Opinion ID: 6215762
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Other Grounds Raised

Text: Hall relies on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to establish that his sentence was rendered illegal because there was no 4 hearing on the departure from presumptive-sentencing guidelines, and a jury did not set the sentence. In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court set forth the rule expressed in Apprendi as follows: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301. Because Hall’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum, his reliance on Blakely and Apprendi is misplaced. See Muhammad, 2021 Ark. 129, 624 S.W.3d 300; see also Smith v. State, 2021 Ark. 131 (rejecting petitioner’s claim that the sentence imposed was an illegal departure from the presumptive sentence due to the trial court’s failure to set forth the reasons for the departure, which was based on Blakely and Apprendi). Because the sentences imposed for first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and the firearm enhancement were facially legal, we need not discuss any other grounds raised by Hall. The trial court did not err when it denied the petition for relief under the statute because section 16-90-111(a) provides no relief when the petitioner cannot demonstrate that a sentence was illegal on its face. Affirmed. Dra’Kease D. Hall, pro se appellant. Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 5