Opinion ID: 884427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Right of Privacy Analysis

Text: As mentioned above, our consideration of this issue does not stop with traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, however. Montanans are afforded broader protections to their right of privacy under Article II, Section 10 of Montana's Constitution. On the facts of this case, Article II, Section 10, is implicated along with Article II, Section 11. In State v. Young (Wash.1994), 867 P.2d 593, the Supreme Court of Washington held that the use of a thermal imager to perform a warrantless surveillance of defendant's home violated the State of Washington's constitutional protection of defendant's private affairs as well as the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Washington's constitution provides: No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law. Young, 867 P.2d at 597 (citing Art. I, Sec. 7, Wash. Const.). The court in Young determined that the United States Constitution provides the minimum protection afforded citizens against unreasonable searches by the government. Young, 867 P.2d at 596. Thus the court found that the private affairs inquiry under its constitution is broader than the Fourth Amendment's reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry. Young, 867 P.2d at 597. So too, on the particular search and seizure question at issue here, we find that the inquiry under Montana's right of privacy provision is broader than the usual Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry. As we stated earlier in this opinion, Montana's Constitution affords citizens broader protection from warrantless governmental intrusion in search and seizure cases than does the United States Constitution. State v. Solis (1984), 214 Mont. 310, 316, 693 P.2d 518, 521. There has been unnecessary emphasis placed on distinguishing right to privacy cases from search and seizure cases. The right to privacy is the cornerstone of protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, a warrantless search can violate a person's right of privacy and thereby violate the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Solis, 693 P.2d at 522-23. In 1972, the delegates to Montana's Constitutional Convention voiced clear opposition to any form of electronic surveillance of Montana citizens. As Delegate Campbell stated: Today, with wiretaps, electronic and bugging devices, photo surveillance equipment and computerized data banks, a person's privacy can be invaded without his knowledge and the information so gained can be misused in the most insidious ways. It isn't only a careless government that has this power to pry; political organizations, private information gathering firms, and even an individual can now snoop more easily and more effectively than ever before. We certainly hope that such snooping is not as widespread as some persons would have us believe, but with technology easily available and becoming more refined all the time, prudent safeguards against the misuse of such technology are needed. Some may urge and argue that this is a legislative, not a constitutional issue. We think the right of privacy is like a number of other inalienable rights; a carefully worded constitutional article reaffirming this right is desirable. . . . . . We at the committee felt very strongly that the people of Montana should be protected as much as possible against eaves-dropping, electronic surveillance, and such type of activities.... [W]e found that the citizens of Montana were very suspicious of such type of activity. Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, pages 1681-82. Delegate Dahood also expressed the concerns of the committee: First of all, we agreed that we would go along with an amendment that would prohibit electronic surveillance in the State of Montana.... After listening to testimony, after examining briefs that were submitted to us, after analyzing the situation, it is inconceivable to any of us that there would ever exist a situation in the State of Montana where electronic surveillance could be justified. And the thinking throughout the United States is, electronic surveillance shall be justified only in matters involving national security, perhaps in matters involving certain heinous federal crimes where the situation is such that in those instances we must risk the right of individual privacy because there is a greater purpose to be served. But within the area of the State of Montana, we cannot conceive of a situation where we could ever permit electronic surveillance. And our intention wasin responding to the proposed amendment; that we would not object to itwas to allow an amendment that would prohibit electronic surveillance in the State of Montana. Transcript, page 1687. While thermal imaging is not mentioned, per se, in their comments, it is clear that the delegates' concerns encompassed the invasion of citizens' privacy without their knowledge by means of various sorts of electronic audio and visual monitoring and surveillance equipment. Not only were the delegates wary of existing technology of this type, but they recognized that this sort of technology would continue to be refined and would become more widespread and easily available. In this regard their concerns have been well-founded. [3] Moreover, it is also clear that, in the delegates' view, the use of this sort of technology should be justified only in the most serious of situations, involving heinous crimes where it is necessary to risk the right of individual privacy because there is a greater purpose to be served. Transcript, page 1687. In the face of this history of Article II, Section 10, we are compelled to conclude that the use of thermal imaging as a criminal investigative tool is the very sort of technology against which Article II, Section 10 of Montana's Constitution was enacted to guard. Accordingly, we conclude that, in the absence of a search warrant, the use of thermal imaging as a criminal investigative tool implicates Article II, Section 10 of Montana's Constitution and requires the demonstration of a compelling state interest, other than enforcement of the criminal law. Finding no such demonstration of a compelling state interest in this case, we hold that the use of thermal imaging at issue here, since no authorizing warrant was issued, violated the Defendants' right to privacy guaranteed under Article II, Section 10 of Montana's Constitution.