Opinion ID: 1133414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission and Exclusion of Evidence

Text: Defendant contends that in admitting and excluding proffered evidence at trial, the trial court committed errors that individually and cumulatively deprived him of due process and a fair trial in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution as well as unspecified provisions of California law. We disagree.
As discussed earlier, the defense called Dennis Morgan as a witness at trial. Before Morgan took the stand, defense attorney Adrienne Dell sought to exclude any testimony by Morgan that defense attorney Bernstein had tried to bribe him with $20. Dell informed the court that Morgan would testify, at least according to his taped statement, that he was served with a subpoena by Mr. Bernstein [and] at the same time, he was passed under the table a 20-dollar bill. Dell added that both she and defendant had been present at the jail visit with Morgan, that no money was ever passed, and that it is physically impossible to pass money under the table at the county jail facility. Dell argued that allowing Morgan to give such testimony goes to the very heart of the credibility of defense counsel in this case. In support, she cited Evidence Code section 352. [6] In refusing to exclude Morgan's testimony about the $20 bill, the trial court noted that Morgan's testimony could be easily refuted by any member of the jail staff and would go to the credibility of the witness. The court added: An attorney, regardless of which side of the table he sits on, cannot pick and choose the testimony a witness is going to give if he chooses to call this witness.... You will take what this witness has to say completely. If he is a liar, he is a liar. Thereafter, Morgan testified on cross-examination that when defense counsel Bernstein came to see him in the Los Angeles County jail and Morgan entered the attorney-visitor room, there was a $20 bill on the table and Morgan assumed Bernstein had put it there. We do not decide whether, as defendant contends, this testimony by Morgan was far more prejudicial than probative and thus should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. We do not reverse a judgment for erroneous admission of evidence unless the admitted evidence should have been excluded on the ground stated and... the error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Evid.Code,  353, subd. (b); see also People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243 [error is harmless under our state constitutional standard unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error].) Here, there was no miscarriage of justice. As explained in part IIID.2., ante, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d at page 887, 978 P.2d at page 45, where we concluded that defense counsel were not ineffective in calling Morgan as a witness, Morgan's story was inherently unbelievable. For the jury to accept the story as true, it would have to conclude that defense counsel Bernstein had placed the $20 bill on the table in violation of jail regulations and in full view not only of the deputy sheriff guarding the attorney-visitor room but also of other inmates and attorneys. Moreover, the evidence that defendant sexually assaulted and brutally murdered a helpless infant left in his care was substantial if not overwhelming. In light of this evidence, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it never heard Morgan's testimony about the $20 bill. Defendant also contends that admission of Morgan's testimony violated various federal and state constitutional provisions. Because defendant did not object to admission of the evidence on those grounds at trial, he has not preserved the claims for review. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1170, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.)
When the trial court allowed Morgan to testify about the $20 bill, it also ruled that defense attorney Bernstein could not refute the evidence through his own testimony. The judge explained: I [will] not allow any attorney to argue his or her own credibility. After Morgan's testimony on cross-examination about the $20 bill, defense attorney Dell sought to call Bernstein as a witness, arguing this was the only way to refute Morgan's testimony in question. The trial court disagreed, noting that the defense could refute Morgan's claim by calling as a witness the on-duty watch commander who was present when Bernstein came to see Morgan in the visitor room and presumably would have noticed Bernstein's placement of money, if any, on the table. The trial court reaffirmed its earlier ruling that defense attorney Bernstein could not testify. This ruling, defendant claims, precluded him from presenting evidence that would refute damaging testimony by Morgan. Preliminarily, we note that the trial court was wrong in its assumption that attorneys, categorically, cannot testify in any criminal case in which they act as counsel. As we said in People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 574, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 822 P.2d 418, a trial court may not deny the defendant the right to present impeaching evidence through the testimony of his counsel, notwithstanding the provisions relating to testimony by counsel in the Rules of Professional Conduct. Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court should have permitted defense attorney Bernstein to testify in this case to refute Morgan's story about the $20 bill, the error was harmless. As already explained, Morgan's testimony was refuted by other evidence.
