Opinion ID: 186988
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Missing-Witness Argument to the Jury

Text: In his closing statement to the jury, Lawson's counsel argued: And when you retire, ladies and gentlemen, to think about what evidence the government has and hasn't presented, I submit to you that you will find yourself asking a whole bunch of questions that are completely unanswered by the government's evidence. The government hasn't presented to you the testimony of Aubrey Canarte. The government hasn't presented to you a single photograph, or a single video, or anything to suggest that this transaction occurred. And how do you know, ladies and gentlemen, that this supposed transaction didn't occur? 9/13/05 Tr. at 129. A moment later and over objection, the court, sua sponte, instructed the jury to disregard counsel's reference to the government's failure to call Canarte because it was, in the court's view, a partial missing-witness argument that was inappropriate and could not be made without prior permission from the court. On appeal, Lawson argues that this instruction was error because his counsel was not making a missing-witness argument. A jury may infer that a witness who potentially ha[s] so much to offer that one would expect [him] to take the stand but is not called would have given testimony harmful to a party that had special ability to produce him at trial. United States v. Pitts, 918 F.2d 197, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1990). And counsel may make that argument upon a showing that the opposing party had such power and failed to use it. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Surely it should not be put to the jury, as either instruction or argument, that an inference should be drawn from a party's failure to produce witnesses if the judge concludes that the party was powerless to do so.). Lawson's counsel could have properly asked the jury to infer that Canarte would have testified that Lawson sold him no drugs if she could have shown that the government had a special ability to produce Canarte to testify at trial. But Lawson does not dispute that a missing-witness argument would have been inappropriate. The government had no special ability to produce Canarte. Lawson could just as easily have called him. Lawson argues instead that his counsel was not making such an argument, and we agree. Lawson was charged with multiple counts of possession-with-intent-to-distribute illegal drugs. Defending against these counts, Lawson's counsel was simply calling into question the sufficiency of the government's evidence, a typical and expected argument for a case like this. It was entirely reasonable for counsel to point out to the jury the kinds of evidence that they might have expected to see but did not in a case to prove that illegal drugs were sold. Emphasizing the lack of one form of evidencein this instance, testimony by Canarteis not always or necessarily an argument that a witness not called would have provided testimony harmful to the prosecution's case. See, e.g., Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ([T]he significance of the absence of a witness is not confined to an inference that if produced his testimony would be unfavorable to the party who has the power to produce him.). Lawson's counsel did not even ask the jury to infer, either directly or in a meaningful indirect manner, that Canarte would have testified against the government's case. See United States v. Henson, 486 F.2d 1292, 1298 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that a party did not make a missing-witness argument because [t]he remarks did not directly, or in a meaningful indirect manner, ask the jury to draw an impermissible inference from [a witness's] absence). Counsel was making a permissible argument based on absence of evidence that the government had failed to prove that Lawson sold illegal drugs. The district court should not have instructed the jury to disregard this argument. But not every error during a trial requires reversal of a conviction. In fact, [a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). An error affecting substantial rights must have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the . . . verdict. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 766, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). The district court's error did not have such an effect or influence. The jury failed to convict Lawson of selling drugs. Each of his drug convictions was for possession alone. The argument his counsel was forbidden to make went only to the distribution charges. Had counsel been allowed to make her full argument about Canarte's failure to testify, the jury could have at most inferred that Lawson had not sold him drugs, which would have left virtually untouched the government's substantial case against Lawson for unlawful possession of illegal drugs. It is highly unlikely that the jury would have struggled over Lawson's possession charges because of the government's failure to call Canarte to the stand.