Opinion ID: 2972190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant-Appellant Boudreau

Text: Defendant-Appellant Boudreau first claims that his conviction should be vacated on ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) grounds. Ordinarily, this Court does not address IAC claims on direct appeal, “since there has not been an opportunity to develop and include in the record evidence bearing on the merits of the allegations.” United States v. Hamilton, 263 F.3d 645, 655 (6th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Fortson, 194 F.3d 730, 736 (6th Cir. 1999). However, on occasion, the record in the case is sufficient as to ineffective assistance alleged by the defendant. -8- Nos. 02-1738, 02-2214 United States v. Makki/Boudreau See, e.g., Fortson, 194 F.3d at 736; United States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 785-86 (6th Cir. 1998). In order to determine if the record is sufficient, we examine if resolution of the IAC claims would require “assessing allegations and evidence that are outside the record.” United States v. Pruitt, 156 F.3d 638, 646 (6th Cir. 1998). Here, Boudreau alleges that his attorney should have objected to the evidence gathered at his home, because the affidavit used to secure the warrant under which the search proceeded was insufficient. However, the details of the warrant and the application therefor are not clearly contained within the record, nor do we have any details regarding Boudreau’s attorney’s decision not to challenge the warrant and related evidence. Therefore, Boudreau’s IAC claims would be “best brought . . . in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 so that the parties can develop an adequate record on the issue,” as suggested by the vast majority of Sixth Circuit cases addressing IAC on direct appeal where IAC was not raised before the district court. United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Daniel, 956 F.2d 540, 543 (6th Cir. 1992). The proper action in situations such as this is to dismiss the IAC claims from a defendant’s direct appeal without prejudice. Id.
Boudreau next claims the district court improperly applied to him the “career offender” sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, on the grounds that a prior conviction of his, used by the district court in determining he was a “career offender,”was actually related to the conspiracy convictions currently at issue and thus could not be used for a “career offender” determination. We -9- Nos. 02-1738, 02-2214 United States v. Makki/Boudreau review a district court’s finding that prior sentences are “related” for the purposes of “career offender” determinations under a “clear error” standard, see, e.g., United States v. Horn, 355 F.3d 610, 612-15 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Lang, 333 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2003), and Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001)), noting however that the government bears the burden of establishing the applicability of a criminal-history-based sentence enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Brown, 147 F.3d 477, 485 (6th Cir. 1998). In order to qualify as a career offender under § 4B1.1 during sentencing for a controlled substance violation, a defendant who was over the age of eighteen at the time he committed the instant offense must have “at least two prior felony convictions of . . . a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(3). Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c), a conviction is considered a “prior” conviction if the defendant (1) “committed the instant offense of conviction subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions . . . and (2) the sentences for at least two of the aforementioned felony convictions are counted separately under the provisions of § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c). The date that a defendant sustained a conviction shall be the date that the guilt of the defendant has been established, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere.” This Court, along with other circuits, has interpreted § 4B1.2(c)(1) to mean that the conduct for which the defendant is currently being sentenced must have occurred, at least in part, after he sustained convictions on the prior offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 209 F.3d 847, 849 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 427 (4th Cir. 2002). - 10 - Nos. 02-1738, 02-2214 United States v. Makki/Boudreau Boudreau does not challenge the first of the two “prior” convictions the Government held against him, a drug conviction from 1988. He does however, challenge the use of the second conviction, which was a Michigan state court conviction of “Controlled Substance Delivery / Manufacture of Narcotics Under 25 Grams,” which he incurred in 1999 on an arrest that took place in October 1998. The indictment and judgment form in the instant case indicated that the approximate dates of the prayer-rug conspiracy were “1990 to July 2000.” The Government insisted, in order to prove that Boudreau’s 1999 offense was not “relevant” to the prayer-rug conspiracy conviction, that Mr. Boudreau’s arrest after the raid on his house “ended his relevant conduct in this conspiracy.” Boudreau claimed that since he was convicted of a conspiracy that continued until 2000, the 1999 state conviction for delivery and manufacture of narcotics was “related to” the conspiracy. In response, the Government argues that the fact that Boudreau was convicted of a drug offense during the time the conspiracy was underway does not necessarily mean the offense was related to the conspiracy. It is undisputed that a defendant-conspirator can remain liable for the acts of his coconspirators through the end of the agreed-upon conspiracy, even if the defendant has ceased affirmative acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Lash, 937 F.2d 1077 (6th Cir. 1991). In fact, a defendant-conspirator’s liability for acts of the conspiracy is generally presumed to continue for all acts of the conspiracy through its end, absent any affirmative act of withdrawal. See, e.g., id.; Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912). This can be the case even if the defendant is arrested or imprisoned. See, e.g., United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1976). As - 11 - Nos. 02-1738, 02-2214 United States v. Makki/Boudreau a result, the district court found Boudreau liable for acts of the conspiracy through 2000, even though it found he took no acts to further the conspiracy after his arrest during the 1997 search of his house.2 Given that the district court found that he was liable for the acts of the conspiracy through 2000, Boudreau argues that the