Opinion ID: 1692853
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of 1996 Iowa Acts Chapter 1131, Section 3 with Respect to Sentence Provided for Third or Subsequent Offense of Domestic Abuse Assault.

Text: Defendant's present conviction for domestic abuse assault and his prior two convictions of that crime all involved offenses that, if committed for the first time, would be simple misdemeanors. Prior to July 1, 1996, the sentence prescribed by section 708.2A(3)(a) for a second or subsequent offense of this type was the sentence provided for a serious misdemeanor. In 1996 Iowa Acts chapter 1131, section 3, the legislature amended section 708.2A so as to add a new subparagraph (4). This new subparagraph provides: On a third or subsequent offense of domestic abuse assault a person commits a class D felony. 1996 Iowa Acts ch. 1131, § 3. The same section of this legislative act added a new subsection (6)(b) to section 708.2A. That provision reads as follows: A person convicted of violating subsection 4 [the newly added subsection] shall be sentenced to a term of not less than one year and committed to the custody of the director of the department of corrections, and assessed a fine of not less than seven hundred fifty dollars. Notwithstanding section 901.5, subsection 3, and section 907.3, subsection 3, the sentence cannot be suspended; however, the person sentenced shall receive credit for any time the person was confined in a jail or detention facility following arrest. 1996 Iowa Acts ch. 1131, § 3. As previously noted, the district court in sentencing defendant pursuant to section 708.2A first looked only to the newly created subsection (4) of that statute, which specifies that a third offense domestic abuse conviction is a class D felony. Later, when its attention was directed to the provisions of newly created subsection (6)(b), it concluded that the one-year sentence called for by that subsection was intended to be a one-year mandatory minimum sentence with respect to the standard five-year sentence imposed for class D felonies under section 902.9(4). Defendant argues that subsection (6)(b) constitutes a separate and distinct sentencing statute that by itself provides a one-year sentence to be imposed on persons convicted of third or subsequent domestic abuse assaults. The State urges that the district court's interpretation was correct. It suggests that an interpretation of the 1996 amendment that would provide for a one-year sentence for this crime would render the amendment without purpose because that was the sentence provided under the prior classification of the offense as a serious misdemeanor. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed with doubts being resolved in favor of the accused. State v. Lawr, 263 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Iowa 1978); State v. Conley, 222 N.W.2d 501, 502 (Iowa 1974). In interpreting criminal statutes, we also apply the usual rules of statutory interpretation that require us to give effect to the usual and ordinary meaning of the language and give meaning to the statute within its context. State v. Ahitow, 544 N.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Iowa 1996). In applying these rules of interpretation to the statute now under consideration, we are convinced that the district court's interpretation was correct. It is impossible to interpret the words a term of not less than one year as being an independent sentencing provision separate and apart from some other statute. This is because the quoted language gives no dimension to the upper end of the sentence that the court may impose. As a result of the language of subsection (4) of section 708.2A, classifying the offense as a class D felony, we are convinced that section 902.9(4) establishes the standard sentence to be imposed, in this case an indeterminate sentence of five years, and subsection (6)(b) engrafts a mandatory minimum sentence onto the standard sentence. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment and sentence of the district court should be affirmed. AFFIRMED.