Opinion ID: 4549957
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impact of the Challenged Law

Text: As we turn to the first Arlington Heights factor – whether the Alabama law has a discriminatory impact—we note that the Supreme Court cautioned that it would be rare to find a case involving “a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race” and that, “[a]bsent a pattern as stark as that, . . . [discriminatory] impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. Here, there is no clear pattern that would be determinative. While we acknowledge Plaintiffs’ assertions that minority voters in Alabama possess photo IDs at a slightly lower rate than white Alabama voters, the small disparities in ID possession rates do not, standing alone, establish a “pattern, unexplainable on 33 The Arlington Heights factors require a fact intensive examination of the record and, even so, do not lend themselves to a clean analysis in this case. While Plaintiffs attempt to provide “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence” in support of their claims, Lewis v. City of Union City, 877 F.3d 1000, 1018 (11th Cir. 2017), this approach results in a presentation of evidence that supports several factors at once to support their overarching “discriminatory intent” argument. We attempt to parse these arguments as neatly as possible within the Arlington Heights and Jean framework, focusing on issues in the order and manner presented in Plaintiffs’ briefing. 42 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 43 of 97 grounds other than race.” 34 Id. Accordingly, we turn to the other Arlington Heights factors and Plaintiffs’ proffered “other evidence” to determine whether the Alabama legislature intended to discriminate when it passed its 2011 voter ID law. ii. Contemporary Statements and Actions of Key Legislators and Historical Background Plaintiffs argue that the discriminatory intentions of individual legislators— as evidenced by their statements made “contemporaneously” 35 to the bill’s passage—and the concurrent passage of other allegedly “racially discriminatory” laws like HB56 36 create a triable issue of fact regarding whether the Alabama legislature intended to discriminate when passing the voter ID law. See Arlington Heights¸429 U.S. at 268 (“The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body.”). In doing so, Plaintiffs attempt to tie the more modern statements made by Alabama legislators to Alabama’s racist history as well as statements made by former Alabama legislators. Because Plaintiffs’ analysis integrates both arguments, we consider these Arlington Heights factors together. 34 Our analysis in Section 3.B.2 further guides our findings that the small disparities in ID possession rates—and its negligible impact—do not establish a pattern based on race and do not rise to a genuine dispute of material fact. 35 Plaintiffs use the term “contemporaneously” loosely, citing some statements made in 2010 and some made as far back as 1996. 36 See supra note 9. 43 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 44 of 97 We begin with the modern statements made by several Alabama legislators. Plaintiffs cite the statements of legislators Dixon, Rich, and Beason and argue that “[t]hese overt statements of racial bias against voters of color powerfully support the inference that HB19 had a discriminatory purpose.” To support their argument, Plaintiffs cite Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that “discriminatory intent could be inferred from the fact that the sponsor of the challenged law had in the past made a racist speech about a different voting bill.” In Stallings, however, this Court found evidence of discriminatory intent based on prior speech because the sponsor of the 1951 bill had made the speech when he introduced the same bill in 1947. 829 F.2d at 1552. The racist speech in 1947 “was evidence of an intent to discriminate against black voters in any voting legislation before the General Assembly during that [1947] session.” Id. Because the bill was re-introduced “under the same sponsorship” in 1951, we considered the circumstances to be the same as in 1947. Id. In this case, Plaintiffs primarily cite various statements made by former Alabama State Senator Larry Dixon in 1996 and 2010. Although in Stallings we found that earlier statements can sometimes provide evidence of discriminatory intent, that case involved the same bill and the same sponsor. Senator Dixon was not a sponsor of this legislation and, in fact, was not a member of the Alabama 44 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 45 of 97 legislature in 2011 when the voter ID law was passed. Similarly, Plaintiffs provide no evidence that Senator Beason’s comment was made at the same time, or even during the same session, as the passage of HB19. In fact, there is no evidence as to when he made his comment or what bill he was discussing when he did. Likewise, Representative Rich’s allegedly “prejudiced comments about Latino citizens” do not provide Stallings-level evidence of discriminatory intent. Although Representative Rich, who was the primary sponsor of HB19, did make these statements during the 2011 legislative session, he made them during the debate on a different bill (HB56) about an entirely different subject (immigration). It does not stand to reason that those comments support a wholesale intent by Representative Rich, or by the Alabama legislature, to discriminate against minority voters. To be clear: this Court does not condone, under any circumstances, racist statements. But we are confined to an analysis of discriminatory intent as it relates to HB19, and the statements Plaintiffs identify were not made about the law at issue in this case and thus do not evidence discriminatory intent behind it. Secretary Merrill’s arguments stand in stark contrast to Plaintiffs’ claims. Secretary Merrill contends that the Alabama voter ID law was passed to combat voter fraud, increase voter confidence, and to modernize elections. As this Court has recognized, “a strong state policy in favor of [the challenged practice], for reasons other than race, is evidence that the [practice] does not have a 45 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 46 of 97 discriminatory intent.” United States v. Marengo Cty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1571 (11th Cir. 1984). Secretary Merrill notes that, at the time of HB19’s passage, Alabama already had an existing—precleared—voter ID law that required Alabamians to present a photo ID. Alabama merely joined a growing national trend in passing voter identification laws. The passage of HB19—and, in fact, the prior 2003 law—was driven by the need to address well-documented and public cases of voter fraud that occurred in Alabama. The law’s passage was championed both by public officials and by grass-roots, citizen-led movements. During oral argument, we expressed our skepticism that the discriminatory intent could be ascertained from the statements of one legislator speaking about another bill.37 As a general matter, determining the intent of the legislature is a problematic and near-impossible challenge. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228 (“Proving the motivation behind official action is often a problematic undertaking.”); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[D]iscerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task. The number of possible motivations, to 37 This skepticism echoed our past reluctance to speculate about a state legislature’s intent. See Autauga Quality Cotton Ass'n v. Crosby, 893 F.3d 1276, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2018) (“It’s certainly not our place—particularly as a federal court . . .—to speculate whether the Alabama Legislature might have secretly intended (or might even today prefer) a different rule.”). 46 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 47 of 97 begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite. . . . To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not exist.”). The Plaintiffs’ position is weakened significantly by the fact that the evidence presented in this case is largely unconnected to the passage of the actual law in question. Unlike North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, the record and the specific sequence of events leading up to the passage of the law does not lead to “the obvious inference . . . of . . . discriminatory intent.” 831 F.3d 204, 227 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. North Carolina v. N. Carolina State Conference of NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017). In McCrory, the North Carolina legislature, immediately after Shelby County, vastly expanded an earlier photo ID bill and changed the accepted photo ID provision: “the new ID provision retained only those types of photo ID disproportionately held by whites and excluded those disproportionately held by African Americans.” Id. But the opposite has happened in Alabama, where the Alabama legislature specifically included the types of photo ID—government employee IDs—that North Carolina failed to accept in McCrory, as acceptable IDs. Furthermore, the Alabama legislature also decided to allow student IDs, in contrast to the Texas election law that the Fifth Circuit criticized in Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 262 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017) (Texas legislature rejected amendments to expand the forms of acceptable ID to include student IDs, federal IDs, state- 47 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 48 of 97 government employee IDs despite testimony about likely disparate impact if such IDs were excluded). Alabama specifically included a wide variety of photo IDs and offers free photo IDs to Alabama citizens who wish to obtain one, which raises the question: “Indeed, why would a racially biased legislature have provided for a cost-free election ID card to assist poor registered voters—of all races—who might not have drivers’ licenses?” Id. at 281 (Jones, J., dissenting). It is also questionable whether the sponsor speaks for all legislators. The vote of a sponsor is only one vote of the 105 votes in the Alabama House of Representatives. And the record does not show that the primary sponsor, Representative Rich, spoke at all about the intentions motivating the passage of HB19. It stretches logic to deem a sponsor’s “intent”—ascertainable only from contemporaneous statements made by HB19 sponsor Representative Rich about a different bill on a different topic unrelated to the voter ID law—as the legally dispositive intent of the entire body of the Alabama legislature on that law. No reasonable fact-finder could find a discriminatory intent or purpose underlying Alabama’s voter ID law from the statements identified by Plaintiffs. When we focus on the circumstances surrounding the passage of HB19, it is undisputed that none of the comments in question were made about that legislation. The statements made by current and former Alabama legislators at issue in this case are not “smoking gun” evidence of discriminatory intent in the context of the 48 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 49 of 97 voter ID law. The fact remains that Plaintiffs cannot point to evidence—not a single comment made by any sitting Alabama legislator in reference to HB19—to support their argument that the voter ID law was intended to discriminate against black and Latino voters. We are mindful of the danger of allowing the old, outdated intentions of previous generations to taint Alabama’s legislative action forevermore on certain topics. Plaintiffs point to the racist history of Alabama as a significant barrier for Secretary Merrill to overcome in defending this law. But it cannot be that Alabama’s history bans its legislature from ever enacting otherwise constitutional laws about voting. Surely, “past discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful.” Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74; see also Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018) (explaining that “the presumption of legislative good faith [is] not changed by a finding of past discrimination”); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267 (focusing the Court’s “historical background” analysis on the “specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision” and not providing an unlimited look-back to past discrimination). In fact, during oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel admitted that, if today’s Alabama legislature passed the same law, without any discriminatory intent and relying on Crawford’s legitimate state interests in preventing voter fraud 49 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 50 of 97 and increasing voter confidence in elections, a current version of HB19 would pass constitutional muster.38 The dissent does not dispute that another state, say Illinois, could enact the identical statute, but instead argues partly that Alabama cannot enact this statute because of its history. But the Supreme Court foresaw this line of argument in Shelby County, emphasizing “the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty,” which requires that we recognize that ours “is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority.” Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 544; id. (“[T]he constitutional equality of the States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.”). Notwithstanding the Shelby County Court’s admonition, the dissent argues our decision allows Alabama to “start with a clean slate” and that we should penalize the current legislature for Alabama’s racist past, because a racist past is evidence of current intent. But applying the principles of equal sovereignty counsels against the dissent’s disparate treatment of Alabama and guides us to look at the precise circumstances surrounding the passing of the voter ID law. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 553 (stating that the Fifteenth Amendment “is not designed to punish for the past; its purpose is to ensure a better 38 See oral argument at 15:40-18:58: (Counsel for Plaintiffs acknowledged that, if “this law was enacted anew, I think we would concede that there may not be a constitutional violation.” Chief Judge Ed Carnes then queried, “Your case rises and falls on the racially discriminatory intent of the legislature, does it not?” to which Counsel answered, “Yes.”). 50 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 51 of 97 future”); Cf. Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924, 590 U.S. ___ (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Too much public discourse today is sullied by ad hominem rhetoric, that is, attempts to discredit an argument not by proving that it is unsound but by attacking the character or motives of the argument’s proponents.”). Perhaps most significant is the fact that Plaintiffs provide no evidence that the Alabama legislators who supported the law intended the law to have a discriminatory impact or believed that the law would have such an effect. Ultimately, the requirement that Alabama voters present photo ID “is amply justified by the [state’s] valid interest in protecting ‘the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.’” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204. HB19 was passed with provisions that permit voters to present many acceptable forms of photo ID. The statements made by individual members of the Alabama legislature at one time about other bills do not change the fact that the legislative body passed a nondiscriminatory voter ID law, supported by valid neutral justifications, and that the law permits many different forms of ID and provides for free IDs for anyone in need. iii. The Specific Sequence of Events Leading Up to HB19’s Passage and Procedural and Substantive Departures Plaintiffs also present evidence of the legislature’s passage of HB19 and the alleged procedural departures that occurred when passing the 2011 voter ID law. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267 (“The specific sequence of events leading up 51 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 52 of 97 the challenged decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker’s purposes. . . . Substantive departures too may be relevant.”). 39 Plaintiffs take issue with the use of cloture and truncated debate that precipitated the quick passage of the voter ID legislation at the end of the 2011 legislative session to support their position. To contradict Plaintiffs’ arguments about the procedural maneuverings by the Alabama legislature in passing HB19, Secretary Merrill insists that there was nothing uncommon about the way that the voter ID law was passed. Indeed, it is undisputed that the use of cloture was exceedingly common during the 2011 legislative session. Plaintiffs counter that no black legislators voted for HB19, and the vote was a strictly party-line vote. Pursuant to Crawford, while it might be suspicious if partisan reasons were the only consideration or justification for the law, 40 Secretary Merrill has provided valid neutral justifications (combatting voter 39 Notably, Plaintiffs attack only the alleged “[p]rocedural [d]epartures” of the Alabama legislature. They provide no evidence of any substantive departures for this Court to consider. 40 In Crawford, the Court also addressed the partisan politics surrounding Indiana’s voter ID law, acknowledging that “all of the Republicans in the General Assembly voted in favor of [the voter ID law] and the Democrats were unanimous in opposing it.” 553 U.S. at 203. But, because “partisan considerations” were not the only justification for enacting the voter ID law, the Court went on to uphold the Indiana law: [I]f a nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators. The state interests identified as justifications for [the voter ID law] are both neutral and sufficiently strong to require us to reject petitioners’ facial attack on the statute. The application of the statute to the vast majority of [] voters is amply justified by 52 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 53 of 97 fraud, increasing confidence in elections, and modernizing Alabama’s elections procedures) for the law’s passage. iv. Foreseeability and Knowledge of Disparate Impact Plaintiffs combine “foreseeability of disparate impact” and “knowledge of that impact,” titling their argument “Foreknowledge.” Plaintiffs assert that the Alabama legislature had foreknowledge of the disparate impact HB19 would have on minority voters in Alabama, as evidenced by the inclusion of a three-year enforcement delay in the bill. As noted above, the evidence establishes that the delay in implementation occurred because the legislature anticipated challenges to the law and needed time to obtain preclearance. The mere fact of an implementation delay, without more, does not suggest that the Alabama legislature foresaw or knew that the law would have a disparate impact on minority voters. Finding a legitimate reason for the enactment delay, we decline to infer “foreknowledge” of disparate impact on the part of the Alabama legislature. v. Availability of Less Discriminatory Alternatives The final Arlington Heights factor we must consider is the “availability of less discriminatory alternatives.” Jean, 711 F.2d at 1486. Plaintiffs argue that HB19’s proponents “failed to include [alternative] options, such as a reasonable the valid interest in protecting “the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.” Id. at 204 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S., at 788 n.9) (emphasis added). 