Opinion ID: 3149835
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trusteeâs Right of Self-Representation

Text: Â¶9Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Tucker first argues that the water court erred in denying him the right to represent himself notwithstanding the fact that he was acting as a trustee for an undisclosed trust. We are not persuaded. Â¶10Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We review the water courtâs legal conclusions de novo. Cherokee Metro. Dist. v.Â Simpson, 148 P.3d 142, 150 (Colo. 2006). Â¶11Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary is fiduciary in nature. 1 Austin Wakeman Scott, William Franklin Fratcher & Mark L. Ascher, Scott & Ascher on Trusts Â§ 2.1.5, at 37 (5th ed. 2006). âA fiduciary relationship involves a duty on the part of the fiduciary to act for the benefit of the other party as to matters within the scope of the relationship.â Id. at 38. Thus, in every trust, âthere is something more than a merely personal relationship between trustee and beneficiary; there is a duty on the part of the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of another.â Id. Â§ 2.1.6, at 38. In this way, a trustee acts as a representative of the trust beneficiariesâ interests. Â¶12Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Although we have not previously considered whether a trustee may proceed pro se on behalf of a trust in a litigation matter, we have made clear in a number of other contexts that a party who is not an attorney may not, without counsel, represent the interests of others in a litigation matter. See, e.g., People v. Adams, 243 P.3d 256, 261 (Colo. 2010) (concluding that a non-attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when he pursued certain subcontractorsâ claims in a representative capacity in bankruptcy court); People ex rel. MacFarlane v. Howard, 612 P.2d 1081, 1081 (Colo.Â 1977) (enjoining a disbarred attorney, in the context of an unauthorized practice of law proceeding, from appearing before any court or administrative agency in Colorado in propria persona as trustee for any trust for which he might be trustee); see also In re Marriage of Kanefsky, 260 P.3d 327, 331 (Colo. App. 2010) (concluding that because the conservators in a case were not licensed attorneys, they could not represent the protected person in court proceedings without an attorney). Â¶13Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â As we reasoned in Adams, 243 P.3d at 266, âThe purpose of the bar and our admission requirements is to protect the public from incompetent legal advice and representation.â Non-attorneys are thus prohibited from undertaking activities that require the exercise of legal discretion or judgment on behalf of others. Id. Â¶14Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Applying similar reasoning, courts that have addressed the question presented here have concluded that a trustee who is not an attorney may not represent a trust pro se in a litigation matter. See, e.g., Marin v. Leslie, 337 F. Appâx 217, 219â20 (3d Cir. 2009); Knoefler v. United Bank, 20 F.3d 347, 348 (8th Cir. 1994); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697â98 (9th Cir. 1987). Â¶15Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In C.E. Pope, 818 F.2d at 697, for example, the Ninth Circuit observed that although a trustee who is not an attorney may appear in propria persona on his own behalf, that privilege is personal to him, and he has no authority to appear as an attorney on behalf of others. The court reasoned that the non-attorney trusteeâs status was as a fiduciary, and because he was not the actual beneficial owner of the claims being asserted by the trusts at issue, he could not be viewed as a party conducting hisÂ own case personally. Id. Thus, he could not claim that his status as trustee included the right to present pro se arguments on behalf of the trust. Id. at 698. Â¶16Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Ninth Circuitâs analysis in C.E. Pope is consistent with our own analyses in cases in which a non-attorney seeks to represent the interests of others in litigation, see,Â e.g., Adams, 243 P.3d at 261; Howard, 612 P.2d at 1081, and we find the Ninth Circuitâs analysis persuasive here. Accordingly, we conclude that a trustee who is not an attorney may not proceed pro se on behalf of a trust in a litigation matter, and we therefore affirm the water courtâs order precluding Tucker from doing so. Â¶17Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We are not persuaded otherwise by Tuckerâs argument that C.R.C.P. 17(a) allowed him to proceed pro se in his capacity as a trustee. C.R.C.P. 17(a) provides, in pertinent part, âEvery action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest; but a . . . trustee of an express trust . . . may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought.â Although this rule allows a trustee to sue in his or her own name, we perceive nothing in the rule, and Tucker cites no applicable authority, that allows a trustee to proceed pro se in representing the interests of a trust. Cf. C.E. Pope, 818 F.2d at 698 (noting that although Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) authorizes a trustee of an express trust to sue on behalf of the trust without joining persons for whose benefit the action is brought, that rule does not warrant the conclusion that a non-attorney can maintain a suit in propria persona). Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We likewise are unpersuaded by Tuckerâs assertion that the water court violated his right to due process when it purportedly denied his right to self-representation. For the reasons set forth above, a non-attorney trustee is not entitled to proceed pro se onÂ behalf of a trust. The water court explained this concept to Tucker and gave him an opportunity to retain counsel, but Tucker, for reasons that the record does not disclose, steadfastly refused to do so. In these circumstances, we perceive no violation of any of Tuckerâs constitutional rights. Cf. Woodford Mfg. Co. v. A.O.Q., Inc., 772 P.2d 652, 654 (Colo. App. 1988) (concluding that requiring a corporation to appear through an attorney did not deprive it of due process).