Opinion ID: 155821
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Schneider, Shaw, and Lambert Offenses14

Text: 94 We reach a different result, however, with respect to the charges arising from the Schneider, Shaw, and Lambert incidents. Application of some of the factors listed in Swafford suggests unitary conduct. For example, Karen Schneider, Dena Shaw, and Lori Lambert each testified that the entire episode was relatively short and took place in the same general area. There was therefore no significant separation of events by time or place. Additionally, viewed generally, the object and result of the initial acts of battery and the acts of CSP were not distinct. As discussed with respect to the Lueras offenses, the jury instructions required the jury to find that petitioner entered the victims' homes with the intent to commit CSP, and there was no indication at trial, nor has the State argued on appeal, that petitioner entered the homes with the intent to commit theft or another felony besides CSP. Further, the initial acts of battery, including grabbing and restraining the victims, pushing them into the bedroom, and pushing them to the floor or the bed, were apparently carried out for the purpose of furthering and completing the goal of committing the CSP. 95 Other factors, however, indicate that the acts constituting battery for purposes of the aggravated burglary charges and the acts constituting CSP were not unitary. New Mexico courts have stated that the offense of aggravated burglary is complete as soon as the requisite elements have occurred. See State v. Corneau, 109 N.M. 81, 87, 781 P.2d 1159, 1165 (Ct.App.1989) (noting that burglary is not an ongoing offense but is complete once the requisite elements have occurred); Livernois, 123 N.M. at 134, 934 P.2d at 1063 (holding acts leading to defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary and felony murder were not unitary where shooting occurred after defendant completed the offense of aggravated burglary by entering building while armed and with intent to commit felony); cf. Pisio, 119 N.M. at 259, 889 P.2d at 867 (noting that although acts of CSP and acts constituting felony offense may be non-unitary, as long as the CSP occurs within the res gestae of a felony, then it occurs 'in the commission of' a felony within the meaning of CSP II, felony). Thus, in the case of aggravated burglary based on battery, the aggravated burglary is complete once the defendant unlawfully enters the dwelling with the intent to commit a felony and commits a battery upon someone inside the dwelling. Additionally, the offense of aggravated burglary does not require that a defendant actually commit a felony after entering the dwelling, but only requires that the defendant enter with the intent to commit a felony. Therefore, in this case, the offense of aggravated burglary was complete as soon as petitioner unlawfully entered the victims' homes with the intent to commit CSP and committed a battery, such as grabbing the victims from behind; the offense did not depend on the actual commission of the CSP. 96 In addition, the acts of battery and the acts of CSP were of a different quality or nature. The acts of battery included grabbing the victims, covering their mouths to prevent them from screaming, pushing them through the house to the bedroom, pushing them on the bed or floor, and restraining them. These acts are of a different nature than the acts constituting CSP, which requires sexual penetration. Cf. State v. Mora, --- N.M. ----, ---- - ----, 950 P.2d 789, 804-06 (1997) (holding quality and nature of defendant's acts underlying felony murder and criminal sexual contact charges were distinct; the acts of criminal sexual contact resulted in injury to genital area, whereas act of felony murder was fatal blow to victim's head). Further, although some acts of battery, such as restraining the victim while committing the CSP, are necessarily inherent in and therefore inseparable from the act of CSP, other acts of battery which occurred both before and after the acts of CSP are not necessarily a part of the CSP. See State v. Crain, 124 N.M. 84, ---- - ----, 946 P.2d 1095, 1100-01 (Ct.App.) (stating that CSP III cannot be charged as CSP II, based on commission during kidnapping, without some force, restraint, or deception occurring either before or after the sexual penetration), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 626, 944 P.2d 274 (1997); Pisio, 119 N.M. at 261-62, 889 P.2d at 869-70 (same); Corneau, 109 N.M. at 86-87, 781 P.2d at 1164-65 (same, in context of CSP II and underlying felony of false imprisonment). 15 97 There are also other factors, specific to the individual incidents, that indicate the acts underlying the battery and the acts underlying the CSP were separate and distinct. For example, Lori Lambert testified that she struggled several times with her assailant. Lambert testified that after one struggle with her assailant, she made it out of the bedroom and into the living room. The attacker at first pulled her back, but then pushed her into the living room. While in the living room, she again struggled with him and attempted to crawl to the front door. New Mexico courts have indicated that such struggling with the attacker may constitute an intervening event between the initial acts of battery and subsequent acts. See State v. Cooper, --- N.M. ----, ----, 949 P.2d 660, 671 (1997) (holding that acts underlying defendant's convictions for aggravated battery and felony murder were non-unitary where evidence showed that after initial battery victim struggled with defendant; this struggle was an intervening event separating the initial