Opinion ID: 4530962
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Because a parole hold was put in place,

Text: McLaughlin does not apply. Benson gave multiple detailed confessions regarding the murders. However, each of the confessions was made during the period of time between Benson’s arrest for kidnapping on January 7, 1986 and January 14, 1986, when he was arraigned and presented with the probable cause for his arrest for the first time. The Supreme Court ruled in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991) that an arrestee is entitled under the Fourth Amendment to a hearing at which he is presented with the probable cause of his arrest within forty-eight hours of the arrest. Benson argues that his confessions were tainted due to the delay in his arraignment. Benson raised his McLaughlin claim in his third state habeas petition, which was denied by the California Supreme Court on February 28, 2001. Accordingly, he is entitled to relief on this claim only if “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. A Fourth Amendment claim resulting from a McLaughlin violation would be cognizable on habeas corpus review. Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the State argues that the 48-hour rule described in McLaughlin does not apply to the Fourth Amendment rights of a parolee who is held pursuant to a “parole hold.” Generally, a parole hold authorizes a person suspected of violating his parole to be detained while authorities investigate the alleged parole violation. As we have already noted, Benson’s parole officer, 42 BENSON V. CHAPPELL Felix Martel, placed a parole hold on Benson immediately after Benson’s arrest for the kidnaping. Benson argues that evidence gathered since his trial calls into question whether a parole hold was, in fact, put in place. In particular, he asserts that as early as 2002, in connection with his third state habeas petition, the actual paper parole hold could not be located. However, Benson’s parole officer Martel testified at the initial suppression hearing in June 1986, and at his deposition on May, 2002, that he had placed a parole hold on Benson on Wednesday, January 8, 1986. Although the district court accepted the 2002 deposition of Benson’s parole officer, the information in the deposition is not properly before us. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (making clear that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted unless the State court’s adjudication on the merits “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding”) (emphasis added). We have held that Pinholster prohibits consideration of new evidence “for the purpose of determining whether the last reasoned state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law or an unreasonable determination of the facts.” Crittenden v. Chappell, 804 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2015). In other words, new evidence may not be used to determine whether the California Supreme Court’s decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts before it. Accordingly, we are precluded from considering the evidence.17 17 In any event the newly proffered evidence does not raise a material issue of fact. All the affirmative evidence in Benson’s state court proceedings shows that a parole hold was placed on Benson on BENSON V. CHAPPELL 43 The existence of a parole hold obviated the Fourth Amendment requirement that Benson be arraigned within 48 hours. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972), the Supreme Court noted that “the State has an overwhelming interest in being able to return the individual [on parole] to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial,” commended a two stage process,18 and recognized that there is “typically a substantial time lag between the arrest and the eventual determination by the parole board whether parole should be revoked.” Id. at 485. In Pierre v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Parole, 699 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1983), we upheld a preliminary probable cause determination held 21 days after parole was suspended. Moreover, the California Supreme Court has declined to require a probable cause hearing for a parolee within ten days of arrest. People v. DeLeon, 399 P.3d 13 ,26 (Cal. 2017). McLaughlin therefore does not apply to Benson’s situation, and there is no clearly established law that a parolee subject to a parole hold must be presented with the probable cause within 48 hours of his arrest. Wednesday, January 8, 1986. Indeed, multiple documents that were produced at the 2002 deposition confirm the parole hold. For example, both an incident report written by Benson’s parole officer and a teletype message sent to the sheriff’s office attest to the placing of a parole hold on Benson. Benson’s presentation does not come near showing that the California Supreme Court’s denial of relief was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 18 The Supreme Court explained: “The first stage occurs when the parolee is arrested and detained, usually at the direction of his parole officer. The second occurs when parole is formally revoked.” 408 U.S. at 485. 44 BENSON V. CHAPPELL