Opinion ID: 4438625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Medical-Malpractice Claim

Text: Under Illinois law a medical-malpractice claim requires expert testimony about the appropriate standard of care “[u]nless the physician’s negligence is so grossly apparent or the treatment so common as to be within the everyday knowledge of a layperson.” Sullivan v. Edward Hosp., 806 N.E.2d 645, 653 (Ill. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The magistrate judge excluded Davis’s sole expert because his disclosure was untimely. Davis challenges that ruling on appeal. tells it, Dr. Kayira chose not to rely on the technician’s observation because he thought him incompetent. But that’s a mischaracterization of what Dr. Kayira said. While he did say that he didn’t think the technician was competent, he also said very clearly that he didn’t recall ever speaking to him. No. 18-2456 11 The problem is that Davis never objected to that ruling when he was before the district court. Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure says that a party may object to a magistrate judge’s ruling on a nondispositive pretrial matter within 14 days. The very next sentence says: “A party may not assign as error a defect in the order not timely objected to.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a); Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 769 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[The] failure to challenge a magistrate’s pretrial ruling in the district court forfeits the right to attack it on appeal.”). In response Davis directs us to the local rules for the Central District of Illinois. He notes that the rule about objecting to nondispositive orders uses permissive rather than mandatory language. See C.D. ILL. L.R. 72.2(A) (“Appeal of Non-Dispositive Matters. Any party may appeal from any order of a magistrate judge within 14 days … .”). He contrasts that with the rule governing dispositive motions, which explicitly says that the failure to object counts as a waiver. See id. L.R. 72.2(B). Thus, he reasons, a party litigating in that particular court need only object to a ruling on a dispositive matter in order to preserve its argument for appeal. But given that Rule 72(a) requires an objection to nondispositive orders within 14 days and itself bars further review of untimely objections, there’s no need for the local rules to parrot that mandate. Davis didn’t object to the magistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert within the timeframe required by Rule 72(a), so the issue is not properly before us. Without expert testimony, Davis’s malpractice claim cannot succeed. Other than Dr. Seskind, the only doctor to have expressed an opinion on the standard of care is the 12 No. 18-2456 doctor who wrote the certificate of merit. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622. But that report is unsigned and the doctor remains unidentified. To take a malpractice claim to trial, “[t]he proponent of an expert’s testimony must lay a foundation which affirmatively establishes the expert’s qualifications and competency to testify.” Weekly v. Solomon, 510 N.E. 2d 152, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Davis obviously can’t lay that foundation without identifying who the doctor is. And without expert testimony, his malpractice claim fails. AFFIRMED