Opinion ID: 2549875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Use of prior arrests on cross-examination

Text: Appellant contends that the district court improperly permitted questioning regarding his prior arrests. We agree. On direct examination, defense counsel asked appellant, So you didn't necessarily at that point [July 1997] have a great reputation for violence, as far as you knew? Appellant answered, No, no, not that I knew of. On cross-examination, the State asked appellant if he had been arrested in 1989 and 1990 for battery, five counts of attempted murder, obstructing a police officer, false imprisonment, battery with substantial bodily harm, battery with a deadly weapon, and first-degree kidnapping. He admitted that he had. On redirect, defense counsel elicited that appellant was not prosecuted for any of these arrests. The district court refused to allow appellant to present evidence on the circumstances of the arrests and the reasons prosecutions were not pursued. Appellant argues that questions about his prior arrests constituted improper character evidence under NRS 48.045(2), which prohibits the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove a person's character. However, NRS 48.045(2) is not the pertinent provision in this case because appellant placed his character in issue on direct examination. Thus NRS 48.045(1)(a) is controlling. It provides that once a criminal defendant presents [e]vidence of his character or a trait of his character the prosecution may offer similar evidence in rebuttal. NRS 48.055(1) provides that this evidence must be in the form of reputation or opinion testimony and allows a party to test such testimony on cross-examination by inquiry into the witness's knowledge of specific instances of conduct. Therefore, because appellant testified regarding his reputation, the State was entitled to cross-examine him on relevant specific acts. However, questions asking whether or not someone has been arrested do not relate to specific instances of conduct. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that questioning about arrests was improper in United States v. Bruguier. [17] In that case, after a witness testified that the defendant was a good father, the government asked on cross-examination, `[D]o you think it is a good father to be arrested 36 times?' [18] The Eighth Circuit rejected the government's contention that arrests prove anything. [19] An arrest shows only that the arresting officer thought the person apprehended had committed a crime, assuming that the officer acted in good faith, which will usually but not always be the case. An arrest does not show that a crime in fact has been committed, or even that there is probable cause for believing that a crime has been committed. The question, accordingly, should not have been asked. [20] Although an arrest alone is not an adequate basis to cross-examine a witness about reputation or opinion testimony, questions about the specific acts and circumstances that culminated in the arrest may be proper. [21] However, before allowing inquiry into facts harmful to the defendant's character that are not otherwise in evidence, the trial court must determine, outside the presence of the jury, whether the prosecution has a reasonable, good-faith basis for its belief that the defendant committed the acts subject to the inquiry. [22] Both sides may present evidence regarding the acts underlying the arrest and the reasons no conviction was obtained. The mere fact of an arrest is not a basis for inquiry. [23] Assuming the State had a good-faith basis for believing appellant committed any of the violent acts leading to the arrests in 1989 and 1990, then the cross-examination should focus on the acts, not the fact of an arrest. The State could have asked appellant, for example, if he had been involved in attempted murder. The district court erred in permitting the State to cross-examine appellant on mere arrests. The district court compounded the error when it refused to allow appellant to present evidence on the circumstances of the arrests and why no prosecutions were pursued. We do not decide if the error, standing alone, warrants reversal given the cumulative error in this case.