Opinion ID: 4118870
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Batson/Wheeler Rulings

Text: Defendant, who is African-American, complains he was deprived of his constitutional rights to equal protection and a representative jury because the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from 15 For this reason, defendant‘s reliance on People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946 and People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306 is unavailing. In those cases, we determined cause dismissals were not supported by substantial evidence. One prospective juror‘s voir dire responses ―indicated he was prepared to follow the law and had no predisposition one way or the other as to imposition of the death penalty.‖ (Heard, at p. 967.) A second ― ‗had no strong feelings on the death penalty‘ ‖ (Pearson, at p. 330) but was ― ‗positive‘ ‖ she could vote to impose it in an appropriate case (id. at p. 331). These views stand in sharp contrast to E.I.‘s predisposition to vote against death in all but the most egregious cases, and her ultimate conclusion that her conscience would prevent her from ever voting for death. 23 the jury. (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).)
Because defendant makes several statistical arguments, we discuss the jury selection procedures in some detail. The process, which the court conducted with meticulous attention, lasted from the middle of November 2002 until the beginning of March 2003. Twelve panels of 90 individuals each were called and completed a 41-page questionnaire. After some panelists were excused by stipulation or for hardship, the rest returned in small groups over several weeks for individual sequestered voir dire. (See Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80.) This process produced a pool of 73 qualified jurors: 49 Caucasians (67.12 percent); 10 Asian or Pacific Islanders (13.70 percent); four African-Americans (5.48 percent); three mixed-race16 individuals (4.11 percent); four Hispanics (5.48 percent); and three (4.11 percent) whose race is not reflected in the questionnaires. Jurors were called into the jury box in random order for the parties to exercise peremptory challenges. Each side had 30 challenges, with 12 additional challenges to use for the alternates. Defendant and Patterson agreed to exercise their challenges jointly. The prosecutor exercised 10 peremptory challenges in selecting the trial jury and eight in selecting the alternates. Three of these challenges were made against African-American panelists. After each, the defense jointly asserted a Batson/Wheeler motion. The court held a hearing and issued a detailed ruling denying the motions. Including alternates, the jury was composed of 11 women and seven men, ranging in age from 24 to 61 years old. All major cities in the county were represented except Fremont, Pleasanton, and Berkeley. Thirteen of the jurors were Caucasian, three were Hispanic, and two were Asian. 16 These jurors identified as Puerto Rican/Hawaiian, Asian/Hispanic, and Caucasian/Latino. 24
Both state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based on their race or membership in a cognizable group. (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) A three-step inquiry governs the analysis of Batson/Wheeler claims. ―First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge based on race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to demonstrate that the challenges were exercised for a race-neutral reason. Third, the court determines whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612-613; see also Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168.) ―A prima facie case of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges is established if the totality of the relevant facts ‗ ―gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 384.) At step two of the analysis, the prosecutor ―must provide a ‗ ―clear and reasonably specific‖ explanation of his ―legitimate reasons‖ for exercising the challenges.‘ [Citation.] ‗The justification need not support a challenge for cause, and even a ―trivial‖ reason, if genuine and neutral, will suffice.‘ [Citation.] A prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons.‖ (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613.) However, ―race-based decisions are not constitutionally tolerable.‖ (Id. at p. 621; accord, Rice v. Collins (2006) 546 U.S. 333, 338.) The People do not dispute the trial court‘s finding that a prima facie case had been established. Accordingly, we focus on the third Batson/Wheeler prong and examine whether the African-American panelists were excused due to 25 intentional discrimination. (See People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 174; People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613, fn. 8.) ―At the third stage of the Wheeler/Batson inquiry, ‗the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor‘s race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor‘s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.‘ (MillerEl [v. Cockrell (2003)] 537 U.S. [322,] 339.)‖ (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613, fn. omitted.) Implausible or fantastic justifications offered at the second stage may not be sufficiently credible to pass muster at stage three. (Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 768.) ―In assessing credibility, the court draws upon its contemporaneous observations of the voir dire.