Opinion ID: 807543
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Thompson's Flight

Text: Thompson also argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence that he traveled to China after the government searched his home and another property he owned as evidence of flight indicating consciousness of guilt. It is well established that evidence of flight is admissible and has probative value as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt. . . . [I]t is today universally conceded that the fact of an accused's flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself. United States v. Hankins, 931 F.2d 1256, 1261 (8th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether evidence of flight is circumstantial evidence of guilt depends on the degree of confidence with which four inferences can be drawn: (1) from the defendant's behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the district court considered the four factors and determined that evidence of Thompson's flight was circumstantial evidence of his guilt: Here, you know, the issue is whether there's evidence that would link the potential, the flight or the trip to China to consciousness of guilt, not only of the crime, but of the specific crime that's charged here. And the evidence has shown, I mean, I think that the jury could conclude from -19- the wiretap telephone conversation that there was a great deal of concern on the part of Mr. Thompson with respect to Tri Cam Le and his arrest and a great deal of effort on his part to deal with that situation. And then the first overt signal that he might be implicated was the search warrant and the search of the premises in May. And there were specific items of evidence seized in that search warrant that relate back to the telephone conversations and this whole thing with Tri Cam Le. And shortly after that, there was a withdrawal of money and the trip to China. So I think there's a sufficient connection for the flight to have probative value, and furthermore, I think the probative value is not outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice. Thompson argues that he fled to China not because of the potential drug charge, but rather because of concern only with the penalty he would face if convicted of being a felon in possession. The line Thompson draws is a thin one. Moreover, although a jury could potentially view the evidence as Thompson presents it, this alternative theory is insufficiently convincing to render district court's interpretation and admission of it an abuse of discretion. D. The Search of the Storage Room Outside of DeLeo's Apartment DeLeo argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence the government collected from a storage room outside his apartment. We review a trial court's factual findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Black Bear, 422 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 2005). When an official search is properly authorized—whether by consent or by the issuance of a valid warrant—the scope of the search is limited by the terms of the authorization. United States v. Ware, 890 F.2d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 1989) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). In Ware, we affirmed a district court's refusal to suppress evidence. The defendant in that case consented to a search -20- of his apartment for drugs, and officers also searched a storage room right outside his apartment, ostensibly under that consent. We found that search did not exceed the scope of defendant's consent: Ware's lease of the apartment included the storage bin and he was provided with a key giving access to the storage room. The storage room was next door to Ware's apartment, near enough to alert the searching officers that it was an appurtenance of the apartment, a fact confirmed when the officers found that Ware's key ring included the keys to both the storage room door and the locked bin. Id.; see also United States v. Principe, 499 F.2d 1135, 1137 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that officers could reasonably suppose that a search warrant for a defendant's apartment also included a cabinet in hallway three to six feet away from the door of that apartment). In this case, the search warrant authorized a search of 17 Russell Street, Apartment 9, Basement in Somerville, Massachusetts. Under this authority, federal agents also searched a storage room in the hallway of that apartment building and recovered ten grams of cocaine. While this storage room was not part of DeLeo's apartment, DeLeo kept the key to it on his key ring. The agents used the key on DeLeo's key ring to access the storage unit. Furthermore, DeLeo's apartment was the only one in the basement, and his apartment had no number on the door. Finally, inside the storage room, officers found a locked box bearing DeLeo's initials (RFD) and warning people not to touch it. The officers were thus reasonable in their belief that the storage room was appurtenant to DeLeo's apartment, and the district court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence. -21- E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel We review the district court's denial of a motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hubbard, 638 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2011). Such claims are generally best litigated in collateral proceedings, such as an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. at 869. A defendant may only bring an ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal where the record has been fully developed, where not to act would amount to a plain miscarriage of justice, or where counsel's error is readily apparent. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has, on occasion, found the trial court record sufficiently developed to allow a defendant to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. Id. (holding we could review the ineffective assistance claim because the district court held an evidentiary hearing on that issue); see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 562 F.3d 938, 941–42 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding a sufficiently developed record when potential trial witnesses testified at the post-trial hearing); United States v. Villalpando, 259 F.3d 934, 938–39 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that, although the district court did not conduct a hearing, we were able to observe trial counsel's poor representation at trial); United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1430, 1434 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding a sufficiently developed record when trial counsel and an investigator testified at a post-trial hearing that they contacted a potential witness alleged to have exculpatory evidence, and determined that his testimony would not have affected the outcome of the case). In all of these cases, however, the trial court was able, either through its own observations or via testimony from a hearing, to observe the performance of defense counsel and draw relatively unbiased conclusions about the quality of that performance. Here, the evidence underlying DeLeo's claim for ineffective assistance is not sufficiently developed. The bulk of the alleged misconduct DeLeo identifies occurred -22- away from the courtroom. DeLeo points to his own pro se motions for a new trial and to his attempts to discharge his attorneys as evidence of the ineffective assistance. He also complains that his attorneys did not sufficiently prepare for trial and that they did not allow him to testify as much as he wanted. These claims, complex and intertwined with trial strategy, are best left for a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding. F. Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Baggett The district court did not err in denying Baggett's motion for acquittal. This Court reviews a district court's denial of a motion for acquittal de novo, but will only reverse if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Espinosa, 585 F.3d 418, 423 (8th Cir. 2009). Where there are conflicting views of the evidence, the Court resolves those conflicts in favor of the government, and accept[s] all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Baggett argues that the evidence was insufficient to support three of the charges for which he was convicted. These charges are count six, aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a weapon; count seven, false statements to a federal agent; and count nine, conspiracy to obtain ammunition for a felon. For each of these three counts, Baggett's argument that there was insufficient evidence for conviction centers on his assertion that the government did not present sufficient evidence to show that Baggett knew or should have known that Thompson was a felon at the time of the weapon and ammunition sale, or at the time of his statements to federal agents. This argument is unavailing. The government presented evidence of (1) a letter Baggett wrote to the judge in Thompson's Pulaski County criminal case in 2003 stating that he had known Thompson for twenty years, and that Thompson was a good man and deserve[d] mercy in sentencing; and (2) a telephone call between Baggett and Thompson in which the two men discussed options to get a gun to Thompson without it being registered in his name. This evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury -23- to conclude that Baggett was aware of Thompson's felony status at the time Baggett sold Thompson a gun. See United States v. Hyles, 521 F.3d 946, 955–56 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding sufficient evidence to show that defendant knew the person to whom she provided a weapon was a felon because she had known him her whole life and she signed his bond papers, which indicated he was charged with felony stealing).4 With regard to count six, Baggett also challenges the government's proof on the issue of whether Thompson constructively possessed the gun Baggett sold on his behalf. The government presented evidence that Baggett was holding Thompson's gun for him and attempting to sell it to others. Most importantly, it introduced a telephone call between Thompson and Baggett in which the two men discussed another person's interest in buying the gun and what price Thompson found acceptable. This is sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that Thompson constructively possessed the gun at that time. See United States v. Ali, 63 F.3d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 1995) (approving the same jury instruction given in this case, which defines constructive possession as occurring when [a] person who, although 4 Hyles also holds that knowledge of the law is not an element of the crime of delivering a firearm to a felon. Hyles, 521 F.3d at 956. In other words, it is not necessary for conviction to know that providing a felon with a firearm is unlawful. The case does not state that knowledge of the fact that the person to whom a defendant delivers a firearm is a felon is not an element of this offense, nor could it correctly do so. Like other aiding and abetting crimes, aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a firearm requires the government to prove the defendant acted purposefully as to all elements of the crime. See Bailey v. United States, 29 F.3d 627, at  (8th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) (To prove aiding and abetting, the government must prove the defendant had a 'purposeful attitude' or knowingly participated in the activity.); United States v. Ivey, 915 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir. 1990) (To establish aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2, the government must prove that the defendant had a 'purposeful attitude,' defined as affirmative participation which at least encourages the perpetrator.). Here, the government must prove a purposeful attitude as to both delivering a firearm and delivering it to a felon. -24- not in actual possession, has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons). Finally, with regard to count nine, Baggett argues that he cannot be convicted of conspiracy to obtain ammunition for a felon because he was not aware of federal laws regulating the sale of ammunition to felons. However, knowledge of the law is not required for conviction. Baggett need only know of the facts constituting the offense, and here, the government has shown that he did. United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2000). G. Double Jeopardy The final issue on appeal is Thompson's claim that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbade the district court from reversing its initial grant of the motion for judgment of acquittal. At the close of the government's case, Thompson moved for judgment of acquittal as to all