Opinion ID: 2118517
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: StricklandFailure to Investigate or Present Mitigating Evidence

Text: Next, defendant claims that his trial counsel, Doherty, was ineffective during the capital sentencing hearing because he failed to investigate and present evidence in mitigation. He argues that Doherty's ineffective representation denied a meaningful assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty. Defendant asks this court to grant him a new sentencing hearing or, at a minimum, order the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this issue. Defendant's sentencing hearing lasted one day. In aggravation, the State presented the victim impact testimony from the victim's two daughters and widow; evidence concerning two prior carjackings performed by defendant in the five days before the murder; evidence regarding defendant's prior drug offenses; disciplinary violations occurring at the Cook County jail during his incarceration, including several instances involving homemade knives; evidence concerning defendant's gang affiliation and his position within the gang; and testimony from the assistant State's Attorney that defendant was cool, calm, and collected during her interrogation and his subsequent statement. Conversely, in mitigation Doherty submitted 17 letters from defendant's family and friends. Defendant's sister collected these letters from family and friends without Doherty's instruction or assistance. These letters discussed defendant's childhood, family, capacity for good grades, and devotion to religion. The letters did not request leniency, but consistently stated: I like to start off by saying I am a tax paying citizen and by that token [defendant] is a waste of tax paying citizen money. I say this because I know he is innocent, no doubt about it.    [Defendant] went to school and got very good grades like he was suppose [ sic ] to. He played with the children in the neighborhood. [Defendant] was a quiet person who loved people. I just don't believe [defendant] committed such an offense as hurting someone or killing someone.    [Defendant] shouldn't have to do the time if he didn't do the crime. I think [defendant] took the blame or got framed.    It is my strong belief, as God as my witness, [defendant] did not commit this offense. He was wrongfully accused and convicted of committing this offense, despite the overwhelming evidence to support his innocence. The prosecutorial arguments weren't convincing enough to link him to this crime. After Doherty submitted the letters to the court, he presented a short argument in mitigation, during which he quickly discussed defendant's troubled childhood and summarized the letters: MR. DOHERTY: I won't recite from the rest of the letters, judge, but they are all similar in that fashion, that he got good grades in school, he was growing up all right, was given religion and then was led astray by the gang. THE COURT: Mr. Doherty, I just want you to know if you want to quote from any of those letters, you go ahead and do it, you take whatever time you need to present whatever you want to present, don't feel that you're being rushed because you're not going to be rushed at all. MR. DOHERTY: No, no, no, I know your Honor would allow, and I sincerely believe that  . Defendant argues that if Doherty had reviewed pretrial investigation reports, and performed even minimal investigation, he would have learned that defendant suffered from severe depression, dependant personality disorder, and organic brain disorder. Defendant also argues that Doherty failed to investigate and present evidence concerning his personal and family history, including the history of drug and alcohol abuse, emotional neglect and possible physical abuse. Finally, defendant maintains that Doherty failed to present evidence regarding his rehabilitative potential to rebut the State's evidence of future dangerousness. To support his claim, defendant relies upon Doherty's affidavit wherein Doherty admits that he negligently failed to investigate or present evidence in mitigation: I never seriously considered that his case was a death penalty case in the sense that it ever occurred to me that a death sentence might actually be imposed.    I never investigated David's case to develop evidence for purposes of a capital sentencing hearing. My failure to investigate was not based on facts that led me to conclude no investigation was necessary, to the contrary, my failure to investigate was based entirely upon my own feeling that David's case didn't merit imposition of the death penalty, and that I hadn't received any `signals' to the contrary. In short, my failure to investigate this aspect of David's case was neither a strategic nor a tactical decision. Furthermore, defendant relies upon a mitigation report from Marylynne Kaplan, a licensed forensic social worker; a psychological assessment report by Dr. Harry Gunn, Ph.D.; a neuropsychological assessment report by Dr. Johnathan Hess, Ph.D; a risk assessment report by Dr. Mark Cunningham, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist; psychiatric records from the Cook County department of corrections' Cermak Health Services; psychiatric records from the Illinois Department of Corrections; an affidavit from defendant's sister, Susie Harris; school records from the Chicago board of education and Sullivan House High School; and a copy of a Gangster Disciples organizational chart used as a government exhibit in federal litigation. In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699. The standard to determine whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at a capital sentencing hearing is governed by the Strickland standard. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 403, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063. In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below minimal professional standards and that a reasonable probability exists that the sentence was affected by the poor performance. People v. Steidl, 177 Ill.2d 239, 257, 226 Ill.Dec. 592, 685 N.E.2d 1335 (1997), citing Orange, 168 Ill.2d at 168, 213 Ill.Dec. 589, 659 N.E.2d 935; People v. Caballero, 126 Ill.2d 248, 259-60, 128 Ill.Dec. 1, 533 N.E.2d 1089 (1989); People v. Perez, 148 Ill.2d 168, 186, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984 (1992). Generally, courts of review are deferential of trial counsel's decisions regarding the presentation of evidence in mitigation. Steidl, 177 Ill.2d at 257, 226 Ill.Dec. 592, 685 N.E.2d 1335. However, deference is not warranted if counsel's failure to present evidence is due to his or her failure to investigate. Steidl, 177 Ill.2d at 257, 226 Ill.Dec. 592, 685 N.E.2d 1335; see also People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill.2d 368, 