Opinion ID: 1444179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: SWAT officers in the courtroom

Text: Appellant filed in district court a motion to appear at all proceedings without shackles, shock belt, blinders, gloves, and SWAT and transportation officers. At the hearing on appellant's motion, the district court granted the motion in part and explained that there would be an officer at each door, one midway between the door and the right side of the courtroom, and one in a chair between the jury and the witness stand. Defense counsel then requested that not all of the security personnel be uniformed and that the SWAT officers wear civilian clothing. The Director of the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) testified that the number of security personnel was necessary, that one more officer would be added when prisoner witnesses testified, and that he was unwilling to interfere with the way SWAT does its job. The court ordered that appellant's arms would be free of restraints, his legs would remain restrained and a curtain placed around counsel tables, he would wear a stun belt under his clothing, and the SWAT team would be limited to four officers. Prior to the penalty hearing, the tables in the courtroom were replaced with tables that were enclosed on three sides. At the hearing on appellant's motion there apparently were twelve officers in the courtroom. Defense counsel renewed the motion pertaining to security issues, arguing that twelve officers was too many. The district judge said that he reduced the number of SWAT officers from seven to four, which he was told was necessary for security, and that there would be two bailiffs and a couple of corrections officers. Defense counsel entered a continuing objection to the number of security officers in the courtroom. At the close of the penalty hearing and outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel made a final record on the number of SWAT officers. Defense counsel stated that for the duration of he hearing there had been half a dozen SWAT officers in uniform armed with handguns, an unarmed officer sitting between the prosecution and defense tables, and guns enclosed in cases, all of which the jury saw. In response, the prosecutor made a record that one of the prisoner witnesses told SWAT officers that appellant had directed him to do certain things while testifying. The prosecutor said that he decided not to put this evidence on as rebuttal evidence of another attempt to escape, but that the officers considered the information in securing the courtroom. Appellant contends that the placement of armed security personnel dressed in SWAT uniforms all around [him] in the courtroom and the use of uniformed law enforcement personnel in general prejudiced him such that he did not receive a fair penalty hearing. Appellant analogizes to cases which hold that a defendant may not be compelled to stand trial dressed in identifiable prison clothes, see, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), and which hold that it is inherently prejudicial to shackle a defendant during the penalty hearing, see Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439 (11th Cir.1987). [3] In his reply brief, appellant specifies that eleven corrections officers were present at the penalty hearing. Although this court has addressed whether security personnel stationed around the courthouse violated a defendant's due process rights, see Elvik v. State, 114 Nev. ___, 965 P.2d 281 (1998), the issue of security personnel inside the courtroom is one of first impression. The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal reviewing court's task in this type of case is not to determine whether it might have been feasible for the State to have employed less conspicuous security measures in the courtroom.... All a federal court may do in such a situation is look at the scene presented to jurors and determine whether what they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a fair trial; if the challenged practice is not found inherently prejudicial and if the defendant fails to show actual prejudice, the inquiry is over. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986). In Holbrook, twelve officers were stationed inside the courtroom during trial, including four uniformed state troopers. Id. at 570, 106 S.Ct. 1340. The six codefendants complained that the state troopers' presence suggested to the jury that the defendants were of bad character. Id. at 563, 106 S.Ct. 1340. The Court held that deployment of security personnel inside the courtroom during trial was not inherently prejudicial because of the wide range of inferences the jurors could reasonably draw from the officers' presence. Id. at 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340. Even if a slight degree of prejudice existed by deployment of the state troopers, sufficient cause for the level of security was found in the state's need to maintain custody of the defendants during the proceedings. Id. at 571, 106 S.Ct. 1340. In the instant case, appellant contends that the jurors saw eleven officers in the courtroom. Although the record could be clearer on this point, it appears that there were eight officers in the courtroom during the penalty hearing, six of whom were SWAT officers. We conclude that appellant has not shown actual prejudice. The only suggestion of actual prejudice is that one venireperson said that she was not necessarily afraid due to the number of uniformed officers but was a little nervous to see the SWAT officers because she did not know what was going on. We cannot tell if this venireperson became a member of the jury. We further conclude that the presence of eight security officers in the courtroom, including six SWAT officers, was not inherently prejudicial. Even if the jurors were aware that deployment of SWAT officers is not common practice, the presence of the six SWAT officers did not force the jury to impose the death penalty. See id. at 570-71, 106 S.Ct. 1340. In addition, even if appellant was slightly prejudiced by the presence of the SWAT officers, sufficient cause for this level of security could be found in the state's need to maintain custody over appellant, given the CCDC Director's testimony and appellant's history of escape attempts and violent crimes, including a possible plan to escape during the penalty hearing.