Opinion ID: 373006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Statutory Law

Text: 27 In their second amended complaint, appellees asserted a cause of action under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub.L.No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975), Codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976) (hereinafter the Act). The trial court did not reach the question of defendants' possible liability under this statute. The parties have nevertheless supplied this court with detailed briefing on the statute. We are persuaded that the Act provides the mentally retarded with a right to treatment. 28 The Act was passed in 1975 as an amendment to the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act. It established particular rights and benefits for the developmentally disabled, a class of persons which included the mentally retarded. 42 U.S.C. § 6001(7)(A)(i). Among those was a right to the least restrictive environment, about which we will have more to say in Section VI A below. In addition, however, the Act expressly provided that the developmentally disabled have a right to treatment or habilitation. In the so-called Bill of Rights section, 42 U.S.C. § 6010, Congress made plain its intention to establish a right to treatment. 15 Congress found that (p) ersons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1). Moreover, both (t)he Federal Government and the States . . . have an obligation to assure that public funds are not provided to any institutional or other residential program for persons with developmental disabilities that (A) does not provide treatment, services, and habilitation which is appropriate to the needs of such persons . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 6010(3)(A). It is hard to see how Congress could have been any more precise in revealing its intention to confer a right to treatment or habilitation. 29 Another section of the Act reaffirms the right to treatment. Section 6063 provides that any state which wishes to take advantage of the subchapter must submit a plan to the Secretary of HEW. That plan must contain a program designed, Inter alia, to improve the quality of care and the state of surroundings of persons for whom institutional care is appropriate. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 6063(b)(20)(B). While this section was deleted in the 1978 revision of the Act, it did apply until that date and retains legal significance for purposes of this litigation. Moreover, the revised statute contains a section requiring states to conform their plans to the dictates of the Bill of Rights provision, section 6010. See 42 U.S.C. § 6063(b)(5)(C) (Supp.1979). 30 The legislative history of Pub.L.No. 94-103 also supports the recognition of a statutory right to treatment for the mentally retarded. Congressman Carter, in introducing H.R. 4005 (later enacted as Pub.L.No. 94-103) in the House, stated that among its many purposes (t)his legislation . . . directs that States should devote attention to improving the facilities and surroundings of institutions where people have been appropriately institutionalized. 121 Cong.Rec. 9976 (1975). The bill was introduced in the Senate as S. 462. 121 Cong. Rec. 16,470. Senator Stafford, discussing the purpose of Title II the Bill of Rights stated Title II was added to the bill to assist in the protection of the rights guaranteed under our Constitution for those individuals that will require institutionalization. . . . Id. at 16,516. Senator Javits added that Congress should reaffirm its belief in equal rights for all citizens including the developmentally disabled. Congress should provide the leadership to change the tragic warehousing of human beings that has been the product of insensitive Federal support of facilities providing inhumane care and treatment of the mentally retarded. Id. at 16,519. Senator Cranston observed that while the bill endorsed deinstitutionalization, it recognize(d) that the need for some long-term residential programs will remain. The bill specifically provides that where institutional programs are appropriate, adequate support should be planned for them so that necessary treatment and habilitation programs can be given residential patients to develop their full potential. Id. at 16,520. Senator Schweiker described one of the requirements of the proposed legislative Bill of Rights as (h) umane care, treatment, rehabilitation, and protection in residential facilities. . . . Id. at 16,522. 31 The bill went to conference, in part because the Senate bill contained an expanded version of Title II specifying in great detail the standards for appropriate care with which the House did not concur. The Conference Committee compromised on details, and produced the more general, yet equally forceful Bill of Rights provisions, now codified in section 6010. A right to treatment was, as we noted above, specifically proclaimed. Thus, the Conference Report for the bill states that the developmentally disabled have a right to appropriate treatment, services and habilitation . . . . H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1975), Reprinted in (1975) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News, 943, 961. In addition, Senators Javits, Schweiker and Williams, in approving the Conference Report, all called attention to the critical role of the right to treatment. 121 Cong.Rec. 29,820-21. We therefore hold that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act grants to the mentally retarded a right to treatment and habilitation. 32 We further hold that retarded persons have a private right of action under the Act. To date, only one other court has considered whether private litigants may enforce the rights granted under the Act. In Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F.Supp. 610 (D.R.I.1978), Judge Pettine concluded that there was a private right of action. Plaintiffs in Naughton were a mentally retarded, schizophrenic patient and his father. They brought suit for injunctive relief and damages, alleging that the child had sustained injuries as a result of drugs administered to him in a Rhode Island institution. Among their several causes of action, plaintiffs asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081. 33 The court, reviewing the statute, concluded that it intended to convey a private right of action. Judge Pettine offered several arguments supporting his view of Congressional intent. First, he noted, section 6010, the Bill of Rights provision, has two sections: the first declares the right to appropriate treatment; the second provides that federal funds are available only to programs that meet certain basic minimum standards and offer 'appropriate' treatment. 458 F.Supp. at 616. This dichotomy in sec. 6010, the court reasoned, suggests that denial of funds is not the only mechanism to enforce the declared statutory rights. Id. In addition, the court noted that the Conference Report expressly states that  'this right the Conference Report expressly states that  'this right (to receive appropriate treatment) should be protected and assured by the Congress and the courts.'  