Opinion ID: 2822110
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rivas

Text: Like Díaz, Rivas was also a member of the conspiracy who chose to cooperate with the government. Rivas's testimony focused mostly on Christopher. First, Rivas described an incident where Christopher had a problem because some people . . . shot at his -28- car with his kids in it while they were traveling near a bakery. According to Rivas, in response to this attack, Christopher and Coquito and Monchi -- two of the drug conspiracy's triggermen -- went in search of the shooters. Rivas testified that he knew all three were armed because [h]e was always armed every time that they would go out to solve a problem and they weren't going out to the shopping mall to look for clothing. They were going out to look for the enemy.
Like with Díaz's testimony, Defendants allege that Rivas's testimony is both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. However, neither of these objections was raised below, so we review for plain error.19 See Ciresi, 697 F.3d at 26. Once again, we find no error. Rivas's testimony is relevant because it helps to establish that Christopher was a leader of the organization -- he was targeted shortly after another leader was murdered and it is unlikely that a low-level member of the organization would be targeted for assassination -- and that the drug organization resorted to violence to protect its territory. Moreover, the fact that Christopher and his men were armed provides proof of the 19 Christopher did object to Rivas's statement that the men were armed and his subsequent explanation as to how he knew this, but the objection was based on a different ground. See United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 35 n.11 (1st Cir. 2006) (Because that objection was on different grounds, however, we deem the defendant's present argument of error, raised for the first time on appeal, as unpreserved.). -29- conspiracy charged in Count Nine -- conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. See Fed. R. Evid. 401; Rivera Calderón, 578 F.3d at 95-96. And because the testimony was neither shocking, heinous, nor likely to inflame the jury, it need not have been excluded under Rule 403. See Varoudakis, 233 F.3d at 122.