Opinion ID: 1329964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: constructive retaliatory discharge

Text: The first assignment of error [25] concerns whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant the Appellants' motion for a directed verdict on the Appellee's claim for constructive retaliatory discharge. The Appellants contend that the Appellee failed, as a matter of law, to show that any of her actions were in support of a substantial public policy of this state and to establish the necessary elements of a constructive retaliatory discharge. In contrast, the Appellee maintains that the trial court did not err in submitting her claim to the jury because substantial public policies were involved in this case and ample evidence to sustain the finding of a constructive discharge was presented to the jury. Before undertaking a review of the error alleged, we set forth the standard of review to be utilized in syllabus point one of Alkire v. First National Bank, 197 W.Va. 122, 475 S.E.2d 122 (1996): In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is not the task of the appellate court reviewing facts to determine how it would have ruled on the evidence presented. Its task is to determine whether the evidence was such that a reasonable trier of fact might have reached the decision below. Thus, in ruling on a denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If on review, the evidence is shown to be legally insufficient to sustain the verdict, it is the obligation of the appellate court to reverse the circuit court and to order judgment for the appellant. 197 W.Va. at 124, 475 S.E.2d at 124, Syl. Pt. 1, in part. Further, in Dodrill v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 201 W.Va. 1, 491 S.E.2d 1 (1996), we stated that [e]ssentially, the same rules apply where motions for a directed verdict are implicated. Id. at 9, 491 S.E.2d at 9. In order to prevail under a constructive retaliatory discharge theory, the Appellee must prove that a substantial public policy of this state has been violated. As this Court held in the syllabus of Harless v. First National Bank (Harless I), 162 W.Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978): The rule that an employer has an absolute right to discharge an at will employee must be tempered by the principle that where the employer's motivation for the discharge is to contravene some substantial public policy principle, then the employer may be liable to the employee for damages occasioned by this discharge. Id. at 116, 246 S.E.2d at 271. To identify the sources of public policy for purposes of determining whether a retaliatory discharge has occurred, we look to established precepts in our constitution, legislative enactments, legislatively approved regulations, and judicial opinions. Syl. Pt. 2, Birthisel v. TriCities Health Servs. Corp., 188 W.Va. 371, 424 S.E.2d 606 (1992). Finally, [i]nherent in the term `substantial public policy' is the concept that the policy will provide specific guidance to a reasonable person. Id. at 372, 424 S.E.2d at 607, Syl. Pt. 3. In numerous prior decisions, this Court has identified specific instances of what qualifies as substantial public policy. See, e.g., Syl. Pt. 4, Page v. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc., 198 W.Va. 378, 480 S.E.2d 817 (1996) (finding substantial public policy violation when at-will employee was discharged based on concern that employee has given or may be called to give truthful testimony in legal action); Syl. Pt. 4, Roberts v. Adkins, 191 W.Va. 215, 444 S.E.2d 725 (1994) (holding that cause of action for wrongful discharge may exist under West Virginia Code § 21-5-5, which sets forth criminal liability for employers who coerce employees to purchase goods in lieu of wages); Slack v. Kanawha County Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 423 S.E.2d 547 (1992) (finding generally that substantial public policy implicated where employee brings attention of federal prosecutors to improprieties in operation of housing authority); Syl. Pt. 2, Lilly v. Overnight Transp. Co., 188 W.Va. 538, 425 S.E.2d 214 (1992) (holding that substantial public policy is predicated upon West Virginia Code § 17C-15-1(a), § 17C-15-31 and § 24A-5-5(j), relating to operation of motor vehicle with brakes in unsafe working condition); Syl. Pt. 2, Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 179 W.Va. 549, 371 S.E.2d 46 (1988) (holding that substantial public policy arises from West Virginia Mine Safety Act, West Virginia Code § 22A-1A-20); Syl. Pt. 2, McClung v. Marion County Comm'n, 178 W.Va. 444, 360 S.E.2d 221 (1987) (holding that substantial public policy is grounded in Wage and Hour Act, West Virginia Code § 21-5C-8); Syl. Pt. 2, Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 165 W.Va. 305, 270 S.E.2d 178 (1980) (holding that substantial public policy arises from Workers' Compensation Act, West Virginia Code § 23-5A-1). In the present case, the Appellee maintains that a substantial public policy emanates from West Virginia Code of State Regulations § 64-12-14.2.4(1987), [26] which is a regulation promulgated by the West Virginia Board of Health and is part of a regulatory scheme governing the licensure of hospitals. [27] That regulation provides that: 14.2.4. There shall be an adequate number of licensed registered professional nurses to meet the following minimum staff requirements: .... d. A registered professional nurse shall be on duty and immediately available for bedside care of any patient when needed on each shift, 24 hours per day and seven days a week. e. Licensed practical nurses as needed to supplement registered professional nurses in appropriate ratio to professional nurses. f. Auxiliary workers as needed to provide physical care and assist with simple nursing and clerical procedures not requiring professional