Opinion ID: 2516937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Refusal of Motion for Mistrial and Demand for New Trial

Text: [¶36] With respect to mistrial we have held: The court's ruling on a motion for mistrial ... is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Espinoza v. State, 969 P.2d 542, 546 (Wyo.1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 818, 120 S.Ct. 59, 145 L.Ed.2d 52 (1999); see also Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo.1996). `Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.'  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo.1986)); see also Stroup v. Oedekoven, 995 P.2d 125, 128 (Wyo.1999). In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we focus on the reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court. Vaughn, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998). If the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and the ruling is one based on sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances, it will not be disturbed absent a showing that some facet of the ruling is arbitrary or capricious. Jordan v. Brackin, 992 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Wyo.1999). Terry v. Sweeney, 10 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2000). [¶37] The Appellants based their motion for new trial on the same set of facts and circumstances as they did their motion for mistrial. Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a motion for new trial, and they will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Pauley v. Newman, 2004 WY 76, ¶ 17, 92 P.3d 819, 825 (Wyo. 2004). [¶38] The jury was given this instruction: JURY INSTRUCTION No. 15 The Plaintiffs' claims must be determined on the basis of comparative fault. In deciding the case you will need to know the meaning of the term fault. A party is at fault when that party's conduct (or misconduct) meets the required legal standard and is a cause of the injury or damages for which the claim is made. The relevant required legal standards are explained in other instructions. There is no claim that Les Butts was at fault. It will be necessary for you to determine the percentage of fault, if any, of the Defendant Hannifan, Defendant Hampleman and Thunder Basin Coal Company. Defendant Hannifan is at fault only if his actions, or inaction, constituted willful and wanton misconduct. Defendant Hampleman is at fault only if his actions, or inaction, constituted willful and wanton misconduct. With regard to Defendants Hannifan and Hampleman the percentage of fault you assign to them, if any, must be that only attributable to willful and wanton misconduct and not to ordinary negligence. Should you find that either the Defendant Hannifan or the Defendant Hampleman are at fault for any measure of ordinary negligence, then that percentage of ordinary negligence must be added to the percentage of fault of Thunder Basin Coal Company, if any. Thunder Basin Coal Company is at fault if its actions (or inactions) constituted ordinary negligence. In order for fault to be attributed to the Defendant Hannifan, the Defendant Hampleman, or Thunder Basin Coal Company, such fault must have been a cause of injury to Les Butts. It also will be necessary for you to determine the amount of damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiffs. You are to determine the amount of damages, if any, without regard to how you answer any other questions on the verdict form. Each defendant's liability for damages is limited to the percentage of fault, if any, that you find is attributable to that defendant. In explaining the consequences of your verdict, the court has not meant to imply that any defendant is at fault. That is for you to decide in conformity with these instructions. [¶39] Appellants point to our holding in Haderlie v. Sondergroth, 866 P.2d 703, 716 (Wyo. 1993) as having a direct effect on this case. There, we said with respect to comparative negligence: The jury is to be informed of the consequences of its determination of the plaintiff's percentage of fault, defendant's and other actors' percentages of fault, only in the context of explaining that the court will reduce the amount of damages by the percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff and that each defendant is liable only for the proportion of total damages determined by the percentage of fault attributed to that defendant. Informing the jury of those consequences is all that the phrase encompasses. In cases in which the jury will determine percentage of negligence of several persons, some parties and some not, care should be exercised to assure that the jury is not left with the impression that plaintiff has, has not, or will not recover from persons not parties to the case before them. This is in accord with W.R.E. 408. If a better public policy would be to inform the jury of more concerning settling defendants, then that ought to be accomplished by amendment to the Wyoming Rules of Evidence or by legislative enactment. This issue arises because Butts's counsel made this argument during closing: And now today you've heard that Black Thunder Coal Company is on the verdict form. They're going to ask you to attribute the fault to Black Thunder Coal Company. Mr. Hampleman, when I asked him if he contended anyone was at fault, Mr. O'Keif or somebody else responsible, he said maybe. And then I showed him his contention interrogatory, and we read it. And he gave sworn testimony during this case before he got to court. This question was asked: Do you contend the injuries suffered by Les Butts were the fault of some person or entity other than yourself? And he read his answer. Defendant Hampleman contends that the injuries suffered by Les Butts were the result of a natural event occurring during the mining process. Combination of the nature of the overburden, weather, and random timing in the release of rock and dirt falling in [the] location Mr. Butts happened to be traveling. And I didn't ask  show interrogatory of Mr. Hannifan because he didn't blame the mine. But now their lawyers will ask you to attribute fault to the mine in this case. The mine is not a defendant. People in the mine were doing what they were asked to be doing. They were driving around in pickups and watching the wall. These are the folks with direct supervisory responsibility for the safety. I'll tell you why they'll ask you to do that. It's in Instruction 15, where it says: Each defendant's liability for damages is limited to the percentage of fault, if any, that you find attributable to that defendant. So if you attribute fault to the mine, it takes away from any recovery Mr. Butts  [¶40] Counsel for Appellants interposed an objection at this point. A discussion followed, during which the district court agreed that Butts's attorney had run afoul of the district court's liminal orders, although Butts's attorney contended that it was fair argument under Instruction No. 15. Appellants' counsel contended, that cat is out of the bag, it really can't be put back in, and asked the trial court to grant a mistrial. The district court offered to give a limiting instruction, but that was refused by the Appellants because it would draw more attention to the irremediable damage that already had been done. Appellants, thus, took an all or nothing approach to this issue, i.e., the only possible remedy, for the asserted error, was for the trial court to declare a mistrial and reset the matter for a new trial. The district court took the Appellants' motion for mistrial under advisement and reserved ruling on it until after the jury had reached a verdict. In significant part because the jury attributed 57% of the fault to the mine, the district court determined that the motion for mistrial should be denied, as should the motion for new trial. [¶41] We have carefully examined these matters in light of the applicable standards of review and the pertinent portions of the record on appeal. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial, nor did it abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial.