Opinion ID: 762123
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Denial of the Inmates' Motion to Stay

Text: 57 The Inmates also argue that the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to stay the termination order until such time as the courts of Pennsylvania agree to enforce the [consent decree]. Brief for Appellants at 46. In making this argument, the Inmates rely heavily on the Second Circuit's novel theory that (a) consent decrees embody contracts arising under state law and (b) federal courts therefore cannot terminate a consent decree under § 3626(b)(2) without first securing parties' contractual rights under that decree. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 178-79 (2d Cir.1997), reh'g granted (Dec. 23, 1997).
58 We cannot accept this argument without ignoring the plain language of the PLRA. The statute entitles defendants to immediate termination of any prospective relief absent a finding of a current and ongoing violation of federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2), (b)(3). It also broadly defines prospective relief as including all relief other than compensatory monetary damages, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7). 7 Because the 1978 consent decree unquestionably fits within that definition, and because the district court made no findings of a current and ongoing violation of federal law, the law demands nothing less than the immediate termination of the consent decree. The Inmates cite no principle of law that allows us to disregard this unambiguous statutory mandate in order to preserve the consent decree. In effect, the Inmates have asked us to turn the termination provision on its head, and replace § 3626(b) with language prohibiting termination of consent decrees unless or until a state court agrees to enforce them. We decline their invitation to do so.
59 We also reject the Inmates' claim that since they might have contractual rights in the consent decrees under Pennsylvania law, and Defendants might refuse to enforce such rights, the District Court must maintain jurisdiction over the decrees in order to prevent Defendants from unconstitutionally impairing their own contractual obligations. Brief for Appellants at 45 (quoting Benjamin, 124 F.3d at 179). Mere speculation that Defendants might refuse to honor alleged contractual obligations is insufficient to support a finding of current and ongoing violations of [a] Federal right. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). The District Court therefore had no statutory basis for maintaining jurisdiction over the consent decrees. 60 If the Inmates have valid contractual claims that survive termination, such claims are based solely upon ... [Pennsylvania] law, and are not affected by the PLRA. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(d) (The limitations on remedies in this section shall not apply to relief entered by a State court based solely upon claims arising under State law.). The Inmates are therefore free to pursue relief in the Pennsylvania courts. It is not our province to speak to the validity of any claims arising under [Pennsylvania] law, or to award relief therefor. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(d). It is our province, however, to decide whether there is any basis for the Inmates' argument that the District Court should have stayed its termination order until such time as the courts of Pennsylvania agree to enforce the [consent decree]. Brief for Appellants at 46. There is not. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's denial of the Inmates motion to stay did not amount to an abuse of discretion.