Opinion ID: 4520685
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntary Provision of a Number

Text: Under the TCPA, it is unlawful to send an unsolicited fax advertisement unless three conditions are met. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i)-(iii); see also Mauthe v. Optum Inc., 925 F.3d 129, 132 (3d Cir. 2019). Specifically, the statute prohibits “any person within the United States, or any person outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States . . . to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement[.]” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). An “unsolicited advertisement,” is that which is sent “to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” Id. § 227(a)(5) (emphasis added). Thus, fax advertisements sent with the recipient’s prior express invitation or permission (i.e., solicited faxes) are not violative of the TCPA. Id. The voluntary provision of a number—phone or fax—by a message-recipient to a message-sender, constitutes express consent such that a received message is solicited and thus not prohibited by the TCPA, if the message relates to the reason the number was provided. See, e.g., Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 389 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Fober v. Mgmt. & Tech. Consultants, LLC, 886 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that the provision of a phone number and receipt of a call that relates to “the reason why the called party 4 Our dissenting colleague views this case as evidencing only implied consent. Hence, the crux of our disagreement. 8 provided his or her phone number in the first place” constitutes express consent such that the calls were deemed solicited); KHS Corp. v. Singer Fin. Corp., No. 16-55, 2018 WL 4030699, at  (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2018) (concluding the same, but in the context of fax advertisements, and collecting cases). In Daubert, a plaintiff alleged a violation of the TCPA due to the receipt of sixty-nine calls that he alleged were unsolicited. 861 F.3d at 387. The defendant argued that the district court was wrong in granting summary judgment on the plaintiff’s TCPA claim, contending instead that a jury could conclude the plaintiff had provided his “prior express consent” to receive calls regarding a medical bill. Id. at 389. This Court proceeded to analyze the TCPA’s scope “guided by the statute’s text, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) interpretations of the statute, the statute’s purpose, and our understanding of the concept of consent as it exists in the common law.” Id. at 389. We first afforded express consent its ordinary meaning. Id. Then, we noted that: “On the issue of prior express consent the FCC has found that ‘persons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called at the number which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.’” Id. (quoting In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 8752, 8769 (1992)) (emphasis added). We then summarized the FCC’s relevant ruling, namely, that the provision of a number to a party evidences prior express consent by the number-provider to be contacted at the number provided for purposes relating to why the number was provided. Id. at 390. And we noted that “[t]he FCC’s rulings make no distinction between directly providing one’s cell phone number to a creditor and taking steps to make that 9 number available through other methods, like consenting to disclose that number to other entities for certain purposes.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Finally, we affirmed that “Congress did not intend to depart from the common law understanding of consent . . . that it’s given voluntarily.” Id. at 390 (citation and quotations marks omitted) (emphasis added). Though the facts of Daubert differ from the facts of this case it is instructive on the TCPA and when prior express consent exists.5 Id. Prior express consent can be deduced from a message-recipient’s voluntary provision or “knowing[] release” of his or her number to a message-sender, such that a message is solicited and thus not prohibited by the TCPA if the message relates to the reason the number was provided. Id. at 389; see also Fober, 886 F.3d at 793; KHS Corp., 2018 WL 4030699, at . Indeed, the FCC’s own explanation supports this concept, explaining that “[e]xpress permission to receive a faxed ad requires that the consumer understand that by providing a fax number, he or she is agreeing to receive fax advertisements.” Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. A-S Medication Sols., LLC, No. 19-1452, 2020 WL 881329, at  (7th Cir. Feb. 24, 2020) (quoting In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act (TCPA) of 1991, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14129 (2003)) (emphasis added); see also 5 In Daubert there was no direct evidence that the plaintiff had given his prior express consent to receive calls, as he had merely provided his cell number to a hospital, an intermediary associated with a creditor, when he was admitted. Daubert, 861 F.3d at 390. 