Opinion ID: 149617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Performance Prong: Mental Health Evidence

Text: DeYoung also argues Jones and O'Brien were ineffective in failing to adequately investigate mental health issues, prepare mental health experts, and present mental health expert testimony. The state habeas court's denial of this claim is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. Nor is it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. First, almost all of the evidence that DeYoung now claims his mental health experts needed was available to DeYoung himself, yet DeYoung did not reveal it to his counsel or the two pretrial mental health experts, Drs. Messer and Shaffer. In evaluating the reasonableness of a defense attorney's investigation, we weigh heavily the information provided by the defendant. Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1202 (11th Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1336, 173 L.Ed.2d 607 (2009). Indeed, a defense attorney does not render ineffective assistance by failing to discover and develop evidence of childhood abuse that his client does not mention to him. Id. Here, there is no evidence that DeYoung mentioned to his trial or appellate counsel or to any mental health experts (before trial or even afterward) that he had any family history of mental illness or that there was significant internal strife or dysfunction in his family. Two mental health experts thoroughly evaluated DeYoung in person before trial and did not diagnose him with the mental infirmities DeYoung now claims he suffered. Importantly, to date DeYoung has never indicated he suffered any sexual or physical abuse, nor has anyone witnessed such abuse of DeYoung. Second, as with the family background and social history evidence, DeYoung's counsel performed a reasonable investigation into mental health issues. Jones and O'Brien retained Dr. Messer and Dr. Shaffer, who each conducted an independent evaluation supported by document review and one or more in-person clinical interviews. Jones and O'Brien met with Drs. Messer and Shaffer to discuss their diagnoses before deciding whether to present a mental health-based defense. Jones and O'Brien decided not to present mental health evidence at the penalty phase because, as Jones testified, they determined it was not helpful. Although DeYoung now contends that trial and appellate counsel should have provided more family information to the mental health experts, and that that information would have changed their diagnoses, the state habeas court's conclusion that trial counsel reasonably investigated DeYoung's family background and social history is consistent with clearly established federal law and is not unreasonable in light of the facts. This is especially accurate given that DeYoung never gave any indication of sexual or physical abuse. Given the many witnesses trial counsel or the investigator interviewed, the mere fact that additional family and social history witnesses have now been discovered does not make trial or appellate counsel ineffective. The record also supports the state habeas court's findings that a number of the witnesses who gave affidavits to habeas counsel were not as forthcoming prior to trial and that a significant portion of the testimony in the affidavits was inadmissible (such as for being pure hearsay). Third, DeYoung does not argue that his trial counsel should have presented mental health expert testimony as to Dr. Messer's and Dr. Shaffer's original diagnoses of borderline personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder. He argues only that his trial and appellate counsel should have discovered and presented evidence that DeYoung had schizotypal personality disorder and dysthymia (the subsequent diagnosis). However, even if trial counsel had presented such testimony, it would have opened the door to harmful evidence, such as: (1) the original diagnoses of Dr. Messer and Dr. Shaffer, which disorders have been found not to be mitigating, see, e.g., Reed, 593 F.3d at 1248 (concluding psychologist's diagnosis of defendant with antisocial personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder was harmful instead of mitigating); (2) Dr. Sachy's testimony that DeYoung had no personality disorder and was malingering (which would have reinforced the State's picture of DeYoung as having a cunning and manipulative criminal mind); and (3) other characteristics of schizotypal personality disorder itself, including peculiar or eccentric behavior and lack of close friends or confidants other than first-degree relatives (accentuating that DeYoung lacked close friends and chose to kill for financial gain even those few persons close to him). Fourth, DeYoung provides no evidence indicating trial counsel had a reasonable basis to suspect, at the time, that providing Dr. Messer and Dr. Shaffer with more background information on DeYoung was likely to change their diagnoses. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. at 2536 (noting that inquiry into reasonableness of counsel's performance includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel's perspective at the time, and that [e]very effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted)); see also Reed, 593 F.3d at 1242 ([T]he mere fact a defendant can find, years after the fact, a mental health expert who will testify favorably for him does not demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to produce that expert at trial.).