Opinion ID: 4486955
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kansas Public Policy

Text: Next, relying on a Kansas Supreme Court case, Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corp., 304 P.3d 1226 (Kan. 2013), Claimants argue that the contractual one-year suit-limitation provision abbreviates the applicable statute of limitations in a manner contrary to Kansas public policy and therefore is unenforceable. Generally under Kansas law, parties are free to contractually shorten otherwise -15- applicable statutes of limitations. Id. This principle recognizes the fact that Kansas public policy favors not interfering with parties’ freedom of contract. See Marshall v. Kan. Med. Mut. Ins., 73 P.3d 120, 128 (Kan. 2003). It is also warranted in light of the fact that “[s]uit limitation provisions serve a number of legitimate purposes which can ultimately lower costs to consumers.” B.S.C. Hold. Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 625 F. App’x 906, 911 (10th Cir. 2015). In Pfeifer, the Kansas Supreme Court limited parties’ freedom to contract in this manner where doing so would violate a “strongly held public policy interest.” Pfeifer, 304 P.3d at 1234. Pfeifer involved a suit-limitation provision in an employment contract that restricted the time in which employees could bring retaliatory discharge claims based on the exercise of rights granted under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. Under the contract at issue, the generally applicable period of two years was reduced to only six months. In considering the validity of the suit-limitation provision, the Kansas Supreme Court noted the issue “is lodged squarely between two long-standing public policy interests”—the freedom to contract and the “protections afforded injured workers against retaliatory discharge when exercising statutory workers compensation rights.” Id. at 1228. In recognizing the latter public policy interest, the court looked to Kansas case law discussing “a thoroughly established public policy supporting injured workers’ rights to pursue remedies for their on-the-job injuries and -16- opposing retaliation against them for exercising their rights.” Id. at 1232 (citing Hysten v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 108 P.3d 437, 444 (Kan. 2004)). The court also noted that the recognition of the retaliatory discharge tort was essential to the protection of the statutory rights of the Workers Compensation Act, which, “exist only because of the legislature’s determination that such [rights are] in the public interest.” Id. Because it found contractually abbreviating the otherwise applicable two-year statute of limitations period to six months would have a “deterrent” effect on the exercise of such rights, the court found the public policy concerns sufficient to invalidate the contractual suit-limitation provision at issue. Id. at 1232–34. Claimants argue that a similar conclusion is warranted here because their “wrongful death, survival and consumer protection claims invoke public policy concerns of a greater magnitude than the retaliatory discharge claim protected by the Pfeifer court.” Aplt. Br. at 28. But Claimants fail to support this conclusory statement with sufficient evidence to demonstrate a “strongly held public policy interest” is at stake. Pfeifer, 304 P.3d at 1234. With respect to Claimants’ wrongful death claim and survival actions, Claimants point to Kansas case law recognizing these causes of action. None of these cases, however, explicitly state a Kansas public policy with respect to the claim at issue, much less one strong enough to outweigh the policy favoring parties’ freedom to contract. See Byrd v. -17- Wesley Med. Ctr., 699 P.2d 459, 468 (Kan. 1985); Flowers v. Marshall, 494 P.2d 1184, 1188 (Kan. 1972). We decline to read such Kansas public policy statements into these precedents. Finally, Claimants suggest that Section 9’s suit-limitation provision violates Kansas public policy because their claims stem from statutory authority. While statutory rights reflect the Kansas “legislature’s determination that such a right is in the public interest,” and thereby provide some evidence of a public policy interest, see Pfeifer, 304 P.3d at 1232, we decline to read Pfeifer so broadly as to invalidate suit-limitation provisions with respect to all statutory rights. Such a broad reading would contradict Pfeifer’s statement that its holding “is limited to the circumstances in which there is a strongly held public policy interest at issue.” Id. at 1234. Indeed, Pfeifer itself affirmed the general proposition that parties are free to shorten applicable statutes of limitations through contracts. See id. at 1231. Accordingly, we hold that the contractual limitations period at issue is neither void or unenforceable as contrary to Kansas public policy.