Opinion ID: 551133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiffs' Motion to Reopen Discovery.

Text: 24 The plaintiffs wish to reopen discovery to take the depositions of five persons. In view of the facts underlying this motion and in light of a previous scheduling order and an unequivocal record of missed deadlines, the Court denies plaintiffs' motion to reopen discovery. 25 The Court relies on the facts set forth in the plaintiffs' moving papers since no responsive briefs were filed opposing this motion. On June 24, 1985, law enforcement officials executed a writ of assistance on property of the Life Science Church located in Tigerton, Wisconsin. This writ was based upon a July 10, 1981 judgment in the Shawano County Circuit Court entered by Acting Judge Timothy L. Vocke. The judgment ordered the removal of illegally placed mobile homes, septic systems, and sanitary systems and enjoined any future placement of these items on the property without first obtaining permits. 26 The plaintiffs charge that the law enforcement officials exceeded the scope of authority contained in the writ, damaged the homes and personal property, auctioned off exempt property, cut utility lines, presented no search warrant, restrained church members from interfering, and terrorized church members. The plaintiffs also allege that the writ had previously been complied with and, thus, there was no outstanding writ to execute. 27 The plaintiffs base their motion to reopen discovery on their asserted need for more information relating to the allegedly wrongful damage and removal of property. The plaintiffs also claim they need this information to respond to defendant Nagy's motion for summary judgment. In an attempt to justify their failure to conduct this discovery during the 90-day period following June 12, 1985, plaintiffs contend that this evidence that they wish to discover would not have been available in the 90-day discovery period allowed by the Court's order. Plaintiffs also contend that they understood that law enforcement officials were to refrain from taking action against plaintiffs herein pursuant to the purported writ of assistance until after the ninety-days [of discovery]. 28 The decision whether to grant a motion to reopen discovery rests within the sound discretion of the Court. Geremia v. First National Bank of Boston, 653 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1981); Union Mechling Corp. v. Carmadelle, 624 F.2d 677 (5th Cir.1980); N.L.R.B. v. Seafarers International Union of North America, 496 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir.1974); U.S. on behalf and for the Benefit of Army Athletic Association v. Reliance Insurance Co., 799 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir.1986); Parrott v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir.1983). As reflected in the Court's Order of August 29, 1985, a hearing was held before the Court on June 12, 1985, whereat the Court ordered that plaintiffs be allowed 90 days from June 12, 1985, in which to complete all discovery. 29 For the five following reasons, the Court will deny plaintiffs leave to conduct further discovery. First, the Court cannot understand how the plaintiffs could interpret the Court's ruling at the June 12th hearing to mean that law enforcement officials would refrain from executing the writ of assistance until after the discovery period when, on the same day, the Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order on that same topic. 30 Second, plaintiffs do not explain the necessity for taking depositions to respond to defendant Nagy's motion for summary judgment. 31 Third, plaintiffs contend in an affidavit by a private investigator that the removed property is evidence which needs to be preserved in some fashion. The writ of assistance was based on a judgment of the Shawano County Circuit Court dated almost four years before the writ was actually enforced. Further, as stated in plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, the writ was issued in 1984, at least six months before it was enforced. Thus, for at least six months, and quite possibly for four years, plaintiffs had notice that the property in issue was subject to removal. Such a period provided ample time to preserve the removed property as evidence through photographs. To the extent that the plaintiffs wish to preserve the evidence in its allegedly damaged state resulting from the writ's enforcement, the next point addresses this issue. 32 Fourth, inasmuch as plaintiffs contend that public officials damaged their property in excess of the writ's authorization, plaintiffs state a cause of action different from those already set forth in this case. Plaintiffs may not use a motion to reopen discovery as a vehicle for alleging facts supportive of a cause of action not contained in the pleadings. 33 Finally, on at least three prior occasions, this Court has allowed the plaintiffs extensions of time to submit responses to various motions filed by the defendants. In each instance, the plaintiffs filed nothing. These repeated failures to take advantage of the Court's several previously granted extensions renders disingenuous plaintiffs' plea for the necessity of yet another extension. 34 Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion to reopen discovery will be denied. 35