Opinion ID: 1802234
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Material Question of Fact Exists with Regard to Coverage.

Text: The first question that must be answered to resolve this dispute is whether there was an Allstate insurance policy in effect at the time of the shooting that covered either James Wright or Billy Ross Wright. This question can only be answered by resolving the disputed factual contentions of the parties. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment was premature. The following are illustrative of the fact questions that preclude summary judgment. We emphasize that by labeling these as material we do not intend to suggest or endorse any liability. James and Louise Wright's names appear on the policy as the insureds. They signed the application for insurance. The address listed on the policy for the insured premises is 753 Kerry Street, a house James and Louise Wright never lived in, but had purchased for Billy Ross Wright to live in at the time the policy was issued. Insurance agent Jenkins filled out the policy at the Caldwell Drive residence after James and Louise Wright answered the questions he asked them. In his order granting summary judgment dated September 12, 1988, the Circuit Court judge correctly stated that questions remained regarding what was told to Will Jenkins, Allstate's agent, at the time the application was made and what, if any, effect this would have on the policy. On this issue there is certainly a conflict as to the facts. Nevertheless, the judge proceeded to decide this issue upon sharply disputed facts. This was error pursuant to M.R.C.P. 56. This Court has stated: A motion for summary judgment lies only where there is no genuine issue of material fact; summary judgment is not a substitute for the trial of disputed fact issues. Accordingly, the court cannot try issues of fact on a Rule 56 motion; it may only determine whether there are issues to be tried. Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1983) (emphasis in original). More recently we have said: Issues of fact sufficient to require denial of a motion for summary judgment obviously are present where one party swears to one version of the matter in issue and another says just the opposite. Short v. Columbus Rubber and Gasket Corp., 535 So.2d 61, 63 (Miss. 1988), citing Dennis v. Searle, 457 So.2d 941, 944 (Miss. 1984). James Wright swears he told Jenkins that Billy Ross was the person who would be living in the Kerry Street home. Jenkins swears James told him that James and Louise Wright were to be living there. Thus the lower court was presented with a classic case requiring a jury determination of disputed issues of fact. The lower court order determined: The only logical conclusion... is that Mr. Jenkins had not been told ... that Billy Ross Wright and his family would be living in the house as opposed to Mr. and Mrs. James Wright. There is another logical conclusion, that being that Jenkins was told by James Wright that Billy Ross would be living in the Kerry Street house. The Circuit Court judge erred in making this determination himself. Short, Dennis, Brown, supra; Lowery v. Guaranty Bank and Trust Co., 592 So.2d 79, 81 (Miss. 1991); Newell v. Hinton, 556 So.2d 1037, 1041 (Miss. 1990); and Allison v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 543 So.2d 661 (Miss. 1989). Furthermore, a disputed question of fact exists concerning whether Jenkins accurately wrote down the answers of James and Louise Wright when he filled out their insurance application as contended by Allstate or whether he filled out the application in his own words in order to close the sale of insurance and get his commission as contended by the Wrights.