Opinion ID: 2678
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Challenged Instruction

Text: Brutus argues that the district court committed reversible error in instructing the jury on how to evaluate her testimony because the instruction contains language that undermined the presumption of innocence owed to her as the accused. We generally review challenged jury instructions de novo, reversing only if the charge, taken as a whole, was prejudicial. See United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1998). Under our system of criminal justice, it is axiomatic and elementary that defendants are entitled to a presumption of innocence. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895); see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). To implement the presumption, the Supreme Court has warned, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691. Our adherence to this admonishment has, on more than one occasion, required that we place[] out of bounds practices that threaten to dilute the presumption of innocence. United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 245-46 (2d Cir.2006); see, e.g., United States v. Dove, 916 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir.1990) (finding that a jury instruction's use of a hypothetical inquiry into whether Jack shot Mary, which was intended to illustrate the concept of circumstantial evidence, was impermissible because it assumed Jack's guilt); United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir.1990) (finding that while guilt-assuming hypothetical questions, posed on cross-examination to a defendant's character witnesses, have probative value in assessing the credibility of the witness, they are prohibited because [they] create[] too great a risk of impairing the presumption of innocence). Principally relying on Gaines, in which we discussed the presumption of innocence in the interested-witness instruction context, Brutus argues that reversible error lies in the district court's instruction that Brutus had a deep personal interest in [the case] . . . possessed by no other witness . . ., [which] create[d] a motive to testify falsely. The government counters that reversal is precluded by United States v. Tolkow, 532 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.1976), which found language nearly identical to that challenged by Brutus to be unobjectionable. The government adds that any untoward effect of the challenged language was adequately balanced by other, more favorable language. There is tension between Tolkow and Gaines. In Gaines, we reviewed an interested-witness instruction relating to the defendant's testimony that stated: Obviously, the defendant has a deep personal interest in the result of his prosecution. This interest creates a motive for false testimony and, therefore, the defendants' testimony should be scrutinized and weighed with care. Gaines, 457 F.3d at 242. We criticized several aspects of this instruction. First, we said that an instruction that the defendant has a motive to testify falsely undermines the presumption of innocence, id. at 246, because it impermissibly presupposes the defendant's guilt, id. at 247(The critical defect in a jury instruction that says the defendant has a motive to lie is its assumption that the defendant is guilty.). In order to prevent [this] needless threat of dilution of the presumption of innocence, we . . . direct[ed] district courts in the circuit not to charge juries that a testifying defendant's interest in the outcome of the case creates a motive to testify falsely. Id. [3] Next, we were concerned about the instruction's statements that the defendant had a deep personal interest in the outcome of the trial and that his testimony should therefore . . . be scrutinized and weighed with care. Id. (alteration in original). We thought that such statements may, by themselves, sufficiently dilute the presumption of innocence to constitute reversible error. We did not go that far, however, and held that these statements simply added to the error already identified in the motive to lie instruction. Id. Nonetheless, we disapproved of jury instructions that highlight[] a testifying defendant's deep personal interest in the outcome of a trial, id., and urged district courts to refrain from using them, see id. at 249. We concluded in Gaines that the charge viewed as a whole was so unbalanced as to amount to reversible error. Id. at 250. In Tolkow, by contrast, we upheld an interested-witness instruction regarding the defendant's testimony that stated: Obviously [the defendant] has a deep, personal interest in the result of his prosecution. Indeed, it is fair to say he has the greatest stake in its outcome. Interest creates a motive for false testimony; the greater the interest the stronger the motive, and a defendant's interest in the result of his trial is of a character possessed by no other witness. 532 F.2d at 859 n. 3. (internal formatting omitted). Recognizing the inconsistency between our ruling in Gaines and our many decisions upholding interested-witness instructions similar to that given in Tolkow, we explained in Gaines that: This case involves (1) a preserved challenge to a charge that (2) the defendant has a deep personal interest giving rise to (3) a motive to lie and a resulting need to (4) carefully scrutinize the defendant's testimony. 457 F.3d at 250 n. 10. We then distinguished the many previously approved interested-witness instructions on the basis that they lacked one of these factors [4]  specifically distinguishing Tolkow on the basis that the instruction therein did not tell the jury to carefully scrutinize the defendant's testimony. Id. The instruction here is, as the government contends, materially indistinguishable from the one given in Tolkow. Both instructions contain statements about the defendant's deep personal interest in the outcome of the case, which is held by no other, and that such an interest creates a motive to testify falsely; but the instructions, both in Tolkow and this case, lack a careful scrutiny instruction. Hence, were we to adhere to Tolkow, the government would prevail on this issue. The principle underlying Gaines, however, leads us to now reject the instruction we once approved in Tolkow and to overrule that holding. [5] Simply stated, an instruction that the defendant's interest in the outcome of the case creates a motive to testify falsely impermissibly undermines the presumption of innocence because it presupposes the defendant's guilt. Gaines, 457 F.3d at 246-47. This is no less true where, as here, the instruction omits additional language specifically cautioning the jury to carefully scrutinize and weigh the defendant's testimony. We also cannot accept the government's contention that the instruction's prejudicial language was balanced by other, more favorable language. We made clear in Gaines that the defect in an instruction that assumes the defendant's guilt is not cured by a further charge that a defendant can still be truthful. Id. at 247. Accordingly, with Gaines we established a prophylactic rule that it is error to instruct the jury that a defendant's interest in the outcome of the case creates a motive to testify falsely; it follows that the charge at issue here was error, the prejudice from which was exacerbated by the district court's reference to the defendant's deep personal interest. See id. We caution our district courts that if the defendant has testified, the charge should tell the jury to evaluate the defendant's testimony in the same way it judges the testimony of other witnesses. See id. at 249. As we did in Gaines, we refer district courts to the Seventh Circuit's pattern instruction. [6] Moreover, if the district court wishes to use additional charging language, we see no problem with the one given in Gaines, stripped of its prejudicial language, id. at 249 & n. 9. [7]