Opinion ID: 836259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's conversations with Reineccius.

Text: We next address the admissibility of the state's body wire evidence of defendant's conversations with Reineccius. The state argues that it complied with ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) in obtaining those conversations and that no statute obligates the state to secure a court order authorizing use of a body wire if it complies with that statute. Defendant argues that the state must obtain a court order under ORS 133.724 under these circumstances. The parties' arguments require us to construe ORS 133.724, 133.726, and 165.540(5)(a)(B) together. ORS 133.724(1) authorizes a circuit court judge, upon a proper application, to issue an ex parte order that authorizes the interception of wire, electronic or oral communications   . In State v. Pottle, 296 Or. 274, 284, 677 P.2d 1 (1984), this court addressed the lawfulness of an ex parte order under ORS 133.724 that authorized police to wiretap telephone calls. The court gave the following explanation of the function of the ex parte order under that statute: `The order serves the same function as a conventional search warrant by indicating judicial authority for the search, acting as the formal record of judicial action, establishing the limits of the search, instructing the officers on the scope of their authority and discretion, and providing the basis for determining the legality of the execution of the search.' J. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance, § 4.07, 194-95. Id. at 284, 677 P.2d 1. This court determined that, under the legislature's scheme that permits electronic surveillance, the ex parte order is the source of authority that allows police to invade the privacy of citizens' telephone communications: The order is the document that allows the police to invade the privacy of all people who use the telephone wire during the authorized period of interception, and limits that invasion. Id. at 288, 677 P.2d 1. The court concluded that, because the order authorizing this wiretap did not conform to the statutory requirements, these conversations were intercepted unlawfully, and the conversations and all evidence derived therefrom must be suppressed. ORS 133.735. Id. at 290, 677 P.2d 1 (footnote omitted). Pottle involved the wiretapping of telephone calls, not the obtaining by body wire and tape recorder of conversations, as in this case. Pottle is significant, however, because, in that case, this court determined that the circuit court's ex parte order, issued under ORS 133.724, is the document that authorizes police to invade the privacy of telephone callers to gather evidence of crime. The Pottle court's conclusion regarding police authority to intercept telephone calls pursuant to court order applies with equal force to the interception of oral communications. ORS 133.724 permits the court to authorize the police, through an ex parte order, to intercept oral communications of the kind involved here. Defendant's conversations with Reineccius were oral communications within the definition provided in ORS 133.721(7). The state's use of the body wire to obtain those oral communications falls within the definition of intercept provided in ORS 133.721(5). The state possessed all the information necessary to demonstrate, in an application for an ex parte order under ORS 133.724(1)(c), that there is probable cause to believe that an individual [ i.e., defendant] is committing, has committed or is about to commit,    a crime punishable as a felony under ORS 475.992 or 475.995   . Applying Pottle in this context, we conclude that ORS 133.724 provides for judicial authorization, through a court order, of exactly the kind of electronic surveillance of oral communications that occurred in this case. ORS 133.724 applies to the interception of all oral communications for which the state can make the requisite showing of probable cause. ORS 133.726 also creates a procedure for issuance of a court order approving the obtaining of conversations by police, but confines that procedure to the obtaining of a conversation under ORS 165.540(5)(a). ORS 165.540(5)(a) states three circumstances in which [t]he prohibitions in [ORS 165.540(1)(c)] do not apply   . Reading ORS 133.726 and 165.540(5)(a) together, it is clear that a court order under ORS 133.726 relieves the criminal prohibition that otherwise might apply under ORS 165.540(1)(c) to the obtaining of a conversation by police without the consent of all participants. However, ORS 133.726 does not change the scope or applicability of ORS 133.724, and the court order procedure provided in that statute, as the source of police authority to intercept oral communications. Moreover, ORS 133.726 does not purport to authorize the police to obtain a conversation by use of a device without a court order for any purpose. The state acknowledges, and we agree, that the probable cause provision in ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) identifies one circumstance that relieves a law enforcement officer of the criminal prohibition in ORS 165.540(1)(c). The state also contends that the court should interpret the probable cause provision in ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) to create an additional legal consequence, i.e., to authorize law enforcement officers to obtain conversations