Opinion ID: 771294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Misconduct.

Text: On appeal, we undergo a two-part analysis to determine whether prosecutorial remarks should have resulted in a mistrial. We first determine whether the remarks were in fact improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected the defendant['s] substantial rights so as to deprive [him] of a fair trial. United States v. Figueroa, 900 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8 th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. O'Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1427 (8 th Cir. 1988)). In assessing the prejudicial impact of prosecutorial misconduct we consider: 1) the cumulative effect of the misconduct; 2) the strength of the properly admitted evidence; and 3) the curative actions taken by the district court. See id. at 1216. When engaging in this analysis, we are mindful that the district court is in a far better position to measure the effect of an improper question on the jury than an appellate court which reviews only the cold record. United States v. Nelson, 984 F.2d 894, 897 (8 th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. See Puckett, 147 F.3d at 770. The first instance of alleged misconduct occurred when the prosecutor revealed that one of Wadlington's co-defendants had been convicted in the conspiracy. Specifically, on redirect the prosecutor asked case agent Michael Dasso (Agent Dasso) the following leading question: [Samuel Miller has] been convicted in this case, hasn't he? (Trial Tr. at 62.) Defense counsel immediately objected and later moved for a mistrial. The District Court sustained the objection and denied the motion. No immediate curative instruction was requested or given. However, at the close of all evidence, the court specifically cautioned the jurors not to consider [s]tatements, arguments, questions and comments by the lawyers [or] [o]bjections and rulings on objections. (Clerk's Rec. at 39.) The court further instructed that [t]he fact that a witness has pleaded guilty or been found by a jury to be guilty of a crime that arose out of the events related to circumstances charged in the Indictment in this case must not be considered by you as any evidence of the defendant's guilt. (Id. at 34.) Although the latter instruction refers specifically to the testimony of co-defendant witnesses, its dictate applies with equal force to the present facts. Simply put, [o]ne person's guilty plea or conviction may not be used as substantive evidence of the guilt of another. United States v. Wiesle, 542 F.2d 61, 62 (8 th Cir. 1976). We have no difficulty finding that the prosecutor's question-particularly its phrasing-was improper. He not only sought inadmissible information, he actually conveyed that information to the jury through the form of the question. The Government asserts that the question was an invited reply to defense allegations that the prosecution was a fraud. 7 We recognize that the Government may use evidence on redirect examination to clarify an issue that was opened up by the defense on cross- examination-even when this evidence would otherwise be inadmissible. United States v. Braidlow, 806 F.2d 781, 783 (8 th Cir. 1986). It is evident, however, that the prosecutor's question went beyond simply responding to Wadlington's theory of the case, and in particular, his cross-examination of Agent Dasso. After all, the conviction of one co-defendant does not necessarily bear on the merits of the Government's case against another. In addition, the fact of Miller's conviction does not clarify whether he and Wadlington were part of the same conspiracy. We think it more likely that the question was asked for the improper purpose of suggesting Wadlington's guilt. Notwithstanding the impropriety of the question, Wadlington has not shown, as he must, that he was prejudiced by its utterance. See Figueroa, 900 F.2d at 1216. The District Court properly sustained defense counsel's prompt objection before it could be answered by Agent Dasso. In addition, the District Court's final instructions to the jury were sufficient to quell any prejudicial effect the question might have had. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1987) (remarking that there is an almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions). If Wadlington believes that a contemporaneous limiting instruction was also necessary to preserve the integrity of the trial, he should have requested one. Furthermore, the jury heard incriminating testimony for six days, the trial itself running over a two week period. We think it unlikely that this relatively fleeting impropriety so tainted the jurors' minds that they disregarded all exculpatory evidence in its favor. A mistrial would therefore have been an excessive and rather incongruous remedy under the circumstances. See United States v. Gundersen, 195 F.3d 1035, 1037-38 (8 th Cir. 1999) (The remedy of a mistrial is a drastic one, and certainly not the only way an error could have been cured.). Instead, the District Court handled the matter appropriately by giving cautionary instructions at the close of evidence. Next, Wadlington argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial following Officer William Greenwalt's unexpected testimony that upon being arrested, Wadlington remarked that he had already done his time. (Trial Tr. at 987.) Once again, defense counsel immediately objected. The District Court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement. The following day, Wadlington moved for a mistrial. After reviewing the previous day's transcript, the District Court denied the