Opinion ID: 201473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Void Judgments

Text: 18 As the magistrate judge noted, courts must always be vigilant about the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. Yet determining when a judgment rendered in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction is void for purposes of collateral attack is an issue of some complexity. 19 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, and the requirement of subject-matter jurisdiction functions as a restriction on federal power, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is never presumed. Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir.1998). Rather, federal courts, including appellate courts, must satisfy themselves that subject-matter jurisdiction has been established. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099. To that end, federal courts have jurisdiction for at least the limited purpose of determining whether they have jurisdiction. Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 377, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940). 20 A court without subject-matter jurisdiction may not acquire it by consent of the parties; principles of estoppel do not apply, and a party does not waive the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the proceedings. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099 (citations omitted). Weighing against this seemingly inflexible jurisdictional requirement, id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), however, is a strong interest in the finality of judgments. The court has the authority to pass upon its own jurisdiction and its decree sustaining jurisdiction against attack, while open to direct review, is res judicata in a collateral action. Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist., 308 U.S. at 377, 60 S.Ct. 317. 21 Where a judgment is collaterally attacked as void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, then, [c]ompeting policies are at stake, namely, observation of limits on federal jurisdiction and need for judgments that are final. Kan. City S. Ry. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 822, 826 (8th Cir.1980) (en banc); see also Hodge v. Hodge, 621 F.2d 590, 592 (3d Cir.1980) ([U]nless more than the private interests of the litigants is at stake, even the issue of subject matter jurisdiction must at some point be laid to rest.); Lubben, 453 F.2d at 650 (noting a need for the certainty which allows controversies to be deemed judicially concluded). Accordingly, this court has established a high bar for collaterally vacating a judgment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction: 22 A void judgment is to be distinguished from an erroneous one, in that the latter is subject only to direct attack. A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect. In the interest of finality, the concept of void judgments is narrowly construed. While absence of subject matter jurisdiction may make a judgment void, such total want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from an error in the exercise of jurisdiction. A court has the power to determine its own jurisdiction, and an error in that determination will not render the judgment void. Only in the rare instance of a clear usurpation of power will a judgment be rendered void. 23 Lubben, 453 F.2d at 649 (footnotes omitted). If a court has an arguable basis for concluding that it has subject-matter jurisdiction, the judgment it enters may not be collaterally attacked as void. Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir.1986). 24 Fafel's collateral attack on the district court's judgment alleging a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction must be evaluated pursuant to these principles. In this case, neither the magistrate judge nor the district court discussed the difference between a challenge to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction on direct appeal and a collateral attack on that jurisdiction. The magistrate judge observed that Fafel's argument that his attorney lacked authority to accept DiPaola's offer of judgment was nothing more than an attempt to cure his failure to appeal the injunction within the time limits set forth in Fed. R.App. P. 4(a). That observation is equally applicable to Fafel's claim that the injunction is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, a claim which Fafel raises for the first time on appeal from the district court's rejection of the magistrate judge's sua sponte recommendation on subject-matter jurisdiction. See Lubben, 453 F.2d at 651 (Rule 60(b)(6), like Rule 60(b) generally, is not a substitute for an appeal). Nevertheless, a motion for relief from an unappealed judgment alleged to be void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may succeed if the rigorous standard for such relief is met. Kocher v. Dow Chem. Co., 132 F.3d 1225, 1230 (8th Cir.1997) (reviewing Rule 60(b)(4) motion employ[ed] ... as a substitute for the timely appeal [plaintiff] never filed). We turn, then, to the question of whether the district court, by enjoining Fafel from pursuing claims in state court in order to enforce a federal court judgment, engaged in a clear usurpation of power such that the injunction, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect, Lubben, 453 F.2d at 649.