Opinion ID: 1813112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Under Federal Law, When a Tribal Court's Jurisdiction is Challenged, Tribal Courts First Determine Their Own Jurisdiction, Subject to Federal District Court Review

Text: The next pertinent issue is whether the Tribal Court's jurisdiction can properly be decided by a non-Indian court. I believe that the majority incorrectly determines that the Exhaustion Doctrine is discretionary in nature. While there is technically no binding precedent on this issue regarding state courts, in my view, federal Exhaustion Doctrine jurisprudence requires that federal district courts defer first to tribal courts and allow them to determine their own jurisdiction, subject to federal district court review. When presented with a conflict between tribal courts and federal district courts regarding the determination of a tribe's sovereign immunity and jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that: the existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decision. National, 471 U.S. at 855-56, 105 S.Ct. at 2453-54. The Supreme Court has therefore concluded that this examination should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself. Id. at 856, 105 S.Ct. at 2454. In support of its determination, the Court has cited several reasons for applying the Exhaustion Doctrine and requiring tribal courts to first determine their own jurisdiction. First, previous Supreme Court precedent often recognizes Congress' committal to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination. Id. Congressional policy therefore favors a jurisprudential rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge. Id. Second, allowing tribal courts to develop a full record before a federal court addresses any issue promotes the orderly administration of justice in federal courts. Id. The risk of creating a procedural nightmare is therefore minimized when federal courts stay their hands until after tribal courts have had a full opportunity to determine their own jurisdiction and rectify any errors that they may have made. Id. at 856-57, 105 S.Ct. at 2454. Third, the exhaustion of tribal remedies encourages tribal courts to explain to the parties their precise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and also provides other courts with the benefit of tribal court experience in tribal law matters in the event of further judicial review. Fourth, unconditional access to federal courts places such courts in direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's authority over reservation affairs. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16, 107 S.Ct. 971, 976, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106). Finally, because tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law, adjudication of such matters by any nontribal [sic] court also infringes upon the tribal law-making authority. Id., 107 S.Ct. at 977. As such, the Supreme Court continually holds that proper respect for tribal legal institutions requires that they be given a `full opportunity' to consider the issues before them and `to rectify any errors.' Id. However, the Exhaustion Doctrine is not without limit. Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that exhaustion is not required (1) when an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, (2) where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or (3) where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction. National, 471 U.S. at 856, 105 S.Ct. at 2454, fn. 21. Finally, when the Exhaustion Doctrine does attach, exhaustion of tribal remedies means that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the determinations of the lower tribal courts. Iowa, 480 U.S. at 17, 107 S.Ct. at 977. As such, and absent any of the aforementioned exceptions to the Exhaustion Doctrine's applicability, a federal district court is required to stay or dismiss an action when a concurrent action is pending in a tribal court until that concurrent tribal action has been decided by the tribal court and any tribal appellate courts. [4] Therefore, in my view, the majority is incorrect when it fails to find that, in the instant case, if the state district court were bound by the Exhaustion Doctrine, the state district court would be required to stay or dismiss any proceedings pending a determination by the Tribal Court and subsequent Coushatta appellate courts. Moreover, if the state district court were bound by the Exhaustion Doctrine, I would further find that none of the enumerated exceptions apply to this case. Meyer suggests in its brief to this court that the Tribal Court might be incompetent or biased in its adjudication, thereby implicating the first exception. However, I believe that this exception will not attach in the instant case. First, the Supreme Court has specifically stated that the alleged incompetence of tribal courts is not among the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 19, 107 S.Ct. at 978 (the Court further stated that an incompetence exception would be contrary to the congressional policy promoting the development of tribal courts). Second, Meyer