Opinion ID: 2751498
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Etching

Text: Rozbicki disputes whether the Chiang Application provides written description support for the claims-atissue. The written description requirement is found in 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012), which states: The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and pro- cess of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention. 12 ROZBICKI v. CHIANG To satisfy the written description requirement, the specification must “convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the [claimed] invention.” Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The properly construed claim must be supported by the originating specification. Agilent, 567 F.3d at 1378–79. Satisfying the written description requirement is a question of fact that we review for substantial evidence. Harari v. Lee, 656 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Chen v. Bouchard, 347 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). In light of its claim construction of “etching,” the PTAB concluded that the Chiang Application sufficiently described this limitation, which is recited in Chiang independent claims 31 and 66. Specifically, the PTAB found the Chiang Application’s discussion of the sputtering/resputtering process, which removes barrier material at the bottom of the via, satisfied the written description requirement for “etching.” In support, it looked to Example 3 in light of Examples 1 and 2 from the Chiang Application. The PTAB explained that the three examples “are sufficient to indicate to one of ordinary skill that, more likely than not, the third example achieves its purported result by offsetting the results of method steps similar to example 2 with the results of method steps similar to example 1.” J.A. 11. The PTAB also relied on the testimony of Chiang’s expert, Dr. Cuomo, who explained that etching results from the biasing substrate, which creates an electrical field, causing ions to impact on the silicon substrate and silicon dioxide sidewall, resulting in simultaneous sputtering of the surfaces such as through the second step of Example 3. Rozbicki argues that the Chiang Application does not satisfy the written description requirement. According to Rozbicki, the written description does not make clear that etching occurs at the bottom of the via, and Example 3 ROZBICKI v. CHIANG 13 does not necessarily show etching. Chiang responds that substantial evidence exists based on Example 3 and Dr. Cuomo’s expert testimony, which the PTAB found more credible than that of Rozbicki’s expert. Since we agree with the PTAB’s claim construction, we look to see if the PTAB’s finding that the Chiang Application sufficiently described the “etching” limitation is supported by substantial evidence. We find that it is, and do not find Rozbicki’s arguments persuasive. The Chiang Application generally discloses the removal of material through sputtering/resputtering. It then provides a step for “applying a subsequent portion of said sculptured layer using ion deposition sputtering, with sufficiently high substrate bias to sculpture a shape from said first portion, while depositing additional layer material.” J.A. 1188. During this step, “[t]he application of increased bias voltage results in the resputtering (sculpturing) of the first portion of barrier layer.” J.A. 1190; see also J.A. 1201. Consequently, the barrier layer from the first deposition period, which includes the barrier layer at the bottom of the via, is resputtered. This resputtering meets the “etching” requirement. Chiang’s expert, Dr. Cuomo, testified that the sputtering/resputtering removes sections of the initially deposited barrier layer from the bottom of the via. In particular, he pointed to Example 3 as reproduced from Figure 5 of the Chiang Application. 14 ROZBICKI v. CHIANG Dr. Cuomo testified that Example 3 discloses the claimed invention, and essentially performs the steps of Example 2 and then Example 1 consecutively, in that order. J.A. 2635–40. Example 1 discloses etching as seen by the breakthrough in the barrier level when sputtering with a substrate bias. Example 2 discloses sputtering with no substrate bias, resulting in the deposit of a large quantity of barrier material at the bottom of the via with no breakthrough. By performing a first step similar to Example 2 prior to the step of Example 1, Chiang’s expert testified that Example 3 prevents breakthrough into the lower level when etching occurs during the second step similar to Example 1. J.A. 2639. Furthermore, the Chiang Application explains that the first deposit layer “protects the substrate surface . . . during the sputtering deposition at higher bias voltage” and “avoids breakthrough.” J.A. 1190. This concern exists only if the second step causes etching. Based on the specification of the Chiang Application and the expert testimony, there is ROZBICKI v. CHIANG 15 substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the Chiang Application discloses etching. Rozbicki also argues that the Chiang Application only employs two sequential deposition steps, not an etching step of the layer at the bottom of the via. In support, he points to language in the Chiang Application stating that the steps listed are described as depositing steps for a barrier layer substance. 4 Chiang disagrees, stating that the second step in its application inherently includes etching within the depositing step. As explained by the PTAB and Chiang’s expert, although the Chiang Application lists its steps as depositing steps, this does not change the fact that the second step in the Chiang Application also performs etching. Rozbicki contends that the PTAB erred because the disclosure of sputtering/resputtering does not provide support for the full scope of the term “etching” in Chiang’s claims. In Rozbicki’s first motion, he requested “judgment that Chiang’s involved claims are unpatentable to Chiang under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as lacking adequate written description.” J.A. 412. The PTAB found that Rozbicki did not advance a scope argument, instead arguing only that the Chiang Application failed to describe a particular embodiment. J.A. 22. The PTAB addressed this point again in its decision on request for rehearing. It stated that, “[w]hile the statute encompasses a scope argument, it does not follow that Rozbicki necessarily made a scope argument. As the decision noted, case law distinguishes scope as a distinct type of 4 The specific claim language for the second step states: “applying a subsequent portion of said sculptured layer using ion deposition sputtering, with sufficiently high substrate bias to sculpture a shape from said first portion, while depositing additional layer material.” J.A. 1188. 16 ROZBICKI v. CHIANG written description problem.” J.A. 40. It further stated that, “[a]s a matter of due process, Chiang need not address every theory that Rozbicki could have argued, but only the argument Rozbicki actually made.” J.A. 40 (footnote omitted). We agree with the PTAB that Rozbicki did not properly raise a scope argument before the PTAB, and thus, we find that the PTAB did not err in failing to address this argument. Because substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s finding that the Chiang Application adequately describes the “etching” limitation, we affirm the PTAB’s finding that Chiang claims 31 and 66 meet the written description requirement. Additionally, since Rozbicki only argues that Chiang dependent claims 32–39, 46, 59–61, 63, 64, 67–71, 83, and 84 do not meet the written description requirement because the Chiang Application fails to disclose the “etching” limitation—the same argument we just rejected—we also affirm the PTAB’s findings as to these claims. Furthermore, because Rozbicki’s arguments that Chiang is not entitled to the benefit of each of its earlier-filed priority application hinges on the written description challenge, we affirm the PTAB’s finding that Chiang is entitled to the benefit of each of its earlier-filed applications for Chiang claims 31–39, 46, 59–61, 63, 64, 66–71, 83, and 84.