Opinion ID: 580873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Postal Service's Liability for Back Pay

Text: 22 When an employer has violated Title VII, a court may award back pay to make the employee whole for the injuries he has suffered. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2373, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). Before doing the algebra, the court must first ascertain the time period of the employer's liability. An employee is generally entitled to back pay from the date of his wrongful termination to the date the discrimination is rectified. See EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local No. 638 of U.A., 542 F.2d 579, 590 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied sub nom., Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local No. 638 of U.A., 430 U.S. 911, 97 S.Ct. 1186, 51 L.Ed.2d 588 (1977). However, back pay will no longer accrue if the employer makes an unconditional offer to reinstate the employee, and the employee rejects the offer. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 241, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 3070, 73 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982). When that occurs, the employer's liability for back pay is tolled on the date the employee rejects the offer. Id. at 239, 241, 102 S.Ct. at 3069, 3070. 23 Whether the employer made an unconditional offer of reinstatement, and whether the employee rejected that offer, are questions of fact to be determined by the district court. See Pierce v. F.R. Tripler & Co., 955 F.2d 820, 830 (2d Cir.1992). We will reverse the district court only if its findings are clearly erroneous; that is, the district court's determination of the evidence need only be plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Applying this deferential standard to the present case, we hold that the district court's findings that (1) the Postal Service made an unconditional offer of reinstatement to Clarke, and (2) Clarke rejected that offer, are supported by the record. 24 We need only look at the Postal Service's December 16, 1985 letter to determine that Clarke was unconditionally offered reinstatement. The letter states In compliance with the Equal Opportunity Commission's decision, you will be reinstated as a city carrier to the Long Island City Post Office, effective January 18, 1986.... It placed no qualifications on Clarke's reinstatement, aside from the Postal Service's standard prerequisites that Clarke pass a driver's test and a physical examination. Thus, the district court did not err in finding that the Postal Service unconditionally offered reinstatement to Clarke. 25 It is equally clear that Clarke rejected the Postal Service's offer. Clarke's January 15, 1986 letter states: 26 I am now faced with having to choose one of two prolific opportunities: 1) accepting the January 18, 1986 reinstatement or 2) completing my final semester at Baruch College.... 27 My decision to continue with my studies is a very responsible one. I regret being in the position of not being able to work and go to school at this time. 28 Clarke's letter reflects his obvious intention to decline the Postal Service's offer of reinstatement. Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Clarke rejected the offer. 29 Inexplicably, the district court cut off Clarke's right to back pay as of December 16, 1985 (the date of the reinstatement offer), rather than January 15, 1986 (the date Clarke rejected the offer). This is squarely contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Ford Motor Co. that back pay accrues until the date that an aggrieved employee rejects the employer's reinstatement offer. Thus, under Ford Motor Co., the Postal Service's back pay liability runs from July 27, 1981 (the date of Clarke's termination) to January 15, 1986 (the date Clarke rejected the Postal Service's reinstatement offer). 30 Accordingly, we do not disturb the district court's calculation of back pay from July 27, 1981 until December 16, 1985. We reverse the district court's decision to limit the Postal Service's back pay liability to December 16, 1985, and remand to the district court with instructions to determine the appropriate back pay due for the month between December 16, 1985 and January 15, 1986.