Opinion ID: 6112002
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mechanic Promotion

Text: To prevail on his ADA discrimination claim based on his disqualification from the Mechanic position, Plaintiff must show that: (1) he is disabled, (2) he is a “qualified individual” with respect to the relevant position, and (3) he was subjected to unlawful discrimination with respect to the position because of his disability. Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016). Defendants concede that Plaintiff satisfies the first requirement because Washington and King regarded Plaintiff as physically impaired and limited in his ability to drive on account of his MS. And it is undisputed that Plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action when he was disqualified from the Mechanic promotion. But Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot make out a claim for disability discrimination based on his disqualification from the Mechanic promotion because he cannot show that he was qualified to be a Mechanic. According to Defendants, driving is an essential function of the Mechanic position, and Washington and King reasonably concluded, based on the FMLA form provided by Dr. Millette in June 2016, that allowing Plaintiff to drive at work would pose a “direct threat” to the safety of himself and other individuals in the workplace and in the general public. The ADA defines a “qualified individual” as a person who “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of the relevant position. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). USCA11 Case: 20-14298 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 19 of 38 20-14298 Opinion of the Court 19 Essential functions are those fundamental job duties that an individual who holds the position is in fact required to perform. See Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2007). When defining the essential functions of a position for purposes of the ADA, “consideration [is] given to the employer’s judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). In addition, “if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” Id. Whether an accommodation is reasonable depends on the circumstances, but the ADA does not require an employer to eliminate an essential function of a position to accommodate a disabled employee. See D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 2005). Instead, an accommodation is only reasonable under the ADA if it enables an employee to perform the essential functions of a position. See Holly, 492 F.3d at 1262 n.16 (“[A]n accommodation that does not enable the employee to perform an essential function of his position is factually unreasonable and is not required by the ADA.”). Further, an accommodation is not reasonable if it would impose an “undue hardship” on the employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). In addition to the above, an employee is not a qualified individual if, by performing the essential duties of the relevant position, he poses a “direct threat” to himself or others in the workplace. See Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203 n.9 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining that the direct threat defense “relates to whether the USCA11 Case: 20-14298 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 20 of 38 20 Opinion of the Court 20-14298 employee is a qualified individual . . . because it focuses on whether the plaintiff can perform the essential functions of her job.”). The ADA defines a “direct threat” as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3). The applicable regulations have expanded the definition of a direct threat to include a risk to the health or safety of the employee himself. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). An employer’s determination that an individual poses a direct threat must be based on “reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” See id. When the direct threat defense is raised, the employee bears the burden of proving either that he was not a direct threat or that reasonable accommodations were available to remove the threat. See Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The employee retains at all times the burden of persuading the jury either that he was not a direct threat or that reasonable accommodations were available.”). The evidence is undisputed that driving is an essential function of the Mechanic position. As discussed above, the job description for the Mechanic position includes “test driving” vehicles and “operat[ing] a tow truck” among its primary duties, and it lists having a valid state driver’s license and being able to obtain a CDL with appropriate endorsements, including an air brake endorsement, as a special requirement. Consistent with the job description, Sumrall testified that Mechanics have the primary responsibility for repairing disabled vehicles in the field, and that they are frequently called USCA11 Case: 20-14298 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 21 of 38 20-14298 Opinion of the Court 21 upon to get to the location of a disabled vehicle in the field and transport the vehicle back to the MAWSS garage—either by driving or towing it—for additional repairs if necessary. Sumrall testified further that emergency situations such as sewer line backups and water line breaks often require a Mechanic to be on standby to travel to the scene and address equipment issues that occur there. Finally, Sumrall stated that a Mechanic regularly test drives vehicles—both in the field and in the garage—to diagnose problems and ensure repairs have been performed correctly. It is further undisputed that Washington and King reasonably concluded, based on the updated FMLA form Dr. Millette submitted in June 2016, that allowing Plaintiff to drive MAWSS vehicles while at work would pose a direct threat to Plaintiff’s own safety and to the safety of other individuals in the workplace. In pertinent part, and as set out above, the June 2016 FMLA form indicated that Plaintiff’s MS: (1) was a permanent condition, (2) that episodically caused symptoms including loss of vision, fatigue, and extremity weakness with spasticity, (3) with episodes occurring every three to six weeks and lasting three to five days per episode. Defendants advised Plaintiff in August 2016 that his symptoms— particularly his symptoms of loss of vision, dizziness, fatigue, and extremity weakness with spasticity—presented “a safety hazard when operating MAWSS vehicles and equipment.” Plaintiff argues that Washington and King’s assessment that he was unable to drive was based on their assumptions about his MS diagnosis rather than objective medical evidence. But as just USCA11 Case: 20-14298 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 22 of 38 22 Opinion of the Court 20-14298 described, Washington and King determined that it would be hazardous to allow Plaintiff to continue driving MAWSS vehicles and equipment based on Dr. Millette’s description of Plaintiff’s symptoms—in particular, loss of vision, dizziness, and extremity weakness with spasticity—rather than on Plaintiff’s MS diagnosis. Dr. Millette’s description of Plaintiff’s symptoms was the “best . . . objective evidence” of Plaintiff’s symptoms and their frequency available to Washington and King at the relevant time. