Opinion ID: 786677
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Comparable Treatment of Probationers and Parolees

Text: 239 Judge Kleinfeld contends in his separate opinion that probationers and parolees should be treated differently for purposes of probation and parole searches. I disagree. The Court in Knights did not address the question of whether, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a probationer and a parolee should be treated comparably. However, other cases by the Court suggest that they should be. See, e.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164 ([I]t is always true of probationers (as we have said to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy `the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.') (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)) (alteration in original). The California Supreme Court invokes the same justifications for conditions of probation and parole, without differentiating between probation and parole. See, e.g., Woods, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d at 1027(probation); Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 450 (parole). I agree with Judge Kleinfeld that for some purposes probationers and parolees can be treated differently, but I do not believe that they are different for present purposes. Indeed, we have explicitly stated that probationers and parolees are indistinguishable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See Harper, 928 F.2d at 896 n.1 (Nor do we see a constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the fourth amendment.).