Opinion ID: 1225431
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Magistrate's Report and Recommendation

Text: The issue was initially reviewed by a magistrate judge, who recommended that the state courts did not unreasonably apply federal law in concluding that there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial. The magistrate judge stated in pertinent part: Here, the trial judge removed the jury and heard the arguments of counsel regarding the effect of defense counsel's implicit argument that this jury should acquit because a previous jury heard the evidence and had been unable to unanimously conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Colvin committed murder. Counsel knew that the trial judge was at least leaning toward declaring a mistrial.. . . Both the prosecutor and defense counsel made suggestions regarding a curative instruction. The trial judge considered and rejected a curative instruction. In her opinion, the bell had been rung. The jurors had heard defense counsel's argument that a previous jury had not convicted, so they also should not. The trial judge told counsel that she did not think there was any way to eliminate the prejudice to the prosecution. The prosecutor had no suggestions. Defense counsel then acknowledged that they understood that the court had ordered that they not refer to the earlier hung jury, but asserted that they did not make that argument to the jury. That assertion simply was not supported by the record. . . . . The trial judge firmly rejected that argument but permitted counsel to continue to recommend a path other than mistrial. The prosecutor stated that the prejudice from defense counsel's argument that the first jury didn't convict so you can't either was not curable. Defense counsel countered that the jury already knew that they were the second jury to hear the case. The trial judge pointed out that the question was not whether there had been an earlier trialwhich the jury knewbut that defense counsel told them that the earlier jury did not reach a verdict. Because defense counsel's argument was based on a fact not known to the jurorsthat the reason for the first mistrial was that the jurors could not reach a verdictthe trial judge declared a mistrial. The magistrate judge remarked that while he might not have reached the same conclusion, it could not be said that the state court's determination of manifest necessity was a misapplication of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Colvin filed objections.