Opinion ID: 1941980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: extent of the abrogation

Text: We now focus our attention on the extent to which the Doctrine should be abrogated. Amicus curiae briefs advocating various theories were filed. This Court must, however, confine its ruling to the case presently before it. Our decision to abrogate the Doctrine applies to any injury which is negligently caused. [11] Accordingly, we overrule Alfree and abrogate the Doctrine. [12] For the most part, interspousal lawsuits typically are initiated when the tortfeasor has sufficient insurance coverage to provide for the damages. From this fact, Wife argues that the Doctrine should be abrogated only to the extent that liability insurance coverage protects the negligent spouse. Under this theory, a negligent spouse is immune from tort liability for damages in excess of his or her liability insurance coverage. One reason for the limit is that it avoids the problem of one spouse executing on marital property to satisfy an excess judgment. In the absence of a statute, the Court finds no reason to limit suits between married persons to insurance coverage while imposing no restrictions upon other suits. Also, making insurance coverage the limit on liability may have the practical effect of leaving the injured spouse far from compensated for his or her suffering. In the present case, the Husband was covered by substantial insurance, but in cases where the tortfeasor spouse has very little or no insurance, the injured spouse will be limited to recovering insufficient damage awards or no award at all. Having concluded that the Doctrine is no longer based on sound public policy grounds, this Court should not retain restrictions that would have the effect, at least in some instances, of preserving the Doctrine. In our view, it is not appropriate to deny or limit a right based upon the existence of insurance coverage. In addition, although the present case involves the rule of interspousal immunity for negligence rather than an intentional tort, it is reasonable to conclude that there is no logical or legal reason for drawing a distinction between the two. Klein v. Klein, Cal.Supr., 58 Cal.2d 692, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 103, 376 P.2d 70, 71 (1962). We realize that marital harmony is lacking where spouses intentionally harm one another. There is logic to the argument that, in cases where the parties have since divorced, there is little, if any, justification for barring an injured spouse from suing for intentional torts as well. [13] The case before us is a negligence case, however, and the intentional tort case is not before us. Nevertheless, it appears that the rationale underlying the abrogation of the Doctrine in the context of negligence actions would apply to intentional torts. [14] As a separate issue, the parties requested permission to submit supplemental briefs addressing the question whether abrogation of the Doctrine would require a modification of the evidentiary rules, specifically Delaware Rule of Evidence (D.R.E.) 411. D.R.E. 411 provides: Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. Husband's argument that some modification to customary trial practice should be made in suits between spouses fails because it is based solely on the assumption of a high risk of collusion between spouses. D.R.E. 411 specifically provides that the rule does not require the evidence of insurance against liability be excluded when offered to show bias or prejudice of a witness. Thus, collusion issues are contemplated by the rule in its current form. As previously stated, the risk of collusion is not unique to interspousal litigation. In addition, empirical evidence shows that fears of rapidly increasing collusive suits due to the abrogation of the Doctrine are unfounded. None of the states which have abrogated the Doctrine have reinstated it. Shearer v. Shearer , Oh.Supr., 18 Ohio St.3d 94, 97, 18 OBR 129, 131, 480 N.E.2d 388, 393 (1985).