Opinion ID: 480737
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Existence of an Agreement with Stright

Text: 45 The cornerstone of Baskin's claim that Local 449 breached its duty of fair representation is, of course, the existence of a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and Stright, for without such an agreement, the Union could not have breached its duty to Baskin by failing to compel Stright's performance of contractual obligations. The jury found that Stright had been bound to such an agreement from 1963 through 1967 both as a signatory and by adoption and ratification. Local 449 argues that it was entitled to judgment n.o.v. because, although Moglia v. Geohegan, 403 F.2d 110, 118 (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 919, 89 S.Ct. 1193, 22 L.Ed.2d 453 (1969), suggests that an employer may be bound to such an agreement either by signing it or by adopting and ratifying it, there was insufficient evidence at trial for the jury to find that either action had occurred. We reject this contention. 46 Judgment n.o.v. is proper only if the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movants, without considering credibility or weight, reasonably permits only a conclusion in the movant's favor. Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838, 103 S.Ct. 86, 74 L.Ed.2d 80 (1982). In other words, either there must be such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's finding could only have been the result or sheer surmise and conjecture or the evidence must be so overwhelming that reasonable and fair-minded persons could only have reached the opposite result. Newmont Mines Ltd. v. Hanover Insurance Co., 784 F.2d 127, 132 (2d Cir.1986) (quoting Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683, 688-89 (2d Cir.1983)). Local 449's challenge does not satisfy these standards. 47 The proof included evidence that Stright allowed Local 449 to banish nonunion workers from its 1958 project and dictate their replacement with union workers; that Local 449 placed Baskin, a Union member, with Stright; and that the Union placed its members only with employers who were bound by collective bargaining agreements. There was evidence that Stright promptly began making contributions to the Local 449 Welfare Fund on behalf of Baskin, and made such payments from 1958 through 1970; that such payments would have been unlawful if Stright was not bound by a collective bargaining agreement; and that the Pension Fund would have considered these payments some evidence of Stright's being party to a collective bargaining agreement. Stright's conduct with respect to the payment of below-scale wages and nonpayment of pension contributions was precisely the same after 1968, when Stright and the Union concede Stright was bound by a collective bargaining agreement, as it had been since 1958. 48 Viewed in the light most favorable to Baskin, the evidence also revealed that Stright made payments to Local 449's Welfare Fund and the Pension Fund whenever Local 449 told it to do so and in whatever amounts the Union demanded. It made no payments to the Pension Fund on behalf of Baskin because Local 449 did not tell Stright it was obligated to do so. The jury was plainly entitled to infer that Stright's contributions to the Welfare Fund from 1958 to 1970 had not been voluntary and to accept DeLuca's concession that if an employer's payments were not voluntary they were contractually required. We conclude that the evidence was ample to permit a rational juror to conclude that Stright had been bound by a collective bargaining agreement with Local 449 from 1963 through 1967.