Opinion ID: 4536507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for Reviewing Disputed Evidence

Text: As a threshold matter, Goebel contends the district court erred in the standard it applied in evaluating the evidence. Both the magistrate judge and the district court recited federal district court decisions from Kansas and the Southern District of Florida for the proposition that on a motion to suppress, the district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. 1 1 The decisions cited were United States v. Turner, No. 13-400500-01JAR, 2013 WL 5727404, at  (D. Kan. Oct. 22, 2013) and United States v. Ortega, No. 12-20580-CR-MOORE/TORRES, 2012 WL 12894242, at  (S.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2012). -6- We agree with Goebel that this is not the correct standard. On a motion to suppress, the district court must assess the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to give to the evidence presented; the inferences the district court draws from that evidence and testimony are entirely within its discretion. E.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 716 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2004). The defendant has the burden of showing the Fourth Amendment was implicated, United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1994), while the government has the burden of proving its warrantless actions were justified. United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010). Although the magistrate judge’s recommendation and the district court’s order cited the wrong standard, Goebel failed to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation on this ground. Rule 59(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the failure to object to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation “waives a party’s right to review.” Here, Goebel not only waived this issue by failing to object to that portion of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, but also failed to address the plain error standard in his opening brief on appeal. The Tenth Circuit has held that “[w]hen an appellant fails to preserve an issue and also fails to make a plain-error argument on appeal, we ordinarily deem the issue waived (rather than -7- merely forfeited) and decline to review the issue at all—for plain error or otherwise.” United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019). Even if we were to entertain Goebel’s argument under a plain error analysis, Goebel cannot show that the district court’s error was prejudicial, “meaning that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. AlgarateValencia, 550 F.3d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Goebel objected to only two proposed facts found by the magistrate judge, both involving the manner in which Officer Barleen observed Goebel driving. Goebel makes no attempt to show how the wrong standard made any difference to the disposition of those factual disputes. Nor does he attempt to show to a reasonable probability that the disposition of those factual disputes would have changed the outcome. Goebel has not demonstrated plain error.