Opinion ID: 462280
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Veterans' Records Statute

Text: 15 Doe challenges the district court's holding that the VA's disclosure of his records was permitted by the Veterans' Records Statute. 38 U.S.C. Sec. 3301. Section 3301 provides that: 16 (a) All files, records, reports, and any other papers and documents pertaining to any claim under any of the laws administered by the Veterans' Administration and the names and addresses of present or former personnel of the armed services, and their dependents, in the possession of the Veterans' Administration shall be confidential and privileged, and no disclosure thereof shall be made except as provided in this section. 17 The statute goes on to list various exceptions, including: 18 (2) When required by process of a United States court to be produced in any suit or proceeding therein pending. 19 (3) When required by any department or other agency of the United States Government. 20 The district court held that disclosure was appropriate in this case under either of these exceptions. However, the court mistakenly failed to apply the 1976 amendments to Sec. 3301. Those amendments added what is now subsection (j), which provides that [e]xcept as provided in subsection (i)(1) of this section [disclosures related to credit information] any disclosure made pursuant to this section shall be made in accordance with the provisions of section 552a of title 5 [the Privacy Act]. 21 Congress enacted subsection (j) because it knew that the Privacy Act conflicted in some aspects with the Veterans' Records Statute. The Senate Committee explained that in situations in which either law would apply, the stricter of the two applicable provisions is operable. By 'stricter' the Committee means the provision more protective of the confidentiality of the individual's records. S.Rep. No. 892, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 1299, 1308. 7 In this case the two statutes do conflict in both of the relevant areas, and it is therefore necessary to examine the stricter of the two--the Privacy Act. 8
22 The Veterans' Records Statute provides that the Administrator shall disclose files [w]hen required by process of a United States court to be produced in any suit or proceeding therein pending. 38 U.S.C. Sec. 3301(b)(2) (emphasis added). Applying this statute, the district court held that grand jury subpoenas qualify as process. The language of the Privacy Act is different in this regard, however. It allows disclosure only pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(b)(11) (emphasis added). It is, therefore, unnecessary for us to review the district court's finding that a grand jury subpoena meets the required by process standard. 9 We need only decide whether a federal grand jury subpoena is an order of a court of competent jurisdiction under the Privacy Act. In order to answer this question, it is first helpful to describe the way in which federal grand jury subpoenas are issued. 23
24 While a federal 10 grand jury subpoena is issued under the authority of a court, the court has no substantive involvement in a particular subpoena unless the subpoenaed party challenges it. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir.1973) (court exercises no prior control whatsoever upon the use of subpoenas). Nor does the grand jury necessarily approve or even have knowledge of a subpoena prior to its issuance. 11 See United States v. Santucci, 674 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir.1982) (U.S. Attorney may fill in blank grand jury subpoenas without actual prior grand jury authorization), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1109, 103 S.Ct. 737, 74 L.Ed.2d 959 (1983); United States v. Kleen Laundry & Cleaner, Inc., 381 F.Supp. 519, 523 (E.D.N.Y.1974) (absence of a sitting grand jury when a subpoena is issued is not disturbing if return date is set for a day when grand jurors would be in session). Rather, grand jury subpoenas are issued at the request, 12 and in the discretion of the prosecuting attorney involved in the case, 13 just as other subpoenas are issued at the request, and in the discretion of, any private litigant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 45. 25 The United States Attorney's Office has considerable latitude in issuing subpoenas. It has been held that the government is not required to make a preliminary showing of reasonableness or relevancy before issuing a subpoena. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15-16, 93 S.Ct. 764, 772-73, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973); In re Grand Jury Investigation (McLean), 565 F.2d 318, 320-21 (5th Cir.1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Hergenroeder), 555 F.2d 686, 686 (9th Cir.1977). Even when a subpoena duces tecum is involved, and hence the fourth amendment may be implicated, 14 no prior authorization for the subpoena has been required. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 1625 n. 8, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209, 66 S.Ct. 494, 505, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946). 26 Although failure to comply with a grand jury subpoena is punishable as criminal contempt, 15 Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c), one seeking to challenge a subpoena may make a motion to quash before the district court. The court must quash or modify a subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c). See generally United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 n. 4, 94 S.Ct. 613, 619 n. 4, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). 27
28 Standing alone, the Privacy Act's order of a court language is susceptible to conflicting constructions. 16 On the one hand, since the subpoena is signed by the clerk of the court, is issued in the name of the court, and carries with it the contempt power, it is plausible to argue that it qualifies as an order of a court. On the other hand, the term order of a court does carry with it a connotation of more than pro forma court involvement. Thus, to decide whether a grand jury subpoena comes within the statutory provision we must look to other sources for guidance. While the legislative history of the provision turns out to be ambiguous as well, two other factors that we will address point to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to allow disclosure pursuant to a subpoena--grand jury or otherwise--unless a court has actually approved its issuance. 