Opinion ID: 2180341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preclusion of Cross-Examination Regarding Mental Health of Minnie Mae Fuller

Text: Appellant Roy contends that the trial court erred when it precluded his cross-examination of government witness Minnie Mae Fuller regarding her prior history of mental illness. Ms. Fuller's mental health records had been disclosed to Roy prior to trial and revealed that she had on different occasions in the past been diagnosed with manic depression, schizophrenia, episodic alcohol abuse and dysthymia. The most recent records regarding these diagnoses were from January of 1986, some 14 years before the murder. There was no indication that she recently suffered from a mental illness or was taking medication for the treatment of a mental illness. The trial judge held that Roy had failed to set forth any basis for believing that Ms. Fuller's mental health history was relevant to her testimony, her statements to the police or the grand jury or her ability to observe or recall events. He further ruled that the records from 1986 were too remote and lack[ed][ ] connection, so he precluded Roy's cross-examination on that issue. Roy further requested an opportunity to voir dire Ms. Fuller about whether she was currently taking any medication but that request was also denied by the trial judge. The regulation of the extent and scope of cross-examination lies with the discretion of the trial judge who may always limit cross-examination ... to prevent inquiry into matters having little relevance or probative value to the issues raised at trial without committing error. Williams v. United States, 805 A.2d 919, 927 (D.C.2002) (internal quotation omitted). In order to delve into a witness's mental health history on cross-examination, it must be required in the interest of justice. Velasquez v. United States, 801 A.2d 72, 79 (D.C.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 963, 123 S.Ct. 396, 154 L.Ed.2d 319 (2002) (citing United States v. Lopez, 611 F.2d 44, 45 (4th Cir.1979)). The last record of a mental health disturbance suffered by Ms. Fuller occurred a decade and a half prior to her testimony in this case. The trial judge had the opportunity to observe Ms. Fuller testify and concluded that her testimony was completely competent. Roy proffered no evidence to rebut Ms. Fuller's competency but rather argued that his lay understanding was that illnesses of the type she had been diagnosed with didn't just sort of [go] away. In light of the evidence stated above, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's preclusion of Roy's cross-examination into Ms. Fuller's mental health history.