Opinion ID: 2343876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The EMRB had authority to hear Spannbauer's complaint because the six-month deadline under NRS 288.110(4) is subject to equitable tolling

Text: The City and the Department contend that the EMRB lacked jurisdiction to hear Spannbauer's complaint because the complaint was filed more than six months after any possible adverse employment action and thus was filed past the six-month period for filing claims set forth in NRS 288.110(4). We disagree. NRS 288.110(4) provides that the EMRB may not consider any complaint or appeal filed more than 6 months after the occurrence which is the subject of the complaint or appeal. In Cone v. Nevada Service Employees Union, 116 Nev. 473, 477 n. 2, 998 P.2d 1178, 1181 n. 2 (2000), and in Rosequist v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 118 Nev. 444, 447, 49 P.3d 651, 653 (2002), overruled on other grounds by Allstate Insurance Co. v. Thorpe, 123 Nev. 565, 573 n. 22, 170 P.3d 989, 995 n. 2 (2007), we described, without discussion, NRS 288.110(4)'s six-month deadline as a statute of limitations. Given the purpose behind the statuteto establish a time frame for filing claims with the EMRBthis description as a statute of limitations is not inaccurate. Cf. Black's Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (defining statute of limitations as a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered)). Further, the six-month deadline for instituting claims with the National Labor Relations Board, upon which the EMRB was based, is likewise considered a statute of limitations. See N.L.R.B. v. Public Service Elec. and Gas Co., 157 F.3d 222, 227-28 (3d Cir.1998) (discussing the six-month limitations period of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) section 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)); Truckee Meadows, 109 Nev. at 375, 849 P.2d at 348-49 (recognizing that, when considering the operation of NRS Chapter 288, this court is guided by federal precedent interpreting the NLRA). Under this statute of limitations, claims accrue when the violation or injury occurs. With regard to the NLRA, several federal circuit courts apply the unequivocal notice rule, which means that the limitations period begins to run when the victim of an unfair labor practice receives unequivocal notice of a final adverse decision. Public Service Elec. and Gas Co., 157 F.3d at 227 (internal quotation omitted); see, e.g., Wright v. AmSouth Bancorporation, 320 F.3d 1198, 1201-02 (11th Cir.2003); Bailey v. United Airlines, 279 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir.2002); Taylor Warehouse Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 98 F.3d 892, 899 (6th Cir.1996); U.S. Can Co. v. N.L.R.B., 984 F.2d 864, 867 (7th Cir.1993); N.L.R.B. v. Drywall, 974 F.2d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir.1992); N.L.R.B. v. Glover Bottled Gas Corp., 905 F.2d 681, 684 (2d Cir.1990). Likewise, we interpret the NRS Chapter 288 limitations period to start running when the alleged victim receives unequivocal notice of a final adverse decision. See Cone, 116 Nev. at 477 n. 2, 998 P.2d at 1181 n. 2 (indicating that the six-month period is triggered when the complainant becomes aware that a prohibited practice actually happened); see generally Nevada State Bank v. Jamison Family Partnership, 106 Nev. 792, 800, 801 P.2d 1377, 1382 (1990) (stating that a statute of limitation[s] will not commence to run until the aggrieved party knew, or reasonably should have known, of the facts giving rise to the breach). With regard to Spannbauer's claims, the period would have started at least by the time Spannbauer resigned on November 6, 2005. But like other statutes of limitations, NRS 288.110(4)'s deadline is subject to the equitable defenses of waiver, estoppel, and tolling. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 395 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (explaining that because Title VII claims (like NRS Chapter 288 claims) were modeled after the NLRA's remedial provisions, Title VII, like the NLRA, includes a statute of limitations subject to equitable defenses). Here, Spannbauer asserts that his claims were subject to equitable tolling. As recognized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, equitable tolling focuses on `whether there was excusable delay by the plaintiff: If a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations for filing suit until the plaintiff can gather what information he needs.' Lukovsky v. City and County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting Johnson v. Henderson, 314 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir.2002)); see also Black's Law Dictionary 618 (9th ed. 2009) (equitable tolling is defined as [t]he doctrine that the statute of limitations will not bar a claim if the plaintiff, despite diligent efforts, did not discover the injury until after the limitations period had expired). The EMRB's reasonable conclusion that equitable tolling is permitted with respect to claims that are before it is entitled to deference. General Sales, 98 Nev. at 98, 641 P.2d at 480. We have previously recognized equitable tolling for discrimination claims addressed to the Equal Rights Commission under NRS Chapter 613. Copeland v. Desert Inn Hotel, 99 Nev. 823, 826, 673 P.2d 490, 492 (1983) (providing that procedural technicalities that would bar claims of discrimination will be looked upon with disfavor). In Copeland, we stated that the following factors, among any other relevant considerations, should be analyzed when determining whether equitable tolling will apply: the claimant's diligence, knowledge of the relevant facts, reliance on misleading authoritative agency statements and/or misleading employer conduct, and any prejudice to the employer. Id. When considering these factors within the context of this case, it becomes clear that justice requires the statute of limitations to be tolled. In this case, Spannbauer learned on April 5, 2006, that the City and the Department had treated a female employee under investigation, and ultimately charged with unprofessional conduct, differently than it had treated him, even though both investigations and further charges were based on conduct that had occurred when they were probationary employees. In particular, evidence in the record demonstrates that, while Spannbauer was threatened with discipline as a probationary employee, the female employee was not. Less than two months after discovering this information, Spannbauer diligently filed his EMRB complaint. In doing so, Spannbauer filed his complaint in an expeditious manner after obtaining knowledge of an NRS Chapter 288 violation and reason to question the Department's prior statements regarding his probationary status. Further, prejudice to the City and the Department is lacking. See Copeland, 99 Nev. at 826, 673 P.2d at 492. Thus, equity requires that the NRS 288.110(4) six-month statute of limitations be tolled to give Spannbauer an opportunity to file his prohibited labor practices claims with the EMRB.