Opinion ID: 2458
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The CERCLA Claims

Text: Preliminary to discussing plaintiffs' particular challenges to the judgment entered in favor of defendants on the CERCLA claims, we discuss the relevant statutory scheme. Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to promote the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for the contamination. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1870, 1874, 173 L.Ed.2d 812 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute seeks to accomplish this goal through three cost-shifting provisions: CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), which permits recovery of cleanup and prevention costs; id. § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), which creates a right of contribution for parties who have been compelled to clean up a site by a court or administrative body; and id. § 113(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B), which creates a similar right of contribution for parties that have resolved the issue of liability to the United States by a settlement agreement. See generally Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir.2005) (discussing statutory framework). [3] This court having affirmed the award of summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' contribution claim, see AMW Materials Testing, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 187 Fed.Appx. at 26, only CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), providing for restitution, is relevant to this appeal.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) defines four classes of covered persons subject to liability for response costs, i.e., the costs of cleaning up and preventing future contamination at a site onto which hazardous materials have been released. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d at 94-95. For purposes of this appeal, we focus on § 9607(a)(2), the provision relied on by plaintiffs in suing defendants for restitution. Section 9607(a)(2) states that any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of is a covered person for purposes of CERCLA. Although plaintiffs were undoubtedly the owners of the AMW facility from which the hazardous materials at issue in this case were released, they submit that defendants are liable under § 9607(a)(2) as the effective operators of the facility throughout the time they fought the fire at the site.
The introductory language of § 9607(a) states that [n]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section, persons covered under the subsection are strictly liable. Subsection (b), which is not at issue in this case, affords an affirmative defense to a covered person who can demonstrate that the damages attributable to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance were caused solely by an act of God, war, or a third party unrelated to the covered person. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). In a 1986 amendment to CERCLA codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d), Congress provided a further defense that is here at issue. Specifically, § 9607(d)(2) states as follows: No State or local government shall be liable under this subchapter[ [4] ] for costs or damages as a result of actions taken in response to an emergency created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance generated by or from a facility owned by another person. This paragraph shall not preclude liability for costs or damages as a result of gross negligence or intentional misconduct by the State or local government. For the purpose of the preceding sentence, reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct shall constitute gross negligence. This subsection is followed by a Savings provision, which states that § 9607(d) shall not alter the liability of any person covered by the provisions of paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (a) of this section with respect to the release or threatened release concerned. Id. § 9602(d)(3).
Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in submitting a verdict sheet to the jury that failed to ask first whether, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), defendants were operators of the AMW facility at the time of the hazardous materials discharge at issue. They assert that the trial record compels an affirmative answer to this question as a matter of law. Plaintiffs further contend that any emergency response by defendants pursuant to § 9607(d)(2) cannot serve as an affirmative defense to § 9607(a) liability. Neither argument is convincing.