Opinion ID: 764448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fiore's Request for a Coercion Jury Instruction

Text: 16 Fiore contends that the district court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on coercion. A district court's decision that a defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to be entitled to a jury instruction on a particular defense theory is subject to de novo review. United States v. Bastanipour, 41 F.3d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir.1994). A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if: 1) the proffered instruction is a correct statement of the law; 2) the theory of defense is supported by the evidence; 3) the theory of defense is not part of the charge; and 4) the failure to include the instruction would deny the defendant a fair trial. United States v. Wilson, 134 F.3d 855, 865 (7th Cir.1998); United States v. Boykins, 9 F.3d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir.1993). 17 Coercion, also known as duress, is available only if the defendant establishes three elements: 1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury; 2) a reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out; and 3) no reasonable opportunity to avoid the threatened harm other than by committing the criminal act charged. United States v. Sotelo, 94 F.3d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir.1996). A defendant is entitled to an instruction of coercion only after he has produced sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find all the elements of the defense. Id. 18 In the immediate case, the record does not support the elements of the coercion defense. As a matter of fact, Fiore's own testimony negates the existence of the first element--an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury. For example, Fiore testified that, Tolomeo once showed him a gun and gestured like ... he would do something, although Tolomeo did not point the weapon at Fiore. On another occasion, Tolomeo told Fiore that if Fiore did not collect the juice loans with him, things could happen, although Fiore also testified that Tolomeo never explicitly detailed to Fiore what those things were and that Tolomeo was referring to things that would happen in the future. Evidently, Fiore's experience was enough so that Tolomeo's remark made him rather uneasy, at the least. In addition, the evidence demonstrates that Fiore's role in the collection activities in the Crew continued even after Tolomeo fled in November of 1988. Fiore never discussed any specific threats of harm from any members of the Crew other than Tolomeo. Fiore's testimony, at best, refers to things that might happen in the future; these are not immediate threats of death or serious bodily injury. See id. 19 The record also shows that Fiore does not satisfy the third element of the coercion defense: that he was without reasonable opportunities to avoid the threatened harm other than by committing the criminal act charged. Fiore testified that he never went to authorities to advise them that Tolomeo had threatened him or that Tolomeo forced him to collect juice loans. Even after Fiore learned from FBI agents that Tolomeo was cooperating with the government, he did not inform them of Tolomeo's threats. Fiore obviously had reasonable opportunities to avoid the threatened harm but he failed to seize those opportunities. We agree with the district court that Fiore failed to present evidence to support a coercion defense. 20 Fiore next contends that he is entitled to a coercion instruction predicated upon the state law defense of compulsion, see 720 ILCS 5/7-11, because the indictment charged state criminal violations under RICO. Under Illinois law, a compulsion defense is available if there is some foundation in the evidence for such a defense. People v. Swartz, 186 Ill.App.3d 399, 134 Ill.Dec. 336, 542 N.E.2d 515, 517 (1989). Although the wording of the Illinois compulsion statute is somewhat different from the federal rules, suffice it to say that the statute, like the federal law, requires a finding of imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm. See ILCS 5/7-11. As we have already discussed, the record reveals no evidence of an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury. Thus, no state law compulsion instruction was warranted. 21