Opinion ID: 2720490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Smith’s Flight After the Curry Shooting

Text: The court admitted evidence that after shooting Curry, Smith tried to evade apprehension, leading police on a high-speed chase and throwing items from his car. Cocaine and a handgun ultimately were found in his possession. Smith now argues the evidence of the cocaine and the chase were irrelevant or unduly prejudicial. The arguments fails. Smith‘s counsel acknowledged that the drug possession was relevant to prove his connection to the Bryant Family. He urged however that proof of connection to the Family had a ―prohibited 1101(a) purpose . . . that someone who is a member of the . . . ‗Family,‘ . . . might have a greater propensity to have committed these particular homicides.‖ The prosecution never made such an argument and Smith requested no limiting instruction. Smith later moved to strike the drug possession testimony because 82 the witnesses had not testified that the drugs were in a unique cookie shape common to the Bryant Family rock cocaine. Therefore, his arrest became like ―any other drug bust.‖ On appeal, Smith renews his contention that the cocaine evidence was irrelevant because the prosecution failed to establish the distinctive shape. The evidence was relevant. While there was no testimony about the cocaine‘s shape, a witness did testify that the drugs were packaged in a manner similar to that used by the Family. To the extent Smith continues to rely on section 1101(a) as a basis for exclusion, the cocaine clearly was not admitted to establish conduct in conformity with a character trait. Smith made no section 352 objection below. Any appellate claim on that ground is forfeited. Smith also contends the evidence of the car chase should have been excluded. Again, the challenge is forfeited for failure to object. Furthermore, the evidence was clearly relevant. Smith‘s efforts to evade the police and his apparent attempt to discard items during the chase had a tendency in reason to show that he knowingly possessed the drugs later found in the car, helping to show his connection to the Bryant Family. B. Challenges to the Admission of Witness Testimony and Out-of-Court Statements Bryant and Smith contend the trial court improperly admitted various hearsay statements. We assume Wheeler has joined in these claims. Many challenges are forfeited for failure to object below. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a), People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434.)34 Defendants occasionally contend the admission of 34 Defendants often contend that the trial court‘s asserted evidentiary errors deprived them of due process under the federal Constitution. As noted, when no specific federal constitutional challenge to the evidence was raised below, such appellate claims are preserved only to the extent that the federal aspect is a gloss on the claim of error actually raised. (Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 487, fn. 29.) Nonetheless, contrary to defendants‘ apparent argument, every state law error does not automatically result in a violation of the federal Constitution under Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346. (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611 [―for the most part . . . the mere erroneous exercise of discretion under such ‗normal‘ rules [of evidence] does not implicate the federal (footnote continued on next page) 83 hearsay violated their federal right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, along with Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36, and its progeny. As the high court has made clear, however, the focus of the confrontation clause is on the admission of testimonial hearsay as that term is understood. The admission of nontestimonial hearsay does not implicate the federal safeguard. (Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. ___, ___ [131 S.Ct. 1143, 1155].) Further, the Crawford rule does not apply when the declarant testifies and is thus subject to cross-examination. (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 731.) Defendants also raise a general confrontation clause challenge to the practice they refer to as ―Greening‖ a witness under California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149. Green, in conjunction with Evidence Code section 1235, permits the introduction of a witness‘s prior statements when he or she testifies inconsistently with or denies having made them. 35 We recently rejected an identical challenge and do not reconsider that decision. (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 23-24; see also People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 927 (Clark).) We now turn to defendants‘ specific challenges. (footnote continued from previous page) Constitution‖]; Engle v. Isaac (1982) 456 U.S. 107, 121, fn. 21 [―We have long recognized that a ‗mere error of state law‘ is not a denial of due process. [Citation.] If the contrary were true, then ‗every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come [to this Court] as a federal constitutional question.‘ ‖].) 35 Evidence Code section 1235 provides: ―Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770.‖ Evidence Code section 770 requires that before an inconsistent statement is admitted, the witness must be given ―an opportunity to explain or deny the statement,‖ or must be subject to being recalled as a witness. 84 1. Winifred Fisher Defendants challenge admission of Winifred Fisher‘s hearsay statements. Any error was harmless. The detective investigating Kenneth Gentry‘s murder interviewed Winifred Fisher. The prosecutor asked the detective to ―describe for the members of the jury what it was that Mr. Fisher related to you in conjunction with Mr. Gentry‘s death.‖ Smith‘s attorney objected on the grounds of hearsay and lack of foundation. In response, the prosecutor elicited that Fisher had died. The court asked Smith‘s attorney, ―Does that massage [sic] your doubts or do you wish more?