Opinion ID: 3045899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bystander Recovery Under Pennsylvania’s

Text: Strict Products Liability Law. The district court relied primarily upon Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000 (Pa. 2003), in holding that Ashley could not recover in strict liability under Pennsylvania law because she was not an intended user of the mower. However, as we discuss in detail below, we believe the district court’s reliance on Phillips was misplaced because bystander liability was not an issue in that case; moreover, no other decision of the Court specifically addresses the issue. In the absence of a controlling decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a federal court applying that state’s substantive law must predict how Pennsylvania’s highest court would decide this case.11 See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2000). “In predicting how the highest court of the state would resolve 11 Because we are sitting in diversity, we must apply Pennsylvania’s law to the facts of this case. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). All parties agree that Pennsylvania law governs this suit and the district court applied Pennsylvania law in granting summary judgment. 17 the issue, [we] must consider ‘relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would decide the issue at hand.’”12 Id. (quoting McKenna v. Ortho Pharm Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980)). Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet expressly recognized a bystander’s right to recover under products liability law, it has not expressly rejected such a claim either. The “modern era” of products liability law in Pennsylvania began with Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966). There, Webb’s father bought a keg of beer from Zern (a beer distributor), and Webb’s brother subsequently tapped the keg and drew beer from it. Webb was injured when the keg exploded. Id. at 426. Webb relied on a theory of “exclusive control” to sue both Zern, the brewer who filled the keg, and the manufacturer of the keg. The trial court dismissed the action pursuant to the defendants’ demurrers. That court ruled that the doctrine of exclusive control did not apply because Webb had not joined his father and brother and either or both of them could have done something that caused the explosion. On appeal, the Supreme Court adopted the Restatement 12 The district court did not conduct a prediction analysis. However, we can do a prediction analysis because, had the district court conducted such an analysis, our review of that analysis would be plenary. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bufetta, 230 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2000) 18 (Second) Torts, Section 402A as a “new basis of liability.” Id. at 426-27. Section 402A provides: (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.13 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. The Court did not fully explain its rationale for adopting Section 402A. Rather it simply referred to the concurring and dissenting opinions in Miller v. Preitz, 221 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1966), which was issued the same day as Webb, 13 The term “seller” includes the “manufacturer” of a product. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, cmt. f. 19 stating: “[o]ne will . . . find there citations to modern case law and commentaries which extend and recommend the extension of the law of strict liability in tort for defective products.” 220 A.2d at 854. In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Miller, Justice Jones recited the history of product liability law in Pennsylvania prior to Webb. Miller, 221 A.2d at 328-35 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He explained that a person injured by a defective product could sue either in negligence or in assumpsit based upon a breach of implied warranty arising from the sale of an allegedly defective product. Id. at 329. However, under either theory the injured person was required to establish privity, id. at 329, 330, and, in a negligence action, the injured person had to prove the specific acts of negligence by the manufacturer. Id. at 330. In his recitation, Justice Jones noted that following the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), Pennsylvania had eliminated the requirement of privity in negligence actions for damages arising from a defective product. Id. at 329. However, in an assumpsit action based on a breach of warranty, privity was still required. Id. at 330. As a result of the privity requirement, a manufacturer’s liability in a breach of warranty action was limited to his immediate purchaser, who was generally a retailer who sold the product directly to the consumer. Id. at 332. The retailer was therefore normally only liable to the actual purchaser and not to subsequent users of the product. Id. at 332-33. Therefore, Justice Jones 20 recommended abolishing the privity requirement, adopting Section 402A, and thereby allowing product liability actions in tort. Id. at 333. He explained that the adoption of Section 402A would protect the consuming public by forcing manufacturers to “stand behind their products,” and make the “burden of injuries caused by defects in . . . products fall upon those who make and market the products.” Id. at 334. Although the Supreme Court in Webb did not expressly recognize a distinct cause of action for bystanders under Section 402A, Webb can be read as standing for the proposition that, under Pennsylvania law, there is a distinct cause of action for bystanders under Section 402A.14 Webb was a bystander who simply had the misfortune of being in the same room as the keg when it exploded. Of course, it is possible that the Court viewed Webb as a user or consumer since he may well have walked into the room to draw beer from the keg. However, the Court did not rely upon any such status in allowing Webb to amend his complaint to include a cause of action under Section 402A, and nothing in the opinion suggests that the Court was concerned with whether Webb was a user of the keg.15 14 A caveat to Section 402A states, in relevant part, that the American Law Institute “expresses no opinion as to whether the rules stated in this Section may not apply . . . to harm to persons other that users or consumers.” 