Opinion ID: 76395
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Double Counting

Text: 49 Rendon argues that the district judge's imposing both the captain enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) and the organizer/leader enhancement under § 3B1.1(a) was improper double counting because it resulted in his being punished twice for the same conduct. We review contentions alleging impermissible double counting de novo. United States v. Matos-Rodriguez, 188 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir.1999). 50 `Impermissible double counting occurs only when one part of the Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant's punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by application of another part of the Guidelines.' Id. at 1309 (citation omitted). Double counting is permissible at sentencing (1) `if the Sentencing Commission intended the result,' and (2) `if the result is permissible because each [guideline] section concerns conceptually separate notions related [sic] to sentencing.' Id. at 1310 (quoting United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir.1992)). This Court presumes the Sentencing Commission intended to apply separate guideline sections cumulatively, unless specifically directed otherwise. Id. at 1310. 51 After hearing argument on adjusting Rendon's sentence upward for being both captain of the vessel and a leader or organizer, the district judge explained his reasoning for giving both enhancements: 52 In this particular case it appears that Mr. Quintero Rendon had both the functional responsibilities of a captain within the meaning of 2D1.1(b)(2) and, based on his recruitment and other activities, was also an organizer and leader within the meaning of 3B1.1(a). 53 . . . . 54 ... [I]n this particular case this individual qualifies, it seems, both as captain, for the specific offense characteristic of captain or any other operational officer, and then based on a separate set of activities, that is his organizer and leadership role, qualifies under 3B1.1(a). 55 . . . . 56 He both did everything presumably that a captain would do and then did something else. He did those things that the leader/organizer of an extensive criminal conspiracy would do. So he qualified on both hands. I found that — the question and the answer to be fairly graphic for the reason that this defendant qualifies here. 57 In this case, neither of the two sentencing factors is a subset of the other. A defendant may captain a craft or vessel without serving as an organizer or leader in the overall conspiracy. See Guerrero, 114 F.3d at 346 (recognizing the § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement does not require evidence of leadership). Likewise, a defendant may be an organizer or leader of a drug conspiracy without having anything to do with the actual operation of the vessel used to transport the drugs. Absent an instruction to the contrary, the adjustments from different guideline sections are applied cumulatively (added together). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.4; United States v. Naves, 252 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir.2001) (Absent a specific direction to the contrary, we presume that the Sentencing Commission intended to apply separate guideline sections cumulatively.); Jackson, 276 F.3d at 1236. Neither of the challenged guidelines includes any language or commentary that suggests that they may not be applied cumulatively. To the contrary, the two enhancements embody conceptually separate notions relating to sentencing because they are designed for two different purposes. Jackson, 276 F.3d at 1235 (internal quotation omitted). 58 Section 3B1.1 requires the court to enhance a defendant's sentence based on his relative culpability within a criminal organization. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. background (The Commission's intent is that this adjustment should increase with both the size of the organization and the degree of the defendant's responsibility.). In contrast, § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) addresses those who facilitate a drug smuggling operation by filling a critical position without which the operation likely would fail. See Guerrero, 114 F.3d at 346 (While the guideline may speak to a defendant's control over some mechanical aspect of a vessel's operation, it does not address the defendant's authority over other individuals involved in a criminal venture.). Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in concluding that Rendon qualified for enhancements under both § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) and § 3B1.1(a), which are not mutually exclusive enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines.