Opinion ID: 2975264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: We apply a de novo standard of review to the district court’s conclusions of law and a clearly erroneous standard of review to the district court’s findings of fact. Brown v. Palmer, 441 F.3d 347, 350 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 dictates the standard of review for state court determinations in habeas petitions. Id. According to the Supreme Court, Under [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied – the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) “was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). The Court has further explained that “contrary to” should be construed to mean “‘diametrically different,’ ‘opposite in character or nature,’ or ‘mutually opposed’” and that the proper inquiry for the “unreasonable application” analysis is whether the state court decision was “objectively unreasonable” and not simply erroneous or incorrect. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-11. Finally, state court findings of fact are presumed correct, and the habeas applicant has the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Benge v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 236, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting McAdoo v. Elo, 365 F.3d 487, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2004)). -5- No. 05-6473 Drew v. Parker