Opinion ID: 1761033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Writ of Prohibition Is Proper in this Case.

Text: The first question to be asked in the writ case is whether the trial court erred by concluding that the DOC was improperly applying HB 406. After all, there would be no basis to issue a writ if the trial court had jurisdiction and came to a proper conclusion. So our primary task by application of the writ standard is to determine whether the trial court erred when it concluded that the DOC improperly applied HB 406 retroactively. Before addressing the merits, we must resolve two important preliminary questions. First, we must determine whether the Pulaski Circuit Court had jurisdiction to issue a statewide injunction. Second, we must determine whether the DOC is actually applying HB 406 in a retroactive manner.
No party disputes that the Pulaski Circuit Court had the subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this type of declaratory judgment or injunctive relief case. The DOC argues, however, that the Pulaski Circuit Court lacked the authority to issue a statewide injunction. We disagree. Section 109 of Kentucky's Constitution assures that Kentucky has a unitary court system. Section 109 states that all judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice[,] which shall be divided into a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, [and] a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the Circuit Court. ... The court shall constitute a unified judicial system for operation and administration. We have recently held that [constitutionally speaking, Kentucky has but one circuit court[;] and all circuit judges are members of that court and enjoy equal capacity to act throughout the state. [26] The DOC appears to contend that only the Franklin Circuit Court has the power to issue a statewide injunction. We do not doubt that the Franklin Circuit Court, generally speaking, has such authority; but the jurisdiction of the Franklin Circuit Court is not at issue. No party has cited any statute or regulation that required this type of action to have been brought only in the Franklin Circuit Court. The lack of such authority is important because the General Assembly could easily have required this type of action to be brought in the Franklin Circuit Court, as it has done in other types of actions. [27] Instead, the General Assembly expressly authorized any court of record of this Commonwealth having general jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment. [28] And, as already noted, the circuit courts of the Commonwealth, including the Pulaski Circuit Court, are the courts of general jurisdiction.... [29] Although it now questions the Pulaski Circuit Court's authority to issue a statewide injunction, the DOC does not contradict the Pulaski Circuit Court's statement that Thompson has conceded that both jurisdiction and venue are proper. In sum, we have a situation in which the Pulaski Circuit Court had jurisdiction, either expressly or by waiver, over both the subject matter and the parties involved in this action. Also, there is no question regarding whether venue was proper since, as stated before, the DOC conceded any venue issue. Perhaps most importantly, we have been pointed to nothing that would have required this action to have been brought in the Franklin Circuit Court. [30] To the contrary, it is plain that our Constitution provides that there is only one circuit court, which leads to the logical conclusion that in the absence of express authority to the contrary, each geographic division of the one statewide circuit court has co-equal abilities and powers. Additionally, it seems that Commonwealth's Attorney Montgomery would not have been able to bring this action in his official capacity in any court lying outside the circuit from which he was elected. [31] So we conclude that the Pulaski Circuit Court had powers co-extensive with the Franklin Circuit Court or any other appropriate circuit court to adjudicate this matter and to grant a declaratory judgment or injunction, statewide or otherwise. [32]
An argument could be made that the DOC did not apply HB 406 retroactively. Instead, as the Franklin Circuit Court seemed to conclude, the DOC merely applied HB 406 equally to all affected prisoners or parolees because the bill contains no express exclusions or limitations on the prisoners or parolees to which it applies. [33] However, all parties (including the DOC) seem to agree that the DOC is applying HB 406 retroactively. [34] And since HB 406 is a biennial budget bill, effective for only a two-year time period, then it logically follows that giving prisoners or parolees credit for time spent on parole before the effective date of that legislation is a retroactive act. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines a retroactive law as [a] legislative act that looks backward or contemplates the past, affecting acts or facts that existed before the act came into effect. [35] Giving prisoners and parolees credit for time served on parole before the effective date of HB 406 fits nicely that definition since giving prisoners and parolees credit for something done before the act's effective date plainly affect[s] acts or facts that existed before the act came into effect. So we shall treat the DOC's interpretation of HB 406 as being retroactive in nature.
