Opinion ID: 535587
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Amounts Awarded

Text: 52 The only remaining issue is whether, as Towers contends, the amounts awarded were unreasonable because they required payment for time expenditures that were unwarranted. In reviewing such a contention, we will not reverse unless the district court has abused its discretion. See, e.g., Brandeis School v. NLRB, 871 F.2d 5, 6 (2d Cir.1989); Wood v. Detroit Auto Inter-Ins. Exch., 413 Mich. 573, 321 N.W.2d 653, 661 (1982). We see no abuse of discretion here. 53 The district court had before it detailed, contemporaneous records of the time spent by Cadillac's attorneys. And though it did not make extensive findings, the court plainly considered Towers's contention that the hours were inflated and rejected that contention after evaluation of the billings in light of the course of the litigation. The court found that some of the time charges that Towers now terms excessive were the result of Cadillac's having to answer baseless allegations; these allegations included Towers's assertion that Towers and Cadillac never entered into a loan commitment agreement in January 1988. Memorandum at 3. On the basis of this record, the district court's finding was not erroneous, and we cannot say that the amount of attorneys' fees awarded constituted an abuse of discretion.