Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted Attempts to Elicit Testimony Regarding the Lactawen Murder

Text: Before trial, the prosecutor represented to the trial court and defendant that he would not seek to introduce evidence of the Lactawen murder during the guilt phase of the trial. Later, immediately before defendant was to testify in his defense, the prosecutor moved to introduce the Lactawen murder during cross-examination. The trial court found the evidence normally would be admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b) of the Evidence Code, but excluded it because defendant had relied upon the prosecutor's general statement that evidence concerning this murder would not be introduced at the guilt phase. Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by nonetheless attempting to elicit testimony on this subject during cross-examination of defendant and defense witness Philip Bodily. When questioning defendant about the supposed fit of rage that caused him to strangle Sorensen without thinking, the prosecutor asked, [H]ow often do you get [so] furiously mad that you don't think? Defendant replied, It's happened before, After asking whether this happened with Garcia, to which defendant answered, Correct, the prosecutor inquired, Is this an everyday occurrence that you get furiously mad enough to kill people? Defendant answered, No, but it has happened before. Defense counsel then asked to approach the bench, and said, Should I move for a mistrial now or later. The prosecutor stated he did not plan on mentioning the Sacramento incident, but the trial court admonished him that the continual invitation to answers that are going to be calling for a direct denial of other conduct needs to be avoided. The prosecutor said, Fine, and the questioning resumed. Later, after questioning spanning approximately 12 pages of the transcript, the prosecutor asked defendant about tying up Sorensen's arms, and posed the question whether defendant like[d] to tie women up like you were doing to this lady at that time? Defendant answered, In that set of feelings, yes. The prosecutor then asked, Did you like to tie them up while they're alive, also? The trial court sustained defense counsel's objection and told the prosecutor this was the No. 2 warning. Assuming defendant preserved prosecutorial misconduct challenges to these exchanges, we are not persuaded by defendant's claims that through these questions the prosecutor was attempting to bait defendant into making a response that would open the door to the introduction of the Lactawen evidence. After the first challenged question was asked, the prosecutor told the trial court he did not intend to mention the Lactawen murder, and it appears the court accepted that representation, although it advised him to avoid the apparently unintended problem of asking questions that might lead in that direction. Moreover, this first question whether it was an everyday occurrence for defendant to get furiously mad enough to kill someoneseems essentially to have been a rhetorical question designed to discredit defendant's claim that he had fits of rage that prevented him from thinking about what he was doing, and probably would lead to a negative answer, not a statement related to the Lactawen murder. Had the prosecutor been attempting to force defendant into making some such statement or a denial that arguably would allow for impeachment with the Lactawen evidence, he might have asked a question inviting a more factual response, such as on what other occasions have you been furiously mad enough to kill someone? The second questionwhether defendant liked to tie up women when they are aliveis, again, insufficient to suggest the prosecutor, despite his earlier assurance to the trial court to the contrary, intended to elicit an answer calling for the introduction of evidence of the Lactawen murder. The question, asked in response to defendant's statement that he liked to tie up women [i]n that set of feelings (meaning, possibly, when the woman was dead), appears to have been an attempt to clarify defendant's answer. It also simply called for a yes or no answer about what defendant like[d], which was not likely to elicit a statement related to what he had done in the past. Because the trial court sustained the objection to the question and the prosecutor proceeded to a different topic, it would be unduly speculative to conclude, based upon the question itself, that the prosecutor was attempting to force defendant into opening the door to the admission of evidence of the Lactawen murder. Accordingly, we discern no indication of prosecutorial misconduct in the cross-examination of defendant. Near the end of the cross-examination of defense witness Philip Bodily, defendant's childhood friend who testified about defendant's mother's sexual advances and activities with a neighborhood boy, the prosecutor asked Bodily, without objection, three questions regarding Bodily's knowledge of the charges faced by defendant in this case. Bodily ultimately answered that defendant was charged with Triple murder. Counsel then asked Bodily whether he had communicated with defendant in the previous five years, to which Bodily answered no. This concluded Bodily's testimony, and he was excused and the next witness was called. At a sidebar conference, the court mentioned the triple-murder answer and stated it assumed the defense did not wish to emphasize it any further, to which defense counsel replied, You've got that right. The court then stated, We'll deal with it later, if at all. No further discussion of the question and answer was held. Defendant's claim on appealthat the prosecutor's cross-examination on the subject of Bodily's knowledge of the charges was misconduct because it was intended to lead to the introduction of the Lactawen evidenceis forfeited and in any event also is without merit. Defendant had three opportunities to object to these questions as improper attempts to circumvent the trial court's order, before Bodily gave the triple-murder answer. The defense failed to do so. Moreover, even at the sidebar conference that took place after Bodily was excused, defense counsel did not mention prosecutorial misconduct. Defense counsel likely did not raise a misconduct claim in the trial court because it was apparent this circumstance was simply an unexpected, erroneous answer by the witness. Shortly before the questions about the charges, the prosecutor had explored Bodily's testimony that he did not tell anyone about defendant's mother's sexual activities until several years later, and the only persons he had told about it prior to trial were Bodily's father and the defense investigator. The prosecutor therefore seemed to be challenging Bodily's credibility, and the circumstance that Bodily, a childhood friend of defendant's, knew defendant was facing serious charges was relevant on that issue. In addition, for the supposed prosecutorial misconduct to have occurred, the prosecutor would have had to suspect that Bodily, a defense witness who resided in Utah and, as far as the record shows, might not have spoken with the prosecutor or his investigator prior to testifying, knew about the uncharged Lactawen murder and incorrectly would answer that defendant was charged with three murders in this one case. Moreover, the prosecutor let the matter drop, despite the absence of any objection from the defense, and did not seek to establish before the jury that Bodily's answer was anything other than a mistake on his part. In sum, we conclude there is no evidence the prosecutor, through the cross-examination of defendant and Bodily, engaged in misconduct by purposefully seeking to undermine the trial court's ruling excluding the Lactawen evidence. Even had defendant established that the prosecutor engaged in deceitful and reprehensible conduct in this regard, we would conclude there is no evidence the outcome or the fairness of the trial would have been adversely affected. The jury simply never heard about the Lactawen murder during the guilt phase of the trial. It also had no reason to suspect the prosecutor's questions to defendant had anything to do with a third rape and murder, or that Bodily's triple-murder answer was anything other than a misunderstanding on his part. Even if the prosecutor had been attempting to subvert the trial court's ruling, he was unsuccessful, and the outcome of the trial was not affected.