Opinion ID: 3001485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Useni’s Trial Challenges

Text: Besides his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, Useni makes several objections to the manner in which the trial was conducted. First, Useni argues that he should have been granted a new trial because statements made by the prosecutor at closing improperly shifted the burden of proof. A district court’s decision not to grant a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Emerson, 501 F.3d 804, 812 (7th Cir. 2007). When Useni’s lawyer raised this issue at trial, he did not direct the trial court to any specific comment by the prosecutor. In his brief on appeal, Useni directs this court to a span of five pages of the trial transcript, although he still 28 Nos. 06-1978 & 06-2107 does not specify the exact comments that he finds prejudicial. After reviewing those pages of the trial transcript, we do not find anything improper. Some of the comments made by the prosecutor were about the defense’s failure to ask questions of government witnesses.12 In United States v. Kelly, 991 F.2d 1308, 1314 (7th Cir. 1993), we held that a prosecutor may comment on a defendant’s failure to call or ask particular questions of a witness so long as he does not tax the defendant’s right not to testify. Useni did not testify at trial. However, the prosecutor’s comments, like the comments by the government lawyer in Kelly, were confined to responding to specific arguments defense lawyers had made about the credibility of two of the government’s witnesses. Cf. id. at 1313-14. The comments did not come close to “invit[ing] the jury to infer guilt from the defendant’s decision not to testify,” and therefore did not tax Useni’s right not to testify. United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1391 (7th Cir. 1987). Useni’s challenge to those comments is without merit. Useni’s second objection suffers a similar fate. Useni argues that he was deprived of a fair trial by a statement Cozzo’s attorney made at closing about Cozzo’s decision to testify. Unlike Useni, Cozzo testified during trial, and Cozzo’s attorney sought to highlight that fact during closing. The statement by Cozzo’s attorney to which Useni objects is the following: “Now, a defendant 12 For example, Useni’s lawyer at closing had suggested that Carole Johnson, Useni’s ex-girlfriend, was biased against him because they had broken up. In response, the prosecutor pointed out that Johnson had never been asked about her current feelings for Useni while she was on the stand. Nos. 06-1978 & 06-2107 29 has a right not to testify. If Phil [Cozzo] didn’t testify, you couldn’t hold it against him. But he took the stand. He opened himself up to any of their questions and any of their rebuttal witnesses.” There is nothing improper about that statement. See United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1983). In Petullo, we held that a similar statement by counsel, asking the jury only to draw favorable inferences from his client’s willingness to testify, was not unfairly prejudicial to a nontestifying codefendant because the statement was limited and counsel concurrently stressed the right not to testify. Id. Petullo controls here, and Useni is not entitled to a new trial because of the comments by Cozzo’s lawyer. Next, Useni argues that the district court improperly prevented his counsel from impeaching Mariani, a highranking IAWV member and the organizer of Bingo Partners, by omission13 when the court excluded the testimony of Agent Michael Cole of the FBI and Agent Mark Lischka of the IRS. The district court’s evidentiary decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Cunningham, 462 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, “when reviewing evidentiary errors, we will only reverse and order a new trial provided that the improper 13 “The theory of impeachment by omission is that ‘if [a] former statement fails to mention a material circumstance presently testified to, which it would have been natural to mention in the prior statement, [then] the prior statement is [considered] sufficiently inconsistent’ to be admitted to impeach the present testimony.” Moylan v. Meadow Club, Inc., 979 F.2d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting 1 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 34 at 114-15 (4th ed. 1992)) (first alteration in original). 30 Nos. 06-1978 & 06-2107 admission was not harmless, which is to say ‘only if the error had a substantial influence over the jury, and the result reached was inconsistent with substantial justice.’ ” United States v. Owens, 424 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 330 F.3d 964, 969 (7th Cir. 2003)). Mariani testified that Useni at first demanded Bingo Partners pay cash for the Grand Palace. On cross-examination, Useni’s lawyer asked Mariani if he told Agent Cole of the FBI about the cash demand at their June 9, 2003, proffer meeting, to which Mariani responded, “I probably was never asked.” Useni’s lawyer also asked Mariani if he told Agent Lischka about the cash demand at their March 10, 2004, proffer meeting. This time Mariani responded, “I would have to say ‘yes.’ ” After the conclusion of the government’s case, Useni’s lawyer made an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury and elicited testimony from Cole and Lischka in an attempt to impeach Mariani by omission. Cole testified, consistent with Mariani, that Mariani did not mention the cash demand when they discussed the purchase of the Grand Palace at their June 9, 2003, meeting. Lischka, on the other hand, contradicted Mariani’s testimony and testified that the subject of the cash demand did not come up at their March 20, 2004, meeting. The district court excluded the testimony of both agents; Useni challenges that decision. The district court acted well within its discretion when it excluded Cole’s proffered testimony. That testimony just reiterated what Mariani had already implicitly admitted—that he did not mention the cash demand at his June 9, 2003, meeting with Cole. It did not aid in establishing the point, crucial for impeachment by omission, that the cash demand ought to have come up at that Nos. 06-1978 & 06-2107 31 meeting and therefore its omission was suspect. In fact, Cole’s testimony suggested just the opposite: that it would not have been natural for the cash demand to have come up during the proffer meeting.14 Thus, while Useni was free to argue to the jury that the cash demand was the type of information that should naturally have come up during the proffer meeting with Cole, and thereby impeach Mariani by omission, Cole’s testimony was not helpful for establishing impeachment by omission and the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it. The exclusion of Lischka’s testimony is more problematic. Mariani’s testimony that he told Lischka of the cash demand was directly contradicted by Lischka himself, who said that the cash demand was not mentioned. The government argues that Lischka’s testimony was not 14 As to why he did not ask Mariani about the form of payment for the Grand Palace, Cole testified: We had the contracts and everything and we saw that they were paid by check. I didn’t—I guess at the time none of us really thought to ask him. You know, if you are drawing up a legal contract it is probably going to be fairly difficult to be paid in cash and not have that. The district judge appeared to reach the same conclusion: Now, I don’t want to leap to anybody’s defense here, but if Useni is, in fact, paid by check, there is a contract which looks like it is payment by check, why would somebody ask the question—why would it necessarily be, or even likely to be the question asked[?] . . . Why would anybody say—did he ask for another form of payment[?] Somebody might ask that question, but why is it so incredible that no one would? 32 Nos. 06-1978 & 06-2107 necessary because the district court perfected Mariani’s impeachment by permitting Useni’s lawyer to argue at closing, without contradiction from the government, that Mariani did not tell Lischka about the cash demand. But Lischka’s impeaching evidence was not before the jury, and—as the court instructed the jury—lawyer’s arguments are not evidence. Mariani’s testimony that he thought he did tell Lischka thus stood unrebutted on the record. Nevertheless, any error that occurred from the exclusion of Lischka’s testimony was harmless. That Useni wanted to be paid in cash for the bingo hall, though relevant to show Useni’s guilty intent, was hardly the centerpiece of the government’s evidence on that point. As was outlined in the discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence on the racketeering conspiracy count, the government had overwhelming evidence to prove Useni’s guilty intent without the evidence of the cash demand even being considered. Besides his challenge to the exclusion of Lischka’s and Cole’s testimony, Useni also challenges the admission of certain testimony from several other witnesses. Those challenges do not merit extended discussion. Rather, it suffices to say that those objections relate to arguments we have already rejected, such as Useni’s contention that he did not participate in either the racketeering or tax-fraud conspiracies, or his contention that he had no part in the illegal scheme after Bingo Partners bought the Grand Palace.15 Because the evidence supported the 15 Useni also argues that evidence as to whether a particular witness was a veteran was not relevant and should not have been elicited by the government’s attorney. But that evidence (continued...) Nos. 06-1978 & 06-2107 33 contrary of what Useni is contending, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence to which Useni now objects. Moving on, Useni argues that the district court erred by failing to give his proffered theory of defense instruction.16 15 (...continued) was very relevant, considering that the jury had to know who was or was not a veteran in order to determine if the Illinois gambling laws were being violated. Consequently, we see no error in the district court having admitted such testimony. 16 Useni proposed the following instruction: It is defendant Frank Useni’s theory of defense that he began working at the Grand Palace Bingo Hall in May 1994 as the kitchen manger [sic] and the janitor in effect, which were his main and almost exclusive duties continually during the entire time he was there; that he was later offered the opportunity to buy the Hall which appeared to offer a purchaser the opportunity to earn additional money by selling bingo supplies, which were then being sold to the veterans at the Grand Palace and by keeping the profits generated by the kitchen; That, while present at the Grand Palace Bingo Hall, he never knowingly directly or indirectly joined any conspiracy, scheme to defraud or criminal enterprise to commit any illegal acts of any kind; In that regard, at no time was he aware that volunteering to help veterans in any way with the Bingo or related games on occasion violated any federal or state laws or that the mere existence of any of these games at the Hall violated any such laws; (continued...) 34 Nos. 06-1978 & 06-2107 We review de novo a district court’s refusal to give a theory of defense instruction.17 United States v. Eberhart, 467 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 2006). A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction as to his or her particular theory of defense provided: (1) the instruction represents an accurate statement of the law; (2) the instruction reflects a theory that is supported by the evidence; (3) the instruction reflects a theory which is not already part of the charge; and (4) the failure to include the instruction would deny the appellant a fair trial. United States v. Prude, 489 F.3d 873, 882 (7th Cir. 2007). The district court refused to give the proffered instruction “as drafted” because it believed that the instruction was “basically the defendant testifying without being subject 16 (...continued) Further, that, he neither was involved in nor aware of the preparation and/or filing of any of the Bingo Applications and/or Tax returns and Pull-tab Returns that were filed on behalf of the Grand Palace, Inc. were materially false. Finally, that the only payments he received from his employment with the Grand Palace Bingo Hall—his wages and his payments for the sale of the Hall—were lawful under state, and thus, federal law, and that he never knowingly participated in any scheme, conspiracy or criminal enterprise to receive or allow others to receive any unlawful monies. 17 Although the government argues that this issue should be reviewed for plain error due to Useni’s failure to object, we find that Useni did properly preserve the issue for the same reasons given in United States v. James, 464 F.3d 699, 707 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006). Nos. 06-1978 & 06-2107 35 to cross-examination.” In addition, the district court believed that the proffered instruction was more akin to argument than to a presentation of the defense’s theory. We find no error in the exclusion of Useni’s proffered instruction. The proffered instruction was not a typical theory of defense instruction. Cf. United States v. Paters, 16 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Josleyn, 99 F.3d 1182, 1194 (1st Cir. 1996). The district court was correct when it observed that a good portion of Useni’s proposed instruction was better suited for closing argument than a theory of defense instruction. Argument is not the purpose of a theory of defense instruction, see United States v. Scott, 19 F.3d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 1994), yet Useni’s proposed instruction contained a string of arguments, couched as factual statements about Useni’s state of mind. The statements were argumentative because they were more about the evidence the government had failed to produce than what evidence was actually before the jury. Furthermore, one of those statements—that Useni was not aware that helping run the games violated state law—was completely unsupported by the evidence. To the extent that Useni’s proposed instruction did convey his theory of defense, that theory was already adequately covered in the charge to the jury. United States v. Irorere, 228 F.3d 816, 826 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[A] defendant is only entitled to such an instruction when his theory of defense is not already adequately captured by the proffered instructions.”). Useni’s theory at trial was that he was just a grunt worker at the Grand Palace, a janitor and kitchen manager who had no idea what was really going on there. The instructions read to the jury emphasized in several places that the jury had to find that Useni knew about the illegal activity occurring at the 36 Nos. 06-1978 & 06-2107 Grand Palace and willingly participated in it before the jury could convict him. The jury was instructed that Useni had to “knowingly” join the racketeering conspiracy, as well as “knowingly” participate in the scheme to defraud. The jury was also instructed that “knowingly” meant “the defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake or accident.” The jury was further instructed that “the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of the common purpose and was a willing participant in the charged conspiracy.” Finally, the jury was instructed that [a] defendant’s presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed [are] not alone sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt. A defendant’s association with conspirators or persons involved in a criminal enterprise or a scheme to defraud is not by itself sufficient to prove his participation or membership in a conspiracy, scheme to defraud and/or a criminal enterprise. If a defendant performed acts that advanced a criminal activity, but had no knowledge that a crime was being committed or was about to be committed, those acts alone are not sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt. Those instructions, along with the closing argument of Useni’s counsel, clearly conveyed Useni’s theory of defense to the jury. Cf. United States v. Hendricks, 319 F.3d 993, 1006 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that the charge given, which included an instruction that the jury had to find that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed Nos. 06-1978 & 06-2107 37 the firearm in order to convict, coupled with the defendant’s ability to argue his theory in front of the jury, fully presented the defense’s theory in a prosecution for illegal possession of a firearm). Consequently, Useni was not deprived of a fair trial by the exclusion of his theory of defense instruction. Finally, Useni asserts that the cumulative effect of all the errors he alleges occurred at trial amounts to reversible error. Although an error by itself may be harmless and insufficient to taint a jury, the combined effect of multiple erroneous rulings may result in significant harm necessitating another trial. United States v. Smith, 502 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 2007). However, in this case we have discerned, at most, one trial error—and that error was harmless. See Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2000). Useni’s cumulative effect argument therefore fails.