Opinion ID: 1193856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Park and Findlay were relatives for the purposes of GEICO's policy.

Text: Park argues that he and Findlay were relatives for the purpose of GEICO's policy, which defined a relative as a person [1] related to you who [2] resides in your household. We agree. There is no question on appeal that Park was a person related to Findlay. The dispositive issue is therefore whether Park resides in [Findlay's] household. GEICO urges that we adopt a multi-part test for analyzing whether two parties reside in the same household. Specifically, GEICO asserts that the following factors should be considered in determining whether a person resides in the same household as an insured: (1) separate control and furnishing of rooms within the same house; (2) separate family functions; (3) separate purchases and payments; (4) separate household chores; (5) eating on different schedules; (6) registered traffic address; (7) voter registration address; (8) other documentary records; and (9) likelihood of considering the claimant in contracting for insurance. We reject GEICO's argument as being in contravention of well-established principles of insurance contract interpretation. The sole opinion from a Hawai`i appellate court addressing the meaning of resides in the same household for the purposes of an insurance policy is our decision in Mun Quon Kok v. Pacific Insurance Co., Ltd., 51 Haw. 470, 462 P.2d 909 (1969). In Tirona v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 812 F.Supp. 1083 (D.Hawai`i 1993), the United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i, using its own best judgment in predicting how the state's highest court would decide the case, id. at 1085, formed an interpretation of the availability of UIM benefits under contractual language similar to that at issue herein. We note initially that, in both of these cases, the court was presented with a factual situation in which two individuals who were not residing in the same residence at the time of the accident, nevertheless claimed benefits as relatives of the insured. Neither case presented the dispositive issue herein, i.e., whether two persons residing in the same house, with no showing of physically separate living conditions, are residing in the same household. [Insurance] policies are subject to the general rules of contract construction; the terms of the policy should be interpreted according to their plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in common speech unless it appears from the policy that a different meaning is intended.... Nevertheless, adherence to the plain language and literal meaning of insurance contract provisions is not without limitation. We have acknowledged that [b]ecause insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and are premised on standard forms prepared by the insurer's attorneys, we have long subscribed to the principle that they must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and [any] ambiguities [must be] resolved against the insurer.  Sturla, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 67 Haw. 203, 209, 684 P.2d 960, 964 (1984). Put another way, the rule is that policies are to be construed in accord with the reasonable expectations of a layperson. Id. Estate of Doe v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 86 Hawai`i 262, 271, 948 P.2d 1103, 1112 (1997) (brackets in original) (some citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases added). In determining whether two persons, residing together, are members of the same household, some courts have adopted a multi-factor, totality of the circumstances approach. The Tirona court noted that: Most courts have adopted the standard first set forth in Hoff v. Hoff [132 Pa.Super. 431] 1 A.2d 506, 508 (1938) when analyzing a claimant's residency: Neither [blood] relationship nor the presence of all the parties within one dwelling is the determining factor, but rather the existence of such domestic arrangements and circumstances as would create separate domestic establishments, each having its own head and separate management. 812 F.Supp. at 1087-88. The Tirona court recited twenty-two factors that have been utilized by various courts to determine whether parties physically residing together nevertheless maintained separate households. Id. at 1088 n. 1. However, in Tirona, the parties had maintained separate residences in different states for the majority of the thirteen years preceding the accident. [2] The court therefore held, without specifically considering any of the enumerated factors, that [t]he undisputed facts show that the households of Plaintiff and his wife were indeed separate and not the type of family unit as described in the Hawaii No-Fault Law and the language of the policy. Id. at 1089. In Mun Quon Kok, the father of the insured filed a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. The stipulated facts were that: (1) the insured and his father maintained separate residences; (2) the insured took two meals a day to his father; and (3) the father received all of his mail at the insured's residence. We noted that actual residence under a common roof is not an absolute requirement. Id. at 471, 462 P.2d at 910. However, we held that [i]n this case there was no showing of temporary absence, no showing that appellant ever lived at named insured's residence, no showing of support beyond two meals a day. There simply are not enough facts to justify a finding that appellant was a resident of the same household as named insured. Id. at 472, 462 P.2d at 910. The facts of Mun Quon Kok did not require us to reach the issue of what constitutes residing in the same household, when both the claimant and the insured are physically residing in the same residence. In light of the principles of insurance contract interpretation enumerated supra, we decline to adopt a complex, multi-factor analysis for determining whether two persons, related to each other, who physically reside in the same residence, are members of the same household. We construe policy terms liberally, in favor of the insured, and in accord with the reasonable expectations of a layperson. Analyzing, inter alia, eating schedules and the delegation of household chores, as urged by GEICO, would be inconsistent with these principles. We noted long ago that Hawaiian and Asian families of this state have long maintained strong ties among members of the same extended family group. The Hawaiian word [`ohana] has been used to express this concept. It is not uncommon in [Hawai`i] to find several parent-children family units, with members of three and even four generations, living under one roof as a single family. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 410, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (1974) (emphasis added). We therefore interpret the reasonable expectations of a layperson in Hawai`i as an expectation that family members, living in the same residence, are considered members of the same household for the purposes of insurance coverage. In the instant case, GEICO does not dispute that Park and Findlay are related. The deposition testimony, noted in the circuit court's findings of fact, that Findlay and Park physically resided together at Kawainui Street is uncontroverted. [3] Therefore, we hold that, for the purposes of the insurance policy at issue herein, Park and Findlay were relatives. Unless some other reason exists to deny coverage to Park, he is entitled to UIM benefits as an insured under Findlay's policy with GEICO.