Opinion ID: 2621659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: response to the court's critique of the dissent

Text: ¶ 5 The court errs as a matter of law when it finds inconsistency between its pronouncement in Delk v. Markel American Insurance Co . [12] and this dissent. There, the United States court received several state-law answers to meet multiple alternative scenarios that might unfold upon its inquiry into the relationship among cotenants. All of the court's answers in Delk represent applicable and efficacious state law tendered for the certifying court's use in a pending federal-court case. ¶ 6 The court's critique of the dissent ignores and hence fails to address directly the critical point in dispute. This point is that judicial testing of state law by federal preemption standards presents for resolution a question of federal law. [13] WINCHESTER, J., with whom OPALA, V.C.J. and HODGES, J. join, dissenting. I dissent from the Court's opinion. I would decline to answer the question. Title 20 O.S.2001, § 1602 allows this Court to answer certified questions that are determinative of an issue in pending litigation. [1] The certified question before us involves the interpretation of a federal statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), and, is not a state question. Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 155 L.Ed.2d 468 (2003); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 363, 119 S.Ct. 1380, 1384, 143 L.Ed.2d 462 (1999), Palmore v. First Unum, 841 So.2d 233, 235 (Ala.2002). Our decision is not binding on a federal court. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 465, 110 S.Ct. 792, 798, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990).