Opinion ID: 2118950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant maintains that the evidence is insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant argues that the evidence was circumstantial; that his evolving statements to the police and his allegedly incriminating statements were simply a misunderstanding; that the testimony against him was unreliable because the witnesses were motivated to lie; and that the evidence showed someone else could have committed the murder. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the function of this court to retry the defendant. People v. Hall, 194 Ill.2d 305, 329-30, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521 (2000). A reviewing court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Young, 128 Ill.2d 1, 49 (1989). That is, '[o]nce a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.' (Emphasis in original.) People v. Tye, 141 Ill.2d 1, 14, 152 Ill.Dec. 249, 565 N.E.2d 931 (1990), quoting People v. Collins, 106 Ill.2d 237, 261, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979). We will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. Hall, 194 Ill.2d at 330, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521. First, defendant claims that the evidence raises reasonable doubt as to his guilt because the evidence equally implicates his brother, Marquis, in the murder. Evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction if the evidence satisfies the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Hall, 194 Ill.2d at 330, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521. It is not necessary that the trier of fact find beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link on the chain of circumstances. Rather, the trier of fact must find only that the evidence taken together supports a finding of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Jones, 105 Ill.2d 342, 350, 86 Ill.Dec. 453, 475 N.E.2d 832 (1985). Here, the evidence taken together supports the jury's verdict. The State presented evidence that on the night of the murder, defendant made repeated attempts to contact and locate Watson. Defendant himself admitted that on the night of the murder he attempted to contact Watson. The State also presented testimony that on the night of the murder, Watson received a telephone call and that immediately after hanging up the telephone, he grabbed his car keys and stated that he was going to defendant's house. Next, the State offered evidence that Watson was found with 20 separate stab wounds two city blocks from defendant's home, and that within defendant's home the police retrieved an amplifier, large stereo speakers, subwoofers, speaker wires, and an empty knife sheath. During questioning after the murder, detectives observed that defendant had a small cut on his left finger. Defendant had no explanation for the cut at the time of the trial. Regarding the recovered stereo items, witnesses identified some of the equipment as belonging to Watson and other equipment which was identified as of the same type previously installed in Watson's car the week before his murder. One witness testified that during her conversation with defendant on the night of the murder, defendant asked about Watson's car and his new car stereo equipment. The State also entered into evidence several items of clothing and shoes from defendant's home. Although defendant asserted that he shared his clothing with Marquis, Marquis denied this fact, and the clothing containing bloodstains was identified as belonging to defendant. Detectives testified that some of the clothing recovered was wet and soaked with bleach and detergent, while other clothing was found in the dryer having been recently washed. A forensic scientist testified that some of this clothing contained human blood. Tests indicated that the gray sweat pants contained a mixture of DNA profiles and Wat son's profile could not be excluded, and that a white T-shirt contained a bloodstain with a DNA profile consistent with Watson's DNA profile. Further, Marquis identified the clothing offered into evidence as the clothing worn by defendant on the night of the murder. In addition, the State presented defendant's evolving statements to the police as evidence of his guilt. Particularly, defendant first told the police that he last saw Watson one month earlier but, when presented with conflicting information, admitted that he was with Watson one week earlier. Further defendant first stated that on the night of the murder he went to the liquor store with his cousin and returned home 45 minutes later, and went to bed at 1 a.m. Defendant, however, changed his statement and told the police that he went with his cousin to his aunt's house to use the telephone, and then returned home. When police detectives presented defendant with the recovered stereo equipment retrieved from his home, defendant implicated an individual named Teddy. When the detectives informed defendant that Teddy had an alibi, defendant changed his statement a fourth time. In his final statement, defendant implicated Marquis. Defendant, however, argues that his evolving statements to the police were his initial clumsy attempts to protect, his brother and, therefore, easily explain the foolish fabrication[s]. Defendant argues that this evidence cannot establish his guilt. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the province of this court to substitute its judgment for that of the jury on questions regarding the weight of the evidence. People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill.2d 24, 43, 227 Ill.Dec. 779, 688 N.E.2d 116 (1997). It is the function of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of the witnesses, to determine the appropriate weight of the testimony, and to resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. People v. McDonald, 168 Ill.2d 420, 444, 214 Ill.Dec. 125, 660 N.E.2d 832 (1995). Therefore, reversal is not warranted simply because the defendant alleges `that a witness was not credible' or that the jury assigned too much weight to a particular piece of evidence. People v. Brown, 185 Ill.2d 229, 250, 235 Ill.Dec. 626, 705 N.E.2d 809 (1998), quoting People v. Byron, 164 Ill.2d 279, 299, 207 Ill.Dec. 453, 647 N.E.2d 946 (1995). A jury is not obligated to accept any possible explanation compatible with the defendant's innocence and elevate it to the status of reasonable doubt. People v. Herrett, 137 Ill.2d 195, 206, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1 (1990); People v. Manning, 182 Ill.2d 193, 211, 230 Ill.Dec. 933, 695 N.E.2d 423 (1998) (speculation that another person might have committed the offense does not necessarily raise a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused). In this case, the jury was presented with conflicting testimony. Defendant's explanation of the retrieved stereo equipment and his conduct on the night of the murder were contradicted by Marquis' testimony. Marquis testified that his brother woke him up on the night of the murder. At defendant's request, Marquis helped defendant carry stereo equipment into the house. Marquis testified that defendant admitted that he stole the equipment from Watson, but did not mention that he murdered Watson. Marquis also identified the clothing taken from the house by the police as defendant's, and testified that the clothing was worn by defendant on the night of the murder. It is the jury's function to resolve the conflicts in the evidence, which they did, against defendant. See Hall, 194 Ill.2d at 332, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521 (the jury is not required to disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence and to search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt), citing McDonald, 168 Ill.2d at 447, 214 Ill.Dec. 125, 660 N.E.2d 832. For these same reasons, we also reject defendant's arguments that his alleged statement to the detective that he was going to hell and going to take everyone with him was a misunderstanding and too ambiguous to indicate responsibility, and that his incriminating statement to Officer Swain was a misunderstanding and insufficient evidence of guilt because it is improbable and unreasonable to believe that he confessed to the murder. Last, we address defendant's argument that jailhouse informants are unreliable witnesses because they are motivated to fabricate evidence against others in return for leniency and, thus, their testimony cannot be the basis for his conviction. As an initial matter, though Scott testified that he had hoped to receive leniency for his pending felony and misdemeanor charges in return for his testimony against defendant at trial, there is no evidence in the record that his hopes were fulfilled. Nonetheless, regarding defendant's allegations that Scott's testimony is unreliable evidence of his guilt, it is well settled that the credibility of a government informant, as with any other witness, is a question for the jury. Manning, 182 Ill.2d at 210, 230 Ill.Dec. 933, 695 N.E.2d 423, citing United States v. Trujillo, 959 F.2d 1377, 1384-85 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir.1989); People v. Irby, 237 Ill. App.3d 38, 58-59, 177 Ill.Dec. 177, 602 N.E.2d 1349 (1992). Regarding the use of informants our Supreme Court has stated, The established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311, 87 S.Ct. 408, 418, 17 L.Ed.2d 374, 387 (1966). In the present case, the jury heard opposing accounts from two jailhouse informants and the defendant himself. The jury heard the testimony of jailhouse informant Britton. Britton testified that Scott fabricated his testimony. Further, defendant himself testified that Scott fabricated his testimony. Conversely, however, the State impeached Britton and presented testimony and evidence corroborating Scott's testimony. For example, on crossexamination of defendant the jury heard defendant admit to having a lot of conversations with Scott in the county jail. Defendant further admitted telling Scott that he called Watson on the night of the murder. Consistent with Scott's testimony, defendant's clothing contained bleach. Consistent with Scott's testimony, the blood-tainted and bleached clothing allegedly worn by defendant matched the clothing described by Scott. Consistent with Scott's testimony, the victim had multiple stab wounds. Further, consistent with Scott's testimony, the recovered stereo equipment matched the stolen items described by Scott. The jury heard defendant's claims that Scott gathered his detailed knowledge about the clothing worn by defendant from the newspaper, and that by luck Scott made up facts that happened to be accurate, such as the presence of bleach on defendant's clothing. On the issue of Scott's credibility, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Additionally, we disagree with defendant's assertion that his conviction was based upon Scott's testimony. Certainly, Scott's testimony was relevant; however, absent his testimony there was certainly substantial evidence to sustain defendant's conviction. For the aforementioned reasons, we cannot say that the evidence of guilt was so improbable, unsatisfactory, or unreasonable that no rational fact finder could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.