Opinion ID: 3065027
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Express Federal Policy

Text: [3] Munich Re contends that presidential foreign policy prohibits legislative recognition of an “Armenian Genocide,” and that this policy preempts § 354.4. In support of this argument, Munich Re points to several failed House Resolutions, H. R. Res. 106, 110th Congress (2007); H. R. Res. 193, 108th Congress (2003); H. R. Res. 596, 106th Congress (2000). Each of these resolutions formally recognized the “Armenian Genocide.” Each time, the Administrations of President Bush and President Clinton took specific action, privately and publicly, to defeat these measures.
House Resolution 596, entitled “Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution,” “[c]all[ed] upon the President to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in the United States record relating to the Armenian Genocide, and for other purposes.” H. R. Res. 596, 106th Cong. (2000). In support of the Resolution, the House passed a number of legislative findings, including the following: 11426 MOVSESIAN v. VICTORIA VERSICHERUNG AG The Armenian Genocide was conceived and carried out by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923, resulting in the deportation of nearly 2,000,000 Armenians, of whom 1,500,000 men, women, and children were killed, 500,000 survivors were expelled from their homes, and which succeeded in the elimination of the over 2,500-year presence of Armenians in their historic homeland. Id. at § 2(1). In all, the Resolution uses the phrase “Armenian Genocide” at least twenty-four times. President Clinton personally expressed his opposition to the Resolution in a letter to Speaker Hastert. Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on a Resolution on Armenian Genocide, 3 Pub. Papers 2225-26 (Oct. 19, 2000). The President explained the potential negative impact the Resolution would have on the nation’s foreign policy interests: [I] am deeply concerned that consideration of H. Res. 596 at this time could have far-reaching negative consequences for the United States. We have significant interests in this troubled region of the world: containing the threat posed by Saddam Hus- sein; working for peace and stability in the Middle East and Central Asia; stabilizing the Balkans; and developing new sources of energy. Consideration of the resolution at this sensitive time will not only negatively affect those interests, but could undermine efforts to encourage improved relations between Armenia and Turkey—the very goal the Resolution’s sponsors seek to advance. Id. In sum, President Clinton urged the Speaker “in the strongest terms not to bring this Resolution to the floor at this time.” Id. In addition, several senior-level Administration officials sent letters to the Chairman of the Committee on International MOVSESIAN v. VICTORIA VERSICHERUNG AG 11427 Relations, reiterating the Administration’s opposition to the Resolution. H.R. Rep. No. 106-933, at 16-19 (2000). The Assistant Secretary of State expressed the Administration’s belief that “legislative measures” were not the appropriate means of addressing the “sensitive issue” raised in the Resolution. Id. at 17. The Secretary of Defense and the Undersecretary of Defense underscored the Administration’s concern that the Resolution “would complicate our efforts to build relationships and protect our interests in the region and sustain our positive relationship with a key, strategically placed ally.” Id. at 16-18. The Resolution was reported out of committee, but never brought to a vote on the floor.
In 2003, a general resolution “reaffirming support of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” was introduced in the House. H.R. Res. 193, 108th Cong. (2003). Unlike the other two resolutions discussed in this section, House Resolution 193 did not contain any legislative findings, or even any reference to Turkey or the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration strongly opposed it. The Administration’s opposition to House Resolution 193 was based solely on two words found in the resolution: “Armenian Genocide.” An official from the State Department explained: I am writing to express the Administration’s opposition to the wording of H. Res. 193 of April 10, 2003 . . . . [W]e oppose HR 193’s reference to the ‘Arme- nian Genocide.’ Were this wording adopted it could complicate our efforts to bring peace and stability to the Caucasus and hamper ongoing attempts to bring about Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. We continue to believe that fostering a productive dialogue on these events is the best way for Turkey and Armenia to build a positive and productive relationship. Dec11428 MOVSESIAN v. VICTORIA VERSICHERUNG AG larations such as this one, however, hinder rather than encourage the process. H.R. Rep. No. 108-130, at 5-6 (2003). The Bush Administration echoed the Clinton Administration’s belief that “legislation on the issue is counterproductive.” Id. at 6. This time, the Resolution was reported out of committee and calendered, but was never actually brought to a vote on the floor.
