Opinion ID: 776874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Schwarz's Challenges to the First Trial

Text: 107 On appeal, Schwarz, represented by new counsel, argues that the loyalties owed by his trial attorney, Worth, to the PBA and Worth's pecuniary interest in the PBA retainer created an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected Worth's representation of him and deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Schwarz further contends (1) that Worth's conflict was so serious as to be unwaivable and (2) that, in any event, the waiver he made during the district court's Curcio hearing was ineffective because he was not specifically apprised and had no reason to believe that Worth's interests in the PBA retainer would conflict with his defenses in the particular way that they did.
108 A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to representation by conflict-free counsel. United States v. Blau, 159 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir.1998); see also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.); Armienti v. United States, 234 F.3d 820, 823 (2d Cir.2000); United States v. Rogers, 209 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir.2000); United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 152 (2d Cir.1994). Whether a defendant's representation violates the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo. See Blau, 159 F.3d at 74; United States v. Kliti, 156 F.3d 150, 152-53 (2d Cir.1998); United States v. Stantini, 85 F.3d 9, 16 (2d Cir.1996). 109 While a defendant is generally required to demonstrate prejudice to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this is not so when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest. Id. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Prejudice is presumed under such circumstances. See id. ; United States v. Malpiedi, 62 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52, 58 (2d Cir.1986). Thus, a defendant claiming he was denied his right to conflict-free counsel based on an actual conflict need not establish a reasonable probability that, but for the conflict or a deficiency in counsel's performance caused by the conflict, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Rather, he need only establish (1) an actual conflict of interest that (2) adversely affected his counsel's performance. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); see also Levy, 25 F.3d at 152. 110
111 An attorney has an actual, as opposed to a potential, conflict of interest when, during the course of the representation, the attorney's and defendant's interests diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action. Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 307 (2d Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Schwarz argues that an actual conflict of interest was created when the Worth firm entered into the PBA retainer. 112 We need not decide whether the PBA retainer itself created an actual conflict of interest with respect to Worth's representation of Schwarz at trial because we find that even if the conflict at the time the PBA retainer was signed could be categorized as only a potential conflict, it became an actual conflict after the Louima civil suit was filed. As we will explain more fully, the PBA's interests in defending against the civil lawsuit, which alleged that the PBA, through its agents, and the PBA's president, Matarazzo, participated in a conspiracy to injure Louima and cover it up, diverged from Schwarz's interests in putting on a defense that would implicate anyone other than Volpe as participating in the assault in the bathroom. While the Worth firm had been barred by the district court from formally representing the PBA or any of its members in the Louima civil suit, Worth nevertheless had an unalloyed duty to the PBA as his client to refrain from any conduct injurious to its interests. Moreover, because the Worth firm's retainer agreement with the PBA provided that (a) a portion of the $10 million retainer (which was otherwise payable in equal monthly installments) would be held back and paid quarterly to ensure the PBA's satisfaction with the Worth firm's performance and (b) the PBA could unilaterally cancel the contract upon thirty days' notice, and because Worth could expect that satisfaction with the firm's performance would result in a renewal of the retainer upon its expiration, Worth had a strong personal interest in refraining from any conduct to which the PBA might object. 113 Because Louima had consistently maintained that he was assaulted in the bathroom by at least two officers, Schwarz had an obvious strategic interest in implicating another officer in the bathroom assault from the moment he was charged with that crime. As further discussed below, that interest became stronger during the course of his trial. Such a defense, however, could have hampered the PBA in its defense of the Louima civil suit. As a result, Worth faced an actual conflict between his representation of Schwarz, on the one hand, and both his professional obligation to the PBA and his self interest, on the other. 114
