Opinion ID: 4648437
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Situs Requirement

Text: We can preliminarily dispose of Wilson’s presumption argument. Section 920(a) states: “it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary[,] . . . [t]hat [a] claim [for compensation under this chapter] comes within the provisions of this chapter.” 33 U.S.C. § 920(a). Wilson argues (1) that § 920(a) creates a situs presumption for claimants, and (2) that it shifts the burden of proving (or disproving) situs to respondents. Both arguments are unavailing. First, situs is a threshold issue that must be resolved before § 920(a) can be applied. Congress enacted the LHWCA under its “admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” which gives it the authority to “alter or revise the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 39 (1932) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). When Congress uses that authority, it is constrained by “the constitutional limits . . . [of] admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” id. at 55; see also Ex parte Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 14 (1891), Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 635 (3d Cir. 1976), which for maritime torts includes only injuries that occur on navigable waters of the United States and certain adjoining land areas, see Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971); Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 423 (1985) (explaining that the LHWCA definition of navigable waters was 5 expanded to include certain shoreside areas). Thus, the LHWCA’s situs requirement is essentially a jurisdictional determination, which means its “existence is a condition precedent to the operation of the statutory scheme.” Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54. Second, the burden of proving situs lies with the claimant. Under the LHWCA, administrative adjudications “shall be conducted in accordance with the [Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)],” 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), and the APA states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a[n] . . . order has the burden of proof.” 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). In Greenwich Collieries, the Supreme Court concluded that courts should “not lightly presume exemptions to the APA.” Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 271 (1994). In that case, the Director argued that § 923(a) exempted the LHWCA from the APA’s burden of proof rule. Id. That provision of the statute states that the Board is not bound by certain rules of evidence and procedure. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Director, however, because it was reluctant to assume that Congress intended to group the burden of proof in the same category as evidentiary and procedural rules, noting that the burden of proof is a rule of substantive law. Id. Moreover, the Court explained, the LHWCA explicitly states that the APA is applicable “notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter.” Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 919(d)). We have subsequently held that a claimant who “seeks to have an order issued that she is entitled to benefits under the [LHWCA] . . . bears the burden of proving entitlement to benefits by a preponderance of the evidence.” Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 992 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1993). For the reasons explained above, we do not think § 920(a) applies to situs determinations. Even if it did, however, § 6 920(a) does nothing more than create a rebuttable presumption that eases the claimant’s burden of proof. See Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 280. It does not shift the burden of proof to the respondent. See id. at 279–80 (explaining that a rebuttable presumption only places a burden of production on the respondent).