Opinion ID: 1111216
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Record of Conviction

Text: We have never defined exactly what comprises the record of conviction to which the trier of fact may look to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a serious felony. (See People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 223 [52 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 914 P.2d 184].) A Court of Appeal decision predating Myers determine[d] `the record of the prior conviction' means all items that could have been used on appeal of that prior conviction, specifically, any items considered a normal part of the record under California Rules of Court, rule 33 or by which it could be augmented pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 12. ( People v. Abarca (1991) 233 Cal. App.3d 1347, 1350 [285 Cal. Rptr. 213].) At one point in Myers, we referred to the record of the proceedings leading to imposition of judgment on the prior conviction.... ( People v. Myers, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1195.) From these cases, a Court of Appeal decision filed a few days before People v. Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th 217, concluded that documents prepared after conviction and sentencing are not part of the `record of conviction.' A document prepared after judgment, by definition, is not part of the record ` leading to imposition of judgment.' ( People v. Lewis (1996) 44 Cal. App.4th 845, 852 [52 Cal. Rptr.2d 338], italics added in Lewis. ) (3) Relying primarily on these decisions, defendant argues that the North Carolina appellate opinion was prepared after conviction and sentencing and was, therefore, not a record leading to imposition of judgment. For this reason, defendant concludes, the opinion is not part of the record of conviction to which the trier of fact may look to determine the truth of the prior conviction allegation. We disagree. Describing the record of conviction as including documents that may be part of the record on appeal ( People v. Abarca, supra, 233 Cal. App.3d at p. 1350) might be useful to help define the trial court documents that the trier of fact may consider, but we do not believe the record of conviction is limited to trial court documents. It also includes appellate court documents at least up to finality of the judgment. Myers should not be interpreted as implying that records from the appellate court may not also be part of the record of conviction. A similar issue arose in People v. Harbolt (1997) 61 Cal. App.4th 123 [71 Cal. Rptr.2d 459], review granted October 15, 1997 (S063658), opinion ordered partially published February 11, 1998. [] There, the prosecution offered an appellate opinion to show the defendant had suffered the prior conviction. The trial court judicially noticed the opinion. Like defendant here, Harbolt argued that admission of the appellate opinion was erroneous because it was prepared after judgment and is therefore not part of the prior record of conviction. ( Id. at p. 126.) The Court of Appeal disagreed: Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d) provides, in relevant part, that judicial notice may be taken of the records of `any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States.' Evidence Code section 453 requires the trial court to `take judicial notice of any matter specified in Section 452 if a party requests it and' has given the adverse party sufficient notice and furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter. Evidence Code sections 452 and 453 permit the trial court to `take judicial notice of the existence of judicial opinions and court documents, along with the truth of the results reached  in the documents such as orders, statements of decision, and judgments  but [the court] cannot take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions or court files, including pleadings, affidavits, testimony, or statements of fact.' ( Williams v. Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal. App.4th 120, 130, fn. 7 [39 Cal. Rptr.2d 658]; [see also] Gilmore v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal. App.3d 416, 418 [281 Cal. Rptr. 343].) Thus, in People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 961, footnote 6 [47 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388], our Supreme Court took judicial notice of an unpublished opinion ... to show that a codefendant had been convicted of murder, conspiracy to commit murder and solicitation to commit murder. ( Id. at pp. 126-127, original italics.) The Harbolt court said the argument that an appellate opinion may not be consulted to determine what convictions a defendant suffered defies common sense, elevating form over substance. In holding that the trier of fact may not look beyond the record of conviction, the high court did not intend to create arbitrary and artificial barriers to proving the existence of the prior conviction. Rather, it merely intended to prevent the People from introducing new evidence outside the record of the prior proceedings. ( People v. Reed, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 226.) Noticing the appellate opinion for the limited purpose of proving the existence of the ... convictions