Opinion ID: 1456526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Warman's sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable

Text: Finally, Warman challenges the imposition of his 97-month sentence as excessive. Warman asserts that the district court erred by adopting the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR)'s recommendation that he be attributed with 4.48 kilograms of cocaine, yielding a Base Offense Level of 30. He contends because 4369.55 grams (approximately 97.5% of the total) was based on the hearsay testimony of Walters and Hannum, the court's reliance on these amounts at sentencing violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. 1. Standard of review We review challenges to the district court's sentencing determinations for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 594, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The reasonableness inquiry has both procedural and substantive components. Caver, 470 F.3d at 248. Accordingly, [w]e must `consider not only the length of the sentence but also the factors evaluated and the procedures employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determination.' United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 539 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir.2005)). Warman does not specify whether his argument is procedural or substantive in nature. To the extent that Warman challenges the drug quantity attributed to him, the reliability of the information before the district court, or the calculation of the Guidelines, we treat his claim as one of procedural unreasonableness. United States v. Burke, 243 Fed.Appx. 69, 71 (6th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir.2006)). To the extent that Warman asserts that his 97-month sentence is excessive, we will construe his claim as one of substantive unreasonableness. See United States v. Olan-Navarro, 350 F.3d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 2003). 2. Warman's sentence is procedurally reasonable When reviewing a sentence for procedural reasonableness, we must ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.... Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Our `reasonableness review focuses on the factors listed in § 3553(a), one of which is the Sentencing Guidelines themselves.' Moon, 513 F.3d at 539 (quoting United States v. Duckro, 466 F.3d 438, 442 (6th Cir.2006)). We may conclude that a sentence is unreasonable when the district court fails to `consider' the applicable Guidelines range or neglects to `consider' the other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and instead simply selects what the judge deems an appropriate sentence without such required consideration. Moon, 513 F.3d at 539 (citing United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 243, 250-51 (6th Cir.2007)). The § 3553(a) factors are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the appropriate advisory guideline range; (5) any other pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. Caver, 470 F.3d at 248 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). Although the district court need not engage in a ritualistic incantation of the § 3553(a) factors, its opinion should be sufficiently detailed to reflect the considerations listed in § 3553(a) and to allow for meaningful appellate review. Moon, 513 F.3d at 539 (citing United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 474 (6th Cir.2006)). The district court's opinion must also provide some indication that the court considered the defendant's arguments in favor of a lower sentence and the basis for rejecting such arguments. Id. (citing Jones, 489 F.3d at 250-51). Warman argues that the district court erred in determining the amount of cocaine attributable to him, and, by extension, the applicable Guidelines range. The amount of cocaine attributable to Warman is a factual finding that this Court normally reviews for clear error. United States v. Samuels, 308 F.3d 662, 670 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (6th Cir.1993)). However, because Warman did not object to the district court's reliance on the hearsay statements at sentencing, we review his claim for plain error. See Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386. A drug quantity need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, and an estimate will suffice.... United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d 319, 326 (6th Cir.2008). [T]estimonial evidence from a coconspirator may be sufficient to determine the amount of drugs for which another coconspirator should be held accountable. United States v. Swanberg, 370 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 697 (6th Cir.2000)). The drug quantity estimate errs on the side of caution and likely underestimates the quantity of drugs actually attributable to the defendant. Anderson, 526 F.3d at 326. Given our previous findings that both the hearsay testimony of Walters, accounting for 3977.55 grams, and the 392 grams of cocaine found in Hannum's pottery shop were properly admitted at trial, Warman's argument fails. 3. Warman's sentence is substantively reasonable In addition to procedural reasonableness, we must determine that a sentence is substantively reasonable. Webb, 403 F.3d at 383. A sentence may be substantively unreasonable where the district court select[s] the sentence arbitrarily, bas[es] the sentence on impermissible factors, fail[s] to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or giv[es] an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor. United States v. Tate, 516 F.3d 459, 469 (6th Cir.2008) (citing United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Sentences within a properly calculated Guidelines range are afforded a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Caver, 470 F.3d at 247 (citing United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir.2006)). Because Warman's sentence falls within the advisory Guidelines range, it is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Id. Warman asserts that his sentence is unreasonably excessive but he fails to offer any support for that claim. Given that Warman does not identify any particular factors that the district court did not consider, his argument amounts to nothing more than a bald assertion that the district court should have reached a different conclusion. United States v. Wright, No. 07-4085, 2009 WL 1444433, at  (6th Cir. May 26, 2009). Regardless, the record also clearly shows clear that the district court did not select Warman's sentence arbitrarily, base it on impermissible factors, or give unreasonable weight to any pertinent § 3553(a) factor in deriving it. See Tate, 516 F.3d at 469. Thus, Warman has failed to rebut the presumption that his sentence is substantively reasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.