Opinion ID: 789742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process concerns were met.

Text: 41 The New Mexico Name claims the district court failed to appreciate how its enforcement of the English judgment deprived him of his due process rights. While the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to the recognition and enforcement of judgments among sister states, it does not apply to judgments rendered in foreign countries. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322 n. 4, 101 S.Ct. 633, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (The Full Faith and Credit Clause, of course, was inapplicable ... because the law of a foreign nation, rather than of a sister State, was at issue....). The parties cite no federal statute applicable to the enforcement of foreign court money judgments in U.S. courts, nor any applicable treaty. Instead, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are governed by state law. See Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co., Kommanditgesellschaft v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572, 582 (2d Cir.1993) (We note that ... the recognition of foreign judgments is governed by state law.); see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 481 cmt. a (1987). 42 New Mexico has adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-4B-1 to 39-4B-9 (1978). Pursuant to the Act, [a] foreign judgment is not conclusive if 43 the judgment was rendered under a system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law; 44 and it need not be recognized if: 45 (1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend; 46 (2) the judgment was obtained by fraud; 47 (3) the cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state.... 48 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-4B-5 (emphasis supplied). 49 The New Mexico Name contends that the New Mexico district court conflated the widely recognized general fairness of the English system, with this particular judgment, which, in his view, conflicts with his constitutional due process rights. Specifically, the New Mexico Name objects to (1) the English Courts' enforcement of the pay-now, sue-later clause, which prohibited him from raising certain defenses and counterclaims during the English action; (2) the conclusive evidence clause, because it renders the amount of the assessment determined by Lloyd's conclusive absent manifest error, and thereby fails to meet due process requirements; and (3) the fact that the cumulative effect of both these clauses is that the New Mexico Name could not receive a pre-deprivation hearing, could not obtain discovery as to the amount of Lloyd's claim, and could not challenge Lloyd's calculation of the amount due. 50 As to whether the contested clauses, taken separately or together, amounted to a forfeit of the Name's due process rights, [t]he question is not whether Lloyd's accorded due process to the names, but whether the English courts did.... Stated differently, the courts held that the names had waived their procedural rights in advance.... Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 479 (emphasis supplied). Waiver of procedural rights in advance is clearly permitted, see e.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185, 92 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972) (The due process rights to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment are subject to waiver.). Moreover, given the New Mexico Name's utter failure to participate in any stage of any of the English proceedings, `we not only look with skepticism, but we flatly reject the due process complaint of a party who was given, and ... waived, the opportunity of making the adequate presentation in the English Court.' Turner, 303 F.3d at 331 n. 20 (quoting British Midland Airways Ltd. v. Int'l Travel Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir.1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 51 Although the New Mexico Name would prefer to have us focus on this particular judgment, rather than the English system, at this stage of these matters, we are not permitted to do so. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-4B-5 (indicating that to determine conclusive[ness] of a foreign judgment, a court examines the foreign country's system and whether it maintains procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law). The procedures the English courts afford need not be identical to ours, they must only be compatible in that they do not offend the notion of basic fairness. See Turner, 303 F.3d at 331 (the courts of England are fair and neutral forums) (footnoted citation omitted); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895) ([W]e are not prepared to hold that the fact that the [foreign] procedure ... differed from that of our own courts is, of itself, a sufficient ground for impeaching the foreign judgment.); Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition Act § 4 cmt. ([A] mere difference in the procedural system is not a sufficient basis for non-recognition. A case of serious injustice must be involved.);1 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 482 cmt. b (1987) (A court asked to recognize or enforce the judgment of a foreign court must satisfy itself of the essential fairness of the judicial system under which the judgment was rendered.). 52 And when we look to the basic fairness of the system, the answer is clear: [O]ur courts have long recognized that the courts of England are fair and neutral forums. Riley, 969 F.2d at 958 (collecting cases); see also Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 967 (This is particularly so in the case of England, a forum that American courts repeatedly have recognized to be fair and impartial.). The Seventh Circuit similarly lauded the English system's regard for due process in its highly persuasive opinion involving nearly identical claims: 53 Any suggestion that [the English] system of courts does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law borders on the risible. [T]he courts of England are fair and neutral forums. The origins of our concept of due process of law are English .... and the English courts ... are highly regarded for impartiality, professionalism, and scrupulous regard for procedural rights. 54 Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 476 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 55 We agree with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and hold that given the structure of the English system, which is substantially similar to our own, the New Mexico Name's suggestion that the English court system does not provide tribunals compatible with due process is untenable. See also Webb, 156 F.Supp.2d. at 640. 56