Opinion ID: 1953032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: bankston

Text: In Bankston, a social host served alcohol to a minor, who, while intoxicated, drove away and collided with a vehicle driven by the plaintiffs. 507 So.2d at 1386. The plaintiffs sued the social host, alleging a violation of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1983). Section 768.125 states: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person, except that a person who willfully and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is not of lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action and the Fourth District affirmed. On review, this Court recognized that prior to the statute's effective date, a third-party plaintiff could bring a common law negligence action against a vendor for selling alcohol to a minor. 507 So.2d at 1386. Finding that Florida courts, by recognizing a common law action, had broadened a vendor's liability for injuries to minors or third parties which resulted in the illegal sales [of alcohol] to minors, we concluded that prior to the statute's effective date, such a cause of action did exist. [3] 507 So.2d at 1386. We explained, however, that in response to this judicial recognition of a vendor's civil liability, the legislature had enacted section 768.125, and that such enactment represented a limitation on the already existing liability of vendors. Id. at 1386. [4] We also noted that although vendor liability had previously been recognized by the courts, the liability of a social host had not been previously recognized. Id. at 1387. Finally, given the legislature's statutory abrogation of a vendor's liability for common law negligence, and its intent to permit liability only for willfully and unlawfully providing alcohol, we felt precluded by legislative policy expressed in the statute from expanding liability through judicial approval of a previously unrecognized cause of action against a social host. Id. Simply put, we chose not to expand liability in a field in which the legislature had so expressly chosen to restrict liability. In this case, the Fourth District refused to recognize Kitchen's cause of action for common law negligence because it found that, similar to the effect of section 768.125 in Bankston, the Florida legislature had abrogated any form of common law liability when it enacted the criminal statutes consisting of section 790.17 and section 790.151, Florida Statutes (1991). [5] Kitchen, 662 So.2d at 978-79. However, the criminal statutes at issue in the present case are entirely different from the civil liability statute involved in Bankston. In Bankston, this Court determined that the legislature had entered into the field of regulating the civil liability for distribution of alcohol with the enactment of a civil statute expressly limiting the civil liability of alcohol vendors. Id. at 1386. Conversely, as noted above, the Florida statutes upon which the Fourth District relied are purely criminal statutes imposing criminal sanctions. The language contained in sections 790.17 and 790.151, unlike the language in section 768.125, does not limit a commercial gun retailer's civil liability. The legislature simply has not entered into the field of regulating the civil liability of vendors for the sale of firearms with the crimes and penalties set forth in sections 790.17 and 790.151. If anything, we conclude that the statutes in question here, which constitute an extension of criminal liability in the general area of firearm transactions, are indicative of broad public policy concerns about the dangers of firearms. Indeed, the legislature has even chosen to impose criminal liability on parents and guardians who negligently allow children access to deadly firearms. § 790.174, Fla. Stat. (1995). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C (1965) (Compliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions). Thus, we conclude that the decisions in Horne and Bankston are not controlling as to the issue before us in this case.