Opinion ID: 780596
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Advisory Jury Verdict

Text: 27 First, although Presley correctly notes the magistrate judge was not bound by the jury's determination against a non-governmental defendant in assessing claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, she argues that the jury's findings must mean something, because [b]asic tenets of statutory construction dictate that Congress would not have utilized the term `advisory' if it had intended the jury findings to be irrelevant. Brief for Appellant at 27. Following this logic, Presley argues that the court improperly ignored the advisory nature of the jury findings in awarding only $415,000 in damages against the United States while at the same time implicitly upholding the $1,795,000 verdict as reasonable compensation. 28 The statutory language of the Federal Tort Claims Act, however, nowhere uses the word advisory. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2402. Instead, § 2402 simply provides, with an exception not relevant here, that [a]ny action against the United States under section 1346 shall be tried by the court without a jury .... Accordingly, the court below acted properly in making its own independent findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Gallardo v. United States, 697 F.Supp. 1243, 1245 n. 1 (E.D.N.Y.1988) (noting in an FTCA case that [t]he verdict of the jury was, at best advisory. The responsibility for decision remains with the court which has discretion whether to accept or reject the jury's verdict.); cf. Matthews v. CTI Container Transp. Int'l Inc., 871 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir.1989) (applying the same standard in an FSIA case, and holding that the trial judge was not bound by the jury's findings in its simultaneous bench trial against a foreign sovereign). 29 Further, the court's roles when conducting a bench trial and in reviewing a jury's verdict under C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) are distinct. Under the former, the trial judge must use his or her own judgment to determine an appropriate award; under the latter, the judge must determine whether the verdict deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c); see also Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437-38, 116 S.Ct. 2211 (holding that in considering a claim based on New York law, a federal district court is to apply § 5501(c) to assess whether a jury verdict is excessive). Because of these different standards, the difference between the jury's award and the magistrate judge's does not alone render the magistrate judge's award clearly erroneous. 6 B. The Magistrate Judge's Factual Findings 30 Presley also alleges that the magistrate judge made clearly erroneous findings underlying the damages awards for the facial and the back and neck injuries. Because we conclude that there were several errors made in the findings of fact on the back and neck injuries, and we are concerned that these errors might well have influenced the magistrate judge's assessment of Presley's credibility and led to the conclusion that Presley was exaggerating the extent of her injuries, we vacate the judgment against the United States and remand for further consideration. 31 Relying exclusively on the testimony of Drs. Goldberg and Trasi, the magistrate judge concluded that 32 the medical evidence credited by this Court as fact-finder establishes that, to the extent plaintiff's lower back and neck were injured as a result of the 1995 accident, those injuries amounted to no more than temporary muscle spasms and soft tissue injuries; plaintiff suffered no neurological damage, fibromyalgia, disc bulges, herniations, protrusions or other permanent spinal injuries attributable to the 1995 accident. 33 Concluding that Presley had exaggerated her injuries, the court awarded only $40,000 in past pain and suffering and no future pain and suffering for the back and neck damages. With respect to Presley's facial injuries, the court found that Presley has only minimal scarring and slight nasal occlusion. While both can be addressed by future surgery, some scarring is permanent and the shape of plaintiff's nose has been permanently altered. The magistrate judge awarded Presley $250,000 for past pain and suffering and $125,000 for future pain and suffering, an amount less than half that awarded by the jury against Hernandez for these injuries. 34 The magistrate judge's findings of fact on Presley's neck and back injuries begin with the observation that while Presley claimed to have experienced pain after the accident and sought treatment from Dr. Black of PIMM Medical Group several months after the accident, [n]otably, she had made no complaints of back or neck pain at Brooklyn Hospital ... and plaintiff offered no records from PIMM or any other corroboration of her alleged treatment by Dr. Black. The June 19, 1996 MRI report, however, demonstrates that Presley had been referred to Dr. Payne by Dr. Black for an MRI of the back sometime before June 19, 1996, and corroborates her testimony that she saw Dr. Black. 