Opinion ID: 1293219
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Burden of Proving Involuntariness

Text: (5) Defendant correctly observes that the federal and California courts have consistently recognized that the admission at trial of improperly obtained statements which results in a fundamentally unfair trial violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial. ( Wilcox v. Ford (11th Cir.1987) 813 F.2d 1140, 1148; see also United States v. Chiavola (7th Cir.1984) 744 F.2d 1271, 1273-1274; United States ex rel. Cunningham v. DeRobertis (7th Cir.1983) 719 F.2d 892, 895-896; United States v. Fredericks (5th Cir.1978) 586 F.2d 470, 480; LaFrance v. Bohlinger (1st Cir.1974) 499 F.2d 29, 34-35; People v. Leach (1985) 41 Cal.3d 92, 102-104 [221 Cal. Rptr. 826, 710 P.2d 893]; People v. Varnum (1967) 66 Cal.2d 808 [59 Cal.Rptr 108, 427 P.2d 772].) (6) But unlike those situations in which a defendant challenges his own prior involuntary statements (see Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 489 [30 L.Ed.2d 618, 627, 92 S.Ct. 619] [the government must prove voluntariness of defendant's confession by preponderance of evidence]; Markham, supra, 49 Cal.3d 63, 71 [same]), when a defendant seeks to exclude the allegedly involuntary testimony of a witness or codefendant, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the admitted statements were involuntarily obtained ( Leach, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 102-104). As we observed in Leach, the heightened protections courts have traditionally afforded defendants in the self-incrimination context are designed to assure that an accused's coerced confessions will not be used against him, and to protect against evidence of guilt emanating from his own involuntary statements. (41 Cal.3d at p. 103.) [T]here is no such need for prophylactic rules directed at assuaging our fear of convicting the innocent  or even the guilty  by means of evidence obtained in violation of due process, when the victim of the violation is not the defendant. In such a case, we see no reason for departing from the ordinary rule that a party `claiming that a person is guilty of ... wrongdoing has the burden of proof on that issue.' (Evid. Code, § 520). ( Id. at p. 104.) (7a) Defendant fails to meet his burden here. Although he emphasizes the assertedly coerced Mexican confession and the subsequent informal interview between Hernandez and Rackacaus, this emphasis misperceives the limited nature of the exclusion recognized for coerced third party testimony. ( Leach, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 104.) Because the exclusion is based on the idea that coerced testimony is inherently unreliable, and that its admission therefore violates a defendant's right to a fair trial, this exclusion necessarily focuses only on whether the evidence actually admitted was coerced. Here, none of the statements made by Hernandez to the Mexican police was introduced at defendant's trial. Accordingly, defendant can prevail on his suppression claim only if he can show that the trial testimony given by Hernandez was involuntary at the time it was given. ( Ibid. )