Opinion ID: 2082776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: [¶ 8] Incapacity benefits are calculated as 80% of the difference between an employee's after-tax average weekly wage at the time of the injury and the employee's post-injury earning capacity, if any. 39-A M.R.S.A. §§ 212-214 (2001). The average weekly wage is intended to provide a fair and reasonable estimate of what the employee in question would have been able to earn in the labor market in the absence of a work-injury. As we have stated, [t]he purpose of calculating an average weekly wage is to arrive at an estimate of the `employee's future earning capacity as fairly as possible.' Nielsen v. Burnham & Morrill, Inc., 600 A.2d 1111, 1112 (Me.1991) (quoting Fowler v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 416 A.2d 1258, 1260 (Me.1980)). [¶ 9] Calculation of the average weekly wage is governed by four alternative methods outlined in 39-A M.R.S.A. §§ 102(4)(A), (B), (C) & (D) (2001). Paragraph 102(4)(A) applies to employees who have worked at least 200 days in the year prior to the injury and is inapplicable here. 39-A M.R.S.A. § 102(4)(A) (2001). [3] Paragraph 102(4)(B) applies to employees who worked less than 200 days in the year preceding the injury, or whose earnings during that year have varied from week to week. [4] Paragraph B provides: B. When the employment or occupation did not continue pursuant to paragraph A for 200 full working days, average weekly wages, earnings or salary is determined by dividing the entire amount of wages or salary earned by the injured employee during the immediately preceding year by the total number of weeks, any part of which the employee worked during the same period. The week in which employment began, if it began during the year immediately preceding the injury, and the week in which the injury occurred, together with the amounts earned in those weeks, may not be considered in computations under this paragraph if their inclusion would reduce the average weekly wages, earnings or salary. 39-A M.R.S.A. § 102(4)(B). Paragraph 102(4)(C) applies to seasonal employees, and neither party contends that Alexander was a seasonal employee. 39-A M.R.S.A. § 102(4)(C) (2001). [5] [¶ 10] Paragraph 102(4)(D) is a fallback provision, applicable when none of the foregoing methods can be reasonably and fairly applied. 39-A M.R.S.A. § 102(4)(D). Paragraph D provides: D. When the methods set out in paragraph A, B or C of arriving at the average weekly wages, earnings or salary of the injured employee can not reasonably and fairly be applied, average weekly wages means the sum, having regard to the previous wages, earnings or salary of the injured employee and of other employees of the same or most similar class working in the same or most similar employment in the same or a neighboring locality, that reasonably represents the weekly earning capacity of the injured employee in the employment in which the employee at the time of the injury was working. 39-A M.R.S.A. § 102(4)(D). [¶ 11] We have said that the methods in section 102(4) should be applied in the order listed whenever possible. Frank v. Manpower Temp. Servs., 687 A.2d 623, 625 (Me.1996); Landry v. Bates Fabrics, Inc., 389 A.2d 311, 312 (Me.1978). Alexander contends that, once it is determined that paragraphs A, B, or C can be applied in a given situation, it is erroneous to apply paragraph D. We disagree. As a matter of logic, one of the paragraphs, either A, B, or C, can be applied in all employment cases. The employee's interpretation, therefore, would preclude the application of paragraph D in all cases. By its plain language, paragraph D is not triggered when the preceding paragraphs cannot be applied; but rather, it is triggered when they cannot  reasonably and fairly be applied. 39-A M.R.S.A. § 102(4)(D). The Hearing Officer may not rule out resorting to the fallback provision simply because one of the preceding paragraphs is applicable on its face. Paragraph D applies to all cases in which the ordinary calculation methods would lead to an unfair or unreasonable result. [¶ 12] PNG persuasively contends that the Hearing Officer should have considered paragraph D in the present case. Paragraph B looks only to the employee's earnings with the employer at the time of the injury, regardless of the brevity of that employment, or the employee's intermittent relationship to the labor market. 39-A M.R.S.A. § 102(4)(B). The fact that employment is of a very short duration does not preclude a reasonable and fair application of paragraph B when the facts suggest that the employee had established a new occupation, which, but for the injury, would have yielded a fair estimate of the employee's uninjured earning capacity. See Fowler, 416 A.2d at 1260 (stating that paragraph B applicable when employee promoted to new occupation one week prior to injury). [6] When the employment does not establish a new occupation, however, but reflects part of a pattern of discrete, short-term employments, paragraph B may result in an inflated average weekly wage. [¶ 13] Alexander's relationship with the labor market, at least since 1995, consisted of a series of discrete, short-term employments which can best be described as consistently intermittent. See 5 A. LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 