Opinion ID: 2777003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Properly

Text: Set Aside the Election ¶ 31 The lieutenant governor contends that the district court had no authority to annul and set aside the election under the grounds asserted by Mr. Dyer. He bases this conclusion on Utah Code section 20A-4-402, which he reads to require a challenger to prove the candidate who would have received each contested vote. Because we do not agree with his interpretation of that provision, 34 we decline to adopt his limitation of the remedies available under section 20A-4-404. ¶ 32 Section 20A-4-404(4)(c) sets forth the remedies available in an election contest: (c)(i) After all the evidence in the contest is submitted, the court shall enter its judgment, either confirming the election result or annulling and setting aside the election. 33 Id. § 20A-4-403(2)(c). 34 See supra Part III.A. 15 COX v. LAYCOCK A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II (ii) If the court determines that a person other than the one declared elected received the highest number of legal votes, the court shall declare that person elected. Thus, under this provision, a court may confirm the election results, annul and set aside the election, or declare a winner if one can be determined. The lieutenant governor contends that these remedies cannot be provided in all circumstances, but that they correspond to two different types of election contests under section 20A-4-402(1): (a) grounds that render the candidate ineligible 35 and (b) grounds that votes were improperly received, rejected, or counted. 36 He argues that annulling and setting aside an election is appropriate only when the candidate has been ruled ineligible. In contrast, when the grounds relate to illegal votes, he argues that the court is statutorily mandated to declare a winner. This reading is based on the lieutenant governor’s interpretation of section 20A-4-402. Under his view, when there is a challenge based on illegal votes, the court must be able to determine for whom each disputed vote was cast because it must know whether the challenge is sufficient to change the election result. He argues that, given that premise, the court must necessarily be able to determine a winner and thus, under section 20A-4-404(4)(c)(ii), is mandated to “declare that person elected.” ¶ 33 We conclude that the statute does not so constrain the courts. As explained above, we read the statute to permit an election contest even if the contested votes cannot ultimately be counted, as when ballots are lost or destroyed. But neither the plain language of the text nor the structure of the provisions suggests that the statutory remedies correspond to only certain types of challenges. The legislature has empowered district courts to review evidence in a variety of election circumstances and either confirm the result or annul and set aside the election. The court must declare a winner, but only if a winner can be determined. 37 Thus, on its face, the statute contemplates a situation in which the court will be unable to determine a winner. 35 UTAH CODE § 20A-4-402(1)(b), (c), and (g). 36 Id. § 20A-4-402(1)(a), (d), (e), (f), and (h). 37 Id. § 20A-4-404(4)(c)(ii). 16 Cite as: 2015 UT 20 A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II The court need not confirm an election result when it finds illegal voting has occurred but cannot count the votes. ¶ 34 The statutory structure also reinforces this understanding. The legislature did not divide the grounds into 38 separate categories and specifically assign remedies based on their type. And there is no limiting language that suggests certain remedies apply only to specific contests. Rather, the structure of the statute—one provision setting forth the contest grounds (section 20A-4-402) and one provision for available dispositions (section 20A-4-404)—indicates the intent that all remedies be available regardless of the contest ground asserted. ¶ 35 In the present case, the district court considered the contested votes individually and determined that seven had been illegally cast and one legal voter had been prevented from voting. The court did not go on to consider the additional ballots that had been contested because it found that eight illegal votes in a fivevote-margin election were enough to warrant setting aside the election results. It also concluded that a winner could not be determined due to the mishandling of the contested ballots. Therefore, the district court was not bound to declare a winner in such circumstances. IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ORDER MANDATING A NEW ELECTION CONTRADICTS EXPRESS STATUTORY LANGUAGE ¶ 36 We next consider that part of the district court order mandating the Millard County Clerk to hold a new primary election. Because we conclude the district court acted in contravention of the statute, we find that the court abused its discretion and reverse that portion of the order. ¶ 37 The lieutenant governor challenges the district court’s order to hold a new election because he argues that the statutory language does not authorize a court to order a special election. In its response to the lieutenant governor’s petition, the district 38 See Hi-Country Prop. Rights Grp. v. Emmer, 2013 UT 33, ¶¶ 23– 28, 304 P.3d 851 (looking to the “structure and context” of the statute to determine its meaning); State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶¶ 11, 13, 122 P.3d 615 (confirming the meaning of a statute based on its “plain language and structure”). 17 COX v. LAYCOCK A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II court acknowledged that the “election statutes seemingly do not answer the question of what should or must happen once an election is set aside. The statutes do not provide a remedy beyond the election being invalidated.” The court asserted, therefore, that absent further court action, both the candidates and the voters of Millard County would be left without an adequate remedy. Citing the court’s equitable power, the district court explained that it ordered a new election as a means to provide relief to all parties. ¶ 38 Utah Code section 20A-4-404 sets forth the means of disposition for an election contest. After reviewing all the evidence, the court may confirm the election result, annul and set aside the election, or, if it is possible, declare another person the winner. 