Opinion ID: 1787099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress incriminatory statements made by stallworth.

Text: ¶ 17. Prior to the trial, Stallworth filed a motion to suppress certain statements he gave to officers of the Harrison County Sheriff's Office. Stallworth asserts that incriminating statements he made to Captain Bruce Carver should not have been admitted because he was not properly advised of his Miranda rights and because the statements were not voluntary. ¶ 18. The applicable standard for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of the accused's free and rational choice. Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 956 (Miss.1997); Porter v. State, 616 So.2d 899, 907-08 (Miss.1993). This Court has stated that, [i]n determining whether a confession is freely and voluntarily given the circuit court judge sits as a trier of fact, McCarty v. State, 554 So.2d 909, 911 (Miss.1989), and this Court should not reverse unless the circuit judge is manifestly wrong. Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 742 (Miss.1992) (collecting authorities). ¶ 19. At approximately 11:00 p.m. on the night of the murder, Stallworth called Captain Bruce Carver from Biloxi and told Carver that he wanted to turn himself in. Stallworth testified that he had known Carver for around twelve to fourteen years and considered Carver to be a friend. Stallworth testified that he called Carver to come pick him up because, [he] was wanted for murder and ... felt that ... [he] needed someone that [he] knew. Sergeant Nicholas Cheatham (Cheatham) drove Carver to meet Stallworth. Cheatham testified that when he and Carver arrived at the scene, they told Stallworth he was under arrest, handcuffed him, and read him his Miranda rights. The exact timing of the Miranda advisement is disputed, though, as Stallworth testified that Cheatham did not read him his Miranda rights until he was placed in the car. Stallworth objects to Carver's testimony regarding the following statements allegedly made by Stallworth while being transported to Gulfport: Q. What did you and Officer Cheatham do upon your arrival? A. ... I told him I would have to search him. And he said, I don't have the weapon on me. Q. Describe for the jury exactly what types of things and what he was saying to you? A. He was just saying that if he was convicted of this, he would get life, and he would be in jail the rest of his life. Q. Did he say anything to the effect that he had snapped or lost it? A....I said what happened, he said I think I snapped. At the time Stallworth allegedly made these statements to Carver, he was sober and he was aware that he was speaking with law enforcement officers. Additionally, no promises of leniency or threats were made to induce Stallworth to speak. During the trial, Carver testified that he told Stallworth to wait until he was taken in by the Gulfport Police to make a statement. ¶ 20. Defense counsel also contests the admissibility of certain statements made by Stallworth to Carver approximately one week after Stallworth had been booked into the jail on the murder charge. Prior to these particular statements, Stallworth had already participated in an initial appearance, and an attorney had been appointed to him. Carver testified that he makes himself accessible to inmates and that it was routine for inmates to come into his office to make complaints and/or requests. ¶ 21. Carver further stated that Stallworth walked into his office and asked if he could speak with Carver. Stallworth allegedly told Carver that the police might be looking in the wrong place for the murder weapon, and that they should look [b]y the doctor's office dumpster. The record does not indicate that the weapon was ever found. When asked at trial whether Stallworth had said anything about how the murder occurred, Carver testified that, [h]e said she grabbed a knife and he had toand he grabbed one and defended himself. Carver did not attempt to prevent Stallworth from speaking or to warn him of potential consequences of his statements. ¶ 22. In overruling Stallworth's motion to suppress, the trial court noted that by the defendant's own admission, there were no forces, promises, threats, acts of coercion, violence, duress, undue influence, et cetera, placed on him. The trial judge heard evidence that Stallworth had been informed of his Miranda rights. The record indicates that neither Carver nor Cheatham interrogated Stallworth about his involvement in the crime, and that Stallworth spoke freely without prompting by the officers. The trial court ruled that it appears all but uncontradicted that these were spontaneous statements by the defendant, notand not subjectand not as a result of questioning by either Carver or Cheatham. ¶ 23. Volunteered, unprompted statements are admissible, even if the Miranda advice has not been first given. Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590, 597 (Miss.1993). Further, law enforcement officers are not required to turn a deaf ear to such statements, nor are they required to stop the arrestee and advise him of his rights. Ricks v. State, 611 So.2d 212, 214 (Miss.1992). ¶ 24. Defense counsel argues that Stallworth's statements were not freely and voluntarily made because the apparent friendship between Stallworth and Carver created a compelling influence on Stallworth. Stallworth cites Dunn v. State, 547 So.2d 42 (Miss.1989), and argues that [w]hile it is not contended that Capt. Carver made any comments similar to those made by the Sheriff in Dunn, it is evident that the relationship certainly had a `compelling influence' upon Stallworth. The State counters that the case at bar presents no suggestion of a relationship being used to compel an incriminating statement. In Dunn, the police chief promised to do whatever he could to help the defendant, and told the defendant that he would be better off if he would make a statement to the police. Id. at 43-44. It is well-settled in Mississippi jurisprudence that a confession given after promises of leniency is incompetent evidence. See, e.g., Matthews v. State, 102 Miss. 549, 59 So. 842 (1912); Johnson v. State, 89 Miss. 773, 42 So. 606 (1907); Mitchell v. State, 24 So. 312 (Miss.1898). Stallworth's argument is not that Carver promised him leniency in exchange for a confession; rather, that because of their apparent friendship, Carver in some way compelled Stallworth to make statements. ¶ 25. Mississippi jurisprudence does not support the claim that a friendship between a defendant and a law enforcement officer necessarily results in a compelling influence on the accused. Stallworth's reliance on Dunn is misplaced. The record indicates that Carver did not in any way attempt to use his friendship with Stallworth to compel him to make a statement. On the contrary, the record clearly indicates that Stallworth volunteered the statements to Carver. Unlike the police official in Dunn, Carver never offered to help Stallworth, did not enjoin him to confess his involvement, and did not in any way interrogate Stallworth about the murder. ¶ 26. The trial judge made well-reasoned findings and determined that the statements were admissible. Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting Stallworth's statements.