Opinion ID: 175190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Montaño’s and Hook’s Affidavits

Text: In opposing the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Montaño and Hook submitted lengthy affidavits that described, in narrative fashion, the events underlying their retaliation claims. Each affidavit referenced several documents, such as newspaper articles, whistleblower complaints, and Lab documents, but none of these documents was attached to either affidavit. In subsequent summary judgment oppositions, the plaintiffs submitted supplemental affidavits that attached many of the documents referenced in their initial affidavits. In their motion to strike inadmissible evidence, the defendants argued that the district court should strike large portions of Hook’s and Montaño’s affidavits because of hearsay, irrelevant facts, allegations not based on personal knowledge, conclusory statements, and improper argument. The defendants also argued that the district court should strike each affidavit’s references to the unattached documents. 8 Montaño only contends, in conclusory fashion, that the affidavit “referenced and described public records, i.e., Congressional testimony and DOE reports” which would be admissible as public records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8). Aplt. Br. at 25. 20 In ruling on the motion to strike, the district court explained that Hook’s and Montaño’s initial affidavits “contain[ed] a significant amount of inadmissible testimony,” but refused to “engage in a sentence by sentence analysis of the challenged affidavits . . . as that analysis could ultimately be longer than the affidavits themselves.” Id. at 1045-46. Instead, the district court advised the parties that the inadmissible portions “have been ignored,” and that the parties could discern the contours of its evidentiary ruling from its discussion of the summary judgment motions. Id. at 1047. The district court also struck the references to unattached documents that were contained in each affidavit because of improper authentication. On appeal, Montaño assails the district court’s “unspecified ruling” as an abuse of discretion, and devotes a substantial portion of his briefing to demonstrating how key portions of his affidavit contain admissible evidence. Aplt. Br. at 26. But like the district court, we will not sift through the substance of Montaño’s and Hook’s affidavits sentence by sentence and determine which portions are admissible. Instead, we focus on the fundamental inquiry at the summary judgment posture, which is “determining whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). And in doing so, we will consider all of the evidentiary material 21 contained in each affidavit, and the remainder of the accompanying documentation contained in the record. Cf. 10B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738, at 328-29 (1998) (“The erroneous admission or exclusion of an affidavit that does not meet the Rule 56(e) standard does not require the reversal of a summary judgment if the error is harmless.”). Of course, because “[c]onclusory statements in affidavits opposing a motion for summary judgment are not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact,” First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 1985), we will disregard the conclusory allegations that appear in each affidavit, such as Montaño’s frequent complaints that he was “retaliated against,” and the ongoing comparisons he makes between his qualifications and those of other job applicants.