Opinion ID: 2512446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Petitioners Had Standing To Seek Mandamus Relief

Text: Standing is concerned with whether the parties have the right to bring suit. Mottl v. Miyahira, 95 Hawai`i 381, 388, 23 P.3d 716, 723 (2001) (quoting Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai`i 64, 67, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1994)). It is well settled that the crucial inquiry with regard to standing is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her invocation of the court's remedial powers on his or her behalf. In re Application of Matson Navigation Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 81 Hawai`i 270, 275, 916 P.2d 680, 685 (1996). In deciding whether the plaintiff has the requisite interest in the outcome of the litigation, we employ a three-part test: (1) has the plaintiff suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant's wrongful conduct; (2) is the injury fairly traceable to the defendant's actions; and (3) would a favorable decision likely provide relief for plaintiff's injury. Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawai`i 474, 479, 918 P.2d 1130, 1135 (1996). With respect to the first prong of this test, the plaintiff must show a distinct and palpable injury to himself [or herself.] Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission of State of Hawai`i, 63 Haw. 166, 173 n. 6, 623 P.2d 431, 446 n. 6 (1981). The injury must be distinct and palpable, as opposed to abstract, conjectural, or merely hypothetical. Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1566 (10th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). Mottl, 95 Hawai`i at 389, 23 P.3d at 724, quoting Akinaka v. Disciplinary Bd. of Hawai`i Supreme Court, 91 Hawai`i 51, 55, 979 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1999). The requirement of a distinct and palpable injury requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in fact. Mottl, 95 Hawai`i at 391, 23 P.3d at 726. Mottl involved a circuit court lawsuit for declaratory and injunctive relief from the finance director's and the governor's decision to reduce the University of Hawaii's allotment of funds by six million dollars for fiscal year 1998. The plaintiffs were: (1) three University of Hawaii faculty members and directors of the University of Hawaii Professional Assembly; (2) the University of Hawaii Professional Assembly; (3) Hawai`i State Senator Rod Tam; and (4) Hawai`i State Representative Chris Halford. The plaintiffs lost in circuit court on summary judgment and lost in this court for lack of standing in the circuit court. We held that none of the plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact as a consequence of the six million dollar reduction in funds. As to plaintiffs Tam and Halford, we concluded that: ... [T]he plaintiffs assert that Tam and Halford, who are members of the legislature, have not only the interest of a general member of the public in seeing that the [fiscal and budget] laws of the state are complied with, but the interest of persons who have spent their own official time on behalf of their constituents, reviewing, voting on, and enacting budgets that become law. This establishes Tam's and Halford's special interest but not an injury in fact. They have not alleged any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, inasmuch as they have not alleged that they had personally suffered any distinct and palpable injury. Akinaka, 91 Hawai`i at 55, 979 P.2d at 1081. Because a special interest in the subject matter of a lawsuit is insufficient to invoke judicial intervention, Tam and Halford are without standing in this action. Mottl, 95 Hawai`i at 392, 23 P.3d at 727. Petitioners sought mandamus relief in their individual capacities and in their capacities as state senators who passed Act 56 to modify the appointment process for regents and who confirm or reject respondent's regent nominees under the modified appointment process. Their standing to invoke our remedial power of mandamus was contested by respondent, who relied on Mottl and argued that petitioners's interest in preventing decision making by a BOR comprised of six holdover regents established their special interest, but did not establish an injury in fact. Respondent argued that petitioners made no allegation that they personally suffered any distinct and palpable injury as a consequence of the holdover by six regents. Petitioners countered that they, as senators, have a constitutional duty [under article X, section 6] to review and consent to, or reject [respondent's nominations of BOR candidates qualified by the CAC] and that they were deprived of performing their own constitutional obligations to advise and consent by [respondent's] acts in purposefully circumventing the constitutional nomination and appointment process [by holding over six regents]. They relied on authority from foreign jurisdictions holding that the injury in fact element of standing is met when a legislator is deprived of the right to advise and consent on executive appointments. According to the legislators' allegations, the interest sought to be protected by this action [for declaratory and injunctive relief against the governor] is [the legislators'] unique statutory right to advise the Governor on executive appointments and to confer their approval or disapproval in this regard. Assuming these allegations to be true, we conclude that they allege a personal and legally cognizable interest peculiar to legislators. The interest asserted is simply not a generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance. Since the right to advise and consent has been vested only in members of the legislature, and since only members of the legislature are bringing this action, the allegation that this right has been usurped by the Governor and [the Acting Commissioner of Commerce] are sufficiently personal to constitute an injury in fact, thus satisfying the minimum constitutional requirements of standing. We therefore believe that it is reasonable to hold that the legislators have standing. Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628, 631 (3rd Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted) (suit by eight members of the Virgin Islands Fifteenth Legislature challenging the governor's appointment of one Arnold Golden as acting Commissioner of Commerce after Golden's nomination for such position was rejected by the legislature). Accord Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d 873, 878 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082, 102 S.Ct. 636, 70 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (We think it may argued plausibly that Senator Riegle has met the [burden of establishing injury-in-fact for purposes of standing].... [A]ssuming that the five Reserve Bank members of the [Federal Open Market Committee] are officers who must be appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate, Riegle's inability to exercise his right under the Appointments Clause of the [federal] Constitution [because Reserve Bank members are selected by a Board of Governors] is an injury sufficiently personal to constitute an injury-in-fact.). The Hawai`i Constitution, article X, section 6, provides that BOR members shall be nominated and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, appointed by the governor from pools of qualified candidates presented to the governor by the [CAC]. Petitioners, as senators who must advise and consent on respondent's BOR nominees, alleged that their unique constitutional duty to do so was usurped by respondent's holding over of six regents. The decisions of the federal appellate courts in Dennis and Riegle are persuasive authority for finding that the allegation that petitioners's right to advise and consent on BOR appointments has been usurped by respondent and is sufficiently personal to constitute an injury in fact. Therefore, we hold that petitioners had standing to invoke our remedial power of mandamus.