Opinion ID: 2599107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Alleged Comments Minimizing the Jury's Responsibility

Text: Kleypas contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing that Kleypas himself by his actions had already made the choice for the jury regarding whether to impose the death penalty. Kleypas argues that these comments improperly minimized the jury's sense of responsibility for the decision. Kleypas complains of the following comments made at the outset of the prosecution's closing argument: Choice, this part of the trial is about choices. Choices that the defendant has made and choices that the defendant has not. And now a choice that you must make. Now, we look at the crime the defendant committed and not necessarily the method he used but the manner in which he committed that crime. And we look at the reason that he committed that crime, to avoid arrest or prosecution. And we look at the facts surrounding the crime and we look at the fact surrounding the defendant and what he has done in his past. And what we find, ladies and gentlemen, what we discover is that the defendant has made the choice for us. (Emphasis added.) In summing up his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that Kleypas had already been faced with the prospect of spending his life in prison because the victim, C.W., could identify him but he made the decision to kill the victim to try to make good his escape. Therefore, the prosecutor stated: [H]e had that opportunity to spend the rest of his life in prison. But he chose to murder instead. He has made this choice about life in prison. Finally, the prosecutor stated: You may be told that imposing the death penalty is one of the hardest things you will ever do, that may be true. But that is the duty that you are sworn to undertake to make that decision. The defendant has made choices and were it not for the choices he has made, today he could be a college graduate working in the field of nursing but he did make choices and now he must answer for those choices. There were no objections to the above statements. In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 86 L. Ed.2d 231, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held that under the Eighth Amendment, it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. The prosecutor in Caldwell had, in closing argument, informed the jury that its decision was not final and that the defendant would receive an appeal. The Court noted that such an argument presents an intolerable danger of bias towards the death penalty and encourages the jury to vote for death on the assumption that any error in its decision would be corrected on appeal. 472 U.S. at 330-31. Further, the Court found that the prosecutor's comments specifically violated the Eighth Amendment and, thus, were not subject to the general harmless error rule but rather the rule for constitutional error. 472 U.S. at 339-41. Caldwell was later narrowly construed by the United States Supreme Court. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9, 129 L. Ed. 2d 1, 114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994). In reaffirming the basic rule in Caldwell, the Court in Romano stated that `[t]o establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law.' 512 U.S. at 9 (quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407, 103 L. Ed.2d 435, 109 S. Ct. 1211 [1989]). The prosecutor in the case at hand did not attempt to improperly describe the role assigned to the jury. He did not argue that some other party such as the trial judge or an appellate court bore the ultimate responsibility for Kleypas' fate. Rather, he argued that Kleypas himself bore responsibility for his fate. Such an argument is appropriate. See Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 350 (6th Cir. 1998); People v. Jackson, 13 Cal. 4th 1164, 1238, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254 (1996); People v. Burgess, 176 Ill.2d 289, 318-19, 680 N.E.2d 357 (1997); State v. Scales, 655 So.2d 1326, 1334-35 (La. 1995); State v. Harris, 870 S.W.2d 798, 807-08 (Mo. 1994); State v. McLaughlin, 341 N.C. 426, 443, 462 S.E.2d 1 (1995); State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 85-86 (Tenn. 1994). The one case relied upon by Kleypas, Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd 908 F.2d 695 (11th Cir. 1990), is distinguishable. In Buttrum, the court found improper comments by the prosecutor that the defendant had signed her own death warrant and alone was responsible for her death. The prosecutor characterized the jury as merely one cog in the criminal process. 721 F. Supp. at 1316. Thus, in Buttrum, the prosecutor did improperly minimize the role of the jury in the process, referring to the jury as only one cog in the process. That is different than the argument in the case at hand which suggested to the jury that Kleypas should be held responsible for his own actions. The prosecutor's comments were not improper.