Opinion ID: 701770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pierce's Issues

Text: 26 Pierce argues that the district court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. We review de novo a trial court's refusal to grant a motion to acquit. United States v. Gibson, 896 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir.1990). The standard is whether the government had introduced evidence sufficient for any rational trier of fact to convict, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the government. Id. (citing United States v. Gibson, 675 F.2d 825, 829 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972, 103 S.Ct. 305, 74 L.Ed.2d 285 (1982)). As discussed supra, the jury had sufficient evidence to return a guilty verdict. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding the government met this standard.
27 Pierce argues that the district court improperly admitted out-of-court statements made by Tackett. In particular, Pierce claims the district court should not have admitted Tackett's statements that (1) Tackett stole a car in order to do a favor for Pierce, (2) he had to burn a church for Pierce and (3) he burned the Church as a favor to Pierce. 28 The district court admitted the statements as non-hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that [a] statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 29 In order to admit a statement of a co-conspirator the government must establish (1) that a conspiracy existed, (2) that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy and (3) that the co-conspirator's statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1341 (6th Cir.1994) (internal citations omitted). The district court must make these determinations under a preponderance of the evidence standard. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2778, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). These are factual determinations which we review for clear error. United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 1261 (6th Cir.1992) (en banc). 30 Pierce argues that Tackett's out-of-court statements were improperly admitted, because the government failed to provide sufficient corroborating evidence independent of the statements to link Pierce to the conspiracy. Pierce correctly asserts that the district court cannot determine whether he was a member of the conspiracy based only upon Tackett's statements. 31 Prior to the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), 3 proof of a conspiracy required evidence independent of the hearsay statement itself ('the independent evidence rule'). Clark, 18 F.3d at 1341. In Bourjaily, the Supreme Court determined that the adoption of Rule 104(a) changed the independent evidence rule. The Supreme Court held that a district court can consider any evidence whatsoever, bound only by the rules of privilege, to make factual determinations under Rule 104. Id. at 178, 107 S.Ct. at 2780. Therefore, a district court can consider out-of-court statements made by anyone, including putative coconspirators, when determining whether a conspiracy existed. Id. While hearsay statements alone may be unreliable to prove a conspiracy, they can become quite probative when corroborated by other evidence. Id. at 180, 107 S.Ct. at 2781. 32 Even if out-of-court declarations by co-conspirators are presumptively unreliable, trial courts must be permitted to evaluate these statements for their evidentiary worth as revealed by the particular circumstances of the case. Courts often act as factfinders, and there is no reason to believe that courts are any less able to properly recognize the probative value of evidence in this particular area. 33 Id. The Supreme Court, however, did not determine whether a district court could base its findings solely on hearsay statements. Id. at 181, 107 S.Ct. at 2781-82. 34 In Clark, we held that absent some independent, corroborating evidence of defendant's knowledge of and participation in the conspiracy, the out-of-court statements remain inadmissible. Clark, 18 F.3d at 1341-42 (emphasis in original); see also Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 184, 107 S.Ct. at 2783 (Stevens, J., concurring) (An otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement cannot provide the sole evidentiary support for its own admissibility--it cannot lift itself into admissibility entirely by tugging on its own bootstraps.).  'Some' independent evidence is not merely a scintilla, but rather enough to rebut the presumed unreliability. Clark, 18 F.3d at 1342. 35 In this case, the government presented sufficient corroborating evidence to overcome the suspected unreliability of the out-of-court statements. First, Tackett, Patton and Gann all went to Pierce's house both before and after the burning. Second, Pierce is the Imperial Wizard of the Klan, and the Church's pastor repeatedly and openly spoke out against the Klan. Third, Pierce and Tackett had a business-type relationship that revolved around criminal acts. Finally and most importantly, Pierce stated to his alleged co-conspirators Thanks, that's what I wanted done after he read the newspaper article about the burning. 36 Accordingly, the district court's finding of a conspiracy was not clearly erroneous, and its admission of co-conspirator statements was proper.
37 Pierce also claims that the district court erred when it admitted evidence of his prior crimes or bad acts. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) permits [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts if it is probative of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation [or] plan.... 4 Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). 38 We review the district court's determination using a three-part standard of review. First, the district court must make a preliminary determination as to whether sufficient evidence exists of the prior act. United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 1261 (6th Cir.1992) (en banc ). This is a factual determination, which we review under a clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 1261-62. Second, the district court must determine whether the other act allegedly committed by the defendant was admissible as evidence of motive, intent, preparation, plan.... Id. at 1262. This is a legal determination, and thus is subject to de novo review. United States v. Ushery, 968 F.2d 575, 580 (6th Cir.1992). Finally, in ruling on the admission of 404(b) evidence, the district court must determine whether the 'other acts' evidence is more unfairly prejudicial than probative, which is governed by an abuse of discretion standard. Gessa, 971 F.2d at 1262.