Having accepted that the DOC is applying HB 406 retroactively, we must now consider whether such a retroactive application is consistent with the intent of the General Assembly, as evidenced by the language used in HB 406.
We reject Montgomery's contentionas echoed by the Attorney General in the Franklin Circuit Court action that the DOC is procedurally barred or estopped from retroactively applying HB 406 since it argued against retroactive application of the similar biennial budget enacted in 2003. [36] To the contrary, an administrative agency, such as the DOC, may depart from its earlier interpretation of the law, provided that the agency explicitly and rationally justifies] such a change of position. [37] In the case at hand, the DOC has not changed its interpretation of the same law because, even though they are similar, the 2003 biennial budget is a different piece of legislation from the 2008 biennial budget. It should also be noted that the gubernatorial administration, which has a direct effect on the officers leading the DOC and the positions taken by those officers, was different at the time the 2003 budget was enacted. It is hardly surprising or improper for different gubernatorial administrations to have different conclusions on the proper scope and effect of various statuteseven statutes of a similar nature. In short, each administration or administrative agency chief is not inalterably bound by the decisions of predecessors. And even if we assumed that the DOC has changed its interpretation of the law, we are satisfied that the change has been sufficiently justified because, as the DOC notes, there was no commensurate budgetary reduction to support a retroactive application of the 2003 biennial budget. So we distinguish this case from those cases, such as Noland , which held that the DOC acted properly in not applying the 2003 budget bill retroactively. In short, we reject any claim that the DOC's interpretation of the 2003 budget bill binds it or estops it from interpreting differently the 2008 budget bill.
Precedent shows that the General Assembly has the power to suspend statutes, even if the suspension occurs in a budget bill. [38] Precedent also holds that the General Assembly has the power to suspend statutes retroactively. [39] The question before us today, then, is not whether the General Assembly may retroactively suspend statutes in a budget bill, typically by inserting a clause beginning with the word notwithstanding. The more pertinent question is whether the General Assembly intended to suspend KRS 439.344 and KRS 439.354 retroactively when it enacted HB 406. If so, the DOC obviously acted properly in giving HB 406 retroactive application; and the Pulaski Circuit Court erred in issuing an injunction to stop the DOC from carrying out the General Assembly's intent. If not, however, then the Pulaski Circuit Court acted properly in preventing the DOC from acting in a manner contrary to the General Assembly's intent. We have held that retroactive application of statutes is improper unless the General Assembly clearly manifests its intent for the statute in question to have retroactive application. [40] And although we have held that the General Assembly need not use magic words [41] to evidence its intent for retroactive application, we have forcefully held that there is a strong presumption that statutes operate prospectively and that retroactive application of statutes will be approved only if it is absolutely certain the legislature intended such a result. [42] Optimally, the General Assembly will state clearly that it intends legislation to have retroactive effect, as it did in 1996 when it amended the worker's compensation statutes. [43] The question is more difficult in cases like the one before us in which the General Assembly does not explicitly state that HB 406 must apply retroactively. But a failure to state explicitly that legislation is to apply retroactively does not always mean that a court may not determine that the legislation has retroactive effect. After all, the General Assembly need not use magic wordsinstead, all that is required is that the enactment make it apparent that retroactivity was the intended result. [44] So a reviewing court may discern the General Assembly's intent for legislation to have a retroactive effect by using traditional tools for statutory interpretation. Among the most helpful aids in interpreting HB 406 is a budgetary analysis, such as the one found in Baker .
