Opinion ID: 852325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Effect of the Statute is Punitive

Text: In assessing a statute's effects we are guided by seven factors that are weighed against each other: [1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 379 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963)) (alterations in original). No one factor is determinative. [O]ur task is not simply to count the factors on each side, but to weigh them. Id. (quoting State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (1992)). We address each factor in turn.
When determining whether a law subjects those within its purview to an affirmative disability or restraint, Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168, 83 S.Ct. 554, the Court inquires how the effects of the Act are felt by those subject to it. If the disability or restraint is minor and indirect, its effects are unlikely to be punitive. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99-100, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). The disability or restraint imposed by the residency restriction statute is neither minor nor indirect. Specifically, Pollard is not allowed to live in a house he owns and in which he has resided for approximately 20 years. And, according to Pollard, the statute would require him to incur the cost of obtaining other housing and relocating his residence. Appellee's Br. at 3. In addition, we observe that the statute prevents a sex offender from living in his or her own home even if the offender purchased the home before the law took effect or if a school or youth program center moved within 1,000 feet of the offender's home after the offender established residency there. This is a substantial housing disadvantage. Although the statute does not affect ownership of property, it does affect one's freedom to live on one's own property. A sex offender is subject to constant eviction because there is no way for him or her to find a permanent home in that there are no guarantees a school or youth program center will not open within 1,000 feet of any given location. We are persuaded the first Mendoza-Martinez factor clearly favors treating the effects of the Act as punitive when applied to Pollard.
We next determine whether [the sanction] has historically been regarded as a punishment. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168, 83 S.Ct. 554. Restricting a person from living in certain areas is not a sanction that historically has been considered punishment. Jurisdictions addressing this aspect of the Mendoza-Martinez test, have drawn an analogy to the historical punishment of banishment [5] and have concluded that their residency statutes are not sufficiently similar to this historical punishment. See, e.g., People v. Leroy, 357 Ill.App.3d 530, 293 Ill.Dec. 459, 828 N.E.2d 769, 780-81 (2005) (Put simply, the restrictions placed on the defendant by [the residency statute] in no way resemble the historical punishment of banishment....); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 667-68 (Iowa 2005) (finding Iowa's residency statute was far removed from the traditional concept of banishment because it restricted only residence, allowing offenders to freely engage in most community activities). However, we have determined the fact that the Act's reporting provisions are comparable to supervised probation or parole standing alone supports a conclusion that the second Mendoza-Martinez factor favors treating the effects of the Act as punitive when applied in this case. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 380-81. In like fashion, restrictions on living in certain areas is not an uncommon condition of probation or parole. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 11-13-3-4(g)(2)(B) (providing that the parole board shall, as a condition of parole, prohibit a parolee who is a sex offender from residing within one thousand (1,000) feet of school property ... for the period of parole, unless the sex offender obtains written approval from the parole board); Ind.Code § 35-38-2-2.2 (providing that as a condition of probation for a sex offender the court shall prohibit the sex offender from residing within one thousand (1,000) feet of school property... unless the sex offender obtains written approval from the court); Fitzgerald v. State, 805 N.E.2d 857, 867 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004) (observing that [c]onditions of probation which reduce the potential for access to potential victims are reasonable). We conclude this factor also favors treating the effects of the statute as punitive when applied to Pollard.
Third, we consider whether [the statute] comes into play only on a finding of scienter.  Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168, 83 S.Ct. 554. The existence of a scienter requirement is customarily an important element in distinguishing criminal from civil statutes. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 381 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997)). If a sanction is not linked to a showing of mens rea, it is less likely to be intended as punishment. The residency restriction statute applies to offenders found to be sexually violent predators or offenders convicted of either child molesting, child exploitation, child solicitation, child seduction, kidnapping, attempt or conspiracy to commit one of these offenses, or an offense in another jurisdiction substantially similar to one of these offenses. Ind.Code § 35-42-4-11. With the exception of child molesting, the underlying offenses that invoke this statute all require a finding of scienter. [6] At first blush it would thus appear this factor favors treating the effects of the residency restriction statute as punitive when applied to Pollard. However, nothing in the record mentions the offense for which Pollard was convicted. If indeed the offense were child molesting, then this factor would not be punitive as to Pollard. In the absence of evidence one way or the other on this point, we must treat the effects of the statute as non-punitive.
