Opinion ID: 2977343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mental-Retardation Expert

Text: Murphy next contends that trial counsel should have retained an expert on mental retardation to explain to the jury the impact that Murphy’s mental incapacities had on his daily functioning. The State contends, however, that in light of the expert testimony actually presented, such an expert would not have affected Murphy’s sentence. As noted supra, Murphy did not specifically allege that trial counsel should have retained a mental-retardation expert in state court. Rather, Murphy first raised this claim in his traverse in the federal habeas proceedings, relying on the affidavit of Michael M. Gelbort, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist who conducted a neuropsychological evaluation of Murphy in 1997, several months after Murphy filed his habeas petition. Because Murphy did not present his claims regarding a mental-retardation expert before the state courts, we must review the claim de novo. See Danner, 448 F.3d at 376 (applying the de novo standard of review to a claim not adjudicated on the merits by the state court.) Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 16 Dr. Gelbort’s report indicated that Murphy received a full scale IQ score of 74, receiving scores of 73 and 78 in the test’s verbal and performances sections, respectively. Dr. Gelbort indicated that Murphy “tests out with IQ in the borderline mentally defective range.” (JA 527.) Dr. Gelbort’s report does not offer significantly different information than that presented at trial. At the mitigation phase, Murphy’s counsel presented the testimony of John Minter regarding Murphy’s educational background. Minter earned an undergraduate degree in psychology, a Master’s degree in educational psychology, and an Ed.S. both in school psychology as well as in administration. Though Minter previously worked for three years as a school psychologist for the Marion County Board of Education, at the time of trial, he was employed by the Marion County Board of Education as the Director of Student Personnel where he was responsible for providing educational programs for students. Minter based his testimony in relevant part on the following evaluations conducted on Murphy by various schools and facilities from 1975 through 1981. Despite the fact that the resulting IQ scores of the evaluations varied greatly over the years, ranging from 54 in 1979 to 86 in 1975, the tests, when considered together, evaluated Murphy’s abilities as in the “moderate mentally retarded” or “low range of average ability” categories and suggested that Murphy belonged in “a program for children with emotional problems.” (JA 1277.) In fact, in 1979, upon the recommendation of the Marion Area Counseling Center (“MACC”), Murphy received home instruction and was no longer permitted to attend school because his emotional problems and his “history of setting fires” made him a possible threat to other students. Minter testified, “initially we of course tried to teach [Murphy] what we call academic skills. Once a child reaches 16, 17 years of age, we change the emphasis and teach what we call survival skills, especially with children who have major academic deficits.” (JA 1277.) Murphy remained in the program until his family moved outside of the school district in 1982. Contrary to Murphy’s assertions, Minter’s testimony provided the jury with a detailed view of Murphy’s educational history and considered the programs employed Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 17 by the school system to foster Murphy’s intellectual development. In the opening statement, trial counsel endeavored to show the jury that Murphy experienced hardship stemming from his mental limitations: Joey Murphy kept inside. Joey Murphy not allowed to be with his brothers. Joey Murphy not allowed to go out and talk to other people. Joey Murphy required to sit, as a baby, in that home, required to stay beside his mother as a shadow all his childhood. Why? Who knows. It was said he was different. It was said he was sick. They were told he was mentally retarded. Whatever the case was, sick, different, mentally retarded, his brothers and sisters didn’t want to be around him cause he was different. His mother wouldn’t let him out because he was different, he was sick. He would have to sit, as she stayed in the home, in one place. At night, she would have him sleep at the end of the bed on the floor, in a shack that was held up by upright two-by-fours and tar paper around it. Four rooms, two bedrooms, a living room, and a kitchen. Coal stove in the middle to heat it. So bad that his dad, on occasions, would tell him to go find another place to sleep while his mother was asleep just because it was so cold. You could see the snow through the floor. Little Joey Murphy 4 years old, 5 years old, had to come in the house. And I can’t even believe it, but when they tell me – when they tell me and they will tell you, daily to get a beating, to take his pants down and lay on the floor. These are things that you will hear about Joey Murphy. Things in his childhood. (JA 968-69.) Additionally, Dr. Schmidtgoessling offered some explanation as to the effects of Murphy’s psychological impairments on his intellectual development. She testified that: One sees he has not adapted effectively at school, not been able to make the adjustment effectively at school, not been able to make the adjustment to authority, to applying his mental capacities to school the way most kids are able to do. He’s not been able to form relationships at all in an age appropriate fashion. He’s extremely ambivalent, relationships literally created so much tension [in] him because of his desire for approval and affection. Yet his feeling, it will be rejected. He can’t regulate his behavior towards other people. Often times he’s very testing and provocative. And at other times, like a child very meek and attention seeking. Work wise, he’s not been able to hold a job for a sustained amount of time. If you just look at him in almost any realm of