Opinion ID: 2525492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sme's express warranty claim against tvsa

Text: ¶ 17 SME's second claim for relief alleges breach of express warranties purportedly contained in the County-TVSA contract. As explained above, SME was not a party to the County TVSA contract and therefore is pursuing its breach of express warranty claim, like its breach of contract claim, under an assignment by the County of its rights, causes of action, and claims against TVSA to Hughes-Hunt, and Hughes-Hunt's subsequent assignment of such interests to SME. Accordingly, if, on remand, the purported assignment is determined to be invalid due to the anti-assignment provision contained in the County TVSA contract, SME's breach of express warranty claim, like its breach of contract claim, fails as a matter of law. Nevertheless, even assuming the validity of the assignment, the trial court held, and TVSA argues on appeal, that the County TVSA contract contained no express warranties as a matter of law. ¶ 18 Express warranties presuppose that the parties have entered into some kind of contractual agreement, and arise out of promises by the warrantor guaranteeing or assuring a specific result. Specifically, an express warranty has been defined by this court as follows: A warranty is an assurance by one party to a contract of the existence of a fact upon which the other party may rely. It is intended to relieve the promisee of any duty to ascertain the fact for himself, and it amounts to a promise to answer in damages for any injury proximately caused if the fact warranted proves untrue. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah 1983); see also 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 410 (1991). Accordingly, unlike a cause of action in negligence, which is premised on fault, a cause of action for breach of express warranty sounds in strict liability. See Groen, 667 P.2d at 604. Therefore, a person may be liable for breach of warranty despite his exercise of all reasonable or even all possible care. Id.; Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 94-95, 297 P.2d 221, 222-23 (1956); see also Chandler v. Bunick, 279 Or. 353, 569 P.2d 1037, 1039 (1977). ¶ 19 In the instant case, SME argues, relying on various provisions of the County-TVSA contract, that TVSA expressly assured, warranted, and guarantee[d] that (1) it would perform its services in full compliance with the latest applicable codes; (2) it would prepare construction documents setting forth in detail the work to be accomplished; (3) it would take responsibility for any necessary changes to . . . designs, drawings and specifications; (4) it would be responsible for all of its professional negligent acts; and (5) its services would be performed accurately and timely in accordance with industry standards. SME argues that TVSA breached these purported express warranties by preparing defective and incomplete plans and specifications and by unreasonably delaying work on the project. ¶ 20 As an initial matter, in order to recover under a theory of breach of express warranty, plaintiff must prove, in addition to the existence of the warranty, that breach of the warranty is the direct and proximate cause of the damage. Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 247 (Utah 1985); see also Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah 1996). However, in regard to the first provision of the County-TVSA contract cited abovethe provision stating that TVSA would perform its services in full compliance with the latest applicable codesSME has made no allegations nor presented any evidence in its amended complaint, in its arguments to the trial court, or in its arguments on appeal that TVSA did not perform its services in full compliance with the latest applicable codes, or that, assuming TVSA did fail to comply with applicable codes, the noncompliance was the proximate cause of its damages. Indeed, SME merely argues that it encountered problems with the structural steel portions of the plans and specifications provided by TVSA due to defects and inaccuracies in the plans; that these problems required the preparation and submittal of numerous RFIs and requests for change orders, which caused considerable delay; and that, consequently, SME was damaged. However, a multitude of problems with a design professional's plans and specification may occur that have little or nothing to do with violations of applicable building codes. Therefore, while we do not decide the issue of whether the above contractual provision creates an express warranty, summary judgment was nevertheless properly granted with regard to this provision. See Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 247 (dismissing plaintiff's breach of express warranty claim for failure to offer evidence that breach of the warranty was the proximate cause of damages); Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 98-100 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (same). ¶ 21 In regard to the remaining provisions of the County-TVSA contract cited by SME as the basis of its express warranty claim, we note that although SME uses the words assured, warranted, and guarantee[d] to describe the relevant provision of the County-TVSA contract, the words do not appear anywhere in the referenced contractual provisions themselves. Moreover, although SME correctly notes that the creation of an express warranty does not necessarily require the use of any particular words, it does require a direct and positive affirmation of fact made by the warrantor with regard to the quality or condition of the goods or services provided, i.e., an affirmation of fact guaranteeing or assuring a specific result. See Groen, 667 P.2d at 606. However, even when viewed in the light most favorable to SME, the remaining provisions of the County-TVSA contract cited by SME do not contain direct and positive affirmations of fact guaranteeing, assuring, or warranting that the services TVSA provided under the County-TVSA contract would be complete, free from defects, or suited for their intended use. Indeed, the contractual provisions cited by SME merely state that TVSA would prepare plans and specifications, make necessary changes to the plans and specifications, take responsibility for its professional negligent acts, and perform the above services in accordance with industry standards. Nowhere in the above provisions, or in the remaining sections of the County-TVSA contract, does TVSA guarantee, assure, or warrant a specific result. Accordingly, the above provisions can be viewed only as setting forth TVSA's obligations to provide specific services, not, as SME urges us to view them, as setting forth express warranties guaranteeing that the services provided would be free from defects or inaccuracies. To hold otherwise would essentially turn every basic contractual promise, duty, or obligation in the County-TVSA contract into a warranty under which TVSA would be strictly liable, despite the exercise of all reasonable or even all possible care. Groen, 667 P.2d at 604. ¶ 22 In view of the above, we conclude that SME has presented insufficient evidence of the existence of an express warranty in the County-TVSA contract. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of TVSA on SME's breach of express warranty claim.