Opinion ID: 1166754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appellant's wrongful death claim

Text: The only true issue before us is whether the district court was correct in determining that a wrongful death action is not viable when the deceased's underlying malpractice action would be time barred at the time of his death. This is an issue of first impression in Wyoming; thus, we look to the rulings of other jurisdictions for guidance. The clear majority rule is that survivors are precluded from bringing a wrongful death action where the deceased does not have a viable malpractice claim at the time of his death. See, e.g., Turner v. Mercy Hospitals & Health Services of Detroit, 210 Mich. App. 345, 349, 533 N.W.2d 365, 367 (1995) and Johnson v. ABC Ins. Co., 193 Wis.2d 35, 46, 532 N.W.2d 130, 134 (1995). See also David P. Chapus, Medical Malpractice: Statute of Limitations in Wrongful Death Action Based on Medical Malpractice, 70 A.L.R.4th 535 (1989), and cases cited therein. For example, in Miller v. Luther, 170 Wis.2d 429, 439, 489 N.W.2d 651, 654 (1992), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals interpreted Wisconsin's wrongful death statute, nearly identical to Wyo. Stat. § 1-38-101, to require that the decedent have a cause of action for damages at the time of death. A negligence action filed by Mr. Miller and his wife was pending when Mr. Miller died. After her husband's death, Mrs. Miller filed a wrongful death action. It was subsequently determined that the negligence action was time barred, and that action was dismissed. The trial court also dismissed the wrongful death action and Mrs. Miller appealed. Relying on Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent, the appeals court held that a wrongful death claim is barred if, at the time of death, the statute of limitations had run against the decedent's underlying claim. Miller, 489 N.W.2d at 654. The Wisconsin court recognized that a wrongful death action is a statutory right which is separate and distinct from that held by the deceased. However, that action is subject to the same infirmities and defenses as would have existed in a suit by the deceased if he were still alive. Miller, 489 N.W.2d at 653. Thus, a viable right of action in the deceased at the time of his death is a condition precedent to the existence of a right of action in the survivors. See also Drake v. St. Francis Hosp., 560 A.2d 1059, 1061 (Del.Supr.1989). Appellant cites to Missouri law which allows a wrongful death action to proceed despite the fact the decedent's malpractice action would have been time barred at the time of death. Gramlich v. Travelers Ins. Co., 640 S.W.2d 180, 185-86 (Mo.App.1982). On facts very similar to those at issue here, the Missouri court held that an action for wrongful death does not arise until the time of death. The court reasoned that a wrongful death action is separate from an action for malpractice, and is intended to alleviate a different injury done to a different class of plaintiffs. Therefore, in Missouri, the statute of limitations governing malpractice actions has no application in a wrongful death action. Id. at 185-86. Appellant urges us to adopt this minority view. However, we believe the majority rule to be better reasoned and more in keeping with Wyoming's wrongful death statute, Wyo. Stat. § 1-38-101, which provides in pertinent part: Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued is liable in an action for damages   . (Emphasis added.) The italicized portion is at the crux of this issue. A plain reading of that language clearly requires the deceased to have a viable claim at the time of his death in order for his survivors to have a valid wrongful death claim. Adopting the minority view by holding that a wrongful death action is not derivative of the underlying negligence action would undermine the purposes of statutes of limitation. If a viable underlying claim is not necessary, wrongful death actions could be brought several years, or even decades, after the negligent act which caused the death, and possibly without regard to whether the deceased had already sued and recovered damages during his lifetime. Cf. Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 251 Ill.App.3d 980, 191 Ill.Dec. 356, 623 N.E.2d 946 (1993). Such a result would render meaningless the language of Wyo. Stat. § 1-38-101 which permits an action based on the entitlement of the injured party to bring suit had death not ensued. This we will not do. Rue v. Carter, 919 P.2d 633, 635 (Wyo.1996).