Opinion ID: 2982483
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counsel’s Claim

Text: Darwich appeals the district court’s sentence, arguing that it erred in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1) to require consecutive enhanced sentences for multiple § 844(h)(1) convictions within a single prosecution. He maintains that the mandatory sentences outlined in § 844(h)(1) do not apply to separate counts of a single prosecution. Rather, he interprets § 844(h)(1) to provide for a single enhanced sentence regardless of the number of § 844(h)(1) 2 The district court also sentenced Darwich to two years of supervised release as to each count, to run concurrently; ordered $1,204,867.62 in restitution; and ordered the forfeiture of certain proceeds, none of which Darwich challenges. 4 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 convictions within a prosecution. He further argues that § 844(h)(1) permits district courts to determine whether the sentences for separate § 844(h)(1) convictions within a prosecution should run concurrently or consecutively to each other. The Government maintains that 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1) permits consecutive sentences for multiple § 844(h)(1) convictions that are part of a single case. The Government argues we need not reach the merits of this issue, however, because Darwich waived, or at least forfeited, his argument as to the statutory interpretation of § 844(h)(1). “In determining whether we have authority to consider an argument not raised below, we distinguish between ‘waiver’ and ‘forfeiture.’” United States v. Holland, 522 F. App’x 265, 272 (6th Cir. 2013). “‘Waiver’ is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Hall, 373 F. App’x 588, 591 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 2002). As such, “a basic failure to bring an issue to the district court’s attention does not create waiver. Rather, waiver requires some affirmative act that shows a party has willfully declined to assert a right.” Holland, 522 F. App’x at 272 (citation omitted). For example, it is well established that “the withdrawal of an objection would constitute a waiver.” Hall, 373 F. App’x at 592. “But we have never held that a defendant must make an objection, then withdraw it, before [a] point can be waived.” Id. Indeed, “‘[a]n attorney cannot agree in open court with a judge’s proposed course of conduct and then charge the court with error in following that course.’” Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d at 1088 (citation omitted); see also, Hall, 373 F. App’x at 592 (citing Aparco-Centeno); United States v. Smith, 749 F.3d 465, 494 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Aparco-Centeno); United States v. Turner, 436 F. App’x 582, 586 (6th 5 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 Cir. 2011) (citing Hall). Waived claims are not reviewable. Hall, 373 F. App’x at 592; AparcoCenteno, 280 F.3d at 1088. In contrast, “[f]orfeiture occurs when a party fails ‘to make the timely assertion of a right,’” and we review forfeited claims for plain error. United States v. Rodriguez, 544 F. App’x 630, 633 (6th Cir. 2013). The record confirms that Darwich waived his claim as to the statutory interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1). Although he listed “statutory construction” as one of his objections to the PSR’s application of § 844(h)(1), Darwich did not explain, develop, or even mention that objection in his sentencing memorandum, let alone raise the statutory interpretation argument he now advances on appeal. Rather, his sentencing memorandum focused only on his four constitutional objections. And in making those constitutional objections, Darwich explicitly stated that “[b]ased on the directive of the statute, it appears the Court must impose” a 130-year mandatory minimum sentence under § 844(h)(1). This conclusion represents an agreement with the PSR’s interpretation of § 844(h)(1). Darwich reiterated his constitutional objections at the sentencing hearing but again did not challenge the conclusion that the statute required a mandatory minimum sentence of 130 years.3 In fact, he explicitly conceded, through defense counsel, that the application of § 844(h)(1) to his case required a mandatory minimum sentence of 130 years. Indeed, in defending his separation of powers argument at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated, “[b]ut when we get to the fourth superseding indictment and Mr. Darwich, I think that the 3 When asked if he had any additional objections or concerns at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel responded that he did not and was only preserving his prior objections. 6 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 consensus between the Government, and the defense and the Probation Department at this point, is that the mandatory minimum before you even address the underlying felonies is 130 years.” We have previously found a defendant to have waived a claim under similar facts. In Hall, the defendant challenged the district court’s application of a sentencing enhancement pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act. 373 F. App’x at 591. Although the defendant’s counsel had previously reserved the right to dispute the enhancement at sentencing, he instead argued that the prosecutor should have exercised more prosecutorial discretion. In so arguing, the defendant’s counsel conceded the applicability of the enhancement and admitted that the defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum. We found this to constitute waiver of the defendant’s argument as to the sentencing enhancement. The defendant argued that he could waive his argument only by objecting to the enhancement and then making an actual, affirmative withdrawal of that objection. He maintained that his counsel merely failed to renew his objection when given the opportunity, rendering his claim forfeited rather than waived. Id. We rejected this argument, finding that by “acknowledg[ing] the accuracy of the court’s [enhancement] determination and reiterat[ing] the applicability of the statutory 15-year mandatory minimum at sentencing,” the defendant waived any claim that the enhancement should not apply. Id. Similarly, defense counsel’s statements in his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing in this case represent a concession in open court that the probation officer and the district court accurately interpreted § 844(h)(1) to impose a 130-year mandatory minimum sentence. By agreeing with the probation officer and the district court that § 844(h)(1) subjected 7 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 Darwich to a 130-year mandatory minimum, Darwich agreed to the interpretation of the statute that resulted in that 130-year sentence. As such, Darwich cannot now argue the court erred in applying the statute in accordance with that interpretation. See Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d at 1088 (finding the defendant waived his argument that his two prior felonies should not qualify as aggravated felonies for sentencing purposes where his counsel did not object to such a finding in the PSR and explicitly agreed in his sentencing memorandum with the PSR’s position); see also, Smith, 749 F.3d at 494–95 (finding the defendant waived his argument that the district court improperly excluded expert testimony where his counsel “unequivocally agreed” at trial that the witness was not considered an expert); United States v. Donovan, 539 F. App’x 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding the defendant waived his challenge to the district court’s failure to apply an offense-level reduction where the defendant agreed at sentencing that the reduction was inappropriate); Holland, 522 F. App’x at 272 (finding the defendant waived his theory that a search was conducted without consent where his counsel explicitly disavowed the theory at a suppression hearing and pursued other arguments as to the invalidity of the search)4; Turner, 436 F. App’x at 586 (finding waiver where defense counsel agreed with the Government’s position at the sentencing hearing); United States v. King, 430 F. App’x 514, 517 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding the defendant waived his challenge to the application of a sentencing enhancement where at sentencing the defendant withdrew his objection to the PSR’s application of the 4 We found that the defendant in Holland “unequivocally asserted a violation of his Fourth Amendment right,” but “explicitly disavowed the theory that the violation stemmed from entry into the apartment without consent.” Holland, 522 F. App’x at 272. Similarly, although Darwich unequivocally challenged the application of the 130-year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to § 844(h)(1), he conceded that such a challenge was not based on the PSR’s conclusion that the statute required such a sentence. 8 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 enhancement and expressly conceded its applicability); United States v. Ward, 506 F.3d 468, 477 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding waiver of argument that provision of sentencing guidelines is unconstitutionally vague where the defendant made the argument as an objection to the PSR but at the sentencing hearing and in a subsequent motion represented that all objections had been resolved except three other enumerated challenges); compare with, Rodriguez, 544 F. App’x at 634 (finding forfeiture where defense counsel withdrew his objection to certain testimony “without explicitly conceding admissibility”). In sum, Darwich has waived any argument that the district court improperly interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1) to require a 130-year mandatory minimum sentence in his case, and we are thus unable to review such a claim on appeal.5