Opinion ID: 215414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brackett Allegation

Text: First, this Court never reviewed the particular charges on which the Committee based its discipline. Instead, in the appeal from Judge Baer's sanction order, this Court stated that it need only review a sampling of Peters's conduct to affirm the district court's imposition of sanctions, and then discussed three charges not now at issue. Wolters Kluwer, 564 F.3d at 116, 118-19. The Court then concluded as follows: Having reviewed these three instances, we see no need to consider the other sanctions for which the district court issued reprimands. No likely argument has been advanced as to why the other nineteen sanctions are defective, and because the sanctions are all non-monetary, the subtraction of one or another from the whole course of conduct would not alter the nature or tenor of the district court's rulings. Id. at 119. Although the Court saw no likely argument concerning the sanctioned conduct presently at issue, the Court nonetheless made clear that appellate review had been limited to the sampling of conduct explicitly discussed in the opinion. We therefore disagree with the Grievance Committee's statements that Judge Baer's conclusions regarding the incident involving Mr. Brackett . . . have been affirmed by the Second Circuit, In re Peters, M-2-238, doc. 193 at 5, and that [t]he Second Circuit affirmed all of the sanctions on Ms. Peters, id. at 7. Thus, the Committee was incorrect to rely on such preclusion doctrines as collateral estoppel and res judicata in finding that it need not hold its own hearing. See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 94 F.3d 747, 754 (2d Cir.1996) (It is a well-established principle of federal law that if an appellate court considers only one of a lower court's alternative bases for its holding, affirming the judgment without reaching the alternative bases, only the basis that is actually considered can have any preclusive effect in subsequent litigation.); Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986) ([I]f an appeal is taken and the appellate court affirms on one ground and disregards the other, there is no collateral estoppel as to the unreviewed ground.); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. o (1982). The Committee also relied on the law of the case doctrine in finding that it need not hold its own hearing. The law of the case doctrine, although not binding, counsels a court against revisiting its prior rulings in subsequent stages of the same case absent `cogent' and `compelling' reasons, including, inter alia, the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 490 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.2000)). We need not address whether the present matter is the same case as Judge Baer's sanctions proceeding because, even assuming arguendo that the doctrine could apply, the present issues are sufficiently compelling to warrant revisiting the Brackett allegation. See id.
Second, this Court's due process analysis in Wolters Kluwer is of limited aid in the present appeal because the notice Peters received in Judge Baer's sanctions proceeding concerning the Brackett allegation, and her opportunity to respond, differed significantly from the notice and opportunity to respond she had concerning the three charges discussed in this Court's Wolters Kluwer decision. As an initial matter, the Brackett allegation was not included in the defendants' sanctions motion, see Peters's App. (App.) at A68-A100, although Judge Baer noted in his sanctions order that he had specifically reiterated at the beginning of the hearings that the [district court] was only considering the same issues raised by [the] sanctions motion, Wolters Kluwer, 525 F.Supp.2d at 452 n. 8; see also App. at A287 (Letter from Judge Baer, copied to all attorneys, concerning sanctions hearing) (The scope of the hearing will encompass the relief requested by Defendants in their motion for contempt, sanctions, and fees.), A374 (similar statement by Judge Baer at beginning of the hearing). While that description of the scope of the sanctions hearing may not be controlling, since an attorney may receive adequate notice of a misconduct charge by means other than a sanctions motion served prior to the sanctions hearing, see Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (explaining that due process requires only notice of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information), it does not appear, on the present record, that Peters received adequate notice of, and opportunity to respond to, the Brackett charge by any means. [5] The sanctions motion charged Peters with, inter alia, failing to deliver all deposition transcripts to the district court, in violation of Judge Baer's protective order, which required her firm to deliver all of the transcripts to him. See App. at A73, A82-85. Although the Brackett allegation was related to Peters's alleged intention to retain transcripts in violation of Judge Baer's order, the sanctions motion contained nothing that would suggest to a reasonable person that the Brackett allegation might be a basis for sanctions. There is a simple explanation for this: the sanctions motion was signed and served on April 24, 2007, see id. at A100; S.D.N.Y. Docket 07-cv-2352, Doc. 124, item 200 at 143 (Cert. of Service), [6] while the Brackett allegation concerned an event that occurred on April 26, 2007, see App. at A714-15 (Brackett Decl.). The Brackett allegation did not surface during the sanctions proceeding until September 4, 2007, the third day of the five days of hearings before