15 No further history of the case is available. Accordingly, we do not know what (if any) defenses were asserted on remand, nor do we know the ultimate outcome of the case. 21 Eight years after Webb, the Court decided Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974). There, an employee was severely injured when a steam boiler exploded at his place of work. He brought an assumpsit action against his employer, the retailer of the boiler and its manufacturer. Id. at 904. The trial court dismissed the complaint because the employee had not alleged a contractual relationship with the defendants and thus horizontal privity was lacking.16 Id. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed, and the 16 “Privity of contract is that connection or relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties.” Salvador, 319 A.2d at 904 n.1. “Vertical privity refers to the relationship between those who are in the distributive chain of a product.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1200 (6th ed. 1990). “Horizontal privity”. . . “is not, in reality, a state of privity but rather one of nonprivity. The term refers to those who are not in the distributive chain of a product but who, nonetheless, use the product and retain a relationship with the purchaser, such as a member of the purchaser’s family.” Id. at 1199. In Miller v. Preitz, supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the requirement of vertical privity in an action for breach of warranty in an action for injuries suffered through a breach of warranty. However, Miller was overruled by Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1968), which noted that the adoption of Section 402A in Webb v. Zern, supra, obliterated any logical basis for retaining the demand for vertical privity. In Salvador, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the requirement for horizontal privity in breach of warranty actions. 319 A.2d at 907-08. 22 Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the reversal. Id. The Supreme Court noted that its earlier adoption of Section 402A in Webb eliminated the necessity of horizontal privity in breach of warranty cases. The Court explained: Today . . . a manufacturer by virtue of section 402A is effectively the guarantor of his product’s safety. Our courts have determined that a manufacturer by marketing and advertising his product impliedly represents that it is safe for its intended use. We have decided that no current societal interest is served by permitting the manufacturer to place a defective article in the stream of commerce and then to avoid responsibility for damages caused by the defect. He may not preclude an injured plaintiff’s recovery by forcing him to prove negligence in the manufacturing process. Neither may the manufacturer defeat the claim by arguing that the purchaser has no contractual relation to him. Why then should the mere fact that the injured party is not himself the purchaser deny recovery? 23 Id. at 907 (citations omitted). Significantly, although the action was for breach of warranty, the Court focused on the safety of the product rather than the status or the contractual relationship of the parties.17 It reasoned that because Pennsylvania products liability law “has progressed,” the demands of public policy “as well as legal symmetry compel” the conclusion that lack of horizontal privity did not bar the employee’s action against the manufacturer for breach of warranty. Id. at 907-08 (emphasis added). Essentially, the Court held that relief available in breach of warranty claims should be as broad as that available under Section 402A. Salvador involved an employer-employee relationship, and Section 402A treats an employee as a user of a product. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, cmt. l. However, as in Webb, the Court in Salvador neither discussed the employee’s status nor suggested that his status as an employee was determinative.18 Rather, the Court 17 It is not clear why the action was brought in assumpsit rather than tort, as § 402A had been the law in Pennsylvania for eight years. 18 The Superior Court expressly acknowledged the employer-employee context of the dispute. It wrote: “We believe that the injured employee stands in the shoes of his employer and that his cause of action is based on implied warranty and is not barred by the shield of privity. The manufacturers know that most businesses are carried on 24 focused on the safety of the product.19 Nevertheless, these Supreme Court cases do not specifically address a bystander’s ability to sue under Section 402A. Accordingly, “[w]e give ‘due regard’ to the decisions of Pennsylvania’s intermediate appellate courts as ‘indicia of how the state’s highest court would decide [the issue].’” Nowak v. Faberge USA Inc., 32 F.3d 755, 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The Pennsylvania Superior Court allowed a bystander to sue in strict liability in Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 391 A.2d 1074 (Pa. Super. 