Opinion ID: 184605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Count I with prejudice

Text: 50 Although the district court did not state whether its dismissal of Count I (for [331 U.S.App.D.C. 237] lack of personal jurisdiction over CCC) was with or without prejudice, both parties assume on appeal that, like the court's earlier dismissal of Counts II-XI, it was with prejudice. CBS sees this as an abuse of discretion; CCC denies the same. Neither party is correct because their shared assumption is mistaken. 51 While an involuntary dismissal ordinarily operates as an adjudication upon the merits unless the court otherwise specifies, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is specifically exempted from this general rule. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); see also Wright & Miller, § 2373 at 406 (1995) (noting that dismissals that do not reach the merits because of a lack of jurisdiction ... must be considered to be without prejudice); Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (noting that Rule 41(b) provides that dismissal is adjudication on merits unless for lack of personal jurisdiction, among other reasons). In rare circumstances, a district court may use its inherent power to dismiss with prejudice (as a sanction for misconduct) even a case over which it lacks jurisdiction, and its decision to do so is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 9 Wright & Miller, § 2369 (1995 & Supp.1997). We cannot infer from the district court's mere silence, however, that it intended to impose such a drastic sanction; nor did the district court advert to any misconduct for which it might have intended such a sanction. We therefore conclude that dismissal of Count I of the complaint was without prejudice.