Opinion ID: 1920407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Usurpation of Legislative Authority.

Text: Pangman further contends the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) has unconstitutionally usurped legislative authority by implicitly defining the term breath in sec. 346.63(1)(b), Stats., as the last 81 ml. of deep lung alveolar air. Pangman argues the legislature's grant of authority to the DOT in sec. 343.305(6)(b), Stats., which allows the DOT to approve techniques or methods of performing chemical analysis of the breath, does not include the authority to alter the meaning of the term breath in sec. 346.63(1)(b). Pangman relies upon State Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. McTigue, 387 So. 2d 454 (Fla. App. 1980), to support his argument. In McTigue, a Florida court of appeals considered a state statute which required that to be certified, a midwife must attend a certain number of births under the supervision of a licensed physician and must obtain a written statement from the physician concerning attendance. The state agency implementing the statute included in its regulations the additional requirement that the supervising physician be licensed in Florida. The McTigue court held the state agency had usurped legislative authority by changing the plain and ordinary meaning of the term physician which, as used in the statute, meant a physician licensed under the laws of any state. McTigue, 387 So. 2d at 455-56. [15] We find no merit in Pangman's claim. Unlike McTigue, here the DOT has not enacted a regulation which expressly defines a statutory term. By approving of the Intoxilyzer 5000 as a means of measuring breath alcohol concentration, see Wis. Admin. Code Sec. Trans. 311.04, the DOT has merely acted in accordance with the authority granted to it by the legislature pursuant to sec. 343.305(6)(b), Stats. See State v. Dwinell, 119 Wis. 2d 305, 309-10, 349 N.W.2d 739 (Ct. App. 1984).