115 The finding of an actual conflict, however, is only the first step in determining whether Schwarz has established his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. He must also show that the actual conflict adversely affected Worth's performance by demonstrating that a `lapse in representation' resulted from the conflict. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d at 58 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349, 100 S.Ct. 1708). 116 To prove a lapse in representation, a defendant must demonstrate that some `plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued,' and that the `alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or interests.' Levy, 25 F.3d at 157 (quoting Winkler, 7 F.3d at 309); see also Triana v. United States, 205 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 956, 121 S.Ct. 378, 148 L.Ed.2d 292 (2000). A defendant is not required to show that the lapse in representation affected the outcome of the trial or that, but for the conflict, counsel's conduct of the trial would have been different. Malpiedi, 62 F.3d at 469. The forgone strategy or tactic is not even subject to a requirement of reasonableness. Id. As we have previously recognized, 117 [t]he test is a strict one because a defendant has a right to an attorney who can make strategic and tactical choices free from any conflict of interest. An attorney who is prevented from pursuing a strategy or tactic because of the canons of ethics is hardly an objective judge of whether that strategy or tactic is sound trial practice. 118 Id. 119
120 Schwarz argues that Worth's loyalties to the PBA caused him to forgo the plausible alternative defense strategy of implicating Wiese as the police officer who escorted Louima to the bathroom with Volpe. Worth would have known that such a theory was viable in light of proffer statements that Wiese and Bruder had made during the initial investigation into the assault and that were disclosed to the defendants by the government before trial. In these proffer statements, Wiese stated that he had escorted Louima towards the bathroom with Volpe and had later entered the bathroom during Volpe's assault on Louima, while Bruder stated that he had observed Wiese and Volpe escorting Louima to the bathroom. 5 Rather than pursue this strategy, Schwarz contends, Worth advanced the implausible and factually unsupported theory that Volpe acted alone and that Louima fabricated the presence of a second officer to demonstrate systemic police brutality and to salvage his manhood, all in an effort to obtain an acquittal for Schwarz without having to implicate another member of the PBA. 121 We agree that implicating Wiese as the second officer in the bathroom was a plausible alternative strategy that Worth did not pursue. In fact, this strategy became a compelling one after Volpe entered a guilty plea before the defense had begun to put on its case, thereby becoming available to Schwarz as a witness. On May 24, 1999, the day before Volpe's guilty plea, Volpe's attorney told Worth that my guy [Volpe] can take your guy [Schwarz] out of the bathroom. Thus, by the time Volpe pled guilty and allocuted to the fact that there was a second officer in the bathroom, Worth had the following information: (1) Volpe, the only witness indisputably in the bathroom with Louima, was willing to testify that Schwarz was not the second officer in the bathroom; (2) Louima had been unable to identify Schwarz and had acknowledged that Schwarz and Wiese look similar; (3) both Wiese and Bruder had indicated in their proffer statements that it was Wiese, not Schwarz, who escorted Louima to the bathroom and that Wiese had actually been in the bathroom with Volpe and Louima; and (4) as had already been introduced by the defense on cross-examination, the interview tape of Turetzky indicated some confusion about whether Schwarz or Wiese escorted Louima from the bathroom. With all of this ammunition, Worth was positioned to try to create a reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds by arguing that Louima and Turetzky had both mistaken Schwarz for Wiese because they look similar, that the second officer in the bathroom was Wiese, and that Schwarz was innocent. 122 Indeed, shortly after the trial and after Volpe's attorney stated publicly that had Volpe been called to testify, he would have said that Schwarz was not in the bathroom, Worth filed a post-verdict motion for a new trial in which he himself acknowledged the potential importance of Volpe's testimony. In that motion, which was based on the allegation that the government violated its Brady obligations by failing to disclose Volpe's exculpatory statements made during plea negotiations conducted during the trial, Worth argued to the district court that [t]he exculpatory value of the disclosure that Mr. Volpe would state that Mr. Schwarz was not in the bathroom and that the defendant Wiese was the other officer referred to in his plea colloquy is too plain to require extended explication. Nevertheless, at trial Worth had doggedly pursued the theory that Volpe acted alone, a theory the district court later characterized as fanciful, Volpe, 62 F.Supp.2d at 892, despite his knowledge that both Wiese and Bruder had made statements implicating Wiese as the person who escorted Louima. And he continued to pursue this theory, and eschewed the opportunity to call Volpe to the stand, despite being told by Volpe's attorney that my guy can take your guy out of the bathroom. 123 The government argues that Worth's decision not to implicate Wiese was made for sound tactical reasons and that he did not call Volpe to testify because Volpe was not a credible witness. For the reasons we have stated above, we are unpersuaded. In any event, this argument is beside the point because Schwarz does not need to prove that the forgone strategy was reasonable or that it would have affected the outcome of the trial, only that it was a plausible one and that it was forgone. 124 We also reject the government's claim that Worth actually took steps to implicate Wiese, but was foreclosed from doing so by evidentiary decisions of the district court. While it is true that Worth sought to sever the trial and to disqualify Wiese's attorney in order to introduce statements made by Wiese to his attorney, a close examination of those efforts shows that Worth did so in a manner that sought to avoid implicating Wiese, which was consistent with the conflict faced by Worth. See Volpe, 42 F.Supp.2d at 211, 213-16. Worth's basis for seeking to sever Schwarz's trial from Wiese and Bruder's was not that it would allow him to present the defense that Wiese was the second officer in the bathroom or that Schwarz's defense was otherwise antagonistic to Wiese's. Rather, he requested a severance to allow Wiese and Bruder to testify only that they did not see Schwarz escort Louima to the bathroom — and only on the condition that Wiese and Bruder be tried first. Compare id. at 210-11 (Volpe's motion based on antagonistic claims) with id. at 211 (Schwarz's motion). 