Opinion ID: 1135834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hernandez-Gomez I

Text: In Cipollone, the Supreme Court stated: If Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,... there is no need to infer congressional intent to preempt state laws.... 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 2618 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Relying primarily on this principle, we determined in Hernandez-Gomez I that federal preemption analysis was limited to ascertaining a federal statute's express preemptive reach and held: 1. Our analysis of preemption by the Safety Act ends with a reading of the text of the preemption clause and its companion savings clause. Hernandez-Gomez I, 180 Ariz. at 305, 884 P.2d at 191. 2. The two clauses work together to forbid states from enacting conflicting regulatory standards but allow common-law tort actions. Id. We therefore concluded that Plaintiff's action for defective design of the restraint system was not preempted by the express terms of the Safety Act even though that type of design was permitted by Standard 208. Because we believed that the reach of the statute's preemption clause was limited to the text of that clause and the savings clause, we did not address the issue of implied preemption. See id. at 304, 884 P.2d at 190 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 2618).