Opinion ID: 4854742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ill 2d at 360–61, 657 N.E.2d at 898.

Text: Finally, while we acknowledge the district court’s point, drawn from Illinois caselaw, that the more obvious the injury, the more easily a plaintiﬀ should be able to determine its cause, we do not think that Ms. Stark’s condition was so obviously a wrongful injury. See Hoﬀman, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1009, 765 N.E.2d at 121. That is, before she spoke with Ms. Enright, Ms. Stark could reasonably believe that her meshrelated complications were brought on by her body’s natural reaction to the mesh—that her pre-existing EDS was to blame, and she need not look any further for a reasonable explanation—particularly where, as here, her “natural reaction” theory was substantiated in conversations with Dr. Roth and Dr. Elser. Additionally, Ms. Stark could reasonably 2d at 149, 421 N.E.2d at 871. Dr. Taubert, on the other hand, felt that plaintiff might have a blood clot in her leg and decided to hospitalize her. Id. When plaintiff was hospitalized a second time, Dr. Weimer and Dr. Taubert again came to different conclusions about the potential for birthcontrol pills to cause blood clots. Id. at 156–57, 421 N.E.2d at 874. That’s not what happened here. Ms. Stark’s three doctors shared an identity of opinion regarding her condition that was plainly absent in Witherell. Her doctors never opined to her that the mesh was possibly defective, and, at some point, all three opined that her EDS was possibly to blame for her continued incontinence and post-procedure complications. 28 No. 20-1837 believe that the mesh device was not defective or the source of her complications because Dr. Elser implanted a second mesh device to treat issues either caused or exacerbated by the ﬁrst mesh device. These theories are reasonably aligned: Ms. Stark believed that her body rejected the ﬁrst mesh device, but believed that the second device, as Dr. Elser told her, was working as it was supposed to. Then again, as defendants argue, perhaps Ms. Stark was unreasonable in holding onto this “natural reaction” theory for so long. On the record before us, it is simply not clear. And where there is reasonable doubt, summary judgment is not appropriate. The choice between competing reasonable inferences is for a jury. REVERSED AND REMANDED for proceedings con- sistent with this opinion.