Opinion ID: 6496687
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Same Test, New Name

Text: ¶59 The majority opinion declares a textualist victory over the zone of interests test. In reality, all it has done is relabel the existing test to create the illusion that it is consistent with the legislative text. The majority claims it has eradicated the subjectivity supposedly present in WED I's articulation of the zone of interests test. But the truth is 2See, e.g., majority op., ¶28; id., ¶25 (complaining the 'zone of interests' terminology is untethered to the text); id., ¶26 (proclaiming that the 'zone of interests' language is not grounded . . . in the statutory text); id., ¶39 (criticizing a pre-Kalal approach to statutory interpretation). 6 Nos. 2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk that as early as the 1980s this court has articulated the zone of interests test exactly the same way the majority opinion now asserts: a statutory question on whether the nature of the statute recognizes or seeks to regulate or protect the plaintiff's injured interest. See Waste Mgmt., 144 Wis. 2d at 503-508. The only change the majority opinion makes is renaming the test substantial interests rather than zone of interests.3 ¶60 Simply renaming the test substantial interests, however, fails to actually interpret what the words substantial interests mean. Is substantial interests a legal term of art? Or is this test the result of those two words' common, ordinary, and accepted meaning? The majority does not say. Yes, the majority opinion recites some statutory history, but its conclusory musing that those changes somehow do not endorse[] the zone of interests label while simultaneously not abrogating its substance is far from a true text-based analysis.4 See majority op., ¶27. In sum, the majority opinion See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶12 & 30 (calling zone of 3 interests a misnomer); id., ¶25 (claiming to change only the 'zone of interests' terminology (emphasis added)); id., ¶¶2 & 28 (concluding that the 'zone of interests' nomenclature has no basis in the text (emphasis added)); id., ¶46 (purporting to clarify only that the zone of interests expression of standing has no basis in Wisconsin law (emphasis added)). 4 Citation to three cases decided after the 1975 amendment that never even mention substantial interests——except in footnotes merely quoting the full statutory text——does not cure the dearth of a textually-driven analysis. Those cases expressly rely on WED I's pre-amendment interpretations without reservation or even acknowledging the statutory changes. 7 Nos. 2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk maintains a judicial limitation on Wis. Stat. ch. 227 standing that remains unaddressed in light of the legislature's substantial interest language. C. A Distraction from the New Substantive Criteria Limit ¶61 The majority opinion's hollow label change only obscures the subtle insertion of another, more exacting atextual limitation——and the majority's prompt misapplication of that limitation. According to the majority, standing to invoke judicial review now turns on whether the law underlying the claim both: (1) protects, recognizes, or regulates the petitioner's injured interest; and (2) contains substantive criteria. The problem with the new substantive criteria limitation is threefold. First, it is based on a single court of appeals decision that neither cites any authority for this limitation nor supports how the majority opinion applies it here. Second, the search for substantive criteria conflates standing with a prejudgment on the merits. And finally, demanding substantive criteria forsakes the actual legislative text. Such a condition overrides the substantive criteria and procedures that Wis. Stat. ch. 227 already provides, thus A real analysis of substantial interests might mean that neither the zone of interests label nor its substance survive. The test (under whichever label) requires interpreting the law allegedly violated. That makes sense under the federal within the meaning of a relevant statute language; it makes little sense in a statute lacking similar language. Perhaps Wisconsin's legislature crafted a broader judicial review provision to ensure a more robust judicial check on state agencies than the federal Congress deemed necessary. Whatever the answer is, the majority opinion's label change simply puts spoiled milk into a new carton, which fails to address the problem. 8 Nos. 2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk overruling the legislature's policy decision to grant broad standing to challenge agency decisions. 