Opinion ID: 895342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The voters have standing to assert an equal protection claim.

Text: Because the voters seek only declaratory and injunctive relief, and because each voter seeks the same relief, only one plaintiff with standing is required. See Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 627 (Tex.1996). [9] Accordingly, we examine whether Sonia Santana, a Travis County resident and registered voter, has standing to pursue the claims she asserts. We may look to the similar federal standing requirements for guidance, [10] and [o]ur threshold inquiry ... `in no way depends on the merits of the [voters'] contention that particular conduct is illegal.' [11] Generally, a citizen lacks standing to bring a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of governmental acts. [12] Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex.2001). Thus, [s]tanding doctrines reflect in many ways the rule that neither citizens nor taxpayers can appear in court simply to insist that the government and its officials adhere to the requirements of law. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.10 (3d ed.2008). This pragmatic approach ensures that `there is a real need to exercise the power of judicial review' in a particular case, and it helps guarantee that courts fashion remedies `no broader than required by the precise facts to which the court's ruling would be applied.' Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 441, 127 S.Ct. 1194, 167 L.Ed.2d 29 (2007) (citations omitted). Based partly on the notion of judicial self governance, this rule recognizes that other branches of government may more appropriately decide abstract questions of wide public significance, particularly when judicial intervention is unnecessary to protect individual rights. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Originally characterized as prudential, [13] the Supreme Court has more recently clarified that the generalized grievance bar to standing is constitutional. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding that a citizen raising only a generally available grievance about governmentclaiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at largedoes not state an Article III case or controversy). [14] The bar is based not on the number of people affecteda grievance is not generalized merely because it is suffered by large numbers of people. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 91 (3d ed.2006). As the Supreme Court has noted, [t]o deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686-88, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973). Thus, where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found injury in fact. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998) (citation omitted). Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the plaintiffs sue solely as citizens who insist that the government follow the law. CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 91. For example, the Supreme Court has held that citizens lacked standing to sue for a violation of a constitutional provision prohibiting members of Congress from serving in the executive branch. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217-27, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974). It has also rejected citizen standing in a case seeking to have parts of the CIA Act declared unconstitutional because it violated the Constitution's Statement and Accounts Clause. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974). We have held that a voter and citizen lacked standing to enjoin a purportedly illegal executive order signed by the mayor. Brown, 53 S.W.3d at 304. The line between a generalized grievance and a particularized harm is difficult to draw, [15] and it varies with the claims made. We recognized the principle over a century ago, when we held that a citizen could not, through litigation, challenge San Antonio's decision to build city hall on what was then a military plaza. City of San Antonio v. Stumburg, 70 Tex. 366, 7 S.W. 754, 755 (1888) (holding that no action lies to restrain an interference with a mere public right, at the suit of an individual who has not suffered or is not threatened with some damage peculiar to himself). And we have stated the general proposition broadly, applying it to voters: No Texas court has ever recognized that a plaintiff's status as a voter, without more, confers standing to challenge the lawfulness of government acts. Brown, 53 S.W.3d at 302. Instead, [o]ur decisions have always required a plaintiff to allege some injury distinct from that sustained by the public at large. Id. But we have also been careful to suggest that challenges to the election process may be different. Id. (noting that [t]his Court has never recognized standing on the basis of the resultsas opposed to the processof an initiative election). The Secretary urges a blanket rule that would ensure no voter ever has standing to challenge a voting system. We think the Secretary overreaches in that respect. The voters assert a denial of equal protectiona claim voters often have standing to bring. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) (noting that voters have standing to bring equal protection challenges to complain of vote dilution, and observing that [m]any of the cases have assumed rather than articulated the premise in deciding the merits of similar claims). [16] For example, the Supreme Court has permitted Virginia residents to sue for a declaration that Virginia's poll tax was unconstitutional. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (holding that poll tax violated the equal protection clause). It has allowed a Hawaii voter to challenge as unconstitutional the state's ban on write-in candidates. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). It has authorized a voter to challenge Tennessee's durational residence requirement. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). Voters residing in racially gerrymandered districts have standing to sue (although voters residing outside those districts do not). United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-45, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995). A voter in Georgia may sue to enjoin that state's allegedly unconstitutional county unit system as a basis for counting votes. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 375, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963) (holding that appellee, like any person whose right to vote is impaired, has standing to sue (citations omitted)). And Tennessee voters may sue to enjoin a statute apportioning legislators among the state's ninety-five counties. Baker, 369 U.S. at 206, 82 S.Ct. 691. In Baker, the Supreme Court explained that voters had standing to challenge a state's apportionment scheme because [t]he injury which appellants assert is that this classification disfavors the voters in the counties in which they reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-a-vis voters in irrationally favored counties.... It would not be necessary to decide whether appellants' allegations of impairment of their votes by the [apportionment] will, ultimately, entitle them to any relief, in order to hold that they have standing to seek it. If such impairment does produce a legally cognizable injury, they are among those who have sustained it. They are asserting a `plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes,' not merely a claim of `the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law....' 369 U.S. at 208, 82 S.Ct. 691 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Tokaji, 73 FORDHAM L.REV. at 1752 (noting that the use of voting machines disfavoring identifiable groups of voters, defined by place of residence, is constitutionally problematic and noting that such claims are analogous to the one person, one vote cases). While equal protections claims involving the use of DREs have been largely unsuccessful, [17] none has been dismissed for lack of standing. [18] The Secretary argues that because the voters have not shown that their votes actually were miscounted, they have not sustained the kind of concrete, particularized injury standing requires. But the voters' equal protection complaint is that the eSlate is susceptible to fraud and prone to malfunction, depriving them of the ability to determine whether their votes were counted. They assert that it is less probable that their votes will be counted than will the votes of residents of other Texas counties or absentee voters in Travis County. It is not necessary to decide whether the voters' claims will, ultimately, entitle them to relief, in order to hold that they have standing to seek it. If such impairment does produce a legally cognizable injury, they are among those who have sustained it. Baker, 369 U.S. at 207-08, 82 S.Ct. 691. Because they assert a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes, not merely a claim of the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law, the voters have standing to pursue their equal protection claim. Id. (citations omitted). The Secretary next asserts that equal protection claims rooted solely in geographical distinctions are insufficient to confer voter standing, citing our decision in Texas Department of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646-647 (Tex.2004). In that case, we held that a county resident had no standing to bring an equal protection claim on behalf of a class challenging the Department's purported failure to accord one county the same treatment other counties received. We held that state and federal equal-protection guarantees relate to equality between persons as such, rather than between areas, and ... territorial uniformity is not a constitutional prerequisite. Id. at 646-47 (citation omitted). We noted that when the State exercises governmental powers, it necessarily draws distinctions between geographic areas, and if citizens were entitled to equal treatment every time government money was spent, almost every government program would be unconstitutional. Id. at 647. Although framed as a standing question, we ultimately held that the claims failed as a matter of law. Id. Sunset Valley 's rule applies to equal protection claims generally, but not to cases involving voting-related equal protection claims. The latter are often based precisely on disparate treatment among voters in different geographical areas. See, e.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336, 92 S.Ct. 995 ([A] citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) (Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any method or means, merely because of where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable.); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964) ([A]s nearly as is practicable[,] one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's.); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963) (invalidating vote-counting method that weighted rural votes more heavily than urban ones); see also ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that voters had standing to bring equal protection claim challenging voter-identification law due to claim of unequal treatment of in-person voters (who had to show identification) and absentee voters (who did not)); Tokaji, 73 FORDHAM L.REV. at 1748 (noting that the [Supreme] Court has closely scrutinized certain election practices which deny or dilute the right to vote, especially when they disadvantage an identifiable group of voters based upon wealth or place of residence). The voters assert that they are forced to use the eSlate while other Travis County voters use an absentee or paper ballot. They also complain that voters in other parts of Texas are not forced to use the eSlate. Without examining the merits of the claim, this disparity gives them standing to sue for an equal protection violation. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000) (Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the state may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another.).