Opinion ID: 528395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: APA Standing: The Zone of Interest of the Relevant Statutes.

Text: 12 A party must have standing to bring suit in federal court. A court may refuse to determine the merits of a legal claim, on the ground that even though the claim may be correct the litigant advancing it is not properly situated to be entitled to its judicial determination. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Sec. 3531, at 338-39 (1984). Standing focuses on the party and not on the issues sought to be adjudicated. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). The requirements of standing are generally separated into two categories: the constitutional requirements of Article III 8 and the prudential requirements crafted by the Judiciary. See generally, Center for Auto Safety v. National Hwy. Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322, 1328-38 (D.C.Cir.1986). Prudential standing requires that the plaintiff's complaint fall within 'the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.'  Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75, 102 S.Ct. 752, 760, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (quoting Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) (footnote omitted)). 13 In the instant case, appellants assert standing under section 702 of the APA. That section provides standing to [a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702 (emphasis added). Section 702 and the prudential zone of interest test are intimately related--the former provides a statutory grant from Congress to an aggrieved party to contest agency action and the latter provides a judicial limitation necessary to ensure that the proper party is asserting the claim against the agency. As the Supreme Court has stated, the zone of interest test is most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of [section] 702, particularly since the principal cases in which the ... test has been applied are those involving claims under the APA. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n. 16, 107 S.Ct. 750, 758 n. 16, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987). 14 Thus, we are required to determine whether appellants' interests bring them within that class of 'aggrieved' persons ... entitled to judicial review of 'agency action.'  Association of Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 157, 90 S.Ct. at 832, by the relevant statute[s], 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702, under which the agency acted, thereby conferring upon appellants standing to sue. The statutes under which appellants assert standing are (1) the two statutes under which OMB Circular A-76 is purported to be authorized, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as amended, 9 and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1979, 10 see OMB Circular A-76 para. 3 (J.A. at 12); and (2) section 1223(b) of the 1987 DoD Authorization Act, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2304 note, requiring a realistic and fair cost comparison in a decision to contract out. 11 15 In Clarke, the most recent and leading Supreme Court statement on the zone of interest test, Justice White, writing for the Court, explained that 16 [t]he zone of interest test is a guide for deciding whether, in view of Congress' evident intent to make agency decision presumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular agency action. In cases where the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the contested ... action, the test denies a right of review if the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the [relevant] statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit. 17 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (emphasis added). Clarke held that the interest of the Securities Industry Association, a trade association representing securities dealers, was plausibl[y] relat[ed] to the policies underlying ... the National Bank Act, and therefore the Association had standing under that Act to contest an action of the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. at 403, 107 S.Ct. at 759. 18 The Court noted that the test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff. Id. at 399-400, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (footnote and citation omitted). The Clarke Court expressly rejected earlier lower court suggestions that the zone of interest test requires indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff. Id. at 400 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. at 757 n. 15 (citing Control Data Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283, 293-94 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881, 102 S.Ct. 363, 70 L.Ed.2d 190 (1981)). Instead, the Clarke formulation of the zone of interest test requires that we deny standing only if appellants' interest is no more than marginally related to or in fact inconsistent with the implicit purposes of the relevant statute. If, after reviewing the relevant statute and its legislative history, we conclude that appellants' interests are consistent with and more than marginally related to the purposes of the relevant statute, appellants have standing to contest an agency action under section 702. 19 Before undertaking our zone of interest inquiry, we must address the parties' fundamental misunderstanding of the relevant question. The issue is not whether appellants' interests are within the zone of interest of OMB Circular A-76; section 702 clearly requires that the party seeking relief be legal[ly] wrong[ed] ..., or adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning of a relevant statute. