Opinion ID: 1275692
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) infringes on speech protected by the First Amendment

Text: Uninhibited speech `is the single most important element upon which this nation has thrived.' Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 131 Wash.2d 523, 536, 936 P.2d 1123 (quoting Guzick v. Drebus, 305 F.Supp. 472, 481 (N.D.Ohio 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 941, 28 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 175, 139 L.Ed.2d 117 (1997). Free speech is revered as the Constitution's majestic guarantee, central to the preservation of all other rights. Id. at 536, 936 P.2d 1123. Advocacy of one's political views through leafleting lies at the very core of our First Amendment freedoms. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346-47, 115 S.Ct. 1511; Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421-22, 108 S.Ct. 1886. The State asserts it may prohibit false statements of fact contained in political advertisements. This claim presupposes the State possesses an independent right to determine truth and falsity in political debate. However, the courts have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truthwhether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964). Rather, the First Amendment operates to insure the public decides what is true and false with respect to governance. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 419-20, 108 S.Ct. 1886; Riley v. National Fed. of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 791, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). In Meyer, the Supreme Court explained: `The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind.... In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.' Thomas v. Collins, [323 U.S. 516, 545, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945)] (Jackson, J., concurring)]. [ Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir. 1987)]. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 419-20, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (emphasis added). Particularly in the religious and political realms, the tenets of one man ... seem the rankest error to his neighbor. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352 (1940). Therefore, the Supreme Court has recognized that to sustain our constitutional commitment to uninhibited political discourse, the State may not prevent others from resort[ing] to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church and state, and even to false statement.  Id. (emphasis added). At times such speech seems unpalatable, but the value of free debate overcomes the danger of misuse. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 1511. For even false statements make valuable contributions to debate by bringing about the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279 n. 19, 84 S.Ct. 710 (quoting John S. Mill, On Liberty 15 (Oxford, Blackwell 1947)). Specifically, the First Amendment prohibits the State from silencing speech it disapproves, particularly silencing criticism of government itself. Threats of coerced silence chill uninhibited political debate and undermine the very purpose of the First Amendment. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 791, 108 S.Ct. 2667; Brown, 456 U.S. at 61, 102 S.Ct. 1523; Meyer, 486 U.S. at 419-20, 108 S.Ct. 1886. [The Founders of the nation] believed that freedom to think as you will and speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.... Believing in the power of reason as applied through the public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by lawthe argument of force in its worst form. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969). See also New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. 710. The State cannot substitute its judgment as to how best to speak for that of speakers and listeners; free and robust debate cannot thrive if directed by the government. Riley, 487 U.S. at 791, 108 S.Ct. 2667. For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self government. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), overruled on other grounds sub nom. by Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967). Instead of relying on the State to silence false political speech, the First Amendment requires our dependence on even more speech to bring forth truth. Brown, 456 U.S. at 61, 102 S.Ct. 1523. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). In the political context, a campaign's factual blunder is most likely noticed and corrected by the campaign's political opponent rather than the State. Id. Contrary to claims made by Justice Talmadge in his concurrence, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize the possibility of `an eleventh-hour anonymous smear campaign' as enough to justify a restriction on speech. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 352 n. 16, 115 S.Ct. 1511 (quoting People v. White, 116 Ill.2d 171, 506 N.E.2d 1284, 1288, 107 Ill.Dec. 229, 233 (1987)). Moreover, a well-publicized, yet bogus, complaint to the PDC on election eve raises the same concern. Therefore, [t]he preferred First Amendment remedy of `more speech, not enforced silence' thus has special force. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61, 102 S.Ct. 1523, 1533, 71 L.Ed.2d 732 (1982) (citation omitted). Underlying our dependence upon more speech is the presupposition that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.' New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. 710 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.1943)). RCW 42.17.530 coerces silence by force of law and presupposes the State will separate the truth from the false for the citizenry. The government made a similar attempt to suppress seditious libel in the Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 273, 84 S.Ct. 710. That Act made it a crime for any person to write, print, utter or publish any false writings against the government. Id. at 273-74, 376 U.S. 254 (quoting 1 Stat. 596). The Act was vigorously condemned as unconstitutional because it inevitably chilled that political debate needed for self-governance; however, it was allowed to expire by its own terms in 1801 before judicial challenge. [6] Id. at 274, 276, 84 S.Ct. 710. The First Amendment exists precisely to protect against laws such as RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) which suppress ideas and inhibit free discussion of governmental affairs. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 1511; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966). Even assuming, as per Justice Talmadge's concurrence, that malicious falsehoods against candidates are beyond constitutional protection, this statute has broader reach and brings within its sweep every maliciously false statement of material fact whether it is defamatory to an individual or not. Justice Talmadge's concurrence cites no authority to support its broad claim that all false statements in a political advertisement, including statements relating to issues campaigns, may be prohibited as unprotected speech. Moreover, the statutory requirement that malice be proved by a high standard of proof does not cure the infirmity as the chilling effect of possible governmental sanction will not be lost on the faint of heart.