counts against him. The district court denied the motion, except as to count five, which it took under advisement and then granted. After the court granted this motion, Thompson rested without putting on a case. Baggett subsequently began his case. After Baggett called several witnesses, the court ordered a recess, expressed that it thought it made a mistake in granting the motion, and asked the parties for law on whether it could reverse itself. The following morning, the court determined reversal was appropriate and denied the motion for judgment of acquittal on count five. At the close of trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on that count. We review de novo the District Court's decision on questions of law, including the application of . . . the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Brekke, 97 F.3d 1043, 1046–47 (8th Cir. 1996). Once a defendant has been acquitted, either by judge or by jury, subjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy -25- Clause. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986). The Supreme Court has defined an acquittal as a decision actually represent[ing] a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 468 (2005) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977)). In Smith, the Supreme Court confronted an issue similar to the one here. There, in a trial of two defendants, the trial court granted one defendant's—Smith's—motion for judgment of acquittal on one of the several charges against him after the prosecution rested its case. After this point, the defense put on its case: Smith's codefendant called one witness, and then both defendants rested. At this point, the court decided it had made a mistake and reversed its earlier ruling, this time denying Smith's motion for judgment of acquittal. The jury then found Smith guilty of the originally-dismissed charge, among others. After determining that the trial court's initial grant of Smith's motion was an acquittal, the Court went on to consider if the Double Jeopardy Clause permitted [the judge] to reconsider that acquittal once petitioner and his codefendant had rested their cases. Smith, 543 U.S. at 469. The Court first noted that the facts of this case gave petitioner no reason to doubt the finality of the state court's ruling. . . . Nor did the court's ruling appear on its face to be tentative. Id. at 470. It then held the following: The Double Jeopardy Clause's guarantee cannot be allowed to become a potential snare for those who reasonably rely upon it. If, after a facially unqualified midtrial dismissal of one count, the trial has proceeded to the defendant's introduction of evidence, the acquittal must be treated as final, unless the availability of reconsideration has been plainly established by pre-existing rule or case authority expressly applicable to midtrial rulings on the sufficiency of the evidence. -26- Id. at 473. Accordingly, the Court found the trial court's reversal of its judgment of acquittal and subsequent submission of that charge to the jury to be a double jeopardy violation. Id. In contrast to Smith, the Eleventh Circuit found no double jeopardy violation in United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2011), where the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal at the beginning of a motions hearing, then dismissed it at the end of the same hearing. Id. at 865–66. The Eleventh Circuit held that, although the initial grant was a judgment of acquittal, the reversal did not cause a double jeopardy violation. Id. at 867. Unlike in Smith, in Hill, the matter was 'resolved satisfactorily before [the defendant] went forward with his case.' Id. (quoting Smith, 543 U.S. at 475). And, the court reasoned, that makes all the difference. Nothing was done, or could have been done, in reliance on the acquittal ruling between the time that ruling was announced and the time it was rescinded. Id. Turning to the facts of this case, the district court's initial ruling, like that in Smith and Hill, was a judgment of acquittal: it was a determination that the government had not met its burden of proof on count five. Like the defendant in Smith, Thompson had no reason to doubt the finality of this ruling, and there was no indication on its face that the ruling was tentative. When the district court initially granted Thompson's motion for judgment of acquittal, it did so unequivocally, without making any indication of any availability of reconsideration: Motion for judgment of acquittal as a matter of law on [count] 5 is granted, exception saved. Moreover, there was significant process in the trial between the district court's initial grant of the motion for judgment of acquittal and its subsequent reversal. Not only did Thompson's defense rest, but his codefendant, Baggett, began putting on evidence. Like the Supreme Court in Smith, we will not allow [t]he Double Jeopardy Clause's guarantee [to] be allowed to become a potential snare for those who reasonably rely upon it. Smith, 543 U.S. at 473. Once Thompson had rested his -27- case, relying at least in part on the district court's judgment of acquittal, double jeopardy attached and the reversal of that judgment was a constitutional violation. Accordingly, we reverse Thompson's conviction on count five, for possession of a Sig Sauer pistol. However, this does not end our inquiry on this issue. After trial, the district court sentenced Thompson to 103 months' imprisonment on counts one, five, and eight, which was to run concurrently with a 120-month sentence on count ten. These sentences would run consecutively to an undischarged term of 121 months' imprisonment imposed in another case. Where we reverse one of several of a defendant's criminal convictions, we remand for resentencing if we are uncertain whether [the district court] would have imposed the same or somewhat lesser sentences for the remaining convictions as it did originally. United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 426 (2d Cir. 1991). Here, the 103-month sentence of which count five is a part is shorter than the sentence with which it runs concurrently, the 120-month sentence for count ten. That sentence is undisturbed by this appeal. We thus do not remand for resentencing, because the vacated conviction would not affect Thompson's sentence for the remaining convictions. See United States v. White Bull, 646 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2011).5