Opinion ID: 809233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant’s Refusal

Text: Citing Randolph, Defendant responds that he objected to the search and effectively vitiated whatever consent Kim may have given. The government disagrees, parsing the exact statement Defendant made to the officers—(“You’re not supposed to be here”)—as too vague to be a true 14 No. 11-3446 statement of non-consent. Similarly, the government contends that Defendant’s statement only objected to the APA’s presence and his arrest, but that it did not refuse the search. Moreover, the government points out that, even if Defendant refused to consent, the APA’s initial search revealed none of the evidence that was eventually seized by the FBI on its subsequent sweep of the apartment. The government attempts to differentiate an essentially indivisible series of events. The officers entered the apartment, arrested Defendant, and began a warrantless search based solely upon their parole authority. Defendant’s objections were therefore sufficient to lodge a challenge to any of the officers’ actions stemming therefrom. Moreover, we note that a substantial amount of the evidence was seized from Defendant’s vehicle based solely upon the APA’s parole authority. The government next argues that Defendant’s objections were without consequence because Randolph only applies when “a physically present” resident refuses consent to a search. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122–23. There are both factual and legal problems with this argument. First, the testimony conflicts as to when exactly Defendant was removed from the apartment. Certain witnesses, including government witnesses, testified that Defendant was still in the apartment when the APA conducted its initial search. Other witnesses for the prosecution testified that Defendant was removed immediately upon his arrest. The district court did not resolve this factual dispute. Moreover, it is also unclear whether Kim signed the FBI’s consent form while Defendant was still present in the apartment. A circuit split currently exists regarding whether or not a nonconsenting resident may be physically removed so as to circumvent Randolph. See United States v. Tatman, 397 F. App’x 152, 166 n.6 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have found that subsequent consent can trump one resident’s refusal after physically removing the 15 No. 11-3446 refusing resident from the premises, but that the Ninth Circuit has drawn the opposite conclusion (comparing United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776, 783–84 (7th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 960–61 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) to United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2008)). We have yet to take a stand on this issue, and we need not do so today, because the government has failed to carry its burden to prove that Kim’s consent was voluntary.