Opinion ID: 853221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of Review for Annexation Remonstrances

Text: Remonstrators argue that the City exceeded its authority by violating certain statutory directives concerning the passage of ordinances. (Appellants' Br. at 57.) Some of these directives appear in Indiana Code Chapter 36-4-3, Municipal Annexation and Disannexation, although not in the sections that deal specifically with remonstrance proceedings. [6] (Appellants' Br. at 57, 65.) Others appear elsewhere in the Code. (Appellants' Br. at 62, 67.) Remonstrators do not argue that any of these violations impaired their substantial rights or caused them specific harm. For example, Remonstrators point to the requirement in Ind.Code § 36-4-3-3 that says, The legislative body of a municipality may, by an ordinance defining the corporate boundaries of the municipality, annex territory.... Remonstrators argue that this statute requires a legal description and, because the City did not prove that the annexation ordinance (which referred to City boundaries generally) had a map attached to define the City's legal boundaries, the annexation fails. They do not claim that they were misled or disadvantaged in any way by this approach. [7] As another example, Remonstrators point to Ind.Code § 36-4-6-13, which says: A two-thirds (2/3) vote of all the elected members, after unanimous consent of the members present to consider the ordinance, is required to pass an ordinance of the legislative body on the same day or at the same meeting at which it is introduced. (Appellants' Br. at 62-63.) They claim that the November 16, 1992, Council action deleting twenty-four acres of land from Area 4 was more than just an amendment and thus triggered the unanimous consent requirement. [8] (Appellants' Br. at 64-65.) They do not, however, assert any specific harm arising out of this course of events. Judge Kellam declined to address these individual challenges on the merits and granted summary judgment to the City, concluding that all sufficiently specific allegations fell outside the scope of judicial review. The Court of Appeals disagreed and remanded for a new remonstrance hearing. Bradley, 730 N.E.2d at 787. We begin by noting that the separation of powers doctrine, which both the trial court and Court of Appeals discussed at length, does not preclude judicial review, if only because Indiana's legislature has provided a specific judicial role in annexation challenges. The question is whether judicial review should extend beyond the confines of Sections 11 through 13. The Court of Appeals f[ou]nd nothing in the Annexation Act [9] that shows that the General Assembly intended to limit the judicial review of a municipalit[y's] annexation power. Bradley, 730 N.E.2d at 782. It therefore concluded that Remonstrators could challenge the annexation based on noncompliance with statutes that do not deal specifically with remonstrances. We disagree. According to Ind.Code § 36-4-3-13, a court shall order a proposed annexation to take place if the following requirements are met. (Emphasis added.) These requirements are contiguity (or specified alternatives to contiguity) plus a fiscal plan that covers enumerated subjects. This language seems plain enough: if the City satisfies Section 13's listed requirements, the court shall order annexation. We recognize, of course, that annexing municipalities may commit procedural wrongs so severe that courts must act to protect remonstrators' substantial rights. An example of such is King v. City of Bloomington, 239 Ind. 548, 159 N.E.2d 563 (1959). There, remonstrators claimed to have incurred great expense to challenge an annexation ordinance. 239 Ind. at 556, 159 N.E.2d at 567. If they succeeded, a statute prohibited any reannexation attempt for two years. 239 Ind. at 558, 159 N.E.2d at 568. In an alleged attempt to frustrate the remonstrators' efforts, the city repealed the ordinance and then three months later started the entire process over by annexing substantially the same territory under a new ordinance. 239 Ind. at 557, 159 N.E.2d at 567-68. Although no statute forbade this practice, this Court held: [I]f it is shown that a defendant prepares at considerable time and expense to defend and the action is then dismissed for the avowed purpose of repeatedly filing like actions to harass and wear down the defendant without giving him an opportunity to adjudicate and settle the issues on the merits, equity has a remedy.... The principle is invoked to prevent vexatious litigation, multiplicities of suits, or circuit of actions. Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy. 239 Ind. at 563-64, 159 N.E.2d at 570-71 (citations omitted). Similarly, due process and due course of law may require judicial relief where plausible claims of fraud or discrimination are established. See, e.g., State ex rel. City of Marion v. Grant Circuit Court, 239 Ind. 315, 157 N.E.2d 188 (1959)(allowing judicial review of city's sewage disposal rate scheme). However, [w]e start from the premise that there can be no protected property interest in adherence to established procedure .... and the mere failure to follow applicable rules or procedures does not, without more, amount to a due process violation. Shook Heavy & Envtl. Const. Group v. City of Kokomo, 632 N.E.2d 355, 361 (Ind.1994)(quoting Rice v. Scott County Sch. Dist., 526 N.E.2d 1193, 1196-97 (Ind.Ct.App.1988)) (citations omitted) (denying judicial review to unsuccessful bidder for public contract). As we noted above, Remonstrators' complaints here are relatively technical in nature, and do not assert any impairment of substantive rights. The trial court therefore correctly concluded that the alleged procedural violations fell outside the scope of judicial review of annexations.