‖ (Lenix, at p. 613.) This assessment may also take into account ―the court‘s own experiences as a lawyer and bench officer in the community, and even the common practices of the advocate and the office that employs him or her. (See Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281.)‖ (Lenix, at p. 613.) ―We review a trial court‘s determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor‘s justifications for exercising peremptory challenges ‗ ―with great restraint.‖ ‘ [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court‘s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 864.) Here, in making its ―sincere and reasoned‖ evaluation, the court carefully examined each of the prosecutor‘s explanations after independent review of the voir dire transcripts and its own notes about the jurors‘ demeanor. (See People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 283-284.) The court clearly understood its duty to scrutinize the prosecutor‘s reasons to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham 26 excuses contrived to hide discrimination. (See People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 115.) It issued an unusually detailed, careful ruling, referring to specific portions of voir dire and citing numerous authorities. Accordingly, its decision is entitled to deference and must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 571; People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613.) a) Prospective Juror E.T. The prosecutor used his second peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror E.T., a retired credit manager from Oakland married to a retired federal immigration agent. She stated in the questionnaire that she had been arrested for obstruction of justice but did not explain her answer. During voir dire, she explained that she and a police officer ―kind of got into a thing‖ when she was helping her sister leave her husband. She said the officer pushed her and ―made some kind of remarks.‖ She retaliated, and ―[i]t escalated from that.‖ She was arrested but the charges were dropped. In the questionnaire, E.T. described her general opinion about the death penalty as neutral but also stated, ―If you take a life be prepared to give up your life.‖ In voir dire, she said she had ―mixed feelings‖ about capital punishment. She explained that, according to the Bible, ―only God is supposed to be able to really take somebody‘s life,‖ and ―[i]t‘s not our place‖ to kill someone; however, she also believed people shouldn‘t be allowed to murder others. The prosecutor cited these mixed feelings about the death penalty as one reason for striking E.T. Another reason, related to the first, was a concern that E.T.‘s religious beliefs would make it difficult for her to impose the death penalty. The prosecutor said it raised ―a huge red flag‖ if a potential juror stated that only God can take a life. He explained that, ―as a prosecutor in a death penalty case, every single juror that makes [that] answer [has to be excused] either by cause or by peremptory challenge or I‘m not doing my job.‖ He noted no one sitting on the jury had given such an answer. 27 The prosecutor also cited E.T.‘s attitude toward law enforcement. Before voir dire, he had obtained the police report related to E.T.‘s obstruction of justice charge. The report, which was provided to the defense, revealed a different kind of encounter than E.T. described. A uniformed police officer responded to a residence to serve a felony arrest warrant on a person inside. E.T. blocked his entry. Even after the officer physically moved her aside, E.T. continued to place herself in the officer‘s way until the subject of the warrant was able to escape. The prosecutor believed the incident showed E.T. was unfriendly toward law enforcement, and this attitude was especially problematic because the credibility of Oakland police officers would be a crucial issue in the case. The prosecutor also observed that Patterson‘s attorney questioned E.T. only briefly and defendant‘s attorney asked no questions at all. Their approach raised the concern that E.T. would favor the defense. The court found each of the prosecutor‘s reasons supported by the record and expressive of his true motives in excusing E.T. Substantial evidence supports these findings. E.T. expressed mixed feelings about capital punishment. A juror‘s reluctance to impose the death penalty has long been considered a legitimate, raceneutral basis for excusal in a capital case. (E.g., People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 572; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1123; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 230; People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1222.) The trial court observed E.T.‘s statement that only God can take a life expressed a ―startling and dramatic‖ reservation about the death penalty based on what appeared to be the juror‘s strongly held religious beliefs. The court observed that no other juror had expressed such a strongly held view. We have repeatedly upheld peremptory challenges to jurors whose reservations about the death penalty are religious in nature. (E.g., People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 725; People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 118-119; see People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 422 [challenge to juror whose religious beliefs would make it ― ‗hard‘ ‖ to impose the death penalty did not support a prima facie case of Wheeler error].) 28 The court found E.T.‘s negative attitude toward law enforcement was an independent reason for the strike. After reading her arrest report for interfering with a police officer, the court concluded E.T. had committed substantial unlawful conduct, which she minimized during voir dire. A juror‘s prior arrest is an accepted race-neutral reason for peremptory challenge. (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 575.) For similar reasons, a juror‘s negative experience with law enforcement can also be a valid basis for exclusion. (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 1124-1125; see People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 138; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 500-501.) Finally, the court noted that defense counsel‘s failure to question a juror was viewed as a valid race-neutral reason justifying the prosecutor‘s peremptory challenge in People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 75. While this reason might not be sufficient in isolation to support a challenge, the absence of any significant questioning by defense counsel is relevant and may legitimately support a prosecutor‘s feeling that the panelist would favor the defense. (See ibid.) b) Prospective Juror B.C. The prosecutor used his sixth peremptory challenge to excuse B.C., a 54year-old receptionist from Oakland. B.C. disclosed in the questionnaire that her daughter had been raped two years earlier by a ―high-profile‖ person who was not convicted. She favored strengthening the justice system to give victims justice. In voir dire, B.C. explained that her daughter‘s rapist was a professional basketball player. The case was investigated by the Alameda Police Department but was eventually ―dropped.‖ B.C. had previously served as the foreperson in a criminal case. In her questionnaire, she stated that the case resulted in a verdict; however, in voir dire, she reported that the jury hung on one count. They found the defendant guilty of attempted robbery and being a felon in possession of a firearm but could not reach a verdict on an attempted murder charge. 29 B.C. also expressed the view that minorities are not treated fairly by the justice system, explaining that minorities were usually unable to pay for the same quality of legal representation available to White defendants. In voir dire, B.C. said she thought people who can afford a private attorney ―have a better chance in court‖ than those represented by a public defender, citing the O.J. Simpson case as an example. Patterson‘s attorney then told B.C. that in addition to retained lawyers and public defenders, some defendants are represented by private lawyers who donate their time. The court remarked after B.C. left the courtroom that this colloquy was misleading. It appeared to give the juror the impression that these defense counsel were donating their time, which was not true. The court noted that the problem had only arisen with B.C. but admonished counsel, ―Don‘t do that again.‖ The prosecutor gave several reasons for striking B.C. He mentioned her experience as the foreperson of a hung jury. He gave examples of other panelists he had excused specifically because they had served on hung juries. B.C. was the foreperson of a jury that could not agree on the most difficult charge, attempted murder. However, even though the jury hung on one count, B.C. found the experience satisfying and nonstressful. From these answers, the prosecutor deduced that, ―rather than dig in[and] work her way through to a verdict, which would have been a more difficult thing to do,‖ B.C. joined with other jurors and ―agreed to take the easy way out[,] to simply agree not to agree.‖ He noted that jurors here would be confronted with a difficult decision if the case reached a penalty phase, and he did not want someone on the jury who previously ―took the easier way out‖ when she was leading deliberations. The prosecutor also feared B.C. would be elected foreperson, because of her experience in that role, ―and when she was a foreperson before, she led the jury to a hang on the difficult charge.‖ The prosecutor also struck B.C. because of her views on the criminal justice system. She expressed concern in both the questionnaire and voir dire about the 30 quality of representation received by people who could not afford private lawyers. After this discussion, Patterson‘s attorney made comments that gave B.C. the clear impression that he was working on the case for free. The impression that defense counsel were working for free was damaging because B.C. seemed to have a ―fullfledged belief that if an African-American defendant can‘t pay his lawyers in the way that O.J. did, [he‘s] not getting a fair shake.‖ B.C.‘s views on money in the criminal justice system were highlighted by her assertion that the police or district attorney‘s office failed to pursue charges against the professional basketball player who had raped her daughter. The prosecutor summarized: ―So here‘s a juror who‘s been in this situation before as a foreperson, who was willing to take the easy way out of a hung jury on a difficult count, who has very strongly held views expressed in her questionnaire and her oral voir dire that money gets you good representation, and she has concerns about that in African-American context. . . . And then we have a defense attorney who stands up and misleads her, leaves her with the impression that he‘s working for free along with the other lawyers here. That‘s a race-neutral reason, your honor. That‘s a situation where that juror was poisoned.‖ The court found that these reasons reflected the truth of why the prosecutor excused B.C. Again, the court‘s careful findings are amply supported by the record. The court found B.C.‘s prior service as the foreperson of a criminal jury that hung on the most serious charge justified the use of a peremptory strike. As the court observed, many cases have held service on a hung jury to be an appropriate, race-neutral reason for excusing a juror, and this reason alone could have justified the excusal of B.C. (E.g., People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 644; People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 265-267; People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 138.) Prior experience on a hung jury ―constitutes a legitimate concern for the prosecution, which seeks a jury that can reach a unanimous verdict.‖ (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 170.) 31 The court found that B.C.‘s views about the fairness of the criminal justice system were also a substantial reason justifying the strike. In many of her answers, B.C. expressed ―real fears‖ that an indigent defendant would suffer a significant disadvantage and only people who can pay for private lawyers will receive a good defense. ―A prospective juror‘s distrust of the criminal justice system is a race-neutral basis for excusal. (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 170-171.)‖ (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 907; see People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 230.) Further, the court believed defense counsel‘s statements about private attorneys donating their time created the irrevocable impression that the defense lawyers in this case were working for free. The prosecutor was justifiably concerned that B.C. would feel sympathy for the defendants because she would believe they were not receiving adequate representation. Finally, the court observed that B.C.‘s views on the disparity of representation available to the wealthy were probably reinforced by the fact that her daughter‘s rapist, a high-profile and presumably wealthy person, avoided prosecution. Skepticism about the fairness of the criminal justice system to indigents and racial minorities has also been recognized as a valid race-neutral ground for excusing a juror. (E.g., People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 850852; People v. Calvin (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1386.) c) Prospective Juror T.W. Immediately after Prospective Juror T.W. was called into the jury box, the prosecutor used his tenth peremptory challenge to excuse him. T.W., a 57-yearold maintenance supervisor from Oakland, answered ―yes‖ to questionnaire items asking if he knew anyone who had been investigated or charged with a crime or if anyone in his family had been arrested or convicted of a crime. When asked to explain these answers, however, he simply drew question marks. In response to a question about particular types of crimes that upset him, T.W. said, ―Innocent people going to jail.‖ He stated, ―I think the system is unfair to Black[s]‖ when asked about the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and checked ―no‖ 32 when asked if the system treats minorities fairly. Expounding on this answer, he wrote: ―So much to say[.] The history of slavery go[es] to[o] deep in this country.‖ Asked if he would like to see changes to the justice system, T.W. responded ―no‖ and explained, ―It [is] the people I want to see changed.‖ T.W. said he was ―neutral‖ on the death penalty and thought it appropriate in some cases. When asked if his views on the death penalty had changed, however, he answered ―yes‖ and commented ―because of the number of Black[s] on death row.‖ The trial court explored some of these responses during T.W.‘s voir dire. Asked about his comment that innocent people are going to jail, T.W. said, ―We seem to be hearing a lot of it lately‖ and recalled hearing that another state had released many prisoners from death row for this reason. He also mentioned he was upset by the Riders scandal, a highly publicized case involving allegations of serious misconduct by four Oakland police officers. He affirmed that he held a strong view ―that African-Americans have not been and are not now being treated fairly‖ in the criminal justice system. When asked about his comment that it was ―the people‖ in the justice system he wanted to see changed, he told the court, ―Well, I guess I‘m talking about White people,‖ although he conceded that ―probably a lot of Black people‘s minds are made up as well, and maybe they‘re not capable of making decisions based on facts.