Opinion ID: 3135540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: The decedent, Mary Lacey, began living with Steven Zirko in June 1995. Plaintiff alleges that in December of the following year, Zirko began physically and emotionally abusing Lacey. Zirko was allegedly arrested on several occasions both for domestic battery and for violating various orders of protection that Lacey received between December 2002 and December 2003. On December 9, 2003, Lacey received a two-year plenary order of protection (order) against Zirko. This order was to be in effect until December 9, 2005. It was, therefore, in full force and effect during all times relevant to this opinion. The order prohibited Zirko from physically abusing, harassing, or interfering with Lacey’s personal liberty. The order also required Zirko to stay away from Lacey. The order was, pursuant to statute, entered into the Law Enforcement Automated Data System. See 750 ILCS 60/302(a) (West 2002). As a result, defendant police officers, their respective departments, the villages, and other unnamed individuals had knowledge of Lacey’s order. -2- In October 2004, Chad Larsen, Zirko’s chiropractor of five years, contacted Detective Daily of the Chicago police department.1 Larsen, whose practice was located in Palatine, contacted the Chicago police because he had heard Zirko, a Chicago resident, make a number of threatening statements toward Lacey. According to plaintiff, Larsen stated that in the several months prior, Zirko had commented to him that Lacey needed to have her legs broken and had asked Larsen if he knew anyone that Zirko could hire to break them. Shortly before Larsen contacted Daily, Zirko told Larsen that he no longer needed someone to break Lacey’s legs, he needed someone to kill her. Zirko then asked Larsen if he knew anyone he could hire to kill Lacey. In early October 2004, Zirko allegedly told Larsen that Zirko’s father had agreed to kill Lacey. Zirko then requested that Larsen charge Zirko’s credit card for chiropractic services on a regular basis to “set up a pattern showing that Zirko was at the chiropractor in Palatine on certain days and times.” Based on Larsen’s statements, Daily began an investigation of Zirko’s alleged solicitation of someone to murder Lacey. On October 14, 2004, Daily contacted the Palatine police department, presumably because Larsen’s practice was located in Palatine. Daily discussed the investigation with Detectives Bertnik and Tulley of the Palatine police department. On October 15, 2004, Palatine police Detectives Bertnik and Kraeger went to the Wilmette police department. Lacey had lived in Wilmette from February 2002 to July 2003, when she moved to Glenview. While in Wilmette, Bertnik and Kraeger learned of Zirko’s “significant history of domestic battery and violations of orders of protection.” Bertnik and Kraeger were also supplied with all the police reports involving Lacey and Zirko during this period. Following their trip to Wilmette, Bertnik and Kraeger reported their investigation to Sergeant Johnson and Detective Mazurkiewicz of the Glenview police department. 1 Detective Dailey and the City of Chicago were originally named as defendants in this case. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed her claims against these defendants. -3- That same day, Bertnik telephoned Lacey and told her she was in “immediate danger” and requested that she “come to the Glenview Police Department Station immediately.” Lacey complied with this request and went to the Glenview police department. At the Glenview police department, Lacey met with Bertnik and Kraeger, who informed Lacey of Zirko’s alleged plot to murder her. Lacey informed Bertnik and Kraeger that Zirko was capable of hurting her and her family. During this discussion, Bertnik and Kraeger informed Lacey that Zirko would not be arrested at that time. Following the meeting at the Glenview police department, Palatine and Glenview officers, including Mazurkiewicz, went to Lacey’s Glenview home to further discuss Zirko’s alleged murder plot. Plaintiff alleges that at this meeting, both Palatine and Glenview officers reiterated that Zirko would not be arrested, but assured Lacey that they would protect her by placing a 24-hour watch over her. Plaintiff alleges that this 24-hour watch was to include an officer posted outside Lacey’s home when she was there, and an officer to follow Lacey when she left her house.2 On October 21, 2004, Bertnik interviewed Zirko. Zirko attended the interview with his attorney. Zirko’s attorney told Bertnik that Zirko would not answer any questions and would not make any statements. However, the attorney did tell Bertnik that Zirko had no intention of harming Lacey or hiring anyone to harm Lacey. Plaintiff alleges that on or about October 22, 2004, defendants closed their investigation into Zirko’s murder-for-hire plot. Zirko was never detained or arrested. Plaintiff alleges that from October 22, 2004, through December 13, 2004, Lacey called the Palatine and Glenview police departments multiple times requesting that defendants either arrest Zirko or provide the supervision and protection they promised. It is undisputed that defendants did not provide Lacey with police protection between October 22 and December 13, 2004. 2 There are no facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint regarding whether defendants ever extended this protection to Lacey. Neither are there any allegations of when this protection was terminated if, in fact, it had ever begun. -4- Plaintiff alleges that on December 13, 2004, Zirko brutally attacked and murdered Lacey and her mother, Margaret Ballog, 3 while the two were present in Lacey’s Glenview home. Thereafter, the special administrator of Lacey’s estate brought suit. