Opinion ID: 1196421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Instruction on Provocation

Text: Defendant requested the following special jury instruction: A defendant may act in the heat of passion at the time of the killing as a result of a series of events which occur over a considerable period of time. [¶] When the provocation extends for a long time, you must take such period of time into account in determining whether there was a sufficient cooling period for the passion to subside. The burden is on the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion. The trial court rejected the proposed instruction on the dual grounds that it was an incorrect statement of the law and that the correct legal points raised were adequately covered in other instructions. (16a) Defendant challenges both reasons for the trial court's refusal to give his requested instruction. We agree with defendant's initial point that provocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter need not occur instantaneously, but may occur over a period of time. People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509 [134 Cal. Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777], is illustrative. In Berry, the defendant's wife Rachel traveled alone to Israel three days after their wedding. When she returned, she announced that she loved another man, they had been sexually intimate, and she now wanted a divorce. For a period of 13 days, Rachel continually provoked defendant with sexual taunts and incitements, alternating acceptance and rejection of him. ( Id. at p. 514.) The defendant killed Rachel. Citing People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321 [325 P.2d 97], we concluded that the two-week period of provocatory conduct by the defendant's wife was sufficient to justify an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion. ( Berry, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 515; see also Borchers, supra, at p. 329 [the victim's long continued provocatory conduct]; People v. Bridgehouse (1956) 47 Cal.2d 406 [303 P.2d 1018] [same].) The key element is not the duration of the source of provocation but `whether or not defendant's reason was, at the time of his act, so disturbed or obscured by some passion ... to such an extent as would render ordinary men of average disposition liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.' ( People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1112 [248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960], quoting People v. Logan (1917) 175 Cal. 45, 49 [164 P. 1121], italics omitted.) Indeed, we note that a jury instruction indistinguishable from defendant's proposed instruction was approved, albeit in dictum, by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. ( People v. Thompkins (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 244, 256-257 & fn. 7 [240 Cal. Rptr. 516].) Defendant's second point  that his proposed instruction was not duplicative of other instructions  also has merit as to some portions of the instruction. The jury was given comprehensive instructions on heat of passion and provocation, including one stating that the killing must have occurred while the slayer was acting under the direct and immediate influence of ... heat of passion, and that the question as to whether the cooling period has elapsed and reason has returned is not measured by the standard of the accused, but the duration of the cooling period is the time it would take an average or ordinarily reasonable person to have cooled his heat of passion and for his reason to have returned. In addition, the jury was told that the prosecution bore the burden of proving defendant did not act while under the heat of passion. Despite these instructions, defendant's proposed instruction raised two points not covered by the standard CALJIC instructions delivered by the court. First, the jury was not informed that provocation could occur over a considerable period of time. Second, it was not told that if provocation occurred over such a period, the jury must take that period of time into account in determining the effect of the cooling-off period. As we discuss, however, the trial court's refusal to deliver an instruction addressing these legal points does not require reversal. (17) A criminal defendant is entitled, on request, to a instruction pinpointing the theory of his defense. ( People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1137 [248 Cal. Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049]; People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [84 Cal. Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847].) As we recently explained, however, instructions that attempt to relate particular facts to a legal issue are generally objectionable as argumentative ( Wright, supra, at p. 1137), and the effect of certain facts on identified theories is best left to argument by counsel, cross-examination of the witnesses, and expert testimony where appropriate. ( Id. at p. 1143.) (16b) Whether the period of provocation was long or short, the jury should consider all the facts to determine whether sufficient time ha[d] elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return. ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 327 [185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) By directing that the jury must take into account the long period of provocation in determining the effect of a cooling-off period, defendant's proposed instruction improperly singled out one factor, favorable to defendant, and improperly elevated it over other factors that the jury should also consider. This portion of the instruction was thus objectionable as argumentative and properly refused, albeit for the wrong reason, by the trial court. ( Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1138, and cases cited.) By contrast, the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, at defendant's request, that legally adequate provocation could occur over a considerable period of time. It was defendant's theory at trial that no single action on the part of the victim provoked the fatal blow but that the book-throwing incident was merely the culmination of his pent-up frustration and anger emanating from his ongoing dysfunctional relationship with the victim. In other words, his defense theory at trial was that he killed after enduring provocatory conduct by the victim over a period of weeks. The People argue there was insufficient evidence of this theory to justify the instruction. We disagree; defendant proffered evidence from which reasonable persons could have concluded there was sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. (See Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 324.) Because defendant requested a pinpoint instruction on his theory of the case that was neither argumentative nor duplicated in the standard instructions, the trial court erred in failing to deliver it to the jury. ( Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1144.) Although the court erred by refusing defendant's requested instruction (or a portion thereof), the error does not require reversal. (18) Reversal is required only if the court, `after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,' is of the `opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]; see also Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1144-1154 [applying Watson to find the instructional error harmless].) [10] (16c) Significantly, the jury was otherwise given comprehensive instructions on provocation and heat of passion and nothing in those instructions precluded the jury from finding adequate provocation resulting from conduct occurring over a considerable period of time. Moreover, defense counsel urged the jury in his closing argument to find such provocation, noting the nature of the relationship (defendant and Smith were lonely, dependent, alcoholic, pathetic), the duration of the alleged provocation (we know that there may have been days and weeks of argument and drinking and confusion), and that Smith became depressed and verbally argumentative when drunk. Later, counsel recounted defendant's statements to Officer Tonello, noting that The argument ... started over something small and kept going on and on becoming shriller and shriller and the voice sounding like an alarm. Indeed, one of the main focal points of the trial  for both sides  was defendant's statements to Dr. Hamilton and Dr. Hutcheson beginning weeks before the killing, indicating tension between defendant and Smith was building and that defendant felt he was losing control of his anger toward Smith. Thus, there was evidence before the jury showing provocation occurring over a period of time and no instruction precluding the jury from giving that evidence its due weight. Finally, although the jury was not directly instructed that provocation could occur over a considerable period of time, the jury was instructed that a killing is first degree murder if it is the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not upon sudden heat of passion. (See CALJIC No. 8.20.) By finding defendant was guilty of first degree murder, the jury necessarily found defendant premeditated and deliberated the killing. This state of mind, involving planning and deliberate action, is manifestly inconsistent with having acted under the heat of passion  even if that state of mind was achieved after a considerable period of provocatory conduct  and clearly demonstrates that defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to give his requested instruction.