Opinion ID: 6107723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Interplay of Family Code sections 161.001(b) and 161.211

Text: The Legislature has set out detailed requirements for an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights. Reflecting the grave significance of such a procedure, Family Code section 161.103 includes  28 subparts. The statute requires, among other elements for a valid affidavit: (1) a waiting period after birth; (2) two witnesses; (3) verification by the parent that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interest; (4) designation of the person or agency to serve as the child's managing conservator; (5) a statement that the parent has been informed of parental rights and duties; and (6) a statement that the termination is irrevocable if that is (as here) the case. 3 The parents' affidavits complied with all statutory directives. For example, as to the requirement that the parent be informed of her parental rights and duties, the affidavit sets out 11 such rights and duties. 4 As to the irrevocable nature of the affidavits, they state: 7. Affidavit of Relinquishment is Irrevocable I fully understand that this Affidavit of Relinquishment of Parental Rights, once signed, is and shall be forever final, permanent, and irrevocable. I fully understand that if I change my mind at any time, I can never force the agency to destroy, revoke, or return this affidavit. I also understand that I will no longer be informed of any hearings or proceedings or decrees affecting the child(ren) named in this Affidavit, including any termination suit. This case concerns the interplay of two Family Code sections: 161.001(b) (governing grounds for termination orders) and 161.211 (governing attacks on termination orders). The grounds-for-termination provision, section 161.001(b), states: The court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the parent has: .... .... (K) executed before or after the suit is filed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided by this chapter; .... and (2) that the termination is in the best interest of the child. The parents emphasize that section 161.001(b) requires both a ground for termination set out in subsection (b)(1) and a separate finding under subsection (b)(2) that termination is in the child's best interest. We agree that the statute is unmistakably written in the conjunctive and requires both a statutorily-compliant affidavit and a finding that termination is in the child's best interest. But the trial court made the required best-interest finding, expressly finding by clear and convincing evidence in its order of termination that termination of the parent-child relationship of both parents was in [K.S.L.'s] best interest. The attack-on-termination provision, section 161.211 (titled Direct or Collateral Attack on Termination Order), states in subpart (c): A direct or collateral attack on an order terminating parental rights based on an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights or affidavit of waiver of interest in a child is limited to issues relating to fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution of the affidavit. 5 K.S.L.'s parents do not contend their affidavits were tainted by fraud, duress, or coercion. Instead, they argue the  trial court's best-interest determination was factually and legally insufficient. We disagree. Moreover, the parents' appeal is based on a ground not covered by the statute, and we are unpersuaded by their arguments for interpreting section 161.211(c) to allow their appeal. The parents contend section 161.211(c) should only apply to challenges to the affidavit , rather than all challenges to the order of termination. We cannot agree because the plain wording of the statute applies to attacks on any order terminating parental rights and is not limited only to attacks on the affidavit on which the order is based. The parents' suggested construction would read an order terminating parental rights based on out of the statute. We presume that lawmakers intended what they enacted and that every word in a statute should be given its natural meaning. 6 The parents suggest that we limit section 161.211(c) to attacks on the relevant affidavit, because otherwise this section would eliminate the dual requirements of an affidavit under section 161.001(b)(1) and a best-interest determination under section 161.001(b)(2). The court of appeals found this argument persuasive, quoting one of its own decisions: To hold otherwise would subsume the requirement of proving best interest by clear and convincing evidence into the requirement of proving an act or omission listed in section 161.001 by clear and convincing evidence. 7 Regardless of what section 161.001 requires of the trial judge, section 161.211(c) limits appellate review of the termination order to grounds the parents did not raise. Further, we disagree with what appears to be the parents' underlying premise. They (and the court of appeals) apparently believe the affidavit cannot by itself support a best-interest determination. We believe that the affidavit itself, in the ordinary case, can be ample evidence to support a best-interest determination. We so held in Brown v. McLennan County Children's Protective Services , where we stated that we find it was the intent of the Legislature to make such an affidavit of relinquishment sufficient evidence on which the trial court can make a finding that termination is in the best interest of the children. 8 We did not hold in Brown that the affidavit is always sufficient by itself to support a best-interest finding, but we indicated that it was generally sufficient, and was sufficient [u]nder the facts 9 in that case. 10 Brown was decided shortly before the United States Supreme Court decided Santosky v. Kramer . 11 In Santosky , the  Court held, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that when the State seeks to sever irrevocably the parent-child relationship, it must establish its grounds by clear and convincing evidence. 12 At the time Brown was decided, the Texas statute on affidavits of relinquishment required a best-interest finding, but did not require the court to make that finding by clear and convincing evidence. 13 But even under a clear-and-convincing standard, we think in the ordinary case a sworn, voluntary, and knowing relinquishment of parental rights, where the parent expressly attests that termination is in the child's best interest, would satisfy a requirement that the trial court's best-interest finding be supported under this higher standard of proof. Under the Family Code,  'Clear and convincing evidence' means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. 14 A parent's willingness to voluntarily give up her child, and to swear affirmatively that this is in her child's best interest, is sufficient, absent unusual or extenuating circumstances, to produce a firm belief or conviction that the child's best interest is served by termination. The holding and logic of Brown apply even if the standard of proof has changed. The Legislature appears to agree, as it added subsection 161.211(c) to the Family Code, and thereby limited appellate review, after it amended section 161.001 to impose the clear-and-convincing standard. 15