Opinion ID: 618536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Upward Departure or Variance

Text: Next, Richart contends that the district court committed procedural error in imposing an upward departure based on U.S.S.G. § 5K2.9. Section 5K2.9 is a policy statement, which provides, If the defendant committed the offense in order to facilitate or conceal the commission of another offense, the court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the actual seriousness of the defendant's conduct. The district court found that an upward departure was appropriate under § 5K2.9 because Richart lied to cover up the fact that she murdered Christina. Richart argues that her act in lying to federal agents in order to conceal her own wrongdoing is not outside the heartland of typical cases and, therefore, a departure is unwarranted. Richart relies on United States v. Robertson, 324 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir.2003), in which we reversed the district court's decision to depart upward under § 5K2.9. In Robertson, we explained that the possibility that a suspect would lie to an interrogator in order to minimize his exposure to criminal prosecution most certainly would have been taken into account by the Sentencing Commission in establishing the guideline range for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Id. at 1032. Therefore, we held that a case in which the defendant knowingly lies to a federal agent regarding a fact material to the agent's investigation does not fall[ ] outside the heartland of such offenses merely because the defendant told the lie to conceal aspects of the offense for which he was arrested. Id. Richart's reliance on Robertson is misplaced. Although we concluded in Robertson that, in that case, the defendant's actions did not fall outside the heartland of § 1001 offenses, we acknowledged that a departure would be warranted if the defendant's conduct `significantly differs from the norm.' Id. at 1031 (quoting United States v. Evans, 148 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming a § 5K2.9 upward departure from a sentence for extortion based on the sheer scale of the violations, which set the offense apart from the incidental violations taken into account by the Sentencing Commission)). Here, the district court concluded, and we agree, that Richart's case differs significantly from the norm. As the district court explained, this is not a case of someone who is lying to a federal agent about whether he paid a tax or wrote a check ... it's about lying to a federal agent about what happened to a child when the person lying murdered the child. Richart lied to federal agents in order to cover up a particularly brutal crime, and, as a result, she successfully avoided detection of that crime for many years. Further, the district court believed that had [Richart] not been successful in covering up [Christina's murder] for so many years ..., she might have even been convicted of a far more serious offence than second degree murder. In addition, Richart's lies not only prevented discovery of her underlying crime but also increased the harm by giving Christina's brother, Michael, false hope of being reunited with Christina. Richart does not argue that any of these factual findings are clearly erroneous, [3] and the district court did not err as a matter of law in concluding that such facts warranted an upward departure under § 5K2.9. In any event, any procedural error in imposing an upward departure pursuant to § 5K2.9 would have been harmless. The district court justified its decision to impose a sentence above the advisory guideline range by referencing both U.S.S.G. § 5K2.9 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Therefore, it is unclear whether the district court imposed an upward departure or an upward variance. The distinction is immaterial, however, where, as here, the district court appropriately considered and explained the relevant § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Washington, 515 F.3d 861, 866-67 (8th Cir.2008) (finding no significant procedural error when the district court described its sentence as a `variance or upward departure' from the Guidelines range and drew no distinctions between the two terms because the court appropriately considered the relevant factors of § 3553(a) and provided an adequate explanation for the variance); cf. United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892, 898 (8th Cir.2009) (After Booker, the only constraints on sentencing judges are the statutory maximum and minimum for the offense at issue and the sentencing statutes, particularly 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The judge is cabined, but also liberated, by the § 3553(a) factors. (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted)); United States v. Jones, 509 F.3d 911, 915 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that the district court did not err in declining to depart from the advisory guidelines range based on the defendant's jail misconduct yet imposing a variance under § 3553(a) based on the same jail misconduct). Here, the district court explicitly found that the sentence imposed was fair and appropriate based on all the considerations in Section 3553(a), and thoroughly documented its justifications for the variance. Thus, the district court committed no significant procedural error. Washington, 515 F.3d at 867; see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 53, 128 S.Ct. 586 (finding no significant procedural error where the District Judge correctly calculated the applicable Guidelines range, allowed both parties to present arguments as to what they believed the appropriate sentence should be, considered all of the § 3553(a) factors, and thoroughly documented his reasoning). For similar reasons, we also reject Richart's argument that the district court erred in failing to explain the degree of its variance. The Supreme Court in Gall explained that a sentencing court `must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.' United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586). However, we do not require a district court to categorically rehearse each of the section 3553(a) factors on the record when it imposes a sentence as long as it is clear that they were considered. United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir.2006). Nor have we required district courts to make specific findings on the record about each § 3553(a) factor. United States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 2008). [A]ll that is generally required to satisfy the appellate court is evidence that the district court was aware of the relevant factors, and [i]f a district court references some of the considerations contained in § 3553(a), we are ordinarily satisfied that the district court was aware of the entire contents of the relevant statute. Id. at 1110-11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court twice stated that it had carefully considered the § 3553(a) factors. In addition, the court explained at some length its reasons for imposing consecutive sixty-month sentences: Richart lied to cover up the fact that she murdered her niece and it was unclear how much time she would actually serve in state prison for the murder; Richart successfully carried on the lie for a long period of time, causing harm not just to Christina but to many other people; the lie may have prevented Richart from being convicted for a more serious offense than second degree murder; Richart's crime would have gone undetected but for Donna Walker; and 120 months' imprisonment provided just punishment for Richart's offense and sends a message to deter others from committing similar offenses. [4] This explanation demonstrat[ed] consideration of the statutory sentencing factors. Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d at 899. The district court's reasons show that it considered the first § 3553(a) factor, which concerns the nature and circumstances of the offense, as well as the seriousness of the offense, the need for just punishment, and the need for deterrence, all of which fall under the second § 3553(a) factor. Further, the district court considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among similarly-situated defendants, which is the sixth § 3553(a) factor, finding that Richart's conduct was of a different order from that of defendants who lied to federal agents about their involvement in less-serious crimes. Based on our review of the lengthy sentencing colloquy, we are satisfied that the district court `considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.' United States v. Starfield, 563 F.3d 673, 675 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)). Accordingly, we find no procedural error in the district court's decision to vary up to the statutory maximum on each count.