Opinion ID: 685145
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Violations of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(a), (b), (c), and (d)

Text: 32 The defendants herein also contend that Crowe has failed to adequately allege violations of the RICO subsections, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(a), (b), (c), and (d). As to subsections (a) and (b), we disagree. 33 Under subsections (a) and (b), there must be a nexus between the claimed RICO violations and the injury suffered by the plaintiff. Old Time, 862 F.2d at 1219. For subsection (a), this means that the injury must flow from the investment of racketeering income into the enterprise. Parker and Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Industries, 972 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir.1992). Crowe has alleged such an injury. Funds that he owned, that were allegedly fraudulently taken from the People's Homestead settlement, were invested into the enterprise and used to reduce the indebtedness on land that Crowe alleges was taken from him through a pattern of racketeering activity. As to subsection (b), a plaintiff must show that his injuries were proximately caused by a RICO person gaining an interest in, or control of, the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Old Time, 862 F.2d at 1219. Crowe has certainly alleged that Henry gained ownership of his land and the farming venture through a pattern of racketeering activity. Accordingly, we find that Crowe has adequately alleged substantive violations of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(a) and (b). 34 The defendants are correct, however, that Crowe cannot successfully make out a claim under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c). This subsection forbids any person employed by or associated with any enterprise  from participating in or conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. (emphasis added). Because of the structure of this language, this Court has held that the RICO person and the RICO enterprise must be distinct. Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc., 802 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir.1986). 35 In this case, Crowe has alleged that Henry is both the RICO person and a member of the Crowe/Henry association-in-fact. This Court has found, though, that a RICO person cannot employ or associate with himself under this subsection. In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 743 (5th Cir.1993). Accordingly, Crowe's claim under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c) fails because there is not a sufficient distinction between the person and the enterprise. Bishop, 802 F.2d at 123. 36 Lastly, the defendants are also correct that Crowe has failed to adequately allege a RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(d). [B]ecause the core of a RICO civil conspiracy is an agreement to commit predicate acts, a RICO civil conspiracy complaint, at the very least, must allege specifically such an agreement. Tel-Phonic, 975 F.2d at 1140 (citing Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir.1990)). While Crowe has pled the conclusory allegation that the defendants herein conspired, nowhere does he allege facts implying any agreement to commit predicate acts of racketeering. Therefore, Crowe's claim under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(d) must also fail. 37