Opinion ID: 1898079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Use of Defendant's Prior Convictions

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that his 1982 armed-robbery conviction, his two 1982 burglary convictions, and his 1974 murder conviction were admissible for impeachment purposes. Alternatively, defendant invites us to adopt the Connecticut rule and require that a prior murder conviction be sanitized before admission into evidence. See State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 480 A. 2d 489 (1984); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 674 S.W. 2d 515 (Ky. 1984); State v. Olsan, 231 Neb. 214, 436 N.W. 2d 128 (1989). Sanitization means that the State would be permitted to disclose only that a defendant had an unspecified prior felony conviction, not that he or she had previously been convicted of murder. Geyer, supra, 194 Conn. at 16, 480 A. 2d at 498 (suggesting sanitization of all convictions for crimes that do not directly relate to credibility). But cf. People v. Barrick, 33 Cal. 3d 115, 124, 654 P. 2d 1243, 1248, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721 (1982) (rejecting sanitization because it undermines jury's ability to assess credibility of witness). We decline defendant's invitation. The well-established rule in this jurisdiction is that admission of a prior conviction into evidence against a criminal defendant rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge   . Ordinarily evidence of prior convictions should be admitted and the burden of proof to justify exclusion rests on the defendant. State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 144, 386 A. 2d 378 (1978). Further, [t]he key to exclusion is remoteness. Ibid. Remoteness involves both the passage of time and the nature of the offense. Ibid. The trial court must balance the lapse of time and the nature of the crime to determine whether the relevance with respect to credibility outweighs the prejudicial effect to the defendant. Id. at 144-45, 386 A. 2d 378. Sanitization would mark a pronounced departure from the Sands rule, which has served well for twelve years. We are not persuaded to depart from Sands or to establish an exception for a prior murder conviction in a capital case. In so holding, we recognize the potential prejudicial effect in such a case of a prior murder conviction. That potential prejudice must be weighed against the countervailing consideration, however, that serious crimes should be given weighty effect. Moreover, even greater prejudice might ensue from jury speculation about the nature of a conviction for an unspecified crime. See Barrick, supra, 33 Cal. 3d at 124-25, 654 P. 2d at 1248, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 721. In a capital case, whether or not defendant testifies at the guilt phase, evidence of a prior murder conviction is admissible as an aggravating factor in the penalty phase. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a); Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 247, 548 A. 2d 939. Because of the possibility of prejudice, however, admission of a murder conviction for impeachment purposes should be tempered, if defendant elects to testify, by an appropriate limiting instruction. State v. Whitehead, 104 N.J. 353, 359, 517 A. 2d 373 (1986); Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 142 n. 3, 386 A. 2d 378. Admission on the penalty phase does not, of course, eradicate prejudice to a defendant who elects to testify on the guilt phase. To some extent, nonetheless, it diminishes the argument that sanitization would prevent the jury from hearing that the defendant had previously been convicted of murder rather than of an unspecified felony. At the conclusion of the Sands hearing, the trial court decided to admit all four convictions for impeachment purposes. It admitted the 1982 robbery and burglary convictions because all three involved a lack of veracity and were not otherwise remote. Although the 1974 murder conviction did not raise the same concerns about dishonesty and posed great potential prejudice to defendant, the court concluded that the conviction was a serious crime bearing on credibility within the meaning of Sands and that it was not remote. Given defendant's extensive criminal record, which extended from 1964 to 1982, the court rejected defendant's argument to sanitize the conviction. See Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 145, 386 A. 2d 378. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the four convictions. Under Sands, the 1982 convictions for robbery and burglary, as crimes involving dishonesty, were properly admitted to impeach defendant's credibility. Id. at 144, 386 A. 2d 378. The 1974 murder conviction was not excludable simply because it did not bear on defendant's veracity. Sands permits impeachment by conviction of any kind of crime, and serious crimes are given more weight than lesser crimes. Ibid. As the trial court found, the four convictions evidenced a pattern of illegality that extended over two decades. After carefully weighing the probative value and potential prejudice, the court properly concluded that the convictions were admissible.