29 i. Legislative history. We agree with the Eighth Circuit's determination that the legislative history of the order of the court provision is not particularly helpful in determining whether Congress perceived a difference between the terms court order and legal process. See Bruce v. United States, 621 F.2d 914, 916 (8th Cir.1980) (There is nothing in the legislative history of the Privacy Act of 1974 to suggest what Congress intended by the term.). The original bill that passed the Senate provided that each federal agency covered by this Act which maintains an information system or file shall make reasonable efforts to serve advance notice on any individual before any personal information on such individual is made available to any person under compulsory legal process. H.R. 16373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Sec. 201(g), reprinted in Senate Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate & Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, S. 3418 (Public Law No. 93-579) 137 (1976) [hereinafter Legislative History] (emphasis added). The Senate Report explained that [t]he purpose of the section is to permit an individual advance notice so that he may take appropriate legal steps to suppress a subpoena for his personal data. S.Rep. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1974), reprinted in Legislative History at 66. The House bill, on the other hand, made no provision for notice but did contain an amendment providing for disclosure pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction. Congressman Butler had introduced this amendment for the purpose of making it perfectly clear that a lawful order of a court of competent jurisdiction would be an appropriate condition of disclosure. 120 Cong.Rec. 36,959 (1974), reprinted in Legislative History at 936. As part of the last-minute compromise that settled the differences between the House and Senate versions, the Senate agreed to adopt the House approach, which did not require notice to the individual but did use the court order language in place of the process terminology. 30 Unfortunately, this legislative history is subject to conflicting interpretations. It is quite possible that the Senate would not have agreed to the no-notice provision if the compromise had permitted disclosure pursuant to process alone. Alternatively, it is conceivable that Congress considered the terms synonymous, and that the Senate was simply abandoning the notice provision, while allowing for disclosure pursuant to process. The history of the Privacy Act, therefore, does not answer the question of whether Congress understood the terms as having different meanings. 17 31 ii. Provisions in similar statutes. Our review of the plain language and legislative history of the Privacy Act has been inconclusive as to whether Congress intended to allow disclosure of records pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to consider whether the use of the same language in another statute aids in a determination of its scope in this one. We presume that when enacting new legislation, Congress is aware of similar language in old statutes, and chooses to repeat that language based on an understanding of relevant law interpreting it. See Stribling v. United States, 419 F.2d 1350, 1352-53 (8th Cir.1969) (Where the interpretation of a particular statute at issue is in doubt, the express language and legislative construction of another statute not strictly in pari materia but employing similar language and applying to similar persons, things, or cognate relationships may control by force of analogy.); accord Yuen v. Internal Revenue Service, 649 F.2d 163, 167 n. 4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053, 102 S.Ct. 597, 70 L.Ed.2d 588 (1981); see also Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 131-32, 63 S.Ct. 494, 498-99, 87 L.Ed. 656 (1943) (applying same scope to language used in statutes which although not strictly analogous, were similar). 32 The order of a court language of the Privacy Act is virtually identical to a provision in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681. The FCRA is quite similar to the Privacy Act inasmuch as it too limits disclosure of certain information which an individual expects to be kept confidential. Section 1681b(1) of the FCRA provides for disclosure [i]n response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such order. 33 The legislative history of the FCRA reveals that Congress consciously decided to use the order language and not process. See In re Gren, 633 F.2d 825, 826-28 (9th Cir.1980). The original Senate bill provided that [a] consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the following circumstances and no others: (1) In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such order ... S. 823, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. Sec. 604 (1970). The bill which ultimately became the House bill, on the other hand, prohibited disclosure of material unless pursuant to legal process. H.R. 1634, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. Sec. 35 (1970). The legislative history demonstrates that Congress was very sensitive to the issue of how broad the government's access to credit information should be. See In re Gren, 633 F.2d at 827. Against this background, the House eventually ceded to the Senate and passed the Senate language verbatim. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681(b). In light of this history, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this very issue was before the Congress and that Congress clearly wanted to exclude process of a court that was not a court order. See In re Gren, 633 F.2d at 827. 18 34 In light of the ambiguity surrounding the order language as used in the Privacy Act, its usage in the FCRA is important. Incorporation of identical or similar language from an act with a related purpose evidences some intention to use it in a similar vein. 19 See Stribling, 419 F.2d at 1352-53. Moreover, the policy considerations that prompted Congress to limit disclosure in the FCRA, were also present in the Privacy Act. Finally, the history of the FCRA demonstrates that when it was passed, Congress understood that the terms process and order were different. Although certainly not dispositive, the meaning attributed to the term by Congress in the FCRA, is probative of the meaning that should be afforded the like term here. 35 The notion that Congress consciously chose to employ the order language from the FCRA is buttressed by the fact that Congress had another option to choose from. The Veterans' Records Statute in its original pre-1976 form provides for disclosure when required by process of a United States court to be produced in any suit or proceeding therein pending. 