Opinion ID: 203024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Who Should Decide the Question

Text: Both parties agree that this case should proceed in arbitration. Their disagreement is whether plaintiffs are barred from pursuing a class action in arbitration. The parties have requested this court to decide the issue and not refer it to the arbitrator. Under the language of the Program, the question here ordinarily would be one for the arbitrator in the first instance for two different reasons. First, the arbitrator must construe all of the language to determine whether there was a waiver, in light of the tensions in the language as described. Second, an arbitrator could carry out the unconscionability analysis. First, the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 123 S.Ct. 2402, 156 L.Ed.2d 414 (2003), made clear that when claims are submitted to arbitration, the question of whether class arbitration is forbidden is not a question of arbitrability, [2] but initially a question of contract interpretation and should be decided in the first instance by an arbitrator. Id. at 447, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (noting that the question [a]rguably . . . should have been made in the first instance by the arbitrator). [T]he question is not whether the parties wanted a judge or an arbitrator to decide whether they agreed to arbitrate a matter. Rather the relevant question here is what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to. Id. at 452, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (plurality opinion) (internal citations omitted); see also PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406-07, 123 S.Ct. 1531, 155 L.Ed.2d 578 (2003) (holding that an arbitrator must decide whether statutory treble damages count as punitive within the meaning of an arbitration agreement). This court adhered to that view in Anderson v. Comcast Corp., 500 F.3d 66 (1st Cir.2007), which held that an arbitrator must decide whether a class action waiver extended to cover the suit in question under the language in the agreement. The relevant arbitration agreement there provided for waiver of class actions unless your state's laws provide otherwise. Id. at 72. It was up to an arbitrator to determine whether a class action right provided by Massachusetts law fell into the exception provided by that arbitration agreement. Id. Second, there is a separate but related question of whether, assuming the contractual language is interpreted to provide for a class action waiver, that waiver is unconscionable. Under Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006), it is likely that this question of the unconscionability of the class action waiver provision, viewed as severable from the arbitration provision, is an issue for the arbitrator. We need not resolve the issue. Nonetheless, here the parties have affirmatively stated their intention that the court decide the unconscionability and statutory invalidity questions. We understand them to agree that the clauses should be assumed to be read to waive class claims, and the question of whether the Program, so read, may be enforced under the FAA is for the court. The parties agree there is no jurisdictional objection to our deciding the question. An agreement to arbitrate does not divest a court of its jurisdiction. See DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins., PLC, 202 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir.2000) (noting the modern view that arbitration agreements do not divest courts of jurisdiction, though they prevent courts from resolving the merits of arbitrable disputes). We have jurisdiction and, in the interests of efficiency, we reach the merits question, as requested. We review the district court's decision de novo, as it presents solely questions of law. Anderson, 500 F.3d at 71; see also Marks 3 Zet-Ernst Marks GmBh & Co. KG v. Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir.2006). The facts on which we rely are undisputed; there are some disputes as to facts which are not material. We may affirm the district court order on any independent ground made manifest by the record. InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir.2003).