Opinion ID: 1036305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: EDRs’ Voting Eligibility

Text: “The law governing the invocation of [§] 1983 for alleged ‘malfunctions’ of the electoral process is well settled.” Bodine v. Elkhart Cnty. Election Bd., 788 F.2d 1270, 1271 (7th Cir. 1986). “The Constitution is not an election fraud statute: protection is extended to the right of all qualified citizens to vote in state and federal elections, and to the right to have votes counted without dilution as compared to the votes of others.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “It is not every election irregularity, however, which will give rise to a constitutional claim and an action under [§] 1983.” Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1975). “[S]ection 1983 is implicated only when there is ‘willful conduct which undermines the organic processes by which candidates are elected.’” Bodine, 788 F.2d at 1272 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hennings, 523 F.2d at 864); see also Hennings, 523 F.2d at 864 (explaining that “irregularities caused by mechanical or human error and lacking in invidious or fraudulent intent” do not warrant relief under § 1983). In concluding that Voters had failed to state a claim concerning Officials’ verification of EDRs’ voting eligibility, the district court relied on our decision in Pettengill v. Putnam County R-1 School District, 472 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In Pettengill, property owners and county residents brought a § 1983 action seeking to set aside a school bond election held by the school district on the basis that certain voters did not meet residency requirements or were not of lawful age and because irregularities existed in applications for absentee ballots. Id. at 121-22. The -4- owners and residents argued that the school district had “diluted [their] legal votes by counting illegally cast votes and that such (state) action amount[ed] to a deprivation of [their] civil rights.” Id. at 122 (parenthetical in original). We held that dismissal was proper because a federal court cannot “be the arbiter of disputes over whether particular persons were or were not entitled to vote or over alleged irregularities in the transmission and handling of absentee voter ballots.” Id. We explained: In essence, the [owners and residents’] complaint asks the federal court to oversee the administrative details of a local election. We find no constitutional basis for doing so in the absence of aggravating factors such as denying the right of citizens to vote for reasons of race, or fraudulent interference with a free election by stuffing of the ballot box, or other unlawful conduct which interferes with the individual’s right to vote. No similar circumstance is alleged in the complaint in this case. Id. (internal citations omitted). In so holding, we adopted the rationale of Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1970). In Powell, voters alleged that state election officials erroneously permitted non-eligible individuals to vote in a congressional primary election. Id. at 85-86. In affirming the denial of relief, the Second Circuit explained that the voters’ § 1983 claim failed for want of “intentional or purposeful discrimination” on the part of election officials. Id. at 88. The court explained: “Were we to embrace plaintiffs’ theory, this court would henceforth be thrust into the details of virtually every election, tinkering with the state’s election machinery, reviewing petitions, registration cards, vote tallies, and certificates of election for all manner of error and insufficiency under state and federal law.” Id. at 86; see also Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1980) (“If every state election irregularity were considered a federal constitutional deprivation, federal courts would adjudicate every state election dispute, and the elaborate state election contest procedures, designed to assure speedy -5- and orderly disposition of the multitudinous questions that may arise in the electoral process, would be superseded by a [§] 1983 gloss.”). Voters argue that their claims differ from those in Pettengill because in this case, “the State exceeded its constitutional limitations of power, by design, to intentionally infringe upon the constitutional rights of entitled voters at any election.” We find this purported distinction unpersuasive. At their base, Voters’ claims are premised on potential harm in the form of vote dilution caused by insufficient preelection verification of EDRs’ voting eligibility and the absence of post-election ballot rescission procedures. Voters raised no allegations of the “aggravating factors” identified in Pettengill; they alleged no discriminatory or other intentional, unlawful misconduct by Officials sufficient to implicate § 1983. Nor did they allege defects causing Minnesota’s voting system to be so “fundamentally unfair” that relief under § 1983 may be appropriate. “A canvass of substantive due process cases related to voting rights reveals that voters can challenge a state election procedure in federal court only in limited circumstances, such as when the complained of conduct discriminates against a discrete group of voters, when election officials refuse to hold an election though required by state law, resulting in a complete disenfranchisement, or when the willful and illegal conduct of election officials results in fraudulently obtained or fundamentally unfair voting results.” Nolles v. State Comm. for Reorganization of Sch. Dists., 524 F.3d 892, 898-99 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, Voters cannot prevail on their § 1983 claims based on Officials’ failure to verify EDRs’ voting eligibility before allowing EDRs to cast their votes.