‖ Counsel replied, ―No,‖ and the court instructed the prosecutor to continue. The detective related Fisher‘s statement that he, Gentry, and Michael Flowers bought substandard ―dope‖ from a person named Bryant. When they challenged the quality of the drugs, ―Bryant‖ refused a refund. In retaliation, the three vandalized a van belonging to Roscoe Bryant. The Bryant who sold the drugs learned they had done so and was angered. Bryant and Wheeler never made or joined in any objection. Smith withdrew his hearsay and foundation objections to the testimony. Nonetheless, rather than become enmeshed in the forfeiture issue, in a case tried before Crawford was decided, we treat the confrontation claim as preserved. (See People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 461-462.) Any assumed error was harmless. Defendants offer no argument on that point. As Livingston, supra, 53 Cal.4th at page 1159, points out, the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18, applies to confrontation clause violations. Although Fisher was absent, Michael Flowers did testify and was crossexamined. His out-of-court statements inconsistent with that testimony were properly 85 admitted. Flower‘s statements conveyed the same information on this collateral issue. Fisher‘s statements to the detective were merely duplicative.36 2. Benny Ward Benny Ward told police, essentially, that 45 minutes before Gentry‘s murder, Gentry said he had just seen Stanley Bryant driving by. Gentry said if he had been armed he would have confronted Bryant. Called as a prosecution witness, Ward denied being with Gentry and did not recall hearing Gentry say he saw Bryant. Over defendants‘ objections, the detectives testified as to what Ward had told them. Defendants contend that Ward‘s statements were improperly admitted as prior inconsistent statements (Evid. Code, § 1235) and Gentry‘s statements to Ward were double hearsay improperly admitted as spontaneous statements (Evid. Code, § 1240).37 The arguments fail. Defendants first argue that Ward‘s testimony was not inconsistent with his prior statements, because he only testified that he did not remember the conversation with Gentry. The trial court, however, reasonably found that Ward‘s claimed failure of recollection was actually a deliberate evasion tantamount to a denial. This ruling is supported by the fact that Ward had been able to recall Gentry‘s statements during a police interview conducted 10 years after the murder, but claimed memory loss when he 36 For this reason, to the extent defendants raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the failure to preserve the confrontation clause issue, any alleged deficient performance was not prejudicial. 37 Evidence Code section 1240 provides: ―Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.‖ 86 testified two and a half years later. (See People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 215 (Collins); People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 84-85.)38 Defendants next contend Gentry‘s statement to Ward was not a spontaneous statement. (Evid. Code, § 1240.) There is no dispute that Gentry‘s statements spontaneously narrated an event he was perceiving. Defendants argue, however, that the event itself was not sufficiently startling or emotion-provoking to induce the excitement required as foundation for the hearsay exception. ― ‗[I]f the declarations are made under the immediate influence of the occurrence to which they relate, they are deemed sufficiently trustworthy to be presented to the jury. [Citation.] [¶] The basis for this circumstantial probability of trustworthiness is ―that in the stress of nervous excitement the reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere expression of one‘s actual impressions and belief.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318.) ― ‗To render [such statements] admissible it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.‘ [Citations.]‖ (Ibid.) ―The crucial element in determining whether an out-of-court statement is admissible as a spontaneous declaration is the mental state of the speaker.‖ (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 811.) 38 The court also instructed the jury on this point as follows. ―If you disbelieve a witness‘ testimony that he or she no longer remembers a certain event, such testimony is inconsistent with a prior statement or statements by him or her describing that event.‖ (See CALJIC No. 2.13.) 87 There was evidence that Gentry, Fisher, and Flowers had bought drugs from a man named Bryant. A dispute arose over the drugs‘ quality. Dissatisfied with the resolution, the three vandalized a van belonging to another member of the Bryant Family. Substantial evidence supported the reasonable inferences that the Bryant Family was a violent drug gang whose members would take a jaundiced view of vandalizing their property and that one should not engage in further interaction with them unless armed. Thus, the trial court could reasonably find that Gentry, having engaged in some illadvised vandalism, was startled by seeing one of the Bryants driving by. His reference to the need for weaponry was consistent with this interpretation. The events, taken in context, produced a nervous reaction sufficient to satisfy the spontaneous statement exception. The court‘s conclusion was well within the realm of reason. 3. Sofinia Newsome Defendants contend the court improperly allowed Sofinia Newsome to testify that Kenneth Gentry told her about the fractious drug deal and vandalism. They argue Gentry‘s statement did not qualify as a declaration against his interest under Evidence Code section 1230. This challenge is forfeited; the sole objection made at trial, by Bryant only, was that the statement was ―not a declaration against penal interest as to anybody except Ken Gentry.‖ Thus, counsel acknowledged that the statement was, in fact, contrary to Gentry‘s interest in avoiding criminal liability. 