Opinion ID: 6323357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fixture-based Approach

Text: [¶21] The Court today makes clear that under the MTCA an appurtenance must be a fixture. Referencing our previous decision in McDonald v. City of Portland, 2020 ME 119, ¶¶ 15-16, 239 A.3d 662, the Court says, “We applied existing law by employing the ‘fixture test’ as originally outlined in Searle v. Town of Bucksport, 2010 ME 89, ¶¶ 13-22, 3 A.3d 390.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 10 n.1. By adopting a fixture-based approach, we have so narrowed the definition of appurtenance that it means only fixtures. I disagree 14 with the Court’s limiting interpretation of the term appurtenance. The plain meaning of the term demonstrates that all appurtenances are not necessarily fixtures. The plain meaning demands additional analysis. [¶22] The Court’s current fixture-based approach does not account for this need. For the purpose of the MTCA, we have defined appurtenance as “an object or thing that belongs or is attached to a public building.” Sanford, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 11, 850 A.2d 325. Although this definition suggests that things other than fixtures could be appurtenances, it presents a false choice: “the proper analysis” simply asks if a thing that may be an appurtenance is either a fixture or personal property. See Searle, 2010 ME 89, ¶¶ 11, 15, 3 A.3d 390. After we defined appurtenance in Sanford, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 11, 850 A.2d 325, a majority of this Court later described that case as “apply[ing] the well-established definition of a fixture to determine whether an object was an appurtenance,” Searle, 2010 ME 89, ¶ 14, 3 A.3d 390. This description is misleading. Sanford created a common law definition of appurtenance that was informed by (1) dictionary definitions of appurtenance and appurtenant; (2) a legal treatise’s description of appurtenances; and (3) a dictionary definition of fixture. 2004 ME 73, ¶¶ 9-11, 850 A.2d 325. We then applied that common law definition, which more closely resembles the dictionary definition of 15 appurtenance than it does fixture, to determine if a trash bin was an appurtenance. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Our application of that definition did not even mention the word “fixture.” Id. [¶23] I agree that it is necessary to distinguish fixtures from personal property, as was done in Sanford, because a governmental entity is not liable “for its negligent acts or omissions in the construction, operation or maintenance” of its personal property. See 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2). The Court’s definition for fixture, as articulated in Searle, is well suited to determine if personal property has become a fixture. 2010 ME 89, ¶ 16, 3 A.3d 390. But our prior cases involving the public building exception to immunity have primarily dealt with things that are commonly considered personal property. See, e.g., id., ¶ 15 (bleachers); Sanford, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 12, 850 A.2d 325 (freestanding trash bin); Donovan v. City of Portland, 2004 ME 70, ¶ 5, 850 A.2d 319 (exterior lighting); Peterson v. City of Bangor, 2003 ME 102, ¶¶ 7-8, 831 A.2d 416 (monkey bars); Petillo v. City of Portland, 657 A.2d 325, 327 (Me. 1995) (irrigation system) (dicta). But see McDonald, 2020 ME 119, ¶¶ 4-5, 239 A.3d 662 (plaza); Kitchen, 666 A.2d at 78 (“The City’s statement of material facts places the raised, blacktopped curbing in the parking area. A parking area constitutes neither a public building nor an appurtenance to a public building.”) 16 (predating Sanford); Stretton v. City of Lewiston, 588 A.2d 739, 741 (Me. 1991) (holding that an athletic field is neither a public building nor an appurtenance because it is similar to “a camouflaged underground assault shelter,” which “is not a public building within the meaning of the [MTCA]” (citing Lovejoy v. State, 544 A.2d 750, 751 (Me. 1988))) (predating Sanford). [¶24] Here, we are asked for the first time to determine on the merits whether a parking lot—a piece of realty rather than an object or personal property—is an appurtenance to a public building. A fixture-based approach cannot answer the question.