Opinion ID: 211846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fifth through Eighth Reviews

Text: 16 Section 1504(d) of Title 19 of the United States Code requires Customs to liquidate entries within six months of receiving notice that a suspension of liquidation of such entries has been removed. To be sufficient for purposes of § 1504(d), the notice must be unambiguous that the suspension of liquidation has been lifted, but does not need to include specific liquidation instructions from Commerce to Customs. Fujitsu, 283 F.3d 1364; Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed.Cir.2002) (finding that publication of the final results of the administrative review in the Federal Register provided the requisite notice to Customs despite the fact that it did not include specific liquidation instructions). If Customs fails to timely liquidate the entries under the statute, the entries are deemed liquidated at the rate asserted at the time of entry. Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1376. 17 On appeal, the government raises three points in support of its argument that the June 23, 2000 e-mail was ambiguous and insufficient notice for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d): (1) The e-mail did not explicitly state that the suspension was lifted and appeared to be instead a request for information; (2) The e-mail did not contain the applicable duty rate; and (3) Commerce did not intend the e-mail to be a notice of removal of suspension. 18 With regard to the first point, the government argues that the Court of International Trade erred in finding that the June 23, 2000 e-mail constituted sufficient notice to begin the six-month statutory period because it was ambiguous. Namely, the government contends that because the e-mail sought information about unliquidated entries, it could have been referring to entries that Customs had liquidated erroneously while the suspension was in force. NEC disagrees, pointing out that there is no evidence to show that Commerce was concerned about improperly liquidated entries and that nowhere in the e-mail did Commerce request information about liquidated entries, only unliquidated ones. Accordingly, NEC argues that, far from making the e-mail ambiguous, the instruction to ignore liquidated entries confirmed that suspension of liquidation had been removed. 19 The Court of International Trade considered these same arguments in its decision and found the June 23, 2000 e-mail to be unambiguous. It held that the juxtaposition [in the June 23, 2000 e-mail] of the mandate `there should be no unliquidated entries' with the exception for certain goods for which a Commerce liquidation order `continues to be enjoined' could only mean that there are no remaining suspensions, court-ordered or otherwise, on subject entries, except for those identified. NEC, 277 F.Supp.2d at 1342-43. Thus, the e-mail provide[d] unambiguously that any suspension of liquidation of NEC's entries had been removed. Id. at 1348. Additionally, Customs then posted the message to its Electronic Bulletin Board, which is apparently `a familiar manner' for Customs to disseminate Commerce's liquidation information to Customs officials. Id. at 1348. 20 We agree that the June 23, 2000 e-mail unambiguously provided notice to Customs that the suspension of liquidation on NEC's entries had been lifted. The first sentence of the first paragraph of the June 23, 2000 e-mail stated that there should be no unliquidated entries of television receivers monochrome and color, from Japan ... held by Customs for antidumping purposes during the period 03/10/1971 through 02/28/1999. The second sentence of the second paragraph of the e-mail identified the exception for televisions from another manufacturer, not NEC. Next, the first sentence of the third paragraph provided that, with the exception of the entries discussed in the second paragraph, if any Customs office was suspending liquidation on any of the entries, Customs officers should report the details of such entries to Commerce. 21 We read these provisions of the e-mail and the e-mail as a whole as giving notice to Customs that there was nothing preventing the entries of NEC from being liquidated, and thus, that the suspension of liquidation had been removed. The first line makes this clear and this reading is reinforced by the second provision that explicitly makes an exception only for certain entries other than NEC's that remain the subject of a court-ordered injunction. Further, while the third provision directs Customs to report unliquidated entries rather than to liquidate such entries, neither the statute nor our precedent requires that the notice give explicit instructions to liquidate or use particular language in order to provide notice that the removal of suspension has occurred. See Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1383. We thus hold that the June 23, 2000 e-mail was sufficiently unambiguous to satisfy the requirements under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d). 22 Second, in a related argument, the government states that the June 23, 2000 e-mail was insufficient under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d), which requires a more specific and detailed form of notice, including the applicable duty rate. NEC responds that neither the statute nor this court's precedent supports the government's position. We agree. As correctly noted by the Court of International Trade, this court has never held that informing Customs of the applicable duty rate was the exclusive alternative method of providing § 1504(d) notice or that is [sic] was a strict requirement. NEC, 277 F.Supp.2d at 1347. While this court held in International Trading that notice of the duty rate provides sufficient notice to Customs that the suspension had been lifted and in Cemex, S.A. v. United States that Customs cannot liquidate the entries without receiving the proper antidumping duty rate, neither the statute nor our precedent requires that the duty rate be included in the notice in order to satisfy the requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d). Cemex v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed.Cir.2004) (finding that Customs must liquidate the entries after the removal of suspension of liquidation when it receives, separately or otherwise, notice of such removal and the proper antidumping duty rate); Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1276 (finding that `notice' of the duty to be paid is, in effect, notice of the removal of suspension). 23 Finally, the government argues that the court must consider Commerce's purpose in sending the June 23, 2000 e-mail when determining whether the e-mail constitutes notice. NEC responds that the Court of International Trade properly addressed this issue when it found that 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) is directed toward the content of the message conveyed to Customs and not the intent of Commerce in delivering the message. 24 According to the Court of International Trade, Commerce's purpose in issuing the e-mail ... is irrelevant and [t]he only question is whether this message notified Customs that suspension had been lifted. NEC, 277 F.Supp.2d at 1348. Furthermore, the Court of International Trade squarely rejected the argument that the large bureaucratic nature of the government excuses the government's delay. Commerce's self-imposed bureaucracy, however, is no excuse for delay. Commerce is aware of its statutory obligations and should have crafted its procedures accordingly. Id. 277 F.Supp.2d at 1346 n. 15. The Court of International Trade flatly stated that administrative difficulties do not justify Commerce's undermining of both the antidumping duty laws and Congress' intent to settle importers' liabilities promptly. Id. 25 We agree that Commerce's intent and the bureaucratic difficulty of conveying Commerce's intent is irrelevant. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether Customs would or could have reasonably comprehended the e-mail as being unambiguous, a matter to which the government offered no direct evidence to support its position. Without any corroboration for the government's position, this court finds that a reasonable Customs official would have read the message to provide notification that any suspension of liquidation on the NEC entries had been removed. The e-mail did not merely inquire into the status of the unliquidated entries but unambiguously informed Customs that there should be no unliquidated entries. (emphasis added). Therefore, whether or not Customs knew Commerce's intent was otherwise, the e-mail still gave Customs notice that suspension had been lifted. Accordingly, we conclude that the June 23, 2000 e-mail constitutes notice for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d).