Opinion ID: 1488269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The institutional history

Text: The section of the presentence investigation report pertaining to institutional history states: On or about 12/6/83 the defendant, John Norman Huffington was cited for 1) refusing to obey a direct order and 2) creating a security threat. The defendant received ten days in disciplinary isolation for each of those infractions. Evidently the defendant offered resistance to Deputy Minnick while being searched. As to the second infraction the defendant apparently interfered with the searching of other inmates in the cell block. Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 297 A.2d 696 (1972), involved the Maryland death sentence cases remanded to us by the Supreme Court of the United States for reconsideration in the light of its holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). In discussing the procedure to be followed by trial judges in re-sentencing those defendants, Chief Judge Murphy said for the Court: [T]o aid the sentencing judge in fairly and intelligently exercising the discretion vested in him, the procedural policy of the State encourages him to consider information concerning the convicted person's reputation, past offenses, health, habits, mental and moral propensities, social background and any other matters that a judge ought to have before him in determining the sentence that should be imposed. Skinker v. State, 239 Md. 234, 210 A.2d 716 (1965); Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575 (1965); Costello v. State, 237 Md. 464, 206 A.2d 812 (1965); Driver v. State, [201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570 (1952)]; Baker v. State, [3 Md. App. 251, 238 A.2d 561 (1968)]. The sentencing judge may, but need not, obtain a presentence report under Article 41, § 124(b). Of course, the sentencing judge may take into consideration the defendant's conduct after the offense was committed, viz., he may consider evidence of events occurring after the date of the original sentencing to whatever extent he may deem necessary. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949); Purnell v. State, [241 Md. 582, 217 A.2d 298 (1966)]; Gatewood v. State, 15 Md. App. 450, 291 A.2d 688 (1972). 267 Md. at 193-94, 297 A.2d at 706. More recently in Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 632 (1981), Judge Digges said for the Court: In considering what is proper punishment, it is now well-settled in this State that a judge is not limited to reviewing past conduct whose occurrence has been judicially established, but may view `reliable evidence of conduct which may be opprobrious although not criminal, as well as details and circumstances of criminal conduct for which the person has not been tried.' Henry v. State, 273 Md. 131, 147-48, 328 A.2d 293, 303 (1974). 289 Md. at 481, 425 A.2d at 643. We are not concerned here with crimes, as in Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 465 A.2d 1126 (1983), with which an accused was charged but had not yet been convicted. We believe that under our prior cases this institutional history was properly admissible.