Opinion ID: 2637824
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Statements to Detectives Carroll and Aguillon on the Morning of December 5, 1996

Text: Defendant argues he invoked his right to silence when he told Officer Lopez, That's all I can tell you, and that, as a result, Detectives Carroll and Aguillon improperly questioned him the following morning. We disagree. In very similar circumstances, in In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496 [165 Cal.Rptr. 837, 612 P.2d 927], we concluded that a defendant's use of the phrase That's all I have to say was not an attempt to end the interrogation and that [i]t was not unreasonable for the [trial] court to endorse the prosecutor's inference that what defendant was saying was, That's my story, and I'll stick with it. ( Id. at p. 516.) In the present case, we agree with the trial court's conclusion, supported by Officer Lopez's testimony, that he believed defendant was telling him [t]hat's all the information he had for me. But even assuming defendant made a sufficiently clear invocation under Davis, which In re Joe R. predates, there was no error. Officer Lopez stopped the interrogation, did not try to persuade defendant to talk, and obtained no further statements from him. Moreover, under the principles of Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96 [46 L.Ed.2d 313, 96 S.Ct. 321], defendant's interrogation the following morning by Detectives Carroll and Aguillon also complied with Miranda. In Mosley, despite the defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent, the high court declined to find a Miranda violation because the police here immediately ceased the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation. ( Michigan v. Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 106.) In Mosley, the time elapsed between the invocation of the right to silence and the reinterrogation was more than two hours. ( Id. at p. 104.) The present case is factually similar. Here, the detectives waited overnight to approach defendant again, and their questioning shifted quickly from Sabrina P.'s assault to a different crime, Sophia's murder. Although the detectives did not reread defendant his Miranda rights verbatim, they did remind him of the admonition given the night before and then specifically asked him if he remembered those rights and whether he still wanted to talk. Defendant responded affirmatively. Given that defendant had been read his Miranda rights the night before and on at least four prior occasions, the record fails to support any inference that defendant was unaware of his rights and the significance of his waiver. ( People v. Riva (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 981, 994 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 649]; see also Weeks v. Angelone (4th Cir. 1999) 176 F.3d 249, 268 [ Mosley was complied with where the officer asked the defendant whether he remembered the rights he had been read from the first interrogation]; U.S. v. Andrade (1st Cir. 1998) 135 F.3d 104, 106-107 [same].)