Opinion ID: 1128369
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the law of summary judgment

Text: It is unnecessary to extensively review the duty of an appellate court on review of summary judgments. This court has recently had the occasion to consider the law of summary judgment in various factual contexts. In Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334, 336 (1983), the court outlined the requisite elements which must be considered on review: The moving party is entitled to summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P.; Lafferty v. Nickel, Wyo., 663 P.2d 168 (1983). Furthermore, the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Timmons v. Reed, Wyo., 569 P.2d 112, 121 (1977). A material fact is one with legal significance which would affect the outcome of litigation. Thus, `   a determination, as to whether or not a fact is material, depends greatly upon the principle of law to be applied.' Timmons v. Reed, supra, 569 P.2d at 117. In this action the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1991, is the principle of law to be applied to the material facts of this case. MVICS affords a civil action to purchasers to enforce liability for violations of the requirements of the law and provides a specific remedy for damages to the aggrieved purchaser. 15 U.S.C. § 1989(a). The action may be brought in any United States district court or in any other court of competent jurisdiction... . 15 U.S.C. § 1989. It has been held that state courts of general jurisdiction have the power to entertain suits and award damages for violations of the MVICS. Christianson v. Lease Associates, Inc., 87 Wis.2d 123, 273 N.W.2d 776 (1978) and Vogt v. Nelson, 69 Wis.2d 125, 230 N.W.2d 123 (1975). MVICS defines a number of violations for which civil actions may be brought to enforce liability to recover damages. It provides: No person shall disconnect, reset, or alter or cause to be disconnected, reset, or altered, the odometer of any motor vehicle with intent to change the number of miles indicated thereon. 15 U.S.C. § 1984. And further, No person shall conspire with any other person to violate section ... 1984... . 15 U.S.C. § 1986. MVICS also provides for rules governing persons who transfer vehicles: No transferor shall violate any rule prescribed under this section or give a false statement to a transferee in making any disclosure required by such rule. 15 U.S.C. § 1988(b). MVICS's remedy provision requires a showing of intent to defraud. 15 U.S.C. § 1989(a). Accordingly, the element of intent is a requisite showing by the person who seeks recovery. It has been ruled that intent to defraud an ultimate purchaser under the MVICS is a factual determination. Ryan v. Edwards, 592 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.1979). Furthermore in Jones v. Fenton Ford, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 1328 (D.C.Conn. 1977), the court held that intent to defraud did not require a showing of actual knowledge. Rather, the intent to defraud requirement could be satisfied by a showing that the representation regarding the mileage on the odometer was made with reckless disregard of the truth. Similarly, in Nieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640, 642 (5th Cir.1978), the court stated: ... [A] transferor who lacked actual knowledge [of accuracy of odometer reading] may still be found to have intended to defraud and thus may be civilly liable for a failure to disclose that a vehicle's actual mileage is unknown. A transferor may not close his eyes to the truth. If a transferor reasonably should have known that a vehicle's odometer reading was incorrect, although he did not know to a certainty the transferee would be defrauded, a court may infer that he understood the risk of such an occurrence. (Footnote omitted.) In Jones v. Fenton Ford, Inc., supra, 427 F. Supp. at 1336, the defendant defended on the basis of his certification on the odometer mileage statement that to the best of his knowledge the odometer was correct. The court ruled that such a statement was: ... false and misleading, and that these representations were made with actual knowledge of their falsity, or with such reckless disregard of the truth as to satisfy the `intent to defraud' requirement in § 409 MVICS Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1989(a). This leaves only the question of damages to consider. In this case, the employee of Gregory Motors, Alan Gregory, admitted he did not check the odometer on the vehicle itself at the time that he signed the odometer statement in which he attested to what the odometer now reads. The question arises whether such a failure could constitute the type of reckless disregard of the truth from which a jury could find the inference of an intent to defraud. While summary judgment was granted in favor of appellants against the principal culprit, Wayne Hudson, can it be said that there is no material factual scenario which would trigger liability on the part of Gregory Motors? The trial court found none. [5] Yet there appear to be several factual questions involving Gregory Motors which remain viable for determination by the trier of fact. Did Alan Gregory, as agent for Gregory Motors, know at the time he signed the odometer statement that the odometer had been rolled back? Was Gregory Motors the owner of the vehicle at the time the odometer was rolled back; thus, when coupled with Gregory Motors' failure to actually observe the automobile at the time the odometer statement was signed, could an inference of intent to defraud be drawn by the trier of fact? Are there other MVICS violations by Gregory Motors which give rise to civil liability to appellants? A mixed question of fact and law arises: May appellants as subsequent purchasers who ultimately received title avail themselves of a direct action against Gregory Motors for the alleged failure of Gregory Motors, its agent or employees, to comply with the odometer law despite the lack of privity between the appellants and the prior transferee? We think that the trier of fact should decide the questions after a full evidentiary exploration.