Opinion ID: 2127232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Rejection of Defendant's Instruction 1

Text: Brown last argues that the court erred in refusing Defendant's Instruction 1 in the penalty phase of trial. This instruction stated: The State of Indiana has alleged the aggravating circumstances following: 1. On or about June 18, 1984, in the County of Lake, and State of Indiana, Alton Coleman and Debra (sic) Denise Brown did intentionally kill Tamika Turks, while committing or attempting to commit child molesting on A.H., a female child. 2. On June 24, 1985 and on June 27, 1985, respectively, Alton Coleman and Deborah Denise Brown, were convicted of two (2) counts of Murder in the Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio under cause number B-843548. 3. On May 6, 1985 and on May 14, 1985, respectively, Alton Coleman and Deborah Denise Brown, were convicted of two (2) counts of Murder in the Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio under cause number B-842559. Before you consider any of these circumstances as an aggravating circumstance, you must find that the circumstance has been established, beyond a reasonable doubt, by the evidence. You are not allowed to take into account any other circumstances, except those of the above which have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as a basis for deciding that the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment in this case. Record at 4065. The instructions given by the trial court listed the charged aggravators one to three. Record at 4079 (final instruction 1). The court's final instructions also told the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances alleged. Record at 4085 (final instruction 7). Instruction 7 given also stated that: The jury may recommend the death penalty only if it finds: 1. that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances exists; and 2. that any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances. Record at 4086. The only conceivable argument here by appellant, then, is that the court erred by not expressly limiting the possible aggravating circumstances considered by the jury to those enumerated by the State in the charging instrument. In reviewing whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction, we consider whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law, whether the record supports the giving of the instruction, and whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by the instructions given. Richey v. State (1981), Ind., 426 N.E.2d 389. Defendant's Instruction 1 misstated the nature of the aggravators charged by the State. The instruction would have informed the jury that the aggravators to be proven were that Brown and Coleman intentionally killed Tamika and killed two others. In fact, the aggravators in Brown's trial related only to Brown. Additionally, the proposed instruction misstated the law with respect to aggravating circumstances. Minnick v. State (1989), Ind., 544 N.E.2d 471, 482. The trial court thus properly refused defendant's Instruction 1.