Opinion ID: 745302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: conditional intent: intent to cause death or serious bodily harm

Text: 14 Romero argues that his carjacking conviction cannot stand because the government presented insufficient evidence to establish that Romero had the requisite intent to commit the offense. Romero contends that for a jury to find him guilty of carjacking, the statute requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause death or serious bodily injury whether or not the victim agreed to relinquish his car. In contrast, the government maintains that the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury element of the carjacking statute is satisfied if the government is able to show that Romero intended to cause death or serious bodily injury if the victim refused to relinquish his or her car. Conditional intent, the government asserts, is enough. 15 We review the district court's interpretation of a criminal statute de novo. 1 United States v. Rothhammer, 64 F.3d 554, 557 (10th Cir.1995). In interpreting a statute, we begin with the plain language of the statute itself. United States v. Green, 967 F.2d 459, 461 (10th Cir.1992). If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, our inquiry ends. Id. 16 In October of 1994, at the time of the incident in this case, the federal carjacking statute provided: 17 Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall-- 18 (1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, 19 (2) if serious bodily injury ... results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and 20 (3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death. 21 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994) (emphasis added). 22 Section 2119 requires that to be convicted of a carjacking offense, the defendant must act with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm. As a general rule, conditional intent is still intent. United States v. Arrellano, 812 F.2d 1209, 1211 n. 2 (9th Cir.), opinion corrected by, 835 F.2d 235 (1987). Where a crime requires the defendant to have a specified intention, he has the required intention although it is a conditional intention, 'unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.'  WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5(d), at 313 (1986) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6)). Applying this general rule to the carjacking statute, the Third Circuit in United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478, 484-85 (3d Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 118 S.Ct. 123, --- L.Ed.2d --- (1997), concluded that conditional intent satisfies the federal carjacking statute's intent requirement. The court explained: 23 The fact that a defendant is able to achieve the goal of obtaining the car without resorting to the infliction of death or serious bodily harm obviously does not negate the intent to cause such harm in order to obtain the car. Whether the harm sought to be prevented by the statute is the theft of cars, the threat to cause death or serious bodily harm in order to obtain another's car, or the causing of death or serious bodily harm, the intervening event of the victim giving up his or her car in order to avoid serious injury in no way negatives the harm sought to be prevented by the statute. Indeed, the fact that the victim opted to turn over his or her car in the hope of avoiding serious harm does not alter the fact that the defendant possessed an intent to cause death or serious bodily harm in order to obtain the car. 24 Id.; see also United States v. Holloway, 921 F.Supp. 155, 160 (E.D.N.Y.1996); United States v. Norwood, 948 F.Supp. 374, 377 (D.N.J.1996). 25 In addition to requiring an intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, section 2119 also requires that the defendant take[ ] a motor vehicle ... by force or by intimidation. Some federal courts have construed section 2119's intent to cause serious bodily harm requirement as requiring something more than a threat or mere conditional intent to harm. United States v. Randolph, 93 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir.1996); United States. v. Craft, No. CRIM A. 96-376, 1996 WL 745527, at  4 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 23, 1996). The Ninth Circuit in Randolph reasoned that the tak[ing] ... by force or intimidation element requires force or intimidation. Randolph, 93 F.3d at 665. A threat satisfies the intimidation prong of the taking element. Id. The court, however, noted that the statute additionally requires proof of an intent to cause death or serious bodily harm. Id. Thus, the court concluded that [t]o construe a mere threat as conclusive evidence of the intent element would be to eliminate that additional intent element. Id. As such, the Ninth Circuit held that the plain language of the statute indicates that the mere conditional intent to harm a victim if she resists is simply not enough to satisfy § 2119's ... intent requirement. Id. 26 We disagree that the tak[ing] ... by force or intimidation element and the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm element constitute two separate and distinct intent requirements. Instead, the plain language of the statute indicates that the tak[ing] ... by force or intimidation element comprises the actus reus of the crime and the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm element constitutes the mens rea of the crime. 27 In our view, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Randolph directly contravenes the plain language of the statute. It is apparent ... that Congress did not intend for death or serious bodily injury to be a prerequisite to every carjacking conviction, since Congress has provided for enhanced penalties, when carjacking does, in fact, result in death or serious bodily injury. Anderson, 108 F.3d at 483. Moreover, as the court in Holloway explained in criticizing such a view: 28 Only those carjackers who intend not only to rob cars, but also to murder or seriously injure another, could be prosecuted. A person who intends to find a Mercedes Benz, shoot the owner and take the car could be prosecuted. A person who intends to find a Mercedes Benz and shoot the owner only if she refuses to give up her car could not, at least if the plan succeeds and the car is taken without the need to fire. This would be an odd result. The statute would no longer prohibit the very crime it was enacted to address except in those unusual circumstances when carjackers also intended to commit another crime--murder or a serious assault. 29 Holloway, 921 F.Supp. at 159. We agree and hold that a defendant's conditional intent to cause death or serious bodily harm satisfies the specific intent requirement of section 2119. 2 30