Opinion ID: 1104732
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inconsistent verdicts and mutually exclusive verdicts

Text: The caselaw concerning inconsistent verdicts has its underpinnings in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932). In Dunn, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether consistency in a verdict is necessary. The defendant in Dunn was charged in a three-count indictment with (1) maintaining a common nuisance by keeping for sale at a specified place intoxicating liquor, (2) unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, and (3) unlawful sale of such liquor. The jury convicted the defendant of maintaining a nuisance by keeping alcohol for sale at a specified place, but acquitted him of the predicate offenses of unlawful possession and unlawful sale of liquor. The Supreme Court held: Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment.... If separate indictments had been presented against the defendant for possession and for maintenance of a nuisance, and had been separately tried, the same evidence being offered in support of each, an acquittal on one could not be pleaded as res judicata of the other. Where the offenses are separately charged in the counts of a single indictment the same rule must hold. As was said in Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 [(2d Cir.1925)]: `The most that can be said about such cases is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal as not more than their assumption of power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.' .... That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters. 284 U.S. at 393-94, 52 S.Ct. 189. In United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that inconsistent verdicts are acceptable. The defendant in Powell was charged with multiple counts of violating the federal narcotics law, along with conspiracy, illegal possession of firearms, and making false statements. A jury acquitted the defendant of conspiring with her husband, son, and others to intentionally possessing cocaine with an intent to distribute. The jury also acquitted her on a count of possessing a specific quantity of cocaine with an intent to distribute it. However, the same jury convicted the defendant on three counts of the compound offense of using the telephone in `committing and in causing and facilitating' certain felonies`conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.' 469 U.S. at 60, 105 S.Ct. 471. The defendant in Powell argued that Dunn, supra, was an incorrect statement of the law and that the principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel should apply to verdicts rendered by a single jury to preclude acceptance of a guilty verdict on a telephone-facilitation count where the jury acquits the defendant on the predicate felony. The Supreme Court stated: We believe the Dunn rule rests on a sound rationale that is independent of its theories of res judicata, and that it therefore survives an attack based upon its presently erroneous reliance on such theories. As the Dunn Court noted, where truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, `[t]he most that can be said ... is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt.' Dunn, supra, at 393. The rule that the defendant may not upset such a verdict embodies a prudent acknowledgment of a number of factors. First, as the above quote suggests, inconsistent verdictseven verdicts that acquit on a predicate offense while convicting on the compound offenseshould not necessarily be interpreted as a windfall to the Government at the defendant's expense. It is equally possible that the jury reached its conclusion on the compound offense, and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense. But in such situations the Government has no recourse if it wishes to correct the jury's error; the Government is precluded from appealing or otherwise upsetting such acquittal by the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130, 133 (1904). Inconsistent verdicts therefore present a situation where `error,' in the sense that the jury has not followed the court's instructions, most certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose ox has been gored. Given this uncertainty, and the fact that the Government is precluded from challenging the acquittal, it is hardly satisfactory to allow the defendant to receive a new trial on the conviction as a matter of course. Harris v. Rivera, [454 U.S. 339 (1981)], indicates that nothing in the Constitution would require such a protection, and we therefore address the problem only under our supervisory powers over the federal criminal process. For us, the possibility that the inconsistent verdicts may favor the criminal defendant as well as the Government militates against review of such convictions at the defendant's behest. This possibility is a premise of Dunn's alternative rationalethat such inconsistencies often are a product of jury lenity. Thus, Dunn has been explained by both courts and commentators as a recognition of the jury's historic function, in criminal trials, as a check against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the Executive Branch. See, e.g., United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902 (C.A.2 1960)(Friendly, J.); Bickel, Judge and JuryInconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 649, 652 (1950). Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-156 (1968). The burden of the exercise of lenity falls only on the Government, and it has been suggested that such an alternative should be available for the difficult cases where the jury wishes to avoid an all-or-nothing verdict. See Bickel, supra, at 652. Such an act is, as the Dunn Court recognized, an `assumption of a power which [the jury has] no right to exercise,' but the illegality alone does not mean that such a collective judgment should be subject to review. The fact that the inconsistency may be the result of lenity, coupled with the Government's inability to invoke review, suggests that inconsistent verdicts should not be reviewable. 469 U.S. at 64-66, 105 S.Ct. 471 (footnote omitted). The Powell Court refused to allow a defendant to challenge inconsistent verdicts on the ground that the verdict in the case was not the product of lenity, but instead was an error that worked against them. The Supreme Court abandoned that portion of its reasoning in Dunn based on a res judicata analysis. 469 U.S. at 64, 66, 105 S.Ct. 471. The Powell Court noted that a defendant is afforded protection against jury irrationality or error by the review of the sufficiency of the evidence: Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves assessment by the courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any rational determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.... This review should be independent of the jury's determination that evidence on another count was insufficient. The Government must convince the jury with its proof, and must also satisfy the courts that given this proof the jury could rationally have reached a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not believe that further safeguards against jury irrationality are necessary. 469 U.S. at 67, 105 S.Ct. 471. The Powell Court noted that nothing in the opinion was intended to resolve the question that occurs when a defendant is convicted of two crimes, and a guilty verdict on one logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other crime. 469 U.S. at 69 n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 471. The Supreme Court cited United States v. Daigle, 149 F.Supp. 409 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 248 F.2d 608 (1957), as such an example. In Daigle, the trial court instructed the jury that it could not return verdicts of guilty as to both larceny and embezzlement. 149 F.Supp. at 414. Despite the trial court's instructions, the jury found the defendant guilty of both, and the court held that the verdicts were absolutely inconsistent stating: [W]here a guilty verdict on one count negatives some fact essential to a finding of guilty on a second count, two guilty verdicts may not stand. 149 F.Supp. at 414. The trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on the greater offense of larceny, allowed the lesser offense of embezzlement to stand, and denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. Confusion exists throughout Alabama courts over the difference between inconsistent verdicts and mutually exclusive verdicts. The general rule is that there need be no rational compatibility between the verdicts on the several counts of an indictment. The exception to this rule is where the jury returns multiple convictions as to crimes which are mutually exclusive of each other. Conway v. State, 489 So.2d 641, 642 (Ala.Cr.App.1986).... Grikis v. State, 552 So.2d 187, 187 (Ala.Crim.App.1989). This seemingly straightforward rule has been somewhat difficult to apply because of confusion over the meaning of the terms inconsistent verdicts and mutually exclusive verdicts. This confusion was heightened by our decision in Dorsey. In Dorsey, the majority opinion never expressly stated that the two verdicts that concerned 13-year-old Cranefelony murder and capital murder were mutually exclusive. See Dorsey, 881 So.2d 533. However, Justice Stuart's dissent in Dorsey seemed to interpret the majority's decision as holding that the two were mutually exclusive. 881 So.2d at 540-41. Therefore, we will attempt to clarify the difference between inconsistent verdicts and mutually exclusive verdicts and state the appropriate analysis for each. Alabama appellate court cases have consistently held that inconsistent verdicts are permissible. See Hammond v. State, 497 So.2d 558 (Ala.Crim.App.1986); McClellan v. State, 484 So.2d 1150 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985); Bradham v. State, 27 Ala.App. 225, 170 So. 222 (1936). As early as 1936, the Court of Appeals in Bradham held that inconsistency in verdicts was a jury matter. In Bradham, the jury convicted the defendant of carnal knowledge of a girl under 12, but acquitted him of the offense of rape. The Court of Appeals stated: [I]f the jury disbelieved the testimony which supported the first count of the indictment, there was no basis for their verdict finding appellant guilty under the second. But, for all we can say, they may have believed in the requisite way this testimony, and, in their province, simply have chosen to ground their verdict on the charge contained in the second count; the same testimony sufficing. It was strictly a jury matter. 27 Ala.App. at 226, 170 So. at 222. The Court of Criminal Appeals has also based subsequent decisions on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Dunn, supra . McClellan, 484 So.2d at 1152-53. In McClellan, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the verdicts of guilty for possession of burglar's tools and of not guilty of burglary in the third degree were inconsistent because, it reasoned, the jury's acquittal of burglary negated the intent element that was also required for the possession charge. 684 So.2d at 1153. However, based on Dunn, the court held that the inconsistency could have been based on jury compromise or a decision that the defendant did not actually commit the burglary. 