Opinion ID: 653367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Reduce Acosta's, Mariscales's and Fierro's Offense Levels For Minimal Participation

Text: 89 Acosta, Mariscales, and Fierro contend that the district court erred by failing to reduce their respective offense levels due to their alleged roles as minimal participants in the relevant conduct of the offense. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.2. 4 We review the issue of whether a particular defendant is a minor or minimal participant in criminal activity for clear error. United States v. Andrus, 925 F.2d 335, 337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 249 (1991); United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 557 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Gillock, 886 F.2d 220, 222 (9th Cir.1989). 90 Application Note # 1 of the Commentary to 3B1.2(a) states: 91 1. Subsection (a) applies to a defendant who plays a minimal role in concerted activity. It is intended to cover defendants who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group. Under this provision, the defendant's lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the activities of others is indicative of a role as minimal participant. 92 Downward adjustments for minimal participation are to be used infrequently, however. Gillock, 886 F.2d at 222. Indeed, we have consistently held that defendants are not automatically entitled to such status merely because the court finds them to be less culpable. See, e.g., United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1452 (9th Cir.1991). We address each defendant in turn. 1. Acosta 93 Acosta was involved, together with Montgomery, Jesus Mariscales, and Rodriguez, in the three shipments of cocaine from Las Vegas to Des Moines. Specifically, Montgomery and Jesus Mariscales transported the cocaine to Des Moines and Acosta then delivered it to the actual distributors in Iowa. Acosta was also responsible for collecting payments for this cocaine and returning such payment to Las Vegas. In addition, Acosta was the registered owner of the car that broke down and was abandoned in Colorado on the second trip transporting cocaine to Des Moines. 94 Before sentencing, the government stipulated with Acosta that the 100 kilograms of cocaine should not be included in the calculation of Acosta's base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. Such stipulation was based on the fact that Acosta was not involved in the negotiations of the 100 kilogram cocaine purchase, and served to reduce Acosta's base offense level by two points. The court accepted the stipulation, but indicated that it was being very lenient with Acosta by not sentencing him for the 100 kilogram quantity of cocaine. 95 On appeal, Acosta contends that the district court committed clear error by failing to sentence him as a minimal participant with respect to the remaining quantities. We disagree. 96 Acosta was not a minimal participant as to the three shipments of cocaine to Iowa. Moreover, the court properly reduced his offense level based on his lack of involvement in the negotiations of the 100 kilogram quantity of cocaine. Hence, we conclude that the district court's failure to sentence Acosta as a minimal participant for the remaining narcotics offenses was not clear error. 2. Mariscales 97 Jesus Mariscales joins in the brief filed by Acosta. However, unlike Acosta, Mariscales did not request a reduction of his base offense level under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.2 at trial. The question whether a defendant is a minimal participant requires a factual determination. United States v. Sanchez, 908 F.2d 1443, 1448-49 (9th Cir.1990). Hence, where a defendant does not raise this issue at trial, we will review the court's failure to reduce his or her offense level only for plain error. See United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1012 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). 98 Mariscales has neither argued nor demonstrated that the district court's failure to sentence him as a minimal participant in the conspiracy was a highly prejudicial error affecting substantial rights. United States v. Koenig, 952 F.2d 267, 272 (9th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Lopez-Cavasos, 915 F.2d 474, 475 (9th Cir.1990)). We therefore conclude that the court's failure to sentence him as a minimal participant does not constitute plain error. 3. Fierro 99 Fierro contends that the district court erred by failing to reduce his offense level by four points due to his minimal participation in the conspiracy. Specifically, Fierro argues that the court so erred because he was not involved in any of the substantive counts of the Superseding Indictment. 100 As set forth above, both Ruiz Alvarez and Fierro indicated to Brito that Fierro was Ruiz Alvarez's enforcer. Ruiz Alvarez also told Brito that he intended to leave Fierro, Fernando Ruiz, and Manjarez in charge of operations in Las Vegas when Ruiz Alvarez returned to Mexico. In addition, Fierro picked up Montgomery and Jesus Mariscales from the airport and brought them to Rodriguez's Venice Street residence to prepare and transport the fourteen kilogram cocaine shipment to Iowa. Finally, Ruiz Alvarez told Brito that he would sent Fierro and Manjarez to Los Angeles to obtain the 100 kilograms of cocaine for delivery to Brito in Las Vegas. 101 In light of this level of participation, we conclude that the district court's failure to reduce Fierro's base offense level due to minimal participation was not clear error. 102 J. Failure to Reduce Ruiz Alvarez's Offense Level by Two Points For Acceptance of Responsibility 103 Ruiz Alvarez contends that the district court erred by failing to reduce his offense level for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1. 