Opinion ID: 1801948
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged improper admission of Emma Foreman's hearsay statement

Text: On direct examination, Emma Foreman, the mother of defendant's former girlfriend, Gerry Tags, testified in pertinent part as follows: Q: Did [defendant] ever say anything to you about murdering anybody? A: Not specifically to me, but I overheard the conversation between him and Gerry, my daughter. Q: What did he say to Gerry about murdering anybody? A: He kept on telling her that if she didn't do what he wanted her to do, he would cut her motherfucking throat. Q: Did he ever mention any elderly people that had he [ sic ] harmed? A: Well, one time he did. Q: Did he say that to you or to your daughter? A: It was to my daughter. Q: What did he say then? A: He said that he wouldhe said he would cut her motherfucking throat. Over defendant's objection, Officer Porter then testified that in January 1990, Foreman told him that defendant had admitted to her that he had killed an old couple in Bakersfield whom he found . . . in a bedroom, and . . . beat . . . to death. Defendant contends Foreman's statement to Porter was inadmissible hearsay because it was not inconsistent with her trial testimony, and that its admission into evidence violated state hearsay rules as well as his federal constitutional rights. We review the trial court's rulings on the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46].) We find no abuse of discretion here. (16) A statement by a witness that is inconsistent with his or her trial testimony is admissible to establish the truth of the matter asserted in the statement under the conditions set forth in Evidence Code sections 1235 and 770. [19] ( People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1219 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1].) The `fundamental requirement' of section 1235 is that the statement in fact be inconsistent with the witness's trial testimony. ( Ibid. ) `Inconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in express terms, is the test for admitting a witness' prior statement . . . .' ( Ibid., quoting People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 988 [92 Cal.Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998].) Here, the trial court properly found that Foreman's statement to Porter was inconsistent with her trial testimony in two ways. First, it was inconsistent regarding to whom defendant purportedly spoke about killing an elderly couple: in her statement to Porter, Foreman said defendant spoke to her, while in her trial testimony, Foreman said she overheard defendant speaking with her daughter, Gerry Tags. Second, it was inconsistent as to what defendant purportedly said: in her statement to Porter, Foreman said defendant admitted killing an elderly couple he had found in a bedroom, while in her trial testimony Foreman reported that defendant said only that he would cut Tags's throat. Defendant argues Foreman's response at trial was not inconsistent, but rather was merely nonresponsive. However, a witness's deliberate evasion of questioning can constitute an implied denial that amounts to inconsistency, rendering a prior statement admissible under Evidence Code section 1235. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 1219-1220; People v. Green, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 988-989.) Normally, the question of evasiveness arises when a witness claims memory loss about the subject of the questioning. (E.g., People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 84-85 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506]; People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 1219-1220; People v. Green, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 988-989.) Answering questions in a deliberately nonresponsive manner, however, also can rise to the level of evasion. Here, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that Foreman was being deliberately evasive when she twice answered questions about what defendant had purportedly said about murdering anybody or harming an elderly couple in a nonresponsive manner. Under the circumstances, her nonresponsive answers could be deemed an implied denial that defendant had admitted killing an elderly couple. Defendant argues that admitting Porter's testimony about Foreman's hearsay statements violated his rights to confront the witnesses against him and to due process of law under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Assuming these claims are preserved for review (see People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-439 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765]; People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 117), they lack merit. The Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause does not prohibit admitting into evidence testimonial hearsay statements against a defendant if the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial. ( Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 59 & fn. 9 [158 L.Ed.2d 177, 124 S.Ct. 1354].) Here, although Foreman testified before Porter did and was not asked about her statements to him, she was released subject to recall. Accordingly, defendant was free to recall and cross-examine her about the discrepancy between her trial testimony and her statements to Porter. No Sixth Amendment violation occurred. For similar reasons, admitting Porter's testimony did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. (See People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439 [the admission of evidence results in a due process violation only if it renders the trial fundamentally unfair].) Here, Porter's testimony was properly admitted under state law, and defendant was free to confront the evidence if he so chose. Furthermore, Porter's testimony was only a small part of the prosecution's case; the prosecutor did not even mention the testimony in her guilt phase summation. Finally, Foreman admitted telling Detective Fraley that she hated defendant with a purple passion. The jury thus was well aware that Foreman may have had reason to fabricate statements by defendant. We find no error or unfairness. [20]