Opinion ID: 527780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individual Officers' Liability

Text: 12 Soto and Gotay moved for directed verdicts at trial arguing that on the evidence presented, the jury could not have reasonably imposed liability under Sec. 1983. While they did not move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, they did make a post-verdict motion for a new trial alleging that the verdict was contrary to the law and against the weight of the evidence. Gotay made a separate motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was the cause of plaintiff's injuries. 13 We note first the standards of review that guide our inquiry. In reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict  'we must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and determine whether there are facts and inferences reasonably drawn from those facts which lead to but one conclusion--that there is a total failure of evidence to prove plaintiff's case.'  Mayo v. Schooner Capital Corp., 825 F.2d 566, 568 (1st Cir.1987) (quoting Fact Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060, 1064 (1st Cir.1980), vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981)); see MacQuarrie v. Howard Johnson Co., 877 F.2d 126, 128 (1st Cir., June 2, 1989); Gonzalez-Marin v. The Equitable Life Assurance Society, 845 F.2d 1140, 1144 (1st Cir.1988); Robinson v. Watts Detective Agency, 685 F.2d 729, 732 (1st Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 728, 74 L.Ed.2d 953 (1983). As to the denial of a new trial motion: 14 [W]e will reverse a judge's decision not to grant a motion for a new trial 'only if the verdict is so seriously mistaken, so clearly against the law or the evidence, as to constitute a miscarriage of justice.' Levesque v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 832 F.2d 702, 703 (1st Cir.1987); see Mayo v. Schooner Capital Corp., 825 F.2d 566, 570 (1st Cir.1987). This strict standard of review is especially appropriate if the motion for new trial is based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Wells [Real Estate v. Greater Lowell Board of Realtors], 850 F.2d at 811 [ (1st Cir.1988) ]. Thus, our review is limited solely to determining if the court abused its discretion in making this decision. Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir.1988); Mayo, 825 F.2d at 568. 15 MacQuarrie, at 131. The standard in reviewing a denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is, likewise, one of abuse of discretion. See Earnhardt v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 744 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1984); Thomas v. Farmville Manufacturing Co., 705 F.2d 1307, 1307-08 (11th Cir.1983). 16 In assessing the imposition of liability under Sec. 1983, we must first ask (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under the color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986). There are two aspects to the second inquiry: (1) there must have been a deprivation of federally protected rights, privileges or immunities, and (2) the conduct complained of must have been causally connected to the deprivation. Woodley v. Town of Nantucket, 645 F.Supp. 1365, 1369 n. 4 (D.Mass.1986) (emphasis added). Since the defendants do not deny that they were acting under color of Commonwealth law, our inquiry focuses on whether there was sufficient evidence to establish both a constitutional deprivation and a causal connection between the defendants' conduct and the deprivation. 17 We have recently held that government officials may be held liable under Sec. 1983 for a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process if their conduct reflects a reckless or callous indifference to an individual's rights. Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 18 (1st Cir.1989); 4 see also infra p. 562 (comparing standards of reckless indifference and deliberate indifference). Soto and Gotay assert that no evidence was presented that might reasonably establish that they had acted with reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. We disagree. Pedro Soto 18 The jury could have found the following facts and drawn the following inferences against defendant Soto: 19 --He was in charge of the preventive round on December 9, 1983. 20 --The preventive rounds have no set guidelines and proceed as the officer in charge orders. That officer has direct responsibility for what occurs on the round. 21 --As the officer in charge, Soto would have determined the area of the patrol, against whom it would act, and how that action was to take place. 22 --On the night in question, Soto drove the police vehicle up to plaintiff's car. 23 --Under his direction, he and the other officers exited their vehicle with guns drawn. 24 --They proceeded to approach the Gutierrez vehicle without identifying themselves as police officers. 25 --As plaintiff began to drive away, he heard a number of shots. One shot was louder than all of the others. Soto was issued a shotgun for the patrol, the other officers carried revolvers. 26 --Officers under Soto's command discharged their weapons at plaintiff and Oquendo. 27 --At least five shots were fired before plaintiff was hit and his car went off the road. 28 --Since Soto was in command, the use of weapons by the officers involved was at his direction or, at least, was tacitly authorized by him. 29 These facts were more than sufficient to establish that Soto's actions amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of Gutierrez. Edwin Gotay 30 Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the liability of defendant Gotay is a closer question. He was not in charge of the patrol and asserts that he was asleep in the police car when plaintiff was shot. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of liability against him. Although the evidence against Gotay was slim, we deem it sufficient. 