Opinion ID: 870822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: DPP's Review of Kuilima's Subdivision Application

Text: As previously stated, the ICA, in its majority opinion, did not address the plaintiffs' argument that the DPP did not take a hard look at the allegations and evidence presented to it with respect to Kuilima's subdivision application. The plaintiffs make the same contention before this court, and essentially argue that the DPP did not follow the requisite procedure in determining that a SEIS was not required. In response, Kuilima argues that the DPP did, in fact, take a hard look at the alleged `intensity of impacts' and `new circumstances and evidence' and, as a result, the DPP followed the requisite procedure and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding not to require a SEIS. Neither the case law in this jurisdiction nor HEPA itself offers guidance as to which standard of review should apply to an agency decision regarding a SEIS. However, this court has reviewed an agency's decision whether an EIS satisfies the statutory requirements under the rule of reason standard. See Price, 81 Hawai`i at 182, 914 P.2d at 1375. As applied to considerations of the adequacy of an EIS, this court has stated that: In making such a determination the court is guided by the rule of reason, under which an EIS need not be exhaustive to the point of discussing all possible details bearing on the proposed action but will be upheld as adequate if it has been compiled in good faith and sets forth sufficient information to enable the decision-maker to consider fully the environmental factors involved and to make a reasoned decision after balancing the risks of harm to the environment against the benefits to be derived from the proposed action, as well as to make a reasoned choice between alternatives. Price, 81 Hawai`i at 182, 914 P.2d at 1375 (quoting Life of the Land, 59 Haw. at 164-65, 577 P.2d at 1121 (citation omitted)) (footnote omitted). Moreover, we have recognized that a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its action. Rather, the court must ensure that the agency has taken a hard look at environmental factors. If the agency has followed the proper procedures, its action will only be set aside if the court finds the action to be arbitrary and capricious, given the known environmental consequences. Id. at 182 n. 12, 914 P.2d at 1375 n. 12 (citing Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Lewis, 538 F.Supp. 149, 159 (D.Haw.1982)) (emphases added). Inasmuch as this court has applied the rule of reason and arbitrary and capricious standards of review with respect to EISs and agency decisions relating to environmental consequences, we extend such standard of review to cases involving an agency's decision with regard to SEISs. As previously mentioned, in assessing Kuilima's subdivision application to determine whether to require a SEIS, the DPP's rationale was that the phasing or timing of the project was irrelevant, and, thus, it looked for changes only within the project itself. However, evidence in the record indicated that there was, indeed, a substantive change in the timing of the project such that an essentially different action was under consideration, HAR § 11-200-26, thereby rendering the original statement . . . no longer. . . valid, id., and, thus, dictating the need for a SEIS. The DPP ignored the most obvious fact that the 1985 EIS was based on detailed information current as of 1985, i.e., that the conditions upon which the 1985 EIS was based were over twenty years old. For the DPP to assume that conditions would not have changed over twenty years is unreasonable, especially given the new evidence with respect to traffic, monk seals, and green sea turtles, discussed supra. Thus, it cannot be said that the agency has taken a `hard look' at [the] environmental factors. Given the unreasonable and seemingly cursory consideration of whether a SEIS was warranted, we hold that the DPP's decision that one was not required was arbitrary and capricious.