Opinion ID: 186000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 24 The Department argues we have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). In the alternative it seeks a writ of mandamus. 25 Section 1292(a)(1) provides that the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from ... [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions. As the Supreme Court stated in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84, 101 S.Ct. 993, 996-97, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), § 1292(a)(1) provides jurisdiction over not just an injunction so-denominated, but over any order having the practical effect of an injunction if the order threatens a serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence and is of such a nature that it can be effectually challenged only by immediate appeal. An order by a federal court that relates only to the conduct or progress of litigation before that court ordinarily is not considered an injunction and therefore is not appealable under § 1292(a)(1). Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 279, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 1138, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988). 26 A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situations. Id. at 289, 108 S.Ct. at 1143. Mandamus does not lie unless the petitioner's right to relief is clear and indisputable, and there is no other adequate means by which the petitioner may attain the relief it seeks. In re Sealed Case, 151 F.3d 1059, 1063 (D.C.Cir. 1998). 27 With these legal principles in mind, we consider our jurisdiction over each of the Department's three claims.
28 The Department argues we have jurisdiction over its claim of judicial overreaching pursuant to § 1292(a)(1) because the district court's rulings (1) imposed an injunction; or (2) had the practical effect of an injunction; or (3) worked a modification of a declaratory judgment that the [district] court has [since] held to be indistinguishable from a mandatory injunction. The gravamen of the Department's argument, however expressed, is that the district court orders both require[ ] action and implicitly enjoin[ ] the Secretary's future exercise of discretion. 29 We disagree. As the plaintiffs demonstrate, the Orders and the Opinion were full of sound and fury, but they signified very little to be done by the DOI. In the Contempt Order the court appointed a Special Master-Monitor, 226 F.Supp.2d at 163 ¶ ¶ 13-16, and required the defendants, in anticipation of the Phase 1.5 trial, to file with the Court ... a plan for conducting a historical accounting of the IIM trust accounts and to file a plan for bringing themselves into compliance with [their] fiduciary obligations. Id. at 162 ¶ ¶ 2, 3. It also held Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb in contempt, id. at 161 ¶ ¶ 1-5, and ordered them to pay the expenses the plaintiffs had incurred for the contempt trial. Id. at 162 ¶ ¶ 9-10.  30 None of this had the practical effect of an injunction. The Contempt Order compels the Department only to prepare for the Phase 1.5 proceedings by making certain filings with the court. As such, we think it more akin to an order ... relat[ing] only to the conduct or progress of litigation, Gulfstream Aerospace, 485 U.S. at 279, 108 S.Ct. at 1138, than to an injunction. 31 The Department also points to the district court's statement that it will order new relief following the Phase 1.5 trial rather than simply remand[ing] the matter back to the agency, Contempt Opinion, 226 F.Supp.2d at 152, as evidence that the court intends to take over the management of trust reform. Such a claim is premature. To be sure, the district court stated it has determined that it will grant further injunctive relief, id. at 146 — specifically, a structural injunction, id. at 146 n. 154 — presumably upon completion of the Phase 1.5 trial. Any such injunction, once issued, would be appealable under § 1292(a)(1). But no such injunction has yet issued. At worst, the district court has threatened to take action that, according to the Department, would violate the separation of powers. Until the district court takes such action, however, we are without power under § 1292(a)(1) to review its decisions. 32 Anticipating that the court might lack jurisdiction to hear the present appeal, the Department asks us in the alternative to issue a writ of mandamus providing equivalent relief. But we may not do that, either. The Department's challenge does not meet the criteria for the writ; in particular, the Department has not shown that an appeal from the district court's eventual entry of an injunction, if and when that occurs, would not provide it with adequate relief. 33
