Opinion ID: 6350362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severance of the Trials

Text: Sexton argues that the trial court’s refusal to sever his case from Tina’s was prejudicial in two ways. First, Sexton claims that Tina’s counsel acted against his interest in the case, pushing blame from her and onto him. Second, Sexton claims that prejudice resulted from Tina’s testimony, in which Tina described Sexton as a bad man and herself as a second victim in his crimes. Under Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 6.20, two or more defendants may be jointly tried if “they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.” RCr 8.31 requires the trial court to “grant separate trials of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires” if it appears that a defendant will be prejudiced by a joint trial. To warrant severance, a joint trial must be so prejudicial as to be “unnecessarily or unreasonably hurtful.” Elam v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.3d 818, 822 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Ratliff v. 4 Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 264 (Ky. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, a “certain degree of prejudice is inherent in the joinder of offenses.” Peacher v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 821, 838 (Ky. 2013). As a result, “[n]either antagonistic defenses nor the fact that the evidence for or against one defendant incriminates the other amounts, by itself, to unfair prejudice.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355, 360 (citations omitted). A trial court’s denial of severance will be upheld “absent a showing of actual prejudice . . . and a clear abuse of discretion by the judge.” Id. Accordingly, “[t]he trial judge has considerable discretion in ruling on such a motion” and must do so based upon the information available before trial begins. Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Ky. 1992) (citing Wilson v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1985); Rachel v. Commonwealth, 523 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1975)). The trial court did not err by denying Sexton’s motion to sever. Tina was charged with complicity to some of Sexton’s alleged crimes. The trial court, before the onset of trial, was presented no evidence that Sexton would suffer unfair prejudice by the joining of his trial with that of Tina. See, e.g., Peacher, 391 S.W.3d at 838 (“Accordingly, in assessing whether joinder resulted in undue prejudice, we have asked, with KRE 404(b) particularly in mind, ‘whether evidence necessary to prove each offense would have been admissible in a separate trial of the other.’” (citations omitted)). In fact, Sexton’s sole stated reason for requesting severance was to forego any prejudice affecting 5 Tina, seemingly acknowledging the overwhelming evidence against himself. With only that justification for severance before trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance, since that prejudice was already inherent. Even if the trial court severed the two trials of the two defendants, the same or substantially similar proof would have been admitted at both Sexton’s and Tina’s trials, since her only charges were complicity to Sexton’s crimes. Further, the fact that Tina’s counsel was antagonistic and her testimony was incriminating is insufficient to establish a showing of undue prejudice, and this Court’s precedent holds such circumstances do not require reversal. See Ratliff, 194 S.W.3d at 265. Thus, the trial court did not err by denying Sexton’s motion for severance.