Opinion ID: 1957199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Brooks

Text: The final issue before the Court is whether the holding of Brooks applies to the present case. Polakoff and Chase argue that Brooks should apply to Brooks and to cases arising from facts that postdate our decision but not to all others which arise on facts predating the opinion. [11] Although they do not use the term, what they seek is selective prospectivity. The U.S. Supreme Court identifies three types of application categories, retroactive, purely prospective, and modified or selective prospectivity. James B. Beam Distilling Company v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535-37, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2443-44, 115 L.Ed.2d 481, 488-89 (1991) (plurality opinion). Retroactive application applies to the parties before the court and to all others by and against whom claims may be pressed, consistent with res judicata and procedural barriers such as statute of limitations. Beam, 501 U.S. at 535, 111 S.Ct. at 2443, 115 L.Ed.2d at 488. The Supreme Court noted that retroactivity is overwhelmingly the norm, and is in keeping with the traditional function of the courts to decide cases before them based upon their best current understanding of the law. Id. (Internal citations omitted.) Pure prospectivity is the method of overruling, under which a new rule is applied neither to the parties in the law-making decision nor to those others against or by whom it might be applied to conduct or events occurring before that decision. The case is decided under the old law but becomes a vehicle for announcing the new, effective with respect to all conduct occurring after the date of that decision. Beam, 501 U.S. at 536, 111 S.Ct. at 2443, 115 L.Ed.2d at 488 (internal citations omitted). Modified or selective prospectivity is the method by which a court may apply a new rule in the case in which it is pronounced, then return to the old one with respect to all others arising on facts predating the pronouncement. Beam, 501 U.S. at 537, 111 S.Ct. at 2444, 115 L.Ed.2d at 489. It is distinguishable from pure prospectivity in that the new pronouncement applies to the case in which it is made and not solely to cases arising after the pronouncement. This is the form of application sought by Polakoff and Chase in the current matter. With regard to selective prospectivity, the Supreme Court has noted that this method ... enjoyed its temporary ascendancy in the criminal law during a period in which the Court formulated new rules, prophylactic or otherwise, to insure protection of the rights of the accused. Id. (Internal citations omitted.) The Supreme Court, however, has abandoned the use of selective prospectivity. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (overruling Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) on the grounds that the integrity of judicial review requires that [the Court] apply [the new] rule to all similar cases pending on direct review and selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated [parties] the same); Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-95, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 2516-517, 125 L.Ed.2d 74, 85 (1993); Beam, 501 U.S. 529, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481. [12] Our own cases have essentially followed the teaching of Linkletter v. Walker in deciding whether a new interpretation of a Maryland constitutional provision, statute, or rule, should receive retrospective effect. American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Goldstein, 312 Md. 583, 591, 541 A.2d 955, 959 (1988) citing State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 336-38, 403 A.2d 356, 370-71 (1979); see also, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 471, 601 A.2d 633, 658 (1992) (When a prior case in this Court is overruled on the ground that it was erroneously decided, the question whether our holding is retrospective or only prospective is governed by the principles set forth in such opinions such as American Trucking ... Linkletter v. Walker ....). [13] The general rule in these cases is that even when a prospective application applies because of the Linkletter factors, a new interpretation of a constitutional provision, statute, or rule has included the case before us and all other pending cases where the relevant question has been preserved for appellate review. American Trucking, 312 Md. at 592, 541 A.2d at 959 (citing Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 576-83, 479 A.2d 1335, 1340-43 (1984); McClain v. State, 288 Md. 456, 470, 419 A.2d 369, 374 (1980); State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 338, 403 A.2d 356, 371 (1979)). [14] It appears that what we have referred to as prospective application in American Trucking, to wit, application of a new interpretation of a statute to the case before us and all other cases pending where the issue has been preserved for appellate review, the Supreme Court classifies as retroactive application. [15] For purposes of clarity, we hereby adopt the Supreme Court's classification of retroactive for application of new interpretations of constitutional provisions, statutes or rules that include the case before us and all other pending cases where the relevant question has been preserved for appellate review. Regardless of how the application is classified, however, both the federal rule and the general rule in Maryland is that a new interpretation of a statute applies to the case before the court and to all cases pending where the issue has been preserved for appellate review. See McClain v. State, 288 Md. 456, 463-64, 419 A.2d 369, 372 (1980) (applying the exclusionary rule of Johnson v. State retroactively). Both rules are consistent with the view that the law can scarcely permit `the substantive law to shift and spring' according to the particular equities of individual parties' claims of actual reliance on an old rule and of harm from retroactive application of a new rule. Harper, 509 U.S. at 97, 113 S.Ct. at 2517, 125 L.Ed.2d at 86 (internal citations omitted). As discussed, supra, in Brooks we held that our prior interpretation of the Code in Richwind was erroneous. [16] In doing so we applied the well-settled Maryland common law rule that when there is an applicable statute designed to protect a certain class of people, the defendant's duty ordinarily is prescribed by the statute. Brooks represented a different interpretation of a statute and the question of its application is governed by the standard discussed in American Trucking. Consequently, our decision in Brooks applies retroactively, and includes the case at bar. Moreover, our per curiam decision in Gentry v. Ebersole, 378 Md. 612, 837 A.2d 924 (2003), makes it clear that Brooks applies retroactively. Gentry involved a lead paint case in which the defendant property owner was granted summary judgment on the issue of notice. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court and the plaintiff petitioned this Court for certiorari while Brooks was pending. Following the publication of our Brooks opinion, we issued the per curiam opinion which mandated that the case be remanded for further proceedings consistent with Brooks. We further note that in the present case, the jury was instructed that it had to find that Polakoff and Chase had reason to know of the existence of flaking, loose, or peeling paint in order to find defendants liable. Presumably, because the jury found in favor of Jasmine, they concluded that Polakoff and Chase did have knowledge. Even assuming Brooks did not apply to the present case, there is no prejudice to Polakoff and Chase in that the Circuit Court required Jasmine to prove more than was necessary to establish liability, to wit, notice of the defect. In Maryland we give great deference to a jury's determination of a disputed fact, consequently the trial court properly denied Polakoff and Chase's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See Houston v. Safeway Stores Inc., 346 Md. 503, 521, 697 A.2d 851, 859 (`As with respect to a judgment n.o.v .... [i]f there is any legally relevant and competent evidence, however slight, from which a rational mind could infer a fact in issue, then the trial court would be invading the province of the jury by declaring a directed verdict.' (Internal citation omitted.)). Here, there was testimony that repairs were made to the inside of the house during the tenancy, including work on the windows alleged to have been the source of the paint which poisoned Jasmine. From this testimony, a rational jury could conclude that Polakoff, through his agent, should have been on notice of the chipping paint on the windowsills. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS. Dissenting Opinion by RAKER, J., which WILNER, J., joins. RAKER, J., dissenting, in which WILNER, J., joins. The question in this case is whether the holding in Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 835 A.2d 616 (2003), applies to this case. I would hold that it does not and that Brooks applies prospectively only. See, e.g., Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 275, 462 A.2d 506, 522 (1983) (abrogating the interspousal immunity rule in Maryland as to cases sounding in negligence, applying the abrogation to the instant case and prospectively to all such causes of action accruing after the date of the filing of the opinion in that case). Accordingly, I would reverse the judgement of the Court of Special Appeals. Writing for the Court on the issue of the prospective effect of a decision of this Court, in Julian v. Christopher, 320 Md. 1, 575 A.2d 735 (1990), Judge Chasanow wrote: In appropriate cases, courts may `in the interest of justice' give their decisions only prospective effect. Contracts are drafted based on what the law is; to upset such transactions even for the purpose of improving the law could be grossly unfair. Overruling prospectively is particularly appropriate when we are dealing with decisions involving contract law. The courts must protect an individual's right to rely on existing law when contracting. Ordinarily decisions which change the common law apply prospectively, as well as to the litigants before the court. Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 217, 438 A.2d 1301, 1309 (1981). What is meant by `prospectively' may depend on the fairness of applying the decision to cases or events occurring after the effective date of the decision. See, e.g., Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 275, 462 A.2d 506, 522 (1983) (abrogating interspousal immunity in negligence cases  decision applicable to the case before the court and causes of action accruing or discovered after the date of the decision); Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 162, 497 A.2d 1143, 1162 (1985) (imposing strict liability on manufacturer of `Saturday Night Specials'  decision applicable to the case before the court as well as retail sales after the date of the mandate). It is reasonable to assume that landlords may have relied on the Klawans interpretation when entering into leases with `silent consent' clauses. This reliance should be protected. Contracts should be interpreted based on the law as it existed when they were entered into. Therefore, whether the Klawans case or the instant case governs the interpretation of a silent consent clause depends on whether the lease being interpreted was executed before or after the mandate in this case. Id. at 10-11, 575 A.2d at 739-40. Landlords in the City of Baltimore had a right to rely on the common law in this State and the law as set out in Richwind. The landlords in the City had no reason to anticipate that they had an affirmative duty to inspect properties for peeling or flaking paint after the inception of the tenancy. Out of fairness to the landlords in the City, Brooks should be applied prospectively only. To declare that plaintiffs need not show notice and to apply the rule retroactively is unjust and unfair. I adhere to my view expressed in my dissent in Brooks that the case was wrongfully decided. I reiterate: ... that absent notice, actual or constructive, the landlord has no duty, even under the Housing Code, to inspect the demised premises during the tenancy. The tenant is in a superior position to detect chipping or peeling paint and should therefore notify the landlord of the hazard. Nor does the landlord have a duty to continuously inspect premises under the tenant's control to see if there is chipping or peeling paint; that duty to inspect arises at the inception of the tenancy. This is so under the common law, and under the City Code. 378 Md. at 97, 835 A.2d at 632. I respectfully dissent. Judge Wilner has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissenting opinion.