Opinion ID: 2827462
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The FBI and DIA properly withheld records under

Text: Exemption 1. Exemption 1 protects national security information, and specifically exempts from disclosure records that are: “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). The records withheld under Exemption 1 in this case are classified under section 1.4 of Executive Order 13,526, which protects, among other things, “foreign government HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 19 information,” “intelligence activities [and] intelligence sources or methods,” and “foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources.” 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 709 (Dec. 29, 2009). The parties do not dispute the meaning of these phrases on appeal or that Executive Order 13,526 provides classification criteria for certain records. Rather, they dispute whether the FBI and the DIA affidavits are sufficiently detailed to show that each document withheld has been properly classified. We held in Wiener that an agency must make an effort to tailor the explanation for classification to the specific document withheld. 943 F.2d at 979. In that case, a history professor sought records concerning the FBI’s investigation of John Lennon, of Beatles fame, in the 1960s and 1970s. Id. at 976–77. To justify its Exemption 1 withholdings, the FBI used “boilerplate” explanations taken from a “‘master’ response filed by the FBI for many FOIA requests.” Id. at 978. We concluded that the categorical approach to explaining why documents were withheld did not give the requester adequate opportunity “to argue for release of particular documents.” Id. at 979. Unless the agency is as specific as possible without thwarting Exemption 1’s purpose, “the adversarial process is unnecessarily compromised.” Id. But the Supreme Court, our court, and other circuits have emphasized the importance of deference to executive branch judgments about national security secrets, and that is what is before us here. In Hunt, we held that where affidavits give reasonably detailed justifications for withholding, and they appear to be in good faith, the inquiry ends and the nondisclosure is upheld. 981 F.2d at 1119; see also CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 179 (1985) (noting that decisions of CIA director are given deference because of high stakes for 20 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE national security); Wilner v. NSA, 592 F.3d 60, 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that courts should be deferential to executive predominance in FOIA cases involving national security); Berman, 501 F.3d at 1141–42 (observing that judges are not well-positioned to evaluate the sufficiency of CIA intelligence claims). Moreover, as the D.C. Circuit has explained, there is nothing suspicious about agencies using “the same or similar language in different affidavits supporting FOIA exemptions [because] when the potential harm to national security . . . is the same, it makes sense that the agency’s stated reasons for nondisclosure will be the same.” Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Wiener itself, in discussing the FBI’s “boilerplate” assertions, emphasized the conditional language in the FBI’s Vaughn index, which included passages such as: Information of this category is either specific in nature or of a unique character, and thereby could lead to the identification of a source. For example, this information may contain details obtained from a one-on-one conversation between a source and another individual. It may be of such detail that it pinpoints a critical time frame or reflects a special vantage point from which the source was reporting. The information may be more or less verbatim from a source’s report and thus reveal a style of reporting peculiar to that source along with other clues as to authorship, such as handwritten or typewritten reports of the informant. The nature of the information may be such that only a handful of parties would have access to it. It is the degree of HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 21 specificity of this information that endangers the source’s continued anonymity . . . . Wiener, 943 F.2d at 978 (emphasis added by the Wiener court). Wiener does not mean that an agency can never repeat language to justify withholding multiple records, but rather that in the context of Wiener, the FBI had not shown why the records at issue could not be opened up for public inspection. “Ultimately, an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’” Larson, 565 F.3d at 862 (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374–75 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). Sitting en banc in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., we affirmed the dismissal of a civil suit under the state secrets doctrine. 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Even the dissenters in that case acknowledged that in FOIA cases, where litigation is for the independent purpose of obtaining disclosure of classified information, “the balance of interests will more often tilt in favor of the Executive . . . . FOIA therefore predictably entails greater deference to . . . classification . . . .” Id. at 1096 n.9 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). Here, awareness of our limited expertise relative to the executive in national security matters leads us to conclude that both the FBI and the DIA properly invoked Exemption 1 to withhold records whose contents were properly classified. In this case, the FBI’s explanations of its Exemption 1 withholdings discussed the general justifications for shielding intelligence sources and methods and foreign government information from public disclosure. But the affidavits also explain the withholding of particular groups of documents. For example, the FBI explained that one document reflected 22 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE a particular vantage point from which the source of the intelligence might be identified, and that a group of documents—each one identified by number—contains detailed intelligence activities information gathered on a specific individual or organization and that disclosure would reveal the means used to gather the intelligence and the extent of the FBI’s knowledge of a specific target during a specific period in time. This has none of the conditional language we found insufficient in Wiener, and we conclude that the FBI has fairly provided as much detail as it can without compromising the very secrets Exemption 1 is supposed to protect. See Wiener, 943 F.2d at 979. The DIA’s explanations are sparser and the question is closer. After explaining the justifications for nondisclosure of intelligence sources and methods generally in its affidavits, the DIA’s Vaughn index used identical language for all but one entry, saying that disclosure “would reveal intelligence sources and methods and compromise the intelligence information collection mission effectiveness of the intelligence community.” But the entry for one document withheld under Exemption 1 says that in addition to revealing intelligence sources and methods, the document contained foreign government information that if disclosed, would damage U.S. relations with that government. See Exec. Order 13,526, § 1.4(d), 75 Fed. Reg. at 709. This detail suggests that the same explanation was not repeated unthinkingly for each document, and that no other information could be revealed without revealing the very information Exemption 1 was designed to protect. Plaintiffs argue that the DIA’s affidavits are less detailed than the State Department’s. But FOIA only requires reasonably specific justifications to enable a meaningful HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 23 adversarial process and review by the courts. The fact that the State Department can divulge more details justifying its withholdings than the DIA is unsurprising: the DIA’s entire public mission is to provide intelligence collection and analysis for the Defense Department. That may require more secrecy for its records than many State Department documents need. Similarly, Plaintiffs argue that Wiener demands more detail than what the DIA has offered here. We disagree. Wiener demands that the government disclose what it can without “thwarting the claimed exemption’s purpose.” 943 F.2d at 979 (alterations omitted). It is reasonable to say that the government can explain its reasons for withholding the records at issue in Wiener, relating to the government’s investigation of John Lennon twenty years earlier, with more detail than the records at issue here, in a case that relates to current intelligence and law enforcement activity of the government, including sensitive issues that may involve possible cooperation with foreign governments. “Minor details of intelligence information may reveal more information than their apparent insignificance suggests because, much like a piece of a jigsaw puzzle, [every detail] may aid in piecing together other bits of information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.” Larson, 565 F.3d at 864 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because here “[i]t is conceivable that the mere explanation of why information must be withheld can convey valuable information to a foreign intelligence agency,” Sims, 471 U.S. at 179, we affirm the FBI’s and the DIA’s invocations of Exemption 1. 24 HAMDAN V. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE