Opinion ID: 4553083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: This Change Will Apply Prospectively.

Text: ¶14 Next, we consider whether the rule announced here should be applied retroactively. Arizona courts follow federal retroactivity jurisprudence. State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 389 ¶ 6 (2003). Specifically, we look to the analytical frameworks established in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) and Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986). Id. We resolve the retroactivity of new rules when they are announced. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. ¶15 Teague instructs that new procedural constitutional rules do not apply retroactively to cases that were already final when the rule was announced. Towery, 204 Ariz. at 389 ¶ 7 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 310). Thus, the Teague framework involves a three-part analysis. First, we consider if a defendant’s conviction is final. Id. Then, we examine if the rule at issue is a new rule and if that rule is substantive or procedural. Id. A rule is “new” when it is not dictated by existing precedent, such as when a court expressly overturns its own precedent. See id. at 390 ¶ 9. Substantive rules define or clarify criminal conduct under a statute whereas procedural rules govern the processes used to ensure criminal proceedings are fair. See id. ¶ 10. 2 The tension between the cap requirement and a victim’s right to restitution increased after the enactment of the VBR and its implementing legislation in the 1990s. 5 ¶16 To begin, we must determine if the defendants’ convictions are final. “A defendant’s case becomes final when ‘a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.’” Id. at 389–90 ¶ 8 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987)). Here, after accepting each of the defendants’ guilty pleas, the court entered a judgment of conviction. The defendants waived their right to file an appeal by pleading guilty and the time for filing an “of-right” initial petition for postconviction relief has expired. See State v. Ward, 211 Ariz. 158, 162 ¶¶ 9–11 (App. 2005); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.1(e). Additionally, no defendant sought review from the Supreme Court, and the time for doing so has expired. The defendants’ convictions are final. ¶17 By directly overruling Lukens, Phillips, and Crowder, we announce a new rule. Because the rule here relates to the procedures necessary for a defendant to waive his constitutional rights when pleading guilty, as codified in Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 17.2, it is undoubtedly procedural. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 730 (2016) (explaining procedural rules serve to enhance the accuracy of a conviction or sentence). ¶18 The directive that new procedural constitutional rules do not retroactively apply to cases that were already final when the new rule was announced is subject to two narrow exceptions. Towery, 204 Ariz. at 391 ¶ 14 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 311). The first exception applies a rule that forbids criminalizing “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct” retroactively. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 307). The second exception applies to “watershed rule[s] of criminal procedure” that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). This exception is only for an extremely narrow set of rules that are “central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 313. ¶19 Neither exception allowing retroactive application applies here. Removing the Lukens/Phillips/Crowder restitution cap requirement does not implicate whether private conduct may be criminalized. Nor is the rule announced here a watershed rule that “alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Towery, 204 Ariz. at 391 ¶ 17 (quoting Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665 (2001)). Although a defendant’s plea must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, ending the cap requirement does not change our understanding of that bedrock principle. ¶20 Likewise, the Allen framework does not suggest retroactive application is appropriate. Under Allen, we look to three factors to determine if a rule applies retroactively to final cases: “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” Allen, 478 U.S. at 258 (citations omitted). 6 ¶21 The purpose of the new standard is to clarify what information must be provided to protect a defendant’s due process rights when pleading guilty. The State has relied on the Lukens/Phillips/Crowder restitution cap requirement since its pronouncement. Because restitution caps were included based on the understanding they were necessary to protect a defendants’ due process rights but, as set forth above, were not actually enforceable, retroactive application is unlikely to threaten the finality of plea agreements. In a limited number of cases, however, where the defendant can show that the decision to accept the plea was induced by the restitution cap, retroactive application of this rule could threaten the finality of a plea agreement and have a burdensome effect on the administration of justice. In total, the Allen factors weigh against retroactive application of this rule. ¶22 The new rule of criminal procedure announced here does not meet either the Teague or Allen standards for retroactive application and will not apply retroactively to cases that have become final. C. Victims’ Attorneys Should Presumptively Be Before the Bar. ¶23 The VBR establishes victims’ constitutional rights before and during criminal proceedings. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1. The Arizona Legislature has acted to further implement these rights. See A.R.S. §§ 13-4401 to -4443. A victim may hire an attorney to protect her rights. § 13-4437(A). A victim’s lawyer “shall be endorsed on all pleadings and, if present, be included in all bench conferences and in chambers meetings and sessions with the trial court that directly involve a victim’s right enumerated in article II, section 2.1, Constitution of Arizona.” § 13-4437(D). ¶24 During a sentencing hearing, the superior court directed E.H.’s counsel to sit in the gallery unless invited into the well of the courtroom to address an issue relevant to E.H.’s rights. E.H. argues her personal counsel should be permitted to sit in front of the bar, in the space designated for the parties and their lawyers, during a hearing concerning her constitutional or statutory rights. We agree. ¶25 A trial court has the inherent authority to control the courtroom and trial proceedings. Brown v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 194 Ariz. 85, 91 ¶ 33 (App. 1998). This discretion includes managing courtroom seating for the parties and their counsel in light of courtroom size, security concerns, and other practical considerations. But just as counsel to a party is generally accommodated in the well of the courtroom, a victim’s counsel should presumptively be permitted to sit before the bar when a victim’s constitutional or statutory rights are directly at issue in a court proceeding. Hearings involving rights that would raise this presumption include, for example, those listed in article 2, section 2.1 of the Arizona Constitution and found at A.R.S. §§ 13-810, -4421, - 4422, -4423, -4426, -4427, -4435, -4437, -4440, and -4441. This presumption may be overcome by physical limitations within the courtroom, or, for instance, to allow for 7 physical distancing during a pandemic, or for other concerns about seating arrangements affecting the conduct of a fair hearing. At all times, however, a trial court’s discretion to address seating arrangements must honor a victim’s constitutional right to be present and heard at criminal proceedings and to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(1), (3)–(4).