Opinion ID: 771054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: One or More Individuals

Text: 11 Title 18 U.S.C. S 1030(a)(5)(A) prohibits a person from knowingly transmitting a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caus[ing] damage without authorization, to a protected computer. A protected computer is a computer which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication. 18 U.S.C. S 1030(e)(2)(B). Defendant concedes that Slip.net's computers fit within that definition. The statute defines damage to mean any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information, that causes loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value during any 1-year period to one or more individuals. 18 U.S.C. S 1030(e)(8)(A). Defendant argues that Congress intended the phrase one or more individuals to exclude corporations. We disagree. 12 In interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain language of the statute, construing the provisions of the entire law, including its object and policy, to ascertain the intent of Congress. United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When a statutory term is undefined, we endeavor to give that term its ordinary meaning. Id. We are instructed to avoid, if possible, an interpretation that would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998). 13 According to Defendant, in common usage the term individuals excludes corporations. He notes that the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. S 1, which provides general rules of statutory construction, defines the word person to include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.  That definition, argues Defendant, implies that the word person includes corporations, but that the word individuals does not. Defendant reasons that, if Congress had intended S 1030(a)(5)(A) to cover damage to corporations, Congress would have used the word persons, not individuals. For several reasons, we are not persuaded. 14 We examine first the ordinary meaning of individuals. That word does not necessarily exclude corporations. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1152 (unabridged ed. 1993) provides five definitions of the noun individual, the first being a single or particular being or thing or group of beings or things. (Emphasis added.) To the extent that a word's dictionary meaning equates to its plain meaning, a corporation can be referred to as an individual.  Cf. United States v. Miguel, 111 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 1997) (using a dictionary to define contemporaneous). 15 Neither is individual a legal term of art that applies only to natural persons. As Black's Law Dictionary 773 (6th ed. 1990) states: 16 Individual. As a noun, this term denotes a single person as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association; but it is said that this restrictive signifi cation is not necessarily inherent in the word, and that it may, in proper cases, include artificial persons. 17 (Emphasis added.) See also Black's Law Dictionary 777 (7th ed. 1999) (stating that individual refers to an indivisible entity or a single person or thing). Because individual as a general legal term does not exclude corporations, we next consider applicable precedent. 18 In Clinton, the Supreme Court held that Congress intended to include corporations within a provision of the Line Item Veto Act that authorized any individual adversely affected to challenge the Act's constitutionality. 524 U.S. at 428 (emphasis added). The Court examined the purpose of the provision (to allow expedited judicial review of the Line Item Veto Act) and determined that Congress could not have intended that only natural persons be able to demand expedited review. Id. at 429. That interpretation, noted the Court, would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended. Id. 19 So, too, here. Defendant was convicted of violating S 1030(a)(5)(A), which criminalizes damage to protected computers. A protected computer is a computer that is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication. 18 U.S.C. S 1030(e)(2)(B). A large number of the computers that are used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication are owned by corporations. Cf. S. Rep. No. 104-357, pt. II (1996) (noting that computers continue to proliferate in businesses and homes). It is highly unlikely, in view of Congress' purpose to stop damage to computers used in interstate and foreign commerce and communication, that Congress intended to criminalize damage to such computers only if the damage is to a natural person. Defendant's interpretation would thwart Congress' intent. 20 Defendant's interpretation also ignores the context in which the term individual appears. It is true that the Dictionary Act's definition of person implies that the words corporations and individuals refer to different things. But the Dictionary Act instructs us not to use its definitions if the context indicates otherwise. 1 U.S.C. S 1. Context refers to the text of the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or the texts of other related congressional Acts. Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993); see id. at 198-200 (interpreting the word person, as used in 28 U.S.C. S 1915, to mean natural persons only). An examination of 18 U.S.C. S 1030 in its entirety uncovers further evidence that Congress did not, as Defendant argues, intend to use the word individuals to mean natural persons only, and the word person to mean natural persons and corporations. 