Opinion ID: 1709139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: apportionment of temporary total disability benefits

Text: On his direct appeal, Sanders asserts and the controlling opinion holds that it was error for the commission to apportion temporary total disability benefits. The statute provides that where a preexisting disease is a material contributing factor in the results following injury,  compensation otherwise payable should  be reduced by the proportion by which the preexisting disease contributed to the production of the results following the injury. (Emphasis added.) The word result means a consequence, effect, or something brought about or achieved. Webster, International Dictionary 2126 (2d ed. 1950). The majority say that the results following injury cannot be known or determined until an injured worker has attained maximum medical recovery. However, following an injury, there are under the act two kinds of results, temporary and permanent. Section 4 makes no distinction between them. Both are results following injury. The problem is to ascertain the legislative intent as reflected in the statute. It includes both temporary and permanent results, since that word is in the plural, and is not restricted to those which are permanent only. If the legislature had intended to exclude from the apportionment act temporary benefits, it could have done so easily by expressly so stating, or by adding the word permanent before the word results. No such limitation was made, and I am not willing to amend the statute to accomplish a limitation which is contrary to its express terms. Moreover, section 4 states that the compensation otherwise payable will be reduced by the amount of contribution of the preexisting disease. That word is defined as the money allowable (allowance) payable to an injured worker or his dependents ... Miss. Laws 1960, ch. 276, § 1; Miss. Code Ann. § 6998-02 (10) (Supp. 1962). The money allowance payable to the injured worker for a disability, either temporary or permanent, is a maximum of $35 per week. Code §§ 6998-07, 6998-09. Apportionment reduces the compensation payable to the worker. Accordingly, the word compensation, as thus defined in the statute, would include the money allowances payable to the injured worker, the weekly  benefits, for both temporary and permanent disability. Here again, a holding that apportionment does not apply to temporary benefits requires an insertion into the act of a limitation upon the word compensation, contrary to the definition in the act itself. The purpose of the legislature in enacting the apportionment statute are also strong factors in considering whether it applies to temporary benefits. The underlying reasons for apportionment are well summarized in Comment, 32 Miss. L.J. 284 (1961): The purpose of such legislation which relieves the individual employer of liability for preexisting infirmities is two-fold: (1) it tends to lessen discrimination in hiring handicapped workers, and (2) it eliminates an injustice to the employer who would, without the apportionment rule, be required to pay more compensation for injury to a handicapped worker because of the preexisting infirmity or injury. Students of this question and at least one attorney member of the House of Representatives which passed both the 1958 and 1960 apportionment statutes are apparently of the opinion the latter applies to temporary as well as permanent disability benefits. Comment, 32 Miss. L.J. 284 (1961); Shanahan, Amendments to Workmen's Compensation Act 1956-1958, 30 Miss. L.J. 105 (1959); Comment, 30 Miss. L.J. 312 (1959). Apparently the legislature concluded it was not fair and equitable to require an employer to make compensation payments for that part of a disability attributable to a preexisting physical handicap or disease. Apportionment holds him liable only for that portion of the disability caused by his employment of claimant. With this purpose in mind, it is not carried out by declining to apply the apportionment act to temporary total disability benefits, where (as here) the undisputed evidence by claimant's own doctors is that a substantial part of his temporary disability represents the material  contribution of his preexisting coronary artery disease. Section 4 apportions the contribution of the preexisting disease to all results following the injury. To say it does not apply to temporary, but only permanent, results constitutes an insertion into the act of that limitation. It also frustrates this essential purpose of section 4. In the present case, all prerequisites to apportionment exist. Southeastern Construction Co. v. Dodson, 247 Miss. 1, 153 So.2d 276 (1963); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Clark, 246 Miss. 868, 152 So.2d 921 (1963); Cuevas v. Sutter Well Works, 245 Miss. 478, 150 So.2d 524 (1963). Eight other states have apportionment statutes, but their terminology varies. None are exactly similar in the respect to the Mississippi act. Only one of these states, Maryland, restricts apportionment to permanent disability. This is by a provision expressly excluding temporary disability. Md. Ann. Code art. 101, § 36 (7) (Supp. 1962). Others apportion temporary benefits. Lindskog v. Rosebud Mines, Inc., 84 Idaho 160, 369 P.2d 580 (1962); Harris v. Bechtel Corp., 74 Idaho 308, 261 P.2d 818 (1953); Hanson v. Independent School Dist., 50 Idaho 81, 294 P. 513 (1930). See also Dunn, Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Law § 94.8 (Supp. 1963). These statutes are reviewed in the appendix to this opinion. The fact that other states apportion temporary benefits demonstrates that it is feasible and no more difficult than apportioning permanent compensation, assuming that is pertinent, as the majority opinion indicates. In summary, I think the apportionment act applies to both temporary and permanent disability benefits. Its terms are plain and unambiguous. It indicates no contrary legislative intent. Both the results following injury and compensation, as used in section 4, reflect an intent to apply the act to temporary benefits.  Moreover, this is consistent with the purpose of apportionment, namely, requiring the employer to pay compensation only for that proportion of claimant's disability attributable to his employment, and not for disability attributable to a preexisting disease or handicap. The wisdom and equality of that legislative decision is not a judicial question.