Opinion ID: 2616594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Murder of a Peace Officer Aggravating Circumstance

Text: Section 31-20A-5 enumerates aggravating circumstances to be considered in capital sentencing, which can result in imposition of the death penalty under Section 31-20A-2. Under Section 31-20A-5(A), the fact that the victim was a peace officer who was acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty when he was murdered is an aggravating circumstance. Section 31-20A-5 and other sections of Chapter 31, Article 20A (entitled Capital Felony Sentencing) do not define peace officer. See NMSA 1978, §§ 31-20A-1 to -6 (Repl.Pamp.1990 & Cum. Supp.1993). Other New Mexico statutes do define peace officer, but these statutory definitions are not specifically applicable. The New Mexico Criminal Code, NMSA 1978, Sections 30-1-1 to -28-3 (Repl.Pamp.1984 & Cum.Supp.1993) et al., and the New Mexico Criminal Procedure Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 31-1-1 to -3-9 (Repl.Pamp.1984 & Cum.Supp.1993), both contain definitions of peace officer. The Criminal Code was enacted in 1963. 1963 N.M.Laws, ch. 303. Although most of the Criminal Code is contained in Chapter 30, some laws enacted as part of the Criminal Code in 1963 are compiled in Chapter 31. See Compiler's Note to NMSA 1978, § 30-1-1 (Repl.Pamp.1984). Because Section 31-20A-5 was not passed until 1979, it is not one of those Chapter 31 sections that are part of the Criminal Code due to original placement there. In addition, the Criminal Code includes later acts in which the legislature specifically stated its intention to add to the Criminal Code. See Compiler's Note to NMSA 1978, § 30-1-1 (Repl.Pamp.1984). Because the legislature did not indicate that Section 31-20A-5 is part of the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Act, or any other act in particular, see 1979 N.M.Laws, ch. 150, § 6; 1981 N.M.Laws ch. 23, § 1, Section 31-20A-5 is not technically part of the Criminal Code nor the Criminal Procedure Act. Therefore, neither statutory definition of peace officer technically controls. See, e.g., State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 797, 568 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1977) (finding statutory definition of public records inapplicable to different statute enacted separately). While this is probably due to legislative oversight, the fact that there is no directly applicable definition for peace officer in the aggravating circumstances statute turns our focus to rules of statutory construction. The principal command of statutory construction is that the court should determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature, State ex rel. Klineline v. Blackhurst, 106 N.M. 732, 735, 749 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1988), using the plain language of the statute as the primary indicator of legislative intent, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya, 103 N.M. 72, 76, 703 P.2d 169, 173 (1985). The words of a statute, including terms not statutorily defined, should be given their ordinary meaning absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 111 N.M. 4, 5, 800 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1990). Statutes defining criminal conduct should be strictly construed, and doubts about construction of criminal statutes are resolved in favor of lenity. Santillanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215, 221, 849 P.2d 358, 364 (1993). Statutes authorizing more severe punishment should be strictly construed because they are highly penal, State v. Keith, 102 N.M. 462, 465, 697 P.2d 145, 148 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 102 N.M. 492, 697 P.2d 492 (1985), and if it is not clear that the legislature intended an enhanced sentence, no enhancement will be applied, Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 16, 810 P.2d 1223, 1236 (1991). The rule of lenity counsels that criminal statutes should be interpreted in the defendant's favor when insurmountable ambiguity persists regarding the intended scope of a criminal statute. See State v. Edmondson, 112 N.M. 654, 658, 818 P.2d 855, 859 (Ct.App.), cert. quashed, 112 N.M. 641, 818 P.2d 419 (1991). There are limits, however, to the rules of lenity and strict construction. A criminal statute is not `ambiguous' for purposes of lenity merely because it [is] possible to articulate a construction more narrow than that urged by the Government. Edmondson, 112 N.M. at 658, 818 P.2d at 859 (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 465, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990)). Nor does a division of judicial authority regarding the proper construction of a particular statute automatically trigger lenity. Id. Rather, lenity is reserved for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies' of the statute. Id. (quoting Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108, 111 S.Ct. at 465). Likewise, strict construction is only one factor influencing interpretation of punitive legislation, and it should not be used to defeat the policy and purposes of a statute. 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.06 (5th ed. 1992). [T]he rule of strict construction does not require that penal statutes be given the `narrowest meaning' that the words of the statute will allow. United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1535 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909, 109 S.Ct. 3197, 105 L.Ed.2d 705 (1989). Instead, the language of penal statutes should be given a reasonable or common sense construction consonant with the objects of the legislation, and the evils sought to be overcome should be given special attention. 3 Sutherland, supra, § 59.06. Another rule of statutory construction is that statutes in pari material should be read together to ascertain legislative intent. Quintana v. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 100 N.M. 224, 225, 668 P.2d 1101, 1102 (1983). Statutes on the same general subject should be construed by reference to each other, see Runyan v. Jaramillo, 90 N.M. 629, 631, 567 P.2d 478, 480 (1977), the theory being that the court can discern legislative intent behind an unclear statute by reference to similar statutes where legislative intent is more clear. These rules also promote consistency in judicial interpretation of similar statutes. The Criminal Code states: As used in the Criminal Code ... `peace officer' means any public official or public officer [10] vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for crime, whether that duty extends to all crimes or is limited to specific crimes[.] NMSA 1978, § 30-1-12(C) (Repl. Pamp.1984). It is noteworthy that the Criminal Code expressly limits its definition of peace officer to use in the Criminal Code, thereby precluding direct applicability of the Criminal Code definition to statutes like Section 31-20A-5(A). The Criminal Procedure Act states: Unless a specific meaning is given, as used in the Criminal Procedure Act [31-1-1 to 31-3-9 NMSA 1978] ... `police officer,' `law enforcement officer,' `peace officer' or `officer' means any full-time salaried officer who by virtue of his office or public employment is vested by law with the duty to maintain the public peace[.] NMSA 1978, § 31-1-2(F) (Repl.Pamp.1984) (emphasis added). The district court and the parties assumed that the definition of peace officer in the Criminal Code applied. This assumption is incorrect; as discussed above, no particular statutory definition applies to peace officer in the aggravating circumstance statute, Section 31-20A-5(A). Two New Mexico cases, State v. Rhea, 94 N.M. 168, 608 P.2d 144 (1980), and State v. Tabaha, 103 N.M. 789, 714 P.2d 1010 (Ct.App.1986), apply the Criminal Code's definition of peace officer, Section 30-1-12(C), to determine if the defendant committed battery upon a police officer. Because the crime of battery upon a police officer, Section 30-22-24(A), is part of the Criminal Code, the use of the Criminal Code definition in these cases was correct. These cases do not address the definition of peace officer as used in the aggravating circumstance statute, so these cases do not stand for an implicit judicial determination that the Criminal Code definition applies to Section 31-20A-5(A). The district court concluded that CSOs are not peace officers because they are not expressly vested by statute or ordinance with the duty to maintain public order or to make arrests. The district court interpreted vested by law in the definition of peace officer to require the presence of legislation, ordinance, or other statutory mandate specifically stating that CSOs are peace officers, or specifically giving CSOs the powers or duties of peace officers. Because CSOs are not recognized statutorily except in one city ordinance giving them the power to issue citations, the district court decided that they are not vested by law as required by the Criminal Code definition. The district court may not have realized that peace officer in Section 31-20A-5(A) is not statutorily defined. When a statutory term is not defined, it must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See Aamodt, 111 N.M. at 5, 800 P.2d at 1062; 2A Sutherland, supra, § 47.04 (If it is expected that a particular term would be defined in the body of the statute, but is not, then the word will be assumed to have its ordinary and popularly understood meaning.). The popularly understood meaning of peace officer is a police officer, sheriff, or other law enforcement official who keeps the peace by patrolling public areas and enforcing the law. The district court concluded that the public has been given the impression that CSO's by their uniforms, their vehicles, and their demeanor are qualified and fully trained police officers with the attendant authority and duty to maintain public order. Thus, based upon the CSOs' duties, authority, and appearance, CSOs are peace officers under the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. The purpose of Section 31-20A-5(A) is to deter the killing of law enforcement officers by enhancing the penalty for committing that crime. The aggravating circumstance statute creates the possibility that one who kills a peace officer will be sentenced to death, and the deterrent value of this penalty enhancement is thought to provide extra protection to law enforcement officers, thereby encouraging their service. Cf. State v. Compton, 104 N.M. 683, 693, 726 P.2d 837, 847 (stating that the legislature intended to protect state officers and state functions by adopting the aggravating circumstance of killing a peace officer), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890, 107 S.Ct. 291, 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); State v. Luna, 99 N.M. 76, 77, 653 P.2d 1222, 1223 (Ct.App.) (stating that clear legislative intent behind penalty enhancement for aggravated burglary is deterrence), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 148, 655 P.2d 160 (1982). A criminal statute must be interpreted in light of the harm or evil it seeks to prevent. 3 Sutherland, supra, § 59.06. Addressing the purpose behind the aggravating circumstance of killing a peace officer, the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated: The presence of uniform officers in places susceptible to breaches of the peace deters unlawful acts and conduct by patrons in those places. The public knows the uniform and the badge stand for the authority of the government. State v. Gaines, 332 N.C. 461, 421 S.E.2d 569, 575 (1992) (quoting Duncan v. State, 163 Ga.App. 148, 294 S.E.2d 365, 366 (1982)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1866, 123 L.Ed.2d 486 (1993). When in the performance of his duties, a law enforcement officer is the representative of the public and a symbol of the rule of law. The murder of a law enforcement officer [engaged in the performance of his duties] in the truest sense strikes a blow at the entire publicthe body politicand is a direct attack upon the rule of law which must prevail if our society as we know it is to survive. Gaines, 421 