Opinion ID: 543757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mootness: Going through the Motions

Text: 13 The first issue that must be resolved in this case is whether the subject appeals have become moot in the light of the second amended consolidated complaint. In the second complaint, which was filed in district court after appellants had filed briefs on the merits of these appeals in this Court, plaintiffs-appellees dropped all CERCLA claims and dropped non-diverse National Gypsum from the consolidated actions in district court. The claim is that the amended complaint created or restored federal diversity jurisdiction in both actions. 2 Thus, subject matter jurisdiction no longer rests on plaintiffs-appellees' ability to establish federal question jurisdiction under CERCLA. They no longer pursue any CERCLA claims, nor do they assert any claims against any non-diverse parties. It is urged, therefore, that the appeals now have become moot. 14 Appellants National Gypsum and U.S. Gypsum oppose the motion. They strongly urge this Court to deny appellees' motion to dismiss the subject appeals because granting the motion would perpetuate plaintiffs' recurring use of a contrived CERCLA claim to manufacture federal court jurisdiction. As evidence that appellees have only abandoned the CERCLA claims temporarily to escape appellate review, appellants point to appellees' contention on the merits of these appeals that they did state a valid claim under CERCLA. 15 While it appears that appellees have attempted to manipulate the court system to their best advantage, we do not find this argument persuasive. If the issue on appeal is moot, then regardless of the desirability of cutting short appellees' manipulations and resolving the substantive CERCLA issue at the appellate level, this Court does not have the power to address it. 16 Grace argues that the appeals are not moot because the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant appellees' motion for leave to amend their first amended consolidated complaint. The argument is persuasive. A federal district court and a federal court of appeals should not attempt to assert jurisdiction over a case simultaneously. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 402, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982). When one aspect of a case is before the appellate court on interlocutory review, the district court is divested of jurisdiction over that aspect of the case. Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp., 869 F.2d 817, 820-21 (5th Cir.1989). A district court does not have the power to alter the status of the case as it rests before the Court of Appeals. Id. By granting plaintiffs' motion to amend and drop all CERCLA claims and dismiss National Gypsum from the actions, the district court significantly changed the status of the appeals. It acted outside its authority. 17 Appellees counter with two Third Circuit cases stating that the rule that a trial court loses jurisdiction pending appeal is not jurisdictional but only a judge-made rule, designed to avoid confusion or a waste of time. See RCA Corp. v. Local 421, Intern. Federation of Prof., 700 F.2d 921, 924 (3d Cir.1983); United States v. Leppo, 634 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir.1980). It is urged that the rule should not be employed to defeat its purpose or to induce unnecessary paper shuffling. We need not consider the scope or extent of these two cases. We are bound by our well-established rulings that the district court loses jurisdiction over all matters which are validly on appeal. See Coastal Corp., supra, 869 F.2d at 820-21 and cases cited therein. This rule which we follow rigorously is based upon Griggs, supra, 459 U.S. 56, 103 S.Ct. 400. We find that the district court acted without jurisdiction in granting appellees leave to amend to drop the CERCLA claim and dismiss National Gypsum as defendant. The subject appeals therefore are not moot. 3 We deny appellees' motion to dismiss the appeals.