Opinion ID: 1193581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: and 2. Disclosure of undercover officer's identity; requested jury instruction on entrapment.

Text: Appellant Brown contends he was entrapped. Brown testified that when the two Operation Switch undercover officers approached him, he had no predisposition to commit any crime nor did he even know what was meant by a fence. In contrast, Officer Huggins testified that Brown admitted he was then stealing and fencing stolen goods and stated that Switch was the finest fencing operation he had ever seen. Incidental to his entrapment argument, Brown claims he is entitled to disclosure of the other undercover officer's identity. He claims that because of the discrepancy in trial testimony, the identity of the undercover officer, the only other party to the conversation, is necessary to afford appellant a fair trial. Appellant analogizes the situation to that regarding the identity of an informant and cites Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), and Miller v. State, 86 Nev. 503, 471 P.2d 213 (1970), as authority. These cases have no application to our factual setting. In Roviaro, the informant was actively present at the transaction for which the defendant was charged for the crime. Further, not only here was the undercover officer not an informant, but he was not a material witness to the crime with which appellant is charged. Miller, supra . The transaction for which appellant stands accused involved his own independent return to Operation Switch to fence stolen credit cards. The undercover officers had no involvement with this later incident which provoked Brown's arrest and subsequent conviction; Officer Huggins was available and testified; there was no showing that the testimony of the two officers would be disparate, and the officer, indeed both of them, were only peripherally involved in the criminal transaction charged. See, People v. Marquez, 546 P.2d 482 (Colo. 1976). Moreover, our review of Officer Huggins' testimony makes it doubtful that the unidentified officer's testimony would be relevant and helpful to appellant's defense. The question is one that requires a balancing of the public interest in protecting the flow of criminal intelligence information against the accused's right to prepare his defense, taking into consideration the crime charged, possible defenses, the significance of the proffered testimony, and other relevant factors. Roviaro, supra . We are not persuaded that the trial court's refusal to compel disclosure of the officer's identity was error. The undercover officer could not be called in an attempt to establish an entrapment defense because no entrapment occurred. Appellant himself testified that he subsequently revisited Operation Switch on his own initiative to sell credit cards belonging to another and that after the initial contact he never saw the undercover officers again. This evidence of predisposition precludes an entrapment defense. United States v. Alexander, 495 F.2d 552 (2nd Cir.1974). The fact that the government affords the opportunity or facility for the commission of an offense charged does not constitute entrapment. See, Lightford v. State, 91 Nev. 482, 538 P.2d 585 (1975); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932). Had appellant been arrested and charged in connection with his initial transaction at Operation Switch, a causal connection would have been shown, entrapment would have been an arguable issue, and the need for the disclosed identity reasonably compelling. Here, however, Brown was charged for his own independent activity, and the undercover officer was not a material witness. Cf. Jones v. State, 93 Nev. 178, 564 P.2d 605 (1977). Relative to appellant's claim of entitlement to entrapment instructions, it is axiomatic that the defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have the court instruct the jury about his theory of defense, if there is evidence to support it.  Barger v. State, 81 Nev. 548, 550-51, 407 P.2d 584, 585 (1965). (Emphasis added.) Accord, Wyatt v. State, 77 Neb. 490, 367 P.2d 104 (1961). Appellant returned to Switch in his own car and sold recently stolen credit cards that he obtained in some unknown way. Here, there is no evidence at all to indicate that police entrapped Brown to return to Operation Switch. There was no error.