Opinion ID: 345119
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Meetings in French Martinique.

Text: 20 The Colombians were not discouraged from their criminal activities by the arrest of the Cravero kingpins. The second portion of the conspiracy began when agent Short traveled to the Bahamas with Andries and his girlfriend. Arrangements for the trip were made sometime between November 3, 1974, and November 10, 1974, when agent Short telephoned Archbold from New York. During that conversation, Short gave Archbold his telephone number in South Florida. On November 10, 1974, Archbold called agent Short at that Florida number and Short made a tape recording of the conversation. The gist of the taped conversation, which was played to the jury at trial, was that agent Short (posing as a buyer of narcotics) was going to Grand Cayman to meet with Alberto, Aldolpho and Archbold to arrange for a delivery. During the conversation, Short asked Archbold why the meeting could not be in St. Thomas rather than Grand Cayman. Archbold replied that Alberto have (sic) practically the same problem as what Billy have (sic). 10 Thereafter, in a series of six meetings arranged by Andries, Short was introduced to the appellants and, without undue delay, their discussion turned to the subject of drug importation. The statements made by the co-conspirators during these meetings were related at trial in the testimony of Short, Andries and Donnie. In the first meeting, Short was introduced to the appellants and talked briefly with them when they arrived at the Hilton Hotel in Martinique. No incriminatory statements were made by the appellants at this meeting. 21 In the second meeting in Martinique, agent Short met with the three appellants, with appellant Archbold acting as an interpreter translating English to Spanish and Spanish to English. Gomez and Ramirez told Short that Andries owed them several hundred thousand dollars from prior narcotic deals, and that this amount included the narcotics sent to Cravero. Short determined that Andries alone owed them about $10,000, and he indicated that he would be willing to pay this amount, but that he would not pay Cravero's debts. They agreed to deal with him on this basis. Ramirez offered to sell Short 20 kilos of cocaine for $25,000 per kilo and suggested a delivery schedule of 20 kilos to be delivered every 15 days. During subsequent conversations with the appellants, Short continued to press for a lower price for the cocaine, but Ramirez insisted upon $20,000 per kilo. The appellants continued to discuss price and methods of payment with Short, and they again stated that Cravero owed them over $200,000. Ramirez explained that he had been to Miami to collect from Cravero when Chandler was arrested in New Jersey. Cravero, however, told Ramirez that he had only $200,000 which he could use either to pay Ramirez or to bail out Chandler. Ramirez said that he told Cavero to get Chandler out of jail, but he later learned that Cravero had not done so. 22 Ramirez then asked, initially, for a $200,000 advance from Short, but he later agreed to send the first shipment on consignment. Ramirez asked whether Short wanted any marijuana, and Short declined. Ramirez agreed, noting that they had had problems with the last delivery as it contained both cocaine and marijuana. During one of their conversations Archbold admitted being on the boat that had delivered the narcotics. He stated that only 28 kilos were delivered, rather than the promised 50. In another meeting, Short and the others discussed plans for the date of the first shipment of cocaine into Miami, the mode and amount of payments, and to whom payment would be made and where. They agreed that Ramirez would leave Martinique and go directly to Colombia to begin preparation for the cocaine shipment and that Gomez and Archbold would go to Panama to await Short and his money. In addition to the discussion of future dealings which occurred in this meeting, the conversation also dealt with past events. Gomez told Short that he had traveled to New York about one week after the delivery that came to Cravero and Chandler and that Cravero's boat with the marijuana burned while Gomez was in New York. Gomez told Short that Cravero had paid Gomez about one hundred and something thousand dollars for the cocaine and marijuana they sent them. Archbold told Short that he too had come to the United States and that he and Ramirez were staying at the Fontainebleau when Chandler was arrested in New Jersey. Archbold also said that he had met with Cravero in October, 1974. 23 During this same time frame, Ramirez told Short that Cravero had paid him about $6,000. Gomez, who was also present at this time, told Short that Cravero had paid him about $38,000 of the $44,000 which Andries owed him from a previous deal. Ramirez also made statements in Martinique to Andries and to Donnie. He told Andries, in Donnie's presence, that Cravero had paid him very little money for the last deal. He also told Donnie that the very little payment which Cravero made to him was for 28 kilograms of cocaine and a quantity of marijuana. 24 Later that day, Short had a conversation with Archbold about Archbold's delivery of cocaine and marijuana to Chandler in the Bahamas. Archbold told Short that Cravero and Chandler were supposed to receive fifty kilograms of cocaine, but that because they, Chandler and Cravero, kept calling down there, Mr. Ramirez and Mr. Gomez decided to go ahead and send what they had available, which was 28 kilos. Archbold also told agent Short that Alfredo Gomez, the father of (defendant) Adolfo Gomez, was the boss and that he put forward Ramirez to handle the business because Ramirez had the confidence of the father . . . and more experience. 