Opinion ID: 1896318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the memorandum agreement was ambiguous.

Text: ¶ 6. In contract construction cases a court's focus is upon the objective fact  the language of the contract. [A reviewing court] is concerned with what the contracting parties have said to each other, not some secret thought of one not communicated to the other. Turner v. Terry, 799 So.2d 25, 32 (Miss.2001); Osborne v. Bullins, 549 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Miss.1989). Only if the contract is unclear or ambiguous can a court go beyond the text to determine the parties' true intent. [T]he mere fact that the parties disagree about the meaning of a contract does not make the contract ambiguous as a matter of law. Turner, 799 So.2d at 32; Cherry v. Anthony, 501 So.2d 416, 419 (Miss.1987). ¶ 7. Questions concerning the construction of contracts are questions of law that are committed to the court rather than questions of fact committed to the fact finder. Parkerson v. Smith, 817 So.2d 529, 532 (Miss.2002); Miss. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Patterson Enters., Ltd., 627 So.2d 261, 263 (Miss.1993). The standard of review for questions of law is de novo. Parkerson, 817 So.2d at 532; Starcher v. Byrne, 687 So.2d 737, 739 (Miss.1997). ¶ 8. A reviewing court should seek the legal purpose and intent of the parties from an objective reading of the words employed in the contract to the exclusion of parol or extrinsic evidence. The reviewing court is not at liberty to infer intent contrary to that emanating from the text at issue. Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So.2d 236, 239 & 241 (Miss.1991). When construing a contract, we will read the contract as a whole, so as to give effect to all of its clauses. Brown v. Hartford Ins. Co., 606 So.2d 122, 126 (Miss.1992). We must look to the four corners of the contract whenever possible to determine how to interpret it. McKee v. McKee, 568 So.2d 262, 266 (Miss.1990). Our concern is not nearly so much with what the parties may have intended, but with what they said, since the words employed are by far the best resource for ascertaining the intent and assigning meaning with fairness and accuracy. Simmons v. Bank of Miss., 593 So.2d 40, 42-43 (Miss.1992). ¶ 9. The chancellor found as follows: The agreement between Phillips and Fitzner says that they desire to reduce their understanding with respect to financial advances to writing. Therefore there is no need nor right to vary or add to the written agreement as the parties intended the written agreement to be complete and whole, the integration of their agreement to writing. Prior negotiations and agreements were merged into the written agreement. The advances to be made by Phillips are to be made to the business, not to Fitzner. Nowhere in the agreement does Fitzner agree to repay the advances made by Phillips to the business. What Fitzner does agree is that the advances shall be repaid by the business prior to any other disbursements from the business. Fitzner also does agree to the interest rate that the business shall pay Phillips for his loans to the business. Nowhere within the four corners of the agreement is there any language which can be interpreted as an agreement by Fitzner to repay Phillips for any advances which Phillips chooses to make to the business, including any disproportionate advances that Phillips may have made to the business in the past. Nowhere in the written agreement does Fitzner agree to be personally liable for principal and interest on any prior advances made by Phillips to the business. This written agreement would have been the logical and reasonable time and place for Fitzner to agree in writing to be liable personally for both previous and future advances by Phillips to the business and he did not. This written agreement was also the logical and reasonable manner in which Fitzner and Phillips would have memorialized any prior agreement between them that any prior advances by Phillips to the business were actually loans to Fitzner and advances by him to the business. No such memorialization was made notwithstanding the parties['] statement that the purpose of the writing was to reduce to writing their agreement on advances to the business. The written agreement evidences that Fitzner would not at that time advance more money to the business but if Phillips chose to do so, Phillips would be repaid by the business, as a creditor, any disproportionate advances in preference to any claims of Fitzner, as a partner. ¶ 10. The chancellor did not err in finding that the memorandum agreement was unambiguous. A contract is sufficiently definite if it contains matters which will enable the court under proper rules of construction to ascertain its terms. Duke v. Whatley, 580 So.2d 1267, 1274 (Miss.1991). The chancellor obviously spent a great deal of time analyzing the document and determining the meaning of its provisions. The chancellor correctly found that the document does not contain any provision making Fitzner personally liable for repayment of Phillips' advances to the business. The document plainly states that Phillips will be repaid first for his disproportionate advances from any proceeds from the sale of the business. Phillips' advances are recognized, and a process was established whereby Phillips would be repaid. Therefore, we conclude that the memorandum agreement was not ambiguous.