Opinion ID: 2444929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scott's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Based on Cooke v. State

Text: On this appeal, Scott has raised a new claim of ineffective counsel based on this Court's recent opinion in Cooke v. State. [44] Scott contends that he had requested his counsel to raise the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, but counsel did not follow his instructions. Instead, Scott asserts, counsel decided to raise the defense of extreme emotional distress, even though the record supported a claim that he suffered from mental illness. Scott's reliance on Cooke is misguided. Cooke is inapplicable because the factual premise giving rise to counsel's infringement of constitutional rights in Cooke is absent here. Moreover, even were we to construe Cooke broadlyto hold that a defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights are violated whenever counsel refuses to present a defense the defendant demandsScott has not shown that he actually demanded that his counsel present the specific defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.
First, Cooke is inapplicable. In Cooke, this Court held that when a defense counsel's strategy infringes a defendant's constitutional right to make fundamental decisions regarding his case such as whether to plead guilty or testify on his own behalf, that conduct undermines the proper functioning of the adversarial process under the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [45] In that case, Cooke's counsel pursued a guilty but mentally ill defense over Cooke's vociferous and repeated protestations that he was completely innocent and not mentally ill. [46] Cooke's counsel also refused to allow Cooke to testify on his own behalf because counsel thought Cooke would assert his innocence, thereby undermining counsel's position that Cooke had, in fact, committed the homicide. [47] Finally, Cooke's trial counsel had compromised the jury's impartiality by stating in their opening argumentagainst Cooke's wishesthat Cooke was guilty but mentally ill. [48] None of these circumstances is present here. Scott has not claimed that his counsel admitted guilt in violation of his express wishes. Scott never denied killing Edna Crown. Nor has Scott contested his counsel's statements or asserted his innocence in his pleadings. Here, in contrast to Cooke, guilt is not a contested issue. Scott has not claimed that his counsel refused to let him testify on his own behalf, or compromised the impartiality of the jury by asserting his guilt when he (Scott) maintained his innocence. Therefore, the concerns underlying the infringement and undermining of a defendant's constitutional rights in Cooke are not implicated in Scott's case.
Even were we to hold that Cooke is applicable, Scott's claim cannot succeed because he did not actually demand that his counsel raise the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Scott's claimthat he was deceived by his trial counsel because counsel raised the defense of extreme emotional distress rather than not guilty by reason of insanitywas not presented to the trial court in Scott's original Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief. Nowhere does Scott's original motion make any reference to his current claim that he wanted his counsel to pursue a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. The first mention of the insanity defense as a basis for Scott's ineffective assistance of counsel claim appears in his November 2009 Opening Brief on appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. After the case was remanded to the trial court to consider Scott's new claim, Scott's trial counsel filed an affidavit testifying that Scott never demanded that we raise the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Scott never responded to counsel's affidavit. [49] The trial court considered the uncontroverted evidence actually presented, and ruled that Scott's Cooke claim was without merit. [50] Clearly, the trial court credited counsel's affidavit, but discredited Scott's assertions that he had previously demanded that his counsel present a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court's factual finding was clearly erroneous. [51] Even if we were to hold that a defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights are violated whenever counsel refuses to present a defense the defendant demands (which we do not), Scott has not shown that he actually demanded that his counsel present the specific defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Therefore, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Scott's claim under Cooke.