Opinion ID: 2383775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Question of Good Moral Character

Text: This Court admitted Daniel Manville to its Bar despite his criminal past and his conviction, fifteen years earlier, of a homicide that he committed in the course of a burglary. See Manville II, 538 A.2d at 1129-30. [10] Both Dortch's crimes and the evidence of his rehabilitation are comparable to Manville's; to the extent there are factual differences, we do not find them to be material. But the standard of proof by which we measure Dortch's claim of good moral character is stricter, and it compels us, we think, to reach a different decision. Evaluating Dortch's application in light of the so-called Manville factors, but holding that application to a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, we are not persuaded of Dortch's present good moral character to the degree of certitude required for admission to the Bar. We are obliged to begin our evaluation with what we think should be obvious. This case is not about the forgivable foibles of an applicant's callow youth. Dortch masterminded and attempted to carry out a conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery. With pecuniary motives, Dortch conceived of the crime, planned it with care, enlisted accomplices, furnished the deadly weapons, and personally led the actual attempt. It misses the point for Dortch to emphasize that the murder of Officer Cobb was not part of his plan, that he was not the direct cause of the fatal shooting, and that he was not even on the scene when it happened. It is more to the point that Dortch knowingly, deliberately, and willingly put innocent lives at risk. Officer Cobb's shooting was a foreseeable consequence, andas Dortch now concedes he cannot escape the legal or moral blame. In terms of what they say about Dortch's moral character, the several crimes he committed were indeed extremely damning. In our view there were no mitigating circumstances. This was not a crime of passion or of desperation. We are not impressed with Dortch's explanation (assuming it is true) that he could not bear to see his investors lose their investments in his business. That Dortch's venture into criminality may have been aberrational counts for nothing; perhaps, as the government contended at Dortch's sentencing, the venture would not have been so aberrational had it succeeded. In any event, Dortch's conduct was the product of neither inexperience nor immaturity. Prager, 661 N.E.2d at 92. The opposite is the case: Dortch was twenty-nine years old, married, a father, a college graduate, a Vietnam veteran, and an experienced and accomplished businessman. Dortch's moral character was not still in formation, and he was not without adequate resources to choose from a variety of paths of conduct other than the fatal path he selected. Id. Plainly, the first four Manville factors the nature and character of the offenses committed, the number and duration of offenses, the age and maturity of the applicant when the offenses were committed, the social and historical contextweigh heavily against Dortch. We need not belabor the point. The fifth Manville factor directs us to consider both the sufficiency of Dortch's punishment and his efforts to make restitution for his wrongdoing. As to the former, Dortch was paroled after serving fifteen years in prison. We will not quibble with the opinion of the Admissions Committee that Dortch's sentence adequately reflected the severity of his offense and that he did not receive inappropriate consideration of mitigating factors: he was a first offender, he surrendered to the authorities within 24 hours of learning of the death of Officer Cobb, and he was not the shooter. Of greater importance to our thinking is the fact that in all the years since his conviction, Dortch has done nothing tangible to help, nor has he offered to help, those still living whom he permanently and deeply harmed by his criminal enterprise: Officer Cobb's family, his confederates, and their families. We appreciate that extending such help might have entailed special effort and even personal sacrifice on Dortch's part. That is one of the reasons why it would have been a meaningful thing to do. It is easy to express remorse, but substantiation of that remorse through acts of restitution seems appropriate in a situation such as this one. Dortch's failure to make restitution undermines his claim of moral regeneration. Turning to the sixth and seventh factors, thirty years have elapsed since Dortch committed his offenses in 1974. Dortch's application in the interim for a Presidential pardon has not been granted. Passage of time alone is insufficient to warrant admission. Prager, 661 N.E.2d at 92-93 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Still, [b]y all accounts, as the Admissions Committee determined, there have been no episodes of misconduct, either in federal prison or in the community, since the failed armed robbery and murder. Dortch's law-abiding behavior over this extended duration is some evidence of his rehabilitation, but its probative value is limited. Like the Supreme Court of Minnesota, we are not persuaded that evidence of conduct while a petitioner is incarcerated is demonstrative of moral fitness or rehabilitation. The constant scrutiny to which the conduct of a prisoner is subjected is intended to minimize his opportunity to exercise