Opinion ID: 2422962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions on Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

Text: Lesko's next three arguments concern the jury instructions regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances. First, Lesko points to language in the trial court's instruction which directed the jury to consider whether the aggravating or mitigating circumstances made the first-degree murder of Officer Miller more terrible or less terrible. According to Lesko, the federal constitution micromanages what courts can say on this score as well. Thus, Lesko argues that such instructions unconstitutionally required the jury to find a nexus between the mitigating circumstances and the crime committed, when the U.S. Constitution requires the jury to consider any evidence that warrants a sentence less than death. Lesko does not address the fact that counsel failed to object to the charge at trial; nor does he argue in his brief that trial counsel was ineffective, under the state of the law extant in 1995, in connection with this claim. Like the claim related to the trial court's failure to permit him to introduce evidence of his co-defendant's sentence, although Lesko raised this issue in terms of trial counsel ineffectiveness in his PCRA petition, he has failed to present this claim in terms of counsel's ineffectiveness in his brief before this Court. Accordingly, this claim of trial court error is waived. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). Lesko's next argument concerns the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury regarding what he calls the mitigating features of age. More specifically, he points to his supposed emotional or psychological age at the time of the offense and avers that the jury should specifically have been informed of these mitigating features in support of the age mitigating circumstance under Section 9711(e)(4). At the time of the murder, Lesko was 21. The trial court instructed the jury that Lesko's age could be considered as a mitigating circumstance, see N.T., 2/17/95, at 26. The trial court, however, refused Lesko's request to instruct the jury that in considering his age, the jury should consider his psychological and emotional age and level of maturity. Lesko acknowledges that his counsel requested such a charge, but asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue this issue on appeal. The PCRA court acknowledged that U.S. Supreme Court case law indicates that the background and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant [must] be duly considered in sentencing, [30] but reasoned that the emotional and psychological consideration was encompassed by the court's general instruction to the jury to consider all other mitigating circumstances pursuant to Section 9711(e)(8). According to the PCRA court, [t]he fact that `age' means `emotional age' in addition to `chronological age' is a matter that can be testified to by an appropriate expert witness, but is not an absolute instruction that should be given by the court. PCRA Court Opinion, 8/7/06, at 61. The PCRA court's reasoning is sound. Lesko's claim here repeats his usual pattern when it comes to jury instructions: he proceeds from an assumption that the evidence and arguments he would proffer in support of a relevant consideration must also be converted into a binding jury instruction. But, instructions are designed to guide the jury's consideration of relevant evidence, not to reaffirm or approve of either party's slant on that evidence. Consistently with the death penalty statute, the jury here was instructed to consider Lesko's age at the time of the crime as potential mitigation. Lesko has not shown any basis in law for an entitlement to a more specific instruction that in considering his age (the relevant factor), the jury was obliged to specifically consider his theory concerning his supposed emotional or psychological age. [31] Furthermore, as noted by the PCRA court, Lesko's supposed emotional or psychological age may well have been a circumstance that was considered and accepted by the jury when assessing Lesko's background and in finding that he acted under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Thus, Lesko has not demonstrated that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue this issue on appeal. Lesko's final argument regarding the trial court's instructions on aggravating and mitigating circumstances focuses on the trial court's instruction directing the jury not to be swayed by sympathy, sentiment or other emotion. Counsel did not object. Lesko speculates that the word swayed conveyed to the jury that it could not give effect to feelings of sympathy or emotion when arriving at its sentence. Furthermore, according to Lesko, such an instruction negated and created an impermissible barrier to the role of sympathy as a mechanism by which to give effect to the actual mitigating evidence presented. Lesko also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to share his speculations and objecting to the word swayed. The PCRA court reasoned that a jury is not permitted to avoid imposing a sentence of death based on unbridled discretion or sympathy. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the trial court's instruction was substantially similar to the instruction found in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions. Accordingly, it deemed Lesko's underlying claim to be meritless. We agree. Lesko's view of the role of sympathy in the jury's penalty deliberations fails to account for decisional law. Claims along this line have previously been considered and rejected by this Court on more than one occasion. Simply stated, [a]s it is well established that a jury instruction not to allow feelings of sympathy to influence the sentencing consideration is constitutionally proper, counsel in this case were not ineffective in failing to object to such instruction. See Natividad, 938 A.2d at 340 ( quoting Commonwealth v. Rios, 591 Pa. 583, 920 A.2d 790, 818 (2007)). Lesko fails to acknowledge controlling law, and does not attempt to distinguish that law. We are not swayed by his claim.