Opinion ID: 1302596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: capital sentencing phase

Text: In his fifteenth argument, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that one of the aggravating circumstances to be considered in the homicide of Buchanan was that the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(6). Defendant contends that there was no evidence to support submission of this aggravating circumstance, and thus defendant's rights to due process and a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 19 and 23 of the North Carolina Constitution were violated. Defendant contends that the evidence showed that the motivating factor for his breaking into Buchanan's apartment was to steal a gun for his own personal protection. Therefore, defendant argues, there was insufficient evidence to support a motive of pecuniary gain and the trial court erred in submitting this aggravating circumstance to the jury. We disagree. Although there was evidence that defendant told his cousin his intent in stealing the gun was to have it for protection, there was substantial evidence that defendant broke into buildings and automobiles that night to steal money or property that could later be converted into drugs. Dowdy's empty wallet was discovered underneath his body, the house in which Dowdy and Buchanan lived had been ransacked, a phone was stolen from Buchanan's car, and items were removed from a storage building near the house. At the sentencing hearing, defendant himself presented evidence that he had a history of committing break-ins to support his drug habit. From this evidence the jury could infer that defendant's motive in stealing the gun was to exchange it or sell it for drugs. Further, [t]he gravamen of the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance is that `the killing was for the purpose of getting money or something of value.' State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 621, 430 S.E.2d 188, 210 (quoting State v. Gardner, 311 N.C. 489, 513, 319 S.E.2d 591, 606 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 105 S.Ct. 1232, 84 L.Ed.2d 369 (1985)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1028, 114 S.Ct. 644, 126 L.Ed.2d 602 (1993). The fact that defendant may have intended to steal the gun for his personal use does not change the fact that the killing was committed for the purpose of getting something of value. See State v. Chandler, 342 N.C. 742, 755, 467 S.E.2d 636, 644, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 875, 117 S.Ct. 196, 136 L.Ed.2d 133 (1996). Therefore, the trial court did not err in submitting the (e)(6) aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, we reject defendant's fifteenth argument. In his sixteenth argument, defendant contends that the trial court erred by submitting as a mitigating circumstance that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1) (Supp.1998). During the penalty-phase instructions conference, defense counsel indicated that they were not requesting the mitigating circumstance of no significant history of prior criminal activity. The following exchange occurred: THE COURT: All right, now we get to the first bone of contention. The significant history of prior criminal activity before the date of the murder. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we omitted that from our, from our statutory because there is no evidence of prior history. We don't want to simply put it on and let them, let them attack it, Your Honor. And, for that reason. THE COURT: Well, you know, there is evidence, you know, from your physicians and your, and you know, from, from those as to the fact that he had been in prison or juvenile detention for eight months and he had committed breaking and enterings and that he had, you know, used illegal drugs. However, there is no evidence as to convictions, but the cases do not really say we've got to have convictions. It said history. [PROSECUTOR]: It's simply history of criminal activity and Your Honor. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: As a statutory mitigator and we do not contend for it, Your Honor. We are the ones that are opposed to the mitigators. THE COURT: Well, I realize that but there are a couple of cases that would indicate that it is error not to submit it even over the defendant's objection if there is, is evidence under which a juror could conclude that or I guess you'd say lack of evidence. Defendant asserts that the submission of the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance, over objection, along with the trial court's instruction and prosecutor's arguments were a violation of defendant's due process rights and guarantees of a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 19, 23, and 27 of the North Carolina Constitution. This Court has emphasized that the test governing the decision to submit the (f)(1) mitigator is `whether a rational jury could conclude that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity.' State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 394-95, 471 S.E.2d 593, 602-03 (quoting State v. Wilson, 322 N.C. 117, 143, 367 S.E.2d 589, 604 (1988)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 117 S.Ct. 314, 136 L.Ed.2d 229 (1996); see also State v. Walker, 343 N.C. 216, 223, 469 S.E.2d 919, 922, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 901, 117 S.Ct. 254, 136 L.Ed.2d 180 (1996). Significant has been defined as meaning that the jury's sentencing recommendation is likely to be influenced by the defendant's prior criminal activity. Williams, 350 N.C. at 11, 510 S.E.2d at 633; see also State v. Williams, 343 N.C. 345, 371, 471 S.E.2d 379, 393 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1061, 117 S.Ct. 695, 136 L.Ed.2d 618 (1997). If a rational jury could so conclude, the trial court has no discretion; the trial court must submit the statutory mitigating circumstance to the jury without regard to the State's or the defendant's wishes. White, 343 