Opinion ID: 1477292
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burning Tree II

Text: In Burning Tree II, this Court adopted Judge Eldridge's rationale in Burning Tree I and rejected the benefits/burdens analysis of Chief Judge Murphy, invalidating what was termed a sex neutral law. In response to the decision of this Court in Burning Tree I, the effect of which was to remove the anti-discrimination provision in its entirety from Section 19(e), the General Assembly enacted 1986 Maryland Laws, Chapter 334, which attempted to reenact the periodic discrimination provision. [34] Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 260-61, 554 A.2d at 370. We held that any enactment of legislation which on its face draws classifications based on sex is state action sufficient to invoke the E.R.A.  Id. at 293, 554 A.2d at 386 (emphasis added). For the precise reasons the primary purpose clause failed under Article 46, Chapter 334 failed as well. Id. at 294-95, 554 A.2d at 386-87. Exactly like Section 19(e), Chapter 334 drew sex-based classifications: first, Chapter 334 distinguished sex-based discrimination from other types of discrimination; second, Chapter 334 permitted some types of sex discrimination (periodic), but proscribed others (total). Id. In addressing the State's contention that physical differences between the sexes justified the contested provision, this Court said: In order to justify a racially or sexually discriminatory statute, it is not enough for the State to claim legitimate interests which it seeks to further. Under strict scrutiny, legislation must be narrowly tailored and precisely limited to achieving those legitimate ends. Id. at 296, 554 A.2d at 387. We held [35] that the State had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Chapter 334 was narrowly tailored to achieving its purposes, id. (Nothing in the statute narrowly confines the permitted sex discrimination to [single-sex golf tournaments].), regardless of whether those purposes were substantial, id. at 295, 554 A.2d at 387, or legitimate. [36] Id. at 296, 554 A.2d at 387. The majority in the present case fails to recognize that Burning Tree II clearly adopted strict scrutiny as the standard in ERA cases. Regardless of whether ostensibly the sexes are benefitted or burdened equally by a statutory classification, that statute must withstand strict scrutiny under the ERA or else be invalidated. Id. at 293-96, 554 A.2d at 386-87. In order to justify a racially or sexually discriminatory statute, it is not enough for the State to claim legitimate interests which it seeks to further. Id. at 296, 554 A.2d at 387. Rather, the State must shoulder the heavy burden of demonstrating that the means chosen are the most restrictive possible consistent with achieving a compelling state interest. Furthermore, the holding of Burning Tree II on the ERA issue relied on the analytically indistinguishable [ Burning Tree I ] case, Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 294, 554 A.2d at 386, which, as I have demonstrated, traces its reasoning back to Rand and ultimately, to the enactment of Article 46 itself. Therefore, the majority in the present case errs fundamentally in its assertion that [v]irtually every Maryland case applying Article 46 has dealt with situations where the distinction drawn by a particular governmental enaction or action singled-out for disparate treatment men and women as discrete classes. See op. at 258-59, 932 A.2d at 594.