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Millette’s October 2016 letter medically cleared him to drive, despite his symptoms. Even if Washington and King had seen the October 2016 letter, they might reasonably have concluded that it was hazardous for Plaintiff to drive at work, given his episodic symptoms of vision loss, dizziness, and extremity weakness. But more importantly, Washington and King testified that they never received Dr. Millette’s October 2016 letter, and Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to rebut their testimony on that point. Contrary to his ordinary practice, Dr. Millette did not send the letter directly to MAWSS, as evidenced by the fact that the letter is unaddressed and directed “To Whom it May Concern.” Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he gave the letter to Sumrall and again, we assume that is true for purposes of this appeal. Nevertheless, Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he “d[id] not know” what Sumrall did with the letter. Plaintiff further acknowledged that he did not take the letter directly to HR, put the letter in interoffice mail, which was the ordinary means of USCA11 Case: 20-14298 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 23 of 38 20-14298 Opinion of the Court 23 transmitting documents to HR, or confirm that HR had ever received the letter. Finally, Plaintiff argues that his perceived inability to drive could have been accommodated in the Mechanic position. As to this argument, Plaintiff has the burden of identifying an accommodation and showing that the accommodation is reasonable and would enable him to perform the essential functions of the Mechanic position. See Boyle v. City of Pell City, 866 F.3d 1280, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of identifying an accommodation and showing that the accommodation would allow him to perform the essential functions of the job in question.”). An employer’s “duty to provide a reasonable accommodation is not triggered unless a specific demand for an accommodation has been made.” Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1255–56 (quoting Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he initial burden of requesting an accommodation is on the employee. Only after the employee has satisfied this burden and the employer fails to provide that accommodation can the employee prevail on a claim that her employer has discriminated against her.”)). The only accommodation suggested by Plaintiff is that Defendants limit his driving restriction to periods of time when Plaintiff is having an MS flare-up and his symptoms are active. Even assuming Plaintiff specifically demanded that accommodation at the relevant time—that is, when Defendants advised him that he was disqualified from the Mechanic position—the evidence in the USCA11 Case: 20-14298 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 24 of 38 24 Opinion of the Court 20-14298 record shows that Plaintiff’s proposed accommodation is not reasonable, and thus it is not required by the ADA. Again, it is undisputed that driving MAWSS vehicles and equipment is an essential function of the Mechanic position, and one that Mechanics frequently are called upon to do during the regular course of their job duties. Revoking Plaintiff’s authorization to drive during his MS flare-ups—which Dr. Millette indicated can occur every three to six weeks and last for three to five days per episode—would not enable Plaintiff to perform the essential function of driving, but rather eliminate that essential function for significant portions of his time at work. As discussed above, the ADA does not require an employer to eliminate an essential function of a position, or alter the essential nature of a position, to accommodate a disabled employee. See D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1229. In short, undisputed evidence in the record shows that: (1) driving is an essential function of the Mechanic position, (2) Defendants reasonably concluded that allowing Plaintiff to drive at work would pose a direct threat to Plaintiff himself or others in the workplace, and (3) Plaintiff failed to identify a reasonable accommodation that would enable him to perform the essential functions of the Mechanic position given his driving restriction. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendants as to Plaintiff’s ADA disability discrimination claim based on his disqualification from the Mechanic position. USCA11 Case: 20-14298 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 25 of 38 20-14298 Opinion of the Court 25 2. Assignment to Small-Engine Work As to Plaintiff’s assignment to work primarily on small-engine repairs in his ASW II position, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was disabled and that he was qualified for the ASW II position he held when he was given the small-engine assignments at issue, but they argue that there is no evidence they discriminated against Plaintiff on account of his disability by giving him smallengine assignments, and we agree. The undisputed evidence shows that small-engine repair was part of the routine work of the MAWSS garage that was shared among various ASW II employees and distributed as dictated by the needs of the garage. To that end, multiple MAWSS garage supervisors testified that Plaintiff was not the only MAWSS employee who did small-engine work, but that his “name would come up first” for that type of work because he was “good at it.” Plaintiff did not present any evidence to rebut this testimony. On the contrary, Plaintiff confirmed in his deposition testimony that he had worked in the small-engine area since 2015, prior to the time he submitted his FMLA paperwork advising Defendants of his MS diagnosis. Sumrall did suggest in his testimony that he tended to direct small-engine assignments to Plaintiff as an informal accommodation for his illness, because those assignments allowed Plaintiff to work away from fumes. But even assuming Plaintiff received more small-engine assignments because of his illness, Plaintiff does not cite any evidence to support his argument that the assignments were adverse in any way. The ADA defines discrimination in terms USCA11 Case: 20-14298 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 26 of 38 26 Opinion of the Court 20-14298 that relate to “the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). There is no evidence that Plaintiff’s small-engine assignments had any effect on the “terms, conditions, and privileges” of his employment in the ASW II position. It is undisputed that small-engine work did not result in less pay, a less desirable schedule, diminished work responsibilities, or reduced opportunities for advancement. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish the final element of his prima facie ADA discrimination claim—that is, discrimination because of his disability—with respect to the small-engine repair assignments he received while working as an ASW II. See Holly, 492 F.3d at 1256. As such, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim based on his reassignment to small-engine repair duties.