Opinion ID: 1450795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Santa Barbara County magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the warrant for the search of defendant's Los Angeles County residence.

Text: (2) (See fn. 3.) We first examine the statutes governing the issuance of search warrants to determine whether they limit a magistrate's jurisdiction to issue an out-of-county warrant in connection with the investigation of a crime committed in the magistrate's county. [3] Section 1524, which authorizes the issuance of search warrants, provides in subdivision (b) that the property or things [to be seized] may be taken on the warrant from any place, or from any person in whose possession it may be. (Italics added.) Section 1528 specifies that [i]f the magistrate is ... satisfied of the existence of the grounds for the application ... he must issue a search warrant ... to a peace officer in his county ... (italics added); section 1529 also provides that the warrants run from The people of the State of California to any sheriff ... in the County of.... These sections thus anticipate that the magistrate will issue the warrant to an officer in his county, but do not specify that the search must be conducted in that same county. The California Legislature has made it clear that peace officers' authority extends beyond the jurisdiction of the county of their employment. In 1968 the Legislature enacted section 830.1 which in subdivision (a) provides that [t]he authority of... [a] peace officer extends to any place in the state ... [a]s to any public offense committed or which there is probable cause to believe has been committed within the political subdivision which employs him. [4] Read together with section 830.1, sections 1524, 1528, and 1529 imply that, at the very least, when the magistrate has probable cause to believe that the evidence relates to a crime committed within the county and pertains to a present or future prosecution in that county, he has authority to issue a warrant authorizing a county peace officer to search property located in another county. [5] Contrary to defendant's claim, the statutory provisions for attacking the validity of a warrant also fail to impose an absolute territorial restriction on the magistrate's jurisdiction. (3) A defendant seeking to suppress evidence under section 1538.5 can bring his motion before the issuing magistrate (§ 1538.5, subd. (b)), the court conducting the preliminary hearing (§ 1538.5, subd. (f)), or the trial court (§ 1538.5, subds. (g), (h) and (i)). [6] Other persons seeking the return of seized property may file a motion under sections 1539 and 1540, but neither these provisions nor section 1538.5 contain any language suggesting a territorial limit on the jurisdiction of the issuing magistrate. Defendant cites section 1541, which indicates that in some cases the magistrate issuing a search warrant may not have jurisdiction over the criminal offense, [7] but one cannot leap from that premise to the conclusion that the magistrate with jurisdiction over the criminal offense lacks authority to issue an out-of-county warrant. We finally note, by way of analogy, the statutory provisions governing the issuance of arrest warrants: the magistrate has jurisdiction to issue the warrant if the defendant is in the magistrate's county (see §§ 827, 829) or has committed a public offense triable in the superior court of that county (§ 813). Defendant asserts that permitting out-of-county search warrants will lead peace officers to forum shop, selecting distant magistrates who may be biased or unfamiliar with local conditions. These asserted dangers would also be present in the issuance of arrest warrants, yet the Legislature explicitly authorized out-of-county arrest warrants when the offense is triable within the county, an action which suggests that the Legislature would permit out-of-county search warrants in a similar case. Concluding that the relevant statutes do not prohibit the out-of-county warrant in the circumstances of the present case, we turn to the cases cited by the parties. Defendant relies on the Court of Appeal decision in People v. Grant (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 563 [89 Cal. Rptr. 784]; both parties rely upon, but interpret differently, our later decision in People v. Ruster (1976) 16 Cal.3d 690 [129 Cal. Rptr. 153, 548 P.2d 353, 80 A.L.R.3d 1269]. In Grant, a San Mateo County magistrate issued a warrant to San Mateo County officers authorizing the search of defendant's person. The officers pursued defendant across the county line into San Francisco, detained him, and searched him. The court stated in dicta that We find little authority, but nevertheless considerable reason, supporting the theory that the effect of a search warrant should be limited at least to the county of its origin. (P. 568). The court upheld the search, however, on the basis of hot pursuit. In People v. Ruster, supra, 16 Cal.3d 690, a Santa Clara County magistrate issued a warrant for the search of defendant's San Mateo County residence. We rejected defendant's claim that Grant compelled a ruling invalidating the warrant. Our opinion acknowledged that `The person offended should have a ready forum in which to attack the validity of the search or seizure, and not be subjected to following his property across county lines, or conceivably to the opposite end of the state.' (P. 702, quoting People v. Grant, supra, 1 Cal. App.3d at p. 569.) Thus, we observed, If the property of a stranger to a criminal investigation were seized in one county pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate in another county, it might well be inconvenient for him to contest the validity of the search or seizure in the county issuing the warrant. But that is not the case here. Defendant had already been arrested and admitted to bail in Santa Clara County when the warrant issued; the charges to which the evidence pertained were triable in Santa Clara County. Therefore, Santa Clara County was the most convenient forum in which to resolve the validity of the search and seizure. The Santa Clara County magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the warrant. (P. 702; italics added.) Defendant interprets Ruster to uphold the validity of an out-of-county warrant only if a criminal prosecution had already commenced in the issuing county when the warrant issued. We think this interpretation focuses on the wrong point in the proceedings. Ruster was concerned with guaranteeing to the person whose property was seized a convenient forum in which to contest the validity of the warrant; for a criminal defendant the county of trial is usually a convenient, and often the exclusive, forum in which to raise that contest (see § 1538.5), regardless of whether charges were filed before or after the warrant issued. Questions of convenience of forum depend upon the situation at the time when the moving party seeks to challenge the warrant, not the time when the warrant issued. (1b) We interpret Ruster to permit an out-of-county warrant whenever the magistrate finds probable cause to believe that defendant has committed a crime within the issuing county and consequently will probably face trial in that county. This interpretation, we believe, will accommodate the interests at issue in this proceeding. Both the state's concern in efficient law enforcement and the magistrate's need for ready access to witnesses and materials that he may require for examination in evaluating the application for the warrant indicate that investigators should be permitted to seek a warrant in the county where the crime was committed and the prosecution will take place. Defendant's fears that officers may forum shop to obtain uninformed, distant magistrates can be alleviated by limiting a magistrate's jurisdiction to issue out-of-county warrants to cases in which a crime was committed within the issuing county and prosecution likely there. Finally, as we noted earlier, the issuing county  being the county where trial will probably take place  is generally a convenient forum for a defendant who challenges the warrant's validity. Defendant raises the question of inconvenience to a true stranger to the criminal investigation ( People v. Ruster, supra, 16 Cal.3d 690, 702), a third party whose property is seized as evidence. As Ruster recognized, it may well be inconvenient for such a person to travel to the county of issuance to seek the return of his property. That concern, however, does not require that we limit the magistrate's jurisdiction to issue an out-of-county warrant for crimes committed within his county and where prosecution will probably take place; it requires only that we recognize the stranger's right, implicit in sections 1539 and 1540, to attack the validity of the warrant in the courts of the county where the property was located. In summary, we conclude, in accord with the controlling statutes and our decision in People v. Ruster, supra, 16 Cal.3d 690, that a magistrate has jurisdiction to issue an out-of-county warrant when he has probable cause to believe that the evidence sought relates to a crime committed within his county and thus pertains to a present or future prosecution in that county. [8] Dictum to the contrary in People v. Grant, supra, 1 Cal. App.3d 563, is disapproved.