nurses. Id. The above-referenced regulation not only mandates that an adequate number of registered nurses be available to meet minimum staffing requirements, but it also mandates that [a] registered professional nurse shall be ... immediately available for bedside care of any patient when needed.... Id. (emphasis added). [28] The Appellants maintain that because this regulation is too general to provide any specific guidance or is so vague that it is subject to different interpretations[,] they should not be exposed to liability under this Court's pronouncements in Birthisel. [29] See 188 W.Va. at 377, 424 S.E.2d at 612. In Birthisel, the plaintiff relied upon general admonitions relating to the requirement of good care for patients by social workers found in regulations established by the West Virginia Social Work Board as a basis for her retaliatory discharge claim, when she was forced to resign because of her failure to transfer data from various records onto master treatment plans. Finding that those general admonitions contain[ed] no specific provision relating to a patient's record review and were extremely general, this Court concluded that the regulations d[id] not constitute a specific statement of public policy. Id. at 379, 424 S.E.2d at 614. In arriving at this conclusion, we further noted in Birthisel, however, that `[t]he employer is bound, at a minimum, to know the fundamental public policies of the state and nation as expressed in their constitutions and statutes[.]' Id. at 377, 424 S.E.2d at 612 (quoting Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095, 4 Cal. Rptr.2d 874, 882, 824 P.2d 680, 688 (1992)). In the instant case, it does not take an in-depth analysis for this Court to hold that West Virginia Code of State Regulations § 64-12-14.2.4 sets forth a specific statement of a substantial public policy which contemplates that a hospital unit will be properly staffed to accommodate the regulation's directive; to ensure that patients are protected from inadequate staffing practices; and to assure that medical care is provided to hospital patients, especially children and young adolescents, who must depend upon others to protect their medical interests and needs. [30] We now turn to whether the Appellee established the necessary elements of a constructive retaliatory discharge. The Appellants argue that there is a complete absence of factual elements which substantiates a constructive discharge. The Appellants further allege that the Appellee was never threatened with discharge and was never urged to resign. Her pay and benefits were never reduced. Her job responsibilities were not altered in any way and there was no evidence of an unfair or unfavorable job. In other words, the Appellants argue that there was a lack of any evidence that the Appellee was involuntarily subjected to employment conditions that would force a reasonable person to end their employment, or that the conditions imposed upon her were different than those placed upon other employees. In contrast, the Appellee contends that there was ample evidence to sustain the jury's finding of a constructive discharge. Under the law enunciated by this Court in Slack v. Kanawha County Housing & Redevelopment Authority, 188 W.Va. 144, 423 S.E.2d 547 (1992): [w]here a constructive discharge is claimed by an employee in a retaliatory discharge case, the employee must prove sufficient facts to establish the retaliatory discharge. In addition, the employee must prove that the intolerable conditions that caused the employee to quit were created by the employer and were related to those facts that gave rise to the retaliatory discharge. In order to prove a constructive discharge, a plaintiff must establish that working conditions created by or known to the employer were so intolerable that a reasonable person would be compelled to quit. It is not necessary, however, that a plaintiff prove that the employer's actions were taken with a specific intent to cause the plaintiff to quit. Id. at 146, 423 S.E.2d at 549, Syl. Pts. 5 and 6. In the present case, the evidence presented by the Appellee revealed that she regularly worked her shifts for over two years alone, without either another nurse or care giver to assist her. Moreover, at times, she was left alone on her shift to care for up to nine seriously ill patients. During this time period, the evidence indicated that the Appellee raised her concerns about the staffing situations to other nurses who worked in the unit. Twelve nurses on this unit ultimately requested and received transfers to other CAMC units. Moreover, after November 1992, the evidence established that she was the recipient of reprisals for voicing concerns about the staffing situation. First, she was reprimanded by Appellant Smith for placing those concerns in an incident report. Appellant Smith testified that she became angry with the Appellee over the comments. The evidence further revealed that in early 1993, Appellant Smith directed that the Appellee's spring evaluation be downgraded, allegedly as a result of the complaints she made, which reduced her merit raise. The Appellee presented additional evidence that her requests for vacation time [31] and her attempts to transfer to other units were denied. [32] Finally, the Appellee testified that these working conditions became intolerable. She stated that she felt like the conditions were never going to change and that professionally and ethically, I couldn't be a part of that. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Appellee, who was the nonmoving party, it is clear that the Appellee presented sufficient evidence of constructive retaliatory discharge to send the issue to the jury. [33] See Alkire, 197 W.Va. at 124, 475 S.E.2d at 124, Syl. Pt. 1, in part. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of the Appellants on this issue.