Opinion ID: 2980118
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jones was entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law

Text: 19 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc. The central issue is the legitimacy of the nondiscriminatory reason offered by Nissan for its actions – that it relied on the order of the workers’ compensation chancellor. This defense fails as a matter of law because 1) as a matter of law and fact, the order did not require that Nissan take the actions it took; 2) there was no genuine issue whether Nissan independently assessed Jones’s physical capabilities; and, 3) there was no genuine issue whether Nissan made the reasonable assessment and inquiry required to assert an honest-belief defense. a. The order did not require that Nissan impose medical restrictions on Jones Nissan’s defense, and the district court’s denial of Jones’s post-trial motions, was based on the premise that Nissan imposed unsubstantiated medical restrictions on Jones because it believed the chancellor’s decision and order required it to do so. We will assume arguendo that if an employer is ordered by a court to impose restrictions on an employee’s work activities, the employer cannot be found to have violated the ADA simply by obeying the court’s order, the theory being that the employer has imposed the restrictions without regard to its perception of the employee’s physical disabilities, and in compliance with the court order. Or, stated differently, the employer’s view of the employee’s disability is not the cause of the restrictions because the employer was obliged to impose the restriction in any event due to the court order. In the instant case, however, notwithstanding Nissan’s arguments to the contrary, it is clear beyond peradventure that the chancellor’s order did not direct Nissan to restrict Jones from continuing in the trim-fit position he was performing at the time of the workers’ compensation trial. The order only directs Nissan to pay certain benefits. 20 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc. Further, even if, as Nissan argues, the findings of the workers’ compensation chancellor could amount to an order to impose restrictions, Nissan employees continually revised the chancellor’s findings without regard to what the chancellor actually stated. Most glaringly, Nissan concluded that Jones was restricted from using “hand tools,” despite the fact that the chancellor did not make a single finding with regard to Jones’s ability to use hand tools in his job. Thus, it cannot fairly be said that Nissan imposed the medical restrictions in compliance with the court order. At best, Nissan imposed the restrictions based on its conclusion that the order required it to do so. b. There was no genuine issue whether Nissan conducted an individualized inquiry. The law is clear that an employer cannot simply rely on a third-party’s assessment that an employee is disabled. Holiday, 206 F.3d at 643, explains that an employer is required to conduct an “individualized inquiry” into the plaintiff’s actual medical condition. The record reflects a complete lack of evidence that Nissan took any steps to ascertain Jones’s actual medical condition. In fact, Nissan acknowledged that it conducted no such inquiry because it determined that it did not matter whether Jones was medically disabled. Nissan’s own physician never saw Jones or even evaluated his medical file and instead placed medical limitations on Jones citing a “recent judicial ruling.” Coss admitted that whatever the chancellor said about restrictions was not a medical judgment “in the classical sense,” but stated that nevertheless, “in the context of this workers’ comp trial and order, we treated [] this as if it was a medical restriction.” Nissan argues that it did not have to inquire into Jones’s true medical condition because it did not base its decision on whether it regarded Jones as medically unable to perform his job functions 21 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc. but, rather, on its honest belief regarding the meaning of the chancellor’s order. Nissan insists that it did not regard Jones as disabled and believed he could do the job, as evidenced by the fact that it let him perform his job until the chancellor’s decision. But that is irrelevant; Jones does not claim he was regarded as disabled before the chancellor’s decision. He claims that as a result of the chancellor’s decision, Nissan regarded him as unable to perform his job. Nissan responds that after the chancellor’s decision it still believed Jones was able to perform his job, but also believed it was required to impose medical restrictions consistent with the chancellor’s findings. Coss acknowledged that he treated the chancellor’s findings as medical restrictions and directed that the restrictions be placed in Jones’s file. Thus, Nissan attempts to draw a distinction between misperceptions of an employee’s medical condition and misperception of his legal status. We reject that effort in the context of this case. Here the misperception motivating Nissan was that the chancellor concluded that Jones could not use hand tools and could do no lifting at all. It is clear that had a doctor used the same words as the chancellor used, Nissan would have been obligated to look beyond its perception of the doctor’s conclusions and make an individualized assessment of Jones’s abilities. See Holiday, 206 F.3d at 643-44, and cases cited therein. The question then is whether when an employer takes action based on a third party’s judgment regarding the employee’s physical ability to perform the job, it is excused from making an individualized inquiry if it perceives that it is required to follow the third party’s judgment without regard to the accuracy of that judgment. Nissan argues that in such a case the employer is not acting based on prejudice, myths or preconceived notions about an employee’s physical abilities, but rather 22 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc. on its understanding, albeit possibly mistaken, of its obligations separate and apart from its perceptions of the employee’s physical capabilities. Nissan thus seeks refuge behind the chancellor’s conclusions by casting them as legal, rather than medical, conclusions. But the chancellor’s statements were neither; they were findings in support of the chancellor’s