Opinion ID: 2669163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Individual Issues Raised by the Defendants

Text: Having addressed the two issues affecting all the defendants, we turn to the issues raised by the individual defendants. These issues involve arguments that the jury instructions were erroneous, the prosecutor committed misconduct, a photo array was too suggestive, the court violated federal law in excusing venirepersons, and the court erred in imposing the sentence. 45
Mr. Daniel Maumau challenges the VICAR jury instructions relating to the Faamausili-home shooting, 15 urging a failure to require a link to the Defendant’s membership in TCG. These challenges fail because: (1) the instructions required proof that TCG membership had provided an “integral or essential purpose” for the home shooting, and (2) the Government had to prove only that the defendant committed the crime in furtherance of his TCG membership. Mr. Tuai questions the instruction on the RICO conspiracy count, arguing that it did not require an agreement for the commission of two predicate acts. We reject the argument because it isolates certain language without consideration of the instruction as a whole.
We engage in de novo review of the jury instructions as a whole, determining whether “they accurately state the governing law and provide the jury with an accurate understanding of the relevant legal standards and factual issues.” United States v. Crockett, 435 F.3d 1305, 1314 (10th Cir. 2006). Reversal is warranted only if: (1) the Court has “‘substantial doubt whether the instructions, considered as a whole, properly guided the jury in its deliberations,’” and (2) the “‘deficient jury instruction is prejudicial.’” United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 15 Mr. Toki joins in Mr. Daniel Maumau’s jury-instruction argument. Toki’s Opening Br. at 1. 46 1011, 1019 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1093 (10th Cir. 2007)).
In Instruction No. 40, the district court stated that on the VICAR charge against Mr. Daniel Maumau, the Government had to prove: First, that on or about the time period described in this Second Superseding Indictment, TCG was a criminal enterprise; Second, that the enterprise engaged in racketeering activity; Third, that the particular Defendant assaulted with a dangerous weapon an individual, as described in the particular Count, as [the district court had] just defined those terms for [the jury], or aided and abetted in the assault with a dangerous weapon; Fourth, that the particular Defendant’s purpose in assaulting the individual with a dangerous weapon, or aiding and abetting in the act, was to maintain or to increase his position in the enterprise. The particular Defendant’s purpose to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise need not [have been] the only purpose for committing the act, but the government [had to] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the purpose was an integral, or essential, purpose. Instruction No. 40, Daniel Maumau R. vol. 1, pt. 2, at 274 (emphasis added). Mr. Daniel Maumau asserts two errors with the fourth part of this instruction: (1) The jury could find guilt even if the shooting did not relate to the Defendant’s membership in TCG; and (2) the reference to an “integral or essential 47 purpose” did “not connect the essential or important purpose in committing the [Faamausili-home shooting] to membership in TCG.” Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 30-31.
Mr. Daniel Maumau’s first challenge is based on his reading of United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1021 (10th Cir. 2009). In Smith, we concluded that the Government need only prove that the “crime was ‘committed as an integral aspect of membership’” in the enterprise to establish this element of a § 1959(a) offense, not that the defendant’s “sole or principal motive for conspiring to murder . . . was to maintain or increase his position in [the enterprise] in order for it to convict Mr. Smith under § 1959(a).” 413 F.3d at 1277-78 (quoting United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 817 (2d Cir. 1994)). We added that “‘the motive requirement is satisfied if the jury could properly infer that the defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that membership.’” Id. at 1278 (emphasis added; quoting United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 671 (2d Cir. 2001)). Mr. Daniel Maumau’s argument is based on reading the “or” in this sentence in the conjunctive. Under his reading, the prosecution would have to establish two purposes: (1) that the defendant committed the violent crime because he knew it 48 was expected of him due to his membership, and (2) that the defendant committed the violent crime to further his membership. Instead, we read Smith’s language in the disjunctive. After all, in Smith, we used the word “or” rather than “and.” 16 Thus, we conclude that the district court did not have to require the jury to find that Mr. Daniel Maumau had fired the gun because he knew it was expected of him as a TCG member and that he had fired the gun in furtherance of that membership. Under Smith, either one would have sufficed. We also reject Mr. Daniel Maumau’s argument regarding the failure to include the second, alternative method of finding the required motive. This alternative would have made it easier to convict Mr. Daniel Maumau on this count; thus, even if the omission involved error, the error worked to the Defendant’s benefit.
