Opinion ID: 2570469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applying the Rothweiler Test

Text: ¶ 11 Jury eligibility focuses on the offense, not the defendant. See Strohson, 190 Ariz. at 125, 945 P.2d at 1256. On the record before us, we look to our Rothweiler decision for the application of the three-part test.
¶ 12 Benitez does not argue that driving on a DUI suspended license is comparable to crimes triable to a jury at common law. Clearly, the offense has no common law antecedent and is therefore not jury eligible as a common law criminal offense.
¶ 13 In accordance with Strohson, we assess severity of the penalty by looking to the potential jail time and fines set by the legislature. 190 Ariz. at 124, 945 P.2d at 1255. Because the offense, driving on a suspended driver's license, is designated a class one misdemeanor, we refer to the maximum imprisonment for a class one misdemeanor, six months, see A.R.S. § 13-707, and the maximum fine, $2500, see A.R.S. § 13-802(A). [2] Whether a defendant in fact receives the maximum sentences is immaterial; we look to potential penalties. As a general rule, the penalties attendant to misdemeanor offenses in this state are, of themselves, not enough to secure a jury trial. See State ex rel. Baumert v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 152, 155, 618 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1980) (maximum six-month sentence and $1000 fine in 1980 did not establish severe penalty for disorderly conduct); Spitz v. Municipal Court of Phoenix, 127 Ariz. 405, 408, 621 P.2d 911, 914 (1980) (liquor license suspension for selling liquor to minor not jury eligible where the penalty was less than six months and the maximum fine was $300 in 1980); O'Neill v. Mangum, 103 Ariz. 484, 485, 445 P.2d 843, 844 (1968) (maximum penalty of six months and $300 fine for drunk and disorderly conduct in 1968 insufficient for jury eligibility); see also Mungarro v. Riley, 170 Ariz. 589, 590, 826 P.2d 1215, 1216 (App.1991) (possible six-month prison sentence and $2500 fine did not make false reporting to a law officer jury eligible, though moral turpitude inherent in the offense justified jury trial). On the record before us, applying our own precedent, the penalties imposed on Benitez are insufficient to warrant trial by jury. The maximum fine and incarceration in a case of this nature simply do not rise to that level.
¶ 14 Moral quality as an element of the test is satisfied where the offense either involves moral turpitude or causes such an impact on the defendant's life or liberty as to constitute sufficiently grave consequences as a matter of law.
¶ 15 Acts of moral turpitude constitute behavior which is depraved and inherently base, O'Neill, 103 Ariz. at 485, 445 P.2d at 844, or actions which adversely reflect on one's honesty, integrity, or personal values. Dolny, 161 Ariz. at 300 n. 3, 778 P.2d at 1196 n. 3. Crimes of moral turpitude are necessarily jury eligible because the [d]amage to reputation, humiliation, and loss of dignity beyond that associated with all crimes brings moral turpitude crimes ... into the realm of serious cases. Id. at 300, 778 P.2d at 1196. ¶ 16 Such crimes include indecent exposure, see City Court of Tucson v. Lee, 16 Ariz.App. 449, 494 P.2d 54 (1972), solicitation of prostitution, see In re Koch, 181 Ariz. 352, 890 P.2d 1137 (1995), perjury, see Harris v. State, 41 Ariz. 311, 17 P.2d 1098 (1933), forgery, see id., fraud, see In re Wines, 135 Ariz. 203, 660 P.2d 454 (1983), and misappropriation of funds, see In re Couser, 122 Ariz. 500, 596 P.2d 26 (1979). ¶ 17 To recognize a right to jury verdict on such crimes is logically consistent with a moral misconduct label. A jury must reflect societal morality. The offense at bar, substantially less serious, does not offend societal morality in the manner of perjury, prostitution, fraud, or forgery. ¶ 18 Benitez nevertheless frames his offense as one of moral turpitude, arguing that someone who has been convicted of driving while intoxicated, and while under a suspension for that conduct, intentionally ignores the law and continues to drive invites moral condemnation. In support, he cites Frederickson v. Superior Court, 187 Ariz. 273, 928 P.2d 697 (App.1996). But Frederickson stands for the proposition that fleeing the scene of an accident is an offense of moral turpitude. Id. at 274, 928 P.2d at 698. Benitez claims his violation involves at least an equivalent moral infraction. We think he mischaracterizes Frederickson's act. Leaving the scene of an accident is a serious offense which places injured victims in jeopardy of further harm and evidences an intent to hide and evade the consequences of one's act. Frederickson found moral turpitude, not in the accident, but in the dishonesty which followedhis attempt to conceal identity and flee prosecution, neither of which is present here. See People v. Bautista, 217 Cal.App.3d 1, 265 Cal.Rptr. 661, 664-65 (1990); State v. Horton, 271 S.C. 413, 248 S.E.2d 263, 263-64 (1978). ¶ 19 Benitez' offense, in one sense, does question his honesty because he did something he was expressly required by law not to do. But this is true of virtually all criminal offenses, serious or minor. Accordingly, offenses similar in quality to driving on a suspended license have been found lacking moral turpitude. Such offenses include reckless driving, see State ex rel. Dean v. City Court of Tucson, 141 Ariz. 361, 687 P.2d 369 (App.1984), selling liquor to a minor, see Spitz, 127 Ariz. 