Opinion ID: 626146
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Endorsement Clause

Text: We first address the endorsement clause, which states a judge or a judicial candidate shall not publicly endorse or, except for the judge or candidate's opponent, publicly oppose another candidate for public office. 52 Minn. Stat. Ann., Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4.1(A)(3). Wersal contends this prohibition does not serve to limit actual bias regarding parties, because while there is a slight risk a judge will become biased in the event he or she receives an endorsement, the same is not true when the judge or candidate makes an endorsement. Moreover, Wersal argues even if the judge or candidate is biased in favor of the candidate he or she endorses, the endorsement is not the cause of the bias, but mere evidence of its previous existence. Thus, Wersal asserts the justification for the endorsement clause must turn on the appearance of bias created by the endorsement, but he claims such concerns are best dealt with via recusal. For support, Wersal relies on our decision in White II, where we stated, [i]n one sense, the underlying rationale for the partisan-activities clausethat associating with a particular group will destroy a judge's impartialitydiffers only in form from that which purportedly supports the announce clausethat expressing one's self on particular issues will destroy a judge's impartiality. 416 F.3d at 754 (emphasis omitted). Recognizing the protection afforded to the right of association, we concluded the partisan-activities clause was barely tailored to any interest in impartiality toward parties to the extent it sought to keep judges from aligning with particular views on issues by keeping them from aligning with a particular political party. Id. According to Wersal, this reasoning may be extended to the endorsement clause, because a candidate's association with another candidate by way of an endorsement is no more a threat to impartiality than a candidate associating with a political party or political interest group. Similarly, in this sense, Wersal contends the endorsement clause is overbroad because Minnesota has no interest in preventing judges or candidates from associating themselves with like-minded individuals and groups. Like the district court, we conclude the endorsement clause serves the compelling interests of preserving impartiality and avoiding the appearance of impropriety. At the outset, we must refuse Wersal's attempt to liken the endorsement clause to the partisan-activities clause in White II. In White I, the Supreme Court concluded the announce clause was barely tailored because it does not restrict speech for or against particular parties, but rather speech for or against particular issues.  536 U.S. at 776, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (emphasis in original). While White II concluded the partisan-activities clause was, in one sense, merely an extension of the announce clause in White I, see White II, 416 F.3d at 754-55, the same is not true here because the endorsement clause is plainly a restriction of speech for or against particular parties, rather than for or against particular issues. See Yost v. Stout, No. 06-4122-JAR, slip op. at 12 (D.Kan. Nov. 16, 2008) (upholding a clause restrict[ing] a judge or judicial candidate from publicly endorsing other candidates for public office [because] it does not restrict speech concerning disputed political issues.). When a judge or judicial candidate endorses another candidate, it creates a risk of partiality toward the endorsed party and his or her supporters, as well as a risk of partiality against other candidates opposing the endorsed party. The endorsement clause is directly aimed at this speech about parties, as it prevents potential litigants in a case from the risk of having an unfair trial. At the very least, the clause serves the State's interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety. Namely, even if a particular endorsement does not serve to create an actual bias toward or against a particular party, the act of endorsement itself undermines the judiciary's appearance of impartiality because the public may perceive the judge to be beholden to political interests. Our conclusion is bolstered by the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Siefert, where the court rejected a judge's attempt to analogize an endorsement clause with a partisan-activities clause: While an interest in the impartiality and perceived impartiality of the judiciary does not justify forbidding judges from identifying as members of political parties, a public endorsement is not the same type of campaign speech targeted by the impermissible rule against party affiliation in this case or the impermissible rule against talking about legal issues the Supreme Court struck down in White I. As Judge Siefert notes, endorsements primarily benefit the endorsee, not the endorser and endorsements may be exchanged between political actors on a quid pro quo basis. This amounts to a concession that offering an endorsement is less a judge's communication about his qualifications and beliefs than an effort to affect a separate political campaign, or even more problematically, assume a role as political powerbroker. . . . . When judges are speaking as judges, and trading on the prestige of their office to advance other political ends, a state has an obligation to regulate their behavior. We thus see a dividing line between the party affiliation rule, which impermissibly bars protected speech about the judge's own campaign, and the public endorsement rule, which addresses a judge's entry into the political arena on behalf of his partisan comrades. 608 F.3d at 984 (citation omitted). Although the court expressed these concerns en route to applying a balancing approach, instead of strict scrutiny, we find them equally valid under the strict scrutiny approach. Under either framework, a judge who tips the outcome of a close election in a politician's favor would necessarily be a powerful political actor, and thus call into question the impartiality of the court. Id. at 986. Of course, unlike Siefert, which did not apply strict scrutiny, [t]he question under our strict scrutiny test . . . is not whether the [endorsement] clause serves this interest at all, but whether it is narrowly tailored to serve this interest. White I, 536 U.S. at 777 n. 7, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (emphasis in original). With this in mind, we must address whether the endorsement clause is overinclusive, underinclusive, or whether there is a less restrictive means of accomplishing the State's interests. We first conclude the endorsement clause is not overinclusive because it does not sweep too broadly. As noted above, unlike the announce clause struck down in White I, the endorsement clause restricts speech for or against particular parties. Although there is some merit in Wersal's argument that an endorsement would serve as a proxy for other underlying ideas, taken to its logical conclusion, such an approach would eviscerate the entire party-issue dichotomy set forth in White I. Under this reasoning, even direct statements of bias toward or against a party could be said to serve as a proxy for underlying issues, even though such statements would undeniably violate a party's due process guarantees. See id. at 775-76, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (discussing the traditional meaning of impartiality). Instead, we abide by White I's directive to analyze whether the clause restrict[s] speech for or against particular parties, . . . [or] for or against particular issues.  