Opinion ID: 805657
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Equal Protection Clause and State-Law

Text: Classifications Based on Tribal Status
The defendants' first argument is that a state-granted preference to a tribe is not a racial preference and so entails only rational basis review. This argument relies on language used by the Court in Mancari, 417 U.S. 535. There, the Court addressed whether a federal law granting an employment preference for qualified Indians in a federal agency, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 417 U.S. at 537. A statute directed the Secretary of the Interior to adopt standards for Indians who may be appointed, without regard to civil-service laws, to the various positions maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian office, in the administration of functions or services affecting any Indian tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the preference to appointment to vacancies in any such positions. Id. at 537-38 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 472) (internal quotation mark omitted). The BIA adopted a policy that [w]here two or more candidates who meet the established qualification requirements are available for filling a vacancy. If one of them -33- is an Indian, he shall be given preference in filling the vacancy. Id. at 538 n.3. The Court rejected the equal protection challenge to the federal statute. The Court first noted that [t]he plenary power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself, citing the portion of the Commerce Clause allowing regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes, as well as the treaty power. Id. at 551-52 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). The Court then noted that there was a special relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes, and that [l]iterally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations . . . single[s] out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. Id. at 552. It was in this historical and legal context that the Court addressed the equal protection claim. Id. at 553. The Court held that this preference does not constitute 'racial discrimination.' Indeed, it is not even a 'racial' preference. Rather, it is an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups. Id. at 553-54 (footnote omitted). The Court further explained: The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are -34- governed by the BIA in a unique fashion. In the sense that there is no other group of people favored in this manner, the legal status of the BIA is truly sui generis. Id. at 554 (citation and footnote omitted). This passage was followed by rather pointed language that if the preference were applied to employment in federal agencies not related to Indians, a different question would be presented: Furthermore, the preference applies only to employment in the Indian service. The preference does not cover any other Government agency or activity, and we need not consider the obviously more difficult question that would be presented by a blanket exemption for Indians from all civil service examinations. Here, the preference is reasonably and directly related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal. This is the principal characteristic that generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial discrimination. Id. at 554. In a footnote, the Court remarked: The preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as 'Indians.' In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature. Id. at 553 n.24. The Commonwealth relies on but overreads the footnote. The Court concluded by explaining that [a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative -35- judgments will not be disturbed, and that this standard was satisfied. Id. at 555. Mancari's analysis as to federal laws giving preference based on Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians has been reaffirmed. See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979) (noting that this Court . . . has repeatedly held that the peculiar semisovereign and constitutionally recognized status of Indians justifies special treatment on their behalf when rationally related to the Government's 'unique obligation toward the Indians' (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555)); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977) (Legislation with respect to these 'unique aggregations' has repeatedly been sustained by this Court against claims of unlawful racial discrimination. (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552)); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990) (That Indians are citizens does not alter the Federal Government's broad authority to legislate with respect to enrolled Indians as a class, whether to impose burdens or benefits. (citing Antelope and Mancari)), superseded by statute as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197-98, 207 (2004). However, it is quite doubtful that Mancari's language can be extended to apply to preferential state classifications based on tribal status. Mancari itself relied on several sources of federal authority to reach its holding, including the portion of the -36- Commerce Clause relating to Indian tribes, the treaty power, and the special trust relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government. 