Opinion ID: 2076678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: the admission of defendant's trial testimony at the sentencing hearing

Text: During the sentencing hearing, the prosecution read portions of the defendant's trial testimony to the jury. Defendant argues that the use of his trial testimony punished him for exercising his constitutional right to testify at trial by preventing him from effectively defending himself at the sentencing hearing. The State maintains that since defendant voluntarily testified at trial he waived his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gave, and that his testimony was admissible against him in any subsequent proceedings. There are really two issues raised by the defendant. First, whether a defendant's testimony at a prior proceeding can be used against him in a subsequent proceeding in which he has invoked his fifth amendment right to remain silent. Second, whether the reading of defendant's testimony at the sentencing hearing defeats the purpose of having a bifurcated trial, one phase to determine guilt or innocence and another phase to determine the sentence. In Harrison v. United States (1968), 392 U.S. 219, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047, 88 S.Ct. 2008, the United States Supreme Court held: In this case we need not and do not question the general evidentiary rule that a defendant's testimony at a former trial is admissible in evidence against him in later proceedings. A defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives, and that waiver is no less effective or complete because the defendant may have been motivated to take the witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against him. 392 U.S. 219, 222, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047, 1051, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 2010. In Harrison, the petitioner's testimony at his former trial regarding illegally obtained confessions was read into evidence at his new trial. The Supreme Court reversed the petitioner's conviction based on the reading of the testimony and held that the petitioner testified only after the Government had illegally introduced into evidence three confessions, all wrongfully obtained, and the same principle that prohibits the use of confessions so procured also prohibits the use of any testimony impelled thereby  the fruit of the poisonous tree, to invoke a time-worn metaphor. 392 U.S. 219, 222, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047, 1051, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 2010. The factual situation in Harrison is distinguishable from the case at bar. It is clear that the testimony which defendant Ramirez gave at his trial was voluntarily given, and it did not pertain to any information illegally obtained. We hold that defendant Ramirez' testimony which is part of the record in this case could be read into evidence at the sentencing hearing. Next we address the defendant's assertion that allowing the defendant's testimony from the guilt-innocence stage of the trial to be read into evidence at the sentencing stage of the trial defeats the purpose of a bifurcated trial as enunciated in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 428 U.S. 153, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 96 S.Ct. 2909. In Gregg, the United States Supreme Court reasoned: Much of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision may have no relevance to the question of guilt, or may even be extremely prejudicial to a fair determination of that question. This problem, however, is scarcely insurmountable. Those who have studied the question suggest that a bifurcated procedure  one in which the question of sentence is not considered until the determination of guilt has been made  is the best answer. 428 U.S. 153, 190-91, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 884, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2933. It is clear that the purpose of having a bifurcated trial in a capital trial is to insure that prejudicial evidence only relevant to sentencing is not admitted against the defendant before he has been found guilty. That does not mean that evidence which was produced at trial and is relevant to sentencing cannot be considered at the sentencing stage. At the sentencing stage it is important that the jury or judge consider all relevant evidence. Defendant voluntarily testified at trial. That decision to testify was a tactical decision  just as his decision not to testify at the sentencing hearing was a tactical decision. He cannot now contend that the testimony which he gave, which became part of the record, should not be used against him at his sentencing hearing when it is relevant to the sentence to be imposed. The purpose of having a bifurcated trial is not defeated by allowing the defendant's relevant trial testimony to be read at his sentencing hearing.