Opinion ID: 1855709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 32

Heading: Right to be present in court/ defendant's assignment of error number 4

Text: In this assignment of error, defendant contends he was improperly removed from the courtroom after the Guzzardos had an outburst in the courtroom, when defense counsel argued for a mistrial during a bench conference. [18] Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 831, which governs the presence in the courtroom of one who is accused of a felony, provides: A. Except as may be provided by local rules of court in accordance with Articles 522 and 551, a defendant charged with a felony shall be present: (1) At arraignment; (2) When a plea of guilty, not guilty, or not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity is made; (3) At the calling, examination, challenging, impanelling, and swearing of the jury, and at any subsequent proceedings for the discharge of the jury or of a juror; (4) At all times during the trial when the court is determining and ruling on the admissibility of evidence; (5) In trials by jury, at all proceedings when the jury is present, and in trials without a jury, at all times when evidence is being adduced; and (6) At the rendition of the verdict or judgment, unless he voluntarily absents himself. B. Nothing in this article shall prohibit the court, by local rule, from providing for a defendant's appearance at his arraignment by simultaneous audio-visual transmission, except when the defense counsel requests the defendant's appearance in open court. On the other hand, La.C.Cr.P. art. 834 governs those instances when an accused's presence in the courtroom is unnecessary: The defendant has a right to be present, but his presence is not essential to the validity of any of the following proceedings in a criminal prosecution: (1) The making, hearing of, or ruling on a preliminary motion or application addressed to the court; (2) The making, hearing of, or ruling on a motion or application addressed to the court during the trial when the jury is not present; except as provided in Clause (4) of Article 831; and (3) The making, hearing of, or ruling on a motion or application made after his conviction. The record shows that defendant was indeed removed from the courtroom during the bench conference at which the mistrial was argued, as was the jury. However, it seems that the defendant's presence in the courtroom at this time was unnecessary, as the proceeding from which he was excluded was not an arraignment, plea, juror proceeding, rendition of judgment, or a determination of the admissibility of evidence, nor was the jury present during this argument. The proceeding was, however, a ruling on a motion in accordance with La.C.Cr.P. art. 834(2). Further, as we have previously held in State v. Kahey, 436 So.2d 475 (La.1983): Presence of the defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only. Therefore, the presence of the defendant is only essential at proceedings which have a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of the opportunity of the defendant to defend against the charge. Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 So.2d[U.S] 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed.2d[L.Ed.] 674 (1934). From this principle has emerged the general rule that no claim of error, or at least no claim of prejudicial error, can be based upon the exclusion or absence of a defendant, pending his trial on a criminal charge, from the courtroom, or from a conference between court and attorneys, during argument on or discussion of a question of law. (Citations omitted.) Consequently, defendant's presence in the court was unnecessary at that time, as the discussion of the mistrial was not substantially related to his opportunity to defend against the charge of two counts of first degree murder, and his attorneys were arguing on whether the legal requirements for a mistrial had been met. This assignment of error thus lacks merit.