Opinion ID: 1592017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel and Conflict Of Interest

Text: Initially we note that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are usually addressed in post-conviction proceedings, rather than on direct appeal. State v. Deruise, XXXX-XXXX p. 35 (La.4/3/01), 802 So.2d 1224, 1247-1248, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 926, 122 S.Ct. 283, 151 L.Ed.2d 208 (2001). The post-conviction proceeding allows the trial court to conduct a full evidentiary hearing, if one is warranted. State v. Howard, XXXX-XXXX p. 15 (La.4/23/99), 751 So.2d 783, 802, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 974, 120 S.Ct. 420, 145 L.Ed.2d 328 (1999). Where the record, however, contains evidence sufficient to decide the issue, and the issue is raised on appeal by an assignment of error, the issue may be considered in the interest of judicial economy. State v. Smith , XXXX-XXXX (La.6/29/01), 793 So.2d 1199 (Appendix, p. 10), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 937, 122 S.Ct. 1317, 152 L.Ed.2d 226 (2002); State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528 (La.1982). Under the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), adopted by this court in State v. Washington, 491 So.2d 1337, 1339 (La.1986), a reviewing court must reverse a conviction if the defendant establishes: (1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel's inadequate performance prejudiced defendant to the extent that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect. We find that the record on appeal is sufficient to decide the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant points to various instances in which he informed the court pretrial of deficiencies in appointed counsel's performance, which he claims the court failed to address. The record on appeal contains several motions filed pro se by the defendant. Moreover, since aspects of the ineffective assistance claim overlap with the claim of conflict of interest, we will address these issues together. First, the defendant points to his October 8, 2002 pleading entitled Pro Se Motion to Dismiss Present Counsel and Appoint Private Counsel and an accompanying memorandum of law. [75] The factual allegation of ineffectiveness raised therein concerns appointed counsel's performance at the April 12, 2002 motion hearing. According to the defendant, the prosecutor called to the stand Gary LeGros, an attorney with the public defender's office and the attorney who first visited the defendant in the Franklin Parish jail on December 12, 2001. The defendant believed that attorney LeGros testified that the defendant admitted his crimes to him and was sorrowful, prompting the defendant to ask his counsel, Colwart, to object to this violation of his attorney-client privilege. Instead, the defendant claims that Colwart instructed him to be quiet. In connection with this motion, the defendant also filed a pro se motion seeking the transcript of the April 12, 2002 hearing. [76] On February 3, 2003, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss counsel. [77] A review of the transcript from the April 12, 2002 hearing shows that the defendant's memory of events was faulty. In fact, it was defense counsel Colwart who called LeGros to the stand. After eliciting the information that LeGros visited the defendant at the Franklin Parish jail, the following colloquy ensured: Colwart: . . . And did you  when you advised Mr. Leger of his rights and discussed with him his case, did he indicate to you that he  did ya'll talk about whether he wanted to make a statement or not to the police? LeGros: We discussed a lot of things. Yeah. And one of the things was that the sta-you know, he wanted to tell his story, and I told him that that's not a good idea. Colwart: Okay. So you advised him to assert his fifth amendment rights? LeGros: Absolutely. Colwart: And he indicated he would? LeGros: Yes. Colwart: And did you inform that  did you make known that fact to the Franklin Police Department? LeGros: I made known that fact to every police officer that I passed on the way out. I told them that I had seen him, he was off limits. [78] The cross-examination conducted by the prosecutor does not even touch on what LeGros discussed with the defendant. [79] The record, thus, does not support the defendant's belief that the prosecutor, or even defense counsel, elicited or provided a statement to the effect that the defendant admitted to the crimes with which he was charged. The defendant fails to show either that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that counsel's alleged inadequate performance prejudiced him to the extent that his trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect. We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying the motion to dismiss counsel on this ground, nor in the trial court's subsequent denial of the defendant's desire to have an independent court reporter re-type the transcript from the original tape recordings of the hearing on the basis of the defendant's belief that the transcript did not accurately reflect the testimony then brought forth. [80] An instance of the defendant's alleged conflict with counsel was pointed out during a hearing conducted April 1, 2003, when the defendant personally informed the court of the fact that he had filed a complaint against his appointed counsel, Colwart, as well as attorney LeGros and the prosecutors, with the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board. [81] Although not discussed, it is presumed that the complaint was based on the defendant's belief that his attorney/client privilege had been violated, as previously discussed. The defendant presented the trial court with a letter he received from Charles Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary Counsel. This letter was made a part of this record. [82] After reviewing the letter, the trial court advised the defendant, as follows: ... The document that you handed to me, one of them is dated September 23rd, 2002, and it is a reply from the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Mr. Charles B. Plattsmier, that the disciplinary counsel does not have the authority to adjudicate the Writ of Habeas corpus, nor petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is best resolved in a court of law. And on this basis  My understanding of the gist of this letter is that they have rejected your complaint. There's a following letter that you submitted to me, dated November 4th, 2002, addressed to the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board, under the signature of Charles B. Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, wherein you may have requested information concerning Mr. Colwart and Mr. LeGros, and that information was provided to you; [83] additionally, indicating whether or not they were eligible to practice law under the licensure of the Louisiana Supreme Court. And except for the information provided, there is an indication that they are currently attorneys in good standing with the Louisiana State Bar Association and able and permitted to practice law throughout the State of Louisiana and in the Courts of the State of Louisiana. . . . [84] After considering the defendant's complaint filed against his attorney and his claims of conflict based on that filing, the trial court ruled: I find that you have not presented anything to me, currently, at this proceeding which would indicate a need to dismiss your attorneys and appoint any other attorneys to represent you. [85] We find no abuse in the trial court's discretion in failing to remove appointed counsel Colwart based on this claim of conflict of interest. In effect, there was no conflict of interest because the state bar disciplinary counsel had refused to accept the defendant's complaint, since it dealt with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We have previously determined that the basis of the defendant's claim was his faulty memory of what occurred at the April 12, 2002 motion hearing. Thus, the trial court properly found the defendant failed to demonstrate a need requiring Colwart's dismissal. Also in connection with the April 1, 2003 hearing, attorney Colwart announced that the defense was not ready for trial, then scheduled for May 14, 2003, because the defendant was seeking new counsel. [86] The trial judge responded: What new counsel? Well, the defendant has Counsel and he has not given the Court any indication why present Counsel should be removed. So as far as the Court is concerned, the defendant has adequate and effective Counsel and the case is ready for trial. [87] Although this instance is raised as an example of Colwart's ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant fails to show either that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that counsel's alleged inadequate performance prejudiced him to the extent that his trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect. This portion of the trial does not support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Next, the defendant claims counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of the recorded telephone conversation between the defendant and his brother, Mark Leger. This claimed error was the subject of yet another pro se motion, entitled Motion and Order to Dismiss Public Defender Craig Colwart and Appoint New Counsel, filed in the court record on June 9, 2003, with a cover letter of June 4, 2003. [88] Prior to the filing of this motion, the trial court had denied the defense motion to suppress all of the defendant's various statements on April 17, 2003. [89] The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss Colwart on this ground without a hearing on July 11, 2003. [90] The focus of this claim by the defendant is his contention that Lt. Guillory lied during the suppression hearing when he testified that he told the defendant and his brother that their telephone conversation would be recorded. He argued in support of this claim that the tape recording of the conversation shows that no such advice was given. The defendant claimed Colwart was ineffective for failing to argue this ground as part of his motion to suppress. We have previously reviewed both Lt. Guillory's suppression hearing and trial testimonies, and the recording of the telephone conversation. Although Lt. Guillory may have been mistaken in believing he had told the defendant and his brother that the line was recorded, the audio recording affirmatively shows that Mark Leger was informed that his conversation with the defendant would be on speaker phone, unmistakably implying that the conversation would be overheard by others. Moreover, we found the police's conduct in tape recording the telephone