Opinion ID: 1253751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: subject matter jurisdiction of superior court to adjudicate defendant mentally retarded

Text: Similarly, we find no error in the superior court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate defendant mentally retarded. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2252, 153 L.Ed.2d 335, 350 (2002), the United States Supreme Court held that executing mentally retarded individuals violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibition against excessive punishment. However, that Court also stated: To the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded. In this case, for instance, the Commonwealth of Virginia disputes that Atkins suffers from mental retardation. Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, [106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335] (1986), with regard to insanity,  we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.  Id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. at 2250, 153 L.Ed.2d at 347-48 (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted). Thus, the United States Supreme Court left the implementation of Atkins entirely to state legislatures. The North Carolina statute prohibiting execution of mentally retarded individuals and defining mental retardation for that purpose, codified at N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005, was enacted in 2001 and thus antedates the Atkins decision. However, it is noteworthy that the legal definition of mental retardation set forth in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(a) was referenced by the United States Supreme Court when it handed down its holding in Atkins. Id. at 308 n. 3, 314-15 & 317 n. 22, 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 3, 2248-49 & 2250 n. 22, 153 L.Ed.2d at 342 n. 3, 346 & 348 n. 22. With respect to mental retardation, our General Assembly has stated that no defendant who is mentally retarded shall be sentenced to death. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(b) (2003). The General Assembly further clarified that: (a) (1) The following definitions apply in this section: a. Mentally retarded.  Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with significant limitations in adaptive functioning, both of which were manifested before the age of 18. b. Significant limitations in adaptive functioning.  Significant limitations in two or more of the following adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure skills and work skills. c. Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.  An intelligence quotient of 70 or below. (2) The defendant has the burden of proving significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, significant limitations in adaptive functioning, and that mental retardation was manifested before the age of 18. An intelligence quotient of 70 or below on an individually administered, scientifically recognized standardized intelligence quotient test administered by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist is evidence of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; however, it is not sufficient, without evidence of significant limitations in adaptive functioning and without evidence of manifestation before the age of 18, to establish that the defendant is mentally retarded. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(a) (2003). Procedurally, under the statute, a defendant may seek a pretrial determination of mental retardation. Id. § 15A-2005(c) (2003). Should the State consent to such a hearing, a defendant must carry the burden of production and persuasion to demonstrate mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence. Id. If the trial court determines that a defendant is mentally retarded, the case may only proceed noncapitally. Id. However, if the trial court determines that a defendant is not mentally retarded, the defendant may still seek a jury determination of mental retardation during the sentencing hearing. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(e) (2003). Thus, under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005, determinations of mental retardation must be made either initially by the superior court in a pretrial proceeding, or subsequently during a sentencing proceeding by the jury. In the case sub judice, defendant argues that N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1411 to 1422, which govern resolution of MAR proceedings, empowered the superior court to determine that he is mentally retarded. Defendant further argues that N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005 is relevant to MAR proceedings only to the extent that it provides a standard by which a superior court judge must determine whether a particular defendant is mentally retarded and thereby not subject to imposition of the death penalty under North Carolina law. Critical to our determination, we note that N.C.G.S. § 15A-2006 (2001), which expired 1 October 2002 pursuant to Act of July 25, 2001, ch. 346, sec. 4, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 1038, 1041, specifically provided a window of opportunity from 1 October 2001 to 1 October 2002 for post-conviction determinations of mental retardation for those defendants who had already been sentenced to death and were therefore unable to avail themselves of the procedures established in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005. Therefore, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2006 established an interim procedure for post-conviction determinations of mental retardation subject to the MAR procedures established in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1420. See State v. Anderson, 355 N.C. 136, 149-50, 558 S.E.2d 87, 96 (2002) (applying N.C.G.S. § 15A-2006). N.C.G.S. § 15A-2006 stated: In cases in which the defendant has been convicted of first-degree murder, sentenced to death, and is in custody awaiting imposition of the death penalty, the following procedures apply: (1) Notwithstanding any other provision or time limitation contained in Article 89 of Chapter 15A, a defendant may seek appropriate relief from the defendant's death sentence upon the ground that the defendant was mentally retarded, as defined in G.S. 15A-2005(a), at the time of the commission of the capital crime. (2) A motion seeking appropriate relief from a death sentence on the ground that the defendant is mentally retarded, shall be filed: a. On or before January 31, 2002, if the defendant's conviction and sentence of death were entered prior to October 1, 2001. b. Within 120 days of the imposition of a sentence of death, if the defendant's trial was in progress on October 1, 2001. For purposes of this section, a trial is considered to be in progress if the process of jury selection has begun. (3) The motion, seeking relief from a death sentence upon the ground that the defendant was mentally retarded, shall comply with the provisions of G.S. 15A-1420. The procedures and hearing on the motion shall follow and comply with G.S. 15A-1420. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2006 (2001) (emphasis added). Both parties concede that N.C.G.S. § 15A-2006 does not apply in this case; however, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2006 is instructive because it clearly establishes that the drafters of N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-2005 and 15A-2006 considered adjudication of mental retardation through motions for appropriate relief. Although N.C.G.S. § 15A-2006 specifically allows adjudication of mental retardation via motions for appropriate relief, such provisions are conspicuously absent from N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005. This absence necessitates the conclusion that the General Assembly did not intend for superior courts to make post-conviction determinations of mental retardation outside the confines of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2006. Thus, we conclude that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1417 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which was enacted in 1977 and allows a trial court to fashion any other appropriate relief, must be read in pari materia with the more recently enacted N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-2005 and 15A-2006 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Therefore, because the one-year window for post-conviction determinations of mental retardation under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2006 has expired and because N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005 allows only for pretrial and sentencing determinations of mental retardation, superior courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal defendants mentally retarded via a motion for appropriate relief proceeding. Accordingly, we find no error in the superior court's order and note that defendant will have the opportunity to be fully heard on the issue of mental retardation in his upcoming resentencing proceeding. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the superior court vacating defendant's death sentence and ordering a new capital sentencing hearing. We further affirm the order of the superior court which denied defendant's request for a new trial and denied defendant's request that the superior court adjudicate him mentally retarded. Inasmuch as this Court has affirmed the trial court's resolution of defendant's MAR, this Court cannot proceed further with defendant's direct appeal until defendant is resentenced and the appropriate appellate jurisdiction is established. AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR NEW SENTENCING PROCEEDING. Justice NEWBY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.