Opinion ID: 6341495
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Exhaust as to R#1942838.

Text: Smith does not dispute that, unlike the promotions under R#1831676 and R#1902620, those made under R#1942838 occurred beyond the timeframe specified in his EEOC charge and applicable limitations period. 4 Case: 21-20366 Document: 00516321873 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/17/2022 No. 21-20366 So the question now is whether that third round of promotions under R#1942838 is properly within our scope of judicial review. The Supreme Court has clarified that each discrete adverse employment action, including a failure to promote, “constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice” and “starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 102 (2002). See also Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 279 (5th Cir. 2004). Therefore, plaintiffs must “file a charge within . . . 300 days of the date of the act or lose the ability to recover for it.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. Smith principally argues that this case is different, because his claims pursuant to R#1942838 reasonably grew from the original charge and involved the same failure to promote claim, decisionmaker(s), location, job title, duties, and requirements. But the Supreme Court has held that discrete discriminatory acts are “time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 102. See also Pegram, 361 F.3d at 279 (discrete failures to promote “are timely only where such acts occurred within the limitations period”). Alternatively, Smith argues that the limitations period should be subject to equitable tolling. But this argument is forfeited on appeal because he failed to make it before the district court. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in the first instance in the district court.”). As we have said before, “[c]ourts should not condone lawsuits that exceed the scope of EEOC exhaustion, because doing so would thwart the administrative process and peremptorily substitute litigation for conciliation.” McClain, 519 F.3d at 273. Consequently, we agree with the 5 Case: 21-20366 Document: 00516321873 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/17/2022 No. 21-20366 district court that Smith has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his failure to promote claim under R#1942838. B. Failure to Establish a Prima Facie Case as to R#1831676 and R#1902620. In analyzing these two requisition numbers, the district court first considered whether Smith had presented direct evidence of discrimination. Finding that the comments made by Smith’s supervisor, O’Neal, did not constitute direct evidence, it applied the McDonnell Douglas framework for evaluating claims predicated on circumstantial evidence. Applying the same framework, we agree with the district court that Smith has failed to demonstrate a prima facie case as to these two requisition numbers. Comments only constitute direct evidence of discrimination when they are: “1) related to the protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member; 2) proximate in time to the complained-of adverse employment decision; 3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue; and 4) related to the employment decision at issue.” Rubinstein v. Administers of Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400–01 (5th Cir. 2000). See also Jackson, 602 F.3d at 380 (same). Comments that do not satisfy these requirements are considered “stray remarks” and are alone insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Jackson, 602 F.3d at 380. While we ultimately agree with the district court that neither comment offers direct evidence of discrimination, the comment expressing O’Neal’s refusal to hire “tenured employees” presents a closer call and warrants further discussion. This comment was made within the relevant timeframe, by an individual with authority over the adverse employment 6 Case: 21-20366 Document: 00516321873 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/17/2022 No. 21-20366 decision, 1 close in time to the complained-of adverse employment decision, and directly pertained to the employment decision at issue. See Rubinstein, 218 F.3d at 400–01. In fact, this comment expressly identified a class of employees whom O’Neal would not consider for the disputed employment position. The question, however, is whether that class is defined by age or merely tenure. There are at least two reasons why “tenured employees” logically appears to be a euphemism for age. For one, the CSM position is not entrylevel, but explicitly requires years of relevant managerial experience—so disqualifying an entire class of individuals on the basis of their seniority, or “tenure,” seems unlikely. For another, O’Neal’s proffered reason for excluding tenured employees—that they would be less “innovative” and fail to lead the “state of the art” facility “with the highest technology and equipment . . . in the right direction”—has nothing to do with seniority and everything to do with stereotypes about age. Ultimately, however, “[d]irect evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact without inference or presumption.” Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005). The term “tenured” is not synonymous with age, nor is the term generally recognized as an expression of ageism. Cf., e.g., Jones v. Robinson Prop. Group, L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 993 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[R]acial epithets undoubtably demonstrate 1 AT&T challenges this element because another employee conducted an initial review of the applications and determined which ones to forward to O’Neal for final consideration. This argument fails. “In determining whether the individual making the remark had authority over the employment decision, consideration is not limited to statements by the person who officially made the decision.” AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 593 (Tex. 2008). See also Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 229 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Age-related remarks are appropriately taken into account . . . even if uttered by one other than the formal decisionmaker, provided that the individual is in a position to influence the decision.”); Rubinstein, 218 F.3d at 400–01; Williams-Pyro, Inc. v. Barbour, 408 S.W.3d 467, 480 (Tex. App. 2013). 7 Case: 21-20366 Document: 00516321873 Page: 8 Date Filed: 05/17/2022 No. 21-20366 racial animus.”); Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that certain terms are “universally recognized opprobrium”). So for O’Neal’s comment to constitute direct evidence of age discrimination, Smith would need to present evidence establishing that O’Neal intended “tenure” to mean age—for example, by presenting testimony from other AT&T employees demonstrating that the term “tenured” is commonly understood to be code for “age” within the company. Absent such evidence, we must presume that O’Neal believes that tenured CSR employees simply possess the wrong kind of experience, regardless of their age. We therefore agree with the district court that this comment does not constitute direct evidence of employment discrimination. Next we apply the McDonnell Douglas framework for analyzing discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence. Our court’s precedent provides clear instruction: “In an age discrimination, failure to promote case, the employee must demonstrate that 1) he belongs to the protected class, 2) he applied to and was qualified for a position for which applicants were being sought, 3) he was rejected, and 4) another applicant not belonging to the protected class was hired.” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co. Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 2001). The district court found that Smith is unable to establish the fourth element “[b]ecause several of the applicants hired for R#1831676 and R#1902620 were over forty and very close in age to Smith.” Smith does not dispute this fact, instead arguing on appeal that these older employees were already CSMs and being transferred from other facilities—and thus not similarly seeking a promotion. But not only did Smith fail to raise this argument before the district court, he does not support it with record evidence on appeal. See Benefit Recovery, Inc. v. Donelon, 521 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Smith’s failure to satisfy this last element is fatal to his prima facie claims as to R#1831676 and R#1902620. 8 Case: 21-20366 Document: 00516321873 Page: 9 Date Filed: 05/17/2022 No. 21-20366