Opinion ID: 1185095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: due process and the remand hearing

Text: Martin argues that he was denied due process of law when he was remanded for prosecution as an adult as the result of a hearing of which he had no notice and at which he was not present and was not represented by counsel. The robbery involved in this case was committed on April 29, 1962, at which time Martin lacked six weeks of being 18 years of age. On May 1, 1962, a hearing was held pursuant to Article 6, § 15, Constitution of Arizona, A.R.S., to determine whether to suspend criminal prosecution; inquiry into the facts was made and the Juvenile Court judge determined that Martin was to be prosecuted as an adult. At the time of the hearing, Martin was still in California where he and Acton had fled after the robbery. Martin contends that he was denied due process of law when he was remanded for prosecution as an adult as a result of a hearing of which he had no notice, and at which he was not present and was not represented by counsel. He argues that under these circumstances the remand hearing did not comport with the requirements enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). In the Kent case, the District of Columbia Juvenile Court entered an order waiving its exclusive jurisdiction and authorizing the petitioner, Morris Kent, to be criminally prosecuted in the District Court. The Juvenile Court had failed to grant or to rule on motions by Kent's attorney that a hearing be held and that he be given access to Kent's social records and probation reports. The Supreme Court held that because of the Juvenile Court's failure to grant a hearing, to give counsel access to the records requested, and to state reasons for its order waiving jurisdiction, the order was invalid. In the Gault decision, the Supreme Court held that juvenile delinquency proceedings which may lead to commitment in a state institution must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment, including the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination, the right to confrontation and cross-examination, and the right to adequate notice of the nature of the charges. The remand or waiver-type hearing in the instant case was held in May, 1962, about four years before the Kent decision was handed down and about five years before Gault was decided. We, therefore, must determine whether those decisions have any retroactive effect on Martin's rights. In Application of Billie, 103 Ariz. 16, 436 P.2d 130 (1968), this Court held that Gault was to have limited retroactive application, restricting retroactivity to situations of delinquency adjudication and commitment proceedings, 103 Ariz. at 22, 436 P.2d at 136. The instant case does not involve a delinquency adjudication and commitment; hence, we do not consider the Billie decision controlling. Rather, we are here concerned with a remand hearing similar in nature to the waiver-type hearing involved in Kent. In Eyman v. Superior Court In and For County of Pinal, 9 Ariz. App. 6, 448 P.2d 878 (1968), Judge Molloy, speaking for the Court of Appeals of Arizona, provides a comprehensive analysis of the question of whether Gault should be applied retroactively to such hearing. He cites a number of jurisdictions which have declined to apply Gault retroactively in such a situation. In In re Harris, 67 Cal.2d 876, 64 Cal. Rptr. 319, 434 P.2d 615 (1967), Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for the Supreme Court of California stated: Retroactive application of Kent would `seriously disrupt' the administration of justice. (Johnson v. State of New Jersey (1966) 384 U.S. 719, 731, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882.) Judgments of conviction entered following waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and final before Gault was decided `threaten to be of significant quantity'. [Citations omitted.] Moreover, many of the defendants convicted after remand for criminal proceedings have become adults and are no longer subject to juvenile court jurisdiction.    Moreover, the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction has always been subject to review in subsequent proceedings in which the defendant was represented by counsel. [Citations omitted.] Only in those cases in which he could have induced the juvenile court to exercise its discretion differently might counsel have affected the result. Finally, since a defendant has always had the right to counsel in the criminal proceedings, denials of that right in the juvenile courts have not resulted in convicting the innocent. [Emphasis added.] 64 Cal. Rptr. at 321-322, 434 P.2d at 617-618. While Billie is not controlling in the case at bar, since this case does not involve a delinquency adjudication and commitment, we are now of the opinion that Gault should no longer have any retroactive application and, in this respect only, our holding in Billie is hereby overruled. Also, since we are in complete agreement with the reasoning of In re Harris, supra, we, therefore, reject the proposition that Kent be given retroactive application. While so holding, we feel that the trial court's failure to notify Martin of the remand hearing and to insure his presence at said hearing constituted a denial of due process. Such star chamber-like procedures cannot be condoned, nor will they be tolerated. We feel, therefore, that basic concepts of fundamental fairness, essential to the very concept of justice, require reversal. Since Martin is now over 21 years of age the Juvenile Court no longer has any jurisdiction over him. We, therefore, remand this case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the Juvenile Court justifiably waived its jurisdiction and permitted defendant to be tried as an adult. Should the court find that the Juvenile Court properly waived its jurisdiction, we believe defendant should be granted a new trial. But, should the Court find that the Juvenile Court improvidently waived its jurisdiction and allowed defendant to be tried as an adult, defendant's conviction is to be vacated and the information dismissed.