Opinion ID: 170677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Application of the recidivist sentencing provision

Text: Mr. House further claims that because N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-101(D) is ambiguous, clearly established federal law requires us to apply the rule of lenity. [16] He interprets the statute as allowing the sentencing court to impose a two-year enhancement for each prior DWI conviction on the aggregate DWI-related sentence of a defendant that arises from an accident resulting in death or great bodily injury. Under Mr. House's view, he would have been subject to a single two-year enhancement for his single prior misdemeanor DWI conviction. The trial court, on the other hand, interpreted the statute as permitting the imposition of a two-year enhancement on each of Mr. House's DWI-related counts of conviction that resulted in death or great bodily injury, resulting in a total of five two-year enhancements. Noting that the statute arguably was amenable to these conflicting interpretations, Mr. House reasoned that it was ambiguous and the trial court should have applied the rule of lenity. The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding that the statute was not ambiguous and that the statutory language supported the trial court's reading. House II, 25 P.3d at 264-65. As with section 66-8-101(A), the New Mexico Court of Appeals's interpretation of section 66-8-101(D) binds us on appeal. Parker, 394 F.3d at 1319. Mr. House cannot demonstrate that the New Mexico Court of Appeals's interpretation of its vehicular homicide statute including the recidivist provision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Therefore, we deny habeas relief on this ground.