Opinion ID: 2507041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ford's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Other Windstar Van Fires

Text: Ford filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the seven other Windstar van fires because the fires did not occur under substantially similar circumstances as the Funkhouser fire and were not caused by the same or substantially similar defects and dangers as alleged in the Funkhouser fire. Although the circuit court found the seven other fires occurred under substantially similar circumstances as the Funkhouser fire since the fires occurred while the vehicles were stationary and no key was in the ignition, the court concluded the other Windstar van fires were not caused by the same or similar defects and dangers as those alleged to have caused the Funkhouser fire. Specifically, the circuit court reasoned that the Funkhouser defect has to be identified with specificity to charge Ford with actual notice of that defect, which it had knowledge of by specific defects identified in the seven fires. Finding [t]he exact defect is not known in the Funkhouser fires, the court concluded it is not fair to Ford to say it is the `same or similar defect and danger' as noted in the other fires and there is not enough specificity noted in the seven fires to say what the defect was that Ford had to warn of or correct. Therefore, the circuit court ruled evidence of the seven other Windstar van fires was inadmissible for any purpose, including as a predicate for the testimony of [Funkhouser's] expert witnesses. After the circuit court granted Ford's motion in limine, the parties entered into an agreed final order wherein Funkhouser stipulated, without waiving his objections to the court's ruling excluding the evidence of the other Windstar van fires, that absent evidence of those fires, he would be unable to prove his failure to warn claims, and therefore, entry of summary judgment was proper.