Opinion ID: 852566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Special Prosecutor Properly Denied

Text: Kubsch pointed to Michael Dvorak's earlier representation of Brad Hardy, one of the witnesses against Kubsch. The State once charged Hardy with conspiring with Kubsch to commit the murders and with assisting a criminal. These charges were filed against Hardy in May 2000, several months after Kubsch was charged. Hardy retained Dvorak, who was in private practice at the time. Dvorak represented Hardy at a deposition conducted by Kubsch's attorneys and during Hardy's testimony at the first murder trial in the summer of 2000. During the representation, Hardy received use immunity for his testimony in the first trial. Kubsch was initially convicted on August 28, 2000. The charges against Hardy pended, with Dvorak still representing him, until May 6, 2002 when the State moved to dismiss, and the court did so. In November 2002, Dvorak was elected St. Joseph County Prosecutor. He took office in January 2003, two months before we reversed Kubsch's first conviction. Following a pre-trial hearing on October 31, 2003, Judge Frese ruled there was no actual conflict of interest arising from this scenario and denied the request for a special prosecutor. [4] Kubsch now claims that this ruling was incorrect and argues that it tainted the second trial sufficiently to warrant a third. At the time of Kubsch's trial, our statutes afforded criminal defendants a vehicle for asking the trial court to appoint a special prosecutor when it is evident by clear and convincing evidence that the appointment is necessary to avoid an actual conflict of interest. . . . Ind.Code § 33-39-1-6(b)(2) (West 2004). A judge called upon to decide whether the prosecutor should be disqualified must determine whether the controversy involved in the pending case is substantially related to a matter in which the lawyer previously represented another client. State ex rel. Meyers v. Tippecanoe County Court, 432 N.E.2d 1377, 1378 (Ind.1982). He must also examine whether the prosecutor has received confidential information in the prior representation, and, more importantly, whether the information may have subsequently assisted the prosecution. Johnson v. State, 675 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind. 1996). Perhaps recognizing that any argument about client confidences relates solely to Hardy and not to him, Kubsch argues that actual conflicts of interest arise not simply from the acquisition and use of client confidences by prosecutors, but any time circumstances exist `in which [the prosecutor] cannot exercise his or her independent [ ] judgment free of compromising interests [or] loyalties.' (Appellant's Reply Br. at 1 (quoting State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tenn.2000)).) Kubsch cites authority declaring that the unfair use of client confidences gained through the prior representation of a defendant or co-defendant is not generally recognized as the only benchmark for determining whether there is an actual conflict of interest. ( Id. ); see also 63C Am.Jur.2d Prosecuting Attorneys § 27 (1997). The language of Ind.Code § 33-39-1-6(b)(2) and our own case law indicate that the question of prosecutorial disqualification is not to be treated in the same manner in which attorney disqualification is determined in the civil context. Johnson, 675 N.E.2d at 682. Rather than limiting ourselves with material adversity, as we would in the civil context, we must determine whether the relationship between Hardy and Dvorak gave rise to an actual conflict that resulted in prejudice to Kubsch. Id. The substance of Kubsch's claim is that during the second trial, Dvorak's professional duties and obligations to Hardy as a former client rendered him unable to treat Kubsch fairly and impartially, or to represent the interests of the State without conflict. (Appellant's Br. at 20.) As evidence of this disability, Kubsch points out that Dvorak was unable to testify fully at the pretrial hearing on whether a special prosecutor should be appointed. Kubsch says such testimony would have theoretically assisted both the defense and the prosecution. ( Id. at 21.) Kubsch also claims that the prior representation prevented Dvorak from seeking a plea bargain with Kubsch since doing so would have put his former client at risk of future prosecution. ( Id. at 21-22.) We think the trial judge got it right here. While the relationships among the parties created the potential for a conflict, the subsequent actions of those involved demonstrate that no actual conflict arose. This is certainly true of Kubsch's claim regarding Dvorak's testimony at the pretrial hearing. Kubsch contends that Dvorak's ethical obligations to Hardy prevented him from answering questions about the representation that might have revealed whether Dvorak possessed disqualifying confidential information about Kubsch and the murders. Kubsch contends that his inability to question Dvorak ultimately prejudiced him by preventing him from subjecting Dvorak to a meaningful examination about the extent of his knowledge of the case that might have revealed disqualifying facts. ( Id. at 26-27.) It is clear enough from the record that Dvorak did not possess such information. The State presented to the trial court all the statements, depositions, and testimony of Hardy that were a