Opinion ID: 219096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: The Supreme Court has recently visited the question whether a Rule 60(b) motion for Relief from Judgment is properly treated as a successive petition in habeas cases in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005). The Court noted that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply in habeas proceedings only to the extent they are not inconsistent with federal statutory provisions and rules. Id. at 529, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11). So where a Rule 60(b) motion raises arguments forbidden by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) or (b)(2), it will amount to an impermissible successive petition and the district court will lack jurisdiction. Id. at 530-32, 125 S.Ct. 2641. Were this not the case, prisoners would be able to use Rule 60(b) to circumvent statutory limitations on successive applications that are integral to federal habeas law. Id. at 532, 125 S.Ct. 2641. However, not every Rule 60(b) motion is forbidden: A motion that ... challenges only the District Court's failure to reach the merits does not warrant such treatment, and can therefore be ruled upon by the District Court.... Id. at 538, 125 S.Ct. 2641; see also Peach v. United States, 468 F.3d 1269, 1271 (10th Cir.2006). Here, we will not look past the district court's express statement that Freeman had not raised the question of conflict-free counsel. We therefore can properly assume that the court did not decide the issue. It is true that the court's discussion looks very much like an analysis of conflict-free counsel, but courts commonly discuss matters they do not decide. We can properly hold that the district court treated the question of conflict-free counsel as waived. But was the district court correct? Did Freeman successfully raise the issue of conflict-free counsel in his habeas petition? As noted, Freeman most prominently highlighted the question of counsel of choice, and not conflict-free counsel, in his petition. But conflict-free counsel was also referenced in the petition, if inconspicuously. The state discussed conflict-free counsel throughout eleven pages of its answer, so there can be no argument that it was lulled into believing that Freeman was not arguing conflict-free counsel and was thereby prejudiced. And the district court discussed the merits of Freeman's conflict-free counsel theory in its memorandum. In short, the question of conflict-free counsel received attention from everyone involved in Freeman's habeas case, which suggests it was not waived. And, if not waived, the district court should have addressed this argument fully on the merits. Therefore, the district court should not have denied Freeman's Rule 60(b) motion. The motion correctly observed that the district court had overlooked one of his arguments for habeas relief. Hence, the motion was not a successive habeas petition. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 538, 125 S.Ct. 2641. Ordinarily the district court should rule on the merits of habeas petitions in the first instance, see, e.g., Holleman v. Duckworth, 155 F.3d 906, 912 (7th Cir. 1998), but we nonetheless have discretion to reach the merits of a habeas claim although they were not first considered by the district court, see Kaczmarek v. Rednour, 627 F.3d 586, 595 (7th Cir.2010); Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 645-46 (7th Cir.1996). And the district court's discussion, though legally ineffectual, certainly provides a preview of how it might be expected to treat Freeman's conflict-free counsel argument on remand. Therefore, in view of the discreteness of Freeman's grievance and the completeness of the record before us and in the interest of judicial economy, we elect to reach the merits. We agree that defense counsel's conflict of interest can violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. See United States v. Adkins, 274 F.3d 444, 453 (7th Cir.2001) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). But a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel is effective, and will foreclose later arguments premised on this right. See United States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 60 (7th Cir.1992). Generally, for a defendant's waiver to be valid, the judge need only `inform each defendant of the nature and importance of the right to conflict-free counsel and ensure that the defendant understands something of the consequences of a conflict.' United States v. Turner, 594 F.3d 946, 952 n. 1 (7th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Flores, 5 F.3d 1070, 1078 (7th Cir.1993)). The state points to the district court's language to the effect that Freeman effectively waived any conflict-free counsel argument, during his colloquy with the trial judge. And on direct appeal, the state appellate court found Freeman had waived the argument. But despite these contrary analyses, we shall assume without deciding that Freeman did not waive the issue. This is not because we doubt the prior rulings on this issue, but simply because we prefer to consider the merits instead of deciding the case on procedural grounds. Therefore, solely for purposes of analysis, we shall treat Freeman's conflict-free counsel argument as preserved. The question of what Freeman must show to secure relief because of a conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel is a thicket, but here a clear answer emerges. The hitch is that there are two frameworks for analyzing the question, one of which derives from proceedings wherein counsel represents multiple clients, and one of which considers whether counsel was ineffective. Under the former framework, defense counsel is said to labor under an actual conflict of interest. If there is any adverse effect on the attorney's performance, prejudice is presumed and the defendant's argument prevails. See Hall v. United States, 371 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir.2004) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). This Cuyler framework applies if the defense counsel was faced with a choice between advancing his own interests above those of his client. Hall, 371 F.3d at 973 (citing Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir.1994)). We have also said that it applies only where there is a danger that [counsel] would ineffectively represent his client because of fear that authorities might become aware of the attorney's own misconduct. United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1293 (7th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). But where this Cuyler precedent does not apply, the defendant must carry the heavier burden of showing that the conflict resulted in ineffective assistance under the familiar framework of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This means showing that counsel's representation fell below an objectively reasonable standard of care, and that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors the trial outcome would have been different. Id. at 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Freeman's case does not come within the less demanding Cuyler line, because his counsel was not actually conflicted in the sense of being forced to choose between himself and his client. Indeed, Nemzin testified favorably to Freeman by impugning the credibility of the complaining witness. Cf. Enoch v. Gramley, 70 F.3d 1490, 1496-97 (7th Cir.1995) (an actual conflict may exist where counsel faces the prospect of having to cross-examine a former client); Stoia, 22 F.3d at 772 (an actual conflict would exist where vigorous representation might lead to revelation of counsel's subornation of perjury in another case, and counsel's violation of a federal plea agreement); United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir.1984) (counsel was actually conflicted where he had been involved in the same criminal activity as the defendant); Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 164-65 (2d Cir. 1983) (an actual conflict existed where defense counsel's vigorous representation might have increased the likelihood of the revelation that counsel was not admitted to practice law). Therefore, Freeman's conflicted counsel argument must proceed pursuant to Strickland. The first prong in the Strickland analysis is whether counsel's performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard of care. It is not at all likely that Nemzin's performance did: much of the responsibility for allowing a defense attorney to testify on behalf of his client belongs to the circuit court. That Nemzin prevailed on the court to allow him to testify speaks to his persuasiveness, although it may reflect poorly on his command of criminal procedure (and the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct [2] ). But the rules of ethics are not necessarily coextensive with Strickland 's objectively reasonable standard of care. [3] This question being legally murky and involved, we do not decide it, and instead we proceed to the second Strickland prong. The second Strickland inquiry goes to the heart of this habeas case, by asking whether, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, it is reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have been different. In other words, Freeman's appeal boils down to the question whether Nemzin's testimony made any real difference in his trial. In view of the record before us (including the state appellate court's adjudication of the issue, to which we owe deference [4] ), we are quite confident that it did not. As discussed above, Nemzin testified favorably to Freeman, and the state, not Freeman, objected to his dual role. Nemzin's testimony impugned the credibility of the complaining witness, and it was fairly effective in doing so: the judge indicated that Nemzin's testimony was plausible. But this simply did not change the outcome in view of the other evidence of Freeman's guilt. There was no chance of Nemzin's dual role confusing a jury because Freeman's was a bench trial. Cf. United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 551 (7th Cir.1991) (likelihood of confusion relating to dual role of eyewitness and expert witness is diminished in a bench trial context). And as a final note, we observe that Freeman himself is conspicuously unable, despite his best efforts in his brief, to articulate a credible theory that he was prejudiced by Nemzin's dual role. We may affirm on any grounds present in the record. See Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 414 (7th Cir.1993). Despite the district court's apparently erroneous denial of Freeman's Rule 60(b) motion, Freeman is not entitled to habeas relief. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.