Opinion ID: 901426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Board's Findings of Fact

Text: [¶ 9.] Benton initially argues that the Board beefed up its findings of fact and conclusions of law after legitimate concerns were raised by Benton through her objections and her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Benton specifically argues that we should infer that the Board's decision was not based upon its findings of Benton's lack of candor before the tribunal and her lack of moral character because those findings were not included in the Board's original proposals. The Board included those findings in its final decision after receiving Benton's submissions that pointed out those omissions. Thus, the record reflects that the Board apparently considered Benton's submissions and ultimately modified its final findings of fact and conclusions of law to rectify the omissions noted by Benton. [¶ 10.] SDCL 1-26-25, [4] the relevant provision of the Administrative Procedures Act, requires that an agency decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law. Additionally, if in accordance with agency rules a party submits proposed findings of fact, the final decision must include a ruling on the issues raised by the opposing party's submissions. In the present case, the Board apparently elected to follow this procedure because it first issued a proposed decision in the form of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. [5] The Board then modified those proposed findings and conclusions after considering Benton's objections and proposals. [¶ 11.] We note that this procedure reflects compliance with SDCL 1-26-25, rather than any improper bolstering of the Board's ultimate decision. Although this procedure allowed the Board to correct the omission in its proposed decision, the procedure is specifically contemplated by SDCL 1-26-25 (and the corresponding Rule of Civil Procedure, SDCL 15-6-52). Moreover, the procedure is specifically intended to enable an agency to take a second look at the facts and law of a case to correct errors or omissions raised by an objecting party. [¶ 12.] Therefore, we do not believe that any improper inference should be permitted to be drawn from this accepted procedure. There are many reasons why an agency may add or delete language from its proposed decision. In any given case, it is just as likely that omitted language reflects an oversight as a failure to understand and apply the appropriate law. We decline to adopt any adverse inference because an agency complied with this procedure. Rather, we believe that our review should be confined to the agency's final findings of fact and conclusions of law because they reflect an agency's final decision after a reconsideration of the competing views. A different rule would also require us to speculate as to the reason for the agency's first proposal. [¶ 13.] Benton next contends that two of the Board's final findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Benton first argues that finding number five  that other person's applications were also denied because of felony convictions [6]  is clearly erroneous. However, the following testimony between counsel for the investigating committee and an employee of the Board supports that finding. Counsel: [reading from the minutes of the March 5, 2003 board meeting] Discussion was held regarding EMT student status request made by [J.H.], Katheryn Benton, and [M.W.S.]. Are you familiar with that discussion? Employee: Yes. Counsel: All of those applications were denied, as I understand it? Employee: Yes. Counsel: Was there a consistent reason for those three folks as to why the denial was made? Employee: Felony conviction. Counsel: All three of them? Employee: Yes. Therefore, finding of fact number five was not clearly erroneous. [¶ 14.] Benton next attacks finding of fact number seven, [7] which states that Benton did not disclose all of her felony convictions at the Board hearing. The record reflects that on her application, Benton only indicated that she had a felony conviction for forgery and that the National Registry has info. Furthermore, during the hearing, Benton essentially indicated that her only felony conviction was for forgery. Benton, however, contends that she fully disclosed every fact relating to her wrongdoing, and simply because she d[id] not understand that her plea agreement was for particular offenses or charges does not mean that she was not forthcoming. (Emphasis added.) Benton finally contends that because her post-hearing affidavits indicated that she obtained a driver's license in someone else's name and that she had signed checks for her friend, she fully disclosed the conduct that led to her convictions. (Emphasis added.) [¶ 15.] We are not persuaded by such parsing of words. The record reflects that neither Benton's hearing testimony nor her post-hearing affidavits ever disclosed that she had been convicted of one count of felony false application for a driver's license and two counts of felony obtaining property under false pretenses. Furthermore, Benton called a number of character witnesses at the hearing who were unaware of the driver's license and obtaining property under false pretenses felonies. We finally note that, when asked during the hearing if she had received a benefit from the forgeries, Benton only responded that she did not get back the funds that she was owed. However, after the hearing, Benton disclosed that she had received $300 and five bags of groceries from the check-writing scheme. Given the partial disclosures and the fact that some of the conduct details were only disclosed after the hearing, this finding concerning Benton's testimony during the hearing was not clearly erroneous.