Opinion ID: 774603
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: 29 Styron complains that since the statute under which he was convicted of capital murder became effective on September 1, 1993, the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that all elements of the offense had to be committed on or after that date operated to subject Styron to an ex post facto law and to deny him due process of law. However, the defense neither objected to the jury charge nor requested an alternative charge along the lines Styron now asserts as crucial. 30 Styron's assertion that there was considerable evidence at Styron's trial that elements of the offense were committed before September 1, 1993 is not supported by the record. There was evidence that the victim had suffered physical abuse for several months prior to his death on October 26, 1993, but the medical evidence revealed that the victim suffered three nearly simultaneous but distinct traumas to the head approximately three days prior to his death, any of which could have caused the fatality. Styron admitted to punching the child once on October 23, 1993, and there was no evidence that any acts of abuse prior to this date contributed to the victim's death. 31 Moreover, the indictment properly alleged that the murder took place on or about October 23, 1993, and the jury charge tracked the language of the indictment: 32 Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 23rd day of October, 1993, in Liberty County, Texas, the defendant, RONFORD LEE STYRON, JR., did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the death of an individual, namely, Lee Hollace Styron, an individual under six years of age, by striking or hitting the head of Lee Hollace Styron with Ronford Lee Styron, Jr.'s fist or by causing the head of Lee Hollace Styron to strike or hit an object or by manner and means unknown to the Grand Jury, then you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder as charged in Count I of the indictment. 33 There was no evidence from which the jury could have found that actions by Styron prior to September 1, 1993, were the cause of death. The complained-of jury instruction properly charged the jury as to the temporal element of the offense. Styron's complaint on these issues is without merit. 34 Finally, in order for Styron's conviction to violate the ex post facto prohibition, the statute under which he was convicted would have to punish as a crime an act previously legal when committed, make more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its commission, or remove a defense available according to the law when the act was committed. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977) (citing Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925)). The statute under which Styron was tried and convicted did none of these things as the jury reasonably found that the offense was committed after its effective date of September 1, 1993. 35 In sum, these issues raised by Styron do not make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as required under the AEDPA. A COA will not issue.