Opinion ID: 2981163
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wire and Mail Fraud Convictions

Text: Campbell argues that there is insufficient evidence to support her convictions for mail and wire fraud. “For appeals from a denial of a judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found essential elements of the crime.” United States v. Kernell, 667 F.3d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). To convict a defendant of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the government must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt “(1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) [that defendant caused] the mailing of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme.” United States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 316 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954)). Similarly, a wire-fraud conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 requires the government to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt “(1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of the scheme; and (3) intent to deprive a victim of money or property.” Id. (quoting United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 747-48 (6th Cir. 2000)). The heart of Campbell’s argument on appeal is that the “scheme to defraud” for purposes of the mail and wire fraud encompasses only the appropriation of the money orders from Stewart Pharmacy. In the defendant’s view, once she obtained the money orders the scheme ended, and thus the use of the mail or wires after the fact was wholly unrelated to the scheme itself. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 402 (1974) (vacating a mail-fraud conviction where the mailing involved previously paid invoices); Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 393 (1960) (same); Kann -4- No. 11-5442 United States v. Glenna Campbell v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 94 (1944) (vacating a mail-fraud conviction where the mailing consisted of previously cashed checks). “To be part of the execution of the fraud, however, the use of the mails need not be an essential element of the scheme.” Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710 (1989) (citing Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8). “It is sufficient for the mailing to be incident to an essential part of the scheme . . . or a step in [the] plot.” Id. at 710 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (second alteration in original). In Schmuck, the Supreme Court held that the act of mailing car registrations containing falsified mileage numbers was an essential component of a scheme to sell cars at inflated prices. Id. at 711-12. This is despite the fact that the actual fraudulent act, rolling back the odometers on the cars, had already been accomplished at the time of the mailing. The court noted that the scheme as a whole was only complete when the cars were sold by the dealers, and without the misleading title documents those sales would not have been possible. Id. at 712; see also United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1378 (6th Cir. 1988) (“For a mailing to be in furtherance of a scheme, the scheme’s completion or the prevention of its detection must have depended in some way on the charged mailing.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). As Schmuck makes clear, a fraudulent scheme is not complete until the perpetrator has secured the benefits of the scheme. In this case, that includes Campbell’s payment of her credit-card bills and her purchase of goods and services for personal use. Campbell’s definition of the scheme to include only taking possession of the money orders is without merit, as money orders are useless until they are used to purchase goods or pay off a debt. When the purchases and payment of debts are included in the scheme, the use of the mail and wires becomes part of an essential step in the -5- No. 11-5442 United States v. Glenna Campbell overall plan, as Campbell could not have paid her debts or used her credit card without making use of the some means of mail or wires in this case. As such, a rational juror could conclude that the government demonstrated that the use of the mail or wires was part of the scheme to defraud. Furthermore, the indictment’s articulation of the scheme to defraud is broad enough to encompass all of the conduct that forms the basis of the counts of conviction. Under “Scheme to Defraud,” the government alleged not only that “defendant GLENNA R. CAMPBELL would and did embezzle cash and money orders,” but also that “the defendants would and did use the cash and money orders to buy services, goods, and merchandise” and “the defendants would and did use credit cards for some purchases and use stolen money orders to pay the credit card bills.” We have held that the scheme as defined in the indictment is controlling for purposes of calculating the proper amount of restitution when the case goes to the jury. United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d 706, 714 (6th Cir. 2011). Similar logic applies here. The broad definition of the scheme in the indictment was before the jury when they returned the convictions, and thus we presume the jury was using that definition when it considered whether the government established the required elements of mail and wire fraud. Thus, we cannot say that it was irrational for the jury to find that the use of the mail and wires was in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.