Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct/Religion (Lewis, Oliver)

Text: Defendants complain the prosecutor exploited religious imagery in closing argument, and that she invoked divine law as the basis for death. Such statements purportedly rendered the penalty trial fundamentally unfair (thus violating federal law), and involved deceptive and reprehensible conduct (thus violating state law). (See Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144; People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th 107, 167, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) In making these arguments, defendants cite the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and parallel provisions of the state Constitution. Emphasis is placed on due process principles, and the requirement of separation between church and state. Defendants focus on various religious references. The prosecutor referred to the crime scene as a house of God. She also stated that defendants appeared evil, soulless, and coward[ly]. [27] Defendants did not object to the foregoing remarks on any ground at trial. Hence, they have forfeited their misconduct claims on appeal. ( People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 48, 100, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th 215, 259-260, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107 [counsel not only failed to object to the prosecutor's remarks, but countered them by citing a number of religious authorities to support his argument].) Oliver counters that no objection was required because defendants did not anticipate the prosecutor's appeal to religion. Oliver claims that because the prosecutor had earlier tried to block defense references to religion, counsel assumed religion would play no role at argument. As we have seen, however, there was never any vigorous argument or clear ruling on the issue. The record shows no surprise or other excuse justifying departure from the general rule requiring a timely objection and preservation of misconduct claims. The claims also lack merit under settled law. To be sure, we have condemned prosecutorial reliance on the Bible as support or approval of the death penalty [citations] or prosecutorial invocations to a different or higher law than that found in the state Penal Code [citation]. ( People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 48, 100, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) But nothing of the sort occurred here. The decision whether to impose the ultimate punishment is a normative one assigned to the jury under California's death penalty law. ( People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th 240, 262, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451.) Here, defendants committed two murders in a church filled with adults and children. Fortuitously, a third shooting victim survived. The prosecutor was not required to ignore these compelling facts. In particular, the prosecutor was free to argue, and the jury was free to infer, that defendants showed exceptional moral depravity in following their victims to a religious sanctuary in order to kill them ruthlessly and in cold blood. Whether it is a church, synagogue, mosque, or temple, any house of God is  by history and tradition  the last place anyone expects to encounter lethal violence. The prosecutor could properly urge jurors to consider evidence of the location in which defendants chose to commit their crimes in making the normative decision whether to impose death under the secular law in which they had been instructed. Moreover, any prosecutorial misconduct was harmless under any test of prejudice. (See People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1130, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498.) The jury could only have seen defendants' crimes as base and vile. Their impact on the victims  including the churchgoers who witnessed the shootings inside the church  was quite painful. Of course, the jury knew about Oliver's criminal record and violent history. Jurors also knew about Lewis's pattern of domestic violence. We discern no prejudice.