93.02[3][c] (2000). It is generally accepted that, in order to fairly and accurately determine the average weekly wage in cases of consistently intermittent employment, the factfinder should consider whether the employee's part-time employment is a matter of choice or due to a temporary industry-wide work slowdown. Id. at 93.02[2][d]. In some cases, when the employee is willing to work full-time, but the employee's recent work history is consistently intermittent due to a general economic slowdown, it may not be fair to assume that the work slowdown will continue into the indefinite future. In such situations, it may be fairer to treat the employee as a full-time employee for purposes of calculating the average weekly wage. Id. When the employee voluntarily limits employment to part-time work, however, it is often appropriate to look to the fall-back method to determine the average weekly wage. Id. at § 93.02[3][c]. See also Bossie v. S.A.D. #24, 1997 ME 233, ¶¶ 5-6, 706 A.2d 578, 579-80; St. Pierre v. St. Regis Paper Co., 386 A.2d 714, 718-19 (Me.1978). [¶ 14] In Bossie, for example, the employee worked as a cook in a school cafeteria for twenty-four years prior to her work-related injury, working 36 weeks a year from August to June. Bossie, 1997 ME 233, ¶ 2, 706 A.2d at 579. Because the employee worked too many weeks to fall within the seasonal worker statute, and because paragraph B would result in an inflated wage, the hearing officer applied the fallback provision. Id. [¶ 15] We agreed in dicta that paragraph D may have been the best calculation method under the circumstances: S.A.D. #24 argues that although subsection B is applicable on its face, subsection D would be the best method for calculating the average weekly wage of an employee, like Bossie, with a long-term history of employment for substantially less than the normal full working year. As Professor Larson states in his treatise, the average weekly wage determination is not based solely on what that employee is theoretically capable of earning, but on the employee's actual work-history, e.g., the employee's willingness to work full-time and the availability of full-time employment in the competitive labor market. 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, §§ 60.21(c), 60.22(a) (1993). Professor Larson is critical of jurisdictions that determine the earnings of long-term part-time employees based on what those employees might earn in hypothetical full-time employment: The flaw in this reasoning is that the purpose of the wage calculation is not to arrive at some theoretical concept of loss of earning capacity; rather it is to make a realistic judgment on what the claimant's future loss is in the light of all the factors that are known. One of these factors is the established fact of claimant's choice of a part-time relation to the labor market. If this is clear, and above all there is no reason to suppose it will change in the future period into which the disability extends, then it is unrealistic to turn a part-time able-bodied worker into a full-time disabled worker. .... Id. at § 60.21(c) ... [W]e agree with S.A.D. #24 that subsection D might have been the best method of determining the average weekly wage in this case.... Id. at ¶¶ 5-6, 706 A.2d at 579-80. (emphasis in original). Although we agreed that paragraph D might provide the best method for determining the employee's average weekly wage in Bossie, we vacated the Hearing Officer's decision because the employer failed to offer into evidence the earnings of comparable employees. Id. at ¶ 6, 706 A.2d at 580-81; see also St. Pierre, 386 A.2d at 718-19. [¶ 16] In the present case, on the other hand, PNG duly met the evidentiary requirements of paragraph D. First, PNG presented evidence of the earnings of comparable employees to establish Alexander's average weekly earnings during the pipeline project. Second, PNG offered evidence to establish that pipeline projects, in general, are of limited duration, and that Alexander's relationship to the labor market was consistently intermittent. The Hearing Officer declined to apply paragraph D, however, concluding that the calculation prescribed by paragraph B yields a wage very close to the wage of the comparable employee[s], who earned between $2200.00 and $2400.00. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer concluded that examination of the earnings of comparable employees adds little to the analysis. To the extent that the Hearing Officer considered paragraph D, the Hearing Officer appears to have concluded that in order for the evidence of comparable employees to be useful, the party asserting application of paragraph D must provide not only evidence of the earnings of comparable employees, but evidence of comparable employees whose relationship to the labor market matches that of the employee. We disagree. [¶ 17] By its express language, paragraph D requires the factfinder to give regard to the previous wages, earnings or salary of the injured employee,  in addition to the earnings of comparable employees. 