Opinion ID: 714869
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Audiotapes

Text: 6 During the undercover investigation, customs agents recorded many potentially incriminating conversations with the defendants. Over vigorous objections, the district court allowed the jury to take to the jury room fourteen tapes that had not been played in the courtroom. The jurors requested and were provided with a tape recorder. They were given no instructions about the tapes. 7 It is clear that the court erred in sending the tapes to the jury room. On three occasions, we have considered problems associated with having a jury rehear tapes that have already been played in open court. See United States v. Felix-Rodriguez, 22 F.3d 964 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Kupau, 781 F.2d 740, 741-43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823, 107 S.Ct. 93, 93 L.Ed.2d 45 (1986). These cases establish that, at a minimum, replaying the tapes is error because the period when the jurors listen to tapes is properly viewed as a stage of the trial at which the presence of the defendant is required. Kupau, 781 F.2d at 743; see Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a). 1 The question in this case is whether the error can be reviewed for harmlessness, as it was in the replay cases, Felix-Rodriguez, 22 F.3d at 967 (harmless error); Brown, 832 F.2d at 130 (harmful error); Kupau, 781 F.2d at 743 (not plain error), or whether it was a structural error requiring reversal. 8 Allowing the jury to listen, without any guidance, to tapes that had never been presented in open court is a more grievous error than replaying them in a judge's presence. These tapes went to the jury room in violation of Rule 43 and, possibly, the Confrontation Clause. The court completely abdicated control of the presentation of the evidence. It made no analysis of whether undue emphasis might be placed on some of the recorded conversations. The court gave no instruction that the jurors must listen to the tapes in their entirety in accordance with the rule of completeness and Fed.R.Evid. 106. And this error undermines one of the most fundamental tenets of our justice system: that a defendant's conviction may be based only on the evidence presented during the trial. Sending the tapes to the jury room is akin to allowing a new witness to testify privately, without cross-examination, to the jury during its deliberations. 9 In cases where the error is so fundamental and defies meaningful review, we have said that harmless or plain error analysis may not be applied. Instead, we find the error to be a structural error requiring automatic reversal. We find structural error where there are structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). 2 Sending unplayed tapes to the jury room is such a defect. It violates the basic framework of the trial system, which requires that evidence be presented and tested in front of the jury, judge and defendant. 10 Two recent cases provide guidance. In Guam v. Marquez, 963 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.1992), we found structural error where the court gave written instructions to the jury in lieu of reading them in open court. We concluded that the error compels an automatic reversal because the impact of the error on the jury's performance of its duties cannot be reviewed. Id. at 1316. Here, we cannot assess the impact of the unplayed tapes on the jury's deliberations. Based on the request for a tape recorder, we may assume that the jurors listened to at least part of one tape, but because of the time constraints they cannot have listened to all of them. 11 In Riley v. Deeds, 56 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.1995), we found structural error when an audiotape was replayed in court without the judge present and with his clerk presiding. We said that structural error analysis was the correct approach where there was a complete abdication of judicial control over the process. In this structural vacuum, a rule requiring the defendant to show prejudice, or one requiring the state to show lack of prejudice, makes no sense. Id. Here, the district court also abdicated its control by sending the tapes to the jury room without first playing them in open court and without presiding during their presentation. In these circumstances we are unable to determine whether the jury's use of the tapes violated the rule of completeness or whether the portions the jury heard provided undue emphasis. Fed.R.Evid. 106; see United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 600 (9th Cir.1985). 12 We reverse all convictions. We find it unnecessary to address most other issues raised by the defendants. We address two issues that might be raised in a new trial.