Opinion ID: 790169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: 5 The Parents challenged under the IDEA the special educational programs that the DOE had provided for their disabled children. The M.S. Orders 6 M.S. participated in two administrative hearings before an IHO on behalf of her child, I.O. The first concluded when the IHO issued a Statement of Agreement and Order that recorded the terms of a settlement agreement between M.S. and the DOE. 7 The M.S. Agreement and Order, signed by the IHO, recites, in part: 8 [I.O.'s] parent [M.S.] sought an impartial hearing to obtain compensatory services for him for the remainder of the academic year or until such time as he actually enters a private school. The parent and student were both present at the hearing, and were represented by counsel. The [DOE] was represented by [the] supervisor of psychologists,... District 4 .... 9 At the hearing, the parties engaged in extensive discussions held off the record. As a result of these discussions, the parties reached various points of agreement. These were put into the record, with the assent of the parties. [The IHO] issued, where appropriate, orders implementing the points of agreement. These are repeated [in this Statement of Agreement and Order]. 10 In re I.O., Case No. 39106, Statement of Agreement & Order at 2 (Bd. of Educ. of the City of N.Y. Apr. 13, 2000, as corrected Apr. 24, 2000). The Agreement and Order then sets forth the terms of the parties' agreement, principally that I.O. would receive from the DOE (1) the right to attend private school at the district's expense, (2) one-on-one tutoring, therapy, and counseling, and (3) an immediate transfer to a more appropriate public school until I.O. was placed at a private school. The Agreement and Order concludes: The above points of agreement and orders were issued orally at the hearing, and were fully effective as of the oral issuance. This written Statement of Agreement and Order reiterates and affirms the oral orders and points of agreement. Id. at 3. 11 M.S. then sought another hearing on a separate claim, asserting that the first hearing and agreement did not address issues relating to prior years, because [M.S.]'s request for the [first] hearing made reference only to the current year. Letter from Michael D. Hampden, Legal Services for Children, Inc., to the New York City BOE, Impartial Hearing Office of Apr. 24, 2000, at 2. On November 6, 2000, in this second administrative hearing, held before a different IHO, the IHO so ordered a three-page written Order and Stipulation of the parties setting forth the terms of a settlement agreement between them. The Order and Stipulation provides that M.S.'s son I.O. is entitled to receive from the DOE three years of compensatory education, to be provided after he graduates or reaches the age of twenty-one, whichever comes first. At a telephonic hearing the same day, transcribed and reduced to a verbatim transcript, the IHO stated that he would order, and thereby give effect to, the terms of the parties' agreement. 12 [IHO]: Okay, I understand that you've both settled ... this case? [Lawyer for I.O.]: That's right. [Lawyer for DOE]: Yes. [IHO]: And, you've settled it pursuant to an order and stipulation that the [DOE] faxed me about a half hour ago. Correct? [Lawyer for DOE]: Yes. [Lawyer for I.O.]: That's right. [IHO]: Okay, then at this point, I will so order, and sign the order and stipulation and mark this case as settled. [Lawyer for DOE]: Great. [Lawyer for I.O.]: Thank you. [IHO]: Are there any objections for the [DOE]? [Lawyer for DOE]: No. [IHO]: [Inquiring the same of the lawyer for I.O.:] [Lawyer for I.O.]: No. [IHO]: Okay, then the order is hereby—I hereby order the stipulation to be put into [e]ffect, and I'll send the paperwork in. [Lawyer for DOE]: Wonderful. 13 Tr. of Hearing, Nov. 6, 2000, at 14-15, In re I.O., Case No. 39486. About a week later, on November 14, 2000, the IHO signed an order dismissing the case. The M.L. Order 14 M.L. challenged the DOE's treatment of her child J.L. in a proceeding that also culminated in a settlement agreement among the parties. On May 14, 2001, the IHO recited the terms of the agreement orally at the conclusion of a brief administrative hearing. He preceded the recitation with the following observations: 15 [IHO]: Okay. We had an off the record discussion regarding this matter. I'll just recap some things. .... [J.L.]'s supposed to be provided with a bilingual teacher.... For some reason, that service hasn't been provided .... .... So that's why we're here today because ... [J.L.]'s mother[] was asking that the service be provided and that I so order. The [BOE and the lawyers for all parties] [seem to] have ... come to an agreement. Basically, they're stipulating to an agreement which they have asked me to order. In fact, the stipulation and agreement that I will order will read as follows.... 16 Tr. of Hearing, May 14, 2001, at 4, In re J.L., Case No. 42736. The agreement was also reflected in a written Statement of Agreement and Order. The Agreement and Order concluded: STATEMENT OF AGREEMENT AND ORDER 17 Accordingly, the parties AGREE and it is SO ORDERED, that on an interim basis, the Board pay to ... a [specified] speech and language therapist, or to any other provider on the Board Related Services Provider list, the fees incurred for providing [J.L.] with monolingual [English] services three forty-five-minute sessions per week through [a specified date]. 18 In re J.L., Case No. 42736, Statement of Agreement and Order at 2-3 (Bd. of Educ. of the City of N.Y. May 17, 2001). The document was dated and signed by the IHO only. Id. at 3. 6 The A.R. Decision 19 In the proceeding that A.R. brought on behalf of her child R.V., the IHO ordered the DOE (1) to determine a new individualized educational plan (IEP) for R.V., (2) to pay for R.V. to attend private school, and (3) to provide R.V. with one year of additional compensatory services to support R.V.'s developing skills to participate in general education. In re R.V., Case No. 42764, Findings of Fact and Decision at 9 (Bd. of Educ. of the City of N.Y. June 14, 2001). The S.W. and M.M. Decision 20 In the hearing that S.W. and M.M. brought on behalf of their child N.W., the IHO ordered the DOE to provide additional behavioral, occupational, and speech therapy for N.W. and to reimburse S.W. and M.M. for the costs incurred in providing such additional therapy prior to the IHO decision. In re I.O., Case No. 39106, Findings of Fact and Decision at 15-16 (Bd. of Educ. of the City of N.Y. Feb. 18, 1999, as amended Mar. 23, 1999). Retention of Counsel 21 Before instituting these administrative proceedings, the Parents all retained counsel to represent them. Two lawyers, Todd Silverblatt and Michael Hampden, associated with Legal Services for Children (LSC), a not-for-profit legal services organization that specializes in, inter alia, education law, represented A.R., M.S., and M.L. (the LSC plaintiffs) in their administrative hearings. LSC did not charge the LSC plaintiffs legal fees. Instead, the LSC plaintiffs assigned to LSC their rights to recover from the DOE under the fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA. That is how [LSC] obtains a good portion of its funding. M.S. ex rel. I.O. v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., Nos. 01 Civ. 4015, 01 Civ. 10871, 01 Civ. 10872, 2002 WL 31556385, at , 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22220, at  (S.D.N.Y. Nov.18, 2002). Gary Mayerson represented S.W. and M.M. in their IDEA hearing, S.W. ex rel. N.W. v. Bd. of Educ. (Dist.Two), 257 F.Supp.2d 600, 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y.2003), for which representation he charged them legal fees. 22 Request for Attorneys' Fees and District Court Proceedings 23 Following the completion of the administrative hearings, LSC, and Mayerson on behalf of S.W. and M.M., requested attorneys' fees from the DOE. For the representation of M.S., LSC sought from the DOE a total of $3,225, reflecting 20.5 hours of legal services rendered by Hampden and Silverblatt. Hampden and Silverblatt billed at an hourly rate of $250 per hour for 12.9 hours and offered to provide 7.6 hours of services without charge. For the representation of M.L., LSC sought from the DOE $2,370, which reflected 7.0 hours of legal services, primarily provided by Hampden at a rate of $350 per hour. For the representation of A.R., LSC sought from the DOE $3,458.50, which reflected primarily 9.25 hours of legal services rendered by Hampden at a rate of $350 per hour. For his representation of S.W. and M.M., Mayerson, on behalf of his clients, sought from the DOE $14,747, which reflected 40.4 hours of legal services rendered by Mayerson at a rate of $365 per hour. The DOE refused to pay any of the fee requests on the grounds that the hourly rates of $250 to $365 per hour were unreasonable. 24 Thereafter, the Parents filed complaints in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York claiming that they had been denied attorneys' fees to which they were entitled under the IDEA. On April 30, 2002, after the LSC plaintiffs' cases were consolidated, they moved for summary judgment, seeking a total award of $18,706, of which $13,003.50 represented legal services rendered in the course of the administrative representation of the LSC plaintiffs 7 and $5,702.50 reflected lawyers' fees for the district court litigation for attorneys' fees itself. Together with their summary judgment motion, the LSC plaintiffs included affidavits supporting their assertion that $350 per hour was the hourly rate[] prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). In response, the DOE argued, inter alia, that the appropriate rate should be between $125 and $175 per hour and submitted affidavits supporting that contention. The DOE also asserted that M.S. and M.L. were not prevailing parties as that term is used in the IDEA because they did not succeed on the merits in their administrative hearings. The DOE argued further that M.S. and M.L. were not prevailing parties by virtue of the IHOs so-ordering their settlement agreements because, the DOE contended, the IHOs did not retain enforcement jurisdiction over the agreements or have the authority to so-order the agreements in the first place. On November 15, 2002, Judge Motley granted the LSC plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, awarding them $18,706 in fees. M.S., 2002 WL 31556385, at , 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22220, at . 25 On October 31, 2002, in a separate proceeding before Judge Scheindlin, S.W. and M.M. filed a motion for attorneys' fees, requesting fees for Mayerson's services at a rate of $350 to $375 per hour. The DOE did not contest that S.W. and M.M. were prevailing parties as a result of the relief granted them in their administrative proceedings. The DOE asserted, however, that the fees sought were not reasonable, and that a rate of $125 to $190 per hour was proper for the services provided. 26 On February 26, 2003, the district court granted S.W. and M.M. $10,644.73 in attorneys' fees and related expenses for their administrative hearings. Relying in part on the award of attorneys' fees to the LSC plaintiffs in their action, the court found that $350 per hour was a reasonable rate for Mayerson's legal representation during the administrative proceedings. S.W., 257 F.Supp.2d at 604-05. The court also found that Mayerson spent a total of 30.2 hours in connection with the administrative proceedings but reduced this figure slightly because it found that some of the relevant time records were vague or incomplete. Id. at 606-07. The court also determined that Mayerson spent 6.8 hours on the fee application process in the district court and that, because Mayerson's expertise had increased since he represented S.W. and M.M. in their administrative proceedings in 1999, the reasonable rate for these services was $375 per hour. Id. at 607. The court awarded the plaintiffs $3,998.15 in attorneys' fees 8 and related costs in connection with the fee application. Id. at 609. 27 The DOE appeals from both district court decisions. Because of the similarities of the appeals, we heard argument in them together and now decide them together.