Opinion ID: 76818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The First Issue — The Weight of the LSD

Text: 29
30 Section 841(b)(1)(A)(v) provides for a mandatory minimum of 10 years' imprisonment for a violation of subsection (a) [making it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance] involving 10 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of [LSD]. The sentencing guidelines parallel the statutory language and requires the base offense level to be determine based upon the weight of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of LSD. Section 2D1.1(c). 31
32 In 1991, in Chapman, the Supreme Court held that the phrase mixture or substance containing.... LSD in Section 841(b)(1) refers to the weight of the carrier medium upon which the drug is mounted. Chapman, 111 S.Ct. at 1929. Two years later, the sentencing commission promulgated an amendment to the guidelines, reducing the penalties for trafficking in carrier-mounted LSD by calculating base offense levels, not at the weight of the LSD plus carrier medium as in Chapman, but by using a standard dosage formula of 0.4 mg. per dose of LSD (amendment 488). See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), n. (H). 33 In 1996, in Neal, the Supreme Court held that, when calculating penalties under the statute, amendment 488 does not overcome Chapman 's definition of mixture or substance, and principles of stare decisis require that it adhere to its earlier decision in Chapman. Neal, 116 S.Ct. at 766. In sum, the sentencing commission has no authority to amend the penalty statute, the guidelines' calculation is independent of the statutory calculation, and the statute controls if they conflict. Id. at 768. 8 The sentencing commission's dose-based method cannot be squared with Chapman. Id.
34 Grant's initial sentence was vacated and remanded by this court for re-sentencing by the district court in light of Camacho, at that time, a case of first impression. This court held in Camacho that, as to the sentencing guidelines, with regard to LSD contained in a liquid solution, the weight of the pure LSD alone should be used to ascertain the appropriate base offense level. See also Turner, 59 F.3d 481 (prior to Neal, in liquid LSD case, for purposes of the sentencing guidelines, only the weight of the pure LSD should be used in determining defendant's base offense level); United States v. Ingram, 67 F.3d 126, 128 (6th Cir.1995); United States v. Jordan, 842 F.Supp. 1031, 1033-34 (M.D.Tenn.1994)(in liquid LSD case, only the weight of the pure LSD should be used). As Camacho did not examine the drug weight issue in the context of the penalty statute, as is present in this appeal, this is an issue of first impression in this circuit.
35 Two circuits have held in liquid LSD cases that, although the weight of the pure LSD alone should be used in determining a defendant's base offense level under the sentencing guidelines, a district court could consider the weight of the liquid LSD when determining the applicability of the mandatory statutory minimum. See Morgan, 292 F.3d 460; Ingram, 67 F.3d 126. Both cases are distinguished from the case before us, as, Morgan was reviewed by the Fifth Circuit for plain error and Ingram was decided prior to Neal. Nevertheless we find them helpful in our discussion. See also Keresztury, 293 F.3d 750 (5th Cir.2002).
36 Morgan most closely aligns with the facts before us. Although the amount of pure LSD in Morgan was less than 10 grams, Morgan's guilty plea included his possessing, with intent to distribute, 10 grams or more of LSD, triggering the ten-year minimum sentence mandated by Section 841(b)(1)(A)(v). Morgan, 292 F.3d at 464-66. Under Section 5G1.1(b), the Morgan court used the statutory minimum because it was greater than the maximum sentence under the guidelines. Id. (holding that the market-oriented approach used in Chapman warrants including the weight of the liquid solution in determining a mandatory minimum sentence). 37 The same is true in Grant's case. Unlike the defendant in Camacho, Grant's indictment charged, and Granted pleaded guilty to, a count containing a specific drug quantity, i.e., 10 or more grams. Accordingly, Grant faced a statutory minimum sentence of ten years. Section 841(b)(1)(A)(v); Section 5G1.1(b). 38 Similarly to the defendant in Morgan, Grant was informed by the district court at his initial sentencing that the maximum statutory penalty it could impose would be a sentence of imprisonment of not less than ten years nor more than life. See note 1 supra. Grant acknowledged to the court that he understood. While Grant earnestly urges us to extend the weight of the pure LSD rationale of Camacho to statutory minimum cases, our reading of Chapman makes it clear that we may not do so. See Chapman, 111 S.Ct. at 1926. 39 We conclude that the district court should use the weight of the liquid LSD in applying Grant's statutory minimum sentence. Under Chapman, liquid LSD can be characterized as the carrier medium of choice at the wholesale level. Id. LSD on blotter paper, LSD in gel form or LSD on a sugar cube can be characterized as the carrier mediums of choice at the retail end of the distribution chain. Id. As the Supreme Court noted, LSD drug dealers are free to choose their own carrier medium, scrutinize its weight, and, by so doing, act to minimize their potential sentences. Id. at 1929 n. 6. 40