Opinion ID: 24783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cross-Appellant’s Damage Award Claims

Text: Galindo argues that the magistrate judge erred in denying back and front pay damages and liquidated damages under the Equal Pay Act. In this circumstance, front and back pay are equitable remedies under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). See 42 U.S.C. 1981(b)(2) (1994). The trial court has discretion to determine whether an award of front and back pay is an appropriate -14- remedy for intentional discrimination. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 423 n.19 (5th Cir. 1998). We review the magistrate judge’s denial of front and back pay under an abuse of discretion standard. See Sellers v. Delgado Cmty. Coll., 839 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir. 1988). However, “‘in the absence of special circumstances, back pay should always be awarded when a Title VII violation is found,’ and the instances wherein such an award is not granted are exceedingly rare.” Id. (quoting Rasimas v. Mich. Dep’t. of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 626 (6th Cir. 1983)). The trial court’s discretion “must be exercised in light of the objectives of Title VII.” Floca v. Homecare Health Serv., Inc., 845 F.2d 108, 111 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)). “The purposes of Title VII are to achieve equality of employment opportunity and to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.” Id. Although Galindo argued to the trial court in her Motion for Determination of Relief and for Entry of Judgment that she was entitled to front and back pay under 1981a and 2000e-5(g), the magistrate judge never addressed the issue. See Record at 1:221; 2:347-52. The jury concluded that the defendants discharged Galindo in retaliation for her protected activity. See Record at 2:215. Galindo did not work for over two months as a result of her termination. Given the Supreme Court’s holding in Albemarle that trial judges should address equitable remedies such as front and back pay under 2000e-5(g), the magistrate judge should have considered Galindo’s request. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421. We remand the issue of front and back pay to the trial court for further proceedings. -15- Galindo also claims that the magistrate judge erred in denying her liquidated damages under the Equal Pay Act. The evidence submitted at trial, however, was insufficient to support her claim for wage discrimination under Title VII and, therefore, is also insufficient to support a claim under the Equal Pay Act.4 Thus, Galindo is not entitled to damages on her wage discrimination claim under either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act.