ruling. In making these findings, the chancellor did not impose restrictions on Jones; the chancellor simply stated, in response to Nissan’s counsel’s request for clarification, what the chancellor found to be the injury’s effect on Jones’s ability to perform various tasks. Whether this is labeled as a medical determination or some other type of determination, this determination concerns Jones’s physical ability to perform his job. Were employers permitted to infer an inability to do the job based on workers’ compensation findings of fact, the purposes of the ADA would be undermined. Although Nissan disavows sharing the chancellor’s view of Jones’s limitations, it nevertheless drew unfounded inferences from those findings, leading it to impose unsupported medical restrictions on Jones. This constitutes discrimination under the ADA. Although the basis for the judgment may have been the chancellor’s ruling, it is undisputed that Nissan regarded Jones as having physical/medical restrictions rendering him unable to perform his job. c. There was no genuine issue whether Nissan is entitled to the honest-belief defense. Nissan has consistently defended this action on the basis that it honestly believed that it was required to impose restrictions by the chancellor’s order. The district court rejected Jones’s post-trial motion on the basis that the jury reasonably concluded that Nissan did not regard Jones as disabled 23 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc. but honestly believed it was required to impose the disqualifying medical restrictions based on the chancellor’s order. We therefore turn to the “honest belief” rule.14 The general rule provides that “so long as the employer honestly believed in the proffered reason for its employment action, the employee cannot establish pretext even if the employer’s reason is ultimately found to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.” Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998). However, this circuit employs a modified honest-belief approach. See Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 714 (6th Cir. 2007). In contrast to the “bare” honest-belief approach described above, in this circuit “the employer must be able to establish its reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made” in order to avoid the finding that its claimed nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. Id. (applying approach to race discrimination retaliation claim); see also Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 155 F.3d 799, 806-07 (6th Cir. 1998) (in the ADEA context), Smith, 155 F.3d at 806-07 (ADA). This Court has explained: In determining whether an employer “reasonably relied on the particularized facts then before it, we do not require that the decisional process used by the employer be optimal or that it left no stone unturned. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse employment action.” [Smith, 155 F.3d at 807] (citing [Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.] Burdine, 450 U.S. [248, 256 (1981)]). Although we will not “micro-manage the process used by employers in making their employment 14 As a preliminary matter, it is unclear whether a defendant is entitled to the benefit of the rule beyond the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. See Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 714 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The honest-belief rule is, in effect, one last opportunity for the defendant to prevail on summary judgment.”). But see Weimer v. Honda of Am. Mfg. Inc., 356 F. App’x 812, 817-18 (6th Cir. 2009) (district court did not commit reversible error by instructing the jury on honest-belief rule in FMLA case). 24 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc. decisions,” we also will not “blindly assume that an employer’s description of its reasons is honest.” Id. Therefore, “[w]hen the employee is able to produce sufficient evidence to establish that the employer failed to make a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking its adverse employment action, thereby making its decisional process ‘unworthy of credence,’ then any reliance placed by the employer in such a process cannot be said to be honestly held.” Id. at 807-08. Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 2006). Nissan’s reliance on its interpretation of the court order as affirmatively requiring it to impose the restrictions on Jones runs afoul of the honest-belief rule. Coss, Nissan’s in-house counsel, testified that Nissan “did our best to try to understand [the order],” and described how he concluded after reading the findings of fact and conclusions of law “taken together and read in totality,” that the court order affirmatively ordered Nissan to impose the restrictions. In closing argument, counsel for Nissan argued that Coss consulted with other lawyers, and was methodical and deliberate in his consideration of the order. However, notwithstanding Coss’s characterizations of his own and Nissan’s efforts, there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support that conclusion. All the evidence supports that Nissan did not engage in a reasonably informed and considered decision. Neither the court’s oral ruling nor the written order directed Nissan to impose restrictions on Jones. Kerry Dove, the individual at Nissan who first articulated the “no lifting,” “no use of power tools,” and “no use of hand tools” restrictions, had not read the chancellor’s order when he proposed the restrictions. Had Dove read the order before recommending restrictions for Jones, he would have realized that the order did not mention hand tools, nor even state that Jones was “having problems” using a screwdriver, the understanding on which he testified he based that restriction. The chancellor actually stated that when using a screwdriver at home 25 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc. Jones had to take breaks, and it caused him pain; but the same opinion stated Jones had no trouble with the hand tools he uses in his job – a light rubber hammer and a chisel. There is absolutely nothing in the decision that can reasonably be understood as finding that Jones was unable to perform the trim fits job. Indeed, the opinion makes clear that while Jones would likely be unable to perform the job he was doing when he was injured, he was at