Opinion ID: 461076
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Initial Warrantless Search of Room 65

Text: 16 The government concedes that the initial warrantless search of room 65 was illegal, because it went beyond the scope of a security check to see if other persons were in the room. Merriweather argues that the money in the toilet tank must be suppressed because it was found during that initial illegal search, and that the illegality cannot be cured by obtaining a warrant after the fact. The government argues that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule makes the money admissible despite the first illegal search. 17 Under the inevitable discovery doctrine as recently adopted by the Supreme Court, even if evidence is initially obtained by unlawful government conduct, [i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence rationale [for the exclusionary rule] has so little basis that the evidence should be received. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). In this case, the warrant for the second search was not invalidated by the illegality of the first search, because none of the information relied on by the magistrate in issuing the warrant came from the illegal entry. Segura v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3391, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). Nor was the securing of the room while waiting for the warrant an unreasonable continuing seizure that invalidated the second search, given the fact that the police had probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime was within the room. See Segura, 104 S.Ct. at 3388-91 & n. 9 (overruling two Ninth Circuit cases to the extent that they hold to the contrary: United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 893-94 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1185-87 (9th Cir.1980)). Thus, the second search was lawful. The prosecution has carried its burden of proof on the factual issue of inevitable discovery by its showing that the second lawful search, which was carried out by agents ignorant of the existence and location of the money, also resulted in discovery of the money. Thus, we affirm the district court's decision to admit the money.II. THE MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL 18 The test for a motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a) is the same in the district court and on appeal: the court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Hazeem, 679 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 848, 103 S.Ct. 106, 74 L.Ed.2d 95 (1982). Merriweather argues that there was insufficient evidence under this standard to support his convictions. As to the bank robbery counts, his contentions are meritless. He was not convicted of the July 12 robbery. As to the July 19 robbery, the physical description of the robber, the gun, and the getaway car all linked Merriweather to the robbery. As to the July 31 robbery, the physical description of the two robbers and their clothing, the gun, and the money, linked Merriweather to the robbery. The jury acted reasonably in finding Merriweather guilty. 19 As to the firearm possession counts, Merriweather contends that the inconsistency of his acquittal on the July 12 bank robbery charge and conviction on the July 12 firearm charge justified a judgment of acquittal on the firearm charge. The rule of this circuit is that [i]nconsistent verdicts may stand, even when a conviction is rationally incompatible with an acquittal, provided there is sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict. United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 943, 104 S.Ct. 1926, 80 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984). In this case, the July 12 firearm conviction is supported by the description of the robber and the handgun, which match Merriweather's appearance and the characteristics of a weapon later found in his possession. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have found that Merriweather possessed a firearm on July 12. 20 As to the July 31 shotgun possession, Merriweather argues that the only evidence connecting him with the gun was that it was found in his car. He argues that the inference of possession raised by this fact was negated by the evidence that Caruso also had access to the car, as shown by a parking ticket Caruso got while driving Merriweather's car. Although this is a close question, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have found that Merriweather possessed the shotgun on July 31st. See United States v. Blanton, 520 F.2d 907, 913 (6th Cir.1975) (firearm found in car to which others had access) and United States v. Jones, 514 F.2d 648, 650 (5th Cir.1975) (same); see also United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 308-09 (8th Cir.1983) (constructive possession can be established by a showing that the firearm was seized at the defendant's residence). We therefore affirm the district court's decision on the motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts.