Opinion ID: 6321090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: definition of “actual injury”

Text: [¶17] I believe that the trial court erred when it dismissed Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5, which contained claims based on complaints made to the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar, the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, and the United States Postal Service (USPS), for the reason that Weinstein failed to present prima facie evidence of actual injury.
[¶18] Maine’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2021), enacted by the Maine Legislature in 1995, P.L. 1995, ch. 413, provides that the nonmoving party in a proceeding on a special motion to dismiss brought pursuant to the statute must prove that “the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to the responding party.” The statute does not contain a definition for “actual injury,” nor does the statute in any way indicate that the Legislature intended to change Maine’s common law. See id. [¶19] The common-law definition of “actual injury” in defamation cases has always allowed for the recovery of damages without evidence of 16 out-of-pocket expenses. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., a defamation case, the United States Supreme Court said: We need not define “actual injury,” as trial courts have wide experience in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort actions. Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974). [¶20] We have followed that approach in numerous cases. See Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 19, 784 A.2d 18 (“We have long allowed recovery for mental anguish and loss of enjoyment of life in most tort actions.” (quotation marks omitted)); Rippett v. Bemis, 672 A.2d 82, 88 (Me. 1996) (“[Defamation] damages may include the elements of mental suffering, humiliation, embarrassment, effect on reputation and loss of social standing so far as they have been proved and may reasonably be presumed.”); Saunders v. VanPelt, 497 A.2d 1121, 1126 (Me. 1985). [¶21] The First Circuit Court of Appeals has provided its interpretation of damages recoverable in a defamation action under Maine’s common law: The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of 17 publication. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349, 94 S. Ct. 2997. Maine adheres to these traditional rules of defamation law in certain contexts. Under Maine law, defamatory words relating to “profession, occupation or official station” are libelous per se. See Saunders, 497 A.2d at 1124. “When [defamation] per se is established, a plaintiff need not prove special damages or malice in order to recover a substantial award.” Marston v. Newavom, 629 A.2d 587, 593 (Me. 1993). . . . General damages include “elements of mental suffering, humiliation, embarrassment, effect upon reputation and loss of social standing, so far as they . . . may reasonably be presumed.” Saunders, 497 A.2d at 1126 (citing McMullen v. Corkum, 143 Me. 47, 54 A.2d 753, 756 (Me. 1947)). Galarneau v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 504 F.3d 189, 203 (1st Cir. 2007) (last alternation in original). [¶22] In its section on general damages, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that “[o]ne who is liable for defamatory communication is liable for the proved, actual harm caused to the reputation of the person defamed.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 621 (Am. L. Inst. 1977). The Reporter’s Notes continue, stating that “‘[a]ctual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, and mental anguish and suffering.’” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 621 Reporter’s Notes (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350). 18 [¶23] We were not called upon to interpret the definition of “actual injury” in the anti-SLAPP statute until 2003, in Maietta. The Maietta court did not adopt Maine’s common-law definition of “actual injury” as applied to defamation cases. Instead it changed the term “actual injury” to “actual damages” without any explanation. Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶¶ 9-10, 847 A.2d 1169. The Maietta court also held, without elaborating or pointing to any source of authority, that the definition of “actual injury” did not include the “certain categories of defamation” where damages are presumed. Id. ¶ 9. The Maietta court defined “actual injury” under the statute as actual damages requiring quantifiable damages. Id. ¶ 10. It supported this change to “actual damages” by citing Dairy Farming Leasing Co. v. Hartley, a case involving liquidated damages in a contract action which held that “[w]hen recovery may be had only for actual damage sustained[, however,] the record must contain evidence from which damage in a definite amount may be determined with reasonable certainty.” Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶ 10, 847 A.2d 1169 (second alteration in original) (quoting Dairy Farm Leasing Co., 395 A.2d 1135, 1140 (Me. 1978)). This is not the law of defamation. See Galarneau, 504 F.3d at 203-04. 