Opinion ID: 2085191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lien Action

Text: [¶ 11] Finley argues that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding (1) the date Platz last performed architectural services; (2) the amount Platz claimed was due; and (3) Finley's knowledge of and consent to Platz's architectural services.
[¶ 12] The date on which Platz last performed services is a material fact here because many of the statutory provisions governing liens impose time limits. For example, a lien will be dissolved unless the person claiming the lien files a lien certificate in the office of the register of deeds within 90 days after ceasing to labor, furnish materials or perform services. 10 M.R.S. § 3253(1)(A) (2008). In addition, in order to preserve and enforce a lien already filed, an action must be filed with the Superior Court or District Court clerk... within 120 days after the last of the labor or services are performed. 10 M.R.S. § 3255(1) (2008). [¶ 13] Here, the lien certificate for the architectural services Platz provided was recorded on June 22, 2006, and the complaint to enforce the lien was filed on August 1, 2006. Platz's statement of material facts asserts that architectural services provided by Platz last occurred on April 6, 2006. [¶ 14] In support of its statement of material fact that April 6, 2006, was the last date on which it performed services, and in conformance with M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4), Platz cites to the affidavit of Bruce Allen. [5] In his affidavit, Allen states that he is the vice president of Platz Associates; he has under his custody and control records relating to the contractual transaction between Platz Associates and Solo Properties LLC; the records were made and kept in the ordinary course of business; and his statements are based on his personal knowledge of the transaction and from said records. Allen states further that the architectural services Platz provided began with the signing of the contract and continued through April 6, 2006. [¶ 15] Finley argues that apart from the Allen affidavit, there is no evidence that April 6, 2006, is the date Platz last provided services. [6] He qualifies Platz's statements of material fact by stating that April 6, 2006, is not the last day work or services were provided, but offers no evidence or documentation to support this statement. Rather, Finley cites to his own affidavit which states [u]pon information and belief, Platz Associates ceased doing any work on the 3 Mill Street property more than ninety (90) days prior to the filing of the mechanics lien against the 3 Mill Street, Lewiston, Maine property. [¶ 16] Summary judgment practice provides for the use of affidavits, but the affidavits must be made on personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. M.R. Civ. P. 56(e). Parties are permitted to rely on the affidavits of interested witnesses, including themselves, see Stanley v. Hancock County Comm'rs, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 19, 864 A.2d 169, 175, but only if the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. M.R. Civ. P. 56(e). [¶ 17] The affidavit used by Platz affirmatively shows that it is based on Allen's personal knowledge, and that Allen had personal knowledge of the date on which Platz last provided services. See Peoples Heritage Sav. Bank v. Pease, 2002 ME 82, ¶ 25, 797 A.2d 1270, 1277. The statement of material fact that April 6, 2006, was the last day services were provided is therefore properly supported. [¶ 18] In contrast, Finley's affidavit demonstrates that he is not competent to testify regarding the dates Platz provided services. Finley states that he did not request that work be completed, did not authorize such work, and had no knowledge of the work. He can only aver that upon information and belief Platz ceased doing any work on the property in question more than ninety days prior to the filing of the lien. Such a statement is not based on personal knowledge, and does not properly controvert Platz's statement of material fact on the issue. By failing to controvert that Platz last performed services on April 6, 2006, Finley has admitted this fact. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4); see also Stanley, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 18, 864 A.2d at 175. Thus, there is no genuine issue that the lien was filed within ninety days as required by 10 M.R.S. § 3253(1)(A), and that the enforcement action was filed within 120 days as required by 10 M.R.S. § 3255(1).
[¶ 19] Title 10 M.R.S. § 3254 (2008) provides that an inaccuracy in a lien statement will not invalidate the proceeding unless it appears that the person making it willfully claims more than his due. [¶ 20] Platz asserts that $149,165.95 represents the full and fair value of the services it provided to Solo. This statement is supported by Allen's affidavit, which cites to an attached exhibit calculating the previous balance, plus interest and termination expenses, as $149,165.95. [¶ 21] Finley denies this amount and states in his affidavit that he has been advised, and therefore verily believe[s], that the amount being claimed by Platz is excessive. Again, such a statement is not based on Finley's personal knowledge, and is not supported by an affidavit of someone with personal knowledge. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(e). Because Finley has not properly controverted Platz's statement on the amount owed, he has not generated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Platz willfully claimed more than was due.
[¶ 22] Title 10 M.R.S. § 3251 (2008) provides that [w]hoever performs... services as a surveyor, an architect or an engineer ... in erecting, altering, moving or repairing a house, building or appurtenances... by virtue of a contract with or by consent of the owner, has a lien thereon ... to secure payment thereof, with costs. [¶ 23] Because there is no contract between Platz and Finley, to establish a lien, Platz must demonstrate that Finley consented to the architectural services performed. We have interpreted consent, which is not defined in the Maine lien statutes, as requiring the subcontractor, or architect, as is the case here, to prove (1) knowledge on the part of the owner of the nature and extent of the work being performed on the premises, and (2) conduct on the part of the owner justifying the expectation and belief on the part of the subcontractor that the owner had consented. John W. Goodwin, Inc. v. Fox, 1999 ME 33, ¶ 15, 725 A.2d 541, 544. [¶ 24] Although Finley denies having knowledge of or consenting to Platz's architectural services, his failure to respond to Platz's request for admission establishes as fact that Finley knew about and consented to the work done by Platz. Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) provides that a party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission... of the truth on matters related to the pending action. The rule further provides that [s]ubject to the provisions of subdivision (b) of this rule, the matter is admitted unless ... the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by the party's attorney. M.R. Civ. P. 36(a) (emphasis added). Subdivision (b) states that [a]ny matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. M.R. Civ. P. 36(b). Thus, while the failure to answer or object to a request for admission can result in the admission of the statements contained therein, the error is not always fatal. A party can move to withdraw or amend an admission, and the court has discretion to permit such modifications. See Diversified Commc'ns, Inc. v. Godard, 549 A.2d 362, 363 (Me.1988). [¶ 25] According to the plain language of Rule 36, Finley's failure to respond to Platz's request for admissions, and his subsequent failure to move the court to amend or withdraw the default admissions conclusively established that Finley was aware of the Owner-Architect Agreement between Platz and Solo for the Mill Street property; Finley was aware of the nature and extent of the architectural services provided by this agreement and consented to these services; and that the services improved the Mill Street property. See M.R. Civ. P. 36(b); see also Psonak v. Roberts, 1999 ME 171, ¶ 4, 740 A.2d 590, 591 (affirming summary judgments when statements of material fact were based on unanswered requests for admissions); Comm'r of Human Servs. v. Waldoboro Water Co., 1999 ME 36, ¶ 12, 724 A.2d 622, 624 (same); Diversified Commc'ns, Inc., 549 A.2d at 363 (same). [¶ 26] Finley's unanswered request for admissions, Allen's affidavit, and Finley's failure to properly controvert Platz's statements of material fact establish that: the lien and enforcement action were timely filed; the amount claimed was not more than what was due; and Finley knew about and consented to Platz's services, thereby eliminating any genuine issue of material fact on these factors. Summary judgment in favor of Platz on its lien action was therefore proper.