Opinion ID: 510022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Opinion Statements

Text: 28 Defendants object that Kropinski's claim was based solely on defendants' statements of opinion, not statements of fact. Under their theory, opinion statements do not refer[ ] to a material fact ; nor do they constitute representations on which a person can be found to rely within the meaning of Urban Investments. Id. (emphasis added). They also urge that the First Amendment bars fraud claims based solely on statements of opinion, just as it bars claims of libel based on statements of pure opinion. E.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 2662, 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985). The district court properly rejected these contentions. 29
30 The operative rule is that [o]pinions or predictions of future events do not constitute representations of material facts upon which a plaintiff successfully may place dispositive reliance. Howard v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 706 (D.C.1981). As with most others, that rule has its exceptions. Opinions or predictions based on facts that are unavailable to the listener either because he does not have access to them or because he is obviously incapable of interpreting them may give rise to liability for fraud. Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018, 1026 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1706, 52 L.Ed.2d 394 (1978), cited with approval in Howard, 432 A.2d at 706. Such liability may also be based on predictions if the listener can demonstrate that the person predicting an event knew of facts that would prevent its occurrence. Day, 548 F.2d at 1027. 31 The district court properly allowed Kropinski's fraud claim under the Day exceptions. He alleged that defendants had represented that TM was scientifically proven to confer certain personal and societal benefits. He was clearly entitled to present evidence to prove that either the supporting scientific data was not available to him, or that he would have been unable to interpret the data if it had been. Furthermore, Kropinski might be able to prove that defendants knew that he could never achieve the advertised benefits. These are factual questions that a jury is competent to decide. 32 Of course, even if the allegedly fraudulent statements were found to fit within the Day exceptions, that case imposes the further requirement that a reasonable person would have found the fact on which the opinion or prediction rests to be one upon which the recipient of a representation might prudently rely. Id. at 1026. We do not reach the question of whether Kropinski reasonably relied on the representations at the time he first began to practice TM because the question was not raised below and is not before us on appeal. 33
34 Defendants note that the First Amendment bars libel actions based solely on opinion statements and argue that the First Amendment similarly prevents opinion statements from forming the basis for a fraud action. True, the First Amendment has been found to protect opinion statements from attack as libel; because such statements are not facts, their truth or falsity cannot be established. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 876, 879, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988). By contrast, the statements here at issue are alleged to have been based on facts. See Day, 548 F.2d at 1026-27. As it is the factual basis of the statements that is being challenged, the statements are not protected by the First Amendment.