Opinion ID: 1419742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extending the Excited Utterance Exception

Text: The case sub judice required the Court to decide for the first time whether a statement made by an unknown and anonymous declarant may be admitted into evidence under the excited utterance exception to hearsay contained in Rule 803(2). In determining the resolution of this issue, the majority opinion relied upon guidance from the decisions in People v. Alexander, 173 A.D.2d 296, 569 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1991), and Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.1985). [4] The decision in Miller was a civil action involving an automobile accident. During the trial, the district court admitted into evidence a statement made by an unidentified declarant at the scene of the accident, which amounted to an allegation that the plaintiff was at fault. On appeal the plaintiff assigned error to the admission of the statement as an excited utterance. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the contention that statements by unidentified declarants are ipso facto inadmissible under Fed. R.Evid. 803(2), finding that [s]uch statements are admissible if they otherwise meet the criteria of 803(2). Miller, 754 F.2d at 510. [5] In rendering this decision, the Third Circuit cited various criteria to be used in evaluating a statement as an excited utterance: (1) a startling occasion, (2) a statement relating to the circumstances of the startling occasion, (3) a declarant who appears to have had opportunity to observe personally the events, and (4) a statement made before there has been time to reflect and fabricate. Id. (citations omitted). In applying this test to the facts of the case, the Miller court found that there was no evidence to establish the third factor, personal knowledge, where the declarant's identity was unknown. Deviating somewhat from the Miller holding, the majority herein has set out, in Syllabus point 2, the following standard regarding the admission of a statement by an unknown and anonymous declarant under W. Va. R. Evid. 803(2): When a court in a criminal case is evaluating whether to apply the excited utterance exception of W. Va. R. Evid. 803(2) to a hearsay statement offered against the defendant by an unknown, anonymous, declarant, the court should ordinarily conclude that the statement does not meet the criteria for the 803(2) exception, unless the statement is accompanied by exceptional indicia of reliability and the ends of justice and fairness require that the statement be admitted into evidence. In light of the Third Circuit's limited decision in Miller and the majority's extension of the excited utterance rule in the instant appeal, I am concerned with the broad and imprecise formulation of our new holding. Accordingly, I believe it is necessary to clarify these inconsistencies to help trial courts apply this new rule. The court in Miller used a four factor test in evaluating a statement by an unidentified declarant as an excited utterance. See 754 F.2d at 510. The general test for excited utterance used by this Court, as formulated in Sutphin, delineated only three factors. See Syl. pt. 7, 195 W.Va. 551, 466 S.E.2d 402. However, a careful reading of the Sutphin test reveals that it includes each of the four factors set out in Miller. The factor in Miller which at first blush seems to be absent from the Sutphin factors is Miller's third factor: a declarant who appears to have had opportunity to observe personally the events. Miller's third factor is actually a part of Sutphin's first factor: the declarant must have experienced a startling event or condition. In other words, Miller's opportunity to observe personally factor is the same as Sutphin's must have experienced factor. Although the majority opinion in this case is not clear on the issue, each of the Sutphin factors must be used in evaluating a statement by an unknown and anonymous declarant. Nevertheless, the majority has also required another factor: the ends of justice and fairness require that the statement be admitted into evidence. [6] Therefore, as I interpret the majority opinion, even if the Sutphin factors are satisfied, a trial court may still exclude an unknown and anonymous statement if the ends of justice and fairness do not require that the statement be admitted into evidence. With the foregoing comments in mind, I concur in the decision reached by the majority in this case.