Opinion ID: 788043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authorization of Suspension

Text: 9 The LMRDA provides, in part, that: (1) Equal rights. Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws. 10 (2) Freedom of speech and assembly. Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations. 11 29 U.S.C. § 411(a). Hughes and Burke contend that suspension is not a valid form of discipline under the Union constitution or rules and is therefore not reasonable under §§ 411(a) or (b). Thus, their argument goes, they have raised genuine issues of material fact as to their equal rights and freedom of speech claims. The Union, on the other hand, contends that suspension is indeed authorized by the Union constitution's broad grant of authority to local chapters to fashion remedies for infractions of Union rules and that, under the circumstances, suspension was a reasonable punishment, permissible under the LMRDA. 12 We easily conclude that the suspensions imposed by Local # 45 on Hughes and Burke were authorized and reasonable. 2 First, the LMRDA does not bar suspension as a form of disciplinary action — in fact, the Act contemplates suspension. It explicitly provides that [n]o member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (emphasis added). In addition, we have held that union membership does not confer an unqualified right to exercise rights of membership and stated that a union has the power to discipline members by suspending them from union privileges for a reasonable period provided they had violated a legitimate rule aimed at preventing disruption of union business and been afforded a full and fair hearing. Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union, Local 10, 605 F.2d 1228, 1238-39 (2d Cir.1979); accord Reyes v. Laborers' International Union Local 16, 464 F.2d 595 (10th Cir.1972) (stating that the court was not moved by appellant's argument that the suspension ... violated his rights as a Union member. Suspension is expressly recognized in 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) as one of the disciplinary actions....). 13 Second, suspension from union membership is consistent with the Union's constitution and by-laws. Hughes and Burke contend that because suspensions are not expressly mentioned in the constitution's provisions relating to discipline, they are not authorized. They point to the provision in the Constitution which provides that [a] Member who violates any provision of this Constitution or the District Council Constitution shall be fined not less than $10.00 nor more than $250.00, except as otherwise provided, and may, in appropriate circumstances, be removed from Office, barred from Office, or expelled from Membership. Local # 45 Const., art. XIII(1)(D). They also point us to the provisions of the Local # 45 constitution and the Constitution, Rules of Order and Codes of the International Union (International Constitution), which set forth the offenses for which they were charged and convicted. Each of these provisions sets forth the maximum fine that can be imposed and whether or not expulsion is a possible punishment for the offense. Hughes and Burke argue that since suspension is not mentioned as a possible sanction in any of these provisions, it was an unauthorized punishment. 14 We are unpersuaded. While it is true that Code 5 of the International Constitution, dealing with offenses, lists fines, expulsion, removal from office, and a bar on office holding as possible punishments for various offenses, nothing in that language suggests that these penalties are exclusive. Int'l Const., code 5, § 2. Rather, the more appropriate reading is that they are intended to define the maximum punishments for various offenses, specifically setting forth which offenses warrant particularly heavy sanctions, whether in the form of high fines or expulsion. Just as the Union would have the ability to set a fine that was less than the maximum, so too would the Union have the authority, when appropriate, to mandate suspension, a milder sanction than expulsion. Code 6, § 2(I)(2) supports this conclusion. It provides that [t]he trial body may impose any penalty not inconsistent with the [International Constitution], or any applicable Constitution or law of an affiliate, including an order to perform or refrain from performing certain acts. If fines, expulsion, removal from office, or a bar on office-holding were the only permissible punishments, § 2(I)(2)'s language concerning orders to perform or refrain from certain acts would be superfluous. Thus, Code 6 explicitly provides the trial body with the authority to assign different punishments as long as they are consistent with other applicable rules. This provision would prevent the Union from imposing a fine above the maximum set by Code 5 or from expelling a member for an offense where expulsion was not a listed sanction. But the provision does not prevent the Union from suspending a member in circumstances where the more harsh sanction of expulsion would be authorized. 15 This natural reading of the International Constitution also comports with longstanding Union practice. The record establishes that the International has, quite logically, long viewed suspension as a far less drastic punishment than expulsion and that its Executive Board has affirmed numerous suspensions. The record also reflects that where the Board has reversed decisions involving suspensions, it has not done so because that remedy was unavailable, but for other reasons. We, of course, defer to a union's construction of its own constitution and rules unless that interpretation is patently unreasonable. Sim v. New York Mailers' Union No. 6, 166 F.3d 465, 470 (2d Cir.1999); Fulk v. United Transp. Union, 160 F.3d 405, 408-09 (7th Cir.1998); Newell v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 789 F.2d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir.1986); Stelling v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 587 F.2d 1379, 1389 (9th Cir.1978). Our conclusion that there is nothing unreasonable about the Union's interpretation of it's constitution and by-laws as authorizing suspensions in situations where the more drastic penalty of expulsion would theoretically be permissible compels us to defer to that interpretation. 16 Finally, our own case law supports the conclusion that suspension is authorized. In Rosario, for example, union members challenged their suspension from union meetings as unauthorized by the LMRDA. We rejected that claim, concluding that suspension does not mean, as the appellants argue here, that the union is acting in some arbitrary fashion to suppress dissent or to sacrifice democracy in the interest of efficiency. 605 F.2d at 1239. Rather, we noted that suspension of a union member's right to attend meetings cannot imperil union democracy or oppress the union member when the union would be entitled to suspend the member ... altogether and that any reasonable sanction imposed in accordance with § 101(a)(5)'s due process requirements would be consistent with § 101(a)(1)'s equal rights guarantee. Id. Here, we hold that suspension from membership privileges does not threaten union democracy or unduly burden the union member when the offense committed would warrant total expulsion from the union. Since there is no contention that § 101(a)(5)'s procedural guarantees were disregarded, appellants' claim that § 101(a)(1) and (a)(2) were violated by the Union fails. 17 Hughes and Burke seek to distinguish Rosario on two grounds: (1) they contend that the union rules in that case explicitly permitted suspension, Rosario v. Dolgen, 441 F.Supp. 657, 661 (S.D.N.Y.1977), and (2) they argue that the union in Rosario only suspended the members from attending meetings but not from voting, nominating candidates for union office, or running for office. We do not find these distinctions material. First, just as the union rules in Rosario explicitly contemplated suspensions, we have found that the International Constitution's broad grant of disciplinary authority also authorizes reasonable suspensions; it merely does not do so explicitly. Second, there is nothing to indicate that if the suspension in Rosario had extended to other rights our Court would have held differently. In fact, we noted that even though the plaintiffs retained the right to vote, nominate candidates, and run for office, there rights perhaps had little practical value to one barred from attending membership meetings. Rosario, 605 F.2d 1228, 1239 n. 15. Consequently, we conclude that the extent of the suspension is immaterial and that Local # 45 was authorized to suspend Hughes and Burke from union membership for a reasonable period of time when the offense committed was one for which the greater penalty of expulsion was authorized.