Opinion ID: 165371
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of AEDPA to Batson Claim

Text: 54 The Colorado Court of Appeals clearly addressed Saiz's Batson claim on its merits, so we must accord its decision deference under the AEDPA. As the court noted, Saiz contend[ed] that the trial court erred by permitting the prosecution systematically to exclude women and Hispanics from the jury without following the procedure set forth in Batson .... Saiz, 923 P.2d at 205. The court concluded that [w]hile we agree that the trial court failed to follow the procedures in Batson, we find no reversible error. Id. The court's explanation was as follows: [T]he trial court failed to follow the three step procedure of Batson. Several times during selection of the jury, the trial court failed to rule on whether defendant had made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. The court also allowed the prosecution to articulate neutral reasons for the exclusion of certain jurors without finding that defendant had made a prima facie showing. 55 However, we conclude that the trial court properly determined, under the circumstances here, that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination based on race or gender. As the trial court noted, the final jury included six individuals with Hispanic surnames and nine women, including alternates. Thus, defendant failed to show that members of a cognizable group were underrepresented on the jury. 56 Id. at 206. 57 The state court correctly identified the applicable federal law — the Equal Protection right recognized in Batson. It also correctly observed that Batson requires courts to follow a three-step process to ensure that peremptory strikes are not used to unconstitutionally exclude potential jurors on the basis of their race or gender. And, while we disagree with some of its reasoning, we conclude that the state court decision did not result in an unreasonable determination of the facts of Saiz's case in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding, nor did it unreasonably apply federal law. 58 Saiz argues the Colorado Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that [Saiz] failed to make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, relying solely on the fact that the ultimate jury panel included several individuals with Hispanic surnames and women. Appellant's Br. at 31. She argues that the ultimate composition of the jury is not dispositive of whether there was a Batson violation. 59 Saiz's initial obligation under Batson was to make a prima facie showing that the prosecution's peremptory strikes were discriminatory. Our independent review of the record reveals that (1) Saiz failed to make such a prima facie case with respect to two of the eight potential jurors, Ms. Hall and Ms. Wagner; (2) the trial court implicitly ruled that she had failed to make a prima facie showing with respect to a third juror, Mr. Aubril; and (3) the existence of a prima facie case became moot once the prosecution offered explanations for its strikes of the remaining five jurors. 60
61 Saiz made no objection to the prosecution's first four peremptory strikes, against Ms. Hall, Ms. Wagner, Mr. Alire and Ms. Jaramillo. The court brought the issue to counsel's attention after the prosecution's fourth peremptory strike, inviting defense counsel to make a record. It was only at that point that defense counsel specifically noted that Mr. Alire and Ms. Jaramillo had Hispanic surnames. Defense counsel made no specific argument about Ms. Hall or Ms. Wagner, other than to assert at the very end of the colloquy that three of the first four jurors struck were women. 6 It is clear, however, that the focus of the court in initiating the Batson inquiry, the prosecution in its explanations, and defense counsel in his argument, was on the two Hispanic jurors, Mr. Alire and Ms. Jaramillo. Thus, Saiz failed to establish a prima facie case with respect to Ms. Hall and Ms. Wagner. 62 The last juror at issue in this case, Mr. Aubril, was dismissed in unusual circumstances. After he had been questioned by both the prosecution and defense counsel, the prosecution notified that court that it intend[ed] to exercise our challenge as to Mr. Aubril. Tr. of Jury Trial, R. Vol. 23 at 109. Defense counsel then ask[ed] for a mistrial. Or the alternative to keep — to prevent them from the peremptory challenge as to Mr. Aubril. And the grounds of that is, the Court has dismissed five Hispanics from the jury. There is no showing there is a basis for the challenge. Id. at 110, 106 S.Ct. 1712. He then stated that we feel that ... they're exercising their peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner towards my client. Id. When the prosecution thereafter dismissed Mr. Aubril, defense counsel made no further objection. The trial court did not invite the prosecution to explain its exercise of the peremptory strike and the prosecution made no attempt to do so. We may infer from the trial court's decision not to go on to step two of the Batson analysis (asking the prosecution to explain its peremptory strike) that it concluded that Saiz had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in connection with the peremptory strike of Mr. Aubril. 7 That finding by the trial court has not been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 63 Thus, with respect to venire persons Hall, Wagner and Aubril, while the Colorado Court of Appeals found that the trial court had [s]everal times ... failed to rule on whether [Saiz] had made a prima facie showing, Saiz, 923 P.2d at 206, our independent review of the record reveals that the trial court had simply failed to make an explicit ruling on the record with respect to Hall, Wagner and Aubril. Having determined that the record reveals that Saiz failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the three venire persons, we can conclude that the Colorado Court of Appeals' ultimate decision that Saiz failed to show purposeful discrimination with respect to those three was a reasonable determination of the facts and a reasonable application of Batson to this case. 64 With respect to the other five jurors, while the trial court did not specifically rule on whether or not Saiz had established a prima facie case, 8 the court invited the prosecution to explain its use of peremptory strikes and the prosecution offered explanations. Accordingly, we may assume [Saiz] established a prima facie Batson showing, given that the court went on to analyze steps two and three of the Batson inquiry. Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d at 928. See United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1108 (10th Cir.1991) (noting that review of a prima facie showing becomes moot after the prosecution has offered a racially neutral explanation for the peremptory strike) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion)). The Colorado Court of Appeals correctly observed that the court allowed the prosecution to articulate its neutral reasons for exercising the peremptory strikes, although the state court apparently failed to state the legal consequence of that — i.e., that the existence of a prima facie case becomes moot. 65
