Opinion ID: 1292623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the evidence supported the verdict

Text: The Court of Appeals found evidence in the record to support the allegation that Dr. Porter negligently failed to diagnose plaintiff's cirrhosis, one of three allegations submitted to the jury. That court determined that Dr. Falkenstein's testimony was some evidence that Dr. Porter's conduct fell below the standard of care. [8] Whinston v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, supra, 93 Or. App. at 532, 763 P.2d 177. We agree. The granting of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict was error. Having so found, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for plaintiff on the verdict. In reaching this disposition, the Court of Appeals, noting that a general verdict was returned by the jury, concluded that because there was evidence to support one of the three allegations (but not the other two), there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. In this conclusion, the Court of Appeals erred. This case involves the relatively common circumstance where multiple allegations of negligence are submitted to the jury, some without supporting evidence but some with supporting evidence, and a general verdict form is used. In this situation, it usually is impossible to determine whether the jury returned a verdict on an allegation supported by the evidence or one unsupported by the evidence. In this case, we cannot determine whether the jury returned its verdict based upon the first or third allegations at issue herein (which are unsupported by the evidence) or the second allegation (which is supported by the evidence). In such cases, where (1) more than one allegation of negligence is submitted to the jury; (2) one or more of, but not all, the allegations are unsupported by the evidence; and (3) it cannot be determined upon which allegation the jury based its verdict, this court has held that a new trial must be granted. That is, the court has followed a we can't tell rule. In Pavlik v. Albertson's, Inc., 253 Or. 370, 454 P.2d 852 (1969), for example, one of two allegations of negligence submitted to the jury was unsupported by the evidence. A general verdict was returned for plaintiff. This court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the jury might have based its general verdict upon the unsupported allegation. See also Martin Engineering v. Opton, 277 Or. 291, 560 P.2d 617 (1977); Alvarez v. Great North. Railway Co., 261 Or. 66, 491 P.2d 190 (1971); Layne v. Portland Traction Co., 212 Or. 658, 319 P.2d 884 (1957), reh. den. 212 Or. 658, 321 P.2d 312 (1958). Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals properly reinstated the verdict in this case because one of his allegations of negligence was supported by the evidence. In so arguing, plaintiff relies on Shelton v. Lowell et al., 196 Or. 430, 249 P.2d 958 (1952), and Finn et al. v. S.P. & S. Ry. Co., 194 Or. 288, 241 P.2d 876 (1952). There is language in both cases that suggests that this court follows the two-issue rule. That is, a general verdict should stand when two or more allegations are submitted to the jury and at least one is supported by the evidence. See Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So.2d 1181, 1185-86 (Fla. 1978). In both Shelton and Finn, this court specifically found error in the trial courts' refusal to remove from the jury an allegation of negligence. Shelton v. Lowell et al., supra, 196 Or. at 446, 249 P.2d 958; Finn et al. v. S.P. & S. Ry. Co., supra, 194 Or. at 299, 241 P.2d 876. In each case, this court nonetheless upheld the general verdict by invoking Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. [9] As stated by Justice Lusk in his dissent in Shelton:    I do not suggest at this time a re-examination of the doctrine of Hoag v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 75 Or 588, 144 P 574, 147 P 756, and the cases which follow it, that this court is authorized under Art VII, § 3 of the constitution, in certain circumstances to re-examine the evidence in a law action that has been tried by a jury and to enter judgment based upon such re-examination. But the power so asserted, if it is to stand, should be exercised only with utmost caution and in rare instances.    196 Or. at 451, 249 P.2d 958. We decline to exercise that extraordinary power in this case. The Court of Appeals, in reaching its decision to reinstate the verdict in this case, relied, in part, on this court's decision in Byers v. Santiam Ford, Inc., 281 Or. 411, 574 P.2d 1122 (1978) and a citation in that case to Berger v. Southern Pac. Co., 144 Cal. App.2d 1, 300 P.2d 170 (1956). In Byers, a buyer of an automobile brought an action against the seller to recover damages on two counts, one for fraud and one for violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). The special verdict form submitted to the jury segregated the two counts. The jury answered yes to both questions asking if the defendant's conduct constituted fraud or violations of UTPA. The defendant contended that the court's instruction on the first count constituted reversible error. This court ruled that even if the first count were submitted on erroneous instructions, count two was not so flawed and affirmed the judgment. Byers is an example of the counterpart to the we can't tell rule: There, because of the special verdict form, this court could determine that the jury based its verdict on a valid count. In the Byers case, the reviewing court could tell. This court's citation in Byers to Berger v. Southern Pac. Co., supra , and its precedent, Leoni v. Delany, 83 Cal. App.2d 303, 188 P.2d 765, 189 P.2d 517 (1948), was preceded by the introductory signal  See,  suggesting that the proposition relied upon is not stated in the cited authority but follows from it. Harvard Law Review Association, A Uniform System of Citation 8 (14th ed 1986). The Court of Appeals, in its decision in this case, interpreted that reference as reliance on Berger, correctly quoting Berger for espousing the two-issue rule: If one count is supported and one count is unsupported, the verdict stands. It is questionable whether the opinion in Byers follows from the opinion in Berger. Nevertheless, the decision in Byers was correct, for the reasons previously stated. Neither Byers, nor the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case, mentions the contrary rule announced over three decades ago by this court and most recently followed in Pavlik v. Albertson's, Inc., supra, 253 Or. at 375, 454 P.2d 852, discussed above. If the court cannot determine whether the verdict was based on an allegation supported by the evidence or on one unsupported by the evidence, the result is a new trial. In light of our longstanding precedent, we decline to adopt a different rule at this time. [10] To avail oneself of the Pavlik rule, a party must have taken some action at trial to remove the unsupported allegation from the jury's purview. The rationale for this proposition is the general rule of appellate procedure that an appellate court will not consider a question on appeal unless it has been first presented to and ruled upon by the lower court. Falk v. Amsberry, 290 Or. 839, 843, 626 P.2d 362 (1981). The preferred method to raise the issue is a proper request for a suitable peremptory instruction to the jury on each of the elements [or allegations] on which the claimant believes it is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. NW Pac. Indem. v. Junction City Water Dist., 296 Or. 365, 372 n. 1, 677 P.2d 671 (1984). We assume that the common practice of a motion to withdraw issues from the jury's consideration ( Dickson v. Hollinger, 257 Or. 89, 93, 476 P.2d 557 (1970)) has survived the enactment of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure as another effective means of raising the issue to the trial court. Because a motion for directed verdict against a party's entire case is properly denied if any allegation is supported by the evidence, see Murphy v. Harty, 238 Or. 228, 247, 393 P.2d 206 (1964), such blanket motions are insufficient as a predicate to invoking the Pavlik rule upon review. Further, this court has observed that [a] motion for a directed verdict is not the proper vehicle for asking the trial court to decide as a matter of law that the movant is entitled to prevail on less than all of the elements of a claim. NW Pac. Indem. v. Junction City Water Dist., supra, 296 Or. at 372 n. 1, 677 P.2d 671.