matter of record. (Hr'g Tr. at 4-7.) When asked if you possess any other information about this case, about the murders . . . than what is contained in the exhibits that [the State] admitted into court today? Dvorak responded, I don't believe so. ( Id. at 14.) Importantly, at the hearing, Hardy specifically relinquished his privilege and allowed Dvorak to answer one question relating to the representation: Did I tell him anything different than what's on them transcripts. ( Id. at 47.) The prosecution subsequently asked Dvorak whether there [is] any information that you possess from your conversations with Mr. Hardy that is different or omitted from any testimony and information he gave in depositions, testimony, or statements to Special Crimes? ( Id. at 48.) Dvorak answered no. ( Id. ) Kubsch seeks to minimize the import of this disclosure by suggesting that it was insufficient to probe Dvorak's knowledge of the defense. The release of the privilege, however, provided an answer to the crucial question: Did Dvorak possess information about the crime not otherwise available to another prosecutor? Through the release of the privilege, Dvorak was able to show he had no more information that could have been used against Kubsch than any other prosecutor. In the absence of such information, no actual conflict arose. Specifically, there is no indication Dvorak either gained any privileged or otherwise non-public information from Hardy or subsequently used such information at the second trial. And, inasmuch as Kubsch and Hardy had never engaged in a joint defense, Dvorak would not have learned anything from Kubsch for subsequent deployment, either. Compare Banton v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1160, 1164 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985) (prosecutor disqualified where via a previous relationship with the same case, [prosecutor learned] the details of [defendant's] case) [5] with Garren v. State, 470 N.E.2d 719, 723 (Ind.1984) (prosecutor not disqualified where [d]efendant has failed to show that the [p]rosecutor obtained information from him in confidence which was relevant to the facts of the [case at bar]), and Williams v. State, 631 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind.1994) (prosecutor not disqualified where deputy prosecutor did not provide any information or assistance to the prosecutor or participate at defendant's trial). In Williams, we held it was appellant's burden to show both that deputy prosecutor received confidential information and that prejudice actually [ ] resulted from the use of confidential information. 631 N.E.2d at 487. In this case, there was no evidence that confidential information was received or used. Thus, there was no need to disqualify Dvorak. It is also apparent that no actual conflict arose as affected the possibility of a plea bargain. As Judge Frese astutely noted, an actual conflict would have arisen had the parties entered into a plea bargaining process because doing so would have put Dvorak into a position where his own duty to Hardy would have conflicted with his duty of impartiality to Kubsch. (Hr'g Tr. at 60-61.) Kubsch contends that Dvorak alone was unwilling to enter a plea agreement. (Appellant's Br. at 21.) The record does not support this contention. At the pre-trial hearing, Judge Frese conducted a private conference with Kubsch and the defense counsel. (Hr'g Tr. at 50-58.) Judge Frese specifically asked Kubsch if he were willing to discuss a plea agreement where the death penalty comes off the table. ( Id. at 57.) Kubsch responded that he had no interest in entering into plea discussions. ( Id. at 58.) During the subsequent description of the substance of the conference in open court, Judge Frese indicated his perception that Kubsch was unwilling to enter into any plea bargaining process. ( Id. at 82-84.) Kubsch's attorneys made no attempt to object to these statements, suggesting it accurately reflected Kubsch's position. As Kubsch now seems to be contending that Dvorak's prior representation made a plea bargain unattainable, we observe that one cannot be unfairly denied something that he did not want. We see no actual conflict of interest along these lines. Kubsch does make one other point worthy of mention here. He contends that Dvorak unfairly and prejudicially failed to investigate Hardy's alleged role in the murders since doing so would have placed his former client at risk. (Appellant's Br. at 28.) In doing so, Kubsch contends Dvorak ignored potentially exculpatory evidence because of his interest in protecting his own former client. This argument might have more punch had not Dvorak's predecessor as St. Joseph County Prosecutor, Christopher Toth, whom Dvorak defeated in a dramatic electoral contest, treated Hardy in exactly the same way as Dvorak. Prosecutor Toth granted Hardy use immunity for his testimony during the first trial and ultimately dismissed the charges against him. (Appellant's App. at 235, 237-38.) For all that appears, Toth simply concluded that Hardy was not culpable. There is no evidence otherwise. [6] Ultimately, it is the defendant's burden to produce evidence of an actual conflict, and in this case he has not. He has also failed to make convincing arguments regarding his due process claims. We conclude the trial court rightly denied the motion for appointment of a special prosecutor.