Opinion ID: 1431414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the 1930 employment agreement

Text: In their 1930 employment agreement, Lugosi granted Universal certain rights to use his likeness and appearance as Count Dracula. [37] The trial court interpreted the contract to entitle Universal to use Lugosi's likeness only in the motion picture Dracula and in related advertisements. Universal argues that the grant-of-rights provision in that contract entitled Universal to license Lugosi's portrayal of Count Dracula in connection with the sale of commercial merchandising products. Universal correctly contends that if the trial court's interpretation were based solely on an examination of the contract, the interpretation of the contract is a question of law and this court will independently review the validity of the trial court's construction. ( Argonaut Insurance Co. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1972) 6 Cal.3d 496, 502 [99 Cal. Rptr. 617, 492 P.2d 673].) However, if the trial court were presented with conflicting extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of the contract, a reasonable construction of the agreement by the trial court which is supported by substantial evidence will be upheld. [Citations.] ( In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738, 746-747 [131 Cal. Rptr. 873, 552 P.2d 1169]; Grove v. Grove Valve & Regulator Co. (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 299, 310 [84 Cal. Rptr. 300]. See generally, 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, §§ 235 and 245, pp. 4225-4226, 4236-4238.) The trial court was presented with conflicting expert testimony on the nature of the rights granted under the grant-of-rights provision and on whether an actor employed to perform in a motion picture usually retained or ceded the commercial merchandising rights in his likeness and appearance. Further, it is undisputed that in 1936 Universal requested and received Lugosi's permission to use in its production of Dracula's Daughter a wax likeness of Lugosi's portrayal of Count Dracula in Dracula. It is reasonable to infer that Universal would not have sought such consent if the 1930 contract granted Universal the broad right to use Lugosi's likeness which Universal now asserts. (See Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System (9th Cir.1954) 216 F.2d 945, 949. Cf. Bohman v. Berg (1960) 54 Cal.2d 787, 795 [8 Cal. Rptr. 441, 356 P.2d 185]; Tanner v. Title Insurance and Trust Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 814, 823 [129 P.2d 383].) Such evidence provides a substantial basis for sustaining the trial court's reasonable interpretation of the grant-of-rights provision in the 1930 contract. [38] Indeed, an independent examination of that contractual provision, with its repeated limitation on the use of Lugosi's likeness only in connection with said photoplay, reaffirms the trial court's conclusion. [39] Contrary to Universal's assertion, Labor Code section 2860 [40] does not compel a different result. ... [Section 2860] is to be construed as but an expression of the familiar principle that forbids an agent or trustee from using the trust property or powers conferred upon him for his own benefit.... ( Burns v. Clark (1901) 133 Cal. 634, 639 [66 P. 12]. Accord Southern Cal. Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin (1960) 183 Cal. App.2d 431, 444 [7 Cal. Rptr. 43]; Williams v. Weisser, supra, 273 Cal. App.2d at pp. 733-734.) That statute applies to a limited class of cases, primarily involving the exploitation of an employer's confidential information or trade secrets by a former employee to the employer's detriment. For example, the statute has been considered applicable in actions to enjoin a former employee from unauthorized use of confidential information concerning customers along a laundry route ( Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier (1913) 165 Cal. 95 [130 P. 1180]) and an ice route ( Santa Monica Ice etc. Co. v. Rossier (1941) 42 Cal. App.2d 467 [109 P.2d 382]), a confidential list of subscribers to a specialized newsletter ( California Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham (1948) 83 Cal. App.2d 197 [188 P.2d 303]), and trade secrets concerning the production of cactus phonographic needles ( Riess v. Sanford (1941) 47 Cal. App.2d 244 [117 P.2d 694]). No such conduct is present here. Lugosi is not alleged to have acquired something from Universal which he improperly exploited. Rather, the issue is to what extent can Universal exploit Lugosi's portrayal of Count Dracula. The contract delineates the scope of Universal's entitlement: it clearly limited Universal's use to exploitation in connection with said photoplay ( ante, fn. 37). The extrinsic evidence presented to the trial court supports that construction. Hence, the contract negates any suggestion that Universal may be entitled, under the doctrine embodied in section 2860, to unlimited use of Lugosi's likeness while portraying Count Dracula. (See Zahler v. Columbia Pictures Corp. (1960) 180 Cal. App.2d 582, 589 [4 Cal. Rptr. 612].)