Opinion ID: 1822567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Public Record Requests

Text: Kearse next argues that he was denied due process because certain public records pertaining to his case were not provided to him, in violation of Chapter 119, Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852. Each of his claims is addressed below. Kearse requested production of pictures and videotape that Fort Pierce police took from the perspective of the apartments of two witnesses on the crime scene. The police produced more than two hundred pictures. At a hearing on Kearse's public records request, however, the police explained they did not have the videotape and that no records showed a videotape ever was placed in the evidence locker. The police suggested the possibility it did not exist due to malfunction. On appeal, Kearse argues that the postconviction court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on his claim regarding the failure to produce the videotape. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the police did not have a videotape and at the hearing on the request, postconviction counsel apparently accepted the explanation given by the police and never again requested the tape or listed it as an outstanding request. Kearse next contends the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his request for the personnel files of a state investigator and two assistant state attorneys. He claims that under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852, he must be given the records because the circuit court did not timely deny the request. Rule 3.852(g)(3) provides that the trial court shall hold a hearing and issue a ruling within 30 days ordering production if the additional public records sought are relevant to the subject matter . . . or appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The rule also provides the trial court with discretion to conduct in-camera inspections and extend the time specifications in the rule. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.852(k). The record shows that after an in-camera inspection, the court denied the request for the personnel files, finding they were not relevant and could not reasonably be calculated to lead to evidence helpful to Kearse's postconviction motions. Accordingly, the court issued a ruling making the requisite finding and had discretion with regard to the date of issuing its order. Kearse has not demonstrated an abuse of that discretion. Finally, Kearse argues that a letter the assistant state attorney sent to Kearse's trial counsel regarding the ineffective assistance claims against him in the postconviction proceedings is not privileged work product. The State responds that under section 119.071, Florida Statutes (2005), the letter is exempt from disclosure as work product prepared in anticipation of litigation. We review the claim under the abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla.2003) (A circuit court's ruling on a public records request filed pursuant to a rule 3.850 motion will be sustained on review absent an abuse of discretion.). At the evidentiary hearing, Kearse's trial counsel stated that the assistant state attorney sent him a letter regarding the issues at the hearing. Kearse's postconviction counsel asked to see the letter. Upon the State's objection, the circuit court sealed the letter and examined it in camera. After hearing argument, the trial court ruled that given the nature of the witnessKearse's trial counselin a postconviction proceeding and that trial counsel was listed as a witness for the State as well as the defense, the letter was work product not subject to disclosure. Section 119.071(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), provides as follows in pertinent part: (d)1. A public record that was prepared by an agency attorney (including an attorney employed or retained by the agency or employed or retained by another public officer or agency to protect or represent the interests of the agency having custody of the record) or prepared at the attorney's express direction, that reflects a mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory of the attorney or the agency, and that was prepared exclusively for civil or criminal litigation or for adversarial administrative proceedings, or that was prepared in anticipation of imminent civil or criminal litigation or imminent adversarial administrative proceedings, is exempt from s. 119.071(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution until the conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings. For purposes of capital collateral litigation as set forth in s. 27.7001, the Attorney General's office is entitled to claim this exemption for those public records prepared for direct appeal as well as for all capital collateral litigation after direct appeal until execution of sentence or imposition of a life sentence. The assistant state attorney's letter containing his mental impressions about the case clearly fits within the exemption of attorney work product prepared with regard to the ongoing postconviction proceedings. See § 119.071(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.220(g)(1) (Disclosure shall not be required of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports, or memoranda to the extent that they contain the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the prosecuting or defense attorney or members of their legal staffs.); State v. Kokal, 562 So.2d 324, 327 (Fla. 1990) (Of course, the state attorney was not required to disclose his current file relating to the motion for postconviction relief because there is ongoing litigation with respect to those documents.). Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kearse's request for the letter.