405, 621 P.2d 911, operating without a contractor's license, see State v. Miller, 172 Ariz. 294, 836 P.2d 1004 (App. 1992), simple assault, see Goldman v. Kautz, 111 Ariz. 431, 531 P.2d 1138 (1975), simple assault designated as domestic violence, see Strohson, 190 Ariz. at 120, 945 P.2d at 1251, and disorderly conduct, see Baumert, 127 Ariz. 152, 618 P.2d 1078; O'Neill, 103 Ariz. 484, 445 P.2d 843. It may be said that each crime enumerated implicates the offender's personal values, but not necessarily his moral deficiencies. Moral turpitude is implicated when behavior is morally repugnant to society. It is not implicated when the offense merely involves poor judgment, lack of self-control, or disrespect for the law involving less serious crimes. ¶ 20 Even though driving on a suspended license for DUI does not reach the level of moral deficiency required for jury trial, the court of appeals reasoned that because DUI is jury eligible, other DUI-based offenses should also be eligible. But moral turpitude, inherent in DUI, is absent from the offense before us. The moral quality of Benitez' original drunk-driving conviction does not extend to a subsequent violation of the license suspension penalty. An offense meets or fails the requirements of jury eligibility on its own, not because of its association with another offense.
¶ 21 An offense not of moral turpitude may nevertheless be jury eligible, as explained in Dolny, depending on the severity of the consequences to the defendant's life. Benitez argues that driving on a DUI suspended license involves such grave consequences that a jury right must attach. Relying on Rothweiler, he repeats the contention that if simple DUI is jury eligible, then driving on a DUI suspended license which carries the same prison potential and fine, as well as a potentially longer license suspension, must certainly be jury eligible. He claims his potential license suspension carried a maximum of one year, or, four times the length of the 90-day suspension possible in Rothweiler. ¶ 22 The statute contradicts this argument. A violation of the suspended license statute requires a suspension for an additional like period, A.R.S. § 28-3473(D)(1), and thus could never result in a longer period of suspension. Nonetheless, though the license suspension faced by a defendant under section 28-3473(D)(1) may be the same length as that faced by Rothweiler, there are clear differences between the factors that make DUI jury eligible and a DUI suspended license violation ineligible. ¶ 23 In Rothweiler, we were concerned not just with the consequences of the license suspension, but with the moral implications of driving under the influence. Simply put, driving sober on a DUI suspended license does not reach the moral repugnancy nor deserve the consequences of a conviction for driving a vehicle while actually under the influence of alcohol. ¶ 24 The Supreme Court of Hawaii reached the same conclusion in State v. Wilson, 75 Haw. 68, 856 P.2d 1240 (1993). Hawaii's distinction between a DUI charge and a DUI suspended license violation is instructive. Though the jail term and fine available in Hawaii for a DUI suspended license conviction are less than those available under the Arizona statute, the potential license suspension period is the same. Confronted with Hawaii precedent holding DUI jury eligible, see State v. O'Brien, 68 Haw. 38, 704 P.2d 883 (1985), the Hawaii Supreme Court determined that driving on a DUI suspended license differed from the grave and therefore constitutionally serious offense of drunk driving. Wilson, 856 P.2d at 1244 (quoting O'Brien, 704 P.2d at 887). The court did not condone the actions of DUI-license suspension violators who refuse to abide by their punishment, [but could not] say that their continued driving is, in and of itself, as serious and tragic a problem as those who drive or continue to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Wilson, 856 P.2d at 1244. The court applied its O'Brien test and held that the offense did not warrant trial by jury. For the same reasons, we reach a similar conclusion. ¶ 25 Benitez further argues grave consequences by reason of the impact on his employment. He claims the loss of one's ability to drive would impact employment by denying transportation to and from work. Though an understandable argument, it leads nowhere because it renders the reason for the suspension immaterial. It would apply to any license suspension, whether the result of a DUI conviction or of any other vehicular offense. ¶ 26 This court does not recognize driving as a right. Instead we view it as a privilege. See State v. Harrison, 164 Ariz. 316, 318, 792 P.2d 779, 781 (App.1990) (The loss of a privilege is not nearly so serious or burdensome as the loss of a recognized right). We recognize that license suspension limits the job functions of those who must drive for a living, but we cannot base our analysis of jury eligibility on the effects of a conviction upon a particular occupation or field. Jury eligibility is determinable on the basis of the offense, not the defendant. When faced with consequences to the employment function, the courts must decide whether the effects are sufficiently widespread to create a grave offense with a jury right. Because we do not view the potential loss of the driving privilege as a grave or serious consequence, we hold today that the inability to get to and from work created by the suspension of one's license does not support a right to trial by jury.