19 [¶24] In turn, Dairy Farm Leasing cited McDougal v. Hunt, 146 Me. 10, 14, 76 A.2d 857 (1950), a case involving a claim of unjust enrichment. Dairy Farm Leasing Co., 395 A.2d at 1137, 1140-41. The premise for requiring actual damages in McDougal was specific to the law of unjust enrichment, where “[a]ctual or compensatory damages are not to be presumed but must be proved.” 146 Me. at 13, 76 A.2d 857, 860 (emphasis added). This stands in stark contrast to “the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel,” where “the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication.” Galarneau, 504 F.3d at 203 (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted); see Saunders, 497 A.2d at 1124-25. [¶25] The damages in a contract action involving the enforceability of a liquidated damages clause and an unjust enrichment case have no relationship to the definition of “actual injury” in a defamation case. Maietta was the first time we defined “actual injury” under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, and we erroneously relied upon cases that dealt with the term “actual damages” in the context of a liquidated damages case and an unjust enrichment case instead of following our common law to determine what constitutes “actual injury.” The Maietta court did not explain why it did not follow our traditional definition of “actual injury” in defamation cases, nor did it discuss whether the Legislature, 20 in enacting the anti-SLAPP statute, made it clear that it was changing Maine’s common-law definition of “actual injury.” [¶26] The Court here also quotes Schelling v. Lindell, 2008 ME 59, 942 A.2d 1226, acknowledging the change in common law, Court’s Opinion ¶ 12, but does not discuss where in the statute or the legislative history the Legislature intended to change the common law. [¶27] We have unswervingly followed the Maietta approach numerous times in subsequent cases interpreting “actual injury” under our anti-SLAPP statute. In Schelling, relying on the Maietta decision, we rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the common-law doctrine associated with defamation cases, which allows for the presumption of damages, satisfies the anti-SLAPP’s “actual injury” requirement. 2008 ME 59, ¶¶ 18-20, 942 A.2d 1226. The Court said: [T]he statutory requirement that a plaintiff must demonstrate actual injury is not satisfied by the common law rule in libel cases that a plaintiff is not required to demonstrate that she has suffered any specific damages in order to recover on her claim. .... This is not the first occasion on which we have explicitly held that the presumed ‘damages per se’ traditionally associated with libel or slander relating to one’s trade or business do not satisfy the actual injury requirement of the statute. See, e.g., Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶¶ 9, 10, 847 A.2d at 1173 at 1173-74. 21 Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶¶ 18-19, 942 A.2d 1226; see also Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 13, 143 A.3d 788 (citing Schelling to define “actual injury” for the purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Desjardins v. Reynolds, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 14, 162 A.3d 228 (citing to the Schelling and Maietta family of cases to distinguish “actual injury” in anti-SLAPP cases from “actual injury” in “common law causes of action”). [¶28] We have held that the Legislature must be clear when it changes the common law. See Batchelder v. Realty Res. Hosp., LLC., 2007 ME 17, ¶ 23, 914 A.2d 1116 (“[W]e have long embraced the well-established rule of statutory construction that the common law is not to be changed by doubtful implication, be overturned except by clear and unambiguous language, and that a statute in derogation of it will not effect a change thereof beyond that clearly indicated either by express terms or necessary implication.” (quotation marks omitted)); Ziegler v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 658 A.2d 219, 223 (Me. 1995) (“[L]egislative pronouncement[s] embodied in [a statute] alter[] common law only to the extent the Legislature has made that purpose clear.”). [¶29] Requiring a litigant to prove a quantifiable loss to prove actual injury in response to a special motion to dismiss in a defamation case is in derogation of our common law. In 2012, in a concurring opinion in Nader v. 22 Maine Democratic Party (Nader I), Justice Silver warned about the use of this procedural mechanism to substantively change our common law: Because of the way the statute has been misused with respect to its intended purpose, treating it as a substantive abrogation of common law claims has become very problematic; it serves to bar legitimate, valid claims that are brought in good faith, regardless of whether a plaintiff would be able to meet her burden on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. While the Legislature may have the authority to do so, there is no indication that it intended to do so. 2012 ME 57, ¶ 47, 41 A.3d 551 (Silver, J., concurring). [¶30] As a result of changing the common-law definition of “actual injury,” we are violating one of the guiding principles of anti-SLAPP law—to screen out “meritless” cases, a principle we have consistently restated. See Thurlow v. Nelson, 2021 ME 58, ¶ 9, 263 A.3d 494; Hamilton v. Drummond Woodsum, 2020 ME 8, ¶ 17, 