‖ Asked to explain his comments about race and capital punishment, T.W. said Black people have not been treated fairly in the judicial system and are disproportionately represented on death row. On the subject of whether he could vote to impose the death penalty on an African-American defendant, T.W. stated that sentencing someone to death would be ―a very difficult decision‖ regardless of the defendant‘s race. He told the prosecutor that he could conceivably impose the death penalty for the murder of a single adult, but the facts would have to be ―pretty heinous‖ and ―ugly.‖ He also said ―it seem[ed] unlikely‖ that he could vote for death for two defendants if only one person had been murdered. 33 Finally, the prosecutor asked if T.W. himself had any experience with being arrested or taken to jail. He answered that around 20 years earlier, after having too much to drink, he was arrested during an altercation with a cab driver. Although the police took him to jail, T.W. stated that he had ―probably‖ been treated appropriately. Neither of the attorneys conducting voir dire for the defense asked T.W. any questions. After this voir dire, the prosecutor challenged T.W. for cause. In the questionnaire, which had been signed under penalty of perjury, T.W. stated that he had not been arrested for any crime and had never ―visited or been incarcerated in, any jail, prison, or juvenile detention facility.‖ The prosecutor argued T.W.‘s prompt and detailed voir dire answers indicated he clearly remembered his previous arrest and trip to jail. His failure to disclose these facts in the questionnaire could not be attributed to faulty memory. The prosecutor was also ―deeply concerned‖ about the juror‘s views on race. He remarked that T.W. was very candid about his view that African-Americans are treated unfairly in the criminal justice system and disproportionately placed on death row. The court denied the cause challenge but said it was ―not totally satisfied . . . that this man is a totally impartial juror.‖ The court understood the prosecutor‘s concern about having T.W. on the jury, noting it would stretch credulity to assume that T.W.‘s views on racism and African-Americans on death row would not enter into his deliberations and judgment. However, it could not conclude as a matter of law that T.W. was too biased to serve. The prosecutor repeated these reasons in explaining why he used a peremptory challenge to excuse T.W. He noted the juror had markedly negative views about the police and had mentioned a recent scandal involving Oakland police officers in particular. Because T.W. said he thought the Oakland Police Department was ―a whole lot better now than it had been‖ despite the egregious misconduct alleged in the case, the prosecutor concluded he held a negative view of the department. The prosecutor‘s case depended heavily on the credibility of 34 Oakland police officers, and he did not believe T.W. would fairly consider their testimony. Negative views about the Oakland police were also evident in T.W.‘s description of his arrest. The prosecutor argued that T.W.‘s failure to disclose this incident in the questionnaire reflected a lack of honesty that was an independent, race-neutral ground for excusal. The prosecutor also cited T.W.‘s reluctance to impose the death penalty and his clear belief that the criminal justice system is racist. The prosecutor also observed that defense counsel did not ask the juror a single question, which suggested their belief that T.W. leaned heavily in their favor. Before ruling on the Batson/Wheeler motion, the court reviewed the transcript of voir dire and the cause challenge hearing as well as its own notes about the juror. Remarking that perhaps the cause challenge should have been granted after all, the court concluded the prosecutor had ample reasons for striking T.W. and his race-neutral justifications were sincere. When a prospective juror‘s hostility to law enforcement and the criminal justice system is not sufficient to support a dismissal for cause, it may well justify a prosecutor‘s peremptory challenge. (See, e.g., People v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 287.) The court noted T.W. had been arrested by the same police department that investigated the murder. T.W.‘s own arrest was a valid race-neutral reason for excusal. (See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1186, 1189.) Moreover, the juror‘s failure to disclose his arrest in the questionnaire could reflect a lack of candor, a legitimate concern for the prosecutor. (See, e.g., People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 114; People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 166-167; People v. Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 266.) T.W. also expressed a very low opinion of the Oakland Police Department. Even if T.W. truly believed the department had improved in recent years, the relevant events took place seven years earlier. Moreover, T.W. strongly believed that nonwhite defendants cannot receive a fair trial. A prospective juror‘s views that the criminal justice system is biased, and that the death penalty has been disproportionately imposed against minorities, can 35 validly support a peremptory strike. (Williams, at p. 285; People v. Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.) Based on this record, the trial court reasonably concluded T.W.‘s mind was already made up against the prosecution.
