Opinion ID: 1622333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Validity of the 1999 Act

Text: The essence of the Daphne plaintiffs' claims, as stated in their brief to this Court, is that Spanish Fort abused its power, [and] attempted to manipulate the different branches of government in order to get its own way, regardless of the rights of the residents of Alabama. The Daphne plaintiffs argue that through the enactment of the 1999 Act, Spanish Fort and the Alabama Legislature set out to design legislation to specifically decide [Dispute I] while it was pending, and thereby violate[d] the constitutional rights of the people they were charged to protect. The Daphne plaintiffs argue that the 1999 Act violates the Alabama Constitution of 1901, Art. III, § 43, and Art. IV, §§ 95 and 105.
The Daphne plaintiffs argue that the 1999 Act violated the separation-of-powers doctrine of § 43, Ala. Const.1901, because, they argue, Spanish Fort and the Legislature intended to usurp the authority of the judiciary by resolving Dispute I by passage of the 1999 Act. The separation-of-powers doctrine provides: In the government of this state, except in the instances in this Constitution hereinafter expressly directed or permitted, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men. Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. III, § 43. The Daphne plaintiffs argue that the power to render a judgment that resolves a case belongs only to the judicial branch of government. See Ex parte Jenkins, 723 So.2d 649, 656 (Ala.1998) (holding that the retroactive application of a statute to change the reopening provisions of paternity judgments finalized before the statute was enacted violated the separation-of-powers doctrine). The Daphne plaintiffs cite the preamble to the 1999 Act as the most dramatic evidence of its constitutional infirmity. The pertinent parts of the preamble are as follows: WHEREAS, there has arisen a dispute regarding the annexation of said territory based on some alleged defects in the enactment of [the 1998 Act] resulting in some uncertainty regarding the boundary lines and corporate limits of the City of Spanish Fort; and WHEREAS, based on the intent of this Legislature in passing [the 1998 Act] and the majority vote of the people in favor of annexation, the Legislature now wishes to resolve the aforementioned dispute in the most expedient manner possible. (Emphasis added.) The Daphne plaintiffs argue that the proponents of the 1999 Act agree that the dispute referenced in the 1999 Act was the ongoing litigation of Dispute I. Spanish Fort argues that the controversy at issue in Dispute I was the validity of the 1998 Act and that the final judgment held that the 1998 Act was unconstitutional. In its brief to this Court, Spanish Fort contends that the 1999 Act is an independent act that accomplished a valid, prospective annexation effective June 18, 1999. Spanish Fort argues that the 1999 Act did not reverse the trial court's judgment in Dispute I, did not direct any court on how to rule in Dispute I, did not make the annexation into Spanish Fort retroactive to the effective date of the 1998 Act, and did not retroactively change any law under which Dispute I was decided. Therefore, Spanish Fort concludes, the 1999 Act did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. We agree. The Alabama Constitution of 1901 vested legislative authority in a State Legislature, whose powers are plenary and unlimited except by special limitations imposed by the [Constitution]. Sisk v. Cargile, 138 Ala. 164, 172, 35 So. 114, 117 (1903), cited in Broadway v. State, 257 Ala. 414, 417, 60 So.2d 701, 703 (1952), and Ex Parte Foshee, 246 Ala. 604, 606, 21 So.2d 827, 829 (1945). Article IV, § 104, expressly provides that the Legislature has the power to alter or rearrange by local law the boundaries of a municipality. As cited by the trial court, this Court described the plenary power of the Legislature over a municipality as follows: It is generally held that the Legislature, in the absence of specific constitutional limitations, has the power to detach, or authorize the detachment of, territory from municipalities. 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 48, p. 139; 37 Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 35, p. 652; Annotation 117 A.L.R. 268. This principle is recognized and stated in Trailway Oil Co. v. City of Mobile, 271 Ala. 218, 122 So.2d 757 [(1960)]. See Punke v. Village of Elliott, 364 Ill. 604, 5 N.E.2d 389 [ (1936) ]. We have held that the State, through its Legislature, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all the governmental powers of a municipality, may expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the State is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the State Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. Opinion of the Justices No. 181, 277 Ala. 630, 633, 173 So.2d 793, 796 (1965). The power of the judiciary, on the other hand, is the power to declare finally the rights of the parties, in a particular case or controversy, based on the law at the time the judgment becomes final. Jenkins, supra, 723 So.2d at 656. `[T]o declare what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power; to declare what the law shall be, is legislative.' Sanders v. Cabaniss, 43 Ala. 173, 180 (1869) (quoting Thomas M. Cooly, Constitutional Limitations 91-95 (1868)). Under the