Opinion ID: 1670832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion to Justify Draganescu's Continued Detention

Text: Draganescu does not appeal the district court's decision that the length of his detention was reasonable. Instead, he contends that Bigsby did not have reasonable suspicion to enlarge the scope of the traffic stop and detain him for a canine sniff after Truesdale attempted to exit the patrol car. To detain a motorist for further investigation past the time reasonably necessary to conduct a routine investigation incident to a traffic stop, [13] an officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the motorist is involved in criminal activity unrelated to the traffic violation. [14] Reasonable suspicion for further detention must exist after the point that an officer issues a citation. [15] Whether a police officer has a reasonable suspicion based on sufficient articulable facts depends on the totality of the circumstances. [16] Courts must determine whether reason-able suspicion exists on a case-by-case basis. [17] Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for detention. It is something more than an inchoate and unparticularized hunch  but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause. [18] Regarding an officer's reasonable suspicion, we have previously considered factors similar to those present in this case. Those factors included an officer's testimony that (1) the motorist had not taken the most direct route from the occupants' stated point of origin to their stated destination [19] and (2) the driver or passengers gave implausible or contradictory answers regarding their travel plans. [20] And, although of limited usefulness, a court may consider, with other factors, evidence that the occupants exhibited nervousness. [21] Finally, a court can consider, as part of the totality of the circumstances, the officer's knowledge of a person's drug-related criminal history. [22] Moreover, factors that would independently be consistent with innocent activities may nonetheless amount to reasonable suspicion when considered collectively. [23] For example, evidence that a motorist is returning to his or her home state in a vehicle rented from another state is not inherently indicative of drug trafficking when the officer has no reason to believe the motorist's explanation is untrue. [24] But a court may nonetheless consider this factor when combined with other indicia that drug activity may be occurringparticularly the occupants' contradictory answers regarding their travel purpose and plans [25] or an occupant's previous drug-related convictions. [26] Here, the rental agreement showed that Truesdale should have returned the van to Seattle 5 days before the traffic stop. His explanation to Bigsby that he had obtained a 3-day extension did not explain why the van was in Nebraska 2 days after it was due for return in Washington. [27] More important, Draganescu's statement that he and Truesdale were traveling straight back to Michigan from Washington was inconsistent with their presence on Interstate 80 in Nebraska. And, most telling, Truesdale and Draganescu gave contradictory answers about their travel plans. Finally, Draganescu's background check revealed a drug-related criminal history. Considering the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that these facts, when viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, [28] created a reasonable, articulable suspicion. The court did not err in concluding that Bigsby had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Truesdale and Draganescu were involved in unlawful activity at the time Bigsby issued the warning citation.