Opinion ID: 2389018
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The statutory definition is controlling.

Text: Anderson asks us to construe the words project and owner according to common usage and general principles of statutory construction to determine whether Alyeska is a project owner for purposes of AS 23.30.045 and .055. She argues that broad application of the statutory definition would have unintended consequences, making many businesses potentially liable for workers' compensation benefits when they hire independent contractors and taking away an employee's right to pursue a negligence action. To minimize these possible results, she contends that project should be construed to encompass only construction-type projects of limited duration and that the legislative history supports this narrow reading. Alyeska responds that the legislature itself defined project owner and maintains that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits Anderson's proposed method of construing the statute. It relies on State v. Jeffery to argue that the canons of construction on which Anderson bases her argument only apply when the words in a statute do not have a peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory definition. [12] Alaska Statute 01.10.040(a) provides, in part, Technical words and phrases and those which have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed according to the peculiar and appropriate meaning. With a few narrow exceptions, we do not construe statutory language according to its common meaning when the legislature has provided a definition of a word or phrase, and our statutory construction cases look first to see if the word or phrase to be construed has a specific definition. [13] Anderson's proposed construction of project owner does not fall within the narrow exceptions to this rule. The definition of project owner is not circular: It does not, for example, define project owner as a person who owns a project. [14] Nor does Anderson argue that the language of the definition is ambiguous; she does not, for example, argue that her work was not in the course of Alyeska's business and for that reason should fall outside the provisions of AS 23.30.045 and .055. [15] Instead, Anderson asks us to construe the term project owner according to the common usage of project and owner, arguing that application of the statutory definition would be contrary to the legislative history. But even accepting Anderson's invitation to examine the legislative history does not persuade us that Alyeska falls outside the statutory purview. Anderson argues that the legislative history shows that the legislature only meant project owner to apply to construction-type projects, not to all businesses that use independent contractors. She illustrates her point by using hypothetical examples where broad application of the statutory definition might impose liability when a business owner was not negligent and had little control over the activities that caused an injury. But our review of the legislative history does not support Anderson's contention that the statute was meant to apply only in the construction context. As Alyeska pointed out at oral argument before us, the legislative history contains at least two hypothetical examples of project owners that involved the oil and gas industry's use of contract labor. Moreover, the policy considerations that prompted the legislature to enact the 2004 amendments to the workers' compensation act apply outside the construction context. As we noted in Schiel v. Union Oil Co. of California, the 2004 amendments had the following purposes: to ensure or expand workers' compensation coverage for workers, to increase workplace safety, to prevent `double dipping,' and to provide protection from tort liability to those who are potentially liable for securing workers' compensation coverage. [16] Limiting application of the amendments to the construction field or exempting large employers with ongoing businesses from the definition of project owner, as Anderson urges, would undermine some of these goals. If Anderson's limited construction of project owner were adopted, a grocery store could use contract labor to stock its shelves and completely avoid workers' compensation liability for work-related injuries to the contract laborers simply because its use of contract labor was not related to building or construction or because it used contract labor as part of its day-to-day operations. We see nothing to suggest that the legislature intended such a result. Even though we reject Anderson's argument that the term project owner should be limited to the construction context, we acknowledge that she has posed difficult hypothetical examples about the potential workers' compensation liability of small business owners that use contractors to carry out functions extraneous to their businesses. [17] But because we hold that Alyeska falls within the statutory definition of project owner, we do not have to decide the questions posed in these hypothetical examples.