Opinion ID: 6358387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sutton's Testimony

Text: Pretrial, the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed that Sutton would describe the shooter but would not identify anyone in the courtroom as that person. To wit: [Commonwealth] : It is my understanding [that Sutton does] not believe [she]'d be able to identify by face. I'm willing to concede that [Sutton] will ... testify as to what [she] saw and heard and describe what [she] saw and heard but will not be asked to identify and would be so informed by me before [she takes] the stand.  [Trial Counsel] : That's fine with me, Judge. That's exactly what my position was. N.T., 5/25/2005, at 5-7 (emphasis added). As reviewed hereinabove, during her testimony on direct examination, Sutton described some of the shooter's physical attributes, including that he was a male, approximately five feet seven to five feet nine inches tall, had a darker complexion than she did, and wore a white skully cap and black jeans. N.T., 5/27/2006, at 16, 31. Trial counsel objected when the prosecutor elicited this descriptive testimony from Sutton on the basis that it violated the pretrial agreement. Agreeing with the prosecutor's sidebar argument that [c]omplexion, height, clothing, that's not an identification at all, N.T., 5/27/2006, at 28, the trial court overruled the objection. Id. at 28-29. In his summation, the prosecutor offered the following argument regarding Sutton's testimony: But what did [Sutton] tell you? She tells you she's crossing the street with her friend Janell, pop, pop, pop, however many there are; looks up; she sees the shooter wearing this jacket (indicating) - how come [trial counsel] forgot to tell you about that? - and wearing this sweatshirt - (indicating), which the defendant's wearing both of them. She doesn't pay any more attention. She says, I didn't get a good enough look to identify his face. In fact, she says she's too busy with the victim that she doesn't even notice the chase that's going on behind her or across the street back that way.    But she tells you the shooter's darker-skinned than her. We all saw her. He's darker-skinned than her. She tells you later the police bring a man back. She says he's got the same complexion as the shooter. He's got the same build as the shooter. And the person she's referring to is him (indicating), the person the police brought back. But I don't know, A, because I didn't see the face as closely; but, B, because now I see a gray hoodie. And lo and behold, what a coincidence: The police have opened up his black jacket by now to search him, remember, when they caught him. When she said black jacket, she's talking about him. When she says gray hoodie, she's talking about him. That's funny. He keeps talking about Angela Sutton, but he only uses the word white kufi. Angela Sutton, without pointing to a person in the courtroom, identifies him (indicating) as the killer. That's the simple, logical conclusion. N.T., 5/31/2005, at 153-54 (emphasis added). On direct appeal, appellate counsel pursued a claim that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by eliciting testimony which was the functional equivalent of an identification - knowingly violating a pre-trial agreement that Angela Sutton would not be asked to provide an identification. Brown , 987 A.2d at 708 . This Court roundly rejected this contention: As the trial court aptly noted, an in-court identification is essentially witness testimony which points a condemning finger at the accused during trial. Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/08, at 12 (quoting Commonwealth v. Fowler, 466 Pa. 198 , 352 A.2d 17 , 20 (1976) ). During her testimony, Angela Sutton described the shooter's physical attributes and actions; she also stated she saw the man the police had in custody and noticed he was not wearing the same thing he had on when he shot the victim.  Appellant's argument is that Ms. Sutton's descriptions constitute an identification because the jury had to be aware she was describing appellant. Indeed, the agreement specifically permitted descriptive testimony and prohibited identification testimony - that these two terms were distinguished in the agreement itself belies appellant's argument that Sutton's description constituted a de facto identification. Appellant cannot first agree to allow descriptive testimony and then object to unfavorable descriptions. A true identification would have violated a pre-trial agreement that she would not be asked to identify him. However, Ms. Sutton did not identify the accused, but only described the scene as she observed it-which is precisely what was agreed to by both parties on the record. Ms. Sutton explicitly told the jury she did not see the shooter's face long enough to make an actual identification and was only describing