We next ask whether [the statute's] operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168, 83 S.Ct. 554. The underlying assumption is that if the statute promotes the traditional aims of punishment, the statute is more likely punitive than regulatory. As we have observed, although the Mendoza-Martinez test focuses on retribution and deterrence, under [the Indiana] Constitution, the primary objective of punishment is rehabilitation. `The penal code shall be founded on principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.' [7] Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 381 (quoting Ind. Const. art. I, § 18). In any event [t]here is no question that the [overall] Act's deterrent effect is substantial. ... Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 393 (Ind.2009). By prohibiting sex offenders from living in certain proscribed areas the residency restriction statute is apparently designed to reduce the likelihood of future crimes by depriving the offender of the opportunity to commit those crimes. In this sense the statute is an even more direct deterrent to sex offenders than the Act's registration and notification regime. We conclude this factor favors treating the effects of the residency statute as punitive when applied to Pollard.
Under the fifth factor we consider whether the behavior to which [the statute] applies is already a crime. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168, 83 S.Ct. 554. The fact that a statute applies only to behavior that is already and exclusively criminal supports a conclusion that its effects are punitive. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 381. There is no question that it is the determination of guilt for a qualifying offense that exposed Pollard to further criminal liability under the residency restriction statute. We conclude this factor favors treating the effects of the residency statute as punitive when applied to Pollard.
We next ask whether, in the words of the Supreme Court, an alternative purpose to which [the statute] may rationally be connected is assignable for it. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554. This statement is best translated as an inquiry into whether the Act advances a legitimate, regulatory purpose. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 382-83. There is no doubt that the residency restriction statute has a purpose other than simply to punish sex offenders. As we have observed, the overall Act advances a legitimate purpose of public safety. Id. at 383. It is certainly reasonable to conclude that restricting sex offenders from residing within one thousand feet of school property, a youth program, or a public park also advances public safety. We thus conclude that the sixth Mendoza-Martinez factor favors treating the effects of the Act as non-punitive when applied to Pollard.
Finally we determine whether [the statute] appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169, 83 S.Ct. 554. We give this factor the greatest weight. See Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 383-84. Although denominated as applying only to offender[s] against children, the residency restriction statute is actually much broader. In addition to applying to offenders convicted of five discrete crimes against children: child molesting, child exploitation, child solicitation, child seduction, and kidnapping where the victim is less than eighteen years of age, the statute also applies to an offender found to be a sexually violent predator under IC XX-XX-X-X.5 In relevant part Ind.Code § 35-38-1-7.5 defines a sexually violent predator as a person who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the individual likely to repeatedly commit a sex offense (as defined in IC 11-8-8-5.2). In turn Ind.Code § 11-8-8-5.2 defines sex offense as meaning an offense listed in section 4.5(a) [Ind.Code § 11-8-8-4.5(a) ] of this chapter. Section 4.5(a) lists seventeen (17) specific offenses that qualify a convicted person as a sex offender, including: rape, criminal deviate conduct, vicarious sexual gratification, incest, sexual battery, and promoting prostitution. [8] Although there is a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose  public safety and protection of children  the residency restriction statute applies equally to persons convicted for example of vicarious sexual gratification as a Class D felony in violation of Ind.Code § 35-42-4-5(a) as to persons convicted of rape as a Class A felony in violation of Ind.Code § 35-42-4-1(b). The statute does not consider the seriousness of the crime, the relationship between the victim and the offender, or an initial determination of the risk of re-offending. See, e.g., Weems v. Little Rock Police Dept., 453 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting particularized risk assessment of sex offenders ... increases the likelihood that the residency restriction is not excessive in relation to the rational purpose of minimizing the risk of sex crimes against minors). Restricting the residence of offenders based on conduct that may have nothing to do with crimes against children, and without considering whether a particular offender is a danger to the general public, the statute exceeds its non-punitive purposes. We are persuaded this factor favors treating the effects of the statute as punitive when applied to Pollard. In summary, of the seven factors identified by Mendoza-Martinez as relevant to the inquiry of whether a statute has a punitive effect, only two factors  finding of scienter and advancing a non-punitive interest  point in favor of treating the effects of the Act as non-punitive. The remaining factors, particularly the factor of excessiveness, point in the other direction.