Opinion ID: 20073
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assault and Battery Under Mississippi Law

Text: In the instant case, the district court ruled that the plaintiff failed to sustain his claims of intentional torts, namely assault and battery, at the close of his case.2 Because this case comes to us under diversity jurisdiction, we look to Mississippi law regarding the substantive elements of the intentional torts of assault and battery. See Rogers v. Corrosion Prods., Inc., 42 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir.1995) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)). 2 In granting the JMOL, the district court opined from the bench that in the alternative the suit should be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to prove damages that met the jurisdictional “amount in controversy” ($75,000) under diversity jurisdiction. However, it is well settled that once a federal court exercises jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, subsequent events which reduces the amount claimed under the jurisdictional minimum will not deprive the court of jurisdiction. See Seafoam, Inc. v. Barrier Systems, Inc,, 830 F.3d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, this erroneous alternative ruling is inconsequential since we find adequate grounds to support the district court’s JMOL which we discuss below. 3 To determine state substantive law, we look to the state’s constitution, statutes, and final decisions of the state’s highest court. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir.1992). Assault and battery are intentional torts under Mississippi law. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-35. An assault occurs where a person “acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension.” See Webb v. Jackson, 583 So.2d 946, 951 (Miss. 1991)(quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965)). A battery goes one step further in that harmful contact actually occurs. Id. (quoting the Restatement (Second) or Torts § 13 (1965)). Essential to each is the element of intent. Our de novo review of the trial transcript supports the district court’s JMOL. The only substantive evidence introduced to establish the assault and battery came from Ms. Reilly’s video taped testimony. She stated t hat someone brushed across her cheek seemingly slapping her. However, she could not identify the person who had allegedly slapped her. Although intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances, Spring failed to put forth evidence that would allow a reasonable inference of intent. The examination conducted the day after the alleged incident revealed no physical bruising or marks to indicate that she was slapped or otherwise physically abused. Ms. Reilly testified that the alleged slap did not hurt her physically. Based on the scant evidence presented by the plaintiff, we find that the requisite intent was not established to sustain an action for an assault and battery.3 Therefore, the district court correctly granted a JMOL for these claims.4