Opinion ID: 624879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: NIPSCO Information and Spears's Criminal History

Text: Duncanson stated in the affidavit that I received information from NIPSCO, and NIPSCO reported an excessive kilowatt usage compared to the normal usage . . . for a residence of this size. The Franks hearing and documents turned over during discovery revealed that these phrases were not entirely accurate. Duncanson did not receive the information directly from NIPSCO, and in fact did not directly receive any electricity information herself. It was obtained by Randall Strapon, an analyst assigned to the FBI. And Strapon himself did not receive the information from NIPSCO in the ordinary sense of the phrase, since it was obtained from a source not directly employed by NIPSCO who had access to the NIPSCO database. Spears argues that a Franks violation occurred because Duncanson: (1) misrepresented that she had personal involvement with obtaining the information; (2) misrepresented the nature of how she obtained the information; and (3) provided substantively false information. We can easily dispense with Spears's third argument, which is premised on the fact that neither Duncanson nor Strapon verified that the source properly calculated the average monthly electricity usage for comparison purposes. Courts have found that failing to inform the court of dissimilarities in houses being compared can amount to a material omission. See, e.g., United States v. Huggins, 299 F.3d 1039, 1045 n. 6 (9th Cir.2002) (Evidence demonstrating that the affidavit had failed to state, for example, that the neighboring houses were much smaller . . . might well have made out a material omission that would preclude reliance on the good faith exception.); see also United States v. Scully, 1992 WL 159329, at  (N.D.Ill. 1992) (unpublished) (Anyone who looked at these homes was reckless in stating that the three were comparable.). Here, by contrast, the affidavit did not compare Spears's electricity usage with that of his neighbors; rather, the affidavit set forth the average monthly usage for a residence of this size. It bears repeating that the first step of the Franks inquiry following a hearing focuses on Duncanson's (and her fellow officers') state of mind. See Franks, 438 U.S. 154, 156, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674. Though neither Strapon nor Duncanson were aware of the methodology or calculations made by the source, there was nothing revealed in the Franks hearing that suggests that Duncanson or Strapon had reason to believe that a false or misleading comparison was made. Spears therefore cannot show that the district court clearly erred in finding that Duncanson did not intentionally include false information. Spears's first two arguments are closer questions. Duncanson stated in the affidavit that she received information from NIPSCO. The district court said this was marginally misleading given that the information was not received by Duncanson directly. But then the district court said it was not really misleading, because earlier in the affidavit Duncanson stated that all information in the affidavit was based upon firsthand knowledge and the information provided by other law enforcement officers and witnesses. (Emphasis added.) Spears relies on United States v. Davis, 714 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir.1983), where the affiant (falsely) stated that he conducted personal interviews with sources when in fact they were conducted by his subordinates. The affiant cut and pasted an affidavit from another investigation, and revealed during a Franks hearing that he knew the statement regarding his personal involvement was false, but submitted the affidavit anyway. Id. at 899. The Ninth Circuit found that the entire problem could have been avoided if [the affiant] had simply rewritten the affidavit to indicate that he was relying on his officers who had personally interviewed the informants. Id. (citations omitted). The court held that by failing properly to identify [his] source[] of information the affiant[] . . . made it impossible for the magistrate to evaluate the existence of probable cause, and that [t]he fact that probable cause did exist and could have been established by a truthful affidavit does not cure the error. Id. Other courts have been more forgiving with phrasing implying personal knowledge or a personal role in the investigation in a Franks analysis. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has cautioned that the requirement to state in the affidavit that an officer is relying upon other officers should not be viewed `in a hypertechnical, rather than a common-sense, manner.' It is sufficient if the affidavit recites at the outset, or if it is clear from reading the affidavit as a whole, that it is based in part upon information obtained from other law enforcement officers. United States v. Kirk, 781 F.2d 1498, 1505 (11th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)). In Kirk, however, the affiant properly identified the source of the information. . . and outlined the circumstances which indicated the reliability of the information. Id. In the affidavit, the affiant included the names of all of the officers engaging in surveillance of the defendant and what that surveillance entailed. Id. at 1499-1500. The Eleventh Circuit found no misrepresentation where the affiant included some events that he had not personally witnessed. Id. at 1505; see also United States v. Reed, 700 F.2d 638, 641 (11th Cir.1983) (upholding warrant even though affiant failed to specify the source of his information because a reasonable person would infer that the information came from fellow police officers). Spears argues that no magistrate judge could infer from this affidavit that the information came from a fellow officer (since Strapon was not actually an officer or otherwise identified anywhere in the affidavit), or that the actual sources of the information were reliable. Alas, this is not a question we must resolve, because even if we agreed with Spears's position that the omission was material, misleading, and done so with intent or reckless disregard, and that the district court committed clear error, we would find that the warrant contained sufficient probable cause with the electricity information stricken, as discussed below. The same is true of the statement related to Spears's criminal history. Duncanson stated that she ran a criminal history check on Spears, and found that he has a criminal history in the state of Indiana. This was false. Spears had a single conviction in 1995 for a sex offense in the state of Wisconsin. The district court found this somewhat misleading because the search warrant related to drugs, and the prior conviction was a sex offense, yet this wasn't disclosed, and because this could have misled the magistrate into believing that the prior offense was related to the potential crimes that were the subject of the search. The district court found, however, that even if stricken, the warrant would still stand. Probable cause is established when, based on the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit sets forth sufficient evidence to induce a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search will uncover evidence of a crime. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); United States v. Garcia, 528 F.3d 481, 485-86 (7th Cir.2008). Where probable cause is based on information supplied by an informant, we consider several factors: (1) the extent to which the police have corroborated the informant's statements; (2) the degree to which the informant has acquired knowledge of the events through firsthand observation; (3) the amount of detail provided; and (4) the interval between the date of the events and police officer's application for the search warrant. United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 866 (7th Cir.2002). In this case, the informant provided detailed information about the marijuana grow operation, and stated that he or she had obtained the information firsthand. The information was specific as to the size of the operation, the location of the marijuana plants, and the equipment used in the endeavor. Duncanson and other officers corroborated that Spears lived at the premises. During the trash pull, the officers found evidence that, in totality, would induce a reasonably prudent person to believe that a grow operation was in progress, including the aquarium equipment (that in the officers' expertise, was used for the cultivation of marijuana plants), and, of course, the marijuana stem. Finally, the amount of time between the informant's information, the corroboration of that information, and the application for the warrant was minimal. Accordingly, we find that even if the electricity and criminal history information were stripped, the remaining portions of the affidavit would be sufficient for a finding of probable cause. We therefore decline to reach Spears's arguments regarding those portions of the affidavit, and affirm the conviction.