Opinion ID: 183028
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wilson failed to give an adequate justification for treating Clairmont differently than other members of the general public

Text: The government bears the burden of showing that under the Pickering balancing test, the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Although the Pickering balancing inquiry is ultimately a legal question, like the private citizen inquiry, its resolution often entails underlying factual disputes. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071. As we have emphasized, we must view all disputed facts in the light most favorable to Clairmont. Huppert, 574 F.3d at 701. Eng holds specifically that the government must establish that its legitimate administrative interests outweigh the employee's First Amendment rights. Id. (emphasis added). These interests include promoting efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties and maintaining proper discipline in the public service. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Because Clairmont's speech is examined in the context of independent contractors, this test is adjusted to weigh the government's interests as contractor rather than as employer. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 673, 116 S.Ct. 2342. Cases that analyze whether the government's administrative interests outweighed the plaintiff's right to engage in protected speech examine disruption resulting both from the act of speaking and from the content of the speech. Here, we conclude that Wilson has not established disruption of either kind sufficient to outweigh Clairmont's First Amendment rights. In examining whether a public employee's act of speaking disrupted the workplace, we review the manner, time, and place in which the employee's speech took place. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152, 103 S.Ct. 1684. In Connick, the fact that the employee's speech took place at the office supported the Court's determination that the speech disrupted the efficiency of the workplace. Id. at 153, 103 S.Ct. 1684. The Court contrasted the situation with that in Pickering, where the employee's speech occurred during the employee's free time away from the office. Id. Here, Clairmont did not speak at the workplace during a Treatment session or at an office meeting; rather, he testified in a criminal hearing concerning a person he was not treating. Relatedly, we consider whether Clairmont's testimony impeded his ability to perform his job duties. See id. at 151, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Perhaps because Wilson earlier argued that testifying was one of Clairmont's official job responsibilities, Wilson makes no argument and puts forth no evidence that Clairmont's act of testifying at the revocation hearing prevented him from fulfilling his other work responsibilities. Wilson does argue, however, that the content of Clairmont's testimony interfered with the working relationship between SMH and the Probation Unit. In Connick, the Court held that [w]hen close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer's judgment is appropriate. Id. at 151-52, 103 S.Ct. 1684. There, the Court characterized the public employee's speech as causing a mini-insurrection and as an act of insubordination which interfered with working relationships. Id. at 151, 103 S.Ct. 1684. To prove that an employee's speech interfered with working relationships, the government must demonstrate actual, material and substantial disruption, or reasonable predictions of disruption in the workplace. Robinson, 566 F.3d at 824 (internal quotation marks omitted). And if there are material factual disputes, we resolve all factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party, provided that there is evidence that reasonably would support such a finding. See CarePartners, 545 F.3d at 875 n. 3 (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379-80, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007)). Here, although Wilson alleges that Clairmont's testimony disrupted the Probation Unit's workplace, she cites no record evidence to support the allegation. We note, however, that in support of her motion for summary judgment, Wilson filed a declaration in which she stated that the Probation Unit's staff aired some concerns about the content of Clairmont's testimony at the monthly staff meeting held the day after Clairmont testified. In speaking to Clairmont's supervisor, Wilson characterized her staff as distrustful of Clairmont because [his] testimony indicated that [he] was still having the same problems I had discussed with [him earlier]. In other words, Wilson appears to argue that Clairmont's testimony was disruptive, because it confirmed his Treatment philosophy, which was the basis for his alleged performance issues. We must construe all evidence in the light most favorable to Clairmont. Huppert, 574 F.3d at 701. As noted above, Clairmont produced evidence that disputes Wilson's allegations of prior poor performance. In addition, Clairmont argues that the Probation Unit's expressed distrust is a result not of what he said (or any alleged prior poor performance), but rather is a result of the fact that he testified on behalf of a criminal defendant and thus on the opposite side of the Probation Unit. We agree with the Fifth Circuit's statement that [a] concept of loyalty that sweeps so broadly is not one that may legitimately trump compelling interests in speaking on matters of public concern. Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 366 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc). More importantly, there is no evidence in the summary judgment record substantiating Wilson's allegations of disruption in the workplace. In balancing Clairmont's First Amendment right to testify truthfully pursuant to a subpoena against the justifications set forth above, we hold that the weak and largely unsupported administrative interests advanced by Wilson do not outweigh Clairmont's First Amendment free speech rights. Having concluded that Wilson is not entitled to summary judgment at step 4, we proceed to step 5.