Opinion ID: 1135325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Confrontation Clause constraints on NRS 51.385 and NRS 174.229.

Text: NRS 51.385 authorizes the admission of out-of-court CSA allegations made by child-declarants whether or not they testify. If a child does testify, admission of that child's prior consistent or inconsistent out-of-court statements does not violate the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, so long as the child is subject to full and effective cross-examination concerning the statements. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (admission of a witness's prior sworn testimony does not violate the Confrontation Clause, so long as he or she is produced and subject to full and effective cross-examination concerning that testimony). Although a witness's prior consistent out-of-court statements generally are inadmissible hearsay, see Daly v. State, 99 Nev. 564, 568-69, 665 P.2d 798, 802 (1983), such statements do not violate the Confrontation Clause. Therefore, even though NRS 51.385 may be in conflict with Nevada's prior consistent statement rule, that exception causes no federal constitutional conflict. See, e.g., Flewallen v. Faulkner, 677 F.2d 610 (7th Cir.1982); State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1989). However, the Confrontation Clause becomes an issue when a child witness does not testify. If the court admits an absent child's statements that are not firmly rooted in a hearsay exception, the Confrontation Clause requires a showing that the hearsay statements bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness such that cross-examination would be of little assistance in ensuring the reliability of the hearsay statements. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 826-27, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3152-53, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) (CSA conviction reversed because hearsay statements made by child and reported by physician did not bear adequate indicia of reliability); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394, 399-400, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 1125-26, 1128-29, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986) (the Confrontation Clause does not require a showing of unavailability as a condition to admission of the out-of-court statements of a non-testifying co-conspirator). NRS 51.385 addresses Confrontation Clause concerns by requiring findings of reliability of the hearsay statements and unavailability of the declarant whenever a child does not testify at trial. Similar statutes have been upheld when challenged on the same grounds. See, e.g., State v. Leavitt, 111 Wash.2d 66, 758 P.2d 982 (1988) (en banc): State v. Ryan, 103 Wash.2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984) (en banc); see also Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680 (10th Cir.1990); State v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741 (Colo.1988); State v. Wright, 751 S.W.2d 48 (Mo.1988) (en banc); State v. Gallagher, 150 Vt. 341, 554 A.2d 221 (1988); State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). NRS 174.229, the statutory provision addressing videotaped preliminary hearing testimony, may raise a Confrontation Clause dilemma when applied to a specific case. [5] First, NRS 174.229 does not require witness unavailability before videotaped testimony given at a preliminary hearing may be used in lieu of a child's testimony at trial. However, when prior testimony is used in lieu of live testimony, the declarant must be unavailable, even though the declarant's statement was made under oath and the declarant was subject to cross-examination. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); White v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 736, 741, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (unavailability analysis is a necessary part of Confrontation Clause inquiry only if challenged out-of-court statements are made in course of prior judicial proceeding). Accordingly, we conclude that NRS 174.229 may only be utilized to show videotaped testimony at trial if a child witness is unavailable to testify. Second, NRS 174.229 makes no provision for the defendant's Confrontation Clause guarantee of physical presence in the courtroom, i.e. the right to face-to-face confrontation. Before excluding a defendant from an adversarial proceeding, a court must make case-specific findings of necessity. In Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), the Supreme Court reversed a CSA conviction because the trial court permitted the prosecution to use screens to block the children's view of the defendants. The Supreme Court held that, without a finding of necessity, such a procedure violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 1020-21, 108 S.Ct. at 2802-03. In Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990), the Court clarified the showing of necessity required to exclude a defendant from the trial. The Craig court held that shielding child witnesses from CSA defendants is constitutional, but only if the trial judge makes three case-specific findings. The trial court must: (1) hear evidence and determine whether use of a one-way closed circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness; (2) find that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant; and (3) find that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., more than mere nervousness, excitement, or reluctance to testify. Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56, 110 S.Ct. at 3168-69. Any shielding of a child witness, whether through screens or closed circuit television, must afford the defendant the opportunity for cross-examination. Also, the judge, jury, and defendant must be able to observe the witness's demeanor. Id. at 851, 858, 110 S.Ct. at 3166-67, 3170. The Court declined to state exactly what degree of trauma is required before a shielding procedure may be used. However, it found that constitutional standards would be met where serious emotional distress, such that the child could not reasonably communicate, would occur. Id. at 856-57, 110 S.Ct. at 3169-70. The Court stated that federal constitutional law does not require that the judge personally examine the witness for potential trauma in the presence of the defendant, or consider less restrictive alternatives such as one-way television, but that such proceedings would be helpful. Id. at 859-60, 110 S.Ct. at 3171. The State contends that the Craig/Coy requirements of findings of necessity apply only to the trial phase of the proceedings and that NRS 174.229 is not unconstitutional because it encompasses only pre-trial videotaped testimony. The Supreme Court has affirmed the exclusion of a defendant from a CSA competency hearing. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). However, the Court noted that competency hearings are different because they do not concern the issue of the defendant's guilt. Moreover, in Stincer, no part of the competency hearing was introduced at trial. In the instant case, preliminary hearing videotaped testimony of four of the children was admitted into evidence at trial after each child testified at trial. The motion to exclude the appellants from the preliminary hearing was made the day of the hearing, and no evidence showing a need for excluding the appellants was presented. We conclude that the failure to adhere to the Craig/Coy requirements at a preliminary hearing should preclude the use of any preliminary hearing testimony at trial. See State v. Crandall, 120 N.J. 649, 577 A.2d 483 (1990) (statutes authorizing exclusion of defendants from the courtroom are constitutional only when the statutes require case-specific findings of necessity); State v. Tafoya, 108 N.M. 1, 765 P.2d 1183 (1988) (court must make Coy findings of necessity before defendants can be excluded from videotaped deposition of child-victim where videotape is used in lieu of child's testimony at trial). We have previously recognized that a preliminary hearing provides important benefits to the defense of an accused. Sturrock v. State, 95 Nev. 938, 942, 604 P.2d 341, 344 (1979). And, as a general rule, evidence adduced in a preliminary hearing must be evidence which would be admissible at trial. See Goldsmith v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 295, 454 P.2d 86 (1969). Unlike the competency hearing in Stincer, preliminary hearing testimony is closely related to the issue of guilt or innocence. Susan was shielded from Felix and Ontiveros when she testified at the preliminary examination. She again testified at trial in the appellants' presence, and her preliminary examination testimony was subsequently admitted. The exclusion of the appellants, without a determination of necessity, may have made Susan's preliminary examination testimony more credible and her cross-examination less effective. The right to face-to-face confrontation of witnesses testifying at a preliminary hearing and at trial is a basic guarantee to all accused of crime, and it should not be modified unless compelled by true necessity. The failure of the justice court to find any necessity in precluding Felix and Ontiveros from the preliminary hearing deprived them of their constitutional right of confrontation, and the videotapes of the preliminary hearing should not have been received into evidence at trial. Susan testified at the competency hearing and at trial in the appellants' presence without any shielding, and this leads to the reasonable assumption that shielding was not necessary at the preliminary hearing.