Opinion ID: 619929
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Significant Purpose Test Is Reasonable

Text: We agree with our sister courts of appeals and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that amended FISA's significant purpose standard is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, for three reasons. First, the significant purpose standard reflects a balance struck by Congress between the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. Keith, 407 U.S. at 323, 92 S.Ct. 2125. The legislative history reveals that Congress was keenly aware that [the Patriot Act's amendment to what is now § 1804(a)(6)(B)] relaxed a requirement that the government show that its primary purpose was other than criminal prosecution. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732. By adopting the amendment, Congress signaled its determination that the new standard was needed to promote coordination between intelligence and law enforcement officials in combating terrorism, acknowledging that, as a practical matter, these functions inevitably overlap. [10] While Congress's conclusion in that regard of course is not dispositive, nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Keith suggested that congressional judgment has an important role to play in weighing government interests and determining reasonable protective standards related to intelligence. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322-23, 92 S.Ct. 2125. We therefore view Congress's actions in this area with some additional measure of deference. Second, even leaving Congress's judgment aside, we conclude that FISA's significant purpose standard is reasonable in light of the government's legitimate national security goals. We are mindful of the high stakes involved and emphasize the Supreme Court's admonition that [w]here, as here, the possible harm against which the Government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance the Government's goal. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674-75, 109 S.Ct. 1384; see also id. at 675 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (approving Second Circuit Court of Appeals' conclusion that `[w]hen the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, that danger alone meets the test of reasonableness so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking' and other safeguards are in place (quoting Edwards, 498 F.2d at 500)). Replacing the primary purpose standard with a significant purpose test reasonably furthers the government's national security goals. As other courts, and Congress, have observed, the status quo ante proved difficult to administerin complex national security investigations, it was often difficult to say whether intelligence or law enforcement, or neither of them, was the primary objectiveand resulted in a rigid, artificial separation between intelligence and law enforcement investigations that prevented cooperation and, ultimately, imposed a cost on national security. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 124-25; see also Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732-33, 743-44 & nn. 27-29. The significant purpose standard, which reflects a negotiated compromise between those in Congress who wished to keep the law the same and officials in the executive branch, who wished to virtually eliminate the foreign intelligence standard, 147 Cong. Rec. S10,591 (Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see also Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 125-26; Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732, alleviates those practical concerns by doing away with the problematic primary purpose test. It also retains key protections for individuals. In particular, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review has held that the statute, as amended, require[s] `that the government have a measurable foreign intelligence purpose, other than just criminal prosecution of even foreign intelligence crimes' and `excludes from the purpose of gaining foreign intelligence information a sole objective of criminal prosecution,' even for foreign intelligence crimes. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 128 (quoting Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735); see also Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736 ([T]he FISA process cannot be used as a device to investigate wholly [non-foreign-intelligence related] ordinary crimes.). Finally, and importantly, FISA contains significant procedural safeguards against abuse. As amended, FISA requires a senior government official (typically the Director of the FBI, see Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736) to certify that obtaining foreign intelligence information ... is a bona fide purpose of the surveillance and the Attorney General (or a senior-level designee, see 50 U.S.C. § 1801(g)) to approve each FISA application. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 127. That senior Justice Department officials must approve every FISA application gives us additional comfort that this process does not provide an end run around the more stringent Fourth Amendment standards that apply in ordinary criminal cases. The statute also provides for appropriate, albeit limited, judicial review. An Article III judge sitting on the FISA court reviews every application, makes particularized findings concerning the application's compliance with the statute's requirements, and issues an order specifying the parameters of the government's surveillance authority. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a), (c). The FISA judge may demand further inquiry into the certifying officer's purposeor perhaps even the Attorney General's or Deputy Attorney General's reasons for approval of the application, and should deny the application if he or she conclude[s] that the government's sole objective [is] merely to gain evidence of past criminal conducteven foreign intelligence crimesto punish the agent rather than halt ongoing espionage or terrorist activity. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735-36. These safeguards confirm that FISA's significant purpose standard is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.