Opinion ID: 2600070
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Instructions on considering unadjudicated criminal activity

Text: In instructing on the evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity admitted under factor (b), the trial court informed the jury: Before a juror may consider any of such criminal act or activity as an aggravating circumstance in this case, a juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did in fact commit such criminal act or activity. . . . [¶] If any juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that such criminal activity occurred, that juror may consider that activity as a fact in aggravation. If a juror is not so convinced, that juror must not consider that evidence for any purpose. (CALJIC No. 8.87 (1989 rev.) (5th ed. 1988) pars. 2, 3.) In connection with this charge, the trial court also instructed with the second paragraph of CALJIC No. 2.90, which defines the reasonable doubt standard. Defendant claims the trial court erred when instructing the jury on how to consider the evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity because it omitted the first paragraph of the standard reasonable doubt instruction, which would have informed the jury about the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [28] We reject defendant's claim. As we have previously made clear, when, as here, the jury is instructed it may consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity as a factor in aggravation only after being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the alleged criminal activity, no more is required. ( People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 263; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 810 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330] [the reasonable doubt standard in this setting provides the substance of the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden of proof].) Defendant argues that the failure to instruct on the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden of proof was error here because the trial court misinformed the jury by remarking, In this type of a proceeding, there are many rules of evidence that don't apply because, remember, we are not talking about guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court's comment was not a misstatement of law. [T]he focus of the penalty selection phase of a capital trial is more normative and less factual than the guilt phase. The penalty jury's principal task is the moral endeavor of deciding whether the death sentence should be imposed on a defendant who has already been determined to be `death eligible' as a result of the findings and verdict reached at the guilt phase. ( People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1267 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475].) Furthermore, given the entire charge, it is not reasonably likely the jury understood the trial court's comment as a call to ignore the given instruction on the reasonable doubt standard applicable to evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity. Defendant's suggestion to the contrary is not persuasive on this record.