Opinion ID: 406418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lawson's Statements to Agent Corcoran

Text: 14 At the time Lawson made the statements described above to Agent Corcoran, Fed.R.Evid. 410 and Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6) made inadmissible any statement made in connection with any offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to a crime. 5 Both rules have been amended in the interim so as to apply only to statements made to prosecuting attorneys. 6 The government expressly waived at oral argument any claim that the new version is applicable either to Lawson's original trial or to a new trial. 15 Lawson claims that all testimony as to his statements to Agent Corcoran should have been excluded under Rules 410 and 11(e)(6). At a pre-trial hearing, the District Court expressed reservations about the admissibility of Lawson's statements. On November 18, 1980, the government wrote the District Court: 16 Please be advised that after further consideration, the Government does not intend to attempt to introduce at trial any statements made by Mr. Lawson to F. B. I. Agent James Corcoran. This is in view of the fact that it is our opinion that the introduction of the statements would be precluded under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 17 Nevertheless, the government used these statements to impeach Lawson's testimony. Two grounds are asserted in support of this use of the statements. First, it is argued that the statements were not made in the course of plea negotiations. The letter of November 18 clearly waives any such claim, however. If the statements were not made in plea negotiations, then Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) would be wholly inapplicable and the statements could have been used in the government's main case. The government was familiar with all the circumstances surrounding Lawson's conversations with Corcoran and the letter of November 18 plainly treats them as within Rule 410. That letter thus waives any position to the contrary. We need not, therefore, determine the impact of our decisions in United States v. Levy, 578 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1978), United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1978), and United States v. Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1978), which in any event involve very different facts. 18 The second ground offered to support use of Lawson's statements relies on the language of Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) that such statements are not admissible against the person who made the plea or offer.... It is argued that against the person means use in the government's case-in-chief and not use for impeachment or rebuttal purposes. Whether the November 18, 1980 letter also waives this claim is a closer question. The letter does not qualify the denial of any intention to use the statements, and we hardly think that a pre-trial hearing was held solely to determine admissibility in the main case. Nevertheless, there is no indication that use for impeachment purposes was ever focused upon by the parties. Therefore, we reach the issue of admissibility. 19 In admitting the statements, the District Court relied upon United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1979). Havens held that pre-trial statements by a criminal defendant which would have been inadmissible as part of the prosecution's main case under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), might be used to impeach the defendant if he or she took the stand. We believe Havens is inapposite, however. A principal purpose of the exclusionary rule under Miranda is to deter police officers while Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) are designed to encourage plea bargaining. So far as deterrence in the former case is concerned, exclusion from the case-in-chief provides the needed deterrence. It is somewhat farfetched to believe that police conduct of an interrogation of a suspect will involve fine calculations as to whether the particular suspect will take the stand in a trial months or years in the future. Plea bargaining involves a wholly different context. Not only does it usually occur closer to trial but it will in all but a few cases involve attorneys. Calculations as to use for impeachment purposes will clearly affect the discussions and impair the frank and open atmosphere Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) were designed to foster. 20 We are aided in resolving this question by an unusually clear legislative history. In considering these rules, Congress debated and rejected proposals that statements made in connection with an offer to plead guilty be available for impeachment purposes. Fed.R.Evid. 410, as originally promulgated by the Supreme Court, provided that an offer to plead guilty ... or statements made in connection with (an offer to plead guilty), is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the ... offer. In 1974, the Senate proposed the addition of the following specific language to Rule 410: 21 This rule should not apply to the introduction of voluntary and reliable statements made in court on the record in connection with (an offer to plead guilty) where offered for impeachment purposes or in a subsequent prosecution of the declarant for perjury or false statement. 22 See S.Rep.No.93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (October 18, 1974); see also id. at 10-11, reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 7051, 7057-58. The Senate amendment was adopted by the Conference Committee but with a provision that Rule 410 would be superseded by any amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was inconsistent with it and was effective after the date of the Act establishing the Federal Rules of Evidence. See H.Conf.Rep.No.93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (December 14, 1974). The Conference Report explained that the issue was about to arise again in Congress' deliberations over Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6), which, as proposed by the Supreme Court, was inconsistent with the Conference Committee's Rule 410. H.Conf.Rep.No.93-1597 at 6-7, reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 7098, 7100. On January 2, 1975, the latter rule was enacted with the proviso described above. Pub.L.No.93-595; 88 Stat. 1926, 1933 (1975). 23 Congress thereupon turned to the proposed Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6). Consistent with its prior position that offers to plead should be admissible for impeachment purposes, the Senate voted to eliminate Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6) so that the newly-enacted Rule 410 would prevail, thereby permitting use of plea bargaining statements for impeachment purposes. See 121 Cong.Rec. 23318-30 (July 17, 1975). The House, on the other hand, opposed the use of such statements for impeachment. See H.Rep.No.94-247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (May 29, 1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 674, 679. The Conference Committee resolved the dispute in favor of the House view. The Conference Report states: 24 Rule 11(e)(6) deals with the use of statements made in connection with plea agreements. The House version permits a limited use of pleas of guilty, later withdrawn, or nolo contendere, offers of such pleas, and statements made in connection with such pleas or offers. Such evidence can be used in a perjury or false statement prosecution if the plea, offer, or related statement was made under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel. The Senate version permits evidence of voluntary and reliable statements made in court on the record to be used for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the declarant or in a perjury or false statement prosecution. 25 The Conference adopts the House version.... 26 See H.Conf.Rep.No.94-414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (July 28, 1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 713, 714. As finally adopted, Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6) was enacted on July 31, 1975, Pub.L.No.94-64, § 3(10), 89 Stat. 370, 372 (1975), and became effective on August 1, 1975. Fed.R.Evid. 410 as enacted on January 2, 1975, thus never became effective because Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6) was inconsistent with it. On December 12, 1975, a version of Rule 410 identical to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6), was adopted by the Congress. Pub.L.No.94-149, § 1(9), 89 Stat. 805 (1975). 27 We regard this legislative history as demonstrating Congress' explicit intention to preclude use of statements made in plea negotiations for impeachment purposes. Indeed, even the Senate version would not have permitted use of the statements at issue here since they were not made in court and on the record. Their inadmissibility under Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) is thus beyond serious dispute. 28 The admission of Lawson's statements to Corcoran was not harmless error. The government's evidence was composed largely of uncertain eyewitness testimony and witnesses impeached for bias. Use of these statements to attack Lawson's credibility was thus no insignificant event and may well have altered the balance of the credible evidence in the eyes of the jury.