Opinion ID: 610900
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Koontz

Text: 30 Koontz offers two primary challenges to his sentence. First, he contends that he improperly was sentenced under the narcotics guidelines. Second, he contends that the district court improperly determined his sentence on counts one and two by attributing three kilograms of cocaine to him, on the ground that he was not reasonably capable of producing such a quantity of narcotics. Both contentions are without merit. 31 On counts one and two, Koontz's Guidelines base offense level was 28, which was enhanced by two points to 30 due to his use of a weapon during the commission of the drug offenses. He was assigned criminal history category III. The sentencing range for offense level 30 and criminal history category III is from 121 to 151 months. As noted above, the district court sentenced Koontz to two concurrent terms of 121 months on counts one and two.
32 Despite the fact that he was convicted of conspiracy and attempt to possess narcotics, Koontz argues that he was improperly sentenced under the narcotics guidelines. Although his argument is somewhat opaque, Koontz apparently believes that, because his and his co-conspirators' criminal activity did not involve a typical drug transaction, the narcotics guidelines are inapplicable to his case as a matter of law. 33 The record does not disclose that Koontz objected to the application of the narcotics guidelines in the court below. Thus, he probably has waived his right to do so on appeal. See United States v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir.1991) (court will be hesitant to consider on appeal sentencing issues not raised in the district court). In any event, his argument is without merit. To be sure, Koontz's crimes did not involve a typical narcotics transaction. Instead of selling or purchasing drugs, he and his co-conspirators planned to steal them. Thus, Howard could likely have been indicted for attempted larceny as well as the drug offenses he was charged with. However, Koontz properly was convicted of conspiracy and attempt to possess and distribute cocaine; thus, he was properly sentenced under the guidelines applicable to those offenses. See, e.g., Schetz v. United States, 901 F.2d 85, 86 (7th Cir.1990) (defendant convicted of conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine through theft of car he believed to contain drugs properly sentenced under narcotics guidelines). 34 Koontz also argues that he and his co-conspirators were incompetent and unlikely to succeed in their robbery plan, even absent government intervention. Koontz apparently believes that the bungling burglar scenario presented by his case constitutes a mitigating circumstance that is not within the heartland of factual scenarios considered by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines. A mitigating circumstance not considered by the Sentencing Commission may entitle a defendant to a downward departure from a Guidelines sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. Yet Koontz failed to argue this allegedly mitigating circumstance as a basis for departure before the district court. He may not do so for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1107 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1606, 113 L.Ed.2d 669 (1991).
35 Koontz next challenges the applicability of guideline § 2D1.1(c)(8), which mandates that defendants convicted of crimes involving possession with intent to sell [a]t least 2 KG but less than 3.5 KG of Cocaine be assigned a base offense level of 28. The court applied § 2D1.1(c)(8) to the conspiracy and attempt charged here because former § 2D1.4(a) of the Guidelines provides that [i]f a defendant is convicted of a conspiracy or an attempt to commit any offense involving a controlled substance, the offense level shall be the same as if the object of the conspiracy or attempt had been completed. U.S.S.G.App. C, amend. no. 447. After Koontz was sentenced, former § 2D1.4 was deleted by the Sentencing Commission and effectively incorporated into the guidelines applicable to certain substantive narcotics offenses, including § 2D1.1. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (applicable to attempts and conspiracies to commit certain drug offenses, including violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)). 36 Koontz contends that he lacked the intent and capability to produce three kilograms of cocaine, and thus that § 2D1.1(c)(8) should not have been applied to him. He relies upon Application Note 1 to former § 2D1.4, which provides in relevant part that: 37 where the court finds that the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount [of the controlled substance], the court shall exclude from the guideline calculation the amount that it finds the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing. 38 U.S.S.G.App. C, amend. no. 447; see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Application Note 12. 39 The drafters of the Application Note had in mind negotiations for the sale of narcotics, and thus the Note is not directly relevant to defendants' conspiracy and attempt to steal narcotics. See United States v. Adames, 901 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir.1990) (applying earlier version of Application Note; sentence refers to a specific situation in which the defendant is a seller of drugs, although broader language of Application Note may be applied to buyers). 40 Even accepting that the reasoning of the Application Note is applicable by analogy to this case, Koontz's theory fails. The Application Note states that a given quantity of narcotics will not be charged to a defendant if the defendant both was not reasonably capable of producing and did not intend to produce the amount of narcotics at issue. See United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1151 (4th Cir.) (Application Note requires showing of both lack of intent and lack of reasonable capability), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 3051, 120 L.Ed.2d 917 (1992). 41 The district court found that Koontz intended to steal three kilograms of cocaine. We review a district court's findings of fact in sentencing only for clear error, see United States v. Olvera, 954 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 3011, 120 L.Ed.2d 885 (1992); United States v. Jacobo, 934 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir.1991), and here there was no error at all. The jury found that Koontz planned to surreptitiously enter a drug dealer's apartment to steal what might amount to three kilograms of cocaine. To be sure, Koontz expressed doubts as to whether the drugs were in the apartment and, at one point, even suggested that he and his co-conspirators call off the plan. Yet, despite these doubts, Koontz and his co-conspirators went forward with their attempt to steal the drugs. Any misgivings Koontz may have had about the eventual success of the criminal venture do not bear upon the quantity of drugs the conspirators hoped to acquire through their burglary. Therefore, such professed doubts do not provide Koontz with a basis for challenging his sentence under the rationale of the Application Note. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 761 F.Supp. 697, 705 (D.Idaho 1991) (rejecting challenge based upon physical inability to produce negotiated amount of narcotics where court did not question the defendant's intent to produce the drugs), aff'd, 988 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.1993). 42 Although we need not reach the issue, Koontz also incorrectly contends that Koontz and his co-conspirators were not reasonably capable of producing three kilograms of cocaine within the meaning of the Application Note. Koontz contends that there was no cocaine in the apartment before the defendants attempted to rob it. Thus, he argues, it would have been impossible for Koontz, Howard and Santana to carry out their criminal plan successfully. Yet, the Application Note does not imply that the Guidelines provide a defense of impossibility that is unavailable under the substantive laws of attempt and conspiracy. As the government notes, to do so would effectively preclude buyers in reverse stings, who unknowingly enter into sham drug deals with undercover agents, from being sentenced under the narcotics guidelines. See Adames, 901 F.2d at 12 (upholding imposition of narcotics guideline sentence upon purchaser who received placebo in reverse sting). Rather, the reasonably capable language of the Application Note looks to whether a defendant would have been able to consummate a narcotics transaction if the facts were as he believed them to be. See United States v. Caba, 955 F.2d 182, 187 (2d Cir.) (issue is whether defendant had the means necessary--financial or otherwise--to go[ ] through with the deal), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 130, 121 L.Ed.2d 84 (1992). Koontz and his co-conspirators clearly had the means to carry out their conspiracy on the facts as they understood them to be. They not only had developed a plan to rob the Jamaican drug dealer, but had obtained a key and tools necessary to carry it out. The tools included the gun carried by Santana that could be used to rob the drug dealer if that proved necessary. 43 Because we have rejected Koontz's arguments in opposition to his Guidelines sentence, we need not reach his final contention, that he was improperly sentenced as a second offender under 21 U.S.C. § 851, which mandates a minimum sentence of 10 years imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II). Koontz's properly determined Guidelines sentence exceeded 10 years by one month.