Opinion ID: 1716174
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Few current problems have inspired more writing by eminent scholars than Conflict of Laws or as it is called by some writers Choice of law.

Text: The basic rules have been recognized in Iowa for many years. In Dorr Cattle Company v. Des Moines National Bank, 127 Iowa 153, 98 N.W. 918, decided in 1905 it was held that the right to sue for tort, the liability of the perpetrator, and the defenses that he may plead are with few exceptions governed by the law of the place, i. e. the lex loci delicti. (loc. cit. 161, 98 N.W. loc. cit. 922) Matters of procedure and the remedy to be applied are to be determined by the law of the forum. (loc. cit. 162, 98 N.W. loc. cit. 922) The authorities and conflicting rules were reviewed and the rule that damages are to be assessed according to the lex fori was approved. (loc. cit. 165, 98 N.W. loc. cit. 923) In Kingery v. Donnell, 222 Iowa 241, 245, 268 N.W. 617, 619 it is said: It is equally well settled that matters of procedure and matters pertaining to the remedy to be applied are to be determined by the law of the forum. The basic rule in most jurisdictions is stated in Restatement of the Law, Conflict of Laws, by American Law Institute, § 391 as follows: The law of the place of wrong governs the right of action for death. This rule creates no problem in the case at bar. If the basic elements i. e. actionable negligence, proximate cause and freedom from contributory negligence are established some one would have a cause of action against the defendant in either Minnesota or Iowa. The differences are in who has the right to sue and in the measure of damage in the respective jurisdictions. Section 394, Restatement, Conflict of Laws, says: If the death statute of the state of wrong designates a particular person as the one to sue upon the cause of action, such person may sue in any state. Assuming, but not deciding because the issue is not before us, that under this rule a trustee appointed under the provisions of section 573.02, Statutes of Minnesota, might bring an action in Iowa, there is no help therein for plaintiff. No one in the capacity of a trustee appointed in Minnesota is a party to the actions here. The only plaintiff we have here is an Iowa administrator appointed by an Iowa court and as such representing an Iowa estate. III. The traditional choice of law rule, embodied in the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws and followed in many jurisdictions, has been that the substantive rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are determinable by the law of the place of the tort. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279, 95 A.L.R.2d 1 (1963); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964), and authorities cited therein. This place of injury or lex loci delicti rule has been the subject of severe criticism in recent years. See authorities cited on page 801 of 203 A.2d, Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra. Although the same reasons are not stated it would appear that the Iowa rules expressed in the Dorr Cattle Company and Kingery cases, both supra, are with a few exceptions more nearly in accord with latest expressions on the subject. The trend toward an improvement of the traditional rule is noted in Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second, Tentative Draft No. 9, § 379, wherein the general principle is stated as follows: The General Principle. (1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort. (2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state of most significant relationship include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct occurred, (c) the domicil, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. (3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum will consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant purposes of the tort rules of the interested states. This rule recognizes the most significant relationship with the occurrence and parties and important contacts as more properly controlling than wooden application (an expression used by some writers) of the strict lex loci delicti rule. In the cases before us the most significant relationships are in Iowa and the important contacts are in Iowa. The accident happened in Minnesota and the question of actionable negligence depends on the law of Minnesota. Otherwise, the place of the accident is merely fortuitous. Minnesota has little, if any, interest in the present controversy. Minnesota has no conceivable interest in the remedy available to Iowa people against an Iowa defendant, in Iowa courts, arising because of acts tortious under both Minnesota and Iowa law. Minnesota would have an interest in the manner in which the cars were driven at the time of the accident but that is not the issue here. The parties are residents of Iowa. No one in Minnesota has the slightest interest in these cases. The parties have invoked the jurisdiction of the court in their home county and state. If there is recovery it will be by an Iowa plaintiff acting as an officer of the Iowa court for the benefit of Iowa people and from an Iowa defendant. The most recent judicial pronouncements coming to our attention that thoroughly examine the problem are Babcock v. Jackson, supra, decided by the Court of Appeals of New York in 1963 and Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on October 14, 1964. In the Babcock case plaintiff and defendant were residents of New York. Plaintiff was a guest in defendant's car. While driving in Ontario plaintiff was injured. An Ontario guest statute would have barred her recovery there. New York had no such bar to recovery. Plaintiff sued in New York. A motion to dismiss based on the lex loci delicti doctrine was sustained and on appeal reversed. The court reviewed the judicial authorities and the writings of eminent scholars and concluded with this statement: In