Opinion ID: 1057579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: the competency and conduct of the jury commissioners

Text: Mr. Hester's final argument with regard to the selection of the jury venire focuses on the competency and conduct of the McMinn County jury commissioners. He asserts that two of these commissioners were not qualified to perform their statutory duties under the law as it existed at all times relevant to this case. [44] The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this claim on the ground that Mr. Hester failed to present evidence to establish it. State v. Hester, 2009 WL 275760, at . While we differ with the Court of Criminal Appeals' reasoning, we have concluded that Mr. Hester has failed to present any evidence that he was prejudiced by the composition or the conduct of the McMinn County jury commissioners. A. On June 4, 2003, almost two years before Mr. Hester's trial, Mr. Heinsman caused subpoenas to be issued to each of McMinn County's three jury commissioners, directing them to appear at a hearing on June 9, 2003. Mr. Heinsman talked with each of the three commissioners on June 5, 2003, to explain the purpose of the subpoena and the hearing. On June 9, 2009, he filed a motion to dismiss the indictment and the jury venire on the ground that the Board of Jury Commissioners was defective. He alleged in the motion that one of the jury commissioners, Mildred Adams, lacked the mental capacity to perform her duties and that another commissioner, Henry T. Webb, was not qualified to serve as a jury commissioner because he was also a member of the McMinn County Board of Equalization. [45] Mr. Heinsman also filed an affidavit [46] attempting to establish that Ms. Adams was unavailable because someone [had] spirited [Ms.] Adams away in advance of the hearing. The State responded on June 9, 2003, by filing a motion to quash the subpoenas to the McMinn County jury commissioners. Even though two of the three commissioners were in court on June 9, 2003, the trial court declined to consider the State's motion to quash the subpoenas. Instead, the court postponed the argument on the motions to a later date to give the parties more time to consider all the motions that had been filed on the day of the hearing, including the State's motion to quash. On September 5, 2003, Mr. Hester again caused subpoenas to be issued to the McMinn County jury commissioners, directing them to appear at a hearing set for September 9, 2003. On the day of the hearing, the State again moved to quash these subpoenas on several different grounds. The trial court granted the State's motion to quash. In his motion for new trial, Mr. Hester again took issue with the competency and conduct of the McMinn County jury commissioners and supported his motion with documentary evidence regarding Mr. Webb's membership on the McMinn County Board of Equalization. Mr. Hester renewed his challenge to the competency of the McMinn County jury commissioners in the Court of Criminal Appeals. The court rejected his arguments based on the following reasoning: Upon careful examination of the record, we conclude that the defendant has failed to establish his claim that the selection of the venire list was invalidated because two of the three McMinn County jury commissioners were disqualified to act. The record reflects that counsel filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment based on an allegedly defective jury commission. However, no hearing was held on the matter and the record is thus devoid of proof to support the defendant's claim with the exception of the aforementioned affidavit regarding Ms. Adams' bad memory and the 1998 document appearing to contain Mr. Webb's signature. We conclude that these documents do not establish that Ms. Adams was unfit to serve as a jury commissioner or that Mr. Webb was disqualified by his service on another county board when the venire list was prepared in 2000. In the absence of evidence that a majority of the jury commissioners were not qualified to act, every presumption must be made in favor of their competency. Turner v. State, 111 Tenn. 593, 608 [69 S.W. 774] (1902). The defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue. State v. Hester, 2009 WL 275760, at . In its brief filed with this Court, the State dismisses Mr. Hester's arguments regarding the McMinn County jury commissioners by pointing out that the only evidence of Ms. Adams's lack of capacity to serve as a jury commissioner is Mr. Heinsman's affidavit. Even though it concedes that the McMinn County Board of Equalization document from 1998 ... appears to have been signed by Mr. Webb, the State insists that there is no other proof in the record regarding his [Mr. Webb's] alleged service on a county board of equalization. In addition, the State hastens to point out that even if one of the jury commissioners was disqualified, the acts of the remaining two commissioners would be valid. [47] We cannot agree with the State that Mr. Hester's arguments regarding the two challenged jury commissioners can properly be dismissed because of the absence of proof. We find this proposition disturbingly Kafkaesque in light of Mr. Hester's efforts to obtain the evidence in a timely manner and the State's successful opposition to these efforts in the trial court. B. The citizen jury provides the foundation of this Nation's legal system. Encroachment on the right to trial by jury was among the chief complaints registered by the American colonists in the Declaration of Independence. [48] Alexander Hamilton considered the right to trial by jury to be the very palladium of free government. [49] Thomas Jefferson believed it to be the only anchor, ever yet imagined by man, by which government can be held to the principles of [the] Constitution. [50] The right to trial by jury was held in equally high estimation [51] by the framers of Tennessee's constitutions. This Court has characterized the right as an essential element of public liberty [52] and as vital... to the security of life, liberty, and property of the citizen. [53] Just thirty years after Tennessee became a state, this Court noted that [t]he right to a trial by jury ... is too sacred to be intermeddled with by any power upon earth; too inseparable from human happiness to be submitted to the discretion of any human