Opinion ID: 884272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: to entertain it. On appeal to this Court, the City concedes the timeliness of Pizzola's notice of appeal in the District Court, thus also conceding that no legal basis existed for its motion to dismiss Pizzola's appeal to the District Court with prejudice. The City argues, however, that Pizzola's failure to respond to its motion to dismiss constituted an admission, under Rule 2(b), Unif.Dist.Ct.R., that the motion was well taken. Consequently, according to the City, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the City's motion to dismiss Pizzola's appeal. We disagree. As noted above, the District Court dismissed Pizzola's appeal on the basis of the City's motion and good cause being shown. We take the court's statement, together with its failure to mention Rule 2(b), to mean that the court ruled on the City's motion on the merits. As previously discussed, that ruling was incorrect as a matter of law under Price and Schindler. Addressing the City's Rule 2(b), Unif.Dist.Ct.R., argument, that Rule provides that failure to file a brief may subject a pending motion to summary ruling. It goes on to provide that a failure by an adverse party to file an answer brief to a briefed motion within 10 days shall be deemed an admission that the motion is well taken. Rule 2 (b), Unif.Dist.Ct.R. We have interpreted this Rule as allowing the trial court discretion to either grant or deny an unanswered motion. State v. Loh (1996), 275 Mont. 460, 466, 914 P.2d 592, 596 (citing Maberry v. Gueths (1989), 238 Mont. 304, 309, 777 P.2d 1285, 1289). In Maberry, the adverse party did not timely respond to a motion and the moving party argued that Rule 2(b) required that the motion be deemed well taken and granted. The district court denied the motion. Maberry, 777 P.2d at 1288. The moving party appealed, arguing--in essence--that the rule required the court to grant the file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-714%20Opinion.htm (3 of 5)4/16/2007 11:36:40 AM 96-714 motion. We reasoned that, while the absence of a response brief to a motion may subject the motion to summary ruling under Rule 2(b), the rule does not require a district court to grant an unanswered motion. We reached the same result in State v. Fertterer (1993), 260 Mont. 397, 399, 860 P.2d 151, 153, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' unanswered motion to amend their sentences and motion for summary ruling on the motion to amend. Loh, Maberry and Fertterer all addressed situations where district courts denied unanswered motions. Our holdings in those cases clarified that district courts have discretion, under Rule 2(b), Unif.Dist.Ct.R., in deciding whether to make a summary ruling on an unanswered motion. None of those cases, however, addressed the specific situation before us in the present case. Here, the issue is whether a district court can properly grant a legally unsupported and insupportable motion to which a timely response brief has not been filed by a party. We hold that it cannot do so. This case involves the interplay between a rule and cases which vest certain discretion in trial courts, the obligation of parties to properly support their motions with legal authority, and the obligation of courts to make rulings which are correct as a matter of law. Clearly, Rule 2(b), Unif.Dist.Ct.R., is intended--and properly so--to allow district courts to deal efficiently with ever-increasing case loads and pending motions which the parties are obligated to brief in order for the courts to make expeditious rulings. Just as clearly, however, the Rule is not intended to allow a party to obtain a favorable legal ruling on a motion which not only cites no supporting authority from this Court, but fails to cite existing authority from this Court which clearly renders the motion incorrect as a matter of law. Moreover, a deemed admission that a motion is well taken under Rule 2(b), Unif.Dist.Ct.R., cannot convert a motion which is incorrect as a matter of law into a motion which is well taken as a matter of law. Finally, in this regard, while Rule 2(b) states that failure to file a brief may subject a motion to a summary ruling, nothing in the Rule or in our cases interpreting the Rule suggests that the summary ruling is to be based on something other than a proper application of the law to the motion at hand. Indeed, since discretion connotes that part of the judicial function which decides questions according to the particular circumstances of the case, uncontrolled by fixed rules of law (State ex rel. Leach v. Visser (1988), 234 Mont. 438, 447, 767 P.2d 858, 863), it is clear that a district court cannot properly exercise discretion to make an incorrect ruling on a question controlled by law. file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-714%20Opinion.htm (4 of 5)4/16/2007 11:36:40 AM 96-714 We conclude that, pursuant to Price and Schindler, the District Court erred as a matter of law in granting the City's motion to dismiss Pizzola's appeal with prejudice. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. /S/ KARLA M. GRAY We concur: /S/ JAMES C. NELSON /S/ JIM REGNIER /S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR. /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-714%20Opinion.htm (5 of 5)4/16/2007 11:36:40 AM