Opinion ID: 4539768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The School Board’s Ministerial Duties

Text: {¶ 20} Cook argues that R.C. 3311.242 grants no discretion to the school board and instead imposes a mandatory, ministerial duty to promptly certify transfer petitions and proposals to the board of elections, citing State ex rel. Dunn v. Plain Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 158 Ohio St.3d 370, 2020-Ohio-40, 143 N.E.3d 488, ¶ 15 (“Dunn I”). He asserts that the school board failed to comply with this duty and that this failure caused the proposal to miss the statutory deadline for certification for the August 4 special election. He argues, citing Dunn II, that we should therefore order the school board to certify the proposal for placement on the August 4 ballot, despite the deadline having passed. {¶ 21} The school board argues that this case does not involve purely ministerial acts and that before certifying the proposal to the elections board, it had the authority to determine whether the proposal violated R.C. 3311.242(B) and whether the proposed transfer would result in a violation of R.C. 3311.06. The school board argues that it was authorized to, within its discretion, adopt a process for its expert to review the proposal and verify compliance with R.C. 3311.242(B) and 3311.06. The school board asserts that because it acted within the scope of its authority and did not deliberately attempt to delay the certification process, it acted promptly under the circumstances. {¶ 22} R.C. 3311.242 provides that “[u]pon receiving” a transfer petition, a school board shall cause the board of elections to check the sufficiency of the signatures, R.C. 3311.242(C), and once the elections board has certified the signatures as sufficient, the school board shall “promptly” certify the proposal to the board of elections and file the proposal, along with a map of the territory proposed to be transferred, with the State Board of Education, R.C. 3311.242(B). 8 January Term, 2020 In Dunn I, we held that “R.C. 3311.242(C) establishes a ministerial duty on the part of the    school board to act. The statute does not empower a school board to determine the validity of a petition.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 15. {¶ 23} When we made that statement, we were considering only the requirement, set forth in R.C. 3311.242(C), that the school board cause the elections board to verify the signatures “[u]pon receiving” the petition, not the requirement, set forth in R.C. 3311.242(B), to “promptly” certify the proposal for placement on the ballot. However, our holding in Dunn I that the statute affords no discretion and imposes a mandatory, ministerial duty on the school board applies equally to R.C. 3311.242(B)’s requirement to promptly certify the proposal to the elections board. {¶ 24} In Dunn I, we relied on State ex rel. Lavelle v. Dailey, 177 Ohio St. 25, 201 N.E.2d 599 (1964). In Lavelle, the applicable statute provided that after a board of elections checks a transfer petition’s signatures and finds them to be sufficient, the “ ‘board of education shall promptly certify the proposal to the board of elections    for the purpose of having the proposal placed on the ballot   .’ ” (Emphasis deleted.) Id. at 26-27, quoting former R.C. 3311.231, Am.H.B. No. 1, 129 Ohio Laws 582, 773. Regarding this language—which is nearly identical to that in R.C. 3311.242(B)—this court stated in Lavelle: “No discretion is placed in the board of education. Once the petition has been determined to be sufficient, then it is the mandatory duty of the board of education to certify it to the board of elections, so that it may be placed on the ballot.” Id. at 27; see Dunn I, 158 Ohio St.3d 370, 2020-Ohio-40, 143 N.E.3d 488, at ¶ 10. {¶ 25} And as we explained in Dunn I, because R.C. 3311.242 imposes mandatory, ministerial duties on the school board to certify transfer petitions, the school board has no “discretion to refuse to submit a petition to the board of elections based on the school board’s own determination that the petition is invalid   . The statute does not empower a school board to determine the validity of a 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO petition.” Dunn I at ¶ 15. The school board therefore lacked authority under R.C. 3311.242 to reject a transfer proposal based on the school board’s own determination that the proposed transfer, if approved by the voters and effectuated under the process set forth in R.C. 3311.242, would violate R.C. 3311.06(B) by creating a noncontiguous school district.2 {¶ 26} In Dunn II, we explained that if a school board has the opportunity to take the action necessary for a proposal to appear on the ballot sought by its proponents but declines to do so for reasons outside its authority, a writ of mandamus ordering the proposal submitted for placement on the sought-after ballot is appropriate. Dunn II, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-339, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 20-22; see also Morris v. Macedonia City Council, 71 Ohio St.3d 52, 57, 641 N.E.2d 1075 (1994) (writ issued when city council “delayed its determination of the sufficiency of the petition based in part on a substantive objection outside the scope of its authority”). This is so even if the school board has already certified the proposal for a later election. See State ex rel. Citizens for a Better Portsmouth v. Sydnor, 61 Ohio St.3d 49, 53, 572 N.E.2d 649 (1991), citing State ex rel. Jurcisin v. Cotner, 10 Ohio St.3d 171, 173, 462 N.E.2d 381 (1984). {¶ 27} Here, Cook complains of two delays on the