Opinion ID: 531841
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Section .105(a) to Century

Text: 22 The Commission's order may be set aside only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A) (1982). The relevant law binding OSHRC is section .105(a), as applied in the Willson cases. Although the Act and related regulations should be construed liberally to fulfill the legislative aim of granting workers the safest working conditions possible, Willson III, 773 F.2d at 1383, OSHA may not rely on imprecisely worded regulations to impose specific requirements on employers. Willson I, 685 F.2d at 674, 676. If the Commission has applied the law correctly, our review will focus on whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the Commission's findings. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 660(a). 23 Because Century was cited for having failed to ensure its employees' use of safety belts while they were burning off tack welds, the Secretary's prima facie case must include a showing that such use was practical. If the Secretary establishes her prima facie case, Century must be given the opportunity to offer, in rebuttal, any evidence that is relevant to the question of practicality. If the employer rebuts this or any other element of her prima facie case, the Secretary bears the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer indeed violated the regulation. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 694 F.2d 584, 587 (9th Cir.1982); Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Secretary of Labor, 649 F.2d 96, 105 (2d Cir.1981). 24 Although the ALJ concluded that the Secretary had made out her prima facie case merely by showing that Century's employees had been exposed to a forty-foot fall (a fact not in dispute) and had not used any of the protective devices listed in the standard, Order at 9, the record confirms that the Secretary had also introduced evidence that the use of safety belts during tack weld removal operations was practical. We refer to the following exchange, at the ALJ hearing, between the Secretary's counsel and Compliance Officer Draper: 25 Q. With reference to Item Number 1, would you explain to the Court upon what observations you made or information you gathered during your investigation which led you to issue a violation of 1926, modified as 105-A? 26 A. I had the occasion to determine as the result of my investigation on the accident that an accident occurred to result in serious physical harm to an employee that had not been provided fall protection, at least in the form of safety belts with attached lanyards, with a requirement to be tied off. 27 .... 28 Q. And, did you believe that it was feasible to use personal protective equipment [i.e., safety belts] with reference to the work that you observed that was being performed on June 17? 29 A. Yes, I did. 30 Hearing Transcript at 97-98. Although he was asked whether the use of protective equipment was feasible, it is clear from the context of Draper's testimony that he had concluded that the use of safety belts was practical within the meaning of section .105(a). 31 Century defended itself against the Secretary's charge by arguing that its employees had in fact used safety belts and that the Secretary had failed to establish that they had failed to do so for less than a substantial portion of the work day. Century also asserted that the Commission had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to law in not accepting Century's evidence that it was industry custom and practice not to require employees to use safety belts while engaged in removing tack welds. We address these defenses in turn. 32 In support of its contention that its employees used safety belts during at least some periods on June 16 and 17, Century points to the ALJ's statement that [b]elts were in fact used when employees began dismantling larger sections of the scaffold after the bar joists and H-beams had been taken down. Order at 13. Thus, Century maintains, it was incumbent on the Secretary to prove that belts were not used during a substantial portion of the work day, a burden she failed to carry. Specifically, Century contends that the Secretary introduced no direct evidence to show that the employees failed to tie off when the work was being performed--except for Compliance Officer Draper's brief inspection that, Century claims, is insufficient under Willson I, 685 F.2d at 673. 33 In the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree with Century that the substantial portion of the work day test applies because, as the ALJ found, Century did not require its employees to use any form of fall protection while burning off tack welds to remove the bar joists and H-beams. See Willson III, 773 F.2d at 1385-86. Even if safety belts were properly used at some point on June 17 and thereafter (as the passage quoted from the ALJ's Order suggests), this would have little relevance to their use while the joists and H-beams were being removed--the operation at issue in this case. Moreover, although the Commission's conclusion that the employees had not used safety belts was based on Draper's brief inspection, it merely confirmed the undisputed evidence that Century does not require its employees to use safety belts when removing bar joists and H-beams, that workers customarily do not tie off during this procedure (as they testified), see Order at 9, and that the decedent had no protection when he fell. Id. at 4. These findings support the ALJ's conclusion that the employees were not wearing their safety belts at all on June 16 or during those hours on June 17 when they were removing the bar joists and H-beams. Id. at 9. 34 In sum, we agree with the Commission that the Secretary established that Century's employees did not use safety belts during the relevant time frame. We now reach Century's principal contention, namely, that the Commission erred in refusing to consider the evidence of industry practice. 