Mr. Daniel Maumau also argues that the district court’s instruction could be read to mean that “this element is established if [he] had any essential or important 16 In his opening brief, Mr. Daniel Maumau seems to agree. While arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict under VICAR, Mr. Daniel Maumau stated that the fifth element of VICAR required only that “the defendant knew it was expected of him due to his membership in the enterprise or that it was committed in furtherance of that membership.” See Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 19 (emphasis added) (discussing the holding in Smith). Mr. Daniel Maumau’s counsel also stated in oral argument that these two methods of establishing the motive requirement were “alternatives.” 49 purpose in committing the act.” Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 31 (emphasis added). We disagree. The instruction stated that “[t]he particular Defendant’s purpose to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise need not be the only purpose for committing the act, but the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the purpose was an integral, or essential, purpose.” Daniel Maumau R. vol. 1, pt. 2, at 274 (emphases added). “The purpose” in the second clause of this sentence refers to the purpose in the first clause, which was limited to maintaining or increasing a position in the enterprise. And, the first sentence in this part of the instruction made clear that the purpose was connected to TCG by requiring proof that the defendant’s purpose “in assaulting the individual with a dangerous weapon, or aiding and abetting in the act, was to maintain or to increase his position in the enterprise.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, we reject Mr. Daniel Maumau’s argument that the instruction allowed the jury to find guilt if he had any purpose, even a lawful one.
Mr. Tuai also challenges the district court’s instruction on the RICO charge in Count 1, conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006). According to Mr. Tuai, the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it had to find that he had agreed that either he or another member of the enterprise, TCG, would commit at least two predicate racketeering acts. We disagree. 50 The district court twice instructed that a conviction required the defendant to agree to participate in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, which it defined (by incorporating the Second Superseding Indictment) as an agreement that a conspirator would commit at least two acts of racketeering in conducting the affairs of the enterprise. With this definition, the district court adequately informed the jury that it could find guilt only if it concluded that Mr. Tuai had known about and agreed to the commission of at least two racketeering acts. Thus, the district court did not broaden the scope of RICO conspiracy by requiring only that Mr. Tuai associate “in some manner” with TCG. On Count 1, the district court instructed the jury: The fourth element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the particular Defendant knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy. This means that in order to meet its burden of proof, the government must show that the particular Defendant agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity as described in the Second Superseding Indictment. The focus of this element is on the particular Defendant’s agreement to participate in the objective of the enterprise to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, and not on the particular Defendant’s agreement to commit the individual acts. The government must prove that the particular Defendant participated in some manner in the overall objective of the conspiracy, and that the conspiracy involved, or would have involved, the commission of two racketeering acts. The government is not required to prove either that the particular Defendant agreed to commit two racketeering acts or that he actually committed two such acts, although you may conclude that he agreed to participate in the conduct of the enterprise from proof that he agreed to commit or actually committed such acts. 51 For the purposes of this count, the Second Superseding Indictment alleges that nine racketeering acts were or were intended to be committed as part of the conspiracy. I will discuss those racketeering acts with you in greater detail in a moment. Again, the government must prove that two of these acts were, or were intended to be, committed as part of the conspiracy, although it need not prove that the particular Defendant committed or agreed to commit any of these acts as long as the government proves that the particular Defendant participated in some manner in the overall objective of the conspiracy. Instruction No. 33, Tuai R. vol. 1, pt. 4, at 739 (emphasis added). Mr. Tuai argues that the district court erred in giving this instruction because it did not require proof of an agreement that two or more predicate acts would be committed by a member of the conspiracy. For support, Mr. Tuai relies on United States v. Smith, where we held: [I]n order to convict a defendant for violating § 1962(d), the Government [had to] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) by knowing about and agreeing to facilitate the commission of two or more acts (2) constituting a pattern (3) of racketeering activity (4) participate[d] in (5) an enterprise (6) the activities of which affect[ed] interstate or foreign commerce. United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1021 (10th Cir. 2009). Mr. Tuai argues that the instruction does not require proof that the defendant joined the conspiracy with knowledge that it would involve two or more 52 racketeering acts. 17 According to Mr. Tuai, the district court broadened the scope of a RICO conspiracy by requiring only that he associate “in some manner” with TCG. Tuai’s Opening Br. at 46. We reject this contention because the requirement is fairly included in the instructions when read as a whole. When considered as a whole, the instructions informed the jury that § 1962(d) required proof that Mr. Tuai had known about and agreed to the commission of two or more racketeering acts. It is true that the instructions included broader language that the defendant had to “participate[] in some manner in the overall objective of the conspiracy.” But in two places, the instructions also required knowledge of and an agreement with the purpose of the conspiracy, which was to commit two or more racketeering acts. 17 At oral argument, counsel discussed whether the district court erred by failing to include the “agreed to and facilitate” language in Smith. But Mr. Tuai did not challenge the instructions based on the omission of this language. As a result, we decline to address the need to include the “agreed to and facilitate” language from Smith. If we were to address the issue, we would need to address the different terminology in Smith, for the opinion refers to the requirement (in different places) in both the conjunctive and disjunctive. In one part, for example, we stated that the conspiracy element is satisfied only if a defendant “knew about and agreed to facilitate the commission of . . . at least two of the predicate acts constituting a pattern of racketeering activity.” Smith, 413 F.3d at 1272 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, we stated that a defendant can be convicted if he “knew about or agreed to facilitate” the acts. Id. at 1265 (emphasis added). But, we need not decide whether the “facilitation” prong is conjunctive or disjunctive because Mr. Tuai did not address the issue in his brief. 53 The instructions stated that to find guilt, the jury had to conclude that the defendant “agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity as described in the Second Superseding Indictment.” Instruction No. 33, Tuai R. vol. 1, pt. 4, at 739 (emphasis added). And the Second Superseding Indictment expressly stated that “each defendant agreed that a conspirator would commit at least two acts of racketeering in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise.” Id. at 739, 773 (emphasis added); see United States v. Davis, 55 F.3d 517, 520 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that incorporation of the indictment within the instruction clarified that the violation of § 924(c) had to be based on a separate underlying offense). Mr. Tuai focuses on part of Instruction No. 33 without consideration of the language as a whole. In this instruction, the district court referred to the allegation of nine racketeering acts, reminding the jury: “Again, the government must prove that two of these [racketeering] acts were, or were intended to be, committed as part of the conspiracy.” Instruction No. 33, Tuai R. vol. 1, pt. 4, at 739. Then, the district court clarified that the defendant could be guilty even if the racketeering acts were to be committed by someone else. Id. In making that clarification, the district court added that if the crimes were to be committed by someone else, the defendant would be guilty only if the government proved that the defendant “participated in some manner in the overall conspiracy.” Id. 54 Mr. Tuai points out that when the district court added this clarification, it did not say that the Government had to prove an agreement to commit two or more racketeering acts. But, the district court had just said it—in the same sentence—in no uncertain terms. See id. (“Again, the government must prove that two of these [racketeering] acts were, or were intended to be, committed as part of the conspiracy.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the instructions (when read as a whole) adequately informed the jury that it could find guilt only if the defendant joined the conspiracy agreeing that two or more racketeering acts would be committed.
Mr. Kamahele argues that the trial was unfair because: (1) the prosecutor improperly asked a probation officer about the contents of a backpack found during a search of his home, and (2) the prosecutor improperly questioned a witness, Mr. Epeti Naa, who refused to answer questions and invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. According to Mr. Kamahele, the misconduct should have led the district court to grant his motion for a mistrial. We reject both arguments because: (1) the record does not suggest bad faith when the prosecutor asked the agent to describe the contents of the backpack, and (2) the record supports the district court’s conclusion that the prosecutor was unaware that the witness would refuse to answer all questions and invoke the Fifth Amendment. 