Opinion ID: 1831943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: presumption of vindictiveness

Text: The legal principle referred to as a presumption of judicial vindictiveness has constitutional roots and developed through a line of United States Supreme Court decisions beginning with North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). In Pearce and its companion case, Simpson v. Rice, the Supreme Court considered what constitutional limitations there may be upon the general power of a judge to impose upon reconviction a longer prison sentence than the defendant originally received. Id. at 719, 89 S.Ct. 2072. The defendant in Pearce was convicted after trial and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, while the defendant in Rice pled guilty to several charges. See id. at 713-14, 89 S.Ct. 2072. Both defendants' judgments were later reversed and both defendants were then retried, convicted, and sentenced to longer terms than previously imposed. See id. The Supreme Court first held that neither the double jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection Clause imposes an absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction. Id. at 723, 89 S.Ct. 2072. However, the Supreme Court concluded that it would be a flagrant violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state trial court to follow an announced practice of imposing a heavier sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside. Id. at 723-24, 89 S.Ct. 2072. Noting that the existence of a retaliatory motivation would ... be extremely difficult to prove in any individual case, id. at 725 n. 20, 89 S.Ct. 2072, the Court held: [W]henever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal. Id. at 726, 89 S.Ct. 2072 (emphasis supplied). As explained by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions, Pearce and its progeny established a presumption of vindictiveness, which may be overcome only by objective information in the record justifying the increased sentence. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982). However, the presumption does not apply unless there is a realistic likelihood of `vindictiveness,' or, in other words, the opportunities for vindictiveness ... [must] impel the conclusion that due process of law requires a rule analogous to that of the Pearce case. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). Accordingly, not every increase in sentence justifies the imposition of the prophylactic rule announced in Pearce. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 26, 94 S.Ct. 2098. In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972), the Supreme Court considered a challenge to Kentucky's two-tier system for adjudicating misdemeanor offenses, which provided that these lesser crimes could be tried by an inferior court with the accused entitled to a de novo trial in a court of general jurisdiction if convicted after trial or a guilty plea. See 407 U.S. at 112-13, 92 S.Ct. 1953. The defendant argued that this system violated the Due Process Clause as interpreted by Pearce, because the trial judge conducting the de novo trial was not bound by the sentence imposed by the inferior court. See Colten, 407 U.S. at 114, 92 S.Ct. 1953. In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Supreme Court concluded: Our view of the Kentucky two-tier system of administering criminal justice... does not lead us to believe ... that the hazard of being penalized for seeking a new trial, which underlay the holding of Pearce, also inheres in the de novo trial arrangement. Nor are we convinced that defendants convicted in Kentucky's inferior courts would be deterred from seeking a second trial out of fear of judicial vindictiveness. The possibility of vindictiveness, found to exist in Pearce, is not inherent in the Kentucky two-tier system. Id. at 116, 92 S.Ct. 1953 (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court also indicated its concern that the restraints called for in ... Pearce ... might, to the detriment of both defendant and State, diminish the likelihood that inferior courts would impose lenient sentences whose effect would be to limit the discretion of a superior court judge or jury if the defendant is retried and found guilty. Id. at 119, 92 S.Ct. 1953. In Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989), upon which the State relies in this case, the Supreme Court again considered the situation where a harsher sentence was imposed after a trial and the initial sentence was the product of a guilty plea. With Smith, the Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in Rice and qualified the Pearce decision, stating: While the Pearce opinion appeared on its face to announce a rule of sweeping dimension, our subsequent cases have made clear that its presumption of vindictiveness do[es] not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial. As we explained in Texas v. McCullough, [475 U.S. 134, 106 S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986) ] the evil the [ Pearce ] Court sought to prevent was not the imposition of enlarged sentences after a new trial but vindictiveness of a sentencing judge. Because the Pearce presumption may operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus... block a legitimate response to criminal conduct, we have limited its application, like that of other `judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by the [Constitution],'to circumstances where its `objectives are thought most efficaciously served.' Such circumstances are those in which there is a reasonable likelihood, that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority. Where there is no such reasonable likelihood, the burden remains upon the defendant to prove actual vindictiveness. Smith, 490 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2201 (citation omitted) (alterations in the original). The Supreme Court in Smith reasoned that [e]ven when the same judge imposes both sentences, the relevant sentencing information available to the judge after the plea will usually be considerably less than that available after a trial. Id. at 801, 109 S.Ct. 2201. Therefore, a greater sentence imposed after trial than imposed after a guilty plea is not more likely than not attributable to judicial vindictiveness, but rather due to the greater relevant sentencing information available to the judge after a trial. Id. The Supreme Court also noted some important developments in the constitutional law of guilty pleas since the Rice decision, including that [a] guilty plea may justify leniency, that a prosecutor may offer to recommend a more lenient sentence or reduction in charges during the plea negotiation process, and that a prosecutor may threaten a defendant with increased charges if he or she does not enter a plea. Smith, 490 U.S. at 802-803, 109 S.Ct. 2201. We conclude that Smith is not dispositive of the issue before us because that case involved a plea offer made by the prosecutor with no judicial participation in the plea discussions. Smith was not a case like Byrd or Wilson in which the trial judges participated in unsuccessful plea discussions. [3] Further, although the Supreme Court broadly held that no presumption of vindictiveness applies in cases where the first sentence was imposed as the result of a guilty plea, the facts of Smith as recited by the Supreme Court indicate that the trial judge had stated the reasons for the increased sentence on the record. See 490 U.S. at 796-97, 109 S.Ct. 2201. We also recognize that the constitutional right at issue in this case is not the defendant's right to appeal his conviction or sentence but, rather, the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial. However, just as a trial judge cannot punish a defendant for exercising his or her appellate rights, see Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723-24, 89 S.Ct. 2072, [t]he law is clear that any judicially imposed penalty which needlessly discourages assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and deters the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial is patently unconstitutional. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968). City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197, 205 (Fla.1985) (quoting Gillman v. State, 373 So.2d 935, 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)). Therefore, although a guilty plea may justify leniency, see Smith, 490 U.S. at 802, 109 S.Ct. 2201, an accused may not be subjected to more severe punishment for exercising ... [the] constitutional right to stand trial. Mitchell v. State, 521 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Thus, the question we must confront is whether due process principles compel us to adopt a presumption of vindictiveness that arises whenever the trial judge participates in the plea negotiations and the defendant subsequently receives a harsher sentence after a trial or hearing. Byrd and Wilson assert that this presumption logically follows from our opinion in State v. Warner, 762 So.2d 507 (Fla.2000). We disagree.