conversation to be consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Mauro, supra . Thus, there was no legal basis for defense counsel to contest the admissibility of the recorded telephone conversation. The fact that the trial court denied the defense's motion to suppress does not establish ineffective assistance on counsel's part. The defendant fails to show either that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that counsel's alleged inadequate performance prejudiced him to the extent that his trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect. There was no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss Colwart on this basis. The July 11, 2003 hearing reveals a factual matter important to our discussion regarding assistance of counsel. One of the purposes for the hearing was to discuss the defendant's contact with one of the victims, Kimberly Zimmerman. In a hand-written letter dated June 12, 2003, the defendant wrote a letter to Zimmerman, urging her not to testify against him. The defendant included this statement in his letter I hope you understand that I have two very good attorneys now that's going to win my freedom easily. [91] (Emphasis added). This letter was penned only eight days after the motion seeking to dismiss Colwart discussed above and a month before the hearing on the matter. Thus, the trial judge was made aware of the defendant's inconsistent assertions regarding the effectiveness of his counsel. Next, the defendant complains that Colwart did not review an audiotape with the defendant that Colwart claimed in court that he had. This claim resulted in a letter written by the defendant to Colwart and included in the record. In the letter, the defendant asserts that Colwart never reviewed with him the December 11, 2001 interrogation involving Agent Rupert, Lt. Guillory and Captain Broussard. [92] First, we note there is no audio or video recording of an interrogation occurring on December 11, 2001 which involved all three of the officers listed in the defendant's letter. However, on December 11, 2001, there was an interrogation in which Lt. Guillory and Agent Rupert were involved; and on December 12, 2001, there was an interrogation in which Lt. Guillory, Captain Broussard and Chief McGuire were involved. Our review of the transcript of the status conference held September 30, 2003, when Colwart allegedly made the statement which the defendant contests, reveals that the defendant is again mistaken in his recollection of the record. Attorney Colwart acknowledged to the court that the state had turned over all the audio and videotapes within the state's possession and that he had been over about half of them with the defendant. [93] Colwart claimed that, since the defendant's transport to Angola from the parish jail, he had been unable to review the rest of the tapes with the defendant. However, he also stated: But I do recall, specifically, the Gus Guillory tape that we have, I've been over with the defendant. [94] There is no indication whether Colwart meant the December 11, 2001 interrogation in which Lt. Guillory participated with Agent Rupert or the December 11, 2001 booking statement, or even the December 12, 2001 interrogation in which Lt. Guillory participated with Chief McGuire and Captain Broussard. Moreover, we fail to discern, because it is not argued precisely, what is being claimed as ineffective assistance of counsel. Insofar as appellate defense counsel finds ineffective that Colwart had not yet reviewed the tapes with the defendant when there were more than three months prior to trial, we find that the defendant fails to show either that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that counsel's alleged inadequate performance prejudiced him to the extent that his trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect. Insofar as appellate defense counsel alleges that Colwart was less than honest on the record with regard to his contact with the defendant, we find that the record does not factually support such an allegation. Finally, on December 10, 2003, defendant addressed the court with his complaints that counsel waited until 15 days before trial before preparing a defense; had failed to file the motions necessary to protect his rights; had refused to accept the defendant's telephone calls or respond to his letters; and had never met with him while he was incarcerated in Angola, although the defendant admitted that counsel visited him about six times at the jail in New Iberia, during which time they were in total disagreement. [95] The record shows that after allowing the defendant to speak about the above-described items, the trial judge reviewed all of the pending pro se motions filed by the defendant and denied them as duplicitous of defense motions already filed and heard. [96] The oral motion to dismiss or terminate Colwart as the defendant's attorney, was denied, as well. [97] Nothing presented by the defendant demonstrates counsel's incompetence, unpreparedness or a bona fide conflict of interest. The trial judge's assessment was correct in that none of the specific instances of claimed ineffective assistance of counsel demonstrated professional error nor merited the trial court's removal of Colwart. We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying the defendant's piecemeal pro se complaints about his counsel's preparation for trial.