Opinion ID: 4527710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Trial and Postconviction Proceedings

Text: Kimbrough was charged by information with two counts of selling cocaine in violation of Florida law. His counsel filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210 to “determine [Kimbrough’s] competency.” Doc. 30-1 at 7.1 In the motion, counsel requested that the court hold a competency hearing to determine whether Kimbrough was competent to stand trial. Counsel stated that Kimbrough was unable to communicate and did not understand the charges against him, the possible punishment, or the role of his attorney and the criminal justice system. 1 “Doc. #” refers to the numbered entry on the district court’s docket. 2 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 3 of 20 The trial court docket shows no action taken on the competency motion. While the motion apparently was still pending, Kimbrough’s counsel withdrew from representation. The court then appointed public defender Andrew Reid to represent Kimbrough. Kimbrough pled guilty to both counts. The plea agreement recited that Kimbrough had discussed the charges with his counsel and was not suffering from any physical or mental disabilities that would make him incapable of understanding the agreement. At the plea hearing, Kimbrough testified that he had gone to school until the tenth grade and could read, write, speak, and understand the English language. He was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or alcohol, and he was thinking clearly. The court asked Kimbrough if he was “suffering from any mental condition . . . or anything else that would prevent [him] from being able to think well and make good decisions,” and after asking the court to repeat the question, he responded “no.” Doc. 30-1 at 74–75. After explaining the possible sentences, the court asked Kimbrough if he understood that he was giving up his right to have a trial, and Kimbrough said that he understood. He confirmed that he wanted to enter a plea and give up his right to a jury trial. He also confirmed that he had talked to Reid about his decision to plead guilty. The court then asked Kimbrough if he had any questions, and Kimbrough responded that he had “several questions.” Id. at 81. Kimbrough said, “I just want 3 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 4 of 20 to know what you—I mean, now that I’m taking this plea, so I know it’s pretty bad, Judge.” Id. The court responded that it could not give Kimbrough “any indication whatsoever about what sentence [he] might receive.” Id. The following exchange occurred: COURT: Do you have any other questions for me? KIMBROUGH: It’s kind of hard to say right this minute. COURT: Any other questions? Please talk up because you are being recorded. KIMBROUGH: Everything just happened so fast. I really didn’t have . . . COURT: Any other questions? KIMBROUGH: No, sir. COURT: You said everything has happened so fast. It seems to me that you’ve understood everything we’ve done here this morning. You told me that you’ve had enough time to talk to your attorney, that he’s answered all your questions, and you’re satisfied with his work. . . . KIMBROUGH: Sir, I’m ready to take this plea, sir. I’m ready to take this plea. COURT: You’re completely prepared, you’re completely advised, and you understand everything that is going on? KIMBROUGH: Yes, sir, I do. Id. at 82–83. Kimbrough pled guilty to Counts 1 and 2. The court accepted the guilty plea as freely and voluntarily given, finding that Kimbrough was “alert, competent[,] and intelligent.” Id. at 84. 4 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 5 of 20 The court sentenced Kimbrough to 16 years in prison. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, Kimbrough filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion. In the motion, Kimbrough argued that Reid was ineffective for, among other things, ignoring information about his mental state and failing to request a mental health evaluation. Kimbrough further asserted that Reid “misadvised [Kimbrough] that the mental health evaluation was vacated by the trial court,” when, in fact, the “motion for an evaluation was granted.” Doc. 30-4 at 74. Kimbrough argued that he was prejudiced by Reid’s deficient performance. In an amended Rule 3.850 motion, Kimbrough clarified that the “crux of this [ineffective assistance] claim is that [his] previous motion for a mental evaluation was granted[,] so [Reid] should have brought the issue to the attention of the court or requested on his own motion to have defendant complete a full mental health evaluation.” Id. at 96. The state postconviction court denied the original and amended Rule 3.850 motions. In addressing the ineffective assistance claim, the postconviction court noted that Kimbrough’s original defense counsel had filed a competency motion. The court explained that, after filing the motion, Kimbrough’s original counsel withdrew from the case, “so th[e] motion was never addressed by the [c]ourt.” Id. at 125. The court denied Kimbrough’s ineffective assistance claim, concluding that his argument that he was prejudiced by the lack of investigation into his 5 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 6 of 20 incompetency was speculative. Kimbrough appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) affirmed without a written opinion. Kimbrough then filed a pro se successive Rule 3.850 motion based on newly discovered evidence. He argued that he had “newly discovered evidence consisting of [the postconviction] court’s conclusion that the motion to determine [his] competency was never addressed.” Doc. 30-6 at 9. Kimbrough explained that he did not know that the trial court had never addressed the competency motion until the postconviction court, in its order denying his original and amended Rule 3.850 motions, stated that the competency motion “was never addressed.” Id. at 10. He alleged that, during his criminal proceedings, he had asked Reid about “the competency issue,” and Reid had told him that “a motion for a mental health evaluation was orally granted” but later “was vacated by the trial court.” Id. at 9–10. Kimbrough argued that, due to Reid’s misleading statements, he never knew that the trial court had, in fact, not addressed the competency motion. Id. at 11. He asserted that his discovery that the court had never ruled on the motion thus constituted new evidence. Based on this new evidence, Kimbrough raised two claims: (1) Reid’s false statement that the trial court had ruled on the motion constituted ineffective assistance; and (2) the trial court’s failure to consider his competency motion was a “clear violation of [his] due process rights not to be tried while incompetent.” Id. at 58. 6 Case: 18-10502 Date Filed: 04/22/2020 Page: 7 of 20 The postconviction court denied Kimbrough’s successive Rule 3.850 motion. The court concluded that Kimbrough’s discovery that his competency motion never was addressed by the trial court was not new evidence under Florida law. The court further determined that, under Florida law, Kimbrough waived his right to challenge the competency issue when he pled guilty. Kimbrough appealed, and the DCA affirmed without a written opinion.