Opinion ID: 1592875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does the 1854 treaty grant fishing rights at all?

Text: Unlike the 1837 and 1842 treaties, the treaty of 1854 contains no express grant of hunting and fishing rights to the Bad River or Red Cliff bands except to give the Bad River band limited fishing rights near Madeline Island, an area not involved in the present appeals. Appellants rely on the following language in Article 2 of the treaty as the basis for their fishing rights: The United States agree to set apart and withhold from sale, for the use of the Chippewas of Lake Superior, the following described tracts of land. . . . (Emphasis added.) The precise question is whether for the use of includes the fishing rights asserted by appellants. The circuit court found that the treaty did extend such rights. We agree. In arguing that the treaty does not grant the Chippewa fishing rights, the attorney general advances several rules for the interpretation of treaties. The first, based upon Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, [8] is that treaties should be construed so as not to override state laws. Guaranty Trust was dealing with quite a different situation than the present case, construing a treaty entered into between the United States and Russia. Contrary to the attorney general's assertion, this rule has not been applied to Indian treaties by the federal supreme court. [9] On the other hand, as will be noted below, the court has developed a set of rules specifically relating to Indian treaties. The supreme court has narrowly construed and limited the application of Guaranty Trust. [10] It would also seem logical that the effect of a treaty between the United States and Indians who have aboriginal ties to land presently making up the United States raises completely different problems than a treaty between the United States and a foreign sovereign which has no ties to the state, as was the case in Guaranty Trust. We conclude that in view of the limited construction given to Guaranty Trust by the United States Supreme Court and in view of the further fact that it is not the rule applied in Indian treaty cases, it is not the rule to be followed in the present case. A second rule advanced by the state for the interpretation of Indian treaties is that such treaties should not be construed by the court so as to meet alleged injustices, thus rewriting the terms of the treaty. This rule has been applied by the Supreme Court of the United States in cases in which the Indians were seeking money damages for the alleged forfeiture of tribal lands to the United States. [11] In such cases, results adverse to the Indians were reached only after an examination of the history and negotiations leading up to the treaty. This is consistent with a basic rule of treaty interpretation that a court will look beyond its written words to the negotiations and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties relating to the subject matter, and to their own practical construction of it. [12] Thus the rule that treaties cannot be expanded beyond their terms is to be applied only after deciding what those terms are. It is notable, too, that this rule has been applied in cases in which the Indians are seeking damages from the federal government, but has not been invoked when considering the Indians' claim to hunting and fishing rights. In Menominee Tribe v. United States , [13] for example, the Supreme Court interpreted the language in another 1854 treaty to be held as Indian lands are held to include the right to hunt and fish regardless of Wisconsin law. This was the precise position taken by this court in State v. Sanapaw . [14] The attorney general finally argues that under the doctrine of express mention-implied exclusion, no fishing rights other than those expressly granted are extended by the 1854 treaty. It is argued that other Indian treaties, not involved in these cases, do give other tribes specific grants of hunting and fishing rights, while the 1854 treaty does not grant such rights (other than those directly associated with Madeline Island). It is further pointed out that in view of the express provision for fishing in an area near Madeline Island, no other fishing rights are to be implied. The circuit court carefully considered this argument and concluded that there was no consistent phraseology in Indian treaties covering hunting and fishing rights. As we have noted, treaties which do not specifically grant hunting and fishing rights have been interpreted to extend such rights by both this court [15] and the Supreme Court of the United States. [16] The proper rule as expressed long ago is to look to the intentions of the framers of the treaty: [17] . . . The intention of the framers of the treaty, must be collected from a view of the whole instrument, and from the words made use of by them to express their intention, or from probable or rational conjectures. If the words express the meaning of the parties plainly, distinctly, and perfectly, there ought to be no other means of interpretation; but if the words are obscure, or ambiguous, or imperfect, recourse must be had to other means of interpretation, and in these three cases, we must collect the meaning from the words, or from probable or rational conjectures, or from both. (Original emphasis omitted.) Once the intention of the parties to the treaty has been ascertained, no rules of construction would authorize a different interpretation of the treaty. [18] Thus, here too it is necessary to ascertain the intent of the parties to the treaty. Appellants argue that Indian treaties are to be liberally construed in favor of the Indians and that ambiguities or uncertainties are to be resolved in favor of the tribe's position. It is apparent from reading the cases cited by appellants [19] that this rule, too, is only to enable the court to determine what the intent of the parties was. The rule advanced by appellants is invoked only when it is of assistance in determining the intent of the parties in view of the history and negotiations between the federal government and the Indians. We conclude that the basic rule for interpreting Indian treaties is to determine what was the intent of the parties. To determine that intent we must review the history of the tribe and the negotiations of the parties. To this end we are aided by a very recent (1971) opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Jondreau, [20] a case interpreting this same treaty as it affects the Chippewa's right to fish on the Keweenaw Bay on Lake Superior. In Jondreau the court concluded: [21] The substance of the right to fish must have included the right to fish on the Keweenaw Bay. For the L'Anse bank of Chippewa Indians, the fishing right on the Keweenaw Bay was clearly a valuable right. Any other construction of the treaty would make the right granted by the treaty without substance. The Indians did not have knowledge of the laws concerning municipal boundaries or sovereignty disputes between the Federal and State governments. Since they were living on land bordering the Keweenaw Bay, as `an unlettered people' they would assume that the right to fish meant the right to fish on the Keweenaw Bay. This is consistent with the interpretation given the treaty between the Menominee Indians and the United States. In State v. Sanapaw [22] this court said: It would seem unlikely that the Menominees would have knowingly relinquished their special fishing and hunting rights which they enjoyed on their own lands, and have accepted in exchange other lands with respect to which such rights did not extend. They undoubtedly believed that these rights were guaranteed to them when these other lands were ceded to them 'to be held as Indian lands are held.' Construing this ambiguous provision of the 1854 treaty favorably to the Menominees, we determine that they enjoyed the same exclusive hunting rights free from the restrictions of the state's game laws over the ceded lands, which comprised the Menominee Indian Reservation, as they had enjoyed over the lands ceded to the United States by the 1848 treaty. The attorney general correctly points out that in Jondreau the Michigan Supreme Court was construing a portion of the 1854 treaty not involved in these appeals and that the history of the Menominee tribe is different from that of the Lake Superior Chippewa. Nevertheless, one important consideration here is that the history of the Chippewa reveals an uninterrupted history of fishing on Lake Superior. They have occupied the land in what is now Bayfield and Ashland counties for more than 300 years. It is also clear that after the treaty was entered into the Indians continued their reliance upon Lake Superior. In his 1861 report, the Indian agent in Bayfield observed: This reserve being located on the lake, where there is an abundance of fish the entire year, and being under the immediate supervision of the agent, the Indians who are located thereon are the most comfortable of any within this agency. [23] As late as 1891, the Indian agent in Ashland, when discussing the activities of the members of the Red Cliff band, noted: . . . The waters of the lake yield a bountiful supply of excellent fish and the surplus catch and all other surplus products find a ready market in the city of Bayfield. In capturing fish both gill nets and pound nets are employed. The natives own a small fleet of sailboats, and in navigating their little craft they display the confidence and skill of experienced sailors. [24] In view of the more than 300 years of fishing the lake, and considering the activities of the bands after the treaty was enacted, we have no doubt but that it was the intention of the parties to the treaty for the Chippewa to retain fishing rights within the 1854 agreement. Anything that this court said in State v. Johnson, [25] the first case in which this court interpreted the 1854 Chippewa treaty, which is inconsistent with the interpretation here is overruled.