Opinion ID: 1136922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Facts pertinent to Complaint Tribunal's rulings on pre-trial motion to dismiss due to unconstitutional delay.

Text: Emil moved the Tribunal at the commencement of the initial hearing to dismiss the formal complaint due to an unconstitutional delay of the prosecution of the cases or, in the alternative, on the grounds that the claims were barred under the doctrine of laches. Emil put on evidence in support of the motion which established the general chronology of events. 1. The Bar received the first informal complaint in this case on April 13, 1988. 2. Emil responded to the informal complaint on August 9, 1988. 3. The Bar's Complaints Committee on November 4, 1988, referred the case to the Bar for further investigation and for the filing of an investigatory report under Rule 7(b)(ii) of the Rules of Discipline. 4. The Bar requested three extensions of time within which to complete its investigation and report back to the Committee through September 13, 1989. 5. The investigatory hearing in the case took place on July 25-27, 1989. 6. The Bar, following the expiration of the third extension granted to the Bar by the Committee, made thirteen additional requests for extension of time in which to file an investigatory report with the Committee extending over a period of time from October 5, 1989, to March 4, 1992, none of which were noticed to Emil's attorney. The testimony of General Counsel as to the need for extensions was that General Counsel's office required time to review evidence taken in the July 25-27, 1989, investigatory hearing. Emil's counsel had interposed no objection to the first three requests for extensions. 7. The Bar filed the formal complaint on November 13, 1992, incorporating seven counts. One hundred ninety six (196) days elapsed from the filing of the informal complaint on April 13, 1988, to the November 4, 1988, initial action of the Bar Committee referring the Complaint for further investigation and for filing of the investigatory report. Between the filing of the informal complaint and the filing of the investigatory report on April 21, 1992, one thousand four hundred thirty eight (1,438) days passed, approximately four years. One thousand six hundred thirty five (1,635) days elapsed from the date of the filing of the informal complaint until the Bar Committee made its determination of the existence of probable cause. The time that elapsed between the date of the filing of the informal complaint and the filing by General Counsel on November 13, 1992, of the formal complaint totals one thousand six hundred ninety five (1,695) days, approximately four years and four months. During the hearing on the motion for dismissal due to unconstitutional delay, the Tribunal heard the testimony of the attorneys representing the Bar and Emil, the testimony of Emil, Emil's investigator, and expert testimony from Aaron Condon, a law professor at the University of Mississippi School of Law. Mike Martz, General Counsel for the Bar, was called to testify by Emil and generally testified to the chronology set forth above. Martz's excuses for not sooner filing the investigatory report were: (1) he thought Emil's attorney had waived the time limits imposed on the Bar under the Rules of Discipline for the filing of the report; (2) the case was complex; and (3) he was busy on other matters. William Liston, attorney for Emil, offered his statement under oath to the Tribunal concerning General Counsel's claim that there had been a waiver of the time for filing the investigatory report. Liston testified that the only time he had agreed to any extensions of time was an agreement to extend the time for conducting the investigatory hearing and an agreement to extend the time for the filing of the investigatory report to September, 1989. Emil testified that as to count one of the formal complaint, a material witness, Gwendolyn Catchings, was no longer available and that a material witness critical to count two could not be located at the time the formal complaint was filed due to the lapse of time. Emil further testified that there were three witnesses material to count three of the complaint who could no longer be located; two critical witnesses concerning count six of the formal complaint could not be located after the filing of the formal complaint; and that two witnesses with critical knowledge relative to count seven, namely, Chancellor John Morris and Attorney Tom Stennis, had passed away during the time the investigatory report filing was delayed. Emil further testified in detail as to the effect the delay had on his law practice and his physical well-being. Greg Buchko, an investigator hired by Emil to attempt to locate the material witnesses who might still be available to testify after the filing of the investigatory report, testified as to his unsuccessful efforts in locating those witnesses still thought to be alive. Condon, after being qualified as an expert in the field of legal ethics, testified that, based on his education, training, the factual matters surrounding the time lapse between the filing of the informal complaint and the filing of the formal complaint, and based on reasonable professional certainty, he was of the opinion that General Counsel did not comply with the mandate of Rule 5, Rules of Discipline, which requires expeditious, timely and speedy handling of complaints. He further testified that in his opinion the time lapse between the institution of the proceedings and the filing of the formal complaint constituted prejudicial and impermissible delay which violated fundamental fairness and Emil's right to due process of law. Neither Emil nor his counsel ever inquired of the Bar concerning the status of the numerous allegations lodged against Emil. The Tribunal heard the proof presented to it and ruled that Emil had not suffered any prejudice even if there was delay in bringing the formal charges against him. The Tribunal denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the Tribunal was of the opinion that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial did not apply to attorney disciplinary proceedings. The Tribunal likewise overruled Emil's motion to dismiss due to a violation by the Bar of the time constraints imposed under Rules 5 and 7, Rules of Discipline, on the ground that time limits proscribed in said Rules are not jurisdictional under Rule 26, Rules of Discipline.