Opinion ID: 2623166
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Circuit Court Properly Sentenced Rivera As A Repeat Offender.

Text: Rivera argues that the circuit court erred in sentencing him as a repeat offender, pursuant to HRS § 706-606.5, see supra note 6, for his conviction in Count II, unlawful use of drug paraphernalia, in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a), inasmuch as unlawful use of drug paraphernalia is not a class C felony enumerated under HRS § 706-606.5 and therefore cannot trigger the operation of the statute. On that basis, Rivera contends that his sentence must be vacated and remanded for further proceedings. We disagree. The prosecution moved in the present matter for Rivera to be sentenced as a repeat offender, under HRS § 706-606.5(1)(b)(iv), to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three years and four months based upon his conviction of the offense charged in Count I, promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree, an enumerated class C felony under HRS § 706-606.5(1)[.] It was Rivera's conviction of promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree that triggered his eligibility for sentencing as a repeat offender under HRS § 706-606.5(1). HRS § 706-606.5 provides in relevant part that any person convicted of ... any of the following class C felonies, including HRS § 712-1243[,] relating to promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree[,] ... shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum period of imprisonment without possibility of parole during such period.... (Emphasis added.) In its order granting the prosecution's motion for repeat offender sentencing, the circuit court found that Rivera was a repeat offender based upon his prior convictions in Criminal Nos. 95-2564 and 96-1456, both involving the offense of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree, in violation of HRS § 712-1242, a class B felony. Thus, Rivera's mandatory minimum sentence under HRS § 706-660.5(1)(b)(iv) for two prior felony convictions, [w]here the instant conviction is for a class C felony offense enumerated above[, is] three years, four months. The circuit court therefore ordered that Rivera be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three (3) years and four (4) months without the possibility of parole. Rivera presumably grounds his assertion that the circuit court sentenced him as a repeat offender based upon his conviction of the offense charged in Count II, unlawful use of drug paraphernalia, on the circuit court's oral ruling, which granted the prosecution's motion for sentencing of a repeat offender. At the hearing on the prosecution's motion, the circuit court granted the prosecution's motions for extended terms of imprisonment and stated that in Count 1, I'll sentence you to 10 years; in Count 2, 10 years; in Count 3, 30 days. In Counts 1 and 2, mandatory minimum sentence of three years and four months. (Emphasis added). However, in its October 13, 2003 written order granting the prosecution's motion for repeat offender sentencing, the circuit court did not specify the count to which the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment applied. Rivera correctly notes that the offense of unlawful use of drug paraphernalia is not among those class C felonies enumerated in HRS § 706-606.5(1), the conviction of which would possibly subject him to repeat offender sentencing. See HRS § 706-606.5(1), supra note 6. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the circuit court orally erred in sentencing Rivera as a repeat offender in connection with Count II, in addition to its oral imposition of a repeat offender sentence in connection with Count I, any error was harmless. As a preliminary matter, we note that Rivera is judicially estopped from challenging his sentence as a repeat offender. Pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, [a] party will not be permitted to maintain inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by his action. Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawai'i 91, 124, 969 P.2d 1209, 1242 (1998) (citation omitted). At the October 8, 2003 hearing on the prosecution's motions for extended term sentencing, Rivera expressly conceded that  the repeat offender statute applies here and that this [c]ourt has an obligation to impose a mandatory minimum [.] (Emphasis added). Moreover, Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of his sentence on January 6, 2004, which stated in relevant part: 2. The defendant appeared before this [c]ourt on October 8, 2003 for sentencing in the above-entitled case. At that time, this [c]ourt imposed the following sentence upon the defendant: In Count one  10 years (as a persistent and multiple offender) concurrent, with a mandatory minimum sentence of three years and four months. In Count two  10 years (as a persistent and multiple offender) concurrent. In Count three  30 days with credit for time served. (Emphases added). That being so, Rivera cannot comply with Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b)(4) (2004), which requires that he show where in the record the alleged error was objected to or the manner in which the alleged error was brought to the attention of the court[.] Rivera cannot now take a position in regard to [his sentence as a repeat offender that] is directly contrary to what he asserted at sentencing, nor may he raise as error a point on appeal to which he did not object at sentencing. Roxas, 89 Hawai'i at 124, 969 P.2d at 1242; HRAP Rule 28(b)(4). For reasons that we discuss infra, we decline to recognize plain error, inasmuch as any error committed by the circuit court in orally sentencing Rivera did not affect his substantial rights. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i at 48, 79 P.3d at 141. Even if the circuit court's oral grant of the prosecution's motion for repeat offender sentencing misstated that Rivera's mandatory minimum prison term applied to both Counts I and II, [e]rror is not to be viewed in isolation [or] considered purely in the abstract. Aplaca, 96 Hawai'i at 25, 25 P.3d at 800 (citations omitted). Consistent with the harmless error doctrine, we have frequently stated that error `must be examined in light of the entire proceedings and given the effect to which the whole record shows it is entitled.' Id. The fact that the error, in this case, implicates [Rivera]'s sentence and not his conviction does not render the harmless error doctrine inapplicable. To the contrary, HRS § 641-16 (1993) expressly states that [n]o order, judgment, or sentence shall be reversed or modified unless the court is of the opinion that error was committed which injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant. (Emphasis added). In addition, [Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP)] Rule 52, which provides that [a]ny error, defect, irregularity[,] or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded[,] is applicable to all penal proceedings, including sentencing. (Emphasis added.) See HRPP Rule 54(a) (2000) (These rules shall apply to all penal proceedings in all courts of the State of Hawai'i except as provided in subsection (b) of this rule.). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has stated that most constitutional errors, including those at sentencing, can be harmless. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). Id. (brackets in original). In its October 13, 2003 written order granting the prosecution's motion for repeat offender sentencing, the circuit court imposed only one mandatory minimum prison term of three years and four months. In addition, the circuit court imposed extended term sentences of ten years in Counts I and II to run concurrently. Accordingly, any error that the circuit court committed by orally stating that the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment applied both to Counts I and II was harmless, because Rivera is, in fact, serving only one mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three years and four months. Moreover, by his own express admission, Rivera clearly understood that the circuit court (1) had an obligation to impose a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under HRS § 706-606.5 as a result of his conviction of promoting a dangerous drug, as charged in Count I, and (2) had in fact imposed that very mandatory minimum in connection with Count I. As such, we hold (1) that there is no reasonable possibility that the circuit court's oral slip of the tongue contributed to Rivera's sentence and (2) that any resulting error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.