Opinion ID: 2544339
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defamation Based on Compelled Self-Publication

Text: Gonsalves contends that the circuit court erred in (1) granting Nissan's motion for judgment as a matter of law and (2) refusing his instruction, based on forced self-publication. [23] Gonsalves urges that this court adopt the theory of compelled self-publication. This court has established the four elements necessary to sustain a claim for defamation: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher [actual malice where the plaintiff is a public figure]; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. Gold v. Harrison, 88 Hawai`i 94, 100, 962 P.2d 353, 359 (1998) (quoting Dunlea v. Dappen, 83 Hawai`i 28, 36, 924 P.2d 196, 204 (1996)) (brackets in original) (quotations omitted). In particular, it is an elementary principle of tort law that a defamation claim requires publication to a third party. The interest which is here protected is of that reputation, and for tort liability to lie for either slander or libel the defamation must be communicated to some third party other than the person defamed. Runnels v. Okamoto, 56 Haw. 1, 3, 525 P.2d 1125, 1127 (1974). This court has not addressed the issue of whether self-publication of the reason for termination by a former employer to prospective employers satisfies this publication requirement. Generally, where a person communicates defamatory statements only to the person defamed, who then repeats the statements to others, the publication of the statements by the person defamed will not support a defamation action against the originator of the statements. David P. Chapus, Annotation, Publication of Allegedly Defamatory Matter by Plaintiff (Self-Publication) as Sufficient to Support Defamation Action, 62 A.L.R.4th 616, 622-25 (1988) (survey of cases nationwide). A minority of the states have created an exception to this general rule where the plaintiff is effectively compelled to publish the defamatory material to prospective employers. Sullivan v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Tenn.1999). The Court of Appeal of California explained the reason for recognizing an exception: The rationale for making the originator of a defamatory statement liable for its foreseeable republication is the strong causal link between the actions of the originator and the damage caused by the republication. This causal link is no less strong where the foreseeable republication is made by the person defamed operating under a strong compulsion to republish the defamatory statement and the circumstances which create the strong compulsion are known to the originator of the defamatory statement at the time he communicates it to the person defamed. McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal.App.3d 787, 797-98, 168 Cal.Rptr. 89 (1980), quoted in Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1344 (Colo.1988); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 887 (Minn. 1986). Thus, some courts have held that, in an action for defamation, the publication requirement may be satisfied where the plaintiff was compelled to publish a defamatory statement to a third person if it was foreseeable to the defendant that the plaintiff would be so compelled. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888; see also McKinney, 110 Cal.App.3d at 797-98, 168 Cal.Rptr. 89; Churchey, 759 P.2d at 1345; Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine, 694 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Mo. Ct.App.1985); First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex.App. 1980). Nevertheless, the majority of states addressing the issue do not recognize self-publication as constituting publication for defamation purposes, even when the publication is compelled in the employment setting. Sullivan, 995 S.W.2d at 573 (citing Gore v. Health-Tex, Inc., 567 So.2d 1307 (Ala.1990)); see also Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply Co., 210 Ill.App.3d 966, 155 Ill.Dec. 493, 569 N.E.2d 1104 (1991); Parsons v. Gulf & South American Steamship Co., 194 So.2d 456 (La. Ct.App.1967); Wieder v. Chemical Bank, 202 A.D.2d 168, 608 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1994); Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 401 Pa.Super. 467, 585 A.2d 1022 (1991); Lunz v. Neuman, 48 Wash.2d 26, 290 P.2d 697 (1955). In addition, many federal courts applying state law have recognized the majority rule. See, e.g., De Leon v. Saint Joseph Hosp., Inc., 871 F.2d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir.1989); Spratt v. Northern Automotive Corp., 958 F.Supp. 456, 465 (D.Ariz.1996); Sarratore v. Longview Van Corp., 666 F.Supp. 1257, 1263 (N.D.Ind. 1987); Hensley v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 798 F.Supp. 653, 657 (W.D.Okla.1992). In Sullivan, the Supreme Court of Tennessee cited several policy reasons for rejecting the doctrine of compelled self-publication. Sullivan, 995 S.W.2d at 573. First, allowing a defamation claim in such context would interfere with employers', employees', and the public's interest