Opinion ID: 1730891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pannell's Motions for Directed Verdict and J.N.O.V. on Count Two

Text: Pannell argues that he acted on the advice of his attorney when he prosecuted Reynolds on the claim for defrauding a secured creditor and that this fact is a complete defense to count two of the malicious prosecution claim. It is well settled in this state that advice of counsel, honestly sought and acted on in good faith, supplies an indispensable element of probable cause for beginning a legal action and is a complete defense to an action for malicious prosecution. Hanson v. Couch, 360 So.2d 942 (Ala. 1978). However, [t]o prevail on this defense, it must be shown factually that the attorney's advice was given on a full and fair statement of all the facts and circumstances know to the prosecutor.... Hanson, 360 So.2d at 945, citing earlier cases. Probable cause is defined in the criminal context as a reasonable ground for suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. Fina Oil, 621 So.2d at 257, quoting earlier cases. In a civil proceeding, `all that is necessary [for probable cause] is that the claimant reasonably believe that there is a chance that [the] claim may be held valid upon adjudication.' Fina Oil, 621 So.2d at 257, quoting Boothby Realty Co. v. Haygood, 269 Ala. 549, 553, 114 So.2d 555, 558 (1959). The uncontradicted evidence establishes that Pannell sought the advice of counsel concerning his rights and obligations as cosigner of Reynolds's note. Pannell's attorney, Joseph Hughes, testified that Pannell informed him that he had co-signed a note with Reynolds; that Reynolds had left the state with the collateral pledged as security on the note; and that the bank was calling on him for payment. Further, Hughes testified that he had contacted the bank concerning the note and had been informed by Dowdy that Reynolds was not making payments on the note. Based on all this information, Hughes told Pannell that he had legal justification for obtaining a warrant under the statute for defrauding secured creditors, and that there was probable cause to obtain a warrant. This evidence was sufficient to establish a complete defense against count two; accordingly, the trial court should have granted Pannell's motion for a directed verdict, and, having not done so, should have granted Pannell's later motion for J.N.O.V. as to that count. The judgment as to that count against Pannell is therefore reversed. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and INGRAM, JJ., concur.