Opinion ID: 2630928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Driveway Removal

Text: The Fricks also argue that the forced removal of the Lot 3 driveways was a compensable taking. On appeal, they do not explain why the City's requiring the removal of the driveways was erroneous or amounted to a taking. They merely assert that the driveways were exempt from the City Code. In other words, they do not dispute that the City had the right to require the removal of any driveway that was constructed in violation of the City Code. Their dispute relates to whether there was a code violation and whether the only code provision at issue is the one specifically mentioned by the City in its letter demanding the removal of the driveways. This letter was sent on May 3, 2005, shortly after the Fricks installed the Lot 3 driveways. In the letter, the City's Director of Public Works O'Leary notified the Fricks that the construction of the two driveway approaches on the south side of East Pacific Avenue was in violation of city codes including Section 35-151 involving required permits for driveway approaches. Salina City Code Ordinance § 35-151 (2010) (enacted in 1966) provides in part that [n]o sidewalks, driveway approaches, curbing, guttering or any other concrete work in any street or public grounds in the city shall be constructed, reconstructed or rebuilt until a permit has been issued. Although the Fricks removed the Lot 3 driveways, they argued that City Ordinance § 35-151 did not apply because it pertains to the installation of concrete structures and the Lot 3 driveways were constructed using dirt fill. During district court proceedings, the City asserted that the Fricks' installation of the Lot 3 driveways violated Salina City Ordinance § 35-129 (2010) (enacted in 1966). At or before the summary judgment hearing, the Fricks did not advance any arguments specific to City Ordinance § 35-129, except to point out that the City's May 3, 2005, letter requesting removal of the Lot 3 driveways did not specifically mention that particular ordinance. In its order of summary judgment, the district court found that the Fricks violated City Ordinance § 35-129, which provides: It shall be unlawful for any person to construct, alter or extend, or permit to cause to be constructed, altered or extended, any driveway approach which can be used only as a parking space or area between the curb and private property. On appeal, the Fricks do not dispute that the Lot 3 driveways constituted an area between the curb and private property. Rather, they again focus on the fact the ordinance was not specifically mentioned in the May 3, 2005, letter. They make the same argument as to yet another City Code section that the City raised for the first time on appealSalina City Code Ordinance § 35-128 (2010), which requires [a]ll driveway approaches shall be paved. This requirement has also been in place since 1966. Because this section requires driveways to be paved, it triggers the permit requirements of City Ordinance § 35-151, the one City Code provision specifically referenced in the May 3 letter. The Fricks ignore this closing of the circle and the fact that the Lot 3 driveways clearly violated one or more provisions of the City Code and continue to question whether the various provisions, including their interrelationship, can be considered when the May 3, 2005, letter only mentioned City Ordinance § 35-151. In response to that argument, the City contends we can consider the violations of City Ordinances §§ 35-128 and 35-129 because the May 3, 2005, letter, referred broadly to city codes, even though it gave only one specific example, City Ordinance § 35-151. According to the City, the letter accomplished its purpose by giving notice that the driveways did not conform to code requirements and that the City was enforcing its code by requiring the removal of the nonconforming structures. As the City argues, because the facts relating to the driveways are not disputed, a question of law is presented as to whether there was a City Code violation. See City of Wichita v. Hackett, 275 Kan. 848, 850, 69 P.3d 621 (2003) (interpretation of municipal ordinance is question of law over which appellate courts exercise unlimited review). Further, because there is solely a question of law raised by the application of the relevant City ordinances, it can be raised for the first time on appeal. See Pierce v. Board of County Commissioners, 200 Kan. 74, 80-81, 434 P.2d 858 (1967). The undisputed fact that the Lot 3 driveways were entirely dirt establishes violations of the various provisions of the City Code. As the Fricks agree, reasonable regulation of private property under the police power is not a taking and therefore does not require payment of just compensation. See Small v. Kemp, 240 Kan. 113, 116-17, 727 P.2d 904 (1986); see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126-27, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985) ([G]overnmental land-use regulation may under extreme circumstances amount to a `taking' of the affected property, but the mere imposition of a permitting or regulatory process does not imply that a taking has occurred.). And the Fricks do not argue due process violations, that the City Code sections were unreasonable regulations of the use of private property, or that removal of the driveways was not an appropriate enforcement mechanism.