conclusion, then, there is no reason why all issues arising out of a tort claim must be resolved by reference to the law of the same jurisdiction. Where the issue involves standards of conduct, it is more than likely that it is the law of the place of the tort which will be controlling but the disposition of other issues must turn, as does the issue of the standard of conduct itself, on the law of the jurisdiction which has the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue presented. In the Griffith case an executor sought recovery for the death of his decedent in an airplane crash in Colorado. Decedent, a Pennsylvania domiciliary, purchased a ticket for a flight from Philadelphia to Phoenix, Arizona and return. The plane crashed in Denver and decedent was killed. Under Colorado law recovery would have been small. Under Pennsylvania law recovery might be substantial. The crux of the litigation was in the differing measures of recovery. Under the Pennsylvania survival statute recovery could be for the present worth of decedent's likely earnings during his life expectancy diminished by the probable cost of maintenance for himself and family. The measure of damage is in many ways comparable to ours. Plaintiff brought an action in assumpsit in Pennsylvania alleging negligent breach of contract of carriage. The nature of the action (assumpsit) was challenged but the court said:    the recovery sought is clearly a tort recoverydamages to decedent's estate as a result of decedent's negligently caused death. The principles which will govern defendant's liability are principles of negligence, not of contract, since the action is for negligent breach, not simple breach, of contract.    The essentials of this case remain the same regardless of its label. Mere technicalities of pleading should not blind us to the true nature of the action. The choice of law will be the same whether the action is labeled trespass or assumpsit. (loc. cit. 800) The authorities from various jurisdictions, texts and articles on the subject were exhaustively reviewed. The court concluded that the Colorado limitation on recovery did not preclude recovery in Pennsylvania. The court said: Thus, after careful review and consideration of the leading authorities and cases, we are of the opinion that the strict lex loci delicti rule should be abandoned in Pennsylvania in favor of a more flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and interests underlying the particular issue before the court.    The state in which injury occurred, as such, has relatively little interest in the measure of damages to be recovered unless it can be said with reasonable certainty that defendant acted in reliance on that state's rule. Moreover, where the tort is unintentional, the reliance argument is almost totally untenable. (Citation) This is abundantly clear in the present case; the site of the accident was purely fortuitous. Ordinarily, the place of the injury may have an interest in the compensation of those who render medical aid and other assistance to the injured party. However, where death is immediate, as on the present facts, that state has no such interest.   Pennsylvania's interest in the amount of recovery, on the other hand, is great.    Our Commonwealth, the domicile of decedent and his family, is vitally concerned with the administration of decedent's estate and the well-being of the surviving dependents to the extent of granting full recovery, including expected earnings.    [T]he law of Pennsylvania is properly applicable to the issue of damages. (loc. cit. pp. 805, 806, 807) IV. We conclude that the better and more modern rule is that the determination as to the existence of actionable negligence is according to the law of the jurisdiction where the claimed tort occurred, in this instance, Minnesota. Questions as to who may maintain an action in Iowa, for whom, and the measure of damage are determined by the law of the forum, in this instance, Iowa. When an Iowa administrator brings an action in the Iowa courts for the benefit of Iowa people and against an Iowa defendant his standing, his methods of procedure and his measure of damage are according to Iowa law. To use the modern term he has made his choice of law and must abide thereby. The Iowa Guest Statute and the dissimilarity with Minnesota law in this particular is not involved in the case before us. As an Iowa administrator plaintiff has legal standing and capacity to sue in Iowa. He has pleaded causes of action maintainable in Iowa in behalf of decedents' estates. Recovery would be distributable according to the law of Iowa and the measure of damage is according to Iowa law. As an Iowa administrator he does not have the capacity or rights of a Minnesota trustee. V. Defendant in each case moved to dismiss and in the alternative to strike. Plaintiff's petitions were vulnerable to the motions to strike rather than to dismiss. The trial court overruled the motions to dismiss but the rulings, if any, on the motions to strike do not appear in the record before us. Plaintiff as administrator in Iowa is a proper party plaintiff to bring and maintain an action for the wrongful death of his decedents. The court had jurisdiction of the parties and jurisdiction to determine the liability of defendant and to whom and the amount thereof. Improper allegations as to whose benefit recovery would inure and pleading of unrecognized measures of damage were not fatal to plaintiff's right to stay in court. If the improper matters were stricken plaintiff, under the rules, should have a reasonable time within which to amend. Failure to amend and plead according to Iowa law would make the actions subject to dismissal. The orders of the trial court overruling the motions to dismiss are affirmed. The cases are remanded to the trial court for ruling on the motions to strike and such further proceedings as are in harmony herewith. Affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.