25 In their final meeting, Short asked for some assurances from the appellants about the identity of his new business associates. He had Gomez and Archbold write on a piece of hotel stationery their names, addresses and telephone numbers, as well as Gomez' father's name and the name of his business in Panama. 11 The document, on which Short also wrote Ramirez' name, was offered and received into evidence. Ramirez also gave his telephone number in Barranquilla, Colombia. Short testified at the trial that Ramirez told him to be careful with this piece of paper because he, Ramirez, was wanted in Puerto Rico and New York. 26 Shortly after this meeting, the defendants were arrested by French authorities upon a statement by agent Short to the authorities concerning his conversations with them during the past two days. Short left Martinique on November 21, 1974, and on December 3 signed a new complaint before Judge Roettger in Fort Lauderdale charging these three defendants with conspiracy to import cocaine and marijuana into the United States. Although this complaint was virtually identical to the first one, Short increased the time period of the alleged conspiracy from May 1, 1973 through November 2, 1974, to May 1, 1973 through November 22, 1974, so as to include the statements that he had received from 27 the defendants during the two days of meetings in 28 Martinique. II. The Admissibility of Incriminatory 29 Statements Made in Martinique. 30 Both Gomez and Ramirez, as well as Archbold by adoption, contend that their surreptitious interrogation, after the issuance of a complaint and arrest warrant, violated their rights under the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution. They argue that since they were in effect in custody on the island of Martinique, their statements to Short were inadmissible because they were not given full Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 31 Appellant Gomez suggests that the Government's motive for having Short question and discuss various drug transactions with the appellants was to obtain the assistance of the French authorities in securing their arrest. He notes that an agent of the French National Police, Ravanello, accompanied Short to Martinique. Once they arrived, Ravanello told Short that, under French law, Gomez and the others could not be arrested in Martinique unless they violated French law while they were there. Thus, rather than arrest the appellants on the strength of the provisional arrest warrants in their possession, the Government agents, according to Gomez, created a new crime for the appellants to participate in. Gomez claims that the meetings with the appellants were used to interrogate each of them, in a surreptitious manner, about the pending charges against them in the Southern District of Florida. Recognizing that the in custody requirement of Miranda is crucial to his case, Gomez attempts to show that he was, in fact, in custody during his encounter with agent Short on Martinique. 32 This court has held that, in determining the degree of custody requisite for the invocation of Miranda protection, it would employ a case by case evaluation rather than any set rule. United States v. Carollo, 507 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874, 96 S.Ct. 143, 46 L.Ed.2d 105 (1975). In Carollo, this court set forth the four significant factors to be relied on in making this determination: 33 These are, (1) probable cause to arrest, (2) subjective intent of the police, (3) subjective belief of the defendant, and (4) focus of the investigation. (Brown v. Beto, 468 F.2d 1284, 1286 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Phelps, 443 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1971)). 507 F.2d at 52. 34 Even the most superficial analysis of the four Carollo factors, as applied to this case, shows that appellants' argument is totally without merit. Although factors (1) and (4) would indicate the desire of the government to put these appellants into custody at some point, factors (2) and (3) simply do not indicate the degree of custody contemplated by Miranda. With respect to factor (2), Gomez argues that Short intended to deprive him of his freedom in a very significant way by somehow preventing his departure from Martinique. 35 Short had testified that although he discovered that he could not force the Martinique government to keep Gomez on the island on the strength of the arrest warrants already obtained, he made every effort to assure that Gomez would not be allowed to leave Martinique before his extradition. It is obvious, however, that Gomez remained on the island because he wanted to make a drug deal, not because agent Short was restraining him from leaving. To hold that such an attenuated and theoretical degree of restraint meets the in custody requirement of Miranda would render the rule useless. If an undercover agent, such as Short, had to give the Miranda warnings to suspects such as the appellants in this case, he would obviously be unable to carry out his investigation. Moreover, the Miranda rule is intended to prevent coercive interrogation and to assure the voluntariness of any incriminatory statements. These objectives were met in this case even though the Miranda warnings were not given. 36 Perhaps the third factor enunciated in Carollo the subjective belief of the defendant best illustrates why the in custody requirement of Miranda has not met in this case. In Carollo, the court noted that Carollo was never told that he could not leave; in fact he walked away several times during his conversations with the ATF agents to conduct restaurant business. Carollo's subjective belief about his freedom of action was indicated by his willingness to help the agents while conducting business as usual. Since these appellants, like Carollo, held no subjective belief that their freedom was being restrained, it can hardly be said that they were being deprived of their freedom of action in any significant way. 37 With obvious sincerity counsel for appellant Gomez asserts that the insinuation of an undercover law enforcement officer into the meeting of the defendants in Martinique, and his suffering and encouraging them to discuss their illegal activities without telling them that he was a law enforcement officer, though he well knew them to be conspirators, was just not fair. 38 Indeed, the record discloses that agent Short was misleading his quarry. Unknown to the conspirators, agent Short had already determined that the appellants had been engaged in a massive drug smuggling operation. Warrants had been obtained for their arrest, but the warrants had not yet been executed. Short was investigating the conspiracy, and the investigation had developed so far that he knew who it was that he should investigate further. 