Opinion ID: 197261
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Exhaustion Doctrine.

Text: A. The Exhaustion Doctrine. Starkly contoured, the exhaustion doctrine holds that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). In practice, the doctrine has softer edges than this language implies. See Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., II Administrative Law Treatise 15.2, at 307 (3d ed. 1994). Although exhaustion of administrative remedies is absolutely required if explicitly mandated by Congress, see McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992), courts have more latitude in dealing with exhaustion questions when Congress has remained silent, see Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 153-54 (1993); McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144. In such purlieus, the court of first instance possesses a modicum of discretion to relax the exhaustion requirement. See Salus v. GTE Directories Serv. Corp., 104 F.3d 131, 138 (7th Cir. 1997). The Court's opinion in McCarthy is integral to an understanding of the parameters of this discretion. Although recognizing that the exhaustion doctrine ordinarily serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency, and, thus, should customarily be enforced, the Court identified three broad sets of circumstances in which the interests of the individual weigh heavily against requiring administrative exhaustion. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145, 146. 5 First, a court may consider relaxing the rule when unreasonable or indefinite delay threatens unduly to prejudice the subsequent bringing of a judicial action. See id. at 146-47. And, relatedly, if the situation is such that a particular plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm if unable to secure immediate judicial consideration of his claim, exhaustion may be excused even though the administrative decisionmaking schedule is otherwise reasonable and definite. Id. at 147. Second, McCarthy acknowledges that it sometimes may be inappropriate for a court to require exhaustion if a substantial doubt exists about whether the agency is empowered to grant meaningful redress. See id. at 147-48, 154; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574 n.14 (1973). An agency, for example, may lack authority to grant the type of relief requested. See, e.g., McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 675 (1963). Finally, McCarthy teaches that the exhaustion rule may be relaxed where there are clear, objectively verifiable indicia of administrative taint. Thus, if the potential decisionmaker is biased or can be shown to have predetermined the issue, failure to exploit an available administrative remedy may be forgiven. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 148.