Opinion ID: 878436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: water priorities--davis creek

Text: Both p a r t i e s r a i s e i s s u e s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p r i o r i t i e s g r a n t e d f o r Davis Creek w a t e r . The Water C o u r t g r a n t e d f i r s t and second priority to Hill. Both the first and second p r i o r i t i e s w e r e b a s e d on t h e answer f i l e d by Owen F e r g u s i n t h e 1929 D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a s e of Spencer v . S i l v e , F e r g u s and Duncan ( d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l i n P a r t V ( B ) , of t h i s o p i n i o n ) . The f i r s t p r i o r i t y had. a May 1, 1884 p r i o r i t y d a t e , r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e Conway D i t c h .  The second p r i o r i t y had a p r i o r i t y d a t e of May 1 5 , 1884, r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e  P a p i l l i o n D i t c h .  The third, fourth, equal fourth, and f i f t h p r i o r i t i e s were g r a n t e d t o Merrimac. The t h i r d had a p r i o r i t y d a t e of May 1, 1897, t h e f o u r t h had a p r i o r i t y d a t e o f May 1, 1898, t h e e q u a l f o u r t h a l s o had a p r i o r i t y d a t e o f May 1, 1898, and t h e f i f t h had a p r i o r i t y d a t e of 1916. Merrimac first contends that H i l l did not prove the first and second priorities because the Water Court i m p r o p e r l y r e l i e d on t h e answer f i l e d i n t h e 1929 D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a s e e n t i t l e d Spencer v . S i l v e , F e r g u s and Duncan. In P a r t V of t h i s o p i n i o n , we have d e t a i l e d t h e background of t h i s 1929 c a s e and a l s o h e l d t h a t t h e Water C o u r t i m p r o p e r l y r e l i e d on t h e answer f i l e d i n t h a t 1929 c a s e and t h a t t h e testimony before the Water Court did not corroborate the d a t e s on which t h e w a t e r w a s f i r s t a p p l i e d . The e f f e c t of our holding i s t h a t H i l l d i d not prove t h e 1884 p r i o r i t y d a t e s and Merrimac's p r i o r i t i e s t a k e p r e c e d e n c e o v e r t h o s e of Hill. Merrimac also argues that one of its fourth priorities, as granted by the Water Court--the May 1, 1898 priority date for 54.8 miner's inches of water to irrigate lands in the N1/2 of Section 33--should be given an 1882 priority date, the effect of which would make this the first priority. Merrimac contends that it proved water was first applied by Ed Simpson, Merrimac's predecessor, in 1882. This claim is based on the 1900 application for a homestead patent by Simpson, in which Simpson made certain statements by which Merrimac would have us infer were sufficient proof that irrigation began in 1882. In his application for a homestead, filed in 1900, Ed Simpson signed an affidavit stating he entered the claim on August 1, 1882. In answering the question of what improvements he had made on the land since settlement, Simpson answered: House; Stable; Cattle Shed; 2 Miles 4 Wire Fence; 1 Mile Ditch, 15 Acres broken; value $800. In answering the question of how much land he had broken and cultivated since settlement, and what kind and quantity of crops he raised., Simpson answered: 15 acres and raised a crop each year, cut 50 ton of hay each year. (Emphasis added. 1 Merrimac argues that the plain meaning of this statement is that Simpson raised a crop on his plot and also cut 50 ton of hay each year since 1882. Merrimac therefore argues that the most reasonable inference is that this production was from land irrigated by his ditch system. Merrimac further argues that a copy of the first map of the area, made in 1899 but based on a survey in 1898, shows irrigation ditches in place and cultivated ground on Simpson's place at that time. From this, Merrimac would have this Court conclude tha.t the most reasonable inference is that Simpson built the ditches and applied the water in 1882. The Water Court, however, based its decisi-onon the only evidence before the Court as to when it could most reasonably be determined that the land was being irrigated. The Water Court therefore based its decision on the 1899 map (based on an 1898 survey) which showed the ditches in place. Accordingly, a. May 1, 1898 priority date was established. Although the evidence may support an inference that the ditches were on the land before 1898, we are faced again with a situation where it is impossible to d-etermine when the ditches were built and water first applied. For exa.mple, Merrimac's argument that the ditches were built and water first applied in 1882, ignores the fact that entry was not made on the land until August 1, 1882. It would be extremely unlikely that Simpson, who made entry under a Homestead Preemption entry, would first ha.ve built the ditches and applied water to the land. The application for his homestead. patent states that Simpson's first act was to build a house, although he later built a stable, cow shed, strung two miles of fence, and dug one mile of ditch. Under the Homestead Preemption entry, Simpson was not required to dig ditches or apply wa-ter within a certain time in order to obtain a land patent. There being no evidence in the record as to when the ditches were built or water first applied, we conclude that the Water Court was correct in holding that 1898 was the first year that it could be definitely established tha-t ditches were in existence and that water was most probably applied. In his cross-appeal, Hill attacks two of the Davis Creek water priorities granted to Merrimac. Hill contends that the 1898 priority granted to Merrimac for irrigation of the Simpson Place'' must be eliminated because Rerrimac failed to prove the source of water for the irrigation, the place of use, and the acreage irrigated. Hill also contends that th.e 1.916 priority granted to Merrimac to irrigate from the Upper Davis Runoff is similarly defective for failure to identify the place of use or the source of supply. Ample proof exists to prove the 1898 priority. The Water Court awarded. 