Opinion ID: 1358526
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statute of Limitations and Continuing Violation Doctrine

Text: The statute of limitations for claims brought under Section 1983 is governed by state law, and in this case is the three-year period for personal injury actions under New York State law. See Ormiston v. Nelson, 117 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir.1997). A Section 1983 claim ordinarily accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the harm. Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir.1994) (quotation marks omitted). The continuing violation doctrine is an exception to the normal knew-or-should-have-known accrual date. Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 248 (2d Cir.1999). When the plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim challenging a discriminatory policy, the commencement of the statute of limitations period may be delayed until the last discriminatory act in furtherance of it. Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir.1994) (quotation marks omitted); see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116-17, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (stating the same of hostile work environment claims under Title VII). To trigger the continuing violation doctrine when challenging discrimination, the plaintiff must allege both the existence of an ongoing policy of discrimination and some non-time-barred acts taken in furtherance of that policy. Harris, 186 F.3d at 250. We have not before explicitly held that the continuing violation doctrine can delay accrual of an Eighth Amendment claim alleging a policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Cf. Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir.1995) (finding that a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claims were untimely, among other reasons, because the complaint alleged no facts indicating a continuous or ongoing violation of his constitutional rights). Shomo's complaint presents the question of whether the continuing violation doctrine is applicable to such claims. Shomo's complaint was filed on September 26, 2003, and did not allege any specific acts of deliberate indifference occurring after September 26, 2000. The district court observed that Shomo's Eighth Amendment claims would be time-barred unless the continuing violation doctrine were applicable, and held that it was. In Morgan, the United States Supreme Court held that a hostile work environment claim under Title VII is timely, and can challenge acts occurring outside the statute of limitations period, as long as any act that is part of the hostile work environment occurs within the statutory time period. 536 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 2061. The Court applied the continuing violation doctrine because a hostile work environment claim challenges repeated conduct that occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own. Id. at 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061. Thus, under Morgan, the continuing violation doctrine can be applied when the plaintiff's claim seeks redress for injuries resulting from a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one `unlawful [act],' but the doctrine cannot be applied when the plaintiff challenges conduct that is a discrete unlawful act. Id. at 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061; see also Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir.2004). The Seventh Circuit in Heard v. Sheahan considered whether the continuing violation doctrine applied to a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim that prison officials delayed giving him medical attention despite his hernia and disregarded the recommendation of doctors that he undergo surgery. 253 F.3d 316, 317-20 (7th Cir. 2001). The Seventh Circuit held that the continuing violation doctrine applied because the prisoner's claim related to a continuous series of events giv[ing] rise to a cumulative injury. Id. at 320. This conclusion is consistent with Morgan's application of the continuing violation doctrine to a series of predicate acts forming the basis for a single claim. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117-18, 122 S.Ct. 2061; see also Heard, 253 F.3d at 319-20 (noting that courts don't want the plaintiff to sue before the violation is complete, or to bring separate lawsuits when a series of acts reasonably should be challenged as part of one claim). We agree that the continuing violation doctrine can apply when a prisoner challenges a series of acts that together comprise an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. That the continuing violation doctrine can apply, however, does not mean it must. To assert a continuing violation for statute of limitations purposes, the plaintiff must allege both the existence of an ongoing policy of [deliberate indifference to his or her serious medical needs] and some non-time-barred acts taken in the furtherance of that policy. See Harris, 186 F.3d at 250. This test screens out Eighth Amendment claims that challenge discrete acts of unconstitutional conduct or that fail to allege acts within the relevant statutory period that are traceable to a policy of deliberate indifference. The district court properly used this test in determining the applicability of the continuing violation doctrine to Shomo's Eighth Amendment claims. The district court found that Shomo sufficiently alleged the existence of an ongoing policy of denying him medical treatment. The policy cannot be construed as an outright denial of access to care because Shomo was frequently seen by doctors and brought to hospitals. Rather, Shomo's complaint alleges a policy of doctors and prison staff disregarding treatment recommendations. See Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398, 404 (2d Cir.2005) ([A] deliberate indifference claim can lie where prison officials deliberately ignore the medical recommendations of a prisoner's treating physicians.). The complaint suggests a pattern where DOC medical personnel and security staff, despite prior treatment recommendations, refused to assist Shomo with ADLs, to transfer him to specialized infirmary housing, or to provide recommended treatments. The district court next found that Shomo did not allege any specific acts of deliberate indifference within the three-year period prior to the filing of the complaint, i.e., after September 26, 2000. Nonetheless, the district court granted Shomo leave to amend on the ground that he might be able to allege acts occurring after September 26, 2000, by at least some of the defendants, which would bring the otherwise untimely acts within the scope of the continuing violation doctrine. The district court's decision to grant leave to amend is consistent with the liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants. See Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam).