Opinion ID: 158637
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: In determining whether sufficient evidence supports a jury's verdict, we review the record de novo . United States v. Johnston , 146 F.3d 785, 789 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 839 (1999). “Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, considered in the light most favorable to the government, it would allow a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 789. We will not question a jury's credibility determinations or its conclusions about the weight of the evidence when evaluating the evidence under this standard. See United States v. Johnson , 57 F.3d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1995).
Mr. Feldman argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a -5- matter of law to establish the essential elements of conspiracy to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute. In order to obtain a conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846, “the government must prove that (1) there was an agreement to violate the law; (2) Defendant knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy; (3) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily took part in the conspiracy; and (4) the coconspirators were interdependent.” United States v. Ailsworth , 138 F.3d 843, 850 (10th Cir.) (quotation marks and citation omitted) , cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 221 (1998). Thus, the government had to establish Mr. Feldman “agreed to violate the law, that [he] knew at least the essential objectives of the conspiracy, and that he knowingly and voluntarily became part of the conspiracy.” United States v. Williams , 923 F.2d 1397, 1402 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied , 500 U.S. 925 (1991). The government need not prove the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and the “jury may infer an agreement constituting a conspiracy from the acts of the parties and other circumstantial evidence indicating concert of action for the accomplishment of a common purpose.” Johnston , 146 F.3d at 789 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, the jury may presume a defendant is a knowing participant in the conspiracy when he acts in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy. See United States v. Brown , 943 F.2d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 1991). “The defendant's participation in or connection to the conspiracy need only be slight, so long as sufficient evidence -6- exists to establish the defendant's participation beyond a reasonable doubt.” Johnston , 146 F.3d at 789. In this case, the evidence shows the owner of the motor home, Mr. Chavez, offered to pay Mr. Feldman and Mr. Ozbirn $1,000 plus expenses to drive the vehicle from El Paso to Chicago. Mr. Feldman and Mr. Ozbirn discussed Mr. Chavez’s offer and after some negotiation, agreed to transport the motor home. Mr. Feldman testified he expected to get at least $300 of the $1000 payment for his role in the transportation of the motor home. Mr. Feldman also testified that he and Mr. Ozbirn, a longtime business associate, traveled together in the motor home for several hundred miles over a two-day period and that he started off driving the motor home out of El Paso and thereafter drove for small periods when Mr. Ozbirn needed a break. Furthermore, the record shows the approximately 863 pounds of marijuana contained in the motor home emitted a very strong odor. So strong, according to law enforcement officers, that the smell permeated the interior of the motor home and was immediately noticeable upon entry into the vehicle. Indeed, Trooper Smith testified he could smell the odor of raw marijuana standing outside the vehicle. Although Mr. Feldman testified he noticed only a musty smell in the -7- motor home, he admits he is familiar with the odor of raw marijuana. In addition, the record shows Mr. Feldman acted overly nervous towards Trooper Smith, and when questioned about the nature of the trip, gave an explanation that varied from his testimony at trial. 1 Admittedly, this evidence is purely circumstantial. However, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, we believe it is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer Mr. Feldman knew the motor home contained a substantial amount of marijuana and that the purpose of the El Paso-Chicago trip was to transport the marijuana in the motor home for later distribution. See United States v. Carter , 130 F.3d 1432, 1439-40 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1856 (1998) (inferring defendant’s awareness of agreement to distribute narcotics from surrounding circumstances and defendant’s conduct towards law enforcement). This guilty knowledge, coupled with Mr. Feldman’s negotiation of the deal with Mr. Ozbirn and Mr. Chavez, his presence in the motor home, and his assistance in driving it, is sufficient to demonstrate that Mr. 1 For example, Mr. Feldman told law enforcement officers he and Mr. Ozbirn borrowed the motor home from a friend and were driving to visit his grandmother in Wisconsin. At trial, Mr. Feldman testified Mr. Chavez hired them to drive the motor home to Chicago and that he and Mr. Ozbirn planned to take a side trip to visit Mr. Feldman’s grandmother in Wisconsin, although he never told his grandmother he was planning to visit. -8- Feldman entered into a joint venture with Mr. Ozbirn and others to transport the marijuana to Chicago in return for compensation. Id. at 1440; see also United States v. Esparsen , 930 F.2d 1461, 1472 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied , 502 U.S. 1036 (1992) (concluding that even though mere presence is insufficient to establish defendant’s involvement in a conspiracy, it is a material factor to be considered). Furthermore, the jury could reasonably presume from Mr. Feldman’s active assistance in transporting the motor home that he knowingly and voluntarily participated in the scheme. See Brown , 943 F.2d at 1250 (stating jury may presume defendant is a knowing participant in a conspiracy when he acts in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy). Finally, the jury could reasonably infer interdependence of the conspirators from Mr. Feldman’s and Mr. Ozbirn’s joint negotiations with Mr. Chavez and the co-defendants’ joint performance and compensation for their role in the scheme. See Carter , 130 F.3d at 1440 (concluding interdependence could be inferred from co-defendants’ reliance on each other to deliver narcotics). Thus, after carefully reviewing the record, we conclude the evidence, albeit circumstantial, permitted the reasonable inference that Mr. Feldman knowingly participated with Mr. Ozbirn and others in a conspiracy to distribute marijuana. -9-
