Opinion ID: 1088837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Revisiting Alfa v. Jackson

Text: The circumstances presented here are much different than those of a case in which the plaintiff's claims against both the principal (on a respondeat superior theory) and the agent (on the underlying tortious conduct) actually are submitted to a jury and a jury then returns a verdict against the principal, but is silent as to the agent, thereby implicitly finding the agent not liable. Under such circumstances, there truly is an inconsistent verdict on the merits, that is, on the facts of what the agent did or did not do. That is not the case here. The jury in this case was not asked to consider any claims against the agents. Likewise, the jury was not asked to consider any claims against the agent in Alfa v. Jackson , a decision upon which the main opinion relies, and a decision that I believe this Court should reconsider. The Jackson Court based its decision on a Court of Civil Appeals' decision, Barlow v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 708 So.2d 168 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). That Court of Civil Appeals' opinion was, in turn, based upon this Court's earlier decision in Larry Terry Contractors, Inc. v. Bogle, 404 So.2d 613 (Ala.1981). In Bogle, the plaintiff sued both the principal and its agent. The case was tried and submitted to the jury as to both of those defendants: Plaintiff Bogle brought suit against [among others, an employee of Larry Terry Contractors, Inc.]. A later amendment added defendant Larry Terry Contractors, Inc. The jury verdict was for plaintiff against defendant Larry Terry Contractors, Inc., but the jury did not return a verdict against the other defendants. Larry Terry Contractors, Inc. appealed. 404 So.2d at 613. Under those circumstances, this Court in Bogle correctly applied the following rule: `[W]hen the principal and his agent are sued in [a] joint action in tort for misfeasance or malfeasance of the servant, and his liability for the conduct of said servant is under the rule of respondeat superior, a verdict in favor of the servant entitles the master to have the verdict against him set aside.' Bogle, 404 So.2d at 614 (quoting Maddox, 236 Ala. at 600, 183 So. at 853 (emphasis added)). [2] The Court in Bogle correctly considered the circumstances presented in that case as involving a verdict by the jury that, by its silence as to the agent, exonerated the agent  that is, a verdict that was tantamount to an affirmative finding that the agent did not commit the underlying tortious acts. Under that circumstance, the verdict against the principal logically must be called into question because it is inconsistent with the jury verdict in favor of the agent. As the Bogle Court held: The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the verdict can stand against defendant-employer, Larry Terry Contractors, Inc., when defendant-employee, Larry Bolden, was exonerated from personal liability. Appellant contends that the verdict is inconsistent under Alabama law, and after a careful review of the record, we agree. Bogle, 404 So.2d at 614 (emphasis added). In both Jackson and the present case, however, the plaintiff's claims against the agents were not pursued at trial and were never presented to the jury. Thus, the resulting silence of the verdicts as to the claims against the agents cannot provide the basis for concluding that the jury impliedly rendered verdicts in favor of the agents. It is true that, because the plaintiff in each case named an agent as a defendant in the complaint, but never obtained a formal dismissal of such claims, the resulting judgment is properly considered to be with prejudice against the plaintiff so that the plaintiff can never sue the agent on the same cause. Such a judgment, however, albeit with prejudice as between the plaintiff and the agent, is not the same as a verdict in favor of the servant on the factual merits, as was contemplated in Bogle and Maddox. I also believe the Court's opinion in Jackson was misdirected in its use of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion in Calhoun v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 676 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Ala.Civ.App.1996). The Jackson decision quotes Calhoun for the proposition that `a dismissal of an action with prejudice constitutes an adjudication on the merits and bars any subsequent litigation.' 906 So.2d at 154. This statement, of course, is true as to the party against whom the action was brought; that party clearly may assert the dismissal as a prejudicial bar. Calhoun does not hold, however, that a third party has standing to benefit from that dismissal. The Jackson opinion wrongly conflates the above-quoted statement from Calhoun with the above-quoted rule from Bogle to reach its holding that a principal may take advantage of a plaintiff's voluntary decision not to pursue his claims against an agent and thereby shield itself from an otherwise proper jury verdict. As Chief Justice Cobb states in her dissenting opinion, [t]he fact that the agents in this action are properly protected from litigation does not require the invalidation of the jury's verdict against H&S. 978 So.2d at 696. Chief Justice Cobb goes on to point out two separate and distinct facts: (1) that the jury in this case determined that H&S was liable as a result of its agents' misconduct, and (2) that the agents in this case are entitled to a judgment because the plaintiff chose not to pursue his claims against them. 978 So.2d at 696. These are indeed two separate facts; the latter does not change the former.