Opinion ID: 202945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mangual-Garcia's Other Alleged Errors

Text: Mangual-Garcia argues that the district court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion for acquittal as to the second count of the indictment, charging him with possession with intent to distribute approximately five kilograms of cocaine, because there was insufficient evidence on the possession element. We disagree. For purposes of the statute of conviction, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession may be either actual or constructive. United States v. Del Rosario, 388 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Pacheo v. United States, 544 U.S. 970, 125 S.Ct. 1866, 161 L.Ed.2d 716 (2005). Constructive possession exists when a person knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mangual-Garcia argues that [t]here was no evidence that Mr. Mangual-Garcia was the owner of the plane, had command of the people transporting the kilos, or any evidence from which the fact finder could find, or at least infer, that he had the necessary power and intent to possess the cocaine. Appellant Mangual-Garcia Br. 7-8. To the contrary, there was sufficient evidence at trial for the jury to conclude that Mangual-Garcia constructively possessed the requisite amount of drugs during the events of December 21-22. First, the record contains evidence that the drugs involved in the conspiracy were owned by Mangual-Garcia. Moreover, tape recorded conversations introduced at trial and the testimony of cooperating witness Escobar-Lopez indicated that Mangual-Garcia was going to pay the person who placed the drugs on the December 22 plane and that the courier on that plane was supposed to deliver the drugs to Mangual-Garcia in the United States. Finally, other tape recorded conversations showed Mangual-Garcia scheduling the shipment of the drugs and coordinating who would place drugs on the plane. Based on all of this evidence (as well as additional evidence introduced at trial), we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Mangual-Garcia's Rule 29 motion for acquittal on the possession charge. Mangual-Garcia makes two other arguments related to constructive possession. First, he argues that the district court's jury instructions should have included a second sentence from Del Rosario in addition to the one quoted above in the text: [i]n a drug case, constructive possession may be inferred from a defendant's dominion and control over an area where narcotics are found. 388 F.3d at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). This quote is clearly just one example of when constructive possession can be found in a drug case, and the district court did not err in refusing to include this language in the instruction. Second, Mangual-Garcia argues that the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument improperly analogized constructive possession to when someone is shipping you something Fed Ex or UPS and you know it's coming to you . . . and you've got the tracking number but you haven't gotten possession of it yet. [10] Certainly, the facts of this case could be distinguished from the analogy, but we do not see how this analogy rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.
Mangual-Garcia also alleges that the prosecutor improperly commented on his silence during the rebuttal closing argument. Mangual-Garcia's attorney, during his closing argument noted that the prosecution had not provided any evidence that Mangual-Garcia was in New Jersey at the time of the charged conspiracy and noted in particular that the government had failed to provide a telephone or electric bill to show that Mangual-Garcia was in Newark. In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that Mangual-Garcia had not provided any evidence to the contrary, stating: Mr. Armenteros suggested, oh, they could have brought the electric bill, they could have brought the phone bill to prove who my client was. Defendants also could have done that; they don't have to. . . . Mangual-Garcia objected to this statement, and the district court immediately gave a curative instruction that the defendant did not have to present evidence because he was presumed innocent and the government had to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor then continued, saying [a]s the Court explained, they don't have to; that doesn't mean they can't, and Mangual-Garcia objected again. The court instructed the prosecutor to leave that subject matter because [it] w[ould] have to re-instruct the jury. [T]he Fifth Amendment . . . forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (footnote omitted). If the prosecutor had been the first one to raise the issue by noting Mangual-Garcia's failure to produce documents showing he was not in Newark, the prosecutor's comments might be seen as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. See United States v. Stroman, No. 06-2133, 500 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847, 856 (1st Cir.1982) (noting that documents within a defendant's personal possession are protected by the 5th Amendment). However, the comments were only made in rebuttal after defense counsel had [himself] raised the issue of the government's failure to produce an electric or telephone bill. United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 107 (1st Cir.2003) (emphasis omitted). By suggesting that the prosecutor could have produced such documents, the defense attorney indicated that these documents were available to persons other than the defendant. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor's response was not such that the jurors would probably interpret it as commentary on the accused's failure to take the stand. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the government's comment merely suggested that, if the documents were generally available (as defense counsel had suggested), either side could have produced them  without the defendant's taking the stand. Under the invited reply doctrine, the prosecutor's remarks were `invited,' and did no more than respond substantially in order to `right the scale,' [and do] not warrant reversing [the] conviction. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12-13, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). In a similar context in Henderson, defense counsel suggested that the government was hiding something by not producing a witness to the drug transaction, and the prosecutor responded in rebuttal by saying that the defendant could have produced this witness. 320 F.3d at 107. This court rejected the defendant's claim that this was an improper comment on his silence, concluding that defense counsel invited a response by raising the issue and [t]he prosecutor's remarks were limited and addressed only the defense counsel's own comments. Id. For the same reason, a new trial is not warranted in this case.
Mangual-Garcia argues that, even if each individual error was harmless in its own right, the total number of incidents in the case at bar have a cumulative effect that warrant a new trial. Appellant Mangual-Garcia's Br. 34; see United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir.2002). As described above, we find only three non-sentence-related errors in the district court proceedings: the use of the December 8 testimony, the failure to make a final Petrozziello determination, and the use of false testimony of Escobar-Lopez. We conclude that these three errors together are insufficient to warrant the remedy of a new trial, which is rarely used [and] is warranted only where there would be a miscarriage of justice or where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. Id. As discussed above, we cannot say that the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict on either the conspiracy or the possession charges. We have already concluded that there was legally sufficient evidence that Mangual-Garcia possessed the requisite amount of drugs and significant evidence (aside from the December 8 events) of his involvement in the conspiracy. Nor can we say that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors, given the curative instructions that were given and the strength of the other evidence, constitutes a miscarriage of justice.