Opinion ID: 2221513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prosecutor's statements during closing arguments

Text: ¶ 81. Even if the admission of the other crimes evidence was not an error entitling him to a new trial, the defendant argues that a new trial is warranted on an alternative ground: prosecutorial misconduct during the closing arguments. The defendant's argument relates to two separate statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. ¶ 82. The first statement occurred near the beginning of the prosecutor's closing argument. The prosecutor stated, So what is the truth? We talked a lot about the credibility of witnesses when we started this, and the bottom line is this, do you believe Tina as I do? The defense immediately objected, and the court sustained the objection, stating, Counsel, you know better than that. The defense did not request a mistrial at that time. The defense argues that this statement was grossly improper because the prosecutor invited the jury to trust his judgment rather than its own view of the evidence. The defense contends that the error was prejudicial because Tina H.'s credibility was so essential to the case. ¶ 83. The second remark occurred during the prosecutor's rebuttal. During cross-examination, the prosecutor had asked the defendant's wife whether she said that fucker when Tina H.'s mother first called and told her about the assault. The defendant's wife denied making the statement, and the prosecutor did not question Tina H.'s mother on the matter. The defense commented during closing arguments that the prosecutor's own witness never verified this statement. On rebuttal, the prosecutor said, Counsel made reference to the district attorney's question about that profanity word, that f___er, and he says my witness didn't even say that on the stand, and you know what, she didn't. You know why she didn't? I didn't ask the question. The defense promptly objected, and the court told the prosecutor, Let's talk about what is in the evidence. The prosecutor moved on to other matters, and the defense did not request a mistrial at the time. The defense argues that this comment in effect constituted unsworn testimony by the prosecutor that the defendant's wife made the alleged statement and that such error deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. ¶ 84. The defendant did not move for a mistrial at the time either of these remarks were made or at any time before the jury returned its verdict. After the jury found the defendant guilty, the defendant filed a motion for mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct based on these allegedly improper statements. The defendant argued that the motion was properly characterized as a motion for mistrial rather than a postconviction motion, because the judgment of conviction had not yet been entered. ¶ 85. At a hearing on the motion, the trial court indicated that the prosecutor's statements were in error and that in both instances, the court had even with the tone of voice, basically, curtly sustained the objection when the comments were made. However, the court held that neither error had so infected the trial with unfairness as to impact the defendant's due process rights. Furthermore, the court held that the defendant's motion for a mistrial was not timely because it should have been made at the time of the prosecutor's alleged misconduct. The trial court therefore concluded that whether the defendant's motion was construed as a motion for a mistrial or as a motion for a new trial, it must be denied. ¶ 86. We conclude that the defendant waived his objections to the prosecutor's statement by failing to make a timely motion for mistrial. A defendant's failure to move for a mistrial before the jury returned its judgment constitutes a waiver of his objections to the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments. Haskins v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 408, 424, 294 N.W.2d 25 (1980); Neely v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 38, 54-55, 292 N.W.2d 859 (1980); State v. Patino, 177 Wis. 2d 348, 380, 502 N.W.2d 601 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Holt, 128 Wis. 2d 110, 137, 382 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1985). If defense counsel had not intended to so waive his complaints there existed ample opportunity to make said motion on the record, before or after the court charged the jury; failure to do so constitutes a waiver of those complaints. Davis v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 284, 287, 212 N.W.2d 139 (1973). ¶ 87. The defendant argues that even if his motion for mistrial was not timely made, a new trial is warranted because the prosecutor's conduct constituted plain error under Wis. Stat. § 901.03(4) and to accomplish the ends of justice under Wis. Stat. § 752.35. [16] ¶ 88. It is true that certain errors are so plain or fundamental that they cannot be waived. Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 21, n.5, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990). When a defendant alleges that a prosecutor's statements constituted misconduct, the test we apply is whether the statements `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' State v. Wolff, 171 Wis. 2d 161, 167, 491 N.W.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1992)(quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). We cannot conclude that the prosecutor's statements in this case were so egregious as to constitute plain error. The comments were limited in scope, and the trial court sustained the defendant's objections and directed the prosecutor to limit his argument to the facts in evidence. The defendant made no motion for mistrial after the trial court addressed the objections. `[A]ll we can assume is that the defendant was satisfied with the court's ruling and curative measure, and that he had no further objections. The defendant took his chances with the jury, curative instruction and all.' Neely, 97 Wis. 2d at 55 (quoting Neely v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 304, 319, 272 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1980)). Accordingly, we find no plain error and decline to grant a new trial in the interests of justice. Neely, 97 Wis. 2d at 55. [8] ¶ 89. In sum, although the prosecutor's statements appear to have been improper, we conclude that the defendant waived his objections to the statements by failing to make a contemporaneous motion for mistrial. We also determine that the prosecutor's statements did not constitute plain error or warrant reversal in the interests of justice.