Opinion ID: 1117896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the jury was properly instructed on circumstantial evidence.

Text: ¶ 32. Jones argues on appeal that he was denied a circumstantial evidence instruction in his case. The record contradicts that assertion. Jones's counsel offered and was granted jury instruction D-1, which provided: The law presumes every person charged with the commission of a crime to be innocent. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis. This presumption of innocence attends the Defendant throughout the trial and prevails at its close unless overcome by evidence which satisfies the jury of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis. The Defendant is not required to prove his innocence. (Emphasis added). ¶ 33. In determining whether error exists in granting or refusing jury instructions, the instructions must be read as a whole; if the instructions fairly announce the law and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. Martin v. State, 854 So.2d 1004, 1009 (Miss.2003). ¶ 34. In Wilson v. State, 936 So.2d 357, 365 (Miss.2006), this Court held: [T]wo  theory instructions should only be given in cases based entirely on circumstantial evidence. State v. Rogers, 847 So.2d 858, 863 (Miss.2003). We have defined circumstantial evidence as that which, without going directly to prove the existence of a fact, gives rise to a logical inference that such a fact exists. Id. A circumstantial evidence case is one in which there is neither eyewitness testimony nor a confession to the crime. Id. ¶ 35. With respect to jury instructions involving the issue of circumstantial evidence, `[where] all the evidence tending to prove the guilt of the defendant is circumstantial, the trial court must grant a jury instruction that every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt must be excluded in order to convict. ' Rubenstein, 941 So.2d at 785 (quoting Givens v. State, 618 So.2d 1313, 1318 (Miss. 1993)) (emphasis added). ¶ 36. The jury was instructed that Jones was presumed innocent, and every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt must be excluded in order to find Jones guilty. There is no error if all instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law. . . . Scott v. State, 878 So.2d 933, 966 (Miss.2004) (citing Milano v. State, 790 So.2d 179, 184 (Miss. 2001)); see also Rubenstein, 941 So.2d at 785. ¶ 37. Since Jones was given a circumstantial evidence instruction, we find that this assignment of error is without merit.