Opinion ID: 2778011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Prohibited Conduct

Text: The conduct prohibited by the offense of electronic enticement of a child in the first degree is stated as follows: (1) Any person who, using a computer or any other electronic device: (a) Intentionally or knowingly communicates: (i) With a minor known by the person to be under the age of eighteen years; (ii) With another person, in reckless disregard of the risk that the other person is under the age of eighteen years, and the other person is under the age of eighteen years; or (iii) With another person who represents that person to be under the age of eighteen years; (b) With the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony: (i) That is a murder in the first or second degree; (ii) That is a class A felony; or (iii) That is another covered offense as defined in section 846E-1, agrees to meet with the minor, or with another person who represents that person to be a minor under the age of eighteen years; and (c) Intentionally or knowingly travels to the agreed upon meeting place at the agreed upon meeting time . . . . HRS § 707-756(1) (emphases added). Therefore, HRS § 707-756 contains three distinct conduct elements: (1) communication with - 18 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER a Minor15 (communication element), (2) agreement to meet (agreement element), and (3) travel to the agreed place at the agreed time (travel element); (collectively, conduct elements). The scope of the applicability of the mens rea “intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony” (felonious intent) to the conduct elements has not been directly addressed by this court.
The fundamental starting point of statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Hawaii Gov’t Emps. Ass’n v. Lingle, 124 Hawaiʻi 197, 202, 239 P.3d 1, 6 (2010). Thus, where the statutory language is unambiguous, our duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning. Id. The plain language and structure of HRS § 707-756 indicate that the felonious intent does not apply to all of the conduct elements of HRS § 707-756. HRS § 707-756 includes three distinct elements with separate mens rea requirements: (a) intentionally or knowingly communicating with a Minor; (b) agreeing to meet the Minor with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony; and (c) intentionally or 15 For convenience of discussion the term “Minor” includes all three categories encompassed by HRS § 707-756(1)(a): (1) a person known by the actor to be under the age of eighteen years, (2) a person who represents to the actor that the person is under the age of eighteen years, or (3) a person under the age of eighteen years where the actor communicates with the person in reckless disregard of the risk the person is underage. - 19 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER knowingly traveling to the agreed meeting place at the agreed time. Thus, for each element, there is a specific mental state that corresponds to the required physical act. The three elements are listed in discrete subsections: (1)(a), (1)(b), and (1)(c). Both the communication element of subsection (1)(a) and the traveling element of subsection (1)(c) must be “intentionally or knowingly” committed. HRS § 707756(1)(a), (c). Only the second element of agreeing to meet the Minor in subsection (1)(b) must be made with “the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony.” HRS § 707756(1)(b). There is nothing to indicate that the mens rea of the agreement element found in subsection (1)(b) was meant to apply to the communication and traveling elements found in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(c), respectively; such an interpretation of the statute is contrary to the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statute. Our reading of HRS § 707-756 is consistent with this court’s application of the statute in State v. McKnight, 131 Hawaiʻi 379, 319 P.3d 298 (2013). In that case, the majority and the dissent, while not specifically analyzing the application of the felonious intent to the conduct elements, separated the felonious intent from the communication and traveling elements when discussing the statute. Id. at 389, 319 P.3d at 308 (finding “it apparent that each of these elements serv[es] a - 20 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER distinct purpose”); see also id. at 400, 319 P.3d at 319 (Recktenwald, C.J., dissenting) (noting that “the statute requires the State to prove that the defendant did three things” and listing each element separately).
The legislative history of a statute remains relevant “even when the language appears clear upon perfunctory review.” Richardson v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 76 Hawaiʻi 46, 68-69, 868 P.2d 1193, 1215-16 (1994). “Were this not the case, a court may be unable to adequately discern the underlying policy which the legislature seeks to promulgate and, thus, would be unable to determine if a literal construction would produce an absurd or unjust result, inconsistent with the policies of the statute.” Id. (quoting Survivors of Medeiros v. Maui Land & Pineapple Co., 66 Haw. 290, 297, 660 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983)). The legislative history of HRS § 707-756 also supports an interpretation that the felonious intent applies only to the agreement element. When HRS § 707-756 was first enacted in 2002, 2002 Haw. Sess. Laws. Act 200, § 1 at 841-42, the House Standing Committee on the Judiciary & Hawaiian Affairs reported that the purpose of the House Bill that eventually became HRS § 707-756 was “to deter crimes against minors by . . . prohibit[ing] the use of a computer or other electronic device to lure a minor to a meeting with intent to commit a felony.” - 21 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 417, in 2002 House Journal, at 1399 (emphasis added). The Senate Standing Committee on Health and Human Services reported: Your Committee finds that the use of the Internet to entice children into meetings has become widespread. Current laws do not specifically address using computers to communicate with minors for purposes of committing crime. This measure would close that loophole, and would allow sex offenders to be investigated and prosecuted before they commit a kidnapping or other crime. S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 2867, in 2002 Senate Journal, at 1384 (emphasis added); see also S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 3131, in 2002 Senate Journal, at 1498 (using the same language). Interpreting the felonious intent so that it also applies to the travel element would appear inconsistent with the underlying policy of the statute, which is to protect children. H. Stand. Comm. No. 417, in 2002 House Journal, at 1399 (“The purpose of the bill is to deter crimes against minors.”). A person who arranges a meeting with a Minor with a felonious intent and then travels to that meeting presents an immediate physical danger to the Minor. See McKnight, 131 Hawaiʻi at 389, 319 P.3d at 308 (“[R]equiring that the defendant travel to an agreed-upon meeting place at an agreed-upon meeting time ensures that an individual is prosecuted only in situations where his behavior poses an actual physical threat to the child.”). A statute that absolves a person from liability based upon the abandonment of felonious intent en route to the meeting would - 22 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER not protect children in conformance with the purpose of the legislation.16
“Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.” State v. Kamanʻo, 118 Hawaiʻi 210, 218, 188 P.3d 724, 732 (2008); see also HRS § 1-16 (1993). The offense of electronic enticement of a child in the second degree, HRS § 707-757 (Supp. 2013), which concerns the same subject matter as the first degree offense, HRS § 707-756, is defined as:
electronic device:

under the age of eighteen years;
of the risk that the other person is under the age of eighteen years, and the other person is under the age of eighteen years; or
person to be under the age of eighteen years; and
commission of a felony, agrees to meet with the minor, or with another person who represents that person to be a minor under the age of eighteen years; and 16 If the felonious intent also applied to the travel element, then its abandonment during the travel element would not permit the offense to be charged, even if that actor again changed his or her mind upon meeting the Minor. - 23 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
agreed upon meeting place at the agreed upon meeting time . . . . HRS § 707-757 (emphasis added). HRS § 707-757 directly links the felonious intent with the agreement element. Because HRS §§ 707-756 and 707-757 are manifestly in pari materia, the clarity with which HRS § 707-757 connects the felonious intent to the agreement element buttresses the conclusion that the intent of the legislature was to assign the felonious intent to the agreement element only. Therefore, in light of the plain language of HRS § 707-756, its legislative history, and the doctrine of in pari materia, we conclude that the “intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony” set forth in the agreement element applies to that element only.