Opinion ID: 1477474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Timeliness of Presentment: Mallory-McNabb

Text: Appellant was held in custody for three days before being formally presented on a murder charge in connection with Michael Day's death. [18] He argues that this was an undue delay in violation of Super. Ct. Crim. R. 5 and the Mallory-McNabb rule. Criminal Rule 5(a) states that an arrested individual must be presented before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay. This court has consistently held, however, that a valid waiver by an accused of his Miranda rights is also a waiver of his right under Mallory and McNabb, supra note 3, to presentment without unnecessary delay. See Bond v. United States, 614 A.2d 892, 899 (D.C.1992) (citing cases); accord, e.g., Outlaw v. United States, 806 A.2d 1192, 1200 (D.C.2002); United States v. Bell, 740 A.2d 958, 963-964 (D.C.1999). Indeed, that has been the law in this jurisdiction since shortly after the Miranda decision came down. See Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S.App. D.C. 69, 74, 419 F.2d 651, 656 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058, 90 S.Ct. 1383, 25 L.Ed.2d 676 (1970); [19] Everetts v. United States, 627 A.2d 981, 984-987 (D.C.1993). Furthermore, [t]he waiver is valid even if obtained during the period of unnecessary delay. Bell, 740 A.2d at 963 (citations omitted). Thus, under Pettyjohn and later cases, when appellant voluntarily signed the PD-47 card waiving his Miranda rights, he also waived his right to presentment without unnecessary delay. The fact that this waiver may have been obtained during a time that might, under other circumstances, be considered a period of unnecessary delay is of no consequence once a waiver has occurred. See Bell, 740 A.2d at 963. Even absent the valid waiver, the delay between appellant's detention and presentment was not so extreme as to violate his rights. See, e.g., Bond, 614 A.2d at 901 (voluntary confession made thirty-six hours after arrest, during a sixty-two hour presentment delay, was nevertheless admissible). As the trial court found, when appellant finished his statement to the police on November 12, it was too late in the day for him to be brought before a magistrate. Appellant was presented the following morning, which was the next available time. We therefore hold that there was no violation of the Mallory-McNabb rule or Criminal Rule 5.