Opinion ID: 805881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Thomas, Davis, and Chapman all argue that there was insufficient evidence to establish they entered into a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. All three moved for acquittal at the close of the government’s case and renewed the motion after evidence was presented in defense. We review the denial of a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Xu, 599 F.3d 452, 453 (5th Cir. 2010). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To establish a conspiracy [under 21 U.S.C. § 846], the government must prove that: (1) an agreement existed between two or more persons to violate federal narcotics law, (2) the defendant knew of the existence of the agreement, and (3) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.” United States v. Ochoa, 667 F.3d 643, 648 (5th Cir. 2012). “An express agreement is not required; a tacit, mutual agreement with common purpose, design, and understanding will suffice.” United States v. Zamora, 661 F.3d 200, 209 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[C]ircumstantial evidence may establish the existence of a conspiracy, as well as an individual’s voluntary participation in it.” United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 719 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The jury can “infer the existence of a conspiracy from the presence, association, and concerted action of the defendant with others.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). While mere presence at the scene or association with co-conspirators 4 Case: 10-50982 Document: 00511942948 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/02/2012 No. 10-50982 is insufficient, they are factors that may be considered “in finding conspiratorial activity.” United States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 423 (5th Cir. 1996).
Davis argues that the government failed to present evidence demonstrating a shared objective to distribute the drugs or any evidence beyond a buyer-seller relationship. Specifically, Davis argues that the government did not present circumstantial evidence typical of conspiracy cases such as prolonged cooperation between Davis and his codefendants, a credit agreement, or an established distribution system. “[A] buyer-seller relationship, without more, will not prove a conspiracy . . . .” United States v. Maseratti, 1 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1993). “The rule shields mere acquirers and street-level users, who would otherwise be guilty of conspiracy to distribute, from the more severe penalties reserved for distributers.” United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 333 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The receipt of drugs without payment is “‘strong evidence’ of membership in a conspiracy because it indicates a strong level of trust and an ongoing, mutually dependent relationship.” United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 860 (5th Cir. 1998). The government presented evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendants were fronted the drugs. Thompson testified that one kilogram of cocaine was worth $17,000 to $18,000 in El Paso and would increase in value as it was transported away from El Paso. Based on his testimony, the total amount of the cocaine was worth at least $255,000. The duffel bag contained only $15,995 in cash. From this, the jury could infer that Thomas, Davis, and Chapman received the drugs without full payment. The government also presented evidence from which the jury could infer that Davis acted in concert with Chapman, Thomas, and Favela. Jimenez testified that he asked a man in running clothes for “Mr. T” and that the man 5 Case: 10-50982 Document: 00511942948 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/02/2012 No. 10-50982 directed him to the van parked next to the restaurant. A government agent who followed Jimenez into the truck stop testified that he saw Davis in the store at the same time wearing a jogging-type suit. The jury could reasonably infer that it was Davis with whom Jimenez spoke in the truck stop. Further, Jimenez testified that the man in the running clothes was the passenger in the Cadillac when he was told to open the back door and retrieve the duffel bag of money. Davis then drove the van from the truck stop and, after the van overturned, ran to the Cadillac driven by Thomas. Finally, Davis, as driver of the van, was entrusted with 15 kilograms of cocaine. “[W]e have inferred knowledge of the conspiracy when the defendant is entrusted to carry a large amount of drugs.” Ochoa, 667 F.3d at 648. The jury could reasonably infer from Davis’s instruction to Jimenez in the truck stop, presence in the Cadillac when the drugs were placed in the van and the money was retrieved, and action in driving the van from the lot that Davis was an active and knowing participant in a conspiracy with Thomas, Chapman, and Favela. Further, because the drugs were fronted to Thomas, Davis, and Chapman, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the relationship with Favela was more than a buy-sell transaction.
