Opinion ID: 2624223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The New 16-Part Standard

Text: ¶77 Having dismissed the trial court's decision without regard for trial court discretion, the majority goes on to create a 16-part test for penalty calculations, which it orders the trial court to employ on remand. The test endangers trial courts' discretion and will also prove unhelpful for litigants and courts alike. ¶78 The majority's new rule lists 16 factors for the trial court to consider in assessing the county's culpability level, and it declares that [the] guidance is not meant to limit [a] trial court's discretion. Majority at 239. But limit trial courts' discretion it will. Though the list of factors is nonexclusive, trial judges still presumably must examine each of the 16 factors on the record. Id. at 240. This formulation provides appellate courts with opportunities aplenty to disregard trial judges' discretion, focusing on judges' strict compliance with the test, rather than their nuanced view of the entirety of each case (She failed to consider aggravating factor 7. He did not adequately address training and supervision.). Id. at 240. And trial judges will only cautiously venture to add new factors to the list, never knowing whether this court will sanction those new factors. With the majority's imposition of a 16-factor test, we watch abuse of discretion review edge its way toward de novo review. ¶79 And at peril of trial judges' discretion, we gain very little. The new test is unhelpful for four reasons. First, the factors are cumulative. All of the mitigating factors and the first six aggravating factors are commonsense inquiries to measure the level of good faith or bad faith on the part of the county (Was the county honest? Was it helpful? Did it train its employees?). As such, these factors are subsumed completely in mitigating factor 3 (good faith ... compliance) and aggravating factor 5 (negligent, reckless, wonton, bad faith, or intentional noncompliance). Id. Second, aggravating factors 7 and 8 (potential for public harm and personal economic loss) tell us nothing about the county's blameworthiness unless we inquire whether the county knew of these risks. Id. Third, aggravating factor 9, deterrence, is a purpose of the penalty provision as a whole, not an indicator of the culpability of the county. In any event, deterrent effect can be effectively evaluated based only on the total award, not the per day award. Fourth, the test does little to assist in standardizing awards because it does not (and cannot) give trial courts guidance as to the relative weight of the factors. While the new test requires trial courts to march through a list of considerations, it leaves courts with little idea of what to do with the results. In my estimation, this test is not worth the risk it poses to trial judges' discretion.