Opinion ID: 3134239
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Identity of Bryson as the Plaintiff?

Text: The defendants next argue that the innocent construction rule must apply in this case because the article may reasonably be construed as referring to someone other than the plaintiff. The defendants note that the complaint does not allege any facts to demonstrate that third persons would reasonably conclude that the character Bryson is the plaintiff, Kimberly Bryson. The defendants argue that, under Illinois law, where an allegedly defamatory statement does not mention the plaintiff by name, the plaintiff must plead extrinsic facts to demonstrate that third persons believed that the libelous statement referred to the plaintiff. Barry Harlem Corp. v. Kraff, 273 Ill. App. 3d 388 (1995); Homerin v. Mid-Illinois Newspapers, 245 Ill. App. 3d 402 (1993); Moore v. Streit, 181 Ill. App. 3d 587, 597-98 (1989); Voris v. Street & Smith Publications, 330 Ill. App. 409 (1947). We agree with the general proposition that, where a libelous article does not name the plaintiff, it should appear on the face of the complaint that persons other than the plaintiff and the defendant must have reasonably understood that the article was about the plaintiff and that the allegedly libelous expression related to her. See 33A Ill. L. & Prac. Slander & Libel §§93, 13, at 97, 28-29 (1970); Coffey v. MacKay, 2 Ill. App. 3d 802, 807 (1972). Neither this principle nor the cases upon which the defendants rely, however, apply here. The article at issue did, of course, use the plaintiff's last name. The name Bryson is not so common that we must find, as a matter of law, that no reasonable person would believe that the article was about the plaintiff. The cases that the defendants cite all involve circumstances in which the allegedly libelous article or statement did not use the plaintiff's name. In Voris, the defamatory article referred only to a person named Snapper Charlie. Voris, 330 Ill. App. 409. Homerin involved a political cartoon that supposedly depicted the plaintiff's likeness, but did not identify him by name. Homerin, 245 Ill. App. 3d 402. Barry Harlem Corp. likewise involved an article that did not mention the plaintiff by name. Barry Harlem Corp., 273 Ill. App. 3d 388. Under the present facts, we reject the defendants' claim that the story must be innocently construed as referring to someone other than the plaintiff. The defendants also argue that the article may be construed as not referring to the plaintiff simply because the story is labeled fiction and, therefore, does not purport to describe any real person. We are not persuaded by this contention. In her complaint, plaintiff Bryson claims that she is the character Bryson depicted in the defamatory story. The fact that the author used the plaintiff's actual name makes it reasonable that third persons would interpret the story as referring to the plaintiff, despite the fictional label. In addition, the setting of the story, the events described therein, and the identification of the writer as a native of southern Illinois all lead to a reasonable conclusion that third persons familiar with both the plaintiff and the defendant would understand the story as referring to the plaintiff. In this regard, we note that, when addressing the defendant's section 2--619 motion to dismiss the per se counts under the innocent construction rule, the trial court should have considered the plaintiff's responses to interrogatories, which were contained in the record. Section 2--619(c) provides that, if the party opposing a section 2--619 motion to dismiss presents affidavits or other proof  establishing facts obviating the grounds of defect, the court may consider the same in granting or denying the motion. 735 ILCS 5/2--619(c) (West 1992). An interrogatory answer is considered equivalent to an affidavit for purposes of a section 2--619 motion to dismiss. See 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 213(f), 212(a)(4). The facts stated in the plaintiff's answers to the defendant's interrogatories were therefore before the trial court for its consideration when it ruled on the defendant's motion to dismiss. Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill. 2d 585, 588 (1975). One of the interrogatories propounded by the defendants asked the plaintiff to identify why she believed that she was the character described in the story. The plaintiff's response identified more than 25 alleged similarities between herself and the physical attributes, locations and events attributed to the character Bryson in the story. Had the trial court considered this interrogatory answer, it certainly would have rejected the defendants' claim that the article must be innocently construed as referring to someone other than the plaintiff. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the plaintiff should be allowed the opportunity to prove that, despite the fictional label, the character Bryson bears such a close resemblance to the plaintiff that reasonable persons would understand that the character was actually intended to portray the plaintiff. Whether the article was actually understood by third parties to be about the plaintiff is, of course, a question of fact for the jury. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 352.