Opinion ID: 702612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Morning's Refusal to Consent.

Text: 20 Morning asserts that because she told the agents that she preferred to have a warrant obtained, the search without a warrant violated her Fourth Amendment rights. 21 The evidence clearly showed that Leon-Yanez had an at least equal interest in the use and possession of the house. Although Morning had signed the rental application, she did so on behalf of herself and her spouse, Leon-Yanez. Moreover, it was undisputed that he paid the bills, resided there full time, and had as much control over the house as she did. That is underscored by the fact that after she expressed a preference for a warrant, she went and talked to Leon-Yanez, sent him to the front door, and made no protest after he gave his consent to the search. Once he went to the front door, Morning remained in the house while he stood in the doorway and spoke with the agents. The house itself was very small--under 1,000 square feet--so she could not have been very far away. That is some indication that she recognized Leon-Yanez as an equal occupant of the property, or, perhaps, as a person who had an even superior interest that could trump hers. In fact, the district court found that he actually did have superior authority over the residence. 22 It is against that backdrop of the parties' relationship to the house and each other that we must answer Morning's assertion that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated. We start, as we must, with United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). In that case, Matlock jointly occupied part of a home with Gayle Graff. Matlock was arrested in the front yard and was not asked for permission to conduct a search. Instead, the police asked Graff and she consented. The Court said: 23 It has been assumed by the parties and the courts below that the voluntary consent of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises jointly occupied is valid against the co-occupant, permitting evidence discovered in the search to be used against him at a criminal trial. 24 Id. at 169, 94 S.Ct. at 992. The Court agreed with that proposition and went on to say that: 25 [W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that the consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. 26 Id. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. As the Court then explained: 27 Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements, but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. 28 Id. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7 (citations omitted). 29 That would appear to answer the issue presented by Morning, but in Matlock the defendant was not actually asked for his consent. Also, although he was on the scene he was arrested in the yard while Graff was approached at the door, and the Court did comment that it had in recent cases allowed third-party consent as against the absent, nonconsenting person.... Id. at 170, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Thus, while Matlock rendered the law in this area translucent, it did not quite render it transparent. Others have striven to supply the necessary clarity. 30 In United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684 (6th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932, 98 S.Ct. 1507, 55 L.Ed.2d 529 (1978), the defendant refused to give his consent to a search of an apartment, but his female companion gave consent and the search went forward. The court declared that the fact of the defendant's presence made no difference because the defendant in Matlock was present in the front yard. Id. at 687. It went on to discount the fact that the defendant had refused to consent to the search. It said: 31 The rationale behind [the Matlock ] rule is that a joint occupant assumes the risk of his co-occupant exposing their common private areas to such a search. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy to be protected under such circumstances. We cannot see how the additional fact of Appellant's initial refusal to consent in any way lessened the risk assumed that his co-occupant would consent. This additional fact does not increase a reasonable expectation of privacy. 32 Id. at 688. Sumlin itself was not entirely clear because the defendant had not urged the joint occupier to refuse consent and had even suggested that she need not do so. Id. at 686. However, the court put that uncertainty to rest in a later case where those ambiguities did not exist. See J.L. Foti Constr. Co. v. Donovan, 786 F.2d 714, 716-17 (6th Cir.1986). 33 In United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C.Cir.1979) (per curiam), the court reached the same conclusion. Even though a joint occupant of an apartment was present and objected to the search, the police obtained consent from the other joint occupant. That was enough. See also Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1548 (11th Cir.1995) (third party with common authority can consent, even when a present subject of the search objects); United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.1992) (Valid consent may be given by a defendant or a third party with 'common authority' over the premises. Third party consent remains valid even when the defendant specifically objects to it.) (citation omitted); United States v. Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381, 383 & n. 1 (5th Cir.Unit A 1981) (per curiam) (a wife could give effective consent to automobile search where she had at least joint control over it even where the defendant had previously refused consent, but her ownership interest may have been greater than the defendant's); United States v. Morales, 861 F.2d 396, 400 n. 9 (3d Cir.1988) (Baldwin noted with approval). 34 We have wiped away some of the fuliginous overlay that Matlock left. Thus, while we have not provided the answer to Morning's particular questions, we have removed some of the obscurity. In United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir.1984), a landlord, who had some right of access to a tenant's premises, impliedly gave consent to a search, but the tenant, who was present, objected. We held that the landlord's unequal right of access coupled with the tenant's objection rendered suppression of the fruits of the search necessary. Id. at 1232-34. 35 In United States v. Warner, 843 F.2d 401 (9th Cir.1988), we took up a similar case. There, too, a landlord had consented to a search of the tenant's property. Id. at 402. We noted the three factors that we had considered in Impink, that is (1) whether the third party has an equal right of access to the premises searched; (2) whether the suspect is present at the time the third party consent is obtained; and (3) if so, whether the suspect actively opposes the search. Id. at 403. 4 The latter two factors were not involved, and we determined that the landlord did not have an equal right of access. Id. Suppression followed. 36 Of course, neither of those cases is like the one at hand because in both of them the consenting landlord had an interest which was inferior to that of the defendant. Cf. United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1533-34 (9th Cir.) (where landlord's right of access was as strong as that of tenant, landlord could give consent to search), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866, 109 S.Ct. 171, 102 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Here the interest of Leon-Yanez was at least as strong as that of Morning, so the major fact upon which Impink and Warner turned was absent. 37 Similarly unhelpful is our pre-Matlock decision in Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir.1965). There we held that a person who was a welcome visitor at an apartment could not effectively give his consent to a search when the actual resident was there and protested. Id. at 20-21. That case has no relevance here because there can be no doubt that Leon-Yanez was much more than a welcome visitor. 38 More on point are cases in which the defendant was present when consent was obtained from a person who did have equal control over the property to be searched. In those cases, we have found the consent to be valid despite the defendant's presence. Thus, in United States v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867, 97 S.Ct. 177, 50 L.Ed.2d 147 (1976), the defendant asserted that because she was not absent a third party's consent to search was not proper. We said that one need only look at Matlock to refute that contention because there the defendant was present but [t]he Court looked not to the defendant's presence or absence but to whether or not the third party 'possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.'  Id. at 1379 (citation omitted). Similarly, in United States v. Childs, 944 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir.1991), we held that the valid consent of a person with common authority will justify the search of a residence even if the co-occupant is physically present. See also Kelley, 953 F.2d at 566 (defendant was on the scene when co-occupant gave consent to a search). 39 However, in none of those cases did we actually decide whether a consent to search given by a co-occupant is valid as against the defendant when both are on the scene but the defendant has refused to consent. We now agree with the courts that have answered that question in the affirmative. 5 We agree that the primary factor is the defendant's reasonable expectations under the circumstances. Those expectations must include the risk that a co-occupant will allow someone to enter, even if the defendant does not approve of the entry. The risks to property or privacy interests are not substantially lessened because of the defendant's own lack of consent. Although there is always the fond hope that a co-occupant will follow one's known wishes, the risks remain. A defendant cannot expect sole exclusionary authority unless he lives alone, or at least has a special and private space within the joint residence. As the Supreme Court said in Matlock, where people have joint access and control over property it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7. So it was here. 6 Either Morning or Leon-Yanez could have consented to entry into and search of their common area. Leon-Yanez did. Morning is bound. 40