Opinion ID: 1496482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: SBC's Statutory Claim

Text: Many of the same reasons apply to bar SBC's direct claim under the statute. SBC contends that section 251.102 waives Harris County's governmental immunity and requires reimbursement of relocation costs. But as we have often noted, the Legislature is best positioned to waive or abrogate sovereign immunity because this allows the Legislature to protect its policymaking function. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex.2002) (citations omitted) (collecting cases). Any such waiver must be clear and unambiguous. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.034 (In order to preserve the legislature's interest in managing state fiscal matters through the appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.); Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 328-29 (Tex.2006). As outlined above, section 251.102 falls short of meeting these exacting demands. While we have on rare occasions found waiver of sovereign immunity absent magic words, we have required clear indications of legislative intent to waive immunity under these circumstances: First, a statute that waives the State's immunity must do so beyond doubt, even though we do not insist that the statute be a model of perfect clarity. For example, we have found waiver when the provision in question would be meaningless unless immunity were waived. Second, when construing a statute that purportedly waives sovereign immunity, we generally resolve ambiguities by retaining immunity. .... Finally, we are cognizant that, when waiving immunity by explicit language, the Legislature often enacts simultaneous measures to insulate public resources from the reach of judgment creditors. Therefore, when deciding whether the Legislature intended to waive sovereign immunity and permit monetary damages against the State, one factor to consider is whether the statute also provides an objective limitation on the State's potential liability. Wichita Falls State Hospital v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697-98 (Tex.2003) (citations omitted). We recently confronted a similar issue in Texas Department of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex.2004). That case involved Transportation Code section 203.058(a), which provides: If the acquisition of real property, property rights, or material by the department [of transportation] from a state agency under this subchapter will deprive the agency of a thing of value to the agency in the exercise of its functions, adequate compensation for the real property, property rights, or material shall be made. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 203.058(a) (emphasis added). We determined that section 203.058 did not waive governmental immunity. Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d at 642-43. As we observed, the statute's language did not clearly indicate the Legislature's intent to waive immunity, but instead merely required the Department of Transportation to make adequate compensation using certain accounting procedures. Id. at 642. (citations omitted). And while the statute imposes a financial obligation on the State, this does not in itself mean that the Legislature intended to create a private right of action, as evidenced by the fact that the statute expressly vests the power to determine adequate compensation in the General Land Office. Id. at 642-43. Further, the statute was not meaningless without a waiver of immunity because it provide[d] a mechanism by which state agencies may ensure budgetary protection when property is transferred between them. Id. at 643. SBC has not argued that section 251.102 contains magic words, but rather that it requires reimbursement of utility relocation costs and thus necessarily waives immunity. But as discussed above, section 251.102 does not clearly require that SBC be reimbursed, nor, as the court of appeals correctly observed, is the statute meaningless absent a waiver of immunity: The statute merely states that a county, at the time it acquires a right-of-way to accommodate county road construction, must include the cost of relocating eligible utility facilities as part of its expense in acquiring the right-of-way. That is, the county must budget not only for the cost of acquiring the right-of-way, but it must also earmark funds to be paid to eligible utilities should they relocate their facilities to accommodate road construction. Section 251.102's requirement that funds be earmarked is a less apparent expression of a private right of action than that found lacking by the Texas Supreme Court in Sunset Valley. Compare TEX. TRANSP.CODE ANN. § 203.058(a) ([A]dequate compensation for the real property ... shall be made. ) (emphasis added) with id. § 251.102 (A county shall include the cost of relocating ... an eligible utility facility in the expense of right-of-way acquisition.) (emphasis added). 263 S.W.3d at 63. The Legislature may require counties to earmark funds for a particular purpose without necessarily creating a private right of action, because, for example, it expects counties to comply, or because it considers the costs of litigation overly burdensome. See, e.g., Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 375 (Tex.2006). And, as explained more fully above in our takings analysis, when we compare those statutes that explicitly provide for relocation reimbursements, the Legislature regularly attaches specific criteria that are absent here. See Wichita Falls State Hosp., 106 S.W.3d at 697-98. SBC nevertheless contends that our precedent supports a reimbursement action like this one. In City of Austin, 331 S.W.2d at 742, we considered whether a statute requiring reimbursement of certain utility relocation costs was an unconstitutional gift or donation. SBC contends that we would not have reached the merits in that case if the State had been immune from suit. City of Austin, however, did not address the state's immunity from suit, as it was a declaratory judgment action filed by the state. Id. at 740. Moreover, although the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in CenterPoint, 436 F.3d 541, discussed reimbursement of utility relocation costs pursuant to the same statute at issue here, that case did not discuss immunity, as Harris County waived immunity from suit under that court's waiver-by-removal rule. See CenterPoint, 436 F.3d at 543; Meyers v. Tex., 410 F.3d 236, 256 (5th Cir.2005). Because section 251.102 does not clearly waive governmental immunity, and because Harris County has not otherwise waived its immunity from suit, SBC's statutory reimbursement claim is barred.