38 U.S.C. Sec. 3301(b)(2). Congress' decision not to use that language, and to adopt a seemingly stricter provision, must be afforded weight. If Congress intended to allow disclosure pursuant to any request issued in the name of a court, then it would more likely have chosen the process terminology used in Sec. 3301. Thus, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that no matter [w]hat other attributes we may ascribe to Congress, this court can hardly hold that Congress did not know, when it enacted this law, that grand jury subpoenas were not the equivalent of a court order. In re Gren, 633 F.2d at 827. 36 iii. The purpose and the structure of the Act. When the language of a specific provision, taken together with its history and other aids of construction, do not provide unequivocal answers to the question of congressional intent, a court may look to the overall structure and purpose of the statute to determine which of the possible readings seems to fit in best with the goal that Congress had in mind. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 104 S.Ct. 597, 604, 78 L.Ed.2d 420 (1984) (court's  'duty is to find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested' ) (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297, 77 S.Ct. 330, 338, 1 L.Ed.2d 331 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In this case, a fair reading of the statute and its purpose leads to the definite conclusion that Congress did not intend to allow disclosure pursuant to a typical grand jury subpoena. 37 One of the stated purposes of the Privacy Act was to prevent the kind of illegal, unwise, overbroad, investigation and record surveillance of law abiding citizens produced in recent years from actions of some overzealous investigators, and the curiosity of some government administrators, or the wrongful disclosure and use, in some cases, of personal files held by Federal agencies. S.Rep. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974), reprinted in Legislative History at 154. At the same time Congress recognized the need to allow for disclosure when there is an important public policy need for such exemption. P.L. No. 93-579, Sec. 2(b)(5) (1974), reprinted in Legislative History at 501. 38 The specific exemptions that Congress established reflect a delicate balance between limiting disclosure of records, and not unduly hampering government operations. The key operating concept of the Privacy Act is that individual rights must be recognized and balanced in agency uses of information. II J. O'Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure 20-22 (1985). For example, although the Act permits disclosure to another governmental agency for civil or criminal law enforcement activity, it conditions the disclosure on the written request of the head of the agency, thereby assuring some high level evaluation of the need for the information. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 522a(b)(7). Similarly, while an agency may disclose information pursuant to a routine use, the Act requires that such routine uses be compatible with the purposes for which [the information] is collected, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(a)(7), and that the public be afforded an opportunity to comment on whether a routine use should be established. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(e)(4)(D). The memorandum describing the compromise bill states that this provision was intended to discourage the unnecessary exchange of information to other persons or to agencies who may not be as sensitive to the collecting agency's reasons for using and interpreting the material. 120 Cong.Rec. 40,881 (introduced by Congressman Moorhead), reprinted in Legislative History at 859-60. 39 To read the order of the court language as permitting disclosure pursuant to a subpoena, would create a gaping hole in the overall scheme of the Privacy Act. Grand jury subpoenas are not necessarily subject to any upper-level evaluation whatsoever. See supra at 79-81. They are typically issued by the AUSA working on the case, without prior approval by the head of the agency, the grand jury, or any judge. One of Congress' explicit goals in enacting the Privacy Act was to preclude overzealous investigators from running roughshod over an individual's privacy, and the grand jury subpoena simply does not safeguard against that danger. As one district court explained in the context of the FCRA: Since a grand jury is primarily a tool of the prosecutor and is issued pro forma by the clerk of the district court, there is no guarantee that a subpoena is based upon a careful consideration of the competing interests of the prosecutor's need for the information and the [individual's] right to privacy. In re Application of Credit Information Corp., 457 F.Supp. 969, 971-72 (S.D.N.Y.1978). 40 Moreover, the reading suggested by the government would severely diminish the utility of the head of the agency provision of subsection (b)(7). That provision deals exclusively with disclosure to law enforcement agencies, yet allows disclosure only pursuant to a written request by the head of the agency. In light of this provision, it is unlikely that Congress intended to allow federal prosecutors to avoid this requirement simply by using a subpoena. 41 Indeed, the weakness of the government's suggested reading is highlighted by the fact that it would require us to allow disclosure pursuant to any subpoenawhether it issues from the prosecutor, a criminal defendant, or civil litigant. In all of these cases, the subpoena is issued in the name of the court, and carries with it the threat of contempt to those who ignore it. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 17; Fed.R.Civ.P. 45. Yet it is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow disclosure pursuant to every private litigant's whims. 20 42 During oral argument, the government advanced a novel argument construing the order of the court language as including only subpoenas for records to be provided to the grand jury. When the grand jury is involved, it argued, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)'s secrecy provision is an ample protection of confidentiality. We reject this argument because it has no basis in the statute, or the legislative history. There is no principled way to assert that the term order of the court includes grand jury subpoenas but excludes other types of subpoenas that are also issued in the name of a court. 43 We conclude, therefore, that subpoenas--grand jury or otherwise--do not qualify as order[s] of a court of competent jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(b)(11), unless they are specifically approved by a court. See Stiles v. Atlantic Gas Co., 453 F.Supp. 798 (N.D.Ga.1978). We now turn to the question of whether the disclosure in this case was permitted under some other provision of the Privacy Act.
