Opinion ID: 2747927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Enhanced Risk from Lightning Strikes

Text: We agree with Kerin that the risked harm, if actualized, could be severe. But whether a risk is speculative also depends on the chances that the risked harm will occur. See Mountain States, 92 F.3d at 1234-35. Although a small probability of a great harm may be sufficient, see Vill. of Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that even a small probability . . . is sufficient . . . [provided] the relief sought would, if granted, reduce the probability), Kerin has failed to -11- meet his burden of pleading that the risk of CSST causing a lightning fire in his home is anything but remote. First, Kerin fails to allege facts sufficient to even calculate or estimate the risk. For example, Kerin alleges that, as of August 2011, there were 141 reported fires that involv[ed] lightning and CSST. See Compl. at ¶ 39. But he does not state in his allegations information that would help us make sense of this figure, like the frequency of lightning strikes, the proportion of homes struck by lightning, the relevant time frame, or the likelihood of lightning fires in homes without CSST. And to the extent that he does cite numbers, they suggest an exceedingly low probability. See Compl. at ¶ 28 (alleging that CSST is present in over 5 million homes across the United States). Second, even in the instances where Kerin alleges there has been actual damage, it is unclear that CSST was the source. This distinguishes Kerin's case from others in which courts found enhanced risk from product defects sufficient for standing. For example, in Cole v. General Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2007), the Fifth Circuit found standing where there was an enhanced risk that the side airbags of cars might deploy unexpectedly. Id. at 722-23. Because there were instances where the airbags had deployed unexpectedly, without a crash, there was no doubt that the airbags were defective and had caused actual damage. See id. at 718-20 (noting that car manufacturer issued voluntary recall -12- because it ha[d] decided that a defect . . . exists). This differs from Kerin's allegations. His three direct allegations that a lightning strike punctured the CSST in a house, instigating a natural gas-fueled fire, fall short: two are speculative, Compl. at ¶¶ 4, 58, leaving only a single instance where a jury found against one of Titeflex's competitors, Compl. at ¶ 57. This is markedly different from Cole, where the defect was essentially conceded. And while he cites to 141 cases of actual fires, Kerin only alleges that both lightning and CSST were involv[ed], not that CSST was the cause of the damage or should not have itself failed under the circumstances.3 Compl. at ¶ 39. Finally, another consideration suggests that the risk carried by this product is not sufficient to give rise to a case or controversy. This is not a case of regulatory silence, but of regulatory approval of the defective product, after a study of the risks. Although not dispositive, this consideration carries particular weight because the political branches have, after study of the particular risk in question, concluded that such risk is both permissible and manageable. Here, it is not merely the case 3 The other case relied on by Kerin, Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012), is inapposite. Mazza involved claims of false advertising about the limitations of Honda's automated braking system. Id. at 585-86, 595 (explaining that the system purportedly would alert the driver to brake and, if necessary, automatically brake). The Ninth Circuit held that class members had only suffered injury in fact to the extent that they had relied upon the misleading advertisements in being relieved of their money. See id. at 595. -13- that CSST does not violate a regulatory standard. To the contrary, Massachusetts regulations specifically permit the use of CSST, even with the known attendant risk of fire from lightning strikes. See, e.g., 248 Mass. Code Regs. 5.03, 5.04 (2014); see also Mass. Board Policy, supra.4 The National Fuel Gas Code, a model code cosponsored by the American Gas Association and the National Fire Protection Association, also permits the installation of CSST with bonding and grounding to mitigate lightning risk. See National Fuel Gas Code, ANSI Z223.1-2015 (NFPA 54-2015) §§ 5.6.3.4, 7.2.6, 7.3.2, 7.13.2, passim (2015 ed.); National Fuel Gas Code, ANSI Z223.1-2012 (NFPA 54-2012) §§ 5.6.3.4, 7.2.7, 7.3.2, 7.13.2, passim (2012 ed.); see also NFPA 54 FAQs, supra, ¶ 6 (explaining that a new requirement for bonding of CSST was added to reduce the risk that nearby lightning strikes will cause small holes in CSST, and that further research into the problem is ongoing). Kerin does not 4 The Massachusetts Board of State Examiners of Plumbers and Gas Fitters has directly considered this problem. It temporarily rescinded product approval for CSST from November 2008 through February 2009 to allow for resolution of the enforcement/requirement of extra bonding by the relevant authorities having jurisdiction. Mass. Board Policy, supra. The Board also continues to monitor the risk. Upon reinstating product approval, the Board specified measures for mitigating damages from indirect lightning strikes and reserved the right to reconsider th[e] policy as well as past and future product approvals in the event it receives evidence that manufacturers' efforts to mitigate indirect lightning strikes are not effective, or in the event a new national standard is adopted that the manufacturers fail to meet. Id. -14- contest these regulations, conceding that the required bonding might address this issue. Compl. at ¶ 32 (emphasis in original). Although we accept as true 'all well-pleaded fact[s] . . . and indulge all reasonable inferences' in Kerin's favor, see Katz, 672 F.3d at 70 (citation omitted), this tenet does not apply to statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions couched as facts or are threadbare or conclusory, see Blum, 744 F.3d at 795 (quoting Air Sunshine, Inc. v. Carl, 663 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, we are not required to accept Kerin's conclusory and subjective allegations that the product is defective and presents an unreasonable risk. Cf. Iannacchino, 888 N.E.2d at 888. Given this, and in light of Kerin's failure adequately to allege either facts sufficient to assess the likelihood of future injury or instances of actual damage where the cause is clear, we find that the alleged risk of harm is too speculative to give rise to a case or controversy. We affirm the dismissal of the action. -15-