Legislature; it stands upon eternal foundations, and as time grows old it grows in veneration and stability. Tipton v. Harris, 7 Tenn. (1 Peck) 414, 419 (1824). Accordingly, Article I, Section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution, like the similar provisions that preceded it, preserves for all persons subject to Tennessee's laws the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law [54] when the federal government ceded to North Carolina the lands containing the territory that now comprises Tennessee. State v. Dusina, 764 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tenn.1989); Willard v. State, 174 Tenn. 642, 645, 130 S.W.2d 99 (1939). This Court has also recognized that juries, like trial judges, must be disinterested and impartial. Gribble v. Wilson, 101 Tenn. 612, 615, 49 S.W. 736, 736 (1899); Neely v. State, 63 Tenn. 174, 183 (1874). Accordingly, the right to trial by jury necessarily includes the use of methods... to secure independent and disinterested jurors. Paducah, T. & A. R.R. v. Muzzell, 95 Tenn. 200, 201, 31 S.W. 999, 999 (1895). As Justice Peck observed, [w]ho is so dull as not to know that the persons to be called as jurors, the calling of them, the place they were to come from, their selection and oath, make parts in the trial by jury. Dispense with any one requisite, and where will we stop? Kirby v. State, 15 Tenn. (7 Yer.) 259, 266 (1834) (Peck, J.). The process for selecting jurors and impaneling juries takes on great significance in criminal cases because of the role that juries play as a vital check against the abuse of power by the government and its prosecutors. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); State v. Bell, 745 S.W.2d 858, 867-68 (Tenn.1988). In order to properly fulfill this role, juries must be chosen from venires that reflect a fair cross-section of the community, and they must be indifferently chosen rather than selected with an impermissible purpose or design. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 86-87, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (quoting 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries -50). C. Because of the central role that juries play in criminal proceedings, all those involved in the process of selecting jury venires and empaneling juriesincluding the jury commissioners and coordinators, court clerks, lawyers, and judges must comply with the applicable constitutional and statutory requirements. See State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tenn.1993). In addition, to accomplish the goal that the administration of justice should not only be chaste, but should not even be suspected, [55] the process for generating jury venires and juries should be open and transparent. The State may alleviate any concerns about transparency by voluntarily making available to defendants information regarding the process for generating lists of prospective jurors and for selecting jury venires in the county where the case will be tried. Where, as in this case, the process for selecting the jury venire is more opaque than transparent, a defendant may seek judicial assistance, as Mr. Hester did, to obtain the information. However, when a defendant requests assistance in discovering or obtaining jury selection information, the courts must balance the defendant's need for the requested information with the significant administrative burdens that may arise from the request and the complexities posed to the orderly functioning of Tennessee's criminal courts that could arise from repeated requests for the same information. In balancing these interests and safeguarding the defendant's statutory and constitutional rights, we conclude that a defendant who makes a prima facie showing of a statutory or constitutional violation with regard to the preparation of lists of prospective jurors or the selection of jury venires or petit juries has the right to subpoena appropriate witnesses and documents. See Buckingham v. State, 540 S.W.2d 660, 665 (Tenn.Crim.App.1976) (stating that [a]ny accused would have the right, upon proper motion, to have the court inquire into any suspected irregularities [in selecting jury venires] ... [and] had the right to present any witnesses or other evidence that he desired in order to support his position); Ward, Tennessee Criminal Trial Practice § 20:3, at 542; see also State v. Johnson, 340 Or. 319, 131 P.3d 173, 193 (2006). To find otherwise would be to render the statutory and constitutional protections regarding the process for selecting juries elusive and hollow. Based on the record in this case, we have determined that Mr. Hester provided the trial court with enough evidence to establish a colorable claim that two of the three McMinn County jury commissioners were not qualified to serve when the Board of Jury Commissioners removed names of prospective jurors from the master list generated by the McMinn County Clerk's Office to form the jury venire at issue in this case. Mr. Hester's lawyer alleged in writing that Mr. Webb was presumptively disqualified from serving as a jury commissioner because he was also serving on the McMinn County Board of Equalization. He also alleged in writing that Ms. Adams was presumptively disqualified because she was incapable of service due to her worsening mental status and that, based on counsel's good faith belief, Ms. Adams's condition was commonly known in the McMinn County Courthouse. These written allegations provided a sufficient substantive basis for denying the State's motion to quash the subpoenas issued to McMinn County's three jury commissioners. D. Our conclusion that Mr. Hester made a colorable claim that two of McMinn County's jury commissioners were not qualified to serve does not necessarily require us to find that the trial court erred by quashing the subpoenas to the jury commissioners or that the unresolved questions regarding the competency of the jury commissioners requires a reversal of Mr. Hester's conviction and sentence. The trial court's decision to quash the subpoenas may be upheld if there are defects in the subpoenas attributable to Mr. Hester. Likewise, Mr. Hester's conviction and sentence need not be reversed based on the incompetency of two of McMinn County's jury commissioners in the absence of evidence that Mr. Hester was actually prejudiced thereby.