Opinion ID: 1058220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Contempt

Text: Citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948), the defendants argue that, unless the contemptible conduct occurs entirely in the presence of the trial court, a party being held in contempt deserves notice of the charges, an opportunity to present a defense, and the assistance of counsel. Because they were not given any of these procedural rights, the defendants maintain they were deprived of their due process rights and ask this Court to reverse their respective convictions for summary contempt. It has long been recognized and established that a court is invested with power to punish for contempt. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 291, 294, 142 S.E.2d 746, 749 (1965). The exercise of this power, however, is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925). [T]he limits of the power to punish for contempt are `the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 165, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965). Although the power of the court to punish is the same, there are two distinct types of contempt, direct and indirect. Burdett v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 838, 846, 48 S.E. 878, 881 (1904). Direct contempt occurs when the contemptible conduct is committed in the presence of the court. Id. at 845-46, 48 S.E. at 880-81. In that circumstance, the court is competent ... to proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts, and to punish the offender without further proof, and without issue or trial in any form. Id. at 846, 48 S.E. at 881 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Code § 18.2-456 (enumerating instances in which courts may summarily punish for contempt); International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 832, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994) ([D]irect contempts in the presence of the court traditionally have been subject to summary adjudication, 'to maintain order in the courtroom and the integrity of the trial process in the face of an actual obstruction of justice.') (citations omitted). Indirect contempt, however, takes place when the contemptible conduct is committed not in the presence of the court. Burdett, 103 Va. at 846, 48 S.E. at 881. In that circumstance, the offender must be brought before the court by a rule or some other sufficient process. Id.; see also United Mine Workers, 512 U.S. at 833, 114 S.Ct. 2552 ([P]rocedural protections are afforded for contempts occurring out of court, where the considerations justifying expedited procedures do not pertain.). Summary punishment always, and rightfully, is regarded with disfavor and, if imposed in passion or pettiness, brings discredit to a court as certainly as the conduct it penalizes. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952). In In re Oliver, the Supreme Court summarized the distinction between direct and indirect contempt: Except for a narrowly limited category of contempts, due process of law ... requires that one charged with contempt of court be advised of the charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have a chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or explanation. The narrow exception to these due process requirements includes only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential to prevent demoralization of the court's authority before the public. If some essential elements of the offense are not personally observed by the judge, so that he must depend upon statements made by others for his knowledge about these essential elements, due process requires ... that the accused be accorded notice and a fair hearing as above set out. 333 U.S. at 275-76, 68 S.Ct. 499; see United States v. Marshall, 451 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir.1971) (stating that when the misconduct occurs in the court's presence, the judge is his own best witness of what occurred and that the use of the testimony of other witnesses precludes the use of summary contempt). With regard to indirect contempt, the Supreme Court of the United States explained that when a judge can not have such personal knowledge [of the misbehavior], and is informed thereof only by confession of the party, or by testimony under oath of others, the proper practice is, by rule or other process, to require the offender to appear and show cause why he should not be punished. Cooke, 267 U.S. at 535, 45 S.Ct. 390. Such due process is required because [p]unishment without issue or trial [is] so contrary to the usual and ordinarily indispensable hearing before judgment, constituting due process, that the assumption that the court saw everything that went on in open court [is] required to justify the exception. Id. at 536, 45 S.Ct. 390; see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273, 68 S.Ct. 499 (A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense... are basic in our system of jurisprudence.). Therefore, unless the contempt is committed in open court, due process requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation. Cooke, 267 U.S. at 537, 45 S.Ct. 390. This opportunity includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, and the right to call witnesses. Id. Thus, we must address two questions. First, did the contemptible conduct in this case occur in open court, in the presence of the judge ... where all of the essential elements of the misconduct [were] actually observed by the court? In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275, 68 S.Ct. 499. And, if not, were the defendants advised of the charges against them and given a reasonable opportunity to meet them, the right to be represented by counsel, and the chance to testify and call other witnesses? Cooke, 267 U.S. at 537, 45 S.Ct. 390. Because the answer to both of these questions is no, we will reverse the defendants' convictions of contempt. There is no question that the circuit court in this case did not observe all the essential elements of the alleged misconduct at issue. The court concluded that Scialdone and Taylor attempted to perpetrate a fraud upon [the] court by [Taylor's] altering a document that was to be presented to [the] court and [by Scialdone's] offering that fraudulent document to the court in violation of Code § 18.2-456(4). Although Scialdone's offering the document into evidence occurred in the circuit court's presence, the court's conclusion that the document was altered was the result of extensive questioning and evidence-gathering. The circuit court repeatedly stated that it did not know what had taken place and that it would get to the bottom of it. After initially questioning Scialdone regarding Documents 1 and 2, the court heard the client's father testify about the chat room rules he had provided in 2005. When that testimony revealed a different username had been used to obtain the 2005 copy, the court asked Scialdone the identity of wndydpooh, the username on Document 2. Upon learning that Scialdone's secretary was named Wendy, the court directed Suttlage and Taylor to come to the courtroom and specifically instructed that they not be informed of the reason