Opinion ID: 2718100
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Defendant from Trial

Text: Defendant contends the court violated his statutory right to be present at his own trial as well as his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine the witnesses against him by ordering him excluded from his entire penalty phase trial. In light of his egregious conduct — spitting on the judge and throwing a bag of excrement and urine in court — we conclude that the exclusion was proper and no further warnings were required beyond those given to him at the outset of trial. a) Background After the trial court‘s difficulties securing defendant‘s attendance at the guilt phase trial, the court admonished defendant that he was required to attend the trial and comport himself properly or else he could be excluded from the trial. The court explained to defendant that ―[t]here are two situations wherein a defendant is not present during even critical portions of a death case. [¶] One is when he waives his presence voluntarily in open court . . . . [¶] The other is if the defendant becomes disruptive and has to be removed. [¶] If you, for some reason, refuse to come into the courtroom when required, which is every day, I will make a finding that you have disrupted the proceeding by your absence and/or waived your right to your presence so the case will go on even if you are not here.‖ During the penalty phase voir dire, as a panel of prospective jurors was exiting the courtroom, defendant began yelling at the court, ―You‘re evil. Evil. Demon.‖ He then flung a plastic bag full of fecal matter and urine at the court. 78 The contents of the bag wound up on the counsel tables and on the bench. According to the court, defendant said, ― ‗I‘m done,‘ or ‗That‘s it,‘ or some words indicating that he was not interested in fighting and he went with the bailiff into lock up.‖ The court then said that ―this is a long history with Mr. Banks, not this particular behavior, but coming to court when he pleases and things of this nature and refusing to come and the court having to get orders to remove him from the cell and playing those games with him. [¶] We will not continue to play the games with Mr. Banks. [¶] My intention is to have Mr. Banks far removed from the proceedings until concluded.‖ The next day the court reiterated this ruling after hearing defense counsel‘s argument that defendant‘s behavior may have been attributable to his not being medicated. In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that it could not ―think of a restraint, short of absolute mummification, which I don‘t propose, that would protect the participants and the integrity of the trial.‖ Later that day, the court had defendant brought to the courtroom, explained its ruling, and asked defendant if he wished to have speakers installed in the lockup to allow him to hear the proceedings. The court allowed defendant to confer with counsel but denied his request for ―a few minutes alone‖ with her. When defendant then refused to answer whether he wanted a speaker, the court ordered him escorted out of the courtroom, at which point defendant responded ―Shut up‖ and spat on the trial judge from approximately 12 feet away. The trial court said that if either party believed appellant‘s presence to be necessary in order to give testimony or to be identified by other witnesses, that party could so move, and the court would hear arguments on whether and how to make appropriate arrangements. Defense counsel never moved for defendant to be readmitted to the courtroom during the penalty phase retrial, and defendant did not 79 return. Over counsel‘s objection, defendant also was not permitted to be present when he was formally sentenced. Instead, he was held in lockup, approximately 10 feet outside the courtroom, with the door open so that he could hear. b) Analysis In Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337 (Allen), the high court said that ―[o]ne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused‘s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.‖ (Id. at p. 338.) Nonetheless, ―a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.‖ (Id. at p. 343, fn. omitted.) Thus, before ordering a defendant excluded from his own trial, a court must warn the defendant that the conduct in question will lead to his or her exclusion. And a defendant who has been excluded must be permitted to return upon demonstrating a willingness to reform. Our Legislature has codified these rules at Penal Code section 1043, subdivisions (b) and (c). Applying these standards, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant from his penalty phase retrial. Because of the prior conflict between defendant and the court regarding defendant‘s attendance at trial, defendant had already been expressly warned that misconduct could result in his exclusion from trial. Defense counsel acknowledged that defendant had been warned he could be excluded if he ―d[id] not behave himself in court.‖ Whether 80 or not a broadly worded, general warning to a defendant at the outset of trial is ordinarily sufficient to justify excluding the defendant for any subsequent misconduct, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to give defendant additional warnings under these unique and egregious circumstances. It is difficult to imagine conduct more repugnant to the orderly conduct of a trial or more disrespectful of the dignity of the courtroom and its participants than defendant‘s act of throwing a bag of excrement and urine at the trial judge. Moreover, we agree with the trial court‘s observation that the degree of premeditation involved in creating and hiding the projectile in question belies any claim that his actions reflected a momentary lapse of impulse control. Any remaining doubt as to defendant‘s ability or willingness to control his behavior was dispelled the next day, when defendant spat on the judge from 12 feet away. Defendant‘s purposeful defilement of the courtroom went much farther than more typical types of misconduct, such as verbal disruptions or abusive language, that might call for a specific warning before a defendant is excluded from trial. (Cf. People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 739 [defendant was properly excluded for verbal disruptions where ―[t]he court repeatedly made it clear to defendant that he would continue to be removed if his disruptive conduct persisted . . . .‖].) Defendant cannot seriously claim that he lacked ―full knowledge and appreciation‖ that his extreme misconduct would likely result in his exclusion from the courtroom. (People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1239.) We also reject defendant‘s suggestion that the trial court erred in failing to consider less restrictive measures such as shackling. That claim is forfeited because defense counsel never asked the court to consider such measures. Instead, counsel suggested a delay of trial to determine what medications her client was taking. But even if the claim were not forfeited, Allen makes clear that a trial court does not commit constitutional error when it opts to exclude a defendant 81 from the courtroom in response to ―extreme and aggravated‖ conduct, even when options such as shackling are also available. (Allen, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 346; see People v. Pena (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1310.) Similarly, defendant‘s claim that the trial court failed to give him a chance to return to trial fails. Defense counsel never informed the court that defendant was willing to reform his behavior and wished to be readmitted to the courtroom. Neither Allen nor section 1043 requires courts to affirmatively inquire whether a defendant wishes to return to trial and is willing to conduct himself properly. It is a defendant‘s duty to ―reclaim‖ his right to be present at trial by moving to do so and by demonstrating a willingness ―to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.‖ (Allen, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 343; see U.S. v. Nunez (10th Cir. 1989) 877 F.2d 1475, 1477–1478.) 2. Exclusion of Evidence of Institutional Failure Defendant sought to introduce evidence that while he was detained as a juvenile at state-run CYA facilities, CYA psychiatrists recommended that he be screened for organic brain damage and treated accordingly, but he never received the recommended treatment. The trial court prohibited defendant from presenting this evidence of institutional failure or evidence that the recommended treatment might have improved his mental health or life chances. We conclude that the trial court erred under clearly established precedent, but we find the error harmless. a) Background The trial court forbade defense counsel from presenting any evidence that defendant had not received proper care during the portions of his childhood when he was in state custody. The trial court repeatedly stated its position in stark terms: ―If this is one of these ‗the system failed him type‘ of issue [sic] and here is 82 proof of it, we will not hear it.‖ ―The issue is not whether the system is a good one or bad one. The system is not on trial.‖ ―We are not going to have testimony to prove that any particular agency or bureaucrat was less than stellar in their performance. [¶] They never are and that‘s thankfully not an issue for the jury to resolve. [¶] These cases do not turn on whether somebody could have done a better job.