Opinion ID: 1100536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Improper Use of Religious Law to Support Death Penalty

Text: This Court has strongly condemned the invocation of religious doctrine either for or against the death penalty as a relevant factor in sentencing proceedings. The majority opinion makes it look like we are currently on both sides of the issue. I do not think we are. See Ferrell v. State, 686 So.2d 1324 (Fla.1996). I dissent from the majority's analysis of this issue and especially from its dismissal of the fundamental nature of the error. It is true that, in Ferrell, we found harmless a brief reference to religious law to which no objection was made. Were that the case here my vote would be with the majority. But it is patently clear from the record here that the references to biblical law in the instant case were extensive and egregious and bear no similarity to the facts of Ferrell. In Ferrell, this Court clearly announced a rule prohibiting the invocation of religious doctrine in death penalty cases: Without question, trial judges and attorneys should refrain from discussing religious philosophy in court proceedings. In a somewhat analogous situation, the California Supreme Court reviewed comments by a prosecutor, in which the prosecutor relied on this same commandment in seeking the death penalty. This is precisely the sort of appeal to religious principles that we have repeatedly held to be improper. As we explained recently in [ People v. Sandoval, 4 Cal.4th 155, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862, 883-84 (1992), affirmed sub nom. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994)]: What is objectionable is reliance on religious authority as supporting or opposing the death penalty. The penalty determination is to be made by reliance on the legal instructions given by the court, not by recourse to extraneous authority. ... The primary vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is that such argument may diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and ... imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions. [ People v. Wrest, 3 Cal.4th 1088, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020, 1028 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848, 114 S.Ct. 144, 126 L.Ed.2d 106 (1993)]. The prosecutor here invoked the Bible to demonstrate the legitimacy of capital punishment, and even implied that defendant deserved death under God's law: God recognized there'd be people like Mr. Wash.... Who must be punished for what they have done ... must forfeit their lives for what he's done. This was improper. People v. Wash, [6 Cal.4th 215, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 421,] 861 P.2d 1107, 1135-36 (1993) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 836[, 115 S.Ct. 116, 130 L.Ed.2d 62] (1994). Ferrell v. State, 686 So.2d 1324, 1328 (Fla. 1996); see also Lawrence v. State, 691 So.2d 1068, 1074 n. 8 (Fla.1997) (cautioning prosecutors that arguments invoking religion can easily cross the boundary of proper argument and become prejudicial). Florida's appellate courts have not hesitated to take forceful action when these principles are violated. In Meade v. State, 431 So.2d 1031, 1031-32 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 441 So.2d 633 (Fla.1983), the Fourth District Court of Appeal found error and reversed a manslaughter conviction where the prosecutor had argued, There, ladies and gentlemen, is a man who forgot the fifth commandment, which was codified in the laws of the State of Florida against murder: Thou shalt not kill. Similarly, in Harper v. State, 411 So.2d 235, 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), the Third District held that the prosecutor's comments to jurors about biblical teachings was an improper appeal to emotion. Hence, Florida law is clear in prohibiting the use of religious doctrine by prosecutors. Rather than dance around the issue, we should reaffirm that prohibition today.