Opinion ID: 2546062
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Exxon Valdez claims

Text: The next items of property at issue are Duane's claims in the litigation arising from the Exxon Valdez disaster, which released 11 million gallons of North Slope crude into Prince William Sound. The superior court dealt with these claims as follows: the Exxon Valdez claims are a marital asset, but the value of the claims [is] speculative. [Tammi] state[s that] the claims are presently known but does not, understandably, elaborate as to their value. The parties['] interest in the Exxon Valdez claims, whatever that is, is awarded to [Duane].... Tammi argues that this allocation was in error, and that she should receive fifty percent of the value of these claims. Tammi correctly cites our Lundquist [24] decision as controlling of this issue. That case presented facts very similar to this case. One spouse, George, had claims against Exxon for damages resulting from the same disaster. [25] George and his wife Jean divorced; George argued that these claims were his separate property, while Jean argued that they were marital property. [26] The Lundquist court tied compensatory awards to the type of compensation involved: In Alaska, a tort recovery is classified according to what it is intended to replace.... When an award compensates for losses to the marital estate it is marital property. To the extent the recovery compensates for losses to a spouse's separate estate, it is his or her separate property. [27] Regarding George's expected award of punitive damages, we held that punitive damages can be partially marital and partially separate, or even entirely one or the other, depending on the facts. An award of punitive damages should be apportioned in the same manner as the underlying compensatory damages award. [28] We decided that the compensatory damages in Lundquist were marital property because they were to compensate for George's fishing losses, not for any loss in the value of his permit. [29] Because the award replaced lost fishing income during a period when the parties were married, we held that the trial court had correctly characterized it as marital property. [30] Accordingly, we upheld the superior court's characterization of the punitive damages award as marital as well.
Here Duane had asserted two compensatory claims, a tender [31] claim, and a set net claim. In the tender claim, Duane expressly states that he is seeking damages for lost income from herring and salmon hauling for 1989. Because these damages occurred during the marriage, any recovery for them is marital property. In the set net claim, Duane alleges two types of damages: (1) compensatory damages for loss of revenue in 1989-91 due to the drop in price of sockeye salmon, and (2) damages for devaluation of his set net permit. Any damages award for lost income, like that in Lundquist, would be marital propertyDuane is seeking to replace lost fishing income during a period when the parties were married. [32] Any damages award for devaluation of the permit, however, would be meant to replace the lost value of Duane's permit. As discussed above, the permit is Duane's separate property; therefore, under Lundquist, this latter type of recovery would be Duane's separate property as well.
The Exxon Valdez plaintiffs were awarded more than $4.786 billion in punitive damages. This award has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Accordingly, it is not known how much will be collected or even if the plaintiffs will ever actually collect this award. This uncertainty appears to have affected the superior court's decision, though it need not have. Under Lundquist, punitive damages are to be allocated in exactly the same way that compensatory damages are. [33] Therefore, any punitive damages that are eventually awarded to Duane should be allocated in accordance with the above characterizations of the compensatory awards.