Opinion ID: 6351649
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Invoking the Right to Counsel

Text: ¶38 As the majority observes, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes the privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; see also Colo. Const. art. II, § 18. To protect that privilege, the Edwards rule provides that if a suspect invokes their right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, interrogation must stop until either (1) an attorney has been made available or (2) the suspect validly waives their earlier request for an attorney by initiating further communication with the police. 451 U.S. at 484–85. ¶39 To trigger Edward’s “rigid prophylactic rule,” an accused’s request for counsel must be unambiguous. Kutlak, ¶ 15, 364 P.3d at 204. In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994), the Supreme Court clarified the standard for determining ambiguity in a purported invocation. Invocation requires “at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression 3 of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” Id. (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)). Thus, as we reiterated in Kutlak, “to make an unambiguous request for counsel, the suspect ‘must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.’” Kutlak, ¶ 16, 364 P.3d at 204 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459) (alteration in original). ¶40 “To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry,” Davis, 512 U.S. at 458–59, which requires courts to consider the totality of the circumstances, Kutlak, ¶ 24, 364 P.3d at 206. The totality of the circumstances may include such factors as: “the words spoken by the interrogating officer; the words used by the accused in referring to counsel; the officer’s response to the accused’s reference to counsel; the speech patterns of the accused; the demeanor and tone of the interrogating officer; the accused’s behavior during interrogation; and the accused’s youth, criminal history, background, nervousness or distress, and feelings of intimidation or powerlessness.” Id. ¶41 As the permissive “may” makes clear, the reviewing court need not take into account all of these factors, but only those that may be relevant to the case at hand. See People v. Arroya, 988 P.2d 1124, 1133 (Colo. 1999) (“A trial court need not 4 make specific findings with respect to each of these factors, and no single factor is controlling.”). II. Application