Opinion ID: 1048505
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Foreclosure Proceedings

Text: Next, Dixon challenges the validity of the foreclosure proceedings as conducted by Chase. Dixon claims that Chase has failed to prove chain of title to the Note and the deed of trust evidencing that it had the right to foreclose on the Property. We disagree. The record shows that Chase entered into the P&A Agreement with the FDIC and thereby agreed to purchase all loans and loan commitments of WaMu. Dixon does not dispute that his loan was formerly serviced by WaMu before it was placed in receivership and its assets (including all loan commitments) were subsequently acquired by Chase. Nor does Dixon dispute that he was notified by Chase in 2008 that it was the replacement mortgagee and servicer of Dixon’s loan. Moreover, as we have previously held, “the chain of assignments is itself sufficient to establish standing to foreclose, even without the original note.” Wheeler v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 4:13–cv–364, 2013 WL 3965304, at  (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2013) (citation omitted)). Here, contrary to Dixon’s allegations, Chase has provided sufficient documentation demonstrating that it acquired Dixon’s loan by purchasing from the FDIC the loan commitments of WaMu that were placed into the receivership after WaMu was declared insolvent - and that WaMu was the successor in interest to PNC - the original party with whom Dixon executed the deed of trust. Any misunderstandings Dixon may have about the chain of assignments are not supported by Dixon’s arguments on appeal or the record. 8 Case: 12-40590 Document: 00512399012 Page: 9 Date Filed: 10/07/2013 No. 12-40590 Additionally, the record indicates that Chase provided the required notices to Dixon prior to the foreclosure proceedings. Contained in the record is the notice of default and opportunity to cure that was provided to Dixon in 2008, as is the note of acceleration along with notice of sale in 2010. The dates on these notices indicate that Chase complied with the terms of the deed of trust (requiring 30 days notice prior to acceleration) as well as the notice requirements set forth in the Texas Property Code (requiring 20 days notice prior to acceleration). See Tex. Prop. Code § 51.002(d). We are not persuaded by Dixon’s argument that the two year lag time between the 2008 default notice and the 2010 notice of acceleration somehow invalidated the foreclosure proceedings. More significantly, however, Dixon has failed to provide evidence that he retained valid title to the Property or that his title, if valid, is superior to that of Appellees. See Fricks v. Hancock, 45 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (citation omitted) (holding that a plaintiff “must prove and recover on the strength of his own title, not the weakness of his adversary’s title.”). Dixon’s ultimate and continuing default on the Note payments, in and of itself, constituted a breach of the terms of the Note and the deed of trust which effectively negated any potential ownership or valid title he could have held to the Property. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in rendering judgment in favor of Appellees as to the propriety of the foreclosure proceedings, Freddie Mac’s superior title to the Property, and the removal of the cloud on the title resulting from the recordation of the (now vacated) state court default judgment.