Opinion ID: 1594611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Accrual of Plaintiffs' Cause of Action.

Text: The district court concluded that the city's maintenance of the ordinance in question constituted a continuing violation tolling the applicability of the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs contend that the defendant did not appeal this particular finding, and therefore cannot challenge it in their action for review. However, the city's argument that the ordinance does not constitute a continuing violation was urged before the district court, and is submitted here in the city's responsive brief. A successful party may, without appealing or assigning errors, seek affirmance of a district court decision on any ground asserted before the district court, even if rejected therein. E.g., Anthony v. State, 374 N.W. 2d 662, 664 (Iowa 1985); Hamilton v. City of Urbandale, 291 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Iowa 1980). As a general rule, no cause of action accrues under Iowa law until the wrongful act produces injury to the claimant. Collins v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 421 N.W.2d 136, 140 (Iowa 1988); Wolfswinkel v. Gesink, 180 N.W.2d 452, 456 (Iowa 1970). The applicable statute of limitations begins to run when the claimant has discovered his or her injury, or should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Sandbulte, 343 N.W. 2d at 462. Plaintiffs contend the ordinance in question has the character of a continuing violation which tolls the applicability of a period of limitations. They also contend no damage could have been assessed by a court until General Growth purchased an alternative site for the development of the shopping center. We have considered the nature of a continuing wrong in several cases. In Anderson v. Yearous, 249 N.W.2d 855 (Iowa 1977), claimants seeking nuisance damages for intermittent flooding caused by a levee on adjacent property brought their action more than five years after the structure was erected. We held that for purposes of the statute of limitations, erection of the structure was not the determinative date, stating [w]here resultant injuries are recurring and successive actions will lie, the limitation period runs from the occurrence of each such injury. 249 N.W. 2d at 860. We stated that such a claimant could recover for damages resulting from flooding occurring in the five-year period preceding institution of the action. Id. Similarly, in Earl v. Clark , we held that a claimant seeking nuisance damages caused by waste drainage from a cattle feedlot on adjacent land could recover for damages occurring within the five-year period preceding the date of trial. Earl v. Clark, 219 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Iowa 1974). In Eppling v. Seuntjens, 254 Iowa 396, 117 N.W.2d 820 (Iowa 1962), the claimant sued for damage to his property attributable to flooding caused by the defendant's erection of a dike. We stated that the plaintiff's causes of action for the intermittent floodings accrued as each episode occurred, and permitted the plaintiff to recover for damages sustained in the five-year period preceding commencement of the action. 254 Iowa at 404, 117 N.W.2d at 825. However, in the present case, the cause of action arises out of the enactment of a land use regulation, not a continuing nuisance or trespass. Although damages for flooding and physical invasion can occur intermittently over the passage of time, in this case, the passage of the permanent ordinance had immediate adverse economic consequences for plaintiffs. The regulation's impact on the development potential and market value of the property was immediate, and constituted a single injury. Accord Beer, 400 N.W.2d at 735; Ocean Acres Ltd. v. Dare County Board of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106-07 (4th Cir.1983). Our conclusion as to the time plaintiffs' cause of action accrued is bolstered by the fact that they filed their first action for inverse condemnation on March 29, 1977, before General Growth is alleged to have purchased an alternative site. They obviously believed that they had sustained injury at that time. We hold that the statute of limitations as to this action began to run no later than March 29, 1977, the date on which plaintiffs filed their first action seeking recovery for inverse condemnation. We conclude the inverse condemnation claim asserted here is barred by the statute of limitations. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED.