Opinion ID: 1516571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probable Cause Federal Case Law

Text: The evolution of federal case law applying the probable-cause standard to specific search warrants has not been distinguished by clarity and consistency. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 35 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 349 (1974). In one of its most recent and significant probable-cause decisions, the Supreme Court observed that perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable-cause standard is that it is a practical, nontechnical conception. In dealing with probable cause, ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. [ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed. 2d 527, 544 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).] The Court's characterization of probable cause as a practical, nontechnical concept has been frequently repeated, even in cases in which the Court was sharply divided as to whether probable cause had been established. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 730-33, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2087-88, 80 L.Ed. 2d 721, 726-27 (1984); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 577, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2079, 29 L.Ed. 2d 723, 730 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct. 584, 590-91, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637, 645 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 745-46, 13 L.Ed. 2d 684, 689 (1965); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 333, 3 L.Ed. 2d 327, 332 (1959). Justice Potter Stewart attempted to explain why the judiciary's application of the probable cause standard  practical and nontechnical though it may be  has generated such markedly divergent views as to its mandate: The fourth amendment is no technicality. The occupation of a judge requires application of its sweeping language to cases presenting the infinite variety of factual situations that arise in real life. The art of being a judge, if there is such an art, is in announcing clear rules in the context of these infinitely varied cases, rules that can be understood and observed by conscientious government officials. If the outcome of fourth amendment cases has come to be regarded as turning on technicalities, it is in part because of the inevitable human shortcomings of judges faced with the task of articulating fourth amendment principles applicable in a broad range of situations while doing justice in a particular case. Most judges do their best, but that is not always good enough. [The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum.L. Rev. 1365, 1393 (1983).] Apart from the central theme that probable cause is a nontechnical concept, the Supreme Court's probable-cause decisions have generated few sustaining principles. One such principle is that probable cause is not established by a conclusory affidavit that does not provide a magistrate with sufficient facts to make an independent determination as to whether the warrant should issue. The leading case for this proposition is Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933). There, the challenged warrant recited that a federal officer has stated under his oath that he has cause to suspect and does believe that certain merchandise, to wit: Certain liquors of foreign origin a more particular description of which cannot be given, upon which the duties have not been paid, or which has otherwise been brought into the United States contrary to law, and that said merchandise is now deposited and contained within the premises of J.J. Nathanson said premises being described as a 2 story frame dwelling located at 117 No. Bartram Ave. [ Id. at 44, 54 S.Ct. at 12, 78 L.Ed. at 160.] The Court held that the warrant had been issued without probable cause, observing that nothing    indicates that a warrant to search a private dwelling may rest upon mere affirmance of suspicion or belief without disclosure of supporting facts or circumstances. [ Id. at 47, 54 S.Ct. at 13, 78 L.Ed. at 161.] Nathanson has consistently been followed by the Court, whether the conclusory allegations are asserted by the officer or by an informant whose observations are incorporated in the officer's affidavit. See Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 564, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 1034-35, 28 L.Ed. 2d 306, 311 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637; United States v. Ventresca, supra, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed. 2d 684; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed. 2d 142 (1964); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d 723 (1964); Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825, 11 L.Ed. 2d 887 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed. 2d 697 (1960), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed. 2d 619 (1980); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1503 (1958). The Court's insistence that an officer's affidavit allege specific facts and not conclusions is based on the principle that the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint [must] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. The purpose of the complaint, then, is to enable the appropriate magistrate, here a Commissioner, to determine whether the probable cause required to support a warrant exists. The Commissioner must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a complaining officer to show probable cause. He should not accept without question the complainant's mere conclusion that the person whose arrest is sought has committed a crime. [ Giordenello v. United States, supra, 357 U.S. at 486, 78 S.Ct. at 1250, 2 L.Ed. 2d at 1509 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436, 440 (1948)).] Another entrenched principle is that not only may a magistrate consider hearsay in determining probable cause, but hearsay alone can provide a sufficient basis for the warrant. Although the Court had impliedly accepted hearsay as a basis for probable cause in prior cases, see Draper v. United States, supra, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed. 2d 327 and Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879, it expressly held in Jones v. United States, supra, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed. 2d 697, that an officer's affidavit could rely on information provided by an informant: The question here is whether an affidavit which sets out personal observations relating to the existence of cause to search is to be deemed insufficient by virtue of the fact that it sets out not the affiant's observations but those of another. An affidavit is not to be deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented. [ Id. at 269, 80 S.Ct. at 735, 4 L.Ed. at 707.] In Jones the Court did not attempt to set standards for determining what constitutes a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. That task was undertaken by the Court in Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d 723, and in Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637. These two decisions, superseded in 1983 by Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed. 2d 527, have for the past two decades been at the center of the debate concerning the sufficiency of an informant's observations in establishing probable cause. [5] In Aguilar, a warrant to search for narcotics in the defendant's home was issued on the basis of an affidavit that alleged: Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law. [378 U.S. at 109, 84 S.Ct. at 1511, 12 L.Ed. 2d at 725.] In sustaining the challenge to the admissibility of the evidence seized by the execution of the warrant, the Court established a two-pronged test to determine the sufficiency of an informant's tip. First, the tip must include information that apprises the magistrate of the basis for the informant's allegations (the basis-of-knowledge prong); and, second, the affiant must inform the magistrate of the basis for his reliance on the informant's credibility (the veracity prong). See Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 267, 103 S.Ct. at 2347-48, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 567 (White, J., concurring). Concluding that the affidavit did not meet these conditions, the Court determined that the warrant should not have issued: Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was credible or his information reliable. Otherwise, the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint will be drawn not by a neutral and detached magistrate, as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, or, as in this case, by an unidentified informant. [ Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S. at 114-15, 84 S.Ct. at 1514, 12 L.Ed. 2d at 729 (quoting Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. at 486, 78 S.Ct. at 1250, 2 L.Ed. 2d at 1509; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 14, 68 S.Ct. at 369, 92 L.Ed. at 440) (footnote omitted, citations omitted).] Five years later, in Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637, the Court sought to clarify Aguilar by delineating the manner in which the two-pronged test should be applied when the informant's allegations, although inadequate standing alone, are partially verified by police investigation. The affidavit in Spinelli stated that a reliable informant had advised the FBI that Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136. Id. at 414, 89 S.Ct. at 588, 21 L.Ed. 2d at 642. To corroborate the informant's tip, the affidavit recited that Spinelli was observed for a period of five days, during four of which he traveled from Illinois to Missouri, parking in a lot adjacent to an apartment house and entering an apartment whose occupant possessed telephones assigned the same phone numbers as those provided by the informant. Although concluding that the FBI affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause, the Court suggested that deficiencies in a search warrant affidavit incorporating information from an informant could be remedied both with respect to basis-of-knowledge and veracity: If the tip is found inadequate under Aguilar, the other allegations which corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report should then be considered. At this stage as well, however, the standards enunciated in Aguilar must inform the magistrate's decision. He must ask: Can it fairly be said that the tip, even when certain parts of it have been corroborated by independent sources, is as trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar's tests without independent corroboration? [ Id. at 415, 89 S.Ct. at 588, 21 L.Ed. 2d at 643.] The majority in Spinelli observed that if an affidavit is deficient in its recitation as to the basis of the informant's knowledge, the self-verifying details of the informant's tip can overcome this deficiency: In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation. [ Id. at 416, 89 S.Ct. at 589, 21 L.Ed. 2d at 644.] The Court also acknowledged that the informant's veracity, if inadequately documented in the officer's affidavit, could be bolstered by a corroborative investigation, but concluded that the veracity of the Spinelli informant had not sufficiently been established: Nor do we believe that the patent doubts Aguilar raises as to the report's reliability are adequately resolved by a consideration of the allegations detailing the FBI's independent investigative efforts. At most, these allegations indicated that Spinelli could have used the telephones specified by the informant for some purpose. This cannot by itself be said to support both the inference that the informer was generally trustworthy and that he had made his charge against Spinelli on the basis of information obtained in a reliable way. Once again, Draper provides a relevant comparison. Independent police work in that case corroborated much more than one small detail that had been provided by the informant. There, the police, upon meeting the inbound Denver train on the second morning specified by informer Hereford, saw a man whose dress corresponded precisely to Hereford's detailed description. It was then apparent that the informant had not been fabricating his report out of whole cloth; since the report was of the sort which in common experience may be recognized as having been obtained in a reliable way, it was perfectly clear that probable cause had been established. [ Id. at 418, 89 S.Ct. at 590, 21 L.Ed. 2d at 644.] [6] In Illinois v. Gates, supra , the Court abandoned its exclusive reliance on the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test for evaluating information provided by an informant, adopting in its place the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations. 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 548. However, the Court took pains to point out that an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We do not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case   . Rather,    they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place. [ Id. at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 543.] Gates involved the sufficiency of an affidavit offered in support of a search warrant authorizing the search of the defendants' car and house. The application for the warrant was triggered by an anonymous, handwritten letter sent to the Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department that alleged: This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement. They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire living on pushers. I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are friends with some big drug dealers, who visit their house often. Lance & Susan Gates Greenway in Condominiums [ Id. at 225, 103 S.Ct. at 2325, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 540.] Detective Mader of the Bloomingdale Police Department investigated the anonymous tip and learned that an Illinois driver's license had been issued to Lance Gates of Bloomingdale. He also learned that an individual named L. Gates had a reservation on a flight to West Palm Beach, Florida, departing from Chicago on May 5th. At Mader's request, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration conducted a surveillance and observed Gates board a flight destined for West Palm Beach. He