39 Pierce claims that there was not sufficient evidence of any alleged prior acts. In Gessa, we held that testimony of two witnesses was sufficient to show that a prior act occurred. Id. at 1261-62. In the case at bar, two witnesses testified about Pierce's prior bad acts, and Pierce previously pleaded guilty to a charge of receiving stolen property. 40 Gary Hale testified that he and Tackett had stolen large volumes of property, including lawn mowers, tractors, and backhoes since they were in the ninth grade. (J.A. at 55455.) After stealing the equipment, Hale and Tackett would often drop it off at Pierce's residence. (J.A. at 540.) Pierce would then pay Tackett, who would share the proceeds with Hale. (J.A. at 545-46.) 41 Detective Eldon Isenberg testified that Hale approached him and confessed to his involvement in the theft ring. (J.A. at 576.) Specifically, Hale admitted that he and Tackett stole a mid-size Ford tractor, which they took to Pierce's house. (J.A. at 548-49.) When Isenberg asked Pierce where he got the tractor, Pierce said he got it from Chuck Floyd for $1800, and produced a fake receipt for it. (J.A. at 579.) Isenberg ran a check on the name Chuck Floyd, and could not find one in Butler or Warren County, where Pierce claimed he would be. (J.A. at 580.) Pierce subsequently pleaded guilty in Warren County Circuit Court to knowingly receiving stolen property, the Ford tractor. (J.A. at 582.) 42 Therefore, the district court had ample evidence to find that the prior bad acts occurred.
43 Next, Pierce claims that the district court improperly admitted his previous crimes under Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) only bars evidence of 'prior bad acts,' such as a criminal conviction, that are offered to show criminal disposition or propensity. If the evidence has an independent purpose, its admission is not prohibited by Rule 404(b). See Ushery, 968 F.2d at 580. In this case, the government explained that it sought to introduce the evidence under Rule 404(b) for the following two reasons: (1) to show that Tackett's motive to burn the Church was to keep in Pierce's good graces; and (2) to show that Pierce utilized his economic control over Tackett to make him burn the Church. 44 At trial, the government developed a theory that presented Tackett as financially dependent upon Pierce. Pierce allegedly wanted the Church burned down. The only way for the government to prove Tackett's motive and Pierce's intent was to establish their relationship. 45 This case closely parallels our decision in United States v. White, 788 F.2d 390 (6th Cir.1986). In White, four men conspired and set fire to an African-American family's house in their Tennessee neighborhood. The district court allowed prior bad acts to come in against two defendants who were tried together, White and Castile. Id. at 393. At White and Castile's trial, the district court admitted evidence of check kiting and fraudulent credit card transactions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the basis that these activities went to motive. Id. at 393. White's willingness to submit phony American Express charges for Castile tends to explain why Castile would be asked and would--without pay--want to help White with his 'problem.'  Id. 46 Rule 404(b) does not prevent the government from establishing how members of a conspiracy are related, solely because doing so would include evidence of prior criminal activities. Rule 404 prohibits such introduction only when the acts are being introduced to show propensity or conformity with past criminal activity. The crimes of theft and trafficking stolen property do not show a propensity to commit arson. Accordingly, this evidence is permissible under Rule 404(b) to establish Tackett's motive and Pierce's intent.
47 Finally, in ruling on admission of 404(b) evidence, the district court must determine whether the 'other acts' evidence is more unfairly prejudicial than probative. Gessa, 971 F.2d at 1262; see also Fed.R.Evid. 403 (Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice....). 5 The District Judge did not abuse his discretion. First, as discussed supra, evidence of Tackett's and Pierce's relationship was probative. Second, the District Judge observed the trial first-hand and was in the best position to assess the impact of the testimony. Ushery, 968 F.2d at 580. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the District Judge issued a number of limiting instructions to the jury to ensure that there would be no unfair prejudice (Trial volumes IV: 327-28; V: 367, 385-86, 407-408, 417; VII: 842-843). Therefore, the district court properly admitted the prior crimes under Rule 404(b).