Opinion ID: 215941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mr. Watson's Retaliation Claim

Text: Mr. Watson next asserts a claim of retaliation under the ADA, arguing that C.R. England impermissibly retaliated against him by sending the debt he owed under the Lease Agreement to a collection agency in response to the complaint he filed with EEOC. [18] Under ADA § 503 which prohibits employer retaliation and coercion[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, Mr. Watson must demonstrate (1) that he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Proctor, 502 F.3d at 1208 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir.2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Mr. Watson has offered no direct evidence of discrimination regarding C.R. England's report of his debt to the collection agency, we analyze his retaliation claim under the burden-shifting framework delineated in McDonnell Douglas. Proctor, 502 F.3d at 1207-08. In this instance, Mr. Watson's retaliation claim fails for two reasons: (1) he has not demonstrated a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action, and therefore he cannot make out a prima facie case; and (2) even if he could make out a prima facie case of retaliation, C.R. England has put forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for attempting to collect the debt, which Mr. Watson has not shown is mere pretext masking discriminatory animus, id. (quoting Piercy, 480 F.3d at 1198) (internal quotation marks omitted). First, under the evidence presented, Mr. Watson has not shown a causal connection between his filing of the EEOC complaint and the collection of his debts owed under the Lease Agreement. A causal connection between a protected action and a subsequent adverse action can be shown through evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive, such as protected conduct closely followed by adverse action. Id. at 1208 (quoting Haynes, 456 F.3d at 1228) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the record does not include the precise amount of time that passed between the filing of the complaint and the reporting of the debt, Mr. Watson acknowledges in his brief that the submission of his debt to the collection agency occurred well over a year after the initial dispute, Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 48, which is too large of a gap to raise an inference of retaliatory motive on its own, see, e.g., Proctor, 502 F.3d at 1208 (finding that a four-month gap between the protected action and the alleged retaliatory action was too large a time gap to establish a causal connection); Piercy, 480 F.3d at 1198 (stating that an adverse employment action that happened more than three months after the protected activity was not entitled to a presumption of causation). If the adverse employment action was not  very closely connected in time to the protected activitywhich, as Mr. Watson concedes, it was not in the present case the plaintiff must rely on additional evidence beyond temporal proximity to establish causation. Piercy, 480 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d at 1179) (internal quotation marks omitted). The only additional evidence presented by Mr. Watson was that the company failed to abide by an arbitration provision contained in the ICOA and Lease Agreement. However, he fails to explain how this establishes a causal connection between his EEOC complaint and the alleged adverse action of sending his debt to a collection agency, and we do not think that it does so. Because he offers no other evidence to demonstrate the necessary connection, Mr. Watson has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. In addition, even if Mr. Watson could make out his prima facie case, C.R. England has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for reporting the debt to a collection agency. Specifically, it has demonstrated that the amount charged off was a just debt that Mr. Watson genuinely owed under the lease agreement. C.R. England Br., No. 09-4217, at 46. Mr. Watson does not contest this on appeal. Because the company has put forth an acceptable justification for its actions, the burden then shifted back to Mr. Watson to show that C.R. England's proffered reason was mere pretext. Proctor, 502 F.3d at 1208. As discussed above, Mr. Watson can meet this burden by demonstrating `such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.' Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1997)). However, [m]ere conjecture that the employer's explanation is pretext is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. In arguing that C.R. England acted with a discriminatory animus, Mr. Watson states that Defendant England's actions can only be viewed as an intimidation tactic to dissuade Plaintiff Watson from pursuing his ADA complaint, because the company did not abide by the arbitration provision. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 48. According to Mr. Watson, because the company clearly waived [its] rights under the Leasing Agreement by not requesting arbitration within the one-year time limit contained in the agreement, the company's continuing attempts to collect the debtwhich he does not dispute that he owescan only be motivated by a discriminatory animus. Id. We fail to see how this demonstrates pretext. In fact, Mr. Watson's assertion that the company's use of a collection agency is an intimidation tactic to dissuade [him] from pursuing his ADA complaint is undermined by the fact that C.R. England notified him in April 2003 that it would pursue the collection ... through all legal channels including collections agencies, EEOC App. at 606, before he filed his initial complaint with the EEOC in August 2003. Furthermore, although the Lease Agreement contained an arbitration provision, it also provided that any default in the payment of any amount due under the agreement could be placed in the hands of an agency or attorney for collections or legal action, and that Mr. Watson would bear the cost of such collection. EEOC App. at 337-47. Under these facts, Mr. Watson has not shown that C.R. England's proffered reason for sending the debt to a collection agency was pretext for discrimination that is, he has not met his burden to show that C.R. England's legitimate, non-discriminatory justification is unworthy of belief. Stover, 382 F.3d at 1071. Accordingly, C.R. England is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in its favor.