Opinion ID: 2395139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: In the context of the sentencing proceeding following the guilt-innocence phase of a capital trial, see N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000 (2009), the General Assembly has provided: (e) If the court does not find the defendant to be mentally retarded in the pretrial proceeding [as outlined in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(c)], upon the introduction of evidence of the defendant's mental retardation during the sentencing hearing, the court shall submit a special issue to the jury as to whether the defendant is mentally retarded as defined in this section. This special issue shall be considered and answered by the jury prior to the consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors and the determination of sentence. If the jury determines the defendant to be mentally retarded, the court shall declare the case noncapital and the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(e) (2009) (emphasis added). A plain reading of these words shows that the statute suggests a single sentencing proceedingduring the sentencing hearingwhile at the same time using language that indicates a required sequence of events within that proceeding:  upon the introduction of evidence ..., the court shall submit a special issue that shall be considered and answered ... prior to the consideration of ... and the determination of sentence. Id. Unlike N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, which explicitly provides that a capital trial must take place in two separate phases, first the determination of guilt or innocence, followed by the determination of sentence, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005 is silentand indeed inherently ambiguousregarding whether these stages may or must take place in a unitary or bifurcated proceeding. When construing legislative provisions, this Court looks first to the plain meaning of the words of the statute itself: When the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required. However, when the language of a statute is ambiguous, this Court will determine the purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature in its enactment. Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006). An ambiguous provision, such as at issue here, leads us in turn to the general rule that, `[i]n discerning the intent of the General Assembly, statutes in pari materia should be construed together and harmonized whenever possible.' State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 330, 677 S.E.2d 444, 450 (2009) (quoting State v. Jones, 359 N.C. 832, 836, 616 S.E.2d 496, 498 (2005) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). For example, subsection (g) of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005 also indicates that the question of mental retardation must be both considered and decided by the jury prior to the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e) and (f): (g) If the jury determines that the defendant is not mentally retarded as defined by this section, the jury may consider any evidence of mental retardation presented during the sentencing hearing when determining aggravating or mitigating factors and the defendant's sentence. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(g) (2009) (emphases added). If the jury determines that the defendant is in fact mentally retarded, then it need not consider evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, because the trial judge must impose a life sentence. Reading this statute to mandate a unitary sentencing proceeding discountsor at the least underemphasizesthe critical phrase and answered in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(e). Cf. N.C. Dep't of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 201, 675 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2009) (Because the actual words of the legislature are the clearest manifestation of its intent, we give every word of the statute effect, presuming that the legislature carefully chose each word used.  (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Such a reading also disregards the additional words in subsection (g) indicating that, when retardation has been raised as a defense, the jury must determine the special issue of mental retardationfirst as a separate issue, and then again as an aspect of determining the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We read this language as envisioning a procedure in which evidence of aggravators is introducedas well as consideredafter the special issue of mental retardation has been answered. Indeed, the pattern jury instructions for capital sentencing proceedings in North Carolina recognize this ambiguity and provide trial judges the flexibility to modify jury instructions in capital cases accordingly. See 1 N.C.P.I.Crim. 150.05 (2001) (Death PenaltyMental Retardation Jury Determination (with Special Verdict Form)) [1] (with an opening note stating that [t]his instruction is written in a manner which contemplates that the jury will return to court with its answer to the mental retardation question before hearing arguments and being instructed [on aggravating and mitigating factors and determination of sentence]. If the trial judge chooses to use a different procedure, this instruction should be modified accordingly. (emphasis added)); id. (The one issue for you to determine at this stage of the proceedings reads: `Is the defendant, ( name ), mentally retarded?'; Your answer to this mental retardation issue, either `yes' or `no,' must be unanimous.); 1 N.C.P.I.Crim. 150.10 (Death Penalty  Instructions to Jury at Separate Sentencing Proceeding) (2004) (Members of the jury, [having found the defendant guilty of] murder in the first degree [and the defendant having been determined by you not to be mentally retarded], it is now your duty to recommend to the Court whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment.). While these pattern jury instructions are not binding on this Court, they were drafted by a committee of the very same superior court judges who oversee capital sentencing proceedings, and they demonstrate these judges' ability to exercise discretion sensibly. In the instructions crafted after N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005 was enacted in 2001, these trial judges have acknowledged the ambiguity in the statute and have addressed it in a careful manner. The instructions maintain consistent treatment of all capital defendants while also allowing for the type of guided discretion and particularized consideration of the relevant aspects of the character and record of a convicted defendant that we have held is critical