Opinion ID: 200347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Co-Conspirators' Hearsay Declarations

Text: Carey argues that the trial court erred by improperly admitting co-conspirator statements into evidence because there was no evidence of a conspiracy. The court reviews a trial court's determination that statements were co-conspirator statements admissible pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) under the clear error standard. See United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 25 (1st Cir. 2002). A statement offered against a party is not hearsay if it is a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course -12- and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Statements of co-conspirators are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) only if the trial court finds it more likely than not that the declarant and the defendant were members of a conspiracy . . . and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977). District courts frequently allow co-conspirator statements to be admitted provisionally, subject to the trial court's final Petrozziello determination, which should be made at the close of all the evidence and out of the hearing of the jury. United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 638 (1st Cir. 1980). At the close of evidence during the trial, Carey argued for the exclusion of the co-conspirators' hearsay statements, reiterating his claim that the testimony of Mozynski and Powers was inherently unreliable, and therefore should be excluded. As we have already discussed, each witness testified that Carey was involved in the distribution of crack cocaine and assisted in setting up the first sale on October 19. This testimony was corroborated by other evidence. In light of this evidence, the district court properly admitted the co-conspirator statements.