Opinion ID: 622599
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Actual Confusion and the Defendant's Intent

Text: We first evaluate Peoples Federal's related arguments as to the sixth and seventh factors in the Pignons analysis: evidence of actual confusion and the defendant's intent in adopting the PEOPLES mark. -18-
Peoples Federal argues that the district court erred by requiring proof of actual confusion. It posits that, [w]hile evidence of actual confusion is 'often deemed the best evidence of possible future confusion,' proof of actual confusion is not essential to finding likelihood of confusion. Id. (quoting Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2006)). It also emphasizes that because People's United and Peoples Federal had only co-existed in Eastern Massachusetts for a short period of time, evidence of actual confusion could not be expected. See id. at 121 (Historically, we have attached substantial weight to a trademark holder's failure to prove actual confusion only in instances in which the relevant products have coexisted on the market for a long period of time.). Peoples Federal notes that the relevant injury in the likelihood of confusion analysis includes loss of goodwill and control of the mark, and is not limited to whether confusion caused an actual diversion of customers or lost sales. See Beacon Mut. Ins. Co., 376 F.3d at 10, 15 (the relevant commercial injury for purposes of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act includes not only loss of sales to actual and prospective buyers, but also harm to the trademark owner's goodwill and reputation). Peoples Federal's argument is a red herring. It is patently clear from a balanced reading of the district court's -19- opinion that it only considered confusion regarding current or prospective buyers as one in a series of factors. Indeed, after noting that evidence of actual confusion was limited in this case, the court went on to state that the scarcity of such evidence [was] not in itself dispositive of plaintiff's claim, Peoples Fed. Sav. Bank, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 226 (citing to relevant case law), and acknowledged that People's United had entered Eastern Massachusetts only a few months prior. The district court then continued to weigh the remaining Pignons factors before reaching its determination. While it is true that evidence of actual confusion is not a prerequisite for a finding of likelihood of confusion, courts may still weigh evidence presented on this factor as part of their balanced analysis. See, e.g., Beacon Mut. Ins. Co., 376 F.3d at 16 (noting that, although other persons might be relevant if their confusion threatens the commercial interests of the mark's owner, [a]ctual and potential customers . . . are the most obvious 'relevant persons' in a likelihood of confusion analysis) (citation and quotation marks omitted). There is no error of law here, and the court's assessment of the evidence was not clearly erroneous.12 12 Notably, the only other evidence presented by Peoples Federal in support of a finding that actual confusion weighed in its favor was an online poll conducted by Banker & Tradesman related to the litigation between PeoplesBank and People's United. The poll was conducted over the course of a week and purportedly resulted in -20-
Peoples Federal argues that the district court erred by requiring evidence of deliberate encroachment (or bad intent) to divert Peoples Federal's customers. It points out that [e]vidence of bad intent, . . . while potentially probative of likelihood of confusion, is simply not required in a trademark infringement case; moreover, 'a finding of good faith is no answer if likelihood of confusion is otherwise established.' Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. AASTAR Mortg. Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting President & Trs. of Colby Coll. v. Colby Coll.-N.H., 508 F.2d 804, 811-12 (1st Cir. 1975)). However, in this case -- as noted throughout this opinion -- likelihood of confusion was not otherwise established. In addition, although bad intent is not almost eighty percent of respondents choosing Yes, the two banks names are too similar, to the question Will PeoplesBank be successful in its legal fight with People's United? Peoples Federal contends that this shows the public would be confused by the presence of another Peoples bank in Massachusetts. Putting aside the fact that the referenced poll used loaded questions to require predictions as to a litigation that is not related to the present case, thus undercutting its accuracy and relevance, we do not think the district court committed error, let alone clear error, by not referencing this poll in its opinion because its findings were adequately supported by other evidence. This proof of potential confusion is not strong enough that we would set aside the lower court's finding as clear error for failure to consider the same. Cf. Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1989) (where plaintiffs' other evidence of confusion was sufficiently strong, lack of survey data as to public knowledge regarding the source of the goods in question did not fatally undercut plaintiffs' claims, as [they] were not bound to a particular form of evidence to prove confusion). -21- required for a finding of trademark infringement, the defendant's intent in adopting the mark is an appropriate consideration in the court's assessment of whether the public is likely to be confused about the actual source of the goods or services at issue. See, e.g., Boston Duck Tours, LP, 531 F.3d at 30 (absence of bad faith weighed against a finding of infringement); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 819 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting as relevant to infringement analysis that, while evidence did not indicate an intent to deceive customers, it did indicate that defendant chose Beetle mark not independently, but with an intent to benefit from [the plaintiff's] reputation). Here, the defendant created its mark and logo years before it entered the Eastern Massachusetts market.
Likelihood of Confusion Peoples Federal contends that the district court erred by requiring proof of actual confusion, actual loss of business, and bad intent, thereby applying an improperly high standard for likelihood of success on the merits. Peoples Federal points to the district court's statement at the end of its likelihood of success analysis to support its position. The district court indicated that at least at this stage of the proceedings, the plaintiff ha[d] not adequately demonstrated it [would be] likely to succeed on the merits of its trademark claim. Peoples Fed. Sav. Bank, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 227. In particular, the district court stated it -22- would entertain a renewed motion for injunctive relief if evidence was elicited of (1) deliberate encroachment into specific neighborhoods where Peoples Federal operates and of (2) People's United's actions having caused actual confusion among Peoples Federal's clientele. Id. Peoples Federal argues this language confirms that the district court required more than a mere likelihood of confusion, and that it found against the grant of a preliminary injunction because Peoples Federal failed to present proof of these two factors. We are not persuaded. Peoples Federal reads more into the district court's words than is warranted. The district court's findings as to likelihood of confusion were supported by the record before it, which included scant evidence of actual confusion, a proper consideration of People's United's intent in adopting the mark, and a thorough analysis of six other factors. These additional expressions were only an attempt to clarify to the parties the court's willingness to consider future motions for injunctive relief if it were given a more developed record. We also reject Peoples Federal's related contention that the district court applied an improperly high standard as to likelihood of confusion because it indicated that in a trademark infringement case the plaintiff carries a considerable burden to show not just a 'possibility of confusion' but rather a 'substantial likelihood of confusion.' Id. at 224 (emphasis -23- added) (quoting Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Cent. City Brewing Co., 716 F. Supp. 2d 134, 140 (D. Mass. 2010)). The district court's consideration of the actual confusion factor did not amount to a requirement to prove an iron-clad, sure-bet likelihood of confusion, as characterized by Peoples Federal. The district court accurately framed the plaintiff's burden, see, e.g., Star Fin. Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d at 10 (We require evidence of a substantial likelihood of confusion -- not a mere possibility . . .) (internal quotation marks omitted), and -- after an appraisal of Peoples Federal's slim proffer of evidence -- determined, in its discretion, that the proffered evidence was insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.