To support a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, “the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the defendant knowingly possessed the illegal drug; and (2) the defendant possessed the drug with the specific intent to distribute it.” United States v. Reece , 86 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir.1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Possession of the drug may be actual or constructive. Id. We have held that “[a]n individual constructively possesses property when he knowingly holds the power and ability to exercise dominion and control over the property,” or has “an appreciable ability to guide the destiny of the drug.” Carter , 130 F.3d at 1441 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This connection “may be established by circumstantial evidence and may be joint among several individuals.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, there is no direct evidence Mr. Feldman physically possessed any marijuana. However, a review of the record convinces us a jury could reasonably conclude Mr. Feldman had constructive possession of the drugs . First, there is evidence a strong odor of raw marijuana permeated the entire motor home. This evidence, combined with Mr. Feldman’s acknowledgment of his familiarity with the smell of marijuana, supports an inference of knowing -10- possession. See United States v. Hooks , 780 F.2d 1526, 1531-32 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 475 U.S. 1128 (1986) (concluding presence of odor combined with other circumstantial evidence supports inference of knowing possession). Although Mr. Feldman testified he detected only a “musty smell” in the motor home and had no knowledge of the marijuana, a reasonable jury was entitled to discredit his explanation. See United States v. Ortiz-Ortiz , 57 F.3d 892, 895 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting jury was free to discredit defendant’s explanation of contents of the vehicle he was riding in); United States v. Levine , 41 F.3d 607, 610 (10th Cir. 1994) (when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, we “accept the jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses.”). Furthermore, the evidence shows Mr. Feldman, along with Mr. Ozbirn, rode in and drove the motor home containing marijuana for close to two days. We acknowledge mere proximity to illegal drugs, without more, is insufficient to support a finding of possession. See Ortiz-Ortiz , 57 F.3d at 895. However, “such proximity, presence or association is sufficient when accompanied ... with testimony connecting the defendant with the incriminating surrounding circumstances.” United States v. Espinosa , 771 F.2d 1382, 1397 (10th Cir.) (quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied , 474 U.S. 1023 (1985). Here, -11- Mr. Feldman’s admission that he drove the motor home, albeit for brief periods, supports a finding that he had some control over the vehicle and that control, when combined with other evidence, supports an inference of knowing possession. See United States v. Pineda-Ortuno , 952 F.2d 98, 102 (5th Cir.) (“Knowing possession can be inferred from a defendant’s control over the vehicle in which the illicit substance is contained in a hidden compartment if there exists other circumstantial evidence that is suspicious in nature or demonstrates guilty knowledge.”), cert. denied , 504 U.S. 928 (1992). Moreover, the government presented evidence showing Mr. Feldman engaged in a joint enterprise with Mr. Ozbirn to deliver the motor home and its contents. Specifically, the record shows Mr. Ozbirn and Mr. Feldman jointly negotiated the deal with Mr. Chavez, jointly agreed to receive $1000 for transporting the motor home, and jointly performed under that agreement. Such evidence supports an inference that Mr. Feldman had an appreciable ability to guide the destiny of the drugs and thus had constructive possession of them, even though he was not driving the motor home at the time of his arrest. See OrtizOrtiz , 57 F.3d at 895 (concluding defendant passenger had constructive possession of marijuana because he engaged in a joint venture with the driver codefendant to possess and distribute the drugs); Espinosa , 771 F.2d at 1397 -12- (finding defendant had constructive possession of drugs where he and his codefendants participated in a “joint undertaking” to possess and distribute marijuana); United States v. Massey , 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (10th Cir. 1982) (concluding evidence of defendant’s participation in a joint enterprise permitted inference of constructive possession even though defendant was not driving the car containing the marijuana). The second element of specific intent to distribute may be inferred from both the quantity of drugs discovered in the motor home and Mr. Feldman’s joint enterprise with Mr. Ozbirn to deliver the motor home and its contents to Chicago. In United States v. Powell , 982 F.2d 1422 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 507 U.S. 946 (1993), we held that intent to distribute drugs can be inferred from the possession of a large quantity of a controlled substance. Id. at 1430. Authorities removed over eight hundred pounds of marijuana from the motor home. Such a quantity easily permits the inference of intent to distribute. In addition, by Mr. Feldman’s own admission, he and Mr. Ozbirn intended to deliver the motor home to Chicago in return for payment. Combining this with the reasonable inference that he had knowledge and constructive possession of the drugs contained in the motor home allowed the jury to conclude Mr. Feldman had the specific intent to distribute the marijuana. For these reasons, we affirm the possession with intent -13- to distribute conviction as supported by sufficient evidence.