Opinion ID: 2500628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Guilty pleas and Brady violations

Text: Before addressing the substance of Huebler's Brady claim, we must address a threshold issue: may a defendant challenging the validity of a guilty plea assert a Brady claim? This issue arises because Brady evolved from the due-process guarantee of a fair trial, Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, and therefore has been described as a trial right, U.S. v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 285 (4th Cir.2010), but when a defendant pleads guilty, he waives several constitutional guarantees, including the due-process right to a fair trial, and any errors that occurred before entry of the plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973); Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 538 P.2d 164 (1975). We have never addressed in a published opinion whether a Brady claim can survive the entry of a guilty plea. [4] Several federal circuit courts of appeals have held that a Brady violation may be asserted to challenge the validity of a guilty plea. E.g., Sanchez v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.1995); White v. U.S., 858 F.2d 416, 422 (8th Cir.1988); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (2d Cir.1988); Campbell v. Marshall 769 F.2d 314, 321 (6th Cir. 1985); accord State v. Sturgeon, 231 Wis.2d 487, 605 N.W.2d 589, 596 (Wis.Ct.App.1999). But see Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that failure to disclose exculpatory evidence before entry of guilty plea does not render plea involuntary or constitute Brady violation). The Ninth Circuit, for example, has reasoned that `a defendant's decision whether or not to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by his appraisal of the prosecution's case' and a waiver of the right to trial cannot be deemed `intelligent and voluntary' if `entered without knowledge of material information withheld by the prosecution.' Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453 (quoting Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320). A contrary decision, according to the Ninth Circuit, could tempt prosecutors to deliberately withhold exculpatory information as part of an attempt to elicit guilty pleas. Id. The validity of those decisions allowing a challenge to a guilty plea based on a Brady violation have been called into question following the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002)the Court's only decision to date that has addressed Brady in the guilty-plea context. See U.S. v. Danzi, 726 F.Supp.2d 120, 127 (D.Conn.2010) (discussing government challenge to circuit precedent based on Ruiz ). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not require the prosecution to disclose impeachment information related to informants or other witnesses before entering a plea agreement with a defendant. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625, 122 S.Ct. 2450. The Ruiz Court did not address the obligation to disclose exculpatory information; as a result, courts have split as to whether the Court's decision also encompasses exculpatory information. [5] Compare U.S. v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 178-79 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that Ruiz implied that exculpatory evidence must be disclosed before guilty plea is entered), with McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787-88 (7th Cir.2003) (reasoning that it is highly likely based on language in Ruiz indicating a significant distinction between impeachment information and exculpatory evidence that Supreme Court would require prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence before guilty plea is entered). See also Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 285-86 (discussing differing opinions regarding scope of Ruiz in dicta but leaving issue unresolved because prosecutor did not withhold exculpatory evidence). We are persuaded by language in Ruiz and due-process considerations that a defendant may challenge the validity of a guilty plea based on the prosecution's failure to disclose material exculpatory information before entry of the plea. [6] In holding that the Constitution does not require the prosecution to disclose impeachment information before a guilty plea is entered, the Ruiz Court focused on the nature of impeachment information and its limited value in deciding whether to plead guilty. The Court first looked to the requirements for a knowing and voluntary plea. The Court explained that [i]t is particularly difficult to characterize impeachment information as critical information of which the defendant must always be aware prior to pleading guilty given the random way in which such information may, or may not, help a particular defendant because the value of impeachment information will depend upon the defendant's own independent knowledge of the prosecution's potential casea matter that the Constitution does not require prosecutors to disclose. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630, 122 S.Ct. 2450. Because of the limited value of impeachment evidence, the Court was reluctant to distinguish it as being more important than other information of which a defendant may be ignorant but still enter a knowing and voluntary plea. Id. at 630-31, 122 S.Ct. 2450. The Ruiz Court then turned to the due-process considerations that led to its decision in Brady, weighing the nature of the private interest at stake, the value of the additional safeguard, and any adverse impact that the additional safeguard would have on the government's interests. Id. at 631. Specifically, the Court repeated that the nature of impeachment information limited the added value of a right to that information before pleading guilty. And the Court rejected the idea that the additional right would have added value in reducing the chance that innocent individuals would plead guilty, in part because the plea agreement in that case stated that the prosecution would provide `any information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant.' Id. Against the limited private interest and added value, the Court determined that an obligation to provide impeachment information before entry of a guilty plea could seriously interfere with the Government's interest in securing those guilty pleas that are factually justified, desired by defendants, and help to secure the efficient administration of justice. Id. Given these considerations, the Court held that the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant. Id. at 633, 122 S.Ct. 2450. In our opinion, the considerations that led to the decision in Ruiz do not lead to the same conclusion when it comes to material exculpatory information. While the value of impeachment information may depend on innumerable variables that primarily come into play at trial and therefore arguably make it less than critical information in entering a guilty plea, the same cannot be said of exculpatory information, which is special not just in relation to the fairness of a trial but also in relation to whether a guilty plea is valid and accurate. For this reason, the due-process calculus also weighs in favor of the added safeguard of requiring the State to disclose material exculpatory information before the defendant enters a guilty plea. It is not every day that an innocent person accused of a crime pleads guilty, but a right to exculpatory information before entering a guilty plea diminishes the possibility that innocent persons accused of crimes will plead guilty. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 Case W. Res. L.Rev. 651 (2007) (discussing reasons that innocent defendant might plead guilty and how Brady disclosure in the guilty-plea context helps reduce risk of such pleas). The distinction between exculpatory and impeachment information in this respect is implicitly recognized in the Ruiz Court's focus on the disclosure requirement in the plea agreement in that case, which provided that the prosecution would disclose any information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant. 536 U.S. at 631, 122 S.Ct. 2450. Unlike in Ruiz, it is information that could establish the factual innocence of the defendantexculpatory informationthat is at issue. In turn, the adverse impact on the government of an obligation to provide exculpatory information is not as significant as the impact of an obligation to provide impeachment information. And importantly, the added safeguard comports with the prosecution's `special role . . . in the search for truth.' Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); see also Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 618, 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996) (The prosecutor represents the state and has a duty to see that justice is done in a criminal prosecution.); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) (The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.); id. cmt. ([I]t is fundamental that the prosecutor's obligation is to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public). We therefore hold that a defendant may challenge the validity of a guilty plea based on the prosecution's failure to disclose material exculpatory information before entry of the plea. Cf. RPC 3.8(d) (providing that prosecutor in a criminal case shall [m]ake timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused). The guilty-plea context, however, requires a different approach to the prejudice component of a Brady violation. Prejudice for purposes of a Brady violation requires a showing that the withheld evidence is material. Normally, evidence is material if it creates a reasonable doubt. [7] Mazzan, 116 Nev. at 74, 993 P.2d at 41. That standard of materiality is not helpful in the guilty-plea context because the defendant has admitted guilt. In fashioning a materiality test in that context, we also must be mindful that guilty pleas are presumptively valid and that the defendant therefore bears a heavy burden when challenging the validity of a guilty plea. See Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 190, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004). Other courts considering this issue have applied a standard of materiality that is based on the relevance of the withheld evidence to the defendant's decision to plead guilty: whether there is a reasonable probability that but for the failure to disclose the Brady material, the defendant would have refused to plead and would have gone to trial. Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454. This materiality test is similar to the prejudice test that is used to evaluate ineffective-assistance claims by a defendant who has pleaded guilty. Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding that to establish prejudice prong of ineffective-assistance claim, defendant who pleaded guilty must demonstrate reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial). We conclude that this materiality test best parallels the materiality test used for Brady claims in the trial context while also ensuring that guilty pleas are not lightly set aside. We therefore adopt the materiality test set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez v. U.S., 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.1995), but we adhere to our decision in Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121, 881 P.2d 1 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Foster v. State, 116 Nev. 1088, 13 P.3d 61 (2000), to use separate materiality tests depending on whether there was a specific request by the defense. Thus, when the defendant has made a specific request, withheld evidence is material in the guilty-plea context if there is a reasonable possibility that but for the failure to disclose the evidence the defendant would have refused to plead and would have insisted on going to trial. The materiality test is a high bar, cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) (describing ineffective-assistance test as high bar), that involves both a subjective and objective component. As a threshold matter, a defendant must affirmatively assert that he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 60, 106 S.Ct. 366 (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim because petitioner did not allege in his habeas petition that, had counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial). That is a subjective assertion. [8] But the validity and reasonableness of that subjective assertion must be evaluated through an objective analysis considering the totality of the circumstances. See Ostrander v. Green, 46 F.3d 347, 355 (4th Cir.1995) (discussing prejudice prong of Hill and observing that [o]bjective analysis of the prejudice prong is probably the only workable means of applying Hill ), overruled on other grounds by O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir.1996); see also Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454 (explaining that materiality test for Brady violation in guilty-plea context is an objective one that centers on `the likely persuasiveness of the withheld information' with respect to decision whether to plead guilty (quoting Miller, 848 F.2d at 1322)). Accordingly, the court must consider objective factors to determine whether a reasonable defendant in the same circumstances as the petitioner would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial. See Ostrander, 46 F.3d at 356. Cases from other jurisdictions provide useful guidance for evaluating whether there is a reasonable probability/possibility that, but for the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, the defendant would have refused to plead guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. In particular, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, which has adopted the same materiality inquiry for Brady claims based on withheld exculpatory evidence in the guilty-plea context, has developed the following list of factors to consider in applying the materiality test: (1) the relative strength and weakness of the State's case and the defendant's case; (2) the persuasiveness of the withheld evidence; (3) the reasons, if any, expressed by the defendant for choosing to plead guilty; (4) the benefits obtained by the defendant in exchange for the plea; and (5) the thoroughness of the plea colloquy. State v. Sturgeon, 231 Wis.2d 487, 605 N.W.2d 589, 596 (Wis.Ct.App.1999). [9] We agree that these are relevant considerations, but we also emphasize that this is not an exhaustive list and that [t]he particular case may present other relevant considerations. Id. With these considerations in mind, we turn to the district court's decision in this case.