Opinion ID: 1591799
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal if we determine that the court of appeals held differently from a prior decision of another court of appeals or of this Court on a question of law material to the decision of the case. See Tex. Gov't Code §§ 22.001(a)(2), 22.225(c); see also Coastal Corp. v. Garza, 979 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex.1998). For conflicts jurisdiction to exist, it must appear that the rulings in the two cases are `so far upon the same state of facts that the decision of one case is necessarily conclusive of the decision in the other.' Coastal Corp., 979 S.W.2d at 319 (quoting Gonzalez v. Avalos, 907 S.W.2d 443, 444 (Tex.1995)). In other words, if one case would operate to overrule the other if both decisions were rendered by the same court, then the test for conflicts jurisdiction has been met. Id. at 319-20. TxDOT argues that we have conflicts jurisdiction because the court of appeals' opinion conflicts with the Third Court of Appeals' opinion in Bellnoa v. City of Austin, 894 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ). The Bellnoas' two sons were struck by a privately owned and operated truck while attempting to cross the street in Austin, Texas. Id. at 823. One of the sons later died of his injuries, and the Bellnoas sued the City of Austin, alleging various acts of negligence relating to the regulation of traffic, including the negligent raising of the speed limit from thirty to forty miles per hour. Id. at 823-25. The court of appeals found the threshold issue to be whether the alleged problem resulted from the decision to increase the speed limit from 30 to 40 miles-per-hour or... from the sign displaying that limit. Id. at 825. Announcing that [t]he source of the alleged problem ... is the setting of the legal speed limit, not the sign displaying that limit, the court refused to hold, as the Garza I court had, that a plaintiff's claim that the City had negligently raised the speed limit presented a condition of the speed-limit sign for which the City could be held liable under section 101.060(a)(2). Id. The court of appeals criticized the Garza I court's reasoning as ignor[ing] the fact that the speed limit is set by law and the posted sign is only an indicator of the legal speed limit. Id. The court of appeals in this case expressly adopted the Garza I panel's reasoning. 878 S.W.2d at 671. The Garza II court held that the 45 mph speed limit sign near a school zone was a condition that should have been corrected by the State and that TxDOT's immunity from suit had been waived. Id. at 376. TxDOT argues that this holding conflicts with Bellnoa. The Garzas respond that no conflict exists because, although the Bellnoa court held that raising the speed limit was a discretionary decision, the court did not hold that plaintiffs could not allege that raising the speed limit was a condition under section 101.060(a)(2). But Bellnoa and Garza II both dealt with claims that the respective speed-limit signs set an excessive speed for the area. See Bellnoa, 894 S.W.2d at 825; Garza II, 72 S.W.3d at 376. Thus, the question presented to both courts of appeals was whether an allegation that the established speed limit was excessive could defeat a governmental entity's sovereign immunity under the Tort Claims Act. The Bellnoa court said no, but the Garza II court answered yes. The conflict between Garza II and Bellnoa is made clear by the words of the Bellnoa court itself, which stated, [W]e decline to follow the decision in [ Garza I ], which held that a 45 mile-per-hour speed limit sign ... was a `condition' of the sign for which the state could be held liable under section 101.060(a)(2). Bellnoa, 894 S.W.2d at 825. The Garza I court's holding, which was expressly adopted by the Garza II court, would necessarily operate to overrule the Bellnoa court's decision if both had been rendered by the same court. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this case and now turn to the merits.