1978). Pegg was injured when riding in a car driven by a co-worker. Unbeknownst to Pegg, the coworker had placed a chemical used to sanitize swimming pools in the car. Pegg was injured when the chemical spontaneously ignited, id. at 1077, and he sued the manufacturer of the chemical (among others) under theories through employees who will actually use the product purchased by their employers.” Salvador v. I.H. English of Phila., Inc., 307 A.2d 398, 402 (Pa. Super. 1973). 19 The Berriers contend that a third Supreme Court case, Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 319 A.2d 914 (Pa. 1974), allows bystander recovery under Section 402A. There, an employee sued after being injured by objects falling from a crane at the job site. However, the manufacturer/seller there conceded that Kuisis was a “user” of the crane within the meaning of Section 402A. Id. at 919. The case therefore did not involve a “bystander.” 25 of negligence and strict liability. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that he could recover even in the absence of privity. The court based liability on whether the manufacturer “place[d] a defective article in the stream of commerce.” Id. at 1079 (quoting Salvador, 319 A.2d at 970). Liability did not turn on the relationship between Pegg and the manufacturer. However, since the Superior Court’s decision in Pegg, the Supreme Court has issued opinions which appear to limit recovery under Section 402A to intended users. In Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978), an employee’s right hand was injured when it was pinched between two hard rubber rollers in a coating machine owned by her employer. The employee sued the manufacturer asserting only a cause of action for strict liability under Section 402A, and the manufacturer joined the employer as an additional defendant arguing that the employer’s negligence caused the accident in whole or in part. The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the manufacturer and the employee moved for a new trial, asserting, inter alia, that the trial judge incorrectly instructed the jury that her burden of proof under Section 402A required a showing that the machine was “unreasonably dangerous.” Id. at 1022. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the employee won a new trial. The Court held that the trial court’s use of “unreasonably dangerous” in the jury instructions had improperly introduced negligence concepts into the proceeding. Id. at 1025. The erroneous instruction burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an element 26 which rings of negligence. As a result, if, in the view of the trier of fact, the “ordinary consumer” would have expected the defective condition of a product, the seller is not strictly liable, regardless of the expectations of the injured plaintiff . . . . Id. at 1025 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court conceded that limiting liability to defects that are “unreasonably dangerous” “may . . . serve the beneficial purpose of preventing the seller from being treated as the insurer of its products.” Id. (citation omitted). However, the Court thought that objective could better be achieved by requiring proof of “a defect in the manufacture or design of the product, and that such defect was a (legal) cause of the injuries.” Id. (citation omitted) (parentheses in original). The Court observed: The development of a sophisticated and complex industrial society with its proliferation of new products and vast changes in the private enterprise system has inspired a change in legal philosophy from the principle of caveat emptor which prevailed in the early nineteenth century market place to the view that a supplier of products should be deemed to be the guarantor of his products’ safety. The realities of our economic society as it exists today forces the conclusion that the risk of loss for injury resulting from defective products should be borne by the suppliers, 27 principally because they are in a position to absorb the loss by distributing it as a cost of doing business. In an era of giant corporate structures, utilizing the national media to sell their wares, the original concern for an emerging manufacturing industry has given way to the view that it is now the consumer who must be protected.20 Id. at 1023-24 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court explained the evolution of Section 402A and the tension between strict liability and a common law cause of action for negligence. The Court noted that Section 402A initially applied “only to foodstuffs and the requirement was that the food be in a condition dangerous to the consumer.” Id. at 1025 n.10. However, the present text of Section 402A was substituted for “dangerous” because of concerns “about liability for a product like whiskey, . . . because a jury might find that all whiskey is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer.” Id. Accordingly, “[t]he word ‘defective’ was added to ensure that it was understood that something had to be wrong with the product.” Id. Then, quoting from Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 902 (Pa. 1975), the Court declared: “[t]he seller must provide the product with every element necessary to make it safe for the intended use.” 391 A.2d at 1027. The Court concluded that, “[f]or the term guarantor to have any meaning in this context 20 Although the Court referred to “the consumer,” given the context of that statement, it does not appear that the Court intended to limit that term to “users.” 