Opinion ID: 2632329
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the object of this action is lands or an interest in lands under Section 38-3-1(D).

Text: {7} Under Section 38-3-1(D)(1), [w]hen lands or any interest in lands are the object of any suit in whole or in part, the suit shall be brought in the county where the land or any portion of the land is situate. Thus, if the object of Plaintiffs' lawsuit is lands or an interest in lands, then venue will only be proper in Lea County. If, on the other hand, the action is transitory, then Plaintiffs are free to choose venue in accordance with the remaining provisions of Section 38-3-1. {8} Claims for damages do not have lands or interest in lands as their object. Accordingly, a lawsuit comprised exclusively of claims for damages need not be brought in the county where the land is situated. Team Bank v. Meridian Oil Inc., 118 N.M. 147, 149, 879 P.2d 779, 781 (1994); Jemez Land Co. v. Garcia, 15 N.M. 316, 321, 107 P. 683, 685 (1910), overruled on other grounds by Kalosha v. Novick, 84 N.M. 502, 504, 505 P.2d 845, 847 (1973). In the present case, the Court of Appeals determined that Plaintiffs were requesting injunctive relief as well as damages. Cooper, 2000-NMCA-100, ¶ 2, 129 N.M. 710, 13 P.3d 68 (Plaintiffs also requested injunctive relief, apparently to restrain Defendants from further tortious acts.). Accordingly, the Court questioned whether Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief converts this case into an action involving an interest in land. Id. ¶ 23. The Court reasoned that Jemez Land Co. created a dichotomy between actions to redress tortious injury to real property and actions to adjudicate title to real property. Id. Because the present action fell into the former category, the Court of Appeals concluded the object of the lawsuit was not lands or interest in lands within the meaning of Section 38-3-1(D)(1). Id. {9} We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that Plaintiffs made a request for injunctive relief. The conclusion of Plaintiffs' complaint requests that the trial court grant judgment against Defendants for the injunctive relief set forth above. However, careful review of the complaint reveals that Plaintiffs never set forth a request for any injunctive relief. Indeed, even if the trial court had granted all forms of relief requested by Plaintiffs in the complaint, no injunction would have ensued. Because this case did not involve an actual claim for injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals' analysis of whether injunctions constitute an interest in land was advisory, and it is hereby overruled. Although we disagree with the reasoning employed in the Court of Appeals' decision, the result that it reached was correct. Because the sole object of this suit is damages, Section 38-3-1(D)(1) does not apply to this action. Jemez Land Co. 15 N.M. at 321, 107 P. at 685. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that Plaintiffs were not required by Section 38-3-1(D)(1) to file their action in Lea County. Cooper, 2000-NMCA-100, ¶ 26, 129 N.M. 710, 13 P.3d 68. {10} The dissent suggests that Plaintiffs' complaint made reference to a continuing nuisance and therefore adequately invoked injunctive relief. Dissent ¶ 37. With regard to the continuing nuisance claim, Plaintiffs' complaint only seek[s] a recovery of the reasonable and necessary costs associated with restoring those portions of the Ranch that remain contaminated by the Defendants' operation, to their condition prior to that contamination occurring. Even though the complaint makes reference to a continuing nuisance, Plaintiffs' request for relief is clearly for monetary, not injunctive, relief. The dissent also argues that the trial court may impose injunctive relief for a continuing nuisance and therefore, for purposes of venue, Plaintiffs' continuing nuisance claim should not be restricted to a claim for monetary relief and should be construed as implicating equitable relief in the form of abatement or injunction. Dissent ¶ 40. However, even if the trial court, in its discretion, decided to award injunctive relief sua sponte, this does not change the object of [the] suit. Consequently, the object of [the] suit continues to be one for damages and therefore venue in the present case is not determined by Section 38-3-1(D)(1).