Opinion ID: 2602376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Excluding Evidence on the Decedent's Suicidal Tendencies

Text: {7} Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence relating to Peek's suicidal tendencies and he was prejudiced as a result. In support of his theory that Peek burned himself to death, Defendant sought to introduce evidence of Peek's mental illness, his suicidal ideations, and prior suicide attempts. {8} Defendant proffered the testimony of Dr. William Foote, a clinical and forensic psychologist, who reviewed Peek's extensive psychological and psychiatric history. Dr. Foote would have testified that Peek had been diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia and bouts of severe depression, and had attempted suicide on at least six occasions since 1987. Five of the attempts occurred by way of an overdose of prescription drugs and the other by slashing himself. Dr. Foote would have also testified that Peek was a substance abuser, consuming mainly alcohol, but also prescription drugs, solvents or whatever else was available. There were indications in his medical records that Peek had sustained brain injury as a result of solvent abuse. According to Dr. Foote, Peek's behavior tended to follow a consistent pattern in which violent or suicidal behavior would result in hospitalization and stabilization through therapeutic drugs. However, following hospital release, Peek would cease taking his medication and begin abusing alcohol or other substances. That, in turn, would contribute to his suicidal ideations and lead to other violent incidents or suicide attempts. {9} Peek appeared to be following this pattern at the time of his death. Three weeks prior to his death, he had expressed to his counselor suicidal ideations and that he intended to stop taking his medication. Also, in the weeks leading up to his death, Peek missed several counseling appointments. The absence of therapeutic drugs in his system indicated that Peek had not taken his medication for at least two weeks prior to his death. Finally, Dr. Foote would have testified that, based on studies of people who commit suicide by self-immolation, Peek was more likely than the average person to have ended his life in this manner due to the combined effects of schizophrenia, depression, his history of personality disorder and violent behavior, and intoxication at the time of death. {10} The trial court determined the evidence of Peek's mental illness and suicidal propensities was irrelevant under Rules 11-401 and 11-402 and therefore inadmissible. It stated that, even if such evidence had been somewhat relevant, it was more prejudicial than probative and would have inserted a confusing issue at trial under the balancing test of Rule 11-403 NMRA 2001. As an alternate ground for exclusion, the trial court considered Rule 11-404(A) NMRA 2001, which prohibits the use of character evidence offered to prove conduct. The trial court further noted Defendant had failed to show that Peek's possible suicide was an essential element of his defense. Finally, the trial court believed there was no physical evidence specifically indicating suicide. {11} Initially, we note the trial court's recognition that evidence of suicide is not an element of the defense was correct, given that suicide is not a recognized affirmative defense. See generally UJI 14-5101 NMRA 2001 (insanity as an affirmative defense); UJI 14-5171 NMRA 2001 (self-defense as an affirmative defense). However, the evidence of Peek's suicidal tendencies was relevant to the element of causation, which the State had the burden of proving. See State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-041, ¶ 16, 126 N.M. 371, 970 P.2d 143 (explaining the State's burden of proving causation). For the reasons that follow, we hold the trial court abused its discretion in its exclusion of this evidence. {12} Rule 11-403 provides, in part, that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.... While the trial court believed the evidence of the decedent's prior suicide attempts to be at least minimally relevant, it appears its balancing test under Rule 11-403 went awry, in that it erroneously gave inordinate weight to the possible prejudice from such evidence. {13} Many jurisdictions have dealt with the issue of the admission or exclusion of evidence relating to the possible suicide or suicidal tendencies of an alleged victim of a homicide. In State v. Drach, 268 Kan. 636, 1 P.3d 864, 868-69 (2000), the court acknowledged that a clear majority and nearly all cited jurisdictions have held that evidence of suicide is admissible as tending to show the decedent's state of mind, and that the cases indicate that evidence of a suicide theory is generally admissible since the jury is capable of determining its validity and attaching the proper weight. Generally, in a homicide defense, [a] suicidal tendency or disposition may be shown in order to create the presumption of suicide, where the testimony shows that death may have been produced by deceased, or there is no positive and direct proof of homicide. 41 C.J.S., Homicide, § 215, p. 55 (footnote omitted). [A]ny evidence otherwise competent tending to show that deceased came to his death by his own act is admissible[.] Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, for example, in People v. Taylor, 112 Cal.App.3d 348, 169 Cal.Rptr. 290, 299 (1980), the court held admissible any competent evidence tending to show the decedent came to his death as a result of his own actions, noting that it was the victim's inclination or propensity to commit suicide under stress that was relevant. {14} The time between the decedent's death and his or her actions or statements indicating, or relating to, suicide does not necessarily impact its admissibility. See, e.g., State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404, 407 (Utah 1999) (holding past suicide attempts made three years before the alleged murder were not so remote as to be irrelevant); People v. Salcido, 246 Cal.App.2d 450, 54 Cal.Rptr. 820, 827 (1966) (holding evidence of victim's earlier suicide attempts, one several months prior to death, should have been admitted). The court in Salcido specifically held that any acts, conduct or declarations of a decedent tending to prove she may have committed suicide are relevant and material even though they may have occurred many months prior to death. See also Drach, 1 P.3d at 868-69 (allowing admission of evidence of deceased's declarations or threats indicating suicidal disposition where facts did not preclude possible suicide). {15} We agree with the rationale of other jurisdictions, which have dealt with this issue, that evidence of suicide is admissible as tending to show the decedent's state of mind, and that evidence of a suicide theory is generally admissible since a properly instructed jury is fully capable of evaluating its validity and attaching the proper weight. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to require that Defendant first provide direct evidence specifically indicating Peek had committed suicide on the night in question before allowing the admission of evidence concerning the suicide theory. {16} Furthermore, evidence of Peek's suicidal tendencies was not so remote as to be irrelevant. Rather, competent evidence, from Dr. Foote, was available which suggested that Peek may have succeeded in committing suicide on this occasion. There was evidence that Peek had been following a pattern of behavior at the time of his death similar to behavior which preceded prior suicide attempts. Based on the above, we hold the testimony of Dr. Foote was not minimally relevant, but rather highly relevant, making such evidence presumptively admissible. See Rule 11-402. {17} Having decided that the excluded evidence was highly probative, the trial court could only properly exclude such evidence if it deemed it so extraordinarily inflammatory to the jury that the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. See 11-403. `Unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. Advisory Committee's Note on Fed. Rule Evid. 403., 28 U.S.C.App., p. 860. Evidence should be excluded as unfairly prejudicial in the sense of being too emotional if it is best characterized as sensational or shocking, provoking anger, inflaming passions, or arousing overwhelmingly sympathetic reactions, or provoking hostility or revulsion or punitive impulses, or appealing entirely to emotion against reason. 1 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 94 (2d ed.1987). The evidence that Peek suffered from mental illness and had attempted suicide in the past is not the type of evidence that has the unusual propensity to prejudice, confuse, inflame or mislead the fact finder. {18} In Jaeger, the Utah Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion on the admission of such evidence when it held that medical records, containing statements that the victim had previously attempted suicide, were admissible when introduced in a case where defendant claimed the victim committed suicide. Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 408. See generally State v. Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 253, 731 P.2d 943, 949 (1987) (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to admit gruesome photograph because the danger of unfair prejudice was not, as a matter of law, greater than the probative value of the evidence). Furthermore, under Rule 11-403, consumption of time was not a factor in the case at hand where the testimony was not cumulative and its exclusion affected the fundamental right of Defendant to present his defense. Defendant had a fundamental right to present evidence negating the State's evidence on causation and the fact finder should have been given the opportunity to consider such evidence and determine what weight, if any, to give to it in light of all other evidence. Based on the foregoing, we hold the trial court abused its discretion in denying the admission of evidence relating to the decedent's suicidal tendencies. Under Rules 11-401 and 11-402, the evidence was relevant and should not have been excluded under Rule 11-403. {19} The State argues that even if the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence, Defendant was not prejudiced by the error. See State v. Wright, 84 N.M. 3, 5, 498 P.2d 695, 697 (Ct.App.1972) (stating that in order for error to be reversible it must be prejudicial). We do not agree. When a substantial right of a party is affected, evidence may not be excluded. See State v. Varela, 