Opinion ID: 311492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: rights-of-way issued to the state of alaska

Text: 169 The State of Alaska has applied for and the Secretary of the Interior has stated his intention to grant a permanent right-of-way for a public highway from the Yukon River to Prudhoe Bay along the pipeline route, a 20-year lease of lands on which to locate three public airports, and permits for the free use of gravel with which to construct these facilities. Appellants draw our attention to the facts that construction of these facilities is indispensable to the proposed pipeline, that the State probably would not have constructed these facilities (at least not at the present time) were it not for the pipeline, and that the facilities are not actually going to be constructed by the State, but rather by Alyeska who by contract with the State has agreed to construct the facilities at its own expense. Based on these allegations, appellants charge that the rights-of-way are nothing but another device to tack together separate rights-of-way in order to achieve that which is explicitly proscribed by the Mineral Leasing Act. Putting it another way, appellants maintain that these too are rights-of-way for the transportation of oil which exceed the width limitations of Section 28 and are therefore barred by the provision in Section 28 [t]hat no right-of-way shall hereafter be granted over said lands for the transportation of oil or natural gas except under and subject to the provisions, limitations, and conditions of this section. 170 Appellees respond by pointing to specific statutory authority for each right -of-way, and argue that we should not read Section 28 so as to forbid resort to other statutory grants of rights-of-way. The highway right-of-way, they argue, is authorized by 43 U.S.C. Sec. 932 (1970) which provides very simply: The right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted. The airport leases are alleged to be authorized under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 211 (1970) which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to lease for use as a public airport any contiguous public lands, unreserved and unappropriated, not to exceed two thousand five hundred and sixty acres in area   . Finally, the application for a free use permit for gravel rests upon 30 U.S.C. Sec. 601 (1970) which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to dispose of mineral materials including gravel. That section provides that the Secretary must charge a price for such materials except that he is authorized in his discretion to permit any    State    to take and remove, without charge, materials and resources subject to this subchapter for use other than for commercial or industrial purposes or resale. 171 In rebuttal appellants contend that the statutes are inapplicable to the rights-of-way at issue in this lawsuit. In their view, the road to be constructed by Alaska will not qualify as a highway within the meaning of Section 932 because it will not be open to the public; similarly, they charge that the airports to be constructed under the lease will not be public within the meaning of Section 211. Finally, since the ultimate purposes of these facilities are allegedly to facilitate construction of the pipeline, they argue, gravel with which the facilities will be constructed will be used for commercial or industrial purposes within the meaning of Section 601, thus making the free use exception inapplicable. 172 These competing contentions of the parties raise two separate questions for this court. First, does Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act preclude resort to other statutory grants of rights-of-way in cases where Section 28 and the other statutes appear in conflict? Second, if the answer to the first question is no, do the rights-of-way at issue in this case meet the requirements of the specific statutes cited by appellees?
173 The only theory upon which we might conclude that Section 28 forbids resort to other statutory rights-of-way is that Congress, in enacting Section 28, intended it to repeal or supersede these other statutes in situations where they conflict. Although Section 28 was passed after one of the other statutes cited by appellees, Section 932, 87 we hesitate to conclude that its enactment was intended to operate as a repeal of that statute to the extent that Section 932 permits rights-of-way which incidentally, or even primarily, are used to facilitate construction of an oil pipeline. It is an axiom of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. 88 Thus when interpreting statutes inconsistencies are to be avoided and repeal by implication found only where there is a positive repugnancy between the two or where the intention to repeal is clear and manifest. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 295, 73 S.Ct. 1152, 97 L.Ed. 1607 (1953) (Mr. Justice Clark, concurring); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 199, 60 S.Ct. 182, 84 L.Ed. 181 (1939). In the case of Section 28, we cannot find any such positive repugnancy or any such manifest intent to repeal. Section 932 is nowhere mentioned in the legislative history of Section 28. It should also be noted that Congress' intent in enacting the Mineral Leasing Act was to grant rights-of-way where none existed previously, not to take away rights-of-way already authorized by statute. 