Opinion ID: 170596
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disclosure of Witnesses

Text: Mr. Ashley claims that the failure to timely disclose the identity of the three witnesses before the retrial violated his due process rights. In a motion to dismiss raised before the district court and in his briefing before this court, he has framed the issue as the suppression of material, exculpatory evidence, arguing that the government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). “We review questions regarding the disclosure of exculpatory or impeachment evidence de novo.” United States v. Gonzalez-Montoya, 161 F.3d 643, 649 (10th Cir. 1998). To establish a Brady violation, Mr. Ashley must demonstrate that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material. Id.; see also United States v. Wright, 506 F.3d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 2007). After thorough review of the record, we reject Mr. Ashley’s disclosure challenge. As the government correctly noted, his challenge fails at the “most fundamental level,” Aplee. Br. at 11—the identification of evidence favorable to the defense. Mr. Ashley has not advanced a persuasive theory that would permit us to characterize information related to the three witnesses as exculpatory. The -4- witnesses possessed testimony that was incriminating to Mr. Ashley, not exculpatory. Indeed, Mr. Ashley candidly acknowledged as much: “It is not Mr. Ashley’s complaint that the evidence provided by these witnesses was in itself favorable to his defense. It clearly was not.” Aplt. Op. Br. at 18. Mr. Ashley’s idea appears to be that the fact that witnesses the government put forward as having relevant testimony for the retrial were not called to testify in the initial trial implicates Brady because it raises the possibility of recent fabrication or otherwise calls the witnesses’ credibility into question. See Aplt. Op. Br. at 18 (citing Brady, stating, “It is his [Mr. Ashley’s] complaint that disclosure of the evidence in a timely fashion would have, as a matter of due process, allowed him to effectively attack the credibility of the evidence” (emphasis added)); Aplee. Supp. App., Vol. I, at 21, 153-54 (e.g., informing the district court, “Basically, . . . it’s our position that we should have been able to explore the possibility of the issue of recent fabrication.” (emphasis added)). However, logically, there is nothing inherently exculpatory about the fact that the government did not call the witnesses in the initial trial, but elected to do so in the retrial. Cf. United States v. Watts, 95 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 1996) (declining to infer from the prosecution’s decision not to call a witness to testify that “his testimony would have been adverse to the prosecution”). 2 In particular, 2 In Watts, the government did not call a witness named “Walls” to testify at the defendant’s trial for possession of crack cocaine with intent to (continued...) -5- this sequence of events does not naturally suggest that the information the witnesses had to offer “changed” between the two trials. Indeed, as the government noted, the answer could easily lie in the fact that a different prosecutor handled the retrial and exercised independent forensic judgment in selecting witnesses. See Aplee. Br. at 12 n.8 (“The change in prosecutors is reflected in the differing presentations of the evidence.”); Aplee. Supp. App., Vol. I, at 156 (“The fact that the United States did not call them is indicative, simply, of the fact that the previous prosecutor on this case must have believed there was sufficient evidence on [sic] the witnesses that were called.”). We are hard-pressed, moreover, to see how the credibility of the witnesses could be called into question by the fact that another person—the government—changed its mind and decided to avail itself of their testimony in the 2 (...continued) distribute. 95 F.3d at 618. He was one of only two people “who might have seen” the defendant possess the drugs. Id. Nevertheless, in assessing defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the Seventh Circuit declined to infer from the government’s failure to call Walls to testify that his evidence was adverse to it (and, thus, presumably favorable to the defense). Id. at 619. Specifically, the court noted: “The government may have had strategic reasons for not calling Walls, or it simply may have decided that it did not need his testimony.” Id. Similarly, we are unwilling to infer the existence of material impeachment evidence within the meaning of Brady and Giglio by engaging in a high degree of speculation about the government’s litigation decision-making. In particular, we will not speculate that at the time of the initial trial the government decided not to call the three individuals at issue as witnesses because their testimony was unfavorable to its case (and, thus, presumably favorable to the defense) and then elected to call them for the retrial because their testimony “changed” for the better. -6- retrial. The witnesses would not have had any role in this government decision, and Mr. Ashley makes no assertions to the contrary. Consequently, we are puzzled as to how the fact of their appearance as witnesses could cast any doubt on their veracity. “[O]n this record we are left only with speculation and conjecture,” United States v. Nevels, 490 F.3d 800, 804 (10th Cir. 2007), concerning the alleged exculpatory nature of the evidence. That is not enough. See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (joining the Third and Ninth Circuits in declining to infer the existence of Brady material based upon speculation alone, and therefore rejecting defendant’s Brady claim because “[e]xcept for bare speculation, . . . [defendant] has nothing to suggest the existence of favorable materials”); United States v. Santiago, 993 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant “failed to demonstrate a Brady violation” in part because he “ha[d] not established the exculpatory nature of the allegedly suppressed evidence—his allegations are mere speculation and conjecture”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 164 & n.27 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997). Mr. Ashley has suggested that his real concern was the timing of the disclosure—which allegedly prevented him from effectively responding to the new witnesses and their testimony. For example, when asked by the district court -7- “[w]hat . . . about [the character of] that testimony” he thought was “exculpatory,” Mr. Ashley responded: Judge, I suppose it is . . . the fact that the Government had this evidence available at a previous trial and did not call these witnesses—it’s the issue of— . . . the fact that the defendant has not had an opportunity to appropriately and completely evaluate why the Government would not call these witnesses at a prior trial in that regard. . . . Basically, . . . it’s our position that we should have been able to explore the possibility of the issue of recent fabrication. And the fact that we were not able to know of this information until less than a week before trial put Mr. Ashley in a position where he was not able to adequately prepare his defense and was, as a result of that, denied the due process of law that he is entitled to receive. Aplee. Supp. App., Vol. I, at 153-54 (emphasis added); see Aplt. Op. Br. at 13 (contending that Mr. Ashley was “denied the opportunity to effectively impeach critical government witnesses by the late disclosure of the nature of their testimony”). 3 3 In oral argument before us, Mr. Ashley could be understood to have advanced a somewhat different concern related to the timing of disclosure. Mr. Ashley argued that the government’s allegedly belated disclosure created a situation where he “w[as] not able to address that [the prospective witnesses’ testimony] adequately to the court.” Oral Arg. at 15:24 (emphasis added). Mr. Ashley appeared to be arguing that the government’s alleged tardiness in disclosing the witnesses impaired his ability to give the district court a proper foundation for evaluating the issue and presumably granting him relief against the government’s use of the witnesses. Forced to operate without adequate information, reasons Mr. Ashley, the district court erred. At no point, however, did Mr. Ashley seek a continuance to permit him to mount a more effective challenge to admission of the witness testimony. Nor has he offered any clues to us regarding what he would have done with the additional time to better prepare (continued...) -8- However, Mr. Ashley’s “plea for earlier disclosure fails for one very simple reason: no rule of law requires it.” Watts, 95 F.3d at 619. “There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case” and Brady “did not create one.” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). In particular, the Due Process Clause does not require the government to disclose before trial the names of its witnesses, just so the defense can have sufficient time to investigate their backgrounds for impeachment information. Id. (rejecting the notion that the Due Process Clause required the government to disclose the name of an adverse witness so the defense can “do a background check” on him “for purposes of cross-examination”); see Nevels, 490 F.3d at 803 (“The Supreme Court has established that no constitutional right to pretrial discovery of witnesses exists in non-capital cases.”). Lastly, even if Mr. Ashley had some legal basis to object to the government’s allegedly untimely disclosure of the three witnesses, on this record we could not conclude that Mr. Ashley was prejudiced in his trial preparation by the alleged delay, much less denied a fair trial. See United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) (reasoning where “the [Brady] evidence was eventually disclosed to the defense, albeit towards the end of trial,” the court focuses not on “the fact that the material, if disclosed earlier, may have affected 3 (...continued) the record for a ruling by the district court. Insofar as Mr. Ashley’s argument encompasses this judicial-relief contention, we conclude that it is untenable. -9- the defense strategy” but rather “on whether earlier disclosure would have created a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not otherwise exist” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Compare United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (rejecting Brady argument where defendant moved to dismiss charges based on government’s alleged untimely disclosure, “only a few days prior to commencement of the trial,” of the identities of nontestifying confidential informants, noting, “There is nothing to support Collins’ assertion that these informants would have produced exculpatory information”), and GonzalezMontoya, 161 F.3d at 650 (concluding in Brady context that “no prejudice resulted” from government’s untimely disclosure during the course of trial of material impeachment evidence, where court afforded defendant opportunity to review evidence and he declined to use the evidence in interviewing or crossexamining the witness), with United States v. Red Elk, 185 F. App’x 716, 723 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (reviewing exclusion of expert witness for alleged untimely disclosure and noting “[t]o support a finding of prejudice, the court must determine that the delay impacted the defendant’s ability to prepare or present its case” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). As to the three witnesses, Mr. Ashley has failed to indicate “how he might have better cross-examined them or what he could have done differently at trial if he had” known the witnesses’ identities “for a longer period of time before trial.” United States v. Cleaver, 163 F. App’x 622, 627 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished), -10- cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1103 (2006). Although the government was not obliged to do so under any discovery rule (see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3500), it had provided Mr. Ashley with Ranger Martinez’s affidavit before trial, so Mr. Ashley would have confronted minimal surprises (if any) concerning the substance of this significant witness’s testimony and would have been armed to conduct a thorough impeachment of him. And, importantly, Mr. Ashley never sought a continuance before trial. See Nevels, 490 F.3d at 804 (noting that defendant “never asked for a continuance of the trial” as a factor bearing on its conclusion that defendant “failed to establish prejudice” from allegedly untimely disclosure of witness’s identity). Cf. Collins, 415 F.3d at 311 (rejecting Brady challenge brought through motion to dismiss, noting that “when his motion was denied, he did not seek a continuance”); Watts, 95 F.3d at 619 (upholding district court’s denial of defense motion in limine, aimed at excluding government witness disclosed three days before trial; observing that “[t]here is no indication in the record” that the defendant “requested a continuance after hearing about” the witness’s testimony). Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we reject Mr. Ashley’s constitutional challenge under Brady and Giglio to the propriety of the government’s disclosure of witnesses. -11-