Opinion ID: 198874
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Specially Designed”

Text: We first find that Cabrera's computer system was “specially designed” for the production of identification documents. As an initial matter, we hold that the statute's text is unambiguous. It does not exclude from its reach implements that could have legitimate other uses if not altered by the perpetrator's modifications. Cabrera suggests that the “specially designed” prong refers not to a defendant's specific implements, but to implements that as a class are uniquely configured to fabricate false identification documents. His interpretation is not tenable. Neither the statute nor Cabrera provides any basis upon which a court could determine the proper level of generality at which to define the class. Should we -8- look to the class of “computers fitted with scanners, printers, document-altering software and digitized templates”? The class of all “computers”? All “electronic implements”? All “implements” of any sort? Nothing in § 1028 requires such arbitrary classification. Rather, the statute unambiguously asks the fact-finder to consider whether the item that the defendant is charged with possessing was “specially designed” for producing forgeries. Asserting that the statute is ambiguous, Cabrera notes that courts may look to a statute's legislative history when its language itself is not conclusive and clear. See, e.g., Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 858 (1st Cir. 1998). But even if § 1028 were unclear (and we believe it is not) Cabrera's resort to its legislative history would be unavailing. The House Judiciary Committee's report on the False Identification Crime Control Act of 1982 -- in which the disputed “specially designed” language was first introduced -- stated that “the committee intend[ed] to exclude implements such as office photocopying machines, which are designed for more general and legitimate purposes.” H.R. Rep. No. 97-802, at 11 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3519, 3530. This language might support an argument that standard -9- computer equipment, bereft of any special-purpose hardware or software, would fall beyond the statute's reach. Perhaps an offender could, it would seem, have used an ordinary word processor and an ordinary printer with ordinary paper to produce false documents, just as an offender could have used an office photocopier to do so, without having violated former § 1028. But Cabrera's computer arrangement, unlike a standard office photocopier, was specifically designed to facilitate counterfeiting. A modern computer is not analogous to an “office photocopying machine[]” circa 1982, which in Congress's view likely could not be altered or specialized, but rather to a modern photocopier fitted with software and hardware that render it uniquely suited to produce illicit materials. We have no reason to believe that such a device would escape § 1028's reach simply because both it and its 1982 analogue were called “photocopiers.” A photocopier configured with special-purpose hardware or software may be “specially designed” for the fabrication of identifying documents, and so may a similarly configured computer. In fact, the more relevant portion of the legislative history is that which precedes the language quoted above. The House committee report noted that the term “document-making implement” would include “text in a distinctive type face and -10- layout that when reproduced [is] part of an identification document.” Id. This statement, of course, accurately describes the templates, which were merely computer files containing digital images of “text in a distinctive type face and layout.” Alone, each template formed “part of an identification document” and together with the inserted data, each would constitute a complete document. Cabrera contends that his system was not specially designed for the fabrication of false identification documents, emphasizing that the hardware at issue -- namely, the computer, printer, and scanner -- were not uniquely suited to such activity. However, the evidence adduced at trial permitted a jury to conclude that Cabrera's system also included software, such as the “Picture It!” program, which testimony indicated “could be used . . . to accept scann[ed] images and also to place those images onto computer-produced documents.” Most tellingly, the system also included digitized templates of various official identification documents stored on Cabrera's hard drive and floppy disks. A jury viewing this paraphernalia as a whole could reasonably have deemed the system “specially designed . . . for making . . . a false identification document.” -11-