Opinion ID: 2219269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: conclusion

Text: ถ 107. Applying our four-factor examination of legislative intent to this multiplicity challenge, we conclude that Davison has failed to meet his burden of persuasion. Aggravated battery and battery by prisoner are clearly not the same offense as a matter of law. Davison has failed to rebut the presumption in this specific situation that the legislature intended to authorize multiple prosecutions and punishments for these two offenses. ถ 108. If we were focusing solely on the text of subsection (2m), we would find this to be a much closer case, for we would not be seeking legislative intent outside the text of the statute. We are informed, however, by our decision in Grayson, where we said: If an express legislative intent or the absence of ambiguity were the benchmark against which the issue of the allowable unit of prosecution had to be decided, consideration of the matter would be limited to the first two factors. The last two factors would not then be relevant. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 161. ถ 109. In applying the more expansive rules of statutory interpretation we have traditionally employed in multiplicity cases, we are convinced not only that Davison has not met his burden, but also that the legislature very likely intended to authorize multiple punishments on these facts. The disturbing inconsistency within ง 939.66 if Davison's literal interpretation of subsection (2m) were adopted, the compelling legislative history of subsection (2m), the legislative motive for the proscribed conduct under the ordinary and special circumstances battery statutes, and the appropriateness of punishing more than one offense lead us to conclude that the legislature has not clearly intended to prohibit multiple punishments on these facts. ถ 110. We have analyzed this case as a single act of battery, because that is the way the case reached us. We are disinclined to abandon the four-part analysis for statutory construction in a multiplicity case on the record presented here. After all, the facts set out in ถถ 5-7 reveal that Davison committed multiple criminal acts of battery over a 45-minute period. Davison caused bodily harm to his wife at different times at different places, resulting in multiple injuries. ถ 111. Because Davison's multiplicity objection fails on the merits, we need not and do not decide whether, by pleading guilty, he waived his right to raise this claim. By the Court. โThe decision of the court of appeals is reversed.