Opinion ID: 1610239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interpretation of Section 48.193(1)(b) in the Context of the World Wide Web

Text: The operative statutory language is committing a tortious act within the state. § 48.193(1)(b). In Wendt, this Court interpreted section 48.193(1)(b) to include electronic communication into the state. The tortious act that ISC alleges Marshall committed within Florida is defamation, and a review of applicable defamation law as it pertains to personal jurisdiction is helpful. Publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person defamed. Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So.2d 1010, 1016 (Fla.2001) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Tort § 577 (1977)). Under Florida law, the tort of libel is not completed until the statements are published. See Silver v. Levinson, 648 So.2d 240, 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). [8] As explained in Silver : [B]ecause the threshold question of personal jurisdiction turns on whether defendant committed an intentional tort in Florida, we must also necessarily review the complaint to determine whether it states a cause of action for libel. If the complaint does not set forth a cause of action for the tort of libel, then assertion of personal jurisdiction predicated on the commission of that specific tort would be improper. . . . . Under Florida law, the tort of libel is not completed until the statements are published. In this case, the final element of the tort was not satisfied until the letters were received ... in Florida. Until that time, no tort had been committed. Id. at 241-42 (citations omitted). Further, the tort of defamation is committed in the place where the defamatory material is published. Casita, L.P. v. Maplewood Equity Partners, L.P., 960 So.2d 854, 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (A telephonic, electronic, or written communication is deemed `published' in Florida, subjecting the publisher to long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes if the communication was made into this state by a person outside the state, even if that person has no other contacts with the state. (citing Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1258)). We conclude that allegedly defamatory material about a Florida resident placed on the Web and accessible in Florida constitutes an electronic communication into Florida when the material is accessed (or published) in Florida. In the context of the World Wide Web, given its pervasiveness, an alleged tortfeasor who posts allegedly defamatory material on a website has intentionally made the material almost instantly available everywhere the material is accessible. By posting allegedly defamatory material on the Web about a Florida resident, the poster has directed the communication about a Florida resident to readers worldwide, including potential readers within Florida. When the posting is then accessed by a third party in Florida, the material has been published in Florida and the poster has communicated the material into Florida, thereby committing the tortious act of defamation within Florida. This interpretation is consistent with the approach taken regarding other forms of communication. Marshall contends that this Court should apply First Amendment principles to Florida's long-arm statute in defamation actions and that we should consider issues of fairness when construing the long-arm statute. We decline to do so because we have never construed the first prong of the jurisdictional analysis with a constitutional overlay. As stated previously by this Court, the statutory prong of the jurisdictional analysis bestows broad jurisdiction on Florida courts. A court can exercise personal jurisdiction, inter alia, whenever a foreign corporation commits a `tortious act' on Florida soil. Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1257 (quoting Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc., 752 So.2d at 584). Issues of due process and fairness are properly considered in the second prong, which imposes a more restrictive requirement. Id. (quoting Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc., 752 So.2d at 584). Further, we decline to make the policy decision that defamation actions should be treated differently under Florida's long-arm statute. [9] As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court, the potential chill on protected First Amendment activity stemming from libel and defamation actions is already taken into account in the constitutional limitations on the substantive law governing such suits. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)). Thus, [t]o reintroduce those concerns at the jurisdictional stage would be a form of double counting. Id. Accordingly, we too reject the suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter into the jurisdictional analysis. Id.