66 We now consider whether the state court reasonably determined the facts as they relate to step two of the Batson inquiry. At step two, the prosecution must offer race-neutral explanations for the peremptory strikes. The second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769. Rather, `the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation,' so `[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.' Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859). A neutral explanation means an explanation based on something besides the race of the juror. Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., 206 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir.2000). 67 The Colorado Court of Appeals noted that the prosecution articulated neutral reasons for the exclusion of certain jurors.... Saiz, 923 P.2d at 206. That was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in this case. The record reveals that the prosecution offered race and/or gender-neutral explanations for the peremptory strikes of the five venire persons for whom a prima facie showing was established: Mr. Alire, Ms. Jaramillo, Ms. Baca, Ms. Eckhardt, and Ms. Ellison. The trial court actually found that the prosecution's gender-neutral explanations for the strikes of Ms. Eckhardt and Ms. Ellison were adequate. 9 Saiz does not dispute, or rebut the correctness of, the court's findings as to those two potential jurors. She also does not dispute the adequacy of the prosecution's explanations for the strikes of Mr. Alire, Ms. Jaramillo and Ms. Baca, thereby waiving an argument that the prosecution failed to satisfy step two of the Batson inquiry with respect to the five venire persons for whom the prosecution gave race- and/or gender-neutral explanations. 68
69 Accordingly, we are left with the question of whether the Colorado Court of Appeals reached a reasonable result under Batson in concluding that the trial court properly determined ... that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination based on race or gender, partly in reliance on the fact that the final jury included six Hispanic jurors and nine women. Saiz, 923 P.2d at 206. Saiz makes two arguments on this point: first, she asserts the trial court failed to satisfy the third Batson step because it made no findings on the record that it found the prosecution's race- and/or gender-neutral explanations for striking the jurors credible, reasonable or believable; and second, she argues the Colorado Court of Appeals placed exclusive reliance on the ultimate composition of the jury in finding no Batson violation. We reject both arguments. 70 While the trial court failed to explicitly find the prosecution's explanations race- and/or gender-neutral, it did refuse to overturn the prosecution's peremptory strikes and permitted voir dire to continue. We have faced a similarly scant trial record before. What we said then applies with equal force here: 71 Although we affirm the district court's ruling, we encourage district courts to make explicit factual findings on the record when ruling on Batson challenges. Specifically,... a district court should state whether it finds the proffered reason for a challenged strike to be facially race neutral or inherently discriminatory and why it chooses to credit or discredit the given explanation. ... A district court's clearly articulated findings assist our appellate review of the court's Batson ruling, and ensure[ ] that the trial court has indeed made the crucial credibility determination that is afforded such great respect on appeal. 72 Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d at 929 (quoting United States v. Perez, 35 F.3d 632, 636 (1st Cir.1994)). While explicit rulings are preferable, we can conclude in this case that the trial court implicitly ruled that the explanations offered by the prosecution were credible, believable, and race-and/or gender-neutral. 73 Given that, because the trial court's findings on the issue of discriminatory intent largely turn on an evaluation of the prosecutor's credibility, United States v. Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570, 1579 (10th Cir.1994), they are factual findings that are presumptively correct under the AEDPA. [E]valuation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies `peculiarly within a trial judge's province.' Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). See Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 941 (11th Cir.2001) ([R]eviewing [a Batson ] claim ... require[s] us to look over the trial court's shoulder, reconstructing the circumstances surrounding the voir dire of the venire persons ... to decide whether the court correctly determined that the defendant had not raised an inference that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to remove jurors on account of their race.). The trial court's implicit finding that the prosecution had offered credible race and/or gender-neutral explanations for its use of peremptory strikes in Saiz's trial has not been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, the Colorado Court of Appeals' conclusion that the trial court properly determined that Saiz failed to show purposeful discrimination is not an unreasonable determination of the facts. 74 We also reject her argument based on the final composition of the jury. The Colorado Court of Appeals did note that the final jury contained a number of Hispanic and female jurors. The presence of members of the subject gender on the final jury `is a relevant factor in negating an alleged Batson violation when the [exercising party] has the opportunity to strike the juror.' Davey v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 301 F.3d 1204, 1216 (10th Cir.2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 904, 913-14 (10th Cir.1993)). It is only a factor, however, and is not dispositive. We do not interpret the state court's ruling as placing exclusive reliance on that factor. Rather, the appellate court was aware that the trial court had heard the prosecution's explanations for its peremptory challenges and had found them credible. The added fact that the final jury contained members from the same groups against whom the disputed peremptory challenges had been exercised simply reinforced the conclusion that Saiz failed to carry her ultimate burden to show purposeful discrimination. We therefore conclude that the result of the Colorado Court of Appeals' decision — that Saiz's Equal Protection rights under Batson were not violated — is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor did it involve an unreasonable determination of the facts in this case.