Opinion ID: 787518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Texas's other arguments on appeal

Text: 18 When stripped of their Eleventh Amendment gloss, Texas's three remaining arguments essentially target the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, rather than Plaintiffs' reliance on the doctrine of Ex parte Young to establish jurisdiction. As we will see, these defenses to liability are beyond the scope of this interlocutory appeal from a denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 144, 113 S.Ct. 684 (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment confers an immunity from suit). 19
20 We first turn to Texas's contentions that Congress lacked the power to enact the substantive provisions of Title II and § 504. The State provides no authority for its assertion that a federal court must determine the constitutionality of a federal law in the course of determining the applicability of the Ex parte Young exception. Instead, the State misleadingly quotes the Supreme Court's opinion in Gonzaga University v. Doe for the proposition that, [a]s a prerequisite to bringing a Young suit, ... `a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law. ' Texas Br. at 13 (quoting Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002)). But this passage in Doe involved the prerequisites for stating a claim under § 1983, not the requirements for avoiding an Eleventh Amendment defense to suit through the vehicle of an Ex parte Young action. 9 Texas relies heavily on this misinterpretation of Doe in contending that Plaintiffs cannot proceed under Ex parte Young unless this court first determines that their claims rely on federal laws that are both constitutional and enforceable against the State. But Texas simply provides no support for its contention that a court must determine the validity of a plaintiff's cause of action in the course of deciding whether an Ex parte Young suit can proceed in the face of a state's Eleventh Amendment defense. 21 Texas's broad understanding of the scope of this interlocutory appeal is not only unprecedented, more importantly, it flies in the face of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 535 U.S. 635, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002). There, Verizon brought suit in federal district court, seeking relief from an order of the Maryland Public Service Commission. Id. at 640, 122 S.Ct. 1753. Verizon alleged that the Commission's order violated federal law. Id. In ruling that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Verizon's action, the Fourth Circuit held, inter alia, that the Eleventh Amendment did not permit Verizon to sue individual commissioners in their official capacities. Id. In the words of the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit suggested that Verizon's claim could not be brought under Ex parte Young, because the Commission's order was probably not inconsistent with federal law after all. Id. at 646, 122 S.Ct. 1753. The Court swiftly rejected this reasoning, noting that the inquiry into whether suit lies under Ex parte Young does not include an analysis of the merits of the claim. Id. (emphasis added). On the contrary, the Court explained that [i]n determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a `straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.' Id. at 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753 (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)) (alteration in original); see also Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 281, 117 S.Ct. 2028 (An allegation of an ongoing violation of federal law where the requested relief is prospective is ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young fiction. (emphasis added)). Thus, the Court made clear that analyzing the applicability of the Ex parte Young exception should generally be a simple matter, which excludes questions regarding the validity of the plaintiff's cause of action. 22 Texas attempts to distinguish Verizon, asserting that its arguments contesting the constitutionality of Title II and § 504 are appropriate for consideration in this interlocutory appeal, even though an argument that it has not violated those statutes would not be. We are not persuaded. Like other defenses to liability, the State's arguments do not challenge the district court's power under Ex parte Young to adjudicate Plaintiffs' claims. Rather, the State seeks to have Plaintiffs' Title II and § 504 claims dismissed on the merits on the ground that the statutes' substantive provisions are unconstitutional; such a disposition would not be a determination that the Ex parte Young exception is inapplicable or that the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from hearing Plaintiffs' action. In other words, resolution of the constitutional questions urged by Defendants is irrelevant to the question whether Texas's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit has been infringed. Moreover, our refusal to consider the constitutional issues in this interlocutory appeal comports with the rationale for allowing an interlocutory appeal from denials of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Unlike a State's entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, the constitutionality of Title II and § 504 can be reviewed effectively on appeal from a final judgment. Cf. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 144-45, 113 S.Ct. 684 (explaining that the question of state-sovereign immunity is (1) conclusively determined by the denial of a motion to dismiss, (2) completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment). We consequently follow the teaching of Verizon and hold that the constitutionality of the substantive provisions of Title II and § 504 is beyond the scope of this appeal. 23
24 Finally, we consider Texas's assertion that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs' surviving § 1983 claim because the due process provision of the Medicaid statute, § 1396a(a)(3), does not create a federal right enforceable under § 1983. Although couched in terms of sovereign immunity, the State's argument on this score is entirely devoted to attacking the district court's ruling that Plaintiffs can state an actionable claim under § 1983 to enforce § 1396a(a)(3). Even more so than Defendants' constitutional contentions, this argument centers on the merits of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim, not their use of Ex parte Young to seek injunctive relief despite the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, other than their misinterpretation of Doe (which we exposed above), Defendants provide no support for the notion that, to determine the applicability of the Ex parte Young exception, we must review the district court's conclusion that a § 1983 action can be brought to enforce § 1396a(a)(3). On the contrary, at least one court of appeals has refused to broaden this type of interlocutory appeal to encompass the question whether alleged transgressions of the Medicaid statute can be vindicated under § 1983. See Rosie D. ex rel. John D. v. Swift, 310 F.3d 230, 233-34, 238 (1st Cir.2002) (opining that the issue of enforceability under § 1983 was not ripe for review). Similarly, we will confine ourselves to the question whether Plaintiffs have properly demonstrated jurisdiction under Ex parte Young. 25