Opinion ID: 7116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: obstruction of justice enhancement claim

Text: 4 Como argues that the district court erred in enhancing his offense level for obstruction of justice without sufficient factual findings relative to his untruthful testimony at the suppression hearing. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 provides for an enhancement [i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense. Though the court may not penalize a defendant for denying his guilt as an exercise of his constitutional rights, a sentence may be enhanced if the defendant commits perjury. United States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1308 (5th Cir.1993). A defendant testifying under oath commits perjury if he gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony. United States v. Dunnigan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). We review a district court's finding of obstructive conduct for clear error. Laury, 985 F.2d at 1308. 5 If the defendant objects to a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice based on his testimony, the district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do so, under the perjury definition. Dunnigan, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1117. A separate and clear finding on each element of the alleged perjury, although preferable, is not required. Laury, 985 F.2d at 1308. 6 Specifically, Como contends that the district court failed to address the materiality of his falsehoods. Material, as defined in the commentary to the sentencing guidelines, means evidence, fact, statement, or information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 comment. (n. 5). At Como's sentencing hearing, the district court made the following findings regarding Como's alleged perjury, stating: 7 Of course, I presided over the suppression hearing and the trial. I'm familiar with the statements made and the position taken, although or albeit through cross-examination during the trial. And I do not believe that Mr. Como was totally candid and truthful at the suppression hearing as established by other testimony and evidence presented. 8 In Dunnigan, Supreme Court approved the following findings made by the district court:The court finds that the defendant was untruthful at trial with respect to material matters in this case. [B]y virtue of her failure to give truthful testimony on material matters that were designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case, the court concludes that the false testimony at trial warrants an upward adjustment by two levels. 9 Dunnigan, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1117 (emphasis and brackets in opinion). The Supreme Court concluded that there was support in the record for those findings because numerous witnesses contradicted the defendant regarding so many facts on which she could not have been mistaken. Id. 1 10 Como argues that his testimony at the suppression hearing was not material because it did not relate to the primary issue raised in his motion to suppress; i.e., the lack of inventory procedures in the Harris County Sheriff's Office. This argument, however, ignores counsel's argument at the suppression hearing regarding the reasonableness of the arrest for a traffic stop. Contradicting Deputy Dupont's testimony regarding the U-turn, Como testified that he drove straight through the light went it became green. Como testified that Dupont gave no reason for stopping him, and he was not aware of any traffic violation that he may have committed. 11 The court below did not expressly find that Como's falsehoods were material. This Court, however, has upheld an implicit finding of materiality when it determined that the false testimony was obviously 'material' in that it was clearly 'designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case.'  United States v. Cabral-Castillo, 35 F.3d 182, 187 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1157, 130 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1995). 12 The government contends that the court's finding that the false statements were material may be inferred from the context of the exchange among the attorneys and the judge at the sentencing hearing. We agree. 13 During the sentencing hearing, the court referenced the government's motion for upward departure which was based on the arguments that Como's criminal history category score did not accurately reflect his criminal history and that Como had obstructed justice by perjuring himself during the suppression hearing. The court stated that it could upwardly depart from the guideline range or make a finding of obstruction of justice, which would increase the guideline range. The court then invited any further arguments or comments regarding the motion. 14 In regard to the issue at bar, the government argued that: 15 [Como] completely disregarded his oath on the stand at the suppression hearing and took one position that the guns were planted on him, that he wasn't properly stopped by the police officers, and at the trial, his attorney took a completely different position with respect to the case; that being that Mr. Como was working as a police informant and that he had placed willingly and voluntarily those guns in the back of his--in the trunk of his car to further an HPD homicide investigation. 16 In response, defense counsel argued as follows: 17 First of all, the defense that was put on was really through cross-examining the Government's witnesses. It was through asking them questions about what they did and what Mr. Como was doing. Mr. Como did not testify during the course of the trial. 18 He did testify at the suppression hearing. And at the suppression hearing, Mr. Como's testimony was really--my intent to use his testimony was focused towards the circumstances surrounding his stop. The Court might recall that it was the Government that started questioning him about the guns and how--and what he may have said to the Harris County Sheriff's deputy. 19 Now, that wasn't something that I was using Mr. Como to give evidence to the Court ... about that. What I was focusing on was the circumstances of his stop, and I wasn't trying to seek suppression of those statements based on his denial. It would be--it would completely eviscerate his attempt to suppress statements if he denied that he had ever made them. 20 The question is whether these--this was even material to the proceeding also, Your Honor, because at the time of the suppression hearing what I focused on was whether the Harris County Sheriff's Department had valid inventory procedures, which would have nothing to do whatsoever with whether or not Mr. Como told the deputy what the deputy said he was told. 21 And so I don't know how what Mr. Como said might have tended to have influenced the outcome of the suppression hearing or of the trial, given the arguments that were raised at the suppression hearing and at the trial, and the fact that he did not testify. 22 (emphasis added). 23 Defense counsel then specifically mentioned that [t]he Guideline commentary itself makes clear under ... Note 3(f) that he must provide materially false information. 2 The government replied that Como misrepresented the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop [w]hich did impact the suppression hearing because if the stop had been unlawful as Mr. Como claimed, the guns would have been suppressed, and that would have a material bearing on the case. 24 At that point during the sentencing hearing, the court articulated the previously quoted findings: 25 Of course, I presided over the suppression hearing and the trial. I'm familiar with the statements made and the position taken, although or albeit through cross-examination during the trial. And I do not believe that Mr. Como was totally candid and truthful at the suppression hearing as established by other testimony and evidence presented. 26 Both the government and defense counsel made arguments regarding the materiality of Como's testimony. Although the court made no explicit finding of materiality, viewed in the context of the attorneys' argument, it is apparent that the court found the testimony material. Moreover, the record indicates that Como's false testimony at the suppression hearing was material as defined in the guideline commentary, and thus, it is sufficient to uphold an implicit finding of materiality by the district court. Cabral-Castillo, 35 F.3d at 187.