Opinion ID: 2374292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Fully abrogated in 27 States.

Text: The Supreme Court of the United States in Thompson v. Thompson, supra, at page 619 of 218 U.S. and at page 1183 of 54 L.Ed., said: In no act called to our attention has the right of the wife been carried to the extent of opening the courts to complaints of the character of the one here involved. The Courts of many States [12] have so interpreted Married Womens Acts and other statutes. In 1914 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889, after citing two prior cases sustaining suits for breach of contract under Connecticut's Married Womens Act, said at page 891 of 89 A.: If a cause of action in her favor arises from the wrongful infliction of such [contractual] injuries upon her by another, why does not the wrongful infliction of such injuries by her husband now give her a cause of action against him? If she may sue him for a broken promise, why may she not sue him for a broken arm? The defendant's answer is that a wise public policy forbids it.... .    In the fact that the wife has a cause of action against her husband for wrongful injuries to her person or property committed by him, we see nothing which is injurious to the public or against the public good or against good morals. This is the usual test for determining whether a statute or a contract is against public policy. When a wife is allowed to possess and deal with her own property and carry on business in her own name like a feme sole, she ought to have the same right to contract and enforce her contracts, and the same remedies for injuries to her person and property which others have, and to be liable upon her contracts and for her torts the same as others are. This is the position in which she now stands. The danger that the domestic tranquility may be disturbed if husband and wife have rights of action against each other for torts, and that the courts will be filled with actions brought by them against each other for assault, slander, and libel, as suggested in some of the cases cited in behalf of the defendant, we think is not serious.