Opinion ID: 1218272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial

Text: At the conclusion of the state's case, Adams moved for acquittal on the ground that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction. He maintains on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to establish two elements of the prima facie case: (1) that the victim suffered permanent physical injury; and (2) that Adams acted with malicious intent to main or disfigure. [8] We first address whether there was sufficient evidence of permanent physical injury. At trial Dr. Anshuetz and Officer Parmeter testified on the victim's physical condition. Dr. Anshuetz described the nature of the head injuries and his treatment of them on August 28, 1975. He also testified that on September 22, 1975, the victim had not improved and was developing complications. Officer Parmeter had observed the victim on March 16, 1976, and he described the victim's serious condition on that date. [9] We find that this testimony creates a reasonable inference of permanent injury to the brain sufficient to support a finding of permanent physical injury. We also find sufficient evidence to support a finding of malicious intent to maim or disfigure. The language malicious intent to maim or disfigure requires a specific intent to maim and disfigure. See R. Perkins, Criminal Law 186 (1969). Direct evidence of a defendant's mental state is rarely available; and normally, this element must be proved by circumstantial evidence. The general rule is that a factfinder may infer a defendant's mental state from a voluntary act that produces as its natural and probable consequence an unlawful result in the absence of any circumstances inconsistent with such an inference. Id. See United States v. Haldeman, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 334-36, 559 F.2d 31, 114-16 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct. 2641, 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977); State v. Tyler, 77 Wash.2d 726, 466 P.2d 120, 135 (1970), vacated as to imposition of death penalty, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S.Ct. 2865, 33 L.Ed.2d 756 (1972); Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900, 904 (Wyo. 1977). This rule does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant; rather, the state must prove from the totality of circumstances that this defendant intended to produce the results that were the natural and probable consequences of his acts. The state must show not only that the act took place but also the requisite specific intent demonstrated by evidence of motive, the means employed to produce the injury, and the parts of the body attacked. The circumstantial evidence in this case does adequately support an inference that Adams acted with malicious intent to maim or disfigure the victim. After being pushed by the victim, Adams pursued him with determination. When he caught the victim, he pushed him off balance and delivered a forceful kick to his head. A shod foot can be a dangerous instrument. Ransom v. State, 460 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1969); Berfield v. State, 458 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1969). In addition, Adams delivered the kick to the head. A forceful kick to the head can easily damage the function of important organs and result in permanent cosmetic damage as well. Thus, the circumstantial evidence in this case is sufficient to permit an inference that the appellant acted with malicious intent to maim or disfigure. The state presented sufficient evidence at trial to sustain a conviction of mayhem; but because the trial followed an invalid indictment, we must reverse the conviction. If we were to find that a trial could validate an otherwise invalid indictment, the right to indictment by a grand jury [10] would become a nullity and the grand jury would cease to operate as a check upon the district attorney's power to initiate prosecution. [11] We therefore REVERSE.