battery from the subsequent acts causing victim's death). Thus, the intervening struggles indicate the initial acts of battery were separate and distinct from the subsequent acts of CSP. 98 In addition, the testimony of two of the rape victims, Lori Lambert and Dena Shaw, indicates that in two of the incidents the assailant's repeated sexual penetrations constituted separate and distinct violations of the CSP statute. In Herron, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that although the number of penetrations is not dispositive of the number of violations of the CSP statute, multiple penetrations may constitute separate violations of the CSP statute where each penetration is in some sense distinct under the evidence. See 111 N.M. at 361, 805 P.2d at 628; see also Pisio, 119 N.M. at 260, 889 P.2d at 868 (stating Herron provides proper basis for whether conduct in sex-crime cases is unitary and should supplement Swafford analysis); State v. Brooks, 117 N.M. 751, 754 n. 1, 877 P.2d 557, 560 n. 1 (1994) (affirming Herron as appropriate analysis for sex-crime cases). The Herron court listed various factors for a court to consider in determining whether the multiple acts are distinct, including the location and position of the victim at the time of each criminal act and distinctions in the manner of committing the criminal acts. See 111 N.M. at 361, 805 P.2d at 628. Applying these factors, the Herron court found that two distinct CSP offenses occurred when the defendant in that case forced his victim into a lying position on the floor and inserted his finger into her vagina, and then forced her into a kneeling position and penetrated her vaginally with his penis. See id. at 362, 805 P.2d at 629. The court stated that these acts were sufficiently distinct to support convictions for two CSP offenses. Id. 99 The testimony of Lambert and Shaw indicates that, under the analysis of Herron, there were at least two distinct acts of CSP in both incidents. Lori Lambert testified that after her assailant pushed her into the living room, he penetrated her vagina with his finger. She screamed and he told her to shut up; her head then hit the floor. She testified that at this point she was on her knees with his left arm around her. She tried to talk to him and he responded for a moment, but he then became angry and told her to shut up, shut up. She then tried to crawl to the front door and she screamed again. He told her to shut up and not to look at him, and he banged her head on the floor again by her hair. She testified that she was then on her stomach. He then told her to spread her legs, and he penetrated her vagina with his penis once or twice. 100 Based on this testimony, two distinct CSP offenses occurred when the assailant first penetrated the victim's vagina with his finger, and then, after she attempted to break away and to talk him out of further acts, the assailant repositioned her and penetrated her vagina with his penis. Based on Herron, therefore, petitioner committed and could have been convicted and punished separately for two distinct CSP offenses based on this incident. See id.; see also Swafford, 112 N.M. at 13, 810 P.2d at 1233 ([I]f the defendant commits two discrete acts violative of the same statutory offense, but separated by sufficient indicia of distinctness, then a court may impose separate, consecutive punishments for each offense.). 101 Dena Shaw testified that after her assailant pushed her into the bedroom, they were both standing, and he pulled down her pants and her pantyhose. She testified that he then just kind of started caressing me with his hand. And he penetrated me with his finger, told me to lay down. And as I was laying down, I kind of tried to lay sideways, and he pushed me down to make sure I'd lay face first on the ground. She then heard some noise behind her, which probably [was him] undoing his pants or something, and he penetrated her vagina with his penis. 102 Although Shaw's testimony is ambiguous, a reasonable interpretation is that while both Shaw and the assailant were standing, the assailant penetrated the victim's vagina with his finger, and then told her to lie down. She then tried to move to her side but he pushed her so she was face-down on the floor; he then penetrated her vagina again with his penis. As with the Lambert incident, petitioner could have been convicted for two CSP offenses based on this incident. 103 Because there were two distinct CSP offenses in the Lambert and Shaw cases, even if the initial acts of battery were not distinct from the acts constituting the first CSP offense, there remained a separate act of CSP. Thus, the aggravated burglary was necessarily completed before, and was distinct from, the second act of CSP and the conduct underlying the CSP and aggravated burglary charges was therefore non-unitary. See Brecheisen, 833 F.2d at 240-41 (holding, in consecutive prosecution case, that defendant's CSP conviction was not barred by a prior battery conviction arising out of same criminal episode because evidence established three separate battery offenses; the two initial acts of battery were separate and distinct from the third battery which occurred during and which merged with the CSP offense). 104 We conclude that the evidence presented at trial supports the determination that there was independent factual support for each of the charges arising from the Schneider, Shaw, and Lambert incidents. Therefore, petitioner's convictions and consecutive sentences for both CSP II and aggravated burglary arising from these incidents did not violate the Constitution's proscription against double jeopardy. See Swafford, 112 N.M. at 13, 810 P.2d at 1233.