Opinion ID: 508775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence Supporting a Single Conspiracy

Text: 11 The defendants claim that the government failed to prove a single ongoing conspiracy from 1983 through 1986, as charged in the indictment. The defendants maintain that the evidence adduced at trial tended to show two separate conspiracies to distribute marijuana, one in 1983 and one in 1986. The defendants contend that the fatal variance between the indictment and the proof at trial requires reversal. 12 In determining the sufficiency of the government's evidence, we must review all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the government. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Abayomi, 820 F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 189, 98 L.Ed.2d 142 (1987); United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315, 319 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216, 104 S.Ct. 2661, 81 L.Ed.2d 367 (1984). An appellate court may overturn a verdict only when a rational jury could not have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; Abayomi, 820 F.2d at 905; Redwine, 715 F.2d at 319. 13  'A conspiracy consists of a combination or confederation between two or more persons formed for the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, a criminal act.'  Abayomi, 820 F.2d at 905 (quoting United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1192 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965, 101 S.Ct. 1481, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)). In order to establish the crime of conspiracy, the government must prove that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act, that the defendant was a party to the agreement, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the agreement by one of the co-conspirators. United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1328 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818, 106 S.Ct. 63, 88 L.Ed.2d 51 (1985). Conspiracies are secretive by nature; thus, circumstantial evidence is often the sole proof of the existence of a conspiracy and the defendants' participation in the conspiracy. Abayomi, 820 F.2d at 905; Hedman, 630 F.2d at 1192. Therefore, [t]he government need not establish that there existed a formal agreement to conspire; circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom concerning the relationship of the parties, their overt acts, and the totality of their conduct may serve as proof. Redwine, 715 F.2d at 320. 14 The defendants argue that Ingold's organization was a typical wheel conspiracy, with Ingold as the hub of the wheel and his many suppliers, including Mealy and Rhodes, as the spokes. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 755, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1243, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); United States v. Whaley, 830 F.2d 1469, 1474-75 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1738, 100 L.Ed.2d 202 (1988); United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600, 606 (7th Cir.1985). In Kotteakos, the Supreme Court barred the government from trying thirty-six defendants as members of a single conspiracy when the only connection between the separate conspiracies was that one man participated in all the conspiracies. 328 U.S. at 773, 66 S.Ct. at 1252. The defendants obtained federal housing loans through a single broker on the basis of false and fraudulent information. The broker was the hub of the conspiracy, obtaining loans for separate groups. The different groups were independent of each other. The government conceded that the proof showed multiple conspiracies, rather than the one conspiracy charged in the indictment, so that the jury could not possibly have found a single conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court found that the variance between the proof at trial and the indictment was not harmless error because the evidence presented to the jury on the many separate conspiracies ran a great risk that the jury would unconsciously transfer guilt from one conspiracy to another. Id. at 774, 66 S.Ct. at 1252. 15 While this case presents a close factual call, we believe it is distinguishable from Kotteakos. The illegal transactions that occurred in this case were not as separate and distinct as the illegal loan transactions in Kotteakos. Here, rather than one man as a nexus between each transaction, we have Ingold's widespread network to distribute the marijuana that he purchased from numerous suppliers. Mealy worked with Rhodes, Spotts, Ingold, and Ingold's drivers to sell marijuana to Ingold, which Ingold then distributed to his customers. The fact that Mealy did not personally know Ingold's other suppliers or customers did not prevent Mealy from joining the overall conspiracy. While the conspiracy may have a small group of core conspirators, other parties who knowingly participate with these core conspirators and others to achieve a common goal may be members of an overall conspiracy. United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 742 (7th Cir.1969). Accord Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558, 68 S.Ct. 248, 257, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Sullivan, 846 F.2d 377, 383 (7th Cir.1988); Noble, 754 F.2d at 1328-29. 