Opinion ID: 1945481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Other Insurance Clause

Text: Appellants next assert that, even if the definition of named insured is reformed to exclude retail lessees, the UM/ UIM coverage issue is not resolved adversely and they are still entitled to coverage under the other insurance clause in endorsement PP FO RD 01 which states that contingent loss and excess auto liability coverage is provided for Red Carpet Lease vehicles. Through this clause, appellants claim that they are at least entitled to UM/UIM coverage as Class II insureds because they were lawful occupants of covered vehicles at the time of their accidents. Class II insureds are protected only if they receive bodily injury due to the negligence of an uninsured motorist while they occupy the insured automobile of the named insured with his permission or consent. Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 229, 233 (Fla. 1971). The language the appellants attempt to invoke to create their insured status as occupants of a covered vehicle is an other insurance provision, found in an endorsement, which replaces only the other insurance clause found in the underlying policy form Liability Coverage section of the personal auto supplement. The original other insurance clause in the underlying contract form that this endorsement replaces is the last paragraph of two policy pages Part A  Liability Coverage. Nothing in the endorsement indicates that the replacement of the other insurance clause has any impact on any remaining policy provisions. In fact, the endorsement specifically states in capital font that ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED. An other insurance clause describes what occurs if other insurance coverage is available for the particular loss. It describes the application and relationship that arises if multiple insurance contracts apply to the same loss. See 8A John Alan Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4909, at 70 (2005 Supp.). The other insurance clause at issue in the present action provides excess coverage once the policy limits of other insurance covering the same risk are exhausted and is only intended to provide excess liability coverage to the named insured, Ford, in the event that a retail lessee's primary insurance is inadequate or the primary insurer denies coverage. The only effect of the endorsement is to afford liability coverage to Ford in the event it is exposed to damages due to an accident involving a vehicle leased through one of three programs listed in the endorsement. Appellants have no legitimate claim for liability coverage under this clause and certainly no claim for UM/UIM coverage, because the description specifically states that [n]o coverage is provided to lessees, agents, or permissive users. Contrary to the appellants' contention, the other insurance clause does not alter the description of covered auto found elsewhere in the policy or endorsement. The endorsement which contains the other insurance clause states that [a]ll other terms and conditions remain unchanged, directing that a plain reading of the policy provisions demonstrates that the description of covered auto in endorsement PP FO RD 04 remains unchanged by the addition of this other insurance clause to the liability coverage section of the personal auto supplement. Similarly, the other insurance clause does not alter the definition of an insured under the uninsured motorist coverage section of the personal auto supplement. The appellants do not become insureds under the uninsured motorist coverage because that definition remains unchanged. Therefore, the language in the other insurance clause does not support the appellants' position that they are insureds entitled to UM/UIM coverage.