31 Based on the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury could have found that Gotay exited the vehicle along with the other three officers with his gun drawn and was thus an active participant in the event that caused plaintiff's injuries. The following evidence supports such a finding: 32 --On cross-examination, Margarita Oquendo testified that all of the officers exited the vehicle. 33 Q: Will you please describe the locations of the agents? 34 A: The driver was in the front, Pedro Soto, another person was off to his right. The other two were in the front seat--excuse me in the back seat. 35 Q: Which one of the officers went out of the car, if you can recall? 36 A: Could you repeat the question, please? 37 Q: Which one of the agents dismounted from the car? A: All of them got out of the car. 5 38 --On direct examination Oquendo testified that the officers carried guns and pointed them at Gutierrez and her. 39 --Following the shooting and the righting of Gutierrez' overturned vehicle, the first officer Oquendo saw was Gotay, who was standing at the window of the car. Since Oquendo testified that it took just seconds for the officers to arrive at her vehicle, Gotay's presence there raises an inference that he was not asleep during the shooting. If Gotay had been asleep in the car, it would have been difficult for him to be at the car window just seconds after the shooting. 40 Given this evidence, we cannot say that no reasonable jury could have found that Gotay's actions evidenced a reckless or callous indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights. The jury was privileged to make such a finding, and it did so. 6 41 Both Gotay and Soto assert that the evidence did not establish that their actions were the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. They allege that since the bullet that entered plaintiff's body came from Officer Moreno's revolver, 7 his action must be seen as an intervening, superceding cause of the constitutional deprivation. This argument may be disposed of quickly. 42 Section 1983 imposes liability upon those who subject[ ] or cause[ ] to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.... This circuit has expanded upon the express words of the statute and stated that: 43 A person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an affirmative act which he is legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made. [Citation omitted.] Moreover, personal participation is not the only predicate for section 1983 liability. Anyone who causes any citizen to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation is also liable. The requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. 44 Springer v. Seaman, 821 F.2d 871, 879 (1st Cir.1987) (quoting Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F.Supp. 662, 673-74 (E.D.Cal.1983) (citations omitted) and Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir.1978)). The Springer court also noted that inquiries into causation under Sec. 1983 are cabined within common law tort principles. See id. at 876-79; see also Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-06, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2541-42, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (noting that common-law principles control the issuance of damages under Sec. 1983). 45 We have no difficulty concluding that there was a firm evidentiary basis for finding that the actions of Soto and Gotay caused plaintiff's injuries. Soto was the man in charge. He directed and participated in the acts that led to the shooting. The jury could also have found that Gotay was a participant in those acts. Gotay exited the car with his gun drawn and moved toward the Gutierrez' vehicle along with the other officers. Under such a factual scenario, the actions of all four of the officers who participated in the intervention could be deemed to be proximate causes of plaintiff's injuries. Cf. Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177, 1186 (5th Cir.1989) (police officer liable under Sec. 1983 where he guarded a door during the commission of an illegal search by other officers). 46 Nor does Moreno's conduct constitute a superseding intervening cause that would relieve Soto and Gotay from liability. We have recently addressed the concept of superseding causes. In Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845, 848 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1027, 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988), we stated that an actor is responsible for 47 those consequences attributable to reasonably foreseeable intervening forces, including the acts of third parties. See Widow of Andino, 93 P.R.R. at 178 (defining intervening cause as a cause of an injury that comes into active operation in producing the result after the actor's negligent act or omission has occurred). A negligent defendant will not be relieved of liability by an intervening cause that was reasonably foreseeable, even if the intervening force may have directly caused the harm. Id. An unforeseen and abnormal intervention, on the other hand, breaks the chain of causality, thus shielding the defendant from liability. Id. 48 See Springer, 821 F.2d at 876-77 (similarly describing intervening causes in tort law). The question in the case at bar is whether Moreno's firing of his weapon--the direct cause of plaintiff's injuries--was a type of harm that Soto and Gotay could reasonably have foreseen. We believe that it was. 49 It was eminently foreseeable that an encounter with a civilian by four policemen with weapons drawn and ready to fire might result in a discharge of the firearms and an injury to the civilian. No matter whose bullet ultimately inflicted plaintiff's injury, the deprivation of Gutierrez' constitutional rights was the result of a team effort. The officers exited their vehicle with guns drawn. As plaintiff pulled away a number of shots, around five or six according to Gutierrez, were fired. That only one bullet found its mark was fortuitous, not exculpatory. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to hold Soto and Gotay liable under Sec. 1983.