Opinion ID: 1960024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion for reference

Text: [¶ 11] Before discussing the merits of Lukas's claims, we first address Bowdoin's contention that the order denying Lukas's motion for reference is not ripe for appellate review. Bowdoin contends that the order is not a final judgment because two of the three trials addressed in the order have yet to take place. Ordinarily, an appeal is only cognizable if it arises from a final judgment. See Millett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 2000 ME 178, ¶8, 760 A.2d 250, 253. Interlocutory orders that are not immediately appealable merge with a final decree and become appealable at that time. See Boyle v. Share, 377 A.2d 458, 462 (Me.1977) (stating that because an interlocutory order is related to the main action, the rule allowing merger of the appeal from the order with the appeal from the final decree is well founded). Although the order denying reference was not a final judgment, it nevertheless became appealable when it merged with the final judgment on the fees trial and is therefore properly before this Court.
[¶ 12] We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision whether to appoint a referee. See George D. Ballard, Builder, Inc. v. City of Westbrook, 502 A.2d 476, 479 n. 4 (Me.1985); Hedberg v. Wallingford, 379 A.2d 126, 128 (Me. 1977). [2] The plain language of the rule establishes that absent an agreement of the parties, a motion for appointment of a referee is only granted in exceptional circumstances. See Frank v. Assessors of Skowhegan, 329 A.2d 167, 169 n. 3 (Me. 1974) (stating that [b]efore any order of reference without agreement may issue, showing must be made some exceptional condition warrants reference). [¶ 13] Lukas contends that all issues on appeal should have been referred because it is logistically difficult to try the issues in Probate Court over several non-consecutive days. Lukas further asserts that witnesses are being forced to appear several more times in the remaining trials, rather than having the convenience of appearing once before a referee on all matters over an estimated two week period. Accordingly, Lukas contends that the burden placed on the parties and witnesses by separate trials in the Probate Court create precisely the exceptional condition envisioned by Rule 53(b)(2). [¶ 14] Lukas directs our attention to a series of cases in which we approved a reference. See George D. Ballard, Builder, Inc., 502 A.2d at 479 n. 4; Bruk v. Town of Georgetown, 436 A.2d 894, 896-97 (Me.1981); Hedberg, 379 A.2d at 127-28. Because the parties agreed to a reference in each of those cases, however, we did not address the restrictive language of Rule 53(b)(2). [3] Here, because the parties did not agree to the reference, Lukas first bears the burden of establishing that this case involves an exceptional condition, and if so, that the court abused its discretion in denying the reference. Although the length of the trials and relative inconvenience to the parties and witnesses may constitute an exceptional condition, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying Lukas's motion for reference based on the logistical difficulties of trying the case in the Probate Court. See, e.g., 1 FIELD, MCKUSICK & WROTH, MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE § 53.1 at 698 (2d ed.1970) (stating that in the absence of agreement by the parties, the rule puts a tight damper on appointment of referees).
[¶ 15] Lukas also contends that his due process rights were violated because denying his motion for reference necessarily permitted Attorney Mitchell to appear as Bowdoin's counsel before a fellow probate judge. According to Lukas, an unfair advantage inures to the litigant represented by a judge, with a correlative disadvantage to the adverse party, when, as here, a probate judge with years of service on the bench appears as a lawyer before another probate judge who is comparatively new to the bench and who may someday appear before the advocate-judge now before him. Although we understand Lukas's concern, we do not believe the situation rises to the level of a constitutional due process deprivation in the circumstances of this case. [¶ 16] The practice of allowing part-time probate judges to litigate cases as part-time lawyers has received widespread criticism. [4] The criticism focuses on 4 M.R.S.A. § 307 (Supp.2000), which explicitly authorizes probate judges to maintain active probate practices. [5] Lukas has not challenged the constitutionality of that provision. Moreover, the principal case Lukas relies on, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986), recognizes that issues involving potential judicial bias or prejudice rise to a constitutional level only in the most extreme of cases, and thus are more appropriately addressed by the policy decisions of state legislatures. Id. at 821-22, 106 S.Ct. 1580. The Maine Legislature has addressed this issue and has continued to allow probate judges to maintain active probate practices. [¶ 17] Finally, we need not decide on these facts whether a due process deprivation occurs when a probate judge has a case pending before counsel and refuses either to recuse himself or grant a timely motion for reference. Lukas never sought Judge Nadeau's recusal, and Lukas concedes that no direct conflict existed because Judge Nadeau did not have a case pending in Judge Mitchell's court while this case has been pending. Moreover, Lukas's motion for reference was untimely because by the time it was filed, Judge Nadeau had already addressed the substance of the matter. [6] Lukas has not established that the asserted appearance of impropriety is sufficient to give rise to a due process claim. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lukas's motion for reference on the ground of due process.