Opinion ID: 722562
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Defendant Jones

Text: 83 Defendant Jones argues that it constitutes cumulative punishment to convict him for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise offense and for conspiracy. This court held in United States v. Mohwish, 993 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1993) that a defendant cannot be subjected to cumulative punishment for both conspiracy and a CCE violation even if the conspiracy and CCE sentences run concurrently. The recent Supreme Court opinion of Rutledge v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996) has affirmed this rule. In light of this rule, the district court in the present case vacated defendant Jones' conspiracy conviction subject to the right of the United States to move to reinstate it in the event the CCE conviction should at some point be overturned. The district court is affirmed.
84 Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, defendant Jones' sentence was enhanced four levels for being an organizer and leader of an organization involving five or more participants. He contends on appeal that the district court failed to make a finding as to the identity of the five individuals whom he organized, relying on this court's opinion in United States v. Stubbs, 11 F.3d 632, 641 (6th Cir.1993). 85 This argument has no merit. This court in Stubbs did not require a district court to identify the five persons whom the defendant organized, but merely required the identity of the five participants involved in the criminal activity. Id. Moreover, in Stubbs, the defendant had not been charged with conspiracy, as defendant Jones in the present case was charged. In United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851, 859 (6th Cir.1991), this court held that where a trial judge also presides over the sentencing, it is not improper for him not to make specific references about why he classifies a defendant as a leader or organizer. In the present case, defendant Jones was convicted at trial along with six codefendants of the conspiracy count charged in the indictment, and there was sufficient evidence to indicate that he managed at a minimum five of these six codefendants. 9 For these reasons, the district court is affirmed on this issue.
86 Defendant Jones contends that the jury's verdict forfeiting his interest in a Mercedes-Benz, a Honda CRX, a Hyundai, a residence, and currency was not supported by the evidence because there was no proof that the property at issue had any connection to the cocaine allegedly bought and sold by defendant. 87 We disagree. There was sufficient evidence connecting the property to the cocaine. First, the currency forfeited was money, which was used by informants to purchase cocaine, a total of $6,000 in all. In regard to the Mercedes-Benz, defendant Anthony Kelly purchased the car for Jones and registered it in his mother's name in 1988, when Kelly was supplying Jones with kilogram quantities of cocaine every month. Also, the informant Charles Beneby testified that defendant Jones tried to trade the Mercedes-Benz to him for quantities of cocaine. In regard to the Honda CRX, the evidence indicates that defendant Jones used this car both in Florida and Knoxville, Tennessee to conduct activities promoting his continuing criminal enterprise. Several coconspirators also testified that defendant Jones and his codefendants extensively used a 1990 Hyundai, which he purchased from defendant Angela Elder to conduct his continuing criminal enterprise. In regard to the forfeiture of the residence located at 421 N.E. 26th Avenue in Boynton Beach, Florida, which was deeded to his mother, coconspirator Davis testified that drug proceeds were transported to that house to conduct a continuing criminal enterprise, and that the house was where the money laundered proceeds were sent. 88 In regard to defendant Jones' argument that these forfeitures were disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the value of the cumulative assets forfeited did not equal the fines which could have been assessed. Therefore, it cannot be rationally suggested that the forfeitures were so grossly disproportionate to the crime that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment or an excessive fine. See United States v. Smith, 966 F.2d 1045, 1056 (6th Cir.1992). The district court is affirmed on this issue.
89 On May 14, 1993, defendant Jones filed a motion to suppress evidence derived from the electronic surveillance of his mother's telephone, evidence which he contended was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The motion was denied. Defendant contends that the affidavit of Agent Garten, which was used to get a warrant for this surveillance, provided no evidence that Betty Jones and defendant Jones had other than a mother-son relationship, and there was nothing to indicate the telephone would be used illegally. Thus, he alleged, the application lacked probable cause. 90 We disagree with defendant Jones' argument. In regard to a wiretap application, the issue is whether the affidavit supplies sufficient information so that a judge can find probable cause that the telephone at issue is being used in an illegal operation. United States v. Domme, 753 F.2d 950, 953 (11th Cir.1985). Agent Garten's affidavit set forth that defendant Jones was engaged in drug trafficking for an extensive period of time, that he utilized his mother's residence for this purpose, and that he used the telephone to contact other drug dealers, who were specifically named. Therefore, we find that there was probable cause to believe a crime would be uncovered by the proposed wiretap. The district court is affirmed on this issue.
91 Defendant Jones argues that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence by two points pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 for possession of a dangerous weapon, arguing that a weapon on the premises alone does not permit an enhancement. United States v. McGhee, 882 F.2d 1095, 1099 (6th Cir.1989). 92 A district court's finding that a defendant possessed a firearm during a drug crime is a factual finding subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Duncan, 918 F.2d 647, 650 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933, 111 S.Ct. 2055, 114 L.Ed.2d 461 (1991). In Bailey v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 501, 503, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the Supreme Court found that for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for use of a firearm, the evidence had to show that the gun was actively employed. However, Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(1) requires enhancement only if a dangerous weapon was possessed and does not specify that the weapon must be used. The Supreme Court in Bailey suggested that § 2D1.1(b)(1) was an enhancement tool for dealing with those who mix guns and drugs, but whose conduct does not fall within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which requires that the defendant use (in the sense of actively employ) or carry the weapon in the commission of the offense. Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 509. The Supreme Court took great pains in Bailey to limit its holding to convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and specifically indicated its holding did not apply to guideline enhancements for weapons possession. Id. Therefore, Bailey does not control the present analysis. United States v. Betz, 82 F.3d 205, 211 n. 3 (8th Cir.1996). See also United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1486 n. 4 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Pollard, 72 F.3d 66, 68-69 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Castillo, 77 F.3d 1480, 1499 n. 34 (5th Cir.1996). 93 We find that there is sufficient evidence that defendant Jones possessed a dangerous weapon within the meaning of § 2D1.1(b)(1). The commentary to § 1B1.1 at Application Note 1(d) defines dangerous weapon to include an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury. Application Note 3 to § 2D1.1 further provides that the adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense. 94 In the present case, there was evidence that defendant Jones possessed a nine-millimeter pistol and an AK-47 rifle at the Sutters Mill apartment which he shared with defendant Troutman during the course of the conspiracy. The evidence also demonstrated that at that apartment, defendant Jones stored cocaine and drug proceeds and bagged cocaine for resale. Furthermore, there was evidence defendant Jones used a baseball bat to assault codefendant Watson in April 1989 in Austin Homes in relation to an argument concerning cocaine. Additionally, the evidence indicated that pipe bombs and a shotgun were stored at the Concepts 21 apartment where defendant Jones stayed and where cocaine was stored and bagged for resale. The evidence also established that employees of defendant Jones regularly carried weapons in Austin Homes while distributing and conspiring to distribute cocaine. The possession of a gun by one coconspirator is attributable to another coconspirator if such possession constitutes reasonably foreseeable conduct. United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d at 1217. We find that in light of this evidence, it was not clearly improbable that dangerous weapons were possessed in relation to the offenses for which defendant Jones was convicted. United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1460 (6th Cir.1991). The district court's finding is not clearly erroneous and is affirmed. 10