Opinion ID: 1773531
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard: unfitness versus best interest

Text: Custody contests between a parent and a nonparent who does not fall within the statutory rule on `de facto' custodians are determined under a standard requiring the nonparent to prove that the case falls within one of two exceptions to parental entitlement to custody. One exception to the parent's superior right to custody arises if the parent is shown to be `unfit' by clear and convincing evidence. A second exception arises if the parent has waived his or her superior right to custody. [99] Under the first exception, the nonparent must first show by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has engaged in conduct similar to activity that could result in the termination of parental rights by the state. [100] Only after making such a threshold showing would the court determine custody in accordance with the child's best interest. [101] Under the second exception, however, if a waiver has been shown by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court shall determine custody between the parent and nonparent based on the best interest of the child. [102] Waiver requires proof of a `knowing and voluntary surrender or relinquishment of a known right.' [103] However, waiver may be implied by a party's decisive, unequivocal conduct reasonably inferring the intent to waive, [104] as long as statements and supporting circumstances [are] equivalent to an express waiver. [105] Kentucky's appellate courts have recognized two circumstances that constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of a parent's superior right to custody. Van Wey v. Van Wey [106] and Boatwright v. Walker [107] held, respectively, that once (1) a voluntary petition to terminate parental rights to permit an adoption or (2) a voluntary, knowing consent to adoption, have been executed, withdrawal, while permissible, nevertheless waives the parent's superior right to child custody, `and the best interests of the child [then] takes precedence.' [108] Whether a parent has waived his or her superior right to custody under KRS 405.020 is a fact-specific determination that should be made after consideration of all relevant factors. Here, based on the undisputed material facts in this case, we conclude that Moore and Dorning waived their superior rights to custody of Justin. Although their consents to Justin's adoption were held invalid because of their mistaken belief that they had until the TPR hearing to withdraw them, the consents were otherwise voluntarily and knowingly signed by them. Their mistake as to when they could revoke their consent was cured when the trial court, in effect, allowed them to revoke their consents to the adoption. But the fact remains that Moore and Dorning voluntarily signed consents with the knowledge and the intent that the consents would facilitate Justin's adoption. That was their intention when they signed the consents and it was their intention when they signed the petition to terminate their parental rights. Even if they had effectively revoked their consents within the statutory twenty-day cut-off period, under the circumstances of this case, we would hold that Moore and Dorning had waived their superior rights because they contacted the Asentes, not once but twice (and on occasions that were several months apart), about the adoption. This was neither a spur of the moment nor a coerced decision by Moore and Dorning. They signed the necessary forms for Justin's placement with the Asentes for the express purpose of his adoption by them, and when placement was finally approved, they delivered Justin to the Asentes. At that time, the intentions of Moore and Dorning to permanently change the legal custody of Justin to the Asentes were clearly defined. [109] Moore and Dorning were unquestionably and knowingly proceeding with a course of action that would result in Justin being considered for purposes of inheritance and succession and for all other legal considerations, the natural child of the [Asentes], the same as if born of their bodies, and terminating all legal relationship[s] between [Justin and Moore and Dorning]. [110] Thereafter, they voluntarily and knowingly signed a petition for the termination of their parental rights and for the transfer of custody to the Asentes for the purpose of his adoption upon the termination of their parental rights. Moore did not notify the Asentes of her change of heart regarding Justin's adoption until 37 days after Justin had physically been delivered to the Asentes. And, Moore and Dorning did not file this action to regain Justin's custody until almost six (6) months after turning him over to the Asentes. Under the circumstances, Moore and Dorning not only waived their superior right to the custody of Justin but are estopped from claiming otherwise. [111] We therefore hold that, upon remand, the trial court shall determine custody in accordance with Justin's present best interest.