Opinion ID: 1129010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Petitioner's Allegedly Involuntary Statements to the Police

Text: The petition alleged that incriminating statements petitioner made to the police were involuntary and that these statements were erroneously introduced into evidence at his sanity trial and used ... to force his plea. At petitioner's trial no objection was made to the admission of the statements on the ground that they were involuntary, and no argument was made on appeal that the statements were involuntary. ( People v. Walker, supra, 33 Cal.2d 250, 259.) So far as appears the matter was raised for the first time in 1970 in the habeas corpus petition that we denied, and it was raised again in the instant proceeding. (1) The general rule is that habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for appeal, and, in the absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse for failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction. ( In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 [264 P.2d 513]; in accord People v. Morrison, 4 Cal.3d 442, 443, fn. 1 [93 Cal. Rptr. 751, 482 P.2d 663]; In re Black, 66 Cal.2d 881, 886-887 [59 Cal. Rptr. 429, 428 P.2d 293]; In re Shipp, 62 Cal.2d 547, 551-553 [43 Cal. Rptr. 3, 399 P.2d 571].) Here petitioner sought to excuse the failure to raise the above matter on appeal by alleging, inter alia, that he was then incompetent. The Solano County Superior Court made no express finding with respect to that allegation, nor does it appear that such a finding can be implied. That court declared that The contention that [petitioner] was incompetent throughout the entire proceeding does not now require a decision, and it would be unreasonable to assume that the court decided whether petitioner was incompetent at the time of his appeal. (2) It is also the rule that a convicted defendant must fully disclose his reasons for delaying in the presentation of the facts upon which he would have a final judgment overturned. ( In re Wells, 67 Cal.2d 873, 875 [64 Cal. Rptr. 317, 434 P.2d 613]; In re Shipp, supra, 62 Cal.2d 547, 553; In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 [209 P.2d 793].) The People argue that petitioner failed to satisfactorily explain the long delay in seeking relief. Petitioner asserts, and the People do not deny, that the matter of the delay was not argued in the court below. The petition for habeas corpus sought to explain the delay by alleging, inter alia, that petitioner was insane from 1944 to 1961, had no counsel following his appeal until the instant proceeding, and was without knowledge of the law. The Solano County Superior Court made no express findings on these matters, nor does it appear that such findings can be implied. Even if we assume that special circumstances excused petitioner's failure to employ his remedy of appeal and that there is an adequate excuse for his delay in the presentation of the facts upon which he seeks to have his conviction overturned, as we shall see, his claim that his statements to the police were involuntary is not supportable on this appeal. In its order granting habeas corpus the Solano County Superior Court stated in part that The combination of circumstances revealed by the testimony of the police [at the murder trial] clearly point to the involuntary character of [petitioner's] incriminating statements. (Italics added.) The evidence of the circumstances surrounding petitioner's statements as revealed by the testimony of the police, may be summarized as follows: Officers Donahue and Wynn testified: Around 2 a.m. on December 20, 1946, accompanied by Officers Rombeau, Baughn and Hannon, they went to the petitioner's apartment. They had a key to the apartment, and when they put it in the door they heard someone moving inside. As the door opened, [2] Donahue saw a submachine gun in petitioner's hand. Donahue jumped on petitioner, and they fell to the floor. A struggle ensued in an attempt to get petitioner's gun. During the struggle Wynn struck petitioner twice on the head with a gun butt. Neither blow seemed to bother petitioner, who was still grasping his gun and trying to twist it. Wynn then shot petitioner twice, and petitioner was hit in the shoulder. Donahue and Rombeau held petitioner's arms, and Wynn held petitioner's shoulders. As they rolled him over, he said, All right, now, you have me. Do a good job. Donahue asked petitioner Why did you kill the Highway Patrolman? and petitioner replied he had to. When asked Did you shoot the two officers in Hollywood? petitioner answered Yes. The officers saw that petitioner was bleeding badly and attempted to make him comfortable by covering him and putting a pillow under his head. Petitioner never became unconscious. The officers called an ambulance, which arrived in less than 10 minutes. During this period petitioner voluntarily told the officers the location of various guns, in addition to loaded weapons the officers found in his apartment. Officer Rombeau testified: He accompanied petitioner to the hospital in the ambulance, and petitioner appeared rational. Rombeau asked about the crimes in question and petitioner said he had nothing to say. Rombeau further testified: I said, `It looks to me like you are in pretty bad shape and I think the smart ... thing to do is to ... tell us all about it, so that the issue will be closed if something serious happens, you are in pretty bad shape, you may not live until you get to the hospital.' [Petitioner] said `I have nothing to say.' Later on, as we arrived at the ... hospital, while on the table being examined by the ... physician, he asked for some opiates. He said he was in pain and he wanted something to kill the pain. I again asked him if he wouldn't relate all