Opinion ID: 560347
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leroy Hamby

Text: 27 Hamby was hired as a temporary maintenance helper in January 1987. In March he was given a choice between a lay-off or a demotion to janitor; Willoughby's no-demotion policy evidently was inapplicable. Hamby chose demotion. On April 27, Hamby secured a union authorization card from a fellow employee, Bucky Rodgers, and signed it. Four days later, Hamby's supervisor, Larry Murphy, fired him for inefficiency. Hamby did not press Murphy for any further explanation. 28 The ALJ acknowledged that [t]he weakness of the General Counsel's case was the absence of any direct evidence that Avecor knew of Hamby's connection to the union. Id. at 33. Hamby had spoken with Bucky Rodgers and signed the authorization card. That five-minute encounter was the sum of Hamby's involvement with the union. It occurred on premises during work hours, but Hamby was on a break and, when he signed the card, no supervisors were present. While some supervisors believed at the time that Rodgers was a union supporter, id. at 34, there is no evidence that any of them was aware of his brief encounter with Hamby. As will be detailed below, Hamby had twice discussed the union with supervisors; in neither instance, however, had he revealed his own sentiments. 29 The ALJ nevertheless concluded that the company knew of Hamby's involvement. First, Avecor submitted no evidence supporting the allegation that Hamby had been a poor employee. Second, at the time Hamby talked with Rodgers and signed the card, supervisor Murphy was closely monitoring Hamby's work performance in preparation for firing him. The implication, which the ALJ did not spell out, appears to be that Murphy probably saw Hamby and Rodgers together, and concluded that Hamby was a union supporter. Finally, four days after signing the union card, Hamby was fired. 30 Here the ALJ expressly applied the small-plant doctrine. He explained: Respondent employed less than 40 unit employees, and the plant was located in a small community. It was aware early on of union talk among its employees and specifically aware of the first union meeting after the second shift on April 24. Id. at 33-34. The evidence, as amplified through the small-plant doctrine, led the ALJ to conclude that it may be fairly inferred that Respondent was aware of Hamby's union involvement. Id. at 34. 31 The evidence supporting that inference is, we find, far from substantial. Murphy's testimony suggests that he might not have begun monitoring Hamby until sometime after the Rodgers encounter. In any event, Murphy would have had no reason to watch Hamby's work performance during a break. 32 Even if Murphy knew of it at the time, the fact that Hamby was talking to Rodgers revealed nothing about Hamby's union sympathies. What the NLRB terms Hamby's propensity to talk to other employees, Brief for Respondent at 36, was no secret to Avecor supervisors. Indeed, Murphy testified that the firing came about partly because Hamby spent too much time chatting with co-workers and neglecting his janitorial duties. 33 A discharge cannot stem from an improper motivation where the employer is ignorant of the employee's union activity. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, 509 F.2d at 496 n. 27. Hamby's activity was isolated, brief, and not especially public. The small-plant doctrine reduces the weight of evidence necessary to impute knowledge of union activities to supervisors, but, as the Sixth Circuit noted, the doctrine does not wholly eliminate the need for evidence: 34 The small size of the facility ... does not give rise to a presumption of knowledge that an employer must rebut to prevent establishment of the Board's prima facie case. Rather, the doctrine permits an inference of employer knowledge only if the Board establishes by other evidence, direct or circumstantial, that an employer had reason to notice the union activities in the facility. 35 NLRB v. Health Care Logistics, Inc., 784 F.2d 232, 236 (6th Cir.1986) (emphasis in original). Even in a tiny plant with strongly anti-union management, supervisors are not omniscient. Because there is no substantial evidence that Avecor knew of Hamby's union activity, we conclude that the prima facie showing was not made. We therefore set aside the finding that Hamby's discharge violated the NLRA.