Opinion ID: 615919
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: good-faith exception applies

Text: The only remaining question is whether the agents are entitled to rely on an invalid warrant under the good-faith exception in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914-15, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). [11] I agree that they are, but for different reasons than the majority. The only potential Leon situation applicable here is whether the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. . . . United States v. Schultz, 14 F.3d 1093, 1098 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405). [12] Whether an affidavit lacks indicia of probable cause is a less demanding showing than the `substantial basis' threshold required to prove the existence of probable cause in the first place. United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 851, 125 S.Ct. 261, 160 L.Ed.2d 84 (2004). The inquiry is whether an agent reading the warrant in a practical, common sense manner would be able to detect the deficiency. United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 337 (6th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1077, 119 S.Ct. 1480, 143 L.Ed.2d 563 (1999). In Van Shutters, we upheld reliance on an affidavit describing both the criminal activity and a location with such particularity that a reasonable executing agent would make the common sense inference that the affiant had verified a nexus between the two. Id. In this case, I disagree with the majority that the affidavit explains why it was necessary to image the entire server. Majority Op. at 542-43. The only area of the server for which the affidavit explains why a search is necessary relates to the unallocated space: I have been informed by James Fottrell, that the entirety of the unallocated space of the servers on which materials relating to IP address [xyz] are found should be searched because the unallocated space of those servers is likely to contain relevant evidence of materials that have been deleted or otherwise moved from the servers. R. 87-1 (BlackSun Aff. at ¶ 55). An explanation like the one above is never offered as to why probable cause exists to image the whole server; only the details of how the server is going to be imaged are given. The remaining parts of the affidavit, however, suggest a sufficient nexus between the illegal activity and the server as a whole to support a good-faith belief in the warrant's validity even though probable cause was ultimately lacking, particularly given the level of detail in the affidavit and the technical nature of the search. The affidavit describes at length the probable cause for suspecting that the JustinsFriends sites are engaging in the production and distribution of child pornography. The affidavit then briefly explains how the FBI agents were able to determine that the JustinsFriends sites were located on a single server at BlackSun. The affidavit indicates a FBI Special Agent spoke to BlackSun representatives and was told the content was hosted on Server # 4, and that Server # 4 was owned and leased by BlackSun. Id. at ¶ 47. The affidavit then describes BlackSun's website as advertising colocation services. [13] The affidavit concludes by stating that [m]embers of the justinsfriend website(s) are able to access servers through the use of a computer and computer modem or other connection device. Id. at ¶ 48. Although the use of the word leased may indicate to a technically savvy agent that this server in question was not necessarily owned entirely by JustinsFriends, the emphasis immediately following is on the colocation services offered at the BlackSun facility. That, coupled with the authorization to search the entire server, permit a common-sense inference of a sufficient connection between JustinsFriends and the entire server. I would therefore hold that the good-faith exception in Leon justifies affirming the district court's decision to deny the motion to suppress, despite the invalidity of the underlying warrant. I therefore concur in the judgment.