55 1. Statements Regarding the Contents of the Backpack In the midst of the trial, Mr. Kamahele’s counsel raised a concern with an exhibit, which was listed as “gang poetry” on the Government’s exhibit list. The disputed exhibit was a document that a probation officer had found in a backpack in Mr. Kamahele’s room. Defense counsel asked the district court to bar description of the document as “gang poetry,” and the district court prohibited reference to “gang poetry” without establishing a foundation that the witness could identify the contents as “gang poetry.” Kamahele R. vol. 3, pt. 4, at 862. Later that day, the prosecutor called Mr. Kamahele’s probation agent to testify. The prosecutor asked the agent if she had found anything when she searched Mr. Kamahele’s room. The following exchange took place: A. I found his backpack. Q. Well, let me ask you this. You found a backpack in his room? A. Yes. Q. Did you open the backpack and search the contents? A. Yes, I did. Q. And what, if anything, did you locate in the backpack? A. I found a total of five items, a Huntington Beach handgun, pellet gun, three nine millimeter bullets, one .22 caliber bullet, a letter with a TC -- TCG gang information on it, and a blue bandan[]a. Id. at 1031-32. 56 Counsel for Mr. Kamahele objected, noting that “the Court had already addressed [the gang-poetry] issue, characterization, of what’s in there.” Id. at 1032. The parties and the district court then held a sidebar conference; afterward, the district court gave the following curative instruction: “Members of the jury, there may have been a mistake about what the witness saw, okay? . . . . But disregard any of that evidence, okay? That is not credible evidence for you to consider.” Id. The district court then dismissed the jury for the day. Outside the jury’s presence, Mr. Kamahele’s counsel moved for a mistrial. Defense counsel argued that: (1) the prosecution had not disclosed an intent to present evidence of what was in the backpack, and (2) the prosecutor had “g[iven] her word” that the bandana, guns and ammunition, and “gang poetry” would not be presented at trial. Id. at 1033-34. The prosecutor stated she had intended to offer the “gang poetry” document and the blue bandana, but conceded that she had agreed the air gun and ammunition would not be introduced. 18 The prosecutor added that she could not recall whether she had told the witness not to mention the pellet gun and ammunition, which were unrelated to the Wal-Mart robbery; but the prosecutor did 18 The “gang poetry” referred to the number “104,” which the prosecution had hoped to offer as evidence of gang activity by connecting the number to Glendale and the TCG. 57 remember telling the witness that these items were not relevant and would not be introduced. Ultimately, the district court adopted defense counsel’s suggested curative measure of striking all of the probation officer’s testimony about the backpack’s contents. Accordingly, the district court gave a curative instruction the following day: One of the things I think I was not clear about, and I apologize, was at the end of yesterday I told you to disregard the testimony of our last witness, Special Agent -- or just Agent Cassity, about a backpack that she said was Eric Kamahele’s. Let me tell you why I told you to disregard it. It’s plain and simple. She was wrong. And you will probably note that throughout any proceedings people make mistakes. Now this isn’t the kind of mistake where one side said it was right and one side said it was wrong, but the kind of mistake where everybody agrees she was wrong. She was wrong. That’s not Mr. Kamahele’s backpack. So you disregard it. It’s not relevant. Kamahele R. vol. 3, pt. 5, at 1059. Mr. Kamahele’s counsel did not object to this instruction. We review the district court’s denial of the motion for a mistrial based on an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Gabaldon, 91 F.3d 91, 93-94 (10th Cir. 1996) (differentiating between instances when no motion for a mistrial is filed, which is reviewed de novo because “the district court has not exercised its discretion”). A district court has discretion to grant a mistrial only when a 58 defendant’s right to a fair trial has been violated. See United States v. Meridyth, 364 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 2004). A trial may become unfair when a prosecutor commits misconduct. Generally, we undertake a two-part inquiry to review prosecutorial misconduct. The threshold question is whether the conduct was improper. If it was, we determine whether the improper conduct requires reversal. See United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 2003). We consider three factors when the alleged misconduct implicates a prosecutor’s solicitation of an improper answer from a testifying witness: (1) “whether the prosecutor acted in bad faith, (2) whether the district court limited the effect of the improper [answer] through its instructions to the jury, and (3) whether the improper [answer] was inconsequential in light of the other evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” Meridyth, 364 F.3d at 1183. Mr. Kamahele does not suggest bad faith when the prosecutor asked the agent to describe the contents of the backpack. The mistake appears to be innocent, for the prosecutor informed the district court that she had previously instructed the witness not to discuss the guns and ammunition. It is true that the prosecutor could not remember whether she had told the witness not to discuss the contents of the backpack, but