Opinion ID: 2209506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Legal Expenses in Prior Proceedings

Text: Woollen claims the trial court erred in granting the State's motion to strike his claim for damages for legal expenses incurred by Woollen in prior proceedings brought to collect medical fees he incurred for the treatment of injuries he sustained in the accident. Because the trial court acted on a motion to strike, it heard no evidence as to the allegations in the petition for damages for attorney fees in prior proceedings, and we assume the truth of the allegations. See Thacker v. State, 193 Neb. 817, 229 N.W.2d 197 (1975). We conclude the trial court erred in striking this claim, and we reverse, and remand for further proceedings with respect to this item of damages. The State observes in its brief that with regard to the recovery of attorney fees in Nebraska, the general rule is that such fees are recoverable only when provided for by statute or allowed in the uniform course of procedure. See, Zimmerman v. FirsTier Bank, 255 Neb. 410, 585 N.W.2d 445 (1998); Schirber v. State, 254 Neb. 1002, 581 N.W.2d 873 (1998). The rule applies, however, only when the party to litigation is seeking to recover attorney fees in the very case being litigated. See, Zimmerman v. FirsTier Bank, supra ; Tetherow v. Wolfe, 223 Neb. 631, 392 N.W.2d 374 (1986). In Tetherow, we held that the trial court correctly allowed as an item of the plaintiff's damages certain attorney fees which the plaintiff had incurred in defending an earlier legal action which were occasioned by the tort of the defendant. Thus, in Tetherow, the plaintiff vendor sued the defendant real estate broker for the broker's failure to properly prepare a real estate sale contract. We approved as an item of damages the attorney fees the vendor had expended defending a suit brought by the purchaser of the real estate to recover the downpayment. In support of our conclusion, we quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 914(2) (1979), which states: One who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover reasonable compensation for loss of time, attorney fees and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred in the earlier action. Tetherow, 223 Neb. at 638, 392 N.W.2d at 379. In response to Woollen's assignment of error, the State relies upon Brochner v. Western Ins. Co., 724 P.2d 1293 (Colo.1986). The Brochner court held that a primarily liable, joint tort-feasor was not obligated in a contribution action to pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by the secondarily liable tort-feasor, in defending the original action filed by the injured plaintiff. Id. Brochner is inapposite to the instant case. Woollen is seeking as an item of damages in the instant case, i.e., legal expenses he paid in prior proceedings brought as a result of medical fees he incurred for the treatment of injuries he sustained as a result of the accident, as distinguished from attorney fees incurred to determine liability in the instant case. In accordance with our analysis in Tetherow, supra, Woollen's legal costs are recoverable as an item of damages in the instant case. The trial court struck this claim for damages, and the record contains no evidence concerning the amount of these attorney fees and expenses incurred by Woollen. Because we have concluded that Woollen established liability against the State, he is entitled to an award of damages including the reasonable amount of attorney fees and expenses suffered by him due to his defense of the prior medical claims, to the extent his evidence may establish those damages, reduced by the percentage of Woollen's comparative fault. We reverse, and remand the cause for a damages trial limited to the presentation of evidence and a determination of the actual expenditures for reasonable attorney fees and other necessary costs directly arising out of Woollen's defense of the health care claims and, if damages are established, they are to be reduced by 40 percent, representing the percentage of negligence attributable to Woollen as determined in the first trial. See Reiser v. Coburn, 255 Neb. 655, 587 N.W.2d 336 (1998).