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint contained 76 separate counts against the various defendants.4 However, this appeal is concerned only with those claims that were brought on behalf of Lacey’s estate under the Act. Further, the defendants who are parties to the present appeal are the Village of Palatine and its employees Detective Bertnik, Detective Tulley, and Officer Kraeger (Palatine defendants) and the Village of Glenview and its employees Sergeant Johnson and Detective Mazurkiewicz (Glenview defendants). The claims relevant to this appeal are plaintiff’s allegations that Palatine defendants and Glenview defendants (collectively referred to as defendants) willfully and wantonly breached a duty owed to Lacey under the Act. Plaintiff filed two relevant counts against each of the police officer defendants. The first count alleged wrongful death under the Act. The second count was a survival claim under the Act. The factual assertions and alleged breaches are identical in both the wrongful-death and the survival counts. The counts are identical as to all the police officer defendants. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Lacey was a member of the class of persons protected by the Act and had been “so found by virtue of the Order of Protection she obtained on December 9, 2003.” Plaintiff further alleges that because Lacey was protected under the Act, she was owed a duty under the Act and that defendants willfully and 3 Originally, the special administrator of Ballog’s estate was also a plaintiff in this case. The circuit court dismissed Ballog’s claim along with Lacey’s claim. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal with regard to Ballog’s estate. The appellate court’s ruling with regard to Ballog is not before this court. 4 The original defendants of the case were: the City of Chicago and its employee, Detective Dailey; the Village of Palatine and its employees, Detective Bertnik, Detective Tulley, and Officer Kraeger; the Village of Glenview and its employees Sergeant Johnson and Detective Mazurkiewicz; and Steven Zirko. -5- wantonly breached that duty. Plaintiff alleges that Bertnik, Tulley, and Kraeger of Palatine and Johnson and Mazurkiewicz of Glenview were aware of the order of protection, knew that Zirko was in violation of that order, had been informed of all facts necessary to take immediate action against Zirko, and had probable cause to arrest Zirko based on the information they received in October 2004. Plaintiff argues that defendants had a “duty under the [Act] to immediately use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, harassment or exploitation, including but not limited to arresting Zirko or providing police supervision and protection.” Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated this duty by: “a) Failing to arrest Zirko in light of his violation of an order of protection; b) Failing to detain and/or arrest Zirko despite learning of his plan to murder Mary Lacey; c) Failing to provide police supervision and protection after learning of the Zirko plan to murder Mary Lacey, after deciding not to arrest Zirko, and after promising 24-hour surveillance and protection of Mary Lacey; d) Failing to further investigate the murder plan; e) Knowingly rejecting Mary Lacey’s pleas for help to respond to complaints that she feared for her life; f) Failing to arrange for Mary Lacey’s transportation to a safe place when informed that Mary Lacey was in need of protection; and g) Failing to intervene after learning that Mary Lacey was in need of protection.” Plaintiff alleges that as a direct and proximate result of this willful and wanton conduct, Lacey was murdered on December 13, 2004. Plaintiff further alleges that the villages of Palatine and Glenview are liable for the breaches of their officers. Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss the case under section 2–619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(9) (West 2006)). The circuit court dismissed the case, finding that defendants had not been engaged in the enforcement of the Act and, thus, the absolute immunity provided defendants by sections 4–102 and 4–107 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS -6- 10/4–102, 4–107 (West 2002)) controlled over the limited immunity in section 305 of the Act (750 ILCS 60/305 (West 2002)). Plaintiff appealed the dismissal arguing that section 305 of the Act trumps the absolute immunity of sections 4–102 and 4–107. The appellate court reversed, holding that material questions of fact precluded dismissal under section 2–619(a)(9). In doing so, the appellate court noted that Lacey was a protected person under the Act and that, as a result, the Act imposed specific duties on defendants. The disputed material facts identified by the appellate court included whether defendants had probable cause to arrest Zirko, whether defendants adequately investigated the murder-for-hire scheme, whether Lacey called defendants on the day of her murder, and whether defendants were enforcing the Act during the investigation and/or at the time of the murder. 379 Ill. App. 3d 62. QUESTION PRESENTED Despite the complex procedural history of this case, the question before this court is relatively straightforward. Defendants assert that the appellate court erred in reinstating plaintiff’s claim, because they were not enforcing the Act and, therefore, enjoy blanket immunity under sections 4–102 and 4–107 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/4–102, 4–107 (West 2002)). Plaintiff counters that she has alleged facts that implicate the Act and demonstrate that defendants were enforcing the Act. Plaintiff further alleges that defendants owed a duty to Lacey under the Act and that this duty was willfully and wantonly breached. Plaintiff notes that where the Act is being enforced, the limited immunity found in section 305 of the Act controls over the absolute immunity found in sections 4–102 and 4–107 of the Tort Immunity Act. Therefore, plaintiff argues that the appellate court should be affirmed and the case remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. All parties agree that if the Act was not being enforced, defendants enjoy absolute immunity and the case was properly dismissed. Therefore, as defendants made clear at oral argument, the question in this case is not whether the immunity of sections 4–102 and 4–107 applies over the limited immunity of the Act, but whether the Act is implicated in the first instance. -7-