Opinion ID: 70986
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Criminal History Category Assessment

Text: Esqueda–Pina also contends that the district court erred in assessing a criminal history category of III. Esqueda–Pina concedes that he failed to raise any objection to the district court’s assessment of his criminal history and that plain error review therefore applies. To establish plain error, an appellant must show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and that affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009). Ordinarily, an error affects substantial rights only if it “‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). If the appellant makes this showing, “the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1429 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under the Guidelines, a defendant receives “3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). Convictions resulting from the same charging instrument or imposed on the same day are usually counted as a single sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). Section 4A1.1(f), however, states an exception to this general rule: 13 Case: 08-40418 Document: 00511013486 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/27/2010 No. 08-40418 if a defendant received two or more prior sentences as a result of convictions for crimes of violence that are counted as a single sentence (see § 4A1.2(a)(2)), one point is added under § 4A1.1(f) for each sentence that did not result in any additional points under § 4A1.1 (a) . . . . A total of up to 3 points may be added under § 4A1.1(f). For purposes of this guideline, “crime of violence” has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(a). U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 cmt. n.6; see also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(f). Section 4B1.2(a), in turn, defines a crime of violence as any state offense punishable by a term of imprisonment more than one year that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” against another person or “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), (2). Although the definitions of crime of violence in § 2L1.2 and § 4B1.2 differ slightly in “structure and syntax,” other Fifth Circuit panels have determined that these differences are inconsequential and that the same analysis applies under each. See, e.g., Rayo–Valdez, 302 F.3d at 318. A criminal history score of 2 or 3 points yields a criminal history category of II; a criminal history score of 4, 5, or 6 points yields a criminal history category of III. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). The district judge, following the PSR’s recommendation, assessed 3 points under § 4A1.1 for Esqueda–Pina’s 1997 Ohio conviction for attempted rape and gross sexual imposition. The district judge also assessed an additional point under § 4A1.1(f) because both the attempted rape and gross sexual imposition convictions were crimes of violence. Esqueda–Pina contends that the district court plainly erred in assessing the extra point because the government did not establish that both of these convictions were for crimes of violence. As to the attempted rape conviction, Esqueda–Pina does not dispute that if he were convicted of attempt under either of the subsections described in the indictment (pertaining to intercourse with a child less than thirteen or intercourse compelled by force or threat of force), the sentence would qualify as 14 Case: 08-40418 Document: 00511013486 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/27/2010 No. 08-40418 a crime of violence under § 4A1.1(f). He renews his argument, however, that Turner precludes such a finding because the 1997 judgment does not specify the subsection of § 2907.02 under which he was convicted for attempt. On plain error review, this argument is foreclosed by our precedent. We addressed a substantially similar set of facts in United States v. Martinez–Vega, 471 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2006), in which the defendant was indicted for first degree aggravated sexual assault on a child younger than 17 in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.021(a)(2)(B), but pled guilty to and was convicted of second degree sexual assault under Texas Penal Code § 22.011. Id. at 561. The judgment indicated that the plea was to “the lesser charge contained in the Indictment,” but did not specify the subsection under which the defendant was convicted. Id. at 562. Citing Turner, the defendant argued, as Esqueda–Pina does here, that it was impossible to tell from the judgment whether he had been convicted under the subsection applicable to sexual assault of a child, or instead under some other subsection of the statute that did not qualify as a crime of violence. Id. at 561–62. We rejected this argument, stressing that unlike in Turner, the defendant had not preserved his objection to the characterization of his prior conviction as a crime of violence, so the court was “limited to plain error review.” Id. at 563. The court observed that the judgment indicated that the defendant pled guilty to “the lesser charge contained in the Indictment,” and reasoned that there was no plain error in the district court’s conclusion that “the lesser charge” referred to a lesser included version of the charged offense of first degree aggravated sexual assault on a child younger than 17. Id. The 1997 judgment against Esqueda–Pina likewise “entered a plea of guilty to the stipulated lesser included offense of Count Two of the Indictment” (emphasis added). The district court did not clearly err in concluding that “the lesser included offense” referred to a lesser included offense under one of the subsections that related to the 15 Case: 08-40418 Document: 00511013486 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/27/2010 No. 08-40418 indictment, and therefore did not plainly err in treating Esqueda–Pina’s attempted rape conviction as a crime of violence under § 4A1.1. Nor was there error, plain or otherwise, in the district court’s conclusion that the gross sexual imposition conviction was a second crime of violence that rendered Esqueda–Pina eligible for a one-point enhancement under § 4A1.1(f). In contending that the gross sexual imposition conviction did not so qualify, Esqueda–Pina does not dispute that, absent the typographical error indicating that Esqueda–Pina “purposely compelled Esqueda to submit by force or threat of force,” either of the charged offenses would provide a proper basis for concluding that Esqueda–Pina’s gross sexual imposition conviction was a crime of violence. We have already rejected the contention that this typographical error provided a basis for concluding that the conviction was not a crime of violence. The district court’s one-point enhancement under § 4A1.1(f) was proper.