Opinion ID: 894476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: For or in Expectation of Remuneration

Text: The court of appeals concluded that a fact issue existed as to whether Dr. McIntyre fell within the subsection (b)(1) exception for care administered for or in expectation of remuneration. The only statutory explanation of that phrase is found in section 74.001(d). Reading these two provisions together, the court of appeals determined that section 74.001(d) provides two distinct possibilities ... for when a person is deemed to be acting for or in expectation of remuneration: when the individual would ordinarily (1) receive remuneration for administering care, or (2) be entitled to receive remuneration for such services. 59 S.W.3d at 824. The court concluded that Dr. McIntyre could only claim exemption from liability under the Good Samaritan statute if he proved conclusively that he would not customarily receive remuneration for the services he performed and he would not legally be entitled to remuneration. Id. We agree with the court of appeals that the burden of proof was on Dr. McIntyre to negate the exception for care provided for or in expectation of remuneration. By its terms, subsection (b)(1) applies to the entirety of section 74.001, including subsection (c) under which Dr. McIntyre falls. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.001(b). Furthermore, we observe that the purpose of this statute is to increase the incentive for volunteersand particularly physiciansto respond to medical emergencies. See Rosell v. Cent. W. Motor Stages, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 643, 658 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, pet. denied); Howell v. City Towing Assocs., Inc., 717 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Keith, Medical Expert Testimony in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 Baylor L.Rev. 1, 132 n. 850 (1991) (The Texas Good Samaritan statute was originally enacted in 1961 to encourage reluctant physicians to administer emergency care to victims without delay.). We therefore conclude that the Legislature intended that any person raising the Good Samaritan defense must prove that he or she acted without expectation of remuneration within the meaning of subsection (b)(1). The question, then, is what effect do we give subsection (d)? Subsection (d) clarifies the application of subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1). Specifically, subsection (d) prevents a person from waiving payment as an attempt to come within the protection of the statute when he or she would otherwise ordinarily receive or be entitled to receive payment. We agree with the court of appeals that subsection (d) defines two situations in which a person could be deemed to be acting for or in expectation of remuneration: when the person would ordinarily (1) receive or (2) be entitled to receive payment under the circumstances of the case. We also agree with the court of appeals that by the phrase ordinarily receive, the first situation speaks toward what is customary. 59 S.W.3d at 824. In other words, if a person presents evidence that he or she does not customarily receive payment under the circumstances in question, he or she can negate the first prong of subsection (d). [2]