Opinion ID: 2844076
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Immunity as to IGRA Claim

Text: We now turn to whether the Individual Defendants, individuals sued in their official capacity, enjoy immunity from Alabama’s IGRA claim. We hold that they do not. Because Alabama alleges that the Individual Defendants are committing ongoing violations of IGRA, a federal law, and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the violations, the officials are not entitled to immunity. In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to sovereign immunity in lawsuits against state officials for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief to stop ongoing violations of federal law. 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908). Under the legal fiction established in Ex Parte Young, when a state official violates federal law, he is stripped of his official or representative character and no longer immune from suit. Id. at 159-60. “An allegation of an ongoing violation of federal law where the requested relief is prospective is ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young fiction,” such that the state officer is not immune from suit. Idaho v. Couer d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997). We previously have extended the Ex parte Young doctrine to tribal officials. Although tribal officials are generally entitled to immunity for acts taken in their official capacity and within the scope of their authority, “they are subject to suit under the doctrine of Ex parte Young when they act beyond their authority” by 14 Case: 14-12004 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 15 of 42 violating a federal statute. Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians (Tamiami III), 177 F.3d 1212, 1225 (11th Cir. 1999). Because Alabama alleges that the Individual Defendants are engaged in ongoing conduct that violates federal law, the Individual Defendants are not entitled to immunity. 19 In an attempt to avoid the application of Ex parte Young, the Individual Defendants argue that the “Supreme Court [in Seminole Tribe I] held that the Ex parte Young theory is not available in IGRA enforcement actions between tribes and states.” Appellees’ Br. at 52. We disagree. The Supreme Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe I addressed only whether Ex parte Young permitted a state official to be sued under the provision of IGRA that gives a tribe an express cause of action to sue to compel a state to negotiate in good faith a tribal-state compact governing class III gaming based on the limited remedial scheme available to a tribe to vindicate this right. See 517 U.S. at 47. Seminole Tribe I neither addressed nor decided whether state and tribal officials are immune from other IGRA-based 19 Several other circuits similarly have held that the Ex parte Young doctrine applies to make tribal officials subject to suit to enjoin ongoing violations of the Constitution or federal law. See Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1154 (10th Cir. 2011) (“recognizing Ex parte Young as an exception not just to state sovereign immunity but also to tribal sovereign immunity”); Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 750 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Faced with allegations of ongoing constitutional and treaty violations, and a prospective request for injunctive relief, officers of the Cherokee Nation cannot seek shelter in the tribe’s sovereign immunity”); Burlington N.& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the Ex parte Young doctrine “has been extended to tribal officials sued in their official capacity”); N. States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Cmty., 991 F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Ex parte Young applies to the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes, just as it does to state sovereign immunity.”). 15 Case: 14-12004 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 16 of 42 claims to enforce rights for which the statute does not set forth such a detailed, limited remedial scheme. In Seminole Tribe I, the tribe sued the governor of Florida in his official capacity, as well as the state of Florida, seeking injunctive relief after the governor refused to negotiate a tribal-state compact governing class III gaming. Id. at 51-52. The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit against Florida and that the governor also enjoyed immunity. The Ex parte Young doctrine did not apply to the tribe’s claim against the governor for failing to negotiate a compact in good faith because “Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right.” Id. at 72, 74. Under this detailed scheme, a tribe has only a “modest” remedy when a state fails to negotiate a compact in good faith: [T]he only remedy prescribed is an order directing the State and the Indian tribe to conclude a compact within 60 days. And if the parties disregard the court’s order and fail to conclude a compact within the 60–day period, the only sanction is that each party then must submit a proposed compact to a mediator who selects the one which best embodies the terms of the Act. Finally, if the State fails to accept the compact selected by the mediator, the only sanction against it is that the mediator shall notify the Secretary of the Interior who then must prescribe regulations governing class III gaming on the tribal lands at issue. Id. at 74-75 (construing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)). The Supreme Court explained that applying the Ex parte Young doctrine—which would permit a tribe to sue a 16 Case: 14-12004 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 17 of 42 state official for broad injunctive relief to compel negotiations—would be inconsistent with and undermine the limited remedy IGRA sets forth. Id. at 75 (“[I]t is difficult to see why an Indian tribe would suffer through the intricate scheme of § 2710(d)(7) when more complete and more immediate relief would be available under Ex parte Young.”). The Supreme Court did not address the argument that the Individual Defendants raise here: whether the Ex parte Young doctrine applies when a state sues a tribal official under 18 U.S.C. § 1166 seeking to enjoin class III gaming. Reviewing this issue of first impression, we hold that the Ex parte Young doctrine applies to a claim under § 1166. In Seminole Tribe I, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to Ex parte Young that applies when a federal statute contains a detailed remedial scheme. Id. at 74-75; see also Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that the Seminole Tribe I exception applies only “if we can discern an intent to displace Ex parte Young suits through the establishment of a more limited remedial regime”). As described in more detail in Section V, infra, in § 1166 Congress created no remedy for a state to enforce directly its gaming laws on Indian lands, much less a detailed remedial scheme. In the absence of such a remedial regime, we cannot conclude that Congress intended § 1166 to displace Ex parte Young. 17 Case: 14-12004 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 18 of 42