Opinion ID: 201767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instructions Regarding Drug Quantity Calculation

Text: 71 The district court required the jury to answer a question on a special verdict form: Do you unanimously agree by proof beyond reasonable doubt that the quantity of cocaine involved in the conspiracy charged in count 1 was more than five kilograms as charged in the indictment? A similar question was applied to the attempt charge. The jury answered yes to each question for each defendant. 72 Rodriguez argues that the jury instructions were defective because they did not incorporate certain standards found in the Sentencing Guidelines for determination of drug quantity in a reverse sting: 73 In an offense involving an agreement to sell a controlled substance, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance shall be used to determine the offense level unless the sale is completed and the amount delivered more accurately reflects the scale of the offense. . . . [I]n a reverse sting, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance would more accurately reflect the scale of the offense because the amount actually delivered is controlled by the government, not by the defendant. If, however, the defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide, or was not reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance, the court shall exclude from the offense level determination the amount of controlled substance that the defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide or was not reasonably capable of providing. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 12 (2002). 12 74 Rodriguez argues that application note 12 should have been incorporated into the jury charge, and that the jury might have found that since there was no evidence that he had even a tenth of the money needed to buy five kilograms of cocaine, he was not reasonably capable of purchasing five kilograms. Because Rodriguez did not request this instruction below, we review for plain error. United States v. Medina-Martinez, 396 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2005). Under this rigorous standard, Rodriguez must show that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was clear or obvious, (3) the error affected his substantial rights, and (4) the error also seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. 75 It may seem unusual to suggest that a principle from the Sentencing Guidelines, which are applied by the court (even under the post- Booker advisory regime), should govern a statutory determination. Indeed, Rodriguez has not cited any case from any court holding that any aspect of the Sentencing Guidelines must be incorporated into jury instructions. He does, however, cite United States v. Lindia, 82 F.3d 1154, 1160 (1st Cir. 1996), for the proposition that [a]pplication note 12 applies for the purposes of both the Sentencing Guidelines and the statutory penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). But Rodriguez has cited no case, and we have found none, suggesting that Lindia has any applicability to jury quantity determinations, or that application note 12 must be incorporated into jury instructions. 13 76 That said, we need not decide whether it would have been correct to grant a request to instruct the jury that it should exclude the amount of controlled substance that the defendant establishes that the defendant did not intend to provide or purchase or was not reasonably capable of providing or purchasing if the defendant had requested such an instruction, nor whether it would have been error to deny a timely request for such an instruction, nor even whether it was error to fail to so instruct sua sponte. The error, if any, was not clear or obvious, and therefore Rodriguez's challenge fails under plain error review.