Opinion ID: 852297
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Indiana Tort Claims Act

Text: Like many other jurisdictions, Indiana abolished common law sovereign immunity for all government activities in a series of judicial decisions in the 1960s and early 1970s. Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 63, 284 N.E.2d 733, 737-38 (1972) (abrogating immunity for the state); Klepinger v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Miami County, 143 Ind. App. 155, 166, 143 Ind.App. 178, 239 N.E.2d 160, 172-73 (1968), trans. denied, (abrogating immunity for counties); Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind.App. 662, 666, 231 N.E.2d 169, 172-73 (1967), trans. denied, (abrogating immunity for municipalities); Keeton et al., supra, § 131, at 1052. As a result of these decisions, most activities of government entities were exposed to liability under traditional tort theories. Campbell, 259 Ind. at 63, 284 N.E.2d at 737-38. In response, the Indiana General Assembly passed the ITCA. Acts 1974, Pub.L. No. 142, § 1 (1974) (current version at I.C. § 34-13-3). This statute granted absolute immunity to governmental entities in a number of specific circumstances, and codified rules of liability for other areas of governmental activity. Compare I.C. § 34-13-3-3(4) (conferring immunity for the condition of some unpaved roads, trails and foot paths) and I.C. § 34-13-3-3(6) (immunity for judicial acts) with I.C. § 34-13-3-3(5) (immunity for the design of an extreme sports facility, but expressly recognizing a duty to maintain the area in an overall safe condition). The portion of the ITCA relevant to this case has remained unchanged since its inception. It states: A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from . . . (3) The temporary condition of a public thoroughfare ... that results from weather. I.C. § 34-13-3-3(3). In the first case addressing a municipality's liability under this provision, the Court of Appeals described the ITCA as little more than a codification of the common law as it pertained to natural accumulation of snow and ice. Walton v. Ramp, 407 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (Ind.Ct.App.1980). Since Walton, the Court of Appeals and this Court have continued to rely on common law precedents in interpreting subsection (3)'s immunity for conditions caused by weather. E.g., Catt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Knox County, 779 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind.2002) (citing City of Muncie v. Hey, 164 Ind. 570, 574, 74 N.E. 250, 251 (1905)); Van Bree v. Harrison County, 584 N.E.2d 1114, 1117-18 (Ind.Ct. App.1992), trans. denied, (citing Ewald v. City of South Bend, 104 Ind.App. 679, 683-84, 12 N.E.2d 995, 996-97 (1938)). These cases demonstrate that the immunity afforded by subsection (3) is narrower than the immunity established by some other provisions of the ITCA. In Catt, a driver sustained injuries stemming from a culvert that was washed out by a torrential rain. Catt, 779 N.E.2d at 2. We noted that immunity analysis under subsection (3) required that the condition be both temporary and caused by weather. Id. at 5. We concluded that a temporary condition was one which the governmental body has not had the time and opportunity to remove. Id. Lack of notice of the condition and the demands of responding to other emergencies bear on the opportunity to remedy it. Id. at 6. In Hochstetler, a major storm felled and scattered scores of trees and limbs on public roads. Hochstetler, 868 N.E.2d at 426. A few hours later, a driver was injured when he struck a fallen tree on a county road. Id. Recognizing that the storm had caused the condition and that the county crews were remedying the situation caused by the storm, we held that the condition was temporary as a matter of law. Id. at 427. In both cases whether a condition was temporary ultimately hinged on whether the governmental entity had a reasonable opportunity to remedy conditions initially caused by weather. And in both cases there was no reasonable opportunity to respond to all of the conditions caused by the weather. Id. at 426-27; Catt, 779 N.E.2d at 5-6. Thus, in each case we held that the condition was within the immunity afforded by subsection (3). Hochstetler, 868 N.E.2d at 426-27; Catt, 779 N.E.2d at 5-6. In sum, these cases established that the government may be liable for negligence in maintaining roads, but when the government is in the process of responding to a weather condition, as a matter of law the immunity conferred in subsection (3) for temporary conditions caused by weather extends to all claims caused by that condition during the period of reasonable response, whether the alleged injury occurred early or late in that period.