Opinion ID: 390862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Backpay Award Against the Board

Text: 23 The district court found that the teachers failed to show that the reinstatement provisions of the Board's maternity leave policy constituted gender discrimination violative of Title VII. Nevertheless, the court determined that the return provisions established an irrational conclusive and irrebuttable presumption that all teachers were physically incapable of teaching for three semesters following childbirth. 9 Accordingly, the court found that the return provisions violated the teachers' right to due process under the rationale of Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974), and imposed backpay liability on the Board for its constitutional violations. 10 After carefully reviewing the return provisions and the applicable law, we conclude that both of these findings were erroneous. In our view, while the return provisions did not establish an irrebuttable presumption violative of the due process clause, they constituted sex-based discrimination in violation of Title VII. Thus, we affirm the district court's ultimate conclusion that the Board is liable to the teachers for backpay. 24
25 A review of the Board's pre-1973 maternity leave policy aids in evaluating the application of the irrebuttable presumption analysis of LaFleur. The maternity leave policy required that all pregnant teachers be placed on maternity leave no later than the sixth month of pregnancy. The leave expired three school semesters thereafter. A teacher could request to be returned from leave prior to the expiration of the leave period, but approval of such a request was within the Superintendent's discretion. All teachers on maternity leave who wished to return for the fall semester were required to notify the district in writing by June 1st of their desire to return, and all teachers on maternity leave were required to submit and obtain approval of a physician's certificate of fitness to return to teaching. 26 Like teachers on maternity leave, those who suffered from any illness or disability for more than ten days were required to submit and obtain approval of a physician's certificate of fitness to return. However, those on sick leave were not subject to the June 1st deadline, and the return of teachers on sick leave was not subject to the Superintendent's discretion. 11 Rather, teachers were reinstated from sick leave on the date their doctors certified they were fit to return to work. 27 In LaFleur, the Supreme Court declared that mandatory school board rules requiring teachers to take maternity leave at a fixed point several months before anticipated childbirth, and making them ineligible to return to work until the child was at least three months old violated the due process clause because the rules amounted to conclusive, irrebuttable presumptions of unfitness to teach that were irrational and arbitrary. LaFleur is illustrative of a series of decisions in which the Supreme Court has employed the irrebuttable presumption doctrine to invalidate as arbitrary and irrational various rules that afford no opportunity for rebuttal in an individual case. See, e. g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44, 96 S.Ct. 249, 46 L.Ed.2d 181 (1975) (per curiam); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 93 S.Ct. 2832, 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); but see Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973). These cases have one crucial feature in common: the rules at issue, by virtue of the fact that they drew hard and fast lines not subject to flexible application in an individual case, embodied conclusive irrebuttable presumptions. 28 We conclude that the return provisions of the Board's maternity leave policy did not establish such an irrebuttable presumption. Had the policy made no provisions for return before expiration of the three semester period, a conclusive presumption of unfitness to teach during the period of leave would have been established. But here the reinstatement policy provided for discretionary approval of applications for early return. By specifically providing a teacher the opportunity to request an early return and to prove her fitness to teach through the doctor's certificate, the Board made the opportunity for rebuttal an integral part of its reinstatement process. Such flexibility was lacking in all the rules at issue in the irrebuttable presumption cases. 29 Further, the district court's conclusion that teachers were perfunctorily presumed unfit to teach for a three semester period does not accord with the facts of the case. Not one of the eight teachers in this suit was prevented from returning to work for the entire three semester period. Rather, each teacher was reinstated substantially before the stated expiration of her leave. Indeed, three of the five teachers were returned as relief teachers only slightly more than one month after the date they requested to return. Moreover, the Board has never attempted to defend its delay in reinstating these teachers on the basis that they were unfit to teach. Rather, the Board has specifically admitted that the teachers were physically fit to resume teaching. The Board's reasons for failing to return the teachers to work when they requested were simply the failure of some of the teachers to meet the June 1st notification deadline and the lack of vacancies for the teachers on the dates they sought to return. 30 We conclude that the facts of this case do not fit the mold of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. The problem with the reinstatement provisions of the Board's policy is not that they failed to accord individual teachers an opportunity to rebut a presumption of unfitness to teach. Rather, their fatal flaw lies in the discretion vested in the Superintendent to determine when a teacher could return from maternity leave coupled with the absence of such discretion in the Board or the Superintendent with respect to the reinstatement of those on sick leave. The result of this policy was that those on maternity leave could be delayed from returning for a lack of vacancies, a burden on the employment opportunities of female teachers that male teachers were never forced to encounter.
