Opinion ID: 28221
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Texas Public Policy

Text: 19 Turner and Webb also argue that the district courts erred in enforcing the English judgments because they contravene the public policy of Texas. Under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, [a] foreign country judgment need not be recognized if ... the cause of action on which the judgment was based is repugnant to the public policy of the state. 23 To deny enforcement of a foreign judgment based on a public policy argument, the level of contravention of Texas law has to be high.... 24 20 In conducting our analysis, we again begin with the the plain language of the Texas Recognition Act and note that it is the cause of action on which the judgment is based which must be contrary to Texas public policy before non-recognition is allowed. 25 In Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co., Inc. v. Ramon, we stated that [t]his subsection of the Texas Recognition Act does not refer to the judgment itself, but specifically to the `cause of action on which the judgment is based.' Thus, the fact that a judgment offends Texas public policy does not, in and of itself, permit the district court to refuse recognition of that judgment. 26 Ramon involved a Mexican judgment [that] was based on an action for collection of a promissory note with a 48% interest rate. 27 The Mexican court ruled in favor of the creditor and ordered the debtor to satisfy the debt and the 48% interest rate in full. 28 The district court, however, refused to recognize the judgment because it violated Texas public policy. 29 This court reversed, concluding that the district court erred in failing to recognize the Mexican judgment because the cause of action for collection on a promissory note did not offend Texas public policy. 30 21 Lloyd's sued Webb and Turner for breach of contract and obtained a judgment in England on that cause of action. In presenting their challenge here, Webb and Turner do not argue that a cause of action for breach of contract is contrary to Texas public policy, but instead claim that their particular judgments are contrary to Texas's breach of contract law because Lloyd's needed only to assert the existence of a contract and the amount owed, while Texas requires four elements to be established for a breach of contract claim (i.e., (i) the existence of a contract, (ii) proof of the plaintiff's performance, (iii) evidence of the defendant's breach, and (iv) damages). 31 In short, the Appellants argue that the English judgments should not be enforced because the legal standards applied by the English courts are different from the standards that the Texas courts would have applied, had Lloyd's brought its claim there. 22 Accepting the Appellants' characterization of English breach of contract law as true, the standard for non-recognition of a foreign judgment under the Texas Act is whether the cause of action is repugnant to state public policy, not whether the standards for evaluating that cause of action are the same or similar in the foreign country. In other words, 23 [e]nforcement of a judgment of a foreign court based on the law of the foreign jurisdiction does not offend the public policy of the forum simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum would have been had the original suit been brought at the forum. The very idea of a law of conflicts of law presupposes differences in the laws of various jurisdictions and that different initial results may be obtained depending upon whether one body of law is applied or another. 32 24 Because a breach-of-contract cause of action is not contrary to Texas public policy, 33 the district courts did not err in rejecting the claims of Webb and Turner and in recognizing the English judgments. 34