Opinion ID: 2444991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the Defendant's Consent Was Voluntary

Text: Having determined that the traffic stop itself was not conducted in a manner that violated the fourth amendment, we now must consider whether the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. [30] This is because the lawfulness of the defendant's seizure is a question different from whether the consent to search was voluntary. See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela, 494 F.3d 886, 891 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1032, 128 S.Ct. 636, 169 L.Ed.2d 411 (2007); Salmeron v. State, supra, 280 Ga. at 739, 632 S.E.2d 645. Raising this claim as an alternate ground upon which we may affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court; see Practice Book § 84-11(a); [31] the defendant contends that his consent to the search of his car was not free and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances; see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); because: (1) Morgan and Sutton behaved in a subtly coercive manner since they were armed, the defendant was a minority from out of state who was alone in his car, and the traffic stop took place on a dark area of the turnpike; (2) Morgan already had escalated the encounter by patting down the defendant without justification; (3) neither officer informed the defendant of his right to refuse to consent to the search; and (4) the defendant was not free to leave because Morgan had not yet returned his license, rental agreement and ticket. In response, the state contends that the trial court's findings of fact on this issue are not clearly erroneousnamely, that the police officers did not act in a coercive or deceptive mannerand further relies on the spontaneous nature of the defendant's invitation to Morgan to search his car in response to Morgan's question about the presence of any illegalities therein. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the defendant's consent was free and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. A warrantless search is not unreasonable under either the fourth amendment to the constitution of the United States or article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut if a person with authority to do so has freely consented to the search.... The state bears the burden of proving that the consent was free and voluntary [32] .... The state must affirmatively establish that the consent was voluntary; mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is not enough to meet the state's burden.... The question whether consent to a search has in fact been freely and voluntarily given, or was the product of coercion, express or implied ... is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.... As a question of fact, it is normally to be decided by the trial court upon the evidence before that court together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence.... We may reverse [the trial court's factual] findings on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Azukas, 278 Conn. 267, 275, 897 A.2d 554 (2006). Thus, [w]hether there was valid consent to a search is a factual question that will not be lightly overturned on appeal. [33] (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nowell, 262 Conn. 686, 699, 817 A.2d 76 (2003). In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the [c]ourt has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstancesboth the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the accused ... his lack of education ... or his low intelligence ... the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights ... the length of detention... the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning ... and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.... (Citations omitted.) Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041. In analyzing these factors, the Supreme Court noted that it had determined the factual circumstances surrounding the confession, assessed the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluated the legal significance of how the accused reacted. Id. In evaluating the voluntariness of the defendant's consent, we note that, while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. Id., at 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The Supreme Court has emphasized that this rule remains applicable to requests for consent to search during traffic stops, calling it unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary. Ohio v. Robinette, supra, 519 U.S. at 40, 117 S.Ct. 417 (following Schneckloth ); see also, e.g., People v. Reddersen, 992 P.2d 1176, 1182-83 (Colo.2000) (consent to search given during ongoing traffic stop was voluntary, despite officer's failure to advise motorist of his right to refuse or to give warning pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [1966]). Moreover, that consent to search is given while a defendant is being detained does not render it involuntary per se, as the fact of custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to search. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); see also id., at 424-25, 96 S.Ct. 820 (The court noted that consent was given on public street, not in the confines of the police station, and that [t]here was no overt act or threat of force against [the defendant] proved or claimed. There were no promises made to him and no indication of more subtle forms of coercion that might flaw his judgment.); State v. Winot, 95 Conn.App. 332, 349, 897 A.2d 115 (2006) (The defendant's consent, given while under arrest in the back of a police cruiser, was voluntary because he does not claim to have been threatened in any way by anyone at the scene. He has not alleged that improper promises were made to him or that he was subjected to any other more subtle forms of coercion that might improperly have impaired his judgment.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 294 Conn. 753, 988 A.2d 188 (2010). Thus, it is significant that the defendant's consent was obtained during a routine traffic stop that, while not itself consensual in nature, also was not unreasonable by fourth amendment standards; see part II A of this opinion; which accords with the trial court's factual findings that [t]here is no evidence that the length of the stop was excessive or overbearing and that [t]he defendant was never threatened or restrained. With respect to the remainder of the defendant's claims, [34] although the officers did not inform him of his right to refuse to consent to the search, this factor is mitigated by the spontaneity of the defendant's invitation to Morgan to check his vehicle, in response to Morgan's question limited to the presence of anything illegal in the car. The spontaneous nature of that invitation, which was not given in response to a specific request for consent to search, renders inapposite the officers' failure to advise the defendant of his right to refuse to consent to the search. United States v. Brown, 563 F.3d 410, 416 (9th Cir.2009); see also id. ([a]lthough [the agent] admittedly did not notify [the co-occupant of the house] that she had a right not to consent to search, this factor is not an absolute requirement for a finding of voluntariness ... and also seems inapposite given that [the co-occupant] volunteered consent without any prompting whatsoever [citation omitted]); United States v. Pedroza, 269 F.3d 821, 827 (7th Cir.2001) (rejecting claim that consent was involuntary because [the defendant] volunteered permission for the agents to search his home and the [vehicle] even before the agents asked for it). Indeed, numerous federal and state courts have considered the spontaneity of consent, or an invitation to search without a prior request, as a strong indication of [its] voluntariness. [35] State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493, 504, 624 P.2d 99 (1981). Thus, the trial court properly found significant that it was the defendant who told the detective to check his vehicle upon the mere inquiry as to whether or not there was anything illegal in his car. We further disagree with the defendant's claim that Morgan and Sutton behaved in a subtly coercive manner because they were armed, the defendant was a minority from out of state who was alone in his car, and the traffic stop took place on a dark area of the turnpike. The defendant has not proffered any evidence to contradict, or demonstrated a void of supporting evidence, with respect to the trial court's finding that there was no untoward conduct on the part of either ... Morgan or ... Sutton and that there was no threatening, coercive or overpowering behavior exhibited at any time during this incident. The fact that the police officers were armed with their duty sidearms does not render the atmosphere coercive, particularly as there is no evidence that the officers ever drew or unholstered their weapons. See State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 45, 836 A.2d 224 (2003) ([a]lthough the presence of drawn weapons is certainly a factor in determining voluntariness... it is not dispositive [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S.Ct. 1614, 158 L.Ed.2d 254 (2004); see also id., at 45-46, 836 A.2d 224 (noting that coercive effect of displayed weapons was mitigated by manner of interaction, which did not involve threatening language or intrusion into subject's home late at night or early in morning); State v. Boyd, 57 Conn. App. 176, 181, 749 A.2d 637 (The presence of drawn weapons was not dispositive of the defendant's coercion claim because [t]he defendant was not greeted with a phalanx of weapons when he opened his apartment door for the police. Rather, one officer had his weapon drawn at the defendant's door while another with his weapon drawn remained at the bottom of the apartment stairs.), cert. denied, 253 Conn. 912, 754 A.2d 162 (2000). Thus, viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court's determination that the defendant's consent was voluntary was not clearly erroneous.