Opinion ID: 2052636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellate Fact-Finding.

Text: Judge Ruiz asserts that the majority has engaged in  de novo fact-finding to justify its reasoning where the government has failed to prove its case. Dissenting op. at 630. She complains that we have observ[ed] without support in the record that the officers had no idea where Womack's handgun might be, or whether there were other individuals on the scene who might endeavor to thwart his apprehension. We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague's characterization. The motions judge having denied Womack's motion to suppress, we must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the government. See Pannell, supra, 383 A.2d at 1080. Moreover, [w]hen we take our seats on the bench we are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see as men [or women]. Poulnot v. District of Columbia, 608 A.2d 134, 141 (D.C.1992) (quoting Edwards v. Habib, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 140, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016, 89 S.Ct. 618, 21 L.Ed.2d 560 (1969)) (second alteration in original). Black robes are not supposed to eviscerate our common sense. The record discloses that the officers came to the home owned by Womack's grandmother only a few hours after the commission of a brutal armed rape and kidnapping. The officers had reason to suspect that Womack was the man responsible. There is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest, if Womack was indeed the guilty party, how the officers could have had any information regarding the location of Womack's handgun, or whether he might have received assistance from others if the officers attempted to take him into custody. How could they possibly have known? The truth of the statement in our opinion for which Judge Ruiz finds no support in the record is, in our view, obvious. Our recognition of the obvious does not constitute appellate fact-finding. [26]