Opinion ID: 173374
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Next, Huggins claims that the evidence was insufficient to support any of the counts of conviction. “When evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and must sustain the jury’s verdict if a reasonable jury believing the government’s evidence could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 537 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the trial evidence.” Id. “We will overturn a conviction for insufficient evidence only if ‘no rational trier of fact could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Holmes, 607 F.3d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 2002)).
16 On appeal, Huggins argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on Count II because he did not facilitate the February 2002 drug transaction between Barner and Rogers. Count II charged Huggins with knowingly distributing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, on or about February 21, 2002. At trial, the jury was instructed as to principal and aider and abettor liability for Count II. The evidence at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that Huggins knowingly distributed cocaine or aided and abetted the distribution of cocaine as alleged. First, Barner testified that he visited Huggins in his store on February 19, 2002, that they exchanged phone numbers, and that he asked Huggins how he could obtain cocaine. Barner testified that Huggins responded that he had a friend who was coming who could provide it and also quoted a price for four and a half ounces of cocaine. Barner further testified that Rogers called him the next day, they arranged for Barner to purchase four and a half ounces of cocaine at the price Huggins quoted, and that he did in fact purchase that amount of cocaine from Rogers on February 21, 2002. Second, Rogers testified that Huggins asked him if he could provide Barner with the cocaine he was seeking. Rogers agreed to do so and sold four and a half ounces of cocaine to Barner. Finally, Agent Greene, Agent Miller, and Task Force Officer Collins testified that Huggins admitted to selling cocaine to Rogers on several occasions when he spoke with agents at his home. This evidence was sufficient to 17 support the jury’s verdict that Huggins knowingly distributed cocaine or aided or abetted the distribution of cocaine on February 21, 2002.6
Count XII charged that, from on or about April 28, 2003, to on or about July 11, 2003, Huggins and Jermaine Franklin and others knowingly conspired to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count XIII charged that Huggins and Franklin knowingly managed a building, room, and enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully storing and distributing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 856(a)(2) and (b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count XIV charged that, on or about 6 Huggins contends that Agent Ramos-Diaz’s trial testimony and Agent Miller’s notes require us to conclude that Rogers was not present in Huggins’s store on February 19, 2002, and thus there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Huggins aided and abetted the distribution of cocaine to Barner. We conclude to the contrary. At trial, Rogers testified that he was inside of Huggins’s store when Barner came in and spoke with Huggins. Barner, on the other hand, testified that Rogers was on his way into Huggins’s store as he was exiting it. Consistent with Barner’s testimony, Agent RamosDiaz testified, and Agent Miller’s notes confirmed, that Agent Ramos-Diaz saw Barner meet and speak with Rogers outside of the store. Although Huggins has identified inconsistencies among the trial testimony of Rogers, Barner, and Agent Ramos-Diaz with regard to whether Rogers was inside of Huggins’s store while Huggins was speaking with Barner, this does not establish that Rogers did not enter the store and speak with Huggins about selling cocaine to Barner on February 19, 2002. In fact, the testimony of Barner and Agent Ramos-Diaz support an inference that Rogers was headed into Huggins’s store after speaking with Barner. The jury, as the finder of fact, was entitled to draw such an inference or to credit the testimony of Rogers. Accordingly, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, and these inconsistencies do not give us reason to overturn it. 18 May 28, 2003, Huggins and Franklin knowingly possessed with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On appeal, Huggins makes three arguments with regard to these convictions. First, with regard to all three counts, he contends that there is no direct evidence that what he possessed was cocaine. With regard to Count XII, he also argues that the evidence did not support a conclusion that the conspiracy involved five or more kilograms of cocaine and that the evidence did not show an agreement between two or more persons. First, the government was not required to produce direct evidence that Huggins possessed cocaine during the conspiracy. Contrary to Huggins’s argument that the government was required to produce a chemical analysis to prove he conspired to distribute cocaine, the government may prove the identity of a controlled substance through circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 22 n.2 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude that Huggins and Franklin were distributing cocaine. Significantly, three law enforcement officers testified that Huggins told them he was selling powder cocaine and that Franklin held his “stash” for him. In addition, Franklin testified that he had seen the contents of the bags Huggins brought to his apartment and that he believed the bags contained kilograms of cocaine because of their white color and rectangular shape. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Huggins was involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine with Franklin. 19 With regard to Count XII, the evidence was clearly sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Huggins and Franklin agreed to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute and that their agreement involved more than five kilograms of cocaine. The jury heard testimony from the three law enforcement officers who interviewed Huggins at his home, and they testified that Huggins told them that Franklin held drugs for him at his apartment. The officers also testified that Huggins made comments about the quantity of drugs that Franklin held for him, and the jury could infer from this testimony that the conspiracy involved a total of more than five kilograms of cocaine. (App. at 275 (“He [Huggins] said he [Franklin] was holding one to two kilos and up to five kilos.”); 1585 (“He [Huggins] said that he [Franklin] holds one or two kilos, but less than five on a couple of occasions.”); 1713 (“Mr. Huggins stated that Jermaine Franklin has held one to two kilograms of cocaine, but less than five kilograms of cocaine a couple of times for Mr. Huggins.”)). Agent Greene also testified that Huggins said he purchased up to ten kilograms from Barnaby at one time. Franklin testified at trial that he agreed to hold Huggins’s drugs at his apartment in exchange for $1,000 a week and that Huggins would frequently bring over bags that contained packages of drugs. Although Franklin testified that he was not certain about the amount of cocaine in each bag, he stated that each bag appeared to have more than one kilogram of cocaine in it and that Huggins came by once a week between April and July of 2003 to drop off a bag of cocaine. Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the conspiracy involved more than five kilograms of cocaine 20 and that Huggins and Franklin formed an agreement in which Huggins paid Franklin to store his drugs.
We also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict as to the money laundering counts. In order to obtain convictions on Counts XVI and XVII, the government was required to prove: “(1) an actual or attempted transaction; (2) involving proceeds of specified unlawful activity; (3) knowledge that the transaction involves the proceeds of some unlawful activity; and (4) . . . knowledge that the transactions were designed in whole or in part to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” United States v. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291, 294-95 (3d Cir. 2001). Count XVI alleged an August 14, 2002, transaction involving the 2001 GMC Denali, and Count XVII alleged a February 3, 2003, transaction involving the same vehicle. On appeal, Huggins first argues that the evidence did not establish that the money used for the two transactions was the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. Contrary to Huggins’s argument, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the money used in the transactions was the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, namely violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. First, Agent Greene testified that Huggins told him during the interview that he spoke with an employee at 1800 Motor Cars and told him that he “had some cash that he needed cleaned up and he wanted to get a car.” (App. at 290.) The jury also heard evidence that Huggins was involved in distributing cocaine and 21 that his expenses greatly exceeded his reported income, and thus it could have reasonably inferred that income from the drug transactions was used to purchase the car. Second, Huggins claims that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he knew the transactions were designed to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds used to purchase the vehicles. This argument also fails. Significantly, as mentioned above, Agent Greene testified that Huggins said he told the employee of 1800 Motor Cars, Malatesta, that he needed money “cleaned up” and that 1800 Motor Cars charged an additional $2,000 for this service. Second, Malatesta testified at trial that 1800 Motor Cars falsified the bill of sale for the Denali in order to conceal the fact that Huggins had paid over $10,000 in cash for the vehicle. Third, the jury also heard from Malatesta that Huggins directed 1800 Motor Cars not to put the title of the Denali in his name and, instead, to title it in grandmother’s name, and then, after she found out and objected, to place it in his father’s name. Further, Huggins’s father testified that he authorized his son to put the Denali in his name, but that it was Huggins’s car, that he did not make payments on it, and that he did not regularly drive it. After hearing this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Huggins knew the transactions were designed to conceal the nature of the proceeds used to purchase the vehicles.7 7 Huggins’s reliance on United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1991), is misplaced because the facts of that case were materially different. There, the defendant was convicted of two counts of money laundering based on two vehicle purchases. The Tenth Circuit found that the evidence was not sufficient to support the money laundering 22