Opinion ID: 487133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Attempt Counts

Text: 11 Both appellants contend that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain their attempt convictions, and therefore the judge should not have submitted Count Two of the indictment to the jury. In United States v. Martinez, 775 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.1985), we reiterated this circuit's definition of attempt liability: 12 A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he or she (1) had the intent to commit the crime, and (2) engaged in conduct amounting to a substantial step towards the commission of the crime.... [A] substantial step must be something more than mere preparation, yet may be less than the last act necessary before the actual commission of the substantive crime.... 13 Id. at 35 (citations omitted). Appellants concede that the evidence was sufficient to enable a jury to find the element of intent; they assert, however, that the evidence was insufficient with respect to the substantial step. 14 Although the verbal formula for what constitutes a substantial step is clear, courts have not always found it easy to decide whether a defendant's conduct has crossed over the line from preparation to attempt. See, e.g., United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 66 (2d Cir.1983) ([T]his is a classic example of a legal doctrine where although the principle is clear, its application is fraught with difficulty.); United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 988 (2d Cir.1980) (Whether conduct represents a substantial step towards the fulfillment of a criminal design is a determination so dependent on the particular factual context of each case that, of necessity, there can be no litmus test to guide the reviewing courts.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112, 101 S.Ct. 922, 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981). 15 In Manley, id. at 989, this court affirmed a conviction for attempt to possess cocaine where the defendant was arrested with a large amount of cash in his possession at the home of an alleged narcotics dealer. Furthermore, Manley had been seen running from a room where cocaine was being measured and weighed, and the cash in his possession was approximately equal to the wholesale price of a quantity of cocaine which was found sitting on a scale. Id. 16 In a case from the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114, 95 S.Ct. 792, 42 L.Ed.2d 812 (1975), the court affirmed defendant's conviction for attempt to distribute heroin, where defendant had accepted $650 in cash from an undercover agent to purchase an ounce of heroin for the agent, but had been unable to find a supplier. 17 After reviewing the facts of these and other cases where courts have grappled with the issue of what constitutes a substantial step, e.g., Martinez, 775 F.2d 31; Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, we agree with appellants that the evidence in their case was insufficient to sustain their convictions for attempt to possess heroin. 18 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Esdaille, 769 F.2d 104, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 258, 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985), the proof at best established that appellants sought out DiChiara, a supplier of narcotics; attempted to contact DiChiara by sending him flowers; met with DiChiara on May 11 and May 17, 1983; and agreed on the price for five kilograms of heroin, the terms of payment, and the date and time of the proposed transaction. 19 The government failed to establish, however, that appellants performed any overt act to carry out the agreed upon purchase. See Manley, 632 F.2d at 988 (It is essential that the defendant, with the intent of committing the particular crime, do some overt act adapted to, approximating, and which in the ordinary and likely course of things will result in, the commission of the particular crime. quoting United States v. Monholland, 607 F.2d 1311, 1318 (10th Cir.1979)). 20 Count Two of the indictment charged appellants with attempt to possess heroin on May 17, because they had failed to appear at the scheduled May 18 meeting. The only evidence of appellants' actions on May 18 consisted of their returning Agent Franciosa's telephone call. There was no evidence that appellants had set out for the meeting site but turned back; nor was there any evidence that they had either acquired or attempted to acquire the almost one million dollars necessary to complete the purchase. 21 On May 17, appellants' plan to possess heroin had only advanced to the stage of meeting with their purported suppliers to work out the terms of the deal. We hold that evidence of a verbal agreement alone, without more, is insufficient as a matter of law to support an attempt conviction. Therefore, Count Two of the indictment should not have been submitted to the jury. Accordingly, we reverse appellants' attempt convictions and direct that Count Two be dismissed.