28 the supplier must at least provide a product which is designed to make it safe for the intended use.” Id. at 1027. However, since a jury could confuse that concept if instructed that the product must be “unreasonably dangerous,” the Court agreed that the jury instructions were misleading. Id. The Court also explained that “unreasonably dangerous,” has no independent significance, but is a term of art that “merely represent[s] a label to be used where it is determined that the risk of loss should be placed upon the supplier.” Id. at 1025. Moreover, the determination of whether the risk should be placed upon the supplier was a legal question that must be resolved by a court, not by the fact finder. Id. at 1025-26. Therefore, the appropriate inquiry after Azzarello was whether the supplier had designed the product with every element necessary to make it safe for use. Id. at 1027. Under that standard, “a jury may find a defect where the product left the supplier’s control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended use.” Id. The Court also reaffirmed that the trial court must decide if “the utility of a product outweigh[s] the unavoidable danger it may pose.” Id. at 1026. Thus “[r]estated, the phrases ‘defective condition’ and ‘unreasonably dangerous’ as used in the Restatement formulation are terms of art invoked [by a court] when strict liability is appropriate.” Id. It is therefore clear that, after Azzarello, strict liability under Section 402A involves a two-prong inquiry. As we 29 explained in Nowak: Initially, the question of whether a product is defective, given the facts as alleged by the plaintiff, is a question of law to be answered by the trial judge. If the judge determines as a matter of law that Pennsylvania’s social policy supports placing the risk of loss on the manufacturer in the situation alleged by the plaintiff, then the case goes to the jury for a determination as to whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff are true. 32 F.3d at 757 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although Azzarello assists our inquiry, it does not resolve it because it does not tell us the Court’s view of who the product must be safe for, and that is the primary issue here. The Court addressed that issue in Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000 (Pa. 2003). There, a majority of the Supreme Court held that a product must be made safe only for its intended user. In Phillips, a two-year-old child accidentally started a fire after removing a butane lighter from his mother’s purse and setting fire to some linens. The fire spread throughout the family’s apartment, and resulted in the deaths of the two-year old child, his mother, and another minor. Id. at 1002-03. One child managed to escape through an open window and survived. Id. at 1003. The administratrix of the decedents’ 30 estates, who was also the guardian of the child who survived, sued the manufacturer and distributor of the lighter, alleging, inter alia, strict liability for a defective design under Section 402A, as well as negligent design, because the lighter was not equipped with “childproof features.” Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to the manufacturer on the Section 402A claim because the manufacturer only intended its lighter to be used by adults, and it was perfectly safe for use by adults.21 Id. The Superior Court reversed based on its belief that a product must be safe for anyone who uses it.22 Id. at 1004. The Superior Court concluded that Cricket’s lighter was defective because it was not equipped with a child safety feature that would have prevented a child from starting a fire. In the Superior Court’s view, that defect exposed intended users to grave risk of harm. Id. The Supreme Court granted allocatur and reversed because it agreed with the trial court. 21 The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the negligent-design-defect claim, holding that when a product is found not defective for strict liability purposes, a negligent-design defect must also fail. 841 A.2d at 1003. 22 As to the negligent-design defect claim, the Superior Court held that since it had found the trial court’s decision on the strict liability claim to be error, it had to reverse the entry of summary judgment on the negligent-design defect claim. 841 A.2d at 1004. However, we are not concerned here with such a claim. 31 The majority in Phillips began by observing that Azzarello “did not answer . . . whether the ‘intended use’ doctrine necessarily encompasses the requirement that the product need be made safe only for its ‘intended user.’” Id. at 1005. The majority explained that, although it had never faced that question in a strict liability design defect case, it had faced it in Mackowick v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 575 A.2d 100 (Pa. 1990), a case alleging strict liability for failure to warn. 841 A.2d at 1005. In Mackowick, an electrician had sued to recover injuries caused by arcing electricity in a high voltage capacitor. He alleged that the capacitor was defective because it did not warn of the dangers of exposed electrical wires. The Mackowick Court “rejected that argument . . .[,] reason[ing] that a product need only be made safe for its intended user.” Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1005 (citing Mackowick, 575 A.2d at 102, 103). The “electrical capacitor was intended to be accessed and used only by qualified electricians, and not general members of the public. As experienced electricians are aware of the dangers of live exposed electrical wires, [the Mackowick court] concluded that the product was safe for its intended user even absent a [specific] warning.” Id. at 1005. In applying the holding of Mackowick, the majority in Phillips reasoned: While Mackowick was a failure to warn case, . . . we cannot perceive how it could be confined exclusively to the failure to warn 32 context. Mackowick stands for the proposition that a product is not defective so long as it is safe for its intended user. Whether the product is allegedly defective due to a lack of warnings, or because it was ill-conceived, the standard that the product need be made safe only for the intended user appears to be equally applicable. Id. The administratrix/appellee in Phillips argued that the lighter’s design was defective because it was reasonably foreseeable that a child might play with it, and therefore the manufacturer should be liable under Section 402A whether the user was the intended adult or the foreseeable child. Although the majority conceded that the argument had “some visceral appeal,” it noted that the visceral appeal “has been memorialized in our tort law as a negligence cause of action.” Id. at 1006. By the time Phillips was decided, the Court had drawn a clear distinction between negligence actions based on notions of foreseeability and a cause of action based on a theory of strict liability. The Court had often declared that “negligence concepts have no place in a case based on strict liability.” Id. (quoting Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., DuffNorton Co., Inc., 528 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa. 1987)). Nonetheless, the majority in Phillips conceded that even though the Court had “remained steadfast in . . . proclamations that negligence concepts should not be 33 imported into strict liability law, [it had] muddied the waters at times with the careless use of negligence terms in the strict liability arena.” Id. at 1006-07 (citing Davis v. Berwind Corp., 690 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 1997).23 The Phillips majority sought to clarify the law by clearly stating that a plaintiff bringing a claim for strict liability based on defective design under Section 402A “must [only] establish that the product was unsafe for its intended user.” Id. at 1007 (emphasis added). “We also explicitly state that a manufacturer will not be held strictly liable for failing to design a product that was safe for use by any reasonably foreseeable user, as such a standard would improperly import negligence concepts into strict liability law.” Id. The Court reiterated the distinction between negligence concepts and strict products liability in Pennsylvania Dept. of General Services v. United States Mineral Products Co., 898 A.2d 590 (Pa. 2006) (“Mineral Products”). There, a fire damaged an office building which used building materials containing polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) manufactured by the defendant. The building housed the offices of several agencies of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Following the fire, the Commonwealth made a decision to demolish the building because of the presence of PCBs, and it was replaced with a new building. The Commonwealth thereafter brought an action against several parties, including the manufacturer 23 In Davis, the Court held that a manufacturer could be held strictly liable for subsequent changes that made its product unsafe if those changes were reasonably foreseeable. 34 of the product containing the PCBs, seeking damages for negligence and strict products liability to recover the cost of constructing a new building as well as the loss of personal property contained in the old building. The case went to the jury “solely on a strict liability theory,” and the jury returned a verdict against the manufacturer without specification of the particular theories/and or claims that were accepted. Id. at 594. The trial court’s instruction had “explicitly or implicitly authorized [the jury] to evaluate the evidence to determine whether the fire could be considered to have been a reasonably foreseeable event against which the [manufacturer] should have guarded.” Id. at 600. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the jury instruction was error because Pennsylvania does not recognize a strict products liability cause of action arising from an unintended use even when the unintended use is foreseeable. Id. (citing Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1007). Accordingly, a “foreseeable misuse of a product [i.e., the fire] will not support a strict liability claim.” Id. (citing Phillips, at 1007). The Court acknowledged that it was “reasonably foreseeable that building materials may be subject to consumption in a fire, and therefore, [there was] an argument that safety . . . should be deemed to encompass . . . the event of . . . combustion.” Id., at 601. Notwithstanding the logic of that argument, the Court rejected it because it “contravenes the strong admonition in the lead opinion in Phillips . . . to the effect that foreseeability considerations have no place in the setting.” Id. For our purposes, it is important to note that in 35 rejecting the trial court’s “foreseeability charge,” the Court observed: “given the conclusion of [the three concurring Justices in Phillips] that there are substantial deficiencies in present strict liability doctrine, it should be closely limited pending an overhaul by the Court.” Id. (citing Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1018 (Saylor, J., concurring)). In the portion of Justice Saylor’s concurring opinion in Phillips that is cited in Mineral Products, Justice Saylor discussed the tension between “foreseeability” in negligence and strict products liability under Section 402A. He stated: “I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, that the . . . summation of Pennsylvania law demonstrates a compelling need for consideration of reasoned alternatives, such as are reflected in the position of the Third Restatement.” 