Opinion ID: 2570337
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: united states supreme court's recent sentencing decisions

Text: Pertinent here is the high court's trilogy of recent sentencing decisions: Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, and Booker, supra, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738. Apprendi, decided in 2000, involved a New Jersey law that provided for an extended term of imprisonment if the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime was committed `to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.' ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 469, 120 S.Ct. 2348.) The high court held that before imposition of the extended sentence the defendant was entitled to a jury trial at which the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts justifying the extended commitment. The court explained that any fact exposing the defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone ( Apprendi, supra, at p. 483, 120 S.Ct. 2348, italics & fn. omitted) is the equivalent of an element of the crime, thus triggering the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial. Generally, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum [ [21] ] must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Apprendi, at p. 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, italics added.) Outside the ambit of this rule, the court said, are prior convictions, because recidivism `does not relate to the commission of the offense' itself ( id. at p. 496, 120 S.Ct. 2348), and because there is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had a right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find [a] required fact under a lesser standard of proof ( ibid. ). Some four years later, in 2004, the high court in Blakely applied its Apprendi holding to the State of Washington's sentencing scheme. In that case, the defendant was convicted of second degree kidnapping with a firearm, a felony punishable by up to 10 years in prison. Under Washington law, the `standard range' for the crime was 49 to 53 months, but a trial court could exceed that range if it found `substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.' ( Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 299, 124 S.Ct. at p. 2535.) The law contained a nonexclusive list of aggravating factors. The trial court found the existence of one of those factors (deliberate cruelty) and imposed a 90-month sentence. ( Ibid. ) Blakely invalidated the State of Washington's sentencing scheme insofar as it did not provide the defendant with a jury trial, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, on the existence of aggravating factors used to increase the defendant's sentence. The Blakely court reiterated its holding in Apprendi that `any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 301, 124 S.Ct. at p. 2536, italics added, quoting Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348.) The term statutory maximum, Blakely explained, is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.  ( Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 303, 124 S.Ct. at p. 2537.) In other words, Blakely said, the relevant `statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When the judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts `which the law makes essential to the punishment,' [citation] and the judge exceeds his proper authority. ( Ibid. ) [E]very defendant, the high court held, has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to the jury all facts legally essential to the punishment. ( Id. at p. 313, 124 S.Ct. at p. 2543.) The next year, in Booker, supra, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, the high court had to determine whether, under Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, and Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial. The decision had two majority opinions, each deciding a distinct issue. The first opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, addressed the question whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. Of particular significance here is part II of that opinion. ( Booker, supra, 543 U.S. at pp. 229-238, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 748-752.) There, the high court explained that if the guidelines were merely advisory, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment, because judges may exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range. ( Booker, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 233, 125 S.Ct. at p. 750.) But, it noted, the guidelines are mandatory and binding on all judges ( ibid. ) because they state that the sentencing court ` shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range' established by the Guidelines, subject to departures in specific, limited cases ( ibid. ). Thus, Booker held, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional. The second majority opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, discussed the remedy for the constitutional violation found in the first opinion. Explaining that there were two possible remedies  (1) to engraft onto the guidelines a jury trial requirement, or (2) to make the guidelines advisory rather than mandatory  the court chose the latter, reasoning that to engraft a jury trial requirement onto the sentencing guidelines would destroy them. It concluded that the provisions in the federal sentencing statute that made the guidelines mandatory and that set forth standards of review on appeal should be severed and excised, and that, with these excisions, the remainder of the guidelines were constitutional. ( Booker, supra, 543 U.S. at pp. 258-267, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 764-768.) To summarize: The high court's decisions in Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, and Booker, supra, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, hold that unless the defendant waives the right to jury trial, the trial court may not, relying on offense-based facts not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant, sentence the defendant to a prison term greater than the maximum sentence authorized by the jury's verdict. The trial court may exceed the maximum sentence only if justified by the defendant's prior criminal history.