Opinion ID: 778643
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constructive Amendment and Prejudicial Variance

Text: 68 St. Germain argues that the government's trial presentation constructively amended the conspiracy charge in Count Two of the superseding indictment and prejudicially varied from the facts alleged in the indictment. We disagree. 69 A constructive amendment of an indictment `occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are altered, either literally or in effect, by prosecutor or court after the grand jury has last passed upon them.' United States v. Zingaro, 858 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1988) (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C.Cir.1969)). As such, a constructive amendment is a per se violation of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Delano, 55 F.3d 720, 729 (2d Cir.1995). To prevail on a constructive amendment claim, a defendant must demonstrate that either the proof at trial or the trial court's jury instructions so altered an essential element of the charge that, upon review, it is uncertain whether the defendant was convicted of conduct that was the subject of the grand jury's indictment. United States v. Frank, 156 F.3d 332, 337 (2d Cir.1998) ( per curiam ) (citing Zingaro, 858 F.2d at 98). In determining whether an `essential element' of the offense has been modified, moreover, we have `consistently permitted significant flexibility in proof, provided that the defendant was given notice of the core of criminality to be proven at trial.' Delano, 55 F.3d at 729 (quoting United States v. Patino, 962 F.2d 263, 266 (2d Cir.1992) (internal quotations omitted)). 70 Moreover, in the context of a conspiracy charge, [t]he Government need not ... set out with precision each and every act committed ... in furtherance of the conspiracy, particularly where the acts proven at trial were part of the core of the overall scheme and in furtherance of that scheme. United States v. Cohen, 518 F.2d 727, 733 (2d Cir.1975). It is clear the Government may offer proof of acts not included within the indictment, as long as they are within the scope of the conspiracy. United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 64 (2d Cir.1983), abrogated on other grounds by Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259-60, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994). 71 St. Germain argues that the superseding indictment was constructively amended because the government's proof expanded the conspiracy to include proceeds from the collection agreement and expanded Elkins's role in the conspiracy. However, both the collection agreement and Elkins's role in the conspiracy were well within the scope of the conspiracy alleged in the superseding indictment. 72 The superseding indictment charged St. Germain with conspiracy, together with others known and unknown..., [to] unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly,... engage and attempt to engage in monetary transactions in criminally derived property ... that was derived from specified unlawful activity, to wit, the interstate transportation of property obtained by fraud and wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957(a). The essential elements of a conspiracy to engage in monetary transactions with criminally derived property are that the defendant conspired with one or more persons to: (1) engage or attempt to engage; (2) in a monetary transaction; (3) in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000; (4) knowing that the property is derived from unlawful activity; and (5) that the property is, in fact, derived from specified unlawful activity. 73 The superseding indictment specifically alleged that the money used in the transactions at issue was derived from a fraudulent scheme involving commissions that Cerplex paid to Schultz and that St. Germain received a portion of the commissions. The purpose of the collection agreement between Schultz and St. Germain was to provide a vehicle for St. Germain to recover part of his share of the proceeds. The agreement was thus evidence of St. Germain's receipt of the criminally derived property. As such, it fell squarely within the scope of the conspiracy as charged in the indictment and did not alter an essential element of the offense. 74 In addition, as stated above, the superseding indictment referred to conspirators known and unknown. It also specifically identified Elkins as one of the co-conspirators. While the indictment referred to Elkins as a strawman in the purchase of Papago Place, such reference did not limit Elkins's involvement to this act because the Government may offer proof of acts not included within the indictment, as long as they are within the scope of the conspiracy. Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 64. The government's evidence of Elkins's involvement in the conspiracy was within the scope of the conspiracy and therefore did not alter an essential element of the crime for which St. Germain was charged. The superseding indictment was not constructively amended by the government's proof. 75 Similarly, the government's proof at trial did not prejudicially vary from the facts alleged in the indictment. A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different from those alleged in an indictment. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105, 99 S.Ct. 2190, 60 L.Ed.2d 743 (1979). Unlike a constructive amendment, a variance does not broaden the possible basis for conviction beyond that contained in the indictment. Patino, 962 F.2d at 266. Accordingly, a defendant must show that the variance resulted in substantial prejudice in order to obtain relief from his conviction. United States v. McDermott, 918 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir.1990). 76 St. Germain argues that several pieces of evidence at trial varied from the facts in the indictment and thus constituted prejudicial variances. Such evidence includes: (1) Schultz's testimony suggesting that her sales representative contract with Cerplex was a sham; (2) Akers's testimony that Cerplex did not employ third party sales representatives; (3) evidence that Klein and Davis were co-conspirators at Cerplex; and (4) evidence that Schultz paid some of the mortgage on Papago Place. Assuming arguendo that any of this evidence varied from the facts alleged, St. Germain has not established that such a variance was prejudicial. The challenged evidence was within the scope of the Cerplex conspiracy as alleged and, as such, was not of a character that could prejudice St. Germain. A variance is immaterial — and hence not prejudicial — `where the allegation and proof substantially correspond, where the variance is not of a character that could have misled the defendant at the trial, and where the variance is not such as to deprive the accused of his right to be protected against another prosecution for the same offense.' United States v. Mucciante, 21 F.3d 1228, 1236 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Heimann, 705 F.2d 662, 669 (2d Cir.1983)). Because any possible variance identified by St. Germain was immaterial, there was no prejudicial variance between the alleged conspiracy and the proof at trial. 77