Opinion ID: 760491
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Grant Immunity to Saripkin

Text: 34 Talley next contends that the district court erred by failing to either immunize Saripkin or compel the government to do so. Talley claims that it was unfair that Tyler was required to testify pursuant to a grant of immunity, but that Saripkin was not. 3 Talley asserts that this case represents a situation in which the government has lopsided access to evidence by using its powers to grant immunity to Tyler, without allowing Talley to call Saripkin to refute these statements. We disagree. 35 We have consistently held that a district court is without authority to either grant immunity to a witness who asserts his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination, or to force the government to do so. See, e.g., United States v. Medina, 992 F.2d 573, 585-86 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1401 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 526-27 (6th Cir.1984). We have, however, discussed, but not explicitly accepted, two limited situations in which such immunity may be warranted: where immunity is necessary to enable a defendant to present an effective defense and/or to remedy prosecutorial misconduct. Neither of these situations is at issue here. 36 As an initial matter, we note that this court has previously discussed and rejected the so-called effective defense theory. See Mohney, 949 F.2d at 1401 (holding that federal courts do not have the inherent power to immunize witnesses whose testimony is essential to an effective defense). But see Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir.1980)(noting that such immunity is available when the defendant properly seeks it, the witness is available to testify, the testimony is essential and exculpatory, and governmental interests are not strongly outweighed). We have explicitly noted that compelled judicial use immunity would raise separation of powers concerns, because the decision of whom to prosecute is soundly within the discretion of the prosecutor, not the courts. Mohney, 949 F.2d at 1401. Moreover, adopting such a theory would force courts to place the government in the undesirable position of choosing whether to prosecute the defendant or the witness. Id. ([c]ompelled judicial use immunity could also impair the subsequent prosecution of the witness). We recognize that in certain limited situations, the government's selective grant of immunity to its own witnesses, while denying immunity to the defendant's witnesses, may deprive the defense of a fair trial, and in some cases require a judicially compelled immunity grant. Id. at 1402 (noting that [s]elective grants of immunity could violate due process where they produce egregiously lopsided access to evidence.). Nonetheless, we have been cautious to note that [a] defendant ... does not have a right to have his witnesses immunized simply because the prosecution relies on immunized witnesses to make its case. Id. Instead, [i]f the government's prosecutorial interest in [prosecuting accused felons] outweighs a defendant's interest in presenting such evidence ... then the government's interest also outweighs any abstract concern with symmetry. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). In this case, Talley makes no allegations which demonstrate that the evidence was so egregiously lopsided by the grant of immunity to Tyler and not Saripkin that an unfair trial resulted. While Saripkin may have supported Talley's argument that Tyler was the aggressor, the key piece of evidence in this case came from the tape recorded conversation between Tally and Tyler. Consequently, we find that Talley presents no compelling reasons here for us to revisit our previous holdings on the effective defense theory. 37 Talley garners no support from the second theory, that immunity may be warranted in order to remedy prosecutorial misconduct. See id., 954 F.2d 1160 This court has discussed, but not yet decided, whether to adopt a rule allowing the district court to grant immunity in limited circumstances in order to remedy prosecutorial misconduct. See id.; Medina, 992 F.2d 573; Pennell, 737 F.2d at 527. Under this theory, due process requires an immunity grant where the prosecution abuses its discretion by intentionally attempting to distort the fact-finding process. Mohney, 949 F.2d at 1402. To this end, the defendant must establish that the government's decisions were made with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). Talley has failed to do so. In making his argument, Talley overlooks the fact that at no point did the government attempt to prevent Saripkin from testifying. See Medina, 992 F.2d at 586 (noting that circuits recognizing the theory have done so where the government took affirmative actions to prevent testimony of defense witnesses) (citing United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.1991)). Moreover, the government has indicated that Saripkin was the subject of a criminal investigation, and that it did not grant immunity to him because it was deciding whether to pursue criminal charges against him concerning his involvement in the case. During the trial, Saripkin asserted the Fifth Amendment on advice from his attorney, not because of any pressure from the government. Finally, it seems reasonable that Tyler was given immunity, and Saripkin was not, where Tyler initially contacted the government to report Talley's activities and served as a government informant throughout the case. Thus, even assuming that the prosecutorial misconduct theory is cognizable in the Sixth Circuit, we are confident that Talley has made no showing of such misconduct in this case.