Opinion ID: 6358387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Brown was denied a reliable sentencing

Text: In his first penalty-phase claim, Brown raises three related arguments intended to establish that he was denied a reliable sentencing. First, he argues that the jury was influenced by facts not of record when a juror informed the jury that Brown would serve his sentence in segregation rather than in the prison's general population. Second, Brown contends that the Commonwealth impermissibly argued to the jury that age can be an aggravating factor. Third, Brown insists that the prosecutor wrongly argued to the jury that the mitigating factors that Brown's counsel argued to the jury were in fact mere excuses for his conduct.
Brown first argues that one of the jurors, Stephen Grillo (Grillo), tainted the jury deliberations. According to an affidavit Brown obtained from Grillo, some of the other jurors asked during deliberations, what was the point of voting for death since [Brown] was just going to sit in jail for [twenty] years. PCRA Petition, Appendix, Grillo Affidavit, 4/24/2013, ¶ 5. Grillo's affidavit indicated that he told the other jurors that, if sentenced to death, Brown would at least be in segregation and not in general population. Id. According to Grillo, he acquired this knowledge by reading John Grisham novels. Id. The law in this area is clear: A juror may not impeach his or her own verdict after the jury has been discharged. An exception to this rule is made for those situations where a jury has been exposed to an ex parte influence, which possesses a reasonable likelihood of prejudice. Commonwealth v. Rollins , 558 Pa. 532 , 738 A.2d 435 , 451 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Laird , 555 Pa. 629 , 726 A.2d 346 , 356 (1999) ). In Rollins , the appellant argued that one juror improperly informed other jurors during deliberations that if it they sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment rather than death, he would be eligible for parole after serving only thirteen years of incarceration. Rollins , 738 A.2d at 451 . Our Court rejected this argument, determining that where no outside factor influenced the jury, deliberations were not tainted. Similarly here, Grillo, as a member of the jury, indicates that he made the statement at issue himself -- and thus there was no outside ex parte influence on the jury. Grillo cannot, by affidavit, impeach his own verdict. As such, this claim lacks arguable merit.
Brown next protests the Commonwealth's alleged presentation of non-statutory aggravating circumstances to the jury. At the penalty phase of the trial, Brown's counsel asserted that his age at the time of the shooting (twenty-five) was a mitigating factor in his favor. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(4). In closing arguments, the prosecutor responded as follows: Let's look at the first one: The age of the defendant at the time of the crime they're putting forth as a mitigating factor. When I first heard they were putting forth, I said, What? I can understand that if he was, you know, 18 or 17 or 19 ... When you're 25, you're a man. You can't come before a jury and say, I'm only 25. If anything, it works the opposite way. You're 25. You're more than old enough to make responsible choices for yourself. You're more than old enough to know that shooting Robert Crawford four times is not a choice you're allowed to make. Now I don't see any way in which the evidence shows that his age of 25 at the time of the  murder could possibly mitigate this crime. If anything, it aggravates it. N.T., 6/2/2017, at 66-67 (emphasis added). The trial judge immediately interjected and instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's personal opinion, stating that the prosecutor's not allowed to tell you ... what his personal views are. So nobody cares that he doesn't see how this could possibly affect anything one way or the other. Id. at 67. Brown attacks trial counsel for not objecting and/or requesting a curative instruction. While acknowledging that the judge admonished the prosecutor, he argues that trial counsel should have asked the judge to specifically instruct the jurors that age is not a statutory aggravator. Pointing out that the jury did not find his age to be a mitigating factor, Brown claims he was prejudiced. Brown's Brief at 54. Brown is correct that the prosecutor's remark constituted an impermissible personal opinion, and that age is not an aggravating circumstance under the law. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d). Nevertheless, we agree with the PCRA court's determination that Brown was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to seek an immediate instruction to the jury on the relevant law. As indicated, the trial court promptly recognized the prosecutor's error, even before trial counsel could lodge an objection, and immediately instructed the jury to disregard what the prosecutor had just stated. N.T., 6/2/2005, at 67. Moreover, at the outset of the penalty phase, the trial court thoroughly explained to the jurors their responsibilities with respect to finding aggravating and mitigating factors and reviewed for them of all of the possible statutory aggravating and mitigating factors upon which they could base their decision. N.T., 6/1/2005, at 35-36. During closing arguments, trial counsel and the prosecutor both summarized the mitigating and aggravating circumstances they each believed the jury should find. Finally, the trial court's charge to the jury included an exhaustive review of the possible mitigating and aggravating being presented for consideration by both parties. N.T., 6/2/2005, at 108-112. For these reasons, we discern no basis for concluding that Brown was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to request an instruction on age as an aggravating circumstance immediately after the prosecutor's improper remark during closing argument, as no basis exists to conclude that there was any jury confusion on this issue.
