Opinion ID: 77044
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Textual Analysis of the DPPA

Text: 11 In construing a statute we must begin, and often should end as well, with the language of the statute itself ... because we presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said. Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 770 (11th Cir.2002)( en banc )(internal quotations and citations omitted). [W]e need not resort to extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, to discern a statute's meaning if the statute's meaning is unambiguous. In re Paschen, 296 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir.2002). Any ambiguity in the statutory language must result from the common usage of that language, not from the parties' dueling characterizations of what Congress `really meant.' CBS Inc. v. Prime-Time 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1225 (11th Cir.2001). 12 The sections of the DPPA that are relevant to our analysis are: 18 U.S.C. §§ 2722 and 2724. Section 2722 states, in pertinent part:  (a) Procurement for unlawful purpose. — It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted under section 2721(b) of this title. 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a). Fidelity does not dispute that a violation of the DPPA occurred — it purchased and used Kehoe's personal information for a purpose that is not permitted under § 2721(b). Since a violation occurred, Kehoe can bring this action pursuant to § 2724. Section 2724, states, in its entirety: Civil action 13 (a) Cause of action. — A person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under this chapter [18 U.S.C. §§ 2721 et seq. ] shall be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains, who may bring a civil action in a United States district court. 14 (b) Remedies. — The court may award — (1) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500; 15 (2) punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law; 16 (3) reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred; and 17 (4) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be appropriate. 18 18 U.S.C. § 2724. Specifically, at issue is the interpretation of sub-section (b)(1) of § 2724. Fidelity and the district court interpret the language in sub-section (b)(1) to mean that proving actual damages is a condition precedent to receiving liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500.00. Kehoe, however, interprets sub-section (b)(1) as permitting a minimum damages award of $2,500.00 regardless of whether a plaintiff suffered any actual damages. In other words, Kehoe reads sub-section (b)(1) in the disjunctive — that he may receive the greater of his actual damages or $2,500.00. 19 At the heart of this case is a disagreement over what effect the phrase but not less than and the comma preceding that phrase has on Kehoe's ability to recover liquidated damages. Specifically, at issue is whether the clause after the comma is dependent upon the proof of actual damages. The placement of the comma and but not less than does not necessarily mean that the second clause is dependent upon proof of the first clause. Accord Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 245 (E.D.Pa.2005) (holding that pursuant to § 2724(b)(1), a plaintiff need not prove actual damages to be awarded liquidated damages). 3 There is no language in sub-section (b)(1) that confines liquidated damages to people who suffered actual damages. For example, if sub-section (b)(1) instead said liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500, but not less than actual damages, the award of actual damages would not be confined to people who should be awarded liquidated damages. 20 Moreover, actual damages and liquidated damages are, by definition, completely different types of damages. Actual damages ... are defined as `[r]eal, substantive and just damages, or the amount awarded to a complainant in compensation for his actual and real loss or injury.' McMillian v. F.D.I.C., 81 F.3d 1041, 1055 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.1991)). We have held that liquidated damages are a contractual substitute for actual damages [and] are paid even in the absence of proof of actual damages. Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Brasileiro, 874 F.2d 1551, 1557 n. 5 (11th Cir.1989). [L]iquidated damages serve a particularly useful function when damages are uncertain in nature or amount or are unmeasurable ... [a]nd the fact that no damages are shown is not fatal. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153, 76 S.Ct. 219, 222, 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Damages for a violation of an individual's privacy are a quintessential example of damages that are uncertain and possibly unmeasurable. Since liquidated damages are an appropriate substitute for the potentially uncertain and unmeasurable actual damages of a privacy violation, it follows that proof of actual damages is not necessary for an award of liquidated damages. To us, the plain meaning of the statute is clear — a plaintiff need not prove actual damages to be awarded liquidated damages.