Opinion ID: 2338714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Harmless Error: Standard and Application

Text: Particularly because the government's three eyewitnessesHarvey, Nicholas, and Hungerfordall identified Samuels as a participant on June 18, the centerpiece of Samuels' defense was his proffered impeachment of Hungerford with evidence tending to show, by reference to the recent and similar June 3 incident, that someone other than Samuels had committed the crime on June 18. The trial judge did allow Samuels' counsel to ask Hungerford about the alleged June 3 incident, but, because the judge would not allow impeachment with extrinsic evidence, Hungerford's denial was the end of counsel's impeachment effort. The attempt to impeach Hungerford with extrinsic evidence of bias, which was cut off entirely, went to the core of the defense. Stack v. United States, 519 A.2d 147, 151 (D.C.1986). The court's error, therefore, was of constitutional magnitude violating Samuels' Sixth Amendment right to confront government witnessesif the proffer of Bego's testimony was credible. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-80, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1434-36, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Jenkins v. United States, 617 A.2d 529, 531-34 (D.C.1992); Stack, 519 A.2d at 151, 154. Strictly speaking, the judge here did not curtail cross-examination; rather []he restricted extrinsic testimony. C.B.N., 499 A.2d at 1221. Nonetheless, because the purpose of admitting the extrinsic evidence is the same as cross-examination, the same harmless error test applies. Id.; accord Clark v. United States, 639 A.2d 76, 81 (D.C. 1993) (Where, for example, the trial court's evidentiary ruling wholly deprived the defendant of any opportunity to cross examine a witness or present evidence concerning bias or a central issue in the case, we may only affirm if we are convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.... (emphasis added)). Likewise, as we previously have indicated, the failure to admit reverse- Drew  evidence will be subject to constitutional harmless error analysis if the evidence goes to the heart of the defense theory. Stack, 519 A.2d at 154. [11] Hungerford was a key government witness, particularly in light of Harvey's and Nicholas' failure to identify Samuels before the appearance of a newspaper article picturing Samuels and identifying him as a suspect in the murder of Williams. Her credibility, therefore, was a central issue in the case, and, for that reason, we must examine the exclusion of extrinsic evidence of her bias for constitutional error. See C.B.N., 499 A.2d at 1221; United States v. Hudson, 970 F.2d 948, 955 (1st Cir.1992) (finding constitutional error where court excluded proffered extrinsic testimony of defense witness regarding bias of key government witness). Because Samuels' proffer of extrinsic evidence both to impeach Hungerford for bias and to show a reasonable possibility that someone else committed the crime implicated both the right of confrontation and the right to present a defense, Bassil, 517 A.2d at 716, we are satisfied that the constitutional harmless error standard applies here. Our next step, therefore, is to determine whether the exclusion of the proffered evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680-81, 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1435-36, 1438; Jenkins, 617 A.2d at 532-34; Stack, 519 A.2d at 154; C.B.N., 499 A.2d at 1221. If Bego's testimony conforms with the proffer, we cannot find exclusion of that proffered evidence harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to Samuels on this record; we cannot say that a jury necessarily would believe only the inculpatory evidence as to Samuelsthe eyewitness testimony of Hungerford, Harvey, and Nicholasrather than Bego's Winfield evidence tending to prove that someone other than Samuels committed both crimes. Although both Harvey and Nicholas identified Samuels in the June 18 incident, there was testimony that they both had been smoking crack and drinking brandy at the time. In addition, both men had failed to identify Samuels until after his picture had appeared with a newspaper article identifying him as a suspect in the Williams murder. Finally, the proffer itself would impeach Hungerford. The jury, therefore could have discounted the identification testimony of all three witnesses. Furthermore, there was no physical evidencesuch as a wallet, as in Newman's caseto locate Samuels at the crime scene on June 18; there was no inculpatory statement by Samuels, as there arguably was by Newman; and there was no testimony by Hungerford indicating she had known Samuels (as she had known Newman) before the June 18 murder. Accordingly, it would be for the jury, not this court, to decide what evidence was credible; and, if Samuels' proffer were to hold upto have substancehe would be entitled to reversal and a new trial.