Opinion ID: 2222525
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Heading: Whether the contributory negligence of the injured spouse bars a claim by the other spouse for loss of consortium.

Text: Plaintiffs argue that Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574 (Iowa 1974), which held that a child's contributory negligence, not the sole proximate cause of his injury, is not a defense to a parent's claim for the expense and actual loss of services, companionship and society resulting from injury to or death of a minor child under Iowa R.Civ.P. 8, dictates that contributory negligence not be a bar to Harold's claim for loss of consortium. We agree. Our decision in Handeland was based on the general principle of tort law that the fact that the negligence of another, not the plaintiff, concurred in producing the injury is no defense to any of those whose negligence proximately caused the injury. Our conclusion there is equally applicable here: [W]e do not believe any proper basis exists for excluding from the operation of that principle only situations where concurrent proximate negligence of the injured person is pleaded as a defense to the claim of one who holds a legally protected interest in the health or life of such injured person. 216 N.W.2d at 578. In reaching this conclusion, Handeland rejected the rule stated in section 494 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which bars a plaintiff from recovering for an invasion of his legally protected interest in the health or life of a third person if that third person would be barred from recovery by his own negligence. While admitting that this is the prevailing rule, we nonetheless analyzed the four bases relied on by courts in applying the rule and found each to be without merit. Those bases, the derivative action theory, the imputed negligence theory, the assignment theory and the well-settled rule theory, have been invoked not only in cases involving parents' claims for damages arising from injury to their children but also in spouses' claims for loss of consortium. See Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 469 (1968). Our analysis in Handeland does not logically exclude consortium claims from our disapproval of those theories. Defendant attempts to distinguish consortium claims from rule 8 claims in various ways. First, he argues that the consortium action arises as a result of a legal relationship between husband and wife while the rule 8 claim arises from the natural relationship of parent and child. We fail to perceive any legal significance that attaches to that distinction, nor is any offered by defendant. Secondly, defendant contends that a spouse has no separate and distinct damage by virtue of his or her loss of consortium as the injury involved is to a relationship enjoyed by both parties. Thus he would distinguish claims by parents for loss of services by their children, which seek a remedy for damages affecting only the parents. See Handeland, 216 N.W.2d at 576 (A rule 8 claim is brought by parent to redress a wrong done to himself rather another.). This contention by defendant is contradicted by decisions of this court that have recognized that consortium is a separate property right of each spouse to the marital relationship. See, e. g., Lampe v. Lagomarcino-Grupe Co., 251 Iowa 204, 206, 100 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1959); Price v. Price, 91 Iowa 693, 697-98, 60 N.W. 202, 203 (1894). It is the right of each to the company, co-operation, affection and aid of the other in each conjugal relation. Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 274, 78 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1956). The distinct nature of each spouse's right to consortium is perhaps most clearly evidenced by the fact that either spouse may sue for loss of consortium by means of an alienation of affections action even though the other spouse was a joint tortfeasor. See id. at 277, 78 N.W.2d at 483. We find persuasive on this point the rationale of Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal.App.3d 152, 157, 157 Cal.Rptr. 22, 24 (1979): [T]he injury incurred [referring to loss of consortium] can neither be said to have been parasitic upon the husband's cause of action nor can it be properly characterized as an injury to the marital unit as a whole. Rather, it is comprised of Anne's own physical, psychological and emotional pain and anguish which results when her husband is negligently injured to the extent that he is no longer capable of providing the love, affection, companionship, comfort or sexual relations concomitant with a normal married life. . . . From the vantage point of the negligent defendant, Anne is simply a foreseeable plaintiff to whom he owes a separate duty of care. . . . If the injury she suffered were a broken leg while riding in a vehicle driven by her contributorily negligent husband, there would be no question but that his contributory negligence would not destroy or mitigate her right to full recovery. . . . There is no reason why injury to her psychological and emotional state should be treated any differently than injury to her physical well being. [Citations omitted.] A third distinction that defendant asserts is that a rule 8 claim is pecuniary in nature while a claim for loss of consortium is not. In this state consortium damages are limited to compensation for the loss of such intangible elements as company, cooperation, affection and aid. As explained in Acuff, 248 Iowa at 274, 78 N.W.2d at 482, we have adopted the sentimental view of consortium, rather than the material or practical view, in which services are an element of damages. See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 805 (1976). Acuff's description of our consortium action is verified by this court's interpretations of section 613.15 of the Code and its statutory predecessors as limiting the right of action for damages for medical expenses and loss of services to only the injured spouse or the administrator of his or her estate. See Egan v. Naylor, 208 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa 1973); Woodard v. City of Des Moines, 182 Iowa 1102, 1106, 165 N.W. 313, 314 (1917); Jacobson v. Fullerton, 181 Iowa 1195, 165 N.W. 358 (1917); Rose v. City of Fort Dodge, 180 Iowa 331, 339, 155 N.W. 170, 173 (1915); Fisher v. Ellston, 174 Iowa 364, 372, 156 N.W. 422, 425 (1916); Lane v. Steiniger, 174 Iowa 317, 156 N.W. 375 (1916). Rule 8, however, also provides for compensation for the loss of such intangible elements as the companionship and society of a child. Those could well be the only damage elements sought in some rule 8 claims. Thus, the asserted distinction is not one that uniformly obtains. Additionally, we discern no meaningful significance related to the distinction. Surely the intangible losses of companionship and society of one's spouse or child are just as real and worthy of compensation as the loss of services of a child or expenses paid as a result of the child's injury or death. Finally, defendant argues that the rule of the Restatement is the fairer one, at least in consortium cases. In support, he cites Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 435-36, 397 P.2d 529, 531-32 (1964), which indicates that permitting one's spouse to enrich the family treasury by recovering consortium damages when the injured spouse is barred from recovery by his or her own negligence defeats the basis of the contributory negligence doctrine, i. e., keeping a person from profiting by his own negligence. This unjust family enrichment argument, as articulated by Ross, was found in Handeland to have been contrary to reasoning long articulated in our own cases and the restatement itself. 216 N.W.2d at 578. There is no reason for us to alter our view in consortium cases. On the contrary, the unjust enrichment theory is less persuasive in cases of this sort than in rule 8 cases. As the dissent in Handeland noted, the defendant in a rule 8 suit will be prevented from obtaining contribution from the contributorily negligent youth because of the family immunity rule. Id. at 579. There is no such impediment to defendants liable for consortium claims. See Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979) (abrogating interspousal immunity doctrine). Defendant also contends that support for the superior fairness of the Restatement rule is found in its prevalence. We disagree. Certainly not all minority views are the less fair views; nor are they all destined to always be minority views. In this regard, it is noteworthy that since the Handeland decision, two additional courts have determined that claims for consortium are not derivative to the injured spouses's personal injury claim and thus are not affected by the injured spouse's contributory negligence. Macon v. Seaward Construction Co., 555 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1977) (interpreting New Hampshire law); Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal.App.3d 152, 155-159, 157 Cal.Rptr. 22, 23-26 (1979). To deny a consortium claim because of the injured spouse's negligence would, in fact, create a new kind of unfairness. It would force the plaintiff, who was free from fault, to assume the full burden of damages caused by the negligence of others. It would also unjustly permit the negligent tortfeasor to escape liability altogether merely because of the fortuitous negligence of another. See Lantis, 95 Cal.App.3d at 158-59, 157 Cal.Rptr. at 25-26. Consequently, we decline to except consortium claims from the rule announced in Handeland on grounds of fairness or any of the other grounds asserted by defendant. We hold that the contributory negligence of an injured spouse which is not the sole proximate cause of that spouse's injury does not bar a claim by the other spouse for loss of consortium. ORDER VACATED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART; CASE REMANDED. LARSON, J., concurs. HARRIS, J., joined by REES, J., concurs specially in Division I and concurs in Division II. UHLENHOPP, J., concurs specially in Division I and dissents from Division II. McCORMICK, J., joined by REYNOLDSON, C. J., dissents from Division I and concurs in Division II. McGIVERIN, J., joined by LeGRAND, J., concurs in result in Division I and dissents from Division II.