Opinion ID: 2323065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Lockwood and the Lassiters

Text: Wraina, the decedent's girlfriend of two years and the mother of his child, testified at trial that there were problems between the Lockwood section of Providence and the Lassiters, but there were no problems between Andrews and the Lassiter on trial. The defendant objected to this testimony and moved to pass the case on two grounds. First, he argued that he was surprised by this testimony and that it constituted a discovery violation, and second, that the evidence was otherwise inadmissible against him. The trial justice denied the motion to pass and instead issued a cautionary instruction to the jury. Turning to Lassiters's contention that Wraina's reference to trouble between the Lockwood and the Lassiters evidenced a violation of Rule 16(a)(8) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, the state provided defendant with an extensive summary of Wraina's expected testimony. Rule 16 obligates the state to provide defendant with a summary of a witness's expected testimony. It is apparent from the record that the state was not trying to elicit impermissible testimony, but rather had explicitly questioned Wraina whether she was aware of any problems between the defendant and [Andrews]. Although Wraina's response exceeded the scope of the prosecutor's inquiry, this does not, in and of itself, establish a discovery violation. We are satisfied, however, that this evidence was nonetheless inadmissible. Given Wraina's statement that she was unaware of any problem between defendant and Andrews, her subsequent testimony that there was trouble between the Lockwood neighborhood and the Lassiters was irrelevant and prejudicial. Evidence of the type at issue here is admissible only if the prosecution demonstrates that the defendant is a member of a certain group, and that there was a direct connection between the defendant's membership in that group and the crimes for which the defendant is charged. See State v. Phillips, 128 N.M. 777, 999 P.2d 421, 428 (Ct.App.2000) (stating that evidence of wrongdoing by third parties may be admitted only to demonstrate the background of a crime when there is a direct link between the evidence and the particular charge against the accused). Unless a direct connection is made linking the defendant, the group, and the alleged activity of that group, the probative value of any evidence concerning that group's activities probably will be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Denmark v. State, 646 So.2d 754, 757 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.1994). Here, not only did the state fail to establish that either Lassiter or Andrews were members of the groups about which Wraina testified, the membership and the nature of the problems between those groups also was a mystery. By permitting a witness to opine that there were problems between the Lockwood and the Lassiters, the jury was left to infer any manner of nefarious association or motive to defendant, none of it shown by the state to be relevant to the specific crimes charged. This evidence is particularly troublesome because the witness stated that there were problems between the decedent's neighborhood, the Lockwood, and the Lassiters, a group that bears the same name as defendant. A logical inference to be drawn from this statement is that defendant is linked to the Lassiters and therefore there was bad blood between the decedent and him. We must now determine whether the trial justice abused his discretion in refusing to pass the case in light of Wraina's testimony. See State v. Bolduc, 822 A.2d 184, 186 (R.I.2003) (per curiam). Not all potentially prejudicial statements made during trial require the trial justice to declare a mistrial. Id. In this situation, the trial justice's duty was to assess the prejudicial impact of the comment and determine whether the prejudice was so ineradicable that the motion to pass must be granted. State v. McDonald, 602 A.2d 923, 927 (R.I.1992). If the prejudice was curable, the trial justice was obliged to issue a timely and effective instruction to the jury. Id. We are convinced that the trial justice appropriately mitigated any prejudice caused by the admission of this testimony. The trial justice instructed the jurors that they could not properly consider Wraina's testimony about the Lockwood and the Lassiters when assessing the defendant's guilt. He said: The offense charged relates to three people:. Derick Hazard, David Lassiter, Troy Lassiter; that they agreed, they conspired to commit an illegal act. They are not responsible for somebody else's feelings. This defendant doesn't have the  doesn't have to defend any charges or any ill will by others who happen to come from Lockwood [Street]. He must defend and the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the offense of conspiracy to commit murder. We are satisfied that this curative instruction, which was given contemporaneously with Wraina's testimony, State v. Jackson, 752 A.2d 5, 11 (R.I.2000), was sufficient to foreclose the possibility that the jury was prejudiced by this testimony. Accordingly, although Wraina's statement constituted error, the contemporaneous instruction rendered it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.