Opinion ID: 2996779
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Length of the Detentions

Text: An excessive length of detention may be sufficient to violate the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), that an officer’s “on-the-scene assessment of probable cause” justifies an arrest and “a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest.” Id. at 113-14. The Court also held that individuals arrested without a warrant are entitled to a timely and judicial determination of probable cause prior to “extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” Id. at 114; see also id. at 126. The Court left unspecified in Gerstein just how “promptly” a probable cause determination had to be made, see id. at 125, but in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), the Court clarified that a determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours is presumptively reasonable, see id. at 56. In the case of detentions over forty10 No. 03-1329 eight hours, the government bears the burden of proving an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance which justifies the delay. Id. at 57. County of Riverside is generally invoked to evaluate cases involving extended detention because the forty-eight hour framework governs the length of time which may elapse before a probable cause hearing. See, e.g., Kyle v. Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 696 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 819-21 (7th Cir. 1997). Here, neither extended detention of the plaintiffs nor probable cause hearings were contemplated. Rather, police held the plaintiffs only while they completed their processing. County of Riverside is relevant to this discussion, nonetheless, because the Court noted in County of Riverside that unreasonable delays, even within the forty-eight hour period, may be constitutionally troublesome. See County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56. The Court specified: “Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake.” Id. Thus, under Gerstein and County of Riverside, the length of time taken to complete administrative steps incident to arrest must be reasonable. This court has addressed previously the reasonableness of the length of detention during administrative steps. In Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1985), we required defendants to explain why individuals spent more than four hours in jail after they were arrested in the middle of the night for a minor offense. See id. at 135051. Similarly, in Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1986), an individual was arrested for shoplifting and detained for four hours in the middle of the night. See id. at 437. As to the length of detention, we noted: No. 03-1329 11 It is premature to say how long is too long under the fourth amendment. On remand the police should ex- plain what must be done after an arrest for shoplifting and why reasonably diligent officers need more than four hours to do it. The court also should determine whether four hours is an acceptable period for a nonviolent misdemeanor. Id. We also suggested that “[i]f the police choose to perform time-consuming tasks after an arrest, perhaps they must do so on their own time rather than the suspect’s, issuing a citation rather than keeping the suspect locked up in the interim.” Id. We later stated that the reasonableness of a length of detention typically “is a question best left open for juries to answer based on the facts presented in each case.” Lewis v. O’Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that an eleven-hour detention of individual waiting to be discharged presented a jury question). All but one of these plaintiffs was held for longer than four hours at PPS. Many were held substantially longer than four hours. Under Moore and Gramenos, we require an explanation for the length of the plaintiffs’ detentions. See also Arlotta v. Bradley Center, No. 03-1584, slip op. at 11 (7th Cir. Nov. 18, 2003) (evaluating government’s explanation of the length of detention of an individual arrested as part of the Bradley Center initiative). The defendants explain the length of the detention as a product of backlog. They note that PPS is the processing facility for the downtown area, that PPS is busiest in late evening to early morning and that the arrest of large groups can cause a backlog at PPS. The defendants also note that supervisors monitored the progress of the booking process and that arresting officers processed the paperwork as quickly as they could, given the number of arrestees for which each was responsible and the number of arrestees at 12 No. 03-1329 PPS. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, have not argued that the detention times were the result of “delay for delay’s sake,” County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56, or for any other 3 impermissible reason. They merely assert that the times were unreasonably long. The detention times of the plaintiffs, on average, were significantly longer than the four-hour periods which gave us pause in Moore and Gramenos and which another panel of this court evaluated in Arlotta. Nonetheless, in the absence of any evidence of improper purpose for the delay, we believe the government has provided a sufficient explanation. Cf. Gramenos, 797 F.2d at 436-37 (noting lack of evidence of time required to complete tasks and evidence of punitive intent); Moore, 754 F.2d at 1350-51 (noting absence of any evidence justifying length of detention). The Supreme Court cautioned in County of Riverside that, in evaluating the reasonableness of delay, “courts must allow a substantial degree of flexibility.” County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56. The Court warned: Courts cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in transporting arrested persons from one facility to an- 3 We have reviewed the record carefully and have discovered no evidence that the plaintiffs were held for any improper purpose. See Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting additional evidence that police held individual “out of spite—or perhaps to impose the real punishment for shoplifting”). Although Lieutenant Edman described the initiative as a “more affirmative action,” R.27, Ex.F at 38, that statement must be considered in the context of the perceived ineffectiveness of citations given on the scene. Alone, the comment does not provide evidence of improper purpose. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have not argued that police held them out of spite or with intent to punish. No. 03-1329 13 other, handling late-night bookings where no magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an arresting officer who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the premises of an arrest, and other practical realities. Id. at 56-57. The Court issued this warning in reference to determinations about the reasonableness of delay in probable cause determinations, but the circumspection the Court advises applies to this situation as well. We must conclude, therefore, that the length of the plaintiffs’ detentions was not constitutionally unreasonable given the natural backlog in processing at PPS.