Judge Baer, when a witness testified that he had been told that Peters had directed Brackett to write attorney notes on clean copies of deposition transcripts. See id. at A657-59. However, the focus at that point remained whether the law firm or Peters had possessed transcripts that previously should have been delivered to the court. See generally id. at A655-72. In fact, Peters's cross-examination of that witness barely touched on his mention of the Brackett allegationin that regard, Peters simply asked if the witness had himself heard the conversation between Brackett and Peters, and whether the witness had participated in the decision not to call Brackett as a witness in the sanctions hearing, at which point Judge Baer stated, We can fix that. Id. at A670. At that time, it appears that the Brackett allegation was regarded as evidence relevant to whether Peters intended to deliver all of the transcripts covered by the protective order to the district court, and not as a separate charge of misconduct. By letter dated September 5, 2007, Judge Baer requested Brackett to submit a declaration regarding his involvement in the litigation, particularly regarding his involvement in activities relating to the allegations that he [had been] directed to alter transcripts provided to [the district court]. Doc. 124, item 409. Judge Baer also stated that, after reviewing Brackett's declaration, he would decide if Brackett would be called as a witness. Id. The declaration itself is dated September 9, 2007, see App. at A716; it was emailed to Judge Baer's law clerk and Peters's attorney, among others, on September 10, 2007, see Doc. 124, item 413; and both Peters and her attorney acknowledged receipt of the declaration on that day, see id. at items 414, 416; App. at A719, A767. Upon Peters's receipt of the Brackett declaration, one arguably might conclude that she was then on notice that the transcript defacement allegation constituted a disciplinary charge that could subject her to sanctions. However, Judge Baer did not explicitly characterize it as such, and other attorneys intimately involved in the proceedings apparently still did not recognize it as a charge. After Peters responded to Brackett's declaration by requesting an opportunity to cross-examine Brackett and several other persons, see Doc. 124, item 414, an opposing attorney objected to Peters's last-ditch and blatant effort to protract [the] proceedings, and listed the six issues that the attorney believed were before the district court, a list which did not include the Brackett allegation, see id. at item 420. Despite these ambiguities, for purposes of this decision, we assume that Peters had notice of the Brackett charge as of September 10, 2007, but find that, for the reasons that follow, she nonetheless did not have adequate time to respond to that charge. It is not clear how much time Peters had, after receipt of the Brackett declaration on September 10, to prepare for her cross-examination of Brackett on September 12. While Peters may have had some preparation time on September 10, she and her counsel were occupied for substantial portions of the next two days by the hearing itself: on September 11, the hearing ran from approximately 10:35 a.m. to approximately 8:00 p.m., see App. at A718, A796, and, on September 12, it began at 9:30 a.m., see id. at A804. Additionally, any preparation time Peters may have had on September 10 and 11 also had to cover four witnesses other than Brackett who were to testify on September 11 and 12, and Peters's own testimony on September 11. Peters also may have spent some of her available time preparing for several other possible witnesses who ultimately did not testify. See id. at A638 (Peters requesting testimony of three attorneys), A719 (plaintiff's counsel noting possible need to call three defendants), A827 (Peters requesting testimony of five witnesses). However, even if we assume that Peters had to prepare only for four potentially adverse witnesses, and not for her own testimony, those four witnesses were relevant to a number of the charges in the sanctions motion, and not simply the Brackett allegation. Furthermore, Judge Baer informed the attorneys on September 11 that the September 12 hearing would run from 9:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m., see id. at A801, with Brackett taking no more than 15 or 20 minutes, id. at A775, clearly requiring Peters to prioritize her preparation time, presumably giving greater priority to the witnesses and allegations directly relevant to the known charges. But, as discussed above, it is not clear when the Brackett allegation became a known chargeone that independently exposed her to possible sanction in that proceedingor, if it was a known charge by September 10, a charge important enough to warrant reallocating scarce resources and time away from the issues that, up to that point, had been treated as the central issues. Since the Brackett allegation was, at the very least, an important basis for the seven-year suspension, we assume that Peters would have cross-examined him on it if she had had unlimited time for cross-examination. See id. at A732 (Peters requesting another witness to provide the exact words used by Brackett for impeachment purposes), A887 (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Compel Discovery (filed Sept. 24, 2007) (objecting to, inter alia, the truncated opportunity for cross examination of witnesses such as Jordan Brackett who have brought what [Judge Baer] has indicated [he] deems the most serious allegations against Peters)). Of course, no lawyer is permitted unlimited