Opinion ID: 1169725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jackman's claim against isif is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)

Text: On September 29, 1989, Dr. Setter gave Jackman an impairment rating of 33% of the whole person. Dr. Setter's impairment rating for Jackman included the multiple surgeries on Jackman's right hip and the loosening of Jackman's right hip prosthesis. The Agreement states that, Dr. Setter examined the Claimant and found that he suffered a 33% whole man impairment as a result of his Grade I L6-S1 spondylolisthesis, right hip pain and total hip arthroplasty. The Agreement apportioned the lump sum settlement as follows: Permanent Partial Impairment 33% whole man at 165 weeks at $164.45 a week $27,134.25 Jackman contends that the Agreement determined that Jackman suffered a 33% whole person impairment, without determining the issue of apportioning new and preexisting impairments. Jackman claims that of the 33% whole person impairment rating, 13% is attributable to Jackman's pre-existing permanent physical impairment and 20% is attributable to the August 13, 1986 accident. ISIF argues that Jackman's claim against ISIF is collaterally estopped. We agree. In Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 849 P.2d 107 (1993), this Court set forth the appropriate test for determining whether collateral estoppel, (issue preclusion), will prevent the relitigation of issues actually decided in a prior case: (1) Did the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted ... have a `full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case?' (2) Was the issue decided in the prior litigation identical with the one presented in the action in question? (3) Was the issue actually decided in the prior litigation? This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was necessary to [the prior] judgment. (4) Was there a final judgment on the merits? (5) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? Magic Valley Radiology, P.A., 123 Idaho at 439, 849 P.2d at 112. Jackman contends that in his previous case against SIF and SHS he was deprived of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of apportionment pursuant to I.C. § 72-332. Jackman's present claim against ISIF for apportionment is tied to the same impairment rating Jackman relied upon in his claim against SIF and SHS: 33% whole person impairment. Jackman had a fair opportunity and incentive to vigorously litigate his whole person impairment rating in Jackman's case against SIF and SHS. Jackman argues the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not be applied in this case since the issue in the present case is distinguishable from the issue raised in Jackman's action against SIF. Jackman contends that the issue in Jackman's case against SIF was the total value of Jackman's claim against SIF and that the apportioning of benefits between ISIF and SIF was never addressed in the Agreement. Jackman also points out that there was no consideration in the Agreement for Jackman to forgo his claims against ISIF. While Jackman has not had an opportunity to litigate the issue of apportionment pursuant to I.C. § 72-332, Jackman has failed to present additional allegations of a preexisting permanent physical impairment, above the 33% impairment rating relied upon in the Agreement. Jackman cannot rely upon the same percentage impairment rating in order to attain further benefits from ISIF. Jackman must present additional evidence of impairment in order to increase his impairment rating. The issue presented in the proceeding against SIF and SHS, compensating Jackman for his impairment rating of 33% whole person, is identical to the issue Jackman presently raises: whether ISIF must compensate Jackman for a portion of the same 33% whole person impairment. In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, there must be a final judgment on the merits. On February 20, 1990, the Commission approved the Agreement, including the 33% whole person impairment rating, pursuant to I.C. § 72-404. In Davidson v. H.H. Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196 (1986), the issue presented was whether the Commission's approval of a lump sum agreement pursuant to I.C. § 72-404 constituted a final decision of the Commission such that a motion for reconsideration pursuant to I.C. § 72-718 would be applicable. Davidson, 110 Idaho at 759-60, 718 P.2d at 1197-98. The Davidson Court held that the Commission's decision to approve a lump sum agreement pursuant to I.C. § 72-404 was a final decision of the Commission. Davidson, 110 Idaho at 760, 718 P.2d at 1198; see also Drake v. Industrial Special Indem. Fund, 128 Idaho 880, 882, 920 P.2d 397, 399 (1996) (holding approved agreement is final decision of Commission). The Commission's February 20, 1990 order, approving the Agreement pursuant to I.C. § 72-404, was a final judgment on the merits. Despite the fact that ISIF was not a party to Jackman's Agreement with SIF and SHS, ISIF may still assert the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the present case. Jackman was a party to the prior action against SIF and SHS and is the party against whom the plea of collateral estoppel has been asserted. See Western Indus. and Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Kaldveer Assoc., Inc., 126 Idaho 541, 545, 887 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1994) (holding party against whom the plea of collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to or in privity with the party in the earlier case). Jackman cannot litigate the issue of apportionment based upon the identical 33% whole person impairment rating Jackman relied upon in entering into the Agreement with SIF and SHS. The Agreement provided Jackman a lump sum award based upon his 33% whole person impairment rating. Jackman now seeks to attribute 13% of his 33% whole person impairment to a pre-existing condition, thereby increasing his whole person impairment rating to 46%, without presenting additional allegations of pre-existing impairment. Jackman's claim against ISIF is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). Since we hold that Jackman's claim against ISIF is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), we do not address the issue of whether Jackman's claim against ISIF was barred by the statute of limitations.