Opinion ID: 799955
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discovery and Reliance on Depositions

Text: The plaintiffs argue that the district court wrongly denied them the opportunity for adequate discovery; our review on this issue is for abuse of discretion, Rivera-Torres v. ReyHernández, 502 F.3d 7, 10 n.2 (1st Cir. 2007), and we will intervene only upon a clear showing [that] . . . the lower court's discovery order was plainly wrong and resulted in substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party. Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol MyersSquibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. N. Bridge Assocs., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1203 (1st Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Also reviewed for abuse of discretion is the district court's reliance on evidence to which plaintiffs say they did not have a chance to respond. Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 409410 (1st Cir. 1985). After the defendants moved for summary judgment, the plaintiffs requested discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) (now -14- encompassed in Rule 56(d)) targeted at whether there was a perimeter, whether the agents' fear of Los Macheteros or members of Puerto Rico's independence movement was reasonable, and whether the crowd was unruly.5 The district court granted the motion in part, allowing the plaintiffs to depose only those individuals who had supplied affidavits in support of the summary judgment motion. The plaintiffs argue that the imposition of this limitation was an abuse of discretion. A basic tenet of Rule 56(f) practice is that the party seeking discovery must explain how the facts, if collected, will suffice to defeat the pending summary judgment motion. Mir-Yepez v. Banco Popular de P.R., 560 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Rivera-Torres, 502 F.3d at 10). The plaintiffs fall short of meeting this requirement with respect to the depositions of Hernández, Rodriguez, Rivera, and the FBI agents. Whether Hernández invited the plaintiffs onto the property is not relevant to the question of the reasonableness of the defendants' actions in responding to what was, at a minimum, a turbulent crowd. Nor does the qualified immunity question turn on 5 Specifically, they sought leave to depose all FBI agents at the scene, Natalia Hernández-Laboy, private security guard Mary Ann Rodriguez, and non-plaintiff photographer Rafael Rivera, who allegedly warned the agents of potential harm to them. The plaintiffs also requested various documents from the FBI, including the agents' after action reports and their prior written statements, records of the FBI's post-incident investigation, and any operational plans related to the search. -15- whether the gate was opened for the plaintiffs by Rodriguez, the security guard. The plaintiffs argued in the district court that deposing Rivera was necessary to address whether the defendants reasonably feared the crowd. Given the ample evidence in the record describing the events in detail, there was no abuse of discretion in denying this request. The precise words that Rivera may have spoken to Agent Figueroa do not alter the calculus. There was also no abuse of discretion in the decision to deny permission to depose the estimated 25-45 non-defendant FBI agents who were at the scene. The question before the court on summary judgment centered on the perceptions of the defendant agents. The denial of the plaintiffs' request for the report prepared by the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility was also within the district court's discretion. The plaintiffs argued below that a report finding that the agents violated FBI policy would be probative of the qualified immunity question. But the plaintiffs do not dispute that both a sworn declaration from Special Agent Figueroa and deposition testimony from one of the defendant agents indicates that no such finding was made. Thus the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how the report would help to defeat summary judgment. See Rivera-Torres, 502 F.3d at 10. With respect to the remaining documents, we note that the district court ordered the defendants to produce written statements prior to their depositions. After the depositions, the plaintiffs -16- sought additional statements that they claimed were revealed by the deponents during their depositions. The district court denied any further relief. As the plaintiffs, here again, have failed to establish how these additional documents would have enabled them to defeat summary judgment, we find no abuse of discretion. In sum, the district court's carefully crafted discovery limitations were consistent with the importance of resolving qualified immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in the litigation, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), and within its discretion. We turn to the plaintiffs' complaint that the district court should not have relied on the defendants' depositions. After the defendants had moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs had deposed the defendants' affiants, the plaintiffs filed an opposition arguing that the defendants should not be permitted to submit new evidence or arguments in their reply. The defendants nevertheless filed a reply referencing the depositions, and the district court ordered that the deposition transcripts be scanned into the record. In citing to these depositions while addressing whether any issues of material fact existed, the court noted that it was permitted to examine the entire record, including all discovery and disclosure materials on file. Periodistas III, slip. op. at 9 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The district court's action was -17- proper. Courts and parties have great flexibility with regard to evidence that may be used on a Rule 56 proceeding, and as Rule 56(c) makes clear, in deciding summary judgment motions courts may consider any material that would be admissible or usable at trial, including depositions.6 The plaintiffs have not argued that the depositions would be unusable at trial or that they were irrelevant to determin[ing] whether any of [the issues presented] [were] real and genuine and whether any of post-pleading material suggests the existence of any other triable issues of material fact. 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2721. The district court was within its discretion to consider them.