Opinion ID: 1209944
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: maxey waived his right to counsel in the 1987 case.

Text: Maxey asserts that the state may not use the 1987 conviction to charge him with a felony in the 1990 case because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel in the 1987 case. We disagree.
We first note that pursuant to M.C.R. 6(c) Maxey had a right to appointed counsel in the 1987 case, if he was indigent: If the offense has a permissible penalty of imprisonment which will be considered as possible punishment by the court, or if the conviction of the offense could cause a subsequent conviction to be enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony, then or in either of such events the defendant shall be advised that he has the right to court appointed counsel at public expense if [the defendant] is indigent. If the defendant is found by the court to be entitled to court appointed counsel, the court shall appoint such counsel unless the defendant voluntarily waives [the defendant's] right to counsel. M.C.R. 6(c). When Maxey pleaded guilty in the 1987 case, I.C. § 18-8005(3) provided that a person who pleaded guilty to or was found guilty of three or more DUI violations within five years was guilty of a felony. Because of this enhancement Maxey had a right to appointed counsel pursuant to M.C.R. 6(c), if he was indigent. Therefore, we do not address the more intricate questions concerning Maxey's right to counsel in the 1987 case under the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. Cf. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980); and U.S. v. Lee, 995 F.2d 887 (9th Cir.1993).
Maxey contends that he never validly waived his right to counsel under I.C. § 19-857, which provides: A person who has been appropriately informed of [the person's] right to counsel may waive in writing, or by other record, any right provided by this act, if the court concerned, at the time of or after waiver, finds of record that [the person] has acted with full awareness of [the person's] rights and of the consequences of a waiver and if the waiver is otherwise according to law. The court shall consider such factors as the person's age, education, and familiarity with the English language and the complexity of the crime involved. In distinction, I.C.R. 11(c) provides: Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the record of the entire proceedings, including reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show: (1) The voluntariness of the plea. (2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences which may apply. (3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the defendant would waive the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses against the defendant. (4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against the defendant. (5) Whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the nature of the agreement and that the defendant was informed that the court is not bound by any promises or recommendation from either party as to punishment. If I.C. § 19-857 is substantive, it takes precedence over I.C.R. 11(c). If the statute is procedural, I.C.R. 11(c) takes precedence over it. State v. Harbaugh, 123 Idaho 835, 837 n. 3, 853 P.2d 580, 582 n. 3 (1993). In State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 540-41, 700 P.2d 942, 943-44 (1985), the Court ruled that the authority of a trial court to allow post-conviction bail to a convicted criminal made ineligible for bail by a statutory enactment is a matter of procedure rather than substantive law. See also State v. Yoder , 96 (I.C.R. 41(c) concerning issuance of search warrants is a rule of procedure and I.C. § 19-4404 is of no further force or effect.). In its analysis in Currington, the Court incorporated the following statement of the distinction between substantive law and procedure: Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, and regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated. 108 Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting from State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 527 P.2d 674, 677 (1974) (en banc)). Applying this distinction to I.C. § 19-857 and I.C.R. 11(c), we conclude that I.C. § 19-857 is procedural and not substantive law. The subject of the statute is how a trial court will consider and rule on the waiver of the right to counsel. The statute does not create, define, or regulate any primary rights. Therefore, I.C.R. 11(c) takes precedence over I.C. § 19-857. We reject Maxey's argument that the conviction in the 1987 case was defective because the trial court failed to comply with I.C. § 19-857 by not considering the factors mentioned in the last sentence of the statute and by not finding on the record that Maxey made a knowing or intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. The acceptance of the plea was in compliance with I.C.R. 11(c) because the record of the entire proceeding, including reasonable inferences from the record, show that the requirements of the rule were met. At the time of Maxey's arraignment in the 1987 case, and before Maxey pleaded guilty, the trial court asked Maxey if he wished to fill out an application for a court appointed lawyer to represent him. Maxey said no. The trial court then asked Maxey if he gave up his right to have a public defender. Maxey said yes. The trial court accepted this as a waiver of Maxey's right to have counsel appointed. Maxey contends that the trial court should have advised Maxey not only of his right to counsel, but also of the dangers and disadvantages of representing himself. In State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 606 P.2d 1000 (1980), the Court stated that, where the defendant wanted to represent himself at trial, the decision amounted to a waiver of the right to counsel, and the defendant should be made aware of the problems inherent in self-representation so that such waiver is knowingly and intelligently made. Id. at 897, 606 P.2d at 1001. See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 581-82 (1975) (A defendant who chooses self-representation at trial should be made aware of the dangers of doing so.). The dangers of self-representation at trial are obvious. The intricacies of the procedures, the rules of evidence, and the law are sufficient to justify extra care in making sure the defendant appreciates the difficulties in conducting a trial without the assistance of a lawyer. Certainly a guilty plea is an important part of a criminal proceeding. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 772 (1970) (to plead guilty ... frequently involves the making of difficult judgments). We are not convinced, however, that the judgments that confront a defendant who pleads guilty in a misdemeanor case are sufficiently difficult to warrant a requirement that the trial court must advise the defendant of the problems inherent in entering a plea without counsel.