Opinion ID: 2001496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Video Lottery Gaming

Text: Plaintiffs next challenge the constitutionality of part C of chapter 383 of the Laws of 2001. That section authorized the operation of video lottery gaming at Aqueduct, Monticello, Yonkers, Finger Lakes and Vernon Downs racetracks, and at certain other racetracks that are licensed pursuant to article III of the Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law and located within a county that has approved video lottery gaming (L 2001, ch 383, part C, § 1). The video lottery is played using video lottery terminals, which are each connected to a central system through the use of site controllers  computers that connect several VLTs both to each other and to the central system. In the most common form of video lottery gaming, participants at individual VLTs play against each other by purchasing electronic instant tickets from a finite pool. In order to play, individuals place cash or other currency into the VLT to purchase an electronic instant ticket. The player then determines the game identifier and the price of the electronic ticket to be purchased. The VLT receives the next ticket from the site controller and displays the predetermined outcomewin or loss. If the player wins, the VLT will print an electronically encoded instrument which can be used to play additional video lottery games or can be redeemed for value. [7] Plaintiffs argue that because video lottery gaming is played using VLTs, which they contend resemble slot machines, the video lottery is not a lottery at all, but rather state-sponsored slot machine gambling forbidden by the Constitution. But whereas slot machines are not mentioned in the Constitution, lotteries are, and they are expressly permitted when operated by the State. Thus, if the video lottery is a lottery, the statute providing for it is constitutional regardless of whether the terminals used to play the lottery also look like, or even meet the Penal Law definition of, slot machines. [8] Since the Constitution does not define the term lottery, we must first determine what constitutes a lottery within the meaning of article I, § 9. The Penal Law definition of lottery  consisting of consideration, chance and prize ( see Penal Law § 225.00 [10]; People v Hines, 284 NY 93, 101 [1940], overruled on other grounds People v Kohut, 30 NY2d 183, 190-191 [1972]; Trump v Perlee, 228 AD2d 367, 368 [1st Dept 1996])  provides little guidance, because, as the Court below recognized, this definition applies equally to all forms of gambling or games of chance. Clearly, the limited constitutional exception for state-run lotteries cannot be read to allow any casino game (such as poker, blackjack or roulette) to constitute a valid lottery if operated by the State. Thus, we agree with the Appellate Division ( see 11 AD3d at 92) that a constitutional lottery requires something morespecifically, the use of tickets and multiple participation, as opposed to a single player competing against a single machine. It is clear from the language of the Constitution that an authorized lottery requires the sale of tickets ( see NY Const, art I, § 9 [1] [no lottery or the sale of lottery tickets . . . except lotteries operated by the state and the sale of lottery tickets in connection therewith . . . shall hereafter be authorized or allowed within this state]). The Senate debates concerning the 1966 amendment to article I, § 9allowing state-run lotteries as an exception to the general prohibition against gambling reflect the same understanding ( see e.g. New York State Senate Debate Transcripts, 1965 New York Constitution, June 14, 1965, at 4776, 4778, 4798). In addition, the constitutional history reflects that the Senate considered multiple participation an additional element of the definition of a lottery ( see New York State Senate Debate Transcripts, 1965 New York Constitution, June 14, 1965, at 4808). The video lottery authorized by part C is consistent with this definition. As noted above, players tender consideration (cash or other currency) to purchase electronic tickets and receive a prize in the form of compensation or chances to play additional games. Multiple participation is satisfied in that the VLTs are linked through the site controllers to a central system, and players compete against one another for prizes by purchasing tickets from a finite depleting pool of electronic instant lottery tickets, with a set number of predetermined winners randomly distributed, or by choosing a series of keno numbers, colors or symbols from a finite pool in the hope that they, as opposed to other players, will have matched those colors, numbers or symbols later drawn, thus satisfying the element of chance. It is of no constitutional significance that the tickets are electronic instead of paper. The particular methods of conducting the lottery are subject to change with time. The language of the Constitution is not so rigid as to prevent this type of update and modernization. Thus, we conclude that the video lottery is a valid lottery under article I, § 9 (1), and that, rather than slot machines, VLTs are simply mechanical devices for the implementation of the video lottery ( see e.g. Tax Law § 1604 [a] [8]). [9] Plaintiffs also argue that part C violated their rights to equal protection because it allows only certain local legislatures to vote to give prior approval for installation of VLTs. They argue that strict scrutiny should be applied because the issue involves the denial of the right to vote. However, as the Appellate Division noted, [e]ven in voter classification, a State is not prohibited from recognizing the distinctive interests of the residents of its political subdivisions ( City of New York v State of New York, 76 NY2d 479, 486 [1990] [holding that it was reasonable to permit Staten Island residents, but no other New York City residents, to vote on the issue of secession]). Thus, rather than strict scrutiny, we use a rational basis standard of review. When reviewing using a rational basis standard, a classification must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification . . . [I]ndeed, a court may even hypothesize the motivations of the State Legislature to discern any conceivable legitimate objective promoted by the provision under attack ( Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284, 290-291 [1999] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, it would have been rational for the Legislature to determine that certain racetrack communities were in greater need of the potential revenue that would be generated by the video lottery than others and, as a result, not require those areas to get prior local approval.