Opinion ID: 1947609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the Jailhouse Informant Acting as a Government Agent?

Text: Appellant's first claim is that the trial court erred in allowing a jailhouse informant, John Romano, to testify to statements made by Appellant while in jail awaiting trial. Appellant argues that the court should have granted his motion to suppress the statements because the way they were gathered constituted interference with his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. He argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Romano was not acting as the Commonwealth's agent in eliciting incriminating statements from Appellant. His contention is that although Romano did not begin as an agent of the Commonwealth, he became one after he met with the officers and received instructions, particularly as. Romano obtained further information about the case and was encouraged to continue to cooperate with law enforcement, which transformed Romano from a mere cooperative witness to a government agent.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to exclude the statements. Detective Rodger Persley of the Scott County Sheriffs Office was the only witness at the hearing. According to his testimony, Romano approached the government with an offer to provide information to the prosecution. Detective Persley stated at the hearing that he never instructed any of the jail personnel to talk to inmates about getting information from Appellant. Instead, he was contacted by one of the officers at the jail who told him that Romano had information about Appellant. Detective Persley met with Romano on April 20, 2004, and took a statement from him. Detective Persley next met with Romano on April 26 and had him sign a Memo of Understanding. The document, prepared by the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office, consisted of a form (with spaces allotted for filling in the inmate's name, the officers' names and the defendant's name) which stated as follows, I John Romano have been instructed by Det. Rodger Persley and Det. Jack Patrick that I am not allowed to ask Roger McBeath Jr. questions about the crime he has been charged with. I may have normal conversations with him about everyday events (Example: sports, movies, etc.,) but I may only listen when he speaks about the crime or his defense to the crime. I will do my best to remember the words he uses and not use other words to describe the statements. I will not sign this memo until the officers have answered all the questions I have. Detective Persley thereafter met with Romano seven more times. Detective Persley had these statements transcribed. The statements do not appear in the record, but the transcripts were provided to defense counsel and were discussed at the hearing. Questioning of Detective Persley centered on the fact that Romano had asked questions of Appellant rather than listen as the memo directed. Detective Persley maintained at the hearing that Romano had not violated the Memo of Understanding because even though he had asked questions of Appellant, they were not direct questions about the offense. He acknowledged, however, that Romano engaged in conversation about the offense. Romano asked Appellant about the funeral of the victim. Romano asked Appellant about the time of the murder. Romano asked Appellant about the yellow gloves he was purported to have worn on the night of the offense. Detective Persley agreed this was a direct question about the crime. In addition, according to the transcripts, by the time Romano relayed his fourth statement to the police on May 14, Romano informed the detective that, when with Appellant, if I get him going, you know, I don't have to ask him any questions. At their next meeting on May 26, he told the detective that he had noticed that Appellant would get upset when he was on the phone, and so at those times Romano would mess with him. Romano said that he would tell Appellant to step into my office, that Romano wanted to talk to him, and would proceed to ask Appellant whether he was okay and what was, bothering him, and then Appellant would talk. In the next statement on June 15, Romano answered questions from Appellant, contrary to the admonition to just listen, and appeared to be trying to present Appellant with trial strategy. Finally, according to the June 28 transcript, Romano reported that he told Appellant that the fifth step in the Alcoholics Anonymous Program was to admit the exact nature of the wrong, and then told Appellant that if he wanted to say anything to Romano to make himself feel better he could. Detective Persley received word another time, on June 29, that Romano had a statement for him, but did not make contact with Romano again until September. Romano gave Persley a statement on September 9th in which he reported that Appellant confessed to the murder. Nowhere in the transcripts did Detective Persley or Detective Patrick inform Romano that he was not supposed to be interrogating Appellant. Detective Persley testified at the hearing, however, that before he taped each statement from Romano, he verbally informed Romano not to ask questions. Following the hearing, the court found that the hearing testimony revealed that Romano did ask questions of Appellant and reported the answers to Detective Persley. Though the trial court found that Romano was questioning Appellant, the court denied the motion of the defense to exclude Romano's testimony. The court found that Romano was not a government agent for any purpose. The trial court set forth its reasons: First, Romano contacted the prosecution about his role, not conversely. Second, the Commonwealth never caused Romano to be placed in closer proximity to the Appellant. Third, the Commonwealth in writing admonished Romano not to ask any questions.
