Opinion ID: 419941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rate Regulation

Text: 38 By contrast, neither Congress nor the FCC has taken the position that the advertising rate provisions of Sec. 315 oust states from regulating the price stations may charge for broadcasting political advertising. The federal statute requires that broadcasters charge the lowest unit rate 45 days before the primary and 60 days before the general election. 47 U.S.C. Sec. 315(b)(1). A comparable use rate applies for the remainder of the year. 47 U.S.C. Sec. 315(b)(2). 53 The FCC has stated that the federal statute of course applies to all legally qualified candidates for public office, and not merely Federal candidates. 54 The statutory language supports that interpretation and we find it persuasive. 55 39 Before Congress amended Sec. 315 the statute simply provided that candidates were entitled to comparable rates at all times. The 1971 amendments added Sec. 315(b)(1), requiring broadcast licensees to offer political advertisers the lowest unit rate within a 45-day window of the primary and a 60-day window of the general election. Congress' overriding purpose in adding Sec. 315(b)(1) was to put political advertisers on par with ordinary commercial advertisers. Candidates are, therefore, entitled to discounts, frequency and otherwise, offered to a station's most favored commercial advertiser for the same class and amount of time for the same period, without regard to frequency of use by the candidate. 56 Thus, for example, a candidate is entitled to a rate based on a package or plan published on the station's rate card even if, during the relevant window period, no commercial advertiser purchased the package. 57 40 Congress sought to place candidates on equal footing with a station's most favored commercial advertisers. Because a political candidate's broadcast requirements are limited in terms of weeks or a few months at best ... he cannot avail himself of the favorable rates available to commercial advertisers who usually buy time in bulk for longer periods. 58 The FCC has recognized that the addition of Sec. 315(b)(1) had a two-fold purpose: to give political candidates access to the broadcast media to explain their stand on issues and to limit the cost of campaigning for public office. 59 Congress' expression of the latter purpose makes clear its determination that candidate access to the media at extremely low cost should be permitted only during a limited window period. It stated: The Committee is also persuaded that a limitation on the length of time when this most favored rate is available will be an incentive to candidates to shorten the duration of their campaigns, thereby helping to reduce campaign costs. Accordingly, the legislation provides that the lowest unit rate will only be available forty-five days before a primary election and sixty days before a general or special election. 60 Indeed the House-Senate Conference Committee rejected a proposal that would have required broadcasters to offer candidates a year-round rate equal to the actual charges ... for any comparable use of [the] station for other purposes. 61 The FCC has applied this policy and expressed extreme reluctance to broaden the meaning of primary election because of the consequent burden on broadcasters. 62 41 In short, although Congress intended to allow access to the media at low rates, it carefully circumscribed the time during which those rates are available. The FCC has likewise moved with caution in applying the statute to the diverse sorts of political gatherings that take place in our 50 states. Furthermore, Congress and the FCC have limited the scope of the provisions to require broadcasters to charge the lowest unit rate to candidates and their campaign committees only. 63 42 The Texas statute sweeps far more broadly. Article 14.09(B) provides that for all political advertising--both candidate and issue advertising--a broadcaster can never charge more than the lowest unit charge of the station for the same class, condition and amount of time for the same period. It permits access by candidates and their committees, but also allows noncandidates and unaffiliated committees to take advantage of the extremely low advertising rate. It extends the low rate from a period of days to the entire year. This extension of the statute's coverage to noncandidates and of the lowest unit charge to a year-round rule stands as an obstacle to the achievement of Congress' purpose in enacting the rate regulation statute. 43 Thus the Texas statute conflicts directly with the federal statute in important ways. It lengthens, rather than shortens, the campaign season. It encourages greater, rather than lesser, campaign spending by encouraging candidates--and others--to advertise year-round. It imposes a considerably heavier burden on broadcasters to make low-cost time available to political advertisers than does the federal statute. 64 Finally, it may have the effect of limiting rather than increasing candidate access to the media by discouraging stations from making advertising time available to nonfederal candidates at all. 65 44 KVUE also asserts that the sponsorship identification requirement violates the first amendment because it requires that certain statements be made with political speech, thus stripping the broadcaster of some measure of absolute editorial control. KVUE characterizes the sponsorship identification requirements as exacting a promise that certain words will be said as the price of political broadcasting and, therefore, as penalizing speech based on its political content. 45 The Supreme Court has recognized that preservation of the integrity of the electoral process is a compelling state interest. 66 As the Court stated in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 39 L.Ed.2d 714, 723 (1974), as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process. Texas' sponsorship requirements are generally-applicable and evenhanded regulations that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself. 67 They do not regulate the content of the political message. Even assuming arguendo that the Texas sponsorship identification requirement infringes on KVUE's first amendment rights, the infringement is of an extremely limited nature because it merely adds the words paid political announcement and the sponsor's address to the federal requirement, the constitutionality of which KVUE does not challenge. By contrast the state interest is compelling. Accordingly, under the balancing test of Anderson, --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d at 557, the Texas requirement does not violate the first amendment. 46 For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.