Opinion ID: 2654518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Supervisory control under Title VII

Text: In Ellerth, the Supreme Court explained that a harasser may be considered 3 Whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive is not disputed on appeal. -16- a supervisor if he or she possesses some amount of actual or apparent authority over the employee. 524 U.S. at 759, 761. But the Court did not specify exactly how much authority a harasser had to have (or appear to have) to qualify as a supervisor, and the circuits were split in answering that question. 4 While Ms. Kramer’s appeal was pending before this court, the Supreme Court resolved that circuit split in Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443. The Court held that a “supervisor” under Title VII is an employee whom “the employer has empowered . . . to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a ‘significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 4 The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits held that a supervisor for Title VII purposes is one who has the power to direct the plaintiff’s daily work activities. See Mack v. Otis Elevator Corp., 326 F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 2003); Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 245 (4th Cir. 2010); Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 940 (9th Cir. 2011). The First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, by contrast, defined supervisor more narrowly to refer only to someone with the power to take tangible employment actions – such as hiring, firing, demoting, promoting, transferring, or disciplining the victim. See Noviello v. City of Bos., 398 F.3d, 76, 95-96 (1st Cir. 2005); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., 163 F.3d 1027, 1034-1035 (7th Cir. 1998); Weyers v. Lear Operations Corp., 359 F.3d 1049, 1057 (8th Cir. 2004). We appear to have taken a hybrid approach finding supervisor status in a harasser who was “in charge of delegating duties and assigning work to plaintiff,” but who was also “involved in the disciplinary process.” Harrison v. Eddy Potash Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1016 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Rubidoux v. Colo. Mental Health Inst., 173 F.3d 1291, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[Supervisor] could not alone make hiring and firing decisions, [but] interviewed both plaintiffs, and his recommendation was ‘quite possibly’ the sole basis for their hiring . . . . [He] set schedules, granted leave, conducted performance reviews, and could initiate hearings to formally consider employee performance.”). -17- significant change in benefits.’” Id. (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761). Importantly, however, the Court explained that an employee need not be empowered to take such tangible employment actions directly to qualify as a supervisor. A manager who works closely with his or her subordinates and who has the power to recommend or otherwise substantially influence tangible employment actions, and who can thus indirectly effectuate them, also qualifies as a “supervisor” under Title VII. Id. at 2452. The holding in Vance is consistent with the Court’s decision in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). There the Court held that employers could be liable for tangible employment actions influenced by a biased subordinate, even though the final decisionmaker was unbiased. Staub reasoned that to hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of employment discrimination laws. An employer’s authority to reward, punish, or dismiss is often allocated among multiple agents. The one who makes the ultimate decision does so on the basis of performance assessments by other supervisors. [Defendant’s] view would have the improbable consequence that if an employer isolates a personnel official from an employee’s supervisors, vests the decision to take adverse employment actions in that official, and asks that official to review the employee’s personnel file before taking the adverse action, then the employer will be effectively shielded from discriminatory acts and recommendations of supervisors that were designed and intended to produce the adverse action. Id. at 1192-93 (emphasis in original). The Court applied the same logic in Vance when it defined supervisor for -18- Title VII purposes, explaining that an employer who “concentrates all decisionmaking authority in a few individuals[] . . . likely will not isolate itself from heightened liability under Faragher and Ellerth.” 133 S. Ct. at 2452. This is so, the Court explained, because when the individuals vested with actual decisionmaking power do not interact regularly with the employee, they will “have a limited ability to exercise independent discretion when making decisions and will likely rely on other workers who actually interact with the affected employee. Under those circumstances, the employer may be held to have effectively delegated the power to take tangible employment actions to the employees on whose recommendations it relies.” Id. We recently emphasized that the decisionmaker’s reliance on a subordinate’s biased recommendation must be an “uncritical” reliance, with no independent verification of the asserted reason for the proposed employment action. Lobato v. N.M. Env’t Dep’t, 733 F.3d 1283, 1294 (10th Cir. 2013). The definition of “supervisor” handed down in Vance relies on another Title VII term of art: “tangible employment action.” Whoever can take or substantially influence tangible employment actions is a “supervisor.” Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2448, 2452. While economic injury is almost always sufficient to create a tangible employment action, it is not always necessary. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 (“A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm.” (emphasis added)). For that reason, a tangible employment action can -19- include not just the obvious firing or demoting, but also giving an employee “a less distinguished title [or actions resulting in] a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.” Id. at 761 (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, neither “a bruised ego” nor a demotion without a concurring change in pay, benefits, duties, or prestige is enough. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a tangible employment action requires some sort of “official act of the enterprise, a company act.” Id. at 762. “Often, the supervisor will use the company’s internal processes and thereby obtain the imprimatur of the enterprise. Ordinarily, the tangible employment decision is documented in official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level supervisors.” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 144-45 (2004) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). One common sense test that can illuminate whether a given harm is a tangible employment action is to ask whether a co-worker could have inflicted the same harm as easily. If the answer is yes, then the harm is not a tangible employment action. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 (explaining that “[a] co-worker can break a co-worker’s arm as easily as a supervisor, and anyone who has regular contact with an employee can inflict psychological injuries by his or her -20- offensive conduct . . . ,” but a co-worker can only cause his victim to be fired or demoted by means of an “elaborate scheme . . .”); see also Rubidoux, 173 F.3d at 1296 (tangible employment actions are things “an harassing co-worker cannot do”). In sum, if Sergeant Benson had or appeared to have the power to take or substantially influence tangible employment actions and used the threat of taking such actions to subject Ms. Kramer to a hostile work environment, then the County is vicariously liable for his severe or pervasive sexual harassment, subject to the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2448. Viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Kramer, we have determined there are fact questions as to whether Sergeant Benson had the power to recommend and influence tangible employment actions against Ms. Kramer, and whether under apparent authority principles Ms. Kramer was reasonable in believing Sergeant Benson had such powers even if he in fact did not. In the following subsections, we do not consider whether Sergeant Benson actually took such actions but only whether he may have had the power to do so. 1. As Ms. Kramer’s direct supervisor, Sergeant Benson completed her performance evaluations and made recommendations regarding her employment status. It is undisputed that Sergeant Benson was Ms. Kramer’s direct manager, that he was the sole person responsible for writing her performance evaluations, -21- and that those evaluations could cause her to be promoted, demoted, or fired. 5 Moreover, the County characterized Sergeant Benson as Ms. Kramer’s supervisor. 6 It is further undisputed that while the Sheriff was officially the only person who could fire employees, Sergeant Benson could recommend to the Sheriff that any of his supervisees be fired. Sergeant Benson’s responsibility to “document noteworthy . . . behaviors of employees” was explicitly defined by the County as potentially affecting his subordinates’ “job advancement, rewards, discipline and discharge.” 7 Aple. Supp. App. at 229. Sergeant Benson could also create a “corrective action” plan for a supervisee such as Ms. Kramer, if he determined her performance was “substandard,” which might include “reassignment[,] . . . transfer, . . . or separation.” Id. at 122-23. We accept arguendo the County’s argument that the Sheriff, not Sergeant Benson, was the 5 “Q: Who was in charge of Camille Kramer’s evaluation? A: It would have been Rick Benson.” Aple. App. at 163 (Van Wagoner Dep.); Aplt. App. at 176 (performance evaluation of Kramer signed by Benson). 6 The Sheriff’s Office Policies and Procedures Manual stated that the position of sergeant is “generally supervisory.” Aplt. App. at 83. When asked whether Sergeant Benson was considered a supervisor, Undersheriff Todd Bonner replied “[y]es.” Id. at 160. When asked who Sergeant Benson supervised, Undersheriff Bonner replied: “Camille.” Id. 7 The Wasatch County Personnel Policy stated that “[i]t is the responsibility of elected officials, department heads and immediate supervisors to properly, and in a timely manner, document noteworthy or critical incident behaviors of employees. Such records may be used to support decisions which affect employee status related to job advancement, rewards, discipline and discharge.” Aple. Supp. App. at 229 (emphasis added). -22- “department head,” but it is undisputed that Sergeant Benson was considered a “supervisor” in the rank hierarchy. 8 These designations are relevant because while the County policy manual refers to some forms of discipline as being done by the “department head,” see, e.g., Aple. Supp. App. at 122 (“Suspension: The department head/elected official may suspend . . . .”), 9 department heads or “supervisors” are referred to with regard to other types of discipline, see, e.g., id. (“Corrective Action: . . . 1. The department head/elected official/supervisor shall discuss the substandard performance with the employee in an attempt to discover the reasons for such performance and to plan an appropriate solution.” (emphasis added)). In the latter category, the listed “[a]ppropriate corrective actions” include “closer supervision, training, referral for personal counseling, reassignment or transfer, use of appropriate level career counseling, or separation.” Id. (emphasis added). The manual also says that “[d]uring the implementation of corrective action, the department head/elected 8 See Aple. Supp. App. at 15, referring to sergeants: “[t]his position is generally supervisory.” 