31
32 The district court held that the teachers failed to prove that the reinstatement provisions of the Board's maternity leave policy constituted gender discrimination violative of Title VII. The court relied upon Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 98 S.Ct. 347, 54 L.Ed.2d 356 (1977), and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976), for the proposition that pregnancy-based differences in employment practices do not constitute gender-based discrimination violative of Title VII absent proof that classification on the basis of pregnancy is a mere pretext designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other. In our view, Satty and Gilbert do not lead to the conclusion that Title VII is inapplicable to the discrimination involved in this case. Based on the findings of fact made by the district court, we hold that as a matter of law the Board's reinstatement policy constituted gender-based discrimination violative of Title VII, 12 and we affirm on that basis the backpay award made by the district court. 13 33 Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer: 34 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's sex ; or 35 (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's sex 36 In Gilbert, the Supreme Court held that an employer disability plan providing nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits to all employees, but excluding disabilities arising from pregnancy, did not violate Title VII absent a showing that exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits was a pretext for discriminating against women. Identifying its equal protection analysis in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 94 S.Ct. 2485, 41 L.Ed.2d 256 (1974), which involved a disability plan strikingly similar to the one in Gilbert, as a useful starting point for analyzing claims of sex-based discrimination under Title VII, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Geduldig that classifications based on pregnancy are neutral rather than gender-based. Absent a showing  'that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other,'  429 U.S. at 135, 97 S.Ct. at 407, quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20, 94 S.Ct. at 2491-92 n.20, the Court found that classification on the basis of pregnancy does not constitute gender-based discrimination within the meaning of the equal protection clause. General Electric's disability plan was held not to be a mere pretext for discrimination against women. The Gilbert opinion recognized the holdings of its prior cases that a prima facie violation of Title VII can be established in some circumstances upon proof that the effect of an otherwise facially neutral plan or classification is to discriminate against members of one class or another, 429 U.S. at 137, 97 S.Ct. at 408, and assumed arguendo that a showing of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of § 703(a)(1). The Court nevertheless held that the plan did not have a discriminatory effect on women because there was no evidence that the total package of benefits under the disability plan was worth more to men than to women. The exclusion of pregnancy from the disability plan was found not to constitute gender-based discrimination under Title VII. 37 One year later, the Supreme Court held in Satty that an employer's policy of denying employees returning from pregnancy leave their accumulated seniority constituted gender-based discrimination violative of § 703(a)(2) of Title VII. Citing Gilbert, the Court treated the seniority policy as neutral on its face in its treatment of male and female employees. However, the Court found that the seniority policy contravened § 703(a)(2) because it had the effect of discriminating against women. The Satty court distinguished Gilbert in the following passage: 38 In Gilbert, supra, there was no showing that General Electric's policy of compensating for all non-job-related disabilities except pregnancy favored men over women. No evidence was produced to suggest that men received more benefits from General Electric's disability insurance fund than did women; both men and women were subject generally to the disabilities covered and presumably drew similar amounts from the insurance fund. We therefore upheld the plan under Title VII 39 Here, by comparison, petitioner has not merely refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but has imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer. The distinction between benefits and burdens is more than one of semantics. We held in Gilbert that § 703(a)(1) did not require that greater economic benefits be paid to one sex or the other because of their differing roles in 'the scheme of human existence,'  429 U.S., at 139, 97 S.Ct. at 410 n.17. But that holding does not allow us to read § 703(a)(2) to permit an employer to burden female employees in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of their different role. 40 434 U.S. at 141-42, 98 S.Ct. at 350-51 (footnote omitted). 41 Though the Court's opinion in Satty left many questions unanswered with respect to when a pregnancy-based classification constitutes gender-based discrimination violative of Title VII, 14 Satty stands for two propositions that are dispositive of this case: (1) a pregnancy-based classification, though neutral on its face, violates § 703(a)(2) of Title VII when its effect is to discriminate on the basis of sex and no showing of sex-based intent is required; and (2) a pregnancy-based classification that has the effect of depriving women of employment opportunities or of adversely affect(ing) (their) status as an employee impose(s) on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer, 434 U.S. at 142, 98 S.Ct. at 351, and, therefore, constitutes sex-based discrimination violative of § 703(a)(2) of Title VII. 42 The district court erred by requiring the teachers to prove, as a part of their prima facie case, that the pregnancy-based classification embodied in the Board's reinstatement policy was a pretext designed to work an invidious discrimination against women. When an employment policy is neutral on its face, proof of pretext must be shown as part of the prima facie case in order to satisfy the intent requirement of the equal protection clause. But when a facially neutral employment practice is challenged under § 703(a)(2), proof of pretext is unnecessary because sex-based intent is not an element of the prima-facie case. 15 Satty necessarily stands for this proposition, for the Satty Court imposed liability under § 703(a)(2) solely on the basis that the facially neutral pregnancy-based seniority policy had a discriminatory impact on women. This case plainly falls within the scope of § 703(a)(2), for the teachers' claim is that the Board's reinstatement policy deprived them of employment opportunities and affected their status as employees by preventing their return to work for varying periods of time. Therefore, the district court erred by dismissing the teachers' claim on the ground that they failed to prove intent to discriminate against women. 