Opinion ID: 2994713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: At the close of the government’s case, Angle made a motion for a judgment of acquittal arguing that the computer diskettes and zip disks introduced to prove Count II (possession of child pornography) had been altered by the government in its effort to recover pornographic material, and therefore, this evidence could not be included among the 3 or more matters required to support a conviction under sec. 2252(a)(4)(B). The district court denied the motion. Challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is an uphill battle and the defendant bears a heavy burden. United States v. Wallace, 212 F.3d 1000, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Angle’s conviction, we must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor. United States v. Frazier, 213 F. 3d 409, 416 (7th Cir. 2000).
Requirement Count II of the superseding indictment charged Angle with knowingly possess[ing] more than 3 items, including computer disks, videotape and computer zip disks, all of which had been transported in interstate commerce and all of which contained visual depictions of minor children engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of sec. 2252(a)(4)(B). Angle argues that with the exception of the videotape cassette, the rest of the evidence that the government showed to contain child pornography had been altered because the files recovered from the diskettes and zip disks were deleted prior to the search on February 3, 1998. As a result, Angle claims that there was insufficient evidence upon which to convict him. As noted earlier, the February 3 search of Angle’s residence produced one videotape cassette, a number of computer diskettes and several zip disks. Angle admits that the videotape contained child pornography. With respect to the computer diskettes and zip disks found at his residence, Angle claims that he had deleted the pornography files months before the search. Therefore, he argues that the government cannot show that he possessed child pornography on those items on or about the date of the search as charged in the superseding indictment./14 In reply, the government maintains that the bulk of the pornography contained on the confiscated diskettes and zip disks was hidden [that is] . . . erased, rendering them temporarily unavailable, but nonetheless viable. The government asserts that neither the diskettes nor the zip disks had been reformatted in an effort to destroy the files contained on them. The government posits that Angle knowingly possessed child pornography because he maintained the ability to recover the files by using a specialized utility program, such as Norton Utilities, which is commonly available in computer software stores. While no such program was found in Angle’s residence at the time of the search, the government contends that Angle could have nonetheless obtained access to someone else’s computer equipped with the capacity to recover the pornography. Although we find the parties’ arguments interesting, we earlier noted that not all of the pornography files contained on the confiscated diskettes were deleted by Angle. In its brief, the government submits that the prosecutor admitted into evidence several diskettes containing child pornography material that had not been deleted and which were obtained during the February 3 search. In his brief, Angle does not refute the government’s contention, arguing instead that the government failed to show that the admitted evidence satisfied the jurisdictional element of sec. 2252(a)(4)(B). Because the record supports the government’s contention, including the report prepared by McDonnell, a computer specialist, who analyzed the confiscated diskettes and zip disks, we find that the government met its burden of showing that Angle possessed 3 or more matters of child pornography at the time of the search./15
Element We turn next to Angle’s argument that the government failed to show that the child pornography found in his residence satisfied the jurisdictional element of sec. 2252(a)(4)(B). In relevant part, sec. 2252(a)(4)(B) prohibits the knowing possession of media/16 which contain any visual depiction . . . which was produced using materials which have been mailed or . . . shipped or transported [in interstate or foreign commerce], by any means including by computer . . . . Although the government introduced evidence that none of the computer diskettes found in Angle’s residence had been manufactured in Indiana and that the videotape cassette had been manufactured in New Jersey, Angle argues that this evidence alone is insufficient to satisfy sec. 2252(a)(4)(B)’s jurisdictional requirement because there was no proof that the diskettes that traveled in interstate commerce were used to create the visual depictions at issue. In support of this argument, Angle relies on United States v. Wilson, 182 F.3d 737, 742-43 (10th Cir. 1999), where the Tenth Circuit held that in order to fulfill the statute’s jurisdictional requirement under a theory that computer diskettes were used to produce pornographic visual depictions, the government must present evidence that the computer diskettes were used to actually produce the computer graphic files contained thereon. In reversing the criminal defendant’s conviction under sec. 2252(a)(4)(B), the Tenth Circuit found that the government had failed to satisfy the jurisdictional element. The court noted, among other things, that the government’s case left unanswered the question of whether a computer graphics file is produced or created prior to being recorded on a [computer diskette], or whether, instead, it only comes into being at or after the point it is recorded on the storage media. Id. at 743. The government in this case argues that we should reject the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the jurisdictional term produced because it is too narrow. The government further contends that its demonstration at trial regarding the recovery of the deleted files sufficiently proved the interaction between the pornography and the [interstate] commodity. In his reply brief, Angle submits that [w]hile the government introduced photographs that had been stored on zip disks and diskettes that had traveled in interstate commerce, it failed to demonstrate that these images were produced using those zip disks and diskettes. Appellee’s Reply Br. at 7 (emphasis in original). While the term produced is not defined by statute, the term producing is defined as producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing, or advertising. 18 U.S.C. sec. 2256(3). In United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit held that evidence that the defendant copied child pornography using computer equipment (i.e., a computer and computer diskettes) that had traveled in interstate commerce satisfied the jurisdictional term produced, as used in sec. 2252(a)(4)(B). The court found that the visual depictions in issue there were created-- ’produced’--when [defendant] used his computer to download data, which we take to mean copying the child pornography images (or visual depictions) onto computer diskettes. Id. at 749. In concluding that the government had proved the jurisdictional element of sec. 2252(a)(4)(B), the court reasoned that [t]he statute requires only that visual depictions be produced; it does not matter that the depictions on [defendant’s] computer were copies rather than originals. Id. We concur with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the jurisdictional term produced is far too restrictive as it essentially renders meaningless the statutory definition of producing (which includes the terms issuing, publishing, or advertising), and focuses entirely on the circumstances surrounding the original or actual production of the visual depiction. We believe, like the Ninth Circuit, that computerized visual depictions (i.e., computer graphic files) are produced when computer equipment, including computer diskettes, are used to copy the depictions onto the diskettes that have traveled in interstate commerce. See Lacy, 119 F.3d at 747-49; see also United States v. Perreault, 195 F.3d 1133, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting sec. 2252(a)(4)(B) required proof that the physical medium of the computer, i.e., the drives or discs, was known to contain the prohibited visual depictions and that the physical matter had passed through interstate or foreign commerce). Here, it is undisputed that the computer diskettes traveled in interstate commerce. And because a reasonable factfinder could find that Angle produced the pornographic files by downloading or copying images onto the computer diskettes that traveled interstate, we find that the government satisfied the jurisdictional element of sec. 2252 (a)(4)(B).