Opinion ID: 689908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach of a Promise to Marry: An Historical Perspective

Text: 14 The action for the breach of a promise to marry is of antique vintage. First conceived as a creature of the English ecclesiastical courts, the action was originally used to pressure a reluctant lover into fulfilling a marital promise. W.J. Brockelbank, The Nature of the Promise to Marry--A Study in Comparative Law, 41 Ill.L.Rev. 1, 3 (1946); Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America 34 (1985). The common law eventually adopted the action, however, and permitted the recovery of monetary damages. Although developed by English courts, the action found its way into the American colonies and was later used by post-revolutionary American lawyers. 15 The action served dual ideals in colonial America. On the one hand, a breach of promise action continued to appeal to vestiges of the older notion that marriage was a property transaction completed after complex family negotiations. Grossberg, supra, at 35. But on the other hand, the action began to pay tribute to the emerging ideal that marriage was a sacred contract premised upon affection and emotional commitment. Id. The suits soon became utilized almost universally by women, and were justified by lawmakers largely on these grounds. Id. at 37. Marriage was considered necessary to secure both a woman's social and financial security. Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J.Law, Economics, and Organization 203, 204-05 (1990). But more importantly, the actions, and the judges who were willing to enforce them, recognized that promises to marry sometimes occasioned a loss of virginity. Id. at 205. Because of the importance the society of that day placed on premarital chastity, the economic and social harm suffered by a jilted woman were often reflected in large damage awards. Id. 16 The actions were characterized by a lack of legal formality peculiar for the law of that time. Foreign observers noted that, unlike wills or commercial contracts, little was needed to support an allegation that the parties had become engaged. Grossberg, supra, at 51. Consequently, appellate courts deferred widely to jury determinations in credibility contests. Id. at 49. Traditional rules relating to damages, too, were relaxed. Despite the originally contractual nature of the action, judges refused to confine the damage measure to immediate loss. Instead, they permitted recovery for elements such as mental anguish and a loss of social position. Id. at 43. 17 Largely because of the perceived vagaries of the suits, the actions had fallen into disrepute by the early twentieth century. Three principal reasons are given for their decline in popularity. The first is the unfounded use of the suit, given the lax standards of proof, to extort out-of-court settlements. Brockelbank, supra, at 13; Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 Mich.L.Rev. 1770, 1776 (1985). 4 Second, the excessive damages awarded prompted disdain for the actions. Id. at 1774. Finally, the ideals that the action served came to be viewed as anachronistic. The greater social and economic freedom incident to women's entry into the workforce meant that the loss of an initial suitor posed a lower threat to future prospects than it might have in the nineteenth century. Grossberg, supra, at 55. 5 18 As concerns grew, legislatures began to act. 6 Florida and Illinois were among these. Florida abrogated the cause of action by enacting a statute providing that agreements to marry made in Florida could not be enforced within or without this state. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 771.04 (1986). Illinois, too, outlawed the common law cause of action. In 1935, the Illinois legislature passed the Heart Balm Act, making it unlawful to file an action based on the breach of a promise to marry. Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, Secs. 246.1 & 246.2 (1943). Although the Florida statute eliminating the cause of action remains in force, the Illinois statute soon encountered troubles. 19 In Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464, 466 (1946), the Illinois Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional under provisions of the Illinois Constitution providing a legal remedy for all injuries. 7 The Illinois legislature soon responded in kind. Faced with the court's determination that the State was required to leave plaintiffs a remedy for the breach of a promise to marry, the legislature enacted Illinois's Breach of Promise Act in 1947. See generally 740 ILCS 15/1 et seq. (1993) (the Promise Act). This second attempt at circumscribing the perceived abuses of the common law action leaves the plaintiff's ability to recover intact. The statute does, however, suggest that actions for breach of promise were subject to both abuse and the danger of an excessive damage award. The legislature clearly states its misgivings in the Act's Preamble, determining that the remedy heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of actions based upon breaches of promises or agreements to marry has been subject to grave abuses and has been used as an instrument for blackmail by unscrupulous persons for their own unjust enrichment.... 740 ILCS 15/1. It therefore uses an elaborate notice provision and limits the types of damages that a plaintiff may recover. 740 ILCS 15/2, 15/4 & 15/5. This constricted version of the original breach of promise action passed muster under the Illinois Constitution, Smith v. Hill, 12 Ill.2d 588, 147 N.E.2d 321, 326-27 (1958), and has survived until the present.