Opinion ID: 2142011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: An Equitable Approach

Text: As noted above, Illinois' void ab initio doctrine has its roots in the early case of Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178 (1886). Under the Norton rule, the invalid statute is eliminated entirely from the consideration of a case. O. Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute 3 (1935). No weight is given to the fact that the statute was enacted by the legislature, approved by the Governor, and relied upon by the people prior to it being declared invalid by a court. O. Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute 3 (1935). Under this approach, some courts have gone so far as to rule that an unconstitutional statute could not protect an officer who executed it or a person who acted in reliance upon it for personal liability for the consequences of their actions. 1 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 2:7, at 47 (6th ed.2002). The failure of the Norton rule to consider the reliance interests of individuals was described early on by the New Jersey Supreme Court as follows: The vice of the doctrine of Norton v. Shelby County    is that it fails to recognize the right of the citizen, which is to accept the law as it is written, and not to be required to determine its validity. The latter is no more the function of the citizen than is the making of the law.    To require the citizen to determine for himself, at his peril, to what extent, if at all, the legislature has overstepped the boundaries defined by the constitution    would be to place upon him an intolerable burden. Lang v. Mayor & Chief of Police, 74 N.J.L. 455, 459, 68 A. 90 (1907). The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that inequities can result from strict application of the Norton rule. See Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973). In Chicot County, Chief Justice Hughes, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that broad statements, such as those in Norton, as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. Chicot County, 308 U.S. at 374, 60 S.Ct. at 318, 84 L.Ed. at 332. The Court explained that [t]he actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. Chicot County, 308 U.S. at 374, 60 S.Ct. at 318, 84 L.Ed. at 333. The Court again took up the shortcomings of the Norton rule in the Lemon case. There, Chief Justice Burger (in a plurality opinion) acknowledged the difficulty in attempting to reconcile the constitutional interests reflected in a new rule of law with reliance interests founded upon the old. Lemon, 411 U.S. at 198, 93 S.Ct. at 1468, 36 L.Ed.2d at 160. Chief Justice Burger recognized that although the logic of Norton may have been appealing in the abstract, statutory or even judge-made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely in making decisions and in shaping their conduct. Lemon, 411 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 1468, 36 L.Ed.2d at 160. Numerous courts are in agreement that Norton represents the old rule as to the effect of an unconstitutional statute. See, e.g., Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir.1995) (acknowledging that the old doctrine, under Norton, pursuant to which unconstitutional statutes are void ab initio has been abandoned); Trucke v. Erlemeier, 657 F.Supp. 1382, 1391 (N.D.Iowa 1987) (observing that the United States Supreme Court abandoned the Norton rationale and suggesting that if Norton and its progeny were decided today, the outcome would be different); United States v. DePoli, 628 F.2d 779, 782 (2d Cir.1980) (recognizing that the Norton view, under which an unconstitutional law is treated as having had no effects whatsoever from the date of its enactment, has been replaced by a more realistic approach); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Department of Revenue, 137 Wash.2d 580, 594 & n. 10, 973 P.2d 1011, 1017 & n. 10 (1999) (rejecting parties' reliance on the now-abandoned void ab initio doctrine and referring to Norton as antiquated Supreme Court authority); American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ingram, 301 N.C. 138, 147-50, 271 S.E.2d 46, 51-52 (1980) (stating that, [d]epending on the circumstances, courts have employed other rules which avoid the hard and fast consequences of the rule enunciated in Norton,  and that North Carolina has retreated from that rule); Wagshal v. Selig, 403 A.2d 338, 341-42 (D.C.App.1979) (discussing the decline of the once-popular `void ab initio ' rule and following the recent trend in adopting a test of reasonableness and good faith in determining the effect which the judicial invalidation of a statute or regulation should have on the rights and obligations of the parties who have taken action pursuant to an invalid provision); Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 627-37, 366 A.2d 21, 27-32 (1976) (discussing the development of the void ab initio rule and other approaches used when determining the status of a statute declared unconstitutional, and joining those jurisdictions which have refused to apply the void ab initio rule in all situations), overruled on other grounds by Parrott v. State, 301 Md. 411, 483 A.2d 68 (1984). Further, at least one legal scholar has recognized that, in light of the injustice and inconvenience which may follow when the void ab initio doctrine is strictly applied, the modern trend is away from void ab initio toward a more equitable and realistic approach that is tempered by considerations of reasonableness and good-faith reliance on the purportedly valid statute. 1 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 2:7, at 47-49 (6th ed.2002). See also E. Plave, Note, The Phenomenon of Antique Laws: Can a State Revive Old Abortion Laws in a New Era?, 58 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 111 (1989) (discussing the development and decline of the void ab initio doctrine and alternative approaches); O. Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute 91 (1935) (suggesting that Norton's dogmatic statement is not true, i.e., Courts have held that unconstitutional statutes have imposed duties, have granted rights, have created offices, and have some operative effect). The circumstances under which state courts have found it appropriate to reject the void ab initio doctrine, in favor of a more realistic and equitable approach, are varied. For example, in Downs v. Jacobs, 272 A.2d 706 (Del.1970), the Delaware Supreme Court declined to apply the Norton rationale in a landlord and tenant dispute involving a distraint for unpaid rent: The Delaware Landlord Distress Law has never been adjudged unconstitutional. Therefore, it is clothed by a presumption of constitutionality. [Citations.] The [defendants] in the instant case were entitled to rely upon that presumption of constitutionality and validity, and to act reasonably and in good faith under the provisions of the Law as it then existed. Citizens and public officials have a right to accept the law as it is written until it is repealed or judicially condemned. They are not required to speculate upon the validity of a statute or to act under it at their peril. Until legislatively or judicially excised, a statute is an operative fact. Courts presume every legislative act constitutional and indulge every intendment in favor of validity. No penalty may be visited upon citizens for doing likewise. Downs, 272 A.2d at 707. More recently, in Dutch Point Credit Union, Inc. v. Caron Auto Works, Inc., 36 Conn.App. 123, 648 A.2d 882 (1994), a Connecticut appeals court declared a statute unconstitutional on due process grounds and then considered the effect of its ruling on the plaintiff's claim for damages. The plaintiff held a lien on a motor vehicle which the defendant repair facility had sold, pursuant to the invalid statute, without notifying the plaintiff. The Connecticut court declined to award damages. The court observed that, in response to the Supreme Court's statements in Chicot County and Lemon, a number of jurisdictions have adopted tests of reasonableness and good faith to determine the consequences of conduct undertaken pursuant to a statute subsequently deemed invalid. [Citations.] Those jurisdictions have concluded that, generally, it would be an injustice to penalize a person for actions taken under a statute that was valid at the time of the conduct. We join those jurisdictions, and recognize that citizens have the right to accept statutory law as written until it is repealed or invalidated; citizens are not required to speculate on the constitutionality of a statute before acting under it. We, therefore, hold that citizens will not face personal liability for acting reasonably and in good faith reliance on the provisions of a statute that is later declared unconstitutional. Dutch Point, 36 Conn.App. at 134-35, 648 A.2d at 888. Of particular relevance here is a Missouri case, State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 118 (Mo.1979). There, the Missouri Supreme Court held that medical malpractice claims, timely submitted under a statute later held unconstitutional, were not time-barred under the void ab initio doctrine. The statute at issue required that all medical malpractice claims be submitted first to a review board which would make a nonbinding recommendation on liability and damages. Submission of the claim to the board, with appropriate notice to the defendants, tolled the running of the limitations period for malpractice claims during the time required for the board to consider the matter. The Missouri Supreme Court held the statute invalid in that it imposed a procedure as a precondition to access to the courts, in violation of the Missouri constitution. Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 110. A month after Cardinal Glennon was decided, the Missouri Supreme Court, in a supplemental opinion, addressed the status of the numerous claims that were pending before the review board. Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 118. The court noted that the claimants undoubtedly relied on the protection afforded them by the tolling provision. Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 118. Citing Norton and other case law, the court acknowledged that, in the past, an unconstitutional statute conferred no rights from the date the statute was enacted, and not merely from the date of the decision holding it invalid. The court concluded, however, that the modern view rejects this rule to the extent that it causes injustice to persons who have acted in good faith and reasonable reliance upon a statute later held unconstitutional. Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 118. The court observed that, if the tolling provisions are viewed as retroactively unconstitutional, those claimants who reasonably and in good faith relied upon the statute to protect their right to submit their claims to the courts would suffer a manifest injustice. Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 118. Accordingly, the court ordered that the statute of limitations would be tolled for claims submitted to the review board between the effective date of the statute and the effective date of the court's declaration of invalidityan approximately two-year period. Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 118. [2] Although this court is not bound by trends in the law occurring outside our jurisdiction, this court has considered whether Illinois law is consistent with our sister states and, where appropriate, has adopted the views of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill.2d 378, 385-86, 250 Ill.Dec. 682, 739 N.E.2d 445 (2000) (overruling, in part, a prior decision of this court because the modern trend in favor of according estoppel effect to criminal convictions was correct); River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill.2d 290, 311, 234 Ill.Dec. 783, 703 N.E.2d 883 (1998) (noting that our adoption of the transactional test to determine whether identity of causes of action exists for purposes of res judicata is consistent with the trend of decisions in other jurisdictions); Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill.2d 186, 195, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981) (explaining that [t]his court's following of Federal Rules 703 and 705 comports with the modern trend liberalizing certain trial procedures). Upon careful review, we are persuaded by the foregoing authorities that this court should adopt a more moderate approach when determining the effect of a declaration by this court that a statute is unconstitutional. We do not, however, abandon the Norton rule. In cases such as Gersch, where a defendant's constitutionally guaranteed rights are in need of vindication, strict application of the void ab initio doctrine is appropriate. In other cases, however, where no such rights are at stake, other equitable and practical factors are appropriate for consideration by this court. The issue is not so much a matter of applying or not applying the void ab initio doctrine, as it is determining whether a particular set of circumstances justifies a court's exercise of its equitable powers to ameliorate the doctrine's sometimes harsh results. Consideration of the circumstances in this case leads us to conclude that plaintiffs' complaint should be allowed to proceed.