Opinion ID: 158734
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rulings on Requested Sidebars and Objections

Text: 10 Mills next complains about the district court's refusal to conduct four requested sidebars, and he also contends that the court's announcement of an automatic no sidebar rule constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. 11 We review the district court's control of its trial proceedings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hanif, 1 F.3d 998, 1002 (10th Cir. 1993). Under this deferential standard, we will not overturn the district court's directions regarding the presentation of evidence absent a manifest injustice to the parties. Strickland Tower Maintenance, Inc. v. AT & T Communications, Inc., 128 F.3d 1422, 1430 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding no abuse of discretion in the court's decision to time-limit the presentation of evidence in the interest of judicial administration). 12 Notably, each of the four refusals to hold a sidebar which Mills criticizes relates to government requests following the court's overruling of government objections. Despite the fact that these rulings ostensibly favored his defense, Mills nonetheless contends that the court's actions actually caused a manifest injustice to him. Thus, he argues that the government's requests for sidebars, which contained references to prior in limine proceedings, suggested inadmissible evidence to the jury. In particular, Mills decries the possibility that the denied requests might have suggested his counsel was either incompetent or unethical. Given the court's favorable treatment vis vis Mills in these instances, we disagree. Additionally, we disagree with Mills' interpretation that one of the court's statements constituted an absolute bar to sidebars. 2 Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion to control the trial without needless consumption of time. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(a); Strickland Tower Maintenance, 128 F.3d at 1430. 13 Mills also claims the district court improperly overruled objections on four occasions. As to the two rulings which involve Mills' own objections, 3 the objections came immediately after the witness responded, and the court overruled both as untimely. 14 We will uphold the district court's rulings on properly made objections unless the court abused its discretion, and caused manifest injustice to the parties. Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 960 (10th Cir 1993) (quoting Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tel., Inc., 931 F.2d 655, 663 (10th Cir. 1991)). That is, under Fed. R. Evid. 103(a), [e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected. When objections are not timely made, we review only for plain error. See Angelo, 11 F.3d at 960. As a threshold matter, we note that our standard of review is governed by the determination of whether or not the objections were in fact timely. However, in this case, we would reach the same conclusion under either standard. Therefore, we assume, without deciding, that the objections were timely, and that they properly preserved the issue for appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. 15 Of the two defense objections, the first was a hearsay objection; the second appears to be based on a lack of foundation. In the first instance, the witness initially claimed that Mills had not made a certain statement directly to him. 4 Immediately after the court overruled Mills' hearsay objection, the government referred the witness to his earlier grand jury testimony. R. Vol. VIII at 431-32. According to the transcript of the grand jury proceedings, the witness had previously testified that Mills had told him the video made him look like he was bouncing on a trampoline. In response to the grand jury transcript, the witness admitted that he had told the truth in his grand jury testimony, and that his memory of the relevant conversations was probably better at the time of the earlier testimony. Id. at 433-34. Moreover, in subsequent redirect, defense counsel incorporated Mills' statement to the witness, again casting it as a direct rather than a hearsay statement. Id. at 457. Accordingly, as both the witness and defense counsel conceded that Mills made the statement directly to the witness, we find no error in the court's admitting it over Mills' hearsay objection. 16 Mills also complains that the court erred in overruling his objection to a question concerning a witness's knowledge as to whether the assault was videotaped. 5 Significantly, Mills' objection came after several questions and answers had fully established that the witness, as the senior correctional officer on the escort team, took personal responsibility to make sure that the Davis transfer was filmed. Id. at 404 (I motioned to [the junior officer] to make sure he filmed the event.). Additionally, the witness testified regarding his familiarity with the filming, including his having instructed the junior officer in operating the camera. Id. at 442. The witness also testified that he was involved in testing the camera and in making sure the battery they used was properly charged. Id. at 444. Furthermore, the witness's testimony regarding the assault clearly indicates that, to his knowledge, the camera was working, since even before the unit manager arrived, he twice advised Mills to cease hitting Davis, saying, Quit it, there's a camera, and Quit it, Mills, there's a damn camera up there. Id. at 439-41. Finally, the witness testified that Mills later informed him that the assault had been recorded, and that it showed Mills jumping on or kicking Davis. Id. at 453. Under the circumstances, the government had established a proper foundation for the witness's knowledge, and the evidence was therefore admissible.