Opinion ID: 1919001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting hinds county's motion for court expenses and attorney's fees.

Text: ¶ 25. The thrust of BellSouth's argument is based on the American Rule, which specifies that parties to litigation should pay their own attorney's fees. Thus, BellSouth cites to language from the comment to Miss. R. Civ. P. 54 and asserts that this Court has adopted Rule 54 as a general guideline for awarding attorney's fees. In reconciling the language of Rule 54 with Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), BellSouth asserts that while Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) allows an award of attorney's fees under certain circumstances, the rule is interpreted so as to work in conjunction with Rule 54. To this end, BellSouth argues that a defendant asking for an award of attorney's fees under Rule 41(a)(2) must demonstrate unfairness and plain legal prejudice, failing which the defendant must bear his own expense. ¶ 26. While BellSouth's interpretation of Miss. R. Civ. P. 54 accurately appraises the rule as a rule of general application, BellSouth misapprehends the fact that this is not a case of general application. This is a case governed directly by Miss. R. Civ. P 41(a)(2), which states in relevant part: Except as provided in Paragraph (a)(1) of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper ... Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice. Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). In clear terms, the language of the rule is designed to give a judge, on hearing a motion for voluntary dismissal, the authority to not just dismiss a case, but to dismiss a case in way which insures protection for the unwitting litigant. The comment to Rule 41(a)(2) expounds on this premise: The terms of conditions that may be imposed upon the granting of a motion for voluntary dismissal are for the protection of the defendant, although if one of several plaintiffs moves for dismissal conditions may be imposed for the protection of the remaining plaintiffs. The court may dismiss without conditions if they have not been shown to be necessary but should at the least require that the plaintiff pay the costs of litigation. In imposing conditions the court is not limited to taxable costs, but may require the plaintiff to compensate for all the expenses to which his adversary has been put; the court may require plaintiff to pay the defendant's attorney's fees as well as other costs and disbursements. Miss. R. Civ. P. 41 cmt. (emphasis added). ¶ 27. In Hughes Equipment Co. v. Fife, 482 So.2d 1144 (Miss.1986), a case cited by BellSouth, we delineated the proper boundary for the broad application and general construction found in Miss. R. Civ. P. 54. Echoing Professors Wright and Miller we stated: Absent a special statute or rule, or an exceptional exercise of judicial discretion, such items as attorney's fees, travel expenditures, and investigatory expenses will not qualify either as statutory fees or reimbursable costs. These expenses must be borne by the litigants. 10 Wright & Miller, supra § 2666. See also 6 Moore's Federal Practice §§ 54.01-.43 (1972). 482 So.2d at 1146 (emphasis added). Enter Rule 41(a)(2), which expressly authorizes the trial court judge to assign fees as justice requires. Importantly, when commenting on Rule 41(a)(2), Professors Wright and Miller readily embrace the discretionary capacity of the trial court to award fees upon voluntary dismissal: The more common practice ... is for the plaintiff to simply move for dismissal without mentioning conditions. The trial court then will specify on what conditions it will allow dismissal. If the conditions are too onerous, the plaintiff need not accept the dismissal on those terms ... In imposing conditions the trial court is not limited to ordering the payment of taxable costs, but may require the plaintiff to compensate for all of the expense to which the defendant has been put. 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2366 at 303, 304 (1994). ¶ 28. In its interpretation of Rule 41, BellSouth has misapprehended both Mississippi procedural and case law and has in essence confused the legal mandate which governs a grant of dismissal with the mandate which governs a court's ability to attach litigation expense and attorney's fees upon a grant of dismissal. Accordingly, BellSouth maintains that while voluntary dismissal was properly granted by the court, the assessment of attorney's fees was improper because voluntary dismissal was neither unfair nor prejudicial to the defendant. In Carter v. Clegg, 557 So.2d 1187 (Miss.1990), this Court examined both the purpose of the rule and the discretion conferred on the ruling trial court in assigning conditions: [T]he primary purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is to prevent voluntary dismissal which unfairly affects the other side and to permit the imposition of curative conditions... dismissals generally should be allowed unless the defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of another lawsuit. Moreover, dismissals should be allowed even when resulting in some tactical advantage for the plaintiff. Accord Phillips v. Illinois Central Gulf RR, 874 F.2d 984, 986 (5th Cir.1989); LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir.1976). Carter, 557 So.2d at 1190. Importantly, in Carter we discerned the standard for preventing the voluntary dismissal of an action and iterated that if voluntary dismissal would result in prejudice to the defendant, then in order to assure fairness and protection the case would not be dismissed under Rule 41(a). Id. This standard has nothing to do with the trial court's discretionary capacity to assess court costs and attorneys fees as a condition of dismissal. Moreover, while the trial court must verify the fee award is reasonable, it is free to assign curative conditions. ¶ 29. Here, the circuit court judge properly assessed attorney's fees as a curative condition to the plaintiff's motion to dismiss under Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The circuit court judge clearly found that the length of the litigation and the amount of documents produced, examined and reviewed more than warranted the imposition of a curative condition. The issue of prejudice to the defendant never arose in this case as both parties acquiesced to the voluntary dismissal. Accordingly, the dual considerations undertaken by a trial court judge when considering voluntary dismissal was thus made singular and the sole consideration facing the circuit court was whether to award attorney's fees or to have the parties bear the burden of their own expenses. In making this ultimate determination, the circuit court judge cited the reasons listed above and, well within the boundaries of this Court's precedent, found that pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41, Hinds County is entitled to attorneys fees and expenses. For these reasons, we find BellSouth's argument that an award of attorney's fees was inappropriately granted is without merit.