Opinion ID: 2576322
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: cruz's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

Text: ¶ 37 Finally, Cruz contends that he is entitled to a new trial because his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by (1) advising Cruz to falsely admit ownership of most of the property seized from the house; (2) not withdrawing as Cruz's counsel during his criminal trial in the face of a conflict of interest; and (3) failing to object to the timing and content of the jury instructions. ¶ 38 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 211 (internal quotations omitted). We have recognized a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, an aggrieved defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the complained-of conduct was not sound trial strategy. Id. (internal quotations omitted). We apply these requirements to each of Cruz's claims of ineffective assistance.
¶ 39 We turn first to Cruz's argument that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by counseling him to falsely admit ownership of the property seized at the house. Cruz's attorney in the proceedings below was the same attorney who represented him in the earlier civil forfeiture action. Cruz argues that his attorney advised him to falsely admit ownership of the seized property in the civil forfeiture action in order to protect the property interests of those who actually owned the seized property. According to Cruz, his admission of ownership did not serve his interests and, in fact, resulted in his conviction because it was used by the State to connect Cruz to the house where the meth lab was located. ¶ 40 We disagree that Cruz's attorney rendered ineffective assistance in this instance. We see nothing in the record to indicate that the performance of Cruz's attorney fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Myers, 2004 UT 31 at ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 211 (internal quotations omitted). [7] To support his claim that his attorney advised him to lie, Cruz relies on the following exchange between his attorney and Chad Platt, the State attorney who handled the civil forfeiture proceeding: [CRUZ'S ATTORNEY]: So the response I filed for Mr. Cruz covers all the property, because he is the only claimant you listed, correct? In the answer, we say not all the property is his, correct? [MR. PLATT]: In your verified answer? [CRUZ'S ATTORNEY]: Right. [MR. PLATT]: Right. I assume that, because you say most. I would assume you are saying some isn't. . . . . [CRUZ'S ATTORNEY]: . . . If Mr. Cruz didn't file an answer to protect everybody's rights that you didn't list, what would happen to that property? If somebody didn't file an answer to the property that was theirs, or claim it, it would be forfeited to your organization? [MR. PLATT]: If nobody answered to the complaint, right. And after a period of time goes by, nobody answers, then at that point what our office will do is file a motion for default judgment saying nobody has answered. ¶ 41 While these comments could be read to suggest that Cruz's attorney advised Cruz to claim ownership of seized property that was not his, that is not the only plausible interpretation. It is also plausible that Cruz admitted ownership of the property because it actually did belong to him and he wanted to protect it from forfeiture despite the potential repercussions of that strategy in any subsequent criminal proceeding. Accordingly, we conclude that Cruz has failed to establish that his attorney's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 42 Moreover, even if Cruz could establish that his attorney performed deficiently by advising him to admit ownership of the seized property in the civil forfeiture action, it would not help him here. A defendant may claim ineffective assistance of counsel only if he had a right to counsel in the first place, Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1982) (per curiam), and Cruz had no right to counsel in the civil forfeiture action. ¶ 43 The United States Constitution contains two sources of a right to counsel: the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has noted that [t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings, and before proceedings are initiated a suspect in a criminal investigation has no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 456-57, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (citation omitted). In contrast, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel attaches during custodial interrogation, McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), or `questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,' Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). ¶ 44 Cruz admitted ownership of the seized property in the verified answer that he filed in the civil forfeiture action. That answer was filed in October 2000, six months before any criminal proceedings were initiated against him. Cruz consequently cannot claim a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Moreover, because there is no allegation that Cruz was in custody when he filed his verified answer, he cannot claim a right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. Without a right to counsel, Cruz cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel. Wainwright, 455 U.S. at 587-88, 102 S.Ct. 1300.
¶ 45 We next address Cruz's argument that his attorney should have withdrawn from representing him in the criminal proceedings below. Specifically, Cruz asserts that, because the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit an attorney from acting as an advocate at a trial in which the attorney may be called as a material witness, Utah R. Prof'l Conduct 3.7(a), his attorney should have withdrawn as Cruz's counsel in the criminal proceeding so that he could testify that he told Cruz to falsely claim ownership of the seized property. Cruz further asserts that his attorney refused to withdraw because his attorney wanted to avoid being charged with perjury for advising Cruz to admit to ownership of property that he did not own. Cruz argues that this situation created a conflict of interest that prevented his attorney from effectively representing him. See State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ¶ 22, 984 P.2d 382 (noting that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to conflict-free representation). ¶ 46 We are unpersuaded because, as we have noted, there is no definitive indication in the record suggesting that Cruz's attorney actually advised him to lie. Absent evidence of that crucial fact, Cruz's attorney had no obligation to withdraw or to take the stand in the criminal trial. In short, Cruz's argument that his attorney had a conflict of interest is without factual basis.
¶ 47 We finally turn to Cruz's claim that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the content and timing of the jury instructions. This claim is severely undermined by our conclusion that the trial court did not err in either the substantive content of its reasonable doubt instructions or the timing of those instructions. Indeed, in light of those conclusions, Cruz cannot establish that his attorney was deficient in failing to object or that the objections, if made, would have yielded a reasonable probability of a different result. See Myers, 2004 UT 31 at ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 211. We therefore reject Cruz's claim that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the content and timing of the jury instructions.