Opinion ID: 1741540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Review Board's Report

Text: Next, the father complains that the juvenile court received the hearsay report of the review board. In that regard, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-285(6) (Cum.Supp.1996) provides: Any written findings or recommendations of the State Foster Care Review Board or any designated local foster care review board with regard to a juvenile in a foster care placement submitted to a court having jurisdiction over such juvenile shall be admissible in any proceeding concerning such juvenile if such findings or recommendations have been provided to all other parties of record. It must be borne in mind, however, that the Constitution of this state distributes the powers of government into three separate and coequal departments, or branches, namely, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Moreover, the Constitution prohibits any one branch from exercising any power belonging to another branch. Neb. Const. art. II, § 1; State ex rel. Shepherd v. Neb. Equal Opp. Comm., 251 Neb. 517, 557 N.W.2d 684 (1997). Thus, we have held that while the legislative branch may have the right in some contexts to prescribe that certain evidence be admissible in a court of law, it is a judicial function to determine whether the evidence is of probative value and to determine the weight, if any, to be given such evidence. See, State v. Burling, 224 Neb. 725, 400 N.W.2d 872 (1987); State v. Bjornsen, 201 Neb. 709, 271 N.W.2d 839 (1978). The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have made plain that a parent's desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). In a later parental termination case, that Court noted: If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of deprivation.... A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). It observed: For all its consequence, due process has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined. [U]nlike some legal rules, this Court has said, due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 [, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)]. Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness, a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty. Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what fundamental fairness consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake. 452 U.S. at 24-25, 101 S.Ct. at 2158 (involving due process considerations for proceedings to terminate parental rights). Shortly after Lassiter, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1395, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982): In Lassiter, it was not disputed that state intervention to terminate the relationship between [a parent] and [the] child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause. [Citations omitted.] The absence of dispute reflected this Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citations omitted.] The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.... If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. The Santosky Court further noted at 455 U.S. at 758, 102 S.Ct. at 1397: `The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be condemned to suffer grievous loss.' See, also, Stanley v. Illinois, supra (integrity of family unit is protected by Due Process Clause of 14th Amendment). Because hearsay evidence is not subject to the test of cross-examination, it is unreliable. In re Interest of P.D., 231 Neb. 608, 437 N.W.2d 156 (1989); In re Interest of J.S., A.C., and C.S., 227 Neb. 251, 417 N.W.2d 147 (1987). For that reason, with certain exceptions not applicable here, Neb. Evid. R. 802, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-802 (Reissue 1995), renders hearsay evidence inadmissible. Notwithstanding that the Nebraska rules of evidence do not apply in dispositional hearings held in proceedings arising under the Nebraska Juvenile Code, the requirements of due process control in determining the type of evidence which may be used by the State in an attempt to prove that parental rights should be terminated. In re Interest of J.H., 242 Neb. 906, 497 N.W.2d 346 (1993). Thus, although the rules of evidence are inapplicable, they nonetheless provide a guidepost in determining whether fundamental due process has been afforded. Id. Because statutory provisions do not overcome constitutional rights, see In re Interest of J.H., supra , we must conclude that the provisions of § 43-285(6) do not apply to proceedings brought under the juvenile code to terminate parental rights. See, also, State ex rel. Caldwell v. Peterson, 153 Neb. 402, 45 N.W.2d 122 (1950) (Legislature cannot lawfully act beyond limits of Constitution). Accordingly, the district court erred in admitting the report of the review board. However, that determination does not end our analysis, for the improper admission of evidence in a parental rights proceeding does not, in and of itself, constitute reversible error, for, as long as the appellant properly objected, we will not consider any such evidence in our de novo review of the record. In re Interest of C.W. et al., 239 Neb. 817, 479 N.W.2d 105 (1992); In re Interest of D.S. and T.S., 236 Neb. 413, 461 N.W.2d 415 (1990).