we have no basis to infer bad faith. The curative instructions served to mitigate any possible prejudice. The district court told the jury that the agent was wrong when she stated that the 59 contents of the backpack were Mr. Kamahele’s. Indeed, the district court went a step further by stating that the opposite was true: that the backpack did not belong to Mr. Kamahele. This curative instruction served to lessen the impact of the stricken testimony. Finally, the agent’s statement about the contents appears inconsequential in light of other evidence involving Mr. Kamahele’s gang involvement and use of guns. One admitted participant in the Wal-Mart robbery, Mr. Fakaosiula, testified that Mr. Kamahele was the man who had carried the sawed-off shotgun during the Wal-Mart robbery. With that testimony, we are hard-pressed to question the fairness of the trial based on the agent’s stricken testimony. The three factors weigh against reversal, and we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion by denying the motion for a mistrial. 2. Mr. Epeti Naa’s Invocation of the Fifth Amendment Mr. Kamahele also contends that the Government called a witness, Mr. Epeti Naa, knowing that he would refuse to testify. To Mr. Kamahele, this action constituted prosecutorial misconduct impeding his right to a fair trial. We disagree. The district court found that the prosecutor had not known that Mr. Naa would refuse to answer all questions, and this finding did not constitute plain error. The Government called Mr. Epeti Naa as a witness to testify regarding the eleventh and twelfth counts of the Second Superseding Indictment. When the 60 prosecutor asked Mr. Naa whether he lived in Utah, he refused to answer. When asked if he had heard the question, Mr. Naa replied that he had, but that he “actually didn’t want to have anything to say.” Tuai R. vol. 3, pt. 16, at 3182-83. 19 At that point, the district court excused the jury. When questioned by the district court, the prosecutor admitted that he had known that Mr. Naa was “unhappy about being here” and “not [in] a comfortable situation,” but had not known that Mr. Naa would refuse to answer a single question. Id. at 3183. The district court accepted this explanation and found that the prosecutor had not committed misconduct. Because Mr. Kamahele did not contemporaneously object or move for a mistrial, we confine our review to the plain-error standard. See United States v. Taylor, 514 F.3d 1092, 1095 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n cases of prosecutorial misconduct in which the defendant makes no objection, our precedent limits us to plain error review.”). Under this standard, the defendant must show that the district court erred, that the error was plain, that the error affected his substantial rights, and that the error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1100. Mr. Kamahele has not shown plain error. 19 This portion of the trial transcript was not included in Mr. Kamahele’s record on appeal. 61 A prosecutor cannot call witnesses solely for them to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128, 1137 (10th Cir. 1999). But the prosecutor denied knowing that Mr. Naa would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, and the district court accepted this statement as truthful. Even if the finding constituted an obvious error, however, reversal would be unwarranted because Mr. Kamahele has not shown any effect on his substantial rights. See United States v. Gonzalez Edeza, 359 F.3d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that plain error is established only “[i]f all four prongs are satisfied”). Mr. Kamahele’s substantial rights were not involved. The trial involved eight defendants, and the jury had no reason to suspect that Mr. Naa would testify about Mr. Kamahele. Accordingly, Mr. Kamahele provides no basis for us to find plain error from Mr. Naa’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment.
The police used a photo array to identify the Gen X robbers. Two of the victims identified a robber from the photographs, and the individual identified was Mr. Kepa Maumau. He argued that the array was unduly suggestive and that the district court should exclude the employees’ identifications. The district court concluded that the photo array was not unduly suggestive, and we agree. Even if it were, however, reversal would not be warranted in light of the reliability of the witnesses’ identifications. 62
When reviewing the admission of a photo array used to identify a defendant, we apply the clear-error standard to factual findings and engage in de novo review of due-process issues. United States v. Sanchez, 24 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1994). When we review a defendant’s challenge to an identification from the photo array, we conduct a two-pronged inquiry. We first determine whether the photo array was unduly suggestive; if it is, we decide whether the identifications were still reliable in view of the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1208 (10th Cir. 1999). Ultimately, we must determine whether the unduly suggestive array created a “substantial likelihood of misidentification.” Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972). If so, the defendant’s due-process rights have been violated. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (“[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.”).
