Opinion ID: 2584939
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenges to Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute

Text: Defendant asserts various grounds in support of his claim that the California death penalty statute is unconstitutional. He acknowledges this court has previously rejected each of them, but raises them here in order to preserve the claims in federal court. The claim that section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad has been rejected by the high court in Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976 [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630], and repeatedly rejected by this court. (See, e.g., People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 365 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545]; People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 574 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182]; Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 439; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 394 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34]; Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1050-1053.) Furthermore, [t]he [death penalty] statute is not invalid for failing to require (1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749].) And except for prior violent crimes evidence and prior felony convictions under section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), the court need not instruct regarding a burden of proof, or instruct the jury that there is no burden of proof at the penalty phase. ( People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1216 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130]; People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 417-418.) Moreover, there is no requirement that California's death penalty sentencing scheme provide for intercase proportionality review. ( People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 317 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433].) And since capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, the death penalty law does not violate equal protection by denying capital defendants certain procedural rights given to noncapital defendants. ( People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1242-1243 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1]; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1286-1287 [232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115].) Hence, the jury may consider unadjudicated offenses under section 190.3, factor (b) as aggravating factors without violating the defendant's rights to trial, confrontation, an impartial and unanimous jury, due process, or a reliable penalty determination. ( People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 316; People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 566 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931].) Nor does the use of adjectives such as extreme in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), or substantial in section 190.3, factor (g), serve as an improper barrier to the consideration of mitigating evidence. ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 73-75 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388] [extreme as used in § 190.3, factor (g)]; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 270 [253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906] [substantial as used in § 190.3, factor (g)].) In a supplemental brief, defendant claims the penalty phase instructions unconstitutionally failed to identify which circumstances were aggravating and which were mitigating. The claim is unmeritorious, having been repeatedly rejected by this court. (See, e.g., People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 590 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614].) Indeed, defendant concedes the point and even quotes from a decision to that effect ( People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568]). He nonetheless urges us to part company with those decisions in his case because here, according to defendant, a portion of one juror's notes, made part of the augmented clerk's transcript on appeal, reflects that the juror did aggravate[] his sentence upon the basis of what were, as a matter of state law, mitigating factors, and did so believing that the Stateas represented by the trial court [through the giving of CALJIC No. 8.85]had identified them as potentially aggravating factors supporting a sentence of death. Fundamentally, however, the incomplete and inconclusive portions of a juror's notes on which defendant would have us rely cannot serve to impeach the jury's verdict. (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a); People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1218 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981] [§ 1150, subd. (a) renders inadmissible any evidence concerning the mental processes by which a verdict is determined.].) Finally, defendant's claims that the high court's decisions in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428], and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348], apply to California's death penalty sentencing scheme have been rejected by this court. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 642 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302].) Nor is the statutory scheme so flawed that any imposition of the death penalty in this state would violate `international norms of humanity and decency.' ( People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 366; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 778-779 [239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].)