Opinion ID: 364668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: constitutional rights of confined persons

Text: 206 My brethren note that most of the persons who have been confined at the jail are pretrial detainees, accused of crime but not, as yet, guilty of anything, Rhem v. Malcolm, 2 Cir. 1974, 507 F.2d 333, 338, even though there may be probable cause for their trial. Those pretrial detainees who remain in jail more than a few hours are for the most part poor. The well-to-do are doubtless able to provide bond. 207 The sole justification for confinement pretrial is to assure attendance at trial; therefore, pretrial detainees cannot constitutionally be subjected to any hardships except those absolutely necessary to ensure their continued confinement. See, e. g., Campbell v. McGruder, 1978, 188 U.S.App.D.C. 258, 266, 580 F.2d 521, 529; Feeley v. Sampson, 1 Cir. 1978, 570 F.2d 364, 369-70; Miller v. Carson, 5 Cir. 1977, 563 F.2d 741, 750; Duran v. Elrod, 7 Cir. 1976, 542 F.2d 998, 999; United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 3 Cir. 1976, 535 F.2d 823, 827; Rhem v. Malcolm, supra, 507 F.2d at 336; Jones v. Wittenberg, N.D.Ohio 1971, 323 F.Supp. 93, 100, Aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 6 Cir. 1972, 456 F.2d 854. I fail to perceive any reason why the probable cause for their detention, so emphasized by my brethren, justifies anything more than their simple confinement until they can be tried. 208 Even persons duly convicted and serving sentences are not deprived of the protection of the constitution. An inmate retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly or by necessary implication, taken from him by law. Jackson v. Godwin, 5 Cir. 1968, 400 F.2d 529, 532, Quoting Coffin v. Reichard, 6 Cir. 1944, 143 F.2d 443, 445, Cert. denied, 1945, 325 U.S. 887, 65 S.Ct. 1568, 89 L.Ed. 2001. See also Pell v. Procunier, 1974, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495, 501; Cruz v. Beto, 1972, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263, 267; Washington v. Lee, M.D.Ala.1966, 263 F.Supp. 327, 331, Aff'd per curiam, 1968, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212. There can be little doubt from the facts found by 209 the majority that at least some of their rights have been 210 violated. IV. SEPARATION OF PRETRIAL DETAINEES FROM CONVICTS AND PROTECTION OF CONFINEES 211 While our decisions have recognized that prison and jail officials have broad discretion in classifying convicts confined within their institutions, I would require further measures than the majority with respect to separation of inmates; the jailers should be required to do more than merely protect prisoners from persons who are violent or contagiously ill; they should be required also to separate pretrial detainees from convicts. Whether or not this is called classification is immaterial. Of course each inmate at the Jackson County Jail, whether or not convicted of a crime, has a constitutional right to be segregated from those who endanger his or her security, and from persons contagiously ill. See, e. g., McCray v. Sullivan, 5 Cir. 1975, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334, Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859, 96 S.Ct. 114, 46 L.Ed.2d 86. I would hold that pretrial detainees have a due process right to be held in facilities apart from convicted inmates even if this necessitates physical modification of the jail. See, e. g., Barnes v. Government of Virgin Islands, D.V.I.1976, 415 F.Supp. 1218, 1232-33; Hamilton v. Landrieu, E.D.La.1972, 351 F.Supp. 549, 552; Jones v. Wittenberg, N.D.Ohio 1971, 330 F.Supp. 707, 717, Aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 6 Cir. 1972, 456 F.2d 854. The facilities in the new jail permit this kind of separation with nothing more than a slight effort by the jailers.