Opinion ID: 8704056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: WHC’s Conduct in Filing This Motion

Text: On September 29, 2011, the Court held a Pre-Motion Conference in this case. During that hearing, both parties were asked whether they intended to file dispositive motions and, if so, to summarize the grounds for their anticipated motion(s) and the undisputed facts they believed entitled them to judgment as a matter of law. WHC indicated that it would seek summary judgment and would argue, in part, that Hancock’s ADA claims should be dismissed because Hancock was not terminated due to a disability; rather, WHC claimed that Hancock’s employment was terminated in June 2008, after she failed to respond to WHC’s requests for more information and was deemed to have abandoned her position. (Pre-Motion Tr. at 20:2-18). In response, Hancock stated that there was evidence that her employment was actually terminated on December 21, 2007, and not in June 2008. (Id. at 22:17-23:25). Based on Hancock’s representations, the Court warned WHC that there appeared to be a dispute of fact surrounding Hancock’s termination date, and that this factual dispute appeared to be material. (Id. at 25:4-26:12). As a result, the Court asked WHC to carefully consider whether there was a credible basis to seek summary judgment and to “look long and hard and think long and hard before [it] file[d] a motion on those grounds.” (Id.). WHC proceeded to file its motion on Hancock’s ADA claims anyway. But as set forth above, the date of Hancock’s termination is clearly in dispute, and that dispute is material to Hancock’s ADA claims. In addition, it is also clearly disputed whether Mr. Russell had been told that Hancock’s triage restriction was indefinite at the time she made the decision not to accommodate Hancock, as WHC argues. WHC also asserted that it was undisputed that Hancock provided Exhibit 19 to its motion — which ostensibly imposed Hancock’s triage restriction “until further notice” — to WHC on December 20, 2007. (Defi’s Stmt, at ¶ 14). But WHC did not submit testimony from any witness to support this assertion, and it is actually contradicted by WHC’s own witness, Ms. Cox, who testified that Exhibit 19 was given to her on December 28, 2007. This latter “fact” was, at best, disputed, but the more appropriate characterization is that the assertion was outright false. In light of these plain disputes of facts— which are patently material to the resolution of Hancock’s claims — WHC’s motion as to these two claims was frivolous and clearly without merit. Further, WHC also violated the Court’s Order by attempting to rely on numerous factual assertions in its brief that were not listed its LCvR 7(h) statement of undisputed facts, (see Dkt. No. 19 at ¶ 3), including, but not limited to: • “Associates are referred to work-life services when their restrictions can no longer be accommodated,” (Def.’s Mem. at 7); • “Ms. Hancock came in to apply for medical leave on December 28, 2007, was advised that additional information was needed from her position to determine whether Ms. Hancock’s restrictions were permanent, and that Ms. Hancock advised them that her physician was either on vacation or holiday,” (Def.’s Mem. at 7); • “Neither Ms. Hancock nor her physician further advised Ms. Cox on this crucial matter,” (Def.’s Mem. at 7); and • “Plaintiff continued to receive both payments and correspondence from WHC until June 2008,” (Def.’s Mem. at 14). Therefore, as WHC was warned, the Court finds that sanctions may be appropriate, given that its motion for summary judgment as to Hancock’s ADA claims appears to have been filed “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46, 48, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991); Shepherd v. ABC, 62 F.3d 1469, 1474-75 (D.C.Cir.1995); United States v. Wallace, 964 F.2d 1214, 1218 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“The Chambers Court explicitly recognized courts’ inherent power to assess attorney’s fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”). Moreover, given that WHC’s submissions were filed in violation of the Court’s Order, sanctions appear appropriate on these grounds as well. Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f), 37(b)(2)(A)(n) through (vii). WHC shall therefore SHOW CAUSE: (1) why the Court should not impose sanctions against WHC and in favor of Hancock, in the amount of two-thirds (2/3) of the attorneys’ fees Hancock incurred in preparing and filing an opposition to WHC’s frivolous motion, 9 and (2) why each attorney who signed WHC’s summary judgment submissions should not be reprimanded. By no later than December 14, 2012, Hancock shall prepare and file a report detailing the attorneys’ fees incurred in preparing her opposition to WHC’s motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, the parties shall meet and confer in an attempt to mutually resolve this issue. If the parties are unable to resolve the issue, then WHC shall file its response to this Order to Show Cause by no later than Wednesday January 2, 2013, and Hancock shall file any response to WHC’s submission by no later than January 9, 2013. The parties shall thereafter appear for a hearing on Tuesday January 22, 2013, at 10:00 A.M. on the Court’s Order to Show Cause and to set dates for a Pretrial Conference and for trial.