Opinion ID: 1407343
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Confession by a Juvenile.

Text: Appellant contends that his confession was elicited while he was a minor and during his detention at juvenile hall and, as such, is inadmissible, as a matter of law, in adult criminal proceedings. [2] We disagree. Appellant relies exclusively on Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir.1961). In Harling, the court of appeals for the District of Columbia circuit held that the admission in a criminal proceeding of a confession by a juvenile prior to his adult certification would destroy the juvenile court's parens patriae relation to the child. 295 F.2d at 163-64. This continues to be the rule in that circuit. But Harling was based on the court's supervisory powers over juvenile proceedings in the District of Columbia. In addition, Harling was decided prior to In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), which defined the rights of juveniles in commitment proceedings. In confirming a juvenile's fifth amendment rights, the Supreme Court said that [i]t would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to `criminal' involvement. Id. at 49, 87 S.Ct. at 1455. The Court thus granted juveniles the protections of adult status. Subsequent to Gault, and in refusing to follow the lead of Harling, many state courts have decided that juvenile confessions are admissible in criminal proceedings provided they were obtained in compliance with constitutional standards. See, e.g., State v. Councilman, 105 Ariz. 145, 460 P.2d 640 (1969) (statement inadmissible where neither youth nor mother advised of youth's right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination or possibility of adult trial); People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945, 88 S.Ct. 2303, 20 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1968) (age and presence of parent are only factors in determining voluntariness); People v. Hester, 39 Ill.2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968) (test is voluntariness under the circumstances); State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1970) (test is voluntariness and juvenile must be told of possible criminal responsibility); State v. Prater, 77 Wash.2d 526, 463 P.2d 640 (1970) (test is voluntariness). See also State v. Gullings, 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966). No state decisions following Harling have been cited to us and we have found none. The parens patriae relation of the juvenile court and authorities to the child cannot be dismissed lightly. Clearly, neither police officers nor juvenile authorities should be allowed to mislead a youth in order to obtain a confession. See State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671, 676-77 (1973). A juvenile should be advised of his rights and informed of the possibility of an adult trial. But where the nature of the charges and the identity of the interrogator reflect the existence of an unquestionably adversary police atmosphere and the suspect is reasonably mature and sophisticated with regard to the nature of the process, resulting statements will be admissible in a criminal trial provided that the record otherwise supports a finding of voluntariness. In this case, appellant testified that the police told him he would be treated as a juvenile. An officer testified that he informed appellant that he could be tried as an adult. The judge and jury apparently disbelieved appellant. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to support the admission of the statements. The charges involved here were serious, appellant was interrogated by a police officer and appellant had had previous experience with the process and with signed waivers. The court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury and found the confession to have been voluntary. The issue of voluntariness was then, pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), presented to the jury which was instructed to determine the same issue. The written confession also demonstrates that appellant was advised of his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney, and told that the statements could be used against him in court. Additionally, incidental to appellant's request, both of his parents spoke to him before the statements were given. Appellant was then re-advised of his rights before he made the statements. The state has the burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 626, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Scott v. State, 92 Nev. 552, 554, 554 P.2d 735, 736-37 (1976). Voluntariness must be shown under the totality of the circumstances. Franklin v. State, 96 Nev. 417, 421, 610 P.2d 732, 734-35 (1980). In the instant case, respondent easily met its burden. The decision of the trial judge and the jury will not be disturbed where, as here, they are supported by substantial evidence. See Scott v. State, 92 Nev. 552, 554, 554 P.2d 735, 737 (1976).