Opinion ID: 599160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Damages for Emotional Distress

Text: 36 In light of our conclusion that Johnson's claims are barred, we need not consider whether the district court erred in holding that he had failed to prove damages for emotional distress because he had shown no physical manifestation of that distress. However, even if no physical manifestation is required, it is clear that evidence of emotional distress must be more substantial than that adduced by Johnson to support such a claim. 37 Johnson based his claim of emotional distress on the following statement which he made at trial: 38 This is concerning damages involving the lawsuit, and we feel at this time that damages are appropriate. And the decision not to hear the [motions] really brought about [a] character conflict with myself, indicating that going back to the plant and talking to those individuals, those members, those other board members at that time made things very difficult to face the peers. And no one really thinks about that, but it is a fact of life that one thinks about what the peers think of them. And I try to be an upstanding person and try to follow procedures.... 39 Jt.App. 241-42 (Transcript of John Johnson's Testimony 106-07). This is simply not enough to award emotional distress damages. Damages for emotional distress may be awarded upon a showing of intimidation, marital problems, weight loss, loss of sleep, shock, or humiliation. See Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 754 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 376, 121 L.Ed.2d 287 (1992); Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 210 (6th Cir.1990); Murphy v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18, 774 F.2d 114, 125-26 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017, 106 S.Ct. 1201, 89 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986). We do not think that the character conflict described by Johnson is comparable to these emotional distress claims; therefore, his claim could not succeed. 40 We REVERSE the application of NLRA § 10(b) to Bradley's LMRDA § 101(a)(5) claim and REMAND for application of Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1). In all other regards, we AFFIRM.