his functioning, he does not behave in a way we would expect a 22 year Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 18 old person. He behaves at a much younger level than that. That’s why I mean by disabling. Disabling psychology means that you are unable to carry out things that people your age should be able to do. (JA 1171-72.) Again, although it is clear that Murphy faced significant challenges during his youth, including the afore-described mental deficiencies, the record before us does not warrant a different conclusion than that reached by the district court. Trial counsel presented Minter’s testimony as a basis for its charge of mental retardation. Indeed, Minter testified about Murphy’s IQ scores and the resultant actions by the school system to address his intellectual needs. Further, Minter testified that Murphy had tested in a “borderline mentally retarded” range and had even produced an IQ score placing him in the range of being considered “moderate mentally retarded.” Dr. Schmidtgoessling also offered testimony about the ways in which Murphy’s behavioral issues and mental limitations have affected him. Additionally, Murphy submits that testimony by a mental-retardation expert would have been beneficial if only to refute the testimony of James Sunbury, Ph.D., who testified for the prosecution. Dr. Sunbury testified that he viewed Murphy as being in the borderline mental-retardation range, meaning having an IQ score of between 70 and 80. However, Dr. Gelbort’s affidavit adds nothing more than evidence previously offered at trial. See Hill v. Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308, 319 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “the new evidence that a habeas petitioner presents must differ in a substantial way – in strength and subject matter – from the evidence actually presented at sentencing”).2 Given that Murphy has not demonstrated that trial counsel’s failure to retain a mental-retardation expert to explain the impact of Murphy’s intellectual limitations upon his life resulted in prejudice, we cannot grant him relief on this claim. 2 Murphy also objects to the district court’s alleged “fail[ure] to address [Dr. Everington’s] affidavit in reaching its decision,” but Dr. Everington’s testimony was not available for the district court’s consideration at the time that this particular claim was resolved. Murphy offered Dr. Everington’s testimony in support of his Atkins claim, which was first raised in 2005, but the district court addressed and rejected the instant claim in 2001. Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 19 3. Disclosure of Records of Past Antisocial Behavior As his final argument that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during the mitigation phase, Murphy contends that trial counsel improperly disclosed to the government documents and evidence gathered in preparation for the mitigation phase, allowing damaging evidence to be presented to the jury. Murphy argues that counsel was not obligated to disclose its entire mitigation file to the prosecution; rather, the trial court ordered counsel only to mark in advance the exhibits intended for use during the mitigation phase of trial. Specifically, Murphy asserts that due to counsel’s allegedly improper disclosure, on cross-examination, Murphy’s mother confirmed that Murphy had been unable to attend a group home because he had a history of setting fires and that he had been removed from a treatment facility because he posed a danger to other patients by mutilating animals, damaging cars, stealing, and destroying a counselor’s room. Murphy also claims that the prosecution used the records in their crossexamination of Dr. Schmidtgoessling, who testified about certain incidents during which Murphy had been identified as “destructive” while a resident in another treatment facility. The State argues that Murphy’s disclosure claim is improperly before this Court, and that, regardless, the argument does not warrant habeas relief. A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus must meet certain procedural requirements to permit review of his habeas claims by a federal court. See Smith v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 463 F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir. 2006). The petitioner must first exhaust the remedies available in state court by fairly presenting his federal claims before the state court; the federal court will not review unexhausted claims. Id. (citing Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 2004); Lott v. Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 601 (6th Cir. 2001)). The exhaustion “requirement is satisfied when the highest court in the state in which the petitioner was convicted has been given a full and fair opportunity to rule on the petitioner’s claims.” Lott, 261 F.3d at 608 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A federal court will not review claims that were not entertained by the state court due to either the petitioner’s failure to raise those claims in the state courts while state remedies were available or the petitioner’s failure to comply with a state procedural Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 20 rule, thereby preventing the state courts from reaching the merits of the claims. Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 763 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Seymour, 224 F.3d at 549-50). For noncompliance with a state procedural rule to serve as a bar to habeas review, the state procedure must satisfy the standards set forth in Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986). See Smith, 463 F.3d at 431. First, there must be a state procedural rule in place that the petitioner failed to follow. Maupin, 785 F.3d at 138. Second, the state court must have actually denied consideration of the petitioner’s claim on the ground of the state procedural default. Id. Third, the state procedural rule must be an “adequate and independent state ground to preclude habeas review.” Id. If these three factors are satisfied, the petitioner can overcome the procedural default by either “demonstrat[ing] cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrat[ing] that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991). We agree with the State’s assessment that Murphy’s disclosure claim is not properly before this Court because he first presented it in his traverse and, thus, failed to exhaust the claim in state court. See Tyler v. Mitchell, 416 F.3d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2005) (a district court may decline to review a claim that a party raises for the first time in his traverse). Regardless, even assuming arguendo that Murphy had properly exhausted his disclosure claim, reviewing Murphy’s claim de novo, Danner, 448 F.3d at 376, Murphy’s arguments fail on their merits. First, the production of the records by Murphy’s counsel was not objectively unreasonable because the prosecution most likely is entitled to such information under the relevant Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure, which provides: If on request or motion the defendant obtains discovery under (B)(1)(c), the court shall, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney order the defendant to permit the prosecuting attorney to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, available to or within the possession, custody Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 21 or control of the defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial. Ohio Crim. R. 16(C)(1)(a). More importantly, however, the documents produced were not prejudicial because they were merely cumulative of potentially damaging information about Murphy that was already presented at trial in support of Murphy’s claim that he had a mental illness. Trial counsel tried to demonstrate to the jury that evidence of Murphy’s problematic and often destructive behavior supported its theory that he suffered from a mental illness and from possible mental retardation. Specifically, on direct examination, Murphy’s mother testified that when Murphy was enrolled in Headstart at the age of five, his teachers contacted her to discuss his habit of starting fires, the fact that he did not get along well with other children and sometimes abused them, and that he was generally badly behaved. Moreover, Murphy’s mother testified that Murphy was institutionalized after he had set fire to a house in which he was being tutored by a Caledonia school system representative. Murphy’s mother also added that Murphy had served eighteen months in prison for convictions of auto theft and arson. Finally, no prejudice resulted from the State’s cross-examination of Dr. Schmidtgoessling related to the allegedly erroneously disclosed information. When the prosecution questioned Dr. Schmidtgoessling about several examples of Murphy’s detrimental behavior, she responded that his behavior reinforced her diagnoses that he suffered from an antisocial personality disorder. Murphy’s behavior, therefore, served as a basis for her finding of mental illness, and was not a detriment to Murphy’s case. Because Murphy has not set forth evidence showing that his counsel’s assistance was objectively unreasonable or that his counsel’s actions prejudiced his case, his claim as to counsel’s provision of records to the prosecution also fails. Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 22 B. The jury was not improperly precluded from considering Murphy’s psychological age as mitigating evidence during sentencing. During the closing arguments at the penalty phase of Murphy’s trial, Murphy’s counsel presented evidence that Murphy’s development had been hampered such that his actual age (in years) did not represent his psychological age. Murphy asserts that the trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury that it could consider his psychological age to be a mitigating factor at sentencing under sections 2929.04(B)(3) and (B)(7) of the Ohio Revised Code, in violation of his constitutional rights. The State counters that this Court should reject the claim because Murphy presented this claim to the federal court for the first time in his traverse, and, alternatively, because the Ohio Supreme Court’s denial of this claim constituted a reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Section 2929.04(B) of the Ohio Revised Code provides a list of the various mitigating factors that the jury may consider in analyzing the appropriateness of the death penalty in a given case: (B) If one or more of the aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of this section is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the offender did not raise the matter of age pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code or if the offender, after raising the matter of age, was found at trial to have been eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense, the court, trial jury, or panel of three judges shall consider, and weigh against the aggravating circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history, character and background of the offender, and all of the following factors: . . . . Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04(B). Among these factors are, “[w]hether, at the time of committing the offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law,” id. § 2929.04(B)(3), “the youth of the offender, id. § 2929.04(B)(4), and “[a]ny other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender should be sentenced to death.” Id. § 2929.04(B)(7). At the end of the mitigation phase, the trial court submitted the following instructions to the jury: Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 23 You will also consider all of the evidence as to any mitigating factors included – including, but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history, character, and background of the Defendant. Mitigating factors are factors that while they do not justify or excuse the crime, nevertheless may be considered by you as extenuating or reducing the degree of the Defendant’s blame or punishment. These mitigating factors include but are not