Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instructions Regarding the Reasonable Doubt Standard

Text: Defendant contends a number of instructions given to the jury (Former CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 2.01, 2.02, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.51, 8.83.1) were unconstitutional because they misled jurors regarding the reasonable doubt standard and impermissibly lightened the prosecution's burden of proof. Each of his contentions is without merit. Defendant initially challenges three interrelated instructions on circumstantial evidence: former CALJIC No. 2.01 (sufficiency of circumstantial evidence generally); former CALJIC No. 2.02 (sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent or mental state); and former CALJIC No. 8.83.1 (special circumstancessufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove required mental state). Defendant argues these instructions (1) misled the jury into believing it could find him guilty if he reasonably appeared guilty regardless of any reasonable doubt they may entertain as to his guilt, and (2) effectively reversed the burden of proof and required the jury to find him guilty unless he came forward with evidence of his innocence. We have repeatedly rejected these arguments, and defendant offers no persuasive reason to reconsider our prior decisions. ( People v. Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 714, 134 Cal. Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 346-347, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432; People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1200, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 160, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 144, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Defendant next argues that former CALJIC No. 1.00 [defendant's arrest and prosecution not used to infer he is more likely to be guilty than innocent] and former CALJIC No. 2.51 [presence of motive may establish guilt] misled the jury because they undercut the prosecution's burden of proof by failing to emphasize the central issue in a criminal trial is not simply guilt or innocence but whether guilt had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. But we have rejected this argument as well. ( People v. Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 714, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 957-958, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) Defendant's contention that former CALJIC No. 2.21.2 (witness willfully false) impermissibly lightened the prosecution's burden of proof, because it allowed the jury to assess prosecution witnesses by seeking only a probability of truth in their testimony, has recently been rejected. (See People v. Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 714, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190; People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 493, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754.) We also have recently rejected defendant's claim that former CALJIC No. 2.22 (weighing conflicting testimony) directed the jurors to evaluate the evidence by looking at its convincing force rather than the relative number of testifying witnesses and in doing so, improperly replaced the beyond reasonable doubt standard with a standard akin to a preponderance of evidence standard. ( People v. Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 714-715, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190.)