Opinion ID: 1402024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The arrest warrant was properly issued

Text: The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution insures that: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Italics added.) The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment wholly incorporates the Fourth Amendment and thus forbids state intrusions upon the right to privacy. (See Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S. 108, 110 [12 L.Ed.2d 723, 726]; Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23, 33 [10 L.Ed.2d 726, 737, 83 S.Ct. 1623]; Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 656-657 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090-1091, 81 S.Ct. 1684].) State constitutional and statutory provisions similarly protect the right to privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19; Pen. Code, § 813.) In interpreting the Fourth Amendment the United States Supreme Court has held that neither a search nor an arrest warrant may issue without probable cause based upon oath or affirmation ( Ex parte Burford (1806) 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 451 [2 L.Ed. 495, 496]). In recent years the Supreme Court has encouraged police officers to seek warrants and established minimum standards for permitting a neutral and detached magistrate to determine whether the probable cause required to support a warrant exists. ( Johnson v. United States (1948) 333 U.S. 10, 14 [92 L.Ed. 436, 440, 68 S.Ct. 367].) (1) In order that an arrest warrant satisfy the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause the affidavit must recite competent facts that would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence conscientiously to entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. ( Skelton v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 144, 150 [81 Cal. Rptr. 613, 460 P.2d 485]; see Beck v. Ohio (1964) 379 U.S. 89, 96 [13 L.Ed.2d 142, 147-148, 85 S.Ct. 223].) [7] The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated its steadfast insistence that the record indicate specific and articulable facts to justify any intrusion upon an individual's privacy. (See Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905-906, 88 S.Ct. 1868], and cases cited therein.) In Giordenello v. United States, supra, 357 U.S. 480, 486 [2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 1509], the Supreme Court held that a complaint which merely stated the affiant's conclusion could not support a valid arrest warrant. The court reasoned that the magistrate who is authorized to issue the warrant must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts upon which the complaint relies. In Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S. 108, 112-113, 116 [12 L.Ed.2d 723, 727-728, 729], the court clearly indicated that Giordenello enunciated constitutional standards under the Fourth Amendment for the issuance of an arrest warrant. (See Beck v. Ohio, supra, 379 U.S. 89, 96 fn. 5 [13 L.Ed.2d 142, 148].) In People v. Sesslin, supra, 68 Cal.2d 418, 423, this court followed the Giordenello-Aguilar standard. And in People v. Groves (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1196, 1198-1199 [80 Cal. Rptr. 745, 458 P.2d 985], this court unanimously held that People v. Sesslin, supra, 68 Cal.2d 418, merely constituted the first case in which we were called upon to follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as enunciated prior to 1966. Thus Sesslin applies to the arrest in the present case. ( Id. at pp. 1198-1199; see Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244, 263-264 [22 L.Ed.2d 248, 263-264, 89 S.Ct. 1030] (dissent of Harlan, J.); Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. 410, 419 [21 L.Ed.2d 637, 645].) [8] In determining the sufficiency of an affidavit to support an arrest warrant we face very different considerations than in considering the notice requirements of pleadings in criminal cases. Since Penal Code sections 950, 951, and 952 are designed only to provide adequate notice to the accused of the charges against him, they permit a pronounced degree of latitude in the form of the pleadings. But in considering the sufficiency of an affidavit to support a warrant for arrest, the Fourth Amendment requires a more detached, neutral scrutiny by a magistrate; he must evaluate the specific factual circumstances that might warrant a particular arrest. [9] In striking the balance between the individual's right to privacy and the governmental interest that allegedly justifies official intrusion, we must be able to point to articulable facts that reasonably justify an intrusion upon an individual's privacy. ( Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905-906]; Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 534-537 [18 L.Ed.2d 930, 938-940, 87 S.Ct. 1727].) (2) The complaint in the present case contained sufficient facts for a magistrate to satisfy himself that probable cause supported the arrest of defendant for nonsupport of his daughter. The verified complaint alleges that defendant, Jesse Cressey, is the father of a minor child, named Jema, and that he had failed to support his child for the year prior to July 31, 1967. The affidavit contained the signature of Isaura Cressey. Defendant's counsel at oral argument could not suggest what additional specific facts would have been useful to the magistrate in determining the existence of probable cause to arrest for nonsupport. Mrs. Cressey need not allege that her husband was able to pay the child's support because inability to pay would constitute a defense to the charge. (See People v. Caseri (1933) 129 Cal. App. 88, 92 [18 P.2d 389].) Although the complaint in this case did not contain a specific allegation that the affiant possessed personal knowledge of the facts related by the complaint, the magistrate in this criminal nonsupport situation could properly have inferred from the surnames that Isaura Cressey was the mother of the child and the wife of Jesse Cressey. (Cf. People v. Hamilton (1969) 71 Cal.2d 176, 181-182 [77 Cal. Rptr. 785, 454 P.2d 681].) This case is distinguishable from Giordenello v. United States, supra, 357 U.S. 480, 484-486 [2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 1508-1510]. Giordenello condemned an arrest based upon an affidavit containing the completely conclusory language of 21 U.S.C. section 174. Our prior cases have held that the warrant cannot be issued upon conclusiory language that parrots the words of the statute, and here, indeed, the complaint does contain some language drawn from Penal Code section 270. [10] Nevertheless, the complaint provides sufficient information from which the magistrate can independently determine whether there exists probable cause for an arrest. The complaint charges that Mr. Cressey failed to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical attendance and other remedial care for his child. What more factual and descriptive statement of the offense could Mrs. Cressy compose? Certainly we could not ask her to peruse Roget's Thesaurus to find suitable synonyms for the fully descriptive language of Penal Code section 270. We must agree with the Attorney General's statement at oral argument that the kind of information required by Penal Code 270 is quite distinct from any other provision of the Penal Code for Giordenello purposes. [11] We conclude that the magistrate possessed sufficient information upon which he could independently find probable cause to arrest defendant for a violation of Penal Code section 270.