Opinion ID: 1784651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: 1966 Jaguar XKE

Text: ¶ 30. In the chancellor's supplemental opinion and judgment, the chancellor found that the Jaguar had been damaged while in Margaret's possession. Margaret contends that the chancellor erred in finding that she had damaged the Jaguar while it was in her possession. Margaret testified she had no knowledge of any damage; did not damage the Jaguar; and could not see any damages in the photographs she reviewed at trial. ¶ 31. Kenneth testified that the photographs depicted the condition of the Jaguar after he received it from Margaret. Kenneth testified and submitted an estimate for repairs that totaled $3,173.24. The estimate from Parks Chevrolet Company, Inc., was introduced as exhibit 16. The Jaguar was in Margaret's possession until the sale. Kenneth purchased the Jaguar at the sale. ¶ 32. Margaret contends the chancellor erroneously factored this into his decision to award Kenneth $5,000 to offset his obligation to her. However, the chancellor's supplemental opinion and judgment does not specifically assess any value to the damage to the Jaguar. The chancellor's supplemental opinion and judgment also does not state that Margaret did not deliver the Jaguar for the public sale. The supplemental opinion only provided that the Jaguar had been damaged while in her [Margaret's] possession. However, the chancellor's supplemental opinion stated that Margaret was responsible for  a judgment of the amount of $5,000.00 to offset the items Margaret Lynn Owen failed to deliver for the public sale.  (Emphasis added). Without a detailed analysis of how the chancellor computed the $5,000 amount and based on the language provided in the chancellor's supplemental opinion, this Court is unable to adequately address this issue. Therefore, the chancellor shall on remand address how, or if, the Jaguar factored into the judgment in the amount of $5,000 to offset for items that Margaret failed to produced for the public sale. ¶ 33. Margaret also argues that the chancellor erroneously allowed Kenneth to introduce the estimate from Parks Chevrolet without an expert. However, Margaret provides no authority to support her position. Failure to cite any authority is a procedural bar, and this Court is under no obligation to consider the assignment of error. Williams v. State, 708 So.2d 1358, 1360 (Miss.1998). Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(1)(6) requires that the argument in an appellant's brief must contain the contentions of appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied upon. See United Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Mosley, 835 So.2d 88, 92 (Miss.App.2002). Therefore, due to Margaret's complete failure to cite authority in her brief, the Court does not have to address her assignment of error regarding the introduction of the estimate. ¶ 34. However, this assignment of error will be briefly addressed in order to provide guidance to the chancellor on remand. It is a well-settled and pronounced legal principle that when cost of repairs are relied upon as a measure of damages it is necessary to establish that (1) the repairs were necessary as a result of the wrongful act, and (2) the cost of repairs were necessary or reasonable. Bryan Bros. Packing Co. v. Grubbs, 251 Miss. 52, 168 So.2d 289, 293 (1964) (citing National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Slayden, 227 Miss. 285, 85 So.2d 916 (1956)); see Sims v. Collins, 762 So.2d 785, 790 (Miss.App.2000). In Bryan, this Court held that it was error for the trial court to admit the testimony of a non-expert as to the amount of damages done to the vehicle as a result of the accident over the defendant's objection. Bryan, 168 So.2d at 293. Here, Kenneth testified to the cost of repairs, and the repair estimate was introduced through him. Margaret's counsel objected to the introduction of the repair estimate. The chancellor overruled the objection and allowed the estimate to be introduced. We find the chancellor erred in allowing the estimate to be introduced without an expert. ¶ 35. Furthermore, Margaret contends, based on her testimony, that the chancellor could not have determined that the Jaguar had been damaged while in her possession. Margaret testified that to her knowledge there was no damage done to the Jaguar. She also testified that she could not see any damage in the photographs. As such, Margaret argues that there was no evidence that the damages occurred while in her possession. Kenneth correctly argues that the chancellor was well within his discretion as the trier of facts to believe his testimony over Margaret's testimony. This Court has repeatedly held that the chancellor's findings of fact are required to be respected if supported by credible evidence and not manifestly wrong. See Bryan, 589 So.2d at 659; In re Taylor, 609 So.2d at 393. Likewise, it is a well-established proposition that [i]t was the chancellor's duty to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Simmons v. Jaggers, 914 So.2d 693, 697 (Miss.2005); see In re Estate of Carter, 912 So.2d 138, 143 (Miss.2005) (Our standard of review is indeed deferential, as we recognize that a chancellor, being the only one to hear the testimony of witnesses and observe their demeanor, is in the best position to judge their credibility.). ¶ 36. However, for the reasons stated herein, the case is remanded to the chancery court in order to provide a detailed analysis, consistent with this opinion, of what, if any, role the Jaguar played in the determination of the $5,000 judgment.