Opinion ID: 1179762
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Threshold Public Concern Inquiry

Text: Turning to the first requirement of the two-prong test to determine whether a public employee's speech is protected by the First Amendment, I agree with the Court of Appeals that plaintiff's petition does involve a matter of public concern. As previously stated, speech that can fairly be considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community is constitutionally protected, Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. at 1689, as determined by the content, form and context of that expression as revealed by the whole record. Id. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. at 1690-91.
Except for the first two sentences of plaintiff's petition, the content of plaintiff's petition addresses issues involving public health and safety. Omitting the first two sentences, plaintiff's petition reads: [I]f everyone on site is to be available in a chlorine emergency, the questions of fit, maintenance and hygiene of the respirators, the supplying of respirators for those who wear glasses, training of all employees in their use, hazard pay, and the availability of respirators for office staff, contractors' employees and visitors must be answered. The aforementioned proposed rules do not take into account the use of respirators by the last three mentioned groups. It would be far more practical to have a volunteer crew, specially trained and outfitted to deal with chlorine in emergency and non-emergency situations. How the majority concludes that this language does not involve a matter of public concern [13] bewilders me. The thrust of all but the first two sentences of plaintiff's petition addresses the practicability and adequacy of the proposed governmental work safety rules and regulations in protecting employees and other members of the public who could be exposed to a chlorine gas leak. In particular, the petition states that the proposed rules did not address the fit, maintenance and hygiene of the respirators, training of all employees in their use, and whether office staff, contractors' employees and visitors would be required to wear respirators. The petition suggested an alternate solution for dealing with chlorine gas, a lethal substance, in emergency and non-emergency situations. The content of the speech in plaintiff's petition, therefore, went beyond plaintiff's personal employment concern (his desire to retain his beard), and expressed concern about health and safety in the work place and particularly about the protection afforded to employees and other members of the public from a chlorine gas leak. Plaintiff's petition, in essence, states that the proposed city rule for dealing with a lethal substance on city property was inadequate to protect large groups of employees and other members of the general public. Speech by a public employee about public health and safety is clearly speech on a matter of public concern. In Caldwell v. City of Elwood, Ind., 959 F.2d 670, 672 (7th Cir.1992), a firefighter's statements to the mayor at the mayor's home discussing his (firefighter's) safety and employer's concerns regarding the fire department's use of ambulances are, the court said, certainly a matter of public concern. In Burgess v. Pierce County, 918 F.2d 104, 105-06 (9th Cir.1990), a county fire marshall's statements to county officials and members of the public that passage and enforcement of county ordinances would conflict with state fire flow and private road standards, threaten life and property, and expose the county to potential tort liability were held to be a matter of public concern. In Considine v. Board of County Com'rs, 910 F.2d 695, 700 (10th Cir 1990), a county employee's statements that alleged numerous statutory and regulatory public health and safety violations were occurring on projects that were sponsored by the county and under the direction of the county's elected officials and administrative staff were held to involve a matter of public concern and were entitled to First Amendment protection. In Morfin v. Albuquerque Public Schools, 906 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 (10th Cir 1990), a public school teacher's criticism of a superior's disciplinary philosophy was recognized as speech on a matter of public concern because [g]enerally, speech by a public school employee about a policy or practice which can substantially and detrimentally affect the welfare of the children attending the school constitutes speech on a matter of public concern. In Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1502 (11th Cir 1989), the court held that a police chief's [w]arning [to the city council] that closing a public road would create a safety hazard is speech on a matter of public concern. In Price v. Brittain, 874 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir 1989), a state mental health facility social worker's statements to patients regarding their right to outside legal counsel and to prosecute civil actions against officials within the facility who were mistreating them were held to be a matter of public concern. In Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 825-26 (5th Cir 1989), a nurse's report to superiors of violations of nursing practices in the prison infirmary which endangered the prisoners was held to be a matter of public concern. In Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (9th Cir 1989), a firefighter's comments to his supervisor and other city workers criticizing the behavior of other firefighters and police officers in their handling of a drug overdose case were held to be speech about a matter of public concern. In Teeters v. Scott, 733 F.Supp. 1279, 1281-83 (E.D.Ark.1990), a nurse's comments to a mother of a patient that the patient was occasionally deprived of meals and bathroom privileges, and that hospital personnel were being mean to the patient, were a matter of public concern because they concerned