841 A.2d at 1018 (upper case in original, italics added). Justice Saylor went on to discuss the application of the Restatement (Third) of Torts at some length. See id. at 1019-22. We believe that Justice Saylor’s concurring opinion in Phillips foreshadows the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s adoption of §§ 1 and 2 of the Third Restatement’s definition of a cause of action for strict products liability. The Restatement (Third) of Torts provides in relevant part as follows: § 1. Liability Of Commercial Seller or Distributor For Harm Caused By Defective Products 36 One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.24 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 1. Section 2 provides, in relevant part: § 2. Categories Of Product Defect A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:
product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product;
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or 24 Under Section 1, “[o]ne engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing” applies to “manufacturers.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 1, cmt. c. 37 other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe;
instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 2. As is readily apparent from this text, the Third Restatement does not limit a strict liability cause of action to the “user or consumer,” and broadly permits any person harmed by a defective product to recover in strict liability. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 1; see also Am. L. Prod. Liab. 3d § 16:56 (2004) (“The drafters thus appear to be sanctioning claims by all foreseeable persons affected by a defective product, an interpretation as broad as that given to the Second Restatement by the courts . . . . The prevailing view as to bystander recovery is that the theory of strict liability in tort may be applied to a mere bystander, as distinguished from a user or consumer.”) (emphasis added). The change in the Restatement (Third) of Torts is 38 consistent with the law in many states, including Wisconsin, California, Mississippi, Arizona, Missouri, Michigan, Iowa, Alabama, Utah, and Vermont.25 These jurisdictions allow 25 See, e.g., Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1970) (Vermont would permit innocent bystanders to recover under § 402A.); Beaver v. Howard Miller Clock Co., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 631, 635 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (“The Michigan Supreme Court has held that a manufacturer of a product owes a legal obligation of due care to a bystander affected by the use of its product.”); Rivers v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 1525, 1531 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (noting Florida Supreme Court recognizes that “doctrine of strict liability applies when harm befalls a foreseeable bystander who comes within the range of danger.”); Lovelace v. Astra Trading Corp., 439 F. Supp. 753, 760 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (noting “the general consensus therefore appears to favor extension of the strict liability doctrine to provide relief to bystanders.”); Caruth v. Mariani, 463 P.2d 83, 85 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (“The doctrine of strict tort liability . . . should be available to bystanders as well as to the user or consumer . . . . All states which have adopted the theory of strict tort liability have extended the theory to the bystander when called upon to do so.”); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal.2d 578, 586 (Cal. 1969) (holding “doctrine [of strict liability] may not be limited on theory that no representation of safety is made to the bystander.”); Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7, 16 (Iowa 1977) (“We now bear out the [8th Circuit] Court of Appeals’ prediction and extend the doctrine of strict liability to the protection of bystanders.”); Howes v. Deere & Co., 201 N.W. 2d 825, 828 (Wis. 1972) (permitting recovery in strict liability 39 bystander liability using the very negligence concepts and foreseeability analysis that the majority opinion in Phillips rejected. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969) (“[i]njury to a bystander is often a perfectly foreseeable risk of the maker’s enterprise . . . . If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the consumer or user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably foreseeable.”). The Third Restatement therefore eliminates much of the confusion that has resulted from attempting to quarantine negligence concepts and insulate them from strict liability claims. As Justice Saylor argues in the heading to Section III of his concurring opinion in Phillips: “The Restatement’s considered approach illuminates the most viable route to providing essential clarification and remediation.” 841 A.2d at 1019. [T]he [Third] Restatement’s conception of defective design is more nuanced, to accommodate the wider range of scenarios that for bystander injured by riding mower. “There is no essential difference between injured user or consumer and the injured bystander.”); Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Mo. 1974) (“We extend any rights flowing from the rule of strict liability in tort . . . to include a bystander.”); Straub v. Fisher & Paykel Health Care, 990 P.2d 384, 390 (Utah 1999) (“Manufacturers and sellers are strictly liable for the usual, foreseeable consequences of the risks presented by the defects in their products.”) 