N.C. at 394-95, 471 S.E.2d at 603. In the instant case, the evidence tended to show that defendant began drinking alcohol as a child and started using marijuana and cocaine when he was thirteen years old. A couple of years later, defendant was committing break-ins to support his drug habit and was hospitalized for treatment of substance abuse. A forensic psychiatrist testified that defendant was frequently violent and gave examples of him striking a horse and fighting and biting the owner. At eighteen, defendant was sent to juvenile detention. Here, the trial court determined that a reasonable juror could find that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity within the meaning of the statute. Thus, the trial court properly submitted the (f)(1) statutory mitigating circumstance for the jury's consideration. During closing arguments, the prosecutor began to argue that the jury should not find the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance. After defendant's objection was made and sustained, the trial court instructed the jury that the (f)(1) mitigator was not requested by defendant; however, since there was some evidence from which a juror might find the circumstance, the court decided to submit it to the jury. We have cautioned prosecutors and trial courts that when a defendant objects to the submission of a mitigating circumstance, prosecutors must not argue to the jury that a defendant has requested that a particular mitigating circumstance be submitted or has sought to have the jury find that circumstance. Walker, 343 N.C. at 223, 469 S.E.2d at 923. Also, in Walker, the Court emphasized that the better practice when a defendant has objected to the submission of a particular mitigating circumstance is for the trial court to instruct the jury that the defendant did not request that the mitigating circumstance be submitted. In such instances, the trial court also should inform the jury that the submission of the mitigating circumstance is required as a matter of law because there is some evidence from which the jury could, but is not required to, find the mitigating circumstance to exist. Id. at 223-24, 469 S.E.2d at 923. In the instant case, the trial court instructed the jury that defendant did not request submission of the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance. While the trial court did not inform the jury that submission of the mitigating circumstance is required as a matter of law, we conclude that the omission was harmless when the instructions are viewed in their totality. Moreover, we conclude that the prosecutor's arguments were not misleading as to whether defendant requested submission of the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, this assignment of error is rejected. In his seventeenth argument, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the prosecutor to argue in his closing sentencing-phase argument, over defendant's objection, that the trial procedures guaranteeing defendant a fair trial were undeserved. Defendant contends that the prosecutor's argument attempted to create resentment in the jurors regarding the trial process and thereby denied defendant his rights to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 19, 23, and 27 of the North Carolina Constitution. Defendant contends that the prosecutor's closing argument denigrated the procedural safeguards provided to defendant under the law. In the instant case, defendant complains of the following prosecutorial argument: [PROSECUTOR]: He [defendant] is the master of his own faith. Let's not get all mixed up here. This will be the last time that I will talk to you about this. You have got to decide justice. He has put himself in this position. What has happened [since] he committed those murders on October 2nd, 1994? He has been given every right in the book. He has been given food to eat and a warm place to stay. Healthcare, lawyers, social workers, psychiatrist. He gets to visit with his family. He gets everything somebody alive would have. What about Alabama or Jerry Dowdy? They have not been here for the last two and a half years. And they are not going to be here for the next and the next after that. They are not entitled to a presumption of innocence. They didn't get that. They didn't have a two part five week long trial. They didn't get a lawyer to plead their cases with Johnny Street Parker that night. Much less two lawyers. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I will object to that. The defendant is entitled to the defense as a matter of law. And now it has become affected [sic] aggravated factors evenfor the defendant[] THE COURT: Okay. I am going to overrule it right now, Mr. Parker. [PROSECUTOR]: They didn't have anybody to stand up and object for them. They didn't have an opportunity to sit here and participate in these proceed[ings]. They didn't have a Judge to see that [their] trial was fair. They didn't have a jury of twelve to decide their fate. They had a jury of one. They didn't get a hearing. (Emphasis added.) In State v. Soyars, 332 N.C. 47, 60, 418 S.E.2d 480, 487 (1992), we said that trial counsel are granted wide latitude over the scope of jury argument and that control of closing arguments is in the discretion of the trial court. Counsel are allowed to argue the facts which have been presented, along with reasonable inferences drawn from those facts. State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 223, 433 S.E.2d 144, 152 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 114 S.Ct. 2784, 129 L.Ed.2d 895 (1994). In order for defendant to receive a new sentencing proceeding, the prosecutorial comment must have `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' Id. at 223-24, 433 S.E.2d at 152 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144, 157 (1986)). We assume, arguendo, that the italicized portions of the prosecutor's argument were improper. Nevertheless, the prosecutor did not directly attack defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights. See State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 64, 463 S.E.2d 738, 772 (1995) (concluding that the prosecutor did not attack the defendant's exercise of constitutional rights by suggesting to the jury that the victims had no lawyer, no jury, no bailiff, no judge and no legal rights), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197, 116 S.Ct. 1694, 134 L.Ed.2d 794 (1996). Substantial evidence supported the aggravating circumstances submitted to the jury, and the jury was instructed that it should base its decision on the evidence alone and not on the arguments of counsel. For these reasons, it is unlikely that the jury's sentencing recommendations were influenced by these portions of the prosecutor's closing argument. Therefore, we conclude that the prosecutor's argument did not deny defendant due process. In his eighteenth argument, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error and violated his constitutional rights in failing to properly answer the jury's questions during deliberation as to whether two life sentences would be served consecutively or concurrently. The jury retired to begin deliberations in the sentencing phase and submitted a written request to define life imprisonment without parole, whether life meant twenty years or death by natural causes, whether there was a possibility of time off for good behavior, and whether the terms would be served consecutively or concurrently if the jury returned life imprisonment for both cases. This Court has consistently held that parole eligibility evidence is irrelevant in a capital sentencing proceeding as it reveals nothing regarding defendant's character or record or about any circumstances of the offense. State v. Payne, 337 N.C. 505, 516, 448 S.E.2d 93, 99 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1038, 115 S.Ct. 1405, 131 L.Ed.2d 292 (1995); see also State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 219, 461 S.E.2d 687, 697 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 116 S.Ct. 1021, 134 L.Ed.2d 100 (1996). In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162-71, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 2193-98, 129 L.Ed.2d 133, 141-47 (1994), the United States Supreme Court determined that when the State argues future dangerousness in a capital sentencing proceeding and state law prohibits defendant's release on parole, due process requires the court to inform the jury that the life sentence faced by the defendant would be life imprisonment without parole. So where the State does not argue future dangerousness, as in the instant case, there is no due process requirement that the jury be informed that defendant would be parole ineligible under a life sentence. However, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002 provides: If the recommendation of the jury is that the defendant be sentenced to death, the judge shall impose a sentence of death in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 15, Article 19 of the General Statutes. If the recommendation of the jury is that the defendant be imprisoned for life in the State's prison, the judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life in the State's prison, without parole. The judge shall instruct the jury, in words substantially equivalent to those of this section, that a sentence of life imprisonment means a sentence of life without parole. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002 (Supp.1998). Here, under Simmons, there was no due process requirement that the jury be informed that defendant would be parole ineligible under a life sentence. Nevertheless, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002, the trial court brought the jury back into the courtroom and instructed that life means life imprisonment without parole. The trial court continued by instructing the jury that life imprisonment means until death. In addition, defendant contends that the trial judge erred by failing to tell the jurors what he would do if they returned two life sentences. With regard to this contention, we hold that the trial court properly instructed the jurors by stating the following: It is not a proper matter for your consideration in this phase of the trial. That is my job to make that determination. And, I'm not allowed to tell you what I'm going to do because that should not influence yourverdict. The trial court has discretion to determine whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1354(a) (1997). The trial court is not required to make its decision and inform the jury thereof before the jury deliberates. Hence, the trial court did not err, and we reject defendant's argument. In his nineteenth argument, based upon two assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in submitting to the jury both the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance that the murder of Buchanan was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of another homicide and the (e)(11) aggravating circumstance that the murder of Buchanan was committed while defendant was engaged in a course of conduct which included the commission by defendant of another crime of violence (castration) against another person (Dowdy). Defendant contends that the (e)(11) aggravating circumstance subsumed the language in the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance. In addition, under this argument, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury that it could consider the aggravating circumstance that the murder of Buchanan was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of another homicide. Defendant contends that the trial court's oral instruction failed to limit the class of violent crimes to castration because the instruction was hindered by the written Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment form subsequently given to the jury. Defendant asserts that by the written submission in the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment form, the instructions made the act of castration one of many acts, or an example, of violence against other people rather than limiting the aggravating circumstance solely to castration. Defendant argues that, as a result, the trial court's oral instruction to the jury and the written words on the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment form would allow a reasonable jury to utilize identical evidence to find both aggravating circumstances (e)(5) and (e)(11). We disagree. In State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 530, 453 S.E.2d 824, 851, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884, 116 S.Ct. 223, 133 L.Ed.2d 153 (1995), we stated that submission of more than one aggravating circumstance supported by the same evidence amount[s] to an unnecessary duplication of the circumstances enumerated in the statute, resulting in an automatic cumulation of aggravating circumstances against the defendant. State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 29, 257 S.E.2d 569, 587 (1979). However, where there is separate substantial evidence to support each aggravating circumstance, it is not improper for each aggravating circumstance to be submitted even though the evidence supporting each may overlap. State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 627-28, 430 S.E.2d 188, 213-14, cert. denied, [510] U.S. [1028, 114 S.Ct. 644], 126 L.Ed.2d 602 (1993). Further, this Court has specifically upheld the submission of both the (e)(5) and (e)(11) aggravating circumstances in the same case. See Wilkinson, 344 N.C. at 228, 474 S.E.2d at 391. In the instant case, there was substantial separate evidence to support the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance that Buchanan's murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of Dowdy's murder and the (e)(11) aggravating circumstance that Buchanan's murder was committed while defendant was engaged in a course of conduct which included commission of the crime of malicious castration. The evidence shows that, on 2 October 1994, defendant committed a series of crimes as a part of a continuous transaction of criminal activity. With regard to defendant's contention that the trial court erred in its oral instructions to the jury, we note that defendant failed to object to that portion of the instruction which he contends improperly led the jury to consider the Dowdy homicide in support of two aggravating circumstances in the Buchanan homicide. Since defendant argues plain error on review, he must show that the error was so fundamental that another result would probably have been obtained absent the error. See State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 661, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378-79 (1983). In the instant case, defendant cannot meet this standard. A jury charge must be construed contextually and will be upheld when the charge is correct as a whole. State v. Stephens, 347 N.C. 352, 359, 493 S.E.2d 435, 439 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 85, 142 L.Ed.2d 66 (1998). The challenged portion of the oral instruction closely followed the pertinent pattern jury instructions. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000; N.C.P.I.Crim. 150.10 (1997). The instruction correctly informed the jury that the only violent crime which could be considered to support the (e)(11) aggravating circumstance was Dowdy's castration. The wording of the circumstance on the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment form further clarified the instruction. There is no reasonable likelihood that the trial court's instructions would have caused the jurors to consider the murder of Dowdy to support both aggravating circumstances. Defendant's argument based upon these two assignments of error is rejected. In his twentieth argument, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in submitting to the jury the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance that the murder of Buchanan was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of arson because there was insufficient evidence to support the submission of that aggravating circumstance. The State argues that there was substantial evidence presented to show that Buchanan's residence was an occupied dwelling at the time it was burned by defendant, as the interval between the mortal blow and the arson was short, and the murder and arson constituted parts of a continuous transaction. We agree. See State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C. 249, 273-74, 464 S.E.2d 448, 464 (1995) (concluding that the interval of three and one-half hours between murder and arson was short enough to be one continuous transaction), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1024, 116 S.Ct. 2563, 135 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1996). In his twenty-first argument, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in submitting the (e)(11) aggravating circumstance that the murder of Buchanan was part of a course of conduct in which defendant engaged, including the commission of another crime of violence against another person (castration of Dowdy). As in a previous argument, defendant contends that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the crime of castration occurred. Defendant assumes that the castration conviction will be reversed for insufficiency of the evidence. Thus, defendant concludes that the death sentence must be vacated because there is a reasonable possibility that the consideration by the jury of the castration charge might have contributed to the recommendation of the death penalty. See State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 516-17, 356 S.E.2d 279, 309-10, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 108 S.Ct. 269, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987). Defendant's contention has no merit. As discussed earlier in defendant's second argument, there was sufficient evidence that the