Opinion ID: 2822801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Separation of Insureds

Text: This Court resolved the meaning of a separation-of-insureds provision in Baker v. DePew, 860 S.W.2d 318, 321-24 (Mo. banc 1993). Insureds are treated separately in CGL policies to prevent an insurer from invoking an employee exclusion on the ground that the injured person's employer happens to qualify as an insured. See id. In other words, without a separation-of-insureds provision, an insurer could avoid liability under an employee exclusion just because some insured was the injured person's employer, regardless of who is seeking coverage. See id. Separation-of-insureds language prevents 5 Defendant acting under his duties as president, executive officer, and director of Missouri Hardwood Charcoal, Inc. was negligent in permitting and not changing the policy of leaning kiln doors upright, and in authorizing and requiring such policy to be followed. . . . As a direct result of defendant's negligence, Linda Nunley died. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, No. 08RE-CC00025-01, at , ¶¶ 5-6 (Cir. Ct. of Reynolds Cnty. Apr. 2, 2012) (the wrongful death case); (L.F. 127, ¶¶ 5-6). 6 As Judge Teitelman notes in dissent, this Court has previously recognized ambiguity in policy language stating that executive officers are insureds only with respect to their duties as your officers or directors. Martin v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 996 S.W.2d 506, 508-10 (Mo. banc 1999). However, this language is irrelevant to whether the employee exclusions apply. Even if the Court 10 this by confining the protections offered by employee exclusions to situations where the employer is actually claiming the benefit of the policy. See id. This requirement is satisfied here: the plaintiffs claim the benefit of the policy on behalf of Flowers, who was acting as Ms. Nunley's employer. The cases cited by the plaintiffs, with the exception of one Texas case, reinforce this principle. 7 The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Chrysler does not apply because it did not address an employee exclusion, only whether defamation liability was excluded under a known-falsity exclusion. 297 S.W.3d at 253. And unlike the insureds who were covered by insurance in the other cited cases, the claim against Flowers was a claim against him solely in his capacity as agent of the employer. See Bituminous Cas. Corp., 599 S.W.2d at 517; Tri-S Corp., 135 P.3d at 87-88, 105; Barnette, 653 P.2d at 1376; Zenti, 262 N.W.2d at 588; Bierman, 292 A.2d at 675-76. The policies' separate treatment of insureds does not prevent Flowers from being considered the employer.