Id. at 776, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (emphasis in original). This approach accords with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, which analyzes content-based restrictions under strict scrutiny by reference to the content itself. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121-23, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991) (discussing the overinclusiveness of a law preventing criminals from profiting by selling books describing their crimes). Here, the endorsement clause does not regulate speech with regard to any underlying issues, and thus the candidates are free to state their positions on these issues, in line with White I. [10] Moreover, candidates are not prevented from conveying necessary information concerning their qualifications to the electorate. See Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) (We have recognized repeatedly that debate on the qualifications of candidates is integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution.) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Instead, the clause only prohibits the act of endorsement itself, which, as noted above, is a direct expression of bias in favor of or against potential parties to a case, or at the very least, damages the appearance of impartiality. Therefore, the clause targets precisely that speech which most likely implicates Minnesota's compelling interests. We also conclude the endorsement clause is not underinclusive, despite the fact it only applies to endorsements for other candidate[s] for public office. In response to the charge that a judicial candidate may endorse another public official so long as the official has not yet filed for office, we find instructive another provision of the Code providing, a judge or judicial candidate shall not . . . make any statement that would reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court. . . . 52 Minn. Stat. Ann., Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4.1(A)(10). Reading the endorsement clause in conjunction with Rule 4.1(A)(10), a judicial candidate would patently be prevented from making biased statements for or against a party or an impending party, regardless of whether the public official had officially become a candidate at the time of the statement. Nor is this a situation like the Seventh Circuit confronted in Siefert, where an endorsement clause only applied to endorsements in partisan elections. 608 F.3d at 987. Siefert recognized this underinclusiveness could be fatal to the rule's constitutionality under strict scrutiny. Id. By contrast, Minnesota's endorsement clause pertains to endorsements of any candidate for public office, regardless of whether the elections are partisan or nonpartisan, and thus the concerns articulated in Siefert do not bear fruit here. Finally, we must address whether recusal would pose a less restrictive alternative to address Minnesota's compelling interests. In White II, we discussed recusal in the context of the partisan-activities clause, including the specific situation of political cases where a judge is more personally involved, such as redistricting cases where a judge's district is at issue. 416 F.3d at 755. In these situations, we concluded recusal is the least restrictive means of accomplishing the state's interest in impartiality articulated as a lack of bias for or against parties to the case. Id. The present case presents a far different set of circumstances than those we contemplated in White II. To begin, our redistricting hypothetical in White II originated with our recognition that: [I]n a case where a political party comes before a judge who has substantially associated himself or herself with that same party, a question could conceivably arise about the potential for bias in favor of that litigant. Yet even then, any credible claim of bias would have to flow from something more than the bare fact that the judge had associated with that political party. That is because the associational activities restricted by Canon 5 are, as we have pointed out, part-and-parcel of a candidate's speech for or against particular issues embraced by the political party. And such restrictions, we have also said, do not serve the due process rights of parties. Id. (emphasis in original). Here, as discussed in depth above, an endorsement itself would be enough to create bias or the appearance of bias, because it is speech directly in favor of or against parties, rather than speech regarding particular issues. Second, our hypothetical in White II envisioned cases where recusals would be infrequent and relatively unburdensome, such that a blanket ban on the judge's conduct would be akin to `burning the house to roast the pig.' Id. (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383, 77 S.Ct. 524, 1 L.Ed.2d 412 (1957)). Under Wersal's sought-after system of open endorsements, however, recusal would be an unworkable remedy because candidates and judges would be free to endorse individuals who would become frequent litigants in future cases, such as county sheriffs and prosecutors. See Siefert, 608 F.3d at 987 (discussing the difficulty of recusal where a judge endorses a prosecutor or sheriff who frequently appears in front of the court). Or, in the case of one of Wersal's proposed endorsements, the individual could become a district court judge subject to appellate review by the endorsing Supreme Court judge. Under either circumstance, this has the potential to create an insurmountable burden for the court system. Wersal, 607 F.Supp.2d at 1023; see also Br. of Former Governor & Chief Justices as Amici Curiae 4 (Recusal is a blunt instrument, wielded differently by individual judges and in particular circumstances; and recusal motions are not infrequently only gamesmanship seeking delay.). Moreover, even if the judiciary would not be plagued by these conflicts and inefficiencies, as Wersal suggests, we find little comfort in recusal as a less restrictive means of addressing Minnesota's separate interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety. See Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2266 (recognizing the impact recusals have on the public's impression of the judiciary); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407, 109 S.Ct. 647 (While the problem of individual bias is usually cured through recusal, no such mechanism can overcome the appearance of institutional partiality that may arise from judiciary involvement in the making of policy.). In sum, we conclude Minnesota's endorsement clause is narrowly tailored to serve its compelling interests of preserving impartiality and preserving the appearance of impartiality. See In re Matter of William A. Vincent, 143 N.M. 56, 172 P.3d 605, 606, 609 (2007) (concluding a clause prohibiting candidates or judges from publicly endors[ing] or publicly oppos[ing] a candidate for public office through the news media or in campaign literature was narrowly tailored to serve the State's compelling interest in a judiciary that is both impartial in fact and in appearance) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); In re Matter of Ira J. Raab, 100 N.Y.2d 305, 763 N.Y.S.2d 213, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1292 (2003).