As a result of the ruling of the court, Romano testified at trial. Romano's examination was conducted in such a way that there was no identification of when particular statements were elicited from Appellant. [1] Romano stated that he was housed in the same unit as Appellant, and was already there when Appellant arrived at the jail. He acknowledged that he knew why Appellant was in jail because he had seen him on the news. He started talking to Appellant a couple of days after his arrival. According to Romano, they had a lot of conversations. Romano said Appellant told him that he was at Wal-Mart when the crime was committed. He testified that even while maintaining his innocence Appellant would tell Romano the facts of the crime. He said Appellant told him that Thomas Williams got him a gun. Appellant reported to him that he was supposed to meet Ashley Lyons in the park that evening and he had called her on his cell phone but he could not meet with her. He said Appellant told him that the evidence was all circumstantial. Appellant discussed an eyewitness he said someone saw him with a bald head running from the truck, across the park and over a fence. He told Romano he was picked out of a photo lineup but that was after he was all over the news. He said the motive was supposed to have been jealousy, but that it couldn't have been jealousy because they weren't together at the time. He testified that Appellant said that he wanted to marry Dena Williams so she could not testify against him because she knew too much. He said that if she was arrested they would scare her into telling everything. He told Romano his father had talked about sending Dena away because she could hurt them. He stated that they were watching the news one night when Ashley Lyons was shown on the news. Romano commented that she was pretty and Appellant responded, Yeah, but she shouldn't have done some of the things that she did. He said Appellant once mentioned that he would have had to pay child support for the rest of his life. After watching a news story which concerned the baby's due date, Appellant told Romano that the only thing that hurt him that day was that his son was dead and that Ashley Lyons had gotten what she deserved. He testified that a story came on the TV about the Lacey Peterson case, and Appellant said the guy was worse than him because he actually cut the baby out and strangled it. According to Romano, Appellant also asked if fingerprints could be found on shell casings. Appellant told him that he was concerned about what he had told another inmate, Jason Coomer, and that if Romano got out he should look up Jason, talk to him, and drag him through the mud so Jason could not testify. Finally, he said that Appellant, seemingly regretting their conversations, threatened him. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked if Appellant ever said that he did it. Romano said Appellant did say so, after he had asked Romano whether he thought Appellant had done it. He also admitted that he asked Appellant one time, You did it, didn't you? But that question, he said, was only in response to things Appellant was telling him.
Appellant argues that Romano's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment and Kentucky Constitution § 10 right to counsel, and the error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the government' violates the accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it uses against him a statement deliberately elicited from the accused after indictment and in the absence of counsel. [2] In United States v. Henry , [3] the Supreme Court applied the rule to jailhouse informants in holding that the government's use of an informant to elicit incriminating information from a defendant after he had been indicted also violated the Sixth Amendment. In Henry , the. Court held that the governmentwhich in that case contacted the informant, asked him to be alert to statements from the defendant, and paid him for the assistancehad created the situation where statements would be elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment. [4] In Maine v. Moulton , [5] the Court held that police and prosecutors may not circumvent, and thereby dilute, the right to counsel. The Court determined that a knowing exploitation of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel is the same as intentional violation of, it. [6] The court held that proof that the State must have known that its agent was likely to obtain incriminating statements from the accused in the absence of counsel suffices to establish a Sixth Amendment violation. [7] In Moulton , which involved a codefendant rather than a jailhouse informant, the police instructed the informant not to question. The codefendant/informant, however, asked the accused to refresh his memory as to details of the offense during their conversation, and the Court found that this led to the defendant's making incriminating statements. [8] In its only remaining case on this subject, the Supreme Court held that a jailhouse informant who acts only as a listening post and reports incriminating statements has not interfered with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, even if police purposefully place him in close proximity to the defendant in the jail or prison. [9] The Court held that a defendant must show that police and their informant did more than merely listen, but instead took some action designed to elicit incriminating remarks. [10] In order to show that the Sixth Amendment right was interfered with, a defendant must show that the right to counsel has attached, the informant was acting as a government agent, and that the informant deliberately elicited incriminating statements. [11] The Sixth Amendment right