Opinion ID: 2973055
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Other Discrimination Complaints

Text: Before trial, the parties stipulated there would be no mention of discrimination complaints filed against Hyatt by past or present employees, including several contemporaneous suits filed as a result of the reduction in force. During trial, Hyatt’s counsel asked Patrick three questions regarding whether Horne and Helms had ever been involved in discrimination allegations. Patrick replied they had not, and Hildebrandt’s counsel objected to the third question. The court sustained the objection, ordered the question and answer stricken, and had Hyatt’s counsel rephrase the question to ask whether, prior to the reduction in force at issue, Horne and Helms had been the subject of discrimination allegations. The court then denied Hildebrandt’s request to use the contemporaneous suits to impeach Patrick, stating, “[Y]ou can’t prove discrimination against her by showing that anyone else was allegedly discriminated against.” -8- No. 04-4119 Hildebrandt v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., et al. Hildebrandt first argues the district court abused its discretion in permitting Hyatt’s counsel to ask the modified question regarding other discrimination cases because “[t]he jury undoubtedly was unable to fathom the difference between this question and the previous one.” Her argument lacks merit, since juries are presumed to follow instructions given them and nothing indicates the jury here did otherwise. Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1047 (6th Cir. 1996). Hildebrandt further argues she should have been permitted to impeach Patrick on crossexamination regarding the other suits. But Patrick’s answer to the modified question obviated impeachment.3 Further, the court’s discretion allowed it to conclude the impeachment value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See FED. R. EVID. 403; Schrand v. Federal Pacific Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 157 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding reversible error under Rule 403 where district court admitted evidence of prior discrimination). Finally, even if the district court abused its discretion, Hildebrandt bears the burden of showing prejudice. Tompkin v. Phillip Morris, USA, Inc., 362 F.3d 882, 891 (6th Cir. 2004). Hildebrandt speculates “there is little doubt that the outcome would have been affected had . . . Appellant been allowed to impeach Patrick” because “the jury deliberated for two days, including returning on a Monday after a four-plus day trial.” Notwithstanding jurors’ aversion to postweekend deliberation, Hildebrandt’s conjecture fails to show that this ruling affected substantial 3 To the extent Hildebrandt challenges the preceding two questions and answers in Patrick’s testimony, her failure to timely object at trial precludes challenge on appeal absent meeting the plain-error standard. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a), (d); Bowman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 350 F.3d 537, 548 (6th Cir. 2003). -9- No. 04-4119 Hildebrandt v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., et al. justice in the face of the other significant evidence Hyatt offered: Hildebrandt was over age forty when she was promoted to her position with Hyatt’s National Sales Force; the decisionmakers testified at length regarding their considerations in determining whom to terminate; and, of the nine National Sales Force employees over age fifty, none was terminated during the reduction in force. The trial court styled this “a very thin case.” On this record, we cannot say the trial court’s decision to prohibit cross-examination on the other discrimination complaints affected substantial justice.