Opinion ID: 1427816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Act Immunity for All Appellees

Text: The district court dismissed the Cooneys' state tort claims against all of the appellees after it concluded that no statutory waiver of sovereign immunity existed under the Claims Act upon which those claims could be based. The Claims Act did not create new causes of action against the State of Wyoming, its employees, agencies, or political subdivisions; rather, it statutorily affirmed the idea that those parties generally enjoy sovereign immunity from civil liability with the exception of certain conduct for which that immunity is specifically waived. Pickle v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Platte, 764 P.2d 262, 266 (Wyo. 1988). Cf. Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, 575 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Wyo. 1978). The Claims Act provides a close-ended waiver of immunity from liability, and an injured party suing an arm of the State of Wyoming under the Act must first establish that the conduct complained of fits into a specific statutory waiver of immunity for liability. W.S. 1-39-104(a); Abelseth v. City of Gillette, 752 P.2d 430, 433 (Wyo. 1988) (citing Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 709 (Wyo. 1987)). Appellees rested their motion to dismiss the Cooneys' state tort claims on the assertion that the conduct complained of did not fit into any of the enumerated exceptions to immunity. They argued that the only applicable exception the Cooneys could assert would be the one set out in W.S. 1-39-112 (Cum.Supp. 1985), which provided: A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of law enforcement officers while acting within the scope of their duties. (emphasis added). See 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 74, § 2. Appellees also argued that a plain interpretation of this statute would be proper in light of this court's opinion in Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1132-33 (Wyo. 1985). In Hurst, we faced the issue whether the plain language of the same statute subjected members of the Wyoming State Board of Parole or its parole officers to civil liability for their alleged negligence in allowing a parolee to leave the state, after which he committed numerous murders. This court's analysis in Hurst noted that the legislature had not given the phrase law enforcement officers a statutory definition. Hurst, 698 P.2d at 1133. This court resolved that problem by looking to the plain meaning of law enforcement officer which led us to the phrase peace officer. Id. That phrase indicated a legislative intent to limit peace officers to those persons with the direct authority to make arrests or keep the peace, and this court upheld the trial court's determination that parole officers were not vested with that kind of authority. That interpretation of the plain language of W.S. 1-39-112 (Cum.Supp. 1985) was also compared with case law from other jurisdictions defining the class of persons considered law enforcement officers, which case law generally supported that distinction. Id. at 1134. Relying on this information this court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity under the phrase law enforcement officer did not extend to the Parole Board or its officers. Id. Appellees have asserted that under either the unambiguous language of W.S. 1-39-112, or the holding in Hurst, or both, no statutory waiver of immunity existed to allow the Cooneys' state tort claims. The Cooneys have countered those arguments by urging a broader waiver of sovereign immunity under W.S. 1-39-112, premised on a review of its subsequent legislative history. They explained that this court published its opinion in Hurst in April 1985. In the next year, during the 1986 legislative session, the legislature amended W.S. 1-39-112 by substituting the phrase peace officers for law enforcement officers. That amendment became effective on March 18, 1986, three days after Mr. Cooney was incarcerated. The Cooneys further noted that the amendment went on to provide for an automatic repealer that would change the phrase peace officers back to law enforcement officers effective June 16, 1988. See 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 74, § 4. The Cooneys theorized that this legislative maneuver was intended to create a two year time period during which the legislature could set up a state self-insurance program to provide monies to be available to pay for the liability of a peace officer. See W.S. 1-41-101 through 1-41-111 (Cum.Supp. 1986). They also argued that the 1986 amendment's automatic resuscitation of the phrase law enforcement officer into the current version W.S. 1-39-112 stands as evidence of legislative intent to give that phrase a broader meaning than the one articulated by this court in Hurst. Under this line of reasoning, they concluded that the legislature intended the phrase law enforcement officers in W.S. 1-39-112 to have a broader meaning from the inception of the statute and that it waived tort sovereign immunity for the appellees in this case and any other governmental officials who assert a more general authority to enforce the laws. The district court considered the arguments of both parties on this issue and ruled for appellees. In its decision letter it rejected the Cooneys' approach to statutory interpretation of W.S. 1-39-112, and dismissed their state tort claims against all appellees finding them to be barred by sovereign immunity. In this appeal, the Cooneys advance essentially the same arguments they made before the district court and candidly request that we overrule our decision in Hurst to reach the result they desire. The Cooneys' theory is creative, but, stripped of its trappings, advocates placing this court in the role of legislative clairvoyant when the unambiguous language of the controlling statute, W.S. 1-39-112, plainly does not waive tort immunity for persons who are not law enforcement officers as we defined that phrase in Hurst. The legislative intent that might have been lurking behind recent changes to the language in W.S. 1-39-112 is not a substitute for upholding a plain reading of an unambiguous statute. Hurst does that, and stare decisis demands that we follow Hurst in this case. We do not see any statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for appellees under the plain language of W.S. 1-39-112. We affirm the district court's W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of the appellants' complaint. URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., filed dissenting opinions.