Opinion ID: 1235178
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Justifications for the City's Actions

Text: Although we believe some of the language in the District Court's opinion cannot be supported, it does not follow that its holding was erroneous. As the Supreme Court has stated, [t]he principles of the First Amendment are not to be treated as a promise that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may gather around him at any public place and at any time a group for discussion or instruction. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405, 73 S.Ct. 760, 97 L.Ed. 1105 (1953). Indeed, [n]othing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker's activities. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800, 105 S.Ct. 3439. Therefore, although the ability of the state to limit expressive activity in a traditional public forum is sharply circumscribed, Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, the state remains free to take action to maintain public order. It follows that although Appellants cannot be excluded from the streets and sidewalks of Philadelphia where OutFest took place, they are not free to proceed as they like through the permit area. Even in a traditional public forum, the government may impose content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions provided that the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Thus, the City had the authority to regulate Appellants' First Amendment activities where necessary. See Wickersham, 481 F.3d at 601 ([Air show organizer-state actor] remains free to take reasonable steps to ensure that its air show message would not be submerged by any alternate forms of speech which prove to be unduly intrusive in their timing, place, or manner of expression.).
To determine if a restriction is content neutral, [t]he principal inquiry..., in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746. It is the government's purpose that controls. Id. A regulation is deemed content neutral if it serves purposes unrelated to the content of speech, regardless of whether it incidentally affects certain speakers or messages and not others. Id. That is, government regulation of speech is properly regarded as content neutral if it is  justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). The District Court rejected Appellants' argument that the police officers acted primarily because of concern with the crowd's reaction to their message, finding instead that the response to the plaintiffs was a response to context, not content[, which] context developed from the City's issuing of a valid permit to Philly Pride. Startzell, 2007 WL 172400, at . A state or municipality has the right to regulate the use of city streets to assure the safety and convenience of the people in their use and the concomitant right of the people of free speech and assembly. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965). The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time. The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy. Id.; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969) ([T]he right of free speech ... does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others.). Thus, for instance, a municipality can control the use of its public streets for parades or processions, and it has similar authority to give consideration, without unfair discrimination, to time, place and manner in relation to the other proper uses of the streets. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941). The Supreme Court has recognized permitting schemes as a content-neutral means for the government to regulate competing uses of public forums. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992) (noting that any permit scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of speech must not be based on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for communication); see also Kroll v. U.S. Capitol Police, 847 F.2d 899, 903 (D.C.Cir.1988) (Permit systems are the embodiment of time, place, and manner restrictions that have long enjoyed the approbation of the Supreme Court.). Permits allow the government to arrange a public forum so that individuals and groups can be heard in an orderly and appropriate manner, and  enforcement of a permit system inevitably requires taking cognizance of content. Kroll, 847 F.2d at 903 (emphasis in original). The principle of content neutrality does not divest police officers of the ability to enforce valid permits and to ensure that permitted speech is allowed to take place. Although Kroll involved a qualified immunity claim, and is therefore not directly on point, it is nevertheless instructive on the treatment of permits in the First Amendment context. Kroll involved a permit to hold a welcoming ceremony for the Olympic Torch Relay Team on the steps of the United States Capitol Building. [9] Id. at 900. Relevant to our purposes, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained that [t]he principle of content neutrality does not ... mean that a permit system exists only as an office operation without enforcement capability. Id. at 903. Different courts have adopted different methods to deal with counter-protestors. See, e.g., Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir.1986) (allotting opposing demonstrators thirty minutes within barricaded enclosure at different times to avoid confrontation between groups). We are not presented with that issue here. Appellants do not challenge the permitting scheme in and of itself as being an unconstitutional restriction of their speech. Rather, Appellants urge us to disregard Philly Pride's permit to hold OutFest because they believe the non-exclusive permit did not give the police the right to restrict their speech. We have already made clear that Appellants possess a First Amendment right to communicate their message in a public forum. Yet, their rights are not superior to the First Amendment rights of Philly Pride, as permit-holder, to effectively convey the message of its event  that we're out and proud of who we are, App.II at 309  and of the audience's ability to receive that message and experience the entire event. The right of free speech does not encompass the right to cause disruption, and that is particularly true when those claiming protection of the First Amendment cause actual disruption of an event covered by a permit. The City has an interest in ensuring that a permit-holder can use the