Opinion ID: 1621755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: JURY INSTRUCTION AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE (i)(5)

Text: In his final issue, the defendant contends that the jury was not properly instructed with respect to the remaining aggravating circumstances. Jodie Lefever was murdered in 1988. At the time of the killing, one of the aggravating circumstances upon which the State relied was defined by statute as [t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(I)(5)(1982). In 1989, the statute was amended and the aggravating circumstance redefined as [t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(I)(5)(1991)(emphasis added). The trial of this defendant was held in February of 1993. The trial court, without objection from the defense or the State, instructed the jury in the language of the 1989 statute, rather than in accordance with the law as it existed when the offense was committed in 1988. Under decisions of this Court rendered after the trial of this case, [9] it is clear that the sentencing hearing should have been conducted in accordance with the 1988 law, the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Tenn. 1994). Therefore, instructing the jury in the terms of the amended statute was erroneous. The defendant argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing which must be conducted in accordance with the law in effect at the time the offense was committed. The State argues that the error was harmless and relies upon the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals which held that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the amended definition of the aggravating circumstance required a higher burden on the State to prove that the act involved torture or serious physical abuse. While we do not agree with the intermediate court that the amended definition imposed a higher burden upon the State, we have determined, for the reasons explained below, that the erroneous jury instruction is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and does not affirmatively appear to have affected the result of the trial on the merits. Tenn. R.App. P. 36(b); Tenn. R.Crim. P. 52(a). The 1989 version of the aggravating circumstance is different from the 1982 version in that it substitutes the phrase serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death for the phrase depravity of mind. The aggravating circumstance is redefined. Unlike the Court of Criminal Appeals, we consider the amendment a substantive change which imposes not a different level of proof upon the State, but different factors of proof. Therefore, it is not accurate to broadly characterize an instructional error such as that complained of on appeal in this case as beneficial to the defendant. [10] Depending upon the facts of the case, such an error could conceivably be beneficial to the State. We do not agree, however, with the defendant's argument that such an error always requires reversal and may never be harmless. The defendant's reliance upon State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1994) is misplaced. The circumstances in Stephenson were unique and are not present in this case. The jury was instructed and returned a verdict in accordance with 1988 law, though the offense was committed after the statute was amended in 1989. The defendant was therefore deprived of the previously noted benefits of the 1989 law. When the error was called to the trial court's attention, the jurors were recalled, some two weeks after the trial, and questioned by the trial court to establish that the erroneous jury instructions had no impact on the verdict rendered, a procedure that was clearly inappropriate. Under such circumstances, this Court found that error required reversal. Unlike Stephenson , the instructional error in this case is harmless for two reasons. First, this aggravating circumstance was sufficiently proven by evidence of torture, independent of the depravity or serious physical abuse prong of the aggravating circumstance. State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 587 (Tenn. 1995). The trial court correctly instructed the jury as to the definitions of the terms heinous, atrocious, and cruel in accordance with this Court's decision in State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517, 529 (Tenn. 1985). Also in accordance with Williams, the trial court instructed the jury that torture means the infliction of severe physical or mental pain upon the victim while he or she remains alive and conscious. Id. The proof introduced by the State during the trial clearly established torture. The victim was initially assaulted and knocked to the floor by the defendant. While she was lying helpless on the floor, the defendant retrieved a butcher knife, returned to the den, and began stabbing her. Dr. Harlan testified that the victim would have been alive and conscious for at least three to five minutes during the assault, and possibly as long as thirty minutes. The pain of the stabbing during that period of consciousness would have been comparable, according to Dr. Harlan, to undergoing surgery without an anesthetic. Therefore, based upon the proof in this record, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that had the sentencing jury given no weight to the invalid aggravating criteria [serious physical abuse], the defendant's sentence would have been the same. State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 260-61 (Tenn. 1993). Therefore the error does not affirmatively appear to have affected the result of the sentencing hearing. Alternatively, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that had the jury been properly instructed, it would have found the evidence sufficient to establish depravity of mind beyond a reasonable doubt. In Williams, this Court stated that depravity is inherent in the state of mind of a murderer who willfully inflicts severe physical or mental pain on a victim prior to death or at a time very close to the victim's death. Id., 690 S.W.2d at 529. In this case the defendant beat and stabbed the victim, a person whom he knew, and later boasted about how he had practiced karate on Lefever. Such evidence clearly establishes that the defendant willfully inflicted severe physical pain upon the victim. Accordingly, we conclude that had the jury been properly instructed it would have found depravity of mind. Therefore, the instructional error in this case does not affirmatively appear to have affected the verdict and is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.