Opinion ID: 867207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged violation of right to fair and impartial jury

Text: ¶ 9 Nelson argues he was deprived of a fair and impartial jury because the trial court did not specifically ask potential jurors about contact they may have had with Juror 56, who was excused. Because Nelson did not raise this issue below, we review for fundamental error. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). ¶ 10 When potential jurors were summoned to the Mohave County Courthouse, the judge admonished them to ignore media coverage; warned that newspaper, radio, and TV coverage is not evidence; and advised them to alert the court if they were exposed to any type of media coverage. During individual voir dire, Juror 56 said he had looked up as much information as [he] could on the Internet about the case because his teenage daughter had been killed and he had very strong feelings about another young person being killed. Both parties agreed to excuse him. ¶ 11 The court continued individual voir dire, questioning each juror regarding prior knowledge about the case. Juror 60 referred to Juror 56, stating that he seemed nervous as he was leaving and she guess[ed] his circumstances were a little crazy. When asked specifically if she had learned anything about the case, she said no. Thirteen more potential jurors were questioned, and none reported that Juror 56 had said anything about the case. Nelson subsequently struck Juror 60. ¶ 12 Juror misconduct necessitates a new trial only if `the defense shows actual prejudice or if prejudice may be fairly presumed from the facts.' State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 208 ¶ 58, 84 P.3d 456, 473 (2004) (quoting State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555, 558, 875 P.2d 788, 794 (1994)) (emphasis and internal citation omitted). In a criminal case, prejudice may be presumed from `any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury.' Id. (quoting Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954)). But [p]rejudice cannot be presumed without the requisite showing that the jury received and considered extrinsic evidence on the issues. Id. ¶ 59. ¶ 13 Nelson has not shown prejudice, nor may it be presumed here. Juror 56 was excused, and the record does not suggest he shared any information about the case with other potential jurors.