Opinion ID: 1690384
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of the principles set out in atkins, thompson, penry, and stanford to the execution of juveniles today

Text: The state argues, and the dissenting judges would hold, that whatever the Supreme Court held in Atkins is irrelevant to the instant case because this Court is bound by Stanford to hold that there is no constitutional bar to the execution of persons who were 16 or 17 years of age at the time of their crimes. This argument ignores the fundamental premise on which Stanford, as well as Thompson , Penry , and Atkins , were based: that this Court has not `confined the prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment to `barbarous' methods that were generally outlawed in the 18th century,' but instead has interpreted the Amendment `in a flexible and dynamic manner.' Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369, 109 S.Ct. 2969, quoting, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). Courts should be guided by the conceptions of decency of modern American society as a whole. Id. (footnote omitted). Atkins recently reaffirmed that decisions as to standards of decency are to be decided by current standards, not ones of years ago. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312, 122 S.Ct. 2242. And, that is just what the issue before this Court requires us to do: determine whether the evolving national consensus bars the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles today, even though it did not bar it fourteen years ago. To say that this determination must be made based on the state of the law and standards that existed when Stanford was decided in 1989, and that to do otherwise is to overrule Stanford, is simply incorrect. This Court clearly has the authority and the obligation to determine the case before it based on current2003standards of decency. See Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 985, 123 S.Ct. 24, 24, 153 L.Ed.2d 887 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ) (This Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), made it tenable for a petitioner to urge reconsideration of Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989)....); In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 123 S.Ct. 472, 154 L.Ed.2d 364 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ) (Court should reconsider Stanford in light of Atkins because even if we were not convinced in 1989 [that juveniles should not be subject to the death penalty] we should be all the more convinced today because of the additional states barring such executions and because of the growth in scientific knowledge of the less than fully developed nature of the adolescent brain.). [6]
As the discussion of Thompson , Stanford, Penry , and Atkins makes evident, many of the same principles and factors that have guided the Supreme Court's determination of the constitutionality of the death penalty for the mentally retarded have also guided the Supreme Court's determination of the constitutionality of the death penalty for juveniles. This Court therefore will use Atkins ' approach in addressing whether a national consensus has developed against the juvenile death penalty since Stanford, looking at: (1) the extent of legislative action against or in favor of the juvenile death penalty; (2) the frequency of the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles in modern times, and the frequency with which it is carried out even when imposed; (3) national and international opinion on the juvenile death penalty; and (4) an independent examination of whether the death penalty for juveniles violates evolving standards of decency and so is barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 1. Legislative Action Has Consistently Been Against the Juvenile Death Penalty. At the time that Penry was decided in 1989, only two states had outlawed executing the mentally retarded, and the Supreme Court found that this was not sufficient to constitute a national consensus. In deciding that developments of the intervening years between Penry and Atkins demonstrated that a national consensus had developed against executing the mentally retarded, Atkins relied heavily on the fact that sixteen more state legislatures had barred execution of the mentally retarded, while no additional states had permitted it. It found this persuasive not principally because of the number of states that had passed such laws, but because of the consistency of the changes in the direction of opposition to the death penalty for the mentally retarded. That same consistency of change has been shown in opposition to the juvenile death penalty. Indeed, the change was in the process of occurring when Stanford was decided. At the time of Stanford, eleven states barred the juvenile death penalty. This was substantial, but not yet enough to constitute a national consensus. Since Stanford, however, and despite what Atkins called the popularity of law and order legislation, five more states have banned the practice of executing juvenile offenders. Two have done so by adopting legislation raising the age of execution to 18, [7] and two have done so by newly reinstating the death penalty, but only for those offenders who were 18 or older at the time of their offense. [8] The Washington Supreme Court has also held that its death penalty statute cannot be construed to authorize imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by juvenile offenders, [9] thereby adding the state of Washington to the list of states in which the practice is now prohibited. Thus, a total of sixteen statesto which should be added federal civilian and military courtsrequire a minimum age of 18 for imposition of the death penalty, only two fewer than the eighteen states Atkins identified as prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded. [10] If the twelve states and the District of Columbia that bar the death penalty entirely are added, the combined total is twenty-eight states that prohibit juvenile executionstwo fewer than the thirty states that prohibited execution of the mentally retarded at the time Atkins was decided. Moreover, as is the case with the mentally retarded, the change has consistently been in the same direction. No state since Stanford has lowered the age for execution from 18 to 17 or 16, although Stanford allowed states to do so. [11] Rather, the minimum age has either stayed