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702 (emphasis added). The Circular is not a statute, see, e.g., Ketler, Federal Employee Challenges to Contracting Out: Is There a Viable Forum?, 111 MILITARY L.REV. 103, 110 (1986) (Circular A-76 promulgates executive branch managerial policy), and, although promulgated pursuant to congressional authority, the Circular itself cannot grant standing. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that where a dispute is otherwise justiciable by an Article III federal court 12 under section 702 of the APA, the question whether the litigant is a 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue' ... is one within the power of Congress to determine. Id. at 732 & n. 3, 92 S.Ct. at 1364 & n. 3 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 100, 88 S.Ct. at 1953, other citations omitted). See also Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 154, 90 S.Ct. at 830 (Congress can, of course, resolve the question [of standing] one way or another, save as the requirements of Article III dictate otherwise.) (citation omitted); State of Alaska v. Department of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 444 (D.C.Cir.1989); Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d at 1335 (Congress may, by legislation, expand standing to the full extent permitted by Article III, thus permitting litigation by one who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rule, 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, Sec. 24:5, at 226 (2d ed. 1983). 13 It is clear then that appellants must be within the zone of interest of the statutes authorizing OMB Circular A-76, not OMB Circular A-76, itself. 20
21 The first of the two statutes under which the OMB promulgated the Circular is the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as amended, 31 U.S.C. Sec. 101 et seq. (1921 Act). We have found nothing in the 1921 Act or its legislative history indicating that Congress contemplated in-house federal employees or federal employee labor unions as  '[a particular] class [of plaintiff] to be relied upon to challenge agency disregard of the law.'  Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2454, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984), other citation omitted, brackets in Clarke ). 14 Moreover, we have found sufficient support in the legislative history to conclude that the interests of in-house federal employees are in fact inconsistent with the animating purpose of the 1921 Act and, therefore, they are outside the Act's zone of interest. Cf. id. 22 Generally, in the 1921 Act Congress sought to coordinate budgeting procedures and to increase efficiency in government operations after vast governmental growth during World War I. After the close of the War, the departments and agencies failed to relinquish authority which had enured to them during the War. Congress found departments and agencies duplicating services and decided to centralize the budgeting system under a single office in each of the two political branches. 23 Before enactment of the 1921 Act, each department or agency developed its own budget and submitted it to Congress, through the Secretary of the Treasury. 15 The President was never directly linked to this process. 16 The congressional committee overseeing that department or agency would authorize and appropriate that budget request. The total United States budget was never forecast; thus it was easy for expenditures to exceed revenues because no single office was monitoring total expenditures. Additionally, each department and agency audited itself with no confirmation by outside auditors. 24 The 1921 Act established a two-pronged approach to this budgeting (or lack-of-budgeting) crisis. First, Congress created a Bureau of the Budget, the predecessor to the OMB, within, but quasi-independent of, the Department of the Treasury. The Bureau was to consolidate all independent budgets of departments and agencies of the United States government, eliminate duplication of services, and cut funding where services were no longer needed. The national budget of the Bureau, including an estimate of revenues for the next fiscal year, would then become the President's budget which the President submitted as one document to Congress for revision and approval. 17 25 The second prong of the 1921 Act was the establishment of the General Accounting Office (GAO) to represent the legislative interest in the budgeting process. The GAO was to be directed by a Comptroller General and Assistant Comptroller General effectively replacing the Comptroller of the Treasury. The Treasury Comptroller had been seriously hampered in effectively controlling Executive branch spending since he served at the pleasure of the President. The 1921 Act also transferred all the auditors from the various departments and agencies to GAO so that auditors would not be employed by the department they were auditing. 26 Congress considered these two separate offices, the Bureau and the GAO, one within each political branch, as a functional and valid constitutional check and balance over the expenditure of funds. Representative James W. Good of Iowa, the chief sponsor of the 1921 Act, and Chairman of both the House Committee on the Budget and the House Committee on Appropriations, stated: 27 We provided for [a] system of checks and balances which ought to exist in every well-regulated budget plan. The President originates the budget and he transmits it to Congress. It is up to Congress to determine whether it will accept the estimates, whether it will modify them, reduce them, or enlarge them. Congress must then assume full responsibility for its acts, just as the President assumes responsibility for his when he makes the budget. After the bill has passed, then, under the execution of the law, we provide for that independent establishment in the general accounting office, an office that will be to the appropriations made by Congress what the Supreme Court is to construction of laws that are enacted by Congress.... 