Opinion ID: 160733
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: career offender sentencing

Text: 29 On appeal, Mr. Gay does not dispute the district court's finding he is a career offender within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, but instead challenges the court's sentencing calculation under the career offender provision. In order to understand the basis of Mr. Gay's appeal, a brief recitation of the probation officer's sentencing computation, which the district court adopted, is necessary. 30 The probation officer found Mr. Gay accountable for a total 257.64 grams of cocaine base, based on the 255.15 grams, or nine ounces, he was fronted in 1997, 6 and the 2.49 grams he possessed when arrested in 1999. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Mr. Gay's base offense level for 257.64 grams of cocaine base is 34. 7 The probation officer added two levels, pursuant to Sentencing Guideline 2D1.1(B)(1), because Mr. Gay possessed a firearm during the offense, resulting in a base offense level of 36. The probation officer then reduced by three levels, pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines 3E1.1(a)-(b), because Mr. Gay accepted responsibility and assisted authorities, resulting in a total offense level of 33. 31 Mr. Gay's initial criminal history category was IV. However, Mr. Gay satisfies the 4B1.1. career offender guideline requirements because he was at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the instant offense, which involved a controlled substance, and had been convicted of at least two prior crimes of violence. See U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Thus, the probation officer assigned Mr. Gay a criminal history category VI, pursuant to 4B1.1 which requires category VI in every case. 8 Id. 32 The probation officer also explained 4B1.1 provides an alternative method for calculating a career offender's base offense level. The 4B1.1 base offense level must be applied if it is greater than the offense level calculated under 2D1.1. Id. Mr. Gay's 4B1.1 base offense level is 34 because the maximum statutory penalty for his violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) is forty years. 9 Because Mr. Gay's base offense level of 36 under 2D1.1 is greater than his offense level of 34 under 4B1.1, 10 the probation office calculated Mr. Gay's sentence applying the 2D1.1 base offense level. Id. 33 The district court adopted the probation officer's sentencing calculation, which combined the adjusted 2D1.1 offense level (33) to the criminal history category VI specified in 4B1.1 and resulted in a sentencing range of 235 to 293 months imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Chapter 5 (Sentencing Table). The district court sentenced Mr. Gay to 235 months in prison. 34 On appeal, Mr. Gay argues the district court applied a piecemeal, and ultimately higher, sentence by using the greater 2D1.1 offense level with the 4B1.1 criminal history category. Mr. Gay contends that because the district court did not apply the offense level listed in the career offender guideline, the higher criminal history category VI also may not be applied. Stated differently, Mr. Gay asserts the district court erred because the career offender provision must be applied in toto, or not at all. 35 We review the district court's factual findings regarding sentencing for clear error and review its legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Maldonado-Acosta, 210 F.3d 1182, 1183 (10th Cir. 2000). The 4B1.1 career offender provision states, in relevant part: If the offense level for a career criminal from the table below is greater than the offense level otherwise applicable, the offense level from the table below shall apply. A career offender's criminal history category in every case shall be Category VI. U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 (2000). The table specified in the provision contains offense levels geared to the maximum sentence under the statute of conviction. 11 In enacting 4B1.1, Congress intended career offenders to receive a sentence of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized. U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 comment. (backg'd) (quotation marks omitted). 36 This court has stated the guidelines must be interpreted as if they were a statute or court rule. United States v. Checora, 175 F.3d 782, 790 (10th Cir. 1999). As with general statutory interpretation, our analysis must begin with the language of the guidelines in question. United States v. Smith, 900 F.2d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 1990). The guidelines, as criminal statutes, are 'given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers.' United States v. Mojica, 214 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145 (1975)). 37 It is evident 4B1.1, adopted for the purpose of enhancing the sentences for career offenders, articulates two opposed offense levels. The first offense level is that listed in the career offender table; the second is the otherwise applicable Chapter Two offense level. See U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The career offender guideline plainly directs the sentencing court to apply the listed career offender offense level if it is greater than the offense level otherwise applicable. Based on the fair meaning of 4B1.1, it logically follows that if the otherwise applicable (ie., Chapter Two) offense level is greater, then the sentencing court must apply that offense level. See Mojica, 214 F.3d at 1171. Our reading of 4B1.1 and its explanatory background notes is consistent with the legislatures' manifest intent for offenders with a career criminal background to receive at or near the maximum sentence authorized, and the fact 4B1.1 is intended as a sentence enhancement. United States v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 201, 206 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1037 (1992); see also U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 comment. (backg'd). 38 Additionally, our holding is in accord other circuits' case law. The Eleventh Circuit, when confronted with a similar question, stated, [i]t would appear the negative corollary of [ 4B1.1] must also apply; i.e., if the offense level from the career offender table is less than the otherwise applicable offense level, the greater of the offense levels shall apply. Robinson, 935 F.2d at 205-06. See United States v. Marrone, 48 F.3d 735, 740 n.9 (3d Cir.) (A career offender's offense level is the greater of the offense level applicable to the underlying conduct or the appropriate offense level specified in section 4B1.1. A career offender automatically receives a criminal history category of VI.