In 2007, the House entertained yet another resolution that would provide official recognition to an “Armenian Genocide.” House Resolution 106 was nearly indistinguishable from House Resolution 596, discussed above. The Bush Administration renewed its opposition to legislative recognition of an “Armenian Genocide” through a joint letter from Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Letter from Condoleeza Rice, Sec’y of State, and Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Defense, to Nancy M. Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Representatives (March 7, 2001). The Secretaries sent an identical letter to the Minority Leader of the House, Representative John Boehner. Letter from Condoleeza Rice, Sec’y of State, and Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Defense, to John A. Boehner, Minority Leader of the House of Representatives (March 7, 2001). In their joint letter, the Secretaries underscored the importance of Turkey’s contributions to the war in Iraq. See Letter from Condoleeza Rice and Robert Gates to Nancy Pelosi, supra, at 2. The Secretaries noted that when the French Assembly voted in favor of a similar bill, the Turkish military cut off contact with the French military and terminated defense contracts under negotiation. Id. The Secretaries warned that “[a] similar reaction by the Government of Turkey to a House resolution could harm American troops in the field, constrain our ability to supply our troops in Iraq and MOVSESIAN v. VICTORIA VERSICHERUNG AG 11429 Afghanistan, and significantly damage our efforts to promote reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey[.]” Id. In conclusion, the Secretaries “strongly urge[d] [the Speaker] to refrain from allowing the resolution to reach the House floor.” Id. Despite the Secretaries’ exhortations, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a motion to order the bill reported. H.R. Res. 106, 110th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on Foreign Aff., Oct. 10, 2007). In response, President Bush made the following statement: On another issue before Congress, I urge members to oppose the Armenian genocide resolution now being considered by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. We all deeply regret the tragic suffering of the Armenian people that began in 1915. This resolution is not the right response to these historic mass killings, and its passage would do great harm to our relations with a key ally in NATO and in the global war on terror. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Discusses Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Legislation (Oct. 10, 2007). Following President Bush’s statements, no further action was taken on the Resolution.
[4] The foregoing account of negotiations between the Executive Branch and Congress, and the public statements and letters of two Presidents, clearly establish a presidential foreign policy preference against providing legislative recognition to an “Armenian Genocide.” The Garamendi Court relied on similar communications between the Administration and state legislative and executive officials, in addition to sev11430 MOVSESIAN v. VICTORIA VERSICHERUNG AG eral executive agreements, in finding that HVIRA was preempted. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 408-11. Unlike the presidential foreign policy at issue in Garamendi, the presidential foreign policy in the present case is not embodied in any executive agreement. This does not, however, detract from the policy’s preemptive force. The executive agreements discussed in Garamendi did not apply to all of the claims at issue, so they could not have been central to the Court’s finding of preemption in that case. Id. at 417. Furthermore, the preemptive power of the federal policy is not derived from the form of the policy, but rather from the source of the executive branch’s authority to act. Presidential foreign policy only carries preemptive weight when the executive authority is validly exercised — as measured by the tripartite framework set forth by Justice Jackson in Youngstown. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 136972 (2008) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). In prior cases where the presidential policy at issue implicated criminal law (an area traditionally left to the states to regulate), or foreign commerce (an area delegated by the Constitution to Congress), the Court has refused to accord the policy preemptive effect. See, e.g., Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1369-72; Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 329-30 (1994). Here, however, the presidential policy concerns national security, a war in progress, and diplomatic relations with a foreign nation. The Constitution squarely, if not solely, vests these powers with the Executive Branch. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. at § 2, cl. 2; id. at § 3; see also Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1367 (holding that the President has the “lead role” in making “sensitive foreign policy decisions”); Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414; Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 708-09 (enumerating the foreign affairs powers delegated by the Constitution to the President). MOVSESIAN v. VICTORIA VERSICHERUNG AG 11431 [5] The President acts well within his constitutionally delegated powers by developing and enforcing the policy refusing to provide official recognition to an “Armenian Genocide.” Accordingly, the presidential policy is entitled to preemptive effect. See, e.g., Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1367 n.13, 1367-71 (suggesting that the President, in the exercise of his Article II powers, could take action which preempts conflicting state law, but refusing to find such preemption in that case); cf. Barclays Bank PLC, 512 U.S. at 330 (“Executive Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render unconstitutional California’s otherwise valid, congressionally condoned, use of worldwide combined reporting.”). Even if the policy implicated a power shared by the President and Congress, Congress’s documented deference in this case lends the presidential policy additional authority. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1368; Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637. The President and his senior officials lobbied Congress, privately and publicly, to implement the policy. Each time, Congress deferred to the President’s authority, and did not bring the Resolution to a vote. Under the Youngstown framework, this congressional acquiescence infuses the President’s authority to act with additional support. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1368; Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637. [6] In sum, we conclude there is an express federal policy prohibiting legislative recognition of an “Armenian Genocide,” as embodied in the previously mentioned statements and letters of the President and other high-ranking Executive Branch officials. This policy is a valid exercise of the President’s Article II powers. In light of this, and in light of Congress’s deference to the Executive Branch on this matter, the policy is entitled to preemptive weight.