Opinion ID: 2087078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusivity of Remedy.

Text: The right to maintain a common law tort action is usually exclusive of the right to be compensated under the WCA. D.C.Code § 36-304(a) (1981) expressly states that liability under the WCA shall be exclusive and in place of all liability of such employer to the employee. [11] Along with all other jurisdictions, see generally 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 1-5 (1985) [hereinafter cited as LARSON], the Council of the District of Columbia (Council) recognized that the WCA is justified on a ` quid pro quo ' basis. That is the employer is made responsible for all occupational injuries, regardless of fault but the employee loses the right to sue for a tort liability award higher than the compensation benefits. COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, REPORT ON BILL 3-106, LAW 3-77: THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT OF 1979, Part I, at 6 (January 16, 1980) (hereinafter PUBLIC SERVICES REPORT). Thus, for injuries which are compensable under the WCA, an employee is limited to the remedy provided by the statute. Conversely, for injuries which are not compensable under the WCA, no remedy is available under the statute, and the employee must seek redress by initiating a tort action in the courts. The nature of a compensable injury under the WCA is defined in § 36-301(12) which provides that injury means an  accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment.... [12] (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, by definition, injuries to an employee that are intended by the employer fall outside of the WCA's exclusivity provisions, even though they are work-related, because they are nonaccidental. Rustin v. District of Columbia, 491 A.2d 496, 501-02 (D.C.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946, 106 S.Ct. 343, 88 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985) (acknowledging the existence of an intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provisions of the WCA's predecessor, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)); see Joyce v. A.C. & S., Inc., 785 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1986) (only accidental injuries are compensable under the WCA); Richardson v. The Fair, Inc., 124 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tex.Civ. App.1939) (an employer cannot correct and punish with whips the mistakes of his employees committed in the course of their employment, and protect himself against civil liability for the results of his assaults under the coverage of our Workmen's Compensation Act). Consequently, intentional torts by the employer are expressly excluded from coverage under the WCA. There is no reference in the legislative history to the intentional tort exception to WCA coverage. But the Council recognized that compensation under this bill is in lieu of judicial action. COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON D.C. BILL 3-106, LAW 3-77: THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT OF 1979, Part II, at 14 (January 30, 1980) (hereinafter ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORT). The Council adopted the view that the purpose of the WCA was to provide a no-fault means of recovery for accidental injuries or death occurring in the course of employment. See, e.g., id. at 2. A compromise was achieved by which the employee surrendered his right to sue for negligence, and the employer could no longer avail himself of the common-law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and negligence of a fellow employee. Id. The WCA's exclusion of employer intentional torts is to be contrasted with the situation in which a co-employee or third party intentionally injures an employee. Section 36-301(12) includes within the scope of compensable injuries an injury caused by the willful act of third persons directed against an employee because of his [or her] employment. From the perspective of the employer, however, the injury is still accidental and the employer is liable so long as the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of employment. By contrast, the employer is bound by the character of his or her own acts in bringing about such a third-party injury and is unable in a civil suit for damages to plead that intended actions were accidental. See 2A LARSON, supra, § 68.12, at 13-7, -8. [13]