Opinion ID: 2814864
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Continuing Jeopardy

Text: Owens’s final argument is that the OCCA’s holding that Owens was subject to continuing jeopardy on the felony murder charge was contrary to clearly established law. Specifically, he contends that even where continuing jeopardy would otherwise allow for retrial on a charge, Yeager establishes that collateral estoppel may nonetheless act as a bar to the second trial. The Double Jeopardy Clause is not “an absolute bar to successive trials.” Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 308 (1984); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause . . . does not offer a guarantee to the defendant that the State will vindicate its societal interest 12 (...continued) considering the application of collateral estoppel to a case of inconsistent verdicts. See Bravo-Fernandez, 2015 WL 3652599, at , ; Simpson v. Lockhart, 942 F.2d 493, 496 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Citron, 853 F.2d 1055, 1058 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The defendant’s burden is particularly difficult to satisfy when the jury has reached inconsistent verdicts. Such verdicts, whether based on error, confusion, or a desire to compromise, give little guidance as to the jury’s factual findings.”); Hoffer v. Morrow, 797 F.2d 348, 352 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[A]n inconsistent verdict cannot be used to establish collateral estoppel and thereby bar retrial under the double jeopardy clause . . . .”); United States v. Price, 750 F.2d 363, 266 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bruno, 531 F. App’x 47, 49 (2d Cir. 2013); Evans v. United States, 987 A.2d 1138, 1142–43 (D.C. 2010); State v. Kelly, 992 A.2d 776, 786 (N.J. 2010) (“Thus, in cases of inconsistent verdicts returned by the same jury at the same trial, the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion has no meaning, because it cannot be determined why a jury returned an acquittal.”); see also 2A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 468 (4th ed. 2015) (“Res judicata concepts are not applicable to inconsistent verdicts.”). But see People v. Michigan, 852 N.W.2d 134 (Mich. 2014) (holding that inconsistent vacated convictions have no place in the collateral estoppel analysis of an acquittal). -33- in the enforcement of the criminal laws in one proceeding.”). As a general matter, the Clause does not bar reprosecution if a jury fails to reach a verdict or if a defendant successfully appeals a conviction on a ground other than sufficiency of the evidence. Justices of Bos., 466 U.S. at 308; see also United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896). The reprosecution is considered a continuation of the original jeopardy. Yeager, 557 U.S. at 118. In Yeager, the defendant achieved a hung verdict on several insider trading counts and the government sought to retry him. The Supreme Court recognized that the government would ordinarily be free to reprosecute Yeager on the insider trading counts because the jury’s failure to reach a verdict meant jeopardy on those charges had not terminated. The Court found, however, that “the question presented [could not] be resolved by asking [only] whether the Government should be given one complete opportunity to convict” Yeager because the Double Jeopardy Clause also embodies a second, dueling interest “in the preservation of the finality of judgments.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The interest in “preserving the finality of the jury’s judgment on the fraud counts” meant that collateral estoppel may nonetheless apply to bar the reprosecution on the insider trading counts despite the continuing jeopardy. After reciting the uncontroversial proposition after Yeager that continuing jeopardy does not end the inquiry where a defendant also argues collateral estoppel applies, Owens succinctly concludes “[t]he OCCA’s reliance on -34- continuing jeopardy contradicts the governing law.” Aplt. Br. at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). We cannot agree. The OCCA stated that continuing jeopardy applies to the felony murder charge and then went on to consider whether collateral estoppel nonetheless precluded the retrial. The OCCA concluded that collateral estoppel did not apply given the inconsistency of the verdicts in the first trial, and thus, continuing jeopardy permitted Owens to be retried on the felony murder charge. The OCCA never said that because Owens was subject to continuing jeopardy, collateral estoppel could not be a bar to his retrial. Thus, we find no basis for finding the OCCA’s decision was contrary to clearly established law.