Opinion ID: 1548268
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Heading: The Doctrine of Necessaries

Text: The ancient common law doctrine of necessaries imposed liability on husbands for essential goods and services provided to [their wives] by third parties if they failed to provide their wives with such necessaries. Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 189, 663 A.2d 1344 (quotation omitted). Necessaries included necessary food, drink, washing, physic, instruction, and a suitable place of residence, with such necessary furniture as is suitable to her condition. Ray v. Adden, 50 N.H. 82, 83 (1870); see Morrison v. Holt, 42 N.H. 478, 480 (1861) (legal expenses not necessaries unless husband's conduct rendered expenses necessary to secure wife's personal protection or safety). This doctrine originated as a result of draconian legal restrictions on the rights of married women to contract, sue, or be sued individually or exercise control over their property or financial affairs. North Ottawa Community Hosp. v. Kieft, 457 Mich. 394, 578 N.W.2d 267, 269 (1998); Medical Business Associates v. Steiner, 183 A.D.2d 86, 588 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892 (1992). A married woman's contracts `were absolutely void,not merely voidable, like those of infants and lunatics.' Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 189, 663 A.2d 1344 (quoting Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 353, 150 A. 905 (1930)). [U]pon marriage a woman forfeited her legal existence and became the property of her husband, as, in the eyes of the law, a husband and wife were considered one legal entity. Id.; Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 892. In return for his responsibility for his wife's support and liability for her torts, a husband was entitled to her society. Drew's Appeal, 57 N.H. 181, 183 (1876). A man has as good a right to his wife, as to the property acquired under a marriage contract; and to divest him of that right without his default, and against his will, would be as flagrant a violation of the principles of justice as the confiscation of his estate. Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 188, 663 A.2d 1344 (quoting Drew's Appeal, 57 N.H. at 183). The husband was the sole owner of the family wealth, and the wife was viewed as little more than a chattel in the eyes of the law. N.C. Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1987) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, the law of necessaries attempted to obviate some of the victimization which coverture would otherwise have permitted by providing a common-law mechanism by which the duty of support could be enforced. Kieft, 578 N.W.2d at 270 (quotation omitted). It reflected the sad reality that, [b]ecause the wife could not contract for food, clothing, or medical needs, her husband was obligated to provide her with such necessaries. Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 189, 663 A.2d 1344 (citation and quotation omitted). To obtain compensation from a husband for goods or services provided to his wife, a creditor had to set forth a prima facie case that husband and wife were married, that the husband failed to provide his wife with necessaries, and that the articles or services in question were necessaries according to the husband's situation in life. Rumney v. Keyes, 7 N.H. 571, 580 (1835); see Ott v. Hentall, 70 N.H. 231, 232, 47 A. 80 (1900). If the couple separated, the husband could nonetheless be liable under the necessaries doctrine if he caused the separation by abandoning his wife, evicting her without reason, or committing some other kind of misconduct that drove the wife out of the marital home. Ott, 70 N.H. at 232, 47 A. 80; Allen, Cummings & Co. v. Aldrich, 29 N.H. 63, 73 (1854); Rumney, 7 N.H. at 578. However, even if the husband and wife separated by consent, a husband could still be liable for his wife's necessaries. Pidgin v. Cram, 8 N.H. 350, 351 (1836). Husbands could avoid liability under the necessaries doctrine under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Tebbets v. Hapgood, 34 N.H. 420, 421 (1857); Allen, 29 N.H. at 73; Rumney, 7 N.H. at 578. For example, a husband whose wife eloped would not be liable for her necessaries. Cogswell v. Tibbetts, 3 N.H. 41, 42 (1824); see Rumney, 7 N.H. at 580. A wife who voluntarily left her husband to live with an adulterer, or was removed forcibly from the marital home but chose to reside with the adulterer, eloped for the purposes of the doctrine. Cogswell, 3 N.H. at 42. Key to the determination of elopement was whether the wife had left her husband, committed adultery and also remained beyond his control. Id.; see Rumney, 7 N.H. at 580. In modern America, `no longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.' Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975)). The modern marital relationship is viewed by law as a partnership of equality, an evolution from the nineteenth century relationship of dominance by a husband and submission by a wife who had little standing as an individual person or legal entity. Forsyth Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Chisholm, 342 N.C. 616, 467 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1996). Undoubtedly, married women to-day have an unrestricted right to contract, and RSA 546-A:2 (2007) imposes a gender-neutral obligation of spousal support. Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 189, 663 A.2d 1344. The doctrine of necessaries has been characterized as an anachronism that no longer fits contemporary society, Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (quotation omitted), and some courts have abolished it. See, e.g., Emanuel v. McGriff, 596 So.2d 578, 580 (Ala.1992); Condore v. Prince George's Cty., 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011, 1019 (1981). In New Hampshire, however, the doctrine endures: we extended it to apply to all married individuals, regardless of gender, see Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 190, 663 A.2d 1344, and many courts have similarly extended the doctrine to apply to both husbands and wives. See, e.g., Simons, Note, Is the Doctrine of Necessaries Necessary in Florida: Should the Legislature Accept the Challenge of Connor v. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center?, 50 FLA. L.REV. 933, 939 (1998); Kieft, 578 N.W.2d at 270. When considering the application of the doctrine in the modern day, some courts have outlined a prima facie case under the law of necessaries as follows: In order to establish a prima facie case against one spouse for the value of [services or goods] provided to the other spouse, the ... provider must show that (1) [services or goods] were provided to the receiving spouse, (2) [they] were necessary for the health and well-being of the receiving spouse, (3) the person against whom the action is brought was married to the receiving spouse at the time the [services or goods] were provided, and (4) payment for the necessaries has not been made. Wesley Long Nursing Center, Inc. v. Harper, No. COA06-1706, 2007 WL 4233643, at  (N.C.Ct.App. Dec.4, 2007) (unpublished opinion); see Queen's Medical Center v. Kagawa, 88 Hawai`i 489, 967 P.2d 686, 693 (1998); Trident Regional Medical Center v. Evans, 317 S.C. 346, 454 S.E.2d 343, 345 (1995). This approach comports with our own common law on the necessaries doctrine. See, e.g., Ott, 70 N.H. at 232, 47 A. 80; Rumney, 7 N.H. at 580. We note that, for the purposes of the necessaries doctrine, hospitals and other medical providers are uniquely situated and, therefore, uniquely likely to seek the application of this doctrine, as, unlike other creditors, medical providers may not turn away patients who require treatment. See Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis.2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326, 329 (1982) (noting that hospitals are often forced to respond to patients who require immediate, emergency care).
We next consider whether elopement is an affirmative or general defense to the law of necessaries. As stated above, the trial court ruled that elopement is an affirmative defense, and barred Anthony from presenting evidence that Karen eloped, finding that Anthony had failed to give adequate notice of his intention to rely upon that defense. We conclude that elopement is no longer a defense to the doctrine of necessaries. Cf. Chisholm, 467 S.E.2d at 91. As noted above, the necessaries doctrine developed during a time when married women were severely restricted in their ability to contract, sue, or be sued, or to exercise control over their property, services, or earnings. See Kieft, 578 N.W.2d at 269; Chisholm, 467 S.E.2d at 90; Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 892. To defend on the grounds of elopement, the non-debtor spouse had to prove that the debtor spouse left the non-debtor spouse, escaped his or her control and committed adultery. See Cogswell, 3 N.H. at 42. Such a defense does not comport with the modern status of marriage. We have rejected such antiquated and obsolete notions concerning women by modernizing the common law necessaries doctrine to impose liability on a gender-neutral basis and, thereby, making either spouse responsible for the necessary services provided to the other. Chisholm, 467 S.E.2d at 90-91; see Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 190, 663 A.2d 1344. Given that the historical purposes underlying the [elopement] exception to the necessaries doctrine are incompatible with current mores and laws governing modern marital relationships in [New Hampshire], we find that the elopement exception has no place in the common law. Chisholm, 467 S.E.2d at 91. But see Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 9-10 (Ind.1993) (reasoning that common law defenses to application of doctrine of necessaries remain applicable). Rather, we conclude that, under the third prong of the prima facie case that we have outlined above, the creditorin this case, the hospital must show more than the legal fact of marriage to demonstrate that the parties are married for the purposes of liability under the necessaries doctrine. See Roach v. Mamakos, 196 Misc.2d 456, 764 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (2003); National Account Systems, Inc. v. Mercado, 196 N.J.Super. 