Opinion ID: 498110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: review of the flra decision

Text: 19 Having concluded that the FLRA had jurisdiction to judge the merits of this case, the Court must next determine whether the Authority's decision should be sustained. Section 7123 of CSRA provides that, review of the Authority's order shall be on the record in accordance with Sec. 706 of this Title [5 U.S.C. Sec. 706]. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7123(c). Under Section 706, FLRA orders must be reversed if they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A); e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, supra, 464 U.S. at 97 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. at 444 n. 7. Concerning the kind of review section 706 requires, the Supreme Court recently wrote: 20 [w]hen a Court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the Court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the Court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the Court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the Court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 21 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); see also American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. FLRA, 778 F.2d 850, 856 (D.C.Cir.1985). 11 Thus, in considering the merits of the FLRA decision, the Court is bound to give considerable deference to the agency's interpretation of the CSRA unless it clearly contravenes Congress' intent. Because we find the clear purpose of the legislature to be at odds with the FLRA's construction of section 7120(e), the agency's decision is overruled. 22 It is axiomatic that a court interpreting a statute must look first to the language of the provision in controversy. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60, 100 S.Ct. 915, 918, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980). In construing subsection 7120(e), the FLRA was guided by this rule. The subsection provides, in relevant part, that 23 this chapter does not authorize participation in the management of a labor organization or acting as a representative of a labor organization by a management official, a supervisor, or a confidential employee 24 .... 25 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7120(e) (emphasis added); see United States Dep't of Labor, supra, 20 F.L.R.A. at 300. In an attempt to give meaning to all the words in the subsection, the Authority noted that subsection 7120(e)'s language prohibits two activities: supervisors acting as a representative of a labor organization and the participation [by supervisors] in the management of a labor organization. Id. The Authority concluded that the prohibition against supervisors acting as representatives of a labor organization encompassed a near limitless set of representative capacities, including acting as an officer, a steward, a member of a bargaining committee or in any similar manner. Id. The Authority thus concluded that the alternative phrase, prohibiting participation in [the] management of a labor organization would be mere redundancy if it did not mean something additional. Id. Accordingly, the FLRA held that 26 taking part in the selection of union officers to lead and direct the organization, or taking part in the selection of union options on alternative courses of action, constitutes [such] participation in the management of a labor organization, and is therefore proscribed by Sec. 7120(e). 27 Id. 28 We believe that such construction was unjustified and improper. The language in section 7120(e) may be given effect without being interpreted as broadly as suggested by the FLRA. Supervisors may be representatives of a labor organization without necessarily participating in union management. Construing representative duties as embracing acting as an officer, a steward, a member of a bargaining committee or in any similar manner creates the need to import new meaning into the phrase participation in management. We thus disagree with the fundamental premise of the FLRA's interpretation: that representative duties are so far-reaching as to incorporate being an officer. 29 The Supreme Court recently noted that [i]f the statute is clear and unambiguous 'that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously espoused intent of Congress,'  Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368, 106 S.Ct. 681, 686, 88 L.Ed.2d 691 (1986) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). 30 As we find the meaning of section 7120 clear, we need not consult its scant legislative history in order to ascertain its application in the case before us. Dickson v. OPM, 828 F.2d 32, 39-40 (D.C.Cir.1987). Rather, in accordance with the structure of the statute, we turn first to the prohibition of supervisor participation in union management. 12 The FLRA found that voting constituted participation in union management. See United States Dep't of Labor, supra, 20 F.L.R.A. at 300. This reading strains credulity. Managing entails the power to supervise directly an activity and the coordinate responsibility of achieving results. 13 Citizens voting in a public election would surely be surprised to learn that their right to vote guaranteed them the right to participate in the direct supervision of the government. Voting guarantees representation in the governance process, not the right or opportunity to govern. Likewise, the right to cast a ballot to elect a union official is not to be equated with acting as representative of a labor organization. Acting as a union representative entails a greater degree of responsibility--the power and obligation of representing others besides oneself. 