Opinion ID: 1309189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: prosecutorial delay in obtaing the indictment

Text: The first assignment of error is the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of prejudicial prosecutorial delay in obtaining the indictment. The crime allegedly occurred on February 22, 1979, and the grand jury indictment was returned on June 19, 1979. The defendant was not arrested prior to the returning of the indictment. He claims that the delay was prejudicial in that investigative facts could not be gathered. In State ex rel. Leonard v. Hey, W.Va., 269 S.E.2d 394 (1980), we held that where eleven years elapsed between the identification, location and connection of the defendant with the criminal act and his formal accusation, there was prima facie prejudice that violated his constitutional due process rights. [1] In Syllabus Point 2 of Leonard, supra, we spoke to the situation where a less extensive pre-indictment delay is involved: The effects of less gross delays upon a defendant's due process rights must be determined by a trial court by weighing the reasons for delay against the impact of the delay upon the defendant's ability to defend himself. In State v. Maynard, W.Va., 289 S.E.2d 714 (1982), we found that a three-month delay between the commission of the offense and the filing of the charges did not result in violating the defendant's due process rights. The evidence against the defendant was acquired in the course of an undercover operation and we viewed the State as having a need for some delay to prevent exposure of its undercover informers and to analyze the evidence. See also State v. Ayers, W.Va., 282 S.E.2d 876 (1981). Here, the record is silent as to any specific facts that would demonstrate why the approximate three-month delay has prejudiced the defendant. The motion to dismiss was filed on December 17, 1979, six months after the returning of the indictment, and asserted only general grounds. [2] While Leonard, supra, created a prima facie ground of prejudice for an extreme or gross delay, the general rule is that where there is a delay between the commission of the crime and the return of the indictment or the arrest of the defendant, the burden rests initially upon the defendant to demonstrate how such delay has prejudiced his case if such delay is not prima facie excessive. Justice Marshall in writing for the majority in United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048-49, 52 L.Ed.2d 752, 759 (1977), [3] made this summary based on United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), in regard to the requirement of proof of prejudice: Thus Marion makes clear that proof of prejudice is generally a necessary element but not sufficient element of a due process claim and that the due process inquiry must consider the reason for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. In Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1978), this concept was expressed as follows: Under the more lenient due process standard applicable to this period, proof of actual prejudice is necessary before a claim of pre-indictment delay is ripe for adjudication. United States v. Lovasco, supra, [431 U.S. 783] at 789-790, 97 S.Ct. 2044 [at 2048-2049, 52 L.Ed.2d 752]; United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 675 (9 Cir.1977). There has been no showing of any actual prejudice to Arnold arising from the one-year delay between the commission of the crime and his first arrest. See also United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.1977); Scott v. State, 263 Ark. 669, 566 S.W.2d 737 (1978); Smith v. United States, 414 A.2d 1189 (D.C.App.1980); People v. Lawson, 67 Ill.2d 449, 10 Ill.Dec. 478, 367 N.E.2d 1244 (1977); State v. Rountree, 106 N.J.Super. 135, 254 A.2d 337 (1969); State v. Rogers, 70 Wis. 160, 233 N.W.2d 480 (1975). We conclude that the defendant has failed to demonstrate any facts which would show prejudice by the delay.