Opinion ID: 2237187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: refund terms and methodology

Text: Turning to the terms that the circuit court established pursuant to its retained, equitable jurisdiction over the refund, we note that the appellate court failed to review them. However, in the interest of judicial economy, we will address each of them in turn. Pursuant to the provisions of the stay order and the circuit court's retained jurisdiction, the circuit court issued its refund order setting forth the terms and methodology of the refund from the Rate Order I rates. Intervenors argue that each of the circuit court's terms are equitable terms lying within the circuit court's discretion. Edison and the Commission argue, in effect, that the appellate court properly affirmed the terms of the refund set forth by the Commission in Rate Order II. In setting the terms of the refund, the circuit court was acting in its equitable capacity and, therefore, had considerable discretion    in affixing appropriate conditions to [its] stay order. ( Henderson v. Graham (1988), 167 Ill. App.3d 256, 259, 118 Ill.Dec. 75, 521 N.E.2d 143.) Review of the refund order's terms is governed by equitable principles and the goal of equity is to make the aggrieved party whole. (See In re Estate of Wernick (1989), 127 Ill.2d 61, 86, 129 Ill.Dec. Ill, 535 N.E.2d 876.) These terms will be affirmed unless the circuit court has abused its discretion. (See Wernick, 127 Ill.2d at 87, 129 Ill.Dec. Ill, 535 N.E.2d 876.) Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 305(b), these terms must be just. 134 Ill.2d R. 305(b). A