Opinion ID: 41966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: On appeal, the defendants argue that the case against them regarding the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more then 100 kilograms of marijuana was circumstantial, and that no direct or circumstantial evidence existed of any illegal agreement between them. They maintain that (1) the detectives 19 never saw them inside or leaving the residence, (2) when the detectives stopped them at the auto parts store, the detectives did not find any marijuana residue in the van or on their persons even though both of the defendants and the van smelled like fresh marijuana, and (3) neither of them lived in the residence during the nine months prior to the discovery of the marijuana and their arrest because Gomez’s cousin and his wife lived there. We review de novo the denial of a defendant's motion for acquittal. United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). In considering whether the evidence against the defendant was sufficient, we draw all reasonable inferences in the government's favor. Id. The question is whether “‘a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (citation omitted). We do not give any deference to the district court’s decision on sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Taylor, 972 F.2d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 1992). “It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Young, 906 F.2d 615, 618 (11th Cir. 1990). Further, we have stated that we will not review a defendant’s sufficiency 20 claim when he does not submit independent briefing on the issue and merely adopts the arguments of his co-defendant. See United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 963 n.13 (11th Cir. 1990), modified, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990). In order for the defendant to be convicted of conspiracy, the government must establish that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy, and (3) the defendant, with knowledge, voluntarily joined the conspiracy. United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423, 1425-26 (11th Cir. 1998). A conspiracy is defined as an “‘agreement to commit an unlawful act.’” Id. at 1425 (citation omitted). In his brief, Gomez does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; however, he indicates that he “adopts the issues, statements of facts and arguments set forth in Appellant Enrique Balderas’ brief.” Appellant Gomez’s Br. at viii. Because Gomez did not submit independent briefing on his sufficiency argument, we do not review his claim. See Khoury, 901 F.2d at 963 n.13. However, we find that the district court erred in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support Balderas’s conviction. In United States v. Villegas, we reversed the conviction of an alleged conspiracy defendant due to insufficient evidence. 911 F.2d 623, 628 (11th Cir. 1990). In that case, the defendant’s 21 brother was involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Id. at 627. The only evidence against the defendant was that he was outside the house while his brother made a cocaine transaction, and he followed his brother to a mall where he went inside the mall while further transactions took place. Id. at 628. The police described the defendant’s activities as counter-surveillance, id.; however, we held that his mere presence at the transactions and association with his brother was insufficient to establish the requirements for his knowing participation in the conspiracy. Id. at 629. Conversely, in United States v. Gamboa, we held that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conspiracy conviction because the defendant rode in the truck with his co-defendants to the scene of the drug transaction, he was riding in the truck with the drugs, and he spent most of the day at a residence where drug paraphernalia was found. 166 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999). We also cited the fact that, before all of the defendants drove to the scene of the drug transaction, the defendant walked to the truck and leaned toward the truck’s console, where the drugs were later found, which suggested that he actively participated in the concealment of the drugs. Id. In United States v. Lyons, we found that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conspiracy conviction because he was with his co-defendant when his co-defendant met with 22 the undercover agent to discuss a drug buy, he went with his co-defendant to the crack house to secure crack for the transaction, and he returned with his codefendant to give the crack to the undercover agent. 53 F.3d 1198, 1202 (11th Cir. 1995). Further, in United States v. Catchings, we also held that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conspiracy conviction even though he only participated on one day and entered the conspiracy after its inception. 922 F.2d 777, 781 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). We stated that he “knew and aided [the conspiracy’s] essential purpose.” Id. However, unlike in Gamboa, Lyons, and Catchings, Balderas was seen only in Gomez’s van, there was no testimony that Balderas was in the residence or, if he was inside, how long he had been there. Gomez and Balderas were going to an auto parts store, the van did not have any marijuana residue in it, and the detectives did not find any money in the van. Further, there was no evidence at trial that Gomez and Balderas were going to a drug transaction, and there was nothing that suggested that Balderas actively participated in the conspiracy or that he aided the drug conspiracy’s essential purpose. See Lyons, 53 F.3d at 1202; Catchings, 922 F.2d at 781. Although Balderas smelled like fresh marijuana, and Tanya Hunt testified that Balderas was best friends with Gomez and was at the residence before, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Balderas did 23 anything other than be present at the residence with his close friend, Gomez. Mere presence at the scene of a crime, although a factor for a conspiracy conviction, is not by itself sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction. See United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354, 1365 (11th Cir. 2001); Villegas, 911 F.2d at 629. Likewise, mere association with conspirators is not sufficient to support the conviction. See Villegas, 911 F.2d at 629. Further, in United States v. Morales, we held that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conspiracy conviction because the apartment’s lease where the drug transactions took place listed the defendant and his codefendant as residents, the defendant had signed the lease for the apartment, and two rental receipts, dated six days before the drug transaction, had his name on them. 868 F.2d 1562, 1573 (11th Cir. 1989). We stated that this evidence proved that the defendant had dominion and control over the apartment, and, because that was where the drug transaction took place, there was sufficient evidence to establish his role in the conspiracy. Id. However, in the present case, although a bill in Balderas’s name was found at the residence, there is nothing to suggest that he lived at the residence during the time that the marijuana was stored there. In fact, both Hunt and Gomez’s wife testified that Balderas did not live there in the nine months preceding the discovery of the marijuana. Moreover, there is nothing 24 in the record to suggest that Balderas had dominion or control over either the residence or the contents therein. Hunt testified that the things found inside the home were her and Ricardo’s things that they had left when they moved out so the house could be fixed. Therefore, there was nothing in the record to indicate that Balderas voluntarily and knowingly joined in the conspiracy, and the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. See Toler, 144 F.3d at 1425-26. While Balderas’s actions and the limited evidence presented may cause reason for suspicion, they are insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was actively participating in the conspiracy. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court on this issue and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal. Because we are ordering the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal, Balderas’s remaining arguments that he adopted from Gomez’s brief are irrelevant. Thus, the remainder of this opinion analyzes Gomez’s claims as they relate to him only.