Opinion ID: 1160538
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the presumptive term imposed by the trial court excessive?

Text: In large part, the majority bases its conclusion that DePiano's sentence is excessive on the notion that this case is not a typical case of child abuse because it did not involve the evil, wicked, depraved or otherwise bad state of mind one associates with child predators. See maj. op. at 31-32, 926 P.2d at 498-499. The majority's error begins with its characterization of the nature of the crime. The majority opinion states: Although her children were with her, the crime here is essentially a botched suicide. Maj. op. at 31, 926 P.2d at 498. While it is clear that DePiano intended suicide, it is equally clear that she intended a double murder of her own children. She is not being sentenced for a botched suicide. She is being sentenced for her botched acts of child abuse by which she intended to kill her children, a result averted only through a neighbor's watchfulness and prompt police intervention. The majority also finds a legislative intent that we fail to discern in the statutory language or otherwise. A.R.S. § 13-3623(B) imposes substantial penalties on those who having the care or custody of a child, intentionally or knowingly place the child in a situation where its person or health is endangered. The majority acknowledges that DePiano violated the statute but asserts that the statute was intended to apply to cases involving child predators, which, we can only infer from the majority opinion, would involve the beating, torture, or molestation of children. See maj. op. at 31, 926 P.2d at 498. A predator limitation, which appears nowhere in the statutory language, should not be grafted onto the statute by this court. The statute punishes caretakers who intentionally or knowingly place children in danger, and that is exactly what DePiano did. The majority seems to suggest that sentencing under § 13-3623(B) should be based on some sliding scale of violence; if a person places a child in mortal danger without violence, she should receive a lesser punishment than one who otherwise places the child in the same mortal danger. We believe this conclusion, unsupported in the majority opinion by logic or precedent, is incorrect. A mother who cold-heartedly and with premeditation attempts to kill her children by asphyxiation, whether by suffocating them with a pillow, by poisoning them with car exhaust, or by putting them in a bag and dumping them in a public receptacle, is not, under the statute, less culpable than a mother who flies into a rage and beats her children. If there is a public policy favoring one or the other for sentencing purposes, it should be expressed by the legislature.
The majority, in deciding that this is not a typical case of child abuse, also concludes that what sets this case apart from typical cases is DePiano's state of mind. See maj. op. at 31-32, 926 P.2d at 498-499. Though the majority acknowledges that this court cannot engage in appellate sentencing, it nevertheless does so. The majority emphasizes that while [n]either [DePiano's] depression nor her despair excuse her guilt ... we believe it is so mitigating here that it sets this case apart from the norm. Maj. op. at 32, 926 P.2d at 499. The majority makes this factual finding without having seen or heard DePiano's testimony or that of the other witnesses. It thereby overturns the sentencing decision made by the trial judge, who was in a far better position to make such a finding but did not. Because the majority reduced DePiano's sentence based on its finding of depression and despair, we deal with that finding. This should not obscure the fact that it was inappropriate for the majority to make the finding in the first place. The majority's finding of depression [and] despair is erroneous for two reasons. First, depression and despair could be found by trial or appellate courts in most, if not all, child abuse cases, particularly those involving abuse of one's own child. The very fact that a parent abuses his or her own child will nearly always raise a question of the emotional well-being of that parent. Surely, the legislature did not enact a legislative scheme with the intent that a mitigated sentence be the norm. As we explain shortly, we believe the majority's conclusion that depression [and] despair motivated DePiano's act is suspect based on this record. However, even if DePiano were depressed, the majority makes no effort to explain how this sets her apart from other child abusers, or why depressed or despairing child abusers should receive mitigated sentences. Even assuming depressed child abusers should receive mitigated sentences, we disagree with the majority's finding that DePiano was depressed, particularly when made, as it was here, as an initial matter on appeal. The majority uses DePiano's suicide note, in which she directed a diatribe of blame and bitterness at those she felt were responsible for her misery, to show that this sad incident was essentially a botched suicide motivated by extreme depression [and] despair. See maj. op. at 31, 926 P.2d at 498. We disagree with this characterization. The letter reads, in part: Your parents tell you your [sic] out of the house when your 18  Your spouse leaves and believes he doesn't need to pay child support.... To my Mom  You've instilled in me that raising children is a nightmare and all they do is grow up to resent you  That's all the appreciation I get, huh,  a resentment  You don't even call me! Boy that pisses me off  Jeff  I lived your life, your problems, your confusion  I loved you  what a waste  Jim  What a loser you are for not helping me with the boys... you bastard.... They deserve more than what I can offer as a single income family. The note, in our view, is at least as aggravating as it is mitigating. It shows that DePiano not only blames all those around her for her problems but that she was willing to kill her own children because of her financial woes and resentments. Admittedly, the emergency room physician who saw DePiano described her as depressed. See state's exhibit 26. The bare assertion that DePiano was acting depressed in the early morning hours following her suicide/infanticide attempt is hardly proof of her motivation before the attempt. It is not surprising or atypical that someone arrested for trying to murder her own children would act depressed. If we are to engage in factfinding on appeal (an approach we wholeheartedly discourage), we need to look at all the evidence. When we do, it certainly does not show a depressed mood either subjectively or objectively. DePiano's own testimony is that she felt fine during the period leading up to October 16, 1991. Her close friends did not report any moodiness but instead testified that she seemed upbeat, normal, and fine. Nor did DePiano withdraw from activity; she went out with her friends and co-workers the same night she attempted the killings. There is no evidence in the record of weight loss or gain, insomnia, psychomotor agitation, fatigue, or diminished ability to think which might support a finding of depression. Finally, DePiano's note makes very clear that it was not she whom she considered worthless but everyone else; her mother, her ex-boyfriend, her ex-husband, and the coldness and hate that goes on. DePiano's absurd defense only underlines her complete lack of remorse or understanding of the impact of her crime. This court should not engage in psychoanalytical guesswork to probe the minds of those who commit criminal acts in order to adjust, sua sponte, the sentences of someone whom this court now deems to show signs of depression [and] despair. Nor should we follow a no harm, no foul approach to criminal law. Although the children suffered no immediate physical harm in this case, they would have been dead had DePiano's plan been executed successfully. Criminal statutes contain many examples of crimes designed to deter conduct which may not result in physical injury but which, by their nature, expose citizens to unwarranted risk. Aggravated assault and armed robbery, just to name two examples, are crimes involving significant penalties even though a person convicted of those crimes might truthfully argue that no one suffered physical injury in the course of the offense. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1203 to -1204, § 13-1902. This court undercuts the policy of many criminal statutes by implying that sentences for crimes that do not result in immediate physical harm should be mitigated. Such an approach overlooks not only the express statutory language but the potentially devastating emotional impact such crimes may inflict on their traumatized victims. On this record, we know nothing of the non-physical damage to the children. We do know that it is only through the children's good luck, the alertness of a neighbor, and the vigilance of the police that the children are alive today, whether emotionally scarred or not. Their survival owes nothing to their mother, the defendant.