Opinion ID: 2219442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: boston redevelopment authority

Text: Date: November 28, 1962 Project: Government Center Gladys Green and Doris Horne, Individually and as mother and next Re: 150-158 Blackstone Street friend of Doris Horne, a minor Address c/o Leonard Poretsky, Esquire 6 Beacon Street 43-2 Boston 8, Massachusetts Parcel Number Dear Madam: The Boston Redevelopment Authority hereby offers to make settlement in the amount of $37,266.32 under the provisions and terms of Section 8A of Chapter 79 of the General Laws, in payment of damages for the taking of the above real estate from you. Damages $ 36,000.00 Interest to 3/30/62 $ 620.00 Apportionment of Real Estate Taxes (Chapter 634 of the Acts of 1953) From 10/25/61 to 12/31/61 $ 646.32 Total Offer $ 37,266.32 Before payment, there will be deducted from the above offer an amount sufficient to remove or discharge existing encumbrances on said parcel. This offer is hereby made in payment for said real estate which was taken from you as the supposed owner. Provision is made at the end of this letter for you to indicate, by signing on the appropriate line, the mannor in which you either accept or reject this offer. You may retain the original of this letter for your files and, after signing, return the carbon copy to this office. If you have any question concerning this offer, please contact this offices. BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY By: _______________________________ John C. Conley, General Counsel _____________________, Mass. _____________________, 19 I hereby accept or reject the above offer as indicated by my signature below. Offer accepted as full settlement ________________________________ Offer accepted pro tanto under Provisions of above Section BA ________________________________ Offer rejected ________________________________ Witness: __________________________ __________________________ his attention on December 3, 1962. [3] The petitioners did not accept the offer and the respondent did not make a tender or other pro tanto offer. The petitioners contend that the offer made by the respondent did not constitute a valid pro tanto offer because it allowed interest only until March 30, 1962. They argue that the respondent thereby failed to comply with G.L.c. 79, § 8A, as appearing in St. 1959, c. 626, § 3, which provided, at the time of the taking, that [a] board of officers who have made a taking under this chapter may at any time after the right to damages for such taking has become vested offer in writing to every person entitled to damages on account of such taking a reasonable amount which such board is willing to pay either in settlement under section thirty-nine of all damages for such taking, with interest thereon and taxable costs, if any, or as a payment pro tanto which may be accepted and collected forthwith without prejudice to or waiver or surrender of any right to claim a larger sum by proceeding before an appropriate tribunal.... At the election of the person accepting such offer, acceptance thereof may be either in settlement as aforesaid or as such payment pro tanto. After payment of such offer or tender of such payment, no interest shall be recovered, except upon such amount of damages as shall, upon final adjudication, be in excess of the amount of such offer.... The petitioners maintain that the interest being incorrectable in favor of ... [them], once payment of such offer or tender of payment will have been made, notwithstanding error resulting in an inadequacy of the amount of interest ... [i]t is inconceivable that those entitled to damages must accept an offer supposedly made in accordance with the ... statute ... which used an arbitrary interim cut-off date to which interest has been computed ..., with the knowledge that upon acceptance thereof not even the Court can rectify the inadequacy and award them the difference between the true interest computation and the arbitrary figure set out in such offer. We do not agree. A payment pro tanto is merely what is implied by its name and is not a final settlement. It is a payment [f]or so much; for as much as may be; as far as it goes. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed. Rev. p. 1364. The statute plainly distinguishes between a payment pro tanto and a final settlement. The purpose of a pro tanto payment is merely to prevent the accumulation of interest on the amount of the offer and to provide funds for the recipient of the offer without waiting for a final adjudication. Thirty-Third Report of the Judicial Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144 (December, 1957), 72-73. There is nothing in the statute that requires, nor does it seem feasible to require, that interest on the amount of the pro tanto offer be included in order to make the offer valid. The petitioners also argue that the so-called pro tanto offer is invalid because it never included Cynthia Horne, one of the co-owners entitled to damages and was addressed to only two of the three petitioners herein, the first named petitioner having been referred to in said exhibit individually and [in] an alleged representative capacity, obviously in error. The covering letter addressed to the attorney for the petitioners sent with the offer states that it duplicates ... [the] offer of March 24, 1962, addressed to the Estate of Elmer Horne. The offer was addressed in part to Doris Horne ... as mother and next friend of Doris Horne, a minor. One of the petitioners for assessment of damages was Cynthia R. Horne, a minor who brought this proceeding through her mother and next friend Doris Horne. It seems obvious that the offer was intended for Cynthia R. Horne, as well as for the other petitioners. We are unable to conclude that a misnomer under these circumstances should render the offer invalid. The petitioners' final contention seems to be that, even if a valid pro tanto offer had been made, the running of interest should not have been stayed because the offer was not followed by payment or a tender thereof. They maintain that [t]o constitute a valid tender, money must be offered to the person entitled to it. However, the statute does not purport to require the tender of money under circumstances such as those in the case at bar. G.L.c. 79, § 8A, as appearing in St. 1959, c. 626, § 3. It presupposes acceptance of the offer, either as a complete settlement or as a pro tanto payment, before requiring tender to be made. The statute does not require superfluous or futile acts to be undertaken. The exceptions are sustained. The petitioners are entitled to have the clerk compute and add to the amount of the verdict interest at four per cent on the amount of $36,000 from the date of the taking (October 25, 1961) to the date of the receipt of the pro tanto offer, and interest at four per cent on the difference (namely, $15,800) between the amount of $36,000 and the amount of the verdict ($51,800) from the date of the taking (October 25, 1961) to the date of the verdict (October 26, 1966). The petitioners are also entitled to have included in the damages such amount, if any, as may be due them for allocation of taxes, to be determined pursuant to G.L.c. 79, §§ 12, 35A. So ordered.