Opinion ID: 2276541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Expert Testified to Appellant's Mental Defect or Condition

Text: In this case, Fulero testified by avowal that, inter alia: (1) in general, people are not aware that police can tell suspects things that are not true; (2) some police tactics put the suspect in the position of feeling like their guilt has already been conclusively established; (3) some suspects confess, although not guilty, to mitigate what they perceive as a hopeless situation; and (4) he had not examined, and would not examine, Appellant. At first blush, we agree that Fulero's testimony regarding the study of police interrogations and tactics seems to relate to Appellant's mental status in some respect. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to surmise that these studies aid the trier of fact in determining the mental status of Appellant when he was interrogated. However, given the parameters of the avowal testimony in this case and the confines of RCr 7.24(3)(B)(i), we do not believe that Fulero's testimony addressed Appellant's mental disease, defect, or condition, as it must to invoke the rule. RCr 7.24(3)(B)(i) specifically states that the testimony must relate to a mental disease or defect or any other mental condition of the defendant.  As is clear from the avowal testimony, Fulero did not, and indeed could not, testify to the mental condition of Appellant because Fulero never examined him. And while Fulero could offer testimony regarding the science surrounding confessions which would aid the jury in its determinations, he would not have been able to say that those scientific findings were specifically applicable to Appellant without an examination. We therefore conclude that RCr 7.24(3)(B)(i) was simply not triggered in this case. Notwithstanding our conclusion that Fulero's testimony did not come within the ambit of RCr 7.24(3)(B)(i), we recognize that the jury could draw from Fulero's testimony certain inferences regarding Appellant's mental condition during his confession. However, we do not think that RCr 7.24(3)(B)(i) goes so far as to cover these inferences. Moreover, we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that any expert testimony relating to a claim that Terry was coerced or improperly persuaded to make a false confession would relate to `his mental condition' when admitting guilt. Yet, after considering the parameters of RCr 7.24(3)(B)(i) and the subject testimony in this case, it appears to us that Fulero was not testifying to a claim that Terry was coerced or improperly persuaded. Instead, Fulero's testimony was confined to police practices and only enveloped their interrogative techniques. Again, while the jury could have drawn an inference that Appellant was indeed coerced, and while Appellant himself testified to this effect, Fulero's avowal reveals that he could have never made such a statementrather he would have merely provided the jury with expert testimony, aiding them in assessing Appellant's confession. [5] Appellant offered Fulero's testimony to specifically confront the preconceived notion that anytime a defendant confesses, that confession is reliable. Thus, Fulero's testimony would have provided a scientific basis within which to analyze this notion, and would have aided the jury in determining whether Appellant's confession was reliable or not. [6] However, had Fulero expressed an opinion on the reliability of Appellant's confession, our analysis would differbut such was not the case. Given the bounds of the avowal, we find that the offered testimony sufficiently demonstrates that Fulero could not testify to Appellant's mental disease, defect, or any other mental condition. Rather, Fulero's testimony addressed police interrogative practices and their potential effects, thus we hold that the trial court erred in this regard.