Opinion ID: 1942962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proffered Heat of Passion Instruction

Text: Coday argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his proffered jury instruction on heat of passion by finding that the standard jury instructions appropriately addressed this subject. He states that this instruction would have resulted in the jury finding him guilty of second-degree murder. Furthermore, he asserts that an accused is entitled to have the jury instructed on this theory of defense and that the trial court effectively denied him this right when it denied the proffered jury instruction. Thus, the issue that we must decide is whether the standard jury instruction on excusable homicide adequately explains heat of passion or whether the trial court should have given Coday's proffered special jury instruction on heat of passion. This Court has held that [d]ecisions regarding jury instructions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and should not be disturbed on appeal absent prejudicial error. Goldschmidt v. Holman, 571 So.2d 422, 425 (Fla.1990). However, [a] defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any valid defense supported by evidence or testimony in the case. State v. Weller, 590 So.2d 923, 927-28 (Fla.1991). The jury and not the trial judge determines whether the evidence supports the defendant's contention. Mora v. State, 814 So.2d 322, 330 (Fla. 2002). Nevertheless, [w]hile a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of defense, the failure to give special jury instructions does not constitute error where the instructions given adequately address the applicable legal standards. Stephens v. State, 787 So.2d 747, 755 (Fla.2001). This case is both factually and legally similar to Kilgore v. State, 688 So.2d 895 (Fla.1996), where we affirmed the trial court's denial of a special instruction on heat of passion. In Kilgore, the appellant was serving a life sentence at the Polk Correctional Institution for first-degree murder and kidnapping when he stabbed his homosexual lover to death outside of his cell with a homemade shank knife. Id. at 896-97. The trial court denied Kilgore's requested special jury instruction on heat of passion, which stated that a person acting under the heat of passion is incapable of premeditation in some circumstances. Id. at 897. The trial judge instead utilized the standard jury instruction of excusable homicide to explain heat of passion. Id. In finding that the trial court did not err, we stated: This Court has acknowledged that the standard jury instructions are sufficient to explain premeditation. Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377, 382 (Fla.1994). We also have ruled that the trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion in denying a special heat-of-passion instruction. Kramer v. State, 619 So.2d 274, 277 (Fla.1993). After viewing these facts, we conclude that there is no indication that the trial court erred by refusing the requested instruction. The necessary elements of premeditation were presented with the standard instruction and the trial court was well within its prerogative to refuse a separate, and possibly confusing, instruction. Id. at 898. In the instant case, the trial court followed this Court's precedent in Kilgore and found that the standard jury instruction on excusable homicide was sufficient to explain heat of passion in the context of premeditation. Since Kilgore is factually similar to the instant case in that both cases deal with the denial of special jury instructions on heat of passion to negate premeditation, we find that the trial court properly exercised, and did not abuse, its discretion.