Opinion ID: 517661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the legality of the search of harper's residence

Text: 165 During trial Harper sought to suppress admission of evidence obtained in the search of his residence on the basis that government agents failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3109, which states in its entirety: 166 The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant. 167 In an affidavit attached to the motion, Mrs. Harper alleged that: 168 On November 30, 1984, at approximately 8 p.m., I was at home, in bed with my husband, Isaac Harper. The first notice that I was given of the federal officer's intention to search my home was their sledgehammer hitting the door of my home. Up to and until that time, the federal officers did not identify themselves, give notice of their authority or of their purpose. Upon the request of my husband, the federal officers identified themselves and requested admittance for the first time. At that time, my husband and I complied with their request, and allowed the federal officers to search our home. 169 (Paragraph omitted). 170 The district court judge refused to rely upon the untimeliness of the suppression motion and instead reached the merits. In ruling the judge stated: 171 I'm willing to accept, at least for the purpose of this ruling, the affidavit of Mrs. Harper. In reading that affidavit and also reading the statute, I think under the facts of this case that [the officers] didn't break open the outer door and they did not break open an inner door. 172 In paragraph 5 of her affidavit she states 'Upon the request of my husband, the federal officers identified themselves and requested admittance for the first time. At that time my husband and I complied with their request and allowed the federal officers to search the home.' So they didn't break down the door. 173 MR. HUPY (Harper's attorney): They were in the process. 174 THE COURT: This doesn't say that. I am not saying that they wouldn't have broken it down, but they didn't break it down. And they were admitted into the house. Consent was given. Under the facts submitted to the court. So therefore the search was legal. 175 Although the district court did not need to even rule upon this motion because of its untimeliness, 29 the court's decision on the merits was proper. We have recently held that: 176 A district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence will be affirmed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. We will rely on the district court's findings of fact absent a showing of clear error. This standard applies to the district court's findings on the credibility of witnesses, findings that will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. 'A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). 'Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.' Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). 177 United States v. D'Antoni, 856 F.2d 975, 978-79 (7th Cir.1988) (citations omitted). 178 We agree with the district court's factual finding that the doors were not broken down and conclude that this finding was not clearly erroneous. Mrs. Harper's own affidavit states that the doors were not broken down and the officers were admitted to the premises by Mr. and Mrs. Harper. Thus, even if based solely upon Mrs. Harper's affidavit, the district court's finding is certainly a permissible view of the evidence. This is all that must be shown for us to conclude that the trial judge's disposition was free from clear error. Accordingly, even if based solely upon Harper's evidence, the district court's finding that the facts did not support a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3109 was not clearly erroneous. Thus, the search was proper and the motion to suppress was properly rejected. 179 The jury verdicts in this case are based on sufficient evidence and the trial court judge did not commit reversible error. Therefore, the jury's verdicts against Grier and Harper are 180 AFFIRMED.