Opinion ID: 4538958
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Petitioner’s Gender-Discrimination Claim

Text: Section 1432(a)(3)’s second clause discriminates on the basis of gender. It grants citizenship upon “the naturalization of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation,” but it does not grant citizenship in the converse scenario: upon the naturalization of the father if the child was born out of wedlock and the child’s maternity has not ROY V. BARR 11 been established by legitimation. Although that scenario is unlikely, it is not impossible. For example, an unmarried mother could give birth at her home and then leave the baby on the father’s doorstep. The father could get a DNA test to confirm his relationship to the baby, but if he had sex with more than one woman approximately nine months earlier, the child’s maternity would remain unknown. And, as we discuss later, the mother could legitimate her relationship to the child well after the child’s birth. Petitioner, however, does not challenge the clearly disparate treatment identified above. Nor could she, because both her paternity and her maternity were established during her youth. Instead, she argues that the statute unconstitutionally discriminates “because it does not contain any equivalent provision stating that a child automatically becomes a citizen upon the naturalization of the father if the child was born out of wedlock and the mother has relinquished parental rights” or has abandoned the child. We disagree. Section 1432(a)(3)’s second clause says nothing about the relinquishment of parental rights or the abandonment of a child. Rather, it hinges derivative citizenship on whether a father legitimated his child. A father who fails to legitimate his out-of-wedlock child might also abandon the child, but the two actions are not identical. For example, a father could legitimate his child and then abandon the child later. Thus, Petitioner’s proposed comparative group does not align with the classified group “in respects that are relevant to the [government’s] challenged policy.” Gallinger, 898 F.3d at 1016. Petitioner’s circumstances illustrate the disconnect between the classified group and her proposed comparative 12 ROY V. BARR group. Even if Petitioner’s parents’ roles in her life had been reversed—that is, if her mother had naturalized and raised her in the United States and her father had “abandoned” her—she still would not have derived citizenship under § 1432(a)(3), because her father legitimated her. Section 1432(a) provides three avenues to derivative citizenship for legitimated children, and none of them “depends on the sex of the parent (or parents) who naturalize or have custody.” Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795, 802 (7th Cir. 2000). Under § 1432(a), “[l]egitimated children become citizens if both parents naturalize, if the surviving parent naturalizes, or if the parent having ‘legal custody’ naturalizes following the parents’ ‘legal separation.’” Id. (quoting § 1432(a)(3)). In other words, Petitioner did not suffer from a gender-based distinction; she simply did not meet the statute’s criteria. See Levy v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 882 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (listing the conditions under which a legitimated child would derive citizenship through § 1432(a) and stating that “[n]one of those conditions turns on gender”); accord Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[Section 1432(a)(3)] makes no sex-based distinction when the petitioner has been legitimated.”), overruled in part on other grounds, as recognized in Mayea-Pulido, 946 F.3d at 1062. Petitioner’s proposed remedy also makes clear the legal infirmity of her equal-protection claim. She suggests that we should modify the second clause of § 1432(a)(3) to provide for derivative citizenship upon: [T]he naturalization of the mother parent with sole legal custody of the child if the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the ROY V. BARR 13 child has not been established by legitimation the other parent has relinquished parental rights. Petitioner’s suggestion does not simply correct a gender disparity—it rewrites the statute entirely. No matter how preferable her version might be as a policy matter,4 we lack the power to amend statutes to accommodate policy preferences. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649 (2012) (explaining that “the pros and cons” of a particular policy “are for the consideration of Congress, not the courts”). The Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection forbids “governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” Dream Act, 855 F.3d at 966 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). Because Petitioner’s father legitimated her, she does not resemble, in all relevant ways, persons who derived citizenship under § 1432(a)(3)’s second clause. Gallinger, 898 F.3d at 1016. We therefore do not apply any level of scrutiny to the second clause’s gender distinction, much less the heightened scrutiny that Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690, applied to a different gender distinction, because 4 Congress repealed § 1432 when it enacted the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, § 103, 114 Stat. 1631, 1632. Under the Child Citizenship Act, a child born outside the United States derives citizenship when the child meets certain other conditions (which Petitioner undisputedly met here) and “[a]t least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a). But that rule does not apply retroactively to people (such as Petitioner) who already had turned 18 when the law took effect in 2001. Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752, 760 (9th Cir. 2001). 14 ROY V. BARR Petitioner’s gender-discrimination claim fails at the outset, Gallinger, 898 F.3d at 1016. B. Petitioner’s Legitimacy-Discrimination Claim Petitioner’s legitimacy-discrimination claim is largely an extension of her gender-discrimination claim, but we address that claim separately here. Petitioner contends that § 1432(a)(3)’s use of legitimation (or lack thereof) as a criterion inherently discriminates on the basis of gender because a father cannot legitimate a child simply by being present for the child’s birth. Regardless, because both fathers and mothers can legitimate a child after the child’s birth, legitimation is not inherently discriminatory on the basis of gender. Consider our earlier example of a hypothetical mother who gave birth at home and then left her baby on the father’s doorstep, thus keeping her maternity a mystery. That mother could reappear later in the child’s life to establish her maternity by legitimation, whether through a DNA test or some other mechanism. For instance, in California (where Petitioner’s father has lived since coming to the United States), the mother could establish a “parent and child relationship” by providing “proof of having given birth to the child.” Cal. Fam. Code § 7610(a). Now recall the version of § 1432(a)(3)’s second clause with reversed gender roles, which would grant citizenship “upon the naturalization of the father if the child was born out of wedlock and the child’s maternity has not been established by legitimation.” Reversing the gender roles does not help Petitioner. Her mother and father both legitimated her when she was a child, so she does not resemble, in all relevant ROY V. BARR 15 ways, persons who derived citizenship under § 1432(a)(3)’s second clause. Gallinger, 898 F.3d at 1016. Again, because Petitioner is not similarly situated to persons who derived citizenship under § 1432(a)(3)’s second clause, we do not apply any level of scrutiny to that clause’s gender or legitimacy distinction, and Petitioner’s repackaged genderdiscrimination claim still fails. Id. To the extent that Petitioner raises a legitimacydiscrimination claim that is distinct from her genderdiscrimination claim, Mayea-Pulido forecloses her claim. There, we explained that children born to unmarried parents could obtain derivative citizenship under § 1432(a)(3) “if [their] parents later married and then legally separated, the same as a marital child whose parents were married at his birth but later [legally] separated.” Mayea-Pulido, 946 F.3d at 1064. If Petitioner’s parents had married at some point after her birth and then legally separated before she turned 18 (and if her father had sole custody), she would have derived citizenship from her father under § 1432(a)(3)’s first clause. Likewise, Petitioner would have derived citizenship from her father under § 1432(a)’s other subsections if she had met the relevant criteria: (1) both parents naturalized; or (2) one parent (her mother) died and the surviving parent (her father) naturalized. Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s view, the statute does not impose a categorical bar against unwed fathers passing citizenship to children born out of wedlock. If anything, § 1432(a)(3)’s second clause gives children born to unmarried parents “an extra route to citizenship, one not enjoyed by legitimate (or legitimated) offspring.” Wedderburn, 215 F.3d at 802. 16 ROY V. BARR Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to § 1432(a)(3) fails, so we cannot grant her derivative citizenship. Accordingly, because Petitioner is not a citizen of the United States, we lack jurisdiction to review her final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). PETITION DISMISSED.