Opinion ID: 1373789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ownership of the Packard Automobile.

Text: The evidence upon this subject is as follows: A certificate of title to the Packard was issued by the Oregon Secretary of State on June 26, 1948, to Kathryn A. Piasecki. Mrs. Piasecki testified that she did not know that the title was in her name until after her husband's death, which occurred August 23, 1952, and that she did not sign any application of any kind in connection with the car. According to her testimony, the car was purchased by her husband in Portland. She identified a check dated June 18, 1948, in the amount of $4,540.19, payable to A. Piasecki and drawn by Edward K. Piasecki. She testified that the proceeds of the check were used to pay for the Packard, that A. Piasecki was Mr. Piasecki's sister, and that the check was made payable to her Because she was a resident of Portland and Mr. Piasecki was not, and he couldn't purchase the car in Portland so his sister paid for it and then she sold the car to him. She was present when he gave the check to his sister. Mrs. Piasecki owned a Cadillac, which she purchased with her own money inherited from her mother. She paid for it with a check for $4,186.83, drawn by her on her personal account on October 8, 1951, to the order of Douglas McKay Chevrolet Company. The check is in evidence. She and her husband had always had two cars. At the time that the Packard was purchased, she owned a small Oldsmobile. Mrs. Piasecki testified that she never drove the Packard, that it was equipped with a regular gearshift which required the use of a clutch pedal, and she had not driven that type of car since 1947 because of arthritis in her hip and knee, that the Cadillac had a hydromatic gear shift and no clutch pedal. in going to and from his office, and was parked near The Packard was used regularly by Mr. Piasecki the office during the day. He had had the back seat taken out, and the back part of the car fixed up for his dog on his trips to his farm near Salem. Mrs. Piasecki was called as an adverse witness by the plaintiff and examined about the ownership of the Packard. She was shown photostats of the face and back of the certificate of title issued for the Packard. On the face of the certificate the name of the owner, Kathryn A. Piasecki, is typed and the date of issuance appears as June 25, 1948. On the back is a printed form of Assignment of Title by Registered and Legal Owner. Mrs. Piasecki's name is written on the line immediately below this language, followed by the date 5-28-52. Below this appears the admitted signature of Mr. Piasecki under the form for Application for Title by New Owner. Mrs. Piasecki was asked by counsel for plaintiff whether these were the signatures of herself and Mr. Piasecki, and answered: A This is my signature typed [evidently referring to her name on the face of the certificate] but I can't make out this lower one [referring to her name written on the back of the certificate]. Q It is not too clear, but do you recall signing that title? A Well, I may have signed it, but I don't remember it. When examined later by her own attorney, she testified that her name as it appeared on the back of the certificate of title was in her late husband's handwriting, not hers, and that her handwriting did not appear on the certificate of title. She was again examined on this subject at length by counsel for the plaintiff. She testified that her husband often wrote her signature without objection on her part, and that she would sign papers which he would bring home without reading what she was signing. And she insisted that she never signed any application of any kind in connection with the Packard and knew nothing about the certificate of title, and her name appearing on it. She was examined about the bank accounts of Mr. Piasecki and herself. She testified in substance that they each had separate bank accounts, but each had the right to draw on the other's account. Q Did you and Mr. Piasecki have a joint checking account or separate checking accounts? A Well, we  they were joint in a way and yet I had my separate checking account and he had his separate checking account. Q Well, do you mean there were three accounts, or you could each draw separately on a joint account? A Yes.     . Q You mentioned this inheritance from your mother; was that put in a joint account? A That was in my own personal account. Q There were three accounts then, were there? A Well . Q Or two, anyway? A Well, Mr. Piasecki could have checked out of my account and I out of his, but we used the separate accounts. Q I see. Each had a drawing  A A drawing capacity on the other. The defendant, Chris Seely, Administrator of the Estate of the deceased, shared office space with the latter for 15 or 20 years and operated a credit bureau for which Mr. Piasecki, an attorney, did some work. Mr. Seely had seen Mr. Piasecki sign his name every day and was familiar with his handwriting. He testified that the name, Kathryn A. Piasecki, written on the back of the certificate of title, was in Mr. Piasecki's handwriting. The plaintiff testified that on one occasion prior to the accident he saw Mrs. Piasecki come out of a market, get into the Packard car, and drive off, and Mrs. Wiebe gave similar testimony, although she was unable to fix the time when she had seen Mrs. Piasecki drive the car. There was no evidence as to who paid the expense of operation and upkeep of the Packard. ORS 481.115 provides that the certificate of title to an automobile shall be prima facie evidence of the ownership of such vehicle or of an interest therein. ORS 481.515 provides in part: In all actions, suits or criminal proceedings when the title to, or right of possession of, any motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer is involved, the record of registration and license, as it appears in the files and records of the department, is prima facie evidence of ownership or right to possession of such vehicle. 