Opinion ID: 202348
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enhancement for physical restraint of victim

Text: 76 The sentencing allegations in the indictment charged that the defendant and his brother Nickoyan physically restrained DiBiasio and Gallinelli, meriting a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). This enhancement applies if any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape during the course of a robbery. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Section 3A1.3 also permits a two-level enhancement if a victim was physically restrained during the course of any offense. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims were physically restrained during the robbery. The PSR recommended the two-level enhancement. Wallace objected. Applying the advisory guidelines, the district court applied the enhancement. 77 Wallace argues that his conduct, and the conduct of Nickoyan, did not constitute physical restraint of the victims because they did not physically touch the victims or force them into a separate and confined space. The government argues that the enhancement was appropriate because Wallace and Nickoyan rendered the victims physically immobile by keeping their guns pointed directly at each victim in close range, repeatedly telling them not to move, and because Nickoyan placed his body in the path of Gallinelli as she tried to flee the store, blocking her escape. These actions, the government contends, are sufficient to justify the enhancement. 78 Physically restrained is defined in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual as the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n. 1(i) (1998); see also U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, cmt.(background) (The guidelines provides an enhancement for robberies where a victim ... was physically restrained by being tied, bound, or locked up.). We have observed that [t]he examples listed in the guideline definition of `physically restrained' are merely illustrative, ... not exhaustive. United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 39 (1st Cir.1998). In DeLuca, we affirmed the application of the physical restraint enhancement against the defendant because one of the defendant's co-conspirators pushed [the victim] as he attempted to leave the hallway in which he was being assaulted and [another co-conspirator], throughout the encounter, stood at the hallway door barring egress by [the victim]. Thus, these physical restrictions on [the victim]'s freedom of movement constituted `physical restraint.' Id. 79 Other circuits have cautioned against an overly broad reading of the term physical restraint. See United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118-1119 (9th Cir.2001) ([C]ases holding that a defendant physically restrained his victims usually involve a sustained focus on the restrained person that lasts long enough for the robber to direct the victim into a room or order the victim to walk somewhere. It is therefore likely that Congress meant for something more than briefly pointing a gun at a victim and commanding her once to get down to constitute physical restraint, given that nearly all armed bank robberies will presumably involve such acts. (internal citations omitted)); United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C.Cir.2000) (The required restraint must, as the language plainly recites, be physical. While [the victim of the attempted murder in this case] no doubt felt restrained by [the defendant], she was not subject to physical restraint, as we interpret the Guideline's use of that phrase. Any other interpretation would effectively add the two-level adjustment to almost any attempted murder because presumably any victim would feel restrained if directed to move at gunpoint. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir.1999) (concluding that displaying a gun and telling people to get down and not move, without more, is insufficient to trigger the `physical restraint' enhancement in sentencing for armed robbery). 80 Some courts have found that holding someone at gunpoint during the commission of an offense, without physical contact or moving the victim into a separate, confined space, can constitute physical restraint. See United States v. Wilson, 198 F.3d 467, 472 (4th Cir.1999) (A gun was held to [the carjacking victim's] head, and she was prevented from leaving her car, albeit briefly, until [the defendants] were able to get her money and gain control of her car. Under these circumstances, unquestionably, [the victim] was physically restrained to facilitate the commission of the carjacking.); United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327, 1329-30 (10th Cir.1997) (Physical restraint is not limited to physical touching of the victim. Rather, physical restraint occurs whenever a victim is specifically prevented at gunpoint from moving, thereby facilitating the crime. Keeping someone from doing something is inherent within the concept of restraint, and in this case one coconspirator deliberately kept the security guard at bay by pointing a gun directly at his head while two others looted the teller counter. (internal citations omitted)). 81 In this case, while there was no physical contact between the defendant and the victims, the facts demonstrate that the defendant and his co-conspirator physically restrained the victims. Notably, the defendant's co-conspirator jumped in front of Gallinelli when she tried to escape, blocking her path and ordering her at gunpoint to stop. At the same time, the defendant kept his gun pointed directly at DiBiasio's face and chest, at close range, commanding him to look straight ahead into the gun and not to move. Given the intense, one-on-one nature of the armed robbery, the close proximity of the armed robbers to the victims, and the posturing of the defendant and co-conspirator when one of the victims tried to escape, there is no doubt that the victims were physically restrained for purposes of the guidelines enhancement. 82