‖ This order affected the testimony given by two or three defense witnesses. First, Dr. Louis Weisberg, the psychologist who examined defendant at the age of 15 while he was in CYA custody, testified that he had diagnosed defendant as suffering from a severe conduct disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and potential organic brain dysfunction, and had recommended neurological testing and an intensive treatment plan. However, the court sustained an objection when defense counsel asked if Dr. Weisberg expected that his treatment recommendations be carried out. Second, the court prohibited Dr. Ira Mansoori, another CYA psychiatrist, from testifying that he too had recommended defendant receive neuropsychological testing and that such testing would have been available at another facility to which defendant could have been transferred. Third, defendant asserts that Juanita Terry, the protective services social worker who had dealings with defendant when he was a child, would have testified about ―issues relating to institutional failure,‖ although defendant does not indicate what Terry might have said. b) Analysis Aside from a footnote, unsupported by any facts or authority, that claims not to concede the question, the Attorney General does not seriously contest that it was error for the trial court to prohibit defendant from presenting evidence of institutional failure. The Attorney General is correct not to contest this point. We 83 have said that at the penalty phase of a capital case ―evidence [i]s relevant and admissible insofar as it suggest[s] that defendant had sought and/or been denied treatment which might have controlled the same dangerous personality disorder that purportedly contributed to the instant crimes. The jury could reasonably view such fact as bearing on defendant‘s moral culpability. (See People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1173.)‖ (People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 193; see People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 457–458 [recognizing defendant‘s institutional failure defense]; In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 718–719 [similar].) Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting defendant from presenting evidence that the correctional facilities in which he was housed failed to diagnose and treat his neurological problems. However, the Attorney General is correct that this error was harmless. The following testimony was excluded as a result of the court‘s erroneous order: (1) Dr. Weisberg was not allowed to answer a question posed by counsel as to whether CYA followed his recommendations that defendant receive neurological testing and intensive treatment; (2) defense counsel was not allowed to elicit testimony from Dr. Mansoori that he recommended neurological testing that would have been available at a different CYA facility than the one where defendant was housed; and (3) defendant did not elicit testimony from protective services worker Juanita Terry about any possible institutional failure. But defendant made no offer of proof that any of the witnesses would testify that had he received the recommended testing and treatment, he might have turned out to be a less violent adult. Nor did defendant proffer such evidence from Dr. Gold, the neurological expert who diagnosed his organic brain damage. In fact, the only evidence on the subject was to the contrary. Another defense expert, Dr. Osborne, testified that defendant had often failed to take medication prescribed to him over the years. Dr. Osborne also testified that 84 defendant would likely remain violent, at least until the age of 40. And the prosecution‘s psychiatric expert, Dr. Ronald Markman, testified that the type of brain malfunction from which defendant suffers would not determine whether an individual would be a moral person and did not cause defendant to commit the murders at issue here or the multiple violent crimes he had previously committed. We therefore conclude that the trial court‘s error in excluding the institutional failure evidence was harmless. 3. Evidence of Future Dangerousness The trial court overruled defendant‘s objections to testimony elicited by the prosecution from a defense expert witness that defendant would remain dangerous for years to come. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because defendant opened the door to the future dangerousness testimony by questioning the witness about the medications that would be available to treat defendant in prison. a) Background Defense expert witness Dr. Carl Osborne testified that defendant suffered from temporal lobe damage in addition to several behavioral disorders. During direct examination, defense counsel elicited testimony that certain medication could help control defendant‘s behavior but that defendant had never consistently taken his medication. The court interrupted to ask Dr. Osborne, ―They can‘t force him to take them [the medications] in state prison either, can they?‖ Dr. Osborne answered, ―I believe there is a hearing in which they can, but I‘m not certain.‖ The court asked, ―They hold them down and make them take them?‖ And Dr. Osborne responded, ―Usually they jab them with a needle.‖ Defense counsel did not object to the court‘s line of questioning. Instead, she then asked Dr. Osborne, ―What is the medication that they are using in state 85 prison?‖ Dr. Osborne responded, ―There are many. [¶] Probably the most commonly used one is Haldol. In inside circles they call that the baseball bat.‖ During cross-examination, the prosecution asked, over defense objection, whether defendant was ―currently prone to violence.‖ The following exchange then occurred: ―[Dr. Osborne]: Currently prone to violence? [¶] Mr. Banks has — [¶] I do not mean to be evasive here, but let me state fully that Mr. Banks has a long history of violent behavior over situations and over time. [¶] He will remain as violent as he always has been. ―Q: Forever? ―A: Barring something being done, not forever. [¶] One of the things that is wrong with Mr. Banks remits substantially, especially in terms of violent behavior when a person is in their forties. ―Q: So we have to look forward to 16 more years of what we have seen in the past? ―A: No. Mr. Banks, no matter what happens during this proceeding, will never be on the street again and violent behavior is very situational and specific.‖ The prosecutor then elicited testimony that defendant had harmed his teacher, Sandra Hess, while in a correctional facility and that the prison where defendant would be detained might have guards, visitors, nurses, psychologists, and district attorneys, any of whom defendant might harm in the future given his violent tendencies. In his closing statement, the prosecutor referenced this testimony as an argument in support of imposing the death penalty over defense objection. ―The problem with putting Mr. Banks, who has no moral conscience, someplace, any place, even a prison, is there are teachers and counselors and guards and visitors and nurses and doctors, prison administrators, staff, secretaries, Board of Prison 86 Terms people, deputy district attorneys, there are other civilians that come into contact with people in the prison system as part of doing their daily routine. [¶] And Mr. Banks doesn‘t care who he victimizes. He doesn‘t care who his victim is. He will randomly select them and he will get rid of them and he will execute them and he has done so.‖ b) Analysis Defendant argues that the court erred by questioning Dr. Osborne on its own initiative as to whether defendant‘s behavior could be controlled through medication in prison, and by overruling defense objections to the prosecutor‘s questioning of Dr. Osborne and portions of the prosecution‘s closing argument relating to defendant‘s future dangerousness. Defendant has forfeited his argument that the court‘s questions were improper by failing to object. (See People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 350.) However, he preserved his objections to the prosecutor‘s questions and closing argument, so we address them on the merits. In California, ―[t]he law is settled: expert testimony that a capital defendant will pose a danger in the future if his life is spared is inadmissible [citation], but ‗prosecutorial argument regarding defendant‘s future dangerousness is permissible when based on evidence of the defendant‘s conduct rather than expert opinion‘ [citation].‖ (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 446; see People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 767–768, overruled by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 773 (Boyd).) Under federal law, however, ―[b]ecause expert evidence of future dangerousness is not barred by the United States Constitution,‖ the introduction of such evidence does not violate a defendant‘s Eighth Amendment right to a reliable penalty determination. (Boyette, at p. 446.) 87 Here, the prosecutor clearly elicited expert testimony from Dr. Osborne as to defendant‘s future dangerousness and then relied on defendant‘s future dangerousness in closing argument. However, the Attorney General suggests that such questioning was proper because defense counsel opened the door by eliciting expert testimony that defendant might behave well in prison. We agree. ― ‗While the prosecution is prohibited from offering expert testimony predicting future dangerousness in its case-in-chief [citation], it may explore the issue on cross-examination or in rebuttal if defendant offers expert testimony predicting good prison behavior in the future.‘ ‖ (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1260.) Here, defense counsel did not necessarily open the door to questions about defendant‘s future dangerousness by asking merely whether any medication existed to treat defendant‘s condition. Nor can we say that defendant opened the door to questions about his dangerousness in prison based on the court’s own questioning as to whether defendant might receive treatment in prison. But instead of objecting to the court‘s line of questioning, defense counsel extended it by asking Dr. Osborne what type of medication would be made available to defendant and eliciting testimony that he might receive Haldol, a medication referred to as the ―baseball bat.‖ Because the clear implication of this testimony was that defendant‘s behavior could be controlled in prison, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to elicit testimony about defendant‘s future dangerousness in prison. (See People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1211, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459 [cross-examination on future dangerousness permitted because the ―clear implication‖ of the expert‘s direct testimony was that defendant would be a well-behaved prisoner]; see also Jones, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1260–1261; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 462.) For the same 88 reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to raise the issue of future dangerousness during closing argument. 4. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Antisocial Personality Disorder Defendant argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense by striking Dr. Carl Osborne‘s testimony regarding defendant‘s antisocial personality disorder (APD). We agree that the court abused its discretion in striking Dr. Osborne‘s APD testimony, but we find the error harmless. a) Background Dr. Osborne testified that he examined defendant for 18 hours over eight separate visits, interviewed family members, reviewed relevant mental health documents from defendant‘s life, and conducted numerous psychological tests. Dr. Osborne concluded: ―In general, Mr. Banks suffers from several severe and chronic mental illnesses. [¶] Among those are intermittent explosive disorder and anti-social personality disorder and probably substance dependence.‖ Dr. Osborne explained APD. ―In the broadest sense it means that the person engages in a number of acts that are illegal and outside the normal social and moral boundaries of the society in which they live. [¶] It comes in a number of different forms and it has a number of additional dimensions that can be present but do not necessarily have to be present. [¶] By and large though, it is a life long problem.‖ Dr. Osborne also explained that ―[t]he essential feature of antisocial personality disorder is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into adulthood.‖ The prosecutor did not object to this testimony. Dr. Osborne also testified that he was aware that Dr. Gold, defendant‘s neurological expert, believed that defendant suffered from organic brain damage 89 to his right temporal lobe. Dr. Osborne concluded that his own diagnosis was ―completely consistent with the theory of underlying brain damage.‖ Furthermore, ―[t]emporal lobe damage is also consistent with antisocial personality disorder type behavior that Mr. Banks exhibits. [¶] They interact together. . . . [¶] What happens with the kind of physical damage, brain damage, that we are talking about is it affects broadly impulse control. [¶] It affects aggressive impulses and sexual impulses. And these are the kinds of behaviors, sexual behaviors, aggressive behaviors, that also contribute to a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. [¶] So you get an added effect one on top of the other.‖ Dr. Osborne also explained the procedures he used when diagnosing defendant with APD. He relied on the documentation of defendant‘s past behavior since age nine, including defendant‘s behavior while in protective services and group homes. Defense counsel then asked whether defendant was born with APD. Dr. Osborne responded: ―That is a new answer for me to be able to give. [¶] We have suspected for a long time, in fact the [fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association], as I said was published in 1994 and has several statements that say: [¶] We believe this, or it is assumed or presumed that this travels in families. [¶] In 1995, there was a cluster of research articles that was published in Archives of General Psychiatry, which I find very persuasive, that shows that, in fact, this is a genetically inherited problem.‖ Defense counsel then asked, ―What was it about Kelvyn‘s genetic make up [sic] that you felt that that was part of the diagnosis?‖ Although the prosecution did not object, the court interrupted the testimony, excused the jury, and instructed counsel that it would hold a Kelly/Frye hearing the following day to determine the admissibility of evidence that APD is hereditary. (See People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly); Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 1013 (Frye).) 90 At the Kelly/Frye hearing the next day, the prosecution for the first time raised its own concerns about Dr. Osborne‘s testimony that APD may be hereditary. The court then heard testimony from Dr. Osborne regarding the acceptance in the psychological community of the view that APD is hereditary. After reviewing numerous articles and reports on APD‘s inheritability, the court ruled that the heritability testimony was inadmissible. The court explained its ruling: ―This testimony is inadmissible, I believe, on a number of grounds. [¶] When I say ‗this testimony‘, I am referring to this testimony having to do with A.P.D., its inheritability, opinions by your expert of its potential heritability, opinions by your expert that your client may have inherited to some degree the propensity for this condition, i.e., to commit criminal conduct, the opinions that his parents suffered from this [¶] . . . [¶] disorder. [¶] The opinions that Kelvyn‘s parents suffered or suffer from this same malady since there is absolutely no foundation whatsoever in this record showing that opinion and any testimony having to do with this witness‘ opinions on those areas seem to me to be wholly without foundation, without relevance, to be so vague as to invite rampant speculation in the jury to have the great potential to mislead this not educated for the most part jury.‖ The court continued: ―It does nothing but tell the jury what everybody knows. If you come from a bad background or have bad parents, you may turn out that way yourself. [¶] If the doctor wants to testify that oftentime if a person comes from a background that may be seen as less than ideal, i.e., a father who is not there, as apparently Mr. Banks‘ father was absent, that seems to be the great correlator in my experience, but if he wants to testify that Mr. Banks‘ father was not there, his mother was inept, and I would concur, she was inept in the extreme, a drunk and drug abuser and just does not have it together, if he wants to testify 91 that oftentime those sorts of conditions can breed a child that has a less than even chance, I have no problem with that.‖ Following the hearing, the defense resumed its direct examination of Dr. Osborne. The questions proceeded as follows: ―[Defense counsel]: Dr. Osborne, yesterday we were discussing your diagnosis, part of your diagnosis, that Kelvyn Banks has an antisocial personality disorder. ―[Dr. Osborne]: Yes. ―[Defense counsel]: And you came to your conclusion by your psychiatric testing, your interviewing Kelvyn and the study of the records and the background that you got. ―[Dr. Osborne]: I did. ―[Defense counsel]: Okay. [¶] To come to that diagnosis, did you look at the type of people his parents were? ―[Dr. Osborne]: Yes. ―[Defense counsel]: And what was [sic] some of the characteristics that his parents had that had an influence on Kelvyn?‖ Following this question, the court immediately called a sidebar conference to explain that it found the questions overreaching. Defense counsel said she was ―not asking if [defendant‘s mental illnesses] were inheritable at this point.‖ Evidently frustrated with defense counsel‘s line of questioning, the court said: ―I will tell you what I will do. [¶] It is going to be very difficult for the jury to understand. I will strike all references to A.P.D. in the record.‖ When defense counsel asked if the court would strike Dr. Weisberg‘s testimony about the meaning of APD, the court responded, ―This witness.‖ The court then explained to the jury: ―You may have heard testimony by this witness to something that he referred to as A.P.D., antisocial personality disorder. [¶] . . . [¶] That testimony is 92 stricken from the record as being without foundation in this case. [¶] So you are to disregard the references to that syndrome.‖ Subsequently, Dr. Osborne sought to testify that he had never encountered another individual with the same combination of brain damage and mental illnesses as defendant. The court interrupted to summarize Dr. Osborne‘s testimony about the combination of defendant‘s mental illnesses as follows: ―The Court: So whatever you are characterizing as temporal lobe disorder and explosive and then something that I have already stricken that you insist on calling antisocial personality disorder which simply means in the court‘s estimation — ―[Defense counsel]: There will be an objection. ―The Court: — committing crimes over and over, that is why it is stricken. [¶] So now what we are left with, so we have a clear record for the jury‘s sake, temporal lobe disorder, as we heard about, and explosive what? ―[Dr. Osborne]: Intermittent Explosive Disorder. ―The Court: Intermittent Explosive Disorder and other than what has been stricken. [¶] Is that it? And drug abuse? ―[Dr. Osborne]: Polysubstance dependence.‖ b) Analysis Defendant does not contest the trial court‘s decision to exclude testimony that APD is hereditary. We therefore do not address the propriety of that ruling. Instead, defendant contends the court erred in striking the rest of Dr. Osborne‘s testimony about APD, i.e., his diagnosis that defendant suffered from the disorder and that it was compounded by defendant‘s organic brain damage, which Dr. Gold had diagnosed. The Attorney General responds that the testimony was properly 93 struck because Dr. Osborne lacked any foundation for his view that APD is hereditary and because that belief infected his entire diagnosis. A claim that expert opinion testimony was improperly admitted or excluded is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 131.) The Kelly/Frye rule ―conditions the ‗admissibility of expert testimony based upon the application of a new scientific technique‘ on a ‗preliminary showing of general acceptance of the new technique in the relevant scientific community.‘ ‖ (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 265, quoting Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30; see Frye, supra, 293 Fed. at p. 1014.) However, we have said that expert psychological testimony diagnosing a defendant as suffering or not suffering from a particular disorder after conducting standard personality testing ―is not subject to Kelly/Frye,‖ at least ―absent some special feature which effectively blindsides the jury.‖ (People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1157 (Stoll); see People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 967; People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 140.) If some portion of the expert‘s diagnosis is based on an unacceptable procedure or technique, ―the witness may be allowed to ‗state his opinion after excluding from consideration the matter determined to be improper.‘ ‖ (Stoll, at p. 1155, fn. 19.) Here, the trial court held a Kelly/Frye hearing to determine only whether the heritability of APD is an established scientific theory or process. The prosecution told the court it had no issue with the remainder of Dr. Osborne‘s APD testimony. The trial court concluded that testimony regarding APD‘s heritability would not satisfy the Kelly/Frye test. As noted, defendant does not challenge that ruling. In subsequently striking Dr. Osborne‘s entire APD diagnosis, the trial court abused its discretion. A diagnosis of APD involves no ―special feature which effectively blindsides the jury.‖ (Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1157.) To the 94 contrary, both Dr. Osborne and Dr. Weisberg before him testified that APD is a well-recognized form of mental illness that was included in the then-current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the leading treatise on psychological conditions. We have recognized that such testimony is routinely presented in capital cases. (See People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1065 [collecting cases].) The Attorney General acknowledges that psychological diagnoses are not typically subject to exclusion under Kelly/Frye but argues that Dr. Osborne‘s APD diagnosis ―rel[ied] on a genetic component, which is a new scientific basis for the diagnosis.‖ Contrary to the Attorney General‘s assertion, however, it is not clear that Dr. Osborne‘s diagnosis relied on genetics. He testified that his diagnosis was based primarily on defendant‘s ―past behavior.‖ He later agreed with the statement that ―in com[ing] to that diagnosis,‖ he ―look[ed] at the type of people [defendant‘s] parents were.‖ But that testimony does not establish whether Dr. Osborne‘s diagnosis was based on nature or nurture. As the trial court recognized, parental influence is a proper basis for reaching a psychological diagnosis. It is true that after initially stating that he had relied on defendant‘s past behavior in reaching his diagnosis, Dr. Osborne further testified that there was new scientific evidence that APD is hereditary. But nowhere did he indicate that his diagnosis was based on that new scientific evidence. The record does not indicate one way or the other whether Dr. Osborne relied on genetics in diagnosing APD because the trial court struck his testimony about APD in its entirety instead of allowing him to answer a question by defense counsel that might have clarified the matter: ―What was [sic] some of the characteristics that his parents had that had an influence on Kelvyn?‖ Moreover, even if Dr. Osborne‘s diagnosis had been based in part upon defendant‘s genetic makeup, Dr. Osborne should have been permitted to ― ‗state his opinion after 95 excluding from consideration the matter determined to be improper.‘ ‖ (Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1155, fn. 19.) In other words, Dr. Osborne should have been allowed to testify whether he would have diagnosed defendant with APD in the absence of any assumptions about its heritability. Thus, the trial court‘s order striking all of Dr. Osborne‘s APD testimony was an abuse of discretion. The error, however, was harmless. First, Dr. Weisberg gave very similar testimony. He defined APD and explained that defendant had ―antisocial personality traits.‖ Dr. Weisberg was unable to diagnose defendant with APD due to defendant‘s age at the time of the examination. But he had diagnosed defendant with a conduct disorder that is the analog of APD for juveniles. Second, the jury heard the rest of Dr. Osborne‘s testimony that defendant suffered from other mental illnesses. It also heard Dr. Gold‘s testimony that defendant had organic brain damage. The jury did not find that evidence to outweigh the aggravating factors in this case. It is not plausible that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had it been able to consider testimony that defendant also suffered from one additional nonhereditary mental illness, an illness that, according to Dr. Osborne, is characterized primarily by the fact that the individual engages in ―a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the right of others‖ and affects ―80 percent of the people in the prison systems.‖ In fact, it is often the case that prosecutors seek to establish that a defendant suffers from APD. (See, e.g., People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 207 (Mills); People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1327.) Here, at the first penalty phase trial, it was the prosecutor who attempted to elicit testimony that defendant had APD. We therefore conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that defendant was prejudiced by the trial court‘s exclusion of Dr. Osborne‘s testimony that defendant suffered from APD. 96 5. Ordering Defendant to Submit to Psychiatric Examination by Dr. Ronald Markman Defendant argues that the trial court violated his statutory rights and his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution by ordering him to cooperate with a prosecution-retained psychiatrist, Dr. Ronald Markman. At the time of trial, California law prohibited trial courts from ordering criminal defendants to submit to psychiatric examinations conducted by prosecution experts. (See Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1116 (Verdin).) In Verdin, we said that Penal Code section 1054, subdivision (e) prohibited courts from ordering any discovery in criminal cases beyond what is expressly authorized by statute or compelled by the United States Constitution. (Verdin, at p. 1103.) Because no statute or constitutional provision in effect at the time authorized trial courts to compel a criminal defendant to submit to a mental health examination (a form of discovery), courts lacked power to order such examinations. (Id. at pp. 1106–1108.) Shortly after Verdin, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 1054.3 to expressly authorize courts to compel a mental examination by a prosecutionretained expert. (See § 1054.3, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2009, ch. 297, § 1.) But because this case predates that amendment, Verdin applies. (See People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 927 & fn. 15 (Gonzales).) We have made clear that even in cases governed by Verdin, trial courts had the power to order defendants to submit to a psychological examination by a court-appointed expert pursuant to Evidence Code section 730. (See Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 927; Verdin, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1110.) The parties disagree as to whether Dr. Markman was a prosecution expert improperly appointed under Verdin or a court-appointed expert properly appointed pursuant to Evidence Code section 730. The record is ambiguous on this point. 97 On one hand, the prosecution‘s motion to appoint Dr. Markman as a courtappointed expert during the first penalty phase quoted, but did not cite, Evidence Code section 730. On the other hand, during argument over Dr. Markman‘s appointment at the first penalty phase trial, the prosecutor described Dr. Markman as having ―been employed to provide assistance in psychiatric work for the prosecution.‖ And at the second penalty phase, he described Dr. Markman as ―the People‘s psychiatrist.‖ We need not resolve whether the trial court‘s order that defendant speak with Dr. Markman violated defendant‘s statutory or constitutional rights, however, because defendant forfeited the argument by failing to raise it below. Defense counsel strenuously objected to Dr. Markman‘s appointment at the first and second penalty phase trials, but did so only on the ground that Dr. Markman was a forensic psychologist, rather than a neurological psychologist (or neuropsychologist), and was thus not qualified to respond to defendant‘s neurological expert testimony. In fact, defense counsel said she would have no problem with defendant being ordered to see an expert whom she considered to be qualified: ―I said I would not object if [the prosecution] had a neuropsychologist that they wanted to examine Mr. Banks.‖ The court overruled defendant‘s objection that Dr. Markman was unqualified, and defendant does not renew that objection on appeal. By arguing only that Dr. Markman was not a qualified expert, defendant forfeited any argument that it was unlawful for the court to compel him to speak with any prosecution expert. (See Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 928 [holding that a defendant who objected only to the qualifications of a psychological expert, but did not argue that compelling him to meet the expert would violate § 1054, subd. (e), forfeited his Verdin claim].) Thus, defendant forfeited his Verdin claim. 