Opinion ID: 2183308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Assumption of Risk and Strict Liability

Text: In the District of Columbia, assumption of risk by the injured party, if established, is a complete bar to recovery in a strict liability action. East Penn, supra, 578 A.2d at 1118-19 (citing Payne, supra, 486 A.2d at 721 n. 9). Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense that, unlike contributory negligence, focuses on the injured party's actual knowledge. In Sinai v. Polinger Co., 498 A.2d 520, 524 (D.C.1985), we discussed both assumption of risk and contributory negligence in the context of a negligence action, and concluded, regarding assumption of risk, that the plaintiff must subjectively know of the existence of the risk and appreciate its unreasonable character. Furthermore, in order to establish an assumption of risk defense in a strict liability action, the defendant must show that the plaintiff knew of the specific defect in the product and was aware of the danger arising from it, but nevertheless voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to use the product. Payne, supra, 486 A.2d at 721-22 n. 9 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra, § 402A cmt. n). The language of D.C. Civil Jury Instruction No. 11-16 is consistent with this court's discussion in Payne, and appropriately requires proof of the plaintiff's actual knowledge of the specific defect in question and of the danger created by the defect. Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia No. 11-16, supra. [6] Warner Fruehauf failed to present sufficient evidence at either trial to establish an assumption of risk defense. It was not enough to argue that the evidence revealed that Boston had twenty-two years of work experience and training covering all types of liftgates, and that reasonable jurors could infer that he knew of the general danger associated with standing behind a liftgate. There was no evidence presented at the first or second trial that showed that Boston had actual knowledge of the liftgate's alleged design defectthe lack of a back-up system (e.g., a second cylinder or other safety device) to prevent the heavy liftgate from free-falling in the event of a mechanical failure. Boston testified without contradiction that he had received only a ten-minute safety instruction class covering the operation of liftgates in general and that prior to the day of the accident he had never used a single-cylinder liftgate and had never seen a piece of hydraulic equipment fail. Furthermore, it would be unreasonable to infer that while Boston was working at the job site in the few minutes before the accident, he actually saw the single-cylinder mechanism under the truck and realized that if the liftgate should malfunction the 1050-pound metal platform might free fall because of the lack of a second cylinder or other effective safety device. [7] Indeed, as a matter of law, Boston's brief opportunity to see the single-cylinder design of the liftgate was insufficient to establish an assumption of risk defense. It did not present him with a condition so open and obvious as to create a fact issue as to whether he knew of the existence of the defecti.e., the lack of an effective back-up safety systemand of the danger it presented. There was evidence from which the presence of warning decals on the liftgate could be inferred, but this too was insufficient to establish an assumption of risk defense. At both trials, Boston acknowledged that on the rear of the liftgate, there was a decal that stated [s]tand clear while lowering and raising gate. This decal failed to give any warning of the specific defect or of the danger it created. At the first trial, Warner-Fruehauf did not present evidence showing that a second type of decal was, as a matter of routine business practice, placed on every liftgate. At the second trial, there was evidence from which one could infer that a second warning decal was affixed to the liftgate. Only the last few of the 189 words of the second decal, however, contained even a vague indication of a defect and possible danger[t]he lift is not equipped with a backup system to prevent falling in the event of a failure. We agree with the trial judge's observation that the jury would have had to engage in speculation to conclude that Boston saw this decal and read the warning at the end of it. Mr. Boston and a co-worker testified that they had no recollection of seeing that decal on the liftgate on the day of the accident, and there was no evidence PEPCO had ever told either of them about the defect or the danger created by it. Thus, the evidence as presented at both trials was insufficient to support a finding that Boston had either actual knowledge of the specific defect in question (the absence of a second cylinder or other effective safety device) or of the danger created by the defect (the possibility of a sudden fall of the liftgate)both of which are required to establish an assumption of risk defense in a strict liability action. Therefore, the trial judge's decision to set aside the original verdict and order a new trial because he had erred in giving the standard assumption of risk jury instruction was correct and is affirmed. And even though we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Warner Fruehauf and must accord Warner Fruehauf the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, the trial judge's conclusion during the second trial that no reasonable juror could find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Boston assumed the risk that caused his injury is supported by the record. [8] Thus, the directed verdict on the assumption of risk issue at the second trial must also be affirmed.