Opinion ID: 1312848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim 8: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a criminal trial includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). The right attaches at both the guilt and sentencing phases. Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir.2002). To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, Robinson must demonstrate that the performance of his counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness at sentencing and ... that `there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Correll, 539 F.3d at 942 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). We hold that Robinson has met his burden to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Under Strickland we presume that counsel was competent. Duncan v. Ornoski, 528 F.3d 1222, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Duncan v. Ayers, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1614, 173 L.Ed.2d 1001 (2009). Robinson can rebut this presumption by showing that [counsel's] performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and was not the product of sound strategy. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052). At the time Robinson was sentenced, prevailing professional norms imposed a duty on counsel to adequately investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings. See Summerlin, 427 F.3d at 630; Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir.2001) ([Investigation] was as crucial in 1980 as it is today in order to assure individualized sentencing and the defendant's right to a fair and reliable capital penalty proceeding.); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1980) (It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the penalty [phase].); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In preparing for the penalty phase of a capital trial, defense counsel has a duty to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background in order to discover all relevant mitigating evidence. Correll, 539 F.3d at 942 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 415, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (counsel has a duty to make a diligent investigation into his client's troubling background and unique personal circumstances). Certain forms of investigation are fundamental to preparing for virtually every capital sentencing proceeding. At the very least, counsel should obtain readily available documentary evidence such as school, employment, and medical records, see Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir.2001) (concluding that counsel was ineffective because he failed to obtain relevant records), and obtain information about the defendant's character and background, see Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 382, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990) ([E]vidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse. (internal quotation and citation omitted)). The investigation should also include inquiries into social background and evidence of family abuse. Summerlin, 427 F.3d at 630 (citing Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005)). Counsel also has a duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence of mental impairment, which includes examination of mental health records. Lambright, 490 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Summerlin, 427 F.3d at 630) (internal edits and quotation marks omitted). Although counsel will typically begin the investigation by interviewing the defendant, the investigation cannot end there unless the defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir.1998), counsel did not perform any real investigation into mitigating circumstances, even though that evidence was rather near the surface, and gave no tactical reasons for his failure to do so. Id. at 1269. At a post-conviction hearing, Smith's counsel testified that he had spoken generally with Smith and with Smith's mother but said that he had received no information that would help with a mitigation defense. Id. We found that the record... indicates that counsel asked nothing more than a few generalized questions and conducted none of the real probing for information that legal praxis assumes and even demands. Id. We noted that counsel could have pointed to Smith's sociopathic personality, drug history, his fine set of family relationships, and his love and support for his children. Id. Because we found no justification for counsel's failure to develop this mitigation evidence, we held that counsel's performance was ineffective. Id. Here, as in Smith, Robinson's trial counsel engaged in virtually no investigation and presented very little argument at the sentencing phase of the trial. Robinson's trial counsel's strategy at the sentencing phase was to focus on the state's failure to prove aggravating circumstances. His sentencing memorandum addressed only two statutory mitigating circumstances Robinson's minor role in the murder, and the fact that the killing was not foreseeableand no nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. At the sentencing hearing, counsel did not call a single witness or introduce any evidence. Although Roberson said at argument that he could cite a whole lot of mitigating factors as far as Fred is concerned, he only briefly discussed two nonstatutory circumstances: that Robinson did not have a history of harming people and that he was apparently a good father. The entirety of Roberson's oral argument at the penalty phase consisted of ten pages of double-spaced transcript. Roberson conducted no investigation of Robinson's family history; he did not speak with any member of Robinson's family; he did not request school, medical, or employment records; and he did not request a mental health evaluation. By his own admission, Roberson limited his preparation to interviewing Robinson and asking him whether there were any witnesses that should be presented. It is not clear from the record how many times they met or for how long, [20] but it is clear that counsel did not ask any probing questions that would likely have led to the discovery of mitigating evidence. See Smith, 140 F.3d at 1269. Additionally, although counsel said he asked Robinson about potential trial witnesses, he did not say that he informed Robinson about what would constitute mitigating evidence to enable Robinson to assist effectively in the investigation. Roberson attempted to justify his failure to interview Robinson's family members by explaining that he thought it would be futile because some of Robinson's family members had testified against him during the guilt phrase of the trial. This decision was not one a reasonably competent attorney would have made. Robinson had fifteen children, only two of whom had testified against him. According to counsel, Robinson was a good father, making it likely that at least some of them would have been willing to testify on his behalf. He also had a wife, ex-wife, parents, and seventeen siblings who not only could have testified on Robinson's behalf, but also could have provided important background information about Robinson's childhood, providing leads for further investigation. We can find no reason for counsel to believe that interviewing these family members would be fruitless. Counsel also failed to explore readily available sources of mitigating evidence concerning Robinson's potential for rehabilitation. If counsel had spoken with prison guards, they would have informed him that Robinson was a model prisoner. Robinson's good behavior has continued while he has been on death row; he gets along well with his fellow inmates, he is visited often by family members, goes to church regularly, and is classified as Level Five-One, the lowest security level possible for a death row inmate. A psychological evaluation of Robinson would have confirmed that he did not have a hostile or aggressive personality, but rather was generally helpful and easy going, and thus demonstrated a potential for rehabilitation and a low risk of future dangerousness. Counsel did not provide any tactical explanation for not presenting evidence of Robinson's potential for rehabilitation. There was no reason not to present such evidence, as this was not a situation where introducing character evidence would have opened the door for the prosecution to introduce negative character evidence. Counsel's decision to forgo any investigation into Robinson's potential for rehabilitation, even though such evidence was close at hand, was not strategic and fell below prevailing professional norms at that time. Had Roberson conducted an effective penalty-phase investigation, he would have learned of aspects of Robinson's character and background that would have provided classic mitigation evidence at sentencing, including: Robinson's impoverished background; his unstable and often abusive upbringing; his multiple episodes of childhood sexual abuse; his low intelligence; his personality disorder; his non-violent nature; and his potential for rehabilitation. [21] Instead, counsel's limited investigation yielded almost nothing of use. Accordingly, we conclude that Roberson's performance was deficient.
Prejudice in a capital sentencing proceeding is measured by reweigh[ing] the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Robinson can establish that he was prejudiced by showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is less than the preponderance more-likely-than-not standard. Summerlin, 427 F.3d at 643. Rather, it is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If there is a reasonable probability that the sentencing judge would not have imposed death if he was aware of the mitigating circumstances, petitioner has been prejudiced and is entitled to relief. Summerlin, 427 F.3d at 643 (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537, 123 S.Ct. 2527). [I]t is not necessary for the habeas petitioner to demonstrate that the newly presented mitigation evidence would necessarily overcome the aggravating circumstances. Correll, 539 F.3d at 951-52 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495). At the time Robinson was sentenced, Arizona's death penalty statute required a judge to impose the death penalty if one or more aggravating circumstances were proved beyond a reasonable doubt and if the mitigation established by a preponderance of the evidence was not sufficiently substantial to justify leniency. Ariz.Rev. Stat. § 13-703(E) (1988) (current version at Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-751). Thus, at that time, failure to present a mitigation defense all but assured the imposition of a death sentence under Arizona law. Summerlin, 427 F.3d at 640. In Summerlin, the sentencing court found that two aggravating circumstances applied to the defendant: the defendant had a prior felony conviction and committed the murder in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner. Id. at 641. Because defendant's counsel presented no mitigating evidence, the court was bound under Arizona law to impose the death sentence. Id. at 640. We concluded that the failure of trial counsel to investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase hearing has undermined our confidence in the sentence of death imposed by the trial judge because, [h]ad an adequate mitigation strategy been presented, there is a `reasonable probability' that an objective sentencing factfinder `would have struck a different balance.' Id. at 643 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537, 123 S.Ct. 2527). The state argues, and the district court held, that Robinson was not prejudiced because Robinson failed to establish a causal connection between the mitigating evidence and the crime. The district court found: (1) that there was no evidence that Robinson's ability to conform his conduct to the law or to know the difference between right and wrong were significantly impaired; (2) that Robinson did not establish a causal connection between [his impoverished childhood, sexual abuse, and unfair treatment] and his offense-related conduct; and (3) that there was no connection between his substandard education, low average intelligence, diabetes, and physical disability and the crime. The district court concluded that even if this evidence had been presented at sentencing, it would have been accorded little mitigating weight and could not outweigh the two aggravating factors. Thus, it was not reasonably probable that the proffered evidence would have undermined confidence in the outcome of the sentencing hearing. The district court's holding is contrary to Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected the requirement that a defendant establish an explanatory nexus between the proffered mitigating evidence and the crime. See Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 45, 125 S.Ct. 400, 160 L.Ed.2d 303 (2004) (holding that evidence of a troubled childhood and limited mental abilities is relevant for mitigation purposes). We explained the reasoning behind rejecting a nexus requirement as follows: If evidence relating to life circumstances with no causal relationship to the crime were to be eliminated, significant aspects of a defendant's disadvantaged background, emotional and mental problems, and adverse history, as well as his positive character traits, would not be considered, even though some of these factors, both positive and negative, might cause a sentencer to determine that a life sentence, rather than death at the hands of the state, is the appropriate punishment for the particular defendant. This is simply unacceptable in any capital sentencing proceeding, given that treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual, and determining whether or not he is deserving of execution only after taking his unique life circumstances, disabilities, and traits into account, is constitutionally required. Lambright, 490 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)). Moreover, whether counsel's failure to present evidence related to antisocial personality disorder and long-term drug use was prejudicial did not turn on whether those precluded [the defendant] from knowing right from wrong....' Id. (quoting Smith, 140 F.3d at 1271). Thus, the district court erred when it relied on Robinson's failure to demonstrate a causal connection between the evidence and the crime as its basis for assigning the evidence minimal mitigating weight. The state also argues that it was not reasonably likely that the sentencing judge would have rendered a different decision if the mitigating evidence had been presented because the Arizona court already determined in the post-conviction proceedings that the additional evidence was not sufficient to warrant leniency. First, the state court, like the district court, erroneously imposed a requirement that Robinson prove a causal connection between the mitigation evidence and the crime. It, therefore, improperly rejected or under-weighted valid mitigating evidence. Compounding this problem, the state court weighed the proffered evidence against two statutory aggravating circumstances: especially cruel, heinous, or depraved conduct and procuring the commission of the offense by a promise of something of pecuniary value. We have held above, however, that the state court arbitrarily applied the aggravating circumstance of especially cruel, heinous, or depraved conduct to Robinson. Our confidence in the court's imposition of the death sentence has been undermined because, had the sentencing judge properly evaluated the mitigating evidence offered in the evidentiary hearing and weighed it against the single aggravating circumstance of procuring the offense by a promise of something of pecuniary value, there is a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a sentence other than death. We conclude that Robinson has established that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffective assistance. In sum, Roberson's failure to conduct a thorough investigation of potential mitigating evidence and to present an adequate mitigation strategy fell below reasonable standards of professional conduct for attorneys representing defendants at a capital sentencing. Robinson was prejudiced by counsel's ineffective assistance because it was reasonably likely that the outcome of sentencing would have been different had the state court considered the mitigating evidence in the proper light against the single surviving aggravating circumstance. We hold therefore that the district court erred in finding that Robinson did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.