Opinion ID: 202871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State of Mind Exception

Text: Rule 803(3) authorizes the introduction into evidence of statements that concern the declarant's then existing state of mind . . . such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling . . . but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed. Fed. R.Evid. 803(3). At trial, Rivera-Hernández sought to introduce the statement justifying his request for false invoices as an alternative explanation for his agreement with Cobián to exchange $100,000 for Rivera-Hernández's services. However, the district court excluded the evidence as hearsay, finding that the statement did not qualify under the state-of-mind exception because the circumstances under which it was made were highly suspicious. Because disputes over whether particular statements come within a state-of-mind exception are fact sensitive, see United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 106 (1st Cir.2004), the trial court is in the best position to resolve them, Colasanto v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 100 F.3d 203, 212 (1st Cir.1996). We will therefore find error in the district court's exclusion of evidence only if the district court has abused its discretion. See United States v. Ventura-Meléndez, 275 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.2001). To be admissible under the state-of-mind exception, a declaration . . . must mirror a state of mind, which, in light of all the circumstances, including proximity in time, is reasonably likely to have been the same condition existing at the material time. Colasanto, 100 F.3d at 212 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.2004) (The premise for admitting hearsay statements evidencing state-of-mind is that such statements are reliable because of their spontaneity and [the] resulting probable sincerity. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted (alteration in original))). Indeed, the advisory committee notes to Rule 803(3) require a substantial contemporaneity of event and statement  when admitting an out-of-court statement under the state-of-mind exception. Fed.R.Evid. 803(1) advisory committee's note (emphasis added); Fed.R.Evid. 803(3) advisory committee's note ([Rule 803(3)] is essentially a specialized application of [Rule 803(1)], presented separately to enhance its usefulness and accessibility.). This contemporaneity requirement is imposed to diminish the likelihood of fabrication or deliberate misrepresentation. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(1) advisory committee's note. Given this contemporaneity requirement, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the state-of-mind exception did not apply to Rivera-Hernández's justification for his need of fraudulent invoices. In order to satisfy Rule 803(3), Rivera-Hernández's statement must have been made contemporaneously with his demand to Cobián for the $100,000, thereby mirroring Rivera-Hernández's state of mind at that time. [4] But evidence in the record confirms that Rivera-Hernández's statement to his father occurred well after his demand to Cobián for the money. As such, the district court could have reasonably concluded that the statement was untrustworthy, and therefore unreliable, because Rivera-Hernández had enough time to fabricate and misrepresent his statement. See United States v. Naiden, 424 F.3d 718, 721-23 (8th Cir.2005) (excluding defendant's statement to a friend that he did not believe his online victim was really fourteen because the statement was made a day after the defendant met the victim and it was therefore not made as an immediate reaction to his communication with her, but after he had had ample opportunity to reflect on the situation); United States v. Macey, 8 F.3d 462, 467-68 (7th Cir.1993) (excluding a statement justifying defendant's request for fraudulent invoices in part because [t]he district court could have reasonably concluded that [the defendant] had time to fabricate a story in the four hours between his fraud and his statement to [the employee]). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the state-of-mind exception inapplicable to Rivera-Hernández's statement to his father.