Opinion ID: 3063132
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hollis Testimony

Text: Because Isley did not contemporaneously object to this testimony, we review its admission for plain error only. United States v. Munoz, 430 F.3d 1357, 1375 (11th Cir. 2005). Under the plain error review standard, a defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain and (3) that affects a defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2008). To affect her substantial rights, Isley must show the admission of this evidence affected the 23 During voir dire, defense counsel informed the venire that Isley is gay and asked whether any venire member had feelings one way or another about gay people that would affect their impartiality as jurors. On appeal, the Government argues that Isley cannot be prejudiced by the admission of the extrinsic evidence challenged here because she first injected her sexual orientation into the trial of the case. Because Isley knew during voir dire, however, that the district court was going to allow evidence of her donation to the Atlanta Lesbian Center, she was entitled to qualify the venire on the issue as a matter of trial strategy. Thus, any argument that Isley somehow waived her objection to this evidence during voir dire is without merit. 24 outcome of the proceedings. United States v. Parker, 277 Fed. Appx. 952, at  (11th Cir. May 15, 2008). First, Isley claims that Hollis’s testimony was not needed because Special Agent Erica Wilker had already testified that the charges to the Capital One cards were personal in nature; thus, Hollis was called solely to emphasize Isley’s sexual orientation and to introduce evidence of her infidelity. To the contrary, Isley specifically argued during the opening statement that the Capital One credit cards were used for both personal and business expenses. Hollis, also an account holder, was the only person other than Isley who could testify that the indicted transactions were personal in nature. Prior to her testimony, the Government did not know whether Isley planned to dispute the personal nature of the charges. Accordingly, Hollis’s testimony was not unnecessary. Second, the Government properly impeached Hollis under Federal Rule of Evidence 607 by eliciting from her that she may have a bias against Isley because of their break-up. Thus, we find no error in the admission of this evidence. Nevertheless, Isley contends that if the testimony is admissible, its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Even if we were to agree with Isley on this point, she is not entitled to a new trial because she has not shown that its admission changed the outcome of the trial. The evidence of Isley’s healthcare fraud and honest services mail fraud amply supports the convictions. 25