attaches on or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated. [12] There is no dispute that the Sixth Amendment right had attached in this case, as Appellant was in jail pursuant to an indictment on the same charges to which the statements related. The questions we must resolve, as regards the Sixth Amendment challenge, are whether the jailhouse informant was acting as a government agent and whether the informant deliberately elicited incriminating statements. The underlying factual issues are to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard but the ultimate constitutional issue is reviewed de novo. [13] We can readily dispense with the second question, whether the information was deliberately elicited. In this case, the trial court made a finding that information was, obtained at least in part by questioning. In order to show that information was deliberately elicited a defendant must show that the police and the informant performed some action beyond merely listening that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. [14] The evidence at the hearing certainly supports a conclusion that action was taken to deliberately elicit statements from Appellant. It is clear that Romano violated the listen and report instructions from the detectives. Romano, according to the transcripts of the tapes discussed in the hearing, would engage in conversations about the offense, contrary to what he had been instructed to do. He asked Appellant questions about the funeral of the victim, the time of the murder, the yellow gloves alleged to have been worn on the night of the offense, and also apparently tried to discuss trial strategy with. Appellant. Romano was obviously not just a listening post. Not only did Romano ask questions of the Appellant regarding the crime and his defense to the charges, he also attempted to use interrogation techniques designed to elicit incriminating remarks. Romano waited until Appellant was upset after being on the phone and used those moments to initiate conversation. He also tried to convince Appellant that he needed to open up about any wrongs he had committed as someone in AA might do. According to the Supreme Court in Kuhlmann , the primary concern of this line of cases was secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation. [15] It is implicit in the trial court's findings that the statements were deliberately elicited, and such a finding was supported by the evidence. Next, we must determine whether Romano was a government agent at the time he engaged Appellant in these conversations. Some courts have opined that there is, by necessity, no bright-line rule for determining whether an individual is a government agent for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. [16] [T]he infinite number of ways that investigators and informants can combine to elicit information from an unsuspecting defendant precludes us from establishing any litmus test for determining when an informant is acting as a government agent under Massiah .  [17] In a Texas case, which surveyed the approaches of various jurisdictions, the court concluded that, Although there are some differences in the approaches of the various jurisdictions, they are unified by at least one common principle: to qualify as a government agent, the informant must, at least have some sort of agreement with, or act under instructions from, a government official. [18] At a minimum . . . there must be some evidence that an agreement, express or implied, between the individual and a government official existed at the time the elicitation takes place. [19] The federal circuit courts also agree that the creation of an agency relationship depends upon the existence of an agreement between the government and the informant at the time the information is obtained. [20] Additionally, some courts are concerned with whether the government has targeted the particular defendant. Those courts hold that an informant becomes a government agent for purposes of the Sixth Amendment analysis only when he receives instructions from law enforcement to gather information from a particular defendant. [21] A conclusion that the government has engaged in the process through an agent, and has not merely received evidence already obtained, must therefore require proof of some affirmative action by a police officer or other governmental official that preceded the interrogation and can reasonably be seen to have induced the third party to conduct the interrogation that took place. [22] Appellant asserts that the fact that he was named in the Memo of Understanding as encouragement to Romano to obtain further information about the case shows that he was targeted. Appellant persuasively contends this demonstrates that Romano was acting, as the government's agent with regard to Appellant. Until the agreement was made, it was not shown that Romano was anything more than a listening post. After the agreement, the agency relationship is undeniable, The memo and the course of meetings had, the effect of inducing Romano to try to obtain more information from Appellant. Officers repeatedly met with Romano, and in the course of doing so. Romano's questioning was not only tolerated, but he was sent back to obtain more information from Appellant. The agreement need not be explicit or formal but may be inferred from a course of conduct over a sustained period of time [23] This was not a case in which an informant was simply reporting back with no involvement from law enforcement. Instead, the government became Romano's handlers, Rather than passively accepting information obtained by the informant on his own initiative, the police took an active role in what came to be a government interrogation. The police prearranged with