Opinion ID: 172420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Instruction on `Substantial Change'

Text: Mr. Martinez contends that the district court erred in giving the following instruction: In order for a supplier to be liable, the injury must have been caused by a condition of the product which was not substantially changed from the condition in which the supplier placed the product on the market or in which the supplier could have reasonably expected it to be used. For substantial change in the product to relieve a supplier of liability, the change itself must be a cause of the harm done. Mr. Martinez does not challenge the substance of the instruction, which traces New Mexico Civil Uniform Jury Instruction 13-1422 word for word. He also acknowledges that the jury could find that the lock ring was not in place during the accident. Instead, Mr. Martinez argues that the lock ring's absence did not constitute a substantial change, and thus it was improper for the court to give that instruction. Relying on the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of Georgia law, Mr. Martinez argues that a substantial change occurs only when a person or entity other than the product seller changes the design construction, or formula of the product. Lamb by Shepard v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1 F.3d 1184, 1188 n. 6 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting Model Uniform Products Liability Act § 112(D)(1)). He maintains that a substantial change could not occur due to a normal, intended use of the product, such as driving the motor grader. Relatedly, Mr. Martinez further asserts that the loss of the lock ring was foreseeable to Caterpillar, and therefore does not constitute a substantial change. New Mexico law does not offer a thorough definition of substantial change, but a plaintiff has the burden of proving that a product was substantially unchanged when it reached the user or consumer. Garner v. Raven Indus., Inc., 732 F.2d 112, 114 (10th Cir.1984) (applying New Mexico law). The plaintiff must prove that the defect existed at a point in time sufficient to charge a particular defendant with the defect. Springer Corp. v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., 90 N.M. 58, 559 P.2d 846, 847 (N.M.App. 1976). In Springer, the issue was whether a defect existed in the tire at the time Firestone parted with it. Id. This court, technically applying Kansas law but recognizing that the law was undeveloped, stated that whether a change is `substantial' must depend on whether the product's design was defective prior to the change. Hiner v. Deere & Co., 340 F.3d 1190, 1199 (10th Cir.2003). Thus, in determining whether a product underwent a substantial change, the analysis focuses on the product's condition when it left the manufacturer's control and its condition at the time of the injury. The analysis does not focus on the way in which the product was changed. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Caterpillar, we assume that the lock ring was not in place when Mr. Martinez attempted to inflate the tire. The lock ring is a crucial safety device that would have prevented the tire assembly from separating. Certainly, a machine that is safe to use is in a substantially different condition from a machine that presents a major injury hazard. We conclude, therefore, that sufficient evidence was submitted to permit a finding that the change or alteration was a cause of the plaintiff's injury. N.M. Civ. UJI 13-1422 (Directions for Use). [1] Relatedly, Mr. Martinez also argues that even if the change was substantial, the change was foreseeable; therefore, the change does not absolve Caterpillar of liability. We agree that foreseeability should be part of the analysis. See Saupitty v. Yazoo, Mfg. Co., 726 F.2d 657, 659 (10th Cir.1984) (The manufacturer is liable if the subsequent modification was foreseeable.). The applicable jury instruction demonstrates that, under New Mexico law, the foreseeability analysis focuses on whether the product was substantially changed from the condition... in which the supplier could have reasonably expected it to be used. N.M. Civ. UJI 13-1422. Thus, we must determine whether Caterpillar could have reasonably expected the motor grader to be used in its altered statenot whether the change itself was foreseeable. Given that the use of the motor grader in this case involved inflating the right-front tire, the question becomes whether Caterpillar could have reasonably expected someone to inflate the tire without the lock ring in place. Mr. Martinez first argues that Caterpillar admitted the foreseeability of Mr. Martinez's accident. An expert witness testified that it was foreseeable for someone to try to inflate the tire without the lock ring in place, meaning that it could happen. But saying that an event could happen does not equate to saying that it is reasonably expected. See N.M. Civ. UJI 13-1422; see also Johnstone v. City of Albuquerque, 140 N.M. 596, 145 P.3d 76, 80 (N.M.App.2006) (Foreseeability is what one might objectively and reasonably expect, not merely what might conceivably occur.) (quotations omitted). The evidence shows that Caterpillar could not reasonably have expected that someone would attempt to inflate the motor grader's tires without the lock ring in place. Caterpillar placed a sign in the cab of the motor grader warning users not to operate the machine without reading the maintenance manuals. The manuals clearly warn of the dangers associated with inflating the tires, stating that only trained personnel should work on the tires. In addition, there was evidence that most purchasers of motor graders are sophisticated users who know how to operate the machine. Caterpillar, therefore, could have reasonably expected that properly trained personnel would perform work on the motor grader's tires. In addition, Caterpillar could reasonably expect that trained personnel would know to look for a crucial safety device such as the lock ring. [2] Thus, Caterpillar could not reasonably have expected that someone would attempt to inflate the tire without the lock ring in place. The district court did not abuse its discretion on this point. Mr. Martinez also contends that the district court should not have given the substantial change instruction because it was not supported by any evidence. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir.1969) (A party is entitled to have the jury instructed properly on his theory of the case if such theory is supported by competent evidence.). However, there was evidence at trial to support a finding that the motor grader's condition had substantially changed. Mr. Mascarenas testified that he found the lock ring approximately twenty feet behind the motor grader after the accident. An expert witness testified that the pressurized separation that caused Mr. Martinez's injuries could not have happened with the lock ring in place. Thus, evidence supported an inference that the motor grader's condition had substantially changed, and that the change was relevant to the accident. The district court, therefore, had the discretion to give the substantial change instruction.