Opinion ID: 2444991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sister state precedents

Text: State courts have taken widely varying approaches to the proper analysis of the scope of a routine traffic stop. Some states either have expressly adopted the purely durational test under their state constitutions or have held that their state constitutions provide no greater rights than the federal constitution. [4] Others have determined that their constitutions require, generally, a more exacting analysis of the scope of routine traffic stops and therefore require such stops to be substantively reasonable under the circumstances. [5] A significant group of states has distinguished between acceptable investigatory techniques during a routine traffic stop and such techniques once the purpose of that traffic stop has been effectuated. Within this group, some states have, by statute, required a reasonable suspicion before consent searches may be undertaken after the purposes of the traffic stop have been effectuated. [6] Others have applied the same standard based on state or federal constitutional provisions. [7] More importantly, a persuasive minority has adopted the rule the defendant urges us to apply: that consent searches undertaken anytime during the course of a routine traffic violation be justified by reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity independent of the initial traffic violation. I begin with the several cases in which state courts have drawn from both federal and state constitutional provisions in limiting the scope of roadside traffic stops and requiring a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity unrelated to the initial stop before a police officer validly can ask for consent during a roadside search. In State v. Smith, 286 Kan. 402, 419, 184 P.3d 890, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 628, 172 L.Ed.2d 639 (2008), the Kansas Supreme Court held that we continue to adhere to our long-standing rule that consensual searches [unrelated to the grounds for a traffic stop] during the period of a detention for a traffic stop are invalid under the [f]ourth [a]mendment to the United States [c]onstitution and § 15 of the Kansas [c]onstitution [b]ill of [r]ights. [8] In Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 69, 757 A.2d 884 (2000), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, noted that [a]rticle I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania [c]onstitution ... would not sustain a consent search conducted in the context of, but which is wholly unrelated in its scope to, an ongoing detention, since there can be no constitutionally-valid detention independently or following a traffic or similar stop absent reasonable suspicion, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Melendez, 544 Pa. 323, 329, [676 A.2d 226] (1996), and the scope of a detention is circumscribed by the reasons that justify it. It is true that, for the purposes of the Geisler analysis, we are concerned only with sister state precedents relevant to the question of whether state constitutions afford more protections than the federal constitution. Each of these courts, however, expressly cited to the search and seizure provisions of its own state constitution and before framing its ultimate conclusion based on both state and federal constitutional provisions. Thus, although I recognize the limitation on the previously discussed precedents, I am nonetheless persuaded by their reasoning that the scope of a routine traffic stop should not be measured merely by its duration. I next turn to the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 790 A.2d 903 (2002). In that case, the court analyzed whether evidence discovered during a roadside consent search was admissible when the state trooper had requested consent without having an articulable suspicion of any criminal activity besides an initial speeding violation. The court first determined that [r]oadside consent searches are ... more akin to an investigatory stop that does involve a detention. Such a stop traditionally has required reasonable and articulable suspicion. Id., at 640, 790 A.2d 903. The court then held that a consent search during a lawful motor vehicle stop is valid only if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that an errant motorist or passenger has engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity. Id., at 647, 790 A.2d 903. The court explained that [t]he requirement of reasonable and articulable suspicion is derived from our [s]tate [c]onstitution [9] and serves to validate the continued detention associated with the search. It also serves the prophylactic purpose of preventing the police from turning a routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for criminal activity unrelated to the stop. Id. I agree with the majority that Carty differs from the present case on three grounds: (1) the New Jersey Supreme Court consistently has afforded a higher level of scrutiny to consent searches than does the United States Supreme Court; (2) the New Jersey police were subject to both a federal decree and state police policy limiting coercive investigatory techniques; and (3) the court had before it an extensive factual record demonstrating the violation of the federal decree and state police policy. Despite these distinctions, however, there are several reasons why Carty is relevant and persuasive. First, although this court has not afforded greater protections than the federal courts concerning consent searches specifically, this court also has found that the Connecticut constitution provides greater protection against official searches and seizures, generally. See State v. Wilkins, supra, 240 Conn. at 504-505, 692 A.2d 1233; State v. Miller, supra, 227 Conn. at 379-80, 630 A.2d 1315; State v. Geisler, supra, 222 Conn. at 690, 610 A.2d 1225; State v. Marsala, supra, 216 Conn. at 159-60, 579 A.2d 58; State v. Dukes, supra, 209 Conn. at 122-23, 547 A.2d 10. Second, although the New Jersey Supreme Court notes that its holding is consistent with the consent decree and state police policy limiting coercive investigatory techniques, it does not rely exclusively upon them. State v. Carty, supra, 170 N.J. at 647, 790 A.2d 903. Finally, much of the data before the court merely corroborated significant legal scholarship, of which we may take judicial notice, [10] demonstrating the psychological pressure faced by detained motorists and the ways in which that pressure may be manipulated to obtain consent to search. Id., at 644-45, 790 A.2d 903. Indeed, the court's analysis emphasized the universal impact of consent searches, observing that [m]any persons, perhaps most, would view the request of a police officer to make a search as having the force of law.... In the context of motor vehicle stops, where the individual is at the side of the road and confronted by a uniformed officer seeking to search his or her vehicle, it is not a stretch of the imagination to assume that the individual feels compelled to consent. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 644, 790 A.2d 903. I therefore find the New Jersey Supreme Court's well reasoned and thorough opinion to have significant persuasive weight within the context of the Geisler analysis. I also find persuasive the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision requiring that officers have reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity independent of the initial traffic violation before asking for consent to search during a traffic stop. See State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418-19 (Minn.2003). Therein, the court noted that the scope and duration of a traffic stop investigation must be limited to the justification for the stop. Id., at 418. It relied on an earlier case, State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn.2002), for support. The court explained: In Wiegand, the defendants were stopped for a burned-out headlight, but the police conducted a search using a narcotics-detection dog in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion of drug-related activity. [Id., at 128-29, 137]. We reversed the defendants' convictions holding, among other things, that under [a]rticle [first], [§] 10, of the Minnesota [c]onstitution any expansion of the scope or duration of a traffic stop must be justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal activity. [Id., at 135]. State v. Fort, supra, at 418-19. Under this framework, although the initial traffic stop was proper, the investigative questioning, consent inquiry, and subsequent search went beyond the scope of the traffic stop and was unsupported by any reasonable articulable suspicion. Id., at 419. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order suppressing evidence discovered during the consent search. [11] Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Alaska recently held that an officer's questions about other potential crimes, and an officer's requests for permission to conduct a search, are significant events under the search and seizure provision of the Alaska [c]onstitution, [article first, § 14]. More specifically, we conclude that, under the circumstances presented in this case, the officer conducting the traffic stop was prohibited from requesting [the defendant's] permission to conduct a search that was (1) unrelated to the basis for the stop and (2) not otherwise supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminality. Brown v. State, 182 P.3d 624, 626 (Alaska App. 2008). In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged that federal precedents, including Muehler v. Mena, supra, 544 U.S. at 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, did not prevent the officer from engaging in a consent search completely unrelated to the initial traffic stop. Brown v. State, supra, at 629 (we conclude that federal law does not afford sufficient protection to motorists who are asked to consent to a search of their person, their vehicle, or their belongings during a traffic stop). The court noted, however, that the Alaska Supreme Court and Court of Appeals repeatedly had interpreted article first, § 14, of that state's constitution to provide greater protection to the citizens of Alaska than that provided by the fourth amendment to the federal constitution. Id., at 633. Drawing from state search and seizure jurisprudence interpreting the Alaska constitution, as well as public policy concerns and sister state precedent, the court concluded that the Alaska constitution must be interpreted to grant broader protections than its federal counterpart in situations involving consent searches during routine traffic stops. [12] Id., at 634.