the circumstances regarding the killing of ... Roosevelt and the shooting of our two Hollywood detectives. I said `Now is your time, because you may not come out of this and you should clear it up.' `Well,' he said, `all right, it looks like there is nothing else to do, so I will tell you.' At that time he went in detail telling just how he shot ... Forbes and Johnson and ... how he had killed ... Roosevelt. Officer Wynn testified that on the morning of December 21, 1946, he talked with petitioner for about an hour at the hospital, after which a stenographic reporter named Bechtel came and the conversation was repeated and transcribed. A doctor and nurse were also then present. Petitioner told them very freely about where this was [and] that was. Bechtel testified to the contents of the conversation. In the conversation petitioner made statements indicating that he murdered Officer Roosevelt during an attempt to commit a burglary; petitioner also admitted having committed the attempted murders and various robberies and burglaries, and said that his statements were freely and voluntarily made. Officer Wynn further testified: On December 23, 1946, Wynn talked with petitioner again at the hospital, and petitioner made described admissions. Officer Forbes testified that around December 28, 1946, he talked with petitioner at the hospital, and petitioner made various admissions to him. Officer Wynn further testified: On December 30, 1946, Wynn was told that petitioner was ready to be transferred from the hospital to jail. Petitioner kept asking [Wynn] for opiates and asked him to get some from the doctor. Wynn tried to do so, but the doctor said No. Petitioner said he was a little weak but did not complain about any discomfort. En route to jail Wynn and petitioner talked. Wynn said he would like to take movies of a reenactment of the killing of Roosevelt and asked if petitioner had any objection, and petitioner said he would like to contact his attorney first and gave Wynn attorney Girard's card. Wynn tried unsuccessfully to reach Girard. Wynn then asked if petitioner had any objection to going to Griffith Park and Soledad Canyon to recover articles there that petitioner had mentioned and petitioner replied he didn't see anything wrong in that. Wynn, petitioner, and several officers proceeded to those locations and recovered specified objects. During this period petitioner made further incriminating statements. At one point petitioner complained of being cold, and the officer thereupon placed his overcoat around petitioner. The record further shows that at the time of the arrest petitioner was about 28. He had one year of college and was well above average in intelligence. He testified at length at the trial and made no claim that any of his statements was involuntary. [3] The admissibility of petitioner's statements as a constitutional matter was governed ... by the contemporary case law elaborating the due process standards of voluntariness. ( Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 453 [27 L.Ed.2d 524, 530, 91 S.Ct. 485].) [4] (3) A confession is involuntary unless it is `the product of a rational intellect and a free will.' ( In re Cameron, 68 Cal.2d 487, 498 [67 Cal. Rptr. 529, 439 P.2d 633], quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 [4 L.Ed.2d 242, 249, 80 S.Ct. 274].) In determining whether a confession is the product of a rational intellect and a free will, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession must be taken into account. ( Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 [6 L.Ed.2d 948, 953, 81 S.Ct. 1541]; People v. Sanchez, 70 Cal.2d 562, 572 [75 Cal. Rptr. 642, 451 P.2d 74].) (4) The use of reasonable force in arresting a defendant does not impair the voluntariness of a statement made by him during or after the arrest (see, e.g., People v. Carter, 56 Cal.2d 549, 561-562 [15 Cal. Rptr. 645, 364 P.2d 477]; People v. Burwell, 44 Cal.2d 16, 30-31 [279 P.2d 744] [cert. den., 349 U.S. 936 (99 L.Ed. 1265, 76 S.Ct. 788)]; People v. Hill, 17 N.Y.2d 185 [269 N.Y.S.2d 422, 216 N.E.2d 588, 591] [cert. den., 383 U.S. 960 (16 L.Ed.2d 303, 86 S.Ct. 1231), 385 U.S. 875 (17 L.Ed.2d 102, 87 S.Ct. 152)]; 29 Am.Jur.2d, p. 627), and here it does not appear from the officers' testimony that the force employed in arresting petitioner was unreasonable. [5] (5) Although petitioner sustained injuries at the time of his arrest and undoubtedly was in pain during some of the interviews, such pain does not appear from the officers' testimony to have reflected on his competency. (See People v. Cobb, 45 Cal.2d 158, 162 [287 P.2d 752]; People v. Burwell, supra, 44 Cal.2d 16, 30-31 [cert. den., 349 U.S. 936]; People v. Amaya, 40 Cal.2d 70, 77 [251 P.2d 324]; 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 575.) As heretofore appears, en route to the hospital Officer Rombeau made a statement to petitioner indicating that petitioner was in pretty bad shape and might not live until he reached the hospital and that the smart ... thing to do was to tell the police about it so that the issue would be closed if something happened. (6) Even assuming Rombeau's statements regarding petitioner's condition constituted deception, this did not render petitioner's subsequent admissions inadmissible since the deception was not of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement. ( People v. Atchley, 53 Cal.2d 160, 171 [346 P.2d 764] [cert. dism., 366 U.S. 207 (6 L.Ed.2d 233, 81 S.Ct. 1051); see also 400 U.S. 446 (27 L.Ed.2d 524, 91 S.Ct. 485)]; cf. People v. Arguello, 65 Cal.2d 768, 775 [56 Cal. Rptr. 274, 423 P.2d 202]; see Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) pp. 446-448.) (7) Nor did petitioner's response I have nothing to say render his ensuing admissions inadmissible. (Compare Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 738-739 [22 L.Ed.2d 684, 692-693, 89 S.Ct. 1420].) And although it does not appear whether petitioner was informed of his constitutional rights before he made the various statements, any such failure would not in itself be coercive but would go only to the weight to be given any evidence of actual coercion. ( Procunier v. Atchley, supra, 400 U.S. 446, 453 [27 L.Ed.2d 524, 530].) We conclude, contrary to the holding of the Solano County Superior Court, the combination of circumstances revealed by the police do not show that petitioner's statements were involuntary. The Solano County Superior Court also found that while [petitioner's] requests for counsel were ignored, the time for his first appearance in court was delayed, and his arraignment was postponed for 17 to 24 days while he was questioned by police for the purpose of getting incriminating statements. The record shows: Petitioner was taken to the hospital following his arrest on December 20, 1946, and was released from the hospital on December 30, 1946, for transportation to jail. On January 3, 1947, he was indicted, and his arraignment was set for January 7, 1947. On that date he appeared without his attorney, and the matter was continued to January 14, 1947, at which time he appeared with his attorney and was arraigned. All petitioner's statements to the police were made on or before December 30, 1946. It does not appear that his requests for counsel were ignored. Assuming that January 7, 1947, was the first date petitioner was brought into court, more than the period specified in Penal Code section 825 [6] elapsed following his arrest before he was brought before a magistrate. (8) However, it would be an unreasonable application of that section to require that a hospitalized defendant be taken before a magistrate until it was possible to do so without jeopardy to his health ( People v. Lane, 56 Cal.2d 773, 781 [16 Cal. Rptr. 801, 366 P.2d 57]), and most of petitioner's statements were made before his release from the hospital. (9) In any event delay in arraignment is but one factor to be considered in determining whether a confession is voluntary. ( People v. Kendrick, 56 Cal.2d 71, 85 [14 Cal. Rptr. 13, 363 P.2d 13]; see Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 3, 10 [291 P.2d 929].) (10) The rule of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 [87 L.Ed. 819, 63 S.Ct. 608], that any confession obtained during an illegal detention is ipso facto inadmissible has not been adopted in California. ( People v. Bashor, 48 Cal.2d 763, 765 [312 P.2d 255]; Rogers v. Superior Court, supra ; see Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966), pp. 454-455.) In our opinion any delay in petitioner's arraignment, in combination with the other circumstances set forth above, did not render his statements involuntary. The Solano County Superior Court's order also recited (1) that when petitioner was arrested he was beaten on the head with a gun butt so hard that the handle of the gun was broken; (2) that he requested counsel (apparently at the scene of his arrest or en route to the hospital); (3) that [a]t the hospital medication was withheld until he talked; and (4) that the duration of the interrogation before petitioner made the 45-page statement (apparently the statement transcribed by Bechtel) was 48 hours. The record contains no substantial evidence supporting any of these matters. [7] (11) In his brief on appeal petitioner further asserts that when he made the statements his intellect was impaired by insanity. In his petition he similarly alleged that he was incompetent and suffering from acute paranoid schizophrenia when he made the statements. At petitioner's murder trial the Los Angeles County Superior Court found that petitioner was sane when he committed the crimes (in April and June 1946) and also commented that he is now ... sane (June 1947). On appeal this court declared that the record affords abundant support for the conclusion that he was sane [at the time of the crimes]. ( People v. Walker, supra, 33 Cal.2d 250, 257.) At the habeas corpus hearing conflicting psychiatric testimony was introduced relating to petitioner's mental condition when he made the statements (December 1946). In the absence of an express or implied determination by the Solano County Superior Court we cannot hold that as a matter of law petitioner was insane when he made the statements. (Cf. People v. Kanos, 70 Cal.2d 381, 385 [74 Cal. Rptr. 902, 450 P.2d 278]; People v. Henry, 65 Cal.2d 842, 846 [56 Cal. Rptr. 485, 423 P.2d 557].) The Solano County Superior Court made no express finding on that subject, nor can such a finding be implied. The court specified in its order why it concluded petitioner's statements were involuntary, and those reasons do not include that he was then insane. Also the court, in connection with other issues, indicated it was not deciding petitioner's mental state at the times of the crimes or trial, and it would be unreasonable to assume that the court decided whether petitioner was insane at an intervening time, i.e., when petitioner made the statements. (12) In his brief on appeal petitioner also asserts that he was told his family would be jailed if he didn't talk [apparently at the scene of the arrest], and petitioner points to an exhibit consisting of a statement by petitioner on August 25, 1949, containing the quoted matter. The Solano County Superior Court, however, made no express finding that such a statement was made to petitioner, nor can such a finding be implied. Petitioner's self-serving statement was made while he was confined at Mendocino State Hospital after being adjudicated insane and is not substantial proof of the fact asserted.