Opinion ID: 2813710
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claim Against Maryland Chemical

Text: The district court also dismissed the only claim against Maryland Chemical -- brought under § 6972(a)(1)(B) -- for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that because the statute requires that a defendant “contribute” to the solid or hazardous waste at issue, the complaint must allege the defendant affirmatively acted to create or cause the contamination in order to survive a motion to dismiss. It concluded that alleging “spilling, releasing, and/or disposing of hazardous wastes” did not satisfy this requirement because those incidents could occur “without any active human participation” by Maryland Chemical. (J.A. 89.) Goldfarb contends that the district court erred because the Complaint alleges that Maryland Chemical’s past operations on the Russell Street Properties led to the current contamination at that site, which is migrating to the Waterfront Parcels and the Middle Branch. He posits that the Complaint thus 36 sufficiently pled Maryland Chemical’s “contribution” so as to state a claim under § 6972(a)(1)(B). We agree. Although we have not previously opined as to the meaning of § 6972(a)(1)(B)’s “contribution” requirement, we are bound to interpret undefined statutory terms according to their “ordinary meaning.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983) (stating congressional “silence compels us to ‘start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the meaning of the words used’” (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)). Consistent with that guidance, other federal circuit courts have looked to the dictionary definition of “contribute” to conclude that term for RCRA purposes means that a defendant must “be actively involved in or have some degree of control over,” “have a share in any act or effect,” or “act as a determining factor.” Hinds Invs., L.P. v. Angioli, 654 F.3d 846, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2011); Sycamore Indus. Parks Assocs. v. Ericsson, Inc., 546 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 2008); Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 294 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1384 (8th Cir. 1989). We adopt this interpretation, which therefore requires a defendant’s active conduct on -- rather than passive connection to -- the property in order to be deemed a contributor for § 6972(a)(1)(B) purposes. See Sycamore Indus. Parks, 546 F.3d at 854. 37 The Complaint adequately alleges such conduct as to Maryland Chemical. Paragraphs 49-51 allege that Maryland Chemical engaged in “chemical manufacturing and/or bulk chemical storage, repackaging and distribution purposes” for over five decades, and that its “past operations at the Russell Street Properties resulted in spills and releases of hazardous substances and/or hazardous wastes including, but not limited to” four specific spills on portions of the Russell Street Properties. (J.A. 18-19.) Paragraph 51 alleges the specific lots on the Russell Street Properties where the spills occurred, and the types of chemicals involved. (J.A. 19.) Paragraph 134, in turn, alleges that Maryland Chemical’s “past operations” contributed to the imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and the environment which is present at the Casino Site and the Waterfront Parcels by unlawfully spilling, releasing, and/or disposing of hazardous wastes and/or hazardous substances in the soils and groundwater at the Casino Site (including, but not limited to [hazardous chemical compounds]) and by failing to address and/or remediate the contamination thereafter. (J.A. 35.) Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing the claim against Maryland Chemical for failure to allege “contribution” under § 6972(a)(1)(B). 10 10Since the district court relied, in part, on a case discussing “disposal” rather than “contribution,” Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992), we point out that the terms have different meanings. Moreover, once the active component of “contribution” has been (Continued) 38 As the City did with respect to the subsection (a)(1)(B) claim against it, Maryland Chemical argues that even if the district court erred as to this one aspect of the claim, we could affirm because the Complaint fails to adequately allege the remaining elements of a § 6972(a)(1)(B) claim. We decline to engage in that analysis for the same reasons we limited our review above. We therefore vacate the district court’s judgment as to Maryland Chemical and remand this claim for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.