Opinion ID: 20408
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FECA Coverage.

Text: 22 The district court next turned to the provisions of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) to analyze plaintiffs' FTCA claims. The FECA provides compensation for personal injuries that federal employees sustain[] while in the performance of his duty. 5 U.S.C. 8102(a) (1994). 23 The FECA functions as a federal workers' compensation act and provides a substitute for, not supplement to, recovery. In enacting [FECA], Congress adopted the principal compromise--the 'quid pro quo'--commonly associated with workers' compensation legislation: employees are guaranteed the right to receive immediate, fixed benefits, regardless of fault and without need for litigation, but in return they lose the right to sue the Government. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States,460 U.S. 190, 194 (1983). The district court held that this remedy is exclusive of any other remedy including the FTCA. See also Avasthi v. United States, 608 F.2d 1059, 1060 (5th Cir. 1979). The district court considered the issue of whether a substantial question existed as to whether plaintiffs' claims of emotional distress are within the coverage of the FECA. 24 Federal courts are divided on this question. The Fifth Circuit has yet to answer it, but we have held that where a substantial question exists as to FECA coverage, a tort action is barred unless the Secretary of Labor determines that the FECA does not apply. See Avasthi, 608 F.2d at 1060. The district court found that a substantial question existed as to FECA coverage and held that the plaintiffs could not maintain their FTCA actions unless and until the Secretary of Labor determined that their claims were not covered by the FECA. 25 Because Harrell did not submit his FTCA claims to the Secretary of Labor and since a substantial question existed with regard to coverage of his claims under the FECA, they were pre-empted. The court dismissed Harrell's FTCA claims without prejudice. We affirm this ruling. 26 The district court held that Bennett could pursue her FTCA claims because she submitted them to the Secretary of Labor. The United States cross-appeals this ruling which allowed Bennett's claims to go to trial. 6 It argues that the district court should have held that all of the FTCA claims were precluded by the FECA. 27 Bennett's second FTCA claim was for emotional distress based on alleged on-the-job harassment. As noted above, employees may not bring FTCA claims that arise out of federal employment relationships until they submit the claim to the Secretary of Labor for a determination of FECA coverage. While Bennett submitted her claim, it was not denied because of lack of coverage under the FECA, but for lack of proof. By ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence, the Secretary thought coverage existed. 7 Thus, the district court did not have jurisdiction to try the claim. See White v. United States, 143 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1998) (FECA vests with the Secretary of Labor the power to 'administer, and decide all questions arising under FECA,' 5 U.S.C. 8145, and the Secretary's action in allowing or denying an award under FECA is final and conclusive and not subject to review by a court of law, 5 U.S.C. 8128(b).). The award of damages to Bennett is reversed. 8 28