43 Based on the facts as found by the district court, we have no difficulty in deciding that as a matter of law the reinstatement provisions of the Board's maternity leave policy as applied to the teachers constituted actionable sex discrimination under § 703(a)(2). The teachers proved that the Board's reinstatement policy discriminated on the basis of pregnancy by vesting discretion in the Superintendent to determine when a teacher could return from maternity leave while granting the Superintendent no concomitant discretion with respect to teachers returning from sick leave. The teachers also proved that the Board's failure to reinstate the teachers did not involve a mere withholding of potential benefits that men cannot and do not receive, 434 U.S. at 142, 98 S.Ct. at 351; rather, it plainly constituted a denial of employment opportunities. And because the Board's reinstatement policy denied employment opportunities on the basis of pregnancy, under the rationale of Satty it imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer. 434 U.S. at 142, 98 S.Ct. at 351. It follows that absent a business justification, the Board's refusal to reinstate the teachers constituted an unlawful employment practice under § 703(a)(2) of Title VI. See Harper v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 619 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1980) (employer's policy of requiring women who had been on pregnancy leave to have sustained a normal menstrual cycle before they could return to work constituted unlawful sex discrimination); In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. Maternity Benefits Litigation, 602 F.2d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 1979) (employer's policy of guaranteeing reinstatement to job position held prior to leave to employees returning from disability leave other than pregnancy, while failing to guarantee reinstatement to female employees returning from maternity leave violated Title VII); Pennington v. Lexington School District, 578 F.2d 546, 548-49 (4th Cir. 1978) (employer's reinstatement policy requiring physically fit female teachers to remain on leave for an entire school year after pregnancy while allowing employees absent for other disabilities to return to work constitutes illegal sex discrimination absent business necessity); cf. deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School District, 588 F.2d 674, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1978) (employer's policy denying use of accumulated sick leave benefits for maternity leave violated Title VII by discriminating against female teachers on the basis of sex). 44
45 Though the teachers proved that the Board's facially neutral reinstatement policy had the effect of depriving women of employment opportunities because of their sex, we must nevertheless consider whether the Board's refusal to reinstate the teachers was brought about by a business necessity. Such a justification is a defense to Title VII liability. See Satty, 434 U.S. at 143, 98 S.Ct. at 352; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 n.14, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2727-28 n.14, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). The Board argues that its refusal to reinstate the teachers was necessary because no vacancies in teaching positions existed at the time the teachers sought to return and the school district could not afford to bear the cost of keeping the teachers on relief status. 16 In evaluating this claim, it is important to understand that lack of vacancies, standing alone, does not explain the Board's refusal to reinstate the teachers to the district's payroll, since it is also true that no vacancies existed for the 340 other teachers who were allowed to remain on the payroll as relief teachers. At most, the lack of vacancies argument explains why teachers who had been on maternity leave were not reinstated to particular teaching positions; it offers no explanation of why teachers who had been on maternity leave were not reinstated to relief positions. The Board's bottom-line argument is an economic one: although those teachers who were on hand were kept on as relief teachers, the district simply could not afford to pay any additional salaries to teachers for whom no teaching posts were available. 46 We need not consider whether the business necessity defense applies to these facts, for even if the asserted economic justification for the Board's actions falls within the scope of the doctrine, we find that the Board's own admissions effectively rebutted its defensive theory. When an employer has defended its discriminatory employment practice on the ground of business necessity, the employee may rebut the employer's showing with proof that the stated business necessity is a pretext for discrimination. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-26, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2375-76, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). Pretext may be proved by showing that less discriminatory alternatives to achievement of the employer's goal were available. Id. at 425, 17 95 S.Ct. at 2375. By the Board's own admission, achievement of its fiscal objectives did not require it to utilize pregnancy as a basis for determining which teachers would remain on the district's payroll. Rather, a number of less discriminatory alternatives existed. As the Board conceded at oral argument, teacher and relief positions could have been filled on the basis of seniority or other objective factors. Likewise, the Board could have laid off any number of teachers it felt necessary by random selection. Moreover, a policy of deferring the return of all teachers on leave, both those who had been pregnant and those who had suffered from other temporary disabilities, would have saved the Board more money than the discriminatory policy it utilized. In view of the availability of these nondiscriminatory alternatives, the Board's attempt to establish a business necessity defense fails as a matter of law. 47
48 Having carried their ultimate burden of proving a violation of Title VII, New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587, n.31, 99 S.Ct. 1355, 1366 n. 31, 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979), the teachers are entitled to an award of backpay to compensate them for the economic loss they sustained as a result of the Board's discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 F.2d 1161, 1167 (5th Cir. 1980); Marks v. Prattco, Inc., 607 F.2d 153, 1155 (5th Cir. 1979). The district court correctly found that each of the five teachers gave the Board timely notice of her desire to return to teaching, 18 and that the economic loss suffered by each teacher was therefore due solely to the Board's discrimination. The court derived the amount of backpay due by calculating the amount of each teacher's lost earnings during the period from the time she desired to return and was fit to teach to the time of her reinstatement. Since the Board does not take issue with the amount of the backpay award, we affirm the award as computed by the district court. 49