Opinion ID: 1809395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 32

Heading: Jury consideration of aggravating circumstances.

Text: ¶ 78. Havard's entire argument on this issue is restated, verbatim, as follows: 277. The trial jury based Mr. Havard's death sentence of [sic] two factors, namely: (a) That the capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, sexual battery; and (b) The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. 278. This finding was erroneous in two ways. First, these two particular aggravating circumstances cannot be submitted where sexual battery was an element of the offense. R. 26, 31. 279. The trial court recognized that [the] especially heinous aggravator fully encompassed the sexual battery aggravator. Where one aggravator fully subsumes another, they cannot both be submitted to the jury. Jones v. U.S., 527 U.S. 373[, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370] (1999) at 399. In weighing states, such as Mississippi, this error demands that the death sentence be vacated. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 2002[222][, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367] (1992). Accordingly, Mr. Havard is entitled to relief on this ground. ¶ 79. On direct appeal, this Court found Havard's identical issue to be barred because no contemporaneous objection was raised at trial, and Havard did not support his claim with authority. Despite the procedural bars, the Court engaged in a full discussion on the merits of Havard's claim, and found none. This Court found the Tenth Circuit to be helpful due to its abundance of case law surrounding this issue. Havard, 928 So.2d at 802. Under our cases, one aggravating circumstance is improperly duplicative of another only if the first aggravator `necessarily subsumes' the other. Patton v. Mullin, 425 F.3d 788, 809 (10th Cir. 2005). The fact that two aggravating circumstances rely on some of the same evidence does not render them duplicative. Id. The concern is that the aggravators are not duplicative. Id. When they are not duplicative, the Tenth Circuit allows use of the same evidence to support different aggravators. Id. The test for determining when aggravating factors impermissibly overlap and are duplicative is whether one aggravating factor necessarily subsumes the other, not whether certain evidence is relevant to both aggravators. Fields v. Gibson, 277 F.3d 1203, 1218-19 (10th Cir.2002). Id. ¶ 80. Specifically noteworthy is this Court's holding on direct appeal that: [o]f the two aggravators on which Havard focuses, one does not necessarily subsume the other. The jury could have found from the evidence presented at trial that Havard was engaged in the commission of sexual battery while committing the acts on Chloe which led to her death. Additionally, the jury could have found this crime to meet the [heinous, atrocious, or cruel] standard because of factors other than the sexual battery, such as the relationship between Havard and Chloe's mother or Chloe's age. Havard, 928 So.2d at 802-03 (emphasis added). Additionally, in Loden v. State, 971 So.2d 548, 570 (Miss.2007), this Court held that [t]he fact that aggravating circumstances share relevant evidence does not make them duplicative. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 399-400, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999). ¶ 81. It is also worth noting that in Jones, on which Havard now relies for his argument before this Court, the United States Supreme Court stated: We have never before held that aggravating factors could be duplicative so as to render them constitutionally invalid, nor have we passed on the double counting theory that the Tenth Circuit advanced in [ U.S. v.] McCullah[, 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir.1996)] and the Fifth Circuit appears to have followed here. What we have said is that the weighing process may be impermissibly skewed if the sentencing jury considers an invalid factor. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 398, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). ¶ 82. Because Havard does not present a novel claim or a sudden reversal of relevant law, this issue is barred by res judicata. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (Rev. 2007); see also Lockett, 614 So.2d at 897.