Opinion ID: 1665894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Physical Contact

Text: As to our interpretation of section 23-89-403 and prior holdings that physical contact must be proven, this court since 1976 has held that neither section 23-89-403 nor public policy is violated by insurance contracts that require physical contact before uninsured coverage is triggered. See Henderson, supra ; Ward, supra . A cardinal rule in dealing with a statutory provision is to give it a consistent and uniform interpretation so that it is not taken to mean one thing at one time and something else at another time. Morris v. McLemore, 313 Ark. 53, 55, 852 S.W.2d 135, 136 (1993). When a statute has been construed, and that construction has been consistently followed for many years, such construction ought not be changed. Low v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 364 Ark. 427, 438, 220 S.W.3d 670, 679 (2005); Morris, 313 Ark. at 55, 852 S.W.2d at 136. The law has remained consistent: Moreover, if there is to be a departure in the public policy since Ward, it is an issue that should be left to the General Assembly. This court has repeatedly held that the determination of public policy lies almost exclusively with the legislature, and the courts will not interfere with that determination in the absence of palpable errors. See, e.g., Jordan v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 344 Ark. 81, 40 S.W.3d 254 (2001); Norton v. Hinson, 337 Ark. 487, 989 S.W.2d 535 (1999); McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 988 S.W.2d 9 (1999). Similarly, this court has long held that a cardinal rule in dealing with a statutory provision is to give it a consistent and uniform interpretation, and when a statute has been consistently construed in one way for many years, that construction should not be changed by the courts. Moix-McNutt[ v. Brown], 348 Ark. 518, 74 S.W.3d 612 [(2002)] (citing Flemens v. Harris, 323 Ark. 421, 915 S.W.2d 685 (1996); Morris v. McLemore, 313 Ark. 53, 852 S.W.2d 135 (1993); Goldsby v. Fairley, 309 Ark. 380, 831 S.W.2d 142 (1992)). Henderson, 356 Ark. at 342, 150 S.W.3d at 279-80. There is no merit to Kelley's claim that requiring physical contact to trigger coverage under uninsured-motorist provisions in insurance contracts restricts coverage to a level that falls below the minimum coverage required by Arkansas law. In Ward, supra , this court stated as follows on the matters at issue: Appellant argues that since the uninsured motorist statute is remedial in nature, the court should construe the act liberally to accomplish its remedial purpose. Appellant acknowledges that we have held that the burden of showing the other vehicle is uninsured is on the plaintiff. South. Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. v. Gottsponer, 245 Ark. 735, 434 S.W.2d 280 (1968). In the case at bar, however, appellant argues that although this may be a proper requirement as to the burden of proof when the driver is known and can be identified, it should not be required where, as here, the driver and vehicle are unknown. § 66-4003, which requires uninsured motorist coverage, reads in pertinent part: No automobile liability insurance... shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state ... unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from the owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles.... Plainly, the statute only requires that coverage be provided for the protection of persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from the owners of uninsured motor vehicles. As indicated, we have interpreted this statute as requiring that the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the other vehicle is uninsured. South. Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. v. Gottsponer, supra . Here the policy does not require this burden of proof when there is physical contact and the operator or owner of such `hit-and-run automobile' cannot be ascertained. Therefore, it appears the policy in question is a liberalization of the coverage required by our statute. See Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. [44 Wis.2d 45], 170 N.W.2d 813 (1969); Phelps v. Twin City Fire Insurance Company, 476 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.Ct.App. 1972); and Ward v. Allstate Insurance Company, 514 S.W.2d 576 (Mo.1974). In the case at bar, in our view, the physical impact provision in the policy is valid and does not contravene public policy. Appellant recognizes that if the physical contact requirement of the policy is not against the public policy, it is a legitimate objective and contractually binding. Ward, 259 Ark. at 698-99, 535 S.W.2d at 832. The law remains that the physical contact requirement in an insurance policy does not violate section 23-89-403, is not against public policy, and is contractually binding. Affirmed.