Opinion ID: 201500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Michael's Evidentiary Challenges

Text: 13 As a general matter, [w]e review the district court's decision to admit the disputed evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. McGuire, 389 F.3d 225, 228 (1st Cir.2004); see also Richards v. Relentless, Inc., 341 F.3d 35, 49 (1st Cir.2003) (reviewing relevancy determinations for abuse of discretion); United States v. Balsam, 203 F.3d 72, 84 (1st Cir.2000) (reviewing rulings pursuant to Rules 403 and 404(b) for abuse of discretion). If, however, there was no objection to the admission of the evidence at trial, our review is only for plain error. 7 See United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.2001). We will not find plain error unless (1) [ ] an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected [Michael's] substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. 14
15 We begin by evaluating the admission of the testimony concerning the Bulger/Flemmi group and its criminal exploits. Michael argues that because this testimony, which is described in detail below, was only marginally relevant, if at all, to the charged offenses and unfairly prejudicial, it should have been excluded under Rules 401, 402, and 403. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. Generally, [a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, while [e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. However, even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 8 Fed.R.Evid. 403. We note at the outset that [o]nly rarely — and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances — will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect. United States v. Sabetta, 373 F.3d 75, 82-83 (1st Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 Testimony Describing Persons Involved with the Bulger/Flemmi Group 17 Michael first questions the admission of St. Croix's testimony concerning individuals involved with the Bulger/Flemmi group. Specifically, he contests the admission of statements that: Stephen and Bulger were partners in a criminal organization (the Bulger/Flemmi group) 9 ; George Kaufman and Phil Costa were members of, and collected money owed to, that organization; and Frank Salemme was the head of the New England mafia and Stephen's ally. 18 The admission of these statements was not an abuse of discretion. Michael was charged with obstructing an investigation into the Bulger/Flemmi group and these statements were relevant because they provided the jury with useful background information — they introduced individuals associated with the investigation that Michael was charged with obstructing. See United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936, 941 (2d Cir.1997) (To be relevant, evidence need only tend to prove the government's case, and evidence that adds context and dimension to the government's proof of the charges can have that tendency. Relevant evidence is not confined to that which directly establishes an element of the crime.); see also United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1388 (2d Cir.1988) ([T]he trial court may admit evidence that does not directly establish an element of the offense charged, in order to provide background for the events alleged in the indictment.). 19 Moreover, the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial to Michael, as St. Croix never suggested that Michael was a member of the Bulger/Flemmi group. And, any prejudice that it may have caused was mitigated by the district court's limiting instructions. 20 Testimony About an X Fund 21 Michael next objects to the admission of Weeks' testimony that the Bulger/Flemmi group had an X fund — a fund comprised of money that was put aside every time we made a score ... for expenses that would come up, ... you know ... payoffs. The testimony was relevant because it indicated that the members of the Bulger/Flemmi group were intent on concealing the group's criminal activities, and thus, it tended to support the government's theory that Stephen recruited St. Croix (who, in turn, recruited Michael) to remove guns from the hide. And, any claim that the testimony was unfairly prejudicial to Michael is weak because Weeks never indicated that Michael had anything to do with the X fund. There was no error in the admission of this testimony. 22 Testimony About the Use of Coded Communications 23 Michael also asserts that the district court erred in admitting (1) St. Croix's testimony that, when possible, St. Croix, Weeks, Allen, and Michael avoided using intercom phones when communicating with Stephen in prison (they would, for example, hold up signs and gesture with their hands), and (2) Weeks' testimony that members of the Bulger/Flemmi group used nicknames when referring to law enforcement agents in front of Michael and that Michael understood the coded references. This testimony was highly relevant because it indicated that Michael was a trusted ally of the Bulger/Flemmi group (such that it would not be unreasonable to think that St. Croix would have enlisted his help in moving the guns) and that he was aware of, and willing to cover up, the group's activities (which helped establish his knowledge of the group's — and his brother's — unlawful behavior, as well as his intent to commit the crimes with which he was charged). We do not think that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony based on its high probative value. We also note that any danger of unfair prejudice was considerably lessened by the limiting instructions the district court gave. 24 Testimony About the Bulger/Flemmi Group's Criminal Activities 25 In addition, Michael attacks the admission of Weeks' testimony concerning: (1) the three people — Barrett, McIntyre, and Hussey — who were murdered in Weeks' presence and buried in Dorchester; (2) two others, Brian Halloran (Halloran) and Michael Donahue (Donahue), who were also murdered in Weeks' presence; and (3) the Bulger/Flemmi group's unlawful acquisition of a liquor store in which Weeks was directly involved. With regard to the murder victims, Weeks gave a brief account of the circumstances surrounding each murder. 