Opinion ID: 681588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adverse Spousal Testimonial Privilege

Text: 63 Before testifying for the government at trial, Wilhelmina Perry Garces claimed that she was married to defendant Norberto Garces and that she wished to invoke the adverse spousal privilege not to testify against her husband. Judge Johnson appointed counsel for Ms. Garces and held a hearing on the applicability of the privilege. The district court determined that the Garces' marriage was not intact, that the purpose of protecting vital marriages from the harmful impact of compelled testimony would not be served in this case, and therefore that Ms. Garces would have to testify. 64 Norberto Garces argues that the district court erred in failing to apply the standard set forth in D.C.Code Sec. 14-306(a), which, Garces claims, gives his spouse an unqualified privilege not to testify against her husband. The government responds that the district court properly consulted the federal common law as directed by Federal Rule of Evidence 501, rather than the D.C.Code, and correctly determined that the Garces' marriage was not intact before denying the privilege. 65 We need not determine whether the district court erred in this instance, however, because under both the federal and D.C. law the spousal privilege is that of the witness-spouse alone, not that of the nontestifying spouse. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53, 100 S.Ct. 906, 913, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980); Bowler v. United States, 480 A.2d 678, 685 (D.C.App.1984). Thus, Garces is without standing to contest the district court's decision to compel Wilhelmina Perry Garces to testify. See United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476, 477 n. 1 (7th Cir.1992); Grand Jury Subpoena of Ford v. United States, 756 F.2d 249, 255 (2d Cir.1985).