Opinion ID: 788656
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Rodriguez

Text: 18 On this appeal Rodriguez argues that the decision in Cruz requires us to reverse his conviction. The government argues that despite our decision in Cruz we may affirm Rodriguez's conviction because a separate set of facts established his guilt. Moreover, the government argues that unlike Cruz, who could have been convicted of the substantive charge only under an aiding and abetting theory, Rodriguez could have been convicted under a constructive possession theory as well. Despite the government's attempt to parse the evidence, we hold that Rodriguez's conviction must be reversed. 19
20 Mindful of the deferential standard of review through which we must consider Rodriguez's appeal, we first ask whether the government presented sufficient evidence to merit a conviction on the conspiracy and substantive charges on the grounds that Rodriguez aided and abetted a drug transaction. 21 To prove possession with the intent to distribute, the government was required to show that Rodriguez knowingly and intentionally possessed heroin, and did so with the intent to distribute it. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a); United States v. Boonphakdee, 40 F.3d 538, 541-42 (2d Cir.1994). And, as we stated in Cruz, [a]n aiding and abetting conviction must be premised on `more than evidence of a general cognizance of criminal activity' or `suspicious circumstances.' 363 F.3d at 197 (quoting United States v. Samaria, 239 F.3d 228, 233 (2d Cir.2001)). We observed that `[t]o prove that the defendant acted with ... specific intent, the government must show that [the defendant] knew of the proposed crime.' Cruz, 363 F.3d at 198 (quoting United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d 18, 23 (2d Cir.1990)). 22 Unlike Cruz, who was convicted only of a possession charge, Rodriguez was also convicted of violating section 846 of Title 21 of the United States Code. That section provides: 23 Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. 24 21 U.S.C. § 846. 25 To sustain a conspiracy conviction, the government must present `some evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that the person charged with conspiracy knew of the existence of the scheme alleged in the indictment and knowingly joined and participated in it.' United States v. Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Gaviria, 740 F.2d 174, 183 (2d Cir.1984)). `Proof that the defendant knew that some crime would be committed is not enough.' Id. (quoting United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir.2002)). 26 In sum, the conspiracy and substantive charges, both of which are specific intent crimes, required the government to establish that Rodriguez knowingly and intentionally participated in the drug deal involving Medina and Ramos. See Morgan, 385 F.3d at 206; Samaria, 239 F.3d at 231, 237-38; United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1121 (2d Cir.1992). For this reason, the government argues that it not only showed that Rodriguez served as a lookout for Medina, but also that it introduced sufficient circumstantial evidence of Rodriguez's knowledge and intent. 27 As an initial matter, we note that as we held in Cruz, the government presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that Rodriguez served as a lookout. See Cruz, 363 F.3d at 199 (Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all permissible inferences in its favor, the most the prosecution demonstrated here ... was that Cruz acted as a lookout for Medina.). For instance, the testimony that Rodriguez (along with Cruz) engaged in countersurveillance activity outside the restaurant just before Medina's meeting with Ramos, that both men remained in the restaurant for the entire meeting — leaving minutes after Medina had departed — and that Rodriguez was observed standing on a corner one block from the restaurant when Medina and Cruz met with Ramos in the Lincoln Town Car, permitted the jury to conclude that Rodriguez acted as a lookout. Nevertheless, as in Cruz, a critical question remains: whether the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Rodriguez had the knowledge and specific intent to aid and abet a drug transaction. See Samaria, 239 F.3d at 237-38 (In conspiracy cases in which defendants acted as lookouts, we have upheld convictions only when other indicia of the elements of the underlying substantive offense have been in evidence.); see also United States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1487 (5th Cir.1995) (noting that evidence establishing that defendant acted as a lookout was alone insufficient to show that he knew he was conducting countersurveillance for a drug transaction); United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 91-92 (3d Cir.1988) (holding despite evidence that defendant acted as a lookout, absence of evidence linking defendant to the specific object of crime was fatal to prosecution). 