10 In terms of the liquor store, Weeks stated that he intimidated the owners of the store (by brandishing a gun) so they would sell the store to the Bulger/Flemmi group. 26 The government defends the admission of this testimony by pointing out that the testimony (which brought to the fore Weeks' extensive criminal history) was important to Weeks' credibility and arguing that such impeachment evidence may be elicited on direct examination. 11 There is support for the government's position. See United States v. Frappier, 807 F.2d 257, 259 (1st Cir.1986) ([T]he prosecution, having called a witness, may then `take the wind out of the sails' of the defense by questions eliciting possible bases for impeachment.); see also Fed.R.Evid. 607 (The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.). Michael even concedes that informing a jury of the nature of a witness' prior criminal conduct is fair game. Nevertheless, he contests the admission of Weeks' testimony on the ground that the prejudicial effect of permitting the government to delve into the particulars of the Bulger/Flemmi group's crimes substantially outweighed the testimony's probative value. We disagree. Although there may be circumstances where a criminal defendant would be wronged if the prosecution were allowed to delve too deeply into the particulars of its witness' criminal history on direct, we do not think that this is such a case. Here, all but one of the statements had significant probative value. 12 And, there was little danger of unfair prejudice: there was no suggestion that Michael was involved in the crimes that Weeks described and the jury was instructed to that effect. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Weeks' testimony. See United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 28 (1st Cir.1988) (It is perhaps true that the government could have [made due] without so much detail concerning the prior [events], but this is essentially a Rule 403 balancing decision left to the broad discretion of the trial judge. (emphasis in original)). 27 Testimony that Weeks Sought a Gun from Stephen 28 The next challenge concerns Weeks' testimony that he visited Stephen in prison and asked Stephen for permission to take one of the guns from the hide so he could act on threats that had been made against him. According to Weeks, Stephen agreed to the request and stated that Stephen, Weeks, and Bulger were the only ones [who] knew [about the hide]. On appeal, Michael disputes only the admission of that portion of the testimony where Weeks stated that he sought a gun to act on threats made against him. The challenged statement was relevant because it prompted, and provided context to, the unchallenged, and clearly relevant, testimony concerning the hide. 13 See Sabetta, 373 F.3d at 83 (recognizing that testimony is relevant if it helps explain [ ] the chain of events). Although the challenged statement's probative value may not have been particularly high, we do not see how its admission caused Michael unfair prejudice — there was no indication that Michael knew of the conversation between Stephen and Weeks or Weeks' plan to act on the threats made against him. Consequently, there was no error in the testimony's admission. 29 Testimony Regarding a Bombing in which Stephen was Implicated 30 Michael also objects to the admission of St. Croix's testimony that he first obtained personal knowledge [of Stephen's] criminal activities ... in 1974 when he learned that Stephen had been implicated in [a] bombing. This testimony provided relevant background to the development of the illegal relationship between St. Croix and his father, a relationship that culminated in the concealment conspiracy in question. See United States v. Santana, 342 F.3d 60, 67 (1st Cir.2003) (noting that evidence is relevant in a conspiracy case if it explains the background of the illegal relationship). And, the naked reference to a bombing in which Stephen was allegedly implicated was not unfairly prejudicial to Michael, as there was no allegation that Michael was involved in, or knew of, the bombing. Moreover, any potential prejudice was counteracted by the limiting instructions. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. 31 Testimony Concerning St. Croix's Relationship with Stephen 32 Michael further contends that it was an abuse of discretion to allow St. Croix to testify that he and Stephen agreed that if St. Croix chose a life of crime, Stephen would show [him] how to do things and [St. Croix would] tell [Stephen] everything [he] was involved in ... to make sure [that he] didn't hurt any of [Stephen's] friends. We disagree. Immediately after St. Croix gave the challenged testimony, he told the jury that he took his father up on his offer and report[ed] to him on a regular basis. Therefore, the testimony was relevant as it established the background and formation of the illegal relationship between St. Croix and Stephen, and it explained why Stephen would feel comfortable telling St. Croix about the hide and asking him to move the guns. See id. (noting that, in a conspiracy case, evidence is relevant if it explains the background [and] formation ... of the illegal relationship and ... help[s] the jury understand the basis for the co-conspirators' relationship of mutual trust (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition, it is not clear how the testimony could have caused Michael unfair prejudice because there was no suggestion that he was in any way involved in St. Croix's life of crime. 33 Michael also finds fault in the admission of St. Croix's statements concerning Stephen's reaction after he learned that St. Croix's brother, Stephen's other son, refused to visit him because he was angry at him. According to St. Croix, Stephen said, What the hell has he got to worry about? All he had to do was 18 months. I may spend the rest of my life in prison. Michael, however, used the testimony pertaining to the length of Stephen's prison term to his advantage when he later relied on the likelihood that Stephen would spend the rest of his life in prison in presenting his defense: In his closing argument, Michael argued that St. Croix was angry at his father for killing Hussey and that, because he could not take direct revenge against his father, who would likely spend the rest of his natural life in prison, he falsely testified against Michael as an indirect way to punish Stephen. Under the circumstances, Michael can hardly complain of prejudicial error. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo-Figueroa, 34 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir.1994). 34 In any event, there was no error in the admission of this testimony. The testimony was relevant because it helped establish that St. Croix was upset with his father (St. Croix testified that his father's cavalier reaction to his brother's anger really [ ] upset him), 14 and thus, it supported Michael's defense that St. Croix falsely testified against him as a way to punish Stephen. See Frappier, 807 F.2d at 259 (stating that the prosecution may elicit possible bases for impeachment on direct). Moreover, we do not see how the testimony, which in no way reflected on Michael, could have caused Michael unfair prejudice. 35 Testimony that Stephen Confessed to Murdering Hussey 36 Michael next disputes the admission of St. Croix's testimony that, on January 20, 2000, Stephen admitted to killing Hussey in front of St. Croix and Michael. He did not object to the admission of this testimony below, and we do not find any error, much less plain error, in its admission. The testimony was highly relevant because Michael was charged with, among other things, perjuring himself before the grand jury, and on June 7, 2000, subsequent to the conversation in question, he told the grand jury that he had no idea whether Hussey was alive. 15 Although the testimony was certainly damaging to Michael, the district court did not err in finding that the danger of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the testimony's probative value. Testimony About Defense Funds 37 This brings us to the final piece of testimony pertinent to the Bulger/Flemmi group and its criminal exploits that Michael challenges on appeal: St. Croix's testimony about the existence of defense funds for members of the group. Despite Michael's insistence to the contrary, the district court did not err in allowing St. Croix to testify that a portion of the proceeds from the illegal activities in which he was involved were used to pay the legal expenses of Stephen and some of his associates. The testimony was relevant for impeachment purposes (its admission enabled the government to bring out on direct examination the fact that St. Croix was engaged in illegal activities), see Frappier, 807 F.2d at 259, and because it provided insight into the relationship between St. Croix and Stephen, see Santana, 342 F.3d at 67. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, because the testimony did not implicate Michael in St. Croix's illegal activities. 38
39 We now consider whether the district court erred in admitting testimony pertaining to Michael's interactions with the Bulger/Flemmi group. Michael argues that this testimony constituted unduly prejudicial evidence of uncharged misconduct that should have been excluded pursuant to Rules 403 and 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Nevertheless, 40 other bad acts evidence is admissible so long as the following, two-part test is satisfied: First, in accordance with Rule 404(b), the evidence must have special relevance to an issue in the case such as [motive,] intent or knowledge, and must not include bad character or propensity as a necessary link in the inferential chain.... Second, consistent with Rule 403, the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 41 United States v. McGuire, 389 F.3d 225, 229 (1st Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We identify, and evaluate Michael's objections to, the relevant statements below. 42 Testimony Concerning Michael's Interactions with Weeks 43 Weeks was permitted to tell the jury that he engaged in loan sharking in Michael's presence without trepidation because Michael was Ste [phen's] brother and Weeks trusted him. Weeks also testified that, after his gun license was revoked, Michael saw him with guns and, on two occasions, loaned him a gun. Weeks stated that he was not afraid [that Michael] was going to arrest [him] for [carrying a gun without a license]. Michael objects to the admission of this testimony for the first time on appeal, and as a result, our review is for plain error. 44 We find no error, and therefore, no plain error, in the admission of this testimony. The government tried Michael on the theory that he lied and obstructed justice to shield members of the Bulger/Flemmi group from prosecution. Thus, the testimony had special relevance in that it demonstrated Michael's knowledge that members of the group engaged in unlawful activities and evidenced his intent 16 to protect those individuals from facing the legal consequences of their actions. 17 Moreover, we do not think that the district court abused its discretion in balancing the probative value of this testimony against the danger of unfair prejudice. 45 Testimony that Michael Handled Stephen's Criminal Affairs 46 The next challenge involves testimony that Michael helped handle Stephen's affairs while Stephen was in prison. St. Croix testified that after Phil Costa died and [ ] Weeks was indicted, [he and Michael were the only people] left to handle [Stephen's] affairs on the outside. St. Croix also testified that, after Stephen's arrest, Michael was picking up money from various bookmakers ... owed to [Stephen]. 