40 may face injured consumers and manufacturers/suppliers. As a general rule, a product is deemed defective in design when the foreseeable risks could have been reduced or avoided by the use of a reasonable alternative design, and when the failure to utilize such a design has caused the product to be not “reasonably safe.” Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b)). Justice Saylor criticized the Phillips majority’s ritualistic approach to products liability as follows: the lead Justices retrench the Court's periodic admonishment to the effect that negligence concepts have no place in a strict liability action. A decided majority of courts and commentators, however, have come to recognize that this proposition cannot be justly sustained in theory in relation to strict products liability cases predicated on defective design; moreover, it is demonstrably incongruent with design-defect strict liability doctrine as it is currently implemented in Pennsylvania trial courts and in federal district courts applying Pennsylvania law. Furthermore, while the parties to the litigation underlying this appeal may not have expressly developed the approach of the products liability segment of the Third 41 Restatement . . ., the Restatement position represents a synthesis of law derived from reasoned, mainstream, modern consensus. Particularly in view of pervasive ambiguities and inconsistencies in prevailing Pennsylvania jurisprudence in this area, I view this appeal as an opportunity to examine the range of readily accessible, corrective measures. In my judgment, the Restatement's considered approach illuminates the most viable route to providing essential clarification and remediation, at least on a prospective basis. Ultimately, I join the majority disposition on the strict liability and negligence claims under present law. 841 A.2d at 1012. Our examination of appellate decisions in Pennsylvania that have discussed products liability convinces us that Justice Saylor was correct in recognizing that “[c]entral conceptions borrowed from negligence theory are embedded in strict products liability doctrine in Pennsylvania.” Id. In fact, Justice Saylor went so far as to criticize the Phillips’ majority’s “adherence to the position that negligence concepts have no place in strict liability” as a “common aphorism in the developmental stages of strict liability doctrine . . . .” Id. at 1014-15. As noted earlier, the majority drew that distinction based upon its view that negligence focused on the conduct of the manufacturer whereas products liability focused on the product. However, 42 Justice Saylor pointed out: “most courts and commentators have come to realize that in design cases the character of the product and the conduct of the manufacturer are largely inseparable.” Id. at 1015.26 Justice Saylor also noted that “the term ‘defective’ gives an illusion of certainty” because it suggests a specific meaning “rather than a term connoting a standard involving the weighing of factors.” Id. at 1018 (citation omitted). We agree that it is difficult (if not impossible) in practice to determine if a product is safe for an intended use by an intended user without any consideration of foreseeability. Id. Accordingly, as Justice Saylor believed, “integration of the ‘reasonably foreseeable use’ alternative into strict products liability doctrine may reflect the greater consensus and better reasoned view, in the landscape of our law as it presently exists . . . .” Id.27 The result achieved from the approach of 26 Indeed, Justice Saylor recognized that it is the manufacturer who designs the product. It is therefore exceedingly difficult to ignore the manufacturer’s conduct and focus only on the design that resulted from it. 27 Despite the admonitions in Phillips and Mineral Products that liability under Section 402A is focused on intended users and intended uses and that negligence and foreseeability concepts have no place under strict products liability law, the decisions of the Pennsylvania Superior Court continue to struggle with the harsh consequences that the “intended user doctrine” can sometimes have. See, e.g., Kiak v. Crown Equipment Corp., A.2d , 2009 WL 377166 (Pa. Super. 43 the Third Restatement is consistent with the modern trend of Feb. 17, 2009) (employee/non-user of forklift injured by coworker operating the forklift permitted to proceed against manufacturer of forklift under Section 402A); Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 958 A.2d 498 (Pa. Super. 2008) (bystanders who witnessed relatives killed and/or injured by defective product allowed to recover under Section 402A for emotional distress even though they suffered no physical injuries). However, in Bogush v. Allen Refractories Co., 932 A.2d 901, 910 (Pa. Super. 2007), the Superior Court refused to grant a new trial to a supplier of asbestos products based on the supplier’s argument that that trial court erred in failing to apply the Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 2, instead of Section 402A, to plaintiff’s strict liability claim. The supplier argued that it was entitled to a new trial because a miscarriage of justice had occurred when the trial court applied Section 402A rather than the reasoning of Justice Saylor’s concurrence in Phillips. Id. The Superior Court refused to adopt the reasoning of the concurrence in Phillips, stating that “[u]nless and until our Supreme Court alters its approach to strict liability, we will continue to adhere to established principles.” Id. The supplier filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which granted the petition on February 27, 2008. Bugosh v. I.U. North America,