Opinion ID: 2982841
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The date of Banks’s termination

Text: Banks alleges she was terminated on July 10, after being summoned to Human Resources for a meeting. Banks, union steward Maria Noel, Allen, and O’Nan were present. The participants have competing recollections of what transpired. Noel doesn’t recall Allen using the phrase “termination” during the meeting, but nonetheless Noel believed that Banks had been terminated at the meeting because Allen told Banks to turn over her ID badge and to leave that day, and Noel had never seen anyone who had merely been suspended have her badge taken away. Banks stated that she was fired on July 10, and that Allen had told her that she was both “suspended and terminated” during the meeting. Allen testified that during the meeting she told Banks she was suspended pending an investigation, and mentioned that it was “probable” that termination would result, but did not tell Banks that she was terminated. Though the participants in the July 10 meeting left with different understandings of Banks’s employment status, any ambiguity was resolved the following day when Reynolds sent Banks the first follow-up letter. Reynolds wrote that it appeared Banks had exhausted her FMLA, vacation, doctor’s visit, and personal time off that could cover her late arrival earlier in the month, and that she had reached the suspension level for absences as well, so it appeared that -16- No. 14-5486 Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp. recent lateness and absence had put her at the termination level. He also noted that Banks had not called in before her July 9 absence. Nonetheless, he further explained that: [B]efore a final decision is made we are requesting that we send you to a company doctor for a second opinion of your FMLA condition. It is possible based on the results of the evaluation we may have to reconsider a possible termination or it may confirm that the termination is in fact the correct decision. R. 49-14, PID 835. The letter indicated that the appointment was scheduled for 10:30 a.m. on July 16, 2012, provided the name and address of the doctor, and advised Banks that “[i]t is extremely important that you keep this appointment.” Reynolds concluded the letter by explaining that “[u]ntil a final decision by the company can be made, you will be placed on paid suspension.” In her deposition, Allen stated that the point of the doctor visit would be to determine what in the building was triggering Banks’s migraines and whether or not the company could take action to accommodate Banks’s perceived disability. Allen testified that if the doctor at the IME had agreed with all of Dr. Burns’s recommendations, Banks likely would have been terminated because Dr. Burns’s recommendations included things that were “not really even within our control” and that were “quite extensive.” Banks did not attend the scheduled July 16 appointment. Reynolds sent Banks a followup letter on July 23, 2012, indicating that “[a]s you failed to keep the previously scheduled [July 16] appointment . . . a new appointment has been made for August 2, 2012 at 1:00 PM.” R. 4915, PageID 837. Reynolds gave Banks the name and address of the doctor, stated that “[i]f you do not intend to keep this appointment please contact me . . . and a final decision will be made by the Company based on the information at hand . . . You will continue to be on paid suspension for now.” On July 31, 2012, Reynolds sent Banks a third letter, stating that: -17- No. 14-5486 Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp. You were not terminated. You were suspended with pay for excessive absenteeism, failure to call in, and failure to provide medical documentation. The only reason you have not been terminated is your claim that some of your attendance issues are related to a disability. The one doctor’s note you provided to us does not specify a course of treatment or identify any reasonable restrictions on your job duties. You have not provided other medical documentation to cover your specific absences. We have referred you to an independent medical doctor in an effort to determine the extent of the restrictions on your return to work. You missed the first appointment. If you miss the second appointment, your absences will not be excused and your employment will be terminated. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me. R. 49-16, PageID 839. Banks did not appear for the appointment. On August 7, 2013, Reynolds sent Banks a final letter, stating that: As was previously communicated to you, you have exceeded the maximum number of absences allowed. You have claimed that your poor attendance was the result of a medical condition. As you have exhausted your FMLA leave, those absences would only have been covered if you could produced [sic] medical documentation confirming a covered disability and confirming that your specific attendance violations were related to that disability. We provided you with two opportunities to see a doctor, at the company’s expense, to get that medical documentation and excuse your absences. You failed to show up for either appointment. Accordingly, your employment is terminated effective Friday August 3, 2012. R. 49-17, PageID 841. At her deposition, Banks acknowledged receiving the July 11 and July 23 letters but said that there was nothing the company could have said in the letters to make her reconsider her determination that she had been fired, so she did not attend either of the doctor appointments. Banks argues that she was justified in concluding she