Opinion ID: 1208537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asylum Status and Adjustment under Section 209(b) and (c)

Text: We turn now to petitioner's other claims, which are interconnected and somewhat circular in nature. Robleto's thesis is that even though his status was adjusted to lawful permanent resident in 1988, he simultaneously retains his status as an asylee. He argues that under the relevant statutory and regulatory scheme, asylum status remains intact unless it is formally terminated. Further, Robleto argues that by virtue of his continued status as an asylee, he is eligible to re-adjust his status to lawful permanent resident under section 209(b) in connection with a waiver of inadmissibility under 209(c), and thereby avoid removal. We reject his arguments.
Robleto alleges that the BIA erred by ordering him removed without first formally terminating his asylum status. He asserts that he retained his asylum status despite his acquisition of LPR status because adjustment of status is not an articulated basis for terminating asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2). [5] Petitioner is correct that acquisition of LPR status is not an enumerated basis for terminating asylum status. However, that does not answer the question of whether respondent could order him removed without first formally terminating his asylum status. Because we conclude that Robleto was a lawful permanent resident and not an asylee at the time of his removal, we conclude that the INA's asylum termination provisions did not apply to him, and accordingly, that no formal termination was required. Section 208(c)(1) of the INA provides, in relevant part, that, [i]n the case of an alien granted asylum under subsection (b) of this section, the Attorney General  (A) shall not remove or return the alien to the alien's country of nationality. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). This prohibition against removal of an asylee is qualified by section 208(c)(2), which provides that [a]sylum granted under subsection (b) ... does not convey a right to remain permanently in the United States. ... 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2). Subsection (c)(2) further provides that asylum may be terminated if the Attorney General determines that, among other things, the alien no longer meets the conditions of subsection (b)(1) [i.e., no longer meets the definition of a refugee], [6] has voluntarily availed himself of the protection of his native country, has acquired a new nationality, or meets a condition set forth in subsection (b)(2), which sets forth bars to asylum eligibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2), (c)(2). Section 208(c)(3) of the INA, entitled Removal when asylum is terminated, provides that an alien described in paragraph [(c) ](2) is subject to any applicable grounds of inadmissibility or deportability under section [ sic ] 1182(a) and 1227(a) of this title, and the alien's removal or return shall be directed by the Attorney General in accordance with sections 1229a and 1231 of this title. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(3) (footnote omitted). Despite its title, subsection (c)(3) does not explicitly require that an asylee's status be terminated prior to removal. Rather, it simply provides that an alien described in paragraph (2)  that is, an alien who is eligible for termination  is subject to removal on the same grounds as any other alien. The attendant regulations provide more detail regarding the context and bases for terminating asylum status prior to removal. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.22, 208.24, 1208.22, 1208.24 (allowing asylum officers to terminate asylum status if they determine, after an interview, that qualifying grounds exist). [7] While these regulations seem to require formal termination according to specifically enumerated grounds, they appear only to address termination of asylum for asylees who have not yet adjusted status to that of lawful permanent resident. Thus, we need not consider whether, even for such individuals, these regulations are exhaustive. [8] Petitioner suggests that because the statute and attendant regulations do not list acquisition of LPR status as a basis for termination of asylum, he must, therefore, retain that status simultaneously with his LPR status. However, petitioner's reliance on the silence of the statute and regulations cannot overcome the logic of the statutory scheme, which treats asylees and lawful permanent residents differently, or the BIA's interpretation of the statute as applying only to asylees who have not yet adjusted status. Each status has legally distinctive features. Compare, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (The term `lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States.) with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2) (Asylum ... does not convey a right to remain permanently in the United States....). Moreover, asylum status may be terminated simply by virtue of the fact that an alien no longer qualifies as a refugee. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24(a)(3) (providing that for asylum applications filed before April 1, 1997, an asylee's status may be terminated if the alien no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution). Not so with lawful permanent resident status, a fact which presents a significant incentive for an alien to adjust his status to that of lawful permanent resident. [9] Here, petitioner availed himself of that incentive and acquired LPR status. He retained that status until a final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p). [10] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that petitioner, having chosen to become a lawful permanent resident with its attendant benefits, was no longer an asylee at the time of his removal proceedings, and was therefore not covered by the statutory and regulatory provisions concerning formal termination of asylum status.