417 U.S. at 552-53. The states have no such equivalent authority,16 which is ceded by the Constitution to the federal government. Further, the state preference here has to do with establishment of gaming facilities and not employment of Indians within agencies whose mission is to assist Indians. Moreover, Mancari itself said that a different question would be presented by a preference in all civil services positions, and suggested that might be viewed as race based discrimination. KG argues that the state's argument that no racial classification is involved is undercut by Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000). In Rice, a case under the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court declined to extend the limited exception of Mancari to a new and larger dimension, id. at 520, and rejected the state of Hawaii's claim that Mancari applied to allow a voting scheme the state established regarding the Office of Hawaiian affairs, id. at 522. The voting scheme permitted only Hawaiians, defined as any 16 Indeed, the state's broad reading of Mancari is inconsistent with the Court's later decision in Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). We discuss Yakima below, and cite it now for its holding that [s]tates do not enjoy this same unique relationship with Indians which permits the Federal Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive. Id. at 501. -37- descendant of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, to vote for the trustees of the Office. Id. at 509 (quoting Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10-2). The Court held this special favorable treatment of Hawaiians was an impermissible racial classification. Id. at 517-22. The Court also held that [a]ncestry can be a proxy for race, and was so in the context of the statute at issue there. Id. at 514. The effect of Rice on a Fourteenth Amendment claim involving federally recognized tribes is unclear. The defendants cite no authority holding that state preferential classifications based on tribal status which are not authorized by federal law are nonetheless not racial classifications under Mancari. Instead, they cite a number of cases upholding state laws, which are not like this case, said to be authorized by federal law under the rationale of Yakima. See Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 736 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding state law regarding Indian gaming enacted pursuant to the IGRA); United States v. Garrett, 122 F. App'x 628, 631-33 (4th Cir. 2005) (same, following Artichoke Joe's); Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d 715, 722 n.10 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding state law where the state is acting under a federal statute explicitly adjusting the state's jurisdiction over Indians); Greene v. Comm'r of Minn. Dep't of Human Servs., 755 -38- N.W.2d 713, 727 (Minn. 2008) (upholding state law where the law was a direct response to a federal law, citing Yakima); N.Y. Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Urbach, 699 N.E.2d 904, 908 (N.Y. 1998) (upholding state law on the rationale of Yakima). We turn next to the defendants' argument that nevertheless the state may still make the classification, because § 91 is authorized by the IGRA under Yakima. In the present posture of this case, that too is quite doubtful.
The premise of defendants' argument is their assertion that § 91 was enacted under explicit authority granted by Congress in IGRA, and so is subject to rational basis review under Yakima. While stronger than the Mancari rationale, and the authorization rationale states a sound argument where it applies, it is questionable whether the IGRA authorizes the state's actions on the present facts. Indeed, KG in effect argues that as the Supreme Court has interpreted the land in trust statute in Carcieri, the intent of Congress was that the Secretary could not take land into trust for tribes such as the Mashpee, and so the intent of Congress is on the other side of the issue. In Yakima, the Court addressed the equal protection analysis of state laws as to Indian tribes where the state acted pursuant to Congressional authorization. The State of Washington, -39- pursuant to authorization granted by federal Public Law 280,17 enacted Chapter 36, extending the state's exercise of jurisdiction onto the Yakima Reservation in certain instances. 439 U.S. at 465-66. The Yakima Nation brought suit raising, among other claims, one of an equal protection violation. Id. at 466-67. The Court rejected the claim. The Court first found that the state law violates neither the procedural nor the substantive terms of Public Law 280, and so the state was authorized by Congress under that law to extend jurisdiction over the reservation. Id. at 499. The Court then addressed the equal protection claim. The Court rejected the argument that this was a racial classification giving rise to heightened scrutiny, explaining, in the opinion's key passage: It is settled that the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law permits the Federal Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-552. States do not enjoy this same unique relationship with Indians, but Chapter 36 is not simply another state law. It was enacted in response to a federal measure explicitly designed to readjust the allocation of jurisdiction over Indians. The jurisdiction permitted under Chapter 36 is, as we have found, within the scope of the authorization of Pub. L. 280. And many of the classifications made by Chapter 36 are also made by