Opinion ID: 1881447
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prospective Juror Russell

Text: With these standards in mind, we must determine whether the trial court erred in denying the challenge for cause as to prospective juror Russell. When questioned as to his thoughts on the presumption of innocence and a defendant's right to remain silent during the trial, Russell responded: I understand what Judge Jones said, but I kind of believe like, I'd want to get up there if I was innocent, you know, and say what I had to say to explain myself. Shortly thereafter, he added: MR. RUSSELL: I always think if a person's innocent they should get up on that stand and speak for themselves. That's the way I believe. But also, I understand what the Judge said, too. It's like confusing to me.... But in all honesty, that's what I really believe. I believe a person should get up there and say, I didn't do this. MR. SMITH [Defense Counsel]: That's what you want someone to do? MR. RUSSELL: Yes. (Emphasis supplied.) Immediately thereafter, the judge explained that the defendant did not have to testify and that a failure to testify could not be held against him. Russell responded: MR. RUSSELL: I could follow the law, what you're telling me. THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. RUSSELL: But I'm giving you my honest opinion. THE COURT: That's all we want. MR. SMITH: Was there anything that you would have to overcome then in your mind for whatever reason, whether it's my advice or MR. RUSSELL: If it's your advice to him not to MR. SMITH: Or for whatever reason, you think that you would tend to kind of hold that against him or want to hear from him? MR. RUSSELL: It's like I said, I could follow the Judge's rules, but I still feel the person should get up there if they're innocent. MR. SMITH: Okay. MR. RUSSELL: I can'tI can't see myself sitting there and being accused of a crime and not getting up there and trying to clear myself, you know. MR. SMITH: Uh-huh. (Emphasis supplied.) Each juror was then individually questioned with respect to the responses they had given during generalized voir dire. The following colloquy ensued: THE COURT: When we were out there in the open group there, you had some reservations about the Defendant's right to remain silent. MR. RUSSELL: Yeah. THE COURT: What if, as part of the evidence, you were not presented with testimony from the Defendant? MR. RUSSELL: Well, I willI will be able to follow your instruction without  THE COURT: meaning if I sit here and say he doesn't, the Defendant MR. RUSSELL: If he doesn't testify and you say that he doesn't have to, then I respect that. THE COURT: Not only doesn't he have to, but it can't be considered as evidence of guilt. MR. RUSSELL: Right, I wouldright. THE COURT: It cannot be used in any adverse way against him. MR. RUSSELL: Right. THE COURT: It cannot come into your deliberations whatsoever. MR. RUSSELL: Right. THE COURT: Yesterday you had reservations about that. MR. RUSSELL: Well, that'sright, that's the way I always feel about it when someone doesn't take the stand, I figure they've got something to hide. That's the way I've always believed. THE COURT: Right. MR. RUSSELL: But I can shut that out. If you tell me to shut it out, I still shut it out. ... SMITH: You said that you would expect and you've always believed that someone should testify, isn't that what you just stated? MR. RUSSELL: You mean the MR. SMITH: The person charged should always testify. MR. RUSSELL: Yeah. I don't know, I just, to me I feel like if I was charged with a crime that I'd want to get up there knowing that I'm innocent and tell it to the jury myself. That's the way I believe. MR. SMITH: And you think that that's what people should do if they're charged with a crime? MR. RUSSELL: That's what I feel I should do. MR. SMITH: Well, what about other people? You wouldn't tend to hold that against someone who wouldn't take the stand? MR. RUSSELL: No, that'sit's MR. SMITH: You wouldn't think, well, why didn't he? MR. RUSSELL: I would think that, but I would close that out of my mind, because the Judge said to close it out of your mind. MR. SMITH: Well, I mean, MR. RUSSELL: I wouldn't consider that if that's what you're asking me. I wouldn't hold it against him. (Emphasis supplied.) We begin our analysis with the premise that the presumption of innocence is defeated if a juror is taken upon a trial whose mind is in such condition that the accused must produce evidence of his innocence to avoid a conviction. Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7, 24 (Fla.1959) (quoting Powell v. State, 131 Fla. 254, 175 So. 213, 216 (1937)). The record in this case clearly demonstrates that Mr. Russell admitted during voir dire that he has always believed that when someone doesn't take the stand ... they've got something to hide. As the record also reveals, he reiterated this same sentiment on more than one occasion. He also stated, however, that he could shut that out and that he was able to follow [the court's] instructions. The obvious question is whether Russell's assurances that he would be able to follow instructions sufficiently negate his prior stated beliefs that it was his honest opinion that a defendant who does not testify must have something to hide. See generally Price v. State, 538 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (quoting Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591, 121 So. 793, 796 (1929) (It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the reasoning which leads to the conclusion that a person stands free of bias of prejudice who having voluntarily and emphatically asserted its existence in his mind, in the next moment under skillful questioning declares his freedom from its influence. By what sort of principle is it to be determined that the last statement of the man is better and more worthy of belief than the former?)). Based on the totality of his responses, we conclude that Russell's assurance that he would be able to follow the law did not sufficiently negate his prior abiding adherence to the notion that he had always believed that defendants should testify if they have nothing to hide. In reaching our conclusion, we rely on our decision in Hamilton v. State, 547 So.2d 630 (Fla.1989), which involved a juror who indicated that she had extreme difficulty with the presumption of innocence and a defendant's right to remain silent. See 547 So.2d at 632. In Hamilton, defense counsel's challenge for cause was denied, as was his request for additional peremptory challenges. See id. In reversing and ordering a new trial, this Court noted that [a]lthough the juror in this case stated in response to questions from the bench that she could hear the case with an open mind, her other responses raised doubt as to whether she could be unbiased. Id. at 633. Our conclusion in this case is similarly guided by the reasoning of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Lowe v. State, 718 So.2d 920 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). In that case, a prospective juror's statements indicated that he possessed what the court termed as an undeniable misunderstanding of the presumption of innocence. Id. at 921. The court found error in the trial court's decision to not remove the person for cause, noting that [t]his juror's single statement that he would acquit if the state presented insufficient evidence was tortuously teased from him only by the most pointed of leading questions. Even if it had been spontaneous, after his repeated assertions imposing on the defendant some burden to erase any idea of guilt, this single statement could not possibly evidence the correction or elimination of a view so resolutely held and repeatedly stated. Id. at 922-23; see also Huber v. State, 669 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (Even though [the] prospective juror... eventually said he would be able to follow the law and require the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, his original expression of doubt about his ability to presume the defendant innocent because he believes that police don't arrest innocent people is a basis for reasonable doubt that he might not be able to render an impartial verdict. This was not overcome by his subsequent capitulation and agreement that he would follow the law as given to him by the trial court, and it was error to not dismiss [him] for cause.) The Third District reached a similar conclusion in Gibson v. State, 534 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), in which it remanded for a new trial after one of the potential jurors stated during voir dire, I feel if they are innocent, they can tell their side of the story to the judge. Id. at 1232. Although the juror ultimately indicated that if she had a reasonable doubt she would find the defendant not guilty, the appellate court concluded that her answers gave reasonable doubt as to whether she could render an impartial verdict. See id. In the present case, after thorough consideration and analysis of the totality of Mr. Russell's voir dire statements with respect to the presumption of innocence and a defendant's right to not testify at trial, we conclude that his responses sufficiently placed in doubt his ability to be an impartial juror, notwithstanding the tortured attempt at rehabilitation. Accordingly, we must conclude that Mr. Russell should have been excused for cause. [13]