Opinion ID: 2978475
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Appeal of Sentence

Text: Initially, we address whether the sentencing issue Stanley raises on appeal was waived as part of his plea agreement. It is well settled that a defendant in a criminal case may waive any right, even a constitutional right, by means of a plea agreement. United States v. McGilvery, 403 F.3d 361, 362 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Criminal defendants may waive their right to appeal as part of a plea agreement so long as the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Swanberg, 370 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir. 2004). Courts interpret plea agreements according to traditional principles of contract law. United States v. Lukse, 286 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2002). During the plea hearing, the district court confirmed that Stanley understood the charges against him, the maximum penalties that he could receive, and that he would be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months if the court agreed with the Government's sentencing position. The district court reviewed with Stanley the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, including the appellate waiver contained in the plea agreement. Thereafter, the district court concluded on the record that Stanley had read and signed the plea agreement, that the plea agreement contained all of the agreement's terms, and that Stanley had voluntarily entered into the agreement. Consistent with the record developed by the district court and the express language of the waiver section of the plea agreement, Stanley voluntarily and knowingly agreed to waive his right to appeal except any sentence to the extent it exceeds the -2- No. 09-3183 United States v. Stanley maximum of the sentencing range determined under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the sentencing stipulations and computations in the plea agreement. See Swanberg, 370 F.3d at 626. The Government filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 to establish that Stanley had a prior felony drug conviction. By operation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), this prior conviction increased Stanley's mandatory minimum sentence from 10 to 20 years. During the sentencing hearing, the district court recognized that recent Sentencing Guideline Amendments relative to crack cocaine reduced the starting-point base offense level for Stanley from 32 to 30, but reasoned that the § 841(b)(1)(A) statutory enhancement of the minimum sentence from 10 to 20 years essentially nullified this base offense level reduction because the statutory minimum sentence was greater than the maximum sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines range that would otherwise apply. Stanley was sentenced to the statutory minimum 240 months on both drugs counts, and 120 months on the weapons conviction, with all sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, Stanley claims the district court exceeded the Guidelines range in light of the recent Sentencing Guideline Amendments relative to crack cocaine. Contrary to Stanley’s argument, his statutory minimum 240-month sentence is a guidelines sentence by operation of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), which provides that, [w]here a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence. Defendant’s reliance on United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d. Cir. 2006), is misplaced in that Gunter was sentenced above the statutory minimum; here, the defendant was not. -3- No. 09-3183 United States v. Stanley Because Stanley received a sentence within the guidelines, he waived the right to challenge in the Rule 11 plea agreement he entered.