Opinion ID: 1791641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Invalid Aggravating Factor

Text: With regard to Herring's first claim, we find that our Rogers decision does not mandate relief under the circumstances of this case. There were four aggravating factors found applicable to this murder: (1) prior conviction of another armed robbery; (2) that the murder was committed while engaged in the commission of a robbery; (3) that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest; and (4) the aggravating circumstance in issue, that this murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. As noted by this Court in Eutzy v. State, 541 So.2d 1143, 1147 (Fla. 1989), our decision in Rogers, restricting the applicability of the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor, was not a fundamental change in the law that should be given retroactive effect but was a mere evolutionary refinement in the law, which should not be utilized to abridge the finality of our judgments. Although we have held in Eutzy that Rogers is not retroactive, we have chosen to address this issue on the merits because we expressly receded from our approval of the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor in Herring I in our Rogers decision. While the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor no longer applies to the circumstances in Herring, we find that this is not a change that requires a new sentencing hearing in this case. None of the facts and circumstances that were before the jury regarding how Herring committed the murder are changed. If the aggravating circumstance of a conviction of a prior crime of violence had been eliminated, that would have changed the facts and circumstances before the jury. The evidence before the jury established that Herring shot the clerk once in the head and again after the clerk fell to the floor and that the second shot was to prevent the clerk from being a witness against him. Herring I at 1057. Given the other aggravating and mitigating factors that went into the weighing process in the sentencing phase of this case, we find that the result of the weighing process would not have been different had this aggravating circumstance not been articulated as a factor in the sentencing. We find that the elimination of this factor, under the circumstances of this case, does not compromise the weighing process of either the judge or jury. See Hill v. State, 515 So.2d 176 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993, 108 S.Ct. 1302, 99 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988).