Opinion ID: 204670
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis Under Turner v. Safley.

Text: “Inmates have a First Amendment right to receive information while in prison to the extent the right is not inconsistent with prisoner status or the legitimate penological objectives of the prison.” Jacklovich v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 420, 426 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ [First Amendment rights], the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). In making the latter determination, a district court must analyze the challenged regulation under the four-part test established by the Supreme Court in Turner. As accurately summarized by the district court, this requires an examination of the following factors: “(1) whether a valid and rational connection exists between 5 As set forth above, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was amended effective December 1, 2010. As part of the amendments, the former Rule 56(c)(3) was eliminated and replaced by the language that is now contained in Rule 56(a) and (c)(1)(A). In accordance with our precedent, we will apply the version of the rule in effect at the time of the district court’s decision. See 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17 F.3d at 1310 n.6; In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d at 1186 n.4. -15- the regulation and the asserted legitimate governmental interest; (2) whether alternative means of exercising the constitutional right remain available to inmates; (3) any effect accommodating the right would have on guards, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives.” R., Doc. 134 at 11 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90); accord Jacklovich, 392 F.3d at 426; Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2007). “The burden, moreover, is not on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). As the district court explained, “[t]he first Turner factor is multifold. The court must determine whether the governmental objective underlying the regulation is legitimate and neutral and whether the regulation is rationally related to that objective.” R., Doc. 134 at 11 (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 (1989)). “To show a rational relationship between a regulation and a legitimate penological interest, prison officials need not prove that the banned materials actually caused problems in the past, or that the materials are ‘likely’ to cause problems in the future.” Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 417 and Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993)). In other words, empirical evidence is not necessarily required. Moreover, it “does not matter whether we agree with” the defendants or whether the policy “in fact advances” the jail’s legitimate interests. See Amatel [v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1998)]. -16- The only question that we must answer is whether the defendants’ judgment was “rational,” that is, whether the defendants might reasonably have thought that the policy would advance its interests. See id. Id. We agree with the district court that the governmental objectives underlying Kansas Administrative Regulation § 44-12-313 are legitimate and neutral and that the regulation is rationally related to those objections. As the district court carefully and thoroughly explained: Defendant implemented the regulation for three reasons: (1) to protect institutional security; (2) to facilitate rehabilitation of sex offenders; (3) and to prevent sexual harassment. These rationales serve legitimate penological interests. [Thornburgh, 490 U.S.] at 415 (finding regulations expressly aimed at protecting prison security serve a purpose that is central to all other corrections goals); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) (“[A]nother paramount objective of the corrections system is the rehabilitation of those committed to its custody”); Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]here is no doubt that protecting the safety of guards in general is a legitimate interest, and that reducing sexual harassment in particular likewise is legitimate.”). Defendant’s affidavit justifies the need for the regulation in relation to the governmental objectives. Sexually explicit materials can lead to the open performance of lewd acts, disrupting overall security and order. Possession of such materials also creates a security concern by identifying homosexual inmates, who are often targeted for exploitation or violent attack. Defendant also explained that sexually explicit materials interfere with the treatment and management of sex offenders. A blanket ban prevents non-sex offenders from trading or dealing the sexually explicit materials with sex offenders. Finally, the materials create a potential for sexual harassment complaints. Before the ban on sexually explicit material, prison staff complained about being required to view these materials while performing their duties, and inmates had made comments -17- comparing prison staff to the individuals in the materials. These are valid concerns that make the governmental objective underlying the regulation legitimate. The regulation is neutral; it bans sexually explicit material due to its impact on prison security, regardless of gender or sexual orientation. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415-16 (“Where, as here, prison administrators draw distinctions between publications solely on the basis of their potential implications for prison security, the regulations are ‘neutral’ in the technical sense in which we meant and used that term in Turner.”). Further, there is a rational connection between the regulation and the governmental objectives. The regulation banning sexually explicit material directly addresses each of the objectives set out by defendant. See, e.g., Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The jail’s ban on inmate access to ‘sexually explicit material’ and ‘technical publications' is expressly aimed at advancing jail security and the ban on ‘sexually explicit material’ also protects the safety of jail personnel and other inmates.”); Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1054 (noting the relationship between the jail’s policy of prohibiting sexually explicit materials and the goals of preventing sexual harassment, inmate rehabilitation, and jail security is not so “remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.”). R., Doc. 134 at 11-13. We also agree with the district court’s analysis of the remaining Turner factors. As the district court succinctly explained: The second Turner factor–whether there is an alternative means of exercising the constitutional right–is satisfied where the regulation permits a broad range of publications to be sent, received, and read. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418. In this case, inmates may continue to subscribe to periodicals, as long as the incoming publication does not contain prohibited content, as well as access publications in the general prison library. The second factor is satisfied. The third factor to be addressed under the Turner analysis is the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right -18- will have on guards, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. As discussed above, the sexually explicit materials banned by the regulation can lead to the disruption of the overall security and order of the prison, lead to staff complaints, and thwart sex offender rehabilitation. According to defendant, if this regulation were to be removed, the staff would expend additional time and resources monitoring inmates to prevent the potential outcomes listed above. As he testified in his affidavit, sexually explicit materials lead to lewd acts and create the potential for violent attacks on homosexual inmates. He also testified that it is extremely difficult to keep sexually explicit materials away from sex offenders because having them in the prison creates a market for the contraband. And he explained the potential for sexual harassment complaints. Accommodating the exercise of plaintiff’s right to possess sexually explicit material would have a negative effect on other prisoners, staff, and prison resources, thus the third Turner factor is also satisfied. The final Turner factor requires the court to consider whether ready alternatives exist. “This is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Id. at 90-91. Instead, if plaintiff can point to an alternative that fully accommodates his rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, the court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard. Id. at 91. Here, plaintiff suggests as an alternative that KDOC house sex-offender inmates in a single cellhouse where it can assure that sex offenders do not have access to the material. Plaintiff asserts that this would be less costly than enforcing the regulation, but he does not support this allegation with any factual support. Furthermore, plaintiff’s alternative remedy does not address the regulation’s other governmental objectivesinstitutional security and sexual harassment. Plaintiff has not raised an issue of fact that an obvious, easy alternative exists that would accommodate his rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Id. at 13-14. -19- The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Although the district court granted Mr. Sperry’s motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of the appellate filing fee, we remind Mr. Sperry of his obligation to continue making partial payments until his entire appellate filing fee has been paid in full. Entered for the Court David M. Ebel