Opinion ID: 613517
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2001)

Text: In McIntosh, the Eighth Circuit similarly concluded that the enhanced penalty in § 841(b)(1)(A) did not have a foreseeability or a proximate cause requirement. [11] McIntosh, 236 F.3d at 972. Defendants McIntosh and McMillan conspired to produce methamphetamine. Id. at 970. McIntosh shared his methamphetamine with Jean Cresswell, who lived with him, and with her niece Amy Cresswell. Id. Some of this methamphetamine eventually reached Jessica Smith, Jean's fourteen-year-old daughter, even though McIntosh had specifically instructed his friends not to give Jessica methamphetamine. Id. Jessica died after using the methamphetamine. Id. [12] The district court determined that: 1) Jessica's death resulted from the use of methamphetamine; 2) the methamphetamine used by Jessica ... came from either Amy Cresswell, Jean Cresswell, or McMillan;[] and 3) regardless of which of the three supplied the methamphetamine, it `originally came' from McIntosh. Id. at 971. The district court also found that the government failed to prove that McIntosh directly furnished Jessica with methamphetamine nor [sic] that he had any knowledge she was being supplied with the drug by the others. Id. Despite the latter two findings, the district court concluded McIntosh was subject to the enhancement because he played a part in manufacturing the drug [Jessica] did use, and sentenced him to twenty years' imprisonment. Id. On appeal, McIntosh contended that § 841(b)(1)(A) permits a sentence enhancement only if death was a reasonably foreseeable result of, or was proximately caused by, a defendant's conduct, and that he did not proximately cause Jessica's death and could not reasonably have foreseen it. Id. The Eighth Circuit explained that [t]he starting point for ascertaining the intended meaning of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Id. The statute's language is unambiguous and ... giving effect to its plain meaning prohibits us from superimposing upon the statute a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement. Id. at 972. The Eighth Circuit decline[d] to hinder Congress's will, apparent from the face of the statute, through a judicial pronouncement that the statute requires more than it says. Id. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Third and Fourth Circuits' conclusions that Congress intended § 841(b)(1)(A)'s enhancement to apply without regard to the principles of proximate cause or the foreseeability of death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 972-73. The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that [o]ur conclusion that the statute imposes strict liability upon McIntosh for Jessica's death vitiates [McIntosh's] argument that the enhanced sentence only applies if the defendant intends to cause death or knowingly risks death. Id. at 974. [13]