Opinion ID: 2063450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction of this appeal. Preliminarily we are confronted with the issue of whether we have jurisdiction to entertain defendant's appeal.

Text: Judgment of conviction and sentence were entered on October 27, 1977. Section 793.2 provides an appeal can only be taken from the final judgment, and within sixty days thereafter. On December 21, 1977 defendant, following the Reaves prerequisite for an appeal challenging the adequacy of his guilty plea, filed a motion in arrest of judgment in the trial court instead of a timely notice of appeal to this court. The motion was set for hearing at a later time. Defendant's notice of appeal, filed April 11, 1978 was within 60 days after the March 1 order overruling his motion in arrest of judgment. However, the appeal was not filed within 60 days after the October 27, 1977 judgment and sentence. Should defendant be deprived of a right of appeal due to the delay necessitated by following the procedural requirement of Reaves and awaiting ruling thereon? Some assistance on this problem is found in State v. Hellickson, 162 N.W.2d 390, 392-393 (Iowa 1968) where the state moved to dismiss an appeal on the ground an adjudication on a motion in arrest of judgment was not an appealable order. Although in the guilty plea proceeding that defendant claimed there had been no threats or promises to induce his plea, in his motion in arrest he claimed promises had induced the plea. There we said: Actually, the issue here presented is whether an appeal lies from a post-sentence arrest of judgment order. . . . Furthermore no appeal lies from an order denying an arrest of judgment motion on a ground which could have been reviewed on appeal from the judgment. . . . In the instant case defendant chose not to appeal from sentence, electing to exercise his statutory right to later seek arrest of judgment upon the premise his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. This, if true, did not appear on the record. Id. at 392-393. We again note that Gillespie, in contrast to the defendant in Hellickson, was mandated by the Reaves requirement to file a motion in arrest and did not have the initial option to file an appeal. After recognizing the general rule to be that an order entered upon a motion in arrest of judgment is not appealable, in State v. Hellickson, 162 N.W.2d 393, we subscribed to an exception to the general rule and stated: This inferentially means a defendant may, by motion in arrest of judgment, with the aid of extrinsic evidence, establish a violation of constitutional or fundamental rights which are not apparent but inhere in the whole record, as a result of which no legal judgment could be pronounced. Section 793.2 was interpreted by State v. Clayton, 217 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa 1974) where we stated: The final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment. In that case the defendant did not attempt to file an appeal until eight months after sentencing. Clayton did not cite or involve the exception that State v. Hellickson carved out for a ruling on motion in arrest. We believe in view of the requirement of Reaves, that a defendant desiring to challenge the adequacy of his guilty plea proceeding must first file a motion in arrest of judgment in the trial court and receive ruling thereon, an appeal under Section 793.2 is valid if filed within 60 days of an adverse ruling on the motion. For that purpose and under that circumstance, an adverse ruling on the motion in arrest of judgment filed under Chapter 788 is a final judgment under Section 793.2, 1977 Code. We hold that we have jurisdiction to entertain defendant's appeal under the record in this case. II. The motion in arrest of judgment. We turn now to the issue raised by defendant. In substance he claims he was deprived of due process of law because trial court failed to discuss the law of aiding and abetting with him and obtain an affirmative showing on the record that defendant understood that aspect of the law at the time his guilty plea was taken. The record amply shows that defendant's attorney had fully explained the law relative to aiding and abetting to defendant prior to defendant's guilty plea. Cf. State v. Reppert, 215 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Iowa 1974) (At the guilty plea taking, defendant told the court he understood the penalty for one of the charges against him.). In this regard counsel was discharging his duty in advising his client and to the court as contemplated in State v. Reaves, 254 N.W.2d at 494; State v. Williams, 224 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Iowa 1974). We hold that the record made at the hearing on the motion in arrest can be used to supply a deficiency in the record made at the time of the taking of the guilty plea relative to the law of aiding and abetting. Adams v. State, 269 N.W.2d 442, 444-445 (Iowa 1978), and authorities cited therein. From the entire record made at the plea taking and the hearing on motion in arrest we are satisfied that defendant knew and understood the essential elements of the crime of robbery and the law of aiding and abetting as it applied to him at the time he plead guilty. His plea was voluntary and in accord with due process of law. State v. Rand, 268 N.W.2d 642, 646 (Iowa 1978). The trial court was correct in denying defendant's motion in arrest of judgment. The case isAFFIRMED. All Justices concur except McCORMICK, J., who concurs specially.