Opinion ID: 1733568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: proceedings in the trial court and the fourth district

Text: Murphy and Innovations (collectively the Plaintiffs) filed suit against UTC/UTOS, Laser, Robotic Systems II, and Hornsby (collectively the Defendants). One of the Plaintiffs' primary allegations was that Carroll, the employee and representative of UTOS/UTC, had misrepresented the extent of involvement that UTC/UTOS would have in producing and marketing the OWL after the deal with Laser was completed. More specifically, the Plaintiffs asserted that Carroll represented that the Australian interests were merely a conduit for UTC/UTOS to become involved with the OWL. The Plaintiffs claimed that if the major corporate presence of UTC/UTOS had supported the OWL, the ultimate financial and production problems associated with the product would not have occurred. The case proceeded to trial and, at the conclusion of the four-week trial, the jury found in favor of the Defendants [3] on all but one claim. Specifically, the jury returned a special interrogatory verdict form finding the following: (1) none of the Defendants either intentionally or negligently misrepresented material facts which the Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon and which caused monetary losses to the Plaintiffs; (2) none of the Defendants conspired with one another to intentionally misrepresent material facts which the Plaintiffs relied upon and which caused monetary losses to the Plaintiffs; (3) none of the Defendants breached the Commission Agreement with Murphy; (4) none of the Defendants breached the Consultancy Agreement with Innovations; [4] (5) Hornsby, individually, breached a fiduciary duty owed to the Plaintiffs, from which the Plaintiffs suffered damages in the amount of $1; (6) Hornsby, individually, did not receive and conceal moneys for himself which were corporate opportunities of Innovations; [5] (7) the assignment of the two OWL patents from Innovations to Robotic Systems II should not be held null and void due to the conduct of the Defendants; and (8) none of the Defendants were liable for punitive damages. After the jury returned its verdict and the trial court had discharged the jury, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial, seeking relief on several grounds. First, the Plaintiffs alleged that a special reasonable reliance jury instruction given by the trial court at the request of the Defendants erroneously stated the law and thus required a new trial. Second, the Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to a new trial against the Defendants because counsel for UTC/UTOS [6] allegedly made numerous improper comments during closing argument, even though counsel for the Plaintiffs made no objections during such argument. Finally, the Plaintiffs alleged that the jury verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence and was grossly inadequate as to the award of damages against Hornsby. After considering the parties' memoranda of law and conducting a hearing, the trial court entered an order summarily denying the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial, and the Plaintiffs appealed. [7] On appeal, the Fourth District rejected the Plaintiffs' request for relief on the closing argument issue. [8] See Murphy, 710 So.2d at 587-91. In so doing, the court (1) disagreed with decisions from the First, Third, and Fifth Districts [9] as to when relief may be granted in a civil case based upon improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument, see id. at 587-88; (2) stated that we do not think improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument in a civil case is something which is so fundamental that there should be an exception to the rule requiring an objection, id. at 589; and (3) expressed that it did not think it was being inconsistent with precedent from this Court on the improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument issue. See id. at 590. The Plaintiffs petitioned this Court for review, and we granted review to resolve the conflict among Florida's District Courts of Appeal regarding the improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument issue. [10] Thus, it is within these complex and multiple contractual circumstances that required four weeks of trial for presentation to a jury that we consider the unobjected-to closing argument issue.