Opinion ID: 1922190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: summary denial of guiltphase ineffective assistance of counsel claims

Text: We begin with the issue of whether the trial court erred in summarily denying Derrick's ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from the guilt phase. Generally, a defendant in a rule 3.850 motion filed in a capital case is entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless: (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the [defendant] is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient. Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla.2000); accord Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(d). [6] In such a case, [t]he defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim. Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet this burden. Freeman, 761 So.2d at 1061. However, when reviewing a court's summary denial of an initial rule 3.850 motion filed in a capital case, the Court will affirm the ruling only if the State has shown that the motion is legally flawed or that the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is entitled to no relief. See Patton v. State, 784 So.2d 380, 386 (Fla.2000). This Court must accept Derrick's allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record. Peede v. State, 748 So.2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999).
In his first claim, Derrick contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the evidence presented at his suppression hearing by: (1) failing to call lay and expert witnesses, such as a confessionologist; and (2) failing to impeach the State's witness. In sum, Derrick asserts that his alleged confession to Detective Vaughn was given under police coercion and that the techniques used during questioning could lead to false confessions. The trial court denied an evidentiary hearing on this claim because Derrick failed to establish a basis for suppression of the confession. As to the failure to call a confessionologist, Derrick specifically claims that a confessionologist would have testified that the techniques used during Derrick's confession could lead to false confessions; thus, the confession should be suppressed. [7] We rejected a similar claim in Bryant v. State, 901 So.2d 810 (Fla.2005). There, Bryant claimed that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to obtain a false confession expert. Id. at 821. Bryant neither provided proposed testimony nor claimed to have retained a confession expert. Id. Instead, Bryant concluded that an expert could testify that [Bryant's] confession is typical of those which are false. Id. at 821-22 (alteration in original). This Court held that such a claim was legally insufficient. Id. at 822. Likewise, Derrick's claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present testimonial evidence from the confessionologist are legally insufficient. We reject the claim as we did in Bryant because Derrick does not provide specific factual allegations regarding the confessionologist's testimony. In making this determination, we also deem it important that Derrick does not allege that his confession to Detective Vaughn was actually false. [8] Derrick also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective at the suppression hearing for failing to impeach the State's witness by: (1) failing to present evidence that Derrick did not waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); (2) failing to challenge the inconsistencies in Detective Vaughn's testimony; and (3) failing to cross-examine Vaughn about his interrogation techniques. As to this ineffective assistance claim, Derrick first asserts that he never waived his Miranda rights; therefore, any statements made to Detective Vaughn should have been suppressed. Derrick emphasizes that he never signed the Statement of and Waiver of Miranda Rights. However, an unsigned waiver form does not necessarily equate to a failure to waive Miranda rights. See Sliney v. State, 699 So.2d 662, 668 (Fla. 1997) (holding that the failure to sign a Miranda form in full does not necessarily invalidate the waiver). Here, Detective Vaughn testified that Derrick was read his Miranda rights, a fact Derrick does not dispute. Further, in response to the question of whether he understood his rights, Derrick replied in the affirmative and stated that he would talk to the officers. Second, Derrick asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the inconsistencies in Detective Vaughn's testimony. In summarily denying this aspect of Derrick's claim, the trial court found that the inconsistencies between witness statements would not have led to suppression of Derrick's confession. Derrick has not identified any significant disparities between statements and we conclude independently that none of the identified inconsistencies would have led to the suppression of the confession as either coerced or involuntary. Third, as to the adequacy of the cross-examination of Detective Vaughn, we agree with the trial court that any cross-examination of Detective Vaughn would go to credibility and not admissibility. [9] We agree with the summary denial because, even assuming counsel had taken the steps proposed by Derrick, there was no legally cognizable basis to suppress Derrick's confession and hence no prejudice. Without an allegation of falsity in this case, any proposed testimony offered by the confessionologist would not have affected the trial court's ultimate decision as to the admissibility of the confession. There is nothing about the circumstances of Derrick's confession that suggest it was coerced, involuntary or otherwise inadmissible, especially in light of the testimony of David Lowry, to whom Derrick initially confessed. [10] In short, we conclude that no prejudice has been established as a matter of law, based on the record in this case, and nothing that Derrick has alleged would alter the conclusion that the confession was voluntary and admissible. Accordingly, this claim is conclusively refuted by the record.
