Opinion ID: 3163926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strict Liability Failure to Warn

Text: In Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 352–53, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976), Maryland embraced the concept of strict liability as a basis for products liability 18 To the extent that Respondents argue that May would not have heeded any warnings had they been printed in the instruction manuals, there is a presumption that a plaintiff will heed any warning given. See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 336 Md. 145, 162, 647 A.2d 405, 413 (1994) (citations omitted) (asserting that Maryland courts have “long recognized a presumption that plaintiffs would have heeded a legally adequate warning had one been given”); see also Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 229, 604 A.2d 445, 469 (1992) (noting that “[t]he Maryland ‘presumption’ at a minimum means that jurors are entitled to bring to their deliberations their knowledge of the ‘natural instinct’ and ‘disposition’ of persons to guard themselves against danger”). 21 and expressly adopted the elements contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides in pertinent part: (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, we considered Comment j of the Restatement § 402A applicable to failure to warn claims predicated on strict liability. 325 Md. 420, 436, 601 A.2d 633, 641 (1992) (“The Phipps opinion expressly indicated that our adoption of § 402A included the official comments.”) (citing Phipps, 278 Md. at 346, 363 A.2d at 959–60). Comment j explains that a seller is only required to give a warning “if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge” of the product’s dangerous propensity. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. j. Relying on Comment j, the Court in Zenobia thus determined that knowledge is an essential element of a strict liability failure to warn claim. 325 Md. at 437, 601 A.2d at 641. Consequently, we recognized that “in a failure to warn case governed by the Restatement § 402A and Comment j, negligence concepts to some extent have been grafted onto strict liability.” Zenobia, 325 Md. at 435, 601 A.2d at 640; see David G. Owen, Products Liability Law § 10.4, at 668 (3d ed. 2015) (“[C]omments j and k[] address the duty to warn in negligence terms and effectively provide that the duty to warn under § 402A 22 is limited to foreseeable risks.”). More recently, we acknowledged that “negligence concepts and those of strict liability have ‘morphed together’ . . . in failure to warn cases.” Gourdine, 405 Md. at 743, 955 A.2d at 782; id. (“Duty, thus, is an essential element of both negligence and strict liability causes of action for failure to warn.”).19 As with negligence, Respondents argue that they cannot be strictly liable for asbestos components they have not manufactured, marketed, sold, or otherwise placed into 19 This is not to say that strict liability and negligent failure to warn claims are equivalent. See Mazda Motor of Am., Inc. v. Rogowski, 105 Md. App. 318, 325–26, 659 A.2d 391, 394–95 (1995), cert. denied, 340 Md. 501, 667 A.2d 342 (1995) (asserting that negligent and strict liability claims for an alleged failure to warn bear “a strong resemblance” to one another, yet espousing that there is a distinction between negligent and strict liability failure to warn claims); Morgan v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 464, 466 (D. Md. 2002) (“It is clear from this case [Rogowski] and others in Maryland that failure to warn as a cause of action only states a claim in the context of forms of tort liability recognized in Maryland.”) (emphasis added); see also Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md. App. 408, 422, 475 A.2d 1243, 1250 (1984) (“There is nothing in Phipps to suggest that the traditional action for negligence was to be subsumed in or replaced by the newly adopted strict liability. Indeed, as subsequent cases make clear, strict liability merely takes its place alongside negligence . . . as an alternative basis of liability.”). These two theories of liability are also distinct from a practical standpoint. In Zenobia, we observed that the availability of contributory negligence as a defense is an important difference between strict liability and negligent failure to warn claims: We note that despite the overlap of negligence principles in a strict liability failure to warn case, strict liability differs from a negligence cause of action in that contributory negligence is not a defense to a strict liability claim. Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 597–98, 495 A.2d 348, 356–57 (1985). In addition, in light of the other comments to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which apply in defective design, defective construction, and failure to warn cases, there are some differences between a negligent failure to warn case and a failure to warn based upon § 402A and Comment j. 325 Md. at 435 n.7, 601 A.2d at 640 n.7. 23 the stream of commerce. Ignoring the economic benefit from the sale of the pump itself, Respondents contend that strict liability is justified only when the defendant derives an economic benefit from its component parts, as well as the ability to test and inspect the component. They claim that these justifications are not advanced by imposing strict liability on a manufacturer for component parts that it did not place into the stream of commerce. Respondents even quote Gourdine, 405 Md. at 739–40, 955 A.2d at 779–80, in asserting that Maryland law holds that the “framework for analysis in negligent failure to warn cases . . . . substantially mirrors that of a strict liability action.” Because of the intersections between strict liability and negligent failure to warn claims, we conclude that a manufacturer has a duty to warn of asbestos-containing replacement components that it has not placed into the stream of commerce in strict liability in the same narrow circumstances as in negligence. That is, a manufacturer will have a duty to warn of asbestos-containing replacement components that it has not placed into the stream of commerce in strict liability only where (1) its product contains asbestos components, and no safer material is available; (2) asbestos is a critical part of the pump sold by the manufacturer; (3) periodic maintenance involving handling asbestos gaskets and packing is required; and (4) the manufacturer knows or should know of the risks from exposure to asbestos.20 20 The dissent asserts that there is no need to weigh the factors articulated in Patton to determine whether Respondents owed May a duty. The dissent states that “Patton involved negligence, not strict products liability; as such, in Patton, we neither commented on nor added to the understanding of what is required to bring a case for strict products liability.” The dissent ignores or misunderstands the record in this case. Petitioner brought failure to warn products liability claims grounded in both strict liability and negligence. 