Opinion ID: 76803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 1 Specifically, the instruction read: The conduct of a person at the time of his arrest is not, of course, sufficient in itself to establish the guilt of that person, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by the jury in light of all the other evidence in the case in determining the guilt or innocence of that person. You should consider that there may be reasons for the conduct by the Defendant that are fully consistent with innocence. A feeling of guilt does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of a crime. If you determine that the conduct of the Defendant showed a consciousness of guilt on the Defendant’s part, the weight, if any, to be attached to that evidence is also a matter exclusively for you as a jury to determine. 6 This Court reviews sufficiency of the evidence de novo, “view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in the government's favor.” United States v. Martinez, 83 F.3d 371, 374 (11th Cir. 1996). We will not overturn a conviction on the grounds of insufficient evidence “unless no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Christo, 129 F.3d 578, 579 (11th Cir. 1997). Finally, our Court must accept a jury’s inferences and determinations of witness credibility. United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 1998). Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a felon to possess a firearm. Section 922(g)(1) required the government to prove “three distinct elements:” (1) that Wright was a convicted felon; (2) that Wright knew he was in possession of a firearm; and (3) that the firearm affected or was in interstate commerce. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003). Wright agreed to his status as a convicted felon, and takes issue only with the second element - knowing possession. The government need not prove actual possession in order to fulfill the “knowing” requirement of § 922(g)(1). Rather, it may be shown through constructive possession. See United States v. Sweeting, 933 F.2d 962, 965 (11th Cir. 1991). The firearm need not be on or near the defendant’s person in order to amount to knowing possession. 7 See United States v. Winchester, 916 F.2d 601, 603-04 (11th Cir.1990) (holding firearm found behind couch when defendant not home sufficient for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)). Moreover, we have held in United States v. Gates, that a defendant had knowing possession of a firearm when driving a car with the weapon beneath the driver’s seat. 967 F.2d 497, 499 (11th Cir. 1992). In the instant case, a reasonable jury could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Wright was in knowing possession of the firearm. United States v. Billue, 994 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.1993). Possession can be shown by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771, 778 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Smith, 591 F.2d 1105, 1107 (5th Cir.1979).2 Possession can be either actual or constructive. Smith, 591 F.2d at 1107. In order to establish constructive possession, the government must produce evidence showing ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself ... or the vehicle in which contraband is concealed. Smith 591 F.2d at 1107. There is no dispute that there was a weapon in the vehicle. Officers found the firearm under Wright’s seat, next to an open bottle of cold beer. Wright owned the 2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981. 8 automobile in which the firearm was carried. Wright had been operating the car when the officers pulled him over. Evidence showed Wright was driving under the influence and once officers attempted to arrest him, Wright aggressively resisted, which could indicate that Wright only resisted after he realized officers would impound the car and discover the gun. See United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 1982) (admitting defendant’s resistance to arrest as evidence of consciousness of guilt). Finally, when Wright commented that it would be “lights out” if he had made it back to the vehicle and formed a pistol with his hand, a jury could infer that Wright knew of the firearm and was prepared to use it. See United States v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1990) (upholding conviction for possession of unregistered firearm where defendant disclaimed knowledge of grenade in his vehicle). The fact that Wright’s father testified that the gun belonged to him and that he accidentally left it in his son’s vehicle does not detract from the evidence. Assessing the credibility of one witness is within the jury’s exclusive province, and all reasonable inferences and credibility choices must be in favor of the jury verdict. United States v. Pruitt, 763 F.2d 1256, 1263- 64 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1084, 106 S.Ct. 856, 88 L.Ed.2d 896 (1985). Based on the jury’s verdict, it is evident that it did not give much credence to the testimony of Wright’s father. Therefore, we hold that the government presented sufficient evidence to convict Wright under 18 9 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).