Opinion ID: 164572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: introduction

Text: The facts in this case were thoroughly detailed by the district court and we need not repeat them here. See McCormick v. City of Lawrence , 253 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1178-84 (D. Kan. 2003); McCormick v. City of Lawrence , 253 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1158-61 (D. Kan. 2003). Although Ms. Willoughby and Mr. Burke are both defendants in the same district court action, the facts supporting Mr. McCormick’s claims against them arise from different encounters. We will discuss only those facts pertinent to Ms. Willoughby’s and Mr. Burke’s appeals. We begin with an overview of the law governing these two appeals. A. Jurisdiction/Standard of review We first examine whether we have jurisdiction over these interlocutory appeals. We conclude that we have jurisdiction to address whether Mr. McCormick’s claims are barred by absolute or qualified immunity because the district court’s denial of immunity turned on an issue of law, thus making the order “an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). We review the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on absolute or qualified immunity de novo. See Kamplain v. Curry County Bd. of Comm’rs , 159 F.3d 1248, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998) (absolute immunity); Butler v. Rio Rancho Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. , 341 F.3d 1197, 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) -4- (qualified immunity). “Because the district court denied a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we confine our review to the allegations set forth in the complaint, accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in [Mr. McCormick’s] favor.” Kamplain , 159 F.3d at 1250. B. Absolute Immunity “[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.” Kalina v. Fletcher , 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997) (quotation omitted). Absolute prosecutorial immunity extends no further than necessary to protect those activities. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 811 (1982). Therefore, “[w]hen a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other. Kalina , 522 U.S. at 126 (quotation omitted); see also Harlow , 457 U.S. at 811 n.16 (prosecutor acting as an investigator has, at best, only qualified immunity) . C. Qualified immunity Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation” if the complained of behavior did not violate clearly established law. Mitchell , 472 U.S. at 526; Harlow , 457 U.S. at 818. -5- In examining a claim of qualified immunity, we first determine whether the plaintiff asserted a violation of federal law in his complaint. See Butler , 341 F.3d at 1200. If the plaintiff properly alleged a violation of federal law, we next “determine whether the [law] was clearly established such that a reasonable person in the [defendants’] position would have known that [their] conduct violated [the law].” Id. (quotation omitted). APPEAL NO. 03-3127