Opinion ID: 567666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individual Photographs Depicting All-White Models

Text: 8 Courts have given a broad reading to the FHA in order to fulfill its remedial purpose. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., Co., 409 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972). To this end, courts have recognized that section 3604(c) applies to all publishing mediums, including newspapers, United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934, 93 S.Ct. 235, 34 L.Ed.2d 189 (1972), and have allowed parties to establish a violation of section 3604(c) by proving either an actual intent by a defendant to discriminate or by proving that [t]o the ordinary reader the natural interpretation of the advertisements published in [the newspaper] ... is that they indicate a racial preference.... Id. at 215. HOME seeks to establish liability based on the ordinary reader standard. 9 Section 3604(c) makes unlawful certain practices associated with the sale or rental of housing: 10 To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 11 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). In 1980, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, (HUD), the agency charged with implementing the FHA, promulgated a regulation to provide guidance to newspapers and others concerning nondiscrimination in advertising in connection with real estate. 24 C.F.R. Part 109. Although applying both to the advertising media and to persons placing advertisements, id. § 109.16(a)(1) and (2), these regulations do not mandate particular actions by these parties. Rather, HUD sought to balance between the identification of practices which might be viewed as violations of Title VIII and ... the limitation which the First Amendment may impose on mandatory restrictions relating to the publication of advertising.... [T]he regulation describes examples of advertising practices ... which might be indicative of a violation of (or compliance with) Title VIII. 45 Fed.Reg. 57,102 (Aug. 26, 1980). Further, [w]hile the practices, etc., cited in the regulation are indices of a standard of conduct to evaluate the existence of discrimination in advertising, they are not intended, per se, to establish immutable rules, but to serve as examples of practices, usage, content, etc., which should be complied with (or avoided), whichever the case may be. Id. (emphasis in original). Mandatory language was intentionally avoided. 12 In keeping with this policy, HUD stated that the selective use of human models in advertisements may be discriminatory: 13 Selective advertising may involve an advertising campaign using human models primarily in media that cater to one racial or national origin segment of the population without a complementary advertising campaign that is directed at other groups. 14 24 C.F.R. § 109.25(c). In its comments, HUD stated that this section is intended to preclude selective use of human models in advertising for the purpose of attracting (or discouraging) certain groups covered by Title VIII with respect to certain housing or neighborhoods. 45 Fed.Reg. 57, 105 (Aug. 26, 1980). In another section, HUD stated: 15 If models are used in display advertising campaigns, the models should be clearly definable as reasonably representing the majority and minority groups in the metropolitan area, both sexes, and, when appropriate, families with children. Models, if used, should portray persons in an equal social setting and indicate to the general public that the housing is open to all without regard to race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, and is not for the exclusive use of one such group. 16 24 C.F.R. § 109.30(b). In explaining this section, HUD noted: 17 Civil rights groups commented that models used should reflect, in numbers, the exact percentage of various covered groups in the population, a suggestion which is clearly unworkable. The term reasonably representing is intended to assure that models will convey a message of general inclusiveness of persons covered by Title VIII, not literal display of each minority group. 18 45 Fed.Reg. 57,105 (Aug. 26, 1980). 19 Several conclusions can be drawn from the language of the FHA and HUD's regulations. On the one hand, the statute and regulations make abundantly clear that an advertisement can discriminate against an individual based on any criteria specified in the FHA. Such discrimination may occur through words or pictures, and the use of all-white models could be a factor in determining whether an advertisement conveys a discriminatory message, although its strength and clarity will depend upon an analysis of the entire advertisement. 20 On the other hand, the statute and regulations create no fixed and immutable rules to determine whether an advertisement is discriminatory. Certainly the use of particular models may be relevant, but this by itself does not prove that an advertisement is discriminatory or indicates a preference. 2 These regulations and comments indicate that HUD rejected a mechanical approach which would require the literal display of a member of each protected group. Rather, HUD approached the use of advertising models in a more practical and fluid manner, referring to the concept of an advertising campaign. At least one other circuit appears to have incorporated the principles underlying HUD's approach into its ordinary reader standard. The Second Circuit recently observed: 21 [The ordinary] reader does not apply a mechanical test to every use of a model of a particular race. An ad depicting a single model or couple of one race that is run only two or three times would seem, absent some other direct evidence of an intentional racial message, outside Section 3604(c)'s prohibitions as a matter of law.... It thus seems inevitable that close questions of liability will involve advertisers that either use a large number of models and/or advertise repetitively. In such cases, the advertiser's opportunities to include all groups are greater, and the message conveyed by the exclusion of a racial group is stronger. 