Opinion ID: 2974210
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of Searches

Text: In his primary issue on appeal, Beasley asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the introduction of the drugs, drug paraphernalia, and handgun recovered from the defendant’s hotel room. According to Beasley, the search -7- 05-5645 United States v. Beasley warrant that led to the uncovering of the incriminating evidence was based upon information obtained during an unjustified protective sweep of the room. Furthermore, the defendant maintains that Teela Frye had neither actual nor apparent authority to consent to any search of Room 401. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Consequently, warrantless searches are presumed unreasonable unless they fall within certain recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. United States v. Radka, 904 F.2d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 1990). In this case, the search of the defendant’s hotel room that ultimately uncovered the package of crack cocaine and one of the handguns that served as bases for his convictions was conducted pursuant to a court-issued warrant. Beasley nevertheless contends that the facts contained in the affidavit supporting the warrant were discovered through unconstitutional means. Specifically, the defendant focuses upon the inclusion in the affidavit of a reference to “a set of scales” that were observed by Sergeant Holstein only while Holstein was conducting a protective sweep of the hotel room. Beasley insists that because such a protective sweep was not justified in this matter, the warrant relying -8- 05-5645 United States v. Beasley on the fruits of that sweep was constitutionally defective and cannot support the admission into evidence of any of the items found during the search conducted pursuant to that authorization. The United States Supreme Court has explained that “a ‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). Furthermore, such a protective sweep is justified only “if the searching officer possessed a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the officer in believing that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or others.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, Holstein was aware that Beasley had been arrested in the parking lot outside of the Extended Stay America hotel and that both drugs and a firearm were found in the defendant’s rental car. Additionally, another person was seen observing the arrest from a room believed to be the very room in which Beasley had been staying and from which he had apparently just left. It is true that, upon gaining entry into that room, Holstein observed only a female occupant, who complied with the officer’s requests and who did not pose a physical threat either to Holstein or to any other individual. Nevertheless, even in the relatively cramped quarters of a hotel room, another more menacing and dangerous -9- 05-5645 United States v. Beasley individual could easily hide. Thus, because Holstein had no idea how many other individuals might have been in Room 401, he was justified in conducting the brief, 15second sweep of the room to make sure other armed persons were not hiding behind beds or in the bathroom area. Even had the sweep not been justified, however, and even had the scales found during the sweep not been mentioned in Benton’s affidavit, probable cause still supported the issuance of the search warrant that led to the discovery of additional incriminating evidence in the hotel room. Regardless of what motivation Sergeant Holstein might have for knocking at the door to Room 401, the evidence is uncontroverted that Teela Frye opened the door wide in response to the rapping, according to her because she thought that the visitor was a pizza delivery man. After Holstein identified himself, after Frye was able to see a uniformed officer accompanying the plainclothes sergeant, and after Holstein stated, “I would like to come in and talk to you regarding a situation that is occurring . . .,” she opened the door wider and stepped aside, giving the clear indication that the officers were allowed to enter the room. Once granted access to that vantage point, Holstein was able to observe, in plain view, plastic baggies and marijuana shake, items that together provided at least probable cause to believe that illegal drugs were being repackaged in the room for possible resale. Beasley argues, however, that the plain view doctrine is not applicable in this situation. In this circuit, the plain view doctrine is properly invoked by the government only - 10 - 05-5645 United States v. Beasley when: (1) the officer is legally present in a location from which he or she can view the items; (2) the items are actually in plain view; (3) the incriminating nature of the items is readily apparent to the officer; and (4) the officer has a lawful right of immediate access to the items. See United States v. McLevain, 310 F.3d 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2002). The defendant does not now dispute that the marijuana “shake” and baggies could be seen from the area directly inside the door to Room 401, or that the illegal nature of the drugs on the counter was readily apparent to Holstein. Furthermore, because the police obtained a search warrant prior to the actual seizure of any evidence in plain view, the legality of the government’s access to the items is not in question. Consequently, before this court, the defendant submits only that Holstein was not “legally present” within the hotel room, both because Frye did not consent to the police officers’ entry and because she was without either actual or apparent authority to consent to such entry into Room 401. At the outset of our analysis of the consent inquiry, we emphasize the important distinction between consent to enter a premises and consent to search that premises. Although identical standards are employed by a court when analyzing either issue, “when a defendant [or third party] consents to the entry of police officers, he or she does not automatically consent to a search.” United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 593 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155 (2005). Without question, the resolution of this appeal does not depend upon whether Teela Frye gave Holstein consent to search Room 401. Indeed, Holstein did not communicate to Frye that he and the uniformed officer with him desired to search the premises; neither did Frye - 11 - 05-5645 United States v. Beasley either explicitly or implicitly grant such consent to search to the officers. Instead, the focus of the germane inquiry on appeal is, as previously stated, simply whether Frye gave her free, knowing, and voluntary consent for Holstein to step inside the room, a location from which the uncontroverted evidence shows he was able to view items that were readily identifiable as contraband. In Carter, the en banc court, addressing a somewhat analogous situation, noted: The investigating officers were instantly recognizable as policemen when Carter opened the [hotel room] door. They properly asked permission to enter, and Carter stepped back, letting them in. Any ordinary caller, under like circumstances, would understand assent to have been given, and the police are not held to a higher standard in this regard than an ordinary person.