As part of our assessment of the court‘s factual findings, we also consider comparisons between African-American panelists the prosecutor challenged with panelists of other races who were allowed to serve. (People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 103.) ―The rationale for comparative juror analysis is that a side-byside comparison of a prospective juror struck by the prosecutor with a prospective juror accepted by the prosecutor may provide relevant circumstantial evidence of purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor. [Citations.]‖ (Id. at p. 109.) ―If a prosecutor‘s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson‘s third step.‖ (MillerEl v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 241.) ―At the same time, ‗we are mindful that comparative juror analysis on a cold appellate record has inherent limitations.‘ [Citation.] In addition to the difficulty of assessing tone, expression and gesture from the written transcript of voir dire, we attempt to keep in mind the fluid character of the jury selection process and the complexity of the balance involved. ‗Two panelists might give a similar answer on a given point. Yet the risk posed by one panelist might be offset by other answers, behavior, attitudes or experiences that make one juror, on balance, more or less desirable. These realities, and the complexity of human nature, make a formulaic comparison of isolated responses an exceptionally poor medium to overturn a trial court‘s factual finding.‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 887.) Defendant urges this court to conduct a comparative analysis of the excused panelists with all 18 of the seated trial jurors and alternates. However, defendant himself compares the excused panelists with only five of the trial jurors and one alternate. He makes no contention that comparison with any of the other 12 jurors 36 has probative value. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to the six seated jurors defendant has specifically discussed. (See People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 572.)17 Defendant does not explicitly compare the excused panelists with jurors who were seated. Rather, he argues two of the prosecutor‘s reasons for dismissing the panelists were pretextual because Caucasian jurors who expressed similar views were not excused. Pretext is established, however, when the compared jurors have expressed ―a substantially similar combination of responses,‖ in all material respects, to the jurors excused. (People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 107, italics added.) Although jurors need not be completely identical for a comparison to be probative (see Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 247, fn. 6), ―they must be materially similar in the respects significant to the prosecutor‘s stated basis for the challenge.‖ (DeHoyos, at p. 107.) Defendant raised a comparative analysis argument in the trial court, and the prosecutor responded by explaining why he accepted some jurors who expressed beliefs similar to those he struck. The trial court accepted the prosecutor‘s reasons, and we too conclude they do not support an inference of discriminatory motive. Like B.C. and T.W., three seated jurors and one alternate expressed the view that the criminal justice system is unfair to minorities. However, the prosecutor adequately explained why each of the seated jurors was stronger for the prosecution than those excused. Juror No. 5, a Puerto Rican financial advisor, checked ―no‖ on the questionnaire when asked if the criminal justice system treats minorities fairly and explained, ―Empirical data has proven this fact.‖ However, based on this juror‘s demeanor and questionnaire responses, the prosecutor viewed him as ―a 17 In any event, we have examined the responses of the remaining jurors and find nothing that casts doubt on the trial court‘s findings. 37 conservative person‖ with ―strong beliefs in the need for people to take personal responsibility for their actions.‖ The prosecutor explained that he accepted Juror No. 5 because of his strong support for the death penalty. For example, he stated that he would vote in favor of the death penalty on a ballot initiative because ―[c]ertain crimes need to be dealt with [by] the death of the convicted.‖ Even more important, when asked in voir dire whether death or a life sentence would be harder to impose, Juror No. 5 indicated they would be equally difficult. The prosecutor explained that in his experience, a juror who perceives either penalty to be a difficult choice is likely to be ―very favorably disposed towards imposing the death penalty.‖18 Juror No. 6, a registered nurse, stated that the criminal justice system treats minorities fairly ―not at all times, but usually.‖ However, this juror had life experience the prosecutor reasonably believed would favor his side. Three years earlier, the 13-year-old niece of the juror‘s husband was murdered by a serial killer. The killer was then on death row in Texas. When asked about her views on the death penalty, Juror No. 6 said she knew that California had over 600 people on death row but had executed only three people in the past 10 years. She hoped the state would either start carrying out the sentences or change the law. Nonetheless, she viewed the death penalty as a strong symbolic statement that could hopefully deter similar crimes. The prosecutor described Juror No. 6‘s voir dire as ―perhaps the most articulate recitation of a variety of kinds of reasons for voting for the death penalty as any juror [he had] ever come across.‖ He found her to be ―a remarkably strong juror‖ for the prosecution. 