Opinion ID: 196519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sandin v. Conner

Text: Sandin v. Conner In Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (5-4), the Court criticized its former precedent under which courts examined the language in state statutes and regulations to determine whether a liberty interest was created. This doctrine encouraged prisoners to comb regulations in search of mandatory language on which to base entitlements to various state-conferred privileges. Id. at 2299. The Court expressed two policy concerns: its prior approach creates disincentives for States to codify prison management procedures in the interest of uniform treatment. Id. The old approach also has led to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons, contrary to cases affording state officials appropriate deference and flexibility in prison management. Id. The Court held that states may still create liberty interests that afford prisoners due process protections, but explained: [T]hese interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . , nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Id. at 2300 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). Applying this standard to the situation in Sandin, the Court -9- concluded that disciplining a prisoner for thirty days in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest. Id. at 2301.