Opinion ID: 773519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claim of Gender Discrimination

Text: 31 Title VII provides, inter alia, that [i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to . . . discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's . . . sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A finding of discrimination is a finding of fact, see, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985), as are findings of discriminatory intent, see, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-90 (1982), and causation, see, e.g., Joseph v. New York City Board of Education, 171 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 876 (1999); Sedor v. Frank, 42 F.3d 741, 746 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123 (1995). After a bench trial, this Court reviews a district court's factual findings for clear error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In so doing, we are not allowed to second-guess either the trial court's credibility assessments, see id., or its choice as to which of competing inferences to draw. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573-74. The mere fact that there was evidence to support an inference contrary to that drawn by the trier of fact does not mean that the findings were clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Healey v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1991). The decisions as to whose testimony to credit and which of permissible inferences to draw are solely within the province of the trier of fact, and [w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous, Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574; see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949). 32 In challenging the dismissal of her claim of gender discrimination, Cifra states that 33 a Title VII plaintiff need only demonstrate that her employer has engaged in prohibited conduct against her as an individual; there is no additional requirement that she demonstrate that the employer has engaged in such conduct against other female employees as well, 34 (Cifra brief on appeal at 20), and she argues, inter alia, that in this case 35 [t]he court erred, as a matter of law, in its interpretation of the requirements for a Title VII claim of gender discrimination when it relied on its finding that other women in Ms. Cifra's department did not experience discrimination to decide that Ms. Cifra's claim necessarily fails. 36 (Cifra brief on appeal at 19 (quoting 62 F.Supp.2d at 745).) She also states that the court ignored Ms. Cifra's evidence that similarly situated male employees received more favorable treatment and were not terminated despite the same alleged performance problems. Id. at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted). We reject Cifra's characterization of the district court's ruling. 37 First, her contention that the court found that her claim necessarily failed simply for lack of credible evidence that other women were treated worse than the men is an unfair elision of the court's discussion. As the passage at 62 F.Supp.2d 744-45, quoted in part I.B. above reveals, the court referred to the testimony of Cifra and Delay that Meashey treated women other than Cifra differently from the men and found their testimony unpersuasive because it was conclusory. The court then went on to point out that there was evidence that Meashey had retained Cifra and all of her female co-workers when he took command of EHS; that women other than Cifra were not given poor performance evaluations; that no other woman was fired; that after firing Cifra, Meashey conducted a nondiscriminatory search for her successor; and that at the end of that search he hired a woman. The court then stated that it found that Cifra had failed to meet her burden of showing that her treatment and discharge were the result of a discriminatory motive, 62 F.Supp.2d at 745, and only then did the court conclude that [a]s such, her Title VII claim necessarily fails, id. Plainly, Cifra's failure to persuade the court that other women were treated differently from the men was but one ingredient in the court's conclusion. And equally plainly, once the court found that Cifra had failed to persuade it that her treatment was the result of a discriminatory motive, the gender discrimination claim could not be sustained. 38 Second, we cannot accept Cifra's contention that the district court ignored her evidence that she herself was treated worse than the EHS male professionals. In its opinion, the district court stated, inter alia, as follows: 39 Plaintiff testified that she was treated differently than her male co-workers, not allowed to attend a certification test and training courses, targeted for termination, exposed to hostile attitudes of her male colleagues, and not given the same support as male co-workers to get jobs done. Anthony Maiurino, though equivocating, testified that Meashey was particularly tough on plaintiff, and forced him to mentor plaintiff. Mary Delay broadly accused Meashey of targeting plaintiff and other females, and testified that Meashey questioned females to a higher degree. Frank Collis testified that plaintiff was the focus of much more intense treatment by Meashey than other employees. He also testified that both he and plaintiff received identical poor ratings, and were placed on nearly identical performance improvement plans, though plaintiff was fired and he was not. 40 62 F.Supp.2d at 743. Thus, the court plainly did not ignore the evidence presented by Cifra to show that she was treated more harshly than similarly situated males. The court simply concluded, following this summary, that the vast majority of this evidence failed to show that plaintiff was treated differently because she was a woman . . . . Id. (emphasis in original). The fact that this passage was located in the section of the court's opinion that discussed whether Cifra had presented sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case provides no basis for reversal. The court is not required to repeat its discussions of evidence that it has clearly considered. 