Opinion ID: 853771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Benefiel's Departure from the Trial

Text: Benefiel testified on his own behalf. After a recess during this testimony, he refused to return to the courtroom. Benefiel argues that his right to be present at trial was violated because the procedures used to determine his competency to waive that right were inadequate, and because his waiver of that right was not knowing and voluntary. (Petitioner-Appellant's Br. at 74-75.) He terms these alleged errors fundamental. ( Id. at 83.) A court is required to hold a hearing to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial only when it is confronted with evidence creating a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competency. Whether reasonable grounds exist to order an evaluation of competency is a decision assigned to the sound discretion of the trial court, reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509, 516 (Ind. 1997) (citations omitted). In Haviland, the trial court held prior competency hearings before it again heard a defense expert testify that the defendant was incompetent. We held that the court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the defendant remained competent and that another competency hearing was unnecessary. Id. In this case, in highly similar circumstances, Judge Eldred held a hearing in chambers and reached the same conclusion. (T.R. at 2551-52 (Really, based on what I have seen of [Benefiel] today and throughout this trial, I see no real difference in his behavior.)). Benefiel obviously knew of his right to be present inasmuch as he had spent the trial in the courtroom. Judge Eldred reminded him of this fact, saying, you know that you have a right to be in the courtroom during this trial, if you want to be. (T.R. at 2550.) Benefiel's response, I can't, ( id. ), does little to indicate that he did not know of and voluntarily waive his right to be at the trial. Although Benefiel summarily terms the alleged error in these claims fundamental, (Petitioner-Appellant's Br. at 83), he makes no effort to demonstrate fundamental error. We find such claims, even if available under the fundamental error doctrine, waived for failure to comply with Ind.Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7). Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1132, 1145 n. 16 (Ind.1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1367, 143 L.Ed.2d 527 (1999).