Opinion ID: 359526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pretrial publicity Hill.

Text: 35 The district court recognized that the jailbreak and ensuing indictments were the subject of extensive publicity. Addressing the jury panel as a group, the court admonished them to make their determination strictly from the evidence presented in court. Because the court determined that every panel member had heard about this case, the court asked that any panel member raise his hand if he felt the publicity impaired his ability to render an impartial decision. None responded. 5 The court denied Hill's request to examine each panel member individually regarding the opinions held because of the publicity. Hill had previously placed much of the publicity in the record and had filed a motion requesting an individual examination of every panel member exposed to publicity to determine the extent, frequency, and harmfulness of the exposure. 36 This case attracted some national coverage and extensive local coverage by news media. Hill's motion brought to the court's attention the scope and substance of much of the local news coverage. Each juror had been exposed to some of this publicity. Prejudice was possible because of the backgrounds of Hill and his confederates 6 and the sensational nature of some of the reports. These reports capitalized on the violence of the armed raid, its purpose to free drug users, and its international repercussions. 37 The district court erred in not undertaking a more thorough examination of those panel members exposed to publicity. Under the circumstances of this case, where the nature of the publicity as a whole raised a significant possibility of prejudice, the cursory questioning by the court was not enough. The court should have determined what in particular each juror had heard or read and how it affected his attitude toward the trial, and should have determined for itself whether any juror's impartiality had been destroyed. The ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press 7 recommend that the district court examine each juror individually and out of the presence of other jurors to determine what he heard or read and how it has affected his attitudes towards the trial. Though separate examination of jurors is sometimes preferable, 8 it is not necessarily required. 9 We recognize the district court's need for flexibility in interrogating jurors as to possible prejudice. 38 A fundamental principle of due process requires that the jury's verdict be based on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). A juror's impartiality is not necessarily destroyed when he is exposed to pretrial publicity. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 723, 81 S.Ct. at 1643, 6 L.Ed.2d at 756; See Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 205-06 (CA5, 1975) (en banc), Cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 1505, 47 L.Ed.2d 760 (1976). But when a juror is exposed to potentially prejudicial pretrial publicity, it is necessary to determine whether the juror can lay aside any impression or opinion due to the exposure. The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality. Instead, the trial court should make this determination. 39 An acceptable procedure is described in U. S. v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815 (CA5, 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058, 92 S.Ct. 736, 30 L.Ed.2d 745 (1972), which dealt with publicity during the course of trial. Even though we held that the publicity was not prejudicial, we were critical of the trial court's asking the jury as a whole if anyone was exposed to publicity that would prevent him from impartially deciding the case. We said: 40 (T)his Circuit has determined that it is for the court, not the jurors themselves, to determine whether their impartiality has been destroyed by any prejudicial publicity they have been exposed to. Therefore, when there has been publicity that would possibly prejudice the defendant's case if it reached the jurors, the court should first ask the jurors what information they have received. Then it should ask about the prejudicial effect and it should make an independent determination whether the juror's impartiality was destroyed. 41 448 F.2d at 848 n.38. Similarly, in U. S. v. Williams, 568 F.2d 464, 471 (CA5, 1978), also involving publicity during trial, we regarded as insufficient the jurors' assurances that each could render an impartial verdict. 10 In Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d at 208-09, we found credible the statements of the court members (jurors) that they would reach a verdict unimpressed by the extensive pretrial publicity in that case in large part because these statements were the product of a voir dire examination conducted according to the recommendations of the ABA Standards. 11 The trial court, in what we called a searching and sensitively conducted voir dire, examined each court member out of the presence of other court members and sought to determine the court member's exposure to publicity and its impact on his impartiality. The trial judge was able to conclude that a fair and impartial jury had been empaneled, and his conclusion was based on a particularized knowledge of the nature and extent of each juror's exposure to pretrial publicity. 42 Without establishing an inflexible rule we hold that under the circumstances of this case the district court did not make sufficient inquiry into the possibility of prejudice and did not reach its own independent determination whether the impartiality of any juror had been destroyed. This conclusion requires reversal of the conviction of Hill under both counts. 43