Opinion ID: 377140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application Information Disclosure Requirements

Text: 27 The ordinance requires that an applicant for an adult use license provide the following information under oath: 28
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32 (e) The business, occupation or employment of the applicant for three (3) years immediately preceding the date of the application. 33 (f) The adult use or similar business license history of the applicant; whether such person, in previously operating in this or any other city or state under license, has had such license revoked or suspended, the reason therefore (sic), and the business activity or occupation subject to such action of suspension or revocation. 34 (g) All criminal or city ordinance violation convictions, forfeiture of bond and pleadings of nolo contendere on all charges, except minor traffic violations. 35 (h) Fingerprints and photograph of the applicant. 36 (i) The exact nature of the adult use to be conducted and the proposed place of business and facilities thereto. 37 (j) The names and addresses of all persons holding any beneficial interest in the real estate upon which such adult use is to be operated, including but not limited to, contract purchasers or sellers, beneficiaries of land trust or lessees subletting to applicant. 38 (k) If the premises are leased or being purchased under contract, a copy of such lease or contract shall accompany the application. 39 (l) A statement by the applicant that he or she is familiar with the provisions of this Article and is in compliance with them. 31 40 At least one plaintiff will be directly affected by a ruling on the validity of these disclosure requirements, and standing to attack them is therefore present. 41 Plaintiffs contend that these provisions are unconstitutional prior restraints on speech and invasions of privacy. They fall into two groups. In the first group are those contained in subsections (a), (b), (i), and (l). We do not understand plaintiffs to contest the validity of subsection (b). The others, except for the required disclosure of all aliases in (a), are legitimately related to the state interest that underlies the zoning provisions that force a separation of adult uses and are therefore valid under our decision in Part V of this opinion, supra. The alias disclosure requirement involves an invasion of privacy not justified by the zoning interest and is not otherwise justified. It is therefore invalid. 42 The second group of disclosure requirements includes subsections (c) through (h), (j), and (k). The city has argued that these provisions, like the investigation provision, are directed toward the goal of keeping anyone convicted of certain past wrongs from operating or having any interest in an adult use. For the reasons stated in Part VI-F of this opinion, infra, these provisions cannot be sustained as furthering the state interest shown by this record. Because they invade plaintiffs' privacy without any legitimate justification, they are prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 43
44 The ordinance requires that information of the same kind required of an applicant for an adult bookstore license must also be provided by any partner or limited partner of the partnership applicant, any officer or director of the corporate applicant, any stockholder holding more than ten (10) percent of the stock of a corporate applicant, and any other person who is interested directly in the ownership or operation of the business. 32 Plaintiffs argue that these requirements are invalid as prior restraints and invasions of the First Amendment right of associational privacy. 45 We must first address plaintiffs' standing. There are no plaintiffs who allege facts that would place them in the categories of partners, limited partners, or any other person who has an interest in an adult bookstore. We are, therefore, without jurisdiction to entertain challenges to these provisions. Portions of the district court's judgment upholding or invalidating these provisions are vacated, and the allegations as to these provisions are dismissed for want of a justiciable case or controversy. 46 There are, however, a corporate plaintiff and a corporate officer plaintiff who have standing to challenge the disclosure requirements that apply to officers, directors, and stockholders of a corporate applicant. We have not been advised whether the plaintiff owner that has sought and obtained a license is the corporate plaintiff. If it is, its officers, directors, and stockholders holding over ten percent of its stock have already disclosed the information required under the ordinance. Nevertheless, the license will have to be renewed, and the owners, directors, and officers may change, so we believe the corporate plaintiff at least has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a challenge to the validity of these disclosure requirements to support standing. 47 The limited information that will be pertinent to enforcement of the scatter zoning provisions will be provided to the city by the application of the corporation itself. There would seem to be no purpose other than harassment in requiring the individual officers, directors, and stockholders to file separate statements or applications under oath. Requiring them to do so is an unjustified prior restraint and an invasion of privacy. 33 Accordingly, the disclosure requirements as to officers, directors, and stockholders of corporate applicants are invalid.