Opinion ID: 1959985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Forced Use of Peremptory Challenge

Text: We now turn to an issue not initially addressed by either of the parties  but raised by the Court  namely, when a trial court erroneously fails to excuse a prospective juror for cause and the defense then peremptorily challenges that juror, does the subsequent exhaustion of peremptory challenges per se constitute reversible error or must defendant show actual prejudice? In Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed. 2d 80 (1988), the Supreme Court held that an erroneous failure to excuse for cause followed by a peremptory challenge and the subsequent exhaustion of the defendant's allotment of peremptory challenges was not per se reversible error. Id. at 85-86, 108 S.Ct. at 2277, 101 L.Ed. 2d at 88. To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury, a defendant must demonstrate that one of the jurors who actually sat on the jury was partial. Any claim that the jury was not impartial, therefore, must focus not on [the juror ultimately excused by a peremptory challenge], but on the jurors who ultimately sat. Id. at 86, 108 S.Ct. at 2277, 101 L.Ed. 2d at 88. The loss, by itself, of a peremptory challenge does not violate the constitutional right to an impartial jury because peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension. Id. at 88, 108 S.Ct. at 2278, 101 L.Ed. 2d at 90. Nonetheless, the Ross Court left open the possibility of an automatic-reversal rule under state law. Id. at 89, 108 S.Ct. at 2279, 101 L.Ed. 2d at 90. We have not heretofore explicitly rejected a per se reversal rule as matter of state law. See Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 445, 550 A. 2d 1172 (We need not decide whether the loss of a peremptory challenge in this case where all peremptories were ultimately exhausted would, by itself, warrant reversal.); see also Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 154-55, 548 A. 2d 887 (In the present, we need not determine whether that error would be reversible under article I, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution.). Such a rejection, however, is implicit in a number of our cases. See, e.g., Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 462-63, 550 A. 2d 1172 (Handler, J., concurring) (noting that the majority here seemingly adopts a jury-bias standard as the operative test for reversal). In fact, our explicit holding in Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 154, 548 A. 2d 887, that the erroneous failure to excuse a juror for cause where the defense had not exhausted its allotment of peremptory challenges was harmless error, demonstrates that we have never viewed the loss of a peremptory challenge as per se reversible error. See State v. Rios, 17 N.J. 572, 592, 112 A. 2d 247 (1955) (applying harmless error standard to erroneous loss of peremptory challenge); State v. Deegan, 133 N.J.L. 263, 268, 44 A. 2d 104 (E. & A. 1945) (same); State v. Calabrese, 107 N.J.L. 115, 151 A. 781 (E. & A. 1930) (same); State v. Lynch, 103 N.J.L. 64, 134 A. 760 (E. & A. 1926) (same); see also State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 105, 358 A. 2d 163 (1976) (reversing for failure to excuse juror for cause where peremptories were exhausted because of indication that error was prejudicial); Wright v. Bernstein, 23 N.J. 284, 294, 129 A. 2d 19 (1957) (reversing for failure to excuse juror for cause where peremptories were exhausted because potentially-biased juror sat on jury). Moreover, we have consistently held that the right of a peremptory challenge is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the federal or State Constitutions. State v. Brunson, 101 N.J. 132, 136, 501 A. 2d 145 (1985). Although the right to exercise peremptory challenges is a `substantial right,' State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 62, 402 A. 2d 203 (1979) (quoting Wright, supra, 23 N.J. at 295, 129 A. 2d 19), with deep historic roots, Brunson, supra, 101 N.J. at 136, 501 A. 2d 145, it is a creature of statute designed `to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, [and] to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them and not otherwise.' Id. at 137-38, 501 A. 2d 145 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835, 13 L.Ed. 2d 759, 772, reh'g denied, 381 U.S. 921, 85 S.Ct. 1528, 14 L.Ed. 2d 442 (1965) (alteration in original)); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, ___ n. 7, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1426 n. 7, 128 L.Ed. 2d 89, 102 n. 7 (1994) (Although peremptory challenges are valuable tools in jury trials, they `are not constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather they are but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial.' (quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2358, 120 L.Ed. 2d 33, 50 (1992))). The goal of peremptory challenge is to secure an impartial jury. See Brunson, supra, 101 N.J. at 138, 501 A. 2d 145; see also Swain, supra, 380 U.S. at 212-20, 85 S.Ct. at 831-36, 13 L.Ed. 2d at 768-73 (sketching origins of right of peremptory challenge). Thus, to hold that the loss of a peremptory challenge will cause a reversal unless that loss ultimately results in a partial jury makes little sense. The argument that such a jury-bias standard for reversal effectively eliminates the need for peremptory challenges because for cause removals already guarantee impartiality misunderstands the nature of for cause challenges. To remove a juror for cause, the challenging party must demonstrate that the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of that juror's duties in accordance with the court's instructions and the juror's oath. Ramseur, supra , 106 N.J. at 255, 524 A. 2d 188. Absent violations of equal protection, see, e.g., J.E.B., supra, ___ U.S . ___, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed. 2d 89 (holding that peremptory challenge exercised solely on basis of gender violated Equal Protection clause); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed. 2d 69 (1986) (holding that peremptory challenge exercised solely on basis of race violated Equal Protection clause), [t]he peremptory challenge, unlike challenges for cause, requires neither explanation nor approval by the court. Brunson, supra, 101 N.J. at 138, 501 A. 2d 145. In certain situations, a prospective juror's responses during voir dire may not indicate that his or her views would prevent or substantially impair performance as a juror, but a party may nonetheless detect some disfavorable leaning. That is precisely the situation in which a party is likely to exercise a peremptory challenge. Thus, a jury-bias rule does not render peremptories superfluous, but merely recognizes