Opinion ID: 537189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Seizure of Contraband.

Text: 31 Libreros contends that Siegel's warrantless seizure of cocaine from Libreros was not justified under the plain view doctrine, which posits that a warrantless seizure by police of a suspicious object that comes into plain view in the course of an otherwise legitimate search will be considered reasonable under the fourth amendment. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737-39, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1540-41, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1151, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-71, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037-41, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (plurality opinion). As we said recently: 32 To seize an item on the theory that it is located in plain view, three conditions must be met. First, the initial intrusion by the police officer must be lawful so that he can justify being in a position to make his discovery. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038. Second, the discovery must be inadvertent. Id. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038. Third, the police must have had probable cause to believe that the item seized was evidence of a crime. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326, 107 S.Ct. at 1153; United States v. $10,000 in United States Currency, 780 F.2d 213, 219-20 (2d Cir.1986). 33 United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 15-16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 364, 107 L.Ed.2d 350 (1989). 34 The first condition poses no difficulty, since it was perfectly proper and lawful for Siegel to be in the public area where Libreros was walking, and to engage Libreros in a consensual conversation. The second requirement, inadvertent discovery, was satisfied when Libreros responded to a question about the bag's contents by voluntarily opening it and displaying its contents to Siegel; the agent's natural response was to look at what Libreros was showing him. This does not suggest any unlawful rummaging--indeed, [Siegel's] viewing was fortuitous--therefore [Siegel's] viewing was inadvertent. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d at 16. 1 35 The third criterion, which requires the agent to have probable cause to believe the package was cocaine, presents a somewhat closer question. In our review of the issue, we are guided by two general considerations. The first is the proposition that probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard requiring only a  'practical, non-technical' probability that incriminating evidence is involved, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). The second is our recognition that the evidentiary significance of an item viewed must be assessed from the perspective of a law enforcement officer, and that the matrix of facts and circumstances, including the experience and judgment of the police officer, must be weighed in determining whether [an] item is contraband. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d at 17; see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S.Ct. at 1543. 36 Applying these principles to the instant case, we note that Siegel is a DEA agent with sixteen years of experience investigating narcotics offenses. He recognized the seized item from its shape, size, color and packaging to be, most likely, a brick of cocaine. Moreover, he made that determination in the context of Libreros' extremely nervous behavior and evidently false statement that the bag contained food. Under these circumstances, Siegel had sufficient grounds to ascertain a  'practical, non-technical' probability that the package shown to him by Libreros contained cocaine. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 176, 69 S.Ct. at 1311). 37