1. Chenequa ¶62 The majority opinion draws its substantive criteria limitation from Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Village of Hartland, 2004 WI App 144, 275 Wis. 2d 533, 685 N.W.2d 573. The majority's reliance on Chenequa is puzzling, however. For one, the Chenequa court created the substantive criteria limitation out of whole cloth as it cites no case or statute for this limit. See id., ¶¶21 & 25. More confounding, though, the majority misapplies Chenequa's substantive criteria limit to reach a result contrary to the one Chenequa compels. ¶63 To explain, Chenequa involved a prospective buyer, the Chenequa Land Conservancy, Inc. (Chenequa), displeased that the Department of Transportation (DOT) sold DOT-owned lands to a competing bidder. Chenequa's challenge invoked Wis. Stat. § 84.09(5), a statute containing a similar provision to one in Wis. Stat. § 23.15(1) at issue in this case. Section 84.09(5) authorizes DOT to sell department-owned property when it determines that the property is no longer necessary for the state's use for transportation purposes. That language parallels the no longer necessary for the state's use for conservation purposes language in § 23.15(1). See also Wis. Admin. Code § NR 1.47(2). ¶64 As a prospective buyer, Chenequa was not challenging the determination that the land was no longer necessary for the state's use; it needed the land sale to happen in order to purchase it. Rather, Chenequa's challenge centered on how DOT 9 Nos. 2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk selected the winning bidder——a matter unrelated to whether the land remained necessary for the state's use for transportation purposes. But § 84.09(5) was silent as to the substantive criteria by which DOT should select the winning bid. As such, the court of appeals concluded that because there are no substantive requirements governing the sale . . . other than DOT's obligation to determine that the property is no longer necessary for highway purposes, Chenequa lacked standing to seek judicial review of the bidding process. Chenequa, 275 Wis. 2d 533, ¶25 (emphasis added). By using other than, the Chenequa court held that the statute's only substantive criterion was the determination about the lands' necessity for a specified purpose.5 But because that determination was the only substantive criterion and Chenequa's bid-selection challenge did not implicate it, Chenequa lacked standing. ¶65 From this holding, the majority opinion engages in a glaring non sequitur. Like the Chenequa court, the majority recognizes that § 23.15 provides no substantive criteria governing the sale other than [DNR]'s obligation to determine the lands are no longer necessary for the state's use for conservation purposes. Majority op., ¶40 (emphasis added). But then, without explanation or analysis, the majority concludes that despite the Friends' challenge directly invoking the substantive criterion in § 23.15, the Friends' conservational interests are not protected, recognized, or 5Other than, Collins Dictionary, https://www.collinsdiction ary.com/us/dictionary/english/other-than (You use other than after a negative statement to say that the person, item, or thing that follows is the only exception to the statement.). 10 Nos. 2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk regulated under § 23.15, [and] that statute cannot serve as a basis for conferring standing on the Friends. Id. That simply does not follow. ¶66 Under the most generous read, the majority opinion is falsely equating the Friends' interests with those of Chenequa. But the two petitioners raised different challenges. Chenequa did not challenge DOT's determination that the land was no longer necessary for state purposes (because they wanted the sale to occur, just under different terms). The Friends, by contrast, do not want the transfer to occur and directly challenge DNR's determination that the affected lands are no longer necessary for conservational purposes. Therefore, applying Chenequa's substantive criteria holding actually leads to the opposite conclusion than the one the majority reaches. 2. Prejudging the merits at the standing stage ¶67 A threshold standing determination decides only whether a petitioner is entitled to be heard by the court; standing in no way depends on the merits of the p[etitioner]'s contention that particular conduct is illegal. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). Indeed, as we explained in Moustakis v. DOJ, [s]tanding and statutory interpretation are distinct and should not be conflated. 2016 WI 42, ¶3 n.2, 368 Wis. 2d 677, 880 N.W.2d 142. Yet the majority's new substantive criteria limitation appears to do just that——it conflates the Friends' standing with a prejudgment on the laws allegedly violated. Thus, not only is the majority's new substantive criteria limit on judicial review unsupported by 11 Nos. 2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk any precedent, it also runs counter to our case law by conflating standing with statutory interpretation. 3. No basis in the text ¶68 More fundamentally, this substantive criteria limitation betrays the legislative text. No provision in Wis. Stat. ch. 227 directs courts to seek out substantive criteria in the statute or regulation at issue. In fact, such a directive conflicts with portions of ch. 227 that already provide the substantive lens for judicial review and the applicable procedures. ¶69 Under Wis. Stat. § 227.57, a reviewing court substantively evaluates the agency decision for:  a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure that impaired the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action;  an erroneous interpretation of applicable law;  any finding of fact on which the agency action depends that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record or was determined without a hearing; or  an exercise of discretion outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law, inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency policy or a prior agency practice, if deviation therefrom is not explained to the satisfaction of the court by the agency, or is otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision. Critically, these