Opinion ID: 1222650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Misclassification as Service Personnel

Text: The plaintiff contends she has been erroneously classified as service personnel rather than professional personnel. As the ALJ did with the disparate salary claim, she concluded this contention was time barred because the decision to reclassify was made in 1990 and the grievance was not filed until 1992, well past the fifteen-day time period stated in W.Va.Code, 18-29-4(a)(1). We conclude, however, that W.Va.Code, 18-29-2, allows employees to contest a misclassification at any time (although only once). As with a salary dispute, any relief is limited to prospective relief and to back relief from and after fifteen days preceding the filing of the grievance. On the merits, the ALJ found the plaintiff was properly classified under service personnel. On this issue, we have considerable sympathy with both the plaintiff and the Board. The ALJ reasoned, and the Board now argues, that the plaintiff's duties do not meet the statutory definition of professional personnel in W.Va.Code, 18A-1-1(b) (1981). That provision states that `[p]rofessional personnel' shall mean persons who meet the certification and/or licensing requirements of the State, and shall include the professional educator and other professional employees. The plaintiff obviously is neither a teacher nor one of the section's specified administrators. Thus, she could be classified as professional personnel only if she meets the definition in W.Va.Code, 18A-1-1(d), of other professional employee, which refers to a person from another profession who is properly licensed and is employed to serve the public schools[.] The Board insists that because the plaintiff's job did not require state certification or licensing she must therefore fall into the classification of service personnel contained in W.Va.Code, 18A-1-1(e). This assertion is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The Board is surely correct when it contends that the fact that the plaintiff has a degree and certification does not make her a professional within the statute. The inquiry must focus on the requirements for the job in question, not on the person who holds the job; a school janitor could be a teacher with a doctoral degree, but he would still not be classified as a professional. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends she does not meet the statute's definition of service personnel, which means those who serve the school or schools as a whole, in a nonprofessional capacity, including such areas as secretarial, custodial, maintenance, transportation, school lunch, and as aides. W.Va.Code, 18A-1-1(e). She argues the list of examples defines the nature of the class and thus distinguishes between those who work in jobs that do not require expertise, training, a degree, or the exercise of considerable discretion and those who work in jobs with such requirements, i.e., in professional jobs, as that term is commonly used. [10] She, therefore, adduced evidence concerning the requirements for and nature of her job, such evidence tending to establish the professional nature of her work. This assertion is also a reasonable interpretation of the statute. Mr. Deitsch conceded the plaintiff's job duties remained basically the same following her transfer from Assistant Finance Officer to Accountant III. He further stated the plaintiff's job duties are in excess of the statutory definition of Accountant III provided in W.Va.Code, 18A-4-8 (1994). [11] Mr. Deitsch also testified the plaintiff's job duties are of a higher level than the other Accountant IIIs in the office. [12] Having reviewed the relevant evidence and the legal principles relating to the issue before us, we now come to our analysis. Here, again, we find the factual findings and conclusions of the ALJ are insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. We begin our analysis with the recognition of a familiar rule of law: School personnel regulations and laws are to be strictly construed in favor of the employee. Syl. pt. 1, Morgan v. Pizzino, 163 W.Va. 454, 256 S.E.2d 592 (1979). It is the duty of the courts to apply the statute in accordance with the legislative intent. Gant v. Waggy, 180 W.Va. 481, 377 S.E.2d 473 (1988). The critical concern of the reviewing court is that the ALJ provide a coherent and reasonable explanation of his or her exercise of discretion. [13] Because the ALJ assumed all the claims of the plaintiff were timed barred, she failed to deal with the specifics of the reclassification issue. We, therefore, find it necessary to remand this issue so the ALJ can evaluate all the relevant information. For purposes of remand, we offer the following guidance. In our judgment, the plaintiff does not neatly fit within the statute's definition of service personnel nor does she fall within the clear language of professional personnel. As we stated above, she could be classified as professional personnel only if she met the definition in W.Va.Code, 18A-1-1(d), of other professional employee, which refers to a person from another profession who is properly licensed and is employed to serve the public schools[.] Unfortunately, under our statutory scheme, she must be either one or the other. Therefore, it becomes necessary for the ALJ to closely analyze the facts and to determine under the law which definition applies. [C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L.Ed.2d 391, 397 (1992). Ordinarily, when forced to choose between a specific statutory provision dealing with a professional personnel and a general listing of jobs from which to infer that a certain job is not included within its provisions, the ALJ should err on the side of the specific provision in the belief that it reflects legislative intent more clearly. Absent a clearly expressed intention that the more specific provision does not control, we do not believe the Legislature intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute limiting professional personnel to those that require certification or licensure. We make this observation consistent with our duty to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris. West Virginia University Hospital, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 1148, 113 L.Ed.2d 68, 84 (1991). Understandably, we have a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions of the same enactment. It is inescapable that the position held by the plaintiff does not require her to possess a teaching certificate or other professional certification. See Trimboli v. Board of Educ. of Wayne County, 163 W.Va. 1, 6 n. 2, 254 S.E.2d 561, 563 n. 2 (1979) (`[p]rofessional personnel' ... are certified or licensed persons). However, this conclusion does not end the controversy. The ALJ must determine whether under this statutory scheme there are other considerations that must be factored into the equation. The legislature knew that this statute would be closely read by school administrators, school boards and the courts. If the legislature had meant to foreclose all but one intended interpretation, it could have precisely drafted the statute to say so. The statute's lack of precision has left us with language that invites two equally plausible interpretations. Without direct evidence of legislative intent, we are forced to choose one valid interpretation over the other. It is by now commonplace that when faced with a problem of statutory construction, the circuit court and this Court should give some deference to the interpretation of the officer who is charged with statutory implementation. As we noted in Syllabus Point 7, in part, of Lincoln County Board of Education v. Adkins, 188 W.Va. 430, 424 S.E.2d 775 (1992): `Interpretations of statutes by bodies charged with their administration are given great weight unless clearly erroneous.' (Citations omitted). See also Syl. pt. 2, West Va. Dept. of Health and Human Resources/Welch Emergency Hosp. v. Blankenship, 189 W.Va. 342, 431 S.E.2d 681 (1993); Boley v. Miller, 187 W.Va. 242, 418 S.E.2d 352 (1992); Blennerhassett Historical Park Comm'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n of W.Va., 179 W.Va. 250, 366 S.E.2d 758 (1988). Of course, when there is more than one reasonable interpretation, the courts ordinarily should follow that of the administrative board. Adherence to the practice described above is particularly important in cases where the agency has some expertise in making these determinations. Nevertheless, the deference that we speak of has some limitations. The policy underlying our grant of special deference to agency decisions and similar agency pronouncements does not extend to every agency action. For example, it does not extend to ad hoc representations on behalf of an agency, such as litigation arguments. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213, 109 S.Ct. 468, 474, 102 L.Ed.2d 493, 503 (1988) (little weight should be given to expedient litigation position of an agency). Petition of Snuffer, 193 W.Va. 412, 417, 456 S.E.2d 493, 498 (1995) (Cleckley, J. Concurring). On remand, the ALJ should consider the above factors in making a determination on this issue.