permit for the purpose for which it was obtained. This interest necessarily includes the right of police officers to prevent counter-protestors from disrupting or interfering with the message of the permit-holder. Thus, when protestors move from distributing literature and wearing signs to disruption of the permitted activities, the existence of a permit tilts the balance in favor of the permit-holders. In the case before us, the video shows that the Repent America contingent used bullhorns and microphones in an attempt to drown out the platform speakers and then, most significantly, congregated in the middle of the walkway. The police had ample justification to direct Appellants to move when they interfered with the permitted event's activities by expressing their message with loud bullhorns right next to the main stage where musical performances were held, [10] directly confronting a transgendered individual, [11] and blocking access to the vendors who had applied for booths at OutFest. The police action was not based on the content of Appellants' message but on their conduct. See Kroll, 847 F.2d at 903. Appellants' conduct was different in kind and degree from that in Parks, where a demonstrator was removed from a non-exclusive Arts Festival which had a permit. 395 F.3d at 646. The court in Parks found that the city's actions were based on the content of the demonstrator's speech, as Parks was acting in a peaceful manner and the only difference between him and the other patrons was that he wore a sign communicating a religious message and distributed religious leaflets. Id. at 653-54. There was no evidence that Parks was interfering with or disrupting any part of the Arts Festival; he was asked to move simply because the event sponsor did not want him there. Id. at 654. The court stated, under these circumstances we find it difficult to conceive that Parks's removal was based on something other than the content of his speech. Id. As we noted earlier, here, by contrast, Appellants did not simply carry their signs or distribute leaflets but used loud bullhorns to express their message near the stage area, directly addressed an OutFest attendee in a confrontational manner, and blocked access to the vendor booths. Because Appellants were interfering with the permitted event's message, something the other OutFest attendees were not doing, see Wickersham, 481 F.3d at 601, the police officers were justified in directing Appellants' movement away from the stage and the vendors. We take this occasion to note favorably the restraint with which the police acted, action we could observe from the videos. Appellants argue that the police officers improperly used a heckler's veto by restricting their movement based on the audience's reaction to their message. If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) ([I]n public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A heckler's veto is an impermissible content-based restriction on speech where the speech is prohibited due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the audience. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n. 1, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637 (1966); see also Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 134-35, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (invalidating ordinance allowing administrator to adjust parade permit fees based on anticipated hostility to speech and concomitant higher cost of security). The District Court found that the heckler's veto jurisprudence was inapposite because it concerns government censorship that completely prohibits speech before it is made based on anticipated listener reaction to the speech. Startzell, 2007 WL 172400, at . Although we agree with Appellants that the heckler's veto analysis is not so limited but may apply to situations where police restrict speech that is taking place, see, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949); Frye v. Kansas City Police Dep't, 375 F.3d 785 (8th Cir.2004), the more germane question is whether the City's actions were based on the content of the speech. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746. There is no evidence that they were. It is apparent that the police understood Appellants had rights under the First Amendment to express their message, but in directing Appellants to move to another location within OutFest they were merely imposing a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction. Captain Fisher testified as to his motive as follows: as a sworn police officer, I have a duty to protect life and property, and it's a case where there's times there has to be some degree of separation for the safety and welfare of everybody concerned. App.II at 282. Chief Tiano explained that the significant part of the reason he wanted Appellants to move was because they were blocking the vendors. App.II at 239. Although he admitted there was a potential for the crowd to get hostile based on Appellants' message, App.II at 239, the undisputed evidence shows Appellants, with the Pink Angels surrounding them, had attracted a crowd that was blocking access to the vendor booths. As Chief Tiano explained, he asked Appellants and not the Pink Angels to move because I knew if they would move, I wouldn't have to worry about the other group. They'd move to[o]. App.II at 237. There is no evidence to suggest that the police direction to Appellants to move to a different location was based on content or viewpoint. [12] Appellants rely on certain testimony to support their argument; however, the cited testimony does not lead to the conclusion that the City's actions were content based. In the context of OutFest, which had received a permit to hold its event and engage vendors to sell their wares, the fact that the police asked Appellants rather than the Pink Angels to move was a content-neutral response to the interference caused by Appellants' actions and loud speech with the permitted event's activities. See Kroll, 847 F.2d at 903 ( [E]nforcement of a permit system inevitably requires taking cognizance of content. Otherwise ... it would be impossible to separate non-permitted activity from activity that did enjoy the authorization conferred by a permit.) (emphasis in original). Preclusion of a message is the evil at which the content-neutrality principle is aimed, not arrangements of a public forum so that individuals and groups can be heard in an orderly and appropriate manner. Id.
