Opinion ID: 2365094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Penalty-Phase Errors

Text: Defendant asserts error in the selection of the penalty-phase jury, in the conduct of the penalty trial, in the jury charge during this phase of the proceeding, and in the jury's assessment of the aggravating factors. Notwithstanding our finding of error in the own-conduct instruction during the guilt-phase, defendant's contentions are reviewed to provide guidance on the issues raised in the event the State elects to pursue the death penalty on remand.

Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly diminished Juror Robert Bighan's sense of responsibility as a penalty-phase juror by providing assurance that the jury's verdict would be reviewed on appeal. The prosecutor explained to Bighan that the appellate process would be long and thorough, and asked him directly whether that information comforted him. Defendant disputes the State's assertion that the prosecutor's comments were invited by the juror's comments on the State of Illinois' death sentence moratorium and concern about the risk of executing innocent people. According to defendant, the juror merely expressed a general concern about the death penalty that was unworthy of the highly specific response given by the prosecutor. Further, defendant contends that the trial court's curative instruction increased the risk of prejudice. Instead of simply ordering the juror to disregard the prosecutor's remarks, the trial court told the jury that what was said about the appellate process was absolutely correct. In Williams II, this Court emphasized the need for a thorough and searching inquiry into the jurors' attitudes on the death penalty. 113 N.J. at 413, 550 A. 2d 1172. That inquiry is necessary given the important, delicate, and complex nature of the death qualification process. Ibid. This Court also observed in Ramseur that trial courts must be accorded a sound measure of discretion in determining whether a juror's death penalty views would prevent or substantially interfere with the juror's performance of his or her duties. Supra, 106 N.J. at 256, 524 A. 2d 188. However, as part of that delicate interaction with jurors, a trial court must be aware that any instruction that `tend[s] to dilute the jury's sense of responsibility in passing on the issue of life or death' is erroneous. Id. at 316, 524 A. 2d 188 (quoting State v. Mount, 30 N.J. 195, 214, 152 A. 2d 343 (1959) (holding that because juries bear sole responsibility in passing on the issue of life or death, juries are obligated to confront that issue without consideration of the possibility of appeal)). The United States Supreme Court in Caldwell v. Mississippi, considered the validity of a capital sentence after the prosecutor urged the jury to refrain from viewing its role as determining whether the defendant would die because the state Supreme Court would review the correctness of the death sentence. 472 U.S. 320, 323, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2635, 86 L.Ed. 2d 231, 235-36 (1985). The Court overturned the death sentence, stating that [b]ecause we cannot say that [the State's effort to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death] had no effect on the sentencing decision, that decision does not meet the standard of reliability that the Eighth Amendment requires. Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 2646, 86 L.Ed. 2d at 247. The holding in Caldwell was refined later to prohibit only those remarks that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 183 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2472 n. 15, 91 L.Ed. 2d 144, 158-59 n. 15 (1986); see also Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 8, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 2009, 129 L.Ed. 2d 1, 11 (1994) (noting Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Caldwell narrowing scope of holding); State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 536, 776 A. 2d 144 (2001) (stating that [l]ike the United States Supreme Court, we also assume that capital-sentencing jurors recognize the gravity and significance of their responsibility). Thus, to establish a Caldwell violation, the defendant has the burden of showing that the remarks to the jury on the death penalty improperly described the role assigned to them under state law. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 1215, 103 L.Ed. 2d 435, 443 (1989). The prejudice that results from a Caldwell error was recognized in State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988). In Rose, the prosecutor, in the course of his opening statement in the penalty phase, informed the jury that the law, not the jurors, would be responsible for the defendant's execution. Id. at 510, 548 A. 2d 1058. Citing to Caldwell, Ramseur, and Mount, this Court held that the prosecutor's remarks to the jury were knowingly misleading in the sense that they tended to dilute the jury's sense of responsibility in passing on the issue of life or death. Id. at 514, 548 A. 2d 1058. See also State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 164, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) ( Bey II ) (finding reversible error where court's penalty-phase charge failed to communicate that the jury, not the mechanics of the statute or the `law,' is ultimately responsible for the imposition of the death penalty); Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F. 3d 710, 735 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that principle in Caldwell was not violated when trial court instructed the jury that its sentencing recommendation was binding if supported by the evidence), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1088, 116 S.Ct. 807, 133 L.Ed. 