Opinion ID: 573333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 13 Petitioner contends that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated because the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to prove that he possessed the requisite mens rea for first-degree murder. The victim of the crime was killed during a robbery of his store. Petitioner was not at the scene of the crime, but the State prosecuted him under an aiding and abetting theory. 14 There is no dispute as to the facts of this case. Rather, petitioner contends that the district court failed to use the proper legal standard in determining that sufficient evidence existed to convict him of felony murder in Michigan. Petitioner does not clearly state in his brief what he believes is the improper legal standard applied by the district court; nevertheless, petitioner correctly asserts that conviction of an accused without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged, is a violation of the accused's due process rights. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 15 In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Supreme Court established the standard to be applied in determining whether the evidence in support of a state court conviction is sufficient to satisfy due process. The proper inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the evidence adduced at trial. Furthermore, this court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; see also Spalla v. Foltz, 788 F.2d 400, 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 935 (1986). Moreover, as the district court correctly stated, evidence will not be considered insufficient simply because it is circumstantial. Foltz, 788 F.2d at 402. 16 In Michigan, murder is judicially defined: [m]urder is where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being, in the peace of the state, with malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304, 319 (1980) (citations omitted). Michigan's felony murder statute under Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.316 provides that [m]urder which is perpetrated ... or which is committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate ... robbery ... is murder of the first degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for life. This statute simply raises the level of a second-degree murder to a first-degree murder. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d at 322. Under Michigan law, malice is an essential element of any murder including felony murder. Intent to commit the underlying felony does not suffice as malice for murder. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d at 326; People v. Kelly, 423 Mich. 261, 378 N.W.2d 365, 370 (1985); People v. Flowers, No. 133312, 1991 Wl 168683, at 7, 1991 Mich.App. LEXIS 385, at  7-8 (Sept. 3, 1991). 17 For purposes of murder, malice is the intention to kill, the intention to do great bodily harm, or the wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of defendant's behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d at 326; Kelly, 423 Mich. 261, 378 N.W.2d at 370; Flowers, 1991 WL 168683 at 8, 1991 Mich.App. LEXIS 385, at  9. The facts and circumstances involved in the commission of a felony may provide sufficient evidence to prove malice. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 326; Kelly, 423 Mich. 261, 378 N.W.2d at 370; Flowers, 1991 WL 168683, at 8, 1991 Mich.App. LEXIS 385, at  10. 18 Finally, under Michigan's aiding and abetting statute, Mich.Comp.Laws § 767.39, one who procures, counsels, aids or abets in the commission of an offense is as guilty as the one who directly committed the offense. The mens rea required for conviction of aiding and abetting in a particular offense is the same as that required for the principal of the offense. Kelly, 423 Mich. 261, 378 N.W.2d at 372; see also Flowers, 1991 WL 168683, at 10, 1991 Mich.App. LEXIS 385, at  12. 19 Based on the evidence, a rational jury could have determined that petitioner intended to have Mike's Meat market robbed and that petitioner aided in the robbery by informing the principals where the store kept its receipts. As to felony-murder, a rational jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner acted with wanton and willful disregard when petitioner aided in the robbery and told the principals to rough up the victim. As the district court found, [p]etitioner set in motion a force that was likely to cause great bodily harm or death. 20 Petitioner argues that in order to find malice for felony murder, the evidence must have shown that he knew of the principals' intent to kill or to cause bodily harm. This contention is incorrect. Knowledge of a principal's intent to kill or cause bodily harm is one means by which wanton and willful disregard may be shown, but it is not the only means. See Kelly, 378 N.W.2d at 372; Flowers, 1991 WL 168683, at 10-11, 1991 Mich.App. Lexis 385, at  12-13. 21 Finally, because in Michigan the killing of another human being with malice during the perpetration of a robbery constitutes first-degree murder, a rational jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was guilty of first-degree murder.