21 As noted, 18 U.S.C. S 1030(e)(8)(A) defines damage to mean any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information that causes loss aggregating at least $5,000 . . . to one or more individuals. Section 1030(e)(8)(C) provides an alternative definition of damage: any impairment to a system that causes physical injury to any person. Under Defendant's theory, corporations could suffer damage as defined in S 1030(e)(8)(C), because a corporation is a person. Corporations, however, cannot suffer physical injury. See Black's Law Dictionary 1147 (defining physical injury as [b]odily harm or hurt). If Congress had meant to incorporate the Dictionary Act's definition of person (and, by extension, Defendant's definition of individual), S 1030(e)(8)(C) should read, that causes physical injury to any individual. But it does not. In context, it appears that Congress used individuals and person in a non-technical manner, without reference to the Dictionary Act. 22 Defendant also relies on the statute's legislative history. We have examined that history, but conclude that the statute's history confirms our reading of the word individuals. Congress originally enacted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, S 2102(a), Oct. 12, 1984. The 1990 version of S 1030(a)(5)(A) prohibited conduct that damages a Federal interest computer and causes loss to one or more others of a value aggregating $1,000 or more. A Federal interest computer was defined as a computer owned or used by the United States Government or a financial institution, or one of two or more computers used in committing the offense, not all of which are located in the same State. 18 U.S.C. S 1030(e)(2)(A) & (B) (1990). In 1994, Congress replaced the term Federal interest computer with the phrase computer used in interstate commerce or communication and changed the damage provision to read, causes loss or damage to one or more other persons of value aggregating $1,000 or more. 18 U.S.C. S 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii)(II)(aa) (1995). Before the 1994 amendment, a hacker could escape the statute's prohibitions by containing activities within a single state. Congress' 1994 amendment attempted to broaden the statute's reach. S. Rep. No. 104-357, pt. IV(E) (discussing 1994 amendment). Congress' 1994 amendments also added a private cause of action for victims of computer crime. 18 U.S.C. S 1030(g). 23 In 1996, Congress amended S 1030(a)(5) to its current form, using the term protected computer and concomitantly expanding the number of computers that the statute protected. 18 U.S.C. S 1030(a)(5) & (e)(2). 2 The 1996 amendments also altered the definition of damage to read, loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value during any 1-year period to one or more individuals. 18 U.S.C. S 1030(e)(8)(A). We have found no explanation for this change. We do not believe, however, that this change evidences an intent to limit the statute's reach. 24 To the contrary, Congress has consciously broadened the statute consistently since its original enactment. The Senate Report on the 1996 amendments notes: 25 As intended when the law was originally enacted, the Computer Fraud and Abuse statute facilitates addressing in a single statute the problem of com putercrime . . . . As computers continue to proliferate in businesses and homes, and new forms of computer crimes emerge, Congress must remain vigilant to ensure that the Computer Fraud and Abuse statute is up-to-date and provides law enforcement with the necessary legal framework to fight com puter crime. 26 S. Rep. No. 104-357, pt. II (emphasis added). The report instructs that the definition of `damage' is amended to be sufficiently broad to encompass the types of harm against which people should be protected. Id. pt. IV(1)(E). The report notes that the interaction between S 1030(a)(5)(A) (the provision that prohibits conduct causing damage) and S 1030(e)(8) (the provision that defines damage) will prohibit a hacker from stealing passwords from an existing log-on program, when this conduct requires all system users to change their passwords, and requires the system administrator to devote resources to resecuring the system. . . . If the loss to the victim meets the required monetary threshold, the conduct should be criminal, and the victim should be entitled to relief. Id. (emphasis added). The reference to a system administrator suggests that a corporate victim is involved. That is, if Congress intended to limit the definition of the crime to conduct causing financial damage to a natural person only, its report would not use the example of a system administrator devoting resources to fix a computer problem as illustrative of the damage to be prevented and criminalized. The Senate Report's reference to the proliferation of computers in businesses as well as homes provides additional evidence of the Senate's intent to extend the statute's protec-tions to corporate entities. 27 On the basis of the statutory text taken in context, the Supreme Court's Clinton decision, and the statute's purpose and legislative history, we conclude that 18 U.S.C. S 1030(a)(5) criminalizes computer crime that damages natural persons and corporations alike. The district court did not err in so ruling. 28