Opinion ID: 894707
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Further Questions

Text: At the conclusion of the general questioning of the panel, the trial judge asked counsel to state the additional questions he sought to ask the jurors about seat belts. The Vasquezes proffered the above question. In sustaining Hyundai's objection, however, the trial judge also ruled: We are not going to go any further into seat belts. [67] In so ruling, the trial judge reversed an earlier decision to allow further follow up about seat belt usage during the time allotted to counsel to question jurors individually at the bench. In sustaining an objection to an improper voir dire question, a trial court should not foreclose all inquiry about a relevant topic. The Vasquezes' complaint as to this part of the trial court's ruling, however, is not preserved. A trial court may not foreclose a proper line of questioning, presuming that the actual questions posed are proper. [68] In some instances, an area of inquiry may be proper, but not the particular question asked. In such circumstances, a trial court may exercise its discretion to reject the form of the question. [69] If it is necessary to discuss the facts in the case to probe for potential biases, counsel must frame corresponding inquiries to avoid jury confusion and ensure that the question does not seek to preview the verdict. When the trial court determines that a proffered question's substance is confusing or seeks to elicit a pre-commitment from the jury, counsel should propose a different question or specific area of inquiry to preserve error on the desired line of inquiry; absent such an effort, the trial court is not required to formulate the question. Thus, to preserve a complaint that a trial court improperly restricted voir dire, a party must timely alert the trial court as to the specific manner in which it intends to pursue the inquiry. [70] Such a requirement provides the trial court with an opportunity to cure any error, obviating the need for later appellate review, and further allows an appellate court to examine the trial court's decision in context to determine whether error exists, and if so, whether harm resulted. [71] In Babcock, we held that litigants need not present a list of each intended voir dire question, but parties must nonetheless adequately apprise[ ] the trial court of the nature of their inquiry. [72] A timely, specific presentation to the trial court of the manner of an inquiry is important because it is difficult to evaluate after a trial whether the trial court's denial of an inquiry caused a biased juror to be seated on the jury or to evaluate what additional information a party could have adduced for the exercise of peremptory strikes. [73] Thus, the Court traditionally has adhered strictly to the principle that voir dire objections must be timely and plainly presented. [74] Here, in response to the trial judge's request that counsel specify the type of additional inquiry he would ask, counsel framed one inquiry. The proposed question is virtually the same inquiry that the trial court perceived had caused confusion during the second voir dire. That the trial court did not allow a similarly confusing question does not mean, though, that the trial court would have rejected a different approach had counsel proposed it. For example, the trial court could not have denied a question that asked if any juror had a bias against product liability lawsuits that would prevent them from considering the Vasquezes' specific claims. Such a bias, if firmly held, would disqualify any prospective juror who confessed such a belief. Not all questions or areas of inquiry involving the facts of a case will impermissibly attempt to pre-test the weight jurors will give those facts. But absent counsel proposing a different method of inquiry that would avoid continued confusion or pre-commitment, the breadth of the trial court's ruling is untested. Counsel does not have to present a list of questions to preserve error, but after the trial court's ruling sustaining Hyundai's objection to the one presented, it was incumbent on the Vasquezes to request alternative approaches to avoid the problems the trial court was addressing by its ruling. Moreover, the fact that counsel asked other general seat belt questions during the first voir dire does not shed light on the extent of the trial court's ruling in the third, when counsel already had asked some general seat belt questions and did not refer to the first two voir dires, or any question in them, in response to the trial judge's request for the type of additional questions counsel sought to ask  much less seek a ruling on other types of questions counsel previously had asked without objection. [75] In determining whether error was preserved, the question is not, as the dissents contend, whether the trial court knew the substantive area of inquiry about which counsel wanted to ask. The trial court knew counsel wanted to further inquire in some manner about seat belts. But the trial court determined that the way in which counsel posed the inquiry confused the jury and elicited pre-commitment, a call that the dissents agree fell within its discretion. Counsel's continued pursuit of the same inquiry did not preserve error on other inquiries that might have been proper had counsel posed them. We cannot infer, as the dissents suggest, from the fact that the trial judge allowed other questions in the first voir dire that she would not have allowed other questions in the third, had counsel presented them in response to her request for the type of questions counsel sought to ask. The Vasquezes carried their objection to the trial court's ruling throughout the remainder of individual voir dire, but they did not frame additional inquiries or convey to the trial court that the thrust of any remaining questions would be different from the single one presented for a ruling. [76] We do not know whether the trial court would have allowed other sorts of inquiries had counsel presented their substance. We therefore hold that the record does not present a sufficient basis for review of the trial court's ruling foreclosing further inquiry into seat belts.