Opinion ID: 182445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Delay on Direct Appeal

Text: Hayes argues that the nearly eleven-year delay between his sentencing and the filing of his opening brief on direct appeal to the California Supreme Court violated his right to due process on appeal. The California Supreme Court received notice of Hayes's death sentence and docketed his automatic appeal on August 26, 1986. The court appointed H. Peter Young to represent Hayes on December 10, 1986. The certified record was filed on January 13, 1993. After requesting and receiving numerous extensions of time to file Hayes's opening brief, Young was relieved of his appointment on April 4, 1995, without ever filing an opening brief. Eric S. Multhaup was appointed to represent Hayes on July 16, 1995. Multhaup filed an opening brief on July 31, 1997. After discounting the time it took to complete the record (four years) and the period during which Multhaup worked on the opening brief (two years), a delay of five years remains unexplained. Hayes contends that this five-year delay was excessive and entitles him to a new trial. We cannot grant relief on this claim because no clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States recognizes a due process right to a speedy appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Hayes relies on Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), but that case established only the contours of the right to a speedy trial, not an appeal. Hayes cites circuit court decisions that have applied the analytical framework of Barker to delayed appeals and held that appellate delay can violate due process or the right to counsel. See United States v. Davis, 55 F.3d 517 (10th Cir.1995); Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir.1994); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1990). [3] Lower courts' extensions of Barker to a new setting, however, cannot be the basis of habeas relief after AEDPA. [W]hen a Supreme Court decision does not `squarely address[ ] the issue in th[e] case' or establish a legal principle that `clearly extend[s]' to a new context, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) requires that we deny relief. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125, 128 S.Ct. 743, 169 L.Ed.2d 583 (2008)) (second, third, and fourth alteration in original). No Supreme Court decision squarely addresses the right to a speedy appeal, nor does the right to a speedy trial clearly extend to the appellate context. The interest in a prompt initial adjudication of a defendant's rights, which underlies the right to a speedy trial, is plainly not the same as the interest in having a trial court conviction reviewed quickly on appeal. Moreover, Hayes identifies no prejudice that resulted from the delay, and we see none. The passage of time did not adversely affect the California Supreme Court's review of the issues Hayes presented, and he does not point to any issue he was unable to pursue because of the delay. Nor does he explain why time taken by counsel appointed to represent him should be attributed to the State, or why it should prevent the State from holding him responsible for his criminal conduct. The district court properly denied relief on this claim.