Opinion ID: 4536379
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: City Officials

Text: Defendant-Appellant City Officials include Emergency Managers Earley and Ambrose, Public Works Director Croft, and Utilities Administrators Glasgow and Johnson. The Guertin court described Earley, Ambrose, and Croft as “instrumental in creating the crisis.” 912 F.3d at 926. We have not had the opportunity previously to address the conduct of Glasgow and Johnson. Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 24 All of the Defendant-Appellant City Officials argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted based on professional opinions from MDEQ officials and private engineering firms. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (“Federal officials will not be liable for mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law.”); Appellant Br. (19-1425) at 25, 27–29, 31–34. We have already held, however, that, “[t]o the extent these defendants claim ‘mistakes in judgment’ because they reasonably relied upon the opinions of Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) employees and professional engineering firms, those are facts to be fleshed out during discovery and are not appropriate to resolve at the motion-to-dismiss posture.” Guertin, 912 F.3d at 927 (citation omitted). The same reasoning applies here. At this stage, we must credit Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Defendant-Appellant City Officials had independent knowledge that the Flint River water was causing a public health crisis—regardless of what the MDEQ or the engineering firms reported.
Darnell Earley was Emergency Manager for the City from September 2013 (prior to the crisis) to January 2015 (in the midst of the crisis). Earley forced the switch to Flint River water when he knew that the FWTP was not ready and that it was important that the water be treated. R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 51, ¶ 147) (Page ID #17854); see also Guertin, 912 F.3d at 927. Plaintiffs-Appellees also allege that Earley directed City officials to lie to the public and tell them that the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak in the summer of 2014 “was ‘an internal issue at McLaren [Hospital] that they are working on with our assistance, not a Flint water problem that we are trying to resolve.’” R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 59, ¶ 175) (Page ID #17862). Even after he was briefed on water quality issues by the MDEQ in the fall of 2014, Earley refused to reconnect to the DWSD. Id. at 60–61, ¶¶ 180–81 (Page ID #17863–64). He again refused to reconnect to the DWSD in January 2015, when officials were aware of the lead and legionella problems and after the University of Michigan ceased use of Flint River drinking water because of lead contamination. Id. at 62, ¶¶ 185–86 (Page ID #17865). These actions plausibly demonstrate deliberate indifference to the crisis that would likely result. Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 25
Gerald Ambrose took over as Emergency Manager for the City of Flint in January 2015 (in the midst of the crisis). Prior to that, he had served as Earley’s advisor, and had been notified about the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak in the summer of 2014. Id. at 59, ¶ 175 (Page ID #17862). Like Earley, he repeatedly refused to reconnect to the DWSD—showcasing an indifference that was “especially egregious” in light of the undeniable and worsening crisis. See Guertin, 912 F.3d at 927. After State officials installed water coolers in Flint offices and the GCHD reported that the outbreak of Legionnaires’ likely was connected to the use of Flint River water, the DWSD offered Ambrose a deal for reconnecting in January 2015. R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 81, ¶ 239) (Page ID #17884). He refused. Id. In February 2015, Flint residents publicly demanded reconnecting to the DWSD, and he again refused. Id. at 82, ¶ 243 (Page ID #17885). In March 2015, the Flint City Council voted to re-connect to DWSD. Id. at 86, ¶ 255 (Page ID #17889). Ambrose rejected their vote. Id. City and State officials were well aware of the crisis by January 2015 and were under the scrutiny of the GCHD and the EPA by March 2015. Ambrose’s staunch refusal to stop use of Flint River water in spite of what he knew plausibly demonstrates deliberate indifference to the crisis.
Michael Glasgow was a City Utilities Administrator, and the City’s water treatment plant laboratory and water quality supervisor. Prior to making the switch to the Flint River, he knew that the FWTP was not ready and that the City would be distributing contaminated water. Id. at 46, ¶ 129 (Page ID #17849). He tried to stop the switch from happening but nevertheless participated in the transition. Id. He later told State investigators that Croft and Johnson, who were his superiors, pressured him to make the switch. Id. at 47, ¶ 130 (Page ID #17850). Plaintiffs-Appellees concede that Glasgow’s conduct in implementing the switch did not demonstrate deliberate indifference. See Oral Argument at 1:12:52–1:13:10. What Plaintiffs-Appellees take issue with is Glasgow’s later role in covering up the extent of lead contamination. In July 2015, Glasgow wrote to Rosenthal that “Flint has lots of lead pipe, no corrosion control treatment” and that “[t]his is an unprecedented situation and EPA Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 26 needs to take this seriously. Now.” Id. at 89, ¶ 267 (Page ID #17892). Despite what he knew, he distorted water quality tests to downplay the extent of the lead contamination. Id. at 89–91, ¶¶ 270–72 (Page ID #17893–94). Glasgow claims that he did so at the direction of MDEQ officials Busch and Prysby. Id. at 91, ¶ 273 (Page ID #17894). But as Plaintiffs-Appellees point out, Busch and Prysby were MDEQ (not City) officials who, unlike Croft and Johnson, had no authority over him. The facts, when fully developed, ultimately might show that Glasgow truly was coerced into distorting the water quality tests, so that he cannot be said to have acted with deliberate indifference. But at this stage, the allegations plausibly support a reasonable inference that he did act with deliberate indifference when he helped to cover up the crisis.
Howard Croft was Public Works Director for the City of Flint. Croft permitted the switch to the Flint River even though he knew that the FWTP was not prepared to deliver safe drinking water. Id. at 47, ¶ 130 (Page ID #17850); see also Guertin, 912 F.3d at 927. In fact, Glasgow stated that Croft pressured him to make the switch despite Glasgow’s warnings. R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 47, ¶ 130) (Page ID #17850). Croft also knew from the GCHD that the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak was connected to Flint River water, and he did nothing. Id. at 138, ¶ 401 (Page ID #17941). His alleged role in creating and failing to mitigate the crisis plausibly demonstrates deliberate indifference.
Daugherty Johnson was another City Utilities Administrator. Along with Croft, he purportedly pressured Glasgow to make the switch to the Flint River despite Glasgow’s warnings. Id. at 47, ¶ 130 (Page ID #17850). He also stonewalled the GCHD’s attempt to investigate Flint River water quality issues and the outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease. Id. at 83– 84, ¶¶ 248–50 (Page ID #17886–87). His alleged role in creating and covering up the crisis plausibly demonstrates deliberate indifference. Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 27