Under the first prong, we consider the number of photographs in the array, the way that the police present the array, and the details of the photographs. See Sanchez, 24 F.3d at 1262. Though we consider the number of photographs in the array, this factor goes to the “weight given to other alleged problems or 63 irregularities in an array”; the number is not itself a substantive factor. Id. (emphasis omitted). After police detectives viewed the Gen X surveillance video, they believed that the robbers were Kepa Maumau and Edward Kamoto. A police detective then created an array of six photographs to show the three Gen X employees who had seen the crime. Two of the three employees identified Mr. Kepa Maumau as the robber; the third was unable to make an identification. During the motion-to-suppress hearing, the Government called the detective who had created the array and shown the array to the employees. In response, Mr. Kepa Maumau called an expert, Dr. David Dodd, to testify about eyewitness reliability. Dr. Dodd testified that the “functional size” of the photo array was actually 1.7 photographs, rather than 6, based on a mock-photo array using 12 mock witnesses. 20 After hearing this testimony, the district court found that the array was not unduly suggestive. This finding did not involve clear error. First, we consider the size of the array: six photos. Though six is “a number sufficiently small to weigh heavily in the balance of factors to be 20 The mock witnesses were told the employees’ description of the suspect—Native American, medium build, early twenties, no facial hair, no scars or tattoos, and approximately five-feet, ten-inches tall. Then Dr. Dodd showed the mock witnesses the actual photo array used by the police detective. Seven of the twelve mock witnesses chose Mr. Kepa Maumau, and the remaining five chose the man in the fourth picture. Dr. Dodd reached the 1.7 size by dividing the total number of mock witnesses by the number that had chosen Mr. Kepa Maumau. 64 considered,” it does not create a “per se unconstitutional” array. Sanchez, 24 F.3d at 1262-63. 21 We also consider the presentation of the array. The district court found that the police detective had presented the photo array in a neutral manner, admonishing the witnesses not to identify anyone if they were unsure, telling them not to guess, and saying that they had no obligation to identify anyone. Kepa Maumau R. vol. 1, pt. 2, at 306-07. Mr. Kepa Maumau does not supply any reason to regard these findings as clearly erroneous. Finally, we consider the details of the photographs. The district court found that each photograph depicted a man in his early twenties with “medium complexion, medium build, no visible piercings, and most ha[d] little, if any, facial hair,” and none had “distinctive facial features or other identifying marks.” Id. at 306. The district court went on to acknowledge the difference in the facial features, but did not find the differences so “strikingly apparent” as to taint the display. Id. Again, Mr. Kepa Maumau does not supply grounds to regard the finding as clearly erroneous. 21 We have stated that the use of six-person photo arrays does not in itself lead to a finding of undue suggestiveness. E.g., Sanchez, 24 F.3d at 1263 (holding that an array with six photographs was not impermissibly suggestive); United States v. Franklin, 195 F. App’x 730, 734-35 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a six-pack photo array was not unduly suggestive). 65 We agree with Mr. Kepa Maumau that the size of the photo array weighs in his favor. For three reasons, however, we reject his argument that the array was unduly suggestive based on differences in facial features and the others’ lack of facial hair. First, we have held that a difference in facial hair—even when the suspect was the only one with a beard and braided hair—did not render the photo array unduly suggestive. See United States v. Flores, 149 F.3d 1272, 1278-79 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a photo array was not unduly suggestive even though the suspect was the only person in the array with a goatee); United States v. Thurston, 771 F.2d 449, 453 (10th Cir. 1985) (concluding that a photo array was not unduly suggestive even though the defendant’s “picture was the only one among the display exhibits which had a beard”). Second, the actual robber had covered the bottom portion of his face during the Gen X robbery. Thus, the witnesses would lack any apparent reason to focus on a subject based on his facial hair (or lack of facial hair). Third, “a photo lineup is not necessarily suggestive merely because the individuals in the lineup differ in facial characteristics.” Grubbs v. Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993). In fact, even Mr. Kepa Maumau’s expert agreed that some variation among facial features was useful. See Kepa Maumau R. vol. 4, pt. 1, at 90 (Dr. Dodd’s testimony agreeing that “lineups should not be composed 66 of individuals who are too similar to one another” and that “some degree of variation among the individuals [was] desirable”). Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the array was not unduly suggestive.
