Opinion ID: 2118368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Uniformity of Taxation Requirement.

Text: Plaintiffs further attack the validity of the 1955 ordinance on the ground that its provisions violate the rule of uniformity of taxation set forth in sec. 1, art. VIII, Const. The provision complained of is that which authorizes the assessment of special charges as taxes against property located in the annexed sanitary district. The result is that assessments against property in this district are higher than elsewhere in the city. In an early case, Weeks v. Milwaukee (1860), 10 Wis. 186 (), this constitutional provision was held not applicable to special assessments levied to pay for street and sidewalk improvements. The court reached this conclusion because of another provision of the constitution, then found in sec. 3, art. XI, Const., which authorized the legislature to restrict the power of cities and villages with respect to taxation and assessment. The word assessment was held to refer to the system of special taxation, which had existed for years in the older states, whereby the cost of public improvements specially benefiting particular property was assessed against such property. However, this provision of sec. 3, art. XI, Const., relied upon in the Weeks Case was repealed by adoption of the home-rule amendment in 1924. Thereafter, in Milwaukee v. Taylor (1938), 229 Wis. 328, 282 N. W. 448, the contention was advanced that this repeal rendered special assessments made under the Kline Law (ch. 275, Laws of 1931), void under the uniformity-of-taxation requirement of sec. 1, art. VIII. The court rejected this argument and stated (p. 340): If the word `taxation' as used in sec. 1 of art. VIII of the constitution in 1860 did not include special assessments, it does not include it now whether the word `assessment' appears in the constitution or not. Certainly no one thought at the time of the adoption of the home-rule amendment that the people were destroying a power and method of assessment which had been recognized and in existence since the adoption of the constitution in 1849. The argument of counsel is ingenious but not persuasive. It is considered therefore that municipalities have the power to levy special assessments based on benefits. Therefore, the holding of the Weeks Case, that the uniformity requirement does not apply to special assessments, is still the law today. The special charges authorized by the 1955 ordinance are composed of two elements: (1) For meeting the operation and maintenance costs of the sewer system within the district, including depreciation and levies or service charges imposed on the district by the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission; and (2) for the repayment of principal and interest due on the mortgage-revenue bonds. These bonds were not issued as general-obligation bonds, but constitute a lien on the property of the sanitary district to defray the major cost of installing the sewerage facilities, which benefit all property in the district. Thus, this part of the special charges is required to be levied by the terms of the bonds and by sec. 60.31 (1) (b), Stats. While this element is not technically a special assessment, it is closely akin in nature to one. Also, the first part of the special charges bears little resemblance to a general property tax. Therefore, it is our conclusion that the uniformity-of-taxation requirement of sec. 1, art. VIII, Const., has no application to these special charges authorized by the ordinance. While the amount of the charges was partly determined on the basis of the assessed value of each parcel of property in the district, this did not convert the charges into a general property tax. Furthermore, a valid classification does not violate the principle of uniformity. Nash Sales, Inc., v. Milwaukee (1929), 198 Wis. 281, 224 N. W. 126. Thus, even if the assessment were considered a tax, it could be upheld on this basis.