Opinion ID: 1914829
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Commonwealth Witness Sherry Taggart

Text: Sherry Taggart was sweeping the deli parking lot on the night of the murder. She testified at trial that she saw Appellant shoot the victim. At the PCRA hearing, defense counsel called Taggart to testify about a letter she purportedly wrote to Appellant's mother after Appellant's first trial and before his second trial. In the letter, Taggart recanted her identification, saying that she did not know whether Appellant committed the murder or not. The letter went on to state that police encouraged Taggart to choose Appellant's photo from an array and that she did as directed. The letter blamed Taggart's conduct on her drug addiction. [5] PCRA counsel asserted that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to use the letter to impeach Taggart at the second trial. [6] At the PCRA hearing, counsel called Taggart as a witness and asked her about the letter's contents and purpose. Taggart testified that although it was her signature on the letter, she had no memory of writing it. Taggart further testified that somebody must have contacted her in order for her to have written the letter. Notes of Testimony (N.T.) 6/21/02 at 187; 209-10. Taggart explained that at the time the letter was written, she had no idea who Appellant's mother was and did not know where she lived. Trial counsel also testified at the PCRA hearing. He explained that he knew about the letter prior to the second trial and made a strategic decision not to use it against Taggart on cross-examination. Counsel explained that his theory of the case prompted his decision on this issue. At the first trial, counsel had advanced a theory that the three eyewitnesses, none of whom knew Appellant, had misidentified him. The first trial ended in a mistrial, with the jury unable to reach a verdict. Counsel was concerned that the letter, which indicated that Taggart knew Appellant and his family, would undermine his previously successful strategy. Moreover, counsel testified, he was concerned that Taggart might tell the jury that she was threatened or forced to write the letter. N.T. 6/25/02 at 98. Counsel feared his cross-examination of Taggart on this issue would blow up in his face. Id. at 87. The PCRA court concluded that Taggart did not willingly and independently write the letter. The court further concluded that counsel exercised a reasonable strategy in declining to use the letter at the second trial. Finally, the court determined that even if the issue were meritorious and there was no reasonable basis for counsel to proceed the way he did, Appellant had not established that but for counsel's alleged error, the verdict would have been different. The law is clear that we are bound by the credibility determinations of the PCRA court, where such findings have support in the record. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 553 Pa. 485, 720 A.2d 79, 93 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 810, 120 S.Ct. 41, 145 L.Ed.2d 38 (1999) (Where ... there is record support for a PCRA court's credibility determinations, we, as a reviewing court, are bound by those determinations) (citing Commonwealth v. Beasley, 544 Pa. 554, 678 A.2d 773, 778 (1996)). The PCRA court's finding is amply supported here. Taggart could not recall ever writing the letter and testified that she did not even know Appellant's family at the time. She testified that somebody would have prompted the letter, thereby admitting that she did not write the letter on her own. The PCRA court considered Taggart's testimony, observed her demeanor, and concluded that Taggart did not willingly or independently write the letter. Further, the PCRA court credited counsel's explanation for declining to use the letter at the second trial, recognizing it as sound strategy. We conclude that the PCRA court's findings have support in the record and we will not disturb them. The court properly rejected Appellant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Taggart with the letter she allegedly wrote. Appellant's claims with respect to the Taggart letter are not limited to questioning counsel's use of the letter as a recantation. Appellant further claims that the fact that Taggart mentioned her drug addiction in the letter provided an additional basis for impeachment, to wit, that Taggart was under the influence of narcotics on the night of the murder and so was not capable of identifying Appellant. In rejecting this claim, the PCRA court reasoned that even though Taggart testified at the PCRA hearing that she did not know if she was coming or going at the time of the murder, she exhibited some measure of awareness and control. PCRA Ct. Op. at 14. The PCRA court noted that Taggart managed to ensure that she was present for her job at the deli and she had the presence of mind to be concerned about her daughter's welfare when the shooting occurred. In addition, the PCRA court relied on the hearing testimony of trial counsel, as well as the prosecuting attorney, both of whom testified that Taggart did not appear to be under the influence of drugs on any of the occasions they interacted with her. We find no error in the PCRA court's assessment. We observe first that the letter did not assert that Taggart was under the influence of narcotics on the night of the murder. Further, upon consideration of the record as whole, and in light of the deference to be accorded the PCRA court, we find no basis to afford relief on this issue. A thorough reading of the record leads us to conclude that Taggart's evidentiary hearing testimony simply did not have the effect Appellant desired. While Taggart claimed at the hearing that she was uncertain about events surrounding the murder, her testimony was equivocal and cannot fairly be described as the recantation Appellant seeks to insert here. Similarly, the letter was not a reliable basis for impeachment with regard to Taggart's alleged