98 6. Exclusion of Lingering Doubt Evidence Defendant argues that the trial court improperly prohibited lingering doubt mitigation evidence and argument, violating his constitutional right to due process. We agree that the trial court erred under California law in excluding the lingering doubt testimony, but we find the error harmless. a) Background Before any testimony in the penalty phase retrial, defense counsel indicated to the prosecutor and trial court that she wished to cross-examine certain defense witnesses, including Latasha W. and Manzanares, regarding the reliability of their eyewitness identifications of defendant. Defense counsel believed she could make this argument ―[b]ecause of the lingering doubt instruction and the fact that I can argue that in certain areas.‖ Although the prosecution did not object, the trial court ruled that it would not permit defendant to introduce evidence suggesting a lingering doubt as to his guilt. ―We are not retrying the guilt phase. [¶] This jury is to be instructed that the defendant has been convicted of these offenses and will be punished for them. [¶] So insofar as bringing up a reasonable doubt, that will not be permitted. This case has been tried before a jury of 12 people. [¶] You may cross-examine within the scope of the direct examination. [¶] But the primary interests here are the circumstances of the crimes that the defendant was convicted of. [¶] I will not let you argue to the jury: [¶] Do not give this guy a particular penalty because maybe he is not guilty.‖ Defense counsel responded, ―I can bring out certain points such as identifications that did not match up.‖ The court responded: ―No, you can‘t. No, you can‘t. [¶] . . . This is not going to happen. I will not let you do that. That would be to retry the entire case.‖ Later, when defense counsel sought to examine Detective Weber about Manzanares‘s identification of defendant, the court interrupted to ―remind both 99 counsel that the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator is not an issue in the case.‖ Moments later and outside the presence of the jury, the trial court reiterated its ruling: ―So there will not be any more questions about identification made by any witness of your client until you first ask to approach the bench and make a very convincing argument so this jury will not be misled.‖ Before closing arguments, defense counsel requested a lingering doubt jury instruction. The court denied the request and explained, ―I think the law is clear that the defendant is entitled, through his counsel, to argue the area of lingering doubt, but this is also — that is true. You can always argue human fallibility. I mean, that is what lingering doubt is all about. Anybody can make mistakes, even though he is presumed conclusively under the law to have been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That is a fact as well. Somewhere in that nether world the courts have decided some argument might be appropriate. [¶] I want to remind you both, this jury did not hear the guilt phase and this jury most definitely did not hear all of the evidence available to both parties in the guilt phase, so any argument that a particular piece of evidence here demonstrates some doubt is obviously or may be met by an objection and may be met by a ruling of the court reminding the jury, folks, you didn‘t hear the evidence that led to this adjudication, you heard some of it to give you an idea — to give you an idea of the circumstances of these offense.‖ The court instructed the jury that ―the defendant‘s guilt as to the [crimes of which defendant was convicted], special allegations, and special circumstances is conclusively presumed to have been shown beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ b) Analysis Our precedent holds that ―evidence of the circumstances of the offense, including evidence that may create a lingering doubt as to the defendant‘s guilt of 100 the offense, is admissible at a penalty retrial as a factor in mitigation under section 190.3.‖ (Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 912.) In applying section 190.3, we have cautioned that a defendant may not ― ‗relitigate‘ ‖ the guilty verdict during the penalty phase, meaning that ―a defendant may not contest ‗the legality of the prior adjudication.‘ ‖ (People v. Gay (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1195, 1223 (Gay).) But the fact that ― ‗the defendant cannot relitigate the issue of guilt or innocence . . . does not preclude the admission of evidence relating to the circumstances of the crime or the aggravating or mitigating circumstances, including evidence which may mitigate a defendant‘s culpability by showing that he actually did not kill the victim.‘ ‖ (Ibid.) Thus, at least in cases in which the jury that decides the penalty did not adjudicate the defendant‘s guilt, we have said it ― ‗ ―is certainly the rule that if the evidence would have been admissible on the trial of the guilt issue, it is admissible on the trial aimed at fixing the penalty.‖ ‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 1221, quoting People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 143, fn. 1.) Under this rule, the trial court erred in concluding that defendant was not permitted to introduce lingering doubt evidence as to whether he was correctly identified by eyewitnesses in the Foster and Coleman crimes. Indeed, the Attorney General concedes that the trial court erred. The error, however, is not one of federal constitutional dimension. (See Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 911; Oregon v. Guzek (2006) 546 U.S. 517, 525–526.) Nor was the error prejudicial in this case. We have said as a general matter that ― ‗residual doubt is perhaps the most effective strategy to employ at sentencing.‘ ‖ (Gay, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1227.) But here, the evidence of defendant‘s innocence was so weak as to be nearly nonexistent. As to the killing of Coleman and the Latasha W. crimes, defendant could have introduced evidence that Latasha W. inconsistently described his complexion and the color of his shoes, and that she initially identified another individual as 101 looking like her assailant. But that evidence pales in comparison to the DNA evidence linking defendant to the crimes at the Coleman residence. Further, despite having initially identified another individual as ―look[ing] like‖ her assailant, Latasaha W.‘s identification of defendant was compelling. The moment she was presented with defendant‘s photograph in a six-pack array, she identified him before the officer questioning her could even place the photo array on the table. She also identified defendant at trial. In short, there is no reasonable possibility that the additional testimony defendant could have elicited to impeach Latasha W. would have had any impact on the jury‘s deliberations. The lingering doubt evidence with respect to the Foster killing was arguably stronger. Defendant could have elicited testimony, as he did at the guilt phase, to partially impeach both eyewitnesses who placed him at the scene of the killing. Any such impeachment evidence, however, would have been fully undermined by Dr. Osborne. He testified on cross-examination that defendant had admitted to having committed the Foster murder because ―he lost his temper because [Foster] had no money.‖ We therefore conclude that the trial court‘s order precluding defendant from presenting lingering doubt evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 7. Admission of Evidence of Testimony Regarding Prior Inadmissible Bad Acts and Bad Character Defendant argues that the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and to receive a reliable penalty determination by permitting two lines of questioning about his character and his prior criminal conduct that were not admissible as aggravating factors under Penal Code section 190.3, factors (b) and (c). The first line of questions concerned Deputy Arthur Penate‘s testimony about defendant‘s behavior in prison. The second involved 102 testimony by defendant‘s mother, Carol Sparks, about defendant‘s nonviolent criminal conduct as a child. ―Under well-established law, evidence of a defendant‘s background, character or conduct that is not probative of any specific sentencing factor is irrelevant to the prosecution‘s case in aggravation and therefore inadmissible. (Boyd,[ supra,] 38 Cal.3d [at pp.] 773–774.)‖ (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1202 (Carter).) Thus, general evidence about a defendant‘s bad character or his commission of uncharged crimes that do not involve the use or attempted use of violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence is inadmissible aggravating evidence. (Boyd, at pp. 772–773; see § 190.3, factors (b), (c).) However, bad character evidence may be introduced as rebuttal evidence if defendant opens the door by offering good character evidence as a mitigating factor. (See People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 495.) a) Deputy Arthur Penate’s Testimony Deputy Penate testified that defendant threw a carton of feces and urine at him from inside his jail cell. He also testified at length that defendant routinely manipulated prison staff in order to get preferential treatment and, in particular, that he used court appearances as an excuse to coerce the guards into doing him favors; that defendant was housed in an area of the prison for violent prisoners; that defendant had repeatedly taunted and threatened Deputy Penate in response to perceived slights in the days prior to and leading up to the assault; and that defendant had written graffiti in his cell saying ―Penate is a bitch‖ and ―fuck you.