discretion or engage in conduct beyond that delimited by prison officials. In re Thompson, 365 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn.1985). Good behavior while on paroleat least while actively supervised-arguably should be discounted for similar reasons, though surely not to the same degree. More fundamentally, service of the sentence imposed, and not committing further crimes, standing alone, do not prove rehabilitation. Merely showing that an individual is now living as and doing those things he or she should have done throughout life, although necessary to prove rehabilitation, does not prove that the individual has undertaken a useful and constructive place in society. In re Cason, 249 Ga. 806, 294 S.E.2d 520, 522-23 (1982). The eighth and ninth Manville factors direct us to consider an applicant's current attitude about his offensesi.e., his or her acceptance of responsibility, renunciation of past wrongdoing, and remorse and the applicant's candor, sincerity and full disclosure in the admission proceedings. The Admissions Committee heard directly from Dortch, questioned him closely, and ultimately credited his current statements of responsibility and remorse. [11] The Committee also found that Dortch was candid in his application and in the proceedings to examine his character and fitness, noting that he readily admitted... to having `orchestrated a conspiracy to commit an armed robbery.' While we accept the Committee's factual findings on these points, we are constrained to say that in reviewing the record, we harbor some remaining doubts about the depth and consistency of Dortch's acceptance of responsibility and remorse. As mentioned previously, those feelings have not led Dortch to try to help Officer Cobb's family or to atone to the accomplices whom he enticed into joining his criminal plot. In addition, we are taken aback by the disingenuous and self-justifying statements that Dortch made, admittedly some years ago, in moving to withdraw his guilty plea and in applying to law schoolfor instance, Dortch's characterization of his own conviction as an abortion of justice. The last two Manville factorsthe applicant's constructive activities and accomplishments subsequent to the criminal convictions and the opinions of character witnesses about the applicant's moral fitnessboth count in Dortch's favor. We are impressed with the duration and consistency of Dortch's post-incarceration efforts to rehabilitate himself and to make a positive contribution to the community through public service activities and otherwise. We likewise are impressed with the character references that Dortch has garnered from a large number of thoughtful and responsible persons who have gotten to know him and who believe he has genuinely reformed. As with any multi-factor, totality of the circumstances inquiry, the challenge comes at the end, when we must weigh and balance the factors against each other. [O]ur decisions reflect the difficulty of determining what `proof of the requisite rehabilitation following conviction of a serious crime' will suffice to justify admission. In re Kleppin, 768 A.2d 1010, 1011 (D.C.2001) (quoting In re Polin, 630 A.2d 1140, 1141 (D.C.1993)). [T]here is no litmus test for good moral character, Manville I, 494 A.2d at 1297 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), nor any rule that prescribes how much weight each factor is to be assigned. Ultimately, the balancing is committed to our honest discretion and rational good judgment. We possess no supernatural ability to look into an applicant's heart. Rather, we must divine what we need to know from the applicant's actions and outward manifestations. Some actions and outward manifestations are more revealing, and more probative, than others. So it is with acts of moral turpitude such as the crimes committed by Dortch. Given the extremely damning character of his crimes, it was incumbent on Dortch to make an exceptionally compelling showing of his full and complete rehabilitation in order to assure us of his present good moral character. We do not perceive that Dortch has made so compelling a showing. As we have seen, the Manville factors cut both ways in his case. Even Dortch's post-conviction efforts to rehabilitate himself, while commendable, have not been extraordinary enough to demonstrate a reformation of character so convincingly that it is proper to allow admission to a profession whose members must stand free from all suspicion. Matthews, 462 A.2d at 176. We do not have before us a substantial record of personal sacrifice, outstanding service to others, or similar expiative and ethical behavior on Dortch's part that would tend to confirm his indisputable moral regeneration. To the contrary, Dortch's failure to make restitutionto offer help, for example, to Officer Cobb's surviving familyseriously undermines his claim that he is fully rehabilitated. We remain uneasy, too, over some of the statements that Dortch has made in the years since his conviction. Perhaps we would reach a different conclusion, as we did on a comparable showing in Manville I and II , if the standard of proof were merely a preponderance of the evidence. But viewed in its entirety, the proof of Dortch's good moral character is not clear and convincing; the evidence is too equivocal to produce in our minds the necessary firm belief or conviction that Dortch is a new, totally rehabilitated man.