Opinion ID: 3053881
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: is at least four years younger than the

Text: person so engaging; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. Thus, the generic offense of “sexual abuse of a minor” requires four elements: (1) a mens rea level of knowingly; (2) a sexual act; (3) with a minor between the ages of 12 and 16; and (4) an age difference of at least four years between the defendant and the minor. [3] Although it is unnecessary to survey current criminal law to ascertain a federal definition because Congress has already supplied it, such a review shows that the congressional definition comports with “the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the words” of the term. United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal 2 Although Congress also defined “sexual abuse” in 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8), this section does not define a crime, but merely addresses the rights of child victims and witnesses. Since 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) defines a category of crime (aggravated felony), it is more plausible that Congress intended the “aggravated felony” of “sexual abuse of a minor” to incorporate the definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” in 18 U.S.C. § 2243, which is a criminal statute outlining the elements of the offense, rather than the definition of “sexual abuse” found in 18 U.S.C. § 3509. ESTRADA-ESPINOZA v. MUKASEY 14765 quotation marks omitted). As it is our duty “to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), a conviction which constitutes “sexual abuse of a minor” must necessarily contain an element of abuse. We have previously construed the word “abuse” as “ ‘physical or nonphysical misuse or maltreatment” or “ ‘use or treat[ment] so as to injure, hurt, or damage.’ ” United States v. LopezSolis, 447 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d 1158, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004)). A survey of relevant statutes makes clear that, under national contemporary standards, although sexual activity with a younger child is certainly abusive, sexual activity with an older adolescent is not necessarily abusive. [4] The Model Penal Code, § 213.3(1)(a), defines statutory rape as “[a] male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, or any person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse or causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse, . . . if: (a) the other person is less than [16] years old and the actor is at least [four] years older than the other person . . . .” Model Penal Code § 213.3(1)(a) (2001) (alteration in original). The majority of states set the age of sexual consent at age 16 and forty-five states permit marriage at age 16 if the parents consent. See United States v. Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1998). California is joined by only about six other states in criminalizing sexual intercourse between a 21-year-old and someone about to turn 18. See “Statutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws and Reporting Requirements,” The Lewin Group, prepared for the Department of Health and Human Services, Dec. 15, 2004, at http:// www.lewin.com/content/publications/3068.pdf; “Statutory Rape Laws by State,” Connecticut Office of Legislative Research, April 14, 2003, at www.cga.ct.gov/ 2003/olrdata/jud/rpt/2003-R-0376.htm. Thirty-five states permit sexual intercourse between a 22-year-old and someone 14766 ESTRADA-ESPINOZA v. MUKASEY who just turned 16, almost two years younger than California would permit. “Statutory Rape Laws by State”; “Statutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws.” In addition, another seven states permit consensual sex between someone who just turned 21 and someone who is close to turning 17, which California would not allow. “Statutory Rape Laws by State”; “Statutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws.” The fact that the vast majority of states do not forbid consensual sexual intercourse with a 17-year-old male or female indicates that such conduct is not necessarily abusive3 under the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of “abuse.” [5] Our interpretations are in accord. Recently, in construing a Tennessee statutory rape statute similar to California’s, we held that “[c]onsensual sexual penetration of an individual between the ages of 17 and 18 by a 22 year old does not necessarily involve physical ‘misuse,’ ‘injur[y],’ or ‘assault’ ” because neither physical force nor resulting physical injury are necessarily implicated and because the Tennessee law covered consensual sexual relationships. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d at 1207 (alteration in original). We also held that psychological abuse was not necessarily a component of sexual penetration of a 17-year-old for two reasons. First, because the government failed to provide any evidence showing such harm and “[i]n the absence of evidence, we refuse to assume the existence of harm.” Id. at 1208 (citing Thomas, 159 F.3d at 299). Second, because “our prior caselaw—as well as common sense—suggest that, while consensual underage sex may be psychologically harmful to a young teen, it may not be harmful to an older one.” Id. We explained that “a teen’s capacity to understand the nature of sexual relations increases 3 California courts charged with interpreting California’s statutory rape laws have recognized that “a minor over the age of 14 who voluntarily engages in sexual intercourse is not necessarily a victim of sexual abuse.” In re Kyle F., 112 Cal. App. 4th 538, 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 50 Cal. App. 4th 842, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). ESTRADA-ESPINOZA v. MUKASEY 14767 gradually as he or she grows older. Thus, an almost 18 year old typically will have a higher level of sophistication about sex . . . than a younger teen or child.” Id. at 1209. We and our sister circuits have been careful on other occasions to distinguish laws governing the sexual behavior of younger teenagers from those governing the behavior of 16and 17-year-olds. See, e.g., United States v. Melton, 344 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing the trend of treating older teenagers differently but distinguishing Alaska law because it applies to those under 18 only when incest or similar familial relationships are involved); Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d at 1101; Thomas, 159 F.3d at 299; United States v. Kirk, 111 F.3d 390, 395 n.8 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Importantly, the circumstances surrounding sexual contact between [a 19-yearold and a 16-year-old] are far different from those surrounding sexual contact between a young child and a much older adult.”). We have extended that line of thought in the context of other generic offenses as well. In Valencia, 439 F.3d 1046, we held that § 261.5(c) is not categorically a “crime of violence” and thus is not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). As Valencia explained, a crime of violence is defined as any offense “ ‘that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.’ ” Id. at 1049 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16). We recognized that other circuits had held that “the non-consent of the victim is the touchstone for determining whether a conviction constitutes a crime of violence under § 16(b)” because “a touching without the victim’s consent presents a substantial risk that force may be used.” Id. at 1050 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[n]one of our sister circuits has considered whether consensual sexual intercourse with a minor between the ages of seventeen and eighteen”—the full range of conduct involved here—“is a crime of violence under § 16(b).” Id. As a result, because “California sets the 14768 ESTRADA-ESPINOZA v. MUKASEY age of majority at eighteen, Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(a), this case requires us to break new ground.” Id. Thus, we acknowledged a significant difference between sexual relations with someone under 16 and sexual relations with someone between the ages of 16 and 18. Moreover, we found that “the assumption that a minor’s legal incapacity implies that the proscribed sexual intercourse is non-consensual . . . may be valid where the minor is a younger child [but] does not hold true where the victim is an older adolescent, who is able to engage in sexual intercourse voluntarily, despite being legally incapable of consent.” Id. at 1051. We then examined a number of California cases clarifying that § 261.5(c) criminalizes completely voluntary conduct by two consenting parties. Id. at 1051-52. After taking all of this into consideration, we held that because § 261.5(c) “includes consensual sexual intercourse between a twenty-oneyear-old and a minor one day shy of eighteen,” and because “a minor of this age is ‘fully capable of freely and voluntarily consenting’ ” there is no substantial risk that physical force will be used in committing the offense. Id. at 1052-53. See also Thomas, 159 F.3d at 299-300 (holding that statutory rape between a 22-year-old male and a 17-year-old female is not a “violent felony”). Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, has found that although “a 13 year old is unlikely to appreciate fully or be able to cope effectively with the disease risks and fertility risks of intercourse and [is likely to have] a high risk pregnancy . . . ,” the government was unable to provide “any studies or reasons that would support a conclusion that sex between a 16 year old girl (perhaps, we said, a day short of 17) and a 22 year old man poses a potential risk of physical injury to the girl.” Thomas, 159 F.3d at 299. See also LopezSolis, 447 F.3d at 1208 (refusing to assume psychological harm where the government failed to provide any evidence of it). The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that “there is evidence that a 16 year old girl is at greater risk of physical injury, in ESTRADA-ESPINOZA v. MUKASEY 14769 the event that she becomes pregnant, than if she were older . . . ,” as well as at greater risk of disease, but concluded that “the risk of sex to 13 year old girls is much greater than the risk to 16 year olds.” Thomas, 159 F.3d at 299, 300. The Seventh Circuit based its reasoning in part on the fact that 45 states permit marriage at age 16 and that “[m]ore than 40 percent of the 16 year old girls in our society have had sexual intercourse.” Id. at 299. The same arguments apply with greater force to the California statutory rape laws, which criminalize sex acts with a male or female of age 17 as well. In other words, while pregnancy and disease pose serious risks of physical injury to people 15 and under, they do not necessarily pose that same risk to the far more sophisticated group of 17-year-old young women and men. [6] In sum, Congress has defined the crime of “sexual abuse of a minor,” and its definition is in accord with the contemporary meaning attached to the crime by a majority of the states.