Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 32

Heading: whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to defense counsel.

Text: ś 398. On the issue of attorneys' fees, the instant appeal is consolidated with Donald Leroy Evans v. State, 94-CA-0176-SCT. ś 399. Evans contends the trial judge erred in providing his defense counsel, William S. Boyd, III only $ 31,008.33 as compensation. At the time of Boyd's representation of Evans, he was a member in the firm of Eaton & Cottrell, P.A. Following trial and sentencing, Boyd filed an Application for Payment of Court-Appointed Counsel. The Application was accompanied by a detailed summary of the nature and type of professional services rendered and disbursements made in connection with the representation of Donald Leroy Evans. In addition to Boyd, two associates, two law clerks and one paralegal assisted in preparation for trial. Total hours expended by each of these individuals were as follows: William S. Boyd, III 631.00 Kenneth R. Flottman 99.25 Scott E. Andress 3.50 Ricky J. Cox 47.95 Thomas Carpenter 14.75 Jodee F. McGill 252.70 ś 400. Attached to the Application as Exhibit A is the affidavit of Robert E. Bass, Jr., a certified public accountant with the firm of Moore & Powell. Bass prepared an hourly cost analysis to detail the actual expenses attributable to the time expended by counsel and his staff. These figures are as follows: William S. Boyd $54,808.66 [14] Kenneth R. Flottman $ 5,086.56 Scott E. Andress $ 179.38 Ricky J. Cox $ 1,642.29 Thomas Carpenter $ 505.19 Jodee F. McGill $ 8,654.98 __________ TOTAL COST PER HOUR $70,877.06 This analysis utilizes an hourly overhead rate for different classes of professionals at Eaton & Cottrell. Those rates are as follows: Shareholders/Principals $86.26 Associates $51.25 Paralegals and Law Clerks $34.25 In his affidavit, Bass noted that he included shareholder/principal compensation, including bonuses, when calculating the hourly rates because it is a normal ongoing expense of every professional practice. Total overhead cost per hour plus actual expenses incurred ($ 6, 773.23) yields a total amount of $ 77,650.29. The same calculation utilizing market rates for services ($ 101, 252.25) plus expenses (6, 773.23) yields a total result of $ 108, 025.48. ś 401. On January 27, 1994, a hearing was held on the Application for Payment. Harrison County was represented by Honorable Walter W. Teel. William S. Boyd, III represented Evans. Boyd indicated that he did not expect to receive payment based on market rates, however, he included these amounts in the Application in order that everybody [could] understand what was being given up, $ 40,000.00 by me and my law firm in this matter. Rather, Boyd stated that he was only asking for $ 66, 377.06 plus expenses. Counsel for the Harrison County conceded that the county did not dispute the amount of hours submitted for payment, but did contest the method of calculation of the overhead hourly rates. ś 402. On January 27, 1994, the trial court found that the applicant failed to meet the burden of proof required to rebut or overcome the presumption of $ 25.00 per hour overhead expense and ordered that Boyd be compensated in the amount of $ 31,008.33. The trial court found that the calculation of an hourly corporate overhead rate rather than an hourly rate for the pro-rata actual office overhead expenses of Mr. Boyd did not conform to the limits of actual overhead expense defined in Wilson and Pruett.  Additionally, the trial court noted that the CPA did not itemize or describe all expenses he determined to be overhead. ś 403. The trial court allowed the following compensation: Reimbursement $20,255.10 of actual office overhead (631 × $32.10) [15] Statutory Compensation $ 2,000.00 (Boyd was the only attorney appointed under § 99-15-15) Actual Expenses incurred in trial of the case (includes $ 2,000.00 approved by this order for 1 law clerk and 1 paralegal, less $ 20.00 expenses dated 8/27/93) $ 8,753.23 __________ $31,008.33 ś 404. This Court, in Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338 (Miss.1990), was faced with a constitutional challenge to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-15-17 and held: Although § 99-15-17 limits the compensation which an attorney may receive for the representation of an indigent, it also allows for reimbursement of actual expenses. Following our rule of statutory construction, we are able to save this statute from unconstitutionality by interpreting this language to include reimbursement for all actual costs to the lawyer for the purpose of keeping his or her door open to handle this case, i.e., the lawyer will receive a pro rata share of actual overhead. ś 405. This Court adopted a rebuttable presumption that an attorney's actual overhead within the statute is $ 25.00 per hour. Id. However, this Court stated that a trial court is bound by this only in the absence of actual proof to the contraryâ proof offered by the lawyer that it is more or by the State that it is less. Id. ś 406. Evans argues that the trial court erred in holding that he failed to rebut the $ 25.00 per hour presumption announced by this Court in Wilson. From this record, the trial court was not presented with sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. Although counsel refers to a document titled Overhead Analysis-Case Reimbursement which presented various hourly overhead rates (i.e. with and without the inclusion of bonuses/shareholder compensation), this information is not contained within the record. Moreover, the trial court specifically found that the CPA calculated a corporate rate, rather than an individual pro rata share of actual overhead and did not itemize the components of the hourly overhead rate. Notably, however, the trial judge, sua sponte, increased the amount to $ 32.10 per hour to provide for inflation. As such, counsel received sufficiently more than $ 25.00 per hour. ś 407. The appointed attorney should not expect to be compensated at market rate, rather at a reasonable, but lesser rate, which reflects the unique difficulty these cases present as balanced with the attorney's obligation to defend the indigent. Bailey v. State, 309 S.C. 455, 424 S.E.2d 503, 508 (1992). What constitutes reasonable compensation is left to the discretion of the trial court in most jurisdictions. In the instant case, there was no dispute that the amount of hours submitted by counsel was reasonable and necessary. Wilson, 574 So.2d at 1340. Moreover, the trial court emphasized that counsel's performance in the instant matter was exemplary and noted that counsel renewed my faith in the law profession because of the professionalism that you responded to a request from the court not someone whom you have known personally for many years. However, in light of the proof presented and the increase allowed by the trial court it is not apparent that the trial court abused his discretion in determining the amount of attorney's fees.