Opinion ID: 201766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Shepard

Text: 12 In his petition to the Supreme Court, Estevez sought certiorari on the Booker issues addressed above. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded his case for further consideration in light of [ Booker ]. Estevez, 125 S.Ct. at 1034. However, in his brief filed in response to this court's request for supplemental briefing on Booker's application to this case, Estevez now raises the claim that the district court violated the prohibition announced in Shepard v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___-___, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1260-61, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), against reliance on a police report to determine whether an offense qualifies as a violent predicate. 13 The government argues that Estevez's Shepard claim is beyond the scope of the remand, and hence, is not properly before this court. However, we have held that [w]hen the Supreme Court vacates an entire judgment, an appellate court, on remand, has the naked power to reexamine an issue that lies beyond the circumference of the Supreme Court's specific order. Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 981 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir.1992). In Kotler, in the civil context, we stated that [t]his power is to be exercised sparingly and only when its invocation is necessary to avoid extreme injustice, but that habeas petitions, for instance, might sometimes present such circumstances. Id. Given that this is a criminal case still on direct appeal, similar concerns may apply, and, thus, as an exercise of our discretion, we will consider Estevez's claim, though it does not get far. 14 Estevez claims that the sentencing court unconstitutionally relied on the language of a police report cited in his presentence investigation report to conclude that the assault and battery conviction of November 19, 1998 was a violent felony. We agree that after Shepard, it is clear that such reliance would be improper. However, we find that any reliance on the language of the police report was unnecessary to the district court's conclusion that the crime was a violent predicate, and thus, any error was harmless. 15 Aside from the police report, the criminal complaint also stated that Estevez did assault and beat the victim. When the state criminal statute involves different types of offenses, some arguably violent and some not, we look first to the charging document to see which type of offense is involved. United States v. Mangos, 134 F.3d 460, 464 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)). Faced with the same situation as in the instant case, we have held that where a defendant is charged with simple assault in Massachusetts, and the charging document states that he did assault and beat the victim, this characterization placed the offense in the harmful battery type, thereby meeting the definition of a crime of violence. United States v. Santos, 363 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir.2004) (upholding district court's categorical application of the rule established in Mangos ). Recognizing that Estevez's conviction clearly falls within this category, we find that the district court correctly concluded that the assault constituted a violent predicate, and any reliance on the police report was harmless error.