Opinion ID: 78551
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reed's Claim: Prejudice Prong

Text: Alternatively, even assuming Nichols's performance was deficient, Reed has not shown the requisite prejudice. As the Florida Supreme Court found, the testimony that could have been presented was just as likely to have resulted in aggravation against rather than mitigation for Reed. Reed III, 875 So.2d at 436-37. The Florida Supreme Court determined that: (1) the proposed family background testimony involved numerous facts that placed Reed in a very negative light, including his long-term drug use, multiple terms in jail, breaking his grandmother's nose, and threatening to kill his brother's wife; (2) the negative evidence was particularly disadvantageous in light of the facts of the crime, as Reed's violent attack on his grandmother and his threatening of his brother's wife established a pattern of violence against women who had taken [Reed] into their homes; and (3) several aspects of the mental health evidence, including the antisocial personality disorder diagnosis, might have been more helpful to the State than the defense. Id. at 437. In Reed's case, the worst kind of bad evidence would have come in with the good mitigation. Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 383, 390, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009); see Windom v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 578 F.3d 1227, 1251 (11th Cir.2009) (finding prejudice prong not satisfied where proposed mitigation testimony would have opened the door to damaging evidence); Gaskin v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 494 F.3d 997, 1004 (11th Cir.2007) (same); Robinson v. Moore, 300 F.3d 1320, 1350-51 (11th Cir.2002) (same). [18] In fact, brother William's mitigation testimony was a gold mine of aggravation for the State. William described Reed as a con man who threatened his sister-in-law and attacked their grandmother who raised them and saved them from their abusive stepfather. Specifically, William testified that Reed: (1) punched his grandmother in the face and broke her nose when she told him she wouldn't let him come inside her house; and (2) threatened to kill William's wife after she found evidence that Reed was using drugs in her and William's home and William asked Reed to leave. Additionally, Dr. Larson's diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder was equally not good mitigation. See, e.g., Cummings, 588 F.3d at 1368, 2009 WL 4452816, at  (stating that a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder is not mitigating but damaging) (collecting cases); see also Looney v. State, 941 So.2d 1017, 1028-29 (Fla.2006) (observing that [t]his Court has noted that a diagnosis as a psychopath is a mental health factor viewed negatively by jurors and is not really considered mitigation) (citing Dufour v. State, 905 So.2d 42, 57-58 (Fla.2005)); Freeman v. State, 858 So.2d 319, 327 (Fla.2003). Had trial counsel Nichols put on Reed's family members or other witnesses to testify about his family background, the State assuredly would have brought out that Reed assaulted his own grandmother and threatened his brother's wife. Had this occurred, it would have been devastating for Reed's chances at sentencing for killing Mrs. Oermann, because as the Florida Supreme Court correctly noted, the instances of Reed's attacking his grandmother and threatening his sister-in-law show a disturbing pattern of violence against women who had taken [Reed] into their homes. Reed III, 875 So.2d at 437. When persons who tried to help Reed put limits on his conduct and forbade drug use in their homes, Reed responded with violence. And even without the jury hearing this specific testimony, it would have been all too easy for the State to use Reed's own mitigation witnesses to paint him as a violent, manipulative person with long-standing drug abuse issues and brushes with the law. The probability of proposed mitigating evidence opening the door to strong aggravating evidence is an important factor to consider in assessing the reasonable probability of a different sentencing result. Belmontes, 130 S.Ct. at 389-90; see Windom, 578 F.3d at 1251; Gaskin, 494 F.3d at 1004; Robinson, 300 F.3d at 1350-51. [19] Here, it was not just a reasonable probability, but a virtual certainty that Reed's good mitigation evidence would have led to the introduction of bad evidence. Belmontes, 130 S.Ct. at 390. In short, Reed has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that he would have received a sentence less than death had the proposed 3.850 evidence been presented. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 447, 453, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009) (stating that, to establish prejudice, petitioner must show that but for his counsel's deficiency, there is a reasonable probability he would have received a different sentence). The Florida Supreme Court considered all the evidenceboth adduced at trial and in postconviction proceedingsin mitigation and aggravation of sentence. See Porter, 130 S.Ct. at 453-54 (To assess that probability [of a different sentence], we consider the totality of the available mitigation evidenceboth that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceedingand reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation. (quotation marks and brackets omitted)). This includes aggravating evidence to which the proposed mitigating evidence would open the door. See Belmontes, 130 S.Ct. at 387 (In evaluating [the prejudice] question, it is necessary to consider all the relevant evidence that the jury would have had before it if [counsel] Schick had pursued the different pathnot just the mitigation evidence Schick could have presented, but also the [aggravating] Howard murder evidence that almost certainly would have come in with it.). And the crime evidence itself in aggravation was substantial. Reed raped, strangled, and repeatedly stabbed a 57 year old woman who had helped him and his family when they were homeless and in need. The four statutory aggravating factors were: (1) Reed murdered Mrs. Oermann while committing sexual battery; (2) Reed murdered Mrs. Oermann for pecuniary gain; (3) Reed murdered Mrs. Oermann to avoid or prevent arrest; and (4) Reed's murder of Mrs. Oermann was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. In considering the weight of the aggravating factors, see Van Hook, 130 S.Ct. at 20, this last circumstance looms large. The evidence showed Reed slapped Mrs. Oermann, tied her up and beat her severely, then choked her and raped her. Reed then killed her by repeatedly slashing her throat more than a dozen times. All told, the brutal