Opinion ID: 2335427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT, KRE 801A(a)(2).

Text: C.M.'s statement to Brandy Maynard was a prior statement consistent with her testimony at trial. KRE 801A(a)(2) permits admission of a prior consistent statement only if it is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. One theory of the defense was that C.M. had been improperly influenced by her father, Mark M., to falsely accuse Appellant of sexual abuse. Defense counsel vigorously cross-examined C.M. in an attempt to prove that theory: Q. Have you told your stepdad, Steve, that your Dad, Mark, asked you to say this? A. He told me what to say. Q. Mark did? A. He said, Do you know what to say? and I said, Yes. ... Q. Did you tell Steve that Mark told me to tell this story about papaw [Appellant]? A. He told you? Q. No, did you tell Steve that? A. What? Q. Did Steve say: [C.M.], where did this come from? Did your dad, Mark, tell you to say this? A. [No response.] ... Q. About two weeks ago, did your stepdad, Steve, ask you this: [C.M.], did Mark put you up to saying this? A. I think he did. Q. And didn't you say, I think he did; that Mark told me to say that? What did you tell Steve? A. I don't know what you're saying? Q. You don't know what I'm saying? A. I don't know what to say. ... Q. About two weeks ago, did Steve ask you anything about what your dad, Mark, had told you to say? Q. I don't know what you are saying? Q. Did your dad, Mark, tell you what to say? A. I think he did. Q. Was that back last year in November? A. I don't know. ... Q. Did you tell Amanda that your Dad, Mark, told you to tell this story? A. No. [Amanda, C.M.'s cousin, did not testify at trial.] ... Q. Are you saying that Mark might have told you or did tell you to tell this story about your papaw? A. I don't know. Q. You don't know whether he told you or didn't tell you? A. He told me, Do you know what to say? and I said, Yes. Obviously, this line of questioning was designed to imply that C.M.'s accusations were the product of improper influence by her father, Mark M. That implication sufficed to trigger the improper influence exception to the general rule of inadmissibility of a prior consistent hearsay statement under KRE 801A(a)(2). Schambon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 804, 811 (1991); see also United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1096 (D.C.Cir.1992) (interpreting FRE 801(d)(1)(B), the federal counterpart of KRE 801A(a)(2)). However, the exception generally applies only if the prior consistent statement predated the improper motive or influence alleged to have produced it. Cf. Slaven v. Commonwealth, supra, at 858 (applying the premotive limitation to an allegation of recent fabrication); Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 514, 517 (1995) (same); see also Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167, 115 S.Ct. 696, 705, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (interpreting FRE 801(d)(1)(B)). C.M.'s version of Appellant's criminal conduct has not changed since her initial statement to Brandy Maynard on November 29, 1997. Thus, if the November 29, 1997, statement was offered solely to prove the truth of its content, it could not have been admitted under KRE 801A(a)(2). However, the statement was offered primarily for rehabilitative, not substantive, purposes. The prior consistent statements admitted in Tome, supra , were offered solely for substantive purposes. (Although those statements might have been probative on the question whether the alleged conduct had occurred, they shed but minimal light on whether A.T. had the charged motive to fabricate. Id at 165, 115 S.Ct. at 705.) Tome specifically intimate[d] no view ... concerning the admissibility of any of A.T.'s out-of-court statements under ... any other evidentiary principle. Id. at 166, 115 S.Ct. at 705. Thus, in United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908 (4th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1068, 118 S.Ct. 738, 139 L.Ed.2d 674 (1998), a post-motive prior consistent statement was held admissible for the purpose of rehabilitation because the statement had some rebutting force beyond the mere fact that the witness has repeated on a prior occasion a statement consistent with his trial testimony. Id. at 920. And in United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 26-27 (1st Cir.2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 54, 151 L.Ed.2d 23 (2001), a post-motive prior consistent statement was held admissible for a purpose other than mere proof of the truth of its contents. Accord: Holmes v. State, 350 Md. 412, 712 A.2d 554, 560 (1998); State v. Brown, 126 N.M. 338, 969 P.2d 313, 325-27 (1998); State v. Church, 167 Vt. 604, 708 A.2d 1341, 1342 (1998). Here, the implication arising from the cross-examination of C.M. was that her father had improperly influenced her to accuse Appellant of sexual abuse. Brandy Maynard's testimony showed that C.M.'s first report of abuse was not to the police, or to a social worker, or even to an adult, but to a teenage friend, and only with apparent reluctance and after substantial coaxing. Perhaps more importantly, C.M.'s father was not present when C.M. reported the abuse to Brandy. Thus, the circumstances under which the report was made tended to rebut the inference that C.M.'s accusation was the product of improper influence by her father; and, thus, the evidence had some rebutting force beyond the mere fact that the witness ha[d] repeated on a prior occasion a statement consistent with [her] trial testimony. United States v. Ellis, supra, at 920. We conclude that the trial judge's decision to admit this evidence was correct even though for the wrong reason. Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 31 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1153, 119 S.Ct. 1056, 143 L.Ed.2d 61 (1999); Jarvis v. Commonwealth, supra, at 469; Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 788 S.W.2d 266, 268 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 852, 111 S.Ct. 146, 112 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990).