limited to the following. One, whether it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation. Two, whether at the time of committing the offense, the offender, because of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Three, the youth of the offender. And four, any other factors that are relevant to the issue whether the Defendant should be sentenced to death. (JA 1368-69.) During its deliberations, the jury asked about how to consider Murphy’s youth, to which the trial court responded: There’s been a question that’s been put by the members of the jury to the Court. On Page 5, charge to the jury, Point 3 in mitigating factors under 3, the youth of the offender. Your question is, “Is youth referring to his chronological age, or psychological age?” My response to that is that that particular mitigating factor refers to a Defendant’s chronological age. (JA 1371.) Defense counsel objected to the court’s answer and argued that the judge should have instructed the jury members that they could still consider psychological age as a mitigating factor. Murphy now argues that the trial court’s answer did not provide the jury with sufficient guidance to allow it to consider Murphy’s psychological age as other mitigating evidence. Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 24 To determine whether jury instructions violated federal due process, “the appropriate inquiry centers on ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction’ in an unconstitutional manner.” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990); see also Hartman, 492 F.3d at 363. “The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution dictate that the sentencer in a capital case may not be precluded from considering any relevant circumstance as a mitigating factor.” Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 371 (1988); see also Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 594 (6th Cir. 2000). A mitigating factor may constitute “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). Relief should be granted “if the instruction ‘by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991); see also Wilson v. Mitchell, 498 F.3d 491, 514 (6th Cir. 2007). Murphy first presented this claim as the ninth proposition of law on direct appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the merits, however, concluding that the trial court’s instruction provided an accurate statement of the law and did not preclude the jury from considering Murphy’s psychological age under the other statutory mitigating factors.” Murphy, 605 N.E.2d at 902-03. As was true of his improper disclosure claim, Murphy’s jury instruction claim is not properly before this Court because Murphy first presented it on federal habeas review in his traverse, Tyler, 416 F.3d at 504. However, the district court declined to give Tyler retroactive effect,3 thus, a discussion of the merits follows. Though the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the “better practice” would have been for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could consider Murphy’s psychological age 3 Declining to retroactively apply Tyler to bar Murphy’s claim, the district court denied the claim on its merits, explaining: In this instance, the jury’s question was directed to the third mitigating factor listed in the jury instructions. The trial court’s response was directed solely to Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04(B)(4). The trial court did not, however, preclude consideration of Petitioner’s psychological age under the other relevant statutory subsections. Considering the context in which the question was asked and the trial court’s specific answer, the Court does not find that the jury was precluded from considering psychological age regarding mitigation. (JA 740.) Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 25 in the context of the other applicable mitigating factors, it ultimately found the trial court’s instruction to the jury that only Murphy’s chronological age could be considered under Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04(B)(4) to be a proper statement of Ohio law. See State v. Landrum, 559 N.E.2d 710, 718 (Ohio 1990) (citing State v. Rogers, 478 N.E.2d 984, 993 (Ohio 1985) (the “youth of the offender” in Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04(B)(4) refers to a defendant’s “chronological age”)). Moreover, the instruction did not preclude the jury from considering Murphy’s psychological age under the other subsections of the statute. Finally, Murphy’s argument that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision did not refer to Supreme Court precedent does not make its decision worthy of dismissal because, as we have previously observed, a state-court decision can be found reasonable as long as “neither the reasoning nor the result” of the decision contradicts United States Supreme Court precedent. See Dennis v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 511, 517-18 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). In summation, because Murphy has failed to put forth evidence demonstrating the reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction “unconstitutionally,” the Ohio Supreme Court’s properly considered Boyd v. California, and Murphy’s claim does not warrant habeas relief. C. The Ohio Court of Appeals’ determination that Murphy is not mentally retarded is not an unreasonable application of federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts.4 Murphy claims that he is mentally retarded, and that, as such, he cannot be sentenced to death under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The State counters that Murphy’s Atkins claim does not warrant habeas relief because the Ohio Court of Appeals’ denial of that claim on the merits was not an unreasonable application of, or contrary to, applicable Supreme Court precedent. In 2002, in the wake of Atkins, the Ohio Supreme Court pronounced Ohio’s definition of what constitutes a mentally retarded individual for purposes of execution 4 In its December 5, 2001 memorandum opinion and order, the district court noted that Murphy first raised his mental retardation claim in his traverse. This Court has since held that a district court may decline to review a claim that a party raises for the first time in his traverse. See Tyler, 416 F.3d at 504. But given the district court’s decision to allow the parties to brief Murphy’s Atkins claim, this Court should not apply Tyler retroactively to bar the same. Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 26 ineligibility in State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ohio 2002). The Lott analysis mirrors the definitions of mental retardation used by the American Association of Mental Retardation (“AAMR”) and the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”). Id. at 101415. Under Lott, an individual is mentally retarded if he or she has: “(1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (2) significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills, such as communication, self-care, and self-direction, and (3) onset before the age of 18.” Id. at 1014. Moreover, although the Ohio Supreme Court clarified that IQ tests alone are “not sufficient to make a final determination on this issue . . . there is a rebuttable presumption that a defendant is not mentally retarded if her IQ is above 70.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Murphy timely filed his Atkins claim, and, as such, he bears the burden of proving that he is mentally retarded by a “preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 1016. Murphy first asserted that he was mentally retarded in his twelfth claim for relief in his first state petition for post-conviction relief. In 1995, an Ohio appeals court affirmed the trial court’s application of res judicata as a procedural bar to Murphy’s claim. Murphy, 1995 WL 275766, at -7. Murphy then filed a second petition for postconviction relief under Atkins in 2002. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the matter in 2004, but found that Murphy was not mentally retarded and denied his petition, reasoning: 1. The Defendant does not possess significantly sub-average intellectual functioning which is a necessary requirement to be classified as being mentally retarded. 2. Even though the Defendant-Petitioner has been evaluated by eight different psychologists, not a single one has diagnosed him as being mentally retarded. 3. Defendant-Petitioner’s IQ has consistently been found to be in excess of 70, which provides a presumption that he is not mentally retarded. 4. After reviewing the tape recordings of the interviews with the Defendant-Petitioner, this Court cannot conclude that the DefendantPetitioner lacked adaptive skills such as communication and selfdirection. In fact, this Court was impressed with Defendant-Petitioner’s Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 27 ability to communicate and logically carry on a conversation with the police officers. 5. Any difficulties that the Defendant-Petitioner possesses did have an onset before age 18. (JA 828-29.) An Ohio appeals court affirmed the decision, Murphy, No. 9-04-36, 2005 WL 280446, at , and the Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. Murphy, 830 N.E.2d at 347. In 2005, when Murphy amended his habeas petition to include his mental retardation claim, the district court also denied relief, explaining that [t]he State courts’ findings were not unreasonable because they were based on the testimony of both experts at the hearing. While Murphy chooses to emphasize different portions of the experts’ testimony in support of his position, this Court is not free to disregard the [s]tate courts’ factual findings merely because some of the hearing testimony at times supported Murphy’s mental retardation claim. Instead, the Court finds that there was ample evidence to support the [s]tate courts’ findings based on the hearing testimony of Dr. Sunbury, who concluded that Murphy was not mentally retarded, and Dr. Everington, who at various points in the hearing stated that it was difficult to determine whether Murphy had significantly subaverage intelligence. (JA 926.) Accordingly, we must consider whether the Ohio appeals court’s finding that Murphy was not mentally retarded was a reasonable application of and in accordance with Supreme Court precedent. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. At the state court evidentiary hearing, Murphy presented testimony by Dr. Caroline Everington, a special educator with extensive training and twenty-five years of experience in working with persons with disabilities, who endeavored to raise doubts about the accuracy of Murphy’s IQ scores. Dr. Everington testified about her examinations of eleven separate psychological evaluations of Murphy, conducted from the time he was nine to when he reached age thirty-two. These test results varied greatly. Over the years, Murphy achieved full-scale IQ scores ranging from 54 to 86, and Dr. Everington testified as to the importance of these results, explaining: Overall, the battery of neuropsychological tests show indication of minimal brain dysfunction arising most notably in terms of frontal lobe Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 28 deficits and temporal lobe impairment. Information processing speed is consistently slowed and Mr. Murphy has difficulty organizing unstructured information efficiently and effectively. Abstract reasoning tasks oftentimes proved to be quite overwhelming to him, leading to impaired logical abilities, poor reasoning, and subsequently poor judgment. These problems arise out of neurocognitive limitations and deficits. Overall, the patient shows indication of having a significant developmental delay in terms of intellectual functioning. He is also showing indication of cognitive and reasoning deficits which effect his ability to function normal in everyday society and interpersonal situations. (JA 1674.) Because assessing Murphy’s IQ scores was difficult, Dr. Everington emphasized the importance of assessing Murphy’s adaptive skills, testifying that such evaluations provide “the best