223 A.3d 904; Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 2019 ME 26, ¶ 14, 202 A.3d 1189; Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 6, 162 A.3d 228; Bradbury v. City of Eastport, 2013 ME 72, ¶ 9, 72 A.3d 512; Nader I, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 22, 41 A.3d 551; Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶ 6, 942 A.2d 1226; Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶ 6, 847 A.2d 1169; Morse Brothers, Inc., v. Webster, 2001 ME 70, ¶ 15, 772 A.2d 842. Both the highest courts of other states and academic analysts have made similar statements regarding the basic purpose of these statutes. See Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 874-75 (Wash. 2015); Duracraft Corp. 23 v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 940-41 (Mass. 1998); Steven J. André, Anti-SLAPP Confabulation and the Government Speech Doctrine, 44 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 117, 119 (2014); Leah McGowan Kelly, Election SLAPPS: Effective at Suppressing Political Participation and Giving Anti-SLAPP Statutes the Slip, 66 Me. L. Rev. 191, 192 (2013); John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPS, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 395, 399 (1993). [¶31] In several of our anti-SLAPP cases, we have followed the approach utilized by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Gaudette v. Mainely Media, LLC (Gaudette II), 2017 ME 87, ¶ 14 & n.2, 160 A.3d 539; Nader I, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 22 & n.9, 41 A.3d 551; Morse Brothers, Inc., 2001 ME 70, ¶¶ 15, 17, 772 A.2d 842. Like us, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court emphasizes the importance of screening out meritless cases. See, e.g., Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 942-43. Recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dealt with the definition of “actual injury” in the context of a second-stage analysis under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute. In 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC (Harrison I), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant’s action caused “actual injury” under the second step in a special motion analysis because the instigation of criminal charges caused him “embarrassment” and he “feared” for his financial 24 health. 74 N.E.3d 1237, 1249 (Mass. 2017); see also 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Bos., LLC (Harrison II), 134 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Mass. 2019) (citing Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 925 N.E.2d 513, 531-32 (Mass. 2010)) (opining that embarrassment and financial concern regarding criminal complaint constitute “actual injury” for purposes of Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute). [¶32] In Harrison II, the court considered the affidavit of the plaintiff and said the following: For purposes of the second stage, we consider the pleadings, as well as the “supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” In Harrison I, for example, we concluded that the developer met its second-stage burden of demonstrating “actual injury” caused by the abutters’ application for a criminal complaint by means of an affidavit from the developer’s manager stating that he suffered “embarrassment,” “that he had to attend a probable cause hearing, and that he feared for the financial health of the plaintiff if the complaint had spawned criminal charges.” Harrison II, 134 N.E.3d at 100 n.3 (citations omitted). [¶33] Once again, we should follow the approach used by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Instead, by following the approach we adopted in Maietta, we are violating the primary purpose of anti-SLAPP statutes. As in this case, if a plaintiff alleges defamation and loss of reputation because of an allegation of criminal conduct without any allegation of a 25 quantifiable loss, the case would survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and a M.R. Civ. P. 56 motion for summary judgment. However, under the narrow definition of “actual injury” we first adopted in Maietta, such a case would be dismissed upon a special motion brought pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. Maietta and its progeny have created a scenario where a meritorious case would be dismissed upon a special motion brought pursuant to Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute. [¶34] As a result of the Maietta approach, the law presents an illogical policy allowing meritorious cases to be screened out by the anti-SLAPP statute. For example, if Weinstein had claimed the cost of one therapist visit as damages, he would survive this special motion to dismiss and the case would proceed. In his case before a jury, Weinstein would not be limited to the cost of the one therapist visit, but he would be able to claim all damages available under our common law in a defamation case, including loss of reputation, embarrassment, and loss of standing in the community. [¶35] It is time to revisit our holding in Maietta and define “actual injury” under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute consistently with our traditional definition of “actual injury” in our common law. 26
