Opinion ID: 853409
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Violations of Double Jeopardy

Text: Kilpatrick next argues that his conviction and sentencing for murder and attempted robbery as a Class A felony violates Indiana's double jeopardy clause. Specifically, he contends that the evidentiary facts used by the jury to elevate the charge of attempted robbery to a Class A felony are the same as the evidentiary facts used to establish the elements of murder. We disagree. The double jeopardy rule prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999), this Court developed a two-part test for determining whether two convictions are permissible under Indiana's double jeopardy clause. Id. at 49. A double jeopardy violation occurs when `the State ... proceed[s] against a person twice for the same criminal transgression.'  Hampton v. State, 719 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind.1999) (quoting Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 49). [T]wo or more offenses are the `same offense' ... if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense. Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 49 (emphasis in original). When we look to the actual evidence presented at trial, we will reverse one of the convictions if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged offense. Id. at 53. Kilpatrick asserts the same evidence stabbing of Crafterwas used to support Kilpatrick's murder conviction and the serious bodily injury element in the attempted robbery conviction. However, both the evidence and the jury instructions, which included the charging information, clearly show that different evidenceblunt force trauma to Crafter's head with a block of ice causing severe brain damagewas used to support the serious bodily injury element for the attempted robbery charge. Thus, application of the actual evidence test discloses that convicting and sentencing Kilpatrick on both offenses does not violate the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause. Kilpatrick further contends that his convictions for attempted robbery, aggravated battery, and criminal gang activity also violate Indiana's double jeopardy clause. As indicated earlier, and as discussed in greater detail below, we reverse Kilpatrick's conviction for criminal gang activity. Therefore for purposes of this analysis, the conviction for criminal gang activity is not a part of the equation. As for the remaining offenses, it is true that the same evidencehitting Crafter with a block of icewas used to prove both attempted robbery and aggravated battery. However, the trial court merged the aggravated battery conviction into the conviction for attempted robbery. [6] We have held that where a trial court merges some offenses into others for purposes of sentencing, there is no double jeopardy violation. This is so because under those circumstances the defendant is not being punished for the merged offenses. Buchanan v. State, 699 N.E.2d 655, 656 (Ind. 1998) (declaring that [n]o double jeopardy issue exists where the trial court merged convictions for criminal confinement and carjacking into a conviction for kidnapping, leaving the defendant subject to punishment for the remaining kidnapping and robbery convictions). Because Kilpatrick is not being subjected to punishment for his conviction of aggravated battery, his double jeopardy claim fails.