Opinion ID: 1944909
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Voluntary Intoxication Defense's Demise

Text: It is difficult to envision a more prejudicial moment in a criminal trial than a defendant personally telling the members of a jury the details of other horrific crimes he has committed. Such facts are so inherently prejudicial that Florida's evidence code law generally bars the admission of such facts except in extremely limited circumstances not involved here. Czubak v. State, 570 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990) (citing § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987); Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 114-15 (Fla.1989); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959)). The inherent prejudice, of course, underlying this rule barring evidence of other crimes is the natural inclination a juror would have in concluding that once a robber, always a robber, or as in Henry's case, once a killer, always a killer. Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122, 124 (Fla.1987) (Similar fact evidence that the defendant committed a collateral offense is inherently prejudicial. Introduction of such evidence creates the risk that a conviction will be based on the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit crimes, rather than on proof that he committed the charged offense.) (citing Keen v. State, 504 So.2d 396 (Fla.1987); Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903 (Fla.1981)); see also Henrion v. State, 895 So.2d 1213, 1216-17 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (reversing a conviction and stating that the improper admission of collateral crimes evidence is presumed harmful error because of the danger that the jury will accept the collateral crime evidence as evidence of guilt of the crime being tried). Further, when the defendant takes the stand, the law provides that the State must limit its inquiry of a defendant's prior record to asking if he or she has ever been convicted of a felony or a crime involving dishonesty. See § 90.610(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). If the defendant acknowledges such a record, there can be no inquiry into the details. See Hopkins v. State, 413 So.2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) ([T]he State was empowered to ask only whether the defendant had ever been convicted of a crime. . . .) (citing Whitehead v. State, 279 So.2d 99, 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)). Yet Henry's counsel ignored and abandoned the protections provided his client from the disclosure of such damning evidence of past criminal conduct, and chose to have Henry himself tell the jury about his horrendous record, disclosures that would seal Henry's fate in his current trial. In addition, these voluntary disclosures opened the door to further detailed questioning by the State on cross-examination regarding the other murders. These other offenses immediately became the focus of the trial. [16] Further, because Henry's counsel introduced this evidence and opened the door to the State's cross-examination of Henry regarding the details of the other crimes, the State was able to destroy the legitimacy of the otherwise viable voluntary intoxication defense by delving into the details of the Roddy murder, which involved a stabbing when Henry was not under the influence of crack cocaine. [17] In addition, by the voluntary disclosure of this information, the defense provided the State with a motive for the murder being tried, that Henry killed Eugene to eliminate him as a witness to his mother's stabbing, and that Henry, having been in prison before, did not want to return. [18] During its cross-examination, the State explicitly laid out for the jury the fact that Henry had been to jail already for the Roddy murder and did not want to go back to jail, thereby developing a substantial motive for why Henry would have intentionally killed Eugene. [19] Of course, even more severe prejudice ensued when the jury learned that Henry had not only been convicted of murdering Suzanne Henry but that another judge and jury had already determined that Henry qualified for the death penalty for that crime. In other words, another judge and jury had already considered and rejected any pleas by Henry to spare his life. [20] Certainly one of the many prejudicial effects of disclosing this death sentence to the jury was the danger that this jury would not feel the same responsibility for a life or death recommendation since another jury had already decided Henry should die. Finally, no one denies, including the majority, that all of this damning evidence voluntarily disclosed by Henry was otherwise inadmissible, and that under ordinary circumstances its admission over the objection of the defense would have surely denied Henry of a fair trial for this particular crime. See Heuring, 513 So.2d at 124. In reviewing these matters, the trial court's order actually demonstrates in great detail the misjudgments of trial counsel and repeatedly characterizes defense counsel as having exhibited bad judgment, but ambiguously and mistakenly suggests that Henry may not be entitled to relief because all of counsel's tactical decisions are completely immune from review regardless of their reasonableness. Now, on review, the majority ignores the trial court's assessment of counsel's conduct as bad judgment, but embraces the flawed concept that counsel's bad judgments were tactical decisions immune to review. However, the reality is that there was simply no good reason for counsel to do what he did. If there was, we would have a different case. Importantly, trial counsel's tactical decision to directly disclose past homicides to the guilt-phase jury does not give counsel a pass upon any postconviction review of counsel's performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (holding that counsel's actions, including tactical decisions, must be reasonable considering all the circumstances); Schwab v. State, 814 So.2d 402, 411 (Fla.2002) (citing Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000)) (stating that strategic decisions are not ineffective assistance if counsel's decision was reasonable); Wright v. State, 446 So.2d 208, 209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (holding that [w]hile a deliberate preemption of the prosecutor's projected cross-examination concerning the defendant's prior convictions is ordinarily a well-justified tactical decision, it was not in that case because the misdemeanor convictions defense counsel elicited on direct examination were all otherwise inadmissible). [21] Under Strickland, there must be some rational basis in law or fact to support counsel's critical decisions. For example, we have already noted counsel's choice in the instant case to abandon an insanity defense in favor of a voluntary intoxication defense. There was a good reason for this since the experts equivocated on insanity whereas there was substantial evidence of intoxication. But there is no good reason for counsel's catastrophic decision to disclose the defendant's horrendous prior record. The record demonstrates without dispute that there is a complete lack of any rational connection between counsel's duty to provide a competent defense in the case by the presentation of a voluntary intoxication defense, and the preemptive and irrational decision to voluntarily disclose the defendant's egregious history. Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of defense counsel's testimony is that concerning his reasons for disclosing the fact that another judge and jury had already determined that Henry should be put to death for the earlier murder of his wife. The trial court's order sets this out: With respect to the testimony elicited regarding the fact that defendant already received a death sentence for killing Suzanne Henry, at the October 17, 2003, evidentiary hearing, the following transpired on cross-examination: HARRISON: Now, let me ask you this, sir. You also brought out to the jury in the guilt phase that he had beenI don't question the fact of the Suzanne Henry homicide, I know the Court has ruled that this was inextricably related to the Eugene Christian homicide, that is the fact of the case, but why in the world did you have to tell the jury, to bring it out through Mr. Henry, that he had already been sentenced to death for killing Suzanne? FUENTE: Well, the thinking there was that would hopefully help them to accept the involuntary intoxication defense since they would have known that he had already been sentenced to death for another case. HARRISON: Telling the jury that he had been sentenced to death for killing Suzanne would strengthen your voluntary intoxication defense? FUENTE: It wouldit would hopefully persuade this jury to not sentence him to death for this homicide because of this defense in this case. HARRISON: Well, how are those two situations related, that is, how is the fact that he had been sentenced to death for Suzanne's murder, how would that enhance your voluntary intoxication defense? FUENTE: Hopefully, this jury would not be as disposed or as inclined to recommend death hadif they already knew he had been sentenced to death for homicide where there was no evidence that he was intoxicated at the time he killed her. The evidence was that he was intoxicated at the time he committed the second homicide. ( See October 17, 2003, Transcript, pages 113-115, attached). After reviewing this portion of claim I, the testimony, evidence, and arguments presented at the October 17, 2003, evidentiary hearing, the court file, and the record, the Court finds that Judge Fuente made a tactical, strategic decision to elicit testimony from defendant that he had already received a death sentence for the murder of Suzanne Henry in an attempt to get the jury to accept the voluntary intoxication defense presented in this case. Trial court order at 26-27. However, the same trial court order sets out the evidence of cocaine use presented at trial: Judge Fuente further testified that defendant did testify on his own behalf at trial, testified that he used cocaine earlier that day at Grant's Pool Hall before the murder of Suzanne Henry, and testified that he spent about $200 on cocaine in Plant City. ( See October 17, 2003, Transcript, pages 95-96, Trial Transcript, Volume V, pages 561-562, 565, 569-574, 577-578, 596-599, 615-619, attached). The record also reflects that Mr. Nathan Giles, Jr. and Ms. Sharon Toomer testified at trial that defendant had used cocaine earlier in the day at Grant's Pool Hall. ( See Trial Transcript, Volume VI, pages 746-748, 750-755, 763-766, 768-770, attached). Trial court order at 16 (emphasis supplied). Hence, in addition to the incredibly damaging effect of counsel's disclosures on their face, his jury is now told directly that his voluntary intoxication preceded the killing of his wife and that another judge and jury have obviously rejected any claim that such intoxication should prevent his conviction or sentence of death. Under any reasonable assessment counsel's explanation that a jury's knowledge of a prior sentence of death would make them more sympathetic to a voluntary intoxication defense is patently unreasonable and simply strains credulity. Counsel's suggestion that the jury would be less impacted at the penalty phase by first hearing of Henry's record at the guilt phase cannot withstand scrutiny, since it assumes the jury's rejection of Henry's defense while counsel is still presenting and advocating that defense. In fact, it makes no sense whatsoever to argue that a juror would be more inclined to believe a voluntary intoxication defense if he or she first learned that the defendant had stabbed his first wife to death when not intoxicated and had also been convicted of the first-degree murder of his second wife and was sentenced to death for that crime. [22] If anything, it would make a reasonable juror more skeptical of voluntary intoxication as a defense. Certainly counsel could not reasonably expect that a jury that saw the intoxication defense abandoned in the guilt phase would even consider it in the penalty phase. Indeed, at one point in the postconviction hearing, counsel candidly acknowledged he had made a serious mistake. [23] He was candid and he was right. To his credit, counsel did not abandon his voluntary intoxication defense at the postconviction hearing. Rather, he acknowledged its efficacy, especially in light of his further decision not to advance an insanity defense because of the equivocation of his experts. There was no such equivocation with the voluntary intoxication defense. In short, in a case where voluntary intoxication is a viable defense to first-degree murder, effectively giving up any chance for a second-degree finding in the guilt phase is not a reasonable tactic. [24] In fact, that chance represented Henry's only hope for life. In an attempt to save counsel's bad judgment, the majority cites Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004), to support its conclusion. Majority op. at 617-18. However, this is like comparing apples and oranges. Not only is there no valid comparison between the cases, but there are many distinctions between the situation in Nixon and the situation here. First and foremost, in Nixon, there was no viable defense such as voluntary intoxication. 543 U.S. at 180-81, 125 S.Ct. 551. Nixon's counsel concluded that Nixon's guilt was not `subject to any reasonable dispute' and every court considering the case agreed with this assessment. Id. at 180-81, 181 n. 2, 125 S.Ct. 551. Further, Nixon was disruptive and violent during the trial and was absent for almost all of the trial, which stands in stark contrast to Henry's cooperative behavior on the stand and throughout the trial. Id. at 182, 125 S.Ct. 551. In Nixon, the United States Supreme Court noted, Counsel therefore may reasonably decide to focus on the trial's penalty phase, at which time counsel's mission is to persuade the trier that his client's life should be spared. . . . [C]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for attempting to impress the jury with his candor and his unwillingness to engage in `a useless charade. ' Id. at 191-92, 125 S.Ct. 551 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)). The key words in this rule of law are reasonably and useless charade. Those circumstances do not exist here. Henry's voluntary intoxication defense was not a useless charade. Indeed, it was well supported by the evidence and the law. Hence, unlike Nixon, the circumstances here do not support a strategy of throwing in the towel during the guilt phase.