Opinion ID: 2370675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of ACS Policy for Impeachment

Text: Prior to trial, Goudreault sought to exclude any evidence suggesting that, by testifying, Dr. Golding was failing to abide by the ACS policy statement on expert testimony because he lacked sufficient experience to offer opinion testimony on matters related to the ALIF procedure. The Trial Court ( McGuire, J.) denied Goudreault's motion in limine, ruling that the standard is relevant to the competency and credibility of Dr. Golding, particularly where he is a Fellow of the [ACS], and is not unfairly prejudicial. Goudreault moved for reconsideration clarifying that he objected only to identification of the ACS as the source of statements and not their contents. The Trial Court ( Murphy, J.) reconsidered the earlier decision and granted Goudreault's motion in limine, ruling it is appropriate to prevent injustice. Dr. Kleeman argues that the trial court erred by granting plaintiff's untimely motion to reconsider. He urges that the policy statement exposed a legitimate basis for rejecting Dr. Golding's testimony because it would have demonstrated [that] the professional organization Dr. Golding relies upon to burnish his reputation had promulgated recommendations that, if ... followed, would have precluded him from testifying due to a lack of experience and demonstrated competence in ALIF surgery and post-operative care. Dr. Kleeman cites case law attaching weight to similar policies promulgated by the American Association of Neurosurgeons. See Austin v. American Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967 (7th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078, 122 S.Ct. 807, 151 L.Ed.2d 693 (2002). Goudreault argues that medical specialty societies, such as ACS, ... should not have any role in determining the qualifications of any expert witness in a judicial proceeding. Rather, he maintains that the trial court made the determination that Dr. Golding was qualified as an expert guided by judicial standards and not those of a private organization. We review a trial court's decisions on the admissibility of evidence under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. Boynton v. Figueroa, 154 N.H. 592, 599-600, 913 A.2d 697 (2006). We will not disturb the trial court's decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Id. at 600, 913 A.2d 697. To meet this standard, [Dr. Kleeman] must demonstrate that the trial court's rulings were clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of h[is] case. Desclos v. S.N.H. Med. Ctr., 153 N.H. 607, 610, 903 A.2d 952 (2006). We cannot say that the trial court's ruling was unreasonable or untenable. [T]he power to [reconsider an issue once decided] remains in the court until final judgment or decree. Redlon Co. v. Corporation, 91 N.H. 502, 506, 23 A.2d 370 (1941) (quotation omitted). It is immaterial that different judges act. Id. Upon clarification of Goudreault's motion in limine, Judge Murphy concluded that reconsideration of Judge McGuire's prior ruling was necessary to prevent injustice. The trial court could have reasoned that its ruling was necessary to avoid juror confusion regarding the threshold determination of expert witness competency. Emery v. Company, 89 N.H. 165, 169, 195 A. 409 (1937) (The question whether one possesses the requisite qualifications to testify as an expert is one of fact for the trial court....). Thus, we cannot say the trial court's ruling exceeded its broad discretion to fix the limits of cross-examination. State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 253, 921 A.2d 942 (2007).