Opinion ID: 169022
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of Count II

Text: 21 Following a jury trial, Mr. Fleming was found guilty on Count II. He appealed his conviction to the OCCA, which affirmed on April 9, 2003. Because Mr. Fleming did not file a petition for certiorari, his conviction with respect to Count II became final ninety days later, on July 8, 2003. See Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir.1999) (explaining that if the defendant fails to file a petition for certiorari, the conviction becomes final after the time for filing the petition has passed); Sup.Ct. R. 13.1 (providing for timely filing for a writ of certiorari within ninety days after entry of the order in state court). Absent statutory or equitable tolling, the AEDPA limitations period expired on July 8, 2004. Mr. Fleming filed an application for post-conviction relief in Oklahoma state court on August 27, 2004. The state court denied his application and the OCCA affirmed on November 30, 2004. Mr. Fleming filed this § 2254 petition in federal district court on June 10, 2005. For the reasons set forth above with respect to Count III, Mr. Fleming is entitled to a determination as to the propriety of equitable tolling due to his post-conviction counsel's failure to timely file. 22 In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Fleming argues that his claims with respect to Count II are timely because he did not learn of the factual predicate of one of the issues he raises in his petition until July 2004. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (stating that the limitations period runs from the latest of four dates, including the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence). Specifically, Mr. Fleming contends that the state used perjured testimony during trial and concealed a plea agreement with one of its witnesses despite his counsel's requests for discovery of such information. He argues that he first learned of the perjured testimony and plea agreement when the clerk of the Oklahoma district court inadvertently sent him the sealed records of the state's primary witness at trial, and the records revealed the existence of the plea agreement as well as other favorable treatment on the part of the state. Mr. Fleming's assertions, however, are belied by his counsel's brief on direct appeal filed in September 2002. The brief contains the following allegation: Appellant had requested extensive pretrial discovery including any plea bargains. The State was aware that it would grant leniency but intentionally failed to disclose such to bolster Kathleen[] [Fleming's] testimony. After Appellant's trial, Kathleen Fleming received extremely favorable treatment and dismissal of charges. Based on the foregoing, the District Court concluded that Mr. Fleming's claims concerning Count II are time-barred because he was aware of their factual basis as early as September 2002 (even though he raised a different legal issue related to these facts on direct appeal). We agree. See Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1226 (10th Cir.2006) (holding petitioner failed to show that factual basis for claim could not have been discovered with due diligence in part because petitioner's counsel mentioned the fact relied upon during sentencing, presumably in the petitioner's presence). 23 In summary, we conclude that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Mr. Fleming's claim on timeliness grounds with respect to his habeas counsel's alleged misconduct. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595. Should the District Court conclude that Mr. Fleming is not entitled to equitable tolling on that basis, Mr. Fleming may not render his claims concerning Count II timely by relying on his assertion that he did not discover the factual predicate of his claims until he received the sealed records from the state district court.