Opinion ID: 2627657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Contempt Sanctions

Text: ¶ 12 A [r]emedial sanction is one imposed for the purpose of coercing performance when the contempt consists of the omission or refusal to perform an act that is yet in the person's power to perform. RCW 7.21.010(3). Remedial sanctions are also known as coercive sanctions, and they are civil in nature. ¶ 13 In contrast, a [p]unitive sanction is imposed to punish a past contempt of court for the purpose of upholding the authority of the court. RCW 7.21.010(2). Punitive sanctions are criminal in nature. When a court imposes a punitive contempt sanction, it must afford a contemnor full criminal due process. RCW 7.21.040. Statutory procedures establish the minimum due process protections a child must receive when a juvenile court uses its inherent authority to impose a punitive sanction. ¶ 14 To determine whether sanctions are punitive or remedial, the courts look not to the `stated purposes of a contempt sanction,' but whether it has a coercive effect whether `the contemnor is able to purge the contempt and obtain his release by committing an affirmative act.' A.K., 162 Wash.2d at 646, 174 P.3d 11 (quoting Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. 2552). ¶ 15 In this case, neither party disputes that the commissioner exercised his inherent contempt authority punitively: the juvenile court imposed a 45-day suspended sentence, which far exceeded the seven-day statutory remedial contempt sanction maximum under RCW 7.21.030(2)(e) and chapter 13.32A RCW, and the court conditioned the purge of that punitive sanction on submission to inpatient treatment for more than 28 days and compliance with all other court orders. [5] Further, the State correctly concedes that A.K. 's ruling regarding dependency contempt proceedings should apply to the ARY contempt proceedings.
¶ 16 At the time the court sanctioned Estevan, In re Interest of A.L.H., 116 Wash. App. 158, 64 P.3d 1262 (2003) was good law. Similar to Estevan's case, A.L.H involved an ARY order. In that case, the juvenile court held that remedial, but not punitive, statutory contempt sanctions may be imposed on a juvenile for violating an ARY order. A.L.H., 116 Wash.App. at 164, 64 P.3d 1262. ¶ 17 In A.K., we disagreed with A.L.H. on the above issue, though we did not explicitly overturn the case on that point. A.K. involved a dependency contempt proceeding wherein the court punitively sanctioned two juveniles to 30 days in detention without affording them full criminal due process pursuant to RCW 7.21.040. In contrast to A.L.H., in A.K., we held that statutory punitive contempt sanctions were available to juvenile courts. However, we also held that before a juvenile court may exercise its inherent authority to impose a punitive sanction in a dependency proceeding, it must first find all statutory contempt sanctions inadequate. A.K., 162 Wash.2d at 652, 174 P.3d 11 (plurality), 653 (concurrence). ¶ 18 In reaching our conclusion in A.K., we found that the ARY and dependency civil contempt provisions were substantially identical, were amended by the same legislation, and that the general remedial contempt statute by its terms applies equally to ARY and dependency cases. Both ARY and dependency coercive contempt statutes state: [f]ailure by a party to comply with an order entered under this chapter is civil contempt of court as provided in RCW 7.21.030(2)(e). A.K., 162 Wash.2d at 648, 174 P.3d 11 (quoting RCW 13.32A.250(2) and RCW 13.34.165(1)). In 1998, both statutes were amended by the same legislation. Laws of 1998, ch. 296, §§ 35-38. Considering the statutes' similarity in texts and legislative history, we interpret the ARY statutory language as we do the identical language in the dependency contempt statute. Therefore, A.K. 's holding applies to Estevan's ARY proceeding. ¶ 19 Accordingly, in Estevan's case, because the commissioner failed to find all statutory contempt remedies inadequate before exercising his inherent power to impose a punitive contempt sanction on the child, we hold the exercise of his inherent contempt power was premature and vacate Estevan's contempt order. ¶ 20 While the parties agree that A.K. applies to this case, the State seeks clarification of and guidance on several points stemming from A.K. The State asks for clarification on two related points in A.K.: (1) whether the court's use of inherent power to impose a coercive contempt sanction requires finding all statutory sanctions inadequate, and (2) whether a finding of inadequacy means that each type of sanction must have been tried and proven ineffective. Amicus Br. at 14-16. ¶ 21 From the State's perspective, the plurality and concurring opinions in A.K. have generated some confusion about what a court is required to do before resorting to inherent contempt sanctions. The plurality holds that a juvenile