Opinion ID: 2240008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ambiguity in the MRAI

Text: Before we review the constitutionality of the MRAI, we must first resolve an ambiguity in section 3-3(1). The ambiguity is whether the phrase in circumstances which constitute a substantial or immediate danger to the minor's physical safety (the immediate danger phrase) modifies both subsection (a), which applies to minors absent from home without parental consent, and subsection (b), which applies to minors beyond parental control, or only subsection (b). The interpretation of section 3-3(1) is important because it affects some of the constitutional issues addressed later. The circuit court, as well as B.R.'s mother and the State, interpreted section 3-3(1) such that the immediate danger phrase did not modify subsection (a). The minors in the case at bar, however, point out that the appellate court in In re J.M. (1988), 170 Ill. App.3d 552, 559-60, found that the immediate danger phrase modifies both subsections (a) and (b). Nevertheless, we conclude that the immediate danger phrase does not modify subsection (a). We can uphold the constitutionality of section 3-3(1)(a) even without the modification. Before we dispose of this issue, however, we must discuss the reasoning of the J.M. court. The J.M. court based its decision on In re Polovchak (1983), 97 Ill.2d 212, and the legislative history of the MRAI. The J.M. court concluded: [I]t is clear that minors to whom the MRAI statute would be applicable are those whose behavior is the same type of behavior which was found to require supervision under the MINS statute [citation], i.e., as noted    in Polovchak, supervision was predicated on the fact the minor was incorrigible, a frequent runaway, or that the minor's acts posed serious hazards to himself or to others. ( J.M., 170 Ill. App.3d at 560-61.) The J.M. court found that in order for the MRAI to apply to the same type of behavior as the MINS, the immediate danger phrase had to modify subsection (a). The Polovchak decision involved the MINS. In Polovchak, Michael and Anna Polovchak and their children, including their son, 12-year-old Walter, moved to Illinois from the Ukraine. Michael and Anna decided to return to the Ukraine but Walter did not want to leave the United States. Walter's parents did not want him to stay in the United States without them. Walter and his sister, without their parents' consent, moved in with their cousin for several days. Michael reported Walter's disappearance to the police. The police located Walter and called the Federal authorities regarding Walter's request to stay in the United States. The circuit court later adjudged Walter a ward of the court after finding him to be a minor in need of supervision. The circuit court denied Michael and Anna's request to have Walter returned to them. This court disagreed with the ruling of the circuit court: While this court has not previously construed the phrase `beyond the control' of one's parents,    it seems manifest that the legislature could not have intended that phrase to include an isolated act by a 12-year-old minor which poses no hazard to him or anyone else. Decisions in this court, while involving different issues, demonstrate that the initial determination that the minor was in need of supervision was predicated on the fact that he was incorrigible, a frequent runaway or his acts posed serious hazards to himself or others. [Citations.]    Neither psychiatrist, testifying in response to hypothetical questions based on these and other relevant facts, believed that Walter was beyond the control of his parents.    Walter's actions, which can hardly be characterized as those of a runaway, and posed no hazard to himself or anyone else, simply do not establish that he was beyond parental control. ( Polovchak, 97 Ill.2d at 224-26.) The Polovchak court also pointed out that Walter never stated he would not remain with his parents if released. ( Polovchak, 97 Ill.2d at 223.) Moreover, this court noted that Walter's reluctance to return home did not originate from his opposition to being reunited with his parents but rather from his desire not to return to the Ukraine, an unlikely possibility, had the court released him to his parents, in view of the interest manifested by the Federal agencies. ( Polovchak, 97 Ill.2d at 224.) For all of these reasons, the court in Polovchak held that Walter was not beyond the control of his parents and thus not in need of supervision. Our decision in the case at bar in no way conflicts with Polovchak. Polovchak only concerned whether a particular minor was beyond the control of his parents under the MINS. Under the MRAI, Polovchak would apply to section 3-3(1)(b) rather than section 3-3(1)(a). We conclude, therefore, that Polovchak does not mandate the interpretation of section 3-3(1) asserted by the J.M. court. The J.M. court also based its interpretation of section 3-3(1) on its finding that the legislature intended the MRAI to cover the same type of behavior covered by the MINS. The J.M. court pointed to the following exchange during the debate on the MRAI in the Illinois House of Representatives: [Representative] Kulas: Representative Grossi, Senate Bill 623 abolishes the category of minors known as minors in need of supervision, and it replaces this category with a second category called a minor requiring authoritative intervention. Could you explain the difference between the two categories to me? [Representative] Grossi: My understanding [is] that it is simply a change in the description of these types of minors. [Representative] Kulas: There is no difference, as far as factual differences? Is it just a name change, in other words? [Representative] Grossi: What is described [is] the same type of behavior, instead of identifying them as minors in need of supervision, they are now known as minors in need of authoritative intervention, and there's the addition of twenty-one days before they are brought before the court. 82d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 25, 1982, at 158. Our interpretation of the MRAI is not inconsistent with the substance of the House debate reiterated above. Even when section 3-3(1)(a) is interpreted as not requiring any proof of immediate danger to the minor, the MRAI and the MINS still apply to the same type of behavior; that is, both statutes apply to runaway minors. The MINS and the MRAI, however, are not exactly alike. The MINS only applied to minors beyond the control of their parents. The MRAI, however, not only applies to minors beyond the control of their parents, but also to minors absent from home without parental consent. If the legislature had intended the MRAI to cover exactly the same conduct as the MINS, the legislature would not have included the absentee category in the MRAI. In fact, section 1-4 of the Act reveals that the legislature intended to cover a broader range of activity under the MRAI: Nothing in this Act shall be construed to give    any court jurisdiction    over any minor solely on the basis of the minor's (i) misbehavior which does not violate any federal or state law or municipal ordinance, (ii) refusal to obey the orders or directions of a parent, guardian or custodian, (iii) absence from home without the consent of his or her parent, guardian or custodian, or (iv) truancy, until efforts and procedures to address and resolve such actions by a law enforcement officer during a period of limited custody, by crisis intervention services    and by alternative voluntary residential placement    have been exhausted without correcting such actions. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 801-4(b) (formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 701-19(b)).) Consequently, while we agree with the decision in J.M. upholding the constitutionality of the MRAI, we overrule that portion of the decision which interpreted the immediate danger phrase as modifying section 3-3(1)(a).