Opinion ID: 772698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-Waiver

Text: 32 Heston raised identical claims before the Magistrate Judge, District Judge, and this court, challenging the ALJ's step four and step-five findings. The Commissioner argues that, before Heston's challenges to the findings at the fourth and fifth steps can be considered, she must have also challenged the finding of no severe impairment at step two. Because she has not done so, the Commissioner argues, she is foreclosed from review on the merits by this court of her challenge to the findings at steps four and five. 33 We hold that the Commissioner cannot rely on any waiver by Heston to foreclose consideration of her claims on the merits, because the Commissioner failed to bring Heston's waiver to the attention of the Magistrate Judge or the District Judge. As a result, neither the Magistrate Judge nor the District Judge had the opportunityto consider the Commissioner's argument that Heston's failure to challenge the step two determination foreclosed her challenge to the ALJ's findings at steps four and five. 34 The Commissioner's claim of waiver violates the fundamental principle that the trial court must be presented with an opportunity to review an argument before it may be raised on appeal. E.g., Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 (6th Cir. 2000) (parties may not raise new arguments or issues at the district court stage that were not presented to the Magistrate Judge); Cupit v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 532, 535 (5th Cir. 1994) (respondent waived review of issue of petitioner's procedural default by not objecting to petitioner's original claim before the Magistrate Judge); Paterson-Leitch Co., Inc. v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 990-91 (1st Cir. 1988) (party has a duty to put its best foot forward before the Magistrate Judge in order to present the issue at a subsequent appeal). 35 As a result of its own waiver, the Commissioner is precluded from arguing that Heston's challenges to the ALJ's findings at steps four and five cannot be considered due to her failure to assert a challenge to the predicate finding at step two. We consider, accordingly, Heston's claims on their merits. 36 B. The ALJ Did Not Commit Reversible Error By Not Explicitly Considering Dr. Haun's Report 37 Heston argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to discuss Dr. Haun's three-page summary of Heston's medical history in the decision. Heston argues that, because the ALJ failed to provide an explanation of the weight given to Dr. Haun's opinion, the ALJ's decision must be vacated. Although the Commissioner must provide a statement discussing the evidence and reasons on which the decision is based, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1), we find that the ALJ's omission of any discussion of Dr. Haun's report was harmless error. 38 Judicial review of the Secretary's findings must be based on the record as a whole. Both the court of appeals and the district court may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the Appeals Council.Walker v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989), questioned on other grounds by Cutlip v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). 39 The court may review Dr. Haun's report, in its consideration of the record as a whole, to determine if the ALJ's decision was based upon substantial evidence, even if the ALJ failed to cite the report in its conclusion 1 . 40 A review of Dr. Haun's report does not mandate a reversal of the ALJ's decision that Heston is not disabled. First, in the report written on August 1, 1995, Dr. Haun admits that he had no current information on Heston. Dr. Haun provided none of Heston's medical records (which he admits are no longer within his control), and does not provide any objective basisfor his conclusions. According to the regulations, a treating physician's opinion will not be given controlling weight unless it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(d)(2). 41 More important, Dr. Haun's report was based on a summary of Heston's medical history, as his last examination of Heston was in February of 1992. Heston's medical status for disability in this case is between November 17, 1992, and June 30, 1994. Although medical history is relevant to a claimant's condition, Heston's medical history should not be given more weight than that of a doctor observing plaintiff during the relevant period of disability. As the record demonstrates, and the ALJ observed, Dr. Colby examined Heston during the relevant period, and concluded that Heston was not suffering from any serious impairment. (J.A. at 141-114). 42 Dr. Haun's report also indicates Heston would have difficulty standing, bending, lifting, or carrying objects in an employment setting. (Id. at 113). During the administrative hearing, the hypothetical posed by the ALJ to the vocational expert described a person who could not lift more than thirty pounds, who should not repeatedly bend or constantly stand, and who could not climb, crouch, kneel or crawl. (Id. at 60). The ALJ, therefore, considered Heston's limitations described by Dr. Haun in the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert. The vocational expert concluded that there were jobs in the area, taking into considerations the limitations, that could be performed. (Id.). 