Opinion ID: 29035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment to SWBT de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Rivers v. Cent. & S.W. Corp., 186 F.3d 681, 683 (5th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is genuine when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 1 This court need not address whether plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding his claims for discrimination under the ADEA, infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the FLSA. Miller waived review of these issues by not incorporating them into the Argument of his Brief. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 n.5 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing cases and FED. R. APP. P. 28). 5 non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law dictates which facts are material, Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1999), and an issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Moreover, in summary judgment proceedings, the record is considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Dupre v. Charter Behav. Health Sys. of Lafayette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-66 (1986). Summary judgment is ultimately appropriate if the non-movant fails to establish facts supporting an essential element of his prima facie claim. Mason v. United Air Lines, 274 F.3d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). III. MILLER’S ADA CLAIM BASED ON REGARDED DISABILITY The ADA prohibits discrimination by private employers against any qualified individual with a disability. See, e.g., Dupre, 242 F.3d at 613. When claiming discrimination based on disability, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was disabled; (2) he was none-the-less qualified to do the job; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him; and (4) that he was replaced by or treated less favorably than non-disabled employees. E.g., id. If a plaintiff can assert a prima facie 6 case for disability discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action; should the employer succeed in doing so, the burden the shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the articulated reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. McInnis v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 2000). An individual qualifies as disabled under the ADA if he demonstrates: (1) he has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one or more of his major life activities; (2) he has a record of such impairment; or (3) he is regarded as having such an impairment. E.g., Aldrup v. Caldera, 274 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2001); McInnis, 207 F.3d at 279-80. When asserting a regarded disability, a plaintiff such as Miller is required to demonstrate that his employer mistakenly believed that either (1) he had a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities; or (2) he had an actual, non-limiting impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. Aldrup, 274 F.3d at 287 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)). Under each of these scenarios, an employer must “entertain some misperception regarding the individual—either that he has a substantially limiting impairment that he does not have or the impairment is not so limiting as believed.” Id. 7 On appeal, Miller insists that his employer regarded him as suffering a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.2 Hence, the key inquiry is whether SWBT mistakenly perceived that Miller had an impairment that substantially limited his major life activity of “working.”3 The Supreme Court recently reemphasized that when working is the major life activity under consideration, the statutory phrase “substantially limits” requires a plaintiff to allege that he was unable to work in a broad range or class of jobs, rather than one specific job. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, - - -, 122 S. Ct. 681, 692 (2002) (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491). Combining the relevant analytical criteria yields the following standard, which is directly applicable to the instant case: To demonstrate that SWBT regarded him as disabled, Miller must produce evidence that SWBT mistakenly believed that he had 2 Miller does not argue that SWBT had the mistaken perception that he had a substantial, non-limiting impairment. 3 The Supreme Court has defined major life activity as those activities that are “of central importance to daily life.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, - - -, 122 S. Ct. 681, 691 (2002). Examples of major life activities include speaking, breathing, learning, and working. E.g., Aldrup, 274 F.3d at 286. Throughout this litigation, Miller has asserted only that his major life activity of working has been implicated. Had Miller asserted another major life activity, the analysis on substantial limitation would be drastically different. Williams, 122 S. Ct. at 693. (“Sutton did not suggest that a class-based analysis should be applied to any major life activity other than working.”). 8 an impairment that made him unable to work in a broad class or range of jobs, as opposed to one specific job. In granting summary judgment to SWBT, the district court determined that Miller had not met the requirements for being regarded as having a disability. The trial court found that Miller had not offered sufficient evidence to raise any inference that SWBT believed that Miller’s impairments would substantially limit him in the major life activity of working. This precluded Miller from successfully asserting his prima facie case for disability discrimination. The court also concluded that even had Miller established a prima facie case, he still would not have been able to advance a viable claim that SWBT’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was a mere pretext for discrimination. We find it unnecessary to discuss whether SWBT’s proffered reason was nondiscriminatory because it is quite clear that Miller did not fulfill his initial burden of meeting his prima facie case for disability discrimination. Miller asserts that he can fulfill his summary judgment burden by demonstrating that SWBT did regard him as being disabled prior to his termination.4 He offers