Opinion ID: 1264811
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ISRB must give adequate written reasons when imposing exceptional sentence

Text: When setting minimum terms and determining parole, the ISRB must make decisions which are reasonably consistent with the ranges, standards, purposes, and recommendations of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA). RCW 9.95.009(2); RCW 9.95.013; see also Addleman v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wash.2d 503, 511, 730 P.2d 1327 (1986) (offenders convicted and sentenced before the SRA became effective are entitled to have their terms reviewed and redetermined pursuant to SRA purposes, standards, and ranges). Although the ISRB is not bound to mirror SRA criteria in its decisions, but only to be reasonably consistent with it, In re the Personal Restraint of Locklear, 118 Wash.2d 409, 414, 823 P.2d 1078 (1992), the legislature has nevertheless provided: [T]he board and its successors shall give adequate written reasons whenever a minimum term or parole release decision is made which is outside the sentencing ranges adopted pursuant to RCW 9.94A.040 [the SRA]. RCW 9.95.009(2) (emphasis added). The statute therefore imposes a mandatory duty upon the ISRB not simply to provide written reasons for its decision, but for those reasons to be adequate. Minimum adequate reasons must also be supported by facts in the record on appeal. Locklear, 118 Wash.2d at 417, 823 P.2d 1078 ([T]he [ISRB's] reasons for an exceptional sentence must be apparent from the record and not chosen `out of thin air') (quoting In re the Personal Restraint of Robles, 63 Wash.App. 208, 218, 817 P.2d 419 (1991)). Here the ISRB added 60 months to Ecklund's minimum term, bringing his total minimum term to 360 months. [4] Ecklund's minimum term is therefore 40 months in excess of the top of the relevant SRA sentencing range of 240 to 320 months. RCW 9.94A.310. This is an exceptional sentence [5] for which the ISRB must provide adequate written reasons. RCW 9.95.009(2). The ISRB characterized its primary reason for denying Ecklund parole as he [Ecklund] continues to deny his involvement in the crime; however, all of the evidence is in the contrary. Mot. for Discretionary Review, Attach. 3, at 2 (ISRB Dec. & Reasons (Oct. 8, 1996, amended Nov. 7, 1997)). However, even if true, the ISRB does not articulate a rationale to justify denial of parole based simply upon a continued assertion of innocence. Indeed the ISRB's decision focuses almost exclusively on the details of the crime and Ecklund's refusal to admit guilt, concluding it has concern regarding his [Ecklund's] denial as to what kind of risk he would present in returning to the community. Id. at 3. However the ISRB can point to nothing in the record showing that Ecklund's refusal to admit guilt is linked to a higher risk of reoffending. To the contrary, the psychological evaluation of Ecklund states, [Ecklund] lacks many of the risk factors that otherwise would indicate a high risk for reoffending: no juvenile delinquency, no prior acts of physical violence documented, no prior adult offenses other than traffic violations, and no major infractions during incarceration involving fighting or assaultiveness. He has in fact maintained a major infraction-free record during his incarceration since 1985, has programmed adequately, and has involved himself in a number of constructive activities. Thus, given all the years he has served, one wonders whether it now would make much difference in terms of his risk of reoffending whether or not he admits to having committed the instant offense. Mot. for Discretionary Review, Attach. 11, at 4-5 (emphasis added) (Psychological Evaluation by Helmut Riedel, Ph.D. (May 13, 1996)). The ISRB explicitly acknowledges Ecklund has done everything he can, short of confessing, to comply with the ISRB's requirements, stating Ecklund has complied with those expectations [set out by the parole board in 1995] with the exception of Victim Awareness, which is not offered at this facility. Mot. for Discretionary Review, Attach. 3, at 2 (ISRB Dec. & Reasons). Not only does the record before this court fail to demonstrate any connection between Ecklund's refusal to admit guilt and an increased risk of reoffending but it seems to affirmatively negate the unsupported inference as well. Absent such a connection, the ISRB's decision to deny parole and impose an exceptional sentence based primarily on Ecklund's refusal to admit guilt lacks an adequate statement of reasons mandated by RCW 9.95.009(2). The majority demonstrates its agreement on this point when it states, [W]e do not believe that it would have been appropriate for the [Indeterminate Sentence Review] Board to base an exceptional minimum term solely on Ecklund's refusal to admit that he was guilty of the offense which led to his sentence Majority at 348. However the relief granted by the Court of Appeals was remand to the ISRB with instructions to reconsider its decision without regard to [Ecklund's] claim of innocence and denial of guilt. Ecklund, 91 Wash.App. at 454, 957 P.2d 1290. By rejecting the terms of the remand which would disallow this narrow factor, the majority mistakenly permits the ISRB to assume refusal to admit guilt is tantamount to lack of rehabilitation absent an articulated basis in the record. Majority at 348 ([The ISRB] is justified in considering [Ecklund's] denial of guilt as a fact bearing on the question of whether he had been rehabilitated and presents a threat to community safety.). Such an assumption and such deference to the ISRB is inconsistent with the statutory mandate that adequate written reasons must be provided before an exceptional sentence is imposed. RCW 9.95.009(2). The majority relies on RCW 9.95.009(3), which gives priority to public safety considerations to justify the ISRB's decision. [6] However precedent holds simple assertion by the ISRB that public safety is at issue, as in the present case, is insufficient to comply with the statute. Locklear, 118 Wash.2d at 418, 823 P.2d 1078 (seeking to ensure there will be a record sufficient to permit meaningful and efficient appellate oversight of ISRB minimum term decisions). If merely raising the specter of danger to public safety were enough to immunize an ISRB decision from reversal, then judicial review would amount to little more than a rubber stamp.