Opinion ID: 1860261
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Measuring Distance Under KRS 241.075

Text: The Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the ABC Board's reading of KRS 241.075(3) as requiring that the measurement be taken along a route that is both lawful and safe. This Court has recognized the deference afforded an administrative agency's construction of a statute that it is charged with implementing, so long as the agency interpretation is in the form of an adopted regulation or formal adjudication. Board of Trustees of Judicial Form Retirement System v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth, 132 S.W.3d 770, 786-87 (Ky.2003) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)); see also Commonwealth, ex rel. Stumbo v. Kentucky Public Service Com'n, 243 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Ky.App.2007) ([W]e afford deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of the statutes and regulations it is charged with implementing.); Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 648 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Ky.App.1982) (Great deference is always given to an administrative agency in the interpretation of a statute which is within its specific province.). The ABC Board's interpretation of KRS 241.075(3) came in the context of the formal adjudicatory process, namely an appeal to the Board. Moreover, the Board's interpretation is not arbitrary or capricious, as it was determined by applying a reasonableness analysis. The Court of Appeals was also correct that it was legal to cross Baxter Avenue where the local administrator did when he measured the distance to the nearest similar establishments. This determination depends in large part on the unique geography, as the Court of Appeals described it, where Molly Malone's is located. Specifically, it involves that portion of Baxter Avenue, which extends north and south, between its intersections with Highland Avenue (to the south) and Cherokee Road/Broadway (to the north). [2] There are no cross-streets on the east side of Baxter Avenue between Highland Avenue and Cherokee Road/Broadway. However, on the west side, as one moves north from Highland Avenue, three streetsMorton Avenue, Christy Avenue, and Breckenridge Street, respectivelyintersect with and terminate at Baxter Avenue. There are no marked crosswalks or traffic control signals at the termination of any of these three roadways. Directly across from Christy Avenue is an alley that runs perpendicular to Baxter Avenue. Molly Malone's sits on the east side of Baxter Avenue, between the intersections with Morton Avenue and Christy Avenue. Wet Willy's and Outlook Inn are located on the west side of Baxter. Wet Willy's is south of the intersection with Morton Avenue; Outlook Inn is located north of the intersection with Christy Avenue. The nearest intersection with a four-way stop and marked crosswalks is where Highland Avenue crosses Baxter Avenue. The ABC Board held that it would be illegal for a pedestrian to cross Baxter Avenue at the intersections with Christy Avenue and Morton Avenue because of KRS 189.570(6)(c), which reads: Between adjacent intersections within the city limits of every city at which traffic control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. The Board read the statute as requiring all crossings within a city to take place at intersections with traffic control signals and marked crosswalks. This interpretation, however, ignores that the at which traffic control signals are in operation language modifies adjacent intersections, all of which creates the condition precedent for the command to cross only in a marked crosswalk that follows. Thus, the crosswalks-only requirement applies only between adjacent intersections with traffic control signals. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly noted that this statute was inapplicable to the current situation, because there are no traffic control signals at adjacent intersections (which means intersections that are next to each other on a roadway). The areas where Morton Avenue, Christy Avenue, and Breckenridge Street terminate at Baxter Avenue are intersections as contemplated by Kentucky's traffic regulations. See KRS 189.010(4)(a) (`Intersection' means ... [t]he area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two (2) highways which join one another, but do not necessarily continue, at approximately right angles, or the area within which vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle may come into conflict....). The intersections at Highland Avenue and Morton Avenue are adjacent; the intersections at Highland Avenue and Christy Avenue are not adjacent, since the intersection at Morton Avenue lies between them. Because there are no traffic control signals in the intersections at Morton Avenue, Christy Avenue, or Breckenridge Street, KRS 189.010(4)(a) does not bar crossing Baxter Avenue outside of a marked crosswalk in the area in question. In fact, it appears that there is no absolute legal bar to crossing Baxter Avenue at any place in the area in question, even outside unmarked crosswalks. [3] Instead, KRS 189.570, which regulates pedestrians, appears only to delegate duties to yield rights-of-way and to prohibit certain specific dangerous actions by pedestrians. For example, KRS 189.570(4) assumes pedestrians will cross roadways [w]hen traffic control signals are not in place or in operation and requires that drivers yield the right of way to pedestrians already crossing the roadway. KRS 189.570(6)(a) assumes that pedestrians may cross at places other than a crosswalk, requiring only that [ejvery pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway. KRS 189.570(9) places a further limit, but no prohibition, on crossing outside a crosswalk: No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Absent the limited circumstances of adjacent intersections with traffic control signals, it appears that crossing a roadway outside of a marked or unmarked