Opinion ID: 379476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sixth Amendment Framework

Text: 142 To summarize, Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel cases can be divided into two categories: (1) those in which the accused is actually denied the assistance of counsel, and (2) those in which his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is denied by virtue of the ineffective representation that counsel rendered. The classic case involving the actual denial of counsel is Gideon v. Wainwright : 25 no defense coun sel was appointed. Other examples in which the assistance of counsel was actually denied include Geders v. United States 26 and Herring v. New York. 27 In both of those cases the defendant did not have the assistance of a lawyer at a critical stage in his trial. 143 The second category, which may be termed a constructive denial of counsel, includes cases in which defense counsel was present and able to participate in every aspect of the trial, but for one reason or another the defense presented is viewed as the equivalent of a denial of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. Cases in which the defense lawyer was ineffective fall into this second category: though the defendant was actually represented, his lawyer's performance was so ineffective that it was tantamount to a denial of his constitutional right. 144 If a defendant is denied the actual assistance of counsel, his constitutional right is violated without any further showing. A showing of such denial is all the prejudice that the Constitution requires, so when he is denied the presence and assistance of counsel at a critical phase of his trial a defendant need not prove further exactly how he was harmed. 28 But cases where counsel was present and assisting, and which involve allegations that a defendant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel was constructively denied as a result of the defense lawyer's ineffectiveness, are different. In these cases the question is: was the attorney's performance so deficient as to constitute the equivalent of a denial of the accused's constitutional right? And in case after case involving an alleged constructive denial of the assistance of counsel it has been held that a lawyer's ineffectiveness is not tantamount to denial of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel unless the defendant can show that he was prejudiced. 29 Therefore in order to establish that his lawyer's ineffectiveness amounted to a Sixth Amendment violation, a defendant must show substantial unfair prejudice to his defense resulting from a substantial violation of duty owed him by his counsel. 145 To illustrate: suppose defense counsel, as frequently happens in criminal cases, does not call any witnesses. 30 Such an allegation would have no force unless it were shown that witnesses to beneficial material facts exist and the lawyer's failure to produce their testimony worked some substantial unfair prejudice to defendant's cause. If the defendant makes the requisite prima facie showing of a substantial violation of the constitutional duty owed him by counsel that resulted in substantial unfair prejudice to his defense, the burden of proceeding shifts to the Government. 31 Then the Government has a right to show, for example, that the alleged witnesses did not exist or could not be located, or that counsel was given no indication that such witnesses did exist, or that the testimony of the witnesses was irrelevant or otherwise deficient. 32 If despite the Government's effort to rebut the evidence presented by the defendant, the defendant eventually carries his burden he demonstrates that a substantial violation of a duty owed him by counsel resulted in substantial unfair prejudice to his defense then a constitutional violation has occurred. 33 146 Applying this test to the instant case, it is clear that Decoster's Sixth Amendment right was not infringed. First, Decoster has great difficulty demonstrating that there was a substantial breach of duty by his lawyer. Judge Waddy's findings to the contrary have not been shown to be clearly erroneous. I agree that counsel is under an obligation to investigate non-fabricated defenses, but the facts here overwhelmingly support Judge Waddy's finding that the only possible defense for Decoster was to put the Government to its proof. From the entire record, it is my view that Decoster's lawyer concluded that he was guilty after: (1) participating in the preliminary hearing; 34 (2) six interviews with appellant; 35 (3) studying the government's file, to which he had access; 36 (4) reviewing the grand jury testimony; 37 (5) reading the transcript of the preliminary hearing; 38 and (6) receiving a letter from Decoster in which he admitted that he was fighting with the victim at the time of the robbery. 39 In addition, counsel, who acted for all defendants at the preliminary hearing, 40 knew that both men who were with Decoster at the time of the robbery had pleaded guilty to that charge on June 18, 1971. Under such circumstances, an extensive investigation was not warranted. 147 More important, there is not a shred of evidence in the record suggesting that Decoster was prejudiced in any way by the conduct of his counsel. We now know, on the basis of Decoster's admission at sentencing on March 3, 1972, that he was guilty, and this is corroborated by a letter he wrote to the Judge which the court referred to at sentencing and which Decoster then acknowledged. 41 Even without Decoster's admissions, it would be hard to imagine a case with more certain proof of guilt and with less room for creditable contrary evidence. Two policemen actually observed Decoster committing the robbery in broad daylight; one of them chased him and without losing sight of him, arrested him. (The dissent shades the facts by stating that the police officers found Decoster. Dissent page --- of --- U.S.App.D.C., page 267 of 624 F.2d.) Decoster was identified on the spot by the victim and one of Decoster's confederates contradicted Decoster's alibi when he testified that Decoster was present at the scene of the robbery. With this factual background, it is not, and cannot be, contended that Decoster was innocent. Even the most extensive investigation could not have discovered exculpatory facts, for there were none to find. Since any failure on the part of defense counsel to investigate was not prejudicial to Decoster, Decoster's Sixth Amendment right to have the assistance of counsel was not violated. 148