Opinion ID: 1060964
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: tennessee rape shield law

Text: Rape shield laws were adopted in response to anachronistic and sexist views that a woman who had sexual relations in the past was more likely to have consented to sexual relations with a specific criminal defendant. [3] Those attitudes resulted in two rape trials at the same time  the trial of the defendant and the trial of the rape victim based on her past sexual conduct. It has been said that the victim of a sexual assault is actually assaulted twice  once by the offender and once by the criminal justice system. The protections in rape shield laws recognized that intrusions into the irrelevant sexual history of a victim were not only prejudicial and embarrassing but also a practical barrier to many victims reporting sexual crimes. As the comments to Tennessee's rape shield law (Rule 412) observe: [T]he rule ... takes into account that the public's interest in prosecuting and convicting people guilty of various sexual offenses is frustrated when sexual assault victims refuse to report the offenses or to testify about them at trial because of the possible admission of evidence of their sexual history. Moreover, the rule seeks to minimize the likelihood that evidence of the alleged victim's sexual history may cause the jury to be unfairly prejudiced against the victim. At the same time, rape shield laws recognize those circumstances in which the admission of such evidence, despite its potentially embarrassing nature, must be admitted to preserve an accused's right to a fair trial. See Shockley v. State, 585 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). As does nearly every jurisdiction, [4] Tennessee's rape shield rule limits the admissibility of evidence about the prior sexual behavior of a victim of a sexual offense, and establishes procedures for determining when evidence is admissible. Tenn. R. Evid. 412 [5] provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal trial, preliminary hearing, deposition, or other proceeding in which a person is accused of an offense under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502 (aggravated rape), 39-13-503 (rape), 39-13-504 (aggravated sexual battery), 39-13-505 (sexual battery), 39-13-507 (spousal sexual offenses), or the attempt to commit any such offense, the following rules apply: (a) Definition of sexual behavior.  In this rule, `sexual behavior' means sexual activity of the alleged victim other than the sexual act at issue in the case. (b) Reputation or opinion.  Reputation or opinion evidence of the sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such offense is inadmissible unless admitted in accordance with the procedures in subdivision (d) of this Rule and required by the Tennessee or United States Constitution. (c) Specific instances of conduct.  Evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual behavior is inadmissible unless admitted in accordance with the procedures in subdivision (d) of the Rule, and the evidence is: (1) Required by the Tennessee or United States Constitution, or (2) Offered by the defendant on the issue of credibility of the victim, provided the prosecutor or victim has presented evidence as to the victim's sexual behavior, and only to the extent needed to rebut the specific evidence presented by the prosecutor or victim, or (3) If the sexual behavior was with the defendant, on the issue of consent, or (4) If the sexual behavior was with persons other than the defendant, (i) to rebut or explain scientific or medical evidence, or (ii) to prove or explain the source of semen, injury, disease, or knowledge of sexual matters, or (iii) to prove consent if the evidence is of a pattern of sexual behavior so distinctive and so closely resembling the defendant's version of the alleged encounter with the victim that it tends to prove that the victim consented to the act charged or behaved in such a manner as to lead the defendant reasonably to believe that the victim consented. ... . (Emphasis added). Accordingly, if, as in the present case, the victim's sexual behavior was with persons other than the defendant, it may be admissible under the rule only (i) to rebut or explain scientific or medical evidence, (ii) to prove or explain the source of semen, injury, disease, or knowledge of sexual matters, or (iii) to prove consent if the evidence is of a pattern of sexual behavior so distinctive and so closely resembling the defendant's version of the alleged encounter with the victim that it tends to prove that the victim consented to the act charged or behaved in such a manner as to lead the defendant reasonably to believe that the victim consented. Tenn. R. Evid. 412(c)(4)(emphasis added). As with other evidentiary rulings, the admissibility of the evidence rests in the discretion of the trial court. When evidence is offered under the rule, the trial court must conduct a non-public hearing and consider the admissibility of the proposed evidence, and if otherwise admissible, then