Thomas argues that there was insufficient evidence at trial to prove that he knowingly either entered into a conspiracy or attempted to possess cocaine. Thomas argues that his only connection to the cocaine was that he was driving the Cadillac at the time it was pulled over by Wagner and that there was no evidence of guilty knowledge. Thomas further argues there was evidence that multiple people walked between the vehicles in the parking lot, and therefore there was no evidence he spoke with Jimenez. “[K]nowledge of a conspiracy and voluntary participation may be inferred from a collection of circumstances.” United States v. Watkins, 591 F.3d 780, 788 6 Case: 10-50982 Document: 00511942948 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/02/2012 No. 10-50982 (5th Cir. 2009) (marks and citation omitted). When Chapman was talking to Jimenez, he stated that he had one of his men at the truck stop prior to the van’s arrival, then stated that the van was pulling in to park next to the Cadillac and that “we” were at the truck stop. Jimenez testified that the driver of the Cadillac directed him to open the backdoor and retrieve the black duffel bag of money. Although Jimenez did not identify Thomas as the man in the driver’s seat of the Cadillac, the government presented evidence from which a juror could infer that Thomas was that individual. Jimenez testified that the man in the driver’s seat was not Clark or the man he spoke with in the store, later identified as Davis. The government presented evidence that Thomas was driving the Cadillac when it left the lot. The jury could reasonably infer that Thomas was the man in the driver’s seat who directed Jimenez to retrieve the money. Thomas argues that the government failed to present any evidence of knowledge. We disagree. The government presented sufficient evidence that Thomas acted in concert with Davis and Chapman. There was evidence the Cadillac was parked next to the van for at least half an hour as the parties waited for the drugs to be placed in the van, followed the van with the sham cocaine out of the truck stop parking lot, and then traveled with the van. When Davis lost control of the van and flipped off of the road, Thomas stopped for him to get into the Cadillac and then continued driving. In doing so, Thomas and Davis abandoned the van on the side of the road. The jury could infer that Thomas’s actions indicated that he was acting in concert with Davis and that his actions in stopping only long enough for Davis to get into the Cadillac indicated his knowledge of the illegal purpose of the conspiracy. Although each of these facts alone may have been insufficient to find Thomas’s knowing participation in the conspiracy, the collection of circumstances was sufficient to support Thomas’s conviction. There was sufficient evidence to support Thomas’s convictions for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine. 7 Case: 10-50982 Document: 00511942948 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/02/2012 No. 10-50982 Thomas also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempt. Because we determine that venue was improper in the Western District of Texas on the attempt count, we need not address this issue.
Chapman argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s findings as to his involvement in the conspiracy because the only information linking him to the conspiracy was Bobo’s testimony identifying his voice on recorded calls and that testimony was impermissible. As discussed in Part III, the admission of Bobo’s testimony identifying Chapman’s voice was proper. Because it was properly admitted, the jury could reasonably infer that it was Chapman’s voice on the recorded calls with Jimenez. The recorded conversations demonstrate that Chapman voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. Chapman answered the number Favela instructed Jimenez to contact once he arrived in Missouri. The jury heard Chapman refer to other men at the truck stop as “we” and “us.” In one conversation, Chapman states “we got a blue van sitting out, outside” and directs Jimenez to “walk out and put it in the blue van.” This is consistent with Davis’s directing Jimenez to the van when asked for Mr. T. The government also presented evidence that Chapman and Jimenez discussed whether Jimenez was supposed to get money and Chapman stated he would check. Chapman confirmed that Jimenez would be able to “get something” for the “burritos,” which Jimenez testified referred to the cocaine. Chapman also told Jimenez that he was talking to Jimenez’s “people down that way.” Chapman also acknowledged that Jimenez was attempting to deliver the fifteen burritos. A jury could reasonably infer that Chapman was working in concert with Davis, Thomas, and Favela. The evidence was sufficient to support Chapman’s conspiracy conviction. 8 Case: 10-50982 Document: 00511942948 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/02/2012 No. 10-50982