Opinion ID: 2570573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Removal of prospective jurors for cause

Text: Leonard asserts that the district court applied an erroneous standard in excusing prospective jurors for cause because of their views on the death penalty. Leonard argues that the district court erroneously considered whether prospective jurors could equally consider the three possible punishments and erroneously excused individuals pursuant to this standard. We agree that equal consideration of the three possible forms of punishment, including death, is not required. Rather, the proper question is whether a prospective juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)). Further, the death penalty is reserved for a limited class of offenders. Although equal might be equated with fair consideration, it is susceptible to being interpreted to require that jurors accord the same consideration to each of the possible penalties. There is no such requirement under Nevada law. The death penalty is permissible only where at least one aggravating circumstance is proven beyond a reasonable doubt and where any mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances. See NRS 200.030(4)(a). Even assuming these conditions are met, the jury has discretion not to impose death. Although the voir dire and jury questionnaire both contained references to the need for jurors to afford equal consideration to the possible penalties, Leonard failed to object to this language. [6] We are not persuaded that Leonard has demonstrated plain error that would warrant relief, notwithstanding his failure to object. [7] We specifically reject Leonard's contention that references to equal consideration tainted the instructions given to the jury about punishment. A jury is presumed to follow its instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 120 S.Ct. 727, 733, 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)). Presumably, the jury followed the instructions it received at the penalty phase. That leaves only the question of whether any prospective juror was erroneously excused for cause because of his or her views on the death penalty. If a prospective juror was erroneously excused, then reversal of Leonard's death sentence is warranted. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 97 S.Ct. 399, 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976). After having considered each of the instances cited by Leonard involving prospective jurors who were excused for cause, we conclude that Leonard has not demonstrated that any individual was erroneously excused. The court afforded the parties ample inquiry to explore each prospective juror's views on the death penalty. During questioning, most of the individuals cited by Leonard unequivocally indicated that their views would prevent or substantially impair their ability to properly consider all of the penalty options, including the death penalty. However, prospective juror no. 129 merits more specific comment and consideration. Prospective juror no. 129 explained that she could probably consider the death penalty in some situations and that it could be occasionally appropriate but probably in very few circumstances. She favored abolishing the death penalty, and stated that she did not think it does any good. She indicated that she would have a hard time looking the defendant in the eye and, with her fellow jurors, telling him he deserved to die. She represented that she would probably give much more weight to either choosing prison with parole or prison without than the death penalty. Having considered the complete transcript of the in-court questioning of prospective juror no. 129, we are persuaded that Leonard has not demonstrated plain error that would entitle him to relief, notwithstanding defense counsel's failure to object to the prospective juror's removal for cause. [8] We are mindful of the importance of proper objection, which affords the district court an opportunity to avoid error by reconsidering or clarifying the basis for its decision. This is particularly true here, where the observations of the district court and the parties are important. The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause since these rulings involve factual determinations. Walker v. State, 113 Nev. 853, 865, 944 P.2d 762, 770 (citing Witt, 469 U.S. at 428-29, 105 S.Ct. 844). The trial court is better able to view a prospective juror's demeanor than a subsequent reviewing court. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 178, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). Further, counsel's failure to speak in a situation later claimed to be so rife with ambiguity as to constitute constitutional error is a circumstance we feel justified in considering. Witt, 469 U.S. at 431 n. 11, 105 S.Ct. 844. Leonard's failure to object might reflect a tactical decision by counsel that is not susceptible to review on direct appeal. [9] Given these concerns, there is no plain error under the facts of this case because the record does not unequivocally reflect that the district court erred in excusing prospective juror no. 129. It is not necessary that a prospective juror's bias be proved with `unmistakable clarity' in the printed record. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844. Prospective juror no. 129 expressed serious reservations about the death penalty that raised doubts as to whether she would be able to set aside those concerns and follow the law in this case. She indicated not only a strong preference for punishments other than the death penalty, but real uncertainty about her ability to return a death verdict. In sum, we conclude that Leonard has not demonstrated plain error. Nevertheless, we are concerned that questions and references indicating the need to afford equal consideration to the possible punishments may be misleading. As discussed above, language referring to the need for equal consideration does not accurately reflect Nevada law. Accordingly, we direct the district courts to refrain from utilizing such language in future proceedings, either by way of the jury voir dire or the jury questionnaire.