[¶36] I recognize the doctrine of stare decisis and our consistent reliance on Maietta in the eighteen years following the decision; however, there are good reasons to revisit our holding in Maietta. It is true that it is our policy, historically, to “stand by precedent” and not “disturb . . . settled point[s] of law.” Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 997 (Me. 1982). However, we also recognize that precedents “do not become totally immune from change for all time.” Id. at 998. [S]tare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions[,] . . . [and] when it appears that public policy and social needs require departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice. Id. (quotation marks omitted). “[W]e also recognize the dangers of a blind application of [stare decisis] merely to enshrine forever earlier decisions of this court.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Finally, “where the authorities supporting the prior rule have been drastically eroded and the suppositions on which it rested are disapproved in the better considered recent cases and in authoritative scholarly writings, and the prior holding of the prior case is counterproductive to its purposes, the situation is appropriate for legal change by the court’s decision.” Id. at 998-99 (alternations and quotations marks omitted). 27 [¶37] There are many reasons to revisit the holding in Maietta. At the time of the Maietta decision in 2003, we were interpreting a statute enacted in 1995. The statute was silent as to the procedures and the standards to be used in evaluating special motions brought under the statute. We were not alone in struggling to interpret the law. Anti-SLAPP statutes were being enacted all across the country, and there were very few cases interpreting the new procedures and terms contained in these anti-SLAPP statutes. Courts struggled with the constitutional conflicts created by the statutes. See Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 943 (describing the problem as a “conundrum [that] has troubled judges and bedeviled the statute’s application”). [¶38] We have a tortured history as a court in dealing with many aspects of this statute. We struggled with the burden of proof in special motions brought under the statute. Initially we held that the defendant/moving party was to be given the benefit of all favorable inferences, Morse Brothers, Inc., 2001 ME 70, ¶ 18, 772 A.2d 842, a rule that we characterized as a “converse summary-judgment-like standard,”9 Nader I, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 32, 41 A.3d 551. 9 In Nader v. Maine Democratic Party (Nader I), 2012 ME 57, ¶ 29, 41 A.3d 551 we used the term “converse-summary-judgment[-]like standard,” to describe the burden of proof for special motions brought under the anti-SLAPP statute. See John G. Osborn & Jeffrey A. Thaler, Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Law: Special Protection Against Improper Lawsuits Targeting Free Speech and Petitioning, 23 Me. Bar J. 32, 37 (2008). 28 In Nader I, to avoid an unconstitutional application of the statute, we overruled Morse Brothers, Inc., and changed the standard to the usual motion-to-dismiss practice giving the plaintiff/nonmoving party all favorable inferences. Id. ¶ 36. [¶39] Six years later, in Gaudette v. Davis (Gaudette I), we described the problem of reconciling the plaintiff’s constitutional right to access the courts with the defendant’s right to petition the government as a “tension between at least these two coexistent constitutional rights.” 2017 ME 86, ¶ 6, 160 A.3d 1190. We abandoned the approach we adopted in Nader I by holding that the plaintiff’s presentation of prima facie evidence as to the elements necessary to defeat a special motion to dismiss was not sufficient to defeat a special motion, and we added a third step whereby the trial court would review affidavits or conduct an evidentiary hearing and then adjudicate disputed facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. ¶¶ 16-18. Then, four years later in Thurlow, we admitted that we had gone too far in Gaudette I because we infringed upon another constitutional right—the plaintiff’s right to have a jury decide disputed issues of fact. Thurlow, 2021 ME 58, ¶¶ 16-19, 263 A.3d 494. We held that this third step violated the plaintiff’s right to have a jury decide disputed facts.10 Id. The right to a jury trial was not raised as an issue in Gaudette v. Davis (Gaudette I), 2017 ME 86, 10 160 A.3d 1190. 29 ¶¶ 18-20. We reinstated the process that we had adopted in Nader I, holding that the plaintiff/nonmoving party’s presentation of prima facie evidence was sufficient to defeat a special motion to dismiss. Id. ¶ 19. [¶40] The Washington Supreme Court, in holding that the Washington anti-SLAPP statute was unconstitutional, stated, “We hold [Washington’s anti-SLAPP statute] violates the right of trial by jury under article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution because it requires a trial judge to invade the jury’s province of resolving disputed facts and dismiss—and punish— nonfrivolous claims without a trial.” Davis, 351 P.3d at 875 (Wash. 2015) (emphasis added). [¶41] Members of this Court have also raised constitutional concerns