Opinion ID: 4520100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Importation Guideline Enhancement

Text: Silva also argues that the district court erred at sentencing when it applied an enhancement because the offense involved the importation of methamphetamine. “The burden of establishing evidence of the facts necessary to support a sentencing enhancement falls on the government, and it must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Perez-Oilveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 (11th Cir. 2007). The district court must ensure that the government carries this burden by finding a sufficient basis for the requested enhancement. Id. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement to a defendant’s offense level when “the offense involved the importation of amphetamine or methamphetamine or the manufacture of amphetamine or methamphetamine from listed chemicals that the defendant knew were imported unlawfully.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5). We previously addressed the scope of this enhancement in Perez-Oliveros. In Perez-Oliveros, the defendant was apprehended while driving a truck loaded with methamphetamine that recently had crossed the Mexican border. 479 F.3d at 781. On appeal, the defendant argued 13 Case: 18-13102 Date Filed: 03/27/2020 Page: 14 of 19 that because he personally did not drive the truck over the border, he could not be subject to the importation enhancement. 3 Id. at 784. We rejected the argument that the importation enhancement applied “to only those defendants who themselves transport methamphetamine across the border.” Id. at 784. We reasoned that the enhancement was not limited to individuals who personally transported methamphetamine because the Sentencing Commission used the “more inclusive language ‘involved the importation,’” even though it could have used the more restrictive language it used in a different subsection. Id.; compare U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5) (applying a two-level enhancement if the offense “involve[s] the importation of . . . methamphetamine”), with U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(3) (applying an enhancement “[i]f the defendant unlawfully imported or exported a controlled substance”). Silva acknowledges that the importation enhancement applies if the methamphetamine was imported from Mexico, even if he did not personally transport it across the border. But he argues that the district court erroneously imposed the enhancement because the evidence did not establish that the methamphetamine was imported from Mexico. He also asserts that his case is factually distinguishable from Perez-Oliveros because he was incarcerated during 3 At the time that we decided Perez-Oliveros, this enhancement appeared at U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(4). 14 Case: 18-13102 Date Filed: 03/27/2020 Page: 15 of 19 the drug deals involved in the instant case, whereas Perez-Oliveros had personally driven the drug-laden truck. We disagree and conclude that the district court’s application of § 2D1.1(b)(5) was appropriate. Although Silva was in prison during the drug deals, the record contains significant evidence linking him to ongoing methamphetamine operations in Mexico. Specifically, the evidence showed that Silva discussed drug deals—which took place in the United States—with Pollo, who was located in Mexico and in a cartel. Additionally, Silva told one associate that Pollo was his drug supplier. In light of that evidence, it was not clear error for the district court to conclude that the methamphetamine that was the subject of the drug deals came from Mexico. See Matos-Rodriguez, 188 F.3d at 1309. Alternatively, Silva argues that “it cannot be determined whether the district court made a factual finding beyond that the offense involved meth imported from Mexico.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. But under Perez-Oliveros, all the court was required to determine was that the offense “involved” the importation of methamphetamine. See Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d at 784. Regarding the importation enhancement, the district court noted that it had read the sentencing memoranda, heard argument from the parties, and admitted evidence showing that Silva communicated with Pollo, who was in Mexico, about the drug deals. Thus, 15 Case: 18-13102 Date Filed: 03/27/2020 Page: 16 of 19 there was a sufficient factual basis for the court to conclude that the enhancement was appropriate. See Askew, 193 F.3d at 1183. We affirm on this ground.4 C. Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness of Total Sentence Finally, Silva challenges his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first consider whether the district court committed any significant procedural error. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if a district court commits an error “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, . . . failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . .” Id. 5 Procedural reasonableness does not require that a court recite or discuss each of the 4 In Perez-Oliveros, we “decline[d] to define the exact contours of what it means for an offense” to involve the importation of methamphetamine. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d at 784. Although the outer boundaries of the enhancement’s applicability are unclear, we conclude that Silva had the “requisite level of involvement” in the drug deals to support the enhancement because the evidence showed that he worked directly with a cartel member in Mexico to bring into the United States methamphetamine that he then distributed. Id. 5 Under § 3553(a), the district court is required to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These purposes include the need to: reflect the seriousness of the offense; promote respect for the law; provide just punishment; deter criminal conduct; protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct; and effectively provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). 16 Case: 18-13102 Date Filed: 03/27/2020 Page: 17 of 19 § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2006). When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, we examine the totality of the circumstances, including “whether the statutory factors in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). “We will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the judge accorded to a given factor under § 3553(a), as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We may vacate a sentence only if we firmly believe that the district court “committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted). We may not set aside a sentence “merely because we would have decided that another one is more appropriate.” Id. at 1191. We apply no presumption of reasonableness to sentences within the Guidelines range, but we ordinarily expect such sentences to be reasonable. United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing it is unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d. 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). 17 Case: 18-13102 Date Filed: 03/27/2020 Page: 18 of 19 The district court imposed no procedurally or substantively unreasonable sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 41. Beyond arguing that the importation enhancement was improper, Silva has not asserted that the court miscalculated the Guidelines range. Nor has he argued that the court neglected to consider the § 3553(a) factors, based the total sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or failed to explain its sentencing decision. Rather, Silva argues that his total sentence was not “proportionate to the crime for which [he was] convicted,” as his case did not involve a “major drug conspiracy.” Appellant’s Br. at 27–28. That argument is refuted by the record, which shows that Silva (1) committed the offenses while he was incarcerated for another drug trafficking crime and (2) coordinated with multiple associates to organize the distribution of over 65 kilograms of methamphetamine. Notably, the court imposed a total sentence below the Guidelines range of life plus 60 months. See Stanley, 739 F.3d at 656. Thus, Silva’s total sentence was within the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case, especially considering the scope of the drug conspiracy, the quantity of methamphetamine involved, and his criminal history. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. We therefore conclude that Silva has not met his burden of showing that his total sentence was unreasonable. See Tome, 611 F.3d. at 1378. Accordingly, we affirm his 420-month total sentence. 18 Case: 18-13102 Date Filed: 03/27/2020 Page: 19 of 19