Opinion ID: 2625875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to California's Death Penalty Law

Text: Defendant contends that the 1978 death penalty scheme violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in several respects. As defendant concedes, we have previously rejected many of his claims in this regard. Thus, we have held: The special circumstances listed in section 190.2 adequately narrow the class of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed. ( People v. ( Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 479, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1029, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) The statute is not invalid for failing to require (1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1137, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 479, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1029, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) [32] The jury may consider prior unadjudicated criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b). ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1054, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1178, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) Prosecutorial discretion to select those death-eligible cases in which the death penalty will actually be sought is not constitutionally impermissible. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 601-602, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1137, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 505, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081.) Comparative intercase proportionality review by the trial or appellate courts is not constitutionally required. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1139, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 741, 97 Cal. Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248.) International law does not compel the elimination of capital punishment in California. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 779, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) We are not persuaded that we should reconsider our previous rulings on these issues. Defendant, relying on a dissenting opinion in Jeffers v. Lewis (9th Cir.1994) 38 F.3d 411, 425-427, contends that the administration of California's death penalty is impermissibly arbitrary in that, out of the many people sentenced to death, only an unsystematically chosen few have yet been executed. The federal appellate court has rejected this argument ( Woratzeck v. Stewart (9th Cir.1997) 118 F.3d 648, 652); we do so as well. If Woratzeck's death sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment, then neither does the scheduling of his execution. Arizona must establish some order of execution. There has been no prima facie showing that this scheduling violates the Eighth Amendment. ( Ibid. ) The same is true here. Defendant does not face imminent execution and can hardly claim he is being singled out for either quick or slow treatment of his appeal and habeas corpus proceedings. More generally, defendant makes no showing that the number of condemned prisoners executed in California, or the order in which their execution dates are set, is determined by any invidious means or method, with discriminatory motive or effect, or indeed according to anything other than the pace at which various defendants' appeals and habeas corpus proceedings are concluded, a matter by no means within the sole control of the state.