Opinion ID: 1757479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the indictment.

Text: Eakes contends the indictment is defective because it fails to specify the dates and locations that the alleged offenses occurred, fails to specify statute, fails to allege an overt act or frustration of purpose as to the attempt charge, fails to set forth the facts necessary to establish the offenses. As a result of these defects, Eakes claims he was not apprised of the nature of the charges against him, and he may be subject to double jeopardy in the future. Eakes further claims the trial court erred by allowing a substantive mid-trial amendment of the indictment from sexual battery to attempted sexual battery, forcing Eakes to suddenly defend against new elements and issues. The State counters that a specific date in a child abuse case is not necessary and that the sexual battery statutory language was tracked in the instant indictment. Further, the indictment indeed alleged an overt act, to wit: placing his penis into her anal cavity. Regarding frustration of purpose, the State claims this was an element of proof for the State at trial rather than an element which was required in the indictment. The State also takes issue with Eakes' double jeopardy argument, claiming that the indictment was sufficiently specific to prevent future charges of sexual battery on the same child within the same dates. The State argues that the amendment of the indictment from sexual battery to attempted sexual battery, in conformity with the evidence presented at trial, was one of form rather than of substance. Regardless of any amendment to the indictment, the State contends Eakes could have been convicted of attempt as a lesser included offense.
The indictment charged Eakes with four counts of sexual battery against April Myers. Following April's trial testimony, which established one completed digital-vaginal penetration, one completed penile-anal penetration, one attempted penile-anal penetration, and two attempts at cunnilingus, the defense moved for a dismissal of counts three and four. The State responded with a motion to amend the indictment by reducing counts three and four to fondling. The trial court declined to allow this substantive amendment of the indictment, granted Eakes' motion to drop count three, and allowed the State to amend the fourth count to attempted sexual battery. Eakes claims this amendment is one of substance rather than of form. An indictment may only be amended at trial if the amendment is immaterial to the merits of the case and the defense will not be prejudiced by the amendment. Griffin v. State, 584 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Miss. 1991). However, amendments as to the substance of the charge must be made by the grand jury. The test for whether an amendment to the indictment will prejudice the defense is whether the defense as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made. Id.. See also, Shive v. State, 507 So.2d 898, 900 (Miss. 1987). An attempt to commit a crime is, as a general rule, an indictable offense, which is separate and distinct from the crime itself. Mason v. State, 430 So.2d 857, 858 (Miss. 1983) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 97-1-7 (1972)). However, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-5 allows a jury to convict of the crime charged in the indictment or of an attempt to commit the offense charged. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-5 (1994). By virtue of this statute, Eakes had notice that he could be convicted of the attempt charge. The amendment of the indictment in this case had the same result as a permissible jury instruction on the attempt charge. Thus, Eakes' defense to the sexual battery charge was still available to him with regard to the attempted sexual battery charge. Therefore, the amendment was immaterial and did not prejudice the defendant. Eakes also contends that the indictment was defective because it did not set forth specific dates. If an indictment includes the seven enumerated items provided in Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct.Prac. 2.05, it is sufficient to provide the defendant with notice of the charge against him. Roberson v. State, 595 So.2d 1310, 1318 (Miss. 1992). Rule 2.05 says the indictment must be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged and shall fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. See also Smallwood v. State, 584 So.2d 733, 738 (Miss. 1991) (indictment legally sufficient if it gives accused fair notice of offense with which he is charged). While Rule 2.05 sets forth the requirement of the date the offense occurred, it also states that [f]ailure to state the correct date shall not render the indictment insufficient. In Morris v. State, 595 So.2d 840, 842 (Miss. 1991), this Court found that a specific date in a child sexual abuse case is not required so long as the defendant is fully and fairly advised of the charge against him. The abuse in Morris allegedly occurred continuously over a period of years. Eakes' indictment alleges his crimes of sexual penetration against April Myers occurred on, about or between December 1, 1990 and December 24, 1990; February 1, 1991 and April 30, 1991; and on or about May 11 and 12, 1991. At trial April was more specific, claiming Eakes had abused her on December 26, 1990, January 26, 1991, and March 16, 1991. She also provided particular reasons and/or events which caused her to be at Eakes' home on these dates. The dates testified to are close to the dates charged in the indictment. Given that Eakes was fully and fairly advised of the charges against him, the lack of specific dates in the indictment is not fatal. While Eakes claims the indictment lacks the specific location the abuse occurred and the reference to the statute violated, the indictment clearly states that the violations occurred in Kemper County and cites Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-3-97 and 97-3-95. Eakes' double jeopardy claim is also disingenuous. Contrary to the situation in Umphress v. State, 295 So.2d 735, 736-37 (Miss. 1974), where the indictment did not specify a time, place, or person to whom delivery of drugs was made, Eakes could claim double jeopardy if additional actions are brought charging him with sexually abusing April Myers in Kemper county on or about the dates specified.