Opinion ID: 1773123
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Extraterritorial Arrests by Municipal Officers are Illegal

Text: In Missouri, it has long been established that municipal law enforcement officials have only those powers conferred upon them by statute. [1] Statutes granting these officers the power to arrest without a warrant, a power traditionally viewed as being in derogation of liberty, have been strictly construed. [2] One result of narrowly circumscribing the authority of municipal officers has been to geographically limit the areas in which these officers may lawfully operate. Specifically, warrantless arrests made by municipal officers outside the boundaries of their municipality are in the absence of some express statutory exceptionillegal. [3] This rule is designed to protect fundamental liberties: Perhaps the most important reason why a state might limit the jurisdiction of city and town officers to their respective communities is that smaller communities are unlikely to have the resources to provide their officers with proper training in the elements of probable cause or arrest procedures. By limiting an officer's jurisdiction to the community in which she serves, a state helps to ensure not only that the power of the police over individuals will be appropriately restricted, but also that an officer will be sufficiently trained for the types of arrests likely to occur in her community. This type of restriction helps to protect the very interests underlying the Fourth Amendment, those of the individual in privacy and personal freedom, and, at the same time, balances the interests of government in protecting society and making arrests in a safe, efficient and constitutional manner. [4] A review of the cases in which warrantless arrests by municipal officers have been an issue also suggests that such arrests frequently occasion violent confrontations, [5] and may, for protection of the arrestees, the public and the officers themselves, best be handled by officers with additional training and experience, or at least officers who are familiar with local conditions. The restriction also serves an interest in local accountability, since residents of a municipality who feel that local officers have failed to perform their duties have recourse to the democratic process to control these officials. Residents outside a municipality have no ability (other than through the state legislature) to control the behavior of officers who venture outside their jurisdiction. The rule that extrajurisdictional arrests by municipal officials are generally illegal is grounded in serious concerns regarding liberty, public safety and democratic accountability, and should notin the absence of a specific legislative authorizationbe disturbed. For an officer of a fourth class city, such as the officer here, three possible exceptions to the rule against extraterritorial arrests are readily apparent. First, such an officer may make an arrest on city owned or leased property outside the bounds of his or her municipality; [6] no party has suggested that this exception is relevant here. Second, certain officers are authorized to make arrests outside their jurisdictions under the fresh pursuit statute, § 544.157, RSMo, but the record here contains neither evidence nor any claim that the conditions of that statute have been met. Finally, there is the authority provided by § 70.815.2, RSMo: The governing body of any political subdivision may by ordinance, order or other ruling enter into a contract or agreement with any other political subdivision... for the provision of police services by one political subdivision to another on request. The scope of the agreement may be general or specific, and may or may not provide for compensation for such services. Officers providing police services in another jurisdiction pursuant to such an agreement shall have the same powers of arrest as officers of the requesting political subdivision, and shall have the same immunity as if acting within their own jurisdiction. The principal opinion's unsupported conclusion that Officer Patrick had authority to make warrantless arrests in Lakeview village if such an agreement existed is speculative, at best, since the statute gives an officer acting under an agreement only those arrest powers a local officer would have, and this Court has long held that the statutes under which village police officers operate do not authorize warrantless arrests. [7] In any case, the question is not presented here, since, contrary to the principal opinion's suggestion, the trial court never received evidence of any agreement between Lake Ozark and Lakeview. The principal opinion says that the police officer testified that on the evening in question, in reliance on instructions given by his supervisor, he was on patrol in Lakeview pursuant to a mutual aid agreement between Lakeview and Lake Ozark. This is a misleading characterization, at best, of the officer's actual testimony. Officer Patrick never testified that he was on patrol anywhere on June 21, 1998, and never testified that anyone instructed him to patrol in Lakeview that night. [8] More importantly, Officer Patrick never connected his authority to operate in Lakeview to the purported agreement. The only testimony regarding the agreement was Officer Patrick's Yes when asked if he believed that Lake Ozark had a mutual aid contract with Lakeview. [9] However, the trial court sustained the defense's objection to this question, ruling that the officer could not testify as to the existence of the agreement, but also ruling that if the State proved the officer's duties and what he was directed to supervise, then the court would permit the State to forego proof of such an agreement. Thus, the trial court refused to receive Officer Patrick's testimony as evidence of the existence of this agreement and, more importantly, the State abandoned any attempt to prove the terms of the purported agreement or to connect Patrick's presence in Lakeview to any authority whatsoever. The only testimony the trial court permitted touching even remotely on Officer Patrick's authority to conduct arrests outside Lake Ozark was that, based upon his education and experience, his area of operation included Lake Ozark and Lakeview. In my view, this is an insufficient basis from which to conclude, as the principal opinion does, that Officer Patrick had a good faith belief that he was entitled to make warrantless arrests in Lakeview (not least because he never testified that he believed he had authority to make such arrests). More importantly, the implicit suggestion that an officer's good faith belief that he had authority to make an arrest suffices to make the arrest legal is both unwarranted and unwise. An officer's authority to make arrests in this situation depends entirely on statutory authority and official acts by government bodies. The officer's state of mind is simply not relevant to these considerations. Where, as here, a police officer admits making an arrest that is prima facie illegal, I would require some specific, competent evidence to overcome the presumption of illegality before evidence gathered in the course of the arrest can be used in a criminal prosecution. The use of such evidence in the absence of any substantial demonstration of authority approaches a manifest injustice.