Opinion ID: 2636786
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying the appellant's motion for a new trial?

Text: [¶ 6] Our standard for the review of the denial of a motion for a new trial is as follows: The question of whether to grant or deny a new trial motion is a matter for the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed without a showing of abuse of that discretion. Baumgartner v. State, 7 P.3d 912, 915 (Wyo.2000). A trial court abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as it did. Id. In this context, reasonably means `sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.' Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo.1986)). Robinson v. State, 2003 WY 32, ¶ 18, 64 P.3d 743, 748 (2003); see also Hicks v. State, 2008 WY 83, ¶ 30, 187 P.3d 877, 883 (2008). Where the motion is based upon alleged newly discovered evidence, the interest of justice requires that the appellant prove the following: 1. He did not become aware of the new evidence until after the trial. 2. It was not because of lack of due diligence that the new evidence did not come to light sooner. 3. The evidence is so material that it would probably produce a different result. 4. The evidence is not cumulative. Robinson, 2003 WY 32, ¶ 20, 64 P.3d at 748-49. [¶ 7] In denying the motion, the district court concluded both that the appellant had not proven the exercise of due diligence, and that the evidence was not so material that it would have had any effect on the trial. We agree as to both conclusions. The record is clear that both the appellant and his attorney were aware of Mr. Agner before trial, and that the appellant specifically knew of Agner's creation of the instruments, both in 2003 and, allegedly, in 2000. The appellant testified at the motion hearing that his attorney did not subpoena Agner to testify at trial, either because the State had already done so, or because Agner was out-of-state and could not be subpoenaed. He did not testify that they did not subpoena Agner because they did not know that he could or should be a witness. They failed to exercise due diligence. [¶ 8] Perhaps more importantly, we also agree with the district court on the more substantive issue of whether the evidence was so material that it likely would have changed the result of the trial. The district court thought not. The gist of Agner's testimony was that, sometime in 2003 when the appellant's bankruptcy had not yet been filed but was being considered, the appellant contacted Agner and asked him for the assignments. Agner testified that, when he could not find the assignments, he simply created new ones and gave them to the appellant for signature. Agner claimed to know nothing about the signature, notarization, or backdating of the assignments, other than that they were blank when he gave them to the appellant, and that the appellant returned them to him to give to a secretary for notarization. [¶ 9] There are several reasons that Agner's testimony is not likely to have affected the outcome of the trial. First, Agner's memory was sketchy, at best, and selective, at worst. Second, his testimony certainly did not exonerate the appellant; instead, it corroborated the State's theory that, just prior to declaring bankruptcy, the appellant went to extraordinary lengths to get the overriding royalty interests out of his name and into his daughter's. Third, Agner's shaky and self-serving testimony directly contradicted the precise testimony of the notary public, given initially against her penal interest, that the appellant brought the assignments to her and asked her to backdate them. [1] And finally, the State produced considerable evidence to corroborate the notary public's version of what had happened, while Agner's testimony was riddled with I don't know and I don't remember answers. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the new trial motion.