Opinion ID: 1302380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The City's Appeal on the Attorney-Fee Award.

Text: In its appeal of the district court's attorney-fee award, the city urges that, because that award was dependent upon Davis achieving a successful result in the case, the determination should have been delayed until the conclusion of the appeal. That argument no longer has substance because, following our decision on the primary appeal, Davis will have attained a successful result. The city also contends that the district court erred in allowing attorney fees for services furnished by Davis's counsel before the time they commenced working on the civil rights complaint. We believe that the city's improper hiring decision subjected Davis to a need for legal counsel from the moment that decision took place and that the district court properly allowed his recovery of fees incurred from that time forward. We do agree, however, with the city's argument that legal services furnished to Davis prior to the time that the council's action on the promotion took place should not have been included in the attorney-fee award against the city. It appears that some of the legal services for which the court ordered reimbursement occurred during that time. As a result of our conclusions, we vacate the attorney-fee award the district court made and remand that issue to the district court to determine anew a reasonable award for the fees of Davis's attorneys. In that recalculation, services rendered prior to the city council's action on the promotion shall not be included. The district court shall also determine on remand an appropriate award of attorney fees for legal services rendered to Davis in pursuing this appeal. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court on the primary appeal should be affirmed. The judgment of the district court on the attorney-fee appeal is vacated, and that matter is remanded for further proceedings in the district court consistent with this opinion. All of the costs in No. 94-1516 and eighty-five percent of the costs in No. 95-509 are assessed to appellant. Appellee is assessed fifteen percent of the costs in No. 95-509. (No. 94-1516) AFFIRMED. (No. 95-509) VACATED AND REMANDED.