Opinion ID: 1772453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Herring

Text: On the other hand, the facts in Herring present different circumstances than those in Esperti. In Herring, the defendant was arrested and, shortly thereafter, the police requested that he submit to a hand swab gunshot residue test. See Herring, 501 So.2d at 20. The defendant refused to submit to the test but was not told that he was required to take the test, or that his refusal could be used against him. See id. At trial, testimony of the defendant's refusal to take the test was introduced over objection and the prosecutor argued to the jury that the testimony was convincing proof of the defendant's consciousness of his guilt. Id. On appeal, the Third District held that it was error to admit evidence of defendant's refusal: The failure to communicate to Herring that the test was compulsory carried with it, we think, the implicit suggestion that the test was permissive and that he thus had a right to refuse. Consequently, even if the refusal had some arguable probative value, its admission would be unfair where the police may have led the defendant to believe that he had a right to refuse. Herring, 501 So.2d at 21. The Third District concluded that [a] defendant's behavior is circumstantial evidence probative of his consciousness of his guilt, and ultimately guilt itself, only when it can be said that the behavior is `susceptible of no prima facie explanation except consciousness of guilt.' Id. at 20 (quoting Esperti, 220 So.2d at 418). Because we find its analysis sound and approve of its result, we quote Judge Pearson's opinion in Herring at length: A defendant's behavior is circumstantial evidence probative of his consciousness of his guilt, and ultimately guilt itself, only when it can be said that the behavior is susceptible of no prima facie explanation except consciousness of guilt. State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416, 418 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. dismissed, 225 So.2d 910 (Fla.1969). In Esperti, the appellate court approved the admission of evidence that the defendant, after being told that he had no choice but to submit to a gunpowder test, resisted the test by sitting on his hands, wiping his hands with a handkerchief, and trying to rub tobacco ashes on his hands after learning that the ingredient in gunpowder can be confused with cigarette ashes. The Esperti court found that the case before it was not one where circumstances other than consciousness of guilt could have explained the defendant's refusal. As the Esperti court significantly noted, the defendant there had been told that he had no right to refuse the test; however, according to the court, had the defendant been told he could refuse, it would be unfair to admit evidence of his refusal. Id. at 419. The unfairness, of course, is that a defendant who is told he may refuse and is told of no consequences which would attach to his refusal may quite plausibly refuse so as to disengage himself from further interaction with the police or simply decide not to volunteer to do anything he is not compelled to do. In contrast, if a defendant knows that his refusal carries with it adverse consequences, the hypothesis that the refusal was an innocent act is far less plausible. Thus, in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the Court, holding admissible the defendant's refusal to take a blood alcohol test, pointed out that, although the defendant was not told that the refusal could be used against him in court, he was told that he could lose his driver's license if he refused. This latter warning made it clear that refusing the test was not a `safe harbor,' free of adverse consequences. Id. at 566, 103 S.Ct. at 924, 74 L.Ed.2d at 760. While the court in Neville held the refusal admissible because the defendant had good reason not to refuse, it noted, in comparison, that in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), the Court had prohibited the impeachment use of the defendant's post- Miranda -warning silence because his silence during police interrogation lacked significant probative value and ... any reference to his silence under such circumstances carried with it an intolerably prejudicial impact. Id. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 2138, 45 L.Ed.2d at 107. See also Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957) (holding that a person's silence during interrogation is not inconsistent with his exculpatory testimony at trial in light of repeated assertions of innocence during interrogation, the secretive nature of the interrogation, and the focus on the defendant during the interrogation). Thus, while Neville stands for the proposition that evidence of the defendant's behavior (refusal to take the blood test) is admissible where the defendant had substantial motivation not to behave as he did, Hale stands for the corollary proposition that evidence of a defendant's behavior (remaining silent) is inadmissible, because not probative, where the defendant had no substantial motivation not to behave as he did. 501 So.2d at 20-21. The Third District concluded that it would be unduly prejudicial and unfair to admit evidence that a defendant had refused to take a test where the defendant is either told he or she may refuse the test, or the defendant is not told of any adverse consequences which would attach to the refusal. See id.