Opinion ID: 754615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Confidential Documents

Text: 56 The district court granted the government's motions for protective orders under the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (1994), and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1). The appellants moved for a mistrial, arguing (1) the district court did not follow the procedures set forth in CIPA; (2) confidential informant and relevant surveillance information was contained within the material and should have been disclosed; and (3) the district court's use of ex parte, in camera hearings improperly prejudiced the court against the appellants. 57 CIPA creates a pretrial procedure for ruling upon the admissibility of classified information. United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir.1988). When the government seeks to protect classified information, sections 3 and 4 of CIPA are relevant. United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427 (1st Cir.1984). Section 4 provides in relevant part: 58 The court may permit the United States to make a written request for [an authorization to delete specified items in discoverable documents] in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the court alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the statement of the United States shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 59 18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 4 (1994). 60 The appellants argue the material was not properly classified and the government did not follow the procedures required under CIPA. 61 In order to show that material is classified, the government must make a formal claim of state secret privilege. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 966. This formal claim must be lodged by the head of the department which has actual control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8, 73 S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727 (1953) (footnotes omitted). We have examined the government's sealed submissions and conclude they satisfy Reynolds. 62 The appellants also argue that although CIPA provides that the district court may conduct an ex parte, in camera review of written material, it may not hold the ex parte, in camera hearings it held in this case. Government counsel was present at these hearings; defense counsel was not. 63 The appellants base their argument on the text of CIPA and Rule 16, both of which refer to a written statement to be inspected by the court [/judge] alone. CIPA § 4, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4; Fed R.Crim. P. 16(d)(1) (emphasis added). No mention is made in CIPA or Rule 16 about a hearing in which counsel participate. 64 Ex parte hearings are generally disfavored. See, e.g., United States v. Kenney, 911 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir.1990). In a case involving classified documents, however, ex parte, in camera hearings in which government counsel participates to the exclusion of defense counsel are part of the process that the district court may use in order to decide the relevancy of the information. See United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 620 (D.C.Cir.1989) (holding an ex parte, in camera hearing in which the government explained the specific damage to national defense if information were disclosed). Such a hearing is appropriate if the court has questions about the confidential nature of the information or its relevancy. Further, while these statutes specify written submissions, they do not rule out hearings in which government counsel participate. The district court did not err in holding the hearings. 65 The appellants next argue that the district court should have disclosed information about confidential informants and surveillance contained in the material that the court reviewed during the ex parte, in camera hearings. We disagree. 66 In order to determine whether the government must disclose classified information, the court must determine whether the information is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused. Yunis, 867 F.2d at 623 (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957)); see also Pringle, 751 F.2d at 428; cf. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 965 (the court can engage in balancing). Under this test, information meets the standard for disclosure only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). We have reviewed the classified material and agree with the district court that the information it contains is not helpful to the defense. The information fails to meet the standard for disclosure. 67 The appellants also contend the ex parte hearings were prejudicial (1) because the appellants were not aware of the nature of the information discussed at the hearings and were unlawfully denied their right to be present during every stage of the trial, and (2) because the information may have prejudiced the trial court judge. Again, we disagree. 68 Congress intended CIPA to clarify the court's power to restrict discovery of classified information. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 965. The legislative history explains that because the government is seeking to withhold classified information from the defendant, an adversary hearing with defense knowledge would defeat the very purpose of the discovery rules. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. 96-831(II), 27 n.22 (1980)). 69 Moreover, an ex parte hearing does not violate a defendant's right to be present at all stages of a trial. A defendant need not be present ... when the proceeding involves only a conference or hearing upon a question of law. Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(c)(3). The question of whether to protect classified information under CIPA is a question of law within the meaning of Rule 43. Cf. United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1225-26 (9th Cir.1981) (defendant's absence from conference to decide defendant's competency to stand trial and a motion in limine did not violate due process or Rule 43 because defendant could not contribute to discussion of questions of law). 70 Finally, we have examined the record and, although the classified material contains information which cuts against the appellants' position, there is nothing to support the appellants' contention that the material prejudiced the district court judge.