Opinion ID: 1356731
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limitation of Evidence.

Text: Defendant further contends the trial court erred in limiting its introduction of certain proffered evidence. The evidence concerned the prior arrest and conviction of the plaintiff for shoplifting. On June 15, 1972, the plaintiff and one of her sons were detained by a local mercantile establishment for attempting to purchase an item of merchandise whose price tag had been tampered with. The plaintiff was subsequently arrested for the larceny theft of shoplifting. Concerning the arrest, Officer Gary W. Sessions reported: While in the process of booking Mrs. Terry (plaintiff) became hysterical and asked to get a handkerchief from her purse, at which time she swallowed several pills and capsules. I grabbed her, took her to the floor, called for assistance and began to remove the pills from her mouth, eight were removed, they were nytroglycerine, darvon and another unidentified type. The plaintiff was arraigned and entered, without the aid of counsel, a plea of guilty to the charged offense. [21] The defendant claims the trial court committed prejudicial error by not permitting the specific instances surrounding the prior conviction to come in substantively. The defendant argues since the essence of the plaintiff's claim is the present detention and arrest were the proximate cause of her depression, suicidal tendencies, consequent disability and damaged reputation, any evidence of prior trauma, suicide attempts or incidents involving her reputation is relevant and should be allowed to come before the jury. Although the relevancy of the proffered evidence is crucial, the probative value of the evidence, standing alone, does not determine its admissibility. Circumstantial evidence, although relevant, may nevertheless be excluded by reason of the general principle that the usefulness of the evidence is more than counter-balanced by its disadvantageous effects in confusing the issues before the jury, or in creating an undue prejudice in excess of its legitimate probative weight. [22] This principle has been codified in Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides: Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the Judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading a jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such evidence would be offered. It is generally conceded the trial court is more competent, in the exercise of this discretion, to judge the exigencies of a particular case and, therefore, when exercised within normal limits, the discretion should not be disturbed. [23] The general rule followed by this court is the judgment of the trial court will not be reversed unless it is shown that the discretion exercised therein has been abused. [24] The defendant wished to introduce evidence of the prior conviction and its surrounding facts as affecting the issue of damages. [25] However, evidence relating only to damages may properly be excluded because in the context of the trial its value on the issue of damages is outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the principal issue of liability. [26] Due to the similarity of the incidents and the substantial likelihood that the introduction of the former incident will confuse and mislead the jury, the trial judge should exercise every reasonable precaution to protect the party's rights. [27] The trial judge effectuated this protection by restricting the evidence admitted to the fact of the prior act and the identity of the party involved. [28] In his decision to exclude the substantive facts of the incident, the trial judge took into consideration the delay and confusion that would result from a re-trial of the prior conviction, [29] the remoteness of the prior act, [30] and the tendency the proffered evidence would have to mislead and prejudice the jury. [31] By considering these factors and basing his decision upon conclusions drawn from these considerations, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the evidence of the prior acts. When the trial judge weighs the matter and makes the determination, his ruling should be looked upon with indulgence and not disturbed unless it clearly appears that he abused his discretion. [32] We hold that the trial judge committed no error in limiting the introduction of this evidence.