Opinion ID: 723207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Questioning During Investigative Stop

Text: 9 Spencer contends that in the absence of Miranda warnings, information obtained from the custodial interrogation that occurred between the time he was stopped and ordered from the car and the time of arrest should have been suppressed. Spencer relies on United States v. Jones, 846 F.2d 358 (6th Cir.1988), for the proposition that Miranda warnings had to be given prior to questioning when the defendant was surrounded by three police cars and prevented from leaving the scene. Spencer argues that because the officers approached the car with guns drawn and shouting orders, he was in custody and therefore Miranda warnings were required. We disagree. 10 Spencer's reliance on Jones is misplaced. The Jones analysis dealt with voluntary consent to search. As a part of a totality of the circumstances analysis, the majority noted that the initial stop and blocking of Jones's car by three police cars established a custodial atmosphere and coercive environment. 846 F.2d at 361. The majority did not find that an arrest had actually taken place, but intimated that the officers created an atmosphere suggesting that consent was not voluntary. Such facts are not present in Spencer's case. 11 Our inquiry in this case must focus on whether the blocking of the car combined with the order to exit given at gunpoint elevated Spencer's situation from an investigative stop to an arrest. This inquiry requires us to focus on whether the totality of the circumstances gave rise to a justifiable fear for the officers' safety, thus justifying the display of force in making the stop. 12 The mere use or display of force in making a stop will not necessarily transform a stop into an arrest if the surrounding circumstances give rise to a justifiable fear for personal safety. United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir.1994). To require an officer to risk his life in order to make an investigatory stop would run contrary to the intent of Terry v. Ohio. United States v. Maslanka, 501 F.2d 208, 213 n. 10 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 912 (1975) (citation omitted). There are numerous cases holding that a blockade of a suspect's car with guns drawn does not constitute an arrest. See e.g., United States v. Edwards, 53 F.3d 616, 619 (3rd Cir.1995); United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357 n. 1 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1097 (1987). 13 We find that the officers and inspectors had an articulable suspicion to support stopping the car because they had just watched Wilson throw a package known to contain a kilo of cocaine onto the back seat. The law enforcement officials' blockade of the car and display of force were also justified to protect their personal safety, as they had just stopped two people who were reasonably believed to be engaged in drug trafficking, and drug traffickers are known often to carry weapons and use force when confronted. See United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739, 754 (6th Cir.) (This court has on several occasions recognized that firearms and ammunition are tools of the drug trafficking trade....), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1014 (1991). The fear for personal safety was clearly justified under these circumstances. See Edwards, 53 F.3d at 618 (finding officers reasonably feared for personal safety in apprehending two felons who had just engaged in bank fraud since the perpetrators might have armed themselves to facilitate their escape if confronted.); Hardnett, 804 F.2d at 357 (finding blocking of vehicle and drawing of weapons justified where officers reasonably feared for safety based on reports that occupants were armed). 14 The facts of this case do not elevate the investigative stop to an arrest requiring Miranda warnings. Therefore, the motion to suppress the two answers given by Spencer regarding his identity and his presence at the post office was properly denied.