16 Likewise, we can distinguish United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (7th Cir.1969). In Varelli, the defendants conspired, on separate occasions, to hijack two trucks, one carrying Polaroid cameras and one carrying silver. The court distinguished a general agreement to hijack trucks and two separate agreements to hijack two specific trucks. The court explained that the conspirators did not contemplate a series of hijackings in which all would partake. Rather, [each] hijacking represented a single transaction with a single purpose. Id. at 744. 17 This case, however, was an ongoing business with various people involved in different ways. Mealy and Rhodes clearly contemplated other sales of marijuana to Ingold whenever a shipment came in. This is evidenced by their periodic conversations with Ingold, in which they discussed possible future shipments. Rhodes and Mealy were both involved in the 1983 and 1986 sales of marijuana to Ingold. Ingold testified that both Rhodes and Mealy came to New Orleans in 1985 to meet with him. During this meeting, Mealy and Ingold discussed prices relating to a possible future sale of marijuana. Ingold testified that their conversation gave him the impression that Mealy was Rhodes's source for marijuana. In addition, Rhodes periodically talked to Ingold to inquire about the possibility of future marijuana transactions. 4 Thus, we believe the evidence supports the jury's finding that the defendants participated in an overall conspiracy to distribute marijuana, rather than two separate sales of marijuana. See United States v. Urbanik, 801 F.2d 692, 696 (4th Cir.1986) (The principals may have performed their roles at different points in the distribution network, but the evidence suffice[d] to support the inference of a single large conspiracy the object of which was the wide-scale possession and distribution of marijuana and cocaine.). 18 Even if we accepted Mealy's argument that no substantive evidence linked Mealy to the conversations between Ingold and Rhodes, we believe that the other evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that Mealy was involved in the single conspiracy.  'As long as the conspiracy continued and its goal is to achieve a common objective, ... parties may still be found guilty even though they join or terminate their relationship with the core conspirators at different times.'  United States v. Davis, 838 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Noble, 754 F.2d at 1329). Accord Varelli, 407 F.2d at 742. The common objective here was the distribution of large quantities of marijuana. The testimony at trial linked Mealy to transactions in 1983 and 1986. In addition, the jury heard testimony that Mealy traveled to New Orleans in 1985 to discuss another possible marijuana sale. The fact that the evidence did not show any actions by Mealy to distribute marijuana in 1984 does not prevent a finding that he was part of the single ongoing conspiracy. As we found in Davis, [t]he fact that some individuals involved in the conspiracy may not have been continuously involved with the enterprise simply does not negate the existence of a single conspiracy. 838 F.2d at 914. Accord Whaley, 830 F.2d at 1474-75; Noble, 754 F.2d at 1328-29. See also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1213 (7th Cir.1985). 19 As for defendant Spotts, the evidence relating to his part in the single conspiracy to distribute marijuana is even stronger. Spotts lived in the Alachua stash house from 1983 until 1986. In addition, the testimony at trial indicated that in 1983, 1984, and 1986, Spotts helped Ingold's drivers load their trucks with marijuana that had been stored in the house. Finally, Spotts was arrested at the Alachua stash house, where officers seized drugs and drug paraphernalia. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Spotts had entered into an agreement to help distribute marijuana. See United States v. Alvarez, 833 F.2d 724, 728 (7th Cir.1987) ( 'Even without personal communication, tacit understanding of the usual business arrangements through a long course of conduct between the parties is enough to constitute an agreement.' ) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 801 F.2d 952, 954 (7th Cir.1986)); Noble, 754 F.2d at 1329 (conspirator need not participate in every facet of the conspiracy). Thus, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury's finding that Spotts was part of the single ongoing conspiracy. See Davis, 838 F.2d at 912-14 (stash house operator was part of a single ongoing conspiracy to distribute marijuana). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we believe that the evidence supports the jury's finding of a single ongoing conspiracy involving both defendants. 20 Finally, we note that the jury was instructed on the defendants' defense of multiple conspiracies. 5 If the jury is properly instructed, the finding of a single conspiracy must stand unless the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, would not allow a reasonable jury so to find. Urbanik, 801 F.2d at 695; accord Percival, 756 F.2d at 609; Varelli, 407 F.2d at 747. The jury in this case, although properly instructed on the possible existence of multiple conspiracies, nevertheless found that the defendants had knowledge of and were involved in a single conspiracy. This was a fact question uniquely within the province of the jury, and was supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore, we will not overturn the jury's verdict. 6