S.E.2d at 575 (quoting State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 372 S.E.2d 12, 37 (1988), cert. granted, 489 U.S. 1010, 109 S.Ct. 1117, 103 L.Ed.2d 180 (1989), and vacated, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990)). Protecting CSOs under the aggravating circumstance statute clearly furthers the purpose of the statute. CSOs are threatened in their positions in the same way that police officers are, except that CSOs have less frequent contact with suspects who are known to be dangerous. (Because CSOs do general patrol, they have some contact with dangerous individuals who are not known in advance to be dangerous, as in this case. We do not think the legislature meant to deny CSOs protection in such situations.) Furthermore, by using the term peace officer, Section 31-20A-5(A) demonstrates the legislature's intention to protect a broader category of law enforcement officers than only police officers. [11] A court should not hobble statutory interpretation with the requirement that every circumstance meant to be covered must be specifically mentioned in the statute. United States v. Bates, 617 F.2d 585, 587 n. 7 (10th Cir.1980). The killing-of-a-peace-officer aggravating circumstance is designed to make criminals think twice before firing at a dark uniform, including that of a CSO. Thus, using two important rules of construing criminal statutes, the plain meaning rule and the rule that criminal statutes should be construed to further their purpose, CSOs should be included within the definition of peace officer in Section 31-20A-5(A). Turning to the two definitions of peace officer in New Mexico criminal statutes, analysis further supports the conclusion that CSOs are peace officers. The definitions of peace officer in Section 31-1-2 and Section 30-1-12 are substantially similar, though the definitions use slightly different language. There is no indication from placement in the statutes that either definition is more likely than the other to have been intended by the legislature to apply to Section 31-20A-5(A). Because both definitions convey basically the same idea and because there is no clear indication that one definition should be preferred, both definitions should be used to inform interpretation of peace officer. Under the plain meaning of Section 31-1-2(F), CSOs are peace officers because they are full-time salaried officer[s] who by virtue of [their] office or public employment [are] vested by law with the duty to maintain the public peace[.] In the Section 31-1-2 definition, by virtue of their office grammatically modifies are vested by law. This shows the fallacy of the district court's conclusion that vested by law requires formal, specific legislative action. Under this definition, the fact that CSOs hold their public employment is what vests them by law with the duty to maintain public order. There is no need for specific legislation stating that the CSOs are vested by law to maintain public order. Such a judicial construction employs an artificial and unduly narrow definition of the term vested by law, and it incorrectly deprives the legislature of the ability to enact broad, general statutes. Instead, vested by law should be read to mean empowered by the sovereign authority of the government. This interpretation is much more natural. The fact that the CSO program is funded and approved by the Farmington City Council and run by the Farmington Police Department means that CSOs are vested by law to maintain public order. CSOs are literally clothed with the authority of the State. There are no New Mexico precedents requiring adoption of the district court's constricted interpretation. Rather than over-literalize the vested by law language in the statutory definitions, our emphasis should focus on the maintenance of public order or peace requirement, the more substantive and limiting language of the definitions. Because the purpose of the aggravating circumstance of killing a peace officer is to protect those who maintain public order, it makes more sense to focus on this aspect of the definition. Furthermore, our Court has stated, To determine whether positions are of a law enforcement nature, this Court will look at the character of the principal duties involved.... Anchondo v. Corrections Dep't, 100 N.M. 108, 110, 666 P.2d 1255, 1257 (1983); see Tabaha, 103 N.M. at 791, 714 P.2d at 1012 (stating that peace officer under Section 30-1-12(C) is defined in terms of duty). Such an approach sufficiently limits the definition of peace officer to protection of precisely those intended to be protected. See, e.g., Vigil v. Martinez, 113 N.M. 714, 721, 832 P.2d 405, 412 (Ct.App.1992) (construing maintain public order as it has been traditionally interpreted in the law enforcement context to refer to the function of police officers, sheriff's deputies, and other traditional law enforcement officers); People v. Perry, 27 Ill.App.3d 230, 327 N.E.2d 167, 170-71 (Ct.1975) (concluding that private security guards and jailers are not peace officers because their duty to maintain public order is confined to a specific time and place). It seems clear that CSOs are charged with the duty to maintain public peace or order. Although their duties exclude some of the duties of police officers, all of their responsibilities are of a peace-keeping nature. Although CSOs' contact with dangerous criminals is limited, they are heavily involved with protection against property crime. And although property crime is usually considered less serious by our penal laws than personal injury crime, this does not mean that prevention of and protection against property crime is not a central component of maintaining public order. In sum, there is no statutory definition of peace officer directly applicable to the aggravating circumstance statute. The plain meaning rule, the rule that criminal statutes should be construed to redress the evil they are intended to prevent, and the plain meaning of the two statutory definitions of peace officer indicate that CSOs are peace officers under Section 31-20A-5(A).