Opinion ID: 184641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Staff Union Case

Text: In December 24, 1996 the Staff Union filed a petition forcertification as bargaining representative of TDMC's supportstaff employees. A stipulation election was conducted onFebruary 13, 1997 and the union prevailed.6 On February 20, 1997 FPA filed objections to the StaffUnion election based on [s]upervisory and management personnel interference on behalf of the union petitioner in thenon-supervisory employees' election decision which likely impaired the employees' freedom of choice in the election and[o]ther acts of interference which restrained, coerced orinterfered with the employees' section 7 rights. JA 860. OnFebruary 28, 1997 FPA filed supporting affidavits allegingspecific unlawful pro-union activities by physician supervisors. __________ the Act.' Miller Trucking Services, 176 NLRB 556 (1969), affd. inthis respect 445 F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1971), and relied on in Topinka's Country House, 235 NLRB 72, 74 (1978), enfd. 624 F.2d 770(6th Cir. 1980). Rockwood Energy & Mineral Corp., 299 N.L.R.B.1136, 1139 (1990), enforced, 942 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1991). 6 A stipulation election is one held pursuant to an agreementbetween the employer and the union waiving a representationhearing and agreeing to terms for holding an election. Smith &Smith Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 735 F.2d 1215, 1216 (10th Cir. 1984). On March 5, 1997 the Regional Director recommended thatFPA's objections be overruled and that the Staff Union becertified because the physicians' supervisory status was previously and comprehensively litigated in the Physician Unionproceeding. JA 881. TDMC filed a request for review of theRegional Director's recommendation on March 18 1997 and arevised request for review on March 24, 1997. On June 10,1997 the Board issued a decision summarily rejectingTDMC's objections to the Regional Director's report andrecommendation, adopting his findings and recommendationsand certifying the Staff Union as the representative of support staff employees. When TDMC subsequently refused to bargain with theStaff Union, the General Counsel again filed an unfair laborpractice complaint against FPA. As a defense FPA assertedit did not have an obligation to bargain with the [StaffUnion] because supervisory personnel interfered with theUnion election. JA 1050. On October 22, 1997 the Boardagain granted summary judgment against FPA, stating, inlanguage almost identical to that in the July 24, 1997 Physician Union decision: All representation issues raised by the Respondent were or could have been litigated in the prior representation proceeding. The Respondent does not offer to adduce at a hearing any newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence, nor does it allege any special circumstances that would require the Board to reexamine the decision made in the representation proceeding. We therefore find that the Respondent has not raised any representation issue that is properly litigable in this unfair labor practice proceeding. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 162 (1941). Accordingly, we grant the Motion for Summary Judgment. 324 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 1. As in the Physician Union case, FPA contends that theBoard's use of the no-relitigation rule improperly deprivedFPA of all opportunity to raise the staff supervision issue. Inthis case, which arrives in a different posture from the Physician Union case--and, as far as we can tell, a uniqueone--we conclude that the Board failed to adequately explainits reliance on the rule in light of past practice. The no-relitigation rule, as formulated in the Board's caselaw and rules, bars relitigation of a waived issue only in anunfair labor practice proceeding that is related to theproceeding in which the waiver occurred. See 29 C.F.R.s 102.67(f) and Westwood One Broadcasting Servs., Inc., 323N.L.R.B. No. 175, 1997 WL 331,860, at  (both quoted supra,p. 7. It is by no means clear that the Staff Union proceedings, in which the no-relitigation bar was invoked, wererelated, as the Board has previously used the term, to thePhysician Union representation proceeding in which TDMCwaived the supervision argument. In the past the Board hasapplied its rule in unfair labor practice proceedings 7 topreclude relitigation of an issue that could have been raised inan earlier proceeding in the same case involving the samelocal and the same bargaining unit. By contrast, here theBoard invoked the rule as a bar during the Staff Unioncertification proceeding based on the fact that TDMC couldhave raised the supervision argument in the separate Physician Union case which addressed whether a different localwas to represent a different bargaining unit. The Boardmust provide a reasoned explanation, either consistent withprecedent or explaining its departure therefrom, if it choosesto so expand the rule's scope and it has offered none. SeeHicks v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1396, 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (remanding to Board for further action either consistent withits existing precedents or for generation of a new jurisdictional rule where Board decision below revealed no reasoningby which to fit its extension of jurisdiction); ConAgra, Inc. v.NLRB, 117 F.3d 1435, 1443-44 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ([I]t is'axiomatic that an agency adjudication must either be consistent with prior adjudications or offer a reasoned basis for its __________ 7 The Board has limited a related unfair trade practice proceeding to one which involves a s 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain charge,expressly excluding from the rule's coverage s 8(a)(1) and s 8(a)(3)proceedings. See Clark & Wilkins Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d308, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 934 (1990). departure from precedent.' ) (quoting Kelley v. FERC, 96F.3d 1482, 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Neither the summarycertification decision of June 10, 1997 nor the boilerplatelanguage in the October 22, 1997 unfair labor practice ordersatisfies this standard. Accordingly, the matter must beremanded to the Board for explanation. For the preceding reasons we deny the petition for reviewand enforce the Board's bargaining order in the PhysicianUnion case (No. 97-1454) and deny enforcement and grantreview in the Staff Union case (No. 97-1660). We remand inthe latter for the Board to explain whether and, if so, how theStaff Union refusal-to-bargain and certification proceedingsare related to the Physician Union representation proceeding so as to come within the scope of the Board's no- relitigation rule. If the Board cannot do so, it must reconsider the staff supervision issue, as appropriate, in the StaffUnion case. So ordered.