Opinion ID: 532961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burnett's Expectation of Privacy in the Hallway

Text: 20 We now consider Burnett's claim to an expectation of privacy in the hallway in light of the Robinson factors. 21 (a) Burnett's Property Interest: Unlike Wanda Burgess, the apartment lessee, Burnett, apparently a casual visitor, did not enjoy a property interest in the hallway. So far as the record shows, even if invitees were staying in the apartment, only Burgess possessed a sufficient relationship to the apartment to control access to its common areas, including the hallway. Cf. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993 (consent given by lessees' daughter to search room that she and her absent husband, defendant in the case, occupied); United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C.Cir.1979) (appellant's wife has authority to consent to search even though appellant present at time of search). Since Burgess, by virtue of her property rights, could have consented to a police search of the hallway, Burnett cannot claim that he legitimately expected privacy from the police in the hallway. 22 (b) Burnett's Right to Exclude Others from the Hallway: There is no suggestion in the record that Burnett had a right to exclude from the hallway anyone lawfully in the apartment. In fact, the hallway directly adjoined the living room, so that there was no clearly defined boundary between the two areas. Presumably, any lawful occupant could have toured the hallway anytime he wanted. Burnett's claim that Cameron did not sleep in a bedroom because he was excluded from the rear section of the apartment, Brief for Appellant (Burnett Br.) at 21, has no support in the record. Furthermore, Burnett had no apparent authority to exclude from the hallway invitees of Burgess, Cameron, Parris, or Hall. In short, the presence of several other transient guests with undefined status in the apartment, with the lessee absent, necessarily diminished to the vanishing point any expectation on Burnett's part of privacy in the apartment's common areas. See United States v. Briones-Garza, 680 F.2d 417, 420-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 229, 74 L.Ed.2d 181 (1982). 23 Burnett's lack of authority to exclude other guests from the hallway did not, however, necessarily mean that he could not exclude police from the hallway under any circumstances, just as he might have resisted a burglar or a trespasser. See generally United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 198-99 (D.C.Cir.1989) (person may relinquish expectation of privacy vis-a-vis bailee or colleague while retaining expectation vis-a-vis police). Burnett could legitimately expect the police not to enter the apartment without a warrant or other justification for a warrantless search, such as consent. See generally Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1414, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a [criminal] case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (discussing consensual searches). 6 Yet Burnett's right to exclude the police was a highly circumscribed one, subject to contrary decisions by Burgess--and, possibly, by other guests to whom she had delegated authority--to allow the police into the apartment's common areas. 7 Since Burnett was unsure of the status of the other guests in the apartment or, at the time of the police entry, of the whereabouts of the lessee, 8 he had no reason to expect that such consensual entry of the police might not take place, as indeed it apparently did. Following the MPD officers' peaceful entry, he had no reason to doubt the police's legitimate presence in the hallway or to exclude the officers from it. 24 (c) Burnett's Subjective Expectation of Privacy: Burnett's decision to keep the door to his room open, so that he could be partially seen from the living room, suggests that he had no significant subjective expectation that third parties, including the police, would not look into his room. Additionally, since Burnett left his belongings in the tote bag, it was likely that Parris and Hall would have to go through them in order to find their own possessions. Had Burnett's subjective expectation of privacy been more pronounced, he would, presumably, have closed the door to the bedroom in which he was staying and brought his personal effects there. 25 (d) Burnett's Precautions to Protect his Privacy: By keeping his bedroom door open and his belongings in the tote bag in Parris' room, Burnett failed to take basic precautions to maintain his privacy. Indeed, it appears that Burnett took no precautions to protect his privacy. 26 (e) Legitimacy of Burnett's Presence on the Premises: While the record in the suppression hearing contains no evidence that Burgess specifically invited Burnett into her apartment, the trial record suggests that Burnett did arrive there with Parris and Hall, who had some prior acquaintance or family relationship with Burgess. Since Burgess apparently voiced no objection to Burnett's presence on the premises, we conclude that he was there legitimately. 27 In sum, while Burnett apparently was legitimately in Burgess' apartment, he took no actions and possessed no property interest that would support his claim to a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hallway. Since Burnett could not protest consensual police presence in the apartment's common areas, and since the position in the hallway where the police were standing when they viewed the tote bag was immediately adjacent to the living room, we conclude that Burnett did not demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hallway. 28