Opinion ID: 403872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conditions Precedent or Jurisdictional Prerequisites?

Text: 12 Appellant did not assert that appellees' Title VII claim should be dismissed on the grounds that appellant was not named as a respondent in the EEOC charge and that the EEOC charge was not filed within 180 days of an alleged discriminatory act until after trial in its motion to vacate the judgment and dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. If the conditions precedent to a Title VII action constitute jurisdictional prerequisites, then the appellant could properly raise these contentions after trial pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a claim involves the court's competency to consider a given type of case 10 and cannot be waived or otherwise conferred upon the court by the parties. E.g., People's Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260-61, 26 L.Ed. 101 (1880). Otherwise, a party could work a wrongful extension of federal jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress denied them. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 18, 71 S.Ct. 534, 542, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1950). If, however, the failure to satisfy the preconditions to a Title VII action does not deprive courts of subject matter jurisdiction, then the appellant waived its right to assert appellees' nonfulfillment of conditions precedent by failing to raise that issue in a timely manner. The courts in recent years have struggled with the question whether or not the conditions precedent to a Title VII action are jurisdictional. After carefully considering the statutory language, legislative history, and case law, we conclude that Congress did not intend Title VII's procedural requirements to be jurisdictional prerequisites, which if not satisfied deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction. 11 13 A court's function in interpreting a statute is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress, and the most persuasive evidence of Congressional intent is the wording of the statute. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 542, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1063, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1939). See Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), the statutory provision conferring jurisdiction over Title VII suits to federal district courts, provides that (e)ach United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions under this subchapter. This provision unconditionally confers jurisdiction over claims arising under Title VII to federal district courts. Nothing in the express language of section 2000e-5(f)(3) suggests that the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is conditioned upon the fulfillment of other procedural requirements for pursuing a Title VII claim. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Nor do any of the provisions that detail the prerequisites to filing a Title VII action contain language qualifying section 2000e-5(f)(3). See, e.g., note 7 supra. We cannot conclude that Congress' omission of such qualifying language was inadvertent. The preconditions to filing a Title VII action and the jurisdictional provision are found in the same subsection of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, and if Congress had wanted to limit the jurisdiction of federal district courts over Title VII claims brought under section 2000e-5(f)(3), it certainly knew how to do it. In conferring jurisdiction on federal district courts over pattern or practice suits instituted by the Attorney General under Title VII, Congress specifically limited federal court jurisdiction to proceedings instituted pursuant to this section.... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(b). 12 But Congress chose not to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts over suits brought by private parties, the EEOC, or the Attorney General under section 2000e-5 in this manner; instead Congress conferred jurisdiction on federal district courts over actions brought under this title (Title VII), without special reference to § 2000e-5 and its procedural requirements. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub.L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, § 706(f)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976)). Thus, the plain language of the statute indicates that Congress did not intend the conditions precedent to a Title VII action to constitute jurisdictional prerequisites. 14 Nor does the legislative history of Title VII suggest that Congress intended the statute to be read otherwise. Congress never specifically addressed this issue and never mentioned the interplay between procedural requirements for filing suit and federal court jurisdiction, even though in 1972 Congress amended several of the conditions precedent 13 and vigorously debated whether or not to alter Title VII's enforcement scheme by giving the EEOC authority to hold hearings and issue cease and desist orders, restricting the jurisdiction of federal district courts. 14 If the legislative history of the conditions precedent and jurisdictional provision provides any insight into this question, it suggests that Congress did not intend the conditions precedent to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The legislative history indicates that Congress considered Title VII's preconditions to be analogous to procedural requirements, which do not limit the jurisdiction of federal courts in other contexts. For example, Congress considered Title VII's filing periods to operate as statutes of limitations. Final Conference Committee section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1745, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 118 Cong.Rec. 7166, 7177; 110 Cong.Rec. 7243 (remarks of Sen. Case); 110 Cong.Rec. 12712 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra, --- U.S. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 1132; Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., supra at 593-94 & n. 18. The failure to satisfy statutes of limitations, conditions precedent, in personam jurisdiction, and other procedural requirements similar to Title VII's preconditions does not deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over actions brought under jurisdictional provisions similar to § 2000e-5(f) (3). 15 Thus, although Congress never expressly addressed this issue, we find some support in the legislative history for our reading of Title VII as providing federal district courts with subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought under § 2000e-5(f)(3), unqualified by the procedural requirements found in other subsections of section 2000e-5. 15 The case law also supports our conclusion that the conditions precedent to filing a Title VII suit are not jurisdictional prerequisites. 16 Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has expressly decided that none of the conditions precedent are jurisdictional; however, both courts have held that particular conditions precedent are not jurisdictional, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra; Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981), and have interpreted and applied other conditions precedent in a manner that is inconsistent with their being jurisdictional. 17 16 For example, in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), the Supreme Court considered whether Title VII relief is available to members of a class action who not only failed to satisfy such conditions precedent as the timely filing of an EEOC complaint within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, timely filing of a Title VII action within 90 days after receiving a right to sue letter, or naming of a defendant as a respondent in the EEOC charge, but who did not file an EEOC complaint at all. Relying on the decisions of the courts of appeals and the legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Court concluded that relief under Title VII may be awarded on a class basis ... without exhaustion of administrative procedures by the unnamed class members. Id. at 414 n.8. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 389 n.6, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 2468, 53 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1267, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). The Court's treatment of class members who failed to satisfy Title VII's filing requirement stands in stark contrast to its treatment of class members who failed to fulfill the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 18 In the latter instance, the Court has barred participation in a class action by potential class members not satisfying the $10,000 requirement. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969). If the timely filing of an administrative claim is truly a jurisdictional prerequisite, then each class member should be required to file a claim before participating in a Title VII class action, just as each class member must satisfy the jurisdictional amount in other class actions. The fact that they do not is an indication that the Court does not consider the filing requirement to be jurisdictional. Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., supra at 589. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra --- U.S. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 1133; Chappell v. Emco Machine Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1979). 17 Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), the former Fifth Circuit in Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) held that non-filing parties can be joined as members of a class in Title VII suits. In so deciding, it rejected the district court's reasoning that since the filing of a charge with the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite, an individual who has not filed charges with the Commission cannot entertain a civil action as a class member. The court explained that (t)he fallacy of the district court's reasoning is that the matter is primarily procedural rather than substantive and thus the question is one of simple expediency. In this posture, it is perfectly clear that no procedural purpose could be served by requiring scores of substantially identical grievances to be processed through the EEOC when a single charge would be sufficient to effectuate both the letter and the spirit of Title VII. Id. at 285 (emphasis added). Extending this rationale to non-filing plaintiffs in a multiple-plaintiff, non-class action, the court in Crawford v. United States Steel Corp., 660 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1981) held that in an action involving claims of several persons arising out of similar discriminatory treatment, not all of them need to have filed EEOC charges as long as one or more of the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirement. Id. at 665; Allen v. United States Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 695 (5th Cir. 1982); Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 1977); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968). 18 The clear implication of these decisions is that the filing of an EEOC charge is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. If it were, neither the Supreme Court nor the former Fifth Circuit could have permitted federal district courts to consider claims of non-filing plaintiffs, regardless of how similar the claims of such plaintiffs were to those raised by plaintiffs who had fulfilled the jurisdictional requirements. Only Congress-not the judiciary-can modify those requirements that must be satisfied to enable lower federal courts to exercise dominion over a cause of action. See Emco Machine Works Co., supra at 1298; Miller v. International Paper Co., supra at 285. If a party's failure to file an EEOC charge and consequently receive a right-to-sue letter does not deprive the courts of subject matter jurisdiction, then certainly the technicalities of filing an EEOC charge or a Title VII suit cannot constitute jurisdictional prerequisites. 