Opinion ID: 815708
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Laprade was convicted of using and carrying a .45 caliber firearm in connection with the armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). He argues on 5 appeal that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction on this charge. According to Laprade, the jury could not have reasonably concluded that he possessed a .45 caliber firearm during the crime because that firearm was never recovered, no eyewitnesses saw him discharge a firearm, and the majority of shell casings found at the scene were fired from Mathis’s 9 millimeter firearm. Because Laprade did not move for a judgment of acquittal on this ground at the close of evidence, we review for plain error. United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 381 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 260–61 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1997); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)) (“Where, as here, a defendant does not preserve the issue of sufficiency of the evidence by making a timely motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence, this Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence for plain error.”). “The plain error standard is met when ‘(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 178 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Marcus, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2160 (2010)). We are not persuaded the jury committed plain error in convicting Laprade on this charge. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) provides in pertinent part: [A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or 6 carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall . . . if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of no less than 10 years. At trial, the Government introduced Laprade’s statements that he carried and discharged a .45 caliber handgun in the parking lot as he and Mathis were departing the credit union. Those statements were corroborated by evidence introduced at trial that a .45 caliber shell was recovered from the parking lot and that a partially full box of .45 caliber ammunition was recovered from Laprade’s home. This is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict. It is settled that “the government may defeat a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge on circumstantial evidence alone.” United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006)). There is no requirement that there be eyewitness testimony of the defendant firing the weapon or that the authorities recover the weapon. Moreover, that all but one of the casings recovered at the crime scene were 9 millimeter casings from Mathis’s firearm is in fact consistent with Laprade’s statement that he fired his weapon once. On this record, we have little difficulty concluding that a reasonable jury could convict Laprade for using the .45 caliber firearm.