Opinion ID: 1090851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure to obtain adequate expert evidence.

Text: ¶ 208. Russell first argues that the manner in which defense counsel asked for funds in part to obtain mental health experts before the 1990 was deficient. Russell points to a motion for defendant's right to make ex parte applications, filed on March 16, 1990. The basis for this motion was that the State did not have any more right to have input in the selection of Russell's experts than Russell did on the experts used by the State. Defense counsel alleged in this motion that in making its request for these funds it would have to reveal to the court its theory of defense, results of investigation and other work product, along with contents of attorney-client conversations. At a hearing before the trial court on April 27, 1990, the circuit judge denied the motion, stating that the rules say I can't have an ex parte hearing now. On May 30, 1990, defense counsel filed a motion for mental examination, asking that Russell be examined by Dr. Gil McVaugh, a psychologist. At a hearing on May 31, 1990, the circuit court announced that, due to a ruling of this Court in another case, it could have ex parte rulings on experts. ¶ 209. Russell states that even though defense counsel were aware that a similar motion in another capital case in the same district had been successful, they then proceeded to file a motion for mental examination, requesting in open court that Russell be examined by Dr. McVaugh. The circuit court eventually ordered Dr. McVaugh, Dr. Charlton Stanley, a psychologist, and Dr. Donald Guild, a psychiatrist, to examine Russell in preparation for trial. Russell complains that counsel failed to secure their own evaluation of the client prior to exposing him to two state witnesses, both of whom would end up being witnesses against him in the penalty phase. The record shows that the trial court first denied defense counsel's request for an ex parte hearing and then came back later and said it would hold such a hearing only after defense counsel had filed the disputed motion to appoint Dr. McVaugh. Russell does not state how being evaluated before the state's doctors got to him would be any great advantage, as they would have eventually examined him anyway. ¶ 210. Russell next argues that defense counsel only obtained his medical and mental health records from the MDOC for the first time just before the second sentencing trial. Russell never states what was in these records that would have made a difference had they been obtained earlier. ¶ 211. Russell next argues that defense counsel had little or nothing to present at the 1993 sentencing hearing so defense counsel called Dr. Mulry Tetlow, a psychologist. Russell argues that this was being done at the last minute, and Tetlow's work was entirely inadequate, because it was done in a hopeless time frame. ¶ 212. Dr. Tetlow was a clinical psychologist and taught at Holy Cross College in New Orleans. He had testified twice previously as an expert in capital sentencing cases in Mississippi. Tetlow stated that he saw Russell a week before his testimony, spent four hours interviewing him and administering psychological tests, and taped a portion of the proceeding. He did testify that some of the data I'm still working on. Tetlow said that he spent eight hours reviewing files that he had been sent, including test reports of two unspecified psychologists and all raw data from Dr. Stanley's report. Tetlow also stated that he also had some reports on Russell's family history. ¶ 213. Dr. Tetlow had Russell take a drawing test, the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test, the Rorschach Ink Blot Test and a Thematic Apperception Test. Russell had already been given the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Inventory and Dr. Tetlow had those results. Dr. Tetlow testified that Russell could be a candidate for organic brain damage because he had sniffed glue and had abused alcohol. Dr. Tetlow stated that neuropsychological test shows definite brain damagedefinite organic dysfunction. Dr. Tetlow concluded that Russell suffered from underlying mental disorders which are the source of schizophrenia, and was suffering from this disorder when he killed Officer Cotton. Dr. Tetlow stated that he had spent about 40 hours working on the material. He denied that Russell's problem was that he had an anti-social personality disorder. ¶ 214. The State's rebuttal witnesses, Drs. McVaugh, Guild and Stanley, stated that Russell had an anti-social personality disorder. ¶ 215. Dr. Tetlow's affidavit is attached to Russell's amended petition. Dr. Tetlow states the following in his affidavit: that he met with defense counsel for the first time shortly before I testified; that time constraints prevented him from coming to a more detailed diagnosis; that he found fault with portions of each of the test results and testimony given by the State's experts; that defense counsel should have asked him about all this when he was on the stand and Dr. Tetlow was incredulous when they did not; that Dr. Tetlow's critique of Dr. Stanley's report and testimony was an extremely important part of what I had to contribute to Mr. Russell's defense, and would have been crucially important to the case; that the trial lawyers apparently did not understand the crucial importance of the materials I had prepared, and did not possess the competence to use it in their cross-examination of Dr. Stanley. In my judgment, had they confronted Dr. Stanley with the evidence of his biased and unprofessional testimony, the jury and court would have had a much different appreciation of his testimony concerning Mr. Russell; and finally, defense counsel should have asked for a continuance to give him more time. ¶ 216. Dr. Tetlow states that he did not have sufficient time, but with what time he did have he could have swayed the jury's decision. Dr. Tetlow assumes that if defense counsel had asked for a continuance it would have been granted. He states that if defense counsel had used him to attack the State's witnesses, particularly Dr. Stanley, or if they had used his work to attack Dr. Stanley, it would have made some kind of difference. We have reviewed Dr. Stanley's testimony and the cross-examination by defense counsel. Dr. Stanley appears at several instances during his testimony as colorful at best and callous and arrogant at worst. If the jury found him credible as he was, it is doubtful that any further attacks, even with Dr. Teltow's expert help, would have made a difference. ¶ 217. Russell then relies on the twenty-four page affidavit of Dr. Catherine L. Boyer, a psychologist from Alabama. Dr. Boyer states that all the mental health testimony, from Dr. Tetlow and the State, was flawed. Dr. Boyer makes some allowance for the time constraints put on Dr. Tetlow, but her primary conclusion