Opinion ID: 889185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: First Trial Setting: July 29, 2002 (199 Days of Delay)

Text: ¶ 131 Rose became an accused on January 11, 2002, when he was arrested in relation to the charges ultimately filed in the District Court. The first trial date set by the District Court was July 29, 2002. This constitutes a 199-day delay between arrest and the first trial setting. The District Court attributed this delay to the State as institutional delay. This Court appears to attribute 35 days of it to Rose. See Opinion, ¶¶ 49-51. An analysis under Ariegwe reveals both to be incorrect. ¶ 132 The following events occurred following Rose's arrest:  January 11: Initial appearance in Justice Court.  January 23: Filing of the Information in District Court.  February 6: Initial appearance in District Court. Upon inquiry by the court, defense counsel stated that he had recently received about 160 pages of discovery and needed time to review it before Rose would enter his plea. The court scheduled entry of plea for February 13.  February 13: Rose entered a plea of not guilty. The District Court scheduled the omnibus hearing for March 6.  March 6: Omnibus hearing. The District Court approved the Omnibus Hearing Memorandum. In addition, pursuant to its trial procedure, the court ordered Rose and the State to conduct a face to face settlement conference on April 18. The court stated that a trial date would be set thereafter if necessary.  April 10: Status hearing. Defense counsel requested a continuance of the settlement conference. The District Court reset the conference for May 2.  April 24: Hearing to address Rose's complaints about defense counsel. At the conclusion of this hearing, the prosecutor and defense counsel advised the court that the case had not been settled.  April 25: The District Court entered an order setting trial for July 29, 2002 (95 days out). ¶ 133 The 95-day delay between April 25 and the July 29 trial date is attributable to the State as institutional delay. Ariegwe, ¶ 68. But the 104-day delay between January 11 (Rose's arrest) and April 25 is another matter. Again, the primary burden to assure that cases are brought to trial is on the courts and the prosecutors, and the trial court itself has an `affirmative constitutional obligation' to make a good faith, diligent effort to bring the defendant to trial quickly. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 65, 72. Given these constitutional mandates, there is simply no justification for a trial court's failing to select a trial date at the earliest practical opportunity to do so. ¶ 134 Notably, in Ariegwe, the district court set trial at Ariegwe's arraignment. In Billman, the district court issued an order 20 days after Billman's arraignment scheduling the omnibus hearing and setting a trial date. In this case, however, the District Court did not set trial until well after the omnibus hearing. The State offers no justification for delaying until 50 days after the omnibus hearing and 71 days after Rose's arraignment to set a trial date which, as noted, was 95 days out. ¶ 135 Absent exceptional circumstances, a trial court should be able to select a trial date by the time of the omnibus hearing or promptly thereafter. The purpose of this hearing, which is to be held [w]ithin a reasonable time following the entry of a not guilty plea but not less than 30 days before trial, is to expedite the procedures leading up to the trial of the defendant. Section 46-13-110(1), (2), MCA. At this point in time, the parties should have a good idea of whether a trial is necessary. Indeed, § 46-13-110(3), MCA, instructs the prosecutor and defense counsel to be prepared to discuss a number of pretrial matters, including the existence of a plea agreement; reliance on certain defenses; intent to seek persistent felony offender status; intent to rely on evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts; and change of venue. While a face to face settlement conference after the omnibus hearing might ultimately resolve the case, that is beside the point. There is always a risk that the case will not be settled, and the speedy trial right prohibits the court from placing that risk on the defendant by refusing to select a trial date until after the conference. ¶ 136 Here, on March 6, the District Court required the parties to have a face to face settlement conference on April 18 and stated that a trial date would be set thereafter, if necessary. While this procedure may have enabled the court to set only necessary trial dates, it conflicted with the court's affirmative constitutional obligation to ensure that criminal defendants are brought to trial expeditiously. Fifty days later, after being apprised by the prosecutor and defense counsel that the case remained unresolved, the court set trial. Presumably, July 29 was the earliest suitable date; however, this does not change the fact that a suitable date roughly 50 days earlier might have been possible had the court not delayed setting Rose's trial. ¶ 137 The Court asserts that Rose's counsel was unprepared at the March 6 omnibus hearing and requested additional time to investigate whether he should move for a change of venue. Opinion, ¶ 50. Conspicuously absent from the Court's discussion, however, is the fact that the prosecutor likewise was unprepared and, thus, requested additional time to file his notice under State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262, 274, 602 P.2d 957, 963-64 (1979), and State v. Matt, 249 Mont. 136, 142-43, 814 P.2d 52, 56 (1991). The District Court gave defense counsel until March 27 to file a change of venue motion and gave the prosecutor until March 29 to file his Just/Matt notice. Nevertheless, the Court assigns 21 days of delay to Rose. Opinion, ¶ 50. This approach is erroneous for two reasons. ¶ 138 First, the District Court's policy, as stated in the Omnibus Hearing Memorandum, was not to set a trial date until after the settlement conference, which was slated for April 18. Thus, defense counsel's request for additional time to investigate a change of venue had absolutely no impact on the setting of a trial date in this case. Both his investigation and his motion were to be completed several weeks before the settlement conference was to occur. Consequently, the Court here is doing exactly what we said in Ariegwe a court should not do: consider any actions taken by the State or the accused which do not result in a postponement of the trial date. Ariegwe, ¶ 63. Defense counsel's request did not delay Rose's trial; thus, there is no basis for the Court to assign Rose the 21 days of delay. ¶ 139 Second, and more to the point, neither Rose's request for additional time to investigate a change of venue nor the State's request for additional time to file its Just/Matt notice precluded the District Court from setting a trial date. The record reflects that that a three- to four-month delay between setting a trial date and holding the trial was typical for the District Court during this period. Had the court set trial on March 6 for June 10, instead of setting it on April 25 for July 29, 50 days of delay could have been averted. While this might appear to be speculative, the critical point here is that the State has the burden of justifying the pretrial delays, and that burden in this case is increased substantially (Opinion, ¶ 46) due to the extent of the delay. Yet, the State has offered no justification for the District Court's waiting until April 25 to select a trial date. ¶ 140 Based on the foregoing analysis, I conclude that the 199-day delay between arrest and the first trial setting is properly attributed as follows. First, from the January 11 arrest to the March 6 omnibus hearing (54 days): Accepting, for the sake of argument, the Court's assertion that Rose delayed the selection of a trial date by 7 days when he requested time to review discovery before entering his plea (Opinion, ¶ 49), 47 days are attributable to the State as institutional delay and 7 days are attributable to Rose as acceptable delay in preparing his case. See Ariegwe, ¶¶ 68-72. Second, from March 7 to April 25 (50 days): Because this delay resulted from the District Court's decision to postpone setting Rose's trial date, for which the State has provided no justification, it is attributable to the State and weighted more heavily than unavoidable delay inherent in the criminal justice system. See e.g. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 126-128. Lastly, from April 26 to July 29 (95 days): These days are attributable to the State as institutional delay.