Opinion ID: 2586049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Krafchick breached his duty of care to Mazon

Text: ¶ 30 Any other professional must bear the cost of his negligence. [1] The majority looks to California precedent to support the claim there is no fiduciary duty between lawyers. Majority at 1171 (citing Beck v. Wecht, 28 Cal.4th 289, 290, 48 P.3d 417, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 384 (2002)). However, Beck only holds an attorney does not have a fiduciary duty to protect a cocounsel's fees. That is all it holds. Beck, 28 Cal.4th at 298, 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 384, 48 P.3d 417. [2] But even assuming an attorney owes no fiduciary duty to cocounsel, he must still exercise that duty of care and act as a reasonable attorney would under similar circumstances. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 52, at 375 (2000) ([A] lawyer who owes a duty of care must exercise the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances.). A lawyer owes a duty of care to nonclients when: (a) [T]he lawyer . . . invites the nonclient to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of other legal services, and the nonclient so relies; and (b) the nonclient is not, under applicable tort law, too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to protection. Id. § 51(2), at 356-57. [3] Under this rule Krafchick owed Mazon a duty because Krafchick invited Mazon to rely on the provision of his legal services, and Mazon did rely. Discussing the rule's rationale, the American Law Institute balances the same concerns raised by the majority: Lawyers regularly act in disputes and transactions involving nonclients who will foreseeably be harmed by inappropriate acts of the lawyers. Holding lawyers liable for such harm is sometimes warranted. Yet it is often difficult to distinguish between harm resulting from inappropriate lawyer conduct on the one hand and, on the other hand, detriment to a nonclient resulting from a lawyer's fulfilling the proper function of helping a client through lawful means. Making lawyers liable to nonclients, moreover, could tend to discourage lawyers from vigorous representation. Hence, a duty of care to nonclients arises only in the limited circumstances described in the Section. Id. § 51 cmt. b at 358. And these limited circumstances are present here. Mazon was foreseeably harmed by Krafchick's failure to timely serve the defendant. Concerns militating against liability are not present here. There is no difficulty distinguishing the harm resulting from Krafchick's negligence and Krafchick's assisting his client. Krafchick was not helping his client when he failed to timely serve a complaint. Nor does liability discourage vigorous representation, rather liability encourages zealous advocacy. ¶ 31 Krafchick is also liable under section 56 of the Restatement. This section provides a lawyer is subject to liability to a client or nonclient when a nonlawyer would be in similar circumstances. Id. § 56, at 416. Unlike the majority, the Restatement makes no special exemption for attorneys: Lawyers are subject to the general law. If activities of a nonlawyer in the same circumstances would render the nonlawyer civilly liable or afford the nonlawyer a defense to liability, the same activities by a lawyer in the same circumstances generally render the lawyer liable or afford the lawyer a defense. Id. § 56 cmt. b at 416. Krafchick would generally be liable for his negligence. His negligence arguably cost Layouni $1.3 million in potential recovery and Mazon $325,000 in potential fees. Layouni recovered his share in the form of a credit to the settlement. However Mazon recovered nothing. ¶ 32 The majority fears attorneys might develop an impermissible self-interest in preserving the claim for prospective fees, even when the client's interests demand otherwise. Majority at 10. This is fiction. Krafchick's negligence would never be in the client's interest. An attorney must always timely serve a complaint and failure to do so may be negligent. When an attorney commits malpractice and that same misconduct damages cocounsel, there is no reason both the client and cocounsel should not be allowed to recover. This result does not jeopardize an attorney's duty of loyalty, it promotes it.