Opinion ID: 2319442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Kante Failed to Show Membership in a Particular Social Group of Women Subjected to Rape as a Method of Government Control

Text: Kante also contends that she was targeted for the attack and rape because she is a member of a a particular social group of women subjected to rape as a method of government control because the attack was committed by members of the Guinean armed forces or political enemies of the RPG in retaliation for her father's support of the RPG. The immigration judge, as well as the Board, did not make such a finding, noting that the definition of the particular social group submitted by Kante is overly broad and otherwise does not meet the parameters of a particular social group. The phrase membership in a particular social group is not statutorily defined, but several Board decisions have refined and articulated the requirements to include: (1) a shared immutable or fundamental characteristic; (2) social visibility; (3) particularity; and (4) the group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subject to harm. Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (BIA 2007), aff'd sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007); accord Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546-50 (6th Cir.2003), modified on other grounds, Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir.2006). Due to the generalized and far-reaching nature of Kante's submitted classification, it has not previously served as a definable limitation. See Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 548. In addition, the group posited by Kante is circularly defined by the fact that it suffers persecution, and the group does not share any narrowing characteristic other than the risk of being persecuted. We have held that a social group may not be circularly defined by the fact that it suffers persecution. In other words, the individuals in the group must share a narrowing characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted. See Castro-Paz v. Holder, 375 Fed.Appx. 586, 590-91 (6th Cir.2010). Moreover, as a factual matter, Kante did not show that government forces used rape as a means of maintaining control or that the Guinean society viewed females as a group specifically targeted for mistreatment. Therefore, the immigration judge reasonably concluded that the social group identified by Kante did not constitute a particular social group warranting relief within the meaning of the Immigration and Naturalization Act and her applications for asylum and withholding of removal on this ground were properly denied. For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition.