Opinion ID: 1784286
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: There Was A Waiver of Right to Object at Trial

Text: The record shows that the parties had stipulated that objections other than objections as to form of [sic] leading questions could be made at trial; such stipulations made during depositions are binding agreements and will be given full force and effect by this Court. C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 426.01(4) (4th ed.1991) (citing National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Weatherwax & Gentry, 247 Ala. 143, 22 So.2d 733 (1945)). This stipulation effectively incorporated the provisions of Rule 32(b), Ala.R.Civ.P., which provides: (b) Objections to Admissibility. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (d)(3) of this rule, objection may be made at the trial or hearing to receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then present and testifying. Rule 32(d)(3)(B) provides: Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the questions or answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of parties, and errors of any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly presented, are waived unless seasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposition. Although we have been unable to find substantial Alabama authority discussing this Rule as it has been applied in the context presented on this appeal, we have determined that the general rule is that an objection, although not made at the deposition examination, may be made at the trial or hearing to receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then present or testifying. 4A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 32.09 (2d ed. 1990), 32-44. Objections based on grounds that might have been obviated or removed if presented at the deposition examination, e.g., that the questions are leading, are waived unless the objections are made at that time. Id. Dean Gamble, in his treatise, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, summarizes the provisions of Rule 32(b) as follows: These provisions, taken together, result in the following rules. First, a party may object to matter in a deposition introduced at trial even though he did not object at the taking of the deposition. This is only true, however, if the objection is to a matter of substance and, had an objection been lodged at the taking of the deposition, the objectionableness could not have been cured. McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 426.01(4) (4th ed. 1991). The reasons Darnell gave for objecting to the deposition questions were based on his claim that McKelvy had not laid a proper foundation for the questions. This problem could have been obviated at the time the deposition was taken; therefore, Darnell should have objected at that time. See Nutterville v. McLam, 84 Idaho 36, 367 P.2d 576 (1961). The rule requires that, if a timely objection would enable the questioner to remedy the problem so that the same testimony could be received in accordance with law, the objection must be made at the time the deposition is taken. See Jordan v. Medley, 711 F.2d 211 (D.C.Cir.1983). Failure to object at that time waives the party's right to object. Therefore, Darnell was not entitled to object to the testimony for the first time at trial. Although the questions were perhaps not in the best form, they were proper questions, and the trial court erred in sustaining Darnell's objection to them. Darnell argues that even if the trial court erred, the error was harmless. Rule 45, A.R.App.P. The record does show that at another point in his deposition testimony, Dr. Irwin stated that, in his opinion, the pains and spasms McKelvy suffered in his neck, back, chest, and knee were due to the car wreck. Dr. Irwin testified: Q. To rephrase that question, Dr. [Irwin], what was this treatment administeredwhat condition was it administered to treat? A. The spasm and pain in this neck, spasm of the muscles and pain in his neck, back, and in the back of his chest and knee. Q. Do you have an opinion what would have caused those, if anything? A. Yeah, I think it was due to the car wreck. This testimony was read to the jury, without objection. Darnell also claims that a general reading of the record also indicates that there was a dispute as to whether the accident was the proximate cause of McKelvy's injuries. Darnell claimed that he was properly turning into a store parking lot, and there was testimony by an investigating state trooper that the McKelvy vehicle was traveling at 60 miles per hour at the time of impact. Darnell states that the jury returned a general verdict in his favor and, because of this and based on the facts in the record, that this Court should apply the principle of law stated in Perry v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 527 So.2d 696 (Ala. 1988). [2] In Perry, the Court held that [b]ecause the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendant, and it was undisputed that the plaintiff incurred some damages, the only permissible conclusion [was] that the jury absolved the defendant from any liability. 527 So.2d at 698. Based on all of the above, we cannot say that the trial court's exclusion of the evidencethrough sustaining the objectionsdid not probably prejudice McKelvy's right to a fair trial. Therefore, we decline to apply the harmless error rule to the facts of this case. The error requires that we reverse and remand the cause for a new trial.