Opinion ID: 2314882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: C: Harmless Error

Text: Assuming that the trial court constitutionally erred in going forward with reinstruction in appellant's absence, we nonetheless find that the government has met its burden of proving the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [18] Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) ([W]e have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-19, 104 S.Ct. 453, 454-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (denial of defendant's right to be present at all stages of trial due to ex parte communication between judge and juror held harmless error); United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.1989) (applying Chapman harmlessness test to read-back of testimony in response to jury note during jury deliberations and modified Allen charge given to deadlocked jury); Kleinbart v. United States, 553 A.2d 1236, 1240 (D.C.1989) (applying beyond a reasonable doubt standard to improper exclusion of defendant from voir dire at bench); Harris, supra, 489 A.2d at 468-70. In Wade, the court credited the psychological influence factor of a defendant's presence at reinstruction, stating that the same influence pertains to the right of confrontation of defendant and jury as to the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. 142 U.S.App.D.C. at 360, 441 F.2d at 1050; cf. Kimes, supra, 489 A.2d at 111 (psychological influence of presence at return of verdict, where jury subject to polling). Appellant makes the same type of argument here, especially with respect to the reinstruction stating the fundamental standard of proof in a criminal trial. However, appellant's absence from the reinstruction here was highly unlikely to lead to any prejudice. The reinstruction was an entirely mechanical process, which might just as well have been sent to the jury in writing. See Quarles v. United States, 349 A.2d 690, 692 (D.C.1975) (rejection of right to presence at submission of trial exhibits to jury after jury request because of the ministerial nature of the activity and the lack of unusual circumstances), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 972, 96 S.Ct. 2169, 48 L.Ed.2d 795 (1976) (cited in Harris, supra, 489 A.2d at 468). There was no discourse or oral questioning involved, and counsel remained silent throughout. The jury had previously been instructed on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, in appellant's presence, and appellant was again present when the jury rendered its verdict and was polled. Appellant had been absent at other points during the trial and during the jury's deliberations when the judge gave some administrative instructions, so there is no reason to suppose, as appellant argues, that the jury would have thought that appellant had escaped or been restrained for disruptive conduct, or would have noticed appellant's absence for any other reason. [19] Finally, appellant was present the evening before the reinstruction, heard the trial judge's intention to reinstruct on all three issues the next morning, and had ample opportunity to assist his counsel in any strategic response to the request for reinstruction. Especially in light of defense counsel's express refusal to object, stated in appellant's presence, it is difficult for us to fathom what more appellant himself could have done the next morning, in the absence of any suggestion on appeal that the reflection of one night somehow brought to mind some new ground of objection. None is even suggested now. There is thus no reason for us to believe that appellant enjoyed knowledge superior to or different from that of his counsel, Harris, supra, 489 A.2d at 468, or that his personal presence would ... have aided his defense. Id. at 467-68. Such is particularly not the case here, where experienced defense counsel unhesitatingly waived his client's presence at a part of the proceeding where the client would have played no active role, a decision which strongly suggests that any prejudice would be purely theoretical in nature. Affirmed.