Opinion ID: 2285388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: estoppel laches

Text: The appellants, apparently conceding the constitutional validity of the statute, as their last thrust, contend that the Board should be estopped, or barred by laches, from attempting to enforce its provisions by virtue of prior rules, regulations and policy of the Board. As heretofore pointed out, we took judicial notice that no such rules or regulations have been filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to the provisions of Art. 41, § 9 and § 246 of the Annotated Code. [21] We must thus conclude that no such rules or regulations were ever promulgated. The record here is devoid of any evidence of a purported policy on the part of the Board, other than the inevitable conclusion that, notwithstanding the existence of the statutory prohibition since 1947, no attempt had been made, prior to March 6, 1962, by the members of former Boards, to enforce its provisions due solely to inaction. Judge Barnes for the Court in Savonis v. Burke, 241 Md. 316, 216 A.2d 521 (1966), succinctly reviewed the doctrine of equitable estoppel as follows: Pomeroy, in his Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed., vol. 3), § 804, page 189 defines equitable estoppel as follows: `Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might have otherwise existed, either of property, or contract or of remedy, as against another person who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy.' We have adopted and have continually applied this definition of equitable estoppel. Bayshore Industries v. Ziats, 232 Md. 167, 175, 192 A.2d 487, 492 (1963); Webb v. Johnson, 195 Md. 587, 595, 74 A.2d 7, 10 (1950); Crane Co. v. Onley, 194 Md. 43, 50, 69 A.2d 903, 906 (1949) and the prior cases cited therein. Equitable estoppel operates as a technical rule of law to prevent a party from asserting his rights where it would be inequitable and unconscionable to assert those rights. Fitch v. Double U Sales Corp., 212 Md. 324, 339, 129 A.2d 93, 101 (1957); Wright v. Wagner, 182 Md. 483, 492, 34 A.2d 441, 446 (1943); Rody v. Doyle, 181 Md. 195, 29 A.2d 290 (1942). It is essential for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel that the party claiming the benefit of the estoppel must have been misled to his injury and changed his position for the worse, having believed and relied on the representations of the party sought to be estopped. Food Fair v. Blumberg, 234 Md. 521, 532, 200 A.2d 166, 172 (1964); Solomon's Marina v. Rogers, 221 Md. 194, 198, 156 A.2d 432, 434-435 (1959); Alvey v. Alvey, 220 Md. 571, 576, 155 A.2d 491, 493 (1959); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Auto Ins. Co., 220 Md. 497, 501, 154 A.2d 826, 828 (1959); Hamlin Mach. Co. v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 197 Md. 148, 159, 78 A.2d 450, 455 (1951); Brenner v. Plitt, 182 Md. 348, 364, 34 A.2d 853, 861 (1943); Rodgers v. John, 131 Md. 455, 102 Atl. 549 (1917).... (Emphasis supplied) [241 Md. at 319-20.] See also Chertkof v. Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington Railroad Co., 254 Md. 557, 255 A.2d 14 (1969). As was held in Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 164 A. 743 (1933), laches is an inexcusable delay, without necessary reference to duration, in the assertion of a right, and, unless mounting to the statutory period of limitations, mere delay is not sufficient to constitute laches, if the delay has not worked a disadvantage to another. See Bradford v. Futrell, 225 Md. 512, 525, 171 A.2d 493, 500 (1961). The doctrine of laches is an application of the general principles of estoppel. Oak Lawn Cemetery v. Baltimore County, 174 Md. 280, 291, 198 A. 600, 605 (1938), citing Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. Vol. 4, § 1440. See also Boehm v. Boehm, 182 Md. 254, 269, 34 A.2d 447, 454 (1943). Prejudice or injury to the party raising laches is an essential element. Simpers v. Clark, 239 Md. 395, 403, 211 A.2d 753, 757 (1965). So long as the position of the parties is not changed and there is no prejudice from the delay laches are inapplicable. Oak Lawn Cemetery v. Baltimore County, supra . Although it is recognized that estoppel may operate against the State by acts done in its proprietary capacity, the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied against the State in the performance of its governmental, public or sovereign capacity or in the enforcement of police measures. 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 123, § 124; 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 140 (b). In Comptroller v. Atlas Industries, 234 Md. 77, 198 A.2d 86 (1964), the appellant sought to invoke the doctrine of estoppel based upon the contention that the delay from 1954 until 1961 in demanding the payment of sales taxes was because the previous administration `did not care to force the issue'  but the present administration did. Judge Prescott (later Chief Judge), concerning this contention, stated: It seems to be universally recognized that, generally, a State cannot be estopped by the acts and conduct of its officers or agents in the performance of the governmental function of collecting taxes legally due. The reason for the rule is obvious: no administrative officer is vested with the power to abrogate the statute law of the State, nor to grant to an individual an exemption from the general operation of the law. United States v. Globe Indemnity Co., 94 F.2d 576 (C.A. 2); Olson Const. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 361 P.2d 1112; Henderson v. Gill, supra; Michigan Sportservice Inc. v. Nims, 30 N.W.2d 281 (Mich.); Claiborne Sales Co. v. Collector of Revenue, 90 So.2d 345 (La.); Comm. v. Western Md. R.R. Co., supra; 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 138; 19 Am.Jur., Estoppel, § 166; Bigelow, Estoppel (6th Ed.), p. 372; 1 Cooley Taxation, p. 159 Cf. Gontrum v. City of Baltimore, 182 Md. 370, 35 A.2d 128. [22] [234 Md. at 84-5.] In National Labor Relations Board v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 Fed.2d 51, 55 (1944) (4th Cir.), cert. denied 64 S.Ct. 848, it was similarly held that the principles of equitable estoppel cannot be applied to deprive the public of the protection of a statute because of mistaken action, or lack of action, on the part of public officials. See also Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409, 37 S.Ct. 387, 61 L.Ed. 791 (1916); Annotations, 1 A.L.R.2d, pp. 341-346. It is equally well settled that laches on the part of the state in bringing suit is not a defense in a case which is founded on the exercise of a sovereign right or the exercise of a governmental function. As it is sometimes expressed, the mere acquiescence, laches, lapse of time or non action on the part of the public agents or officers will not be imputed to the government to work an estoppel. 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, § 156, 30A C.J.S., Equity, § 114, 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 138. See also Thompson v. United States, 312 F.2d 516 (Kan.) (10th Cir.1962), cert. denied 373 U.S. 912, 83 S.Ct. 1303, 10 L.Ed.2d 414. This contention by appellants is similar to that raised in Atkinson v. Sapperstein, 191 Md. 301, 60 A.2d 737 (1948), wherein the appellee sought to have declared invalid the provisions of Art. 56, §§ 24 and 25 of the Code of 1939, which required a license to be obtained by ice cream vendors. One of his challenges to the constitutionality of the statute alleged that the statutes had been disregarded throughout the State by practically all the law enforcement agencies charged with their enforcement, not out of an intent to flout the pronouncements of the Legislature, but because of their recognition that the enactments are unreasonable and invalid. Judge Collins, writing for the Court and in rejecting this contention, stated: In the case at bar the appellee is not contending for an interpretation of the statutes here in question. He is asking this Court to declare them null and void because he alleges that the law enforcement agencies have not enforced them. It is one thing to interpret a statute according to the way it has been administered. It is entirely a different thing to declare a statute null and void on account of its total nonenforcement. In Arnreich v. State, supra, the administrative authorities interpreted the statute there in question to exempt those who operated stalls in the markets. The provisions of the code here in question have been amended many times by the Legislature, as late as the year 1937. We cannot say, as was said in Arnreich v. State, supra, that the Legislature has acquiesced in an administrative declaration that these provisions are invalid. The instant case comes within the limitation of the rule set out in Arnreich v. State, supra, where the Court said at pages 105 and 106 of 150 Md., at page 436 of 132 A: We are not unmindful of the limitation upon this rule as expressed in the case of Smith v. State, 134 Md. 473, [480], 107 A. 255, in which it was said: `When the question is presented to it of a laxity in enforcement, or misconception of the intent of the law by administrative officers whose duty it was to carry out the act of the Legislature, such omission or misconception of clear statutory provisions cannot be allowed to stand in the way of giving to the act of the Legislature the proper interpretation.' This limitation, as thus expressed, is supported by the great weight of authority. (Emphasis supplied) [191 Md. at 312.] See also Brown v. State, 177 Md. 321, 9 A.2d 209 (1939), sustaining the action of the lower court in excluding evidence of previous failure on the part of the police in Baltimore to enforce the Hawkers and Peddlers license laws. There is no evidence here of any long standing and consistent administrative interpretation acquiesced in by the Legislature, but even if there were, since the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous any such administrative interpretation contrary to that clear and unambiguous meaning could not be given effect. See Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. v. Dept. of Assessment and Taxation, 252 Md. 173, 183, 249 A.2d 180, 186 (1969); Beneficial Finance Co., etc. v. Administrator of Loan Laws, 260 Md. 430, 441-2, 272 A.2d 649, 655 (1971). Since the prohibition here under attack has been part of the statutory law of the State since 1947 and since the knowledge of that law is imputed to the appellants  and to all others [23]  they cannot here successfully contend that there has been any change in the position of the parties as a result of inaction on the part of predecessor Boards in enforcing compliance with the statute. Indeed, it appears that from 1962, when this litigation was instituted, up until the hearing of the respective Cross-Motions, the appellants undertook  unsuccessfully  to obtain legislative relief. The statute, with its express prohibition, is self-enforcing. The only policy attributable to the Board on the record before us is one of inaction. Any such inaction or acquiescence by predecessor Boards in failing to call upon the appellants for enforcement of the statute cannot abrogate a statute which has been enacted in furtherance of the police power of the State. To hold otherwise would be to permit administrative officers of the State by inactivity or apathy to effectively bring about a repeal of a validly enacted statute and a resultant veto of a legislative enactment. Since no formula has been adopted by the Board by rule or regulation as to what may be encompassed within the definition of the cost of materials, the Chancellor properly retained jurisdiction over that subject-matter and remanded that issue to the expertise of the Board for the promulgation of such a rule or regulation. The interlocutory injunction issued on April 10, 1963, served its office and purpose until the final decree was issued; no order of dissolution was necessary to the validity of the decree here appealed. Musgraove v. Staylor, Admr., 36 Md. 123, 128 (1872). Decree affirmed, the costs to be paid by appellants.