28 On appeal, the government posits that four pieces of evidence provided indicia of Rodriguez's knowledge and specific intent. First, the government points to Rodriguez's Lincoln Town Car — the car in which Medina and Cruz were arrested and from which the drugs were seized. Although there was evidence presented that the car was registered to someone other than Rodriguez, the government offered testimony that after Rodriguez's arrest he asked a DEA agent where his car was being kept. Moreover, the government also offered the documents bearing Rodriguez's name — which were seized from the car — to establish that the Lincoln Town Car belonged to Rodriguez. However, even assuming that the government established that the vehicle belonged to Rodriguez, this does not adequately prove that Rodriguez knew the specific nature of the deal between Medina and Ramos. See, e.g., Samaria, 239 F.3d at 237 (holding that although defendant transported stolen goods in his car, the evidence was not sufficient to support the conclusion that [the defendant] knew that the goods were stolen). 29 Second, the government argues that it presented evidence that the heroin was seized from an area of the Lincoln Town Car in reasonable proximity to where Rodriguez had sat moments earlier. On this point the government contends that minutes before Medina returned to the Boston Market parking lot with the heroin and met with Ramos the DEA agents observed the Lincoln Town Car pass the restaurant carrying three individuals, with someone sitting in the back seat. Although surveillance did not reveal who sat where, the government argues that Rodriguez must have been the back seat passenger because Cruz drove the car when it later pulled into the parking lot, while Medina sat in the front passenger seat. However, given that the testimony at trial established that Medina left the Boston Market meeting on foot, with Rodriguez and Cruz following in the Lincoln Town Car, it would be equally plausible that Medina (the last to be picked up) sat in the back seat and moved to the front when Rodriguez exited the car. Thus, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we cannot accept the premise of the government's argument — that Rodriguez necessarily sat in the car's back seat in proximity to the heroin. See Friedman, 300 F.3d at 124 (holding that where the Government seeks to prove a fact that is also an element of the offense by circumstantial evidence, `[w]e must ... be satisfied that the inferences are sufficiently supported to permit a rational juror to find that the element, like all elements, is established beyond a reasonable doubt') (quoting United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1043 (2d Cir.1995)) (alterations in original). 30 Moreover, even if we were to accept the government's premise that a jury could reasonably conclude that Rodriguez sat in the back seat of the car, the government would have us conclude that the heroin was in plain view or could somehow be identified if one were sitting next to it, such that Rodriguez would have been aware of the nature of the transaction. We cannot so hold. As we explained in Cruz, the heroin was hidden inside a telephone box and also wrapped in two bags. See Cruz, 363 F.3d at 198 (stating that the heroin was hidden in the back of the vehicle inside both a telephone box and a plastic bag) (emphasis added); see also Samaria, 239 F.3d at 237 (holding that the government did not present sufficient evidence of the defendant's intent to engage in a conspiracy to receive or possess stolen goods when defendant rode in car with boxes of stolen goods because the exterior appearance of the boxes was equally consistent with any number of different criminal offenses including the receipt and possession of drugs, illegal weapons, counterfeit currency, or the receipt of legal goods such as drug paraphernalia that would later be employed in a criminal endeavor). Accordingly, even were we to assume that Rodriguez sat near the heroin, this fact may not serve as circumstantial evidence adequate to prove Rodriguez's knowledge and intent. 31 Third, the government argues that by establishing that Rodriguez brought weapons with him, it presented the jury with indicia of Rodriguez's knowledge and intent to partake in a drug deal. To advance this argument, the government points to the taser gun and OC spray that were seized from a locked briefcase inside the Lincoln Town Car. When coupled with Agent Fleming's expert testimony that it is common to recover weapons at a narcotics arrest, the government supposes that the jury could have reasonably inferred that Rodriguez brought weapons because he knew Medina would be engaging in a narcotics transaction. 2 Crediting Agent Fleming's testimony — although we note the weapons were kept in a locked briefcase when Medina met with Ramos — the government nonetheless failed to prove that Rodriguez knew the purpose of his countersurveillance was to facilitate a narcotics deal. See, e.g., Friedman, 300 F.3d at 126. 