Opinion ID: 472144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims Against Former Superintendent Riles in his Individual Capacity

Text: 137 Doe and Smith's claims against Riles in his individual capacity present somewhat more complicated problems. In their complaints, they sued Riles for damages in both his official and individual capacities pursuant to the EAHCA, section 504, and section 1983. Riles eventually pleaded qualified immunity on the claims asserted against him individually. Soon thereafter, the plaintiffs requested further discovery against Riles. The district court promptly denied the request on two grounds: first, that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim against Riles in his individual capacity; and, second, that the deposing of Riles would add nothing to the claim against him in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief. Order Re Further Discovery and Proceedings Re Claims Against State Defendants at 1 (Oct. 26, 1983), reprinted in C.R. item 265. We agree with the plaintiffs that the denial of further discovery was tantamount to a sua sponte dismissal of their claims against Riles in his individual capacity because of their failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 138 The district court's action was grounded on the plaintiffs' implicit theory that Riles's liability stemmed from his failure to perform his official duties. The court observed that the only plausible omission liability alleged in the complaint is defendant's failure to promulgate or implement regulations or policy. It concluded that because nothing stated in the complaint ... suggests some conduct or omission by defendant giving rise to a common law cause of action, the plaintiffs had alleged only violations by Riles in his official capacity. See Order Re Further Discovery and Proceedings Re Claims Against State Defendants at 2 (citing Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir.1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 719, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983)), reprinted in C.R. item 265. 139 We sustain the district court's holding, but on somewhat more fully developed grounds. The claims based on section 504 were subject to dismissal for the reasons already discussed, viz. that the EAHCA supersedes section 504 in regard to claims alleging a denial of the right to a free appropriate public education. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3473, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984); Alexopulos v. Riles, 784 F.2d 1408, 1411-12 (9th Cir.1986). 140 The remaining claims--EAHCA claims, section 1983 claims based upon the EAHCA, and section 1983 claims based upon the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process--are ones with respect to which Riles at all relevant times enjoyed a qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2737, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984), the Supreme Court clearly delineated the scope of this qualified immunity: A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. Id., 104 S.Ct. at 3021; accord Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. 141 We do not believe that Doe and Smith can make the required Davis v. Scherer showing. 142
143 As this case amply illustrates, at the time the actions against the plaintiffs took place, the effect of the EAHCA on school disciplinary matters was uncertain in this circuit. Similarly unclear were the specific duties of the responsible state agency in overseeing local agencies' compliance with the EAHCA. In the EACHA, Congress frequently spoke as an oracle, not as the author of detailed specifications. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Riles's omissions violated clearly established rights of the plaintiffs under the EAHCA.
144 Plaintiffs are no more successful with respect to their independent due process claims. They argue that fundamental fairness compels states to afford handicapped children procedures more involved than those the Supreme Court prescribed for other students in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-84, 95 S.Ct. 729, 738-41, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). Whatever the merits of this assertion, we do not think that any such constitutional right was clearly established at the time the plaintiffs' causes of action arose. 145 Therefore, we hold the plaintiffs' damage claims against Riles in his individual capacity are barred by his qualified immunity.