Opinion ID: 196165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ex Post Facto Concerns.

Text: 170 Appellant seeks to incorporate an argument advanced on appeal by his codefendants to the effect that the district court's sentencing determinations abridged the Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 3. In appellant's view, the court's error lay in increasing his TOL based on an amendment to the money laundering guideline, U.S.S.G. Sec. 2S1.1(b)(1), 31 that did not become effective until November 1, 1991--during the lifespan of the conspiracy, but subsequent to the last proven instance of money laundering. This criticism fails for at least three reasons. 171 First, appellant did not broach the topic at sentencing. He has, therefore, waived it. See United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 55 (1st Cir.1991) (explaining that in connection with sentencing as in other contexts, ... arguments not seasonably addressed to the trial court may not be raised for the first time in an appellate venue); accord, e.g., United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 620 n. 6 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1118, 130 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1995); Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1202. 172 Second, appellant was not only the mastermind of the money laundering ring, but also its chief executive officer, comptroller, sales manager, and director of operations. The weight of the evidence heavily preponderates in favor of a finding that appellant knew and believed of the money's origins. Indeed, appellant wholly fails to demonstrate how and where the district court erred in determining his level of knowledge or belief, or why the guideline revision makes any real difference in his case. This failure--typical of litigants who attempt to incorporate by reference arguments which, if made in earnest, deserve individualized attention--is fatal to appellant's cause. See, e.g., Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17 ([I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.). 173 Third, even if appellant were somehow to surmount the two hurdles we have just described, he could prevail only upon a showing of plain error. See United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-78, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); United States v. Olivier-Diaz, 13 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.1993). Given the strict requirements that attend amelioration under the plain error doctrine, and the substantial discretion invested in appellate courts with regard to the doctrine's use, see generally Taylor, 54 F.3d at 972-73 plain error is plainly absent here. Put bluntly, we detect nothing in appellant's belated assault that causes us to question the fundamental fairness or basic integrity of the proceeding below in [any] major respect. Id. at 973. 174