Opinion ID: 2374050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prosecutorial DiscretionEqual Protection

Text: The argument advanced most forcefully by the defendant focuses upon the unusual discretion which is granted to the prosecution by the election procedure of section 1312-C. Although the civil and criminal provisions prohibit identical conduct, the prosecutor is given the authority to select those persons to be prosecuted civilly. It is entirely possible that of two persons similarly situated, one might be prosecuted criminally while the other was prosecuted civilly. Such a result has in the past evoked strong criticism. See, e.g., Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 140, 76 S.Ct. 685, 691, 100 L.Ed. 1013 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting). In Batchelder, however, the United States Supreme Court undercut substantially, if not completely, defendant's argument. The Court specifically held that for purposes of constitutional doctrine, there is no appreciable difference between the discretion a prosecutor exercises when deciding whether to charge under one of two statutes with different elements and the discretion he exercises when choosing one of two statutes with identical elements. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125, 99 S.Ct. at 2205. [12] Such a holding recognizes the criminal role of prosecutorial discretion within our system of law in maintaining flexibility and sensitivity. See State v. Heald, 382 A.2d 290, 301 (Me.1978). That is not to say that such discretion is totally unfettered. Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is subject to constitutional constraints. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits selective enforcement based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification. Id. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 506, 7 L.E.2d 446 (1962). The defendant, however, does not claim here on appeal that the prosecutor employed such impermissible factors in exercising his discretion. [13] Although the holding of Batchelder was largely ignored by the courts in those decisions upon which the defendant relies, many state courts have had the occasion to apply its logic under fact situations analogous to that which we now confront. In State v. Watts, 601 S.W.2d 617 (Mo.1980), the defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with greater than 0.10% blood alcohol despite the existence of a separate statute proscribing operating while intoxicated, which mandated lesser penalties. The court rejected defendant's challenge, finding the constitutional issues resolved by Batchelder. In State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis.2d 599, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979), the prosecutor, in his discretion, charged the defendant with a criminal violation when the same conduct could have been prosecuted as an ordinance violation in a civil action. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that given the absence of any improper prosecutorial discrimination, such discretion is necessary, and not dissimilar from a prosecutorial determination of whether to prosecute at all. In State v. Gerdes, 252 N.W.2d 335 (S.D. 1977), the defendant was charged with being in control of a vehicle while there was 0.10 percent or more alcohol in his blood. A second statutory provision proscribed the same activity but placed a greater burden on the state. The South Dakota Supreme Court held that there was no violation of any constitutional guarantees given the very broad discretion necessarily extended to prosecutors. In Crews v. State, 366 So.2d 117 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 70 (Fla.1979), the defendant was charged pursuant to statute for carrying a concealed weapon despite the existence of a municipal ordinance proscribing the identical activity. The Florida District Court of Appeals upheld the prosecutor's exercise of discretion against constitutional attack, reasoning that such discretion is necessary and inherent in our system of law. On two prior occasions, this Court has applied the rationale of Batchelder, although in situations distinguishable from the present case. In State v. Jones, 405 A.2d 149 (Me.1979), the defendant argued that it was improper for the State to bring an indictment for reckless conduct (17-A M.R.S.A. § 211) rather than an indictment for the less serious charges of reckless driving (29 M.R.S.A. § 1311) or driving to endanger (29 M.R.S.A. § 1314). The Court, citing Batchelder, noted that in the absence of allegations that the decision to prosecute was based upon an arbitrary classification, [w]here the same criminal conduct or episode gives rise to more than one offense, the prosecution has discretion in deciding which offense to charge unless a `contrary legislative intent plainly appears.' Id. at 152 (citing 17-A M.R.S.A. § 13(1)). In State v. Anderson, 409 A.2d 1290 (Me.1979), we ruled that the felony-murder statute (17-A M.R.S.A. § 202) did not repeal or constitute an exception to the accomplice statute (17-A M.R.S.A. § 57) when applied to the intentional-knowing murder statute (17-A M.R.S.A. § 201). Having determined that the statutes overlapped, we stated: Thus, when a single act violates more than one statute, the State may elect to proceed against the accused under either statute. . . . The discretion to choose under which to prosecute is vested in the prosecuting attorney and the grand jury, provided no impermissible invidious discrimination is involved. Id. at 1306. It is fair to conclude on the basis of Batchelder and our own decisions in Anderson and Jones, that in the case of duplicative or overlapping criminal statutes, both the state and federal guarantee of equal protection is limited to the defense of a discriminatory prosecution. The present controversy is distinguishable from Batchelder in that the prohibited conduct under both section 1312-B and section 1312-C is coextensive and identical Although not argued by the defense, commentators have suggested that identical statutes, as opposed to overlapping statutes, are distinguishable and should be found unconstitutional on the basis of unfettered prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Comment, Duplicative Statutes, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Illinois Armed Violence Statute, 71 Journal of Criminal Law of Criminology 226, 236 (1980). In the abstract, it could be argued that prosecutorial discretion is totally unguided and qualitatively different when choosing between statutes which are identical except for terms of punishment. [14] We are not prepared, however, to state as a matter of constitutional doctrine, that such a grant of discretion is improper and that the criminal statute must be struck down as being facially unconstitutional. [15] As was stated in Batchelder: [A] decision to proceed under § 922(h) [the greater offense] does not empower the Government to predetermine ultimate criminal sanctions. Rather, it merely enables the sentencing judge to impose a longer prison sentence than § 1202(a) would permit and precludes him from imposing the greater fine authorized by § 1202(a). More importantly, there is no appreciable difference between the discretion a prosecutor exercises when deciding whether to charge under one of two statutes with different elements and the discretion he exercises when choosing one of two statutes with identical elements. In the former situation, once he determines that the proof will support conviction under either statute, his decision is indistinguishable from the one he faces in the latter context. The prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available upon conviction, but this fact, standing alone, does not give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause. ... Just as a defendant has no constitutional right to elect which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the basis of his indictment and prosecution, neither is he entitled to choose the penalty scheme under which he will be sentenced. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125, 99 S.Ct. at 2205.