484 So.2d at 1152. At any rate, we are unable to conclude that the two verdicts are so irreconcilably inconsistent with, or repugnant to, each other as to justify a reversal of the judgment of conviction of the crime charged by the first count of the indictment. 484 So.2d at 1153. The Court of Criminal Appeals has also upheld jury verdicts in other cases where the verdicts were inconsistent. See Hammond, supra (upholding a jury verdict convicting the defendant of robbery, but acquitting him of felony murder when such a verdict was inconsistent based on the facts); Hill v. State, 651 So.2d 1128 (Ala. Crim.App.1994) (upholding a jury verdict acquitting the defendant of theft and convicting him of a violation of the ethics act, where the two charges were related to the same act). In Conway v. State, 489 So.2d 641, 642 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: There is an exception to this rule [that consistency in verdicts is not necessary]. 'The general rule dispensing with the necessity for consistency as between the acquittals and guilty verdicts under a multicount indictment or information is not ordinarily applied where the jury returns multiple convictions as to crimes which are mutually exclusive of each other.' 18 A.L.R.3d at 283. The jury in Conway had returned verdicts of not guilty of first-degree kidnapping, but guilty of second-degree kidnapping, and guilty of felony murder based on the underlying felony of first-degree kidnapping. 489 So.2d at 641-42. The Court of Criminal Appeals explained mutually exclusive verdicts, stating: Here, the jury's verdicts of not guilty of kidnapping in the first degree and guilty of felony-murder were mutually exclusive because, by statutory definition, felony murder involves causing a death during the commission or attempt to commit certain specific felonies including kidnapping in the first degree. Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-6-2(a)(3). Because of the very definition of the offenses, the defendant could not be guilty of felony-murder if he only committed kidnapping in the second degree. Conversely, if the defendant was guilty of felony-murder, he could not have been guilty of kidnapping in the second degree, but must have been guilty of kidnapping in the first degree. 489 So.2d at 642. Since Conway, there has been confusion over what verdicts are mutually exclusive and what are merely inconsistent. Decisions from other jurisdictions, which this Court finds persuasive, may be helpful in distinguishing between the two types of verdicts. We note that federal courts and a majority of state courts follow United States v. Powell in the area of inconsistent verdicts. Eric J. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 771, 787 (1998)(citing cases from jurisdictions addressing inconsistent verdicts of guilty and not guilty against a single defendant); see also 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 24.10(b)(2d ed.1999)(noting that most state courts have followed Dunn and Powell ); Annotation, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict as Between Different Counts of Indictment or Information, 18 A.L.R.3d. 259 §§ 2-3 (1968) (citing cases addressing the view that contrary verdicts convicting on some counts and acquitting on others need not be consistent). The states have been free to develop their own responses to the problem of inconsistent criminal jury verdicts because the Supreme Court found no constitutional dimension to the problem. See Powell, 469 U.S. at 65. Muller, 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 774 n. 7. There have been numerous Georgia cases concerning inconsistent verdicts and mutually exclusive verdicts. In Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 341 S.E.2d 216 (1986), the Supreme Court of Georgia adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Powell, supra, and abolished the rule in Georgia against inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases. In Milam, the defendant was charged with two murders, which were committed at the same time. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as to one murder and guilty but mentally ill as to the other murder. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the acquittal, ruling that there was no error inherent in the inconsistency. The holding in Milam stands for the proposition that a defendant cannot challenge as inconsistent a guilty verdict on one count and a not-guilty verdict on another count because it is not generally within the trial court's power to make inquiries into the jury's deliberations or to speculate as to the reasons for an inconsistency in the jury's verdict. However, in Thomas v. State, 199 Ga. App. 586, 405 S.E.2d 512 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Ga. 854, 413 S.E.2d 196 (1992), the Court of Appeals of Georgia noted that the `general rule dispensing with the necessity for consistency as between the acquittals and guilty verdicts under a multicount indictment or information is not ordinarily applied where the jury returns multiple convictions as to crimes which are mutually exclusive of each other' (quoting W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdicts as Between Different Counts of Indictment or Information, 18 A.L.R.3d 259, 283 (1968)). In Thomas, the defendant was found guilty of both armed robbery of a car and theft by receiving stolen property relating to the same car. The Georgia Court of Appeals noted that [a]n essential element of the crime of theft by receiving is `that the goods had been stolen by some person other than the accused.' 