Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court's failure to conduct a hearing into defendant's competence to stand trial

Text: Defendant claims the trial court's failure (both before and during the trial) to inquire into, and to conduct a hearing regarding, his competence to stand trial and to assist counsel in his defense, violated his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as his rights under sections 1367 and 1368. Defendant claims this failure also violated his right to be mentally present at the proceedings, both under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution and state statutory law. (See § 1043; In re Dennis (1959) 51 Cal.2d 666, 672, 335 P.2d 657; People v. Berling (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 255, 267-268, 251 P.2d 1017.) We reject these contentions. Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal defendant while he is mentally incompetent. (§ 1367; Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 181, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103; Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 384-386, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815; People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478.) A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he or she lacks `a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding  and ... a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' ( Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824; see also Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 399-400, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321; § 1367; People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 513, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) Both federal due process and state law require a trial judge to suspend trial proceedings and conduct a competency hearing whenever the court is presented with substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant's competence to stand trial. (§ 1368; Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 181, 95 S.Ct. 896; Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 384-386, 86 S.Ct. 836; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 711, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 516-517, 58 Cal.Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942.) The court's duty to conduct a competency hearing may arise at any time prior to judgment. ( People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 726, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618.) Evidence of incompetence may emanate from several sources, including the defendant's demeanor, irrational behavior, and prior mental evaluations. ( Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 180, 95 S.Ct. 896; People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 507-508, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478.) But to be entitled to a competency hearing, a defendant must exhibit more than ... a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the question ... whether the defendant can assist his defense counsel. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 508, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478; see also People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 727, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729.) A trial court's decision whether or not to hold a competence hearing is entitled to deference, because the court has the opportunity to observe the defendant during trial. (See People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 727, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729; see also Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 181, 95 S.Ct. 896.) The failure to declare a doubt and conduct a hearing when there is substantial evidence of incompetence, however, requires reversal of the judgment of conviction. ( Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 181, 95 S.Ct. 896; Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 384-386, 86 S.Ct. 836; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 711, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145.) Defendant contends there was substantial evidence of his incompetence before the trial court. Defendant first points to testimony, received both during the preliminary hearing and later during the guilt phase, indicating that defendant was depressed and suicidal in jail and had been placed on a suicide watch. Dr. Bird testified defendant scored extremely high on psychological tests designed to assess suicide risk. Dr. Glaser and Dr. Franz agreed defendant was an extreme suicide risk. Although the risk was most elevated immediately following defendant's arrest, the summer before trial defendant had hoarded razor blades and strips of cloth in his jail cell. Dr. Franz testified the suicide risk continued up until the time of trial. Actual suicide attempts or suicidal ideation, in combination with other factors, may constitute substantial evidence raising a bona fide doubt regarding a defendant's competence to stand trial. (See Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at pp. 166-167, 179-180, 95 S.Ct. 896; Moore v. United States (9th Cir.1972) 464 F.2d 663, 665-666; see also Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. at p. 381, 86 S.Ct. 836.) Nonetheless, in contrast to the cases cited above, here defendant's suicidal tendencies did not constitute substantial evidence of incompetence, for they were not accompanied by bizarre behavior, the testimony of a mental health professional regarding competence, or any other indications of an inability to understand the proceedings or to assist counsel. (Cf. People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 509, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478 [defendant's hoarding of medication in apparent preparation for a suicide attempt did not give rise to a doubt regarding his competence to stand trial].) Defendant points out that his counsel moved to suppress his tape-recorded confession on the ground defendant was not psychologically fit to waive his Miranda rights after his arrest and was not in a position to give free and voluntary consent. Defendant also notes his counsel's argument during opening statements that defendant suffered from extreme mental problems. Counsel never suggested, however, that defendant's alleged inability to consent to interrogation gave rise to a doubt concerning his competence to stand trial. Although trial counsel's failure to seek a competency hearing is not determinative (see Odle v. Woodford (9th Cir.2000) 238 F.3d 1084, 1088-1089), it is significant because trial counsel interacts with the defendant on a daily basis and is in the best position to evaluate whether the defendant is able to participate meaningfully in the proceedings (see id. at p. 1088). Defendant argues there was substantial evidence of incompetence in the guilt phase testimony demonstrating that he suffered from long-standing mental problems. All three defense mental health experts agreed defendant suffered some type of dissociative disorder  a a splitting off of [defendant's] mind into different directions  which possibly rose to the level of a multiple personality disorder. [6] No medical expert, however, testified defendant was likely to dissociate during the trial. Rather, the testimony suggested defendant's dissociative states were triggered by traumatic events such as childhood sexual abuse or Clark's verbal abuse. Likewise no medical expert ever related defendant's alleged multiple personality disorder to any inability to understand the trial process or assist his attorneys. Defendant also points to evidence establishing that he twice was exposed accidentally to the drug PCP on the job, causing serious temporary brain impairment and dissociation. The testimony suggests, however, the effects of the PCP exposure were temporary. There was no testimony the brief exposure affected defendant's competence to stand trial. Finally, defendant argues that a doubt concerning his competence should have been raised by the evidence suggesting he could not recall various events in his childhood and those surrounding the killing of Clark and Benintende. We never have held that memory loss regarding the charged crime renders a defendant unable to assist in his or her defense. (Cf. People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 948-952, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 [testimony establishing defendant had a mild memory impairment that made it difficult for him to recapture memory and to retain information, and also that he might have brain damage, was not substantial evidence of incompetence].) Moreover, the question whether defendant genuinely could not remember the events surrounding the crimes was disputed at trial, and there was evidence demonstrating defendant had recovered some memories through the sodium amytal interview. There was no testimony suggesting defendant's memory loss affected his ability to understand the proceedings or assist his counsel. Accordingly, here the mental health testimony was similar to the kind of `psychiatric testimony ... with little reference to defendant's ability to assist in his own defense' that we have found insufficient to raise a doubt regarding a defendant's competence to stand trial. ( People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 727, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729.) The trial court had the opportunity to observe defendant's testimony and demeanor during the trial. Defendant's intelligence was above average. Defendant testified coherently and articulately, and there was nothing in his testimony that would have caused the trial court to question whether he was unable to understand the proceedings or cooperate with counsel. In sum, defendant's history, statements and conduct did not approach the overwhelming indications of incompetence present in Drope and other cases. ( Davis v. Woodford (9th Cir.2004) 384 F.3d 628, 646; see also People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 509, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478.) Considering all the evidence before the trial court, there was no substantial indication of incompetence requiring the trial court to declare a doubt and conduct a competence hearing. For the same reasons, defendant has not shown he was mentally absent from the trial in violation of his rights under the state or federal Constitutions or state statutory law. [7] (See § 1043; In re Dennis, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 672, 335 P.2d 657; People v. Berling, supra, 115 Cal.App.2d at pp. 267-268, 251 P.2d 1017.)