Opinion ID: 1169955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equity Considerations

Text: Notwithstanding the strict legal effect of the contract, however, plaintiff seeks equitable relief based on a mutual mistake in the contract. He contends the parties talked about one parcel of land only and intended the sale to cover the land sellers thought they owned and the land buyer thought he was buying, including Tract C. In effect, the trial court was asked to find that parties had made a mutual mistake in their contract by not including Tract C and to grant adequate equitable relief to prevent an injustice. If equitable relief is to be given, as plaintiff himself has requested, it must be expected that it will be equitable to both sides. It seems to us the trial court has afforded all relief sought by plaintiff except that the damages allowed do not satisfy. We find the judgment of the district court entirely fair and equitable to plaintiff and we see no reason to modify or reverse it. Regarding the measure of damages, the contract itself states the property contains 15.78 acres, more or less. There was no guarantee that there would be a full 15.78 acres. The expressed guarantee, as provided in the contract, was that the area contains not less than 15 acres. The parties in that regard specifically agreed, if there were less than 15 acres, the price is to be adjusted in accordance with the area conveyed. Such a provision can only mean the price would be adjusted by prorating the purchase price at the contract rate. The court found Tract C contained 0.7 acres and, with such tract excluded, there still remained 14.9 acres to be conveyed. Thus, according to the language of the contract, the shortage under 15 acres, which would be 0.1 acres, would be deducted from the purchase price on the basis of a prorated share of the stated purchase price. That would amount to a deduction of $123.33 from the purchase price. However, the court allowed not only the deduction of $123.33, it allowed a further deduction for the 0.7 acres contained in Tract C. Plaintiff therefore received an adjustment eight times as large as the contract provided for. Plaintiff's theory is that the land was bought for and was worth approximately $1,000 per acre at the time of purchase; and that the land had since increased in value so that it was worth five times as much or $5,000 per acre at the time of trial. As far as the number of acres is concerned, plaintiff cannot complain if the adjustment rate contemplated by the contract is followed  especially where he received an adjustment for 0.8 acres instead of for 0.1 acres. The buyer's principal complaint, however, seems to be that there is damage stemming from the fact that his land is divided so that one tract is cut off from the other by the Government's access strip. The court's finding on this point was that plaintiff failed to prove actual damage of this nature; that the evidence produced was speculative, had insufficient foundation, and was not credible. Plaintiff suggested he intended to subdivide the land, but there was no evidence to show exactly what damage he would suffer in subdividing because Tract A and Tract B were separated by the Government's Tract C. Both Tracts A and B abut on U.S. Highway 187. We dealt with a contention similar to the one made here by Kipp in State Highway Commission v. Triangle Development Co., Wyo., 369 P.2d 864, 869-870. See also Sheridan Drive-In Theatre, Inc., v. State, Wyo., 384 P.2d 597, 600-601. If there was indeed a mutual mistake caused by Tract C not being included in the contract when all parties thought it was being included, there would be reason to grant relief to the party injured when enforcement of the contract is sought. Barnard v. Cedar Rapids City Cab Co., 257 Iowa 734, 133 N.W.2d 884, 890; Mortensen v. Berzell Investment Company, 102 Ariz. 348, 429 P.2d 945, 947. Beaver v. Estate of Harris, 67 Wash.2d 621, 409 P.2d 143, 146. See also 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 144, p. 894. However, a relief which equity might very well offer to the buyer in such a situation would be to restore the parties to their original position by voiding the contract and ordering all money paid by the purchaser to be refunded to him, less the rental value of the land during buyer's occupancy of it. See Mortensen v. Berzell Investment Company, 102 Ariz. 348, 429 P.2d 945, 948. As stated in 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 144, p. 895, and in Pepper v. Evanson, 70 Wash.2d 309, 422 P.2d 817, 819, mutual mistake renders a contract merely voidable and not void. In this case Kipp makes it very clear he does not want the contract voided. He is not willing for the contract to be voided because of the increase in the value of the land since the contract was entered into. Having so chosen, he cannot complain if the court follows the language of the contract and refuses to allow a severance damage caused by Tract A and Tract B being separated. Our conclusion is, regardless of whether plaintiff proved a severance damage resulting from a situation not known to exist at the time of contracting, the court nevertheless arrived at an equitable result and its judgment cannot be said to be inequitable to buyer-Kipp. That is especially true in view of Kipp's election not to have the contract voided. In other words, if plaintiff does not want the contract voided, he cannot complain if it stands as written. In the absence of rescission of a contract because of a mutual mistake, a contract may be regarded as still subsisting and as determining the rights of the parties. Long v. Thompson, 63 Cal. App.2d 834, 148 P.2d 129, 131. In Dunlap v. Orwig, 199 Okl. 378, 186 P.2d 659, 662, a contract was held to be voidable and not void. The court said parties seeking relief may not both affirm and repudiate the contract. It was held such parties must elect either to rescind or to affirm the contract, and until they so elect, the court said, the contract continues valid.