Opinion ID: 2185069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies.

Text: Appellant contends that the attorney general has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him and for that reason the circuit court is without jurisdiction to hear the matter. When a party has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the circuit court is not automatically divested of jurisdiction to hear the matter. Rather, such failure simply supplies the court with a reason for refusing to hear the suit in appropriate circumstances. Whether such circumstances are present in a given case is a matter of discretion of the court involved. Appellant argues here that because the department of natural resources could issue an abatement order under these facts, the attorney general must seek that remedy before he is entitled to seek the aid of the circuit court. Appellant misapprehends the function of the exhaustion rule. The rule of exhaustion contemplates a situation where some administrative action is under way but is as yet uncompleted. Wisconsin Collectors Asso. v. Thorp Finance Corp. (1966), 32 Wis. 2d 36, 47, 145 N. W. 2d 33; United States v. Western Pac. R. Co. (1956), 352 U. S. 59, 77 Sup. Ct. 161, 1 L. Ed. 2d 126; McKart v. United States (1969), 395 U. S. 185, 89 Sup. Ct. 1657, 23 L. Ed. 2d 194; 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, pp. 56-115, secs. 20.01 et seq. In this case there is no uncompleted administrative action since there has been no administrative action of any kind whatsoever. There is some authority for the idea that exhaustion should be applied even where no administrative activity has been commenced. 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, p. 431, sec. 597. However, application of that version of the rule results in confusion between the purpose of the exhaustion rule and the primary jurisdiction rule. Moreover, even under appellant's version of the exhaustion rule, it is recognized that exhaustion will not be required where it would cause needless circuity or irreparable harm to the party seeking judicial relief. In this case the attorney general qualifies under both exceptions. The harmful emissions complained of in this suit can never be retracted; and even if the attorney general were to obtain an abatement order from the department of natural resources, such order is not self-executing; and the attorney general would find himself, six months to a year hence, right back where he is nowin the circuit court for Buffalo county, seeking to have a public nuisance abated. On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is inapplicable to the facts of this case. A closer question is presented by the primary jurisdiction rule. The function of the primary jurisdiction rule is clearly stated by Professor Davis in his work Administrative Law-CasesTextProblems, ch. 19, p. 363: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, or exclusive primary jurisdiction, or primary decision, or preliminary resort, or prior resort, is not a doctrine that governs judicial review of administrative action. In this important respect, it is altogether different from the doctrines of exhaustion and of ripeness, which govern the timing of judicial review of administrative action. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction determines whether the court or the agency should make the initial decision. The primary jurisdiction rule does not negate the jurisdiction of the circuit court, [2] but, like the exhaustion concept, simply gives the court reason to pause and consider whether its jurisdiction should be exercised. In making that decision, the court is to consider, among others, the following factors: `. . . If the issue presented to the court involves exclusively factual issues within the peculiar expertise of the commission, the obviously better course would be to decline jurisdiction and to refer the matter to the agency. On the other hand, if statutory interpretation or issues of law are significant, the court may properly choose in its discretion to entertain the proceedings. The trial court should exercise its discretion with an understanding that the legislature has created the agency in order to afford a systematic method of fact-finding and policy-making and that the agency's jurisdiction should be given priority in the absence of a valid reason for judicial intervention.' Wisconsin Collectors Asso. v. Thorp Finance Corp., supra, at page 45. (Emphasis supplied.) City Firefighters Union v. Madison (1970), 48 Wis. 2d 262, 270, 179 N. W. 2d 800. In this case issues of law, rather than issues of fact, appear to be paramount. A substantial portion of appellant's brief is devoted to an exposition of the complex nature of the pollution problem and the technological difficulties involved in discovering methods of abating the particular kind of pollution appellant is charged with emitting. Appellant contends that there is no way, given the present state of the science, that it can effect substantial reductions in the emissions of sulphur oxides and still continue to operate. If that is true, then the fact questions in this case are relatively simple. The remaining question of what relief, if any, the circuit court should grant to the complainant is very much a question of policy and the law, and rests within the special expertise of the circuit court, not the department of natural resources.