Opinion ID: 172187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: James Hearing

Text: Aguilera-Meza states that he “timely demanded a [James] hearing . . . , [and that the district court’s decision to] proceed without a [James] hearing 14 compromised [his] right to due process.” Aplt. Br. at 34. We reject this argument for several reasons. First, it does not appear that Aguilera-Meza “timely” requested a James hearing. Aguilera-Meza did not file a motion requesting a James hearing. Instead, Aguilera-Meza’s reference to a James hearing appears in a paragraph of a motion in limine filed the day before the start of trial. R. Vol. I Doc. 332, at 3 (“For that purpose, the defendant would be entitled to a James hearing in advance of the proposed testimony.”). Even if we were to construe Aguilera-Meza’s reference to a James hearing as a request for a James hearing, this request was untimely. Second, while we have reiterated “our strong preference” for James hearings when the prosecution relies on co-conspirator statements, a James hearing is not required. United States v. Gonzalez-Montoya 161 F.3d 643, 648–49 (10th Cir. 1998). In the alternative to holding a James hearing, a district court may properly admit a co-conspirator statement “by provisionally admitting the statement with the caveat that the party offering it must prove the existence of the predicate conspiracy through trial testimony or other evidence.” Id. at 649 (internal quotations and alterations omitted); Townley, 472 F.3d at 1273 (identifying both alternatives). The trial court retains some discretion in choosing between these alternatives. United States v. Urena, 27 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1994). 15 Aguilera-Meza does not contend that the district court erred in its provisional admission of the co-conspirator testimony. 3 Further, Aguilera-Meza does not specifically identify to which co-conspirator statements he objects, offering only the conclusory statement, “[t]he testimony of both Hamideh and Minichino are replete with discussions of conversations between themselves and [Aguilera-Meza’s] wife, Veronica Moran, her father, her cousin, or [AguileraMeza’s] brothers[; s]uch statements should have been found to be hearsay, not specifically in furtherance of a money laundering conspiracy . . . .” Aplt. Br. at 34. Based on our prior analysis concluding there was sufficient evidence to support Aguilera-Meza’s money laundering convictions, we conclude that the district court’s decision to not conduct a James hearing did not prejudice Aguilera-Meza. Aguilera-Meza also argues that the admission of the co-conspirator statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). We explicitly rejected similar arguments in Townley. 472 F.3d at 1273 (“We find no merit to Appellant’s unfounded and unsupported contention that Crawford’s instruction on testimonial hearsay somehow eviscerated Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), especially since Rule 801(d)(2)(E) treats declarations by coconspirators not as an exception to the 3 In his reply brief, Aguilera-Meza asserts, without support or citation, that “the Government . . . was permitted wholesale to inquire of multiple witnesses about bad conduct, not eventually tied to [Aguilera-Meza].” Aplt. Reply Br. at 6. 16 hearsay rules, but as nonhearsay.”).