Pub. L. 280. Indeed, classifications based on tribal status and land tenure inhere in many of the decisions of this Court 17 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588. -40- involving jurisdictional controversies between tribal Indians and the States, see, e. g., United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621. For these reasons, we find the argument that such classifications are suspect an untenable one. The contention that Chapter 36 abridges a fundamental right is also untenable. It is well established that Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian affairs, may restrict the retained sovereign powers of the Indian tribes. See, e. g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313. In enacting Chapter 36, Washington was legislating under explicit authority granted by Congress in the exercise of that federal power. Id. at 500-01. This portion of Yakima has not been addressed by the Court since Yakima was decided. It would be difficult to conclude that the IGRA authorizes the Massachusetts statute under these circumstances -- where there are no Indian lands in Region C at present within the meaning of the IGRA. Further, Carcieri may in the end prohibit the Secretary from taking the Mashpee lands into trust and so making them Indian lands, a question not yet resolved. KG does not dispute that if a federally recognized tribe in Massachusetts currently possessed Indian lands within the meaning of the IGRA,18 § 91 would fall sufficiently within the scope 18 As said, the IGRA defines Indian lands as (1) lands within any Indian reservation and (2) lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to jurisdiction by the United States against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4). Neither party addresses the meaning of the or held by any Indian tribe portion of the statute or its relevance to this -41- of the IGRA's authorization and thus be subject to only rational basis review. Two circuits have reached this conclusion as to other states' Indian gaming laws. See Garrett, 122 F. App'x at 631-32; Artichoke Joe's, 353 F.3d at 736.19 KG argues with some force that the fact that a tribe may, in the future, acquire Indian lands is insufficient for § 91 to be considered authorized in the Yakima sense by the IGRA. Instead, KG argues, a tribe20 must currently possess Indian lands in order for § 91 in any relevant sense to be authorized by Congress. We outline the present state of affairs as we understand it. The Mashpee have submitted a land in trust application to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, requesting that the Bureau take land into trust for purposes of operating a casino in Massachusetts. See 77 Fed. Reg. 32,132, 32,133 (May 31, 2012) (BIA notice requesting comments for purposes of preparing an environmental impact statement for the proposed transfer into trust of 146.39 acres in the City of Taunton, to be taken into trust for the development of a casino, hotel, parking, and other facilities supporting the casino, as well as a proposed transfer into trust of 170.1 acres case, and we do not pass on it here. 19 The Ninth Circuit expressly reserved the question of whether lands that are purchased specifically for the purpose of conducting class III gaming activities are 'Indian lands' within the meaning of IGRA. Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 735 n.16 (9th Cir. 2003). 20 Again, we distinguish the Aquinnah for the reasons stated. -42- in the Town of Mashpee, Massachusetts, for other purposes). The agreed-on tribal-state compact has yet to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior, and the compact acknowledges that the Mashpee currently possess no land in trust. The Governor agreed in the compact to support the Tribe's land in trust application. Mashpee Tribal-State Compact §§ 2.11, 9.1.6. The strongest argument made by KG is based on Carcieri: that even if being in the application process to have a Secretary (with authority) take the purchased land into trust might suffice for purposes of being found authorized under the IGRA as a general matter, if no land can be taken into trust given Carcieri, § 91 cannot be viewed as authorized by the IGRA. KG's argument starts from the premise that the Mashpee were federally recognized only after 1934.21 That being so, KG argues, unless the tribe can demonstrate that it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 (in the view of three Justices),22 or Congress positively grants the 21 See Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of the Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribal Council, Inc. of Massachusetts, 72 Fed. Reg. 8,007 (Feb. 22, 2007) (finding that the Mashpee meet the criteria for federal acknowledgment under 25 C.F.R. § 83.7). 