Opinion ID: 2613958
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Instructions Regarding Permissible Inferences

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in giving a series of instructions that unfairly permitted the jury to draw critically adverse inferences against him based on evidence of his behavior before, during and after the events in question. Defendant claims that these errors were particularly devastating with respect to the special circumstance allegations, and that they deprived him of due process, a fair jury trial and a reliable jury determination on guilt, special circumstances and penalty. As we will demonstrate, no error appears.
Over defense objection, the trial court gave CALJIC No. 2.71.7, specifically relating to a defendant's preoffense statements. [39] According to the record, this instruction evidently was given because of Ontiveros's testimony in which she recounted the conversations she had with Garcia and defendant before the murder. (27) Defendant argues that the instruction was not sufficiently supported by the evidence because Ontiveros did not attribute any particular statement to defendant, but referred to defendant as being part of the conversations only when the prosecutor asked leading questions. We conclude otherwise. Although Ontiveros identified certain statements made specifically to and by Garcia, she repeatedly affirmed that her conversations were with both Garcia and defendant, and that all three of them discussed the plan to get drugs from the brothers. [40] She also testified that, after having discovered that the brothers had no more drugs, she had a conversation with Garcia and defendant in which they agreed to go up to the apartment and get money instead. Thus, even though Ontiveros did not ascribe any particular statement to defendant, the jurors could reasonably infer from her testimony that defendant made a pre-offense oral statement by actively participating in planning the robbery, or at least by assenting to the plan. CALJIC No. 2.71.7 was properly given.
At trial, Ontiveros recounted various statements made by Garcia in defendant's presence as the three drove away from the crime scene in defendant's car. In substance, Garcia told Ontiveros that Garcia kept asking Zavala for the money as they were fighting, and that Zavala kept saying it was under the couch. When Garcia made these statements, defendant apparently said nothing. Over the defense's objection, the trial court gave the adoptive admission instruction contained in CALJIC No. 2.71.5. [41] (28a) Defendant maintains that the court's delivery of CALJIC No. 2.71.5 was improper because the statements identified as the basis for the instruction lacked the foundational requirements of an adoptive admission, in that: (1) the record fails to show that he either heard or had any knowledge of the statements made by Garcia (see Evid. Code, § 1221; People v. Lebell (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 772, 779-780 [152 Cal. Rptr. 840]); and (2) Garcia's statements did not accuse or implicate him in any way (see People v. Preston (1973) 9 Cal.3d 308, 313-314 [107 Cal. Rptr. 300, 508 P.2d 300]). (29), (28b) Defendant claims that the giving of the instruction under these circumstances was erroneous in light of People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 597 [138 Cal. Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203], which held: It is an elementary principle of law that before a jury can be instructed that it may draw a particular inference, evidence must appear in the record which, if believed by the jury, will support the suggested inference. Although defense counsel objected to the giving of CALJIC No. 2.71.5, he did not object on foundational or other grounds when evidence of Garcia's statements was admitted. Because counsel failed to object to admission of the evidence, the Attorney General argues that defendant waived any instructional error claim. Defendant disagrees. He asserts that Garcia's statements were not offered or admitted into evidence as an adoptive admission, and that in any event, People v. Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d 588, precludes a finding of waiver. In that case we held that the lack of objection to admission of testimony does not waive the right to appellate review of the propriety of jury instructions affecting the substantial rights of a defendant. (19 Cal.3d at p. 600 [deciding issue in context of CALJIC No. 2.06]; see § 1259.) Even if the claim is not deemed waived, it fails for lack of merit. As the Attorney General points out, aside from Garcia's postoffense statements, there was evidence in the record that prior to the crimes, defendant was with Ontiveros and Garcia when the plan to rob the victims was discussed. In response to the prosecutor's questions, Ontiveros confirmed: (1) that the three of [them] discuss[ed] the plan; (2) that she told Garcia and defendant that she would go up to the door. And they knew me, so I knew that they would open the door. And at that point, ... that they could rush in after me; (3) that she told Garcia and defendant that they wouldn't need no weapons; and (4) that she did not remember either Garcia or defendant disagreeing or taking issue with that. (See fn. 40, ante. ) Inasmuch as defendant was a party to the discussions, it may be reasonably inferred that he was afforded the opportunity to refuse to participate or to otherwise dissociate himself from the planned activity; but that he did not do so. Such evidence, which indicated that defendant participated without demur in the planning of a robbery, warranted the inference that an adoptive admission had been made. (See People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 852 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249].)
