Opinion ID: 2636938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Trial and appellate delay.

Text: Defendant urges that by virtue of the nearly three-year delay between our decision in Anderson I and the commencement of his penalty retrial, he was denied speedy-trial rights guaranteed by statute (ง 1382) and by the state and federal Constitutions (U.S. Const., Amend. VI, cl. 1; Cal. Const., art. I, ง 15, cl. 1). He also claims the long periods consumed by both appeals in his case, during which he has remained on death row awaiting execution, constitute violations of his rights to due process and against cruel and unusual punishment, as guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. His contentions must fail. As to the speedy-trial claims, the following facts are pertinent: Our Anderson I decision was announced on October 13, 1987 ( Anderson I, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306), and our remittitur issued on November 18, 1987. Thereafter, defendant first appeared in superior court on December 17, 1987, whereupon he personally waived time for commencement of the retrial, and the matter was continued to January 7, 1988, at defense counsel's request. On January 7, 1988, and thereafter, a series of trial continuances was granted to September 28, 1990, all at the request of the defense for reasons specifically related to the penalty retrial itself, and every day of which was covered by defendant's personal time waivers. On Friday, September 28, 1990, with the agreement of both counsel, the trial was continued until the following Monday, October 1. Defendant did not affirmatively waive this weekend continuance, but neither did he object. At no time did defendant move in the trial court to dismiss the cause on speedy-trial grounds. With respect to the penalty retrial, defendant does not argue that his speedy-trial rights attached any earlier than the issuance of our remittitur in Anderson I. On the other hand, from and after the time our remittitur issued, defendant remained under the actual restraints imposed by his affirmed conviction on capital charges, and we may therefore assume that the rights he asserts attached no later than that time. (See United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468; People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 755, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 996 P.2d 32 ( Martinez ); see also ง 1382 [statutory right to retrial within 60 days after issuance of remittitur on appeal].) Nonetheless, defendant fails to establish that the subsequent trial delay violated either his state or his federal constitutional rights. To determine whether federal speedy-trial rights were violated, courts apply a balancing test involving four factors: length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. ( Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ( Barker) ; People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 512, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521 ( Roybal ).) In Barker, the high court noted that the defendant's responsibility to assert his right is closely interrelated to the other factors. ( Barker, supra, at p. 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182.) The court explained that because [t]he more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain, the defendant's assertion of his speedy-trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight on the issue whether he is being deprived of the right. ( Id., at pp. 531-532, 92 S.Ct. 2182.) On the other hand, the court emphasize[d] that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. ( Id., at p. 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182.) Here, the delays were for defendant's benefit, not the result of prosecutorial negligence or bad faith. (See Doggett v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 647, 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 ( Doggett) . ) Moreover, defendant not only failed to complain, he personally waived all the delays except the final weekend continuance. Nor does defendant demonstrate prejudice. He cannot claim the delay unfairly prolonged his incarceration (see Roybal, supra, 19 Cal.4th 481, 513, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521), because we had theretofore affirmed his conviction on capital charges that subjected him, at a minimum, to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. And he adverts to no specific way in which his defense was compromised. (See id., at pp. 513-514, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521.) Defendant urges that the length of the delay rendered it presumptively prejudicial. In Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, the court concluded that an eight-and-one-half-year delay between indictment and trial produced a presumption of prejudice. But even there, the court was careful to note that other elements of the Barker test also indicated a deprivation of the defendant's rights; much of the delay was attributable to government negligence, and the defendant had not acquiesced. ( Doggett, supra, at pp. 656-658, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) Here, defendant himself created and consented to the much shorter delay at issue in this case. We cannot conclude he thereby manufactured federal constitutional grounds to overturn the death judgment against him. No federal speedy-trial violation occurred. [21] Where its terms govern, section 1382, California's speedy-trial statute, is `supplementary to and a construction of' the state constitutional speedy-trial guarantee, and the statute implement[s] that guarantee. ( Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th 750, 766, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 996 P.2d 32, quoting People v. Godlewski (1943) 22 Cal.2d 677, 682, 140 P.2d 381; see Sykes v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 83, 89, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90.) Thus, a violation of the statute will entitle the defendant to dismissal regardless of prejudice. The constitutional guarantee may apply even where the statute does not, but when a claim of violation of the state constitutional speedy trial right goes beyond the statute, California law requires an affirmative showing of prejudice. ( Martinez, supra, at pp. 766-768, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 996 P.2d 32.) As relevant here, section 1382 provides for dismissal of a felony action, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, if the case is to be retried following appeal, but is not brought to trial within 60 days after the appellate remittitur is filed in the trial court. ( Id., subd. (a)(2).) On the other hand, dismissal is not required if the defendant requests or consents to the setting of a trial date beyond the 60 day period, and the matter is brought to trial within 10 days after the date set. ( Id., subd. (a)(2)(B).) Here, defendant did enter personal time waivers allowing the trial date to be continued to September 28, 1990. Trial began on October 1, 1990, within the 10 day grace period. The statutory speedy trial requirements were therefore satisfied. In any event, defendant waived any violation of section 1382 by his failure to timely object to the delay and thereafter move for dismissal in the trial court. (E.g., Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d 367, 389, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221.) Accordingly, defendant cannot prevail on a statutory speedy-trial claim, nor can he succeed on a state constitutional theory dependent on violation of the statute. Moreover, as noted above, defendant has demonstrated no prejudice from the delay in bringing him to retrial. Hence, to the extent he claims a nonstatutory form of state speedy-trial violation, his claim must be rejected. [22] Defendant's claims that delays in the appellate process have denied him due process and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment also lack merit. Though excessive appellate delays may sometimes result in a denial of due process, defendant fails to identify any concrete prejudice from the delay, such as an impairment of grounds for appeal. Hence, his due process claim must fail. ( Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1141, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478; see also United States v. Loud Hawk (1986) 474 U.S. 302, 313-314, 106 S.Ct. 648, 88 L.Ed.2d 640; Coe v. Thurman (9th Cir.1990) 922 F.2d 528, 530.) Finally, we must dismiss defendant's claim that his execution after two decades of confinement on death row would be cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant notes that two justices of the United States Supreme Court (Justices Stevens and Breyer) have expressed interest in this issue. ( Lackey v. Texas (1995) 514 U.S. 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421, 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (mem. opn. of Stevens, J., on denial of cert.).) However, we have consistently concluded, both before and since Lackey, that delay inherent in the automatic appeal process is not a basis for concluding that either the death penalty itself, or the process leading to its execution, is cruel and unusual punishment. ( People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 574, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 967 P.2d 29 ( Massie ); People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1016, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984; see also Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 1030-1031, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) As we have explained, the automatic appeal process following judgments of death is a constitutional safeguard, not a constitutional defect ( Massie, supra, 19 Cal.4th 550, 574, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 967 P.2d 29; People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th 959, 1014, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984), because it assures careful review of the defendant's conviction and sentence ( Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 1031, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183). Moreover, an argument that one under judgment of death suffers cruel and unusual punishment by the inherent delays in resolving his appeal is untenable. If the appeal results in reversal of the death judgment, he has suffered no conceivable prejudice, while if the judgment is affirmed, the delay has prolonged his life. ( People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 1015-1016, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984.) Indeed, from and after October 1987, when we affirmed the guilt judgment and special circumstance findings in Anderson I, defendant has had no conceivable complaint about his extended incarceration awaiting appeal, because life without possibility of parole was the minimum sentence he faced. We reiterate our determination that appellate delay in a capital case is not cruel and unusual punishment.