Opinion ID: 6349251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mathews’s Conviction and Sentence

Text: In 1990, the leader of Mathews’s motorcycle gang kicked him out of the gang. In retaliation, Mathews and an accomplice placed a “bomb packed with steel balls (to increase the risk of personal injury)” in the alley beside the gang leader’s home. United States v. Mathews, 120 F.3d 185, 186 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Aug. 6, 1997). A man 4 UNITED STATES V. MATHEWS unaffiliated with either Mathews or his target walked down the alley collecting cans and picked up the box that had the bomb in it. Id. The bomb detonated, and the man suffered serious injuries. Id. Mathews was convicted of multiple felonies. Relevant here, he was convicted of maliciously damaging or destroying property by means of an explosive, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (the property-damage conviction), and of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (the firearm conviction). An explosive device is a “firearm” under Section 924(c), and when a conviction under this statute is based on use of an explosive device, it carries a 30-year mandatory, consecutive sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). After several appeals, Mathews was sentenced to 495 months’ imprisonment, 360 months of which were for the firearm conviction. B. The Supreme Court’s Johnson and Davis Decisions Section 924(c)(3) defines a “crime of violence” as any felony that “(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” or a felony “(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Subsection A is commonly referred to as the “elements” clause, while subsection B is referred to as the “residual” clause. Davis, __ U.S. at __, 139 S. Ct. at 2324. In 2015, the Supreme Court struck down a similarly worded “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act as unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 597–98 (2015). Mathews then moved under UNITED STATES V. MATHEWS 5 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his firearm conviction, arguing that it rested on the residual clause in Section 924(c)(3)(B). The district court received briefing from both parties, but it did not decide the motion. Then, in 2019, the Supreme Court also struck down Section 924(c)(3)’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Davis, __ U.S. at __, 139 S. Ct. at 2336. Mathews raised the Davis decision to the district court in a supplemental brief. C. The District Court’s Decision Two months after the Davis decision, the district court denied Mathews’s Section 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, holding that his property-damage conviction was a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3). The district court did not apply the categorical approach to determine whether the property-damage conviction was a crime of violence but instead held that “the primary purpose of the categorical approach is to effectuate the intent of Congress,” and thus it was “bound” by our 1994 decision in Mathews’s direct appeal stating that Congress intended for bombing under 28 U.S.C. § 844(i) to be a crime of violence under Section 924(c). We granted Mathews a certificate of appealability. Case No. 19-56110, Dkt. No. 5. Before either party submitted briefing, the Government filed an unopposed motion to vacate Mathews’s conviction and remand for resentencing. The Government concedes that, under the categorical approach, Mathews’s property-damage conviction is not a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. We denied the Government’s unopposed motion “without prejudice to renewing its arguments in the answering brief” and “express[ed] no opinion as to the merits of the appeal.” Case No. 19-56110, Dkt. No. 7. 6 UNITED STATES V. MATHEWS