Opinion ID: 2773281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instruction Defining “Sexual Activity”

Text: Defendant argues on appeal that the district court erred when it instructed the jury that the definition of “sexual activity” included lewd and lascivious 1 The district court arrived at this definition of “sexual activity” by incorporating the definition of lewd and lascivious molestation found in Florida Statute § 800.04(5). 3 Case: 14-11333 Date Filed: 01/26/2015 Page: 4 of 16 touching over clothing. 2 He contends that this definition of “sexual activity” was broader than the applicable definition of “sexual act” found in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2), which expressly excludes touching through clothing. We review de novo the question of whether a jury instruction misstated the law or misled the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party. United States v. House, 684 F.3d 1173, 1196 (11th Cir. 2012). Nevertheless, even if erroneous, a jury instruction is subject to harmless error review. Id. “An error is harmless if the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. at 1197 (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted, Defendant was charged with attempting to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). A person violates this statute when, by using a means of interstate 2 The district court’s complete instruction concerning the definition of “sexual activity” is as follows. The term sexual activity, as used in these instructions, means the oral or anal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another, or anal penetration of another by another object. So the first definition is the oral or anal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another, or anal penetration of another by another object. In addition to that, the term sexual activity includes the intentional touching in a lewd and lascivious manner of the genitals, the genital area, or buttocks, or clothing covering those areas of a person less than 16 years of age, or enticing a person under the age of 16 to so touch the perpetrator. The words lewd and lascivious mean the same thing and they mean a wicked, lustful, unchaste, licentious, or sensual intent on the part of the person doing the act. 4 Case: 14-11333 Date Filed: 01/26/2015 Page: 5 of 16 commerce, he “knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual” under the age of 18 “to engage in . . . any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so.” 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). This statute, which is found in Chapter 117 of Title 18 of the United States Code, does not define “sexual activity.” In another chapter of Title 18 of the Code, Chapter 109A, the latter defines “sexual act” to mean: (A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however, slight; (B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus; (C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or (D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Id. § 2246(2) (emphasis added). In short, the federal statute under which Defendant was convicted (§ 2422(b)) does not define the “sexual activity” that is prohibited by that statute other than to say that it includes any attempted sexual activity for which one could be charged with a criminal offense. A statute in another chapter of Title 18, § 2246(2), defines a “sexual act,” but that definition 5 Case: 14-11333 Date Filed: 01/26/2015 Page: 6 of 16 explicitly excludes touching made through the clothing of the genitalia of a person under the age of 16. We have yet to consider whether § 2246(2)’s definition of “sexual act” also defines “sexual activity” under § 2422(b). We note that our sister circuits that have considered this issue are split. The Seventh Circuit has determined that “sexual activity” under § 2422(b) is synonymous with “sexual act” as defined in § 2246(2). United States v. Taylor, 640 F.3d 255, 257-60 (7th Cir. 2011). On the other hand, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have explicitly rejected Taylor’s holding and have concluded that the definition of “sexual activity” in § 2422(b) is not limited to the definition of “sexual act” found in § 2246(2). United States v. Shill, 740 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 147 (2014); United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248, 254-56 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014) (concluding that “sexual activity” is defined as the “active pursuit of libidinal gratification”). We decline to resolve the issue here. Even assuming that Defendant is correct that the jury instruction should have used the § 2246(2) definition of “sexual act” to define “sexual activity”—and that it therefore should not have included, as a prohibited act, touching over clothing—the error is harmless. This is so because the evidence at trial did not indicate that Defendant had attempted to persuade “Paul” to engage in touching through clothing. Instead, the evidence 6 Case: 14-11333 Date Filed: 01/26/2015 Page: 7 of 16 overwhelmingly reflects that Defendant had attempted to persuade “Paul” to engage in “sexual activity” that clearly fits within the definition of “sexual act” found in § 2246(2). Specifically, after learning that “Paul” was 15 years old, Defendant continued to message him. In these communications, Defendant assured “Paul” that the two-hour lull in conversation did not mean that he was concerned about “Paul’s” age, discussed “Paul’s” sexual orientation and “Paul’s” experience with receiving oral sex, and sent “Paul” two pencil drawings of men engaged in sexual acts. Defendant initially expressed his regret that “Paul” was not 18 years old so that he could perform sex acts, including oral sex, on “Paul.” But Defendant also sent “Paul” a pencil drawing of men engaging in anal sex, and asked “Paul” if that was his “next big sexual step.” On July 14, Defendant and “Paul” continued to chat and Defendant stated that he wished “Paul” was 17 years old. Defendant told “Paul” that he wished he could teach “Paul” about “intense passionate man love” and stated that he was an excellent teacher. Defendant also questioned “Paul” about his preferred sexual position, the size and appearance of his penis, and his grooming habits. Defendant stated to “Paul” that because “Paul” shaved his pubic hair, it meant that Defendant would not get hair in his mouth. 