Opinion ID: 795895
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Qualified Immunity under State Law

Text: 46 The district court held that because state law governs a defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity with respect to state-law claims, see Napolitano v. Flynn, 949 F.2d 617, 621 (2d Cir.1991) (citation omitted), and current New York law does not provide police defendants with a qualified immunity defense with respect to state-law claims, the Court may only consider the issue of qualified immunity with regard to Plaintiffs' federal-law claims. Jones, 2005 WL 928667, at  n. 8. New York law, however, does grant government officials qualified immunity on state-law claims except where the officials' actions are undertaken in bad faith or without a reasonable basis. See Blouin ex rel. Estate of Pouliot v. Spitzer, 356 F.3d 348, 364 (2d Cir.2004) (The New York courts recognize the defense of qualified immunity to shield the government official from liability unless that action is taken in bad faith or without a reasonable basis.); Arteaga v. State, 72 N.Y.2d 212, 216-17, 532 N.Y.S.2d 57, 527 N.E.2d 1194 (1988). The district court thus erred in holding the contrary. 47 Plaintiffs do not attempt to defend the district court's interpretation of New York law, but rather contend that [e]ven if the [qualified immunity] defense did apply to Plaintiffs' state claims, defendants' defense would necessarily depend on the same `reasonableness' at issue with respect to Plaintiffs' federal claims. We agree. 48 As with our determination on defendants' assertion of qualified immunity on plaintiffs' excessive force claims, we see no reason to remand where, as here, the record plainly reveals the existence of genuine issues of material fact relating to the qualified immunity defense. Hurlman, 927 F.2d at 82. New York courts are no different in this regard. Simpkin v. City of Troy, 224 A.D.2d 897, 638 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (3d Dep't 1996) (Clearly, without a factual resolution of the sharply conflicting versions of these events, it is not possible to determine whether defendants are qualifiedly immune.); Hayes v. City of Amsterdam, 2 A.D.3d 1139, 770 N.Y.S.2d 138, 141 (3d Dep't 2003) (same). 49 Plaintiffs' remaining state-law claims focus on the reasonableness of the State troopers in arresting and detaining them, including whether the defendants' actions resulted in false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault, battery or the intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The resolution of these claims rests heavily on the same facts that form the heart of the federal claims. For instance, under New York law, qualified immunity in the context of a claim of false arrest depends on whether it was objectively reasonable for the police to believe that they had probable cause to arrest. Simpkin, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 232; see also Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir.2003). This question was at the center of the district court's Fourth Amendment excessive force analysis, see Jones, 2005 WL 928667, at -, and that court's conclusions were correct: the numerous disputed material facts precluded the grant of qualified immunity. This analysis also applies to, and controls, the qualified immunity questions presented under New York law. 50 Because the remaining state-law claims present similar unresolved issues, we need not remand the state-law qualified immunity question here. 51