Opinion ID: 163699
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial Of The Hartnetts’ Motion to Compel

Text: Finally, the Hartnetts argue that the district court erred in denying their motion to compel production of notes from Dr. O’Rourke’s prior surgeries. We owe considerable deference to the district court’s rulings on discovery matters, reviewing its decisions only for an abuse of discretion. Soma Med. Int’l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999). “Under this standard, a trial court’s decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Nieto v. Kapoor, 268 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). -22- Here, the procedural posture in which this issue was raised is relevant to its appropriate disposition. In particular, the record indicates that after the Hartnetts requested these records, the defendants objected on the grounds that production of the documents would be unduly burdensome. The Hartnetts then filed a motion to compel production of the documents. The defendants filed an objection to the motion, arguing in part, that the Hartnetts had failed to engage in reasonable, good faith efforts to confer with opposing counsel to resolve the disputed matter, as required by a local rule of the Colorado federal district court and Fed. R. Civ . P. 37. In particular, the defendants reported that: In their Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs claim that an attempt was made to comply with D.C. Colo. L.R. 7.1 by sending a letter to counsel for Dr. O’Rourke by facsimile “to attempt to discuss this matter but was unable to speak with him.” On February 14, 2000, the day Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel was mailed, counsel faxed a letter stating: “We are getting ready to file our Motion to Compel the production of Dr. O’Rourke’s Operative Reports pertaining to prior surgeries. If there is a chance we could resolve this without filing a motion, please call my office today and ask for either [counsel’s paralegal or secretary].” . . . This eleventh hour letter, placing the burden on Defendant’s counsel to contact Plaintiffs’ counsel, cannot be characterized as “reasonable, good faith efforts to confer with opposing counsel to resolve the disputed matter.” D.C. Colo. L.R. 7.1(A). Defense counsel did in fact call and was informed Mr. Carey [one of the lawyers for the Hartnetts] was out of state and Mr. Rector [the other lawyer for the Hartnetts] was away from the office. No return call was received from plaintiff counsel. Aplee Supp. App. at 6. -23- In denying the Hartnetts’ motion to compel, the district court cited the Colorado local rule and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. The court also concluded that the request for other operative reports was unduly burdensome. In our view, it is unclear from this record whether the production of these potentially important records would be unduly burdensome. However, the district court’s reliance on the procedural rules requiring the moving party to seek out-ofcourt resolution of discovery disputes (D.C. Colo. L.R. 7.1(A) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37) is within the court’s province. Moreover, the Hartnetts’ opening brief fails to challenge the district court’s finding that the Hartnetts failed to comply with these rules. See Aplts’ Br. at 29 (arguing that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to compel production of Dr. O’Rourke’s notes but failing to address the district court’s ruling that the Hartnetts failed to comply with D.C. Colo, L.R. 7.1(A) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 before filing their motion to compel). Because the Hartnetts did not raise the issue in their opening brief, they have waived it. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994). 4 4 In their reply brief, the Hartnetts do present an argument that they complied with the requirement that they confer with opposing counsel before filing their motion to compel. In particular, they contend that before they filed the motion, they attempted to call defendants’ counsel and that when that proved unsuccessful, they faxed a letter to opposing counsel requesting that the defendants’ counsel speak to one of the Hartnetts’ counsel’s paralegals if they (continued...) -24- Accordingly, we will not review the district court’s denial of the Hartnetts’ motion to compel, based upon their failure to comply with D.C. Colo. L.R. 7.1(A) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. The defendants substantive objection to the Hartnetts’ discovery request (that the request was unduly burdensome) is also not properly before us. Nevertheless, we note that the documents sought by the Hartnetts could be quite significant: If notes from other surgeries established that Dr. O’Rourke usually employed the phrase “double ligature” or a similar term when he applied two ligatures, then his failure to do so in the notes of the first surgery here would constitute some evidence that he only used one ligature, thus supporting the Hartnetts’ contention. On the other hand, if in the notes of other surgeries Dr. O’Rourke regularly used the phase “was ligated” to indicate that he applied more than one ligature, then these notes could provide support for his testimony that he used two ligatures in Mrs. Hartnett’s first surgery. Accordingly, in light of our 4 (...continued) wanted to discuss the motion to compel. According to the Hartnetts’ counsel, the defendants’ counsel did not call the paralegals but instead requested to speak to the Hartnetts’ counsel personally. In their response to the Hartnetts’ motion to compel, the defendants note that these efforts to resolve this discovery dispute were initiated on the same day that the Hartnetts’ counsel mailed the motion to compel. Accordingly, we see little indication that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that these eleventh hour efforts to resolve the discovery dispute were insufficient to comply with D.C. Colo. L.R. 7.1(A) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. -25- vacating the grant of summary judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings, the district court should allow further opportunity for discovery and should exercise its sound discretion should further disputes arise involving these records.