Opinion ID: 2046794
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Applicability of Sections 902.12 and 903A.2(1)(b) to a Juvenile Prosecuted Under Section 232.8(1)(c).

Text: As noted earlier, section 232.8(1)( c ) places jurisdiction in the district court of juveniles age sixteen or older who commit certain specified crimes, including forcible felonies. Unless the court transfers jurisdiction to the juvenile court as allowed by that statute, a juvenile convicted of a violation encompassed in section 232.8(1)( c ) shall be sentenced pursuant to section 124.401B, 902.9, or 903.1. [2] See Iowa Code § 232.8(1)( c ). The defendant argues that because section 232.8(1)( c ) does not specifically list sections 902.12 and 903A.2(1)( b ), the legislature did not intend these statutes to be applied to juveniles prosecuted under section 232.8(1)( c ). If his argument is correct, the defendant would be subject only to section 902.9, providing for an indeterminate ten-year sentence for a person convicted of a class C felony, and would remain eligible for a 50% reduction of his sentence for good conduct under section 903A.2(1)( a ). We reject the defendant's interpretation of section 232.8(1)( c ) because it would lead to absurd results inconsistent with legislative intent. See generally State v. Draper, 457 N.W.2d 600, 603-04 (Iowa 1990) (rejecting defendant's interpretation of pertinent sentencing statutes because it would lead to an absurd result). A review of the legislative scheme for the prosecution of juveniles will illustrate this point. One category of juvenile offenders consists of children who are initially subject to district court jurisdiction, rather than juvenile court jurisdiction. This group encompasses juveniles age sixteen and older under two different sets of circumstances: (1) juveniles, age sixteen and older, who commit specified crimes, including forcible felonies, see Iowa Code § 232.8(1)( c ); and (2) juveniles, age sixteen and older, who have previously been waived to and convicted of an aggravated misdemeanor or a felony in district court and who have been charged with a subsequent aggravated misdemeanor or felony, see id. § 232.45A(2). All other juveniles are subject, at least initially, to juvenile court jurisdiction. See id. § 232.8(1)( a ). The second relevant category of children consists of those juveniles, age fourteen and older, over whom the juvenile court may waive jurisdiction so they may be prosecuted in district court. See id. §§ 232.8(3), .45(1). These juveniles may be prosecuted as adults or as youthful offenders. See id. § 232.8(3). Youthful offender status is available to children age fifteen or younger who have committed a section 232.8(1)( c ) offense. See id. § 232.45(7). If convicted as a youthful offender, the juvenile's sentence is deferred and supervision of the child is transferred back to the juvenile court. See id. § 907.3A(1). If the youthful offender is returned to the jurisdiction of the district court, see id. §§ 232.54(8), .56, the district court may defer sentence or may enter a sentence and suspend it, [n]otwithstanding any provision of the Code which prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence for the offense committed by the youthful offender. See id. § 907.3A(3). If the child waived to district court is not given youthful offender status and is convicted as an adult of a forcible felony, the child is eligible for a deferred judgment, see id. § 232.8(3), despite the fact that an adult convicted of a forcible felony is not eligible to have judgment deferred, see id. § 907.3. From this statutory scheme we conclude that the legislature intended to treat older juveniles committing more serious crimes and older juveniles who are repeat offenders more severely than younger juveniles. See generally State v. Mann, 602 N.W.2d 785 at 793 (1999) (holding that legislative scheme that punishes older juveniles more severely than younger juveniles does not violate the Equal Protection Clause). The defendant's interpretation of the sentencing provision of section 232.8(1)( c ) would, however, be contrary to this legislative intent. Let us suppose that a fourteen-year-old child commits second-degree robbery, a forcible felony. The juvenile court waives jurisdiction to the district court and he is prosecuted as an adult, not as a youthful offender. If he is convicted, the sentencing court would be faced with two alternatives: a deferred judgment as authorized by section 232.8(3), or the mandatory minimum sentence required by section 902.12. [3] An option more lenient than the latter alternativean indeterminate prison sentencewould not be available. Thus, under the defendant's suggested interpretation of section 232.8(1)( c ), a younger juvenile committing the same crime as the defendant could be punished more severely. We do not think this incongruous resultwhere younger offenders are treated more harshly than older offenders was intended by the legislature. Rather, we conclude that the legislature's reference in section 232.8(1)( c ) to the general statutes for sentencing adult felons and misdemeanants indicates its intent that sections 902.9 and 903.1 be applied in conjunction with the other relevant statutes that modify and supplement these general sentencing provisions. As this court stated in a recent case also interpreting section 232.8(1)( c ), Nothing in the language of section 232.8(1)( c ) suggests that juveniles who commit forcible felonies and are automatically subject to prosecution as adults are to be subject to sentencing limits any different than those imposed upon similarly-situated adults. State v. Edgington, 601 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Iowa 1999) (holding juveniles prosecuted in district court pursuant to section 232.8(1)( c ) are not eligible for deferred judgments). The interpretation we give to section 232.8(1)( c ) will result in a system that punishes older juveniles who commit more serious crimes more severely than younger juveniles, thereby giving effect to the legislature's intent to progressively increase the punishment of juvenile offenders as they become older. See generally Mann, 602 N.W.2d at 793 (noting legislature's desire to punish older juveniles more severely than younger juveniles). This interpretation is also consistent with this court's long history of reading general sentencing statutes in pari materia with specific sentencing provisions found elsewhere in the Code. See, e.g., State v. Carstens, 594 N.W.2d 436, 437 (Iowa 1999) (stating that section 902.9, the general sentencing statute for felony violations, must be read in pari materia with specific sentencing provisions found elsewhere in the Code); State v. Daniel, 574 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Iowa 1998) (requiring that sentencing provisions of sections 124.401(5), 901.5(10) and 903.1 be read together to ascertain legislative intent); State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Iowa 1979) (stating that section 321.281, providing punishment for first-offense operating while intoxicated, must be read in pari materia with section 901.5, granting courts the authority to defer judgment, defer sentence or suspend sentence). Finally, we think that if the legislature had intended that juveniles subject to section 232.8(1)( c ) be exempt from the harshness of adult sentencing, it would have specifically said so, as it has in other places in the Code. See Iowa Code § 232.8(3) (providing that juvenile waived to district court may be given a deferred judgment without regard to restrictions placed upon deferred judgments for adults); id. § 232.45(14) (providing that children waived to district court for prosecution for certain drug violations are not subject to the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in section 124.413); id. § 907.3A(3) (providing that youthful offenders are not subject to mandatory minimum sentences). In conclusion, we hold that the trial court erred in ruling that the defendant was not subject to the 85% rule of sections 902.12 and 903A.2(1)( b ). Therefore, we sustain the writ of certiorari, vacate the defendant's sentence, and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. See generally Iowa Code § 901.6 (In every case in which judgment is entered, the court shall include in the judgment entry the number of the particular section of the Code and the name of the offense under which the defendant is sentenced....); Iowa R.Crim. P. 22(3)(d) (same); State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Iowa 1981) (same). WRIT SUSTAINED; SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. All justices concur except NEUMAN, J., who takes no part.