Opinion ID: 624033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellants contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their conspiracy, mail fraud, and wire fraud convictions. Specifically, Louper-Morris states that the United States failed to prove that she harmed or intended to harm anyone, that she made material false representations or promises, and that she intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud. Morris only contends that the United States failed to prove his intent to defraud. We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. United States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir.2010). The evidence is viewed most favorably to the verdict, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Id. Reversal is appropriate only where no reasonable jury could find all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We do not weigh the credibility of the witnesses or the evidence. Id. The jury has the sole responsibility to resolve conflicts or contradictions in testimony, and credibility determinations are resolved in favor of the verdict. Id. (quoting United States v. Honarvar, 477 F.3d 999, 1000 (8th Cir. 2007)). To prove conspiracy to commit wire fraud, the United States must show that 1) there was a conspiracy, an agreement to commit wire fraud; 2) Louper-Morris and Morris knew of the agreement; and 3) they intentionally joined in the conspiracy. Johnson, 450 F.3d at 374. The elements of conspiracy may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, and the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented about what the defendant's state of mind was when he did or said the things presented in the evidence. United States v. Rodriguez-Ramos, 663 F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Cervantes, 646 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir.2011)). To establish mail fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the United States must prove: (1) a scheme to defraud by means of material false representations or promises, (2) intent to defraud, (3) reasonable foreseeability that the mail would be used, and (4) [that] the mail was used in furtherance of some essential step in the scheme. United States v. Bryant, 606 F.3d 912, 917 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Parker, 364 F.3d 934, 943 (8th Cir.2004)). [T]o constitute mail fraud, a defendant's misrepresentations must be material. Id. at 917-18. A misrepresentation is material if it is capable of influencing the intended victim. Id. at 918; see also Preston v. United States, 312 F.3d 959, 961 (8th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (a material fact is a fact that would be important to a reasonable person in deciding whether to engage or not to engage in a particular transaction). The elements of wire fraud are virtually identical to mail fraud. To establish wire fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the United States needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) Appellants joined a scheme to defraud; 2) they intended to defraud; 3) it was reasonably foreseeable that interstate wire communications would be used; and 4) the wires were, in fact, used. Johnson, 450 F.3d at 374. Intent is an essential element of both wire fraud and mail fraud. United States v. Flynn, 196 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir.1999) (wire fraud); Bryant, 606 F.3d at 917 (mail fraud). Fraudulent intent need not be proved directly and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding a defendant's actions. Flynn, 196 F.3d at 929. Accordingly, the question before us is whether the facts and circumstances of this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, are sufficient to establish intent to defraud. ... Id. (quoting United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 527 (8th Cir.1986)). Contrary to Louper-Morris's assertions, the United States is not required to show actual loss or harm to the victims of the fraud in order to prove wire fraud or mail fraud. United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir.2008). Rather, [t]he government merely needs to show that the accused intended to defraud his victim and that his or her communications were reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The record is replete with evidence of Appellants' intent to defraud the State of Minnesota, K-Mart, and CyberStudy customers through material misrepresentations. Appellants intended to deceive the Department of Revenue about the existence of a pool loan. Denita Hollie and Benita Williams testified that Appellants were intentionally obtuse in their representations of the loan and led the Department of Revenue to believe that Rev. McAfee through Salem, Inc., had loaned over four million dollars to CyberStudy customers. In truth, Rev. McAfee had only loaned CyberStudy less than $3000, and the pool loan did not exist. Appellants also forged signatures on power-of-attorney forms and directed Denita, Benita, and Jennifer Davis to do the same. Those forged forms were filed with customer's state tax returns thereby defrauding the Department of Revenue. Appellants intended to deceive K-Mart. Lyman Locket testified that K-Mart entered into a contract with CyberStudy in which K-Mart would provide computers to CyberStudy customers at a reduced rate. Louper-Morris told Locket that CyberStudy had over 100,000 customers and that two other computer companies were currently providing computers to CyberStudy and deferring payment until the tax credit reimbursement was released from the State in the following tax year. Locket stated that K-Mart provided the computers believing that CyberStudy would provide a comprehensive educational tutorial to low-income individuals, which would further K-Mart's diversity initiative. Numerous individuals testified, however, that the tutorial lacked the advertised educational content. K-Mart also expected payment on the computers once CyberStudy began receiving tax credit reimbursements. After Minnesota began depositing money in CyberStudy's bank account, Appellants never routed any of the funds to K-Mart. Locket's testimony is sufficient to show that Appellants intended to defraud K-Mart. Perhaps Appellants' most egregious behavior in their fraudulent scheme was their joint intention to deceive CyberStudy customers, low-income individuals, many who did not speak English. Numerous CyberStudy customers testified that Appellants promised them a free computer. In fact, the computers were not free and required customers to sign a service contract with CyberStudy and to assign their tax credit refund to CyberStudy. CyberStudy customers testified that they were promised a comprehensive educational tutorial with material in four languages. That content never existed. Denita and Benita testified that Appellants had them prepare CyberStudy customers' tax returns for mailing on December 31, 2000 even though the CyberStudy contract stated that tax returns would not be filed until April 15, 2001. When Appellants did not receive the full tax credit amount, Appellants in many cases threatened legal action against the customers, including immigration enforcement. Despite Appellants' repeated assertion that they were just trying to break the digital divide and educate low-income individuals, the trial testimony shows that Appellants intended to defraud others. The United States proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellants made material misrepresentations and intended to defraud the state of Minnesota, K-Mart, and CyberStudy customers. We conclude that evidence was sufficient to support Appellants' conspiracy, mail fraud, and wire fraud convictions.