Opinion ID: 71569
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Williams's Conviction

Text: While Williams's appeal is couched as a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, deciding it requires us to construeas a matter of first impression in this circuit the boundaries of the statute under which she was convicted. Section 111 provides, in relevant part: (a) In generalWhoever (1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any [federal officer] while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties; . . . shall, where the acts in violation of this section constitute only simple assault, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, and where such acts involve physical contact with the victim of that assault or the intent to commit another felony, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. (b) Enhanced penalty.Whoever, in the commission of any acts described in subsection (a), uses a deadly or dangerous weapon (including a weapon intended to cause death or danger but that fails to do so by reason of a defective component) or inflicts bodily injury, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. As discussed in cases in other circuits, the statute contains two ambiguities. First, it distinguishes between misdemeanor and felony conduct by use of the undefined term simple assault. Second, and central to this case, the statute appears to outlaw several forms of conduct directed against federal officers, only one of which is assault, but then distinguishes between misdemeanors and felonies by reference to the crime of assault. The difficulty that has confronted other courts is whether conviction for the non-assaultive conduct apparently outlawed by the statute ( i.e., resist[ing], oppos[ing], imped[ing], intimidat[ing], or interfer[ing] with a federal officer) requires, at a minimum, conduct that amounts to simple assault. To put the question another way, can a defendant be convicted of forcible resistance under this statute without having committed an underlying assault? Williams argues that criminal liability under § 111(a)(1) requires conduct amounting to an assault and, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of such, asks us to vacate the judgment against her. [T]his circuit has interpreted . . . § 111 to create three separate offenses: `(1) simple assault; (2) more serious assaults but not involving a dangerous weapon; and (3) assault with a dangerous weapon.' United States v. Williams, 520 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir.2000), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 629-31, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 111, 172 L.Ed.2d 89 (2008) (mem.). We have held that simple assault is a misdemeanor offense under § 111(a) and defined simple assault as an attempted or threatened battery. United States v. Hazlewood, 526 F.3d 862, 865 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Ramirez, 233 F.3d at 321-22; United States v. Vallery, 437 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2006)). By implication, the other two forms of assault are felonies under the statute. However, this court has never ruled on whether the additional conduct proscribed in § 111(a)(1) requires, at a minimum, underlying assaultive conduct. [3] Several circuits have split on this question. In United States v. Chapman, the Ninth Circuit held that convictions under the statute require at least some form of assault. 528 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2008). Construing an earlier version of the statute, [4] the Ninth Circuit noted that other circuits have adopted a construction that leaves no room for a conviction that does not involve at least some form of assault. Id. at 1219. More importantly, the Ninth Circuit argued that without requiring some sort of underlying assault, it would be impossible to distinguish non-assaultive misdemeanor resistance cases from felonious resistance cases, because the now-superseded statutory language clearly limits the category of `misdemeanors' to cases of `simple assault' and then categorizes `all other cases' felonies. Id. at 1220. If Congress had intended to prohibit both assaultive and non-assaultive conduct and intended to distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies based solely on physical contact, it easily could have said so. Id. at 1221. To hold that non-assaultive conduct was proscribed by the statute would lead to absurd results, the Ninth Circuit suggested, because in cases of mere resistance, it is not at all clear that resistance with physical contact is any more culpable than resistance without such contact, especially when . . . the physical contact is initiated by the arresting officer rather than by the arrestee. Id. The Sixth Circuit, also construing the earlier version of the statute, reached the opposite conclusion. The court reasoned that interpreting § 111(a)(1) as requiring an underlying assault for a defendant to be convicted would render meaningless the five forms of non-assaultive conduct that are plainly proscribed by the statute. United States v. Gagnon, 553 F.3d 1021, 1026 (6th Cir.2009). Congress left much open with § 111 . . . but that is no excuse to ignore what it plainly does say. Id. Under this reading, the phrase simple assault is a term of art that includes the forcible performance of any of the six proscribed actions in § 111(a) without the intent to cause physical contact or to commit a serious felony while `all other cases' covers the commission of these same violations plus the intent to commit a felony or resulting physical contact. Id. at 1027. The Ninth Circuit's concern about the difficulty of determining whether a defendant was culpable for physical contact initiated by an arresting officer was misplaced, since any such contact would not have been forcibly initiated by the defendant and thus would not be proscribed by the statute. Id.; see also United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C.Cir.2002) ([A] defendant does not violate [§ 111(a)] unless he forcibly assaults or forcibly resists or forcibly opposes, etc.); United States v. Schrader, 10 F.3d 1345, 1348 (8th Cir.1993) (Force is a necessary element of any § 111 violation.). Even before the recent change in the statute, the Sixth Circuit rule was the better one, as it avoided rendering superfluous the other five forms of conduct proscribed by § 111(a)(1). The recent change in the statutory languagestriking out all other cases in the penalty provision of the statute and specifying that the line between misdemeanors and felonies is drawn at physical contact or acting with the intent to commit another crimealso supports the conclusion that § 111(a)(1) prohibits more than assault, simple or otherwise. Congress addressed the ambiguity identified by the Ninth Circuit by explicitly drawing the misdemeanor/felony line at physical contact, but it declined the opportunity to delete the other forms of conduct proscribed by the statute or to otherwise clarify that § 111(a)(1) convictions require an underlying assault. Finally, the Sixth Circuit's approach is more consonant with the dual purpose of the statute, which, the Supreme Court has noted, is not simply to protect federal officers by punishing assault, but also to deter interference with federal law enforcement activities and ensure the integrity of federal operations by punishing obstruction and other forms of resistance. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 678, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975); see also id. at 679-82, 95 S.Ct. 1255 (discussing the legislative history of § 111's predecessor statute). We adopt the Sixth Circuit rule and hold that a misdemeanor conviction under § 111(a)(1) does not require underlying assaultive conduct. With the adoption of this rule, this case becomes straightforward. There is ample evidence that Williams forcibly . . . resist[ed] federal officers. In fact, Williams admitted after being arrested that she swung her arms for the specific purpose of resisting the officers' attempts to handcuff her. We affirm Williams's conviction.