Opinion ID: 6351441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: respondent’s prior disciplinary record

Text: After the presentation of evidence in the matter of [A] Estate (Charge I), respondent’s counsel stipulated that Disciplinary Counsel had established at least one violation of the Disciplinary Rules whereupon Disciplinary Counsel introduced documentary evidence of respondent’s prior disciplinary record. On July 19, 1973 and November 16, 1973, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed petitions for discipline with the Disciplinary Board of Pennsylvania against respondent. One count involved the dilatory settling of the Estate of [H], which matter arose in 1970. Respondent was cited with these charges: (1) Incompetent representation of [I] in an action of divorce; (2) Incompetent representation of [J] before the Civil Service Commission; and (3) Incompetent representation of [K] in a real estate transaction. The [I] matter arose in 1970, as did the matter involving [J]. The matter of [K] arose in 1971 and early 1972. Hearing committee conducted hearings on the above matters on January 23,1974, and February 8, 1974. With respect to the matters involving [H], [I] and [K], the hearing committee found respondent’s conduct violative of D.R. 6-101(A)(3) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The hearing committee recommended dismissal of the [ J] matter, but recommended private reprimand in the [H], [I] and [K] matters. On September 20, 1974, respondent was privately reprimanded by the Disciplinary Board for the above three separate violations of D.R. 6-101(A)(3), to wit: neglect of an estate for a period of about two and one-half years; neglect of a divorce action for about three years; and, neglect of a real estate matter. The hearing committee who heard the charges concerning the divorce case made two conclusions of law relative to respondent’s character,- namely: “2. That Respondent, [ ], attempted to mislead Complainant into believing he had secured a divorce, although the files had not been presented to the proper court for approval and signature. “3. That Respondent, [ ], without any reason except gross neglect, failed to perform a legal matter entrusted to him and attempted to conceal his inadequacy by the substitution of false documents.” There is a similarity between the [I] matter and the charge in the [E] complaint (Charge II). At the time (September 20, 1974) that respondent was reprimanded, he was neglecting his professional responsibilities to file an action on [E’s widow and son]’s behalf for about two years. While the one-year statute of limitations had already run on [E’s widow and son’s] wrongful death action, the two-year statute of limitation on the survival action would not run until on or about October 14, 1974. On November 20, 1975, petition was filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel with the Secretary of the Disciplinary Board of Pennsylvania. The petition charged respondent with six counts of misconduct. Charge one dealing with a personal injury to one [L], arose in August, 1969. Charge two deals with a personal injury to one [M], which cause of action arose in early 1970 when [M] retained respondent. Charge three deals with [N]. Respondent became involved in this matter in June, 1968. Charge four, regarding [O], arose in July, 1965. Charge five, dealing with [P], arose in June, 1970. Finally, Charge six, dealing with [Q], arose in January, 1969. The record reveals that of the six charges, two complaints were received subsequent to February 8, 1974, the date of the first board hearing. Specifically, the [P] complaint was received by the Disciplinary Board on July, 1974, and the [N] complaint was received on August 6, 1974. The hearing committee filed its report and recommendation on May 14, 1974 and a private reprimand was administered to respondent on Friday, September 20, 1974. Subsequent to that date, the remaining four charges were filed with the board and ultimately on November 20, 1975, petition was filed. The above illustrates that all of the charges arose during the same time period as the charges in the first petition. There is no record of charges or incompetency which arose subsequent to the private reprimand of September 1974, with the exception of the two matters now before the board, and the [E] complaint represents one of those cases from the time period of 1972. On April 14, 1977, respondent was publicly censured by Chief Justice Michael J. Eagen for multiple counts of violating, inter alia, D.R. 1-102(A)(4) and D.R. 6-101(A)(3). In those multiple charges, respondent’s inattention to his professional responsibilities caused the statute of limitations to run in five personal injury actions he was to prosecute on behalf of various clients. Respondent never advised his clients of his derelictions, failed to return numerous phone calls, did not keep appointments, and, in some cases, misrepresented to his clients that he had taken certain actions when he, in fact, had not. In their report and recommendation to the Supreme Court, the Disciplinary Board said: “We totally reject the testimony of respondent in attempting to excuse the irresponsible behavior. There is no explanation for such complete dereliction of duty. Respondent not only allowed his clients’ causes of action to extinguish, but did so during a period when he was constantly reminded that said causes existed. His total disregard of his clients as manifested by his active course of non-communication only compounds the unethical conduct. It can only leave a bitter feeling with his clients and adversely affect their regard for the iegal profession. The lack of communication in not making his clients aware of his wrongdoings — missing the statute of limitations — only conveys to the board and the hearing committee the possibility of a flaw in respondent’s character.. . .” While the hearing committee in that case recommended a suspension of three months as the appropriate discipline to impose upon respondent for his multiple violations of the Dis ciplinary Rules, the Disciplinary Board recommended only the imposition of a public censure. The board’s more lenient recommendation was based upon their belief that respondent, after receiving the private reprimand, made a “good faith attempt to ascribe to the wishes of the Disciplinary Board” and “put his house in order. ” In their report, the board went on to say: “This board cannot overlook the negligent conduct of respondent and does find ample reason for public discipline at this time. But the Board feels that it must temper the hearing committee’s recommendation of three months’ suspension. Respondent has altered his office priorities and improved his attitude towards the responsibility owed to his clients and his approach to his chosen profession. He has apparently taken the steps necessary to restore him to the ranks of his profession where he will bring credit to himself and his vocation. He should consider himself fortunate that he has been given an opportunity to show the improvement. This improvement must be considered as mitigating circumstances to respondent’s credit.” After noting that the Supreme Court had “serious reservations about (respondent’s) character” and that they “considered very seriously revoking (respondent’s) license,” Chief Justice Eagen, in administering the public censure, said: “But the Board itself tells us you have made a serious effort to right the wrongs you have committed; that you have made a determined effort to put your house in order, and that at least in the last two years your conduct has been beyond reproach.” At the time o the public censure, respondent had already neglected the [E] matter for a period of about four and one-half years and had misrepresented to [E’s widow and son] that he had initiated an action on their behalf when he had not. In addition, approximately nine months had expired from the date of death of the decedent in the [A] Estate.