Opinion ID: 1702221
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Whether Bishop's death sentence was disproportionately imposed.

Text: ¶ 46. Bishop contends that the death penalty was disproportionately imposed because his co-defendant, who committed the acts which killed Gentry (beating him in the head with a hammer), received a life sentence. He also makes other arguments, all of which are addressed above. ¶ 47. The Court addressed the difference in the two sentences on direct appeal: The United States Supreme Court required that the imposition of the death penalty be consistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The death penalty cannot be given to an aider and abettor who has not killed, attempted to kill, or contemplated that life would be taken. The record shows that, after Gentry had been hit in the head with the hammer for the first time, Bishop chased after him and brought him back. When Bishop saw Gentry hit with the hammer he knew deadly force was being used. When he ran Gentry down and held Gentry as he was being struck by Jessie, he became more of a principal in the crime. A jury could have easily found that Bishop killed, intended to kill, or at least contemplated that deadly force would be used. This case is not like a robbery where someone is killed on impulse. Bishop took an active role in the killing. All of these facts show that Bishop's involvement was sufficient to justify the death sentence, even, assuming arguendo, that the actual killer did not receive the death sentence. Bishop, 812 So.2d at 948-49. ¶ 48. This issue was decided on direct appeal against Bishop. Accordingly, this claim is procedurally barred and cannot be relitigated on post-conviction review. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3); Walker v. State, 863 So.2d at 28-9 (citing Wiley, 750 So.2d at 1200; Foster, 687 So.2d 1124; Wiley, 517 So.2d at 1377). In addition to the procedural bar, it is worthwhile to note that the same issue has been addressed by this Court: The appellant's last assignment of error is based on the argument that the rendering of the death penalty for a murder he did not commit nor attempt to commit, nor intended to commit, is inconsistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The appellant's argument is based on the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140, (1982) wherein the Court held that the death penalty may not be imposed upon a non-triggerman unless there is proof that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill the victim. In Enmund, the Court reversed a decision of the Florida Supreme Court which upheld the death penalty for Enmund who had been indicted for the first degree murder and robbery of an elderly couple who were known to carry large amounts of cash.    However, we find that the case sub judice does not fall within the holding of Enmund. Enmund did not participate in the actual robbery nor was he present when the murder was committed  he was waiting in the getaway car. Michael Leatherwood, like Enmund, participated in the planning of the crime. The difference is that Leatherwood was also present and involved in the execution of the robbery/murder of Albert Taylor by throwing a rope over his head and pulling it tight with such force that the victim was jerked into the backseat. Leatherwood held the rope tight and told Tokman to stab him even as the victim was being subdued. Though Leatherwood testified he never believed the robbery would be carried out and certainly never intended to kill the victim, this Court cannot believe that one who attempts to strangle his victim into submission to the point of unconsciousness and tells his accomplice to stab him does not intend to or attempt to kill. The appellant's actions spoke louder than his words. Though Michael Leatherwood was not the triggerman, he planned, schemed, and ultimately physically subdued the victim by choking him with a rope, while another stabbed and bludgeoned the victim to death. These are hardly the facts upon which Enmund was decided by the United States Supreme Court and thus we find that the appellant's argument is not persuasive, and we find no merit in this assignment of error. Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645, 655-57 (Miss.1983). There is absolutely no difference between Leatherwood's actions and Bishop's actions, and the imposition of the death penalty upon Bishop is not disproportionate in any way. This issue is procedurally barred and without merit.