Opinion ID: 1527587
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Test Proposed by the Panel Majority.

Text: In its discussion of how the judge should determine whether minimum standards of reliability, Agent Orange, supra, have been met, the majority of the panel adopted the following test: a trial judge will properly admit expert opinion based on hearsay testimony under Rule 703 when (1) the judge is persuaded that experts in the field commonly rely on the particular type of hearsay information in addressing the specific type of problem raised in the case before the court, and (2) the judge concludes that the information (if not admissible for its truth under an exception to the hearsay rule) is of a type for which the underlying reliability of the data can be sufficiently explored through cross-examination of the testifying expert. Of course, a trial judge [3] should exclude an expert opinion, including the facts and data upon which it relies (even if of a type reasonably relied on most of the time), if admission in evidence would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice or would mislead the jury. Melton I, 565 A.2d at 645 (emphasis added; citations and internal quotations marks omitted). The panel majority then strongly implied that in a great many cases, if not in most, a psychiatric's expert reliance on out-of-court statements by lay observers will not pass muster. We are not stating categorically that expert reliance on hearsay observations by laypersons will always fail to satisfy the second prong of the test set forth supra at page 645. But, given the possibility that lay observers in some contexts ( e.g., a family with a mentally ill member) may not be disinterested, and given, further, that the expert's inability to vouch for the lay observer's reliability will not necessarily undermine the expert's own aura of authority, [17] a trial court must be very careful to evaluate whether the proffered expert testimony and its underlying sources can be effectively scrutinized before the jury. Id. at 646. Melton urges us to adopt the panel majority's three-part test. We have no quarrel with the first and third prongs of this articulation, but are unable to agree with the second. The United States has filed an excellent brief as amicus curiae in which it has effectively marshalled the arguments against the division's second prong. We cannot improve upon the government's Summary of Argument, which we reproduce below in slightly edited form, annotated by authorities which, in our view, support the various propositions articulated therein: The panel opinion's holding, mandating classification and compartmentalization of the `type' of [information] underlying expert opinion or inference in order to determine its source and susceptibility to cross-examination, constitutes a significant, ill-advised change in this court's long-established jurisprudence. The decisions of this court have held that an expert's opinion is not inadmissible simply because it is based on [what would otherwise be] inadmissible hearsay if persons within the field of expertise customarily or reasonably rely upon such [information] in arriving at opinions. This rule is consistent with other jurisdictions' reasoned analysis. There are adequate safeguards to ensure the integrity and fairness of proceedings when an expert opinion relying in part on inadmissible evidence is proffered: (1) this court's three-part Dyas test for the qualification of experts; [18] (2) this court's rule that the profession must customarily rely upon such inadmissible hearsay evidence;[ [19] ] (3) the trial court's broad discretion to exclude expert testimony that is more prejudicial than probative, founded on incompetent evidence, or mere speculation;[ [20] ] (4) the opposing party's right to cross-examine on the underlying data and introduce contrary evidence;[ [21] ] (5) the trier-of-fact's ability to determine the reliability and weight to be given to such evidence;[ [22] ] (6) the risk of nonpersuasion borne by the party with the burden of proof;[ [23] ] (7) the trial court's discretion to direct a verdict.... where there is insufficient evidence to support a jury's finding;[ [24] ] and (8) this court's authority to take corrective measures on appellate review, should the trial court abuse its discretion. Moreover, the proposed rule would introduce new, intractable problems of law and administration.[ [25] ] It does not account for expert testimony founded only in part on otherwise inadmissible hearsay; it would lead to unwieldy hearings necessitating formidable, fine distinctions between types of hearsay and whether they are `sufficiently' susceptible to cross-examination; and it would prevent the jury from hearing probative expert opinions that are developed in accordance with accepted professional norms and methodology, including relevant psychiatric testimony.[ [26] ] In the final analysis, we view Rule 703 as having been intended to permit expert witnesses, provided that minimal standards of reliability have been met, to rely in the courtroom on the same data which they use in the office or laboratory. The panel majority's second prong would effect a substantial and in our view unnecessary intrusion upon the expert's sources. Accordingly, we decline to adopt it, and adhere instead to Judge Weinstein's articulation in Agent Orange, supra, 611 F.Supp. at 1245, which we have quoted at page 903 of this opinion. [27]