Opinion ID: 1237936
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Granting Prosecution Challenges for Cause

Text: (17) Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excused two prospective jurors, on prosecution challenges for cause, because of the jurors' death penalty views. In a capital case, a prospective juror may be excluded if the juror's views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851, 105 S.Ct. 844]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) During the voir dire, prospective juror Janet Ohligschlager answered correct when asked if her opinion concerning the death penalty was such that she would be unable to vote for it even though the evidence indicated it was a proper punishment. Under questioning by the defense, she said she could try to put aside her personal feelings about the death penalty and consider the evidence presented by both sides. When again questioned by the court, Ohligschlager said she did not think she could conceive of any situation in which she would vote for the death penalty. Prospective juror Sandy Natt also expressed serious reservations about his ability to return a verdict of death. As he put it, ... to take a life, I don't know if I could handle that. Asked whether he would be able to vote for death, he said, I don't think I could. He also indicated, in response to defense questioning, that he could consider the evidence presented by both sides. Asked by the prosecutor whether he could return a verdict of death, Natt said, Might be  if he had enough real bad stuff about him, maybe I could. But I don't really think I could. We find no error in the rulings sustaining the challenges for cause to these prospective jurors. Each juror gave answers showing substantial impairment of the juror's ability to fairly decide the issue of penalty. To the extent the jurors' other answers were conflicting or ambiguous, the trial court's implied determination as to their states of mind is binding upon this court. ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 875 [277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906].)