5 In so doing, the court determined, based on the evidence presented at trial, that Ruiz Alvarez was far from accepting responsibility for his conduct. Id. 104 Whether or not a defendant has accepted responsibility for his crime is a factual determination subject to review for clear error. United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir.1990). 105 Ruiz Alvarez contends the reduction was warranted because he pled guilty to Counts 4 and 5, distribution of one kilogram of cocaine and distribution of ten pieces of heroin, respectively. In addition, Ruiz Alvarez points to his testimony at sentencing, wherein he stated: Your Honor, I am very sorry about this. I'm sorry for getting involved in this. That is all. [Sentencing Transcript, July 20, 1992, at 17.] 106 First, we note that the court accepted Ruiz Alvarez's acceptance of responsibility for Counts 4 and 5, the two counts to which he pled guilty, and adjusted his offense level for these two counts accordingly. Without more, the guilty pleas on Counts 4 and 5 do not evidence a general acceptance of responsibility for the conduct underlying the remaining counts. 107 It is true that the fact that Ruiz Alvarez chose to go to trial on the remaining counts does not, by itself, warrant the court's denial of an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1378 (9th Cir.1991) (defendant's silence at trial cannot provide basis for denying an adjustment for his acceptance of responsibility); United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587 (9th Cir.1990). However, the record does not indicate that the court based its refusal to adjust Ruiz Alvarez's offense level on his failure to plead guilty on all counts. Rather, the record reveals that the court concluded, based on all the evidence presented at trial, that Ruiz Alvarez had not accepted responsibility for the conduct underlying the counts on which he went to trial. We conclude that such conclusion is not clearly erroneous. 108 K. Failure to Depart Downward Due to Non-Likelihood of Recidivism 109 Ruiz Alvarez contends that the district court erred by failing to depart downward based on non-likelihood of recidivism under U.S.S.G. Secs. 5H1.1, 5K2.0, and 4A1.3. Specifically, he argues that his sentence to thirty years' imprisonment amounts to a life sentence and therefore is not consistent with the goals expressed in the Sentencing Guidelines. 110 A district court's discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines is not reviewable on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 958 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir.1992) (This court has no jurisdiction to review a sentencing court's refusal to depart downward as long as the court in fact exercised its discretion); United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 103 (9th Cir.1990). The record reveals that the district court's decision not to depart downward on this basis was discretionary. Hence, we lack jurisdiction to review this issue on appeal. 111 L. District Court's Denial of Ruiz Alvarez's, Acosta's and Fierro's Motion for a Mistrial as A Result of Improper Testimony 112 Ruiz Alvarez, Acosta, and Fierro contend that the district court erred by denying their motions for a mistrial, made as a result of the admission of particular evidence and the hearsay testimony of a government agent. We review evidentiary rulings of the district court for abuse of discretion. United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453 (9th Cir.1988) (citation omitted). We review the court's denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Segal, 852 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.1988). 113 During the trial, undercover agents Brito and Valladolid testified at length regarding conversations with various members of the conspiracy. Throughout such conversations, many statements were made regarding connections to the Amado Carillo Fuentas Organization. Specifically, Brito testified regarding Ruiz Alvarez's ties to the Fuentas organization and alleged involvement in several drug transactions not at issue in this case. 114 After Brito testified, Ruiz Alvarez moved for a mistrial. The court did not rule on the motion, but instead gave the following limiting instruction, upon which all counsel agreed: 115 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I wish to issue this limiting instruction concerning a portion of the testimony of Agent Brito about a meeting with [Ruiz Alvarez] on July 16, 1990. There is no allegation in this Indictment that any Defendant is associated with the Medellin Drug Cartel. There is no allegation in this indictment that any Defendant is associated with the seizure of 20 tons of cocaine in Somar, California. There is no allegation in this Indictment that any Defendant is associated with the distribution of marijuana with Amado Carillo Fuentas. There's no allegation in this Indictment that any Defendant has anything to do with any bribery of any Mexican official or law enforcement officer by Amado Carillo Fuentas. There's no allegation in this Indictment that any Defendant is associated with Carlos Tapia Ponce. You are therefore ordered to treat such evidence with caution and to give it such weight as you think appropriate in the totality of the circumstances and in conjunction with all of the instructions that you will be given. 116 At the request of Ruiz Alvarez, the court also ruled that it would not allow any future testimony regarding the Medellin Cartel or any of the other drug transactions to which Brito referred in his testimony that were not at issue in this case. Ruiz Alvarez then moved to strike Brito's testimony on these issues. The court denied the motion. 117 Thereafter, Special Agent Valladolid testified for the government. The government asked Valladolid about a conversation he had with Ruiz Alvarez. Valladolid answered: 118 Well, he said that his boss was Amado Carillo Fuentas and he was bigger than anybody, and that people talked about Caro Quintero, but that Amado Carillo Fuentas was bigger than Caro Quintero. And Caro Quintero is, of course, ... the drug dealer that killed the DEA Agent in Mexico. 