28 We create this independent establishment [the GAO], answerable to Congress, an establishment that has clerks and accountants, who will go through every department of the Government. When they find waste and inefficiency, when they find duplication in the service, they will come to the committee of Congress that has jurisdiction of appropriations and report that fact. That fact will also be communicated to the President of the United States. With that system of checks and balances it is believed this great overlapping of activities, this duplication that exists in every department of the Government, will cease, and that the Government of the United States will be placed upon a business basis.... 18 29 Throughout debate, Representative Good referred to the GAO as a semijudicial office, working directly for Congress to ensure that executive budgets and estimates are properly prepared. 19 30 Nothing in the legislative history of the 1921 Act suggests that Congress contemplated the protection of employment of federal employees. Indeed, Representative Good's presentation of the 1921 Act to the 67th Congress suggests a congressional purpose inconsistent with those interests. That is, the Act would require that some federal employees be terminated under the new budgeting process. 31 The director of the [Bureau of the Budget] must perform his work without fear or favor. He must do it with a realization that practically every Senator ... will at some time or another be opposed to what he is doing. He must do it with a realization that at some time or another practically every Member of the House will oppose him.... Many [federal employee] offices must be abolished. Some of the men who are here performing a public service must go home, and they will have to be sent home; and when such an officeholder comes from your [congressional] district you will go down and see the [employee's superior] officer in [sic] behalf of the man from your district whom he is discharging, and Senators will go down, and they will make strong pleas showing how this man or that man who is slated to go has been a faithful public servant and why he should be permitted to remain. 32 When it comes to discharging these men who must be discharged, I say to you it is going to test the backbone in a man who has to do this work; it will try the fiber of the best man that the President can secure.... We ought not to throw upon the Secretary of the Treasury this duty ... [because this]would simply create disturbance with the other members of the Cabinet whose organizations by such act he was attempting to regulate and control. 20 33 While Representative Good made this statement during debate on whether the Bureau of the Budget should be under the Department of the Treasury or directly under the Executive Office of the President, 21 his statements illustrate that Congress was aware that some federal employees would lose their jobs after the 1921 Act took effect. He does not hint of any remedy for the severed employees, or suggest that the employees may assert standing upon an act with which their interests are logically inconsistent. Good's statements support the inference to be drawn from the text of the Act. That is, although Congress was well aware that the reformation of the federal budgeting process would result in a loss of federal jobs, it afforded the discharged employees neither protection nor remedy. Thus, the 1921 Act is fundamentally inconsistent with the interests asserted by appellants, who, quite understandably complain that the challenged governmental conduct will cause an adverse impact to in-house employees. 34 Appellants may have many interests, but for zone of interest purposes we must look to their particular interests, not to the interests amounting to generalized grievances of all citizens. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2037, 104 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-12, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1670, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). The dissent contends that we proceed from an erroneous fundamental premise that the employees cannot assert an interest in having the government conform to the law in making a contracting out decision. Dissent at 1056. However, as we have previously held, ... to satisfy the zone of interests requirement, appellants must establish that their particular interest alleged to have been injured by the [alleged failure of the government to conform to a law] fall within the respective zones of interests intended to be protected or regulated by [that law]. Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 812 (D.C.Cir.1987) (emphasis added). 35 As we noted in Haitian Refugee Center, 36 [i]f any person or organization interested in promoting ... protection of the rights created by a statute ... has an interest that falls within the zone protected or regulated by the statute ..., then the zone-of-interest test is not a test because it excludes nothing. Indeed, such a reading would mean that this court ignores the Supreme Court's decisions that persons who have only a generalized grievance about the way in which government operates do not have standing. 37 Id. at 813 (citing Schlesinger v. Reservist Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974)). 