Opinion ID: 4282325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sanderson I

Text: ¶49. Not only was the chancellor’s limitation of the marital assets to the funds remaining in the joint account at the time of separation consistent with the clear terms of the prenuptial agreement, it was also rooted in Sanderson I. The chancellor’s reasoning was two-fold. First, Sanderson I’s holding was specific—“certain funds, used for familial purposes, kept in a joint bank account created after the marriage began do not fall within the parameters of the prenuptial agreement.” Sanderson I, 170 So. 3d at 432. Second, Sanderson I’s holding did not include reversing the prior chancellor’s classification of Hob’s home and investment accounts as marital—even though Tanya had raised the exact same commingling arguments in her Sanderson I briefs, as she did on remand. 21 ¶50. The chancellor was right on both counts. Tanya raised the exact same commingling arguments in Sanderson I regarding Hob’s home and investment accounts as she did on remand and in this second appeal. And while we acknowledged these raised points of error, we addressed only the joint bank account and the chancellor’s “clearinghouse” finding.12 See Sanderson I, 170 So. 3d at 437-38. The joint bank account was the only asset we held had been wrongly classified by the chancellor. Id. at 438. The opinion began by holding “that certain funds, used for familial purposes, kept in a joint bank account created after the marriage began, do not fall within the parameters of the prenuptial agreement.” Id. at 432 (emphasis added). Section III of the discussion specifically held “that the money deposited into the joint checking account became a marital asset subject to equitable division because of its familial use.” Id. at 437. And the opinion concluded by “revers[ing] the chancellor’s finding that the joint bank account funds were not commingled.” Id. at 438. ¶51. Significantly, we did not address whether potential further commingling may have occurred based on finding that the joint account was marital through the familial-use doctrine. Nor did we direct the chancellor to consider Tanya’s arguments that other assets had been commingled, in light of its holding.13 12 Section III of the opinion begins by noting that “Tanya argues the chancellor improperly found certain assets not commingled for purposes of making an equitable distribution of marital property. Included in the charge of error is a joint bank account.” Sanderson I, 170 So. 3d at 438. 13 Instead, the opinion merely stated, “After due consideration of the other issues raised, we discern no other errors.” Id. 22 ¶52. As the chancellor noted, this Court could have reversed and remanded the original chancellor’s finding that the marital home and Hob’s investment and banking accounts were his separate property but did not. Thus, the second chancellor reasonably concluded that Tanya’s request to reclassify these assets as marital was outside the scope of remand. And we find no abuse of discretion in the chancellor’s following this Court’s specific holding “that certain funds, used for familial purposes, kept in a joint bank account created after the marriage began, do not fall within the parameters of the prenuptial agreement” and thus were subject to equitable distribution. Id. at 432.