Opinion ID: 2156762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to Discharge Counsel After Meaningful Trial Proceedings Begin

Text: Our focus now must shift to the logistical requirements imposed upon a request to discharge counsel. We have held that a defendant's right to waive counsel and proceed pro se or to substitute counsel is more limited once meaningful trial proceedings have begun, because the mandatory nature of Rule 4-215(e) is inapplicable, and the decision to permit discharge of counsel after trial has begun is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Brown, 342 Md. at 420, 676 A.2d at 521. In the exercise of discretion, the judge is required to conduct an inquiry to assess whether the defendant's reason for dismissal of counsel justifies any resulting disruption, id. at 428, 676 A.2d at 525, through consideration of the following factors: (1) the merit of the reason for discharge; (2) the quality of counsel's representation prior to the request; (3) the disruptive effect, if any, that discharge would have on the proceedings; (4) the timing of the request; (5) the complexity and stage of the proceedings; and (6) any prior requests by the defendant to discharge counsel. Id. In Brown, we examined what constitutes meaningful trial proceedings and noted that the exact point in time when the right to discharge counsel is curtailed, can differ. Id. at 422, 676 A.2d at 522. [6] Quoting from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886 (5th Cir.1977), we held: A defendant must have a last clear chance to assert his constitutional right. If there must be a point beyond which the defendant forfeits the unqualified right to defend pro se, that point should not come before meaningful trial proceedings have commenced. We have not entered the age of stop-watch jurisprudence[.] Id. (internal citation omitted). Since Brown, we have had occasion in State v. Wischhusen, 342 Md. 530, 677 A.2d 595 (1996), to determine whether meaningful trial proceedings had begun when a request to dismiss counsel was made. In Wischhusen, defense counsel was not present when the jury, during deliberations, asked the judge a clarification question. Id. at 533, 677 A.2d at 596. The judge, prior to reinstructing the jury, asked the defendant if he wanted to have his counsel present, to which the defendant replied in the negative. Id. at 535, 677 A.2d at 597. The defendant was convicted, and the Court of Special Appeals, reversed holding that the judge should have obtained a waiver of counsel pursuant to Rule 4-215(e). Id. We reversed and held that although Rule 4-215 applies up to and including the beginning of trial, the Rule does not apply after meaningful trial proceedings have commenced. Id. at 543, 677 A.2d at 601 (emphasis added). [7] In the present case, Campbell made a request to discharge counsel at the close of the State's case-in-chief and after defense counsel had announced that Campbell had elected to remain silent. We find that meaningful trial proceedings definitely had begun, rendering Rule 4-215(e) inapplicable. The trial judge did ask Campbell if he wanted to address the court after the State had rested its case, to which Campbell stated his reasons for wanting to discharge his attorney, which included alleged conflicts existing between himself and his attorney during the prior and current trials; and his lawyer's comments that he would not represent him, that the jury was going to convict him [Campbell], and that he should receive a long sentence. In addition, Campbell's attorney explained the problems that had existed between the two. Because Campbell's reasons for wanting to dismiss his counsel were apparent based upon his statements, the trial judge was not required to make any further inquiry. After having the dialogue, the trial judge denied Campbell's request. Balancing the Brown factors against the countervailing considerations of permitting Campbell to discharge counsel compels us to agree. See Brown, 342 Md. at 428-29, 676 A.2d at 525. The trial judge's response to Campbell's request reflected his assessment that the request lacked merit: that Campbell was incorrect in stating that his counsel did not act in his best interest because defense counsel had expressed a negative view to Campbell about the outcome of the case. The other Brown factors, whether the discharge of counsel would have a disruptive effect on the proceedings, the timing of the request, and the complexity and stage of the proceedings, likewise support the trial court's decision because Campbell's request came after the State had already concluded its case-in-chief and only the closing arguments and the jury instructions remained. The disruptive effect of Campbell dismissing his attorney and either proceeding pro se or substituting counsel so late in the proceedings supports our expression in Brown that requests to discharge should not be used as eleventh hour tactics to delay the trial or to confuse the jury, and must be limited to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice. Brown, 342 Md. at 414-15, 676 A.2d at 518. Consideration of the final Brown factor, whether any prior requests had been made, further yields the conclusion that the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Campbell's request; the record does not reflect that prior requests to dismiss counsel were made, but that when Campbell had been given an opportunity to address the court he elected to bring it up later. Judge Raker, when speaking for this Court in Brown, was clear that [a]lthough the trial judge need not engage in a full-scale inquiry pursuant to Rule 4-215, the judge must at least consider the defendant's reason for requesting dismissal before rendering a decision. Id. at 431, 676 A.2d at 526. Here, the trial judge considered the reasons for Campbell's request to discharge his counsel and articulated reasons for the denial of the request based upon the Brown factors.