Opinion ID: 1932899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Country Club's Motion for a New Trial

Text: The first trial was concluded on January 16, 1998, when the jury returned a verdict for the Cowees. The jury's verdict found Country Club negligent, that its negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and injuries, that Mrs. Cowee's negligence was not a proximate cause of her injuries and that damages should be awarded to her. Country Club filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial, arguing that the jury incorrectly found it was negligent and that its negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. In its March 24, 1998 Order, the Superior Court partially granted Country Club's motion for a new trial, holding that a new trial must be held solely on the issue of her contributory negligence. [16] The Superior Court adequately set forth in its March 24, 1998, Order the factors and rationale it used in its denial of Country Club's motion for a new trial on the issue of its negligence and proximate cause. [17] This Court is bound by the jury verdict finding negligence and apportioning proximate cause against Country Club, if it is supported by the evidence. [18] Country Club argues that the evidence did not support the jury's finding of its negligence because Mrs. Cowee failed to stop prior to entering the intersection of Route 52, thereby being negligent as a matter of law. The jury, however, could have found from all the evidence that the exit of the country club's private driveway was difficult to ascertain and that the facts did not support a finding of negligence against Mrs. Cowee especially in viewing the testimony of other individuals who also failed to locate the exit's location prior to entering Route 52. The Superior Court therefore correctly denied Country Club's Motion for a New Trial on the issue of its negligence and proximate cause.