Opinion ID: 2973286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Legislative History of the

Text: 2004 IDEA Amendments “Supreme Court cases declaring that clear language cannot be overcome by contrary legislative history are legion.” First Merchs. Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 198 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). That said, legislative history can play a confirmatory role in resolving ambiguity when statutory language and structure support a given interpretation. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586-91 (2004); Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2010). This is such a case. A legislature designing a statute of limitations confronts certain choices. As we have discussed, it can set the date from which the limitations period begins to run by using the occurrence rule or the discovery rule. See supra at 23-26. It also can set the expiration date either by counting forward from that occurrence or discovery date to the filing of a complaint or by counting backward from the date a complaint is filed to the occurrence or discovery date. When the House of Representatives proposed the amendment that was eventually incorporated into § 1415(b)(6), it chose to use the occurrence rule and to count backward, providing that parents would have: (6) an opportunity to present complaints– 42 (A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and (B) which set forth a violation that occurred not more than one year before the complaint is filed; H.R. Rep. 108-77, at 254 (2003). The House committee’s report unambiguously described this language as a one-year statute of limitations. Id. at 115-16 (“Statute of limitations[:] The Act currently has no statute of limitations and leaves local educational agencies open to litigation for the entire length of time a child is in school, whether or not the child has been identified as a child with a disability. . . . The bill includes a statute of limitations of one year from the date of the violation . . . .). And as written, it would have unambiguously functioned like one, barring claims based on injuries that occurred more than twelve months before the complaint was filed. The Senate, meanwhile, chose to use the discovery rule and to count forward, providing in what became § 1415(f)(3)(C): Timeline for requesting hearing.–A parent or public agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a 43 hearing under this part, in such time as the State law allows. S. Rep. 108-185, at 222 (2003). Unlike the House’s proposal, the Senate’s also added the provision giving primacy to a state’s limitations period, along with the two statutory tolling exceptions. Those two bills—both statutes of limitations but pointing in different directions and using different starting dates for the limitations period—then went to conference where the conference committee sought to reconcile them. That committee reaffirmed that each body’s amendment functioned as a traditional statute of limitations on the filing of a complaint: The House bill and Senate amendment have similar language regarding the opportunity to present complaints, but the House bill, not the Senate amendment, includes language establishing a 1 year statute of limitations on the right to present complaints. Senate has a 2 year timeline for filing complaints at note 221. H.R. Rep. 108-779, at 213 n.193 (2004) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2480, 2527; see also id. at 218 n.221, 2532 (“The Senate amendment establishes a 2- year statute of limitations unless State law already has a statute of limitations. The House bill includes a 1-year statute of limitations (see note 193).”). Apparently concluding that the addition of a statute of limitations should involve both a new provision within § 1415(f)(3)(C) and an amendment to its prefatory subsection 44 at § 1415(b)(6), the conference committee opted not to choose one body’s addition over the other but to retain both. It did so by conforming each and every of the material terms of the House’s version to the Senate’s, i.e., by changing the House’s limitations period from one year to two, changing the occurrence rule to the discovery rule, adding that a state’s statute of limitations could override the IDEA’s, and adding the two equitable tolling provisions specified by the Senate. The conference committee then incorporated the Senate’s version at § 1415(f) and the House’s version in the summary listing at § 1415(b). When it did so, however, it omitted to change the backward-looking framework of the House’s version to the forward-looking framework of the Senate’s. Thus was created the problem we grapple with today. Section 1415(b)(6), in other words, started in the House as a functioning, one-year statute of limitations for the filing of complaints: (A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and (B) which set forth a violation that occurred not more than one year before the complaint is filed[.] H.R. Rep. 108-77, at 254 (emphasis added). It ended, however, as something different altogether: (A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational 45 placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and (B) which set forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than two years before the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for presenting such a complaint under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows, except that the exceptions to the timeline described in subsection (f)(3)(D) shall apply to the timeline described in this subparagraph. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (emphasis added). The Congressional Research Service described the amendments this way: The 2004 reauthorization includes statutes of limitations in various sections. As previously discussed [Section 1415(b)] provides for a two-year statute of limitations regarding the filing of a complaint. There is also a two-year statute of limitations regarding requests for a hearing. The two years is from the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action. Richard N. Appling and Nancy Lee Jones, Cong. Research Serv., RL32716, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Analysis of Changes Made by P.L. 108-446, CRS-27 (2005) (emphasis added). While this post-enactment 46 observation on its own carries little weight, nothing in the IDEA’s legislative history points to a contrary interpretation. In fact, quite the opposite. Far from Congress intending that the two limitations periods diverge or limit a court’s remedial power under § 1415(i), the legislative history reflects that the drafters intended the amendments to add a single statute of limitations and to leave untouched the IDEA’s broad remedies. For example, in its explanation of the addition of the statute of limitations, the Senate report stated: This new provision is not intended to alter the principle under IDEA that children may receive compensatory education services, as affirmed in School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 (1985) and Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993) and otherwise limited under section [1412(a)(10)(C)] . . . . In essence, where the issue giving rise to the claim is more than two years old and not ongoing, the claim is barred; where the conduct or services at issue are ongoing to the previous two years, the claim for compensatory education services may be made on the basis of the most recent conduct or services and the conduct or services that were more than two years old at the time of due process or the private placement . . . . S. Rep. 108-185, 40 (emphasis added). 47 After conference, but before final passage, Senator Harkin, a co-sponsor of the amendments, addressed the addition of a statute of limitations this way: In this reauthorization, we also include a 2-year statute of limitations on claims. However, it should be noted that this limitation is not designed to have any impact on the ability of a child to receive compensatory damages for the entire period in which he or she has been deprived of services. The statute of limitations goes only to the filing of the complaint, not the crafting of remedy. This is important because it is only fair that if a school district repeatedly failed to provide services to a child, they should be required to provide compensatory services to rectify this problem and help the child achieve despite the school’s failings. Therefore, compensatory education must cover the entire period and must belatedly provide all education and related services previously denied and needed to make the child whole. 150 Cong. Rec. S11851 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) (emphasis added); see also Robert R. v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., No. 05-1282, 2005 WL 3003033, at  (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2005) (examining the IDEA’s legislative history and concluding that “the limitations period placed on claims for compensatory education by the [2004] amendment to the IDEA was not meant to limit the period which the hearing officer could consider when a due process 48 hearing was timely brought”); Jennifer Rosen Valverde, A Poor IDEA: Statute of Limitations Decisions Cement SecondClass Remedial Scheme for Low-Income Children with Disabilities in the Third Circuit, 41 Fordham Urb. L.J. 599, 643-646 (2013). The legislative history is thus crystal clear that Congress intended to impose a single statute of limitations, but otherwise not to limit a court’s power to remedy the deprivation of a free appropriate education.