The next guilt-phase issue of ineffective assistance of counsel concerns trial counsel's handling of the proposed testimony of jailhouse informant Randall James. The background facts pertinent to this issue are set forth in our opinion on Derrick's first direct appeal: After the defense had presented two witnesses, they announced that they were calling Derrick to testify. At this point, the prosecutor announced that if Derrick testified that he had not committed the murder, he planned to call in rebuttal an inmate named Randall James. The prosecutor said that, after the first defense witness began to testify, he had received a note informing him that Detective Vaughn had just been told by James that Derrick told James that he had killed Sharma and that he would kill again. The prosecutor offered to make James available for a deposition. Derrick's attorneys, who were public defenders, requested a recess to determine what to do because their office also represented James and they were therefore concerned about the implications of cross-examining James. The prosecutor indicated that it was his understanding that James was willing to waive the attorney-client privilege. After the recess, the judge removed the public defender's office from representing James in an effort to alleviate the conflict. Continuing to express concern over the dual representation, Derrick's attorneys made a motion for mistrial which was denied. They then decided to rest without calling Derrick as a witness. The jury found Derrick guilty. Derrick's attorneys took James's deposition while the jury was deliberating. Derrick, 581 So.2d at 33-34 (footnotes omitted). As to the specifics of James's testimony, the State alleged that James would testify to the following conversation, in which James asked the defendant, What are you in here for? Derrick said, Murder to which James allegedly asked him, Did you do it? The State further alleged that Derrick responded, Yeah, I killed the motherfucker and I may kill again. Based on that representation by the State, trial counsel made a decision not to call Derrick, thereby avoiding this potentially devastating testimony in the guilt phase. Trial counsel ultimately deposed James before the penalty phase and discovered that James had a history of mental illness and was moved to the psychiatric ward after the alleged conversation with Derrick. Derrick cites a number of reasons for counsel's ineffectiveness as to this issue, including: the failure of trial counsel to depose James until after the conclusion of the guilt phase; an allegation that the jury overheard the substance of James's proposed testimony; and an alleged conflict of interest because Derrick's attorney from the Public Defender's Office was also representing James in a separate matter. To put this issue in proper context, it is important to stress that James never testified at the guilt phase because trial counsel decided not to call his client to testify when faced with his damaging testimony. Further, Derrick never alleges what he would have testified to if called to the stand and, given his confession, it is difficult to understand how his testimony would have been helpful to his defense. Moreover, this Court previously reviewed trial counsel's conduct in dealing with James's rebuttal testimony on direct appeal. In fact, we rejected the claim that the trial court failed to conduct a proper Richardson inquiry after the State revealed James as a potential witness. Derrick, 581 So.2d at 34. In rejecting the claim, this Court stated that trial counsel made a tactical decision to rely upon the prosecutor's representations of what James's testimony would be and advised Derrick not to testify. Id. at 35. By finding that this issue had previously been considered on direct appeal, the lower court correctly held that Derrick's claim should be denied. In essence, Derrick's claim is procedurally barred because it is merely a variant of the issues raised on direct appeal. Jones v. State, 949 So.2d 1021, 1033 (Fla.2006). Even assuming that trial counsel's failure to depose James rather than rely on the prosecutor's representations could be considered unreasonable, there is no basis to conclude that the failure to call Derrick in light of James's extremely damaging testimony was an unreasonable strategy. Although it is true that counsel could have deposed James and obtained potentially valuable impeachment evidence regarding his mental illness, impeachment alone would not have eliminated the damage that could have resulted from James's proposed testimony that Derrick admitted: Yeah, I killed the motherfucker and I may kill again. To the contrary, if trial counsel had called Derrick to testify and thus opened the door for James's damaging testimony, Derrick might well have had a valid claim that it was unreasonable strategy to allow him to testify. Further, we conclude as a matter of law that prejudice has not been established, i.e., our confidence in the outcome of the guilt phase has not been undermined. Had James testified in the guilt phase, such statements would only have added to the existing incriminating evidence against Derrick, including Lowry's testimony that Derrick admitted to the murder and Derrick's own confession. Importantly, none of the alleged claims of ineffectiveness would affect the admissibility of James's testimony, only the ability to impeach James if he had testified. Further, as stated previously, Derrick fails to allege in his postconviction motion what he would have testified to had he taken the stand in his own defense. In short, Derrick has failed to establish a basis for either deficiency or prejudice. Therefore, summary denial was proper because the record conclusively shows that Derrick is entitled to no relief. As to Derrick's assertion that the substance of James's testimony was announced in open court, the record affirmatively indicates that the jury was removed from the courtroom before any discussion of James's testimony took place. Derrick has not alleged any facts that would refute the record, showing that the jury was in the courtroom when James's testimony was discussed or that the jury overheard that testimony. Further, considering the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including Derrick's own confession, prejudice has not been established as a result of these alleged deficiencies in not deposing James in the guilt phase. Lastly, as