Opinion ID: 1833353
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Whether the chancellor erred in granting Ken a divorce on the grounds of adultery instead of granting Brenda a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.

Text: ¶ 36. This issue lies within the discretion of the chancellor as the trier of fact and must be decided based on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. The standard of proof in cases involving allegations of adultery as grounds for divorce was clearly and succinctly stated by this Court in Holden v. Frasher-Holden, 680 So.2d 795 (Miss.1996). In that case we stated as follows: A charge of adultery may be grounds for divorce upon a showing of either an infatuation for a particular person of the opposite sex or a generally adulterous nature on the part of the defendant. [ McAdory v. McAdory, 608 So.2d 695, 700 (Miss.1992).] There must be evidence of one or the other before a divorce may be granted on these grounds. Id. In [ Brooks v. Brooks, 652 So.2d 1113, 1118 (Miss.1995) ], this Court recited the proper evidentiary standard to be applied to the proof set forth by the complaining party, as articulated in [ Dillon v. Dillon, 498 So.2d 328, 330 (Miss. 1986) ]: In Mississippi one seeking a divorce on the grounds of adulterous activity must show by clear and convincing evidence both an adulterous inclination and a reasonable opportunity to satisfy that inclination. Owen v. Gerity, 422 So.2d 284, 287 (Miss.1982); Magee v. Magee, 320 So.2d 779, 783 (Miss.1975); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 274 So.2d 671, 673 (Miss.1973). Where the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence as proof for his allegations, he or she retains the burden of presenting satisfactory evidence sufficient to lead the trier of fact to a conclusion of guilt. Rodgers, 274 So.2d at 673. However, such evidence need not prove the alleged acts beyond a reasonable doubt and the plaintiff is not required to present direct testimony as to the events complained of due to their secretive nature. Bunkley & Morse's Amis, Divorce & Separation in Mississippi, §§ 3.09(5)(1957). Nevertheless, the burden of proof is a heavy one in such cases because the evidence must be logical, tend to prove the facts charged, and be inconsistent with a reasonable theory of innocence. Owen, 422 So.2d at 287, citing and quoting Banks v. Banks, 118 Miss. 783, 79 So. 841 (Miss. 1918). Brooks, 652 So.2d at 1116 (quoting Dillon, 498 So.2d at 330) (emphasis added). Holden, 680 So.2d at 798. ¶ 37. We also held in McAdory that the elements of infatuation or proclivity toward adulterous behavior must be supported by evidence of a reasonable opportunity to satisfy the infatuation or proclivity. McAdory, 608 So.2d at 700. Brenda testified that she did not know Art Sharpe until after Ken had left home and filed for divorce and that she was never sexually involved with him. However, in this case there is substantial evidence in the record to support the chancellor's conclusion that proclivity and opportunity were present in the relationship between Brenda and Art Sharpe. The burden of proof was met with regard to this issue. As such, the chancellor's finding of adultery is not clearly erroneous. ¶ 38. Finding that the trial court did not err in granting the parties' divorce on the grounds of adultery, there is no need to discuss the issue of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.