Opinion ID: 2636866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Question and Trial Court Response

Text: In submitting this case to the jury, the trial court employed the standard instruction for fourth degree arson. See CJI-Crim. 13:06. This instruction mirrors the statutory language. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the jury understood and heeded the trial court's instructions. See Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Colo.1986). In response to the jury's inquiry during deliberations regarding whether the knowingly or recklessly part of the instruction applied to the endangerment provision, the trial court, over Copeland's objection, correctly said that it did not. Despite some confusion early in the proceedings, [5] the fourth degree arson statute did not require the prosecution to prove Copeland's awareness of special or unique circumstances that made this car fire particularly dangerous. A person who knowingly or recklessly starts or maintains a car fire is subject to conviction as a felon if that conduct places another in danger of death or serious bodily injury. § 18-4-105(1), (2). The jury had before it proof that firefighters responded to the fire Copeland started and were endangered. This was sufficient to support the endangerment element of the offense. Given the facts of the case, it is logical that the jury sought to have the trial court clarify whether Copeland had to know that a Porsche fire is particularly dangerous, because of the vehicle's magnesium engine block and its reaction to fire and water. The trial court soundly determined not to comment on the facts before the jury but, rather, to clarify the applicability of the mens rea requirement to the different elements of the offense. Regarding whether a trial court should provide a jury with additional instructions that properly state the law, Colorado follows the test articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice. See People v. Shields, 822 P.2d 15, 21 (Colo.1991); Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d at 1255; ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 15-5.3(a) (2nd ed.1980). The Commentary to Standard 15-5.3 states that a court should give additional instructions whenever such action is needed to answer a proper question from the jury. See ABA Standard 15-5.3 (Commentary). Thus, when needed to answer a proper jury question, an additional instruction should be provided unless: (1) the jurors can be adequately informed by directing their attention to some portion of the original instructions; (2) the request concerns matters not in evidence or does not pertain to the law of the case; or (3) the request would call upon the judge to express an opinion upon factual matters that the jury should determine. In Leonardo, for example, we held that the question posed by the jury demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the instructions, thus warranting clarification and re-instruction. Leonardo, 728 P.2d at 1255. See also Shields, 822 P.2d at 21; Sanchez v. People, 820 P.2d 1103, 1106-07 (Colo. 1991); People v. Alexis, 806 P.2d 929, 931-32 (Colo.1991). The trial court here determined that the jury's inquiry was not capable of being answered by a referral back to the instructions, nor was it off-topic or inappropriate. The jury was concerned with a legal question, the answer to which was not readily apparent in the original instructions. Under the applicable standard, the trial court responded appropriately to the jury's question.