Opinion ID: 2074839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Where a criminal conviction is challenged based on insufficient evidence, a reviewing court, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, must determine whether any rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime. A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Eyler, 133 Ill.2d 173, 191, 139 Ill.Dec. 756, 549 N.E.2d 268 (1989). Defendant views the State's case as depending on the testimony of Dye, whom defendant characterizes as a jailhouse informant and an experienced liar. Defendant argues that Dye's uncorroborated testimony should never be the basis for any conviction. Jailhouse informants are motivated by the desire to help themselves and are notoriously dishonest and unreliable witnesses. According to defendant, without Dye's testimony, the remainder of the State's case is testimony that the victim was going to meet defendant on the day the victim disappeared, and that the bullets found in defendant's storage locker were the same caliber of the fatal bullet, but had a different metal composition. Defendant argues that this evidence, taken as a whole, fails to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not the function of a reviewing court to retry a defendant when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Rather, it is the function of the jury to assess the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. People v. Tye, 141 Ill.2d 1, 13, 152 Ill.Dec. 249, 565 N.E.2d 931 (1990). Specifically, it is quite established that the credibility of a government informant, as with any other witness, is a question for the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 959 F.2d 1377, 1384-85 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir.1989); People v. Irby, 237 Ill.App.3d 38, 58-59, 177 Ill.Dec. 177, 602 N.E.2d 1349 (1992). The jury was aware of the factors that would allow it to adequately judge the credibility of Dye. Thus, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the jury. See People v. Carter, 168 Ill.App.3d 237, 243-44, 118 Ill. Dec. 983, 522 N.E.2d 653 (1988). Regarding defendant's insinuation that someone else murdered the victim, we note that speculation that another person might have committed the offense does not necessarily raise a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. People v. Herrett, 137 Ill.2d 195, 206, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1 (1990). We have reviewed the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution. We note that the evidence against defendant was not ample or overwhelming. However, we cannot say that the evidence was so improbable or unsatisfactory that no rational fact finder could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder and armed robbery.