presents no evidence of bias, and the Supreme Court has declined to permit parties to excuse themselves from the Exhaustion requirement merely by alleging bias. Id. Moreover, the Indian Civil Rights Act provides non-Indians with various protections against unfair treatment in the tribal courts. Id. (citing the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302). As such, I do not believe that Meyer can escape the application of the Exhaustion Doctrine by way of the first exception. Meyer, in an appeal to equity, also suggests that it will have no recourse if the Tribal Court is allowed to decide this case, thereby implicating the third exception. However, again, in my view, this exception will not attach in the instant case. The Supreme Court has stated with absolute clarity that the question of whether a tribal court has civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian is one that must be answered by reference to federal law and is a `federal question' under § 1331. National, 471 U.S. at 852, 105 S.Ct. at 2452. Therefore, a federal court may review the Tribal Court's decision and can determine whether the Tribal Court exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction after the Tribal Court and subsequent Coushatta appellate courts have made their determinations. [5] Id. at 853, 105 S.Ct. at 2452. Meyer also argues that the Exhaustion Doctrine is not a mandatory jurisprudential rule, but rather an optional matter of comity. The majority opinion also cites the discretionary nature of comity as a reason for declining to apply the Exhaustion Doctrine. In support of this argument, Meyer cites in his brief a footnote in which the Supreme Court noted that exhaustion is required as a matter of comity, not as a jurisdictional requirement. Iowa, 480 U.S. at 16, 107 S.Ct. at 976, fn. 8. In my view, Meyer's argument and the majority's decision that Exhaustion is a discretionary jurisprudential rule is without merit, and I would find that the Exhaustion Doctrine is mandatory for federal courts. See, e.g., Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442, 445 (10th Cir.1991) (relying on Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), for the proposition that Iowa and National established the Exhaustion Doctrine as an inflexible bar); Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir.1991) (The requirement of exhaustion of tribal remedies is not discretionary; it is mandatory). In making this footnoted statement, the Iowa Court connoted merely that a federal district court is not deprived of jurisdiction solely by failure to apply the Exhaustion Doctrine. Drumm v. Brown, 245 Conn. 657, 716 A.2d 50, 56-7 (1998). Rather, I believe that the Exhaustion requirement means that, although the district court has jurisdiction over the action, it cannot exercise that jurisdiction until all tribal remedies have first been exhausted. Id. at 57. The use of the verb required when discussing the application of the doctrine as a matter of comity supports this contention. In essence, Exhaustion is required as a matter of comity; it is not required as a matter of jurisdiction. Regardless, it is still required. [6] Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently required lower federal courts to apply the Doctrine, and in its application of the Doctrine, has not suggested that Exhaustion is discretionary. See supra. See also National, 471 U.S. at 857, 105 S.Ct. at 2454 (holding that exhaustion is required before such a claim may be entertained by a federal court) (emphasis added); Iowa, 480 U.S. at 16-17, 107 S.Ct. at 976 (stating that the federal policy supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court to stay its hand and that proper respect for tribal legal institutions requires that they be given a `full opportunity ...') (emphasis added). Finally, the enumeration of three distinct exceptions to the Exhaustion Doctrine and the Court's refusal to expand that list strongly suggests that lower federal courts cannot decline to apply the Exhaustion Doctrine in their discretion. National, 471 U.S. at 856, 105 S.Ct. at 2454, fn. 21 (naming exceptions); Iowa, 480 U.S. at 19, 107 S.Ct. at 978 (refusing to expand the list of exceptions). If lower federal courts were allowed to apply the Exhaustion Doctrine at their discretion as a matter of comity, the enumeration of three limited exceptions would be meaningless. Consequently, I do not believe that the Exhaustion Doctrine is as optional in nature as Meyer or the majority opinion suggests, and that federal courts are in fact required to apply Exhaustion before exercising jurisdiction. Therefore, in the instant case, if the state district court were bound by the Exhaustion Doctrine, I believe that the state district court would have to either stay or dismiss the action currently before it because there is a concurrent proceeding pending in the Tribal Court. Therefore, in my opinion, the majority is incorrect to dismiss the Exhaustion Doctrine as optional in nature. Consequently, the only question remaining before this court is whether the state district court is required to apply the federal Exhaustion Doctrine.