Opinion ID: 2527692
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of R.C. 2929.19(A)(1)

Text: {¶ 79} Before it was amended effective April 29, 2005, R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) provided: The court shall hold a sentencing hearing before imposing a sentence under this chapter upon an offender who was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony   . At the hearing, the offender, the prosecuting attorney, the victim or the victim's representative in accordance with [R.C.] 2930.14   , and, with the approval of the court, any other person may present information relevant to the imposition of sentence in the case. The court shall inform the offender of the verdict of the jury or finding of the court and ask the offender whether the offender has anything to say as to why sentence should not be imposed upon the offender. 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 5741. {¶ 80} Aggravated murder is a felony, R.C. 2901.02(C), and a sentence for aggravated murder with aggravating circumstances is imposed under this chapterthat is, R.C. Chapter 2929. R.C. 2929.03(C)(2)(a), (D), and (E) (setting forth sentences for aggravated murder with one or more aggravating-circumstance specification). Hence, Short argued at trial, capital cases fall within the literal terms of R.C. 2929.19(A)(1). Moreover, according to Short, neither R.C. 2929.19 nor R.C. 2929.03 specifically exempts capital cases from the scope of R.C. 2929.19(A)(1). Therefore, Short argued at trial, a capital defendant is entitled to a hearing under R.C. 2929.19(A)(1), at which he may present information relevant to the imposition of sentence in the case. {¶ 81} Short's reading of R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) is unpersuasive. Were we to accept it, capital defendants would be entitled to two evidentiary hearings: one before the judge and jury (the penalty phase), and a second before the judge alone. Short fails to explain why the General Assembly would have intended to create such a system. There is no reason to believe that a system of dual evidentiary hearings would make capital sentencing more fair, reliable, or consistent. {¶ 82} Moreover, had the General Assembly intended R.C. 2929.19 to apply in capital cases, we believe it would have said so expressly. The comprehensive procedural scheme set forth in R.C. 2929.03 predates the enactment of R.C. 2929.19 by 22 years. [2] Short's reading of R.C. 2929.19 would work a major change in that comprehensive scheme. The General Assembly would not have intended to make such a change in a statute dealing with noncapital sentencing procedures without clearly saying so. We therefore reject Short's contention that R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) applies to capital sentencing.