Opinion ID: 736236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: AGM's Policy Regarding Applicants for Employment Who Hold

Text: Another Full-Time Job 24 AGM argues that Zell was not hired because it has a nondiscriminatory policy prohibiting the employment of those who simultaneously hold another full-time job. AGM therefore asserts that it did not violate the Act because it has demonstrated a legitimate reason for asking Zell about his union employment and for not hiring him. Because our analysis of the merits of this defense with regard to the refusal to hire allegation affects our view of the defense with regard to the unlawful interrogation allegation, we will begin with the refusal to hire allegation.
25 Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to engage in conduct intended to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in exercising their rights under section 7 of the Act. 2 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 8(a)(3) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against employees with regard to terms or tenure of employment for the purpose of discouraging membership in a labor organization. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Although sections 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) are not coterminous, a violation of section 8(a)(3) constitutes a derivative violation of section 8(a)(1). Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 698 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 1467, 1471 n. 4, 75 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983). The General Counsel of the NLRB bears the burden of proof in unfair labor practices cases. See Fluor Daniel, 102 F.3d at 831. 26 In NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 397-98, 401-03, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2472-73, 2474-75, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983), the Supreme Court approved the Board's approach, established in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1980 WL 12312 (1980), to analyzing cases involving charges of employment actions motivated by antiunion animus and employer protestations of legitimate reasons for the actions. W.F. Bolin Co. v. NLRB, 70 F.3d 863, 870 (6th Cir.1995) (quoting Birch Run Welding & Fabricating Inc. v. NLRB, 761 F.2d 1175, 1179 (6th Cir.1985)). First, the General Counsel must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case that anti-union animus motivated or contributed, at least in part, to an employment action. See Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 400, 103 S.Ct. at 2473-74; W.F. Bolin Co., 70 F.3d at 870; NLRB v. Cook Family Foods, Ltd., 47 F.3d 809, 816 (6th Cir.1995). If this prima facie case is established, then the employer can avoid being held in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) if it proves, also by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employment action rested on the employee's unprotected conduct as well and that the employee would have lost his job in any event. Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 400, 103 S.Ct. at 2473; accord Cook Family Foods, 47 F.3d at 816. This latter showing is regarded as an affirmative defense, and if the proffered business justification is deemed pretextual, the defense fails. See W.F. Bolin Co., 70 F.3d at 873; NLRB v. Vemco, Inc., 989 F.2d 1468, 1482 (6th Cir.), amended by 997 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir.1993). 27 Drawing upon McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), this Circuit recently held that in a refusal to hire case in which an established employer seeks applicants for newly created jobs, the General Counsel's prima facie case consists of proving: 28 (1) that the employer is covered by the Act; (2) that the applicant is covered by the Act; (3) that the applicant actually applied for a job and was qualified for a job for which the employer is seeking applicants; (4) despite his qualifications the applicant was not hired; (5) anti-union animus contributed to the decision not to hire an applicant; and (6) after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons with the applicant's qualifications. 29 Fluor Daniel, 102 F.3d at 832. In defending this newly-articulated prima facie test against claims that it conflicts with Wright Line, we noted that we had no desire to disturb Wright Line 's test for discriminatory animus where it is applicable. We simply believe it is inapplicable in cases involving hiring rather than discharge or discrimination in other terms or conditions of employment against those already holding a position. See id. at 833. Our reliance on McDonnell Douglas makes clear, however, that after the General Counsel has established a prima facie case of union-based discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's rejection of the applicant. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The prima facie case simply serves to eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the rejection of a job applicant. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). 30 Thus, under either Fluor Daniel or Wright Line, an employer can assert a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to hire a particular applicant. Although refusing to hire a paid union organizer solely because of that status would be unlawful, see Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 398, 103 S.Ct. at 2472-73, the employer argued here that the paid union organizer was not hired because of its policy against hiring individuals who intend to work simultaneously for another employer on a full-time basis. However, the Board improperly relied on the ALJ's assessment of the legitimacy of AGM's dual employment policy and, in the process, it suggested that such a policy cannot rebut an unfair labor practice claim. Although the Board suggested that it believed that AGM's proffered business justification was pretextual--[AGM] claims that it would not hire a full-time employee who had a full-time job elsewhere, but Menefee never asked if Zell's union job would interfere with his job with [AGM]--it was really questioning the legitimacy of such a rule. In other words, in adopting the ALJ's findings, the Board appears to have found that an employer cannot assert that such a dual employment policy was the basis of its employment action because such a rule is not legitimate. The Board's determination as to what qualifies as a defense against an unfair labor practice charge is a question of law, see E & L Transport Co. v. NLRB, 85 F.3d 1258, 1265 (7th Cir.1996), subject to de novo review, see Fluor Daniel, 102 F.3d at 826. We conclude that the Board's decision in this respect was based on legal errors. 31 While paid union organizers are employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), see NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 450, 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 371 (1995), that does not mean that an employer's refusal to hire a paid union organizer is always unlawful under section 8(a)(3). 3 Rather, as in all cases involving charges of employment actions motivated by antiunion animus, the employer should be permitted to attempt to demonstrate that it had a legitimate business reason for taking employment action against a paid union organizer. Indeed, just because an employee is a paid union organizer does not mean that an employer can take no adverse actions against that employee. 4 See Town & Country, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 457 (A company faced with unlawful (or possibly unlawful) activity can discipline or dismiss the worker, file a complaint with the Board, or notify law enforcement authorities.); Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1330 (D.C.Cir.1992) (holding that paid union organizers are employees within the meaning of the Act, but noting that we are ready to assume arguendo that Willmar made out so powerful a case of likely disloyalty that the Board would have had to conclude that rejection of Hendrix's application on that ground would have been legitimate and not in violation of the anti-discrimination and anti-coercion provisions of the Act.); cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 186, 61 S.Ct. 845, 849, 85 L.Ed. 1271 (1941) (stating that the Act does not impose an obligation on the employer to favor union members in hiring employees). 32 Additionally, a rule prohibiting an employee from working two full-time jobs is legitimate. See H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 75 (4th Cir.1989). 5 An employer could reasonably conclude that the work product of an employee would suffer if that employee worked two full-time jobs. Additionally, an employer could require its employees to work overtime and on the weekends on a regular or irregular basis, and a second job would make it more difficult for an employee to comply with those requirements. Of course, such a rule must be applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion, see H.B. Zachry, 886 F.2d at 75; cf. Airborne Freight Corp. v. NLRB, 728 F.2d 357, 358 (6th Cir.1984); Burger King Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1053, 1055 (6th Cir.1984), and must be promulgated for nondiscriminatory reasons, see Tualatin Elec., Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1237, 1995 WL 788569 (1995) (finding that substantial evidence indicated that an anti-moonlighting policy was adopted as a result of employer's anti-union animus). The Board could reasonably find that a rule has been discriminatorily or laxly administered or that the timing of the rule's promulgation indicates that employees are being targeted for union activities. See Aquatech, 926 F.2d at 547. But this goes to whether the employer has asserted the rule as a pretext for union-based discrimination, not to whether the rule can be asserted as a defense in the first place. 6 33 The Board actually concedes in its brief that employers may promulgate and enforce nondiscriminatory hiring practices excluding dual full-time employment candidates from consideration. In fact, the Board's decision in this case conflicts with prior Board statements. In Willmar Electric Service, Inc., 303 N.L.R.B. 245, 1991 WL 135226 (1991), enforced, 968 F.2d 1327 (D.C.Cir.1992), the Board adhered to its holding that full-time paid union organizers are employees within the meaning of the Act and thus cannot be denied employment simply on the basis of that union activity or status. But it noted in a footnote that 34 [a]n employer may, however, lawfully refuse to hire a statutorily protected employee applicant, including a paid union organizer, on the basis of a nondiscriminatory policy against hiring any individual who, for example, seeks only temporary employment, applies while working for another employer, or intends to work simultaneously for more than one employer. The Respondent here did not prove that it refused to hire ... pursuant to any such nondiscriminatory policy. 35 303 N.L.R.B. at 246 n. 2 (emphasis added). In addition, in his concurring opinion in Sunland Construction Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1992 WL 390105 (1992), Member Raudabaugh opined that an employer with a nondiscriminatory policy or practice of refusing to hire persons who will be simultaneously employed by another employer could lawfully refuse to hire a paid union organizer. 36 While the General Counsel now agrees that such a policy is a valid defense, the Board found otherwise. Even if the Board's decision can be construed as finding that AGM's proffered justification was pretextual, it erred in suggesting that AGM's policy was invalid as a matter of law. We cannot be certain the extent to which the Board's view of this policy affected any finding that the policy was pretext. 7 Here, the Board erroneously suggested that an employer's policy regarding the hiring of individuals who intend to work two full-time jobs simultaneously was legally invalid as a defense to an alleged refusal to hire. Thus, we conclude that the Board applied the wrong legal standard in analyzing this portion of the case.
37 Our opinion regarding the validity of AGM's policy affects our analysis of the unlawful interrogation allegation. An employer violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogating its employees about their union activities. NLRB v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 750 F.2d 524, 527 (6th Cir.1984). The basic test for evaluating the legality of an interrogation is  'whether under all of the circumstances the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain, coerce or interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act.'  Dayton Typographic Serv. v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 1188, 1194 (6th Cir.1985) (quoting Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1984), enforced, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.1985)). Among the factors relevant in determining the coercive effect of employer interrogation are the background of employer hostility to unionization, the nature of the information sought, the questioner's identity, and the place and method of interrogation. Id. An employer with a legitimate reason may question employees concerning union matters without violating section 8(a)(1). See Mead Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 1013, 1025 (11th Cir.1983). 38 With regard to the unlawful interrogation claim, the Board found it unnecessary to determine whose version of the telephone conversation was credible, because it found that as a matter of law it is unlawful to refuse to hire a full-time paid union organizer because of that status. Yet, the Board ultimately credited Menefee's version of the conversation, which focused on Zell's employment with, not his membership in, the Union. The Board did not consider whether AGM had a valid reason for asking Zell whether he would remain employed by the Union if he came to work for AGM. Because we hold that an employer may assert that it refused to hire a paid union organizer because of a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy regarding applicants who intend to work simultaneously elsewhere, it follows that an employer could ask an applicant whether he or she intends to work full-time for two employers. The nature of the information sought would be related to a legitimate policy of the employer. Id. Consequently, in the absence of other circumstances suggesting that the inquiry was coercive, the interrogation would be lawful. Because the Board concluded that AGM's policy was invalid as a matter of law, it failed to properly consider its relevance to the unlawful interrogation claim, even though it credited Menefee's version of the conversation with its emphasis on Zell's employee status with the Union. Accordingly, the Board's decision with regard to this allegation has no reasonable basis in law. See Pentre Elec., 998 F.2d at 368.