Opinion ID: 3043068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Venue Was Proper in Georgia.

Text: Kopp argues that he failed to register as a sex offender in Florida, which makes venue proper only in Florida, see Fed R. Crim. P. 18, but we disagree. Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has a right to a trial by “an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Kopp’s crime includes as an element “travel[] in interstate . . . commerce,” 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B), which Kopp began in Georgia. Where a 5 Case: 14-12408 Date Filed: 02/18/2015 Page: 6 of 9 federal statute does not “expressly provide[]” for venue, the crime may be prosecuted in “any district” where the crime was “begun, continued, or completed.” Id. § 3237(a). The statute that Kopp violated, id. § 2250, does not provide for venue, so Kopp may be prosecuted in any district where he “beg[a]n, continued, or completed” the crime, id. § 3237(a). Kopp “beg[a]n” his crime in Georgia because his interstate journey started there. Section 2250 provides criminal penalties for anyone subject to the registration requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911–16929, who “travels in interstate . . . commerce” and then “knowingly fails to register or update [their] registration as required by the [Act].” 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). To keep his registration current, a sex offender must, “not later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status,” inform the relevant jurisdiction of his change in status. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c); see also United States v. Beasley, 636 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2011). Kopp does not dispute that he traveled from Georgia to Florida in interstate commerce and then failed to update his registration. Because travel in interstate commerce is an element of the offense, Kopp “beg[a]n” his crime in Georgia, 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). Kopp argues that because the elements of a violation of section 2250 must occur “in sequence,” Beasley, 636 F.3d at 1329, the crime was committed only in 6 Case: 14-12408 Date Filed: 02/18/2015 Page: 7 of 9 Florida. Kopp cites United States v. Miller, where a district court concluded that “[i]nterstate travel is an element of this particular crime only because it is needed to properly invoke Congress’s Commerce Clause authority,” and so the requirement of “interstate travel is more like a condition precedent than an essential element of the crime.” No. 2:10–CR–196, 2011 WL 711090, at , (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 2011). In Miller, the district court ruled that the “criminal act itself takes place entirely within the district where the offender had a duty to register [but] failed to do so.” Id. We reject this argument. Miller is unpersuasive. The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he act of travel by a convicted sex offender may serve as a jurisdictional predicate for [section] 2250, but it is also . . . the very conduct at which Congress took aim.” Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 454, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2010). Because the crime consists of both traveling and failing to register, Kopp began his crime in Georgia and consummated it in Florida. Like our sister circuits that have addressed the issue, we hold that section 3237 applies, and venue lies in Georgia. See United States v. Lewis, 768 F.3d 1086, 1092–94 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lunsford, 725 F.3d 859, 863 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2009)); United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 771–72 (7th Cir. 2011). 7 Case: 14-12408 Date Filed: 02/18/2015 Page: 8 of 9 B. Kopp’s Sentence for Violating His Supervised Release Is Substantively Reasonable. When it revoked Kopp’s supervised release, the district court did not sentence him “outside the range of reasonable sentences,” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191, by varying upward from the guideline range by six months. Kopp has a long and violent history of crime. In 1981, he was convicted of raping a woman at gunpoint, and within three years of being released from prison, he raped a child in Hungary. He has also committed other serious crimes, including trespassing and breaking and entering, and twice violated his supervised release after he failed to register as a sex offender. The district court explained that Kopp had failed to abide by the conditions of his supervised release; that the crimes that Kopp had committed made him a potential threat to public safety; and that there must be “consequence[s]” to deter him because, even after any period of supervised release, Kopp would again have to register as a sex offender. The district court did not commit a “clear error of judgment,” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009), when it weighed the applicable factors and imposed a sentence of 16 months of imprisonment.