125 In addition, Schwarz's motion to disqualify Wiese's counsel did not seek to introduce Wiese's statement, made pursuant to his proffer agreement, that it was Wiese who had escorted Louima to the bathroom. See id. at 213-14. Rather, Schwarz sought to introduce different statements, ones to which Wiese's attorney stipulated Wiese had told Louima's attorneys in connection with Louima's civil action. See id. In an affidavit filed in support of Schwarz's motion, Worth told the district court that 126 [Wiese's counsel] agreed that he had told counsel for Abner Louima that Mr. Wiese had told him that Wiese did not see Schwarz strike Louima, that Schwarz did not go with Volpe and Louima to the men's room, and that when he looked into the men's room he saw that only Volpe and Louima were in there. 127 Aff. of Stephen C. Worth in Support of Omnibus Mot. dated Dec. 1998, ¶ 5, at 5. 128 The clear import of the stipulated statements was that Volpe acted alone. Presumably, they were made in response to Louima's allegations in the civil action that his beatings and sexual victimization were the result of a conspiracy. Significantly, Wiese's admission that he, not Schwarz, escorted Louima to the bathroom was not included among those statements. Volpe, 42 F.Supp.2d at 211, 213-16. In fact, the very reason the district court denied the disqualification motion was because none of the statements sought to be introduced were against Wiese's interest, and therefore the statements were inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 211, 215-16. 129 Similarly, the district court's reason for denying the severance motion was that there was no indication that Wiese and Bruder would actually testify for Schwarz and because their good faith in seeking to do so was questionable. Id. at 211. It is unclear, moreover, whether the district court was even made aware of Wiese's admission either for purposes of the Curcio hearing or for the severance and disqualification motions. See id.; see also id. at 212 (discussing Wiese's motion to sever on the ground, inter alia, that Bruder had previously stated that he — Bruder — saw Wiese escorting Louima with Volpe). 130
131 We also agree that pursuit of this plausible alternative strategy implicating Wiese would have been inherently in conflict with Worth's loyalty to the PBA (and, thus, with his self-interest) and that Worth's failure to pursue this strategy was almost certainly the result of this conflict. See Levy, 25 F.3d at 157. Critically, implicating a second officer in the assault would have supported Louima's claim in his civil case that he was assaulted both in the car and in the bathroom by multiple officers acting in furtherance of a conspiracy. Casting Volpe as an aberrant officer who acted alone, on the other hand, would likely have been consistent with any defense advanced in the civil case. Thus, the actual conflict created by the Louima civil suit sharply intensified at trial when Volpe — the only person who was indisputably in the bathroom with Louima — pleaded guilty and Volpe's counsel informed Worth that Volpe could provide testimony from which Worth could argue that Schwarz was not the second officer in the bathroom, a course clearly in Schwarz's interest. Indeed, to put Volpe on the stand to testify that there was in fact a second officer in the bathroom (who was not Schwarz) would plainly have been inherently in conflict with ... the attorney's other loyalties or interests, Winkler, 7 F.3d at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted), because it would have provided support for Louima's conspiracy claim in the civil suit against the PBA. 132 This conflict would seem to be the only possible explanation for why Worth did not pursue the strategy of implicating Wiese. No evidence in the record up to then supported the theory that Volpe acted alone, while both Louima's testimony and Volpe's potential testimony (following his plea) supported a finding that a second officer participated in the assault. Worth could have relied on Volpe's potential testimony, Louima's inability to identify Schwarz coupled with the fact that Wiese and Schwarz look similar, and Wiese's own statement that he had been the officer who escorted Louima to the restroom to argue with considerable force that the second officer was Wiese. In contrast, he could rely only upon an attack on Louima's credibility to support his argument that Volpe acted alone — a theory the district court deemed fanciful. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that no effective conflict-free defense attorney would have acted as Worth did, and, thus, only Worth's conflict could explain his actions. Cf. Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir.1995) (finding that only an attorney's personal interest could explain a lengthy cross examination on an issue only marginally related to his client's guilt or innocence). 133 In short, we conclude that Worth's actual conflict adversely affected his performance in representing Schwarz. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708. Accordingly, we find that Schwarz has established a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel due to Worth's conflict unless, as the government maintains, Schwarz effectively waived the conflict at the Curcio hearing. We now turn to that question.
