases are reviewed for both procedural and substantive reasonableness.” United States v. Morgan, 687 F.3d 688, 693 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Taylor challenges only the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The determination of which standard of review applies to a defendant’s challenge to the procedural reasonableness of a sentence depends on whether the defendant preserved that No. 14-6048 United States v. Taylor Page 14 challenge for appeal by making a clear objection. United States v. Richards, 593 F. App’x 500, 503 (6th Cir. 2014). The court reviews preserved procedural-reasonableness claims for abuse of discretion. Id. Pursuant to United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004), where a party has failed to object to a procedural defect at sentencing, including a procedural defect in the district court’s § 3553 analysis, we review claims of procedural unreasonableness for plain error. United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 802 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385-86 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Under Bostic: a district court must “ask the parties whether they have any objections to the sentence ... that have not previously been raised.” Id. The purpose of the Bostic question is twofold: to allow parties a chance to raise objections not previously raised, United States v. Freeman, 640 F.3d 180, 186 (6th Cir.2011), and, critically, to allow the district court an opportunity to address and “correct[ ] any error ... on the spot.” Bostic, 371 F.3d at 873. Accordingly, in general, defendants can preserve challenges to the procedural reasonableness of their sentence when: (1) the district court addresses a procedural-reasonableness claim the defendant raised prior to asking the Bostic question; or (2) the district court addresses a procedural-reasonableness claim after asking the Bostic question—in this scenario, the claim could be one raised for the first time after the district court asks the Bostic question, or it could be a previously developed claim that the district court failed to address prior to asking the Bostic question. See United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385–86 (6th Cir.2008) (en banc); United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 354–55 (6th Cir.2009). When determining whether a party has adequately preserved a claim for appeal, this court examines the record “with an eye to the realities of the facts and circumstances of each sentencing proceeding.” United States v. Morgan, 687 F.3d 688, 694 (6th Cir.2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Richards, 593 F. App’x at 503. In contrast, “[u]nlike with a procedural-reasonableness claim, a defendant is not required to preserve a substantive-reasonableness claim for appellate review. . . . Accordingly, all challenges to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 504 (citations omitted). The government argues plain error applies because Taylor did not object to the district court’s failure to address his age-recidivism mitigation argument at the close of the sentencing hearing. Taylor responds that under the rationale in Bostic, he was not required to reiterate his age-recidivism argument at the close of the sentencing hearing in order to avoid plain error review. See United States v. Freeman, 640 F.3d 180, 186 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding “the purpose No. 14-6048 United States v. Taylor Page 15 of the Bostic question is to allow the parties to raise objections ‘that have not previously been raised,’” not to give parties an opportunity to renew their previously raised objections). Taylor is correct, in part, that Bostic does not require a defendant to reiterate a procedural objection, previously raised, to preserve it for appeal under abuse-of-discretion review; nor does the law require a defendant to raise a substantive objection at all to receive abuse-of-discretion review on appeal. Under Vonner, however, the law is well-settled that a defendant’s failure to object to the adequacy of a district court’s explanation for rejecting some of his requests for leniency previously raised—“an issue that became apparent as soon as the court finished announcing its proposed sentence”—triggers plain error review under Bostic. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386. In this case, Taylor argues that the district court committed a procedural error by failing to address explicitly his previously raised age-recidivism argument during sentencing. The district judge, however, inquired after sentencing as to whether Taylor had any “any other objections as far as sentencing, or any other matters I failed to address on behalf of the defendant,” and Taylor did not respond with any new objections not previously raised regarding procedural defects in the district court’s sentencing decision stated a few moments before. Thus, Taylor’s challenge to the procedural reasonableness of the district court’s sentencing decision is subject to plain error review. To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show: “(1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected defendant’s substantial rights and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Wallace, 597 at 802 (citing Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386).
Taylor argues that the district court’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the sentencing record shows that the court did not discuss explicitly Taylor’s mitigation argument that his advanced age upon his release would be sufficient to protect the public from any further crimes, thus weighing in favor of a downward departure. At the highest level, procedural reasonableness requires that a district court “properly calculate the guidelines range, treat the guidelines as advisory, consider the § 3553(a) factors and No. 14-6048 United States v. Taylor Page 16 adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any variance from the guidelines range.” United States v. Presley, 547 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). In order for a district court’s sentencing determination to be procedurally reasonable, a “‘sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’” United States v. Gapinski, 561 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)); see also Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387 (the question regarding procedural reasonableness in each case “is whether ‘[t]he record makes clear that the sentencing judge listened to each argument,’ ‘considered the supporting evidence,’ was ‘fully aware’ of the defendant’s circumstances and took ‘them into account’ in sentencing him”) (quoting Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2469, 127 S.Ct. 2456) (alteration in original); Wallace, 597 F.3d at 804. While, on the one hand, the district court is not required to “give the reasons for rejecting any and all arguments [made] by the parties for alternative sentences,” Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387, on the other hand, when a defendant raises a “non-frivolous argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.” Gapinski, 561 F.3d at 474 (quoting United States v. Lalonde, 509 F.3d 750, 770 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2467, 127 S.Ct. 2456; United States v. Peters, 512 F.3d 787, 789 (6th Cir. 2008) (“When the defendant or prosecutor ‘presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence,’ . . . a sentencing judge should address the ‘parties’ arguments’ and ‘explain why he has rejected those arguments.’”). Further, the Supreme Court in Rita suggested that “[w]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation…” Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387 (citing Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2468). While the district court judge in this case did not make even a cursory mention of Taylor’s age-recidivism argument, this Court cannot conclude that the sentencing was procedurally unreasonable. Taylor did not raise the objection with a sufficient degree of specificity under the circumstances to apprise the court of the true basis for his objection. Bostic, 371 F.3d at 871 (a party “must ‘object with that reasonable degree of specificity which would have adequately apprised the trial court of the true basis for his objection’”) (quoting United No. 14-6048 United States v. Taylor Page 17 States v. LeBlanc, 612 F.2d 1012, 1014 (6th Cir.)); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 51(b). As explained in Bostic, “[a] specific objection provides the district court with an opportunity to address the error in the first instance and allows this court to engage in more meaningful review.” Id. The one and only time Taylor raised his age-recidivism argument, it was in a fleeting manner, and buried within a series of interrelated objections concerning his personal characteristics, including his age, disabilities, and request for placement in a medical facility. In the briefs before this Court, Taylor fleshes out policy and legal arguments concerning the correlation between increased age and lower recidivism rates, including citation to academic and statistical findings; such supporting legal and policy rationales, however, were not before the district court. While an argument for leniency based on lower recidivism rates for older prior offenders certainly is not frivolous, see Payton v. United States, 754 F.3d 375, 377 (6th Cir. 2014), neither is it so well established in our jurisprudence that it can be said with certainty that a brief reference to it, without any supporting argument, would adequately apprise the court of its import. Further, of some consideration is the fact that Taylor’s written objections to the PSR did not raise the age-recidivism objection. This is not to say that placing an objection in a response to a PSR is necessary in order to make an objection with a reasonable degree of specificity. In this case, however, in combination with the fleeting and inexplicit nature of the comment at the sentencing hearing, it provides support for the conclusion that such an objection was not stated with a reasonable degree of specificity to put the district court on notice of it. We must conclude, in sum, that the objection as raised did not apprise the court of its responsibility to resolve it explicitly within the sentencing hearing. Although the district court did not refer to Taylor’s age-recidivism argument explicitly when it denied a downward departure, the district court did consider Taylor’s personal characteristics, and set forth a sufficient explanation for Taylor’s within-Guidelines sentence. In weighing Taylor’s personal characteristics against other §3553(a) factors, the district court found that the other factors weighed against deviating below the minimum Guidelines range, including: the seriousness of Taylor’s crime, his criminal history, protection of the community, and the deterrent effect of the sentence both on Taylor, as well as on others. Taylor’s age-recidivism argument is, essentially, that the community’s interest in safety, a factor to be considered under No. 14-6048 United States v. Taylor Page 18 § 3553(a), still would be served by a below-Guidelines sentence because he is less likely to offend as he ages. The transcript shows implicitly, though not explicitly, however, that the district court concluded that the community’s interest in safety and deterrence would not be served by granting Taylor a shorter sentence. While the Supreme Court and this Court “encourage[] district court judges to give ‘reasoned’ explanation for all sentencing decisions . . . ‘[t]he law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge’s own professional judgment.’” Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387 (citing Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2468). In this case, the court provided a reasoned explanation for its sentence. This is not to say that Taylor’s age-recidivism argument would be frivolous under different circumstances. On the contrary, this decision does not undermine the continuous vitality and validity of Payton v. USA, where this Court found that it was procedurally unreasonable for the district court to fail to address on the record its consideration of the defendant’s age-recidivism argument in favor of a shorter sentence. 754 F.3d at 377. The Payton court concluded that statistical evidence2 showing a decline in recidivism with age required “the sentencing judge to explain carefully why a criminal defendant like Payton remains likely to engage in violent robberies between the age of seventy and ninety.” Id. at 379. Accordingly, the Payton Court held that a complete failure to provide any rationale as to why the district court rejected such an argument warranted a remand. Id. Thus, as with any non- 2 The Payton Court included the following statistical and scientific evidence in its decision: The Sentencing Commission has observed that “[r]ecidivism rates decline relatively consistently as age increases.”1 Recent analysis from the Bureau of Justice Statistics considering the recidivism rates of released prisoners in 30 states (including Michigan) from 2005 to 2010 supported the Commission’s conclusion, finding decreased recidivism rates as prisoners age.2 These statistics suggest that past fifty years old there is a significantly lower rate of recidivism.3 Both the Guidelines and our Circuit’s cases explicitly acknowledge that a defendant’s age, and specifically old age, is a relevant consideration in sentencing. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1; United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332, 341 (6th Cir.2009); United States v. Davis, 537 F.3d 611, 616–17 (6th Cir.2008). And observers of the criminal justice system have long acknowledged the “key” argument “that elderly offenders pose so low a risk to the public that long or otherwise harsh sentences have little to no utilitarian benefit.”4 Indeed, they observe that “because of health or other reasons, elderly offenders have the lowest rate of recidivism of all types of offenders; in fact, only about one percent of elderly offenders ever face a second conviction.” Id. Studies indicate that neurotransmitters affecting aggression supplied at the synapses of brain neurons vary based on age, and may explain the observed decline in recidivism among older prisoners. Id. at 378-79. No. 14-6048 United States v. Taylor Page 19 frivolous mitigation argument, a district court is under an obligation to articulate its rationale for accepting or rejecting an age-recidivism argument in favor of a lower sentence. Under the circumstances of this case, however, we hold that the sentencing procedure was not unreasonable, and thus the district court did not commit plain error by failing to discuss explicitly Taylor’s statement that he would pose a lesser threat to the community at age 60.