drug addiction. Taggart's testimony about the letter, and counsel's explanation for declining to use it, lend more than sufficient support to the PCRA court's resolution of this issue. Appellant's claim fails. Appellant's focus on Taggart's drug addiction leads to his next claim concerning this witness. Appellant alleges that the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by failing to disclose evidence that could have been used to impeach Taggart, and that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise this issue at trial and on appeal. [7] Appellant's Brady claim has two parts. First, he asserts that the Commonwealth failed to disclose that Taggart was addicted to drugs and alcohol, as well as under the influence of narcotics on the night of the shooting. Second, he claims that the Commonwealth concealed an agreement to drop criminal charges against Taggart in exchange for her testimony at trial. The PCRA court dismissed both claims after the evidentiary hearing, concluding that Appellant proffered no evidence to establish either one. To establish a violation under Brady, an appellant must demonstrate: 1) suppression by the prosecution 2) of evidence, whether exculpatory or impeaching, favorable to the [appellant], 3) to the prejudice of the [appellant]. Commonwealth v. Paddy, 569 Pa. 47, 800 A.2d 294, 305 (2002) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). The evidence purportedly suppressed must have been material to guilt. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1126 (Pa.2008) (citations omitted). Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Burke, 566 Pa. 402, 781 A.2d 1136, 1141 (2001) (citations omitted). With respect to the evidence of drug addiction and Taggart's condition on the night of the murder, Appellant relies primarily on the Taggart letter and Taggart's testimony at the PCRA hearing. At the hearing, Taggart indeed testified that she was under the influence of drugs and alcohol, as well as sleep-deprived, on the night of the shooting. She furthered testified that she told police at the time that she could not be sure of the shooter's identity. Appellant now asserts that not only is Taggart's version of events true, but the prosecutor was in possession of all of this information at time of trial and withheld it from the defense in violation of Brady. The transcript of the PCRA hearing belies Appellant's claims. Appellant offered no credited evidence that the prosecution was aware of the condition Taggart claimed (at the PCRA hearing) to have been in on the night of the crime. Nor did Appellant present any credited evidence that the Commonwealth knew Taggart was uncertain about her identification. The only evidence Appellant offered was that of Taggart, whose testimony the PCRA court explicitly declined to credit. [8] The PCRA court not only discounted Taggart's testimony in this regard, it also credited the testimony of trial counsel and the prosecutor. Taggart testified at the PCRA hearing that her drug addiction would have been obvious to anyone who saw her. However, trial counsel testified that he did not observe anything unusual about Taggart's demeanor to suggest drug addiction. The prosecutor gave the same testimony when asked about her own interaction with Taggart. In light of the record and our limited standard of review, we conclude that no relief is warranted on this issue. We reach the same conclusion on Appellant's other Brady claim. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth concealed from the defense the fact that it made a deal with Taggart to induce her to testify. In support of this claim, Appellant proffered evidence that a five-year-old retail theft charge that Taggart faced was dismissed on August 15, 1994, shortly after Taggart testified at Appellant's first trial, but before she testified at the second trial. Appellant argues that the dismissal of this charge constitutes proof of an agreement between Taggart and the Commonwealth. The PCRA court rejected this claim for lack of any evidence. We agree with the PCRA court that the record simply does not support this claim. Contrary to Appellant's argument, Taggart herself testified at the PCRA hearing that she did not have an agreement with the Commonwealth. The prosecutor likewise testified that she struck no deal with Taggart, and further offered that she was not even aware of Taggart's unrelated retail theft charge. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the PCRA court's ruling on this issue was proper. The only evidence of record was that there was no deal between the Commonwealth and Taggart. Appellant's Brady claim is wholly without merit. The final claim Appellant asserts in connection with Taggart involves alleged misconduct by police in the use of a photo array. Appellant claims that once trial counsel read the letter Taggart allegedly wrote to Appellant's mother, counsel should have moved to renew his motion to suppress Taggart's identification. This is true, Appellant argues, because the letter asserts that police urged Taggart to identify Appellant from the photo array. The PCRA court rejected this claim. Following extensive testimony by Taggart and trial counsel on this issue, the court concluded with certainty that the Taggart letter, however it came to be, was neither willfully nor independently written. We find no error in the PCRA court's findings. Taggart's own testimony called into question the reliability of the letter. Moreover, Taggart specifically testified that she remembered no coaching by police in connection with the photo array. Finally, trial counsel testified about his concern that Taggart would testify that she knew Appellant's family and she was forced to write the letter. All of this evidence supports the PCRA court's (and trial counsel's) treatment of the letter and its contents. We conclude there was no error in the PCRA court's credibility-based findings and no basis for finding ineffectiveness. Appellant is due no relief.