134 The waiver given by Schwarz at the Curcio hearing would defeat his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is determined that (1) the conflict with respect to the PBA retainer was so severe as to be unwaivable, or (2) the Curcio waiver by Schwarz was not knowing and intelligent with respect to the specific conflict that led to the lapse in Worth's representation. We need not decide whether Schwarz's waiver was knowing and intelligent because we conclude that the actual conflict that Schwarz's attorney faced was unwaivable. 135 In most cases when a defendant is faced with a situation in which his attorney has an actual or potential conflict of interest, it is possible for him to waive his right to conflict-free counsel in order to retain the attorney of his choice. See Kliti, 156 F.3d at 153; see also Blau, 159 F.3d at 74. Where an actual or potential conflict has been validly waived, the waiver cannot be defeated simply because the conflict subsequently affects counsel's performance; such a result would eviscerate the very purpose of obtaining the waiver. 136 Not all conflicts may be waived, however. An actual or potential conflict cannot be waived if, in the circumstances of the case, the conflict is of such a serious nature that no rational defendant would knowingly and intelligently desire that attoney's representation. See Kliti, 156 F.3d at 153; Levy, 25 F.3d at 153. Under such circumstances, the attorney must be disqualified, regardless of whether the defendant is willing to waive his right to conflict-free counsel. See Levy, 25 F.3d at 153. 137 We enunciated the distinction between waivable and unwaivable conflicts in United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605 (2d Cir.1993). Fulton involved the representation of a defendant by an attorney who had been accused of participating in criminal activity related to the crimes for which the defendant was on trial. See id. at 607-10. The district court had advised the defendant of the conflict and had obtained a waiver. See id. at 608. On appeal, the defendant argued that the waiver was ineffective. See id. at 612. 138 We agreed. We began by noting that, [i]n such cases, we must assume that counsel's fear of, and desire to avoid, criminal charges, or even the reputational damage from an unfounded but ostensibly plausible accusation, will affect virtually every aspect of his or her representation of the defendant. Id. at 613. We then distinguished between conflicts that implicate the attorney's self-interest and those that implicate the attorney's ethical obligation to someone other than the defendant, noting that the former are of a different character than the latter. Id. We concluded that because the conflict at issue there resulted in counsel's [a]dvice as well as advocacy [being] permeated by counsel's self interest, and [because] no rational defendant would knowingly and intelligently be represented by a lawyer whose conduct was guided largely by a desire for self-preservation, the conflict was not waivable. Id. 139 Although the particular conflict at issue in Fulton belonged to that narrow category of conflicts that we have deemed to be per se violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see id. at 611-12; Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 168-69 (2d Cir.1983), Fulton' s rationale with respect to when an attorney's self-interest renders a conflict unwaivable is equally applicable to the unusual facts of this case. As noted above, Worth's representation of Schwarz was in conflict not only with his ethical obligation to the PBA as his client, but also with his own substantial self-interest in the two-year, $10 million retainer agreement his newly formed firm had entered into with the PBA. Like the conflict in Fulton, Worth's conflict so permeate[ed] the defense that no meaningful waiver could be obtained. Fulton, 5 F.3d at 613. We must assume that, under such circumstances, the distinct possibility existed that, at each point the conflict was felt, Worth would sacrifice Schwarz's interests for those of the PBA. Indeed, we think it likely that these very concerns motivated the government to argue to the district court at the Curcio hearing that the conflict created by the PBA retainer could not be waived. Thus, we conclude that the conflict between Worth's representation of Schwarz, on the one hand, and his ethical obligation to the PBA as his client and his self interest in the PBA retainer, on the other, was so severe that no rational defendant in Schwarz's position would have knowingly and intelligently desired Worth's representation. Cf. id. ([N]o rational defendant would knowingly and intelligently be represented by a lawyer whose conduct was guided largely by a desire for self-preservation.); cf. also United States v. Arrington, 867 F.2d 122, 129 (2d Cir.1989) (upholding district court's disqualification of attorney saddled with serious conflict where allowing waiver would have required defendant to forego[] the presentation of ... evidence that would [have been] of great assistance). 140 In sum, we hold that Schwarz's counsel suffered an actual conflict, that the conflict adversely affected his counsel's representation, and that the conflict was unwaivable. Accordingly, we are required to vacate Schwarz's conviction in the first trial and remand for a new trial.