54.8 miner's inches to irrigate 54.8 acres from diversions 6, 7, and 8. Merrimac presently irrigates 54.8 acres on the Simpson Place from diversions 6, 7, and 8, and the trial testimony is undisputed that Merrimac has always irrigated this same land from the same ditches for as long as the witnesses at trial could remember. The water has always come from Davis Creek, or more correct, from Simpson Springs, a tributary to Davis Creek. The historical evidence of Simpson's irrigation activities, presents circumstantial evidence that the same lands were irrigated at least as early as 1898, the year in which the survey was made indicating the existence of the ditches. We note, furthermore, that Hill is in no position to complain of this 1898 priority grantecj to Merrimac, because the evidence clearly demonstrates that Hill cannot be hurt by Merrimac's use of this water. The source of the water is Simpson Springs, which ultimately drains into Davis Creek. However, this spring drains into Davis Creek below any of the Hill ditches. Hill therefore has no interest in the waters of Simpson Springs, and cannot object to Merrimac's use of this water. Hill also contends that the 1916 priority granted to Merrimac for a use right--a. right established by longstanding, unchallenged use of the excess water from Upper Davis Creek Meadows to irrigate the land involved--must be eliminated because Merrimac failed to establish the place and source of use. Both Lennie 16cDonald and Jim McDonald, owners of Mewrimac, testified to use of the excess water from Upper Davis Creek to irrigate the land involved. Both Lennie McDonald and Jim McDonald, testified to historic use, and present day irrigation maps clearly show irrigation of this land from Upper Davis Creek. Hill has failed to set forth any contradictory evidence, and the Water Court relied on all the evidence before it when it awarded this priority. The evidence clearly supports the 1916 priority granted to Merrimac. The effect of our holdings on the Davis Creek issues is that Merrimac's third priority moves to first priority, Merrimac's fourth and equal fourth priority move to second and equal second priority, and Merrimac's fifth priority moves to third priority. VIII. CAMERON COULEE IS NOT A TRIBIJTARY TO MARTIN CREEK OR TO PAUL CREEK In his cross-appeal, Hill contends that he is entitled to the excess water flow from Cameron Coulee after Merrimac has satisfied his 1 8 . 6 miner's inches awarded by the Water Court. Although Hill concedes Merrimac's claim to the 1 8 . 6 miner's inches, Hill contends that Cameron Coulee is a tributary to Paul Creek or to Martin Creek, and therefore that he is entitled to satisfy his downstream irrigation needs from this excess water source once Merrimac has obtained his 1 8 . 6 miner's inches. For his proof, Hill relies on a 1 8 9 9 government map and the desert land claims of Conrad Sack, a predecessor to Merrimac. The map depicts Cameron Coulee (ajk/a. Pacific Creek) to be a tributary to Martin Creek; also, Conrad Sacks's Desert Land claim, based on a May 1, 1896 appropriation, states that Cameron Coulee is a tributary to Martin Creek. The Water Court, however, was convinced that the more persuasive evidence proved that the water in Cameron Coulee disappears into the ground before it reaches any creek and therefore that it was not a tributary to any creek. Substantial evidence supports the Water Court's finding, and based on this evidentiary picture, Cameron Coulee is not legally a tributary. See Anderson v. Spear-Morgan Livestock Co. (1938), 107 Mont. 18, 79 P.2d 667. We note, furthermore, that Hill did not contend at trial that Cameron Coulee was a tributary to Martin Creek; rather, Hill contended only that Cameron Coulee was a tributary to Paul Creek, and the Water Court confined its ruling to this issue. Although Hill cannot for the first time on appeal change the theory of his case, we nonetheless conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that Cameron Coulee is not a tributary to any creek. We therefore affirm the Water Court's ruling. IX. MEASURE OF WATER FLOW PER ACRE TO WHICH PARTIES ARE ENTITLED Merrimac contends that it is entitled to 1.25 miner's inches per acre for each of its water rights rather than the 1 miner's inch per acre as set forth in the Water Court's amended decree. Hill does not dispute this 1.25 miner's inches per acre as the proper quantity, but argues that if Merrimac gets this amount Hill is entitled to the same amount. We remand for a further hearing on this issue. In a general finding, applicable to both parties, the Water Court found that: A flow rate of 1 . 2 5 miner's inches per acre is a sufficier,t and necessary amount of flow to irrigate the lands of the parties hereto. Based on this finding, the decree, in setting forth Merrimac's rights, and also those of Hill, used 1 . 2 5 miner's inches per acre as the factor to be applied to the acreage irrigated. After the decree and judgment, however, Kill moved to amend the findings and conclusions, although Hill did not move to amend the 1 . 2 5 miner's inches per acre finding. The Water Court amended the findinqs and conclusions on other matters, but did not amend the 1.25 miner's inches per acre finding. The decree affecting Merrimac, however, effectively granted Merrimac only one miner's inch per acre for all of its water rights. Eecause the 1 . 2 5 miner's inches per acre finding was not changed, Merrimac argues that the change affecting Merrimac must be a clerical or bookkeeping error and asks that this Court determine 1 . 