Opinion ID: 339099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the government's evidence presented at trial established a single continuous conspiracy.

Text: 10 The details of the conspiracy were provided by former policeman Thomas. Because of his duty assignments he did not serve in the vice squad the entire eleven years covered by the indictment. But he did testify that during the two periods he was assigned to the vice squad he participated in the conspiracy with the defendants. From February 1964 through October 1965 Thomas worked with defendants Abraham and Henkin. In fact Abraham was Thomas' partner for six of those months. Thomas testified that during this time the defendants shared in the proceeds of the extortion plot. In addition, various tavern owners testified that Abraham and Henkin received payoffs from them. 11 Abraham and Henkin both left the vice unit in mid-1966 and returned after Thomas left in late 1970. Defendant Mulligan joined the vice unit in early 1968 and was still a member when Thomas left. Thomas testified that at various times Mulligan also affirmatively participated in the conspiracy. Certain tavern owners also named Mulligan as a recipient of the payoffs. 12 The defense argues that, as a result of the various assignments of Thomas and the other defendant police officers, the government failed to prove a single continuous conspiracy. We disagree. The periods in which the defendants were not actively participating in the conspiracy, and the absence of a direct link between Mulligan and the other two defendants, does not create a fatal variance between the proof offered and the indictment. We see the evidence as establishing a single ongoing conspiracy in which various co-conspirators moved in and out of active participation. There is no evidence that the defendants ever took affirmative action to withdraw from the conspiracy. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912); United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388-90 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960, 85 S.Ct. 647, 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1965). 3 13 In nearly every conspiracy case the claim is made that a variance exists because multiple conspiracies were shown. This line of argument is based upon Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), in which thirty-two persons were indicted and the government admitted that eight or more conspiracies were present with little factual connection. But this case does not involve a factual situation as was presented in Kotteakos. Rather, this case meets the test as described in United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1969), in which this Court set forth one method to distinguish between a single conspiracy and multiple conspiracies. The Court stated: 14 While the parties to the agreement must know of each other's existence, they need not know each other's identity nor need there be direct contact. The agreement may continue for a long period of time and include the performance of many transactions. New parties may join the agreement at any time while others may terminate their relationship. The parties are not always identical, but this does not mean that there are separate conspiracies. 15 The distinction must be made between separate conspiracies, where certain parties are common to all and one overall continuing conspiracy with various parties joining and terminating their relationship at different times. Various people knowingly joining together in furtherance of a common design or purpose constitute a single conspiracy. While the conspiracy may have a small group of core conspirators, other parties who knowingly participate with these core conspirators and others to achieve a common goal may be members of an overall conspiracy. 16 In essence, the question is what is the nature of the agreement. If there is one overall agreement among the various parties to perform different functions in order to carry out the objectives of the conspiracy, the agreement among all the parties constitutes a single conspiracy. 17 Id. at 742 (citation omitted). 18 The Court reversed the convictions in Varelli because it did not believe that there was one overall agreement among the various parties. . . . But in this case there was evidence showing one agreement to organize, maintain and collect monthly payments from a club of tavern owners. The Thomas testimony is not continuous due to the various district reassignments of Thomas and the other defendants. Nevertheless, the collections from the tavern owners did not stop while Thomas was absent from the vice squad during October 1965 through June 1966. Mr. Baukas, owner of the Beritz Theatre Lounge, testified that he made monthly payments to members of the vice squad from sometime in 1964 through late 1971 or early 1972. Nor did the conspiracy terminate when Thomas left the vice squad in November 1970. Various tavern owners testified that they continued to make payments to three defendants after Thomas left the vice squad. 19 The defense also argues that the refusal to instruct the jury on the question of multiple conspiracies was improper. United States v. Varelli, supra, and United States v. Borelli, supra, both hold that the trial judge should instruct the jury on multiple conspiracies when the possibility of a variance appears. The record discloses that the trial judge discussed the proposed defense instruction at a conference with counsel. After hearing argument, the judge concluded that the instruction would not help the jury, stating: 20 This whole thing is premised on the possibility that the jury might find one or more of the defendants guilty of a conspiracy not charged in the indictment. But don't we define the conspiracy charged in the indictment (in other instructions) and isn't it a rather . . . (simple) one count conspiracy indictment, so that the jury knows what it is that they are charged with, and they either find that or acquit them. We have told them that a half a dozen times. My problem is that I am not at all sure that this would contribute to the jury's body of knowledge at all, it would confuse them. July 7, 1975 transcript, p. 76. 21 In light of the trial judge's well founded comments, we find no error in his refusing the defense instructions dealing with multiple conspiracies. Admittedly, the case law requires an instruction to be given in some situations. However, in this case, where there is a simple one count indictment, where the crime of conspiracy has been previously outlined in other instructions, and where the evidence shows a single ongoing conspiracy, we see no reason to overrule the decision of a respected trial judge merely to be faithful to our previous decision in Varelli, supra, which encourages but does not demand the giving of such an instruction. The trial judge was in the best position to determine whether the evidence created the possibility of a variance. Now, on appeal, from a position of hindsight, we believe his decision was correct in that such an instruction would only confuse the issue before the jury. However, our decision in this case should not be read as discouraging the giving of an instruction when the possibility of a variance clearly exists. 4 22