Opinion ID: 3022108
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Loss Range

Text: 6 Panaro also contends that the District Court erred in calculating the “loss range” resulting from his crimes. Specifically, he argues that it was a mistake for the Court to calculate loss by treating all monies received in connection with the fraudulently brokered transactions, less “an arbitrarily determined ‘reasonable’ fee relating to such transactions,” because “there was no evidence that fees charged by [Panaro] violated any state or federal laws or regulations or that there was a ‘cap’ on such charges which was exceeded.” Normally, we review the calculation of loss for clear error. United States v. Taftsiou, 144 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1998). Panano, however, failed to preserve the loss range argument he now raises on appeal. At sentencing, he objected to the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) recommended loss range of $500,000 to $800,000, see PSR, Addendum, p. 39 (“The Defendant objects to the loss calculation as being in the $500,000 to $800,000 category, suggesting instead that it should be in the $350,000 to $500,000 category.”), and the District Court sustained that objection, later describing its decision to go to the lower range as giving Panaro “the benefit of the doubt.” Panaro is now asserting an argument never presented to the District Court, that is, that the $350,000 to $500,000 category is inapplicable. Panaro’s failure to raise this point before the Court dictates that we review the loss range calculation for plain error.2 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 2 Panaro also fails to inform us precisely what loss range he believes is applicable. He argues that the amount he advocated for in the District Court—$350,000 to $500,000—is inapplicable, but he does not tell us what the range should be instead. 7 Panaro’s loss range argument underwhelms in any event. He contends that the District Court’s allowance of approximately $3,000 per fraudulent transaction, which it determined that Panano’s businesses could have legitimately charged on a non-fraudulent loan, was “arbitrary” (i.e., too low) despite the fact that Carol Kirby of the Delaware Bank Commissioner’s Office testified that $3,000 was a reasonable fee for a nonprocessing broker to charge per legitimate loan. Because there is no cap on broker fees under Delaware law and brokers are allowed to charge up to ten percent of the loan amount under federal law, Panaro deems it error that the District Court only discounted the loss amount by $3,000 per fraudulent loan. In other words, Panaro believes it unjust that the District Court refused to discount the loss amount by ten percent of the sum of the fraudulent loans because, in his view, he was entitled to that kind of fee in exchange for defrauding his customers. The District Court’s calculation of loss range was not plain error, that is, an error that is plain and substantially affects Panaro’s rights adversely. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Indeed, it is arguable that the District Court was overly generous in discounting Panaro’s loss amount in the first instance by $3,000 because that amount is what the evidence established was a reasonable fee for a legitimately obtained loan. Kirby never opined what amount would be a reasonable fee for a fraudulently obtained loan. Most likely, that is because no legitimate fee can be earned for helping someone obtain a fraudulent loan, i.e., aiding in the commission of a federal crime. As the Government explains, ruling that Panaro deserved his loss amount discounted by a fee 8 to compensate him for his illegal brokerage activities is akin to saying that an individual who helps in the planning of the bank robbery should enjoy some of the proceeds. Put another way, we would have affirmed the District Court in this case had it decided not to discount the loss amount by any fee amount.