Opinion ID: 792216
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim of improper vouching for witness for prosecution.

Text: 22 During closing argument, one prosecutor referred to the plea agreements signed by several Government witnesses, Owens's accomplices in the robberies, which condition federal immunity on their truthful testimony at trial. In apparent response, the judge said, I'm afraid you are coming dangerously close here to vouching. Because defense counsel did not object at the time, we review the claim of improper vouching for plain error. United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir.1994). To establish plain error, Owens must show (1) the existence of an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that substantially affects the rights of the defendant, and (4) that substantially affects the fairness of and integrity of the proceedings. United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377, 386 (6th Cir.2002). 23 The prosecutor uttered his statements in response to defense counsel who, in her closing, suggested that each Government witness had some motivation to testify falsely in light of an obligation or plea agreement. When a defendant attacks the credibility of a government witness for signing a plea agreement, the prosecution is entitled to refer to the agreement in rebuttal. See United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir.1999) (The prosecutor may elicit testimony about [a plea's] terms . . . and even refer to the plea agreement of a government witness in an attempt to deflect defense counsel's use of the agreement to attack the witness's credibility.). 24 Even where the defense did not mention the plea agreement, this Court condones its reasonable use by the prosecution. See United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593 (6th Cir.2004). In Trujillo, for instance, the Government revealed the terms of two witnesses' plea agreements; among the conditions of the plea were that the witness testify truthfully at trial. Because the prosecutor did not offer any personal observations or opinions as to the veracity of either [witness,] nor . . . place the prestige of the government behind [witness] credibility this Court found that the Government did not engage in improper vouching. Id. at 608-09. 25 Following its admonishment, furthermore, the trial court reminded the jurors that they, not the prosecutor, were the trier of fact. The prosecutor himself repeatedly echoed the judge on this point stating, You twelve are the judges . . . all I can do is highlight the facts and the argument. An immediate instruction by the trial court mitigates otherwise improper vouching. See Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1387 (prosecution's vouching might have been reversible error, had the trial court not immediately instructed the jury that all assertions are to be made from the evidence). 26 Generally speaking, improper vouching includes either blunt comments or comments that imply that the prosecutor has special knowledge of facts not in front of the jury. Francis, 170 F.3d at 550 (internal citations omitted); see, e.g., Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1387 (holding the prosecutor's statement-I submit to you that [the witnesses] are credible-improper). The prosecutor in the instant case merely referred to the plea agreement, per his right. We therefore find no ground for reversal. 27