Even if we were to conclude that the array was unduly suggestive, we would decline to reverse because the identifications were reliable. When a photo array is unduly suggestive, we consider whether it is sufficiently reliable to satisfy due process. See United States v. Sanchez, 24 F.3d 1259, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 1994). For reliability, the pertinent factors include: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect during the crime, (2) the witness’s level of attention during the crime, (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the suspect, (4) the level of certainty the witness demonstrated during the array, and (5) the time lapse between the crime and the array. See United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999). The employees’ identifications were sufficiently reliable even if we were to conclude that the array was unduly suggestive. Mr. Kepa Maumau makes three arguments on reliability: (1) The witnesses are Hispanic and he is Polynesian, making the identification problematic because it is “cross racial”; (2) the witnesses were unable to provide certain details of the robbers in their descriptions, such as eye color or facial shape; and (3) the 67 circumstances of the robbery made identification difficult because the event took place in only about a minute and multiple robbers were involved. We reject these arguments. Though the employees had only about a minute to observe the robbers, they were within eight feet. The employees were not only close, but also able to describe the robber with the gun as a Native American man in his early twenties with no scars, tattoos, or marks, with a medium build and approximately five-feet, ten-inches tall. And the employees viewed the array separately only about three months after the robbery. See Kepa Maumau R. vol. 4, pt. 1, at 17 (noting that the robbery took place in August 2008). Finally, two of the employees testified that they had recognized Mr. Maumau as someone who had previously visited the store. The witnesses’ identifications were reliable, and we would decline to reverse even if the photo array had been unduly suggestive.
Mr. Daniel Maumau contends that the district court violated the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006). According to the Defendant, the court erroneously excluded “potential jurors who had indicated in a questionnaire sent by the court clerk that they would be unable to serve on a jury 68 for a six week trial.” 22 Daniel Maumau R. vol. 1, pt. 1, at 149. Mr. Daniel Maumau argues that the procedure violated the Jury Selection Act. This argument is rejected.
Under the district court’s plan for selection of petit jurors, the “Clerk [could] grant temporary excuses to prospective jurors on the grounds of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience.” Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br., attachment 2, at 4. The jury administrator carried out this plan for the trial, telling the 260 prospective jurors that if they felt service would create an undue hardship or extreme inconvenience, they should reply with their reason. Some replied by e- mail, and the jury administrator read the replies and temporarily excused those whose service would create an undue hardship.
Court’s Ruling Mr. Daniel Maumau challenged this process under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a) (2006), and the district court allowed defense counsel to review the e-mail replies. After reviewing them, defense counsel filed a sealed supplemental affidavit. There counsel asserted that “about twenty of th[e]se explanations [in the e-mails] involve[d] individuals who if subjected to personal questioning by the court may 22 Mr. Tuai and Mr. Toki join in Mr. Daniel Maumau’s jury-selection argument. Tuai’s Opening Br. at 47; Toki’s Opening Br. at 1. 69 not have qualified as hardship excuses.” Appellee Supp. App. at 2. Defense counsel then identified eight potential jurors who had been excused for subjective criteria. See id. at 2. Again, the district court conducted a conference to address defense counsel’s continued concern. After the conference, the district court found that the procedure was proper and that any possible statutory deviation would not have involved a substantial violation. The district court added that “there [was] no evidence that the venire [was] anything other than a random cross section of the community” and that “[t]he jury administrator’s excusals in no way altered or skewed the composition of the venire.” Toki R. vol. 1, pt. 4, at 711-12. Of the venirepersons summoned, 80 were selected and 15 were selected as jurors.
We review a district court’s factual determinations involving a jury-composition claim for clear error, but we engage in de novo review of the legal conclusions. See United States v. Contreras, 108 F.3d 1255, 1265 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e review the district court’s decisions de novo to determine whether the jury selection process failed to substantially comply with the Jury Selection and Service Act.”). 70
The Jury Selection Act mandates that a petit jury be composed of a random, fair cross-section of the community. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006). Remedies become available when the procedure involves a substantial failure to comply with the statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a) (2006). A failure is considered “substantial” when it “frustrates one of the three principles underlying the Act”: (1) the random selection of jurors, (2) culling of the jury from a fair cross-section of the community, and (3) determination of disqualifications, exemptions, and exclusions based on objective criteria. United States v. Carmichael, 560 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 2009). Mr. Daniel Maumau raises three arguments: (1) The jury administrator’s striking of venirepersons violated the third principle (that excusals be based on objective criteria); (2) venirepersons can be excused by the district court, but not the jury administrator; and (3) the jury was not composed of a fair cross section of the community. We reject the arguments because: (1) the dismissals were based on objective criteria satisfying the Jury Selection Act and Utah Jury Plan, (2) the Jury Selection Act and the Utah Jury Plan authorize the jury administrator to grant excusals, and (3) the excusals did not remove a distinctive group.
