Opinion ID: 2719704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hourly Rate Reduction

Text: 6 Case: 14-10427 Date Filed: 08/21/2014 Page: 7 of 14 Martinez first contends that the district court erred in reducing his hourly rate by ignoring evidence showing what Mr. Cornell charges his fee-paying clients and rates he had previously been awarded. Martinez asserts that the court effectively imposed a cap on rates for FLSA cases in the Middle District, and he suggests that qualified attorneys will give up representing workers in these cases if they are not adequately compensated. “A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. The applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that his requested rate is reasonable. Testimony that a given fee is reasonable is unsatisfactory because “satisfactory evidence necessarily must speak to rates actually billed and paid in similar lawsuits.” Id. What an attorney charges his clients is “powerful, and perhaps the best, evidence of his market rate.” Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 213 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000). However, “a court should hesitate to give controlling weight to prior awards, even though they may be relevant.” Id. The district court’s calculation of a reasonable rate is a factual matter that is reviewed for clear error. Barnes, 168 F.3d at 436. Here, the district court did not clearly err in determining that $300 per hour for Mr. Cornell was a reasonable rate. The court correctly stated and applied the 7 Case: 14-10427 Date Filed: 08/21/2014 Page: 8 of 14 law, focusing on the market rate for FLSA cases in the Middle District for attorneys of comparable experience, and it properly placed the burden on Martinez. The court acknowledged that “Mr. Cornell is a board certified civil trial attorney with approximately thirty-eight years of experience,” and it examined Martinez’s evidence in support of the requested fee award. The court then adequately explained why it did not find Martinez’s evidence persuasive, and we discern no clear error in its findings. Specifically, our review of Martinez’s evidence shows that it did not “speak to rates actually billed and paid in similar lawsuits” in the Middle District. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. Moreover, the district court is entitled to rely on its own experience and judgment in coming to a reasonable hourly rate. See id. at 1303. While the district court’s rate of $300 per hour may have been slightly lower than awards made to attorneys of comparable or somewhat less experience in other cases from the Middle District referenced in the court’s order, the rate was not clearly erroneous.