Opinion ID: 8704089
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Material Adversity

Text: Like its sister circuits, the D.C. Circuit “analyz[es] ... retaliation claim[s] ... us[ing] the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” Smith v. District of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C.Cir.2005) (collecting cases). “Under this framework, the plaintiff must. establish three elements of a prima facie ease of retaliation: first, that [he] ‘engaged in a protected activity’; second, that [he] ‘was subjected to adverse action by the employer’; and third, that ‘there existed a causal link between the adverse action and the protected activity.’ ” Smith, 430 F.3d at 455 (quoting Jones v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 205 F.3d 428, 433 (D.C.Cir.2000)). “[A] ‘materially adverse’ action for purposes of a retaliation claim is one that ‘could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ” Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc., 601 F.3d 565, 577 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006)). Defendant argues that the actions underlying Counts II, III, VI, VIII, and IX were not materially adverse. See Mot. at 8-14. The Court, however, finds that only Counts III, VI, and IX fail to meet this threshold. As the remaining counts will be dismissed for lack of evidence of pretext, see Section III.B, infra, the Court need not discuss their material adversity.
Count III alleges that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff after he was reinstated by “not [giving him] work assignments, duties and responsibilities that were previously assigned [to him] as Deputy.” See Compl., ¶ 53. Mary Goodwin, Chief of FE-3, however, testified without contradiction that to the extent that Alford’s duties changed when he returned, they were still “the same kinds of things that [Goodwin herself] was doing.” See Mot., Exh. 16 (Excerpts from Transcript of January 24, 2011, Merit Systems Protection Board Hearing) at 27. While Alford offers very little in the way of specific evidentiary examples of changes to his duties upon his return, he did testify that his being required to report back to his supervisors after attending meetings on behalf of the office was an example of a retaliatory change. See Mot., Exh. 5 (EEOC Testimony of Leroy Alford) at 87, 100-101. Goodwin testified, however, that this requirement was merely “intended to provide a record of what [Plaintiff did] as a representative of the organization, particularly ... [at] ... senior level meetings ... to know what those results were, what are the implications, what homework assignments [were given].” Id. (EEOC Testimony of Mary Goodwin) at 237. Plaintiff fails to show how this requirement rises to the level of an adverse employment action that would have “dissuade[d] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Though he may have been frustrated by it, Alford points to no evidence that this requirement was inappropriate for his grade or position, or that “[his] work hours or [his] pay were affected by the [requirement].” Sewell v. Chao, 532 F.Supp.2d 126, 136 (D.D.C.2008). As this Court previously held in Bailey v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 810 F.Supp.2d 295 (D.D.C.2011), “[W]hile Plaintiff may well have found [reporting back to his supervisors] uncomfortable ... this is the type of work typical employees are required to do every day. Even if [it] were not, such ‘petty slights [and] minor annoyances’ do not rise to the level of a materially adverse employment action.” Id. at 301 (quoting Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405). Defendant is accordingly entitled to summary judgment on Count III.
In Count VI, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied overtime in retaliation for his protected activity. See Compl., ¶56. Alford testified that this denial occurred when a meeting appeared likely to run past his normal departure time, and he asked his supervisor whether he would receive compensatory time if he remained. See Alford EEOC Testimony at 105-106. His supervisor instructed him to leave at his normal time, indicating that compensatory time would not be approved. See Goodwin EEOC Testimony at 252. Plaintiff does not demonstrate any tangible harm associated with this incident, nor does he explain how such an incident would have “dissuade[d] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405. It is certainly plausible that Alford was disappointed by his supervisor’s decision and felt aggrieved at that moment. Our Circuit, however, notes that “not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1233 (D.C.Cir.2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Given the complete absence of tangible injury over and above any “[p]urely subjective injuries, such as ... dissatisfaction,” the Court is unable to find that Alford experienced an adverse employment action for purposes of his retaliation claim in this instance. Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1130 (D.C.Cir.2002). Summary judgment is thus also warranted as to Count VI.
Count IX alleges that DIA retaliated against Plaintiff by issuing him a poor performance appraisal in May 2008. See Compl., ¶ 59. The Agency argues that, as there were no objectively discernible consequences resulting from the performance appraisal, the appraisal itself cannot constitute a materially adverse employment action as a matter of law. See Mot. at 14. The Agency’s position is consistent with clear governing law. In this Circuit, a “thick body of precedent ... refutes the notion that formal criticism or poor performance evaluations are necessarily adverse actions.” Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 458 (D.C.Cir.1999). Rather, because “job-related constructive criticism ... ‘can prompt an employee to improve [his] performance’ ... performance reviews typically constitute adverse actions only when attached to financial harms.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1199 (D.C.Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted); see also Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“‘[F]ormal criticism or poor performance evaluations are [not] necessarily adverse actions’ and they should not be considered such if they did not ‘affect[ ] the [employee’s] grade or salary.’ ”) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, even the cases Plaintiff relies on here are readily distinguishable. In support of his position, Plaintiff cites Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179 (D.C.Cir.2007), Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513 (D.C.Cir. 2002), and Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 815 (D.C.Cir.2001). See Opp. at 11-12. -In each case, the D.C. Circuit held that a poor performance evaluation could be materially adverse where the plaintiffs “sufficiently alleged loss of a ‘tangible, quantifiable award’ which had been received ‘nearly every year’ ” prior to the plaintiffs’ protected activity. Weber, 494 F.3d at 185 (quoting Burke, 286 F.3d at 522). Alford, on the contrary, presents no evidence that he is similarly situated to these individuals. Even as his Opposition cites these cases, Plaintiff neither shows that he suffered a tangible harm of any kind from his poor evaluation nor presents evidence of the kind of history of strong performance (and receipt of concomitant performance awards) that typified the Weber, Burke, and Russell plaintiffs. As a result, the Court is again unable to find that Plaintiff experienced a materially adverse employment action in the form of his May 2008 performance review and will thus grant summary judgment to DIA on Count IX.