Opinion ID: 165930
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether error was harmless

Text: 87 Jury instructions that omit an element of the offense are subject to harmless error analysis. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). The harmless error test is whether it appears `beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' Id. at 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). The burden of proving the error was harmless is on the Government. United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1250 (10th Cir.2002). 88 Here, the Government argues that if there was error it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence supporting the jury's conviction for voluntary manslaughter. 9 Although it is true that the medical testimony, combined with the inconsistencies in Serwop's stories, present a convincing case for voluntary manslaughter, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury did not erroneously base its verdict on the given instruction, nor can we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury could not have returned a verdict of involuntary manslaughter on the evidence before us. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827. 89 In Neder, the Supreme Court said that an erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error. Id. at 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827. 90 To the contrary, in this case, the only issue actually in dispute is the very subject of the instruction's error—whether Serawop's mental state warranted conviction for involuntary or voluntary manslaughter. Because the jury here was not properly charged on this basic issue, the conviction cannot stand. See id. The risks of misunderstanding are simply too significant to overlook in this case. See also Paul, 37 F.3d at 501 (reversing under plain error analysis instruction that failed to distinguish the different mental state requirements of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter). 91 Thus, in light of the theory of the defense's case, we are convinced that Serawop was prejudiced here. Under the instructions given, the jury was free to convict Serawop of voluntary manslaughter regardless of the culpability of his mental state, as long as they found he was in the heat of passion. Because of the prejudice of this improper instruction, Serawop's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1112 cannot stand.