Opinion ID: 414310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: factual background & statutory framework

Text: 2 Defendant was arrested on December 10, 1981. On the following day a complaint was filed charging him with forging and uttering a United States Treasury check in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 495. On January 22, 1982, the United States dismissed the complaint by filing a praecipe. On January 28 an original indictment was returned charging defendant with two counts of forging and uttering a United States Treasury check, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 495, and one count of possession of stolen mail matter, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1708. These charges were based on the same criminal conduct as the complaint that had previously been dismissed. On February 5 defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act and Local Rule 2-7(4)(a) of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. United States District Judge Joyce Hens Green denied defendant's motion. On March 3, after a stipulated bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of possession of stolen mail matter. The other two counts of the indictment were dismissed in accordance with the stipulation. Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen months and fined $750; execution of the sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on probation for eighteen months with special conditions. 3 Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(b) provides that an indictment must be filed within thirty days of an individual's arrest. 1 Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(c)(1) provides that the trial of an individual must commence within seventy days of the latter of the filing of the indictment and the individual's appearance before a judicial officer. 2 If these time limits are not met, the indictment or the charges contained in the complaint must be dismissed. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3162(a) (1976). 3 The trial judge may dismiss the indictment or complaint with or without prejudice. Id. If a complaint is dismissed without prejudice, and thereafter a complaint or indictment is filed based on the same criminal episode as the first complaint, the provisions of [subsections 3161(b) and (c) ] shall be applicable with respect to such subsequent complaint [or] indictment. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981). 4 If an indictment is dismissed upon motion of the government, and thereafter a charge is filed for the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge is excluded in applying the time limits of subsections 3161(b) and (c). 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(h)(6) (1976). 5 The District Court Rules supplement the Speedy Trial Act, but they do not alter the statutory framework described above. See D.D.C.R. 2-7(4), (8). 6 4 The trial court recognized that the 43-day period between defendant's arrest and the dismissal of the complaint and the 49-day period between defendant's arrest and indictment exceeded the Speedy Trial Act's 30-day time limit for indictment. Trial Record, Part 2 (T.R.) at 9, 13-14. The court also recognized that the Speedy Trial Act mandated that the complaint be dismissed, as it had been. Id. at 9. Nevertheless, the court held that the indictment could be dismissed only if the complaint should have been dismissed with prejudice. Id. 7 Section 3161(d)(1) usually permits the time period for indictment to run anew when a complaint is dismissed. The court, however, interpreted section 3161(d)(1) not to apply when the complaint has been dismissed more than thirty days after the arrest and the dismissal would have been with prejudice if the issue had been addressed. The court, therefore, had to inquire whether the complaint should have been dismissed with or without prejudice. It considered the three factors listed in section 3162(a)(1), the seriousness of the offense, the circumstances leading to the dismissal, and the impact of reprosecution on the administration of justice and on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act, as well as other factors. T.R. at 14-17. The court found that the crime of possessing stolen mail matter is relatively serious, that the government's exceeding the time limit was unintentional and is unlikely to recur, that the delay beyond the time limit was short, and that defendant suffered little prejudice. Id. Weighing these factors, the court found that the complaint should have been dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 16-17. Therefore, it denied the motion to dismiss the indictment. 5 Defendant contends that section 3161(d)(1) does not apply when a complaint is dismissed more than thirty days after an arrest and that in the present case sections 3161(b) and 3162(a)(1) require that the indictment be dismissed without inquiry into whether the complaint should have been dismissed without prejudice. Alternatively, defendant argues that the trial court misapplied the three factors set forth in section 3162(a)(1) in determining that the complaint should have been dismissed without prejudice. He contends that the general rule is that charges should be dismissed with prejudice and that the court placed undue emphasis on the lack of prejudice to defendant's ability to prepare his case.