Baker involved a scenario in which the General Assembly had failed to enact a biennial budget in 2002, leading then-Governor Patton to issue an executive spending order. That executive order provided for a 2.7 percent annual salary increment for state employees, the fact that KRS 18A.355(1) guaranteed state workers at least a 5 percent annual salary increment notwithstanding. [45] In 2003, the General Assembly belatedly enacted a biennial budget for the fiscal year beginning July 1 2002, through June 30, 2004. Like Governor Patton's executive order, that budget provided for a 2.7 percent salary increment for state workers for the 2002-03 fiscal year. Several state workers filed a declaratory judgment action against Ernie Fletcher, who had become Governor, arguing that they were entitled to a 5 percent salary increment for 2002-03 because Governor Patton lacked the authority to suspend KRS 18A.355. [46] We held that Governor Patton's purported suspension of KRS 18A.355 was void ab initio and that members of the General Assembly were immune for their official actions (or inactions). [47] Despite those seemingly insurmountable obstacles to the plaintiffs' claims against then-Governor Fletcher, we, nonetheless, chose to address whether Appellants would have been entitled to the five percent pay increase even if a proper defendant had been named. [48] In the course of answering that question in the negative, we concluded that there was no doubt that the General Assembly intended to suspend KRS 18A.355 retroactively for the duration of the 2002-04 biennial budget. [49] Chief among our reasons was the fact that the budget contained explicit language providing for a retroactive suspension of KRS 18A.355. [50] Important to the case at hand, however, we also noted that our conclusion that the General Assembly intended to suspend retroactively KRS 18A.355 was confirmed by the actual amount of money appropriated. The General Assembly appropriated just enough to pay a two and seven-tenths percent raise for all employees. ... Where a sum certain is appropriated[,] there can be no legitimate contention that more spending was intended. [51]
Turning to the case now before us, by using Baker as a guidepost, we may properly look to the funds appropriated to the DOC in HB 406 to determine whether the General Assembly intended HB 406 to apply retroactively. It is uncontested that the funds allocated to the DOC were significantly reduced from the budget request submitted by the Governor. [52] Indeed, as the Pulaski Circuit Court noted in its permanent injunction, the final version of HB 406 [that] was ultimately enacted included a $12 million budget cut in fiscal year [2008-09] and a $19 million budget cut in fiscal year [2009-10].... The street credit provisions were in the original budgets of both chambers of the General Assembly, and were not altered in any manner by subsequent amendments or alterations to the proposed budgets of each chamber. ... Upon request of the Senate leadership, the state budget office, assisted by the DOC, submitted a financial analysis showing the anticipated savings resulting from the street credit provision of the proposed budget, including nearly $6 million in fiscal year 2008-09 and nearly $7.5 million in fiscal year 2009-10. It is uncontested that those calculations required retroactive application of the street credit provision to realize the proposed savings. [53] It is abundantly clear from the facts and circumstances surrounding the passage of HB 406, therefore, that the General Assembly wanted the DOC to save as much money as is legally feasible. Also, the numbers presented by the DOC and the state budget office to the General Assembly regarding potential savings from a broad application of the street credit provisions were based upon an expectation that those provisions would be applied retroactively. Unlike the Pulaski Circuit Court, we find it inconsequential that the General Assembly members apparently did not make in-depth inquiries about whether the savings provisions were to apply retroactively or that the projected savings calculations were not provided to each member of the General Assembly. [54] Nor is our decision affected by the lack of floor debate about street credit provisions in both legislative chambers. The General Assembly speaks through the laws it enacts, and the severe budget cuts contained in HB 406 speak loudly the General Assembly's intent that the DOC should strive to save as much as possible. Moreover, the DOC's decision to apply the street credit and related provisions of HB 406 retroactively is not rendered infirm by the fact that the Executive Branch, of which the DOC is a part, could theoretically have saved just as muchif not morescarce resources if the Governor had simply exercised his constitutional pardon and commutation powers. [55] In other words, since the General Assembly appropriated even less money than the DOC projected to save through the retroactive application of the street time credit, [56] then there can be no legitimate contention that more spending was intended. [57]
