Opinion ID: 1728613
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Oklahoma Preliminary Hearing Testimony

Text: We next consider whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of co-defendant, Mona Lisa Watson, given at the defendant's preliminary hearing in Oklahoma on the charges against him in that state for the murder of Charlene Calhoun. The trial court admitted this testimony under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule, which provides: (b) Hearsay exceptions The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: (1) Former testimony Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, ... if the party against whom the testimony is now offered ... had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1) (adopted by this Court as a statement of the law in Tennessee in State v. Causby, 706 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tenn. 1986)). [2] Whenever former testimony is at issue, the underlying question is whether fairness allows imposing, upon the party against whom now offered, the handling of the witness on the earlier occasion. Fed. R.Evid. 804, advisory committee note, 28 U.S.C.A. at 446, subd. (b), except. (1). The rule was designed to ensure fairness in cases when former testimony is admitted. Accordingly, the rule must be given a literal meaning, and each element of the rule must be satisfied before former testimony is admitted. See United States v. Salerno, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2503, 120 L.Ed.2d 255 (1992). First, the defendant contends that Watson was not unavailable because she did not invoke her privilege against self-incrimination until after the preliminary hearing testimony was admitted and read to the jury. While it would have been a better procedure for the trial court to have Watson invoke the privilege against self-incrimination out of the jury's presence before admitting the preliminary hearing testimony, Watson invoked her privilege against self-incrimination and did not testify during the trial. Since invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination renders a witness unavailable, State v. Armes, 607 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Tenn. 1980), and since the circumstances of the present case conclusively support a finding of unavailability, we find no merit to the defendant's argument. The defendant next contends that although he had an opportunity to cross examine Watson at the Oklahoma preliminary hearing, he did not have a similar motive to develop her testimony because the preliminary hearing involved separate charges in another state. He also argues that he was represented by a different lawyer in those proceedings, who had no real motive to inquire into or develop the facts relevant to the killing of Alvin Kennedy in Tennessee. As a result, the defendant asserts that admission of the former testimony violated the hearsay rule and his right to confrontation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The corresponding provision of the Tennessee Constitution provides [t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right ... to meet the witnesses face to face. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. This Court has previously held that the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule has sufficient indicia of reliability [3] so that admission of evidence thereunder comports with the right of confrontation. [4] Accordingly, if Watson's Oklahoma preliminary hearing testimony met the requirements of the former testimony hearsay exception, it would also satisfy the right of confrontation. In State v. Causby, supra , a first-degree murder case, this Court held that the trial court properly admitted a co-defendant's former testimony from a juvenile transfer hearing under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule because the defendants had a full opportunity and similar motive to develop the prior testimony. Several factors were considered in reaching that conclusion, but the most emphasis was placed on the fact that at both the transfer hearing and the subsequent trial, the testimony was addressed to the same issue of [w]hether or not the defendants had committed the offense charged. Causby, 706 S.W.2d at 632. Complete identity of the issues is not necessary. Other courts considering what constitutes a similar motive have concluded that if the issues in both cases are sufficiently similar, the requirement of similar motive is satisfied. United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1048 (6th Cir.1984); United States v. Pizarro, 717 F.2d 336, 349 (7th Cir.1983); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1252 (E.D.Pa. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 319 (3rd Cir.1983). This conclusion comports with the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 804 that observes: The common law ... did require identity of issues as a means of insuring that the former handling of the witness was the equivalent of what would now be done if the opportunity were presented. Modern decisions reduce the requirement to `substantial' identity. 28 U.S.C.A. at 447, subd. (b), except. (1); see also Cohen, Paine & Sheppeard, Tennessee Law of Evidence, Sec. 804(b)(2).1, p. 461 (2d ed. 1990). The defendant's identity as the killer of Alvin Kennedy and Charlene Calhoun was an issue in both the Oklahoma hearing and the Tennessee trial. The testimony identifying the defendant as the killer of Alvin Kennedy circumstantially established the defendant's identity as the killer of Charlene Calhoun, since Kennedy and Calhoun were shot with the same gun. Likewise, Watson's testimony identifying the defendant as the person who shot Charlene Calhoun circumstantially established the defendant's identity as the thief of the Whitsett truck and killer of Alvin Kennedy. Consequently, the defendant had a similar motive to explore the identification issues at the Oklahoma preliminary hearing. See, e.g., Pizarro, 717 F.2d at 349. In fact, the defendant has failed to point to any matter that would have been developed in cross-examination that was not raised in the prior proceedings. Therefore, we conclude that a similar motive existed to develop Watson's preliminary hearing testimony with respect to the killings of both Charlene Calhoun, and Alvin Kennedy in Tennessee. It is true that the defendant was not represented by the same counsel in the Oklahoma hearing and the Tennessee trial. However, the rule requires only that the party against whom the testimony is offered have an opportunity and similar motive. An identity of lawyers is not necessary. Tennessee Law of Evidence, at p. 460. Moreover, the facts relating to the murder of Alvin Kennedy were brought out on Watson's cross-examination by the defendant's Oklahoma counsel. If the party against whom [the testimony] is now offered is the one against whom the testimony was offered previously, no unfairness is apparent in requiring him to accept his own prior conduct of cross-examination... . Fed.R.Evid. 804, advisory committee note, 28 U.S.C.A. at 447, subd. (b), except. (1). Moreover, a party, for tactical reasons, may decide not to engage in a rigorous cross-examination, or even in any cross-examination at all. Salerno, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2511 (Stephens, J. dissenting). The party may have a similar motive, but simply choose not to act on it. Id. [A]s long as the party had a similar motive to develop the testimony in the prior proceeding, there is no unfairness in requiring the party against whom the testimony is now offered to accept her prior decision to develop or not develop the testimony fully. U.S. v. Salerno, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2511, n. 6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). As a result of the foregoing, we conclude that defendant's Oklahoma counsel had a similar motive to defendant's Tennessee counsel to develop Watson's testimony about Alvin Kennedy's murder at the preliminary hearing in Oklahoma. Accordingly, we conclude that the admission of Watson's Oklahoma preliminary hearing testimony with respect to the murder of Alvin Kennedy in Memphis did not violate the hearsay rule nor the defendant's confrontation rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution.