Opinion ID: 1587456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of 194.171 to Challenges by the State

Text: We now consider the effect of sovereign immunity on the application of section 194.171 to actions filed by the State. The crucial inquiry is whether the language of section 194.171 clearly and unambiguously demonstrates legislative intent to apply this section to challenges by the State on State-owned property. Although legislative intent is the polestar of statutory interpretation, such intent is derived primarily from the language of the statute. See State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002). We conclude that no such clear and direct expression is manifested from the language of this statute. Dickinson, 325 So.2d at 4. Section 194.171(2) provides that [n]o action shall be brought beyond the sixty-day period. It does not identify specific entities or persons to whom this requirement applies. Thus, we look to the other provisions of section 194.171 to determine whether the State is subject to the requirements of subsection (2). See Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So.2d 561, 564 (Fla.2000) ([R]elated statutory provisions should be read together to determine legislative intent. . . .); Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992) (It is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole.). Section 194.171(6), which provides that all the requirements of subsections (2), (3), and (5) are jurisdictional, refers to the taxpayer. Both subsections (3) and (5) also refer to actions the taxpayer must take to contest an assessment. Subsection (3) requires the taxpayer to pay to the tax collector the amount that he or she admits in good faith to be owing for the tax year in which the assessment is levied, while subsection (5) provides that the taxpayer cannot maintain a legal challenge to an assessment unless her or she pays taxes admittedly owed for subsequent tax years. We conclude that the Legislature intended subsection (2), like subsections (3), (5), and (6), to apply to taxpayers. Cf. Ward, 894 So.2d at 812 (stating that the sixty-day time requirement in section 194.171 applies broadly to taxpayers' actions challenging the assessment of taxes against their property regardless of the legal basis of the challenge) (emphasis supplied). Taxpayer is not defined in section 194.171 or elsewhere in chapter 194. We therefore turn to a standard dictionary and to a related statute to derive the common, ordinary meaning of the term. See Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 863 So.2d 201, 205 (Fla.2003) (stating that where the Legislature has not defined a term, its plain and ordinary meaning can be taken from a dictionary); State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997) (In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term, and where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.). Chapter 192 supplies a definition of taxpayer for purposes of ad valorem taxation that could encompass the State as a property owner, because taxpayer status is tied to assessments and all property, including State property, must be assessed. See § 192.001(13), Fla. Stat. (2006) (`Taxpayer' means the person or other legal entity in whose name property is assessed. . . .); § 193.085(1), (3)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2006) (requiring all Florida property, including property owned by the State, to be assessed). The dictionary defines taxpayer as one that pays or is liable for a tax. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1209 (10th ed.1999). Although useful, neither of these definitions is controlling, because in construing statutory language we must give consideration not only to the literal and usual meaning of the words, but also to their meaning and effect on the objectives and purpose of the statute's enactment. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n v. Florida Div. of Administrative Hearings, 686 So.2d 1349, 1354 (Fla.1997). Thus, the term taxpayer as used in section 194.171 should be construed in a manner consistent with the statute's purpose, which is to ensure a reliable and predictable method for counties to collect revenue while also providing for taxpayer challenges to tax assessments. See Ward, 894 So.2d at 815. Subsection (2) of the statute serves this purpose by creating a relatively brief window in which legal challenges may be brought. Subsections (3) and (5) serve the statute's purpose by ensuring that the disputed assessment does not disrupt the flow of taxes that are not in dispute. See id. Under these provisions, a taxpayer is not merely the entity in whose name the property is assessed, but one whom the county has the power to tax subject to disputes about individual assessments. In short, a taxpayer under section 194.171 is a taxable entity. This definition excludes the State and its political subdivisions, which are immune from taxation since there is no power to tax them. Dickinson, 325 So.2d at 3. Accordingly, where the State files suit challenging ad valorem taxation on grounds of sovereign immunity, the State's assertion that it is not a taxable entity takes it outside the category of taxpayer targeted by section 194.171. As suggested by the First District, this is an important distinction from Markham and Ward, in which we focused on the nature of the challenges made by the private property holders rather than on their status as taxpayers. See Cason, 909 So.2d at 381 (expressing doubt that this Court intended the rationale of Markham and Ward to be extended beyond their facts). The necessity of a clear expression of legislative intent to authorize taxation of the State reinforces our construction of section 194.171. We presume that the Legislature was aware of precedent recognizing both the State's immunity and the necessity of a clear and direct expression of intent to authorize taxation of the State when it enacted the jurisdictional nonclaim provision, section 194.171, in 1983. See Cason, 909 So.2d at 382; see generally Holmes County Sch. Bd. v. Duffell, 651 So.2d 1176, 1179 (Fla.1995) (The legislature is presumed to know existing law when it enacts a statute.). Thus, the absence of specific language imposing the procedural requirements on the State, rather than on taxpayers generally, is significant. Language in chapter 196, Florida Statutes (2006), which governs tax exemptions, further demonstrates an absence of legislative intent to subject lawsuits brought by the State to challenge tax assessments on grounds of immunity to the jurisdictional statute of nonclaim. Although it speaks in terms of exemption rather than immunity, section 196.199(1)(b) provides that [a]ll property of this state which is used for governmental purposes shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation except as otherwise provided by law. As noted by the First District, this provision demonstrates that the Legislature has heeded the dictate that intent to authorize taxes