The DOC's retroactive application of HB 406 is also supported by the plain language used in that bill. [58] HB 406 authorizes street credit for time spent on parole. Obviously, spent is a past-tense verb; and the General Assembly did not see fit to add any modifying or limiting language (such as time spent after the effective date of this act) to this facially broad provision. So we agree with the DOC that the plain language of HB 406 supports a conclusion that the General Assembly intended for the street credit provision to apply to all time spent on paroleincluding time spent on parole before the effective date of HB 406. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the General Assembly later amended KRS 439.344 itself to provide that, with certain exceptions, [t]he period of time spent on parole shall count as a part of the prisoner's sentence. ... Had the General Assembly disagreed with the DOC's interpretation of HB 406, it would have been illogical for the General Assembly to have permanently amended KRS 439.344 by inserting similar language to that used in HB 406. Finally, we must be careful not to examine HB 406's street credit provision in a vacuum. Rather, we must construe the street credit provision in conjunction with the other sections of that bill. As our predecessor court held, [s]tatutes in pari materia or those which relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or which have a common purpose, must be construed together and the legislative intention apparent from the whole enactment must be carried into effect. [59] We conclude that the General Assembly's intent regarding the street credit provision may be gleaned by examining the subsection that immediately follows it. Part I, Section I(5)(c)(5) of HB 406 provides that [notwithstanding KRS 439.354, a final discharge shall be issued when the prisoner has been out of prison on parole a sufficient period of time to have been eligible for discharge from prison by minimum expiration of sentence had he not been paroled. ... [60] So construing the street credit section together with the minimum discharge section leads to the unmistakable conclusion that the General Assembly intended for the DOC to release or discharge as many prisoners or parolees as possible in order to save as many state dollars as possible. Since the most efficacious and logical manner of ensuring maximum savings is to apply retroactively the street credit provision, we conclude that the DOC's retroactive application of HB 406 was in accordance with the General Assembly's intent. After all, it would have been illogical for the General Assembly to have intended a restrictive version of the street credit provision while simultaneously cutting the DOC's funding and ordering the DOC to release prisoners on their minimum expiration dates. In summary, we conclude that the Pulaski Circuit Court erred when it determined that the General Assembly did not intend HB 406 to have retroactive effect. We then must turn to whether this error is sufficient to rise to the level necessary to grant a writ. [61]
Since this is not a no jurisdiction-type of writ action, we must determine whether the DOC lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. [62] It is unclear what further proceedings remain to be conducted in the Pulaski Circuit Court. But if left undisturbed until appeal, the Pulaski Circuit Court's erroneous interpretation of the retroactivity of HB 406 will have caused many prisoners and parolees to remain improperly under the DOC's supervision, resulting in expenditure of scarce state funds. [63] Since those expended and yet to be expended state funds cannot be recouped and the improperly detained prisoners or parolees cannot regain lost freedom from incarceration or supervision, we conclude that the DOC does not have an adequate remedy by appeal. Next, we then must determine whether the DOC has shown that either it will suffer an irreparable injury absent the writ or that the failure to issue the writ would result in a substantial miscarriage of justice. [64] As stated before, allowing the Pulaski Circuit Court's erroneous permanent injunction to stand would result in the continued incarceration or supervision of prisoners or parolees, which would, in turn, cause the expenditure of scarce state funds to house or supervise those prisoners or parolees. There would be no mechanism for the DOC to recoup those expenses if it prevailed later on a direct appeal. So we conclude that the DOC has shown that it would suffer an irreparable injury unless a writ issues. Furthermore, we deem it to be a substantial miscarriage of justice for prisoners or parolees to continue to be incarcerated or supervised in a manner contrary to the intent of the General Assembly, as embodied in HB 406. Simply put, once a prisoner or parolee has completed his authorized sentence, justice demands that the prisoner or parolee be released from the DOC's supervision. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, we conclude that a writ of prohibition should issue against the Pulaski Circuit Court in this action.