Opinion ID: 458191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Burpos' Negligence Claim Against Algoma

Text: 31 Many of the facts are in dispute in this controversy. The following outline of events, however, would seem to be undisputed: 32 1. Portec, Inc. employee, Dewey Burpo, was injured while trying to place a chain or holding device under a package of steel that was being temporarily lifted by a cable sling device; the cable broke and his hand was crushed by the falling package of steel. 33 2. Officials of Portec thought it necessary to lift up the package because the package had arrived resting on only one 4' X 4' X 8' piece of timber; this apparently left not enough space between the floor and the package to wrap the chain around the bottom side of the package. 34 3. Portec had specified as usual to steel manufacturer and loader Algoma that all such packages should have at least three such timber supports between a package and the floor; 35 4. Five other steel packages in this shipment had three such timber supports underneath them. 36 5. The apparently missing timber supports were found somewhere else in the transport car. 37 Algoma essentially argues that the trial court should have granted a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict under the above-related set of circumstances. In such a situation it is clear that this court must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to Burpo as the non-moving party who received the jury verdict. Gillham v. Admiral Corporation, 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975); Teti v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 392 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1968). In order to avoid a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the only burden on the plaintiff was to establish some credible proof of the four necessary elements in a negligence action: (a) that defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (b) that defendant violated the duty; (c) that defendant's violation of duty was a proximate cause of incident involving plaintiff; and (d) that plaintiff actually suffered damages. Falkner v. Fetzer, Inc., 113 Mich. App. 500, 317 N.W.2d 337, 339 (1982).
38 It appears that Michigan law would impose a duty of care on Algoma stemming from its undertaking of the activity in question and in view of its contractual relationship with Portec. See Clark v. Dalman, 379 Mich. 251, 150 N.W.2d 955, 960 (1967) (affirming the theory that 'accompanying every contract is a common law duty to perform with ordinary care the thing agreed to be done'). Algoma and Portec enjoyed an on-going contractual relationship for a number of years. Portec specifically requested how it wanted the steel packaged. Algoma's package and loading supervisor, Mr. Joseph Nadeau, also acknowledged that Algoma was required to meet specific loading regulations of the American Association of Railroads.
39 Burpo presented circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable inference might be drawn that Algoma was responsible for a bad packing job. Plaintiffs pointed to the testimony of Portec employees who said that they had previously witnessed the arrival of steel packages with only one supporting timber block. A Portec official also stated that he had complained to Algoma about faulty loading. On cross-examination an Algoma foreman appeared to contradict a previous statement that he had never known of such one-piece support loading. 40 Perhaps the strongest circumstantial evidence came from third parties involved. Plaintiffs point in the record to a document submitted by Algoms in which a railroad official had previously disclaimed any responsibility for Algoma shipments due to 'poor loading practices' [emphasis added]. An expert witness in mechanical engineering, Professor Thomas Manos of the University of Detroit, also testified that 1) it was possible for the steel package to be effectively loaded with one timber block and 2) it was doubtful that any physical force during transportation could cause such significant shifting of the steel and the support blockage as suggested by Algoma. An Algoma foreman, George Glemnitz, also admitted that he had never heard of a situation where such massive shifting occurred in transportation. 41 Defendant Algoma essentially attacks the circumstantial nature of this evidence. We find this to be sufficient evidence, although indirect, under the circumstances of this case to support a jury verdict.
42 Defendant Algoma especially emphasizes that fault on the part of the railroad transporter C & O and Burpo's employer, Portec, may have been indicated. It is not enough, however, for Algoma to show that negligence by the railroad or employer could have been contributing causes to his injury. Algoma must show that these parties are the sole proximate or superseding causes of his injury. But in our view of the record, Algoma provided no strong evidentiary grounds to establish that the rail transportation provided by C & O caused significant shifting of the blocks. 43 Algoma is thus primarily relegated to the argument either that the employer Portec was guilty of superseding negligence or employee Burpo guilty of contributory negligence in the attempt to unload the package. Algoma concludes that Portec's and Burpo's attempted unloading of the package was 'in violation of Federal OSHA and state MIOSHA safety standards.' This charge is supported by no discussion of the standards involved nor any reference to the record. Algoma then goes on to assert that these supposed unloading violations should have formed a presumption of negligence per se which the Burpos failed to rebut. 44 We cannot agree with Algoma's claim that either Portec's and/or Burpos' violation of federal regulations was so strongly established beyond dispute in the record. We cannot find error in the trial court § judgment that a reasonable jury might have found Algoma liable for proximately causing the injury. In such complicated factual situations, the issue of negligent liability is a question for the jury rather than a question of law for the court. The jury was specifically instructed on and rejected the defense of contributory negligence. The function of an appellate court is not to try de novo these contested fact issues, even those closely related to ultimate findings of fact and related conclusions of liability.
45 On appeal the question of damages is governed by an 'abuse of discretion' standard regarding the trial court's refusal to reject the jury's determination. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. It is not disputed that four of Burpo's fingers have been amputated on his right working hand. Dr. Alexander Kelly, a plastic surgeon, testified that Burpo was now necessarily limited to one-hand jobs. The personnel director at Portec also gave specific testimony regarding Burpo's approximate $14,060.80 salary. Even if our view of adequate damages would have differed from those of the factfinders, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to adjust this particular award. We rather hold that the jury's verdict was within reasonable limits under the evidence. 46 Algoma also challenges the court's award of pre-judgment interest. Federal law explicitly grants post-judgment interest but is silent on the question of pre-judgment interest. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(a). This court has held that the awarding of pre-judgment interest in diversity cases is controlled by state law. See American Anodco, Inc. v. Reynolds Metal Co., 743 F.2d 417, 425 (6th Cir. 1984); Clissold v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway, 600 F.2d 35, 39 n.3 (6th Cir. 1979). The awarding of pre-judgment interest dating from the filing of a complaint in a successful civil action is mandatory under Michigan law. See MSA Sec. 27A.6013, MCL Sec. 600.6013; McGrath v. Clark, 89 Mich. App. 194, 280 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1979). Thus the trial court did not err in granting prejudgment interest dating from the filing of the complaint. 47 The court, however, additionally computed interest from date of injury until the filing of the complaint into the judgment award. Plaintiff Burpo's complaint requested judgment only beginning with 'the filing of the complaint.' This court has held that an 'award of interest should be restricted to the amount specifically prayed for in the complaint.' Steffen v. United States, 213 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1954). The trial court therefore erred in awarding this precomplaint interest as part of the judgment. 48 The district court's order dismissing Wire and Supply is VACATED and REMANDED for reconsideration consistent with this opinion, and, the district court's award of precomplaint interest is VACATED and set aside. In all other respects, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.