Opinion ID: 2981055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Photo Array Identifications

Text: Prior to trial, Washam moved to suppress the identifications made from the photo array. After an independent examination, the district court agreed that the array was unduly suggestive: In the present case, the descriptions given by the witnesses to the officers indicated that the bank robber was “thin,” “skinny,” “thin build,” “not heavy,” and “not overweight. Armed with this description, the officers presented the witnesses with a photographic array comprised of six African-American males . . . . However, - 13 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam Washam’s features bear little resemblance to the others in the array. Defendant’s picture clearly contains facial features or characteristics foreign to all of the other pictures. Washam’s face appears long and thin, whereas the other five individuals have rounder, fuller features. Additionally, Washam’s nose and [cheek] bone structure do not in any way resemble the other five individuals . . . . Clearly, with the witness descriptions of the bank robber as a thin man, the placement of Defendant’s photo in a photo array with clearly heavy set men with round full faces suggests to the witnesses that the Defendant “is more likely to be the culprit.” The Court concludes that the dissimilarities among the participants in the photo array resulted in an identification procedure which was unduly suggestive to Washam. (RE 75, Op. and Order 4–7) (internal citations omitted). Having deemed the array suggestive, the court held a second evidentiary hearing allowing the government to prove that the identifications were nevertheless reliable.1 To support that effort, the government elicited the testimony of the three employees who selected Washam’s photograph from the array. For each witness, the government introduced written statements made by the employees when they were first presented with the array. One employee wrote, “I [] feel that number 3 looks very similar to the gentleman that robbed our branch. When I saw the lineup he immediately jumped out at me.” (RE 99, Hr’g Tr. 9.) The second employee wrote, “[N]umber 3 looks like the robber.” (Id. at 28.) The third employee wrote, “Possible number 3, same shaped face, cheekbone structure, eyebrows look like the [robber].” (Id. at 40.) After each employee read his or her written statement out loud, on the next beat, the prosecutor posed the following question: 1 At the defense’s request, Washam did not attend the second evidentiary hearing, in order to prevent taint. - 14 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam Now, one might say that when someone says that a photograph looks like someone, that the person identifying the photograph might not be sure. Are you sure that number 3 was the robber? (Id. at 9, 28–29, 40.) In response to the prosecutor’s leading question, the first employee changed his identification. As did the second employee. And so with the third employee. In each instance, the employee changed his or her identification to positively identify Washam as the robber, not merely someone who looked like the robber. Based on this testimony, the district court issued a short oral opinion admitting the photo array identifications as reliable. At trial, only one of the three employees was able to successfully identify Washam in person.
“A conviction based on identification testimony violates the defendant’s constitutional right to due process whenever the identification procedure is ‘so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’” United States v. Meyer, 359 F.3d 820, 825 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir. 1986)). This Court applies a two-step analysis for determining the admissibility of identification evidence. Id. (citing Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1071–72 (6th Cir. 1994)). First, the defendant must prove that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive. Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1071–72. If the defendant proves suggestiveness, the burden then shifts to the government to prove that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the identification was “nevertheless reliable.” Id. at 1071. - 15 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factual findings and the de novo standard to its legal conclusions. Meyer, 359 F.3d at 824 (citing United States v. Dotson, 49 F.3d 227, 229 (6th Cir. 1995)). One such question of law is “[w]hether identification evidence was sufficiently reliable so as not to offend [the defendant’s] rights under the due process clause.” Id. (citing Smith v. Perini, 723 F.2d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 1983)). In this case, the district court found the array suggestive, and the government does not appeal that ruling. Accordingly, because the court’s factual findings are not in dispute, the only question remaining is the reliability of the identifications, which we review de novo. Reliability of the eyewitness identification is the “linchpin” of our suppression analysis. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 724–25 (2012) (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)). To determine whether an identification made off a suggestive procedure is nevertheless reliable, we apply a totality of the circumstances approach including those factors set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) and reiterated in Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 724–25: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at the time of observation; (3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. - 16 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam
Despite the full suppression hearing, the district court disposed of the Biggers factors in a perfunctory oral opinion. The court’s opinion gave short shrift to the heightened due process concern that exists “when [] misidentification is possible because the witness is called upon to identify a stranger whom [the witness] has observed only briefly, under poor conditions, and at a time of extreme emotional stress and excitement.” Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1070. The district court’s ruling did not indicate that it considered any of the Biggers factors that favored Washam: for instance, that the robber was a stranger to the tellers, that the employees only interacted with the robber for a few brief minutes, or that several of the employees stated that the gun distracted their focus from the robber himself. However, it is the evolution of the employees’ initial identifications into their testimony at the evidentiary hearing that is my primary concern. The changes in their testimony pertain directly to the fourth Biggers factor: “the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation.” Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. The district court completely mishandled this factor when it allowed the employees’ changed testimony to trump their initial identifications. As with all Biggers suppression, the court’s focus should have remained on the level of certainty expressed by the employees when they made their initial identifications—in other words, the certainty expressed “at the time of confrontation.” Id. A witness’ level of certainty thereafter, especially after the identified individual has been arrested and indicted, is not part of the Biggers’ analysis. Rather, continued certainty—or in this case, increased certainty—is tested through in-court identification and cross-examination. - 17 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam The district court missed this distinction, and the majority repeats the error by dismissing the convenient change to the employees’ testimony. What should have been significant to the district court were the statements the employees made when they were first shown the array. At that stage, each employee made statements indicating that they selected Washam’s picture because his was the one that most resembled or “looked like” the robber. However, as all parties agree, Washam was the only individual pictured that plausibly “looked like” the robber. Therefore, the employees’ certainty on that score provides little to support the reliability of their selections from the photo array. Tellingly, the employees’ testimony at the evidentiary hearing only reinforces that they noticed Washam’s photograph did not resemble the others. One employee stated that Washam’s photograph “immediately jumped out” from the others. Another noted that Washam’s photograph was the only one with a “shaped face, cheekbone structure, [and] eyebrows” that looked liked the robber—the exact same qualities that led the district court to find the array suggestive. The last employee testified that Washam’s photograph was the only one “even close” to looking like the robber. These statements clearly indicate that the employees’ selections were affected by the suggestiveness of the array and were therefore unreliable. As such, the photo array identifications should have been suppressed. All too often, investigatory identifications are treated as one in the same with in-court identifications. However, they are different pieces of proof with different evidentiary value, and they - 18 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam ought not be conflated. Excluding a suggestive investigatory identification is not fatal to the prosecution, although of course, doing so may weaken the government’s case. It is, however, the appropriate course of action, especially given the greater evidentiary value of pretrial identifications. (See Maj. Op. 7.) Excluding an unreliable pretrial identification only forces the government to rely solely on a witness’ in-court identification. Of course, in this case and with the benefit of hindsight, we know that only one of the three employees was able to repeat his positive identification at trial.2 Finally, I am troubled by the government’s efforts to bolster the photo identifications at the evidentiary hearing. Its efforts suggest that the prosecutor, if no one else, recognized the deficiencies of the identifications and sought to repair them. However, the employees’ willingness to change their testimony at the prosecutor’s behest certainly does not improve their credibility or inspire further confidence about the reliability of the photo array identifications.