Opinion ID: 836190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: applicable michigan law

Text: In 1970, the Michigan Legislature enacted the CCA. Among its provisions are statutory presumptions that apply in custody disputes. The presumptions pertinent to this case are found in MCL 722.25(1) and MCL 722.27(1)(c). MCL 722.25(1) states: If a child custody dispute is between the parents, between agencies, or between third persons, the best interests of the child control. If the child custody dispute is between the parent or parents and an agency or a third person, the court shall presume that the best interests of the child are served by awarding custody to the parent or parents, unless the contrary is shown by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 722.27(1)(c), by contrast, provides in part: If a child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court as an original action under this act or has arisen incidentally from another action in the circuit court or an order or judgment of the circuit court, for the best interests of the child the court may do 1 or more of the following:    (c) Modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances until the child reaches 18 years of age.... The court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. The custodial environment of a child is established if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship shall also be considered. Thus, a conflict arises between these sections when a court hears a custody dispute between a child's natural parent and a third party with whom the child has an established custodial environment. This Court has not addressed the proper application of these sections of the CCA in such cases. On numerous occasions before Troxel was decided, the Court of Appeals considered the interplay of these two presumptions. Panels of the Court came to conflicting conclusions about how to reconcile them. [18] However, after Troxel, in Heltzel v. Heltzel , the Court recognized that, to properly protect a parent's fundamental liberty interest, the presumption of MCL 722.25(1) in favor of the natural parent must control. [19] Heltzel further concluded that it was imperative that trial courts balance the two significant interests. First, the lower courts must adequately safeguard the fundamental constitutional nature of the parental liberty interest. Second, they must simultaneously maintain the statutory focus of the CCA on the best interests of the child. To achieve this balance, Heltzel held: [C]ustody of a child should be awarded to a third-party custodian instead of the child's natural parent only when the third person proves that all relevant factors, including the existence of an established custodial environment and all legislatively mandated best interest concerns within [MCL 722.23], taken together clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the child's best interests require placement with the third person.[ [20] ] The Court of Appeals thoroughly considered Heltzel's analysis when it decided Mason. It noted that no published Court of Appeals case had addressed the applicability of Heltzel in cases in which a natural parent was unfit or had neglected or abandoned a child. [21] Without citing authority to support its conclusion, Mason then distinguished Heltzel, saying that it applies only to custody disputes involving fit parents. It held that when a parent's conduct is inconsistent with the protected parental interest, that is, the parent is not fit, or has neglected or abandoned a child, the reasoning and holding of Heltzel do not govern. [22] Mason thus affirmed the trial court's determination that the defendant was not entitled to the constitutional deference afforded a fit parent under Heltzel and Troxel. It extended that reasoning to justify denying the natural parent the benefit of the statutory presumption in MCL 722.25(1).