Opinion ID: 279027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Irrelevant Evidence

Text: 6 In Chase supra, we held that the conspiracy had ended on April 5 when all of the conspirators were arrested except Chase and Smith. Thus acts done by Chase after April 5 were held to be admissible against defendants other than Chase only if they were relevant to show 'the previous existence of the conspiracy or the attainment of its illegal ends.' 372 F.2d at 460. Declarations made after the conspiracy had ended were held to be admissible only as against the declarant. The court then went on to hold that acts done by Chase and Carr after April 5 were not admissible as against Parrish, one of the jury defendants, because they shed 'no light on whether the previous conspiracy in fact existed nor    prove attainment of any of its illegal objectives.' Since the trial judge 'failed to limit, carefully and clearly, the jury's consideration of evidence after April 5 to Chase,' Parrish's conviction was reversed. The same result obtained as to Roy, the other non-jury defendant, because 'nowhere later in the proceedings, nor in stating why he concluded Roy was guilty, did the district judge give any indication that he placed no reliance on the evidence of events after April 5.' 7 Roy's case cannot be distinguished from Smith's. To hold that the acts of Chase were admissible as against Smith, we would have to say that the conspiracy continued between Chase and Smith after April 5. It is true that Smith performed some acts after April 5 while Roy did not, but the extent of those acts was to help Parrish post bond; we are unwilling to hold that posting a criminal appearance bond was a part of the conspiracy. 8 For the sake of symmetry and consistency of treatment of two non-jury defendants we consider ourselves bound by Chase. 2 Smith, like Roy, and for the same reason, is entitled to reversal of conviction.