Opinion ID: 2156240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Knabe

Text: In Knabe, an injury befell the decedent on January 12, 1927, and he died on July 3, 1930. An action was commenced under the Death Act on June 29, 1932. The Court of Errors & Appeals accepted the reasoning in Coulter v. New Jersey Pulverizing Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 5, 163 A. 661 (Sup.Ct.1932), and concluded that a right of action under the Wrongful Death Act did not vest when the decedent died. Knabe, supra, 111 N.J.L. at 334-35, 168 A. 418. The Court stated, [w]e agree [with Coulter ] that, where any right of action by the living party injured was barred by limitation before his death, the Death Act... does not create a right of action in the personal representative. Id. at 335, 168 A. 418. Knabe adopted Coulter's perception of the legislative intent underlying the Wrongful Death Act: [If D]ecedent lingered for twenty years and made no move, his representative could then assert a right of action to recover for an injury forgotten by every one but the injured, who had slept on his rights for twenty years. Such could not have been the legislative intention. [ Coulter, supra, 11 N.J. Misc. at 7, 163 A. 661.] Based on that understanding, Knabe determined that the Act required a viable personal injury claim at the time of death in order for decedent's representative to maintain a wrongful death cause of action. Knabe did not, however, base that conclusion on the statutory language of the Wrongful Death Act, but, rather, relied solely upon the Coulter view of the legislative intent. Knabe, supra, 111 N.J.L. at 334-35, 168 A. 418.