Opinion ID: 297019
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exceptional Judicial Reviewability.

Text: 24 A limited area of review remains open, however. 25 'In special circumstances, the general rule concerning the unreviewability of agency action committed by law to agency discretion will be qualified to permit limited judicial review with respect to fundamental jurisdictional or constitutional issues, even in the face of a legislative intent to foreclose total review. See Davis, Administrative Law, 28.12-28.15. (1958) and cases cited therein; 2 Am.Jr.2d, Administrative Law, 565.' Hamel v. Nelson, 226 F.Supp. 96, 98 (N.D.Calif.1963). 26 Appellant asserts that Double Deelacked standing to appeal the second decision of the Chief of the Forest Service and that the Secretary's decision is therefore invalid. At the time in question, the appeals regulation, 36 C.F.R. 211.2 (1960 ed.), provided that any person 'aggrieved' by the decision of an officer of the Forest Service may appeal. The language has subsequently been changed to provide appeal for those 'adversely affected'. It is appellant's contention that the former standard is much more restricted than the latter and the term 'aggrieved' has the same meaning in this regulation as in several cases dealing with jurisdiction to sue. The district court characterized these assertions an 'fatuous' and we must agree that they are unconvincing. 27 Appellant's arguments rest upon several mistaken notions. Hi-Ridge attempts to assimilate the standards relating to standing to sue in obtaining judicial review of an administrative decision with those relating to internal administrative appeals. The Department of Agriculture could reasonably read the 'aggrieved' provision in its own regulations as qualifying the second high bidder to take an appeal. While not having a vested legal interest, Double Dee had a sufficient stake in the outcome to merit an opportunity to argue for a different decision. It is more likely that the revision to the term 'adversely affected' was intended to clarify the meaning of aggrieved rather than to change the standard for an appeal. Moreover, we fail to see to whom the appeal provision would apply in a timber auction context if not to another bidder. Cf., F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84 L.Ed. 869 (1940). Hi-Ridge cites cases such as Perkins v. Lukens Steel Company, 310 U.S. 113, 60 S.Ct. 869, 84 L.Ed. 1108 (1940) and Edelman v. Federal Housing Administration, 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967) for the proposition that prospective or unsuccessful bidders a government contract do not have standing to sue. The issue raised in this case by Hi-Ridge, however, is whether a disappointed bidder has the right to an administrative appeal. There is no legal principle which prevents an administrative agency from allowing a broader range of appeals than are permitted in the federal courts. In fact, Perkins and Edelman tend to foreclose Hi-Ridge's claim for relief instead of furthering it. Hi-Ridge attempts to turn the force of these cases away from itself by characterizing itself as the 'successful' bidder and Double Dee as a 'prospective' or 'unsuccessful' bidder. Hi-Ridge was the successful bidder only according to its own standards. The regulations and affidavits clearly show that no binding contract is formed in a timber auction until the award is approved by higher officials. In contract terms, Hi-Ridge's designation as high bidder only placed it in a position of offeror, a point conceded in its brief (Ap.Br. 22). Appellant tries to bridge this gap by creating a concept previously unknown to contract law-- an 'informal' contract. 28 In view of our resolution of the reviewability issue, we decline this opportunity to discuss the difficult standing questions raised by Perkins, supra, Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C.Cir. 1970), Association of Data Processing, etc., supra, and Barlow, supra. 29 Appellant's other contentions are equally without merit. There is an allegation of discrimination but not cogent statement of facts tending to show any invidious or capricious treatment by the Forest Service toward appellant. At most, the facts show that there was an innocent oversight in failing to appraise the transportation to the south, as well as to the north. This is precisely the reason for which a rebid was called. 30 Finally, the summary judgment was proper because there was no genuine issue of fact. 31 Affirmed.