Opinion ID: 2639460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Court of Appeal Decisions After Van Beurden

Text: In People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Cherry Highland Properties (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 257, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 214 ( Cherry Highland), the Court of Appeal addressed the question of what event would trigger section 660's 60-day period in which a trial court must rule on a motion for a new trial. The action was a condemnation in which the state prevailed; the property owner, however, objected to the proposed judgment and submitted its own judgment. When the court signed the property owner's judgment, the property owner on July 8, 1998, mailed to the state a notice of the entry of judgment. On July 20, the property owner filed in the trial court a notice of its intention to move for a new trial, and it filed proof of service of the notice of entry it had mailed on July 8. ( Cherry Highland, at p. 261, 90 Cal. Rptr.2d 214.) The Court of Appeal sought to reconcile section 664.5, which controls notice of entry of judgment, with section 660, which defines the jurisdictional time limit for ruling on a new trial motion. Section 660 provides: [T]he power of the court to rule on a motion for a new trial shall expire 60 days from and after the mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk ... or 60 days from and after service on the moving party by any party of written notice of the entry of judgment, or if such notice is not given, then 60 days after filing of the first notice of intention to move for a new trial. The Court of Appeal in Cherry Highland concluded that under the express language of section 660 the operative act was service of notice on the moving party. The court reasoned that because the property owner was the moving party, it could not serve itself, and therefore the time within which to rule on the new trial motion ... did not begin until the property owner on July 20, 1998, filed its notice of intention to move for a new trial. ( Cherry Highland, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 263, 90 Cal. Rptr.2d 214.) Alternatively, the Court of Appeal in Cherry Highland rested its holding on the statement in Van Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th at page 65, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 166, 931 P.2d 344, that the time for ruling on a motion for a new trial `will be shortened only if the party submitting the order or judgment for entry [under section 664.5] serves notice of entry of judgment on all the parties, files the original notice with the court, and files a proof of service.' ( Cherry Highland, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 261, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 214.) Applying that language, the Court of Appeal concluded that the jurisdictional 60-day period for the trial court to rule on the property owner's new trial motion began only on July 20, 1998, when the owner filed proof of serving notice of entry of judgment. ( Ibid. ) The next year, in Dodge v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 513, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 758 ( Dodge ), a different division of the same Court of Appeal that had decided Cherry Highland addressed section 660 but reached a different result. On February 11, 1999, after the jury in Dodge returned a verdict for the plaintiff, he personally served defense counsel with conformed copies of the judgment. On February 19, the defendants moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court did not enter its minute order granting a new trial, however, until the 61st day after service of the judgment. The plaintiff moved to strike the order because it was made beyond section 660's 60-day period. The trial court denied the motion. Citing Van Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th 51, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 166, 931 P.2d 344, the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to comply with section 664.5 because he had served on the defendants merely a conformed copy of the judgment rather than a document entitled notice of entry of judgment, plus the filing in the trial court of such notice and proof of its service. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that the 60 days did not begin to run until the defendants filed a notice of intention to move for a new trial. The Court of Appeal disagreed. It found section 664.5 irrelevant because notice of entry of judgment was not mailed, as contemplated by that section, either by the plaintiff or the court clerk, but instead was personally served on the opposing party. After examining the language of section 660, the court concluded that [t]he triggering event under section 660 is `service on the moving party,' not filing the proof of service. ( Dodge, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 520, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 758.) It explained: The language is perhaps tacit admission of the fact that parties often file proof of service at a later date, particularly where as here they use a registered process server and may not have immediate access to the proof of service. ( Id. at p. 522, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 758.) In the context of the cases discussed above, the Court of Appeal here concluded that Palmer's service of a file-stamped copy of the judgment was written notice of entry of judgment under sections 659 and 660 sufficient to start the requisite time limits for moving for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for ruling on those motions. In the Court of Appeal's view, the operative act under sections 659 and 660 was service, and therefore it was immaterial whether service is personal or by mail.