Opinion ID: 1908964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the trial court properly deny Dr. Beyer's motion to recuse?

Text: ¶ 19. Dr. Beyer argues that Judge McKenzie erred in refusing to recuse himself from the present case. Dr. Beyer based his motion for recusal on the fact that Easterling has practiced before Judge McKenzie in several cases. Dr. Beyer argues that: Easterling has practiced law in Hattiesburg since 1968. He testified that his practice currently consists primarily of litigation in the Hattiesburg area. The matter has been assigned to the Honorable Judge Richard W. McKenzie, who, alone, has presided over the Circuit Court of Forrest County, Mississippi since 1979. Dr. Beyer has not resided in Hattiesburg since 1991 and currently lives in Maryland. One can clearly see why Dr. Beyer would question Judge McKenzie's impartiality given the obvious facts: an out of town person comes into Forrest County and sues a local lawyer for legal malpractice, and the judge is a local who has known the lawyer professionally for approximately 20 years. Beyer further notes that: Since 1985 there have been five reported cases appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court in which Easterling or his firm was practicing before Judge McKenzie.... Moreover, Easterling has had numerous cases, over forty (40), before Judge McKenzie that were not reported or appealed, or that settled before trial. ¶ 20. In Jenkins v. Forrest Cty. Gen. Hosp., 542 So.2d 1180 (Miss.1988), this Court adopted an objective test for recusal, pursuant to which a judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality. Jenkins, 542 So.2d at 1181. On appeal, however, this Court applies the manifest error standard in reviewing a trial judge's refusal to recuse himself. This Court presumes that a trial judge is qualified and unbiased, and this presumption may only be overcome by evidence which produces a reasonable doubt about the validity of the presumption. Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So.2d 770, 774 (Miss.1997). ¶ 21. Dr. Beyer notes that, in Jenkins, this Court held that the very same Judge McKenzie had manifestly erred in failing to recuse himself from that case. It is apparent, however, that the facts of the present case do not present as compelling a case for disqualification as in Jenkins. In Jenkins, this Court noted that Judge McKenzie's brother was a senior partner in a law firm representing the defendant hospital in a medical malpractice action and we also noted that there were allegations and testimony that the medical community in Forrest County assisted in electing (Judge McKenzie). Jenkins, 542 So.2d at 1181. ¶ 22. In the present case, by contrast, Dr. Beyer only established that Easterling has practiced before Judge McKenzie during the last two decades. In the view of this Court, the fact that a lawyer practiced before a given judge for a lengthy period of time might not, by itself, be sufficient for this Court to find that judge manifestly in error for refusing to recuse himself in a case in which the lawyer is a party. At the same time, given that we have elected to reverse with regard to the summary judgment issues, it is unnecessary to determine whether Judge McKenzie committed reversible error in refusing to recuse himself. Instead, we simply conclude that it would be preferable that another judge hear the case on remand in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety. We accordingly direct that another judge hear this case on remand, although we expressly decline to make a finding that Judge McKenzie committed reversible error in refusing to recuse himself. ¶ 23. REVERSED AND REMANDED. SULLIVAN, P.J., BANKS, McRAE, SMITH, MILLS AND WALLER, JJ., CONCUR. PITTMAN, P.J., AND COBB, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.