Opinion ID: 2048265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dues deduction authorization and other evidence

Text: The first issue raised by the Board is one of statutory interpretation, which is subject to de novo review. Harrisonville Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 212 Ill.2d 237, 247, 288 Ill.Dec. 121, 817 N.E.2d 479 (2004). Our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Harrisonville Telephone Co., 212 Ill.2d at 251, 288 Ill.Dec. 121, 817 N.E.2d 479; Alternate Fuels, Inc. v. Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 215 Ill.2d 219, 237-38, 294 Ill.Dec. 32, 830 N.E.2d 444 (2004). The most reliable indicator of such intent is the language of the statute, which is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Harrisonville Telephone Co., 212 Ill.2d at 251, 288 Ill.Dec. 121, 817 N.E.2d 479; Alternate Fuels, 215 Ill.2d at 238, 294 Ill.Dec. 32, 830 N.E.2d 444. Words and phrases should not be considered in isolation; rather, they must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions and the statute as a whole. Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill.2d 480, 487, 281 Ill.Dec. 524, 804 N.E.2d 489 (2004); In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d 300, 308, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218 (2002). In addition to the statutory language, the court may consider the purpose behind the law and the evils sought to be remedied, as well as the consequences that would result from construing the law one way or the other. Williams, 208 Ill.2d at 487, 281 Ill.Dec. 524, 804 N.E.2d 489; Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 308, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218. Where a statute is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, the statute will be deemed ambiguous. General Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Vehicle Review Board, 224 Ill.2d 1, 13, 308 Ill.Dec. 611, 862 N.E.2d 209 (2007). In that event, the court may consider extrinsic aids to construction, such as legislative history. People v. Collins, 214 Ill.2d 206, 214, 291 Ill.Dec. 686, 824 N.E.2d 262 (2005). For ease of discussion, we repeat a portion of section 9(a-5): If the parties to a dispute are without agreement on the means to ascertain the choice, if any, of employee organization as their representative, the Board shall ascertain the employees' choice of employee organization, on the basis of dues deduction authorization and other evidence, or, if necessary, by conducting an election. If either party provides to the Board, before the designation of a representative, clear and convincing evidence that the dues deduction authorizations, and other evidence upon which the Board would otherwise rely to ascertain the employees' choice of representative, are fraudulent or were obtained through coercion, the Board shall promptly thereafter conduct an election. 5 ILCS 315/9(a-5) (West 2004). The Board argues that the word and, as used in the phrase dues deduction authorization and other evidence, when considered in the context of section 9(a-5) as a whole, should be read in the disjunctive. Under this reading, dues deduction authorization and other evidence establishes a range or category of evidence which will support a majority interest petition, but it does not require that the petition be supported by all such evidence. Rather, dues deduction authorization or other evidence, similar in kind to dues deduction authorizations, is sufficient. This interpretation is reflected in the Board's rules, which state in relevant part: The showing of interest in support of a majority interest petition may consist of authorization cards, petitions, or any other evidence that demonstrates that a majority of the employees wish to be represented by the union for the purposes of collective bargaining. (Emphasis added.) 80 Ill. Adm.Code § 1210.80(d)(2)(A) (as amended at 28 Ill. Reg. 4172, eff. February 19, 2004). The Board also posits that reading and as or avoids creating an internal inconsistency in the statute. The Board explains that, if, in the second sentence quoted above, the Board could otherwise rely on other evidence to ascertain the employees' choice of representative, then the phrase dues deduction authorization and other evidence in the first sentence cannot require both forms of evidence. The Employer argues that and typically signifies and expresses the relation of addition ( People v. A Parcel of Property Commonly Known as 1945 North 31st Street, Decatur, Macon County, Illinois, 217 Ill.2d 481, 501, 299 Ill.Dec. 196, 841 N.E.2d 928 (2005)), and thus is generally read in the conjunctive. The Employer disputes that reading and in this fashion creates an inconsistency in the statute, and adopts the reasoning of the appellate court that the term otherwise, when given its ordinary meaning, can be reconciled with reading and in the conjunctive. See 375 Ill.App.3d at 775, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319. In evaluating the parties' divergent interpretations, we note that use of the word and between two statutory elements generally indicates that both of the elements must be satisfied in order to comply with the statute. People v. A Parcel of Property Commonly Known as 1945 North 31st Street, Decatur, Macon County, Illinois, 217 Ill.2d 481, 501, 299 Ill.Dec. 196, 841 N.E.2d 928 (2005); Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill.2d 81, 87-88, 265 Ill.Dec. 877, 773 N.E.2d 641 (2002). Nonetheless, this court has also recognized that and is often used interchangeably with or, the meaning being determined by the context. Sturgeon Bay, Etc. Ship Canal & Harbor Co. v. Leatham, 164 Ill. 239, 243, 45 N.E. 422 (1896). Webster's dictionary reflects this use of and, providing the following secondary definition: 2used as a function word to express    reference to either or both of two alternatives esp. in legal language when also plainly intended to mean or . (Emphasis in original.) Webster's Third New International Dictionary 80 (1993). See also Black's Law Dictionary 86 (6th ed.1990) (stating that and is [s]ometimes construed as `or'). In construing statutes, the strict meaning of words like and is more readily departed from than that of other words. John P. Moriarty, Inc. v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 119, 129, 55 N.E.2d 281 (1944). Thus, if reading and in its literal sense would create an inconsistency in the statute or render[ ] the sense of a statutory enactment dubious, we will read and as or. John P. Moriarty, Inc., 387 Ill. at 129-30, 55 N.E.2d 281; accord 1945 North 31st Street, 217 Ill.2d at 500-01, 299 Ill. Dec. 196, 841 N.E.2d 928; People ex rel. Department of Registration & Education v. D.R.G., Inc., 62 Ill.2d 401, 405, 342 N.E.2d 380 (1976). We conclude that the basic premise underlying the Board's reading of the statutethat and does not necessarily mean andand the basic premise underlying the Employer's reading of the statute that and typically means andboth appear, at first blush, to be on solid ground. We conclude also that both interpretations can be harmonized, to a greater or lesser degree, with section 9(a-5) as a whole, including the otherwise clause. Accordingly, because section 9(a-5) is `capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses,' we deem the statute ambiguous. Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill.2d 485, 511, 315 Ill.Dec. 772, 877 N.E.2d 1101 (2007), quoting People v. Jameson, 162 Ill.2d 282, 288, 205 Ill.Dec. 90, 642 N.E.2d 1207 (1994). To resolve this ambiguity, we turn to the legislative history of section 9(a-5), which began its life as House Bill 3396. We find instructive the statements of Senator Martin Sandoval, who spoke in support of this bill: Under current law, workers must go through a difficult process to form a union. Workers must first sign union authorization cards stating that they want a union. Then, even though they've already said they want a union, they must file for a    Labor Board-run election. The election process can be lengthy and cumbersome, as we all know, during which time the employer has control of the employers [ sic ] and can interfere with the employees' decision. And, in fact, employers routinely use this time to scare workers into voting against a union even if the workers want a union. Solution to this problem for public employees is to allow them    to vote for a union through a process called card check. 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 21, 2003, at 12 (statements of Senator Sandoval). The senator's statements indicate that the legislature intended, through its adoption of House Bill 3396, to provide an alternative to the lengthy and cumbersome statutory election procedure, namely, a simple card check procedure. We therefore cannot agree with the Employer that the legislature would have complicated the card check procedure by requiring two forms of evidence: a dues checkoff card and some other unspecified form of evidence. Support for this conclusion is also found in the statements of Representative Larry McKeon: House Bill 3396 is modeled after a piece of legislation in New York that simplifies the manner in which elections may be held to certify a collective bargaining agent   . 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, March 31, 2003, at 50 (statements of Representative McKeon). The New York legislation to which Representative McKeon referred is section 207 of New York's Public Employees' Fair Employment Act. The New York statute requires that for purposes of resolving disputes concerning representation status, the public employees' choice of representative shall be ascertained on the basis of dues deduction authorization and other evidences. (Emphasis added.) N.Y. Civ. Serv. § 207 (Consol.2008). To implement the statute, New York's labor board adopted rules requiring a majority of the employees to indicate their choice of representative by the execution of dues deduction authorization cards which are current or individual designation cards. (Emphasis added.) N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 4, § 201.9(g)(1) (2008). We presume that our legislature, having modeled House Bill 3396 on the New York statute, was also aware of the corresponding administrative regulations, which were then in effect. Having adopted language that mirrors in pertinent part the language of the New York statute, we also presume that the legislature intended a similar result. The Board's reading of section 9(a-5), as reflected in its regulations, achieves that result. To the extent, however, that the legislative history fails to completely resolve any doubt as to the legislature's intent, we are guided by the principle that courts afford considerable deference to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency charged with its administration. Lauer v. American Family Life Insurance Co., 199 Ill.2d 384, 388, 264 Ill. Dec. 87, 769 N.E.2d 924 (2002); Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Pappas, 194 Ill.2d 99, 106, 251 Ill.Dec. 654, 741 N.E.2d 248 (2000). The reason for this deference is that the agency can make informed judgments upon the issues, based on its experience and expertise. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill.2d 391, 398, 199 Ill.Dec. 659, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994), citing Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill.2d 76, 97-98, 180 Ill.Dec. 34, 606 N.E.2d 1111 (1992); see also Andrews v. Kowa Printing Corp., 217 Ill.2d 101, 116, 298 Ill.Dec. 1, 838 N.E.2d 894 (2005) (the interpretation of a statute by involved administrative bodies constitutes `an informed source for guidance when seeking to ascertain the legislature's intention when the statute was enacted'), quoting Johnson v. Marshall Field & Co., 57 Ill.2d 272, 278, 312 N.E.2d 271 (1974). For this additional reason, we would adopt the construction urged by the Board. We hold that the word and, as used in the phrase dues deduction authorization and other evidence, was intended by the legislature to mean or. The appellate court therefore erred in holding section 1210.80(d)(2)(A) of the Board's regulations, which do not require dues deduction authorization evidence, invalid. See 375 Ill. App.3d at 777, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319. The appellate court also erred when it held that the Board's decision certifying the union was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See 375 Ill.App.3d at 778-79, 314 Ill.Dec. 409, 874 N.E.2d 319. That holding was based on the failure of the Board to require, and the presumed failure of the Union to submit, dues deduction authorization evidence. Because the statute does not require such evidence, the appellate court erred in vacating the Board's decision.