Romano that he would get as much information about Appellant that he could. He was told to report back what was said in Appellant's exact words. This informed Romano that the police wanted more information about the crime and induced him to obtain that information, until finally, he resorted to interrogation techniques in order to get as much from Appellant as possible. Even when Romano violated the plan set forth by the government, he was still sent back with the understanding that he would continue to do as he had done, even though police did not explicitly tell him to ask questions. The identification of ,Appellant as a target, and the course of dealing with the police show that Romano was acting as a government agent. The Commonwealth contends that the lack of a quid pro quo underlying the relationship between the government and Romano confirms that Romano was not a government agent. The existence of an agreement wherein the government promises benefits or rewards (a quid pro quo) is considered evidence of agency. [24] While we agree that receiving payment or some other benefit as quid pro quo is persuasive evidence of agency, we observe that Supreme Court precedent cited above does not require a quid pro quo before a person may be found to be a government agent. The government is not absolved of its use of Romano by the fact that it does not appear to have rewarded him for his actions or testimony. There was evidence that Romano could have been acting with an expectation of future benefit from his activity with the police and prosecutor. Romano had asked, What can you all do for me? Detective Persley responded, That's up to the prosecutor. Detective. Persley testified that he subsequently had a meeting once with Romano and the Commonwealth's Attorney, although no details from that meeting appear of record. Defense counsel contended at trial that Romano had had two or three probation violations with no action taken on them. However, at the time of trial Romano had apparently not received any benefit for his efforts. The Commonwealth asked Romano on redirect whether he was getting any type of benefit for testifying. Romano replied, Not at all. Additionally, while the trial court found it important, it was not determinative that Romano approached the Commonwealth about giving assistance rather than the other way around. Romano's initial, unsolicited approach does not prevent him from thereafter serving as an agent of the government under the Sixth Amendment analysis. Similarly, the officer's instructions not to ask questions could not prevent the informant from becoming a government agent. The Supreme Court in Moulton rejected the suggestion that the mere fact of the police's instructions to the informant not to ask questions was sufficient to prevent him from acting as an agent of the government. [25] In this case, since the informant was questioning the accused, law enforcement must have known that their informant was deliberately eliciting incriminating information. The government has an affirmative obligation not to circumvent an accused's right to counsel. [26] When the government knowingly exploits an opportunity to obtain information from an accused party in the absence of counsel it improperly evades its obligation. [27] From the foregoing precedent, we believe the trial court's legal conclusion was erroneous. We have no doubt of a knowing exploitation of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel, an act prohibited by Moulton . The government was actively involved in inducing the informant to elicit the information from Appellant in violation of the Sixth Amendment and Section 10 of the Constitution of Kentucky.
Notwithstanding our conclusion with respect to Romano as a government agent, any statements he testified to that were obtained before he was acting as a government agent were not inadmissible. The Massiah rule covers only those statements obtained as a result of an intentional effort on the part of the government, so information gotten before the inmates became agents/informants is not protected by the rule. [28] However, if an informant obtains some initial evidence, approaches the government to make a deal on the basis of that information, and thenwith the backing of the governmentdeliberately elicits further evidence from an accused, the materials obtained after such government contact must be excluded under the Massiah rule. [29] The Sixth Amendment protection extends to situations that `look' like government interrogations. [30] In this case, however, it is not apparent what information was obtained before Romano became a government agent, and what came later. Thus, we are unable to determine from this record what statements by Appellant should have been admitted and what should have been excluded. Appellant argues that the improperly admitted evidence cannot be considered harmless as all of the other evidence of Appellant's culpability was circumstantial or speculative. The question to be answered when there is an assertion of harmless error, as made by the Commonwealth, is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. [31] We cannot escape the conclusion that it is reasonably possible that Romano's testimony influenced the jury to conclude that Appellant committed the offenses. In particular, the testimony from a fellow inmate that Appellant confessed to the crime would have almost certainly contributed to the conviction. Thus, we cannot regard this testimony as harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. [32] We therefore reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial. On retrial, Romano will be allowed to testify to information he obtained prior to the Memo of Understanding, but not to information obtained thereafter.