her observations of the man in the back of the police car. N.T. Trial, 5/27/05, at 49-50. That the jury had previously heard what appellant was wearing when he was arrested is irrelevant; Ms. Sutton did not implicate appellant in the crime, and never once stated someone in the courtroom resembled the shooter . Rather, by relaying her observations, she simply confirmed what had previously been stated. Her testimony contained only such information as agreed to by both parties and therefore does not constitute an impermissible identification. Even if such testimony had amounted to an impermissible identification, to obtain relief for alleged prosecutorial misconduct, (which is the framework in which this issue is cast), appellant must establish the prosecutor's conduct had the unavoidable effect of prejudicing the jury ... as to render it incapable of fairly weighing the evidence and arriving at a just verdict. Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501 , 913 A.2d 220 , 236 (2006) (citations omitted). In this case, Ms. Sutton's confirmation of previous testimony was at most cumulative, as previous witnesses had described appellant's actions and appearance. The testimony was certainly not so prejudicial as to render the jury incapable of achieving a fair and just verdict. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's request for a mistrial based upon alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Brown , 987 A.2d at 708-09 (emphasis added). In the present appeal, Brown now argues that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct, in violation of Brown's rights to due process, by breaching the pretrial agreement during the closing argument by saying, Angela Sutton, without pointing to a person in the courtroom, identifies him [Brown] as the killer. Brown's Brief at 43. Brown insists that with this argument, the prosecutor flatly asserted that Sutton had identified Brown as the shooter. Id. As such, Brown posits that the prosecutor's argument was improper, as it was not based upon evidence of record or upon legitimate inferences drawn from evidence of record. Id. at 43-44 (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson , 635 Pa. 665 , 139 A.3d 1257 , 1275 (2016) ). Brown further claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this portion of the prosecutor's closing argument, and that appellate counsel was ineffective for not pursuing the prosecutorial misconduct claim on appeal. Id. at 44-45. A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural  justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Pa.R.P.C. 3.8, Comment. This unique role in our justice system, however, does not prevent prosecutors from fairly responding to defense arguments with force and vigor, provided they are not injecting their own personal opinion. Commonwealth v. Burno , 626 Pa. 30 , 94 A.3d 956 , 974 (2014) ; Johnson , 139 A.3d at 1275 . A prosecutor enjoys reasonable latitude during closing arguments, and may advocate with force, vigor, and oratorical flair. Commonwealth v. Brown , 551 Pa. 465 , 711 A.2d 444 , 454 (1998). This latitude is not unrestrained, and closing argument must be based upon matters in evidence, or upon the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. Johnson , 139 A.3d at 1275 (citing Commonwealth v. Chester , 526 Pa. 578 , 587 A.2d 1367 , 1377 (1991) ). Comments by a prosecutor constitute reversible error only where their unavoidable effect is to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a fair verdict. Commonwealth v. Hutchinson , 611 Pa. 280 , 25 A.3d 277 , 307 (2011) (citation omitted). For the same reasons that we offered on direct appeal with respect to Sutton's testimony, we likewise conclude that the prosecutor's summation did not constitute a violation of the pretrial agreement or otherwise constitute prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor's closing remarks were a summary of the descriptive testimony provided by Sutton and were grounded in the evidence of record. The prosecutor accurately informed the jury that Sutton did not see the shooter's face, and merely tied Sutton's description of the shooter to the other evidence adduced at trial. As the PCRA court correctly noted, the prosecutor's argument amounted to a contention that the person Sutton saw shoot Crawford could not have been anyone other than Brown. Rule 907 Notice, 4/7/2016, at 30. That is not an in-court identification. Moreover, it was a fair response to trial counsel's closing argument, in which he emphasized that Sutton, unlike other witnesses, said the shooter was wearing a white kufi. N.T., 5/31/2006, at 100-01, 116, 121). Because we conclude that the prosecutor's summation was not improper, we likewise reject Brown's contentions that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to object and/or pursue this claim on appeal.