separation-of-powers doctrine, the Legislature cannot enact a law that would change the law incorporated into a final judgment of a court. Jenkins, 723 So.2d at 655 (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995)). Dispute I focused upon the validity of the 1998 Act, which altered the corporate limits of Spanish Fort to include the disputed parcels, provided that a majority of qualified voters approved the annexation by a referendum. The validity of the 1999 Act was not addressed in Dispute I, and if it was enacted so as to have prospective operation, it could not usurp the power of the court to resolve the then pending litigation in Dispute I. See Jenkins, 723 So.2d at 659. As recognized in Jenkins, this Court has long operated under the following rule of statutory construction: `It may be laid down as a fundamental rule for the construction of statutes that they will be considered to have prospective operation only, unless a legislative intent to the contrary is expressed or is necessarily to be implied from the language used or the particular circumstances; especially where to construe the act as retrospective in its operation would render it obnoxious to some constitutional provision, though the fact that the retrospective operation would not be unconstitutional, does not require the act to be construed as retrospective [sic].' 723 So.2d at 658-59 (quoting Greenwood v. Trigg, Dobbs & Co., 143 Ala. 617, 619, 39 So. 361, 361 (1905), quoting in turn 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 693). In Jenkins, this Court addressed the validity of a statute that permitted the reopening of a finalized paternity judgment based upon scientific evidence that the adjudged father was not the biological father. 723 So.2d at 652. The statute at issue in Jenkins did not expressly require retroactive application, but, instead, provided: `This act shall become effective immediately upon its passage and approval by the Governor, or upon its otherwise becoming a law.' Ala. Acts 1994, Act No. 94-633, § 4. Id. at 659. We held that the statute, applied prospectively, did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine because that statutory construction would prevent any constitutional infirmity. Id. The 1999 Act includes the same prospective language. Furthermore, the 1999 Act refers to the 1998 Act and provides: Section 5. All laws or parts of laws which conflict with this Act are hereby repealed to the extent of such conflict. However, any and all rights or authority granted to the City of Spanish Fort pursuant to [the 1998 Act] shall remain in effect and shall be deemed cumulative to the authority and rights vested in the City of Spanish Fort hereunder. The language expressly provides that the enactment of the 1999 Act is not dependent upon the validity of the 1998 Act. The rights vested in the 1999 Act were cumulative to the rights, if any, vested by the 1998 Act. Accordingly, the 1999 Act operated prospectively to annex the disputed parcels into Spanish Fort, and such prospective effect did not usurp the power of the court in Dispute I. Moreover, the Legislature has the plenary power to correct constitutional defects in statutes. In interpreting a criminal statute in Ex parte Jackson, 614 So.2d 405, 408 (Ala.1993), this Court acknowledged that if the Legislature disagreed with the Court's interpretation of the statute, then the Legislature could enact appropriate legislation to modify the statute and yield a different result in subsequent cases. In the present action, the Legislature adopted the 1999 Act to properly annex the disputed parcels and to correct its mistakes in the 1998 Act. By enacting the 1999 Act, the Legislature did not take away a power of the judiciary. The 1999 Act annexed the disputed parcelsthe same parcels Spanish Fort purported to annex under the 1998 Actbut in doing so, it did not interfere with the status of the disputed parcels between July 1998 and June 1999, the year in which the 1998 Act was in effect. The 1999 Act contains no indication that it was enacted to resolve retrospectively the pending litigation of Dispute I. In our review of the 1999 Act, we are bound to construe the act with every presumption in favor of its validity. City of Birmingham v. City of Vestavia Hills, 654 So.2d 532, 535 (Ala.1995). Our duty is to sustain a legislative act unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the act violates a fundamental law. Id. The Daphne plaintiffs argue that the word dispute in the introduction of the 1999 Act refers to the ongoing litigation of Dispute I and is therefore evidence indicating that the 1999 Act intended to resolve Dispute I. However, we find that the language refers to the infirmity of the 1998 Act, which was prospectively corrected by the enactment of the 1999 Act. The Daphne plaintiffs also argue that the Legislature was required to wait until Dispute I was finally adjudicated before it could enact legislation affecting the disputed parcels. The Daphne plaintiffs cite no authority for this proposition, [4] however, and we know of no authority that would require the Legislature to wait until a final adjudication before it can enact an act that is prospective in effect. The 1999 Act is an independent, prospective act that altered the corporate limits and boundaries of Spanish Forta right expressly reserved to the Legislature. Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. IV, § 104(18).