crime of malicious castration was committed in conjunction with Dowdy's murder as part of a continuous chain of events forming one single transaction. Since the malicious castration was a part of a continuous, single transaction, the malicious castration was a violent felony committed against Dowdy and was a part of a course of conduct including the murder of Buchanan. Thus, the trial court properly submitted the (e)(11) aggravating circumstance. In his twenty-second argument, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in submitting as an aggravating circumstance that the murder of Dowdy was committed while defendant was engaged in flight after committing another homicide, see N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5), as there was no evidence to support submission of this aggravating circumstance. Defendant contends that since the State failed to present competent evidence that the killing of Dowdy was committed during flight, there was no direct evidence of the order in which the two men were murdered. The State correctly contends that defendant has waived his right to assign error to the trial judge's instructions by failing to object to the language of the instructions at the time they were given or before the jury retired to deliberate. See N.C. R.App. P. 10(b)(2); Allen, 339 N.C. at 554-55, 453 S.E.2d at 155. Since this issue was not properly preserved for appeal, this Court may review it only for plain error. Allen, 339 N.C. at 555, 453 S.E.2d at 155. The plain error rule requires defendant to show that the error was so fundamental that another result would probably have been obtained absent the error. Odom, 307 N.C. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at 378-79. The State further contends that defendant waived plain error review by failing to allege in his assignment of error that the trial court committed plain error. See N.C. R.App. P. 10(c)(4); see also State v. Truesdale, 340 N.C. 229, 232-33, 456 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1995); State v. Hamilton, 338 N.C. 193, 208, 449 S.E.2d 402, 411 (1994). We agree. In the instant case, defendant failed to specifically and distinctly contend that the trial court's submission of the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance was plain error. Thus, defendant has waived his right to appellate review of this issue. In his twenty-third argument, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in submitting to the jury as an aggravating circumstance that the murder of Dowdy was committed by defendant while defendant was engaged in the commission of arson, see N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5), as there was insufficient evidence to submit that aggravating circumstance to the jury. Defendant contends that there was no evidence that there was any burning in connection with Dowdy's apartment. The State contends, and we agree, that such evidence is not required where the burning of the downstairs apartment and the murder of Dowdy were parts of a continuous transaction. If the interval between the mortal blow and the arson is short, and the murder and arson constitute parts of a continuous transaction, then a dwelling is occupied for purposes of the arson statute. See N.C.G.S. § 14-58 (1995); see also Jaynes, 342 N.C. at 274, 464 S.E.2d at 464. In Jaynes, this Court held that the interval of three and one-half hours between the victim's death and the setting of the fire did not prevent a finding based on all the surrounding circumstances that the interval was `short' enough for the arson and the murder to be parts of one continuous transaction. Jaynes, 342 N.C. at 275, 464 S.E.2d at 464. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State in the instant case, defendant carried out the murder of Dowdy and the arson as parts of a continuous transaction. The record shows that the deaths of Dowdy and Buchanan occurred somewhere around 3:30 a.m. or 4:00 a.m., and possibly as late as 7:00 a.m., on Sunday, 2 October 1994. The fire was set using lamp oil or lighter fluid and burned for some twenty minutes to one hour. The fire department received the fire call at approximately 7:25 a.m. Hence, under Jaynes, the murder of Dowdy and the arson occurred under a short span of time and as parts of a continuous transaction. The trial court properly submitted the aggravating circumstance that the murder of Dowdy was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of arson. In his twenty-fourth argument, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the prosecutor to argue in his sentencing-phase closing argument that with regard to many of the aggravating circumstances, the jurors had already found them to exist by their verdicts. Defendant did not object to this argument. Where a defendant fails to object to the prosecutor's argument at trial, the impropriety of the argument must be gross indeed in order for this Court to hold that a trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero motu an argument which defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when he heard it. State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979), quoted in State v. Hoffman, 349 N.C. 167, 185, 505 S.E.2d 80, 91 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1362, 143 L.Ed.2d 522 (1999). In the instant case, none of defendant's convictions from the guilt phase that were used to support either of his convictions of first-degree murder were used as aggravating circumstances for the same murder in the sentencing phase. In his argument, the prosecutor was merely urging the jurors to understand how their earlier verdicts compared to the aggravating circumstances and to urge them to so find in their sentencing determination. This argument did not encourage the jury to engage in impermissible double-counting. Clearly the prosecutor's argument was not so grossly improper as to require the trial court to intervene ex mero motu. Therefore, we reject defendant's twenty-fourth argument.