Opinion ID: 842428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: origins of rluipa

Text: The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” US Const, Am I. The second clause of this amendment is commonly known as the Free Exercise Clause. The protections provided by the First Amendment, including the Free Exercise Clause, have been “incorporated” and extended to the states and to their political subdivisions by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 303; 60 S Ct 900; 84 L Ed 1213 (1940); Santa Fe Independent School Dist v Doe, 530 US 290, 301; 120 S Ct 2266; 147 L Ed 2d 295 (2000). 4 In Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398; 83 S Ct 1790; 10 L Ed 2d 965 (1963), the plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church was discharged by her employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. She was unable to obtain other employment because she would not work on Saturdays. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, SC Code, Tit 68, § 68-1 et seq., provided that a claimant was ineligible for benefits if the claimant had failed “without good cause” to accept available suitable work. The Employment Security Commission determined that the plaintiff’s religious belief against working on Saturdays did not constitute “good cause.” The United States Supreme Court held that denying the plaintiff unemployment compensation benefits solely because of her refusal to accept employment in which she would have to work on Saturdays contrary to her religious belief imposed a substantial burden on her exercise of her religion that was not justified by a compelling state interest, and, thus, violated the Free Exercise Clause. In Employment Div, Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith, 494 US 872; 110 S Ct 1595; 108 L Ed 2d 876 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that Oregon’s prohibition of the use of peyote in religious ceremonies, and the denial of unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Court explained that generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a 5 particular religious practice need not be justified, under the Free Exercise Clause, by a compelling governmental interest.1 In response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),2 prohibiting the government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion, even by means of a generally applicable, religionneutral law, unless the government could demonstrate that the burden imposed furthers a compelling governmental interest and that it constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering such interest. 1 Smith, supra at 884, held that Sherbert was distinguishable because Sherbert involved an “individualized governmental assessment”; that is, the “good cause” standard at issue in Sherbert allowed the government to consider the plaintiff’s “particular circumstances.” See pp 15-17 infra. That is, Smith held that while the “compelling governmental interest” test may be applicable to laws allowing for an “individualized governmental assessment,” it is not applicable to generally applicable laws that do not allow for an “individualized governmental assessment.” 2 RFRA provides, in pertinent part: (a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b). (b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-- (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [42 USC 2000bb-1.] 6 However, in City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507; 117 S Ct 2157; 138 L Ed 2d 624 (1997), the United States Supreme Court held that Congress, in enacting RFRA, had exceeded its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact legislation enforcing the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because RFRA proscribes state conduct that the First Amendment itself does not proscribe.3 The Court explained: Congress’ power under § 5, however, extends only to “enforcing” the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has described this power as “remedial . . . .” The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power “to enforce,” not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].” While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect. [Id. at 519-520.] 3 Section 5, the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. [US Const, Am XIV, § 5.] 7 The Supreme Court then concluded that the substantial costs that RFRA exacted through its “compelling governmental interest” test “far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith.” Id. at 534. Thus, “the Court invalidated RFRA as applied to the states, finding it an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Enforcement Clause powers because Congress had not shown a pattern of religious discrimination meriting such a far-reaching remedy . . . .” Galvan, Beyond worship: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and religious institutions’ auxiliary uses, 24 Yale L & Policy R 207, 218 (2006).4 In response to City of Boerne, Congress enacted RLUIPA. Unlike RFRA, RLUIPA does not attempt to bar all laws that substantially burden religious exercise. Instead, it focuses on land use regulations5 and provides, in pertinent part: 4 Although RFRA no longer applies to the states, it still applies to the federal government. See Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 US 418; 126 S Ct 1211; 163 L Ed 2d 1017 (2006) (holding that, under RFRA, the Controlled Substances Act, 21 USC 801 et seq., cannot prohibit a religious sect from receiving communion by drinking hoasca, a tea that contains a hallucinogen). 5 RLUIPA also focuses on regulations pertaining to institutionalized persons, but that portion of RLUIPA is not applicable here. 8 (a) Substantial burdens. (1) General rule. No government[6] shall impose or implement a land use regulation[7] in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution-- (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 6 “Government” is defined as: (i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State; (ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and (iii) any other person acting under color of State law; and (B) for the purposes of sections 4(b) and 5 [42 USC 2000cc- 2(b) and 2000cc-3], includes the United States, a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of the United States, and any other person acting under color of Federal law. [42 USC 2000cc-5(4).] 7 “Land use regulation” is defined as a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest. [42 USC 2000cc-5(5).] That the city’s denial of plaintiff’s petition to rezone its property here constitutes a “land use regulation” is uncontested. 9 (2) Scope of application. This subsection applies in any case in which--