Opinion ID: 835029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: rpc 3.1

Text: The Bar argues that the accused violated RPC 3.1 when he told Leveque that (1) she was legally entitled to take over the clinic and (2) she was legally entitled to enter the clinic's premises when it was closed to the public. Indeed, the Bar suggests that the accused knew in advance that Leveque intended to try to take over the clinic and that he assisted in that effort, also in violation of RPC 3.1. RPC 3.1 provides: In representing a client or the lawyer's own interests, a lawyer shall not knowingly bring or defend a proceeding, assert a position therein, delay a trial or take other action on behalf of a client, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law, except that a lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration may, nevertheless[,] so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established. (Emphases added.) Although the Bar and the accused focus on whether the accused's legal advice to Leveque had a nonfrivolous basis, we note that the Bar did not charge the accused with failing to provide competent representation to a client, in violation of RPC 1.1. The text of RPC 3.1 refers not to legal advice, but to a lawyer's action on behalf of a client. The word action, in this context, appears to mean a thing done: DEED. See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 21 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining action). Moreover, the rule uses the phrase other action on behalf of a client, in contrast to the actions mentioned earlier in the rule, viz., bring[ing] or defend[ing] a proceeding, assert[ing] a position therein[, or] delay[ing] a trial. RPC 3.1 (emphasis added). Giving legal advice to a client is a thing done, a deed. So is appearing with a client at premises over which the client believes she has a right to assert control and acting with and on behalf of the client in discussions with other persons on the premises and with police. We conclude that the accused's advice to Leveque and his conduct on November 14, 2005, in the course of representing her were action[s] within the scope of RPC 3.1. The pivotal factual issue, then, is whether defendant took the actions alleged by the Bar. If he did, the pivotal legal issue is whether there was a nonfrivolous basis in law or fact for the accused's actions. As to the factual dispute, the accused argues that he did not advise Leveque that she had the right to take over the clinic or to enter the premises before the clinic was open to the public. Instead, he argues, the actions that Leveque took on November 14, 2005, were on her own initiative; he advised her only that she had as much right as Stanford to run the clinic and that he thought that he could defend her in any resulting civil or criminal proceedings if she chose to attempt to take over the clinic. [3] He claims that, based on his understanding of the facts when he gave the advice (including the legal status of the corporation), his advice was legally sound. He also appears to argue that, even if he had advised Leveque that she had a right to take over the clinic, that advice would have been sound as well. He asserts that the legal doctrines of choice of evils and self-help support his position. The Bar's theory that defendant assisted Leveque in planning to take over the clinic is plausible and is supported by some circumstantial evidence. Nevertheless, in the absence of testimony from Leveque, and given the accused's denials, we do not find by clear and convincing evidence that the accused worked with Leveque in advance to plan the attempted takeover. That said, clear and convincing evidence does support the Bar's contentions that (1) the accused appeared at the clinic early on the morning of November 14 in the course of his representation of Leveque and asserted to Witte and Officer Keist that Leveque had the same right to operate the clinic as did Stanford and therefore had the right to take over physical control of the clinic, and (2) the accused previously had told Leveque that she could assert the defenses of choice of evils and self-help in response to any civil or criminal proceedings that might arise if she attempted to take over the clinic. We turn to the legal issue, whether the accused made those statements and gave that advice without a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous. Id. We conclude that he did. Even if the accused's advice that Leveque and Stanford had an equal right to operate the clinic had a nonfrivolous basis in law or fact, that nevertheless would not justify his position that Leveque could use self-help to take physical control of the clinic's operations or the accused's participation in her efforts to do just that. Both the Bar's and the accused's experts agreed that the nonprofit corporation laws do not give an employee any legal authority to walk in and take over an operating nonprofit corporation, even if the corporation has been administratively dissolved for more than five years. Although certain statutes authorize self-help remedies in some contexts, see, e.g., ORS 79.0609(2)(b) (secured party's right to self-help under Uniform Commercial Code), the accused cites no statute or case that supports his contention that Leveque, as a current or former employee of the clinic, was authorized to enter the clinic and claim that she was taking over because she disagreed with various aspects of the way the clinic was being operated. Further, the accused has not demonstrated that he acted in furtherance of a good faith argument for an extension of the self-help remedies that are permitted, in certain limited circumstances, under current law. See RPC 3.1 (defining frivolous). The accused also argues that the choice of evils doctrine supports his advice to Leveque and his and Leveque's conduct, although the precise nature of his argument is unclear. He appears to be attempting to demonstrate that his statement that he could defend Leveque from a trespass action for entering the clinic before business hours was not frivolous. He also appears to argue that the choice of evils defense applies to Leveque's attempt to take over the clinic. In describing the defense, the accused cites Black's Law Dictionary, which defines necessity as [a] privilege that may relieve a person from liability for trespass or conversion if that person, having no alternative, harms another's property in an effort to protect life or health. He argues that Leveque was attempting to protect life or health by taking over the clinic, because she believed that, if she complained to the Attorney General, he would shut down the clinic and the patients would have no way to get their medical needs met. To state the accused's argument is to refute it. Leveque had an alternative not complaining to the Attorney General. Moreover, even if she had complained to the Attorney General, the accused does not indicate why Leveque would have been justified in believing that the Attorney General would act in a way that would harm life or health and why, as a result, her only alternative was to trespass and attempt to take over the clinic. [4] The accused also cites two cases La Grande/Astoria v. PERB, 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204 (1978), and Sizemore v. Myers, 327 Or. 456, 964 P.2d 255 (1998)that he claims demonstrate the breadth that Oregon courts apply to this concept of choice between competing values. In La Grande/Astoria, the court noted that competing policies advanced by state and local governments must often involve a choice among values, and then noted that [s]uch choices are the essence of political, not judicial, decision. 281 Or. at 148, 576 P.2d 1204. The accused claims that that choice among values is directly analogous to the [a]ccused's dilemma when navigating the uncharted waters of non-profit corporation law. Sizemore involved a challenge to a ballot title explanatory statement composed by a committee directed by statute to prepare such a statement. In determining that that statute did not require the explanatory statement to explain the effect of the measure, the court examined the statute's legislative history. The court concluded that that history showed that the requirement that the explanatory statement committees explain such effects left divided committees with a choice of two evils either have an acrimonious debate concerning the potential effect of a measure or disobey the law and omit the effect from the explanatory statement altogether. Sizemore, 327 Or. at 466, 964 P.2d 255 (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added). We are not persuaded. Neither LaGrande/Astoria nor Sizemore has any bearing on the accused's claim that the positions he took in the course of representing Leveque were not frivolous. They were. The accused claims that, to the extent that he is incorrect in his legal conclusions, he believed, when advising Leveque and acting on her behalf, that those conclusions were correct. We find, however, that the accused knew that the positions he took in the course of representing Leveque were frivolous. First, the accused's claim is undermined both by his advice to Leveque that her only redress for any concerns that she had about the corporation was to seek the assistance of the Attorney General and by his letter to Witte, in which he made a similar statement. Second, as discussed in greater detail below, on the morning of November 14, the accused lied to various individuals at the clinic, telling them that he had some written authorization permitting Leveque and her associates to take over the clinic. That supports the Bar's position that the accused knew that, without some such authorization, he and Leveque had no legal rightself-help or otherwiseto take over the clinic. Finally, the accused has practiced law in Oregon for more than 40 years, has substantial experience in securities and corporate litigation, and has some experience working with nonprofit corporations. He is a sophisticated lawyer with extensive experience. We find that the accused knew that his advice to his clientthat she had some legal basis for her attempt to take control of the clinic's operationswas frivolous.