Opinion ID: 626721
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Specificity Requirement

Text: As in all statutory construction cases, we begin with the language of the statute, Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). Under § 512(c)(1)(A), safe harbor protection is available only if the service provider: (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing; (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.... 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A). As previously noted, the District Court held that the statutory phrases actual knowledge that the material ... is infringing and facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent refer to knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements. Viacom, 718 F.Supp.2d at 523. For the reasons that follow, we substantially affirm that holding. Although the parties marshal a battery of other arguments on appeal, it is the text of the statute that compels our conclusion. In particular, we are persuaded that the basic operation of § 512(c) requires knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity. Under § 512(c)(1)(A), knowledge or awareness alone does not disqualify the service provider; rather, the provider that gains knowledge or awareness of infringing activity retains safe-harbor protection if it acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). Thus, the nature of the removal obligation itself contemplates knowledge or awareness of specific infringing material, because expeditious removal is possible only if the service provider knows with particularity which items to remove. Indeed, to require expeditious removal in the absence of specific knowledge or awareness would be to mandate an amorphous obligation to take commercially reasonable steps in response to a generalized awareness of infringement. Viacom Br. 33. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of the statute, which requires expeditious[] action to remove or disable  the material  at issue. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). On appeal, the plaintiffs dispute this conclusion by drawing our attention to § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), the so-called red flag knowledge provision. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (limiting liability where, in the absence of such actual knowledge, [the service provider] is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent). In their view, the use of the phrase facts or circumstances demonstrates that Congress did not intend to limit the red flag provision to a particular type of knowledge. The plaintiffs contend that requiring awareness of specific infringements in order to establish aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), renders the red flag provision superfluous, because that provision would be satisfied only when the actual knowledge provision is also satisfied. For that reason, the plaintiffs urge the Court to hold that the red flag provision requires less specificity than the actual knowledge provision. Pls.' Supp. Br. 1. This argument misconstrues the relationship between actual knowledge and red flag knowledge. It is true that we are required to `disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous.' Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992)). But contrary to the plaintiffs' assertions, construing § 512(c)(1)(A) to require actual knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement does not render the red flag provision superfluous. The phrase actual knowledge, which appears in § 512(c)(1)(A)(i), is frequently used to denote subjective belief. See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 635 F.3d 590, 602 (2d Cir.2011) ([T]he belief held by the defendant need not be reasonable in order for it to defeat ... actual knowledge.). By contrast, courts often invoke the language of facts or circumstances, which appears in § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), in discussing an objective reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir.2004) (Police officers' application of force is excessive ... if it is objectively unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is thus not between specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objective standard. In other words, the actual knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or subjectively knew of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement objectively obvious to a reasonable person. The red flag provision, because it incorporates an objective standard, is not swallowed up by the actual knowledge provision under our construction of the § 512(c) safe harbor. Both provisions do independent work, and both apply only to specific instances of infringement. The limited body of case law interpreting the knowledge provisions of the § 512(c) safe harbor comports with our view of the specificity requirement. Most recently, a panel of the Ninth Circuit addressed the scope of § 512(c) in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir.2011), a copyright infringement case against Veoh Networks, a video-hosting service similar to YouTube. [8] As in this case, various music publishers brought suit against the service provider, claiming direct and secondary copyright infringement based on the presence of unauthorized content on the website, and the website operator sought refuge in the § 512(c) safe harbor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's determination on summary judgment that the website operator was entitled to safe harbor protection. With respect to the actual knowledge provision, the panel declined to adopt[] a broad conception of the knowledge requirement, id. at 1038, holding instead that the safe harbor [r]equir[es] specific knowledge of particular infringing activity, id. at 1037. The Court of Appeals reach[ed] the same conclusion with respect to the red flag provision, noting that [w]e do not place the burden of determining whether [materials] are actually illegal on a service provider. Id. at 1038 (alterations in original) (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir.2007)). Although Shelter Capital contains the most explicit discussion of the § 512(c) knowledge provisions, other cases are generally in accord. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F.Supp.2d 627, 635, 2011 WL 5104616, at  (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011) (Undoubtedly, MP3tunes is aware that some level of infringement occurs. But, there is no genuine dispute that MP3tunes did not have specific `red flag' knowledge with respect to any particular link....); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1108 (C.D.Cal.2009) ( UMG II ) ([I]f investigation of `facts and circumstances' is required to identify material as infringing, then those facts and circumstances are not `red flags.'). While we decline to adopt the reasoning of those decisions in toto, we note that no court has embraced the contrary propositionurged by the plaintiffsthat the red flag provision requires less specificity than the actual knowledge provision. Based on the text of § 512(c)(1)(A), as well as the limited case law on point, we affirm the District Court's holding that actual knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances that indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement will disqualify a service provider from the safe harbor.