Opinion ID: 519232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jurisdiction Over the Cause of Action Against Quinn and Paul

Text: 30 Ghartey's second cause of action alleged that Quinn and Paul had intentionally interfered with her employment relationship with the Hospital. After finding that the first cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, the district court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state claims against Quinn and Paul and ordered dismissal of the second cause of action for lack of jurisdiction. In light of its dismissal of the first cause of action and the failure of Ghartey to assert any independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the second cause of action, 3 the district court was within its discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a pendent state law claim. See Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 843 F.2d 658, 664-65 (2d Cir.1988). Nevertheless, as our decision revives the first cause of action, the district court on remand should reconsider exercising pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Juras v. Aman Collection Service, Inc., 829 F.2d 739, 745 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 192, 102 L.Ed.2d 162 (1988). 31 The Hospital, Quinn and Paul ask us to affirm the dismissal of the second cause of action on the ground that it is preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185 (1982). See Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1879, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988); Evangelista v. Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific, 777 F.2d 1390, 1400-01 (9th Cir.1985). This argument was raised as a possible basis for dismissal below, but it was not reached by the district court. 4 Nor did the district court consider the subtle and complex issue of the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction over Quinn and Paul, who were not named as defendants under the first cause of action. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 2422, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976); see also Baylis, 843 F.2d at 663-64; Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 757 F.2d 453, 463-64 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186, 106 S.Ct. 2926, 91 L.Ed.2d 554 (1986). 32 We believe that such possible grounds for dismissal of the common law claims [of Ghartey's second cause of action] should be considered in the first instance by the district court, see Connecticut National Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 963 (2d Cir.1987), and we express no opinion on them. On remand, the district court should reassess whether it has jurisdiction over the cause of action against Quinn and Paul.