Opinion ID: 2077563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Practical Effects of the Majority Opinion

Text: The majority expends some effort in trying to limit its holding to the facts of this case. 237 Ill.2d at 124-29, 340 Ill.Dec. at 573-74, 928 N.E.2d at 820-21. I am concerned that, despite the majority's insistence that its holding is limited to the facts of this case, constructive notice in zoning cases will, after today, never be deemed reasonable for purposes of procedural due process. There is nothing about these plaintiffs that would be any different from any other landowner interested in zoning proceedings, particularly when those landowners, like plaintiffs here, do not reside within the municipality. [4] Moreover, in this case, the zoning change was comprehensive and involved the entire city. The majority makes no effort to explain what the guideposts are for decisionmaking regarding reasonable notice in such situations. Is it a matter of how easy it is to locate those who are affected by the zoning change? Where will this information come from and what is the scope of a reasonable investigation in these circumstances? Does the majority have in mind a title search for all affected parcels? Or perhaps a search of the county's tax rolls for each affected parcel? Such a broad, sweeping investigation appears better suited to a facial challenge than an as-applied challenge, as the majority purports to be ruling on in this case. I note that the majority also states that 85 parcels were affected in this case, implying that the number of affected parcels is also relevant. 237 Ill.2d at 128, 340 Ill.Dec. at 573, 928 N.E.2d at 820. At what number of affected parcels would actual notice become unreasonable? Would 100 parcels be too burdensome for the City? The majority further alludes to the cost of the mailing to the City. 237 Ill.2d at 128, 340 Ill.Dec. at 573, 928 N.E.2d at 820. At what price point would the cost become unreasonable? These questions need to be answered or else municipalities will never be certain when constructive notice, as the statute permits, will be sufficient to satisfy due process. While procedural due process cases are unsuitable by their nature for precise formulae to balance interests (see Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657, 94 L.Ed. at 873), in light of the imprecise nature of the property interest deemed by the majority to require due process protection, the number of parcels affected and the cost, in my view, would seem irrelevant to the balancing of interests under the majority's analysis. For these reasons, I believe that the majority opinion will cause more findings of procedural due process violations than not. Accordingly, while I agree with the majority that plaintiffs were entitled to notice and the opportunity to be heard on the issue of the City's comprehensive zoning plan, I do not agree that the constructive notice given by the City was constitutionally deficient.