Opinion ID: 3034224
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Certification Marks Versus Trademarks

Text: IPC argues that the only certification mark policy reflected in the Lanham Act is that underlying trademarks — the avoidIDAHO POTATO COMMISSION v. G&T TERMINAL 13931 ance of public confusion. In its view, M&M III should have therefore enforced the no-challenge provision as courts have done in the trademark context. Certification marks, however, differ from trademarks in a number of significant ways. See McCarthy § 19:91 (“A certification mark is a special creature created for a purpose uniquely different from that of an ordinary trademark or service mark.”). Certification marks are subject to cancellation if the owner produces or markets goods on which the mark appears, permits use of the mark for purposes other than to certify, or discriminately refuses to certify the goods of one who meets the standards the mark denotes. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5). The mark holder’s duty to license all who qualify makes certification “a form of limited compulsory licensing.” McCarthy § 19:96. [5] The Lanham Act makes clear that certification marks serve other public interests in addition to the prevention of public confusion. Its certification mark cancellation provisions illustrate the legislative intent to protect “a further public interest in free and open competition among producers and distributors of the certified product.” M&M III, 335 F.3d at 138. By requiring certification mark holders to license all individuals who meet the certification criteria, the Lanham Act ensures that the market will include as many participants as can produce conforming goods. By preventing mark holders from becoming market participants, it removes incentives for mark holders to engage in anti-competitive conduct. The Lanham Act’s cancellation provisions thus appear designed to promote free competition in the market for certified products.4 We therefore agree with M&M III’s assessment of the policy concerns underlying the Lanham Act’s certification mark regime. 4 IPC offers no persuasive argument to the contrary, simply asserting that the Lanham Act’s restrictions on certification mark holders serve an anti-confusion purpose but failing to explain why they cannot also encourage free competition. 13932 IDAHO POTATO COMMISSION v. G&T TERMINAL [6] We also find persuasive M&M III’s conclusions regarding the relative weight of the pertinent public interests. In M&M III, as in this case, IPC sought to enforce a no- challenge provision against a former licensee. Allowing it to do so would enable it to prevent anyone who had ever held an IPC license from challenging its conduct as a certification mark owner. This would likely leave IPC’s conduct unchecked by precluding challenges by the only individuals with enough economic incentive to bring them.5 See M&M III, 335 F.3d at 139 (“[P]arties that have entered into a licensee relationship with the IPC may often be the only individuals with enough economic incentive to challenge the IPC’s licensing scheme, and thus the only individuals with enough economic incentive to force the IPC to conform to the law.” (citing Lear, 395 U.S. at 670)). As M&M III concluded, the public interest in ensuring free competition in the market for certified goods outweighs IPC’s interest in enforcing a contractual provision that would prevent all current and former licensees from challenging its conduct as a certification mark holder.