Opinion ID: 2356861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Resurrection of Thomas

Text: Resurrecting the rule in Thomas, supra , the majority reverses Appellant's conviction because the trial court denied Appellant's challenge to Juror 138 for cause, even though juror 138 never sat on the jury that convicted Appellant All because Appellant used one of his nine (9) peremptory challenges allotted to him for, the very purpose for which they were grantedto strike a juror he felt would not be sympathetic to his cause. RCr 9.40. To be clear, one should not believe that this is a case where an obviously biased juror sat on the trial jury. Morgan, 189 S.W.3d at 105. As in Thomas , the majority re-adopts. the doctrine that the use of Appellant's peremptory challenge in this circumstance resulted in a violation of a substantial right which made, the trial unfair, requiring reversal. A square collision with RCr 9.24, the harmless error rule, which commands that, [n]o error ... in anything done or omitted by the court ... is ground[s] for ... setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment ... unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice. When announced in 1993, Thomas made a quantum leap from Rigsby v. Commonwealth, 495 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Ky.1973) ([t]here has been no showing that use of the eleven peremptories to dispose of the suspect jurors resulted in a subsequent inability to challenge additional unacceptable veniremen) and Marsch v. Commonwealth, 743 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Ky.1987) ([t]wo jurors who were challenged for cause actually served upon the jury because appellant's peremptories had been exhausted and he could not excuse them), to overrule Turpin v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 619 (Ky.1989) and Dunbar v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Ky.1991) (Whey have failed to demonstrate that in fact any person who sat on the jury was incompetent and should have been stricken for cause). Pre- Thomas , even Justice Leibson, acknowledged the rule of Rigsby and Marsch : Without forewarning to the trial bar, we have quietly and subtly shifted this rule to a new one stating that no prejudice is presumed when a party is forced to use peremptory challenges to excuse jurors who should have been excused for cause unless that party not only then exhausts all peremptory challenges available to him, but also requests additional challenges on grounds that he was unfairly denied challenges for cause, or, at the least, before having a right to complain a party must state on the record additional persons against whom he would have exercised peremptory challenges had such challenges been available to him. Turpin, 780 S.W.2d at 626 (Liebson, J., dissenting). Thomas, supra , changed the rule in Rigsby and Marsch, while Morgan, supra , did not in any way challenge, change, or disparage, Rigsby or Marsch , only Thomas . In fact, in Morgan , there was no proof, or allegations that there was any other juror that the defense needed to strike with the one peremptory challenge at issue.