Opinion ID: 2098691
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Witness Statement

Text: As an initial matter, we are troubled by the absence from the record of the trial justice's reasoning underlying her ruling on the admissibility of the witness statement. The discussions between the trial justice and the parties about the admissibility of this evidence occurred in chambers without the presence of a stenographer and, therefore, were not on the record. The defendant faults the trial justice for failure to place on the record the reasons behind her ruling on admissibility. However, it is the responsibility of the party claiming the error to provide a complete record so that this Court may weigh the merits. See Shorrock v. Scott, 944 A.2d 861, 864 (R.I.2008) (It was [the] defendant's responsibility to provide those portions of the trial transcript that are necessary for this Court to perform a meaningful review.); State v. Pineda, 712 A.2d 858, 861 (R.I.1998) (declining to overlook the glaring defects in [the] record furnished by the petitioner). In our opinion, defendant had a responsibility to request that the trial justice place the rationale for her reasoning on the record. He does not contend that she refused to do so. Therefore, [i]n the absence of the transcript or other adequate record of the proceedings in the court below, we are unable to consider the issues raised by [the] defendant's appeal. State v. Jennings, 117 R.I. 291, 294, 366 A.2d 543, 545 (1976). Although it is our opinion that this issue has not been properly preserved, we recognize that the state has conceded in its brief that the record is sufficient to demonstrate that the witness statement was properly admitted. Therefore, we shall address the issue briefly. Based upon the record before us, we conclude that defendant's argument lacks merit. The essential facts of Medeiros's previous sexual misconduct with his cousin, as set forth in her witness statement are not in dispute; they also bear many similarities to Jennifer's testimony, which the trial justice found to be credible. The incident involving Medeiros's cousin occurred in 1990 when she was eight years old. The first incident with Jennifer occurred when she was nine years old. In both cases, Medeiros was an older adult relative who lived in the same household with each girl at the time of the sexual misconduct. In addition, the nature of the offensive touchings began in a strikingly similar fashion. In her witness statement, Medeiros's cousin said he touched her private parts over her clothes, whereas Jennifer testified that Medeiros first touched her vagina, buttocks, and chest over her clothes. In light of the evidence that is in the record, we cannot say that the trial justice abused her discretion in admitting the 1990 witness statement of Medeiros's cousin. We conclude, rather, that the prior incident was similar to the charged offense, nonremote, and tended to show a common scheme or plan to sexually assault young girls in his family. Moreover, given that this evidence was admitted in the context of a jury-waived trial, any risk of unfair prejudice was substantially diminished. See State v. Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 242 (R.I.2002) (noting that in nonjury trials, the risk of undue prejudice under [R.I. R. Evid.] Rule 403    [is] minimal). Because this was a jury-waived trial, and because of the deference we afford to the trial justice's evidentiary rulings, we cannot say that the probative value of this relevant evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 403. Therefore, even if this issue was properly before this Court, we would not be able to say that the trial justice abused her discretion when she ruled that the witness statement was admissible evidence.