Opinion ID: 160066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: lack of informant’s consent to government

Text: INTERCEPTION OF PETITIONER’S ADMISSIONS TO HIM Petitioner admitted to an acquaintance, Tim Allen, that petitioner had killed the victim. Allen was cooperating with police. Police had given Allen a sports car to use, equipped with a tape recorder, and “wired” him with a concealed radio transmitter. Allen then took petitioner for a ride in the car. During their conversation, petitioner made numerous inculpatory statements, which police intercepted and recorded. -3- 3 Clearly established Supreme Court precedent provides that law enforcement’s eavesdropping or electronically monitoring conversations, with the consent of one of the conversants, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Caceres , 440 U.S. 741, 744, 750 (1979); see also United States v. White , 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (plurality). Petitioner argues, however, that Allen did not voluntarily consent to the interception of this conversation. Allen failed to appear at trial in August 1991, although he had been served with a subpoena the preceding week. The trial court, in Allen’s absence, found that he had consented to the interception of this conversation, in light of the fact that he had permitted officers to “wire” him with a radio transmitter and had given him the sports car to use. The state court’s determination that Allen voluntarily consented is a finding of fact, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973), to which this court must defer, absent petitioner’s assertion of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner challenges the trial court’s finding of consent with a signed statement from Allen, dated August 1998, in which Allen asserts that police coerced his cooperation by threatening Allen and his family. Petitioner asserted this evidence for the first time in these § 2254 proceedings and sought an evidentiary hearing on the issue of consent. -4- 4 The district court properly determined that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), it could not conduct an evidentiary hearing. In relevant part, § 2254(e)(2) provides that, where a petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis of his federal habeas claim in state court, the federal habeas court “shall not” conduct an evidentiary hearing unless the petitioner shows that the factual predicate could not have been discovered previously, through the exercise of due diligence, and “the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” Petitioner will not be deemed to have “fail[ed] to develop the factual basis” of this claim “unless there is lack of diligence or some greater fault, attributable to” him. Williams , 120 S. Ct. at 1488. “Diligence . . . depends upon whether the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court . . . .” Id. at 1490. Petitioner alleges only that his investigator did not start looking for Allen until appointed counsel began preparing for the federal habeas proceeding, seven years after his trial, and that only through skill and luck did the investigator find Allen after a four-month search. These allegations are insufficient to show petitioner’s due diligence in seeking to develop the factual basis of this claim in -5- 5 state court. See Smallwood v. Gibson , 191 F.3d 1257, 1266 (10th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 9, 2000) (No. 99-9445). Petitioner argues that his efforts to develop this claim in state court were diligent, albeit unsuccessful, because the State withheld evidence of its coercion of Allen. See Williams , 120 S. Ct. at 1488 (petitioner is not at fault when his diligent efforts are thwarted by another’s conduct); see also id. at 1489. This conclusory allegation, however, is insufficient to explain petitioner’s failure to look for Allen at the time of trial or for almost seven years following trial. Petitioner argued at trial and on direct appeal that Allen had not consented to the interception of his conversation with petitioner. Petitioner, thus, was aware of the disputed consent issue throughout his state court proceedings. See id. at 1490 (diligence is based on available information). He fails to assert, however, any efforts he undertook during those state proceedings to develop the factual basis of that claim. See id. at 1491-92. Because petitioner failed to develop the factual basis of this § 2254 claim, he must establish both that any efforts to discover the facts would have been in vain and that he has a “convincing claim of innocence.” Williams , 120 S. Ct. at 1490 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) and (B)); see also id. at 1491. This he has not done. The district court, therefore, properly denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on the issue of consent. -6- 6