Opinion ID: 164176
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pleading Compliance with Section 24-10-109(1)

Text: 26 In addition to construing its terms strictly, Colorado courts consistently hold that a plaintiff must plead compliance with the CGIA's notice provisions in the complaint to avoid dismissal. See Kratzer v. Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Share Agency, 18 P.3d 766, 769 (Colo.Ct.App. 2000) ([A] claimant must allege in his or her complaint that the claimant has complied with the jurisdictional prerequisite of filing of a notice of claim.) (citations omitted); Deason v. Lewis, 706 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Colo.Ct.App.1985) (plaintiff failed to plead compliance with the notice provision, and thus, his tort claims under the [C]GIA were insufficient); Jones v. Northeast Durango Water Dist., 622 P.2d 92, 94 (Colo.Ct.App.1980) (holding that because plaintiff failed to plead compliance with the CGIA notice provisions [t]hese claims were ... subject to dismissal at any stage of the proceedings); John W. Grund et al., 7A West's Colorado Practice Series, Personal Injury Practice — Torts and Insurance § 28.24 (West Pub. 2000 & Supp. 2003) (Because compliance with the notice requirement is jurisdictional, the plaintiff must allege compliance in the complaint, and lack of compliance may be raised at any time by the defendant or the court.). 5 27 In the context of a motion to dismiss, pleading compliance with the notice provisions of the CGIA is de facto jurisdictional. The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial[.] Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1236 (quotation omitted and emphasis added). Rather, the facts in the case are limited to the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint. See Swoboda v. Dubach, 992 F.2d 286, 290 (10th Cir.1993) (In determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim, the district court may not look to ... any other pleading outside the complaint itself....). When a plaintiff fails to plead compliance with the CGIA, and a court addresses the case in the context of a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as a matter of fact that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice provisions. This lack of compliance, then, is a jurisdictional issue. 6 D. The Sufficiency of the Amended Complaint 28 The Plaintiffs fail to allege compliance with the CGIA notice provisions. Generally, an allegation such as the following would suffice: Plaintiff fully complied with the provisions of Colo.Rev.Stat. section 24-10-109. Here, we are not presented with such a succinct allegation of compliance. Instead, in an effort to give the Amended Complaint the most liberal reading, we forage through the Amended Complaint for allegations of compliance with section 24-10-109(1). See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1236. Given this standard, in the Amended Complaint we find that the Plaintiffs pleaded that A.O.S.M. twice presented grievances to the Hospital. First, paragraph 69 of the Amended Complaint alleges that A.O.S.M. .... challenged such [non-referral] practices as improper... bringing them to the attention ... of the Hospital defendants. 7 Second, paragraph 89 of the Amended Complaint alleges that on April 29, 1997, ... A.O.S.M. presented the issue of its exclusion from the [Midvalley Medical Center] to the Board of [the Hospital], ... but to no avail. We find these allegations insufficient. 29 1. Doctors Brazina and Nadler's Failure To Plead CGIA Compliance 30 Although we read the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs fail to plead that all three Plaintiffs filed individual notices of claims against the Hospital. Here, the Amended Complaint only alleges that A.O.S.M., not Doctors Brazina and Nadler, filed complaints with the Hospital. Thus, Doctors Brazina and Nadler fail to allege that they filed a written notice with the Hospital demanding monetary damages within 180 days of discovery of, or when they should have discovered, their injuries as required by section 24-10-109(1). See Gallagher, 54 P.3d at 391; Kelsey, 8 P.3d at 1204-05. 31 Doctors Brazina and Nadler's role as the principals of A.O.S.M. has no bearing on this analysis. In DeForrest, the Colorado Court of Appeals faced a similar issue. In that case, the plaintiff sought to recover from a state entity for the wrongful death of his wife both in his individual capacity and as executor of his wife's estate. Id. at 386. The husband, however, only filed CGIA notice in his individual capacity. Id. at 387. The Colorado court barred the claim on behalf of the estate for failure to comply with the CGIA notice provisions, even though the executor of the wife's estate was also the plaintiff who properly filed CGIA notice in his individual capacity. Id. (Here, only one notice of claim, by husband individually, was served on the governmental entities.... We conclude that any action by wife's estate for damages is barred for failure to give the requisite notice pursuant to the [C]GIA.). 