Opinion ID: 1667573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Claims Based on Other Alleged Intentional Torts

Text: This Court in Barnes v. Birmingham International Raceway, Inc., 551 So.2d 929 (Ala.1989), has recently held a general release that purported to discharge Birmingham International Raceway (BIR) from any and all liability to be valid only as to claims based on negligence. In that case, the plaintiff (Barnes), before entering a stock car race, signed a document purporting to release BIR from any and all liability for injuries he might receive during the race. The plaintiff was injured in an accident during the race and subsequently sued BIR and others on claims alleging negligence and wantonness. The trial court, relying on the release, granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. This Court affirmed the summary judgment as to the negligence claim but reversed as to the wantonness claim. Justice Houston, writing for the Court, stated: Other than Young v. City of Gadsden, [482 So.2d 1158 (Ala.1985)], we have found no cases in the United States that uphold pre-race releases for wanton and willful conduct. Those jurisdictions that have addressed this issue hold that general pre-race releases exculpating one from liability for wanton or willful conduct are invalid and contrary to public policy. See Conradt v. Four Star Promotions, Inc., [45 Wash.App. 847, 728 P.2d 617 (1986) ], (an exception to validating contracts waiving liability exists where the conduct was substantially or appreciably substandard and fell greatly below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm); Tope v. Waterford Hills Road Racing Corp., [81 Mich. App. 591, 265 N.W.2d 761 (1978) ], (generally a party may contract against liability for harm caused by negligence in the performance of a contractual duty, but he may not do so with respect to his gross negligence); Seymour v. New Bremen Speedway, Inc., [31 Ohio App.2d 141, 287 N.E.2d 111 (1971)], (the release was not against public policy and constituted a full defense to any claim for damages except those due to `wanton or willful negligence'); see also LaFrenz v. Lake County Fair Board, [172 Ind.App. 389, 360 N.E.2d 605 (1977) ], (exculpatory agreements are not valid as to extreme forms of negligence or any conduct that constitutes an intentional tort). In Alabama, willfulness or wantonness imports premeditation or knowledge and consciousness that the injury is likely to result from the act done or from the omission to act, while negligence involves inadvertent action. See Lynn Strickland Sales & Service, Inc. v. Aero-Lane Fabricators, Inc., 510 So.2d 142 (Ala. 1987). Having considered the decisions of other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of the validity of release forms in the context of racetracks, and having reconsidered the nature of willful and wanton conduct, we are of the opinion that the holding in Young v. City of Gadsden, supra, that pre-race releases exculpate one from liability for wanton conduct, is in error. The opinion in Young v. City of Gadsden, supra, did not elaborate on the evidence with respect to the alleged wantonness of the defendants, even though the holding in that case clearly was that pre-race releases could exculpate one from liability for wanton conduct. It was on the basis of that holding that the trial court in this case granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiff's wantonness count. The court is convinced that the ratio decidendi of that portion of Young v. City of Gadsden, supra, would not be consented to today by the conscience and feeling of justice of the majority of all those whose obedience is required by the rule of law on which that ratio decidendi was based. Laun, Stare Decisis, 25 Va.L.Rev. 12, 22 (1938). Therefore we will depart from the doctrine of stare decisis and overrule that portion of Young v. City of Gadsden, supra , that holds that pre-race releases exculpating a person from liability for wanton conduct are valid and not against public policy. We are persuaded, and now hold, that pre-race releases, although valid and consistent with public policy as to negligent conduct, are invalid and contrary to public policy as to wanton or willful conduct. (Emphasis added.) 551 So.2d at 932-33. Applying the BIR analysis to the facts of this case, we are clear to the conclusion that, if public policy prohibits releases as to future wanton conduct in the context of an automobile race, releases as to future intentional tortious conduct in the instant context would likewise be prohibited. Because the trial court, in entering summary judgment with respect to the claims alleging intentional torts, based its decision solely on the existence of the document that purported to release the defendants from any and all liability, the summary judgment must be reversed insofar as it favored the defendants on those claims alleging intentional non-defamation torts. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. MADDOX and STEAGALL, JJ., concur in the result as to the defamation claim and dissent as to the other claims.