Opinion ID: 6350182
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State ex rel. AMFM, LLC v. King

Text: In AMFM, the administratrix of the estate of Ms. Beulah Wyatt filed a wrongful death suit against McDowell Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, where Ms. Wyatt had lived before her death.17 McDowell Nursing moved to dismiss the suit and enforce an arbitration agreement that Ms. Wyatt’s healthcare surrogate 18—her daughter, Nancy Belcher—had executed in the process of admitting Ms. Wyatt to the nursing facility. 19 As is the case, here, neither the resident nor her authorized agent had to accept the arbitration agreement in order for the resident to receive services from McDowell 17 AMFM, 230 W. Va. at 476, 740 S.E.2d at 71. 18 A health care “surrogate” is “authorized to make health care decisions on behalf of the incapacitated person without a court order or judicial involvement.” W. Va. Code § 16-30-8(c) (2002). 19 Id. at 475−76, 740 S.E.2d at 70−71. 9 Nursing. 20 And, an authorized signatory could rescind his or her acceptance of that agreement within thirty days of signing it, which is also the case, here.21 The circuit court denied McDowell Nursing’s motion to compel Ms. Belcher to arbitrate the claims of her mother’s estate. 22 The court reasoned that a healthcare surrogate’s authority to act on behalf of an incapacitated person is limited to making “health care decision[s],” 23 and did not extend to the decision to waive one’s right to trial by jury (i.e., a decision unrelated to health care). 24 The court concluded that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because Ms. Belcher lacked the authority as her mother’s healthcare surrogate to execute the agreement on her mother’s behalf. 25 McDowell Nursing petitioned this Court for a writ prohibiting enforcement of the lower court’s order.26 It argued that as Ms. Wyatt’s health care surrogate, Ms. 20 Id. 21 Id. at 476, 740 S.E.2d at 70−71. 22 Id. at 476, 740 S.E.2d at 71. 23 A “health care decision” is “a decision to give, withhold, or withdraw informed consent to any type of health care, including, but not limited to, medical and surgical treatments, including life-prolonging interventions, psychiatric treatment, nursing care, hospitalization, treatment in a nursing home or other facility, home health care, and organ or tissue donation.” W. Va. Code § 16-30-3 (2022). 24 AMFM, 230 W. Va. at 476, 740 S.E.2d at 71. 25 Id. 26 Id. 10 Belcher was indeed authorized to endorse the arbitration agreement on her mother’s behalf so the agreement was binding on her mother.27 We rejected that argument because the Act “authorizes a health care surrogate to make health care decisions on behalf of the incapacitated person for whom the surrogate has been appointed.”28 We went on to describe the limited breadth of that kind of decision: The health care decisions that a health care surrogate is authorized to make on behalf of the incapacitated person for whom the surrogate has been appointed are “decision[s] to give, withhold or withdraw informed consent to any type of health care, including, but not limited to, medical and surgical treatments, including life-prolonging interventions, psychiatric treatment, nursing care, hospitalization, treatment in a nursing home or other facility, home health care and organ or tissue donation.” W. Va.Code § 16-30-3(i) (2002) (Repl.Vol.2011). [29] We then applied those rules to the arbitration agreement before the Court, explaining that, [f]rom both the statutory pronouncements defining and clarifying the scope of a health care surrogate’s authority and the actual form used by physicians to select a health care surrogate, it is clear that a decision to arbitrate disputes 27 Id. at 477, 740 S.E.2d at 72. 28 Syl. Pt. 6, id. at 471, 740 S.E.2d at 66. 29 Syl. Pt. 7, id. Petitioners suggest that the decision to admit Ms. Faw to Greystone was not a “health care decision” because the Residency Agreement contains “terms and provisions that are no more ‘medical decisions’ than the decision to settle claims in arbitration.” Petitioners’ suggestion lands beside the point of this case, which is whether Administratrix Hoover possessed authority to bind her mother to arbitrate future disputes when she executed the Arbitration Agreement. 11 regarding care provided by a nursing home to an incapacitated person is not within the ambit of a health care surrogate’s authority. This is particularly true in the case sub judice where both McDowell Nursing and Ms. Baker concede that acquiescence to the Arbitration Agreement was optional and not required for Ms. Wyatt’s receipt of services from McDowell Nursing. Further evidence of the understanding that the Arbitration Agreement was not a precondition to admission into McDowell Nursing’s facility is the fact that, once signed, the signatory had thirty days within which to rescind his/her decision to be bound by the Agreement. In light of the foregoing authorities and consistent with the facts of the case sub judice, we therefore hold that an agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration, which is optional and not required for the receipt of nursing home services, is not a health care decision under the West Virginia Health Care Decisions Act, W. Va.Code § 16-30-1 et seq. Because the subject Arbitration Agreement was not a health care decision, Ms. Belcher, whose role as Ms. Wyatt’s health care surrogate permitted her to make only health care decisions, was not a “competent part[y]” to the Agreement because she did not have the authority to sign this document on Ms. Wyatt’s behalf.[30] For those reasons, we denied the writ requested by McDowell Nursing. That logic applies equally to this case. The Arbitration Agreement in this case parallels that in AMFM: its acceptance was not a precondition to admission to Greystone and could have been rescinded within thirty days. Under AMFM, such an agreement is not a health care decision under the Act. Administratrix Hoover was Ms. Faw’s health care surrogate when she endorsed the Arbitration Agreement. So, Administratrix Hoover’s authority to act on her mother’s behalf was limited to making 30 Id. at 480–81, 740 S.E.2d at 75–76 (emphasis in original) (internal notes omitted). 12 health care decisions. “[A]n agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration, which is optional and not required for the receipt of nursing home services, is not a health care decision under the West Virginia Health Care Decisions Act, W. Va.Code § 16-30-1 et seq.” 31 Consequently, Administratrix Hoover then lacked the authority to bind her mother to the Arbitration Agreement. For that reason, Administratrix Hoover was not a competent party to the Arbitration Agreement. 32 And for that reason, as well, the Arbitration Agreement does not satisfy the first condition necessary to form a valid contract. Under AMFM, the Arbitration Agreement is not a valid contract.