Opinion ID: 789140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Booker/Fanfan Opinions

Text: 14 The Supreme Court's decision in Booker/Fanfan significantly altered the sentencing regime that has existed since the Guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987. The Court's two-part decision consists of an opinion by Justice Stevens adjudicating the merits of the Sixth Amendment issue (Substantive Opinion), and an opinion by Justice Breyer setting forth the remedy (Remedy Opinion).
15 Booker/Fanfan was the culmination of a series of decisions explicating the requirements of the Sixth Amendment in the context of sentencing. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). In the Substantive Opinion, the Court ruled that [a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Substantive Opinion at 20. 6 This ruling, the Court explained, was required for enforcement of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in today's world. Id. at 11. As the Court explained, the world of sentencing formerly relied primarily on indeterminate sentencing, i.e., a regime in which, for every offense, the sentencing judge had discretion to select a sentence anywhere within the range bounded by the maximum sentence and the minimum sentence, if any, that the legislature established. But that world, the Court further explained, was significantly modified by the advent of determinate sentencing, i.e., a regime in which a legislature or a commission specifies precise sentences or, more typically, establishes fairly narrow ranges within the broader statutory ranges, and the sentencing judge is required to select a sentence within the narrow range, subject to limited exceptions. 16 The Substantive Opinion emphasized that it was the mandatory aspect of these determinate sentencing regimes that implicated the Sixth Amendment's requirement of a jury trial: 17 We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range. Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitutional issues presented by these cases would have been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the SRA the provisions that make the Guidelines binding on district judges.... For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant. 18 Id. at 8-9 (internal citations omitted). 19 In Booker's case, the Court ruled in the Substantive Opinion that Booker's sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because the sentencing judge, as required by the Guidelines, had increased the sentencing range of 210-262 months, the applicable range based on the facts reflected in the jury's verdict, to 360 months to life, the applicable range based on the facts of the defendant's relevant conduct, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, as found by the judge. Booker received a sentence of 360 months. In Fanfan's case, the applicable Guidelines range had been increased from 63-78 months to 188-235 months based on the sentencing judge's finding of relevant conduct. However, the sentencing judge, concluding that Blakely precluded his use of the Guidelines to enhance the sentencing range above the range based solely on the verdict, applied the 63-78 months range and imposed a sentence of 78 months.
20 In the Remedy Opinion, the Court ruled that implementation of the Substantive Opinion required that two provisions of the SRA be sever[ed] and excise[d]. Remedy Opinion, ___ U.S. at ___, 125 S.Ct. at 764. These are subsection 3553(b)(1), mandating use of the Guidelines, and section 3742(e), which sets forth standards of review on appeal. Remedy Opinion, id. 21 Having severed and excised the SRA's standards governing review of sentences, the Court in the Remedy Opinion replaced them with a practical standard of review already familiar to appellate courts: review for `unreasonable [ness].' Id. at 765 (quoting subsection 3742(e)(3)). The Court pointed out that `[r]easonableness' standards are not foreign to sentencing law. Id. at 766. The SRA has required appellate courts to use the standard of reasonableness or, the opposite side of the same coin, unreasonableness, in two contexts. First, prior to a 2003 amendment, 7 subsection 3742(e)(3) instructed appellate courts reviewing a departure to determine whether the resulting sentence is unreasonable after considering various identified factors. Second, subsections 3742(a)(4), (b)(4), and (e)(4) instructed appellate courts to use the standard of plainly reasonable in reviewing a sentence imposed in the absence of an applicable guideline. 22 Although the most significant aspect of the Remedy Opinion is the excision of subsection 3553(b)(1), with the result that the use of the Guidelines to select a sentence is no longer mandatory, a critically important aspect of Booker/Fanfan is the preservation of the entirety of the SRA with the exception of only the two severed provisions. 8 As the Court noted in the Remedy Opinion, The remainder of the Act `function[s] independently.' Remedy Opinion, ___ U.S. at ___, 125 S.Ct. at 764 (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987)). Notably, the Court explained, Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth numerous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 766. 23