Opinion ID: 506592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Oddo's Role in the Transaction

Text: 8 Oddo contested the accuracy of various statements in the presentence report that identified him as the source of the cocaine sold to the undercover agent. In particular, the report contained the following assertions regarding his role: 9 Allo and Oddo are equally the most culpable defendants and the source of the cocaine. The case agent says that Allo received the cocaine from Oddo and then gave it to Montalvo for sale. 10 Agents characterized the defendant [Oddo] as a primary figure who served as the source for the two kilos [of cocaine].... [H]is role [would] seem to indicate a proprietary interest in the overall transaction.... 11 Oddo claimed that these statements were inaccurate because he played only a minor role in the deal, acting only as lookout for Allo. 12 On appeal, Oddo asserts that the court failed to make specific findings as to each of these controverted statements. This contention is without merit. Judge Pratt announced in open court at the conclusion of three days of hearings that he and Judge Mishler had reached a finding as to the roles played by the different defendants: We find that the cocaine was originally supplied here by Mr. Oddo, and his responsibility here was essentially to see that when it was sold it got paid for and the money would come back to him. We have no information as to where Mr. Oddo may have acquired it. We consider this statement to be sufficiently precise to comply with the requirement of Rule 32, since it directly addressed Oddo's challenge that these statements of his level of culpability are pure conjecture and that Oddo had a minor role and is the least culpable in what transpired with respect to the cocaine on November 4, 1986. Although the court again failed to order that its findings be appended to the report, this omission also can readily be cured on remand without requiring us to vacate the sentence. Santamaria, 788 F.2d at 829. 13 Prior to sentencing, Oddo also challenged the statement in the presentence report that Montalvo has previously mentioned [sic] received the cocaine from Oddo [sic]. The government now concedes that this statement is inaccurate because Montalvo did not assert that Oddo provided him with the cocaine; rather, he testified that Allo was his supplier and that he had not met Oddo prior to participating in this drug transaction. The government contends that the statement merely contained typographical errors. Under Rule 32, however, the district court was required to make findings as to the accuracy of the statement or to disclaim reliance upon it, but did not do either. Ordinarily, in such a situation, [u]nless the government can demonstrate that the disputed facts were not relied upon, the defendant must be resentenced. United States v. Eschweiler, 782 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir.1986); see United States v. Lawal, 810 F.2d 491, 492-93 (5th Cir.1987). 14 Although the statement in question misrepresents Montalvo's identification of his supplier, this inaccuracy was not prejudicial to Oddo. The court found that the cocaine was originally supplied here by Mr. Oddo.... As discussed infra at point C, we find that the testimony provided at the hearing was more than sufficient to sustain this finding; therefore, we do not believe that the failure to correct or to disclaim reliance upon the misstatement requires us to vacate the sentence. 15 Although the rule is designed to insure maximum clarity, on the record, of the sentencing judge's treatment of disputed matters, Ursillo, 786 F.2d at 71, this court does not apply the rule mechanically. Rather, where the inaccuracy is de minimis in the context of the case as a whole, or where the violation of the rule is technical or ministerial, resentencing is not required. United States v. Bradley, 812 F.2d 774, 782 (2d Cir.1987); see United States v. Castillo-Roman, 774 F.2d 1280, 1285 (5th Cir.1985); see also Ursillo, 786 F.2d at 71. 16 We likewise see no reason to vacate a sentence where, as here, the error could not have been relied upon to the defendant's detriment. See United States v. Ryan, 810 F.2d 650, 657 (7th Cir.1987); Eschweiler, 782 F.2d at 1390. After considering Oddo's arguments, we are satisfied that, in view of all of the other evidence presented regarding Oddo's involvement in the transaction, this particular statement was inconsequential. Indeed, Judge Pratt's explicit finding that Mr. Montalvo was acting as a go between, between ... the under cover [sic] officer and Mr. Allo from whom Mr. Montalvo believed he would be able to obtain the cocaine, clearly indicates that he was not misled as to the chain of supply. Under these circumstances, it would be inappropriate to upset the sentence imposed based on these omissions alone. However, even if a misstatement is harmless and does not require resentencing, it must still be corrected or clarified, see Eschweiler, 782 F.2d at 1390; see also Bradley, 812 F.2d at 782, and we therefore remand to the district court for compliance with Rule 32. 17 We also note and draw the attention of the district court to the fact that the presentence report submitted to this Court under seal as part of the record on appeal has been modified and varies from the one that Oddo challenged. In the version that we have examined, some of the statements that Oddo contested have been corrected, although in other instances, only grammatical changes have been made. One of the significant modifications that we have discovered involves the alteration of the sentence that, according to the government, had contained typographical errors. It now reads: Montalvo, as previously mentioned, received the cocaine from Allo (changes underlined). 18 While it appears that the government may have made a good faith effort to correct prior errors, we disapprove of the alteration of documents in this manner. Though it may have been appropriate for the government to request permission to submit two versions of the report--the original plus a corrected report marked to show changes--it is improper to submit on appeal a record that differs from that which was actually before the district court. Upon remand, in order to fulfill the purposes of Rule 32, the district court should compare the two versions of the presentence report and ensure that the version considered by the district court to be correct is made available to appropriate prison and parole authorities.