Opinion ID: 622858
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The sentence was procedurally unreasonable.3

Text: Phillips argues that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court “failed to consider the materiality of factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553, in sentencing” him. Phillips’s Br. at 20. More specifically, Phillips submits that the district court failed to take into consideration his difficult childhood and his physical condition. 3 We review the district court’s sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005). The party challenging the sentence has the burden of showing its unreasonableness, and we give due deference to the district court’s judgment. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330-32 (3d Cir. 2006). Although arguments “B” through “D” may be waived, we choose to address them on the merits. 5 In determining the appropriate sentence, the sentencing court must first select the applicable Guideline range after disposing of any motions, and any non frivolous arguments of counsel. It must then consider the various sentencing factors codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006). The court is not required to make findings as to each § 3553(a) factor “if the record otherwise makes clear that the court took the factors into account.” United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The record here shows that the district court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors. The district court acknowledged that it had received and read Phillips’s sentencing memorandum in which Phillips described at length his difficult childhood. The court expressed some sympathy for the defendant’s difficult background, but the court also expressed appropriate concern for the nature and seriousness of the crime, commenting on both the vulnerability of the victim of the assault and the seriousness of the harm that firearm offenses cause to the community. The court nevertheless empathized with Phillips. The court told him: “I regret that life has been hard on you, I really do,” but noted that Phillips’s past crimes had caused harm to others. The court stated, “it’s with a very heavy heart that I see somebody like you before me and facing – you know, this could be life imprisonment.” Nevertheless, the court properly concluded it could not readily ignore the violent nature of the offense of conviction and Phillips’s prior conviction for a “brutal” rape. The court noted that Phillips committed two drug trafficking crimes, one shortly after committing the rape and the other not long after he was granted parole. It stated: 6 “Palpably, society must protect itself from recidivists like the defendant.” Finally, the court noted that Phillips was “certainly a candidate for an upward variance,” but based on his age, it chose to impose a sentence within the guidelines range. Although the district court did not expressly delineate the § 3553(a) factors in its discussion, it is clear from the record that the district court did consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors in imposing the sentence. Accordingly, we find that the district court’s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable. C. The district court allowed counsel adequate time to review the 1997 conviction. In arguing that the court did not allow his counsel enough time to review the reverse side of the bill of information relating to his 1997 drug conviction, Phillips misstates the facts. When the government produced the certified records of Phillips’s convictions at sentencing and his trial counsel claimed that he had not previously seen the back of the bill of information,4 the district court offered Phillips’s counsel a continuance. Phillips’s counsel declined noting that Phillips was “not at all prejudiced” by proceeding with the sentencing, and counsel conceded that the certified records clearly identified the drug involved as cocaine thus establishing that the 1997 conviction was a predicate for armed career criminal status. D. The district court afforded counsel an opportunity to be heard. Phillips contends that the district court denied him due process because it failed to give his trial counsel an opportunity to comment on matters relating to the sentence, in 4 The government contended at the sentencing hearing, and continues to contend here, that a copy of both sides of the bill of information for the 1997 drug conviction had been sent to Phillips’s counsel several weeks before the sentencing. 7 violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32. Phillips notes that at the sentencing hearing, after he addressed the district court and prior to this imposition of sentence, his trial counsel asked the court, “May I be heard, your Honor.” The district court responded: Yes, you’re certainly welcome to support your client, that’s for sure. And, you know, as I said to you when you pled guilty, sentencing in Federal Court is complicated business and you certainly got a hefty dose of that this morning. However, Phillips further notes that immediately after saying that, the district court imposed its sentence upon him. Nonetheless, after imposing the sentence, the following exchange took place between his trial counsel and the court: Trial Counsel: Correct. Your Honor, perhaps I didn’t make myself clear. What I wanted to do before the Court imposed sentence was to address the Court on sentence. Court: Oh. Trial Counsel: However, briefly. Court: Well, he had the last word, I’m sorry, I have to give him the last word, as you know. Phillips contends that his trial counsel wanted to present argument to the district court on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, but the court denied him that opportunity, thereby denying him due process in violation of Rule 32. Two subsections of amended Rule 32 concern defense counsel’s right to address the court at sentencing. Rule 32(i)(1)(C) concerns the presentence report and provides that the court “must allow the parties’ attorneys to comment on the probation officer’s determinations and on other matters relating to an appropriate sentence.” Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i) states that “[b]efore imposing sentence, the court must . . . provide the 8 defendant’s attorney an opportunity to speak on the defendant’s behalf.” We can therefore assume that Phillips argument is based on Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i). Our review of a district court’s compliance with Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 is plenary. United States v. Cherry, 10 F.3d 1003, 1013 (3d Cir. 1993). If a defendant objects to a Rule 32 error, we may conduct a harmless error analysis. A non-constitutional error is harmless where the government establishes that “it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.” United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The “high probability” standard “requires that [the court] have a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendant[],” but does not require the government to disprove every reasonable possibility of prejudice. Id. at 266 (citation omitted). Here, assuming arguendo that the court violated Rule 32 (i)(4)(A)(i), we have no doubt that any such error was harmless. This was an “egregious case.” Phillips used an illegally possessed hand gun to bludgeon a disabled man in the man’s own home. The district court saw the videotape of the beating and made a first-hand evaluation of the nature and severity of the assault. Phillips’s criminal history, which included a rape, confirmed his violent nature. The dates of his drug trafficking convictions, which occurred while he was on bail in the rape case and not long after his release, plainly showed that his exposure to the justice system had not deterred him in the least bit from criminal conduct. Moreover, the district court was fully aware of Phillips’s mitigating information. The PSR described his background of childhood deprivation and abuse. In his 9 sentencing memorandum, which the district court acknowledged having read, Phillips’s counsel argued for leniency based on Phillips’s deprived and abusive childhood. It also detailed that positive changes that Phillips claimed to have made and to be making in his life. His sister, his fiancée and Phillips himself addressed the district court, making the same assertions and asking for leniency. Moreover, Phillips does not claim that there is anything his counsel could have said to the district court that would have persuaded the district court to impose a lower sentence. Indeed, the district court said had considered Phillips to be “a candidate for an upward variance,” but it exercised leniency and sentenced Phillips to less than the maximum advisory guideline range. It appears that the court did that based on its consideration of Phillips’s very real hardships even though Phillips now claims the court ignored those hardships in imposing sentence.