10 Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Safemark Sys., LP, 931 F.3d 1094, 1101 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding that hotel franchisees had provided their express permission and invitation to receive faxes because the franchisees understood that the Wyndham Hotel Group might provide optional assistance with facility items, which would inherently entail receiving information about products to purchase, and that by having included a fax number in an agreement, “the hotels invited the assistance or advertisements to come by fax.”).6 Here, it is undisputed that PHI voluntarily provided a business card with a fax number on it to Defendants (i.e., knowingly released the number such that the provision was an invitation 6 In this case, PHI understood that the voluntary provision of their business card, with a fax number on it, was in part for the purpose of having drug representatives contact them with information on the drugs. See JA200 (answering affirmatively in a deposition that the business cards were provided for the drug representatives “to have, so they could get in touch” with the doctors). We acknowledge that PHI believes A-S Medication supports their position in this matter, but the facts between that case and the present case are clearly distinguishable. In A-S Medication, a company sent a fax advertisement to 11,422 different numbers from an “acquired customer list.” 2020 WL 881329, at . That is drastically different from the present case wherein two faxes were sent to PHI after drug representatives had continued and sustained contact with Dr. Martinez and voluntarily provided fax numbers, in part, for the purpose of having drug representatives be in contact and provide follow-up information. 11 to be contacted), and it is undisputed that the two faxes related to prior conversations Cephalon’s drug representatives had with Dr. Martinez as part of an ongoing business relationship.7 7 This conceded fact touches upon our dissenting colleague’s first concern: that there remains a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Dr. Martinez gave Cephalon prior express permission to send the faxes. Again, the following is stressed: 1) case law and the FCC both acknowledge that the voluntary provision of a telephone number constitutes express permission to be contacted, and 2) PHI—the PlaintiffAppellant in this case—conceded that there was a voluntary provision of a fax number to Defendants. As such, and as explained further below, we find that the voluntary provision of a fax number also constitutes express permission to be contacted, and here, there is literally no question, only a concession, that a fax number was voluntarily provided to Defendants, meaning there was express consent to be faxed. Though our dissenting colleague focuses on Dr. Martinez’s deposition, Dr. Martinez is neither a plaintiff nor appellant in this case. His testimony is of course relevant, but PlaintiffAppellant PHI’s concession that there is no question of fact regarding the voluntary provision of the business card with a fax number on it is key. Thus, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that need be resolved. Our dissenting colleague, here, too, believes we have applied the wrong legal standard, permitting implied permission to satisfy the TCPA’s requirement of express permission. He suggests that PHI’s conduct of leaving business cards on the receptionist’s desk is passive and cannot constitute express consent. He questions this opinion’s reliance on our prior 12 But PHI quarrels with the law believing that “express consent” and “express invitation and permission” are different and not interchangeable. PHI argues that “express consent” relates only to telephone calls whereas “express invitation or precedent in Daubert and our references to Fober and KHS Corp. We stress that this case does not involve implied permission, but voluntary provision, which has been equated to express consent in the telephone context, and which here, we equate to express consent in the fax context. There is no question that Daubert centered on telephone calls and not faxes. 861 F.3d at 387. But Daubert, in a similar vein to this case, addressed situations in which phone calls could be deemed solicited or unsolicited and then either permissible or impermissible in accordance with the TCPA. Id. at 389. Our dissenting colleague is concerned that the FCC’s use of “in effect” shows that “releasing a contact number is merely implied consent through conduct” but the FCC itself was speaking to the issue of “prior express consent.” Further, consent in this case is buttressed by the fact that the fax number was provided in the first place, namely, so that PHI could be contacted. See also Fober, 886 F.3d at 793 (“FCC orders and rulings show that . . . transactional context matters in determining . . . consumer’s consent . . . . To fall within the prior express consent exception, a call must relate to the reason why the called party provided his or her phone number” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 13 permission” relates to faxes, that case law about the provision of numbers in telephone situations is inapposite, and that Defendants needed to prove more than the voluntary provision of the fax number to properly meet their burden for summary judgment purposes. We disagree.