Opinion ID: 4116906
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for Franks Hearing

Text: [¶19] Having concluded that the court did not err in rejecting Thompson’s argument that the affidavit failed to support the District Court judge’s probable cause determination, we next consider the court’s treatment of Thompson’s motion for a Franks hearing. 13 [¶20] In contrast to challenging the sufficiency of the information as it is presented in a warrant affidavit, a defendant may seek to invoke the process established in Franks and go behind that information based on a claim that the affiant knowingly or recklessly misstated information, see State v. Hamel, 634 A.2d 1272, 1273 (Me. 1993), or deliberately omitted facts “negatory of probable cause,” State v. Van Sickle, 580 A.2d 691, 693 (Me. 1990). Affidavits submitted in support of warrant applications are presumed to be proper. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); Hamel, 634 A.2d at 1273-74. Therefore, in order to demonstrate an entitlement to an evidentiary hearing where a challenge to alleged misstatements may be developed on a proper record, a defendant must make a “substantial preliminary showing” that (1) the affiant “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth” made a false statement in a warrant affidavit, and (2) “the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. If a defendant makes the requisite showing, he is constitutionally entitled to a Franks hearing. Id. at 156. [¶21] The substantial preliminary showing that the defendant must make is in the nature of an offer of proof. Id. at 171; State v. Dickinson, 2005 ME 100, ¶ 8, 881 A.2d 651; see also United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 14 820 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that the showing must satisfy a “burden of production”). Unless the defendant adequately explains why he cannot do so, that showing is made in the form of “[a]ffidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. The supporting material must contain information that is “more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine.” Id. [¶22] The motion court must then determine whether the defendant has made a showing sufficient to trigger a Franks hearing. That determination is generally based on the affidavit or other documentary material filed in support of the motion. Dickinson, 2005 ME 100, ¶ 19, 881 A.2d 651 (“This preliminary inquiry requires the court to consider the warrant affidavit and the defendant’s written submissions . . . .”). It has been recognized, however, that it is “not always easy to draw the Franks line between sufficient and insufficient showings” based on the documentary materials submitted by the accused. See United States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 509 (7th Cir. 2013). Consequently, the motion court is authorized, as a matter of discretion, to give the accused an opportunity “to supplement or elaborate on [the] original submissions.” Id. 15 [¶23] The forum for this opportunity is a “pre-Franks” hearing that serves the narrow purpose of allowing the court to determine whether the defendant can make the showing necessary to warrant a full Franks hearing. Id. at 509-510; Glover, 755 F.3d at 821. The purpose and scope of any such preliminary hearing is not to provide the prosecution with an opportunity to clarify information in the warrant application or to explain any discrepancies or contradictions that bear on issues of veracity affecting the warrant affidavit. See McMurtrey, 704 F.3d at 504. [¶24] Here, the court stated that it chose to hold a preliminary hearing to inform its determination of whether Thompson would be entitled to a full Franks hearing. As it was carried out, however, the hearing, held over Thompson’s objection, constituted a vehicle for the State to respond to the challenges asserted in Thompson’s written motion rather than as a forum for Thompson to supplement or enhance the information that he had already submitted in support of his motion for a Franks hearing. [¶25] This is demonstrated by the court’s ruling, after the court listened to Agent Milligan’s explanation of challenged portions of the affidavit, that it contained no “deliberate material falsity.” The court made that ruling without providing any opportunity for Thompson to test the State’s evidence or to 16 present his own evidence to support the substantial preliminary showing that he was required to present. For example, during the course of the State’s direct examination of Milligan and without giving Thompson an opportunity to cross-examine, the court ruled that it was denying Thompson’s motion for a full Franks hearing. Further, the court declined to consider an audio recording, offered into evidence by Thompson, of the controlled drug buy involving SOI #1, which was the basis for Thompson’s assertion that Milligan misrepresented the participants’ conversation in the warrant affidavit. [¶26] The court erred by holding a pre-Franks hearing that, in process and purpose, did not allow Thompson to attempt to meet the burden of production necessary for a full Franks hearing. In effect, the court converted the preliminary hearing into the beginning of a full Franks hearing, and we must vacate the order denying Thompson’s motion for a Franks hearing.7 Because the court entered that order based in part on Milligan’s partial testimony, we remand for the court to hold a full Franks hearing— encompassing the remainder of Milligan’s testimony, including Thompson’s cross-examination of him, and other evidence the parties wish to present— 7 In the past, we have reserved ruling on whether we review the denial of a motion for a Franks hearing for clear error or on a de novo basis. See State v. Boutilier, 2011 ME 17, ¶ 1 n.1, 12 A.3d 44. We need not address that issue here, because our decision is the same under either standard. 17 rather than for the court to determine merely whether Thompson’s pre-hearing submissions constitute a substantial preliminary showing. See McMurtrey, 704 F.3d at 504 (“[T]he court should not give the government an opportunity to present its evidence on the validity of the warrant without converting the hearing into a full evidentiary Franks hearing, including full cross-examination of government witnesses.”). [¶27] We emphasize that our remand instruction for the court to conduct a full Franks hearing does not suggest any determination about whether Thompson made the substantial preliminary showing that is ordinarily required as a predicate to such a hearing. Rather, given the unusual procedural posture of Thompson’s motion, where the court began the testimonial process and ruled based in part on Milligan’s partial testimony, a full hearing is the only available course for Thompson’s contentions to be considered properly.