Opinion ID: 801681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scheringer’s sentence

Text: Finally, Scheringer challenges his forty-year sentence, a downward departure from the Guideline range of life imprisonment, in three ways. He argues that the district court based its sentence on its personal view of the charged crime, rather than a reasoned analysis; that the court gave flawed or incorrect weight to the need to protect the public from further crimes; and that the court misunderstood its authority to depart downward based on on Scheringer’s alleged diminished capacity. All three arguments lack merit. First, the district court’s lengthy discussion at the sentencing of the severity of Scheringer’s crimes was unremarkable given the huge losses sustained by investors and the scope and duration of the conspiracy. There is no evidence that the district court, which actually departed downward from the Guideline range, based its sentence on animosity of the type that the Third Circuit found impermissible in United States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 550-53 (3d Cir. 2009) (vacating a below-Guidelines sentence for possession of child pornography), the case on which Scheringer principally relies. Second, the district court did not err by considering the need to protect the public in determining an appropriate sentence. To the contrary, Congress has expressly directed courts to consider this factor in imposing sentences. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (a sentencing court “shall consider . . . the need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”). As the district court reasonably found, the fact that Scheringer 6 continued to conduct aspects of the scheme while incarcerated supported the conclusion that he would pose a significant future danger to the public. Third, this Court may not review the district court’s discretionary decision to depart downward; we may only vacate “when a sentencing court misapprehended the scope of its authority to depart or the sentence was otherwise illegal.” United States v. Stinson, 465 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, Scheringer has not presented “clear evidence of a substantial risk that the judge misapprehended the scope” of his authority to depart downward based on diminished mental capacity. Id., quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 281 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2002). The court declined to depart not because it misunderstood its authority, but because it found Scheringer’s argument factually false. Because the court understood he scope of its authority, its discretionary decision is not reviewable. United States v. Valdez, 426 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2005).