Opinion ID: 1719983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: right to assist in presentation of defenses.

Text: Prior to trial, the defendant requested the right to participate as co-counsel in his defense, and this request was denied by the trial court. The defendant contends that he is constitutionally guaranteed the right to so participate in his defense. [11] The defendant first maintains that this right is guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the federal constitution. These amendments guarantee a criminal defendant the right to assistance of counsel, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 Sup. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed.2d 530 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 Sup. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed.2d 799 (1963), and the right, when he voluntarily and intelligently decides to do so, to proceed without counsel, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 Sup. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed.2d 562 (1975). The United States Supreme Court has never held, however, that the sixth amendment confers upon the accused a right to participate with counsel in his own defense. The Court's decision in the Faretta Case, the defendant argues, implies such a right by recognizing a defendant's right to conduct his own defense. However, the opinion does not mention or suggest any right to both conduct one's own defense and be represented by counsel. Those federal courts which have considered the question have uniformly determined that the federal constitution creates no right to participate as co-counsel. United States v. Wolfish, 525 Fed.2d 457 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 1059; United States v. Hill, 526 Fed.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425 U.S. 940; United States v. Conder, 423 Fed.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 958; United States v. Shea, 508 Fed.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 847; Duke v. United States, 255 Fed.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. den. 357 U.S. 920; United States v. Dellinger, 472 Fed.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 410 U.S. 970. The defendant's argument is also founded on art. I, sec. 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides in part that: . . . In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and by counsel; . . . Construing this language, this court has stated that: Every person sui juris, who is charged with crime, has the right to try his own case if he so desires. The constitution guarantees him the right to be heard `by himself' as well as by counsel. . . . (Emphasis added.) Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 479, 136 N.W. 166 (1912); cf. Bartozek v. State, 186 Wis. 644, 647, 203 N.W. 374 (1925); Browne v. State, 24 Wis.2d 491, 510, 511, 129 N.W.2d 175 (1964). The defendant suggests the conjunctive language of the constitution, reflected in Dietz v. State, supra , should be construed as recognizing an absolute right of the defendant to actively participate, with his counsel, in the trial of his case. This court has never endorsed such a construction. Significantly, neither have the courts of other states approved such a construction. The constitutions of twenty-six states contain provisions similar to art. I, sec. 7. Six others permit a defendant to defend by himself, or counsel, or both. [2] The great weight of judicial authority is to the effect that a defendant has no constitutional right to proceed to trial with counsel and to simultaneously actively conduct his own defense. See cases collected in: Annot. Right of defendant in criminal case to conduct defense in person, or to participate with counsel, 77 A.L.R.2d 1233, sec. 4, pp. 1241-1248, and later case service; 3 Wharton's Criminal Procedure (12th ed.) sec. 413, p. 121; and Comment, Self-Representation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 Cal. L. Rev. 1479, 1494-1497 (1971). The decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.2d 777, 336 Pac.2d 937 (1959), is representative. There the court said that: . . . despite the constitutional . . . and statutory . . . provisions that defendant has the right to appear and defend in person and with counsel, defendant is not entitled to have his case presented in court both by himself and by counsel acting at the same time or alternating at defendant's pleasure. . . . So long as defendant is represented by counsel at the trial, he has no right to be heard by himself. . . . People v. Mattson, supra, at 789. (Emphasis in original.) Similarly, in Moore v. People, 171 Colo. 338, 467 Pac. 2d 50, 54 (1970), the Colorado Supreme Court, interpreting a constitutional provision providing an accused the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, said: The defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right to be assisted and represented by counsel. He also has the constitutional right to defend himself providing that the trial judge shall find him competent to conduct his own defense. However, the language of our constitution cannot be interpreted to provide that the defendant can assert his right to be represented by counsel and at the same time actively conduct his own defense. . . . [12] Thus the courts are in substantial agreement that a defendant has no constitutional right to be actively represented in the courtroom both by counsel and by himself. [3] This rule recognizes that the conflicting interests of the accused and society involved in a criminal trial can be served only in an orderly proceeding. The trial judge must therefore have discretion to control the conduct of a trial to maintain dignity, decorum and orderly procedures; to avoid unnecessary delays; and to prevent the disruption of the judicial process by the accused's inept or disorderly self-representation. This approach reflects the fact that no right is more important to the accused and to society than the right to a fair, orderly trial. In the present case, after receiving the defendant's request to participate in his defense at trial, the trial court scheduled a hearing on the request. At the hearing, the trial court ruled that defense counsel alone would be permitted to examine and cross-examine witnesses, although the defendant would be allowed to sit with his attorney at the counsel table, to confer privately with his attorney and to make suggestions privately during the voir dire of the jury and the direct and cross-examination of witnesses. The court stated that this ruling was made, in the court's discretion, to best carry out the statutory purposes of sec. 906.11 (1), Stats.; [4] that interrogation by the defendant's counsel would be effective for the ascertainment of truth; and that by limiting the questioning to his lawyer, needless consumption of time would be avoided and witnesses would be protected from harassment or undue embarrassment. The defendant contends that the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion, apparently on the theory that the trial court was under a duty to affirmatively establish that the defendant wished to be represented by counsel before denying his request. This argument turns the trial court's duty upside-down. [13] There is a strong presumption against waiver of the right to counsel, Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723, 724, 68 Sup. Ct. 316, 92 L. Ed. 309 (1948); and this right may be relinquished only where a knowing and intelligent waiver is affirmatively shown. Faretta v. California, supra, at 835. In accepting such a waiver in Faretta, supra, at 835, the Supreme Court emphasized that Faretta was literate, competent and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will. The instant case, in contrast, is not one in which the defendant asserted the constitutional right to proceed without counsel; it was rather a case in which the defendant appealed to the discretion of the trial court for permission to be actively represented by both himself and counsel. [14] The denial of the request of the defendant to participate in his trial along with his trial counsel was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion under sec. 906.11 (1), Stats. We conclude our discussion of this issue with two observations. First, we do not view the situation in this case as comparable to that in which a party is represented by more than one counsel, and his lawyers wish to divide responsibility for examination and cross-examination of witnesses, with one lawyer assuming sole responsibility for each witness. The trial court may, in its discretion, permit such an arrangement. In the present case, however, the defendant asked to participate in the examination and cross examination of all witnesses. . . . Second, this is not a case where the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and elected to conduct his own defense. Therefore, the case presents no issues as to the defendant's right to standby counsel, nor as to the circumstances in which the trial court would have a discretionary right to appoint such counsel over a defendant's objection.