Opinion ID: 1398014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: trifurcated proceedings

Text: 2. Since 1994, three court of appeals' opinions have endorsed the trifurcation concept as the preferred procedure for ensuring a fair trial on punitive damages. [26] Their rationale is that the jury has the opportunity to determine whether the defendant should be assessed punitive damages based on all the relevant evidence, but without confusion or prejudice to the defendant. [27] In this case, however, both Webster and Boyett agreed to a bifurcated trial and criticize the trifurcated proceeding as little more than a meaningless procedural gesture. Although we agree with the court of appeals that trifurcation is an option for trial courts to consider, we disagree that they should employ a trifurcated procedure in most cases. [28] It is the rare case where, due to the complexity of the issues or evidence, the trial court should divide the trial into three separate phases. [29] First, although not completely devoid of purpose, a third phase expends limited judicial resources by requiring the judge and jury to hear evidence and render a verdict in three separate proceedings. Second, the liability issues, witnesses, and evidence on both compensatory and punitive damages often may not differ substantially, thus eliminating the desire for two separate phases on liability. Third, in routine cases where there is less likelihood of confusion, a limiting instruction may adequately protect the defendant from the prejudicial effect of the similar act evidence. Finally, the trial courts in most tort actions have been able to ensure a fair trial by applying the balancing test, despite their contrary rulings on when the evidence is admissible. Contrary to the court of appeals, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. Balancing the probative value of the prior DUI on the issue of punitive damages against its prejudicial effect on the issue of Webster's liability in this negligence action, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the evidence of Webster's prior DUI was inadmissible during the liability phase of this trial. There was conflicting testimony on the issue of liability for the accident, Webster had no subsequent DUI convictions and just one prior conviction, and his prior conviction had not caused any injury. In addition, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to separate the issues of liability and damages for the underlying tort from the issue of liability for punitive damages. This action was a routine personal injury case involving two individuals in an automobile accident. The trial court followed the bifurcation procedure outlined in the punitive damages statute and approved by the court of appeals in prior cases. It was not required to adopt additional procedures to safeguard the rights of both parties to a fair trial. Judgment reversed.