Opinion ID: 6336983
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: “Available”

Text: {25} Finally, CenturyLink challenges the Commission’s construction of “available” in Section 63-9A-8(C) as having required the physical deployment of CenturyLink facilities at the retail residential “customer locations where such service is available at the time the petition is filed.” CenturyLink asserts that the Commission should have included all potential customer locations within the Section 63-9A-8(C) denominator—regardless of whether facilities for landline telephone service were ever installed—because CenturyLink has a regulatory obligation to provide these services to all customers in its territory. The other parties, countering that CenturyLink has “discretion” not to provide the service “‘if the costs of the facility extension [do not] represent a prudent investment,’” thus argue to disqualify the counting of unconnected locations in the denominator. {26} Relying on dictionaries, expert testimony, a Court of Appeals’ opinion (State ex rel. N.M. Gaming Control Bd. v. Ten (10) Gaming Devices, 2005-NMCA 117, 138 N.M. 426, 120 P.3d 848), and the meaning the FCC accorded to “availability” in its 2012 Lifeline Order,3 the hearing examiner explained that “‘where such service is available’” meant that the denominator was limited to those locations where CenturyLink had existing physical facilities for its residential landline telephone service. She reasoned 3In its 2012 Lifeline Order, the FCC established goals for the Universal Service Fund’s Lifeline program, including “ensuring the availability of voice [and broadband] service for low-income Americans.” 27 FCC Rcd. 6656, 6671, 6673, ¶¶ 27, 33 (2012). The FCC explained that for “broadband to be ‘available’ to a low-income consumer, a broadband network (or networks) must have been deployed to the consumer, and the broadband service offered over the network must be affordable and provide a sufficient level of robustness (e.g., bandwidth) to meet basic broadband needs.” Id. at 6674, ¶ 34 (emphasis added). that inclusion of all customer locations in the denominator would render Section 63-9A- 8(C)’s language requiring “‘where such service is available’ meaningless.” {27} In Ten Gaming Devices, the Court of Appeals considered whether slot machines that were held and used in a private residence could be considered “gaming machines” subject to forfeiture under the Gaming Control Act. 2005-NMCA-117, ¶¶ 1, 12. Reasoning that the relevant statutes required the machines to be “available” for a forprofit “game” to be considered a “gaming machine,” the Court of Appeals explained: The complete definition of “available” contained in Black’s Law Dictionary 132 (5th ed. 1979) reads, “[s]uitable; useable; accessible; obtainable; present or ready for immediate use. Having sufficient force or efficacy; effectual; valid.” Similarly, Webster’s Dictionary defines the word “available” to mean something “that is accessible or may be obtained” or something that is “at disposal esp. for sale or utilization.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 150 (unabridged) (2002). . . . These definitions and the common understanding of the word “available” lead us to conclude that the legislature meant that a machine must be accessible to play or operate a “game” to be a “gaming machine.” 2005-NMCA-117, ¶ 12. The Court of Appeals held that a privately owned and operated machine was not accessible as a “game” and not subject to forfeiture. Id. {28} We are also guided by our decision in Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. N.M. State Corp. Comm’n, 1990-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 1, 13-15, 109 N.M. 504, 787 P.2d 423, in which we interpreted a pre-2017 version of the Act. In Mountain States, petitioner US West Communications (US West) argued that the relevant market for evaluating effective competition “should not be defined in terms of physically existing alternate services but rather the potential for entry into the market by an alternative supplier.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 13. We determined the argument to be without merit based on the ordinary meaning of the statutory language, “extent to which services are reasonably available.” Id. ¶ 13; see § 63-9A-8(B)(1) (1987). We further pointed to undisputed evidence showing that US West had “an 86% share of the market . . . [and] was the dominant supplier of public telephone services in the state.” Id. ¶ 14. Accordingly, we “affirm[ed] the [C]ommission’s determination that the absence of physical evidence or manifestation of competition activity . . . demonstrated a lack of effective competition.” Id. {29} Section 63-9A-8(A)-(C) requires the Commission to determine “the customer locations where such service is available.” (Emphasis added.) Section 63-9A-8(C) discusses availability in the present tense and “does not refer to future availability of services or how they might be available, but rather focuses on the present set of circumstances.” Mountain States, 1990-NMSC-017, ¶ 13. And the “ordinary meaning” of the phrase “‘services are reasonably available,’” which was at issue in Mountain States, id., is not easily distinguished from the ordinary meaning of the phrase “service is available” at issue here. Moreover, as the hearing examiner noted, extending the relevant locations to include all potential customer locations in CenturyLink’s territory, regardless of the current existence of facilities to connect those locations to its landline telephone service, would render the phrase “customer locations where such service is available” superfluous. Section 63-9A-8(C) (emphasis added); see Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 24, 309 P.3d 1047 (We “must interpret a statute so as to avoid rendering the Legislature’s language superfluous.”) Furthermore, as the hearing examiner’s reliance on expert testimony and the FCC’s 2012 LifeLine Order show, there are both factual and policy considerations that influence whether a telecommunications service should be considered properly “available” at any given location.