Id. (quoting (1975) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 961). Furthermore, participating states are required under the Act to establish an independent agency 'to protect and advocate the rights of persons with developmental disabilities, and . . . to pursue Legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies to insure the protection of the rights of such persons who are receiving treatment, services or habilitation within the State . . . .'  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6012(a)). As the court observed, (t)he enforcement of individual rights . . . cannot be achieved solely by withholding federal funds; not only is the Secretary incapable of investigating every violation, but the Secretary may quite properly be unwilling to withhold funds for a single violation. Thus, the advocacy agency and a private right of action are crucial to protect the rights secured by the Act. Id. Finding that the developmentally disabled were the especial benefi(ciaries) of the Act, that private suits would effectuate the policies of the statute, and that they would not infringe traditional state prerogatives, the Naughton court concluded that there was a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081. 34 We find the Naughton Court's analysis persuasive. A private right of action eminently satisfies the standards articulated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). 16 As developmentally disabled persons, the mentally retarded undoubtedly qualify as especial benefi(ciaries) of the section 6010 grant of a right to treatment. In addition, the Conference Report recognized the desirability of enforcement of the Act, in part, by the courts. Moreover, a private right of action would surely further the purposes of the Act. By permitting private suits, courts would facilitate improvements in the delivery of services to the disabled without forcing the federal government to resort to the drastic remedy of a cut-off of funds. 35 It may be argued, however, that while the first three Cort v. Ash Criteria are satisfied, the implication of a private right of action would infringe basic state prerogatives, and transgress the bounds of federal law making competence, inasmuch as mental health policies have always been within the states' traditional police power authority. We are unpersuaded by that argument. While providing for the health and well-being of the citizenry is surely a legitimate state function, Congress' recognition of a right to treatment in section 6010 is not a simple displacement of that admittedly basic state concern. 36 In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977), the Supreme Court said that among the liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment is a right to be free from and to obtain judicial relief, for unjustified intrusions on personal security. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment vests Congress with authority to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. In Section 6010, Congress has legislated with respect to the state intrusions on personal security of the developmentally disabled. 17 Thus, in providing specific guarantees for a particular affected group, Congress' action is consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition of the broad underlying right protected against impairment by the state through the fourteenth amendment. Section 6010 does not go beyond what has been judicially declared to be the limits of the fourteenth amendment but clearly is within those bounds. 18 Since the rights described in section 6010 are specified pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, implication of a private cause of action from that statute rests upon the same constitutional footing. Thus we are not dealing with the implication of a private cause of action from a congressional enactment justified only by the spending power of the federal government, and we need not address the question whether such a statute could ever provide the predicate for private substantive rights. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in another context, Congress may, under section 5, establish certain restrictions that might otherwise implicate the prerogatives of the states. 19 37 We also note that any suggestion that private enforcement of the Act usurps basic state concerns is vitiated by the structure of the Act itself. For example, section 6063(b)(20)(B), which until 1978 required states to produce a plan providing for improved quality of care, was applicable to all those states desiring to take advantage of this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 6063(a). Congress thus invoked its spending clause powers to condition the grant of federal monies on the provision by the states of adequate care. Pennsylvania has accepted federal funds provided pursuant to the Act. 20 Whatever argument it might otherwise have had were it faced with an unexpected set of federal obligations is refuted by its obvious willingness to accept the benefits of the Act. 21 38 Finally, we have recently decided that a private right of action exists for the enforcement of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) another statute designed to improve the lives of handicapped persons. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. The Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1979). 22 We did not feel, in that case, that the traditional police power duties of the states foreclosed a private right of action. In view of these considerations, then, we hold that appellees have standing to sue to enforce the Bill of Rights provisions of the Act. 39 One court, we note, has held that claims under the Act must be brought in state court. United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d at 1125. The Solomon court acknowledged that the Conference Report on the Act stated that the right to treatment should be protected and assured by the Congress and the courts. 563 F.2d at 1124. It held, however, that this language manifestly refers to a state judicial forum and not to a federal judicial forum where the United States customarily sues. Id. at 1125. 40 With deference to the Fourth Circuit, we see nothing manifest in the Conference Report supporting that court's interpretation. If anything, the legislative history reflects a Congressional belief that States were not spending funds for the disabled effectively. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act sought to change the traditional spending habits of the states. It is most unlikely that Congress intended those changes to be enforceable only in state courts. 23 We would find it quite anomalous in the absence of a clear congressional expression to hold that a federal statute created a cause of action arising under federal law, but enforceable only in the state courts and not under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). 41 Accordingly, we hold that appellees have a federal statutory right to habilitation, that they may sue to enforce that right, and that such suit is properly lodged in federal court.