Opinion ID: 6215960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appeals in Deferred Restitution Cases

Text: We turn now to the final unresolved issue in this case: whether the district court erred in concluding that Anthony’s time to appeal his conviction and initial sentence expired 14 days after the entry of the initial judgment. While the Supreme Court decided in Manrique that a direct appeal of an initial judgment does not include an appeal of a subsequent restitution order, the Court left open the converse question of whether a direct appeal of a subsequent restitution order can include an appeal of the initial judgment. The Supreme Court’s decision in Corey sheds some light on the question. There, the trial court imposed a preliminary sentence, including custody, but deferred imposing a final sentence until after the Bureau of Prisons completed a study of the defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b). Corey, 375 U.S. at 170. After the Bureau completed the study, the district court reconsidered its initial sentence and imposed a final sentence of probation rather than imprisonment. Id. The defendant appealed the new sentence, but the appeal was dismissed as than 90 days after sentencing so long as the court informs the defendant that restitution will be imposed). 12 The fact that Anthony’s one-year limitations periods has not started does not mean that Anthony needs to wait until restitution proceedings conclude to challenge his conviction and custodial sentence under § 2255. So long as there is no potential conflict between the collateral proceedings and the direct appeal— and there is no conflict in Anthony’s case—a district court may entertain a § 2255 motion while a direct appeal is pending. See Prows, 448 F.3d at 1228. -22- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 23 untimely on the ground that the time to appeal had expired ten days after entry of the initial sentence. Id. at 170–71. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the defendant’s appeal was timely. Id. at 175. The Court explained that while the defendant could have filed his appeal after the initial sentence, he was not required to do so: “While an initial commitment under § 4208(b) is . . . freighted with sufficiently substantial indicia of finality to support an appeal, the fact remains that the proceedings in the trial court are not actually terminated until after the period of diagnostic study, review of the same by the district judge, and final sentence.” Id. “Long- accepted and conventional principles of federal appellate procedure require recognition of the defendant’s right to await the imposition of final sentence before seeking review of the conviction.” Id. at 176. Consistent with Corey, other circuits have held that a defendant in a deferred restitution case may wait until restitution is ordered before filing an appeal. See United States v. Muzio, 757 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court has . . . recognized that if the defendant chooses to do so, he may avoid bifurcation of his appeal by waiting until restitution has been resolved to appeal.”) (citing Corey, 375 U.S. at 175); United States v. Shehadeh, 962 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[W]here a district court defers its restitution order, a defendant wishing to appeal his conviction and sentence of imprisonment may enter a notice of appeal either within fourteen days following the district court’s -23- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 24 entry of the custodial sentence, or within fourteen days of the entry of the amended judgment.”). Our own precedent supports this conclusion. In United States v. Paup, 933 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2019), we held that “a defendant sentenced to imprisonment need not wait until restitution is finally resolved . . . before being allowed to challenge her conviction and sentence on appeal.” Id. at 1230 (emphasis added). This language implies that a defendant may wait to appeal his conviction and initial sentence until after restitution is ordered. This makes sense. A defendant may want to challenge a custodial sentence as soon as possible, even if collateral matters are yet to be resolved. 13 We thus conclude that in a deferred restitution case a defendant may file his appeal of his conviction and sentence within 14 days of either (1) the entry of the initial judgment or (2) the entry of the amended judgment containing the restitution amount. 14 See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i); Paup, 933 F.3d at 1230. 13 Our conclusion promotes judicial economy. See Shehadeh, 962 F.3d at 1100 n.2 (“The government’s proposed rule would require a defendant to appeal twice: first, immediately after the custodial sentence is imposed, and then again after the amount of restitution is determined. This rule would be inefficient, and it is required neither by Manrique nor by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.”). 14 To be clear, a remand for resentencing does not reopen the door for a defendant to appeal aspects of his conviction or sentence not previously appealed. See United States v. Mendes, 912 F.2d 434, 437 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The grant of remand on appeal does not reopen the order appealed from[.]”). Nor does resentencing following a probation violation resurrect time-barred challenges to a conviction or sentence. See Prendergast v. Clements, 699 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012). -24- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 25 We note in closing that such a rule reinforces our conclusion that Anthony’s judgment of conviction has yet to become final. Because a defendant can wait until after the entry of a restitution order to appeal his initial sentence, it would be incongruent to hold that the judgment of conviction becomes final prior the determination of restitution. If a defendant’s judgment of conviction became final for AEDPA purposes after the initial judgment but the defendant did not have to appeal until after restitution is ordered, there is a possibility that the defendant’s one-year period of limitations would run before the defendant ever had a chance to directly appeal his conviction and initial sentence (e.g., if the district court deferred imposing restitution until a year or more after the initial sentence was entered). 15 This would be contrary to § 2255 and the overall AEDPA scheme, which require the completion of the direct review before collateral attack. See Burton, 549 U.S. at 156–57 (AEDPA limitations period “did not begin until both his conviction and sentence ‘became final by the 15 The district court cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Gilbert, 807 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 2015), as support for the proposition that restitution proceedings do not extend the § 2255 limitations period. See R., Vol. 6 at 58. In Gilbert, the Ninth Circuit held that “when a judgment imposes a sentence but leaves the amount of restitution to be determined, the one-year statute of limitations to file a § 2255 motion does not restart when the specific amount of restitution is later entered.” Id. at 1201. We disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion and side with the Second Circuit. See Gonzalez, 792 F.3d at 233–34. If a defendant can wait until after restitution is ordered to file his direct appeal, then it does not make sense that a defendant’s § 2255 clock would start before a final restitution amount is determined, as Gilbert holds. The Ninth Circuit’s more recent decision in Shehadeh highlights this tension. It holds that a defendant can wait until after the restitution order is entered to appeal his conviction and sentence. See Shehadeh, 962 F.3d at 1099. -25- Appellate Case: 20-6134 Document: 010110642395 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 26 conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)). In sum, Anthony did not need to appeal his conviction and sentence within 14 days of the district court entering the initial judgment. Anthony could have challenged the initial judgment when he appealed the first restitution order.