Opinion ID: 214589
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Elimination-of-Jobs

Text: -9- But we conclude it was not necessary to consult the other provisions of the CBA to determine whether Article 11 exempts elimination-of-jobs grievances that “involve” the reassignment-of-work. The assignment clause cannot be read so broadly. Because managerial decisions will frequently result in redistribution of work, the district court’s interpretation would cause the single exception in Article 11 to swallow the entire provision. It is also obvious under the CBA that grievances regarding the elimination of a position and the reassignment of that position’s duties are separable. For example, ConocoPhillips might have an absolute right to eliminate a position but face constraints in the way it reassigns the work of that position. Thus, we will review only Article 11 to determine whether the Union’s elimination-of-job grievances are expressly exempted from arbitration. C. The Arbitrability of the Union’s Grievances Under the CBA With this background, we address the arbitrability of each grievance raised by the Union on appeal. 1. Lead Operator Position First, the Union lodged multiple grievances challenging ConocoPhillips’s decision to eliminate the Lead Operator position and divide the work previously performed by this position between Unit Operators and APSs. 1 1 In the district court, the Union asserted these actions violated Articles 1, 3, 20-1, 20-4, 20-5, 20-6, 20-15, 21-1, 21-9, and Appendix A of the CBA. On (continued...) -10- Elimination of the Lead Operator Position As the district court noted, Article 11 vests management with absolute discretion to “[determine] the number of persons required to operate and maintain any portion or all of the physical plant,” to “shut down any portion or all of the plant,” to “determine and to redetermine the organization of the Ponca City Refinery,” to “determine the methods, processes and materials to be employed,” and to “discontinue in whole or in part processes or operations.” App. at 260. Article 11 goes on to provide that grievances arising from these decisions are not subject to arbitration. Id. We find a grievance regarding elimination-of-jobs arises under the above-listed provisions, and is therefore exempt from arbitration under Article 11. Because this exemption is absolute, we need not consider any other provision of the CBA in reaching this conclusion. Reassignment of the Lead Operator Duties The exemption is not absolute as to reassignment-of-work. As set forth above, to determine whether Article 11 exempts a reassignment-of-work grievance from arbitration, we must consider whether the grievance implicates other provisions of the CBA. 1 (...continued) appeal, the Union also claims these actions violated Articles 21-4 and 21-5. Because the 21-4 and 21-5 claims were not properly raised before the district court, we need not consider them here. Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. v. C.I.R., 104 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 1997). -11- We agree with the district court that Articles 1, 3, 20-1, 20-4, 20-5, 20-6, 20-15, 21-9, and Appendix A are not implicated by the challenged reassignment. But we disagree as to Article 21-1. Because this provision limits ConocoPhillips’s ability to reassign work, the question of whether it was violated by the reassignment of Lead Operator duties is arbitrable. To reach this conclusion, we must consider each provision in light of the Union’s grievance. 1. Article 1, entitled “Recognition,” provides that the Union is “the sole and exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wage, hours of employment and other conditions of employment . . . .” Id. at 258. The Union argues ConocoPhillips violated this provision when it assigned part of the work previously performed by a Union position (the Lead Operator) to a non-Union position (the APS). The Union also argues Article 1 was violated when ConocoPhillips made changes in the work assignment of Union employees without bargaining. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that this provision is not implicated by the reassignment of Lead Operator work. Article 1 only mandates that the Union be the sole employee representative in negotiations with ConocoPhillips. It does not require that certain work be performed by Union employees or that any particular topic be subject to collective bargaining. -12- Article 3, entitled “Exclusive Agreement,” provides: This contract is the entire Agreement between the [parties]. No practices, payments of wages or benefits prior to this Agreement date shall act to change or enlarge the express wording of this Agreement. All Agreements subsequently entered into by the parties during the term of this Agreement shall also be considered a part of this Agreement when reduced to writing and signed by authorized representatives of the Company and the Union. Id. at 258. The Union contends when ConocoPhillips reassigned the work of the Lead Operator position, it “changed” the terms of the CBA without complying with Article 3’s requirement that contract changes be reduced to a signed writing. This provision would be relevant if ConocoPhillips attempted to defend the reassignment on the theory that it was authorized by a new contract term. An arbitrator might then conclude that the new term was not valid under Article 3, and that ConocoPhillips’s actions were unauthorized. But ConocoPhillips makes no such argument. And there is nothing in Article 3 that limits ConocoPhillips’s ability to reassign work. We therefore find Article 3 is not implicated by the challenged reassignment. The Union also argues the reassignment of Lead Operator work violated several provisions of Article 20, which it characterizes generally as “provid[ing] what the lead operators do and how the vacancies are filled.” Aplt. Br. at 9. But -13- the Union does not make specific arguments as to how each provision was violated by the reassignment. 