Opinion ID: 1830839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: Whether the Trial Court erred in granting the Appellee's motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior drug use by the victim, Ashley Galloway.

Text: ¶ 159. Hughes also contends that the trial court erred when it prevented him from introducing evidence of prior drug use by Galloway. Hughes sought to develop at trial the theory that Galloway was involved in some sort of drug ring, and was apparently raped and killed for a drug debt. ¶ 160. During the hearing on the State's motion in limine, defense counsel for Hughes alluded to information tending to show that Galloway was involved with narcotics. After the State had argued the absolute lack of any evidence whatsoever that Galloway was in a drug ring or was killed as part of some dope deal, counsel for Hughes averred: Your Honor, the discovery is replete in some parts of it of allegations of Galloway being involved in drug trade, of using drugs. It's replete in discovery. I didn't conjure this up out of my imagination. I got it out of the discovery provided to me by the State. ¶ 161. The judge granted the motion in limine, but allowed Hughes to make a proffer of the evidence replete in discovery that Galloway was involved in the narcotics industry. Hughes proffered the testimony of four classmates none of whom had any first hand knowledge of drug use or drug sales. ¶ 162. Rule 401 states: Relevant Evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. ¶ 163. The comment to the Rule notes: If the evidence has any probative value at all, the rule favors its admission. Such has been the experience under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 which is identical to this rule.... ¶ 164. The trial court enjoys substantial deference when determining matters of relevance. The problem here is that Hughes' evidence is so slight that it has no probative value whatsoever. Hughes' proffered testimony in the current case consists entirely of hearsay statements that Galloway may have used marijuana, and some rumors that she sold it. Lacking was actual evidence of a drug ring or drug debt being involved in her death. None of the proffered testimony has any bearing on why she was murdered in the absence of at least some shred of testimony that connects the purported conduct with the murder. The trial judge correctly found that such evidence was wholly irrelevant. ¶ 165. Furthermore, this Court has noted that while the defense is entitled to rebut the State's case, wholesale character assassination of the victim is not valid legal argument: The admissibility of evidence lies within the trial court's discretion, and this Court will not put the trial court in error unless the trial court abused its discretion. Here, the trial court thoroughly examined the evidence. Since the defense theory did not require an inquiry into the victim's character and since the proposed evidence bore significant prejudicial value, the trial court appropriately excluded it. Pierre v. State, 607 So.2d 43, 53 (Miss.1992)( citing Spivey v. State, 58 Miss. 858 (1881)). ¶ 166. The trial judge was absolutely correct to exclude the evidence of Ashley Galloway's alleged prior drug use as a possible alternate theory of her murder as irrelevant.