Opinion ID: 1666961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The One-Year Provision

Text: The one-year provision of the Statute of Frauds applies to any agreement which by its terms cannot be performed within one year.  Abbott v. Hurst, 643 So.2d 589, 592 (Ala.1994) (emphasis added). Dr. Jones argues that the promise was capable of performance in one year, and, therefore, that the Statute of Frauds does not apply. However, this argument is belied by her own characterization of the promise. Specifically, she states: In a one-on-one meeting, President Henson indicated that [Dr. Jones's] salary would be raised in two steps  one step that academic year (1994-95), and the second step the following year (1995-96)  ending up with a salary of approximately $90,000 per year. Dr. Jones's brief, at 4-5. Elsewhere, she says: The first half of that pay raise would be paid during the 1994-95 school year; and, the second half would be paid during the 1995-96 school year. Dr. Jones's brief, at 5-6. In other words, according to Dr. Jones, she was to receive one step in the first year, and the second step a year later. This oral promise is a quintessential example of one to which § 8-9-2(1) is applicable. On its face, the promise of the second step of the raise was incapable of performance within one year of the making of the promise. Dr. Jones would not, indeed could not, receive any part of the second-step salary increase until she had been paid for one year under the first step. Thus, unless Dr. Jones can demonstrate that the oral promise falls within an exception to the Statute of Frauds, she cannot recover from the University.