Opinion ID: 2327204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying the WCA's Jurisdictional Provisions to Cumulative Traumatic Injuries

Text: In King, this court considered at length the question of applying the WCA's jurisdictional provisions to cumulative traumatic injuries (which include carpal tunnel syndrome). [1] These injuries present a special challenge in the workers' compensation area, since it is not possible to identify a discrete event occurring at a particular date and time that causes (or aggravates) the injury. Instead, the cumulative traumatic injury becomes manifest only after the body's repeated exposure to individually minor traumas, insults, or harmful employment-related conditions. . . . Id. at 469. Thus, a jurisdictional standard defined with insufficient clarity could lead to forum shopping by a claimant, subjecting employers and their insurance carriers to unknown risks and undermining the goals of predictability and limited liability that workers' compensation laws are designed to promote. On the other hand, too rigid a standard could lead to incongruous results, such as the denial of benefits to one who suffers a bona fide injury after working for a substantial amount of time within the jurisdiction. Because of the many considerations bearing on the implementation of the WCA, id. at 473-74, King recognized that the choice of adopting specific guidelines and rules involved policy considerations that are best left, in the first instance, to DOES. Nonetheless, King proposed the following analytical framework as a general guideline: First, the agency should decide whether the case involved the aggravation of a preexisting condition through a discrete injury or an injury that resulted from a gradual accumulation of work-related trauma. Id. at 467. It concluded that in the case of cumulative trauma, the agency would need to adopt a rule for determining the time of injury. Contrary to the ad hoc regime advocated by petitioner-which would require DOES to adopt different rules in different cases-the King court specifically stated that a consistent approach was necessary. Id. at 470. Once the time of injury was determined, the agency could then determine the place of injury and apply the appropriate subsection from the coverage provisions of the WCA. For those work-related injuries occurring outside of the District, the factors approved in Hughes v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 498 A.2d 567 (D.C.1985), [2] would then guide the determination of whether the employment, at the time of the injury, was localized principally in the District and thus subject to District law. King, supra, 742 A.2d at 474. The heart of the King approach thus involves determining the time of a cumulative injury. King surveyed several approaches to this issue and strongly suggested, although it did not mandate, that DOES adopt a rule that fixes the time of a cumulative injury on the date on which disability manifests itself. Id. at 470, 473-74. As to which specific formulation of the manifestation rule to apply, the court expressed no opinion, preferring to leave that determination to DOES. Id. at 473. It noted, however, that several versions exist, including: (1) the date when the employee's pain or symptoms made continued work impossible; (2) the date of the onset of pain occasioning medical attention, even where such pain does not render the employee unable to work; (3) the date the employee becomes aware of, or through due diligence should have been aware of, a connection between the symptoms and employment; and (4) the date the employee first seeks medical attention for the symptoms (whether or not the employee ceases work), or the date of disability, whichever comes first. Id. at 470-72. King reviewed pertinent precedents within the District of Columbia and noted that DOES previously had used the date the employee first seeks medical attention for the symptoms, or the date of disability, whichever comes first, to fix the date of a cumulative injury for the purpose of determining which of the employer's insurance carriers was responsible for providing coverage. See Franklin v. Blake Realty Co., H & AS No. 84-26, OWC No. 25856 (Aug. 18, 1985). But four years later, in 1989, this court used the third of the above formulations, that is, the date the employee became aware of, or through due diligence should have been aware of, a connection between the symptoms and employment, to determine whether a case of gradual hearing loss should be covered under the WCA or its precursor, the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Railco Multi-Constr. Co. v. Gardner, 564 A.2d 1167 (D.C.1989). King cautioned, however, that both of these cases preceded the 1991 amendments, and neither addressed the precise question of fixing the time of a cumulative injury for jurisdictional purposes. 742 A.2d at 472. Moreover, Railco, while citing Blake Realty as having adopted the manifestation rule for cumulative traumatic injury, employed a different version of the rule without further comment. Thus, the court concluded that we do not think [ Blake Realty and Railco ] definitively resolve the question . . . of how to fix the time of a cumulative traumatic injury for purposes of determining under D.C.Code § [32-1503(a) ] whether the injury occurred in the District or outside the District. Id. In the case now before us, the Compensation Order adopted by the Board applied the test from Blake Realty, in which the injury is considered to have been manifested on (1) the date when the employee first seeks medical attention for his painful symptoms, whether or not he ceases work or (2) the date of disability, whichever comes first. [3] (Comp. Order at 3.) Finding that petitioner was not disabled, the ALJ therefore held that the relevant date was the date when petitioner Smith first sought medical attention, which was January 9, 2001, and his primary care physician diagnosed him with carpal tunnel syndrome. ( Id. at 3-4.) Since the ALJ also found that petitioner was employed by respondent in Maryland on January 9, 2001, he held the manifestation rule necessitated the application of § 32-1503(a)(2), the jurisdictional provisions relating to injuries occurring outside the District. ( Id. at 4.) Applying the Hughes test to the localized principally question, the ALJ found that there is simply no qualitative and quantitative connection with the District of Columbia to confer any jurisdiction on the District. The question thus becomes whether DOES, given the legal context in which the WCA operates, acted within the proper bounds of its discretion in applying that particular manifestation rule to the facts of this case. Petitioner claims that DOES adopted a manifestation rule that deprives injured workers of the presumption of compensability and therefore is inconsistent with the statute, contrary to law and should be reversed. (Pet'r Br. 8.) [4] This claim, however, misconstrues the nature and function of the presumption.