is that everyone who analyzed Russell in this case performed poorly. Dr. Boyer states that a competent practitioner would have obtained a social and developmental history; chosen the psychological tests which would have been appropriate for Russell, taking into account his poor reading skills; gotten some competent neuropsychological testing done; and that the anti-social personality disorder diagnosis is prone to racial bias and could be applied to any number of inner-city African-American men who are being tried on criminal charges. Dr. Boyer never states who, with the requisite competence, was ready, willing and able, in 1993, to take on Russell's case. ¶ 218. Russell next argues that defense counsel should have brought out more evidence that other members of Russell's family have mental problems. Russell specifically mentions that he has a sister and a nephew that are mentally retarded. If Russell had presented this evidence, the State could have pointed to other members of Russell's family that are not mentally retarded, such as Russell's sister that testified for him, and another sister and Russell's daughter that he now argues would have been good witnesses. Russell states that he himself is mentally retarded, but the testimony on this is conflicting. Dr. McVaugh testified that Russell was mildly mentally retarded, Russell's IQ was 76, borderline low to normal, and he was not retarded. This subject is discussed at length later in this opinion. ¶ 219. Defense counsel did introduce evidence through Dr. Tetlow that Russell has brain damage. Russell argues that defense counsel should have followed up on this, and developed and introduced more evidence of this kind. Each time more evidence of this kind was introduced, the State would have gotten another chance to emphasize how Russell received this brain damage: drug abuse, alcohol abuse and a dangerous criminal lifestyle. We cannot say that the pluses of such evidence would outweigh the minuses. ¶ 220. We do not know what other options on the subject of mental health experts might have been available to the defense. Dr. Tetlow may have been the only option. It appears that Dr. Tetlow was under some kind of time constraint, though the exact nature and cause is unclear. The constraints may have been substantial enough to hinder Tetlow's effectiveness as a witness. ¶ 221. By the time of the 1993 sentencing hearing Russell had been declared competent, declared sane and convicted of capital murder. The only question at this point was aggravating versus mitigating circumstances. We are unable to say that Dr. Tetlow's presentation was half-baked. Even if defense counsel had done all that Russell now says should have been done, it is speculation to say that the result would have been any better or different. We cannot say that defense counsel's handling of expert witnesses in 1993 was ineffective. J. FAILURE TO PRESENT A MEANING OPENING STATEMENT DURING THE PENALTY PHASE. ¶ 222. Russell states that defense counsel's opening statement was thoroughly inadequate, but does not say why, except that it apparently was not long or detailed enough. Counsel stated that he was going to put on lay witnesses who knew Willie Russell so that the jury could know Russell better. Counsel also said that he would call an expert witness in the field of psychology. An opening statement can always be improved, but there does not appear to be any glaring deficiency in this one. K. FAILURE TO OBJECT ADEQUATELY TO AN ORDER PERTAINING TO WHAT EVIDENCE WOULD BE ADMISSIBLE. ¶ 223. The circuit court entered an order on February 26, 1993, which prohibited the State from offering, introducing any evidence on or otherwise making any reference to any of the enumerated aggravating circumstances other than those found to exist by the jury in Russell's first trial. At trial, the circuit court found that the State should be able to introduce evidence of the actual killing. Defense counsel objected and raised this as an issue on direct appeal. We found that the issue was without merit. See Russell, 670 So.2d at 832-33. ¶ 224. Russell states that this rendered counsel ineffective, in that [i]t is not always counsel's voluntary action that may make counsel ineffective.... Russell cites no authority for the proposition that counsel may be ineffective except as a result of his own action or inaction. This issue is without merit. L. FAILURE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS. ¶ 225. The two aggravating circumstances the State attempted to prove as to Russell were (1) the capital offense was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment and (2) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. The State offered proof of Russell's previous convictions for armed robbery, escape and kidnaping. Russell states now that defense counsel should have challenged the constitutionality of these convictions. We have found that the proper means for attacking prior convictions is by separate post-conviction actions in the respective court in which they occurred, and not in the court in which they are being used as aggravating factors or for enhancement purposes. See Holly v. State, 716 So.2d at 983. ¶ 226. Russell next states that his attorneys should have explored the details of his prior convictions. Apparently he is arguing that the jury should have heard more details of his prior convictions, not less. Russell mentions a few unsupported details about his prior convictions, such as in his robbery conviction, he only drove the getaway car; in another robbery he was framed by his girlfriend; and his escape was only a matter of opportunism. Even if this had been admissible, and the jury believed Russell enough to put their finding on the second aggravator in doubt, there was still another aggravating circumstance to support his death sentence. This issue is without merit. M. INEFFECTIVE CLOSING ARGUMENT DURING THE PENALTY PHASE. ¶ 227. Russell alleges that defense counsel failed to present an effective closing argument. He cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions discussing substandard, rambling, incoherent, perfunctory or lackluster arguments. Russell never states why these cases are applicable or how defense counsel's closing was deficient. This issue is without merit. N. FAILURE TO PREVENT THE JURY BEING COERCED INTO A UNANIMOUS VERDICT. ¶ 228. Russell next alleges that defense counsel failed to prevent a verdict against him by providing the venire an incorrect statement of the law. In the passage cited by Russell, defense counsel appears to be arguing that any decision by the jury would have to be unanimous. This one passage, taken in isolation, could be taken as meaning that split votes are not allowed. The passage cited by Russell is from the first trial. It would have no effect on Russell's second death sentence, decided by a different jury. This issue is without merit.