Opinion ID: 2606599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: substantial and substantive evidentiary conflict disposition

Text: As a summary-judgment subject, some consideration of the testimony of the other witnesses as reflected by depositions and affidavits is authoritatively justified. Barnes testified: A.    I was just a few miles from the rig, and I got behind a water truck and stayed behind him for a while. And he was in the middle of the road. So I moved off to the right shoulder of the road so he could see me in his mirror. And I'm sure that he saw me, because as soon as I saw him, you know, facing, you know, facing towards the mirror, he moved over to the side. And I didn't pass him right away. But after he was clear over to the side, I was still trying to look around him, but it was too dusty. But I took it that he was giving me the okay to pass, so I went out around him. And I guess about halfway or half the length of the truck is when I hit the other guy.       A.    The water truck was in the middle of the road, and I went, you know, to the side of the shoulder, and I couldn't see much around. Q. You went to the side, the right-hand side? A. The right-hand side, yeah, so he could see me, because the dust was pretty bad on the left side. And I won't say that he did see me, but I thought for sure that he did at the time, because as soon as I thought that he had seen me, he moved over on the side of the road.          Q. Now you say the water truck was in the middle of the road as you were following him; is that right? A. Yes, sir. Q. Isn't this road wide enough for two cars to pass? A. It is. Q. So it's a two-lane road; is that correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. Why was the water truck in the middle of the road, if you know? A. I don't know. Q. There was no reason  A. No, no reason. Q.  for him to be in the middle of the road, was there? A. No. Q. And the dust cloud that the water truck was kicking up, there was just no way to see through it? A. No. Q. Either the right-hand side or the left-hand side of the vehicle? A. The right-hand side was pretty clear; it was just the left side that you couldn't see too well. Q. Could you see around the vehicle, the water truck, if you went over to the right? A. Yeah, I could have, if he would have stayed, you know, more to the middle of the road. But as it was, he turned or went off to the right side.       A.    It's common courtesy in the oil field for any kind of truck, big or small, if a guy is going to be poking along, you know, and everything is going good, just move over to the side, pull over, or even stop, and let somebody around him. Q. That's not only common courtesy, that would be a safe practice, wouldn't it? A. Yes, sir. From the summary-judgment status of this case, it is assumed by the parties and reasonably demonstrated by the evidence that Barnes was negligent as to England in attempting to pass Simmons when he did. See §§ 31-5-204 and 31-5-205, W.S. 1977, 1984 Replacement. Ludeman, who was in the passenger side of the Barnes vehicle, added: Q. So you just remember approaching the truck, and at that point as you approached the back of the truck you couldn't see around the truck; is that correct? A. Yeah. You could say that, yeah. Q. Now, tell me as best you can remember and as specifically as you can remember exactly what happened as he approached the rear end of that truck. A. Mike said something, but I don't remember what he said. Anyway, it had to do with passing the truck or what the truck was doing. And I looked and I could see his brake lights on. Q. You could see the truck's brake lights? A. Yeah, on the passenger's side, because the driver's side was in the dust. Q. Okay. So you could only see basically half of the truck? A. Right. Q. So it was a pretty thick dust cloud at that point then, wasn't it? A. Yeah, right behind the truck it was, yes. And as he  as the truck pulled off the road, we figured he was letting us by. Q. Did the truck pull to the right? A. To the right. Q. And did you notice if the truck slowed down any? A. Yeah, he had his brake lights on. He was slowing down because Mike was slowing down. We had followed him for a while. Q. Okay. So you say the one brake light and you saw the truck pull to the right? A. Uh-huh. Q. And did you say anything to Mr. Barnes? A. Yeah. Q. Or did he say anything? A. I said he was pulling over. I said, `His brake light is on and he's pulling over.'       Q. And the brake lights stayed on all that time? A. While I was looking at them, yes, they were on. Q. Did it appear to you that the truck was continuing to slow down? A. Yeah, it looked to me like he was pulling over to let us around is exactly what it looks like. Apropos of the status of the deposition evidence, it is noteworthy that England saw Simmons for about a half mile before the accident and Simmons only saw England for a hundred yards. With the foregoing as a general indication of the factual state of the record, it is now necessary to examine the two bases on which the majority justify summary judgment: (1) no issue of fact existed for jury determination; [1] and (2) Simmons was not liable to England as a matter of law because he owed no duty to ensure Barnes a fair opportunity to pass in order to avoid endangering the oncoming vehicles. It is inappropriate to say as a determined fact that Simmons was driving in the middle of the road even in the face of the probability factors existent, but certainly the status of an evidentiary conflict cannot be questioned. I do not doubt that a jury familiar with Wyoming's geography could find that Simmons was driving in the middle of the road for the distance of between a half mile and four miles, and that the Barnes pickup followed the semi truck loaded with salt water in a continued effort to pass the slower-moving truck. Consequently, any justification for disposing of this case by summary judgment on the absence of an issue of fact lacks support in the record. I find a decision on this category of summary judgment similar to Toltec Watershed Improvement District v. Johnston, Wyo., 717 P.2d 808 (1986), again demonstrating that an overbroad summary judgment analysis which includes an evaluation of the presence of factual issues is inapposite where summary judgment is really being decided on a dispositive question of law. See Cordova v. Gosar, supra.