Opinion ID: 2966563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Against Franciulli

Text: Young originally alleged claims of fraud, negligence, conspiracy, and unfair trade practices against Attilio Franciulli. However, given the factual complexity of the case, Young thought it prudent to form an alliance with at least one defendant. He therefore entered into a release agreement with Franciulli on December 13, 1991. The agreement provided that, in exchange for Franciulli's cooperation in Young's suit against the other defendants, Young would release all claims against Franciulli. On March 31, 1993, the district court entered an order dismissing Tony Habib for lack of personal jurisdiction. In a footnote to that order, the district court noted that it would not rule on Franciulli's earlier motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because of the seemingly valid release agreement. The court noted, however, that Franciulli could reassert the motion to dismiss if Young properly brought a subsequent motion to question the validity of the release agreement. Young did not file any such motion. Franciulli filed a motion on May 19, 1993 to compel Young to adhere to the terms of the release agreement and to dismiss Franciulli from the case because of his compliance with the agreement. At a hearing on August 3, 1993, the district court granted Franciulli's motion to enforce the terms of the agreement, but the court required Franciulli to continue cooperating with Young. The court ordered Franciulli to appear for a deposition and to turn over several documents that Young's attorney had requested. Pursuant to the district court's order, Franciulli attended a deposition on September 20 and 21, 1993. On November 21, 1994, Young listed Franciulli as a witness for trial. On December 9, 1994, however, the district court entered a final order that disposed of the remaining defendants and claims, thus mooting Franciulli's appearance at the trial. Young claims that Franciulli failed to cooperate with him and that Franciulli therefore breached the terms of the release agreement. He 21 raised that contention below in the hearing on Franciulli's motion to enforce the release agreement. Young argues on appeal that the district court should have submitted the question of Franciulli's breach to a jury, and he contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing Franciulli pursuant to the terms of the release agreement. Young concedes, however, that the district court did not enter any orders that actually dismissed Franciulli. He appears to contend instead that the court impliedly dismissed Franciulli when it enforced the terms of the release agreement. Since we cannot review an order that the district court did not enter, we review only the district court's decision to grant Franciulli's motion to enforce the terms of the release agreement, which impliedly rejected Young's claim that Franciulli breached the agreement. We review the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. See Wilson v. Wilson, 46 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 1995). 8 The Fourth Circuit has clearly held that district courts possess the inherent power to enforce settlement agreements and to enter judgments based on such agreements without a plenary hearing. In Petty v. Timken Corp., 849 F.2d 130, 132 (4th Cir. 1988), the plaintiff contended that the district court erred in summarily enforcing a settle_________________________________________________________________ 8 Young states in his brief that the district court also erred in releasing SAFIG and FPC on the basis of [the release] agreement. Young correctly points out that the release agreement did not release any individual or entity besides Franciulli, and he therefore contends that the district court erred in releasing SAFIG and FPC pursuant to that agreement. However, Young did not raise that issue before the district court. Accordingly, Young has waived his right to complain about the district court's treatment. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1068 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that appellate courts ordinarily do not consider issues that the appellant did not raise below). Moreover, we find no evidence in the record that the district court actually or impliedly released either SAFIG or FPC pursuant to the release agreement. The record reveals instead that the district court entered a default judgment against SAFIG and FPC for failure to comply with discovery orders. We therefore do not address Young's arguments regarding the erroneous release of SAFIG and FPC. 22 ment agreement without conducting an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the agreement. The Court held that when there is no doubt as to the existence of a settlement agreement, or the authority of an attorney to enter into a settlement agreement, the district court possesses the inherent authority to enforce the agreement and to enter judgment based on the agreement without a plenary hearing. Id. In addition, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that trial courts may summarily enforce a settlement agreement in some cases even when one party claims a breach of the terms of the agreement. In Millner v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 643 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1981), the Court noted: This summary procedure has been found to be admirably suited to situations where, for example, a binding settlement bargain is conceded as shown, and the excuse for nonperformance is comparably unsubstantial. Id. at 1009 (quoting Autera v. Robinson , 419 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). Finally, the Fourth Circuit has held that district courts also possess the inherent power to supervise and aid the implementation of settlement agreements. See Wood v. Virginia Hauling Co., 528 F.2d 423, 425 (4th Cir. 1975). In the instant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the terms of the release agreement. As the above precedents demonstrate, the district court possessed the inherent authority to enforce the terms of the agreement since neither party disputed that a settlement agreement existed and neither party claimed that its attorney lacked authority to enter into the agreement. Young's excuse for failing to release Franciulli and his allegations regarding Franciulli's breach are unsubstantial and conclusory; Young failed to cite to the record or to provide any evidence that Franciulli materially breached the terms of the agreement so as to void the release. Furthermore, the district court properly supervised and aided the implementation of the agreement pursuant to its inherent powers when it established the particulars of Franciulli's subsequent deposition. As the Fourth Circuit held in Petty, 849 F.2d at 133, having second thoughts about the results of a settlement agreement does not justify 23 setting aside an otherwise valid agreement. We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the terms of the release agreement.9