Opinion ID: 2638203
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The trial court must supplement its findings to support an uneven distribution of marital property.

Text: Under AS 25.24.160(a)(4), [19] in a divorce action, the court must consider certain statutory factors when dividing property. We have held that [i]n the absence of findings to warrant an unequal division . . . an equal division of the marital estate is presumptively the most equitable. [20] At trial, Karsten requested that the court move toward a 50/50 distribution rather than the distribution Maureen proposed, which was skewed in her favor. But the trial court made two adjustments to Maureen's proposed division, allocating debt owed to Maureen's family to Maureen and attributing $5,000 worth of ammunition to Maureen after determining that the gun collection should be awarded to Maureen. The trial court valued the allocation as $158,560 to Maureen and $146,000 to Karsten. In doing so, the court noted that [a]lthough the resulting distribution is not weighted as heavily in Maureen's favor as the one she proposed, it is more than $12,000 in her favor. . . . In its order entering additional findings of fact, in response to Maureen's motion, the trial court added the factual finding that [t]he property division, while weighted slightly in Maureen's favor, is equitable given the fact that Maureen will be caring for the parties' children in the future and the children will likely need counseling for years to come. Karsten challenges this uneven allocation of marital property. According to Turner's treatise on equitable distribution of property, the needs of the children should generally not be a factor in determining the amount of marital property assigned to each spouse. [21] Turner cites as support for this statement our decision in Brandal v. Shangin, which concluded that [f]or a trial court to award `one spouse a greater share of the marital property simply to ease his or her burden of child support constitutes reversible error.' [22] Turner further suggests that [p]roperty division should be used to meet the needs of the children only in the presence of a specific reason why this goal cannot be met with an award of child support alone. [23] We conclude that before the superior court may fashion an uneven distribution of the Rodviks' marital property in Maureen's favor on the basis that Maureen will be caring for the parties' children in the future and the children will likely need counseling for years to come, it must first determine whether the child support is adequate to meet the children's counseling needs. The need for additional findings is reinforced by the superior court's child support order, which already requires that Karsten pay half of any of the children's uncovered medical expenses, which could include the children's counseling. We have remanded this case to the superior court for reconsideration of whether certain assets constitute marital property and for redistribution based on its findings. If the superior court deems it necessary to distribute property in either party's favor based on the needs of the children, it must explain why the needs of the children cannot be met with child support alone. 4. The trial court did not err in awarding the marital guns to Maureen based on 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) but did err in awarding Karsten's separate property to Maureen. The trial court awarded the entire twenty-one gun collection in dispute to Maureen, ruling that [g]iven the dictates of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the court is compelled not to be putting into Karsten's control anything which would make him a criminal. Karsten argues that the superior court misinterpreted the federal statute and that the statute criminalizes only the receipt of any firearm or ammunition that has been transported in interstate commerce. Karsten contends that he should be awarded the entire gun collection and the ammunition. In order to determine whether Karsten's argument on division of the gun collection has merit, it is first necessary to examine whether Karsten was permitted to possess any firearms or ammunition under the federal statute at the time the trial court divided the parties' property. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) states: It shall be unlawful for any person  (8) who is subject to a court order that  (A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains a person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C) (i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child; . . . . . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Prior to the divorce trial, the trial court had issued three protective orders against Karsten upon Maureen's petitions on: October 24, 2003; April 23, 2004; and November 1, 2004. The October 2003 protective order was based on allegations by Maureen that Karsten was verbally abusive, drank heavily, and had struck both Maureen and the children. The April 2004 and November 2004 protective orders were issued after findings that Karsten had violated previous protective orders. In connection with its final order on custody and property division in the divorce, the trial court issued a fourth protective order on March 2, 2005, which was designed to last one year. Although Karsten disputes the interpretation of the statute and its application to him, he does not argue that the protective orders do not meet the criteria listed in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Decisions analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) have assumed that the statute applies to simple possession of a firearm, as well as receipt of a firearm through interstate commerce. [24] For example, in United States v. Emerson , the defendant was indicted for simple possession of a firearm while subject to a restraining order in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). [25] There, the defendant had purchased the firearm about a year before the restraining order was entered. [26] The Fifth Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) was constitutional as applied to the defendant's possession of a weapon while subject to a domestic violence restraining order. [27] And, in United States v. Lippman , the defendant was subject to a domestic violence restraining order against him when he was arrested for possession of two firearms. [28] He was found guilty by a jury of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), and the Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction, concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) did not violate the Second Amendment. [29] In People v. Adams , the New York trial court analyzed whether a defendant, who was subject to a court order of protection, was entitled to a waiver under the probation rules that would allow him to apply for a hunting license and use a hunting rifle. [30] The court examined both state and federal law and determined that the defendant, for as long as the [court order of protection] is in effect, is barred by 18 U.S.C. [§ ] 922(g)(8) from possessing a firearm, including a hunting rifle. [31] Finally, in Towell v. Steger, the Missouri Court of Appeals examined whether to remove an order of protection issued by the trial court, noting that [u]nder the Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. [§ ] 922(g)(8), a person under an order of protection may not possess a firearm, even for recreational purposes. Therefore, Appellant may violate federal laws if he possesses hunting weapons or legitimately hunts. The mere possession of firearms while under an order of protection violates 18 U.S.C. [§ ] 922(g)(8).[ [32] ] Thus, the court recognized a person who is subject to a protective order could not possess a gun. [33] Karsten has pointed to no case concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) does not prohibit possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who is subject to a protective order. As it is not disputed that the trial court entered a valid protective order when it issued the divorce decree, Karsten's possession of any firearm, whether received before the issuance of the restraining order or after, was illegal under the statute. Thus, based on the case law interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), the superior court was at least reasonable in concluding that federal law imposes a barrier to awarding firearms to Karsten while a protective order is in effect. [34] Although the trial court did not err in awarding the marital guns to Maureen, we analyze separately the question whether it was error for the trial court to award to Maureen the gun that was Karsten's separate property. There was testimony at trial that one of the twenty-one guns in the collection was Karsten's separate property. When Karsten was asked at trial if any of the other guns were premarital, he stated [w]ell, there are others on there that are definitely premarital but he did not offer further evidence regarding the guns. Karsten identified four guns as his separate property in his motion to reconsider the findings of fact and conclusions of law issued by the superior court. Karsten again argues in his brief on appeal that the four guns are premarital property. Under AS 25.24.160(a)(4), although the trial court is to provide for the division of the property acquired only during marriage, the court, in making the division, may invade the property . . . of either spouse acquired before marriage when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it. Ordinarily a decision to invade separate property must be accompanied by specific findings justifying the invasion. [35] But in this case, the trial court stated that it would not award the guns to Karsten based on the federal statute because such an award would make [Karsten] a criminal. Because the trial court's overriding reason for awarding the guns to Maureen was expressed, we conclude that the trial court's findings are sufficient to justify this limited invasion of Karsten's separate property, consisting of four guns.