Opinion ID: 1337448
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Appellee's Cross Assignments of Error

Text: Appellee makes numerous cross-assignments of error, which we shall address in turn. First appellee argued that the trial court should also have awarded a new trial because of comments made by plaintiff's counsel during closing argument in which he started to ask the jury to send a message to Dr. Sakhai. Appellee argues that this utterance violated one of the trial court's in limine rulings. At the pretrial conference the judge ruled that the plaintiff had a choice between dropping any claim for punitive damages or agreeing to a continuance. The plaintiff opted to abandon the punitive damages claim, and the trial court stated on several occasions to counsel that punitive damages were not at issue. The court also refused to grant the plaintiff/appellants's proffered jury instruction on punitive damages. During the very end of closing argument, plaintiff's counsel started to say, [d]o something to send a message . . ., but was interrupted by defense counsel's objection. When allowed to continue, plaintiff's counsel again attempted to finish the same sentence, but was again interrupted by a second defense objection, which the judge sustained. We do not know what appellants's counsel would have said in toto, but appellee argues that the use of the phrase send a message improperly injected the issue of punitive damages into the case. We recently considered when an alleged violation of a motion in limine might be cause for reversal: A deliberate and intentional violation of a trial court's ruling on a motion in limine, and thereby the intentional introduction of prejudicial evidence into a trial, is a ground for reversing a jury's verdict. However, in order for a violation of a trial court's evidentiary ruling to serve as the basis for a new trial, the ruling must be specific in its prohibitions, and the violation must be clear. Syl. pt. 5, Honaker v. Mahon, 210 W.Va. 53, 552 S.E.2d 788 (2001). We went on in that case to say: In deciding whether to set aside a jury's verdict due to a party's violation of a trial court's ruling on a motion in limine, a court should consider whether the evidence excluded by the court's order was deliberately introduced or solicited by the party, or whether the violation of the court's order was inadvertent. The violation of the court's ruling must have been reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did cause, the rendition of an improper judgment. Id., syl. pt. 6, in part. We do not believe that counsel's remarks were reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did cause, the jury to enter an improper judgment in this case. Next appellee argues that the jury's verdict was excessive and clearly based upon passion, prejudice or sympathy. We have long held that: Courts must not set aside jury verdicts as excessive unless they are monstrous, enormous, at first blush beyond all measure, unreasonable, outrageous, and manifestly show jury passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption. Syl. pt. 1, Addair v. Majestic Petroleum Co., 160 W.Va. 105, 232 S.E.2d 821 (1977); Syl. pt. 5, Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hosp., Inc., 176 W.Va. 492, 345 S.E.2d 791 (1986); Syl pt, 3, Adkins v. Foster, 187 W.Va. 730, 421 S.E.2d 271 (1992). In this case, the appellant offered evidence that Mr. Foster had to undergo a second operation on his brain, and that he suffered numerous and serious limitations on his ability to read, see, walk, or generally enjoy his life and his family. We have noted: There is and there can be no fixed basis, table, standard, or mathematical rule which will serve as an accurate index and guide to the establishment of damage awards for personal injuries. And it is equally plain that there is no measure by which the amount of pain and suffering endured by a particular human can be calculated. No market place exists at which such malaise is bought and sold. A person can sell quantities of his blood, but there is no mart where the price of a voluntary subjection of oneself to pain and suffering is or can be fixed. Crum v. Ward, 146 W.Va. 421, 429, 122 S.E.2d 18, 23-24 (1961) (quoting Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713, 60 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1958)). It is not ours to calculate the price of Mr. Foster's malaise, and we cannot say that the jury's verdict in this case was monstrous, unreasonable, or outrageous. Addair, supra . Appellee also maintains that the trial court erred by permitting appellant's counsel to argue that Dr. Sakhai engaged in a coverup. At the close of all the evidence, the court heard argument from counsel for each side on this issue, and after reflection and consideration, actually granted Dr. Sakhai's motion in limine to prohibit plaintiff's counsel from arguing to the jury that Dr. Sakhai covered up the alleged mistake. Defense counsel pressed the court to offer a cautionary instruction, but the court specifically chose not to give one, stating I think for me to instruct the jury as to that issue would be to tilt the table, and I'm not going to do that. Trial Transcript Vol. IV at 74. Before the parties presented their evidence, plaintiff's counsel did claim that he would show evidence of a cover up. We note that