Opinion ID: 2450038
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of the merger doctrine

Text: The merger doctrine developed in the felony-murder context as a means of restricting the scope of the felony-murder rule, particularly when it is used to support a second-degree murder conviction. People v. Sarun Chun, 45 Cal.4th 1172, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d 425, 434 (2009). The merger doctrine developed due to the understanding that the underlying felony must be an independent crime and not merely the killing itself. Thus, certain underlying felonies `merge' with the homicide and cannot be used for purposes of felony murder. Id. 91 Cal. Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d at 434-35. This court has considered the merger doctrine in the context of first-degree felony murder. In Contreras, 118 Nev. 332, 46 P.3d 661, we considered whether the merger doctrine precluded the State from pursuing a first-degree felony-murder charge based on the underlying felony of burglary with the intent to commit battery. This court recognized that it had traditionally applied the merger doctrine only when an offense is included within another offense and had refused to apply the merger doctrine in determining whether double jeopardy applies to a prosecution for both felony murder and the underlying felony. Id. at 337, 46 P.3d at 664. After considering a California decision adopting the merger doctrine to preclude a first-degree felony-murder charge based on the underlying felony of burglary with the intent to commit assault, People v. Wilson, 1 Cal.3d 431, 82 Cal.Rptr. 494, 462 P.2d 22 (1969), overruled by People v. Farley, 46 Cal.4th 1053, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 210 P.3d 361 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1285, 175 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2010), we declined to apply the merger doctrine to first-degree felony murder when the underlying felony was burglary with the intent to commit battery. Contreras, 118 Nev. at 337, 46 P.3d at 664. In doing so, we emphasized the fact that the Legislature had specifically included burglary as a felony that supports first-degree felony murder regardless of the intent underlying the burglary, and that we were reluctant to depart from the Legislature's intent in that respect. Id. ; accord Farley, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 210 P.3d at 409-11. However, Contreras did not address the merger doctrine in the context of second-degree felony murder. We do so now. The merger doctrine was first articulated and applied to second-degree felony murder in California in People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580 (1969). See also State v. Essman, 98 Ariz. 228, 403 P.2d 540 (1965); State v. Severns, 158 Kan. 453, 148 P.2d 488 (1944); People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35, 36 (1927); People v. Wagner, 245 N.Y. 143, 156 N.E. 644 (1927); State v. Branch, 244 Or. 97, 415 P.2d 766 (1966). The issue arose in Ireland in response to a trial court instruction allowing second-degree felony murder based on assault with a deadly weapon as the predicate felony. 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d at 590. The California Supreme Court held that such an instruction was improper because [t]o allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assaulta category which includes the great majority of all homicides. Id. Recently, in Sarun Chun, the California Supreme Court further clarified when an underlying felony merges with murder in the context of second-degree felony murder. 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d 425. It plainly stated that an underlying felony that is assaultive in nature necessarily merges with the homicide and cannot be the basis for a second-degree felony-murder instruction. Id. 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d at 443. The court went on to define an assaultive felony as any felony that involves a threat of immediate violent injury. Id. Accordingly, if the elements of the crime have an assaultive aspect, the crime merges with the underlying homicide even if the elements also include conduct that is not assaultive. Id. The Sarun Chun court declined to enumerate which felonies are assaultive but held that shooting at an occupied vehicle is assaultive and cannot be used as the underlying felony to support a second-degree felony-murder charge; therefore, it concluded that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on second-degree felony murder. Id. We have not always followed California's example with regard to the applicability of the merger doctrine to the felony-murder rule. As noted above, we rejected a California case in refusing to apply the merger doctrine to a first-degree felony-murder charge that was based on burglary with the intent to commit battery. Contreras, 118 Nev. at 337, 46 P.3d at 664. One of the primary reasons we declined to follow California's example was our recognition that the Legislature had specified the felonies that can be used for purposes of establishing first-degree felony murder. NRS 200.030(1)(b). We noted that it is not this court's role to override the [L]egislature's determination that [a certain felony] should be one of the enumerated felonies appropriate to elevate a homicide to felony murder. Contreras, 118 Nev. at 337, 46 P.3d at 664; accord Farley, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 210 P.3d at 409-11. But the Legislature has not specified the felonies that can be used for purposes of second-degree felony murder, and absent such clear direction, we are convinced that the merger doctrine has a worthwhile place in restricting the scope of the second-degree felony-murder rule to avoid the potential for untoward prosecutions that has led us to restrict the rule in other ways. See Ramirez, 126 Nev. at ___, 235 P.3d at 622 (requiring that the felony supporting second-degree felony murder be inherently dangerous and that there be a direct causal relationship between defendant's actions and victim's death); Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 659 P.2d 852. We are persuaded by the California Supreme Court's reasoning that allowing assaultive-type felonies to form the basis for a second-degree murder conviction based on the felony-murder rule would mean that virtually every homicide would occur in the commission of a felony and therefore be murder, unless otherwise justifiable or excusable or committed upon a sudden irresistible impulse. See Sarun Chun, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d at 435; Ireland, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d at 590; accord Moran, 158 N.E. at 36 (addressing felony-murder rule and holding that felonious assault that culminated in homicide could not be used to apply the felony-murder rule because the result would be that almost every homicide would be committed in the course of a felony so that no further evidence of intent would ever be required for a murder conviction; therefore, the felony must be one that is independent of the homicide and of the assault merged therein  (emphasis added)). However, we are mindful of the differences between the second-degree murder statutes in California and Nevada. Under our decision today, the application of the merger doctrine turns on a determination of whether the underlying felony is assaultive in nature. We therefore also must determine whether that question presents a factual determination for the jury or a legal determination for the trial court. We faced a similar decision as to the question of whether a felony is inherently dangerous for purposes of second-degree felony murder. Recently, in Ramirez v. State, we abandoned earlier cases that had suggested that that question is a legal one to be determined in the abstract based on the elements of the underlying felony; we instead held that the jury must determine whether the felony underlying a second-degree felony-murder charge is inherently dangerous based on the manner in which the felony was committed. 126 Nev. at ___n. 2, 235 P.3d at 622 n. 2. In applying the merger doctrine, we are similarly persuaded that the jury should determine whether the underlying felony is assaultive i.e., involves a threat of immediate violent injurybased on the manner in which the felony was committed. In the present case, the predicate felony for the second-degree felony-murder theory was assault with a deadly weapon. At the time that Rose shot Watkins, NRS 200.471 defined assault as [u]lawfully attempting to use physical force against another person or [i]ntentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. The offense was a felony if the assault was made with the use of a deadly weapon. The assault here is based on Rose's act of aiming the gun at or near Watkins and telling her to get off the phone. The conduct could be viewed as using a deadly weapon to intentionally place the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm by threatening her with immediate violent injury. A jury therefore could find that the felony was assaultive and merged with the homicide. Alternatively, a properly instructed jury could have found implied malice based on the circumstances of the killing, see NRS 200.020(2), and still convicted Rose of second-degree murder. But based on the facts of this case and the conflicting evidence as to Rose's state of mind, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found Rose guilty of second-degree murder absent the omitted instruction. [2] Alfred, 120 Nev. at 415, 92 P.3d at 1250. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We concur: PICKERING and HARDESTY, JJ.