Opinion ID: 805977
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to pursue an insanity defense

Text: Mr. Hooks argues that counsel was deficient for failing to investigate and pursue an insanity defense. In his view, such a defense, even if ultimately unsuccessful, would have opened the door to expert testimony on his mental state, which in turn would have helped establish that he had killed in the heat of passion rather than with malice aforethought. In particular, according to Mr. Hooks, his counsel was ineffective because he misunderstood the legal standard for insanity. Prior to trial, Mr. Hooks’s attorney, Ron Evans, requested a competency evaluation for Mr. Hooks. Mr. Hooks was examined by Dr. Edith King and declared -76- competent. Thereafter, Mr. Evans retained Dr. King and the aforementioned Dr. Murphy to assist him at trial. In light of the fact that Mr. Hooks had unquestionably killed Ms. Blaine, Mr. Evans’s strategy was to attempt to negate the intent-to-kill element of the first-degree murder charge. See Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 206. To that end, he put on three witnesses at trial: Scott Cannon, a police officer, to testify about a statement by Mr. Hooks six days after the murder that he “didn’t mean to kill her [i.e., Ms. Blaine],” 3 Trial Tr. at 440 (internal quotation marks omitted); and Drs. King and Murphy, to establish through expert testimony that Mr. Hooks had committed the murder in the heat of passion or with a depraved mind, rather than with malice aforethought. All such testimony was ultimately excluded, however. The State objected to Officer Cannon’s testimony on the ground that Mr. Hooks’s statement (“I didn’t mean to kill her”) was self-serving hearsay, and the trial court sustained the objection. See id. at 442–43. When Mr. Evans began direct examination of Dr. Murphy, the State objected to his testimony, as well as to the proposed testimony of Dr. King, on the ground that it would invade the province of the jury. See id. at 447–56, 473–74. The trial court sustained those objections, too. See id. at 456, 474. The court recognized that psychiatric testimony was permissible to help establish a defendant’s insanity, but because an insanity defense was not being pursued, Mr. Hooks’s state of mind was “a question of fact peculiarly left within the exclusive province of the jury.” Id. at 455. Mr. Hooks vigorously argues that the information available to Mr. Evans should have prompted a reasonable attorney to pursue an insanity defense and that he was -77- prejudiced by Mr. Evans’s failure to do so because, even if he did not prevail on his insanity defense, “[t]here is a reasonable probability the insanity evidence would have eliminated an intent finding, the essential requisite for a first degree murder conviction.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 81. Indeed, there was no dispute that Mr. Hooks killed Ms. Blaine; the salient question was whether he acted with the requisite intent to constitute firstdegree murder. See Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d at 1231 (separate opinion of Ebel, J.) (“From the outset of trial Hooks admitted that he caused Shalimein’s death, and sought only to challenge the state’s assertion that he did so intentionally.”). We conclude, however, that Mr. Hooks cannot prevail on this claim of error. Mr. Evans had considered presenting an insanity defense but opted not to because, as he would later explain at the federal evidentiary hearing, he “didn’t think that there was a factual basis for it.” Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 173 (Test. of Mr. Evans). Oklahoma follows the M’Naghten rule, under which “[t]he defendant must demonstrate at trial that during the commission of the crime he was suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him unable to differentiate between right and wrong, or unable to understand the nature and consequences of his acts.” Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (emphases added). As a leading commentator helpfully observes: The M’Naghten test consists of two elements which logically can be separated. The first portion [concerning an inability to understand the nature and consequences of one’s actions] relates to an accused who is psychotic to an extreme degree. It assumes an accused who, because of mental disease, did not know the nature and quality of his act; he simply did not know what he was doing. For example, in crushing the skull of a human being with an iron bar, he believed that he was -78- smashing a glass jar. The latter portion of M’Naghten [involving an inability to differentiate between right or wrong] relates to an accused who knew the nature and quality of his act. He knew what he was doing; he knew that he was crushing the skull of a human being with an iron bar. However, because of mental disease, he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. He believed, for example, that he was carrying out a command from God. 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 101, at 12–17 (15th ed. 1994) (footnotes omitted); see also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 99, at 128 (1989) (noting that under the M’Naghten test “there exist two distinct and independent bases upon which a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity might be returned”).25 Under Oklahoma law, “a defendant is presumed to be sane and the burden is upon him to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to his sanity.” Wooldridge v. State, 801 P.2d 729, 733 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990); accord Garrett v. State, 586 P.2d 754, 755 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978). Ordinarily, we indulge a “‘a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,’ and that ‘the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Fairchild, 579 F.3d at 1140 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). As it relates to the portion of the M’Naghten rule involving an alleged inability to know right from wrong, we conclude on this record that Mr. Evans 25 The first portion of the M’Naghten rule discussed in the quoted passage above customarily is stated using the phrase “nature and quality,” when referring to a defendant’s understanding of his actions, whereas Oklahoma uses the phrase “nature and consequences.” However, the term “quality” and “consequences” are apparently intended to embrace the same concept, focusing on a defendant’s comprehension of the “harmfulness” of his actions. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 103, at 134. -79- reasonably could have concluded that he did not have the evidence to satisfy his burden. First, Mr. Hooks’s initial lies to cover up the murder, his attempt to hide evidence, and his seeking medical attention for Ms. Blaine indicate that he knew right from wrong.26 Cf. Garrett, 586 P.2d at 756 (“The evidence that the defendant looked ‘wild’ or ‘berserk’ or her own testimony of loss of memory is not evidence that brings the defendant within the above rule to show that she did not know right from wrong.”). Second, Mr. Evans unquestionably would have been aware that there would be evidence introduced in the trial that, prior to the murder of Ms. Blaine, Mr. Hooks had not infrequently beaten her (sometimes viciously). See 2 Trial Tr. at 417, 420 (Test. of Ms. Dinh). Such evidence could have cast doubt on an assertion that, at the time that he killed Ms. Blaine, Mr. Hooks did not know right from wrong. See Kobyluk v. State, 231 P.2d 388, 393 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951) (“We think that evidence of the actions, conduct, and general demeanor of defendant toward his wife, showing a continuous course of abuse from 1945 until the date of the alleged assault in 1948, was competent as tending to show the state of mind of defendant at the time of the assault. It should be borne in mind that the only issue in this case was the question as to whether defendant knew right from wrong at the time of the shooting . . . .” (citations omitted)). Third, nothing in Mr. 26 Mr. Hooks disputes this, pointing out that insanity is judged at the time that one commits an offense, not afterwards. However, the actions one takes immediately after committing a crime are surely probative of one’s legal sanity at the time of the act. See Frederick v. State, 37 P.3d 908, 945 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (relying in part on the fact that the defendant had attempted to conceal his crime to conclude that the defense of insanity was unsupported by the evidence). -80- Evans’s interaction with Mr. Hooks or in the experts’ reports gave him any other reason to believe that an insanity defense (on the right-from-wrong ground) would be successful. See Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 208–09 (Test. of Mr. Evans). Finally, an insanity defense would have allowed the State to put on its own experts, and as Mr. Evans was aware, the mental-state evidence was not a slam-dunk for Mr. Hooks. See id. (discussing Dr. King’s report, which detailed Mr. Hooks’s ability to understand and communicate, and admitting that it was “not good evidence for an insanity defense”); see also Hooks Habeas I, slip op. at 6–8. For these reasons, we cannot conclude that Mr. Evans rendered constitutionally deficient representation in electing not to pursue such a defense. However, with respect to M’Naghten’s second theory, the picture is more complicated. Mr. Evans was apparently unaware of this theory. At the federal evidentiary hearing, he described the M’Naghten rule as “basically not knowing the difference between right and wrong.” Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 173 (Test. of Mr. Evans). It was pointed out to him that the definition is disjunctive and also includes an inability to understand the nature and consequences of one’s actions, to which he responded, “I think that goes hand-in-hand with not knowing right from wrong.” Id. When his understanding was corrected, he admitted, “I guess I was wrong.” Id. at 174. The ordinary presumption discussed above—that an attorney’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that his conduct might be deemed sound trial strategy—dissipates when an attorney has a “demonstrated ignorance of law directly relevant to a decision.” Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1049 (10th Cir. -81- 2002). Counsel’s mistake of law will often, though not always, mean that “counsel performed in an objectively deficient manner.” Id. at 1050. Nonetheless, we need not opine on Mr. Evans’s performance with regard to his failure to advance M’Naghten’s nature-and-consequences insanity theory. Even if we were to conclude that, because of his apparent lack of knowledge of this M’Naghten theory, Mr. Evans could not have made a reasonable decision not to pursue it, and thus his representation in this regard was constitutionally deficient, we would determine under Strickland’s second prong that Mr. Hooks did not suffer any prejudice from this deficient representation. Giving appropriate consideration to the OCCA’s findings, the record would not have supported a jury verdict of insanity under the M’Naghten’s nature-and-consequences theory (which was apparently beyond Mr. Evans’s ken). In support of his claim, Mr. Hooks relies heavily on the testimony of Dr. Murphy. Among other things, Dr. Murphy apparently was prepared to testify that Mr. Hooks was “suffering from a severe chronic psychosis, which has a recurrent and episodic nature,” 3 Trial Tr. at 459, and that when he killed Ms. Blaine, “[h]e acted in the heat of passion in a delusional state,” id. at 463. However, in upholding the trial court’s exclusion of the guilt-stage testimony of Dr. Murphy, as well as Dr. King, the OCCA found: Both doctors’ testimony significantly omitted an assessment of Hooks’ sanity, i.e., whether, at the time of the murder, he had the mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong or to understand the nature and consequences of his acts. Dr. Murphy testified Hooks was probably not in touch with reality when he murdered Ms. Blaine, but did not say -82- whether Hooks could have distinguished right from wrong or appreciated the nature and consequences of his acts. Dr. King testified Hooks has a “tendency not to pay attention to consequences but just impulsively to act.” Choosing to ignore consequences is clearly different from being incapable of understanding those consequences. Hooks v. State, 862 P.2d at 1278 (citation omitted). These factual findings of the OCCA are entitled to a presumption of correctness, rebuttable only by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d at 1223. Mr. Hooks has failed to rebut that presumption. Consequently, we cannot conclude that a rational factfinder could have determined that Mr. Hooks suffered from such an extreme form of psychosis that he was unaware of the nature and consequences of his actions, as contemplated by the M’Naghten rule. Indeed, although opining that Mr. Hooks was delusional when he beat Ms. Blaine to death, Dr. Murphy never asserted that, because of mental illness, Mr. Hooks actually thought he was inflicting his lethal blows on anyone—or anything—other than Ms. Blaine. With an insufficient factual foundation under M’Naghten’s nature-andconsequences theory, Mr. Hooks would not have been allowed to place “insanity evidence,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 81, supportive of this theory before the jury. Nor could a rational trier of fact possibly have concluded under this theory that Mr. Hooks was insane. Thus, even if Mr. Evans’s ignorance of the second half of the M’Naghten rule rendered his representation objectively unreasonable, Mr. Hooks has failed to establish that he was prejudiced. -83-