Opinion ID: 4208265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dissent: Scope of the Preliminary Injunction

Text: The preliminary injunction issued here has both prohibitory and mandatory aspects. 4 In considering the 4 As relevant to this opinion, the order reads as follows: “I. Procedures for ICE Custody Determinations, IJ Custody Redeterminations, and BIA Review
§ 1226(a) in the Central District of California (the “District”) after the date of this Order, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”), when setting, re-determining, and/or reviewing the terms of any person’s release, must (a) consider the person’s financial ability to pay a bond; (b) not set bond at a greater amount than that needed to ensure the person’s appearance; and HERNANDEZ V. SESSIONS 49 (c) consider whether the person may be released on alternative conditions of supervision, alone or in combination with a lower bond amount, that are sufficient to mitigate flight risk.
will meet and confer with Plaintiffs’ counsel (“Class Counsel”), and continue to confer thereafter with Class Counsel in good faith, to develop and agree to the following:
Judges (“IJs”) to apply in determining an individual’s financial ability to pay a bond;
conduct initial custody determinations under Section 1226(a) and to all IJs in the District that inform them of the requirements of this Order (including the guidelines developed in Paragraph 2(a) above); and
detained in the District summarizing the requirements of this Order in connection with their upcoming custody redetermination hearings pursuant to this Order.
than thirty days after this order, Defendants shall:
Paragraph 2(b) above (including the guidelines developed in Paragraph 2(a) above) to all ICE officers who conduct initial custody determinations under Section 1226(a) and to all IJs in the District; and 50 HERNANDEZ V. SESSIONS propriety of the injunction, we must bear in mind the fact that mandatory terms 5 present more difficulties than prohibitive terms, 6 and it is the former that I disagree with in this case.
2(c) above to all class members currently detained in the District.
date and location of each new custody redetermination hearing set pursuant to this Order at least seven days in advance of the hearing.
provide each class member currently detained in the District with a new custody redetermination hearing where the IJ decides whether the class member should be released on his or her own recognizance or released on a money bond and/or other conditions of supervision. When setting a class member’s terms of release, the IJ must comply with Paragraph 1 of this Order. Nothing in this Order prevents a class member from seeking a continuance to prepare for his or her hearing.
appeals the IJ’s custody redetermination to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), the BIA will determine whether the IJ has properly performed the analysis set forth in Paragraph 1, which is required by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” 5 See Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A mandatory injunction orders a responsible party to take action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 6 See id. at 878 (“A prohibitory injunction prohibits a party from taking action . . . .”). HERNANDEZ V. SESSIONS 51 Even without regard to the form and despite the rulings of the district court and the thrust of the majority opinion, “[a] preliminary injunction, of course, is not a preliminary adjudication on the merits but rather a device for preserving the status quo and preventing the irreparable loss of rights before judgment.” Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984). A mandatory injunction is much more likely to trench on that principle than is a prohibitory injunction. For that reason, we have stated that: A mandatory injunction goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo [p]endente lite [and] is particularly disfavored. In general, mandatory injunctions are not granted unless extreme or very serious damage will result and are not issued in doubtful cases or where the injury complained of is capable of compensation in damages. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 879 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). The majority bridles at our wisely adopted distinction, but reluctantly agrees that it must be followed. Still, I fear that its distaste for the distinction, together with its declaration that it is “unlikely” that the outstanding bonds are reasonable, has helped to lead it astray. However, when the above standards are applied, I cannot agree with the district court order which proceeds as if the merits have been finely adjudicated and which immediately and inappropriately imposes mandatory duties upon the government accordingly. 52 HERNANDEZ V. SESSIONS More specifically, I disagree with the district court’s order in the ways set forth below. 1. As to paragraph I.1. 7 of the order, while I agree that the government must consider financial ability in future release hearings, 8 I do not agree that it must forthwith conduct new bond hearings for all those who are currently detained, regardless of the nature of the records regarding their prior hearings. To the extent this paragraph contemplates that must be done, I do not agree. 2. I do not agree with the scope of paragraphs I.2. and I.3. of the order. Again, I do agree that financial ability must be considered at future release hearings, but I do not agree that the district court can, at this point, order the government to consult with class counsel and “develop and agree” to guidelines. While it is suggested that this is a mere conferencing and consulting direction, it plainly is not just that—it directs the government to “agree” with class counsel. As I see it, at this point, the government must consider financial ability. If detailed procedures beyond those that already exist (or amendments to current procedures) are needed for that purpose, the government’s determination and adoption of those procedures should basically be through the usual governmental processes 9 rather than in a forced march and a required agreement with class counsel. I note that all of that is to take place within 30 days of the order. That by itself is unreasonable. 7 All references to paragraphs in the order are to those as set forth in note 4, supra. 8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 9 See Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 1987). HERNANDEZ V. SESSIONS 53 Incidentally, I would see no real difficulty if the government were merely required to distribute the preliminary injunction order to the relevant parties (officers and class members) once a proper order is issued. These paragraphs should be set aside or rewritten accordingly. 3. I do not agree with paragraph I.5., which requires that hearings for all current detainees be conducted within 45 days of the order. Specifically I do not agree with the requirement that hearings be held for all current detainees, and the timing exacerbates the problem. Interestingly enough, the government is required to meet, confer, and agree with class counsel and give necessary notices within 30 days. It is then to conduct hearings for all of those currently detained within 15 days thereafter, or, of course, agree earlier and gain some extra hearing time. I would also strike this unreasonable paragraph. In short, at this preliminary injunction stage of the proceeding, I agree that the government must consider financial ability in future hearings, a requirement that I find to be essentially prohibitory. I do not agree with the other essentially mandatory aspects of the order regarding development and agreement on guidelines, or the holding of hearings for all current detainees forthwith and within the strict deadlines set out by the district court. Thus, I respectfully concur with the majority opinion in part and dissent in part.