Opinion ID: 2707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probable Cause and Arguable Probable Cause

Text: Probable cause to arrest exists when the officers have knowledge of, or reasonably trustworthy information as to, facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161-62, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir.1997). Probable cause is to be assessed on an objective basis. Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004). [A]n arresting officer's state of mind ( except for the facts that he knows ) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (reviewing cases); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) ( per curiam ). Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153, 125 S.Ct. 588 (emphasis added). Thus, an officer's subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause, id. ; an arrest is not unlawful so long as the officer has knowledge of, or reasonably trustworthy information as to, facts and circumstances sufficient to provide probable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed any crime, see, e.g., id. at 155, 125 S.Ct. 588; Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir.2006) ([A] plaintiff is not entitled to damages under § 1983 for false arrest so long as the arrest itself was supported by probable cause, regardless of whether probable cause supported any individual charge identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.). The existence of probable cause need not be assessed on the basis of the knowledge of a single officer. [A]n arrest . . . is permissible where the actual arresting or searching officer lacks the specific information to form the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion but sufficient information to justify the arrest or search was known by other law enforcement officials initiating or involved with the investigation. United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2001); see, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 230-33, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). This principle, known as the collective or imputed knowledge doctrine, recognizes that, in light of the complexity of modern police work, the arresting officer cannot always be aware of every aspect of an investigation; sometimes his authority to arrest a suspect is based on facts known only to his superiors or associates. United States v. Valez, 796 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067, 107 S.Ct. 957, 93 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1987); see, e.g., United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d at 135. Where it has been conceded or established that the officers arrested the plaintiff without a warrant and without probable cause, the question raised by the qualified immunity defense is whether it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe they did have probable cause. Referring to this standard as arguable probable cause, we have stated that [a]rguable probable cause exists when a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light of well established law. Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cerrone, 246 F.3d at 202-03 (emphasis in original); see also Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir.2004) (Arguable probable cause exists `if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.' (quoting Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991))). Although the tests for probable cause and arguable probable cause are thus not congruent, see, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640-41, 107 S.Ct. 3034, the concept of probable cause is the same in both inquiries. Probable cause existed if `at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within the [officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing' that [the suspect] had violated the law, Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)) (emphasis ours); and an officer sued under the Fourth Amendment for false arrest is entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed,  Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228, 112 S.Ct. 534 (emphasis added). Accordingly, like the probable cause analysis, the analysis of a qualified immunity defense to claims that official actions were taken without probable cause entails an inquiry into the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest, Coons, 284 F.3d at 441. A court must evaluate the objective reasonableness of the appellants' conduct `in light of . . . the information the . . . officers possessed.' Cerrone, 246 F.3d at 202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034). `Arguable' probable cause must not be misunderstood to mean `almost' probable cause. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir.2007). The essential inquiry in determining whether qualified immunity is available to an officer accused of false arrest is whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude that probable cause existed. See Anderson [v. Creighton ], 483 U.S. [635] at 644 [107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)]. . . . There should be no doubt that probable cause remains the relevant standard. If officers of reasonable competence would have to agree that the information possessed by the officer at the time of arrest did not add up to probable cause, the fact that it came close does not immunize the officer. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d at 87 (emphasis added); see also Cerrone, 246 F.3d at 202-03 (arguable probable cause focuses on the objectively reasonable belief of a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question (internal quotation marks omitted)).