Opinion ID: 8288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voir Dire: Youth as a Mitigating Factor

Text: Johnson-Bey argues that the district court erred in denying habeas relief because the state trial court refused to excuse Jurors Barbee, Lammert, and Kiker for cause after they declared during voir dire that they would not consider youth as a mitigating factor in answering the special issues at the sentencing phase. Johnson-Bey contends that under the rule announced in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992),1 prospective jurors must be willing to consider particular evidence, such as a defendant's age, as a mitigating factor in 1 In Morgan, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case in which the defendant is found guilty shall be excused for cause. 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). 7 sentencing. We need not reach the question posed by Johnson-Bey- -whether jurors are constitutionally required to consider particular evidence as mitigating--because the state habeas court made factual findings that Barbee, Lammert, and Kiker had indicated in voir dire that they could consider youth as a mitigating factor. These factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).2 2 Section 2254(d) provides: In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit--
not resolved in the State court hearing; (2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing; (4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction . . . (5) that [the State court failed to appoint counsel for an indigent applicant] . . . (6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or (7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding; (8) or unless . . . the Federal court on a consideration of [the relevant] part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 8 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426 (1985); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984). Johnson-Bey contends that the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness should not apply to the state court's findings in this case for three reasons: (1) because the state habeas court findings were made seven years after the trial, the state court was not in a better position to evaluate the credibility and demeanor of the jurors than is this court; (2) Johnson-Bey was denied a fair opportunity to challenge these findings; and (3) the findings are not supported by the record. We reject these contentions. First, Johnson-Bey's argument that the presumption of correctness is inapplicable because the factual findings were not contemporaneous with the challenges for cause is incorrect. Although one reason state court findings are accorded a presumption of correctness is that the state trial judge is in a better position to judge the credibility and demeanor of witnesses, the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness also embodies principles of federalism. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981). These principles support the application of the presumption of correctness to state appellate court findings made on the basis of the trial court record, as well as state trial court findings. Id. Furthermore, that the factual findings were made by the state court during the habeas proceeding rather than contemporaneous with voir dire does not render the presumption of correctness inapplicable. See Williams v. Lynaugh, 809 F.2d 9 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1987) (according a presumption of correctness to factual findings that juror was properly excused for cause made by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upon habeas review), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1008 (1987). Johnson-Bey next contends that the factual findings are not entitled to a presumption of correctness because he was denied any fair opportunity to challenge the findings, invoking the exception of § 2254(d)(6). This contention lacks merit. Johnson-Bey had an opportunity to challenge the state court's findings in the state habeas proceeding, which satisfies the requirement that the applicant receive a full, fair and adequate hearing in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(6); see May v. Collins, 955 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a state court affords a full, fair, and adequate hearing so long as the state and the petitioner are parties to the proceeding and written findings are made, citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981)), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 901 (1992). Finally, Johnson asserts that the state court's findings that Lammert, Barbee, and Kiker could consider youth as a mitigating factor were not supported by the record, citing brief portions of each juror's voir dire. However, section 2254(d) provides an exception to the presumption of correctness only if the federal court determines that the state court factual findings were not supported by the record as a whole. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8). We conclude that the record provides ample support for the state court's findings. When first asked whether he 10 thought the age of a person charged was a factor to consider in answering special issue number two, concerning future dangerousness, Barbee answered I don't think age would make any difference. However, upon further questioning, Barbee stated that people definitely can change, and he agreed that younger people will sometimes do things that they might not do in the future. Lammert stated that individuals can change, that people do things when they are young that they would in the future consider wrong and never do again, and that he would not now do some of the things he did as a teenager. Although he also stated that he did not consider a nineteen-year-old to be a youth, he reaffirmed that he believed that people do change in time. Kiker stated that she believed a nineteen-year-old with the maturity of a twelve-year-old should be treated the same for punishment purposes as a nineteen-year-old with the maturity of a twenty-five-year-old. However, she also testified that: Yes people can change. What they have been like as a young adult does not necessarily mean that that's the way they'll be in their older adult years. Therefore, the record of these three jurors' voir dire testimony as a whole supports the state court's factual findings that these jurors could consider youth as a mitigating factor. We affirm the district court's judgment denying habeas relief on the ground that Jurors Barbee, Lammert and Kiker refused to consider youth as a mitigating factor in the punishment phase. 11