Opinion ID: 162166
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Correspondence

Text: In his original complaint, Mr Brown contended that (1) on August 13, 2000 prison officials intercepted a package from his lawyer; and (2) that on August 28, 2000, prison officials mishandled, opened, withheld and altered correspondence -2- from his attorney. He also contends that he sought administrative relief on these claims. Mr. Brown’s attorney supplies an affidavit stating that he sent his client a copy of a petition for review of the denial of post-conviction relief in Oregon. Mr. Brown’s counsel also filed the petition with the Oregon Supreme Court. Mr. Brown’s attorney learned a month later that his client never received the correspondence. The Defendants suggest that we need not consider the allegations regarding tampering with legal correspondence, as they were part of the initial complaint only, and Mr. Brown failed to reallege them in the amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). We are mindful of our duty to liberally construe pleadings of pro se litigants. See Meade v. Grubbs , 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir. 1988). At the same time, we acknowledge that such litigants must adhere to the same rules of procedure as other litigants. See Green v. Dorrell , 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992). Also, we need not manufacture issues for pro se parties. See National Commodity and Barter Ass’n v. Gibbs , 886 F.2d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1989). Nevertheless, because Mr. Brown’s amended complaint clearly expresses the intention to “add[] a claim,” Rec. doc. 9, at 1, we shall address all of his contentions. The Defendants note that as to the August 13, 2000 package that was apparently lost, there was no deprivation of constitutional rights. They assert that -3- because his attorney filed the document in Oregon state court, Mr. Brown cannot claim denial of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996) (noting that inmates have a right to receive legal advice from other inmates only when it is a necessary “means for ensuring a ‘reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.’”) (quoting Bounds v. Smith , 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)). Similarly, Defendants claim there is no First Amendment violation because there is no evidence of improper motive. Regarding the August 28, 2000 package, Defendants admit to opening this package in Mr. Brown’s presence. The package, however, was not marked as legal mail and had no return address on the outside of the box to suggest the return address. We review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss the complaint under § 1915(e)(2) , taking the allegations of the complaint as true. See Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001). There is no evidence that the Defendants caused any interference with either the August 13 or the August 28, 2000 package. The Oregon court received the petition, so the loss of the August 13 package did not constitute interference with Mr. Brown’s access to the courts. Likewise, there is no evidence of improper motive, so Mr. Brown cannot assert a -4- First Amendment violation. The district court properly dismissed Mr. Brown’s claims with respect to the August 13 package. Additionally we note that Mr. Brown ultimately received the August 28, 2000 package. We agree with the Defendants that the August 28, 2000 incident was “an isolated incident, without any evidence of improper motive or resulting interference with [Mr. Brown’s] right to counsel or to access to the courts.” Smith v. Maschner , 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990). In addition, prison officials may open an inmate’s incoming legal mail to search for contraband in the presence of the inmate. See Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974). Because the August 28, 2000 package was opened in Mr. Brown’s presence, this incident “does not give rise to a constitutional violation.” Smith , 899 F.2d at 944.