141 On appeal, Schwarz argues that the district court erred in denying him a new trial without holding a hearing on whether the exposure to extrinsic information affected the jury's deliberations. As the district court observed in denying Schwarz's post-trial motion on this issue, [t]he sanctity of jury deliberations is a basic tenet of our system of criminal justice. Volpe, 62 F.Supp.2d at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 618 (2d Cir.1997) (The secrecy of deliberations is the cornerstone of the modern Anglo-American jury system.). See generally Thomas, 116 F.3d at 618-20 (discussing importance of maintaining the secrecy of jury deliberations). As a result, [w]e are always reluctant to `haul jurors in after they have reached a verdict in order to probe for potential instances of bias, misconduct or extraneous influences.' United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir.1983)). As we noted in Ianniello, 142 post-verdict inquiries may lead to evil consequences: subjecting juries to harassment, inhibiting juryroom deliberation, burdening courts with meritless applications, increasing temptation for jury tampering and creating uncertainty in jury verdicts. This court has consistently refused to allow a defendant to investigate jurors merely to conduct a fishing expedition. 143 Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543 (quoting United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 667 (2d Cir.1978)) (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, a defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury, unprejudiced by extraneous influence, and when reasonable grounds exist to believe that the jury may have been exposed to ... an [improper] influence, the entire picture should be explored. Often, the only way this exploration can be accomplished is by asking the jury about it. United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 664 (2d Cir.1978) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result of these conflicting concerns, [c]ourts face a delicate and complex task whenever they undertake to investigate reports of juror misconduct or bias during the course of a trial. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 618. This case is no exception. 144 One reason given by the district court below for declining to hold an evidentiary hearing was its view that, notwithstanding the fact that the jurors initiated the contact with Schwarz's attorney, Schwarz's attorney had acted improperly in discussing the case with the jurors without first giving notice to the court and opposing counsel. See Volpe, 62 F.Supp.2d at 892. We have long recognized that the proper functioning of the jury system requires that the courts protect jurors from being `harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.' Moten, 582 F.2d at 664 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915)); see also United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 950 (2d Cir.1961). As the court in Moten observed: 145 Human nature is such that some jurors, instead of feeling harassed by post-trial interviewing, might rather enjoy it, particularly when it involves the disclosure of secrets or provides an opportunity to express misgivings and lingering doubts. A serious danger exists that, in the absence of supervision by the court, some jurors, especially those who were unenthusiastic about the verdict or have grievances against fellow jurors, would be led into imagining sinister happenings which simply did not occur or into saying things which, although inadmissible, would be included in motion papers and would serve only to decrease public confidence in verdicts. 146 Moten, 582 F.2d at 665. In light of these concerns, we have established the requirement that [a]t a minimum, ... notice to opposing counsel and the court should be given in all cases before engaging in any post-verdict inquiry of jurors. Id. at 665-66; see also United States v. Brasco, 516 F.2d 816, 819 n. 4 (2d Cir.1975) ([P]ost-trial questioning of jurors must only be conducted under the strict supervision and control of the court.... (internal quotation marks omitted)). 147 We fail to see, however, how counsel's allegedly improper unilateral post-verdict discussions with jurors, where the contact was not initiated by counsel — an averment that we must take as true in the absence of a hearing — is a basis for denying Schwarz the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing and a judicial determination of whether he was deprived of his right to a trial by an impartial jury, unprejudiced by extraneous influence. See Moten, 582 F.2d at 664. The importance of this Seventh Amendment right is recognized by Federal Rules of Evidence, which, while barring jurors from testifying as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions, expressly permit testimony concerning whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). 148 A `duty to investigate arises ... when the party alleging misconduct makes an adequate showing of extrinsic influence to overcome the presumption of jury impartiality.' Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543 (quoting United States v. Barshov, 733 F.2d 842, 851 (11th Cir.1984)). Indeed, in Ianniello, we held that a post-trial hearing was mandatory when a party comes forward with `clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence ... that a specific, non-speculative impropriety has occurred[.]' Id. (quoting Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234) (alterations in original); cf. King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir.1978). 