Opinion ID: 2061218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: THE CHANCERY (Equity) JURISDICTION

Text: We now direct attention to an independent jurisdiction relating to the control of infants entirely separate and distinct from that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et recipiendum a jurisdiction which reposed exclusively in the English Courts of Chancery. The distinction between the traditional equity jurisdiction exercised by the English Chancery Courts and habeas corpus jurisdiction, (whether the habeas corpus was before a Common Law or a Chancery judge), is most cogently disclosed by a contrast of the two cases of Rex v. DeManneville, 5 East 221, (1804) decided by a Common Law Court, (the King's Bench), and DeManneville v. DeManneville, 10 Vesey Jr's 52 (1804) decided by the Chancery court. Rex v. DeManneville, as we have seen in prior discussion, decided that the presence of the child with the father, the person legally entitled to custody, negatived illegal restraint and, therefore, habeas corpus jurisdiction was inoperative. Shortly after the habeas corpus decision by the King's Bench the mother filed a petition in Chancery. She asked the Chancellor to order the return of the eleven month old child to her and to award her the right to custody. This second proceeding in Chancery, instituted by petition, is the case of DeManneville v. DeManneville, supra. Lord Chancellor Eldon said: The Court of King's Bench, when the child was brought up by Habeas Corpus, declined to interfere; and I am not surprised at it; for that Court has not within it by its constitution any of that species of delegated authority, that exists in the King, as Parens Patriae; and resides in this Court, as representing his Majesty. That application therefore failed, and the child was left in the custody of the father. (pp. 58, 59) (emphasis supplied) Continuing, Lord Eldon observed that there was, however, an independent jurisdiction in equity: To control the right of the father, prima facie, to the person of the child, and as to which In whatever principle that right is founded, it is unquestionably established; and is not disputed. (p. 63) Lord Eldon inclined to the view that the principle on which this independent equity jurisdiction had been truly founded does not go upon guardianship, and can be said to disclaim wardships and seems to be founded on the doctrine, enunciated by Lord Hardwicke in Butler v. Freeman, Ambler 301, `that the Court represents the King, as Parens Patriae' a doctrine, says Lord Eldon, that has been followed in many cases. (p. 63). In number one of the Reporter's notes to the Chancery case of DeManneville v. DeManneville, it is stated: The King, as pater patriae, has the direction of infants, which charge is administered in his Court of Chancery; Cary v. Bertie, 2 Vern, 342; Eyre v. The Countess of Shaftesbury, 2 P.Wms. 119. (p. 66) An excellent summary of this historic equity jurisdiction and the differentiation of it from habeas corpus jurisdiction, in relation to the control of infants, is found in the case of The Queen v. Gyngall 2 Q.B. 232, (1893). Lord Esher, M.R., carefully discusses the scope of the equity jurisdiction as follows: But there was another and an absolutely different and distinguishable jurisdiction, which has been exercised by the Court of Chancery from time immemorial. That was not a jurisdiction to determine rights as between a parent and a stranger, or as between a parent and a child. It was a paternal jurisdiction, a judicially administrative jurisdiction, in virtue of which the Chancery Court was put to act on behalf of The Crown, as being the guardian of all infants, in the place of a parent, and as if it were the parent of the child, thus superseding the natural guardianship of the parent. (p. 239) In a leading American case Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925) Cardozo, J. reveals the nature of this original equity jurisdiction as being unconcerned with adversary rights. The chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction    does not proceed upon the theory that the petitioner, whether father or mother, has a cause of action against the other or indeed against any one. He acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the child. He is to put himself in the position of a `wise, affectionate, and careful parent'   , and make provision for the child accordingly. (p. 626)