the time of trial, successfully performing the trim fits job. Nor was the significance of Jones’s ability to use hand tools unnoticed by Nissan. Wade Pinkard, a job-placement coordinator questioned Dove’s interpretation of Boyte’s email, especially his conclusion that Jones could not use hand tools: In Kitty’s June 08 message she states Chancellor Smith found EE to be restricted from lifting and using power tools. In your June 14 message you opine [permanent] restrictions should be no lifting, no use of power tools, and no use of hand tools. The no use of hand tools is very significant. Dove responded that Pinkard should obtain Dr. Kubina’s opinion and that her opinion should be the company’s official stance. Nevertheless, despite his own uncertainty about his conclusions, Dove then went to the legal department to see how to get his restrictions into Jones’s medical record, and met with Coss. Coss interpreted the court’s order as affirmatively ‘order[ing Nissan] to impose medical restrictions on Mark Jones.” But Coss’s stated rationale for the restrictions of no lifting, no use of power tools, and no use of hand tools was no more rooted in evidence than Dove’s. Coss conceded that the court’s ruling did not specifically say anything about the use of hand tools, but testified that his conclusion was supported by the part of the judge’s ruling that acknowledged that Jones was having pain in his metal-line job, and that Jones had used hand tools in that job. Coss’s conclusion 26 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc. is not the result of reasonable reliance on particularized facts. The metal-line job was Jones’s position when he was injured, not the job Jones was performing at the time Coss was determining restrictions. Nor did the opinion state anything about hand tools in Jones’s old metal-line job. The opinion states that Jones probably could not do the metal-line job again because it “required a lot of lifting and more use of vibratory tools.” (emphasis added). Coss also testified that, though the court’s order does not say that Jones is permanently restricted from all lifting, he interpreted the language in the chancellor’s written order (drafted by Nissan’s own attorney) referencing a “restriction[] . . . against lifting,” to mean that Jones was not permitted to lift anything at all. There is simply no reason for Nissan to interpret the phrasing it selected in this narrow way. The chancellor had stated that Jones “can’t lift as much as he could before,” but also distinguished the job that Jones could no longer do – “the job he was doing at the time of his injury,” which “required a lot of lifting and more use of vibratory tools” – from the job he was doing at the time of the workers’ compensation trial – “Right now all he has to use is a hammer and a chisel. . . . But it’s very . . . light type use of a hammer and a chisel. . . . and it doesn’t require any heavy lifting, maybe sometime a hood, . . . it’s very light . . . they’re not very difficult to raise.” Further, Dr. Weikert, Jones’s Nissan-chosen physician, had released him back to work with no restrictions, lifting or otherwise. Also strikingly contradictory to Nissan’s interpretation of the chancellor’s ruling and order is the statement in the order, drafted by Nissan’s workers’ compensation counsel, stating that the workers’ compensation award is based on several factors, including Jones’s “ability to return to his pre-injury employer at or above his pre-injury wage rate.” 27 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc. No reasonable jury could conclude that Nissan had an honest belief based on a “reasonably informed and considered decision” that the chancellor had ordered Nissan to impose restrictions on Jones such that he could no longer do the job the chancellor found he was able to do and assumed he would continue doing. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court erred in denying Jones’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and remand for a determination/new trial limited to the issue of damages.15 15 Although our decision that Jones is entitled to judgment as a matter of law renders it unnecessary to reach most of his additional arguments, we nevertheless observe that for the reasons set forth above, the verdict and judgment were against the great weight of the evidence, and were Jones not entitled to a JMOL, he would clearly be entitled to a new trial. Further, the Court’s instructions did not fairly present the issue to the jury. The district court instructed the jury that it was obliged to find in Nissan’s favor if it concluded that Nissan honestly believed it was acting as required by the chancellor’s ruling and honestly believed that because of that ruling Jones could not perform the essential functions of his job, but refused to give Jones’s requested instruction, explaining that an honest belief is one made after a “reasonably informed and considered decision.” Thus, that the jury was instructed on the honest-belief rule and ultimately found for Nissan does imply a legitimate conclusion that Nissan is entitled to the benefit of the rule. The jury’s verdict did not contain any particularized finding and the district court’s instructions improperly characterized the rule, completely omitting the important reasonable-reliance-onparticularized-facts requirement that applies in this circuit and ignoring that “[w]hen the employee is able to produce sufficient evidence to establish that the employer failed to make a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking its adverse employment action, thereby making its decisional process ‘unworthy of credence,’ then any reliance placed by the employer in such a process cannot be said to be honestly held.” Moreover, this incomplete instruction coupled with the instruction that “[a]ll persons who are subject to an order of a court have an obligation to comply and to follow the court’s order” and “[a] person subject to a court order may not ignore or violate that order” allowed the jury to infer that the order indeed required Nissan to impose the medical restrictions. Jones objected to the instruction, arguing that because the order did not oblige Nissan to impose the restrictions the instruction would be prejudicial. The court accepted Nissan’s argument that the true meaning of the 28 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc.