Opinion ID: 2631851
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Time Mandates

Text: {15} Compton contends that the time requirements in Section 43-1-11(A) and Section 43-1-15(B) are mandatory and that the appropriate remedy for a violation of the time requirements is dismissal of the petition. We first separately address the time requirements in each statute and then subsequently address the issue of remedies. {16} Compton argues that Section 43-1-11(A) establishes a mandatory requirement for a hearing within seven days of admission. He asserts that the hearing in the present case exceeded this time limitation by seven days. We begin by correcting Compton's time calculation. {17} In computing a period of time prescribed or allowed by a statute or rule, . . . if the period is less than eleven days, a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday is excluded from the computation. NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-7(E) (1997). Application of this statute yields the following results: Compton's right to a hearing under Section 43-1-11 accrued seven days, excluding weekends, from February 18, his date of admission, which would have been March 1. The district court conducted the hearing on March 4. Thus, under Section 43-1-11, the hearing was three days late, not seven days late. We consider whether a three-day postponement is permissible under Section 43-1-11(A). {18} In construing a particular statute, a reviewing court's central concern is to determine and give effect to the intent of the [L]egislature. State ex rel. Klineline v. Blackhurst, 106 N.M. 732, 735, 749 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1988). [T]he plain language of the statute [is] the primary indicator of legislative intent. Whitely v. N.M. State Pers. Bd., 115 N.M. 308, 311, 850 P.2d 1011, 1014 (1993). Looking to the plain language of the statute, Section 43-1-11(A) provides that Compton had the right to a hearing within seven days of admission unless waived after consultation with counsel. The Court of Appeals has previously interpreted this language to be silent on the issue of postponement of the hearing; the waiver language furnishes a means by which an individual may waive [the] right to challenge [the] detention. By waiver [the individual] transforms an involuntary commitment into a voluntary one. State v. Bunnell (In re Bunnell), 100 N.M. 242, 244, 668 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Ct.App.1983). We agree with this assessment of the statute. The Legislature has directed that a decision to forgo a hearing to contest a petition for a thirty-day commitment can only be made by an express knowing and voluntary waiver, but Section 43-1-11(A) is silent on the question of whether the district court may postpone the hearing beyond the seven-day requirement. Confronted with legislative silence on this issue, we must determine whether the Legislature intended to allow for postponement of the hearing by looking to the provisions of the Code as a whole and by assessing the purposes of the seven-day time limitation. [3] See Sunwest Bank v. Nelson, 1998-NMSC-012, ¶ 14, 125 N.M. 170, 958 P.2d 740 (stating that it is necessary to resort to other statutory construction aids in order to discern the intent of the Legislature in the face of legislative silence on an issue); Roberts v. Southwest Cmty. Health Servs., 114 N.M. 248, 251, 837 P.2d 442, 445 (1992) (Statutes should be construed so as to facilitate their operation and the achievement of the goals as specified by the legislature.). {19} The Legislature's decision to provide a right to a hearing within seven days of admission reflects a careful balance between the individual's liberty interests and the interest of the individual and society in proper care and treatment. The goal in establishing a seven-day time frame is, on one hand, to ensure that individuals are not erroneously committed against their will and, on the other hand, to ensure that there is a sufficient period of time after the initial commitment and prior to a hearing for the proper diagnosis and emergency treatment necessary to conduct a meaningful and effective judicial review. The time after initial commitment before judicial proceedings must be begun is not simply for the purpose of delay. It has a positive aspect as well. There is a compensating advantage to the committed person because in many cases during this period the medical staff at the hospital can adequately alleviate his [or her] mental illness or by use of non-emergency diagnostic procedures determine that he [or she] is not a danger to himself [or herself] or others. In such cases, the stigma of court record is avoided and the length of confinement is shortened. Logan, 346 F.Supp. at 1269. {20} In response to these concerns, the Legislature has provided that, [i]f the division, physician or evaluation facility decides to seek commitment of the client for evaluation and treatment, a petition shall be filed with the court within five days of admission requesting the commitment. Section 43-1-11(A). This five-day period is, in the Legislature's judgment, a proper amount of time to evaluate a patient appropriately and to make a determination of the need for continued involuntary hospitalization. Walsh, supra, at 690. It must be remembered that commitment has not been undertaken for the sake of penal detention. The patient is committed for treatment and care, and some knowledge of his [or her] mental condition can be gained by visual observation and diagnostic tests. This takes time. Logan, 346 F.Supp. at 1269 (footnote omitted). If the Legislature had required that the filing of the petition and the hearing take place immediately upon admission, many clients might be needlessly detained beyond the initial seven-day evaluation period. See Walsh, supra, at 684 (discussing commentators' view that, because many acute psychiatric episodes subside within one to four days, . . . many patients whose conditions would have improved sufficiently for discharge in a few days would be retained unnecessarily for long commitment periods). An immediate hearing may also harm the patient's clinical interest because it transforms the doctor-patient relationship from a therapeutic to an adversarial one. Id. In addition, in order to adequately protect the individual's right to counsel, there must be an adequate amount of time for counsel to review the case and prepare for the commitment hearing. Coll, 411 F.Supp. at 911. Any time limitation placed on the hearing requirement must also take into account the administrative burdens of a judicial hearing, including scheduling, availability of judicial staff, and the impact on treatment resources. [4] See Parham, 442 U.S. at 605-06, 99 S.Ct. 2493 (One factor that must be considered is the utilization of the time of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other behavioral specialists in preparing for and participating in hearings rather than performing the task for which their special training has fitted them. Behavioral experts in courtrooms and hearings are of little help to patients.); Coll, 411 F.Supp. at 911. {21} As can be seen, the Legislature's decision to establish a seven-day hearing requirement implicates a number of different factors. Given the Legislature's awareness of the complex relationship between these various factors and of the alternative remedy of filing a writ of habeas corpus, we do not believe that the Legislature intended to establish a rigid seven-day requirement in Section 43-1-11(A). Just as the constitutional right to due process necessarily requires flexibility, see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.), we believe the Legislature intended to provide enough flexibility in the procedural time requirement of Section 43-1-11(B) to respond to the particular demands of individual cases. For example, because the Legislature provided five days after admission to file a petition, it is conceivable that a full judicial hearing would be required to be held within two days of the filing of the petition. See § 43-1-11(B). Under these circumstances, it is highly foreseeable that a postponement might be necessary for either the parties or the court. See Walsh, supra, at 690-91 (discussing the conclusions of an ad hoc committee formed to evaluate Massachusetts' emergency commitment procedure and stating [a]ll of the representatives of the judiciary on the Ad Hoc Committee stated that a minimum of five business days between the filing of the petition and the hearing was necessary for the courts to process the petition, prepare the case file and schedule a judge and other staff to travel to the petitioning hospital to hold a hearing). In fact, the Court of Appeals has specifically faced a situation in which it was necessary to postpone the hearing required under Section 43-1-11(A). In Bunnell, an individual who was involuntarily committed pursuant to Section 43-1-10 argued that his Section 43-1-11 hearing should have been postponed in order to allow his counsel adequate time to prepare. 100 N.M. at 244, 668 P.2d at 1121. The Court of Appeals noted that the potentially short period of time between the filing of a petition and a judicial hearing might result in little time to prepare for appointed counsel. Id. at 244-45, 668 P.2d at 1121-22. The Court [b]alanc[ed] the need for a prompt hearing with the importance of a meaningful hearing before imposition of a thirty-day detention and held that the district court must grant a short continuance when counsel establishes that he [or she] has not had sufficient time to prepare his [or her] client's case. Id. at 245, 668 P.2d at 1122. [5] We believe the need for flexibility articulated in Bunnell demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to establish a rigid time requirement and that a postponement is contemplated by Section 43-1-11(A). [6] For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the seven-day hearing requirement in Section 43-1-11(A) is subject to postponement for good cause. {22} Our interpretation of Section 43-1-11(A) accords with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of a different statutory time requirement for an administrative hearing. In Redman, the Court of Appeals addressed a statute that provided that a de novo hearing on a teacher's dismissal shall be held by the State Board of Education within sixty days of receipt of a notice of appeal. 102 N.M. at 238, 693 P.2d at 1270 (internal quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). The Court determined that the sixty-day requirement was mandatory; however, this mandatory requirement did not prevent postponement. Id. at 239, 693 P.2d at 1271. On showing of good cause, or with a written waiver, the State Board may extend the time. Id. at 240, 693 P.2d at 1272. [7] {23} Our conclusion that the Legislature intended to permit postponements of a Section 43-1-11(A) hearing for good cause is also supported by the somewhat analogous requirement in Rule 5-604 NMRA 2001 for the commencement of trial in criminal cases. Even though this rule protects the important interest of the prompt adjudication and resolution of criminal cases, State v. Wilson, 1998-NMCA-084, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 390, 962 P.2d 636, district courts may extend the six-month commencement requirement [f]or good cause shown. Rule 5-604(C). As reflected by the power to order postponement in Rule 5-604(C), trial courts possess the inherent power to manage their dockets, State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 65 n. 3, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477, and must have the ability to respond to exigencies that arise in individual cases. We do not believe that the Legislature, by establishing the seven-day hearing requirement in Section 43-1-11(A), intended to prevent the exercise of this power in response to good cause for postponement. {24} Considering the number of factors at stake in establishing a seven-day hearing requirement and the number of variables that might necessitate a delay in particular cases, we believe that the Legislature intended to allow postponement of the seven-day hearing requirement in Section 43-1-11(A). We therefore hold that Section 43-1-11(A) imposes a mandatory requirement that a hearing be held within seven days of admission unless good cause exists to postpone the hearing. A determination of good cause should take into account any objection by the client, as well as the client's substantial interest in not being mistakenly confined against his or her will. Further, district courts must consider the Legislature's intent to require a prompt hearing on a thirty-day commitment petition in determining whether good cause exists for