Opinion ID: 219723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Burden of Proving Extreme Emotional Disturbance

Text: Petitioner argues that the prosecutor failed to prove all of the elements of murder under Kentucky law, and that, therefore, his conviction violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Petitioner asserts that Kentucky's definition of murder when he committed the crimes at issue included the absence of EED as an element of the crimes, and that the state failed to meet its burden of proof on the EED element. Therefore, Petitioner contends that based on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), his conviction resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under In re Winship, in order for a conviction to pass constitutional muster, the state must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068; Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 286 (6th Cir.2000) ( Gall II ). Therefore, the inquiries necessary to evaluate this ground for relief are: (1) whether the absence of EED was an element of the crime of murder under Kentucky law in effect at the time of Petitioner's crimes; and (2) if so, whether the state carried its In re Winship burden, including proving the EED element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Kentucky murder statute in effect at the time of the murders stated that a person commits murder when: with the intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution a person shall not be guilty under this subsection if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 507.020(1)(a). In the years preceding Petitioner's crimes, the Kentucky Supreme Court reiterated on numerous occasions that, the failure to act under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance is an element of the offense of murder. Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 586 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Ky. 1979); see also Bartrug v. Commonwealth, 568 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Ky.1978) ([T]he statute makes the absence of extreme emotional disturbance an essential element of the offense of murder. The Kentucky legislature clearly intended the prosecution to bear the risk of non-persuasion on the element of mitigation.); Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 567 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Ky. 1978) ([T]he prosecution carried the burden to satisfy the jury of the absence of extreme emotional disturbance.). In June of 1981 when Petitioner committed the crimes at issue, Kentucky law defined the absence of EED as an element of murder. During the months preceding Petitioner's crimes, the Kentucky Supreme Court refined the distribution of the burden of proving the EED element. In Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97, 108-09 (Ky.1980) ( Gall I ), the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that [t]he Commonwealth bore the burden of proof on the EED element, but [a]n instruction of murder need not require the jury to find that the defendant was not acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance unless there is something in the evidence to suggest that he was, thereby affording room for a reasonable doubt in that respect. See also Smith v. Commonwealth, 599 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Ky.1980). Thus, after Gall I, the burden of proving the EED element was distributed between the parties. The defendant bore the initial burden of production required to trigger the inclusion of the EED element as an element of the crime. Once the defendant satisfied its burden of production and raised a reasonable doubt regarding the EED element, the state bore the ultimate burden of persuasion, and was required to prove the EED element beyond a reasonable doubt. In the years following Petitioner's crimes, the Kentucky Supreme Court redistributed the burden of proving EED, and placed it entirely on the defendant. In Wellman v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696 (Ky.1985), decided four years after Petitioner's crimes, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that [t]he presence or absence of extreme emotional distress is a matter of evidence, not an element of the crime. Id. at 697. To dispel any ambiguity, the Kentucky Supreme Court further declared that [t]o the extent that ... cases declare absence of extreme emotional distress to be an element of the crime of murder, they are expressly overruled. Id. Wellman was the law when the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Petitioner's direct appeal. However, because Gall I was the law when Petitioner committed the crimes, the Kentucky Supreme Court was constitutionally required to apply Gall I to Petitioner's case. As the Supreme Court stated in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) (internal quotations and citations omitted), an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids.... The fundamental principle that the required criminal law must have existed when the conduct in issue occurred, must apply to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions emanating from courts as well as from legislatures. If a judicial construction of a criminal statute is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue it must not be given retroactive effect. [1] According to Bouie, it is impermissible for a court to apply a new judicial construction of the criminal law to prior crimes. In Gall II, 231 F.3d at 305-06, we analyzed the constitutionality of applying the post- Wellman understanding of parties' EED burdens to earlier conduct, and applied Bouie to a materially indistinguishable case. We explained that although the Kentucky Supreme Court's later cases discussing EED held that absence of EED was not an element of murder, under Bouie, the Kentucky Supreme Court's explicit alterations of its interpretation of EED in cases such as Wellman ... [may] not be applied to preceding conduct. Id. at 305. Bouie prohibits retroactive application of Wellman, as Wellman was not a conclusion that was foreseeable at the time of Petitioner's crimes. As we explained in Gall II, [u]nder the most reasonable reading of the statute's plain text ... absence of EED was an element of the crime. Id. Moreover, [b]eyond the statute itself, [the] Kentucky Supreme Court's earliest interpretations of the statute, its decision to apply this reading retroactively to cases that occurred shortly after the statute came into effect ... and its explicit acknowledgment that the later cases were directly overruling the prior cases, all support this view. Id. at 305-06. Finally, application of the Kentucky Supreme Court's later formulation of the EED burden to crimes previously committed contravenes Bouie