Opinion ID: 1228478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consent to Search the Van.

Text: The burden rests upon the prosecution to prove that consent to a warrantless search was given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. People v. Wieckert, Colo., 554 P.2d 688 (1976); People v. Huffman, Colo., 541 P.2d 1250 (1975); People v. Hancock, 186 Colo. 30, 525 P.2d 435 (1974). Whether a valid consent has been given in a particular case is to be determined by the court in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding the consent. People v. Wieckert, supra ; People v. Hancock, supra ; Phillips v. People, supra ; Capps v. People, 162 Colo. 323, 426 P.2d 189 (1967). In the instant case, the trial court found that the Hayhursts had in fact voluntarily consented to the search. Ample evidence supports that finding. Police officers testified that the appellee's father, the van's owner, affirmatively cooperated, stated that he wished to get to the bottom of the matter, and directed his son to open the van for the officers' inspection. Nonetheless, the trial court held that it could not admit the evidence absent proof that the police expressly advised the father of his right to refuse consent to the warrantless search. We have not previously addressed the specific issue whether the police are required expressly to warn a property owner that he has a right to decline consent to search his property in cases where the owner voluntarily consents to the search. While it is true that in the case primarily relied upon by the trial court and the appellee, Phillips v. People, supra , an advisement of the right to refuse consent was given, that case does not hold that such an advisement is indispensable in all cases. See also People v. Hancock, supra ; Massey v. People, 179 Colo. 167, 498 P.2d 953 (1972); People v. Reyes, 174 Colo. 377, 483 P.2d 1342 (1971); Capps v. People, supra . Cf. People v. Sanchez, 184 Colo. 25, 518 P.2d 818 (1974). The United States Supreme Court [3] and many state courts [4] have held that such an express advisement is not required by either the United States Constitution or by applicable state constitutions. See generally Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.Chi.L.Rev. 47 (1974-75). Our state constitution and statutes, of course, may impose on police activity greater or additional restrictions than those minimally mandated by the federal constitution. People v. Hoinville, Colo., 553 P.2d 777 (1976). In this case, however, it is not necessary to impose another warning requirement on police officers. The People already have the heavy burden of proving the voluntariness of a consent to search. While proof that an express advisement was given in a particular case certainly would lighten that burden, and such a warningif givenwould be a persuasive factor to be considered in determining voluntariness, other evidence is often quite adequate to prove that a consent was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Taking the instant case as an example, it would serve no useful purpose to suppress the evidence simply because no advisement was given, when the evidence is overwhelming that the Hayhursts voluntarily consented to the search. The officers simply asked if they could look in the van and were met with affirmative cooperation. There is no evidence that the officers claimed any right to search the vehicle, [5] exhibited any signs of force, [6] or attempted to deceive the Hayhursts. [7] Given these facts, we conclude that the Hayhursts' consent was voluntary, and no additional advisement was necessary.