Opinion ID: 2685521
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory sufficiency

Text: 23 No. 2012AP336-CR ¶42 No specific statutory authority is necessary to the issuance of a valid warrant for cell site information. See id., ¶¶69-72 (explaining that the failure to comply with all of the statutory provisions relating to warrants did not affect the validity of the warrant). However, even though statutory authorization was not necessary in order to issue the warrant, because the legislature has enacted general criteria about the procedures to employ with regard to issuing warrants, we examine relevant statutes. ¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.10(3) authorizes searches pursuant to a valid warrant, and Wis. Stat. § 968.12(1) provides: A search warrant is an order signed by a judge directing a law enforcement officer to conduct a search of a designated person, a designated object or a designated place for the purpose of seizing designated property or kinds of property. A judge shall issue a search warrant if probable cause is shown. The probable cause that § 968.12(1) speaks to is comparable to probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. See id., ¶44; see also Bergman v. State, 189 Wis. 615, 617-18, 208 N.W. 470 (1926) (quoting State v. Blumenstein, 186 Wis. 428, 430, 202 N.W. 684 (1925) (overruled on other grounds)) (§ 968.12's predecessor, Wis. Stat. § 4839, must be construed in accordance with the constitutional requirements upon the subject of searches and seizures). ¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.12(1) requires a judge to issue a warrant upon a showing of probable cause, and we conclude that 24 No. 2012AP336-CR Judge Wagner's order was supported by probable cause. We also conclude that law enforcement's use of a stingray to locate Tate's cell phone was reasonable. Law enforcement's use of cell site information requires additional discussion because § 968.12(1) must be read in concert with Wis. Stat. § 968.13(2) and Wis. Stat. § 968.135 in order to have a more complete statutory picture when law enforcement seeks a warrant to obtain cell site information. ¶45 Tate explained in his brief that [w]hen a cell phone identifies itself to a cell site, a log of location information is created and stored in a carrier's database.20 While the record in this case does not show exactly what form this log of location information takes, we think it is safe to assume that it would come within Wis. Stat. § 968.13(2)'s broad definition of documents, which includes, but is not limited to, books, papers, records, recordings, tapes, photographs, films or computer or electronic data.21 20 We do not know whether US Cellular maintained this log as a matter of routine or whether it installed a pen register at law enforcement's request in order to collect cell site information for law enforcement. See Toeniskoetter, supra note 9 (cellular service providers obtain cell site information by installing their own pen register). This distinction could matter if law enforcement had not obtained prior judicial authorization for the tracking. See Wis. Stat. § 968.34(2)(a) (prohibiting the use of a pen register without prior judicial authorization, subject to certain exceptions, one of which relates to a cellular service provider's operation, maintenance and testing of a wire or electronic communication service). 21 See also In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) ([c]ell site data are business records). 25 No. 2012AP336-CR ¶46 Search warrants issued under Wis. Stat. § 968.12(1) may not authorize the seizure of documents, Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(c), unless they are under the control of a person who is reasonably suspected to be concerned in the commission of that crime, § 968.13(1)(d). According to Officer Brosseau's testimony, law enforcement officers tracked Tate's cell phone using cell site information obtained from a cellular service provider. Therefore, the documents sought were in the hands of a third party; they were not under the control of a person who is reasonably suspected to be concerned in the commission of that crime. ¶47 When law enforcement wants to compel a third party to turn over documents, it can proceed to obtain an order to that effect, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 968.135. Section 968.135 provides that a court shall issue a subpoena requiring the production of documents, as specified in s. 968.13(2). This is done [u]pon the request of the attorney general or a district attorney and upon a showing of probable cause.22 Id. 22 Because Wis. Stat. § 968.135 does not limit or affect any other subpoena authority provided by law, we note that § 968.135 does not restrict the authority to issue a subpoena under Wis. Stat. § 968.375. Section 968.375 describes situations in which a judge may issue a subpoena or warrant to obtain records or information from an electronic communication service or remote computing service provider. It does not limit a judge's powers under the more general subpoena statute, § 968.135. We do not decide whether § 968.375 provides an additional source of authority for Judge Wagner's order because no party has addressed § 968.375. 26 No. 2012AP336-CR ¶48 We have held that failure to make a probable cause determination, when one is required in order to obtain particular documents, may deprive a defendant of the safeguards to which he is entitled. State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶4, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611. However, Popenhagen has no application here. ¶49 In Popenhagen, law enforcement officers and the district attorney obtained a criminal defendant's bank records pursuant to a subpoena issued under Wis. Stat. § 805.07, the civil subpoena statute. Because they sought to obtain the record as part of a criminal investigation, they should have proceeded under the criminal subpoena statute, Wis. Stat. § 968.135, which strictly limits a court's issuance of a subpoena for the production of documents. Only the attorney general or a district attorney may request a subpoena for the production of documents. The request must be ruled upon by the circuit court before the subpoena is issued. The circuit court may issue a subpoena for documents only upon a showing of probable cause.23 23 The legislature chose to require probable cause for a subpoena issued under Wis. Stat. § 968.135. We note, however, that we do not decide whether the Fourth Amendment comes into play when obtaining cell site information in part because any electronic documents have necessarily been shared with a third party. See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 614-15 (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Stored Communication Act's specific and articulable facts standard for disclosure of historical cell site information because a cell phone user voluntarily conveys . . . cell site data to the phone company each time he makes a call). 27 No. 2012AP336-CR Id., ¶53. The officers in Popenhagen did not present an affidavit showing probable cause to the subpoena-issuing judges and those judges did not make the determination of probable cause that § 968.135 requires. Id., ¶7. ¶50 Unlike the defendant in Popenhagen, Tate was not deprived of Wis. Stat. § 968.135's safeguards. Judge Wagner issued the order upon the request of a district attorney. He determined that the probable cause standard had been met based on Detective Pajot's sworn affidavit. We reject the argument that the court's citation to statutes that may not have been the best choices is reversible error because Judge Wagner's analysis was consistent with the legal standard Wis. Stat. § 968.12 and Wis. Stat. § 968.135 required. Accordingly, we conclude that Tate's substantial rights were not prejudiced.