Opinion ID: 487837
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comments by Cepeda's Counsel During Final Argument

Text: 24 LaChance did not testify at the trial. He argues that the district court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial as to him on grounds that counsel for Cepeda, who did testify, commented upon his right to remain silent during the closing argument. Counsel for Cepeda told the jury that you had better be clean up there when you take the stand because if you're not, Mr. Kennedy (the prosecutor) will have her in his hand. Transcript at 1658. No objection was made when the comment occurred. LaChance moved for a mistrial only after the closing charge had been given by the court and contended that the remark by counsel for Cepeda constituted a side slap at those who have not taken the stand and an impermissible reference to his client's failure to testify. Transcript at 1695. No other relief was thereafter requested. 25 In United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 553 (5th Cir.1979), the court distinguished between an adverse reference to an accused's silence by counsel for a testifying co-defendant, which is improper, and a favorable observation by that lawyer on the willingness of his own client to testify, which, we hold, is permissible. The court found no error where counsel made no reference to the silence of other defendants but merely observed that [his own client] had told his story under oath, subject to cross-examination and before the scrutiny of the jury. Compare DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.1962), in which a co-defendant's attorney's direct comment on the failure of another accused to testify constituted reversible error. 26 We see no significant difference between the remarks in Diecidue and those of Cepeda's lawyer, and we hold that the comment was not error. See also United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1362 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Washington, 550 F.2d 320, 328 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Hodges, 502 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.1974). 27 We note further that the court in its final instructions instructed the jury that the government bore the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It also admonished the jury that if a defendant elects not to testify, you should not consider this in any way during your deliberations. This language afforded LaChance the protection to which he was entitled.