‖ As an initial matter, defendant has forfeited his claim that the trial court erred by admitting Deputy Penate‘s testimony that defendant was housed in a unit reserved for violent inmates. Defendant did not object to that testimony at trial and in fact cross-examined Deputy Penate as to the foundation for this testimony. 103 Thus, his objection is forfeited. (See Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1203–1204.) Similarly, defendant‘s objection to Deputy Penate‘s testimony about the graffiti in his cell is forfeited because defendant did not object to that testimony. Defendant did object to Deputy Penate‘s testimony regarding his conversations with defendant prior to and following the assault and his testimony that defendant routinely manipulated prison guards. We therefore address the merits of those claims. We agree with the Attorney General that the testimony about defendant‘s conversations with Deputy Penate was admissible. Clearly, Deputy Penate‘s testimony about defendant‘s assault upon him with a container filled with urine and feces was admissible. Deputy Penate‘s testimony about his conversations with defendant revealed defendant‘s motive for that assault and showed that defendant acted intentionally and with forethought. Specifically, the testimony established that defendant had a grudge against Deputy Penate and that defendant viewed the assault as a way to teach Deputy Penate to respect him. This evidence was relevant because it informed the jury‘s determination of what weight to assign to defendant‘s prior violent criminal conduct. (See People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1135; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 672; People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1013–1014, disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 588.) Contrary to defendant‘s contention, admitting this testimony does not ―open the door to essentially unlimited, speculative testimony about defendant‘s behavior and character in the guise of ‗circumstances‘ of any factor (b) offense offered as aggravation.‖ The admissible portion of Deputy Penate‘s testimony was not a freewheeling discussion of defendant‘s conduct in prison. It merely described the discrete interactions that directly led to defendant‘s assault against Deputy Penate. 104 However, we agree with defendant that Deputy Penate‘s testimony about defendant‘s attempts to manipulate prison officers was inadmissible bad character evidence and should have been excluded. This testimony bore no relation to the circumstances of defendant‘s assault against Deputy Penate. Indeed, the prosecutor‘s questioning makes clear that he repeatedly sought to have Deputy Penate testify to defendant‘s general reputation and behavior as an inmate. For example, the prosecutor asked: ―This [manipulating people] isn‘t an infrequent thing with Mr. Banks?‖ ―If he does not get what he wants, he acts out in some fashion?‖ ―You say that he continuously manipulates and tries to control other deputies[?]‖ ―Does Mr. Banks do particular things on days he is supposed to go to court to get additional favors?‖ These broad questions were not calculated to elicit information about the circumstances leading up to the assault. The Attorney General contends that this testimony was admissible because it was rebuttal to defense counsel‘s cross-examination of Deputy Penate, in which counsel asked Deputy Penate whether he was aware that defendant had been diagnosed as mentally ill. But Deputy Penate repeatedly testified that he knew nothing about defendant‘s mental health, and the court struck a question by defense counsel that assumed defendant suffered from organic brain damage. Thus, at the time of cross-examination, there was no testimony by Deputy Penate about defendant‘s mental health to rebut. To the contrary, Deputy Penate had testified that he had no access to defendant‘s medical files and was not qualified to speak to his mental health in any case. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Deputy Penate to testify at length about defendant‘s manipulative character. (See, e.g., Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 778 [finding error in trial court‘s admission of testimony about a defendant‘s reputation for violence even though that ―reputation may be well deserved‖ and ―the result of one‘s behavior in the community‖].) But the error 105 was harmless. Dr. Osborne, defendant‘s psychological expert, testified without objection that defendant was manipulative and always would be. Thus, defendant’s own expert witness provided more damning evidence of defendant‘s manipulative character than the anecdotes recounted by Deputy Penate. There is no reasonable possibility that defendant was prejudiced by the erroneously admitted testimony. b) Carole Sparks’s Testimony Defense counsel elicited overwhelming testimony from police officials, social workers, neighbors, and family members that defendant‘s mother, Carole Sparks, abused and abandoned him on numerous occasions throughout the first six years of his life. There was also testimony that Sparks was a drug user, that she used legal or illegal drugs while she was pregnant with defendant, and that defendant‘s father, with whom Sparks and defendant lived for some period of time while defendant was very young, was extremely violent toward Sparks. Defense counsel called Sparks as a witness and questioned her about many of these incidents. Sparks denied most of them. On cross-examination, the trial court permitted Sparks to testify over defendant‘s objection that defendant had stolen bikes or other merchandise when he was nine or ten years old. When defendant objected, the prosecutor told the court at sidebar that he wanted to question Sparks about these incidents because he had police reports stating that Sparks had taken defendant to the police station and told officers she was unable to control defendant‘s conduct. The prosecutor hoped to rehabilitate Sparks by showing that she had been unable to control defendant‘s conduct around the age of nine or 10 years old. The trial court admitted the testimony. In so doing, the court said it would instruct the jury as to what crimes they could consider as aggravating factors and also noted that testimony of petty 106 childhood thefts would not likely prejudice defendant given his extensive violent criminal history. We agree with defendant that the testimony about his nonviolent childhood criminal acts should not have been admitted. We have repeatedly held that ―[e]vidence that a defendant suffered abuse in childhood generally does not open the door to evidence of defendant‘s prior crimes or other misconduct. [Citations.] We do not believe that evidence of specific acts of abuse inflicted on [defendant] in early childhood would permit rebuttal with evidence of his subsequent misconduct . . . . And evidence and argument intended to demonstrate that [the defendant] justifiably was abused in the manner he was, because he was a bad boy at the age of five or six years, would be unlikely to carry much weight in the prosecution‘s favor with the jury.‖ (In re Lucas, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 733; see People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 709; People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1193 [holding that defendant did not open the door to the prosecutor questioning defendant‘s mother about his teenage criminal conduct by eliciting testimony about abuse during his early childhood].) Likewise here, defendant introduced evidence that he was abandoned and abused by his mother during his early childhood. This testimony did not open the door to the prosecutor‘s introduction of evidence that defendant committed nonviolent offenses three to four years later. (See, e.g., In re Lucas, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 733.) Nor does the trial court‘s reasoning that the testimony in question was not overly prejudicial provide a basis for admitting the testimony. The Attorney General correctly does not defend this logic. Our case law prohibiting admission of nonviolent childhood criminal conduct does not exempt evidence that a trial court deems not prejudicial. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to elicit evidence of defendant‘s nonviolent childhood criminal offenses. 107 Nonetheless, the error was harmless. The evidence that defendant had previously committed an array of violent crimes from a young age was voluminous. At age 14, he struck a pregnant woman in the head with a pipe, causing her to miscarry. Shortly thereafter, he choked a teacher at the CYA badly enough that she had to speak in a whisper for a week. Later, he assaulted a CYA youth counselor. At age 20, he beat, raped, and choked his pregnant girlfriend in front of her young daughter and then threatened to kill her family if she testified against him. Later, he assaulted a fellow inmate and Deputy Penate while in prison. It is implausible that the additional fact that defendant engaged in petty theft a few years before this string of escalating violent incidents significantly impacted the jury‘s deliberations. (See People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1239.) Further, the trial court, as it had promised, properly instructed the jury that it was not to consider any criminal acts aside from the six enumerated offenses just described as potential aggravating factors. We presume the jury followed these instructions. (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 530.) We therefore conclude that the trial court‘s erroneous admission of Sparks‘s testimony about defendant‘s prior nonviolent criminal acts was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 8. Comments to Jury During Voir Dire Defendant argues that several comments made by the trial court to prospective jurors misrepresented the jury‘s penalty phase duties. During voir dire, the trial court described the jury‘s task as weighing ―the good and the bad‖ on several occasions and told prospective jurors about some but not all mitigating factors. Defendant argues that the trial court misled the prospective jurors by failing to explain that section 190.3, factor (k) permits a jury to consider as a 108 mitigating factor ―any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.‖ The Attorney General is incorrect that defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object at trial. We have held that a defendant generally cannot forfeit a claim that the trial court erred at voir dire when describing to prospective jurors their penalty phase duties, just as other instructional errors cannot usually be forfeited by a defendant‘s mere failure to object. (See People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 929 (Dunkle), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.) On the merits, the trial court‘s comments were not erroneous. We have repeatedly held that a trial court does not err when making similar comments to the jury during voir dire. (See People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 423 [holding that nearly identical comments made by the same trial judge who presided at defendant‘s trial were ―proper‖ in ―the context of voir dire‖ because ― ‗ ―[t]he purpose of these comments was to give prospective jurors, most of whom had little or no familiarity with courts in general and penalty phase death trials in particular, a general idea of the nature of the proceeding‖ ‘ ‖]; see also Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 929; People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 781.) Moreover, when instructing the jury at the end of trial, the court correctly instructed the jury that it could consider all relevant mitigating evidence under section 190.3, factor (k). Thus, there was no instructional error. 9. The Court’s Interruption of the Defense’s Closing Surrebuttal a) Background During the defense‘s closing surrebuttal, counsel told the jury ―you represent society and our society likes to think of ourselves as civilized, compassionate, merciful, just. We do not sink to the level of horrendous deeds 109 and acts because we represent the best of what society has, not the worst. We don‘t kill because somebody else kills, because that lowers us to the level of a horrendous verdict.‖ The court interrupted to tell counsel that her argument was ―getting quite out of hand‖ and to admonish the jurors that whatever sentence they imposed, they would not have ―demeaned or lowered yourselves.‖ Moments later, defense counsel told the jury that ―[e]very morning for the rest of your lives you will look in the mirror and you have to be content with who you see and what you have done and it is much easier to look in that mirror if you give life.‖ The trial court again interrupted saying, ―[o]nce again, these arguments, counsel, if you want to sit down and formulate your thoughts to keep them ethical and lawful arguments, I will allow you too.‖ When counsel said that she had made identical arguments without objection during the first penalty trial, the court responded, ―Do you want to debate with the court or do you want to be quiet and let the court admonish the jury as to their duties? [¶] I would prefer the latter.‖ In fact, defense counsel had made an almost identical argument at the first penalty phase. During the first penalty phase she argued, ―Every morning for the rest of your lives you will look in the mirror and you have to be content with who you see and what you have done, and it is much easier to look in that mirror if you give life.‖ Her second penalty phase argument, which provoked the court‘s ire, was indistinguishable. b) Analysis Defendant does not argue that the trial court was wrong to admonish counsel for her arguments. We have said it is ―correct[]‖ for a trial court to ―stop[] counsel from improperly addressing as a factor in mitigation the emotional impact a death verdict would have upon each juror. The jurors‘ reactions to the penalty 110 imposed would constitute emotional responses ‗untethered to the facts of the case‘ [citation], not proper factors for consideration.‖ (People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 355.) However, defendant contends that by suggesting that counsel was acting illegally and unethically, the trial court‘s reprimand unnecessarily disparaged counsel, thereby denying defendant his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, due process, and a reliable penalty determination. As noted earlier, a trial court must refrain from making ―comments implying that defense counsel was behaving unethically or in an underhanded fashion‖ in front of the jury. (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1241; see People v. Fatone (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1164, 1175 [―When the court embarks on a personal attack on an attorney, it is not the lawyer who pays the price, but the client.‖].) In Sturm, we held that the trial court acted inappropriately when it admonished counsel in front of the jury for ― ‗trying to sneak‘ in improper evidence . . . and by admonishing the jury that defense counsel‘s questions were not evidence ‗as much as he would like them to be evidence,‘ ‖ thereby ―impl[ying] to the jury that defense counsel was deliberately asking improper questions in order to place inadmissible evidence in front of the jury.‖ (Sturm, at p. 1240.) We found that the trial court‘s disparaging remarks were improper even though the court was ―[u]nderstandably frustrated by defense counsel‘s persistent attempts to push the boundaries of the trial court‘s evidentiary rulings . . . .‖ (Ibid.) Here, the court was understandably frustrated by counsel‘s repeated attempts to make the jurors feel guilty about the prospect of imposing a death sentence. And it was appropriate for the court to interrupt defense counsel and to admonish the jury that there was no dishonor in making the sentencing decision lawfully entrusted to them. Nonetheless, by accusing counsel of unethical and unlawful conduct in front of the jury, the court overstepped the bounds of 111 propriety. The court admonished counsel to ―sit down and formulate your thoughts to keep them ethical and lawful arguments‖ even though the prosecutor had not objected and even though defense counsel had made virtually identical remarks before the same trial judge, without objection, during her closing argument in the first penalty phase trial. But this conduct, on its own, does not require reversal of the conviction. In each of the cases cited by defendant in which we have reversed a conviction as a result of intemperate remarks by the trial court, the trial court had engaged in a persistent or pervasive course of disparaging counsel and the defense. Defendant relies heavily on Sturm, but as discussed above, Sturm reversed a death verdict where the trial judge intervened throughout trial, engaged in lengthy and hostile questioning of defense witnesses, made sarcastic remarks about the defense‘s evidence, and belittled multiple defense witnesses and defense counsel. (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1233–1243.) Similarly in People v. Jackson (1955) 44 Cal.2d 511, 518, the trial judge ―[c]ontinually‖ interrupted defense counsel on behalf of the prosecution, appeared to refer to some of its decisions as being made on behalf of both the court and the prosecution, repeatedly denigrated defense counsel, read the jury only three of the 81 instructions requested by the defendants, and remarked on the source of those instructions in a way ―as to create the impression they were not charges by the court‖ (id. at p. 520; see also People v. Mahoney (1927) 201 Cal. 618, 627 [trial court ―persist[ed] in making discourteous and disparaging remarks to a defendant‘s counsel and witnesses and utter[ed] frequent comment from which the jury [could] plainly perceive that the testimony of the witnesses is not believed by the judge, and in other ways discredit[ed] the cause of the defense‖].) Here, the court‘s intervention was an isolated reaction to an inappropriate emotional appeal during closing argument by defense counsel. The court‘s 112 comments were not made during the questioning of a witness or the taking of evidence. Contrary to defendant‘s argument, the court‘s comments would not, on their own, have ―conveyed to the jury that the trial judge did not take seriously the defense theory in mitigation‖ (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1238) or ―created the impression that the trial judge was allied with the prosecution‖ (id. at p. 1241). The trial court‘s comments, though inappropriate, do not rise to the level of judicial misconduct that we have held to be prejudicial. 10. Judicial Bias and Denial of a Fair Trial Defendant argues that three incidents, in combination with all of the prior assertions of error, demonstrate that the trial judge was biased against defendant and engaged in prejudicial misconduct. We find no evidence of judicial bias in the three incidents. a) Voir Dire of Prospective Alternate Jurors Defendant argues that the court‘s differential questioning of two jurors with pro-death-penalty views and two with anti-death-penalty views betrayed judicial bias. Defendant does not argue that the trial court‘s rulings on the for-cause challenges to these individuals were incorrect or that these rulings were prejudicial. Instead, he argues that Prospective Alternate Jurors T.H. and R.N., who made anti-death penalty remarks in their juror questionnaires, were subjected to lengthy questioning by the court calculated to elicit disqualifying testimony, whereas the court quickly accepted Prospective Alternate Juror K.H.