Opinion ID: 1458154
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Legal Cause

Text: LAA contends that even if it breached a legal duty to Kadlec, the plaintiffs' claims fail for lack of legal causation. LAA argues that legal cause is not met here because Kadlec's and Dr. Berry's intervening negligence precludes concluding that it is a legal cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Because legal cause is a legal question under Louisiana law, [26] we review the district court's conclusion as to legal cause de novo. [27] The leading case on legal cause in Louisiana is Roberts v. Benoit. [28] There, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that [t]he critical test in Louisiana . . . is phrased in terms of `the ease of association' which melds policy and foreseeability into one inquiry: Is the harm which befell the plaintiff easily associated with the type of conduct engaged in by the defendant? [29] Under Louisiana law, and with the jury's factual findings in mind, [30] the LAA defendants' actions and omissions were a legal cause of Kadlec's liability. Following the Louisiana Supreme Court, we ask ourselves whether the harm to plaintiffs is easily associated with the type of conduct engaged in by the defendant. Here, Dr. Dennis and Dr. Preau gave Dr. Berry favorable recommendations, when they knew that Dr. Berry had used narcotic drugs while on duty at a hospital. LAA even fired Dr. Berry for cause for report[ing] to work in an impaired physical, mental, and emotional state, which prevented [him] from properly performing [his] duties and put[ ][his] patients at significant risk. The harm to Jones and the harm to plaintiffs that resulted from the LAA defendants' breaches are easily associated with Kadlec's liability. In fact, harm stemming from Dr. Berry's use of narcotic drugs while on-duty is the type of harm we would expect. The LAA defendants' argument that the intervening negligence of Dr. Berry and Kadlec absolves them of liability is not accepted. Roberts held that [i]t is well settled in Louisiana law that an intervening act does not automatically absolve a prior negligent party from liability. [31] Whether an intervening act absolves a prior negligent actor from liability depends on the foreseeability of the act from the perspective of the original tortfeasor and whether the intervening act is easily associated with the risk of harm brought about by the breach of the original duty. [32] Dr. Berry's hiring and his subsequent negligent use of narcotics while on-duty was foreseeable and easily associated with the LAA defendants' actions. He had used narcotics while on-duty in the past, and the LAA defendants could foresee that he would do so again if they misled a future employer about his drug problem. The LAA defendants focus on Kadlec's negligence and claim that it was a superseding cause of plaintiffs' injuries. They argue that Kadlec had multiple warning signs that Dr. Berry was using drugs, and had it responded with an investigation, plaintiffs' injuries would have been avoided. The LAA defendants focus on Dr. Berry's erratic behavior after his return from Montana, his over-anesthetization of a patient in September 2002, and the signs that he was ill on the day of Jones's surgery. The jury found that Kadlec's own negligence was a cause of plaintiffs' financial injury. But this does not relieve the defendants of liability. The jury also reasonably concluded that the LAA defendants negligently and intentionally misled Kadlec about Dr. Berry's drug addiction. By intentionally covering up Dr. Berry's drug addiction in communications with a future employer, they should have foreseen that the future employer might miss the warning signs of Dr. Berry's addiction. This was within the scope of the risk they took. Indeed, both plaintiffs' and defendants' witnesses agreed at trial that narcotics addiction is a disease, that addicts try to hide their disease from their co-workers, and that particularly in the case of narcotics-addicted anesthesiologists, for whom livelihood and drug supply are in the same place, colleagues may be the last to know about their addiction and impairment. This is not a case where a future tortious act is so unforeseeable that it should relieve the earlier tortfeasor of liability. In fact, this case illustrates why the comparative fault system was developedso, as here, multiple actors can share fault for an injury based on their respective degrees of responsibility. [33]