Having decided that the content-neutral analysis is appropriate, we must consider whether the restriction on Appellants' speech was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and whether it left open ample alternative channels of communication. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746. The burden is on the City to demonstrate the constitutionality of its actions. Although the District Court incorrectly placed that burden on Appellants, that error was without consequence. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 658, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (As our cases have long noted, once a governmental regulation is shown to impinge upon basic First Amendment rights, the burden falls on the government to show the validity of its asserted interest and the absence of less intrusive alternatives.); N.J. Citizen Action v. Edison Twp., 797 F.2d 1250, 1255 (3d Cir.1986) (Ordinarily, when a statute or other government action is alleged to infringe on the exercise of First Amendment rights, the state or municipality bears the burden of demonstrating the constitutionality of the action.). Appellants do not appear to question the legitimacy of the City's interests  to ensure public order and safety and to ensure that OutFest's permit to engage in its speech activities is respected. As a general matter, it is clear that a State's interest in protecting the `safety and convenience' of persons using a public forum is a valid governmental objective. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650, 101 S.Ct. 2559; see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (recognizing the state has a strong interest in ensuring the public safety and order, in promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets and sidewalks). Instead, Appellants challenge the restrictions to their movement, arguing that they were not narrowly tailored because they resulted in their complete removal from the event area. The Supreme Court has stated that restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech are not invalid `simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.' Ward, 491 U.S. at 797, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (citation omitted). There is no need to determine if the restrictions are the least intrusive, but only whether the regulation `promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' Id. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (citation omitted). `The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does not turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests' or the degree to which those interests should be promoted. Id. at 800, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (citation omitted). The City's actions in this case were narrowly tailored to serve its significant interests. As the District Court found, the City did not exclude Appellants from OutFest but instead went out of its way to grant [them] access, Startzell, 2007 WL 172400, at , and let them move about freely until plaintiffs insulted individual attendees, blocked access to vendors, and disobeyed direct orders from the police, who were trying to preserve order and keep the peace. Id. Although Appellants' arrest ultimately silenced their speech, the police did not initially ban Appellants' speech; they were arrested only after they disobeyed police orders to move in a specified direction.
The final factor to be considered in determining whether the City's actions were valid time, place, or manner restrictions is whether there were alternative avenues for the expression of Appellants' protected speech. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 802, 109 S.Ct. 2746. [T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559. Restrictions have been upheld, for example, when the challenged regulation neither prevents access outside of nor within the forum in question. Id. at 654-55, 101 S.Ct. 2559. Until their arrest, Appellants had alternative ways to express themselves without causing disruption, such as through the use of smaller signs without bullhorns so that the performances on the stages would not be obscured, the distribution of leaflets and counter-information without making derogatory comments, and the ability to move along with the crowd to express their message while avoiding standing still and blocking access to the vendors. Although [a]n alternative is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the `intended audience,' Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir.1990) (citation omitted), that is not what occurred here. Admittedly, Appellants' intended audience was the LGBT OutFest attendees, whom they wanted to instruct about what they believed were the sins of homosexuality. The police officers' direction that Appellants move to a less congested area, albeit still within OutFest, may have reduced their potential audience. Nonetheless, Appellants have not demonstrated that the avenues that remained were inadequate. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 802, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (That the city's limitations on volume may reduce to some degree the potential audience for respondent's speech is of no consequence, for there has been no showing that the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate.). Appellants complain that they were told to move to one specific area of OutFest; however, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Heffron, where members of the Krishna religion were required at a state fair to confine the distribution and sale of their religious literature and the solicitation of donations to a fixed location. 452 U.S. at 648, 654, 101 S.Ct. 2559. The Court upheld that requirement as a valid time, place, or manner regulation, as it did not deny [the Krishnas] the right to conduct any desired activity at some point within the forum and provided for adequate means to distribute and solicit from a location on the fairgrounds. Id. at 655, 101 S.Ct. 2559. Here, too, there is no showing that Appellants were unnecessarily limited in conveying their message from the location to which they were ordered to move, which was only about one-and-one-half blocks from OutFest's epicenter and near Philadelphia's biggest gay bar, a popular event location. Appellants cite to Mahoney v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 1452, 1459 (D.C.Cir.1997), where the court held that the government's grant of permits to protest in two other areas not along President Clinton's inaugural parade route did not provide an adequate alternative channel of communication because it cannot rightly be said that all forums are equal. Here, however, even if Appellants' message would have been somewhat less effective if expressed outside OutFest, Appellants were not moved outside of OutFest and the record shows that ample avenues of communication remained available for them to preach within the boundaries of OutFest had they followed the police directions. [13] Therefore, we hold that the City's actions in restricting Appellants' movement when they were interfering with or disrupting the speech of the permitted event were justified, reasonable, content-neutral regulations of the time, place, or manner of their expression.