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 37, 128 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d 1280. {20} In the present case, the issue of suicide was never allowed to be presented to the jury. The only explanation the fact finder had before it for the presence of gasoline on the deceased and the fire was that Defendant purchased the gasoline, transported it back to the apartment, poured it on Peek and intentionally set him on fire. The trial court never allowed the defense to inquire of the experts whether it was possible that Peek started the fire intentionally. It appeared the State's experts had not seriously considered the possibility that Peek himself started the fire since they, themselves, were apparently unaware of his suicidal propensities. Since the fire was ignited within inches of Peek and the ignition source was unknown, it would appear from the record that it was possible for the fact finder to conclude that Peek started the fire. The proffered testimony of Dr. Foote would have supported the plausible explanation that Peek intentionally started the fire himself, as a means of committing suicide. We conclude the exclusion of the evidence in question was prejudicial to Defendant. We further conclude that the evidence relating to Peek's suicidal tendencies should have been admitted for the jury to consider and determine what weight and effect, if any, to place on it. Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court on its exclusion of evidence relating to Peek's suicidal tendencies. {21} Although the trial court considered, but ultimately did not decide on, excluding the proffered suicide evidence under Rule 11-404, we address that issue to avoid confusion upon retrial regarding whether it is appropriate to categorize evidence of a decedent's suicidal tendencies as character evidence. Rule 11-404(A) provides that [e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.... The evidence of prior suicide attempts is not appropriately analogized to prior bad acts which are inadmissible to show character, as provided for under Rule 11-404(B). [1] Rather, the evidence here was of a serious, long-term mental illness treatable with medication and specific manifestations of that illness. {22} We hold that evidence of suicidal tendencies of a deceased should not be considered character evidence for purposes of Rule 11-404. Suicidal dispositions typically stem from mental illness, not from a person's bad character or trait of character. See generally In re Joseph G., 34 Cal.3d 429, 194 Cal.Rptr. 163, 667 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1983) (In Bank) (recognizing that suicide in the United States has continued to be considered an expression of mental illness). The Supreme Court of South Dakota recently held that expert testimony concerning the risk factors for suicide, such as mental illness, depression, significant physical illness, chemical dependency, suicidal ideation or previous suicidal behavior, was relevant and admissible. State v. Guthrie, 627 N.W.2d 401, 410-11 (S.D.2001). This holding was reached despite the high court's cautiousness in authorizing definitive opinions based on psychological syndromes. Id. at 417-18. However, the court determined that insight into the state of mind of suicidal individuals was of benefit to the fact finder. Id. at 417. With similar reasoning, in State v. Hueglin, 2000-NMCA-106, ¶ 16, 130 N.M. 54, 16 P.3d 1113, our Court of Appeals held that psychological testimony concerning the functional age of a victim with Down Syndrome was properly admitted into evidence. {23} In determining whether evidence of suicide and suicidal tendencies is admissible, jurisdictions that have analyzed its admissibility have not considered the application of Rule 11-404. See, e.g., Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 406-10; Taylor, 169 Cal.Rptr. at 298-300. In New Mexico, and under the facts of this case, exclusion of such evidence under Rule 11 404 would be inconsistent with the main purpose of our Rules of Evidence, that being the ascertainment of the truth. See State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 185, 539 P.2d 204, 205 (1975) (suggesting the Rules of Evidence should not be applied mechanistically to defeat their purpose). A finding of relevancy under Rule 11-401 and the careful application of the balancing test under Rule 11-403 are sufficient to prevent the misuse of expert evidence pertaining to typical characteristics of suicidal individuals. {24} Although this Court is generally deferential to the evidentiary rulings of trial courts, see Woodward, 121 N.M. at 4, 908 P.2d at 234, the complete exclusion of any evidence concerning suicide cannot reasonably be justified under the facts of this case. The denial of an opportunity for Defendant to develop a major part of his defense was an abuse of discretion. See generally State v. Duncan, 111 N.M. 354, 356, 805 P.2d 621, 623 (1991) (holding that evidence of defendant's state of mind was of such import to the defense that excluding it constituted an abuse of discretion). Here, the evidence of the deceased's suicidal tendencies was relevant under Rule 11-401, and, therefore, admissible under Rule 11-402. It was not excludable under Rule 11-403 or Rule 11-404. We reverse the trial court on this issue.