Opinion ID: 2272566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Charge of Violation of a Protective Order

Text: [¶ 28] Elliott argues that following, monitoring, and stalking are not elements of the crime of violating a protection order because any terms added to the protection order beyond the terms permitted by 19-A M.R.S. § 4007(1XA) to (G) may be penalized only through civil contempt. See 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(2). Accordingly, he contends that the complaint charging him with the crime was fatally defective. [12] [¶ 29] The sufficiency of a charging instrument is a jurisdictional issue. See State v. Day, 2000 ME 192, ¶ 4, 760 A.2d 1039, 1040. The instrument must allege every element of the offense charged. Id. A court may not add elements to a crime because [n]o conduct constitutes a crime unless it is prohibited... [b]y this code [the Maine Criminal Code]; or ... [b]y any statute or private act outside this code, including any rule, regulation or ordinance authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute. 17-A MILS. § 3(1) (2009). We construe the statute defining an offense de novo to determine what elements constitute the crime. Day, 2000 ME 192, ¶ 5, 760 A.2d at 1040. In doing so, we construe the statute strictly based on its plain meaning, viewed in the context of the entire statutory scheme. Id. The purpose is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature, which presumably intended to generate a harmonious result. Id. [¶ 30] For Elliott to be criminally convicted for violating a protective order, the State had to prove the following elements: (1) that a temporary, emergency, interim or final protective order was entered against Elliott; (2) that Elliott had prior actual notice of the order or agreement; and (3) that Elliott violated the terms of that order. See 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1). Regarding this third element, Elliott could be subjected to criminal charges and sanctions only if the term of the order that he violated was among those listed in paragraphs (A) through (G) of section 4007(1). See 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(2). In entering a protective order, a court is free to establish such conditions as are necessary to protect an individual from harm, see 19-A M.R.S. § 4007(1)(M), but violations of only those protections set forth in paragraphs (A) through (G) are punishable as crimes, see 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(2). [¶ 31] Elliott was charged with violating the provision of the extended protection from abuse order that prohibited him from having any direct or indirect contact with Doe. See 19-A M.R.S. § 4007(1)(D). With the parties' agreement at the time the extended order was entered, the court that issued this order included clarifying language, in addition to the prohibition against having direct or indirect contact, to ensure that Elliott understood exactly what behavior would be considered to violate the order. In so doing, the court wrote that contact includes following, stalking, monitoring [Doe] along her work route from So. Portland to Andover, MA. [¶ 32] We are asked to decide whether, in its effort to put Elliott on notice of the conduct that was prohibited and subject to criminal punishment, the court described conduct that was outside the proscribed conduct of having any direct or indirect contact with the person identified in the protective order. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 4007(1)(D), 4011(2). Thus, the question is whether Elliott could be convicted for violating a protective order entered pursuant to section 4007(1)(D) based on a charge that Elliott follow[ed], monitor[ed], or stalk[ed] Doe along her work route from Portland to Andover. [¶ 33] Contact prohibited by paragraph (D) may be established by proof of a variety of actions, such as sending electronic mail, State v. Turner, 2001 ME 44, 766 A.2d 1025, or calling the house of a person with whom the protected person had an existing romantic relationship, State v. Smen, 2006 ME 40, ¶¶ 2-9, 895 A.2d 319, 320-22. See also State v. Pettengill, 635 A.2d 1309, 1309-10 (Me.1994) (holding that the defendant violated a bail condition that prohibited contact by making a gesture from a car window). Because the criminal complaint did not specifically allege contact, we must consider whether the conduct describedthat of following, monitoring, or stalking an identified individual along that person's route to and from work would, if proved, constitute criminally punishable direct or indirect contact. 19-A M.R.S. § 4007(1)(D); see 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1), (2). [¶ 34] Contact is a condition or an instance of meeting, connecting, or communicating. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 490 (2002). The term direct means marked by absence of an intervening agency, instrumentality, or influence, or experienced personally without associative effort of anyone else. Id. at 640. By prohibiting direct or indirect contact, therefore, an order entered pursuant to section 4007(1)(D) instructs a defendant not to meet, connect, or communicate with the protected person, either personally or through an intervening agency, instrumentality, influence, or other person. See id. at 490, 640. [¶ 35] We first address whether following Doe along her work route would necessarily involve contact. To follow means to go, proceed, or come after: move behind over the same course. Id. at 883. Going, proceeding, or coming after a person along that person's work route inherently involves a direct or indirect meeting with that person in a defined geographic area and at particular times of day. Thus, the criminal complaint was not defective to the extent that it alleged that Elliott had violated the protective order by following Doe along her work route. [¶ 36] Regarding Elliott's argument that monitoring Doe along her work route does not necessarily constitute contact, we look to the ordinary meaning of the term monitor, which means to watch, observe, or check esp. for a special purpose. [13] Id. at 1460. The term as used heremonitoring [Doe] along her work route from So. Portland to Andover, MAdescribes conduct that would inherently involve at least indirect contact with Doe because of the identified temporal and geographical limitation. Whether the person subject to the order has a purpose to communicate his or her presence, or to keep track of the movements and doings of the person who obtained the order, monitoring a person along a specified route to and from work results in a meeting between the two parties either directly or indirectly. See id. at 490, 640, 1460. [14] Monitoring an individual along a specified route therefore inherently involves direct or indirect contact with that other person. [¶ 37] Regarding Elliott's final contention that stalking Doe along her work route does not necessarily constitute direct or indirect contact, we examine the statutory definition of the crime of stalking. To establish that Elliott engaged in stalking as defined by the statute then in effect, the State was required to prove that: (1) Elliott repeatedly maintained a visual or physical proximity to Doe; (2) Elliott's conduct was not an activity protected by the Maine or United States Constitutions or by state or federal statutes; (3) Elliott's conduct was directed at Doe specifically; (4) Elliott acted intentionally or knowingly; and (5) Elliott's course of conduct would in fact cause both a reasonable person and Doe to suffer intimidation or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. See 17-A M.R.S. § 210-A(1)(A)(1), (2)(A). Repeatedly maintaining visual or physical proximity to Doe along her work route constitutes contact, as that term is commonly understood. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 490 (defining contact to include a condition or an instance of meeting, connecting, or communicating). Because stalking a person along a specified route constitutes contact with that person, the court that issued the protective order was authorized to prohibit Elliott from stalking Doe along her work route pursuant to section 4007(1)(D). [¶ 38] Accordingly, although the State may not, by complaint, alter or add to the elements of a crime, see 17-A M.R.S. § 3(1), the State here charged Elliott with conduct that, if proved, would constitute either direct or indirect contact with Doe and satisfy the element of the crime that requires a violation of a provision in a protective order that was authorized by paragraphs (A) through (G) of section 4007(1)here, paragraph (D). See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 4007(1)(D), 4011(1), (2). For these reasons, there was no defect in the complaint or in the resulting jury instructions on the charge for violating a protective order. [¶ 39] We discern no defect in the charging instrument or in the jury instructions on either charge, and we affirm the judgments of conviction on both counts. The entry is: Judgments affirmed.