Opinion ID: 46958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Booker sentencing error

Text: Because Pineda and Vazquez-Casares objected to the drug amount in the district court, we review their sentence de novo and reverse the district court only if any error was harmful. See United States v. Paz, 405 F.3d 946, 948 (11th Cir. 8 2005). “A non-constitutional [Booker] error is harmless if, viewing the proceedings in their entirety, a court determines that the error did not affect the [sentence], or had but very slight effect. If one can say with fair assurance . . . that the [sentence] was not substantially swayed by the error, the [sentence] is due to be affirmed even though there was error.” United States v. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore “[t]he non-constitutional harmless error standard is not easy for the government to meet.” Id. It is uncontested here that the sentencing court committed statutory error by finding that the sentencing guidelines were mandatory. We cannot say that this error was harmless based solely on the district judges’ sentencing defendants at the midpoint of the guidelines range and stating that the sentences were “sufficient to provide just punishment for the offense.” See United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, __(11th Cir. 2005) (finding that Booker statutory error was not harmless where the district judge sentenced defendants in the middle of the guidelines range under a mandatory guidelines system because “the sentence alone tells us nothing about whether the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence under an advisory guidelines scheme.”). We have required more than a sentence in the middle of the guidelines range to find Booker statutory error to be harmless. See, 9 e.g., Mathenia, 409 F.3d at 1292 (finding Booker statutory error to be harmless where the district judge stated that “I would nonetheless consider the guidelines as—for their persuasive value or as advisory, and the sentence I would impose would be the same.”). Accordingly, we vacate both Pineda and Vazquez-Casares’ sentences on this ground. Vazquez-Casares also claims constitutional Booker error. His claim of constitutional Booker error must be disregarded only if harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard that is only met where it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the [sentence] obtained.” See Paz, 405 F.3d at 948 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the government bears the burden of showing that the sentence did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. Vazquez-Casares first claims that there was constitutional Booker error based on the drug quantity attributed to him. However, Vazquez-Casares stipulated during trial that there were “1,789 grams of methamphetamine,” which was the exact amount attributed to him in the PSI and at sentencing. Accordingly, there was no constitutional Booker error based on the drug quantity attributed to Vazquez-Casares at sentencing. See Booker, 543 U.S. at __ (“Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the 10 maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (emphasis added). Next, Vazquez-Casares claims that there was constitutional Booker error based on the role enhancement that he received. The government did not address this issue, much less show that Vazquez-Casares’s sentence did not affect his substantial rights. Accordingly, as the district court applied a two-level enhancement based on its finding regarding Vazquez-Casares’s supervisory role, it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to Vazquez-Casares’s sentence. Therefore, because Vazquez-Casares’s sentence was erroneously based, in part, on an extra-verdict sentence enhancement imposed under a mandatory guidelines system, and the government did not show that this constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we vacate Vazquez-Casares’s sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. See Paz, 405 F.3d at 948-49. CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED, SENTENCES VACATED AND REMANDED. 11