Opinion ID: 2344665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lack of Control Due to Elected Status

Text: The City first argues that the undisputed facts establish that it lacked the requisite control over Lafond because of her elected status, and that her elected status moved her beyond the limits of a traditional master and servant relationship, thus eliminating any liability of the City for her actions. It argues, Simply saying Mrs. Lafond was an employee does not establish the master-servant relationship and the necessary factors to establish liability through respondeat superior. At oral argument, the City conceded that it is not arguing for a blanket rule that a municipality can never be liable for the actions of an elected employee, but that such a lack of control exists in this case. To determine whether an employee-employer relationship exists we examine the totality of the circumstances, which requires consideration of many factors, including those set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1958). See Boissonnault v. Bristol Federated Church, 138 N.H. 476, 478, 642 A.2d 328 (1994). The Restatement criteria include: (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220. Considering these factors, there was sufficient dispute on the issue of control to allow it to go to the jury. On factor (a), the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work, there was testimony at the first trial by a City witness that the Mayor as the chief executive officer had the ability to tell a department head what to do; regardless if that department head was elected or appointed, the Mayor was the CEO, that's what the charter says and it still does. There was also testimony that the City could not discipline or fire Lafond. Factor (e), whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work, is also relevant, as there was evidence that Lafond worked out of an office which the City owned. Similarly, factors (f), the length of time for which the person is employed and (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job, are relevant. Lafond was drawing a regular paycheck from the City for her work, and she had been in the job for more than a short time, Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 comment j at 490. Finally, factor (h), whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer, is relevant because Lafond's services consisted of running a City department. Based upon at least these factors, the trial court did not err by denying the City's motion for summary judgment because there were sufficient disputed material facts, which prevented the control issue from being settled as a matter of law in the City's favor.