Opinion ID: 1974115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Essential Elements of Respondent's Criminal Offense

Text: Respondent's conviction was entered in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on a plea of guilty to an information charging him with aiding and abetting another person in the commission of passport fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1028(a)(4). The pertinent statutory provisions are as follows: § 2 Principals (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.       § 1028 Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Identification Documents (a) Whoever . . . (4) knowingly possesses an identification document (other than one issued lawfully for the use of the possessor) or a false identification document, with the intent such document be used to defraud the United States ... shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. Subsection (b)(3) provides that the offense defined in § 1028(a)(4) is punishable by a fine of not more than $5000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. It is therefore a misdemeanor offense, whereas the punishment for violations of certain other subsections of § 1028(a) cause them to be felonies. It is acknowledged that respondent's conviction was under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) for aiding and abetting a pro bono client, Ms. Patricia Shahid, in committing passport fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4). The elements of such conviction requires a legal analysis of the interplay between the aider/abetter provisions of § 2(a) of the Criminal Code and the substantive offense defined in § 1028(a)(4). The controlling precedent is Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980). As the Court observed, the Common Law dealt with parties to a crime in terms of principals and accessories, and over the years, the Common Law became riddled with `intricate' distinctions. Id. at 15, 100 S.Ct. at 2003. As part of a turn-of-the-century reform movement, Congress in 1909 enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2 to eliminate such intricate Common Law distinctions and to provide instead that all persons participating in the commission of a crime, either directly or as one who aids and abets its commission, should be tried and punished as principals. Thus, as originally enacted, 18 U.S.C. § 2 expressly provided that anyone who aids or abets the commission of a crime is a principal. 447 U.S. at 18, 100 S.Ct. at 2005. In 1951, Congress changed the words is a principal to the words is punishable as a principal. As the Supreme Court observed, this change was designed to eliminate all doubt that in the case of offenses whose prohibition is directed at members of specified classes ( e.g., federal employees), a person who is not himself a member of that class may nonetheless be punished as a principal if he induces a person in that class to violate the prohibition. Id. As the Standefer Court held, a criminal trial under 18 U.S.C. § 2 imposes upon the government the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that [the other person committed the alleged underlying crime]... and that petitioner aided and abetted him in that venture. Id. at 26, 100 S.Ct. at 2009. However, it is clear that 18 U.S.C. § 2 does not create a wholly independent crime, and indeed there is no penalty applicable to § 2. It simply abolishes the old Common Law intricacies of principal and accessory, and if the requirements of § 2 are satisfied, the aider and abetter is a principal subject to the same punishment as the other person committing the alleged underlying crime. United States v. Kegler, 724 F.2d 190 (D.C.Cir.1984). A leading opinion in this jurisdiction is United States v. Raper, 676 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.1982). As the court observed, there must be a guilty principal before a second party can be found to be an aider and abetter, but the party who aids or abets the offense is guilty under the statute as a principal. Id. at 849. According to the Raper court, the elements of an aiding and abetting offense are the following: (1) the specific intent [of the alleged aider or abetter] to facilitate the commission of a crime by another; (2) guilty knowledge on the part of the accused; (3) that an offense was being committed by someone; and (4) that the accused assisted or participated in the commission of the offense. Id. at 849 (citations omitted). With respect to the third element listed by the Raper court, the law is clear that proof in the aiding and abetting case must establish every element of the criminal offense allegedly committed by another person. As stated by the Ninth Circuit, the jury in the aiding and abetting case must find every essential element of the crime allegedly committed by the other person as a prerequisite to conviction of the alleged aider and abetter. United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir.1974). It is not necessary to conviction of an aider and abetter that the other person be tried and convicted, or even that such person be identified. United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947, 85 S.Ct. 440, 13 L.Ed.2d 544 (1964). Indeed, the aider and abetter can be convicted even though the other person is acquitted, because the fate of other participants [in their trials] is irrelevant. United States v. Sandefer, 447 U.S. 10, 20, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980). However, all elements of the criminal offense allegedly committed by the other person must be established in the case against the alleged aider and abetter. The first and second elements identified by the Raper court (specific intent and guilty knowledge) are closely related. These two elements require proof that the alleged aider and abetter had actual knowledge of the other person's conduct and intent with respect to every material element of the crime allegedly committed by such other person. For example, in a case where the alleged underlying crime was armed bank robbery, the trial court instructed the jury that the alleged aider and abetter could be found guilty without proof of his knowledge that the other person inside the bank had a gun. Since use of a gun was an essential element of the alleged underlying crime of armed robbery, this instruction was erroneous because it is the aider and abetter's state of mind, rather than the state of mind of the principal, that determines the former's liability. United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir.1974). The fourth element of aiding or abetting requires proof that the accused assisted or participated in the commission of the underlying offense. The legal standard was initially formulated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir.1938). The alleged aider and abetter must . . . associate himself with the [criminal] venture . . . participate in it as something that he wishes to bring about and ... seek by his action to make it succeed. Id. at 402. This standard for establishing the required participation of the alleged aider and abetter has been adopted by the Supreme Court and numerous lower federal courts. E.g., Nye and Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949); United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 887 (D.C.Cir.1978); United States v. Holder, 566 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir.1977). As refined by the Raper court: All that is necessary is to show some affirmative participation which at least encourages the principal offender to commit the offense, with all its elements, as proscribed by the statute. 676 F.2d at 850. We turn next to the essential elements of the alleged underlying criminal offense by the other person who, in this case, was Respondent's client, Ms. Shahid. She allegedly violated 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4), the language of which breaks down into the following elements: (1) Ms. Shahid knowingly possess[ed] an identification document (other than one issued lawfully for the use of the possessor); or (2) Ms. Shahid knowingly possess[ed]... a false identification document; and (3) Ms. Shahid had the intent [that] such document be used to defraud the United States. Elements (1) and (2) above are alternative requirements, i.e., Ms. Shahid knowingly possessed either a counterfeit or a false identification document. For purposes of determining whether the Respondent's aiding and abetting offense involved moral turpitude, the Board perceives no legal significance in the possibility that Ms. Shahid's alleged crime could have been predicated on either a counterfeit document or a false document. Ms. Shahid's alleged offense required proof of her possession of either a counterfeit or false identification document. Of course, proof of possession by Ms. Shahid does not establish possession by Respondent, the alleged aider and abetter. This distinction, however, is of no avail because the courts have held that an aiding and abetting offense, when predicated on another party's underlying crime which requires as an essential element the possession of something, there is no need to prove that the aider and abetteor possessed the thing in question. This was the principal holding in the Raper case. 676 F.2d at 850. On the other hand, the government's proof must establish that the aider and abetter had guilty knowledge of the other person's possession of the thing in question. As to the intent element in Ms. Shahid's alleged criminal offense, the statute required proof of her intent [that] such document be used to defraud the United States, which the information identified as passport fraud. Accordingly, Respondent's conviction established that he had the specific intent to facilitate Ms. Shahid's commission of her alleged crime requiring such intent to defraud and that Respondent further had guilty knowledge of the criminal venture. Raper, 676 F.2d at 849; see discussion supra. To sum up, based on the essential elements of the crime involved in Respondent's conviction, the following must be accepted as true for purposes of the moral turpitude issue: 1. Ms. Shahid had possession of either a counterfeit or false identification document; 2. Ms. Shahid had the intent to use such identification document to defraud the United States by means of passport fraud; 3. Ms. Shahid therefore committed a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4); 4. Respondent had the specific intent to facilitate commission of the crime by Ms. Shahid; 5. Respondent had contemporaneous guilty knowledge of the criminal offense, including all of its elements, as the crime was being committed by Ms. Shahid; and 6. Respondent knowingly assisted or participated in the commission of Ms. Shahid's criminal offense. The Board concludes that the above elements establish that the crime of which Respondent was convicted was one involving a knowing intent to defraud. Under the controlling rule of Willcher discussed supra, Respondent's conviction was of a crime that involves moral turpitude per se.