Opinion ID: 751691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tenancy at Sufferance

Text: 8 The court ruled that since no landlord-tenant relationship existed between Dale and Smith, see Carlton Chambers Co. v. Trask, 261 Mass. 264, 158 N.E. 786, 788 (1927), Dale could not control [Smith] as the sublessee.... We now examine its thesis. 9 It is widely acknowledged, in Massachusetts and elsewhere, that a sublessee becomes a tenant at sufferance in relation to the lessor upon termination of the sublessor's tenancy, at least absent an agreement to the contrary. See Evans v. Reed, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 308, 309 (1855) (Had [the sublessee] remained after [the sublessor] left, and [the owner] accepted rent of him, it would have been evidence from which an agreement to accept [the sublessee] as a tenant might have been implied.); 3 see also Staples v. Collins, 321 Mass. 449, 73 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1947) ([A] tenancy at sufferance is readily changed into a tenancy at will by express or implied agreement of the parties.... [Continued] payment and acceptance of rent [on the regular rent day], standing alone, are prima facie proof of the creation of a tenancy at will....). There is no contention or evidence that Dale accepted rent from Smith after the expiration of the Realty Trust subtenancy. Thus, by holding over after the Realty Trust sublease with Dale had expired, Smith became a tenant at sufferance. See Evans, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) at 309. 10 Although the absence of privity--either of contract or estate--between the landowner and the sublessee precludes an action for rent against the sublessee, see 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 509, at 488-89 (1970); 1 A. James Casner, American Law of Property § 3.62, at 313 (1952), the present action is not for rent but for use and occupancy of the property by Smith during its holdover following expiration of the Realty Trust subtenancy with Dale. See Lowell Hous. Auth. v. Save-Mor Furniture Stores, Inc., 346 Mass. 426, 193 N.E.2d 585, 588 (1963) (The liability of a tenant at sufferance is not to be determined arbitrarily by the rent fixed in a lease with the former owner, but rather is the sum which the trier of fact finds the use and occupation were reasonably worth.). 11 The court below held, in reliance on Dennett v. Nesson, 244 Mass. 299, 138 N.E. 381 (1923), that Smith could not have become a tenant at sufferance prior to execution of the state district court judgment for possession, initially scheduled for August 1, 1990. 4 The court further noted that a tenancy at sufferance existed [in Dennett ], if it existed at all, only after judgment for possession was granted to the landlord. The core question in Dennett, however, was whether the order staying the judgment of ejectment resulted in a new tenancy at will once the holdover tenant commenced making the rent payments required by court order. Thus, the Dennett holding--that [t]he mere acceptance of rent, in the circumstances here disclosed, falls far short of requiring a finding that a new tenancy at will was created[,] id. 138 N.E. at 382--is inapposite to the question presented here: at what point does a tenancy at sufferance arise? We turn to the latter question. 12 As explained above, see supra p. 847, a sublessee which holds over after its sublessor's tenancy has terminated becomes a tenant at sufferance vis-a-vis the property owner. See Evans, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) at 309. In other words, the tenancy at sufferance arises by virtue of the holdover. See Benton v. Williams, 202 Mass. 189, 88 N.E. 843, 844 (1909). Thus, a tenant for life, for years, a periodic tenant or a tenant at will who holds over without the consent of his landlord after his estate is brought to an end is a tenant at sufferance, and this however his estate may have terminated. 1 A. James Casner, American Law of Property § 3.32, at 235 (1952) (footnote omitted); see also C. Healy Assocs. v. Concord Oil Co., 1992 WL 24068, at  1 (Mass.App.Div.1992) (After the termination of the lease, subtenant in possession was a tenant at sufferance.). 13 In an instructive application of this legal principle, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) was called upon to decide whether the plaintiff, who had acquired title by eminent domain, could treat the prior property owner's lessee as a tenant at sufferance. See Lowell Hous. Auth., 346 Mass. 426, 193 N.E.2d 585. The SJC held that the tenant, simultaneously with the taking [--i.e., upon the transfer of title--] became a tenant at sufferance of the [new owner]. Id. 193 N.E.2d at 587 (emphasis added). Thus, Lowell effectively precludes the position taken by the court below, that the property owner first must obtain final judgment in a summary process action before it can acquire the right to possession. 14 Summary process actions were designed for use in just such circumstances. The Massachusetts statute provides: If ... a person holding under [the lessee of land ] holds possession without right after the determination of a lease by its own limitation ..., the person entitled to the land ... may recover possession thereof under this chapter. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 239, § 1 (emphasis added). See Commonwealth v. Goldberg, 319 Mass. 7, 64 N.E.2d 438, 438-39 (1946) ([A] tenant ... whose tenancy has terminated is liable to summary process under [Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 239, § 1], as a 'lessee of land' who 'holds possession without right after the determination of a lease ....' ) (quoting Marster v. Cling, 163 Mass. 477, 40 N.E. 763, 764 (1895)). Thus, the Massachusetts statute plainly contemplates that a tenancy at sufferance may predate the summary process action itself. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 239, § 3 ([I]f the court finds that the [property owner ] is entitled to possession, [the property owner] shall have judgment and execution for possession .... (emphasis added)); see also Ghoti Estates, Inc. v. Freda's Capri Restaurant, Inc., 332 Mass. 17, 123 N.E.2d 232, 238 (1954) (We are of opinion that ... if [the defendant] was a tenant at sufferance when the action of summary process was instituted no notice of any kind was required.); Marster v. Cling, 163 Mass. 477, 40 N.E. 763, 764 (1895) ([Once] the defendants were made tenants at sufferance ..., the plaintiff, after giving his notices, had the right to immediate possession [by summary process].). Accordingly, a tenancy at sufferance may arise before--indeed, even absent--any summary process action. See, e.g., Lowell Hous. Auth., 346 Mass. 426, 193 N.E.2d 585. 15 The court below erroneously concluded that the Smith tenancy at sufferance had arisen by virtue of the state district court order granting Dale the right to take possession in the summary process action. See Ghoti Estates, 123 N.E.2d at 238 (tenancy at sufferance began before entry of judgment in summary process action). Instead, Smith became a tenant at sufferance on June 1, 1989, by holding over after the Realty Trust subtenancy had terminated under the terms of its sublease with International following Realty Trust's failure to renew the sublease in a timely manner. See Evans, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) at 309. 5 Thus, the Realty Trust subtenancy terminated on May 31, 1989, whereupon Smith, Realty Trust's former sublessee, became a tenant at sufferance. 16 Next we consider the claim raised in the Smith cross-appeal: whether the court correctly ruled that the Smith tenancy at sufferance ended June 30, 1991, because (i) the summary process action against Smith terminated on May 1, 1991, with the dismissal of the Smith appeal from the state district court order, and (ii) final judgment in the summary process action would have been entered by June 30, 1991, but for the unsuccessful second appeal taken by Realty Trust. 17 Smith contends that it ceased to be a tenant at sufferance on January 1, 1991, when it surrendered the property to Realty Trust, thereby enabling Dale to take possession. Dale responds that Smith was a tenant at sufferance throughout the second Realty Trust appeal from the state district court order in the summary process action, since Dale could not enter upon the property pending the Realty Trust appeal without regard to whether Smith itself took a further appeal. Dale also maintains that Smith remained a tenant at sufferance until February 14, 1992, the date Dale became entitled to recover possession of the property pursuant to the order of possession entered in the summary process action. 18 A tenant who wrongfully holds over remains at sufferance for such time as [it] may occupy or detain the [premises]. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 186, § 3. Accordingly, as Smith asserted no right to continue its use or occupancy after vacating the premises on January 1, 1991, nothing prevented Dale from lawfully recovering possession of the property vis-a-vis Smith. 19 Relying on Bandera v. Donohue, 326 Mass. 563, 95 N.E.2d 654 (1950), the court below held that Smith's tenancy at sufferance could not have been terminated simply by its abandonment of the property, because there was no evidence that Dale had accepted its surrender of possession. Bandera is inapposite to the present context, however, as it involved an attempted abandonment of a contractual tenancy for years without the landlord's consent. The SJC simply held that the tenant remained liable in accordance with the terms of the lease. Id. 95 N.E.2d at 656. 20 In the present context, however, as Smith was merely a tenant at sufferance its abandonment of the premises in no sense impeded--from that time forward at least--Dale's right to assume immediate possession vis-a-vis Smith. Accordingly, upon its abandonment of the premises, Smith's tenancy at sufferance terminated. See Benton v. Williams, 202 Mass. 189, 88 N.E. 843, 844 (1909) (A tenant at sufferance may leave at any time without notice or liability.). 21 Finally, Dale maintains that Smith detained the property pending its appeal from the order entered in the summary process action and throughout the ensuing Realty Trust appeal from the May 1, 1991, order dismissing its first appeal. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 186, § 3 (Tenants at sufferance in possession of land ... shall be liable to pay rent therefor for such time as they may occupy or detain the same.) (emphasis added). Even though Smith had vacated the property completely on January 1, 1991, the court held that while its initial appeal from the summary possession order remained pending Dale was prevented from regaining possession of the premises. Although neither the court nor Dale articulated a legal rationale for their view, presumably Smith was deemed to have detained the property during its appeal from the summary process order despite the fact that it had vacated the premises on January 1, 1991. 22 As previously noted, Smith became a tenant at sufferance on June 1, 1989, upon the expiration of the Realty Trust sublease, rather than upon entry of judgment in the summary process action. See pp. 847-849, supra. Thus, since the right to possession remained with Dale throughout the unsuccessful Smith appeal, nothing prevented Dale--via-a-vis Smith--from resuming lawful possession once Smith vacated the premises on January 1, 1991. 6