cross-examination; rather, [t]he scope and extent of cross-examination are generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the decision to restrict cross-examination will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 335 (2d Cir.1993); see also United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 125 (2d Cir.2008). Although the trial court may, under proper circumstances, impose a time limit on cross-examination, see United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1173 (2d Cir.1989) (upholding time limit when defense counsel had adequate time to elicit evidence of witness's motive for testifying falsely and counsel had not identified other areas of inquiry they wished to pursue), such limits should be imposed with caution, cf. United States v. Vest, 116 F.3d 1179, 1187 (7th Cir.1997)(stating that a trial judge's rigid adherence to time limitations would prevent the judge from making the necessary particularized judgment as to the proper length of cross-examination). Here, we are not directly reviewing Judge Baer's decision to limit Peters's cross-examination of Brackett; instead, we are reviewing the Grievance Committee's reliance on the procedures employed by Judge Baer, which included that limitation. That distinction may be highly relevant here since Judge Baer only imposed a reprimand, and specifically declined to suspend Peters, finding it more appropriate to refer Peters to the Grievance Committee because of the procedural protections inherent to that process. Wolters Kluwer, 525 F.Supp.2d at 550. It is not known which specific procedural protections Judge Baer had in mind; however, that statement suggests that the very judge who conducted the hearing did not believe that the procedures employed were necessarily sufficient for purposes of a suspension. During the September 12, 2007 hearing, Judge Baer stated that Peters would have fifteen minutes to cross-examine Brackett, see App. at A814, and then kept a close eye on the clock, announcing when only five minutes remained, id. at A822, and when only two minutes remained, id. at A823, and stopping Peters mid-question, [7] id. The transcript defacement issue, which was not covered by Peters's cross-examination, was first mentioned during opposing counsel's redirect examination of Brackett, with Judge Baer asking the only question relevant to the present proceedingsoliciting from Brackett that he did not believe that Peters's statement that he should scribble on the transcripts was said in jest. Id. at A824. After that, Judge Baer immediately excused Brackett from the stand. Id. Under these circumstances, we do not agree that Peters `chose not to directly cross-examine Brackett about the [defacement allegation].' In re Peters, 543 F.Supp.2d at 332 (quoting Wolters Kluwer, 525 F.Supp.2d at 521 n. 277). Instead, the record strongly suggests that Peters simply ran out of time as a result of the strict time limit imposed by Judge Baer. Furthermore, although the Grievance Committee noted that the Brackett cross-examination spann[ed] 19 pages of the transcript and that one of Peters's lawyers was present, id., neither of those facts suggests that Peters had adequate time to question Brackett on the defacement issue, given that his declaration covered a number of topics relevant to several of the misconduct charges. Additionally, the limited advance notice of the Brackett allegation severely restricted Peters's ability to investigate and obtain impeachment evidence relevant to that charge, beyond the evidence and witnesses already scheduled for presentation to Judge Baer. We do not, however, comment on whether Peters was prejudiced by that particular limitation, which may be mooted in whole or part by the further proceedings to be held by the Grievance Committee. In light of the more exacting standard that applies to this matter, Wolters Kluwer, 564 F.3d at 113-14 (quoting Perez v. Danbury Hosp., 347 F.3d 419, 423 (2nd Cir.2003)), we conclude that Peters was denied due process with respect to the Brackett allegation and vacate the Grievance Committee's suspension order to the extent it was based on that allegation. However, the Grievance Committee is free, on remand, to hold further proceedings concerning that charge, providing Peters with sufficient opportunity to respond and cross-examine adverse witnesses. In those further proceedings, the Grievance Committee should decide, in the first instance, what evidence Peters should be permitted to present in her defense, and, if the Grievance Committee declines to consider particular proffered evidence, it should provide detailed findings in support of that decision. For example, regarding the Committee's finding that Peters had unreasonably delayed in presenting certain evidence from Peters's former secretary, see In re Peters, M-2-238, doc. 193 at 6 (SPA-45) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2009), it is not clear to us what prior opportunity Peters had to present that evidence, or how it substantially altered her position. However, since the scope of any new proceedings will be decided by the Grievance Committee, any further discussion of potential evidence would be speculative. We also decline to consider, at this juncture, whether Peters's suspension may be based on a conclusion that Peters's statements to Brackett evidenced, at a minimum, a reckless disregard of the prohibitions of the New York Disciplinary Code. In re Peters, 543 F.Supp.2d at 332; see Peters's Br. at 72-77. If that issue remains relevant on remand, Peters should present her argument on that point to the Grievance Committee for its consideration in the first instance.