Opinion ID: 705181
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: feha prima facie case

Text: 13 We first consider the threshold issue, raised by Mobil in its cross-appeal, whether the district court erred in finding that Jimeno established a prima facie case of physical handicap discrimination under the FEHA. Section 12940(a) prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of physical disability, as well as other characteristics. Under the regulations interpreting the FEHA, [p]hysical handicap discrimination is established by showing that an employment practice denies, in whole or in part, an employment benefit to an individual because he or she is a handicapped individual. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2, Sec. 7293.7. There are two elements of a prima facie case: (1) the complainant must satisfy one of the statutory definitions of handicapped individual and (2) the employer must have discriminated on that basis. Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 5 Cal.4th 1050, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 287, 290 n. 4, 856 P.2d 1143 (1993). 14 The statutory definition of handicapped individual includes both those who actually ha[ve] a physical handicap which substantially limits one or more major life activities and those who are regarded as having such a physical handicap. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2, Sec. 7293.6(i). Major life activities include normal functions such as speaking or working. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2, Sec. 7293.6(f). The interpretation of substantially limits is fact-specific. Inability to continue at the particular position for which the individual was responsible before the disability is ordinarily insufficient to constitute a substantial limitation under most state anti-discrimination statutes and the federal Rehabilitation Act. 2 See, e.g., Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., 722 F.Supp. 633, 639 (D.Or.1989) (finding that a heat-sensitive individual was not handicapped merely because he could not satisfy the temporary transfer requirements of a specific telephone installer job with AT & T, when he could perform ordinary telephone installer jobs without accommodation), aff'd, 915 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (adopting the district court's opinion). Primary attention is to be given to those life activities that affect employability, or otherwise present a barrier to employment or advancement. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2, Sec. 7293.6(f). 15 In order to satisfy the regarded as having a handicap prong, the claim asserted by Jimeno, the employee must (1) actually have a physiological disease or disorder affecting one or more of the bodily systems and (2) be perceived by the employer as having a physiological disorder within the meaning of the FEHA, even if it is not in fact disabling. Cassista, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d at 297. The regulation, which specifies various fact situations under the regarded as handicapped prong, includes the following circumstances that are applicable to Jimeno's case: 16 (3) Does not have a physical handicap that substantially limits one or more major life activities but is treated by an employer ... as having ... a physical handicap that presently substantially limits major life activities. 17 (4) Does not have a physical handicap that substantially limits one or more major life activities but is treated by an employer or other covered entity as having an increased likelihood of developing a physical handicap that substantially limits major life activities. 18 Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2, Sec. 7293.6(h)(3)-(4) (emphases added). 19 Thus, in Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. California State Univ. Sacramento, FEHC Dec. No. 88-08 (Cal.F.E.H.C., May 20, 1988), the California Fair Employment and Housing Commission found that 20 It is clear that complainant was 'physically handicapped' within the meaning of the Act. In removing complainant from his custodial position, respondent relied both on the fact that he had had a lumbar laminectomy and on respondent's belief that the condition of his back increased the chance of serious future impairment of his health and physical ability if he worked as a custodian without restrictions. It is now well established that an employer's reliance on either of these grounds to disqualify an applicant constitutes discrimination because of physical handicap. 21 Id. at 17 (emphasis added); see also Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Harbor Tug and Barge Co., FEHC Dec. No. 92-02, 1992 WL 223888, at  8- 10 (Cal.F.E.H.C., Feb. 20, 1992) (finding no dispute regarding the employee's prima facie case, because the employee's degenerative spine disease requiring work restrictions was the basis for the employer's refusal to reinstate him to his former position); Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. General Dynamics, Inc., FEHC Dec. No. 90-08, 1990 WL 312873, at  6- 7 (Cal.F.E.H.C., May 31, 1990) (finding the complainant physically handicapped within the FEHA because the employer relied on the existence of osteoarthritis in the ankle, and the fear that it would cause complainant problems in the future, as a basis for disqualifying the applicant). Therefore, an employer cannot terminate an employee merely because of a physical impairment that might endanger the employee's health sometime in the future if the employee continues with the type of work that he or she is currently doing. Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal.App.3d 791, 175 Cal.Rptr. 548, 549-50 (1981) (finding that the employer's refusal, because of the discovery of a back problem of congenital scoliosis, to hire an individual who had worked in the identical capacity for 19 months, violated the FEHA); see also Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1518-19 (9th Cir.1988) (affirming that the California FEHA protects a woman who was discharged from her position as a telephone installer because of an asthma condition that restricted her ability to perform tasks that exposed her to dust, which could aggravate the condition); Johnson v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 153 Cal.App.3d 585, 200 Cal.Rptr. 289, 292 (1984) (finding that the city discriminated on the basis of handicap when it refused to hire an otherwise qualified person for the position of firefighter because of spondylolysis with spondylolisthesis, where the decision was based on the potential risk that he might suffer a disability at some indefinite time in the future); cf. Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir.1989) (finding an individual handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act because of a congenital deformity which the Corps perceived as imposing a disqualifying limitation on his ability to lift weight); Mahoney v. Ortiz, 645 F.Supp. 22, 24 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (finding that an individual's dislocated shoulder was a handicap because the employer regard[ed] him as unfit for the job because of a potential for ... 'nearly total incapacitation' ). 22 We conclude that Mobil's conduct towards Jimeno falls within the regarded as prong of the statutory definition. Jimeno was terminated because Mobil regarded him as having a disability, stemming from an actual physiological disorder, that precluded his working in any hourly position at Mobil because of the risk he faced of future handicapping injury. See Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2, Sec. 7293.6(h)(4). Mobil's representatives stated that Mobil's decision to terminate Jimeno relied on the reports that he would be at risk if he continued in his current position. Jimeno undoubtedly has a spinal impairment (the spondylitic defect) which permanently limits his ability to lift weights above fifty pounds and thus affects his ability to find employment anywhere in his chosen profession. That is, because he has worked all of his adult life as a truck mechanic, and because those mechanics generally have to lift truck batteries and wheels which weigh more than the fifty pounds that Jimeno is allowed to lift alone, Mobil perceived Jimeno as being unable to perform his duties without accommodation. Mobil indicated that it regarded Jimeno's disability as limiting his current work potential when it arranged for vocational rehabilitation training in the entirely different career of computer-assisted design, and when it suggested that Jimeno was eligible for long-term disability benefits, which are available for a complete inability to engage in any gainful occupation for which the employee is reasonably qualified by training, education or experience. Mobil Long-Term Disability Plan. Mobil thus treated Jimeno as though his impairment foreclosed generally the possibility of employment as a truck mechanic, without accommodation, because of the risk he faced of future injury. Miller, 722 F.Supp. at 640. Therefore, Mobil regarded Jimeno as a disabled individual within the meaning of the FEHA. Second, discrimination is established if 23 a causal connection exists between complainant's ... perceived physical handicap and an adverse action taken against [the complainant] by respondent. The evidence need not demonstrate that complainant's physical handicap was the sole or even the dominant cause of [complainant's] adverse treatment. Discrimination is established if the physical handicap was at least one of the factors that influenced respondent. 24 Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Gibson, FEHC Dec. No. 94-06, 1994 WL 421316 (Cal.F.E.H.C., April 27, 1994) (citing Watson v. Dept. of Rehabilitation, 212 Cal.App.3d 1271, 261 Cal.Rptr. 204, 215 (1989), review denied (1989), and Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. General Dynamics, FEHC Dec. No. 90-08, 1990 WL 312873, at  8 (Cal.F.E.H.C., May 31, 1990)). Medical testimony confirmed Jimeno's spondylitic defect and the necessity of work restrictions to avoid risk of injury to his back. Mobil admittedly terminated Jimeno, in accord with its policy, because it concluded that Jimeno's back condition precluded any further employment as a Mobil mechanic. Mobil's workers' compensation defense also acknowledges that the work restrictions due to Jimeno's back condition prompted its decision to terminate him. 25 These facts are substantially similar to the situation in Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Harbor Tug and Barge Co., FEHC Dec. No. 92-02, 1992 WL 223888 (Cal.F.E.H.C., February 20, 1992). In that case, complainant had worked in the physically demanding position of tankerman for nine years when he began to have recurring lower back injuries. After complainant was diagnosed as having degenerative disc disease with herniation and nerve impingement which required work restrictions, the employer found him unfit for duty. Id. at  2- 7. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission found that the employer's actions satisfied the causation requirement of discrimination because complainant's back condition was the sole reason he was not reinstated to his position as tankerman. Id. at  10. Thus, Mobil's decision to terminate Jimeno, based solely upon the condition of his back, is sufficient to establish the causal link that the FEHA requires for discrimination. Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision that Jimeno established a prima facie case pursuant to the FEHA.