174 A differently phrased yet similar principle of statutory construction is that where there are two acts on the same subject-here rights-of-way in federal lands-effect should be given to both if possible. United States v. Borden Co., supra, 308 U.S. at 198, 60 S.Ct. 182; Rawls v. United States, 8 Cir., 331 F.2d 21, 28 (1964); A.P.W. Paper Co. v. F.T.C., 2 Cir., 149 F.2d 424, 427 (1945), affirmed, 328 U.S. 193, 66 S.Ct. 932, 90 L.Ed. 1165 (1946). Courts should make every effort to reconcile allegedly conflicting statutes and to give effect to the language and intent of both, so long as doing so does not deprive one or the other of its essential meaning. Myers v. Hollister, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 390, 226 F.2d 346, 348 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 987, 76 S.Ct. 474, 100 L.Ed. 854 (1956). 175 This doctrine should be of special significance when we deal with allegedly conflicting public land laws. As a cursory glance at those sections of the United States Code which deal with public lands will indicate, these laws are hardly a model of neat organization and uniform planning. Congress recently noted in creating the Public Land Law Review Commission: 176 Because the public land laws of the United States have developed over a long period of years through a series of Acts of Congress which are not fully correlated with each other and because those laws, or some of them, may be inadequate to meet the current and future needs of the American people    it is necessary to have a comprehensive review of those laws and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder and to determine whether and to what extent revisions thereof are necessary. 177 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1392 (1970). This is an area of the law where it truly can be said that most statutes are sui generis. It is an area where it is extremely doubtful that Congress, when passing certain legislation, was aware of, let alone intended, inconsistencies with prior legislation. Indeed, the history of Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act is a good example of the lack of organization and coordination in this area of our nation's statutory framework. As noted in Part I supra, when Congress passed the Mineral Leasing Act it thought the only prior law dealing with oil pipelines was an 1896 statute, now codified at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 962 (1970), which granted rights-of-way for pipelines in Colorado and Wyoming. Congress was evidently unaware of a 1910 statute dealing with rights-of-way for pipelines through public lands in the State of Arkansas, see 43 U.S.C. Sec. 966 (1970), an unawareness caused, no doubt, by the fact that in 1920 the first edition of the United States Code had not yet been prepared. However understandable this ignorance may be, it indicates that in this area of the law we should be especially hesitant to arrive at inferences with respect to congressional intent to have one statute supplant, modify or supersede another. Absent specific indication to the contrary, the only reasonable inference is that Congress intended all of its statutes to have effect, and it is this inference we follow in holding that nothing in Section 28 precludes resort to other specific statutory grants of rights-of-way, even in cases where the purposes for which said rights-of-way are to be used seem to fall within the purposes intended to be covered by Section 28.
178 Having concluded that if the rights-of-way at issue qualify under the specific statutory provisions cited by appellees they will be valid notwithstanding Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act, we can now analyze whether in fact they so qualify. 179
180 Appellants contend that the road to be built does not qualify as a highway under 43 U.S.C. Sec. 932 (1970). They argue first that, even though Alaska has formally indicated its intention to construct a public highway along the right-of-way, its real motive is not benefit to the public but assistance to those constructing the pipeline, and that this motive takes the road outside Section 932. Second, they charge that the State in fact has no intention of making the road public, at least not until construction of the pipeline has been completed, pointing to the fact that the construction contract between Alaska and Alyeska gives Alyeska a preference over the public to use the road. 181 There is no question that the State, at least formally, has indicated its intention to construct a public highway along the right-of-way requested. The application from the State Department of Highways to the Bureau of Land Management specifically states that [t]he primary purpose for which the right of way is to be used is a public highway. 89 In addition, in 1970 the legislature of the State passed a statute enabling the Department of Highways to contract with Alyeska for construction of the highway. In that statute [t]he legislature finds and declares that there is an immediate need for a public highway from the Yukon River to the Arctic Ocean and that this public highway should be constructed by the State of Alaska at this time   . Alaska Stat. Sec. 19.40.010(a). Ordinarily this expression of intent would constitute valid acceptance of the right-of-way granted in Section 932. That section acts as a present grant which takes effect as soon as it is accepted by the State. 90 Tholl v. Koles, 65 Kan. 802, 803, 70 P. 881, 882 (1902); cf. Railroad Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U.S. 426, 429, 26 L.Ed.2d 578 (1880). All that is needed for acceptance is some positive act on the part of the appropriate public authorities of the state, clearly manifesting an intention to accept   . Hamerly v. Denton, Alaska, 359 P.2d 121, 123 (1961). 