Opinion ID: 629054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing to bring a Sec. 1983 cause of action

Text: 14 Before proceeding to address the question raised on this interlocutory appeal, we must determine whether there is standing. City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe, 625 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted) (Standing is a necessary element of federal-court jurisdiction.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1039, 101 S.Ct. 619, 66 L.Ed.2d 502 (1980). Therefore, as a threshold issue, we first turn to the trustees' contention that Price lacks standing to bring a Sec. 1983 cause of action based on the Admission Act. The issue is two-fold: (1) whether Price has standing; and (2) whether Price may bring a Sec. 1983 cause of action based on the Admission Act.
15 The trustees argue that Price does not have standing because of the Supreme Court's rationale in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). We disagree. Lujan involved a challenge to a new regulation interpreting Sec. 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) to apply only within the United States or on the high seas. Specifically, plaintiffs filed an action against the Secretary of the Interior, seeking a declaratory judgment that the new regulation is in error as to the geographic scope of Sec. 7(a)(2), and an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation restoring the initial interpretation. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2135. The Court found plaintiffs failed to show standing to enforce the ESA. 16 The Court set out a three-part test and stated that a plaintiff has standing if: (1) plaintiff suffered an actual or imminent injury; (2) there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. Whether a plaintiff is the object of the action at issue will affect the standing analysis: 17 When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. When, however, as in this case, a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. 18 Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2137. 19 The Court determined that it was dealing with the latter situation. It then applied the standing requirements strictly where a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2137. 20 The present case, unlike Lujan, does not involve a suit against government for promulgating an unlawful regulation or for failing to promulgate a regulation. Rather, Price is among the class of Sec. 5(f) beneficiaries whose welfare is the object of the action at issue. Therefore, there is little question that the [trustees'] action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring action will redress it. Id. 5 Moreover, we have held that Price, as a native Hawaiian, has standing to seek redress for past violations of Sec. 5(f). Akaka I, 928 F.2d at 827 n. 2. The Supreme Court's rationale in Lujan does not compel a different result. Price has standing.
21 In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Suter v. Artist M., --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), the trustees argue that Sec. 1983 claims based on the Admission Act simply cannot be brought. This argument fails unless Suter overruled our prior decision in Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1467, 1472 (1984) (Keaukaha II ), where we held that a Sec. 1983 cause of action may be brought under the Admission Act. 22 The issue in Suter was whether private individuals have the right to enforce by suit a provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (Adoption Act or Act) either under the Act itself or through an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1363 (citation and footnote omitted). As to the Sec. 1983 issue, the Suter Court stated: 23 In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 [100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555] (1980), we first established that Sec. 1983 is available as a remedy for violations of federal statutes as well as for constitutional violations. We have subsequently recognized that Sec. 1983 is not available to enforce a violation of a federal statute where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself and where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of Sec. 1983. 24 Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1366 (parallel citations omitted) (quotation omitted). The Court then stated that [s]ection 1983 speaks in terms of 'rights, privileges, or immunities,' not violations of federal law, id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1367 (quotation omitted), and concluded that the Adoption Act does not create a federally enforceable right under Sec. 1983. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1370. 25 The trustees argue that, as in Suter, Sec. 1983 claims may not be brought to challenge violations of the Admission Act because the Admission Act does not create a federally enforceable right. We disagree. The instant case involves a public trust, 6 and under basic trust law principles, beneficiaries have the right to maintain a suit (a) to compel the trustee to perform his duties as trustee; (b) to enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust; [and] (c) to compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust. Restatement 2d of the Law of Trusts, Sec. 199; see also id. at Sec. 200, comment a (Normally a suit against a trustee to enforce the trust or to enjoin or obtain redress for a breach of trust is brought by a beneficiary.). We have accordingly held that allowing Price to enforce Sec. 5(f) is consistent with the common law of trusts, in which one whose status as a beneficiary depends upon the discretion of the trustee nevertheless may sue to compel the trustee to abide by the terms of the trust. Akaka I, 928 F.2d at 826-27. 26 Our decisions in Keaukaha II, 739 F.2d at 1472, and Akaka I, 928 F.2d at 828, holding that beneficiaries of the public trust created by Congress may bring a Sec. 1983 claim are consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Suter. Congress enacted the Admission Act, a federal public trust, which by its nature creates a federally enforceable right for its beneficiaries to maintain an action against the trustee in breach of the trust. As a beneficiary, Price may therefore bring a Sec. 1983 action under the Hawaii Admission Act against the trustees.