also reported that federal agents in Florida had observed Gates' arrival in West Palm Beach and confirmed that he had traveled from the airport by taxi to a nearby motel. The agents reported that Gates had entered a room in the motel registered to Susan Gates. The next morning Gates and an unidentified woman left the motel in a Mercury automobile with Illinois license plates. They drove northbound on an interstate highway generally used by travelers bound for Chicago. The license plate number on the Mercury was identified by the federal agents as one registered to a station wagon owned by Gates. Detective Mader prepared an affidavit that incorporated the details learned during the investigation. He submitted the affidavit, along with a copy of the anonymous letter, to a county court judge. The judge issued a search warrant that authorized the searches of the Gates' residence and automobile. On May 7, when Lance Gates and his wife returned to their home in Bloomingdale, the Bloomingdale police searched the trunk of the Mercury and discovered approximately 350 pounds of marijuana. During a search of the Gates' home the officers found marijuana, weapons, and other contraband. The Illinois Circuit Court suppressed the evidence on the ground that the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant did not establish probable cause. That decision was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 38 Ill.Dec. 62, 403 N.E. 2d 77 (1980), and by the Supreme Court of Illinois, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 53 Ill.Dec. 218, 423 N.E. 2d 887 (1981). Relying on the two-pronged analysis derived from Aguilar and Spinelli, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the anonymous letter, supplemented by Detective Mader's affidavit, did not satisfy either the veracity or the basis-of-knowledge prong established by Aguilar. The court concluded that there was no basis for determining that the anonymous letter writer was credible, and that the corroboration by police of innocent details contained in the letter could not satisfy the veracity requirement. Id. at 384-90, 53 Ill.Dec. at 222-24, 423 N.E. 2d at 891-93. In addition, the court observed that the anonymous letter did not reveal the source of its author's knowledge and concluded that the detail set forth in the letter was not sufficient to justify an inference that the contents of the letter had been obtained from a reliable source. Id. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Gates majority, agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court that the anonymous letter, standing alone provides virtually nothing from which one might conclude that its author is either honest or his information reliable; likewise, the letter gives absolutely no indication of the basis for the writer's predictions regarding the Gateses' criminal activities. Something more was required, then, before a magistrate could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in the Gateses' home and car. [462 U.S. at 227, 103 S.Ct. at 2326, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 541.] Rejecting the Illinois Supreme Court's reliance on Aguilar and Spinelli, the Court determined that the independent investigation by the federal agents and the Bloomingdale police adequately verified the reliability of the informant's tip. The Court observed that the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged analysis was overly technical and ill-suited to guide determinations of probable cause: [T]he two-pronged test directs analysis into two largely independent channels  the informant's veracity or reliability and his basis of knowledge. There are persuasive arguments against according these two elements such independent status.         The rigorous inquiry into the Spinelli prongs and the complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that many warrants are  quite properly  issued on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used in more formal legal proceedings. Likewise, given the informal, often hurried context in which it must be applied, the built-in subtleties, of the two-pronged test are particularly unlikely to assist magistrates in determining probable cause. [ Id. at 233, 235-36, 103 S.Ct. at 2329, 2331, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 546 (citations omitted).] Nevertheless, in formulating the elements of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the Court recognized the continued relevance of an informant's veracity and basis of knowledge: The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.    We are convinced that this flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach that has developed from Aguilar and Spinelli. [ Id. at 233, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. at 2329, 2332, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 545, 548 (emphasis added, citations omitted).] The Gates majority also observed that the totality-of-the-circumstances test provided magistrates with wider discretion to grant or refuse warrants than had been permitted under the Aguilar-Spinelli rules: Nothing in our opinion in any way lessens the authority of the magistrate to draw such reasonable inferences as he will from the material supplied to him by applicants for a warrant; indeed, he is freer than under the regime of Aguilar and Spinelli to draw such inferences, or to refuse to draw them if he is so minded. [ Id. at 240, 103 S.Ct. at 2333, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 549 (emphasis added).] [7] Finally, the Court explicitly limited the permissible scope of appellate review of the probable cause determination made by the warrant-issuing judge, holding that the fourth amendment did not require de novo review as to the validity of the warrant: [W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants, is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; courts should not invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.         Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, the traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrate's probable-cause determination has been that so long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for ... conclud[ing] that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more. [ Id. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 546-47 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct. 584, 590-91, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09, 85 S.Ct. 741, 745-46, 13 L.Ed. 2d 684; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed. 2d 697).] [8] To sum up, the impact of Gates on fourth amendment probable-cause determinations is two-fold. First, by adopting the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, it signals a reemphasis of the practical, nontechnical conception of probable cause endorsed in Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879, but does so without repudiating the relevance of veracity and basis-of-knowledge inquiries with respect to allegations by informants. Second, it limits the scope of federal appellate review mandated by the fourth amendment as to probable-cause determinations by the warrant-issuing magistrate.