2d 754 (1996). The responsibility borne by a sentencing jury is grave and the jury's perception of its signal responsibility to determine whether to impose the death penalty cannot be lightened. It is the difficult judgment that each juror must face. No dilution of the jury's singular role can be allowed to dull an individual juror's comprehension of that responsibility. Our review of the record in this matter persuades us that the prosecutor's statement did tend to minimize Bighan's sense of responsibility. For the prosecutor to have suggested that the appellate process would take care of Bighan's concern about the execution of innocents was improper and had the capacity to mislead. It could have left Bighan with a lessened sense of responsibility for his role as a juror because it assured him that a higher authority would act as a check on the correctness of a jury verdict of death. That was an impermissible suggestion for the prosecutor to convey. The risk that Bighan would take that misapprehension with him into deliberations was not ameliorated when the court informed him that the prosecutor's comments were absolutely correct. Trial courts must act to rectify any juror's misapprehension concerning his or her role in passing on a sentence of life versus death, and must be vigilant in identifying any misunderstandings that may result from suggestive remarks by counsel. The totality of the judge's interaction with and instructions to the jury may have ameliorated the possibility that this exchange with Juror Bighan was reversible error. We need not resolve that question in view of our earlier disposition. However, we urge trial courts to take vigorous and prompt measures to prevent the possibility of that type of suggestiveness in the future.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excusing for cause penalty-phase juror Rebecca Pierson because she could not say explicitly whether she would be willing to vote to impose the death penalty. The test for determining when it is proper to excuse a prospective juror for cause based on the juror's death penalty views is the same under the New Jersey Constitution as it is under the United States Constitution: a juror may not be excused for cause based on his or her views on capital punishment `unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255, 524 A. 2d 188 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2523, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581, 589 (1980)). While the standard does not require that a juror's bias be proven with unmistakable clarity, it also does not require a conscientious juror to state with the same clarity a willingness to convict in a case that has not yet been heard. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256-257, 524 A. 2d 188. Thus, the trial court must conduct a sensitive appraisal of the juror's beliefs and opinions to determine if they would substantially interfere with the juror's performance of his or her duties. Here, Juror Pierson vacillated concerning her ability to impose the death penalty. Although not philosophically or religiously opposed to the death penalty, she equivocated concerning her ability to impose the death penalty when ... faced with a human being. In response to numerous questions concerning her ability to impose the death penalty, Juror Pierson framed her responses to indicate that she would not be able to give a definitive response until she were required to vote and had heard the facts regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors in detail. Notably, when asked whether she would return a verdict for a life sentence if she found that the mitigating factors were outweighed by the aggravating factors, and if she were the deciding vote, she replied: I don't know. The trial court concluded, after extensive probing, that there was no way of knowing whether Juror Pierson would be capable of imposing the death penalty if the facts and circumstances warranted it. The court determined that she was too equivocal in her responses, even when informed that if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors the law required imposition of the death sentence. We are fully satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing Juror Pierson. The trial court conducted a thorough and thoughtful voir dire examination of Juror Pierson's ability to perform the function as a penalty-phase juror in a capital murder trial. After reviewing the record and the extensive probing conducted by the trial court into Juror Pierson's beliefs and opinions, we are satisfied that Juror Pierson's honest and profound uncertainty concerning her ability to vote for the death penalty, even if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, rendered her unable to serve as a capital juror. Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of Juror Pierson constituted an appropriate exercise of its discretion.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the penalty-phase jury that it was required to accept the murder verdicts of the guilt-phase jury in its deliberations on the 4(g)murder in the course of murderaggravating factor. In support, defendant cites to the death penalty statute, which states that evidence presented at trial that is relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors need not be reintroduced at the penalty phase if the factfinder is the same at both stages. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(c). Defendant maintains that the implication of that provision is that evidence from the guilt phase must be re-introduced at the penalty phase if, as was the case here, the factfinder is different. To impose the death penalty, the jury must find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 158-59, 548 A. 2d 887. This Court has declared that a trial is constitutionally defective if the State is not required to prove, over the defendant's objection, the essential elements of the offense charged. The requirement is so basic and fundamental that it admits of no exception no matter how inconsequential the circumstances. State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 293, 566 A. 2d 531 (1989) (holding trial court committed reversible error for failing to instruct jury on State's burden to prove that defendant did not have permit for handgun found in his possession). The necessity of a jury's reconsideration of the elements of a crime established during an earlier portion of a bifurcated trial was recognized in State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189, 519 A. 2d 1361 (1986). In Ragland, the jury convicted the defendant of several offenses, including unlawful possession of a weapon in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5. Id. at 192, 519 A. 2d 1361. Another charge, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7, was severed to avoid prejudice, but was tried before the same jury. Ibid. Before the jury deliberated on the severed count, the trial court instructed the jury that: [i]f you find that the defendant ... was previously convicted for the crime of robbery and that he was in possession of a sawed-off shotgun, as you have indicated ... then you must find him guilty as charged by this Court. Ibid. That jury instruction had the effect of directing a guilty verdict on the possession of a weapon by a convicted felon charge. Id. at 193, 519 A. 2d 1361. The Court held that it is essential ... that the jury be instructed in no uncertain terms to consider anew the evidence previously admitted [and] to disregard completely its prior verdict. Id. at 195, 519 A. 2d 1361. The sole function of a penalty-phase jury is to determine the appropriate sentence, and the evidence presented by the State need only be relevant to that issue and not to a defendant's guilt. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 71, 524 A. 2d 130. However, the distinct nature of the penalty phase allows the jury to reach conclusions concerning aggravating factors and mitigating factors different from and inconsistent with the findings at the original sentencing proceeding. Id. at 72, 524 A. 2d 130. Further, although the defendant may lose whatever advantage inheres in the `residual doubts' that the original jury may have had regarding defendant's guilt, the State may also lose whatever `advantage' inheres in the emotional impact that often surrounds the initial guilt phase. Id. at 71, 524 A. 2d 130 (citation omitted). That proposition served in part as a basis for our decision in State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991), where we held that the State's burden at the penalty phase remains even when an aggravating factor duplicates an element of a crime found by the jury during the guilt phase. Id. at 138-39, 586 A. 2d 85. The aggravating factor alleged, namely that the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment, was analogous to an element of the crime for which he was convicted during the guilt phase of the trial. Id. at 138, 586 A. 2d 85. The defendant argued that by not instructing the jurors to disregard their former factual finding and deliberate anew, the trial court allowed a directed verdict on the aggravating factor in contravention of Ragland. Id. at 138-39, 586 A. 2d 85 (citing to Ragland, supra, 105 N.J. at 195-96, 519 A. 2d 1361). Marshall held that penalty-phase jurors are not bound by findings of fact made by guilt-phase jurors. Id. at 139, 586 A. 2d 85. Because the guilt and sentencing phases are separate proceedings under the Capital Punishment Act, a trial court should instruct a penalty-phase jury of its duty to deliberate anew concerning any facts established by the verdict in the guilt-phase determination that the State relies on to prove an aggravating factor, and of its right to reach a different conclusion concerning such facts in the penalty phase. Ibid. The Court acknowledged that it would be a rare case where a penalty-phase jury, especially one not presented with any new evidence in the penalty phase, would make penalty-phase determinations that contradict its verdict in the guilt phase. Ibid. However, the Court concluded that reversal was unwarranted under the facts of the case before it because this jury understood clearly that the penalty proceedings were separate from the guilt phase of the case, and required the jury's fresh determination on the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. Ibid. The Court's holding in Marshall is reflected in the model jury charge on the 4(e) aggravating factorthat the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value. When the guilt-phase jury finds that the defendant procured a murder by payment or promise of payment, the trial court must instruct the penalty-phase jury to deliberate anew: While you have already determined that the defendant procured the commission of the murder by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value during the guilt phase of the trial, that finding is insufficient for this sentencing proceeding. That is so because the guilt and sentencing phases are considered as separate proceedings. Therefore, you must deliberate anew regarding any facts established by your verdict in the guilt phase determination that the State relies on to prove an aggravating factor, and you have the right to reach a different conclusion about such facts in the penalty phase. [ Judges Bench Manual For Capital Causes, Appendix J-22 (July 17, 2000).] A similar instruction is required when the alleged aggravating factor is 4(g), that the defendant