Opinion ID: 1881795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Specific Acts Versus Reputation

Text: Having noted the difference between circumstantial use of character and character in issue, we must next determine the significance of the distinction. MRE 405 provides: Methods of Proving Character (a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into reports of relevant specific instances of conduct. (b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct. As a general rule, the character of the victim may not be shown by specific instances of conduct unless those instances are independently admissible to show some matter apart from character as circumstantial evidence of the conduct of the victim on a particular occasion. [W]hen character is not an essential element, it may be shown only by reputation or opinion evidence.... Hence, construed literally, Rule 405 does not permit a defendant to use specific instances to show that the victim was the aggressor since the aggressive character of the victim is not an essential element of the defense of self-defense since the aggressive character of the victim is introduced as circumstantial evidence to show that the victim committed the first or primary act of aggression against the defendant, which is to say that the defense of self-defense in this situation makes an act of the victim, rather than a trait of the victim's character, the material issue. [1A Wigmore, Evidence (Tillers rev.), § 63.1, p. 1382-1383, n. 1.] On the other hand, rule 405 allows specific instances of violence to be admitted only when character or a trait of character is made an essential element of a claim, charge, or defense. Id. See People v. Farrell, 137 Mich. 127, 100 N.W. 264 (1904); People v. Cooper, 73 Mich.App. 660, 252 N.W.2d 564 (1977) (indicating that specific acts may not be shown to establish that the victim was the aggressor; specific acts, however, may be shown to establish reasonable apprehension of harm).