Opinion ID: 1756976
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue of material factfraudulent concealment

Text: For his first point for reversal, Mr. Hampton contends that the trial court erred in failing to find an issue of material fact with respect to Ms. Taylor's alleged fraudulent concealment of the existence of his cause of action. There is no merit in his argument. Summary judgment is a remedy that should only be granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact to litigate and when the case can be decided as a matter of law. Birchfield v. Nationwide Insurance, 317 Ark. 38, 875 S.W.2d 502 (1994). The movant for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Wright v. Compton, Prewett, Thomas & Hickey, P.A., 315 Ark. 213, 866 S.W.2d 387 (1993). Once the moving party makes a prima facie showing of entitlement, however, the responding party must meet proof with proof in order to demonstrate that there is remaining a genuine issue of material fact. Mount Olive Water Ass'n v. City of Fayetteville, 313 Ark. 606, 856 S.W.2d 864 (1993). The response and supporting material must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. On appeal, this court's review is limited to examining the evidentiary items presented and determining whether the trial court correctly ruled that those items left all material facts undisputed. Hardie v. Estate of Davis, 312 Ark. 189, 848 S.W.2d 417 (1993). We review the facts in the light most favorable to the appellant and resolve all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id. The tort of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit consists of five elements which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a false representation of a material fact; (2) knowledge that the representation is false or that there is insufficient evidence upon which to make the representation; (3) intent to induce action or inaction in reliance upon the representation; (4) justifiable reliance on the representation; and (5) damage suffered as a result of the reliance. Roach v. Concord Boat Corp., 317 Ark. 474, 880 S.W.2d 305 (1994); Wheeler Motor Co. v. Roth, 315 Ark. 318, 867 S.W.2d 446 (1993). The applicable statute of limitations is the three-year period provided in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105 (1987). The statutory limitation period begins to run, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the wrong occurs, not when it is discovered. Wright v. Compton, Prewett, Thomas & Hickey, supra . In the present case, it is undisputed that the dates on which Ms. Taylor's alleged misrepresentations were made were April 24, 1989, and May 3, 1989. The latter date is controlling for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations. Mr. Hampton insists that the earliest date on which he could have been apprised of the misrepresentations was November 23, 1989, when the promissory note came due. He asserts that he made significant inquiry of Ms. Taylor and was provided with false information during a time well within three years prior to filing the suit. This course of conduct, he maintains, amounted to a fraudulent act that tolled the statute of limitations. In support of his contention, he refers to the following passage from Wilson v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 311 Ark. 84, 87, 841 S.W.2d 619, 620-1 (1992): No mere ignorance on the part of the plaintiff of his rights, nor the mere silence of one who is under no obligation to speak, will prevent the statute bar. There must be some positive act of fraud, something so furtively planned and secretly executed as to keep the plaintiff's cause of action concealed, or perpetrated in a way that it conceals itself. And if the plaintiff, by reasonable diligence, might have detected the fraud, he is presumed to have had reasonable knowledge of it. Quoting Scroggin Farms Corp. v. Howell, 216 Ark. 569, 572-3, 226 S.W.2d 562, 565 (1950); and McKneely v. Terry, 61 Ark. 527, 545, 33 S.W. 953, 957 (1896). See also First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Stoltz, 311 Ark. 313, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), where the same quotation appears. The language from Wilson and Stoltz , however, in fact bolsters Ms. Taylor's position. There is no evidence of record that Ms. Taylor committed a positive act of fraud. Instead, Mr. Hampton merely stated in his answers to interrogatories that Ms. Taylor was, as the secretary for GCP, Inc., familiar with the promissory note and assignments, yet told representatives of Thermal-Tec and Triple T that The bank has been paid, send payment directly to us. This allegation reveals no furtive planning or secret execution of a fraudulent act to keep Mr. Hampton's cause of action concealed. Neither does the bare assertion in Mr. Hampton's affidavit that he had made periodic inquiry of Ms. Taylor about the accounts receivable between May 26, 1989, and March 9, 1990, and was told that they were all in good standing. From the corporate perspective, the accounts receivable were indeed in good standing. Mr. Hampton's statement in his affidavit that Donna Taylor did not tell me that the accounts receivable assigned to the First National Bank had been paid directly to GCP, Inc., as a result of her misrepresentation fails to establish a positive act of fraud. Moreover, none of Mr. Hampton's assertions satisfies the five elements of misrepresentation. His unsupported allegations simply do not prove that Ms. Taylor made a false representation of a material fact; that she knew her representations were false or that she had insufficient information on which to base them; that she intended to induce action or inaction on Mr. Hampton's part in reliance upon her representations; that Mr. Hampton justifiably relied upon the representations; or that he suffered damage as a result of the reliance. See Roach v. Concord Boat Corp., supra . An affidavit stating only conclusions is not sufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact. Mount Olive Water Ass'n v. City of Fayetteville, supra . Hence, no proof was submitted to the circuit court that would suffice to toll the statute of limitations. The circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment.