Opinion ID: 1923309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Clarifying the Definition of Sentencing Error

Text: Although quoted above, the definition of sentencing error in the Court Commentary to rule 3.800 bears repeating: [S]entencing errors include harmful errors in orders entered as a result of the sentencing process. This includes errors in orders of probation, orders of community control, cost and restitution orders, as well as errors within the sentence itself. Fla. R. Civ. P. 3.800 court cmt. The commentary thus explains that rule 3.800(b) is intended to permit defendants to bring to the trial court's attention errors in sentence-related orders, not any error in the sentencing process. As we explained in Amendments I, rule 3.800(b) was intended to authorize the filing of a motion to correct a defendant's sentence.  Amendments I, 696 So.2d at 1105 (emphasis added). We have never held that any error that happens to occur in the sentencing context constitutes a sentencing error under the rule. Instead, errors we have recognized as sentencing errors are those apparent in orders entered as a result of the sentencing process. For example, we have recognized the following as sentencing errors subject to the rule: claims that the defendant was improperly habitualized, see Brannon, 850 So.2d at 454; that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, see Terry v. State, 764 So.2d 571, 572 (Fla.2000); that the scoresheet was inaccurate, see State v. Anderson, 905 So.2d 111, 118 (Fla.2005); that the trial court improperly imposed a departure sentence, see Thogode v. State, 763 So.2d 281, 281 (Fla.2000); that the written order deviated from the oral pronouncement, see State v. Cote, 913 So.2d 544 (Fla.2005); that the trial court improperly assessed costs, see Maddox, 760 So.2d at 101-09; that the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant to simultaneous incarceration and probation, see Spencer v. State, 764 So.2d 576, 577 (Fla.2000); that the trial court failed to award credit for time served, see Charles v. State, 763 So.2d 316, 317 (Fla.2000); that the trial court failed to address in writing its decision to impose adult sanctions, see Cargle v. State, 770 So.2d 1151, 1152 (Fla.2000); and that a sentencing statute was unconstitutional, see Salters v. State, 758 So.2d 667, 669 n. 4 (Fla.2000). While these holdings do not necessarily exhaust the list of errors that can be designated as sentencing errors under rule 3.800(b), they all involve errors related to the ultimate sanctions imposed, whether involving incarceration, conditions of probation, or costs. These cases are consistent with the goal of both the Act and the rules amendments to ensure that sentencing errors are brought to the trial court's attention at the earliest opportunity. See, e.g., Maddox, 760 So.2d at 95; Amendments II, 761 So.2d at 1016. When a sentence is erroneous, it is more efficient to address the issue in the trial court first, where it can be quickly remedied. In many circumstances, however, defendants do not have the opportunity to object or otherwise address the trial court before the sentencing order is entered. For example, where the written sentence deviates from an oral pronouncement, the defendant has no reason to object at the sentencing; only when the sentencing order issues does the defendant notice the discrepancy. Before rule 3.800(b), however, no mechanism existed for the defendant to remedy the error in the trial court. The only remedy was to appeal the sentence. The rule was designed to remedy that institutional inefficiency. In contrast, defendants do have the opportunity to object to many errors that occur during the sentencing process  for example, the introduction of evidence at sentencing. The rule was never intended to allow a defendant (or defense counsel) to sit silent in the face of a procedural error in the sentencing process and then, if unhappy with the result, file a motion under rule 3.800(b). To the contrary, such a practice undermines the goal of addressing errors at the earliest opportunity. As one court has emphasized, The rule was not intended to circumvent rules requiring contemporaneous objections or enforcing principles of waiver. It was not intended to give a defendant a second bite at the apple to contest evidentiary rulings made at sentencing to which the defendant could have objected but chose not to do so. It was not intended as a broad substitute for a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's representation at a sentencing hearing. Griffin, 946 So.2d at 613. In addition, we have recognized that the changes to the statutes and rules were intended to relieve the appellate workload and to limit sentencing errors brought on direct appeal. See, e.g., Amendments II, 761 So.2d at 1016. Allowing defendants to use rule 3.800(b) to resurrect unpreserved errors in the sentencing process increases rather than decreases the errors that may be brought on appeal and increases the appellate workload. We therefore agree with Judge Stringer that a `sentencing error' that can be preserved under rule 3.800(b)(2) is an error in the sentence itself  not any error that might conceivably occur during a sentencing hearing. Jackson, 952 So.2d at 616 (Stringer, J., specially concurring). We also agree with the court in Griffin that rule 3.800(b) was not intended to circumvent rules requiring contemporaneous objections or to substitute for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. On the other hand, the rule applies to more than illegal sentences. According to its plain language, rule 3.800(b) may be used to correct any sentencing error, including an illegal sentence. Fla. R. Civ. P. 3.800(b) (emphasis added); see also Williams v. State, 957 So.2d 600, 602 (Fla.2007) (We have generally defined an `illegal sentence' as one that imposes a punishment or penalty that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes and laws could impose under any set of factual circumstances.). In Amendments II, we clarified the relationship between rule 3.800(a) and rule 3.800(b), stating that a rule 3.800(b) motion can be used to correct any type of sentencing error, whether we had formerly called that error erroneous, unlawful, or illegal. 761 So.2d at 1019 (emphasis added). Although rule 3.800(b) encompasses any claim that could be raised under rule 3.800(a), see Brooks, 969 So.2d at 242 n. 7, the plain language of rule 3.800(b) is not limited to errors resulting in an illegal sentence or errors to which the defendant had no opportunity to object. Instead, it provides that it may be used to correct any sentencing error. There are sentencing errors to which the defendant may have had an opportunity to object that do not result in an illegal sentence or a sentence otherwise subject to correction under rule 3.800(a). For example, the imposition of costs without statutory authority is a sentencing error for purposes of rule 3.800(b). See Maddox, 760 So.2d at 109 (recognizing that the unpreserved sentencing error at issue in Maddox involved improper imposition of six dollars in costs without statutory authority); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800 court cmt. (explaining that an error in a cost or restitution order is a sentencing error for purposes of the rule). Where the costs are announced at sentencing, the defendant has an opportunity to object to unauthorized costs. However, the imposition of these costs does not constitute fundamental error, much less rise to the level of an illegal sentence. See Maddox, 760 So.2d at 100 & n. 8 (stating that only in an extreme case would an improper cost assessment or public defender's lien qualify as fundamental error and recognizing that the class of errors that constitute an `illegal' sentence that can be raised for the first time in a postconviction motion decades after a sentence becomes final is a narrower class of errors than those termed `fundamental' errors). Thus, as written, rule 3.800(b) is not limited to correcting illegal sentences or errors to which the defendant had no opportunity to object. Instead, the rule may be used to correct and preserve for appeal any error in an order entered as a result of the sentencing process  that is, orders related to the sanctions imposed. A claim of denial of counsel at sentencing, however, is an error in the sentencing process, not an error in the sentencing order. Therefore, such a claim is not cognizable in a motion under rule 3.800(b) and no such motion must be filed for the appellate court to consider the issue.