to the constitutionality of our death penalty procedures. State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 350-52, 259 S.E.2d 510, 542-43 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 3050, 65 L.Ed.2d 1137 (1980), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 193, 344 S.E.2d 775 (1986). The plain language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005 indicates that the jury will make two separate determinations, at two distinct points during the sentencing proceeding: first, on the special issue of mental retardation, and next, only if the defendant is found not to be mentally retarded, the sentence to be imposed. Allowing trial courts the discretion to bifurcate such proceedings gives proper weight to the words and answered, which also appear in the statute before the phrase prior to the consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors and the determination of sentence. Surely the General Assembly chose to require that the special issue of mental retardation be answered to indicate that the sentencing proceeding follow a specific sequence of events. By mandating that the jury first consider and answer the special issue on mental retardation, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(c) does not preclude a bifurcated proceeding, but rather contemplates that only after completing and returning a not mentally retarded verdict on the first issue may the jury even begin to consider evidence of aggravating and mitigating factors. The evidence presented to the jury on these questions may overlap somewhat, particularly concerning the defendant's adaptive functioning skills and whether the perpetration and details of the crime reflect those skills. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(a)(1)a. (2009) (defining mentally retarded as [s]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with significant limitations in adaptive functioning). However, the evidence is also likely to be appreciably different, as [t]he defendant has the burden of proving significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, significant limitations in adaptive functioning, and that mental retardation was manifested before the age of 18, which will typically be unrelated to the details of the crime. Id. § 15A-2005(a)(2) (2009). It seems reasonable that the legislature intended to allow for a trial court, in overseeing the sequence of events envisioned in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(e), to wait until receiving a negative answer to the question of a defendant's mental retardation before expending time and resources on the presentation of evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(e) (If the jury determines the defendant to be mentally retarded, the court shall declare the case noncapital and the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.). In light of this conditionality, that the jury only need consider aggravating and mitigating factors if it finds that the defendant is not mentally retarded, a trial judge might determine, in a case in which the evidence of mental retardation is particularly strong, that bifurcation would best promote judicial economy in that the need for the second phase could well be obviated. In another instance, a trial court might determine that bifurcation would be the best means of avoiding undue prejudice. For example, when the evidence of aggravation is especially gruesome or heinous, the judge could conclude that viewing or hearing such evidence might unduly prejudice the jury in its determination of the issue of mental retardation. In connection with the issue of mental retardation, the jury will necessarily hear evidence about the defendant's intelligence quotient (IQ) and capabilities or limitations in the following adaptive skills areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure skills and work skills. Id. § 15A-2005(a)(1)b. (2009). By contrast, the State's evidence of aggravating circumstances will focus on the worst aspects of the offense itself, much of which may be entirely irrelevant to the issue of mental retardation. [2] Because of this difference in subject matter, from the capacity of the defendant to the circumstances of the crime itself, a trial judge may sometimes deem it appropriate to conduct the sentencing proceeding in two phases to ensure the issues are considered and answered separately. We have recognized the discretion of trial courts to conduct bifurcated proceedings, or the propriety of that approach, in a number of other contexts. See, e.g., In re Will of Barnes, 358 N.C. 143, 143, 592 S.E.2d 688, 689 (2004) (per curiam) (reversing the Court of Appeals based on the reasoning in the dissent, which would have affirmed the trial court's exercise of discretion in managing a trial by bifurcating the proceedings); In re Will of Hester, 320 N.C. 738, 742-43, 360 S.E.2d 801, 804-05 (1987) (noting that North Carolina Civil Procedure Rule 42(b) gives trial courts extremely broad discretion to sever or bifurcate civil proceedings when doing so furthers convenience and avoids prejudice (citation omitted)); Barfield, 298 N.C. at 350, 259 S.E.2d at 541-42 (recognizing the constitutionality of statute mandating bifurcated capital trial proceedings); In re White, 81 N.C.App. 82, 85, 344 S.E.2d 36, 38 (citing In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984), and noting that when the statutes do not specify how the proceedings are to be conducted, but only that both stages must occur, trial judges may conduct the adjudication and disposition stages of a termination of parental rights proceeding concurrently, or they may hold a bifurcated proceeding in which the stages take place separately), disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 283, 347 S.E.2d 470 (1986); see also State v. Kilby, ___ N.C.App. ___, ___ n. 5, 679 S.E.2d 430, 433 n. 5 (2009) (observing that the wording of the statute outlining the satellite-based monitoring program for sexual offenders, N.C.G.S. § 14-208.40B(c), allows for either a bifurcated or single proceeding, to take place in two phases, with that determination left to the trial judge). Like the statute at issue here, the statutes in each of these situations either explicitly provide for bifurcated proceedings or plainly contemplate that the proceeding take place in stages or phases. Thus, our case law demonstrates that, even bifurcated, a hearing is still treated as the same single proceeding or trial. See, e.g., In re Will of Hester, 320 N.C. at 745, 360 S.E.2d at 806 (Simple bifurcation of the sub-issues does not create two proceedings. In a bifurcated trial the entire action and all issues therein remain under the control of one court; bifurcation of issues normally