Opinion ID: 2388854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wrongful Sale

Text: The jury also returned a verdict of $1,000 for the wrongful sale of Smith's automobile by Franklin. Franklin does not, on appeal, contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's conclusion that Smith was not afforded statutory notice prior to the sale. It does, however, contest the introduction of the checkbook stub as bearing upon this verdict. One element of Smith's damages was his equity in the automobile. The improperly admitted evidence tended to prove that Smith's debt was less than alleged by Franklin and that, therefore, Smith's equity was greater. The introduction of this evidence did not, however, prejudice Franklin with respect to the wrongful sale verdict. Excluding all evidence with respect to the payment assertedly demonstrated by the checkbook stub, Smith's evidence tended to show that he had made twenty-nine of the thirty-six payments of $139.41that, in other words, $975.87 was unpaid. As Smith's counsel properly argued to the jury, Smithwhether in default or notwas entitled by reason of the wrongful sale to his equity in the automobile, i.e., its value less any debt owed upon it. D.C.Code 1973, § 28:9-507(1). See Neumeyer v. Union Bank, 43 Cal.App.3d 873, 118 Cal.Rptr. 116 (1974); Farmers State Bank v. Otten, 87 S.D. 161, 204 N.W.2d 178 (1973). The difference ($1,024.13) between the value of the automobile (testified by Smith to be $2,000) [2] and the value of seven payments ($975.87) fully supports the verdict of $1,000 for wrongful sale even if we assume that the full amount of each payment represented principal. [3] Franklin further argues that the verdict for wrongful sale cannot stand in conjunction with a verdict for wrongful repossession. In this case, we agree. The verdicts under each count were necessarily based upon the same evidence of damage, the value of Smith's equity in the automobile. [4] We need not consider, therefore, whether, in another case, liability for wrongful repossession might produce damages different from those for liability for wrongful sale with the result that the damages proved under each count would be complimentary rather than duplicative. It is elementary that damages for the same injury may be recovered only once, even though recoverable under two theories or for two wrongs, for a plaintiff is not entitled to be made more than whole unless punitive damages are warranted. Morrissette v. Boiseau, D.C.Mun.App., 91 A.2d 130, 131-32 (1952). See Robie v. Ofgant, 306 F.2d 656, 660 (1st Cir. 1962); Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1960); Muise v. Abbott, 60 F.Supp. 561, 562 (D.Mass.1945), aff'd, 160 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1947) (In the absence of circumstances warranting the allowance of exemplary damages, the court will not allow a plaintiff to recover more than one satisfaction in damagesenough to put him in status quo.); Burke v. Burnham, 97 N.H. 203, 84 A.2d 918, 922 (1951); Industrial Supply Co. v. Goen, 58 N.M. 738, 276 P.2d 509, 513 (1954). Recovery of the equity for wrongful sale necessarily assumes that the same equity has not already been recovered under another count. In this case we have held that there must be a new trial as to the wrongful repossession count. The verdict for wrongful repossession, therefore, does not now stand in duplication of the verdict for wrongful sale, and the latter verdict must be approved. Since, however, on retrial Smith might obtain a verdict on the wrongful repossession count, and since such a verdict would be inconsistent with the verdict now approved, Smith must, on remand, elect whether to accept the verdict on the wrongful sale count as his entire recovery or to retry both countsbearing in mind that he can recover his equity only once.