39 The statute nowhere authorizes the court to order a new election. Additionally, in the provision governing appeals of an election contest decision, the Utah Code provides that “[w]henever an election is annulled or set aside by the judgment of a court and no appeal is taken within 10 days, the certificate of election, if any has been issued, is void, and the office is vacant.”40 Moreover, the circumstances for authorizing a special election are expressly limited and do not encompass the situation presented here. 41 ¶ 39 Recognizing that the district court sought to fashion the most appropriate remedy given the circumstances, we nonetheless hold that by ordering the new election the district court contravened the dictates of the election code. This mistake of law constituted an abuse of discretion warranting extraordinary relief; we therefore reverse that part of the district court order. 39 UTAH CODE § 20A-4-404(4)(c). 40 Id. § 20A-4-406(2). 41 See id. § 20A-1-203(5)(a) (providing that a local legislative body may call a special election “only for” certain enumerated circumstances). 18 Cite as: 2015 UT 20 A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II V. IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEAR STATUTORY DIRECTION, WE LOOK TO ANALOGOUS PROVISIONS TO CARRY OUT THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE ¶ 40 Having affirmed annulment of the election, our task is not complete. We have repeatedly asserted that “this Court’s primary responsibility in construing legislative enactments is to give effect to the Legislature’s underlying intent.” 42 Our duty is directed by the statute’s “plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.” 43 And “[w]hen the plain meaning of the statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed.” 44 ¶ 41 This case, however, does not present a situation of vague or ambiguous statutory language. Instead, the Code is silent regarding these circumstances. There is no provision in the election code that describes how to fill a candidate vacancy in the case of an annulled primary election, 45 and the limited grounds under which a special election can be held do not apply here.46 We conclude, however, that the legislature did not intend the vacancy resulting from an annulled primary to continue in perpetuity. We therefore look to analogous provisions within the election code to carry out the legislature’s intent. ¶ 42 From the outset, we emphasize that we do not undertake such an endeavor lightly. Our task is to seek the intent of the legislature, not to substitute our own wisdom in its stead. 47 To 42 W. Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). 43J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 2011 UT 38, ¶ 15, 266 P.3d 702 (internal quotation marks omitted). 44 LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 11, 215 P.3d 135. 45See UTAH CODE § 20A-1-501 (providing procedures to fill candidate vacancies); id. § 20A-1-508 (midterm vacancies). 46 See id. § 20A-1-203(5). 47 Eames v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 199 P. 970, 972 (Utah 1921) (“It is the duty of this court, according to its best knowledge and understanding, to declare the law as it finds it, and determine the intent and purpose thereof from the language used by the Legislature in expressing such purpose and intention.”). 19 COX v. LAYCOCK A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II that end, when a statute is silent regarding particular circumstances and we determine that such a gap was not the intent of the legislature, “we must determine the best rule of law to ensure that the statute is applied uniformly.” 48 We “analyze the act in its entirety and harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.” 49 ¶ 43 Section 20A-1-501 of the election code provides procedures for filling candidate vacancies before a general election. While it does not address the specific circumstances here, it presents the closest analogy to it and is therefore instructive. Under certain circumstances, for most local positions, “the county central committee of a political party . . . may certify 48 Mariemont Corp. v. White City Water Improvement Dist., 958 P.2d 222, 226 (Utah 1998); see also Fausnight v. Perkins, 994 So. 2d 912, 922 (Ala. 2008) (See, J., concurring) (“When a statute is silent, this Court will look outside of the plain language of the statute to determine the intent of the legislature.”); State v. Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207, 221 (Iowa 2012) (“When the statutory language is silent, legislative intent can be gleaned from the purposes and underlying policies of the statute, along with the consequences of various interpretations.”); Anderson v. Ochsner Health Sys., 20132970, p. 3 (La. 7/1/14) ___ So. 3d ___ (“[B]ecause the statute is silent . . . , the court, in interpreting the statute, is tasked with determining the legislative intent.”); Griffin v. Griffin, 92 A.3d 1144, 1149 (Me. 2014) (“If the statutory language . . . is silent on a particular point, we will then consider other indicia of legislative intent including the purpose of the statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Miss. Methodist Hosp. & Rehab. Ctr. v. Miss. Div. of Medicaid, 21 So. 3d 600, 607 (Miss. 2009) (“[I]f a statute . . . is silent on a specific issue[,] . . . . the ultimate goal of this Court is to discern the legislative intent.” (citation omitted)); Ogborne v. Mercer Cemetery Corp., 963 A.2d 828, 834 (N.J. 2009) (“In light of the Act’s silence on the issue, we look to the underlying legislative intent.”); Clarkston v. Bridge, 539 P.2d 1094, 1099 (Or. 1975) (“When the legislature has not spoken on a particular issue which arises under a statute, it is our duty to determine their probable intent.”). 49Mariemont Corp., 958 P.2d at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 Cite as: 2015 UT 20 A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II the name of another candidate to the appropriate election officer.” 