2 Article 20-1 states: “Providing an employee has the necessary qualifications, seniority rating . . . shall be the determining factor in bidding and bumping. Ranking number in a progression unit will be the determining factor for promoting or demoting within a progression unit or demoting out of a progression unit.” App. at 272. In other words, Article 20-1 provides that seniority is to be the primary factor in advancement. We find this provision imposes no limit on ConocoPhillips’s ability to reassign work. Article 20-4 provides, in pertinent part: “Filling a permanent vacancy in the Lead Operator classification shall be by the selection/qualification process. All other permanent vacancies within a progression unit will be filled by the employees in the progression unit moving up, leaving the bottom number in the progression unit vacant.” Id. The Union does not argue that a vacant position has been improperly filled, or explain how the reassignment of Lead Operator work offends Article 20-4. We also find this provision is not relevant to the reassignment of work. 2 Before the district court, the Union made specific arguments that the elimination of the Lead Operator position violated each of these provisions. But since we have found that elimination-of-jobs grievances are exempted absolutely by Article 11, we do not address these arguments. -14- Article 20-5 addresses ConocoPhillips’s ability to prevent an employee from advancing further according to seniority due to physical inability: No employee will be frozen unless the Company doctor determines he is physically unable to advance to the next higher classification. The period of time he is frozen will be limited to the time he is physically unable to advance. No more than one employee can be frozen in any classification. Employees promoting around a frozen employee shall also demote around him for the first calendar year. After one calendar year, if the employee remains frozen then he is subject to once around, always around, for any employee who promotes around him according to paragraph 20-12. Id. at 273. Because this provision has no language limiting assignment in any way, we find it is not implicated by the reassignment of the Lead Operator work. Article 20-6 states: “It is recognized that employees must meet all qualifications of their job as a condition of employment,” and sets out the guidelines for removing an employee who is not qualified to perform a job. Id. The Union does not argue that any employee was removed, or otherwise explain how ConocoPhillips’s actions violated this provision. We find that Article 20-6 does not limit the reassignment of work. Article 20-15 discusses in detail the rules for advancement where an employee is demoted out of a position as a result of reductions in the unit. Id. at 275–76. We agree with the district court this provision contains no language restricting ConocoPhillips’s ability to reassign work. Article 21-9 provides: -15- If the work of a higher-paid classification is temporarily required for 4 or more hours of any employee within the bargaining unit during a regular 8-hour day, evening, or night shift, he shall receive the wages of the higher-paid classification for all hours worked in that shift. Overtime shall be paid for at rate of job worked. Id. at 277 (emphasis added). The Union suggests ConocoPhillips violated Article 21-9 by reassigning Lead Operator work without making the mandatory increased payment to certain employees. But, as ConocoPhillips points out, Article 21-9 applies only to temporary reassignments. There is nothing in the record to suggest the reassignment of Lead Operator duties to Unit Operators and APSs is temporary. And, in fact, the Union does not make this contention. Thus, we conclude Article 21-9 is not implicated by the reassignment of Lead Operator work. Finally, Appendix A is a rate schedule for Union jobs in the refinery. This provision explains: “This Appendix is the agreed-upon base rates of pay for the listed jobs as they existed at the time of the Agreement. It is not an agreement on the part of ConocoPhillips that the listed jobs will not be changed, combined, or eliminated.” Id. at 291–92. The Union argued below the negotiated duties of the Lead Operator are fixed by Appendix A. But, as the district court noted, because this provision explicitly states the Appendix is not an agreement that the listed jobs will not be changed, this argument is unavailing. We therefore conclude Appendix A also does not narrow ConocoPhillips’s right to reassign work. -16- To summarize, none of these provisions of the CBA are implicated by the Union’s Lead Operator grievances. 