Opinion ID: 2626354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Dodge's Statement Material?

Text: When Dodge made her false representation to the court on June 8, 2000, I.R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1) prohibited false statements only if they were material. I.R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1) (2000). [1] The rule at the time provided that [a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal. Id. This Court has defined the test for materiality as whether (a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it. Defendant A v. Idaho State Bar, 134 Idaho 338, 343, 2 P.3d 147, 152 (2000). In his testimony to the hearing committee, the magistrate stated he was not misled by Dodge's allegedly false statements, and the allegedly false portions of those statements did not influence his ruling to grant an arrest warrant with a $50,000 bond. Dodge argues that because the magistrate was not misled and her false representations did not form the basis of his decision, her comments were therefore immaterial. Contrary to Dodge's assertion, the magistrate's state of mind and the grounds he used in making his ruling are irrelevant to the question of materiality. As stated above, the test of materiality is whether (1) a reasonable man would attach importance to the statement, or (2) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient would regard the statement as important. Defendant A v. Idaho State Bar, 134 Idaho at 343, 2 P.3d at 152. Under neither option is any weight given to the state of mind of the recipient of the questioned statement  only the state of mind of the maker of the statement or of a reasonable man placed in the position of the recipient is relevant. In reaching its decision, the hearing committee chose not to determine whether a reasonable man would have attached importance to Dodge's alleged falsehood. Instead, the hearing committee simply noted that Dodge expected the magistrate might regard her statement about the shotgun incident as important, or otherwise she would not have brought the matter to the attention of the court. Indeed, without the allegation of pull[ing] a shotgun, the court had only the argument regarding Ford's Canadian citizenship and an unsubstantiated allegation the situation was becoming volatile to provide grounds for the large $50,000 bond. Because the hearing committee found that Dodge, the speaker, had reason to know that the magistrate, the recipient, might regard the statement as important, the test of materiality was met. As has been pointed out before, Dodge's intent was to try to get a felony warrant and a high bond against Ford at the probable cause hearing. The additional fact that Ford had pulled a shotgun on a law enforcement officer was very material to a high bond request. This Court affirms the hearing committee's finding as to the materiality of Dodge's falsehood.