Opinion ID: 804522
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Marcus’ initial command

Text: [1] A Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when the government infringes on a subjective expectation of privacy that UNITED STATES v. POPE 8213 society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The existence of a “search” is not dependent upon “the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.” Id. at 353 (majority opinion); cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012) (holding GPS tracking of car was unconstitutional, comparing the “property-based” or trespass-based approach with the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” approach to determine whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred, and holding that either may lead to the conclusion that a search occurred). [2] The government concedes that Pope had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his pockets. The question, however, is whether a command to empty one’s pockets intrudes on that reasonable expectation of privacy when the suspect does not comply with the command. We conclude it does not.1 Pope did nothing to comply with Officer Marcus’ initial command and thus nothing that was not already exposed to the public was revealed. Neither Officer Marcus nor his verbal command produced any invasion of privacy, whether based on societal expectations or physical trespass. Therefore, Officer Marcus’ initial command, without compliance, did not effect a search under the Fourth Amendment. Cf. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) 1 The district court was less than clear in its holding that the initial command was a “search which was supported by probable cause and incident to arrest.” The district court stated that Pope “makes much ado about the initial order to empty his pockets,” and that “it is clear . . . that [Pope’s] reasonable expectation of privacy evaporated once he admitted that he was in possession of marijuana. That fact, combined with the officer’s observations of defendant’s intoxicated state, created probable cause . . . .” Pope correctly points out that this language shows that the district court erroneously relied on the statements that came after the officer first told Pope that he needed to empty his pockets. This distinction is irrelevant, however, as we affirm on the alternative ground supported by the record that the initial command did not effect a search. See Washington, 969 F.2d at 755. 8214 UNITED STATES v. POPE (holding no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred when juvenile did not comply with officer’s command to halt). While this case presents a question of first impression, we conclude our decision in United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569 (1988) (en banc) is instructive. In Winsor, we held that police effected a search when they gained visual entry into a hotel room through a door that was opened at their command. Id. at 1573. The suspect in Winsor did not open his door voluntarily, but rather “in response to a claim of lawful authority.” Id. Also, the fact that the police did not physically enter the room was irrelevant; visual access to a private space was sufficient to consummate the search. Id. at 1572. [3] Winsor supports the proposition that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when police command a person to reveal something in which he would otherwise have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that thing or that area is revealed as a result of the command. Had Winsor refused to open the door, the police would not have gained access to his room by the command alone. They would have had to do something more to execute the search. In the present case, Officer Marcus’ first command for Pope to empty his pockets had the potential to become a search. However, unlike the suspect in Winsor, Pope did not comply with Officer Marcus’ command. That is, Officer Marcus’ first attempt to discover the contents of Pope’s pockets failed. Pope argues, however, that Officer Marcus’ initial command constituted a search regardless of whether he complied with the order. He relies on United States v. Chatman, 573 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1997). We are not persuaded. In Chatman, law enforcement officers stopped a suspected drug trafficker in the Seattle airport and directed him to an interview room for interrogation. Id. at 566-67. En route to the interview room, Chatman repeatedly attempted to hide a bulge in his pants’ pocket. Id. at 567. The officers ordered UNITED STATES v. POPE 8215 Chatman to empty his pockets and, when he failed to produce the item causing the bulge, they searched his pants. Id. The officers discovered narcotics in the bulging pocket. Id. On appeal, we framed the issue as “whether, at the time [Chatman] was directed to empty his pockets, there was probable cause.” Id. By framing the issue in this way, the court implied that the search began with the officers’ command to Chatman to empty his pockets. But whether the search occurred as soon as the officers commanded Chatman to empty his pockets or when the officers searched the pockets themselves was not relevant to that case. Instead, the court found that probable cause to arrest existed prior to entering the interview room and that the subsequent search of the defendant was valid because it was substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. Id. Under the court’s analysis, the precise moment that the search began was irrelevant so long as it occurred after the defendant entered the interview room and was substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. Here, in contrast, the government concedes that probable cause to arrest Pope did not exist prior to the initial command, but that it did arise prior to the second command. Therefore, unlike Chatman, it matters in this case whether Officer Marcus’ initial command effected a Fourth Amendment search. Chatman does not aid us in this inquiry because the Chatman court did not analyze or decide the issue whether the command by itself, before compliance, constituted a search. Because we conclude that Officer Marcus’ initial command for Pope to empty his pockets did not effect a search,2 there 2 The Sixth Circuit has stated that “[s]everal cases confirm that words alone may amount to a search” and that “an officer may not sidestep the requirements of the Fourth Amendment by directing a suspect to ‘empty your pockets,’ then disclaim any constitutional violation on the ground that he verbally directed the suspect without touching or in any way searching him.” United States v. Street, 614 F.3d 228, 233-34 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). However, none of the cases cited by the Sixth 8216 UNITED STATES v. POPE is no need to address whether it was conducted without probable cause or is excepted from the warrant requirement as a search incident to arrest. We now turn to the second command.