Opinion ID: 735453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instinctive Flight v. Reckless Endangerment

Text: 8 In this case, we must define the scope of section 3C1.2 and determine what conduct is sufficient to warrant its application. Section 3C1.2 states: 9 If the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer, increase by 2 levels. 10 The guidelines define reckless as a situation in which the defendant was aware of the risk created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a situation. USSG § 2A1.4, comment. (n.1). We have had little opportunity to determine when a foot flight can rise to the level of reckless endangerment. 11 In United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 389, 390-91 (9th Cir.1990), the defendant fled on foot after a traffic stop. Police pursued him into a nearby field, where he surrendered. The district court enhanced the defendant's sentence based on section 3C1.1, obstruction of justice, which was applied in flight cases prior to the 1990 addition of section 3C1.2. We reversed, explaining that obstruction of justice required something different from the instinctive flight of a suspect who suddenly finds himself in the power of the police. 'Mere flight in the immediate aftermath of a crime' does not justify the enhancement. Id. at 392 (quoting United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir.1990)). 12 Appellants ask us to hold that section 3C1.2 does not apply to foot flight, pointing out that the majority of our caselaw applying section 3C1.2 involved vehicle pursuits, often at high-speeds. While we recognize that courts typically apply section 3C1.2 enhancements in the context of high-speed or dangerous vehicle pursuits, we have not precluded application of section 3C1.2 to other situations, including foot flight. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Lopez, 13 F.3d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir.1994) (finding that additional danger to the motoring public posed by defendant's foot flight is of the same type created by their high-speed chase and is within the 'heartland'  of section 3C1.2); Young, 33 F.3d at 33 (Wiggins, J., concurring) (emphasizing that reckless endangerment could include not only driving recklessly, but also seeking to escape on foot). Thus, we decline appellants' request, but reiterate the rule that instinctive flight on foot from law enforcement is insufficient on its own to justify the application of section 3C1.2. The guidelines contemplate that some additional conduct must create a substantial risk. 13 Having determined that, without more, instinctive flight does not constitute reckless endangerment, we must consider whether the defendants' conduct constituted mere flight, or included additional behavior that recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.