Opinion ID: 765760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of the Teague defense

Text: 70 Relying primarily on Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115 (1995) (per curiam), Judge Clay concludes that the state properly preserved its Teague defense. According to Judge Clay, Goeke held that a federal court's application of Teague is mandatory, even when raised for the first time at the first hearing on appeal. I believe that Judge Clay has misapprehended the Goeke holding. The habeas petitioner in Goeke argued in the district court that the state court's dismissal of her appeal, based upon Missouri's fugitive dismissal rule, constituted a violation of due process. Thisargument was construed by the district court as a procedural due process claim. In response, the state argued that the petitioner's claim was barred by Teague: In the District Court, the State argued that respondent's due process claim is barred from litigation in federal habeas corpus unless the Court could say, as a threshold matter, that it would make its new rule of law retroactive. Teague v. Lane. Id. at 117 (internal quotation marks omitted). The state again raised the Teague defense on appeal, noting that it had also raised this defense at the district court. See id. The Eighth Circuit, after relabeling the petitioner's due process argument as substantive rather than procedural, ultimately held that the state had waived the Teague defense, and addressed the merits of the case. See id. 71 The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's opinion, holding that the state had properly preserved its Teague defense. See id. at 118. Contrary to Judge Clay's interpretation, the Court did not hold that the state could assert this defense for the first time on appeal. Rather, the Court clearly indicated that Teague was raised at both the district and appellate levels in response to the same issue, regardless of whether it was characterized as procedural or substantive. See id. at 117-18. The Court's statement that [t]he State's efforts to alert the Eighth Circuit to the Teague problem provided that court with ample opportunity to make a reasoned judgment on the issue, id. at 118, is therefore not inconsistent with the undisputed fact that the state first asserted its Teague defense at the district court level. 72 Judge Clay acknowledges that the Teague defense in Goeke was first raised in the district court, but argues that the substantiative due process claim presented on appeal was legally distinct from the procedural due process claim presented in the district court. I respectfully disagree. The petitioner in Goeke raised the same issue -- that the state court's dismissal of her appeal based upon Missouri's fugitive dismissal rule constituted a violation of due process -- at both the district and appellate levels. In response, the government raised the Teague defense at both stages of the habeas litigation. I thus find no support in Goeke for the proposition that the Teague defense is properly preserved when raised for the first time on appeal. Nor did the court in Goeke face such a situation. In contrast, the state in the present case did not raise the Teague defense at all until the case reached the appellate level. Goeke, therefore, is not controlling. 73 In his opinion, Judge Clay cites two cases that he argues are supportive of his interpretation of Goeke -- Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 1995), and Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1992). In Ciak, the Second Circuit stated that the Teague defense was waived because the state did not argue in its brief or at oral argument that Teague bar[red] application of the new rule. 59 F.3d at 302. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held in Williams that the state had waived its Teague argument by its failure to raise the issue at the district court level or at the first hearing before this court. 961 F.2d at 459. 74 Judge Clay draws an inference from these statements that both the Second and the Fourth Circuits would have held that the state had preserved its Teague defense even if raised for the first time on appeal. I, on the other hand, find that the above-quoted statements provide faint support for such an inference. Both cases in fact held that the state had waived its Teague defense when belatedly raised for the first time on appeal, and neither faced the factual situation presently before us. Moreover, the Williams court specifically stated that a state's failure to raise [its Teague defense to] the issue of retroactivity below constitutes waiver of that defense. Id. 75 I also note that both Ciak and Williams are cases from other circuits, and are therefore considered only for their persuasive value. As stated above, I do not find them persuasive for the proposition urged by Judge Clay. More importantly, this court has spoken on the very point at issue in Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 1995). In Sinistaj, this court held that the state had waived its Teague defense by raising it for the first time in a motion to amend the district court's judgment. See id. at 805 n.1. Logic dictates that if the Teague defense is waived when raised for the first time in a motion to amend the district court's judgment, it is certainly waived when raised for the first time at the appellate level. Sinistaj is therefore the controlling precedent in this circuit and is determinative of the present case. 76 For all of the reasons stated above, I would find that the state has waived its Teague defense. 77