32 Finally, the government highlights the telephone calls and pages placed between Rodriguez and Medina as circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Rodriguez knew Medina was engaged in a drug deal. Drawing all inferences in the government's favor, we conclude that from this evidence the jury reasonably could have concluded that Medina spoke to Rodriguez during these calls and that they discussed some aspects of the transaction, such as how Rodriguez and Cruz should conduct the countersurveillance or where Rodriguez and Cruz were to meet Medina after he exited the Boston Market on foot. Critically absent, however, is any evidence of the precise contents of the conversations. Compare Labat, 905 F.2d at 22 (affirming a conviction for conspiracy to distribute narcotics when a defendant who served as a lookout was also overhead using coded drug language during telephone conversations), with Wexler, 838 F.2d at 91 (holding that although defendant who served as a lookout during sale of narcotics was in communication with the seller at various times throughout the operation there was missing ... any evidence that [the defendant] knew that [the sale involved] a controlled substance). Accordingly, standing alone the toll records offered at trial fail to support the conclusion that Rodriguez knew why Medina met with Ramos. For the foregoing reasons, even when the evidence is viewed cumulatively and in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that the evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate that Rodriguez knew the specific nature of the conspiracy or underlying crime, [such that] he has met the `heavy burden' faced by defendants seeking to overturn a conviction on grounds that the evidence was insufficient. Friedman, 300 F.3d at 126. 33
34 Having failed to provide sufficient proof of [Rodriguez's] specific knowledge and intent regarding the crimes charged through circumstantial evidence, Samaria, 239 F.3d at 238, the government argues that the jury could have convicted Rodriguez of the substantive charge on a constructive possession theory of liability as well. We disagree. 35 We first note that at trial the government did not differentiate the roles Rodriguez and Cruz played in the transaction, and on appeal in Cruz the government affirmatively represented that it sought to convict Cruz only on an aiding and abetting theory. See Cruz, 363 F.3d at 197 (In this case, the government concedes that it sought to convict Cruz of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing heroin on the basis of `an aiding and abetting theory.'); id. at 200 (holding that the government did not offer proof sufficient to convince a reasonable jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Cruz was guilty of aiding and abetting the drug transaction at issue in this appeal). Nonetheless, perhaps in response to our holding in Cruz, the government now argues that Rodriguez could have been convicted under either theory. 36 To establish constructive possession, the government must demonstrate that Rodriguez had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the heroin. United States v. Payton, 159 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir.1998). [M]ere presence at the location of contraband does not establish possession. United States v. Rios, 856 F.2d 493, 496 (2d Cir.1988) (per curiam). Thus, in Samaria, we held that although an individual rode as a passenger in his own car while it contained contraband, he was not in constructive possession of stolen goods because [t]here is no evidence that [the defendant] handled any of the boxes or directed where they were to be taken or what was to be done with them. 239 F.3d at 239. Mere proximity or presence is therefore insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession. See United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir.1992). 37 Here, as a threshold matter and as previously discussed, the government did not present evidence to permit a rational jury to conclude that Rodriguez sat in the back of the Town Car. Rather, the evidence merely showed that just before Medina and Cruz pulled into the Boston Market parking lot three individuals had been in the car. Yet, even if the jury reasonably could have inferred that Rodriguez was in the back seat of the car, this only would establish his proximity to a box that had heroin concealed inside of it. Similar to the situation we considered in Samaria, the government did not offer evidence to show that Rodriguez exercised dominion or control over the box containing the heroin, a necessary predicate to a constructive possession finding. See Samaria, 239 F.3d at 239. Therefore, there was insufficient evidence on which a reasonable factfinder could have found Rodriguez guilty under a constructive possession theory. 38 Because we decide that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on both the conspiracy and substantive counts, we need not address the other issues raised on appeal. See, e.g., Glenn, 312 F.3d at 60.