Opinion ID: 1277190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Relationship Between Broce and Hubbard

Text: ¶ 28 In Broce, Ray Broce pled guilty to two counts of conspiracy. Broce, 488 U.S. at 566, 109 S.Ct. 757. Another defendant, involved in the same conspiracy but prosecuted separately for two counts of conspiracy, successfully argued that there was only a single conspiracy and that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the multiplicitous charges. Id. at 566-67, 109 S.Ct. 757. Relying on results from this other prosecution, Broce collaterally attacked his two-count conviction as multiplicitous. Id. at 567, 109 S.Ct. 757. ¶ 29 The Supreme Court held that Broce's guilty plea relinquished his right to assert a double jeopardy claim, even though he never expressly waived this right. Id. at 573-74, 109 S.Ct. 757. The Court reasoned, a defendant who pleads guilty to two counts with facial allegations of distinct offenses concede[s] that he has committed two separate crimes. Id. at 570, 109 S.Ct. 757. Thus, a guilty plea alone is a sufficient basis to conclude that a defendant has relinquished a multiplicity challenge. Id. at 571 n. , 109 S.Ct. 757. ¶ 30 The holding in Broce followed from the nature and effect of a guilty plea. A guilty plea is an `admission that [the defendant] committed the crime charged against him.' Broce, 488 U.S. at 570, 109 S.Ct. 757 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)). It is an admission that all of the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful sentence[ ] are true. Id. at 569, 109 S.Ct. 757. These admissions necessarily entail that a defendant relinquishes her opportunity to receive a factual hearing on a fact-intensive unit-of-prosecution claim after pleading guilty. Id. at 573-74, 109 S.Ct. 757. ¶ 31 The only published Wisconsin case that discusses Broce is Hubbard. In Hubbard the court of appeals held that a plea does not waive a double jeopardy defense and that only an express waiver can preclude a defendant from having the merits of his double jeopardy claim reviewed on appeal. Hubbard, 206 Wis.2d at 655, 657, 558 N.W.2d 126. The court distinguished Broce, limiting its holding to situations where (1) a defendant seeks to collaterally attack a guilty plea, and (2) the double jeopardy violation cannot be resolved on the record. Id. at 655, 558 N.W.2d 126. The Hubbard court found the facts of the case satisfied neither of the two prerequisites for invoking Broce, because Hubbard challenged his convictions as multiplicitous on direct appeal and it was possible to resolve the multiplicity challenge on the record. Id. at 656, 558 N.W.2d 126. Based solely on the record, therefore, the court of appeals reviewed the merits of Hubbard's multiplicity claim, concluding his conviction for six counts of issuing worthless checks did not violate double jeopardy. Id. at 662, 558 N.W.2d 126. ¶ 32 Kelty relies upon Hubbard for the rule that only an express waiver can relinquish a defendant's right to raise a double jeopardy challenge after pleading guilty. Kelty argues the court of appeals in the present case correctly invoked Hubbard. She contends she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty pleas if the State fails to present evidence that establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the two counts of first-degree reckless injury are not multiplicitous. According to Kelty, Broce does not apply because it precludes a double jeopardy challenge to a guilty plea only on collateral attack, not on direct appeal. ¶ 33 The State responds by asking this court to overrule Hubbard insofar as it limited the applicability of Broce to collateral attacks. The State asserts that the distinction between a collateral attack and a direct appeal was irrelevant to the analysis in Broce. According to the State, the fundamental holding of Broce is that a defendant relinquishes the right to an evidentiary hearing on a double jeopardy claim when she pleads guilty. Therefore, the State reasons, the court of appeals erred, both in Hubbard and in the present case, when it elevated the distinction between direct appeal and collateral attack to a reason not to apply Broce. ¶ 34 We agree with the State. A guilty plea waives a multiplicity claim anytime the claim cannot be resolved on the record, regardless whether a case presents on direct appeal or collateral attack. In Broce the distinction between direct appeal and collateral attack was not