Opinion ID: 159105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of New Regulation and Program Statement:

Text: 38 The BOP argues that the new regulation and Program Statement, unlike the prior ones, do not attempt to define any statutory term, but merely express eligibility criteria clearly entrusted to the BOP's discretion. We believe that the BOP relies upon a distinction without a difference. Kilpatrick v. Houston, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1330 (N.D. Fla.), aff'd, 197 F.3d 1134 (11th Cir. 1999). 39 In Fristoe, we held that the operative statute, 3621(e)(2)(B), plainly stated that prisoners convicted of nonviolent offenses were eligible for sentence reductions. We emphasized in that opinion and in Martinez that the statute addresses convictions, and that convictions for drug offense are nonviolent. We held that any use of sentence enhancements to turn a conviction of a nonviolent offense into a violent offense for purposes of 3621(e)(2)(B) was impermissible, simply because it ran afoul of the statute's clear language. 40 The language of the statute remains unchanged and its focus on convictions for nonviolent offenses still stands. The BOP's new regulation and Program Statement, like the old ones, use sentencing enhancements to effectively override the statute's clear statement that a prisoner is eligible if convicted of a nonviolent offense. Couching it as an exercise of discretion does not make it any less contrary to the statute. As a district court recently observed in an opinion affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, to hold otherwise would render Fristoe a trivial criticism of the Bureau's drafting technique rather than a substantive ruling on the meaning of the statute and the scope of the Bureau's authority thereunder. Kilpatrick, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1330. See Samples v. Scibana, 74 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (This Court further agrees with other district courts that the amendments to both 28 C.F.R. 550.58(a)(1) and Program Statement 5162.04 are an attempt by the BOP to disregard the line of federal circuit court cases that held that the BOP could not use a sentence enhancement to conclude that a prisoner had not been convicted of a nonviolent offense.); Rodriguez v. Herrera, 72 (D. Colo. 1999) ([T]he revised provision runs afoul of Fristoe by declaring a category of statutorily eligible inmates 'ineligible' solely on the basis of sentencing factors implicated neither by the nature of the underlying offense nor by the definition of violent crimes set forth at 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3).); Todd v. Scibana, 70 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (The amendments to both 28 C.F.R. 550.58(a)(1) and P.S. 5162.04 appear to be an attempt by the BOP to circumvent the line of federal circuit court cases which hold that the BOP cannot use a sentence enhancement to conclude that a prisoner has not been convicted of a nonviolent offense.); Nelson v. Crabtree, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1084 (D. Ore. 1999) ([The Ninth Circuit held] that the operative word of 3621(e)(2)(B) is 'conviction.' A decision not to allow early release may only be based on the nature of the conviction; sentencing enhancements . . . are irrelevant.); Williams v. Clark, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1151 (C.D. Calif. 1999) (The language of Section 3621(e)(2)(B) has not been amended . . . and it remains plain and clear; the BOP may not use a sentence enhancement to conclude that a prisoner has not been convicted of a nonviolent offense.); Hicks v. Brooks, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1272-73 (D. Colo. 1998) ([T]he BOP again has accomplished precisely what Fristoe said it may not, i.e., exclude categorically from consideration for early release upon completion of a drug treatment program those inmates convicted of a nonviolent offense whose sentence was enhanced for possession of a weapon and, once again, convert a conviction for a nonviolent offense into a violent one by considering the sentence enhancement.); Gavis v. Crabtree, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1266 (D. Ore. 1998) (The inescapable result of this new program statement is that it reverses governing case law by looking to the underlying facts to exclude prisoners [with firearms sentencing enhancements] . . . from early release consideration.). 41 We recognize that in reaching this conclusion, we part company with the Eighth Circuit, which recently held that the new regulation and Program Statement were valid: [w]e think that the BOP's decision to exclude these additional categories of inmates from eligibility [i.e. those with sentencing enhancements because of firearms possession] represent a manifestly permissible construction of the statute and an appropriate exercise of the BOP's discretion. Bellis v. Davis, 186 F.3d 1092, 1095 (8th Cir. 1999), petitions for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. Dec. 15, 1999) (Nos. 99-7504, 99-7558). The court simply dismissed as of no relevance its prior decision in Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1998), which invalidated the earlier regulation and Program Statement for the same reasons we did in Fristoe. Id. Nonetheless, we join the Eleventh Circuit and numerous district courts, whose reasoning we find more persuasive. 42 Thus, whether we review the current regulation or the current Program Statement, we conclude that they conflict with the clear language of 3621(e)(2)(B). The regulation is therefore not based upon a permissible construction of the statute. Fristoe, 144 F.3d at 631; see also Martinez, 164 F.3d at 1259 (noting that we defer to agency's interpretation of a statute through a formal regulation only if it is based on a permissible constructions of the statute). 7 The Program Statement is not well-reasoned nor does it have 'power to persuade.' Id. 43 In reaching this conclusion, we in no way denigrate the BOP's broad discretion to determine who among eligible prisoners may receive a sentence reduction following participation in a substance abuse treatment program. As the Seventh Circuit has observed, [c]ommission of a 'nonviolent offense' makes a prisoner eligible for consideration but does not require the Bureau to grant the boon he seeks. Eligibility is not entitlement. Bush, 133 F.3d at 457; see also Samples, 133 F.3d 457 (While early release under 3621(e)(2)(B) is open to all prisoners who meet the statutory requirements, the statute vests the BOP with broad discretion to grant or deny sentence reductions to eligible prisoners.); Rodriguez, 72 at 1231 (noting that the fact Petitioners are eligible for consideration for early release under 3621(e)(2)(B) does not mean they are entitled to early release); Todd, 70 at 785 (While eligibility for early release under section 3621(e)(2)(B) is open to all prisoners who meet the statutory requirements, the statute vests the BOP with broad discretion to grant or deny sentence reductions to eligible prisoners based upon factors other than the categorical restrictions currently imposed.). We simply hold that the BOP may not disregard the statutory eligibility requirements by categorically excluding from sentence reduction eligibility prisoners convicted of nonviolent offenses whose sentences were enhanced because of firearms. In doing so, it has exceeded it statutory authority.