Opinion ID: 4448072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court’s decision was reasonable

Text: The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision more than satisfies our deferential standard of review. To begin, it reasonably set forth the federal principles governing appeals of a manifest-necessity finding. It explained that it was reviewing for abuse of discretion, deferring to the trial court’s superior ability to gauge potential bias and jury prejudice. 88 A.3d at 995–97; see Renico, 559 U.S. at 772–73 (standard of review); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 510 (deference). And it warned that trial courts should not declare mistrials too readily and should resolve any doubts in favor of the defendant. 88 A.3d at 996; see Renico, 559 U.S. at 772–74. Next, the Superior Court reasoned that the trial court had legal authority to grant a mistrial once it discovered that the exhibits were forged. It reasonably held that “[o]nce the trial judge realized forged documents had been admitted into evi- dence, he could not allow those documents to enter into the jury’s deliberation and verdict.” 88 A.3d at 998. No Supreme Court case suggests otherwise. On the contrary, in so holding, the Superior Court cited and reasonably interpreted the Supreme Court’s guidance. See id. (citing trial court’s opinion as in turn citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)); see also Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246 (“The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud.”). 10 The Superior Court also reasonably upheld the trial court’s “initial factual determination that the documents were forgeries.” 88 A.3d at 998–99. In doing so, it made a series of reasonable observations: The jury did not have enough evidence to resolve that question. Id. at 998. Though the prosecution brought out Exhibit 101B’s defects on cross-examination of Orie, it did not discover Exhibit 110’s forgery until after the jury had started deliberating. Id. The jury was never instructed what to do if it found that documents were forged. Id. And because the defense did not let the prosecution inspect the documents until the second-to-last day of trial, the prosecution could not have discovered the forgeries earlier. So the prosecution could not introduce evidence to help the jury evaluate the exhibits. Id. at 998–99. The record amply supports each of these observations. Further, the Superior Court reasoned that the forged exhibits were material to the trial’s outcome. As it noted, Orie had argued “that Pavlot had the complete authority to direct the staffers and that Pavlot acted on her own initiative and against Orie’s directives that no improper political activity occur in the office.” Id. at 999. The forged documents supported that reading. Orie had introduced these documents to show that Pavlot had disobeyed Orie’s directives and let the staff do campaign work on legislative time. These and similar documents were the basis of Orie’s argument to the jury that Pavlot, not Orie, was responsible for the staffers’ actions. And when Pavlot could not remember any of the directives on cross-examination, the defense impugned her credibility. 11 Pavlot’s credibility was at the heart of the case. As Orie’s lawyer argued in closing, “[t]he Commonwealth’s case rises and falls on [Pavlot’s] truthfulness.” Tr. Pt. 7, 1st Trial (Mar. 2, 2011), p. 3180. So Pavlot’s forged signatures on those documents greatly inflated the force of Orie’s arguments and her cross-examination of Pavlot. Finally, the Superior Court emphasized that while the trial court had solicited and weighed alternative remedies, it had reasonably found that nothing short of a mistrial would counteract the fraud. 88 A.3d at 998–99. That reasoning is sound. The trial court repeatedly asked the parties what it should do about the forgeries, both before and after hearing from the handwriting expert. Twice, the prosecution suggested a curative instruction. But twice, the defense balked, insisting that “[b]efore you do that then declare a mistrial” and that giving an instruction “is absolutely not an option here.” App. 1557a, 1571a. Orie’s only proposed remedy, as the Superior Court noted, was to do nothing. See 88 A.3d at 999 & n.13; see also App. 1572a (“We are asking that [the jury’s] deliberations resume immediately, and we are opposed to a mistrial.”). Given the importance of the forged documents, the threat to the integrity of the verdict, and the lack of a good alternative remedy, the only solution was a mistrial. So we cannot say that the Superior Court’s decision to uphold the grant of a mistrial was unreasonable.