Opinion ID: 1197790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the commission's findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record

Text: Parson challenges a number of the Commission's findings of fact. In reviewing an appeal from the Industrial Commission, this Court will uphold the findings of the Commission if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. I.C. § 72-732; Lethrud v. State, 126 Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995). Evidence is substantial and competent if a reasonable mind might accept such evidence as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion. Reiher v. American Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 60, 878 P.2d 757, 759 (1994). In reviewing a decision from the Commission, all facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the Commission. Dumaw v. J.L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 155, 795 P.2d 312, 317 (1990). The Commission's conclusions of law are freely reviewed by the Court. Idaho Const. art. V, § 9; Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). Parson challenges the Commission's finding of a 3% impairment rating for Smith's blood condition on the grounds that the Commission failed to make a specific finding that the impairment rating for Smith's blood condition was made as of the date of Smith's back injury. Parson relies upon Colpaert v. Larson's Inc., 115 Idaho 825, 771 P.2d 46 (1989), to assert that the Commission was required to assign an impairment rating for a progressive disease or injury (the polycythemia vera) as of the date of the last injury, and that it erred in failing to do so. Colpaert does not support Parson's argument. In Colpaert, the claimant was injured in an industrial accident on December 10, 1982 and suffered from a pre-existing condition that was progressive in nature. Id. at 826-27, 771 P.2d at 47-48. The Commission found the claimant to be totally and permanently disabled. Id. at 827, 771 P.2d at 48. On appeal, the employer and the I.S.I.F. challenged the Commission's finding of total and permanent disability on the ground that the Commission did not consider the date of claimant's medical stability. Id. at 828, 771 P.2d at 49. The Court upheld the Commission's reliance on an impairment rating of January 2, 1985, rather than the earlier ratings of May 19 and June 13, 1983, since claimant's shoulder had not become medically stable as of the first impairment ratings. Id. By this holding, the Court reaffirmed the requirement that an injury is to be rated upon the date of medical stability. The Court then went on to hold that with respect to progressive diseases or conditions, a permanent physical impairment rating can still be assessed, if the rating is made at a specific point in time. Id. at 829, 771 P.2d at 50. In the present case, the Commission's lack of a specific finding as to the date it assigned an impairment rating on Smith's blood condition is not fatal to its determination. As the fact finder and the evaluator of impairment, the Commission made its own determination of the impairment rating of Smith's blood disease. Urry v. Walker & Fox Masonry Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 755, 769 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1989). The Commission's impairment rating of Smith's blood condition was based upon the testimony of Smith and the reports of Smith's physicians. We conclude that the Commission's rating is supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Parson next argues that the Commission made inconsistent findings on the issue of whether Smith's index finger injury was a pre-existing injury that constituted a hindrance or obstacle to Smith's ability to obtain employment. More specifically, Parson asserts that the Commission's determination that Smith's finger injury constituted a hindrance to Smith's obtaining employment required a conclusion that the finger injury constituted a pre-existing injury for which the I.S.I.F. bears liability. We disagree. In a total and permanent, odd-lot disability case, involving the I.S.I.F., several portions of the analysis include a determination of whether an impairment or disability hinders the claimant's employability. The first finding challenged by Parsonthat Smith's dexterity, strength, and endurance was diminished by the finger injurywas part of the Commission's analysis to determine whether Smith was totally and permanently disabled. The Commission assessed Smith's ability to engage in gainful activity pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 72-425 and 72-430, and considered whether Smith's impairments reduced the likelihood that Smith could find suitable employment. The Commission then determined that Smith was totally and permanently disabled and that he fell within the odd-lot doctrine, based on Smith's abilities, including the extent to which Smith's finger injury impaired his employability. The Commission's later finding that Smith's injury was not a pre-existing injury is not inconsistent with the above findings. This latter finding was made for the purpose of determining the liability of the I.S.I.F. for pre-existing impairments under the worker's compensation apportionment scheme at I.C. § 72-332. The Commission found that the finger injury existed prior to the 1990 back injury, but it determined that the injury was not pre-existing for purposes of I.S.I.F. liability, since the claim was a separate, viable, and open claim at the time of the 1990 back injury. The Commission's conclusion is supported by the fact that Smith's disability and Parson's liability due to the finger injury had never been determined prior to Smith's 1990 back injury. Smith's subsequent back injury, which occurred prior to the final determination of Smith's disability due to the 1988 finger injury, does not dismiss Parson from liability for Smith's total and permanent disability caused by the 1988 industrial accident. Parson makes an additional request that this Court make an advisory ruling on the issue of whether the schedule of benefits at Idaho Code § 72-428 controls over impairment ratings assessed by treating physicians for the same injury. Parson admits that this issue was neither argued nor contested below. The Court does not address issues that are raised for the first time on appeal. Schiewe v. Farwell, 125 Idaho 46, 49, 867 P.2d 920, 923 (1993).