Opinion ID: 1881430
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to Disqualify State Attorney's Office and Trial Court

Text: In claims seven and eleven in the petition, Downs argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the trial court's denial of his motions to disqualify the State Attorney's Office for destroying relevant records and the trial judge based on her knowledge or awareness of inadmissible evidence. Both motions concerned the same evidencenamely the results of four polygraph tests given to Larry Johnson, one of the co-conspirators in this case and the person who testified against Downs as to the circumstances surrounding the murder. We find both claims to be without merit.
During the mid- to late 1980s, Downs filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in circuit court in Duval county to direct the State Attorney's Office to allow him to copy and inspect Johnson's polygraph test results. The circuit court dismissed the petition and the First District Court of Appeal reversed. See Downs v. Austin, 522 So.2d 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The district court held that the public records law did not exempt the polygraph test results from disclosure, and, therefore, Downs was entitled to them. In response to the writ of mandamus, Ed Austin, the State Attorney, stated that the polygraph results no longer existed as they had been destroyed by the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office at some point during the previous eleven years. During the resentencing proceeding, Downs filed a motion, pro se, to disqualify the State Attorney's Office. That motion alleged that the State had indicated in several proceedings in this case that a state witness (i.e., Johnson) had taken and passed a polygraph test; that the State destroyed the results of this test and was not able to disclose them in a post-trial public records request; that the State Attorney would be called as a witness during the resentencing proceeding; that the State Attorney's Office was a defendant in a civil suit filed by Downs; and that as a result of these grounds, the State Attorney was prejudiced against Downs. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that Downs had not made a sufficient showing to disqualify the State Attorney's Office. To disqualify the State Attorney's Office, a defendant must show substantial misconduct or actual prejudice. Farina v. State, 679 So.2d 1151 (Fla.1996) (holding actual prejudice not shown where state attorney improperly asked clerk's office to assign case to particular division), receded from on other grounds by Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312 (Fla.1997); State v. Clausell, 474 So.2d 1189, 1191 (Fla.1985). Actual prejudice is something more than the mere appearance of impropriety. Kearse v. State, 770 So.2d 1119, 1129 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Meggs v. McClure, 538 So.2d 518, 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)). Under these rules, none of the allegations in Downs' motion indicated actual prejudice. The fact that he initiated a civil suit against the State Attorney's Office to obtain copies of the polygraph test results and that the documents no longer existed does not, without more, indicate that the State was biased or prejudiced against him. Thus, it does not appear that the trial court erred in denying the motion to disqualify the State Attorney's Office. As a result, Downs' appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue this claim on appeal. See Rutherford, 774 So.2d at 643 (holding that appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise on appeal a nonmeritorious claim).
For similar reasons, we also find claim eleven to be without merit. The record indicates that in January 1989, Downs filed a pro se motion to disqualify Judge Dorothy Pate from presiding over the resentencing proceeding. [10] Downs attached to the motion two affidavits in support of his claim: one by Roberto Arias, his court-appointed attorney, and one by himself, filed on his own behalf. Arias stated in his affidavit that because the State presented evidence of Johnson's polygraph results (i.e., that he was telling the truth about not being the triggerman), the court was in the untenable position of having to disregard evidence which it has already heard. Downs' affidavit stated the same and added a few other allegations namely, that the State had presented evidence of the polygraph results, that the State had his since destroyed those tests, that the court had refused Downs' request to take a polygraph test, and that the court had exhibited prejudice in its rulings and warnings to the defense. The affidavits were based, in part, on the fact that during the initial trial in 1978, the State made reference to the fact that Johnson had taken and passed polygraph tests. The trial court denied the motion on the ground it was legally insufficient. In the instant habeas petition, Downs argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court had improperly denied his motion to disqualify the judge. However, we find this claim to be without merit because Downs' motion to disqualify failed to demonstrate any bias or prejudice. In Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083 (Fla.1983), we set forth the requirements for a motion to disqualify a trial judge: First, there must be a verified statement of the specific facts which indicate a bias or prejudice requiring disqualification. Second, the application must be timely made. Third, the judge with respect to whom the motion is made may only determine whether the motion is legally sufficient and is not allowed to pass on the truth of the allegations. Id. at 1086; see also Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160. To be legally sufficient, a motion to disqualify must demonstrate some actual bias or prejudice so as to create a reasonable fear that a fair trial cannot be had. Dragovich v. State, 492 So.2d 350, 353 (Fla.1986); see also Thompson v. State, 759 So.2d 650 (Fla.2000) (A motion to disqualify a judge `must be well-founded and contain facts germane to the judge's undue bias, prejudice, or sympathy.') (quoting Rivera v. State, 717 So.2d 477, 480-81 (Fla.1998)). In determining whether the motion is legally sufficient, this Court looks to see whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in the fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial. Correll v. State, 698 So.2d 522 (Fla.1997) (quoting Livingston, 441 So.2d at 1087). Here, Judge Pate presided over the initial trial, the initial 3.850 proceedings and the resentencing proceedings. The fact that this judge may have learned that Johnson passed a polygraph test, without more, did not create a reasonable fear that a fair and impartial trial could not be had. See, e.g., Dragovich, 492 So.2d at 353 (holding that appellant's allegation that trial judge had a fixed opinion about appellant because judge presided over trial of appellant's codefendant did not establish actual bias or prejudice so as to create a reasonable fear that a fair trial could not be had). Downs has alleged no facts to show that the mere knowledge of Johnson's polygraph test results actually biased or prejudiced Judge Pate or otherwise caused her to disregard her obligations of impartiality and sentence Downs to death. The remaining allegations in the motion also appear to be legally insufficient. First, the fact that the State Attorney's Office lost or destroyed the polygraph results does not indicate any bias on behalf of the judge. Second, the fact that the trial court during the resentencing proceedings denied Downs' request to take a polygraph is not a legally sufficient reason for disqualification. This Court has repeatedly held that an adverse ruling does not provide a legally sufficient basis for disqualification. See Thompson, 759 So.2d at 659 ([T]he fact that a judge has ruled adversely to the party in the past does not constitute a legally sufficient ground for a motion to disqualify.); Correll, 698 So.2d at 525 (However, an adverse ruling is not sufficient to establish bias or prejudice.). Because Downs failed to present any facts indicative of actual bias or prejudice on the part of Judge Pate, his motion was legally insufficient. [11] As a result, this claim would have been rejected on appeal as being without merit. Appellate counsel cannot be faulted for failing to argue a nonmeritorious claim on appeal. See Rutherford, 774 So.2d at 643.