Opinion ID: 203101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions Actually Given Were in Error

Text: The jury verdict was based on erroneous instructions which were in error both in the omissions to give the correct instructions and in the instructions which were given. The court instructed the jury as follows: (1) that liability for all employees' actions accrued to the air carrier, not just the decisionmakers' actions: Now, American Airlines is a company. . . . Companies are people and they're bureaucracies and they operate hierarchically; in other words, there are higher-ups in the company and lower down people. But all are employees of the company and . . . if you think they're acting within the scope of their employment and they're doing what they are doing as employees of American Airlines, then that conduct is attributed to American Airlines. (2) that it could find for the plaintiff if it concluded that a lower-ranking American employee, such as a flight attendant, gave certain information to the decisionmaker: But [American] cannot, they're forbidden by law from acting to discriminate . . . against someone based upon their perception that that person is a certain race or a certain ethnic heritage. If that's why they did what they did, that's forbidden by the law. And let's say that's why a lower-level person acted as she did in respect to this. If that action is transformed into the action of the higher corporate people, if that's what drives the action of the higher corporate people, American's stuck with it because American should take care that they're not acting against a person based on the perceived race or ethnicity. The law forbids that. (3) that American Airlines had the ultimate burden of showing that its reasons for removing the plaintiff were legitimate: [I]f you think there is a forbidden reason in there, then the burden shifts over to American Airlines. And if [American Airlines] would have done it anyway, if they would have behaved exactly the same way anyway for legitimate reasons, if . . . American Airlines proves that, well, your verdict must be for American Airlines. The court, in its written opinion denying American's motion for a new trial, set forth its reasoning for these jury instructions. See Cerqueira, 484 F.Supp.2d at 234. The court reasoned that its instruction on finding intentional discrimination was adequate to cover § 44902(b), because if there was intentional discrimination as defined under the burden-shifting analysis of the McDonnell Douglas test, that would itself per se be arbitrary or capricious. Id. ; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). That reasoning was a mismatch with this case. Here, there is absolutely no evidence that either the Captain himself or the SOC manager had discriminatory animus, let alone that their decisions to refuse to transport a passenger, which were made under time pressure, were based on any discriminatory animus. The decision not to reboard the plaintiff on the flight was made by the State Police and accepted by the Captain. The Captain did not see the plaintiff and thus was unaware of his appearance, whether Middle Eastern or not, until the time of the trial. The Captain's actions were justified in light of the safety concerns described earlier. The SOC manager, who was in Dallas, based his decision, made that same morning and within minutes, not to rebook the plaintiff on information provided by the Captain, specifically all of the security concerns that formed the basis of the Captain's decision relayed to him from Boston. The § 1981 claim against the SOC manager's decision was derivative of the § 1981 claim against the Captain's decision. There is no evidence that the SOC manager's decision was based on race discrimination. There is also no evidence that any of the security concerns which made the Captain's decision appropriate had been proven unfounded by the time the SOC manager decided within minutes that morning to deny rebooking or that the SOC manager's following the Captain's decision was motivated by race. [19] Further, there is no evidence that the SOC manager was aware of the plaintiff's appearance, race, or ethnicity. As a result, the § 1981 claim against the SOC manager fails, and § 1981 imposed no further duties on him. If the Captain had made a decision to remove plaintiff from this flight based only on the Captain's bias toward persons who appeared to be of Middle Eastern descent, such a decision would be arbitrary within the meaning of § 44902(b). In such instances, there is congruence between the different statutory commandspassenger safety and non-discrimination. The jury, though, was never asked the correct questions here. The instructions given were based on three incorrect assumptions on the part of the district court: (1) that instructions from Title VII employment discrimination cases were appropriate in a refusal to transport case under § 44902(b); (2) that the instructions given were required by the doctrine of respondeat superior; and (3) that the instructions were required by Cariglia v. Hertz Equipment Rental Corp., 363 F.3d 77 (1st Cir.2004). This claim, however, is not an employment discrimination claim arising under Title VII; it arose under § 1981 [20] and challenged a decision made pursuant to the authorization given an air carrier by Congress in § 44902(b). As we have held, the burden is on the plaintiff to show the decision not to transport was arbitrary or capricious. Cordero (and Williams ) hold the same. See Cordero, 681 F.2d at 672; Williams, 509 F.2d at 948. The jury must be instructed that the Captain has the power to refuse transport because transport of a passenger might be inimical to safety unless that decision was arbitrary or capricious. See Cordero, 681 F.2d at 672. It is the plaintiff's burden to show the Captain's decision was arbitrary or capricious. The test we have outlined under § 44902(b) is inconsistent with the use in Title VII cases of prima facie case methodology and the burden-shifting test. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). [21] There were a number of other problems with the instructions given. The primary problem was that the instructions permitted liability of the air carrier to turn on the purported bias of non-decisionmakers. The jury was erroneously instructed that its focus was not to be on the Captain's bias but on any employee of the airline involved in providing information [22] to the Captain. The deemed attribution instruction is flatly inconsistent with the leeway for the Captain's decision under § 44902(b), and it was not justified either by reference to the Restatement (Second) of Agency (Restatement) or under Cariglia. Even in interpreting Title VII, the Supreme Court has not adopted Restatement § 219 principles wholesale, as the district court purported here to do. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 797, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (The proper analysis here, then, calls not for a mechanical application of indefinite and malleable factors set forth in the Restatement. . . .). The district court here interpreted the respondeat superior doctrine to impose liability on an air carrier for the Captain's decision based not on the issue of the Captain's bias, but on the purported discrimination of a lower-level employee who neither had authority to make the allegedly discriminatory decision nor in fact made the decision. Further, the Supreme Court has not addressed the scope of any respondeat superior liability in § 1981 claims generally [23] and we need not do so here. The district court also erroneously invoked another doctrine from employment law, which has no applicability on the facts here as to the Captain's decision. In Cariglia, this court recognized that under the Massachusetts state employment discrimination statute, liability may be found where (a) a discriminating subordinate (b) causes the firing of a plaintiff by (i) intentionally giving false information to and (ii) withholding accurate information from the decisionmaker, (c) the decisionmaker's decision is significantly based on these very inaccuracies, and (d) the plaintiff has been given no opportunity to provide contrary information. See Cariglia, 363 F.3d at 87-88. [24] This theory was applied to a state employment law claim and is not available in a § 1981 federal claim where the air carrier has made a decision within the statutory authorization of § 44902(b). Further, even on the Cariglia theory, the facts did not warrant such an instruction. [25] The Captain consulted with State Police and TSA personnel; it was the State Police who told the Captain that the plaintiff would not reboard the aircraft for the flight. The State Police had spoken to the plaintiff. And, even if the Captain's decision was based on his own experiences with one of the three passengers and other information, it was independently grounded and not captive of whatever information (biased or not) he received from Flight Attendant Two. Even under conventional discrimination theory, the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to show the tainted information was a cause for his treatment, much less a but-for cause. For the reasons given, we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment and fees award in favor of plaintiff and enter judgment for defendant.