Opinion ID: 1903090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the appellant's probation was revoked after the circuit court's jurisdiction over her had expired.

Text: ¶ 12. We address this issue first, as its subsequent conclusion renders Ellis's other arguments moot. This is an issue of apparent first impression in this State, and to begin our analysis we look first to the plain language of Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-37 (1993), which governs the time limits for probation and the procedures for revocation of probation in this state, as follows in pertinent part: The period of probation shall be fixed by the court, and may at any time be extended or terminated by the court, or judge in vacation. Such period with any extension thereof shall not exceed five (5) years.... At any time during the period of probation the court, or judge in vacation, may issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence and cause the probationer to be arrested. Any probation and parole officer may arrest a probationer without a warrant, or may deputize any other officer with power of arrest to do so by giving him a written statement setting forth that the probationer has, in the judgment of the probation and parole officer, violated the conditions of probation ... Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-37 (1993)(emphasis added). ¶ 13. We agree with Ellis's assertion that when the Leflore County Circuit Court revoked her probation and subsequently detained and returned her to Mississippi, the court lacked the jurisdiction. At the time of her arrest, on or about November 20, 1996, the five year term of her probation had already expired by several months and, therefore, could not be revoked. ¶ 14. The State argues that the May 4, 1995, form warrant signed and mailed by MDOC officer Garrett served to toll the running of Ellis's term of probation. However, because it was not issued by the court or a judge in vacation, it was not an arrest warrant, but at most was an authorization to arrest, being a written statement setting forth that the probationer has, in the judgment of the probation and parole officer, violated the conditions of probation ....as set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-37. Had the written statement been received by an officer who then lawfully arrested the probationer prior to the running of the five year term, that would have been sufficient to toll the running of the five year period in accord with Jackson v. State, 483 So.2d 1353 (Miss.1986). In Jackson we held that a petition for revocation filed eleven days prior to the expiration of the probationary period tolled the running of the five year period. Also in Jackson, we found that since the lower court had acted on the petition within a reasonable time (13 days after it was issued), the revocation of probation was lawful even though it did not occur before the final day of the term of probation. Because our statutes do not specifically require the filing of a petition of revocation, we do not today adopt a rule that the filing of such petition is a specific requirement for tolling the running of the probationary period. (However, due process necessarily requires that the probationer receive proper notice, whether by an arrest warrant or by the filing of a petition of revocation, which must state at a minimum the nature of the violation and the date, time and place of hearing.) For further instruction and requirements regarding probation revocation procedures pursuant to § 47-7-37, see Riely v. State, 562 So.2d 1206 (Miss.1990). ¶ 15. The State is unable to explain why it allowed five months to pass between Ellis's release and her subsequent detention. The State asserts that it did not know exactly where Ellis was after her release, yet it fails to explain why a warrant was never served on her while she was confined in an Arkansas penitentiary or why it did not contact Ellis's Arkansas parole officer until November, 1996. ¶ 16. The MDOC through its inaction and inattention allowed Ellis's five year probation period to expire in August 1996. Thus, the Leflore County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to detain her in November 1996.