Opinion ID: 1472630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motion in Limine and Jury Instructions

Text: Before trial, Banther moved in limine to preclude the State from arguing a theory of accomplice liability to the jury. Citing the differences between the conspiracy and accomplice-liability statutes, the trial judge denied Banther's motion. Because the jury had previously acquitted Banther of conspiracy, however, the trial judge prohibited the State from using the word conspiracy in its arguments to the jury. In so doing, the trial judge distinguished, for collateral estoppel purposes, the terms conspiracy and substantial planning: I find no basis to collaterally estop the State from suggesting to the jury by evidence ... that the death of Dennis Ravers was a result of substantial planning. There simply is no [earlier] unanimous jury verdict in the defendant's favor on those points. [8] The trial judge allowed the State to argue not only that Banther had engaged in substantial planning of Ravers's death, but also that Banther and Schmitz had worked together and that Banther had agreed to aid Schmitz in planning Ravers's murder. During trial, the State conformed to the trial judge's ruling by refraining from using the word conspiracy. The State's arguments to the jury, however, repeatedly urged them to conclude that Banther and Schmitz agreed to act together and in fact planned the murder together. [9] The State, of course, faced the obvious dilemma of having to prove individual substantial planning by Banther after having failed to convict Banther of conspiracy in the earlier trial, and after having allowed Schmitz to plead guilty to a lesser offense. To obtain a conviction for murder in the first degree, the State had to establish that Banther engaged in substantial planning for Ravers's murder. Accomplice liability had to be the available route, but how to secure a murder conviction after the earlier failure to convict for conspiracy, posed a serious problem for the State. Following trial, the trial judge instructed the jury on accomplice liability as follows: A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when, intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, the person aids, counsels, or agrees, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it.... [10] The trial judge specifically instructed the jury that among the bases on which they could convict Banther as an accomplice was a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he  agree[d] ... to aid [Schmitz] in planning ... the offense. [11]