Opinion ID: 1545753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of the sole aggravating circumstance

Text: Next, Appellant maintains that the jury impermissibly found the sole aggravating factorthat he killed Milano in perpetration of the felony of kidnapping because such finding rested solely on Appellant's kidnapping conviction, and not on the jury's independent conclusion that the evidence proved the aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iii) (requiring aggravating circumstances to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt). He also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of the (d)(6) aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. In the sentencing hearing, the parties stipulated that, at his first trial, Appellant was convicted of kidnapping Milano. See N.T. Feb. 12, 2007, at 26 (reflecting the court's explanation to the jury that the stipulation means that the parties agree that Appellant was convicted of kidnapping); N.T. Feb. 13, 2007, at 171 (same). On this basis, the jury was entitled to find that Appellant had, as a factual matter, kidnapped Milano, and that the kidnapping was intertwined with the murder, as the underlying circumstances readily demonstrate. This, in turn, formed an adequate basis for the jury to find the (d)(6) aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Diggs, 597 Pa. 28, 48, 949 A.2d 873, 885 (2008); Commonwealth v. Cousar, 593 Pa. 204, 236, 928 A.2d 1025, 1044 (2007). It is also noteworthy that, in addition to stipulating to the conviction itself, Appellant accepted that such conviction constituted an aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes, arguing to the jury as follows: [The prosecutor] told you about the aggravating factors and there's a stipulation to one of them. That's correct but it doesn't end there. As the Judge will tell you once you find an aggravator, you then have to decide how much weight to give it. That's what the law says. So you may find kidnapping because it's stipulated to. . . . N.T. Feb. 12, 2007, at 22. Thus, [a]lthough the reasonable doubt standard is indeed applicable to aggravating circumstances, the defense, by stipulating to an aggravating circumstance, effectively declares that the Commonwealth has proved such aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Frey, 588 Pa. 326, 338 n. 11, 904 A.2d 866, 873 n. 11 (2006) (citation omitted). Accordingly, this claim is without merit.