Opinion ID: 744246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The form and effect of Schiller's suspension

Text: 22 We next consider whether the suspension is so punitive in form and effect as to negate the intended civil and remedial purposes of the suspension. Ursery, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2148. Schiller has the burden of establishing punitive form and effect with the clearest proof. Id. 23 Schiller argues that her suspension takes a punitive form because the suspension is conditioned upon the commission of a crime. Schiller bases this argument on the Supreme Court's decision in Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). In Kurth Ranch, the Supreme Court held that a drug tax constituted punishment in part because its assessment was conditioned upon the commission of a crime. Id. at 781, 114 S.Ct. at 1946. 24 Since Kurth Ranch, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that conditioning a measure upon the commission of a crime will not in itself render that measure criminal and punitive. To the contrary, [i]t is well settled that 'Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission.'  Ursery, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2149 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 632, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938)). Thus, we are unpersuaded by Schiller's argument that her suspension has a punitive form merely because it was based upon her criminal act of drunk driving. 25 Schiller also argues that her suspension has a punitive effect because it serves the traditional goals of punishment: deterrence and incapacitation. We rejected a similar argument in United States v. Borjesson, 92 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 622, 136 L.Ed.2d 545 (1996). In Borjesson, the defendant had been administratively barred from a federal housing program after defrauding homeowners. He argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded his subsequent criminal prosecution because the debarment had resulted in deterrence and incapacitation. We held to the contrary, reasoning that although some deterrence and incapacitation may inevitably result from an action meant to protect the integrity of a government program, this incidental punitive effect does not change the essentially remedial character of that action. Id. at 955-56. 26 In the present case, some deterrence and incapacitation inevitably result from the suspension of military driving privileges. But the fact that the suspension results in some deterrence and incapacitation does not change the essentially remedial character of the suspension. We agree with the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Imngren that the argument that suspending a motorist's driving privileges is punitive because some element of deterrence is involved is without merit. Imngren, 98 F.3d at 816. 27 Contrary to Schiller's argument, the narrow practical scope of Schiller's suspension indicates that her suspension was essentially remedial in form and effect as well as purpose. The scope of Schiller's suspension was flexible, subject to modification at any time depending upon Schiller's work and personal needs. Such flexibility is typical of remedial suspension provisions. Allen v. Attorney General of State of Maine, 80 F.3d 569, 577 (1st Cir.1996). Moreover, Schiller's suspension was limited in time to one year and limited in area to military installations. These limits show the suspension to be remedial because the scope of the suspension reasonably corresponds to the future harm the offender's conduct might portend. Id. The fact that Schiller's suspension only affected her ability to drive on military installation roadways also distinguishes this suspension from the general suspensions authorized for criminal violations under the California Vehicle Code. 28 In sum, the form and effect of Schiller's suspension can fairly be viewed as remedial inasmuch as it is rationally related to the apprehended danger and the potential harm of drunk driving on military bases. Id. Thus, although Schiller's suspension may have resulted in some deterrence and incapacitation, Schiller has failed to show by the clearest proof that her suspension was so punitive in form and effect as to negate its intended civil and remedial purposes.