Opinion ID: 2974556
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breaking and Entering

Text: Jaadan’s first conviction was for breaking and entering in violation of Michigan law. The applicable statute provided that “[a]ny person who breaks and enters any occupied dwelling house, with intent to commit any felony or larceny therein, shall be guilty of a felony . . . .” Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110 (1970). The Government concedes that this statute prohibits a broad range of conduct, some of which does not categorically qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude under the INA. The Court therefore should apply the modified categorical approach to determine whether the record evidence clearly establishes that Jaadan’s conviction under section 750.110 constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. Cf. Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1020. Jaadan does not dispute that generally a conviction for breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny is a crime involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., id. at 1020 (“Because the underlying crime of theft or larceny is a crime of moral turpitude, unlawfully entering a residence with intent to commit theft or larceny therein is likewise a crime involving moral turpitude.”); In re M-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 721, 723 (AG 1946) (“[I]f the crime accompanying the breaking and entering is larceny, then this violation . . . would involve moral turpitude, since larceny is an offense [that] has been universally held to involve such conduct.”). Jaaden contends, however, that the record is -8- No. 05-4258 Jaadan v. Gonzales insufficient to establish that his crime involved an intent to commit larceny; accordingly, he argues, the crime cannot be shown to involve moral turpitude. He points out that the “Articles of Probation” document states that Jaadan was “convicted . . . of the crime of breaking and entering ([an] occupied dwelling house)” but does not specifically include language indicating an intent to commit larceny. Jaadan ignores, however, many documents in the record showing that he was convicted of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling house “with the intent to commit the crime of larceny therein.” (See, e.g., Criminal Complaint, JA 90; Habitual Offender Information, JA 83; Circuit Court General Information, JA 87.) This evidence suffices to establish that Jaadan’s conviction under section 750.110 involved an intent to commit larceny. Cf. Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1020 (“[B]ecause [petitioner] admitted in his guilty plea to entering a residence with the intent to steal property from the residence, his conviction constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude under the modified categorical approach.”). Additionally, Jaadan points out that the INS’s Show Cause Order described his breaking-andentering conviction under section 750.110 as a violation of “MCL 750.110-B,” (JA 227) (emphasis added), which he argues is confusing because Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110b—in contrast to Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110—does not involve breaking and entering; rather, it prohibits dumping garbage from boats. But whatever confusion exists here does not provide him relief. In the Michigan statute, section 750.110 is the basic provision prohibiting breaking and entering. Section 750.110a provides definitions and penalties under section 750.110. Section 750.110b, dealing with dumping from boats, was apparently intended to follow section 109a (which regulates mooring of boats), not section 110. See Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 750.110b (2006) (Editor’s note). It is not -9- No. 05-4258 Jaadan v. Gonzales clear why the Show Cause Order refers to the applicable statute as “MCL 750.110-B” when Jaadan was convicted of violating section 750.110. But there is no confusion that Jaadan was convicted of violating section 750.110 for breaking and entering: The Show Cause Order itself refers to his conviction “for the offense of breaking and entering,” (JA 227), and the other conviction documents refer to the same conviction as a violation of “750.110.” (See, e.g., Criminal Complaint, JA 90 (referring to “breaking and entering of an occupied dwelling with intent to commit larceny” as “[c]ontrary to Sec. 750.110”); Circuit Court General Information, JA 87 (same).) Jaadan himself admits as much: “Certainly, logic dictates that the seventeen-year-old Jaadan was not dumping from a boat, and that what he was accused of was breaking and entering an occupied dwelling house with the intent to commit the crime of larceny therein.” (Pet’r Br. 7.) Accordingly, Jaadan’s typographical concerns regarding the Show Cause Order do not affect the IJ’s proper conclusion that he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.