Opinion ID: 1391800
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: What are the remedies for an incomplete affidavit?

Text: Theodor recognized that all inaccuracy in the affidavit impedes the neutral determination of probable cause. However, it concluded, probability and not certainty is the relevant standard; and constitutional protections against unlawful search and seizure are subject to the overriding principle of reasonableness.... Negligence by an affiant should be deterred, but reasonable attempts at accuracy should be accepted. (8 Cal.3d at pp. 96-97.) Thus, the court held, where affiant reasonably believed his statements the warrant should stand. When he was not reasonable in believing them, they should be excised and the remaining allegations retested for probable cause. ( Id., at pp. 100-101.) In Cook, we considered the appropriate sanction for reckless or knowing falsehoods. We explained why mere negligence calls for the correct and retest device, rather than quashing of the warrant. Negligent falsehood, we reasoned, does not undermine the magistrate's conclusion that affiant was generally credible. Hence the remaining statements in the affidavit may be presumed true and their sufficiency retested by a reviewing court under section 1538.5. But lying or reckless inaccuracy may render the truthfulness of all statements in the affidavit suspect. The reviewing court independently cannot reassess the affiant's credibility, since that is a matter exclusively for the magistrate. It therefore lacks a reliable factual basis to determine probable cause. There remains in such cases no alternative but to quash the warrant. (22 Cal.3d at pp. 84-87.) Cook expressly reaffirmed the rule of reason, holding that the exclusionary doctrine developed in Theodor is intended, by deterring unlawful police conduct, to minimize the risk that innocent privacy will be invaded. Once unlawful conduct is shown, Cook explained, the scope of the exclusionary rule will depend on whether the inaccuracy was negligent, on the one hand, or reckless or deliberate on the other. But if the affidavit reflects a reasonable attempt at truth, constitutional principles are satisfied; and no purpose is served by vitiating the warrant, no matter how crucial the inaccuracy. (22 Cal.3d at pp. 82-88.) We adhere to that analysis here. Theodor and Cook described misstatements as reasonable, negligent, and intentional, applying the exclusionary rule accordingly. By analogy, the Courts of Appeal have held that material facts negligently omitted must be added to the affidavit by the reviewing court and the affidavit then retested for probable cause. Intentional omissions of material facts have been deemed to require an automatic quashing of the warrant. ( Barger, supra, 40 Cal. App.3d 662, 669; Neusom, supra, 76 Cal. App.3d 534, 538-539; Morris, supra, 57 Cal. App.3d 521, 527-528.) Defendant contends that, under Theodor and Cook, negligence is synonymous with inadvertence and that every conscious omission of a material fact, no matter how reasonable or justified, should invoke the sanction of suppression. We disagree. Both defendant and lower courts have failed to realize that the Theodor-Cook system of remedies may not be applied exactly to omissions. Unlike misstatements, omissions do not always render an affidavit inaccurate. As we have seen, only material omissions have that effect. Intentional omissions, unlike the intentional misstatements considered in Cook, are not necessarily an effort to mislead the magistrate. (5) (See fn. 5.) They may arise from a correct, or at least reasonable, conclusion that the omitted facts were immaterial or privileged. [5] The procedures and remedies applicable to omissions must account for those crucial differences. (6a) First, the reviewing court must determine whether any omissions asserted are material, as herein we have defined that term. Because an affidavit with no material omissions is substantially accurate and truthful, it corresponds for most purposes to an affidavit with no misstatements. Once all the asserted omissions have been deemed immaterial, the primary question is whether the affidavit on its face supports probable cause. If it does, the warrant usually must stand. (See, e.g., People v. Neusom, supra, 76 Cal. App.3d at p. 541; People v. Webb, supra, 36 Cal. App.3d at p. 470; but see discussion, post. ) (7), (8) If an omission is found material, the reviewing court must next determine, as in Theodor and Cook, whether it arose innocently or from culpable conduct. However, since not all intentional omissions of material facts are blameworthy, the reviewing court must apply a modified version of the Theodor-Cook formula for culpability. The necessary modification is plain. The trial court must decide whether the material omission was either (1) reasonable, (2) negligent, or (3) recklessly inaccurate or intentionally misleading. That the omission itself was intentional rather than inadvertent may be relevant to those issues, but may not alone be dispositive. A material omission is reasonable when despite the exercise of due care, affiant was ignorant of the omitted fact or forgot to include it, or his conclusion that it was privileged or immaterial was reasonable even if incorrect. Where material omissions are reasonable, whether volitional or inadvertent, no sanction should be imposed; the situation corresponds to that of reasonable misstatements. Because affiant will, in such cases, have done all that can reasonably be expected to comply with constitutional standards, little deterrent purpose would be served by further review of the affidavit. ( Theodor, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 97-100.) Negligent omissions of material fact occur when the affiant is unreasonably ignorant of facts, unreasonably forgets to include them, or makes a good faith but unreasonable decision that they need not or should not be included. In such cases the add and retest formula developed in Barger, Morris, and Neusom is proper. It discourages carelessness and helps eliminate the likelihood that a negligent mistake may cause an erroneous finding of probable cause. Yet it recognizes the affiant's good faith effort at accuracy. ( Cook, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 84-85.) The dissent here suggests that any intentional material omission should automatically vitiate the warrant. As with intentional misstatements, it argues, deliberate omission of a material fact undermines the magistrate's implicit finding that the affiant was credible and deprives the reviewing court of a reliable factual basis to redetermine probable cause. (See