Opinion ID: 772953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Divisibility of Harm

Text: 18 One aspect of CERCLA that has long vexed courts is the role of causation in the statutory scheme. Id. at 935 (describing the causation element as a problematic portion of the CERCLA calculus). This is because, [a]lthough the simplistic slogan 'make the polluter pay' may have helped propel CERCLA into law, the statutory scheme does not take a simplistic view of who is and who is not a 'polluter.' Westfarm Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 66 F.3d 669, 681 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Indeed, at least at the liability stage, the language of the statute does not require the government to prove as part of its prima facie case that the defendant caused any harm to the environment. Control Data, 53 F.3d at 935. Rather, once the requisite connection between the defendant and a hazardous waste site has been established (because the defendant fits into one of the four categories of responsible parties), it is enough that response costs resulted from a release or threatened release-not necessarily the defendant's release or threatened release. 8 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(4). Thus, the government need not trace or fingerprint a defendant's wastes in order to recover under CERCLA. United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 169-70 (4th Cir. 1988). Considerations of causation explicitly enter into the statutory liability scheme only as part of the three statutory defenses not at issue in this case. Id. at 170; 42 U.S.C. 9607(b). 19 Many courts, however, have recognized the defense of divisibility of harm, a special exception to the absence of causation requirement that in effect brings causation principles back into the case - through the backdoor, after being denied entry at the front door. United States v. Alcan Alum. Corp. (Alcan II), 990 F.2d 711, 722 (2d Cir. 1993); see United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 317-19 (6th Cir. 1998); Bell, 3 F.3d at 894-902; Alcan I, 964 F.2d at 268-69; O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1989); Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-73. Although we have not been squarely presented with the question whether a divisibility defense should be allowed under CERCLA, we have expressed our approval of the doctrine on several occasions. Control Data, 53 F.3d at 934 n.4 (Once liability is proved, all of the defendants are jointly and severally liable, unless a particular defendant can establish that his harm is divisible, a very difficult proposition.); Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 992 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1993) (remanding for liability findings and suggesting that the district court might find divisible harms); cf. United States v. Dico, Inc., 136 F.3d 572, 578-79 (8th Cir. 1998) (remanding for trial on liability because district court failed to distinguish between two geographically separate areas within single hazardous waste site). 20 The parties in this case do not dispute the general validity of the divisibility doctrine, and we find it to be both compatible with the text and the overall statutory scheme of CERCLA 9 and a sensible way to avoid imposing on parties excessive liability for harm that is not fairly attributable to them. See Alcan I, 964 F.2d at 269. We thus proceed to a more detailed discussion of the doctrine. 21 The universal starting point for divisibility of harm analyses in CERCLA cases is the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides for the apportionment of damages among two or more parties when at least one is able to show either (1) distinct harms or (2) a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts 433A (1965); see Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318; Bell, 3 F.3d at 895; Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810. We will follow the Restatement, however, only to the extent that it is compatible with the provisions of CERCLA. See O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 179 n.4 (describing the Restatement as one source for us to consult). Thus, for example, although the Restatement contemplates that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving causation, in a CERCLA case, once the government has established the four essential elements of liability the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there exists a reasonable basis for divisibility. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318; O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 182. Divisibility generally limits the scope of, but does not entirely eliminate, CERCLA liability since the doctrine is essentially a defense only to joint and several liability. Control Data, 53 F.3d at 934 n.4; Bell, 3 F.3d at 895. 22 We have previously observed that proving divisibility is a very difficult proposition, Control Data, 53 F.3d at 934 n.4, and the Restatement recognizes that some harms, by their nature, are normally incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical division. Restatement (Second) of Torts 433A cmt. to subsection (2) (1965), quoted in Bell, 3 F.3d at 896. Where this is the case, the Restatement cautions against making an arbitrary apportionment for its own sake. Id.; see also United States v. Colorado & Eastern R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that the courts have been reluctant to apportion costs and that responsible parties rarely escape joint and several liability); O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 183 (defendants hoping to escape joint and several liability must satisfy the stringent burden placed on them by Congress). When a defendant is successful in demonstrating a reasonable basis for apportionment, approaches to divisibility will vary tremendously depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. Evidence of divisibility will focus on determining the amount of harm caused by the defendant. Bell, 3 F.3d at 903. Our description below of some of the most common approaches is by no means intended to be exhaustive, for we know that we cannot define for all time what is a reasonable basis for divisibility and what is not. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 319. 23 Distinct harms are those that may properly be regarded as separate injuries. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 433A (1965); Bell, 3 F.3d at 895. Defendants may be able to demonstrate that harms are distinct based on geographical considerations, such as where a site consists of non-contiguous areas of soil contamination, Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 881 F. Supp. 1202, 1210 (N.D. Ind. 1994), clarified on reconsid., 909 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Ind. 1995), or separate and distinct subterranean plumes of groundwater contamination, United States v. Broderick Investment Co., 862 F. Supp. 272, 277 (D. Colo. 1994). 24 Other cases, by contrast, involve a single harm that is nonetheless divisible because it is possible to discern the degree to which different parties contributed to the damage. Id. The basis for division in such situations is that it is clear that each [defendant] has caused a separate amount of harm, limited in time, and that neither has any responsibility for the harm caused by the other, such as where two defendants, independently operating the same plant, pollute a stream over successive periods of time. Bell, 3 F.3d at 895. Single harms may also be treated as divisible in terms of degree, based, for example, on the relative quantities of waste discharged into the stream. Id. at 895-96. Divisibility of this type may be provable even where wastes have become cross-contaminated and commingled, for commingling is not synonymous with indivisible harm. Alcan II, 990 F.2d at 722; see also Bell, 3 F.3d at 903. 25 Evidence supporting divisibility must be concrete and specific. See United States v. Alcan Alum. Corp., 892 F. Supp. 648, 657 (M.D. Penn. 1995) (Alcan III) (rejecting divisibility argument on remand because defendant took all or nothing approach, presenting no new evidence beyond what court of appeals had already considered), aff'd, 96 F.3d 1434 (3d Cir. 1996) (table). The preliminary issue of whether the harm to the environment is capable of apportionment among two or more causes is a question of law. Bell, 3 F.3d at 902. Then, [o]nce it has been determined that the harm is capable of being apportioned among the various causes of it, the actual apportionment of damages is a question of fact. Id. at 896. 26 We also observe that the divisibility doctrine is conceptually distinct from contribution or allocation of damages. See Redwing, 94 F.3d at 1513. At the allocation phase, the only question is the extent to which a defendant's liability may be offset by the liability of another; the inquiry at this stage is an equitable one and courts generally take into account the so-called Gore factors. See 42 U.S.C. 9613(f) (providing that a court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate); Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318; Control Data, 53 F.3d at 935. The divisibility of harm inquiry, by contrast, is guided not by equity-specifically, not by the Gore factors-but by principles of causation alone. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280-81 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, where causation is unclear, divisibility is not an opportunity for courts to split the difference in an attempt to achieve equity. 10 Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d at 319. Rather, [i]f they are in doubt, district courts should not settle on a compromise amount that they think best approximates the relative responsibility of the parties. Id. In such circumstances, courts lacking a reasonable basis for dividing causation should avoid apportionment altogether by imposing joint and several liability. Id.