the same or been raised, and the only two states to reinstate the death penalty since 1989 did so only for those 18 or older. In addition, many states, including Missouri, have recently considered legislation to raise the minimum age for executions to 17 or 18. Streib, supra, at 7. This accounts for the most legislative attention to the issue in twenty years. Id. In 2000, a bill to abolish the death penalty in New Hampshire passed both houses of the state legislature, but was vetoed. [12] 2. Infrequency of Imposition of Death Penalty. In Atkins , the Supreme Court also found persuasive the fact that execution of the mentally retarded had become truly unusual. Many states that nominally had the death penalty on their books no longer imposed it at all or had never imposed it on a mentally retarded person, and only a total of five persons known to be mentally retarded had been executed in the United States in the thirteen years following the Court's decision in Penry . Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316, 122 S.Ct. 2242. The practice of executing those under 18 has become similarly uncommon today. Although twenty-two states theoretically permit the death penalty for juveniles, only six (Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Georgia, Oklahoma, and Louisiana) have actually executed a juvenile offender since Stanford was decided fourteen years ago. Streib, supra, at 3-4. Of these six states, only three have executed juvenile offenders since 1993Texas, Virginia, and Oklahoma. Id. at 4. Louisiana last executed a juvenile offender in 1990; Georgia in 1993. Id. at 3. Missouri executed Frederick Lashley in 1993. That is the only officially recorded execution of a juvenile offender in Missouri since the state took over executions from Missouri's counties in 1937. [13] Perhaps most telling is that, while at least 366 juvenile offenders have been executed in this country since 1642 (when the first juvenile offender execution occurred), only twenty-two of the 366 were carried out during the current era (1973-2003). Id. Of these twenty-two executions, Texas, Virginia, and Oklahoma together account for eighty-one percent of the juvenile executions. Id. at 5. Although Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming all theoretically permit the death penalty for 16year-olds, and while Florida, New Hampshire, and North Carolina theoretically permit it for 17-year-olds, none of these states has executed a juvenile since the death penalty was re-established in 1976. Id. at 3-4, 6. All but South Dakota and New Hampshire, however, have executed other offenders during that period. [14] Indeed, even where juries have imposed a death sentence on a juvenile since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976, its application has consistently been reversed by the courts on a variety of grounds, making South Carolina the only other state (other than Texas, Louisiana, Missouri, Georgia, Virginia, and Oklahoma) to carry out a juvenile execution since 1976. Id. at 3. As the chart attached as Appendix A graphically demonstrates, more mentally retarded persons than juveniles have been executed, in more states, since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976. [15] As Atkins noted in regard to the mentally retarded, in light of the small number of executions of juvenile offenders carried out in the last decade, legislatures in states with a juvenile death penalty may have seen little reason to pass legislation barring it. Juveniles are so seldom executed that, other than perhaps in Texas and Virginia, the death penalty for juveniles has become so truly unusual that its potential application is more hypothetical than real. But, the likelihood of such an execution is not hypothetical in Missouri today. The state argues that Missouri should become the only state other than Texas, Virginia, and now Oklahoma to carry out more than one juvenile execution since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976. 3. National and International Consensus. Opposition to the juvenile death penalty by professional, social, and religious organizations has been longstanding. At the time Stanford was decided, a large number of groups, including the ABA, child advocacy groups, psychiatric organizations, and church and religious groups filed amicus briefs urging an end to such executions. [16] Since Stanford, additional organizations of professionals have also called for an end to the death penalty, including: The American Psychiatric Association, The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, The National Mental Health Association, The National Center for Youth Law, The Coalition for Juvenile Justice, The American Humane Association, and The Constitutional Project (a bipartisan nonprofit organization that seeks consensus on controversial legal and constitutional issues). Additional groups of faith also have issued statements in opposition to the death penalty, including: American Baptist Churches in the USA, American Ethical Union, American Friends Service Committee, American Jewish Committee, Amnesty International, The Bruderhof Communities, Central Conference of America, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Church of the Brethren, Church Women United, The Episcopal Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Friends United Meeting, General Conference of General Baptists, General Conference Mennonite Church, The Mennonite Church, The Moravian Church in America, YMCA of the USA, Mormons for Equality and Social Justice, The Orthodox Church in America, National Council of the Churches of Christ, Presbyterian Church (USA), The Rabbinical Assembly, Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Reformed Church in America, Unitarian Universalist Association, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, United Methodist Church, United Church of Christ, and United States Catholic Conference. [17] A recent poll found that only thirty-four percent of Missourians support the death penalty for juveniles. [18] While Stanford found the opposition of social, professional, and religious groups to be of little importance, the Court's more recent decision in Atkins clearly demonstrated a shift back to reliance on such evidence to confirm the national consensus that evolving standards of decency proscribe imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n. 21. Similarly, here, although by no means dispositive, we