119 In response, all counsel, including the government's counsel, objected. Ruiz Alvarez immediately moved for a mistrial. All other defendants, including Acosta and Fierro, joined in the motion. The government opposed the motion, instead requesting that the jury receive a limiting instruction. The court denied the motion for mistrial, but instructed the jury as follows: 120 I repeat to you that any testimony related to the killing of any agent is not involved in this case at all and must not be considered by you at all in making an assessment as to the allegations set forth in the Indictment. 121 The court then recessed to enable the government to advise Valladolid as to his testimony. 122 Shortly after his testimony resumed, Valladolid referred to drug trafficking from Mexico into the United States and drugs being obtained in Colombia. Again, all defense counsel objected. The court sustained the objections, but again refused to grant a mistrial. 123 Valladolid then made a reference to a private deal with an individual by the name of Canedo. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that such testimony related to a separate incident not at issue in this case. The court sustained the objection. 124 Thereafter, the government questioned Valladolid regarding Canedo's narcotics operation in Tucson, Arizona. Defense counsel again objected on the grounds that such testimony did not relate to the conspiracy alleged in this case. However, the court overruled the objection. 125 On appeal, Ruiz Alvarez, Acosta, and Fierro contend that the admission of the above evidence violated Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 provides as follows: 126 Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 127 F.R.Evid. 403. Rule 404(b) provides as follows: 128 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.... 129 F.R.Evid. 404(b). 130 Ruiz Alvarez and Fierro argue that the above testimony was so egregious as to warrant a mistrial. Specifically, Ruiz Alvarez, Acosta, and Fierro contend that the testimony related to separate incidents, other crimes, not at issue in this case and that the probative value of such testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Hence, they argue that the testimony violated Rules 404(b) and 403, respectively. Fierro also contends that the testimony of the DEA agent's murder and the Medellin Cartel, in particular, was more prejudicial to him than to the other defendants because it directly relates to his alleged role as a shooter in the conspiracy. 131 With respect to the testimony by Brito and the testimony by Valladolid regarding the murder of the DEA agent, the court gave prompt and specific curative instructions to redress defense counsel's concerns. We must assume the jury followed such instructions. United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir.1991). Hence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to declare a mistrial as a result of such testimony. 132 The district court did not give curative instructions as a result of Valladolid's reference to drug's being obtained from Colombia and the alleged private deal with Canedo. However, the court sustained defense counsel's objections based thereon and struck the testimony in question. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for mistrial based on such testimony. 133 Finally, the court overruled defense counsel's objection based on the testimony regarding Canedo's Tucson operation. This case involves an intricate narcotics distribution conspiracy. Canedo was not in fact a defendant in this case. Nonetheless, the government argued that, with respect to the conspiracy, Ruiz Alvarez was in charge of Las Vegas operations, while Canedo was in charge of Tucson operations. Given Canedo's alleged relationship to Ruiz Alvarez in the conspiracy, we agree with the district court that the probative value of the testimony regarding Canedo's Tucson operations was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Hence, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel's motion for a mistrial based thereon. 134 M. Failure to Grant Motion for Mistrial Based on Alleged Improper Jury Contact 135 Ruiz Alvarez contends that the district court committed reversible error by denying his motion for mistrial based on extrajudicial communications between the jury and FBI agents. We review a trial court's decisions regarding jury incidents for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Soulard, 730 F.2d 1292, 1305 (9th Cir.1984). In responding to charges of juror misconduct or bias, a trial court has the power 'to discriminate on the basis of their content, their source, and the nature of the alleged misconduct.'  Soulard, 730 F.2d at 1305 (citation omitted). Such court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to hold an investigative hearing on allegations of improper jury contact. Id. 136 On agreement of counsel, the government proffered the following information to the court, as disclosed by the FBI agents: An alternate juror had looked directly at FBI Agent Ferrin and stated, Thank God it's Friday. Agent Ferrin smiled in return but did not otherwise respond. Secondly, in response to testimony by Rodriguez, an FBI agent exchanged glances with one of defense counsel, who rolled his eyes. 137 The government advised the court that the government was too close to the jury in the courtroom, but that thereafter it would attempt not to have any contact with the jury or even to look at the jurors excessively. Defense counsel offered no further objection or requests for remedial action by the court. Hence, the court resolved the matter to the satisfaction of defense counsel at trial. 138 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ruiz Alvarez's motion for mistrial based on the above extrajudicial jury contact. 139 We REVERSE Ruiz Alvarez's conviction for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (Count 1). We AFFIRM on all other counts.