to Derrick's claim that James's proposed testimony should have been excluded from the guilt phase because he and Derrick were represented by the same counsel, this claim should have been raised on direct appeal and is therefore procedurally barred. See Thompson v. State, 759 So.2d 650, 661 (Fla.2000) (supporting trial court's finding that conflict of interest claim should have been raised on direct appeal and was procedurally barred because the facts that formed the basis of the claim were known to the defendant at the time of the direct appeal). However, because the right to effective assistance of counsel encompasses the right to conflict-free counsel, Hunter v. State, 817 So.2d 786, 791 (Fla.2002), we also examine this claim on the merits. In a motion for postconviction relief, a defendant must establish both that there was an actual conflict of interest and that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. See id.; Quince v. State, 732 So.2d 1059, 1065 (Fla.1999). However, in this case, once the trial court removed counsel from representing James, any actual conflict of interest was eliminated. Further, even assuming an actual conflict existed, the defendant must also allege how the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. See Hunter, 817 So.2d at 791. As to this prong, Derrick alleges that counsel's faulty advice not to testify arose from a conflict of interest. However, we reject as a matter of law the claim that a conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's performance for the same reasons we previously discussed in concluding that no prejudice could have resulted from the failure to depose James earlier. In short, even if counsel had advised Derrick to testify, James's rebuttal testimony would have been extremely damaging to Derrick's defense and there has been no allegation of how Derrick's proposed testimony would have in fact assisted his defense. We likewise reject Derrick's claim that the State's notice regarding the proposed guilt-phase testimony of Randall James amounted to prosecutorial misconduct in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). First, on direct appeal, we rejected that there was a Richardson violation in the trial court's treatment of Randall James's proposed testimony. See Derrick, 581 So.2d at 35 (We have never before held that a defendant was prejudiced by the late listing of a witness who never testifies at trial, and we decline to do so now.). Second, there cannot be a Giglio violation, which involves the knowing presentation of false testimony, because James never testified. Third, for the same reasons that we concluded that Derrick has not suffered prejudice from the proposed testimony of Randall James, Derrick has not established materiality under Brady. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (expressly applying the Strickland standard of reasonable probability to Brady cases); Cardona v. State, 826 So.2d 968, 973 (Fla. 2002). Because of the foregoing, the trial court was correct in finding that this claim did not warrant an evidentiary hearing and we affirm the denial.
Derrick's final allegations of error regarding the guilt-phase ineffective assistance claims that were summarily denied involve the following: trial counsel's failure to object to the State's closing argument about the type of knife that was used on the victim; the failure of trial counsel to object to the testimony of State witnesses Calhoun and Page; and trial counsel's failure to attack blood evidence found at the crime scene. As to the first aspect of this claim, the State argued in its closing argument that the medical examiner, whom the State called as a witness, made a mistake in determining that the murder weapon was a single-edged blade because the photos of the victim's wounds plainly showed that the blade used was double-edged. In summarily denying this claim, the trial court found the closing arguments proper, stating that Derrick was seen with both single and double-edged knives and admitted to using a double-edged knife during the murder. We agree that there was nothing improper about this closing argument for the same reasons; accordingly, the trial court did not err in summarily denying the claim that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object. See Mungin v. State, 932 So.2d 986, 997 (Fla.2006) (finding that the prosecutor's statements were proper and therefore ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object could not be established). As to the claim of failure to object to the admissibility of the testimony of State witnesses Calhoun and Page regarding blood splatter evidence, neither witness's testimony amounted to expert opinion. Both witnesses were crime scene technicians and testified as to their observations, such as the location and position of the body and its distance from a trail of blood found on a pathway. Because trial counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to object to properly admissible testimony, see id., summary denial of this claim was also proper. Finally, Derrick alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an expert to examine a bloody T-shirt found at the crime scene and analyze actual blood evidence and the videotape of the crime scene. The trial court found that it was unnecessary for counsel to obtain an independent analysis of the blood evidence because there was no suggestion that the blood did not belong to the victim or that anyone else bled in the vicinity of the crime scene. Further, Derrick did not allege how an independent analysis of the videotape or bloody T-shirt would demonstrate prejudice. We agree with the trial court that the allegations do not provide a basis for a finding of deficiency or prejudice. However, we note that subsequent to his rule 3.850 motion, Derrick filed in the trial court a motion for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.853. The State did not oppose the motion and the trial court granted the testing. The items to be tested include the bloody shirt, but also include a partially eaten hot dog, a sample from a blood drop found under a nearby picnic table, and fingernail scrapings from the victim. Accordingly, although we affirm the summary denial of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the blood evidence and videotape, we do so without prejudice to consideration of the separate DNA proceedings in the trial court.