Opinion ID: 1893631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Who is a Resident?

Text: Resident has no technical or fixed meaning; the term is flexible, elastic, slippery, and somewhat ambiguous. 77 C.J.S. Resident at 305 (1952). The term has an evasive way about it, with as many colors as Joseph's coat. Weible v. United States, 244 F.2d 158, 163 (9th Cir.1957), cited in Government Emp. Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah 1982). The two concepts most often discussed in defining resident are 1) presence; and 2) an intent to remain for some time. However, there is no fixed formula for determining how much of any factor (presence, intent, or time) is required: It has been said that the word resident is generally understood to mean one having more than a mere physical presence, and that the transient visit of a person for a time to a place does not make him a resident while there. It has also been said that the term imports a fixed abode for the time being, as contradistinguished from a place of temporary abode, and that in order to entitle one to the character of a resident there must be a settled fixed abode, and an intention to remain permanently, or at least for some time, for business or other purposes. On the other hand, it has been stated that living in a particular locality is sufficient for becoming a resident of it, and that the term resident may be used in the strict primary sense of one actually living in a place for a time, irrespective of domicile, and that it may refer to a temporary sojourner, as well as to one possessing a legal domicile. 77 C.J.S. Resident at 306 (citations omitted). Construction of the term resident depends on the context, subject matter, and purpose designed to be accomplished by its use. 77 C.J.S. at 306. The question of who is a resident is, of course, not new to this Court. In the case primarily relied on by Preferred, Goens v. Arinder, 248 Miss. 806, 161 So.2d 509 (1964), we held that where a daughter and her husband (the Stogners) were temporarily staying in the home of her father (Arinder) while awaiting the completion of their new house and the birth of their child, the daughter was not a resident of the father's household under the terms of his auto liability insurance. The father's policy excluded from coverage any non-owned auto registered in the name of the named insured or a relative; relative was defined in the policy as a relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same household. An auto registered to the Stogners was involved in an accident which killed a child (Goens); Arinder's insurer denied liability on the grounds that the Stogners were residents of the Arinder home, and therefore their auto was a non-owned auto registered in the name of a relative excluded from coverage. The trial court found for the insurance company, [5] but we reversed, finding that the Stogners were not members of the Arinder household, and therefore that the Stogner vehicle was not excluded from coverage. We commented on the term resident: The word resident means one having more than physical presence. The transient visit of a person for a time to a place does not make him or her a resident while there. The word resident imports a fixed abode for the time being, as distinguished from a place of temporary abode or a temporary sojourn. 77 C.J.S., pp. 305-307. In the instant case the Stogners were building a home into which they had already moved part of their furniture, and were simply visiting or sojourning for the time being in the Arinder house, until Mrs. Stogner could have a baby and their house was completed. Hence she was not a resident of the Arinder household within the meaning of exclusion clause (1)(b)... . We are of the opinion that the Stogners' stay in the Arinder home was no more than a visit or sojourning for the time being until Mrs. Stogner could have her baby and until their house was completed. This was of course temporary, and the proof shows that they did move into the home when these two events had taken place. Goens v. Arinder , 248 Miss. at 811, 822, 161 So.2d at 516. We noted that the Stogners were building a new home a short distance from the Arinder house; they had set up a bed in the Arinder home so that Mr. Stogner could finish the house, and Mrs. Stogner could be assisted by her family. The Stogners had moved their washing machine and refrigerator into the Arinder home, and moved a stove, dinette, bed and clothing to the new home. They paid their own expenses, cooked their own meals, and frequently visited the new home. Stating that such conduct certainly shows there was no permanency in the arrangement, the Court held that as a matter of law, the Stogners were not members of Arinder's household, and therefore that the Stogner's car was covered by the insurance policy. Goens v. Arinder, 248 Miss. at 821-22, 161 So.2d at 515. However, Goens v. Arinder is overruled today. Recently, we gave a broad construction to