Opinion ID: 2976834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Counsel’s Mistake Regarding the

Text: Pre-sentence Investigation Report Trial counsel requested a Pre-sentence Investigation Report (the “Report”) to be prepared, and that Report, including damaging victim-impact statements, was introduced into evidence during mitigation without any objection from counsel. Courts in Ohio give a defendant in a capital murder trial the statutory option of having such a Report made before the mitigation hearing. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.03(D)(1). If the defendant requests the Report, copies of the Report will automatically be furnished to the court, the prosecutor, and the defendant. Counsel then loses control of how the Report is used at the mitigation trial. Experienced capital counsel generally believe that it is a mistake to ask for such a Report. This Court has explained before that requesting a Report instead of performing a full mitigation investigation is a sign of inadequate preparation. See Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 717 n.29 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that counsel’s reliance on a PSI was part of the “overarching question of whether counsel’s . . . preparation for mitigation was constitutionally deficient”); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1209 (faulting counsel for requesting such a Report). The ABA Guidelines similarly advise counsel for capital defendants in Ohio against requesting it. See Haliym, 492 F.3d at 717 (citing ABA Guidelines at 1073) (“Because Ohio provides capital defendants the right to reasonably necessary investigation, experts, or other assistance for trial and penalty phases, capital counsel who request a pre-sentence report instead may be ineffective for doing so.”). Trial counsel then failed to object to the introduction of the victim-impact statement that was contained within the Report. In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the introduction of victim-impact evidence at the mitigation phase of a capital murder trial violates the Eighth Amendment. A few years later, though, the Court retreated somewhat by holding that “the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar” on the introduction of all such evidence. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (emphasis in original). But the Payne Court said that it only overturned the part of Booth disallowing evidence “relating to . . . .the impact of the victim’s death on the victim’s family,” and that it did not overrule the part of Booth that forbids “a victim family members’ characterization and opinions about . . . the appropriate sentence.” Id. at 830 n.2. Our Court recently aligned itself with many of our sister circuits in holding that victim-impact statements recommending an appropriate sentence are barred by the Eighth Amendment. See Fautenberry v. Mitchell, 515 F.3d 614, 638 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the trial court erred in admitting this evidence”); see also Welch v. Sirnans, 451 F.3d 675, 703 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that many circuits have found this portion of Booth’s holding “survived the holding in Payne and remains valid”). Thus, the introduction of any opinions of the victim’s family that suggest an appropriate sentence for the defendants is precluded by the Constitution. Van Hook’s attorneys did not object when the Report they requested caused the entry of the victim-impact statements into evidence during the mitigation hearing. (J.A. at 5561, 5567-68.) The statements included a plea to the sentencer from Mrs. Self, the victim’s mother, that Van Hook be given the death penalty. Mrs. Self said that she “fe[lt Van Hook] should receive the maximum possible punishment.” (J.A. at 5568.) She also stated that if the State did not execute Van Hook, “it just compounds the offense.” (J.A. at 5568.) Finally, she said that “the maximum punishment would prevent another family from suffering as a result of [Van Hook’s] actions.” (J.A. at 5568.) The victim-impact statement included in the Report therefore contained an opinion by family members about what they thought to be the appropriate sentence. Trial counsel invited a Report that contained a strong plea for the death penalty and did nothing to keep this recommendation out, even though the Eighth Amendment case law holds its admission unconstitutional. Additionally, the ABA Guidelines emphasize the importance of counsel’s objecting to potentially inadmissible evidence in a capital murder case. See ABA Guidelines ¶ 10.7 at § 7 (“One No. 03-4207 Van Hook v. Anderson Page 9 of the most fundamental duties of an attorney defending a capital case at trial is the preservation of any and all conceivable errors for each stage of appellate and post-conviction review.”). Because Van Hook’s counsel failed to object to the victim-impact evidence, and because his counsel in fact caused the victim-impact statement to go into evidence by requesting such a Report, his attorneys’ performance fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In sum, because Van Hook’s trial attorneys failed to fully investigate and present his family background as mitigating evidence, failed to obtain the sort of independent mental health expert needed to prepare an effective defense, and failed to object to proscribed, damaging evidence, their performance was constitutionally deficient under the first prong of Strickland.