Opinion ID: 164078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sending The Qualified Immunity Defense To The Jury

Text: 13 The district court properly sent the qualified immunity issue to the jury. We review de novo a district court's ruling on qualified immunity. Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir.2002). Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). To determine whether a plaintiff can overcome a qualified immunity defense, we first determine whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and then we decide whether that right was clearly established such that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known that [his] conduct violated that right. Garramone, 94 F.3d at 1449. Order is important; we must decide first whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, and only then do we proceed to determine whether the law was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). 14 Although issues of qualified immunity normally are questions of law decided prior to trial, in exceptional circumstances historical facts may be so intertwined with the law that a jury question is appropriate as to whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known that his conduct violated that right. Walker v. Elbert, 75 F.3d 592, 598 (10th Cir.1996) (qualified immunity issues may be sent to the jury under special circumstances); see also Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1251 (10th Cir.2003) (The objective legal reasonableness of the [defendant's] actions is a legal question[,] [b]ut where the historical facts material to that issue are in dispute there is an issue for the jury.) (quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted). But even under such special circumstances, whether plaintiff's claim asserts a violation of a constitutional right and whether this right was clearly established at the time remain questions of law. See Walker, 75 F.3d at 598 (limiting jury issue to question of reasonableness of defendant's actions). 15 We do not read Roska as providing an exclusive set of circumstances of when objective legal reasonableness properly poses a jury question. Roska, 328 F.3d at 1251 (In considering the `objective legal reasonableness' of the state officer's actions, one relevant factor is whether the defendant relied on a state statute....) (emphasis added). Roska, then, falls in line with several other circuit courts, which hold that a contested issue of fact that is material to the qualified immunity analysis gives rise to a jury question. 16 In Catone v. Spielmann, 149 F.3d 156 (2d Cir.1998), plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim for violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights after she was terminated from her employment in the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation following a gubernatorial change. In that case, plaintiff was discharged without a hearing, an act deemed legal only if she was a `deputy.' Id. at 160. The parties hotly contested whether plaintiff was actually a deputy. Id. at 161. Given this background, the Second Circuit held that the issue of qualified immunity turn[ed] on the answers to the following [factual] questions: (1) was [plaintiff] a deputy; and (2) would a reasonable officer in [defendant's] shoes have believed [plaintiff] was a deputy. Id. at 160. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial judge['s] reject[ion of] defendant's contention that the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to create a jury issue. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 17 Similarly, in Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir.2000), plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim, alleging Fourth Amendment violations, after a police officer shot her while she was driving. [T]he district court had ruled that the factual dispute as to the behavior of the car driven by [plaintiff] as it approached [Officer] Taylor[, who claimed the car was driven threateningly,] prevented the granting of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. Id. at 317. The Sixth Circuit held: 18 Where, as here, the legal question of qualified immunity turns upon which version of facts one accepts, the jury, not the judge, must determine liability. In this case, the district court charged the jury to consider whether Officer Taylor's use of deadly force had been objectively unreasonable; that is, to resolve the continuing factual dispute as to the car's behavior as it came towards Officer Taylor. There was no error in such instructions. Id. (citation omitted). 19 Although courts often emphasize that qualified immunity is effectively lost if the case goes to trial, see Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, pursuing qualified immunity during trial is not pointless. To the contrary, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields a defendant both from trial and from damages. Guffey v. Wyatt, 18 F.3d 869, 873 (10th Cir.1994) (emphasis added). In Guffey, we noted that `the right not to pay damages and the right to avoid trial are distinct aspects of immunity[.]' Id. (quoting Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989)). Thus, even when a defendant has lost his right not to stand trial, the law is clear the [defendant] can `reassert [his] qualified immunity claims at and after trial when the factual disputes have been resolved.' Id. (quoting Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1463 (10th Cir.1991)). 20 Here, Ms. Maestas alleges a constitutional violation. In her § 1983 claim, Ms. Maestas contends that Mr. Lujan, a state employee exercising governmental authority over her, subjected her to sexual harassment. If true, Mr. Lujan's conduct would constitute a constitutional violation. Lankford v. City of Hobart, 73 F.3d 283, 286 (10th Cir.1996) (Sexual harassment [by a public official or employee] can violate the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws thus triggering a § 1983 cause of action.). Furthermore, Ms. Maestas possesses a clearly established right to be free of such harassment. Sh.A. ex rel. J.A. v. Tucumcari Mun. Schs., 321 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir.2003) ([T]he law holding that sexual harassment is actionable as an equal protection violation has long been clearly established.). 