18 In addition, Weeks testified that Michael participate[d] in th[e] process of picking up [proceeds from an extortionate] sale. 19 47 Michael insists that the district court should have excluded the above statements. We disagree. The statements were specially relevant not only to show that Michael had knowledge of, and occasionally assisted in, Stephen's illegal activities (which helped establish that he had a motive to engage in the crimes with which he was charged — to conceal from the grand jury his and his brother's wrongdoing, as well as the intent to do so), but also to demonstrate that while Stephen was in prison, St. Croix and Michael were among the few people he trusted to help him with his illegal activities. This explains why Stephen would feel comfortable telling St. Croix about the hide and asking him to move the guns (and why St. Croix would then feel comfortable enlisting Michael to help). See Santana, 342 F.3d at 67 (allowing the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence to explain the trust that existed among the coconspirators). Although the testimony may have caused the jury to view Michael in a negative light, we do not think that the district court erred in admitting the evidence after balancing its significant probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice. 48 Testimony that Michael Informed Weeks of Stephen's Arrest 49 Michael also contests the admission of Weeks' statement that Michael told him that Stephen had been arrested soon after the arrest. Michael's claim is unavailing. The statement had special relevance that could reasonably have been found to outweigh any danger of unfair prejudice, as it helped establish Michael's knowledge of Stephen's legal troubles and wrongdoing. Moreover, the statement was independently admissible as a necessary component of Weeks' ensuing testimony, the admission of which Michael does not contest. Weeks testified that he responded to the news about Stephen's arrest by telling Michael, I told [Stephen] to take off, to which Michael replied, I know, I know. This exchange is probative of Michael's knowledge of Stephen's criminal wrongdoing and intent to obstruct justice (Michael acknowledged that he was aware that Stephen had been told to take off to avoid capture).
50 Having disposed of Michael's claims involving the testimony of his interactions with the Bulger/Flemmi group, we turn our attention to his final evidentiary challenge, which is premised on his assertion that the district court erred in admitting all of the above testimony that describes statements Stephen made to Weeks and St. Croix because that testimony related inadmissible hearsay. 20 Michael claims that, despite the district court's apparent finding to the contrary, the statements did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. As an initial matter, there are only two statements made by Stephen that would even arguably constitute hearsay but for the application of Rule 801(d)(2)(E): (1) his statement to Weeks that only he, Weeks, and Bulger knew of the hide, and (2) his statement to Michael and St. Croix that he killed Hussey. 21 51 To invoke Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the government bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a conspiracy embracing both the declarant and the defendant existed, and that the declarant uttered the statement[s] during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 283 (1st Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant who wishes to preserve for appeal a challenge to the admission of statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) must request, at the close of all the evidence, that the district court make a determination as to whether the government carried its burden. See United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 715 (1st Cir.1992). [A] defendant's failure to object to the omission of such an express trial-end determination bars him from raising the point on appeal in the absence of plain error. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the district court did not make, and Michael did not ask for, an express trial-end determination, our review is for plain error. Id. 52 We do not think that Michael has demonstrated that the admission of the challenged statements was error (and, ergo, he has not shown plain error). The government certainly established that Michael was involved in a conspiracy with Stephen, Weeks, St. Croix, and Allen to conceal the illegal activities of the Bulger/Flemmi group. 22 Nevertheless, Michael asserts that the statements should have been excluded because there was no evidence that he was a coconspirator at the time they were made. But, whether Michael was a coconspirator at the time the statements were made is irrelevant — we have held that an individual who joins a conspiracy at a later date,... effectively adopt[s] coconspirator declarations previously made. United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 778 (1st Cir.1995). 53 In addition, Michael claims that the statements were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy, but that claim also fails. [A] coconspirator's statement is considered to be in furtherance of the conspiracy as long as it tends to promote one or more of the objects of the conspiracy. United States v. Piper, 298 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir.2002). Stephen's statement to Weeks that Stephen, Weeks, and Bulger were the only people who knew of the hide furthered the conspiracy because it informed a coconspirator (Weeks) of those with knowledge of the hide, which was important to ensure that the knowledge remained contained. Likewise, Stephen's statement to Michael and St. Croix (in response to a direct question from St. Croix) that he killed Hussey furthered the conspiracy because it fostered a relationship of trust among the three, and it kept Michael and St. Croix abreast of current developments and problems facing the group, United States v. Jefferson, 215 F.3d 820, 824 (8th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54 We conclude our evidentiary discussion by noting that the one error we have identified, see supra note 12, was harmless and, as such, does not merit reversal of the jury verdict. It is settled that [a] non-constitutional evidentiary error is harmless (and, therefore, does not require a new trial) so long as it is highly probable that the error did not influence the verdict. Piper, 298 F.3d at 56. Here, that standard is met. This is because the jury was presented with ample direct evidence that Michael obstructed justice, committed perjury, and possessed guns. Moreover, the fact that the jury was instructed that it was to confine [its] deliberations to the crimes with which Michael [was] actually charged and that [g]uilt can never be established by the mere fact of association makes it even more unlikely that the error affected the verdict. 23