385, 226 Ill.Dec. 791, 686 N.E.2d 574 (1997) (where counsel has neglected to conduct a proper investigation into mitigating circumstances, the failure to introduce mitigating evidence cannot be attributed to strategy), quoting People v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509, 535, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919 (1995). In Steidl, we considered a defendant's claim that his counsel was ineffective at the sentencing hearing for failing to prepare and present sufficient mitigation evidence. Steidl, 177 Ill.2d at 257, 226 Ill. Dec. 592, 685 N.E.2d 1335. Defense counsel indicated that based upon the defendant's lack of a serious criminal history, and his belief that it was unlikely that defendant would get the death penalty, he did not prepare for the sentencing hearing. We held that defense counsel's failure to conduct even a minimal investigation into possible mitigation evidence raises serious questions as to the effectiveness. Steidl, 177 Ill.2d at 258-59, 226 Ill.Dec. 592, 685 N.E.2d 1335. In Steidl, defense counsel's serious inaction constituted deficient performance, and the lack of evidence offered in mitigation prejudiced defendant. Similarly, in this case defendant argues that Doherty was woefully unprepared for the capital sentencing hearing because he did not consider defendant a serious candidate for the death penalty. Doherty's failure to present evidence in mitigation was not a strategic choice, but rather an omission due to his own lack of preparation. Doherty's failure to investigate and present evidence in mitigation produced an unreliable and unjust result. He failed to investigate potential sources of mitigation clearly contained in the pretrial investigation report. The pretrial report indicates that defendant was treated for depression in 1994 and prescribed psychotropic medicine for a period of five months before he refused to continue treatment. The pretrial report states that defendant consumed a pint of hard liquor and a half ounce of marijuana on a weekly basis. Doherty failed to make even initial inquiries into these matters. Furthermore, although defendant denied a history of physical or emotional abuse, the pretrial report indicated that he described his childhood as rough. Again, Doherty never investigated or contacted individuals regarding this potential mitigating evidence. See People v. Morgan, 187 Ill.2d 500, 544-45, 241 Ill.Dec. 552, 719 N.E.2d 681 (1999) (the duty to investigate is not limited to matters about which defendant has informed defense counsel or lessened by the lack of the specificity of information conveyed). Therefore, we consider whether a reasonable probability exists that defendant's sentence was affected by the poor performance. In so doing, we take into account the extent of the evidence in mitigation, as well as aggravation. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d at 538, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919. In this case, evidence regarding defendant's depression, dependent personality disorder, organic brain damage and social background may have explained the aggravating evidence presented by the State and, more importantly, defendant's actions at the time of the crime. Particularly, the post-conviction exhibits suggest that defendant suffers from dependent personality disorder. Several individuals, including defendant's former academic advisor and one expert concluded that defendant is a follower not a leader, easily led by his peers, unwilling to make decisions without assistance from others, in constant need of approval, insecure, an unwise follower, and suffers from massive dependency. Additionally, a review of the sentencing transcript reveals that the trial judge was influenced by the lack of mitigation evidence: I started out with the feeling that I would attempt to look at everything in the best eye possible to find something mitigating in Mr. David Harris.    I was listening to the arguments of the defense saying, you know that David had this problem where three people died in his family, and then he had no role models   .    I am suppose to think that David Harris acted this way only because somebody else told him, I don't think so. I think that David Harris acted on his own volition. These comments clearly reveal a connection between the judge's imposition of the death penalty and Doherty's failure to present any mitigating evidence. We cannot say that the mitigation evidence contained in the post-conviction record could not have altered the determination that there was no evidence that mitigated against the imposition of the death sentence. Doherty's deficient performance, and the weight of the missing evidence in mitigation, make a substantial showing that Doherty's performance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Doherty's failure to investigate and present evidence in mitigation may have so undermined the proper function of the adversarial system as to have produced an unjust result and raises serious doubts regarding the propriety of defendant's sentence. See Morgan, 187 Ill.2d at 557, 241 Ill.Dec. 552, 719 N.E.2d 681 (The court must scrutinize and remain vigilant in determining whether the proceedings are unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process). Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's dismissal of the defendant's petition on this ground and remand for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's allegations. Defendant requests that this court remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing, rather than remand the matter to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing. Although the record clearly makes a showing that Doherty's performance was deficient and that his performance, or lack thereof, prejudiced defendant, we decline to grant a new sentencing hearing absent an evidentiary hearing. The circuit court, in the context of an evidentiary hearing, offers the more appropriate forum to address Doherty's alleged ineffective representation. This is true because, although there is no evidence that Doherty willfully committed reversible error, a court should be critical of conduct designed to disrupt the appropriate administration of justice. Thus, while counsel is obligated to admit that he or she negligently represented a defendant, his or her obligation does not end with the filing of an affidavit. The State has the right to attack the factual basis of the affidavit, and one method to attack the credibility of an affidavit is through cross-examination during the course of an evidentiary hearing. This ensures that counsel, in their zeal to advocate for their client, do not betray their obligation to the court. For this reason, we decline to grant defendant a new sentencing hearing absent an evidentiary hearing.