Opinion ID: 414405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Self Defense under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(h)

Text: 24 Nolan argues that he was entitled to present evidence of self defense to charges that he received a weapon during the July 11 shooting. The trial court ruled that self defense was not a defense to charges under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(h) and that, even were it a defense, Nolan had not pleaded facts sufficient to raise it. 25 Until recently, no federal court had allowed a self defense claim to charges of receipt or possession of firearms. Defendants have labeled the defense duress, coercion, necessity, or self defense. 1 Regardless of the label, the courts have ruled that federal firearms laws impose something approaching absolute liability. United States v. Hammons, 566 F.2d 1301, 1303 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810, 99 S.Ct. 68, 58 L.Ed.2d 102 (1978). 26 Rather than rule self defense is never available, courts have generally ruled that the defendant has not pleaded facts sufficient to raise the defense. E.g., United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665 (18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a)(1)) (no defense of duress or coercion for defendant who initiated confrontation); United States v. Scales, 599 F.2d 78 (5th Cir.1979) (18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(h)) (purchase of gun for defense of wife not a defense); United States v. Parker, 566 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 1589, 55 L.Ed.2d 808 (1978) (26 U.S.C. Sec. 5861(d)) (defendant held gun too long to claim self defense to charges of possession of unregistered weapon). Cf. United States v. Wood, 566 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir.1978) (defendant did not plead impossibility of escape before carrying knife within prison). 27 The Fifth Circuit has ruled that a claim of self defense is available under 18 U.S.C. (App.) Sec. 1202(a)(1). United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.1982). The Panter court stated that in the absence of a legislated exclusion of self defense, the common law defense of self defense must be available. Id. at 271. 28 We suspect that the unusual facts of the Panter case will not soon be repeated. There, Panter's assailant threatened Panter, stabbed him in the abdomen, and had Panter underneath him on the floor before Panter's hand fell fortuitously on a pistol. In this rarest of situations, the Fifth Circuit allowed Panter to plead self defense to charges of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. 29 Nolan has not pleaded such circumstances here, and we consider Panter sui generis. In requesting that Nolan be allowed to show self defense, Nolan's attorney avowed the facts he would prove. Both this avowal and the government's offer of counter-proof showed that, after a confrontation in the bar, Nolan followed the victim of the shooting outside. 30 A defendant may not plead duress or coercion unless he has no reasonable opportunity to escape. Wood, 566 F.2d at 1109. Nor is the defense available to one who has recklessly placed himself in a dangerous situation. Agard, 605 F.2d at 667; Model Penal Code Sec. 2.09(2) (Tent.Draft No. 10, 1960). 31 To plead necessity, a defendant must show he is acting to prevent an imminent harm which no available options could similarly prevent. United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 402, 66 L.Ed.2d 247 (1980). Similarly, self defense is not available to one who renews a confrontation which has ended. W. Lafave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, pp. 394-95 (1972). 32 However we characterize Nolan's defense, he did not plead facts sufficient to raise the issue. He prolonged and renewed the confrontation when he pursued the victim. The court correctly excluded all evidence of self defense.
33 Nolan argues that the admission of details about the shooting required the court to allow evidence of self defense. He asserts that the court should have granted a mistrial. 34 Before trial, the court ordered the government to limit evidence relating to the July 11 shooting. The court specifically warned the government to instruct its witnesses to omit any reference to events of July 11 that might be prejudicial. 35 Despite these warnings, one officer testifying for the government stated that someone had been shot and that there had been victims of the shooting. Although the court issued prompt curative instructions, Nolan argues that the testimony tainted the entire trial. Absent any evidence of self defense, the jury was left with knowledge of a shooting, Nolan's possession of a gun, and victims of the crime. 36 Before concluding that Nolan suffered prejudice, we must consider the court's curative instructions. 37 We assume that juries follow admonitions and curative instructions. United States v. Johnson, 618 F.2d 60, 62 (9th Cir.1980). As we indicated in Johnson, we weigh the force and delivery of the instruction against the prejudice generated by the evidence. To determine the prejudice, we compare the probative force of the inadmissible evidence with that of the admissible evidence that supports the verdict. The trial judge's determination of the prejudicial impact of evidence must be accorded deference. United States v. Sanford, 673 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir.1982). 38 The court cautioned the prosecutor twice during the officer's testimony and twice told the jury to disregard mention of any details of the shooting. The court reiterated the presumption of innocence in Nolan's favor, and reminded the jury that they were concerned only with possession or receipt of firearms charges. The court then delivered curative instructions forcefully and did what it could to limit the prejudicial effect of the officer's testimony. 39 We next consider the prejudicial impact of the officer's statements. Although the news that Nolan shot someone created a likelihood of prejudice, the officer indicated also that Nolan may have shot in self defense. The proof against Nolan on this count was overwhelming. We have little question that the jury would have convicted him regardless of any mention of victims of a shooting. 40 Given the court's forceful instructions and the weight of the evidence against Nolan, we conclude the court correctly declined to grant a mistrial.