Opinion ID: 2064648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Father's Appeal

Text: The sole issue raised by the father's appeal is his contention that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine is applicable in this case. This court has abrogated the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, with two exceptions:    (1) Where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care   . Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968); see, Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966). The second exception does not apply in this case, because none of the specific types of care enumerated is involved here, and the term other care should, we believe, be construed to apply to items similar to those enumerated. Cole v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis.2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970). It appears, therefore, that whether the father is immune from tort liability depends on how broadly the first exception is construed. This is a matter of first impression in Minnesota. Wisconsin and Michigan, which both recognize the identical two exceptions that we recognize, [2] have construed the parental authority exception differently. The Michigan Court of Appeals, in Paige v. Bing Const. Co., 61 Mich.App. 480, 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975), held that a construction company could not recover contribution from the parents of a child for negligent supervision where a 2½-year-old child died as the result of a fall into a man-made hole on a construction site. The court concluded that the parents were immune from suit, because of the parental authority exception. The court construed this exception, stating: A parent's exercise of authority over his or her child involves more than discipline. It includes the providing of instruction and education so that a child may be aware of dangers to his or her well being. We find it impossible to separate such general phenomena as authority and supervision. In order to adequately supervise a child, every parent knows that some amount of discipline is inextricably involved. The right to exercise authority over a child certainly includes the responsibility to supervise that child's behavior. 61 Mich.App. 486, 233 N.W.2d 48. [3] The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Co., 56 Wis.2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972), held that a mother was not immune from tort liability where she was found to have negligently supervised or educated her 3-year-old child. Her child was injured by a bus when he ran into the street from between parked cars. The court construed the parental authority exception to embrace only the area of discipline and, therefore, not to extend to negligent supervision. [4] We find it unnecessary to adopt either construction to affirm the trial court's refusal to grant immunity to the father. The jury's finding concerning the father's causal negligence included its affirmative answer to this question: Was Gerald Romanik negligent in warning John Romanik of any dangers or defects as to the use of the Toro Snow Hound? The record permits interpreting this finding to encompass either a finding of (1) negligence in failing to adequately warn his son of the dangers in the use or defects inherent in the snowthrower  in short, negligent supervision, or (2) negligence in instructing his son that it was acceptable to operate the clutch lever by hand, contrary to the specific instructions contained in the operator's manual that it should be operated by pushing the lever down with the foot, or both. [5] A fair reading of the relevant testimony persuades us that the jury's finding of negligence was more likely based on the father's instructions to operate the clutch lever contrary to the operator's manual than on the broader finding of negligent supervision. The father testified that he specifically instructed his son in the use of the snowthrower and told him before the accident that it was acceptable to operate the clutch lever by hand, despite his testimony that he read and understood the instructions in the manual that it was to be operated with the foot. Also, the evidence is undisputed that before the accident the son had observed the father and the father had observed his son so operate the lever. A parent who entrusts a potentially dangerous piece of machinery to a child and negligently instructs him to operate it contrary to the operator's manual cannot characterize his misconduct as negligent supervision. At the very least, it is an affirmative act of negligence involving a foreseeable, unreasonable risk of injury to a child. The policy favoring immunity for a parent's exercise of ordinary discipline and authority over a child cannot justifiably be extended to the facts peculiar to this case. Thus, we leave our construction of the scope of the parental-authority exception to a case where liability is based on a clear finding of negligent supervision. Accordingly, we hold the immunity exceptions inapplicable to bar suit against the father. Affirmed. OTIS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.