Opinion ID: 2388059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether section 14-1-40 proscribes admission of prior family court adjudications as evidence at trial in the family court

Text: The first issue requires that we examine the precise wording of G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 14-1-40, as amended by P.L. 1985, ch. 349, § 1. Bernard argued successfully at the motion hearing that although a trial justice can consider previous Family Court findings against a minor for sentencing purposes, under the law of this jurisdiction evidence of prior juvenile adjudications is inadmissible substantively at trial in the Family Court. We disagree. Controlling of this court's decision is chapter 1 of title 14, Rhode Island's Family Court Act, which provides in pertinent part: The disposition of a child or any evidence given in the [family] court shall not be admissible as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in any other court   . Provided, however, any finding of delinquency based upon acts which would constitute a felony, if committed by an adult, shall be available to the attorney general for use in its recommendations to any court in sentencing and said record may be taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing. (Emphasis added.) Section 14-1-40. In enacting a statute, the General Assembly is presumed to have intended that every word, sentence, or provision serve some useful purpose and have some force and effect. See Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116 R.I. 614, 624, 359 A.2d 682, 687 (1976); see also 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06 at 104 (Sands 4th ed. 1984). A statute should therefore be construed to avoid rendering sentences, clauses, or words as mere surplusage. Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I. 1987). We read § 14-1-40 as authorizing the Family Court to admit in evidence a juvenile's record of past adjudications of delinquency or waywardness. The lucid language of the act prohibits the evidentiary use of a juvenile record to determine the guilt or innocence of a minor at trial in any court other than the Family Court. It is a settled canon of construction that when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to inquire beyond what it plainly expresses. See Fruit Growers Express Co. v. Norberg, 471 A.2d 628 (R.I. 1984); Little v. Conflict of Interest Comm'n, 121 R.I. 232, 397 A.2d 884 (1979). By inserting the phrase in any other court, we believe the Legislature specifically exempted the Family Court from the proscription against admitting a juvenile's prior adjudications in evidence at trial. The qualifying language of the statute is unambiguous and requires no further interpretation. Thus, while § 14-1-40 permits every trial justice to consider a juvenile record for the limited purpose of sentencing, Taylor v. Howard, 111 R.I. 527, 530-31, 304 A.2d 891, 894 (1973), we conclude that the statute further authorizes the Family Court to admit this information as substantive evidence in the course of a trial. [5]