Opinion ID: 1125178
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court Properly Refused to Disturb the Jury's Resolution of the Agency Issue.

Text: Harris and Moore first challenge the jury's conclusion that Satterwhite was not an agent of Keys. This court's role in reviewing a grant of a motion for a directed verdict or JNOV is not to weigh conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, but rather to determine whether [the] evidence, when viewed in [the] light most favorable to the non-moving party, is such that reasonable persons could not differ in their judgment.... [I]f there is room for diversity of opinion among reasonable people, the question is one for the jury. Korean Air Lines Co. v. State, 779 P.2d 333, 338 (Alaska 1989) (citations and quotations omitted). Since the evidence does not compel the conclusion that an agency relation existed, we must affirm the decision of the superior court. Under Alaska law, `an agency relation exists only if there has been a manifestation of the principal to the agent that the agent may act on his account and consent by the agent so to act.' Bruton v. Automatic Welding & Supply Corp., 513 P.2d 1122, 1126 (Alaska 1973) (citation omitted) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 15). If the arrangement required Satterwhite to act on Keys's account, subject to Keys's control, an agency relation existed, and Harris's and Moore's claims regarding the nature, scope, and duration of that relation would merit consideration. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1. However, if the arrangement were characterized as an agreement in which Satterwhite would live in the motor home on site in exchange for such benefits as might accrue to Keys from occupancy by Satterwhite, Keys and Satterwhite would have been landlord and tenant, or bailor and bailee (given the personal property nature of the motor home [7] ) and not principal and agent. [8] See id. (holding that loan of tractor was a bailment, and did not create agency relation). Alaska case law does not delineate precisely between an agency relationship and a landlord-tenant relationship or a bailor-bailee relationship. Every non-gratuitous tenancy or bailment results in the tenant/bailee serving the purposes of the landlord/bailor, which arguably could be acting on the account of the owner. Indeed, it is clear that, when Satterwhite began occupying the motor home, he served Keys's purposes by living at the site. [9] However, Harris and Moore cite no authority, and we are aware of none, which indicates that every tenancy or bailment which serves the owner's purposes renders the tenant/bailee an agent of the owner. Indeed, other jurisdictions recognize bailments for hire or bailments for mutual benefit, but do not characterize such relationships as agency relationships. See, e.g., Waggoner v. General Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 1195 (Wyoming 1989) (recognizing bailment for mutual benefit); see also Bannister v. Hertz Corp., 316 S.C. 513, 450 S.E.2d 629, 630 (App. 1994) (holding that bailment, whether gratuitous or for hire, does not render bailor responsible for negligent uses of property where bailor has relinquished control of that property). Similarly, [i]t is accepted law that the relationship of lessor and lessee is not that of principal and agent. DeArmon v. B. Mears Corp., 312 N.C. 749, 325 S.E.2d 223, 227 (1985) (quoting Brown v. Ward, 221 N.C. 344, 20 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1942)); see also Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 815, 818 (Okla. 1963) ([T]enancy alone will not render the landlord liable for the torts of his tenant.). Mere occupancy of the motor home by Satterwhite and performing the duties that one would ordinarily expect of a tenant or bailee occupant would not entail sufficient acting on the account of Keys to create an agency relationship. Further, the Restatement's requirement that an agent act on the principal's account should be interpreted as requiring action under the principal's control, rather than merely action which serves the principal's purposes. See Nava v. Truly Nolen Exterminating, 140 Ariz. 497, 683 P.2d 296, 299 (App. 1984) (holding that crucial distinction between agency and bailment is the bailee's freedom from control by the bailor). Hence, if the jury could have concluded that the services to be performed by Satterwhite for Keys did not go beyond those inherent in a normal landlord-tenant or bailor-bailee relationship, or if the jury could have concluded that Satterwhite was not subject to control by Keys, its conclusion that no agency relationship existed had sufficient support to withstand review. There was evidence that the agreement concerning the use of the motor home was that Satterwhite could live in it. His only duty was to keep it clean and not permit any smoking in it. From this evidence the jury could have concluded that there was no agreement for services beyond that inherent in a normal landlord-tenant or bailor-bailee relationship and therefore no agency relationship was created. Concerning the issue of control, Satterwhite failed to keep the motor home clean, despite the fact that Keys permitted him to live there only on the condition that he keep the motor home clean. In addition, Satterwhite abandoned the site for several weeks without informing Keys, and then returned without Keys's knowledge or consent. Moreover, Satterwhite allowed Harris to stay at the site even though Keys had ordered Harris to leave. On this evidence, a jury could conclude that Keys did not in fact exercise control of Satterwhite's conduct at the site. It is less clear whether Keys had the right to control Satterwhite, but declined to exercise that right, or whether Keys lacked the right entirely. However, Keys's failure to exercise control, despite the fact that Satterwhite had nearly destroyed his motor home, suggests that the ability to control was absent. Based on this evidence, a jury could conclude that Keys retained no right to control Satterwhite beyond the right to terminate the bailment or tenancy and expel Satterwhite from the motor home. From this conclusion, it would also follow that Keys and Satterwhite were not principal and agent. Since a jury could reasonably conclude that Keys and Satterwhite were not principal and agent, [10] the jury's conclusion that no agency relationship existed must be upheld. [11]