Opinion ID: 2556523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preservation Contentions.

Text: Morris acknowledges that he did not raise below, and is not raising here, a simple, traditional severance issue. . . . He concedes also that he is not rais[ing] a Bruton issue in this appeal. Instead, he unfurls a broad sham trial tent, propped up by at least two supporting arguments. In particular, Morris avers, as he did before the Court of Special Appeals, that the trial court erred by authorizing the sham `joint trial' in this case, and that the circumvention of Crawford was [but] one of the harms inflicted by this error. (Emphasis added.) Presumably, the second harm inflicted by this sham `joint trial' is the defraud[ing of] the jury. . . . Morris relies on State v. Bowers, 349 Md. 710, 724, 709 A.2d 1255, 1262 (1998), for the precept that [o]ur cases never intended to permit juries to be mislead. (Citation omitted.) The State rejoins that Morris's current complaint . . . is not preserved for appellate review; even if preserved, he lacks standing to advance it; even if he has standing, his complaint has no merit. First, the State highlights that, at trial, Morris objected on two grounds, one erroneousbut for the miscellaneous agreement, he would have been able to call Williams as a witness at their joint-trial which we shall not consider further, and the other based on Bruton. Before the Court of Special Appeals, however, Morris abandoned these trial objections and articulated that this was a sham trial which violated Morris's confrontation clause rights and defrauded the jury. . . . The abandonment of his trial objections, according to the State, should prevent Morris from raising substantively different arguments on appeal. Second, the State remonstrates that, even if Morris preserved a sham trial argument, any complaints about its validity should come from Williams, not Morris. Only those injured by an action have standing to object to it. [7] Finally, responding to the merits of Morris's appellate argument, the State counters that Morris's sham trial/ Crawford argument is based on the incorrect premise that Williams was not on trial. To the State, Williams was on trial. The State, Williams, and the trial court had not formed a plea agreement. Rather, Williams struck an agreement with the State and trial court, whereby his sentence would be capped in return for dropping his demand for a bench trial. In the State's words: Williams went before the jury cloaked in the presumption of innocence[,] and the State was obligated to prove the elements of the offenses against him beyond a reasonable doubt. Gerald v. State, 299 Md. 138, [144-45, 472 A.2d 977, 981] (1983[1984]). The jury could have acquitted Williams on some or all of the charges against himand indeed did acquit him of attempted first degree murder. Williams essentially agreed to exercise his right to a jury trial in return for a guaranteed sentence, but enjoyed the possibility of an acquittal whether from a failure of the State's evidence, leniency on the part of the jury, or some unforseen structural error in the conduct of the trial. As this Court noted in Smith [ v. State, 375 Md. 365, 377-78, 825 A.2d 1055, 1062-63 (2003)], a defendant may waive any number of rights, constitutional or otherwise, as part of a negotiated agreement. Williams was entitled to specific performance of the court's agreement notwithstanding the State's lack of participation in the agreement. Like a plea agreement, an agreement to cap the sentence in exchange for a waiver of the right to a jury trial should be enforceable. Ogonowski [ v. State, 87 Md.App. 173, 185, 589 A.2d 513, 519 (1991)]. There is no principled basis for arguing that the same is not true when a sentence cap is offered in exchange for exercising the right to a jury trial. Assuming that there was a bona fide trial, the State claims that certainly it was within its right to use Williams's statement to prove Williams's guilt. The fact that Morris also was on trial demanded only that the State follow the redaction requirements of Bruton and Marsh, so that Williams's statement did not incriminate inadvertently Morris. As Williams's statement did not so inculpate Morris, and, in any event, Morris expressly waived his Bruton argument, Williams's statement was admitted properly. Crawford, the State entreats, is inapplicable, as it concerns the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to confront witnesses against him or her. Because Williams's statement was used against Williams alone, any Crawford concerns evaporate. [8] The Court of Special Appeals determined that Morris did not challenge, on appeal, the trial court's severance ruling, its Bruton ruling, or the impact of Crawford. ([Morris] is correct that he made a Crawford argument [to the trial court]. . . . as part of his severance and Bruton arguments, [none of] which . . . are . . . raised on appeal.). Nonetheless, it acknowledged, paradoxically that, [i]n his opening brief, [Morris] contends the `miscellaneous agreement' violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights under Crawford . . . . [Morris] maintains that, if he had been tried separately from Williams, the intermediate appellate court continued, Williams's statement would not have been admitted into evidence at his ([Morris's]) trial. . . . Thus, it appearsin the Court of Special Appeals's own words and Morris's brief in that courtthat Morris, in fact, did raise properly a Crawford argument on appeal. Morris gathers not only Crawford, but also jury deception under his sham trial tent. Under the weight of preservation principles, however, his tent buckles on the latter point. Nonetheless, Morris adequately, if not inarticulately, preserved his Crawford claim. Before the trial court, Morris's counsel did not rely initially on any particular case, but focused rather on his client's general confrontation rights. As Crawford is grounded in Sixth Amendment confrontation right principles, we conclude that Morris asserted, at trial, a Crawford complaint, albeit tangentially. (Emphasis added.) The Court of Special Appealsregarding its perception that Morris failed to maintain his confrontation argument before itbegins with its identification of a sharp contrast between the trial court's severance . . . [and] Bruton ruling[s], and Morris's `sham trial'/confrontation right argument. Morris objected to the former at trial, but, according to the intermediate appellate court, raised the lattercharacterized as a wholly different claimon appeal. We fail to see so clear a distinction. Instead, by raising confrontation concerns before the Court of Special Appeals, Morris was not merely alleging error in the admission of Williams's statements. But see Morris v. State, No. 455, September Term, 2008, slip op. at 13 (Md.App. February 4, 2010) ([Morris] contends the `miscellaneous agreement' . . . prejudiced him because the State was able to introduce into evidence Williams's recorded statement without regard for his . . . confrontation rights. . . .). He was taking issue directly with the trial court's severance ruling. . . . [9] Although Morris's trial counsel did not state clearly that he was seeking a severance because the miscellaneous agreement was simply a subterfuge or sham, by which the State could admit Williams's statement against Morris in violation of Crawford,  he did object to the agreement. . . as . . . beneficial to the State and, presumably, unduly prejudicial, to his client. He also stated that he wanted a severance (not simply a redaction pursuant to Bruton) because the State proposed to admit a statement which connect[s] Morris more proximately to the crime scene and actually hurts my client. ([W]hat I think [Williams's statement] does, [is] to further my argument as to severance.). On this record, we conclude that Morris preserved, albeit tangentially, a claim that severance was proper, in light of an impending Confrontation Clause violation caused by the existence of the miscellaneous agreement ( i.e., the joint trial). [10]