certainly does not require consideration of facts beyond those necessarily adjudicated in the prior proceedings. ( People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 355.) Indeed, adoption of defendant's argument would actually frustrate another stated purpose of the holding which is to `promote[] the efficient administration of justice.' ( Ibid. ) Thus, admission of the opinion is not precluded by Guerrero and its progeny. ( People v. Harbolt, supra, 61 Cal. App.4th at pp. 127-128, review granted Oct. 15, 1997 (S063658), opn. ordered par. pub. Feb. 11, 1998. [] ) We agree with Harbolt. We see no reason to limit the record of conviction to the trial court record and to preclude reference to the appellate court record, including the appellate opinion. Indeed, the appellate record might show the conviction was no longer valid. As the Attorney General notes, it would be absurd to preclude reference to an appellate opinion to show that a conviction had been reversed or modified to a lesser, nonqualifying offense. We also see no basis for allowing one party (the defendant), but not the other party (the prosecution), to rely on the appellate opinion. As we explained in Guerrero, we allow recourse to the record of conviction, but no further, to promote the efficient administration of justice and to preclude the relitigation of the circumstances of the crime. ( People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 355.) Including the appellate opinion as part of the record of conviction promotes efficiency and does not relitigate stale factual questions. Allowing consideration of the appellate opinion makes practical sense. An opinion that either affirms, reverses, or modifies a conviction is one of the most logical sources to consider in determining the truth of the prior conviction allegation. The trial court record alone might be incomplete because it might not include a later reversal or modification. The appellate opinion reflects what is in the trial record. Often, it will be more practical to obtain the opinion than the trial record, especially when the conviction is old and from a distant locale. The record, including transcripts, might be massive; the local authorities might be reluctant to part with it even temporarily; the cost of copying it might be prohibitive; and the prosecution might not be able to send an investigator to a foreign jurisdiction like North Carolina to seek and examine it. Additionally, the record might have been destroyed during the many years that sometimes elapse between the finality of a conviction and its use in California. Obtaining the opinion, which reflects the trial record, might be easy, while obtaining the actual trial record might be impractical or even impossible. The Court of Appeal here found that the opinion was not part of the record of conviction (but was admissible to corroborate or explain that record). One reason it gave is that an appellate opinion is not always reliable to establish a foreign prior. The author of an appellate opinion gleans facts from the record and may characterize them so as to emphasize a point pertinent to the issues raised on appeal. Opinions gloss over or omit facts not germane or indispensable to a determination of a particular issue. For example, sentencing issues may not require a thorough recitation of the facts. The facts not contained in an opinion may be the very facts necessary to determine whether an offense qualifies as a serious or violent felony for purposes of the Three Strikes law. We find this reasoning unpersuasive. It is certainly correct that an appellate opinion might not supply all answers. A future reader of this opinion, for example, seeking to learn the facts underlying the crime of this case will seek in vain. Those facts are not relevant to the sole issue before us, so we do not include them. But because some opinions might not be probative on a given question is no reason to exclude all opinions, including those that are probative. If the appellate court did state the pertinent facts, a trier of fact is entitled to find that those statements accurately reflect the trial record. Moreover, the defendant, who suffered the conviction and took the appeal, would know of and be able to challenge any material flaws or omissions in the opinion. (The record of this case suggests the reason defendant did not challenge the appellate opinion's statement that he personally used the weapon. In a declaration filed for a different purpose in the trial court of this case (and therefore not part of the record of the North Carolina conviction), defendant specifically stated, I ... stabbed [the victim] with the scissors on his left side.) We do not hold that all appellate opinions will, alone, be sufficient to establish whether a prior conviction qualifies as a serious felony under the Three Strikes law, or even that all opinions will be relevant to the question. Rather, we hold that appellate opinions, in general, are part of the record of conviction that the trier of fact may consider in determining whether a conviction qualifies under the sentencing scheme at issue. Whether and to what extent an opinion is probative in a specific case must be decided on the facts of that case.