Opinion ID: 1911276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: previous holdings

Text: We next examine our decisions in Anthony v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 239 Neb. 404, 476 N.W.2d 559 (1991), Eden v. Spaulding, 218 Neb. 799, 359 N.W.2d 758 (1984), and Stephens v. Celeryvale Transport, Inc., 205 Neb. 12, 286 N.W.2d 420 (1979), and consider the Tribune's assertion that the Court of Appeals failed to follow these cases. Pre-Fab Transit Company (Pre-Fab) was a national trucking concern which received orders from customers to transport goods and then assigned these orders to truckers with whom Pre-Fab had contracted for transportation. Anthony owned his truck and trailer. The contract under which the parties operated provided: `It is the intention of the parties to this contract that Contractor shall be and remain an independent Contractor....' Anthony v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 239 Neb. at 405, 476 N.W.2d at 561. Anthony was required to use his own equipment in performing the contract. His compensation was 75 percent of the revenue received by Pre-Fab on each haul he made. He was paid only for hauling the loads, not while driving an empty truck. On his income tax forms, Anthony indicated he was self-employed; he paid his own taxes; and he took his own business deductions. Anthony was required to insure against liability arising from the use of his equipment. He had the right to hire employees, but the contract specifically provided that any such employees would be his. Pre-Fab did not have authority over the selection of Anthony's routes or the determination of whether Anthony would accept a particular assignment. Based upon these and other facts, we found nothing in the manner of performance that was inconsistent with the independent contractor relationship described in the contract. In Eden, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for injuries received when his car collided with a truck driven by defendant Spaulding and owned by defendant Fundum. Spaulding was on his way to pick up newspapers in Omaha and transport the newspapers to Norfolk. We expressly pointed out that `the common-law test for independent contractor includes many factors which are to be considered and weighed in making the determination, no one of which may be conclusive.' Eden v. Spaulding, 218 Neb. at 804, 359 N.W.2d at 761 (quoting Erspamer Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Labor, 214 Neb. 68, 333 N.W.2d 646 (1983)). Applying the 10 factors from the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1958) to the facts in Eden, we found as a matter of law that Fundum was an independent contractor. The control exercisable by the newspaper was minimal. It could only suggest when Fundum should pick up the newspapers. The newspaper had no control over the drivers of the trucks and did not dictate the truck route, and there were no intimations in the record which suggested a right of control on the part of the newspaper. At the time, Fundum also had other contracts with the post office, and he did not rely solely on the newspaper for income. Clearly, Fundum was engaged in a distinct trucking operation. Hauling for the newspaper was not his only business. The job was not supervised by the newspaper, and there were no fixed routes or regulations regarding carrying passengers or other baggage. Fundum supplied all his own equipment, and on the night of the accident, he paid for a substitute truck to haul the newspapers. Fundum had his own employees, and the paper made no deductions for Social Security or withholdings for income tax from the payments made to Fundum. In Stephens, we determined as a matter of law that Stephens was an independent contractor. There was a clear inference that a master-servant relationship did not exist. The manner in which the agreement between the parties was carried out was not in any way inconsistent with Stephens' status as an independent contractor under the terms of the agreement. A determination regarding whether a worker is an employee, as distinguished from an independent contractor, must be made from all the facts in the case. Anthony v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 239 Neb. 404, 476 N.W.2d 559 (1991). In the case at bar, the trial judge's findings have established the existence of 10 factors that create the inference of an employer-employee relationship. Upon appellate review, the findings of fact made by the trial judge of the compensation court have the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. Id. Anthony, Eden, and Stephens are factually dissimilar to the present case, and they do not control our decision. The trial judge's factual determination regarding the 10 factors and the inferences therefrom is supported by sufficient competent evidence and is not clearly wrong.