Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Affecting Guilt and Penalty

Text: Defendant contends the superior court judge assigned to preside over his case for all purposes improperly failed to recuse himself as suggested by defendant and under circumstances in which a reasonable person would have entertained doubts concerning his impartiality, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6). He adds that subsequent rulings made by the judge revealed his bias throughout trial.
During pretrial proceedings, defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal after the trial judge allegedly refused to reconsider the denial of [his] section 995 motion [to dismiss the information]. He also requested a temporary stay of the trial proceedings. The Court of Appeal issued the stay on Friday, July 9, 1993. Three hundred prospective jurors had been summoned to appear in the trial court on Monday, July 12, 1993, for the commencement of jury selection. Instead, the trial judge conducted a hearing regarding defendant's writ petition and the temporary stay of proceedings that had issued. At the hearing, the trial judge said that he was very upset about the recent developments in defendant's case because to his knowledge, a copy of defendant's writ petition had not been served on the trial court and defense counsel gave him no indication of the possibility that a stay of proceedings might issue. The judge further explained that he tried to keep the costs of county trials to a minimum and that he had no time to tell jurors to not report for jury duty as scheduled. The trial judge and counsel then discussed the procedural posture leading to the filing of the writ petition. Counsel reminded the trial judge that a previous writ petition had been filed in this case. The trial judge remarked that the prior petition was [a]lso full of specious statements. When counsel disagreed with the judge's characterization, the judge responded, [Counsel], you are so intellectually dishonest that if you turned around fast, you'd screw yourself into the ground. The trial judge and counsel then debated the merits of the writ petition and the circumstances that resulted in its filing. Counsel claimed that the trial judge failed to rule on his motion to reconsider the denial of his section 995 motion. The trial judge disagreed and stated that he declined to reconsider the motion on June 21st, and that Oh, I see. The word `refused' doesn't mean refused to you. The judge then asked counsel, How many times do you want me to reconsider a denial to reconsider? After a recess, the trial judge told counsel that he had considered whether this incident would cause him to be biased against defendant and ultimately decided he could give defendant a fair trial. Counsel asked the trial judge whether he would not hold the temporary stay of the trial proceedings against defendant. The trial court responded, Without question. The trial judge continued to complain that counsel's office had not served him with the writ petition and that certain allegations were either untrue or misleading. Ultimately, the trial judge reiterated he could give defendant a fair trial and assured counsel he would disqualify himself if he found himself compromising defendant's right to a fair jury trial. Trial counsel did not respond and apparently accepted the trial judge's representation that defendant would receive a fair trial. We note initially that during the pretrial hearing regarding the issuance of the temporary stay of proceedings that defendant did not request but merely suggested the trial judge should recuse [himself]. When the trial judge responded by assuring counsel that defendant would receive a fair trial and continuing with the proceedings, counsel made no effort to comply with the procedures under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (c)(1), and seek disqualification of the judge. ( People v. Bryant (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1569, 1572-1573, 236 Cal.Rptr. 96 [discussing the procedures under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (c)(1), that counsel is to follow to challenge a judge's qualification to preside over further proceedings once the judge refuses to disqualify himself or herself].) As the People assert, counsel apparently accepted the judge's representation that defendant would receive a fair trial. If a judge refuses or fails to disqualify herself, a party may seek the judge's disqualification. The party must do so, however, `at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(1).) ( People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1206-1207, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354.) As was the case in Scott, defense counsel was fully aware before and during trial of all the facts defendant now cites in support of his claim of judicial bias. But he never claimed during trial that the judge should recuse himself or that his constitutional rights were violated because of judicial bias. It is too late to raise the issue for the first time on appeal. ( Ibid; see also People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 334, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 862 P.2d 710 [[Code of Civil Procedure s]ection 170.3 [subdivision] (d) forecloses appeal of a claim that a statutory motion for disqualification authorized by section 170.1 was erroneously denied].) For the same reason, defendant has forfeited his additional claims that the trial judge's alleged bias affected his subsequent trial rulings. ( Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1207, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354.) In any event, defendant's claim lacks merit. Defendant has a due process right to an impartial trial judge under the state and federal Constitutions. ( Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302; People v. Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 332, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 710, 862 P.2d 710.) The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a fair trial in a fair tribunal before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of the case. ( Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904-905, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97.) Section 1044 provides that a trial court has the duty to control the trial proceedings. (See also People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 397, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) When an attorney engages in improper behavior, such as ignoring the court's instructions or asking inappropriate questions, it is within a trial court's discretion to reprimand the attorney, even harshly, as the circumstances require. ( People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Mere expressions of opinion by a trial judge based on actual observation of the witnesses and evidence in the courtroom do not demonstrate a bias. ( Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219-1220, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 519; see also People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 193-195, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) Moreover, a trial court's numerous rulings against a partyeven when erroneousdo not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review. ( Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781, 795-796, 171 Cal.Rptr. 590, 623 P.2d 151; McEwen v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. (1916) 172 Cal. 6, 11, 155 P. 86.) On appeal, we assess whether any judicial misconduct or bias was so prejudicial that it deprived defendant of `a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.' ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78, 132 Cal. Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749, quoting United States v. Pisani (2d Cir.1985) 773 F.2d 397, 402.) Here, based on our review of the record, we conclude defendant fails to establish he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial tribunal. The trial judge was outraged because trial counsel failed to give him or the courtroom clerk a courtesy call and inform him that he (counsel) had requested a temporary stay of proceedings that would potentially obviate the need for the 300 prospective jurors who had been summoned for the commencement of jury selection. But all of his comments in this regard were made outside the presence of any jurors. The judge made clear, moreover, that his irritation was with counsel and not defendant. He unequivocally stated defendant would receive a fair trial, and counsel accepted that representation. Further, the trial judge did not display overt bias against the defense so as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 79, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Defendant's additional claim that subsequent rulings by the trial judge revealed a bias that was more than passing anger also fails on the merits. As stated, adverse or erroneous rulings, especially those that are subject to review, do not establish a charge of judicial bias. ( Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 795-796, 171 Cal.Rptr. 590, 623 P.2d 151.) Defendant never expressed any concern that the judge was prejudiced against him during trial nor did he request the judge to recuse himself. We see nothing in the record establishing bias against defendant. As the People argue, defendant's willingness to let the entire trial pass without another charge of bias against the judge not only forfeits his claims on appeal but also strongly suggests they are without merit. (See, e.g., People v. Tappan (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 812, 816-817, 72 Cal.Rptr. 585 [following the trial judge's allegedly prejudicial pretrial comment, defendant's failure to complain of judge's bias during trial showed defendant's confidence in judge's impartiality].) Accordingly, defendant's claim of judicial bias fails on the merits.