Opinion ID: 691965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Actual Confusion or Lack Thereof (Scott Factors 4 & 6)

Text: 63 The fourth Scott factor is the length of time defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion arising. While we hold that this factor applies to product configuration cases as well as to trademark and product packaging cases (for it is obviously relevant), we take this opportunity to underscore the role of the lack of actual confusion factor. If a defendant's product has been sold for an appreciable period of time without evidence of actual confusion, one can infer that continued marketing will not lead to consumer confusion in the future. The longer the challenged product has been in use, the stronger this inference will be. 64 Evidence of actual confusion (the sixth Scott factor bearing on likelihood of confusion) is similarly relevant: the more evidence of actual confusion that a plaintiff can muster, the stronger the likelihood of confusion in the future, but lack of evidence of actual confusion (at least where the time period that the two products have been in competition is short or when the particular circumstances [do not] indicate such evidence should have been available, AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir.1979)) does not raise an inference that there is no likelihood of confusion. As the case law makes clear, proof of actual confusion is not required for a successful trade dress infringement action under the Lanham Act. Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 292 (quoting Opticians Ass'n v. Independent Opticians, 920 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir.1990)); accord 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION Sec. 23:2 (2d ed. 1984); id. Sec. 23:20. 65 We see no reason that these factors would not also apply to product configuration cases. However, we emphasize again, see supra at 204-05, that to make out unfair competition a plaintiff must show a likelihood that a consumer exercising ordinary care to discover the identity of the source would suffer confusion or be mistaken because of the appearance of the allegedly infringing product configuration. Thus, instances of actual confusion may not weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion unless the confused consumer was acting with the care expected of consumers purchasing the type of good at issue. See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharmaceutical Corp., 715 F.2d 837, 840 & n. 6 (1983) (ignoring testimony of witness who was not acting as a reasonably prudent consumer of the type of goods in issue when purchasing the product).