Opinion ID: 4527475
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Intrinsic” versus “Extrinsic” Evidence

Text: In light of our above assessment, we disagree with Sumlin’s characterization of Kelly’s testimony as barred by Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) “does not apply to evidence that itself is probative of the crime charged[.]” United States v. Price, 329 F.3d 903, 906 (6th Cir. 2003). Such probative proof includes “intrinsic acts” evidence that relates to those acts that “were necessary preliminaries to the crime charged.” United States v. Daulton, 266 F. App’x 381, 384 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Furthermore, even if the evidence at issue relates to a defendant’s uncharged criminal conduct, the evidence still is admissible if the conduct “arises from the same events as” and “is directly probative of [defendant’s] charged offense[.]” United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 698 (6th Cir. 2012). To demarcate the scope of admissible “intrinsic evidence” from proof that falls under the scope of Rule 404(b)’s exclusion, our circuit uses the following framework: Rule 404(b) does not apply where the challenged evidence is “inextricably intertwined” with evidence of the crime charged in the indictment. When the other crimes or wrongs occurred at different times and under different circumstances from the offense charged, the deeds are termed “extrinsic.” “Intrinsic” acts on the other hand, are those that are part of a single criminal episode. United States v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1149 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Torres, 685 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1982)). Note as well, that evidence relating to the background of the charged offense, known as “res gestae evidence,” is also considered “intrinsic” and admissible, meaning the court would not undertake a Rule 404(b) analysis: Proper background evidence has a causal, temporal or spatial connection with the charged offense. Typically, such evidence is a prelude to the charged offense, is directly probative of the charged offense, arises from the same events as the charged offense, forms an integral part of a witness's testimony, or completes the story of the charged offense. United States v. Hardy (Marlondo), 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2000). No. 18-3819 United States v. Sumlin Page 13 In light of this authority, we find that Amanda Kelly’s testimony, in which she reveals her previous drug use and past drug purchase history from Sumlin, constituted both proper res gestae evidence, as well as evidence that is “inextricably intertwined” with evidence of Sumlin’s conviction under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). At a foundational level, Kelly’s historic drug dealings with Sumlin help contextualize (1) how she knew Sumlin was “TJ,” (2) how she recognized Sumlin’s car in her mother’s driveway on the morning of her sister’s death, and (3) how she identified Sumlin as the individual in the living room with her sister at 8:45 a.m. on the same morning. Kelly’s previous interactions with Sumlin also help de-code the text messages in which Carrie Dobbins appears to request drugs and Sumlin agrees to drop them off. Without any level of background knowledge of Sumlin’s past drug dealings with Kelly and Carrie, the texts, in isolation, could appear cryptic. There were no explicit references to drugs, or even popular drug code words in the conversation, which would have aided in confirming that the text message exchange was indeed, about a drug deal. Without any background knowledge, the number “35” (Carrie’s response to Sumlin’s question of “how much”) could have been referring to “35” units of any type of commodity. (R. 177: Schmidt Trans., PageID 1404–14 & Exhibit 140, PageID 1655). However, as the government argues, and as we agree, Kelly’s testimony as to her past relationship and dealings with Sumlin is “integral,” in that it completes the story of Sumlin’s charged offense under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C)—namely, that those “35” units discussed in the text exchange could reasonably have been interpreted as “35” units of fentanyl or heroin, which was the quantity of drugs that Sumlin, operating under the alias “TJ,” distributed to Carrie and that ultimately led to her death. Moreover, as Kelly explained, because Sumlin had prior dealings with both her and her sister, when he asked Carrie “how much” following her request to “come over,” he did not have to ask where to deliver the drugs. (Id.). Significantly as well, we find the testimony to represent both “intrinsic” and proper background evidence in clarifying Kelly’s motives for testifying, as well as revealing any potential bias she harbored against Sumlin, which could have prejudiced his case. The Supreme Court characterizes bias as “the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, [her] testimony in favor of or against a party.” No. 18-3819 United States v. Sumlin Page 14 United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984). “Bias is always relevant in assessing a witness’s credibility.” Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1015 (6th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 607 permits a party to proactively introduce potential impeachment evidence during direct examination prior to the defense having the opportunity to present the same evidence during cross-examination. Kelly’s testimony relating to her past drug use and prior sexual relationship with Sumlin was directly relevant to her credibility.7 The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the government to inform the jury of impeachment facts through Kelly’s direct testimony, rather than wait for them to be introduced in her cross-examination. For the aforementioned reasons, we classify Kelly’s evidence as both “intrinsic” and relevant, and therefore, properly admitted by the district court. Given this holding, we need not analyze Sumlin’s alternative argument regarding the testimony’s applicability under a Rule 404(b) analysis.