Opinion ID: 2346627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Board

Text: Doctor Arnold first argues that the board did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review his determination of attorney's fees. Pursuant to G.L.1956 § 28-43-14, a person aggrieved by any decision of fact or law by the director with reference to    any    matter for which an appeal is not otherwise provided in chapters 42 [through] 44 of [title 28], may    appeal to the board of review   . (Emphasis added.) According to Dr. Arnold, in awarding attorney's fees, he is performing a ministerial function rather than a decision from which an appeal may be filed. If the action is deemed a ministerial function, the only remedy available to claimants is the invocation of the extraordinary writ of mandamus, which was not sought here. Beacon Restaurant v. Adamo, 103 R.I. 698, 704, 241 A.2d 291, 294 (1968). A ministerial function is one that is to be performed by an official in a prescribed manner based on a particular set of facts `without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done.' Id. at 703, 241 A.2d at 294. Conversely, if Dr. Arnold's action is deemed to be a decision, that action is subject to the appeals process provided for § 28-43-24. A decision as the term is used in § 28-43-14 contemplates a marriage of the director's factual findings and legal conclusions that affects an employer or person. The payment of attorney's fees under § 28-44-57(b) involves both a decision-making process and a ministerial function. Although the determination of the appropriate amount of attorney's fees to be paid pursuant to § 28-44-57(b) depends on a mechanical application of the statute, the calculation is not made unless and until the director determines how the fee provision applies. Presumably, the calculation of benefits at issue before the board likely involves little more than a cursory review of the record. Nevertheless, this case demonstrates that the determination of whether there are benefits at issue as contemplated under the statute constitutes a mixed question of fact and law. Further, Dr. Arnold's conclusion about how to apply the $50 minimum fee in consolidated cases constitutes a legal decision based on his interpretation of the statute; a quintessential legal conclusion. See, e.g., New England Expedition  Providence, LLC v. City of Providence, 773 A.2d 259, 262 (R.I.2001). Accordingly, although it is unlikely that the calculation of the appropriate fee would evolve into a disputed issue, it is a decision nonetheless. Once the director has determined how fees should be calculated, the act of tendering payment based on that determination becomes ministerial. Here, Dr. Arnold has tendered payment, and the crux of this appeal depends upon how the fee formula should have been applied, not whether the fee should be paid. Thus, claimants appropriately invoked the statutorily provided appellate process by appealing Dr. Arnold's decision to the board.