Opinion ID: 895244
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proof required

Text: In regard to the issue urged by the State, the trial court, to commit K.E.W., was required to find by clear and convincing evidence that as a result of his mental illness, K.E.W. was likely to cause serious harm to others. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 574.034(a)(2)(B). The statute does not prescribe what evidence the State must present to carry its burden, except that it must include expert testimony and evidence of a recent overt act that tends to confirm the likelihood of serious harm to ... others. Id. § 574.034(d)(1). The court of appeals interpreted the latter as requiring evidence of a substantial threat of harm, based on actual dangerous behavior, manifested by some overt act or threats in the past. 276 S.W.3d at 695. The court further stated that evidence of possible or potential harm to others does not satisfy the State's burden. Id. at 694. Arranging previous court of appeals' cases into three categoriesthose involving Per Se Overt Acts of Dangerousness, [1] those involving Ambiguous Conduct, [2] and those involving No Substantially Dangerous Conduct [3] K.E.W. urges the court of appeals' judgment be affirmed on the basis that courts of appeals have consistently required an overt act be proven by evidence of actual harmful conduct demonstrating a threat of imminent harm to others. The State, on the other hand, urges that the statute does not require evidence of an act that either is actually harmful itself or that demonstrates harm to others is imminent. We agree with the State. In construing statutes, our primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed in the statute's language. Galbraith Eng'g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex.2009). We rely on the plain meaning of the text unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition, is apparent from the context, or unless such a construction leads to absurd results. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex.2008). Language in a statute is presumed to have been selected and used with care, and every word or phrase in a statute is presumed to have been intentionally used with a meaning and purpose. See In re Caballero, 272 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex.2008); Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex.1985). First, we address the overt act requirement. The phrase is not defined in the Health and Safety Code. Accordingly, we read it in context and construe the term according to common usage. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.011(a). When something is overt, it is generally considered to be open and observable, rather than concealed or secret. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (8th ed. 2004); WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1386 (1996). And an act is something that is done or performed. See BLACK'S at 26; WEBSTER'S at 19. Although this Court has not construed the term in the civil commitment context, courts from other jurisdictions have said it can include both physical acts and verbal statements. See, e.g., In re Mental Health of E.M., 265 Mont. 211, 875 P.2d 355, 356-57 (1994) (holding that a verbal statement of a threatening nature can constitute an overt act within the context of civil commitment cases). We do not see any indication the Legislature intended to limit the term overt act to physical conduct as opposed to any other action objectively perceptible, including verbal statements. Words can express intent just as physical actions can. For example, a person saying he is going to hit someone can reflect intent to do so, just as the physical act of making a fist and drawing back can reflect such intent. We conclude that a proposed patient's words are overt acts within the meaning of Section 574.034(d). Further, when the words expressed by a person that has a mental illness foreshadow violence, the Legislature has permitted the law's intervention to prevent serious injury to others. Stated another way, statements made by a proposed patient such as K.E.W. can be relevant both to determining whether he is mentally ill and also to predicting what actions he might or will take in the future as a result of his mental illness. The court of appeals stated that potential harm is not sufficient to deprive a person of his liberty and the threat of harm must be substantial. 276 S.W.3d at 694-95 (citing J.M. v. State, 178 S.W.3d 185, 193 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); State ex rel. L.C.F., 96 S.W.3d 651, 657 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.); In re Interest and Protection of C.O., 65 S.W.3d 175, 181-82 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2001, no pet.); Broussard v. State, 827 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (stating that [b]are psychiatric expert opinion of a `potential danger' to others is insufficient to support a commitment)). Echoing that statement, K.E.W. argues that evidence of an overt act within the meaning of the statute must show a clear and present danger of imminent harm to others. He urges that to the extent his words can be considered evidence, the requirement that they show imminent harm to others accords with the United States Supreme Court's holdings that speech is protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919). K.E.W.'s argument misses the mark. The statute does not require that the overt act demonstrate serious harm to others is imminent if the proposed patient is not committed; its language is broad enough to permit commitment even if the person's oral threat does not cause physical harm. [4] TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 574.034. Rather, the statute requires evidence of an overt act that tends to confirm the likelihood of serious harm to others. Id. § 574.034(d). In determining the meaning of the statutory language, we presume its words were selected with care and used with purpose. See In re Caballero, 272 S.W.3d at 599. Likelihood connotes more than mere possibility or conjecture and is synonymous with probability. WEBSTER'S at 1114; see Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 681 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied). Some appellate courts, including the court of appeals in this case, have held that the proposed patient must have engaged in actual dangerous behavior manifested by an overt act or threats. See, e.g., 276 S.W.3d at 695 (citing J.M., 178 S.W.3d at 196; Taylor v. State, 671 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ)). This proposition seems to have originated with the court of appeals' analysis in Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 948-51 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976, no writ). In Moss , physicians testified that their diagnoses were based on statements the proposed patient made to them, but they did not reveal the contents of those statements or explain why they believed she was dangerous. Id. The Moss court stated that an order for involuntary commitment must be supported by the recommendation of a physician and proof of the factual information on which the recommendation was based. Id. at 950. We do not read Moss as requiring proof of a substantial threat of future harm founded on actual, dangerous behavior. In any event, after Moss was decided, the Legislature specified both the criteria by which a person can be ordered to submit to mental health services and certain elements of evidence required by the clear and convincing evidentiary standard in such proceedings. Act of April 20, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 47, § 50, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 211, 241 (current version recodified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 574.034); see also HOUSE STUDY GROUP, BILL ANALYSIS, C.S. S.B. 435, 68th Leg., R.S., 4 (1983). The statute applicable to this case does not require evidence of a recent overt act that by itself proves the likelihood a proposed patient will cause serious harm to others. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 574.034(d). It requires only that the overt act tends to confirm the likelihood of serious harm. Id. Tends means to have leaning, to contribute to, or have a more or less direct bearing or effect. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1507 (8th ed. 2004) (defining tend as to be disposed toward something; to serve, contribute, or conduce in some degree or way; to have more or less a direct bearing or effect; and to be directed or have a tendency to an end, object, or purpose); WEBSTER'S at 1955 (defining tend as to be disposed or inclined in action, operation, or effect to do something); see also Simmons v. State, 282 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (stating that in determining whether non-accomplice evidence tends to connect a defendant to the offense, the evidence must simply link the accused in some way to the commission of the crime and show that rational jurors could conclude that this evidence sufficiently tended to connect [the accused] to the offense (quoting Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex.Crim. App.2008))); Nash v. State, 61 Tex.Crim. 259, 134 S.W. 709, 717-21 (Tex.Crim.App. 1911) (defining the word tend as [t]o stretch, extend, direct one's course; to be directed as to any end, object or purpose; to aim; to have or give a leaning and stating that if the circumstances lead toward, or tend toward, the defendant as the party who committed the offense, and show the truth of the prosecutrix, this would be all the law required). Accordingly, a recent overt act by a proposed patient tends to confirm that the patient poses a likelihood of serious harm to others within the meaning of Section 573.034(d) if the overt act is to some degree probative of a finding that serious harm is probable, even though the overt act itself may not be dangerous. Such a construction honors the statute's language and the Legislature's attempt to fairly balance the rights of a proposed patient, the difficulties in predicting future behavior of mentally ill persons, and the community's interest in protection from persons who are mentally ill and who, by reason of their illness, may commit future harmful acts against others. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-30, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). In sum, the statute requires evidence of a recent act by the proposed patient, either physical or verbal, that can be objectively perceived and that is to some degree probative of a finding that serious harm to others is probable if the person is not treated. The overt act itself need not be of such character that it alone would support a finding of probable serious harm to others. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 573.034(d)(1). Keeping the foregoing in mind, we next review the evidence presented at the commitment hearing.