Opinion ID: 2508322
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Johnson's statement to Davis

Text: Defendant contends the trial court's admission of Johnson's statement to Davis that defendant killed Thompson and Robinson violated his right to confront witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. On direct examination by the prosecution, Davis testified that Johnson came to his house on Tuesday, April 28, 1987, after defendant had visited. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked, And when you talked to [Johnson], he told you that he was there [when Thompson and Robinson were killed]? The prosecutor objected on the ground of hearsay, and the trial court excused the jury and heard the parties' arguments regarding the proffered testimony. Defendant's offer of proof was that Davis would testify Johnson told him he was present when Thompson and Robinson were killed and warned him not to tell anybody about it. Defense counsel acknowledged such testimony was hearsay, but sought to introduce it as a declaration against penal interest under Evidence Code section 1230. The parties stipulated Johnson was an unavailable witness, and defense counsel argued the proffered evidence was relevant to show that Johnson was present at the scene of the murders, had the opportunity to commit the murders, and ultimately committed the murders. The prosecutor responded that the statement defense counsel was trying to introduce was completely out of context and that, if the court admitted the statement, he would ask the court to admit Johnson's entire statement under Evidence Code section 356, because to do otherwise would be extremely misleading. The court asked the parties whether Johnson's entire statement to Davis would be admissible under Evidence Code section 356 if it ruled that defense counsel's question called for a proper declaration against penal interest. Defense counsel answered yes and noted that if the full statement were admitted, the defense could bring in other hearsay statements to show prior consistent or inconsistent statements, acknowledging that doing so would be a tactical decision that the defense would have to live with. The trial court concluded that, based on defendant's offer of proof, Johnson's statement to Davis about his presence at the scene of the murders was a declaration against penal interest, and that it was prepared to rule such evidence relevant, subject to the provisions of Evidence Code section 356 and other provisions regarding prior inconsistent and consistent statements without ruling on what else comes in. The court added that if the defense chose not to cross-examine Davis on the contents of the conversation, the issue could nevertheless become relevant in the defense case, subject to cross-examination and rebuttal evidence as to his prior consistent or inconsistent statements. Based on the court's ruling, the prosecutor withdrew his original hearsay objection. The following then occurred during cross-examination of Davis by the defense: Q. After the conversation, did Rick [Johnson] tell you not to tell anybody about this particular conversation he was having with you? A. Yes. Q. And the conversation related to the homicides of Betty Thompson and her old man; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And what Rick told you ... was that he was present at the time of these particular murders, correct? A. Yes. Q. And then Rick proceeded to lay the murder on [defendant]; is that correct? THE COURT: Do you understand the question? [DAVIS]: No. THE COURT: Could you translate your slang and reframe your question. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The slang is, Rick blamed [defendant] for the murder; isn't that correct? [DAVIS]: Your Honor, can I answer the question  THE COURT: Yes. [DAVIS]:  and give  say something else? THE COURT: Well, yes, but start with  the question is, in this conversation you had with Rick, did he blame [defendant] for the murders, that's the question. [DAVIS]: Well, he said [defendant] did it, yes. THE COURT: What is it you wanted to explain? [DAVIS]: But what I want to explain is that when he said that [defendant] did it, I mean he just told me that he was there, [defendant] did it, and keep everything to myself, okay, that was it. But [defendant] had already told me he did it hisself [ sic ]. Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted Johnson's hearsay statements because they were not proper declarations against penal interest excepted from the hearsay rule under Evidence Code section 1230, and because they violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. We need not decide whether the trial court erred in admitting Johnson's hearsay statements, for defendant invited any error. (See People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1214, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 198, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Defense counsel expressly acknowledged that eliciting testimony on the portion of Johnson's statement admitting he was at the scene of the crime was a tactical decision on their part, as they knew that admission of such evidence likely would mean that the portion of Johnson's statement attributing the murders to defendant would also be admitted to place the statement in context of the entire conversation between Johnson and Davis under Evidence Code section 356. [3] Defense counsel wanted the jury to learn that Johnson was present at the scene of the crime so that they could later argue during closing argument that Johnson was the shooter.