Opinion ID: 2537633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in refusing jury instructions D-77A and D-77B in the jury charge.

Text: ¶ 78. Fulgham argues that the court erred in refusing jury instructions D-77A and D-77B at the sentencing phase when it granted a circumstantial-evidence instruction at the guilt phase. Instruction D-77A reads: The Court instructs the jury that if the State has relied on circumstantial evidence to establish an aggravating circumstance, then the evidence for the State must be so strong as to establish the aggravating circumstance not only beyond a reasonable doubt, but must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis other than establishment of the aggravating circumstance. Put differently, all of the facts and circumstances, taken together, must be inconsistent with any reasonable theory or conclusion other than the existence of the aggravating circumstance. All of the facts and circumstances, taken together, must establish to your satisfaction the existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 79. And instruction D-77B reads: During the penalty phase, I instruct you that if there be a fact or circumstance in this case which is susceptible of two interpretations, one favorable and the other unfavorable to Ms. Fulgham and if, after considering all the other facts and circumstances, there is a reasonable doubt regarding the correct interpretation, then you must resolve such doubt in favor of Ms. Fulgham and place upon such fact or circumstance the interpretation most favorable to Ms. Fulgham. ¶ 80. Contrary to Fulgham's argument, we have held that a defendant (under the proper circumstances) is entitled to a circumstantial-evidence instruction at the guilt phase. [77] We find no authority to support such an instruction at sentencing. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding these circumstantial-evidence instructions from the jury's consideration at the sentencing phase.