Opinion ID: 3172724
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequacy of Oral Explanation

Text: Vázquez concedes that he did not object to the adequacy of the district court's oral explanation and therefore our review should be for plain error. Under the plain error standard, a defendant must show that (1) an error occurred, (2) which was clear or obvious, (3) that affected his substantial rights, and (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public -8- reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. MillánIsaac, 749 F.3d 57, 66 (1st Cir. 2014). It is not clear or obvious that the district court's explanation for its above-Guidelines sentence was inadequate. Vázquez characterizes the district court's explanation as consisting sole[ly] of its statement that a longer sentence was needed to satisfy the statutory sentencing factors and to protect the community from further crimes committed by Vázquez. Vázquez acknowledges that the district court recounted his personal history and characteristics, his prior criminal history, and the nature of his offense at the sentencing hearing, but argues that the district court failed to link this information to Vázquez's sentence. Although an explicit link is preferred, this Court may infer a district court's reasoning. See United States v. JiménezBeltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) ([A] court's reasoning can often be inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties or contained in the pre-sentence report with what the judge did.); see also United States v. Paulino-Guzmán, No. 14-1859, a ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 8284615, at  (1st Cir. Dec. 9, 2015) (rejecting defendant's argument that district court based upward variance solely on community considerations when court provided run-down of [the defendant's] criminal history -9- and concluded its discussion of the sentencing factors with a reference to [the defendant's] age, education, work history, and history of drug use). Moreover, the district court followed the proper procedural framework of calculating Vázquez's Guidelines range as a starting point, Gall, 552 U.S. at 49, before turning to the sentencing factors and the specifics of Vázquez's case, Martin, 520 F.3d at 91. This Court can infer that by following this sequential process, the district court based its departure on all of the factors listed prior to the announcement of its sentence.5 Vázquez also portrays the district court's variance as mathematically large and as thus requiring a proportionally more detailed explanation. We have recognized that a certain 'sliding scale' effect applies to sentencing so that a major deviation . . . must 'be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.' Martin, 520 F.3d at 91 (quoting Gall, 522 U.S. at 50). Nonetheless, we have refused to apply a stringent 5 Vázquez also contends that the district court failed to consider the mitigating circumstances he presented, but all of the relevant information was included in the PSR, which the district court reviewed and considered in selecting a sentence. Under such circumstances, [t]he district court is not obligated to articulate all the factors it took into consideration at sentencing, provided that its sentencing rationale is adequate. United States v. Torres-Nevárez, No. 13-2396, 2015 WL 5306394, at -3 (1st Cir. Sept. 11, 2015). -10- mathematical formula to a district court's sentencing decision. Id. at 91. It is also true that [w]hen a factor is already included in the calculation of the guidelines sentencing range, a judge who wishes to rely on that same factor to impose a sentence above or below the range must articulate specifically the reasons that this particular defendant's situation is different from the ordinary situation covered by the guidelines calculation. United States v. Zapete–García, 447 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2006). Thus, Vázquez's criminal history and drug addiction could not have been the only reasons for the district court's departure when his Guidelines range incorporated both. We admit that the district court's variance was not insubstantial and its discussion was not as robust as it could be. Nonetheless, we conclude that it was neither clear nor obvious that the district court's proffered explanation was inadequate. In addition to following the correct procedural framework, the district court did not base its departure entirely on factors already included in the Guidelines calculations. Along with Vázquez's criminal history and drug addiction, the district court also considered his subsequent probation revocation, his prior adult arrest, and the circumstances surrounding his current offense as well as the need to promote respect for the law and to -11- protect the public from further crimes committed by Vázquez and address the sentencing factors of deterrence and punishment. Although the district court could have made its rationale more explicit, we can reasonably infer that the district court's discussion of deterrence, punishment, and respect for the law reflected a concern that a Guidelines-range sentence did not adequately take into account Vázquez's potential for recidivism. Based on less than one-and-a-half years elapsing between Vázquez's release for prior weapons convictions and the August 2013 arrest, the district court could conclude that Vázquez did not take his previous conviction seriously and an above-Guidelines sentence was needed to promote respect for the law. For similar reasons, the district court could also conclude that because Vázquez's previous conviction did not deter his illegal conduct an above-Guidelines sentence was necessary to prevent future crimes. In addition to these recidivism-based concerns, the district court also took into consideration the circumstances surrounding Vázquez's offense that made it more serious. These circumstances include the fact that Vázquez kept his machinegun (and another legal firearm) in a residence he shared with three minor children. Given all of these factors and the overall procedural soundness of the sentencing hearing, we reject -12- Vázquez's plain error challenge to the sufficiency of the district court's oral explanation.