Opinion ID: 1040084
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counts II and III - Redress of Grievances

Text: In counts II and III of their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their constitutional right to redress their grievances under the First and No. 12-2384 Top Flight Entm’t, et al. v. Schuette, et al. Page 9 Fourteenth Amendments by barring all future licenses in retaliation for the lawsuits Plaintiffs brought against Public Act 343. Defendants moved to dismiss these counts for failure to state a claim. The district court denied Defendants’ motion; though, as discussed below, it nonetheless dismissed these counts with prejudice based on quasijudicial immunity and failure to allege personal involvement of the defendant officials. On appeal, Defendants renew their argument that counts II and III do not state a claim for which relief may be granted. These First Amendment retaliation claims also require that Plaintiffs allege: (1) the plaintiff engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff’s protected conduct. Wurzelbacher, 675 F.3d at 583 (citation omitted). On appeal, Defendants argue that the adverse action the Plaintiffs complain of, the denial of millionaire-party licenses for organizations wishing to hold events at Flying Aces, was motivated by illegal activity and a criminal investigation targeting Plaintiffs’ business, not by Plaintiffs’ unrelated litigation against the state. Defendants also argue that the denial of a millionaire-party license to a third-party would not deter a person of ordinary firmness from redressing grievances in the courts, and that although temporal proximity between the adverse action and protected conduct can support an inference of retaliatory motive, it is not always sufficient. See Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512, 526 (6th Cir. 2010). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, we must accept all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See New Albany Tractor, 650 F.3d at1050. Here, Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to state a claim of First Amendment retaliation. Although Defendants dispute the reason for the license denials, we must accept Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded claims. See Mediacom Se. LLC v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 672 F.3d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 2012). Further, it is not implausible that No. 12-2384 Top Flight Entm’t, et al. v. Schuette, et al. Page 10 the denial of necessary licenses to organizations seeking to hold millionaire parties at Flying Aces might cause economic injury sufficient to deter Plaintiffs from filing future litigation. See Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 701 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[S]ince there is no justification for harassing people for exercising their constitutional rights, [the deterrent effect] need not be great in order to be actionable.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). And although temporal proximity may not be enough to ultimately sustain Plaintiffs’ allegations, it is sufficient at this stage to render Plaintiffs’ claims plausible. As we recently noted in reversing the grant of a motion to dismiss in a § 1983 action, “[t]emporal proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse action by the state actor alone may be significant enough to constitute indirect evidence . . . to create an inference of retaliatory motive.” Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 272, 283 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the district court did not err by denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss counts II and III of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint.