Opinion ID: 6320445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Good Defense

Text: First, the district court correctly found that Hunter failed to present “a good defense to the alleged cause of action on which the judgment is founded.” Mitchell, 651 F.3d at 595. The district court rejected both of Hunter’s defenses: (1) “that but for the stipulated dismissal, he could have 6 No. 21-1496, Hunter v. Sterling Mortg. and Inv. Co. et al. filed a counterclaim against the Government under 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)”; and (2) “that the stipulated dismissal and Defendants’ settlement agreement prevented him from redeeming his property.” Hunter III, 2021 WL 1087654, at –4. The stipulated dismissal did not impact Hunter’s ability to file a claim of his own because the dismissal was without prejudice. R. 10-4 (2017 Order) (Page ID #126). Further, Hunter was able to (and, in fact, did) sue the IRS in a separate action under 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a). See Hunter II, 769 F. App’x at 330–31. Moreover, this defense is not “a good defense” as is required to succeed under Rule 60(d)(1), Mitchell, 651 F.3d at 595, for we rejected Hunter’s “quiet title” claim against the IRS in Hunter II and dismissed the action, 769 F. App’x at 333. Likewise, Hunter failed to allege that the dismissal in Sterling prevented him from redeeming the property. It is true that the statutory redemption period had not expired when Hunter agreed to the stipulation of dismissal.6 Sterling, however, did not file an eviction notice against Hunter until five days after the redemption period had expired.7 Neither the settlement nor the stipulated dismissal prevented Hunter from redeeming the property before the redemption period expired. As a result, Hunter cannot present a good defense that satisfies the second element required for an independent action under Rule 60(d)(1).