Opinion ID: 2277764
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: role of expert testimony in cases raising the defense of lack of criminal responsibility

Text: We believe the trial justice incorrectly interpreted our decision in State v. Johnson . Johnson attempted to carefully delineate the role of expert testimony in cases in which the defendant raises the defense of lack of criminal responsibility. We explained the role of expert opinion as follows: Ideally, psychiatrists  much like experts in other fields  should provide grist for the legal mill, should furnish the raw data upon which the legal judgment is based. It is the psychiatrist who informs as to the mental state of the accused  his characteristics, his potentialities, his capabilities. But once this information is disclosed, it is society as a whole, represented by judge or jury, which decides whether a [person] with the characteristics described should or should not be held accountable for his acts. 121 R.I. at 266-67, 399 A.2d at 476 (quoting United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d at 619-20). In addition the Johnson opinion gave specific directions aimed at preserving the proper role for the jury. We stated that the charge to the jury must include unambiguous instructions stressing that regardless of the nature and extent of the experts' testimony, the issue of exculpation remains at all times a legal and not a medical question. Id. at 270, 399 A.2d at 478. Under the Johnson formulation, the jury should hear all relevant expert testimony regarding a defendant's mental condition. The trial justice, however, must instruct the jury to weigh the credibility of the experts, make its own independent decision concerning whether the defendant suffered from a mental defect at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and determine whether there existed a sufficient relationship between the mental defect and the condemned conduct to conclude that the defendant should not be held responsible. Id. In this case expert testimony concerning defendant's mental state at the time of the offenses is exactly the type of grist for the legal mill that Johnson contemplated would come before the jury. As noted above, the jury must determine whether defendant suffered from a mental defect at the time of the perpetration of the crimes. The jury should not perform this function in a vacuum; it should hear testimony on this issue from both prosecution and defense expert witnesses, assess the credibility of their testimony, and determine if the defendant in fact suffered from this mental defect. The state argues that to admit this evidence would result in expert testimony that encroaches on an area left to the jury. The state gleans this argument from our language in Johnson specifically making the issue of a defendant's mental state at the time of the crimes a jury question. Id. Nothing in our Johnson opinion, however, suggested that because the jury must determine the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime, experts could not testify on this issue. To the contrary, Johnson 's direction to allow experts to provide the jury with a full and accurate picture of a defendant's mental state strongly indicates that this evidence is admissible. Moreover, the state's argument that defendant's mental state at the time of the offense is an ultimate issue for the jury must fail in light of Rule 704 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Rule 704 states,  Opinion on ultimate issue.  Testimony in the form of an opinion otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. The advisory committee's note following Rule 704 goes even further. The note describes the state's argument as empty rhetoric (citing 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1920 at 17-18 (Chadbourn rev. 1978)). Pursuant to Rule 704, Dr. Seghorn's testimony is admissible irrespective of the fact that it addresses an issue that the jury must ultimately decide. Thus under Rhode Island law there is no categorical bar to expert testimony regarding a defendant's mental condition at the time he or she perpetrates a crime. Nevertheless, we still must determine whether Dr. Seghorn's testimony satisfies the requirements for the admission of expert testimony found in Rule 702 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. B