24 In strict liability, Respondents’ theory that no duty arises when the defendant never touched the offending asbestos components is equivalent to the defense that the product was substantially modified after sale. But, Petitioner rightly counters that the duty to warn is only absolved if there is substantial modification to the product between the time of sale and when the injured party encountered the product. See Owen, supra at § 15.3, at 958 (asserting that “The Restatement (Second) of Torts . . . address[es] this issue in terms of whether the dangerous defect was in the component at the time it left the component supplier’s control, or whether the danger was introduced into the product through ‘further processing or other substantial change.’”). As the Court of Special Appeals explained in Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., strict liability “under § 402A is expressly conditioned upon the product reaching the user ‘without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.’” 59 Md. App. 408, 432, 475 A.2d 1243, 1255 (1984) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1)(b)). Thus, contrary to the dissent’s maintaining that Patton “offers zero support for the conclusion that Respondents had a duty to warn,” it is wholly appropriate to consider the Patton factors in analyzing Petitioner’s negligent failure to warn claim. Moreover, as to the pertinence of the Patton factors in examining Petitioner’s strict liability failure to warn claim, the dissent overlooks our recognition that the framework for analysis in strict liability failure to warn cases “substantially mirrors” that of a negligent failure to warn action. Gourdine, 405 Md. at 739–40, 955 A.2d at 779–80; see generally David G. Owen, Products Liability Law § 9.2, at 561 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing how “most courts now agree that these types of claims [negligent and strict liability failure to warn] are nearly, or entirely, identical . . . .”). Once we have determined the existence of a duty to warn for the negligence claim, we are hard-pressed to deny a comparable duty in the strict liability failure to warn claim. 25 Petitioner asserts and Respondents do not deny that the asbestos gaskets and packing that replaced the component parts in the original pumps sold by Respondents were identical to the original components. Our four elements necessary to establish duty in this context, stated above, ensure compliance with the substantial modification doctrine. Part of the first element—that a manufacturer’s product contains asbestos—requires that a manufacturer’s product be defective when it leaves the manufacturer’s hands. The second element—the product will not function properly without using asbestos—requires that the manufacturer’s product remains defective when the user of that product suffers harm. The necessary replacement of asbestos components with identical components cannot be said to constitute a substantial modification. Consequently, our test for determining whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn of asbestos-containing replacement components that it has not placed into the stream of commerce incorporates the substantial modification doctrine. We are not persuaded by Respondents’ argument that the asbestos gaskets and packing themselves are the “product” for purposes of strict liability analysis. Common sense tells us that the pumps were what Respondents sold to the Navy, and the gaskets and packing are included within that product. We have studied Ford Motor Co. v. Wood and the out-of-state cases cited by Respondents refusing to impose any liability when the offensive product was a replacement 26 from a third party.21 But we fault these cases for failing to recognize the exception to the “bare metal defense” when the ultimate product sold—here, the pump—cannot function properly without the expendable and noxious component. See Surre, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 801; Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 769–70; cf. O’Neil, 266 P.3d at 996 n.6, 1005. When an expendable noxious component such as asbestos is essential to a product that is sold, we should not consider the expendable component as the “product.” Rather we should focus on the final product, the pump. It is undisputed that the pump contained asbestos, and there is sufficient evidence that the asbestos was essential to its operation, needed periodic 21 See Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488, 492, 494–95 (6th Cir. 2005); Faddish v. Buffalo Pumps, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1368, 1372–73 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Thurmon v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1283, 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2014). Petitioner and Respondents discuss three Washington Supreme Court decisions in their dispute over whether a manufacturer can be strictly liable for asbestos-containing replacement parts that it did not place into the stream of commerce. Compare Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 197 P.3d 127, 138 (Wash. 2008) (holding “[b]ecause [product manufacturer] was not in the chain of distribution of the dangerous product, we conclude not only that it had no duty to warn under negligence, but also that it cannot be strictly liable for failure to warn”), and Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 198 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2008) (holding no duty to warn of the dangers of exposure to asbestos in products it did not manufacture and for which the manufacturer was not in the chain of distribution), with Macias v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 282 P.3d 1069 (Wash. 2012) (holding duty to warn of exposure to asbestos when manufacturers were not in the chain of distribution of the asbestos-containing products). The most recent of these cases favors a duty to warn, but it does not overrule the earlier cases concluding that no duty exists. See Macias, 282 P.3d at 1083 (“While the chain-of-distribution requirement is undoubtedly the general rule . . . it is not absolute.”). The opaqueness of Washington law makes it an uncertain predicate for either the majority or dissent. See Schwartz, 2015 WL 3387824, at  (“[I]t is not entirely clear from the rationale set forth in Macias whether and how a product manufacturer (such as a valve or pump manufacturer) would be liable under Washington law for internal component parts (such as replacement gaskets and packing) that it did not manufacture or supply that are used in connection with its product.”). 27 replacement, and was dangerous. Finally, as Respondents’ state of knowledge regarding the dangers of asbestos was not the subject of their summary judgment motion, we do not address the sufficiency of evidence adduced by Petitioner on this issue. See Higginbotham, 412 Md. at 147, 985 A.2d at 1203. Thus, Petitioner has supplied sufficient evidence to survive Respondents’ motion for summary judgment. We must stress that a manufacturer is generally not strictly liable for products it has not manufactured or placed into the stream of commerce. As the Court in Phipps cautioned: “Despite the use of the term ‘strict liability’ the seller is not an insurer, as absolute liability is not imposed on the seller for any injury resulting from the use of his product.” 278 Md. at 351–52, 363 A.2d at 963. Our holding that a manufacturer has a duty in strict liability to warn of asbestos-containing replacement components that it has not placed into the stream of commerce in limited circumstances is in accord with the recognition that the reach of strict liability is not boundless. Mindful of the Court’s admonition in Phipps that a seller is not an insurer, we carefully decline to extend the duty to warn to all instances when a manufacturer can foresee that a defective component may be used with its product.