Opinion ID: 184539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intended Use of Military Munitions

Text: 40 Under the challenged Rule a military munition is not a statutory or regulatory solid waste when it is used for its intended purpose. 40 C.F.R. § 266.202(a)(1). According [331 U.S.App.D.C. 14] to the preamble to the final Rule, firing a munition does not constitute discarding it, so a munition does not become a regulatory solid waste simply by hitting the ground and remaining there, see 62 C.F.R. at 6630, and most spent military munitions will not be regulated pursuant to Subtitle C. The EPA defends this aspect of the Rule as but one example of its longstanding interpretation of the regulatory definition of solid waste as excluding products, such as pesticides and fertilizers, the intended use of which involves application to the land. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(1)(B)(ii) (commercial chemical products ... are not solid wastes if they are applied to the land and that is their ordinary manner of use) with id. § 261.33 (listing commercial chemicals that are hazardous wastes when they are otherwise applied to the land in lieu of their intended use). The MTP attacks the EPA's intended-use interpretation of § 3004(y)(1) as both contrary to the meaning and purpose of the statute and as arbitrary and capricious.
41 Section 3004(y)(1) requires the EPA to adopt regulations identifying when military munitions become hazardous waste for purposes of [Subtitle C]. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(y)(1). According to the MTP, [t]he use of the word 'when,' as opposed to the word 'if,' demonstrates an assumption by Congress that there are circumstances in which military munitions are 'discarded,' become solid waste, and are subject to regulation as hazardous waste. Perhaps so; in any event the EPA has identified such circumstances, see 40 C.F.R. § 266.202(b) & (c). The MTP nonetheless goes on to accuse the EPA of avoiding the clear congressional mandate of § 3004(y)(1), apparently because the MTP believes the word when in that section implies the Congress contemplated that all military munitions would be subject to regulation pursuant to Subtitle C. While that is not an unreasonable reading of the statute, we think it hardly rises to the level of the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress required for the petitioner to prevail under Chevron step one. 42 Turning to the MTP's Chevron step two argument, we see that in the preamble to the final Rule the EPA interprets RCRA 3004(y) as only requiring the Agency to identify the circumstances under which military munitions become subject to the regulatory scheme for identified or listed hazardous waste promulgated under Subtitle C. 62 Fed.Reg. at 6632. We are inclined to agree with the EPA that, read in context, this is the more natural meaning of the word when. In any event, under Chevron step two we defer to the EPA's reasonable interpretation. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1087 (D.C.Cir.1996) (upholding the EPA's interpretation of the statutory term new). Accordingly, we hold that the EPA did not violate § 3004(y) of the RCRA when it excluded from the regulatory definition of solid waste used or spent munitions lying on the ground.
43 The MTP argues that the intended-use interpretation of § 3004(y)(1), as applied to military munitions, is arbitrary and capricious for three reasons. First, the MTP maintains that the intended-use principle is inapposite to military munitions because once a military munition fired from a weapon hits the ground, the unexploded ordnance or explosive residue serves no further purpose; it should therefore be regarded as discarded within the regulatory definition of solid waste. For the same reason the MTP distinguishes military munitions from pesticides and fertilizers, which do perform a function after they have been applied to the ground. 44 The distinction that the MTP draws between munitions and other chemicals applied to the ground is perhaps a reasonable one; the question for present purposes, however, is not whether the MTP's position is reasonable but whether the EPA's position is arbitrary and capricious. The EPA considered and rejected the MTP's view, deciding instead to focus upon whether a product was used as it was intended to be used, not on whether the purpose of the product is to perform some function once on the ground. 62 Fed.Reg. at 6630. The MTP has provided [331 U.S.App.D.C. 15] no reason for us to think that the EPA's focus is irrational or inconsistent with other policies. See id. (the use of explosives (e.g., dynamite) for road clearing, construction, or mining does not trigger RCRA regulation, even though any residuals on the ground serve no further function). 45 Second, the MTP argues that the Military Munitions Rule is internally inconsistent because it does not regulate fired munitions that are left undisturbed but does regulate munitions that are buried after firing. The EPA responds that, unlike the use of a munition--including its landing on the ground--the subsequent recovery and burial of a munition, or its placement in a landfill, is an act of discarding because munitions are not produced to be buried or landfilled. We agree with the EPA that the difference in regulatory treatment does not evince a logical flaw in the final Rule. 46 Finally, the MTP objects that the EPA has not consistently applied its intended-use interpretation because, while a spent munition lying undisturbed on a firing range is not a solid waste, a spent munition that lands off range is a solid waste if it is not promptly rendered safe and/or retrieved. 40 C.F.R. § 266.202(d). If firing constitutes use of the product, the MTP suggests, then the regulatory status of the fired munition should not depend upon where the munition happens to fall. The EPA answers that the MTP confuses the statutory and regulatory definitions of solid waste. More particularly, the agency explains that a spent munition that has landed, no matter where it comes to ground, is not for that reason subject to the regulatory program of Subtitle C. If the munition lands off range, however, and is not promptly retrieved or rendered safe, then the EPA regards it as having been discarded within the statutory (but not the regulatory) definition of solid waste and thus potentially subject to the provisions of Subtitle G that empower both the agency and private litigants to sue in order to compel the abatement of an imminent environmental threat. In this respect an off-range landing is like an accidental spill; in either event, the failure to respond properly can trigger a suit to compel action pursuant to Subtitle G. See 62 Fed.Reg. at 6633. Because the EPA's interpretation of its own regulation is neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation, we accept it as controlling. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 45, 113 S.Ct. 1913. 47