Opinion ID: 164075
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unfair Labor Practice Under the NLRA

Text: 19 Section 8(a) of the NLRA prohibits discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). In general, for both refusal-to-hire and wrongful-termination cases, the critical question is the company's motivation for the challenged conduct; specifically, we focus on whether anti-union animus motivated that conduct. NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 276-78, 114 S.Ct. 2251, 129 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994); MJ Metal Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 267 F.3d 1059, 1065-66 (10th Cir.2001). As we have previously recognized, [a]n employer's anti-union motivation often may be proven only by circumstantial evidence. Ready Mixed Concrete Co. v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 1546, 1550 (10th Cir.1996). Thus, in determining a company's motivation, [t]he NLRB may consider factors such as the employer's knowledge of the employee's union activities, the employer's commission of other unfair labor practices, the timing of the employer's action, and the credibility of its explanation of the reasons for the discharge. MJ Metal Prods., 267 F.3d at 1065. 20 We have previously approved the NLRB's burden-shifting approach in section 8(a) cases: Initially, the [NLRB's] General Counsel must establish that the employee's protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the discharge decision; thereafter the burden shifts to the employer to show that it would have reached the same decision absent the protected conduct. Ready Mixed Concrete, 81 F.3d at 1550 (internal quotation marks omitted). 21 Thus, an employer does not violate the NLRA ... if any anti-union animus that he might have entertained did not contribute at all to an otherwise lawful discharge for good cause. 1 Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 398, 103 S.Ct. 2469 (emphasis added). As we have previously noted, [t]he Act does not allow [the] Board to act as a `super-employer' in derogation of the right of the employer to select its employees or discharge them. NLRB v. First Nat'l Bank of Pueblo, 623 F.2d 686, 693-94 (10th Cir.1980) (citations omitted). The statute does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self-organization. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187, 61 S.Ct. 845, 85 L.Ed. 1271 (1941) (quotation omitted). In other words, what the Act purports to do is simply to withdraw a range of factors from the employer's consideration when exercising his otherwise unfettered discretion to discharge an unwanted employee. In short, sections 8(a)(3) and (1) require that an employer not terminate an employee out of hostility toward the latter's union activities. First Nat'l Bank of Pueblo, 623 F.2d at 693-94. In sum, where anti-union animus actually contributed to the discharge decision, an employer violates the NLRA. Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 398, 103 S.Ct. 2469 (emphasis added).