Opinion ID: 2767413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Opportunity to Replead

Text: “We review the denial of leave to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion.” Hermann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 558 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Generally, courts should give plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case under Rule 12(b)(6). See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). The court may deny leave to amend, 6 New factual allegations, however, need not be so construed unless the plaintiff explicitly requests leave to amend and expresses the grounds upon which the amendment is sought with particularity. See United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 2003). 9 Case: 14-50788 Document: 00512892939 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/07/2015 No. 14-50788 however, if the defects are incurable or the plaintiffs have already alleged their best case. See id.; Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). Trojacek was not driving the ATV that caused De’Jon’s death and did not exercise control over De’Jon’s movements at the time of the accident. Because at least the latter element is required to demonstrate a waiver of sovereign immunity under the TTCA, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Pierces pled their best case as to those claims. Additionally, because the Pierces do not contest the dismissal of their original Section 1983 claims and we have concluded that leave to amend would be futile as to their later-asserted claim, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that they also pled their best case as to their Section 1983 claims. IV. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State-Law Claims “We review a district court’s decision to decline jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims for an abuse of discretion.” Batiste v. Island Records Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 226 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if: “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The dismissal of all federal claims provides “a powerful reason to choose not to continue to exercise jurisdiction.” CarnegieMellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Batiste, 179 F.3d at 227. 10 Case: 14-50788 Document: 00512892939 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/07/2015 No. 14-50788 Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Pierces’ federal claims, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Pierces’ state-law claims against Trojacek’s father on the basis of the second and third Section 1367(c) factors. AFFIRMED. 11