Opinion ID: 770952
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: MMS Orders to Pay and 28 U.S.C. 2415(a)

Text: 21 Because footnote 1 of Phillips III does not constitute a holding, it is incumbent upon this court to determine whether 2415(a) forecloses the government's claims. We hold that 2415(a) is inapplicable in these circumstances because orders issued by the MMS seeking unpaid royalties do not constitute actions. We reach this conclusion in part because [s]tatutes of limitation sought to be applied to bar rights of the Government, must receive a strict construction in favor of the Government. Badaracco v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 464 U.S. 386, 391 (1984) (citation omitted); accord United States v. Ward, 985 F.2d 500, 502 (10th Cir. 1993) (interpreting 2415(a)); Hess, 194 F.3d at 1175 (interpreting 2415(b)). Given our interpretation of the term action, we need not consider the government's alternative arguments that MMS orders do not seek money damages, are not founded upon contract, and are encompassed by the FOGRMA's otherwise provided by Congress exception. 22 Administrative orders issued by the MMS do not constitute actions for three reasons. First, throughout 2415, Congress linked the term action to the filing of a complaint. See 28 U.S.C. 2415(a), (b), (d) (barring an action founded upon contract, founded upon tort, or to recover money erroneously paid unless the complaint is filed within a specified time period). A complaint is usually regarded as [t]he original or initial pleading by which an action is commenced under codes or Rules of Civil Procedure. Black's Law Dictionary 285 (6th ed. 1990). Pleadings, in turn, normally include [t]he formal allegations by the parties to a lawsuit of their respective claims and defenses, with the intended purpose being to provide notice of what is to be expected at trial. Id. at 1152 (emphasis added); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, No. 93-1377, 1994 WL 484506, at  (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 1994) (unpublished disposition cited by the parties) (concluding that an agency order cannot be construed as a complaint and that [a]ctions that do not involve the filing of a complaint are not 'action[s] for money damages'). 9 Second, even if Congress had not used the term complaint throughout the statute, the phrase action for money damages typically refers to judicial proceedings. Black's Law Dictionary states that action, in its usual legal sense, means a lawsuit brought in a court; a formal complaint within the jurisdiction of a court of law. Id. at 28 (emphasis added); see also id. at 389 (defining damages as [a] pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may be recovered in the courts) (emphasis added). Third, nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to ascribe a specialized meaning to the term action in 2415. The House Report speaks of actions in the U.S. courts. H.R. Rep. No. 89-1534, at 2 (1966); see also id. at 3 (referring to civil litigation and court congestion). The Senate Report similarly provides that 2415 applies to civil actions and actions in the U.S. courts. S. Rep. No. 89-1328, at 1, 8 (1966); see also id. at 8 (making reference to claims in the courts); id. at 2, 7 (using the term suit as a synonym for action). 23 Shell and OXY argue that this interpretation of the term action will produce untenable results. They contend that the government can attempt to collect unpaid royalties either by initiating a judicial proceeding, see 30 U.S.C. 1722, or by issuing an administrative order. Shell and OXY maintain that under the government's interpretation of 2415(a), the former would be subject to a limitation period, but the latter would not. As a consequence, say Shell and OXY, the government could always avoid the statute of limitation by pursuing claims for unpaid royalties administratively. This argument has some force, and one circuit court has rejected the notion that Congress intended agencies to be free to assert their claims at any time and by any means other than court actions, unencumbered by the period of limitation imposed by section 2415(a). United States v. Hanover Ins. Co., 82 F.3d at 1052, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 24 Nonetheless, this potentially troubling result cannot be corrected by judicial fiat. While interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available, Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982), it is equally true that [c]ourts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement. Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 398. As discussed above, [t]his is especially so when courts construe a statute of limitations, which 'must receive a strict construction in favor of the Government.' Id. (citation omitted); see also E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924) (establishing that an action by the government is subject to no time limitation, in the absence of congressional enactment clearly imposing it). Congress may not have precisely envision[ed] that agencies such as the MMS might be able to issue administrative orders that resemble claims for breach of contract, but [i]t is enough that Congress intended that the language it enacted would be applied as we have applied it. The remedy for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies with Congress and not with this Court. Congress may amend the statute; we may not. Griffin, 458 U.S. at 576. 25 Shell and OXY also argue that 2415(i) shows the term action was intended to encompass agency proceedings. That section states that 2415(a) cannot prevent the government from collecting any claim by means of administrative offset. 10 See S. Rep. No. 97-378, at 16 (1982) (explaining that 2415(i) allows collection of delinquent debts owed the government by administrative offset beyond the six-year statute of limitations); id. at 28 (indicating that the purpose of 2415(i) is to extend the time period that agencies are allowed to offset benefits of debtors). Shell and OXY assert that if 2415(a) is inapplicable to administrative actions, then the exemption created by 2415(i) is superfluous. Accordingly, Shell and OXY urge us to adopt the Federal Circuit's holdings in Hanover: Administrative offset is not a judicial action. Thus, Congress has considered and dealt not only with judicial actions in section 2415, but with extra-judicial agency actions as well. 82 F.3d at 1055. 26 Section 2415(i) unquestionably lends support to the position advanced by Shell and OXY, but it cannot override the legal definitions of action and complaint as those terms are used in 2415(a). Congress's enactment of section 2415(i) is best understood as a clarification of the limited scope of section 2415(a), to ensure that section 2415 would not be applied to administrative offsets. Id. at 1057 (Bryson, J., dissenting). As the dissenting judge in Hanover recognized: 27 The legislative history of the 1982 amendment that added section 2415(i) provides support for that interpretation. Before 1982, the Justice Department had concluded that, absent an amendment, section 2415 could be invoked to prevent the administrative offset of debts more than six years old. See S. Rep. No. 378, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1982). The Comptroller General took the opposite position, arguing that section 2415 had no application to the administrative offset of debts. See Debt Collection Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1249 before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1981). Noting the contrary position taken by the Justice Department, the Comptroller General recommended enacting subsection (i) as a means of resolving the differences between us. Id. By adopting section 2415(i), Congress thus did not have to decide whether the Department of Justice or the Comptroller General had the better of the argument as to the proper construction of the pre-1982 version of section 2415. 28 In light of that background, the enactment of subsection (i) cannot be invoked to support the inference that Congress regarded section 2415(a) as extending to administrative actions. In any event, any such inference that could be drawn from the enactment of subsection (i) is not strong enough to overcome the clear language of section 2415(a). Particularly in light of the principle that statutes of limitations running against the sovereign are to be strictly construed, the apparent superfluity of section 2415(i) does not justify reading section 2415(a) to apply to cases that fall outside its explicit reach. 29 Id. (case citation omitted); see also Samedan Oil Corp. v. Deer, Civ. A. No. 94-2123 (RCL), 1995 WL 431307, at - (D.D.C. June 14, 1995) (intimating that in enacting 2415(i) Congress was merely acting out of an abundance of caution), rev'd on other grounds, Independent Petroleum Ass'n of America v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Gerrard v. United States Office of Educ., 656 F. Supp. 570, 573 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that although Congress adopted 2415(i) in response to a Justice Department determination that the six-year limitation period applied to administrative offsets, [t]here is no indication in the legislative history that Congress agreed with the department's interpretation). 30