the following 4 In his Brief, Miller asserts that he can “clearly meet at least two” of the factors, i.e., that he had a substantially limiting physical impairment (actually disabled) and that he was regarded as such, that would qualify him as disabled. However, he offers no real support for this contention. The district court recognized that Miller did not contend that he was actually disabled, but only that SWBT regarded him as disabled, and therefore did not rule on the actual disability. Further, on 9 arguments for consideration: that it was only after he returned from six-week disability leave that SWBT began the process of dismissing him; that he was substantially limited because he was restricted as to the duration he could work under the physician’s orders, and his work schedule was thus cut from eighty-four hours per week to fifty; and that three weeks afer his return from disability leave, upon his request for rest and medication, he was suspended and then fired. On the other hand, SWBT contends that the summary judgment evidence established that SWBT did not regard Miller as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. SWBT also asserts that an employer should not be held liable under the ADA for “regarding” an individual with having a disability where the employer merely relies upon restrictions placed upon the employee by the employer. It argues further that Miller was allowed to work as a fully functioning CST without any restrictions beyond those prescribed by his doctor. Viewing any factual disputes in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we will assume that all of Miller’s appeal, Miller states that he “may have had no impairment at all but Defendant treated him as having a substantial limiting impairment.” Given this statement, it appears that Miller is not taking his claim of actual disability very seriously; but in the unlikely circumstance that he were, this argument cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal since Miller’s initial argument on the issue was insufficient for the district court to rule on it. See, e.g., Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 663 (5th Cir. 2000). 10 allegations are true. However, even in the light most favorable to him, Miller’s contentions fall short of raising a genuine issue of fact. Initially, Miller fails to adduce evidence to support a claim that SWBT believed that he was unable to participate in a broad range of jobs. He does not even appear to introduce evidence that SWBT believed that he was unable to participate in one specific job, as he was allowed to continue working as a CST subsequent to his return from disability leave. Moreover, Miller’s supervisor Dugas testified that it was his understanding that Miller had difficulty with his knees if he squatted for too long and his back hurt if he sat for long periods of time. Miller does not dispute the additional testimony in which Dugas indicated that these kinds of complaints were not unusual from members on his crew, and therefore he did not perceive these physical ailments as significantly limiting. The fact that Miller was terminated weeks after his return and that he was suspended after his request for rest and medication does not sufficiently establish that SWBT believed that he was unable to work a broad range of jobs. While his termination may (merely in a circumstantial sense) indicate that SWBT believed that he was unable to be employed as a CST, this does not sufficiently raise a genuine issue as to whether SWBT believed that Miller was unable to work in a range of occupational positions. See Dupre, 242 F.3d at 616 (denying plaintiff’s regarded disability claim even though defendant fired 11 plaintiff because “an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as having a substantially limiting impairment simply because it believes the employee is incapable of performing a particular job”). Miller’s assertion that he suffered a substantial limitation on his ability to work because instead of laboring for his usual eighty-four hour week, he had to work fifty, is equally problematic. When evaluating the traditional forty-hour work week, courts have determined that the inability to work overtime is not a substantial limitation on the ability to work under the ADA. E.g., Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 598-99 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing cases); see also Brennan v. Nat’l Tel. Directory Corp., 850 F. Supp. 331, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (“The inability to work overtime hardly makes a plaintiff handicapped.”). In addition, this argument does not address the critical issue of whether Miller’s supervisors regarded him as being unable to work a broad range of jobs. Indeed, the uncontroverted evidence indicates that Miller’s supervisor believed that he could and would, despite his physician’s directions, exceed his allotted work time. Further, SWBT cannot be considered to have regarded Miller as being disabled simply because of its receipt of the note from Miller’s physician. Significantly, Miller forgets that the standard for regarded disability hinges on the mistaken belief of impairment. “[I]f the employer’s belief [about the employee’s 12 condition] corresponds to the employee’s or his physician’s description of his limitations, the employer cannot be viewed as improperly regarding him as disabled.” Eber v. Harris County Hosp. Dist., 130 F. Supp. 2d 847, 863 (S.D. Tex. 2001). Even assuming arguendo that this evidence satisfactorily raises the issue of SWBT’s belief of his impairment, Miller’s introduction of the doctor’s note is ultimately counterproductive to his cause because it suggests that SWBT was correct, i.e., not mistaken, to assume some sort of impairment. Because Miller has not demonstrated that SWBT regarded his physical condition to substantially limit his ability to perform the major life activity of working during his tenure at SWBT, a reasonable jury could not find that he was qualifiedly disabled. Miller’s failure to introduce facts supporting this essential element of his prima facie claim of disability discrimination indicates that the trial court acted properly in granting summary judgment to SWBT on Miller’s claim of disability discrimination.