Opinion ID: 1737862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim II. Ineffective Assistance by Penalty-phase Counsel in Failing to Object to Closing Argument

Text: In this subclaim of claim II, Brown contends that his penalty-phase counsel, Craig Alldredge, was prejudicially ineffective in that he failed to object to a portion of the penalty-phase closing argument by Assistant State Attorney Michael Benito that described positive aspects of life in prison in support of the prosecutor's argument against a life sentence. In her order, the circuit judge held in respect to this claim: Evidence relating to [this claim] was presented by testimony of Wayne Chalu,... lead trial counsel for the defense, and Craig Alldredge, ... penalty phase trial counsel for the defense. The claim is essentially that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's improper closing argument in the second phase...: What about life imprisonment, ladies and gentlemen? What about life imprisonment? Now I am not saying that I would like to spend one day in jail, all right, don't get me wrong, but what about life imprisonment? What can one do in prison? You can laugh; you can cry; you can eat; you can sleep; you can participate in sports; you can make friends; you can watch TV; you can read; in short, you live to learnyou live to learn about the wonders that the future holds. In short, it is life. It is undisputed that counsel for the defense did not object. Mr. Chalu was familiar with the prosecutor's use of this argument and was also aware that such argument had not been found to be improper at that time. Mr. Alldredge testified that he was not aware that such argument was improper, that he would have objected had he known, and that he did not object. Assuming without deciding that penalty phase counsel was deficient in his performance for failing to object to this portion of the prosecutor's argument, this Court cannot and does not find that the alleged deficient performance resulted in prejudice which meets the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688[668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674] (1984), that is, a reasonable possibility that the outcome would have been different. Order II at 2-3 (citations omitted). Based upon our review of the trial record, we agree with the circuit court that Brown's claim in respect to this portion of the State's argument fails to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland, as recently reiterated by this Court in Jones v. State, 732 So.2d 313 (Fla.1999). [8] The circuit court's ruling is consistent with this Court's holding in Jackson v. State, 522 So.2d 802, 809 (Fla.1988), that a similar unobjected-to argument would not be grounds for reversal for a new penalty phase. See also Hodges v. State, 595 So.2d 929, 933 (Fla.1992); Hudson v. State, 538 So.2d 829, 832 n. 6 (Fla.1989). Although we did find a similar claim as to the denial of an objection to be harmful error in Taylor v. State, 583 So.2d 323 (Fla.1991), we did so on the basis of harmless error record review. [9] In sum, under the circumstances of this case, we do not find that the failure to object to this argument was conduct by counsel that deprived the defendant of a trial whose result was reliable. Although we agree that Brown's claim fails to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland, we also have reviewed the evidentiary record to evaluate whether counsel's failure to object violates the first prong of Strickland. In this case, both defense counsel Wayne Chalu, who had primary responsibility for the entire case, and defense counsel Craig Alldredge, who handled the penalty phase, testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Chalu, who is now an assistant state attorney in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, was at the time of this trial an experienced felony litigator who had been an assistant public defender in the Thirteenth Circuit for about eight years, had received special training in handling capital cases, and had handled several prior capital cases. Chalu had overall responsibility for preparing and presenting Brown's entire case. Throughout the proceedings, Chalu worked closely with Alldredge, who was assigned to handle the penalty phase. At the time of the trial, Alldredge had been an assistant public defender in the Thirteenth Circuit for about six years and had handled the guilt phases of two other capital cases. This was the first case in which Alldredge had lead responsibility for the penalty phase. Alldredge subsequently became an assistant federal public defender. In the evidentiary hearing below, Chalu described his working relationship with Alldredge during this case as follows: [W]e talked to each other constantly. We're in the same office. We're just a few feet away from each other, and we talked about the case probably daily.... [B]asically, I was working on the guilt phase and [Alldredge] was working on the penalty phase. Of course ... we both pretty much knew what the other was doing in terms of preparation because we talked about it all the time. Chalu testified that at time of the trial he understood that no case law had found reversible error in a court's allowing the challenged penalty-phase closing argument. Chalu further testified: I personally don't think it was so bad. I think we capitalized on it, too. Mr. Alldredge sort of capitalized on that. In their closing, it seemed closest to me innuendo if you're alive, you can do these things; if you are not, you can't. I didn't think it was that prejudicial. Alldredge testified at the evidentiary hearing that he saw no reason to object during the prosecutor's presentation of the now-challenged portion of the closing argument because he did not consider the argument to be improper. The trial record reflects that Alldredge, in arguing for a life sentence, presented in penalty-phase closing argument a grim description of life in prison in order to counter the prosecutor's positive characterization of life in prison. Alldredge answered the prosecutor's argument by describing prison life in these contrasting terms: Mr. Benito tells you life in prison ain't that bad. The number one cause of death in [the] Florida State Prison system is suicide, so if it ain't that bad, there are a lot of men who are obviously making terrible mistakes. It's a world of reinforced concrete, and steel, and steel doors, and coils of razor wire, and electric fences, and machine guns, and shotguns. Mr. Benito says he'll make friends and be able to enjoy sports. He will spend the rest of his life with men who society has found their presence so abhorred that they have to be locked away. Paul Brown will most likely get out of prison when he dies.... He is going to die. We all have to die. His life has been garbage. If he spends the rest of his life in prison, the rest of his life is going to be garbage, too, but it will be life. . . . . ... If Judge Spicola sentences him to life in prison, he will spend life in prison. He's not going to harm another innocent person, again. We find that defense counsel's failure to object does not fall below the standard of constitutionally effective counsel as provided in Strickland. Moreover, we find no basis in the evidence to reject trial counsel's opinion that Alldredge capitalized upon the complained-of closing argument in presenting his own argument for a sentence of life in prison. [10] Accordingly, we find no merit in Brown's claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor's penalty-phase closing argument.