Opinion ID: 884966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Fourth Claim for Relief

Text: ¶ 44 Gollehon contends that the State is responsible for an alleged substantial delay in bringing his case to a full and final conclusion, in violation of his rights under Article II, Sections 17 and 22 of the Montana Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and that his death sentence should be vacated. Essentially, the Petitioner argues that an unusually long period of time on death row implicates the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. ¶ 45 Petitioner complains that the Brady claim is causing the alleged delay and it is the State which is responsible for lengthy litigation of the claim. His argument finds its genesis in Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421, 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995), a denial of certiorari, where Justices Stevens and Breyer suggested that such an argument would benefit from further study and that the issue should be postponed until it has been addressed by other courts. ¶ 46 In Smith, 280 Mont. at 183-85, 931 P.2d at 1287-88, we rejected a claim that the defendant's rights of due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated because of the amount of time he spent on death row and the number of sentencing hearings held in his case. Smith also relied on Justice Stevens' memorandum in Lackey. ¶ 47 Gollehon's argument is premised on the contention that his length of time on death row was caused by a delay in the post-trial proceedings caused by the State. Yet, despite this Court's urging on two occasions to file his postconviction petition, the Petitioner continued the delay by filing a federal habeas corpus petition and an amended petition which included a Brady claim which he knew had not been exhausted in the state courts. The federal court noted this and, at the Petitioner's request, stayed it pending the exhaustion of his Brady claim in the state court. Gollehon ultimately filed his petition on December 2, 1996, four years and nine months after the date of conviction, coming just under the then five-year deadline. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the majority of the delay in this case was caused by the Petitioner pursuing his constitutional and statutory rights and not caused by the actions of the State. ¶ 48 The Fourth Claim of Relief is denied.