Opinion ID: 1662000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: summary judgment for holley

Text: Holley, in its motion for summary judgment, did not dispute the contention that it failed to replace or install the safety device when it made repairs in February 1989. Rather, in its motion Holley basically relied on Russo's arguments that McLelland was the borrowed servant of Schrimsher, as a matter of law, and therefore, argued that McLelland's knowledge of the missing safety device was imputed to Schrimsher so as to relieve Holley of any liability. Holley also maintains that McLelland was contributorily negligent, that his contributory negligence was imputed to Schrimsher because he was its borrowed servant, and that that negligence bars any recovery. Schrimsher and USF & G maintain that even if McLelland was in fact the borrowed servant of Schrimsher (and we have determined he was), a fact question exists as to whether knowledge of, at best, a temporary employee can be imputed to [Schrimsher] as a matter of law. One of the legal consequences of the relation of master and servant is that the negligence of the servant, committed in the line and scope of his employment, is imputed to the master. See Towry v. Moore, 281 Ala. 644, 206 So.2d 889 (1968). It does not matter that the negligent servant is a borrowed servant and merely in the temporary employ of another. Rather, as long as the relation of master and servant exists, the master may be liable to third persons because of the negligent acts of its borrowed servant. See Coleman v. Steel City Crane Rentals, Inc., supra; Martin v. Anniston Foundry Co., supra; Hendrix v. Frisco Builders, Inc., supra. The general rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of the third person and by the concurring negligence of its own servant or agent, the servant or agent's negligence is imputed to his master and will defeat the master's action against the third person. See, 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 1786, pp. 468-70 (1970). Although it is disputed whether McLelland reported the absence of the safety device to anyone at Schrimsher, it is undisputed that he knew for at least six weeks before the accident occurred that the boom kick-out safety device was not installed on the crane; knew that the purpose of the safety device was to prevent just the kind of accident that occurred; and knew that a federal regulation required that a safety device be installed. Nonetheless, after considering all those factors, we conclude, based on the authority of Johnson v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 555 So.2d 88 (Ala.1989), and Central Alabama Elec. Co-op. v. Tapley, 546 So.2d 371 (Ala.1989), that although McLelland may have been heedless of the danger presented by operating the crane without the safety device, his doing so does not rise to the level of contributory negligence as a matter of law. [3] Based on the foregoing, the summary judgment for Holley is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.