Opinion ID: 1984671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Summary Judgment Properly Granted on the Issue of Actual Malice?

Text: Having been a police officer when the alleged cheating incident occurred and a City Councilor when the articles and editorials appeared in the newspapers, Tucci concedes that he is a public official within the meaning of New York Times, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686. Therefore, to succeed in this action, he must prove not only that the allegedly defamatory statements were in fact false, but that defendants made the statements with `actual malice'  that is, with knowledge that [they were] false or with reckless disregard of whether [they were] false or not. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726; see also Michaud v. Inhabitants of the Town of Livermore Falls, 381 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Me.1978). Plaintiff's burden is a heavy one; actual malice must be proved with convincing clarity. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86, 84 S.Ct. at 729; Michaud, 381 A.2d at 1114. The New York Times standard of actual malice has a specialized inquiry which focuses on defendant's attitude towards the truth or falsity of the publication rather than on defendant's ill will or animosity against plaintiff. Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 40 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078, 100 S.Ct. 1028, 62 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980); Michaud, 381 A.2d at 1113. Where, as here, the plaintiff claims that defendants published with reckless disregard of the truth, he must show by evidence of convincing clarity that these defendants in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964) (only those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity ... may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions). Before addressing the propriety of entering summary judgment for the defendants on the issue of actual malice, we must next set forth the applicable law relative to summary judgment. M.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides in relevant part: Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must not resolve any issues of fact; rather, it must determine whether there is any issue of material fact from which a jury could find for the non-moving party. Hammond v. Maine Central R.R., 390 A.2d 502, 504 (Me.1978); Millett v. Dumais, 365 A.2d 1038, 1042 (Me.1976); see also Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 573 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922, 89 S.Ct. 1776, 23 L.Ed.2d 239 (1969). [Summary judgment] should only be granted when `the facts before the court so conclusively preclude . . . [a party's] recovery' that a judgment in favor of the other party is the only possible result. Wallingford v. Butcher, 413 A.2d 162, 165 (Me.1980). Where, as here, a defendant in a libel action moves for summary judgment on the issue of actual malice, the motion should be granted only, if upon viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, there exists no genuine issue of fact from which a jury could reasonably find with convincing clarity that defendants acted with actual malice. Yiamouyiannis v. Consumer Union of the United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932, 940 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839, 101 S.Ct. 117, 66 L.Ed.2d 46 (1980); Nader, 408 A.2d at 42; Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 341, 563 P.2d 395, 399 (1977); National Association of Government Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 231, 396 N.E.2d 996, 1003 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S.Ct. 2152, 64 L.Ed.2d 788 (1980); MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830, 832 (Wyo.1980). Although the facts are viewed against the convincing clarity standard, this does not work a change in traditional summary judgment procedure. The standard (convincing clarity) against which the evidence is examined is dictated by New York Times, while the manner of examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party is the same as in all determinations of motions for summary judgment. [5] Guam Federation of Teachers, Local 1581, A.F.T. v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872, 95 S.Ct. 132, 42 L.Ed.2d 111 (1974); Nader, 408 A.2d at 42; Bandelin, 98 Idaho at 341, 563 P.2d at 399. In light of those principles, we now review the presiding justice's granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the issue of actual malice. In doing so, we do not accord deference to the presiding justice's determination. Rather, we must independently review whether the evidence which is either undisputed or, if disputed, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff raises a genuine issue of fact from which a jury could reasonably find that actual malice was established with convincing clarity. See MacGuire, 612 P.2d at 833. The underlying material facts in this case are essentially undisputed. Tucci does not claim that defendants knew in fact the publications were false. Rather, he argues that, on this record, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendants published with reckless disregard of the truth because there [were] obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326. Tucci principally contends that an inference of malice could be drawn from Menario's expressed dislike of Tucci; Menario's expressed disapproval with the Civil Service Commission's handling of the matter; and an inference that Curley disliked Tucci. Because different circumstances attend the publishings by defendant Menario and defendant Gannett, we will analyze them separately.