Opinion ID: 529726
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Robinson's Alleged Responsibility for Diecks'

Text: Constitutional Tort 77 As we have noted, Sample argues in the alternative that Robinson failed to enforce the written procedures and that his failure resulted in Sample's overstay. This argument focuses not on what system Robinson established, but on the adequacy of his supervision of the prison system. We think the rubric supervision entails, among other things, training, defining expected performance by promulgating rules or otherwise, monitoring adherence to performance standards, and responding to unacceptable performance whether through individualized discipline or further rulemaking. For the purpose of defining the standard for liability of a supervisor under Sec. 1983, the characterization of a particular aspect of supervision is unimportant. Supervisory liability in this context presents the question whether Robinson was responsible for--whether he was the moving force [behind], City of Canton v. Harris, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978))--Diecks' constitutional tort. 6 78 In City of Canton v. Harris--a case that had not yet been decided at the time of the proceedings in the district court--the Court considered the standard for liability for an official's failure to train, an aspect of supervision. In particular, the Court first rejected the municipality's argument that it could be held liable only if its policy regarding training itself violated the Constitution. The Court recognized that in some circumstances such a policy, not itself unconstitutional, could give rise to Sec. 1983 liability when causally related to a constitutional tort of a municipal employee. In describing those circumstances, the court first addressed the degree of fault that must be evidenced by a municipality's inaction before liability is permitted. It held that a municipality may be held liable for a failure to train public employees that results in a constitutional violation [o]nly where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants. 109 S.Ct. at 1206. The Court further observed that liability may be imposed where the risk of constitutional violations is so great and obvious that deliberate indifference can be inferred from that risk and the city's failure to address it through appropriate training. [T]he need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force, [for example] may be 'so obvious,' that failure to do so could properly be characterized as 'deliberate indifference' to constitutional rights. Id. at 1205 n. 10. The Court also noted that where the risk is not obvious from the nature of the activity, the existence of a pattern of constitutional violations may provide a basis for implying deliberate indifference on the part of city policymakers to the need for training in a particular area. 79 The Court went on to caution, however, that for liability to attach ... the identified deficiency in a city's training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury. Id. at 1206. That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city. Thus, in the factual setting of City of Canton, the Court stressed that the plaintiff must still prove that the deficiency in training actually caused the police officer's indifference to her medical needs. Id. Finally, the Court emphasized: 80 To adopt lesser standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to unprecedented liability under Sec. 1983. In virtually every instance where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a Sec. 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city could have done to prevent the unfortunate incident. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, [471 U.S. 808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2436, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) ]. Thus, permitting cases against cities for their failure to train employees to go forward under Sec. 1983 on a lesser standard of fault would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities--a result we rejected in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 693, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ].... 81 Id. 82 Although the issue here is one of individual liability rather than of the liability of a political subdivision, we are confident that, absent official immunity, 7 the standard of individual liability for supervisory public officials will be found to be no less stringent than the standard of liability for the public entities that they serve. In either case, a person is not the moving force [behind] the constitutional violation of a subordinate, City of Canton, 109 S.Ct. at 1205, unless that person--whether a natural one or a municipality--has exhibited deliberate indifference to the plight of the person deprived. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir.1988). 83 Based on City of Canton, we conclude that a judgment could not properly be entered against Robinson in this case based on supervisory liability absent an identification by Sample of a specific supervisory practice or procedure that Robinson failed to employ and specific findings by the district court that (1) the existing custom and practice without that specific practice or procedure created an unreasonable risk of prison overstays, (2) Robinson was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (3) Robinson was indifferent to that risk, and (4) Diecks' failure to assure that Sample's complaint received meaningful consideration resulted from Robinson's failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure. Sample has not made such an identification. The district court may have made the first of these findings implicitly; it clearly did not make the last three. Accordingly, the judgment against Robinson cannot be sustained on this theory and we will remand for further consideration in light of the governing principles identified in this opinion. Given that neither the parties nor the court had the benefit of City of Canton when this case was originally tried, the district court may wish to take, or have the magistrate take, further evidence. We leave that to the discretion of the district court, however. 84 On remand, the district court should bear in mind that under the teachings of City of Canton it is not enough for a plaintiff to argue that the constitutionally cognizable injury would not have occurred if the superior had done more than he or she did. The district court must insist that Sample identify specifically what it is that Robinson failed to do that evidences his deliberate indifference. Only in the context of a specific defalcation on the part of the supervisory official can the court assess whether the official's conduct evidenced deliberate indifference and whether there is a close causal relationship between the identified deficiency and the ultimate injury. 85 Normally, an unreasonable risk in a supervisory liability case will be shown by evidence that such harm has in fact occurred on numerous occasions. Similarly, deliberate indifference to a known risk will ordinarily be demonstrated by evidence that the supervisory official failed to respond appropriately in the face of an awareness of a pattern of such injuries. The present record in this case does not affirmatively show a pattern of injuries similar to Sample's and there is no indication that Robinson was aware of any such incident. City of Canton indicates that this absence of prior incidents and knowledge thereof is not necessarily fatal to Sample's case. As we have noted, that case observed that there are situations in which the risk of constitutionally cognizable harm is so great and so obvious that the risk and the failure of supervisory officials to respond will alone support findings of the existence of an unreasonable risk, of knowledge of that unreasonable risk, and of indifference to it. Nevertheless, in the absence of a pattern of constitutionally cognizable injuries, it becomes particularly important for a trial court finding for the plaintiff to explain the basis for its inference in the plaintiff's favor on all three of these issues.