Opinion ID: 1121427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: propriety of declaratory judgment action

Text: In granting the Bar's motion to dismiss, the trial court also concluded that there was no case or controversy presented which is ripe for adjudication. Again, in reviewing this legal conclusion, we apply the correction of error standard. Scharf, 700 P.2d at 1070. Our cases construing the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 to -13 (1992), set forth the following requirements to sustain an action: a justiciable controversy based upon an accrued set of facts, an actual conflict, adverse parties, a legally protectible interest on the plaintiff's part, and an issue ripe for judicial resolution. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (citing Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978)). We agree with the trial court that this case failed to meet those requirements. The trial court ruled correctly that the Bar had barely begun a preliminary investigation into the matter and that, as a result, no accrued set of facts existed to support Barnard's claim. The record reveals that at the time Barnard filed his suit, he had merely received two letters of inquiry from the Bar. While it is entirely possible that the matter might have matured into a full-blown controversy at a later time, no actual conflict existed when Barnard commenced his lawsuit. We sympathize with Barnard's desire to determine whether his conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, his attempt at a preemptive strike was inappropriate in light of the other remedies at his disposal. He could have answered the Bar's questions and asked for an advisory opinion from the Bar concerning the definition of the unauthorized practice of law. Despite the history of strained relations between the parties, we fully expect that the Bar would have rendered such an opinion had one been requested. Similarly, Barnard could have petitioned this court in its rule-making capacity for clarification of the rule. Sutliff, 846 P.2d at 1237. Either of these remedies would have given guidance to Barnard and other attorneys similarly situated. Finally, he could have waited until a full-blown disciplinary proceeding was underway and challenged the rule in this court if and when the Bar recommended that action be taken against him. But declaratory relief in district court was not among the options available to him, given the inchoate nature of the investigation into his conduct.