had been terminated on July 10 because she was not paid for the period between July 10 and August 3 until September, instead of on the regular employee payment schedule. But given Reynolds’s repeated written statements -18- No. 14-5486 Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp. that Banks was suspended and had not been terminated, no reasonable juror could find that Banks could infer she had been terminated on July 10. Banks also argues that Allen’s emails reveal that she was having difficulty scheduling IMEs for the days Bosch told Banks that she had appointments, and there is some question about whether an IME was scheduled by July 16. Even if there were a problem with scheduling the IME for July 16, it was unknown to Banks and there is no indication that Allen failed to schedule the August 2 IME. Banks’s testimony, moreover, was clear that she had no intention of going to either of the appointments because she insisted that she had already been terminated. In light of the clear and repeated statements in the letters that Banks had been put on paid suspension rather than being terminated, and that the medical appointments were an attempt to determine the extent of the restrictions on her return to work, we find that there can be no dispute that Banks was actually terminated on August 3, rather than July 10. b. The IME as part of the interactive process under the KCRA The ADA provides that an employer cannot require a medical examination to determine whether an employee is an individual with a disability or the nature or severity of the disability, unless the examination “is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Under the ADA, an employer’s request for a medical examination is job-related and consistent with business necessity in cases where, as here, the employee has requested an accommodation. Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 656 (6th Cir. 2000); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.14(c) (noting that 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) permits employers “to make inquiries or require medical examinations necessary to the reasonable accommodation process”). -19- No. 14-5486 Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp. Though Banks concedes that the ADA permits employers to require IMEs of employees in certain circumstances, she argues that because the KCRA has no language analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A), that provision of the ADA has no bearing on interpretation of the KCRA. This argument, however, ignores the provision in the KCRA that “[t]he general purposes of this chapter [the KCRA] are . . . [t]o provide for execution within the state of the policies embodies in . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990” and several other enumerated federal civil rights statutes. KRS § 344.020(a). Given this express statement of purpose in the KCRA itself, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s statement that the KCRA is to be interpreted in accord with the ADA, Schave, 127 S.W.3d at 592, and the absence of a signal from the Kentucky legislature or courts that the ADA’s provisions about medical examinations of an employee should not apply, we can only conclude that the KCRA tracks the ADA with respect to those provisions as well. 3. Conclusions regarding Banks’s failure to accommodate claim The record leaves no doubt that Banks was terminated on August 3 as opposed to July 10. Though scheduling an IME to confirm an employee’s disability is permitted under Kentucky law when an employee has requested an accommodation, Banks refused to attend both IMEs Bosch scheduled for her before she was terminated. Nothing in the record indicates that Banks took any other action—such as objecting to the request for an IME or communicating an alternative— to continue the interactive process. We conclude that Banks’s refusal to engage in the interactive process caused its breakdown and her claim for failure to accommodate fails. C. KCRA retaliation claim Banks alleges that Bosch retaliated against her because of her engagement in protected activity under the KCRA. When, as here, a plaintiff alleges a retaliation claim based on indirect -20- No. 14-5486 Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp. evidence, we employ the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis. Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428, 435 (6th Cir. 2009). To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under the KCRA on an indirect evidence theory, Banks must show that: “(1) [s]he . . . engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer knew of the exercise of the protected right, (3) an adverse employment action was subsequently taken against [her], and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Id. Here, the district court found that Banks had made out her prima facie case: she filed an EEOC complaint, Bosch knew it, Bosch suspended and then fired her, and the complaint and suspension were close enough in time to show causation. Upon establishment of the prima facie case, the burden shifts to Bosch “to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Id. Bosch argues that Banks’s termination was not retaliatory because she was given her full allotment of FMLA leave and several additional weeks, was put on paid suspension and given two opportunities to attend an IME at the company’s expense, and was terminated for attendance and tardies after she herself backed out of the interactive process by failing to attend an IME while on paid leave. Because Bosch met its burden of producing a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Banks’s employment, Banks has the burden of demonstrating that this legitimate reason is pretextual. Id. A plaintiff can show that an employer’s proffered reasons for discharge are merely pretextual by demonstrating that they (1) “had no basis in fact,” (2) “did not actually motivate the employer’s action,” or (3) were “insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.” Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009). In addressing the reasons for her termination, Banks noted two of Reynolds’s assertions in his letters to Banks—that she failed to call in her absence on July 9 and that she was at -21- No. 14-5486 Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp. termination level for absences—and asserts that these allegedly incorrect statements, along with Bosch’s pattern of incorrectly calculating her leave, show that Bosch’s proffered reasons for firing her were pretextual. The district court noted that there were disputes of fact concerning whether Banks had called in to report her absence on July 9 and whether she was at the termination level or merely suspension level for absences, but held that here, even if Bosch’s belief was wrong on either point, Bosch was saved by the “honest belief rule.” The rule “provides that as long as the employer honestly believed in the proffered reason given for its employment action, the employee cannot establish pretext even if the employer’s reason is ultimately found to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.” Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998). As this court has noted, “the ‘honest belief’ defense fits neatly into the retaliation context, where the legal standard inherently demands an employer’s culpable mental state i.e., that the employee’s exercise of FMLA [or ADA] rights caused the employer to discriminate against the employee.” Tillman v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 545 F. App’x 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2013). However, the honest belief rule is not applicable to claims where the employer’s frame of mind is not at issue, FMLA interference claims for example. Id. There, an employer who honestly, but mistakenly believes that the employee used up all his FMLA leave can still be said to have interfered with the exercise of the employee’s rights under the FMLA. Id. at 352. Though both types of claims are at issue in this case, the district court properly limited its application of the honest belief rule to its analysis of Banks’s retaliation claims. In this circuit, a party may only invoke the honest belief rule when the employer’s belief is “reasonably based on particularized facts rather than on ignorance and mythology.” Smith, -22- No. 14-5486 Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp. 155 F.3d at 806 Even if the employer is able to point to particularized facts, “the protection of the rule is not automatic.” Id. at 807. The employee may rebut the rule by showing “proof to the contrary” nonetheless, “the key inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse employment action.” Id. Applying these principles, we hold that the district court did not err in its conclusion that Bosch relied on reasonably particularized facts when deciding to terminate Banks’s employment on August 3, 2012. Even assuming that Banks reported her absence on July 9 and that she was at the suspension point rather than the termination point for absences, Banks has not cited anything in the record that refutes Bosch’s assertion that she had reached the termination level for tardies absent an accommodation that would cover that time, and the record leaves no doubt that she was the cause of the breakdown in the interactive process that could have resulted in such an accommodation. These are “particularized facts” that support Bosch’s decision to fire Banks. Banks’s more general argument that Bosch’s miscalculations about her leave show its retaliatory intent must also fail. She has not presented any evidence refuting Bosch’s assertions that (1) its miscalculations were ultimately in her favor, or (2) had her leave not been coded as FMLA leave, it would necessarily have been coded as unexcused leave and led to her termination at an earlier date. Moreover, when Banks grieved the inaccuracy of her FMLA leave calculation, Bosch Production Manager Steve Hargis attempted to meet with her to reach a correct calculation. Banks instead withdrew the grievance and refused to discuss the matter further with Hargis, telling him that “us all meeting to compare my FMLA approvals was just a waste of time and stressful to me.” R. 49-2, PageID 722, 724-28. -23- No. 14-5486 Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp. Because Banks has not offered sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Bosch’s reasons for terminating Banks were pretextual, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Bosch on the KCRA retaliation claim. D. FMLA retaliation claim On appeal, Banks challenges the grant of summary judgment to Bosch with regard to her FMLA retaliation claim as well as her KCRA retaliation claim. As with disability-related claims under the KCRA, FMLA-related retaliation claims based on indirect evidence follow the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. Edgar, 443 F.3d at 508. Though Banks made her prima facie case for FMLA retaliation, summary judgment was properly granted to Bosch because, as with the KCRA retaliation claim discussed above, she has not shown that Bosch’s proffered reasons for her termination were pretextual.