Opinion ID: 2631032
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determining Whether the Two Convictions Were for the Same Offense

Text: {45} In determining whether two charged offenses are the same for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, [a court] looks to whether the offenses are the same, not the interests that the offenses violate. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 699, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990). In making this determination, the Supreme Court has consistently used the test formulated by Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). See, e.g., Brown, 432 U.S. at 166, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (stating that [t]he established test for determining whether two offenses are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative punishment was stated in Blockburger ). In fact, the Blockburger test, otherwise known as the same-elements test, see Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, is the only test used to determine whether two offenses are the same for purposes of double jeopardy. See id. at 704, 113 S.Ct. 2849 (overruling Grady's same-conduct test and noting that the Blockburger test has deep historical roots and has been accepted in numerous precedents of [the Supreme] Court); see also United States v. Hatchett, 245 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir.2001) ( Dixon reestablished the `same-elements' test articulated by Blockburger as the one and only test that courts are to apply. . . . ). {46} According to Blockburger, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180. Thus, there are two prongs to Blockburger. Under Blockburger, a court must determine: (1) whether each charged offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not; and (2) whether each charged offense was part of the same act or transaction. {47} Brown is instructive on both of these points. [2] In Brown, the defendant stole a car in East Cleveland, Ohio. Nine days later, the defendant was caught driving the car in Wickliffe, Ohio. In Wickliffe, the defendant was charged with the offense of joyriding taking or operating the car without the owner's consent. 432 U.S. at 162, 97 S.Ct. 2221. The defendant pled guilty to the charge, paid a $100 fine, and spent thirty days in jail. About a month after being released from jail, the defendant was charged in East Cleveland with auto theft. Id. at 162-63, 97 S.Ct. 2221. Contingent on his argument that he could not be prosecuted for auto theft on grounds of double jeopardy, the defendant pled guilty. Id. at 163, 97 S.Ct. 2221. On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that joyriding was a lesser-included offense of auto theft because the only element needed to prove auto theft not needed to prove joyriding was an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the automobile. Id. at 163-64, 97 S.Ct. 2221. Nonetheless, the defendant's conviction of auto theft was upheld on appeal because the court determined that the conduct underlying each conviction was not part of the same act or transaction. According to the Ohio court: The two prosecutions [were] based on two separate acts of the appellant, one which occurred on November 29th and one which occurred on December 8th. Since appellant ha[d] not shown that both prosecutions [were] based on the same act or transaction, the second prosecution [was] not barred by the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 164, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (quotation marks omitted). {48} Applying the first prong of Blockburger, the Supreme Court in Brown agreed with the Ohio Court of Appeals and held that a greater offense and a lesser-included offense are generally the same for purposes of double jeopardy: As is invariably true of a greater and lesser included offense, the lesser offense . . . requires no proof beyond that which is required for conviction of the greater. . . . The greater offense is therefore by definition the `same' for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it. Id. at 168, 97 S.Ct. 2221. {49} Regarding the same act or transaction prong of Blockburger, however, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Ohio court. Notwithstanding the nine days separating the conduct underlying the two charges, the Supreme Court held that the two offenses were part of the same act or transaction. Id. at 169-70, 97 S.Ct. 2221. It did so because [t]he applicable Ohio statutes, as written and as construed in th[e] case, ma[de] the theft and operation of a single car a single offense. Id. at 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221. Critically, the Supreme Court stated: The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.  Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 169 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (noting that it would have [been] a different case if the Ohio Legislature had provided that joyriding [was] a separate offense for each day in which a motor vehicle is operated without the owner's consent). Soon afterwards in another case, the Supreme Court quoted Brown and further clarified this principle. The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that . . . its limitations [can be avoided] by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units, or, as we hold today, into discrete bases of liability not defined as such by the legislature. Sanabria v. United States 437 U.S. 54, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). {50} Under the analysis in Brown, a lesser-included offense is the same offense as the greater offense so long as both occurred as part of the same act or transaction. Importantly, Brown and Sanabria mandate that in determining whether two charges are part of the same act or transaction, courts are to look solely at what the governing statutes provide  not simply to the temporal or spatial distance between the events or conduct underlying the charges. [3]