Opinion ID: 2267917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Materially Relevant Requirement

Text: Section 4504(a)(5) is the heart of the statute. It requires that the test have the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the person's assertion of actual innocence. [15] Although all DNA testing statutes are intended to remedy situations in which an innocent person has been wrongly convicted, they differ on how significant or persuasive a favorable test result must be to justify the testing. The New York and Illinois post-conviction DNA testing statutes exemplify two different approaches. The New York statute, the first in the country, provides that post-conviction DNA testing will not be granted unless a court determines that, if a DNA test had been conducted on [the] evidence, and ... the results had been admitted in the trial..., there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant. [16] Numerous jurisdictions followed New York's lead and enacted statutes with a similar standard for the persuasiveness of exculpatory DNA test results. [17] Even among those states that favor the New York model, however, there is some disagreement over how dispositive an exculpatory test must be. [18] Illinois was the second state in the nation to enact a post-conviction DNA testing statute. [19] A major difference between the Illinois and New York statutes is that, instead of following New York's reasonable-probability-of-a-different-result rule, the Illinois statute requires only that the result of the [requested] testing ha[ve] the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence;.... [20] Delaware, along with several other jurisdictions, followed the Illinois framework. [21] Because the Delaware statute was modeled after the Illinois statute, that state's case law is highly persuasive in determining the meaning of § 4504(a)(5). In People v. Savory , the Illinois Supreme Court overturned a lower court's determination that post-conviction DNA testing is available only in cases where the proposed scientific testing will, by itself, completely vindicate a defendant. [22] The Savory court decided the meaning of materially relevant by reference to dictionary definitions and held that, evidence which is `materially relevant' to a defendant's claim of actual innocence is simply evidence which tends to significantly advance that claim. [23] We adopt that definition in construing the identical language in Delaware's statute. When deciding whether evidence is materially relevant, the trial court must consider not only the exculpatory potential of a favorable DNA test result, but also the other evidence presented at trial. [24] Thus, if the State presented a strong case, and a favorable DNA test would discredit only an ancillary fact, the testing should be refused. At the opposite end of the spectrum, where the DNA test could exonerate the defendant, it does not matter how strong the other evidence might have been; § 4504(a)(5) is satisfied. Finally, since § 4504(a)(5) demands only that the proposed DNA testing have the scientific potential to return favorable evidence, it is irrelevant whether the test is likely to be favorable or not. If testing is otherwise warranted, it should be authorized, no matter how slight the chance that it will, in fact, yield a favorable result.