Mr. Daniel Maumau argues that: (1) the administrator’s excusal of potential jurors was based on subjective criteria, and (2) eight of the potential jurors’ 71 proffered bases for undue hardship warranted further questioning by the district court. We disagree. The reasons proffered by the eight witnesses were legitimate for excusal. Of the eight, four were caring for the “aged or infirm”; two would have had to drive over 100 miles each day; and the final two functioned in key business roles. Federal law defines “undue hardship or extreme inconvenience” as great distance, either in miles or traveltime, from the place of holding court, grave illness in the family or any other emergency which outweighs in immediacy and urgency the obligation to serve as a juror when summoned, or any other factor which the court determines to constitute an undue hardship or to create an extreme inconvenience to the juror. 28 U.S.C. § 1869(j) (2006). The law also allows excusal of a venireperson when the trial is expected to take more than 30 days or would result in “severe economic hardship to an employer which would result from the absence of a key employee during the period of such service.” Id. The pertinent provisions of the Utah Jury Plan excuse potential jurors from service for undue hardship when individuals are: (1) “essential to the care of aged or infirm persons” or “the operation of a business, commercial or agricultural enterprise,” or (2) “resid[e] in an area where private or public transportation to the place of holding court is not readily available.” Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br., attachment 2, at 3-4. 72 Accordingly, the eight venirepersons had legitimate reasons for excusal under the Act and the Utah Jury Plan. Mr. Daniel Maumau gives us no reason to disbelieve these reasons or to conclude that the jury administrator used subjective criteria.
Mr. Daniel Maumau also argues that a prospective juror can be excused by a district court, but not the jury administrator. Under § 1866(c), however, “any person summoned for jury service may be (1) excused by the court, or by the clerk under supervision of the court if the court’s jury selection plan so authorizes, upon a showing of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience, for such period as the court deems necessary.” 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (2006). Because the statute and the Utah Jury Plan authorized the jury administrator to grant excusals, we reject Mr. Daniel Maumau’s argument.
According to Mr. Daniel Maumau, the excusals of jurors violated the statutory requirement for the jury to comprise a fair cross section of the community. We disagree, concluding that the excusals did not remove a distinctive group that would influence Mr. Daniel Maumau’s right to an impartial jury. For this challenge, the Defendant must show: 73 (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); see United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Because the Jury Act’s fair cross section requirement parallels a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury, the defendant’s Jury Act challenge and his constitutional challenge are both evaluated under the Sixth Amendment standard.”). If the defendant shows a prima facie violation, “the government . . . bears the burden of proving that attainment of a fair cross section is incompatible with a significant state interest.” Shinault, 147 F.3d at 1271. Mr. Daniel Maumau fails to explain how the process resulted in disqualification of a “distinctive group.” In determining whether a group is “distinctive” for these purposes, we consider three factors: (1) whether the group is defined by a “limiting quality (i.e. the group has a definite composition such as race or sex)”; (2) whether “a common thread or basic similarity in attitude, idea, or experience runs through the group”; and (3) whether “a community of interests exists among members of the group such that the group’s interest cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process.” United States v. Green, 435 F.3d 1265, 1271 (10th Cir. 2006). 74 Without citing authority, Mr. Daniel Maumau asserts that the jury administrator’s excusal of prospective jurors “preclud[ed] a venire that constituted a fair cross section of the community.” Daniel Maumau’s Opening Br. at 15. We cannot discern how excusal of individuals unable to sit for a four- to six-week jury trial would distort the jury pool. See Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that people older than 70 were not a cognizable “distinctive” group). Thus, Mr. Daniel Maumau has not satisfied the first element of his burden. In these circumstances, we reject his argument.
According to Mr. Daniel Maumau, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated by the district court’s imposition of a ten-year mandatory-minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for discharging a firearm. He argues that the district court erred because the jury found only that he had used or carried the gun—not that he had brandished or discharged the gun. Based on this argument, the Defendant seeks a remand that would direct the district court to impose a fiveyear sentence. But Mr. Daniel Maumau now has that five-year sentence. After the completion of briefing, Mr. Maumau and the government jointly moved for a limited remand to allow the imposition of a new sentence. We granted the motion, and the district court resentenced Mr. Daniel Maumau to five years on the § 924(c) count. The resentencing moots Mr. Maumau’s challenge to the original sentence. 75 See United States v. Padilla, 947 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that resentencing of the defendant mooted his challenge to the original sentence).