Opinion ID: 795316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 61 In her next argument, Edelmann challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all five counts for which she was convicted. As to the first mail fraud conviction, she argues that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that the mails were used to further her attempt to obtain the $50,000 loan. As to the second mail fraud conviction, she argues that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that she knew that the closing agent would mail documents back to the lender or that such conduct was reasonably foreseeable. As to the wire fraud conviction, she asserts that no proof exists that interstate, as opposed to intrastate wires, were used or that a scheme to defraud was implemented. She makes this same argument regarding the second wire fraud conviction. Finally, she contends that the money laundering conviction fails because the wire fraud allegation on which it is based is flawed. 62 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and accept all reasonable inferences that support the jury's verdict. United States v. Allen, 440 F.3d 449, 450 (8th Cir.2006). We will uphold the verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The standard we employ is a strict one, and we do not lightly overturn a jury's verdict. Id.
63 To establish mail fraud, the government must prove that the defendant: 1) voluntarily and intentionally devised or participated in a scheme to defraud; 2) entered into the scheme with intent to defraud; 3) knew that it was reasonably foreseeable that the mails would be used; and 4) used the mails in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Hively, 437 F.3d 752, 760 (8th Cir.2006). 64 Edelmann argues that Vaughn could not remember receiving a Federal Express package or what that package contained, indicating that the government failed to prove that Edelmann used the mails. However, the government presented the testimony of four witnesses to establish this element. First, Beard testified that he requested that Vaughn obtain a list of documentation from Edelmann and that the requested documentation be sent by Federal Express. In addition, he testified that Vaughn hand-delivered to him a packet of documents that were responsive to his request. 65 Second, Vaughn testified that she received via Federal Express further documentation that Beard had requested and that she hand-delivered the documents to Beard. According to Vaughn, in February 2001, she was unable to leave her residence, so a neighbor delivered the Federal Express envelope to her. She identified Government Exhibit 2 as the Federal Express envelope that she received and testified that she sent the original envelope to Agent Dawkins. 66 Third, the operations manager for Federal Express testified that the markings on Government Exhibit 2 showed that Edelmann sent the package to Vaughn. Additionally, he testified that the employee who generated the mailing label was based at the Little Rock station. 67 Fourth, Agent Dawkins introduced Edelmann's certified American Express credit card records showing that her American Express card had been charged for mailing the Federal Express envelope to Vaughn. Based on the witnesses' testimony, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict as to Count I.
68 As to Count II, the government was permitted to establish the use of mails element of the crime by proving that the mailing was incident to an essential part of the scheme. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989). The statute provides that a defendant must `cause' the use of mails, but `a defendant will be deemed to have `caused' the use of mails ... if the use was the reasonably foreseeable result of his actions.' United States v. Waterman, 704 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Wrehe, 628 F.2d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir.1980)). 69 Here, Edelmann sought to defraud the lender, BNC, by submitting false financial documents to qualify for a home loan. To obtain the loan, Edelmann had to sign documents at a loan closing, which was overseen by Dianne Cathey at Standard Abstract and Title Company. Cathey testified that during the loan closing, Edelmann reviewed and executed a number of documents, including a settlement sheet. This settlement sheet specifically enumerated a mailing fee of $45 for return of documents to the lender. 70 Because this settlement sheet provided notice to Edelmann that the documents would be mailed from the title company to the lender to complete the loan, we reject Edelmann's argument that the government failed to present any evidence that she knew or should have reasonably foreseen that the closing agent would mail the documents back to the lender.
71 The essential elements of wire fraud are a scheme to defraud, the use of interstate wires incident to the scheme, and an intent to cause harm. United States v. Frank, 354 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir.2004). 72 Edelmann's argument is that the government failed to establish the use of interstate wires, asserting that the evidence demonstrated that only intrastate wires were used, as Richardson caused the Schwab office in Little Rock to wire the funds to Edelmann's bank account at a Little Rock bank. However, the government presented the testimony of David Fern, a Charles Schwab employee, who testified that Schwab has relationships with various banks across the country who hold their funds in-house. Fern testified that Schwab held Richardson's funds and, in making a transfer, these funds go from Schwab to the federal wire routing house, and from there . . . to the receiving bank. He explained that the money went through a clearinghouse for wires and that all wired funds go through the Federal Reserve. Fern testified that his branch office in Little Rock does not hold cash in any way, shape, or form. In addition, the government presented evidence showing that Richardson's request for the wire transfer was made via fax to Schwab's wired funds department in San Francisco. Therefore, the money was sent by Citibank to Superior Federal, with the originator being located in San Francisco and the beneficiary being located in Lonoke, Arkansas. 73 Additionally, Edelmann argues that the government failed to prove that a scheme to defraud existed because a legitimate debtor-creditor relationship existed between Richardson and Edelmann. The government, however, presented evidence that Edelmann procured the promissory notes through false statements and false documents that she presented to Richardson to entice him to loan her $250,000. Therefore, we find that sufficient evidence exists to support the jury's verdict as to Count III.
74 Edelmann argues that the second wire fraud count fails because the government failed to prove a scheme to defraud Richardson, as the transactions between Richardson and Edelmann were debtor-creditor transactions properly secured by legitimate promissory notes. 75 The government, however, offered at least 11 exhibits to substantiate the scheme to defraud Richardson of $250,000 in Count III. In addition, the government submitted approximately eight additional exhibits to show that Edelmann continued her scheme to defraud Richardson of an additional $50,000. Richardson testified to the terms of the additional loan and documentation signed by Edelmann that was intended to secure the loan. Therefore, any promissory notes Edelmann signed were a part of her scheme to defraud Richardson and were procured through false representations to Richardson. Therefore, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Edelmann engaged in a scheme to defraud Richardson as charged in Count IV.
76 A defendant is guilty of money laundering when he knowingly engages in, or attempts to engage in, a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is valued at more than $10,000. United States v. Mooney, 401 F.3d 940, 946 (8th Cir.2005). 77 Edelmann argues that if the predicate offense of wire fraud fails, so too must the money laundering conviction. However, because the evidence is sufficient to support her conviction for wire fraud in Counts III and IV, her challenge to Count V also fails.