Opinion ID: 468119
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of Inspections Under the Fourth Amendment

Text: 35 The fourth amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures and imposes an obligation on the government to respect the reasonable privacy and security interests of individuals. See Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1820, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978). A government search of private property conducted without proper consent is infirm unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant or comes within one of a few carefully defined exceptions to the general rule. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730-31, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). Whether a warrantless search is nevertheless a reasonable one depends on the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy in the area searched, the importance of the governmental interest occasioning the search, and the degree to which alleged authority for the search is tailored to that interest and minimizes the intrusion. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981). We conclude that Lovgren had little if any reasonable expectation of privacy in his dock during the unshipping of a fishing vessel, that the governmental interest which occasioned the search is a compelling one and that the Magnuson Act and regulations do not invite unnecessary intrusion on privacy. Accordingly, we find that the Secretary's construction of his authority raises no fourth amendment problem. 36 [T]he expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's home. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 598-99, 101 S.Ct. at 2537-38 (citations omitted); see Bionic Auto Parts and Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F.2d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir.1983). Moreover, one who is engaged in an industry that is pervasively regulated by the government or that has been historically subject to such close supervision is ordinarily held to be on notice that periodic inspections will occur and, accordingly, has no reasonable expectations of privacy in the areas where he knows those inspections will occur. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2542, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corporation v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970). 37 The industry of which Lovgren is a part is pervasively regulated. The management plans created pursuant to the Act regulate the type, number, size, and timing of the catch that can lawfully be taken as well as the equipment that may be used in its taking. Vessels must be licensed and must account for their activities. While Lovgren himself is not the operator of a vessel, he services licensed vessels from a location where surveillance is necessary to the enforcement of the overall management scheme. 38 In addition, while the Magnuson Act is of relatively recent origin, the fishing industry has been the subject of pervasive governmental regulation almost since the founding of the Republic. 8 Indeed the expectation of finding the game warden looking over one's shoulder at the catch is virtually as old as fishing itself. 39 Also relevant to Lovgren's expectation of privacy is the fact that his dock is located on the territorial boundary of our nation and services vessels which are returning from voyages beyond its territorial waters. Given the long history of governmental control of such border activity, see e.g., 19 U.S.C., Sec. 482; United States v. Cascante-Bernitta, 711 F.2d 36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 898, 104 S.Ct. 252, 78 L.Ed.2d 239 (1983); United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 947, 91 S.Ct. 933, 28 L.Ed.2d 230 (1971), as well as the government regulation of the fishing industry, one can conclude with confidence that Lovgren, when he decided to engage in his business, must have been aware that government intrusions were bound to occur in the regular course of that business. 40 That the federal interests at stake in the effective enforcement of the Fisheries Management programs are vital to the country has been clearly articulated by Congress. 9 We agree that there is a strong federal interest in protecting the natural resources within the Fishery Conservation Zone. Congress was aware that an important national asset was at stake and that strong measures were necessary. Kaiyo Maru No. 53, 699 F.2d at 995; see Legislative History-S.Rep. at 666-71. The measures taken, including the allowance for warrantless inspections of dock areas for the purpose of identifying the fish being off-loaded, appear reasonable in light of this strong federal interest. 41 Although fishing operations in the Fishery Conservation Zone are frequently observed by aircraft and other vessels, the quantity of fish caught can only be accurately determined as the catch is unshipped after the vessel docks. As this record indicates, these landing areas are at times extremely active, particularly when the fishing vessels are discharging their catch. After the fish are transferred to shore, the various species of fish are frequently commingled with the catch from other vessels and usually are soon dispatched to market, canneries or other processors. Although the principal activity subject to regulatory control under the Magnuson Act is the fishery operation itself, the accurate determination of the quantities, and to a significant extent the species, of fish caught depends principally upon the weighing and tallying of the vessel's catch after the vessel has docked. 42 Unlike See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967), a case involving housing code violations, and Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), a case involving OSHA inspections, the government in this case will rarely have time to obtain a warrant before the status quo is changed. The fish are highly perishable and even in the best of circumstance are unlikely to remain on the docks for any length of time. Moreover, it would often be difficult to obtain a warrant in advance since the purpose of inspection will frequently be limited to obtaining information, not seeking out wrongdoers. The government often will not know when and where fishing boats will dock after returning from the Fishery Conservation Zone. See Kaiyo Maru No. 53, 699 F.2d at 995-96. 43 Finally, the statute sufficiently limits the inspecting officers in the field as to render warrantless inspections reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Enforcement is limited to those officers authorized by the Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation. 16 U.S.C. Sec. 1861(b). Furthermore, the inspection scheme is carefully tailored to the requirements of the Act and does not unnecessarily intrude on the reasonable privacy interests of those in the industry. The scope of the inspection is limited to only those times when and those places where groundfish may be found. 50 CFR Sec. 651.2. Individuals can only be fined for refusing to permit a search in connection with the enforcement of the Magnuson Act. 50 CFR Sec. 651.7(1). Thus, the participants in the fishing industry need not fear an attempt by the government to use the warrantless search provisions of the Act to enforce other statutes or to discover other criminal activity. See United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.1978).