4. William Johnson Defendants challenge the admission of statements by William Johnson as inadmissible hearsay and unduly prejudicial. Their claims lack merit. Johnson was arrested during a police raid on a Bryant Family drug house. At trial he claimed to be a freelance drug dealer, and generally denied knowing about the Family‘s operations. He also denied he was afraid to testify. The prosecutor then asked Johnson about inconsistent statements he had made during a police interview. In those 88 statements he recounted details of the Family‘s operations and his role. He spoke of his fear to cooperate with authorities. Wheeler objected that Johnson‘s statements that witnesses might be killed were unduly prejudicial and should be excluded under section 352. The court overruled the objection, observing that the statements related to Johnson‘s demeanor and credibility. On cross-examination, Bryant questioned Johnson about an interview statement he made seeming to suggest police had arrested and then released the ―real‖ Wheeler Avenue murderer. 39 On redirect, Johnson testified that the statement concerned a different murder. The prosecution subsequently sought to introduce an edited recording of Johnson‘s police interview. Johnson was asked, ―The quadruple homicides — the wrong people are in custody?‖ He replied, ―It‘s not the wrong people in custody, but there‘s more people out there . . . that‘s putting more pressure down.‖ Defendants first objected that the entire statement was ―vague‖ and ―rambling‖ and therefore substantially more prejudicial than probative. The court overruled the objection. Smith and Wheeler also objected that Johnson‘s statement about the ―right people‖ being in custody for the Wheeler Avenue murders was based on speculation or hearsay, and unduly prejudicial. Bryant objected on a different ground — that the ―right people‖ statement was not inconsistent with the statement asked about in cross-examination because they each concerned different subjects. The court overruled the objections, but 39 Counsel asked Johnson if he told the police ―they had arrested the right people but let them go after a few months.‖ Counsel later revisited the subject and asked if Johnson remembered saying, specifically, ―I‘m talking about when the murder first hit, ya all picked his ass up and had him locked up for about four or five months and let him go.‖ Johnson initially denied having made such statements. 89 offered to instruct the jury that it could not consider the ―right people‖ statement for its truth, but only as it reflected on Johnson‘s state of mind and credibility. Defendants chose not to request such an instruction so that the matter would not be highlighted to the jury. The court told the jury that to the extent it found Johnson‘s testimony inconsistent with his statement to police, it could consider the prior statement as both credibility evidence and for the truth of the matters stated. (CALJIC No. 2.13.) No defendant objected to the instruction. The trial court properly overruled defendants‘ section 352 objections. Evidence of Johnson‘s fear of retaliation and the basis of that fear was relevant to his credibility, which was aggressively challenged on cross-examination. (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1084; People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1288 (Harris); Gonzalez, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 946.) His statements about the Family organization were probative of the circumstances of and motivations for the Wheeler Avenue murders. Nothing in Johnson‘s statements was unduly prejudicial as that term is properly understood. (Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 491.) Defendants forfeited the claim that the reasons for Johnson‘s fear should not have been admitted for the truth. They did not object to the instruction. The court also properly admitted the ―right people‖ statement. It was relevant to the jury‘s evaluation of the statement Bryant introduced regarding the police having released some murderer. Defendants waived the claim that the court erred by admitting this statement for its truth because they agreed to forgo a limiting instruction. 5. Lawrence Walton and Ladell Player Defendants raise conclusory claims that the trial court improperly admitted testimony and out-of-court statements by Lawrence Walton and Ladell Player. They admit that some statements were relevant and probative. They assert that other largely unspecified aspects of the statements were ―irrelevant and/or cumulative to the issues in 90 the present case and highly prejudicial.‖ To the extent they do not specify the evidence they contest, they fail to properly present the issue. Defendants do mention testimony and statements concerning the witnesses‘ reluctance to testify and concern that defendants would learn that they had spoken with the authorities. As with defendants‘ challenge to William Johnson‘s statements, such issues were relevant to the jury‘s assessment of credibility. In his reply brief, Bryant asserts that the court erroneously refused to accept a stipulation from defendants that they ―were selling drugs,‖ which assertedly would have made the testimony and evidence regarding the Bryant Family operations cumulative and unduly prejudicial. That contention is forfeited because it was not raised in the opening brief. Further, it is meritless. Wheeler‘s counsel asserted that the testimony would be cumulative because the court had already admitted a great deal of evidence about the drug business. Counsel stated, ―there is not one count that we are currently dealing with that deals with the drug organization or selling drugs. If that is the case, we will stipulate that they were selling drugs. The issue is the murder case.‖ The trial court, however, pointed out that the other defendants had disputed the nature of the Bryant Family organization. There was no further discussion of a stipulation. Bryant‘s claim is unfounded.