court possesses the inherent authority to impose remedial or punitive sanctions; [h]owever, before exercising that power, the court must specifically find all statutory contempt remedies inadequate. A.K., 162 Wash.2d at 652, 174 P.3d 11 (emphasis added). The concurrence disagree[s] to the extent that [the plurality] may be read to require a dependency court to resort to criminal contempt before exercising its inherent authority to impose a coercive contempt sanction. A.K., 162 Wash.2d at 653, 174 P.3d 11 (Madsen, J., concurring). ¶ 22 As A.K. explicitly states, a juvenile court is required to find all statutory contempt sanctions, remedial and punitive, inadequate before resorting to its inherent power. A.K., 162 Wash.2d at 652, 174 P.3d 11. Further, that finding of inadequacy requires a juvenile court to try all statutory contempt sanctions and specifically find them ineffective before a court can exercise its inherent contempt powers to sanction a youth. ¶ 23 In clarifying these points, we emphasize that remedial sanctions are the favored juvenile contempt sanction. As we have long-held, `[o]nly under the most egregious circumstances should the juvenile court exercise its contempt power to incarcerate a status offender in a secure facility.' A.K., 162 Wash.2d at 647, 174 P.3d 11 (quoting State v. Norlund, 31 Wash.App. 725, 729, 644 P.2d 724, review denied, 98 Wash.2d 1013, 1982 WL 226396 (1982)); see also In re Pers. Restraint of King, 110 Wash.2d 793, 802, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988). Consistent with this long-standing position and the FRA's aim of keeping children out of detention, juvenile courts should rarely, if ever, impose punitive contempt sanctions on at-risk youth. As we stated in A.K., if punitive incarceration is necessary, `the record should demonstrate that all less restrictive alternatives have failed.' A.K., 162 Wash.2d at 647, 174 P.3d 11 (emphasis added) (quoting Norlund, 31 Wash.App. at 729, 644 P.2d 724). Punitive incarceration should be used as a last resort. ¶ 24 While the State agrees that we have determined that a juvenile court should use punitive sanctions sparingly, it contends that A.K. did not determine what due process protections are required when a court uses its inherent authority to impose a punitive sanction. In such an instance, the State argues that a court does not have to grant a child the full criminal due process protections established in RCW 7.21.040 because a court's inherent contempt power, unlike a court's statutory contempt power, does not depend on a legislative grant of authority. See Amicus Br. at 16-20. ¶ 25 Although the State is correct that inherent authority does not derive from the legislature, due process constrains the exercise of both statutory contempt authority and inherent contempt authority. See A.K., 162 Wash.2d at 646, 174 P.3d 11. As we stated in A.K., before a juvenile court imposes a punitive contempt sanction, full criminal due process protections attach. A.K., 162 Wash.2d at 646 n. 4, 174 P.3d 11 (citing Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 833, 114 S.Ct. 2552; see also King, 110 Wash.2d at 800, 756 P.2d 1303). In RCW 7.21.040, the legislature established the due process protections and procedures for imposing statutory punitive contempt sanctions. When a statutory procedure exists for imposing a particular type of sanction, a court exercising its inherent contempt power to impose that type of sanction must, at minimum, follow those statutory procedures. Thus, the processes set out in RCW 7.21.040 establish the minimum due process a child must receive when the court imposes a punitive sanction. ¶ 26 Finally, the State seeks guidance as to what a juvenile court should do after it has found all statutory contempt sanctions inadequate and has properly invoked its inherent power. Because the legislature, not the judiciary, establishes the laws and procedures for juveniles' treatment and rehabilitation, we can provide only limited guidance. ¶ 27 In providing guidance, we acknowledge that parents of at-risk youth often face difficult challenges in raising and keeping their children safe, and we encourage struggling parents to use ARY services and juvenile court processes to assist them. We further recognize that courts face challenges in rehabilitating and treating youth given the State's limited resources. However, courts do not make public policy determinations regarding the sentencing and treatment of youth. That is distinctly the province of the legislature. Therefore, we confine our guidance to a summary of our holdings: a juvenile court's inherent power is very limited, punitive sanctions should be utilized as a last resort, and existing statutory procedures must guide the judiciary in their determination of both the proper sanction and the due process protections necessary for the imposition of that sanction.