committed murder in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing after committing or attempting to commit felony murder (murder in the course of robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnaping, or the crime of contempt in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9b). Judges Bench Manual, Appendix J-26. However, when the defendant is alleged to have committed murder in the course of murder, the instruction apparently is not required to be given. Judges Bench Manual, Appendix J-26 n. 41. Instead, the trial court need only state: I charge you that in order to find the existence of this aggravating factor, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the following: (a) the commission of a [murder] AND (b) that the killing of another victim was caused by the defendant at some time within the course of the commission of that crime which can include flight after the commission of the murder. [ Judges Bench Manual, Appendix J-26.] The issue raised by defendant is whether the State should be required to reprove the elements of murder to establish that he committed murder in the course of murder pursuant to aggravating factor 4(g). In cases of felony murder, the model jury charge on aggravating factor 4(g) requires the trial court to instruct the penalty-phase jury to disregard the guilt-phase jury's conclusion that the defendant did commit the predicate felony. That is because the commission of the predicate felony constitutes an element of aggravating factor 4(g). Similarly, in the case of murder within murder, where the predicate felony is murder and where murder constitutes an element of aggravating factor 4(g), it follows that the penalty-phase jury should be instructed to deliberate anew in conformance with this Court's holding in Marshall. Although the jury in Marshall was the same for the guilt and penalty phases, that does not distinguish the Marshall holding such that application of the principle of deliberation anew should not occur here. Further, to accomplish that deliberation, the prosecution is required under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(c) to reintroduce relevant guilt-phase evidence when the factfinder at the penalty phase is different from the factfinder at the guilt phase. Defendant argues not that the penalty-phase jury should have been permitted to acquit him of the murders, but that it should have been given an opportunity to consider anew the evidence supporting his convictions and to view it from a different perspective than that of the guilt-phase jury. Properly instructed, the penalty-phase jury could have concluded that the 4(g) aggravating factor should have been accorded less weight in the balancing process in conformance with this Court's holding in Biegenwald. Although the guilt-phase verdict would have remained intact, defendant might have received a sentence of imprisonment in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3. We conclude, therefore, that the instruction as it appears in our Judges Bench Manual, and as used here, requires correction. Because the charge had the capacity to affect seriously the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors by a separate penalty-phase jury, its use would have necessitated reversal of defendant's penalty-phase judgment but for our ruling on the jury's own-conduct determination that itself warrants reversal of defendant's death sentence.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding from the penalty-phase criticism of the State's physical evidence, thereby depriving the jury of the ability to consider residual doubt in its sentencing decision. Prior to commencement of the penalty trial, the court heard argument on the State's motion to exclude the proposed testimony of a forensic scientist who was hired by defendant to evaluate the physical evidence and to present a crime scene reconstruction for the jury. Defendant sought to call the forensic scientist to illuminate the inadequacies in the State's crime-scene processing and evidence collection. Defendant intended to rely on that testimony with respect to the circumstances of the crime and the State's burden to prove aggravating factor 4(g); to suggest defendant's lesser role in the crime from that of Junior's; and to establish a basis to support a passion/provocation jury charge. Because residual doubt concerning a defendant's guilt is not relevant to character or the circumstances of the offense, defendants do not have the right under the United States Constitution to have the jury instructed on residual doubt as a mitigating factor. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 174, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2327, 101 L.Ed. 2d 155, 165-66 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution limits the penalty-phase jury in capital cases to consider, as a mitigating factor, evidence of any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965, 57 L.Ed. 2d 973, 990 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, under the New Jersey Constitution, the proffered evidence must be relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors; therefore, [r]etrial of issues relevant only to guilt is not permitted. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 71, 524 A. 2d 130. Thus, [w]hile defendant may lose whatever advantage inheres in the `residual doubts' that the original jury may have had regarding defendant's guilt, the State may also lose whatever `advantage' inheres in the emotional impact that often surrounds the initial guilt phase. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 71, 524 A. 2d 130 (citation omitted). Defendant urges reconsideration of our prior decisions, seeking a holding that evidence of residual doubt is admissible at the penalty phase. We decline to do so and reaffirm the principle that the only evidence admissible in the penalty phase is evidence relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors. Defendant also argues that he was improperly precluded from presenting evidence that was both critical of the aggravating factors and relevant to the circumstances of the offense. Because we are requiring the State to reprove the elements of murder to establish aggravating factor 4(g), defendant will have the opportunity to criticize the evidence presented in support of aggravating factor 4(g) and to present his own evidence relevant to the circumstances of the offense on retrial.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's introduction of inadmissible evidence of the similarity between the circumstances of defendant's prior murder conviction and the present matter improperly encouraged the imposition of the death sentence. Defendant contends that the prosecutor elicited testimony during the penalty phase that defendant and his prior murder victim worked together in a large marijuana distribution network, a fact that, in the minds of the jurors, would have linked that murder to the present offenses. Moreover, he says the details of the prior murder, including diagrams of the locations of the wounds, were inflammatory and should not have been admitted. Defendant's point of error includes an argument that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to accept defendant's offer to stipulate to the prior murder conviction. The trial court believed that it could not require the stipulation and, therefore, the State proceeded to call both the New York Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted the prior murder case and the medical examiner who examined the victim. Our jurisprudence reflects an abiding effort to guard against jury prejudice in the penalty phase of a capital case. State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 638-39, 562 A. 2d 1320 (1989). Other-crimes evidence is of special concern because of its capacity to prejudice the capital-sentencing deliberations. State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 586, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990). The prejudicial effect of prior-conviction evidence is particularly high when the prior conviction is for a similar crime. State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 386, 625 A. 2d 1085 (1993). In proving the aggravating factor of prior murder, the State may offer evidence of a prior homicide in the form of the identity and age of the victim, the manner of death and the relationship, if any, of the victim to the defendant. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f). Ordinarily, the existence of a prior murder conviction is established simply by the introduction into evidence of the judgment of conviction. Simon, supra, 161 N.J. at 460, 737 A. 2d 1. Because the conviction itself constitutes the statutory aggravating factor, Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 276, 524 A. 2d 188, the judgment is introduced for the limited purpose of aiding the jury's determination whether to impose a life or death sentence. Thus, although the State may offer evidence of a prior conviction to prove the aggravating factor of prior murder, the purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f) is `to avoid turning the sentencing proceeding into a second trial of the previous case and at the same time to provide the jury with some information about the prior conviction.' State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 136, 594 A. 2d 232 (1991) (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee Statement to Senate No. 950, at 2, concerning purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f)). In Erazo, supra, this Court considered thoroughly the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f) and the policy considerations that support it. Rejecting the claim that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f) violated the prohibition against double jeopardy, the Court stated that the statute makes evidence of a prior murder admissible not for the purpose of punishing defendant for that murder, but to enable the jury to determine the appropriate sentence for the present murder. Id. at 134, 594 A. 2d 232. The Court noted that [t]he history of c(2)(f) reflects the Legislature's concern about the amount of evidence of prior murders that is admissible on the penalty phase. Id. at 136, 594 A. 2d 232. Reiterating the need to guard against `jury prejudice,' the Court held that in addition to complying with the statutory restrictions on evidence used to prove a prior murder, a trial court also must instruct the jury on the limited relevance of prior-murder evidence. Id. at 135-36, 594 A. 2d 232. Case law has examined the parameters of various aspects of prior murder that are admissible in a capital penalty trial. See generally, State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 595-97, 610 A. 2d 814 (1992) ( Bey III ) (stating that medical evidence presented in clinical terminology does not eliminate potentially prejudicial effect and instructing that manner of death should be described in general terms); Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 574-75, 575 A. 2d 816 (citing prosecutor's conduct as improper and an attempt to inflame penalty jury in case decided prior to Erazo when prosecutor exceeded defense stipulation and court instruction on prior murder by telling jury that defendant `blew away half of the victim's face' and `crippled another human being'). The amount of prior murder information that should be disclosed concerning a victim's relationship to the defendant has not been