Opinion ID: 1951996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: smp 610915

Text: Having determined that the only coverage available to either Cuddy Construction or American is derived from policy SMP 610915, we need only look at the questions of whether the damages to the property are covered by the terms of that policy and if so, whether General Accident has any affirmative defenses, including exclusions to and limitations of the policy, that would bar coverage. The trial justice analyzed the applicable policy provisions and concluded that the faulty installation of the fireproofing in 1986 was an occurrence within the terms of the policy but that the damage to the building that Windswept alleges will occur as a result of the remedial work necessary falls within the policy's exclusion for restoration, repair, or replacement. She thereupon found that General Accident had a valid defense to coverage under the policy. General Accident has challenged a portion of this ruling and urges this Court to reverse that part of the trial justice's decision that declares that: [t]he Court finds that the occurrence under the policy provisions was the faulty installation of the fireproofing which took place in 1986. The Court finds that the third party, Windswept, suffered an injury at that time, though that injury was not discovered until 1989. General Accident correctly points to this Court's decision in CPC International, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Insurance Co., 668 A.2d 647, 650 (R.I.1995), in which we clearly stated that under Rhode Island law, an occurrence under a general liability policy happens when the property damage manifests itself or is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence is discoverable. Nevertheless Windswept, Cuddy Construction, and American argue that this issue is not properly before the Court because it was not argued before the trial justice. Windswept further asserts that if the Court does consider this argument, we must apply South Carolina law, which contrary to this Court's opinions holds that a continuous trigger of coverage exists so that an insurance carrier is responsible for an injury that occurs during the coverage period, regardless of when it is discovered. See Joe Harden Builders, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 326 S.C. 231, 486 S.E.2d 89 (1997). Windswept maintains that South Carolina decisional law is the appropriate choice of law by virtue of § 38-61-10 of the South Carolina Code, which provides: All contracts of insurance on property, lives, or interest in this State are considered to be made in this State, and all contracts of insurance the applications for which are taken within this State are considered to have been made within this State and are subject to the laws of the State. After a review of the record we are satisfied that the trial justice recognized the choice-of-law issue but declined to address it, finding instead that the exclusions under the policy were applicable, thus barring recovery for the claims at issue. The conflict between the law relating to [when an occurrence is] trigger[ed] is the only conflict which is apparent from the record, and as we shall see, the [c]ourt determined it need not meet that issue in this case. We agree with this determination and decline to reach the choice-of-law issue as well. The exclusion provision in issue in this policy specifically excludes from coverage (d) to that particular part of any property, not on premises owned by or rented to the insured,       (iii) the restoration, repair or replacement of which has been made or is necessary by reason of faulty workmanship thereon by or on behalf of the insured. The trial justice found, and we agree, that the work involved in correcting the inadequacy of the fireproofing clearly fell within the plain meaning of restoration, repair or replacement of the property made necessary by the faulty workmanship of American. Windswept disputes this finding and suggests that commercial general liability insurance policies only exclude coverage for repair, restoration, or replacement of the insured's work product and not other consequential damages. Therefore, Windswept argues that this exclusion should only apply to replacement of American's fireproofing materials and not to the other consequential damages involved in actually performing the replacement. We reject this interpretation of the insurance agreement and are satisfied that the trial justice properly determined the exclusion provision applied to the claims in this case on the basis of the record before her: In an effort to avoid the exclusion, the defendants and intervenor have argued    that the exclusion is inapplicable. They suggest that the losses will be a consequence of the remediation of the fireproofing, but not the 1986 installation. Assuming for a moment the validity of this rationale, we see that it is really of no help to the defendants and the intervenor. If the event which will cause the future property damage is the future remediation, and neither one are [sic] necessitated by American National's faulty performance, then we have an occurrence or an event taking place well after the policy period and property damage taking place well after the policy period. By distancing the damages from the 1986 installation by American National, the defendants and the intervenors necessarily distance themselves from the coverage provided by the insuring agreements in this policy. This third party liability insurance only affords coverage for occurrences for which the insured can be held legally liable. If the anticipated property damage is not necessitated by American National's faulty performance, then we have no occurrence for which American National can be held legally liable.       But if the injury is the placement of the defective fireproofing, then the work performed exclusion applies, and around and around we go again. Accordingly, although the trial justice was incorrect in her determination that the faulty installation of the fireproofing constituted an occurrence under the policy provisions, she correctly concluded that the damages facing Windswept are subject to the work performance exclusions contained in the policy for which no coverage is available. Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Providence County, Rodgers, J., of first-degree child-molestation sexual assault, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Goldberg, J., held that: (1) defendant's mistaken belief as to victim's age was not defense; (2) conviction without establishing mens rea as to element of victim's age was not violation of defendant's due process rights; and (3) defendant was not entitled to cross-examine victim regarding her false identification of defendant as father of her unborn child. Affirmed.