Opinion ID: 181309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: SORNA Registration

Text: Pilati divides issue IX, challenging the magistrate judge's requirement that Pilati register under SORNA, into two parts. First, he asserts the magistrate judge committed reversible error in requiring him to register as a sex offender because he was not convicted of a qualifying offense. Second, he contends the magistrate judge erred in requiring him to register because he was not charged in the indictment or found guilty of a sex offense against a minor. We review for abuse of discretion the imposition of a special condition of supervised release, as long as the objection was preserved for appeal. United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir.2010) (en banc). We review the trial court's interpretation of a statute de novo. Id. The trial court abuses its discretion if it applies the incorrect legal standard. Id. Both of Pilati's arguments under issue IX are without merit. While Pilati raised the issue of not being convicted of a qualifying offense before the magistrate judge, he did not raise this issue in his appeal to the district court. Thus, this argument has been waived or abandoned by his failure to raise it on appeal to the district court. Alternatively, our precedent is contrary to Pilati's argument. District judges do not need a statute to spell out every instance of conduct that is a sexual offense against a minor. They are capable of examining the underlying conduct of an offense and determining whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor. Dodge, 597 F.3d at 1355. Here, the magistrate judge examined the underlying conduct of the offense in Count Four and correctly determined Pilati had engaged in conduct that by its nature [was] a sex offense against a minor. See id. Pilati's argument that he should not have been required to register as a sex offender because he was not charged in the indictment or found by the jury to have committed a sex offense against someone under 18 is also meritless. When a defendant fails to object to statements in the PSI despite several opportunities to do so, a defendant is deemed to have admitted those facts. United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825, 833-34 (11th Cir.2006); see also United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.2006) (stating [i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a PSI admits those facts for sentencing purposes); United States v. Williams, 438 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir.2006) (stating the defendant's failure to contest the 37 grams [of crack cocaine] imputed in the PSI constituted an admission of that quantity). While it is true that neither the indictment nor the jury finding specified the victim's age, the PSI specified that A.Y., the victim in Count Four, was 17 years old when Pilati strok[ed] A.Y.'s testicles, concentrating on the area between his penis and his testicles, and then held A.Y.'s penis while he urinated into the cup for drug testing. Pilati did not object to the statement in the PSI that A.Y. was 17 years old despite several opportunities to do so. Pilati did not object to this statement in his written objections to the PSI, nor did he object at sentencing when the magistrate judge referred to A.Y. as a minor. Further, he responded in the negative when asked if he had any further objections to the magistrate judge's findings of fact after the sentence was imposed. All these facts show Pilati failed to object to this factual allegation in the PSI despite being given multiple opportunities to do so. Thus, he is deemed to have admitted A.Y. was a minor at the time of the offense.