Opinion ID: 686739
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct: Closing Argument

Text: 29 James complains that his trial was fundamentally unfair because the prosecution made several statements during closing argument to the jury that, according to James, vouched for the credibility of government witnesses and challenged the veracity of defense witnesses. As James did not object to these statements contemporaneously or otherwise object prior to appeal, we must consider [first] whether the statements were improper and, if so, [second] whether they amounted to plain error under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). 17 30
31 The law is clear that in closing argument a prosecutor may not personally vouch for the credibility of a government witness, as doing so may imply that the prosecutor has additional personal knowledge about the witness and facts that confirm such witness' testimony, or may add credence to such witness' testimony. 18 James complains that the prosecution violated this clear prohibition three times: (1) when in summarizing the responsibility of cooperating witnesses the prosecutor stated, [t]heir obligation is to cooperate and tell the truth; (2) by commenting that, [w]e're not exaggerating, we're telling you exactly what happened (emphasis added); and (3) after questioning rhetorically whether a government witness, Jones, was making up stories, the prosecutor answered his own question by responding, I don't think so (emphasis added). Although at first blush--and taken out of context--several of the prosecutor's statements might appear to be impermissible vouching, when viewed in the context in which they were made, we see clearly that no such personal assurances were offered by government counsel. 32 We must review the allegedly improper argument 'in light of the argument to which it responded.'  19 During trial, defense counsel contended that the plea agreements between government witnesses and the prosecution invited the witnesses to perjure themselves so as to procure lesser sentences. In such circumstances, the government 'may even present what amounts to bolstering argument if it is specifically done in rebuttal to assertions made by defense counsel in order to remove any stigma cast upon [the prosecutor] or his witnesses.'  20 Even if these statements were tantamount to bolstering, such bolstering would not have been improper in this case. 33 But we do not believe that the prosecution's reference to the obligations of cooperating witnesses did amount to bolstering. Taken in context, the prosecution merely argued that the plea agreements, which had been entered into evidence, provided little motivation for cooperating witnesses to testify falsely. A prosecutor is not forbidden to argue that  'the fair inference from the facts presented is that a witness has no reason to lie.'  21 34 Moreover, a prosecutor is not prohibited from recit[ing] to the jury those inferences and conclusions he wishes [the jury] to draw from the evidence so long as those inferences are grounded upon the evidence. 22 In each of the other two instances of alleged bolstering, that is clearly all that the prosecution was attempting to do. When the prosecution commented, we're not exaggerating, and I don't think so, it was inviting the jury to compare the credibility of the government's witnesses with that of those who testified for the defense, even though we concede that the prosecutor's choice of the first person pronouns may have been a bit unfortunate. The purpose of closing argument is to assist the jury in analyzing and evaluating the evidence, 23 and we are convinced that here the prosecution did nothing more. 35 We also find meritless James' argument the prosecution improperly offered its personal view of the credibility of defense witnesses in two other instances when the prosecution ventured the opinions that one defense witness was lying, and that another defense witness was not being truthful. Taken in context, these two statements are merely further examples of the prosecution's reciting evidence in the record--this time, conflicting evidence--and then attempting to persuade the jury to arrive at a certain conclusion based on that evidence. There is nothing impermissible about a prosecutor's pointing out inconsistent facts or testimony in the record and arguing that the jury should adopt a particular conclusion based on that evidence. 24 Given the evidence before the jury, therefore, we find nothing inappropriate about the prosecution's comments in closing argument. 36
37 Even assuming arguendo that we were to find any or all of these statements improper, such a finding would not here require reversal. Reversal for plain error is required only when the error is prejudicial, i.e., it must have affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings. 25 In determining the overall degree of prejudice in a prosecutor's closing argument, we consider the district court's cautionary instructions to the jury 26 and the strength of the evidence against each defendant. 27 In light of the district court's proper jury instruction and the quantum of evidence establishing guilt, any putatively improper closing argument by the prosecutor here certainly would not rise to the level of plain error.