Opinion ID: 848612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: people v. henderson

Text: The majority finds People v. Henderson [20] persuasive on the issue whether restoration of the right to possess a firearm is an element of felon in possession. I believe that this decision does not aid the majority's position. [21] Moreover, I find that Henderson was wrongly decided. Henderson dealt with MCL 750.227, which, at that time, provided: Any person who shall carry a dagger, dirk, stiletto or other dangerous weapon except hunting knives adapted and carried as such, concealed on or about his person, or whether concealed or otherwise in any vehicle operated or occupied by him, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him; and any person who shall carry a pistol concealed on or about his person, or, whether concealed or otherwise, in any vehicle operated or occupied by him, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him, without a license to so carry said pistol as provided by law, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years, or by fine of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars. The Henderson Court concluded that, as regards the facts of that case, the only elements of the crime were: (1) the defendant was carrying a pistol and (2) he was in a vehicle operated or occupied by him. It ruled that the language without a license to so carry said pistol did not add an element to the offense. People v. Henderson, 391 Mich. 612, 616, 218 N.W.2d 2 (1974). This conclusion cannot be correct. If only two elements existed, the sole defenses available to a defendant would be (1) that he did not carry a pistol or (2) that he was not in a vehicle with it. Whether the defendant was licensed to carry that pistol would not matter. He would be guilty of the crime, even though licensed, because he (1) carried a pistol (2) in a vehicle. It is obvious that there is a third key element. It is found in the statute's language without a license. [22] My interpretation is strengthened by the fact that, in writing MCL 750.227, the Legislature did not use any of the terms listed in MCL 776.20. The clause without a license is not prefaced by anything signaling or otherwise phrased to signal that it constitutes an exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption. Contrast this with the language except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him that is also contained in the statute. The Legislature knew how to create an exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption when it wrote MCL 750.227. And, in fact, it did so in that statute by explicitly using the term except. But it did not use any of those terms with respect to the lack of a license. Again, the Legislature's choice of wording should not be presumed accidental. Redford Twp, supra at 456, 235 N.W. 217. To rule as it did, the Henderson Court had to read words into the statute. Specifically, it had to read in some form of exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption before the language without a license. But this violates the well-established rule of statutory construction that a court cannot read into a statute what is not there. AFSCME v. Detroit, 468 Mich. 388, 412, 662 N.W.2d 695 (2003). [23] Therefore, the Henderson Court failed to construe the language actually chosen by the Legislature. Instead, it added language to change the burden of production. The majority today falls into the same trap. And in doing so, it violates its own repeatedly stated rule of statutory construction.