Opinion ID: 8410531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Substantive Reasonableness of Jones’ Sentence

Text: Finally, we reject Jones’ argument that his sentence of 180 months is substantively unreasonable. In assessing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, for abuse of discretion, we-review questions of law de novo and questions of fact for clear error. United States v. Bonilla, 618 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation .omitted). We may not substitute our own judgment for that of the district court and can find substantively unreasonable only those sentences that are so “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law” that affirming them would “damage the administration of justice.” United States v. Bigas, 583. F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). In the “overwhelming majority of cases,” a sentence within the Guidelines range will “fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable.” United States v. Perez-Frias, 636 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Jones’ Guidelines range was 210 months to 262 months, the top of which was lowered to 240 months, the statutory maximum for assault of a federal officer. The court imposed a sentence of 180 months, or fiftéen years, which, while substantial, was considerably below the Guidelines range. The primary thrust of Jones’ argument is that a fifteen-year sentence is substantively unreasonable for an assault of a federal officer that consists solely of biting the victim’s finger and in which the injury was not permanent. Jones’ argument, however, misses the mark. The district court specified a combination of reasons for the fifteen-year sentence, including: (1) the need to encourage respect for the law and cooperation with law enforcement officials who are attempting to carry out their lawful duties; (2) Jones’ substantial prior criminal history, consisting of seven prior convictions, two of which, in addition to the assault of the officer, resulted in him being designated a career offender; and (3) Jones’ substantial history of misconduct while incarcerated, including twenty-seven occasions upon which he was disciplined. Jones attempts to compare his case to instances where defendants were convicted of violating the same statute, received lower sentences, and arguably committed more egregious conduct. That defendants convicted of similar or even more serious conduct received lower sentences, however, does not render Jones’ sentence substantively unreasonable. Plainly, the district court also relied upon Jones’ criminal and prison history, including his career offender status, which distinguishes this ease from those to which he refers. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Jones’ sentence was substantively unreasonable.