Opinion ID: 4511395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-Examination of Detective Higbee and Leo

Text: ¶ 40. Considering the testimony of Allen, Judge Pearson concluded that trial counsel’s “performance in the area of cross-examination of several key witnesses was deficient.” With regard to Leo specifically, Allen testified that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective because he failed to establish that Leo had a financial incentive to testify during jury draw and opening statements. Nevertheless, Judge Pearson concluded that petitioner could not establish he was prejudiced by this error because he did not provide any “specific description of more vigorous cross-examination that could have been accomplished.” Judge Pearson did not specifically address if trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective in his cross-examination of Detective Higbee because Allen did not offer any opinion on whether trial counsel’s “performance was deficient in this particular regard.” ¶ 41. On appeal, petitioner argues the PCR court erred because he did show how trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine Leo prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Specifically, petitioner argues that trial counsel could have impeached Leo about police notes indicating that he reported petitioner’s admission to police in October 1993, not in March as he testified. Furthermore, even though Judge Pearson did not determine that trial counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Higbee was ineffective, petitioner suggests that he was prejudiced because trial counsel could have impeached Detective Higbee on his testimony that petitioner volunteered information about the condition of Amy’s bathroom. Citing to police notes, petitioner argues that, contrary to his testimony, Detective Higbee asked petitioner to describe the condition of the bathroom. We conclude that petitioner failed to present the necessary expert testimony to support these claims. ¶ 42. Because “[t]rial counsel are permitted a great deal of discretion in decisions regarding trial strategy,” In re Dunbar, 162 Vt. at 212, 647 A.2d at 319, “expert testimony is generally required to show that an attorney’s conduct fell below the standard of accepted practice in Vermont,” In re Burke, 2019 VT 28, ¶ 19. “Where a professional’s lack of care is so apparent 18 that only common knowledge and experience are needed to comprehend it, expert testimony is not required.” In re Grega, 2003 VT 77, ¶ 16 (quotation omitted) (noting that “sleeping counsel is considered equivalent to no counsel at all”). ¶ 43. First, as Judge Pearson noted, petitioner presented no expert testimony that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective in his cross-examination of Detective Higbee. Petitioner’s expert testified only that counsel was “subpar” during his cross-examination of Amy’s two neighbors, O’Brien, and petitioner’s siblings. Without any expert testimony whatsoever, petitioner cannot show that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective because of his cross-examination of Detective Higbee. ¶ 44. Second, although Allen presented testimony about why trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective in regard to his cross-examination of Leo, he presented no testimony on the grounds that petitioner has pursued on appeal. Specifically, Allen explained that although counsel had “some luck” in establishing that Leo had a financial incentive to testify, “[h]e could have mentioned it in the opening statement” and during jury draw. On appeal, however, petitioner argues that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective because trial counsel failed to cross-examine Leo based upon police notes that suggest he reported petitioner’s confession to the police in October 1993. Without expert testimony on this issue, petitioner cannot demonstrate that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Leo based on when he told police about petitioner’s admission of having been at the scene.