32 The DeForrest decision compels a similar result here. Although Doctors Brazina and Nadler are identifiable with A.O.S.M., all three Plaintiffs are distinct legal entities who, pursuant to DeForrest, must have provided separate notices of their claims against the Hospital. Id. Turning to the appropriate response to this failure to plead compliance, we find Doctors Brazina and Nadler's claims to be unlike those presented in Gallagher, 54 P.3d 386 (Colo.2002), where the Colorado Supreme Court remanded the CGIA notice issue to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. In Gallagher, a factual dispute existed as to whether the plaintiff filed timely notice. Id. at 389. Here, there is no factual dispute; rather, the Plaintiffs fail to plead that Doctors Brazina and Nadler complied with the CGIA notice provisions at all. 33 When faced with situations in which a plaintiff fails to plead compliance with the CGIA, Colorado courts have taken two courses of actions. First, if the plaintiff fails to plead compliance and cannot cure this defect, Colorado courts dismiss the claims with prejudice. See, e.g., Jones, 622 P.2d at 94. 8 If the plaintiff fails to plead compliance but later proves compliance at trial prior to the raising of an objection to the sufficiency of the complaint, Colorado courts, pursuant to Colo. R. Civ. P. 15(b), 9 treat the CGIA notice issues as if they had been raised in the complaint. Morgan v. Board of Water Works of Pueblo, 837 P.2d 300, 302 (Colo. Ct.App.1992). 34 Here, unlike in Jones, it is not clear from the record whether Doctors Brazina and Nadler can cure their deficient pleading by amendment. Also, unlike Morgan, Doctors Brazina and Nadler have not proved compliance with the CGIA at trial. Given these circumstances, we find that a Colorado court would dismiss their claims without prejudice. If the Plaintiffs believe that they can cure their insufficient Amended Complaint, they can move for leave to file a second amended complaint and plead compliance with the CGIA notice provisions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) ([L]eave [to amend the complaint] shall be freely given when justice so requires.). Therefore, Doctors Brazina and Nadler's Counts XIII, XVI and XVIII should be dismissed without prejudice. 35 2. Factual Issue as to A.O.S.M.'s CGIA Compliance 36 It is unclear from the face of the Amended Complaint whether A.O.S.M. in fact complied with section 24-10-109(1). Nevertheless, we read the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint liberally. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1236. Given this standard, we find that a factual issue exists as to whether A.O.S.M. provided the Hospital with written notice demanding monetary damages within 180 days of discovering its alleged tort injuries. 37 A.O.S.M. alleges that it twice filed grievances with the Hospital. The first grievance presented to the Hospital, as alleged in paragraph 69 of the Amended Complaint, fails to include a date or even a rough time frame of when A.O.S.M. filed this protest. This allegation, then, provides no basis for determining when it gave notice and if the notice was timely. Gallagher, 54 P.3d at 391. Moreover, A.O.S.M. does not allege that this first grievance, or the second, contained a demand for monetary damages. See Kelsey, 8 P.3d at 1204-05. 38 The Plaintiffs do include a date, April 29, 1997, for A.O.S.M.'s second grievance to the Hospital. Nevertheless, it is unclear, based merely upon the Amended Complaint, if the April 29, 1997, grievance was timely. In paragraphs 12, 54, and 55 of the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that they first knew of their purported injuries in the summer of 1996. In paragraphs 56, 57, 63, and 76 of the Amended Complaint, however, the Plaintiffs allege that they first knew of their purported injuries in the fall of 1996 or late 1996. If the scope of A.O.S.M.'s injuries are limited to the failure to lease space at the Midvalley Medical Center or injuries occurring in late 1996, this second grievance may well constitute timely notice. On the other hand, if the scope of A.O.S.M.'s injuries include those dating back to the summer or early fall of 1996, it may not be timely. The Amended Complaint itself does not resolve this issue. 39 This set of circumstances differs from those presented by Doctor Brazina and Nadler's claims. As to the Doctors' claims, the Amended Complaint contains no allegations that written notices were filed at all. Thus, there can be no factual issue as to whether a non-alleged notice contained a demand for monetary damages or timely filed. A.O.S.M.'s claims, on the other hand, do allege that written notice was filed. We find that these allegations of filed written notice sufficiently raise a factual question as to whether these notices contained a monetary demand and were timely. Therefore, unlike the claims brought by Doctors Brazina and Nadler, Colorado law requires us to remand A.O.S.M.'s tort claims to the district court. Gallagher, 54 P.3d at 392 (factual issues of compliance with section 24-10-109(1) are for the trial court to determine on remand). On remand, the district court shall hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether A.O.S.M. filed notice 180 days after it discovered, or should have discovered, its injuries and whether the notice contained a demand for monetary damages. See Gallagher, 54 P.3d at 392; Kelsey, 8 P.3d at 1204-05.