Opinion ID: 1345015
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the campaign has failed to rebut the presumption of adequate representation

Text: [5] Because the Proponents' and the Campaign's interests are essentially identical, the Campaign may only defeat the presumption of adequate representation with a compelling showing to the contrary. Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086; see also Prete, 438 F.3d at 957-59 (holding that a public interest organization seeking intervention to defend a state constitutional ballot initiative failed to defeat the presumption of adequate representation when the ultimate objective of both the organization and the defendant party was to uphold the measure's validity). We assess the Campaign's rebuttal argument in terms of the three Arakaki factors: (1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of a proposed intervenor's arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect. Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086 (citing Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 792 F.2d at 778). The Campaign has failed to make a compelling showing that the Proponents will not mount an adequate defense of Prop. 8 against Perry's due process and equal protection claims. Even taking all of the Campaign's well-pleaded and nonconclusory allegations as true, Berg, 268 F.3d at 820, the record establishes that the Proponents are capable and willing to make the Campaign's arguments in support of Prop. 8 and will not neglect any elements necessary to the defense of Prop. 8. [6] The Campaign bases its argument almost entirely on the Proponents' Case Management Statement, proposed stipulations, and responses to Perry's proposed stipulations, which the Proponents submitted in response to the district court's request that they provide [a]dmissions and stipulations that the parties are prepared to enter with respect to the . . . elements of Perry's claims. Citing these documents, the Campaign asserts that the Proponents have conceded valuable legal ground and will not make arguments the Campaign is willing to make. These very documents illustrate that the Campaign overstates its case and that any differences between Proponents and the Campaign are primarily differences as to litigation tactics. Proponents' Case Management Statement, for example, amply illustrates their intention to mount a vigorous defense of the constitutionality of Prop. 8. Proponents detail the legal theories necessary to sustain Prop. 8 and state that they contest the existence of a fundamental liberty interest in same-sex marriage, declare that Prop. 8 does not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation and that same-sex and opposite-sex couples are not similarly situated groups, and argue that sexual orientation is not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. The Proponents also contend that Prop. 8 is sufficiently related to several legitimate governmental interests, such as [p]reserving the traditional definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman[;] [p]romoting the formation of naturally procreative unions[;] [p]romoting stability and responsible behavior in naturally procreative relationships[;] [p]romoting enduring and stable family structures for the responsible raising and care of children by their biological parents[;] [p]romoting the natural and mutually beneficial bond between parents and their biological children by encouraging parents to raise their biological children[;] [and] [a]cting incrementally and with caution when considering radical change to the fundamental nature of a bedrock social institution. Despite this robust defense of Prop. 8, the Campaign argues that the Proponents have shown their willingness to stipulate to specific facts proposed by Perry that would virtually establish, as a matter of law, that sexual orientation is a suspect class under the . . . criteria [set forth in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)] . . . [and] that there is no rational basis for defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman. The Campaign also argues that these concessions will jeopardize its interest in follow-on litigation. These sweeping allegations turn out to be just thatan unsupported broadside against the Proponents' litigation strategy. Proponents have not made concessions that would sell the Campaign down the river. Instead, in certain discrete areas, the Proponents found limited agreement with Perry. For the most part, however, the Proponents made clear again and again that while they may be able to agree to some form of [the] stipulation, [they] cannot agree to the formulation offered by plaintiffs. A review of the record shows that the Campaign has distorted Proponents' position in a number of respects. For example, contrary to the Campaign's assertions, the Proponents did not indicate they would stipulate across the board to the existence of continuing discrimination against gays and lesbians. [4] Instead, the Proponents explicitly refused to agree to the following stipulations: 15. Gay and lesbian individuals have been subjected to and stigmatized by a long history of purposeful and invidious discrimination that continues to this day. 16. Gay and lesbian individuals are still among the most stigmatized groups in the country. 17. Hate crimes against gay and lesbian individuals remain prevalent. 