Opinion ID: 691011
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The INS's Amendments Regarding Waiver Applications

Text: 51 The other policy development challenged by plaintiffs was the INS's decision to amend the regulatory special rule so that aliens who showed evidence of self-support under the rule did not have to file a separate waiver application. While this decision may have constituted a substantive change in INS policy, the INS communicated the new rule to the four regional offices in September of 1987 and issued a technical amendment revising the regulatory special rule in November of 1987. Plaintiffs claim that because this revision came six months into the application period and was not widely communicated to the alien population directly, the INS violated its duties to disseminate pertinent information broadly and to sponsor a full twelve-month application period. 52 However, we believe that plaintiffs again attempt to hold the INS to too strict a standard. The IRCA does not define how broadly the INS must disseminate information relevant to the application process. It is undisputed that the INS's initial regulations were widely communicated within the agency and to the public through radio and television broadcasts, literature, and outreach programs. The INS subsequently communicated its change as to the operation of the regulatory special rule within the agency through a memorandum sent to the four regional offices and to the public through publication in the Federal Register. We cannot say that further outreach regarding this amendment was required by either IRCA or due process. Nowhere in IRCA is there a mandate that the INS must undertake a media campaign regarding revisions to the application process. Under the circumstances, we find that the INS more than fulfilled the broad dissemination requirement by publishing these changes in the Federal Register. First, the INS had already made great efforts to inform the alien population of the amnesty program. Second, under the statutory framework, QDEs were made widely available to reach a population that would otherwise be fearful of the INS. Thus, publications in the Federal Register indicating revisions in the application process were disseminated to the alien population via the QDEs. We note, without deciding, that had no QDEs existed, given the special nature of the potential beneficiaries, publication in the Federal Register might not have been sufficient to satisfy the broad dissemination requirement. However, under the circumstances here, we hold that the INS fulfilled its statutory duties. 53 Given that the due process notice standard is even lower than the IRCA broad dissemination requirement, the INS also complied with its constitutional obligations. Due process cases have long recognized that publication in the Federal Register constitutes an adequate means of informing the public of agency action. See, e.g., Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942-43, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 2343, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986). Thus, we hold that the INS fulfilled its statutory and constitutional duties with regard to providing notice to the aliens of the clarifications and revisions of the application criteria. 54 We also reject plaintiffs' argument that the INS's revision of the special regulatory rule violated its duty to sponsor a twelve-month application period. The twelve-month period required by IRCA referred to the time frame for accepting applications. The INS satisfied this statutory obligation by accepting applications from May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. There is no provision in IRCA requiring the INS to restart the application period any time it issues amendments to the rules for processing applications or clarifications of its standards for adjudicating applications. We thus affirm the district court's decision that the INS did not breach its duties under IRCA or the Constitution to disseminate information to undocumented aliens and to sponsor a full twelve month application period. 55 We must nonetheless remand this case, as we initially decided to do, to determine whether plaintiffs' claim challenging the validity of the public charge regulations is ripe as to any of the plaintiffs in light of CSS. On remand, the district court must determine whether any of the plaintiffs were front-desked or can otherwise demonstrate that the front-desking policy was ... a substantial cause of their failure ... to apply. CSS, --- U.S. at ---- n. 28, 113 S.Ct. at 2500 n. 28. We reject the INS's argument that a remand is unnecessary because it did not employ any front-desking policy or otherwise impede class members from filing applications. Ruling on such an issue would improperly require us to delve into factual issues that should be decided in the first instance by the district court. 56 We also reject the INS's argument that the district court already decided this issue. The district court found only that the plaintiffs who testified at trial did not take any affirmative, conscientious step to actually file an application and that no person had come forth during this entire case and alleged that he or she was turned away at an INS legalization office because he or she had a welfare-dependent child. Perales, 762 F.Supp. at 1070. These statements do not foreclose the possibility that the plaintiff class includes members who were in fact front-desked. Although plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that the search for a front-desked class member may not prove fruitful, we cannot dispense with such an inquiry. Finally, we decline to rule on the issue of whether the governmental plaintiffs have standing and instead leave this issue, which has not been ruled on to date, to be decided in the first instance by the district court if necessary.