41 Cifra also contends that because the court concluded ultimately that 'there was a complete paucity of evidence' to show that she was terminated because of her gender, . . . . the Court admitted that it ignored important evidence relied upon for its earlier finding that Ms. Cifra met her prima facie burden by demonstrating an inference of discrimination. (Cifra brief on appeal at 26 (quoting 62 F.Supp.2d at 744) (emphasis ours).) This argument is untenable. The fact that the evidence of record is sufficient to establish a prima facie case does not mean that an inference of discrimination is compelled. Whether such an inference ultimately is drawn is up to the factfinder. To the extent that Cifra suggests that her presentation of a prima facie case in effect create[d] a presumption of gender discrimination, Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981), her argument is misplaced here because once a defendant has come forward with a nondiscriminatory explanation for its adverse employment decision--whether ultimately persuasive or not, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)--the presumption created by the establishment of a prima facie case simply drops out of the picture, id. at 511. 42 Finally, we reject Cifra's contention that her gender discrimination claim should be revived on the basis that [t]he Court's obligation, at a minimum, should be to consider whether the facts introduced to create this inference supported a finding of pretext and/or intentional discrimination. (Cifra brief on appeal at 27-28 (emphasis added).) The obligation that Cifra describes is the type of responsibility that the district court has when it considers a motion to dismiss as a matter of law, and is an obligation that the appellate court would have if the trier of fact had made a finding of pretext or intentional discrimination. But when the district court is sitting as trier of fact, it has no obligation to draw a given inference merely because it is supportable; nor has it any obligation, in its capacity as trier of fact, to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The obligations of the court as the trier of fact are to determine which of the witnesses it finds credible, which of the permissible competing inferences it will draw, and whether the party having the burden of proof has persuaded it as factfinder that the requisite facts are proven. 43 We have no doubt here that in deciding the gender discrimination claim the district court performed its functions properly. The court twice rejected GE requests for judgment dismissing that claim as a matter of law, first denying its motion for summary judgment, see Order dated October 2, 1998, and later denying its similar motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) following the close of all the evidence at trial, see 62 F.Supp.2d at 741. The record does not support Cifra's suggestion that the court adopted as a legal principle the notion that a gender-discrimination claimant cannot prevail without showing that the defendant similarly mistreated others of the same gender. Rather, sitting as the trier of fact, the court stated that the vast majority of [Cifra's] evidence failed to show that plaintiff was treated differently because she was a woman, id. at 743 (emphasis in original), and it plainly--and permissibly--viewed the fact that Meashey treated women other than Cifra the same way he treated men as part of the circumstantial evidence that lessened the likelihood that a basis for his treatment of Cifra was her gender. Nor does the record support the supposition that the court in its role as factfinder rejected Cifra's claim solely for lack of evidence that other women were treated worse than the men. Noting that although Meashey on many occasions treated plaintiff differently than her co-workers, the court explicitly credited the testimony of Meashey and other GE witnesses that he ultimately singled her out for termination because of her resistance to taking over the leadership or 'ownership' role he was requiring of all employees in her category, id. at 744. 44 In sum, Cifra, who has not cited to us any substantial evidence of gender bias, such as a decisionmaker's gender-derogatory comments or documents, simply failed to persuade the factfinder that a preponderance of the evidence showed she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender. Given the trial record, we cannot conclude that the court's factual findings are clearly erroneous, and we see no indication that the court applied an incorrect standard of law. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the claim of gender discrimination.