39-A M.R.S.A. § 102(4)(D) (emphasis added). Subsection D is flexible and does not require rigid adherence to any mathematical formula. See, e.g., Roberts v. Smith, 415 A.2d 1089, 1090 (Me. 1980) (it [is] not necessary that [the] computation reflect an exact average of other employees' actual earnings). As we have noted, [the fallback provision] in effect broadly requires regard to be given to any factors relevant in determining the injured employee's earning capacity on his job just prior to the injury.... Under appropriate circumstances [the fallback provision's] reference to `the previous wages, earnings or salary of the injured employee' must be extended to wages received from other employers; that is, the scope of the search for relevant evidence of the employee's own earning capacity under [the fallback provision] extends beyond computing the arithmetic averages of the prior wages he had received from a single employer prescribed by paragraphs A and B. St. Pierre, 386 A.2d at 719. [7] [¶ 18] Paragraph D is intended to apply to unique employment situations like those present here. Conceivably, none of PNG's employees may have fit the mold of a consistently intermittent employee with earnings similar to Alexander. Paragraph D does not require employers to perform a nationwide search for comparable employees. It permits the Hearing Officer to consider the employee's own earnings and the employee's own unique relationship with the labor market. PNG provided evidence of the earnings of comparable employees and evidence that Alexander's relationship to the labor market was consistently intermittent. 5 A. Larson, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 93.02[3][c]. Under these facts, we conclude that the Hearing Officer erred by failing to consider 102(4)(D) because paragraph B can not be reasonably and fairly applied.
[¶ 19] PNG next challenges the Hearing Officer's award of total incapacity benefits. [8] An employee can prove entitlement to total incapacity benefits by showing: (1) the unavailability of work within the employee's local labor market; and (2) the physical inability to perform full-time work in the statewide labor market, regardless of availability. See Lamphier v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2000 ME 121, ¶ 1, 755 A.2d 489, 490; Adams v. Mt. Blue Health Ctr., 1999 ME 105, ¶ 18, 735 A.2d 478, 483-84. [¶ 20] The Hearing Officer stated: Even assuming that Mr. Alexander could find work in a competitive labor market within his limitations for ten dollars an hour for forty hours a week, he would continue to be entitled to total compensation. We agree with PNG that this statement is erroneous on its face. The physical ability to perform full-time work in the competitive labor market precludes an award of total compensation pursuant to the total incapacity statute. Lamphier, 2000 ME 121, at ¶ 1, 755 A.2d at 490; Adams, 1999 ME 105, at ¶ 18, 735 A.2d at 483-84. [¶ 21] Alexander contends that the Hearing Officer's use of the phrase total compensation was not intended to refer to total incapacity benefits pursuant to section 212, but to the maximum level of partial benefits permissible under the Act. See 39-A M.R.S.A. §§ 211, 213 (2001). Workers' compensation benefits are capped at a maximum dollar amount as provided in 39-A M.R.S.A. § 211 (2001). Alexander contends that, because his average weekly wage was calculated at over $2,000 a week, he would be limited to the maximum level of benefits even if he returned to work earning $10 an hour for a forty-hour work week. See 39-A M.R.S.A. § 213(1) (2001) (Partial benefits are calculated as 80% the difference between the employee's after-tax average weekly wage and post-injury wages). [¶ 22] Nevertheless, because partial incapacity benefits are potentially subject to a maximum week-limitation, see 39-A M.R.S.A. § 213, and total incapacity benefits have no such limitation, see 39-A M.R.S.A. § 212, the applicable statute can have important long-term consequences to the employer and employee. PNG is, therefore, entitled to a determination as to whether Alexander is physically able to perform full-time work in the statewide labor market in order to determine whether Alexander is entitled to benefits pursuant to section 212 or section 213. Moreover, because the Hearing Officer's determination of incapacity was based on the employee's average weekly wage, and because the Hearing Officer may have erred in its determination of that wage, we must remand to the Board for a new calculation of Alexander's entitlement to incapacity benefits. [¶ 23] Finally, PNG contends that the Hearing Officer erred, as a matter of law, in suggesting that accommodations made by the Delta Gulf, during Alexander's post-injury employment, automatically prevents the employment from being regarded as reflecting his post-injury earning capacity. We disagree with PNG's contentions that the Hearing Officer's findings reflect an automatic assumption that, just because the employer accommodated the injury, the employment must be discounted out of hand. As we have stated, the fact that the employee is earning the same or more after the injury than before does not preclude a finding of an earning incapacity. Severy v. S.D. Warren Co., 402 A.2d 53, 55 (Me.1979). In light of the substantial job-modifications made by the employer to accommodate Alexander's work-injuries, the Hearing Officer's finding that Alexander's short-term employment with Delta Gulf did not reflect the employee's post-injury earning capacity was not clearly erroneous.