Opinion ID: 1309317
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Consideration of Sympathy Evidence

Text: (20) In a related argument, defendant contends the jury was misled about whether it could consider sympathy evidence in determining penalty. As noted, the prosecution presented no additional evidence at the penalty phase. The defense established that defendant was only 18 years old at the time of the incident, and presented a number of his relatives and friends who testified that he had not previously been in serious trouble with the law, that he was good natured, well-liked, helpful to his family, concerned with the welfare of the children in his neighborhood, and respectful and very kind to several elderly neighbors. The court instructed the jury, In determining which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant, you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case. The court further instructed the jury that it may consider any ... circumstances which extenuate the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. (Former § 190.3, subd. (j) (currently subd. (k).) Defendant asserts the jury may have mistakenly believed it could not consider defendant's character and sympathy evidence. We have addressed essentially identical claims in a number of cases arising under the 1978 death penalty law, which contains in section 190.3, subdivision (k), the same language as appeared in the 1977 law's former section 190.3, subdivision (j). Our concern here, as in cases decided without the benefit of the expanded factor (k) instruction subsequently prescribed in People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813], footnote 10, is that the jury might have been left with the erroneous impression that defendant's character evidence which was unrelated to the circumstances of the crime was irrelevant to the jury's sentencing decision. After careful review of the whole record ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 544, fn. 17), we are satisfied the jury was not so misled. First, as previously discussed, the court did not err in instructing the jury to base its penalty determination on the evidence presented during trial rather than on factors unrelated to such evidence. We fail to see how this proper admonition worked to restrict the scope of mitigating character evidence the jury could consider in determining penalty. Second, although it is possible that a reasonable jury might interpret the unadorned factor (j) instruction as unduly limiting its consideration of a defendant's mitigating evidence, we doubt this occurred here. As noted above, the jury was presented with mitigating character evidence, and it was instructed to consider  all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case. (Italics added.) Most significantly, the prosecutor said nothing to suggest the jury should not consider such evidence. To the contrary, he indicated otherwise. First, he told the jury that defense counsel would ask that it show mercy. But, instead of stating it would be improper for the jury to show mercy, he argued the jury should measure mercy by the mercy that ... defendant himself exhibited and demonstrated. Later, in a similar vein, he told the jury he could not understand you having any sympathy or empathy for defendant. Likewise, he stated: You heard all of the testimony, ladies and gentlemen. You will hear considerable more argument from both sides, but right now, as you look at it, isn't it a fair statement that as you consider aggravation and mitigation the stark thing before you is there is no mitigation? We believe the essence of the prosecutor's comments was identical to the argument made in People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222. In Allen, the prosecutor argued that the defendant's sympathy evidence was `as good as nothing.... If anything, it's just the most pathetic, almost invisible mitigating evidence that you have ever seen.' (42 Cal.3d at p. 1276, italics added.) We interpreted this statement to mean that although the prosecutor believed the evidence was without great value it was quite proper for the jury to consider such evidence. ( Ibid. ) At no time did the prosecutor urge the jury not to consider the sympathy evidence presented at the penalty phase. As in Allen, the prosecutor argued merely that the weight to which defendant's sympathy evidence was entitled was, in the prosecutor's opinion, minimal. [19] We therefore reject defendant's claim that the jury was misled into believing that it could not consider sympathy evidence in determining penalty.