Opinion ID: 465428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Juror substitution improper absent judicial inquiry.

Text: 167 Under Georgia law, a juror may be excused and replaced if he is unable to perform his duty as a juror because he becomes ill. Ga.Code Ann. Sec. 15-12-172. In the state habeas proceeding, the court held that Greeson was properly excused under Georgia law. The state court made no finding whatsoever that Greeson was ill at the time of his excusal or, more importantly, that the trial court had so found prior to Greeson's excusal. 168 Nonetheless, the majority of this Court concludes that the state habeas court found (1) that Greeson's emotional and physical state impaired his voting and participating in deliberations, and (2) that the trial judge formed the correct impression that Greeson was ill and unable to continue deliberating at that time. The majority states that these findings are fairly supported by the record, and are therefore to be accorded a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2254(d). 169 Based on the record before this Court, it is impossible for us conclusively to determine whether Greeson was in fact ill at the time he was excused from the jury. Contrary to the majority's conclusion attributing to the state court the findings that Greeson was ill and unable to continue deliberating, these findings are simply factual inferences that the majority of this Court draws to support the legal conclusion of the state habeas court. Although a federal habeas court is supposed to defer to properly supported factual findings of a state court, the federal court owes no deference to the state court's holdings on issues of federal law. By inferring certain factual findings from the state court's legal conclusions, the majority of this Court in effect converts reviewable legal conclusions of a state court into unreviewable findings of fact. 170 Since the state habeas court made no factual findings regarding the circumstances under which Greeson was excused and, specifically, whether Greeson was ill and unable to continue as a juror, the federal habeas court cannot possibly presume that such findings are correct. The district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing in the present case but, rather, limited its review to the transcripts of the trial and the state habeas proceeding. In light of the district court's failure to hear testimony or observe witnesses, the district court's findings are entitled to less deference than they would otherwise be entitled to under the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Green v. Russell County, 603 F.2d 571, 573 (5th Cir.1979). 171 The circumstances of Greeson's removal strongly suggest that, at the time Greeson was excused, he was not too ill to continue serving as a juror but, rather, had been pressured into resigning his position on the jury. The jury began hearing evidence at 9:00 a.m., and did not even commence its deliberations until the late hour of 10:30 p.m. Eventually, the jury became divided eleven-to-one in favor of conviction, with Greeson remaining the lone holdout. This situation continued for between thirty and forty minutes. 172 At the state habeas hearing, Greeson testified, I knew I was going to have difficulty making a decision but I think it was more the decision--in other words, the way the other eleven had decided to go and I didn't think I was--it was a combination. I was upset. I didn't think I could and I was--I couldn't even think any more.... 173 Greeson testified that, prior to his removal from the jury, he was under great stress. After his excusal, however, Greeson immediately began to feel better--so much so that he declined any assistance and drove himself home. The main evidence at the habeas hearing that Greeson had been ill was provided by the jury foreman who had requested Greeson's excusal. The jury foreman testified that Greeson had a reddened complexion, had begun to sweat, and was making frequent trips to the restroom. The foreman also testified that Greeson wasn't cooperative ... he just couldn't participate in ... my idea of a jury deliberation. Greeson continued to cast his vote in favor of acquittal, although he ceased to participate in the discussions. 174 The ambiguity of the post-conviction testimony as to whether Greeson was actually ill highlights the main problem with the present case: namely, that Greeson was excused from the jury without any prior judicial determination that he was in fact ill. The trial court never observed Greeson prior to excusing him. Rather, the trial court based its excusal of Greeson solely on the word of the jury foreman, who had an opposing view to the juror whose excusal the foreman sought. The majority holds that Greeson was in fact ill and, therefore, that the absence of a judicial inquiry into his purported illness caused Greeson no prejudice. I am not satisfied that Greeson was too ill to continue serving as a juror, at a reasonable hour and after having had some rest. In any event, I would hold that, absent a prior judicial determination which entails at least the observation of the juror in question and findings of fact, a court cannot excuse a juror on the grounds of illness. To permit the excusal of a juror without such an inquiry creates an undue risk that the defendant will be unfairly deprived of his right to be convicted only upon agreement by the requisite number of jurors, through the excusal of those jurors who disagree with the majority. 175