Opinion ID: 1198834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: suppression of the breath test

Text: The defendant contends that the results of his breath test should have been suppressed because the arresting officer unreasonably prevented him from taking a blood alcohol test he requested before and after the breath test. Sergeant A.J. Wuthnow, after conducting certain field sobriety tests at the scene, took the defendant to the station and gave him a breath test. The defendant was unable to blow a sufficient amount of air into the machine. Thus, the test resulted in a deficient sample, although the machine registered a .210 concentration of alcohol. Prior to the administration of the breath test, the defendant requested a blood alcohol test. Wuthnow correctly explained that the defendant would have to take the breath test before being allowed to take the requested blood test. After completing the breath test, Wuthnow told the defendant that he would take him to the hospital to get his requested blood test. Wuthnow also told the defendant that the blood test would register higher. The defendant decided not to take the blood test and told Wuthnow to forget it. Both parties suggest that the trial court did not resolve this issue. Two district judges handled pretrial motions in this case. The first judge to hear the suppression motion resolved against the defendant the question of whether proper procedures were utilized in the operation of the breath testing machine. During the proceeding, Wuthnow mentioned that he informed the defendant that the results of the blood test would be higher. Defense counsel indicated that he would raise the issue of unreasonable interference by a later motion. The second district judge, dealing with another pretrial motion concerning the admissibility of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, refused to hear additional evidence on the issue of unreasonable interference with the defendant's requested blood test. After consulting with counsel for the State, the judge was convinced that the issue had been resolved in the prior suppression hearing. The defendant did not object and the matter was not resolved by the second district judge. However, we conclude that the essential facts concerning this issue are undisputed and that the record permits us to resolve the legal issue without remanding for further hearing. The State argues that under K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 8-1001(f)(2), the failure of a person to provide an adequate breath sample constitutes a refusal unless the person shows that the failure was due to physical inability caused by a medical condition unrelated to any ingested alcohol or drugs. Thus, according to the State, the defendant's deficient sample constituted a refusal, with the result that no additional testing was allowed. We find no merit in the State's contention. K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 8-1001(f)(1) does not by its terms cut off the right to an independent test provided for under K.S.A. 8-1004 which states: Without limiting or affecting the provisions of K.S.A. 8-1001 and amendments thereto, the person tested shall have a reasonable opportunity to have an additional test by a physician of the person's own choosing. In case the officer refuses to permit such additional testing, the testing administered pursuant to K.S.A. 8-1001 and amendments thereto shall not be competent in evidence. While an accused who refuses the arresting officer's test may not be eligible for independent testing under K.S.A. 8-1004, an accused who submits to the requested breath test but blows an inadequate sample retains his or her right under the provisions of K.S.A. 8-1004. Even though under the provisions of K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 8-1001(f)(2), the blowing of an inadequate sample may constitute a refusal unless the person shows that the failure was due to physical inability caused by a medical condition unrelated to any ingested alcohol or drugs, the opportunity for the accused to show such a medical condition for his or her inability may not be demonstrated until a later time. Thus, a person who provides an inadequate breath sample is still entitled to an independent test under the provisions of K.S.A. 8-1004. Moreover, even a deficient sample, as in the present case, registers a blood alcohol level. K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 8-1013(f)(2) provides that readings obtained from a partial alcohol concentration test on a breath testing machine are admissible into evidence. See State v. Maze, 16 Kan. App.2d 527, 533-34, 825 P.2d 1169 (1992). The purpose expressed in K.S.A. 8-1004 is to allow an accused an opportunity to secure independent testing in order to rebut the results of police testing, which may be used by the State upon trial. Thus, the provisions of K.S.A. 8-1004 apply to an accused who, rather than refusing a test, simply failed to provide an adequate breath sample. The defendant in this case provided a deficient sample which was introduced into evidence by the State. The defendant in this case retained his right to an independent test. The Court of Appeals, in State v. George, 12 Kan. App.2d 649, Syl. ¶ 4, 754 P.2d 460 (1988), correctly noted: While the State is not required to provide a DUI suspect with a free additional alcohol concentration test, it may not unreasonably interfere with the suspect's reasonable attempts to secure an additional test, at his own expense, by a physician by his own choosing, for the purpose of attempting to secure evidence for his defense at or near the crucial time under consideration. The defendant contends Wuthnow's statements that a blood test would show higher levels of alcohol wrongfully persuaded him from taking the blood test and resulted in an unreasonable interference by the State with his rights under the provisions of K.S.A. 8-1004. The defendant relies upon Lau v. State, 896 P.2d 825 (Alaska App. 1995). Lau was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence and a breath test indicated that his blood alcohol level was .201. However, Lau testified that when he was asked by officers whether he wanted to take an independent blood test, another officer with whom Lau was acquainted mouthed the word no and made a hand gesture. Lau stated he wanted an independent test but later conferred with the other officer who told him that the blood test would nail him. Lau, therefore, decided not to take the test. Under the totality of circumstances, the Alaska Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's determination that no interference occurred. The Court of Appeals concluded that the officer's conduct had prevented Lau from obtaining an independent test that he would otherwise have obtained, and the breath test should have been suppressed. 896 P.2d at 828-29. A similar result was reached in People v. Underwood, 153 Mich. App. 598, 396 N.W.2d 443 (1986). Underwood demanded that an independent test be performed. However, the arresting officer talked him out of having the blood test saying that the test was silly and stupid, that the test would show a higher blood alcohol level and that the defendant was going to go to jail anyway. 153 Mich. App. at 600. The Michigan Court of Appeals determined that although Underwood eventually chose not to take the blood test, the officer's conduct deprived him of his opportunity to take an independent test, and the court reversed Underwood's conviction. 153 Mich. App. at 600. In Hattaway v. State, 191 Ga. App. 812, 813, 383 S.E.2d 140 (1989), Hattaway testified that she asked specifically about a blood test but was told by officers that it was too time consuming and later told by the same officers that it was `possibly a hassle' and she instead decided to take a second breath test. The court noted that there was conflicting testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding the second test and that the interpretation was for the trial court to decide. 191 Ga. App. at 814. The court then stated that there was no evidence of actual coercion and the trial court did not err in denying Hattaway's motion to suppress. 191 Ga. App. at 814. A synthesis of the above cases demonstrates that officers may not unreasonably interfere with an accused's right to obtain additional testing and that in certain circumstances, comments by officers which persuade an accused not to take an additional test will constitute an unreasonable interference with that right. Whether such comments constitute coercion and rise to the level of unreasonable interference depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that the defendant was told by Wuthnow that he could obtain an additional test and that Wuthnow would transport him to obtain one. The record fails to demonstrate any coercion by Wuthnow who testified he was not trying to discourage the defendant from taking any further independent tests by his statement that a blood test would show higher. As a matter of law, the statement of Wuthnow to the defendant that a blood test would show higher, without any further evidence of unreasonable interference or coercion, does not establish the defendant was deprived of his right for further testing under the provisions of K.S.A. 8-1004.