Opinion ID: 741171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the Initial Stop of Mr. Gallegos Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment?

Text: 14 The trial court determined the initial stop of Mr. Gallegos by Sergeant Lofgren and Officer Santos was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it was supported by reasonable suspicion. Mr. Gallegos contests this determination on appeal. Mr. Gallegos contends the record establishes his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because Sergeant Lofgren and Officer Santos did not have a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gallegos was involved in criminal activity. In determining whether the officers' actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we employ a de novo review. United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1556 (10th Cir.1993). However, we must accept the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. See Ornelas v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 15 The Fourth Amendment protects [t]he right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures. 3 U.S. Const. amend. IV. The purpose of this amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). Of course, not all police-citizen encounters implicate the Fourth Amendment. King, 990 F.2d at 1556. Mere police questioning does not amount to a seizure and  'law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place.'  Id. at 1556 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)). Generally, a person is not seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment unless, considering all the surrounding circumstances, the police conduct 'would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.'  King, 990 F.2d at 1556 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439, 111 S.Ct. at 2389). 16 Where a police-citizen encounter rises to the level of a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, such seizure must be reasonable to be valid. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures). Formal arrests or seizures that resemble formal arrests must be supported by probable cause to be reasonable. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir.1993). However, mere investigatory detentions of persons may require less than probable cause to be reasonable. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court held police officers can temporarily detain an individual suspected of criminal activity if the officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Terry stops constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained and are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2592-93, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981). 17 We must conduct a two-step inquiry to determine whether an investigative detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. King, 990 F.2d at 1557. First, we must ascertain whether the detention was  'justified at its inception.'  Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879.) For a detention to be valid, the officer must have an articulable suspicion that a detainee has committed or is about to commit a crime. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Neither inarticulate hunches nor unparticularized suspicion will suffice to justify an investigatory detention. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1880-81, 1883. However, in determining the reasonableness of an investigative detention,  'common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.'  United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 975 (10th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)). The Fourth Amendment  'does not require police officers to close their eyes to suspicious circumstances.'  Id. at 976 (quoting United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir.1986)). 18 The second step in determining the reasonableness of an investigative detention consists of determining whether the officers' actions are  'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.'  King, 990 F.2d at 1557 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). In Perdue, we stated: 19 Terry stops must be limited in scope to the justification for the stop. Officers may ask the detained individual questions during the Terry stop in order to dispel or confirm their suspicions, [b]ut the detainee is not obliged to respond. Since police officers should not be required to take unnecessary risks in performing their duties, they are authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of [a Terry ] stop. An encounter between police and an individual which goes beyond the limits of a Terry stop, however, may be constitutionally justified only by probable cause or consent. 20 8 F.3d at 1462 (citations omitted). With these legal principles in mind, we now turn to the facts of the present case. 21 After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude, as did the trial court, the initial stop of Mr. Gallegos was a Terry investigative detention thus implicating the Fourth Amendment. To determine if this detention was reasonable, we must apply the aforementioned two-part test. First, we must decide whether, at the time of the stop, Sergeant Lofgren and Officer Santos had an articulable suspicion that Mr. Gallegos had committed or was about to commit a crime. The record reveals Sergeant Lofgren and Officer Santos were sent to William Avenue on May 20, 1992 after receiving two dispatches of suspicious activity occurring in the neighborhood. The first dispatch was a prowler report from a resident who had seen two people running on William Avenue and heard a noise like someone was messing with the fence. The second dispatch was a report from another resident who observed a man in a white T-shirt, who appeared to be drunk, arguing with a woman. 22 When the officers arrived at William Avenue at 1:15 in the morning, less than seven minutes after receiving the first dispatch, they observed Mr. Gallegos on the sidewalk acting in a very unusual fashion. Mr. Gallegos, who was wearing a gray tank top, was crying and talking loudly to himself. He had both of his hands over his face and he smelled of alcohol. When Sergeant Lofgren inquired as to what was going on, Mr. Gallegos did not respond. He appeared distraught. 23 Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the time of night, Mr. Gallegos' conduct, the odor of alcohol, and the two dispatch reports, we conclude the officers possessed a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gallegos was involved in criminal activity. Thus, the officers acted reasonably in attempting to detain Mr. Gallegos. This was not a case of police officers arbitrarily stopping an individual walking down the sidewalk during the middle of the afternoon. Rather, Sergeant Lofgren and Officer Santos were aware of articulable and specific facts that justified their attempts to detain Mr. Gallegos. We believe the officers would have been derelict in their duties if they had simply ignored Mr. Gallegos and allowed him to proceed. Accordingly, we conclude the attempted detention of Mr. Gallegos was justified at its inception. 