Opinion ID: 492347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the mla

Text: 7 Section 2(c) of the MLA broadly prohibits the grant of federal coal leases to common-carrier railroads: 8 No company or corporation operating a common-carrier railroad shall be given or hold a permit or lease under the provisions of [the MLA] ... for any coal deposits except for its own use for railroad purposes.... 9 30 U.S.C. Sec. 202 (1982). The restriction nips in the bud certain potential violations of the so-called commodities clause of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10746 (1982), which prohibits interstate rail carriers from transporting an article or commodity that ... is manufactured, mined, or produced by the carrier or under its authority.... 1 Section 2(c) is reinforced by Sec. 37 of the MLA, which makes the MLA the exclusive means of disposing of federal coal lands, subject to a qualification that specifically includes the very authority under which the Secretary acted here: 10 [T]he deposits of coal ... herein referred to ... shall be subject to disposition only in the form and manner provided in this Act, except as provided in sections 206 and 209 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.... 11 Pub.L. No. 66-146, Sec. 37, 41 Stat. 437, 451 (1920), as amended by Pub.L. No. 95-554, Sec. 4, 92 Stat. 2073, 2074 (1978) (codified at 30 U.S.C. Sec. 193 (1982)) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend that the MLA implicitly limits Sec. 206 of FLPMA.
12 The government challenged plaintiffs' standing only in a footnote, Brief for Secretary at 18 n. 15, to which plaintiffs never responded. Since this court must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction, however, we address the issue without the benefit of argument by the parties. 13 Plaintiffs' alleged injury stems from their members' status as competitors of ... [Rocky Mountain]. Complaint at 40, Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 40. 2 The exchange, they allege, allows Rocky Mountain economically to mine a large tract of previously unminable land, thereby threatening plaintiffs' members with more rigorous competition. 14 Since plaintiffs' allegations of competitive threat undoubtedly satisfy constitutional standing requirements, see Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 750, 754 n. 5, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620-21, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 1093-94, 28 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971), we address only their prudential standing under Sec. 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702 (1982). 3 That inquiry proceeds in two parts. First we must determine whether plaintiffs are arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the MLA. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). The Supreme Court recently articulated the test as follows: 15 In cases [such as this one] where the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the contested regulatory action, the test denies a right of review if the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit. 16 Clarke, 107 S.Ct. at 757. If we find that plaintiffs fall within the MLA's zone of interests, we must then examine whether the MLA exhibits a  'fairly discernible' ... congressional intent to preclude review at [their] behest. Id. at 759. Thus, even plaintiffs who are among a statute's prime beneficiaries will lack standing if, for instance, allowance of such suits would severely disrupt the administrative scheme. Id. at 757 (citing Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 348, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2455, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984)). 17 The legislative history of Sec. 2(c) provides a sufficient basis for locating plaintiffs within its protected zone. It was enacted out of fear that if railroads were allowed to own coal mines they would discriminate in transportation against competing coal mines which depended on rail transportation.... Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 271 (7th Cir.1986) [hereinafter cited as NIPSCO ]; see 58 CONG.REC. 4739 (1919) (remarks of Sen. LaFollette). 4 18 It is an open question whether Sec. 2(c)'s prohibition encompasses leases to a railroad's affiliate. See NIPSCO, 799 F.2d at 270-72. But parties complaining of administrative error obviously need not prevail on all issues of statutory interpretation in order to establish standing; were that so, the zone of interests test would not merely implicate but would duplicate the merits. Cf. Von Aulock v. Smith, 720 F.2d 176, 185 (D.C.Cir.1983). Since  'Congress has arguably legislated against the competition that [plaintiffs seek] to challenge,'  plaintiffs have asserted an interest that bears a plausible relationship to the policies underlying the MLA. Clarke, 107 S.Ct. at 759 (quoting Investment Company Institute, 401 U.S. at 620, 91 S.Ct. at 1094). That is enough. 19 Nor do there appear any factors, such as existed in Block, 467 U.S. at 345-51, 104 S.Ct. at 2453-56, that make fairly discernible in the MLA a congressional intent to preclude review at [plaintiffs'] behest. Clarke, 107 S.Ct. at 759. Plaintiffs, therefore, have standing to assert their challenge based on the MLA.
