Opinion ID: 1027257
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use and Refer to

Text: The district court, after correctly determining summary judgment was warranted on the § 2002(3) claim, also awarded summary judgment as to the use component of Worden's § 2002(2) claim because it is completely duplicative of the claim ... regarding plaintiff's discharge. Worden, slip op. at 15. Similarly, in rejecting Worden's refer to prong of the § 2002(2) claim, the district court determined the point is moot because the ultimate outcome would not be any different because plaintiff's employment would have been terminated even without knowledge of the polygraph results. Id. at 20. With regard to both statutory prongs, the district court misconstrued the operation of subsections (2) and (3) of § 2002 and failed to recognize that the statutory cause of action under § 2002(2) is wholly separate and distinct from the cause of action under § 2002(3). Under the plain terms of § 2002(2), a § 2002(2) claim is not dependent upon an employer's liability under § 2002(3). Rather, a § 2002(2) claim constitutes an independent basis for asserting the liability of an employer. Although, as a practical matter, the evidence establishing a § 2002(2) or § 2002(3) claim may be substantially the same, liability under § 2002(2) does not require the same proof as would be necessary to recover under § 2002(3). For example, no proof of an adverse employment action is required under § 2002(2). Instead, the plaintiff need only prove the employer used or referred to the polygraph examination results. Thus, liability under § 2002(3) is not a condition precedent for a § 2002(2) claim. How a plaintiff proves a § 2002(2) claim for use, accept, [or] refer to as to the results of a polygraph examination, when there is no cognizable claim for an employment action under § 2002(3), may present a formidable burden. This is particularly so as to damages, but it is plain that Congress saw fit to create separate causes of action in §§ 2002(2) and 2002(3), and it was within the authority of Congress to do so. As we have often noted, our judicial task is only to determine the meaning of the statute as passed by Congress, not to question the wisdom of the provision enacted. Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 308 (4th Cir.2000). [A]s long as a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the promulgating entity. McDaniels v. United States, 300 F.3d 407, 412 n. 2 (4th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is evident that the district court determined it would not recognize Worden's § 2002(2) claim on the use or refer to prongs only because Worden's § 2002(3) claim had failed. The district court's grant of summary judgment on this part of the § 2002(2) claim was thus grounded in the erroneous conclusion that the § 2002(2) claim was dependent upon the success or failure of Worden's § 2002(3) claim. Because the district court's rationale for the award of summary judgment on the use and refer to prongs was based on an incorrect reading of the relationship of § 2002(2) and (3), it erred in granting summary judgment on that portion of Worden's § 2002(2) claim. We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the use and refer to portions of Worden's § 2002(2) claim. We also remand to the district court for further proceedings the part of the § 2002 claim as to whether SunTrust use[d] or refer[red to] the polygraph results in violation of § 2002(2). As always, the analysis upon remand should focus principally on the plain meaning of the statutory text. See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254-55, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). [11]