Opinion ID: 201470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sentence for Count One

Text: 9 Serrano brings a trio of challenges to his sentence as to Count One, 2 and argues that we should remand to the district court for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2005). First, he challenges the evidentiary support for his criminal record and his organizer role sentencing enhancement; second, he argues that the district court was constrained by the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines and so sentenced him to above the statutory minimum; third, he argues that he should have been given the benefit of the safety valve. We take up each challenge in turn. 10 i. We begin with Serrano's argument that there was no factual support for either the finding 1) that Serrano's role during the offense was that of an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor, justifying an increase in his offense level by two levels, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), or 2) that Serrano's criminal history placed him in criminal history category II. 3 If the district court erred in making these findings and, as a result, misapplied sentencing enhancements under the Guidelines so as to cause prejudice to Serrano's sentence, the errors would justify remand for resentencing even under pre- Booker circuit precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Thiongo, 344 F.3d 55, 63 (1st Cir.2003); United States v. McMinn, 103 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir.1997). 11 Serrano has waived his challenge to his organizer role enhancement. The plea agreement stipulated that Serrano helped [another codefendant] contact and recruit a police officer to assist in the escort of the cocaine shipment. The plea agreement also included the stipulation that Serrano's offense level would be adjusted upwards by two levels under § 3B1.1 because he recruited one of his co-defendants. The district judge ascertained that Serrano understood and agreed to this adjustment. At sentencing, Serrano made no objection to the finding that he recruited a codefendant. 12 As for Serrano's criminal history, [o]nce the government establishes the existence of a prior conviction, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the earlier conviction was constitutionally infirm or otherwise inappropriate for consideration. United States v. Barbour, 393 F.3d 82, 93 (1st Cir.2004). At Serrano's detention hearing, his counsel stipulated to a criminal conviction in Humacao for violating Puerto Rico weapons laws. Serrano's pre-sentencing report (PSR), which can be used to satisfy the government's `modest' burden, id. (quoting United States v. Gray, 177 F.3d 86, 89 (1st Cir.1999)), detailed Serrano's prior conviction in commonwealth court in Humacao for violating Puerto Rico weapons laws and calculated his criminal history score to be 3. Serrano made no objection to his criminal history score in the PSR at his sentencing hearing. Serrano conceded that the probation officer has to follow what convictions [Serrano] has in the police of Puerto Rico records. In fact, the only correction that Serrano's counsel wished to make to the PSR was to reference... the actual number of the criminal case in Humacao, and the court agreed. Serrano admitted to this conviction at the sentencing hearing, but suggested as a mitigating argument that he had a solid alibi defense. The district court properly rejected this argument. 13 ii. Serrano next argues that his sentence on Count One should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing because the district court was clearly constrained by the Guidelines during sentencing and imposed the 63-month term, which was above the statutory minimum of 60 months, and was at the bottom of the applicable Guidelines range. Post Booker, Serrano argues, the district court could have (and would have) sentenced him to the statutory minimum of 60 months. Serrano made no arguments in the district court questioning the constitutionality of the Guidelines or the application of the Guidelines to his sentence under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), or Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), so the Booker issue was not preserved. See Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 76. 14 We have recently set forth the applicable framework for review of unpreserved Booker claims in Antonakopoulos. Utilizing the four-prong test in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), there must be (1) an error (2) that is plain, and it (3) affects substantial rights and (4) seriously impairs the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 74. The first two prongs of the plain error test are met whenever the district court treated the Guidelines as mandatory at the time of sentencing. Id. But to meet the third prong of the test, the defendant must persuade us that there is a reasonable probability that the district court would impose a different sentence more favorable to the defendant under the new `advisory Guidelines' Booker regime. Id. [I]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice under plain-error analysis. Id. at 77 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 15 Serrano relies upon the district judge's statement at the sentencing hearing: I have to consider the fact that I cannot sentence him to 60 months. The lowest I can sentence him on that particular situation is 63. This statement, he argues, makes it clear that the district court would have sentenced [Serrano] to 60 months in prison instead of 63 on count one. Not so. Given Serrano's criminal history category and his role as recruiter, and the amount of drugs involved, the court's statement was a simple statement of fact. The statutory minimum, without the enhancements, was 60 months. He was sentenced to 63 months, out of a possible range of 63 to 78 months. Serrano's argument amounts to an assertion that there was such a reasonable probability that the judge would have totally ignored Serrano's role in the offense and prior conviction and that our confidence in the outcome is undermined by the fact that the judge actually considered these two enhancements. Even post- Booker, the district court must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing. Booker, 543 U.S. at ___, 125 S.Ct. at 767. And so the court had to consider both role in the offense and his criminal history. Serrano has failed to meet his burden. 16 iii. Serrano's final argument in his sentencing appeal is that the district court committed error in denying him the benefit of the provisions of the safety valve under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. The argument, raised for the first time on appeal, is that but for the court's findings that Serrano had more than one criminal history point and that Serrano was an organizer of the criminal activity, he would have qualified for safety-valve treatment and thus be entitled to sentencing without regard to any statutory minimum. 17 The effect of Booker, if any, on the safety valve has not been determined. See Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 76 n. 6. But Serrano's argument is waived because Serrano explicitly agreed in his plea agreement that he did not qualify for safety-valve treatment, and confirmed that he understood that he did not qualify for the safety valve during his change of plea hearing.