Third, Brown argues that the prosecutor improperly disregarded the evidence presented by the defense in support of mitigating circumstances as mere excuses for Brown's behavior in killing Crawford. This claim is based upon the following excerpt from the prosecutor's closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial: What the defense is going to ask you to do -- as I understood the testimony they put on for the last day and a half -- is asking you to use his early childhood to excuse . Well, they don't want this sob story, however true a lot of it is, they don't want to actually reflect on his -- his character as it was at 25. They want to use it to excuse his bad character. They want you to say, Sure, you made those horrible choices and killed Robert Crawford; please excuse it because of what happened. Ms. Rubino: Objection. The Court: Sustained. N.T., 6/2/2005, at 80 (emphasis added). Brown insists that these arguments clouded the jury's understanding of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and  that in addition to objecting to them, his counsel should also have requested a curative instruction advising the jury that mitigating circumstances are not excuses. Brown claims that appellate counsel could not have possessed a strategic basis for her omission, and that but for the prosecutor's improper argument and his counsel's failure to request a curative instruction, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have found (e)(8) mitigation and concluded that this mitigation outweighs the aggravating evidence presented. 19 Brown's Brief at 55. In support of this claim, Brown argues that in Eddings v. Oklahoma , 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), the Supreme Court declared mitigating evidence cannot be disregarded as an 'excuse.'  Brown's Brief at 55. Brown's reliance upon Eddings is misplaced. In that case, a trial judge presiding over a bench trial cast aside, as a matter of law, all of the mitigating evidence presented by the appellant on the grounds that it was improper to consider mitigating evidence. Eddings , 455 U.S. at 108-09 , 102 S.Ct. 869 . The intermediate appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the evidence of the appellant's family history did not excuse his behavior. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence of the appellant's violent upbringing was relevant mitigating evidence that should have been considered. Id. at 114-15 , 102 S.Ct. 869 . The high Court remanded with instructions for the lower court to consider and weigh it. Id. at 117 , 102 S.Ct. 869 . In this case, in substantial contrast to Eddings , the jury was not precluded from hearing any mitigating evidence relating to Brown's childhood or family history. We agree with the Chief Justice that the prosecutor's remarks were plainly improper. Mitigating evidence is not in the nature of excuses for the crime committed. Nevertheless, under the circumstances presented here, counsel's failure to request a curative instruction for the prosecutor's clear impropriety during closing argument does not constitute a basis for PCRA relief, as Brown cannot demonstrate that he suffered prejudice. Immediately after closing arguments, the trial court charged the jurors on mitigating circumstances in full detail, explaining every mitigator they should consider and how each of the mitigators should be considered. N.T., 6/2/2005, at 104-22. Further, directly contrary to the prosecutor's contention that mitigating factors are excuses, the trial court emphasized to the jury, both at the outset of the penalty phase of the trial and again in her charge, the importance of mitigating factors, describing them as one of the law's safeguards against unjust death sentences. Id. at 120 . Given the trial judge's precise and thorough instructions, no grounds exist on which to conclude that the jury did not understand its clear obligations in the penalty phase of the trial, including with respect to mitigating factors. Brown has not demonstrated that a curative instruction during the prosecutor's closing argument would have resulted in a different outcome in the penalty phase of the trial, and thus no relief is due on this claim.