Opinion ID: 1350536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dismissal without prejudice as successful termination in favor of malicious-prosecution plaintiff

Text: It is well established in Oklahoma that one of the elements a malicious-prosecution plaintiff must affirmatively prove is a successful termination in his favor of the original action. See, Young v. First State Bank of Watonga, Okl., 628 P.2d 707, 709, (1981). Malicious prosecution actions are not favored by the court, and they should not be encouraged by lax rules favoring them. Williams v. Frey, 182 Okl. 556, 78 P.2d 1052 (1938). Young, supra, clearly established that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice is such a favorable termination. The issue of whether dismissal without prejudice is also a favorable termination is one of first impression in Oklahoma. Because of this, appellant turned to other jurisdictions to find support for his premise. However, the cases he relied on are not controlling, for Oklahoma has a statute which determines the question. Title 12, O.S. 1981, § 683, states as follows: § 683. Dismissal of action-Grounds and time An action may be dismissed, without prejudice to a future action: First, By the plaintiff, before the final submission of the case to the jury, or to the court, where the trial is by the court. Second, By the court, where the plaintiff fails to appear on the trial. Third, By the Court, for the want of necessary parties. Fourth, By the court, on the application of some of the defendants, where there are others whom the plaintiff fails to prosecute with diligence. Fifth, By the court, for disobedience by the plaintiff of an order concerning the proceedings in the action. Sixth, In all other cases, upon the trial of the action, the decision must be upon the merits.  (emphasis added) A careful reading of the sixth provision shows that any dismissal falling within one of the first five categories is not determinative of the substantive issues of the case. Rather, it is a dismissal on procedural grounds or dismissal without merit determination. Furthermore, this section provides a litigant the opportunity to dismiss an action without being foreclosed from bringing the action at another time. Because the action may be reinstituted, by the plaintiff, to allow the voluntary dismissal to form the basis for a malicious prosecution action could allow a person to recover for the bringing of an action which may eventually be found to be well-brought. At the same time, it would tend to encourage the filing of malicious prosecution actions by relaxing the requirements and thus expanding the scope of the action. See, Savage v. Seed, 81 Ill. App.3d 744, 36 Ill.Dec. 846, 401 N.E.2d 984 (1980). Such a result would be inconsistent with Oklahoma's policy which does not look favorably on malicious prosecution actions. Therefore, we hold that dismissal without prejudice of the underlying malpractice action was not a termination of the suit in appellant's favor which will support an action for malicious prosecution. It did not reach the substantive rights of the cause of action and thereby vindicate appellant as to the underlying action. Florida Rock Industries Inc. v. Smith, et al., 163 Ga. App. 361, 294 S.E.2d 553 (1982).