Opinion ID: 1383118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due process applies to parole revocation.

Text: Courts of this state have in the past ruled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to parole revocation proceedings. [26] As described above, the Adult Authority has itself established a parole revocation process which by grace affords some minimal procedural protections for the parolee, including notice, the opportunity to appear before an impartial decision-making tribunal, and the opportunity to present oral and written material. Yet even these extremely basic procedures are supposedly not required by law, [27] and may presumably be terminated at the option of the Adult Authority. The majority of this court attempt to rationalize this position by characterizing the Adult Authority's procedures as administrative [28] and not judicial [29] and by considering parole as a matter of grace, a privilege and not a right. [30] The invocation of labels, however, does no more than avoid analysis; it does not provide the basis for careful consideration of the threshold constitutional question of whether due process applies to parole revocation hearings. The Adult Authority, like all other administrative tribunals, must observe at least the basic elements of procedural due process. [31] The elements of due process vary with the nature of the proceeding, but there remains no doubt that the requirement of due process adheres to every sort of adjudicative proceeding. [32] As the United States Supreme Court has held, `Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. On the other hand, when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example, when a general fact-finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used. Therefore, as a generalization it can be said that due process embodies the differing rules of fair play, which through the years, have become associated with differing types of proceedings. Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account. ( Hannah v. Larche (1960) 363 U.S. 420, 442 [4 L.Ed.2d 1307, 1321, 80 S.Ct. 1502]; Jenkins v. McKeithen, supra, 395 U.S. 411, 426 [23 L.Ed.2d 404, 419]; Hyser v. Reed (1963) 318 F.2d 225, 251-252 [115 App.D.C. 254] (concurring and dissent opn. of Bazelon, C.J.).) Parole revocation clearly involves specific factual determinations which directly and substantially affect the individual's ability to remain on parole, rather than a general fact-finding investigation or rule-making proceeding. [33] Hence, we need not rely upon the Adult Authority's own characterization [34] of parole revocation as an adjudicative process in order to find that adjudication occurs and to declare that it is imperative that those agencies use at least the basic procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. (363 U.S. at p. 442 [4 L.Ed.2d at p. 1321].) Even though a parolee cannot claim an abstract right conditionally to be released from prison (see In re Schoengarth, supra, 66 Cal.2d 295, 302; In re McLain, supra, 55 Cal.2d 78, 87; In re Smith, supra, 33 Cal.2d 797, 803-805), and even though parole itself might be characterized as a matter of grace, a privilege and not a right, it does not follow that the Adult Authority can decide whether a parole shall be revoked without regard to the fundamental requisites of procedural due process. [35] The essence of due process is the protection of the individual against arbitrary action. ( Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1937) 301 U.S. 292, 302 [81 L.Ed. 1093, 1100, 57 S.Ct. 724]; see Slochower v. Board of Education (1956) 350 U.S. 551, 559 [100 L.Ed. 692, 700-701, 76 S.Ct. 637].) We have long recognized that the Adult Authority may not act arbitrarily or upon whim, caprice, or rumor in revoking parole. ( In re McLain, supra, 55 Cal.2d 78, 87; Dunn v. California Department of Corrections (9th Cir.1968) 401 F.2d 340, 342; Eason v. Dickson (9th Cir.1968) 390 F.2d 585, 589, fn. 4; Glenn v. Reed (1961) 289 F.2d 462, 463 [110 App. D.C. 85]; Freedman v. Looney (10th Cir.1954) 210 F.2d 56, 57; Fleenor v. Hammond (6th Cir.1941) 116 F.2d 982, 986.) Procedural due process may well afford the only means for preventing the arbitrary exercise of the Adult Authority's power to revoke parole. The United States Supreme Court has established that when governmental action will seriously injure or substantially affect the life of an individual, the government must conduct its adjudicative proceedings in accordance with the basic requisites of procedural due process. [36] The effects of parole revocation certainly reach far beyond the consequences of the governmental actions for which the Supreme Court has already required the procedures of due process. For example, the courts have required the governmental authorities to follow the mandates of due process when they seek to discharge public employees, [37] revoke security clearances, [38] refuse unemployment compensation, [39] and terminate welfare payments, [40] even though these governmental actions involved matters which would have formerly been considered mere privileges, benefits, or questions of grace. In Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. 254, 261-263 [25 L.Ed.2d 287, 295-296], the United States Supreme Court rejected the distinction between privilege and right in determining the application of due process: The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are `a privilege and not a right.' Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, n. 6 (1969). Relevant constitutional restraints apply as much to the withdrawal of public assistance benefits as to disqualification for unemployment compensation, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); or to denial of a tax exemption, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); or to discharge from public employment, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956). The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be `condemned to suffer grievous loss,' Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication. [See Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 371 (28 L.Ed.2d 113, 91 S.Ct. 780, 785-788).] Accordingly, as we said in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), `consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.' See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440, 442 (1960). (Fns. omitted; cf. Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535, 539 [29 L.Ed.2d 90, 94, 91 S.Ct. 1586].) The revocation of parole certainly condemns the parolee to suffer far more grievous loss than the other matters for which procedural due process has been constitutionally compelled. (See Wisconsin v. Constantineau (1971) 400 U.S. 433, 436-437 [27 L.Ed.2d 515, 518-519, 91 S.Ct. 507].) The parolee is not merely a prisoner. (See In re Marzec (1945) 25 Cal.2d 794, 797 [154 P.2d 873].) He works at a job, lives with his family, reads books and newspapers of his choosing, enjoys a limited right to travel, makes friends, and generally pursues a normal law-abiding life within the conditions of his parole. (See Note (1971) 84 Harv. L.Rev. 1727.) When his parole is revoked and he is returned to prison, the parolee loses his precious, albeit limited, freedom. [41] He loses his job and his ability to lead a relatively normal life. As a result of the parole revocation he may spend the rest of his life in prison. These consequences are sufficiently severe to invoke at least the basic requisites of due process. (See Hester v. Craven (C.D.Cal. 1971) 322 F. Supp. 1256, 1261-1265.) In any case, we are not seeking to protect the grace [42] or right of parole; we are attempting to express and vindicate the right to a fair determination of the facts upon which the state would deprive a person of parole and his concurrent liberty. Finally, we must confront an argument which apparently underlies the majority's position: To grant procedures which comport with due process every time parole is suspended would purportedly impose an excessive burden on the administration of the parole system that would far outweigh any speculative benefit. We recognize that parole constitutes a major tool in achieving the rehabilitation of those convicted of criminal offenses. [43] The parolee is required to live according to a reasonable code of conduct which is intended to assist his adjustment to a normal and useful life. [44] Parole revocation is the Adult Authority's most severe sanction for the parolee's refusal to follow the conditions of his parole. [45] If this court were to raise revocation hearings into full dress criminal trials, we might deter the Adult Authority from granting release for fear that it would be unable to revoke parole when the circumstances indicated that the conditional release had not been successful. [46] We might also so significantly impede the revocation process that some parolees who appear dangerous to society would be permitted to remain at large. No one argues, however, that the Adult Authority's present procedures impose a substantial handicap upon the machinery of the parole system. [47] Hence, to rule that due process applies to parole revocation and requires only those procedural elements which are already incorporated in the present proceedings obviously could not impose any additional or grievous burden on the Adult Authority. A large number of states, as well as the federal government, grant to parolees far more extensive procedural safeguards than does California, and these protections are afforded without any apparent breakdown in their parole systems. [48] For example, parolees in the federal system have the right to notice, a geographically convenient hearing, retained counsel, production of favorable witnesses, and production of documentary material. [49] If the federal system, and, indeed, most states, are quite capable of utilizing these procedural elements of due process in parole revocation, California certainly should be able to do so. We proceed to discuss the elements of due process which we believe must be observed in a parole revocation proceeding. [50] Our discussion follows the analytical approach this court suggested in Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1965) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [53 Cal. Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265], What is due process depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation. (Holmes, J., in Moyer v. Peabody (1909) 212 U.S. 78, 84 [53 L.Ed. 410, 416, 29 S.Ct. 235].) Its content is a function of many variables, including the nature of the right affected, the degree of danger caused by the proscribed condition or activity, and the availability of prompt remedial measures. (See Richardson v. Perales (1971) 402 U.S. 389, 399-406 [28 L.Ed.2d 842, 852-855, 91 S.Ct. 1420]; Hannah v. Larche, supra, 363 U.S. 420, 442 [4 L.Ed.2d 1307, 1321]; People v. Moore (1968) 69 Cal.2d 674, 681 [72 Cal. Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800]; Newman, The Process of Prescribing Due Process (1961) 49 Cal.L.Rev. 215.) We need not choose between affording the parolee all rights or according him none. [51] We do not and cannot clothe the parolee with the investitures of a defendant in a criminal prosecution, but we submit that he should at least be entitled to these basic and minimal protections of due process: notice, hearing, and representation by counsel.