Opinion ID: 1630580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Alcohol Dependence

Text: G.H. contends that alcohol dependence cannot be considered a mental illness for purposes of SOCA, based upon definitional differences between SOCA and MHCA. SOCA incorporates by reference [9] the definition of mentally ill found in MHCA: Mentally ill means having a psychiatric disorder that involves a severe or substantial impairment of a person's thought processes, sensory input, mood balance, memory, or ability to reason which substantially interferes with such person's ability to meet the ordinary demands of living or interferes with the safety or well-being of others. [10] But SOCA does not incorporate MHCA's definition of substance dependent, which means having a behavioral disorder that involves a maladaptive pattern of repeated use of controlled substances, illegal drugs, or alcohol, usually resulting in increased tolerance, withdrawal, and compulsive using behavior and including a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological symptoms involving the continued use of such substances despite significant adverse effects resulting from such use. [11] Nor does SOCA include its own definition of substance dependent. Under MHCA, a person may be adjudicated as a [m]entally ill and dangerous person and subjected to involuntary custody and treatment on the basis of either mental illness or substance dependence. [12] G.H. argues that because SOCA does not incorporate the language of MHCA with respect to substance dependence, substance dependence cannot be considered a mental illness for purposes of determining that an individual is a dangerous sex offender. Lukin testified that alcohol dependence is an Axis I mental disorder as defined by the DSM-IV-TR, and he considered the alcohol dependence and antisocial personality disorder as primary factors in assessing the risk that G.H. would reoffend sexually. Lukin testified: I did not [diagnose G.H.] with a paraphiliac condition simply because it's the prominence of his substance dependence and antisocial personality. He would be characterized more as an opportunistic sex offender and someone with general antisocial personality independent rather than a primary paraphiliac or patterned sex offender. We note that because G.H. had been convicted of two sex offenses, he could be adjudicated as a dangerous sex offender on the basis of the personality disorder alone under the alternative definition of § 83-174.01(1)(b). On these facts, we conclude that the diagnosis of alcohol dependence was properly considered in conjunction with the diagnosis of an antisocial personality disorder in the calculus of whether G.H. was a dangerous sex offender within the meaning of SOCA. We are not persuaded by G.H.'s argument that the diagnosis of alcohol dependence should be disregarded because Lukin described it as in remission. Lukin attributed this fact to the controlled environment created by G.H.'s incarceration, but testified that G.H. nevertheless displayed signs consistent with alcohol dependence.