Opinion ID: 2818095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: 1. Pursuit Statute Our analysis begins with § 13-911, the pursuit statute. It provides that when an innocent third party suffers injury proximately caused by the action of a law enforcement officer during vehicular pursuit, the political subdivision employing the officer shall be liable for damages to the innocent third party.6 The pursuit statute defines “vehicular pursuit” as an active attempt by a law enforcement officer operating a motor vehicle to apprehend one or more occupants of another motor vehicle, when the driver of the fleeing vehicle is or should be aware of such attempt and is resisting apprehension by maintaining or increasing his or her speed, ignoring the officer, or attempting to elude the officer while driving at speeds in excess of those reasonable and proper under the conditions.7 2. Whether Officers Were in Pursuit at Time of Collision [4] The City challenges the district court’s determination that a pursuit began before the collision. A police pursuit as defined in § 13-911 involves multiple elements and is a much more nuanced matter than simply deciding whether one vehicle is trying to catch up to, or maintain sight of, another.8 Among other arguments, the City contends that the “time was too short for the officers to respond in any way that could be seen as an active attempt to apprehend Webster,”9 that the 5 Id. 6 § 13-911(1). 7 § 13-911(5). 8 See Perez v. City of Omaha, 15 Neb. App. 502, 731 N.W.2d 604 (2007). 9 Brief for appellant at 17. - 410 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports WILLIAMS v. CITY OF OMAHA Cite as 291 Neb. 403 officers’ decision to pursue is not the affirmative act required under the statute, and that the pursuit statute does not impose liability when officers attempt to make a traffic stop and the vehicle flees. [5] Three requirements must be met before a finding can be made that a vehicular pursuit under § 13-911 has occurred: (1) There must be an active attempt by a law enforcement officer to apprehend occupants of another motor vehicle, (2) the driver of the fleeing vehicle must be aware of the attempt to apprehend, and (3) the driver must resist apprehension by taking some action, such as speeding, ignoring the officer, or attempting to elude the officer while driving at a speed which is not reasonable under the conditions.10 We consider these requirements in turn. (a) Active Attempt to Apprehend The first component of a vehicular pursuit under the statute requires an “active attempt” to “apprehend.” These terms are not defined in the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. We agree with the City that under § 13-911, the attempt to apprehend the driver “must be more than passively driving, monitoring, or watching.”11 But two actions by the officers prior to the collision demonstrate conduct above and beyond mere driving, monitoring, or watching. First, while following Webster’s vehicle, the officers activated the cruiser’s overhead flashing lights in order to get Webster to stop. Second, the police cruiser accelerated just before the collision. These facts, which are not clearly wrong, establish an “active attempt.” [6] The City focuses primarily upon the word “apprehend.” Whether law enforcement sought to apprehend an individual under § 13-911 is a mixed question of law and fact.12 The meaning of “apprehend” presents a question of law. The City 10 See Lalley v. City of Omaha, 266 Neb. 893, 670 N.W.2d 327 (2003). 11 See brief for appellant at 28. 12 See Maclovi-Sierra v. City of Omaha, supra note 4. - 411 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports WILLIAMS v. CITY OF OMAHA Cite as 291 Neb. 403 contends that “[a]ll the evidence shows the officers’ conduct was nothing more than an attempt to make a traffic stop for a minor violation that would not lead to apprehension.”13 In this case, we need not decide whether liability under § 13-911 can be established where an officer does nothing more than attempt to stop a vehicle by operating the cruiser’s emergency lights. Here, the police not only activated the lights but also accelerated their vehicle prior to the collision. Although “apprehend” has various meanings depending on the context, an inference arises that the officers were attempting to apprehend Webster. And as the prevailing party, Williams is entitled to the benefit of every inference that can reasonably be deduced from the evidence.14 The word “apprehend” is derived from a French word meaning “to lay hold of, seize.”15 In the physical context, it can mean “[t]o lay hold upon, seize, with hands, teeth, etc.”; “[t]o seize (a person) in name of law, to arrest”; “[t]o seize upon for one’s own, take possession of”; or “[t]o seize or embrace (an offer or opportunity).”16 The Nebraska Court of Appeals noted that “apprehension” has been defined as “‘[s]eizure in the name of the law; arrest,’”17 but that “apprehend” can mean to “‘catch’” or “‘detain.’”18 While the officers may not have intended to “apprehend” Webster at the moment when they activated their overhead lights, their vehicle’s acceleration prior to the collision raised an inference that their objective had changed. [7] Our application of the word “apprehend” is consistent with the purpose of the statute. Under § 13-911, a political 13 Brief for appellant at 23. 