2. As to Article 21-1, however, the Union’s contention has merit. Article 21-1 provides, in relevant part: Work peculiar to a classification shall be performed by employees assigned to that classification within the bargaining unit with the exception that the Company reserves the right to assign work without compromising safety to qualified employees regularly assigned to other classifications within the bargaining unit for efficient, productive and profitable operations of the plant. Id. at 277. The Union contends the reassignment of work violated Article 21-1, because work peculiar to the Lead Operator classification is now being performed by the Unit Operator and APS classifications. In response, ConocoPhillips acknowledges that it is “generally prohibited” from reassigning the work of one classification to another. But, it argues, Article 21-1 limits reassignment only where the classification that originally performed the work still exists, as work cannot be “peculiar to” a classification that does not exist. Under this interpretation, Article 21-1 does not apply where ConocoPhillips has eliminated the original classification, as it did here. We find the language of this provision arguably restricts ConocoPhillips’s ability to reassign work previously performed by one classification to another. Such a reassignment is only permitted where it does not compromise safety, it is -17- made to qualified employees, and it is made to employees within the bargaining unit. The question of whether the reassignment of Lead Operator work complied with these limitations is for the arbitrator to resolve. ConocoPhillips’s narrow interpretation of this restriction is not unreasonable, but it is not required by the language of Article 21-1. It is not clear whether the provision’s purpose is to protect the old classification from being stripped of duties (which would favor ConocoPhillips’s interpretation, as there would be no value in protecting a classification that no longer exists) or to protect the new classification from being burdened with additional duties (which would favor a broader interpretation, as the burden of increased responsibility would be the same, regardless of whether the original classification was eliminated). Because the reassignment of the Lead Operator duties at least arguably implicates Article 21-1, we find this grievance is arbitrable. In sum, we conclude Article 11 exempts every Lead Operator grievance from arbitration except the claim that the reassignment of Lead Operator duties violated Article 21-1 of the CBA. 2. Still Cleaner Unit The Union also filed grievances based on ConocoPhillips’s decision to (1) eliminate three positions in the Still Cleaner unit and replace them with two general Still Cleaners and (2) reassign some portion of the still cleanout preparation work to the newly created Drum Operator position in the -18- Coker/Combo unit. On appeal, the Union urges these actions violated Articles 21-1 and 36 of the CBA. 3 Elimination of the Three Still Cleaner Positions As discussed above, a grievance arising from ConocoPhillips’s right to eliminate a position is exempt from arbitration under Article 11. The Still Cleaner grievances regarding the elimination of the original three positions are therefore not arbitrable. Reassignment of the Still Cleaner Work For the same reasons addressed above, Article 21-1 arguably places a limit on ConocoPhillips’s ability to reassign work formerly performed by one classification to another. Thus, the grievance that the reassignment of Still Cleaner work to the Drum Operator violated Article 21-1 is arbitrable. Finally, we turn to the Union’s claim that the reassignment of Still Cleaner work to the Drum Operator position is contrary to Article 36. Article 36 addresses the payment and hours of employees who clean the stills. Specifically, Article 36 states, “Cleaning of the coke still equipment shall be paid for on a piecework basis . . . .” App. at 287. Article 36-2 continues that “[e]arnings of an entire crew per cleanout will be distributed among the crew in the same ratio as their base hourly rates bear to each other.” Id. And Article 36-3 requires that 3 The Union also asserts these actions violated Article 21-4. Again, however, we do not consider this claim because it was not properly raised before the district court. Tele-Commc’ns, Inc., 104 F.3d at 1233. -19- overtime be paid “for each hour worked over 8 in a given cleanout” and “for each hour worked over 40 in a given workweek.” Id. at 288. Article 36 also mandates that “hours shall not exceed 40 a week,” and Article 36-1 explains that “[w]henever it appears that a delay will exceed 2 hours, the crew may be notified that they are not needed; and they may leave the premises until called again.” Id. at 287. It is undisputed the Drum Operator position does not comply with these requirements. The Union contends the reassignment of Still Cleaner work to an employee who is not paid or employed in accordance with Article 36 is a violation of the CBA. ConocoPhillips, echoing the findings of the district court, responds that Article 36 applies only to workers employed in the Still Cleaning unit. Because the Drum Operator is located in the Coker/Combo unit, ConocoPhillips argues, Article 36 is not operative. The text of Article 36 does not support ConocoPhillips’s interpretation. By its own terms, Article 36 regulates payment and hours for “[c]leaning of the coke still equipment.” Id. Article 36-9 defines still cleaning duties as including “the actual preparation of the equipment for cleaning.” Id. at 288. Because ConocoPhillips concedes the Drum Operator performs “cleanout preparation work,” which includes “isolating energy before the coke equipment can be properly disassembled,” Aple. Br. at 8, Article 36 arguably applies to the Drum -20- Operators. Thus, the Union’s grievance that the reassignment of Still Cleaner work to the Drum Operators violated Article 36 is arbitrable. To conclude, the Union’s Still Cleaner reassignment grievances under Articles 21-1 and 36 are not exempted from arbitration by Article 11 of the CBA.