Opinion ID: 2691462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Tax Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss

Text: {¶ 13} On March 30, 2009, the tax commissioner filed a motion to dismiss that raised four jurisdictional grounds for dismissing appellants’ appeal. We issued a brief order on July 22, 2009, denying the motion to dismiss. See Ohio Apt. Assn. v. Levin, 122 Ohio St.3d 1231, 2009-Ohio-3477, 911 N.E.2d 906. Our decision, however, left unresolved one aspect of that motion. {¶ 14} In the fourth proposition of law of his motion to dismiss, the tax commissioner attacked the sufficiency of appellants’ notice of appeal. According 2. Appellants challenge Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-10 only to the extent that it serves as a mechanism by which the commissioner would effect the elimination of the 10 percent rollback for appellants. 4 January Term, 2010 to the commissioner, the notice of appeal contains only broad challenges to the constitutionality of the administrative rules and, therefore, fails to satisfy the standard for specifying error in R.C. 5717.04. {¶ 15} On this issue, we previously held that there was no basis for granting the motion to dismiss because the notice of appeal contained a sufficient specification of appellants’ challenge to the Uniformity Clause. Ohio Apt. Assn., 122 Ohio St.3d 1231, 2009-Ohio-3477, 911 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 6. Because the notice of appeal advanced at least one cognizable claim, we declined to address whether the scope of the notice of appeal also encompassed appellants’ equal protection claim. Id. {¶ 16} R.C. 5717.04 mandates that a notice of appeal from the BTA to this court “set forth the decision of the board appealed from and the errors therein complained of.” In their notice of appeal, appellants allege that the BTA’s decision “violates Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, which provides equal protection to Appellants.” The tax commissioner asserts that the notice of appeal is jurisdictionally deficient because appellants have failed to precisely state their constitutional challenges pursuant to our decision in Castle Aviation, Inc. v. Wilkins, 109 Ohio St.3d 290, 2006-Ohio-2420, 847 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 38-41 (finding that the wording of appellant’s constitutional claim was so general that it could be used in almost every use-tax case).3 {¶ 17} We find that appellants’ notice of appeal sufficiently sets forth their equal protection challenge as required by R.C. 5717.04. In Castle Aviation, the notice of appeal said nothing more than that the imposition of the tax violated equal protection. Id. at ¶ 31. In contrast, appellants’ notice of appeal in this case 3. Although Castle Aviation involved R.C. 5717.02, which sets forth procedures for filing a notice of appeal from a final determination of the tax commissioner to the BTA, this court has consistently analyzed notices of appeal under R.C. 5717.04 in light of case law construing R.C. 5717.02. See Lawson Milk Co. v. Bowers (1961), 171 Ohio St. 418, 14 O.O.2d 217, 171 N.E.2d 495; Richter Transfer Co. v. Bowers (1962), 174 Ohio St. 113, 21 O.O.2d 369, 186 N.E.2d 832; and Deerhake v. Limbach (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 44, 546 N.E.2d 1327. 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO specifically sets forth the administrative rules at issue. Moreover, the administrative rules on their face create a tax classification of different uses of property that is alleged to violate equal protection. {¶ 18} The assignments of error set forth in the notice of appeal define the scope of our revisory jurisdiction over BTA decisions. See Polaris Amphitheater Concerts, Inc. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 118 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio2454, 889 N.E.2d 103, ¶ 5. Appellants’ assignment of error is not so broad as to encompass every possible equal protection claim. See Brown v. Levin, 119 Ohio St.3d 335, 2008-Ohio-4081, 894 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 17 (although the notice of appeal may create “jurisdiction over one or more issues that have been sufficiently specified,” the BTA “lacks jurisdiction to grant relief from a final determination based on other alleged errors that were not sufficiently specified in the notice of appeal”). Here, appellants argue in their merit brief that the rules discriminate between different types of real property owners based on an arbitrary and unreasonable classification of property, an allegation that is within the scope of the error assigned in the notice of appeal to this court. {¶ 19} In sum, the foregoing circumstances establish the sufficiency of appellants’ notice of appeal and, accordingly, our jurisdiction over their equal protection challenge.