Opinion ID: 1611682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does Alabama's method of execution constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment?

Text: Belisle argues that Alabama's method of execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment. [14] Petition at 158; Belisle's brief at 29. In Alabama, lethal injection is the method of execution of a death sentence unless the inmate chooses electrocution. See § 15-18-82(a), Ala.Code 1975 (Where the sentence of death is pronounced against a convict, the sentence shall be executed ... as the court may adjudge, by lethal injection unless the convict elects execution by electrocution as provided by law.). Belisle notes that Alabama's lethal injection execution procedure, which is similar to the procedure typically used by lethal injection states, proscribes the sequential administration of sodium thiopental for anaesthesia, pancuronium bromide or Pavulon to induce paralysis, and potassium chloride. Belisle's brief at 30. He contends, however, that evidence indicates that the three-drug protocol creates an unnecessary risk of agonizing pain. Id. The risk of unnecessary pain and suffering arises, says Belisle, if the sedative effect of the sodium thiopental is ineffective and the inmate has retained or regained conscious[ness] when the State administers the final two drugs to induce paralysis and death. [15] Belisle's brief at 31. Belisle argues that the State of Alabama has taken none of the steps necessary to safeguard against unnecessary pain and suffering. Belisle's brief at 30. Specifically, Belisle contends that the method employed by Alabama to check an inmate's level of consciousness after the administration of the first drugsodium thiopentalis insufficient. Belisle's brief at 37-38. The State argues that Alabama's execution protocol is designed to minimize pain and is not inherently cruel and unusual. State's brief at 47. It notes that Alabama eliminates the risk of unnecessary pain by using 2.5 grams of sodium thiopental itself a lethal doseto sufficiently anesthetize the inmate. State's brief at 52-53. The State notes that [a]s an additional safeguard to ensure that the inmate is properly anesthetized, the Department of Corrections recently modified the execution protocol to add a consciousness assessment. These additional safeguards include (1) examination of the prisoner by an execution team member, following administration of the sodium [thiopental] but before administration of the pancuronium bromide, to assess his consciousness (by calling his name, gently stroking his eyelashes, and pinching his arm); and (2) administration of a second dosage of sodium [thiopental] if the preceding examination reveals consciousness. Arthur v. Allen (Civil Action 07-0722-WS-M, Nov. 15, 2007) (S.D.Ala.2007) (not published in F.Supp.2d). Thus, the State contends that Alabama's lethal-injection procedures do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,something more than the mere extinguishment of life. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447, 10 S.Ct. 930, 34 L.Ed. 519 (1890). However, as the Supreme Court of the United States recently stated in Baze v. Rees, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008): Our cases recognize that subjecting individuals to a risk of future harmnot simply actually inflicting paincan qualify as cruel and unusual punishment. To establish that such exposure violates the Eighth Amendment, however, the conditions presenting the risk must be ` sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,' and give rise to `sufficiently imminent dangers.' Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 34-35 (1993) (emphasis added). We have explained that to prevail on such a claim there must be a `substantial risk of serious harm,' an `objectively intolerable risk of harm' that prevents prison officials from pleading that they were `subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.' Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846, and n. 9 (1994). ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1530-31. In Baze, two death-row inmates challenged Kentucky's use of the three-drug protocol, arguing that there is a significant risk that the procedures will not be properly followedin particular, that the sodium thiopental will not be properly administered to achieve its intended effect resulting in severe pain when the other chemicals are administered. ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1530. Belisle's claim, like the claims made by the inmates in Baze, hinges on the improper administration of the first drug, sodium thiopental. Baze, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1533. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Kentucky's method of execution, Baze, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1538, and noted that [a] State with a lethal injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold today would not create a risk that meets this standard. Baze, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1537. Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter dissented from the main opinion, arguing that Kentucky's protocol lacks basic safeguards used by other States to confirm that an inmate is unconscious before injection of the second and third drugs. Baze, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices recognized, however, that Alabama's procedures, along with procedures used in Missouri, California, and Indiana provide a degree of assurancemissing from Kentucky's protocolthat the first drug had been properly administered. Baze, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1571 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The State argues, and we agree, that Belisle, like the inmates in Baze, cannot meet his burden of demonstrating that Alabama's lethal-injection protocol poses a substantial risk of harm by asserting the mere possibility that something may go wrong. Simply because an execution method may result in pain, either by accident or as an inescapable consequence of death, does not establish the sort of `objectively intolerable risk of harm' that qualifies as cruel and unusual. Baze, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1531. Thus, we conclude that Alabama's use of lethal injection as a method of execution does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.