34 The Department concedes that [t]he court's order elevating the Court Monitor to the judicial role of Special Master would not generally be immediately appealable. Nevertheless the Department claims that Kieffer's appointment is subject to interlocutory review both because it forms an integral part of the relief the court believed was required and because it has the effect of an injunction. These claims are essentially a restatement of those we have already rejected as part of the Department's claim of judicial overreaching. We see no need to revisit them under a new heading. 35 The orders appointing Kieffer — first as Court Monitor, and later as Special Master-Monitor — and the order denying the Department's motion to revoke Kieffer's appointment as Court Monitor do, however, present an appropriate occasion for mandamus. First, as we explain below (in Part II.B), the Department's entitlement to relief is clear. Second, there is no other way for the Department to obtain effective relief on its claims that Kieffer should not have been appointed Special Master-Monitor, nor permitted to continue as Court Monitor. 36 The ordinary route to relief from an adverse interlocutory order is to appeal from the final judgment. When the relief sought is recusal of a disqualified judicial officer, however, the injury suffered by a party required to complete judicial proceedings overseen by that officer is by its nature irreparable. As the Supreme Court has explained: 37 The remedy by appeal is inadequate. It comes after the trial and, if prejudice exist, it has worked its evil and a judgment of it in a reviewing tribunal is precarious. It goes there fortified by presumptions, and nothing can be more elusive of estimate or decision than a disposition of a mind in which there is a personal ingredient. 38 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36, 41 S.Ct. 230, 234, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921); see In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir.1981) (A case involving a motion for disqualification is clearly distinguishable from those where a party alleges an error of law that ... may be fully addressed and remedied on appeal). The parties agree that after his elevation to Special Master-Monitor status, Kieffer was serving as a judicial officer. 39 Although this court does not seem to have ruled upon the propriety of seeking the recusal of a judicial officer by petition for a writ of mandamus, every circuit to have addressed the issue has found it proper. The First through Seventh Circuits and the Tenth Circuit have each issued the writ for this purpose, see In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir.2001); In re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d 641 (2d Cir.1995); In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97 (3d Cir.1995); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.1992); In re Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir.1976); In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716 (5th Cir.1988); In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir.1990) (en banc); In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir.1998); In re Edgar, 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir.1996); Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir.1995), and the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have suggested they would do so in an appropriate case. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 536-37 (8th Cir.1972) (holding mandamus is an appropriate avenue to review recusal decision but denying the writ on the facts presented); Cordoza v. Pac. States Steel Corp., 320 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir.2003) (similar); In re Lopez-Lukis, 113 F.3d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir.1997) (denying writ seeking review of recusal decision because petitioners have not carried their burden of showing their right to issuance of a writ of mandamus). The Federal Circuit looks to the law of the regional circuit in which the officer to be recused sits. Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. Franksu Enter. Corp., 78 F.3d 550, 556-57 (1996); In re Solex Robotics, Inc., 56 Fed. Appx. 490 (Fed.Cir.2003) (unpublished). We join the unanimous view of our sister circuits and hold that we will issue a writ of mandamus compelling recusal of a judicial officer where the party seeking the writ demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief. 40 We also find it appropriate to issue the writ in order to clarify that the district court exceeded its authority when it reappointed Kieffer as Court Monitor over the Department's objection. As we discuss below, the Department's right to relief is clear, and the injury it alleges — interference with the internal deliberations of a Department of the Government of the United States — cannot be remedied by an appeal from the final judgment. In re Sealed Case, 151 F.3d at 1063.
41 The district court styled the contempt in which it held the appellants civil in nature. In this circuit an order holding a party in civil contempt in an on-going proceeding is not appealable as a final order. Byrd v. Reno, 180 F.3d 298 (D.C.Cir.1999) (per curiam). In contrast, [c]riminal contempt judgments are immediately appealable pursuant to § 1291 because they result from a separate and independent proceeding ... to vindicate the authority of the court and are not a part of the original cause. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 1331, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985). As we explain below (in Part II.C.1), the district court's findings of contempt are functionally criminal rather than civil in nature. Therefore, we have jurisdiction over this appeal from the contempt aspects of the Contempt Order. 42