50 The statute then provides for three scenarios: (a) replacement of a candidate before the primary election, (b) replacement of a candidate who was certified without a primary election, and (c) replacement of a candidate who won the primary election.51 In each case, the party may select a replacement candidate if the original candidate dies, resigns due to a physical or mental disability, or is disqualified by an election official for improper filing or nominating procedures. 52 ¶ 44 Utah Code section 20A-1-501 does not address a situation in which the result of a primary election is set aside. The lieutenant governor contends that this silence means that the party will simply be without a candidate on the general election ballot. Although the statute is silent on this situation, we disagree with the lieutenant governor’s interpretation of the statutory scheme. Section 20A-1-501 provides a means for political parties to submit a candidate in an emergency situation. The circumstances provided for in the statute therefore reflect the most common situations that would render a political party without a candidate. Section 20A-1-501 also appears to strike a balance between respecting voter decisions in primary elections and ensuring that political parties can make necessary substitutions. If replacements were permitted in all circumstances, a political party could effectively overrule the decision of its voters in the primary election and name its own candidate. By allowing the party to submit a replacement candidate only in rare circumstances, the legislature respects the choice of voters. But where the party is left without a candidate through no fault of its own, it should be able to substitute one. ¶ 45 The Code’s midterm vacancy protocols are instructive as well. There, the legislature set forth various procedures for filling a midterm vacancy depending on the timing of the vacancy.53 If the vacancy arises well before the primary election, the procedure parallels a regular election—a nominated party candidate or a 50 UTAH CODE § 20A-1-501(1). 51 Id. 52 Id. 53 Id. § 20A-1-508. 21 COX v. LAYCOCK A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II qualified independent candidate can run in the general election.54 But if the vacancy arises closer to the date of the general election, the procedures reflect the expedited timeline. 55 The statute even permits a party to summarily place an individual in office for the remainder of the unexpired term. 56 It would make little sense for the legislature to so empower a political party for midterm vacancies and yet leave the party unable to name its own candidate for the general election ballot. If political parties can “summarily certify” a candidate for the general election ballot even before the primary election date, 57 it stands to reason that a party may summarily certify a candidate when the primary itself is annulled. ¶ 46 We therefore determine that the legislature did not intend that a political party be entirely foreclosed from nominating its candidate in advance of the general election when the primary has been set aside through no fault of the party. We conclude that section 20A-1-501(c)(iii) regarding candidacy vacancies presents the closest analogy to the present situation and thus order that the Republican candidate be certified according to the procedures therein. 54 Id. § 20A-1-508(3). 55 See id. § 20A-1-508(4) (when a vacancy arises after April 9 but more than 75 days before the primary election, candidates have five days to submit their names and the political party will select among them); id. § 20A-1-508(5) (when a vacancy arises 75 days or less before the primary election but more than 65 days before the general election, the political party “shall summarily certify” a candidate for the general election ballot). 56Id. § 20A-1-508(6) (when a vacancy arises less than 65 days before general election, the political party of the prior office holder may submit an individual to serve the unexpired term). 57 Id. § 20A-1-508(5). 22 Cite as: 2015 UT 20 A.C.J. NEHRING, opinion of the Court except Part II VI. THE CROSS-PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF IS DENIED AS PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER ¶ 47 The Voters also submitted a third-party cross-petition for extraordinary relief, requesting this court to order that both candidates be placed on the November general election ballot. We deny the cross-petition as an improper means of petitioning this court. As noted above, a petition for extraordinary writ is appropriate only when “no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available.” 58 When the petitioner is a party to the action below and seeks alternate relief from the district court order, there is an adequate remedy available—namely, an appeal. Thus, “[b]efore we can address a petition for extraordinary relief, the petitioning party must have exhaust[ed] all available avenues of appeal.” 59 The purpose of this rule is to “keep litigants from bypassing traditional avenues for judicial relief, or in other words from substituting the extraordinary writ process for what should have been ordinary litigation.”60 ¶ 48 Cross-petitioners were all parties to the action below. As such, they possessed a right of appeal from the district court order. Should they seek relief contrary to that order, the appropriate means is through an appeal, not through an extraordinary writ to this court. 61 The cross-petition is therefore denied. 58 UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B(a). 59 Friends of Great Salt Lake v. Utah Dep’t of Natural Res., 2010 UT 20, ¶ 23, 230 P.3d 1014 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Krejci v. City of Saratoga Springs, 2013 UT 74, ¶ 10, 322 P.3d 662 (“[W]here a petitioner had an opportunity to file an appeal but failed to do so, it cannot use an extraordinary writ to gain a second shot at an appeal.”). 60 Krejci, 2013 UT 74, ¶ 10. 61 See Friends of Great Salt Lake, 2010 UT 20, ¶ 23 (“[T]he opportunity to appeal . . . constitutes a plain, speedy and adequate remedy[;] . . . an extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for general review.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 23 COX v. LAYCOCK JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court in Part II