Opinion ID: 2670502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statement to Officer Rodríguez

Text: Oquendo seeks suppression of his statement to Officer Rodríguez that he did not hold a license to possess firearms. This statement was made while at the Toa Baja residence, after Oquendo was restrained on the floor. Oquendo asserts that it was elicited while he was formally in custody, see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438-39 (1984) (establishing the test to determine whether detention prior to arrest is custodial), but prior to the receipt of any Miranda warnings. We do not reach the merits of this claim, as it is not properly before us. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e) (deeming waived any motion to suppress not made before the district court's motion deadline); United States v. Santos Batista, 239 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (Failure to raise suppression arguments before trial shall constitute waiver thereof. (citation and internal quotation -7- marks omitted)).5 Oquendo's motion to suppress never made reference to his statement regarding licensure, instead only seeking the suppression of two other sets of statements, which were made after formal arrest and during interrogation. United States v. Torres, 162 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1998) ([Rule 12(e)'s] waiver provision applies not only when a defendant has failed altogether to make a suppression motion but also when, having made one, he has neglected to include the particular ground that he later seeks to argue.). Our court has previously suggested that unpreserved suppression arguments may be merely forfeited rather than waived, engendering plain-error review. United States v. Nuñez, 19 F.3d 719, 723 n.10 (1st Cir. 1994); see also United States v. PérezGonzález, 445 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 2006). Recent precedent, however, shows a strong inclination against plain-error review. United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 720 (1st Cir. 2014) (reasoning that recent precedent strongly favors a finding of waiver); United States v. Crooker, 688 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2012) (refusing to review an untimely suppression argument for plain error). We have emphasized that, by its express terms, Rule 12(e) 5 In 2002, amendments to Rule 12 incorporated the content of what was then Rule 12(f) into the current Rule 12(e). The Advisory Committee made clear that this alteration effected no change in the current law regarding waivers of motions or defenses. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 advisory committee notes on the 2002 amendments. Preamendment case law, therefore, continues to guide our reasoning. -8- calls for waiver, and we have noted that ignoring this mandate would be manifestly unfair to the prosecution. United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 228 (1st Cir. 2011). We see no grounds on which to treat Oquendo's claim differently. Neither can Oquendo find refuge in Rule 12(e)'s good cause exception, which allows the court to grant relief from waiver for a showing of good cause. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e). Like the appellant in Lyons, Oquendo has not addressed the waiver issue at all, let alone explained why he has good cause to seek relief from it. Lyons, 740 F.3d at 720. It is not the job of this court to build good cause from naught, and Oquendo has failed even to hint at why his claim should be excused from Rule 12(e)'s express strictures. Consequently, we find that Oquendo has waived his argument for suppression of this statement.