Opinion ID: 1141081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sudden-peril instruction

Text: UDOT next objects to the sudden-peril instruction that was given to the jury. [13] That instruction informed the jury that a person who, without negligence on his or her part, is suddenly confronted with peril is not required to use the same judgment required in calmer moments. [14] UDOT raises two objections to the instruction: first, that it was prejudicial error to give it under Utah's comparative fault system, and second, that the evidence did not support giving the instruction to the jury. By UDOT's own admission, it did not raise an objection at trial concerning the instruction's continued viability under Utah's comparative fault system. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51, [n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he [or she] objects thereto. [15] UDOT asks this court to consider its objection to the instruction pursuant to another portion of rule 51 under which an appellate court may, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, review the giving or failing to give an instruction. [16] We hold that discretionary review in this case is not appropriate. UDOT has not demonstrated that justice will be furthered by our consideration of an alleged error that it failed to raise at trial. [17] Therefore, we decline to consider this challenge to the sudden-peril instruction. UDOT next argues that the evidence at trial did not support the submission of the instruction to the jury. UDOT claims that no sudden emergency existed or, alternatively, that if one did exist, it was the product of McCorvey's own negligence. It is not error for the trial court to give a sudden-peril instruction if it is consistent with the proponent's theory of the case and supported by some evidence. [18] Here, McCorvey's theory of the case was that he was faced with imminent danger when Wright pulled up beside him in the outside right lane and began to pummel his Honda with gravel. McCorvey testified that he was trapped in the left lane by the gravel grooves and tried first to speed up and then to slow down to avoid Wright. His car left the road after hitting a mound of gravel as he attempted to slow down and fall behind Wright. The evidence presented at trial amply supports McCorvey's theory that he was faced with a sudden peril and acted accordingly. Given that evidence, `it [was] for the jury to determine whether an emergency existed.' [19] We find no error in the trial court's submitting the sudden-peril instruction to the jury.