Opinion ID: 2551468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Limiting Cross-Examination of a Witness

Text: Defendant claims that the trial court erred under Evidence Code section 352 and that the proceedings violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when the court refused to allow him to inquire of Walter Joe Lewis, whose testimony is summarized ante, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d page 725, 1 P.3d page 42, whether he had made threats and committed violent acts. Defendant wanted to ask Lewis on cross-examination whether he had committed murder and assaults in prison. He asserted that if his character was on trial in the penalty phase, so should be the adverse witnesses'; but the trial court disagreed. It ruled that impeaching character evidence in the form of specific instances of Lewis's conduct was unduly prejudicial character evidence, and that we're not going to try Mr. Lewis. Though it did not cite a statute in the record, the trial court may have made its ruling under Evidence Code section 787, which provides that evidence of specific instances of his conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his character is inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of a witness. The trial was completed before we filed People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619, in which we held that the California Constitution forbade applying section 787 in criminal cases. (Harris, at p. 1081, 255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619.) Our holding responded to the People's argument that the statutory limitations on the admission of evidence relevant to a witness's honesty or veracity are no longer applicable in criminal cases, except to the extent that exclusion is ordered pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. (Ibid.) Our holding that section 787 could no longer be applied in criminal cases should be viewed in the context of that argument. (See also People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th 284, 299, fn. 10, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938 [limiting and clarifying Harris ].) Defendant did not raise the claim at trial that Evidence Code section 787 had been abrogated. He thus failed to preserve it for review. ( People v. Von Villas (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 201, 267-268, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 62.) In any event, as implied by the context of Harris, Von Villas correctly held that the California Constitution did not, notwithstanding the limitation of Evidence Code section 787, forbid excluding evidence that fell within that statute's ambit if a trial court properly ruled that the evidence should also be excluded under Evidence Code section 352. ( Von Villas, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 268-269, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 62.) Implicitly, the trial court here ruled that the evidence would mislead[] the jury (Evid.Code, § 352) because it would be confusing to appear to place Lewis on trial with side issues regarding credibility. We review the ruling accordingly. The trial court did not abuse its discretion (Evid.Code, § 352). [T]he latitude section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in individual cases is broad. The statute empowers courts to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th 284, 296, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938.) Impeaching Lewis with inquiries into his own violent conductan inquiry that would not have borne on any question of veracity or honestywould have been collateral. Moreover, the jury already knew that Lewis had committed two murders and that he had been a member of a prison gang. There was no abuse of discretion. As for defendant's constitutional claim, we have repeatedly held that not every restriction on a defendant's desired method of cross-examination is a constitutional violation. Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 946, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) The constitutional claim is without merit.