20 On the merits, plaintiffs' argument would be implausible even in the absence of Sec. 37's explicit exception (added in 1978) for transfers under Sec. 206 of FLPMA. Section 206 itself makes not the slightest allusion to any of the MLA restrictions. Plaintiffs suggest that adherence to the plain meaning of Sec. 206 produces an unreasonable result and is in outright controversion of [MLA] Secs. 2(c) and 37.... Brief for Appellants at 18. We see neither absurdity nor contradiction in the plain language. Congress has erected two schemes for disposition of federal coal interests. The leasing scheme potentially applies to every lump of federal coal, and is hedged with restrictions. Section 206 of FLPMA provides for disposition only of lands (including coal lands) sought by other entities; but in return, those entities must offer the government tracts that are especially suitable for federal ownership and of approximately equal value. 5 Thus the scope of Sec. 206 is far more circumscribed, and each exchange affords the government unique land rather than fungible cash. Congress could naturally have seen these two features as obviating any need to subject the exchanges to the MLA restriction. 21 After adoption of FLPMA in 1976, Congress evidently realized that Sec. 37 of the MLA could raise doubts about the Secretary's authority to exchange coal lands under Sec. 206. Accordingly, Congress in 1978 amended Sec. 37 to except such exchanges explicitly, limiting Sec. 37 in the clearest language imaginable: The MLA was exclusive except as provided in sections 206 and 209 of FLPMA. Pub.L. No. 95-554, Sec. 4, 92 Stat. 2074 (1978) (codified at 30 U.S.C. Sec. 193). If that language did not do the job, none could. 22 Plaintiffs invoke legislative history in their quest to construe the 1978 amendment into oblivion. But this is one of those cases where the clarity of [Congress's] language ... makes resort to legislative history unnecessary and unavailing. Independent Community Bankers Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 820 F.2d 428, 434 (D.C.Cir.1987) (citation omitted); see also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-90, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194-96, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917), quoted in United States v. Dickson, 816 F.2d 751, 752 (D.C.Cir.1987) (per curiam). 23 To resolve any doubts, however, we consider the item of legislative history that plaintiffs appear to regard as a smoking gun. It consists of a statement on the House floor by Representative Kazen, the chairman of the subcommittee that considered the 1978 amendment: 24 The purpose of the ... [1978 amendment to Sec. 37 of the MLA] is to permit the Secretary to resolve land title problems created by such mineral reservations in situations where no substantial mineral value is involved. 25 124 CONG.REC. 33,282 (October 3, 1978). 26 Rep. Kazen's remark makes sense as a partial explanation of the amendment's reference to Sec. 209 of FLPMA; it could not have been intended to cover Sec. 206. Section 209 starts by requiring that [a]ll conveyances ... by the Secretary, except those involving land exchanges provided for in ... [Sec. 206 of FLPMA], shall reserve to the United States all minerals in the lands.... 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1719(a) (1982) (emphasis added). It proceeds to except from the prohibition conveyances of federal mineral interests where the federal government does not own the surface, if either (1) there are no known mineral values in the land or (2) federal retention of mineral rights would thwart a more beneficial nonmineral land use. Id. Sec. 1719(b)(1). 27 Even as to Sec. 209, the Kazen comment is incomplete, as it overlooks the second type of finding that would authorize a mineral grant. It also entirely fails to explain Sec. 206. Whatever the reasons for its incompleteness, 6 a legislator's remark that mentions one function or effect of an enactment cannot negate statutory language that establishes others. See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 801 F.2d 417, 421 (D.C.Cir.1986); Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1310 (D.C.Cir.1986). The Kazen remark is no smoking gun, nor even a water pistol. We give the words of Sec. 37 their full meaning.