Opinion ID: 2016002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: first cause of action: adequacy of damages for loss of society, comfort, and companionship

Text: A plaintiff in a wrongful death case can only recover damages for loss of the deceased's society, comfort, and companionship which are shown by the evidence to have a pecuniary value. Garvin v. Coover, 202 Neb. 582, 276 N.W.2d 225 (1979). See Crewdson, supra . However, we have recognized that in this context, the word pecuniary is not to be construed in a strict sense, that it is difficult to determine its exact measure, and that the task of determining such must be left to the good judgment and ordinary common sense of the jurors. The law does not provide any positive, definite mathematical formula or legal rule by which a jury shall fix the amount of pecuniary loss; it must be determined upon a consideration of the circumstances of each case. [Citations omitted.] There is no requirement that there be evidence of the dollar value of companionship, counseling, or advice. Maloney v. Kaminski, 220 Neb. 55, 69, 368 N.W.2d 447, 458 (1985) (affirming verdict of approximately $59,000 to elderly widow for loss of her husband's society and companionship). No recovery is allowed for mental suffering or bereavement or as solace on account of the death. Garvin v. Coover, supra . In Garvin, we affirmed a verdict of $0 in general damages in an action for the wrongful death of a 20-year-old unmarried woman. Her parents testified that she had been a bright and loving child, who had graduated from high school and was studying to become a nurse at the time of her death. Id. She attended church with them, and they took comfort in her attitude toward school, her interest in sewing and music, and her interest in sports. Id. In considering whether the verdict should be set aside on appeal, we framed the question as whether there was such a reasonable expectation of monetary contributions on Linda's part and a monetary worth which can reasonably be assigned to the loss of her society, comfort, and companionship that we can say the verdict of none was so inadequate as to be contrary to the evidence and therefore wrong as a matter of law. Id. at 586, 276 N.W.2d at 227. In answering that question, we noted that [i]t is virtually impossible to `color match' cases to determine whether a verdict in a particular case was adequate. Id. After reviewing other cases involving actions for wrongful death of a child, we observed that one common thread runs throughout all of those cases, namely, that damages in any wrongful death case are incapable of computation and are largely a matter for the jury. Id. We referred to our decision in Selders v. Armentrout, 192 Neb. 291, 220 N.W.2d 222 (1974), in which we affirmed verdicts of $1,500 each for the deaths of three children, ages 15, 13, and 9, upon a finding that the evidence was such that the jury could have concluded the pecuniary loss to the parents, including the value of society and companionship, was relatively small. Id. at 293, 220 N.W.2d at 224, quoted in Garvin, supra . In Garvin, 202 Neb. at 587, 276 N.W.2d at 228, we noted that the case was fairly tried and submitted to the jury under proper instructions, and concluded that we were not inclined to disturb its verdict. Two cases decided by this court since Garvin provide further guidance in evaluating the adequacy or excessiveness of a verdict awarded as the result of the wrongful death of unmarried young adults. In Crewdson v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 234 Neb. 631, 452 N.W.2d 270 (1990), we considered a challenge to a verdict in the amount of $510,000 awarded to parents for the loss of their 21-year-old son, who was killed by a train. We noted that a jury verdict may be set aside when it is so clearly wrong and unreasonable as to indicate passion, prejudice, or mistake. Additionally, we stated that passion or prejudice is shown when the verdict shocks the conscience. Id. at 643, 452 N.W.2d at 280. Thus, [i]f a verdict shocks the conscience, it necessarily follows that the verdict was the result of passion, prejudice, mistake, or some other means not apparent in the record. Id. In Crewdson, the evidence established that prior to his death, the deceased lived with his parents and did not contribute to his living expenses. He worked part time and did chores around the house, including taking care of the dogs, shoveling snow, mowing, and taking out the garbage. He was engaged to be married. Based upon this evidence, we found that the verdict of $510,000 for the parents' loss of their son's society, comfort, and companionship shocked the conscience and was clearly excessive, necessitating a new trial on the issue of damages. The second case, Williams v. Monarch Transp., 238 Neb. 354, 470 N.W.2d 751 (1991), involved the death of an unmarried 24-year-old woman in a motor vehicle accident. The deceased lived with her parents until a year before the accident and visited her parents almost daily, often staying for dinner and