Opinion ID: 1801839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Challenge to Prospective Juror T.J.

Text: T.J., 26 years old and single at the time of trial, worked as a file clerk for Kaiser Permanente. He had a high school education and had taken some college courses. Asked on the questionnaire about having visited correctional facilities, he wrote: I've visited a friend @ a correctional facility at least times [ sic : original spacing]. Regarding the American jury system, he wrote: I think that those with the most money can afford the best defense. I feel that it would work if we were all on a level playing field. Asked for his general feelings about the death penalty, he wrote: I do feel that the taking of a life is a serious crime, however, I don't have any general feelings about anything. To the next question, which asked for reasons for his feelings, T.J. wrote that criminal trials are complicated and must be viewed objectively, and that while he possibly could judge guilt or innocence, he thought sentencing laws are motivated by politics and not always reflective of the degree of the crime. His other answers regarding the death penalty consistently stated he would look to all the circumstances of a case and would not preclude either sentence beforehand. Asked whether there was any reason he would prefer not to serve as a juror, he noted that his employer only paid for 30 days of jury duty and that this trial may last longer and cause him financial hardship. In voir dire, the prosecutor assured T.J. the parties did not anticipate the trial taking more than 30 court days, though there might be a one- or two-week break between the guilt and penalty phases. T.J. said that would not create a problem for him. When the prosecutor asked about T.J.'s statement that those with the most money can get the best defense, T.J. explained that this opinion was based in part on the recently concluded O.J. Simpson murder trial but also on other cases, and he noted that defendant was representing himself, which was not very smart. Regarding the political motivation of sentencing, T.J. explained he thought some white collar criminals were given unjustifiably light sentences compared with those who commit violent crimes. At the Wheeler/Batson hearing, the prosecutor explained, first, that he found it very disturbing T.J. had visited friends in jail or prison but did not say how many times he had done so. The prosecutor continued: Hewe talked about his unpleasant experience with the police. We talked about money affording the best defense. He also indicated under confidentiality that a close friend or relative has been arrested. . . . [H]e was unequivocal [ sic ] about the death penalty. He didn't have any feelings about anything. Talked about the law, and although he may have been indicating appropriate answers when I asked him questions today, his body language, the way he responded, his movement indicated he did not want to serve, as well as hisI can count three times where he's questioned the length of time, the hardship it would create for him and his employment. The prosecutor reiterated that there might be a delay between the two phases of trial, which may create a problem in these situations. The court evaluated the challenge to T.J. as follows: [C]ertainly there was no reason to excuse him for cause, at least what appeared from his answers. But based on his answers, some of his answers in his questionnaire, some of his views about the justice system, I can see a basis for excusing him that is not based on race. Defendant argues several of the prosecutor's stated reasons for excusing T.J. are contradicted by the record or do not withstand comparison with White jurors the prosecutor retained. But even granting that some parts of the prosecutor's assessment (for example, that T.J. equivocated regarding the death penalty on his questionnaire) are not well supported by the record, the trial court was not required to find the excusal was motivated by T.J.'s race. The reason the trial court accepted for T.J.'s excusal was supported by the record: T.J. had written in his questionnaire that sentencing law reflected politics and that a defendant's wealth determined the quality of his defense. On voir dire, he did not retreat from those positions. While T.J.'s critique of the criminal justice system was hardly out of the mainstream, and did not indicate any legal disqualification to serve as a juror, a prosecutor might reasonably prefer jurors who did not hold these views. That the prosecutor excused T.J. on this basis, and not because of his race, was therefore plausible on its face. As we explained in discussing the challenge to Prospective Juror V.H., a trial court deciding whether to credit the prosecutor's stated reasons may, but is not required to, discount a supportable reason because it is accompanied by unsupportable ones. While an attorney who offers unsupported explanations for excusing a prospective juror may be trying to cover for the fact his or her real motivation is discriminatory, alternatively this may reflect nothing more than a misguided sense that more reasons must be better than fewer or simply a failure of accurate recollection. In the present case, whether by offering a series of nondiscriminatory reasons the prosecutor was trying to obscure his group bias or was simply reading through his notes attempting to articulate what he found unsatisfactory about the prospective juror is impossible to tell from the cold record. The trial court, which could judge tone, gesture and inflection, as well as the words themselves, was in the best position to make this credibility determination. In this situation, we cannot confidently conclude the trial court misjudged the prosecutor and must fall back on the principle that we `give great deference to the trial court's ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses.' ( People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 614.)