Cook, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 86-87.) We disagree. An intentional omission is not necessarily culpable. Moreover, an omission can be both intentional and negligent at the same time. Thus an intentional omission, even where material, should not automatically invoke Cook 's suspect-credibility reasoning, though a deliberate lie properly does. Something more than mere intent to omit is required to justify the conclusion that statements that do appear in the affidavit may not be trusted. [6] The dissenting opinion here suggests that a reviewing court may not assume the magistrate would have found probable cause had he known of the negligent omission. Hence, the dissent reasons, an affidavit materially incomplete because of affiant's negligence may never support a decision to uphold the warrant. That view contravenes both Theodor and Cook. Every negligent inaccuracy, whether misstatement or substantial omission, might have induced a fully informed magistrate to find probable cause lacking. Yet nothing in our recent cases suggests that the court therefore must quash the warrant. On the contrary, the reviewing court simply eliminates the negligent inaccuracy, assumes the affidavit to be otherwise truthful, and determines independently whether, as corrected, the affidavit is sufficient, under settled standards, to [establish] probable cause.... ( Theodor, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 101, fn. 14; Cook, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 84-85.) That rule of reason assumes, as does the dissent, that the reviewing court may not second-guess the magistrate. ( Cook, supra, at p. 85.) However, it also recognizes that we do not minimize unreasonable invasions of privacy by rejecting, on review, the entire showing of a credible affiant because negligently he or she was inaccurate in one respect. ( Ibid. ) Moreover, it encourages the affiant to inform the magistrate fully by extending the duty of disclosure in the affidavit beyond those facts that necessarily would preclude a finding of probable cause. [7] The dissent urges that an add and retest remedy for negligent omissions is an insufficient sanction to deter improper police conduct. Such a view ignores the express holding of Theodor, so recently confirmed in Cook, that negligent inaccuracy calls only for correction and retesting. ( Theodor, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 100-101; Cook, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 82-85.) Indeed, the rule espoused would frustrate rather than promote the deterrent goals of those decisions. It would contravene the principle of reasonable accuracy, under which mistakes occurring despite the exercise of due care are not punished, however crucial. ( Theodor, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 97-101; Cook, 22 Cal.3d at p. 82.) And because it would not leave a sterner sanction for deliberate attempts to mislead the magistrate (see discussion, post ), the police would have nothing to lose by sliding from mere carelessness into recklessness and treachery. (6b), (9) When an abuse of that gravity appears  when affiant intentionally omits any fact for the purpose of deceiving the magistrate or recklessly disregards the accuracy and completeness of the affidavit  Cook's analysis fully applies. An omission of that kind is no different from a reckless falsehood or a deliberate lie. Any such attempt to mislead the magistrate undermines the judicial process, makes the entire affidavit suspect, and calls for harsh deterrence. The appropriate response is to quash the warrant regardless of whether the omission ultimately is deemed material. (10), (11) The burden on the issues of materiality, privilege, and affiant's culpability is to be allocated as in the case of misstatements. If the defense states with some specificity its reasons for believing that material facts were omitted, it may try to show such omissions and their materiality. The obligation of showing that material omissions were proper or reasonable rests with the People, but defendant has the burden of demonstrating recklessness or intent to mislead. (See Cook, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 89-92; Theodor, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 102.) We are aware of Cook's holding that defendant need not show bad faith or ulterior motive to quash a warrant for deliberate falsehood, since [t]hat would indeed be a difficult burden to sustain.... (22 Cal.3d at p. 91.) But Cook also reasoned that such a showing was of little if any relevance: once the defendant has shown the affiant knowingly lied under oath in any respect, the remainder of his allegations become suspect regardless of what his ulterior motives may have been.... ( Ibid., italics added.) In other words, perjury is sufficient evidence of lack of credibility; and proof of an ulterior motive for the lie is redundant. But intentional omissions do not necessarily have the same effect. There must be something more that gives an intentional omission the culpable quality of perjury. An intent to mislead supplies the element of purposeful deception already implicit in lying. Demonstrating purposeful deception may be a difficult burden, but we do not think it is an insurmountable one. It may be evidenced by the affirmative statement or admission of affiant. If he is silent or [denies a purpose to mislead] it may be shown indirectly. ( Id., at p. 90.) For example, if affiant denies knowledge of omitted facts his protestations may be overcome by the testimony of those present when he learned them. If he says he did not disclose the facts because he thought they were privileged or immaterial, the evidence may permit an inference that no such belief could have arisen in good faith. The more unreasonable the circumstances surrounding an omission, the more compelling the inference of recklessness or intentional deception. [8] If defendant can show why the affiant sought to deceive  his ulterior motive  he certainly may do so to bolster his circumstantial case. Yet such an inquiry often will be unnecessary under the standard we adopt. All issues necessary to determine the warrant's validity are to be resolved in the first instance by the trial court at the suppression hearing. [9] Here the court did not make the necessary determinations. It suppressed the warrant evidence simply on grounds that the omissions were material and volitional. Issues of privilege, negligence, recklessness, and intentional deception never were resolved. On that ground alone, the suppression order and the consequent judgment of dismissal must be reversed.