Opinion ID: 2427845
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Interoffice Memo of April 23, 1984

Text: Valero contends that this internal memorandum from one of its employees to one of its in-house attorneys is an attorney-client communication and a witness statement. The document shows on its face that it is providing information requested by the lawyer. However, under our decision in National Tank and TEX.R. EVID. 503, this communication is not covered by the attorney-client privilege. There is no evidence that the Valero employee who wrote it was seeking or had the authority to seek or to act on legal advice, other than the affidavit of Valero's general counsel which said that all employees of Valero had authority to seek and act on legal advice. That broad, conclusory statement will not suffice. While I concede that this document does not fall within Rule 503, it points up the need to amend our rules of evidence. A large corporation, such as Valero, must have the means of obtaining meaningful legal advice without waiving its privileges. A hypothetical example illustrates the inadequacy of the current definition of who is a representative of the client. Rule 503 now says that a representative of the client is one who has authority to obtain legal services or to act on that legal advice. TEX.R. CIV. EVID. 503(a)(2). Suppose a corporation seeks legal advice about some aspect of its operations to determine if it is in compliance with its contracts or perhaps with governmental regulations. And assume that its lawyer cannot adequately advise the client without knowing all the facts about this aspect of the company's operations. It is extremely naive to think that the upper echelon of management (a term used in National Tank, 851 S.W.2d at 197) in a large organization will possess the kind of detailed, nitty-gritty facts that are often necessary to such an analysis. The knowledge of operational or middle management personnel is essential. Under Rule 503, neither the lawyer nor members of upper management can seek out this information and maintain the attorney-client privilege. Even if a memo from upper management to an employee who does not have authority to act on legal advice clearly says, The company is seeking legal advice and needs to know ..., that communication is not privileged because it is not between a representative of the client (as defined in the rule) and another representative of the client. Nor would it fall within any of the other provisions of Rule 503(b). For the same reasons, a communication between the lawyer and the employee who has possession of the facts that the lawyer needs to know to render legal advice is not privileged. Such a rule impairs a corporation's right to effective legal counsel. Although Valero also contends that this memo is a witness statement within the meaning of TEX.R. CIV. P. 166b(3)(c), there is no indication from the face of the document or in the record that this document was prepared in anticipation of litigation. Accordingly, it is not privileged. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 166b(3)(c) (providing that privilege applies to written statements made in connection with prosecution, investigation, or defense of the particular suit or in anticipation of the prosecution or defense of the pending litigation).