Opinion ID: 166442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Claim 7: Allegely Duplicative Evidence Supporting Aggravating Circumstances

Text: 95 As we have noted, the jury found the existence of four aggravating circumstances. It concluded that: (1) Mr. Patton was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (3) Mr. Patton committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; and (4) Mr. Patton committed the murder while he was on parole for California felony convictions. 96 Mr. Patton now argues that aggravating circumstances (1) and (4) are duplicative. He points to the prosecutors' reliance on the same California robbery conviction to support both aggravators. The OCCA summarily rejected this argument. See Patton, 973 P.2d at 297 (stating that the argument was rejected in Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 25-26 (Okla.Crim.App.1995) [and that] [w]e do so again). 97 Mr. Patton has failed to establish that this alleged double-counting resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has noted that it has never before held that aggravating factors could be duplicative so as to render them constitutionally invalid, nor have we passed on the `double counting' theory that the Tenth Circuit advanced in [ United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1111 (10th Cir.1996)]. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 398, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999). 98 Moreover, even if the double-counting theory were applicable here, see id. (accepting, for the sake of argument, petitioner's `double counting' theory), Mr. Patton would still not be entitled to relief. Under our cases, one aggravating circumstance is improperly duplicative of another only if the first aggravator necessarily subsumes the other. Fields v. Gibson, 277 F.3d 1203, 1218-19 (10th Cir.2002). The fact that two aggravating circumstances rely on some of the same evidence does not render them duplicative. See id. As we noted in Fields, so long as the aggravators are not duplicative, . . . we see no problem with . . . us[ing] the same evidence to support different aggravators. Id. at 1219-20. 99 Here, the first and fourth aggravating circumstance do not necessarily subsume one another and thus are not duplicative. In order to establish the first aggravating circumstance, the prosecution was required to prove that Mr. Patton was convicted of a certain kind of felony (a violent one). In order to establish the fourth aggravating circumstance, the prosecution was required to prove that Mr. Patton was on parole for a felony conviction at the time of the murder. The fact that the same conviction was used by the prosecution to prove both aggravators does not render the aggravators unconstitutionally duplicative. 100 Accordingly, Mr. Patton is not entitled to relief on this claim.