Opinion ID: 1889175
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Mitchell Framework When a Witness Asserts an Invalid Privilege

Text: Although we have determined that Vega-Lara did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against testifying at Morales's trial, this conclusion does not end our analysis. We must next address the State's second assertion that the holdings in State v. Mitchell, 268 Minn. 513, 130 N.W.2d 128 (1964) and Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S.Ct. 1151, 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963), do not apply to a situation where a witness claims an invalid privilege. The State argues that because Vega-Lara did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege, the holdings in Mitchell and Namet do not apply, and the State's calling and questioning of Vega-Lara was proper. Morales argues that even if Vega-Lara did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege, the State's questioning of Vega-Lara was reversible error under the holdings in Mitchell and Namet . In Mitchell, a defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the State's direct examination of a co-conspirator who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to answer questions was prejudicial error because the State knew that the witness would claim immunity and that the only purpose of calling him was to discredit defendant with the jury. 268 Minn. at 515, 130 N.W.2d at 130. In addressing the defendant's claim, we first explained in Mitchell that a witness's claim of privilege can be prejudicial to a defendant because the refusal to answer a question invites the fact-finder to make inferences about what the answer to the question would have been had the witness answered. Id. at 516, 130 N.W.2d at 130 (citing United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir.1959)). Given that the individual is refusing to testify under the privilege against self-incrimination, the tendency for a fact finder is to draw unfavorable inferences about the witness's likely answer. See id. at 516, 130 N.W.2d at 130. In those circumstances, a fact-finder is likely to impute the perceived culpability of the witness to the defendant. See id. at 516, 130 N.W.2d at 130. Accordingly, we held that calling a witness who the prosecutor knows will claim a privilege can constitute prejudicial misconduct. We disagree on several grounds with the State's argument that Mitchell does not apply to situations where a witness claims an invalid privilege. First, though the witness in Mitchell invoked what appears to be a valid privilege, we did not specify whether our holding was limited to valid claims of privilege. See id. at 516-17, 130 N.W.2d at 129. Second, we have used the Mitchell framework to analyze a defendant's claim of unfair privilege in a situation where the witness called to testify did not have a valid privilege. See State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 212-13 (Minn. 1980), abrogation on other grounds recognized by State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903 (Minn.1996). In Black , the State called and questioned a witness who refused to testify but did not claim or possess a valid privilege. Id. at 212. We nonetheless examined the record to determine whether the State's actions unfairly prejudiced the defendant under the Mitchell framework. 291 N.W.2d at 212-13. Third, the Mitchell framework provides a sound analytical approach for situations where the State calls a witness who refuses to testify. This is so because defendants are just as likely to suffer from unfair inferences when a witness asserts an invalid Fifth Amendment privilege as when a witness asserts a valid privilege. For example, here, Vega-Lara responded to the State's first question by stating, I plead the fifth. Refuse to answer. Regardless of whether the privilege was valid, the jury heard Vega-Lara claim that privilege, and every refusal provided the jury with an opportunity to make unfavorable inferences. Courts in other jurisdictions agree that a defendant is unfairly prejudiced when a witness refuses to answer, regardless of whether the witness was protected by a valid privilege. These courts reason that [j]uries are no less likely to draw improper inferences from an invalid assertion of privilege than from a valid assertion. See United States v. Griffin, 66 F.3d 68, 71 (5th Cir.1995); accord Martin v. United States, 756 A.2d 901, 905 (D.C. 2000); People v. Gearns, 457 Mich. 170, 577 N.W.2d 422, 434-35 (1998), overruled on other grounds by People v. Lukity, 460 Mich. 484, 596 N.W.2d 607 (1999). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that in cases where the State calls a witness who refuses to testify, the framework outlined in Mitchell should apply regardless of whether the refusal is based on a valid privilege.