Opinion ID: 589992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: liability under 42 u.s.c. section 1983

Text: 47 Plaintiffs dismissed their Title VII claims and pursued instead their claim for racial discrimination against Wayne under § 1983. The jury decided that Wayne neither denied plaintiffs' civil rights nor discriminated against either of them because of race. As noted, defendants produced considerable additional evidence at the second trial with respect to § 1983 and the Michigan Civil Rights Act claims based upon racial discrimination and retaliation. 48 We must first decide whether defendant Wayne was entitled to a new trial with respect to liability on the discrimination and retaliation claims in light of our prior remand: 49 The instructions given by the court on the claim of discrimination do not mention official policy or custom and practice, or actions sanctioned, adopted, approved, or authorized by Wayne through its responsible officials or Board. The district court deemed, under the proof, that actions taken by or involving the presidents of the College and its directors of personnel were official and sanctioned actions of Wayne; they were Wayne personified. 50 Michigan courts have expressly relied on federal precedent regarding proof of employment discrimination for purposes of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Jenkins v. Southeastern Michigan Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich.App. 785, 369 N.W.2d 223, 237 n. 2 (1985). Elliott-Larsen provides a cause of action for retaliation following the filing of a discrimination claim, while it may be questionable that § 1983 creates a substantive right against such retaliation. See Day v. Wayne County Board of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199 (6th Cir.1984). Wayne argues therefore that separate instructions on the two parallel but different causes of action should have been given. The district court also did not use separate instructions for the federal and the state claims of employment discrimination. 51 We are troubled by the district court's failure to set out in its instructions the specifics of the § 1983 claim as to official policy requirements and to distinguish the § 1983 from the Elliott-Larsen claim with regard to respondeat superior and to certain important particulars. To sustain the jury verdict for plaintiffs we would have to conclude that it necessarily incorporates a finding that defendant Wayne, through its responsible officials and agents, rejected plaintiffs as administrators and faculty members because of their race, and that defendant Wayne failed to produce satisfactory economic or academic reasons for its alleged discriminatory actions. It is a close and difficult question that there was a basis for a judgment for plaintiffs against Wayne because of its demotion and discharge for racial reasons under § 1983 and/or under Elliott-Larsen. See Pembaur [v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 1986], supra; Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894, 902 n. 22 (11th Cir.1984); Ponton v. Newport News School Board, 632 F.Supp. 1056 (E.D.Va.1986). We also note particularly the Court's recent decision of City of Canton v. Harris, U.S. , 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) citing approvingly an earlier remand by this court of a § 1983 case because the jury instruction might have led the jury to believe that it could find against the city on a mere respondeat superior theory. Id. at , 109 S.Ct. at 1201. Therefore, we REMAND the case to the district court for further consideration as to whether a new trial on these liability issues is required because of the absence of Monell instructions. 52 Chonich I, 874 F.2d at 367. 53 The district court interpreted our remand as mandating a new trial, not just on damages, but on the issue of liability. Judge Gilmore stated, as far as I am concerned, there is going to be a new trial so I don't think we have to waste any time on that. 8 Wayne's counsel understandably responded, I am quite content with that. Plaintiffs' counsel, surprisingly, made no objection to the district court's ruling. 54 The plaintiffs now allege that it was error to deprive them of the earlier, favorable jury verdict. They take the position that there has never been a Monell issue in this case, and therefore a new trial on liability was not required. Plaintiffs argue that our concern in Chonich I was misplaced, and served to deprive the Plaintiffs of a substantial and properly arrived at verdict. They argue that throughout ... [Wayne] is the Defendant against whom its [sic] charges have been brought, since it was the College that acted wrongfully against them, not lower level administrators. (The governmental entity itself.) Plaintiffs concede that its governing board is indeed the personification of the institution and it was and is only the actions of the Board of which Plaintiffs have complained. Plaintiffs, however, filed no motion to rehear, to reconsider, or to clarify Chonich I. As heretofore pointed out at the hearing before the district court, after remand, on Wayne's motion for a new trial, plaintiffs did not press this position. We made the following additional observations in Chonich I with respect to the Board's role in the failure to transfer Chonich to the Wayne faculty: 55 Dr. Waters was not named by plaintiffs as a party defendant. Chonich claims that he sought to transfer to a faculty position in 1984, which involved potentially higher pay, but it seems doubtful that the Board of Wayne itself acted on the 1984 request made to Waters for transfer. Dr. Waters did submit the request of plaintiff in a communication dated July 2, 1984, dealing with personnel reassignments to all college personnel, but it is unclear as to whether the Board was included or whether the Board itself acted. Dr. Waters stated that Chonich's request for faculty status would be recommended and submitted to the Board at the next meeting. 