Opinion ID: 814614
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: deliberately avoided learning the truth.

Text: You may not find such knowledge, however, if you find that the defendant actually believed that there was no asbestos in the UNITED STATES V . YI 7 ceilings at the Forest Glen Condominiums, or if you find that the defendant was simply careless. A district court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 921 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). An instruction’s substance is reviewed de novo. Id. An instruction is appropriate if it is “supported by law and has foundation in the evidence.” Id. at 922. As such, “the district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting it.” Id. If a party requests alternative instructions, the district court considers them separately to “determine if the evidence could support a verdict on either ground.” Id. Willful blindness is inconsistent with actual knowledge, and thus a deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate only where “the jury could rationally find willful blindness even though it has rejected the government’s evidence of actual knowledge.” Id. Deliberate ignorance contains two prongs: (1) a subjective belief that there is a high probability a fact exists; and (2) deliberate actions taken to avoid learning the truth. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011). Regarding the first Global-Tech prong, testimony from Hill, Yoon, and Yi himself supports an inference that Yi was aware of a high probability that the Forest Glen ceilings contained asbestos. Both Hill and Yoon testified that Yi commented on the likelihood that the Forest Glen ceilings contained asbestos during their initial walk-through. Yi’s 16year experience in property management bolsters the evidence that he suspected the ceilings contained asbestos, as the age of the Forest Glen building and the ceiling’s physical 8 UNITED STATES V . YI appearance would, according to both Hill and Yi’s own testimony, have put a person experienced in property management on notice of the likelihood that it contained asbestos. While he argues that the insurance company’s supposedly negative test allayed his suspicions, that inference need not be drawn when viewing the evidence in the government’s favor. Thus, there was sufficient evidentiary support for the first Global-Tech prong. Turning to the second Global-Tech prong, if the jury could infer that Yi was aware of a high probability that the ceilings contained asbestos, it also could infer that Yi engaged in a deliberate pattern of failing to read documents that might clarify whether asbestos was in fact present. The jury would not be required to believe Yi’s argument that he was very busy, that he trusted all of his subordinates to read everything for him, or even that he was told the insurance company’s test had come back “negative” for asbestos. The evidence regarding Yi’s real estate experience and pattern of failing to read documents common to real estate transactions supports a finding that Yi deliberately avoided learning the truth about whether the Forest Glen ceilings contained asbestos. Yi attempts to analogize this case with some that have found the evidence could not support finding deliberate ignorance. See, e.g., United States v. Baron, 94 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled by Heredia, 483 F.3d 913. But those cases are factually distinguishable, with records very different from the record here. Yi also argues that the instruction itself was legally flawed. He primarily takes issue with the term “simply careless.” Yi argues that instructing a jury that it may not find UNITED STATES V . YI 9 knowledge where a defendant is “simply” careless leaves the door open for some other level of carelessness. But Heredia makes clear that the Ninth Circuit model instruction is appropriate “and there is little reason to suspect that juries will import [recklessness or negligence] concepts, as to which they are not instructed, into their deliberations.” 483 F.3d at 924. The district court did not err in giving or formulating the deliberate ignorance instruction.