Opinion ID: 1925538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure to dismiss count one

Text: Davis first claims that the court erred in failing to dismiss Count One of the indictment because he, Davis, as a co-owner of the trailer, had the right to consent to Brown's entry into the trailer, and therefore there was no breaking and entering. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-21 (Supp. 1989), states in pertinent part: § 97-17-21. Burglary  inhabited dwelling. Every person who shall be convicted of breaking and entering, in the day or night, the dwelling house of another, in which there shall be, at the time, some human being, with intent to commit some crime therein, either by forcibly bursting or breaking the wall, or an outer door, window or shutter, of a window of such house, or the lock or bolt of such door, or the fastening of such window or shutter, or by breaking in in any other manner ... shall be guilty of burglary, and imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than seven years nor more than fifteen years. Davis does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to a physical breaking and entering, and we have consistently held that any act of force, however slight, necessary to be used in entering a building is sufficient to constitute a breaking. Mason v. State, 344 So.2d 144 (Miss. 1977); Branning v. State, 222 So.2d 667 (Miss. 1969); Newburn v. State, 205 So.2d 260 (Miss. 1967): Fondren v. State, 253 Miss. 241, 175 So.2d 628 (1965); Gross v. State, 191 Miss. 383, 2 So.2d 818 (1941). Davis' challenge is that since he as a co-owner could enter the building, he could also consent to Brown's entering the building, and therefore Brown's entry was not burglarious. Davis is, of course, correct that ordinarily a person who enters a building with the consent of the owner has not made an unlawful entry, and consequently there was no criminal breaking and entering. Mason v. State ; Holderfield v. State, 215 Miss. 564, 61 So.2d 385, 386 (1952); 12 C.J.S. Burglary § 24. The question in this case, however, is whether Davis, even though he was co-owner of the trailer, had the right to consent to Brown's entry for the purpose of raping or robbing Mrs. Davis. To justify a conviction of burglary, it is necessary not only to show that a person entered a building of another person, but in addition that at the time he did so, he intended to commit a crime therein. The intent to commit a crime therein must co-exist with the physical act of entry. Brumfield v. State, 206 Miss. 506, 40 So.2d 268 (1949); Gross v. State, 191 Miss. 383, 2 So.2d 818 (1941). Brown clearly fulfilled these conditions. Does the fact that he entered the trailer at co-owner Davis' request, however, change it from having been burglarious? We conclude that Davis' participation in the entry was no defense to the burglary count. The crimes in this case which Brown intended to commit upon entering the trailer were not against Davis, but Mrs. Davis. While Davis was co-owner, Mrs. Davis was then in actual possession, sleeping peacefully. In Clinton v. State, 163 Miss. 435, 439, 142 So. 17, 18 (1932), we recognized that it was the person against whom the crime was directed who was important when we held that insofar as the burglary is concerned, the occupant of the property at the time is the owner... . Again, in Taylor v. State, 214 Miss. 263, 266, 58 So.2d 664, 665 (1952), wherein the burglarious intent was to steal property of the tenant, we held that the occupant of the building at the time of the burglary is the owner, and that allegations of the indictment of ownership of the title to the building constitute surplusage ... While Davis had the authority to consent to Brown's entry into the trailer for a lawful purpose, by no stretch of reasoning could he ever be considered as having a right to authorize Brown's entry to rob or rape Mrs. Davis. In People v. Talbot, 64 Cal.2d 691, 700, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417, 428, 414 P.2d 633, 639 (1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 1015, 87 S.Ct. 729, 17 L.Ed.2d 551 (1967), the California Supreme Court held that the crime of burglary was an integral offense consisting of an entry together with an evil intent, which was indivisible into ingredients, and that consent could not be made to relate to entry alone as a constituent ingredient. It was therefore no defense to the indictment for burglary that the owner-possessor of a building consented to another's entry into the building to murder a guest. In State v. Gregor, 11 Wash. App. 95, 521 P.2d 960, 962 (1974), the Washington Court of Appeals held that permission by one of the co-owners and co-possessors of a residence to the entry by the accused for the purpose of stealing from the other owners constituted no defense to a burglary charge, holding the statutory offense of second degree burglary of the dwelling house of another involves no unlawfulness of entry except as the entry becomes unlawful by reason of the criminal intent of the person entering. Courts from other jurisdictions have also held that permission by an agent or custodian of the owner to an accused to enter a building to steal constitutes no defense, because the agent or custodian clearly had no authority to give such permission. State v. Gendusa, 193 La. 59, 190 So. 332, 338 (1939); People v. Harris, 33 Ill. App.3d 600, 338 N.E.2d 129 (1975); People v. Castile, 34 Ill. App.3d 220, 339 N.E.2d 366 (1975); Damico v. State, 153 Fla. 850, 16 So.2d 43 (1943). In K.P.M. v. State, 446 So.2d 723 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 1984), a minor son permitted the accused to enter the residence of his parents to steal, and the Florida Court of Appeals held this constituted no defense to the crime of burglary because clearly the son had no authority to grant such permission. It would be monstrous to hold that Davis had any authority whatever to permit Brown to enter the trailer for the purpose of robbing or raping his wife, and having no such authority, his consent did not prevent Brown's entry from having been burglarious.