Opinion ID: 2330386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: issues

Text: [¶ 52] Finally, Mr. Counts claims that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict that he was guilty of kidnapping, and also insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict for aggravated burglary. We apply a familiar standard of review: [W]e must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. When considering a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, we review that evidence with the assumption that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, disregard the evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the benefit of every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the evidence. We will not reweigh the evidence nor will we re-examine the credibility of the witnesses. Garner v. State, 2011 WY 156, ¶ 20, 264 P.3d 811, 820 (Wyo.2011), quoting Ewing v. State, 2007 WY 78, ¶ 11, 157 P.3d 943, 946 (Wyo. 2007). [¶ 53] With respect to the kidnapping charge, Mr. Counts contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he intended to terrorize BP. The applicable statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201, provides in relevant part: (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the removal, or if he unlawfully confines another person, with the intent to: ... (iii) Inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another. In its special verdict, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant removed the victim from the vicinity where she was at with the intent to terrorize her, and also found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant confined the victim with the intent to terrorize her. Mr. Counts claims there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that he removed BP, that he confined her, or that he did either with the intent to terrorize. [¶ 54] Mr. Counts points to evidence showing that he took BP from the outside back into her home. Based on this, he argues that there was no evidence by which the jury could find that he removed BP from her home. His argument is, however, based on a faulty portrayal of the charge against him. He was not charged with removing BP from her home, but rather, with removing her from outside where she was hiding near the neighbor's pickup. As previously indicated, defense counsel knew the nature of this charge against Mr. Counts, telling the district court, I understand the theory under which they are proceeding, that she's removed from outside by a truck and then taken in this home where I assume the State will allege she's confined. The testimony of BP, Mr. Gilstrap, Mr. Thomas, and several neighbors was sufficient to support the jury's finding that Mr. Counts removed BP from the vicinity where she was. [¶ 55] Mr. Counts acknowledges that a victim may be confined within her home, but quoting Darrow v. State, 824 P.2d 1269, 1270 (Wyo.1992), he asserts that confinement within a home can occur only if discovery or rescue is made unlikely, and if the victim is effectively isolated from the usual protections of society. (Quotation marks omitted.) Mr. Counts asserts that his taking BP into her residence did not make discovery unlikely because there was no secrecy to the fact that Mr. Counts and the girlfriend were there. The two men who left knew it, the neighbors knew it and the police knew it. Even if this argument correctly interprets the term discovery, it ignores evidence demonstrating that Mr. Counts' actions made rescue less likely. The two men who left testified that Mr. Counts was holding a knife. After he forced BP back into her home, he sent them outside and locked the door. He then took BP down to her basement bedroom. The police made no move to rescue BP, but only surrounded the home and waited. Further, BP testified that Mr. Counts locked the bedroom door and stood in front of it to block her escape. This evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that Mr. Counts had confined BP in a place from which rescue was less likely, and where she was isolated from the usual protections of society. [¶ 56] With regard to the intent to terrorize, Mr. Counts again contends that to terrorize means to frighten in the extreme, and that terror is a high degree of fear or an intense fright or apprehension. Obviously, Mr. Counts submits in his brief, the term `terrorize' is a stronger term than `frighten,' `scare,' `discomfort,' `alarm' or `concern.' According to Mr. Counts, there was no evidence of his intent to inflict such extreme fright on BP. He characterizes BP's testimony as establishing only that she was struck [and] yelled at and that music discs in her bedroom were thrown around and broken. She never testified to any fear beyond the ordinary, indeed, she expressed that she had not thought it was a big deal. She testified to no verbal threats and specifically testified that she never saw a knife.... There were no threats, deadly or otherwise. Mr. Counts insists that BP did not experience the extreme fear necessary to be terrorized, but felt only ordinary fear. [¶ 57] This argument seriously understates the evidence. Mr. Thomas and Mr. Gilstrap, testified that BP freaked out and became frantically scared when Mr. Counts started yelling and knocking on her windows. She ran outside and tried to hide under a parked pickup. Mr. Thomas, Mr. Gilstrap, and the neighbors saw Mr. Counts forcibly grab BP by the hair and neck and drag her back to the house while she was screaming and begging for help. Mr. Counts confined BP in her basement bedroom, beat and strangled her, called her horrific names, and threw her own possessions at her. When he let BP out of the bedroom, he tied an electric cable around her waist to keep her from running away. [¶ 58] Given this evidence, it is disturbing that Mr. Counts, in his brief, seeks to characterize this as a fairly plain vanilla domestic violence case. We reject that characterization. However strong the term terrorize might be, the record contains sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Counts intended to terrorize his victim. [¶ 59] Mr. Counts also asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on the charge of aggravated burglary. The applicable statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a), provides that A person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein. Mr. Counts correctly states that, to convict him under this statute, the jury had to find that he entered BP's house with the intent to commit a felony thereinin other words, with the intent to commit the crime within BP's residence. [¶ 60] The prosecution charged that Mr. Counts entered BP's residence with the intent to commit two felonies: aggravated assault and kidnapping. The jury found that Mr. Counts did not enter with the intent to commit aggravated assault, but found that he did enter with the intent to commit kidnapping. We therefore consider the evidence only as it relates to kidnapping. [¶ 61] The kidnapping statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201 (a), provides that a person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the removal, or if he unlawfully confines another person, with the specified criminal intent. It is Mr. Counts' contention that, under the language of this statute, he could kidnap BP within her residence only by removing her from that residence. Keene, 812 P.2d at 150 (Removal cannot refer to locational changes within a victim's residence or a business.) (emphasis in original). He asserts that there was no evidence that he intended to remove BP from her residence. The evidence actually indicates the opposite: he retrieved her from outside and returned her to her residence. [¶ 62] Mr. Counts further asserts that there was no evidence that he intended to force BP to run outside, or that he anticipated she would do so. After she did, Mr. Counts pursued her and brought her back into the house. Even if this qualifies as removing BP from the vicinity where she was, and therefore constitutes kidnapping, Mr. Counts contends that it was not a kidnapping within her residence, and could not constitute the crime of aggravated burglary therein. In sum, Mr. Counts argues that there is no evidence that he broke into BP's residence with the intent to kidnap her therein, and so the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated burglary. [¶ 63] The argument formulated by Mr. Counts ignores a vital portion of the kidnapping statute. Again, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(a) provides that a person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the removal, or if he unlawfully confines another person. (Emphasis added.) As we did in Keene, 812 P.2d at 150, we interpret the emphasized or as making the statutory alternatives separate and distinct and mutually exclusive. Thus, to support the jury's finding that Mr. Counts broke into the house with the intent to commit kidnapping, it was not also necessary for the jury to find an intent to remove her from the house. It was sufficient for a conviction if the jury found that he intended to confine and terrorize her therein. [¶ 64] The evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to support a finding that Mr. Counts entered the house with the intent of confining and terrorizing BP. Before Mr. Counts entered the house, he sounded Angry. Very angry. BP freaked out and became frantically scared. She explained that Mr. Counts was jealous, and if he got into the house, he was going to be very upset with me, and it wasn't going to be pretty. Mr. Counts violently broke in through the back door, smashing glass, and breaking parts of the door jamb. He carried a knife. He pursued BP when she escaped. He forcibly returned her to the house and held her in her basement bedroom. This evidence is adequate for a rational jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that when Mr. Counts broke in through the back door of the house, he did so with the intent to confine and terrorize BP therein. There is sufficient evidence to support his conviction on the charge of aggravated burglary. [¶ 65] Affirmed.