Opinion ID: 528510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Chemical Analysis

Text: 13 During the search of defendant's residence, police seized a centrifuge tube containing a residue of white powder. The police chemist determined that the powder was d,1-amphetamine. This formed a basis for the charge against defendant of possession of a controlled substance. 14 During the first day of trial, after informing defendant of its intent to do so, the government gave the exhibit of tube and residue to the police chemist for analysis. On the second day of trial, the chemist, over defendant's objection, was permitted to state the results of his analysis. Defendant then requested a continuance ostensibly for the purpose of obtaining his own analysis of the tube's residue. The request was denied. 15 Defendant argues that the government's action does not comport with the spirit of Rule 16(a)(1)(D) Fed.R.Crim.P. requiring disclosure of evidence to be used against him. 16 The rubric that the trial court is entrusted with wide discretion in matters of discovery applies, and any error in administrating discovery rules is not reversible unless prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant. United States v. Bailey, 550 F.2d 1099, 1100 (8th Cir.1977), citing United States v. Cole, 453 F.2d 902, 904 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 922, 92 S.Ct. 1788, 32 L.Ed.2d 122 (1972). There was no abuse of discretion nor substantial prejudice to defendant's rights by the trial court's actions in admitting the tube and residue. 17 The government's evidence, including the tube with its residue, was always available to defendant for examination and analysis any time after its seizure, and defendant was informed of its availability to him. But defendant did not avail himself of the opportunity. The fact that the government did not deliver the exhibit to its chemist until time of trial did not hamper defendant's ability to make an independent analysis. 18 Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a) does not require disclosure of prospective witnesses, and, too, defendant could have anticipated that a chemical analysis by an expert witness would be a part of the government's case. Certainly, the identity of a particular expert witness would not be of significance. United States v. Krohn, 558 F.2d 390, 394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 868, 98 S.Ct. 207, 54 L.Ed.2d 145 (1977). Although rules of discovery require disclosure of scientific reports, Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(D), the report did not exist until the first day of trial, at the earliest, and the government was prompt in providing a copy of it to defendant. So there was no unfair surprise, abuse of substantial rights, or abuse of discretion in the trial court's action in allowing the testimony of the police chemist. 19 Finally, with regard to this issue, there was no abuse of the trial court's substantial discretion in denying defendant's mid-trial request for continuance. United States v. Pruett, 788 F.2d 1395, 1396 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Phillips, 607 F.2d 808, 810 (8th Cir.1979). Defendant could not have been surprised by the expert witness or his testimony.