22 Ragin v. The New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002 (2d Cir.1991). 3 23 We conclude that a complaint alleging a violation of section 3604(c) based on the single publication of an advertisement which uses a small number of all-white models does not, without more, state a cognizable claim under section 3604(c) as a matter of law. The complaint must allege that an advertiser had the opportunity, based upon either the large number of models used in an advertisement or the numerous advertisements placed by an advertiser with a particular publisher, to include models of a protected group. 4 24 HOME made the following claim in its complaint: 25 9. At least 34% of the population of the City of Cincinnati is black. 19% of Hamilton County is black. 12% of the Metropolitan Statistical Area is black. During the twenty year period since the Act was passed prohibiting discriminatory advertisements, display advertisements have appeared in the Sunday Enquirer featuring hundreds of human models of whom virtually none were black. Nearly all advertisers in the real estate section who have advertisements with human models depict only whites. In group photographs in the real estate section the groups consist of exclusively white people. Of all of the advertisements displaying human models less than 1% include a black person. 26 17. The real estate display advertisements featured by the Cincinnati Enquirer indicate a preference based on race through the use of human models reflecting predominant race of the advertised building, development or community. 27 18. In light of the Cincinnati Enquirer's continuing and longstanding practice of printing and publishing racially discriminatory advertisements, Plaintiffs believe the Cincinnati Enquirer has intentionally violated the Fair Housing Act. 28 The complaint is silent as to the source of the advertisements. At either extreme, we could infer that one advertiser submitted all of the advertisements, or that a different advertiser placed each advertisement. 29 We need not dwell upon this ambiguity, however. In its brief and at oral argument HOME clarified its position. It stated that its claim rested exclusively upon the use of all-white models and not upon any other factor, such as repetition of advertising by a single advertiser. In its brief, HOME asserted that [s]uch consistent and overwhelming absence of black models clearly entitles the finder of fact to find a preference ... based on race. At no time did HOME point to a series of advertisements by a particular advertiser or a picture depicting a large number of models all of whom were white in order to establish its section 3604(c) claim. Based on these concessions, we construe HOME's complaint to allege that a single advertisement depicting all-white models is sufficient to state a cause of action under section 3604(c). 30 Once clarified, HOME's first allegation in its complaint deals only with individual advertisements, and not with a plurality of advertisements. HOME's purpose for pointing to the publication of multiple advertisements is to raise its claim of liability based on its aggregate message theory. 5 HOME is not alleging this fact in order to state a claim based on the repetitive advertising by a single advertiser. We hold that such an allegation fails to state a cause of action for purposes of section 3604(c). 6 B. Liability Based on a Message Created by an Aggregation of Advertisements 31 For purposes of HOME's second claim, 7 it is not necessary that any single advertisement violate the FHA; this claim targets a message which cannot be traced to a particular advertisement. In other words, HOME's claim is based on the premise that the whole is greater than the sum of the individual parts: the aggregate message created and sent by the publication of multiple advertisements violates section 3604(c) notwithstanding the legality of each advertisement. In its complaint, HOME sought to hold defendant legally responsible--including the imposition of compensatory and punitive damages--for the creation and effects of this aggregate message. Because we find that the text and purpose of the FHA, as well as the regulations interpreting it, do not support this theory of liability, and because we desire to avoid a constitutional infirmity which would otherwise arise, we decline to construe the FHA to create liability for the possible aggregate message of otherwise nondiscriminatory advertisements. 32 Section 3604(c) makes clear that a discriminatory message must stem from a notice, statement, or advertisement that indicates a racial preference. Hence, liability of a realtor or a publisher stems from the same act: a discriminatory advertisement. Yet HOME does not attack here an advertisement, or a message derived by an ordinary reader from a particular advertisement, but a message separate from and incidental to the individually placed advertisements. Although implicating advertisements in general, this claim does not depend upon a finding that any particular advertisement is discriminatory. We agree with HOME that the FHA must be construed broadly; but the text of the statute--the starting point for construing a statute--ties the prohibition of discriminatory messages to particular advertisements. HOME's cause of action, therefore, does not fall within the literal language of the statute. See Hunter, 459 F.2d at 210 (stating that [l]egislative intent is first to be gathered from the plain meaning of the words of the statute). 