Opinion ID: 1383099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction in the case at bar

Text: Determination of whether we have jurisdiction in the case at bar initially involves a question of the proper characterization of the present proceeding. As was mentioned previously, the superior court reversed the district court's contempt conviction of Browder and remanded his case to the district court for a new trial. Supreme Court Rule 6 provides in part that An appeal may be taken to this court from a final judgment entered by the superior court    in any action or proceeding, civil or criminal   . Here the requisite finality is lacking for the superior court's decision granting Browder a new trial in district court was neither a final judgment within the intendment of Rule 6 nor our precedents under this rule. See Patrick v. Sedwick, 387 P.2d 294 (Alaska 1963); In re Mountain View Public Utility District No. 1, 359 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1961). [7] Since a non-final interlocutory order of the superior court is the focal point of the parties' dispute, we must next determine whether the case at bar offers an appropriate occasion to exercise our review jurisdiction. For it is established that the parties do not have a right to review, rather the grant of review lies within this court's sound discretion. City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 352 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1960). In order to obtain review, the party must satisfy both Supreme Court Rules 23 and 24. Levi v. Sexton, 439 P.2d 423, 426 (Alaska 1968); State v. Hillstrand, 352 P.2d 633, 634 (Alaska 1960). Supreme Court Rule 23(c) (3) provides that an aggrieved party in any criminal proceeding may petition this court to review any order or decision of the superior court not otherwise appealable, which affects a substantial right and which grants a new trial. [8] In the case at bar, the superior court did in fact grant a new trial. Furthermore, we deem the state's interest in preservation of the contempt conviction and the district court's implied ruling that Browder was not entitled to a jury trial, in regard to his allegedly directly contumacious conduct, is reflective of the substantiality of the interests of the state which were affected by the rulings under which the superior court ordered a new trial. [9] In view of these factors, we conclude that the case comes within the purview of Supreme Court Rule 23(c) (3). Our study of the matter has led us to the further conclusion that the state has also met the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 24(1). [10] We hold that the superior court's decision that in a case of direct contempt the contemnor is entitled to a jury trial, in regard to his purportedly contumacious conduct, is of such importance and substance as to justify our review of the matter. As was explained earlier, the superior court's jury trial ruling was embodied in a decision which resulted in the granting of a new trial to Browder in district court. Because of the absence of a final order under Supreme Court Rule 6 and the limitation imposed by AS 22.05.010 upon the state's right to appeal in criminal cases, normal appellate procedures by way of appeal were unavailable to the state. In light of the importance of the superior court's ruling, the unavailability of appeal to the state, and the necessity that this court exercise its final appellate jurisdiction in regard to a ruling so crucial to the proper administration of criminal justice, we have decided that this case presents an appropriate instance for affirmative exercise of our review jurisdiction. [11] Before leaving the subject of jurisdiction, we think it pertinent to comment upon our previous decisions in State v. Keep, 397 P.2d 973, aff'd on rehearing, 409 P.2d 321 (Alaska 1965). There one James Benton had been acquitted by the district magistrate court. The state then petitioned the superior court for review of the judgment of acquittal, and its petition was dismissed. It then appealed the dismissal of its petition, and we affirmed the superior court's dismissal of the petition for review. The first Keep opinion reasoned the state was clearly barred from appealing a judgment of acquittal, so should not be permitted to petition for review because it could then accomplish indirectly what AS 22.05.010 and Supreme Court Rule 6 explicitly barred it from doing directly. Our opinion on rehearing further reasoned that since the defendant would be protected from conviction by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the case was moot and the defendant had no interest in contesting the state's petition for review. The case at bar is distinguishable from the circumstances of Keep. Here Browder was convicted of contempt in district court. A reversal of the superior court's decision granting a new trial to Browder would not place him in double jeopardy. Since Browder was convicted in the district court and obtained a reversal in the superior court, his case is not moot. This lack of mootness is reflected in the vigorous and skillful adversary presentations we have been accorded regarding the substantive and jurisdictional issues in the case at bar. [12]