Opinion ID: 751803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Admissibility of Evidence Concerning the Aliens'

Text: Living Conditions 32 The defendant initially contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the illegal aliens' living conditions in violation of Fed.R.Evid. 401 and 403. Specifically, the defendant argues that the evidence was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. Furthermore, Fawley contends that the court's limiting instruction did not cure the error and denied the defendant his right to fair trial. The Government contends that this evidence is relevant in demonstrating that Fawley had knowledge of the aliens' living conditions, and that the alleged prejudice of the reception of such evidence is not greater than its probative value in establishing that Fawley clearly had knowledge that Klehm was employing illegal aliens. 33 Prior to hearing the aliens' testimony, the court gave the jury the following limiting instruction: 34 Now, you're going to hear testimony, jurors, about the conditions of these premises, how many people were there, what the living conditions were. This evidence is for the limited purpose, again, of whether it may or may not tend to prove knowledge on the part of Mr. Fawley, tend to prove what did he know and how much, did he know. 35 The defendant, in arguing against the Government's contention, asserted that relevant evidence is defined by the relationship between the evidence and the fact at issue and must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences. 36 The illegal alien employees subsequently testified that the defendant had knowledge of the Mexicans' living conditions. The defendant now contends that in reaching this conclusion, the jury was required to speculate or to take a leap of faith in drawing these inferences. To conclude that because Defendant may have been aware of the living conditions of the aliens he made false statements before the grand jury, i.e. that he had any knowledge that Klehm Nursery employed illegal aliens, would indeed require a leap of faith. We disagree. 37 Under Fed.R.Evid. 401, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. (emphasis added). Fawley testified that he was, in essence, Klehm's right-hand man. As previously indicated, Fawley was deeply involved in the daily operations of the nursery, including, but not limited to, such activities as providing Klehm's workers transportation to other jobs, delivering paychecks, performing occasional maintenance at the workers' homes, and generally acting as a go-between for Klehm and his employees. While visiting the workers' homes, Fawley had ample opportunity on a number of occasions to observe the workers' deplorable living conditions. According to both Phillips and Robert Jamison, a furnace repairman who visited the aliens' dwellings with Fawley, the Queensway and Redwood residences were virtually unfit for human habitation, with trash strewn about, bugs and insects scurrying everywhere, and a penetrating foul odor in the house. The sleeping accommodations were what one would expect to find in a third-world tenement, with sixteen adult men crammed into a dwelling intended for six. Rental rates were also exorbitant. The Mexicans collectively paid Klehm a total of $2,400 per month for rent at the Queensway and Redwood apartments. 38 Phillips also testified that he and Fawley had visited the residences together on several occasions. In early November of 1994, for example, Phillips and Fawley stopped by the Redwood dwelling. Seeing the aliens' living conditions, Phillips inquired of Fawley if the house was about to be cleaned or repaired. Phillips testified that Fawley responded that this was the way Mexicans lived and that they would not complain because they were illegal. On a later occasion at Queensway, Phillips advised Fawley that people should not have to live in such wretched conditions. Fawley once again responded that the aliens would not complain because of their illegal status. 39 Referring to the earlier testimony of INS Agent Merchant, who was called by the Government to discuss the relevance of the aliens' living conditions to Fawley's knowledge of Klehm's illegal activities, you take the totality of the circumstances, the living conditions, the manner of dress, the speech ... in determining whether a person is an illegal alien. Merchant's testimony demonstrates why the defendant's knowledge of the aliens' living conditions was relevant to Fawley's overall knowledge of the legal status of Klehm's employees. Surely, Fawley's statement based upon his observations, as referred to in his testimony and that of Phillips regarding the aliens' living conditions, makes it eminently clear that Klehm's workers were illegal aliens. Contrary to the defendant's argument, this Court is of the opinion that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in holding that the evidence of the aliens' living conditions was relevant, believing it would be helpful to the jury in determining whether the defendant Fawley had knowledge of the illegal status of Klehm's employees. 40 The defendant also contends that the district court's admission of this evidence constituted reversible error because even if it was relevant, the prejudicial effect of its inclusion outweighed its probative value. Specifically, Fawley argues that the jury might very well have been inclined to convict him due to their outrage over the aliens' deplorable living conditions, rather than on the basis of his alleged false statements before the grand jury. The defendant argues that in determining the prejudicial effect of evidence, the court must measure the extent to which a jury might consider evidence for purposes other than which it was intended or that a jury may decide a case based upon an improper basis, such as an emotional one, rather than on the evidence presented. See United States v. Medina, 755 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir.1985). 41 Under Fed.R.Evid. 403, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.... Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if it will induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather than on the evidence presented. United States v. Vretta, 790 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851, 107 S.Ct. 179, 93 L.Ed.2d 115 (1986) (citation and internal quotation omitted). Under Rule 403, the district court is required to balance the questionable relevance of the excluded testimony against the hazards of admitting that evidence. United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 204 (7th Cir.1993). And because it is a 'comparison of intangibles,' a district court's Rule 403 balancing is afforded a special degree of deference: '[o]nly in an extreme case are appellate judges competent to second-guess the judgment of the person on the spot, the trial judge.'  United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496, 503 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 810, 112 S.Ct. 54, 116 L.Ed.2d 31 (1991) (quoting United States v. Krenzelok, 874 F.2d 480, 482 (7th Cir.1989)). 42 Furthermore, courts often give limiting instructions to juries to confine the possible prejudicial effect of otherwise probative evidence. During Fawley's trial, the court admonished the jury on more than one occasion not to consider the evidence of the aliens' living conditions for any purpose other than whether or not it tended to establish the defendant's knowledge of the aliens' living conditions. We hold that the court's limiting instructions certainly abated any risk of prejudice that might arise from the reception of the evidence. The totality of the circumstances concerning the existence of the illegal aliens, including their living conditions, was highly probative of the issue of Fawley's knowledge, and was not outweighed by prejudice, if there was any, resulting from the admission of this evidence.