determine whether its probative value outweighs its unfair prejudice to the victim. Tenn.R. Evid. 412(d). As with other evidentiary rulings, the admissibility of the evidence rests in the discretion of the trial court. The State contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion threatens to resurrect ill-founded and fallacious presumptions about alleged sexual victims and that its interpretation of the Rule 412(c)(4)(iii) exception effectively engulfs the entire rule. The State argues that the testimony of Gray and Jindrak did not establish a pattern of distinctive sexual behavior by the victim that so closely resembled the defendant's version of events as to be relevant on the issue of consent. The defendant, however, maintains that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly interpreted Rule 412(c)(4)(iii), and that excluding the evidence denied his rights under the Tennessee and United States Constitutions. As we consider these arguments, we first turn to the language of Rule 412(c)(4), which requires a pattern of sexual behavior. Although there is no Tennessee case on the issue, it is clear that a pattern of sexual conduct requires more than one act of sexual conduct. Cohen, Paine and Sheppeard, Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 412.4 at 236. The plain language of the rule speaks of specific instances of sexual conduct with persons other than the defendant. Moreover, other jurisdictions have consistently observed that a pattern of sexual conduct denotes repetitive or multiple acts and not just an isolated occurrence. See State v. Ginyard, 122 N.C. App. 25, 468 S.E.2d 525 (1996); State v. Woodfork, 454 N.W.2d 332 (S.D. 1990); Kaplan v. State, 451 So.2d 1386, 1387 (Fla.App. 1984); State v. Patnaude, 140 Vt. 361, 438 A.2d 402 (1981); State v. Jones, 62 Haw. 572, 617 P.2d 1214 (1980); Parks v. State, 147 Ga. App. 617, 249 S.E.2d 672 (1978). The rule also requires that the pattern consist of sexual behavior so distinctive and so closely resembling the defendant's version that it tends to prove that the victim consented to the act charged. The advisory comments to Rule 412 use the word signature cases to describe the distinctive behavior required. As the Illinois Supreme Court has said, the sexual conduct must be so unusual, so outside the normal, that it had distinctive characteristics which make it the complainant's modus operandi. People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill.2d 159, 142 Ill.Dec. 135, 147-48, 552 N.E.2d 726, 738 (1990); see also State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860 (Minn.App. 1995); Jeffries v. Nix, 912 F.2d 982, 986 (8th Cir.1990). Moreover, to have probative value on the issue of consent, the pattern of distinctive sexual conduct must closely resemble the defendant's version of facts. Cohen, et al., supra, § 412.4 at 246-47. Applying the rule and the foregoing principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that there was no pattern of prior sexual behavior on the victim's part. Gray testified that on one occasion in the past he had oral sex and sexual intercourse with the victim after the couple met in a bar where both had been drinking. On the second occasion, he and the victim had sexual intercourse after attending a basketball game and a fraternity party. On the other hand, Jindrak testified only that the victim kissed him and asked him to go home with her. [6] For the Jindrak testimony to be considered part of a pattern, a court would have to presume that the victim would have consented to engage in sexual intercourse with Jindrak. We are unwilling to make such a presumption. The two separate occasions of sexual intercourse described by Gray, therefore, do not establish the required pattern of sexual conduct. Moreover, there was nothing so distinctive about the testimony of either Gray or Jindrak that so closely resembled the defendant's version of the events that took place between he and the victim. The described acts could hardly be characterized as signature cases. As Judge Peay observed in his dissent, to decide otherwise is to hold that any woman who has sexual intercourse with someone she meets in a bar is automatically engaging in distinctive sexual conduct. Other courts have rejected such a conclusion as well: We observe, however, that a victim's sexual history with others only goes to show a generalized attitude toward sex and says little if anything about her attitude toward a specific act of sex with the defendant... . We conclude that the evidence of [the victim's] sexual advances, over a period of years, toward some of the men she had met in a bar is not relevant, in itself, to establish that she consented to have sex with [the defendant]. State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 839 P.2d 1223, 1229 (1992). Accordingly, we hold that the evidence proffered by the defendant did not establish a pattern of distinctive sexual behavior as required for admissibility under Tenn. R. Evid. 412(c)(4)(iii), and it was properly excluded by the trial court.