Opinion ID: 1462048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Seat Belt Evidence Limited Admissibility

Text: The admission of evidence for a limited purpose is contemplated by Delaware Rules of Evidence 105. [8] It is generally accompanied by an appropriate instruction to the jury. The limited instruction can be given, upon request or ex mero motu: at the time the evidence is admitted; in the charge to the jury before deliberations; or on both occasions. See D.R.E. 105; cf. Weber v. State, Del.Supr., 547 A.2d 948 (1988). In this case, General Motors wishes to admit seat belt evidence with regard to two limited issues. First, General Motors seeks to establish the reasonableness of its seat design. General Motors plans to do so by demonstrating that the use of a seat belt was an essential safety feature of the vehicle's over-all design. Second, General Motors seeks to negate the plaintiffs' contention that its design was the proximate cause of Mrs. Wolhar's enhanced injuries. General Motors intends to do so by demonstrating that Mrs. Wolhar's enhanced injuries were proximately caused due to her failure to occupy and operate the 1987 Chevrolet Blazer as designed for safety, i.e., her failure to wear her seat belt. The plaintiffs acknowledge that the existence of seat belts is admissible as evidence to demonstrate reasonableness of design. The plaintiffs object, however, to evidence or inferences that the seat belts were not used. General Motors contends it is not logical to admit evidence that it designed and provided seat belts for Mrs. Wolhar's safety without also permitting it to demonstrate her non-use of those seat belts was the supervening cause of her enhanced injuries. Thus, General Motors seeks to assert Mrs. Wolhar's non-use of her seat belt as a complete defense to her action for negligent design. This Court considered an analogous contention in another case with regard to evidence of negligent parental supervision. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Huang, Del.Supr., 652 A.2d 568 (1995). In Huang, this Court held that although Delaware did not recognize a cause of action for negligent parental supervision, such evidence was admissible to establish that the parent's negligence was the supervening cause of a minor child's injuries that were alleged to have been proximately caused by the defendant. Id. at 574. Once again, we note that Lipscomb is distinguishable. In Lipscomb, the Superior Court, without discussing proximate causation, only determined that evidence of nonuse of seat belts was inadmissible by a driver defendant at common law to establish either the plaintiffs duty to wear a seat belt or the plaintiffs contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, or failure to mitigate damages. Lipscomb v. Diamiani, Del.Supr., 226 A.2d 914, 918 (1967). The duty to wear a seat belt has now been codified in the Seat Belt Safety Act. Concomitantly, evidence of failure to wear an occupant protection system was restricted significantly by the General Assembly. 21 Del.C. § 4803(i). We are persuaded, however, that as a matter of common law, seat belt evidence is admissible in an action for negligently defective vehicular design for crashworthiness to disprove proximate causation, i.e., to establish that seat belts were an integral part of the vehicle's over-all safety design and that the non-use of seat belts was the supervening cause of the plaintiffs enhanced injuries. [9] Accord Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Huang, 652 A.2d at 574; Duphily v. Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc., Del.Supr., 662 A.2d 821, 828 (1995); see also Straley v. United States, 887 F.Supp. 728, 742-43 (D.N.J.1995). A plaintiff cannot recover unless it is established that the defendants' negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. Money v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Compensation Trust Fund, Del.Supr., 596 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1991); Culver v. Bennett, Del.Supr., 588 A.2d 1094, 1097 (1991); see also Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38, 740 (3d Cir.1976). Permitting a plaintiff to allege that she was injured by a defective vehicular design, while at the same time, preventing the defendant manufacturer from introducing evidence that the plaintiffs failure to use an essential safety device designed and supplied by the manufacturer was the supervening cause of the plaintiffs injuries, would essentially remove the issue of proximate cause in crashworthiness litigation. MacDonald v. General Motors Corp., 784 F.Supp. at 499-500; see also Duphily v. Delaware Elec. Co-op., Inc., 662 A.2d at 828-30.