Opinion ID: 2431
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Advisory Mandamus

Text: The stringencies of traditional mandamus standards admit of a limited exception for what has been termed advisory mandamusthe use of mandamus to provide guidance on a novel question of general or exceptional importance to the administration of justice that should not await review by appeal from a final judgment. In Schlagenhauf v. Holder, [29] the Supreme Court departed in some degree from the traditional mandamus standards to countenance the use of the writ for such advisory purposes. [30] There, the Court indicated that mandamus may be used to settle important questions of first impression where there is a substantial allegation of usurpation of power by the district court. [31] Thus, courts of appeals have some scope for use of mandamus to settle novel questions. On the other hand, as this Court has written, [n]o one could reasonably suppose that the [Supreme] Court has now subscribed ... to a doctrine that any non-frivolous claim of error in a decision is a claim of `usurpation of power' on the theory that courts are bound to decide all issues correctly. [32] The Second Circuit's decisions subsequent to Schlagenhauf do not resolve entirely the uncertainty as to the criteria dividing appropriate from inappropriate uses of advisory mandamus. The cases that bear most strongly on the facts at bar are In re International Business Machines Corp. [33] and United States v. Amante. [34] In IBM, the Circuit granted mandamus to halt the district court's consideration of whether the Tunney Act requirement of judicial approval of consent decrees in government antitrust cases [35] applied to stipulations of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). [36] It did so, however, not simply because it disagreed with the district court's retention of jurisdiction to consider the issue, but for three other reasons. First, both parties were united in their desire that the case be dismissed outright. [37] Second, the case already had gone on for thirteen years, tying up one of the nation's largest industrial concerns, during which time many of the underlying products [had become] commercially outmoded. [38] Finally, there was no serious basis for the assertion that the Tunney Act applied to a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal in light of the plain language of the statute and the clear and indisputable legislative history. [39] Amante concerned a different question, viz. whether a district court had erred in bifurcating a simple felon-in-possession firearm case to require first a trial on the issue of possession and then a separate trial on the issue of the prior felony conviction, the latter of which would take place only after a jury finding of possession. In granting mandamus to vacate the bifurcation order, the Circuit relied upon its conclusions that (1) the issue was significant because [i]ts resolution will affect numerous defendants in similar trials and will aid in the administration of criminal justice, and (2) no remedy [wa]s available to the government other than mandamus. [40] Both IBM and Amante demonstrate that this Court has granted mandamus for advisory purposes when presented with questions of significance and the district court had committed a clear abuse of discretion and usurpation of power. [41] In addition, both cases reached the merits of the issues presented by the petitions as, of course, the Court was compelled to explain the district court's error. But they did not involve the question whether this Court may reach the merits for advisory purposes to deny a petition for mandamus where the issue and need for review are sufficiently pressing. This question was answered in the affirmative in Kaufman v. Edelstein. [42] There, two expert witnesses whom the government had subpoenaed to testify in a civil antitrust case petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to quash the subpoenas. Observing that the district court's denial of the motions to quash clearly was no `usurpation of power' nor a clear abuse of discretion, the Court, speaking through Judge Friendly, stated that the only argument in favor of granting the writ was that the case presented a novel and important issue. [43] The Court then discussed the merits of the case at some length, concluding that, although there existed no privilege protecting expert witnesses from being called to testify, courts in their discretion could protect expert witnesses when good cause was shown. [44] Judge Friendly listed a number of factors pertinent to deciding whether a particular expert witness merited the protection of the court. [45] In sum, we have held that it is appropriate for us to discuss the merits of a challenged district court action to deny mandamus when the question is of sufficient importance and there is a dearth of guidance on the issue.