22 The Department of the Interior has, post-Carcieri, approved a land in trust application for a tribe recognized after 1934, largely relying on the Carcieri concurring opinion. See U.S. Dep't of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Trust Acquisition of, and Reservation Proclamation for the 151.87-acre Cowlitz Parcel in Clark County, Washington, for the Cowlitz Indian Tribe (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/mywcsp/ documents/text/idc012719.pdf. It was also based on facts which may be unique to the Cowlitz tribe, or at least not shared by the Mashpee. There is no evidence one way or the other as to any such -43- Secretary new authority to take land into trust for post-1934 tribes, no land could be taken into trust given Carcieri. Moreover, it would be inconsistent with Congressional intent to view the IGRA, which permits gaming only on Indian lands, to authorize negotiation of a tribal-state compact where a tribe neither possessed such lands nor could acquire such lands in the absence of Congressional legislation. We have not been given the benefit of any view by the Secretary on any of these issues. Further, the Mashpee's land in trust application has not been placed in the record, so we do not know the predicate for the tribe's application. KG's argument that the IGRA cannot authorize § 91 in these circumstances rests not only on Carcieri but also on the language of the IGRA, which repeatedly uses the term Indian lands in explaining when Class III gaming is permitted. In particular, the term is used in the context of explaining when tribes and states may negotiate a tribal-state compact: (A) Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the State in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a facts as to the Mashpee. This determination has been challenged, including as to whether the Secretary had authority to take land into trust given Carcieri. See Clark County, Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, No. 11-00284 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 31, 2011). -44- request, the State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact. (B) Any State and any Indian tribe may enter into a Tribal-State compact governing gaming activities on the Indian lands of the Indian tribe, but such compact shall take effect only when notice of approval by the Secretary of such compact has been published by the Secretary in the Federal Register. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (emphasis added). KG argues, as a matter of federal statutory interpretation, that the IGRA precludes a finding of authorization here. The Sixth Circuit has interpreted subsection (A) in Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2002). There, the court addressed whether an Indian tribe which did not possess Indian lands could compel a state to negotiate a tribal-state compact. The court held that the tribe could not do so, as [h]aving jurisdiction over land for the casino is a condition precedent to negotiations and federal jurisdiction, based on the plain language of § 2710(d)(3)(A). Id. at 618. The court explained that [s]ection (3)(A) describes not just an Indian tribe, but one that is in possession of land. Id. Of course, there is a distinction: there the tribe was trying to force the state to negotiate; here the state wishes to negotiate.23 23 The Mashpee Tribal-State Compact states that [t]he parties agree that IGRA negotiations need not be commenced or concluded until the Tribe has land in trust that is qualified for Gaming. -45- KG's argument based on Carcieri goes beyond the language of the IGRA describing when a compact may be negotiated to a more basic premise of the IGRA: that Class III gaming may occur only on Indian lands. Because the Secretary presently most likely lacks authority under the IGRA to take land into trust for the Mashpee, KG argues, there is no real prospect, absent an act of Congress, for land to be taken into trust, and so § 91 cannot be viewed as authorized. The defendants' response to this reading of the statute relies not upon the terms of the statute, but on certain actions taken by the Secretary, albeit in factual situations not identical to this. The Secretary's present position appears to be that tribal-state compacts may be negotiated and approved by the Secretary even if a tribe does not currently possess Indian lands, conditional upon the tribe's acquiring Indian lands. The most recent position of the Secretary, cited by the parties, was articulated in a March 2011 approval of a tribal-state compact. There, the Secretary approved a tribal-state compact, with the authorization of any gaming facility under the compact contingent on the relevant land being acquired in trust by the Secretary for the tribe.24 76 Fed. Reg. 11,258, 11,258 (Mar. 1, 2011). Whether Mashpee Tribal-State Compact § 9.1.2. 24 Neither party addresses whether the tribe whose compact was approved, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation, was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and so Carcieri would not -46- or not the Secretary's interpretation of the statute is correct or would apply to the Mashpee has not been briefed and is not before us. The Secretary's views on whether tribal-state compacts may be approved before the tribe possesses land that is taken into trust have varied over the years.25 In 2005, the Secretary disapproved a tribal-state compact between the State of Oregon and the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, on the basis that it could only approve a tribal-state compact governing gaming on Indian lands of such Indian tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(A) (emphasis added). The Department's reading was that [t]his section does not authorize the Secretary to approve a compact for the conduct of Class III gaming activities on lands that are not now, and may never be, Indian lands of such Indian tribe. Because the land was not in trust, approval of the compact would run afoul of § 2710(d)(8)(A). The Secretary did note that the Department had previously approved compacts for the regulation pose a barrier to the taking of land into trust, in contrast to this situation. 