Opinion ID: 2338715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Equitable Exceptions To Entire Controversy Doctrine

Text: The application of the entire controversy doctrine requires us to consider fairness to the parties, as the polestar of the application of the rule is judicial fairness. DiTrolio, supra, 142 N.J. at 272, 662 A. 2d 494. Consequently, the boundaries of the entire controversy doctrine are not limitless. It remains an equitable doctrine whose application is left to judicial discretion based on the factual circumstances of individual cases. Brennan, supra, 145 N.J. at 291, 678 A. 2d 667 (citing Mystic Isle, supra, 142 N.J. at 323, 662 A. 2d 523). Thus, equitable considerations can relax mandatory-joinder requirements when joinder would be unfair. Prevratil, supra, 145 N.J. at 190, 678 A. 2d 243. For example, in Prevratil, although the Court found that the entire controversy doctrine applied to actions arising out of automobile accident cases, the Court remanded the matter to the Law Division for a determination of whether it was fair to dismiss the claims. Id. at 196, 678 A. 2d 243. In that case, a possible equitable consideration was the fact that the plaintiff was represented by counsel selected by the insurer in the first action. Ibid. In considering the fairness to the plaintiff, we are mindful that the plaintiff, whose claim is being barred, must have had a fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated her claim in the prior action. See Cafferata v. Peyser, 251 N.J. Super. 256, 261, 597 A. 2d 1101 (App.Div. 1991). Therefore, we have stated that the doctrine will not bar a claim that was unknown or unaccrued at the time of the original action. DiTrolio, supra, 142 N.J. at 273-74, 662 A. 2d 494 (citing comment 2 on R. 4:30A). However, where the plaintiff had sufficient information to have included the claims in the prior suit, mandatory joinder is not unfair. Id. at 274, 662 A. 2d 494 (citing Cogdell, supra, 116 N.J. at 25, 560 A. 2d 1169). In Brown, supra, while a divorce action was pending, the husband assaulted the wife, pushing her to the ground and twisting her arm. 208 N.J. Super. at 378, 506 A. 2d 29. The Appellate Division considered equitable principles in holding that the entire controversy doctrine did not bar a marital tort action. Id. at 374, 506 A. 2d 29. In support of that finding, the panel observed that the wife's matrimonial lawyer refused to raise the tort action in the divorce proceeding; that the husband was aware of the tort claim during the pendency of the equitable distribution proceedings and filed for bankruptcy in an attempt to avoid it; and therefore, the husband had already substantially assumed the burdens of successive litigation and had encouraged plaintiff herself to continue in the costly prosecution thereof. Id. at 383-84, 506 A. 2d 29. Hence, the court reasoned that, [a]lthough we conclude that the entire controversy doctrine ordinarily requires joinder or attempted joinder of constituent causes arising pendente lite, we are also satisfied that in exceptional cases there may be countervailing equitable considerations which would render application of that doctrine unfair. Id. at 374, 506 A. 2d 29. In sum, the entire controversy doctrine applies to family actions. Claims stemming from the same core of facts should be raised in one action. Similar to other contexts, the goal is to avoid fractionalized and successive litigation in family actions. The courts have indicated that equitable considerations can relax the application of the doctrine, but the extent to which the doctrine is relaxed depends on the facts of the case and the policy interests implicated.