that only when jurors who should have been removed for cause sit on the jury is the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury offended. The dilution of number of statutorily-prescribed peremptories by the erroneous failure to excuse a juror for cause is of no moment to the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury. Were it otherwise, we would be forced to recognize a constitutional right to an unlimited number of peremptories because, like the dilution of the number of peremptories caused by a trial judge's erroneous failure to remove a juror for cause, the Legislature's provision for a certain finite number of peremptories would have to be seen as an unconstitutional limitation on the ability of a defendant to secure an impartial jury. We have never suggested such a rule. To the contrary, the Legislature may set the number of peremptory challenges at fifty, twenty, ten or zero, if it so choses, because the choice of peremptory challenge is merely a statutory guarantee. For those reasons, we find that for the forced expenditure of a peremptory challenge to constitute reversible error under New Jersey law, a defendant must demonstrate that a juror who was partial sat as a result of the defendant's exhaustion of peremptories. That view is consistent with the United State's Supreme Court's analysis in Ross, supra, with our prior decisions, and with our belief that a peremptory challenge is not a fundamental constitutional right. It also is the rule recognized by several federal circuit courts and at least twenty-two other states. [1] To prove such error a defendant must show (1) that the trial court erred by failing to remove a juror for cause; (2) that the juror in question was eliminated by the exercise of defendant's peremptory challenge and that defendant exhausted his remaining challenges; and (3) that at least one of the remaining jurors that sat on the jury was a partial juror. We assume that defendant meets the first two tests. Accordingly, we must decide whether any juror who should have been removed for cause ultimately sat on defendant's jury. Only one juror was called after defendant exhausted his challenges  juror Jung. No one challenged her impartiality at voir dire, nor does anyone assert such a challenge now. Instead the defense now points to juror Kennedy, whom defendant unsuccessfully challenged for cause. Defendant had not named Kennedy in his original brief, but did so in his court-requested supplementary brief on this issue. Before determining whether the trial court should have excused juror Kennedy for cause, we note that defendant's argument that juror Kennedy should have been removed for cause is belied by defendant's failure to have challenged Kennedy peremptorily. After defendant exercised a peremptory challenge against juror Dawson, he had sixteen peremptory challenges remaining. He used ten of those remaining sixteen to challenge prospective jurors whom he had not challenged for cause. [2] The only juror called after defendant had exhausted his challenges (juror Jung) was not the subject of an earlier challenge for cause by the defense. Although we have acknowledged the potentially harmful effect associated with an unnecessary use of a peremptory challenge, see Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 155, 548 A. 2d 887 (stating that forcing a defendant to `waste' a peremptory challenge could force defense counsel to be more cautious in the exercise of remaining peremptories); see also Williams, 113 N.J. at 469, 550 A. 2d 1172 (stating that defendant cannot intelligently weigh each potential juror against others, making the exercise of each peremptory challenge a greater gamble and a more fateful decision), we cannot help but conclude that defendant was not harmed by the forced use of a peremptory to strike juror Dawson. For whatever reason, defendant elected to challenge peremptorily a total of twelve other jurors whom he had not sought to challenge earlier for cause, instead of peremptorily challenging juror Kennedy. Ten of those twelve challenges occurred after juror Dawson was challenged. Moreover, if the defense felt restricted by the forced use of a peremptory to exclude juror Dawson, it could have requested additional peremptories, and the trial court would have been obliged to exercise its discretion generously in granting defendant's request. See Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 155, 548 A. 2d 887. The clear implication of defendant's failure to challenge juror Kennedy peremptorily is that he did not think that she was objectionable. Indeed, defense counsel stated in accepting the jury that the jury is satisfactory. We agree with the State that no basis existed to remove juror Kennedy for cause. Nothing in the voir dire record suggests that her views on capital punishment would have prevented or substantially impaired her performance as juror in accordance with her instructions and oath. Ramseur, supra , 106 N.J. at 255, 524 A. 2d 188; Adams, supra, 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526, 65 L.Ed. 2d at 589. She stated throughout voir dire that she would consider all evidence in mitigation and weigh such evidence against any of the aggravating factors that the State would have to prove. Although she stated she believed in the death penalty as a general proposition, she repeatedly indicated a willingness to review the evidence as presented and to follow the court's instructions. At one point she did indicate that she did not feel that drug addiction reduced the seriousness of a crime, but she also indicated that she would follow the court's instructions about whether it should be considered a mitigating factor. As did the trial court, we reject the defense's characterization of juror Kennedy's responses as indicating a pro-death penalty bias. The court stated and we agree: That is not a fair characterization of her statements at all. She talked about a general view, she made it perfectly clear that she's capable of considering both the death penalty as well as life imprisonment and is willing to consider drugs as well so she is a perfectly sound juror. Thus, we find that defendant's right to an impartial jury was not infringed by the forced use of a peremptory challenge on juror Dawson. We restate our position that an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause will not result in the reversal of a conviction unless defendant can show that the trial court's error interfered with the defendant's ability to obtain an impartial jury. Rios, supra, 17 N.J. at 592, 112 A. 2d 247. Because the trial court's decision not to excuse juror Kennedy was proper, the court's erroneous failure to excuse juror Dawson for cause was harmless error because no partial juror sat as a result of that error.