Opinion ID: 722408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Walsh

Text: 2 The Department of Veterans Affairs employed Jeanette M. Walsh as a Social Services Assistant at the agency's medical center in St. Cloud, Minnesota. The agency removed her for engaging in a sexual relationship with a patient, engaging in improper financial dealings with patients, and providing false statements to the agency regarding her alleged relationship with a patient. In particular, Walsh provided inconsistent statements regarding when her relationship with the patient began and how long it lasted. In a December 1988 meeting with her supervisor, Walsh acknowledged that she was having an intimate relationship with the patient, who at the time was no longer an in-patient. However, in a December 1991 affidavit, she averred that during the December 1988 meeting with her supervisor she accurately denied having an intimate relationship with the patient at that time. In spite of this inconsistency, she always stated that she did not have an intimate relationship with the patient while he was an in-patient at the agency's facility from April 1988 until November 1, 1988. 3 In an initial decision, an administrative judge (AJ) found that the agency failed to prove the first two charges. Based on his findings regarding these charges, the AJ did not uphold the third charge. The agency petitioned for review by the full board. The board reversed the AJ's finding that the agency had failed to prove the first two charges, but held that the agency improperly charged Walsh with making false statements regarding the alleged misconduct. Relying on our decision in Grubka v. Department of the Treasury, 858 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1988), the board held that an agency may not charge an employee both with misconduct and with making false statements regarding the alleged misconduct. The board recognized that certain of its prior decisions had held to the contrary. Walsh, 62 M.S.P.R. at 594 (citing Greer v. United States Postal Serv., 43 M.S.P.R. 180, 184-85 (1990); Kane v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 46 M.S.P.R. 203, 209 (1990); Sterling v. Department of Defense, 46 M.S.P.R. 177, 185-86 (1990); Hornbuckle v. Department of the Army, 45 M.S.P.R. 50, 54 n. 2 (1990); Hill v. Department of the Army, 44 M.S.P.R. 607, 611-12 (1990)). However, the board also determined that those decisions relied upon a faulty analysis of Grubka. In Grubka, we stated that a falsification charge based upon an employee's denial of misconduct has no substance, is frivolous, and the decision of the AJ sustaining it is not supported by substantial evidence and is erroneous as a matter of law.... Grubka, 858 F.2d at 1575. The board in Walsh reasoned that, because we used the conjunction and in our holding in Grubka, two findings were made, one of which was that the charge was erroneous as a matter of law. According to the board, Grubka thus supports the proposition that a separate charge of making false statements regarding alleged misconduct is erroneous as a matter of law and is therefore improper. 4 The board also stated that in Greer and its progeny, it mischaracterized the due process concerns enunciated in Grubka. According to the board, these concerns were not, as stated in previous board decisions, based upon the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination but, rather, were based upon the due process right to be heard on a charge and to not have a falsification charge automatically sustained on the ground of sustaining the related misconduct. The board also determined that it erred in Greer when it stated that, as an alternative to providing false statements during an agency investigation, an employee may simply refuse to answer questions. According to the board, such a statement was contrary to precedential board decisions and Federal Circuit precedent; an employee may be removed solely for refusing to answer questions during an agency investigation if she is warned that she may be removed for not answering and that her statements cannot be used against her in a criminal prosecution. See Weston v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 724 F.2d 943, 949 (Fed.Cir.1983); see also Haine v. Department of the Navy, 41 M.S.P.R. 462, 469 (1989). Accordingly, the board overruled Greer and its progeny to the extent that their holdings were contrary to Grubka. 5 The board mitigated Walsh's penalty to a 90-day suspension. In determining the appropriate penalty, the board noted that it previously had held that an employee's false statements may be considered in determining a maximum reasonable penalty for misconduct. However, it stated that consideration of false statements in determining a penalty would conflict with the holding in Grubka and would in effect penalize an employee for denying a charge. Accordingly, the board held that an employee's alleged false statements in response to an agency inquiry may not properly be considered in determining a penalty.