Opinion ID: 3011677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alexander v. Sandoval, U.S. (2001).

Text: 4 On June 22, 1998, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Distr., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). As a result, plaintif fs' counsel became aware that the Supreme Court had articulated a deliberate indifference standard, albeit in the Title IX context, to determine whether a recipient of federal funds could be liable for knowingly allowing discrimination to occur. Meanwhile, in response to the Supreme Court having granted certiorari in a Title VI case, the NCAA moved in September of 1998 to amend the District Court's October 9, 1997, order and to certify for appeal the question of whether Title VI's implementing regulations permitted a private right of action. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they consider ed moving to amend their complaint to allege intentional discrimination at this point. However, because the District Court denied the NCAA's motion to certify the private right of action question for appeal, plaintiffs made a tactical decision not to move to amend their complaint. Plaintiffsfiled a motion for summary judgment on their disparate impact claim on October 6, 1998. That motion contained a footnote suggesting plaintiffs' belief that they could allege a purposeful discrimination claim in light of Gebser.3 On November 13, 1998, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint by adding two additional named parties. The NCAA filed a cross motion for summary judgment on November 18, 1998, and opposed plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and for leave to add party plaintif fs. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the NCAA attached the affidavit of an NCAA official who opined that one of the valid educational objectives of Pr oposition 16 was closing the gap between black and white student-athlete graduation rates. By memorandum and order dated December 18, 1998, the District Court allowed the two additional named plaintiffs to intervene pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24. The District Court's order granting the motion specifically stated _________________________________________________________________ 3. With the exception of that footnote, plaintiffs did not advance an intentional discrimination claim until after their disparate impact claim had been rejected on appeal. 5 that it bears noting that the time is near to when motions of this sort would affect the close of discovery and consequently, any additional similar requests will be looked on with disfavor. Subsequently, both parties filed supplemental submissions in support of summary judgment and participated in oral argument. On March 8, 1999, the District Court denied the NCAA's motion for summary judgment and granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring Proposition 16 unlawful under Title VI's implementing regulations and permanently enjoining application of Proposition 16. See Cur eton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D.Pa. 1999). The District Court concluded that the NCAA was an indirect recipient of federal funding due to its complete control over the NYSP Fund. Alternatively, the District Court determined that the NCAA was subject to Title VI coverage because member schools had ceded contr olling authority to it. Next, the District Court determined that the NCAA's legitimate objective in adopting Proposition 16 was raising overall student-athlete graduation rates and r ejected the NCAA's alternative justification of closing the gap between black and white student-athlete graduation rates. The court held that the NCAA's second proffer ed objective, closing the gap between black and white student-athletes, was unequivocally not the purpose behind adoption of Proposition 16. Finally, the court deter mined that the use of the standardized test score for fr eshman eligibility had an unjustified disparate impact on African-American student-athletes and that there were equally effective alternatives to the standardized test score component which could further the NCAA's objective of incr easing graduation rates of student-athletes. On Mar ch 16, 1999, the District Court clarified its injunction and enjoined the NCAA from denying eligibility based on the minimum standardized test component of Proposition 16. On December 22, 1999, we reversed the District Court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs and r emanded the case with directions to enter judgment for the NCAA. See Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999). Specifically, 6 we found that the Title VI regulations under which plaintiffs sued were program specific (i.e., specific to the NYSP) and therefore did not reach Pr oposition 16. In addition, we rejected the controlling authority argument and found that the NCAA was not a recipient of federal funds based on its relationship to its member institutions. On February 28, 2000, after the case was remanded to the District Court, plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend summary judgment and a motion for leave to amend their complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Pr ocedure 59(e) and 15(a). In their proposed amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that Proposition 16 has been adopted and used by the NCAA as an instrument of intentional discrimination against African-American student-athletes. On April 13, 2000, the District Court denied the motion, finding it to be untimely, prejudicial to the NCAA, and futile. The District Court denied plaintiffs' request for r econsideration, and plaintiffs timely appealed.