without the necessity of securing authorization through a court order issued under ORS 133.724. We conclude that ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) does not go as far as the state suggests. ORS 165.540(5)(a) identifies only one legislative objective for the enactment of that subsection: the identification of three factual scenarios in which the criminal prohibition stated in ORS 165.540(1)(c) do[es] not apply. ORS 165.540(5)(a) does not refer, directly or indirectly, to ORS 133.724. The legislature cited ORS 133.724 in the opening clause of ORS 165.540(1), but that provision establishes only that compliance with ORS 133.724 renders ineffective the criminal prohibitions provided in ORS 165.540(1). Nothing in ORS 165.540 plausibly suggests that, in adopting the exceptions to criminal liability in ORS 165.540(5)(a), the legislature intended in addition to modify the scope or applicability of ORS 133.724 to the interception by law enforcement officers of oral communications by means of a device. The state's argument, if accepted, would eliminate the detailed process for securing a court order authorizing electronic interception of oral communications under ORS 133.724. ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) contains no wording that supports such a broad exception. This court could create the additional legal consequence for which the state advocates only by adding words to ORS 165.540(5)(a) that the legislature did not include. ORS 174.010 does not permit us to do that. See Castrejon, 317 Or. at 206, 856 P.2d 616 (quoting legislative proscription in ORS 174.010 against inserting words that legislature has omitted). The state relies for its position in part on State v. Lissy, 304 Or. 455, 747 P.2d 345 (1987). Defendant argues that Lissy is distinguishable on its facts and, in any event, was wrongly decided. We agree that Lissy is distinguishable. In Lissy, the court separately analyzed the interception by police, without a court order, of telephone conversations with the consent of one party and the obtaining by police of face-to-face conversations with a court order. The court explored the legislative history that applied to the statutes regulating electronic interception of telephone calls. Id. at 463-67, 747 P.2d 345. The court concluded that the legislature in 1955 had prohibited the wiretapping of telephone calls, but had excepted from that prohibition the interception of calls either with a court order or with the consent of at least one participant. Id. at 464, 747 P.2d 345. The court decided that numerous revisions of the pertinent electronic surveillance statutes over the years had left intact the legislature's original 1955 policy choice not to restrict the taping or recording of telephone calls with one party's consent. Id. at 466, 747 P.2d 345. The court held that the conduct of the police in listening to telephone conversations with one person's consent was not in violation of state statute. Id. at 467, 747 P.2d 345. The court also concluded that a federal statute did not impose more stringent requirements for securing a court order to obtain face-to-face conversations than did ORS 133.726 (1983) and, as a result, the police, in obtaining conversations, were not required to comply with ORS 133.724 in order to satisfy the federal statute. [11] Id. at 467-68, 747 P.2d 345. The legislature did not enact the probable cause provision in ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B) until 1989, two years after this court decided Lissy. See Oregon Laws 1989, ch 1078, § 1 (amending ORS 165.540(5)(a)(B)). Therefore, Lissy did not purport to interpret that statute. The interception that the police carried out without a court order in Lissy concerned telephone calls, not face-to-face conversations. The court's analysis in Lissy of the unique legislative history of Oregon's laws regulating the interception of telephone calls sheds no light on the necessity under current law of a court order to authorize interception of face-to-face oral communications. The court's resolution of the federal law compliance issue in Lissy did not require a discussion of this court's interpretation of ORS 133.724 in Pottle. As a result, we decline the state's invitation to extend the rationale of Lissy to a subject that that case did not address, i.e., police authority to intercept face-to-face oral communications without a court order. We conclude that where, as here, ORS 133.724 permits the court to authorize the police to secure evidence by intercepting oral communications pursuant to an ex parte court order, the police must conduct their electronic interception activities pursuant to such an order. No statute entitles the police to elect to employ electronic surveillance to obtain evidence without a court order under circumstances, such as those presented here, in which ORS 133.724 clearly applies. The state obtained the body wire evidence of defendant's conversations with Reineccius without first obtaining an ex parte court order under ORS 133.724. No exception to the requirement that the police obtain an order applied. Thus, the trial court did not err in ordering suppression of the body wire evidence of defendant's conversations with Reineccius. ORS 133.735(1). The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The order of the circuit court is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.