Opinion ID: 1316209
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Relationship between torture and death

Text: Defendant next challenges the torture-murder special-circumstance finding on the ground the prosecution failed to establish a causal relationship between the intentional infliction of extreme pain and the murder. He insists that, to the extent the torturous acts merely facilitated the robbery and did not lead directly to Muck's death, the murder could not properly have been found to involve torture within the meaning of section 190.2(a)(18). Defendant's interpretation of the torture-murder special-circumstance statute is mistaken. As we recently explained, section 190.2(a)(18) applies where `[t]he murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.' (Italics added.) Unlike section 189, which defines the crime of first degree torture murder as murder `perpetrated by means of ... torture,' thereby positing the requirement of a causal relationship between the torturous act and death [citations], section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), does not by its terms require such a causal relationship. [Citations.] Because other types of murder, such as premeditated murder, also are defined as murder of the first degree, we believe the Legislature, by employing the broader language of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), intended to encompass (within the torture-murder special circumstance) acts of torture occurring within a larger time frame, including those that would not have caused death. [Citation.] We conclude the prosecution was not required to prove that the acts of torture inflicted upon, [the victim] were the cause of his death. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 141-142, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887, fn. omitted.) Defendant next argues that the torture-murder relationship contemplated by section 190.2(a)(18) does not adequately define or limit the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, and that the statute is unconstitutional as a result. (See Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 878, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235; Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 433, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398.) He seems to imply that, unless construed to require a causal relationship of the sort required for first degree torture murder under section 189, the phrase, involved the infliction of torture, in section 190.2(a)(18) is either too broad or too vague to meaningfully distinguish between those first degree murderers who deserve death and those who do not. We have rejected similar claims before. Section 190.2(a)(18) requires some proximity in time [and] space between the murder and torture. ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1161, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384 [construing and approving CALJIC No. 8.81.18 insofar as it summarizes the torture-murder special circumstance statute].) The statute obviously does not apply where no connection between the two events appears. ( Barnett, at p. 1161, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) Also, the torture-murder special circumstance renders death eligible only those first degree murderers who intentionally performed acts which were calculated to cause extreme physical pain to the victim and which were inflicted prior to death. ( People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 271, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861.) As so construed, section 190.2(a)(18) satisfies the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution by providing a sufficiently narrow and rational basis on which to base eligibility for the death penalty. ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1162, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384; see People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 270, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861.) Finally, whatever the outer limits of the statute in this regard ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1162, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384), the instant record discloses a close connection between the torture and the murder. Muck was last seen alive at 9:45 p.m. and the crime was first discovered at 10:45 p.m. During this one-hour period, defendant entered the liquor store, repeatedly stabbed Muck, and removed the safe with the help of a third person. The knife attack itself lasted about 15 to 30 minutes, and was confined to the storage room where the safe was located. Only a few wounds were individually life-threatening; most or all of these occurred towards the end of the violent assault. For reasons we have explained, many less dangerous stab wounds were evidently sustained in the first part of the attack while Muck was alive and being ordered by defendant to open the safe. Certain nonlethal knife wounds, such as those clustered on Muck's flank, seem plainly calculated to cause extreme pain and to induce his cooperation. Whether these or any other acts deemed torturous by the jury actually caused Muck's death, the murder involved the infliction of torture within the meaning of section 190.2(a)(18).