Opinion ID: 746275
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Aggravating-Circumstance Instruction

Text: 21 The jury found four statutory aggravating circumstances, plus two others based on prior convictions, when it sentenced Kilgore. Kilgore now argues that the four statutory aggravating-circumstance instructions were constitutionally flawed. We do not agree. 22 Kilgore argues that two of the aggravating circumstances, as submitted to the jury, are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. One of the aggravating circumstances the jury found was that the killing involved torture or depravity of mind and as a result thereof was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman. State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d at 68. We have rejected the argument that this instruction is vague. In Smith v. Armontrout, 888 F.2d 530, 538 (8th Cir.1989), we held that a finding of torture could show a properly limited construction of the vile, horrible, or inhuman description, such that jurors could reasonably designate some murders as worse than others for purposes of imposing the death penalty. (The Missouri Supreme Court had adopted this limiting construction before the trial in this case.) The instruction was supported by substantial evidence, since there is evidence that Wilkins was kidnapped, driven around face-down in a car, told she was going to be killed, and had wounds consistent with attempting to fight off her attacker. These facts support a finding of both physical and psychological torture, and the instruction as applied in this case was neither vague nor overbroad. 23 The second aggravating circumstance Kilgore challenges for overbreadth is that the killing was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest. State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d at 68. The District Court held that this aggravating circumstance provided the jury with a means rationally to distinguish murderers who should receive the death penalty from those who should not. Accord, Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444, 449-50 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 995, 113 S.Ct. 1609, 123 L.Ed.2d 170 (1993). We agree. 24 Kilgore also argues that two of the aggravating circumstances submitted to the jury were duplicative. The jury found both that Kilgore committed the killing for the purpose of receiving money or some other thing of monetary value, and that Kilgore committed the crime during the perpetration of a robbery and kidnapping. As the Missouri Supreme Court has noted, the two circumstances are related, but distinct, because they concern different facets of criminal activity. State v. Jones, 749 S.W.2d 356, 365 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 186, 102 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988). Even if that distinction were insufficient, and only one of the aggravating circumstances were allowed to stand, the error would still be harmless. Four aggravating circumstances would remain. By the same logic, even if Kilgore were to prevail in all his arguments, he would only eliminate three, or possibly four, of the six aggravating circumstances cited by the jury. In Missouri, only one aggravating circumstance is required to support a death sentence. Schlup v. State, 758 S.W.2d 715, 716 (Mo.1988) (en banc). Missouri is a non-weighing state. The District Court correctly rejected Kilgore's aggravating-circumstance claims.