Opinion ID: 2010520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Banther as Schmitz's Accomplice

Text: Banther's next argument is that there was no record evidence to support the State's theory that Banther was Schmitz's accomplice. Therefore, Banther submits that the trial judge erred, as a matter of law, by denying Banther's motion for a judgment of acquittal as to any potential liability for Banther as an accomplice to Schmitz. Banther correctly states in his opening brief, however, that with the exception of Schmitz's testimony, the State presented substantially the same evidence in the 2008 trial as in the 2004 and 1998 trials. This acknowledgment by Banther is significant because in our 2005 decision, we concluded that it was appropriate to give an accomplice liability instruction at Banther's 2004 trial but that the instruction which was given should have been more limited in scope: [18] To fully implement the collateral estoppel effects of the conspiracy acquittal and to protect Banther's Constitutional right against double jeopardy, the trial judge should have limited the State to arguing that Banther's actions alone, independent of any agreement or working with Schmitz, constituted counsel[ing] or attempt[ing] to aid Schmitz. In his jury instructions, furthermore, the trial judge should have accounted for the earlier acquittal by tailoring the jury charge to exclude any reference to a bilateral agreement between the parties. The earlier jury finding that Banther and Schmitz did not agree in advance to kill Raversa finding implicit in the conspiracy acquittalremoved that issue from the jury's consideration at the second trial. [19] The State argues that because of the similarity of the evidence, since we held that a limited accomplice liability instruction would have been appropriate at Banther's 2004 trial, it was proper for the Superior Court, at Banther's 2008 trial, to give a limited accomplice liability instruction of the type which was described in our 2005 opinion. We agree. The record reflects that there was a rational basis in the evidence for the Superior Court to instruct the jury as to Banther's accomplice liability in the 2008 trial. In our 2005 opinion, we noted: An accomplice, on the other hand, may act unilaterally, without a preexisting agreement, by spontaneously deciding to aid, counsel, or attempting to aid another, or by agreeing to aid a principal in planning or committing a crime. In State v. Travis, the Superior Court stated that the use of the [disjunctive] or instead of the conjunctive and  in the accomplice statute implicitly recognized accomplice liability based on [a defendant's] unilateral decision to aid in the commission of an offense. We agree that the use of the disjunctive or in the accomplice-liability statute allows the jury to find that a defendant either aided or counseled another without actually agreeing to do so in advance. [20] Banther gave a detailed description in a taped statement that was played for the jury of how a physical fight broke out between Schmitz and Ravers at the Mesibov Road crime scene, and how Schmitz then killed Ravers with the axe. Banther's description of what happened is consistent with a Travis -type scenario, to wit, an intentional killing that occurred during a sudden argument or confrontation and was not premeditated. [21] On the basis of Banther's taped statement and other evidence presented at the third trial, the jury could rationally have concluded that, if Schmitz did hit Ravers with an axe, Banther was his accomplice. The jury could have accepted Banther's description of how the killing began, but rejected Banther's claim that he had no involvement in the murder and, instead, concluded that Banther either aided or counseled Schmitz at the time of the attack on Ravers without actually agreeing to do so in advance. Accordingly, there was a rational basis in the evidence at Banther's third trial for the trial judge to give an accomplice liability instruction. In a related argument, Banther contends that the accomplice liability instruction at his third trial still permitted the jury to infer an agreement between Schmitz and Banther which was not a permitted inference under any circumstance. As we stated in our 2005 opinion, [a]lthough a determination to give a particular jury instruction lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, a defendant enjoys the `unqualified right' to a correct statement of the law. [22] The record does not support Banther's argument. The record reflects that the jury instructions on accomplice liability at Banther's third trial correctly stated the law and enabled the jury to perform its duty. [23]