measure[] that we have right now, and what is included is what you would call best practice, or the adaptive behavior scales. . . . And those are skills that are normed on the typical population.” (JA 1450.) To conduct her assessment, Dr. Everington used the Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised (“SIB-R”) adaptive skills test, which she deemed one of the most “respected instruments” in the area of mental retardation. Dr. Everington also relied on conversations she had with “informants”—Murphy’s grandmother, Murphy’s brother, and a former social worker—who provided her with their own observations of Murphy’s behavior when he was growing up. Because Murphy had been incarcerated for a significant amount of time when Dr. Everington administered the SIB-R, she had to “retrodiagnose” Murphy from the time he was incarcerated, at age twenty-one. Also, given that at the time of Dr. Everington’s evaluation, Murphy was already much older than eighteen (the cut-off age for “mental retardation under Lott), Dr. Everington was forced to base her SIB-R evaluation on the informants’ recollections about Murphy’s conduct from twenty-five years earlier. Summarizing the SIB-R results for the court, Dr. Everington noted that Murphy appeared to function “more like a child . . . but did not maintain the functioning of a household such as paying rent, or . . . [b]udgeting, buying supplies that are needed and those kinds of things.” (JA 1463.) Specifically, Murphy did not manage his own Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 29 money, did not maintain a checking account or credit cards, and never lived on his own or cared for himself. Also, though Murphy had some rudimentary cooking skills, he did not grocery shop or plan meals. Dr. Everington concluded: He has – has had clear deficits in adaptive skills throughout his life. And those deficits are in the mental retardation range. And I would add that they are more significant than you typically see with somebody who has IQ scores in the range that he does. These are much more significant than you typically see with somebody who has IQ scores in the 70s where he does. (JA 1468-69.) The State challenged Dr. Everington’s interpretation of Murphy’s IQ test results and attempted to undermine her assessment of Murphy’s limited adaptive skills, focusing specifically on the problems of retrodiagnosis and the possibility that the informants used were providing her with data that would aid Murphy’s claims. On crossexamination, Dr. Everington agreed that in a “technical” sense, a diagnosis of borderline mental retardation is not equivalent to a diagnosis of “mentally retarded.” Moreover, the State noted that Dr. Everington had testified that because she was neither a psychologist nor a pyschiatrist, unlike the numerous individual who had administered the evaluations on which she had opined—none of whom had diagnosed Murphy as “mentally retarded”—she was unqualified to make a diagnosis of mental retardation. State: In fact, [Murphy’s] been evaluated by seven different psychologists who performed Wechsler I.Q. Tests on him, and not a single one has diagnosed him as being mentally retarded, isn’t that correct? Everington: That is correct. State: And you’re not a psychologist? Everington: No, I’m not. State: And you’re not a psychiatrist? Everington: No, I’m not. State: And you testified from the outset that you, you know, would not be qualified to make the diagnosis yourself? You’d have to rely upon a psychiatrist or a psychologist, did you not? Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 30 Everington: I made that statement, yes. (JA 1478.) The State then presented the testimony of its own expert, Dr. James Sunbury, Ph.D. a psychologist whose practice includes work in the field of mental retardation. Based on Dr. Sunbury’s two evaluations of Murphy—conducted in 1985 and 1987—Dr. Sunbury concluded with a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that Murphy is not mentally retarded but rather has “borderline intellectual functioning,” (JA 1521), which translates to having an IQ “in the range of 70-83.” (JA 1523.) Unlike Dr. Everington, who testified that adaptive skills are the most important consideration in Murphy’s case, Dr. Sunbury argued that IQ scores should be the primary focus of an assessment of an individual’s mental abilities: State: Now, those [full scale IQ test scores], are they helpful to you in rendering an opinion as to whether or not the Defendant suffers from mental retardation? Sunbury: Well, they pretty much rule out mental retardation. State: Why so? Sunbury: Well, you can’t have a valid score in the 80s on IQ tests and be diagnosed with mental retardation. State: Why not? Sunbury: Because of the definition of mental retardation is IQ’s, full scale IQ’s of 70 or below 70, 75 and below scored by the time the person was an adult, before the person was an adult. (JA 1528.) Although Dr. Sunbury testified that he had administered an IQ test to Murphy that resulted in a score of 66, he felt that the score was invalid and did not accurately reflect Murphy’s abilities because Murphy told Dr. Sunbury that he “was just having some fun” during the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory test, which had been given on the same day as the IQ test. Dr. Sunbury also explained that although Murphy suffered from other intellectual limitations, such as poor academic performance, conduct Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 31 disorder, and antisocial personality disorder, his “functioning in society has always been very poor,” (JA 1535), and the foregoing problems and poor scoring on adaptive behavior tests can be the result of “many other conditions” outside of mental retardation. (JA 1535.) In short, Sunbury concluded that because Murphy’s only other IQ score under 70, a 54, was an outlier that was not an accurate estimate of Murphy’s abilities and that the rest of Murphy’s IQ scores were above 70, he suffers other intellectual limitations, but he is not mentally retarded. Murphy’s Atkins claim does not warrant habeas