44 The district court also held that the disclosure in this case was authorized under the provision of the Veterans' Records Statute permitting disclosure [w]hen required by any department or other agency of the United States Government. 38 U.S.C. Sec. 3301(b)(3). Here again, the court applied the wrong provision. The relevant Privacy Act provision permits disclosure to another agency ... for a civil or criminal law enforcement activity if the activity is authorized by law, and if the head of the agency or instrumentality has made a written request to the agency which maintains the record specifying the particular portion desired and the law enforcement activity for which the record is sought. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(b)(7) (emphasis added). The Senate Committee that inserted the amendment incorporating the Privacy Act into Sec. 3301 recognized that this was one of the areas where the Privacy Act was stricter: 45 [S]ection ... 3301(b)(3) ... authorizes the disclosure of information 'when required by any department or other agency of the United States Government.' Subsection (b)(7) of the Privacy Act also authorizes disclosure of information to another Federal agency, but imposes three additional requirements on the disclosure--it must be for a 'civil or criminal law enforcement activity,' the activity must be 'authorized by law,' and the head of the agency seeking disclosure must make a written request specifying the particular portion of the information desired and the law enforcement activity for which it is sought. In this instance, the Privacy Act clearly imposes more restrictions on the release of information than section 3301 of title 38.... Thus, ... the stricter provisions of the Privacy Act would apply, and the VA could release information to another Federal agency only when the three additional requirements ... were satisfied. 46 S.Rep. No. 892, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976) reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 1299, 1308 (1976). As it must, the government concedes that there was no written request from the head of the agency in this case. Thus, it is obvious that the disclosure was not sanctioned by Sec. 3301 as amended by subsection (j). 21
47 The Privacy Act permits disclosure of information for a routine use, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(b)(3), which it defines as the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(a)(7). The Act requires that the agency publish in the Federal Register, at least annually, a notice of the existence and character of each routine use of the records contained in the system, including the categories of users and the purpose of such use. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(e)(4)(D). At least 30 days prior to the publication of a routine use, the agency must publish a notice of any new use or intended use of the information in the system, and provide an opportunity for interested persons to submit written data, views, or arguments to the agency. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(e)(11). 48
49 The government urges that the disclosure here was in conformance with Veterans' Administration Routine Use 22. That provision states that: 50 In the event that a system of records maintained by this agency to carry out its functions indicates a violation or potential violation of law, whether civil, criminal or regulatory in nature, ... the relevant records in the system of records may be referred, as a routine use, to the appropriate agency ... charged with the responsibility of investigating or prosecuting such violation or charged with enforcing or implementing the statute, or rule, regulation or order issued pursuant thereto. 51 43 Fed.Reg. 44,743 (1978). We reject the government's assertion that this routine use permits the disclosure here. It is clear from the language of the provision that this routine use deals with referral of records to law enforcement officials only when the records themselves indicate a violation of law. In this case, by contrast, the disclosure was in no way related to the VA's suspicion that the records indicated a violation of law. 52
53 Subsequent to the VA's disclosure of Doe's records, the VA promulgated two new routine uses relating to disclosure pursuant to federal and state subpoenas. The routine use dealing with federal subpoenas provides that: 54 Any information in this system may be disclosed to a federal grand jury, a Federal Court or a party in litigation or a Federal Agency or party to an administrative proceeding being conducted by a Federal Agency, in order for the VA to respond to and comply with the issuance of a federal subpoena. 55 47 Fed.Reg. 51,841 (1982) (proposed November 17, 1982). 22 56 The promulgation of this new routine use is not relevant to our assessment of what the statute meant as of November 5, 1981, the day the VA disclosed Doe's records. 23 The new routine use is, however, very relevant to Doe's request for injunctive and declaratory relief against further disclosure of his records pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. If the district court determines that such equitable relief is appropriate, 24 it will have to consider the validity and scope of the new routine use. We fully expect that the parties would, at that point, be given a full opportunity to brief and argue this issue.
57 After reviewing all of the government's proffered exceptions to the Privacy Act's prohibition on nonconsenual disclosure of medical records, we conclude that none of the exceptions governed in this case. Thus, we reverse the district court's determination that there was no violation of the veterans' Records Statute.