Having determined that petitioner's status during the removal proceedings was that of a lawful permanent resident and not an asylee, we next consider his contention that he is entitled to seek relief from removal by re-adjusting his status to lawful permanent resident. We conclude that he is not. Petitioner seeks to avoid removal by applying to re-adjust status under section 209(b). [11] That section, however, requires that the asylee be admissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(5). Petitioner concedes inadmissibility based on his aggravated felony conviction, and seeks to overcome this barrier to adjustment by seeking a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 209(c). That section provides the Secretary or the Attorney General with discretion to waive inadmissibility for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c). The BIA rejected petitioner's claim for relief under section 209, reasoning that it made no sense in light of 8 U.S.C. § 1001.1(p), which provides that LPR status remains intact until issuance of a final order of removal. The BIA determined that petitioner retained his LPR status, not asylee status, and as such, could not avail himself of section 209(b) and (c). Not surprisingly, we can find no case squarely addressing the issue of whether an alien who has adjusted status from asylee to LPR may seek relief from removal under section 209. The statute provides for an asylee's adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, a process petitioner completed in 1988. Accordingly, section 209(b) would appear to be inapplicable. Further, the waiver of inadmissibility in section 209(c) appears to be designed for consideration of inadmissibility when the issue is first considered, i.e., soon after the alien's entry into the United States. Thus, we agree with the BIA that the petitioner's invocation of section 209 makes no sense because it does not apply to lawful permanent residents seeking relief from removal. We find support for our perspective in cases from our sister circuits, which have held that refugees who adjust status to lawful permanent resident are ineligible for relief from removal under section 209(a) in connection with a waiver of inadmissibility under section 209(c). Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 692 (7th Cir.2006) (holding that an alien who adjusted status from refugee to LPR was no longer eligible to apply for a waiver of inadmissibility in connection with an adjustment of status under section 209); Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 569 n. 16 (7th Cir.2008) (We have held that, when an individual adjusts his status to that of lawful permanent resident, he still may meet the definition of a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); however, he no longer retains his refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157.); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 252-53 (4th Cir.2008) (applying Chevron deference to the BIA's determination that a refugee who had already acquired LPR status was precluded from subsequently re-adjusting to LPR status). While these cases involve section 209(a), which concerns adjustment of status from refugee to LPR, they are nonetheless instructive. In Gutnik, the Seventh Circuit deferred to the BIA's determination that relief under section 209 was unavailable to a removable refugee who had previously adjusted his status to that of LPR. Gutnik, 469 F.3d at 692. The BIA adopted the IJ's reasoning that Gutnik was ineligible to apply for the waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) because his prior adjustment of status to LPR terminated his refugee status. Id. at 685, 689. The BIA also noted that allowing Gutnik to apply for a waiver under section 209(c) would place him at an unfair advantage over other aliens and would improperly insulate him from his criminal misconduct which occurred many years after his arrival as a refugee. Id. at 689. The BIA's reasoning appears to reflect a concern that non-refugee aliens who had previously adjusted status and were facing removal would not have similar opportunities to readjust under section 209. [12] This reasoning echoes the concern we voiced in Kaganovich in deciding that refugee status should not be used to insulate aliens from the otherwise applicable removal statute. See Kaganovich, 470 F.3d at 898 (finding persuasive the BIA's holding in In re Smriko, 23 I. & N. Dec. 836 (BIA 2005) that 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4) should not be read to shield refugees from the INA's general removal provision). Similarly, in Saintha, the Fourth Circuit deferred to the BIA's interpretation of section 209(a)(1) as precluding relief from removal for a refugee who had previously acquired LPR status. [13] Saintha, 516 F.3d at 247, 253. The BIA rejected Saintha's application to adjust status a second time under section 209(a) in connection with a waiver of inadmissibility under section 209(c), concluding that the plain language of section 209(a)(1) precluded a refugee who has already acquired LPR status ... from subsequently re-adjusting to LPR status. Id. at 247. Specifically, the BIA read section 209(a)(1) as providing three criteria for adjusting status, one of which requires the alien not to have already acquired permanent resident status. Id. at 253. Because Saintha had already acquired LPR status, he could not satisfy this criterion, and therefore was ineligible to adjust status a second time. Id. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the BIA's interpretation, noting that it was logical to conclude that an alien ... who has previously acquired permanent resident status but was later rendered removable by the commission of multiple crimes, is ineligible to acquire LPR status again under § 1159. Id. We find the Fourth and Seventh Circuits' interpretation of section 209(a) to be persuasive. It is consistent with our conclusion that petitioner was a lawful permanent resident and not an asylee during the removal proceedings, and we see no reason why we should read 209(b) in a contrary manner with respect to asylees who have acquired lawful permanent resident status. [14] Although section 209(a) explicitly provides that adjustment under that section is unavailable to refugees who have already acquired permanent resident status, see 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)(C), and section 209(b) contains no such provision, the language of section 209(b) is nonetheless clear. It provides the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General with discretion to adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence the status of any alien granted asylum. ... 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). It does not provide for re-adjustment of status for asylees who have already acquired LPR status, and we decline to expand the statute's coverage to such individuals. To do so would provide unique relief to asylees who have acquired LPR status, while precluding such relief for similarly situated refugees, many of whom, unlike petitioner, will not have been convicted of an aggravated felony. Significantly, the legislative history of the INA's asylum provisions supports our reluctance to treat refugees and asylees disparately, as it indicates that the two classes of aliens were to have essentially equivalent status under the law. The INA's asylum provisions were enacted into law pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980. The Refugee Act, in addition to regulariz[ing] the procedures governing the admission of refugees into the United States, INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984), required the Attorney General to establish procedures for determining asylum claims filed by aliens who are physically present in the United States. Refugee Act of 1980, S. Rep. No 96-256, at 9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 149. The legislative history shows that Congress saw asylees and refugees as having similar status under the law, indicating that those granted asylum were to be placed into a conditional admission status equivalent in most respects to that provided under current law to refugees.  Id. (emphasis added). Nothing in the legislative history indicates that asylum status was so distinct that it conferred an exemption from statutes governing the conduct of other aliens admitted to the United States, or otherwise provided additional relief from removal that was unavailable to refugees. See Kaganovich, 470 F.3d at 898 (agreeing with BIA's determination that INA's refugee provisions could not be read to immunize refugees from the INA's removal provision). Consistent with this history, we decline to read section 209(b) as providing asylees who have acquired LPR status with additional avenues for avoiding removal that are otherwise foreclosed to similarly situated refugees. As set forth above, at the time of his request for readjustment Robleto was, in fact, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. He retained that status until a final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p). Section 209(b), by its terms, contemplates an asylee's adjustment of status to LPR, and does not extend relief to aliens who have already acquired LPR status. This plain reading of section 209(b) is consistent with decisions of the Seventh and Fourth Circuits holding that relief from removal under 209(a) is unavailable to refugees who have adjusted status. Based on the foregoing, we deny Robleto's petition and hold that an alien who acquired lawful permanent resident status based on a prior grant of asylum may not re-apply for LPR status and relief from removal under section 209(b).