Opinion ID: 2044456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Uniform Test for the Appointment of Experts

Text: Defendant's final argument is that this court should adopt a uniform test to guide trial courts in deciding whether to appoint an expert for trial or post-conviction proceedings. Defendant contends that the appropriate standard is known as the truth-seeking theory, which requires the appointment of an expert if the expert could provide the fact finder with information that, standing alone or in combination with other information, would form the basis for a reasonable doubt. See D. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 469, 492 (1992). This approach requires the trial court to ask two questions: (1) is the issue in dispute; and (2) would the expert bring helpful information to the fact finder. 83 J.Crim. L. & Criminology at 492-93. Defendant does not explain how this test is either different in application from or superior to the test we established in Hall. In Hall we explained that an expert should be appointed if the testimony would assist the court in deciding the question before it. Hall, 157 Ill.2d at 339-40. 193 Ill.Dec. 98, 626 N.E.2d 131. If defendant can demonstrate that the expert testimony is relevant and material to the trial court's consideration of his post-conviction petition and if the court believes that the expert's opinion would be of assistance in deciding the issues before the court, then the trial court should appoint the expert. If these conditions are not met, then the trial court does not abuse its discretion by failing to appoint the expert. Additionally, we question defendant's concerns relating to uniformity. The test we established in Hall for post-conviction purposes is the same test that is used in determining whether the trial court should appoint an expert for trial purposes. See Hall, 157 Ill.2d at 339-40, 193 Ill.Dec. 98, 626 N.E.2d 131; People v. Mack, 128 Ill.2d 231, 250, 131 Ill.Dec. 551, 538 N.E.2d 1107 (1989). Without some explanation by defendant as to why the test he proposes is different from and, more importantly, superior to the test we adopted in Hall, we must decline defendant's invitation to adopt a new test.