Opinion ID: 1145492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Resulting Prejudice/Prejudgment

Text: A summary of the referee's factual findings (and logical inferences drawn therefrom) thus far will help clarify the analysis. In essence, the referee found that: (i) Nordstrom was untruthful in her responses to the jury questionnaire and on voir dire concerning the fact and scope of her pretrial knowledge of petitioner's case, (ii) she continued to lie at the evidentiary hearing about the scope of her pretrial knowledge of the case, (iii) she violated her oath as a juror by discussing the case with nonjurors before the trial was over, and (iv) she lied about having discussed the case with nonjurors. (7) As a general rule, juror misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice that may be rebutted by proof that no prejudice actually resulted. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 835 [281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865]; People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1108 [269 Cal. Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327].) Thus, [a] judgment adverse to a defendant in a criminal case must be reversed or vacated `whenever ... the court finds a substantial likelihood that the vote of one or more jurors was influenced by exposure to prejudicial matter relating to the defendant or to the case itself that was not part of the trial record on which the case was submitted to the jury.' (2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, std. 8-3.7 (2d ed. 1980) p. 8.57;...) [¶] `The ultimate issue of influence on the juror is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard. In effect, the court must examine the extrajudicial material and then judge whether it is inherently likely to have influenced the juror.' (2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, supra, std. 8-3.7, Commentary, p. 8.58.) ( People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 950-951 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676]; see also People v. Holloway, supra at pp. 1109-1110.) (8) The rule applies to both types of misconduct present in this case. Thus, juror misconduct involving the concealment of material information on voir dire raises the presumption of prejudice ( Wiley v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 177, 189 [269 Cal. Rptr. 240] [applying the presumption of prejudice standard in case involving concealment on voir dire]; Blackwell, supra 191 Cal. App.3d 925, 929 [same]; Diaz, supra, 152 Cal. App.3d 926, 934-935 [same]), as does the misconduct of discussing the case with nonjurors while the case is pending ( People v. Pierce, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 207; see People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 156 [141 Cal. Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050] [It is well settled that a presumption of prejudice arises from any juror misconduct. (Italics added.)]). This presumption of prejudice `may be rebutted by an affirmative evidentiary showing that prejudice does not exist or by a reviewing court's examination of the entire record to determine whether there is a reasonable probability of actual harm to the complaining party [resulting from the misconduct]....' ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 117 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127], quoting Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 417 [185 Cal. Rptr. 654, 650 P.2d 1171]; Wiley v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., supra, 220 Cal. App.3d at p. 189.) (9a) Respondent argues that even if Nordstrom committed misconduct, the presumption of prejudice is rebutted by other evidence elicited at the reference hearing. (10) Respondent relies heavily on the referee's conclusion that No credible testimony was received indicating that Cathy Nordstrom had in fact prejudged the defendant's guilt. After a careful examination of the record, however, we conclude the referee's determination that Nordstrom did not prejudge the case is not supported by substantial or credible evidence. Accordingly, we decline to adopt it. We reach this conclusion for a number of reasons. First, the referee found  and our independent review of the evidence confirms  that Nordstrom intentionally concealed her knowledge of the case. [I]n most cases, the honesty or dishonesty of a juror's response [to a question on voir dire] is the best initial indicator of whether the juror in fact was impartial. ( McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, supra, 464 U.S. at p. 556 [78 L.Ed.2d at pp. 671-672] (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.).) As we explained, ante, at page 115, the record shows Nordstrom's concealment was intentional. Her false answers concerning the depth of her knowledge of the crime thus provides an initial indication that she may have prejudged petitioner's case. Moreover, when a juror conceals material information on voir dire, that information establish[es] substantial grounds for inferring that [the juror] was biased ... despite ... protestations to the contrary. ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 400-401 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610] [challenge to trial court's grant of prosecution's challenge for cause].) Concealment by a potential juror constitutes implied bias justifying disqualification. ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 183-184 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949] [same].) Nordstrom's suppression of material information on voir dire thus creates an inference that she prejudged the case. This initial indication of Nordstrom's partiality is further supported by evidence that she violated her oath as a juror by speaking about the case to Kim Robinson before the trial was over. The evidence shows Nordstrom made midtrial statements to Robinson at Frankie's Champagne Palace that petitioner should be horribly mutilated for his crimes. Significantly, the referee found Nordstrom made these statements, stating that she violated the trial court's admonition not to discuss the case. When a person violates his oath as a juror, doubt is cast on that person's ability to otherwise perform his duties. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 835-836.) Although the referee found Robinson's testimony recounting Nordstrom's midtrial statements was generally believable, he also found the statements were not indicative of prejudgment. Instead, the referee found that the most that can be said for the discussions is that Ms. Nordstrom was being influenced by the evidence she was hearing and forming impressions thereof and passing those impressions on to Kim Robinson. We disagree. In essence, the referee found that (i) Nordstrom was untruthful in her jury questionnaire and on voir dire concerning the scope of her pretrial knowledge about petitioner's case, (ii) she violated her oath as a juror by discussing the case with nonjurors before the trial was over, (iii) she continued to lie at the evidentiary hearing about the scope of her pretrial knowledge of the case, and (iv) she lied at the evidentiary hearing about having discussed the case with Robinson. Under these circumstances, the referee's conclusion that Nordstrom's vitriolic statements were nothing more than forming impressions about the evidence is not supported by substantial evidence. Instead, it appears reasonably probable Nordstrom had prejudged the case. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 117.) [7] Respondent urges a contrary conclusion, claiming the referee was entitled to conclude Nordstrom did not prejudge the case based on the fact that she was one of the last jurors to vote for guilt. The record shows that Nordstrom executed a declaration on February 26, 1990, in which she states, I was one of the last two jurors to join in the verdict of guilt. When asked about the declaration at the evidentiary hearing on April 22, 1991, however, she was unsure. The record shows the following colloquy: Q [by Mr. Ingram]: Do you remember signing anything in front of Mr. Reynolds [from the district attorney's office]? A: Actually, I believe I  he was recording the conversation. Q: Okay. A: I don't believe I signed anything. I believe that was with the District Attorney's Office. Q: Okay. Did you remember putting in this declaration that you were one of the last two jurors to vote for guilt? A: I don't believe that that's  it may have  I may have said that. In the case, it wasn't the guilt of Mr. Hitchings, it was the penalty phase that I had problems with. Q: Okay. So you were not one of the last two to vote for guilt? A: I may have been one of the last two, but I still felt that he was guilty. Q: Okay. Do you remember telling Mr. Reynolds that  that, in fact, you were not one of the last two in regards to the guilt phase? A: Like I said, I'm not sure on that. I do know that I believe the man was guilty.... (Italics added.) After her equivocation, the district attorney revisited the subject on cross-examination: Q: During the guilt phase or the first phase, were you not one of the last jurors to vote for guilty? A: I've done some thinking about it. I think I was close to the last one  one of the last ones. (Italics added.) She reiterated this point on redirect examination. Petitioner challenges the referee's finding in this regard. His challenge is twofold. First, he contends the evidence supporting the finding is not worthy of belief. Second, he asserts such a finding violates Evidence Code section 1150. We need not reach either point, for assuming the evidence was admissible, relevant, and worthy of belief, we conclude the evidence was simply too ambiguous to be probative. Accordingly, such evidence cannot constitute substantial evidence to support the referee's conclusion that Nordstrom did not prejudge the case. Respondent would have us draw from the fact that Nordstrom was one of the last jurors to vote for guilt the inference that she had not prejudged the case. Even assuming for argument that Nordstrom was one of the last jurors to vote for guilt, that fact is too tenuous a foundation to support respondent's inference. Nordstrom may simply have been the last juror as the foreperson went around the table for votes. Some other order of casting votes may have been used under which Nordstrom was last. She might have asked to vote last to conceal her prejudgment of the issues. There are many possible scenarios that could explain Nordstrom being the last (or one of the last) jurors to vote for guilt. Under the circumstances, we conclude that fact cannot constitute substantial evidence to support the referee's conclusion that Nordstrom did not prejudge the case. [8] (9b) In the absence of any substantial evidence that Nordstrom was one of the last to vote for guilt, the referee's ultimate conclusion that she did not prejudge the case lacks reasonable support in the record. We reiterate that this court will independently review the evidence, and is not bound by a referee's factual findings. A referee's findings are entitled to judicial deference only when they are supported by ample, credible evidence or substantial evidence. ( People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 219.) The referee's finding regarding Nordstrom's lack of prejudgment is not supported by such evidence. Accordingly, we sustain petitioner's exception to the referee's finding on this point, and conclude there was no substantial evidence to support the referee's decision that Nordstrom did not prejudge the case. It necessarily follows that respondent has not rebutted the presumption of prejudice that arises from both (i) Nordstrom's concealment of material information on voir dire, and (ii) her violation of her oath by speaking to Robinson about the case while a sitting juror.