Opinion ID: 1376871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Theory of plaintiff's action.

Text: As earlier writers have remarked in similar appeals, we find it difficult to conclude    what particular theory of recovery plaintiff's attorney had in mind. Lynch v. Herrig, 32 Mont. 267, 273, 80 P. 240, 242. Plaintiff alleges fraud and prays for lien on the disputed property. What is plaintiff's theory? Plaintiff's brief says it is the theory of a resulting trust. Trusts are either voluntary or involuntary, R.C.M.1947, § 86-201, and otherwise are classified as express or implied. Express trusts depend on intention, implied trusts arise by operation of law, R.C.M.1947, § 86-203. Implied trusts are subclassified as constructive or resulting. Constructive trusts spring from fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, R.C.M.1947, § 86-210. The test of a constructive trust is fraud, Bradbury v. Nagelhus, supra. Resulting trusts are presumed to rise when a transfer of real property is made to one person, and the consideration thereof is paid by or for another, R.C.M.1947, § 86-103. But when the consideration for the purchase of real property moves from a parent and the title is taken by a child, a gift is presumed to the child, not a trust for the parent. McQuay v. McQuay, supra; 54 Am. Jur., Trusts, § 205, p. 160; 89 C.J.S. Trusts, § 129 b, p. 992. In a word, within the normal bounties of the parental relationship, the presumption is gift, not trust. Both presumptions are rebuttable. McQuay v. McQuay, supra. Coming now to the trust recitals of plaintiff's second amended complaint, and editing it first to accentuate allegations of an express trust, we find plaintiff saying that the down payment    was all paid by    [the deceased]    with his own funds    that said contract was placed in the name of the defendants with the specific understanding and agreement between the deceased and the defendants that as soon as the deceased was legally separated from his wife, the said contract of purchase would be assigned to    [the deceased] and such transfer constituted a trust for the benefit of said    [ deceased ]. Emphasis added. No writing embodying this alleged specific understanding and agreement is alleged or attached as exhibit, nor was any proved. Therefore, in the above form the trust is bottomed on parol and void under the statute of frauds. R.C.M.1947, § 86-102, § 86-105, § 86-108; Lynch v. Herrig, supra, 32 Mont. 267, 80 P. 240; 2 Bancroft's Code Pleading, § 2397, p. 1192. (Ten Year Supp.) Plaintiff having stood on the theory of a resulting trust, the foregoing might be omitted were it not for the fact that, as will appear below, this alleged agreement between deceased and the defendants is the essence of the district court's finding for the plaintiff. Likewise, any consideration of constructive trust could be omitted except for the emphasis placed by the plaintiff on fraud and the findings of concealment made against defendant by the district court. As stated, no valid express trust is alleged. If we examine the complaint for an implied constructive trust, we find that the fraud which the court's findings refer to as concealment is charged as a fraud committed by the deceased upon the wife of the deceased. Fraud is the gravamen of a constructive trust. Morton v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 80 Mont. 593, 261 P. 278, and cases cited at page 612 of 80 Mont., at page 282 of 261 P. Plaintiff's first count alleges that the said deceased was very bitter toward his wife    and has threatened to and intended to divorce or separate from her. By reason thereof, he had the contract for the purchase of said premises placed in the name of the defendants so as to cheat and defraud his wife    out of any share of his estate in case divorce proceedings were commenced; that said contract was placed in the name of the defendants with the specific understanding    [as quoted above from the complaint]; that the said defendants were parties to said fraud and well knew, and still know, that they were and are holding the said contract in their names as trustees for the benefit of    [deceased] and his estate, and they agreed to do so until the deceased was separated from his wife. Emphasis added. Disregarding the unwarranted inference of community property rights, foreign to Montana, the plaintiff administratrix is here alleging a fraud instigated by the deceased party in whose shoes she stands as his administratrix. Further, during deceased's lifetime he could give his money to anyone he desired, and until deceased died he had no estate of any nature out of which anyone could be defrauded. No man is an heir of the living. The discord between the deceased and his wife is unfortunate, but this does not in itself raise a resulting trust, render a gift illegal, or rebut the presumption that a gift was made. Gift is per se no badge of fraud. The right to own includes the right to give away. These considerations apply equally to plaintiff's second count going to the ranch livestock and equipment. The form of plaintiff's complaint and the findings of the court have necessitated our proceeding to the discussion of resulting trust by a process of elimination, although when faced with argument on general demurrer plaintiff's counsel stood on the theory of resulting trust and although in overruling defendant's third general demurrer the court adopted this theory. As shown above, if the complaint be taken as alleging an express trust, the first count fails by parol. If the complaint be taken as alleging a constructive trust, both counts fail because the fraud alleged is committed by the deceased on no party to the action, so that in effect the deceased through his personal representative is seeking to recover on his own fraud for the benefit of a stranger to the action. This may not be done, R.C.M.1947, § 49-109. If the complaint be taken as alleging a resulting trust both counts are subject to the legal presumption of gift. But the complaint also fails for further reasons. These reasons are that the first count recites an uncompleted executory contract and alleges no title in defendants, fails to show what aliquot portion, if any, of the land is allocable to deceased in consideration for his down payment, and terminates with a prayer for a decree adjudging that the estate of    deceased, has an interest and equity in said real estate, and determining the amount thereof, and imposing a lien on said real estate to the amount of such interest, although the aliquot portion is not pleaded and the supporting allegation is that deceased is the sole purchaser. See discussion 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, §§ 457, 459, 461. Title being still in the sellers, at common law it would have been said there has been no livery of seisin. R.C.M. 1947, § 86-103, under which resulting trusts are raised is but declaratory of the common law. Lynch v. Herrig, supra, 32 Mont. at page 274, 80 P. at page 242.    It is another well-recognized principle that the money paid must be an aliquot part of the entire purchase price.       It seems clear, therefore, that this action could not be maintained at the time of the commencement of the suit for the purpose of establishing a resulting trust in the land, because the legal title thereto did not rest in the party sought to be charged therewith. A resulting trust in land can only be declared when the legal title has passed to the party against whom the trust is sought to be declared. Lynch v. Herrig, supra, 32 Mont. at pages 275, 276, 80 P. at page 243. Appellant's first specification of error is well taken.