When called as a defense witness, Dennis Morgan testified regarding statements he had made to prosecution investigator Detective Edwin Milkey in a tape-recorded interview. Thereafter, the defense called Detective Milkey and questioned him about the interview. Defense counsel asked Milkey if he had reviewed a transcription of the tape-recording that had been prepared by the defense. Milkey answered: I have looked at one and a quarter pages of what's purported to be on the tape. But what's on the transcript is not what's on the tape. During a recess in the trial, defense attorney Bernstein told the court that the transcription was nothing more than a working copy that a secretary had prepared after listening to the tape. This working copy, Bernstein said, was never meant to be a word for word accurate transcription but was just a guide to go along with the tape. That night, Detective Milkey listened to the tape-recording to refresh his recollection of Morgan's comments in the interview. The next day when Milkey returned to the witness stand, defense counsel again asked him about the interview of Morgan; counsel used the defense working copy as the basis for the questioning. In responding to a question, Detective Milkey remarked that the working copy transcript of the tape recording of the Morgan interview wasn't complete as to what was said. Milkey added that the previous evening he had made corrections to the working copy, and in response to another question he said that the way it is written on the transcript is in error. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Detective Milkey if the working copy transcript prepared by the defense accurately reflected what was on the tape recording of the interview. The defense immediately objected that the answer would be irrelevant and immaterial. The trial court overruled the objection. Milkey then answered: No, it is not. When the prosecution asked if the transcript was different from the tape in more than one way, Milkey replied: `Tes, in over 400 ways. To refute Milkey's comment, defendant sought to have a redacted version of the tape recording played for; the jury. The prosecution objected to the playing of a redacted tape, but it had no objection to playing the tape recording in its entirety. The court found that the tape recording of the Morgan interview was irrelevant to any issue in the case but said that it would allow the jury to listen to the entire tape if the parties so stipulated. When the defense refused to do so, the court stated:ÔÇö Absent stipulation, the tape will not be played. Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling as a violation of his right under Evidence Code section 780, subdivision (i) to prove the nonexistence of any fact testified to by a witness. Preliminarily we observe that contrary to defendant's assertion, that provision does not' grant litigants an unbridled right to prove the nonexistence of any fact a witness has testified to. Rather, it provides that the court or the jury may consider in determining the credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing, and it specifies in several subdivisions categories of evidence that might be relevant for this purpose including, in subdivision (i), [t]he existence or nonexistence of any fact testified to by the witness. Even assuming that the trial court erred in not allowing a redacted version of Morgan's tape-recorded interview to be played for the jury, reversal of a judgment or decision by reason of the erroneous exclusion of evidence is proper only when there has been a miscarriage of justice. (Evid.Code,  354.) That is not the case here. It is not reasonably probable that upon hearing evidence of the nonexistent fact defendant sought to establish (i.e., that Detective Milkey was exaggerating when he said the defense working copy transcription contained 400 errors), the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendant. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) Defendant also claims the exclusion violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront an adverse witness (Morgan as well as Milkey) and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to present evidence in his own behalf. As in People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1182, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384, defendant fails to support that claim with adequate argument. We therefore reject it as not properly raised. ( Ibid.; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1244, fn. 3, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251; People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 857, fn. 6, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.)
Over a defense objection on the ground that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative (Evid.Code,  352), the trial court admitted two photographs taken during the autopsy of baby Amanda that depicted her anal area and buttocks. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting these two photographs, asserting that they were cumulative of two others taken before Amanda's death, and that they gave an exaggerated and misleading impression because bruises visible on one postmortem photograph appeared darker than those shown on one taken before Amanda's death. We discern no abuse of discretion. As testified by Dr. Eva Hauser, the Deputy Medical Examiner, one of the autopsy photographs showed Amanda's anal opening to be wide open and stretched out rather than puckered. This, Dr. Hauser said, differed from a normal anus, which would have a constricted, puckered appearance. The second autopsy photograph depicted bruising on Amanda's buttocks. These two photographs taken during the autopsy did not duplicate the two taken before Amanda died, one depicting Amanda's vagina and the other taken with Amanda on her side and showing the top of one buttock. Although in the coroner's photograph the bruises on Amanda's buttocks appear somewhat darker than the bruises shown on the photograph taken while Amanda was still alive, the coroner's photograph also shows considerably more detail than the one taken before she died. The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in admitting the two coroner's photographs. ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1170, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 385, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) Likewise, the trial court acted well within its discretion in allowing the jury to view three slides depicting the injuries to Amanda's anus and vagina. We agree with the trial court's observation that the slides, projected larger than life, were somewhat clinical but extremely illustrative in aid of the testimony by Kaiser Sunset Hospital doctor Joel Ament who described Amanda's injuries. Finally, defendant argues that admission of the two coroner's photographs and the three slides violated the federal Constitution's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because defendant did not object to admission of the evidence on these grounds at trial, he has not preserved these claims. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1170, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.)
