Opinion ID: 2304181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony About Lifetime Goals Permissible

Text: Hignutt asserts that the trial judge abused her discretion in permitting Szostkowski to talk about his personal goals when he testified for the State. Hignutt argues that Szostkowski's credibility was significant because Szostkowski was a critical witness whose testimony about raising his 15-year-old brothers and preparing to get married impermissibly elicited sympathy from the jury. Hignutt also argues that the sympathy instruction that the trial judge gave at the conclusion of trial was not direct enough to refer to the technician's testimony regarding his future goals. Therefore, Hignutt argues, the testimony was unfairly prejudicial and had no probative value. This Court reviews decisions of the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. [1] The decision whether to admit testimony as relevant under D.R.E. 402 is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. [2] The determination of whether the probative value of relevant evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under D.R.E. 403 also is particularly within the trial judge's discretion. [3] Further, [a] trial judge has broad discretion in determining the relevance of `peripheral or background evidence concerning a witness.' [4] In Chapman v. State , this Court explained that background evidence about a witness may be necessary to provide the jury with the general character of the witness. [5] In Chapman, the defendant was charged with Aggravated Menacing, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony and Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon after the vehicle in which he was a passenger allegedly stopped on the side of the road and the defendant pulled a gun on two pedestrians who had yelled at the vehicle to slow down as it drove by. [6] The defendant and the driver of the vehicle testified that they did not display a gun during the confrontation, but one complaining witness testified that the defendant had displayed a gun while the other complaining witness corroborated that allegation. [7] The jury resolved the credibility dispute against the defendant, and found him guilty of all three charges. [8] At trial, the prosecutor asked the complaining witnesses about their educational backgrounds. [9] In Chapman, this Court determined that, because [c]redibility was the nub issue in this case[,][e]vidence of good character, to a limited extent, was relevant to the issue of credibility. [10] The Court concluded that the good character evidence was limited and its admission was not an abuse of discretion. [11] In Webb v. State, the defendant-appellant, who had been convicted of first degree rape, argued that the prosecution had attempted to elicit sympathy for the victim by asking her about her grades in school and her plans for the future. [12] This Court held that, although the questions were objectionable, they were not highly inflammatory, and because they were withdrawn, they were not unduly prejudicial. [13] In Webb, this Court noted that [t]he prosecutor explained that he was trying to make the witness comfortable, and we see no reason to doubt that explanation. [14] Similarly, the trial judge in this case permitted the questions about Szostkowski's personal goals because she determined that they were routine background questions. The trial judge explained that the testimony was precisely the type . . . that comes in generally at the beginning of every witness's testimony, [such as] how many children do you have, what are their ages, are you married, how long have you been married and that it did not go beyond what is normally permitted. Like Chapman, this case turned on the credibility of Szostkowski's testimony. Because the questions about Szostkowski's personal goals were limited and went to his credibility as good character evidence, they did not prejudice the defendant. Like Webb, the prosecutor had an explanation for asking the witness about his goals for the future. The prosecutor in this case explained that the defense suggested on cross-examination that Szostkowski was on probation during the summer 2006 incident at Sheridan. [15] On redirect, the prosecution asked Szostkowski whether he was on probation when the incident occurred and Szostkowski responded that he was not but that he had been on probation five years prior for a juvenile conspiracy conviction and had served five months of a one-year sentence. The prosecution next asked Szostkowski whether he had performed community service as part of the probation. The defense objected. The prosecution withdrew the question and instead asked Szostkowski about the winter 2007 encounter with Hignutt. The prosecutor explained that he had asked Szostkowski about his goals for the future in an attempt to rehabilitate Szostkowski as a witness because it had just come out that Szostkowski had a juvenile conviction for conspiracy. The record reflects that Szostkowski's background testimony was not unfairly prejudicial and was properly admitted into evidence. The fact that the jury resolved the credibility dispute in favor of Szostkowski does not in itself indicate that Hignutt was prejudiced. In addition, the trial judge gave a sympathy instruction at the conclusion of trial to further protect the defendant from prejudice. Therefore, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion when she permitted Szostkowski's testimony about his personal goals.