Opinion ID: 2499410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: history of municipal prosecutions in washington

Text: ¶ 6 This case asks us to examine the prosecutorial authority of counties and municipalities. During the American colonial period, the county became the primary unit of most local government. SHO SATO & ARVO VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 2 (1970). While our nation is not uniform, counties generally `handle such state-directed functions as the administration of justice.' Id. at 6 (quoting COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., MODERNIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 28-29 (1966)). Our Washington State Constitution vests superior courts at the county level with general jurisdiction over most conflicts involving state law. Wash. Const. art. IV, §§ 5, 6. Our statutes explicitly authorize county prosecuting attorneys to appear for and represent the state and the counties in judicial proceedings. RCW 36.27.005. Our constitution also vests the legislature with the power to establish inferior courts, such as municipal courts. Wash. Const. art. IV, § 12; see also Titles 3, 35, 35A RCW (establishing inferior courts). The jurisdiction of the municipal courts is generally restricted to matters arising under penal ordinances and local police regulations. 9A EUGENE McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 27:2, at 370 (3d rev. ed.2007). ¶ 7 Until this case, the principle that, absent explicit legislative direction, municipalities could charge and municipal courts could hear only violations of the local municipal code seemed nearly unquestioned. At least, we could find no case directly on point and the parties have brought none to our attention. [3] However, since the 1980s some municipalities have tried to avoid the costs associated with criminal justice by either declining to adopt, or by repealing, criminal ordinances. E.g., City of Medina v. Primm, 160 Wash.2d 268, 278, 157 P.3d 379 (2007). For example in 1980, the city of Bellingham repealed almost all of its criminal ordinances, changed the penalties on most of those remaining from jail time to fines, closed its jail, and directed its agents to charge those they arrested with violating state law. Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash.2d 537, 540-42, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996). This effectively transferred responsibility for prosecution and the other costs associated with criminal justice from the city to Whatcom County. Id. at 551, 909 P.2d 1303. The county attempted to recoup the increased costs from the city. Id. at 542, 909 P.2d 1303. After the city sought declaratory judgment that it was not liable for those costs, the city and county negotiated a deal and agreed to dismiss the case. Id. ¶ 8 The legislature responded by passing the court improvement act of 1984. LAWS OF 1984, ch. 258, codified in part as former RCW 3.50.800 (1984). [4] See 2000 OP. ATT'Y GEN. NO. 2, at 1-3. Among other things, this act required municipalities repealing their criminal codes (which come with the expenses of enforcement, such as maintaining police departments and jails) but keeping their traffic codes (which tend to generate income through fines) to pay their counties a reasonable amount for the associated increased costs. Former RCW 3.50.800; Whatcom County, 128 Wash.2d at 542-43, 909 P.2d 1303; see also Gerhard O.W. Mueller, How to Increase Traffic Fatalities: A Useful Guide for Modern Legislators and Traffic Courts, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 944, 947 & n. 3 (1960) (citing MORGANTOWN POST (W.VA.), Dec. 15, 1955, at 12; N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1955, at 35). RCW 3.50.800 also requires cities and counties to arbitrate the amount due, if they cannot come to an agreement, and to review the terms periodically. ¶ 9 In 1993, Whatcom County sued the city of Bellingham over the city's 1980 repeal of most of its criminal code, contending that it had improperly shifted the cost of municipal criminal justice to the county. Whatcom County, 128 Wash.2d at 542-43, 909 P.2d 1303. We concluded the legislature intended to prevent cities from freely imposing the costs of their criminal justice activities on counties by repealing municipal criminal codes or terminating municipal courts, especially when keeping the comparatively, financially remunerative traffic codes and courts. Id. at 545-46, 909 P.2d 1303. ¶ 10 The same year Whatcom County was decided, the legislature amended the Interlocal Cooperation Act, chapter 39.34 RCW, in two relevant ways. First, and for the first time in Washington State, the act explicitly declared that [e]ach county, city, and town is responsible for the prosecution, adjudication, sentencing, and incarceration of misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor offenses committed by adults in their respective jurisdictions, and referred from their respective law enforcement agencies, whether filed under state law or city ordinance, RCW 39.34.180(1), thus, clarifying that cities and towns had criminal justice obligations. Second, RCW 39.34.180(1) established that each local government must carry out these responsibilities through the use of their own courts ... or by entering into contracts or interlocal agreements under this chapter to provide these services. Effectively, the legislature gave local governments a choice: provide criminal justice services locally or by contract with another local government. Id.; see also Primm, 160 Wash.2d at 278-79, 157 P.3d 379. Either way, cities bore the financial responsibility for the prosecution of all criminal misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor offenses occurring within the city limits. Primm, 160 Wash.2d at 278-79, 157 P.3d 379.