Opinion ID: 168044
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 19 The district court found that Nova failed to show any of the four elements necessary for a preliminary injunction to issue. We agree with the district court that Nova has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and thus we affirm the district court's order on that ground without reaching the other three factors. See Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1263 (10th Cir.2005) (affirming district court's denial of preliminary injunction because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits). 20 In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979), the Supreme Court considered a statute that required the consent of both parents before an unmarried minor could obtain an abortion. Id. at 625, 99 S.Ct. 3035. In passing on the constitutionality of the statute, the Court explained that the minor must be provided an alternative judicial procedure whereby authorization could be obtained, and that this proceeding must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained. Id. at 643-44, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (emphasis added). 7 21 As a threshold matter, Appellees argue that Bellotti involved a parental consent statute and that it is not clear that Bellotti's expeditious bypass requirement applies to a statute like the one at issue here, which only requires parental notification. The Supreme Court has not specifically resolved this question, see Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 510, 110 S.Ct. 2972, and its decisions do not suggest a clear answer, compare Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (explaining that a spousal notice requirement will often be tantamount to the [spousal consent requirement] found unconstitutional in [ Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.]Danforth [, 428 U.S. 52, 69, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976)] because a spousal notice requirement enables the husband to wield an effective veto over his wife's decision) with Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 445, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 111 L.Ed.2d 344 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (Although the Court has held that parents may not exercise an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over [a minor's decision to have an abortion], it has never challenged a State's reasonable judgment that the decision should be made after notification to and consultation with a parent.). 22 Even so, as Nova points out, several courts of appeals have applied Bellotti's expeditious bypass requirement in the context of a parental notice statute. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1460 (8th Cir.1995) ([P]arental-notice provisions, like parental-consent provisions, are unconstitutional without a Bellotti -type bypass.); Ind. Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983) (Because parental involvement brought about by either consent or notification statutes may result in similar efforts by parents to block the abortion, we will apply the Supreme Court's analysis with respect to consent bypass procedures in our consideration of the constitutional sufficiency of Indiana's notification bypass procedures.). 23 We need not resolve this question today. Because we conclude that the Oklahoma Act meets Belloti's expeditious bypass requirement, we assume without deciding that the requirement would apply to parental notification statutes. See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 510, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (assuming, without deciding, that a notification statute must contain Bellotti -type bypass procedures because, whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment requires notice statutes to contain bypass procedures, [the statute in question] meets the requirements). 8 24 We now turn to the heart of the present appeal—whether Bellotti's expeditious bypass requirement requires a concrete, definite time frame in which judicial action must be taken. Nova's argument that it does rests on the premise that [a]lthough time is always of the essence where abortion decisions are concerned, expedition is especially important to the judicial bypass process because the longer a minor has to wait to obtain an abortion, the more expensive — and, more importantly, less safe — the procedure becomes. This is certainly correct. However, whether or not time is of the essence misses the point; the question is whether, without a specified time frame, the Oklahoma Act assures that the judicial bypass process will be completed with sufficient expedition. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644, 99 S.Ct. 3035. Nova has not shown a substantial likelihood that a statute which requires bypass proceedings be given precedence over other pending matters so that the court may reach a decision promptly and without delay so as to serve the best interests of the pregnant unemancipated minor and provides for [a]n expedited confidential appeal fails, on its face, to satisfy Bellotti. 9 25 Two points are critical to our decision. First is the posture of this appeal. Nova is challenging the Oklahoma Act on its face and has presented no evidence that there is, has been, or will be any impermissible delay as to bypass petitions. Nova argues that [b]ecause the judicial bypass procedure does not contain any deadlines by which the court must rule, . . . young women face potentially unlimited delays in obtaining their abortions. Were this true, we would have serious concerns about the constitutionality of the bypass procedures. But Nova points to no evidence to support this scenario. On the record before us, there is nothing to suggest that courts will act with anything other than prompt[ness], without delay to serve the best interests of the pregnant unemancipated minor, and with expedit[ion], as the statute requires. 26 Second, and relatedly, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must presume that courts will follow the law. See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 515, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (Absent a demonstrated pattern of abuse or defiance, a State may expect that its judges will follow mandated procedural requirements.); Manning, 119 F.3d at 270 (State judges are bound, just as federal judges are, to uphold the Constitution of the United States and to follow the opinions of the United States Supreme Court.); cf. Falcone v. Stewart, 120 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.1997) ([A] defendant can legitimately expect that the courts will follow the law.), vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 947, 118 S.Ct. 2364, 141 L.Ed.2d 732 (1998). The Oklahoma Act, on its face, complies with Bellotti in that it requires Oklahoma courts to issue prompt decisions and provide for expeditious appeals, all in accordance with the best interests of the pregnant unemancipated minor. We presume they will do just that. 10 27 We acknowledge that this decision conflicts with several of our sister circuits, who have held or suggested that parental involvement laws require specific time frames to satisfy Bellotti's standard. See Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 180 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1028 (9th Cir.1999) (finding parental consent statute which provide[s] general time frames for expedited proceedings, but no specific time requirements unconstitutional because the trial court's review of a minor's application must be performed within specific, determinate time limits); Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1110-11 (5th Cir.1997) (finding parental consent statute that provided bypass petitions shall be heard . . . in a summary manner plainly conflict[s] with Bellotti [] because the juvenile court is not required to rule on the minor's application within any specified time), overruled on other grounds Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 427 n. 35 (5th Cir.2001); cf. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1539-41 (7th Cir.1985) (enjoining parental notification statute, which provided that an expedited confidential appeal shall be available as the [Illinois] Supreme Court provides by rule, until such rules were established because the general instructions . . . to promulgate rules failed to provide the framework for a constitutionally sufficient means of expediting the appeal) (quotations, alterations omitted), aff'd, 484 U.S. 171, 108 S.Ct. 479, 98 L.Ed.2d 478 (1987); Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 296-98, 307 (3d Cir.1984) (enjoining parental consent statute until the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania complied with the statutory mandate to promulgate rules assuring confidentiality and promptness of disposition), aff'd, 476 U.S. 747, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986); but see Manning, 119 F.3d at 270-72 (rejecting argument that statute which failed to adopt specific time frames for appellate court proceedings and decisions above state superior court failed to satisfy Bellotti; It is improper for a federal court to assume easily, without factual support of such findings, that state courts will not comply with the . . . expedition mandates of the Supreme Court.). 28 Notwithstanding the concerns expressed by these courts, we conclude that the statutory mandates here for prompt and expeditious judicial review of a bypass request, conducted in the best interests of the unemancipated pregnant minor likely complies with the Supreme Court's mandate for sufficient expedition. Thus, at this preliminary injunction stage, where Nova is making only a facial challenge with no evidence that unemancipated minors are not being given expeditious bypass review, we conclude that Nova has failed to carry its burden of establishing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claim.