Opinion ID: 161014
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct

Text: 134 The third prong of inquiry further supports our holding. Section 1981 does not have a statutory cap that limits punitive damages as does Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). As stated above, few § 1981 claims involve retail transactions, and fewer reach trial. We thus consider whether the award would shock the judicial conscience, and constitute a denial of justice. Deters, 202 F.3d at 1273 (internal quotation marks omitted). Dillard's does not argue that the award would result in [its] financial ruin or that the award is a disproportionally large percentage of its net worth. Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d. 210, 221 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Deters, 202 F.3d at 1273 (affirming punitive damages award with ratio of 59 to 1 in a sexual harassment case); Big D Enters., 184 F.3d at 933 (noting that, in weighing BMW factors, the reprehensibility of [defendant's] conduct more than justifies the punitive damage award). Because the reprehensibility of the store's conduct as found by the jury was particularly offensive, and the resulting punitive damage award was therefore reasonable, we conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to reduce the punitive damage award.