Opinion ID: 1126626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The complaint alleged sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for fraud.

Text: In considering this assignment of error it must be noted that no motion or demurrer was filed by defendant prior to trial. As a result, the complaint must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiffs. Rohner et ux. v. Neville, 230 Or. 31, 33, 365 P.2d 614, 368 P.2d 391 (1961). This is particularly true after a verdict in favor of plaintiff. Western Feed Co. v. Heidloff, 230 Or. 324, 343, 370 P.2d 612 (1962). Defendant first contends that nowhere in plaintiffs' complaint is it alleged that the representations are material   . In construing these allegations as a whole, however, it appears that the alleged representation was to the effect that the blank spaces in the contract form would be filled in according to the terms previously agreed upon, including the trade-in allowance of $900, as previously agreed. Such an alleged representation was a material representation because the trade-in allowance on the sale of a car is a material and important term in such a transaction and agreement. Having alleged such facts, it was not necessary to allege the legal conclusion that such a representation was material. Nisson v. Tillman et ux., 213 Or. 133, at pp. 137-138, 323 P.2d 329, at p. 331 (1958), cited by defendant, is not to the contrary, but holds that a complaint    is sufficient if it alleges facts showing that    a material representation was made to the plaintiff    and that it is sufficient if the pleading as a whole may be said to contain each of these necessary elements. Defendant also contends that the complaint did not allege that this representation was known to be false and made with an intent to deceive plaintiffs; that this is particularly necessary in this case because plaintiffs' complaint is predicated upon a promise not performed, for the reason that non-performance of a promise does not of itself constitute fraud (citing Butte Motor Company v. Strand, 225 Or. 317, 358 P.2d 279 (1960)), and that in such a case it is also necessary to allege that defendant had no intention of performing at the time the promise was made (citing Holland v. Lentz, 239 Or. 332, 397 P.2d 787 (1964), and other cases to the same effect). Again, however, and construing these allegations as a whole, we hold that the allegations that defendant represented to plaintiffs that the blank spaces in the contract would be filled in as previously agreed and that defendant concealed from plaintiffs the fact that they would not be allowed $900 as a trade-in value of their old car, as agreed, but would be allowed only the sum of Five Hundred Ninety-nine Dollars ($599.00), sufficiently alleged both knowledge that the representation was false, as well as an intent to deceive plaintiffs and not to perform the promise to fill in the contract form so as to allow $900 as a trade-in allowance. In Debow v. Nelson, 131 Or. 478, 480, 283 P. 34 (1929), this court held that it is not necessary to allege scienter or knowledge in express terms and that when the averments of fraud are stated in terms that necessarily imply that the person making the representations knew their falsity, the pleading is sufficient in that respect, particularly in the absence of a motion or demurrer. Similarly, in this case, we hold that these allegations in plaintiffs' complaint were stated in terms that necessarily implied not only that defendant knew that the alleged representation was false, but also that defendant intended by that representation to deceive plaintiffs and did not intend to perform the promise to allow $900 as a trade-in allowance, as agreed upon. See also Hardy v. Oregon Eilers Music House, 99 Or. 340, 356, 195 P. 563 (1921), and Heise et ux. v. Pilot Rock Lbr. Co., 222 Or. 78, 86, 352 P.2d 1072 (1960). Butte Motor Company v. Strand, supra , and Holland v. Lentz, supra , cited by defendant are not to the contrary. For these reasons we reject defendant's contention that the facts stated in plaintiffs' complaint did not constitute a cause of action.