Opinion ID: 2795994
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comparison to Perjury

Text: A comparison of the federal obstruction of justice statute with the federal perjury statute reinforces the conclusion that “corruptly” means “by bribery.” The obstruction of justice statute prescribes different ranges of punishment depending on the act. The most lenient is “imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under this title, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1503(b)(3). The federal perjury statute, by contrast, prescribes only one range of punishment. It provides that someone found guilty of perjury “shall . . . be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1621. If we accept the principal concurrence’s reading of the word “corruptly,” a person who makes a material truthful statement with the intent to “influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice” may be punished by a term of imprisonment of up to ten years. A person who makes a material untruthful statement with the same intent may be punished by a term of imprisonment of up to only half that. It makes no sense for Congress to punish a truthful statement 11 more severely than a lie. If, on the other hand, we accept that “corruptly” means “by bribery” in § 1503(a), the disparity in punishment makes perfect sense. In Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), the Court explained the difference between truthful but misleading statements, on the one hand, and perjurious statements, on the other. The Court faced a question related to the question now before us: “whether a witness may be convicted of perjury for an answer, under oath, that is literally true but not responsive to the question asked and arguably misleading by negative implication.” Id. at 352–53. The government had charged Bronston with violating § 1621, the federal perjury statute, based on statements he had made at a hearing before a bankruptcy referee. When asked whether he had ever had any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Bronston replied that his “company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.” Id. at 354. Bronston did not mention that he had previously had a personal bank account in Geneva. Id. Bronston’s answer was true. His company had indeed had an account in Zurich. However, his answer, while true, was designed to mislead the questioner. The United States successfully prosecuted Bronston for perjury on the theory that he had testified under oath “with literal truthfulness but unresponsively.” Id. at 355. The Court reversed Bronston’s conviction because “the federal perjury statute cannot be construed to sustain a 12 conviction based on [his] answer.” Id. at 357. The Court explained, “[W]e perceive no reason why Congress would intend the drastic sanction of a perjury prosecution to cure a testimonial mishap that could readily have been reached with a single additional question by counsel alert — as every examiner ought to be — to the incongruity of [Bronston]’s unresponsive answer.” Id. at 358. “If a witness evades, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to recognize the evasion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush out the whole truth with the tools of adversary examination.” Id. at 358–59. This is so even when a witness’s answers were “not guileless but were shrewdly calculated to evade.” Id. at 362. The Court rejected the very argument that the government makes in the case now before us: It is no answer to say that here the jury found that [the witness] intended to mislead his examiner. A jury should not be permitted to engage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was intended to mislead or divert the examiner; the state of mind of the witness is relevant only to the extent that it bears on whether “he does not believe (his answer) to be true.” To hold otherwise would be to inject a new and confusing element into the adversary testimonial system we know. Witnesses would be unsure of the extent of their responsibility for the misunderstandings and inadequacies of examiners, and might well fear having that responsibility tested by a jury under the vague rubric of “intent to mislead” or “perjury by implication.” The seminal modern treatment of the history of the offense concludes that one consideration of policy overshadowed all others during the years 13 when perjury first emerged as a common-law offense: “that the measures taken against the offense must not be so severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or testifying.” Id. at 359 (citation omitted). Simply put, “any special problems arising from the literally true but unresponsive answer are to be remedied through the ‘questioner’s acuity’ and not by a federal perjury prosecution.” Id. at 362. The government and the principal concurrence brush Bronston aside. That is not so easily done, for the Court’s reasoning is as applicable to this case as to Bronston’s. In either case, “[a] jury should not be permitted to engage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was intended to mislead or divert the examiner.” Id. at 358. “To hold otherwise would be to inject a new and confusing element into the adversary testimonial system we know.” Id. Further, and perhaps more important, if the concurrence is right about the meaning of “corruptly” in § 1503(a), the Court’s careful parsing of the perjury statute in Bronston was wasted effort. If the concurrence is right, a prosecutor seeking to convict someone who may or may not have testified truthfully will never need to pursue a perjury conviction. The prosecutor can get an obstruction of justice conviction, carrying twice the penalty, for half the effort.