Opinion ID: 2266133
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Competing views regarding the scope of a mechanic's lien hearing

Text: There are two different views regarding the scope of a hearing to expunge a mechanic's lien. California allows determination of the material facts of the case at a summary proceeding and does not require an evidentiary hearing. See Jasper Constr., Inc. v. University Casework Systems, Inc., 39 Cal. App.3d 582, 114 Cal.Rptr. 143, 144 (1974). The California Supreme Court determined that due process is satisfied by a speedy hearing on the probable validity of the lien. Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.3d 803, 132 Cal.Rptr. 477, 553 P.2d 637, 641 (1976). In contrast, Washington state courts have interpreted their statute to limit determinations of factual disputes in a hearing to expunge a frivolous or excessive lien. Washington courts have concluded that its statute allows for resolutions of factual disputes but such resolution is confined to the limited group of cases where the lien claim is clearly merit less. S.D. Deacon Corp. v. Gaston, 150 Wash.App. 87, 206 P.3d 689, 691 (2009). Washington's summary proceeding is similar to a trial by affidavit but is not a substitute for a trial on the merits. W.R.P. Lake Union v. Exterior Services, 85 Wash.App. 744, 934 P.2d 722 (1997). It is unclear what the exact limits of Washington's summary proceeding are for factual disputes. [8] J.D. Construction argues that the district court exceeded its statutory authority by resolving highly disputed factual issues that should have been resolved at trial. J.D. Construction asserts that an NRS 108.2275 hearing is an improper vehicle to resolve disputed material issues of fact concerning the amount of work performed or the payment due or owing. Rather, J.D. Construction argues that a hearing held pursuant to NRS 108.2275 should be limited to the determination of facts that can be determined by affidavit. J.D. Construction urges this court to adopt the approach taken by Washington because Washington's statute for removal of frivolous or excessive mechanics' liens, Washington Revised Code section 60.04.081 (West 2009), is comparable to NRS 108.2275. Washington has interpreted its statute to limit a district court's ability to make factual determinations in a hearing on a motion to expunge, and J.D. Construction argues that NRS 108.2275 should be interpreted in the same manner. IBEX instead argues that Nevada has not adopted Washington caselaw, and urges this court to adopt California's approach, which allows factual determinations to be made at summary proceedings. [9] IBEX argues that the summary procedure in NRS 108.2275 provides a speedy hearing on the probable validity of the lien, just like California. IBEX argues that if the district court is to determine whether the lien was excessive, it must make findings of fact based on the affidavits, documents, and depositions submitted to the district court. We agree with IBEX and conclude that the plain language of NRS 108.2275 requires the district court to consider the material facts of the case in order to make a determination regarding whether the lien is excessive or frivolous. Lien claims are statutory and a dispute over the interpretation of a lien statute is one of statutory construction. Crestline, 119 Nev. at 368, 75 P.3d at 365. As statutory construction is a question of law, it is subject to de novo review. California Commercial v. Amedeo Vegas I, 119 Nev. 143, 145, 67 P.3d 328, 330 (2003). When this court engages in a de novo review of an issue of statutory construction, [t]he `court first looks to the plain language of the statute.' Crestline, 119 Nev. at 368, 75 P.3d at 365 (quoting A.F. Constr. Co. v. Virgin River Casino, 118 Nev. 699, 703, 56 P.3d 887, 890 (2002)). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself. Madera v. SIIS, 114 Nev. 253, 257, 956 P.2d 117, 120 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). A statute's language is ambiguous when it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 404, 168 P.3d 712, 716 (2007). We conclude that NRS 108.2275 is unambiguous. The plain language of NRS 108.2275 allows a property owner to challenge a lien as frivolous or excessive and requires the district court to make a finding of whether the lien is frivolous, excessive, or neither. In order for the district court to make a finding that the lien is excessive or frivolous, the district court must consider the material facts of the case. We are unpersuaded that this language can be read any other way. The plain language of the statute requires the district court to determine the material facts in order to make a ruling as to whether the lien is frivolous or excessive.