Opinion ID: 2188622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: count ii(a)

Text: This count, on which the committee divided, also arose out of respondent's representation of Katrina Yurenka. In June 1987, the Washington Superior Court issued a temporary order giving temporary custody of the child to Ms. Yurenka, but awarded the father visitation each weekend and set the final hearing for July 14, 1987. On July 7, 1987, Ms. Yurenka became concerned that the father had sexually abused the child. She went to the Washington Superior Court seeking a relief-from-abuse order to prevent further contact between the child and the father. By chance, she met respondent at the court, and he helped her prepare the proper paperwork. The relief-from-abuse petition was filed on July 10th, and the attorney for the father of the child was notified of the filing. The court decided to consolidate it with the hearing on permanent custody to be held on the following Tuesday, July 14, 1987. On learning that the matter would not be heard until after the weekend, respondent and Ms. Yurenka conferred on what to do about the father's right to visitation over the weekend. Respondent told Ms. Yurenka that he could not advise her to violate the outstanding visitation order. Nevertheless, he told her that he did not think the judge would hold it against her if she denied visitation. He informed her that it was his guess that ... [the judge] did not expect her to permit ... [the father] to exercise his parent-child contact for the coming weekend. To avoid a confrontation, he advised her not to be at home if she decided to withhold visitation. Respondent thought that his client would not allow visitation that weekend, and his expectation proved correct. The majority of the committee found that respondent was properly sympathetic to his client's concerns and was honest with her. It noted that he failed to discourage her from violating the order, adding his failure... was not blunted by his self-serving disclaimer that he could not counsel a violation of the order. The committee concluded that respondent did not violate DR 7-106(A) (a lawyer shall not advise a client to disregard a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but may take steps in good faith to challenge the validity of the ruling) because of the jeopardy his client perceived in granting visitation, the inability to place the matter before the court prior to the weekend visit, the loss of only one weekend visit, and the short time prior to the court hearing. The committee also concluded that similar situations arose often in family practice and many attorneys choose to assure the safety of the child over the sanctity of the court order. The chairman of the committee dissented, concluding that the failure of respondent to advise Ms. Yurenka that she was legally obligated to comply with the court order effectively guaranteed that she would violate the order. He rejected the application of a different standard for family law practitioners and concluded the conduct violated DR 7-106(A) as well as DR 1-102(A)(5) and (A)(7). The Attorney General argues that the committee's conclusion is inconsistent with its findings and should be reversed. Respondent urges that we uphold the conclusion on the basis that the evidence shows he did not advise his client to disregard the court's order. See DR 7-106(A). We first emphasize the proper standard for our review. The committee was the trier of fact and it was for the committee to determine the weight of the evidence and the persuasive effect of the testimony. In re Wright, 131 Vt. 473, 490, 310 A.2d 1, 10 (1973). The committee's findings must be upheld if they are clearly and reasonably supported by the evidence. Id. The committee had to decide as a factual matter whether respondent advised Ms. Yurenka to violate the visitation order of the court. Often this determination is difficult because the precise words used may not reflect fully the message conveyed. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey found in a case where a lawyer told a client how he could skip bail: To the extent that respondent did not intend his remarks to constitute advice to a client, it nevertheless had all of the indicia of improper counselling. His communication is one that reasonably could be understood to convey improper advice. In re Mintz, 101 N.J. 527, 535, 503 A.2d 290, 295 (1986). See also Committee on Professional Ethics v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298, 307 (Iowa 1976) (respondent's participation in successful effort to frustrate a custody order is circumstantial evidence that he counseled the client to disobey the order). We read the findings of the majority of the committee as resolving the fact question against respondent. The committee did not adopt the theory that respondent technically complied with DR 7-106(A) because he did not advise the client to violate the order. Indeed, this theory was specifically rejected with a finding that respondent's failure was not blunted by his self-serving disclaimer that he could not counsel a violation of the order. It is inconsistent with the committee's conclusions that respondent expected Ms. Yurenka to violate the visitation order and counseled her to be away from her house if she violated the order. We are left, then, with the committee's conclusion that respondent's conduct was justified by the danger present to the child, the short duration of the violation, and the inability to obtain other relief. While we agree that these factors should mitigate any sanction imposed, we see nothing in the Code of Professional Responsibility that permits respondent's conduct. See In re Goodrich, 111 Vt. 156, 159-60, 11 A.2d 325, 326 (1940) (ignorance of ethical requirements does not excuse misconduct but operates to mitigate its seriousness). All of the facts here presented had been placed before the superior court in Ms. Yurenka's request for relief from abuse, and that court refused to act to change the outstanding custody and visitation order to suspend the father's visitation until the hearing on the permanent order. Respondent's obligation was to trust in the efficacy of the legal system to resolve the custody and visitation dispute, and counsel the client accordingly. Florida Bar v. Wishart, 543 So.2d 1250, 1252-53 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044, 110 S.Ct. 839, 107 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990). We do not agree that this obligation is different for attorneys handling family matters. See A. Haralambie, Handling Child Custody Cases § 9.23, at 135 (1983) (Clients should always be counseled to work within the proper legal procedures in obtaining custody and visitation, without resorting to self-help.). Indeed, the need is greater in family matters where the emotional commitment of the parties to the rightness and justice of their cause may lead to the use of self-help, which undercuts the ability of the courts to resolve disputes in a meaningful or effective manner. Based on the committee's findings of fact, we conclude that the Attorney General demonstrated ethical misconduct as alleged in Count II(A) of the presentment. We find that in connection with his representation of Ms. Yurenka, respondent violated DR 7-106(A), his conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5), and adversely reflected on his fitness to practice in violation of DR 1-102(A)(7).