14 Maclovi-Sierra v. City of Omaha, supra note 4. 15 1 The Oxford English Dictionary 581 (2d ed. 1989). 16 Id. 17 Jura v. City of Omaha, 15 Neb. App. 390, 396, 727 N.W.2d 735, 740 (2007). 18 Id. - 412 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports WILLIAMS v. CITY OF OMAHA Cite as 291 Neb. 403 subdivision is strictly liable for injuries to an “innocent third party” during a vehicular pursuit, regardless whether the law enforcement officer’s actions were otherwise proper or even necessary.19 The obvious purpose is to shift the burden of bearing the costs resulting from such injuries away from the innocent third party. Clearly, the purpose applies where police pursue a vehicle in order to make an arrest. But it equally applies where police actively pursue a vehicle that flees from an attempt to initiate a traffic stop. The City also focuses on the district court’s statements regarding the police officers’ intent to pursue Webster. The City emphasizes the subjective views of the officers and states—without citing any authority—that the “‘active attempt’ to ‘apprehend’ requirement is measured by the officer’s intent.”20 And the district court concentrated on when the officers made the decision to pursue. But the court’s discussion of the officers’ intent, even if not directly pertinent, does not detract from the two factual findings that were essential to the court’s decision. The district court found that prior to the collision, the officers activated the cruiser’s overhead lights and the cruiser was increasing its speed. As we have already said, these factual findings are not clearly erroneous. And these facts support the court’s conclusion that the police were actively attempting to apprehend Webster. The first component of a vehicular pursuit was established. (b) Awareness of Attempt to Apprehend Next, for a vehicular pursuit under § 13-911, the driver must be aware of the attempt to apprehend. Webster did not testify at trial. If he made any statements reflecting on the issue, they were not included in the evidence. Thus, Webster’s 19 Werner v. County of Platte, 284 Neb. 899, 824 N.W.2d 38 (2012). 20 Brief for appellant at 25. - 413 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports WILLIAMS v. CITY OF OMAHA Cite as 291 Neb. 403 awareness of the attempt to apprehend him must be based on his actions at the time. The district court found that after the officers activated the cruiser’s overhead lights, Webster increased his speed and “ran a stop sign.” These facts support a reasonable inference that Webster was aware of the attempt to apprehend him. Giving Williams the benefit of this inference, as we must, the evidence supports the district court’s conclusion. (c) Resistance of Apprehension The last component for a vehicular pursuit is resistance of apprehension by the driver. The district court found that Webster was aware of the pursuit and, as a result, disregarded the stop sign. The City concedes that this element was met, stating, “There was no dispute that when William[s’] car was struck, Webster was resisting apprehension by driving at speeds in excess of those reasonable and proper under the conditions.”21 (d) Conclusion as to Pursuit The district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. Viewing the evidence most favorably to Williams and giving him the benefit of every reasonable inference, we cannot say that the district court was clearly wrong in concluding that a pursuit was in progress at the time of the collision. 3. Whether Pursuit Was Proximate Cause of Collision [8] For the pursuit under § 13-911 to have been a proximate cause of the accident, the pursuit must have caused the motorist to resist apprehension by maintaining or increasing speed, or by attempting to elude the pursuing officer at unreasonable speeds.22 The City’s argument that the pursuit was not the proximate cause of the collision is premised upon its belief 21 Id. at 17. 22 Staley v. City of Omaha, 271 Neb. 543, 713 N.W.2d 457 (2006). - 414 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports WILLIAMS v. CITY OF OMAHA Cite as 291 Neb. 403 that there was no vehicular pursuit before the collision. We have rejected that argument. The district court’s conclusion that the pursuit was a proximate cause of the collision and the damages suffered by Williams was not clearly wrong.