Opinion ID: 802001
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Express and Implied Contracts

Text: -7- “Contracts are often spoken of as express or implied.” Hyland v. Dewey, 73 P.2d 1038, 1039 (Kan. 1937) (quotations omitted). “Contracts implied in fact are inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case and are not formally or explicitly stated in words.” Atchison Cnty. Farmers Union Co-op Ass’n v. Turnbull, 736 P.2d 917, 922 (Kan. 1987). In the employment context, “[t]he implied contract theory recognizes an implied obligation on the employer to not terminate an employee arbitrarily where a policy or program of the employer, either express or implied, restricts the employer’s right of termination at will.” Allsup v. Mount Carmel Med. Ctr., 922 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (quotations omitted).5 Where an express employment contract exists, however, Kansas courts have declined to consider implied terms outside the written contract. For example, in Dickens v. Snodgrass, Dunlap & Co., 872 P.2d 252 (Kan. 1994), the plaintiff argued that “her continued employment with pay increases establishe[d] satisfactory performance and created an implied contract of continuing employment over and above the written contract.” Id. at 260 (emphasis added). In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court of Kansas explained that the plaintiff’s implied-contract theory relied on cases that did not “involve[] written contracts of employment establishing the employee’s status.” Id. The court noted that, “[i]n the absence of written contracts, it was necessary [in those cases] 5 In Allsup, the plaintiff sued his former employer for wrongful termination. 922 P.2d at 1098. The Allsup court made no mention of a written employment contract, and the parties assumed for purposes of summary judgment and appeal that the employer’s discipline policies gave rise to an implied contract of employment. Id. -8- to look at all the facts to determine whether there was an implied contract of continuing employment at the time of the commencement of the employment.” Id. Before and after Dickens, Kansas courts have repeatedly noted the distinction between express contracts and implied contracts. See, e.g., Stover v. Superior Indus. Int’l, Inc., 29 P.3d 967, 971 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that Dickens did not foreclose a plaintiff’s implied-contract theory because “[i]n this case, there is no written employment contract to modify, and Dickens is not on point”); Kastner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 894 P.2d 909, 915 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (“In this case, Kastner acknowledges that no express contract existed between the parties. Instead, he maintains that an implied-in-fact contract of employment was created . . . .”); see also Duvanel v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 227 P.2d 88, 92 (Kan. 1951) (“An express agreement or covenant excludes the possibility of an implied one of a different or contradictory nature.”).6 6 Although express and implied contracts are conceptually distinct, Kansas courts have recognized that an implied contract may modify an express contract if the parties have demonstrated “mutual assent, or a meeting of the minds with respect to the proposed amendment.” Dickens, 872 P.2d at 259 (quotations omitted). However, “[a]n implied contract which modifies a written contract also requires fresh and independent consideration.” Id. (quotations omitted). Mr. Ribeau argues that his and Mr. Katt’s deposition testimony demonstrate that both men believed classified employees were entitled to a pre-termination hearing before the Board. This testimony is insufficient, however, to establish that an implied contract modified Mr. Ribeau’s express employment contract. Mr. Ribeau has not provided evidence of “fresh and independent consideration” establishing an implied contractual provision for a pre-termination hearing. -9- Because Mr. Ribeau had an express employment contract, we conclude that Kansas courts would not recognize his implied-contract theory.