1, 2. The effect of the certificate of title or of the registration certificate as evidence may, of course, be overcome; and the strength of the evidence on the other side may be such that the court is warranted in declaring that the statutory prima facie case has been rebutted. In the analogous situation where we have considered the inference that the operator of an automobile is the agent of the owner and engaged in the owner's business while driving his car, the doctrine of our cases is that inferences, like presumptions, are out of place when the facts are known or are admitted. Kantola v. Lovell Auto Company, 157 Or 534, 540, 72 P2d 61; Consor v. Andrew, 61 Or 483, 485, 123 P 46. See, Butenshon v. Shoesmith, 191 Or 76, 82, 228 P2d 426. As stated in French v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 156 Or 443, 455, 68 P2d 466, When the fact otherwise presumable is negatived by proof, free from question and contradiction, no room remains for a favorable presumption, and neither court nor jury are at liberty to engage in one. The decisions bearing on this question are reviewed in Jasper v. Wells, 173 Or 114, 144 P2d 505. Plaintiff does not dispute that the present case is governed by this rule, but contends that the evidence on the part of the defendant, Mrs. Piasecki, is not of such character that but one reasonable deduction can be made therefrom, Judson v. Bee Hive Auto Service Company, 136 Or 1, 14, 294 P 588, 297 P 1050, and that the question of ownership of the Packard car was for the jury. The Judson, Kantola and Jasper cases afford good illustrations of clear and convincing evidence which this court held to be sufficient to overcome the inference as a matter of law. We have said that the mere fact that the evidence on behalf of the person charged is uncontradicted does not necessarily preclude recovery against him, Steele v. Hemmers, 149 Or 381, 386, 40 P2d 1022; that the showing against the inference need not be documentary, Miller v. Service and Sales, Inc., 149 Or 11, 17, 38 P2d 995, 96 ALR 628; and that the evidence may be sufficient even though it comes from an interested source, Summerville v. Gillespie, 181 Or 144, 153-154, 179 P2d 719; Gossett v. Van Egmond, 176 Or 134, 143, 155 P2d 304. See Re Miller's Will, 49 Or 452, 464-465, 90 P 1002, 124 AmStRep 1051, and Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 22 NJ 482, 126 A2d 323, 62 ALR2d 1179. Cases in which the courts of other jurisdictions have passed on the sufficiency of evidence to rebut the prima facie case or presumption arising from registration or license plates are collected in 27 ALR2d 180-185. Speaking to a somewhat similar question, namely, whether, in an action on a policy of theft insurance, uncontradicted evidence of a circumstantial nature that insured jewelry had been stolen entitled the plaintiff to a directed verdict, the late Chief Justice Vanderbilt said in Ferdinand v. Agricultural Insurance Co., supra:    Where men of reason and fairness may entertain differing views as to the truth of testimony, whether it be uncontradicted, uncontroverted or even undisputed, evidence of such a character is for the jury.    [Citing cases]. But when the testimony of witnesses, interested in the event or otherwise, is clear and convincing, not incredible in the light of general knowledge and common experience, not extraordinary, not contradicted in any way by witnesses or circumstances, and so plain and complete that disbelief of the story could not reasonably arise in the rational process of an ordinarily intelligent mind, then a question has been presented for the court to decide and not the jury.    [Citing cases]. 62 ALR2d 1186-1187. 3. Judged by the standards set forth in the decisions cited, we are constrained to hold that the question of ownership of the Packard car was for the jury. This conclusion is unavoidable because of the failure of the defendant, Kathryn A. Piasecki, to prove by unequivocal evidence that the car was purchased with her husband's money. Proof that a check drawn by Edward K. Piasecki was given in payment of the car, does not of itself, in view of other testimony, establish that this check was paid by the bank out of funds on deposit to Mr. Piasecki's account. Mrs. Piasecki testified that she and her husband had separate accounts, but each had the right to draw against the other's account. For all that appears, this check may have been paid out of Mrs. Piasecki's account. It was incumbent upon her to show that this was not the fact. She did not so testify, nor introduce any evidence such as the bank's records, for example, to clear up the uncertainty. Mrs. Piasecki's testimony that she never drove the Packard was contradicted, and, in addition, the complete want of evidence as to who paid the expense of maintaining the car must be counted a significant omission. This court does not pass upon the credibility of the witnesses nor the truth of Mrs. Piasecki's testimony that her husband owned the car. We determine only whether the evidence is such that a jury would have the right to reject it. And we are compelled to hold that, in the words of Chief Justice Vanderbilt which we have quoted, the evidence was not so plain and complete that disbelief of the story could not reasonably arise in the rational process of an ordinarily intelligent mind.