Opinion ID: 2084582
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Good Faith Immunity

Text: Although we have determined that N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b immunizes defendants from liability, it is appropriate in this matter to consider whether defendants also are entitled to immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3, which provides: A public employee is not liable if he acts in good faith in the execution or enforcement of any law. In Fielder, supra, this Court noted that good faith immunity may be applied to police pursuits. 141 N.J. at 132, 661 A. 2d 231. The majority in Fielder, however, decided to apply pursuit immunity instead, finding that section 2b(2) better serves the legislative purpose of relieving officers of the expense of litigation and the threat of civil liability, a deterrent to pursuits. 141 N.J. at 132, 661 A. 2d 231. This Court explained that good faith immunity would subject an officer's conduct to a more searching scrutiny, and would frequently require a trial on the merits to establish the reasonableness of the conduct at issue and thus would not adequately fulfill the legislative goal. Fielder, supra, 141 N.J. at 132, 661 A. 2d 231. We believe that that analysis has value in this appeal. Good faith immunity under section 3-3 has two alternate components. Id. at 131, 661 A. 2d 231 (citing Tice, supra, 133 N.J. at 374, 627 A. 2d 1090, and Bombace v. City of Newark, 125 N.J. 361, 374, 593 A. 2d 335 (1991)). A public employee either must demonstrate objective reasonableness or that he behaved with subjective good faith. Id. at 132, 661 A. 2d 231. A public employee need prove only one component. Immunity attaches if the employee can show either objective or subjective good faith. We note that both forms of good faith overlap as a matter of fact and law. Our courts have cited with approval the Supreme Court's standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736-37, 73 L.Ed. 2d 396, 408-09 (1982) for application of those terms: The objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for basic, unquestioned constitutional rights. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1001, 43 L.Ed. 2d 214 (1975). The subjective component refers to permissible intentions. Ibid. ... Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we have held that... immunity would be defeated if an official knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the (plaintiff), or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.... Ibid. Although `good faith' pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:3-3, and the Legislature's refusal to grant the officer immunity in those cases in which the officer acts with `willful misconduct,' see N.J.S.A. 59:3-14a, are not necessarily two sides of the same coin, the distinction between the two is a narrow one. Fielder, supra, 141 N.J. at 137, 661 A. 2d 231 (Stein, J. concurring). Defendant's actions may have been negligent, but negligence does not necessarily prevent a finding of `good faith.' Id. at 138, 661 A. 2d 231. We believe that defendant's conduct at the time of the pursuit was objectively reasonable. Prompt response to criminal complaints, such as suspected drug transactions, is essential to protect the public. An officer who is forced to stop and check his weapon may lose valuable time, possibly allowing the suspect to escape. We emphasize that police are often forced to make split-second judgmentsin circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L.Ed. 2d 443, 456 (1989). Defendant's pursuit of the suspect without first checking his firearm must be viewed in that context. The question is whether the officers' actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. Ibid. Assuming that the jury credited plaintiff's version of events at trial, defendant Conley merely was engaged in a foot pursuit with a drug suspect in an alley containing a large puddle while trying to apprehend that suspect. Defendant Conley's commencement of the pursuit was objectively reasonable. In any event, we conclude that defendant's conduct was subjectively reasonable as well. The question is whether defendant's conduct was subjectively reasonable based on the totality of circumstances, including those events preceding and following the chase, as well as the pursuit itself. However, it is defendant's conduct at the commencement of and during the pursuit that is the essential gauge. Thus, earlier that day defendant accidentally, and we assume negligently, left his gun in its fire position. There is no evidence that he was aware, at the start of the pursuit, that the gun was in the fire position. He did not check the safety mechanism while he was concentrating on, and pursuing, a fleeing suspect. After the weapon discharged, he claimed that he abandoned his pursuit, called an ambulance for plaintiff, and tended him until the ambulance and back-up vehicles arrived. For the reasons expressed above, we conclude that defendant's conduct in the pursuit of a suspect under exigent circumstances was not objectively or subjectively unreasonable. We recognize that the concepts overlap. However one denominates it, good faith insulates defendants from liability.