Opinion ID: 1451091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Other evidentiary claims

Text: On appeal, Defendant objects for the first time to the admission of testimony revealing that Defendant had been fired from two jobs, once for fighting with a co-worker and once due to his temperament. Because these claims were not raised below, we review only for fundamental error. West, 176 Ariz. at 445, 862 P.2d at 205. Arguably, this testimony concerns prior bad acts inadmissible under Rule 404. The state claims Defendant made a tactical decision not to object to the testimony because it tended to show Defendant's impulsivity. We decline to resolve the issue, however, because even if the testimony was erroneously admitted, its admission does not rise to the level of fundamental error. The testimony in both instances was perfunctory and undetailed. Moreover, there was other compelling evidence of Defendant's ill temper, much of it introduced by Defendant himself on the issue of impulsivity. Defendant's final evidentiary claim concerns testimony of a witness who related a neighbor's report that Defendant had vandalized Debra's apartment. This testimony was hearsay and should not have been admitted. See Ariz.R.Evid. 801 and 802. Again, Defendant did not object to this testimony. Because other witnesses presented direct testimony on the same issue, we conclude Defendant was not prejudiced. See Fulminante, 161 Ariz. at 250, 778 P.2d at 615. We find no fundamental error. 2. Failure to instruct on manslaughter The trial court instructed the jury on both first and second degree murder under A.R.S. §§ 13-1105(A)(1) and 13-1104. Defendant claims the trial court committed reversible error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. We disagree. It is true that in capital cases, trial courts must instruct on all lesser-included homicide offenses supported by the evidence. State v. Comer, 165 Ariz. 413, 422, 799 P.2d 333, 342 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 943, 111 S.Ct. 1404, 113 L.Ed.2d 460 (1991). It is equally true, however, that such instructions need not be given if unsupported by the evidence. State v. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. 335, 345, 690 P.2d 54, 64 (1984). The manslaughter statute provides, in relevant part: A. A person commits manslaughter by: 1. Recklessly causing the death of another person; or 2. Committing second degree murder ... upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim; or 3. Committing second degree murder ... while being coerced to do so by the use or threatened immediate use of unlawful deadly physical force ... A.R.S. § 13-1103(A). There was no evidence to support a manslaughter instruction. These were not reckless shootings. Nor was there evidence Defendant was provoked or coerced. Defendant intentionally shot both victims at close range. The claim is meritless. See State v. Ortiz, 158 Ariz. 528, 534, 764 P.2d 13, 19 (1988). 3. Sufficiency of evidence of aggravated assault The trial court denied Defendant's motion for directed verdicts on the aggravated assault counts. Defendant now alleges those convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence because neither police officer testified to a subjective fear of imminent physical harm. We have previously rejected this same argument. Valdez, 160 Ariz. at 11, 770 P.2d at 315. To be guilty of aggravated assault, the defendant need only intentionally act using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument so that the victim is placed in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury. Id. Either direct or circumstantial evidence may prove the victim's apprehension. There is no requirement that the victim testify to actual fright. Id. There was ample circumstantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the officers were apprehensive or in fear of imminent harm. The police officers knew that at least one victim had been shot and that other shots had been fired. Defendant grabbed his revolver and began to aim at the officers despite their orders not to do so. Police officers, of course, are not immune from the fear that anyone would reasonably feel under these circumstances. See In re Juvenile Appeal No. J-78539-2, 143 Ariz. 254, 256, 693 P.2d 909, 911 (1984) (sufficient evidence of apprehension where police officer-victim drew gun and assumed protective stance). The jury could have concluded the officers must have acted with apprehension or fear when they used deadly force against Defendant. The evidence certainly supports that conclusion. 4. Prosecutorial misconduct Defendant alleges the prosecutor ran amok at trial, particularly in his cross-examination of Dr. Allender, Defendant's psychological expert. [9] Because defense counsel made no trial objection, again we review these claims only for fundamental error. Bible, 175 Ariz. at 601, 858 P.2d at 1204. In determining whether a prosecutor's conduct amounts to fundamental error, we focus on the probability it influenced the jury and whether the conduct denied the defendant a fair trial. See id. Subject to Rule 403 limitations, expert witnesses may disclose facts not otherwise admissible if they form a basis for their opinions and are of a type normally relied on by experts. Ariz.R.Evid. 703; State v. Lundstrom, 161 Ariz. 141, 145, 776 P.2d 1067, 1071 (1989). If such facts are disclosed, they are admissible only to demonstrate the basis for the expert's testimony. Lundstrom, 161 Ariz. at 146, 776 P.2d at 1071. However, to offset the potential advantage this rule bestows on the proponent of expert opinion, it is proper to inquire into the reasons for [the] opinion, including the facts upon which it is based, and to subject the expert to a most rigid cross-examination concerning his opinion and its sources. State v. Stabler, 162 Ariz. 370, 374, 783 P.2d 816, 820 (Ct.App. 1989); Ariz.R.Evid. 705. This latitude on cross-examination extends to matters otherwise inadmissible. United States v. A & S Council Oil Co., 947 F.2d 1128, 1135 (4th Cir.1991) (Rule 703 creates a shield by which a party may enjoy the benefit of inadmissible evidence by wrapping it in an expert's opinion; Rule 705 is the cross-examiner's sword, and, within very broad limits, he may wield it as he likes.). With these principles in mind, we turn to the alleged misconduct. On direct examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Allender what materials he reviewed in preparing to examine Defendant. Dr. Allender replied, in part, a variety of police reports from the Tucson Police Department, as well as from the Las Vegas Police