Opinion ID: 3159727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the UCCJEA

Text: [¶6] With certain exceptions not applicable here, “a court of this State has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if” one of four criteria is met. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1745(1).2 Jurisdiction will lie in Maine if 2 A “child custody determination” is defined as a judgment, decree or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial and modification order. The term does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual. 19-A M.R.S. § 1732(3) (2014). “‘Initial determination’ means the first child custody determination concerning a particular child.” 19-A M.R.S. § 1732(8) (2014). 4 (A) Maine “is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding or was the home state of the child within 6 months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this State”; (B) no other state has “home state” jurisdiction; (C) any “home state” declined jurisdiction on the basis that Maine is the more appropriate forum; or (D) “[n]o court of any other state would have jurisdiction” pursuant to the preceding criteria. Id. § 1745(1)(A)-(D). Section 1745(1) “is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this State.” Id. § 1745(2). Thus, although the child’s physical presence is not necessarily required for the court to make a child custody determination, id. § 1745(1), (3), at least one of the criteria of section 1745(1) must be met for the court to have jurisdiction. [¶7] The “home state” of a child over the age of six months is “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” 19-A M.R.S. § 1732(7). “A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.” Id. [¶8] When determining jurisdiction, “[a] court of this State shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States,” unless the child custody laws of that foreign country violate “fundamental principles of human rights,” 5 19-A M.R.S. § 1735(1), (3), as provided in article 20 of the Hague Convention,3 see UCCJEA § 105 uniform cmt., included with 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1735 (2012). There is no indication in the record that the child custody laws of Guatemala violate fundamental principles of human rights; indeed, the Hague Convention has been in force between Guatemala and the United States since January 1, 2008. U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaties in Force 410-11 (Jan. 1, 2013); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, International Parental Child Abduction, U.S. Hague Convention Treaty Partners, http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/en/ country/hague-party-countries.html. [¶9] Although Seekins disputes the reasons that neither Hamm nor the child has visited Maine,4 the child’s actual place of residence is not in dispute and is dispositive of jurisdiction. The child was more than six months old when the complaint was filed, and she had lived in Guatemala with her mother for the six consecutive months immediately preceding Seekins’s commencement of his parental rights and responsibilities action. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1732(7). Guatemala—not Maine—is the child’s home state based on the child’s actual place 3 Article 20 of the Hague Convention provides, “The return of the child . . . may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction art. 20, opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10494 (Mar. 26, 1986) (emphasis added). 4 Seekins testified that, at some point, Hamm had agreed to move to Maine with the child and reside with him. Seekins appears to base his claim for jurisdiction in Maine in part on that agreement. 6 of residence. See id. There is no evidence that Guatemala has declined jurisdiction; thus, the initial proceeding with respect to the child must be pursued there. Because of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court appropriately dismissed the complaint.