Opinion ID: 168023
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: In general. --Whoever--

Text: (1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes w ith any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties . . . . .... (b) Enhanced penalty.--W hoever, in the commission of any acts described in subsection (a) uses a deadly or dangerous weapon . . . or inflicts bodily injury, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) & (b). The instructions to the jury explained the elements of -7- this count to be: One: The defendant forcibly assaulted, resisted, opposed, impeded, intimidated or interfered with an officer or employee of the United States, Craig Overby; Two: At the time, Craig O verby was engaged in official duties. Three: The defendant used a deadly or dangerous weapon. Rec., vol. I, doc. 38, at 21. M r. Gruber specifically takes issue with his conviction under subsection (b) of the statute because of the jury’s finding that he “used” a dangerous w eapon to assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with Agent Overby during their standoff. He contends that the fact that a gun was found on the ground under him after he was subdued “cannot relate back to create a fact that did not exist during the time of the offense.” Aplt’s Br. at 13. During trial, the government called a number of w itnesses to show that M r. Gruber “carried” a gun during a violent federal felony for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The government’s argument that M r. Gruber violated section 924(c) was based on testimony of witnesses who stated that he had a gun in his possession during the bank robbery, testimony of friends who recalled that M r. Gruber owned such a gun, and testimony of law enforcement officials who remembered that after subduing him, they found the gun on the ground underneath his body. The government did not, however, present any witnesses testifying that they saw M r. G ruber “use” his gun during his face-to-face encounter w ith Agent Overby. Instead, when Agent Overby testified regarding the incident, he stated that he -8- never actually saw M r. Gruber’s.45-caliber pistol while the two men stared at each other from opposite sides of the parked car. Agent Overby testified that when M r. Gruber dropped his hands out of sight, he assumed that M r. Gruber was reaching for a weapon of some sort, but the agent never actually saw it. After backup officers subdued M r. G ruber, they located the pistol on the ground. This after-the-fact discovery may indeed have validated Agent Overby’s fear that M r. Gruber was holding a weapon. But it does not rise to the level of the “active employment” definition of use, which includes “brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 148 (1995). In Bailey, the C ourt distinguished between the terms “carry” and “use” in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 924. Id. The Court gave “use” its ordinary and natural meaning and limited the application of “use” to instances of active use, because otherwise no role w ould remain for the term “carry.” Bailey, 516 U.S. at 147. M oreover, the Court reasoned that “use” must mean something more than mere possession, since Congress frequently employed the term “possess” in gun-crime statutes and “[h]ad Congress intended possession alone to trigger liability . . . , it easily could have so provided.” Id. at 143. Though Bailey does not deal with 18 U.S.C. § 111(b), the reasoning is persuasive. The ordinary and natural meaning of “use” in § 111(b) requires that a defendant must actively, in the Bailey sense, use the deadly weapon to qualify for § 111(b)’s enhanced penalties. -9- In its brief, the government marshals no evidence to show that M r. Gruber’s “use” of the gun was active or that the gun was disclosed. W hile the evidence would likely support a finding that M r. Gruber “carried” the weapon during his standoff with the FBI agent, he did not brandish, strike with, fire or even attempt to fire the gun. During oral argument (but not in its brief), the government cited a part of the transcript of the jury trial, where Agent Bob Horn testified that during an interview immediately after his arrest and while he was recovering from having been shot, M r. Gruber admitted that “he [had] reached for his weapon” during the standoff. Rec. vol. VI, at 591 (Tr. of Jury Trial, dated M ar. 24, 2004). Agent Horn also testified that M r. Gruber would not admit to reaching for the gun with the intent to shoot Agent Overby; instead, Agent Horn explained that M r. Gruber had insisted that “[i]t’s possible that I was just reaching for the weapon to take it out and throw it on the ground and give myself up.” Id. at 593. Agent Horn also explained that M r. Gruber never told him that he intended to “to pull [the] gun and intimidate or interfere with . . . Agent Overby,” and that M r. Gruber had stated that “he had no intention o[f] shooting anybody.” Id. at 600. This testimony is insufficient to establish active use, as required by the plain meaning interpretation of the term “use,” provided by the Supreme Court in Bailey. W e acknowledge that this is a fine distinction, but one that is significant, given the plain meaning of the term “use” as interpreted by the Supreme Court: “if the gun is not disclosed or mentioned by the offender, it is not actively -10- employed, and it is not ‘used.’” Bailey, 516 U.S. at 149. Even applying the highly deferential standard of review to the government on appeal, there was insufficient evidence to support M r. Gruber’s conviction under § 111(b). “W e have w arned against sustaining a conviction based on mere suspicion or speculation: ‘W hile the jury may draw reasonable inferences from direct or circumstantial evidence, an inference must be more than speculation and conjecture to be reasonable, and caution must be taken that the conviction not be obtained by piling inference on inference.” United States v. Dunmire, 403 F.3d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 865 (10th Cir. 1995)). W ithout any evidence or testimony, it is only speculation to say that M r. Gruber actually “used” the gun during the incident with Agent Overby. The circumstantial evidence presented cannot shed light on whether or not M r. Gruber “used” the gun during the incident, especially in light of the fact that Agent Overby admitted to having never seen M r. Gruber’s gun. W hile this evidence may be enough to prove that M r. Gruber “carried” and “possessed” the gun, it does not prove “use,” an essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 111(b).