Opinion ID: 3011972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Audit Team Leader

Text: The District Court held that, even assuming Elwell could establish a prima facie case of age discrimination arising out of the selection of a younger candidate for the Audit Team Leader position, this claim necessarily failed because Elwell did not present evidence which would lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the reasons advanced by the Defendant were pretextual. Elwell asserts that, in arriving at its conclusion, the District Court improperly weighed the evidence by reasoning that Defendant’s “subjective evidence” was more worthy of credence than the “objective evidence” he introduced. Appellant’s Br. at 11. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), the Supreme Court held that a juror could “infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the -6- employer’s explanation” absent the introduction of “additional, independent evidence of discrimination.” Reeves, 503 U.S. at 147-49. The Court explained that: [A] plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury’s finding of liability. Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant’s explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred. Id. at 148 (emphasis in original). This is consistent with our earlier holding in Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), where we explained that: because the factfinder may infer from the combination of the plaintiff’s prima facie case and its own rejection of the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff and was merely trying to conceal its illegal act with the articulated reasons, a plaintiff who has made out a prima facie case may defeat a motion for summary judgment by either (i) discrediting the proffered reasons, either circumstantially or directly, or (ii) adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action. Thus, if the plaintiff has pointed to evidence sufficiently to discredit the defendant’s proffered reasons, to survive summary judgment the plaintiff need not also come forward with additional evidence of discrimination beyond his or her prima facie case. -7- Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Defendant came forward with the deposition testimony of Martin Urban, who was one of three employees of the Defendant who interviewed Elwell for the Audit Team Leader position in February of 1997 and was the person who made the decision to not hire Elwell. Urban testified that he decided that Elwell was not the best candidate for the Audit Team Leader position because a score of 3.0 was required for the position and he had interviewed him for a position entailing similar responsibilities in a different area of the company in August of 1996, at which time Elwell received a consensus score of 2.43 from the three interviewers. In order to show that this reason was but a pretext for discrimination, Elwell came forward with a “Synchrony Feedback” evaluation of Elwell from August of 1996, in which he received a score of 4.2 for his performance on his then current job. The District Court correctly reasoned that, because there was no evidence (1) that either Elwell’s score of 2.43 in the earlier interview for the similar position or the requirement of a score of 3.0 were incorrect; or (2) that the level of proficiency required to score 4.2 on the Synchrony Feedback evaluation was sufficient to qualify for the Audit Team Leader position; or (3) that Elwell’s qualifications for his then current job implied he was sufficiently qualified for a higher level position, a reasonable jury could neither discredit Defendant’s reasons as pretextual nor find that age discrimination was more likely than not a determinative factor in Defendant’s decision not to promote Elwell. The District Court properly rejected Elwell’s argument that it usurped the role of the jury by weighing the Synchrony Evaluation against the consensus score. As the District Court explained, -8- [c]redibility determinations are indeed the province of the trier of fact. On a motion for summary judgment, the court must accept as true all reasonable inference that favor the nonmoving party. However, we may only consider reasonable inferences; we may not improperly consider those inferences that are unreasonable. We have drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff. It remains our function, however, to determine whether there is sufficient evidence for a claim to reach the trier of fact. App. at 60-61 (citing 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2528 (2d ed. 1995), at 294) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Elwell’s claim for age discrimination arising out of the selection of a younger candidate for the Audit Team Leader position.