Opinion ID: 1137000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the alleged school house confessions

Text: The defendants contend that there is not substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that no confessions were made at the school. We believe that, under any standard, [9] if confessions were made at the school in the manner contended by the defendants, those confessions should have been suppressed and the confessions made at the trooper's station should also have been suppressed as the fruits of the earlier confession. We hold, however, that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that no confessions were made at the school. Accordingly, we are not confronted with the issue of whether those alleged confessions were made involuntarily and whether the subsequent confessions must be suppressed as illegal fruits of earlier confessions. [10] United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.1977), makes clear the difference between the appellate scope of review of the factual question whether a confession was, in fact, made, and of the mixed factual and legal question whether the confession was entered voluntarily. The inquiry whether, in a particular case, a confession was voluntarily or involuntarily made involves, at the least, a three-phase process. First, there is the business of finding the crude historical facts, the external, phenomenological occurrences and events surrounding the confession. Second, because the concept of voluntariness is one which concerns a mental state, there is the imaginative recreation, largely inferential, of internal psychological fact. Third, there is the application to this psychological fact of standards for judgment informed by the larger legal conceptions ordinarily characterized as rules of law but which, also, comprehend those inductions from, and anticipation of, factual circumstances. Culoumb v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. at [568] 603, 81 S.Ct. [1860] at 1879 [6 L.Ed.2d 1037]. As to the first phase, findings of historical fact, great deference is afforded the trier of fact because of its ability to observe the witnesses' demeanor. Resolution of testimonial conflicts and specific findings of fact by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear from the record that an error has been committed. Id. at 603, 81 S.Ct. 1860 [at 1879]. In reviewing the second and third phases of the inquiry, determining the mental state of the accused and assessing its legal significance, appellate courts are granted greater leeway: ... For the mental state of involuntariness upon which the due process question turns can never be affirmatively established other than circumstantially  that is, by inference; and it cannot be competent to the trier of fact to conclude our review simply by declining to draw inferences which the historical facts can tell. Id. at 604-05, 81 S.Ct. at 1880. 557 F.2d at 547-48. Thus, our scope of review on the question of whether a confession was in fact made is confined to determining whether the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous; [11] on the voluntariness question, we have a duty to examine the entire record and make an independent determination. With these principles in mind, we now proceed to determine whether the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding that no confession was made at the school. The testimony was hopelessly in conflict. Troyer and Vincent testified that they did, in fact, make confessions at the school. On the other hand, the officers testified that no confessions were made at the school. Vincent testified that he told Trooper Sumey at the trooper station about the prior confessions. Trooper Sumey testified that the defendants made no mention of any prior confessions, which is consistent with the arresting officers' version. The testimony of the polygraph expert supported the defendants' version. The trial court considered this testimony to the extent of indicating that he believed the defendants thought what they related was truthful. [12] Here, the trial judge's decision depended largely on the oral testimony of witnesses seen and heard by him and on inferences to be drawn from the statements made. Thus, we give due regard to his opportunity to judge the credibility of such witnesses. [13] Had we been the trier of fact, we might have concluded that confessions were made at the school. Nevertheless, given our limited scope of review of factual findings, we are not convinced that the trial judge's finding that no confessions were made at the school was clearly erroneous and it is hereby affirmed. This conclusion disposes of the defendants' argument that the alleged confessions were made involuntarily. Furthermore, it disposes of their argument that the subsequently-obtained confessions by Troyer and Vincent at the trooper station and by McGahan should have been suppressed as fruits of the alleged confessions at the school.