witnesses did disagree as to the information provided by Dr. Sakhai, and the specific communications he had with Mr. Foster regarding the first operation. We do not believe it was error for the trial judge to initially deny Dr. Sakhai's motion in limine on this issue. Also Dr. Sakhai argues that the court should not have permitted plaintiff's expert to testify that Dr. Sakhai was negligent in the manner in which he operated on Mr. Foster, particularly regarding the way he localized or attempted to find Mr. Foster's brain tumor. Specifically, appellee claims that the plaintiff's expert had never performed the particular technique at issue. It is clear that the qualification of an expert witness is in the judge's discretion: ``Whether a witness is qualified to state an opinion is a matter which rests within the discretion of the trial court and its ruling on that point will not ordinarily be disturbed unless it clearly appears that its discretion has been abused. Point 5, syllabus, Overton v. Fields, 145 W.Va. 797 [117 S.E.2d 598 (1960) ].' Syllabus Point 4, Hall v. Nello Teer Co., 157 W.Va. 582, 203 S.E.2d 145 (1974). Syllabus Point 12, Board of Education v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, 182 W.Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796 (1990).' Syl. pt. 3, Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39, 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993). Syl. pt. 5, Mayhorn v. Logan Medical Foundation, 193 W.Va. 42, 454 S.E.2d 87 (1994). Dr. Sakhai argues that Mrs. Foster's expert has not operated on a patient for several years and that he never performed the specific procedure at issue. [8] We do agree with the appellee that: [T]o qualify a witness as an expert on that standard of care, the party offering the witness must establish that the witness has more than a casual familiarity with the standard of care and treatment commonly practiced by physicians engaged in the defendant's specialty. Gilman v. Choi, 185 W.Va. 177, 181, 406 S.E.2d 200, 204 (1990). However, we also note that a medical expert, otherwise qualified, is not barred from testifying merely because he or she is not engaged in practice as a specialist in the field about which his or her testimony is offered[.] Id. (emphasis in original). Dr. Smith, who was the plaintiff's expert, was also a board certified neurological surgeon. We do not feel it was error to allow him to give an opinion concerning the way in which Dr. Sakhai performed the procedure in question. Finally, appellee argues that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence, and that a new trial should have been awarded based upon the cumulative effect of errors below. First we note that: In determining whether the verdict of a jury is supported by the evidence, every reasonable and legitimate inference, fairly arising from the evidence in favor of the party for whom the verdict was returned, must be considered, and those facts, which the jury might properly find under the evidence, must be assumed as true. Syl. pt. 3, Walker v. Monongahela Power Co., 147 W.Va. 825, 131 S.E.2d 736 (1963). We have also explained that: In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict the court should: (1) consider the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party; (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved by the jury in favor of the prevailing party; (3) assume as proved all facts which the prevailing party's evidence tends to prove; and (4) give to the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences which reasonably may be drawn from the facts proved. Syl. pt. 5, Orr v. Crowder, 173 W.Va. 335, 315 S.E.2d 593 (1983); accord, Pote v. Jarrell, 186 W.Va. 369, 412 S.E.2d 770 (1991) (per curiam) ; Pinnacle Mining v. Duncan Aircraft Sales, 182 W.Va. 307, 387 S.E.2d 542 (1989); Finley v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 208 W.Va. 276, 540 S.E.2d 144 (1999) (per curiam ). Finally, upon review, we must examine this case in a light favorable to Mrs. Foster: When examining the record for the sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. We are not concerned with how we might decide the facts in the jury's stead, nor does our review favor the inferences and conflicts in the evidence helpful to the losing party. Dodrill v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 201 W.Va. 1, 11, 491 S.E.2d 1, 11 (1996). Bearing this authority in mind, we cannot conclude that the jury's verdict was, in any regard, against the clear weight of the evidence. Lastly, with respect to appellee's argument that a new trial should be awarded based upon the cumulative effect of errors below: Although we recognize that the cumulative error doctrine may be used by a circuit court in situations where there are numerous harmless errors, as we have frequently noted, the doctrine should be used sparingly. Furthermore, if the errors . . . are insignificant and inconsequential, the case should not be reversed under this rule. I Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence § 1-7(B)(5) at 49. Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found., Inc., 194 W.Va. 97, 118, 459 S.E.2d 374, 395 (1995). Even if we were to take a generous view of the various items alleged as error by appellee, we do not find that there has been error sufficient to merit the award of a new trial.