results in only one judgment. (citation omitted)). The outcome here is consistent with our language in Hester: Whether or not the trial court bifurcates a sentencing proceeding, defendant will receive one, single sentencing judgment. [3] We have stated that a bifurcated trial is particularly appropriate where separate submission of issues avoids confusion and promotes a logical presentation to the jury and where resolution of the separated issue will potentially dispose of the entire case. Id. at 743, 360 S.E.2d at 804 (citations omitted). Such an approach is also consistent with our recognition that trial judges have broad discretion to supervise and organize the proceedings before them: The paramount duty of the trial judge is to supervise and control the course of the trial so as to prevent injustice. In discharging this duty, the court possesses broad discretionary powers sufficient to meet the circumstances of each case. This supervisory power encompasses the authority to structure the trial logically and to set the order of proof. Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial judge's decisions in these matters will not be disturbed on appeal. Id. at 741-42, 360 S.E.2d at 804 (citations omitted). This Court has long emphasized the inherent authority and discretion of trial judges: [A trial judge] is clothed with this power because of his learning and integrity, and of the superior knowledge which his presence at and participation in the trial gives him over any other forum. However great and responsible this power, the law intends that the Judge will exercise it to further the ends of justice, and though doubtless, it is occasionally abused, it would be difficult to fix upon a safer tribunal for the exercise of this discretionary power, which must be lodged somewhere. Moore v. Edmiston, 70 N.C. 382, 390, 70 N.C. 470, 481 (1874); see also State v. Davis, 317 N.C. 315, 318, 345 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1986) (The trial judge has inherent authority to supervise and control trial proceedings. The manner of the presentation of the evidence is largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge and his control of a case will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. (citations omitted)); State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 236, 333 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1985) (In this connection it is well settled that it is the duty of the trial judge to supervise and control the course of a trial so as to insure justice to all parties.). Equally important, we have recently noted in a capital case that heightened attention to procedural safeguards is necessary in cases of alleged mental retardation in order to protect against the inadvertent and unconstitutional execution of mentally retarded defendants. State v. Locklear, 363 N.C. 438, 461, 681 S.E.2d 293, 310 (2009). Only if we recognize the silence on bifurcation in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005, and afford trial judges the discretionary flexibility to bifurcate the proceedings, do we conform with our recent jurisprudence in Locklear. Likewise, our seminal opinion in State v. Barfield , emphasizing the constitutional necessity of particularized consideration of the relevant aspects of the character and record of a convicted defendant in the application of the death penalty, 298 N.C. at 351, 259 S.E.2d at 542, requires us to resolve the ambiguity in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e) by recognizing the guided discretion of trial judges to ensure a fair and impartial jury determination of a particular defendant's characteristics, including his possible mental retardation. In Locklear this Court also recognized the cautionary advice given by the United States Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), which struck down as unconstitutional the execution of mentally retarded defendants: Identifying mentally retarded offenders can be an inherently difficult task requiring particular attention to procedural safeguards. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 [122 S.Ct. at 2250], 153 L.Ed.2d at 348 (noting that some characteristics of mental retardation undermine the strength of the procedural protections that our capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards). The difficulty of this task increases the likelihood that mentally retarded offenders will be unconstitutionally sentenced to death. See id. at 321 [122 S.Ct. at 2252], 153 L.Ed.2d at 350 (Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution.). Locklear, 363 N.C. at 464, 681 S.E.2d at 312. Trial judges are best situated to evaluate the evidence presented of a defendant's mental retardation, [4] and to determine if bifurcating the sentencing proceeding into two distinct phases would promote both fairness and the interests of justice. The record here reflects that, before denying defendant's motion for bifurcation, the trial judge heard extensive, well-reasoned argument on the issue from both the prosecution and the defense. Defendant's trial counsel explicitly outlined what such a bifurcated proceeding would look like, reasoning to the trial court: Let's go ahead and determine up front [defendant's mental retardation]. Put on the evidence that goes towards mental retardation: let's talk about that. And then if the jury finds that, that is fine. If they don't find that, at least they had a chance to determine that issue without a lot of other baggage and those types of things coming in, and then we proceed. [The State] would not have to put the witness on a second time. The same juror has heard that [evidence of mental retardation]. We are not losing any time. I am just asking that that issue [of mental retardation] be determined up front without allowing the state [sic] to put everything in that they possibly would to try to inflame a jury and try to get them all jacked up ready to do anything. Let's focus on this issue. Notwithstanding these arguments, the trial court denied defendant's motion. Nothing in the record or transcript indicates that the trial court's decision was arbitrary or manifestly unsupported by reason. White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (citing Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 271 S.E.2d 58 (1980)). Nor is there any suggestion that the trial court erroneously believed it lacked the discretion to grant the motion. State v. Johnson, 346 N.C. 119, 124, 484 S.E.2d 372, 376 (1997) ([T]here is error when the trial court refuses to exercise its discretion in the erroneous belief that it has no discretion as to the question presented. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion to bifurcate the sentencing proceeding.