Opinion ID: 2499272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Representation of Barnes

Text: Barnes hired Respondent in March 2007 to represent her in a personal injury lawsuit against Jeremy Morrey (Morrey), a motorist who struck her vehicle. Barnes, who is in her mid-eighties, testified that, from the outset, she had great difficulty in eliciting information about her case from Respondent. She claims to have heard nothing from him for nearly a year after retaining him, despite calling his work and cell phones weekly. He finally responded to a letter she wrote in early 2008, in which she sought a release from their contract. According to Barnes, Respondent called her to say he had not received her earlier messages and had been addressing a problem with his mother, but he vowed to turn his attention to her case. Barnes agreed to let him continue the representation, and she then began to receive sporadic communication from him. However, she testified that he did not meet with her prior to her deposition and she was very distressed when he arrived at the deposition nearly an hour late without alerting her or his staff. Respondent offers a somewhat different version of these events. Contrary to Barnes's recollection, he testified that he took photographs and obtained documents at a visit to her home on May 22, 2007, and he then interviewed her and collected information at her home on November 30, 2007. When they next met in March 2008, he explained to her that, among other actions, he had obtained relevant records and had sent notices to subrogation carriers. His notes show that he again visited her home on May 19, 2008, at which time he documented how her injuries had impaired her regular activities. We find Respondent's testimony regarding his visits to Barnes's home to be credible. On November 5, 2008, Respondent filed a complaint on Barnes's behalf in Denver District Court. [20] A settlement conference was held on September 14, 2009. Barnes attended the conference with Respondent, but she testified that she just sat there and no one talked to her. She also testified that she signed the settlement documents without receiving an explanation of what they meant. Respondent, by contrast, averred that he reviewed the settlement documents with Barnes by telephone before his assistant brought them to her home for her signature on November 2, 2009. We credit Respondent's testimony that he spoke with Barnes about the settlement documents before she signed them, though we also believe Barnes's testimony that she did not receive a full and clearly comprehensible explanation regarding the documents. Under the terms of the settlement, Farmers Insurance agreed to pay Barnes $35,000.00 on Morrey's behalf. [21] That figure was subject to a $22,510.00 lien held by Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company (Hartford) and a $12,953.50 lien held by Kaiser Colorado Foundation Health Plan (Kaiser). On November 2, 2009, the day Barnes signed the settlement documents, Respondent deposited Barnes's settlement check for $35,000.00 into his COLTAF account and paid himself $11,666.66, his one-third share of the settlement proceeds based upon his contingency fee agreement with Barnes. From November 2009 to January 2010, Respondent endeavored to reduce the two outstanding liens. He first settled the Hartford lien on January 10, 2010, for $4,502.00. [22] Respondent claims he told Barnes at the time of the settlement and in January 2009 that he needed to resolve subrogation issues before giving her a check. But Barnes's testimony indicated that she had not understood her receipt of settlement funds would be delayed, and she became concerned in early 2010 when no settlement check had arrived. On February 2, 2010, Barnes complained to the People about Respondent, and the next day she mailed Respondent a letter requesting her settlement share. [23] On February 5, 2010, Respondent sent Barnes a disbursement statement and a letter, explaining that he could not disburse the final sum to her until he resolved the outstanding Kaiser lien, a process that had been delayed when an adjuster took an extended leave. [24] On February 11, 2010, Respondent settled the Kaiser lien for $1,050.00 [25] and delivered to Barnes a check for $15,175.96. [26] The People allege Respondent violated Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3) and 1.4(a)(4) by failing to keep Barnes reasonably informed about the status of the settlement funds and liens, as well as by neglecting to respond to her reasonable requests for information. While we do not believe Respondent wholly abdicated his responsibility to share information with Barnes, his communication with her did not meet the standards expected of Colorado lawyers. Indeed, during the initial portion of the representation, Barnes grew so frustrated with Respondent's inaccessibility that she wished to terminate his services. Although Respondent's communication efforts improved in 2008, he did not adequately prepare Barnes for her deposition or the settlement conference, nor did he sufficiently explain the relevant issues to her during the conference. Therefore, we find that Respondent did not abide by his duties under Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3) and 1.4(a)(4). The PDJ previously entered summary judgment for the People on their Colo. RPC 1.15(i)(3) claim, which they pled under the rubric of the Barnes matter. [27] As noted in the order granting summary judgment, Respondent admits he violated this rule by making four cash withdrawals totaling $1,700.00 from his COLTAF account between October 2009 and March 2010. [28] The People also allege Respondent violated Colo. RPC 1.15(a), which requires a lawyer to hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property, by making approximately $2,000.00 in payments to Sprint and LexisNexis out of his COLTAF account. Respondent concedes his office acted inappropriately by paying several office bills from his COLTAF account, although he does not agree that these actions amount to impermissible commingling of lawyer and client funds, as the People assert. As the PDJ noted in his summary judgment order, Respondent's payments to Sprint and LexisNexis from his trust account suggest that, for at least a brief period between the moment at which he earned legal fees and the time at which he paid the bills, he kept funds belonging to him in his trust account. But the requirement under Colo. RPC 1.15(a) that lawyers transfer earned fees out of their trust accounts [29] does not mean lawyers must execute the nearly impossible feat of instantaneously transferring such fees. Indeed, lawyers for the People have taken the position that attorneys must transfer earned fees out of their trust accounts within ninety days of completing the underlying work. [30] Thus, the fact that earned fees remained in Respondent's trust account for a certain period of time does not necessarily amount to a violation of Colo. RPC 1.15(a). Nor does it appear that the direct nature of Respondent's transfers to Sprint and LexisNexis gives rise to a violation of Colo. RPC 1.15(a). The Hearing Board is aware of no legal authority establishing that Colo. RPC 1.15(a) bars a lawyer from paying a personal or office bill from earned fees via direct transfer from a trust account. More relevant to this issue is Colo. RPC 1.15(d)(2), which requires a lawyer to maintain a business account into which all funds received for professional services shall be deposited. [31] Here, because Respondent directly paid Sprint and LexisNexis from his trust account, it appears he never deposited those funds into his business account, as required by Colo. RPC 1.15(d)(2). Given that the People improperly pled Claim VIII, we find no violation of Colo. RPC 1.15(a).