Opinion ID: 883399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: The distribution of the marital estate is governed by 5 40-4-202, MCA. This statute vests the district court with broad discretion to apportion the marital estate in a manner which is equitable to each party under the circumstances. In re Mammuge Rock of (l993), 257 Mont. 476, 850 P.2d 296; In reMummageofCollelt (1981), 190 Mont. 500, 621 P.2d 1093. The standard of review employed by this Court in marital property division cases is whether the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. lnreMum'ageofMcLean/Fleury (1993), 257 Mont. 55, 849 P.2d 1012. When there is substantial credible evidence to support the court's findings and judgment, this Court will not alter the trial court's decision unless there is an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Scojfield (Mont. 1993)' 852 P.2d 664, 50 St. Rep. 560. Were the court's findings regarding the increase in value of the Inyokern property during the parties' marriage clearly erroneous? Rick contends that the court's findings in regard to the appreciation of the Inyokern property during the time that the parties were married is clearly erroneous. Therefore, he asserts that the property distribution scheme, which is based in part on the Inyokern property's appreciation, is inequitable. Rick does not challenge the court's methodology for calculating the appreciation of premarital property during the parties' marriage. However, he contends that the figures used by the court to calculate the appreciation of the Inyokern property were purely speculative and are not supported by substantial credible evidence. We agree with this contention. The District Court's findings of fact numbered 23 and 24 address the valuation of the Inyokern property. Those findings state as follows: 23. Petitioner testified that he believed Inyokern's value as of June 1989 was $103,000. Respondent testified that Petitioner told her the property was worth between $85,000 - $90,000 as of June 1989. 24. Averaging the values given by the parties, the Special Master recommends that the value as of date of marriage be established at $96,000. Thus the increase in the value of this property from the date of marriage to the date of sale is approximately $29,000. After reviewing the record, we conclude that there was no factual basis in the record for these findings. When Rick testified, he stated that he did not know the value of the Inyokern property in June 1989, but that he had sold ten acres of it for $105,000 in 1983. There is no indication what relationship that ten acres had to the 19.2 acres of Inyokern property which Rick brought into the marriage in June 1989, Although it is unclear whether a portion of Inyokern was actually sold or whether this was a lease option which ultimately fell through, there is no evidence that Rick stated that Inyokern was worth $103,000 in 1989. Furthermore, when Kim was asked about the value of the Inyokern property in 1989, she gave the following answers to the following questions during the course of her testimony: Q. (BY MR. WITCH) Moving along here, Kim, regarding the Inyokern property, you state in the [proposed] Findings that in June of '89 it was valued at $85,000. Where did that figure come from? A. That figure I had gotten from--and I think it is more of a guesstimation on the price that Rick wanted to sell it to the Hackers for. They lived right next door to us. And originally I had always heard-- MR. NEWCOMER: Objection, speculation. THE COURT: Sustained. Q. Okay. But you said that it was valued at $90,000 by Rick, not $85,000? A. Well, it was speculation on our part. We thought 8 5 to 9 0 and that's how I feel about it. It is hard when you are not real estate agents, and we are not even talking about an appraisal here. We are talking about two people talking. MR. NEWCOMER: Your Honor, I would object to this line of questioning as simply eliciting speculation as to value. In other words, in order to arrive at the value sf the Inyokern property at the time the parties were married so that it could determine the amount by which the property appreciated during the marriage, the court averaged a figure which it erroneously attributed to the testimony of Rick with a figure thrown out by Kim based on total speculation. The result was an average of $96,000, which has no factual basis in the record. In hzreMam'ageofLuki (1988), 232 Mont. 243, 756 P.2d 4 5 6 , we stated that, when valuing the assets in a marital estate, the court is free to adopt any valuation of property which is supported by the record. However, in this instance the court's findings are based largely on speculation, and we have made clear that speculation, conjecture, inference, or guess do not constitute credible factual evidence. Graham v. Rolatuhn (1967), 150 Mont. 270, We conclude that the court's findings were not supported by substantial credible evidence, and therefore, its calculation of the appreciation of the Inyokern property during the parties' marriage was clearly erroneous. The judgment of the District Court with respect to the valuation of the Inyokern property is vacated and we remand this case to the District Court for a proper determination of the amount by which the Inyokern property appreciated during the parties' marriage, 11. Did the court err in its distribution of the marital estate? Rick contends that the court erroneously awarded Kim the Nine Mile property as compensation for her share of the appreciation of Inyokern and Tehachapi because she did not contribute significantly to the appreciation of those pre-acquired properties which Rick brought into the marriage. He asserts that even if Kim did contribute to the value of Tehachapi, the court's award of half of the appreciation of both properties was disproportionate to the value of her contributions. Finally, he claims that the court should not have ordered him to pay the mortgage on the Nine Mile property because Kim testified that she would be willing to pay it if she were awarded the property. Section 40-4-202(1), MCA, sets forth the factors which must be considered by the court before distributing property acquired before the marriage. That section provides in relevant part that: In dividing property acquired prior to the marriage ... the court shall consider those contributions of the other spouse to the marriage, including: (a) the nonmonetary contribution of a homemaker; (b) the extent to which such contributions have facilitated the maintenance of this property; and (c) whether or not the property division serves as an alternative to maintenance arrangements. In this instance, the record demonstrates that the court considered Kim's contributions to the marriage, including specific contributions she ma6e to the properties in question. Eased on testimony by the parties and other witnesses, the court found that Kim had made substantial nonmonetary contributions to the marriage. There was testimony that, among other things, Kim had remodeled and painted buildings on the parties1 various properties, performed daily housekeeping activities, and kept the marital financial records. Furthermore, although a recpest for maintenance was made in the response to the petition for dissolution, no maintenance was awarded. Although the court found that the increase in the value of the Inyokern and Tehachapi properties was primarily attributable to appreciation,' it concluded that due to her contributions to the marriage, she was entitled to half of the appreciation in value of those properties. Although the evidence does not indicate that Kim's contributions resulted in any significant increase in the value of the properties in question, the record does support the finding that Kim contributed in some fashion to the maintenance and appreciation of these properties. We conclude that this evidence supports the District Court's allocation of these assets according to the considerations required by 5 40-4-202, MCA. Therefore, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Kim half of the appreciated value of the Inyokern and Tehachapi properties. Although Kim had stated that she would 10 pay the mortgage on the Mine Mile property, it was within the court's discretion to award her this property unencumbered as compensation for her share of the marital estate. This case is reversed in part and remanded for a proper determination of the amount by which the Inyokern property appreciated during the partiesi marriage. The distribution of the marital estate is affirmed subject to any adjustments necessary to reflect the corrected value of appreciation on the Inyokern property. We concur: