Opinion ID: 873505
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hobbs Act: Status as a Public Official

Text: Munchak states that the District Court’s jury instructions allowed the jury to improperly convict him of extortion under color of right pursuant to the Hobbs Act. As Munchak did not object to the jury instructions below, we review for plain error. See United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2005). An error is plain if it is “clear” or “obvious” under current law and affects substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). An error affects substantial rights if it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id. The burden is on Munchak to show that the error affects substantial rights. See id. Additionally, an appellate court should not exercise its discretion to correct an error “unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, 2 Cordaro joins Munchak’s arguments on issues one, two, three, and four. 4 integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 732 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Under the Hobbs Act, a public official is guilty of extortion if he “receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts.” Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992). While the official acts do not have to be completed, the Government needs to show that “a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.” Id. Here, the District Court instructed: “The extorsion [sic] under color of official right means that the public official induced, obtained, accepted or agreed to accept a payment to which he or she was not entitled knowing that the payment was made in return for taking or withholding or influencing official acts.” 3 JA 934. The Court later stated: The government is not required to prove an explicit promise to perform the official acts in return for payment. Passive acceptance of a benefit by a public official is a sufficient basis for this type of extorsion [sic] if the official knows that he is being offered the payment in exchange for his ability to do official acts. 3 JA 934-35. Munchak focuses on the words “his ability to do official acts” to assert that the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict him for receiving payment because of his mere status as a public official rather than in exchange for official acts. Munchak alleges that the instructions improperly omitted the quid pro quo requirement stated in Evans. Jury instructions must be read as a whole. See United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995). These jury instructions, read as a whole, properly convey the 5 quid pro quo requirement. The District Court unequivocally stated that payment must be received “in return for” official acts. 3 JA 934. Munchak cannot focus solely on the “ability to” language, in a section of the instructions referring to a separate issue.3 The District Court did not clearly err.4