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 836 (1995). For the reasons stated, we hold Mr. Gay's otherwise applicable offense level, under 2D1.1, applies because it is greater than his career criminal offense level. 39 However, our resolution of the applicable offense level does not end our inquiry. We now must resolve Mr. Gay's appropriate criminal history category. Mr. Gay contends his criminal history category is inextricably intertwined with his applicable offense level. Thus, he suggests the sentencing court may only apply the specified 4B1.1 criminal history category VI if that court also uses the listed career offender offense level. We reject such a constrained reading of 4B1.1. 40 This court has previously noted the structure of the Sentencing Guidelines suggests that the criminal history category is to be determined independently of the offense level and without regard to the nature of the crime for which the defendant is currently being sentenced. United States v. Goldbaum, 879 F.2d 811, 813 (10th Cir. 1989). Therefore, Mr. Gay's contention the automatic criminal history category is dependent on the offense level listed in the career offender table is erroneous. The plain language of 4B1.1 requires criminal history category VI in every case. We read this to mean the sentencing court must employ Category VI regardless of which offense level is applied. Congress provided no exceptions to the mandatory criminal history category, and we find it difficult to believe Congress intended an alternative criminal history to apply to a career offender. This court recognizes [t]he automatic placement of a career offender in criminal history category VI under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 reflects the Commission's assessment that the offender possess the most serious criminal history and the highest possible likelihood of recidivism. United States v. Collins, 122 F.3d 1297, 1304 (10th Cir. 1997). For the reasons stated, we hold the district court did not err in applying the otherwise applicable 2D1.1 offense level with the career offender criminal history category VI. 41 Although Mr. Gay cites no case law to support his argument, he suggests 1B1.5 requires the sentencing court to apply the career offender guideline in its entirety. Section 1B1.5 generally provides guidance on how to apply a guideline referenced in another guideline. See U.S.S.G. 1B1.5. Mr. Gay asserts 1B1.5 requires that if a cross-reference to another [offense] guideline is used, then the entire [offense] guideline shall be used. However, Mr. Gay's argument excludes relevant commentary, and ultimately attempts to inject a cross-reference term into the plain language of the guideline. 42 The intent of the Sentencing Commission is demonstrated in part through its commentary. District courts are obliged to follow the explanatory application notes unless they are plainly erroneous, inconsistent with the guidelines, or violative of the Constitution or a federal statute. Mojica, 214 F.3d at 1171. The commentary explains the guidelines and provides concrete guidance as to how even unambiguous guidelines are to be applied in practice. United States v. Pedragh, 225 F.3d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 43 Mr. Gay disregards the commentary to 1B1.5 which acknowledges a cross-reference, or instruction to apply another offense guideline, is typically labeled as such. The commentary states [r]eferences to other offense guidelines are most frequently designated 'Cross References,' but may also appear in the portion of the guideline entitled 'Base Offense Level' ..., or 'Specific Offense Characteristics.' U.S.S.G. 1B1.5. It is clear the career offender provision contains no cross reference designation, and does not appear in the portion of the guideline entitled Base Offense Level or Specific Offense Characteristic. Thus, 4B1.1 does not cross reference, as defined by 1B1.5, another guideline provision by merely stating an otherwise applicable offense level may apply. Compare U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 with 2D1.1(d), 2D2.1(b), 2A4.1(c). 44 As an alternative argument, Mr. Gay asserts we should invoke the rule of lenity because the district court suggested his sentence under the career offender guideline is a close question. The rule of lenity requires courts to interpret ambiguous statutes, including the Sentencing Guidelines, in favor of criminal defendants. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958); United States v. Blake, 59 F.3d 138, 140 (10th Cir.) (applying the rule of lenity to the Sentencing Guidelines), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1016 (1995). The rule of lenity, however, applies only in cases where there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of a provision. United States v. Onheiber, 173 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The rule of lenity is a rule of last resort [and] the mere assertion of an alternative interpretation is not sufficient to bring the rule into play. Blake, 59 F.3d at 140. 45 After a thorough review of the text and structure of the career offender guideline, and mindful of the lawmaker's manifest intent, we do not believe the 4B1.1 offense level and criminal history category language is grievously ambiguous or uncertain. See United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1994). For the reasons stated, the provision unequivocally addresses the applicable offense level and the automatic criminal history category that shall apply in every case. See U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Moreover, Congress intended the career offender provision to impose substantial imprisonment at or near the statutory maximum for repeat drug traffickers and repeat violent offenders. See U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 comment. (backg'd). In order to accept Mr. Gay's argument, we would ignore the plain language requiring a criminal history category VI in every case and nullify Congress' evident intent. We refuse to do so. Accordingly, we conclude no grievous ambiguity exists and Mr. Gay's assertion of an alternative interpretation is simply insufficient to invoke this rule. See Blake, 59 F.3d at 140. 46 Finally, Mr. Gay argues the district court erred in computing his criminal history category by improperly including deferred sentences in computing his criminal history. We need not pause long to consider Mr. Gay's contention because we concluded a criminal history category VI applies in his case pursuant to 4B1.1. Thus, our holding renders Mr. Gay's argument moot. We AFFIRM the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.