25 In 2010, the director of the Office of Indian Gaming in the Department of the Interior sent a letter to a member of the Michigan House of Representatives, which explained that the IGRA does not authorize the Secretary to approve a compact for the conduct of Class III gaming on lands that are not now, and may never be, Indian lands of such Indian tribe. Thus if a compact is 'site specific' and identifies land that is not now or may never be Indian lands in accordance with IGRA and the tribe has not identified land that is eligible for gaming in the compact the compact may be disapproved. -47- of class III gaming activities before the specified lands qualified as Indian lands under IGRA, but upon further review of the statute, the Secretary changed his position. See also Second Discussion Draft of Legislation Regarding Off-Reservation Indian Gaming: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Res., 109th Cong. 16 (2005) (statement of Ron Suppah, Chairman, Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, Or.) (discussing this 2005 compact and explaining that Interior has previously approved several compacts before the land was in trust, but four days before our 45-day review ended Interior announced to us with no forewarning that they were changing their policy and would require the Cascade Locks' lands to be in trust before they would consider our compact). The Secretary has promulgated regulations governing the procedures for submitting a tribal-state compact, see 25 C.F.R. pt. 293, but these regulations do not address the matter before us.26 The Secretary has also promulgated regulations regarding the procedures for acquiring the Secretary's approval to conduct gaming 26 One of the comments received when the regulations were proposed was that the Department should clarify its position on Indian lands, and another suggested removal of the phrase on the tribe's Indian lands located within the State from the definition of a tribal-state compact. 73 Fed. Reg. 74,004, 70,004-05 (Dec. 5, 2008). In response to the former comment, the Department stated that [t]his regulation addresses the process for submission by tribes and States and consideration by the Secretary of Class III Tribal-State Gaming Compacts, and is not intended to address substantive issues. Id. In response to the latter comment, the Department removed the phrase on the Tribe's Indian lands from the definition of a Tribal-State compact under these procedural regulations. Id. at 70,005. -48- on lands acquired in trust after October 1988 under 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A). These regulations permit tribes to apply for the Secretary's determination for lands not yet held in trust at the same time that [the tribe] applies . . . to have the land taken into trust. 25 C.F.R. § 292.15. In sum, whether § 91 is authorized by the IGRA such that it falls within Yakima and is subject to only rational basis review is far from clear, presents a difficult question of statutory interpretation, and implicates a practice of the Secretary of the Interior not challenged in this suit. There is apparently no judicial authority addressing the question of whether a state may negotiate a tribal-state compact with a federally recognized tribe that does not presently possess Indian lands.27 The Secretary's present position does, though, provide some assistance to the Commonwealth. If the Secretary is willing 27 The Ninth Circuit has addressed the separate question of whether the NIGC chairman must affirmatively determine that any Class III gaming is to take place on Indian lands before approving a tribal ordinance authorizing gaming. The Ninth Circuit did not decide whether, if a tribal ordinance specifies a particular site on which gaming is to be conducted (i.e. is a site-specific ordinance), such a determination must take place. N. Cnty. Cmty. Alliance, Inc. v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 738, 746 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2095 (2010). It held that where an ordinance does not specify where gaming will take place (and there need be no such specification; i.e. the ordinance may be non-site-specific), no such determination need be made. Id. at 746-47. Regulations promulgated by the NIGC in 2008 now appear to require that, while non-site-specific ordinances may still be approved, in an application for a facility license from the NIGC, the tribe must submit information to enable the NIGC to make an Indian lands determination. See id. at 747-48 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 559.2(a)). -49- under the IGRA to approve a tribal-state compact contingent on the relevant land being later acquired in trust, then the Commonwealth can argue that § 91 establishes a parallel mechanism, meant to facilitate the purposes of the IGRA, even if not precisely authorized by the IGRA, for a limited period of time. The argument, of course, would become weaker with the passage of time and the continuation of the status that there are no Indian lands in the region. The tribal-state compact entered into weakens the state's position by extending the period of time, as we explain below. And the argument is qualitatively different, and even weaker, to the extent that Congressional action is required to provide the Secretary authority to take this land into trust. It is in this context that we turn to the relief requested by KG and the disposition of this suit.