Opinion ID: 1358675
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Heading: The Employer's Liability for Outrageous Conduct

Text: The second question proffered by the District Court is: Would that employee have a cause of action against his employer for the tort of intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress based upon the employer's failure to put a stop to the supervisor's conduct, despite repeated requests by the employee? As with the District Court's first question, the question is fact-specific, and requires reformulation to make our decision more generally applicable. Upon close examination, we believe that there are two legal issues within the District Court's second question. These issues are: (1) may an employer be held responsible for a supervisor's outrageous actions; and (2) can an employer be liable for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress for refusing to stop a supervisor's outrageous conduct? We believe that both parts of the question should be answered in the affirmative. The first issue we discuss is whether an employer can be held liable for emotional distress intentionally or recklessly inflicted by a supervisor. The general rule is that an employer is responsible for the all of the acts of its agents or employees that are done within the course and scope of their employment. Individual agents or employees may also be held individually responsible for their acts done within the course and scope of their employment. We stated in Syllabus Point 3 of Musgrove v. Hickory Inn, Inc., 168 W.Va. 65, 281 S.E.2d 499 (1981) that: An agent or employee can be held personally liable for his own torts against third parties and this personal liability is independent of his agency or employee relationship. Of course, if he is acting within the scope of his employment, then his principal or employer may also be held liable. Generally, the course and scope of employment includes any conduct by an officer, agent or employee in the furtherance of the employer's business. We have generally accepted the proposition that an employer may be liable for the conduct of an employee, even if the specific conduct is unauthorized or contrary to express orders, so long as the employee is acting within his general authority and for the benefit of the employer. For example, in Nees v. Julian Goldman Stores, Inc., 106 W.Va. 502, 146 S.E. 61 (1928), we concluded that an employee of the defendant was within the scope of his employment when he seriously injured the housewife-plaintiff in a violent altercation while trying to collect a debt owed to the defendant. We stated that: A master may not limit his liability to such of the conduct of his servant as is discreet and within the bounds of propriety, and avoid liability as to such conduct as is indiscreet and improper. Where a master sends forth an agent he is responsible for the acts of his agent within the apparent scope of his authority, though the agent oversteps the strict line of his duty. 106 W.Va. at 505, 146 S.E. at 62. See also, Cremeans v. Maynard, 162 W.Va. 74, 246 S.E.2d 253 (1978) (question of fact presented as to whether out-of-state workers brought to job site by employer were within the scope of employment in firing shotguns at union picketers); Porter v. South Penn Oil Co., 125 W.Va. 361, 24 S.E.2d 330 (1943) (an employer may be liable for an assault committed by an employee acting in the performance of duties within the scope of the employment); Meadows v. Corinne Coal & Land Co., 115 W.Va. 522, 177 S.E. 281 (1934) (employer was liable for malicious prosecution initiated against plaintiff by employee acting within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of the employer's business); Fetty v. Huntington Loan Co., 70 W.Va. 688, 74 S.E. 956 (1912) (same). Hence, intentional or reckless acts of an employee or supervisor may be imputed to the employer, if those acts were committed within the scope of employment. The second issue posed by the District Court indicates a concern over whether an employer with knowledge of a supervisor's tortious conduct which fails to put a stop to the supervisor's conduct, despite repeated requests from the plaintiff, can be held liable for the tortious conduct. In our prior cases, we have stated that when a supervisor engages in tortious conduct such as sexual or other types of harassment, the supervisor's knowledge and actions may be imputed to the employer. Furthermore, an employer's liability may also be premised on its failure to remedy, or its ratification of, tortious conduct. In Hanlon v. Chambers, 195 W.Va. 99, 108, 464 S.E.2d 741, 750 (1995), we said that: Where an agent or supervisor of an employer has caused, contributed to, or acquiesced in the harassment, then such conduct is attributed to the employer, and it can be fairly said that the employer is strictly liable for the damages that result. We went on to state that an employer must do what it can to prevent harassment and must respond swiftly and effectively to complaints about harassment. The sufficiency of the employer's response determines its legal responsibility.... Each case will turn on its own particular circumstances.... The point is that common sense must be applied to the facts in each case to determine whether the employer took direct and prompt action `reasonably calculated' to end the harassment. 195 W.Va. at 108-09, 464 S.E.2d at 750-51. We believe that the reasoning of Hanlon v. Chambers is equally applicable to the tort of outrage. We made clear that a supervisor may be held individually liable for the tort of outrage when committed during the course of employment, and reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims of outrageous conduct by his supervisor in Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, supra. 169 W.Va. at 683-85, 289 S.E.2d at 698-99. Today we make clear the converse, that an employer may be held individually liable for contributing to or allowing outrageous conduct by a supervisor in the workplace. An employer must do what it can to prevent outrageous conduct arising from the employment relationship, and must respond swiftly and effectively to complaints of such conduct. Accordingly, we hold that where a supervisor of an employer has, within the scope of employment, caused, contributed to, or acquiesced in the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress upon an employee, then such conduct is attributed to the employer, and the employer is liable for the damages that result. We conclude, therefore, that the District Court's second question should be answered yes. An employer may be held liable for a supervisor's outrageous actions committed within the scope of employment, and an employer may be held liable for causing, contributing to, or acquiescing to the commission of outrageous conduct occurring during the course of employment.