149 We cannot agree with the district court's conclusion that the juror affidavits submitted by Schwarz do not present clear evidence of specific improprieties. See Volpe, 62 F.Supp.2d at 893. The three affidavits in this case contained clear and specific allegations of inappropriate exposure to extrinsic information, allegations that were plainly sufficient to satisfy the requirement of strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence. Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543. As we have observed, this test do[es] not demand that the allegations be irrebuttable; if the allegations were conclusive, there would be no need for a hearing. Id. We conclude that the basic averments in the affidavits were sufficiently serious to warrant further inquiry. See id. at 543-44 (In a case such as this, `[t]he trial court should not decide and take final action ex parte ..., but should determine the circumstances ... in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate.' (quoting Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954)) (alterations in original)). Thus, the district court erred in denying Schwarz an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the allegations were true and, if so, to assess whether he was prejudiced by the jury's exposure to the evidence concerning Volpe's plea. 150 The government argues that even if the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, the error was harmless. In line with the district court's conclusion, see Volpe, 62 F.Supp.2d at 892, the government argues that Schwarz was not prejudiced by the jury's exposure to the extrinsic information because there was a wealth of evidence at trial that a second officer was present and no evidence whatsoever to support the theory that there was only one officer in the bathroom. 151 The government is correct that not every instance of a juror's exposure to extrinsic information results in the denial of a defendant's right to a fair trial. Many such instances do not. As the Supreme Court has admonished: 152 [D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable.... [I]t is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. 153 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 738, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (alterations in original)); see also United States v. Wiley, 846 F.2d 150, 157-58 (2d Cir.1988) (upholding district court's determination that jury's exposure to extrajudicial information was harmless). 154 To determine whether the jury's exposure to extrinsic information here was harmless — i.e., whether the exposure prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial — we must examine the extrinsic information on the basis of the nature of the matter and its probable effect on a hypothetical average jury. Crosby, 294 F.2d at 950. 155 With respect to the nature of the matter, id., we note that a co-defendant's admission of wrongdoing can be very powerful evidence against a remaining defendant, and, in this case, news of Volpe's statement that a second officer was present in the bathroom significantly bolstered the testimony of Louima, who was the only witness at the first trial to actually place a second officer in the bathroom. 156 With respect to the information's probable effect on a hypothetical average jur[or], id., our analysis is necessarily affected by the particular effects on such a juror of Worth's quixotic adherence to the one-man-did-it theory and his concomitant failure to call Volpe to the stand to testify — both, as we have held above, caused by his unwaivable conflict of interest. The combined effect of Worth's conflict-impaired lone-rogue-cop defense and the jury's exposure to portions of Volpe's plea resulted in the worst of all possible worlds for Schwarz's defense. At the same time that the single-attacker theory was being undermined by the jury's improper exposure to Volpe's assertion that a second officer was indeed present in the bathroom during the assault, Schwarz was denied the use of Volpe's complete testimony that the second officer was someone other than Schwarz. Indeed, a hypothetical average jur[or] in such circumstances would likely conclude that Volpe's second officer was in fact Schwarz, because otherwise there was no explanation for Schwarz's failure to call Volpe to testify. 157 Accordingly, we cannot dismiss the district court's error in denying an evidentiary hearing on the matter as harmless. Our next task ordinarily would be to determine the proper remedy for the district court's error in not holding an evidentiary hearing. Some cases would support a remand for an evidentiary hearing to explore the truth of the allegations and to assess the prejudicial impact the extrinsic information may have had on the jury's verdict in order to determine if a new trial were warranted. See Moten, 582 F.2d at 666-67 (collecting cases). Other cases would support directly ordering a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Camporeale, 515 F.2d 184, 188-89 (2d Cir.1975). In light of our conclusion that a new trial must be held because of the conflict of interest of Schwarz's attorney, however, there is no need for us to decide the issue. THE SECOND TRIAL