Opinion ID: 799338
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ressam's Cooperation and Character

Text: Section 3553(a)(1) identifies the history and characteristics of the defendant as one of the factors to consider in imposing a sentence. That factor may include the defendant's cooperation with authorities. [10] The only justifications for the district court's substantial downward departure in sentencing Ressam were his cooperation and, more broadly, his history and personal characteristics, as expressed in the court's explanation for the sentence. It was appropriate for the district court to consider those factors. When imposing a sentence that is well below the Guidelines range because of the assistance provided by a defendant, however, there must be some indication that the extent of departure is justified. See United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997 (8th Cir.2005) (examining the reasonableness of the sentence against the five factors outlined in U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and concluding that the imposition of a 78-month sentence was not justified where the Guidelines range was 180 months and the assistance the defendant provided consisted of information regarding others who were either already under indictment or were suspects). There is no doubt that Ressam cooperated with the federal government and with governments of some other allied nations, for a period of time. But he did not begin to cooperate until after he was convicted by the jury and faced life in prison. The timing of Ressam's cooperation suggests that it was prompted by his desire to make the best of a bad situation, not some altruistic motive, sincere regret, or deeper good nature. Moreover, Ressam stopped cooperating. This made it impossible for the government to proceed with certain prosecutions and led to the release of certain suspected terrorists. At the time his sentence was originally imposed in 2005, there remained some hope that Ressam might live up to the cooperation agreement that he had signed. That hope was extinguished by the time of Ressam's resentencing in 2008. He had, in the interim, affirmatively repudiated his agreement to cooperate, recanted his testimony, and done everything he could to diminish the assistance he had already provided. Yet the district court imposed exactly the same sentence in 2008 as it had in 2005, failing to account for the dramatic change in circumstances. The court stated in 2008 that Ressam's cooperation, unique in its breadth and scope, weighed heavily in my initial sentencing decision and its import has not changed in my analysis today. Treated as a factual finding, the district court's assessment of Ressam's cooperation was clearly erroneous. The district court significantly overvalued the cooperation provided by Ressam during the time that he provided assistance. The Guidelines afford the sentencing judge wide latitude in evaluating the `significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance,' but direct courts to give `substantial weight . . . to the government's evaluation' of that assistance. United States v. Awad, 371 F.3d 583, 586-87 (9th Cir.2004) (citing U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a)(1) & cmt. background) (alterations in original; some internal quotation marks omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 cmt. n. 3 (providing that [s]ubstantial weight should be given to the government's evaluation of the extent of the defendant's assistance, particularly where the extent and value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain). The district court failed to give substantial weight to the government's evaluation of the extent of the defendant's assistance. Instead, the court credited Ressam's assessment of the value of his own cooperation, expressly relying on the defendant's sentencing memorandum submitted before the July 2005 sentencing hearing as the basis for its assessment of the far-reaching impact of Mr. Ressam's cooperation on the investigations and prosecutions of terrorist activities in this country and abroad. That consideration failed to take into account the effect of Ressam's subsequent recantations. More broadly, Ressam and his counsel were in no position to evaluate the effects of and benefits from his cooperation. Notably, they could not know what the government already knew or would have been able to learn from other sources. That is why the Guidelines expressly require district courts to give substantial weight to the evaluation by the government. It is the government that is in the position to know the effects of defendants' provided information, and that is especially true with information of the kind provided by Ressam. Much of the information Ressam provided was not unique to him, according to the government. Moreover, as the government argued, Ressam's most valuable informationthat leading to the charges against Doha and Mohamedcannot be credited [because] Ressam undermined that value when he chose to end his cooperation leading to the dismissal of these charges. Similarly, the district court significantly understated the impact of Ressam's repudiation of the cooperation agreement and recantations of his prior statements. The district court acknowledged that Mr. Ressam's later decision to end his cooperation resulted in the dismissal of two pending prosecutions and the retraction of certain of his statements against two other terrorist suspects. But the district court failed to take into proper account the effect of Ressam's early cessation of cooperation or recantations and failed to adjust the sentence in response. The district court expressed concern that [d]ownplaying the cooperation that Mr. Ressam provided the government would diminish the likelihood of future cooperation by other apprehended terrorists. That assessment appears to us woefully misguided and, if intended as a finding of fact, clearly erroneous. Ressam voluntarily, and with advice from counsel, entered into an agreement with the government in which he promised full cooperation. Under the terms of that agreement, both parties committed to seeking a sentence of not less than 27 years. Ressam may have believed, with some justification, that he could later ask the government to agree to reduce the minimum term, but the agreement he entered into set 27 years as a floor for the term of imprisonment that either party would recommend to the court. But Ressam violated the agreement. Most importantly, he withheld his cooperation. He compounded the potential ill effects of his withdrawal by affirmatively disavowing the information he had already provided. He then argued for a sentence substantially lower than the 27-year term which the cooperation agreement provided would be the minimum that either side would recommend, thus breaching the agreement in yet another way. After all that, the district court gave him a sentence well below the 27-year minimum that was premised on full cooperation. The far more likely inference to be drawn from the court's sentencing is that a defendant might be able to repudiate a cooperation agreement and recant previous testimony with no ill effects. Indeed, Ressam appeared to come out ahead. It is hard to perceive what reason there is to provide any reward to a defendant who terminates his cooperation in breach of the agreement into which he entered and who affirmatively acts, as Ressam did, to undermine the value of statements that he had already provided. Rewarding such conduct sends precisely the wrong message to other offenders. We also find unreasonable and clearly erroneous the district court's finding that Mr. Ressam's life history and personal characteristics support favorable sentencing consideration, in view of the substantial evidence, including the information contained in the Presentence Report, that Ressam had for many years violated the laws of many nations and led a life dedicated to terrorist causes. The district court credited Dr. Grassian's favorable report and Ressam's own characterization in his 2005 sentencing memorandum that by naming and identifying scores of former associates, Mr. Ressam not only has imperiled his life, but also has decisively walked away from the illegality that led to his arrest. But Ressam's subsequent recantations squarely undermined that assessment. In finding that Ressam was a quiet, solitary and devout man whose true character is manifest in his decision to cooperate, the district court simply did not come to grips with the many facts demonstrating the contrary. Even leaving aside his plan to blow up LAX, it cannot be overlooked that Ressam spent nearly a year attending three training camps for Islamic terrorists in Afghanistan, conspired with other would-be terrorists, used forged documents and false identities on multiple occasions, had been deported from France as early as 1993, violated the immigration laws of the United States, France, and Canada, and planned to rob a bank to obtain funds to carry out his mission. In the course of robbing the bank, Ressam intended to throw a live hand grenade and run if necessary to get away. These facts and others directly refute the district court's finding that Ressam is a quiet, solitary and devout man whose true character is manifest in his decision to cooperate. Indeed, based on this record, if there was a period of aberrant behavior in Ressam's adult life, it was during the relatively brief time following his conviction when Ressam provided assistance to the government. His conduct before and after that limited period contradicts the district court's assessment of his character. Even if, in the end, it might be determined that Ressam should be given some credit for his cooperation and personal characteristics, that credit is not nearly strong enough to justify the substantial downward departure provided in the district court's 22-year sentence.