Opinion ID: 2377101
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Crawford and KDHE Records Custodian Subpoenas

Text: These two later KDHE subpoenas require us to address three preliminary points. First, the State's Notice of Interlocutory Appeal was timely and specific enough to create appellate jurisdiction over the Crawford and KDHE records custodian subpoenas. The State's Notice of Interlocutory Appeal was filed on June 6, 2008, within 10 days of the May 27, 2008, hearing before Judge Tatum and explicitly referenced that hearing. Second, as mentioned above, the subpoenas to Crawford and the KDHE records custodian were titled Subpoena Duces Tecum but listed no documents to be brought to court. In addition, Kline assured Judge Tatum that the titles of the subpoenas were in error and that they were not meant to command the production of documents by either witness. Third, some of the topics on which Kline intended to have these witnesses testify are clear and some less so. It is clear that the State wished to call Crawford and the records custodian to testify generally to the agency's practices regarding reports submitted by abortion providers such as CHPP, presumably including the forms used and other information about means of submission and storage. Kline and one of the other attorneys from his District Attorney's office also represented that the State would put on evidence from these witnesses about any markings made on the reports by agency employees. Kline also wanted testimony from a KDHE witness to show that KDHE responded to the Inquisition during his term as Attorney General by producing copies of reports submitted by CHPP on the 23 abortions underlying the felony counts in the complaint. It is somewhat less clear from the record before us whether Kline also intended to use these two subpoenas to secure testimony comparing the reports as they currently exist in KDHE's files, i.e., those called for in the Saadi subpoena, to those Kline obtained from KDHE in the Inquisition, i.e., those called for in the subpoena to Judge Anderson. It is also somewhat less clear whether Kline also intended to use the two later KDHE subpoenas to obtain testimony on the comparison between one or both of the sets of reports from KDHE to the reports as produced in the Inquisition by CHPP, once Cavanaugh inquired about written determinations of fetal viability. From the record before us, it is certain Kline intended to get comparison testimony from Saadi. And it is evident that Judge Tatum believed this to be one of Kline's goals with the two other KDHE witnesses as well. In addition, at oral argument before this court, counsel for the State asserted that Saadi and a KDHE records custodian would serve the same evidentiary purposes for the State. In the discussion below, we therefore assume that Kline intended, and the State still intends, to use Crawford and/or the KDHE records custodian to compare sets of documents, one of which consists of CHPP reports as they currently exist in KDHE's files. The statute governing Judge Tatum's evaluation of the motion to quash filed by KDHE is K.S.A. 60-245(c)(3)(A), which reads in pertinent part: On timely motion, the court by which a subpoena was issued shall quash or modify the subpoena if it: ... (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and no exception or waiver applies. Neither KDHE nor CHPP has claimed that the reports as they currently exist in KDHE's files or their contents are privileged. However, both have argued that the reports and their contents are other protected matter because they are covered by K.S.A. 65-445. That statute states in pertinent part: (a) Every medical care facility shall keep written records of all pregnancies which are lawfully terminated within such medical care facility and shall annually submit a written report thereon to the secretary of health and environment in the manner and form prescribed by the secretary.... (b) Each report required by this section shall include the number of pregnancies terminated during the period of time covered by the report, the type of medical facility in which the pregnancy was terminated, information required to be reported under K.S.A. 65-6703 and amendments thereto if applicable to the pregnancy terminated, and such other information as may be required by the secretary of health and environment, but the report shall not include the names of the persons whose pregnancies were so terminated. (c) Information obtained by the secretary of health and environment under this section shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed in a manner that would reveal the identity ... of any medical care facility which submits a report to the secretary under this section, except that such information, including information identifying such persons and facilities may be disclosed to the state board of healing arts upon request of the board for disciplinary action conducted by the board and may be disclosed to the attorney general upon a showing that a reasonable cause exists to believe that a violation of this act has occurred. Any information disclosed to the state board of healing arts or the attorney general pursuant to the subsection shall be used solely for the purposes of a disciplinary action or criminal proceeding. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, information obtained by the secretary under this section may be used only for statistical purposes and such information shall not be released in a manner which would identify any county or other area of this state in which the termination of the pregnancy occurred. A violation of this subsection (c) is a class A nonperson misdemeanor. .... (e) For the purpose of maintaining confidentiality as provided by subsections (c) and (d), reports of terminations of pregnancies required by this section shall identify the ... facility submitting such reports only by confidential code number assigned by the secretary of health and environment to such ... facility and the department of health and environment shall maintain such reports only by such number. K.S.A. 65-6703, referenced by K.S.A. 65-445(b), makes the performance of certain abortions illegal and outlines specific reporting and record-keeping obligations: (a) No person shall perform or induce an abortion when the fetus is viable unless such person is a physician and has a documented referral from another physician not legally or financially affiliated with the physician performing or inducing the abortion and both physicians determine that: (1) The abortion is necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman; or (2) a continuation of the pregnancy will cause a substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman. (b)(1) Except in the case of a medical emergency, prior to performing an abortion upon a woman, the physician shall determine the gestational age of the fetus according to accepted obstetrical and neonatal practice and standards applied by physicians in the same or similar circumstances. If the physician determines the gestational age is less than 22 weeks, the physician shall document as part of the medical records of the woman the basis for the determination. (2) If the physician determines the gestational age of the fetus is 22 or more weeks, prior to performing the abortion upon the woman the physician shall determine if the fetus is viable by using and exercising that degree of care, skill and proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinary skillful, careful and prudent physician in the same or similar circumstances. In making this determination of viability, the physician shall perform or cause to be performed such medical examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of the gestational age of the fetus and shall enter such findings and determinations of viability in the medical record of the woman. (3) If the physician determines the gestational age of a fetus is 22 or more weeks, and determines that the fetus is not viable and performs an abortion on the woman, the physician shall report such determinations and the reasons for such determinations in writing to the medical care facility in which the abortion is performed for inclusion in the report of the medical care facility to the secretary of health and environment under K.S.A. 65-445 and amendments thereto or if the abortion is not performed in a medical care facility, the physician shall report such determinations and the reasons for such determinations in writing to the secretary of health and environment as part of the written report made by the physician to the secretary of health and environment under K.S.A. 65-445 and amendments thereto. (4) If the physician who is to perform the abortion determines the gestational age of a fetus is 22 or more weeks, and determines that the fetus is viable, both physicians under subsection (a) determine in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) that an abortion is necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman or that a continuation of the pregnancy will cause a substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman and the physician performs an abortion on the woman, the physician who performs the abortion shall report such determinations, the reasons for such determinations and the basis for the determination that an abortion is necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman or that a continuation of the pregnancy will cause a substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman in writing to the medical care facility in which the abortion is performed for inclusion in the report of the medical care facility to the secretary of health and environment under K.S.A. 65-445 and amendments thereto or if the abortion is not performed in a medical care facility, the physician who performs the abortion shall report such determinations, the reasons for such determinations and the basis for the determination that an abortion is necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman or that a continuation of the pregnancy will cause a substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman in writing to the secretary of health and environment as part of the written report made by the physician to the secretary of health and environment under K.S.A. 65-445 and amendments thereto. (5) The physician shall retain the medical records required to be kept under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection (b) for not less than five years and shall retain a copy of the written reports required under paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection (b) for not less than five years. .... (d) ... Notwithstanding any provision of this section, a person shall not perform an abortion that is prohibited by law. (e) As used in this section, `viable' means that stage of fetal development when it is the physician's judgment according to accepted obstetrical or neonatal standards of care and practice applied by physicians in the same or similar circumstances that there is a reasonable probability that the life of the child can be continued indefinitely outside the mother's womb with natural or artificial life-supportive measures. .... (g) Upon a first conviction of a violation of this section, a person shall be guilty of a class A nonperson misdemeanor. Upon a second or subsequent conviction of a violation of this section, a person shall be guilty of a severity level 10, nonperson felony. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. State v. Arnett, 290 Kan. 41, 47, 223 P.3d 780 (2010). The most fundamental rule is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. Arnett, 290 Kan. at 47, 223 P.3d 780. An appellate court must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings. State v. Raschke, 289 Kan. 911, 914, 219 P.3d 481 (2009). When a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court does not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read into the statute something not readily found in it. Where there is no ambiguity, the court need not resort to statutory construction. Only if the statute's language or text is unclear or ambiguous does the court use canons of construction or legislative history or other background considerations to construe the legislature's intent. State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 796, 217 P.3d 15 (2009). This court cannot delete vital provisions or supply vital omissions in a statute. No matter what the legislature may have really intended to do, if it did not in fact do it, under any reasonable interpretation of the language used, the defect is one that the legislature alone can correct. See State v. Johnson, 289 Kan. 870, 879, 218 P.3d 46 (2009). The relevant text of K.S.A. 65-445(c) is unambiguous. It tells us plainly that any disclosure of the reports filed by CHPP in the form they currently exist in KDHE's files or of their contents is strictly limited to two recipients, the Board of Healing Arts and the Attorney General. The party now seeking disclosure of the reports or their content is the Johnson County District Attorney rather than the Board of Healing Arts or the Attorney General. In our view, the plain statutory limitation on disclosure in K.S.A. 65-445(c) makes the information it covers other protected matter under K.S.A. 60-245(c)(3)(A)(iii). We also note that K.S.A. 65-445(c) sets up a condition for disclosure to the Attorney General. He or she must show that a reasonable cause exists to believe that a violation of this act has occurred. (Emphasis added.) This condition would have controlled the appropriateness of KDHE's disclosure in Kline's Inquisition during his term as Attorney General. That disclosure is not before us in this action, and we pass no judgment on it. The statute also sets up strict parameters on the use to which disclosed reports or contents of reports can be used. Such information shall be used solely for the purposes of a disciplinary action or criminal proceeding. The KDHE Secretary may also use the information in its statistical reports. The statute does not state that the Attorney General is the only prosecutor entitled to use properly disclosed KDHE reports or their contents in the pursuit of criminal justice. To the extent CHPP has urged us to read this additional restriction into the statute here, we decline to do so. Counsel for the State is correct that the legislature is able to design a statute to limit a prosecutor's jurisdiction, and it did not do so in K.S.A. 65-445. In addition, the disclosure language in the statute is more restrictive than the use language. Disclosure to the Attorney General is conditioned on a showing of reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Chapter 65 occurred, while use of properly disclosed reports is permitted in a criminal proceeding, apparently including prosecutions of crimes beyond those defined in Chapter 65. Although our analysis could end here, we note possible support for our plain-language conclusion from two other lines of argument mentioned by the parties over the course of this criminal prosecution. First, events during the 2008 legislative session may have significance. Both houses approved legislation to amend K.S.A. 65-445(c) to permit disclosure of KDHE reports such as those under consideration here to county and district attorneys. See H. Sub. for S.B. 389 (2008) (enrolled and presented April 11, 2008). The amendment would have become law but for the Governor's veto and a failure to override it. See Sen. J., April 30, 2008, p.2023 (message from the Governor vetoing S.B. 389); Sen. J., April 30, 2008, p.2043 (Senate unable to override veto). Because we presume that a legislative alteration of statutory language makes a substantive change in the law, see State v. Preston, 287 Kan. 181, 184, 195 P.3d 240 (2008), we could make the further assumption that the 2008 legislature believed it necessary to state explicitly that a district attorney could obtain release of KDHE reports in order for the statute to allow it. The counterargument is that courts should avoid reading too much into legislative inaction. Second, contrary to the oral argument of the State, the Kansas Open Records Act's treatment of the type of KDHE reports at issue here is consistent with our limitation on their dissemination. The Act sets out an exception permitting agency refusal to disclose these reports to unauthorized persons. See K.S.A. 45-221(a). That exception, which had been due to expire in July 2010, see K.S.A.2009 Supp. 45-229(i), was instead extended to July 2015 during the 2010 legislative session. See L.2010, ch. 112, sec. 3. K.S.A. 65-445(c) compels us to conclude that Judge Tatum's ruling quashing the subpoenas directed to Crawford and the KDHE records custodian must be affirmed in part and reversed in part. To the extent the State wishes to call these persons to the stand as fact witnesses on general practices of the agency regarding reports such as those filed by CHPP, it should be permitted to do so. Such testimony does not disclose either the reports themselves or their contents. To the extent the State wishes to call these persons to testify on additional facts about the agency's response in the Inquisition, i.e., that it received a subpoena or request of some sort that appeared to be in compliance with the statutory condition or was otherwise unchallenged, and that it produced reports to Kline as Attorney General, that type of testimony also is permissible. Again, such testimony does not disclose either the reports themselves or their contents, with the possible exception of CHPP's code number, which has already been discussed in open court. In contrast, neither Crawford nor the KDHE records custodian can be permitted to testify in a way that, as Judge Tatum put it, accomplishes indirectly what cannot be accomplished directly under K.S.A. 65-445. The statute prevents these witnesses from making what is effectively a disclosure of the KDHE reports filed by CHPP as they currently exist in the agency's files by bringing the reports to court in a district attorney's prosecution. It also prevents these witnesses from doing a physical comparison of the KDHE reports filed by CHPP as they currently exist in the agency's files in order to testify that they are the same as or different from another set of documents. Likewise, these witnesses are not permitted to testify from memory on the contents of the KDHE reports filed by CHPP as they currently exist in the agency's files.