on lands of the State must be expressed in clear and unmistakable terms. Cason, 909 So.2d at 382. The Legislature has also expressly exempted from ad valorem taxation the leasehold interest in State-owned property when the property is leased to a nongovernmental lessee who serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6); or is an organization which uses the property exclusively for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes. § 196.199(2)(a), (2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2006). Thus, we conclude that the absence of a clear and unmistakable waiver of immunity from taxation and the exemption of State property used for governmental purposes from ad valorem taxation demonstrate that the Legislature does not intend for section 194.171(2) to constitute a jurisdictional bar to lawsuits brought by the State to challenge tax assessments on State property that is either immune or exempt from taxation. The related provisions of the statutory scheme for counties to assess and collect taxes also supports this conclusion. Even when no exemption applies and a leaseholder of State property is subject to ad valorem taxation, the penalty for nonpayment falls on the leaseholder and not the State. Section 196.199(8)(a) prohibits any taxes on a leasehold by a nongovernmental lessee from becoming a lien on the governmental property itself. Instead, these taxes constitute a debt due and shall be recoverable by legal action or by the issuance of tax executions that shall become liens upon any other property in any county of this state of the taxpayer who owes said tax. Id. Similarly, section 197.432(9), Florida Statutes (2006), prohibits either the issuance of a tax certificate or the creation of a lien on property owned by a governmental unit that has become subject to taxation due to the lease of the property to a nongovernmental lessee. Delinquent taxes must either be enforced and collected in the manner provided in s. 196.199(8) or, in certain circumstances, the delinquent taxes become a lien on the leasehold. Id. Under these related statutory provisions, even when the State has leased its property to a nongovernmental entity and the property is used for nongovernmental purposes, the Legislature has specifically prohibited an issuance of a tax certificate or a lien on the property itself. Thus, under no circumstances can the State lose its property when the lessee fails to pay (or challenge) ad valorem taxes. On the other hand, there are no similar provisions prohibiting the issuance of a tax certificate when the State is the owner of property that it is using for a governmental purpose. This omission is significant in that it suggests the Legislature never contemplated that the State would be a taxpayer whose property could be lost through nonpayment of ad valorem taxes. We conclude that the Legislature did not intentionally enact a statutory scheme that precludes the loss of State property for nonpayment of taxes on leased property but allows the loss through a tax deed sale of State property that has not been leased merely because the State failed to file a timely challenge to the assessment. We also note that the provisions of section 194.171 differ from the civil statute of limitations, which specifically includes the State within its operation. See § 95.011, Fla. Stat. (2006) (providing that limitations period in chapter applies to civil actions including those brought by public entities including the state). In the past, we have pointed to language in other statutes to show that the Legislature knows how to accomplish what it has omitted in the statute in question. See, e.g., Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So.2d 294, 298 (Fla.2000) (looking to language in different statute to conclude that [w]hen the Florida Legislature wishes to provide for set-offs for future benefits it well knows how to express itself) (quoting Pizzarelli v. Rollins, 704 So.2d 630, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). Section 95.011 shows that had the Legislature chosen to make the State subject to the sixty-day filing requirement in section 194.171(2), it knew how to do so. The omission is especially significant in light of the overriding principle that any waiver of the State's immunity from ad valorem taxation must be clear and direct. The petitioners actually use the statute of limitations to support their position that because the Legislature clearly intended the State to be subject to the limitations periods set forth in chapter 95, Florida Statutes (2006), the Legislature also intended the State to be bound by section 194.171(2). Section 95.011 provides that a civil action or proceeding, . . . including one brought by the state, a public officer, a political subdivision of the state, a municipality, . . . or any agency or officer of any of them, or any other governmental authority, shall be barred unless begun within the time prescribed in this chapter or, if a different time is prescribed elsewhere in these statutes, within the time prescribed elsewhere. (Emphasis supplied.) The petitioners contend that for lawsuits challenging ad valorem tax assessments, the time prescribed elsewhere is the sixty-day period in section 194.171(2). We disagree. The reference to the time prescribed elsewhere in section 95.011 encompasses other provisions that can also be construed as statutes of limitations, but not jurisdictional statutes of nonclaim such as section 194.171. We have previously noted the important distinction between a statute of limitations and a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim: An untimely claim filed pursuant to a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim is automatically barred. Miller v. Nolte, 453 So.2d 397 (Fla.1984). However, a claim filed beyond the time set forth in a statute of limitations is only barred if the statute of limitations is raised as an affirmative defense or, if the defense appears on the face of a prior pleading, by way of a motion to dismiss. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). Failure to plead that the statute of limitations has expired constitutes waiver. May v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1151 (Fla.2000) (quoting Barnett Bank v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla.1986)). Conflating the two would muddle the distinction and yield confusion as to whether actions brought outside the sixty-day period in section 194.171(2) are barred automatically or only when the issue is affirmatively pled. In addition, when the State is the party challenging an ad valorem tax assessment on property it owns, treating section 194.171(2) as a statute of limitations would extract a waiver of the State's immunity from less than clear and unambiguous language. Accordingly, for all these reasons we conclude that the Legislature did not intend that the sixty-day filing requirement of section 194.171(2) be imposed upon a nontaxpaying governmental entity such as the State.