Opinion ID: 157623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the District Court Err in Ordering $14.5 Million in Restitution?

Text: 116 Mr. Nichols next argues the district court erred in imposing $14.5 million restitution. In the district court, Mr. Nichols' counsel estimated the vast economic losses caused by the bombing exceeded $650 million. The actual cost of replacing the Murrah building today would be $34.9 million. The district court ordered restitution in the amount of $14.5 million, the original cost of the Murrah building, payable to the building's owner, the General Services Administration (GSA). 117 Mr. Nichols argues the order must be vacated for two reasons: (1) it violates the statutory requirement of showing his conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy directly harmed the GSA, and (2) the district court failed to consider Mr. Nichols' ability to pay and entered the order for punitive rather than compensatory purposes. We review the legality of a restitution order de novo. See United States v. Herndon, 982 F.2d 1411, 1420 (10th Cir.1992). Factual findings underlying a restitution order are reviewed for clear error and the amount of restitution for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Rogat, 924 F.2d 983, 984-85 (10th Cir.1991). 118 The Victim Witness and Protection Act (VWPA) provides a court may order restitution to any victim of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1997). In Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990), the Supreme Court instructed the VWPA authorizes an award of restitution only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of the conviction. After Hughey, the VWPA was amended in 1990 to provide: 119 For the purposes of this section, the term victim means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered including, in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 120 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (Supp. III 1997). 121 Mr. Nichols claims the restitution order was illegal under Hughey and the amended VWPA because: (1) the GSA was not a victim of the manslaughter convictions, and (2) he did not place and detonate the bomb; therefore, his conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy did not directly harm GSA. We find no merit in either point. The first is no point at all, and the second is unsupported. 122 Federal courts possess no inherent authority to order restitution, and may only do so as explicitly empowered by statute. United States v. Hensley, 91 F.3d 274, 276 (1st Cir.1996). Mr. Nichols argues the statutory language requiring the victim be directly harmed by the defendant precludes restitution in his case because he was merely a co-conspirator. He offers little authority to support this argument, and we have already ruled, losses caused by the entire conspiracy, not just losses caused by those acts committed by the defendant, can be attributed to the defendant when the district court orders restitution. United States v. Brewer, 983 F.2d 181, 185 (10th Cir.1993). Because Mr. Nichols was convicted of conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction against the Murrah building and the persons inside, the order of restitution to the building owner was correct under Brewer. 123 Mr. Nichols contends Brewer is not controlling because it did not address the 1990 amendments to the VWPA. We disagree. As the Fourth Circuit has explained, [n]othing in the plain language of [the amended] § 3663(a)(2) or its legislative history usurps the settled principle that a criminal defendant who participates in a conspiracy is liable in restitution for all losses flowing from that conspiracy. United States v. Plumley, 993 F.2d 1140, 1142 n. 2 (4th Cir.1993) (affirming restitution order under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664 where defendant argued her actions did not directly harm a robbed bank because she only drove the getaway car); see also United States v. Davis, 117 F.3d 459, 463 (11th Cir.1997) (not plain error to impose restitution on each member in conspiracy based on the acts of all). We agree with and adopt the view of our sister circuits. The district court did not err by holding Mr. Nichols is subject to full restitution. The more difficult issue raised, however, is whether the district court properly considered Mr. Nichols' ability to pay restitution. Under the VWPA, the court must consider the amount of loss sustained by each victim as a result of the offense; and the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and other such factors as the court deems appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. II 1996). The VWPA was amended in 1996 by the Mandatory Victim's Restitution Act (MVRA) which now requires restitution be ordered for crimes of violence without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1996). The district court did not apply the amended version of the act because it found a constitutional impediment to doing so. The basis for the district court's refusal to apply the MVRA is set forth in this bench ruling at the hearing of May 13, 1998, on restitution: 124 [I]t is my view that the significant difference between these two statutes [the VWPA and MVRA] and the reason for the change is that this is a mandatory restitution order. It is not dependent upon ability to pay now or in the future. It does not relate really to the situation of the defendant at all but focuses directly on the victims and what is needed to compensate them for the consequences of the crime for which the sentence is being imposed. 