circumstances of the crime alone provided powerful aggravating evidence. And the bad evidence that would follow the good mitigation evidence would have piled on top of the crime-related aggravation. By contrast, the proposed mitigation evidence was weak, and most of it was alloyed with negative information. Even the portions that were good mitigation evidenceReed's horrific childhood clearly qualifieswould have opened the door to damaging testimony. For example, Reed's brother William testified that their father was abusive and was killed by their mother in self-defense, but Reed was an infant when his father died and William never had the problems Reed did. Both brother William and sister Diana testified that Reed and Diana suffered physical and mental abuse at the hands of their stepfather Charles Lassman, but Reed only lived with Lassman for about eight months, and Reed spent the rest of his childhood in the care and custody of his loving grandparents. William and Diana testified that Reed and his three siblings (William, Diana, and Tony) were affected by the same childhood abuse and neglect he suffered, but acknowledged that Reed was the only one of the siblings who had ever been arrested for a violent crime. Reed's middle-school teacher Ronnie Yates testified that Reed struggled in school, but that his struggles stemmed from a failure to apply himself. Reed argues his history of drug abuse and huffing gasoline was mitigating, but no one testified that Reed was under the influence of drugs or had been huffing gasoline when he killed Mrs. Oermann. In fact, Reed denied to the parole officer using any drugs or narcotics. [20] We recognize that: (1) William testified that Reed began huffing gasoline when he was about ten and continued for years; (2) Yates testified that when Reed was in the seventh and eighth grades, he repeatedly showed up to school and school functions while drunk; and (3) Reed's former girlfriend Christine Niznik testified that Reed abused drugsincluding alcohol, gasoline, and a homemade methamphetamine-based drug called stove topthroughout their relationship. However, presenting evidence of a defendant's drug addiction to a jury is often a `two-edged sword': while providing a mitigating factor, such details may alienate the jury and offer little reason to lessen the sentence. Pace v. McNeil, 556 F.3d 1211, 1224 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 190, 175 L.Ed.2d 118 (2009); see Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir.1999) ([A] showing of alcohol and drug abuse... can harm a capital defendant as easily as it can help him at sentencing.). Similarly, Dr. Larson's diagnosisthat Reed had an antisocial personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder was more harmful to Reed than mitigating. See Parker, 331 F.3d at 788 (Counsel decided not to put Dr. Stillman on the stand because Dr. Stillman had opined that Parker was antisocial and a sociopath, a diagnosis the jury might not consider mitigating.... Counsel cannot be deemed deficient in failing to call a witness whose testimony is of such limited value.); Clisby v. State of Ala., 26 F.3d 1054, 1056 & n. 2 (11th Cir.1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim on prejudice grounds because mental health expert's testimony would not have changed the result, noting that [s]entencing courts need no experts to explain that `antisocial' people-people who by common definition have little respect for social norms or the rights of others-tend to misbehave if they abuse drugs and alcohol and [i]t has been estimated that 91% of the `criminal element' are `antisocial' personality types); Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1035 n. 4 (11th Cir.1994) (stating antisocial personality disorder is not ... mitigating as a matter of law). Dr. Larson himself admitted that it is an unflattering diagnosis. Indeed, as part of his diagnosis, Dr. Larson characterized Reed as selfish, self-indulgent, hedonistic, and exploitative. This characterization was confirmed by Reed's brother William, who testified that Reed was manipulative and like a con artist. We recognize Dr. Larson also opined that in addition to drug abuse and personality disorders, there was  possible interaction of organic brain syndrome and alcohol and drugs during the time frame of the events. (Emphasis added). The problem for Reed is Dr. Larson is a clinical psychologist who never addressed: (1) the electroencephalogram test, which Dr. Miller, a medical doctor, ordered and which showed Reed's brain was functioning within normal limits in 1986; (2) that Reed denied having a drinking (or substance abuse) problem anymore when he was examined by Dr. Miller and social worker Kaldor in October 1986; (3) that there was no evidence at trial that Reed was under the influence of drugs or gasoline huffing at the time of the murder; (4) that none of the Rule 3.850 testimony concerned Reed's mental state on the day of the murder; (5) that no neurological or other medical test revealed organic brain syndrome around the time of the murder; (6) that Reed's verbal, performance, and full-scale IQ scores were 83, 79, and 79 respectively; and (7) that Dr. Larson testified to only a possibility that was not supported by any doctor or medical evidence around the time of the murder. And although Dr. Larson summarily opined (six years after the crime) that it appeared that Reed was under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance and lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, Dr. Larson did not explain why he believed these factors appeared to have been met. Regardless, even crediting Dr. Larson's largely unsupported and speculative 3.850 testimony as to the existence of statutory mitigating factors, the fact remains that had Dr. Larson taken the stand to give his opinions, the State would have used him to reveal to the jury that Reed had an antisocial personality, was selfish, was unconcerned with the rights of others, and was prone to repeated violence against women who tried to help him. The net result of Dr. Larson testifying would not have been so mitigating as to raise a reasonable probability that Reed would have received a different sentence. As the Rule 3.850 court stated, It is certainly not ineffective assistance of counsel for an attorney not to call an expert when doing so causes his client to run the risk of having the state successfully make his client look like a sociopathic killer. In sum, we conclude that the Florida Supreme Court's denial of Reed's 3.850 ineffective assistance claims as to mitigation evidence was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record. [21] Thus, he cannot satisfy Strickland 's prejudice prong.