Over the defense's objection, the trial court gave several jury instructions relating to statements or efforts by defendant which might tend to prove a consciousness of guilt: CALJIC No. 2.03 (consciousness of guilt  falsehoods); CALJIC No. 2.04 (efforts by defendant to fabricate evidence); and CALJIC No. 2.06 (efforts to suppress evidence). [42] (30) Defendant argues that it was prejudicial error to give these instructions, and that he was thereby deprived of his federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial by jury, and reliable guilt, special circumstance and penalty determinations. We are not persuaded. First, defendant contends that CALJIC No. 2.04 was erroneously given because there was insufficient evidence in the record to warrant any inference that he had attempted to persuade a witness to testify falsely, or tried to fabricate evidence to be produced at trial. While acknowledging that his brother admitted at trial that defendant had asked him to lie about defendant's arm injury, defendant nevertheless maintains that his brother's testimony fell outside the scope of CALJIC No. 2.04 because the incident occurred before judicial proceedings had been initiated. We cannot agree. CALJIC No. 2.04 does not require judicial proceedings to actually be in progress when the attempt to procure false testimony or to fabricate evidence is made. It was sufficient that the jury could reasonably infer from the incident that defendant expected his brother to be a witness in the event of a trial, or that defendant sought to fabricate evidence in anticipation of a trial. Next, defendant contends that CALJIC No. 2.06 was erroneously given because the evidence did not support the prosecutor's rationale for the instruction, i.e., that defendant threw away or otherwise destroyed or concealed the knife used in the attack, as well as his bloodstained clothes. We are not convinced. Ontiveros testified that as Garcia and defendant were discussing the knife on the way home after the attack, she felt a blast of air in the car as if defendant had rolled down the backseat window. Although Ontiveros admitted she did not actually see defendant toss the knife out, she never saw it again and authorities later found the knife in the area where she thought it had been thrown. CALJIC No. 2.06 was therefore properly given because the jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that defendant attempted to suppress evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Fitzpatrick (1992) 2 Cal. App.4th 1285, 1296-1297 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 808] [CALJIC No. 2.06 properly given based on circumstantial evidence indicating that defendant threw murder weapon down gutter].) [43] Finally, defendant claims that the trial court should have modified CALJIC Nos. 2.03, 2.04 and 2.06 to apply only to the murder charge and not to the charges of attempted robbery, burglary and the corresponding special circumstances. Again, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence corroborating Ontiveros's testimony regarding defendant's involvement in the latter crimes. This claim must be rejected. In the first place, if defendant believed the instructions required clarification or modification, it was incumbent upon him to request it. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1236.) In any case, the unmodified instructions correctly guided the jury's consideration of the evidence because, as we have previously explained, there was ample corroborating evidence tending to connect defendant to the planned robbery and burglary, as well as to the murder. Additionally, it must be remembered that the defense relied on an all-or-nothing strategy to cast doubt solely on the issue of identity. Certainly the trial court had no sua sponte duty to make instructional modifications that were arguably inconsistent with, or even detrimental to, that strategy. [44] In sum, the jury would not have been unreasonable in drawing inferences that defendant's false statements about his arm injury, his attempt to persuade his brother to lie and his effort to get rid of the knife all tended to show consciousness of guilt of all the charged crimes. Defendant's conduct was clearly probative on the issue of identity of the second assailant who was seen fleeing the crime scene with an injured arm. No error appears. (See People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 276 [266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892] [rejecting argument that standard CALJIC No. 2.03 should have been tailored to require some relationship between defendant's false statements and various crimes charged].)
Defendant argues that the erroneous delivery of CALJIC Nos. 2.71.5, 2.71.7, 2.03, 2.04 and 2.06, whether considered singly or together, deprived him of his constitutional rights. He is mistaken. Inasmuch as none of the five instructions was erroneous, it is inconceivable that defendant's constitutional rights were violated.