19 The Supreme Court's treatment of Title VII's time limitations for filing an EEOC charge, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and for bringing a civil action, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), confirms our conclusion. In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra, the Court expressly addressed for the first time whether or not a condition precedent to a Title VII action constitutes a jurisdictional prerequisite. The issue before the Court was whether the requirement that an EEOC charge be timely filed, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), is a jurisdictional prerequisite, which if not satisfied deprives federal district courts of subject matter jurisdiction over Title VII claims, or whether the requirement is more akin to a statute of limitations, which is not jurisdictional and thus may be subject to equitable modification. 19 20 In a well-reasoned opinion, the Court held that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra, --- U.S. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 1132. First, the Court observed that the provision granting jurisdiction to district courts, section 2000e-5(f)(3), does not limit jurisdiction to those cases in which there has been a timely filing with the EEOC, and that (t)he provision specifying the time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an entirely separate provision, and it does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts. Id. Second, the Court noted that the legislative history was sparse but that it indicated that Congress intended the filing limitation to operate like a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. Id. Third, the Court found that prior case law was inconsistent with treating the filing requirement as limiting the jurisdiction of the district court. It noted that to hold the filing requirement to be a jurisdictional prerequisite would be inconsistent with Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, and Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, which, as discussed above, held that relief under Title VII may be awarded to class members who have not exhausted administrative remedies before the EEOC, and with the reasoning of other Supreme Court decisions, which treated the filing requirement as non-jurisdictional without expressly so holding. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 1133. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980); International Union of Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 97 S.Ct. 441, 50 L.Ed.2d 427 (1976). 20 And, finally, the Court reasoned that (b)y holding compliance with the filing period to be not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 1133. 21 In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980), the Supreme Court also made clear that the requirement that a party file a Title VII action within 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue letter, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Before reaching the merits, the Court noted that the action had not been timely filed. But rather than dismissing the action sua sponte as it would have done had it considered the requirement a jurisdictional prerequisite, the Court considered the case properly before it because the (p)etitioner did not assert respondent's failure to file the action within 90 days as a defense. Id. at 811 n.9, 100 S.Ct. at 2489 n.9. In so doing, the Court held by implication that Title VII's 90 day filing requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra --- U.S. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 1133. 22 The former Fifth Circuit also has concluded that Title VII's filing periods are not jurisdictional. In Chappell v. Emco Machine Works Co., supra, the court addressed whether the 180 day limitation for filing an EEOC complaint, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), is subject to equitable delay or interruption. See also Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975). Confronted with prior decisions of the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court that loosely referred to the timely filing of an EEOC complaint as a jurisdictional prerequisite, the court acknowledged that (i)t is illogical to designate a particular fact as necessary to the court's jurisdiction, yet, in its absence, allow the court to adjudicate whether equities indicate that the jurisdictional defect should be ignored. Id. at 1298. After carefully analyzing the relevant precedent, the court concluded that even though some holdings characterized the filing period as jurisdictional, they do not preclude equitable modification of its requirements. Id. at 1302. In Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., supra, the former Fifth Circuit, en banc, reaffirmed its holding in Chappell and made clear that while the 180 day filing requirement under Title VII is a condition precedent to filing suit in district court, it is not related to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 587-95. See Allen v. United States Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 695 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982). Similarly, in Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981), the court held that the 90 day limitation for filing a Title VII suit is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. After the right-to-sue letter is issued, the timeliness of the suit in federal court does not involve the court's jurisdiction but whether the litigant has fulfilled the statutory conditions. Id. at 1070. See Whatley v. Department of Education, 673 F.2d 873, 879 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Page v. U. S. Industries, Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045, 98 S.Ct. 890, 54 L.Ed.2d 796 (1978); Zambuto v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 544 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1977). Thus, both the Supreme Court and former Fifth Circuit have concluded that Title VII's time limitations are not jurisdictional prerequisites. 