Opinion ID: 789576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conflicts of Interest and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: 18 A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to representation by conflict-free counsel. United States v. Blau, 159 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir.1998). In the absence of a conflict of interest, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that the lawyer's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and that counsel's deficiency was prejudicial to the defense, id. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. However, [p]rejudice is presumed ... if the defendant demonstrates that counsel `actively represented conflicting interests' and that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' Cuyler [446 U.S.] at 350, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (footnote omitted). Id. These components are considered in a single, integrated inquiry. [T]he [Cuyler v.] Sullivan standard is not properly read as requiring inquiry into actual conflict as something separate and apart from adverse effect. An `actual conflict,' for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). 19 The circuits are divided as to how a defendant may demonstrate that a conflict adversely affected his counsel's performance. As we discuss below, see Part III, the differing views have relevance to application of the standard for habeas corpus relief required by AEDPA. Our Court has stated that a defendant need suggest only a plausible alternative strategy that was not pursued at trial, not necessarily a reasonable one. See United States v. Feyrer, 333 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.2003). To prove the lapse in representation `a defendant must demonstrate that some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued, and that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or interests.' Id. at 116 (quoting United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 92 (2d Cir.2002)). We have held previously that a defendant represented by conflicted counsel need not demonstrate that the alternative strategy or tactic foregone by counsel was reasonable. Rather, the defendant need only prove that the alternative strategy was plausible. Id. 118 (citing United States v. Malpiedi, 62 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir.1995)). Moreover, [w]ith respect to the substance of the plausible alternative strategy, the defendant need not show that the defense would necessarily have been successful had it been used, only that `it possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative.' Id. at 116 (quoting Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir.1993)). 20 Other circuits have taken a slightly more demanding approach, requiring suggestion of a defense that was objectively reasonable. The Fourth Circuit requires defendants urging an ineffective assistance claim based on conflict of interest to (a) identify a plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic that [their] defense counsel might have pursued, (b) show that the alternative strategy or tactic was objectively reasonable under the facts of the case, and (c) establish that the defense counsel's failure to pursue that strategy or tactic was linked to the actual conflict. Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir.2001) (in banc), aff'd without consideration of this point, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002); see Covey v. United States, 377 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir.2004) (same); Quince v. Crosby, 360 F.3d 1259, 1264-65 (11th Cir.2004) (same).