Opinion ID: 1913160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the trial court err in denying heftel's motion for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence?

Text: Our standard of review of a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is whether State set forth sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty of the crime charged. State v. Buller, 484 N.W.2d 883 (S.D.1992) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 248, 121 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992); State v. Gallipo, 460 N.W.2d 739 (S.D.1990). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the question is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; in making this determination, the court will accept the evidence, and the most favorable inference fairly drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict. State v. Svihl, 490 N.W.2d 269, 274 (S.D. 1992); State v. Banks, 387 N.W.2d 19, 27 (S.D.1986). It is the function of the jury, not this court, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, determine witness credibility, and weigh the evidence. We afford the strongest presumption in favor of the jury's determination of credibility. State v. Arguello, 502 N.W.2d 548, 552 (S.D. 1993); State v. Martin, 493 N.W.2d 223 (S.D. 1992); State v. Huber, 356 N.W.2d 468 (S.D. 1984). All elements of a crime, including intent, may be proven through circumstantial evidence. State v. Davi, 504 N.W.2d 844, 856-57 (S.D.1993). The state of mind of the actor at the time he commits the offense, may be determined from his acts, conduct and inferences fairly deducible from the circumstances. Huber, 356 N.W.2d at 473. Heftel claims State did not present sufficient evidence to support the verdict in general or to sustain a finding that he had the specific intent necessary to commit grand theft by deception. [2] This court has previously resolved that theft by deception is a specific intent crime. State v. Klein, 444 N.W.2d 16, 19 (S.D.1989). We have explained that `intent to defraud' means to act willfully and with the specific intent to deceive or cheat, ordinarily for the purpose of either causing some financial loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to one's self. State v. DeWall, 343 N.W.2d 790, 792 (S.D.1984) (quoting South Dakota pattern jury instruction (criminal) 1-1-4). This court over the past several years has repeatedly analyzed the specific intent/general intent dichotomy. The use of the terms `intentionally' or `knowingly' merely designate[s] that the culpability required is something more than negligence or recklessness. State v. Shilvock-Havird, 472 N.W.2d 773, 777 (S.D.1991) (citing State v. Balint, 426 N.W.2d 316 (S.D.1988); Huber, 356 N.W.2d at 472; State v. Barrientos, III, 444 N.W.2d 374 (S.D.1989); State v. Bailey, 464 N.W.2d 626 (S.D.1991)). On September 14, 1992, Heftel advised Green that he was expecting a wire transfer of approximately $1,300. At the drive-up window, he filled out a withdrawal slip for $1,350 and received $1,550 by mistake. Green, who was in the vehicle with Heftel, testified: He withdrew the money, and he counted it out at the window. And counted it out two, three times. And he said he'd been paid [$]200 extra dollars. And I counted it out, and he was $200 extra. The teller who had made the error testified that Heftel counted the money for a long period of time. Green then testified concerning his conversations with Heftel on the 16th of September: A He told me he was going to close out his and Leigh Ann's account. There was only $10 or so in there. He called me that afternoon and told me that the wire that he had picked up Monday had been transferred to his account, and he withdrew another $700 to put tires on his pickup and miscellaneous things. Q Do you know what wire he was talking about? A It was the wire from his mother. Q Is that the one you already testified about? A Yes. Q From Monday? A Yes. Q How much did he say he took out? A $700.       Q And then he told youHow much did he tell you was in it when he actually went to check? A They had put the whole [$]1,350, the wire, into his account. Q Again? A Again. A second time. Heftel testified that he did not notice the extra $200 given to him by mistake on the 14th. He swore the additional money in the account on the 16th had come from a second wire transfer to his account from Andrew Goldstein, an Arizona man he claimed owed him money. Lawrence County Sheriff's Department investigator James Charles testified that the telephone number Heftel had given him for Goldstein was a no-good number and his investigation through the Arizona police had failed to find anyone by that name. Investigation revealed there had not been a second wire transfer into Heftel's Norwest account. Heftel claims that Green testified falsely. Evidence showed that after Heftel was arrested, Green wrecked Heftel's truck, sold some of his property and kept the money, and gave other property belonging to Heftel to Leigh Ann Ricker. Green also admitted that he was on probation for receiving stolen property. Although the evidence was conflicting, the jury obviously believed Green's testimony that Heftel knew about the mistake before he took the money. Accord, State v. Weber, 487 N.W.2d 25, 28 (S.D.1992) ([i]n order to determine what Weber specifically intended, the jury had to weigh the credibility of Weber and Fey). It is not a proper function of this court to resolve evidentiary conflictsthe jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence in South Dakota. State v. Battest, 295 N.W.2d 739, 742 (S.D.1980); Huber, 356 N.W.2d at 476. Heftel has failed to overcome the presumption in favor of the jury's determination of credibility. Arguello, 502 N.W.2d at 552; Svihl, 490 N.W.2d at 274. State provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find Heftel specifically intended to defraud Norwest Bank.