Opinion ID: 2164036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: liability of defendant robinson

Text: Robinson concedes that it trespassed onto Plaintiffs' land and cut and carried away timber, and that it is liable under 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552 for single damages. Robinson contends, however, that the evidence does not support the jury's finding that it acted willfully or knowingly within the meaning of the statute, and therefore, it should not be liable for treble damages and attorney fees. We agree. 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552 provides in part: Whoever cuts down, destroys, injures or carries away any ... timber, wood, underwood, stones, gravel, ore, goods or property of any kind from land not that person's own, without license of the owner, or injures or throws down any fences, bars or gates, or leaves such gates open, or breaks glass in any building is liable in damages to the owner in a civil action. If such act or such acts are committed willfully or knowingly, the defendant is liable to the owner in treble damages and, in addition, for the costs of any professional services necessary for the determination of damages, for the attorney's fees, and for court costs. In order for an act to be committed knowingly within the meaning of section 7552, the defendant must be subjectively aware that the cutting is improperly taking place on another's land. See Grant v. Warren Bros. Co., 405 A.2d 213, 218-19 (Me.1979); see also Blaisdell v. Daigle, 155 Me. 1, 2, 149 A.2d 904 (1959). Because there is no evidence in this case to suggest that Robinson or any of its employees had subjective knowledge that the timber cutting was occurring on Plaintiffs' property, the court erred in allowing the jury to consider whether the cutting was knowing. [5] Willfully, as used in section 7552, although it requires a lesser degree of culpability than knowingly, nevertheless is intended `to embrace conduct on the part of the defendant which displays an utter and complete indifference to and disregard for the rights of others.' Guilmet v. Galvin, 597 A.2d 1348, 1349 (Me.1991) (quoting Blaisdell, 155 Me. at 2, 149 A.2d 904). Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, as we must, Schiavi v. Goodwin, 542 A.2d 367, 368 (Me.1988), we conclude that Robinson's actions cannot be construed as being willful within the meaning of section 7552. The evidence shows that the trees were cut and the road constructed in the wrong place because of a misunderstanding between Earl Robinson and Ken Lamond, not out of any indifference to or disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs. Although Robinson's crew did not have a map, plan, or photo when it bulldozed the road, Earl Robinson and Lamond had discussed where the road should go and Earl Robinson testified that he felt confident that he knew where the road should go based on those discussions and his inspection of the area. There were in fact two different old roads that if extended would run between Grace Pond Road and Two Mile Road, and it is clear from the evidence that the parties were unaware at the time of their discussion that they were talking about different old roads. It was not until after the cut was made that the misunderstanding came to light. Moreover, there were no boundary markers setting off Plaintiffs' lots from the rest of the rural wooded area that would have alerted Robinson's crew to a potential trespass. This case differs from Guilmet, where we found no clear error in the finding by the trial court that the cutting by defendants of timber on Guilmet's property was willful within the meaning of section 7552. In that case, there was a cottage situated on Guilmet's property and existing boundary markers on Guilmet's land indicating the property line. Defendants made little effort to ascertain the correct location of those boundaries or their own boundaries before cutting. Here, the cutting took place in an uninhabited area in an unorganized Township and there were no markings to identify Plaintiffs' lots. Moreover, in Guilmet there was evidence of other conduct on the part of the defendants that evinced an utter and complete indifference to Guilmet's rights. Id. at 1350. This case is also distinguishable from Grant, 405 A.2d at 216, and Nyzio v. Vaillancourt, 382 A.2d 856, 860 (Me.1978). The defendant in Grant was notified that there was a possible dispute as to whose property was being cut, but nonetheless continued in the removal of timber and topsoil from the plaintiff's land. Grant, 405 A.2d at 216. In Nyzio, the defendant was aware of a protest of his actions. Nyzio, 382 A.2d at 860. Those circumstances are lacking here. In this case, the cutting on Plaintiffs' property resulted from a misunderstanding over the location of the old road that was to be connected to Two Mile Road. The mistake as to the location of that road did not amount to an utter and complete disregard of Plaintiffs' rights.