burden was on the government to prove that his 1999 conviction was not related to his ongoing conspiracy liability in 1999. The pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”) alleged that the two offenses were not related, on the grounds that Boudreau ceased all conspiracyfurthering activity after his 1997 arrest, and the district judge found, as a matter of fact, that this was the case. Boudreau claims that this alone does not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his 1999 conviction was unrelated to the instant conspiracy offense. He argues that the Government has thus not met the required burden for imposing a sentencing enhancement. But Boudreau has not satisfied his burden of production on this issue. As this Court has noted: [A] defendant cannot show that a PSR is inaccurate by simply denying the PSR's truth. Instead, beyond such a bare denial, he must produce some evidence that calls the reliability or correctness of the alleged facts into question. If a defendant meets this burden of production, the government must then convince the court that the PSR's facts are actually true. But the defendant gets no free ride: he must produce more than a bare denial, or the judge may rely entirely on the PSR. 2 It should be noted that Boudreau has maintained his claim throughout the proceedings that he never met, knew, or dealt with the prayer rug conspirators. Unfortunately this has left him in the awkward situation of being unable to prove withdrawal; since he insists he was never in the conspiracy, or, indeed, even knew of the other men’s existence, he can hardly claim he acted to notify them of his withdrawal. - 12 - Nos. 02-1738, 02-2214 United States v. Makki/Boudreau United States v. Lang, 333 F.3d 678, 681-82 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Here, not only did Boudreau not present any evidence that the PSR was incorrect, but he has also continuously denied all participation altogether in the prayer-rug conspiracy. He has not denied his guilt on the 1999 conviction, nor has he even hinted that he intended to sell the 1999 narcotics to customers of the conspiracy or that he purchased these narcotics from members of the conspiracy, nor suggested in any other way that the narcotics might be related to his conspiracy conviction. Thus, even on his version of the facts, the 1999 conviction was not related to the current conspiracy. As a result, and regardless of whether the district court was correct in finding that Boudreau ceased acting affirmatively in favor of the conspiracy following his 1997 arrest, the district court did not commit clear error in finding that Boudreau’s 1999 conviction was unrelated to the conspiracy at issue here.
Finally, Boudreau filed several pro se supplemental briefs containing numerous additional challenges to his sentence. He first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him, but we have previously held that the testimony of co-conspirators, without more, can be sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction, see, e.g., United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 600 (6th Cir. 2003), and that a large volume of narcotics purchased by a defendant can create a presumption of conspiracy to distribute. See, e.g., United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d 229, 233 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 363, 373 (6th Cir. 2003). In addition, though Boudreau challenges in some detail the factual assertions in the co-conspirators’ testimony, the witnesses’ credibility was a matter - 13 - Nos. 02-1738, 02-2214 United States v. Makki/Boudreau for the jury, not for this Court. See, e.g., Lones v. Detroit, Toledo, and Ironton R.R. Co., 398 F.2d 914, 921 (6th Cir. 1968). Boudreau next challenges the power of Congress to enact the Controlled Substances Act, but we have previously denied such challenges. See United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Brown, 276 F.3d 211, 214-15 (6th Cir. 2002). He challenges the sufficiency of his indictment, but the indictment, which alleges that he was involved in conspiracy to import drugs from abroad, is also sufficient, both constitutionally and factually. See, e.g., United States v. Piccolo, 723 F.2d 1234, 1237-39 (6th Cir. 1983) (en banc). Boudreau also claims that the use of guns seized from his house constituted a “variance” or “amendment” to his indictment, and that these guns were highly prejudicial to his case, but we have previously held that firearms may be used as “tools of the trade” evidence in drug trafficking prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v. Hardin, 248 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir. 2001). These guns thus not only did not constitute a variance to or amendment of his indictment, but were also properly admitted to prove the charges against him. Boudreau additionally claims that prosecutorial misconduct during discovery kept him from properly preparing for trial, but has failed to show how such misconduct, even if proven, in any way prejudiced his case. In the absence of any such proof, any such misconduct constitutes harmless error. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993).
- 14 - Nos. 02-1738, 02-2214 United States v. Makki/Boudreau Finally, Boudreau argues in a supplemental pro se brief that his sentence violated his Sixth Amendment rights, under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ----, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Following briefing, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ----, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), holding that the Sixth Amendment requires facts necessary for sentencing to be found by a jury, and rendering the federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory. Neither Blakely nor Booker having been decided at the time of Boudreau’s sentencing, he did not raise any Sixth Amendment claims before the sentencing court. Accordingly, as with all constitutional claims raised for the first time on appeal, we review Boudreau’s sentence for plain error. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997). In a supplemental brief submitted by counsel following Booker, Boudreau also argues that the very fact that he was sentenced under a mandatory sentencing system itself warrants resentencing, and notes that the sentence imposed upon him was at the lowest end of the Guideline range calculated by the sentencing judge. Given the lack of clear and specific evidence that the district court would not have imposed a lower sentence had the Guidelines been applied in an advisory fashion, we must vacate Boudreau’s sentence and remand for sentencing. See United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 523-31 (6th Cir. 2005).