Near the close of the defense case, defense counsel reminded the trial court of Dennis Morgan's testimony that a medical examination in jail had evaluated him to be HIV-negative. From this testimony, defense counsel presumed that the jail had a sample of Morgan's blood that could be tested for blood type. Counsel mentioned that he had subpoenaed Morgan's jail medical records, but also asked the court to order the jail medical division to determine Morgan's blood type. The trial court stated that it would issue the order if the jail had a sample of Morgan's blood available for typing or if Morgan consented to have blood drawn. The trial court refused to order that blood be taken from Morgan against his will, citing People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 738, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741. In Melton, we held that [a] defendant's constitutional right to confront a witness does not entitle him to obtain court-ordered evidence in violation of the witness's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. ( Ibid. ) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to order that blood be drawn from Dennis Morgan for use in a blood test. He argues that his own testimony that Morgan was present at the time Amanda suffered her fatal injuries provided the court with probable cause to order Morgan to give a blood sample. Because defendant did not make this argument in the trial court, he may not now raise the issue. It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided. ( People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 276, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 754, 934 P.2d 1279; see also People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1035, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388 [claim that ruling violated constitutional right was not preserved for appeal because of failure to object on that ground at trial].) Even if properly before us, the claim lacks merit. Before a court can order an instrusion[ ] beneath the body's surface, it must find the existence of probable cause to believe the intrusion will uncover material evidence, and it must then weigh the degree of intrusion against the likelihood and importance of recovering the evidence. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 738, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741; People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 293, 145 Cal.Rptr. 876, 578 P.2d 123.) We evaluate the existence of probable cause by considering the totality of circumstances. (See People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 600-601, 286 Cal.Rptr. 780, 818 P.2d 63 [setting out the totality of circumstances considered in evaluating probable cause supporting a search warrant].) Here, the totality of circumstances fails to establish probable cause to believe that testing Morgan's blood would uncover material evidence. The blood type evidence in this case, as testified to during the defense case by Sheriffs Department criminalist Douglas Ridolfi, was that the bloodstains recovered at the crime scene were consistent with the blood of about half of the general population. Thus testing of Morgan's blood, at most, could have established that he did or did not fall within that half. The possibility of uncovering such inconclusive evidence provided insufficient cause for the trial court to order Morgan to submit to a blood test.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in overruling his objection to a line of questions the prosecutor asked defendant's girlfriend, Virginia MacNair, on redirect examination about telephone conversations She had with defendant. These are the relevant facts: On direct examination by the prosecutor, Virginia MacNair testified that on August 25, 1988, the day baby Amanda was rushed to the hospital, defendant had telephoned Mac-Nair at home around 6:00 or 6:30 in the evening and asked about Amanda's condition. MacNair told defendant that deputy sheriffs had said that Amanda had been sexually molested. On cross-examination, when asked by defense counsel if she had ever spoken to defendant since August 25, 1988, when she left for work at 7:00 a.m., MacNair said that had gotten calls from him. Also in response to defense questioning, MacNair denied that she had ever discussed with defendant whether he should run away. On redirect examination, the prosecution asked MacNair if in a telephone conversation during the evening hours of Thursday, Au gust 25, 1988, she had told defendant anything at all about the nature of Amanda's injuries. When defense counsel objected to this question by the prosecutor as beyond the scope of cross-examination, the trial court overruled the objection. The court stated: When there is evidence of conversations on the telephone, the People are not limited to just those conversations. The court relied on People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 56, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423, which holds that the scope of cross-examination can exceed the scope of direct examination when a defendant takes the witness stand and makes a general denial of committing the crime charged. Defendant argues there was no legal basis for the trial court's ruling. We disagree. The situation here, in which defendant's girlfriend on cross-examination made a general denial that she and defendant had ever discussed his fleeing the authorities, was sufficiently similar to the situation in People v. Phillips , in which the defendant made a general denial of the crime, that the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecutor, in redirect examination, to question MacNair on this point with regard to the August 25, 1988, telephone conversation. Defendant also makes the sweeping assertion that the trial court's ruling rendered the trial fundamentally unfair and denied him the heightened due process to which he had a right under the Eighth Amendment. Because defendant did not object at trial on these grounds, he is barred from raising these issues on appeal. ( People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th 997, 1035, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.)
Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to pursue a number of irrelevant and collateral matters, to ask numerous argumentative questions, and to introduce a recently made video of the neighborhood where defendant's girlfriend, Virginia MacNair, lived. He also complains he was subjected to unequal treatment when the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to a defense question while overruling a defense objection to a somewhat similar prosecution question. Other than broad references to fundamental fairness and heightened due process, defendant provides no legal authority, reasoning, or analysis to explain why any of these rulings was in error. Defendant did not object on any constitutional ground to these trial court rulings. Thus, his assertions that the rulings violated fundamental fairness or heightened due process are not preserved for appeal. ( People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th 997, 1035, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Moreover, as noted earlier, we need not consider on appeal mere contentions of error unaccompanied by legal argument. ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1182, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1244, fn. 3, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251; People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d 808, 857, fn. 6, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.)