relief. In the IQ tests administered before he turned nineteen, Murphy received the following scores: 86, 76, 54, 83, 76; and 82. Of those scores, both Dr. Everington and Dr. Sunbury considered the 54 to be an outlier, and there was no indication that the other evaluations had not already considered the impact that an out-of-date test or some other measurement of error could have on Murphy’s full-scale IQ. See In re Bowling, 422 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is no indication that the psychologists who administered the IQ tests to Bowling would not have already considered the adequacy and accuracy of the testing mechanisms in calculating his scores or in using these instruments for evaluation in the first place.”) Accordingly, under Lott, there is a rebuttable presumption that Murphy’s IQ scores prevent him from being classified as mentally retarded. Further, we do not find it to be an unreasonable evaluation of the facts that the trial court found that the evidence presented at the Atkins hearing does not allow Murphy to overcome this presumption. The lack of clarity as to possible deficits in Murphy’s adaptive skills also undermines his claim. In Bowling, petitioner’s mother submitted an affidavit containing possible evidence of deficits in his adaptive skills, stating that he was: “slow in learning to walk and in becoming toilet trained”; had scarlet fever when he was three years old and suffered multiple head injuries as both an infant and a teenager; “wandered off as a child and teenager, got into fights, and was a follower”; and “had problems with money, difficulty in keeping jobs, and difficulty maintaining personal relationships.” 422 F.3d at 437. However, we denied petitioner’s request to file a second or successive Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 32 habeas petition based upon his Atkins claim because the information offered by his mother did not indicate mental retardation. Id. at 438. We explained, These limitations do not state a prima facie case for Bowling’s mental retardation claim. Bowling’s known, diagnosed psychological problems include attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, alcohol abuse, and a personality disorder. These diagnoses provide an explanation for the various problems noted by Bowling’s mother and sister. While some of the problems may also be indicative of a low level of intellectual function, their existence has little tendency to establish mental retardation, given Bowling’s other diagnoses and the fact that the psychological evidence is inconsistent with mental retardation. 422 F.3d at 438. A similar determination can be made here. Dr. Everington’s evaluation of Murphy’s adaptive skills is unreliable. Though Dr. Everington identified skill deficits she found to be indicative of mental retardation—Murphy’s inability to maintain the household or do chores around the house—this information was culled from third parties’ assessments of Murphy’s abilities twenty-five years earlier. Moreover, Dr. Everington acknowledged that Murphy’s adaptive skill deficits could be attributed to something other than mental retardation, explaining that “[c]ertainly when you say ‘some other mental problem,’ you can’t separate. He does have a dual diagnosis, and he does have some psychiatric issues as well.” (JA 1463.) Also, though it was not considered at the hearing, other testimony presented at Murphy’s trial suggests that Murphy’s adaptive skills were more developed than Dr. Everington believed. For instance, Murphy’s mother, Stella, testified that Murphy moved out of her house to live with his then-girlfriend, with whom he had a child. Additionally, Dr. McBride, whose report was before the trial court at the evidentiary hearing, stated that “[e]ven though [Murphy] was somewhat unkempt, he has the ability to care for himself and his personal needs.” (JA 1684.) In conclusion, although it is evident that Murphy has severe psychological problems and certain mental deficiencies, these characteristics alone do not make him “mentally retarded” such that his execution would violate Atkins. Lott, 779 N.E.2d at Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 33 1016; see Bowling, 422 F.3d at 438 (defendant’s psychological disorders, alcohol abuse and personality disorder do not amount to mental retardation warranting the protection of Atkins). Therefore, the Ohio appeals court’s resolution of this claim was not an unreasonable application of, or contrary to, Supreme Court precedent, and we must affirm the district court’s decision. D. Murphy’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated by the admission into evidence of numerous statements Murphy made to the police The last issue before us is whether the trial court should have suppressed various statements Murphy made to law enforcement when he was in police custody. Murphy asserts that those statements should have been suppressed because the police coerced him into making an involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. On direct appeal, Murphy alleged that the trial court improperly admitted his statements to the police because they used inappropriate interrogation tactics and his mental limitations undermined any conclusion that his statements were voluntary. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Murphy’s assertions, explaining: The transcripts of the interviews reveal that each [round of interrogation] was preceded by warnings, that knowing and voluntary waivers of his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination were obtained and the statements he made were the product of his own free choice. This view is underscored by appellant’s exercise of his right to cease the interview and consult an attorney on February 3, 1987, and is further bolstered by the evaluation of Dr. Sunbury that “Joseph Murphy has sufficient intellectual understanding of courtroom proceedings in general, and his own legal difficulties in particular. He also has the ability to cooperate with his attorneys. However, although he is not mentally retarded and he is not psychotic, he does have a character or personality disorder. He is unreliable and unpredictable and he may not tell his attorneys the whole truth. He has fluctuating internal standards and is manipulative. These behaviors represent Mr. Murphy’s personality style and are not treatable as mental illness within any reasonable time period.” Murphy, 605 N.E.2d at 900. Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 34 Murphy again alleged that the trial court improperly admitted his statements to the police at trial as his first ground for relief in his habeas petition. He argued that in addition to the police officers’ decision to ignore his mental deficiencies, they also failed to ask him whether he wanted to waive his Miranda rights. The district court denied Murphy’s claim, finding that he failed to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that the factual findings of the trial court on the issue of coercion or the validity of the waiver were correct. Murphy, No. 03-96-cv-07244 (Doc. No. 130) (N.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 2001). In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000), the Supreme Court acknowledged that there are “two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into evidence: the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Notably,“[a] statement is not ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment if an individual ‘voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently’ waives his constitutional privilege.” Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). To protect this Fifth Amendment right, an “implied right to counsel” exists “when a suspect is interrogated while ‘in custody’ or ‘otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way.’” Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 925 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). “[T]he determination [as to] whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-77). The totality of the circumstances can include such factors as “age, education, and intelligence of the defendant; whether the defendant has been informed of his Miranda rights; the length of the questioning; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment, such as Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 35 deprivation of food or sleep.” McCalvin v. Yukins, 444 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). Before trial, Murphy moved to suppress his statements to the police, and the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The following five statements were at issue: (1) Murphy’s February 3, 1987 statement to Detective Creasap and Sergeant Gosnell; (2) Murphy’s February 4, 1987 statement to Detective Creasap accusing Murphy’s brother-in-law, Alvie Coykendall, of the murder; (3) Murphy’s March 17, 1987 statement to Detective Kauble and Captain Hayden admitting involvement, but claiming that Coykendall committed the actual murder; (4) Murphy’s April 9, 1987 statement to Sergeant Black and Detective Layne confessing to the murder; and (5) Murphy’s April 13, 1987 statement to Detective Kauble and the prosecutor during which Murphy entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The details surrounding each of these statements follow. 1. February 3 statement On February 3, Detective Wayne Creasap and Sergeant J. L. Gosnell arrested Murphy at the Wood Valley Trailer Park, and Murphy verbally received Miranda warnings while in the police cruiser. At the Marion County Police Department, Murphy was again advised of his Miranda warnings, this time, both verbally and in writing. Murphy acknowledged that he understood his rights to silence and to have counsel, but he agreed to sign a waiver form and to participate in an interview. Murphy specifically agreed to speak with Gosnell, with whom he had a prior relationship. Gosnell testified that he had known Murphy for about five years and knew Murphy “well” given that he “has been involved in several cases that I investigated over the past years, and – involving alleged arsons and thefts.” (JA 1156.) Gosnell also added that he and Murphy “have camaraderie, I believe up to a certain point.” (JA 1159.) Murphy subsequently ended the February 3 interview by invoking his right to counsel, stating: “I think I’m gonna stop and talk to my lawyer.” (JA 547.) The police did not continue to try to question Murphy after that point. Nos. 00-4558; 06-4428 Murphy v. State of Ohio Page 36 2. February 4 statement Donald Griffin, a police officer with the Marion City Police Department working as a jailer in the Marion City Jail, testified that on February 4, a jail trustee informed him that Murphy wanted to talk to him. When Griffin approached Murphy, Murphy indicated that he wanted to confess. Griffin then requested that another police officer contact the detectives working on the Predmore murder case. At this point, Griffin knew that Murphy was represented by an attorney, but he testified that since he did not know the attorney’s name, he did not contact him. Creasap, Gosnell, and Captain Frank Arnold were present at the February 4 interview with Murphy. After being advised of his Miranda rights, Murphy indicated that he understood his rights but had decided to speak with the police and executed a waiver form to the effect. In the interview, which was transcribed, Murphy indicated that he had initiated the contact with the police through the jail trustee. Murphy also indicated that although he knew that he had a right to counsel, he did not want his attorney to be present. Notwithstanding any discrepancy as to Murphy’s education level—Murphy told Creasap he had only a third-grade education but later informed Gosnell that he had actually completed the ninth grade—Gosnell and Creasap both verbally explained Murphy’s rights to him and confirmed that he understood those rights. Gosnell believed that Murphy understood the consequences of his decision-making and was aware of the possibility of the death penalty in this case. Gosnell testified that he never made any misrepresentations to or struck any deals with Murphy.