addressed by this Court. Here, the State called the New York Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted the prior murder case. After testifying to the charges against defendant in that case and the age of the prior victim, the witness was asked about the relationship between defendant and the prior victim. He replied: I learned through the trial testimony that [defendant] and the victim as well as Mr. Nicholas [a co-defendant in the prior murder] were not only close friends but also involved in a major drug distribution network involving marijuana. Defendant objected to the irrelevant and highly prejudicial nature of the testimony. The trial court sustained the objection on the ground that the prosecutor was allowed only to show that defendant and the victim were friends and [a]nything beyond that such as involving a major drug distribution is irrelevant. We concur with the trial court's ruling. That defendant and the victim were friends is admissible under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f). However, the further circumstances surrounding the nature of the relationship exceeded permissible limits under the statute. The evidence had the ability to prejudice defendant given the similarity between the circumstances surrounding the prior murder and that of the current murders. Due to the potentially prejudicial effect of the testimony, the trial court gave the jury a curative instruction immediately after the prosecutor elicited the testimony about the New York drug operation. In no uncertain terms, the court instructed the jury not to consider that information in its deliberations: Ladies and gentlemen, I instruct you that under our law when the State intends to prove that one of the aggravating factors is a prior murder, there's certain limitations that are in place upon it insofar as the proofs are concerned. When evidence is admitted concerning prior murders, nothing of the facts of the murders beyond name and age of [sic] victim, the manner of death and the victim's relationship to the defendant should be allowed. Anything else is irrelevant. Therefore, I instruct you that anything you heard about these people being involved in a major drug distribution business, although you heard it, I can tell you to disregard it but I'm also going to tell you that it's not to be considered at all during your deliberations. Consistent with this Court's direction in Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 135-36, 594 A. 2d 232, the court also charged the jury that defendant already had been punished for the prior murder and that they were not to consider the offense for that purpose. We note defendant's argument that the prosecutor raised the issue of defendant's New York drug distribution activities during cross-examination of the mitigation expert and during summation. However, because the mitigation expert's testimony on defendant's New York drug activities was admissible testimony and not stricken from the record, the prosecutor was permitted to discuss that testimony in her summation. Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to prove the manner of death in the prior murder with diagrams illustrating the location of the victim's wounds. Specifically, the prosecutor called the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on the victim in the New York case. When the medical examiner took the stand, the prosecutor inquired as to his name, position, and qualifications. The following ensued concerning the autopsy: Q. Now after completing the autopsy, did you reach a conclusion as to the cause of Philip Rowe's death? A. Yes, I did. Q. And did he sustain a gunshot wound to the hand? A. Yes, he did. Q. That was a through and through wound? A. From the back of the left hand through the palm side through and through, correct. Q. Did he sustain two gunshot wounds to the head? A. Yes, he did. Q. Did one enter through the left temple and exit through the ear? A. That's correct. Q. And did the other enter through the back of the head and exit through the parietal orbit? A. On the right side. Yes. True. Q. Did he sustain any injuries that were consistent with what are known as defensive wounds? A. Yeah .... [T]here was no such cluster of [defensive] wounds in this case except for an abraded mark that was circular on the back of the left hand but isn't what we would typically call a cluster of defense wounds. The prosecutor then had the medical examiner identify photographs and diagrams of the wounds that were either taken during the autopsy or prepared by the witness. The diagrams were later admitted over the defense's objection that they were inflammatory. Defendant's objection is similar to the one raised by the defendant in Erazo. At issue in Erazo was the admissibility of three pages from the autopsy report from the defendant's prior murder conviction. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 131, 594 A. 2d 232. The selected pages described in detail the multiple stab wounds to the victim and contained a diagram showing the location of the wounds. Ibid. Noting that the evidence was admitted pursuant to a stipulation by both parties, the Court declined to find plain error. Id. at 136, 594 A. 2d 232. However, because the case was being remanded on other grounds, the Court held that the defendant should not be bound by his prior stipulation in his new trial, reasoning: We believe that the statutory purpose can be served with less than the stipulated evidence. The prejudicial effect of a graphic and detailed account of the victim's death might exceed its probative value. On remand, the purposes of the statute will be served if the evidence of the manner of [the former victim's] death is described as multiple stab wounds to the chest, lungs, and heart.