Opinion ID: 2076498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: District of Columbia Precedent.

Text: This court has employed a functional rather than a maxim-shackled analysis in determining whether a particular object is a dangerous weapon. In holding that a Cadillac automobile, which bears little or no resemblance to the enumerated instrumentalities, may nevertheless be encompassed by the enhancement provisions of Section 22-3202, this court stated that an instrument capable of producing death or serious bodily injury by its manner of use qualifies as a dangerous weapon whether it is used to effect an attack or is handled with reckless disregard for the safety of others. Powell v. United States, 485 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981, 106 S.Ct. 420, 88 L.Ed.2d 339 (1985). Similarly, in United States v. Gualdado, 794 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1327, 94 L.Ed.2d 178 (1987), the court upheld appellants' conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon where they had rammed customs officials with their boat. Quoting United States v. Barber, 297 F.Supp. 917 (D.Del.1969), the court explained that [a]lmost any object which as used or attempted to be used may endanger life or inflict great bodily harm, or which is likely to produce death or great bodily injury, can in some circumstances be a dangerous weapon. Id. The best evidence of [a weapon's] dangerous character, and of what it was capable of doing, was the injury actually inflicted by it. Hopkins v. United States, 4 App.D.C. 430, 442 (1894); [5] see also Freeman v. United States, 391 A.2d 239, 242 (D.C.1978). Accordingly, a dangerous weapon need not be a hand-held item, like a pistol, dagger or hatchet, which could readily be used in combat. Tatum v. United States, 71 App.D.C. 393, 393-94, 110 F.2d 555, 555-56 (1940) (lye); Logan v. United States, 460 A.2d 34, 36 (D.C.1983) (fire). The parties have cited no District of Columbia authority, and we have found none, addressing the precise question whether a stationary fixture may be a dangerous weapon. The government relies primarily on Logan, supra, while Edwards invites our attention to Curtis v. United States, 568 A.2d 1074 (D.C.1990). Neither decision is controlling. In Logan, the defendant first tried to push the complainant's face into a gas burner on a kitchen stove. He then set some telephone books on fire in the living room and tried to thrust the complainant into the resulting conflagration. Sustaining Logan's ADW conviction in connection with the burning telephone books, this court stated that [a]ppellant attempted to shove Osborne into these flames. A jury could reasonably find that appellant, through conduct separate and distinct from his actions in the kitchen, intended in the living room to harm Osborne with a dangerous weaponnamely, fire. 460 A.2d at 36. Logan differs from the present case, however, in that there the appellant lit the fire for the purpose of using it as a weapon and propelled his victim into it. The telephone books which Logan ignited were movable items which he possessed for use against another. In the present case, the bathroom fixtures were but a pre-existing part of the surroundings in which Edwards found himself while perpetrating the assault. They were not something which Edwards could possess or with which he could arm himself as he went looking for his victim. In Curtis, this court considered the question whether convictions of malicious disfigurement while armed and assault with a dangerous weapon merged with one another. 568 A.2d at 1076. In analyzing the elements of the two offenses, we observed that [e]ven an armed man could inflict disfigurement without the use of any weapon, e.g., by breaking the victim's nose with a punch or kick, pushing his face against barbed wire or a hot stove. Id. The court's focus in this discussion was on the weapon with which the hypothetical defendant was armed, and the lack of any connection between that weapon and the victim's injury. The court was not asked to, and did not, decide whether a stationary object can be a dangerous weapon when used by an otherwise unarmed defendant in order to inflict injury. Although the court's use of the word any suggests that a defendant who injures a person by pushing him into barbed wire or a hot stove has not used any weapon, the court was not confronted with the question here presented and did not address our opinion in Logan. [6]