Opinion ID: 2655846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: errors in district court’s factual findings

Text: Brown contends that the district court’s ruling contained several factual errors that constitute clear error, and therefore warrant reversal. Specifically, to overcome any presumption that they were merely innocent passengers, and in the Court’s opinion established probable cause for their arrest likewise”); Matter of E.G., 482 A.2d 1243, 1247 (D.C. 1984) (finding probable cause where suspect matched complainant’s description and refused officer’s order to halt; the court explained that “the strong correlation between appellant’s appearance and the description possessed by [the officer], together with appellant’s proximity to the crime scene and his behavior when confronted with a police order to halt, tips the scales here in favor of probable cause”); LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.4(c) (explaining that “if the officer attempts a lawful stop but the suspect ‘refused to stop when initially ordered to do so,’ this may also be taken into account” in the probable cause analysis). 14 Case: 13-60223 Document: 00512551826 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/06/2014 No. 13-60223 he challenges the district court’s findings that: (1) counterfeit money was found “in the vehicle and on the persons of Jones and Brown”; (2) Guyton “provided a description of the persons that were offering the counterfeit bills”; (3) Brown was a passenger in the truck and “almost immediately exited the truck and attempted to walk into the convenience store”; (4) and Guyton told “one or both or both defendants, ‘You gave me a fake 100-dollar bill.’” Brown also argues that the district court committed clear error when it stated that Jones’s response to Guyton, that he “will make it right,” was “indicative to the [c]ourt that Jones and the other occupant, Brown, were aware that the currency passed at the yard sale was counterfeit currency.” We conclude that the district court’s first finding constitutes clear error, since there was no testimony that counterfeit money was found on Brown’s person. However, the district court’s erroneous finding does not alter our Terry or probable cause analyses, since there was sufficient evidence to reach our conclusions absent the error. Therefore, the court’s finding does not affect Brown’s substantial rights, and is harmless error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52; see United States v. Hughes, 726 F.3d 656, 668 (5th Cir. 2013). The district court’s other findings are not clearly erroneous. Guyton provided a description of both Jones and Brown, and their vehicle, that was sufficient for Officer Benjamin to identify them. The fact that Guyton’s description of Brown was less specific than her description of Jones is not material; Brown was found accompanying Jones and in the vehicle that Guyton described. The court’s finding that Brown was a passenger in the vehicle and attempted to enter the convenience store is supported by the record and the patrol car’s video. The court’s finding that Guyton informed “one or both defendants” of the counterfeit bill is likewise not erroneous, since the record reveals that she made her statement to Jones. 15 Case: 13-60223 Document: 00512551826 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/06/2014 No. 13-60223 Finally, the court did not commit clear error when it suggested that Jones’s statement was indicative of Brown’s guilt. Since Guyton’s information implicated both defendants, and Brown’s independent actions reasonably raised Officer Benjamin’s suspicions, there is a “reasonable view of the evidence [] support[ing]” the district court’s statement. See Scroggins, 599 F.3d at 440. Moreover, even if the court’s statement were clearly erroneous, it would not change our Terry or probable cause analyses, since there was sufficient evidence to reach our conclusions without consideration of Jones’s statement.