7 Case: 14-11333 Date Filed: 01/26/2015 Page: 8 of 16 The following day, July 15, Defendant became very direct about the sexual act he wanted to perform with “Paul.” He discussed his ability to perform oral sex and indicated that “Paul” would soon know about Defendant’s ability. On July 16, Defendant asked “Paul” whether it was a good day for him to lose his virginity. Defendant described what he wanted to do to “Paul,” including “kiss, lick, and suck” his genitalia, and he went on to instruct “Paul” to have phone sex. About 30 minutes later, Defendant began making plans to meet with “Paul.” Defendant said that he wished “Paul” was 16 years old so Defendant could be with him, but stated that he was tempted to come by “to hug and kiss” “Paul.” “Paul” responded that Defendant stopping by “would be really sweet.” An hour and a half later, “Paul” and Defendant discussed which window Defendant should use to sneak into “Paul’s” room and that “Paul” would be home alone until 7 p.m. Another hour later, Defendant stated that he was free and asked whether “Paul” wanted him to visit. “Paul” replied “sure” and told Defendant where he lived. Despite his prior statement that he wanted to come by to “hug and kiss” “Paul,” Defendant affirmatively responded to “Paul’s” question about whether he was bringing his tongue when he came over. Defendant was arrested when he showed up at “Paul’s” apartment. When arrested, Defendant had two condoms in his pocket. 8 Case: 14-11333 Date Filed: 01/26/2015 Page: 9 of 16 As noted, Defendant has argued that 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) sets the parameters of any prohibited sexual act and that, because it excludes intentional touching through clothing as a prohibited act, the trial court’s inclusion of that conduct in the list of prohibited acts rendered erroneous its instruction. Yet, even assuming that § 2246(2) provides the definition of “sexual activity” at issue in this case, we conclude that the trial court’s mention of the above act had no impact on the jury’s deliberations and was harmless. We reach this conclusion because any fair reading of the evidence indicates that the acts that Defendant indicated he wanted to engage in with “Paul” fit the definition of “sexual act” set out in the statute that Defendant argues should have supplied the definition for “sexual activity” in this case: 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). The evidence indicated that Defendant had expressed his intent, upon meeting “Paul,” to perform oral sex on the latter. Oral sex would constitute a “sexual act” under § 2246(2)(B). Defendant had also expressed interest in anal sex, which if consummated, would constitute a violation of § 2246(2)(A). He had also indicated that he wanted to “kiss, lick, and suck” “Paul’s” genitalia: an act that would violate § 2246(2)(D)’s prohibition on the intentional touching, not through clothing, of the genitalia of a person under the age of 16. 9 Case: 14-11333 Date Filed: 01/26/2015 Page: 10 of 16 Stated another way, Defendant’s stated intentions toward “Paul” did not indicate the desire to touch the latter through his clothing. 3 To the contrary, a clothed “Paul” did not form a part of Defendant’s articulation of his anatomically graphic and vivid erotic intentions towards the young man. Further, in his closing argument, the prosecutor never even hinted that the jury should convict the Defendant if it merely found that he had attempted to encourage “Paul” to allow himself to be touched through his clothing. Indeed, that would have been an odd argument to make as the evidence never indicated that Defendant had expressed such an intention. Rather, the prosecutor focused on the very serious sexual acts that Defendant was, in fact, proposing: acts that would clearly fit within any definition of sexual activity. In light of the above evidence, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that any error in instructing the jury that “sexual activity” included intentional touching over clothing did not contribute to the jury’s guilty verdict. Accordingly, even if the giving of that instruction was error, it was harmless error. 3 Nor is our analysis altered by the fact that, during one of his four conversations with “Paul” on the day of the planned assignation, Defendant mentioned that he would like “to hug and kiss” “Paul.” In contrast to his repeated discussion of oral sex and other sex acts, Defendant made one isolated reference to this desire “to hug and kiss” “Paul.” At any rate, the jury would have understood that it could not convict Defendant had it concluded that hugging and kissing was his sole goal because hugging and kissing is not a prohibited sex act or sexual activity under any definition of the latter terms at issue here. 10 Case: 14-11333 Date Filed: 01/26/2015 Page: 11 of 16