Opinion ID: 2052595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of homicide by reckless conduct, sec. 940.06, stats. 1967.

Text: [9, 10] While the circuit court is given broad discretion with respect to the submission of jury instructions, when the issue is whether the evidence adduced at trial permits the giving of a lesser-included offense instruction, a question of law is presented. State v. Michels, 141 Wis. 2d 81, 95, 414 N.W.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1987). This court decides questions of law independently, without deference to the trial court or the court of appeals. Contempt in State v. Dewerth, 139 Wis. 2d 544, 552, 407 N.W.2d 862 (1987). [11-13] A circuit court has the duty to accurately give to the jury the law of whatever degree of felonious homicide the evidence tends to prove and no other. State v. Stortecky, 273 Wis. 362, 369, 77 N.W.2d 721 (1956). It is error for a court to refuse to instruct on an issue which is raised by the evidence or to give an instruction on an issue which finds no support in the evidence. Lutz v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co., 70 Wis. 2d 743, 750, 235 N.W.2d 426 (1975). The submission of a lesser-included offense instruction is proper only when there are reasonable grounds in the evidence both for acquittal on the greater charge and conviction on the lesser offense. Hawthorne v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 673, 682, 299 N.W.2d 866 (1981). To give an instruction on a lesser included offense when the commission of that lesser included offense is not reasonably shown by the evidence is no favor to a defendant. The inclusion of a doubtful lesser included offense is likely to result in a jury's compromise to the detriment of the defendant. Numerous cases arise in which the proper alternative for the jury is either the conviction on the major crime or a complete acquittal. To superfluously add to the verdict a lesser included offense may well in some cases result in the defendant being found guilty of that offense when a verdict of not guilty should have been returned. Ross v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 160, 170, 211 N.W.2d 827 (1973). The differentiating factors between second-degree murder and reckless homicide are the actor's conduct and state of mind. As to conduct, second-degree murder contemplates an act imminently dangerous to another whereas reckless homicide contemplates an act creating a situation of unreasonable risk and high probability of death or great bodily harm. See secs. 940.02 and 940.06(2), Stats. 1967. As to state of mind, second-degree murder contemplates a depraved mind whereas reckless homicide contemplates a conscious disregard for the safety of another and a willingness to take known chances of perpetrating an injury. Id. [14] A special situation arises, as in this case, where the defendant presents wholly exculpatory testimony as to the charged offense but requests a lesser-included offense instruction which is directly contrary to the defendant's version of the facts. In such a situation, we have concluded that in viewing the evidence in the most favorable light it will reasonably admit from the standpoint of the accused, we must take into account the fact that the jury could reasonably disbelieve the defendant's version of the facts. State v. Sarabia, 118 Wis. 2d 655, 663, 348 N.W.2d 527 (1984). Consequently, we have held that a defendant or the state may request and receive a lesser-included offense instruction, even when the defendant has given exculpatory testimony, if a reasonable but different view of the record, the evidence, and any testimony other than part of the defendant's testimony which is exculpatory supports acquittal on the greater charge and conviction on the lesser charge. Id. We note, however, that: It is unreasonable to find a basis for a lesser-included offense by assuming that the jury may repudiate the other evidence if none of it supports the lesser offense. It is unreasonable because jurors are assumed to be reasonable in their deliberations. If, of course, the testimony of the other witnesses conflicts, and part of the testimony supports the lesser offense, that offense must be submitted to the jury. Similarly, if part of the testimony of other witnesses reasonably supports an inference providing a basis for the lesser offense, that offense must be submitted to the jury. But if none of the other evidence or reasonable inferences from it support the lesser offense, it cannot be said that under a different but `reasonable view' the evidence is sufficient to establish guilt of the lower degree .... State v. Simpson, 125 Wis. 2d 375, 382, 373 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1985). Therefore, in determining whether the defendant is entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of homicide by reckless conduct, we must reject the defendant's wholly exculpatory evidence that he did nothing to harm the child on the day in question. Sarabia, 118 Wis. 2d at 663-64; Simpson, 125 Wis. 2d at 380. In addition, we must review the remaining evidence, the defendant's nonexculpatory testimony, and other witnesses' testimony to determine whether under a different but reasonable view of the record the remaining evidence supports acquittal on the greater charge and conviction on the lesser charge. The defendant argues, citing Seidler, that the jury should have been instructed on the charge of homicide by reckless conduct because under the evidence in this case, the jury could have found that the defendant engaged in exactly the same sort of conduct as the defendant did in Seidler. The defendant maintains that [p]erhaps he threw Donnie toward a bed where Donnie landed, without any plan by [the defendant], on some protruding object, or perhaps he pulled Donnie from a top bunk upon finding him poised to follow his sisters' habit of jumping from one top bunk to the other, only to have him land upon some sharp toy on the floor. The problem with the defendant's argument is that in Seidler there was evidence in the record which supported the conclusion that the defendant engaged in conduct constituting homicide by reckless conduct. The defendant in Seidler testified that he had angrily grabbed the child by the arm and threw her into a bedroom in the direction of a bed where she hit her stomach against a portion of the bed. Seidler, 64 Wis. 2d at 463. In the case presently before us, however, there is not sufficient evidence in the record which would reasonably support a finding of such conduct on the part of the defendant. [15] Contrary to the court of appeals' holding, the mere fact that the injury suffered by a victim may be consistent with conduct constituting the crime charged and consistent with conduct constituting the lesser-included offense does not entitle a defendant to an instruction on the lesser-included offense. There must be enough evidence in the record to support a conviction on the lesser-included charge before a defendant is entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense. Hawthorne, 99 Wis. 2d at 682. Thus, we will review the evidence which supports a conviction on the lesser-included offense of homicide by reckless conduct. In addition to the fact that the injury suffered by Donald was consistent with conduct constituting the crime charged and consistent with conduct constituting the lesser-included offense, the evidence also demonstrates that the defendant was home alone with Donald and had exclusive control over Donald at the time of the injury. Furthermore, in reviewing the remaining evidence most favorably to the defendant, we find that the jury could have rejected the testimony relating to the defendant's prior abuse of Donald and the state's expert medical testimony which indicated that there is nothing in a typical home capable of producing a fatal stomach laceration by accidental means. [16] After reviewing this evidence, we conclude that the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom are insufficient to support a conviction of the defendant on the lesser-included offense of homicide by reckless conduct. There is simply not enough evidence in the record which would support, directly or circumstantially, the conclusion that the defendant acted in a manner creating a high degree of unreasonable risk of great bodily harm evincing a conscious disregard for the safety of another and a willingness to take known chances of perpetrating an injury on the day in question. Compare Seidler, 64 Wis. 2d at 463. Consequently, we reverse that part of the decision of the court of appeals which found that the circuit court had erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide.