Opinion ID: 2524568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Timeliness of Heiland's Actions Under the KJRA

Text: Having concluded that the KJRA is the exclusive remedy in this case, it becomes necessary to determine what would have been the triggering event for the 30 days allotted for filing a petition for review under the KJRA. The trial court and the Court of Appeals determined that the denial by the Kansas Legislature's Joint Committee on Special Claims Against the State was the triggering event. Although the Joint Committee had the power to address Heiland's claims, this legislative committee is not an administrative agency under the KJRA. See K.S.A. 77-602(k) (excluding the legislative branch of the government from the definition of state agency). Thus, the denial of his claim by the Joint Committee was not the triggering event. Moreover, the submission of the claim to the Joint Committee would not toll the time for filing a petition for review under the provisions of K.S.A. 77-612, which requires exhaustion of remedies available within the agency whose action is being challenged or the reviewing agency but does not provide for review by the legislative branch. Heiland made no attempt to contact anyone at the SBC with regard to his claims. However, the SBC does not claim that Heiland failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to it. Heiland did contact the Department of Administration's Division of Personnel Services. The Director of Personnel Services is charged by statute, K.S.A. 75-3746, with the responsibility to make investigations concerning all matters touching the enforcement and effect of the provision of the Kansas Civil Service Act, K.S.A. 75-2925 et seq., and rules and regulations adopted thereunder and to enforce the Act. Heiland's demand to the Department of Administration was not only an attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also it was a claim to an appropriate agency having the authority and power to redress his claims. The Department of Administration was a proper agency to which Heiland should have gone to obtain an administrative remedy. The denial of his claim by letter dated August 17, 1994, constituted a final agency action, as defined by K.S.A. 77-607(b)(1) and (2). Three days for service by mail of the letter should have been added pursuant to K.S.A. 77-613(e). Thus, Heiland's petition for review would have had to have been filed within 30 days of August 20, 1994, to be timely. This conclusion, however, assumes full compliance with the provisions of K.S.A. 77-613(e). According to this court's decision in Reifschneider, compliance with K.S.A. 77-613(e) requires that the agency: (1) serve the order not only on counsel but also on the parties themselves as mandated by K.S.A. 77-613(e) and (2) state the agency officer who is to receive service of a petition for judicial review on behalf of the agency. 266 Kan. at 342. The denial letter by the Department of Administration did not comply with K.S.A. 77-613(e). In Reifschneider, the plaintiffs had purchased a winning lottery ticket. Because two winning tickets had been sold for that particular drawing, the plaintiffs were awarded one-half of the jackpot. Anticipating that the second ticket might not be presented, the plaintiffs filed a claim for the other half of the prize. The Executive Director of the Kansas Lottery notified the plaintiffs' attorney by letter that their claim was denied. We held that the director's notification was a final agency order under the KJRA, and it was thus incumbent on the director to: (1) serve the order not only on counsel but also on the parties themselves, as mandated by K.S.A. 77-613(e) and (2) state in the letter the agency officer to receive service of a petition for judicial review on behalf of the agency also mandated by K.S.A. 77-613(e). 266 Kan. at 342. We stated that the purpose of the requirement in K.S.A. 77-613(e) mandating that the final order state the agency officer to receive service of a petition for judicial review was so that appellate rights may be preserved. 266 Kan. at 342. The SBC argues that its action was not an agency order but rather an action which does not require compliance with the provisions of K.S.A. 77-613(e) regarding service of orders. According to the SBC's argument, the triggering event for the running of the 30-day period was the inaction of the SBC in failing to rehire Heiland which occurred between February 17, 1991 and February 17, 1994. See K.S.A. 77-613(d). The SBC argues that its action concluded on February 17, 1994, and the 30 days began running from that point and would have continued running unless extended by one of the reasons contained in K.S.A. 77-613(d)(1) or (2). The SBC contends that it is unrealistic to require it to send notice to every person who might possibly be affected by its hiring decisions. We agree. The KJRA clearly makes a distinction between an order which is subject to judicial review within 30 days of its service and an agency action which is subject to judicial review within 30 days of its date except where it is not discovered or an attempt to exhaust administrative remedies is involved. See K.S.A. 77-613(b) and (d). However, once Heiland attempted to pursue an administrative remedy, the decision of the administrative agency denying his claim became an order. See K.S.A. 77-602(e) (defining an order as an agency action of particular applicability that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities or other legal interests of one or more specific persons). Thus, because the Department of Administration was the proper agency before whom Heiland brought his claim in order to exhaust his administrative remedies, it was incumbent upon the Department of Administration in denying Heiland's claim to give him some idea of his next step by designating the agency person to receive his petition for judicial review. This interpretation is consistent with the goal of the KJRA. The KJRA favors administrative rather than legal resolutions of problems. To this end, the KJRA mandates that administrative remedies be exhausted prior to the filing of a petition for judicial review. See K.S.A. 77-612. This presents a problem in actions involving agencies whose administrative remedies are not well defined. The Kansas Administrative Procedure Act (KAPA), K.S.A. 77-501 et seq., sets up a framework for administrative review. However, by its own terms, the KAPA applies only to the extent that other statutes expressly provide that its provisions govern proceedings under those statutes. K.S.A. 77-503. Thus, the KAPA is not applicable in the situation before the court. We acknowledge that there is a difference between this case and Reifschneider in that Heiland sought an administrative remedy not from the agency which took the action but from the Department of Administration. However, because the Department of Administration is charged with overseeing employment issues relating to the Civil Service Act, it was an agency with power to remedy his situation and, therefore, in the absence of a defined procedure for administrative action, it was proper for him to seek a remedy from that agency. We conclude that Heiland properly sought an administrative remedy from the Department of Administration. In accordance with our decision in Reifschneider, the Department of Administration failed to notify Heiland of the officer to receive service of a petition for judicial review in its denial letter of his claims, as required by K.S.A. 77-613(e). As a result, his time to file his petition for review under the provisions of the KJRA did not begin to run. In light of our decision, we need not address other arguments advanced by Heiland regarding the tolling of the time to file a petition under the KJRA. We therefore reverse that part of the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the district court's dismissal and reverse the district court's dismissal of Heiland's claims based upon his failure to timely file a petition for review under the KJRA. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The decision of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.