Opinion ID: 2777003
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statutory appeal deadline

Text: ¶ 21 I disagree with this court’s holding that the district court order to annul and set aside the election “became unassailable when no appeal was taken by the parties” within the ten-day deadline set by statute.16 I would therefore reach the merits of the lieutenant governor’s arguments on that issue. ¶ 22 The Utah Constitution grants this court “original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs,” 17 and we may issue the writ when “no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is 12 See Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 2013 UT 15, ¶ 24 (“[W]hen an individual who is not a party to a district court proceeding is adversely affected by an order or judgment, the procedural mechanism for challenging the district court’s action is through a petition for extraordinary writ.”). 13Krejci v. City of Saratoga Springs, 2013 UT 74, ¶ 12, 322 P.3d 662 (refusing to adopt a rule requiring “intervention as a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for extraordinary writ”). 14 Id. ¶ 18 (recognizing that “petitioners’ decision to sit on the sidelines [during district court proceedings] was both strategically and economically defensible”). 15 Id. ¶ 20 (noting that petitioner could have filed a separate suit in district court regarding a ballot referendum but given “the need to seek relief occurred so shortly before the ballot decision would have to be made, a new proceeding in the district court was not a ‘speedy’ or ‘adequate’ remedy”). 16 Infra ¶¶ 60–66. 17 UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 3. 9 COX v. LAYCOCK A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II available.” 18 Thus, we will only issue a writ in exceptional circumstances, balancing due deference to the legislature with our constitutional prerogative. For example, in Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, this court permitted a defendant to challenge a decision by the Board of Pardons through an extraordinary writ even though the legislature had insulated Board decisions from judicial review. 19 We allowed the challenge because “where there is a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion and fundamental principles of fairness are flouted, a court may, giving appropriate deference to legislative policy[,] . . . intervene to correct such abuses by means of an appropriate extraordinary writ.” 20 In my view, the lieutenant governor has alleged just such an abuse, claiming that the district court erroneously denied Mr. Withers his candidacy and citizens their right to vote. As Utah’s chief election official, the lieutenant governor had an interest in the outcome of the case. But because he was not a party below, the only remedy available to him was through a writ. I believe this situation rises to the level of the sort of exceptional circumstance that an extraordinary writ was meant to address. ¶ 23 Therefore, I would conclude that the lieutenant governor’s request was not foreclosed by the statutory language declaring the office vacant at the close of the parties’ ten-day appeal deadline. Certainly election contests represent a unique form of litigation due, in part, to their time-sensitive nature. It is presumably for this reason that the legislature provided the brief ten-day window for the parties to appeal an election decision. But the issuing of a writ is an equitable power derived from our duty to prevent a “flagrant abuse of discretion.” 21 To declare the district court’s decision insulated from review curtails our constitutional power and deprives the lieutenant governor of the only remedy available to him. I also note concern about possible 18 UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B(a). 19 904 P.2d 677, 683–84 (Utah 1995). 20 Id.; see State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 19, 127 P.3d 682 (recognizing that in Renn “we relied upon this court’s constitutional authority to issue extraordinary writs” even though “the statute foreclos[ed] judicial review”). 21 Renn, 904 P.2d at 683. 10 Cite as: 2015 UT 20 A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II due process implications for individuals whose interests may be affected because they were not made parties to the action and may not have had notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. We have extolled “the practical utility of the flexibility of extraordinary writs in various circumstances,” 22 and I believe such flexibility is warranted here. ¶ 24 I would instead evaluate the lieutenant governor’s request under the equitable doctrine of laches. We have explained that under rule 65B “there is no fixed limitation period governing the time for filing” extraordinary writs.23 However, we cautioned that a writ “should be filed within a reasonable time after the act complained of has been done or refused” because “the equitable doctrine of laches is available to dismiss untimely writs.” 24 I believe that in filing his petition on August 26—twelve days after the district court’s order—the lieutenant governor acted within a reasonable time. Under the doctrine of laches, we look to a party’s lack of diligence and the resulting injury. 25 I cannot say that the lieutenant governor acted without diligence when he submitted his petition less than two weeks after the district court order, particularly given that he was not a party to the action below and may not have had notice of the election contest. I therefore would conclude that the lieutenant governor could challenge the district court order to annul and set aside the election, and I would reach the merits of that claim.