91 182 Appellants charge that this is not the ordinary case because the State's real intentions and real motives are not to construct a public highway but to permit Alyeska to build a haul road for construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline. It is a well known precept of our jurisprudence that we shun attempts to look behind a stated legislative purpose to find a hidden intention or motive, and that we may not restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56, 24 S.Ct. 769, 776, 49 L.Ed. 78 (1904). See United States v. O'Brien, supra, 391 U.S. at 383, 88 S.Ct. 1673; Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455, 51 S.Ct. 522, 75 L.Ed. 1154 (1931). While this doctrine typically has force in a context different from that present here, namely review of the constitutionality of legislative enactments, we think it thoroughly applicable to the instant case. The doctrine is based on the theory that ascertaining motive is a difficult and hazardous task, see United States v. O'Brien, supra, a factor present when reviewing administrative as well as legislative action, in a constitutional context or otherwise. In addition, any rule requiring us to look behind the face of Alaska's action in this case and analyze its real motive is inconsistent with the sound federal-state relationship that the judiciary has carefully protected in other contexts. 183 Even were we to pierce the alleged facade of Alaska's intentions, we would be constrained to approve the highway right-of-way. The State has been interested in providing some form of ground transportation to the North Slope area for many years. Studies of a proposed road were made in both 1951 and 1965, and in 1966 the State Legislature authorized the expenditure of up to $20,000 for another study, involving aerial photography and visual investigation of principal alternative routes and the drafting of maps and preliminary cost estimates for the various alternatives. 92 The State's intentions to have a public highway, rather than a mere pipeline construction road, are further evidenced by the fact that the State required Alyeska to make certain changes in the design features of the road to better accommodate public use. 93 These changes included realigning segments of the road to tie it in with an existing network of roads, reducing grades in certain segments, changing standards for bridges and culverts to ensure their continued maintenance after construction of the pipeline is completed, and enlarging bridge spans to better accommodate public traffic. 184 Appellants charge that even though Alaska might intend eventually to open the road to the public, the contract between the State and Alyeska envisions granting Alyeska preferential use during the pipeline construction period-that is, it may be read to allow public use to be barred when hazards posed by pipeline construction use endanger the public. Even were we to conclude that Alaska intends to grant Alyeska this preference, 94 we would affirm the validity of the right-of-way. 185 The contract between Alyeska and Alaska provides that Alyeska will bear the entire cost of constructing the road for the State, a cost which the Alaska Department of Highways estimates to be in excess of $100,000,000. 95 Preferential use in favor of Alyeska may be looked at as a reasonable price to be paid by the State and by the public for what amounts to, in the words of the Department of Highways, a gift to the State of Alaska. 96 There can be no doubt that but for Alyeska this road would not be built at the present time. But rather than tainting the arrangement between the State and Alyeska, this fact merely supports its reasonableness. As Mr. Justice Jackson said in United States v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 318 U.S. 206, 211, 63 S.Ct. 534, 536, 87 L.Ed. 716 (1943): [I]t has long been both customary and lawful to stimulate private self-interest and utilize the profit motive to get needful services performed for the public. The State appears to be doing no more than that. 186
187 Appellants' contention that the airports will not be public and that they therefore cannot be authorized under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 211 (1970) warrants little discussion in view of the fact that the contract between Alaska and Alyeska, whereunder the latter agrees to construct the airports for the former, specifically provides that each airport, as soon as it is open for air traffic, shall be open to the public on a nondiscriminatory basis. 97 For the reasons discussed earlier, we hesitate to search for any hidden intention to the contrary, and if one exists there certainly is no indication of it in the present record. In addition, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 212(b) (1970) requires the lessee to maintain the lands in such condition, and provide for the furnishing of such facilities, service, fuel, and other supplies, as are necessary to make the lands available for public use as an airport   , and applicable regulations of the Department of the Interior provide for cancellation of the lease for failure to comply with such conditions. See 43 C.F.R. Sec. 2911.1-2(c) (1972). 188
189 Appellants charge that, since the ultimate purpose of the road and airports is to facilitate construction of the pipeline, the use is for commercial or industrial purposes within the meaning of 30 U.S.C. Sec. 601 (1970), and therefore excepted from the free use exemption. As indicated earlier, however, both the declared and the real State intention with respect to the road and airports is to construct public facilities, and the fact that such facilities will incidentally, or even primarily, initially benefit private industrial or commercial activities does not detract from the public, noncommercial, nature of the facilities themselves. It seems reasonable to assume that in enacting the exception to the free use exemption Congress intended to exact a price from the state only when the state itself was using the gravel in some profit-making enterprise. There being no indication that this is the case here, we hold the free use permits valid.