4 24 Next, we must determine whether the Terry stop was limited in scope to the justification for the stop. In reviewing the reasonableness of the scope of the stop, we focus here on the actions of Sergeant Lofgren and Officer Santos occurring prior to the arm bar maneuver applied by Officer Santos. In section III.B., infra, in the context of determining whether Mr. Gallegos was arrested, we will review the reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of the arm bar maneuver and all actions occurring subsequent thereto. 25 Sergeant Lofgren and Officer Santos sought to detain Mr. Gallegos to determine whether he was the prowler a resident had reported to be messing with a fence and/or the man another resident had reported as being drunk and yelling at a woman. To make this determination, Sergeant Lofgren initially asked Mr. Gallegos what was going on. When Mr. Gallegos did not respond to Sergeant Lofgren's question, Sergeant Lofgren grabbed Mr. Gallegos' left arm. Mr. Gallegos jerked away and continued walking down the sidewalk. Thereafter, Sergeant Lofgren grabbed Mr. Gallegos' arm on two more occasions in an effort to detain him. However, each time, Mr. Gallegos jerked away from the officer's grasp. 26 We believe Sergeant Lofgren's actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the stop. Sergeant Lofgren grabbed Mr. Gallegos' arm in an effort to briefly detain Mr. Gallegos and confirm or dispel his suspicions. Although Sergeant Lofgren grabbed Mr. Gallegos' arm three separate times, his actions consisted of a relatively minor application of force that did not exceed the amount allowable under the circumstances. If anything, Sergeant Lofgren did not exercise enough force to accomplish the purpose of the detention. Each time he grabbed Mr. Gallegos' arm, Mr. Gallegos broke free. Moreover, we do not believe the detention of Mr. Gallegos was a significant restraint on his liberty. From the time the officers arrived at William Avenue to the time Mr. Gallegos' assumed the crouched wrestling position, less than two minutes elapsed. Thus, we conclude the stop of Mr. Gallegos was a valid Terry stop that did not exceed the scope of its justification. 5 27 B. Did the Seizure of Mr. Gallegos Escalate into an Arrest that Was Not Supported by Probable Cause? 28 Mr. Gallegos contends the officers' actions in taking Mr. Gallegos down in the street constituted an arrest. According to Mr. Gallegos, the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him and, therefore, they violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. 29 It is well settled that a police-citizen encounter which goes beyond the limits of a Terry stop is an arrest that must be supported by probable cause or consent to be valid. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1462. However, a Terry stop does not automatically elevate into an arrest where police officers use handcuffs on a suspect or place him on the ground. Id. at 1463. Police officers are  'authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of [a Terry ] stop.'  Id. at 1462 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 683-84, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)). At least nine courts of appeals, including this circuit, have determined the use of intrusive precautionary measures (such as handcuffs or placing a suspect on the ground) during a Terry stop do not necessarily turn a lawful Terry stop into an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1463 (setting forth list of circuit authority). The hallmark of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. As long as the precautionary measures employed by officers during a Terry stop are reasonable, they will be permitted without a showing of probable cause. See id. In determining whether the precautionary measures were reasonable, the standard is objective-- 'would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure ... warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.'  United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1536 (10th Cir.1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880). 30 In the present case, we must determine whether the Terry stop escalated into an arrest following the application of the arm bar maneuver by Officer Santos. The district court concluded the take-down of Mr. Gallegos was justified by a reasonably perceived threat to officer safety. The court did not find Mr. Gallegos was subjected to an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. We agree. 31 The record reveals that following Sergeant Lofgren's third attempt to grab Mr. Gallegos' arm, Mr. Gallegos' demeanor and body position changed drastically. Previously, Mr. Gallegos had been intent on walking down the sidewalk with his hands covering his face. In a matter of seconds, however, Mr. Gallegos removed his hands from his face, pivoted toward the officers, and crouched into a wrestler's position. Mr. Gallegos was yelling and he appeared very angry. He smelled as if he had been drinking. 32 Based on these objective facts, we believe Officer Santos reasonably believed her safety was in danger. To gain control of the situation before her or her partner was harmed, she made a split second decision to apply an arm bar maneuver to Mr. Gallegos. We cannot say this decision was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Nor can we say Officer Lofgren's decision to initiate a take-down was unreasonable. Having witnessed Mr. Gallegos' strange and aggressive conduct, he now observed his partner, a police officer in field training, trying to gain control of a man who weighed 200 pounds or more. We believe Sergeant Lofgren harbored an objectively reasonable belief there was a serious risk Mr. Gallegos would strike Officer Santos with his free arm. Based on this belief, Sergeant Lofgren used a reasonable amount of force to bring Mr. Gallegos face-down on the pavement. 33 Only seconds after Sergeant Lofgren initiated the take-down procedure, Mr. Gallegos and Officer Santos unfortunately were struck by the hit-and-run driver. Nevertheless, we find, as did the trial court, that at the time Mr. Gallegos was injured, the actions taken by Sergeant Lofgren and Officer Santos were merely those reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of [a Terry ] stop. 6 See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1462 (quoting Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235, 105 S.Ct. at 683-84.) Thus, we conclude no arrest had taken place at the time Mr. Gallegos was hit by the car. 7 Because Mr. Gallegos was not arrested, the officers did not need probable cause to justify their actions. 8 34 C. Are Sergeant Lofgren and Officer Santos Entitled to Qualified Immunity for their Actions? 35 Because we have determined Mr. Gallegos was not deprived of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, we need not address the issue of qualified immunity.