Opinion ID: 1588942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Revisiting Murphy I

Text: Murphy Oil next urges that this court should revisit and overrule our decision in Murphy I . The crux of Murphy Oil's argument is that because the California Supreme Court ruled in favor of the policyholder in a similar case and this court was misled in Murphy I , we should correct our mistake. We find Murphy Oil's initial premise, which is based on law of the case, to be faulty. The underlying litigation for Murphy I was Blakely I, and we are convinced that Blakely III and Blakely I are not the same case. The parties are different, and we can only speculate as to what the triggering spills for liability may be in Blakely III, because that is not altogether clear from the Harrison Brothers complaint. Migration is also alleged in Blakely III, but was not a factor in Blakely I. Furthermore, the liability of Murphy Oil has yet to be decided in Blakely III, much less the grounds for that liability. In sum, we do not believe that the doctrine of law of the case applies to these circumstances for a reason different than that posited by Murphy Oil. Having said that, to the extent Murphy Oil is urging the reversal of a three-year-old case based on a 1999 California decision [ Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.4th 815, 982 P.2d 229, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 (1999)], we decline to do so. In Thiel v. Priest, 342 Ark. 292, 28 S.W.3d 296 (2000), this court noted that while it does have the power to overrule prior decisions, it is necessary, as a matter of public policy, to uphold those decisions unless a great injury or injustice would result. See id. (citing Sanders v. County of Sebastian, 324 Ark. 433, 922 S.W.2d 334 (1996)). In Thiel, we noted that [t]he United States Supreme Court has recognized that adherence to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority. Id. at 300, 28 S.W.3d at 300 (citing Sanders, supra ; Zinger v. Terrell, 336 Ark. 423, 985 S.W.2d 737 (1999)). In Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001), we made similar statements regarding stare decisis: As a general rule, we are bound to follow prior case law under the doctrine of stare decisis, a policy designed to lend predictability and stability to the law. State Office of Child Support Enforcem't v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338, 343, 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997) (citing Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1252, 429 S.W.2d 45, 52 (1968) (superseded by statute on other grounds)). Indeed, it is well-settled that [p]recedent governs until it gives a result so patently wrong, so manifestly unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable. Mitchell, 330 Ark. at 343, 954 S.W.2d 907 (quoting Parish, 244 Ark. at 1252, 429 S.W.2d 45). Our test is whether adherence to the rule would result in great injury or injustice. Mitchell, 330 Ark. at 343, 954 S.W.2d 907 (quoting Independence Fed. Bank v. Paine Webber, 302 Ark. 324, 331, 789 S.W.2d 725, 730 (1990)). Aka, 344 Ark. at 641, 42 S.W.3d at 518. It is our belief that overruling precedent after three short years would lend instability to our common law. It is true that differing views were expressed in Murphy I , evidencing the point that justices could differ dramatically over the law and the result in the case. We cannot, however, conclude that our opinion in Murphy I attains the high standard of patent error or manifest injustice necessary for us to overrule this precedent.