199 Ga. App. at 586, 405 S.E.2d at 514 (quoting Austin v. State, 89 Ga.App. 866, 868, 81 S.E.2d 508, 510 (1954)). The two verdicts required the defendant to have stolen the car and not to have stolen the car; therefore, the verdicts were mutually exclusive. Thomas. Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797, 471 S.E.2d 508 (1996), presents another example of mutually exclusive verdicts. In Dumas, the defendant was charged with malice murder, felony murder, vehicular homicide, and driving under the influence. At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of malice murder, vehicular homicide, and driving under the influence. In Georgia, malice murder is defined as the killing of another `with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied.' 266 Ga. at 799, 471 S.E.2d at 511 (quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-1(a) (1968)) (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Vehicular homicide is defined as killing another while operating a car, `without malice aforethought' and `without an intention to do so.'  Id. (quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-393(a) and (b) (1968)) (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Because the crime of malice murder required malice aforethought and vehicular homicide was defined as a killing without malice, the Georgia Supreme Court held that these two verdicts were mutually exclusive, killing both with and without an intention to do so. 266 Ga. at 799, 471 S.E.2d at 511. In Kimble v. State, 236 Ga.App. 391, 512 S.E.2d 306 (1999), the Court of Appeals of Georgia stated that in light of the abolition of the inconsistent-verdict rule (which applies to inconsistencies between verdicts of acquittal and verdicts of conviction), it was not necessary to vacate a conviction because of an acquittal on the predicate offense. [T]he issue is not whether an acquittal on one charge would logically necessitate acquittal on another charge on which the jury convicted the defendant; rather the sole question is whether the evidence viewed in favor of the conviction was sufficient to support the guilty verdict. 236 Ga.App. at 395, 512 S.E.2d at 309. In Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. 408, 577 S.E.2d 570 (2003), the Supreme Court of Georgia offered an explanation of mutually exclusive verdicts. In that case, the defendant was convicted of felony murder based on aggravated assault and of involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct arising out of the death of the same victim. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the two verdicts  finding the defendant guilty of felony murder and of involuntary manslaughter  were not mutually exclusive as a matter of law because felony murder, like involuntary manslaughter, does not require proof of a criminal intent to murder to support a conviction. 276 Ga. at 410, 577 S.E.2d at 573-74. The court explained that this, however, does not end the inquiry because both felony murder and involuntary manslaughter are predicated upon the commission or omission of another offense or act: [A] mutually exclusive verdict may be rendered in a particular case where the offenses or acts alleged in the indictment as underlying the felony murder and involuntary manslaughter counts reflect that the jury, in order to find the defendant guilty on both counts, necessarily reached `two positive findings of fact that cannot logically mutually exist.' Strong v. State, 223 Ga.App. 434, 436, 477 S.E.2d 866 (1996)(Beasley, C.J., dissenting), rev'd in Kimble v. State, 236 Ga.App. 391(1), 512 S.E.2d 306 (1999). To determine whether this occurred, the alleged underlying offenses or acts must be carefully scrutinized. 276 Ga. at 410-11, 577 S.E.2d at 574. The Georgia Supreme Court ultimately found these two verdicts mutually exclusive, stating, [v]erdicts are mutually exclusive 'where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other. [Cits.]' United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 69 fn. 8. Jackson, 276 Ga. at 410, 577 S.E.2d at 573. In a footnote, the court further clarified the difference between mutually exclusive verdicts and inconsistent verdicts, stating: [M]utually exclusive verdicts, which cannot both stand, result in two positive findings of fact which cannot logically mutually exist. Inconsistent verdicts, which do not introduce invalidity, bespeak a positive finding of fact as to one charge and the failure to make a positive finding of fact as to the other. The latter, which results in an acquittal, does not constitute a negative finding of fact but may be explained as compromise, mistake, or lenity. We can neither speculate nor inquire. 276 Ga. at 410, 577 S.E.2d at 574 n. 3 (emphasis added). Because aggravated assault, on which the felony-murder verdict in Jackson was based, required intentional infliction of injury, the requisite criminal negligence for involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct is precluded. Thus, [a] finding of guilt on the essential element of criminal intent for aggravated assault based on [the statute] thus excludes a finding of guilt based on the essential element of criminal negligence for reckless conduct. 276 Ga. at 412, 577 S.E.2d at 575 (footnote omitted). Therefore, the two verdicts were mutually exclusive. The Georgia Supreme Court has addressed cases where the jury returns mutually exclusive verdicts in two different settings: before the jury has been dismissed and after the jury has been dismissed. Where the jury returns mutually exclusive verdicts at trial, the trial court should refuse to accept the mutually exclusive verdicts and instruct the jury to continue deliberating. In Dumas, supra, the court held, the trial court was absolutely correct when it refused to accept the verdicts and sent the jury back to continue its deliberations. 