Opinion ID: 610593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: WHETHER A CONSTITUTIONAL SECTION 27A(b) HELPS SIMMONS

Text: 32 The TGX Defendants argue that § 27A(b) does not afford Simmons any relief even if it is constitutional, because Simmons asked the district court to dismiss his March 1990 claims under § 10(b) without prejudice. But all of their arguments require an inaccurate reading of § 27A(b). 33 Congress wrote § 27A(b) to prevent courts from applying Lampf to cases that plaintiffs filed before the Court rendered Lampf. Section 27A(b) states a specific procedure (motion for reinstatement within 60 days of enactment) to restart [a]ny § 10(b) claim commenced on or before June 19, 1991 ... which was dismissed as time barred after Lampf, but would have been timely filed before Lampf. 34 What little legislative history exists for § 27A confirms that Congress intended to obliterate Lampf and Beam for all cases filed before the Court rendered Lampf. 6 See, e.g., 137 CONG.REC. S17382 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1992) (Sen. Riegle, § 27A sponsor) (The language of the bill is designed to return plaintiffs and defendants to exactly the position that they had on June 19, 1991, the day before the Court rendered Lampf.); id. at H11813 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (Rep. Markey) (The language ... unambiguously reverses the Lampf ruling's application of the 1-year and 3-year statute of limitations....). The Supreme Court itself has recognized as much. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2085, 2089, 124 L.Ed.2d 194 (1993) (Congress ... limit[ed] the retroactive effect of [Lampf by directing] the applicable 'limitation period for any private civil action implied under [§ 10(b) ] that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991....' ); id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2095 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Congress alter[ed] the retroactive effect of the 10b-5 limitations period that we adopted in Lampf.). We know of no evidence or reason that supports a narrower reading of § 27A. Compare Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386, 103 S.Ct. 683, 689, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983) (interpreting securities laws to further[ ] their broad remedial purposes).
35 The TGX Defendants seize on the district court's statement that Simmons did not voluntarily dismiss his § 10(b) claims under FED.R.CIV.P. 41 by asking the court to dismiss those claims without prejudice in August 1991. Simmons, 786 F.Supp. at 590. They argue that the court's statement is erroneous, and once we recognize that Simmons voluntarily dismissed his claims, we must hold that the claims were not dismissed as time barred under § 27A(b)(1). 36 But even if Simmons chose to dismiss his § 10(b) claims, the record conclusively establishes that he did so because Lampf rendered those claims time barred. The district court's August 1991 judgment states this very fact. We interpret dismissed as time barred in § 27A(b) to include all cases that were dismissed because of Lampf's time bar. Simmons satisfies this but-for scrutiny.
37 The TGX Defendants have found language in our cases in which this court states that the effect of a voluntary dismissal is to put the plaintiff in the same legal position in which he would have been had he never brought the first suit. Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985). They would have us apply this language, irrespective of the reasons for and context in which we used it, to hold that Simmons's suit vanished upon voluntary dismissal, leaving nothing to reinstate by operation of § 27A(b). 38 But there is no rule that makes all voluntarily dismissed cases absolutely null for all purposes. The District of Columbia Circuit has permitted a district court to resurrect a voluntarily dismissed case under FED.R.CIV.P. 60. Boehm v. Office of Alien Property, 344 F.2d 194 (D.C.Cir.1965). And even if there were an absolute-nullity rule, we could not apply it in the face of contrary congressional intent unless we could articulate a constitutional basis for doing so. As we have explained, Congress intended broad relief from Lampf for any § 10(b) claim that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991. Simmons commenced his § 10(b) claims against the TGX Defendants on March 8, 1990, which places those claims within the ambit of § 27A(b).
39 The TGX Defendants cite cases holding that courts should refrain from deciding constitutional questions if possible. See, e.g., Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, 501 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C.Cir.1974) ([W]hen one interpretation of a statute would create a substantial doubt as to the statute's constitutional validity, the courts will avoid that interpretation absent a 'clear statement' of a contrary legislative intent.). They accompany these cites with creative readings of § 27A(b) that would avoid constitutional questions, while conveniently killing Simmons's claims. 7 None of their readings respects Congress' unmistakable intent to keep Lampf from operating retroactively in cases that were dismissed as time barred. 8 We will not ignore the obvious meaning of § 27A simply to avoid the constitutional questions that Congress has created.
40 Finally, the TGX Defendants point to the district court's October 1991 dismissal of Simmons's amended counterclaim in the TGX suit. They argue that the court dismissed this amended counterclaim with prejudice, and the amended counterclaim raised the same claims that Simmons pursues through his January 1992 reinstatement motion under § 27A(b), so claim preclusion bars any reinstatement of Simmons's March 1990 claims regardless of § 27A(b). 41 But the TGX Defendants have waived any claim-preclusion argument by failing to raise it in the district court. Our thorough search of the record reveals no mention of claim preclusion by the court's October 1991 judgment, and we refuse to consider it for the first time on appeal. See Russell v. SunAmerica Sec., Inc., 962 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to present res judicata argument to district court usually prevents appellate court from addressing the issue); see also Aluminum Prod. Distrib., Inc. v. Aaacon Auto Transp., Inc., 549 F.2d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir.1977) (where a party asserted res judicata for the first time in a new-trial motion, the district court was not bound by any [prior] judgment, and the appellate court refused to consider any preclusive effect on appeal). 42 We come to the central question of both cases: the constitutionality of § 27A(b). 43