Opinion ID: 2219007
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Heading: Thomas's Wage Income from Gateway

Text: Arizona is a community property state. [2] The wages Thomas receives from Gateway are personal property acquired during the marriage and are community property and therefore not his sole and separate property under Arizona law. A.R.S. § 25-211. Applying Arizona law, the wages would not be subject to the present garnishment actions. North Dakota is not a community property state. Rozan v. Rozan, 129 N.W.2d 694 (N.D.1964); Matter of Estate of Erickson, 368 N.W.2d 525 (N.D.1985). [3] Wages and salaries are one's sole and separate personal property, [4] and wages are subject to garnishment actions. Arguably, North Dakota law allows foreign laws to reach a party's personal property located within North Dakota by stating that [i]f there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile. [5] NDCC § 47-07-01. The source note of section 47-07-01, NDCC, incorrectly states it was derived from section 946 of the California Civil Code, [6] which in turn was derived from the Field Code. [7] This section of the Field Code was enacted by the Dakota Territory Legislature in 1865 (Civ.C.1865, § 364). It was subsequently adopted by the North Dakota Legislature where it has undergone only minor changes. [8] For the purposes of historical reference and to aid in interpretation, the provisions of the modern Century Code are to be considered as continuations of previously existing sections if the two are substantially similar. NDCC § 1-02-25. Section 47-07-01 is substantially similar to section 364 of the 1865 Dakota Civil Code, which in turn is substantially similar to California's adaptation of the Field Code. In construing statutes, we may look to its legislative history and former statutory provision, including laws upon the same or similar subjects. NDCC § 1-02-39; Furlong Ent. v. Sun Exploration & Prod., 423 N.W.2d 130 (N.D.1988). Therefore, we look to California case law and interpretation of section 946, Cal.Civ.Code, for guidance in interpreting section 47-07-01, NDCC. Foreign case law interpreting statutes is most persuasive if the cases were decided prior to our own adoption of the statute. Although we find no relevant case law interpreting the Field Code provision, prior to North Dakota's adoption of it, we find relevant interpretations after our enactment; and although not mandatory, California's interpretation of it is somewhat persuasive. E.g., Estate of Zins by Kelsch v. Zins, 420 N.W.2d 729 (N.D.1988). In In re Lathrop's Estate, 165 Cal. 243, 131 P. 752 (1913), the California Supreme Court stated that section 946, Cal.Civ.Code, is part of the jus gentium [law of nations] and that it announces the clearly established rule arising out of consideration of justice and the principle of comity that the law controlling personal property is governed by the law of the domicile of the owner. But this declaration is accompanied by the all-important limitation that the law of the domicile controls if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the personal property is situated. Id. 131 P. at 754. This limitation of the otherwise universal rule applies when the disposition of the property does violence to the law of the place where the property is located, or where it is contrary to public policy. The exception to the rule was expounded upon in In re Nolan's Estate, 135 Cal. App.2d 16, 286 P.2d 899 (1955), wherein the court stated that section 946, Cal.Civ.Code, was not merely a maxim of law, but a part of the conflict of laws. It held that [t]he obvious meaning of the statute is that personal property is governed by the law of the domicile of its owner, unless a general or specific law where the property is situated provides that the law of the domicile shall not govern. Id. 286 P.2d at 901 citing In re Barton's Estate, 196 Cal. 508, 238 P. 681, 683 (1925). In Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal.3d 461, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325, 492 P.2d 13 (1972), the defendant worked in California where he earned retirement benefits. He later became a resident of Nevada, and sued for divorce in Nevada. Subsequently the plaintiff sued for divorce in California, and the California Supreme Court was asked to determine which court had jurisdiction over retirement benefits earned in CaliforniaCalifornia or Nevada. Acknowledging that Nevada lacked in personam jurisdiction over the plaintiff, the defendant contended that his right to the retirement benefits was a species of intangible personal property, [9] and that Nevada, as the state of his domicile, could exercise jurisdiction in rem to adjudicate and award that property. In support of his contention, he cited section 946, Cal.Civ.Code. The California Supreme Court concluded that Nevada had no jurisdiction over the relevant benefits and observed that an intangible, unlike real or tangible personal property, has no physical characteristics that would serve as a basis for assigning it to a particular locality. The location assigned to it depends on what action is to be taken with reference to it. Id. 99 Cal.Rptr. at 329, 492 P.2d at 17 [emphasis deleted]; Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960, 963 (1957); In re Waits' Estate, 23 Cal.2d 676, 146 P.2d 5, 8 (1944). See also Hanson v. Denckla 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). In American Standard's case, the purpose of assigning a situs to the wages is to establish the jurisdiction in which to garnish them. Within this context, jurisdiction should be determined in light of the totality of contacts with the state involved and the bearing that local contacts have to the question of over-all fair play and substantial justice. Atkinson, supra, 316 P.2d at 965. Accordingly, we enumerate the relevant contacts of each state in this action. The wages at issue arise from Thomas's employment at Gateway Chevrolet, a North Dakota corporation doing business in North Dakota. These wages are subject to North Dakota taxes and withholding. The laws of North Dakota, not Arizona or Texas, determine Thomas's right to the wages, and likewise fix the character of the wages as sole and separate property. It is his service in North Dakota that entitles Thomas to the wages. Neither Arizona nor Texas has closer contacts with the wages. As unpaid wages are intangibles and the action taken with reference to them shows closer connections to North Dakota than any other state, the wages are classified according to North Dakota law. Because North Dakota is not a community property state, the wages are Thomas's sole and separate property. We accordingly hold that Thomas's wages are subject to the garnishment proceeding. Because there is no dispute as to fact, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of American Standard in this regard. Rule 56, N.D.R.Civ.P.; Capsco Prods., Inc. v. Savageau, 493 N.W.2d 650 (N.D.1992).