in open communication about job-related problems. Id. (quoting Layne, 155 Ill.Dec. 493, 569 N.E.2d at 1111 (citation omitted)). [T]he potential for defamation liability every time an employee is terminated would chill communications in the work place, preventing employers from disclosing reasons for their business decisions, and would negatively affect grievance procedures intended to benefit the discharged employee. Id. More specifically, [a] shutdown of communication would hurt both employees and employers. Employees falsely accused of misconduct may be wrongfully terminated because they would never have a chance to rebut the false accusations. Employees who may be able to improve substandard job performances may fail to do so because needed feedback is withheld.... It seems that both employees and employers stand to lose if employers adopt a policy of silence.... Unfortunately, employees will bear the costs of such a policy without a corresponding benefit. Id. at 574 (quoting Louis B. Eble, Self-Publication Defamation: Employee Right or Employee Burden?, 47 Baylor L.Rev. 745, 779-80 (1995)). Indeed, accepting the compelled self-publication doctrine may actually harm employees who have been fired for discriminatory reasons: Normally, a factfinder would be justifiably suspicious if an employer fired an employee in a protected group and refused to explain the reason for the termination at the time of discharge. In light of the self-publication doctrine, however, an employer's silence could justifiably be viewed as savvy rather than suspicious. Id. (quotation, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, plaintiffs would have a perverse incentive to not mitigate damages. See id. (citing Layne, 155 Ill.Dec. 493, 569 N.E.2d at 1111). Because (1) the statute of limitations in a defamation case starts to run from the date of publication, and (2) a new cause of action arises with each publication, a plaintiff would not only have the ability to control the statute of limitations but also the number of causes of action which arise. Id. In other words, a plaintiff need only apply for a job and give the former employer's reason for termination to have a cause of action. Thus, a defendant employer could be subject to liability throughout the plaintiff's lifetime. Third, the theory of compelled self-publication conflicts with the employee-at-will doctrine. See id. Under the at-will employment doctrine, an employer may terminate an at-will employee at any time for good cause, bad cause, or no cause. Id. (citation omitted). To adopt the doctrine of compelled self-publication and to impose a duty on employers to conduct a thorough investigation leading to accurate conclusions would significantly compromise these well-settled principles encompassed by the at-will employment doctrine[.] Id. (citations omitted); cf. discussion supra IV.C. Finally, the court recognized that the Tennessee legislature had already spoken on the issue of the employer's liability incurred from communicating information about the employee. Id. at 574, 155 Ill.Dec. 493, 569 N.E.2d 1104. The court stated: Under [Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1998) ], mere negligence is not enough to rebut the presumption in favor of the employer's good faith. In contrast, defamation may be proven by establishing that a party published a false and defaming statement with reckless disregard for the truth or with negligence in failing to ascertain the truth. Thus, under the statute, an employer could not be held liable for disclosing allegedly defamatory information about which it was only negligent in ascertaining the truth. It follows, therefore, that an employer should not be held liable for disclosure of this same information when it is self-published by a former employee. Id. (citation omitted). We observe that the Hawai`i legislature has likewise prescribed that an employer that provides to a prospective employer information or opinion about a current or former employee's job performance is presumed to be acting in good faith and shall have a qualified immunity from civil liability for disclosing the information and for the consequences of the disclosure. HRS § 663-1.95(a) (Supp.1998). We note that another argument against recognizing the compelled self-publication theory in this context is that [t]ruth is an absolute defense to defamation. See Hensley, 798 F.Supp. at 657 (citations omitted). Thus, an employer's statement that the employee was terminated for a perceived reason would be truthful, regardless of whether the reason itself was accurate. See id. But see Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 889 (Requiring that truth as a defense go to the underlying implication of the statement, at least where the statement involves more than a simple allegation, appears to be the better view.) (citation omitted). We adopt the majority rule of rejecting the theory of compelled self-publication. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in (1) dismissing Gonsalves's claim for defamation and (2) refusing Gonsalves's instruction based on compelled self-publication.