even overnight. She attended church each Sunday with her parents and shopped most weekends with her mother. Her mother referred to the deceased as her `best friend.' Id. at 357, 470 N.W.2d at 754. The jury returned a verdict which included $250,000 for the parents' loss of the society, comfort, and companionship of their daughter. We held that this verdict was not excessive in view of the uncontroverted evidence regarding the close and loving relationship which had existed between the deceased and her parents. In reaching this conclusion, we noted `[w]hen children are wrongfully killed, the parents' investment of money and in affection, guidance, security and love is destroyed. Society recognizes the destruction of that value, whether the child is a minor or an adult.' Id. at 359, 470 N.W.2d at 755, quoting Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 114 Ill.2d 107, 102 Ill.Dec. 360, 499 N.E.2d 1373 (1986). We further noted: The term `society' embraces a broad range of mutual benefits each family member receives from the others' continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974) (wrongful death action). Accord, Singh v. Air Illinois, Inc., 165 Ill.App.3d 923, 117 Ill.Dec. 501, 520 N.E.2d 852 (1988); 1 S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death § 3:49 (2d ed.1975). [T]here is a growing appreciation of the true value to the parent of the rewards which flow from the family relationship and are manifested in acts of material aid, comfort, and assistance .... Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 353, 113 N.W.2d 355, 359 (1961). Williams, 238 Neb. at 359, 470 N.W.2d at 755. In Williams, 238 Neb. at 359-60, 470 N.W.2d at 755, we also quoted the following observation of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960): What, then, is the pecuniary loss suffered because of the taking of the child's life? It is the pecuniary value of the life.... ...[A]n individual member of a family has a value to others as part of a functioning social and economic unit. This value is the value of mutual society and protection, in a word, companionship. The human companionship thus afforded has a definite, substantial, and ascertainable pecuniary value and its loss forms a part of the `value' of the life we seek to ascertain. Based upon these principles, we stated in Williams that in an action for wrongful death of a child, `money value' of parental loss is not limited to, always equated with, or necessarily dependent on deprivation of the child's monetary contribution toward parental well-being. 238 Neb. at 360, 470 N.W.2d at 756. We further stated that there is no exact fiscal formula for determination of damages recoverable for loss of society, comfort, and companionship, a loss which is not subject to some strict accounting method based on monetary contributions, past or prospective. Rather, the society, care and attention of a deceased [family member] are `services' having financial value which may be both measured and compensated. Id. at 361-62, 470 N.W.2d at 756. In the present case, there is uncontroverted evidence of a close and loving relationship between James Reiser and his parents. James Reiser was engaged in farming with his father, who described him as his right-hand man. Martin Reiser testified that his son was with him all the time and helped him with everything that needed to be done on the farm. He described him as an honest and loving kid with whom he had a real good relationship. Since graduating from high school several months before his death, James Reiser lived by himself in a farmhouse owned by his grandparents which was located near his parents' farm. The family often gathered at his home for Sunday dinner. James Reiser regularly went to church and engaged in recreational activities with his parents and younger siblings. His mother testified that she thought of the loss of her son every day. When asked to describe what it meant not to have his son with him, Martin Reiser stated: It was a shock and devastating. I think about it, you know, every time I go to the other place, you know, what we could be doing .... The parties stipulated that the surviving parents had life expectancies of 39.74 and 34.51 years. We acknowledge the factual parallel between this case and Garvin v. Coover, 202 Neb. 582, 276 N.W.2d 225 (1979), decided almost 20 years ago. Nevertheless, mindful of the characteristics and intrinsic value of the relationship between parent and child which we examined and applied in Williams v. Monarch Transp., 238 Neb. 354, 470 N.W.2d 751 (1991), and applying the same test which we used in reviewing the verdict in Crewdson v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 234 Neb. 631, 452 N.W.2d 270 (1990), we conclude that a verdict of $0 for the loss of the deceased's society, comfort, and companionship sustained by his parents as the result of his death bears no reasonable relationship to the evidence and shocks the conscience. The verdict on the first cause of action is therefore inadequate as a matter of law.