35 At the hearing before the ALJ, Century argued 36 that it would not have been practical for its employees to tie off during the work operations at issue ... [because of] the need for mobility, the interference that lanyards would cause, and the custom and practice of ironworkers not to tie off in the circumstances here. 37 Order at 10. The ALJ concluded that Century had failed to show that the use of tied-off safety belts would have been infeasible, id. (emphasis added), and that as section .105(a) is a specific standard, compliance with industry custom and practice is not a defense. Id. at 11 (citing Willson III, 773 F.2d at 1387). 38 On appeal, Century argues that the Commission should have considered the evidence of custom and practice. Century maintains that it was admissible under L.R. Willson & Sons v. OSHRC, 698 F.2d 507, 513 (D.C.Cir.1983) (Willson II ), which held that the Secretary had failed to establish a violation of a general safety regulation, section 1926.28(a), which requires employers to provide employees with appropriate protective equipment. We stated that the Secretary had not shown that a reasonably prudent employer familiar with the structural steel erection industry would have protected against the hazard in the manner specified by his citation and concluded that evidence of industry practice regarding the use of safety belts was highly probative of their feasibility and safety. Id. at 513-14. 39 The Willson II court relied upon industry practice in order to give meaningful content to a general standard, 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1926.28(a). Century claims that section .105(a) is similarly general regarding safety belts and is only specific as to safety nets. The Commission, by contrast, accepted the ALJ's ruling that since [.105(a) ] is a specific standard, compliance with industry custom and practice is not a defense. Order at 11. 40 We reject the Commission's conclusion. Section .105(a) appears under the caption Safety nets and clearly focuses on that device, although six alternative safeguards (including safety belts) are mentioned. We have consistently referred to section .105(a) as a general standard. See Willson I, 685 F.2d at 669-70; Williams Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d at 179. In Willson III, 773 F.2d at 1380, we again referred to section .105(a) as a general construction standard. Later in that opinion, responding to the suggestion that industry practice did not require use of perimeter netting to protect connectors, we stated: The regulatory command of Sec. .105(a) is specific enough so that no reference to industry practice is necessary. Id. at 1387. Earlier in the same paragraph, however, we noted that 41 courts have remedied facial vagueness in OSHA standards by looking to industry custom and practice in order to derive a standard of conduct as to which the employer had notice. 42 Id. We interpret these passages, when read in the factual context of Willson III, to mean that the standard was specific enough to give the employer notice that safety nets were required where the alternative measures were impractical. When we must determine the practicality of those alternatives, however, we are faced with an area of ambiguity that has long concerned us, see Willson I, 685 F.2d at 675, and for which a reference to industry practice remains a useful remedy. Thus we agree with Century that section .105(a) is general insofar as it applies to those alternative measures. 43 But even if we were to conclude that the standard is specific in its entirety, industry practice would still be admissible to rebut the Secretary's prima facie case because it is relevant to an essential element the Secretary must prove, namely, that the use of safety belts by Century's employees was practical. Unfortunately, the ALJ has muddied the analysis through his persistent use of feasible and infeasible as substitutes for practical and impractical. The words are not interchangeable. 44 As we pointed out in Willson I, we will not accept an interpretation of impractical that wanders so far from its ordinary meaning that ... it does not provide adequate notice to employers of their duties under the Act. Id. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1983) defines practical as relating to, or manifested in practice or action: not theoretical or ideal; and in distinguishing between practicable and practical, the Dictionary explains that PRACTICAL applies to things and to persons and implies proven success in meeting the demands made by actual living or use. On the other hand, it defines feasible as capable of being done or carried out. Thus while evidence of the steel erection industry's custom and practice might well shed little light on the feasibility of using safety belts in the circumstances here at issue, it is clearly relevant to the question of practicality as reflected by the industry's actual usage. 45 We recognize that the Secretary may have intended a different result from the one we reach today. As we pointed out in Willson I, however, [i]t is well settled that 'regulations cannot be construed to mean what an agency intended but did not adequately express.'  685 F.2d at 675 (citation omitted). Should intention and expression not coincide here, we note once again that the Secretary remains free to amend or clarify OSHA's general regulations, or to promulgate new, specific regulations to govern the use of safety belts at construction sites generally or for the steel erection industry in particular. We have urged OSHA to do so, but it has declined our invitation. See, e.g., id. at 676. Indeed, in Willson I we noted that the standard teeter[s] precariously on the edge of the wall that divides adequate notice from impermissible vagueness. Id.