Opinion ID: 1172222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Section 667(a) Enhancements to Options (i) and (ii)

Text: (4) The Attorney General asserts it is well-settled that a separate determinate term is imposed for the enhancements under options (i) and (ii). Therefore, the Attorney General argues that not imposing enhancements under option (iii) would be inconsistent with language in section 1170.12 pertaining to all three options, and would lead to anomalous results. Defendant contends that the Attorney General's underlying premise is incorrect, and that enhancements are not imposed in addition to the indeterminate terms of options (i) and (ii). We therefore turn first to this issue. We begin with the language of the statute. Subdivision (c) provides that the indeterminate life term must be imposed in addition to any other enhancements or punishment provisions which may apply. This language clearly prescribes that terms of enhancement, including the five-year enhancement under section 667(a), be imposed in addition to the indeterminate term. It is difficult to interpret the language of the statute in any other manner. ( People v. Ramirez (1995) 33 Cal. App.4th 559, 568 [39 Cal. Rptr.2d 374]; see also People v. Nelson (1996) 42 Cal. App.4th 131, 136 [49 Cal. Rptr.2d 361] [second strike; Section 667 thus requires the doubling of the base term when there is a prior serious felony, and since such sentence is to be `in addition to any other enhancement,' also requires the addition of five years for any section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement.]; People v. Cartwright (1995) 39 Cal. App.4th 1123, 1138-1139 [46 Cal. Rptr.2d 351] [third strike, option (ii); ... Legislature intended a defendant's sentence under the three strikes law should include a doubled term or life term, as appropriate under section 667, subdivision (e), plus an enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a) for each prior serious felony conviction.].) In addition, subdivision (c)(2)(B) provides in part that [t]he indeterminate term described in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2) of this subdivision shall be served consecutive to any other term of imprisonment for which a consecutive term may be imposed by law. We have recently construed the language any other term in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(B) (which is virtually identical to subdivision (c)(2)(B)), to refer to a term other than the sentence for the current offense, such as a term of enhancement or other punishment provision. ( People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 508, 515 [66 Cal. Rptr.2d 431, 941 P.2d 64].) Moreover, defendant's construction fails to appreciate a significant distinction between section 1170.12 and section 667(a). Under section 1170.12, the defendant's current felony need not be serious for the three strikes law to apply. (Subd. (a).) Under section 667(a), however, the current felony offense must be serious within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c), for the five-year enhancement to apply. (See ante, p. 553, fn. 4.) Thus, if we concluded that section 667(a) enhancements are not added as a separate determinate term under subdivision (c)(2)(A), a recidivist who committed a serious third strike felony would receive the same sentence as a recidivist who committed a non serious third strike felony. (See People v. Ramirez, supra, 33 Cal. App.4th at p. 571 [It is certainly appropriate to punish more harshly those convicted of new serious felonies.].) Defendant asserts, however, that a separate determinate term for section 667(a) enhancements may not be added because section 667(a) by its terms does not apply when the punishment imposed under other provisions of law would result in a longer term of imprisonment. (§ 667(a)(2).) Defendant contends that [t]he 26-year-to-life term imposed upon [defendant] in this case is a longer term. We disagree. In People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142 [22 Cal. Rptr.2d 753, 857 P.2d 1163], on which defendant relies, we construed the predecessor to section 667(a)(2) to mean, when multiple statutory enhancement provisions are available for the same prior offense, one of which is a section 667[a] enhancement, the greatest enhancement, but only that one, will apply. (5 Cal.4th at p. 1150, italics added.) Here, however, neither subdivision (c)(2)(A), nor an indeterminate life term imposed thereunder, is a sentence enhancement. (See People v. Jenkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 241, 254 [§ 667.7, which requires certain recidivists be punished with a life term, not a sentence enhancement]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 405(c) [an enhancement is an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term].) Rather, subdivision (c)(2)(A) prescribes a method by which defendant's minimum indeterminate life term is calculated. ( People v. Superior Court ( Romero ), supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 524 [The Three Strikes law, when applicable, takes the place of whatever law would otherwise determine defendant's sentence for the current offense.]; subd. (a).) Thus, we are not confronted with a situation presenting one or more statutory enhancement alternatives to a section 667, subdivision (a), enhancement. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 254.) Defendant further asserts, without elaboration, that the language in addition to any other enhancements or punishment provisions which may apply in subdivision (c) could refer to sentencing schemes other than five-year priors, for example, the sentencing scheme found in section 667.61. Accordingly, nothing in that phrase requires cumulation of the five-year enhancements for priors under section 667, subdivision (a). To the extent defendant is suggesting that the broad language at issue somehow does not include section 667(a) enhancements, or bars cumulating these enhancements, we see no basis in the language for that interpretation. Defendant also contends that the lack of reference in the legislative history of section 1170.12 to the imposition of section 667(a) enhancements in a three-strike case indicates that the voters did not intend to add such enhancements to the indeterminate term. At the outset, we note that the addition of a separate determinate term for enhancements appears consistent with the voters' stated intent in enacting section 1170.12, which was to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses. (Ballot Pamp., text of Prop. 184, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 64; § 667, subd. (b).) Defendant, however, relies on the Attorney General's summary of the initiative, which states in part: Convicted felons with two or more such prior convictions would receive a life sentence with a minimum term three times the normal sentence or 25 years, whichever is greater. (Ballot Pamp., Atty. Gen. summary of Prop. 184 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 32.) Of course, the Attorney General does not even include in this summary the third option we are addressing here, i.e., a sentence calculated by adding the term selected for the current conviction to applicable enhancements. Moreover, the entire substantive summary is only eight lines long. ( Ibid. ) Any lack of reference to section 667(a) enhancements therefore is only marginally helpful in ascertaining voter intent regarding their application. Defendant also asserts that the Legislative Analyst noted that a five-year enhancement would be added to the sentence for a two-strike defendant, but made no similar reference regarding the sentence for a three-strike defendant. (Ballot Pamp., analysis of Prop. 184 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 33.) Given that the language of subdivision (c), which prescribes that the term under section 1170.12 must be imposed in addition to any other enhancements or punishment provisions which may apply, pertains to sentencing for both two- and three-strike defendants, this excerpt appears to support the imposition of a separate determinate term for enhancements. (Subd. (c)(1) & (2), see ante, p. 552, fn. 3.) Moreover, we note that in describing the sentence for a three-strike defendant, the Legislative Analyst states that he or she would receive a [l]ife sentence of at least 25 years. (Ballot Pamp., analysis of Prop. 184 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 34, italics added.) Finally, defendant notes that in the proponents' ballot arguments, they similarly noted that enhancements would be added to the sentence for a two-strike defendant, but made no similar reference to the sentence for a three-strike defendant. Rather, the proponents stated: A third felony conviction, with two serious/violent prior felonies, TRIPLES the base sentence or imposes 25 years to life, whichever is greater. (Ballot Pamp., argument in favor of Prop. 184 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 36.) Once again, the reference to enhancements for two-strike defendants supports their imposition for three-strike defendants. Moreover, as with the Attorney General's summary, this excerpt does not even reference the sentencing option at issue in this case. In addition, the fact that proponents highlighted in their brief statement the minimum indeterminate term of 25 years is not inconsistent with a conclusion that enhancements are imposed as a separate determinate term. Rather, once again, inclusion of such a term of enhancement is consistent with the voters' stated purpose in enacting the initiative.