38 Concededly, in Haitian Refugee Center, we conducted our zone of interest analysis without the benefit of the Clarke decision, but nothing in Clarke changes that analysis as it applied in Haitian Refugee Center or in the present case. Indeed, in our recent post-Clarke zone of interest decision, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277 (D.C.Cir.1988) (per curiam) (HWTC ), we expressly reapproved our prior understanding of the generalized grievance concept as taught in Schlesinger and Haitian Refugee Center. In HWTC, we expressly reiterated that neither individuals with only a 'generalized grievance[ ]'  (citing Schlesinger ) nor an organization formed to advance [a generalized] grievance (citing Haitian Refugee Center ) has a sufficient interest to support standing. HWTC, 861 F.2d at 287. Thus, in HWTC, although we found that a trade association had standing as an organizational representative of the consumer environmental interest of a member company, we rejected standing to assert claims based solely on the status as representative of competitors of entities allegedly advantaged by the Environmental Protection Agency's failure adequately to perform a statutory duty. We did so, analyzing the standing question in light of Clarke, and expressly revivified Haitian Refugee Center stating a rule that gave any such plaintiff standing merely because it happened to be disadvantaged by a particular agency decision would destroy the requirement of prudential standing; any party with constitutional standing could sue. Id. at 283. See also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 114-17, 107 S.Ct. 484, 491-93, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986) (holding that threatened loss from increased competition did not alone confer standing on a competitor to bring action under the Clayton Act to enjoin a proposed merger). 39 In HWTC, we recognized that the Clarke analysis of the zone of interest test  'denies a right of review if the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.'  861 F.2d at 283 (quoting Clarke, 107 S.Ct. at 757.) We thus found that the test now requires less than a showing of congressional intent to benefit but more than a 'marginal[ ] rela[tionship]' to the statutory purposes. Id. (brackets in original). 22 40 In the present case, the legislative history of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as amended, leads us to conclude that Congress did not contemplate in-house federal employees and federal employee labor unions as plaintiffs. Congress carefully crafted a two-pronged checks and balances budgeting process to coordinate the United States budgeting process, eliminate duplication of services, and promote efficiency. Congress knew that some federal employees would be adversely affected and, instead of giving these employees some recourse, intentionally removed the director of the Bureau of the Budget from as much external pressure as possible so that he could make the hard decision to reduce the employee force where necessary. At most, federal employees' interests are marginally related to this centralized annual budgeting process balanced between the Executive and Legislative branches. Cf. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757. It is more logical to conclude that federal employees' interests are inconsistent. Id. Appellants alleged particular interest in the instant case is protection of the federal jobs of their members, not governmental efficiency as asserted by them. See infra. 41 If governmental efficiency was appellants' interest, then they would have no greater Article III injury in fact 23 than any taxpayer opposing a government appropriation. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) (for a taxpayer to assert standing, the taxpayer must show that the challenged conduct violates a specific constitutional limitation imposed on the taxing and spending clause and does not merely exceed the general delegation of powers to Congress); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 2579, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988) (referring to Flast and the narrow exception it created to the general rule against taxpayer standing); Ketler, supra, at 115-16 ([F]ederal employees have no greater legal interest in or standing to assert allegations of government mismanagement [in the contracting out process] than do ordinary taxpayers.); see generally, District of Columbia Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C.Cir.1988). 42
43 In addition to the 1921 Act, OMB Circular A-76 cites as authority the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1979 (OFPPAA), as amended, 41 U.S.C. Secs. 401-424. See OMB Circular A-76 para. 3, J.A. at 12. In 1974, Congress created the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 24 to implement recommendations of the Commission on Government Procurement to establish a central body to provide overall direction of procurement policy for Federal executive agencies. H.R.REP. No. 178, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1979 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1492, 1492. In OFPPAA, Congress amended and extended the life of this Office. 44 After a thorough review of the OFPPAA and its legislative history, we have found nothing to suggest a congressional purpose more than marginally related to the interests of federal employees vis-a-vis procurement policy. Throughout the legislative history of OFPPAA and its amendments, Congress emphasized economy and efficiency in government operations. Specifically regarding contracting out, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs recognized that there had been a long-standing executive branch policy of reliance on the private sector to improve governmental efficiency as expressed in earlier versions of OMB Circular A-76. S.Rep. No. 144, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979), U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 1979, p. 1492. Congress specifically validated this Executive branch policy favoring the private sector in its enactment of the OFPPAA: 45 The new [contracting out] policy is built on three principles: 46 1. Rely on the private sector. The Government's business is not to be in business. If private sources are available, they should be looked to first to provide the commercial or industrial services needed by the Government. 