Opinion ID: 414471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Actual Damages Under the Privacy Act

Text: 4 The Privacy Act allows recovery for actual damages sustained by an individual as a result of an agency's intentional or willful failure to comply with any provision of the Act which has an adverse effect 7 on the individual. Section 552a(g)(4) states: 5 In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of-- 6 (A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000; and 7 (B) the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court. 8 Johnson argues that the term actual damages allowed under the Act encompasses all the ordinary elements of compensatory damages, e.g., mental depression as well as physical injury, if these elements are supported by record evidence. The Government contends that actual damages refers only to out-of-pocket or pecuniary losses.
9 This Court begins its inquiry with the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, the plain meaning of the language is ordinarily controlling. Johnson and the Government vehemently disagree as to the plain meaning of the term actual damages. Both parties cite numerous authorities supporting their respective usages of the term. See, e.g., United States v. State Road Department of Florida, 189 F.2d 591, 596 (5th Cir.1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 903, 72 S.Ct. 291, 96 L.Ed. 676 (1952); contra Morvant v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 429 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir.1970). After a review of the cited authorities, this Court concludes that the term actual damages has no plain meaning or consistent legal interpretation.
10 Because the plain meaning of the term actual damages is uncertain, we seek illumination in the legislative history of the Act. In attempting to discern congressional intent from an examination of the legislative history of a statute, the Court looks to the purpose the original enactment served, the discussion of statutory meaning in committee reports, the effect of amendments--whether accepted or rejected--and the remarks in debate preceding passage. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889, 101 S.Ct. 246, 66 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980).
11 This Court has not heretofore sought to determine the meaning of actual damages in the Privacy Act. In construing a statute, the court's task is to interpret the words of [the statute] in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1911, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979). The purpose of the Privacy Act is set forth in its preamble: 12 (b) The purpose of this Act [enacting this section and notes set out under this section] is to provide certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion of personal privacy by requiring Federal agencies, except as otherwise provided by law, to-- 13