Opinion ID: 607691
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment with respect to the remaining claims.

Text: 10 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Aiken, Neitzke, Jordan, Badger, Dr. Dryden, and Dr. Dugan on the ground of res judicata, and granted Dr. Nonweiler's motion for summary judgment on substantive grounds. We may affirm summary judgment on any ground that finds support in the record. 5 See Reed v. Amax Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir.1992) (per curiam ); Box v. A & P Tea Co., 772 F.2d 1372, 1376 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986). 11 Rule 56(c) provides that when a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the district court shall grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). We review the record and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir.1992). Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, however, it may not merely rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See id. 12 Clarkson has not alleged any facts tending to show that Aiken, Neitzke, Jordan, and Badger were responsible for any of the decisions concerning his medical treatment, or that they failed to act where such failure would amount to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Kelley, 899 F.2d at 616-17; see also Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 396-97 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff must establish a causal connection between person he is suing and the deprivation of his constitutional rights), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988); Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir.1990) (same), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1622 (1991). We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Aiken, Neitzke, Jordan, and Badger. 13 Clarkson's claims against Dr. Nonweiler are centered upon Clarkson's desire to return to his former physicians at Wishard for further treatment, rather than being obliged to seek treatment at local hospitals, 6 and his disagreement with Dr. Nonweiler concerning the proper treatment of his pain. Neither of these claims rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 413. The medical records submitted by Clarkson show that he has undergone thorough examinations for the recurrence of prostate cancer, and his own pleadings belie his claim that Dr. Nonweiler has deliberately withheld all pain medication. The medical record fails to establish that Dr. Nonweiler's refusal to continue treating Clarkson with Percocet was medically unsound, and thus falls far short of demonstrating a violation of Clarkson's constitutional right to minimally adequate medical treatment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, 97 S.Ct. at 291-92. Moreover, the record does not support Clarkson's bare allegation that Dr. Nonweiler acted with the requisite culpable mental state. See Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2324-25, 2326. Entry of summary judgment was thus proper. 14 Clarkson also alleges that Dr. Dryden misdiagnosed his pain as stemming from degenerative arthritis, and that he did so at the direction of Dr. Nonweiler, for the purpose of depriving Clarkson of effective pain medication. Clarkson's medical record contains several diagnostic X-ray reports, conducted at Wishard and dated as early as 1983 and 1985, indicating the presence of degenerative joint disease. This evidence would likely undermine a conclusion that Dr. Dryden was negligent in his diagnosis, and certainly forecloses any claim that Dr. Dryden's actions amounted to a violation of Clarkson's Eighth Amendment rights. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, 97 S.Ct. at 291-92. We therefore affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment in Dr. Dryden's favor as well. 15 With respect to his claim against Dr. Dugan, Clarkson challenges both the district court's decision to convert Dr. Dugan's Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment without adequate notice to Clarkson, and its entry of summary judgment in Dr. Dugan's favor. It is well-established that a district court must provide reasonable notice to a litigant of the effect of a defendant's motion for summary judgment, and a reasonable opportunity to submit evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Kelley, 899 F.2d at 615 (citations omitted). We believe that the notice provided to Clarkson was minimally adequate, 7 and that in any case Clarkson was aware of the import of the district court's order and was not prejudiced by it. See Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 285-86 (7th Cir.) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 2307 (1992). A remand is therefore not warranted. See id. 16 In the case of Dr. Dugan, the medical record before the district court again amply demonstrates that there was no colorable Eighth Amendment violation. Dr. Dugan conducted a thorough medical examination of Clarkson and determined that he was not suffering from metastatic cancer. Rather than showing deliberate indifference, Dr. Dugan's treatment notes appear to show genuine concern for Clarkson's condition, and suggest that close monitoring of his prostate cancer, as well as some additional tests to ascertain the cause of Clarkson's pain, were warranted. The district court acted properly in entering summary judgment in Dr. Dugan's favor. 17