Opinion ID: 878340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Eighth Amendment Considerations

Text: Appellant next contends that abolition of the affirmative defense of insanity violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In Robinson v. California (1962), 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, the Supreme Court held that punishment for the status crime of drug addiction violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition. The Court declared that any law which created a criminal offense of being mentally ill would also constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Court noted that had the California statute under which Robinson was convicted required proof of the actual use of narcotics, it would have been valid. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. at 532, 88 S.Ct. at 2154, a statute imposing a fine for public intoxication was found to not violate the Eighth Amendment. There the Court reasoned that although alcoholism might be a disease, the statute was valid because it punished an act, not the status of being an alcoholic. The Montana Criminal Code does not permit punishment of a mentally ill person who has not committed a criminal act. As such, the statutes avoid the constitutional infirmities discussed in Robinson v. California, supra, and Powell v. Texas, supra. Prior to sentencing, the court is required to consider the convicted defendant's mental condition at the time the offense was committed. This review is mandatory whenever a claim of mental disease or defect is raised. The plain language of the statute reads: ... the sentencing court shall consider any relevant evidence... . Section 46-14-311, MCA (emphasis added). Whenever the sentencing court finds the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect, as described in section 46-14-311, MCA, the defendant must be placed in an ... appropriate institution for custody, care and treatment... . Section 46-14-312(2), MCA. These requirements place a heavy burden on the courts and the department of institutions. They serve to prevent imposition of cruel and unusual punishment upon the insane. Since the jury is properly preoccupied with proof of state of mind, it is imperative that the sentencing court discharge its responsibility to independently review the defendant's mental condition. It is further argued that subjecting the insane to the stigma of a criminal conviction violates fundamental principles of justice. We cannot agree. The legislature has made a conscious decision to hold individuals who act with a proven criminal state of mind accountable for their acts, regardless of motivation or mental condition. Arguably, this policy does not further criminal justice goals of deterrence and prevention in cases where an accused suffers from a mental disease that renders him incapable of appreciating the criminality of his conduct. However, the policy does further goals of protection of society and education. One State Supreme Court Justice who wrestled with this dilemma observed: In a very real sense, the confinement of the insane is the punishment of the innocent; the release of the insane is the punishment of society. State v. Stacy (Tenn. 1980), 601 S.W.2d 696, 704 (Henry, J., dissenting). Our legislature has acted to assure that the attendant stigma of a criminal conviction is mitigated by the sentencing judge's personal consideration of the defendant's mental condition and provision for commitment to an appropriate institution for treatment, as an alternative to a sentence of imprisonment. For the foregoing reasons we hold that Montana's abolition of the insanity defense neither deprives a defendant of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process nor violates the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. There is no independent constitutional right to plead insanity.