The Daphne plaintiffs argue that the 1999 Act violates § 95, Ala. Const.1901, because, they say, the Legislature changed a rule of decision midstream in order to affect the outcome of Dispute I. Section 95 provides that [a]fter suit has been commenced on any cause of action, the legislature shall have no power to take away such cause of action, or destroy any existing defense to such suit. See United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Autrey, 723 So.2d 617 (Ala.1998) (the Legislature cannot change the law to lessen a plaintiff's recovery once the plaintiff files an action); see also Kemp v. Britt, 410 So.2d 31 (Ala.1982) (the Legislature may not change the law to lessen a state employee's benefits after the employee has sued to collect those benefits). The 1999 Act did not take away the Daphne plaintiffs' cause of action, nor did it destroy a defense available to the Daphne plaintiffs in Dispute I. In fact, the 1999 Act did not retroactively affect, in violation of § 95, any of the rights available to the Daphne plaintiffs under the then existing law. See Kemp, 410 So.2d at 34. The 1999 Act created an independent, prospective annexation. For all that appears, the Daphne plaintiffs could have introduced a similar annexation bill to the Legislature to annex the disputed parcels into Daphne; however, the action was taken by Spanish Fort. The 1999 Act does not violate § 95 because it did not take away any rights available to the Daphne plaintiffs under Dispute I.
The Daphne plaintiffs argue that the 1999 Act granted the very same relief that was pending before the court in Dispute I, in violation of Art. IV, § 105, Ala. Const. of 1901. Section 105 prohibits the enactment of a local law when such a law is provided for by a general law or when the relief sought can be given by any court of this state. The Daphne plaintiffs contend that the deposition testimony of the mayor of Spanish Fort, certain members of the Legislature, and the members of the city council of Spanish Fort constitutes evidence indicating that Spanish Fort annexed the same property in the 1999 Act that Spanish Fort had asked the Alabama courts to declare part of its municipality in Dispute I. For example, a city council member testified: Q. So, if you pass this Act, the '99 Act, you'd get the same relief you would have gotten if the [trial court] ruled in your favor, is that right? A. Yes. Another council member testified that she understood the legal description of the property in the annexation attempted in the 1998 Act to be the same as that in the 1999 Act. In this state, property can be annexed to a municipality by three methods. First, the Legislature can annex property by passing a local law. Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. IV, § 104(18). Second, property can be annexed by a referendum. § 11-42-2, Ala.Code 1975. Finally, property can be annexed under the landowner-consent method pursuant to §§ 11-42-20 to -24, Ala.Code 1975. The general laws of the State place restrictions on the annexation of property under the landowner-consent method. See, e.g., § 11-42-21, Ala.Code 1975. However, the Legislature's power to annex property by local law is restricted only by the Alabama Constitution. City of Birmingham, supra, 654 So.2d at 535. The Constitution restricts the Legislature from enacting a local law to incorporate a municipality or to amend, confirm, or extend the charter of a municipal corporation. Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. IV, § 104. However, Art. IV, § 104, expressly provides that the Legislature may alter or rearrange the boundaries of a municipality by local law. See Town of Vance, supra, 661 So.2d at 743-44 (upholding a local law that altered the boundary lines of the City of Tuscaloosa); City of Birmingham v. Norton, 255 Ala. 262, 50 So.2d 754 (1950) (the Legislature can enact a law that rearranges or alters municipal boundaries even when the law disincorporates another municipality); City of Ensley v. Simpson, 166 Ala. 366, 52 So. 61 (1909) (upholding a local law that altered and rearranged the boundary lines of the City of Birmingham). The courts were