Opinion ID: 1401004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Admission of Victim Impact Evidence

Text: Mr. Wilson contends that the testimony of Angela Yost, the victim's wife, and Alma Dorn, the victim's mother, which was offered as victim impact testimony during the sentencing phase of the trial, violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The OCCA denied this claim of error on appeal, Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 466-67, and the district court denied habeas relief on this claim. Wilson III, 2006 WL 2289777, at -40. As is required by 22 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 984.1(C), the victim impact statements in written form were provided to the defendant in advance of sentencing. See also Ledbetter v. State, 933 P.2d 880, 894 (Okla.Crim.App.1997). Defense counsel objected to one sentence, which was removed. In court, Ms. Yost read her victim impact statement to the jury toward the end of the state's case in the sentencing phase. She began by describing how her life had changed since Yost's death and how she enjoyed cooking and ironing for her husband. After explaining the effect Yost's death had on herself and her two young sons, she stated Richard was raised in a religion which did not recognize holidays or birthdays, so those times were very special to us. Christmas used to be very special, because Richard got so excited. Here was this 25-year old man who wanted toys for Christmas, because he never got them. Tr. trans. 2/18/97, at 167-68. Following Ms. Yost's testimony, defense counsel asked to approach the bench and objected, as prejudicial, to a member of the Victim Witness Center's presence in the courtroom, as she had been crying. Id. at 168. The court removed the audience member. Counsel did not object to the testimony itself. The state's final witness was Ms. Dorn. She testified, [a]s a child, a young adult, Richard didn't give me any problems. He was maturing into a responsible adult, and an asset to our family and community. He had long-range plans of being better educated. He had gone to TJC for two years. He had gotten his real estate license, just set plans, hopes and dreams of taking care of his family. Id. at 170. She also discussed her son's plans to take care of her in her old age. After Ms. Dorn completed her statement, the following colloquy transpired: Mr. SMALLWOOD: [Mr. Brown's defense attorney] May we make a brief record, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. SMALLWOOD: Judge, comes now Defendant Brown and objects to the victim impact testimony as being far more prejudicial than relevant. THE COURT: Overrule your objection, Mr. Smallwood. You had an opportunity to object to these victim impact statements. The Court eliminated one of the sentences that you didn't like of Ms. Yost's. I'll overrule it and overrule your motion for a mistrial. Id. at 171. Mr. Wilson asserts that this testimony was so highly emotional and unduly prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). In Payne, the Court overruled portions of its decisions in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989), and held that the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar to victim impact evidence. 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597. A State may legitimately conclude, as Oklahoma has done, Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.10(C), that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. Id. However, there will be some cases in which victim impact evidence is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597. Because Mr. Wilson's counsel did not object to the victim impact statements, the OCCA correctly reviewed this claim for plain error. It found that: In this case, Wilson complains about statements from the victim's wife stating she enjoyed cooking and ironing for the victim. This evidence is relevant to show the psychological, emotional and physical impact of the victim's death. Wilson complains about the victim's mother's statements that he had just received his real estate license and had plans for the future. The victim's mother also stated that the victim told her that he would take care of her in old age and for her not to worry about the future. These statements were relevant to show the financial and emotional impact of the crime itself on the victim's survivors. Wilson claims that the mother's statement was hearsay. Arguably the statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, thus not hearsay. The statement was only offered to show that the victim's mother believed that the victim would take care of her financially in the future. The victim's wife testified that the victim was especially fond of Christmas holidays because he was raised in a family that did not celebrate Christmas. The victim's mother testified that she didn't have any problems with the victim as a child. Statements about a victim's childhood have no relevance in victim impact evidence. We find that these comments amounted to error, but they do not rise to the level of plain error, because they did not go to the foundation of the case, or take from Wilson a right essential to his defense. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 467 (internal citation omitted). Accepting the OCCA's conclusion that the testimony about the victim's childhood was highly emotional and replete with irrelevant information, we agree that it did not rise to the level of plain error. At the outset, we note that [Mr. Wilson's] assertions of prejudice are undermined by his counsel's delay in challenging [the victim impact] statement[s]. Short v. Sirmons, 472 F.3d 1177, 1193 (10th Cir.2006). Counsel had a version of the statements prior to trial, and yet he failed to challenge their admission until after the statements were presented to the jury. Id. The requirement of timely objection applies with particular force in this context, when the defendant knows the content of the testimony in advance and could prevent any error from taking place; even an objection to the oral testimony would, if well taken, elicit a curative instruction. Additionally, we have found that far more inflammatory statements did not render the proceeding fundamentally unfair. For example, in United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1274 (10th Cir.2000), the victim's children ended their testimony in tears, and the husband supplied the jury with numerous color photos of the victim while she was alive. Id. In the jury room, the jury viewed the letters the children had written to their dead mother and one child's daily journal describing his loss. Id. Despite the tremendous emotional effects of the evidence, this Court held that it was not so unduly prejudicial as to render the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. Id. at 1273; see also Turrentine, 390 F.3d at 1201 (victim's husband's statement that the murder was brutal, and his request that the jury let justice be done, did not render the proceeding fundamentally unfair); Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1223-24 (10th Cir.2003) (lengthy and emotional statement from victim's sister and photographs of the victims while they were alive not unduly prejudicial). The victim impact statements here contained only a few short references to the victim's childhood. Overall, the statements were very brief, and while a person sitting in the courtroom broke down into tears, there is no evidence that either witness exhibited such an emotionally charged display as might be unduly prejudicial. Compare with Chanthadara, 230 F.3d at 1274. We cannot conclude that [t]he irrelevant testimony regarding Mrs. Yost's enjoyment of cooking and ironing for the victim and involving Mr. Yost's childhood could . . . have influenced the jury's finding as to the aggravating factors, Brown, 515 F.3d at 1095, nor could it have prevented the jury from considering the mitigating evidence, see Short, 472 F.3d at 1195. The OCCA's application was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Payne, so we deny habeas relief on this issue.