Opinion ID: 163250
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Counsel Claims

Text: Mr. Evans also contends that the absence of counsel during another lawyer’s cross-examination and during jury deliberations constituted per se violations of his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney during the trial proceedings. We are not persuaded by this argument. “The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel during the critical stages of an adversarial proceeding.” United States v. Gordon , 4 F.3d 1567, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Kirby v. Illinois , 406 U.S. 682, 690 -5- (1972)). However, when counsel’s absence is temporary and the defendant has expressed his consent to the absence, courts have declined to find a per se Sixth Amendment violation, instead inquiring whether the absence was prejudicial. See Vines v. United States , 28 F.3d 1123, 1127-29 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that trial counsel’s temporary absence during taking of evidence against codefendants did not constitute per se error, and did not prejudice defendant). Here, as noted above, one of the absences of Mr. Evans’s lead counsel did occur during the cross-examination of a government witness by the attorney for another defendant. We agree for substantially the same reasons as set forth by the district court that this absence did not constitute a Sixth Amendment violation: the presence of an associate of Mr. Evans’s lead counsel during the subject crossexamination was sufficient to protect his interests. As to the other alleged absence—during jury deliberations— the record indicates that there was no Sixth Amendment violation. In particular, Mr. Evans acknowledges in his appellate brief that his counsel “provided a cell phone number to the court’s clerk to contact him if an issue arose in which he was needed to make a decision.” Aplt’s Br. at 20-21. After discussing the admissibility of the tape and the issue regarding the verdict form, the trial court instructed the clerk to contact Mr. Evans’s lawyer and “advise hi[m] as to the content of the note and the response that I have prepared and if he has no objection then we will send it back -6- to the jury.” Rec. Supl. vol. II, at 2114 (Trial Tr., Oct. 31, 1995). Under these facts, Mr. Evans’s counsel was not absent from a critical stage of the trial in a manner that would constitute a per se Sixth Amendment violation.