Opinion ID: 771998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Challenge to 18 U.S.C. SS 2251(a) AND 2252(b)(4)(B).

Text: 18 As noted above, Galo pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. SS 2251(a) and 2252 (a)(4)(B). Section 2251(a), is captioned Sexual Exploitation of Children, and provides in relevant part as follows: 19 Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, . .. any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (d), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. 20 18 U.S.C. S 2251(a) (emphasis added). Section 2252(a)(4)(B), is captioned Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors, and provides in relevant part: 21 (a) Any person who . . . (4) either . . . 22 (B) knowingly possesses 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported by any means including computer, if -- (i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 23 18 U.S.C. S 2252(b)(4)(B). After Galo was sentenced, we decided United States v. Rodia, 194 F .3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 2008 (2000). There we held that Congress enacted S 2252(a)(4)(B) pursuant to a valid exercise of authority under the Commerce Clause. Section 2252(a)(4)(B) imposes criminal liability on anyone who possesses child pornography that has not itself traveled in interstate commerce, so long as one of the materials used to create the pornography has traveled in interstate commerce. We reasoned that Congress could have rationally concluded that intrastate possession of child pornography created a demand that substantially affected interstate commerce. Accordingly, Congress could regulate intrastate possession of child pornography under the Commerce Clause in order to effectively regulate its impact on interstate commerce. Although Rodia focused only on S 2252(a)(4)(B), the same reasoning governs our analysis of S 2251(a) because both statutes contain the same jurisdictional element. 24 As we explained in Rodia, [a] jurisdictional element [or hook] . . . refers to a provision in a federal statute that requires the government to establish specific facts justifying the existence of federal jurisdiction in connection with any individual application of the statute. Rodia at 471. Here, the requirement that at least one of the materials used to produce the child pornography travel in interstate commerce provides the jurisdictional hook. Consequently, we find that Rodia forecloses Galo's attack upon the constitutionality of SS 2252 (a) and 2252 (a)(4)(B). Nonetheless, even though we are clearly bound by our holding in Rodia, 1 Galo argues that Rodia was wrongly decided. He asserts that Rodia ignores the jurisdictional requirement contained in S 2254(b)(4)(B). Galo misreads Rodia. 25 In Rodia we concluded that the jurisdictional hook of S 2252(a)(4)(B) does not achieve the goal of limiting the reach of the statute to activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 194 F.3d at 468. We recognized that the jurisdictional element -- the requirement that precursor materials like film or cameras moved in interstate commerce -- is only tenuously related to the ultimate activity regulated: interstate possession of child pornography. Id. at 473. We noted that, [a]s a practical matter, the limiting jurisdictional factor is almost useless here, since all but the most self-sufficient child pornographers will rely on film, cameras, or chemicals that traveled in interstate commerce and will therefore fall within the sweep of the statute. Id. Nevertheless, we held that Congress was empowered to enact the statute under the Commerce Clause because Congress rationally could have believed that intrastate possession of pornography has substantial effects on interstate commerce. Id. at 468. 2 Galo argues that Rodia was incorrectly decided because we ignored the reality that Congress had criminalized purely intrastate, local activity. However, despite Galo's argument to the contrary, we were well aware that the statute criminaliz[ed] an activity that is not directly linked to interstate commerce. Id. at 468. However, as we noted there, the fact that purely local activity is criminalized is not fatal to the statute. 26 The precise question before us is whether it was within Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to enact 18 U.S.C. S 2254(a)(4)(B), which imposes criminal liability on individuals who possess child pornography that has not itself traveled in interstate commerce as long as one of the materials from which the pornography was created . . . has so traveled. 27 Id. at 468. Rodia answers the inquiry in the affirmative and Galo's attack on the constitutionality of the statute is therefore to no avail. 28 His assertion that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him is also without merit as our analysis in Rodia clearly shows that Congress could properly regulate intrastate possession of child pornography produced by materials that had traveled in interstate commerce. 3 Consequently, we will affirm the judgment of conviction. 29