Opinion ID: 1827095
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered dss to provide long-term protective supervision to child.

Text: The trial court found there was no longer clear and convincing evidence that sexual abuse therapy must occur before [Child] can be returned, [although] for purposes of this disposition there remain sufficiently strong `concerns' which, when considered together with the lack of parenting skills, marital issues and other types of neglect, mandate long term supervision of this family. The trial court then concluded in part that physical custody should be returned to Parents with protective supervision by DSS subject to terms to include marriage, family and child therapy counseling sessions and parenting classes. State objects to the protective supervision order. The trial court may, in its final decree of disposition, return Child to Parents with or without protective supervision or he may be placed with DSS for a length of time subject to conditions which the trial court determines to be necessary or appropriate. SDCL 26-8A-22(1). Here, Child was returned to Parents and DSS was ordered to continue supervision until [Child] reaches the age of majority or until further order of this [trial] Court. State misstates this order when it asserts this is an order to DSS to provide protective services to a child for 17 years. Further, this court is not persuaded by State's unsupported assertion that there will be no further court order ending supervision. State asserts supervision until Child's majority exceeds the definition of an appropriate length of time envisioned by the legislature. This assertion is not supported by insights into what the legislature may have envisioned when it enacted SDCL 26-8A-22(1). Nor is it certain that supervision must be provided until Child's majority in view of the trial court's provision of the alternate duration of supervision: until further order of this Court. State also asserts long-term supervision is not envisioned within the services provided by DSS and will intrude upon Parents' rights to conduct their lives in as normal a manner as possible. Supervision by DSS has always been an intrusion into family life. Here, however, such intrusion is necessary, and hopefully, will lead to Parents' assumption of a normal home life. We are not persuaded that DSS is left with a near impossible task of regularly monitoring Child. DSS routinely engages in such monitoring. The mere fact that long-term supervision may be necessary is not sufficient to overcome the requirement that it is the child's best interest, not the convenience of the State, which is the paramount interest. S., V. & L.W., 398 N.W.2d at 139. State admits the goal of social services is to help the family correct identified problems within the home and keep the family intact. With the exception of sexual abuse therapy, Parents are addressing many of their parenting problems. Should it develop that Parents overcome their problems, State is not precluded from petitioning the trial court to relieve DSS from its supervisory role. The trial court authorized DSS workers to conduct as many announced and unannounced visits of [Parents'] home as the worker deems appropriate. State is not precluded from returning to the trial court, IF EVIDENCE WARRANTS, and again seeking to terminate Parents' rights to Child. Although the trial court's order for protective supervision may be different from what this court may have ordered, we are not convinced that a mistake has been made. S.W., 428 N.W.2d at 525. Affirmed. WUEST and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur. SABERS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. HENDERSON, J., concurs in result in part and dissents in part.