47 2. Retain certain governmental functions in-house. Certain functions are inherently governmental in nature being so closely related to the public interest as to demand performance by Federal employees. 48 3. Aim for economy. Use cost comparison. When private performance is feasible and no overriding factors require in-house performance, the taxpayer deserves and expects the most economical performance and therefore rigorous comparison of contract cost versus in-house cost should be used when appropriate to decide how the work will be done. 49 Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 146, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1983), U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 1983, p. 2027 (quoting the above government[ ] policy on contracting out and stating that [t]hese are wise principles, and in their applicability to all agencies they are entirely consistent with the goal that the Federal procurement system be standardized.). The policy endorsed in the Report does not merely favor the private sector; it endorses reliance on the private sector. The obvious presumption is that private sector performance is more economical and efficient. Only if the goods or services required are inherently governmental, 25 as none of the services in question are, should the procuring agency look away from the private sector. The third principle's call for rigorous comparison of contract cost versus in-house cost, read in the context of the whole policy, illustrates that Congress wanted in-house costs estimates to be strictly reviewed, so as not to frustrate the first principle's emphasis on the private sector. 50 Since the legislative history of the OFPPAA endorses the Executive branch policy of reliance on the private sector and the Circular finds authority in the OFPPAA, it is difficult to conclude anything but that the interests of federal employees are inconsistent with the purposes of OFPPAA. As previously discussed, appellants' real interest in this case is the protection of the federal jobs of its members, not efficiency in governmental operations. If appellants' real interest in this case was governmental efficiency, they might very well be within the zone of interest of the purposes of the OFPPAA. But again in the assertion of that interest of efficiency, they have no greater claim to standing than any taxpayers. See pp. 1046-1048 supra. Their real interest of job protection flies in the face of a policy that federal departments and agencies, through OMB Circular A-76, should rely on the private sector. Thus appellants' interests are inconsistent with the purposes of the OFPPAA and not within the zone of interest of that Act. Cf. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757. 51 Because we hold that appellants' interests are not within the zone of interest of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 or the OFPPAA, the statutory authority for OMB Circular A-76, appellants may not assert standing based on those statutes. 52
53 Appellants also assert standing under section 1223(b) of the 1987 DoD Authorization Act, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2304 note. That section requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that all costs considered [in a contracting out decision] ... are realistic and fair. See supra note 6. Appellants contend that the legislative history of the Act, which prohibits contracting out of federal firefighter and DoD security guard positions, evidences congressional intent to provide employee standing because at least some government jobs are protected. Additionally they point out that advocates for federal employees defeated attempts by private contractors to eliminate built-in bias in the contracting out process favoring federal employees, such as the addition of a ten percent conversion differential which must be added to each contractor's bid. We find appellants' arguments unconvincing and, after reviewing the legislative history of section 1223(b), conclude that appellants' interest is inconsistent with the statutory requirement of a realistic and fair cost comparison. 54 From our review of the legislative history, the phrase realistic and fair was added to the Authorization Act to protect the private government contractor in the contracting out process against undue built-in bias favoring in-house performance of services. In fact, the phrase was added at the behest of government contractors in protest against the ten percent conversion differential. Appellees point to, and we find convincing, the following explanation of the realistic and fair language found in the Senate Report on the Authorization Act. Realistic and Fair Cost Comparisons 55 DOD handicaps contractors' bidding on services and supplies during cost comparisons against retaining these functions in-house. In addition to the existing 10% [conversion] bias used to date, other handicaps are: 56  Contract Administration Cost--The cost for the government to administer the contract if awarded to a private concern is added to the vendor's bid. 57  Quality and Technical Assurance Cost--Quality and technical supervision and assurance are costs added to the vendor's bid when contracting out work. 58  Excessive liability coverage required and unrealistically low costs for government agencies. 59  Overhead costs computed for the government bid. 60 Agency cost comparison must be made more equal for determination of contracting out. Some DOD organizations have used these handicaps to their advantage in determining the cost comparison outcome. In addition to opening the door for more competition, the competitions must be conducted on an apples to apples basis. 