Opinion ID: 769431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jose Santos

Text: 77 Jose Santos's appellate counsel seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because he believes that there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Pursuant to Circuit Rule 51(b), Santos filed a response to counsel's motion. Because counsel's Anders brief is adequate on its face, we consider only those issues raised in the brief and Santos's response. See United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). And our duty is merely to determine whether counsel is correct in believing those grounds frivolous. United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). 78 Counsel first considers whether Santos could argue that there was insufficient evidence to support Santos's convictions for conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 371, and for aiding and abetting the bolita's operation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 1955 and sec. 2. Santos bears an extremely heavy burden on this issue, as we will reverse a conviction only if we determine that no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Vega, 72 F.3d at 513. To establish a violation of sec. 1955, the government must prove that Santos conducted the bolita. United States v. Cyprian, 23 F.3d 1189, 1199 n. 14 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 18 U.S.C. sec. 1955). To conduct means to perform any act, function or duty which is necessary to or helpful in the ordinary operation of the business, and . . . a person may be found to conduct a gambling business even though he is a mere servant or employee having no part in the management or control of the business and no share in the profits. Id. at 1199 n. 15 (quoting United States v. Greco, 619 F.2d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 1980)). 79 Jose Santos rented a bar called the Poolroom, and allowed the bolita's operators (including his brother Efrain Santos) to use the Poolroom as a bolita collection site after another bar/collection site was searched by authorities. Therefore, the record demonstrates that Santos knew that he was facilitating the bolita's continued operation by allowing his bar to function as a new collection site, and thus counsel properly concluded that this argument would be frivolous. 80 Counsel also considered whether Santos could argue that the district court should have severed Jose Santos from Efrain Santos under Fed. R. Crim.P. 14, or admonished the witnesses early in the trial to specify when they were speaking about Jose or Efrain Santos. Because Jose Santos's trial counsel did not seek a severance, this issue is reviewed for plain error only. United States v. Wilson, 134 F.3d 855, 862-63 (7th Cir. 1998). According to the Supreme Court 81 We believe that, when defendants have been properly joined under Rule 8(b), a district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). 82 Santos cites to no cases in which co-defendants with the same last name required a severance, and he does not specify any instances in the record where he may have been prejudiced. We will not scour the record searching haystacks for needles, Wagner, 103 F.3d at 553, to discover specific testimony that supports Santos's argument, and we agree with counsel's conclusion that this argument is frivolous. 83 Finally, counsel considered whether Santos could argue that the district court erred by refusing to adjust Santos's sentence downward by two points for being a minor participant in the bolita under Guideline sec. 3B1.2(b). We lack jurisdiction to review a district court's discretionary refusal to depart downward unless the sentence was imposed in violation of the law or as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Yoon, 128 F.3d 515, 529 (7th Cir. 1997). In this case, the district court's statements at the sentencing hearing indicate that it knew it had authority to depart, but decided, in its discretion, that Santos in no way qualified for a downward departure. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Santos participated in the bolita in a substantial way by knowingly providing his bar as a collection center for the bolita's operations in exchange for a monthly payment. We conclude, therefore, that this argument is frivolous. Accordingly, we grant counsel's motion to withdraw and dismiss Jose Santos's appeal. 84 In conclusion, we AFFIRM the district court's decisions by holding that: 1) there was sufficient evidence to convict Efrain Santos of money laundering, and thus his sentence was proper; 2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Benedicto Diaz's motion to withdraw his plea agreement; 3) Angel Morales was not entitled to an interpreter under the Court Interpreter's Act, and was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel or his right to the effective assistance of counsel; and 4) Roberto Febus was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury or his right to the effective assistance of counsel, and that his conviction and sentence were proper. We also GRANT Jose Santos's appellate counsel's motion to withdraw, and we DISMISS Jose Santos's appeal.