Opinion ID: 1760281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Redevelopment Act and 25 Mills

Text: As a related point, the City next asserts that the General Assembly's Redevelopment Act was amended twice to show that Amendment 74's 25 mills should be included in the TIF formula. See Act 2231 of 2005, now codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 14-168-301(18)(A) (Supp.2005) (adding state taxes for purposes of TIF funding); Act 43 of 2003, now codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 14-168-323 (Supp.2005) (removing incremental value in a redevelopment district for purposes of computing school-district funding). According to the City, these statutory amendments help clarify the original intent of the General Assembly, when it proposed Amendment 78 as an initiated act. The City argues, moreover, that the School District and Washington County actually levy the 25 mills and, thus, the 25 mills should be included within the applicable ad valorem rate for purposes of funding the redevelopment project, since that millage is levied by a taxing unit. Finally, it claims that the 25 mills are a general property tax under the total ad valorem rate in the original Redevelopment Act. See Ark.Code Ann. § 14-168-301(17) (Supp.2001). We initially agree with the Arkansas Director of Finance and Administration that it is axiomatic that the General Assembly cannot amend the Arkansas Constitution, and specifically Amendment 74, by legislative enactments. See, e.g., Arkansas Dept. of Corr. v. Bailey, 368 Ark. 518, 247 S.W.3d 851 (2007) (noting that statutes are presumed to be framed in accordance with the Constitution); Johnson v. Cummings, 281 Ark. 229, 663 S.W.2d 168 (1984). In addition, it is constitutionally impermissible to interpret Amendment 78 as conferring upon the General Assembly the authority to repeal in part a constitutional provision like Amendment 74 for purposes of redesignating any portion of the 25 mills for a use other than the maintenance and operation of the public schools. We further agree with the Director that to the extent any of the legislation cited by the City authorizes the diversion of the 25 mills for a different purpose other than the maintenance and operation of our public schools, that legislation would be unconstitutional. Nor can we agree, as already discussed, that Amendment 78 empowers the General Assembly to divert the uniform rate of 25 mills under Amendment 74 for TIF funding by later legislation. The 25 mills under Amendment 74, as the circuit court correctly emphasized, is a tax adopted by the collective voters of the state, who levied the uniform rate of 25 mills as a matter of constitutional law when they approved Amendment 74. Hence, we hold that any increase or decrease in this uniform rate of tax or diversion of this tax for any other purpose must be submitted to the voters of this state for approval at a general election. We hold, furthermore, that the 2003 and 2005 amendments to the Redevelopment Act provide no gauge of the intent of the voters when they adopted Amendment 78 in 2000. When interpreting the language of a provision of the Arkansas Constitution, this court endeavors to effectuate the intent of the people passing the measure. See Harris v. City of Little Rock, 344 Ark. 95, 40 S.W.3d 214 (2001). We have said that legislative interpretation of constitutional provisions is never binding on the courts, and when there is some doubt or ambiguity in the provision, legislative interpretation is persuasive and only entitled to some consideration. See Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978). There is no doubt or ambiguity in our reading of Amendment 74 and Amendment 78. Moreover, it is clearly beyond the authority of the General Assembly to amend a constitutional provision by a legislative act that runs counter to the express language of that provision.