Opinion ID: 2477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether We Have Jurisdiction Over Exemptions

Text: Pursuant to the Hobbs Act, Petitioners have challenged the NRC's actions directly in this court without first filing in a district court. The Act gives the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of ... all final orders of the [NRC] made reviewable by section 2239 of title 42. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4). [2] Section 2239, in turn, makes reviewable [a]ny final order entered in any proceeding of the kind specified in [§ 2239(a)]. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b)(1). And § 2239(a), in relevant part, encompasses any proceeding... for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license. In defining the scope of our jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act, § 2239(a) does not mention exemptions. The NRC contends that the Hobbs Act should nonetheless apply to exemptions because of the Supreme Court's decision in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985). Lorion sheds light on how § 2239(a) operates. Section 2239(a) serves multiple ends: In addition to establishing Hobbs Act jurisdiction in the courts of appeals, it also dictates when the NRC must hold hearings. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A). These two purposes may or may not coexist in particular instances. For example, with respect to license amendments, § 2239(a) gives the courts of appeals the exclusive jurisdiction to review an amendment and simultaneously compels the NRC to hold a hearing (if requested) before issuing an amendment. See id. Lorion tells us, however, that the jurisdictional element and hearing requirement of § 2239(a) are not coextensive, because we have Hobbs Act jurisdiction over all final orders in licensing proceedings whether or not a hearing before the Commission occurred or could have occurred. [3] Lorion, 470 U.S. at 737, 105 S.Ct. 1598. The NRC argues that this distinction between § 2239(a)'s two elements establishes that we have Hobbs Act jurisdiction over exemptions even though, under § 2239(a), exemptions do not require hearings. We disagree. In separating § 2239(a)'s hearing requirement from the provision's jurisdictional component, Lorion did not alter the basis for jurisdiction pursuant to that section: we have jurisdiction over only an appeal from an order issued in a `proceeding... for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license.' Id. at 735 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)) (ellipsis in original). The Supreme Court has commanded strict fidelity to the[] terms of judicial review provisions that create jurisdiction, such as those contained in the Hobbs Act. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995). The plain text of § 2239(a) does not confer appellate jurisdiction over final orders issued in proceedings involving exemptions, irrespective of any hearing requirement. Lorion 's facts are instructive on this point. Lorion specifically held that the Hobbs Act gives the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review the NRC's denial of a citizen petition without a hearing. Id. at 746, 105 S.Ct. 1598. The NRC suggests that the Hobbs Act similarly applies to an appeal from a final order granting an exemption without a hearing. But a citizen petition is a request to institute a proceeding ... to modify, suspend, or revoke a license. 10 C.F.R. § 2.206(a) (emphasis added). The petition is but the first step in a process that will, if not terminated for any reason, culminate in a full formal proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1). Lorion, 470 U.S. at 745 n. 11, 105 S.Ct. 1598. In contrast, the NRC contends that an exemption is distinct from the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of a license. We think this is a reasonable interpretation of the Hobbs Act, and one that deserves deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The NRC takes this stance to avoid having to hold hearings for exemptions; but by asserting that exemptions are different from amendments, a position to which we defer, the NRC necessarily deprives us of the ability to review exemptions pursuant to § 2239(a). There are, of course, policy advantages in finding Hobbs Act jurisdiction over exemptions. Placing initial review of agency action in the courts of appeals improves judicial efficiency. The factfinding capacity of the district court is ... typically unnecessary to judicial review of agency decisionmaking, and thus proceeding in the district court often adds an unneeded layer of review. Lorion, 470 U.S. at 744-45. These advantages led the Lorion Court to hold that, [a]bsent a firm indication that Congress intended to locate initial APA review of agency action in the district courts, we will not presume that Congress intended to depart from the sound policy of placing initial APA review in the courts of appeals. Id. at 745, 105 S.Ct. 1598. The First Circuit gave this policy special weight when finding that it had Hobbs Act jurisdiction to review NRC rules that, as a textual matter, appear[ed] to fall outside the Act. Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 346-47 (1st Cir.2004). But ultimately, policies alone are not dispositive. Whether initial subject-matter jurisdiction lies initially in the courts of appeals must of course be governed by the intent of Congress and not by any views we may have about sound policy. Lorion, 470 U.S. at 746, 105 S.Ct. 1598. [T]he plain language of the enacted text is the best indicator of intent. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 232, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). Indeed, when the First Circuit broadly construed its Hobbs Act jurisdiction in light of the Lorion policies, the statutory text still constrained the court to hold that it could review any NRC action that could be cognizable in a petition for review from a proceeding under section 2239.  Citizens Awareness Network, 391 F.3d at 347 (emphasis added). Here, we cannot read exemptions into the plain text of § 2239(a), particularly when the NRC itself (to which deference is owed) is urging that exemptions are different from amending ... [a] license and the other orders mentioned in that section. See, e.g., Resp't's Mot. to Dismiss at 7 (An exemption is not a licensing action or rulemaking.); Resp't's Br. at 39 (License amendments and post-licensing exemptions are entirely distinct and serve distinct purposes under NRC's regulatory scheme....). Moreover, the NRC's exemption program has been on the books in some form since 1956, see 21 Fed.Reg. 356 (Jan. 19, 1956), and Congress has amended § 2239(a) since then, see Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub.L. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 3120, but has never included exemptions in the statute's text. This reinforces our view, evident from the text, that Congress intended to have exemptions treated differently from the orders mentioned in § 2239(a). The NRC points out that the First and Sixth Circuits have each reviewed an exemption under the Hobbs Act. In both cases, however, other orders plainly within § 2239(a)'s scope were also being challenged. In Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 878 F.2d 1516 (1st Cir.1989), the petitioners appealed not only an NRC exemption, but also a citizen petition denial (the subject of Lorion ) and a decision allowing a previously shutdown plant to resume operations. Id. at 1519-20. Similarly, Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501 (6th Cir.1995), concerned several NRC orders, only one of which was an exemption. Id. at 1503-04. Neither case explained how or why exemptions fall under the Hobbs Act. It is possible that the issue was not squarely presented to those courts, which frequently occurs when parties prefer that the court decide an issue despite its potential jurisdictional infirmity, especially when the problem is relevant to only part of the appeal. It is also possible that the two courts assumed some type of supplemental jurisdiction over the exemption, in light of their undisputed Hobbs Act jurisdiction over the other orders at issue. See Conoco, Inc. v. Skinner, 970 F.2d 1206, 1214 n. 10 (3d Cir.1992) (As long as this court has jurisdiction over one of the challenged regulations, the interests of judicial economy and efficiency allow us to hear the entire matter.). Regardless, to the extent that Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Kelley are inconsistent with our jurisdictional analysis, we decline to follow them. We therefore hold that we lack jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act to review an NRC exemption. In the absence of jurisdiction, we lack the authority to review not only an NRC order that issues an exemption, but also any orders preliminary or ancillary to an exemption, such as a denial of a hearing request. Lorion, 470 U.S. at 743, 105 S.Ct. 1598 ([R]eview of orders resolving issues preliminary or ancillary to the core issue in a proceeding should be reviewed in the same forum as the final order resolving the core issue.). But our inquiry does not end there, because we lack jurisdiction in this case only if the challenged NRC order is indeed an exemption and not an amendment or otherwise within the purview of § 2239, an issue to which we now turn.