Opinion ID: 2598371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Good Faith and Due Diligence

Text: Periods during which the prosecutor acts with good faith and due diligence in trying to bring a defendant before the court are excluded from the time for trial calculation. [4] Greenwood, 120 Wash.2d at 604-05, 845 P.2d 971. Although the good faith and due diligence standard was adopted in interpreting a prior version of CrR 3.3, see State v. Peterson, 90 Wash.2d 423, 428, 585 P.2d 66 (1978), its validity continues because it is consistent with the purpose behind Striker, CrR 3.3, and the criminal rules as a whole. Greenwood, 120 Wash.2d at 600-01, 845 P.2d 971 (citing State v. Pacheco, 107 Wash.2d 59, 65, 726 P.2d 981 (1986)). The rule ensures that defendants are brought before the court in a timely manner, while allowing for unavoidable periods of delay that, if not taken into account, would put an extraordinary and unfair burden on the prosecution. Greenwood, 120 Wash.2d at 601, 845 P.2d 971 (quoting State v. Miffitt, 56 Wash.App. 786, 792, 785 P.2d 850 (1990)); see also Huffmeyer, 145 Wash.2d at 62-63, 32 P.3d 996. In State v. Landey the first of the four cases consolidated in Greenwood, the Supreme Court determined that whether the prosecution acted with good faith and due diligence turned on the facts of each case. Greenwood, 120 Wash.2d at 601, 845 P.2d 971. In Landey, the State had attempted to notify the defendant of the charges against him by sending a letter and attempting to telephone him. Id. at 601-02, 845 P.2d 971. The court held that the State had acted in a timely manner with the information it had regarding the defendant's whereabouts. Id. at 602, 845 P.2d 971. Because of this good faith and due diligence, the trial court used the actual arraignment date and did not need to establish a constructive arraignment date. Id. at 602-03, 845 P.2d 971. Here, the trial court determined that the State acted with good faith and due diligence. The trial judge noted that Swenson was in the custody of DOC, and that DOC could not transport him to Jefferson County because it had a conflicting transport order from King County. The Jefferson County prosecutor had contacted King County and was told that Swenson would remain there until his matters were resolved. The trial judge also observed that the Jefferson County prosecutor routinely called DOC and King County to confirm Swenson's whereabouts so that he could be transported to Jefferson County as soon as possible. Once the prosecutor learned Swenson had returned to CBCC, a second transport order was issued and he was brought to Jefferson County for arraignment. The trial court stated that it was confident that the State has demonstrated good faith and diligent effort to locate and obtain the Defendant for trial. Supplemental Clerk's Papers (SCP) at 4. Swenson cites several cases to support his proposition that the prosecutor did not act with good faith and due diligence. Swenson notes that State v. Anderson, 121 Wash.2d 852, 863, 855 P.2d 671 (1993), adopted American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed.1986) to help determine whether the State acts with good faith and due diligence. Those standards provide that, if a defendant is in custody in another county, the prosecutor must promptly `undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.' Anderson, 121 Wash.2d at 863-64, 855 P.2d 671 (quoting STANDARDS std., 12-3.1(a)(i)). The record reflects that the Jefferson County prosecutor did just that. Swenson also cites State v. Jones, 79 Wash.App. 7, 901 P.2d 1057 (1995), a case in which the State had mailed a certified letter to the defendant but it was returned as unclaimed. Jones, 79 Wash.App. at 9, 901 P.2d 1057. The State made no further attempts to notify the defendant, despite the fact it had other information regarding the defendant's whereabouts. Id. The court determined that the State failed to exercise good faith and due diligence. Id. at 13-14, 901 P.2d 1057. Jones is inapposite because here the State knew precisely where Swenson was located and repeatedly checked on his availability for transport to Jefferson County. Swenson also cites State v. Bazan, 79 Wash.App. 723, 904 P.2d 1167 (1995). Like Jones, Bazan dealt with unclaimed certified letters and is readily distinguishable from this case. Id. at 726, 904 P.2d 1167. Swenson also argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously placed upon him the burden of proving that the State failed to act with good faith and due diligence, rather than having the State prove it, by the statement: Swenson never provided the trial court with information on when he believes he should have been available for transport. Swenson, 113 Wash.App. 1022, 2002 WL 31521200, at . The State has the burden of proving good faith and due diligence because it knows what it was doing during the relevant period. State v. King, 101 Wash.App. 318, 322, 2 P.3d 1012 (2000) (citing State v. Roman, 94 Wash.App. 211, 216, 972 P.2d 511 (1999)). Here, the prosecutor presented evidence of its good faith and due diligence by having DeWitt testify. Swenson also argues there was not good faith and due diligence because there was no evidence that DeWitt tried to arrange with King County for Swenson to be transported directly from King County to Jefferson County. In Huffmeyer, the defendant was being held in the King County Jail when prosecutors filed an information in a Kitsap County court. Huffmeyer, 145 Wash.2d at 55, 32 P.3d 996. He was not arraigned on the Kitsap County charge until 121 days after pleading guilty on the King County charge. Id. The court held that the prosecutors failed to act with due diligence because they did nothing. [P]rosecutors should have at least inquired as to when he would be available for trial in Kitsap County. Further, prosecutors should have contacted King County to inquire as to the progression of Huffmeyer's trial and his availability after the guilty plea. Id. at 63, 32 P.3d 996. DeWitt regularly contacted King County and CBCC. Swenson also argues that the State failed to meet its burden to show that it could not have transported Swenson directly from King County to Jefferson County. The trial judge in this case noted that there was an issue whether, once the prosecutor knew that DOC sent Swenson to King County, the prosecutor was obligated to do more than say, let us know when he returns and we'll get him then. Report of Proceedings at 29-30. In his order denying the motion to dismiss, the trial judge noted [t]he State had no ability to supercede the Department of Corrections requirements in relation to Mr. Swenson. SCP at 4. Likewise, the Court of Appeals noted that, unlike Huffmeyer, Swenson was in the formal custody of the DOC, who had sent him to King County subject to return. Swenson, 113 Wash.App. 1022, 2002 WL 31521200, at . [5] There is substantial evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that the State acted with good faith and due diligence in trying to procure Swenson's presence before the Jefferson County Superior Court. The State's good faith and due diligence extends the time for trial deadline. Greenwood, 120 Wash.2d at 604-05, 845 P.2d 971; Anderson, 102 Wash.App. at 411, 9 P.3d 840 (State's due diligence extended time for trial deadline, making defendant's objection to arraignment after her actual arraignment untimely under CrR 3.3(e)). Swenson's time for trial deadline changed to 90 days after his actual arraignment. Because there was time remaining before the time for trial deadline passed, Swenson's failure to object at his actual arraignment constituted a waiver of that objection. CrR 3.3(e). The Court of Appeals correctly determined that Swenson waived his objection to the arraignment date under CrR 3.3(e).