Opinion ID: 747825
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Warrant for Arrest of Personal Property

Text: 25 Dunmore asserts that the warrant for the arrest of his personal property was a general warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that, consequently, the United States could not rely on any evidence seized under the warrant. This court reviews de novo a determination that a warrant is sufficiently particular. United States v. Janus Indus., 48 F.3d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 87, 133 L.Ed.2d 44 (1995); United States v. Williamson, 1 F.3d 1134, 1135 (10th Cir.1993). 26 The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. As the Supreme Court has explained, 27 The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. 28 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S.Ct. 506, 511-12, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927)). The warrant for the arrest of personal property in this case complied with the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. 29 The Affidavit submitted in support of the application for the warrant for arrest of property sets out in extensive detail the investigation of Dunmore for drug trafficking. The fifty-one page Affidavit began by describing the activities of confidential informant Joseph Rector, a distant relative of Dunmore. The Affidavit recited how Rector had been recruited as a confidential informant and detailed Rector's extensive drug dealings with Dunmore over the previous several years. The Affidavit then set forth a recorded conversation between Rector and Dunmore on June 25, 1987, when Dunmore discussed the large cashflow generated by his drug trafficking business and the property that he had purchased with that money, including the subject house and its contents. 30 The Affidavit went on to detail how Dunmore was apparently laundering the proceeds of his drug trafficking business by purchasing both cashier's checks and property, including the house and contents, under the name of his uncle Thomas Stiles. The Affidavit referenced attached surveillance photographs from banks that depicted Dunmore purchasing cashier's checks under the name of Thomas Stiles. It also recounted interviews with employees from a number of furniture stores which identified Dunmore as the purchaser of the furniture and furnishings at issue here. Those same employees indicated that Dunmore had purchased the furniture and furnishings under the name of Thomas Stiles and had paid for the purchases with cashier's checks with Thomas Stiles listed as the remitter. 31 Finally, the Affidavit recounted an extensive background investigation of the financial conditions of both Thomas Stiles and Dunmore. That investigation demonstrated Thomas Stiles never lived in the subject house and did not have the financial means to purchase either the house or its belongings. Furthermore, the investigation demonstrated that Dunmore had no employment history for the prior thirteen fiscal quarters and had not filed a federal income tax return since some time before 1970. 5 32 In light of the Affidavit, a magistrate judge found that probable cause existed to believe the real property and all its furnishings, fixtures, and equipment were proceeds traceable to exchanges of controlled substances in violation of subchapter I of Title 21, United States Code, subject to seizure pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881. Based on that conclusion, the magistrate judge authorized a warrant for the arrest of the defendant real property and all fixtures, furnishings, and equipment within the buildings, appurtenances, and improvements, including but not limited to, a dining room table and chairs, living room furniture, a marble table, marble accessories, clocks, a grandfather clock, draperies, oriental rugs, and a 'muskrat' throw. 33 On appeal, Dunmore contends that the warrant is an invalid general warrant because it allowed the United States to seize all of the personal property in the house without any limitation as to the kind of property to be seized or any description as to how the property might be related to the alleged underlying criminal offense. The basic problem with Dunmore's argument is that the magistrate judge found probable cause to believe that all of the furnishings in the house were the converted proceeds of Dunmore's drug trafficking business. There was sufficient evidence in the Affidavit upon which to base the probable cause conclusion: (1) Dunmore had admitted to Rector that the house and all of its furnishings were purchased with drug proceeds; (2) many of the identified furnishings of the home had been purchased by Dunmore in the name of his uncle Thomas Stiles, in an apparent effort to launder his drug proceeds; and (3) neither Stiles nor Dunmore had lawful means to purchase furnishings for the home. In light of the magistrate judge's unchallenged finding that probable cause existed to believe all of the furniture and furnishings in the house were purchased with drug proceeds and the virtual impossibility of cataloging every single fixture or furnishing in the house, the warrant was as particular as it could be and, therefore, comported with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See Janus, 48 F.3d at 1554 (approving affidavit and warrant that were as specific as circumstances would allow); United States v. Emmons, 24 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir.1994) ( 'When the circumstances of the crime make an exact description of the fruits and instrumentalities a virtual impossibility, the searching officer can only be expected to describe the generic class of items he is seeking.' ) (quoting United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 775 (10th Cir.1990)).