provisions provide the only substantive criteria by which a court may review an agency's decision. See 12 Nos. 2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk § 227.57 (limiting the scope of judicial review to these criteria).6 Chapter 227 likewise establishes comprehensive procedures for judicial review of agency decisions. See §§ 227.40-227.60. ¶70 Despite ch. 227's existing substantive and procedural judicial-review provisions, the majority opinion denies the Friends standing in part because nothing in § 23.15 'establish[es] procedures to protect persons or entities interested in' challenging land sale decisions. Majority op., ¶40 (alteration in original) (quoting Chenequa, 275 13 Wis. 2d 533, ¶22). But never has this court held, and certainly no statute directs, that the only reviewable agency decisions are those that implicate substantive laws containing their own judicial-review criteria and procedures. Such a rule forsakes the plain text of ch. 227. That rule is also nonsensical: Why would the right to judicial review depend on substantive statutes containing their own judicial-review criteria and procedures when those criteria and procedures already appear in a statutory chapter entirely dedicated to judicial review? The majority opinion's newly crafted substantive criteria limitation is nothing short of the enactment of judicial policy at odds with legislative policy enshrined in the statutory text. 6 The Friends' challenge fits well within these criteria. For example, a court could adjudicate whether redrawing the Park's boundaries without amending the Park's master plan was inconsistent with or otherwise in violation of Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 44. So, too, could a court answer whether the factual finding that the disposed lands were no longer necessary for the state's use for conservation purposes lacked support[] [from] substantial evidence in the record. 13 Nos. 2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk D. The Textualism Smokescreen ¶71 Though the majority opinion seeks to style itself as a textually-driven analysis, the above shows it actually gives little regard to the text. This dissonance supplies a prime example of how the textualism descriptor and the objectivity it allegedly imparts can be used to conceal or distract from an otherwise result-orientated analysis. ¶72 Broadly speaking, textualism is an approach to interpreting laws that focuses almost exclusively on the plain meaning of the statutory text. See generally State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶38-52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. That emphasis on the text generally disregards the enacting body's intent and the law's underlying purpose, to the extent either is not ascertainable from the text and structure. Id., ¶¶48-51. The purported virtue of this approach is that it constrains judicial discretion by curbing any tendency to let policy preferences color legal interpretations under the guise of legislative intent or purpose.7 Just read and apply the law as written. Simple, right? ¶73 Unfortunately, that's not always the case. Empirics and experience tell us that a textualist approach is as susceptible to a result-driven analysis as any of its alternatives. That is because textualism invites the very 7See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 17-18, 22, 40-41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law at xxviii (2012); see also John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 747 (2017). 14 Nos. 2019AP299 & 2019AP534.jjk judicial discretion it claims to oust; it simply shifts that discretion to between the lines. Which version of textualism is appropriate?8 Which words deserve attention?9 When do those words shift from plain to ambiguous?10 Which canons of legal 8 Multiple ideological camps of textualism have emerged that emphasize either formalism or flexibility. See Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 265, 279-90 (2020). The divergent textualist opinions in Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), exposed the wide discretion a textualist Justice exercises in identifying the relevant context——semantic, social, or otherwise——in which she interprets the text. See Grove, supra, at 279-90. 9 Not only do the United States Supreme Court's recent cases reveal that courts have a wide choice of context, they also face a choice of text dilemma that can be outcome determinative. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Victoria F. Nourse, Textual Gerrymandering, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1718, 1738-88 (2021). [T]he number of 5-4 splits in cases involving textual method deployed by both sides, which regularly turn on the Justices' differing choice of text, indicate that no singular plain meaning actually exist. See Victoria Nourse, Textualism 3.0, 70 Ala. L. Rev. 667, 669-84 (2019). 10Language is often ambiguous; the distinction between 'plain' and 'ambiguous' is in the eye of the beholder; and both words too often are conclusory labels a court pins on a statute, making its decision appear result-oriented. State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶63, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (footnotes omitted); see also State v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, ¶¶45-56, 263 Wis. 2d 113, 665 N.W.2d 729 (Abrahamson,