Opinion ID: 676060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: consent decree modification law

Text: 79 The Supreme Court has articulated a two-pronged approach to determining when, and to what extent, an institutional-reform consent decree that arguably relates to the vindication of a constitutional right should be modified. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, --- U.S. ----, ---- n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 748, 760 n. 7, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). The first prong requires the party seeking modification to establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 765. If the moving party satisfies this requirement, then the second prong requires the court to make modifications that are suitably tailored to address the new factual or legal environment. Id. We now elaborate on this dual inquiry. 80
81 Rufo normally permits modification of a consent decree only to accommodate new factual or legal circumstances. The sorts of factual changes that may qualify include unanticipated developments that render continuation of the decree inequitable, Jacksonville Branch, NAACP v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 978 F.2d 1574, 1582 (11th Cir.1992), or that, for reasons unrelated to past discrimination or to the fault of the parties, make it extremely difficult or impossible to satisfy obligations that, while imposed by the decree, are not part of its fundamental purpose, United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1509 (11th Cir.1993). However, a district court should not modify long-standing goals in consent decrees merely because the goals have not been achieved. Id. at 1509. 82 Rufo similarly provides for flexibility in the face of changing legal standards, but does not mandate modifications in response to every legal development. For example, a court need not necessarily rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor just because that floor drops after entry of the decree. Rufo, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 764. On the other hand, a rising constitutional floor--or, as in this case, a falling constitutional ceiling--may make modifications necessary. Above all, [a] consent decree must ... be modified if ... one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties has become impermissible under federal law, id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 762, and that is the aspect of Rufo with which we grapple in the present case. 83
84 Once a court has determined that some modification is warranted because of a significant change in law or fact, the second prong of the Rufo analysis comes into play. This prong requires the court to determine the appropriate scope of the changes, accepting only proposals that are suitably tailored to address significant factual developments or conflicts between new legal standards and the requirements of the decree. Rufo, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 765. This determination requires a flexible exercise of that court's equitable power, City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1509, but the district court's discretion is not unlimited. The court may not modify a decree in a way that would violate the basic purpose of the decree, and must under no circumstances create or perpetuate a constitutional violation. Rufo, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 762-63. 85 We now turn to the question of whether the district court properly exercised its equitable discretion when it rejected some of the appellants' proposed modifications. This inquiry will require us to decide whether the court modified the consent decrees' race- and gender-based remedies sufficiently to make them permissible under current constitutional standards. Because racial and gender classifications attract different levels of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, we analyze separately the decrees' race- and gender-conscious provisions. 86