14 Consequently, we hold that the plain meaning of subsection 7120(e) does not proscribe the right of supervisor-members to vote in union elections. 31 Without more, the foregoing discussion suffices to overturn the agency's interpretation of subsection 7120(e). However, we believe that scrutiny of the cases and policy considerations relied upon by the FLRA is in order. Even though the Board acknowledges that there is no analogous provision in the NLRA to section 7120(e) of the Statute, Brief for the FLRA at 17, it nevertheless relies primarily on NLRB cases applying private sector law as support for its interpretation of a provision unique to the public sector. While, in Library of Congress v. FLRA, we recognize that there are occasions where private sector case law is relevant to public sector labor relations, we note that the two areas are governed by different statutory provisions and by different policy considerations. We then state: 32 While these differences do not lead us to eschew completely the private sector model in defining the limits of negotiability in the public sector, we shall be careful to appreciate fully those distinctions between the private and public sectors that might necessitate a different legal analysis and conclusion. 33 699 F.2d 1280, 1287 (D.C.Cir.1983) (footnote omitted). Accord NTEU v. FLRA, 826 F.2d 114, 122 (D.C.Cir.1987) (while private sector law may provide useful guidance in certain instances, the [Federal Service Labor-Management] Act itself must ultimately be interpreted in the context of its own language, history, and case law (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)). Because section 7120 is unique to the LMRDA, we conclude that this is one of those instances where reliance on private sector precedent is inappropriate. 34 We are thus free to consider the final issue which confronts us: whether the policy considerations motivating the FLRA decision are sufficient to rebut our conclusions. We do not find them sufficiently persuasive. The FLRA first wrote that sponsorship, control or assistance of the Union by management might constitute an unfair labor practice in violation of subsection 7116(a)(3) if management officials, supervisors or confidential employees were to influence a union's choice of bargaining goals by voting in an election to determine those goals. United States Dep't of Labor, supra at 300 (emphasis added). However, the possibility of supervisor-member control of the Union is simply not an issue in this case. Susan Wuchinich, the Secretary-Treasurer of Local 2513, whose complaint against the Labor Department forms the predicate of this lawsuit, only alleged that supervisor-member votes might have determined the outcome of an election of officers. She nowhere questioned whether union policy goals voted on at local elections might be impermissibly influenced by supervisor-member voting. See Wuchinich Complaint (April 11, 1983), Joint Appendix at 119-21. Moreover, she testified that there was simply no way of knowing whether the six or seven supervisor votes cast in Local 2513's election were determinative of the outcome of the election. See Testimony of Susan Wuchinich (Secretary of Local 2513) Before Administrative Judge William Naimark on January 10, 1984, p. 69, Joint Appendix at 75. 35 As an alternative policy consideration, the FLRA noted that 36 the harm done to the independence of a labor organization cannot be measured only in terms of the number of votes cast by management officials, supervisors or confidential employees. Rather, such individuals, because of their positions of authority, could exert significant influence over rank and file employees in matters affecting the management or policies of the labor organizations. 37 Id. at 301, Joint Appendix at 162 (emphasis added). Once again, the Authority focused on a concern which is not a part of the record in this case. The election at issue was conducted by mail and union members did not sign their ballots. No evidence of coercion was ever introduced. Even if coercion were somehow possible, neither party claims that any supervisor attempted such an act. 38 Courts are charged to decide concrete controversies, not hypothetical or conjectural ones. On the record, the FLRA could not permissibly find that the supervisors who voted in Local 2513's election determined any union goals or exerted any influence over the rank and file members. We find that the FLRA's decision was founded wholly on conjecture, and therefore accord no weight to its policy-based support for its conclusion. 39 In sum, we reject the FLRA's determination that section 7120(e) of the CSRA prohibits supervisor-members from voting to elect union officials in local elections. Congress has not prohibited supervisors from joining unions. It is inconceivable that supervisor-members' right to belong to a union includes nothing more than paying dues and participating in various health plans. While Congress expressly prohibited supervisors from assuming policy-making and representative functions within the union, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7120(e), there is no evidence that Congress intended to deny supervisors one of the most essential vestiges of union membership, the right to cast a vote in the election of their union's officials. Therefore, the decision of the FLRA is 40 Reversed.