Opinion ID: 3134286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Other Provisions of Public Act 89--7

Text: Because of our severability holding, we address only briefly the other specific provisions of the Act that were challenged in the instant appeal. The circuit court ruled that section 2--1107.1, which describes three jury instructions to be given in tort actions, is unconstitutional. One jury instruction would prevent the jury from being informed about the cap on noneconomic or punitive damages. Clearly, this instruction is nullified by our declaration that the cap itself is unconstitutional. See 2 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction sec. 44.04, at 502 (5th ed. 1993) (Even where part of an act is independent and valid, other parts which are not themselves substantively invalid but have no separate function to perform independent of the invalid portions of the act are also held invalid). The other two jury instructions are not clearly invalid, however. One of these jury instructions would require the court to inform the jury that compensatory and punitive damage awards are not taxable. The other instruction would prevent the jury from being informed that the plaintiff would not recover any damages if his or her contributory negligence exceeded 50% percent. Because of our determination that the valid provisions of the Act are not severable from the invalid provisions, we strike these two instructions without expressing any opinion regarding their constitutionality independent of the Act. The circuit court also invalidated five specific provisions that relate to product liability actions. One provision, section 2-- 623, requires product liability plaintiffs to attach a certificate of merit to their complaint as a prerequisite for initiating an action to recover damages. 735 ILCS 5/2--623 (West 1996). Although a certificate of merit requirement in medical malpractice actions was upheld by this court in DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 147 Ill. 2d 57, 75 (1992), plaintiffs attempt to distinguish DeLuna and also, in the alternative, request us to reconsider the DeLuna holding. Another section, which amends the existing product liability statute of repose, extends the limitation periods and outside period of repose to include all theories of product liability. 735 ILCS 5/13--213(b) (West 1996). In contrast, the prior version of the repose statute excluded negligence from its scope. See 735 ILCS 5/13--213(b) (West 1994). Defendants contend that this court's decision in Mega v. Holy Cross Hospital, 111 Ill. 2d 416, 422 (1986), which upheld a four-year statute of repose in medical malpractice actions, is persuasive authority for upholding the constitutional validity of section 13-- 213(b). Two other provisions that were declared invalid by the circuit court, sections 2--2103 and 2--204, create statutory presumptions as to when a product is considered reasonably safe. Section 2--2103 attaches a presumption of safety to any product that meets state or federal safety standards. 735 ILCS 5/2--2103 (West 1996). Section 2--2104 provides that the design of a product or component shall be presumed to be reasonably safe unless the plaintiff can establish that, at the time the product left the manufacturer's control, a practical and technically feasible alternative design was available that would have prevented the harm without significantly impairing the usefulness, desirability, or marketability of the product. 735 ILCS 5/2--2104 (West 1996). The fifth provision, section 2-- 2106, imposes a presumption that if written warnings are given to users of products, such warnings shall be deemed adequate if they conform to generally recognized standards in the industry at the time the product was introduced into the stream of commerce. 735 ILCS 5/2--2106 (West 1996). We do not determine, in this case, whether or not the above product liability provisions are infirm as a matter of substantive constitutional law. We note that defendants, in addition to arguing in favor of the constitutionality of the provisions, have raised waiver and ripeness as reasons for this court to reject the circuit court's holding that the product liability provisions in issue are unconstitutional. For example, defendants contend that plaintiff Best waived his challenge to the filing of a certificate of merit because he did, in fact, obtain and file an expert's affidavit in support of his cause of action. Plaintiff Best responds that his filing of the product liability certificate of merit was done under protest, without waiving his challenge. Defendants also challenge, at this early stage in the litigation, the ripeness of a constitutional challenge to the provisions which allow product liability defendants to benefit from evidentiary presumptions. Plaintiffs dispute defendants' ripeness argument and urge this court to resolve the constitutionality of the provisions under review. We believe that we should exercise caution and restraint in making any ruling, apart from our severability holding, on the constitutionality of these product liability provisions. Without indicating how this court might rule in a future case involving a possibly reenacted version of the challenged provisions, we simply note that if we were to hold that the provisions in issue were not facially invalid, we would be rendering an advisory opinion on a portion of Public Act 89--7 that has been held inseverable from the unconstitutional provisions. If we were to hold that some but not all five of the provisions were unconstitutional, we would be making a selective determination of individual provisions within the larger product liability scheme that is contemplated by the instant Act. We decline to engage in speculative analysis or to render an advisory opinion on the efficacy of the product liability provisions where, as in the instant case, such analysis or opinion is not necessary for the disposition of the cause. In conclusion, although the circuit court declared the product liability provisions of the Act invalid, as well as the provisions setting forth three jury instructions to be given in tort actions, we decline to reach the substantive merits of the constitutional challenges made to those provisions for the reasons stated. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the circuit court's holding that reached the substantive merits of the products liability issues and the jury instructions, but otherwise affirm the judgment of the circuit court in its entirety. We emphasize that all of the remaining provisions of Public Act 89- -7, which were not challenged in the instant cases, are deemed invalid in this case solely on grounds of severability. As such, the General Assembly is free to reenact whatever provisions it deems desirable or appropriate. The problems addressed in the briefs and in oral arguments in the case at bar represent some of the most critical concerns which confront our society today. We acknowledge and wish to commend the attorneys for the plaintiffs, the defendants, amici, and Attorney General on the scholarly and impressive briefs and oral arguments submitted by each. Circuit court judgment affirmed. JUSTICE HEIPLE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.