as [i]t is also clear that the retroactive application of those cases would substantially disadvantage [a defendant], both by removing an element of murder, and by making [the defendant's] burden of showing EED substantially more difficult. Id. at 306. Thus, at Petitioner's trial, if Petitioner raised a reasonable doubt regarding the EED element, the state bore the burden of establishing the EED element beyond a reasonable doubt. Notwithstanding that Gall I was the law at the time of Petitioner's crimes, the Kentucky Supreme Court nevertheless applied the new Wellman formulation of its murder statute to uphold Petitioner's conviction on direct appeal. See Matthews I, 709 S.W.2d at 421 (We have recently written on this subject in Wellman v. Commonwealth ... clarifying that the absence of extreme emotional disturbance is not an element of the crime of murder which the Commonwealth must affirmatively prove. The trial court's instructions in regard to extreme emotional disturbance were adequate, and the proof supported the jury's findings of intentional murder.). However, because the Kentucky Supreme Court's decisions subsequent to Petitioner's crimes cannot constitutionally govern the disposition of Petitioner's appeal, Petitioner's murder conviction can only be upheld if the state proved the elements of murder, as defined by Gall I, beyond a reasonable doubt. As we explained above, under Gall I, EED was only an element of murder if the defendant raised a reasonable doubt as to its presence. Therefore, the defendant had the initial burden of production. Once the defendant met this burden, the burden shifted, requiring the state to prove the EED element beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gall I, 607 S.W.2d at 108-09. Therefore, once Petitioner presented sufficient evidence demonstrating his EED to carry his burden of going forward, the prosecution was required to demonstrate the absence of EED beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Petitioner of murder. [2] Convicting Petitioner of murder when the prosecution failed to prove the EED element beyond a reasonable doubt, contravened the Supreme Court's established precedent requiring the state to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. In this case, we look to Kentucky's substantive treatment of EED to determine whether Petitioner met his production burden, and triggered EED's inclusion as an element of murder. At the time of the murders, the Kentucky statute did not clearly define EED. However, under Kentucky law at the time of Petitioner's crimes, a mental disorder, whether or not it amounts to legal insanity, may constitute a reasonable explanation or excuse for extreme emotional disturbance. Gall I, 607 S.W.2d at 109; see also Gall II, 231 F.3d at 302. For EED to be included as an element of murder, Petitioner had to introduce sufficient evidence, which could include evidence of a mental disorder, to raise a reasonable doubt regarding whether he was under the influence of EED when he committed the crimes. See Gall I, 607 S.W.2d at 108-09. At trial, Dr. Lee Chutkow, the psychiatrist who evaluated and diagnosed Petitioner in advance of trial, testified that Petitioner suffered from an adjustment disorder and alcohol abuse. ( See App. at 1196, Trial Tr.) An adjustment disorder, explained Dr. Chutkow, is a temporary emotional and behavioral disturbance in individuals subject to a variety of stresses, either psychological, social, physical, or a combination of stresses for days, weeks or months. ( Id. ) Symptoms of an adjustment disorder can include impaired judgment and self control, as well as attempts to hurt others. ( See id. ) On redirect examination, Petitioner's counsel asked Dr. Chutkow whether he was able to formulate an opinion as to whether at the time of the offenses on June the 29, 1981 ... [Petitioner's] mental state ... amounted to an extreme emotional disturbance or not? Dr. Chutkow replied, Yes. He was developing for several weeks, I believe, progressively, extreme tension, irritability, and almost a kind of fear of his late wife. ( Id. at 1205.) The Kentucky Supreme Court applied the relevant definition of EED to determine that several defendants were operating under EED. However, these defendants often suffered from more serious conditions than did Petitioner, including mental disorders akin to paranoid schizophrenia. See, e.g., Ratliff, 567 S.W.2d at 309; Gall I, 607 S.W.2d at 109; Edmonds, 586 S.W.2d at 26. Nevertheless, through Dr. Chutkow's testimony, Petitioner presented evidence that Petitioner was suffering from a mental condition in the form of EED. Dr. Chutkow's testimony raised a reasonable doubt regarding the EED element, and shifted onto the state the burden of proving the EED element beyond a reasonable doubt. The constitutionality of Petitioner's conviction thus rests on whether the state met this burden of proof. In general, to determine whether the prosecution carried its burden on an element of a crime we ask whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). [3] In the instant case, we must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the prosecution proved the EED element beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution presented no evidence of its own regarding the EED element. Moreover, in cross-examining Dr. Chutkow, the prosecution only elicited further statements supporting Petitioner's EED at the time of the crimes. For example, when the prosecution asked Dr. Chutkow whether he had testified that Petitioner was suffering from some extreme emotional disturbance at the time, Dr. Chutkow replied Yes. (App. at 1219-20, Trial Tr.) Under Kentucky law, the prosecution was not required to present direct evidence regarding a defendant's mental state in order to sustain its burden of proof on the EED element. See Gall I, 607 S.W.2d at 109. However, because Petitioner satisfied his burden of going forward with respect to the EED element, and the prosecution neither undermined nor contravened Petitioner's EED evidence, there remained a reasonable doubt regarding the EED element. Therefore, no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner acted in the absence of EED, and convicting Petitioner violated the requirements articulated in In re Winship. [4] Accordingly, the Kentucky courts violated clearly established federal law as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in In re Winship by shifting the burden of proving the EED element onto Petitioner. At the time of Petitioner's crimes, the absence of EED was an element of murder under Kentucky law; however, the state failed to prove the EED element beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore grant Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus on this ground. [5]