18 Although the prosecutor justified his challenges to E.T. and T.W., in part, because the defense had failed to question them in voir dire, defense counsel also asked no questions of Juror No. 5. The prosecutor observed that Juror No. 5 was the only juror he had accepted whom defense counsel did not question. He believed Juror No. 5 leaned toward the prosecution, however, observing that he and the defense ―probably have a pretty big disagreement about where that juror sits.‖ 38 Juror No. 11 was a fire department captain. He placed an ―x‖ on the questionnaire in between ―yes‖ and ―no‖ when asked if the justice system treats minorities fairly. He explained, ―I have seen newspaper and news accounts that address this. I do believe that ethnicity is an issue in the criminal justice system. However, I have no strong personal opinion.‖ The prosecutor recalled that he liked Juror No. 11 because he seemed focused on the issue of remorse. He stated in the questionnaire that the death penalty was appropriate only for cases involving extreme acts for which the defendant showed no remorse. Noting that both defendants had committed significant postmurder violence, including attempts to intimidate a witness, the prosecutor predicted he would ―do pretty well on [the remorse] issue‖ with this juror. Also, like Juror No. 5, Juror No. 11 said in voir dire that both death and life imprisonment are severe penalties, and he would not have more difficulty imposing either one. Some seated jurors also made statements similar to B.C.‘s comments that money is necessary to buy a good defense. However, their sentiments on this issue were generally milder, or qualified. The prosecutor reasonably viewed them as stronger jurors for his side. Juror No. 8 referred to the influence of wealth obliquely when she commented in the questionnaire that the O.J. Simpson trial had made her ―somewhat skeptical‖ of the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. The prosecutor was impressed with her prior jury service in a murder trial, however. Juror No. 8 and one other juror believed the defendant was guilty of the greater offense, but the rest of the jury believed only the lesser offense had been proven. Aware that the verdict had to be unanimous, after much deliberation she and the other juror switched sides, convicting the defendant of the lesser offense. Juror No. 8 commented that they later learned, after talking with the judge, that they ―had given the wrong verdict.‖ From Juror No. 8‘s description of this experience, the prosecutor saw her as someone ―who made great strides to reach a unanimous verdict.‖ As for the fact that Juror No. 8 had talked herself into voting not guilty 39 on a murder charge, only to find out later that she had made a mistake, the prosecutor believed she would see this case as ―an opportunity to redo her jury service‖ and would not make the same mistake again. Juror No. 10, a supervisor of a grocery store meat department, stated in her questionnaire that the criminal justice system is ―very effective if you have plenty of money & an excellent attorney.‖ She also checked ―yes‖ when asked whether minorities are treated unfairly in the criminal justice system. The prosecutor explained that he liked jurors who are supervisors because they often have to make hard decisions in their job. Because Juror No. 10 was a butcher, he felt she would not be overwhelmed by gory evidence in the case. The prosecutor also noted two ways in which Juror No. 10 shared similarities with victim Beeson: She had a history of drug abuse, and her husband had strangled her during an argument. In addition, when asked in the general portion of the questionnaire if she would like to see any changes to the criminal justice system, Juror No. 10 volunteered that she wanted to ―narrow the appeals down on death penalty cases.‖ She repeated in voir dire that if there was no doubt of a defendant‘s guilt, she did not see the need to spend money and court time on lengthy appeals. In light of these answers, the prosecutor believed she was a strong juror. Like Juror No. 10, Alternate Juror No. 16 expressed doubts about the fairness of the justice system to minorities and the indigent. She stated in the questionnaire that the criminal justice system is ―generally effective – but access (financially) to effective attorneys can be beneficial.‖ When asked if minorities are fairly treated, she answered, ―For the most part yes[,] but as in all aspects of life some people can be judged (unfairly) based on their race or ethnicity.‖ The prosecutor did not recall details of Alternate Juror No. 16‘s questionnaire or voir dire except that she was strongly in favor of the death penalty and that her brotherin-law was a judge in Kern County. Although she circled the questionnaire response stating she was ―moderately in favor‖ of the death penalty, rather than ―strongly in favor,‖ we do not agree with defendant‘s assertion that the prosecutor 40 mischaracterized the juror‘s views in a manner that evidences discriminatory pretext. (See Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 244-246; Cook v. LaMarque (9th Cir. 2010) 593 F.3d 810, 818.) Moreover, we find reasonable the prosecutor‘s reliance on the fact that Alternate Juror No. 16 was related to a sitting judge as an explanation for why the prosecutor chose not to challenge her. The prosecutor gave reasonable explanations for why he viewed each of these seated jurors as more favorable than excused panelists E.T., B.C., and T.W. Comparative analysis does not suggest that the prosecutor‘s reasons for striking these panelists were pretexts for unlawful discrimination.