for their required appearance. The circuit court then questioned Suttlage, Taylor, Jones, and Scialdone, all under oath, regarding Documents 1 and 2. Despite that questioning, the court still was not satisfied, stating that [s]omebody has perpetrated a fraud on this court, and I will get to the bottom of it. After finding Taylor, Jones, and Scialdone in contempt, the court instructed Taylor to return to the law office and retrieve every piece of paper ... related to this case. When Taylor returned to the courtroom with additional documents, the court directed Suttlage to sort through the papers. This effort did not provide the court with satisfactory answers, so it twice instructed Suttlage to return to the law office to print additional copies of the chat room rules. On one of those occasions, the court directed a deputy sheriff to accompany Suttlage to the law office. Finally, when the additional copies provided by Suttlage still did not allay the court's concerns, it ended the investigation and held the defendants in summary contempt. Though the circuit court suspected Document 2 had been altered when Scialdone first offered it into evidence, the court's subsequent actions and statements demonstrate that it did not know what had occurred or who was responsible. In particular, the court's repeated requests that Suttlage return to the law office and print new copies of the chat room rules indicate that the court was not certain whether the absence of the copyright and print date on the submitted document was due to alteration or a function of the law office's computers and/or printers. By the time it had completed its investigation, the circuit court had questioned four witnesses under oath, including the three defendants, and had obtained additional documents from the law office. Thus, it is clear that the circuit court did not have ... personal knowledge of the misconduct, Cooke, 267 U.S. at 535, 45 S.Ct. 390, and that all of the essential elements of the misconduct were not under the eye of the court. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275, 68 S.Ct. 499. Rather, the court was informed thereof only by confession of the party [and] testimony under oath of others. Cooke, 267 U.S. at 535, 45 S.Ct. 390. As in In re Oliver, the circuit court's conclusion that [the document was altered] was based, at least in part, upon the testimony given ... by one or more witnesses other than petitioner. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 276, 68 S.Ct. 499. Thus, we conclude that the circuit court erred by employing a summary proceeding to find Scialdone and Taylor in contempt and thereby violated their due process rights. We reach the same conclusion as to Jones. The circuit court found Jones in contempt for violating the prohibition in Code § 18.2-456(3) of vile, contemptuous, and assaulting language addressed to ... a judge, by creating a screen name `westisanazi.' Although the document bearing the westisanazi username was offered into evidence by Scialdone, the court did not know the essential elements of what had taken place: in particular who had created and used that screen name. After asking Scialdone about the username, the court questioned Jones under oath, who then admitted creating the username and explained why he had done so. As with Scialdone and Taylor, the circuit court had to engage in fact-gathering before it knew that Jones was responsible for the username. Moreover, Jones' alleged misconduct in creating the username did not occur in the presence of the court. Jones' sole act was creating the username and printing Document 1 in the law office, which Scialdone then published to the court by offering it into evidence. To the degree Jones engaged in contemptible conduct, it occurred wholly outside the court's presence. In sum, nothing indicates that defendants' conduct was such an open, serious threat to orderly procedure that instant and summary punishment, as distinguished from due and deliberate procedures, was necessary. Harris, 382 U.S. at 165, 86 S.Ct. 352 (internal citation omitted). The circuit court relied on the statements of the defendants, as well as others, and the gathering of additional documents before it knew the essential elements of the offenses. By our decision today, we do not, however, imply that a trial court is unable to ask any questions in a summary contempt proceeding. Circumstances will undoubtedly arise when a trial court observes the essential elements of the contemptible conduct, but nonetheless needs to ask questions to clarify some detail. See, e.g., People v. Clancy, 239 Ill.App. 369, 375, 1926 WL 3737 (1926) (holding that some testimony can properly be heard in a case of direct contempt). Indeed, a trial court will often provide the contemnor with an opportunity to show cause why he should not be held in contempt and ask questions in that regard. See, e.g., Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 985-86, 117 S.Ct. 2359, 138 L.Ed.2d 976 (1997) (in summary contempt proceeding, court asked questions of the contemnor to explain conduct); State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 298 A.2d 867, 872-73 (1973) (aware of the contemnor's offense, court heard additional testimony of details and asked contemnor to show cause); In re Yengo, 84 N.J. 111, 417 A.2d 533, 540-42 (1980) (holding that unexplained absence of attorney requires explanation and some questioning). But, as we have explained, a summary contempt proceeding in this case was improper and violated the defendants' due process rights. Because this case is outside the narrow category of cases that can be punished as contempt without notice, hearing and counsel, the defendants were entitled to the due process rights outlined by the Supreme Court in In re Oliver: [notice] of the charges against [them], ... a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation, ... the right to be represented by counsel, and ... a chance to testify and call other witnesses in [their] behalf, either by way of defense or explanation. 333 U.S. at 275, 68 S.Ct. 499. Although the circuit court afforded the defendants an opportunity to explain their conduct, albeit under oath and upon questioning by the court, that opportunity alone did not satisfy the due process rights to which the defendants were entitled. The defendants were not notified of the nature of the charges before being questioned by the circuit court. Accord Davis v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 395, 397-98, 247 S.E.2d 681, 682-83 (1978) (finding violation of appellant's due process rights when he was told to appear in court but was not told that the purpose for the appearance was to explain why he should not be found in contempt). Without such notice, the defendants could not prepare a defense to the charges before they were placed under oath and questioned. In addition, the circuit court did not provide the defendants the right to call witnesses on their behalf or to retain counsel. In fact, the court maintained its belief throughout the proceeding that the defendants had no right to counsel. In sum, the circuit court did not afford the defendants the due process rights to which they were entitled.