Opinion ID: 1494737
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Heading: The DTPA Claim

Text: A trial court may grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if there is no evidence to support one or more of the jury findings on issues necessary to liability. TEX.R. CIV. P. 301. In determining whether there is no evidence to support the jury verdict and thus uphold the judgment n.o.v., we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and reasonable inferences that tend to support it. State v. Biggar, 873 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex.1994). To maintain a DTPA cause of action against the Bank, Brown must show that (1) he is a consumer under the DTPA with respect to his claim against the Bank, (2) the Bank committed a false, misleading, or deceptive act under section 17.46(b) of the DTPA, breached an express or implied warranty, or engaged in an unconscionable action or course of action, and (3) these acts were the producing cause of Brown's actual damages. Act of May 10, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 143, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, amended by Act of May 10, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 216, § 5, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 600, 603, amended by Act of May 16, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 603, § 4, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1327, 1329 (amended 1989) (current version at TEX. BUS. & COM.CODE § 17.50(a)); Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex.1995). On appeal to this Court, Brown does not argue that the Bank was inextricably intertwined with Compean; he instead argues that the Bank's own acts violated the DTPA. [1] Assuming, without deciding, that Brown is a consumer, we hold that the Bank's acts either were not the producing cause of Brown's damages or could not give rise to a DTPA violation. Producing cause requires that the acts be both a cause-in-fact and a substantial factor in causing the injuries. Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.1995); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs. Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex.1995). A producing cause is an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause, which in the natural sequence of events, produces injuries or damages. Haynes & Boone v. Bowser Bouldin, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex.1995). The jury found that Brown's damages were (1) the difference between the value the house would have had if it had been built as represented by Compean when the contract was signed and the value when Brown moved in, (2) the cost to complete the house, (3) the expenses already paid by Brown to partially complete the house, and (4) the amount Brown paid to Fort Worth Mortgage. The jury also found that the Bank had knowingly engaged in false, misleading, and deceptive acts, failed to comply with express or implied warranties, and engaged in an unconscionable course of action, and that the Bank's acts were the producing cause of Brown's damages. Even if the Bank's acts could support the jury's liability findings, there is no evidence that they were the producing cause of Brown's damages. Brown identifies certain acts of the Bank that he contends support the jury's findings that the Bank violated the DTPA. But the acts he cites either were not the producing cause of the damages, were Compean's acts and not the Bank's, or could not have been a DTPA violation as a matter of law. First, Brown contends that the Bank made periodic inspections of the construction site and contacted him once problems arose, and that the Bank tried to get Compean to settle his disputes with Brown and complete the house according to the specifications. None of these acts, however, can logically be considered an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause of the damages found by the jury. Brown also cites as evidence Compean's failure to pay suppliers, resulting in additional liens on the property. This failure was Compean's act, not the Bank's. Finally, Brown asserts that the Bank represented that it had more legal rights than it actually did by insisting on full payment when the house was not yet complete. See TEX. BUS. & COM.CODE § 17.46(b)(12). But the mechanic's lien contract that secured the Brown note provides that in the event of partial or substandard completion of the house the holder of the debt and note shall have a valid and subsisting lien for said contract price, less such amount as would be reasonably necessary to complete said improvements according to said plans and specifications, or in such event the owner and holder of the hereinbefore mentioned indebtedness and note, at his option, shall have the right to complete said improvements, and the liens herein given shall inure to the benefit of said owner and holder. (emphasis added). The contract's operable language is identical to language this Court has already interpreted in Ogden v. Dickinson State Bank, 662 S.W.2d 330 (Tex.1983), where the plaintiff also alleged a violation of section 17.46(b)(12). This contract provision only determines the amount secured under the lien. There is no DTPA violation for beginning foreclosure under a lien against a partially-completed house when the lien allows the lienholder the option to complete the house for the full value of the lien or risk foreclosing on a partially secured debt. Ogden, 662 S.W.2d at 332-33. Brown is still personally liable for the full amount under the note. Id. at 333. Thus, the Bank's demand for full payment was within its legal rights. We hold that there is no evidence that the Bank's acts were the producing cause of Brown's damages and that as a matter of law the Bank's demand for full payment under the note in this case did not violate the DTPA.