Opinion ID: 347528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Specific Intent Instruction

Text: 248 Haldeman raises a number of arguments which he contends demonstrate that the District Court failed to give a clear and correct definition of the essential element of specific intent. His major points appear to be: (1) the court failed to emphasize specific intent as an element of each offense charged; (2) the court failed to distinguish specific intent from general intent; and (3) the placement of the specific intent instruction tended to minimize its impact. For the reasons explained below, we find no error in the judge's charge to the jury on this subject. 249 First, it becomes clear upon reading the entire charge (Tr. 12356-12415) that the jury was instructed with respect to each count that they must find the presence of specific intent as a prerequisite to returning a verdict of guilty. The judge first addressed the charge of conspiracy, telling the jury that one of the essential elements of the offense is (t)hat each Defendant knowingly participated in this conspiracy with the intent to commit the offense or the fraud which was the object of the conspiracy   . Tr. 12364 (emphasis added). This is a correct statement, for the specific intent required for the crime of conspiracy is in fact the intent to advance or further the unlawful object of the conspiracy. 223 But the judge went on to give a more comprehensive instruction on the meaning of specific intent: 250 The Government must also prove, as part of the second element of the crime of conspiracy, that each Defendant who allegedly participated in the conspiracy charged did so with criminal intent. 251 Intent means that a person had the purpose to do a thing; it means that he made an act of the will to do the thing; it means that the thing was done consciously and voluntarily and not inadvertently or accidentally. 252 Now, some criminal offenses require only a general intent. Where this is so and it is shown that a person has knowingly committed an act which the law makes a crime, intent may be inferred from the doing of the act. Other offenses, such as this one (conspiracy), require a specific intent. Specific intent requires more than a mere general intent to engage in certain conduct or to do certain acts. A person who knowingly does an act which the law forbids intending with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law, may be found to act with specific intent. 253 Tr. 12367-12368 (emphasis added). The court's charge on this point was nearly a verbatim statement of the applicable D. C. Standard Jury Instruction, 224 which we specifically approved in United States v. Moore, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 309, 311, 435 F.2d 113, 115 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 1376, 28 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). The District Court went on to emphasize that since the defendants claim(ed) they lacked the specific intent to join the alleged conspiracy, the jury had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a Defendant possessed the specific intent to join the conspiracy in order to find that defendant guilty of Count 1. Tr. 12370. 254 The jury instructions thus clearly spelled out for the jury that specific intent was an essential element of the crime of conspiracy charged under Count 1. Haldeman, however, argues that because the definition of specific intent does not appear in the same place as the recital of the elements of the crime of conspiracy, the jury could have been confused into believing that only general intent was required to convict on that charge. We cannot accept that contention, for the instructions are to be examined as a whole on appeal. 225 It could be most disruptive and confusing if the judge were required to interrupt his identification of the elements of an offense with definitions of the terms involved. Doubtlessly, some might be able to improve the organization of the charge but we find no error in this portion of it. Here, the judge indicated the type of intent required for conspiracy every time the subject came up; 226 the fact that he occasionally failed to use the word specific 227 and only once defined specific intent in great detail is not ground for reversal. 255 Similarly, the instruction on Count 2, the obstruction of justice count, was clear as to the need for specific intent. The judge told the jury: 256 I have already instructed you on what we mean when we use the words, specific intent, knowingly, and wilfully. These words center on the purpose an individual has when he does something, that is, his intent, his will. Specific intent is an important element of the crime charged in Count Two. To convict any Defendant charged in Count Two, you must find, in addition to the other elements, that he had the specific intent to obstruct, impair, or impede the due administration of justice and that his endeavor was not accidental or inadvertent. 257 Tr. 12381 (emphasis added). The argument, raised by Haldeman, 228 that there was something prejudicial in the court's failure to use the words necessary or required, or in failing to include the phrase with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law when referring to specific intent, is insubstantial in light of the above-quoted language. Specific intent is plainly identified not only as an element of the offense (and therefore necessary) but also as an important element. And since the requisites of a finding of specific intent (including the necessity of an evil purpose) had been explained earlier and were cross-referenced here, the failure to define the term in detail again does not constitute error. Once a proper instruction is given, it need not be fully repeated on every subsequent occasion when it is referred to in listing the requirements for conviction. 229 This point also disposes of the contentions that the District Court acted improperly in making only shorthand references 230 to specific intent, without defining the term, when instructing on the perjury and false declarations counts. Haldeman br. at 126. 258 The second group of arguments made against the court's specific intent instruction is that it failed to distinguish specific intent from general intent. 231 See, e. g., Haldeman br. at 129-130. Ignoring the careful distinction drawn between the two concepts by the trial judge when he defined specific intent for the jury, see text at 147 supra, appellant criticizes the use both of the natural and probable consequences instruction 232 and the instruction to consider all of the circumstances 233 as creating the impression that it was permissible to infer specific knowledge or intent solely on the basis of equivocal criteria, and without regard to the totality of the circumstances. Haldeman br. at 129 (emphasis added). See also id. at 127. 259 Charging that the jury could consider all of the circumstances was clearly proper. Except in extraordinary circumstances, criminal intent cannot be proved by direct evidence; it is therefore not only appropriate but also necessary for the jury to look at all of the circumstances in determining specific intent. 234 After all, when all the circumstantial evidence is considered, it might support the defense. The instruction in question was therefore both proper and beneficial to the appellants, since it cautioned the jury against fixing on one or two isolated circumstances as evidence of intent. This is not to say that intent may be presumed as a matter of law from the circumstances e. g., from the commission of the crime itself but only that intent may be inferred from all the circumstantial evidence introduced at trial. 260 As to the natural and probable consequences instruction, we have previously approved this instruction with the inclusion of the phrase  knowingly done or knowingly omitted as indicated by the D.C. Criminal Jury Instructions 235 in United States v. Moore, supra, 140 U.S.App.D.C. at 312, 435 F.2d at 116. However, we did so with some reservation. As we pointed out there, 236 several circuits have found this instruction to be both useless and misleading; one court has called it an invitation to reversal. 237 But we did not find the mere use of this instruction, without more, to be reversible error in Moore. 238 We considered the charge as a whole and found no plain error, 239 a procedure which finds support in other circuits as well. 240 That approach will be adhered to here, where we also find reversal to be unwarranted. In this case the phrase knowingly done or knowingly omitted was included in the charge on this point, although we note that the final sentence of D.C. Standard Criminal Instruction 3.02 241 a sentence which was inserted by the drafters to help assure proper application of the natural and probable consequences portion of the instruction 242 was not used here. 243 Also, we note that, as in Moore, there was no objection raised at trial to this instruction. 244 See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30. But of controlling importance is our own evaluation of the entire charge, from which we have concluded on the facts of this case that the jury was adequately and fairly instructed on the requirement of specific intent. 261 The final group of arguments which Haldeman makes against the court's specific intent instruction is his criticism of its location within the overall charge to the jury. One source of prejudice is said to be the placement of the definition of specific intent (quoted in text at ---- of 181 U.S.App.D.C., at 116 of 559 F.2d supra ) immediately after a discussion of guilty knowledge and somewhat before the court's discussion of natural and probable consequences, which allegedly operated to minimize the impact of the specific intent charge. Haldeman br. at 128. Appellant apparently believes that the jury could be confused by the serial explanation of these similar concepts. However, when the entire charge is read it becomes clear that the judge's order was logical and designed to minimize confusion. First, he explained the elements of Count 1, the conspiracy count; then he defined the legal concepts that the jury would have to employ in considering the first count; and then he proceeded to discuss the other counts, adding definitions or referring back to ones previously made as necessary. By discussing all the similar concepts in one place, the judge could minimize confusion by clarifying the differences between them; and he also avoided confusion regarding the elements of the crime by listing them all at once first, without interruption for definitions of terms. We find no undue potential for confusion here. 262 Appellant's other argument on this point is similar: he contends that, immediately after explaining that specific intent requires a finding that the accused acted knowingly, the District Judge did an about-face, Haldeman br. at 123, by stating that (i)n attempting to show that a defendant acted wilfully, it is not essential that the Government establish that the Defendant knew he was breaking some particular rule or law. Tr. 12368. The judge's statement was correct: a defendant does not have to be aware that he was violating a particular law, such as 18 U.S.C. § 371, so long as he had the conscious intent to do that which the law in fact forbids. See generally United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686-696, 95 S.Ct. 1255 (1975). Referring to the specific intent required by the crime of obstructing justice in Caldwell v. United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 37, 218 F.2d 370, 372 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930, 75 S.Ct. 773, 99 L.Ed. 1260 (1955), we stated: 263 The only intent involved in the crime is the intent to do the forbidden act. The defendant must have had knowledge of the facts, though not necessarily the law, that made his act criminal. 264 Again, the placement of a caveat immediately following the specific intent definition in all likelihood tended to clarify the requirements for conviction rather than to confuse the jury. 265 In summary, we find the specific intent instruction given by the District Court to be adequate and nonprejudicial, and we reject this alleged ground for reversal. 266