school board’s part. First, despite R.C. 3311.242(C)’s requirement that the school board cause the elections board to verify the sufficiency of the signatures “[u]pon receiving” the petition, the school board waited a week before it voted to forward the petition to the elections board, and it then waited three more days before actually doing so. 2. Because R.C. 3311.242(B) provides that the board of education of a school district has a duty to promptly certify “a proposal to transfer territory from the district to another school district to which the territory is adjoining” (emphasis added), a school board does have the authority to reject proposals to transfer territory when it is apparent that the territory does not adjoin the transferee school district. See Dunn I at ¶ 13 (upon receiving petition, school board was authorized to “examine whether it appeared to be a transfer petition under R.C. 3311.242 and whether the petition was signed by what appeared to be at least 10 percent of the qualified electors”). However, the school board has never asserted that it is apparent that Petition L or Petition M involves nonadjacent territory. 10 January Term, 2020 Second, despite R.C. 3311.242(B)’s requirement to promptly certify the proposal to the elections board for placement on the ballot and despite receiving the verification of the signatures from the elections board in time to meet the May 6 deadline (even accounting for the required 24-hour notice for board meetings mentioned by the school board in its brief, see R.C. 121.22(F)), the school board delayed the certification until May 8. {¶ 28} The school board acknowledges that both of these delays were caused by the “fact-finding process” in which its title agent evaluated proposals for compliance with R.C. 3311.06. The school board admits that it delayed holding a meeting to forward Petition M to the elections board for signature verification because when the school board received Petition M, its title agent was reassessing whether the transfer proposed in Petition A would result in a noncontiguous school district and it wanted to act on both petitions at the same meeting. The school board states that the week of April 27 “gave the Board time to allow the facts to develop so the Board could do exactly what Relator’s counsel wanted, which was to have Petition A placed on the ballot prior to the special-election deadline. And at that same meeting, it adopted a resolution authorizing the transmittal of the new Petition M to the Board of Elections.” The school board further states that it waited to certify the Petition M proposal until its title agent could complete her review of it and that that review was delayed by a day due to the title agent’s unavailability.3 {¶ 29} The timetable for certifying Petition M was undoubtedly short. Nevertheless, the evidence establishes that the school board could have completed both required certifications in the time available in this case but for its attempt to 3. The school board argues that Cook does not challenge its use of a process that involves factfinding by a title agent. However, the school board’s authority is delineated by R.C. 3311.242, not by the scope of Cook’s challenge. Moreover, even if this point were relevant, Cook has maintained in his filings in this action that the school board’s duty was purely ministerial and that it had no discretion to reject transfer proposals; his counsel made the same arguments to the school board in correspondence during March and April. 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO enforce R.C. 3311.06(B) in contravention of the express mandates of R.C. 3311.242. Accordingly, we conclude that the school board had the opportunity to certify the proposal for placement on the August 4 special-election ballot but declined to do so for reasons outside its authority. We will therefore issue a writ of mandamus against the school board. {¶ 30} In Dunn II, as in this case, the school board had issued a certification but the certification named an election later than the one sought by the petition’s proponents. In Dunn II, we declined to issue a writ ordering the school board to issue a new certification specifying the correct election date, because “R.C. 3311.242(B)(2) requires a school board to specify the date of the election in its certification only if the proposal is to be placed on the ballot at a special election” and the proposal at issue in Dunn was intended for a primary election. Dunn II, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-339, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 13. Therefore, the original certification’s “reference to the November 3 election was inconsequential and [had] no binding effect.” Id. at ¶ 14. Here, by contrast, the proposal was intended for a special election, the date of which R.C. 3311.242(B)(2) did require to be included in the school board’s certification. {¶ 31} Accordingly, we grant a writ of mandamus ordering the school board to certify Petition M to the board of elections for placement on the August 4 specialelection ballot and to comply with R.C. 3311.242(B)’s other requirement—that it file the proposal and a map of the affected territory with the State Board of Education under R.C. 3311.242(B)(1)—if it has not already done so. {¶ 32} Finally, we deny the writ as to the board of elections. Because the elections board has not failed to take action on a resolution certifying the proposal for placement on the August 4 ballot, it has not abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law, so Cook’s mandamus claim against the elections board is not ripe. 12 January Term, 2020