Opinion ID: 1314092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence Concerning Respondent Lapica

Text: Chowdhry next contends that the district court improperly excluded evidence concerning Lapica's employment history. The district court excluded the evidence upon a determination that similarities between the past and present incidents had not been established and because it sought to avoid a parade of witnesses on this collateral issue. The district court ruled that the evidence would be excluded because of its marginal relevance and because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. NRS 48.035 provides that even relevant evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues and misleading the jury. Questions of probative value are left to the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse. McCourt v. J.C. Penney Co., 103 Nev. 101, 103, 734 P.2d 696, 698 (1987). Moreover, where evidence is marginally relevant and could inject collateral issues which would divert the jury from the real issues in the case, exclusion is proper. Nevada Nat'l Bank v. Huff, 94 Nev. 506, 516, 582 P.2d 364, 371 (1978). We discern no error in the district court's ruling on this issue. The district court acted well within its discretion in excluding the evidence.