Opinion ID: 4560706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Davis contends that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his claims that the State knowingly presented false testimony from trial witness Janet 1. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 2. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). -4- Cotton—in violation of Giglio—and suppressed Cotton’s “true” testimony—in violation of Brady. Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is appropriate “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B). Applying a de novo standard of review, we find that test satisfied here. Giglio We first address Davis’s Giglio claim. To establish a Giglio violation, Davis must show “that: (1) the testimony given was false; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the statement was material.” Moore v. State, 132 So. 3d 718, 724 (Fla. 2013). False testimony is material “if there is any reasonable possibility that it could have affected the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quoting Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1091 (Fla. 2008)). “The State . . . bears the burden to prove that the presentation of false testimony at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 506 (Fla. 2003)). In support of his claim, Davis relies on an affidavit from Cotton in which she states that—contrary to her trial testimony—she “did not hear a baby or child cry or scream on December 9, 1992.” She further claims that she did not hear “a thumping noise” or Davis “yell, ‘Sit down.’ ” Rather, Cotton states, she heard “crying and screaming” coming from a nearby apartment “[a]t some point” one or two days “before December 9, 1992.” She claims that she “was put under a great -5- deal of pressure and duress by the State of Florida during multiple meetings with law enforcement.” Cotton further recalls that she stayed in touch with a former state attorney, who—during their final conversation “several years ago”—offered to “take care” of criminal charges filed against her. We conclude that the circuit court properly denied this claim. Even assuming Davis could prove that the State knowingly presented false testimony from Cotton, the use of this testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Regardless of whether Cotton heard noises coming from Davis’s apartment on December 9, 1992, the State presented ample evidence that the victim’s injuries were not accidental and occurred while she was in Davis’s care. This includes the testimony “that Davis was alone in the apartment with the victim,” “the bloodstain evidence,” the medical testimony regarding the nature of the victim’s injuries, “the fact that there were no french fries found in the victim’s stomach,” and Davis’s inability to explain how the victim fell or why blood was found in certain areas of the apartment. Davis I, 703 So. 2d at 1059. Accordingly, there is no reasonable possibility that Cotton’s testimony affected the jury’s verdict. Davis contends, however, that Cotton’s testimony was material because it was essential in refuting his defense that Thomas Moore was responsible for the victim’s injuries. At trial, Davis testified that “at about 12:30 p.m.,” he left the victim alone in the apartment with Moore while he made phone calls. Davis I, 703 -6- So. 2d at 1056. Without Cotton’s testimony that she heard noises—including “thumping” sounds, a child crying, and Davis’s voice saying, “[s]it down”— coming from the apartment between 12:00 p.m. and 12:30 p.m., Davis claims that it would have been more difficult for the jury to rule out the possibility that Moore had injured the victim. Davis II, 136 So. 3d at 1189 (alteration in original). This argument lacks merit for three reasons. First, even if Cotton had not testified, “[t]he jury would still be left with the impression . . . that Davis’s defense evolved after he had time to contemplate the situation.” Id. at 1188. “Davis did not begin to assert that someone else harmed the victim until after his conversations with the first responders and his interview with the investigating detectives.” Id. He “spoke to seven people in six separate statements about what happened to the victim without ever asserting that Moore—or anyone else—was left alone with” her. Id. Further, Davis claimed “that when he returned to the apartment after leaving the victim with Moore,” there appeared to be nothing wrong with the victim. Id. He recalled that “[s]he looked normal, except for she wasn’t breathing.” Id. Yet medical testimony “render[ed] Davis’s claim that the child appeared uninjured patently implausible.” Id. Finally, Davis failed to provide a credible “explanation of why he did not immediately implicate Moore.” Id. At trial, Davis “testified that he promised not -7- to inform law enforcement about Moore’s presence—and thus risked implicating himself in the murder—because Moore was afraid of being charged with drug possession.” Id. at 1188-89. The circuit court correctly determined that there is no reasonable possibility that Cotton’s testimony affected the jury’s verdict. 3 Accordingly, we affirm the summary denial of Davis’s Giglio claim. Brady Davis next argues that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his Brady claim based on Cotton’s testimony. To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show “(1) that favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Taylor v. State, 62 So. 3d 1101, 1114 (Fla. 2011) (emphasis omitted). Davis contends that the State violated Brady by suppressing Cotton’s “true” testimony. But we conclude that Davis’s Brady claim—like his Giglio claim— fails on the materiality prong. There is no “reasonable probability that, had” Cotton’s “true” testimony “been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 3. Davis further asserts that Cotton’s statement should be considered cumulatively with evidence presented in prior postconviction claims when evaluating the materiality prong. We conclude, however, that engaging in such a cumulative analysis would not change our determination. -8- proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 506). Whether or not Cotton heard noises coming from Davis’s apartment on December 9, 1992, the State presented ample evidence that Davis intentionally injured the victim on that date.4 We therefore conclude that the circuit court properly summarily denied this claim.