Opinion ID: 2574747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the court erred in admitting the hearsay statements in the recorded phone calls

Text: {17} The recording and transcript of the telephone conversation between Eric and Jessica were admitted into evidence without limitation and despite Defendant's hearsay objection. `Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rule 11-801(C) NMRA. Hearsay is not admissible except pursuant to an explicit exception in our court rules or by statute. Rule 11-802 NMRA. Thus, we must determine whether any statements in the phone call were hearsay, and if so, whether they fell under any exception to the hearsay rule. The trial record does not clearly reveal the trial court's specific reason for admitting the statements, but we may uphold the judge's decision if it was right for any reason. State v. Boyett, 2008-NMSC-030, ¶ 25, 144 N.M. 184, 185 P.3d 355. {18} For the purposes of our discussion, we focus on those out-of-court statements by Jessica that had the potential to incriminate Defendant: Uh, it was, well, yeah, it was [Defendant who shot the victim]. The, I guess [Defendant shot the victim] in the back. Shot him in the back. In the back of the head. Got him in the back of the head. Uh, nah, [Defendant] said that he, he told me that nobody, the only one that was with him [at the time of the shooting] was Fat Ass and that Fat Ass was all scared, too. {19} Each of these statements was made out of court. The District Attorney insisted at trial that the phone calls speak the truth and should be admitted for that reason. Nevertheless, on appeal the State argues that the statements were not admitted for truth, but for the purposes of impeachment or to refresh the witnesses' memory. Neither explanation is plausible, and even if they were, neither the CD nor the transcript should have been provided to the jury during its deliberations for use as substantive evidence. {20} With respect to the State's claim that the phone call was used as impeachment evidence, it is generally true that a witness's prior inconsistent statements may be used to cast doubt on the witness's credibility. Rules 11-607, 11-613 NMRA; see also State v. Hermosillo, 88 N.M. 424, 432, 540 P.2d 1313, 1321 (Ct.App.1975) (noting that the credibility of a witness is subject to an attack by proof that the witness on a previous occasion has made statements inconsistent with his present testimony. (Hernández, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). When impeaching with prior inconsistent statements not made under oath, it is the fact of the inconsistency that is admissible, not the substantive truth or falsity of the prior statement. See 3A John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1017, at 993 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1970) (We place [the witness's] contradictory statements side by side, and, as both cannot be correct, we realize that in at least one of the two he must have spoken erroneously. Thus, we have detected him in one specific error, from which may be inferred a capacity to make other errors.); Rule 11-801(D)(1)(a) (providing an exclusion from the definition of hearsay, not relevant to this case, which allows the admission as substantive evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statements given under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition). To accomplish impeachment by prior inconsistent statements, the attorney must first elicit in-court testimony about a matter. If the testimony is inconsistent with a witness's prior statement, the attorney confronts the witness with the prior statement. The attorney must provide the witness with an opportunity to explain and the opposite party an opportunity to examine on the statement, although not necessarily with any specification of any particular time or sequence of the statement. State v. Dominguez, 2007-NMSC-060, ¶ 18, 142 N.M. 811, 171 P.3d 750 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Rule 11-613(B) (making admission of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements contingent upon the witness having an opportunity to explain the statements). {21} The use of the taped phone conversation during the District Attorney's direct examination of Eric was not for impeachment purposes. The District Attorney began this area of questioning by asking Eric whether he remembered calling Jessica on January 15, 2006. After Eric testified that he did not remember the telephone call and was uncertain what was discussed, the District Attorney distributed a transcript to the jury and played the recording of the phone call in its entirety. The District Attorney then proceeded to have Eric attempt to interpret the meaning of Jessica's statements. The District Attorney simply was not impeaching Eric with a prior inconsistent statement, because Eric had not made a statement in his testimony that could be impeached by the statements made in the call. [2] See State v. Spadafore, 159 W.Va. 236, 220 S.E.2d 655, 656 (1975) (syllabus by the court) (Prior out-of-court statements may be used to impeach the credibility of a witness and a prior inconsistent statement may be introduced concerning any specific matter about which the witness has testified at trial; however, where the witness does not testify contrary to his prior statement but demonstrates an absence of memory, such prior statement must be used sparingly to demonstrate lack of integrity in the witness or the reason for surprise to the party which calls him, but these legitimate purposes may not be used as a ruse for introducing inadmissible evidence.). Neither could the statements be used to impeach Jessica, who had not yet testified when Eric took the stand. In any case, even if impeachment were proper, the introduction of the entire call with its myriad hearsay statements would plainly be an inappropriate undertaking, unless the hearsay itself were admissible. See McClaugherty, 2003-NMSC-006, ¶ 27, 133 N.M. 459, 64 P.3d 486 (finding error where [t]he statements that were used by the State did not serve only to impeach; they offered an admission by Defendant on an issue that was highly disputed at trial[,] but the admission was inadmissible.). {22} The approach taken with Jessica was virtually identical to that taken with Eric. The District Attorney's direct examination concerning the call began with general questions regarding whether Jessica remembered her telephone conversations in the days following the shooting. Jessica indicated that she did not recall the content of the conversations. The District Attorney then read from a transcript of the January 15 phone call, asking Jessica if she recalled the specifics of the conversation. As with Eric, the District Attorney's questioning cannot fairly be characterized as an impeachment of the witness with a prior statement. In any event, the recording and transcript of statements used to impeach should not have been admitted as an exhibit for use by the jury as substantive evidence. See Armijo, 2005-NMCA-010, ¶ 9, 136 N.M. 723, 104 P.3d 1114 ([A] prior inconsistent statement not under oath is inadmissible as substantive evidence (citing State v. Gutierrez, 1998-NMCA-172, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 366, 969 P.2d 970 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted))); Rule 11-801(D)(1)(a) (allowing the admission as substantive evidence of prior inconsistent statements made under oath in a prior proceeding). {23} Similarly, despite the State's superficial attempts to disguise its actions as refreshing the recollection of the witnesses, the playing and reading of the recorded conversations before the jury and the admission of the CD and transcript of the phone call exceeded the limited activities allowed by our Rules of Evidence. See Rule 11-612 NMRA. Although witnesses are expected to testify in their own words, there are times when a witness does not have perfect recall. In order to refresh a witness's recollection with an exhibit, the attorney must first establish that the witness does not recall the matter. State v. Bazan, 90 N.M. 209, 212, 561 P.2d 482, 485 (Ct.App.1977) (No means of arousing recollection may be used until the witness has satisfied the trial judge that he lacks effective present recollection .... (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see generally Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 9, at 37-43 (6th ed.2006) (describing the process of refreshing recollection). {24} Next, the attorney must determine that the witness's memory will be refreshed by reference to a certain exhibit. If the witness does not agree that the exhibit will be helpful, then the attorney may not attempt to refresh the witness's memory by calling the witness's attention to the exhibit. See State v. Orona, 92 N.M. 450, 454, 589 P.2d 1041, 1045 (1979) ( If the witness acknowledges the statement, the court may allow the witness to use it to refresh his recollection. (emphasis added)). If the witness testifies that the exhibit might refresh his or her memory, the witness reviews the exhibit without the jury viewing or listening to the exhibit. {25} Although a song, a scent, a photograph, all allusion, even a past statement known to be false may be used to refresh a witness's recollection, Bazan, 90 N.M. at 212, 561 P.2d at 485 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), we believe that the refreshing of recollection must be conducted, as under the federal rules, to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as... asking questions in the hearing of the jury. Broun, supra, § 9 at 38 n. 7. After the witness has considered the exhibit, the attorney must then ask the witness whether his or her memory has been refreshed. If the answer is yes, the exhibit is removed from the witness and the witness continues with his or her testimony. See 3 Wigmore, supra, § 758, at 125 ([I]f an actual present recollection results, of the quality sufficient for testimony, the process and the result are legitimate. (internal citation omitted)). The testimony must come from the witness's restored memory, not from the exhibit, and certainly not from the questioning attorney. Orona, 92 N.M. at 455, 589 P.2d at 1046 ([I]f a party can offer a previously given statement to substitute for a witness's testimony under the guise of `refreshing recollection,' the whole adversary system of trial must be revised. The evil of this practice hardly merits discussion. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {26} In this case, the witnesses never acknowledged that the recording or transcript would refresh their recollections. Moreover, instead of providing the recording and transcription to the witnesses outside the presence of the jury, the District Attorney, with the trial court's permission, conveyed their content directly to the jury without bothering to determine whether the witnesses' recollections might be refreshed such that they could testify. The allowable procedure for refreshing recollection was simply not followed. Even if it had been, the District Attorney would not have been justified in admitting the CD or transcript as evidence for the jury to consider. See Broun, supra, § 9 at 42 (noting that the adversary [may] inspect the memoranda used to refresh memory during the witness's examination, [and] she may also submit them to the jury for their examination. However, the party calling the witness may not do so unless the memoranda constitute independent evidence not barred by the hearsay rule. (Footnotes omitted.)). {27} In the absence of a reasonable explanation of how the statements might have been offered for anything other than the truth of the matter, we must conclude that they were, in fact, admitted for truth. Therefore, because the statements were made out of court and as proof of facts contained in the out-of-court statement, we hold that they constituted hearsay. See Rule 11-801(C). {28} Since the statements were hearsay, they were only admissible if they fell within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. See Rules 11-802, 11-803, 11-804 NMRA. The State suggests that even if the statements were hearsay, they could have fallen under the present sense impression exception, Rule 11-803(A), or the excited utterance exception, Rule 11-803(B). At trial, the District Attorney also suggested that the recordings fell under the business records exception of Rule 11-803(F) or the recorded recollection exception of Rule 11-803(E). {29} We reject these contentions. First, a present sense impression is defined as [a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. Rule 11-803(A). Although it appears undisputed that Jessica was observing Defendant's discussion with police during her phone call with Eric, her hearsay statements concerned the events of the previous night. The State does not suggest, and in any case there is no evidence that would support the assertion, that Jessica perceived the shooting. Her statements were not present sense impressions. {30} Second, an excited utterance is defined in our rules as [a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Rule 11-803(B). The theory underlying the excited utterance exception is that the exciting event induced the declarant's surprise, shock, or nervous excitement which temporarily stills capacity for conscious fabrication and makes it unlikely that the speaker would relate other than the truth. State v. Martinez, 99 N.M. 48, 51, 653 P.2d 879, 882 (Ct.App.1982). This theory presupposes that the witness was actually present to experience the exciting event; nothing about being in a state of excitement would lead us to believe that a witness is less likely to fabricate information about events of which he or she had no first-hand knowledge. Jessica's most damaging statements concerned the shooting itself, and for this reason, if her statements were to be admitted under the excited utterance exception, she must, at the time of the phone call, have been under the stress of excitement caused by the shootingnot, for instance, by the arrival of police next door. However, once again, there is no suggestion that Jessica was present at the shooting. {31} The State suggests that Jessica was merely conveying that Defendant  told her he shot and killed the victim (emphasis added) the night before. Setting aside the fact that many of Jessica's statements make no attribution to Defendant at all, this reading would still present insurmountable problems for the excited utterance theory. Although it would clarify that Jessica was excited by Defendant's admissions rather than by the events themselves, it would do nothing to explain how Jessica would still have been so excited, nearly twelve hours after talking to Defendant, that Rule 11-803(B) should apply to her statements. We have held that in order to constitute an excited utterance, the declaration should be spontaneous, made before there is time for fabrication, and made under the stress of the moment. State v. Martinez, 102 N.M. 94, 99, 691 P.2d 887, 892 (Ct.App.1984). Jessica's statements do not fit this description: far from exhibiting any spontaneity, other hearsay statements in the calls suggest that Jessica was, in part, communicating on behalf of Defendant; the calls were made many hours after the State contends that Jessica was made aware of Defendant's role in the shooting; and finally, the statements concerning the shooting were prefaced by small talk that indicated that the stress of the moment had passed. Thus, these statements were not excited utterances. {32} Third, we reject the contention that the recorded calls were records of regularly conducted activity under Rule 11-803(F). Under that rule, hearsay is admissible if it is: [a] memorandum, report, record or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness ... unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. Rule 11-803(F) (emphasis added). The justification for this exception is that [r]eliability is furnished by the fact that regularly kept records typically have a high degree of accuracy. The regularity and continuity of the records are calculated to train the recordkeeper in habits of precision[.] Broun, supra, § 286 at 304. Here, even if the jail was a business and the recordings were regularly conducted business activities, conclusions we need not make, Jessica's statements would clearly fall outside of the rule. {33} Where the hearsay statements to be admitted from a business record come from individuals without personal knowledge who are under no duty to report to the recordkeeper, we cannot hold that the requirements of this exception are met. In Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 926-27 (Tex. Crim.App.2004), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether a trial court should have admitted statements from the defendant's wife that were contained in a report created by a women's shelter. It concluded that [t]he records themselves were admissible, but that does not mean that all information, from whatever source or of whatever reliability, contained within those business records is necessarily admissible. When a business receives information from a person who is outside the business and who has no business duty to report or to report accurately, those statements are not covered by the business records exception. Those statements must independently qualify for admission under their own hearsay exception.... Id. (footnotes omitted). We agree with this reasoning. To hold otherwise would be to allow the State to transform completely inadmissible hearsay into admissible evidence simply by routinely recording it. {34} Finally, the transcript was not admissible as a recorded recollection. Under Rule 11-803(E), hearsay may be admitted if it is: [a] memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness's memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. Neither Eric nor Jessica testified that he or she had made or adopted the recordings when the matter was fresh in his or her memory or that the information in the recordings correctly reflected his or her knowledge, and so the statements do not fall under Rule 11-803(E). Cf. State v. Allison, 2000-NMSC-027, ¶ 30, 129 N.M. 566, 11 P.3d 141 (Because it appears that the witness was denying the information from the tape, the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under Rule 11-803(E).). {35} In addition, Rule 11-803(E) provides that [i]f admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.  (Emphasis added.) The State would not have been entitled to admit the statements if they were recorded recollections. {36} In sum, we find that the hearsay exceptions under which the State sought to admit Defendant's testimony are inapplicable. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit these potentially damaging statements in contravention of our Rules of Evidence.