Opinion ID: 2075762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Best Interests Standard and Parental Fitness

Text: As indicated earlier, the assumption that a natural parent's fitness incorporates the child's best interests may be suspect on occasion. There conceivably can be circumstances in which clear and convincing evidence will show that an award of custody to a fit natural parent would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. I therefore turn to the meaning of parental fitness and to the kinds of situations that could cause the court, despite a father's fitness, to terminate his parental rights. In the first place, I do not believe a parent would be unfit only if the District of Columbia had grounds to intervene and take the child away if the parent had custody. But see Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal.3d 787, 796 n. 8, 218 Cal.Rptr. 39, 45 n. 8, 705 P.2d 362, 368 n. 8 (1985). Nonetheless, the § 16-2353(b) factors, see supra note 18as applied to the natural parent are of central concern: the child's prospects for continuity of care in a stable and permanent home; the parent's physical, mental, and emotional health; the quality of the interaction between parent and child; and, to the extent feasible, the child's opinion. See K.A., 484 A.2d at 998. Thus, in cases such as M.M.M., where the objecting mother was mentally ill and at times violent, or C.O.W., where the mother had serious emotional problems, or U.S.W., where there was a parental history of alcohol abuse and an inability to hold jobs, a fitness analysis as such apparently would have justified the termination. If, however, a parent is not found unfit, under what circumstances, if any, could an award of custody to the parent be detrimental to the best interests of the child, such that termination of parental rights in favor of adoptive parents might be justified? In allowing for such a possibility, I do not try to define its contours or even to provide many examples. I am merely saying that presumptive custody for a fit parent subject to rebuttal in the child's best interests is not constitutionally precluded; I do not try to speak definitively on the scope of a best interests exception. I provide only minimal guidance in the form of suggesting considerations. More than likely, given a common-sense application of the best interests exception, a parental preference will evaporate where circumstances beyond the control of the noncustodial, fit parent have created a situation that signals harm if the child is turned over to his or her parent. In California, for example, in applying a statutory detriment or actual harm exception to the fitness test, an appellate court concluded that negative evidence about the father was not necessary to a finding of detriment and then justified termination of the parental rights of a fit, noncustodial natural father solely because of the psychological harm that would result from removing the child from a prospective adoptive home where she had lived for five years. In re Baby Girl M., 236 Cal.Rptr. 660 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.1987). [39] We do not have the California statute or its history, but the most obvious, and possibly the only, basis for denying custody to a fit parent in the best interests of the child would be a finding based on clear and convincing evidence that parental custody would actually harm the child. In sum, under the adoption statute, D.C. Code § 16-304(e) (1989), as applied to an unwed, noncustodial father who has not lost his opportunity interest, the trial court shall consider, first, the fitness of the father. If, for example, the court finds him generally fit, the court must deem him presumptively entitled to custody, subject to rebuttal only by clear and convincing evidence that the child's best interests require the court to deny the father custody. I would leave it to the trial courts to implement this approach case by case. I merely add that in allowing for the possibility that a fit natural father may lose parental rights because the best interests of the child would preclude a transfer of custodydespite the father's best possible effort to preserve his opportunity interest we should not foreclose the possibility of a damages remedy, however inadequate, for violations of the father's statutory and constitutional rights that may have caused prejudicial delay.