the term resident to find that an insured's college-age son was a member of his father's household, and therefore covered by his father's UM policy, despite the fact that the son lived with his mother. We cited public policy as the basis for such broad construction: Our law ... embodies a mandate that the term resident be construed broadly to include Williams' son as an insured under the father's uninsured motorist coverage. The term resident appears in both the policy and the statute by which it is governed, and we must read both provisions broadly as a matter of public policy. Aetna Cas. And Sur. Co. v. Williams, 623 So.2d 1005, 1009 (Miss. 1993). We noted that our UM statute uses the word residence rather than the narrower term domicile in defining who is an insured. Distinguishing the two terms, we stated: Apparently, Aetna desires that we equate the term residence with the term domicile. The law is clear that a person can have but one domicile. Once established, a person's domicile remains stationary absent a clear indication of intent to abandon the existing domicile and to establish another. However, one may still have other residences. Residence is an entirely different and more flexible concept. The limitations applicable to one's domicile do not apply to one's residence. For instance, a person may have multiple residences simultaneously. Further, a dwelling place need not be fixed and permanent in order to qualify as a residence. Even a temporary and transient habitation can qualify... . Aetna Cas. And Sur. Co. v. Williams, 623 So.2d 1005, 1009-10 (Miss. 1993) (citations omitted). While holding as a matter of law that a minor child is a resident of both parents' households, we nevertheless engaged in a discussion of the facts to support our (and the trial court's) conclusion that the son was in fact a resident of his father's home. We stated: It has been held that the term `residence' imports merely having abode at a particular place which may be one of any number of such places at which one is, at least from time to time, physically present. In re Brown, 505 N.Y.S.2d 334, 132 Misc.2d 811 (N.Y.Sur. 1986). Whether a person resides at a particular location is a practical question which turns on the degree of one's attachment to a particular place of abode. In the instant case, Junior's attachment to his father's household was considerable. He had a room. He had clothing and personal possessions there. He stayed there at least occasionally. He depended, in part, on his father to provide transportation and money. His father carried him on a hospitalization insurance policy. Moreover, he was still his father's son and a part of his father's family... . Aetna Cas. And Sur. Co. v. Williams, 623 So.2d at 1010. Our rationale for a broad construction of the term resident was based on a perception that the legislature intended to provide maximum protection for minor children, who, we noted, are unable to establish their own domicile. [6] We have not recently addressed the question presented by this case: whether adult children temporarily staying with their parents may be considered residents of the parents' households for purposes of UM coverage. Other courts have considered cases in which adult children seeking UM benefits under their parents' policies claim to be residents of their parents' households, although their visits were brief and/or impermanent. See David B. Harrison, Annotation, Who is Member or Resident of Same Family or Household, Within No-Fault or Uninsured Motorist Provisions of Motor Vehicle Insurance Policy, 96 A.L.R.3rd 804 (1979). In general, college students are considered residents of their parents' homes, although they reside elsewhere for most of the year, and visit their parents only occasionally. See e.g., Morgan v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 392 N.W.2d 37 (Minn.App. 1986); Manuel v. American Employers Ins. Co., 228 So.2d 321 (La. App. 1969). Courts generally reason that college students leave possessions at their parents' home, return there on vacations, maintain their parents home as their permanent address, while changing their temporary school addresses, and continue to regard their parents' homes as their own. Sometimes adult children are found to be residents of their parents' households for purposes of UM coverage. For example, in Workman v. Detroit Auto Inter-Insurance Exchange, 404 Mich. 477, 274 N.W.2d 373 (1979), an insured's daughter-in-law, who had been living with her husband and child in a travel trailer on the insured's property, was held a member of the insured's household at the time of an accident, although several days prior to the accident she and her family had gone to her mother's residence for a visit. The court set out several factors to consider in determining whether a person is a resident of an insured's household, including: 1) the subjective or declared intent of the person remaining, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited period, in the place he contends is his household; 2) the formality or informality of the relationship between such person and the members of the household; and 3) whether the person alleging his residence to be a particular household has another place of lodging. These factors provide a reasonable framework for answering the question presented by the Johnsons: whether they were residents of their respective parents' households at the time of their accident for purposes of collecting UM benefits under their parents' Preferred insurance policies. However, let us not forget one of the preliminary threshold and most important considerations we must be cognizant of before reaching the necessity of balancing residency factors when determining whether someone is a resident. That consideration is that one may have more than one `residence' making that person a `resident' of more than one locale. As previously discussed in Aetna Cas. And Sur. Co. v. Williams, 623 So.2d 1005, 1009, a person may have multiple residences simultaneously. Id.; In re Estate of Burshiem, 483 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1992); In re Marriage of Tucker, 226 Cal. App.3d 1249, 277 Cal. Rptr. 403 (Cal. App.Ct. 1991); Laufer v. Hauge, 140 A.D.2d 671, 528 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co. v. Olson, 402 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Davis ex rel Davis v. Maryland Casualty Co., 76 N.C. App. 102, 331 S.E.2d 744 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Gowins v. Gowins, 466 So.2d 32 (La. 1985). Also, a dwelling place need not be fixed and permanent in order to qualify as a residence. Aetna Cas. And Sur. Co. v. Williams, 623 So.2d 1005, 1010. Even a temporary and transient habitation can qualify. Williams at 1010. In re Brown, 132 Misc.2d 811, 505 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y.Sur. 1986). Applying these factors to the Johnsons' case, it may first be noted that Ron and Dee intended to stay with their respective parents until such time as they could move despite the fact that they had a plan and an obligation to be residing elsewhere later that month. It could also be presumed that had something unexpected happened which would have delayed or terminated Ron and Dee's plans to move that they would have continued to `reside' with their respective parents until another opportunity arose enabling them to reside elsewhere. After their departure from Tennessee on June 1, Ron and Dee intended to subsequently establish residence in a particular house in Little Rock, and had taken some steps towards establishing it, including discussing renting month-to-month with the owner and applying for phone service. However, at the time of the accident, the Johnsons' possessions were not in Little Rock, nor had Ron and Dee spent any time at the intended residence. Rather, the possessions, as well as the Johnsons themselves, were indefinitely in Columbus and Plantersville with the respective parents. Therefore, at the time of the accident, we find that they were simultaneously residents of Arkansas and Mississippi while residing with their respective parents, albeit temporarily. We noted the difficulty of pinning a precise meaning to an insurance policy term in Fleming v. Travelers Ins. Co., 206 Miss. 284, 39 So.2d 885 (1949). Considering the word household, we stated: In seeking to expand the meaning to include many diverse situations, the courts, have, without perfect consistency, solved their dilemmas by such test as the fact or obligation of continual support, housing under a single roof, actual dwelling together, absence animo revertendi; constructive presence or actual absence. Divergent results have followed the application of these criteria operating in some cases to establish the status, and in others to deny it. It is not our purpose to bring to view the many decisions which illustrate, not only the application of these tests, but also the common denominator is the evident purpose of the statute or contract involved. `Household' cannot be satisfactorily defined as an abstract term. Definition by lexicon supplies elements which are seized upon by opposing interests, and isolated from other factors furnish material relevant to contradictory conclusions. We are dealing with a contract of insurance. We must inquire, what the parties thereto meant. Practical considerations must be given play, interpreted in the light of the purpose of the policy provision... . Fleming v. Travelers Ins. Co., 206 Miss. at 293-94, 39 So.2d at 887 cited in Perry v. Southern Farm Bureau Ins., 251 Miss. 544, 549, 170 So.2d 628, 630 (emphasis added). Of course, the original intentions of the parties forming the contracts underlying this case do not appear in the record. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the Charles Johnsons or the Ballards intended their UM coverage to extend to their emancipated, married children during any indefinite subsequent visits.