23 The former Fifth Circuit has also treated other Title VII conditions precedent in a manner inconsistent with their being jurisdictional. In White v. Dallas Independent School District, 581 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), the court considered whether the district court properly dismissed the appellant's Title VII suit for want of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to pursue her claim of employment discrimination in an appropriate state agency before filing a charge with the EEOC as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). 21 Although the court found that the Texas statute in question was sufficient to trigger the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), it nevertheless held that the district court erred in dismissing the suit because the EEOC substantially misled the plaintiff and their mistakes should not redound to her detriment. Id. at 562. As the court later noted in Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., supra, (a)lthough we expressly declined to decide whether the provision was a 'jurisdictional prerequisite,' we necessarily held that the equitable consideration of the misleading EEOC letters excused Mrs. White's failure to file with the state agency. Id. at 592. See Chappell v. Emco Machine Works Co., supra at 1300. 22 The court could not have excused the plaintiff from filing a complaint with the appropriate state agency if the satisfaction of the precondition was necessary to the court's jurisdiction. In EEOC v. Airguide Corp., 539 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1976), the court again interpreted a specific precondition to filing a Title VII suit in light of equitable considerations. The issue there was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the EEOC failed to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), which requires the Commission to serve notice of a charge to the alleged violator within ten days after the charge is filed. 23 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that the notice of the charge was mailed within the ten day period but that it was not received by the defendant until nine months after the charge was filed. Nevertheless, the former Fifth Circuit was unwilling to hold that in the present situation-where there has been virtual compliance with all the statutory procedural steps, and where there has been no clear showing of substantial prejudice to Airguide-there has been a showing of a denial of due process sufficient to bar EEOC from bringing suit. Id. at 1042. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the cause to the district court for a determination of the prejudice suffered by defendant Airguide because of the lack of timely notice of the charge. Again, the court in EEOC v. Airguide Corp., supra, could not have equitably modified the condition precedent if the failure to satisfy the precondition deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. 24 Finally, a line of former Fifth Circuit cases explicitly treats the preconditions to filing a Title VII action as conditions precedent under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(c). EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. The Times-Picayune Publishing Corp., 500 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1353, 43 L.Ed.2d 440 (1975); EEOC v. Standard Forge and Axle Co., 496 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106, 95 S.Ct. 776, 42 L.Ed.2d 801 (1975). Rule 9(c) provides that (i)n pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance shall be made specifically and with particularity. Under this rule, if a party disagrees with a general averment that the conditions precedent have been met, that party may raise the issue with a specific and particular denial. If the party does not deny the satisfaction of the conditions precedent specifically and with particularity, however, the allegations are assumed admitted and cannot later be attacked. EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp., supra at 107; EEOC v. Standard Forge and Axle Co., supra at 1395; Ginsburg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 427 F.2d 1318 (6th Cir. 1970). The court's treatment of Title VII's procedural requirements as conditions precedent under Rule 9(c) is wholly inconsistent with their being jurisdictional prerequisites because the satisfaction of a jurisdictional requirement cannot be waived and may be joined in issue by the parties or raised by the court at any time during the judicial proceedings. 25 In conclusion, the decisions of both the Supreme Court and former Fifth Circuit reaffirm our interpretation of the language of Title VII and its legislative history. Both courts expressly have held that particular conditions precedent to a Title VII action are not jurisdictional prerequisites and have treated other preconditions in a manner inconsistent with their being jurisdictional. Although the courts have not had occasion to address the nature of each of Title VII's preconditions, we discern no rational basis for treating those that have not been considered from those that implicitly or explicitly have been held not to be jurisdictional. 24 Therefore, we hold that the conditions precedent to a Title VII action are not jurisdictional prerequisites, which if not satisfied deprive federal district courts of subject matter jurisdiction. 26 Our holding does not mean that plaintiffs no longer must prove that they have satisfied the conditions precedent to a Title VII action. See EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp., supra at 107; Cutliff v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1977). To the contrary, a plaintiff must generally allege in his complaint that all conditions precedent to the institution of the lawsuit have been fulfilled. Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(c). If the defendant doubts the veracity of the plaintiff's allegation, in whole or in part, then the defendant may deny specifically and with particularity that the preconditions have not been fulfilled. Id. The plaintiff then bears the burden of proving that the conditions precedent, which the defendant has specifically joined in issue, have been satisfied. See EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp., supra at 106; EEOC v. The Times-Picayune Publishing Corp., supra; EEOC v. Standard Forge and Axle Company, Inc., supra at 1395. Cf. Cutliff v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra at 806. If, however, the defendant does not deny the satisfaction of the preconditions specifically and with particularity, then the plaintiff's allegations are assumed admitted, and the defendant cannot later assert that a condition precedent has not been met. See EEOC v. Standard Forge and Axle Company, Inc., supra at 1395; Ginsburg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 427 F.2d 1318, 1322 (6th Cir. 1970). 27 B. The EEOC Complaint: The Naming of The Brotherhood and the Timely Filing of the Complaint. 28 Appellant contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction over appellees' Title VII claims because it was not properly named as a respondent in the EEOC charge filed by Jackson and therefore did not receive notice of the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The EEOC complaint filed by Jackson specifically named as respondents the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad and BRC of A Local No. 508. Appellant argues that the naming of the union local as a respondent does not suffice to confer jurisdiction over Title VII claims brought against the international union. Moreover, the Brotherhood asserts that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the Title VII claims because the EEOC complaint was not filed within 180 days of an alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). These claims were first raised by the appellant after trial by motion to vacate the judgment and dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion. We affirm. 29 As discussed above and contrary to appellant's contention, the conditions precedent to a Title VII action are not jurisdictional. A party, therefore, cannot wait until after trial to take issue with the opposing party's general averment that the conditions precedent have been satisfied. On the contrary, a defendant must deny in its answer that a condition precedent has not been fulfilled specifically and with particularity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(c). In this case, the original complaint alleged that the conditions precedent to a Title VII action against the defendants had been satisfied. 25 The Brotherhood answered that it was without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations .... 26 This answer suffices as a general denial of the averment but does not constitute a specific and particular denial, which is required by Rule 9(c) to join in issue the appellees' allegations. By waiting until after trial to assert that Jackson's EEOC complaint was not timely filed and did not name the Brotherhood as a respondent, appellant waived its right to raise these claims. 30 C. Lack of Jurisdiction over Non-Filing Plaintiffs 31 Appellant also argues that the district court improperly permitted the joinder of appellees McClendon, Scretchen, Cooper, and Parker because they had not filed complaints with the EEOC and could not rely upon Jackson's EEOC complaint to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites to a Title VII action. This claim was timely raised by appellant; 27 however, we find it to be without merit. 32 We begin by reiterating that the failure to satisfy the conditions precedent to a Title VII action does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the timely filing of an EEOC complaint is a precondition to a Title VII action. Allen v. United States Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 695 (former 5th Cir. 1982); Crawford v. United States Steel Corp., 660 F.2d 663, 665 (5th Cir. 1981). However, in a multiple-plaintiff, non-class action suit, if one plaintiff has filed a timely EEOC complaint as to that plaintiff's individual claim, then co-plaintiffs with individual claims arising out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame need not have satisfied the filing requirement. Allen v. United States Steel Corp., supra at 695. See Crawford v. United States Steel Corp., supra; Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp., 563 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir.), reprinted, 582 F.2d 891 (1977). This single-filing rule contains two essential requirements, both of which were satisfied in this case. First, at least one plaintiff must have timely filed an EEOC complaint that is not otherwise defective. As the propriety of Jackson's EEOC complaint was not challenged in a timely manner by the Brotherhood, we must consider it to have been timely filed and proper in every other respect. Second, the individual claims of the filing and non-filing plaintiffs must have arisen out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame. The appellees all worked as helpers in the carman department at the Waycross Yard during the same time period and were all allegedly passed over for promotion on account of their race as a result of discriminatory promotion provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement between the Brotherhood and Seaboard Coast Line Railroad. There is no question that the appellees were similarly situated and that the purpose of the filing requirement-to permit the EEOC first to attempt settlement of grievances-would not have been served by requiring each of the several plaintiffs to file essentially identical charges. Crawford v. United States Steel Corp., supra at 666-67 (plaintiffs, who alleged they were given improper seniority dates, passed over on account of their race, and not adequately represented by their union, held similarly situated even though they worked in different departments); Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp., supra at 893-97 (intervention of eight non-filing female employees permitted in an action alleging, inter alia, that the union defendants failed to represent the plaintiffs fairly by consenting to the employer's sex discrimination). Thus, we hold that the district court properly allowed the non-filing appellees to join in this action and pursue their Title VII claims.