Opinion ID: 137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Above-range Sentence Warranted

Text: As we noted, in this appeal Angle does not dispute that the district court adequately explained why it found the evidence of uncharged acts of sexual abuse to be reliable. That prong of our last remand is satisfied. Angle contends, however, that the court still did not justify the need for an above-range sentence after applying the pattern of abuse upward adjustment under § 2G2.2(b)(4). That guideline mandates a 5-level increase in offense level [i]f the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) (1998) (current version at U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5)); see United States v. Osborne, 551 F.3d 718, 721-22 (7th Cir.2009). As discussed above, the district court gave several reasons for concluding that an above-range sentence was warranted in addition to the pattern of abuse adjustment: Angle had an unbroken, 20-year pattern of abusive conduct; he exploited positions of trust to get at his young victims; he created as well as consumed child pornography; he showed no remorse; and he would have faced a significantly higher imprisonment range if sentenced under the current version of the guidelines. Angle insists that the first four reasons are fully embodied in § 2G2.2(b)(4), and that the last is improper given the limited scope of our remand. We reject both contentions. The district court first explained that Angle's pattern of abuse was atypical. Many of the reported decisions analyzing the pattern of abuse adjustment involve a narrower range of abuse than was present in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 478 F.3d 864, 865-66 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding application of the adjustment where defendant repeatedly abused one victim); United States v. Gunderson, 345 F.3d 471, 472-73 (7th Cir.2003) (upholding application of the adjustment where defendant abused two victims); United States v. Lovaas, 241 F.3d 900, 901 (7th Cir.2001) (upholding application of the adjustment where defendant abused three victims). Indeed, the commentary to § 2G2.2 encourages district courts to impose a term of imprisonment outside the guidelines range if an upward adjustment under subsection (b)(4) is inadequate to account for the seriousness of the sexual abuse or the exploitation involved. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n. 2 (1998) (current version at U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n. 7); United States v. Griffith, 344 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir.2003). We cannot disagree with the district court that Angle's prolonged and extensive pattern of abusive conduct placed him squarely within the group of offenders contemplated by the commentary. Second, the district court thought it significant that Angle's pattern of abuse involved exploiting positions of trust. Angle opposes this reasoning on two fronts, though his initial objection is frivolous. The government's evidence, he says, does not show that he held a position of trust involving his victims. But sentencing judges are not bound by the stringent evidentiary standards applicable at trial; rather, the evidence need only be reliable. United States v. Cooper, 591 F.3d 582, 591 (7th Cir.2010); United States v. Johnson, 489 F.3d 794, 796 (7th Cir.2007). At Angle's latest sentencing hearing, the judge found that Angle had abused his niece and nephews, and had targeted single mothers whose trust he could engender in order to abuse their children. These factual findings are reviewed only for clear error, United States v. Davis, 442 F.3d 1003, 1008-09 (7th Cir.2006), and though Angle disagrees with the inference drawn by the district court from the evidence, he has not identified any error in the court's assessment of that evidence. Angle's other objection to receiving an above-range sentence in part for exploiting positions of trust rests on our decision in United States v. McCaffrey, 437 F.3d 684 (7th Cir.2006). That child-pornography prosecution involved a priest who was sentenced to 240 months60 less than Angleafter abusing more than 100 children, most of them from his congregations. 437 F.3d at 686-88. Angle reads that outcome as confirmation that his own situation does not warrant both a pattern of abuse upward adjustment and an increase above the resulting guidelines range. But Angle did not read our McCaffrey opinion carefully. In that case the government successfully argued that the defendant's pattern of abuse warranted not only the 5-level increase under the pattern of abuse adjustment, but also a (pre- Booker) upward departure equivalent to another 5 offense levels. Id. at 686-87. We rejected the defendant's double counting argument and upheld both increases, which effectively yielded a guidelines imprisonment range of 360 months to life. Id. at 687-89. The only reason that the defendant in that case averted a higher prison sentence is that he was charged with just two counts carrying a combined maximum of 20 years, which is what the district court gave him. Id. at 687-88. The sentencing judge was explicit, however, that the defendant would have been imprisoned for longer if not for the statutory caps. Id. at 690. At all events, McCaffrey represents an extreme, and simply because Angle's conduct was less egregious does not mean that his pattern of abuse could not sustain both the upward adjustment and an above-range sentence. The district court concluded that there was reliable evidence that Angle abused positions of trust and, on this basis, reasoned that Angle's case was comparable to McCaffrey. We agree with that assessment. A third reason given by the district court for sentencing Angle above the guidelines range is that he created child pornography. Angle not only traveled to Mexico for the specific purpose of engaging in sexual abuse of children, but he arranged for the encounters to be filmed so that he could trade the tapes. The upward adjustment for a pattern of abuse is designed to punish sexual abuse or exploitation, McCaffrey, 437 F.3d at 688; Lovaas, 241 F.3d at 904, not the production of child pornography, see U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n. 1 (`Sexual abuse or exploitation' does not include possession, accessing with intent to view, receipt, or trafficking in material relating to the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.); United States v. Williamson, 439 F.3d 1125, 1139 n. 16 (9th Cir.2006); United States v. Woodward, 277 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir.2002); United States v. Kemmish, 120 F.3d 937, 941-42 (9th Cir. 1997). Section 2G2.2 does not address the creation of child pornography, and it was appropriate for the district court to take into account that narrow scope in exercising its sentencing discretion. See Griffith, 344 F.3d at 719 (explaining that an upward adjustment may be inadequate to address the degree of sexual exploitation); see also United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 339-42 (4th Cir.2008) (affirming above-range sentence as reasonable