56 Chonich I, 874 F.2d at 369-70. 57 This court's assessment of the situation and its doubts about the role of the Board in that regard were not challenged by plaintiffs. The plaintiffs did not file motions for reconsideration or rehearing in Chonich I. At the second trial, Chonich indicated that his only source of information about this issue was Dr. Waters' advice that he would not be transferred because he was a political liability due to Ford's letter, and he had no factual basis to assume that the board of trustees would not approve his request to transfer to the faculty. Plaintiffs also unsuccessfully requested Dr. Temple, Waters' successor as president, to transfer them to faculty. Plaintiffs, however, have not sued for breach of contract in this regard, nor has Chonich filed any subsequent grievance concerning this issue. Pascaretti filed a grievance and was advised that his contract gave him no right to transfer to the faculty. Pascaretti's testimony at the second trial was that Waters told him approval would not be forthcoming from the board for a transfer, and he did not present his request to the board. 58 We recite these matters because we believe that plaintiffs have waived their right to complain about the circumstances and propriety of our prior remand under the law of the case doctrine. They could have, of course, and should have, pressed their contention that a new trial was not mandated before the district court. 59 In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 [98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611] (1978), we decided that a municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983. Id. at 694-695 [98 S.Ct. at 2037-2038]. It is only when the 'execution of the government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury' that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983. Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 [107 S.Ct. 1114, 1119, 94 L.Ed.2d 293] (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Monell, supra, [436 U.S.], at 694 [98 S.Ct. at 2038]. 60 Thus, our first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under § 1983 is the question whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The inquiry is a difficult one.... 61 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1203, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). 62 We had concern as to whether the jury in Chonich I might have believed that Wayne was liable, under principles of respondeat superior, for possible or potential unauthorized or ultra vires acts of the presidents of the college, when plaintiffs themselves concede that the actions of the board of trustees itself were the ones at issue. The board sets the policy, makes the final decisions, and establishes custom or practice for employment determinations for high administrative personnel, such as Chonich and Pascaretti. Instructions to the jury should make this clear in a case charging Wayne with racial discrimination and retaliation based on racial considerations. 63 In the second trial, the subject of this appeal, the district court instructed that Wayne might be liable for discrimination and/or retaliation as the result of the official policy or custom of the college or where the acts were officially sanctioned or ordered by the college. The court amplified to the jury, 64 you must assess whether the college discriminated against the Plaintiffs on the basis of their race through some official act, custom or policy, or whether discrimination occurred by individuals who were acting as agents of the college at the time ... acting within their authority intentionally discriminated against them because of their race. 65 Although the district court did not give reasons for its decision to grant Wayne a new trial and should have afforded plaintiffs' counsel adequate opportunity to argue this motion, we hold that under all the circumstances a new trial was appropriate. We assume that the district court fully considered plaintiffs' response to the motion, which argued that respondeat superior has never been an issue in this case. Plaintiffs' response to the motion for a new trial, moreover, refers to Waters' actions and his alleged informal polling of the board while at the same time conceding that it is the Board who has the ultimate authority to hire, fire, and re-assign personnel. They later assert in this same response that Dr. Temple was the direct instrument of the Board in discriminating against Plaintiffs. They make reference to Monell: 66 The test of their [Wayne's] liability is intentional constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom'  as well as deprivations visited pursuant to policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the body's officers. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 426 U.S. 658 (1978) at 690-91 [98 S.Ct. 2018 at 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611]. 67 The question presented on Wayne's liability under Monell and its progeny, we believe, was whether it officially discriminated through its board, not whether the board was simply aware or cognizant of actions being taken with regard to plaintiffs, as plaintiffs argued, in their response to the district court. 9 68 Reiterating what we said in Chonich I, this issue represents a close and difficult question, but we AFFIRM the district court's judgment for defendant Wayne on the § 1983 claim. We recognize plaintiffs' difficulty with this result after having obtained a very substantial judgment on this issue in the first trial. We find no merit in plaintiffs' other contentions addressing the district court's actions as to the § 1983 claims, including jury instructions and submission of jury interrogatories. 69 Our discussion with respect to alleged race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to the Fourteenth Amendment claim asserting a violation of equal protection for racial reasons against Wayne. 70