2 5 miner's inches to be the proper measure. It appears that the evidence would support either a finding of 1 miner's inch per acre or 1.25 miner's inches per acre as the measure to which each party is entitled, but we have no explanation for the change in the decree as it affected Merrimac. We therefore remand for the Water Court to determine whether 1 miner's inch per acre is the proper measure for each party or whether it should be 1 . 2 5 miner's inches per acre. X. WHETHER HILL MAY HAVE BEEN GRANTED EXCESSIVE WATER BECAUSE OF FAILURE OF WATER COURT TO DETERMINE HILL'S TOTAL ACREAGE UNDER IRRIGATION In award.i.ng water rights to Hill the Water Court failed to determine how many acres Hill. has under irrigation for each of the water rights. Rather, the Water Court simply granted to Hill a certain number of miner's inches for each of the rights granted. The parties differ wid-ely on their estimate of the number of acres that Hill had under irrigation. Merrimac contends that Hill had a total of 426.9 acres under irrigation and Hill contends that he had a total of 1,890 acres under irrigation. If Merrimac is correct clearly Hill was awarded excess water for each of his water rights. On the other hand, if Hill is correct, then the water awarded for each water right may not be excessive. Merrimac argues, and we agree, that this issue cannot be resolved unless there is a fact determination on each water right as to how many acres are being irrigated. The problem arises in part from the original findings and conclusions entered by the Water Court. In finding no. 10 the Water Court set forth the acreage that Merrimac had under irrigation for each water right and the number of miner's inches that Merrimac was entitled to for each water right. However, nowhere in the original findings or in later findings did the Water Court determine the number of acres Hill had under irrigation for each claimed water right. Although the Water Court did decide the number of miner's inches that Hill was entitled to for each claimed water right, this finding is meaningless without another finding on the number of acres under irrigation. Although Hill devotes a large part of his brief to justifying the number of miner's inches granted for each water right, Hill ignores the fact that, regardless of his interpretation of the evidence, the findings are deficient. We will not affirm the Water Court where the findings and supporting memoranda leave us in the dark as to whether the Water Court made determinations of Hill's acreage under irrigation, and, if so, how the Water Court arrived at those determinations. We therefore remand this issue to the District Court to enter findings on Hill's acreage under irrigation for each water right, and then to determine the total miner's inches per acre to which Hill is entitled, based on the appropriate measure of water flow. X?. WHETHER HILL'S RIGHT TO IRRIGATE WAS IMPROPERLY RESTRICTED TO THE AREAS DESIGNATED IN THE HISTORICAL APPROPIATIONS In his cross-appeal, Hill contends that the Water Court improperly confined his water rights to those areas described in the original appropriations, and that instead the Water Court should have based the water rights on the lands which Hill is presently irrigating. Merrimac agrees essentially that the case must be remanded for the Water Court to make the necessary findings ts to the lands presently being irrigated by Hill. Hill contends that in the early 1900rs, after the ownership merged in one owner, the new owner marshaled and accumulated the water rights and diverted the water to various lands whenever and wherever needed without regard to the original points of diversion or original places of use as established in the historical documents. Hill contends that he is entitled to irrigate based on the changed applications and properly points out that the Water Court, in awarding priorities to Merrimac, based them on the land which Merrimac is currently irrigating. Merrimac essentially agrees with Hill's position and states that the case must be remanded for the Water Court to make these essential findings, because the Water Court did not take sufficient care to define correctly the areas where Hill applies irrigation water . . . The problem was caused in part by the failure of the Water Court to change its findings to reflect the new legal relationship between the parties after the Water Court reversed itself and declared that Merrimac had not proved a prescriptive right to the use of water from Martin Creek and Davis Creek. Upon reversing its holding, the Water Court should have expanded its findings to adequately describe the land that Hill currently irriga.tes. Because the original ruling was in favor of Merrimac on the prescriptive use issue, it was not necessary for the Water Court to detail the lands which Hill had under irrigation. Merrimac was the upstream user, and having a prescriptive right to use water from both Martin Creek and Davis Creeks, Merrimac was entitled to first satisfy all its water needs before Hill could satisfy any of its water needs. The result of this prescriptive ruling is, of course, that Hill could use the remaining water however he saw fit without adversely affecting Merrimac's use of the water. However, when the Water Court reversed its prescriptive rights ruling by declaring that Merrimac had not proved its claim, the effect of this decision was to trigger certain priority rights in Hill over Merrimac and there was a corresponding need to determine the land that Hill was currently irrigating. The Water Court failed to do this. We remand this cause for the Water Court to make the necessary findings, and to take additional evidence if necessary, as to the lands that Hill is currently irrigating.