Opinion ID: 848696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: unlawful-act manslaughter and gross negligence

Text: Defendants likewise argue that their convictions of manslaughter cannot be sustained because gross negligence manslaughter, which is the mens rea that the prosecutor in this case argued that defendants possessed, requires that a lawful act have been committed, whereas the act committed in this case, pouring GHB into Samantha Reids drink, was clearly unlawful. In support of this contention, defendants again refer to Ryczek, wherein this Court described manslaughter as: the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty. [ Ryczek, supra at 110, 194 N.W. 609, citation omitted, emphasis added.] Defendants argument has no merit. In Datema, supra at 596, 533 N.W.2d 272, this Court explained that Ryczek sets forth three different theories giving rise to involuntary manslaughter liability. These theories are not mutually exclusive, and, under the proper circumstances, multiple theories may be appropriate. Thus, it is possible to determine, on the basis of the specific facts at issue, that the act committed by the defendant that resulted in death was, for instance, not only unlawful, but also committed with a mens rea of gross negligence. In People v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 273-274, 183 N.W. 177 (1921), this Court provided some early guidance regarding the proofs necessary to demonstrate the unlawful-act theory of involuntary manslaughter and the lawful-act theory. Townsend provides: The distinction between involuntary manslaughter committed while perpetrating an unlawful act not amounting to a felony and the offense arising out of some negligence or fault in doing a lawful act in a grossly negligent manner and from which death results must be kept in mind upon the question of pleading. In the former case it is sufficient to allege the unlawful act with sufficient particularity to identify it and then to charge that as a consequence the defendant caused the death of the deceased, and there is no need to aver in detail the specific acts of the accused; but in case of manslaughter committed through gross or culpable negligence while doing a lawful act the duty which was neglected or improperly performed must be charged as well as the acts of the accused constituting failure to perform or improper performance. [ Id. at 372-274, 183 N.W. 177.] This statement in Townsend essentially means that if the defendant committed an unlawful act that resulted in death, it is sufficient to allege the commission of the unlawful act and the resulting death; whereas, if the defendant committed a lawful act resulting in death, the prosecutor must specifically allege the manner in which the defendants actions were grossly or culpably negligent. That is, under Townsend, lawful-act manslaughter requires that the defendant acted with a mens rea of culpable negligence; whereas unlawful-act manslaughter does not require that the defendant acted with a specific mens rea  all that is required is that the defendant committed the unlawful act. In Pavlic, this Court considered, as noted above, whether a defendant can be convicted of involuntary manslaughter for a death resulting after the defendant committed the unlawful act of selling intoxicating liquor. The Court explained that a manslaughter conviction may be appropriate, but that, because this unlawful act is only malum prohibitum rather than malum in se, it is only appropriate if the prosecutor specifically proves that the defendant acted with a culpable mens rea. The Court essentially equated malum prohibitum unlawful acts with lawful acts, stating The act of selling or furnishing intoxicating liquor in violation of the statute is what the law terms an act malum prohibitum, a crime existing only by reason of statutory prohibition. An unlawful act of this character which unintentionally causes the death of another, is not in itself a sufficient basis for a charge of involuntary manslaughter. [9] But the commission of such an [malum prohibitum] unlawful act will constitute manslaughter if performed under such circumstances as to supply the intent to do wrong and inflict some bodily injury.... The rule is well stated in Thiede v. State, 106 Neb. 48 (182 N.W. 570 [1921]), as follows: We believe the rule to be that though the act made unlawful by statute is an act merely malum prohibitum and is ordinarily insufficient, still when such an act is accompanied by negligence or further wrong so as to be in its nature, dangerous, or as to manifest a reckless disregard for the safety of others, then it may be sufficient to supply the wrongful intent essential to criminal homicide [and] when such an act results in the death of another, may constitute involuntary manslaughter. [ Pavlic, supra at 566, 199 N.W. 373.] Thus, similar to Townsend, what may be gleaned from Pavlic is that, traditionally, commission of a malum in se unlawful act that results in an unintended death is sufficient in itself to constitute manslaughter; whereas an unintended death resulting from either a lawful act or a malum prohibitum unlawful act requires specific proof of a culpable mens rea, which may consist of an intent to inflict bodily injury or of gross negligence showing a reckless disregard for the safety of another. In a more recent case, Datema, this Court again addressed the mens rea necessary to sustain a manslaughter conviction. Citing Pavlic, we held that where an act is malum prohibitum unlawful or lawful, a mens rea of criminal negligence is required to prove manslaughter, and this requirement is met if the defendant either intended to inflict some bodily injury on another or if the defendant acted carelessly in such a manner that manifests a reckless disregard for anothers life-that is, if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Datema, supra at 598-599, 533 N.W.2d 272. Gross negligence is only necessary if an intent to injure cannot be established. Id. at 605, 533 N.W.2d 272. [10] Regarding malum in se unlawful-act manslaughter, Datema first noted that under traditional common law (as expressed in Townsend and Pavlic ), [w]hen an unintentional killing occurred during the commission of [a malum in se unlawful] act..., the commission of the underlying malum in se [act] supplied the mens rea for involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 599-600, 199 N.W. 373. Further, Datema noted that [u]nlike the second and third theories of involuntary manslaughter liability, the [unlawful act] rule does not require negligence. Id. at 600, 533 N.W.2d 272. The defendant in Datema argued that, just as Aaron held that proof that a defendant committed the underlying felony is no longer sufficient to show malice and thus constitute murder, proof that the defendant committed the underlying malum in se unlawful act should no longer in itself be sufficient to constitute manslaughter. We declined to address this issue in Datema because the unlawful act that the defendant committed, assault and battery, itself showed that the defendant acted with a specific intent to injure and, thus, the defendant acted with a culpable manslaughter mens rea. Thus, Datema concluded that the defendant was properly convicted of involuntary manslaughter because [a]n unlawful act committed with the intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner that proximately causes death is involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 606, 533 N.W.2d 272. We, too, need not consider whether the prosecutor was required in this case to specifically prove that defendants acted with a culpable mens rea or whether proof that defendants committed the malum in se unlawful act itself furnishes a sufficient mens rea for involuntary manslaughter [11] because, in either case, the prosecutor did prove that defendants acted with a culpable mens rea of gross negligence. Pursuant to Datema, if the prosecutor proves that defendants committed [a]n unlawful act ... with the intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner that proximately cause[d] death, id., an involuntary manslaughter conviction may be appropriate. Therefore, the prosecutor did not err in proceeding under a gross negligence theory. Moreover, it is apparent that, at the very least, the prosecutor sufficiently proved its case. Defendants may not seek relief on the basis that the prosecutor may have over-proved its case by demonstrating that defendants acted with a mens rea of gross negligence.