18. Although social antipathy toward gay and lesbian individuals has moderated, these groups suffer from continuing political disabilities and discrimination. Proponents also affirmatively stated their intention to present evidence demonstrating that . . . discrimination [against gays and lesbians] has decreased significantly in recent years, both in governmental and non-governmental contexts, as well as evidence that gays and lesbians wield substantial political power today. Further, while Proponents did anticipate that they may be able to agree to some form of th[e] stipulation that [s]exual orientation is fundamental to a person's identity and that [i]t can be harmful to an individual to attempt to change his or her sexual orientation, they refused to agree to Perry's proposed formulation. The Proponents also refused to stipulate that [t]here is no credible evidence that sexual orientation can or should be changed, and affirmatively represented their intention to dispute Plaintiffs' claim that homosexuality is immutable. Similarly, Proponents anticipate[d] that they may be able to agree to some form of th[e] stipulation that [a]n individual's capacity to raise children does not depend on the individual's sexual orientation, but refused to agree to Perry's proposed formulation. The Proponents also refused to stipulate that [t]he best interests of a child are equally served by being raised by same-sex parents, or that [l]esbian and gay parents are as likely as heterosexual parents to provide supportive and healthy environments for children, and indicated that they may submit expert opinion that a child's biological parents provide the optimal environment for raising that child. The Campaign's contention that Proponents are willing to stipulate to, and therefore . . . not present evidence on the issue of gays and lesbians' past persecution; the fact that sexual orientation is a kind of distinguishing characteristic that defines gays and lesbians as a discrete group; and the idea that an individual's ability to form long-term committed relationships does not depend on sexual orientation, is also overstated. Rather, Proponents indicated that they might be able to agree to some form of the stipulation, but rejected Perry's proposed formulation. [7] In the end, out of sixty-seven proposed stipulations, the Proponents were willing to stipulate to only three facts that the Campaign highlights that it would not have conceded: (1) that, except for procreation, being homosexual does not affect an individual's ability to perform or contribute to society; (2) that being homosexual does not result in any impairment in judgment or general social and vocational capacities; and (3) that, [a]s a matter of history, individuals practicing a homosexual lifestyle have experienced discrimination. These differences are not sufficient to satisfy the Campaign's rebuttal burden of a compelling showing of inadequate representation. See Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086. Our review of these claims, coupled with the Campaign's statements at oral argument, leads us to conclude that the real differences between the Proponents and the Campaign boil down to strategy calls. Indeed, as the Proponents pointed out, they would be hard pressed to deny that gays and lesbians have experienced discrimination in the past in light of the Ninth Circuit's ruling in High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office that homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination. 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990). [8] Although it appears that the Proponents may not defend Prop. 8 in the exact manner that the Campaign would, the Campaign has not shown that Proponents have conceded any  necessary elements to the proceeding. Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086 (emphasis added). Rather, the Proponents' Case Management Statement documents their intention to mount a full and vigorous defense of Prop. 8's constitutionality. To the extent that there is disagreement between the Proponents and the Campaign, it is best characterized as a dispute over litigation strategy or tactics. As we have held, mere[ ] differences in [litigation] strategy . . . are not enough to justify intervention as a matter of right. United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 402-03 (9th Cir. 2002); Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that minor differences in opinion between the parties and proposed intervenor fail[ ] to demonstrate inadequacy of representation); see also Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that [o]f course, the use of different arguments as a matter of litigation judgment is not inadequate representation per se ). Finally, the Campaign argues that the number of parties on each side of the litigation will result in an unbalanced presentation [that] will not create the fully developed factual record and fully adversarial proceeding necessary to resolve the significant constitutional questions Plaintiffs have raised. The Campaign cites no authority for this proposition. Indeed, adequate representation is surely not a numbers game. Having an equal number of parties on each side is hardly the sine qua non of adequate representation in an adversarial process. In judging representation, we look to substance, not numbers.