Opinion ID: 4558220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Somerville’s Eighth Amendment Challenge

Text: Finally, Defendant Somerville argues that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because it is not proportionate to his crime. While we ordinarily review constitutional challenges to a district court’s sentence de novo, we apply plain error review to unpreserved Eighth Amendment claims. United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328, 363 (6th Cir. 2017). Because Somerville did not present this challenge before the district court, we review the district court’s decision for plain error. Id. at 360–61. Eighth Amendment proportionality “evaluates a particular defendant’s culpability for his crime in relation to the punishment that he has received.” Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295, 305 (6th Cir. 2007). We apply a “narrow proportionality principle” in considering such claims, and Nos. 19-5815/5817/5983 United States v. Sherrill Page 23 will find unconstitutional only “extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Young, 847 F.3d at 363 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Three factors are relevant to our proportionality analysis: “(1) ‘the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty’; (2) ‘the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction’; and (3) ‘the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.’” United States v. Abdulmutallab, 739 F.3d 891, 906 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)). For the most part, our consideration turns on the first factor, as we reach the second and third “only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Regarding the first factor, the court imposed upon Somerville the harsh sentence of life imprisonment plus ten years. However, as recognized by the district court, Somerville’s offense was grave. Among other things, he was convicted of causing the death of another person using a firearm in a manner that constitutes murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). Indeed, the court emphasized that it “[could not] imagine a more serious situation than this one,” given that Somerville planned the robbery, convinced others to participate, shot both Edwards and Hall, and subsequently threatened other witnesses with violence if they spoke with law enforcement about the crime. These facts reasonably support the district court’s sentence. In recognition of the severity of the crimes of which Somerville was convicted, Congress allowed a term of life imprisonment for two of his four crimes of conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (stating that “if the firearm is discharged,” the defendant shall “be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years”); id. § 924(j)(1) (stating that “if the killing is murder,” the defendant shall “be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life”). We “grant substantial deference to” legislative determinations of “the types and limits of punishments for crimes.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 290. Thus, “[a] sentence within the statutory maximum . . . generally does not constitute ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment.” United States v. Moore, 643 F.3d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 2011) (first alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Layne, 324 F.3d 464, 474 (6th Cir. 2003)). That is the case here. Nos. 19-5815/5817/5983 United States v. Sherrill Page 24 This is even more clear upon considering Somerville’s sentence in light of the Sentencing Guidelines. Life imprisonment is the Guidelines term for any offense level over 43, regardless of criminal history category. As it happens, Somerville had an offense level of 49 and the second-highest criminal history category of V, making a life sentence not only statutorily justified, but clearly justified under the Guidelines. The district court acknowledged as much in sentencing Somerville. (See Somerville Sent’g Hr’g Tr., R. 284 at PageID #3468 (“[T]he way the numbers actually add up, [his offense level is] 49, and 43 would have gotten him there [to a life sentence.]”).) “[T]his court has held that an Eighth Amendment challenge must fail if a defendant receives a sentence within the guideline range, when the guideline range contemplates the gravity of the offense . . . .” Abdulmutallab, 739 F.3d at 907. So too here. Even so, Somerville argues that his youth and mental health issues make his sentence unduly harsh. But Somerville was legally an adult at the time of his crime, and he offers no case law to support the idea that his sentence was unconstitutional because he was only nineteen. Moreover, the district court considered Somerville’s age in the course of its sentencing decision. In particular, it noted that the fact that Somerville already had an extensive criminal history at this age, placing him in the second-highest criminal history category (Category V), suggested that he was likely to reoffend and needed a substantial sentence to deter and incapacitate him. Indeed, this history suggests that Somerville’s sentence was not unduly harsh or grossly disproportionate. Regarding Somerville’s mental health history, the district court also considered this issue in deciding his sentence. It observed that Somerville had “issues with anxiety, impulse control, anger, [and] maybe bipolar [disorder],” some of which had been diagnosed. (Somerville Sent’g Hr’g Tr., R. 284 at PageID #3466.) But it did not think that these facts justified a more lenient sentence in light of the circumstances, particularly because “not everyone who [suffers from these conditions] . . . goes out and kills people.” (Id.) This was not plain error, as we have rejected the notion that even a defendant’s reduced culpability as a result of a mental disability automatically “transforms an otherwise constitutional sentence into an unconstitutional one.” Moore, 643 F.3d at 454. Somerville does not argue that he had a mental disability that affected his understanding of his conduct, and he offers no support for the notion that his sentence is Nos. 19-5815/5817/5983 United States v. Sherrill Page 25 unconstitutional simply because he had a history of mental health issues. This fact thus provides no reason to overturn the district court’s sentencing decision. Somerville also appears to raise a substantive reasonableness challenge to his sentence. Although he does not develop this argument explicitly, it is evidently based upon the same reasoning as his Eighth Amendment claim—specifically, that his sentence was too long in light of his age and mental health history. But this substantive reasonableness claim fails for the same reasons that Somerville’s Eighth Amendment claim fails. His sentence was within the Guidelines recommendation, and the district court gave “adequate consideration to [the § 3553(a) factors].” Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d at 753 (alteration in original) (quoting HolguinHernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 766).) Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and Somerville’s sentence is substantively reasonable. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether a defendant may raise on direct appeal an Eighth Amendment claim that his life sentence is disproportionate, and hence cruel and unusual, because he is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. It has long recognized, however, that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); see also id. at 465 (holding unconstitutional state mandatory life-without-parole sentences for homicide offenses for those under eighteen); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 52–53 (2010) (same regarding life-without parole sentences for nonhomicide cases); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005) (same regarding capital punishment). While we have historically declined to extend this reasoning to individuals over the age of eighteen, see United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2013), in determining whether a sentence is cruel and unusual, we “must look beyond historical conceptions to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’” Graham, 560 U.S. at 58 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). Members of this Court have already begun to consider whether the line separating childhood and adulthood has shifted due to society’s recognition that young adults between the ages of eighteen and twentyone are mentally more like children than adults, pointing to various contexts in which we consider twenty-one the age of majority, as well as scientific and social research indicating that Nos. 19-5815/5817/5983 United States v. Sherrill Page 26 those under twenty-one retain the defining characteristics of youth. Pike v. Gross, 936 F.3d 372, 385 (6th Cir. 2019) (Stranch, J., concurring). The acknowledgement of youth’s impact is vital in the federal sentencing context. To be sure, the United States Sentencing Guidelines disfavors granting downward departures based on age, including youth. United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 875 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1). But a district court may consider age as part of the “history and characteristics of the defendant” in balancing the § 3553(a) factors, as occurred here. United States v. Davis, 537 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)). We leave to a future case the issue of whether a life sentence would be cruel and unusual or substantively unreasonable if a young-adult defendant’s criminal history and other conduct do not outweigh his youth. Those circumstances are simply not present in this case. Thus, because the district court did not err in imposing Somerville’s sentence, we affirm without reaching the remaining factors of the plain error analysis.