Opinion ID: 780505
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equal access standard

Text: 15 In analyzing whether the Plan violates Title VII, the district court adopted the equal access standard used by this court in construing the scope of the ADA's prohibition of discrimination based on disability. See Saks, 117 F.Supp.2d at 328-29. In EEOC v. Staten Island Savings Bank, we held that an employee disabilities benefits plan that provided more benefits for physical disabilities than for mental disorders did not violate the ADA, so long as mentally disabled employees had equal access to the physical disability benefits provided to their coworkers. See 207 F.3d 144, 149-50 (2d Cir.2000). Extending this analysis to the Title VII context, the district court found that as long as both men and women receive the same benefits and are subject to the same exclusions under an employer's insurance policy, the policy does not discriminate on the basis of sex. Saks, 117 F.Supp.2d at 328. 16 The district court erred in applying the equal access standard to Saks's Title VII claim. In General Electric v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court applied the equal access standard to an employee disability benefits plan that provided compensation during periods of all disabilities except pregnancy. The Court found that the plan did not violate Title VII because men and women had equal access to the same benefits, even if certain sex-specific benefits were excluded. The Court reasoned that pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks. 429 U.S. 125, 139, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976) (emphasis added). Shortly after the Gilbert decision, Congress enacted the PDA, and, in so doing, not only overturned the specific holding in General Electric v. Gilbert, ... but also rejected the test of discrimination employed by the Court in that case. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676, 103 S.Ct. 2622; accord id. at 678, 103 S.Ct. 2622 (the PDA unambiguously expressed [Congress's] disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision); see also Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 277 & n. 6, 284, 288, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987); Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 483 (2d Cir.1985), aff'd modified and remanded on other grounds, 479 U.S. 60, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). 17 In light of Congress's repudiation of the equal access standard as applied in Gilbert, we conclude that this test is inapplicable to Title VII claims involving sex discrimination in the provision of employee benefits packages. Under Title VII the proper inquiry in reviewing a sex discrimination challenge to a health benefits plan is whether sex-specific conditions exist, and if so, whether exclusion of benefits for those conditions results in a plan that provides inferior coverage to one sex. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676, 103 S.Ct. 2622 (stating that equality in employment health benefits plans is measured by the relative comprehensiveness of coverage for men and women). 18
19 Saks further contends that the district court improperly endorsed a couple analysis, defined by the parties as a finding that a female-specific exclusion does not constitute sex discrimination so long as male and female employees and their respective partners receive the same health benefits when considered as a couple. Franklin Covey, on the other hand, maintains that the couple analysis is used regularly by courts in determining whether an employer's benefits plan constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII. We reject Saks's contention that the district court relied on the couple analysis, and find that Judge McMahon properly focused on the effect of the exclusion on employees, male and female, not on the benefits offered to the couple ( i.e., the employee and his or her spouse, considered together). See Saks, 117 F.Supp.2d at 328. Contrary to Franklin Covey's suggestion, moreover, we find that the Supreme Court's decision in Newport News gives us no reason to adopt the couple analysis, as defined above, as part of this Circuit's PDA or Title VII jurisprudence. 20 In Newport News, the Supreme Court held that an employee health benefits plan violated Title VII by covering pregnancy-related costs for employees but excluding such costs for the spouses of employees. Reasoning that this exclusion would necessarily affect only the coverage offered to the female spouses of male employees, the Court found that the exclusion discriminated against male employees. See 462 U.S. at 684-85, 103 S.Ct. 2622. The Court, therefore, focused on whether male and female employees received equal coverage under their health benefits packages. It did not hold, as Franklin Covey seems to suggest, that an across-the-board female-specific exclusion would pass muster under Title VII or the PDA, so long as all couples received the same benefits. Under Franklin Covey's couple analysis, exclusions based on pregnancy would not violate Title VII, a conclusion that has been squarely rejected by Congress and the Supreme Court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684, 103 S.Ct. 2622. 2