Opinion ID: 1685844
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act

Text: Jones argues on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in granting the County's motion for a directed verdict on her claim under the Whistle-Blower Act. According to Jones, she submitted evidence that established that she reported violations to the appropriate authorities and that adverse action was taken against her as a result of that reporting. Specifically, Jones avers that the evidence demonstrated that she voiced concerns about wrongful, wasteful, or inappropriate acts of Faucher and AMC to Faucher and members of the quorum court prior to the time that she was laid off. The County argues to the contrary that a directed verdict was warranted because there was no evidence that Jones was a whistle-blower or that she made complaints to the appropriate authorities as required under the Act. This court recently discussed the standard to be applied when reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion for directed verdict and stated: In deciding whether the grant of a motion for directed verdict was appropriate, appellate courts review whether there was substantial evidence to support the circuit court's decision. See, e.g., Ward v. Williams, 354 Ark. 168, 118 S.W.3d 513 (2003); Woodall v. Chuck Dory Auto Sales, Inc., 347 Ark. 260, 61 S.W.3d 835 (2001). A motion for directed verdict should be granted only if there is no substantial evidence to support a jury verdict. Mangrum v. Pigue, 359 Ark. 373, 198 S.W.3d 496 (2004); Curry v. Thornsberry, 354 Ark. 631, 128 S.W.3d 438 (2003); Mankey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 314 Ark. 14, 858 S.W.2d 85 (1993). Stated another way, a motion for a directed verdict should be granted only when the evidence viewed is so insubstantial as to require the jury's verdict for the party to be set aside. Curry, 354 Ark. 631, 128 S.W.3d 438; Conagra, Inc. v. Strother, 340 Ark. 672, 13 S.W.3d 150 (2000). Where the evidence is such that fair-minded persons might reach different conclusions, then a jury question is presented, and the directed verdict should be reversed. Howard v. Hicks, 304 Ark. 112, 800 S.W.2d 706 (1990). Switzer v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 362 Ark. 419, 432, 208 S.W.3d 792, 800-801 (2005). Here, at the conclusion of Jones's case, the County moved for a directed verdict on the whistle-blower claim, arguing that there was no evidence to support a conclusion that Jones was a whistle-blower. The County further argued that Jones never made any complaints to the proper authorities prior to the time when the adverse action was taken against her. Jones countered that she had presented evidence that she complained to members of the quorum court. The trial court, without comment, granted the directed-verdict motion. Public employees who report violations of law or waste of public funds to the appropriate authorities are afforded protection under the Whistle-Blower Act. A whistle-blower who is punished by a public employer may seek actual damages and injunctive relief. In order for Jones to prevail on her claim under the Act, she was required to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she suffered an adverse action because she, or a person acting on her behalf, engaged or intended to engage in an activity protected under the Act. See Ark.Code Ann. § 21-1-604(c) (Repl.1999). Pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 21-1-602(1) (Repl.1999), an adverse action means to discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against a public employee in any manner that affects the employee's employment, including compensation. Under section 21-1-602(8), a whistle-blower is defined as: a person who witnesses or has evidence of a waste or violation while employed with a public employer and who communicates in good faith or testifies to the waste or violation, verbally or in writing, to one of the employee's superiors, to an agent of the public employer, or to an appropriate authority, provided that the communication is made prior to any adverse action by the employer. Further, section 21-1-602(2)(A) provides that an appropriate authority includes: (i) A state, county, or municipal government department, agency, or organization having jurisdiction over criminal law enforcement, regulatory violations, professional conduct or ethics, or waste; or (ii) A member, officer, agent, investigator, auditor, representative or supervisory employee of the body, agency, or organization. Here, Jones testified that she told Faucher about instances of waste after Faucher called her and informed her that she was being laid off. Jones further testified that she reported misdeeds to Giles Osborne, Doyle Johnson, and Partain. According to Jones, her conversations with Osborne and Johnson occurred prior to her grievance hearing. In addition, Partain testified that Jones made comments to her about problems in the Assessor's office but did so on the night of the grievance hearing. The issue for this court to resolve is whether Jones's actions of reporting alleged misdeeds to quorum court members constituted reporting to the appropriate authorities. Under Ark.Code Ann. § 14-14-502(a)(1) (Repl.1998), the quorum court is vested with the legislative power of the county. Section 21-1-602(2)(A)(i) specifically provides that a county government is an appropriate authority. Moreover, section 21-1-602(2)(A)(ii) allows reporting to a member of a governing body. As such, the evidence submitted by Jones regarding her reporting of alleged misdeeds to quorum court members created a question of fact that should have been resolved by the jury. We further note that prior to granting the motion for directed verdict, there was a discussion among counsel and the trial court as to whether the remedies available to Jones for her claims for breach of contract and violation of the Act would be the same. A review of the Whistle-Blower Act reveals, however, that it offers specific remedies including injunctive relief and reinstatement of employment and compensation and benefits. See Ark.Code Ann. § 21-1-605 (Repl.1999). In sum, the evidence supporting Jones's claim under the Whistle-Blower Act created a question of fact to be resolved by a jury; thus, it was error for the trial court to grant the County's motion for directed verdict. We, therefore, reverse on this point and remand for a new trial on Jones's claim under the Whistle-Blower Act.