find the opposition to the juvenile death penalty of the wide array of groups within the United States listed above to be consistent with the legislative and other evidence that current standards of decency do not permit the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles. We also find of note that the views of the international community have consistently grown in opposition to the death penalty for juveniles. Article 37(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and several other international treaties and agreements expressly prohibit the practice. Streib, supra, at 7. According to Amnesty International, officially sanctioned executions of juveniles have occurred in only two other countries in the world in the last few years, Iran and The Republic of the Congo (DRC). Amnesty International, Juveniles: The Death Penalty Gives up on Juvenile Offenders (July 28, 2003), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/juveniles. Of the last seven juvenile offender executions, five occurred in the United States. Streib, supra, at 7. 4. Independent Examination of Death Penalty. Atkins also undertook an independent analysis of whether the death penalty was warranted for mentally retarded offenders by examining whether the social purposes intended to be served by the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, applied to mentally retarded offenders. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19, 122 S.Ct. 2242. The Supreme Court found that neither purpose would be furthered by executing the mentally retarded, as such individuals are inherently less culpable than other actors and less able to deliberate about their actions and, thus, are less able to be deterred by awareness that their crime could result in death. Id. at 319-21, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Further, Atkins found that it was necessary to categorically exclude the mentally retarded from execution, rather than allowing their mental capacity to be considered on a case-by-case basis, because their reduced mental capacity would increase the possibility of false confessions and reduce their ability to show mitigation or assist counsel, so that [m]entally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution. Id. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Lastly, it concluded: As Penry demonstrated... reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury. Id. Similarly, as to juveniles, neither retribution nor deterrence provides an effective rationale for the imposition of the juvenile death penalty, and the risk of wrongful execution of juveniles is enhanced for reasons similar to that set out in Atkins in regard to the mentally retarded. While the parties have cited this Court to numerous current studies and scientific articles about the structure of the human mind, the continuing growth of those portions of the mind that control maturity and decision-making during adolescence and young adulthood, and the lesser ability of teenagers to reason, this Court need not look so far afield. The Supreme Court recognized the lesser culpability and developing nature of the adolescent mind in its 1988 decision in Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835, 108 S.Ct. 2687, in which it stated, there is also broad agreement on the proposition that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than adults, id. at 834, 108 S.Ct. 2687, and therefore less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. Id. at 835, 108 S.Ct. 2687. Thompson noted that it was not the first time that the Court had been called upon to recognize the lesser culpability of the young, for in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982): We stressed this difference in explaining the importance of treating the defendant's youth as a mitigating factor in capital cases: But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly `during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment' expected of adults.... Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834, 108 S.Ct. 2687. Thompson then stated: Thus, the Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation. Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult. Id. at 835, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (footnotes omitted). Thompson concluded, The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult. Id. Although Mr. Simmons is 17 rather than 15, he is still an adolescent, and this Court finds the rationales set forth in Thompson and Eddings apply here. [19] Similarly, the deterrence function of the death penalty can have little application to juveniles, not just because of their lesser ability to reason and their lack of informed judgment, but because, as discussed supra, the imposition of the death penalty on 16year-olds and 17-year-olds has become so unusual in the last decade that the likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually non-existent. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (discussing effect of infrequency of executions of those 15 and younger). Finally, as Mr. Simmons notes, the risk of wrongful execution also is greater as to younger offenders, who have had less time to develop ties to the community, less time to perform mitigating good works, and less time to develop a stable work history, than is true of adult offenders, and who are far more likely than adults to waive their rights and to give false confessions. Moreover, although nominally under Missouri law defendants are permitted to use their youth as a mitigating factor, this case provides a graphic illustration of the fact that their youth can become a further argument against them. In closing argument in Mr. Simmons' case, the state argued that the jury should not let him use his age to protect himself because if it did so, then he wins. The state then argued, Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary. Doesn't that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary. Thus, Mr. Simmons' youth was used to suggest greater immorality and future dangerousness and so to provide a further reason to impose the death penalty. For these reasons, this Court concludes that the Supreme Court of the United States would hold that the execution of persons for crimes committed when they were under 18 years of age violates the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, and is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. [20]