Opinion ID: 1985278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue 3 Reference to Post-arrest Silence

Text: Following Mr. Hawley's identification of defendant, Hardy and Powell in the photographic array, Hawley gave Detective Haverstock a list of names of men who he suspected of being the fourth robber. One of those men, Rick Sinor, was already incarcerated, thus Haverstock proceeded to question him. Sinor admitted his involvement and gave a full statement implicating defendant, Hardy and Powell. Haverstock subsequently contacted Hardy and had Hardy accompany him to the police station. Hardy agreed to talk, then admitted his participation and corroborated Sinor's statement. That same day, Powell was arrested and Haverstock interrogated him. The following exchange occurred during Haverstock's direct examination: Prosecutor: Well, did John Powell confess to you that he committed any crime? Haverstock: No, he did not. Prosecutor: Did you have any, did you make any contact this time with the Defendant, Clarence Henson? Haverstock: I can't recall the exact date, but yes, I did. Prosecutor: Okay. Would you describe how that went? Defense Counsel: I object to this as being a violation of Miranda, Your Honor. Prosecutor: I don't think we've even gotten far enough to give an objection to anything. The Court: I will overrule. You may continue. Haverstock: Yes, I did. Prosecutor: And, where was that contact made? Haverstock: At the Monroe County Jail. Prosecutor: And, did you interrogate him at the Monroe County Jail? Haverstock: I was not given the opportunity. Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I'll . . Well, I have no objection. We'll just let it roll. Prosecutor: Did the Defendant refuse to be interrogated? Haverstock: Yes, he did. At this point, defense counsel objected and, out of the presence of the jury, moved for a mistrial based on the impropriety of admitting evidence of the defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment right to remain silent in response to custodial interrogation. The trial court denied the motion and refused to admonish the jury to disregard the question and answer. Defendant relies on Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, in which the Supreme Court held that the use of evidence of defendant's silence following arrest and Miranda warnings, either for substantive or impeachment purposes, violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Doyle, the convictions of two defendants were reversed based on portions of the prosecutor's cross-examination wherein he repeatedly asked the defendants about their failure to tell their exculpatory stories at the time of their arrest. Noting that post- Miranda silence is insolubly ambiguous, the Supreme Court held that it would be fundamentally unfair to allow the post- Miranda silence to impeach the defendants' exculpatory explanation at trial because the Miranda warning carries with it an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty. Id. at 617-18, 96 S.Ct. at 2244-45, 49 L.Ed.2d 97-98. The facts in this case fall between those in Doyle and those in Greer v. Miller (1987), 483 U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618, which rejected the application of Doyle. In Greer, the trial court sustained an objection to the only question that touched on defendant's post-arrest silence; no further questioning or argument occurred; the jury was admonished; and the prosecutor was not allowed to undertake impeachment on, or permitted to call attention to, defendant's silence. Although the Doyle holding was directed to the prosecutorial use of a defendant's post- Miranda silence to attack his exculpatory story, it is obviously relevant on the question of whether error of constitutional dimension occurred here despite the fact that defendant declined to testify or present any exculpatory evidence in his own behalf. [1] The disputed question and answer here were improper and unwarranted. Although we disapprove of the prosecutorial tactic here, the question we must decide is whether it had the effect of producing a trial which was fundamentally unfair so as to deny defendant due process. We hold that the disputed question and answer did not have that effect. An error of this type is harmless only when the court, after assessing the record as a whole to determine the probable impact of the improper evidence on the jury, can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the jury's verdict. Williams v. Zahradnick (1980), 4th Cir., 632 F.2d 353. See Chapman v. United States (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. In Bieghler v. State (1985), Ind., 481 N.E.2d 78, cert. denied, (1986), 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S.Ct. 1241, 89 L.Ed.2d 349, this Court looked to the following five factors [2] to assist the analysis in determining whether a Doyle violation constitutes harmless error: 1) the use to which the prosecution puts the post-arrest silence; 2) who elected to pursue the line of questioning; 3) the quantum of other evidence indicative of guilt; 4) the intensity and frequency of the reference; and 5) the availability to the trial judge of an opportunity to grant a motion for mistrial or to give curative instructions. It appears from the record that at least one of the prosecutor's purposes may have been to suggest that if defendant was innocent, he would not have refused interrogation. It is also apparent that the trial judge had opportunity to admonish the jury, yet declined to do so. We note, however, that the disputed question and answer were very brief in the context of the entire trial and, as indicated earlier, did not reflect on an exculpatory story. The record does not reveal a prosecutorial focus by repetitive questions or references to the defendant's silence as in Doyle. The prosecutor did not undertake impeachment on, nor did he call attention to, defendant's silence so as to undermine the fairness of the trial. In addition, we note again the overwhelming quantum of evidence supporting the guilty verdict in this case. Under the circumstances, we are persuaded that the disputed question and answer did not have an intolerable prejudicial impact. We conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Judgment affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.