Opinion ID: 222092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Equitable estoppel does apply where the plaintiff believes she has a cause of action but is dissuaded from bringing the claim because of defendant's affirmative misrepresentations and stonewalling within the limitations period.

Text: The doctrine of equitable estoppel, often referred to as fraudulent concealment, is based on the principle that a party should not be allowed to benefit from its own wrongdoing. Collins v. Gee West Seattle LLC, 631 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir.2011). The doctrine focuses primarily on the actions taken by the defendant in preventing a plaintiff from filing suit. Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir.2000). In this circuit, the plaintiff carries the burden of pleading and proving the following elements of equitable estoppel: (1) knowledge of the true facts by the party to be estopped, (2) intent to induce reliance or actions giving rise to a belief in that intent, (3) ignorance of the true facts by the relying party, and (4) detrimental reliance. Bolt v. United States, 944 F.2d 603, 609 (9th Cir.1991). Additionally, when estoppel is sought against the government, there must be affirmative misconduct (not mere negligence) and a serious injustice outweighing the damage to the public interest of estopping the government. Id. The City contends that equitable estoppel does not apply to this case because Montoya thought she had a cause of action, and thus, cannot establish the third prong of the equitable estoppel test: ignorance of the true facts by the relying party. However, this court has held exactly the opposite. This court's precedent holds that a plaintiff can know, or suspect, that she has a cause of action and still be ignorant of the true facts of the case. Most directly, this court has held that equitable estoppel applies to bar a statute of limitations defense when a plaintiff who knows of his cause of action reasonably relies on the defendant's statements or conduct in failing to bring suit. Stitt v. Williams, 919 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir.1990) (emphasis added). Therefore, the focus of the equitable estoppel analysis is not whether the plaintiff knew she had a cause of action  or even pursued some other form of litigation based on that knowledge  but whether the defendant's fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation deprived the plaintiff of a full understanding of the true facts, and thus, dissuaded the plaintiff from filing the claim at issue within the limitations period. The case which best draws the distinction between knowledge of a cause of action and knowledge of the true facts is UA Local 343 v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir.1994). In Local 343, defendant Elmar Lee Pettit appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff Union in the Union's suit against Pettit for running a double-breasted plumbing operation (running one union shop and a parallel non-union shop to circumvent the collective bargaining agreement). Id. at 1469. Union officers suspected Pettit of illegal double-breasting, but when confronted with their suspicions, Pettit lied and claimed that the second, non-union plumbing shop was owned by his wife. Id. at 1474. The Union nevertheless lodged an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB based on its suspicions (the charge was later withdrawn when the NLRB threatened dismissal). Id. The Union later filed suit against Pettit alleging breach of the CBA; however, the suit was filed after expiration of the four-year limitations period, for breach of a written contract. Relevant here, the district court held that Pettit could not assert a statute of limitations defense to the Union's suit because he had fraudulently concealed the true facts of the case during the limitations period. This court affirmed, rejecting Pettit's contention that fraudulent concealment could not apply where the Union acted on its suspicions in filing a charge with the NLRB. Id. The court concluded: [w]here a plaintiff suspects the truth but investigates unsuccessfully, fraudulent concealment will toll the statute [of limitations]. Id. at 1475. We find no basis for distinguishing the reasoning of Local 343, even though Local 343 presents itself, at least nominally, as an equitable tolling case. See id. at 1474 (We agree with the district court that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies here.). This court has held that, although the doctrines of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel are often confused, the better reasoning states that equitable tolling applies when the plaintiff is unaware of his cause of action, while equitable estoppel applies when a plaintiff who knows of his cause of action reasonably relies on the defendant's statements or conduct in failing to bring suit. See Stitt, 919 F.2d at 522. As such, we believe the logic of Local 343  where the Union strongly suspected it had a claim against Pettit, so much so that it filed a charge with the NLRB  can be extended to estop the City of Oakland from raising a statute of limitations defense to Montoya's § 1983 suit. Here, Montoya diligently investigated her son's arrest and death within the limitations period and believed she had a claim against the Department. However, five different lawyers told her that, in light of Amaro's uncorroborated statements about a police beating and Sergeant Galindo's (mis)statements regarding Amaro's death, Montoya did not have sufficient evidence to file a § 1983 claim. Instead, she filed a pro per government claim to put the City of Oakland on notice of her grievance, and thereby preserve her cause of action under California's Governmental Tort Action statute (Cal.Gov.Code § 910). Although the language of Montoya's government claim reveals her suspicion  and subjective knowledge  that her son died as a result of a police beating, Sergeant Galindo's misrepresentations regarding the circumstances of Amaro's death and the Department's continued stonewalling in refusing her requests for Department reports prevented Montoya from appreciating the full nature of her claim and dissuaded her from filing a § 1983 claim. Just as the filing of an NLRB charge by the Union in Local 343 did not preclude invocation of equitable estoppel by this court, the fact that Montoya expressed her suspicions in a § 910 Government Code claim does not bar application of the doctrine here. Therefore, we answer the district court's certified question in the affirmative: the doctrine of equitable estoppel does apply where a plaintiff believes she has a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim but is dissuaded from bringing the claim by affirmative misrepresentations and stonewalling by the police. [5] AFFIRMED.