where circumstances were atypical and not taken into account by the guidelines). In fact, Angle's involvement in making child pornography might have warranted a cross-reference to the higher offense levels in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1 for production offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c) (1998); United States v. Dawn, 129 F.3d 878, 880-81 (7th Cir.1997). Fourth, the district court was unpersuaded that Angle had shown any remorse for his abusive conduct. Twice previously Angle had been convicted of sex offenses against children, and after those convictions he declined opportunities to participate in treatment for sex offenders. What is more, the court observed, Angle boasted about his criminal conduct in written correspondence and Internet chat messages. The absence of remorse, the court reasoned, made it likely that Angle would resume his abusive conduct when he is released. Angle's future dangerousness is not accounted for in § 2G2.2(b)(4), and, thus, there was no error in the judge's decision to impose an above-range sentence on this basis. See Griffith, 344 F.3d at 719-20 (upholding upward departure based on defendant's two prior convictions for sexual abuse of children and his three failed attempts to complete treatment for sex offenders); United States v. Turchen, 187 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir.1999) (upholding upward departure in child-pornography prosecution where defendant's criminal history and unsuccessful rehabilitation suggested risk of recidivism). Angle asserts that none of these reasons is compelling, but his contention is obviously subjective and, regardless, misunderstands the nature of our review. Our task is simply to assess whether the overall prison sentence imposed by the district court is reasonable in light of the justifications for that sentence. E.g., United States v. Perez, 581 F.3d 539, 548 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. McKinney, 543 F.3d 911, 913 (7th Cir.2008). The sentencing guidelines are advisory; the imprisonment range is one of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), but a district court does not need a compelling reason to exceed the range. Nelson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 890, 892, 172 L.Ed.2d 719 (2009); United States v. Kirkpatrick, 589 F.3d 414, 415-16 (7th Cir. 2009). That was the point of Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), which, after our last remand, clarified that a district court is free to weigh any sentencing factor differently than the Sentencing Commission, even in a typical case. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101, 128 S.Ct. 558; United States v. Alldredge, 551 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir.2008). All that matters is that the sentence imposed be reasonable in relation to the package of reasons given by the court, and in that sense Kimbrough has eroded the premise in our last remand of requiring the district to quantify how Angle's situation exceeded a mine run application of § 2G2.2(b)(5). See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110, 128 S.Ct. 558; McKinney, 543 F.3d at 913. The district court did exactly what we asked in explaining its application of subsection (b)(4), but, as we now recognize, it was also within the court's power to disagree with the weight given by the Sentencing Commission to the pattern of abuse adjustment. That brings us to the final reason given by the district court for its sentence: the imprisonment range that Angle would have faced under the 2006 version of the guidelines in effect when he was last sentenced. Angle principally contends that the language of our remand precluded the court from taking notice of revisions to § 2G2.2, but we imposed no such limitation. Angle is correct in assuming that a district court must adhere to the scope of a remand from this court, United States v. White, 406 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir.2005), but the scope of any remand is determined from reading all, not part, of an opinion, United States v. Husband, 312 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Parker, 101 F.3d 527, 528 (7th Cir.1996). After oral argument in Angle's third appeal, his lawyer notified us that Angle had been apprised of the possibility that his fourth sentencing would be governed by the updated guidelines, and we responded with the observation that applying the current guidelines on remand would not raise an ex post facto concern; we did not imply that using the current guidelines would exceed the scope of our remand. Angle III, 216 Fed.Appx. at 559 n. 1. Our decision in Angle III was released before this court clarified that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g), the guidelines in effect at the time of the original sentencing must be used again when an appeal results in an order for resentencing, United States v. Tanner, 544 F.3d 793, 795 (7th Cir.2008), but the force of this statutory limitation does not alter the scope of the remand we contemplated. Moreover, even though § 3742(g) precluded the district court from applying the 2006 guidelines, the statute did not bar the court from consulting the Sentencing Commission's current views as a guide to its exercise of Booker discretion. United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 427 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. Coe, 220 F.3d 573, 578 (7th Cir.2000). And that is all the district court did here. To quote the district court, it would be impossible to ignore the perverse fact that, were Angle to be sentenced for the same conduct under the current guidelines, his advisory range would be 360 months to life, and the court would need to explain why a sentence of less than 360 months is appropriate. Angle also contends that the district court's assessment of his guidelines range under the 2006 version of § 2G2.2 was inaccurate. But this assertion really comes down to his belief that the court did not adequately explain its conclusion that, under the 2006 guidelines, he would receive a 5-level increase for intending to trade child pornography for other child pornography, see U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) (2006), plus a 4-level increase for possessing 300 to 600 images of child pornography, id. § 2G2.2(b)(7) (2006). Before Angle's latest resentencing, however, the probation officer revised the presentence report to explain that Angle would be eligible for both increases. Angle did not object on the ground that the probation officer's proposed findings were not supported by the evidence, and the district court relied on those findings, which the court was entitled to do. See United States v. Heckel, 570 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.2004). Had Angle wished to cast doubt on the reliability of the information in the revised presentence report, he was obligated to dispute its accuracy, which he did not do. See Heckel, 570 F.3d at 795. This final argument, then, like Angle's previous contention, is without merit. We thus uphold the 300-month total imprisonment.