Opinion ID: 1897473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court's Post-Trial Rulings

Text: Following the return of the jury verdict, Owens-Corning moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, contending that appellants had failed to demonstrate that its product, Kaylo, had proximately caused their injuries. The trial court denied the motion. With respect to Mr. Freas, the court was satisfied that Mr. Freas' testimony of exposure to [Owens-Corning] Kaylo when he actually installed the product in several schools in 1958 and 1959 was sufficient to present a jury question. As to Mr. Bragg, the court ruled that [a]lthough Mr. Bragg could not identify Kaylo at any particular worksite, there [was] just enough evidence to raise a jury question as to his exposure to Kaylo. Specifically, the court noted that Russell Tarbox, an insulator who worked [at Chalk Point] as a steamfitter, testified to the dusty air created by insulators using Kaylo products. Addressing the expert testimony, the court recognized that although neither Dr. Rockoff nor Dr. Daum isolated Kaylo asbestos fibers as a cause of either [appellant's] asbestosis, they testified to their opinion that every exposure to asbestos-laden dust... is a significant factor in the development of the disease. The court ruled that these opinions dovetail[ed] with evidence of Mr. Bragg's exposure to Kaylo asbestos fibers and thus provide[d] a proper and sufficient basis upon which a jury could conclude that Kaylo was a substantial factor in causing his disease. In a separate order, using virtually identical language, the court reached the same conclusion regarding Mr. Freas. Owens-Corning also moved for a pro rata set-off against the awards for settlement proceeds from the Manville Trust. In a lengthy written order, the court discussed the history of the Trust and the related class-action settlement and determined that the order of the United States District Court approving the settlement [11] affected the instant case as follows: (1) Effectively, the Manville Trust is a defendant in each [plaintiff's] case by virtue of that plaintiff's mandatory inclusion in the class suing the Trust and by virtue of [Owens-Corning's] classification as a beneficiary with a right of contribution from the trust. (2) The [Trust Distribution Process (TDP)], Sec. H-1 (d), states that the Trust is to be considered a legally responsible tortfeasor under applicable law, without introduction of further proof. ... Thus the Trust is deemed in the instant cases to be a joint tortfeasor with [Owens-Corning]. (3) The TDP provides in pro rata jurisdictions that set-offs to which joint tortfeasors are entitled, whether claims are liquidated or non-liquidated, shall be either (a) the ... Trust Payment, or (b) the Trust's pro rata share of the judgment, as provided by applicable law. [Citations and footnote omitted.] The court concluded that because the law in the District of Columbia provides that joint tortfeasors must share pro rata in any judgment, Owens-Corning, for the purpose of calculating set-offs, must be credited with the Trust's pro rata share of the awards. The court did note that it was sympathetic to [appellants'] argument that their mandatory inclusion in the [case against the Manville Trust] leads to some inequitable results, but ruled nevertheless that it was bound by the federal court's order in Asbestos Litigation III and by established District of Columbia law.