133, 481 A.2d 835, 837 (1984). [P]roof of an undissolved marriage does not in itself provide the basis for liability to a creditor supplying a spouse with necessaries, as in some circumstances a marriage will cease to [exist] for purposes of liability under the necessaries doctrine. Mercado, 481 A.2d at 837. This is a fact-specific, and case-specific, inquiry. See Nichol v. Clema, 188 Neb. 74, 195 N.W.2d 233, 235 (1972) (noting that each decision with respect to liability under necessaries doctrine must necessarily be largely governed by the facts existing in the particular case in which it is rendered). The non-debtor spouse's liability under the necessaries doctrine depends on a mutual expectation that the spouses will share assets, expenses, and debts. Accordingly, factors to consider in determining whether the marriage is no longer viable for the purposes of the necessaries doctrine might include whether the parties were separated, when they separated, whether they are living apart, and whether they share their living expenses and debt. See Mercado, 481 A.2d at 837 (factors to consider in determining liability under necessaries doctrine include whether the parties are separated and have been financially supporting each other). If a marriage has broken down to the extent that spouses are no longer sharing assets or debts, it makes little sense to hold a non-debtor spouse liable for the medical expenses of the other. See id. at 837. But see Kagawa, 967 P.2d at 699-700 (non-debtor spouse liable for necessaries until divorce finalized); Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 9 (holding that duty of spousal support continues at least until the marriage relationship is dissolved). For the reasons described above, elopement is no longer a defense to the application of the necessaries doctrine; rather, the third party seeking to impose liability on the non-debtor spousein this case, SNHMCretains the burden to demonstrate that the parties were married for the purposes of liability under the necessaries doctrine. Because we hold today that elopement is not an affirmative defense, we reverse and remand to the trial court for a new trial on the merits.
We next consider Anthony's argument that SNHMC must determine that his wife could not satisfy her debt before seeking reimbursement from him. Anthony relies primarily upon Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 190, 663 A.2d 1344. SNHMC argues that it must only seek payment from Karen before pursuing Anthony, relying upon language in Holbrook which states that a medical provider must first seek payment from the spouse who received its services before pursuing collection from the other spouse. Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 190, 663 A.2d 1344. Under the doctrine of necessaries, a husband or wife is not liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by his or her spouse unless the resources of the spouse who received the services are insufficient to satisfy the debt. Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 187, 663 A.2d 1344 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the spouse who receives the necessary goods or services is primarily liable for payment, and the other spouse is secondarily liable. Id. at 188, 663 A.2d 1344. We have held that the doctrine of necessaries renders the nondebtor spouse liable to the hospital to the extent [his or her spouse's] estate[ ][is] unable to pay for the necessary medical services provided. St. Joseph Hosp. of Nashua v. Rizzo, 141 N.H. 9, 12, 676 A.2d 98 (1996) (emphasis added). The defendant argued before the trial court that SNHMC was required to demonstrate that Karen could not pay for her medical services before pursuing his assets. The trial court stated that it did not necessarily agree with ... Mr. Hayes['] legal position, citing the language in Holbrook which states that the medical provider must first seek payment from the spouse who received its services before pursuing collection from the other spouse. The trial court reasoned that the Holbrook language is directed at collection efforts and does not necessarily restrict a finding of liability. However, the trial court, [f]or the purposes of its analysis ... accept[ed] [without] deciding the defendant's legal position and determined that, even under a standard requiring SNHMC to prove that Karen lacks the resources to pay her debts before pursuing Anthony, SNHMC demonstrated that Karen's estate could not satisfy the debt to SNHMC. We clarify our holding in Holbrook by confirming that the trial court applied the correct standard when it determined that Karen could not satisfy her debt to SNHMC. On remand, the trial court should apply the standard set out above, that the non-debtor spouse is liable for his or her spouse's necessaries if the debtor spouse is unable to pay for his or her necessaries. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.