Opinion ID: 2621310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Nevada law and application of Ring to this case

Text: The rule announced in Ring applies here. We recognize that because Ring dealt with conflicting prior authority and expressly overruled precedent, it established a new rule of criminal procedure. And Ring was decided after Johnson's trial. Nevertheless, the rule applies in this case because Johnson's conviction has not yet become final: we have yet to decide his appeal. [31] The Supreme Court has held that failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication. [32] NRS 175.556(1) provides that when a jury in a capital case cannot reach a unanimous verdict upon the sentence, a panel of three district judges shall conduct the required penalty hearing to determine the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and give sentence accordingly. We conclude that under Ring this provision violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it allows a panel of judges, without a jury, to find aggravating circumstances necessary for imposition of the death penalty. [33] Moreover, Nevada statutory law requires two distinct findings to render a defendant death-eligible: The jury or the panel of judges may impose a sentence of death only if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found. [34] This second finding regarding mitigating circumstances is necessary to authorize the death penalty in Nevada, and we conclude that it is in part a factual determination, not merely discretionary weighing. So even though Ring expressly abstained from ruling on any Sixth Amendment claim with respect to mitigating circumstances, [35] we conclude that Ring requires a jury to make this finding as well: If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that factno matter how the State labels itmust be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. [36] We therefore must reject the State's argument that because the facts necessary for imposing the death penalty were inherent in the jury's guilty verdicts, the sentencing determination by the three-judge panel was harmless error. [37] Even if the guilty verdicts necessarily entailed the jury's finding of the two aggravators found by the three-judge panel, the guilt-phase verdicts did not and could not entail the required consideration of mitigating evidence. That evidence and that consideration were not presented to the jury until the penalty phase. And the facts from the first penalty hearing do not establish harmless error either. The accuracy of the penalty-phase special verdict forms was not verified when the jury was dismissed, but the forms indicate that the jurors found the two aggravating circumstances found by the panel and a number of mitigating circumstances. But even assuming arguendo that we could rely on these forms as proof of the jurors' findings, there is no verdict form or other evidence showing that the jurors unanimously agreed that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, making Johnson eligible for death. We do know that at least one juror in this case did not agree that death was the proper sentence. Therefore, we cannot declare that the constitutional error that occurred was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson stresses that when a jury deadlocks in a capital penalty phase, Nevada statutes provide for only one sentencing procedure and that one procedure is now unconstitutional. He argues therefore that after vacating his death sentences, this court cannot create another sentencing procedure ad hoc and must simply impose a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole under NRS 177.055(3)(c). This argument is meritless. When this court vacates a death sentence and the original penalty hearing was before a jury, NRS 177.055(3) provides two options: this court can either remand the case for a new penalty hearing before a newly empaneled jury or impose a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole. If we choose the first option and remand for a new penalty hearing, we need not invent any ad hoc proceduresthe normal procedures for a death penalty hearing before a jury apply. We therefore vacate Johnson's death sentences and remand for a new penalty hearing before a new jury.