Opinion ID: 1862228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the fact finding process

Text: The factfinder, whether it be jury or judge, or both of them, has two objectives in evaluating the testimony of any witness: 1. How much does the witness really know of the events he relates as facts; and 2. Is he accurate and truthful in his relation of the events? Factfinders want evidence that is reliable, trustworthy. The purpose of a trial is to furnish the factfinder the best opportunity, the best basis possible to reach these objectives. These objectives and this purpose of a trial never change, but are always the same. The lawyer's role in this enterprise varies, however. With the run-of-the-mill witness, questioning by the attorney who calls him seeks to demonstrate that the witness does indeed have first-hand knowledge of what he relates and that he is truthful and accurate. The role of the adversary is to show, if possible, that one or both these objectives has not been satisfied. Yet it often happens that while some of the facts the witness observed are favorable, others are not. The lawyer therefore knows that by placing this witness in the witness chair, the factfinder is going to hear testimony that does not help his client's case. Quite naturally, the lawyer attempts to minimize the unfavorable, frequently by attempts to nudge his witness away from the unfavorable testimony. Courts have not permitted a party to call a disinterested witness, and after eliciting favorable testimony from him, attempt to cross-examine him as to the testimony that is unfavorable. Moffett v. State, 456 So.2d 714, 718 (Miss. 1984); Gardner v. State, 368 So.2d 245, 249 (Miss. 1979); Manning v. State, 188 Miss. 393, 195 So. 319 (1940). Courts have called this the voucher rule. Moffett, 456 So.2d at 718. It is something in the nature of an estoppel to place a totally disinterested witness on the stand and ask the factfinder to believe that which is favorable to your case, yet reject that which is unfavorable. A different rule prevails where a party, in order to prove his case, must call the adverse party or a clearly hostile witness to the stand. In such instance, courts allow leading questions to be addressed to such witnesses. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-53, repealed Ch. 573, § 141 Laws 1991; MRE Rule 611(c). Finally, there is the witness who unexpectedly on the witness stand becomes hostile to the party calling him, or who relates a story completely different from his pretrial statements. In such instances the lawyer, caught by surprise, is permitted to ask leading questions. Moffett, 456 So.2d at 718. Courts have had to struggle not only with the manner in which a witness may be questioned by the party calling him, but also the weight which the factfinder is authorized to give to a pretrial contradictory statement at odds with the witness's trial testimony. May the pretrial out-of-court statement be considered as substantive evidence of the fact it relates? And, if it cannot be considered as substantive evidence, how can a court be sure the jury did not in fact so consider it? If Wilkins told Barnes that he killed Garner, this was an admission and would have been competent evidence for Barnes as a witness to relate. It was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, or indeed as we have held in Yawn v. State, 220 Miss. 767, 71 So.2d 779, 780 (1954), was not hearsay but direct evidence. However, it has never been the rule that voluntary admissions of a defendant himself made either in or out of court are hearsay. They are admissions against interest. Yawn, 220 Miss. at 771, 71 So.2d at 780. And obviously, if Barnes had testified that he did transport a bag of bloody clothes to a dumpster and set it afire, this was not hearsay but direct evidence of facts of which Barnes had personal knowledge. Wright's testimony as to what Barnes told him was hearsay, however. It was not admissible under our pre-rules decisions in the absence of showing that the State had been surprised by Barnes's testimony at trial. Then, and only then would the State have been permitted to offer such statements to Wright solely to impeach Barnes's credibility as a witness, and not as substantive evidence of the facts related in pretrial statements. Moffett, 456 So.2d at 718-19; Allison v. State, 447 So.2d 649, 650 (Miss. 1984); Shelton v. State, 445 So.2d 844, 847 (Miss. 1984); Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468, 473 (Miss. 1983); Gardner v. State, 368 So.2d 245, 249 (Miss. 1979); Denton v. State, 348 So.2d 1031, 1034 (Miss. 1977); Murphy v. State, 336 So.2d 213, 216-217 (Miss. 1976); Magee v. Magee, 320 So.2d 779, 783 (Miss. 1975); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss. 1975); Hammons v. State, 291 So.2d 177, 179 (Miss. 1974); Hooks v. State, 197 So.2d 238, 240 (Miss. 1967) (reversible error to admit such testimony in absence of showing surprise); Hall v. State, 250 Miss. 253, 165 So.2d 345, 350 (1964); Manning v. State, 188 Miss. 393, 398, 195 So. 319, 320 (1940); Bove v. State, 185 Miss. 547, 554, 188 So. 557, 558 (1939); State of Mississippi v. Durham, 444 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir.1971); Ellis & Williams, Mississippi Evidence § 4-8 (1983). Courts generally made a further restriction upon the introduction of inconsistent pretrial statements, namely: the inconsistent statement had to be about a material, not a collateral matter. Because Barnes would have been competent to testify to these facts as a willing witness, this was a material, not a collateral matter. White v. State, 532 So.2d 1207, 1217 (Miss. 1988); Price v. Simpson, 205 So.2d 642, 643 (Miss. 1968); Jones v. State, 180 Miss. 210, 177 So. 35, 37 (1937); Witt v. State, 159 Miss. 478, 132 So. 338 (1931); Williams v. State, 73 Miss. 820, 19 So. 826 (1896). The reasoning behind the courts' reluctance to permit a party to introduce prior inconsistent statements made by his own witness was the fear that an accused might be convicted upon unsworn pretrial statements. United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.1975). Judges have endeavored to minimize this danger by instructing a jury that the unsworn pretrial statements could not be considered as substantive evidence, but only to impeach the credibility of a witness who by his testimony has ambushed the party calling him. It has also been of chronic concern to courts whether a jury would or could divest their minds of the statement proved to have been made by the witness, and not treat it as substantive evidence. As stated in Williams, 73 Miss. at 826, 19 So. at 327: If the jury believed that he made such statement, would it be natural for them to obey the instruction of the court, and restrict their consideration of it to the impeachment of the witness? They might endeavor to do so, and believe they were doing so, and still be involuntarily and unconsciously influenced thereby. See also, Moffett, 456 So.2d at 720. Indeed, permitting a jury to hear such testimony and then instructing it not to consider it except for impeachment has been called by one scholar a pious fraud. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L.Rev. 177, 193 (1948). Clearly there was no element of surprise in this case. The State did not claim surprise; Barnes had testified in his own defense in his own trial a week previously, and was cross-examined. While his testimony in his own trial is not in this record, it is inconceivable that he did not then make the same denials as to the statements to Wright and McKenzie that he made in Wilkins' trial. Had he testified in his own trial that he had made such statements to Wright and McKenzie and they were correct, he would have been admitting guilt on the witness stand to being an accessory after the fact, for which he had been indicted. Also, while the State cross-examined Barnes at length about the statements he purportedly had made to Wright and McKenzie, there was a conspicuous absence of any cross-examination as to inconsistent testimony from his own trial. There being no surprise to the State in Barnes's testimony, under all our pre-rules decisions it was not competent to allow Wright's testimony as to the pretrial statements. Having said all this, it should also be noted that we observed in Moffett that the rule is not in favor, 456 So.2d at 718, thus signaling that changes might be made. There have been critics of the rule. [2] As observed by Judge Learned Hand in DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2nd Cir.1925): If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before, they are none the less deciding from what they see and hear of that person and in court. In Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613 and 607, Professor Graham in his seminal article in 75 Michigan Law Review 1565, 1573 (1977) states: In summary, the opponents of the Orthodox Rule argue that, so long as the witness is in court and subject to cross-examination, the hearsay problems are eliminated and prior inconsistent statements of the witness should be substantively admissible. They contend further that substantive admissibility is desirable because the proximity of prior statements to the event in question makes them more trustworthy than in-court testimony and because substantive admissibility protects parties from turncoat witnesses. Finally, they urge that the Orthodox Rule does not accomplish its primary purpose because juries are unable or unwilling to distinguish between statements admitted substantively and those admitted solely as evidence of the witness' credibility.