125 I think that is different. I think that is different in its thrust and effect; and accordingly, it is not to be applied in this case because to do so would be increasing the punishment for a crime in violation of the ex post facto prohibition in the Constitution. 126 Neither the government nor Mr. Nichols has directly taken issue with this ruling, but it has been raised in the brief of the amici who were present at and took part in the sentencing proceedings. 127 Amici argue that MVRA is not punitive in nature and therefore does not implicate the ex post facto prohibition. The government also suggests we can apply the MVRA, but Mr. Nichols takes the opposite view relying on United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir.1998) (holding Ex Post Facto Clause barred application of MVRA to defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute) (citing holdings or dicta of the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. circuits), and United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir.1998) (same). We believe under the circumstances, we must resolve the ex post facto question. See United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (stating court is not bound by the legal theories advanced by the parties but retains the power to identify the proper construction of the law). 128 We have held [t]he VWPA's purpose is not to punish defendants or to provide a windfall for crime victims but rather to ensure that victims, to the greatest extent possible, are made whole for their losses. United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Diamond, 969 F.2d 961, 968 (10th Cir.1992), and United States v. Rochester, 898 F.2d 971, 983 (5th Cir.1990)). In a case challenging a restitution order awarding sums that had accrued before passage of the substantive statute providing the basis for restitution, we held: 129 The Constitution's explicit prohibition against ex post facto laws applies only to those laws that inflict criminal punishment. Mr. Hampshire's restitution order does not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it does not inflict punishment upon him but rather seeks to compensate his child for his failure to pay his past due support obligation. 130 United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1006 (10th Cir.1996) (affirming restitution ordered pursuant to Child Support Recovery Act) (internal quotation marks omitted). This same view has been followed elsewhere as well. See United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir.1998) (application of MVRA is not prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause because it is not punitive in nature). We think the law in this circuit has been established in Hampshire and Arutunoff , 8 and we are obliged to follow it. 9 Therefore, we believe the district court erred in viewing restitution as a punitive act, thus leading it into the albeit logical but nonetheless erroneous conclusion it could not apply the MVRA. 131 The district court was not required to consider Mr. Nichols' financial condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A), thus mooting the issue raised by Mr. Nichols on appeal. Although disagreeing with the district court in the route it followed, we nonetheless affirm its judgment in assessing restitution against Mr. Nichols. See United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 n. 6 (10th Cir.1994) (stating we are free to affirm the district court on any grounds for which there is a supportive record). Although Mr. Nichols argues restitution in this instance was entered for punitive, even vindictive, purposes rather than to compensate victims, we are not persuaded. The government, as we have already noted, was a victim of the conspiracy, and it was entitled to compensation for its loss. 132 XI. Is the District Court's Judgment Fatally Defective Because it Fails to Enter Judgment on Some of the Jury's Verdicts of Acquittal? 133 Lastly, Mr. Nichols states: [T]he district court's judgment is fatally defective because it fails to enter judgment on the jury's verdicts of acquittal. This failure poses a serious threat to Mr. Nichols' double jeopardy rights, and requires that the judgment be vacated and the case remanded, regardless of what action this Court may take on the other issues presented. 134 The judgment entered in this case states, in pertinent part, that the defendant has been found not guilty on Counts Two [use of a weapon of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a] and Three [destruction by explosives, 18 U.S.C. § 844(f) ] and is discharged as to such counts. The judgment fails, however, to state the jury acquitted Mr. Nichols on the offenses of first and second-degree murder in Counts Four through Eleven. 135 Mr. Nichols complains of no more than a clerical error, and we need not vacate the judgment to correct the omission. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 36 (1994). Rule 36 provides the district court may at any time correct clerical mistakes in judgments arising from oversight or omission, even while a case is pending on appeal. Thus, the preferred remedy for correcting such a clerical error would have been a motion brought before the district court under Rule 36. See United States v. Wach, 907 F.2d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir.1990). Because counsel failed to take advantage of this simple remedy, we believe it sufficient here to call the oversight to the attention of the district court. It may then properly perform the purely ministerial task of correcting the judgment sua sponte. See United States v. Corey, 999 F.2d 493, 497 (10th Cir.1993). 136 In all other respects, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.