Department. On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: Q. Directing your attention, you said you had some Las Vegas police reports? A. Yes. Q. You had police reports from 1979? A. I believe I did. I would have to flip through and look for it if you want me to. Q. Do you recall in 1979 an incident when he was arrested from some criminal activity? A. I think I found a report from '79 from Las Vegas. R.T., Feb. 22, 1991, at 160-61. Defendant alleges this was improper because the trial court had ruled inadmissible Defendant's 1979 Las Vegas misdemeanor assault conviction. On cross-examination, however, the prosecutor simply asked Dr. Allender to elaborate on the reports he first mentioned on direct examination. The jury never learned the details of the conduct underlying Defendant's Las Vegas arrest. Because Dr. Allender relied on the reports in forming his opinion of Defendant, the prosecutor's cross-examination was proper. Defendant was entitled, however, to a limiting instruction that references to the Las Vegas police reports were admissible only to show the basis of Dr. Allender's opinions. See Lundstrom, 161 Ariz. at 148, 776 P.2d at 1074. Defense counsel did not request such an instruction. On this record, we conclude that the absence of such an instruction did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial. There was no fundamental error. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined Dr. Allender about the possibility of testing Defendant to determine the validity of his claim that he had no memory of the day of the murders. The full extent of that questioning was as follows: Q. Didn't Dr. Morris [another psychologist who examined Defendant] suggest that hypnosis or amobarbital might be ideal to discover whether this defendant was malingering? A. He suggested that those might be techniques. Q. With hypnosis, you place them under hypnosis in order to find out what the truth of the matter was? A. [Answer about the theory of hypnosis and amobarbital.] Q. So you didn't, did you attempt, did you request a hypnosis evaluation? A. I didn't because I'm not as convinced about those techniques as Dr. Morris. Q. Amobarbital, is that a truth serum? A. That is what they call it, that is what people have called it along the way. R.T., Feb. 22, 1991, at 173-74. Defendant claims this exchange prejudiced him much like questioning a defendant about refusing to take a polygraph test. It is true that, as with polygraph test results, courts generally exclude testimony induced or refreshed by drugs or hypnosis. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 431, 661 P.2d at 1132; State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 228-29, 624 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (1981). Defendant's analogy, however, is misguided. The prosecutor's cross-examination was not intended to impugn Defendant but to test the basis and credibility of Dr. Allender's opinions concerning whether Defendant was faking his asserted memory loss at the time of the murders. Dr. Morris had examined Defendant and recommended the disputed testing. Dr. Allender relied in part on Dr. Morris's written evaluation in forming his own opinions about Defendant. Without reaching the issue of admissibility of expert testimony based upon the results of hypnotic or amobarbital examination of a subject, we conclude the prosecutor acted within the wide latitude permitted on cross-examination. Stabler, 162 Ariz. at 374, 783 P.2d at 820. 5. The Wussler instruction Defendant next claims the trial court violated his due process rights by instructing the jury that it must acquit Defendant of the principle charge before considering any lesser included offenses. Although we have previously rejected a similar claim, see State v. Wussler, 139 Ariz. 428, 429-30, 679 P.2d 74, 75-76 (1984), we need not address it here. [10] The record reveals that the trial court refused the state's request to give such an instruction. Rather, the trial court instructed the jury that if it determined Defendant was guilty of either first or second degree murder, but had a reasonable doubt as to which one, it must find him guilty of second degree murder. That instruction was not improper. 6. Alleged plea bargain veto by victims' family On appeal, Defendant urges for the first time that his due process and equal protection rights were violated when the victims' family allegedly vetoed a plea bargain in which the state would not seek the death penalty in exchange for a guilty plea to all counts. Defendant attacks the family's involvement in both the plea bargaining process and the decision to seek the death penalty. Defendant rests his claim on the following passage from his trial counsel's opposition to a motion to continue, which the state filed at the request of the victims' family: [11] In this case, the family has already put the quietus on any plea negotiations. Undersigned counsel and the prosecutor had earlier discussions about the defendant entering into a guilty plea to two counts of First Degree Murder, with two life sentences.... Upon conferring with the Dietz family, the prosecutor announced he could not make such an offer. Clearly the County Attorney has permitted the family to put the finishing stroke to a fair and economical end to this case. Opposition to Motion to Continue Trial, filed Nov. 19, 1990, at 2. The state properly may consider the wishes of the victim's family in deciding whether to seek the death penalty, so long as it does not accord undue weight to those wishes. State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 397, 814 P.2d 333, 354 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 926, 112 S.Ct. 343, 116 L.Ed.2d 282 (1991). Moreover, Arizona crime victims have a constitutional and procedural right to confer with the state on any prospective plea bargain. See Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1(A)(4); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 39(b)(7). In the present case we need not consider the breadth of that right because the record does not support Defendant's contention that the family's wishes were the controlling factor in the state's decision to forego a plea and pursue the death penalty. Other than the passage quoted above, the record is silent on plea negotiations and the state's decision to seek death. Since that passage appears to be little more than defense counsel's rhetorical comment, and there is no evidence in the present record that the state gave any undue consideration to the desires of the victims' family, we find no error. See Lavers, 168 Ariz. at 397-98, 814 P.2d at 354-55.