61 S.REP. No. 331, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 278, reprinted in 1986 U.S. U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 6413, 6472. Thus the legislative history shows that the provision for a realistic and fair cost comparison was designed to protect the integrity of the contracting out process by resolving handicaps against government contractors--the apparent intended beneficiaries of section 1223(b). 62 Obedient to the teachings of Clarke, we must determine whether the interests of the in-house employees are only marginally related to or inconsistent with the purpose of the statute. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757. As discussed above, appellants' real interest in a decision to contract out is the protection of the jobs of their members. Private contractors competing to perform the same services that appellants' members now perform are the central threat to these government union members' jobs. The interests of the in-house federal employees are therefore antithetical to the interests of the private contractors because federal employees present an 'either-or' situation in relation to private contractors. American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1668 v. Dunn, 561 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir.1977) (federal employees lack standing to contest a contracting out of an Air Force food service facility). Thus appellants' interest is inconsistent with the purpose of the section 1223(b) which provides for contracting out where that is the most cost-efficient alternative. It follows that appellants' interests are not within the zone of interests of the Authorization Act of 1987. 63 As we noted in footnote 22, supra, the dissent correctly points out our holding in HWTC that [i]n the absence of apparent congressional intent to benefit, however, there may still be standing if some factor--some indicator that plaintiff is a peculiarly suitable challenger of administrative neglect--supports an inference that Congress would have intended eligibility. 861 F.2d at 283. In the present case the dissent would find that factor in the absence of another potential plaintiff. Dissent at p. 1058. Assuming--and it is only an assumption 26 --that there is no other potential plaintiff, this is simply not the sort of factor necessary to confer standing. Indeed, the Supreme Court teaching is directly to the contrary. The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing. Schlesinger v. Reservist Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 227, 94 S.Ct. at 2935 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179, 94 S.Ct. at 2947-48). 64 In Schlesinger, the Supreme Court actually indicated that the absence of other plaintiffs is not a relevant factor, rejecting the District Court's observation that it was not irrelevant that if respondents could not obtain judicial review of petitioners' action, 'then as a practical matter no one can.'  418 U.S. at 227, 94 S.Ct. at 2935. The Supreme Court went on to state [o]ur system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the political processes. Id. 65 Arguably, the discussion in Schlesinger occurred in the context of determining Article III rather than zone of interest standing, 27 but logically the same analysis applies in the zone of interest context of the present case. Indeed, we cited and relied on the Schlesinger analysis in our zone of interest decision in Haitian Refugee Center, 809 F.2d at 813, and HWTC, in turn, cites and relies on the relevant portion of Haitian Refugee Center, 861 F.2d at 283. The reasoning is equally applicable here. The interests of appellants in lawful and economic conduct of the contracting-out process is no more distinguishable from the interest of the citizenry-at-large than was the interest of the Reservist Committee in Schlesinger in preventing members of Congress from holding Reserve military commissions. Insofar as appellants assert an interest different from the citizenry-at-large, that interest--the protection of government employees whose job opportunities would be impaired because of contracting out--is close to the very bureaucratic interest, in expansion of government, that Congress sought to restrain in all of these statutes. 28 Congress has indicated no intention to rely on the bureaucracy as a plaintiff class, and, indeed, all evidence is to the contrary. The bureaucratic interest functions internally, as it did in this case in the extensive review conducted by the Evaluation Board, the Administrative Appeals Review Board, and the General Accounting Office. See supra, pp. 1040-41. 66 In this connection, we note that the dissent turns the intent to rely analysis on its head, stating that the federal employees, and therefore the Union plaintiff here, do have standing unless the statutes or their legislative histories reveal a congressional intent to preclude reliance on this particular class of plaintiffs. Dissent at 1058. But Supreme Court precedent requires an affirmative not a negative test: the essential inquiry is whether Congress 'intended for [a particular] class [of plaintiffs] to be relied upon to challenge agency disregard of the law.'  Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (quoting Block, 467 U.S. at 347, 104 S.Ct. at 2454) (other citation omitted). Nothing in Clarke or any other authority cited by the dissent or the parties suggests that the assumed unavailability of other plaintiffs is any more relevant to the intent of Congress in the present context than it was to the determination of the lack of citizen standing in Schlesinger. 67