Opinion ID: 1217175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sixth Amendment and Procedural Due Process Rights of the United States Constitution

Text: Generally, the granting of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921, reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 925, 84 S.Ct. 1218, 12 L.Ed.2d 217 (1964); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S.Ct. 321, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940). A significant limitation on that discretion occurs where denial of a continuance results in the violation of a defendant's right to due process or his sixth amendment right to compulsory process. The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part as follows: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.... U.S. Const.amend. VI. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 1023 (1967), the United States Supreme Court noted that [t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense. Courts have discussed numerous factors which are weighed to determine whether the failure to grant a continuance rises to constitutional dimensions. Of particular importance are the reasons for the requested continuance presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. at 589, 84 S.Ct. at 849-50, 11 L.Ed.2d at 931. A continuance in a criminal trial essentially involves a question of procedural due process. Implicitly, the courts balance the private interest that will be affected and the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used against the government interest in fiscal and administrative efficiency. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (procedural due process standard). When the individual interest at stake is the defendant's life or liberty, the individual interest is especially compelling. An interest such as, in this case, defendant's life is factored heavily into the analysis. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1093-94, 84 L.Ed.2d 53, 63 (1985). On the other side of the scale, the government has an interest in procuring testimony within a reasonable time. Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir.1981); see also Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 444 (3d Cir.1987) (in a first-degree murder and kidnapping case, government interest prevailed where excluded testimony was available from another source), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 979, 108 S.Ct. 1277, 99 L.Ed.2d 488, reh'g denied, 486 U.S. 1018, 108 S.Ct. 1759, 100 L.Ed.2d 220 (1988); McKinney v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir.) (in an assault with intent to commit murder case, government interest prevailed where defendant failed to articulate specific basis for request at time of motion for continuance), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 973, 94 S.Ct. 1998, 40 L.Ed.2d 562 (1974); Taylor v. Minnesota, 466 F.2d 1119, 1122 (8th Cir.1972) (in a case involving an attempt to force a young woman to become a prostitute, government interest prevailed where there was no showing of a lack of diligence by the state), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956, 93 S.Ct. 1425, 35 L.Ed.2d 689 (1973); Allen v. Rhay, 431 F.2d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir.1970) (in a robbery case, government interest prevailed where defendant failed to preserve error in record), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 834, 92 S.Ct. 116, 30 L.Ed.2d 64 (1971). Where highly relevant and noncumulative evidence is excluded by the denial of the continuance, courts have often held that the defendant's constitutional rights outweighed the government's interest. See, e.g., Bennett v. Scroggy, 793 F.2d 772, 775-76 (6th Cir.1986) (in a murder case, individual interest prevailed where missing witness' testimony was unique and noncumulative); Dickerson v. Alabama, 667 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (11th Cir.) (in a robbery case, individual interest prevailed because inherent credibility of alibi testimony by police officer was not considered cumulative), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 878, 103 S.Ct. 173, 74 L.Ed.2d 142 (1982); Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1148-50 (in a breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony and involuntary sexual battery case, individual interest prevailed where testimony was from defendant's only expert witness on issue of insanity defense). Moreover, cases have further shifted the balance away from the government's interest where significant culpability by the government is found. See, e.g., Renzi v. Virginia, 794 F.2d 155, 159 (4th Cir.1986) (in a possession of PCP case, individual interest prevailed in due process challenge where government gave intentionally misleading information to defendant, who lost opportunity to produce critical witness); Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F.2d 618, 624-26 (2d Cir. 1978) (in a possession of a dangerous drug case, individual interest prevailed where government improperly released defendant's witness from custody after his arrest pursuant to a material witness order), cert. denied sub nom. Abrams v. Singleton, 440 U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 1266, 59 L.Ed.2d 486 (1979); United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1018-23 (6th Cir.1977) (in a bank robbery case, individual interest prevailed where government both did not exercise due diligence in securing presence of expert witnesses and violated a stipulation not to make a certain related argument); Shirley v. North Carolina, 528 F.2d 819, 822 (4th Cir.1975) (in a violation of state narcotics laws case, individual interest prevailed in due process challenge where government made clearly unsupported assertion that witness might never be available). Lester Wyatt failed to appear in response to a timely and properly issued subpoena by the State. Subsequent extensive efforts made in good faith by the State to locate him were unsuccessful. Testimony at trial indicated that Wyatt had previously been known to hide out from authorities until things calmed down or [until authorities] weren't looking for him any more. Additional testimony indicated that he was able to live in the woods for an extended period of time under conditions that others could not survive. The full foliage in the mountains added to the difficulty in locating him. There was no culpability by the State in this case, because the authorities had made extensive efforts to locate him after diligently serving him with a subpoena. In fact, there were warrants out for Wyatt's arrest on totally different charges in addition to the order for his arrest which the trial court issued in this case. Moreover, in light of the fact that Lester Wyatt's testimony was admitted into evidence by way of statements he had made in an interview with a detective of the county Sheriff's Department and, more importantly, statements he had made in an interview with defendant's counsel, the risk of error resulting from a denial of the continuance is significantly low here. We hold that the trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated defendant's constitutional rights to compulsory process or due process in denying the continuance.