35 If, as appears, the Magistrate Judge doubted that Presley was credible in stating that she was treated by Dr. Black, a misimpression on this score might well have cast unwarranted doubt on Presley's testimony as to the extent of her injuries. Most explicitly, in suggesting that Dr. Fernandez's testimony that Presley's neck and back injuries were the sequelae of the November 1995 accident lacked credibility, the magistrate judge again observed that [t]his opinion is difficult to reconcile with the totality of the evidence, especially plaintiff's delay in seeking medical attention for her back and neck, and her statement to Dr. Norma Bilbool[, a physiatrist with the Alea Medical Center,] that her low back pain was brought on by stress at work (emphasis added). Accordingly, it appears that the magistrate judge discredited Presley's treating chiropractor's opinion based in part on the mistaken belief that Presley had not sought treatment for over a year after the accident. 36 We additionally note that Presley's statement to Dr. Bilbool that her lower back pain was brought on by stress at work, also relied on by the magistrate judge, appears to have been taken out of context by both the court and defendant's expert, Dr. Goldberg. In an examination report dated March 17, 1997, Dr. Bilbool noted: 37 The patient is a 28 year-old female status post a motor vehicle accident on 11/15/95, as a result of which she sustained injuries to her neck and low back. The patient comes in today stating that her neck pain is no better, however, it is worsened by stress. She says she can feel her muscles tighten. She has a lot of stress at work at present and is about to leave her job within the next week. Her headaches, however, have improved.... A week ago, the patient experienced low back pain for two days which she thinks was brought on by aggravation and stress at work. 38 Thus, this notation, consistent with other treatment records from the Alea Medical Center, indicates that Presley attributed her neck and lower back injuries to the accident, and was merely explaining that stress worsened her pain. 39 Further, in explaining the basis for the conclusion that the accident would cause Presley no future pain and suffering with respect to any back and neck injuries, the magistrate judge relied on the fact that [a]ccording to the medical records, the last medical treatment that plaintiff received for her neck and back injuries occurred in December 1998, with physical therapy until January 1999. The magistrate judge had previously noted in her findings of fact, however, that Dr. Fernandez had testified that she treated Presley in September 1999, 7 and Presley had testified at trial that she was still receiving treatment as of the time of trial, June 2001. See Presley Tr. at 341 (Q: Without going into any details, do you still get treatment for your back? A: Yes.). While we are sympathetic to the difficulty caused by Presley's failure to introduce medical records supporting some of this treatment, the magistrate judge's evident doubts about Presley's claim of continued treatment, and refusal to award damages for future pain and suffering for back and neck pain, might have resulted from unwarranted doubts about Presley's claim of treatment by Dr. Black. Moreover, it is evident that Presley's credibility — or doubts concerning it — was critical to the magistrate judge's ultimate conclusion that plaintiff has exaggerated the symptoms and pain that she suffered as a result of the accident. Thus, what appear to have been unwarranted doubts about certain aspects of Presley's testimony may have led to an undue depreciation of her credibility and affected the ultimate damages award. 40 Several of the magistrate judge's other findings of fact also may warrant reconsideration on remand. For example, in discussing the treatment records from the Alea Medical Center, the judge observed that [n]one of the Alea records disclosed evidence of radicular pain, reflex changes, atrophy or numbness.... There were, however, objective indications of muscle spasm. In so concluding, the court may have overlooked the fact that Dr. Bilbool had found, through a number of different tests, that Presley had suffered nerve damage in her neck and back, resulting in increased sensitivity in some areas and reduced sensitivity in others. 41 Finally, with respect to the damages award for past and future pain and suffering caused by the facial injuries, Presley argues that the magistrate judge erred in failing to calculate her damages with reference to her occupation as a topless dancer, model and aspiring actress, and contends that even if she remains very attractive, the lack of reference to her career in the bench ruling evidences a lack of appreciation of the magnitude of her injuries. Presley has not identified anything in the record to support the inference she seeks — that is, that the injuries did interfere with her occupation. 8 Nonetheless, we are concerned that the specific factual errors previously identified might have had some effect on the magistrate judge's calculation of damages attributable to Presley's facial injuries. We therefore believe that further consideration of Presley's past and future facial injuries is also warranted on remand. 42 In summary, because we are concerned that the identified erroneous factual findings may have influenced the magistrate judge's decision on Presley's damages, we vacate the damages award against the United States and remand for reconsideration. In remanding, we seek clarification and either correction of what appear to be some mischaracterizations or assurance that they have not affected the ultimate damages award. We emphasize that the ultimate decision as to all witnesses' credibility and as to the persuasive force of their testimony is for the trier of fact, as is the ultimate determination of damages, subject only to the outer limits of reasonableness.