Opinion ID: 1868222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Fundamental-Error Doctrine

Text: A limited exception to our procedural preservation rules is the fundamental-error doctrine. See Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979, 982-83 (1947). Historically, we have used the term fundamental error to describe situations in which an appellate court may review error that was neither raised in the trial court nor assigned on appeal. See, e.g., McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957) (per curiam). In light of our strong policy considerations favoring preservation, we have called fundamental error a discredited doctrine. Cox v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex.1982) (per curiam). Nevertheless, we have employed fundamental error in rare instances to review certain types of unpreserved or unassigned error. First, we have reviewed unassigned error or error not raised by the parties when the record shows on its face that the court lacked jurisdiction. See McCauley, 304 S.W.2d at 266 (error is fundamental when the record shows a jurisdictional defect). In addition, we have applied the fundamental-error doctrine to review certain types of error in juvenile delinquency cases. See In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d at 767 (reviewing a trial court's failure to give mandatory statutory admonishments in a juvenile delinquency proceeding); State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.1969), vacated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 596, 90 S.Ct. 1350, 25 L.Ed.2d 594, on remand, 457 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.1970) (reviewing the constitutionality of the burden of proof instruction in a juvenile delinquency proceeding). Our application of fundamental error in these last two cases rested on the quasi-criminal nature of juvenile delinquency cases. See C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d at 765 (characterizing a juvenile delinquency proceeding as quasi-criminal and analyzing the criminal rules on applying fundamental error); Santana, 444 S.W.2d at 615 (observing that juvenile delinquency proceedings are not ordinary civil adversarial proceedings). Specifically, in C.O.S., we explained that it is unwise and problematic to apply one preservation rule in adult, criminal proceedings and another, stricter rule in juvenile cases. 988 S.W.2d at 767. Texas criminal jurisprudence recognizes that certain types of error can be reviewed for the first time on appeal. [10] Tex.R. Evid. 103(d) (In a criminal case, nothing in these rules precludes taking notice of fundamental errors affecting substantive rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.); see C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d at 765-67 (describing certain substantive rights that criminal defendants cannot forfeit by the failure to preserve error in the trial court) (citing Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 278-79 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (en banc)). However, this rationale does not support applying the criminal fundamental-error doctrine to parental rights termination cases. We consider juvenile delinquency cases to be quasi-criminal because under the Family Code, the Texas Rules of Evidence applicable to criminal cases and Chapter 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure govern juvenile delinquency proceedings. Tex. Fam. Code § 51.17(c); In re M.A.F., 966 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex.1998). In contrast, our Rules of Evidence applicable to civil cases and our Rules of Civil Procedure govern termination proceedings. Tex. Fam.Code § 104.001 (civil rules of evidence apply to suits affecting the parent-child relationship except as otherwise provided); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 262-63 (determining that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 279 applies to judgment terminating parental rights); E.B., 802 S.W.2d at 648 (analyzing the application of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 277 to a jury charge complaint in a termination case). Accordingly, because termination cases do not apply criminal procedural or evidentiary rules (that are only applicable to criminal cases), they do not necessarily incorporate the concomitant criminal fundamental-error doctrine. In sum, we have not previously extended the fundamental-error doctrine to this area of the law, and we are not persuaded to do so here. We are aware of no precedent in either our criminal or civil jurisprudence that informs the court of appeals' conclusion that core jury charge issues in termination cases should be reviewed even when not preserved. Further, we cannot see any reasonable, practical, and consistent way of reviewing unpreserved complaints of charge error in termination cases that satisfies our narrow fundamental-error doctrine. We conclude that the fundamental-error doctrine does not permit appellate review of the complaint of unpreserved charge error in this case.