Opinion ID: 1841473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of the Blood Alcohol Test

Text: The record reflects that several hours following the accident, and after Stong had been pronounced dead, a blood sample was taken from his heart. This sample was tested and found to contain.17 grams of ether alcohol per 100 ml. of blood. Coupled with the passage of time, this would indicate that Stong was highly intoxicated at the time of the accident in question. Prior to trial Administratrix filed a motion in limine, citing Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-43 (1972) which provides: Neither results of a chemical test under the provisions of this chapter, nor the fact of submission to or refusal of such test shall be admissible in a civil case. [13] The trial judge sustained the motion in limine and refused to allow the defense in any way to present to the jury the results of the blood test. On cross appeal, Freeman/Long argued vigorously that the trial judge's ruling was in error. We disagree. The statute by its own terms clearly covers this case. It refers first to the results of a chemical test. As any high school chemistry student knows, a blood test is a chemical test. While lawmakers certainly have the power and authority to define terms in ways that may surprise devotees of the dictionary, see, e.g., McLaurin v. Mississippi Employment Security Commission, 435 So.2d 1170, 1171-1172 (Miss. 1983) (the term unemployed arbitrarily defined by legislature), we find no evidence that the legislature has done so here. A blood test is a type of chemical test. More legalistically, the blood test in question was a chemical test under the provisions of this chapter. The words this chapter no doubt refer to Chapter 11 of Title 63 of the Mississippi Code of 1972. That chapter is commonly known as the Mississippi Implied Consent Law. Section 7 of Chapter 11 [§ 63-11-7] authorizes and establishes procedures for obtaining blood tests from persons unconscious or dead as a result of an accident. Section 9 [§ 63-11-9] says who may perform the test. The blood test performed upon the remains of Kirk Harrison Stong was performed under this authority. Section 63-11-7 significantly provides It is the intent of this chapter that blood samples taken under this section shall be used exclusively for statistical evaluation of accident causes with safeguards established to protect the identity of such victims and to extend the rights of privileged communications to those engaged in taking, handling and evaluating such statistical evidence. We are fully cognizant of the impact of this ruling upon the defense (although a defense verdict was obtained in spite of Freeman/Long's inability to prove the results of the blood test). Whether Stong was intoxicated was an important issue in the case. The blood test involved is certainly highly credible evidence of that intoxication. The clear wording of § 63-11-43 coupled with the statement of legislative intent articulated in § 63-11-7 proscribe receipt of the results of this test into evidence in this case. [14]
In the alternative, conceding inadmissibility as an original proposition, Freeman/Long argue that Appellant Administratrix waived her § 63-11-43 objection through her actions during discovery. In their answer Defendants alleged as an affirmative defense that Stong was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Administratrix served interrogatories requesting the factual basis upon which this affirmative allegation had been made. These interrogatories were served under the authority of Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-233 (1972). Defendants now claim that, since they were forced to reveal under oath the existence of this otherwise inadmissible matter, Administratrix has waived her statutory objection. The suggestion that one waives an objection to admissibility by inquiring into the matter on discovery is wholly inconsistent with the nature and purpose of our discovery rules. [15] This is so whether we refer to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26-37, which became effective January 1, 1982, or to Chapter 501 of the Laws of Mississippi, 1975, which was in effect between January 1, 1976, and January 1, 1982. The general discovery statute in effect at the time this action arose was § 13-1-226(b)(1) provided in relevant part It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The result of the blood test, suggesting as it does that Stong was highly intoxicated, is the sort of discoverable information which to us appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of other evidence of Stong's intoxication that may be admissible. Discovery is a stage of the proceedings entirely separate and apart from trial. The idea is to encourage full disclosure of all relevant facts and circumstances. Questions of admissibility are wholly reserved for trial, or at least for the post-discovery pre-trial period. Our rules have been shaped to assure that each party knows all of the relevant facts and circumstances so that the question of admissibility can be fully presented to the trial judge. To provide that one inquires into sensitive areas at the peril of waiving for trial purposes otherwise valid objections to admissibility would be wholly inconsistent with the purpose and philosophy of our discovery procedures. We hold as a matter of law that Administratrix' inquiry into the basis of Freeman/Long's affirmative defense of intoxication constitutes no waiver of her right to invoke § 63-11-43 in opposition to the admissibility of the results of the blood test.