33 The regulations interpreting this section also fail to support HOME's claim. The regulations refer to advertising campaigns directed at readers for certain housing or neighborhoods. Clearly, a random layout of advertisements submitted by independent realtors does not constitute a campaign; nor does the aggregate message allegedly communicated by such unrelated advertisements target certain housing or neighborhoods. In publishing unrelated advertisements, a newspaper is not directing an advertising campaign, and as an advertising medium, a newspaper does not limit advertisements to certain housing or neighborhoods. The regulations contemplate a certain level of specificity in the discriminatory message vis-a-vis the real estate in order to establish a violation of the FHA. A different message may be conveyed by a brochure or related advertisements for a property or development which shows multiple pictures of multiple models, all of them white. 8 We conclude that the interpretation urged by HOME is not supported by, and may run counter to, the language of section 3604(c) and the relevant HUD regulations. 34 HOME cites numerous cases to bolster the validity of its claim. Ragin v. Steiner, Clateman and Assoc., 714 F.Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y.1989); Spann, 899 F.2d 24; Spann v. The Carley Capital Group, Inc., 734 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C.1988); Saunders v. General Servs. Corp., 659 F.Supp. 1042 (E.D.Va.1987). We find that these cases are either distinguishable or unpersuasive. Saunders involved the publication of a brochure depicting over 68 human models advertising for particular complexes owned by a single real estate organization. Any messages--whether created by individual or an aggregation of advertisements--could be traced to identifiable pieces of property owned by a single real estate organization. In contrast, defendant published numerous advertisements which were submitted by independent unrelated realtors. Under these circumstances, the instant aggregate message cannot be tied to a particular piece of property. 35 Neither The Carley Capital Group nor Spann expresses an opinion on a cause of action similar to the instant action. The District Court in The Carley Capital Group construed plaintiff's complaint to allege that defendants published advertisements that failed to include a black model, and that in other respects ... intentional racial discrimination occurred. 734 F.Supp. at 3. Thus, it appears that plaintiff's claim was one of actual discriminatory intent bolstered by advertisements. So construed, we would agree that this would appear to state a valid cause of action under the FHA. 36 In Spann, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether plaintiff's claim was time-barred. The court of appeals held that the District Court erred in its application of the relevant statute of limitations. The court of appeals never addressed the issue of the viability of the cause of action. Thus, this case does not help in our analysis of the instant issue. 37 Finally, we note that the only other circuit to address the issue--the Second Circuit--arrives at the same conclusion. The Ragin court stated: 38 [W]e agree with the Times that liability may not be based on an aggregation of advertisements by different advertisers. Although the twenty-year pattern alleged in the complaint may have been a powerful engine for housing segregation and, if proven, will almost certainly include violations of Section 3604(c), the statute provides a prohibition only with regard to individual advertisers. 39 Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1002. 40 The statutory construction urged by HOME also fails to pass constitutional muster based on an analysis of relevant first amendment principles. 9 In general, the Supreme Court has distinguished between speech that proposes a commercial transaction and other types of speech, Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63, 100 S.Ct. at 2349-50, and has concluded that the Constitution provides less protection to commercial speech. The Supreme Court has established a four-part analysis to determine the protection accorded particular commercial speech: 41 At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 42 Id. at 566, 100 S.Ct. at 2351. We note that the speech at issue here 10 is lawful and not misleading. Further, the asserted governmental interest is substantial. Trafficante, 409 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 364. Our chief concerns lie with the last two prongs of the analysis, the advancement of the government interest and the extensiveness of the regulations. 43 The interpretation of the FHA urged by HOME does little to promote the governmental interest. The purposes of the FHA are to eradicate housing discrimination and to promote integrated housing. Among other measures, the FHA prohibits discriminatory housing practices and discriminatory advertising practices for housing. The former measure attacks the root of the problem, discriminatory housing practices against certain minority groups. The prohibition against discriminatory advertising contributes to the eradication of discriminatory housing practices. Without the regulation of advertisements, realtors could deter certain classes of potential tenants from seeking housing at a particular location, effectively discriminating against these classes without running afoul of the FHA's prohibition against discriminatory housing practices. Congress obviously recognized the key role housing advertisements play in potential real estate transactions and concluded that the regulations of real estate advertisements is warranted. 