Opinion ID: 2455719
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The language of MUMA is unambiguous

Text: ¶ 13 The rules of construction applied to statutes also apply to initiatives. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183, 205, 11 P.3d 762 (2001). The court's purpose when determining the meaning of a statute enacted by the initiative process is to determine the intent of the voters who enacted the measure. Id. This court focuses on the language of the statute as the average informed voter voting on the initiative would read it. Id. If the voters' intent is clear, this court need not look further. Id. (Where the language of an initiative enactment is `plain, unambiguous, and well understood according to its natural and ordinary sense and meaning, the enactment is not subject to judicial interpretation.' (quoting State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 762-63, 921 P.2d 514 (1996))); Duke v. Boyd, 133 Wash.2d 80, 87, 942 P.2d 351 (1997) (When the words in a statute are clear and unequivocal, this court is required to assume the Legislature meant exactly what it said and apply the statute as written.). An ambiguity exists if statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wash.2d 795, 804, 854 P.2d 629 (1993). If there is ambiguity in an initiative, the court may look to extrinsic evidence of the voters' intent such as statements in the voters' pamphlet. Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash.2d at 205, 11 P.3d 762. ¶ 14 Both parties argue this court can determine the meaning of MUMA from the enactment's plain language. Roe claims the original language in RCW 69.51A.005, .040, and .060(4) demonstrates MUMA's sweeping purpose, which was not only to provide an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution, but also to prohibit an employer from discharging an employee for authorized use of medical marijuana. Specifically, Roe argues RCW 69.51A.040's protection against a denial of any right or privilege protects an employee from being denied the privilege of employment due to authorized medical marijuana use. In contrast, TeleTech argues MUMA's language unambiguously does not provide employment protections. ¶ 15 This court will not read a statutory phrase in isolation; its language takes meaning from the enactment as a whole. Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash.2d at 220, 11 P.3d 762; W. Petroleum Importers, Inc. v. Friedt, 127 Wash.2d 420, 428, 899 P.2d 792 (1995) (When construing a statute, we must read it in its entirety, not piecemeal, and interpret the various provisions of the statute in light of one another.). The language upon which Roe relies for her claim that MUMA protects medical marijuana users from denial of the privilege of employment immediately follows MUMA's grant of an affirmative defense to qualifying patients and caregivers: If charged with a violation of state law relating to marijuana, any qualifying patient who is engaged in the medical use of marijuana, or any designated primary caregiver who assists a qualifying patient in the medical use of marijuana, will be deemed to have established an affirmative defense to such charges by proof of his or her compliance with the requirements provided in this chapter. Any person meeting the requirements appropriate to his or her status under this chapter shall be considered to have engaged in activities permitted by this chapter and shall not be penalized in any manner, or denied any right or privilege, for such actions. Former RCW 69.51A.040(1) (1999). The first sentence of subsection (1) establishes the context of the subsection: it applies to a person charged with violation of state law relating to marijuana. The second sentence applies in this same context of criminal proceedings; it does not address the actions or duties of private entities. Id. The section's prohibition against a denial of any right or privilege, when read in context, does not confer any obligation on private employers. ¶ 16 Roe argues the original language of RCW 69.51A.060(4) confirms that employment is one of the privileges protected by RCW 69.51A.040(1). Roe claims that because RCW 69.51A.060(4) explicitly does not require an employer to accommodate medical marijuana use in any place of employment, the statute implicitly requires an employer to accommodate an employee's medical marijuana use outside the workplace. But the statute's explicit statement against an obligation to accommodate on-site use does not require reading into MUMA an implicit obligation to accommodate off-site medical marijuana use. [4] The language of MUMA is unambiguousit does not regulate the conduct of a private employer or protect an employee from being discharged because of authorized medical marijuana use.