Opinion ID: 1374852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conditionality of Utah's Liquor Laws

Text: Petitioners next argue that Utah's liquor laws are unconstitutionally vague and broad. Specifically, they contend that the statutory language relied upon by the Commission to suspend their licenses  the private club will not be used for permitting gambling or any other violation of law or ordinance,  Utah Code Ann. § 32A-5-105(2)(c) (emphasis added)  violates their rights to due process of law because the language is overly broad and/or vague. This court will construe a challenged statute to avoid constitutional infirmities wherever possible. Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993). The Commission must similarly prefer a constitutional reading of a statute over an unconstitutional interpretation thereof. Chris & Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 516 (Utah 1990). Therefore, we will find the statute unconstitutional only if petitioners can demonstrate that the statute is either facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied. In making this determination, we will resolve any reasonable doubt in favor of constitutionality. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 920. An enactment will be held unconstitutionally vague only if the terms of the law are so ambiguous that persons of ordinary intelligence are unable to determine whether their acts conform to the law. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). The only language that petitioners argue is impermissibly vague is the phrase which indicates that club licensees may not allow their premises to be used to violate any ... law or ordinance. Utah Code Ann. & 32A-5-105(2)(c). Petitioners do not argue that this phrase is subject to differing interpretations, nor do they attempt to show that as licensees they are unable to determine whether their conduct conforms to the statute. The only support petitioners offer for their position is Atlanta Attractions, Inc. v. Massell, 330 F.Supp. 865 (N.D.Ga.1971), aff'd, 463 F.2d 449 (5th Cir.1972). In that case, the plaintiff's liquor license had been suspended for allegedly violating several state ordinances. The Georgia scheme allowed for the revocation of a liquor license by the state alcoholic beverage control commission whenever that commission found due cause. Based on the breadth of this phrase, the court found this ordinance unconstitutional. 330 F.Supp. at 866. Massell offers no support for petitioners in this instance, however. First, a showing of overbreadth is not a showing of vagueness. State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987). Second, we find the language for due cause to be distinguishable from language which requires a club to certify that it will not use its premises for gambling or violation of any other laws. While the Utah law may be strict, it is not so vaguely drafted as to make persons of ordinary intelligence guess at whether they are comporting with its requirements. See, e.g., Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162, 92 S.Ct. at 843. We also note that the language of the Georgia statute allows for arbitrary enforcement through the broadly framed term due cause. There is no such phrase in the Utah statute. In fact, Utah's statute requires the action to be taken by club incorporators, who are required to include a statement of compliance in the club's bylaws. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-5-105(2)(c). The Georgia statute required Alcoholic Beverage Control officials to make the determination of whether the clubs were complying with all state and local ordinances or whether there was due cause to revoke the license. The statute was problematic because the operative phrase due cause was so broad as to open the door to abuse, as no restrictions or guidelines were imposed on the commission in making this determination. Massell, 330 F.Supp. at 866. The facts in the Georgia case are so different from those in our case as to make it entirely inapposite. Because petitioners have made no showing, either legally or factually, to support their contention that the language of the challenged Utah statute is subject to arbitrary enforcement or to differing but reasonable interpretations, we hold that the language is not unconstitutionally vague. We also hold that the language is not overly broad. Statutory language is overbroad if its language proscribes both harmful and innocuous behavior. Stated another way, a statute is overbroad if it attempts to sanction constitutionally protected activities. State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987). Because the statute in question proscribes club licensees only from allowing activities that are already illegal from taking place on their premises, it does not sanction any protected behavior. Also, unlike the Georgia statute, which as noted above places broad discretion in the hands of enforcement officials, the language in Utah's statute is not so broad as to either risk arbitrary enforcement or sanction protected behavior. Therefore, we affirm the Commission's ruling that the challenged language is not unconstitutionally broad. See also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 630-31, 104 S.Ct. at 3256-57 (holding that Minnesota Human Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination against women by large social organizations, is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad).