Opinion ID: 1884555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Negligent Supervision of a Child

Text: [¶ 12] Counts III and V of the complaint allege Margaret and William's negligent supervision of the child on two separate occasions, which resulted in the child accessing alcohol and becoming extremely ill as a result. [4] Count III asserts that the child sustained physical and emotional injuries in addition to the injuries alleged in the counts asserting the sexual abuse of the child by William. Count V asserts that the child suffered emotional distress and damages. [¶ 13] The Superior Court relied squarely on the holding in Johnson, 1997 ME 3, 687 A.2d 642, when it granted a summary judgment after concluding that the phrase, the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of any insured person, in William and Margaret's policy did not require Allstate to indemnify for Margaret's negligence. In Johnson, policy language that excluded coverage for injuries arising from the intentional act of any insured was held to also bar coverage for injuries in connection with the negligence of an insured when the injuries are not separate from those caused by any insured. Id. ¶ 6, 687 A.2d at 644 (involving a grandfather who sexually abused the plaintiff for eleven years while his wife, the grandmother, babysat the plaintiff). In Crocker, 1997 ME 19, 688 A.2d 928, the opposite result was reached. There, because the policy only excluded coverage for injuries caused by the intentional acts of the insured, coverage was available for the negligent acts of a coinsured resulting in the same injuries. Id. ¶ 7, 688 A.2d at 931. The basis for the opposite outcomes reached in Johnson and Crocker was recently explained: Because the negligent and intentional actors in Crocker and Johnson were different, even though the injuries were the same, coverage for the negligence turned upon the policy language. Pinette, 2000 ME 155, ¶ 10, 756 A.2d at 524. [5] [¶ 14] The two counts involving negligent supervision of a child assert injuries resulting from Margaret's negligence that are separate and distinct from the injuries resulting from William's intentional and criminal acts. The question of coverage presented under these circumstances does not implicate the public policy concern addressed in Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 568 A.2d 1100, 1102 (Me. 1990), that homeowner's coverage for criminal sexual abuse of children is undoubtedly outside the contemplation of the parties to the insurance contract. Although Margaret's negligence occurred in the same home as her husband's intentional and criminal acts, it is not claimed that her negligence facilitated the sexual abuse. There is no recognized public policy that would prohibit insurance coverage for an insured whose negligence caused injuries to a minor child that are distinct from the injuries proximately caused by a coinsured's sexual abuse of the child. [¶ 15] Unlike the negligence claims against the grandmother in Johnson in which the plaintiff did not allege damages separate from those caused by [the grandfather], 1997 ME 3, ¶ 6, 687 A.2d at 644, the negligent supervision claims asserted against Margaret here are for injuries that are distinct from those associated with William's intentional and criminal conduct. Because of this fundamental difference, Johnson does not compel the conclusion that coverage cannot be available in this action, and a summary judgment should not have been awarded in favor of Allstate on the two counts alleging negligent supervision on this basis. [¶ 16] However, the Superior Court's analysis and, now, this analysis of Counts III and V are made without the benefit of statements of material fact or an evidentiary record that explicates the specific circumstances of Margaret's failure to care for the child. Allstate's motion for a summary judgment and the parties' statements of material facts focus exclusively on the insurance policy's provision excluding coverage for injuries resulting from intentional or criminal acts and do not address the circumstances surrounding Margaret's actions. It is, therefore, premature to determine whether Margaret did in fact owe a duty that gives rise to liability for the injuries suffered by the child, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324(a) cmt. b (1965) (recognizing a duty of one who takes charge of another who by reason of his youth is incapable of caring for himself, and that the actor is liable to the other if she fails to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other while within the actor's charge), other than to recognize that Counts III and V are sufficient to suggest a duty might have existed. Consequently, it remains to be determined whether Counts III and V of the underlying complaint actually gave rise to a form of tort liability covered by the Allstate policy, as well as whether any statutory defense bars Sally's recovery in this action. See e.g., 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2904(6) (stating that a judgment creditor may not succeed against the insurer [w]hen there is fraud or collusion between the judgment creditor and the insured). [6]