Opinion ID: 1541345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the cross-appeals

Text: Thomas Lustberg, M.D., a physician presently practicing only in Maryland, [15] is a defendant in the Schoeny case. [16] C. Gibson Dunn, M.D., a physician practicing only in Virginia, [17] is one of the defendants in the Tabitha L. Kirk case. Dr. Lustberg and Dr. Dunn rendered psychiatric care to Ms. Schoeny and Ms. Kirk when these plaintiffs were in-patients in psychiatric hospitals in Maryland and Virginia, respectively. Dr. Lustberg and Dr. Dunn each moved the trial court to dismiss the action against him for lack of jurisdiction over his person. In the alternative, both defendants asked the court to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens. In each case, Judge Steffen W. Graae ordered dismissal on the physician's secondary theory  forum non conveniens  but specifically declined to rule on the question of personal jurisdiction. [18] Each dismissal was conditioned upon a waiver by the defendant of any applicable statute of limitations defense that might have been available between the filing of these suits in the District of Columbia and the prompt filing of new suits in Maryland or Virginia. The trial court imposed this condition because [a] prerequisite for application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is the availability of an alternative forum in which plaintiff's action may more appropriately be entertained. Mills, supra, 511 A.2d at 13 (citation omitted). We stated in Mills that [i]n the interest of justice, a court must retain such a case, no matter how inappropriate the forum may be, unless the court accepts the defendant's stipulation that he will not raise the defense of statute of limitations in the proposed alternative forum. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS Sec. 84 comment c (1971). Id. See also Begum v. Auvongazeb, 695 A.2d 112 (D.C. 1997). We implicitly recognized in Mills, however, that such a condition could not be imposed if the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 15 n. 9. We now make explicit the applicable legal principles which the court surely had in mind in the Mills footnote. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting rights or interests of non-resident defendants. Kulko v. California Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 91, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1696, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 198-200, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2576-78, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)). It has long been the rule that a valid judgment imposing a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Id., see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-733, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). [19] The constitutional requirement of personal jurisdiction over these defendants stems from their individual liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which [they] have established no meaningful `contacts, ties or relations.' Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2181, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (quoting International Shoe Co., supra, 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 159-60.) Because the trial court's orders dismissing the cases against Dr. Lustberg and Dr. Dunn under the doctrine of forum non conveniens required the physician-defendants to waive their limitations defenses in Maryland and Virginia, these orders impos[ed] a personal obligation or duty upon them. Kulko, supra, 436 U.S. at 91, 98 S.Ct. at 1696. We are satisfied that, in the absence of personal jurisdiction, the trial court was without authority to place such a restriction on any party. The plaintiffs have provided us with no case law or plausible argument to the contrary, [20] and the trial court likewise cited no authority relevant to this issue. We conclude that the condition was erroneously imposed. [21]