Opinion ID: 2519626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scope of the Talent Agencies Act: Application to Managers

Text: Marathon contends that personal managers are categorically exempt from regulation under the Act. We disagree; as we shall explain, the text of the Act and persuasive interpretations of it by the Courts of Appeal and the Labor Commissioner demonstrate otherwise. We begin with the language of the Act. ( Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 927, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 530, 102 P.3d 915.) Section 1700.5 provides in relevant part: No person shall engage in or carry on the occupation of a talent agency without first procuring a license therefor from the Labor Commissioner. (Italics added.) In turn, person is expressly defined to include any individual, company, society, firm, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability company, manager, or their agents or employees (§ 1700, italics added), and `[t]alent agency' means a person or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists other than recording contracts (§ 1700.4, subd. (a)). The Act establishes its scope through a functional, not a titular, definition. It regulates conduct, not labels; it is the act of procuring (or soliciting), not the title of one's business, that qualifies one as a talent agency and subjects one to the Act's licensure and related requirements. (§ 1700.4, subd. (a).) Any person who procures employmentany individual, any corporation, any manageris a talent agency subject to regulation. (§§ 1700, 1700.4, subd. (a).) Consequently, as the Courts of Appeal have unanimously held, a personal manager who solicits or procures employment for his artist-client is subject to and must abide by the Act. ( Park v. Deftones, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1470-1471, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 616; Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 253, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 437; see also Buchwald v. Superior Court, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d at pp. 354-355, 62 Cal.Rptr. 364 [deciding same issue under the Act's predecessor, the Artists' Managers Act].) [4] The Labor Commissioner, whose interpretations of the Act we may look to for guidance (see Styne v. Stevens, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 53, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 14, 26 P.3d 343; Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7-8, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031), has similarly uniformly applied the Act to personal managers. (See, e.g., Sheridan v. Yoches, Inc. (Cal.Lab.Com., Sept. 4, 2007) TAC No. 21-06, pp. 2, 13-20; Jones v. La Roda Group (Cal.Lab.Com., Dec. 30, 2005) TAC No. 35-04, pp. 9-11; Hall v. X Management, Inc. (Cal. Lab. Com., Apr. 24, 1992) TAC No. 19-90, pp. 28-35.) [5] As to the further question whether even a single act of procurement suffices to bring a manager under the Act, we note that the Act references the occupation of procuring employment and serving as a talent agency. (§§ 1700.4, subd. (a), 1700.5.) Considering this in isolation, one might interpret the statute as applying only to those who regularly, and not merely occasionally, procure employment. (See Wachs v. Curry (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 616, 628, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 496 [Act applies only when the agent's employment procurement function constitutes a significant part of the agent's business as a whole].) However, as we have previously acknowledged in dicta, [t]he weight of authority is that even the incidental or occasional provision of such services requires licensure. ( Styne v. Stevens, supra. 26 Cal.4th at p. 51, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 14, 26 P.3d 343, citing Park v. Deftones, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1465, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 616, and Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th 246, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 437.) [6] In agreement with these decisions, the Labor Commissioner has uniformly interpreted the Act as extending to incidental procurement. (See, e.g., Gittelman v. Karolat (Cal.Lab.Com., July 19, 2004) TAC No. 24-02, p. 14; Kilcher v. Vainshtein (Cal.Lab. Com., May 30, 2001) TAC No. 02-99, pp. 20-21; Damon v. Emler (Cal.Lab.Com., Jan. 12, 1982) TAC No. 36-79, p. 4.) The Labor Commissioner's views are entitled to substantial weight if not clearly erroneous ( Styne v. Stevens , at p. 53', 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 14, 26 P.3d 343); accordingly, we likewise conclude the Act extends to individual incidents of procurement. Marathon offers two main arguments against the conclusion that it is subject to the Act whenever it solicits or procures employment. First, it objects that the Act's title and contents reference only talent agencies