Opinion ID: 1963937
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Farley's Contentions

Text: Farley argues that his psychological condition is a mitigating factor. When an attorney raises a psychological disorder as a mitigating factor, the attorney must prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a severe psychological disorder; (2) the psychological disorder caused the misconduct; (3) the attorney is undergoing treatment and is making progress to recover from the psychological disorder that caused or contributed to the misconduct; (4) recovery has arrested the misconduct; and (5) the misconduct is not apt to recur. In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn.1983). When the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has proven misconduct, the burden shifts to the attorney to prove the psychological disorder. See id. Farley contends that the referee erred in finding that his conduct was not caused by his sexual dysfunction. Specifically, he argues that the referee should not have applied the right from wrong test used in In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn.2002). He urges us to adopt a proximate cause test. But Farley misconstrues our case law regarding psychological disorder as a mitigating factor. In Jellinger, we considered whether the attorney's moderate depression satisfied the Weyhrich test. Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d at 314-15. The referee found that Jellinger's misconduct was largely the byproduct of inadequate treatment of his depression and therefore Jellinger proved mitigation. Id. at 314. On appeal we reversed, concluding, among other things, that Jellinger's expert testimony did not establish that Jellinger had a psychological disorder that was severe or that a causal relationship existed between Jellinger's depression and his affirmative acts of dishonesty. Id. at 315. We observed that in In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d 321 (Minn.1988), we affirmed the referee's rejection of a psychological disorder as a mitigating factor based on the finding that the disorder was not a severe problem on a recognized psychological diagnostic scale and did not result in impairment of [Pyles'] cognitive functions, his ability to direct his actions, or to know right from wrong. Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d at 315 (quoting Pyles, 421 N.W.2d at 325) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Jellinger did not adopt a new right from wrong test to satisfy the Weyhrich factors regarding severity or causation. Rather, Jellinger simply concluded that the expert testimony failed to establish severity and causation under Weyhrich. As a result, we concluded that Jellinger had not met all of the Weyhrich factors for psychological disorder as a mitigating factor. We reiterate that to satisfy the Weyhrich test, the attorney must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) he or she has a severe psychological disorder; (2) the psychological disorder caused the misconduct; (3) the attorney is undergoing treatment and is making progress to recover from the psychological disorder that caused or contributed to the misconduct; (4) recovery has arrested the misconduct; and (5) the misconduct is not apt to recur. See Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279. Here, the referee found that Respondent knew that his conduct was ethically and morally wrong so that his behavior was not caused by his sexual addiction/dysfunction, and did not find that this dysfunction was severe. We conclude that the referee conflated the first and second Weyhrich factors, regarding severity and causation respectively. To establish severity, Farley must show that the psychological disorder was severe, not that he knew that his conduct was ethically and morally wrong. Farley presented no evidence that he suffered from a severe psychological disorder on a recognized psychological diagnostic scale. See Pyles, 421 N.W.2d at 325. Further, the referee found that Farley's behavior was not caused by his sexual addiction/dysfunction. Farley's own expert witness testified that Farley's disorder indirectly led to the offense. Indirect causation, however, is not sufficient to justify a finding of causation under Weyhrich. See In re Shoemaker, 518 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn.1994). Thus, we conclude that Farley failed to satisfy two of the Weyhrich factors, and therefore his psychological disorder is not a mitigating factor. Farley next argues that the referee erred in not crediting his remorse as a mitigating factor. The referee found that there is no way to judge remorse in this case. This claim will not be considered either way. Whether an attorney has expressed remorse over his misconduct is an important consideration in determining the appropriate discipline for an attorney. See In re Houge, 764 N.W.2d 328, 339 (Minn.2009). We conclude that examination of remorse is an important issue and that the referee erred in failing to address it. Based on our review of the record, it appears that Farley has established that he had remorse for his conduct. Farley next argues that the referee erred by not finding that his cooperation was a mitigating factor. The referee found: Respondent cooperated with the criminal and disciplinary investigations. This is required by the rules, and is not a factor for mitigation in this case. Cooperation is required by Rule 25 of Minnesota Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), which states: It shall be the duty of any lawyer who is the subject of an investigation or proceeding under these Rules to cooperate with the District Committee, the Director, or the Director's staff, the Board, or a Panel. Previously, we have concluded that cooperation with disciplinary proceedings is required by Rule 25, and therefore it should not be considered a mitigating factor. In re Moulton, 721 N.W.2d 900, 906 (Minn.2006). Here, the referee's finding has support in the record and is not clearly erroneous. Farley also claims that the referee failed to consider the lack of harm to clients as a mitigating factor. Lack of harm to clients may be considered as a mitigating factor. In re Ray, 452 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Minn.1990). The referee made no specific finding regarding lack of harm to clients, but did find that Farley's crime occurred outside the practice of law and therefore was a mitigating factor. Therefore, we conclude that the referee implicitly considered the lack of harm to clients as a mitigating factor. [2] Finally, Farley claims that the referee should have concluded that Farley's overall good character is a mitigating factor. Although several witnesses testified to Farley's good character, the referee made no finding as to Farley's overall character. But the referee is free to reject an attorney's argument that the testimony presented is sufficient to support mitigation in a particular case. On this record, the referee's failure to find that Farley's overall good character should be considered in mitigation is not clearly erroneous.