Opinion ID: 2576153
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judge Krieger's failure between the guilt and penalty phases to declare a doubt concerning defendant's competence and to conduct a competency hearing

Text: Defendant's second claim of error is premised upon the failure of the trial judge, Judge Krieger, who had observed defendant's performance at the guilt phase, to declare a doubt concerning defendant's competence when defendant's advisory counsel raised the issue between the guilt and penalty phases. At an ex parte hearing on May 8, 1989, after the guilt verdict had been rendered but before the penalty phase began, defendant's additional advisory counsel, Lucas, informed the court that the defense was preparing to have a psychiatrist interview defendant. Lucas added that he believed defendant might not be competent to represent himself or to stand trial. The court disagreed: Having seen [defendant] in the past month and a half, I don't find that he's incapable of standing trial, at least from a judicial  a psychological lay person's point of view. [¶] He's a lot more competent than most pro. per.'s I've seen. The court refused to find that defendant's decision to represent himself was grounds per [se] . . . for some type of psychological finding. The next court day, May 10, 1989, Lucas again raised the issue of defendant's competence to represent himself. Lucas explained that, having observed defendant through the guilt phase, he did not believe that defendant was competent legally to undertake the representation he's done. When the court asked him to clarify this statement, Lucas replied: I'm talking about his legal competency . . . I'm not saying that he has a mental problem at this point, and I haven't raised that issue. Newman, however, added: I would be inclined to say that a lot of it is mental, too. I don't think [defendant]  though him and I disagree on that  is mentally competent to represent himself. The court again disagreed with both attorneys, finding defendant possessed a good grasp of a lot of legal issues and appeared mentally stable. Newman observed that there had been an incarceration of [defendant] at Atascadero State Hospital and asked the court, over defendant's objection, to declare a doubt as to defendant's competency. The court replied: I have no doubt as to his competency, his mental capacity and his sanity. Newman then said that over the years he had tried to persuade defendant to be examined by a psychiatrist, but defendant had refused. When the court asked defendant whether he was requesting the appointment of a psychiatrist, defendant stated: No. I made my position clear . . . to both advisory counsel, that I am not  I'm not raising an incompetency hearing nor an insanity  nor an insanity issue. Defendant reiterated that he wished to represent himself at the penalty phase as well, and that he understood the drawbacks of that course of action. Later that day, during an in camera hearing regarding defense strategy held in the prosecutor's absence, Newman stated for the record that he and Lucas had advised defendant to be examined by a psychiatrist, to consider calling family members or friends as penalty phase witnesses, and to consider introducing his Atascadero State Hospital records, but that defendant had refused to do so. Newman told the court that there were records from Atascadero State Hospital that I think would have a bearing  I think would have had a bearing also as far as the guilt phase and the penalty phase. Newman said he had long believed that Mr. Blair might have some mental deficiency that would have been to the benefit at least as to the guilt phase and definitely of some benefit as to the penalty phase. Lucas added that defendant had spent 95 percent of his time writing writs, writing and thinking writs. He has spent absolutely no significant time in preparation of this case. Defendant confirmed that he had instructed his advisory attorneys not to contact his family members or friends, that he did not want to introduce the Atascadero records, and that he did not want to put on, in his words, a diminished capacity or an insanity defense. When the court asked whether there would be any mitigating evidence, defendant stated: I am not sure. I have to do some research on that, just what is mitigating evidence. It may be my defense will be that the district attorney shouldn't be allowed to put on aggravating evidence. I'm not sure what mitigating evidence would be  there would be. I do know that the  the insanity or diminished capacity is out, and I do know that  that compelling my family members to  to attend is out. Defendant contends that Judge Krieger had before him substantial evidence that defendant was unable to consult with his lawyers or to rationally understand the nature of the proceedings. Defendant asserts that he did almost nothing to prepare for the guilt and penalty phases, prevented his advisory counsel from investigating and presenting mental health evidence, prevented advisory counsel from investigating any kind of mitigating evidence, and spent most of his time researching and writing writs instead of preparing for trial. Defendant contends that these actions were the product of his mental illness and should have alerted the trial court to his possible incompetence. But nothing concerning defendant's failure to prepare indicated that he did not understand the proceedings against him. Further, we have rejected the notion that a defendant's choice not to present a defense, even at the penalty phase, amounts to substantial evidence of incompetence. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1373, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259 [defendant's choice not to present a defense at the penalty phase did not compel a doubt as to his competence to stand trial and represent himself].) Defendant further claims the record demonstrates that he did not understand the nature of mitigating evidence. Defendant's technical legal knowledge, however, was irrelevant to the competency inquiry. (See People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1364, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259, citing Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) Defendant further contends there were other signs of mental illness, which included his hospitalization at Atascadero State Hospital, the irrational nature of the crime, and his insistence on self-representation in this capital case. But we have rejected the notion that the existence of Atascadero records raised a reasonable doubt as to defendant's competence. [12] Further, the circumstance that the crime itself was irrational does not raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant's competence; the same could be said of many murders. Moreover, we agree with the trial judge that the fact that a defendant represents himself or herself cannot be the basis, in itself, for some type of psychological finding, because such a rule would require a competency hearing in every case in which a defendant exercises his or her right of self-representation  a standard that neither the high court nor this court has adopted. Defendant further observes that his advisory counsel expressed doubts concerning defendant's competency. Lucas clarified, however, that he was questioning only defendant's legal competency, not any possible mental problem. Again, defendant's legal knowledge was irrelevant to the competency inquiry. (See People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1364, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259, citing Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) Further, Newman's general opinion that defendant might be incompetent, although relevant, did not compel the court to declare a doubt or to order a competency hearing. ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 738-739, fn. 7, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1112, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1164, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Newman did not explain the basis of any belief on his part in defendant's possible incompetence other than to highlight the Atascadero hospitalization, defendant's refusal to be examined by a psychiatrist, and defendant's insistence on remaining in propria persona and filing numerous motions and writs. As we have explained, those circumstances did not compel a doubt concerning defendant's competence. Further, the trial court had ample opportunity to observe defendant personally. (See People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 509, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478.) In sum, whether the facts outlined above are considered separately or cumulatively, the record in the present case does not indicate that a reasonable doubt existed [or should have existed] as to defendant's ability to understand the proceedings against him. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1373, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Defendant further contends that the court erred in allowing him to decide whether or not to request the appointment of a psychiatrist. Defendant, however, was acting as his own attorney. Because the court did not find reason to doubt defendant's competence, it properly deferred to defendant's wishes on that score. Defendant finally contends that the trial court utterly failed to follow the requirements of section 1368 when it failed to appoint counsel for him, to solicit counsel's opinion as to his competence, to order a competency hearing, and to appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to examine him. [13] Those statutory duties arise, however, only if the court entertains a doubt as to the defendant's competence. (§ 1368, subd. (a) [requiring the trial judge to declare a doubt concerning the defendant's competence, appoint counsel if the defendant is unrepresented, and solicit counsel's opinion as to competence [ i ] f, during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment, a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant,' italics added]; id., subd. (b) [requiring the trial judge to order a competency hearing [i]f counsel [appointed pursuant to subdivision (a)] informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent]; § 1369 [outlining the procedure for a hearing ordered under section 1368, including the appointment of a psychiatrist or psychologist to examine the defendant].) Because the court here never entertained or declared such a doubt, it was not obligated to appoint counsel or to take the other steps outlined in sections 1368 and 1369. [14]