and thus only talent agencies may be regulated under the Act. (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 9; Brunson v. City of Santa Monica (1915) 27 Cal.App. 89, 92-93, 148 P. 950 [act whose title limits its scope to public officer liability may not constitutionally be interpreted to alter public municipal corporation liability].) Article IV, section 9 sets out this state's single-subject rule and, as relevant here, requires: A statute shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. If a statute embraces a subject not in its title, only the part not expressed is void. From this, Marathon reasons that (1) the Act's title omits reference to regulation of personal managers, and (2) to the extent it purports to regulate personal managers, it is thus void. This is a misreading of the constitutional provision and the 1978 legislation. The single-subject rule is intended to prevent log-rolling by the Legislature, i.e., combining several proposals in a single bill so that legislators, by combining their votes, obtain a majority for a measure which would not have been approved if divided into separate bills. ( Harbor v. Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1096, 240 Cal.Rptr. 569, 742 P.2d 1290.) In turn, the requirement that the single subject of a bill shall be expressed in its title is to prevent misleading or inaccurate titles so that legislators and the public are afforded reasonable notice of the contents of a statute. (Ibid.; see also Homan v. Gomez (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 597, 600, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 647 [rule intended to prevent unrelated provisions from sliding through unnoticed and unchallenged]; Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1187, 1196, 219 Cal.Rptr. 664 [rule intended to `prevent legislators and the public from being entrapped by misleading titles to bills whereby legislation relating to one subject might be obtained under the title of another'].) However, the single-subject rule is to be liberally construed to uphold proper legislation and not used to invalidate legitimate legislation. (San Joaquin Helicopters v. Department of Forestry (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1549, 1556, 3 Cal. Rptr.3d 246; accord, Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1097-1098, 240 Cal.Rptr. 569, 742 P.2d 1290; Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt (1963) 59 Cal.2d 159, 172-173, 28 Cal.Rptr. 724, 379 P.2d 28; Evans v. Superior Court (1932) 215 Cal. 58, 62, 8 P.2d 467.) The Legislature may combine in a single act numerous provisions `governing projects so related and interdependent as to constitute a single scheme,' and provisions auxiliary to the scheme's execution may be adopted as part of that single package. (Harbor, at p. 1097, 240 Cal.Rptr. 569, 742 P.2d 1290, quoting Evans, at p. 62, 8 P.2d 467.) The act's title need not contain either an index or an abstract of its provisions. The constitutional mandate [citation] is satisfied if the provisions themselves are cognate and germane to the subject matter designated by the title, and if the title intelligently refers the reader to the subject to which the act applies, and suggests the field of legislation which the text includes. ( Powers Farms, Inc. v. Consolidated Irr. Dist. (1941) 19 Cal.2d 123, 130, 119 P.2d 717; see also City of Whittier v. Dixon (1944) 24 Cal.2d 664, 666, 151 P.2d 5 [to satisfy the Constitution, title need only contain[ ] a reasonably intelligible reference to the subject to which the legislation is addressed]; Lyons v. Municipal Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 829, 841, 142 Cal. Rptr. 449.) Here, the 1978 legislation and its title satisfy the California Constitution. The legislation's provisions pertain to a single subject, the comprehensive regulation of persons and entities that provide talent agency services. The title, quoted in full in the margin, identifies that subject and specifically references the existing comprehensive regulations that are to be modified. [7] The legislation defines talent agencies the see that engage in particular conduct; thus, to the extent personal managers engage in that conduct, they fit within the legislation's title and subject matter and may be regulated by its provisions. Second, Marathon correctly notes that in 1978, after much deliberation, the Legislature decided not to add separate licensing and regulation of personal managers to the legislation. (See Assem. Bill No. 2535 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 10, 1978, pp. 16-18 [deleting new licensure provisions].) The consequence of this conscious omission is not, as Marathon contends, that personal managers are therefore exempt from regulation. Rather, they remain exempt from regulation insofar as they do those things that personal managers do, but they are regulated under the Act to the extent they stray into doing the things that make one a talent agency under the Act. [8]