43 A review of Dr. Haun's report does not mandate a reversal of the ALJ's determination that Heston was not disabled. Although the ALJ should have included a reference to the report in its findings, the failure to do so, in this case, was harmless error. 44 C. The ALJ's Finding That Heston's Testimony Was Not Credible Was Based on Substantial Evidence 45 Heston argues that the ALJ incorrectly determined that her testimony, regarding limitations based on shortness of breath and fatigue, was not supported by evidence in the record. A circuit court, however, may not review a determination of credibility. It [i]s for the Secretary and his examiner, as the fact-finders, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and weigh and evaluate their testimony. Myers v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1972) (citing Celebrezze v. Sutton, 338 F.2d 417, 421 (8th Cir. 1964)). 46 The ALJ's determination that the symptoms did not render Heston disabled is also supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ considered Heston's testimony concerning fatigue and shortness of breath in light of other evidence that Heston regularly walks around her yard for exercise, rides an exercise bicycle, goes to church, goes on vacation, cooks, vacuums, and makes beds. (Id. at 16). The ALJ could properly determine that her subjective complaints were not credible in light of her ability to perform other tasks. 47 D. The ALJ Did Not Improperly Rely on Rule 203.12 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in Determining Heston's Vocational Profile 48 To deny Heston's application for disability benefits, the Commissioner must show that the claimant cannot perform any substantial gainful work that exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(a). 49 Medical-Vocational Guidelines (grids) are utilized by the Secretary during the final step of the disability decision.Abbot v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). After the Secretary determines that the plaintiff is incapable of performing past relevant work, these grids are used to determine whether plaintiff can perform other jobs in the national economy. The grid allows the Secretary to take administrative notice that plaintiff has met the requirements to perform certain jobs in the economy. Id. 50 The ALJ made the following findings of fact: 51 11. Section 404.1569 of Regulations No. 4 and Vocational Rule 203.12 . . . . directs a conclusion that, considering the claimant's residual functioning capacity, age, education, and work experience, she was not disabled. 52 12. Applying the above-cited rule as a framework for decisionmaking, and considering the claimant's vocational profile and residual functional capacity, she could have performed approximately 3,600 medium range jobs such as rental clerk, photocopy machine operator, and marker. The jobs identified exist in proportionate numbers throughout the national economy as well. (J.A. at 19-20). 53 Heston argues that the ALJ improperly applied the Vocational Rule 203.12 for determining the number of jobs Heston could perform. Vocational Rule 203.12 is relied upon if it is determined that claimant is capable of performing medium work. A claimant is capable of performing medium work if they are capable of lifting up to fifty pounds. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c). Vocational Rule 202.02 applies if the claimant is capable of performing only light work. Light work is defined as lifting no more than twenty pounds. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). 54 Dr. Tripathi stated that Heston can lift up to thirty pounds. (J.A. at 160). Dr. Haun's report also stated that Heston has a limited ability to lift, but he does not provide a specific weight limit. Heston's ability to lift thirty pounds falls between the definitions of light and medium work. Therefore, the ALJ could not accurately make a determination of which jobs Heston could perform by relying solely on either Vocational Rule 203.12 or 202.02. 55 Social Security Ruling 83-12 applies when a claimant's abilities fall between the regulatory guidelines for exertional limitations: In situations where the rules would direct different conclusions, and the individual's exertional limitations are somewhere 'in the middle' in terms of the regulatory criteria for exertional ranges of work, more difficult judgments are involved as to the sufficiency of the remaining occupational base to support a conclusion as to disability. Accordingly [vocational specialist] assistance is advisable for these types of cases. 1983-1991 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 36, 1983 WL 31253 (S.S.A.). 56 The ALJ discussed Heston's limitations with the vocational expert. (J.A. at 60). The ALJ posed a hypothetical with a person who was not able to lift above fifty pounds on occasion or not able to lift twenty-five pounds frequently. The vocational expert concluded that there were approximately 2,000 jobs available. The ALJ then asked the vocational expert about job opportunities for someone who could lift up to thirty pounds, had problems climbing, crouching, kneeling and crawling. The vocational expert stated that there were about 3,600 jobs available for someone with those limitations. (Id. at 61). 57 The ALJ based his finding of facts on the vocational expert's determination that there were 3,600 jobs available for someonewith Heston's capabilities. (Id. at 19-20). Heston's argument that the ALJ improperly relied on Vocational Rule 203.12, in light of the ALJ's consideration of Heston's specific vocational profile and residual functioning capacity, is without merit. (Id.).