limited in Dispute I to addressing only the question of the validity of the 1998 Act and the validity of Daphne's purported annexations under the landowner-consent method. The annexation method of the 1998 Act was held to be invalid. City of Spanish Fort, supra, 774 So.2d at 571. However, Spanish Fort could not ask the courts to annex the territory into Spanish Fort. A court's power extends only to the cases and controversies brought before it, and the court in Dispute I could declare only whether the method used to annex territory was valid. The Daphne plaintiffs acknowledge that a court does not have the power to annex territory; however, they argue that under the unique circumstances of the present action, the court could grant the same relief as that provided in the 1999 Act. However, a finding of validity or invalidity does not equate to the power to annex; that action is a prerogative of the Legislature, not the courts of this state. Because the court never had the power to annex territory to Spanish Fort, the 1999 Act does not violate § 105 because the court could not have granted the relief sought by Spanish Fort under the 1999 Act. See Sisk, supra, 138 Ala. at 171, 35 So. at 117. In Sisk, the legislative act in question provided for a special levy of taxes to pay for bonds authorized by an original act for the construction of public roads. 138 Ala. at 170, 35 So. at 116. This Court upheld the validity of the act and recognized that it did not violate § 105 because the levy of a tax is a legislative power and such relief cannot be had in the courts. 138 Ala. at 171, 35 So. at 117. By analogy to Sisk, the court in the present action did not have the power to annex territory to a municipality because that power is reserved to the Legislature under § 104(18). In Sisk, the gravamen of the act was to levy a special tax, whereas here the gravamen of the 1999 Act was to annex territory; both are legislative powers. 138 Ala. at 172, 35 So. at 117. The court in Sisk had the power to declare the act unconstitutional, just as the court in Dispute I had the power to declare the 1998 Act unconstitutional. However, neither court had the power to grant the relief requested by the respective actions. The Daphne plaintiffs argue that determining the meaning of when the relief sought can be given by any court in § 105 is a matter of first impression. The Daphne plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the meaning of the phrase from the meaning applied in Sisk because ongoing litigation regarding the same tax was not an issue before the Court in Sisk. However, the ongoing litigation in Dispute I involved only the 1998 Act. The judicial system lacked the authority in Dispute I to insulate the Daphne plaintiffs from the prospective exercise of the legislative prerogative of annexation. Consequently, the distinction from Sisk urged by the Daphne plaintiffs is not persuasive. The Daphne plaintiffs urge us to consider the testimony of members of the Legislature; however, this Court will not inquire into the motive or intent of members of the Legislature: `The intention of the Legislature, to which effect must be given, is that expressed in the statute, and the courts will not inquire into the motives which influenced the Legislature or individual members in voting for its passage, nor indeed as to the intention of the draftsman or of the Legislature so far as it has not been expressed in the act. So in ascertaining the meaning of a statute the court will not be governed or influenced by the views or opinions of any or all of the members of the Legislature, or its legislative committees or any other person.' James v. Todd, 267 Ala. 495, 506, 103 So.2d 19, 28-29 (1957) (quoting Wiseman v. Madison Cadillac Co., 191 Ark. 1021, 1024-25, 88 S.W.2d 1007, 1009 (1935)). In sum, the testimony presented by the Daphne plaintiffs fails to establish a genuine issue as to a material fact regarding a violation of § 105. Such testimony is immaterial in view of our holding recognizing the authority of the Legislature to annex prospectively territory that was the subject of proceedings involving the 1998 Act in Dispute I.