Opinion ID: 889252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether the Error was Prejudicial

Text: ¶ 49 We now turn to the issue of whether the District Court's error in admitting the deputies' expert testimony was prejudicial, i.e., not harmless, to Larson. This Court utilizes a two-step analysis to determine whether error was prejudicial to a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial and mandates reversal. Van Kirk, ¶ 37. First, we inquire whether the error is structural error or trial error. Id. Structural error is error that affects the framework within which a trial proceeds; it typically is of constitutional dimension, precedes the trial, and undermines the fairness of the entire trial proceeding. Nobach, ¶ 27. Examples include errors in jury selection, deprivation of the right to counsel, and lack of an impartial judge. Van Kirk, ¶ 39. If the error was structural, the inquiry ends and the verdict reversed. Id. at ¶ 41. On the other hand, if the error is trial error, we proceed to the second step and inquire whether the error was prejudicial. Id. Trial error typically occurs during presentation of the case, and includes improper admission of evidence. Nobach, ¶ 27. ¶ 50 Based upon the foregoing, the erroneous admission of the deputies' expert opinions during trial constituted trial error. We assess trial error under our harmless error statute, § 46-20-701(1), MCA, in order to determine the prejudicial impact with regard to the other evidence produced at trial. Van Kirk, ¶ 40. To do this, we utilize the cumulative evidence test. Id. at ¶ 43. Under this test, the State must show that the jury was presented with admissible evidence that proved the same facts as the tainted evidence and, qualitatively, by comparison, the tainted evidence would not have contributed to the conviction. Id. at ¶ 47. ¶ 51 The expert opinions were offered as proof that Larson's driving was impaired by marijuana. Thus, to satisfy the cumulative evidence test the State must meet two requirements. First, the State must point to other admissible evidence demonstrating that Larson's ability to operate his truck was impaired by marijuana. Second, the State must demonstrate that qualitatively, no reasonable possibility exists that the erroneously-admitted opinions might have contributed to Larson's conviction. We conclude that the State has satisfied both requirements. ¶ 52 First, the State has shown other admissible evidence demonstrating that Larson's ability to operate his vehicle safely was impaired by marijuana. The deputies' non-expert testimony provided the jury with observations of Larson's impairment. Both King and Schmill testified to Larson's clear lack of judgment when he screeched the truck's tires and revved the engine, in plain sight of two officers and two patrol vehicles with activated light bars. King testified to Larson's wide turn into the oncoming lane, his slow and slurred speech, and delayed reaction time. Larson told King he had consumed alcohol earlier in the day, and his performance on the field sobriety tests indicated impairment. Based upon these facts, the jury certainly could have concluded Larson's driving was impaired. Additionally, the jury was presented with admissible evidence that Larson's impairment was due to marijuana. Larson voluntarily produced a bag of marijuana and a pipe, and admitted that he had smoked an hour earlier. Furthermore, Schmill testified to an odor of marijuana and Larson's bloodshot, glassy eyes. Thus, the jury was presented with other admissible evidence that allowed it to conclude Larson's driving was impaired by marijuana. ¶ 53 Second, in comparison to the admissible evidence, there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneously-admitted expert testimony contributed to Larson's conviction. Each deputy clearly conveyed his respective lack of familiarity with marijuana. The jury heard each admit to a deficiency in training and experience with regard to marijuana impairment. On cross-examination, Larson demonstrated that neither deputy was qualified to offer opinions regarding marijuana's impact on the ability to drive. We conclude that the erroneously-admitted expert opinions were harmless and did not prejudice Larson's right to a fair trial. ¶ 54 Whether the District Court Properly Refused Larson's Proposed Jury Instruction. ¶ 55 Larson argues that the District Court's rebuttable inference jury instruction failed to accurately state the law, because it did not explain that the State had a burden of proof beyond the rebuttable inference. He argues that in the absence of such an instruction, a jury does not know how to construe the word rebuttable, and is permitted to convict a defendant solely on the basis of the rebuttable inference. Furthermore, Larson posits that this issue was not raised in, and is not controlled by, either State v. Michaud, 2008 MT 88, 342 Mont. 244, 180 P.3d 636, or Great Falls v. Morris, 2006 MT 93, 332 Mont. 85, 134 P.3d 692. The State responds that the jury instructions, as a whole, properly advised the jury as to the State's burden of proof and explained how the jury was permitted to consider Larson's refusal to submit to a blood test. ¶ 56 Section 61-8-404, MCA, governs the admissibility of, and weight given to, evidence in a DUI trial. We have previously interpreted this statute to demand competent corroborating evidence of impairment, beyond drug test results or a defendant's refusal to submit to a drug test. Morris, ¶ 21; Michaud, ¶ 49. Larson posits that our prior decisions mandate an explicit jury instruction that explains the State's burden to provide competent corroborating evidence. We disagree. ¶ 57 In State v. Miller , we were faced with the issue of whether a district court abused its discretion by failing to explicitly tell the jury that the State needed to provide competent corroborating evidence other than the rebuttable inference. Miller, ¶ 17. The specific jury instruction at issue in Miller provided: If a person refuses to submit to a physical test or a test of their breath or blood for alcohol concentration, such a refusal is admissible evidence. You may infer from the refusal that the person was under the influence. The inference is rebuttable. Id. at ¶ 7. Miller argued that absent a competent corroborating evidence instruction, the district court turned the permissive inference from § 61-8-404(2), MCA, into a mandatory presumption, creating an unconstitutional burden shift. Id. at ¶ 19. ¶ 58 We rejected Miller's argument, reasoning that when the jury instructions were viewed as a whole, they fully and fairly set forth the applicable law and did not result in an unconstitutional burden shift. Id. at ¶ 23. The jury was informed that they were to consider all of the instructions as a whole, Miller was presumed innocent throughout the entire trial, the State had the burden to overcome that presumption beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon all the evidence, and Miller was not required to present any evidence. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23. Furthermore, the jury was instructed as to the specific elements of the DUI offense. Id. at ¶ 22. We concluded that the lack of an explicit instruction regarding competent corroborating evidence was compensated for by the other instructions given to the jury. Id. at ¶ 24. ¶ 59 Miller is applicable to the case at hand. The District Court's rebuttable inference instruction is materially indistinguishable from the one given in Miller. Moreover, Larson's jury was instructed (1) to consider all of the instructions as a whole, (2) that Larson was presumed innocent throughout the proceedings, (3) that the State had the burden to prove Larson's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon all the evidence, (4) that Larson was permitted to not testify or offer evidence, and (5) that each element of the DUI offense had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, when viewed as a whole, the instructions fully and fairly instructed the jury regarding the applicable law. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Larson's proposed jury instruction. [2] ¶ 60 Finally, based upon the evidence before the jury, Larson was not convicted solely on the basis of his refusal to submit to a blood test. Sufficient corroborating evidence of impairment was presented, including Larson's screeching and squealing of tires across the intersection while in plain view of two officers, the truck's wide turn into oncoming traffic, Larson's slow reactions, slurred speech, earlier consumption of alcohol, and poor performance on the field sobriety tests. Moreover, the jury heard that Larson retrieved a bag of marijuana and a pipe, and told the officers that he had smoked an hour prior. The jury was well aware of their duty to consider all of this evidence. In light of the corroborating evidence presented, we cannot say the jury convicted Larson solely on his refusal to submit to a blood test. ¶ 61 Affirmed. We concur: BRIAN MORRIS, MICHAEL E. WHEAT, W. WILLIAM LEAPHART and JIM RICE, JJ.