Opinion ID: 458728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Compensable Damages for Deprivation of Constitutional Rights

Text: 41 The Indiana Civil Liberties Union, in its amicus brief, argues that where substantive rights are violated damages can be presumed even in the absence of discernible consequential injuries. It cites Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 69, 78 L.Ed.2d 84 (1983) and Owen v. Lash, 682 F.2d 648, 658-59 (7th Cir.1982), in support of this contention. It is true that Owen and Lenard recognize that under certain circumstances it is proper to presume damages. 6 From our examination of the circumstances of this case and considering the nature of the constitutional violations involved, we conclude that this is not a case where damages may be presumed. 42 In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), the Supreme Court reversed this court's holding that students were entitled to recover substantial non-punitive damages without a showing of consequential injury where they had been denied procedural due process. 7 The Court concluded: 43 In sum, then, although mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is compensable under Sec. 1983, we hold that neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually was caused. 44 Id. at 264, 98 S.Ct. at 1052. 45 The Court recognized, however, that damages may be appropriate without a showing of consequential injury under some circumstances: 46 [T]he rules governing compensation for injuries caused by deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the interests protected by the particular right in question.... 47 Id. at 259, 98 S.Ct. at 1050. 48 [T]he elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of another. 49 Id. at 264-65, 98 S.Ct. at 1053. 50 This court considered this holding in the cases cited by the Indiana Civil Liberties Union. In Owen we declin[ed] to attempt to resolve the question, noting that remand was required on another point, i.e., to determine whether the defendant, in his individual capacity was immune from liability for damages. 682 F.2d at 659. In Lenard, applying Carey, we examined the circumstances of that case and the constitutional issues involved in order to determine the appropriate prerequisite for a damage award. 699 F.2d at 889. 8 51 In the subsequent case of Crawford v. Garnier, 719 F.2d 1317, 1324 (7th Cir.1983), we noted that while Owen and Lenard suggest that certain constitutional violations may support an award for damages in the absence of consequential injuries, neither of those decisions spoke directly to the issue as did Kincaid [Kincaid v. Rusk, 670 F.2d 737, 745-746 (7th Cir.1982) ] and neither discussed or cited Kincaid. In Kincaid the plaintiff sought damages against a sheriff for violation of his due process and First Amendment Rights in denying him reading material. This court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove compensable damages, but was entitled to nominal damages. In Crawford, the plaintiff challenged his termination from a federal emergency employment program as violation of his First Amendment right of free speech. We upheld an award for lost wages, injury to reputation, and pain and suffering, but held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an additional award of $10,000 for injury to his civil rights and that award should be reduced to $1.00. 52 We now examine the circumstances of this case and the nature of the constitutional violation to determine the appropriate prerequisites for a damage award. Neither Carey v. Piphus nor any of the prior cases in this court involved a class action. The court was concerned in each case with whether an individual plaintiff had sustained compensable damage. While the motion for judgment n.o.v. was pending, the case of Doe v. District of Columbia, supra, was brought to the court's attention. The district court found Judge MacKinnon's separate statement reported at 701 F.2d 948, persuasive in concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts and that the plaintiffs could not recover damages for violation of their constitutioal rights in the absence of proof of actual harm. 53 In Doe the jury, as did the jury in the instant action, awarded damages to a class made up of inmates based on the claim of cruel and unusual punishment and the failure to provide adequate protection from assault. There, too, the total award amounted to over $500,000. Doe, 701 F.2d at 948-49. Injunctive relief was also granted. The case was remanded for a new trial based on procedural errors. Judge MacKinnon acquiesce[d] in the court's decision only because defendants [did] not appeal[ ] from the district court's decision to deny their motion for judgment n.o.v. Id. at 948. Judge Robb agreed with Judge MacKinnon. 54 Judge MacKinnon began his discussion by stating that he doubted whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conclusion of constitutional violation but addressed the damage award nonetheless. He noted that after diligent research he could find no case where money damages to a class of prisoners has been upheld. Id. at 949. His research revealed that in the past only individual prisoners have been awarded money damages. Indeed, the cases cited by the appellants to support their argument that per diem compensation is a well recognized methodology for compensating prisoners are all claims made by individual prisoners. 9 In sum, Judge MacKinnon was loathe to grant money damages to a class of prisoners in mass that includes many prisoners who are causing the conditions complained of and who will not cooperate to help correct them. Doe, 701 F.2d at 949. 10 55 A review of the record reveals that the prisoners at Madison County Jail caused some of the conditions complained of. The homosexual attacks, food stealing, and fights were, of course, all committed by inmates. White testified that the inmates swept debris into the floor drains which resulted in their becoming clogged. TR. at IV, 169-71. Baines testified that the inmates would put blankets in the drains and toilets to make the floor flood to get the guards up so they could get attention. TR. at IV, 145. He also testified that the inmates would hoard toilet paper and that some inmates would use the toilet paper to start fires to heat coffee. TR. at VI, 145-146. Corbin testified that he and other inmates did not report observed fights, TR. at IV, 28-29, homosexual assaults, TR. at IV, 30-31 or food stealing, TR. at IV, 53, to the prison officials. Baines also testified that this type of activity was not reported. TR. at III, 88. 56 Both appellants and the Indiana Civil Liberties Union rely on Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C.1977), a class action by demonstrators on the steps of the United States Capitol who had been arrested at a Vietnam War protest rally. The jury had awarded $7,500 to each demonstrator for denial of First Amendment rights. The D.C. Court of appeals reversed and remanded for a redetermination of First Amendment damages, holding that the $7,500 judgment was totally out of proportion to any harm that has been suffered. 11 Id. at 196. 57 The jury had also awarded $500 to each class member for cruel and unusual punishment, $3,000 to each of eight class members who actually stood trial for malicious prosecution, and $50 to all other class members for malicious prosecution. 12 The comments of Judge Leventhal in his concurring opinion with respect to the award for cruel and unusual punishment are pertinent to this case. Judge Leventhal said in part: 58 A second reason why the $500 per plaintiff award cannot stand is that individual plaintiffs were confined under greatly differing conditions. As is clear from the award of false imprisonment, some members of the class were detained for substantially less time than others. One-half of the class was not taken to the D.C. cell block, where conditions were apparently most inhumane. It appears that even among those imprisoned at the same location, there may have been significant differences in terms of food and bedding supplied, medical attention, use of physical force, etc. Under these circumstances, a uniform award was inappropriate. 59 Id. at 208-09 (Leventhal, J., concurring). 60