Opinion ID: 396890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Absence of Substantial Prejudice

Text: 41 Appellant asserts that the cumulative effect of the improper statements was to deny him a fair trial. A prosecutor's improper summation results in a denial of due process when the improper statements cause substantial prejudice to the defendant. See, e. g., United States v. Bivona, supra, 487 F.2d at 444; United States v. White, 486 F.2d 204, 205 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 980, 94 S.Ct. 1569, 39 L.Ed.2d 876 (1974); cf. United States v. Morris, supra, 568 F.2d at 402. Often, the existence of substantial prejudice turns upon the strength of the government's case: if proof of guilt is strong, then the prejudicial effect of the comments tends to be deemed insubstantial; if proof of guilt is weak, then improper statements are more likely to result in reversal. Compare United States v. Gallagher, supra, 576 F.2d at 1042-43 and United States v. Benter, 457 F.2d 1174, 1178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842, 93 S.Ct. 41, 34 L.Ed.2d 82 (1972) with Berger v. United States, supra, 295 U.S. at 88-89, 55 S.Ct. at 633 and United States v. Burse, supra, 531 F.2d at 1155. More comprehensively, however, determining the existence of substantial prejudice involves three factors: the severity of the misconduct; the measures adopted to cure the misconduct; and the certainty of conviction absent the improper statements. See generally Vess, Walking a Tightrope; A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor's Closing Argument, 64 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 22, 54-55 (1973). 42 The first question is whether the improper comments were minor aberrations in a prolonged trial or cumulative evidence of a proceeding dominated by passion and prejudice. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 240, 60 S.Ct. 811, 852, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940); see, e. g., United States v. Sprayregen, supra, 577 F.2d at 175; United States v. Wilner, 523 F.2d 68, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1975). Among the elements weighed in this inquiry are the extent to which the misconduct was intentional and the extent to which the statements were made in response to defense contentions. Here, the prosecutor's offending behavior was confined to his summation: his opening statement and his conduct throughout the six-day trial were free of improper remarks. This was not a trial marked by passion and prejudice. At no time did the prosecutor disregard any rulings of the trial court; in fact, the prosecutor changed the gist of his argument as to why Amato was scared, immediately after the trial judge had overruled the objection to his initial comment. 4 43 The trial court made no effort to cure the effects of the improper remarks. Cf. United States v. Morris, supra, 568 F.2d at 402; United States v. Farnkoff, 535 F.2d 661, 668 (1st Cir. 1976). The judge erroneously overruled appellant's objections and therefore never utilized the authority at his disposal to minimize any prejudice-for example, by ordering the remarks stricken or issuing cautionary instructions. The court's pattern instruction to the jury-that the arguments of counsel are not to be considered evidence-was proper, but was an insufficient response to the prosecutor's conduct. 44 Nevertheless, the trial record strongly indicates that the jury would have convicted appellant even if the improper statements had not been made. The case against appellant was overwhelming; he was caught red-handed, and his explanation was implausible and refuted. 45 Numerous witnesses-other than Amato-flatly contradicted appellant on facts critical to his claim that he was an innocent bystander framed by Amato. An Alitalia employee, Costanzo, testified that appellant had approached him on the afternoon of November 12 looking for Amato; appellant claimed that he had never seen or spoken with Costanzo and that his meeting Amato had been fortuitous. Appellant claimed that he was looking for a second lost suitcase from his November 11 flight; Miradoli testified that appellant had asked him on November 12 (after Amato had left the lost-and-found room) to help locate a bag left by his aunt from the October 22 flight. Appellant claimed that, on the night of November 12, Amato had pointed to the suspect suitcase as the one to select; DEA agent Mella, stationed down the hallway, denied that Amato had pointed. These contradictions, by witnesses other than Amato, undermined appellant's credibility and his defense. 5 46 Appellant's story was so inherently implausible, moreover, that it is unlikely that the jury would have accepted it. His claim that the note that he handed to Amato with the letters RWUY referred to a cleaner named Rightaway, and not to the luggage brandmark Airway, was incredible. Similarly, appellant's assertion that he took the suitcase without opening it to see if it was his, because he could always bring it back, made no sense. Above all, the unlikely claims of coincidence-that appellant had happened along just as Amato was looking for someone to frame; that he had lost a bag just like the one containing the heroin-strained belief, particularly in light of the contradictions of appellant by sundry witnesses. 47 In sum, the prosecutor's remarks, although improper and uncorrected, did not result in substantial prejudice to appellant or deprive him of a fair trial. His summation remarks were the only improper behavior that occurred, and the case against appellant was so strong that the jury in all probability would have found him guilty even absent the improper comments. 48