Opinion ID: 2998787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mark Brown

Text: Mark Brown worked for Thompson Distribution as a warehouse manager. Thompson testified in his deposition that Thompson Distribution fired Brown for two main reasons: 1) Brown repeatedly cursed and yelled at his subordinates; and 2) Brown allowed a supplier to remove boilers from Thompson Distribution which Thompson believed belonged to him and not the supplier. This evidence satisfied Thompson Distribution’s burden under McDonnell Douglas to produce evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Brown’s firing. See Rand v. CH Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that an employer’s mere production of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action rebuts the presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie showing). At this point, the burden shifts back to Brown to present sufficient evidence that Thompson Distribution’s reason was pretextual. Statler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1999). Pretext “means a dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or an error.” Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, to show pretext, Brown must show more than that Thompson Distribution’s “decision was ‘mistaken, ill considered or foolish,’ [and] so long as [the employer] honestly believes those reasons, pretext has not been shown.” Ballance, 424 F.3d at 617 (quoting Jordan v. Summers, 205 F.3d 337, 343 (7th Cir. 2000)). While arguing that Thompson Distribution’s proffered reasons for his firing were pretextual, Brown admits that he used profanity at work, but he claims it was nothing more No. 05-1654 13 severe than “hell” or “damn,” and that he needed to yell and use this “shop talk” to motivate the individuals hired by Thompson Distribution, whom Brown claims were inexperienced and incompetent. As to allowing the supplier to remove the boiler, Thompson claims that he purchased all of the assets physically located at Mutual Pipe on November 26, 2001, including the boilers. Brown argues in response that the supplier owned the boilers and therefore he did nothing wrong. Specifically, Brown claims that prior to Thompson’s purchase of Mutual Pipe’s assets, Hague had arranged to return the boiler to the supplier for credit on its account, but that the supplier was unable to pick up the boiler prior to Thompson Distribution taking over. Brown thus maintains that the boiler belonged to the supplier and not Thompson Distribution. In making these arguments, however, Brown does not comprehend his legal burden. Brown must establish that Thompson Distribution lied about its reasons for firing him—not that Thompson Distribution was wrong for firing him for the reasons it gave. See Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that our role is solely to assess whether the justifications given are honest, not whether the sanction imposed was accurate, wise or well considered). See also Jordan, 205 F.3d at 344 (“Discrimination laws serve only to prevent consideration of forbidden characteristics—like race—but they are not, as we have repeatedly noted, court-enforced merit selection programs.”) By admitting to the conduct at issue—swearing, yelling, and returning the boilers—Brown is left attacking Thompson Distribution’s leadership and business judgment. That will not suffice. See Ballance, 424 F.3d at 621 (“We do not sit as a super-personnel department with authority to review an employer’s business decision as to whether 14 No. 05-1654 someone should be fired or disciplined . . . .”) Accordingly, Brown did not present sufficient evidence of pretext.