Opinion ID: 1693342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: statutory speedy trial claim

Text: The information against Ward was filed on April 28, 1997. Excluding the day the information was filed, see State v. Jones, 208 Neb. 641, 305 N.W.2d 355 (1981), the last day on which Ward could have been tried within the statutory 6-month period was October 28, unless any period between the filing of the information and commencement of trial must be excluded, see State v. Murphy, 255 Neb. 797, 587 N.W.2d 384 (1998). Therefore, assuming the trial court had timely ruled on Ward's motion to discharge on or about October 30, we analyze whether the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a period of time that is excluded under § 29-1207. That section provides, in relevant part: (3) If such defendant is to be tried again following a mistrial, an order for a new trial, or an appeal or collateral attack, such period shall commence to run from the date of the mistrial, order granting a new trial, or the mandate on remand. (4) The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial: (a) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to ... the time from filing until final disposition of pretrial motions of the defendant.... § 29-1207. The State argues that our speedy trial calculation should exclude the time between the filing of Ward's pretrial motions and the completion of the 30-day period allotted for the taking of depositions, as the time from filing until final disposition of pretrial motions of the defendant. See § 29-1207(4)(a). We have held, however, that a pretrial motion of the defendant is `finally disposed' on the date that it is granted. State v. Murphy, 255 Neb. at 802, 587 N.W.2d at 388, citing State v. Brown, 214 Neb. 665, 335 N.W.2d 542 (1983). The excludable period attributable to the defendant's pretrial motions is calculated from the date the motions were filed until the date the motions were granted. See State v. Brown, supra. From April 30 to May 19, 1997, is a period of 20 days. Considering the 20 days of excludable time, Ward's motion to discharge on speedy trial grounds would not have had merit on October 30. Ward's trial was further delayed, however, by his interlocutory appeal. Although the appeal was ultimately dismissed, it certainly constitutes a period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, within the meaning of § 29-1207(4)(a). It is clear that the period to be excluded due to Ward's appeal commenced on and includes October 31, 1997the date on which he filed his notice of appeal. The date on which this period is to end presents a more difficult question. We have held, with reference to § 29-1207(3), that the 6-month period in which the State is to retry a defendant following a successful appeal is fixed by reference to the date on which the district court first takes action pursuant to the mandate of the appellate court. State v. Kinser, 256 Neb. 56, 588 N.W.2d 794 (1999). Our rationale for that holding was that the date of the district court's first action on the mandate was the date on which the district court had reacquired jurisdiction over the case from the appellate courts. Id. See, also, State v. Belmarez, 254 Neb. 436, 577 N.W.2d 255 (1998). This rationale also dictates that where further proceedings are to be had following an interlocutory appeal, for speedy trial purposes, the period of time excludable due to the appeal concludes when the district court first reacquires jurisdiction over the case by taking action on the mandate of the appellate court. The record in this case does not indicate the date on which the district court first reacquired jurisdiction over the cause. The only evidence contained in the record is a copy of the mandate of the Court of Appeals, file stamped by the clerk of the district court on March 27, 1998. This may or may not be the same date on which the district court first took action on the mandate. For purposes of our present analysis, giving the benefit to Ward, we assume that the mandate was acted upon on March 27, as soon as it was received. The resulting period of excluded time, from October 31, 1997, to March 27, 1998, is 148 days. Combined, Ward's pretrial motions and appeal result in an excluded period of 168 days. Counting forward from October 28, 1997, this means that the State was obliged to bring Ward to trial on or before April 14, 1998. Ward's trial began on April 13within the 6-month period, absent excluded periods, required by the statute. Consequently, Ward's statutory speedy trial claim is without merit.