postponement. Any postponement should be narrowly prescribed and should be allowed only for so long as necessity demands, again taking into account the legislative intent for a prompt judicial hearing. {25} In this case, the district court scheduled a timely hearing but postponed the hearing for three days beyond the seven-day requirement in Section 43-1-11(A) due to illness of the presiding judge. Compton did not object or make any demand for a hearing or for his release until the scheduled hearing on March 4. Under these circumstances, we believe that good cause existed for a postponement and that the postponement was sufficiently minimal so as not to infringe unduly on Compton's statutory right to a prompt hearing. Cf. State v. Aaron, 102 N.M. 187, 191-92, 692 P.2d 1336, 1340-41 (Ct.App.1984) (discussing the requirement of good cause for a continuance and referring to People v. Watson, 650 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Colo. Ct.App.1982), in which good cause was shown when the trial judge became ill). In addition, as recognized by the Court of Appeals, the postponement did not affect the length of Compton's involuntary commitment because the district court based the thirty-day commitment period on the date of the originally scheduled hearing. Compton, 2000-NMCA-078, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 474, 10 P.3d 153. We conclude that the district court did not err in postponing the Section 43-1-11 hearing. {26} We now turn to the time requirement in Section 43-1-15(B). We begin by noting that the hearing contemplated by Section 43-1-15(B) serves a different purpose and protects different interests than a commitment hearing under Section 43-1-11. Section 43-1-15(A) governs the administration of psychotropic medication, psychosurgery, convulsive therapy, experimental treatment or behavior modification program involving aversive stimuli or substantial deprivations. This statute provides that [i]f the client is capable of understanding the proposed nature of treatment and its consequences and is capable of informed consent, his [or her] consent shall be obtained before the treatment is performed. Section 43-1-15(A). This statute is intended to protect a client's right to refuse treatment. However, if the physician or mental health professional believes that the client is incapable of informed consent, he [or she] may petition the court for the appointment of a treatment guardian to make a substitute decision for the client. Section 43-1-15(B). This provision is intended to protect clients' right to receive necessary and appropriate treatment, Section 43-1-10(F), when they are unable to do so themselves. In order to protect a client's right to refuse treatment, however, there must be a hearing at which the client has the right to be present and the right to representation of counsel, and the court must find[ ] that the client is not capable of making his [or her] own treatment decisions before it is permitted to appoint a treatment guardian. Section 43-1-15(B). The hearing on the petition shall be held within three court days. Id. Under Section 43-1-15(B), a hearing for appointment of the treatment guardian should have been held in this case three court days after the filing of the petition on February 22, which would have been February 25, the date of the original hearing. Thus, the hearing for appointment of the treatment guardian was five days late. {27} Unlike Section 43-1-11, Section 43-1-15(B) does not implicate a client's liberty interest in being free from involuntary commitment. A hearing under Section 43-1-15(B) protects a client's right to refuse treatment and the right to necessary and appropriate treatment. The client retains the right to refuse treatment unless a court makes the appropriate finding following a hearing. Thus, for purposes of the right to refuse treatment, Section 43-1-15(B) provides for a pre-determination hearing. As a result, we believe that the purpose of requiring a hearing within three days is to ensure that clients receive appropriate and necessary treatment at the earliest opportunity. See NMSA 1978, § 43-1-7 (1977) (Each resident client receiving mental health services shall have the right to prompt treatment.. . .). The short period of time between the filing of the petition and the hearing indicates the Legislature's view of the immediacy and importance of ensuring proper treatment. We assess whether the three-day requirement may be postponed for good cause in light of this purpose. {28} As the Court of Appeals noted, the language in Section 43-1-15(B), with the use of shall, is clear and unambiguous and creates a mandatory hearing deadline. Compton, 2000-NMCA-078, ¶ 11, 129 N.M. 474, 10 P.3d 153. However, we note that the filing of the petition itself is not mandatory even if the physician or mental health professional believes that the client is incapable of informed consent. See § 43-1-15(B) (providing that the physician or mental health professional  may petition the court for the appointment of a treatment guardian (emphasis added)); see also NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-4(B) (1997) (`May' confers a power, authority, privilege or right.). In addition, Section 43-1-11(D) provides that a court which makes the appropriate findings for a thirty-day commitment shall hear further evidence as to whether the client is capable of informed consent for purposes of determining whether to appoint a treatment guardian, regardless of the filing of a petition pursuant to Section 43-1-15(B). Finally, Section 43-1-15(F) provides a mechanism for the emergency administration of psychotropic medication if it is necessary to protect the client from serious harm while a petition for appointment of a treatment guardian is pending. As a result, at least in the context of an emergency involuntary commitment under Section 43-1-10 and a thirty-day commitment petition under Section 43-1-11, we believe that a narrowly prescribed postponement of the three-day hearing requirement under Section 43-1-15(B) for good cause will not substantially interfere with the client's right to prompt treatment, Section 43-1-7. While we caution the district court to make every effort to comply with the statutory time mandate in order to protect the client's right to treatment, we conclude that the court did not err in postponing the hearing for good cause.