Opinion ID: 4486921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence and Findings

Text: ¶ 33. Finally, parents argue that the court’s findings do not support its conclusions about their inability to parent the children within a reasonable time. They suggest that the court’s findings about them and their unsanitary living conditions reflect “cultural differences” that should not play a role in a termination decision. They maintain that the findings do not show their inability to parent the children within a reasonable time. Father also asserts that the court erred in finding that he could not control the children’s tantrums. And, parents argue that the court “ignored” the opinions of the children’s guardians ad litem. ¶ 34. To determine the best interests of a child, the court must consider four statutory factors. See 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a). The most important factor is the likelihood that the parent will be able to resume parental duties within a reasonable time. See In re B.M., 165 Vt. 331, 336, 682 A.2d 477, 480 (1996). As long as the court applied the proper standard, we will not disturb its findings on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous; we will affirm its conclusions if they are supported by the findings. In re G.S., 153 Vt. at 652, 572 A.2d at 1351. We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses on appeal. See In re S.B., 174 Vt. 427, 429, 800 5 Notwithstanding any overlap in the analysis generally, it is clear that the court here did not modify an initial disposition order based on stagnation. Thus, mother’s reliance on In re M.P. is misplaced. See 2019 VT 69, ¶ 30, __ Vt. __, 219 A.3d 1315 (“We reiterate that stagnation was inapplicable in the absence of a disposition order of the court that included a case plan that father had to follow.”). 14 A.2d 476, 479 (2002) (mem.) (“Our role is not to second-guess the family court or to reweigh the evidence, but rather to determine whether the court abused its discretion in terminating [an individual’s] parental rights”). ¶ 35. The court did not terminate parents’ rights because they lived in a “smelly house,” as they suggest. Instead, it found that they failed to make any progress in their ability to parent. This failure included an inability to maintain a home free of filth, the “unpleasant smells” being urine and feces; it also included their failure to learn from parenting coaching, and numerous other obstacles recited above. The court’s numerous findings are amply supported by the evidence and they support the court’s conclusion. This includes the finding that parents could not control the children’s tantrums, as reflected in the detailed notes from the Family Time coaches and other testimony at the hearing. Any error in the court’s finding about father’s ability to control M.T.’s tantrums would be harmless in any event given the court’s numerous other findings. ¶ 36. While the delay in the initial disposition hearing meant the court did not have to find stagnation in order to terminate the parents’ residual parental rights, the court made findings that support stagnation. The Family Time coaches ceased coaching parents, as testified at the hearing, due to parents’ stagnant parenting skills and their inability to make progress despite the coaches’ lengthy and consistent efforts to provide them guidance and advice. Finally, the court was not required to expressly consider the opinions of the guardians ad litem in reaching its decision. See V.R.F.P. 6(e)(3) (stating that guardian may, at a disposition hearing, “state his or her position or opinion and the reasons therefor”). Contrary to parents’ assertion, the court did not “ignore[] the injustices that were apparent to service providers, expert witnesses and the GALs.” Instead, it applied the law and evaluated, based on the evidence, whether terminating parents’ 15 rights would be in the children’s best interests.6 While parents disagree with the court’s conclusion, they fail to show error. Affirmed. FOR THE COURT: