Opinion ID: 1835766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Derek Ward

Text: In assignment of error number 48, the defendant argues that venireman Derek Ward was improperly excused for cause. Ward was excused because his testimony indicated that his attitude towards the mitigating circumstance of no significant prior criminal history would have prevented him from rendering an impartial verdict. See La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.5(a) (West 1997). Defendant asserts however, that Ward merely expressed a willingness to consider this mitigating circumstance in light of all other relevant factors in the case and that he could render an impartial verdict. The relevant testimony is the following: Q: If you didn't know that [Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma  5bomber] had a prior criminal history, you couldn't give him the death penalty for blowing up those people? Is that what you told the judge? A: Right. Q: ... But I guess it concerns me suppose you find out thatyou were on the jury and found out that Timothy McVeigh had no criminal record whatsoever, a clean record. You couldn't give him the death penalty? A: No. Q: Even though he killed two hundred people, your answer is still no? A: No. When questioned by the trial court on this issue, Ward stated the following: A: Well, the death penalty ... just because someone ... has been locked up or have stolen, that doesn't mean, you knowand then they murderthat doesn't mean they should get the death penalty, but if someone in they full right mind, you know doesn't have any kind ofhow can I put itany kind of Q: Mental? A: Yeah, mental problems that have threatened to kill someone and tried it's ... about killing people or they have done killed people, be locked up and got out ... peoples like that, you know, ... I'd ... consider them put, you know, the gas chamber.... Potential jurors in Louisiana are required by law to possess a willingness to consider certain enumerated mitigating circumstances. See La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.5 (West 1997). However, when a potential juror indicates during voir dire that he may afford too much weight to any one particular mitigating circumstance, such that his ability to return the death penalty would be substantially impaired, then that juror is properly excluded for cause. State v. Williams, 96-1023 (1/21/98), 708 So.2d 703, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 99, 142 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998) (two jurors properly dismissed for cause where age of the defendant would have impaired their ability to return the death penalty). From the above trial excerpts, we conclude that Ward's testimony indicated that his attitude regarding the mitigating circumstance no significant prior criminal history would have been the overriding factor in his determination of the appropriateness of the death penalty without regard to any other factor including the strength of the aggravating circumstances. Thus, Ward was not dismissed, as the defendant argues, simply because of an expressed willingness to consider, among other relevant considerations, a particular mitigating circumstance. To the contrary, Ward's testimony indicates that no significant prior criminal history would have been the overriding consideration for him in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. In granting the prosecution's challenge for cause, the trial judge noted that it was clear in [her] mind that for [Ward] unless a person has a demonstrated history of prior criminal activity involving other murders or attempts at murders or threats to murder, he could not fairly consider the death penalty as an option. A review of Ward's voir dire testimony leads us to the conclusion that the trial judge's ruling is supported by the record. We are not disposed to find that the trial court erred in determining that Ward was unable to accept the law as given him and that he could not be impartial regarding the potential for either penalty option. Thus, the trial judge did not err in granting the State's cause challenge. The assignment of error has no merit.