39 In what appellants apparently view as the game of law man versus lawbreaker, 12 the rules under which agent Short was operating really didn't give appellant and his associates a fair chance of success. Were this transaction a game, appellants' argument would be persuasive. Were this court something of an NCAA Rules Committee seeing to it that the offense and the defense each had a fair chance of prevailing upon the gaming fields, we ought to revise the rules more in keeping with what appellant seeks. 13 This business is not a game and this court is not prescribing rules for a fair contest. In the ongoing clash between those who would break our nation's laws and those who seek to enforce the law, it will be quite satisfactory if the former receive the ball in their own end zone with no reason to believe that they can hope to advance it one yard. 40 Yet there are restraints upon those who seek to attain that favorable position. Those restraints appear in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, other amendments, and the laws made pursuant thereto. They are not promulgated for the purpose of insuring that the guilty shall be given a fair chance of escaping detection. They safeguard the liberties of the people against tyranny. The blessings of liberty are of such value that, in order to safeguard them, the people are and have been content to restrain even the detection of crime. If, consistent with those restraints, those who serve the people as law enforcement personnel can gain the overwhelming upper hand over those who set about to break the law, justice is served, our Constitutional form of government is protected and, to that extent, preserved. 41 The Miranda rule is a statement by our Supreme Court of such a constitutional restraint upon governments' efforts to detect crime. It evolved from a long history of various activities which have been denounced, but though the activities be varied, the Constitutional purpose furthered by their separate denunciations remains constant. 42 For example, it was once thought expedient in extracting confessions from suspects to give them the third degree. Quite likely, long hours without sleep, the glare of an intense light, and the pain of beatings with a rubber hose resulted, with some expedition, in persuading even the guilty truthfully to confess his wrongdoing. Furthermore, a citizen innocent of any crime could well be persuaded to fabricate whatever confession was being sought to bring such a proceeding to an end. Neither was to be thus compelled to give testimony against himself under the fifth amendment and neither may be so compelled today. 43 The compulsion and coercion of the third degree is apparent. Yet, absent the bright light and rubber hose trappings of such a discredited proceeding, citizens may be coerced into loss of their rights under the fifth amendment. Such occasions are similarly condemned. The impact of arrest, to one unfamiliar with our basic charter, may produce a feeling of helplessness to resist the questions of the arresting officer or his associates. Before the officer can, in such a situation, question the arrested person, the coercive effect of his status must be removed. Thus, it has been judicially established as a prerequisite to interrogation of an arrestee that he be advised that he is not under coercion to talk even though he be under arrest. Miranda, supra. Once the threat of coercion has thus been removed, no rule prevents the taking of a confession or other incriminatory statement or its later use in court. The law does not denounce clever or imaginative police work within the bounds of the Constitution even though its result is that a lawbreaker really has no fair chance of escaping prosecution. The law does denounce coercion of an arrested person to provide information he would not voluntarily provide. Even though such coercion may be more subtly applied than in the third degree setting, it is, nevertheless, unlawful, wherever found and however applied. In this case, agent Short used imaginative methods to create the occasion for his quarry to speak in his presence, but when they spoke they did so voluntarily and under no compulsion or coercion. 44 The appellants also contend that their interrogation occurred without the assistance of counsel, in violation of the principles announced in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). The appellants claim that Short's questioning took place while they were constructively under arrest and after a complaint had been filed and an arrest warrant had been issued. These facts, they allege, subjected them to the criminal justice system in a manner which required assistance of counsel. It is well settled, however, that an accused is entitled to counsel only when the prosecution of his case has reached a critical stage. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). Furthermore, as noted in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966), (t)here is no constitutional right to be arrested. Thus, the government was entitled to continue gathering evidence, even though a complaint and an arrest warrant had been issued. 45