Opinion ID: 1831455
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove identity

Text: Johnston argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the State was insufficient to prove identity. The question for this Court is whether the State presented competent, substantial evidence from which the jury could find that all reasonable hypotheses of innocence were excluded.
In reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, a de novo standard of review applies. See Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2278, 156 L.Ed.2d 137 (2003). Generally, an appellate court will not reverse a conviction that is supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Pagan, 830 So.2d at 803 (citing Donaldson v. State, 722 So.2d 177 (Fla.1998); Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954, 964 (Fla.1996)). There is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Banks v. State, 732 So.2d 1065 (Fla.1999). A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted in a circumstantial evidence case if the state fails to present evidence from which the jury can exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. Orme v. State, 677 So.2d 258, 262 (Fla.1996). The question of whether the evidence fails to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to determine, and where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury verdict, we will not reverse. Darling v. State, 808 So.2d 145, 155 (Fla.) (quoting State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla. 1989)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 848, 123 S.Ct. 190, 154 L.Ed.2d 78 (2002). In meeting its burden, the State is not required to rebut conclusively, every possible variation of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but must introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of events. Darling, 808 So.2d at 156 (quoting Law, 559 So.2d at 189). Once the State meets this threshold burden, it becomes the jury's duty to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
The evidence against Johnston can be summarized generally as follows: 1. DNA on master bedroom bed sheet, from a bodily fluid which is consistent with blood, sweat, saliva or mucus, but not semen. 2. Fingerprint on bathtub cold water knob, in close proximity to the body. 3. Fingerprint on a plastic cup under the kitchen table. 4. Two partial shoe tracks which are consistent with Johnston's shoes, but cannot positively be identified as made by Johnston's shoes. 5. Testimony by Kelli McCarthy (Nugent's daughter) concerning Nugent's frequent bathing and house cleaning habits. [8] 6. Williams rule evidence of the similar fact murder of Leanne Coryell. 7. Incriminating statements made by Johnston concerning Dwight, the alter ego living inside him, during an interview with detectives investigating the Nugent murder. 8. Inconsistent statements made by Johnston concerning the events that transpired when he was in the victim's home. Johnston argues that the evidence against him is not sufficient for a jury to find that there was no reasonable hypothesis of innocence. As support for this argument, Johnston cites a number of district court of appeal cases, including Shores v. State, 756 So.2d 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), where fingerprint evidence alone was insufficient to sustain a conviction. Johnston also cites a case from this Court, Jaramillo v. State, 417 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1982), as support for his argument. The facts in Jaramillo and in Shores indicate that the only evidence linking the defendants to the crimes in those cases was fingerprint evidence. In those cases the defendants presented reasonable explanations for the presence of their fingerprints at the crime scenes. In this case, the defense argued that Johnston's DNA was transferred to Nugent's master bedroom bed sheet several weeks before the murder. The State countered this argument with Johnston's statements to law enforcement officers, in which he denied ever entering Nugent's master bedroom. The defense argued that the bathroom fingerprint was left by Johnston several weeks before the murder when he ran into the shower after Nugent burned him with massage oil. The State countered this argument by showing that Johnston did not convey this version of events to the police until Detective Noblitt told him the location of the fingerprint. The defense maintained that the shoe tracks in Nugent's kitchen were not from Johnston's shoes. The State countered this argument by introducing evidence that the shoe impressions were consistent with Johnston's shoes, but could not be conclusively identified as Johnston's shoes because of a lack of identifying characteristics. Clearly, the State introduced evidence inconsistent with Johnston's theory of events. This Court does not have to determine that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence was excluded in this case. The sole determination we must make is whether there was competent, substantial evidence for the jury to make such a determination. See Darling, 808 So.2d at 156 (citing Law, 559 So.2d at 188-89). The DNA evidence, fingerprint evidence, shoe track evidence, Dwight statements and Williams rule evidence of the Coryell murder conviction constitute competent, substantial evidence from which a jury could have concluded that there was no reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Accordingly, we reject Johnston's argument.