Opinion ID: 1969356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying wahle's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas?

Text: SDCL 23A-27-11 provides: A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice a court after sentence may set aside a judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea. This court has held that: The withdrawal of a guilty plea before the imposition of sentence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. SDCL 23A-27-11. There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea but the trial court's `discretion in the matter should be exercised liberally in favor of withdrawal, unless it appears that the State has detrimentally relied upon the plea and the prosecution of the defendant has been thereby prejudiced.' When deciding whether to allow a criminal defendant to withdraw his plea, the trial court must look at the reasons why the plea is sought to be withdrawn and if the request to withdraw is obviously frivolous, the trial court need not grant it. State v. Grosh, 387 N.W.2d 503, 505-506 (S.D.1986) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Wahle contends he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not voluntary. Similar to the argument in State v. Lohnes, 344 N.W.2d 686 (S.D. 1984), Wahle argues his plea was not voluntary because he misunderstood the 300 year cap on the sentence he would receive as a result of the plea bargain. In Lohnes, we reversed the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea where the plea bargain provided that the defendant would not be sentenced to life and the defendant was ultimately sentenced to 347 years in the penitentiary. In reaching our decision, we focused on the defendant's reasonable expectations from the plea bargain. We concluded that the defendant could have reasonably understood the part of the plea bargain that he would be sentenced to a term of years included a promise that he would not receive a sentence exceeding his life expectancy. As authority for our holding in Lohnes, we relied on United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21 (3rd Cir.1976). In Crusco, the Third Circuit reversed the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea where there was confusion in the elocution of the plea bargain concerning the maximum seven year sentence and whether a mandatory parole term would be part of that seven years or in addition to it. The circuit court concluded: Where the record shows that `circumstances as they existed at the time of the guilty plea, judged by objective standards, reasonably justified his mistaken impression,' a defendant must be held to have entered his plea without full knowledge of the consequences and involuntarily. In the instant case, there is sufficient objective proof on the record in statements by the Government and the district judge to support [the defendant's] claim that he misunderstood the maximum sentence he faced. Crusco, 536 F.2d at 24-25 (citations omitted) (emphasis original). Lohnes and Crusco establish that the withdrawal of a guilty plea, even prior to sentencing, is not subject to the whim or caprice of the defendant. Rather, it is a matter that lies solely within the discretion of the trial court. Although, before sentencing, that discretion is to be exercised liberally in favor of withdrawal, the trial court must still look at the reasons why withdrawal is sought. If, as in Crusco and Lohnes, there is sufficient objective proof on the record of the defendant's misunderstanding of the maximum sentence he faced, then the plea is considered to have been entered without full knowledge of the consequences and involuntarily. Under these circumstances, the trial court's discretion should favor withdrawal of the guilty plea. However, as we said in Grosh, supra, if the request to withdraw is frivolous, the trial court need not grant it. Wahle's request to withdraw his plea was obviously frivolous and distinguishable from that in Lohnes. In Lohnes, there was never any discussion during elocution of the plea agreement that the defendant's sentence to a term of years could be to a term exceeding his life expectancy. Here, Wahle's own counsel outlined the terms of the plea bargain and he specifically mentioned that the sentence would be, something less than three hundred years zero to three hundred years ... (emphasis added). When asked if he understood the plea bargain, Wahle unhesitatingly replied, [y]es, I do. It is difficult to see how the terms of the plea bargain could have been made more plain and also difficult to see how Wahle could have held any expectation other than that the maximum penalty he faced was a 300 year sentence to the state penitentiary. In view of the clear explanation of the plea bargain, Wahle's claims of misunderstanding, misapprehension and involuntariness ring hollow. See, U.S. v. Dalman, 994 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1993) (defendant's performance during plea hearing inconsistent with his after-the-fact claim of misunderstanding of proceedings and involuntariness of guilty plea). The record of entry of Wahle's guilty plea fails to contain any objective facts whatsoever that can be viewed as reasonably justifying a mistaken impression as to the maximum possible penalty for his offense. To the contrary, all pertinent facts and consequences were carefully explained and Wahle unhesitatingly indicated his understanding of the plea bargain and its effects. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Wahle's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Affirmed. MILLER, C.J., and WUEST, HENDERSON, SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., participating.