Opinion ID: 4057356
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counsel’s Closing Argument

Text: In the eighth ground of ineffective assistance, applicant asserts that his trial counsel conceded during closing argument that applicant acted in a “totally unreasonable way that lacks common sense even at a basic level.” According to applicant, this concession amounted to ineffective assistance because the argument was affirmatively prejudicial. In an affidavit, applicant’s trial counsel stated that he was convinced by the end of the trial that the jury believed applicant was either stupid or guilty, so he argued that applicant was stupid. Counsel stated that he should have crafted the argument in a different way so as to make the same point without conceding that applicant’s behavior was unreasonable. The trial court concluded that it was a reasonable trial strategy to acknowledge applicant’s odd behavior and shortcomings upfront. Applicant argues that this finding does not directly address counsel’s conduct in conceding that applicant acted unreasonably. Applicant was indicted for forgery. The jury charge explained that “[a] person commits forgery if he forges a writing with intent to defraud or harm another.” The jury was charged that “[a] person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire in the conduct [to] cause the result.” The record supports the trial court’s finding that counsel’s acknowledgment of applicant’s odd behavior upfront was a sound trial strategy. See Ex Parte Rogers, 369 S.W.3d 858, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The record reveals that the jury received evidence that suggested applicant knew the money was counterfeit. 3 Applicant complained of ten acts or omissions of his trial counsel in his application in the trial court, but he has not argued two of these acts or omissions on appeal. 8 To convince the jury that applicant did not know the money was counterfeit, counsel sought to gain credibility with the jury by admitting that applicant’s behavior seemed odd. Trial counsel then attempted to explain away the oddity. This decision was a calculated risk by trial counsel. See Alexander v. State, 282 S.W.3d 701, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (noting that appellate courts cannot find deficiency from a calculated risk by trial counsel that simply did not work). Applicant objects to counsel’s use of the term “unreasonable” as a descriptor for applicant’s actions. But, the jury was not required to determine whether or not applicant’s actions were reasonable; the inquiry put to the jury was whether or not applicant intended to pass counterfeit money. In light of the charge and question before the jury, the fact that counsel used the term “unreasonable” in describing applicant’s actions does not make counsel’s strategy deficient. Applicant’s trial counsel took a calculated risk in arguing to the jury that applicant was naïve. That risk was reasonable given the evidence presented. See id. The record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that counsel’s legal representation of applicant did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Under the applicable standard of review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that applicant did not prove by a preponderance of evidence the first prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel. See Ex parte Rogers, 369 S.W.3d at 862; Alexander, 282 S.W.3d at 706; Taylor v. State, 947 S.W.2d 698, 704 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref’d). Applicant’s argument is without merit.