Apart from individual and comparative juror analyses designed to ferret out pretext, defendant insists discrimination must have occurred because it was statistically improbable that no African-Americans would serve on a jury in Alameda County. He notes that while African-Americans comprised only about 6 percent of the panel, the prosecutor used 30 percent of his peremptory challenges against them, excusing 100 percent of the African-American panelists called into the jury box. In regard to whether a prima facie case of discrimination has been established under Batson‘s first step, we have observed that the excusal of all members of a particular group may suggest impropriety. (People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 422; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 119.) Statistical evidence about the underrepresentation of certain groups in the venire may also be relevant to this prima facie showing. (See Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 169-170 & fn. 5.) Here, however, the trial court found a prima facie case had been established and proceeded to the second and third steps of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry. The existence of a prima facie case is therefore not in dispute. The only dispute here concerns whether the court properly found that the inference of discrimination was rebutted by the race-neutral justifications given for the strikes. (See Johnson, at p. 168.) 41 We are aware of no case holding that statistical evidence about the underrepresentation of particular groups on a venire, or jury panel, can be sufficient to undermine a trial court‘s considered findings at the third step of a Batson/Wheeler analysis. By the third step, the court has already found that exclusion of jurors from a particular group requires explanation. (See Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 173.) The question at the third step is not whether the defendant can plausibly urge systematic exclusion, but whether any particular panelist was, in fact, excused due to group bias. (See People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 549.) Defendant argues the Supreme Court‘s discussion of the percentage of African-American panel members struck in Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. at pages 240 to 241, supports the relevance of statistics to third step inquiries. The high court did discuss these facts as relevant background. However, its conclusion that at least two panelists were dismissed because of manifest racial prejudice was not based solely on statistics but also on a close analysis of the voir dire responses of dismissed panelists and seated jurors, the use of racially discriminatory practices such as ―shuffling‖ the jury panels, disparities in the prosecutor‘s questioning of African-American panelists, and a systemic policy of the district attorney‘s office to exclude African-Americans from juries. (Id. at pp. 241-264.) While statistical facts may retain some relevance at Batson‘s third step as part of the universe of evidence bearing on the plausibility of asserted justifications for a strike (see id. at pp. 251-252), no case has suggested such facts alone could be sufficient to establish pretext. Defendant complains that his jury consisted of eight Caucasians, two Asians and two Latinos, whereas, ―if race were not an issue . . . one would have expected five white jurors, three Asian jurors, two Latinos, [and] two blacks.‖ However, we have long held that ―no litigant has the right to a jury that mirrors the demographic composition of the population, or necessarily includes members of his own group, or indeed is composed of any particular individuals.‖ (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 277.) Nor does the Sixth Amendment demand such a 42 precise correlation between the demographics of the community and a particular jury. ―Although a defendant has a right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community as a means of ensuring his or her right to an impartial jury, he or she has no right to a jury that reflects the racial composition of the community. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 119-120.) As the Supreme Court has explained, ―[t]he Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does).‖ (Holland v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 474, 480.) Finally, to the extent defendant‘s statistical arguments urge that the venire was not representative, the claim has not been preserved for appeal. Defendant neither objected to the panel nor moved to quash the venire. (See People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 634.) Nor has he attempted to support the claim by showing that the jury selection process in Alameda County results in the systematic exclusion of African-Americans. (See Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 364; Lewis, at pp. 634-635.)