21 The only remaining issue, then, for qualified immunity purposes, was whether a reasonable person in [Mr. Lujan's] position would have known that [his] conduct violated [Ms. Maestas's equal protection rights]. Garramone, 94 F.3d at 1449. Both parties hotly contested this issue. As stated by Mr. Lujan, and unopposed by Ms. Maestas on appeal, the parties below presented diametrically opposed versions of their relationship.... According to Lujan, he and Maestas had a consensual romantic/sexual relationship for a period of four months. Lujan also either denied Maestas' accusations of harassment and/or sexual harassment, or gave radically different versions of these events. Indeed, the parties even contested whether Mr. Lujan was Ms. Maestas's supervisor. 22 Given this dispute, the district court properly gave a qualified immunity instruction, which limited the jury's inquiry to the objective reasonableness of Mr. Lujan's conduct. See Roska, 328 F.3d at 1251. As in Catone, here the objective reasonableness of Mr. Lujan's conduct turns on the factual issue of his status as supervisor. See Catone, 149 F.3d at 160-61 (holding plaintiff's status as a deputy, which was the key issue for qualified immunity, was a factual question). Moreover, as in Fisher, the qualified immunity analysis, at issue here, hinges upon whose version of the facts are believed. See Fisher, 234 F.3d at 317 (holding that when the legal question of qualified immunity turns upon which version of facts one accepts, the jury, not the judge, must determine liability.). Thus, we agree with the Catone and Fisher courts that such a scenario, as is presented in this case, raises a jury question. Here, the district court instructed: 23 In order for [Mr. Lujan] to prevail on his defense of qualified immunity, he bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he act[ed] at all times in good faith in carrying out discretionary duties, reasonably believing that he was not violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 24 This instruction only permits a jury evaluation of the reasonableness element of the qualified immunity defense, which, given the nature of the factual dispute, is proper under Roska and Walker. 25 We are mindful that an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability ... is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (alternation in original). This case, however, presents the exceptional situation in which the district court cannot complete its qualified immunity analysis without first determining disputed material facts. If Ms. Maestas and Mr. Lujan had engaged in a consensual relationship and Mr. Lujan was not her supervisor, a reasonable person in Mr. Lujan's position would not have known that his conduct violated Ms. Maestas's equal protection rights. See Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1151 (7th Cir.1990) (absent intent to discriminate on the basis of sex, a consensual workplace romance involving a state supervisor and employee which soured for one reason or another ... [does not] give rise to equal protection claims if the employee simply alleges that his or her supervisor's conduct during the term of the romance constituted `sexual harassment'). The converse is also true. See Sh.A. ex rel. J.A., 321 F.3d at 1288. In short, the disputed issues of material fact concerning the objective reasonableness of Mr. Lujan's actions are dispositive of the qualified immunity issue. Further, as stated above, Mr. Lujan retained the defense of immunity from liability even though the jury was needed to resolve issues of objective legal reasonableness. See Guffey, 18 F.3d at 873. Therefore, the district court properly presented the reasonableness element of the qualified immunity analysis to the jury. 26 We are unpersuaded by Ms. Maestas's arguments to the contrary. First, Ms. Maestas suggests that our conclusion invites district courts to frame every qualified immunity issue as a question of fact, contrary to our holding in Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir.1992). We disagree. Our holding here is limited. A jury question exists only when a disputed issue of material fact concerning the objective reasonableness of the defendant's actions exists. Roska, 328 F.3d at 1251. This ruling does not disturb our previous decisions holding that qualified immunity issues, except in special circumstances, present legal questions resolvable on summary judgment. See, e.g., Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 (10th Cir.1995). Furthermore, because our decision only restates existing law, and we have yet to see a flood of qualified immunity issues sent to juries, we doubt that the district courts will adopt such a practice now. 27 Finally, Ms. Maestas argues that Mr. Lujan waived his qualified immunity defense. Ms. Maestas contends that Mr. Lujan's failure to raise qualified immunity at any point in the proceedings below, except as an affirmative defense in his Answer and his failure to offer evidence on this issue, other than his own testimony, effectively waives the issue. We disagree. 28 We find that Mr. Lujan, in the June 7, 2001, Final Pretrial Order, reserved the right to assert all affirmative defenses pleaded in his Answer. Moreover, Ms. Maestas's citation to Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Station KYFM, Inc., 424 F.2d 14, 17 (10th Cir.1970), does not support her conclusion. In Radio Corp., we held that a defendant's failure to raise effectively an affirmative defense waives the right to a jury instruction. Id. We are not faced with that situation here. Mr. Lujan raised qualified immunity as an affirmative defense in his Answer, referenced the defense in the Pretrial Order, and gave testimony on the matter at trial. We hold, therefore, that Mr. Lujan appropriately raised the qualified immunity issue. See Guffey, 18 F.3d at 873 (A defendant who has appropriately pleaded the affirmative defense of qualified immunity may establish his right to immunity at any point in the proceeding, including at trial.) (quoting Figueroa-Rodriguez v. Aquino, 863 F.2d 1037, 1041 n. 5 (1st Cir.1988)). 29