44 The connection between the state's interest espoused in the FHA and HOME's claim is too attenuated, however. HOME's claim does not attack an illegal housing or rental practice; nor does it target discriminatory advertisements for specific real estate. Rather, this claim purports to hold a publisher liable for the creation of a general message of discrimination not traceable to a particular advertisement. Even if such a general message is felt in a real estate market and generates a less than friendly environment for certain groups, it is difficult to determine how this message deters individuals from seeking to buy or rent specific real estate. Recognition of HOME's claim would do little to promote the purpose of the FHA. Indeed, such a claim leads to anomalous results because it would impose liability on a publisher notwithstanding that all of the advertisers complied with the FHA in their advertising practices. 45 In a similar case, Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-96, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 1619-20, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977), the Supreme Court struck down a township's ordinance banning the use of For Sale signs in front of houses. Although the ordinance sought to promote an important objective--racially integrated housing--the Supreme Court found the connection between the goal and the ban too attenuated. Id.; see Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. at 2350 n. 7 (stating that we observed [in Linmark ] that there was no definite connection between the township's goal of integrated housing and its ban on the use of 'For Sale' signs). We find the connection between HOME's claim based on the asserted cumulative message created and sent by multiple advertisements and the purpose of the FHA similarly attenuated. 46 Moreover, the statutory construction urged by HOME is too extensive to serve the state's interest. Expanding the statute to encompass the instant claim places a heavy burden on publishers while achieving only incidental benefits. Publishers would become the government's policemen in enforcing section 3604(c), having to ensure that advertisers and the message of advertisements individually and in the aggregate comply with this section. In this instance, newspapers would be required to achieve a proper racial mix in the layout of their advertisements. 11 A publisher would be hard pressed to determine what set of statistics upon which to rely in achieving that mix. Should proportionality be determined based on the general population in the area; based on the composition of the subscribers; or based on the composition of potentially qualified buyers in a particular area? Moreover, a newspaper would have to notify particular advertisers to use minority human models in order to achieve this proper mix of minorities in its layout of advertisements. Of course, a newspaper could simply refuse to publish advertisements with human models, an extreme policy not adopted by either the relevant statute or regulations. And this extreme act still may not shield a publisher from liability. See Ragin, 714 F.Supp. 709. We are reluctant to construe this statute so as to impose such burdens on a publisher or to create a policy not established by Congress or HUD. 47 Requiring a publisher to perform this task, as opposed to the advertiser himself or a government agency, is at odds with the traditional relationship between the government and the press. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 829, 95 S.Ct. at 2236 (noting that a claim against a publisher for publishing an abortion advertisement in violation of a statute would impair, perhaps severely, [the newspapers'] functioning). In light of the nominal promotion of the asserted governmental interest and the significant burden imposed upon the press, we determine that the construction urged by HOME is constitutionally infirm. 48 On the other hand, the construction we give to section 3604(c) serves substantially the purposes sought to be achieved by the FHA without seriously burdening publishers. To be sure, publishers remain liable for publishing an advertisement that is obviously discriminatory, including an advertisement featuring the exclusive use of a large number of all-white models; for the publication of a plurality of advertisements submitted by an advertiser that depict all-white models; or for intending to discriminate through the publication of advertisements. This potential liability does not impose substantial affirmative duties upon publishers, thereby minimizing their role as enforcers of congressional policy. This construction avoids the constitutional infirmities inherent in the construction urged by HOME. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988). 49 In sum, HOME's aggregation theory of liability goes beyond the language or congressional intent of section 3604(c) and cannot be supported by the regulations interpreting this section. Moreover, the viability of this cause of action hinges on a statutory construction which raises serious first amendment concerns. 50 We conclude that the District Court properly dismissed HOME's claims which were not based on a discriminatory advertisement or proof of a discriminatory intent by defendant. 12 III. 51 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court dismissing appellant's action. 52