material to the discussion; it was just happenstance that the case involved a collateral attack. [13] Subsequent decisions from the federal circuits confirm this conclusion. See United States v. Kurti, 427 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir.2005) (applying Broce on direct appeal); United States v. Leyland, 277 F.3d 628, 631-32 (2d Cir.2002) (same); United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 83-84 (3d Cir.1992); United States v. Quinones, 906 F.2d 924, 925-27 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Kaiser, 893 F.2d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 550, 553 (9th Cir.1989) (applying Broce on direct appeal to conclude the defendant waived the right to an evidentiary hearing on her due process challenge). ¶ 35 We know of no published decision that has refused to apply Broce for the sole reason that a defendant challenged a guilty plea on direct appeal rather than collateral attack. ¶ 36 In the context of addressing the question whether a guilty plea waives the right to an evidentiary hearing on a multiplicity challenge, we conclude the distinction between direct appeal and collateral attack is irrelevant. Over and over the Broce court stressed the nature and effect of a guilty plea and the admissions of guilt that necessarily flow from the entry of a voluntary plea. Broce, 488 U.S. at 570, 573-74, 109 S.Ct. 757. Recognizing the effect of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea surpasses the state's interest in finality, although that interest, particularly when a plea bargain is involved, is also substantial. ¶ 37 Because the distinction between a direct appeal and collateral attack is irrelevant, this case is on the same track as Broce. We conclude that neither overbroad precedent from Wisconsin courts nor any policy view of our criminal justice system warrants our breaking ranks with Broce. [14]
¶ 38 The differences that Kelty seeks to draw between Broce and the Wisconsin rule of express waiver are not as clear-cut as she claims. The Supreme Court in Broce did not conclude that a guilty plea waives the right to raise a double jeopardy challenge. Rather, the Court held that a guilty plea waives the right to a fact-finding hearing on a double jeopardy challenge. Broce, 488 U.S. at 573, 109 S.Ct. 757. Thus, a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that judged on its face the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute. Id. at 575, 109 S.Ct. 757 (quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241). What this means is that a court will consider the merits of a defendant's double jeopardy challenge if it can be resolved on the record as it existed at the time the defendant pled. [15] ¶ 39 Except for some unnecessarily expansive language on the need for express waiver, e.g., Robinson, 249 Wis.2d 553, ¶ 13, 638 N.W.2d 564 (An express waiver of a double jeopardy claim in a plea agreement is needed for a waiver of a double jeopardy claim.), and Hubbard, 206 Wis.2d at 656, 558 N.W.2d 126, none of the published Wisconsin cases that recognize a double jeopardy exception to the guilty-plea-waiver rule is inconsistent with Broce on its facts. In all these Wisconsin cases, appellate courts resolved any double jeopardy issue based on the record without a fact-finding hearing to supplement the record. See Multaler, 252 Wis.2d 54, ¶¶ 59, 66, 643 N.W.2d 437 (based on the record, no multiplicity violation); Robinson, 249 Wis.2d 553, ¶ 12, 638 N.W.2d 564 (multiplicity violation acknowledged by parties); Lechner, 217 Wis.2d at 413, 416-17, 576 N.W.2d 912 (based on the record, no multiplicity violation); Hubbard, 206 Wis.2d at 662, 558 N.W.2d 126 (same); Riley, 166 Wis.2d at 304, 479 N.W.2d 234 (same); Hartnek, 146 Wis.2d at 197, 430 N.W.2d 361 (same). Thus, the analysis in these cases is exactly what Broce requires: if a double jeopardy challenge can be resolved without any need to venture beyond the record, the court should decide the claim on its merits. Broce, 488 U.S. at 575-76, 109 S.Ct. 757. Otherwise, by entering a guilty plea, a defendant relinquishes the opportunity to receive a fact-finding hearing on a double jeopardy claim. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 573-74, 576, 109 S.Ct. 757. We withdraw the language in Robinson, 249 Wis.2d 553, ¶ 13, 638 N.W.2d 564, Hubbard, 206 Wis.2d at 656, 558 N.W.2d 126, and other cases that suggests that only express waiver can waive a double jeopardy claim.
