Opinion ID: 1198869
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver and Forfeiture Principles

Text: Despite ruling that the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be accorded strict protection, the Jaffee Court noted that [l]ike other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the protection. 518 U.S. at 15 n. 14, 116 S.Ct. 1923. Waiver of a privilege may be either express or implied, see, e.g., John Doe Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 302 (2d Cir.2003) ( Doe Co. ), and a district court's finding that a party has waived a privilege is reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard, see, e.g., In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 101. A district court has abuse[d] its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990), or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions, Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir.2001). In dealing with testimonial privileges other than the psychotherapist-patient privilege, we have held that a waiver may be implied in circumstances where it is called for in the interests of fairness. [F]airness considerations arise when the party attempts to use the privilege both as 'a shield and a sword.' In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir.2000) ( In re Grand Jury ) (quoting United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir.) ( Bilzerian ), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 813, 112 S.Ct. 63, 116 L.Ed.2d 39 (1991), and In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 103). The quintessential example is the defendant who asserts an advice-of-counsel defense and is thereby deemed to have waived his [attorney-client] privilege with respect to the advice that he received. In re Grand Jury, 219 F.3d at 182-83 (internal quotation marks omitted). Or the holder of the privilege may assert[] a claim that in fairness requires examination of protected communications. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292; see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239-40, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (litigant may not both present the trial testimony of an investigator as to statements he obtained from witnesses and refuse, on the ground of work-product privilege, to produce relevant portions of the investigator's report for use in cross-examining him). In other words, a party cannot partially disclose privileged communications or affirmatively rely on privileged communications to support its claim or defense and then shield the underlying communications from scrutiny by the opposing party. In re Grand Jury, 219 F.3d at 182 (emphasis added). `[W]hether fairness requires disclosure ... is best decided on a case by case basis, and depends primarily on the specific context in which the privilege is asserted.' Doe Co., 350 F.3d at 302 (quoting In re Grand Jury, 219 F.3d at 183). For example, we look to see whether the privilege holder took affirmative steps to inject privileged materials into the litigation. Id. at 187. In addition, the venue of the privilege holder's statements may be material, for the fairness inquiry focuses on whether there is a risk that some independent decisionmaker will accept [the privilege-holder's] representations without the [adversary's] having adequate opportunity to rebut them. Doe Co., 350 F.3d at 305. Thus, a defendant may forfeit his attorney-client privilege with respect to certain materials if [he gives] certain testimony at trial before the jury, id. at 304 n. 3 (emphasis in original) (discussing Nobles and Bilzerian ); but he does not forfeit it merely by asserting to his adversary that he believes he has done nothing wrong, see, e.g., id. at 304; see also id. at 302 (noting that where the holder made no representation, express or implied, that he intended to surrender his privilege, the applicable principle is perhaps more aptly termed one of forfeiture, rather than waiver). The Supreme Court has noted that [p]arties may forfeit a privilege by exposing privileged evidence, but do not forfeit one merely by taking a position that the evidence might contradict. United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 323, 112 S.Ct. 2503, 120 L.Ed.2d 255 (1992). A further consideration in the fairness analysis is whether the witness's testimony was given in the absence of counsel. Thus, in In re Grand Jury, 219 F.3d at 186-87, we held that a corporation's privilege was not necessarily lost by reason of the grand jury testimony of a witnessthe corporation's founder, chief executive officer, and controlling shareholderwho was uncounseled in the grand jury room and had no legal training. We also note that in other contexts, a party appearing without counsel is afforded extra leeway in meeting the procedural rules governing litigation, and that district judges should make some effort to protect a party so appearing from waiving a right ... because of his or her lack of legal knowledge. Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir.1993). To give such extra leeway, courts are, for example, to construe a pro se litigant's pleadings and motions liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), and to allow amendments to a pro se litigant's pleadings more freely, see Holmes v. Goldin, 615 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir.1980); courts should not allow a pro se litigant's rights to be impaired by harsh application of technical rules, Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1983). This Court has not previously addressed questions as to whether a plaintiff asserting a civil rights claim forfeits his psychotherapist-patient privilege by reason of allegations in his pleading or his answers to questions in discovery. We note that the District of Columbia Circuit, presented with precisely these questions in Koch, 489 F.3d 384, has rejected broad claims of waiver. In Koch, the plaintiff sued his employer, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate his medical conditions; the SEC sought to subpoena records and testimony from Koch's psychotherapist. A magistrate judge ordered production, ruling that Koch had forfeited his psychotherapist-privilege because (1) he had made a claim for emotional distress damages, and (2) he had stated in answers to interrogatories that he suffered from depression and took medication for that condition. Koch moved in the district court to withdraw any claim for emotional distress damages, and he argued to the court of appeals that in fact his complaint d[id] not even contain a claim of emotional distress. 489 F.3d at 388. The court of appeals, on reviewing the complaint, found that Koch indeed had made no such claim in his complaint. And it found that his interrogatory answers as to depression d[id] not clearly make an allegation of, much less a claim to recovery for, emotional distress. Id. In addition, the Koch Court found it clear that Koch had abandoned any claim the district court may have thought he made for damages due to emotional stress. Id. Accordingly, the only question before the court of appeals was whether a plaintiffwho had in fact made no claim for emotional distress and had expressly abandoned any such claimhad nevertheless irrevocably put[] his mental state in issue in such a way as to waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege by acknowledging he sufferfed] from depression. Id. Analogizing to other testimonial privileges, consistent with the Supreme Court's analogy in Jaffee,  the Koch Court stated that although a plaintiff waives his psychotherapist-patient privilege if he does the sort of thing that would waive the attorney-client privilege, such as basing his claim upon the psychotherapist's communications with him, id. at 391, or selectively disclos[ing] part of a privileged communication in order to gain an advantage in litigation, id. (internal quotation marks omitted), or su[ing] the therapist for malpractice, id. at 389, he  does not put his mental state in issue merely by acknowledging he suffers from depression, for which he is not seeking recompense,  id. at 391 (emphasis added). The Koch Court also ruled that the privilege is not overcome when the plaintiff's mental state is put in issue only by the defendant. See id.; see also id. at 390-91 (plaintiff's waiver of the privilege as to a different doctor with respect to physical ailments did not put his mental condition in issue or waive his psychotherapist-patient privilege). The Koch Court rejected the SEC's contention that any time it is possible, as a matter of medical science, that a plaintiff's mental conditiondepression, anxiety, remorse, etc.may be a cause of his alleged physical condition, or even just aggravate that condition, the plaintiff necessarily has put his mental state in issue and thereby waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege, stating that such a rule would eviscerate the privilege. Id. 389-90. The Koch decision is consistent with the considerations leading to our own decisions discussed above. In light of the transcendent importance of the psychotherapist-patient privilege as discussed in Jaffee, we agree with the Koch Court that a plaintiff does not forfeit his psychotherapist-patient privilege merely by asserting a claim for injuries that do not include emotional damage; that a plaintiff does not forfeit that privilege by merely stating that he suffers from a condition such as depression or anxiety for which he does not seek damages; that a plaintiff may withdraw or formally abandon all claims for emotional distress in order to avoid forfeiting his psychotherapist-patient privilege; and that a party's psychotherapist-patient privilege is not overcome when his mental state is put in issue only by a another party.