Opinion ID: 2171926
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Legislative Intent Issue

Text: The defendant claims that the prosecution of a distributor corporation is contrary to the following expression of legislative intent: It is the express intent of the general court that . . . RSA 650 . . . apply only to those persons actually responsible for the production and dissemination of pornographic or obscene materials. Laws 1976, 46:6. The defendant theorizes that the legislature intended the statute to apply only to the producer of the material, and not to the mere distributor of obscene material. We cannot agree with the defendant. [10] The language of RSA 650:2 (Supp. 1976) (amended by Laws 1977, 199:2) manifests the legislature's intent to attach criminal liability to more than just the person or corporation responsible for the decision to produce the obscene material. The legislature clearly intended to include those individuals and corporations in the chain of distribution. This is indicated by the language of RSA 650:2 (Supp. 1976): [S]ells, delivers or provides, or offers or agrees to sell, deliver or provide, ... otherwise makes available any obscene material; . . . possesses any obscene material for the purposes of sale or other commercial dissemination. . . . RSA 650:1 I (Supp. 1976) includes in the definition of disseminate the terms distribute and sell. The legislature would not have used this language if it intended to exclude distributors of obscene material. We hold that the defendant is within the scope of the statute. We therefore remand for further proceedings consistent with our construction of RSA ch. 650 (Supp. 1976). Exceptions sustained in part; remanded.