Opinion ID: 162640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overholt Challenges.

Text: 128
129 United States Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.) § 3B1.1(a) provides for an increase in offense level if the defendant was the organizer or leader of a criminal activity. Overholt objects to the application of this provision by the sentencing court because it failed to make specific findings of fact. He relies on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1), which states that at the sentencing hearing, [ f ] or each matter controverted, the court must make either a finding on the allegation or a determination that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing. (Emphasis added). 130 Overholt cannot invoke this rule, however, because he did not properly controvert the assertion that he was an organizer or leader. The probation office delivered Overholt's presentence report (PSR) to him on February 28, 2000. Yet he raised no objections to the PSR until his sentencing hearing on April 11, 2000—42 days later. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(6)(B), objections to the PSR must be submitted within 14 days of receipt; the probation office must then submit the PSR, together with an addendum responding to any unresolved objections, at least seven days before the sentencing hearing. Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(b)(6)(C). Because Overholt's objections were untimely, the sentencing court could properly proceed as if no objection had been made. The court was entitled to rely upon the PSR without making independent factual findings. See United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1500 (10th Cir.1996) (district court not required to hear government's objections to PSR first raised at sentencing hearing); United States v. Chung, 261 F.3d 536, 538-39 (5th Cir.2001) (district court not required to hear defendant's objections to PSR first raised at sentencing hearing). 131
132 Overholt next challenges the determination of his criminal history category under the Sentencing Guidelines. The sentencing court set the category at level II based on two 1987 misdemeanor convictions in Oklahoma: (1) dispensing nonintoxicating alcoholic beverages without a license and (2) contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Overholt asserts that consideration of these offenses violated the Guidelines. 133 In calculating a defendant's criminal history category, the sentencing court must consider not only all felonies but also all misdemeanors and petty offenses, except as provided in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). Section 4A1.2 (c)(1) lists fifteen offenses that are counted only if (A) the sentence was a term of probation of at least one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days, or (B) the prior offense was similar to an instant offense. Section 4A1.2 (c)(2) lists six offenses that are never considered: hitchhiking, juvenile status offenses and truancy, loitering, minor traffic infractions, public intoxication, and vagrancy. Any prior offense that is similar to a listed offense in either category is also excluded. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1)-(2). 134 Because Overholt failed to raise his challenge in district court, we review only for plain error. United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1308 (10th Cir. 2000). Overholt's two offenses—dispensing nonintoxicating alcoholic beverages without a license and contributing to the delinquency of a minor — are not listed in § 4A1.2(c)(1) or (2). Therefore, Overholt's challenge can succeed only if his offense is similar to one listed. In assessing similarity, we examine whether the underlying behavior necessary to commit the prior misdemeanor shares the same general characteristics as the behavior required to commit an offense expressly listed under (c)(1) or (c)(2). United States v. Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir.2001). 135 Overholt does not specify which of the twenty-one listed offenses is similar to distributing non-intoxicating alcoholic beverages without a license or contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He merely asserts that, like his prior offenses, all the listed offenses are of relative insignificance. Such a vague argument is hardly helpful. 136 In any event, we fail to see a listed offense that is plainly similar to either of Overholt's prior offenses. The PSR describes the actions that formed the predicate for both of Overholt's convictions as caus[ing], aid[ing], abett[ing], and encourag[ing] a planned event for high school students between the ages of sixteen and seventeen years old whereby the students were permitted to enter an establishment... and pay a $5.00 `cover charge' that permitted them to obtain and drink all the beer they wish[ed] to drink. None of the offenses listed in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) has anything to do with facilitating underage drinking. The Fourth Circuit has held that the Florida offense of selling alcohol to a minor is not similar to any of the offenses listed in § 4A1.2(c) because it does not share common elements with any of them. United States v. Harris, 128 F.3d 850, 855 (4th Cir.1997) (none involve selling alcohol; none involve transactions with minors). Although we have noted that the Fourth Circuit's elements approach is more restrictive than our own approach to similarity, see Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d at 1198, we believe the same result is required by our own approach. The district court did not plainly err when it included Overholt's prior misdemeanor convictions in his criminal history calculation. 137