Opinion ID: 1602019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ormco's Argument

Text: Ormco contends that irreparable injury should be inferred when a violation of a noncompetition agreement is alleged and when there has been an initial showing that the agreement is enforceable and that the employer has a protectible interest. Accordingly, Ormco argues that if such a showing is made, irreparable injury is established and it need present no further evidence as to that element of injunctive relief. Ormco acknowledges that this Court has not explicitly adopted this inference of irreparable injury in a case involving the alleged violation of a noncompetition agreement; however, Ormco cites several decisions of other jurisdictions that appear to indicate that the courts in those jurisdictions either explicitly use that inference or at least appear to be willing to find irreparable injury easily established in a case involving the alleged violation of a noncompetition agreement: Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir.1999) (New York cases in the covenant-not-to-compete context apparently assume an irreparable injury to plaintiff); JAK Prods., Inc. v. Wiza, 986 F.2d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir.1993) (under Indiana law, [w]henever an employee uses his experience gained from an employer in violation of a reasonable covenant not to compete, irreparable injury occurs and injunctive relief is appropriate); Highdata Software Corp. v. Kothandan, 160 F.Supp.2d 167, 168 (D.N.H.2001) (stating that [a]ny significant violation of an enforceable noncompetition and nondisclosure agreement causes irreparable harm to the party seeking to promptly enforce the agreement); American Express Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Scott, 955 F.Supp. 688, 693 (N.D.Tex.1996) ([i]n Texas, injury resulting from the breach of non-compete covenants is the epitome of irreparable injury, because [i]n a situation where trade secrets and goodwill are involved, the threat is significant that the harm experienced by the misappropriation or misuse of trade secrets will be irreparable and damages [will be] impossible to calculate); Harrison v. Albright, 40 Colo.App. 227, 231-32, 577 P.2d 302, 305 (1977) (irreparable injury is presumed from the breach of [a noncompetition] clause, and ... the remedy at law is presumed inadequate); McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen, 138 Ill.App.3d 1045, 1054, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1313, 93 Ill.Dec. 471, 478 (1985) (Once a protectable interest is established, irreparable injury is presumed to follow if the interest is not protected.); Osage Glass, Inc. v. Donovan, 693 S.W.2d 71, 75 (Mo.1985) (If the [noncompetition] covenant is lawful and opportunity for influencing customers exists, enforcement is appropriate.). Ormco points out that this Court has never held a trial court in error for finding that an employer demonstrated irreparable harm stemming from an employee's breach of a noncompetition agreement, so as to justify a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Seymour v. Buckley, 628 So.2d 554 (Ala.1993); Gross v. QMS, Inc., 613 So.2d 331 (Ala.1993); and Harkness v. Scottsboro Newspapers, Inc., 529 So.2d 1000, 1003 (Ala.1988). However, this fact is of little persuasive effect, given that this Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction with great deference to the decision of the trial court. See Seymour, 628 So.2d at 557 (The issue before us is whether the trial court's finding that irreparable harm would result if the preliminary injunction was not issued was plainly and palpably erroneous. It is settled law that wide discretion is accorded the trial judge hearing a motion for a preliminary injunction and that his action will not be disturbed on appeal unless he abuses his discretion. (citing Chunchula Energy Corp. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 503 So.2d 1211 (Ala.1987), and Martin v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 559 So.2d 1075 (Ala.1990))); Gross, 613 So.2d at 332-33 (`It is well established that the issuance of injunctive relief is within the sound discretion of the trial court, especially when... the facts are in dispute and the evidence is presented ore tenus.' (quoting Davis v. Hester, 582 So.2d 538, 540 (Ala. 1991) (citation omitted))); Harkness, 529 So.2d at 1002 (This Court adheres to the principle that the grant of a preliminary injunction will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. This abuse must be of such a nature as to constitute or manifest injustice unless rectified on appeal.).