¶ 40 The rule set forth in Broce balances the conflicting interests of a defendant and the state. On one hand, Broce is a check on defendants who may attempt gamesmanship or seek two kicks at the cat. Consider the facts of this case. Kelty reached a plea agreement with the State in which the State agreed to drop charges and have other charges read in at sentencing. Significantly, this plea agreement reduced Kelty's maximum exposure from 128 years to 61-½ years. Despite these concessions, Kelty still challenges her conviction as multiplicitous. [16] She is demanding an evidentiary hearing, almost six years after the crimes were committed, and more than five years after entering her pleas. If the court of appeals decision in the present case supplied the rule of law, Kelty would receive her fact-finding hearing even though the case has already received exhaustive review by Judge Mason. ¶ 41 Functionally, this hearing would likely be comparable to a small trial. Unlike a trial, however, Kelty would have nothing to lose since she has already negotiated a plea agreement and has already been sentenced. Under the court of appeals analysis, Kelty would receive the benefit of a guilty plea and a trial even though a guilty plea necessarily established her factual guilt, Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, 109 S.Ct. 757; State v. Pohlhammer, 82 Wis.2d 1, 4, 260 N.W.2d 678 (1978) (on motion for re-hearing) (originally reported in 78 Wis.2d 516, 254 N.W.2d 478 (1977)), and waived her rights to a trial, to present evidence, and to make the State present evidence to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown, ___ Wis.2d ___, ¶ 67, 716 N.W.2d 906. ¶ 42 On the other hand, Broce ensures adequate protection for the double jeopardy rights of defendants. Defendants may present a double jeopardy challenge if the issue can be resolved on the record, as recognized in Broce. Only the class of double jeopardy defects that cannot be resolved on the record will escape substantive review. This result logically follows from the nature of a guilty plea. Where doubts about the presence of a double jeopardy violation exist, these doubts should be treated no differently than other factual and legal uncertainties, which are also resolved by a guilty plea. Just as a defendant does not know whether the state will be able to prove the factual predicates necessary to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant does not know whether she will succeed on a double jeopardy claim that is heavily enmeshed with disputed and uncertain facts. In both situations, a plea should waive the defendant's right to make the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts necessary to support guilt. ¶ 43 Although Broce limits the right to substantive review of some alleged double jeopardy violations, a defendant may obtain a postconviction fact-finding hearing when she seeks to withdraw a guilty plea because (1) the plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; or (2) the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in deciding to enter a plea. Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, 574, 109 S.Ct. 757. In both of these situations, if the defendant's postconviction motion is sufficient, she is entitled to a fact-finding hearing. A guilty plea waives constitutional trial rights, but does not waive Fourteenth Amendment due process rights or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which are the rights implicated in a challenge that a guilty plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and a challenge that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. ¶ 44 A properly conducted plea colloquy assures that the defendant understands the nature of the charges and the elements the state would be required to prove at trial. It also establishes that there is a factual basis for each of the charges against the defendant [17] and that the defendant understands the trial rights she is giving up by entering a plea. Brown, ___ Wis.2d ___, ¶ 35, 716 N.W.2d 906; Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 261-62, 389 N.W.2d 12. Notwithstanding a guilty plea, when a defendant files a postconviction motion that adequately alleges that the plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the plea colloquy was defective in discussing the elements of the crime or the factual basis for multiple charges, or because the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to a possible multiplicity claim, she is entitled to a fact-finding hearing under well-established law. ¶ 45 Even though a guilty plea relinquishes a defendant's right to a fact-finding hearing on a double jeopardy challenge, nothing about our decision prevents a prosecutor or a court from securing a defendant's express waiver of his or her double jeopardy rights. See Salters v. State, 52 Wis.2d 708, 714, 191 N.W.2d 19 (1971) (recognizing the validity of an express waiver of double jeopardy rights). We believe this is the better practice. Express waivers not only make for a more complete record, but also allow a circuit court and a prosecutor to guard against the possibility of reversible error. They lend greater confidence to convictions secured by guilty pleas, by reducing concerns that a conviction may have resulted in part from some shortcoming or deficiency of defense counsel.