Opinion ID: 6983251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General Right to Detain Without Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause

Text: Defendants contend that they required neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to handcuff and detain Plaintiffs with the use of firearms. Specifically, Defendants argue that “[u]nder the circumstances of the present case, it was reasonable for Appellee officers to handcuff the Appellants and otherwise secure the area until the fleeing suspect could be detained.” (Appellees’ Br. at 12.) The handcuffing and detention of Plaintiffs with the display of firearms certainly deprived Plaintiffs of their freedom of action in a significant way, and thus constituted a seizure. See United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 289 (6th Cir.1988). While we have occasionally permitted the use of such tactics by officers to detain private individuals for investigative purposes, we have done so only where the officers making the seizures acted out of a justifiable fear of personal safety. See United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 356 (6th Cir.1986); see also United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 663 (6th Cir.1993) (permitting detention by handcuffing of occupants of home in which officers had seized weapons and narcotics just one month earlier). Here, there is no evidence to suggest that Defendants had reason to fear for their personal safety. In the events preceding Defendants’ entry into 395 Stoddart, Carroll had not displayed a weapon, and the officers possessed no independent information leading them to believe that Carroll was a dangerous individual. Nor does the record disclose behavior on the part of Plaintiffs leading Defendants to justifiably fear for their safety, or any reason for Defendants to believe that 395 Stoddart contained weapons that might be used against them. Most importantly, however, the record suggests that Defendants placed Ingram, Collins, and Deborah Womack in handcuffs after they had already located and handcuffed Carroll and presumably no longer needed to “secure” the area as they searched for their suspect. Setting these points aside, however, we observe that although they themselves can cite no precedent giving rise to such police authority, Defendants ostensibly rely on Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), to support their contention that they have a general right to forcibly detain the occupants of a home when searching for a criminal suspect. We are unpersuaded. In Summers, the Court held that “a warrant to search for contraband that is founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Id. at 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587. Summers constitutes an extension of the principle set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), by permitting the seizure of an individual based on something less than probable cause. See id. at 699, 101 S.Ct. 2587. However, the Court expressly noted in Summers that it was not deciding the question of whether such authority accompanies police action justified by exigent circumstances. See id. at 702 n. 17, 101 S.Ct. 2587. The Court also noted that while its decision would permit a “routine detention” of the residents of a house searched pursuant to a valid warrant, special circumstances or a prolonged detention might lead to a different result. See id. at 705 n. 21, 101 S.Ct. 2587. Summers does not shield Defendants in the present case, which did not involve a predetermination of probable cause by a judicial officer. Although Defendants urge that they were entitled to handcuff Plaintiffs under the circumstances, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the idea of “a multifactor balancing test of ‘reasonable police conduct under the circumstances’ to cover all seizures that do not amount to technical arrests,” adhering instead to the traditional probable cause requirement. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248. Additionally, taking as true Plaintiffs’ version of events, the detention in the present case was not limited or routine as was the detention in Summers. Rather, the officers, with their guns drawn, placed all four of the Plaintiffs in handcuffs, and formally arrested and struck two of them. Indeed, Defendants’ treatment of Plaintiffs was more akin to technical arrest than mere investigative seizure. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 594, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (likening seizure to arrest where officers drew their guns, informed individual he was under arrest, and handcuffed him). Accordingly, we conclude that Defendants did not have a general right to handcuff and detain at gunpoint the occupants of 395 Stoddart in order to apprehend Carroll.