53 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 54 of 97 impediment provision, 41 which would have reduced the law’s” allegedly discriminatory impact. We find this argument unpersuasive because, although the Alabama legislature did not include the alternative option that Plaintiffs would have preferred, we cannot say that the legislature failed to consider voter ID alternatives that would lessen any potentially discriminatory impact. Rather, the legislature passed a voter ID law that allows the use of not only driver’s licenses, but also many other forms of photo ID, and ensured that any Alabamian who wants one could obtain a free photo ID from the state. The record does not support Plaintiffs’ claim that the Alabama legislature intended to discriminate by failing to include alternative options that were less discriminatory. Overall, the Arlington Heights are meant to assist this Court in determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed when the Alabama legislature passed the 2011 voter ID law. After examining all of the Arlington Heights factors, it is clear that Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the law was enacted with discriminatory intent. In this case, Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Crawford, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, rings particularly true: “[W]ithout proof of discriminatory intent, a generally applicable law with disparate impact is not 41 This type of provision would allow voters who face some “reasonable impediment” in obtaining photo ID to submit affidavits or non-photo ID and cast a ballot. 54 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 55 of 97 unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment does not regard neutral laws as invidious ones, even when their burdens purportedly fall disproportionately on a protected class.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 207 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). Lastly, we need not reach Hunter’s second prong because the Plaintiffs “cannot first prove that race was a motivating factor.” Burton, 178 F.3d at 1195 (citations omitted). Thus, “there is no basis for shifting the burden to the [State] to determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, it would have made the same decision notwithstanding its racial motivation.” Id. In sum, when we weigh the burden on a voter to obtain and present a photo ID against Alabama’s interests underlying the voter ID law, we find the law to be a neutral, nondiscriminatory regulation of voting procedure. We reiterate that, in order “to establish a violation of either the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Fifteenth Amendment, Appellants must show that [Alabama’s] decision or act had a discriminatory purpose and effect.” Id. at 1188– 89; see also Bolden, 446 U.S. at 65 (“[The Fifteenth] Amendment prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote . . .”). Because Plaintiffs-Appellants have failed to show that the Alabama voter ID law was passed with a racially discriminatory intent or purpose, the 55 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 56 of 97 district court appropriately granted Secretary Merrill’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims. We affirm. 2. Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Plaintiffs allege that the Alabama voter ID law and its implementation violate Section 2 of the VRA because it results in minority voters “having less opportunity than white voters to participate effectively in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice” and “having less opportunity to participate effectively in the political process in Alabama on account of race, color, or language minority status.” The district court, however, noted that a black voter and a white voter “of equal means who each lack ID and a birth certificate, and who each live an equal distance away from the registrar’s office, are in the exact same position.” Finding that there was no discriminatory impact, the district court granted Secretary Merrill’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. Our analysis begins with the statute. Section 2 of the VRA states: (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2)[42] of this title, as provided in subsection (b). 42 Section 10303(f)(2) prohibits any voting qualification or practice that results in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote protections for members of a language minority group. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73; 52 U.S.C. § 10303(f)(2) (“No voting 56 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 57 of 97 (b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. . . . 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)-(b) (emphasis added). Unlike discrimination claims brought pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which require proof of both discriminatory intent and actual discriminatory effect, the language of Section 2(a) of the VRA requires only proof of discriminatory “results,” not of discriminatory intent. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403–04 (1991) (voter dilution case discussing the 1982 amendments to Section 2 of the VRA which removed the proof of intent requirement); Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act so that a plaintiff could establish a violation without providing discriminatory intent.”). However, “[d]espite its broad language, Section 2 does not prohibit all voting restrictions that may have a racially disproportionate effect.” Id. at 1228. Rather, Section 2(b) “make[s] clear that an application of the results test requires an inquiry into the totality of the qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote because he is a member of a language minority group”). 57 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 58 of 97 circumstances.” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 394. And, in looking into the totality of the circumstances, if “members of a protected class have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice,” a violation is shown. Id. at 388 (internal quotations omitted). Thus, under the analysis set forth by the statutory text and embraced by the Supreme Court in Chisom and this Court in Johnson, we must consider whether the challenged law results in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color. This analysis turns on whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, the challenged law violates Section 2(a) because it deprives minority voters of an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process and to elect representatives of their choice. In support of their Section 2 claim, Plaintiffs point to disparate voter ID possession rates and disparate burdens placed on minority voters—travel disparities, socioeconomic disparities, and lack of Spanish-language materials—as evidence that HB19 violates Section 2 by resulting in a discriminatory effect. Plaintiffs’ expert identified a total of 118,000 Alabamians who lack proper IDs: 50,000 Alabama voters who do not possess any photo ID that would permit them to vote and another approximately 68,000 voters who possess IDs that potentially could not be used to vote (i.e., IDs with a discrepancy between the information on 58 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 59 of 97 a voter roll and the ID). Plaintiffs also argue that black voters are twice as likely as white voters to lack a photo ID. In contrast to Plaintiffs’ 118,000 estimate, however, Merrill’s expert estimated that only approximately 32,000 registered voters lack a photo ID that passes muster under the law and that there is only a 1% difference between white and minority voters in that regard. Secretary Merrill also argues that no voter will be denied an equal opportunity to vote because the Alabama law allows a large variety of IDs to be utilized and Alabama makes it very easy to obtain a necessary voter photo ID if one is lacking. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs just barely clear the hurdle of demonstrating that minority voters are less likely than white voters to possess photo ID. Even if Plaintiffs’ estimate of the number of minority voters without a plainly compliant photo ID is correct, the number of Alabama voters who lack photo ID is miniscule compared to the overall state population of eligible voters. It is undisputed that approximately 99% of white voters and 98% of black voters possess a photo ID. Plaintiffs, however, continue to argue that black and Latino voters are about twice as likely as white voters to lack a valid voter photo ID. Plaintiffs arrive at their “twice as likely” statement by comparing the 1% of white voters who lack valid photo ID to the 2% of minority voters who lack a valid photo ID. But, as the Secretary noted in his brief, when Plaintiffs represent percentages in this way, it “is 59 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 60 of 97 a misuse of data” that “mask[s] the fact that the populations were effectively identical.” Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014). There is only a 1% difference between the ID possession rates of white and minority Alabama voters. Even though minority voters in Alabama are slightly more likely than white voters not to have compliant IDs, the plain language of Section 2(a) requires more. First, the challenged law has to “result in” the denial or abridgement of the right to vote. Second, the denial or abridgement of the right to vote must be “on account of race or color.” In other words, the challenged law must have caused the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race. As Judge Tjoflat noted in his concurrence to our holding in Johnson, the words “on account of” contained in section 2(a) “suggest a causation requirement.” Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1238 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (stating that the “minimum content of such a case” requires a “showing that racial bias in the relevant community caused the alleged vote-denial or abridgment.”). A number of our sister circuits have either expressly or in essence agreed. The Fourth Circuit, presented with a challenge to a photo ID law, refused to make the “unjustified leap from the disparate inconveniences that voters face when voting to the denial or abridgement of the right to vote.” Lee v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 843 F.3d 592, 600–01 (4th Cir. 2016) (emphases in original). The Sixth Circuit, in evaluating a challenge to a 60 Case: 18-10151 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 61 of 97 change in Ohio’s early voting laws, noted that beyond some statistical disparities, “the record does not establish that [the state law] . . . actually makes voting harder for African Americans.” Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 631 (6th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit, in analyzing Wisconsin’s photo ID law, noted that “[a]lthough these findings [of statistical disparities in ID possession rates] document a disparate outcome, they do not show a ‘denial’ of anything by Wisconsin, as § 2(a) requires; unless Wisconsin makes it needlessly hard to get photo ID, it has not denied anything to any voter.” Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit, in analyzing an Arizona law which required proof of citizenship to register to vote and the presentation of ID at the polls, stated that “proof of ‘causal connection between the challenged voting practice and a prohibited discriminatory result’ is crucial.” Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 405 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir.