Opinion ID: 2028655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is IDEM Estopped from Claiming the Decree is Binding?

Text: Westinghouse also correctly contends that the trial court erred in finding for the Conards on grounds of estoppel. The court held that IDEM is estopped from asserting that the Consent Decree binds the NPDES permitting process by virtue of statements made by Larry Kane, a representative of the permits section of the Office of Water Management, at the public hearing held on the permit. The court cited the following statements by Kane: My presentation tonight is intended to give a brief explanation of the NPDES Permit which is proposed by our agency for issuance to Westinghouse Electric Corporation for the proposed treatment system being constructed and operated at the Neal's Landfill site. [Record at 491] [Emphasis added]. ... . The effluent limitations and the monitoring requirements proposed in this permit for outfall 001, from any treatment system outfall, are as follows: ... . [Record at 495] [Emphasis added]. By way of explanation of the 1 ppb limit, which is a daily maximum limit from the outfall 001 for total PCB's, this limitation as proposed is derived from the consent decree. [Record at 495-96] [Emphasis added]. The trial court concluded that the plain meaning of the word proposed is that the 1 ppb PCB level in the Consent Decree is not binding on the NPDES permitting process. (Record at 1497). As a general rule, equitable estoppel will not be applied against governmental authorities. City of Crown Point v. Lake County (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 684. The state will not be estopped in the absence of clear evidence that its agents made representations upon which the party asserting estoppel relied. West Pub. v. Indiana Dept. of Revenue (1988), Ind.Tax, 524 N.E.2d 1329. The party claiming estoppel has the burden to establish all facts necessary to constitute it. Phar-Crest Land Corp. v. Therber (1969), 251 Ind. 674, 244 N.E.2d 644. To make out a claim of estoppel, one must show: (1) a representation or concealment of material fact; (2) made by a person with knowledge of the fact and with the intention that the other party should act upon it; (3) to a party ignorant of the matter; and (4) which induced the other party to act upon it to his detriment. Magnant v. Ambulatory Renal Servs. (1991), Ind. App., 575 N.E.2d 1029, 1033. We need not decide whether the equities of this case warrant application of the estoppel doctrine, because the Conards have not made out the minimum elements of the claim. The Conards do not demonstrate any detrimental reliance on Kane's statements. Although they suggest that the public relied upon such representations at the hearing to argue for more stringent PCB requirements for the water treatment facility and that the IDEM improperly failed to consider public comment on the draft permit, the Conards point to no detriment incurred by the public as a result of Kane's statements. Furthermore, we are not persuaded that Kane's use of the word proposed in references to the permit is a representation of fact that is contrary to the State's current position concerning the binding effect of the Consent Decree, or that Kane sought to induce reliance by using the word proposed. As required by federal and state law, IDEM held public hearings and solicited public comment on the draft permit. Certain details of the permit were not finalized by the Consent Decree (e.g., monitoring requirements, and levels of constituents in the water other than PCBs), and public input on such details was forthcoming.