Opinion ID: 2169253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Error in Prosecutor's Opening Statement

Text: Defendant argues that the prosecutor's opening statement at the guilt phase of the trial, during which he described the life histories and positive attributes of the victims, prejudiced defendant by distracting the jury from his trial defense that Detectives Guilfoyle and Ruettiger obtained a false confession. Defendant characterizes much of the prosecutor's opening statement as a eulogy for the victims. Prior to opening statements, the trial court admonished the jury that opening statements, as well as closing arguments, do not constitute evidence and that the purpose of opening statements is to give jurors an outline of what the attorneys believe the evidence will show. Thereafter, the prosecutor began his opening statement. After relating to the jury the prosecution's theory of the case, the prosecutor described in some detail the personal histories, accomplishments, and aspirations of the victims. Following the testimony of the prosecution's first three witnesses, defense counsel made an oral motion for mistrial due to comments made by the prosecutor in his opening statement about the background of the victims. Counsel stated that he waited to make the motion until after the prosecutor had finished his opening statement. He did not want to interrupt the flow of the trial until we got to this point when the jury was out. In his oral motion, defense counsel stated that there were a lot of things the prosecutor had mentioned that defense counsel did not expect the evidence to show and that there were things to get sympathy right off the bat for [the] State's case. The prosecutor responded that, based upon the State's understanding of the defense's strategy involving Debra Tennant, he expected additional background information would be presented later in the trial. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine, seeking to bar any evidence from the defense suggesting or claiming that Debra Tennant committed the murders. The motion was based on certain discovery the defense had requested concerning Debra. The State alleged in its motion that any evidence the defense might present would be based on speculation and that none of the discovery material directly implicated Debra in the murders. Following argument on the motion, the trial court denied it, stating that it would address the matter again if any evidence attempting to implicate Debra in the crimes was presented at trial. The court further stated, in response to an inquiry by the prosecutor, that it did not feel it could preclude defense counsel from commenting on the matter in his opening statement if evidence about Debra was to be part of defendant's defense. In response to the defense's motion for mistrial, the trial court noted that there had previously been a couple of sidebars where the same issue regarding background information was raised. The court stated it had mentioned to one of the prosecutors with his first two witnesses, that the courts clearly are reluctant to allow a great deal of background information on individuals who have been homicide victims. The court stated that it had given the defense a standing objection to some of the prosecutor's background inquiry. The court then denied the motion for mistrial. The court admonished the State to limit any background information concerning the victims' families and the impact the crimes had on them. A mistrial should be granted where an error of such gravity has occurred that the defendant has been denied fundamental fairness such that continuation of the proceedings would defeat the ends of justice. The trial court's denial of a mistrial will not be disturbed on review absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Bishop, 218 Ill.2d 232, 251, 300 Ill.Dec. 107, 843 N.E.2d 365 (2006). Initially, the State argues that defendant has forfeited review of this issue because his counsel failed to make a timely objection to the prosecutor's opening statement. Defense counsel waited until after the third witness had testified before moving for mistrial. In addition, the State argues that counsel's objection to things the prosecutor said in his opening statement was too vague and stands in contrast to the specific complaints defendant is now making on appeal. The State further argues that the sidebars were held after the prosecutor's opening statement had concluded and that the objections made in the sidebars were to witness testimony about family history anticipated from the State's first two witnesses, Jodi Keele and Debra Tennant. The record shows that following the conclusion of opening statements, the State called Keele to the stand. Defense counsel asked to approach the bench. The proceedings at the bench were not placed on the record. Thereafter, Keele's testimony was heard. This would appear to confirm the State's contention that defendant's objection was not to the prosecutor's opening statement, but to some other matter. The record does not show any sidebars prior to the giving of opening statements. It is well established that to preserve an alleged error for review, a party must object at trial and include the issue in a written posttrial motion. People v. Phelps, 211 Ill.2d 1, 10-11, 284 Ill.Dec. 268, 809 N.E.2d 1214 (2004). Here, defense counsel did not make an objection on the record. Instead, the first indication of any objection came when counsel moved for a mistrial after the first three witnesses had completed their testimony. Although defendant claims that he was given a standing objection to background information on the victims, the record does not clearly show that the objection was to background information given in the prosecutor's opening statement. Based upon what appears in the record, the sidebar defendant refers to concerned the background inquiry of the State's first two witnesses, both of whom were family members of the victims. Thus, we conclude that defendant did not make a timely objection to the prosecutor's opening statement. Further, we note that defendant's motion for a mistrial, made without first making such an objection, deprived the trial court of the ability to mitigate any error stemming from the prosecutor's remarks. Timely and specific objections at trial afford the trial court an opportunity to prevent most errors by sustaining the objection or instructing the jury to disregard a remark. People v. Jackson, 84 Ill.2d 350, 359, 49 Ill.Dec. 719, 418 N.E.2d 739 (1981). We note that, while the State argues in its appellee's brief that defendant has forfeited his claims of error on this issue, defendant does not make any plain-error argument in response. He does not argue either that the evidence was closely balanced or that the alleged error was so serious as to deprive him of a fair trial. Accordingly, defendant has forfeited any plain-error argument. See Phelps, 211 Ill.2d at 10-11, 284 Ill.Dec. 268, 809 N.E.2d 1214 (where defendant did not argue that alleged misstatements in closing argument rose to level of plain error, issue was waived); People v. Nieves, 192 Ill.2d 487, 503, 249 Ill.Dec. 760, 737 N.E.2d 150 (2000).