crosswalk is not per se illegal. [4] Thus, the ABC Board was incorrect in reading KRS 189.570(6)(a) as making it illegal to cross Baxter Avenue at Morton Avenue and Christy Avenue. Furthermore, because the ABC Board is not charged with administering the traffic regulations, its interpretation of the statute is accorded no deference by the courts of this Commonwealth. This conclusion, however, does not end the enquiry. The ABC Board read KRS 241.075(3) to require that the path of measurement be both lawful and safe. While the question of the legality of the path is a pure question of law, which this Court has reviewed de novo, whether the path urged by Metro (and used by the local administrator) is safe is a finding of fact and is entitled to a greater deal of deference. KRS 13B. 150(2) requires that when reviewing an administrative agency's decision, [t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. In fact, the court may only reverse an agency's final order, in whole or in part, ... if it finds the agency's final order is: (a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) Without support of substantial evidence on the whole record; (d) Arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion; (e) Based on an ex parte communication which substantially prejudiced the rights of any party and likely affected the outcome of the hearing; (f) Prejudiced by a failure of the person conducting a proceeding to be disqualified pursuant to KRS 13B.040(2); or (g) Deficient as otherwise provided by law. KRS 13B.150(2). The judicial standard of review of an agency's decision therefore is largely deferential: The ... court's role as an appellate court is to review the administrative decision, not to reinterpret or to reconsider the merits of the claim, nor to substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence. 500 Associates, Inc. v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 204 S.W.3d 121, 131 (Ky.App.2006) (citation footnote omitted). When it comes to an agency's findings of fact, [a]s long as there is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency's decision, the court must defer to the agency, even if there is conflicting evidence. Id. at 132. The Court of Appeals did not give such deference to the ABC Board's finding that crossing outside of the marked crosswalk at the intersection of Baxter Avenue and Highland Avenue was unsafe. The Court of Appeals' holding is based on the facts that such crossings are not illegal and that pedestrians who cross outside a crosswalk are required to yield the right-of-way. That a crossing is legal and a pedestrian has a duty with regard to the right-of-way, however, does not make the crossing inherently safe. Nowhere does this analysis take into account the evidence presented to and reviewed by the ABC Board. In fact, the Court of Appeals simply failed to engage in proper judicial review of the ABC Board's finding, choosing instead to treat it like review of a question of law. But the ABC Board's finding that Metro's proposed crossing is unsafe is a finding of fact, and thus must be upheld as long as there is substantial evidence to support it. At the Board's hearing, William Schreck, the local ABC administrator, testified that he lived near the area of Baxter Avenue in question and was personally familiar with it. He also agreed that Baxter Avenue is a very heavily traveled thoroughfare. Charles Weather, the ABC investigator, also testified that Baxter Avenue was a heavily traveled thoroughfare. Evidence also indicated that the closest marked crosswalk with traffic control signals was at the intersection of Highland Avenue and Baxter Avenue. The Board concluded in part that this heavy traffic made it unsafe to cross Baxter Avenue outside the marked crosswalk at Highland Avenue. The testimony of the local ABC administrator and investigator alone is sufficient to support the ABC Board's finding. Thus, this Court must conclude that it was supported by substantial evidence. Since the Board's decision was premised on requiring that the measurement be taken along a route that is both lawful and safe, this finding that Metro's proposed route was unsafe was alone enough to justify its decision not to accept Metro's measurement and instead to adopt the route proposed by Molly Malone's. Moreover, since the ABC Board is charged with implementing KRS 241.075 and its interpretations of the statute, unless clearly contradicted by the language of the statute itself, are accorded deference by the courts, it is unclear that even a lack of substantial evidence of the unsafe nature of crossing Baxter Avenue would require reversal of its decision. The Board concluded, The only safe and reasonable means of crossing Baxter Ave[nue] is by the use of marked crosswalks at the Highland Ave[nue] intersection where traffic signals are in place.... [T]he Board's distance measurement based upon the use of marked crosswalks is proper, irrespective of legal pedestrian laws. Though this passage is not explicit, it clearly implies that the Board reads the ordinary pedestrian language of KRS 241.075(3) to mean a reasonable pedestrian. In determining what a reasonable pedestrian would do in this situation, the Board required the measurement to include a marked crosswalk, even if a pedestrian would not be legally obligated to use the crosswalk. That the Board incorrectly interpreted KRS 189.570(6) to conclude that the proposed pedestrian crossings were illegal does not undermine this final conclusion, since it reached its decision irrespective of the legal pedestrian laws. Though such an interpretation likely means the Board will grant more licenses, this Court cannot say that the Board's conclusion in this regard was arbitrary or capricious, or outside its legal authority under KRS 241.075. Such policy decisions are a fundamental part of an administrative agency's regulatory powers as delegated to them by the legislature. Thus, this Court concludes that the Board did not abuse its discretion, and its decision must be upheld.