Opinion ID: 724943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Particularized Seizure and the Warrant Requirement of

Text: 26 the Theramatic Case 27 Argent next contends that, even if it is a closely regulated industry for purposes of the Colonnade-Biswell exception, that exception does not apply to the seizure in this case. 28 To the extent that Argent's argument suggests that the Colonnade-Biswell exception applies only to inspections and not to seizures, the argument is untenable. It is true that Burger discussed its criteria for closely regulated industries in terms of inspections, but it also approved the use of evidence seized in the course of the inspection. 482 U.S. at 716, 107 S.Ct. at 2651. Moreover, both Colonnade and Biswell involved seizures of contraband discovered during the unwarranted inspections. Biswell held that, because the unwarranted inspection was constitutionally permissible, [t]he seizure of respondent's sawed-off rifles was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 406 U.S. at 317, 92 S.Ct. at 1597. Thus, Colonnade-Biswell extends to seizure without warrant of what may be inspected without warrant, when Congress so authorizes. 29 The argument that Argent most vigorously asserts, and the one that was accepted by the district court, is based on our decision in United States v. Device Labeled Theramatic, 641 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.1981) (Theramatic I ). In Theramatic I, we held that the Fourth Amendment was violated by the FDA's seizure from a physician's office of an allegedly misbranded medical device pursuant to a warrant issued under the Supplemental Rules. Id. at 1295. We emphasized that the physician was entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment in his office just as he was in his home. Id. at 1292. We recognized that some administrative searches could be conducted on the strength of a warrant issued on less than probable cause, but the government in Theramatic I was not conducting random inspections to enforce administrative standards; it was searching a particular physician's office to seize a particular, identified device. Id. at 1294. Finally, we said that the Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement did not apply because the search at issue here was not part of any statutory program to inspect physicians' offices. Id. at 1295. 30 We do not draw from Theramatic I the same lessons that Argent and the district court did. The problem with the seizure in Theramatic I was that it was effectuated by an impermissible invasion of the physician's right of privacy. That is why we were careful in Theramatic I to point out that the case involved not only a seizure, but a paradigmatic search--a physical intrusion by the U.S. Marshal into [the physician's] office. Id. at 1291. We also stated: 31 It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an open area or seizable by levy without an intrusion into privacy, and it is quite another thing to effect a warrantless seizure of property, even that owned by a corporation, situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer. 32 Id. at 1292 (quoting G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354, 97 S.Ct. 619, 629-30, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977)) (emphasis added). The Colonnade-Biswell exception did not apply because it is based largely on the diminished expectation of privacy in a closely-regulated industry, see Burger, 482 U.S. at 700, 107 S.Ct. at 2642-43, and the physician in Theramatic I was not closely regulated by the FDA. 33 The district court, however, accepted Argent's interpretation of Theramatic I, concluding that [a]lthough a well-defined scheme for inspecting pervasively regulated businesses may survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may nevertheless prevent government agents from returning to conduct a particularized search and seizure without first obtaining an ordinary warrant. The District Court held that Theramatic I forbade agents from searching a particular business to seize particular, identified chemicals and drugs. 34 Theramatic I 's reference to a particularized search, however, was made to point out that the search conducted there was not an administrative search similar to those designed to insure sanitary housing conditions, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), or workplace safety, see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978); that was not what the FDA was doing. But a wholly separate point (which we thought was even clearer) was that the physician was not closely regulated by the FDA and therefore was not subject to the Colonnade-Biswell exception. Theramatic I, 641 F.2d at 1295. 35 Thus it is the invasion of privacy, not the particularity of the seizure, that is the relevant difference between Argent's case and Theramatic I for purposes of the Colonnade-Biswell exception. Argent, being closely regulated by the FDA, has a diminished expectation of privacy that was not violated by the seizure. We attach no significance to the fact that the FDA returned to execute its in rem warrant some time after its last inspection. If a random, unannounced inspection does not violate Argent's Fourth Amendment right of privacy, we see no reason why the unannounced execution of a warrant under the Supplemental Rules would do so. The seizure is from the premises of a closely regulated manufacturer and is conducted within the regulatory scheme in the manner Congress has authorized. There is no need to brigade the seizure with an inspection in order to legitimize it; Argent's expectation of privacy has not been violated.