Opinion ID: 1453252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the scope of discovery and review of a discovery order

Text: The fundamental principle of discovery is that a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... CR 26(b)(1). The first limitation, privilege, is not applicable, as discussed hereafter. The second limitation, relevancy, is not questioned. However, a measure of protection to litigants and others is provided by CR 26(c) which permits a variety of restrictions when, for good cause shown,  justice requires [an order] to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.... (Italics ours.) It is to be noted that the limitations or restrictions contemplated by CR 26(c) are dependent upon (1) a showing of good cause, and (2) that justice requires the limitation or restriction. The reasons for protecting a party or person must be found to exist and be stated as such. [1] Within the generalities of the rule, it is the proper function of the trial court to exercise its discretion in the control of litigation before it. Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Department of Transp., 107 Wn.2d 872, 875-76, 734 P.2d 480 (1987) (citing and quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36, 81 L.Ed.2d 17, 104 S.Ct. 2199 (1984)). Exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with by an appellate court unless there has been an abuse of discretion which caused prejudice to a party or person. Weber v. Biddle, 72 Wn.2d 22, 29, 431 P.2d 705 (1967); Barfield v. Seattle, 100 Wn.2d 878, 887, 676 P.2d 438 (1984); 4 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Federal Practice 26.02 (2d ed. 1989); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice § 2006 (1970). The relevant principles involved in the exercise of discretion were well stated in State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971): Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. State ex rel. Clark v. Hogan, 49 Wn.2d 457, 303 P.2d 290 (1956). Where the decision or order of the trial court is a matter of discretion, it will not be disturbed on review except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons. MacKay v. MacKay, 55 Wn.2d 344, 347 P.2d 1062 (1959); State ex rel. Nielsen v. Superior Court, 7 Wn.2d 562, 110 P.2d 645, 115 P.2d 142 (1941). To obtain reversal of the discovery order, absent privilege or irrelevancy, defendant here must demonstrate good cause such that justice requires a denial for the reasons stated in CR 26(c). Given the latitude of discretion accorded the trial court, defendant must show that the trial court abused that discretion. The components of review are contained in State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, supra at 26: Whether this discretion is based on untenable grounds, or is manifestly unreasonable, or is arbitrarily exercised, depends upon the comparative and compelling public or private interests of those affected by the order or decision and the comparative weight of the reasons for and against the decision one way or the other. To apply that test to the exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting this discovery order, with its protective elements, thus requires this court to identify and weigh the comparative and compelling public and private interests of plaintiff, defendant and the donor. See Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wn.2d 226, 256, 654 P.2d 673 (1982), aff'd, 467 U.S. 20, 81 L.Ed.2d 17, 104 S.Ct. 2199 (1984); Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 125-26 (W.D. La. 1989). First, however, we consider the privilege issue.