Opinion ID: 3163494
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantially Exculpatory Standard

Text: Rollerson contends that the proposed testimony of Burns was substantially exculpatory under Jackson, and therefore required the trial court to grant his severance motion. Considering this court‟s case law, the fundamental right to a fair trial and the nature of the proposed testimony, we conclude the testimony had substantial exculpatory potential and the subsequent denial of Rollerson‟s motion to 13 sever was an abuse of discretion. In deciding whether to sever based on a claim of exculpatory codefendant testimony, a court should consider: (1) the exculpatory nature and effect of the desired testimony; (2) the movant‟s desire to present the codefendant‟s testimony; (3) the codefendant‟s willingness to testify; and (4) the demands of judicial administration. See Jackson v. United States, 329 A.2d 782, 788 (D.C. 1974). The movant must “satisfy the court that the testimony would be exculpatory in effect and that the co-defendant is reasonably likely to testify.” Williams, 884 A.2d at 594. In assessing the exculpatory nature of a codefendant‟s proposed testimony, the testimony need not prove actual innocence. Id. at 595-96. Accordingly, a court looks to how the proposed testimony, if credited by the jury, would prove or disprove charged offenses. See id.; Martin v. United States, 606 A.2d 120, 130 (D.C. 1991); King v. United States, 550 A.2d 348, 356-57 (D.C. 1988). A trial court should not rely upon credibility determinations of a codefendant‟s proposed testimony when assessing whether the testimony is substantially exculpatory as credibility determinations are reserved for the jury. See Martin, 606 A.2d at 129-30; King, 550 A.2d at 356. Here, the trial court found that if presented, Burns‟s proposed testimony 14 would be “officially” exculpatory. Rollerson contends that this finding indicates that the trial court established the first prong of the Jackson analysis. We agree. Despite the government‟s assertion that this statement was unclear, we are satisfied that this finding by the trial court can be most plainly read to fulfill the first element of Jackson, that the proposed testimony was “exculpatory in nature and effect.” See Jackson, 329 A.2d at 788. To establish the second and third elements, Rollerson proffered evidence that Burns would testify that Rollerson was not present in the parking lot during the altercation with Harrington and that she did not notify him of the altercation until the next morning. Additionally, Burns‟s attorney confirmed the veracity of the proffer and verified that Burns was willing to testify on Rollerson‟s behalf provided her trial was first. Having presented sufficient evidence of the exculpatory nature of Burns‟s potential testimony and her willingness to testify, we hold that the proposed testimony was substantially exculpatory. This court has found similar codefendant testimony to be substantially exculpatory and remanded accordingly, where the proposed evidence directly negated motive, where the only other evidence of guilt was the testimony of the complaining witness or arresting officer, and where the denial of a severance motion was predicated on a credibility determination made before any co-defendant testimony was presented to the jury. 15 In Martin, an appellant was prevented from introducing the testimony of a codefendant who pled guilty before trial because the judge believed that the codefendant‟s alleged inconsistent statements indicated he would be “a most undependable witness.” Martin, 606 A.2d at 126. Despite the inconsistencies and credibility flaws of the codefendant, this court determined that the testimony had substantial exculpatory potential because the nature of the proposed testimony went to the appellant‟s motivation for committing the charged offense. Id. Further, this court emphasized the importance of permitting the jury to hear such testimony because questions of credibility are reserved for the finder of fact. Id. at 129. By prohibiting the jury from hearing appellant‟s alternative theory for motive, presented through the testimony of the codefendant, this court found that the trial court erred and remanded for a new trial. Additionally, in Williams this court concluded that co-defendant testimony was substantially exculpatory where the appellant and a codefendant were convicted of several weapons offenses after police officers discovered a handgun above appellant‟s seat in the course of a traffic stop. Williams, 884 A.2d at 589. Based on the sole testimony of an arresting officer that observed appellant lean forward in his seat, the government contended that appellant and codefendant had constructive 16 possession of the weapon and were both guilty of the weapons offenses. Id. at 592. This court found that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant‟s severance motion where appellant wanted to offer the testimony of the codefendant, the only other witness to the incident, to show that the appellant was never seen with the gun. Id. at 595-96. Though the trial court acknowledged the proposed testimony was exculpatory, this court found that it erred by failing to consider the relative weakness of the government case, which hinged upon the testimony of the police officer, when deciding to deny appellant‟s motion. Id. Finally, in King, the appellant and a codefendant were convicted of unlawful distribution of PCP and marijuana. King, 500 A.2d at 350. At trial, a police officer testified to being sold narcotics by appellant and codefendant. Id. Appellant testified on her own behalf and denied any involvement in the sale of narcotics, claiming she was in the area to visit her child‟s school. Id. at 351. Arguing that the codefendant was the only person present at the transaction, besides the undercover officer, appellant‟s counsel maintained that the codefendant‟s testimony would be crucial to appellant‟s defense. Id. The trial court denied the motion to reopen. Id. This court remanded for a new trial holding that appellant was substantially prejudiced by the denial of the motion to reopen her case, as the co-defendant was the only other witness to the transaction. Id. at 357. Although 17 the government argued that the codefendant lacked credibility, this court determined the potential incongruences of the codefendant‟s testimony did not trump the defendant‟s right to present a witness in his defense that planned to testify to exculpatory evidence. Id. at 356. For Rollerson, similar to the proposed testimony in Martin, Burns would have provided probative evidence of his intent and motive for committing the alleged offense had they been tried separately. See Martin, 606 A.2d at 122, 130. Id. at 126. By requiring a stipulation in place of live testimony, the trial court foreclosed on the jury‟s ability to hear from Burns and determine the credibility of her testimony and whether Rollerson lacked the motive to commit the alleged offenses stemming from the altercation at the apartment. In the present case, analogous to the court‟s analysis in Williams and King, the trial court does not appear to have considered the relative strength of the government‟s case in weighing the exculpatory nature of Burns‟s testimony, leaving the jury to rely solely on the testimony of the complaining witness to establish Rollerson‟s conduct during the Elvans Road incident. See Williams, 884 A.2d at 596. Notwithstanding the extension of time and potential delay in retrying these cases severally, the demands of judicial administration do not outweigh Rollerson‟s 18 right to a fair trial. Similar to the court in Williams, the court‟s “concern for judicial efficiency” in this case cannot outweigh a criminal defendant‟s right to present exculpatory evidence on his behalf. Id. at 602. On these facts, we conclude that evidence proffered by Burns would have been substantially exculpatory under Jackson and constituted sufficient grounds for severing Burns‟s trial.