266 Ga. at 799, 471 S.E.2d at 511. If the judge did not send the jury back to resolve its mutually exclusive verdicts before the jurors were dismissed, the Georgia Supreme Court, citing Thomas and Dumas, held: `[W]here there are mutually exclusive convictions, it is insufficient for an appellate court merely to set aside the lesser verdict, because to do so is to speculate about what the jury might have done if properly instructed, and to usurp the functions of both the jury and the trial court.' (Footnote omitted) [ Dumas, 266 Ga. at 799, 471 S.E.2d at 511]. Thus, where, as here, it was both legally and logically impossible to convict Jackson of both felony murder and involuntary manslaughter, we must reverse both mutually exclusive convictions and order a new trial. Jackson, 276 Ga. at 413, 577 S.E.2d at 575 (citations omitted). The rationale in Powell is based upon a guilty verdict and a not -guilty verdict. In a majority of courts, including Alabama's, a guilty verdict and a not -guilty verdict against a single defendant in the same trial does not entitle the defendant to relief. The resulting inconsistent verdict may arise from mistake or confusion, compromise, or lenity on the part of the jury. The defendant is afforded protection against jury irrationality or error by its review of the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial and whether that evidence could support a rational determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Powell Court stated, this review is independent of the jury's determination that evidence on another count was insufficient to support a guilty verdict on that count. We noted earlier that the Powell Court indicated that nothing in that opinion was intended to resolve the question in a case in which a defendant is found guilty of two crimes and a guilty verdict as to one crime logically excludes a finding of guilt as to the other crime. We agree with the Georgia courts; mutually exclusive verdicts are the result of two positive findings of fact that cannot logically coexist. In other words, it is legally impossible for the State to prove the elements of both crimes. In order to determine whether the guilty verdicts are mutually exclusive as a matter of law, the alleged underlying offenses or acts must be carefully scrutinized. The two guilty verdicts are not mutually exclusive if no element of one crime necessarily negates an element of the other. Mutually exclusive verdicts exist when a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a guilty verdict on another count. In contrast, inconsistent verdicts can exist where there is a verdict of guilty and another of not guilty, as when there are two guilty verdicts that are not mutually exclusive. Inconsistent criminal verdicts are permissible; mutually exclusive verdicts are not. There has been much confusion as to whether the verdicts returned against Heard were mutually exclusive or merely inconsistent. Heard was convicted of both capital murder and felony murder. According to Alabama law, a defendant must have the intent to kill in order to be found guilty of a capital offense. § 13A-5-40(b), Ala.Code 1975; Ex parte Woodall, 730 So.2d 652, 657 (Ala.1998)(No defendant can be found guilty of a capital offense unless he had an intent to kill, and that intent to kill cannot be supplied by the felony-murder doctrine.). Felony murder, on the other hand, does not require the specific intent to kill; it requires only the intent to commit the underlying felony. § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975; Mitchell v. State, 706 So.2d 787 (Ala.Crim. App.1997). The absence of an intent to kill, however, is not necessarily an element of felony murder, as contrasted with the intent to kill, which is an element of capital murder. In other words, a felony-murder conviction does not require proof that the defendant unintentionally killed the victim, only that the defendant intended to commit the underlying felony. Therefore, it is possible that a defendant intended to kill the victim (the element necessary for the capital conviction) while at the same time intending to commit an underlying felony (the element necessary for the felony-murder conviction). Therefore, the most that can be said of the verdicts finding Heard guilty both of capital murder and of felony murder is that they may be merely inconsistent. These two verdicts are not mutually exclusive; they do not contain mutually exclusive essential elements. Because these verdicts are not mutually exclusive, the verdicts should stand; [t]hat the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation of inquiry into such matters. Dunn, 284 U.S. at 394, 52 S.Ct. 189. [4] We recognize that the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a verdict of felony murder and a verdict of capital murder of the same victim are legally inconsistent because one murder cannot be both unintended and intended, Dorsey v. State, 881 So.2d 460 (Ala.Crim.App.2002), and this Court approved that rationale in Ex parte Dorsey. However, to the extent Dorsey conflicts with the rationale in the present case that verdicts finding the defendant guilty of felony murder and capital murder are not mutually exclusive, it is hereby overruled. Although neither party has asked this Court to overrule that holding in Dorsey and it is this Court's practice not to address issues not presented to us, the Court has a duty to resolve the conflict in the law to ensure that similarly situated defendants are treated in a like manner.