Opinion ID: 407908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wheeler's Individual Claim

Text: 42 The factual background of Wheeler's individual claim was discussed at the outset of this opinion. After a complete trial, the district court entered judgment for the City and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court held that Wheeler had made out a prima facie case of gender-based discrimination applying the standards articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under the standard of shifting burdens articulated in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), the City offered, and the district court accepted, the superior qualifications of Lewis as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for passing over Wheeler. The district court held that Wheeler failed to prove that the City's proffered reason for not hiring Wheeler was merely a pretext for what was actually intentional gender-based discrimination. The district court concluded that Mr. Alton Lewis possessed better qualifications than plaintiff and that the (C)ity did not discriminate against plaintiff because of her sex in refusing to hire her for the position of auditorium manager. That conclusion, together with the City's evidence that Wheeler's application was duly considered, led the court to enter judgment for the City. 43 At trial Wheeler presented the following evidence to which the district court did not allude in its findings of fact. Wheeler testified that she requested an interview after filing her application. Such interviews were granted to all male applicants, but not to her. 12 A member of the City Council, Glen Lollar, allegedly told her that the job of auditorium manager was not one for a woman. Wheeler claims that similar comments were made by other City officials. Furthermore, statistical evidence was adduced to demonstrate that gender-based discrimination in City hiring was a widespread phenomenon. 44 Wheeler appears to argue that the City's refusal to interview her barred her from consideration and of itself entitles her to recover under Title VII. This assertion, however, fails to recognize that the essence of her Title VII claim must be the refusal to hire based on impermissible gender-based discrimination. Thus, the failure to interview, standing alone, gives rise to no entitlement to recover. Nonetheless, the failure to interview may have independent significance even if it was not determinative of whether she was considered with other applicants. 45 In this case Wheeler had the burden of proving that Columbus' stated reason for not hiring her was pretextual. The City's failure even to interview her could help carry that burden. For example, that failure, together with Wheeler's evidence of sexist comments by City officials and a pervasive pattern of discriminatory hiring practices, would constitute proof probative of the existence of intentional discrimination. The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas noted that an employer's general employment policies and practices, demonstrated through statistical evidence or otherwise, are relevant in determining whether the employer's ostensible reason for not hiring an applicant is pretextual. 411 U.S. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. at 1825. 46 In its Answer, the City asserted that Wheeler was not hired because historically the City and the Board of Supervisors of Lowndes County cooperated in a joint venture of hiring the same person to be both city auditorium manager and county veterans service officer. The City contended that Wheeler was not hired because of her lack of veteran status. The district court, in ruling for the City, relied only upon Alton's superior qualifications. On remand, the district court should also consider the requirement of veteran status and make appropriate findings on its relevance to the issue of individual gender-based discrimination in Wheeler's case. Cf. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296 & n.25, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979). 47 The absence of a discussion of these factors, which, if properly established, could strengthen Wheeler's case on the ultimate burden, leaves this court without a confident base for review of the district court's conclusion that she was not the victim of sex discrimination. 48 Since we have concluded that the class certification and claim must again be reviewed by the court below, we remand Wheeler's individual claim also with directions to the district court to supplement its fact findings as indicated above and determine whether the supplemental facts found alter the outcome on the issue of intentional discrimination.