Opinion ID: 1268837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: New Trial Motion Newly Discovered Evidence

Text: Reynolds next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Shortly after the trial concluded, Reynolds's trial counsel, Scott Reed, received a telephone call from one Judy Oscarson, who claimed to have been an eyewitness to the accident. Reynolds contends that had Oscarson been available as a witness, her testimony would have been material on the issue of comparative negligence. In an affidavit submitted to the trial court in support of the motion for a new trial, Oscarson stated in part, I am positive that the Black girl was on the traveled portion of the highway and not on the shoulder. She was walking to my left of the fog line. The trial court denied the motion, holding that given the weight of other testimony, Oscarson's testimony would probably have had no effect on the result of the trial, and that had counsel exercised due diligence, Oscarson could have been discovered prior to trial. I.R.C.P. 59(a)(4) provides that a new trial may be granted when there is [n]ewly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at trial. Reynolds' counsel submitted an affidavit stating that during the trial, he asked Officer Hatch of the Priest River Police Department for permission to examine the police accident file, that he was granted permission to examine the file, and that his examination of the file revealed no statement taken by the police from Judy Oscarson, nor any reference to her as a witness. As the trial court noted in its order denying the motion for a new trial, the statement set forth in Oscarson's affidavit contrasts sharply with the statements she had given to Officer Hatch of the Priest River Police Department. The statement made to Officer Hatch read: I was turning into the parking lot of the High School and I met Brian Reynolds in his van. He was waiting for the traffic to clear so that he could turn on to the highway. I picked up my daughter at the school and left the parking lot, heading back towards town. I was the second car behind Brian. My speed at this time was 30 mph and I caught up with the cars in front of me. All of a sudden I noticed that the cars in front of me were stopping and I realized that there was some problem ahead of me. We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that even if Oscarson's testimony had been available at trial, it is highly unlikely that the result would have been different. Since Reynolds had testified that prior to impact his vehicle had not crossed the white fog line, permitting the inference that Leona had been on the left side of the fog line, Oscarson's testimony would have been cumulative. Also, when Oscarson's statement as set forth in the affidavit is compared with her earlier statement to Officer Hatch, it appears to be relatively weak. Moreover, Police Chief Mitchell submitted two affidavits in which he stated that Oscarson's statement, wherein she identified herself as witness, was available as part of an accident file in his office since March 29, 1979. The record reflects, and Reynolds does not contest, that Reynolds's counsel did not request the accident report prior to the time of trial. Mitchell stated, [t]o my personal knowledge the police file has at all times contained statements made on March 29, 1979, by Judy Oscarson and Robert J. Fitter... . Had Reynolds's counsel acted with due diligence, he would have, at a minimum, attempted to identify and interview eye-witnesses prior to trial. As an obvious step in this process, he would have requested the police accident file. The trial court did not err in concluding that Reynolds's counsel could have ascertained prior to trial that Oscarson was a witness.