Opinion ID: 187122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count I: Reverse False Claim Charge

Text: Section 3730(c)(2)(A), which sets out the [r]ights of the parties to qui tam actions brought on behalf of the United States, provides: The Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the person has been notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion. In granting the Government's motion to dismiss Count I, the district court concluded that under this provision, as construed in Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250 (D.C.Cir.2003), the court did not have a role to play in the Government's decision whether to dismiss Count I given the general presumption of the Government's right to end a prosecution and the absence of special circumstances that warrant an exception such as fraud on the court. 4/27/06 Hr'g Tr. 41. The district court correctly dismissed Count I. In Swift, a Department of Justice (DOJ) lawyer filed a qui tam action alleging that three employees of the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel had conspired to defraud the Government of $6,169.20 using falsified time sheets and leave slips. The Government moved to dismiss the action and the district court granted the motion. On appeal, we upheld the dismissal, concluding that the Government has what amounts to an unfettered right to dismiss a qui tam action, citing four bases for our conclusion: (1) the separation of powers doctrine, (2) the Government's broad discretion in initiating or continuing a criminal prosecution, (3) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(i), which permits a plaintiff to dismiss a civil action without order of the court, and (4) the language of section § 3730(c)(2)(A) itself, which grants to [t]he Government (not the court) unilateral authority to dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252. As we there explained: Nothing in § 3730(c)(2)(A) purports to deprive the Executive Branch of its historical prerogative to decide which cases should go forward in the name of the United States. The provision neither sets `substantive priorities' nor circumscribes the government's `power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.' Id. at 253 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)). In addition, we noted that, although the government conceded at oral argument that there may be an exception for `fraud on the court,' no evidence of that sort was presented and therefore we d[id] not pass on whether this type of exception, or any other, might be consistent with our reading of § 3730(c)(2)(A). Id. We conclude that under Swift the district court correctly deferred to the Government's virtually unfettered discretion to dismiss the qui tam claim. As in Swift, there is no evidence here of fraud on the court or any similar exceptional circumstance to warrant departure from the usual deference we owe the Government's determination whether an action should proceed in the Government's name. Hoyte asks us to recognize a new exception for a dismissal clearly contrary to manifest public interest, Appellant's Br. at 14, contending that in Swift we left the door open for future recognition of other types of exceptions in addition to fraud on the court. In Swift, however, we flatly rejected the relator's suggestion that we routinely review the Government's decision to dismiss a qui tam action, instead holding the door only barely ajar for review in an exceptional circumstancein particular, where there is fraud on the court. See id. at 253. It is clear from Swift that any exception to section 3730(c)(2)(A)if there are anymust be like fraud on the court and Hoyte's proposed manifest public interest exception is not. [4] Hoyte was afforded the hearing the FCA mandates to give her a formal opportunity to convince the government not to end the case. Id. The Government was not persuaded to proceed, however, and its decision to dismiss the case, based on its own assessment, is not reviewable in the district court or this court. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Count I.