the standard of care given a patient at a public institution. In Brown v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 656 F.Supp. 517 (E.D.N.Y.1987), aff'd without opinion, 867 F.2d 1423 (2d Cir 1988), a lieutenant in the security force assigned to JFK Airport was disciplined following his writing a memo to his superiors and his union in which he expressed the view that airport security was not sufficient to repel terrorist activity. Although the memo addressed plaintiff's personal safety concerns, noted the court, the memo essentially concerned the ability of the airport to respond to a matter of utmost public concernterrorism. Id. at 521. In Woodruff v. Bd. of Tru. of Cabell Huntington, 173 W.Va. 604, 319 S.E.2d 372, 378-379 (1984), hospital employees' distribution near the hospital of leaflets disclosing a labor dispute with the hospital and the effects of job eliminations on the level of public health care was held to be speech on a matter of public concern. Additionally, the Oregon Legislative Assembly has recognized that speech which discloses information on matters of public health and safety is of public import. ORS 659.510(1)(b)(B) prohibits a public employer from taking or threatening to take disciplinary action against an employee for the disclosure of any information that the employee reasonably believes is evidence of substantial and specific danger to public health and safety resulting from action of the state, agency or political subdivision. One purpose of the Oregon Safe Employment Act, ORS 654.001 to 654.295, ORS 654.750 to 654.780, and ORS 654.991, is to assure as far as possible safe and healthful working conditions for every working man and woman in Oregon. ORS 654.003. To accomplish that purpose, the Legislative Assembly provides a procedure that [e]ncourage[s] employers and employees to reduce the number of occupational safety and health hazards and to institute new programs and improve existing programs for providing safe and healthful working conditions. ORS 654.003(1). Under ORS 654.062(5)(a), it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to bar or discharge from employment or otherwise discriminate against any employee or prospective employee, who opposed any practice forbidden by [health and safety laws] or who made any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under [the health and safety laws].
As to the form of plaintiff's expression, plaintiff's petition was posted on the company bulletin board, given to the city commissioner in charge of the Bureau of Environmental Services, and circulated among employees affected by the policy. The fact that plaintiff's speech was not directed to the public at large, to inform it of the perceived problems, is not determinative to the inquiry of whether the speech involves a matter of public concern. See Rankin v. McPherson, supra, 483 U.S. at 386 n. 11, 107 S.Ct. at 2898 n. 11 (The private nature of the [public employee's] statement does not    vitiate the status of the statement as addressing a matter of public concern.); see also McGowan and Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of University Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 Cal L Rev 825, 855 (1991) ( Rankin demonstrates that the concept of public speech has a very strong content basethe speech at issue was not distributed in anything remotely resembling a public fashion.); Gillette v. Delmore, supra, 886 F.2d at 1198 (a public employee's speech was held to involve a matter of public concern even though made to employee's supervisor and other city workers, and not to the public at large).
Taken in context, I will assume that plaintiff's petition arose because of plaintiff's personal dissatisfaction with the proposed work safety policy. A motive of personal concern behind a public employee's speech is not, however, dispositive on the issue whether the employee's speech involves a matter of public concern. Breuer v. Hart, 909 F.2d 1035, 1038-39 (7th Cir 1990); Belk v. Town of Minocqua, 858 F.2d 1258, 1264 (7th Cir 1988). Content, not context as stated by the majority, [14] is the most important factor in the inquiry whether the public employee's speech passes the threshold public concern test. Breuer v. Hart, supra, 909 F.2d at 1039; Belk v. Town of Minocqua, supra, 858 F.2d at 1264; Berg v. Hunter, 854 F.2d 238, 242-43 (7th Cir 1988), cert. den. 489 U.S. 1053, 109 S.Ct. 1314, 103 L.Ed.2d 583 (1989). Bodensteiner and Levinson, 1 State & Local Government Civil Rights Liability 77, § 1:08.50 (1987); McGowan and Tangri, supra, 79 Cal L Rev at 855. In Connick v. Myers, supra , the Supreme Court considered one of Myers' thirteen questionsthe question regarding pressure to work in political campaignsto be of public concern, even though the Court found that Myers' grievances were fairly rooted in a personal dispute over her transfer. The fact that a speaker was motivated by narrow self-interest does not automatically mean that the issue is not of public concern. Breuer v. Hart, supra, 909 F.2d at 1038-39; Bodensteiner and Levinson, supra. Connick makes clear that a public employee's statements motivated, triggered, or predominated by a personal grievance, dissatisfaction, or narrow self-interests may nevertheless involve matters of public concern necessitating inquiry as to whether the employee's (plaintiff's) speech passes the second requirement of the two-prong test to determine whether the speech is protected by the First Amendment, namely, the Pickering balancing test. The fact that plaintiff's speech arose in the context of what began as a personal dispute does not, therefore, in itself disqualify that speech from constitutional protection. In sum, as determined by the content, form, and context of plaintiff's expression as revealed by the whole record, I conclude that, despite whatever self-interests motivated or triggered plaintiff to circulate the petition, all but the first two sentences of plaintiff's petition concerns a matter of public concern.