Opinion ID: 65275
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: To recover for legal malpractice under Mississippi law, “a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a lawyer-client relationship, negligence on the part of the lawyer in handling his client’s affairs entrusted to him, and some injury proximately caused by the lawyer’s negligence.” Baker Donelson Bearman & Caldwell, P.C. v. Muirhead, 920 So. 2d 440 (Miss. 2006). The Mississippi cases discussing legal malpractice require that the plaintiffs “show that but for their attorney’s negligence, they would have been successful in the prosecution or defense of the underlying action.” Pierce 6 v. Cook, 992 So. 2d 612, 612 (Miss. 2008) (citations omitted). Based on the facts of this case, the trial court made a legal conclusion that “Pilger committed legal malpractice.” To establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show (1) a misrepresentation or omission of fact, (2) that the representation is material or significant, (3) failure to exercise reasonable care on the part of the defendant, (4) reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) damages as a direct result of the reasonable reliance. Powell v. Cohen Realty, Inc., 803 So. 2d 1186, 1186 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Levens v. Campell, 733 So. 2d 753 (Miss. 1999)). The trial court also made a legal conclusion that “Plaintiffs have established liability for negligent misrepresentation.” On appeal, Pilger takes issue with liability based on the sufficiency of the evidence and the amount of damages.
The trial court recognized that the Reigstads had not produced any policy as evidence. The court, therefore, relied on the stated terms of the Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting Association (“MWUA”) application to find that the value of the policy would have been $220,000. Based on the “standard deduction in most policies,” the court also found that the policy amount would have had a 2% deductible, applied against the policy value. We find no clear error in these findings. Pilger argues that the Reigstads had to produce evidence of the specific terms and conditions of the policy or policies which they sought. The Mississippi cases upon which Pilger relies are inapposite. See Pope v. Schroeder, 512 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1987) (discussing legal malpractice where lawyer failed to timely file an appeal); Hickcox v. Holleman, 502 So. 2d 626 (Miss. 1987) (discussing legal malpractice claim for failure to file suit within limitations period). In Williams 7 v. Henson, 42 F. Supp. 2d 628, 632 n.6 (N.D. Miss. 1999), the district court cited a Mississippi case for the proposition that “the measure of damages recoverable against an agent has been held to be the amount for which the insurer would have been liable had proper insurance been effected.” Id. at 632 n.6 (quoting Simpson v. M-P Enterprises, Inc., 252 So. 2d 202, 207 (Miss. 1971)). Neither Williams nor Simpson supports Pilger’s argument that the “specific terms and conditions of the policy” must be presented into evidence. Pilger relies heavily on Atlas Roofing Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Robinson & Julienne, Inc., 279 So. 2d 625 (Miss. 1973). Pilger argues that “[t]he Mississippi Supreme Court made it clear in the Atlas Roofing decision that in order to recover damages, the prospective insured has to produce more proof than to merely state, as the Reigstads have done, that they wanted ‘hurricane insurance’ or had applied for a policy through the ‘wind pool.’” In Atlas Roofing, the plaintiff, Atlas Roofing, alleged that their agent, Robinson & Julienne, had negligently failed to provide adequate fire insurance on its facility, and as a consequence, plaintiff had been unable to collect the full amount of a fire loss sustained. Id. at 626. Robinson & Julienne argued that Atlas Roofing could have recovered the entire amount of their loss from the policy that was issued, but Atlas Roofing accepted less and failed to recover that loss solely because it neglected to pursue its claim in court. Id. at 628. Atlas Roofing countered by arguing that it would not have been able to recover under the policy that was issued. Id. The court indicated the difficulty of determining that issue in the absence of the insurer who issued the policy obtained by Atlas Roofing, because “there [was] no way of knowing what its position would be nor what defenses it would interpose.” Id. The court, therefore, declined to determine if the absent insurer was, in fact, liable for the full amount of sustained damages. See id. 8 The court then noted that five years had lapsed since the issuance of the policy with no objection. See id. at 629. The court therefore concluded that “upon the whole record that Atlas failed to meet the burden which rested upon it to establish by evidence that it[s] loss was the result of negligence upon the part of [Robinson & Julienne].” Id. In this case, there was no existing policy on the Reigstads’ property, so there is no argument that an existing policy provided the requisite coverage. Here, it is undisputed that there was no windstorm coverage. Further, Pilger specifically told the Reigstads at the closing that insurance coverage was in place, although there was no coverage. The court’s holding in Atlas Roofing does not support Pilger’s argument. At trial, the Reigstads had to establish their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, and the MWUA application and testimony at trial are sufficient to support a finding on the amount of coverage that would have been in place but for Pilger’s negligence. The trial court’s assessment of the evidence is not clearly erroneous.
The trial court determined that the value of damages was $159,100. Pilger argues that the maximum amount of damages that could have been awarded to the Reigstads was $112,991.37, the amount of the wind damage estimate, $117,391.37, minus the $4,400 deductible. In making the damages determination, the trial court considered the Reigstads’ exhibit substantiating the Reigstads’ actual expenditures for repairs. Because this list of expenditures did not indicate whether damages were caused by wind or flood, the court also considered the estimate for only wind damage. Mr. Reigstad also testified that, based on what he saw when he went to the house and how the windows blew out, he estimated that 95% of the damage “was done long before the water got there.” 9 The court considered Baird’s estimate of wind damage to be the best estimate of wind or wind-driven rain damage, but the court did not totally disregard the other relevant evidence. The court undertook “an attempted correlation” between the Baird estimate of wind damage and the itemized list of total damages and concluded that the independent wind and wind-driven water damage to the home prior to the flood damage was $163,500. The court deducted the $4,400 deductible to reach the final award of $159,100. Although the court’s calculation was not to a mathematical certainty, we do not find that the trial court’s calculation of wind damage is clearly erroneous. The evidence of actual expenses incurred and Mr. Reigstad’s testimony that 95% of the damages were caused by wind or wind-driven rain sufficiently supports the trial court’s determination of damages in excess of the wind damage estimate. See Green v. Seariver Maritime, Inc., 248 F. App’x 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“Trial testimony from both the plaintiff and his Captain substantiated the court’s finding that the line used in that particular mooring was heavier and larger than previous mooring lines.”); Snow-Sorapuru v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 54 F. App’x 405, 405 (5th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (“The only evidence presented on the issue of causation was the testimony of the plaintiff. . . . Because the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, we affirm.”).