Opinion ID: 2301516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Brady Requirements

Text: As indicated above, Petitioner's flagship contentions are that he was prejudiced by the State's violations of its constitutional obligations to Petitioner under Brady. We begin our analysis by identifying the essential elements Petitioner must establish to succeed on a Brady challenge. As we recently explained in Wilson v. State, 363 Md. 333, 345-47, 768 A.2d 675, 681-83 (2001): The Supreme Court made clear in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. [ Brady, 373 U.S.] at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. In order to establish a Brady violation, Petitioner must establish (1) that the prosecutor suppressed or withheld evidence that is (2) favorable to the defenseeither because it is exculpatory, provides a basis for mitigation of sentence, or because it provides grounds for impeaching a witnessand (3) that the suppressed evidence is material. Evidence that is obviously favorable must be disclosed even absent a specific request by the defendant. Impeachment evidence, as well as exculpatory evidence, is evidence favorable to an accused. [ C]f. Napue v. People of Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (holding that the prohibition against the use of false testimony applies even when the evidence goes only to the credibility of the witness because the jury's assessment of credibility can be determinative of guilt or innocence). The failure to disclose evidence relating to any understanding or agreement with a key witness as to a future prosecution, in particular, violates due process, because such evidence is relevant to witness's credibility. The Supreme Court explained in Giglio [ v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972)] that, when the government depends almost entirely on the testimony of a key witness to establish its prima facie case and the witness's credibility, therefore, is an important issue, evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to his credibility.... See id. (emphasis added). This Court underscored the same point in Ware [ v. State, 348 Md. 19, 702 A.2d 699 (1997)] when we concluded that the prosecutor's duty to disclose applies to any understanding or agreement between the witness and the State. Ware, 348 Md. at 41, 702 A.2d at 710. (emphasis in original). The standard for measuring the materiality of the undisclosed evidence is strictest if it demonstrates that the prosecution's case includes perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury. In [ United States v. ] Agurs, [427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)] the Supreme Court explained that a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. In cases where there is no false testimony but the prosecution nonetheless fails to disclose favorable evidence, the standard for materiality, in the language of the Supreme Court, is whether there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [ S]ee... Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).3 Materiality is assessed by considering all of the suppressed evidence collectively. The question, therefore, is not whether the State would have had a case to go to the jury if it had disclosed the favorable evidence, but whether we can be confident that the jury's verdict would have been the same, which is determined in reference to the sum of the evidence and its significance for the prosecution. 3 This Court has interpreted the reasonable probability standard from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to mean a substantial possibility that ... the result of [the] trial would have been any different. State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160, 190, 599 A.2d 1171, 1185 (1992). See [ Thomas, 325 Md.] at 190 n. 8, 599 A.2d at 1185 n. 8; Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 426-27, 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990). (Some citations omitted). Applying the above analysis in Conyers's case, we must determine whether (1) the State suppressed or withheld evidence that was (2) favorable to the Petitioner and (3) whether the suppressed evidence was material.