Opinion ID: 2971953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: collette’s melcra claim

Text: A. Legal Standard When interpreting state law, we look first and foremost to decisions of the state’s own courts. See Bernstein v. Lopez, 321 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J. dissenting). If state court precedent is definitive, we must follow it. See Foster v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 714 F.2d 654, 657 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Under MELCRA, “an employer may not discriminate on the basis of sex, and this also prohibits sexual harassment.” James v. TCF Nat’l Bank, 2003 WL 22161828, at  (Mich. App. Sept. 18, 2003) (citing Chambers v. Trettco, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. 2000)). “Sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature if: (1) submission to the conduct of communication is made a term or condition, either explicitly or implicitly, to obtain employment; (2) submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication is used as a factor in determining the individual’s employment; or (3) the conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s employment by creating a hostile environment.” James, 2003 WL 22161828 at  (citing Mich. C.L. 37.2103(i) and Chambers, 614 N.W.2d 910). To establish a sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work environment under MELCRA, Collette had to show that she belonged to a protected group, that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or communication on the basis of her sex which was intended to or did -15- substantially interfere with her employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. See James, 2003 WL 22161828 at  (citing Chambers, 614 N.W. 2d 910). The court considers whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would perceive the conduct at issue as substantially interfering with his employment or as having the purpose or effect of creating a hostile, intimidating, or offensive employment environment. See James, 2003 WL 22161828 at  (citing Burns v. City of Detroit, 660 N.W.2d 85 (Mich. 2002), modified in part o.g. and app. denied in part, 658 N.W.2d 468 (Mich. 2003)). See, e.g., Shepard v. Uniboring, 72 Fed. Appx. 333, 335-36, 2003 WL 21782604, at -2 (6th Cir. July 31, 2003) (supervisor’s offensive and annoying comments and behavior, without physical touching or threatening, did not create hostile work environment under MELCRA), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 1435 (2004). Unlike federal case law interpreting Title VII, a hostile work environment claim under MELCRA requires the employee to show that the harassment was “sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously [her] psychological well being.” Langlois v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Mich., 385 N.W.2d 778, 782 (Mich. App. 1986). Once an employee satisfies the elements of a hostile work environment sex discrimination claim, he can hold the employer liable under MELCRA for his supervisor’s harassing behavior only if he shows that “the employer failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action after having been put on notice of the sexual harassment.” Schemansky v. California Pizza Kitchen, 122 F. Supp. 2d 761, 772 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (citing Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993)). Moreover, under Michigan case law, a single incident is generally insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment unless it was “severe and perpetrated by an employer in a closely-knit -16- working environment.” James, 2003 WL 22161828 at  (citing Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993) (employer physically restrained employee for more than one minute while he tried to kiss her)). See, e.g., Langlois, 385 N.W.2d 778 (hostile work environment not created by one incident where supervisor requested “some fun” and touched employee on breast and buttocks). B. Discussion For the reasons discussed in the Title VII analysis, Collette’s MELCRA claim fails because she did not raise a genuine issue as to whether the unwelcome conduct or communication substantially interfered with her employment or created an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. Similarly, Collette did not raise a genuine issue as to whether she was constructively discharged. See, e.g., Hartleip v. McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d 767, 775-76 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying Michigan law); Selph v. Gottlieb’s Financial Servs., 35 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (under Michigan law, female employee’s testimony that male coworker ceased alleged harassment one day after she reported it precluded finding that she was constructively discharged). Lastly, even if Collette showed a genuine issue as to each element of her MELCRA claim, as a matter of law SM took prompt, decisive action to ensure that Davidson could never harass her again. Under Michigan law, the critical test of whether the employer’s corrective action was adequate is whether it stopped the harassment. See Houghtaling v. Bay Med. Ctr., 1997 WL 33353513, at  (Mich. App. Mar. 14, 1997) (“Defendant’s actions were effective in that the doctor was thwarted from future misconduct, as evidenced by the fact that he did not harass plaintiff again after the initial incident.”), app. denied, 577 N.W.2d 685 (Mich. 1998). -17-