‘s and Alternate Juror No. 1‘s assurances that they could be fair notwithstanding prodeath penalty answers in their juror questionnaires. The record shows that more time was spent questioning T.H. and R.N. about their views on the death penalty (approximately 16 and eight transcript pages, respectively) than K.H. and Alternate Juror No. 1 (three and two transcript 113 pages, respectively). However, T.H. and R.N. repeatedly equivocated as to whether they could set aside their views of the death penalty in reaching a verdict. For example, Juror T.H. said, ―I guess I can do it,‖ ―I think I can do that,‖ ―I guess I don‘t know for sure whether I can be entirely objective,‖ ―I guess I will not know for sure [if he could set aside his personal views],‖ and ―I am becoming more uncomfortable with it.‖ It was proper for the court to continue questioning T.H. to determine his views in light of these remarks. As for R.N., he continuously evaded the court‘s questions as to why he testified that he could be objective but wrote on his juror questionnaire that he would always vote against the death penalty. It was proper for the court to ask further questions to determine whether R.N. was misleading the court in order to get on the jury, as the court ultimately and reasonably found. By contrast, K.H. and Alternate Juror No. 1 stated on their questionnaires and during voir dire that they were strong supporters of the death penalty, but they quickly testified that they could set those views aside. Only after they unequivocally and credibly said they could set their political views aside did the court cease questioning them. Indeed, when Alternative Juror No. 1 initially stated that he ―guessed‖ he could set aside his views, the court expressed the same exasperation it had shown when trying to determine the vacillating views of T.H. and R.N. In sum, we find no indication of judicial bias in the court‘s questioning of the prospective alternate jurors. b) Curtailing Sandra Hess’s Cross-Examination Defendant claims that the trial judge demonstrated bias by granting its own relevance objection to defense counsel‘s cross-examination of Sandra Hess when counsel asked whether Hess had consulted a school psychiatrist about defendant‘s 114 behavioral problems and by cutting short cross-examination when defense counsel subsequently asked Hess whether she had reviewed notes before testifying. The trial court‘s comments, though brusque, were measured and appropriate. (See People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78–79 & fn. 6). They came after the court had already admonished both sides that it would not tolerate any questioning of Hess regarding her teaching qualifications because the only issue raised by her testimony was whether defendant had assaulted her. The court invited defense counsel to state what relevant evidence would result from further questioning, but defense counsel gave no substantive response. The trial court‘s ruling betrayed no judicial bias. c) Vouching for Bridget R. Defendant‘s ex-girlfriend, Bridget R., testified that defendant brutally assaulted her, raped her in front of her three-year old daughter, and threatened to kill her family if she testified against him. At the end of her testimony, the court told Bridget R., ―[m]a‘am, I‘m sorry this happened to you and I want to thank you for coming back down.‖ A few minutes later, after brief testimony by another witness, the court told the jury that its statement to Bridget R. had been inappropriate. ―It donned on the court that this is a matter being offered in aggravation and not one of the matters that the defendant has been convicted of, unlike the murders and so forth. [¶] You will have to determine whether the incident described occurred, not me. [¶] I want you to do the following: [¶] Disregard my comments to her that the court was sorry what happened. [¶] You decide what happened. [¶] My comments mean zero, absolutely zero, when it came to that [¶] . . . [¶] It is improper and inappropriate.‖ A trial judge may not vouch for the credibility of a witness. (See People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 616, disapproved on other grounds in Price v. 115 Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13; People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 34, 38, 41.) Although it is understandable that the judge would offer kind words to a sympathetic witness, the court‘s comments improperly vouched for Bridget R. by suggesting that her testimony was true. But this exchange does not demonstrate that the court was biased against defendant. Rather, it is clear that the court experienced a momentary lapse of judgment as a result of Bridget R.‘s moving testimony. The court quickly corrected its error and properly instructed that jury that its comments were ―improper and inappropriate.‖ The court‘s prompt and sincere attempt to rectify its error makes clear that its improper comments were not motivated by, or evidence of, judicial bias. 11. Miscellaneous Challenges to the Death Penalty Defendant raises a series of challenges to California‘s death penalty scheme that we have previously considered and rejected. We find no persuasive reason to reexamine those conclusions and therefore reject these challenges as follows: ―Contrary to defendant‘s arguments, the statutory [death penalty] scheme ‗adequately narrows the class of murder for which the death penalty may be imposed [citation], and is not overbroad . . . because of the sheer number and scope of special circumstances [that] define a capital murder . . . .‖ (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 373.) ―[W]e reject the assertion that [section 190.3,] factor (a) is so vague and arbitrary that it leads to the wanton or freakish application of the death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.‖ (Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 213.) ― ‗The federal Constitution does not impose on the prosecution a burden of proof as to penalty, and the state need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt whether ―aggravating circumstances exist, that the aggravating circumstances 116 outweigh the mitigating circumstances, or that death is the appropriate penalty.‖ [Citation.] Nor does the federal Constitution require that the jury be unanimous on which aggravating factors apply. [Citation.] Nothing in the high court‘s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey [(2000)] 530 U.S. 466, or its progeny, compels a different result. [Citation.] [¶ ] There is no requirement that the trial court instruct the jury that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the presumed sentence unless proven otherwise.‘ ‖ (People v. Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1, 27– 28.) ―Written findings by the jury during the penalty phase are not constitutionally required and their absence does not deprive defendant of meaningful appellate review.‖ (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1097.) ―Review for intercase proportionality is not constitutionally compelled.‖ (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 295.) ―At the penalty phase, the jury properly may consider a defendant‘s unadjudicated criminal activity and need not agree unanimously or beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed those acts.‖ (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 968.) ―The use of restrictive adjectives, such as ‗extreme‘ and ‗substantial,‘ in the statute‘s list of potential mitigating factors does not render it unconstitutional.‖ (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 968.) ― ‗[T]he phrase ―whether or not‖ in section 190.3, factors (d) through (h) and (j)‘ does not allow ‗the absence of a mitigating factor to be considered as an aggravating circumstance . . . .‘ ‖ (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 903.) ―Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California‘s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants.‖ (People v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 295.) 117 Finally, ―[t]he death penalty as applied in this state is not rendered unconstitutional through operation of international laws and treaties.‖ (People v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 295.) 12. Cumulative Error Defendant contends that the multiple errors that infected his second penalty phase trial were cumulatively prejudicial, even if no one error was prejudicial standing alone. We have explained why each of the errors that occurred during the second penalty phase was harmless. We are not persuaded that they are cumulatively prejudicial because collectively they do not ―create[] a negative synergistic effect, rendering the degree of overall unfairness to defendant more than that flowing from the sum of the individual errors.‖ (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 847.) Although the first penalty phase resulted in a mistrial, the jury divided 11 to one in favor of a death sentence. At the second penalty phase, the prosecution presented a stronger case. Defendant‘s primary defense at both penalty phases concerned his mental illness and brain damage. At the first penalty phase, the prosecution did not call any expert witness to rebut defendant‘s psychological and neurological experts. By contrast, at the second penalty phase, the prosecution called its own expert witness, Dr. Markman, who provided unequivocal testimony that defendant‘s mental illness and brain damage were not related to the violent crimes he had committed throughout his life. That testimony undermined the heart of the defense by delinking defendant‘s mental health defense from his long history of violent conduct. The relatively peripheral errors we have identified do not singly or together persuade us of a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict absent the errors. 118