motion, specifically finding that the cautionary instruction was sufficient to allay any risk of undue prejudice. We agree. See Richardson, 481 U.S. 206-07. As an aside, Wadlington also contends that the prosecutor violated discovery requirements by failing to provide him with the statement prior to trial. However, he has failed to show that the prosecutor was actually aware of the statement before it was revealed on the stand and that the prosecutor intended to use the statement during trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A). Lastly, Wadlington claims that the prosecutor's false statements of law and personal attacks on defense counsel during rebuttal summation necessitate reversal of his conviction. Because Wadlington did not object to these statements when made, we will reverse only upon a finding of plain error. See United States v. Tulk, 171 F.3d 596, 599 (8 th Cir. 1999). Wadlington must therefore show that the error was clear or obvious and that it 'affected his substantial rights, which requires a showing that the error was prejudicial and affected the trial's outcome.' Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 12 F.3d 827, 835 (8 th Cir. 1994)). The plain error rule is designed to correct only those errors that 'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). We reverse only if certain that a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. Id. 1 Wadlington first argues that the prosecutor misstated the law when he told the jurors that, You know that if you believe the testimony of one witness, Azure Foster, Tina Bostic, Raashaan Wilkins, Titus Crawford, Sherman Bell, Mark Thomas, Tyrone Redmond, Kristie Barker, just one, if you believe their testimony, then you know you must find Mr. Wadlington guilty of conspiracy. (Partial Tr. Closing Argument at 27.) Because each named witness provided some link between Wadlington and the conspiracy, we are not convinced that the statement was incorrect. Nevertheless, we are unable to find the requisite prejudice because the District Court properly instructed the jury on that point of law and advised that the attorneys' statements, arguments, and comments are not evidence. See Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453, 460-61 (8 th Cir. 1999). 2 Wadlington also points to the prosecutor's accusations that defense counsel misstated the evidence and engaged in unethical conduct. The prosecutor began, 3 I have in my hand the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, and in this book . . . there's a thing called a disciplinary rule. That's a rule that lawyers are supposed to be bound by, and the rule says . . . A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Ill read that again. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 4 (Partial Tr. Closing Argument at 78-79.) He then proceeded to accuse defense counsel of violating the code in his closing remarks when he mentioned that government agents encouraged Wadlington to cooperate: 5 Where is this evidence that Mr. Greenwalt and Mr. Cundiff asked Mr. Wadlington to cooperate when he was arrested? Think back on the testimony. Did anybody mention that when Mr. Wadlington was arrested, they read him his rights and asked him to cooperate? 6 There was no evidence of that, and yet this man can stand here and tell you that thats what happened. 7 Ladies and gentlemen, A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, even misrepresentation. 8 (Id. at 80.) In fact, Agent Greenwalt did testify as represented by defense counsel: 9 Inspector Cundiff mirandized Mr. Wadlington and then asked Mr. Wadlington if he was interested in helping himself out or talking with Inspector Cundiff or myself, Inspector Cundiff informed Mr. Wadlington that at this time no promises could be made if Mr. Wadlington agreed to cooperate. 10 (Trial Tr. at 987.) To the extent that the prosecutor's comments can be construed as personal attacks on defense counsel, they were certainly improper. The Government does not deny that. However, viewed in the light of both parties' summations and the trial as a whole, we do not believe that plain error flowed from the comments. This is primarily because they were discernible attempts to address defense counsel's relentless-and at times questionable 8 -attacks on his case. Certainly, two wrongs do not make a right, however, the comments did no more than respond substantially in order to 'right the scale.' Young, 470 U.S. at 12-13. Moreover, the comments were not so inflammatory as to jeopardize Wadlington's due process rights. See James v. Bowersox, 187 F.3d 866, 868-70 (8 th Cir. 1999). 11 Because the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct must be assessed in determining whether the defendant was prejudiced, a finding that each particular instance of misconduct was harmless does not end the inquiry. See Figueroa, 900 F.2d at 1216. Reviewing the record as a whole, we cannot conclude that even the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct denied Wadlington a fair trial. Each instance of impropriety occurred at different times over the course of the six day trial, during which the Government presented ample evidence of Wadlington's guilt. Additionally, presumably effective curative instructions were given by the District Court where appropriate. Because we find no miscarriage of justice, we affirm the District Court's denial of a mistrial. Of course, by our decision we do not condone prosecutorial misconduct, either purposeful or incidental. We once again caution that 12 [t]he United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 13 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 14