9 In her deposition, Ms. Kramer argued with defense counsel as to whether “department head” meant Sheriff or Sergeant Benson. Aple. Supp. App. at 13 (Q: Who was the department head? A: “The department head was Rick Benson. He was in charge of our department. That’s how I would read that . . . . Q: You don’t believe that department head refers to the sheriff’s department, so that would be the sheriff? A: No.”) Even if the County is correct that “department head” referred to the Sheriff, whether Ms. Kramer was reasonable in thinking “department head” referred to Sergeant Benson in the context of bailiffs – or whether the term and the policy are ambiguous–are questions properly considered under our apparent authority analysis, infra. -23- official/supervisor shall frequently evaluate and document the employee’s progress.” Id. at 122-23. This entry reinforces the likelihood that Sergeant Benson had the power to influence or recommend tangible employment actions – he could “plan an appropriate solution” including “reassignment or transfer” or “separation,” and he could likely influence other tangible employment actions by means of “frequent[] evaluat[ion] and document[ation]” of an employee’s compliance with a corrective plan – all this after having first decided that an employee’s performance was “substandard.” Id. In addition, the Sheriff’s Department’s own policy manual included a section called “Disciplinary Measures.” Id. at 14. One type of disciplinary measure referred to is “Relief of Duty,” which occurs “in cases where a supervisor finds it necessary . . . .” Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added). That section indicates that the Sheriff would determine whether relief of duty was with or without pay, but apparently the “supervisor” could decide in the first instance whether one of his subordinates would be relieved from duty. In addition, bailiffs worked at the justice court instead of the Sheriff’s office and the record is unclear as to when, if ever, the Sheriff personally worked with Ms. Kramer or directly supervised her work as a bailiff. Where an harasser is empowered to effect significant changes in employment status indirectly through recommendations, performance evaluations, and the like, and where the person with final decision-making power does not work directly with the plaintiff, -24- the harasser may be a “supervisor” under Title VII. See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452; see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 (approvingly citing Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990), in which “supervisor did not fire plaintiff; rather, the Career Path Committee did, but the employer was still liable because the committee functioned as the supervisor’s ‘cat’s-paw’”). In contrast to a coworker who can only cause a demotion or a pay cut through “some elaborate scheme,” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762, a supervisor who lacks the direct power to impose tangible employment consequences can accomplish the same easily, without scheming, if the employer has “effectively delegated” the power to make those decisions to him by empowering him to evaluate his supervisees and then relying on his recommendations. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452; see also id. at 2434 n.8 (explaining that the harasser in Faragher would be considered a supervisor because his recommendations were highly influential); see also Lobato, 733 F.3d at 1294-95 (employer is liable if the employer relied on facts from biased subordinate in deciding to take tangible employment action). On the record before us, Ms. Kramer has raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Wasatch County Sheriff’s Department effectively delegated to Sergeant Benson the power to cause tangible employment actions regarding Ms. Kramer by providing for reliance on recommendations from sergeants such as Benson when making decisions regarding firing, promotion, demotion, and reassignment. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452. Ms. Kramer is not required to establish -25- that the Sheriff would follow Sergeant Benson’s recommendations blindly. Even if the Sheriff undertook some independent analysis when considering employment decisions recommended by Sergeant Benson, Sergeant Benson would qualify as a supervisor so long as his recommendations were among the proximate causes of the Sheriff’s decision-making. See Lobato, 733 F.3d at 1294-95; Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1193. 2. Apparent authority principles Even if it is determined that Sergeant Benson lacked the actual supervisory authority described above, he could still qualify as a supervisor under apparent authority principles. “In the usual case, a supervisor’s harassment involves misuse of actual power, not the false impression of its existence.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. But “in the unusual case,” apparent authority can suffice to make the harasser a supervisor for Title VII purposes, so long as the “the victim’s mistaken conclusion [is] a reasonable one.” Id. The district court held that no apparent authority existed because Ms. Kramer was unreasonable as a matter of law in believing that Sergeant Benson had the power to fire her. As we have explained, however, firing is not the only kind of tangible employment action that can make one a supervisor. Apparent authority exists where an entity “has created such an appearance of things that it causes a third party reasonably and prudently to believe that a second party has the power to act on behalf of the first [party].” Bridgeport -26- Firemen’s Sick & Death Ben. Ass’n v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 735 F.2d 383, 388 (10th Cir. 1984). We have recognized that “the question of apparent authority is usually considered a question of fact.” Id. One relevant fact question is how much power the principal has actually given to the agent. R ESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF A GENCY § 3.03, cmt. c (2006). Thus, where the principal (Wasatch County) has given the agent (Sergeant Benson) some amount of power, it might be reasonable for the third party (Ms. Kramer) to believe that the agent has other types of related powers even if the agent actually does not. Id. Comparing Sergeant Benson with the harassers in Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1034-35, illustrates this principle. The plaintiff in Parkins was a dump-truck driver whose job was to haul materials and debris to and from construction sites. Id. at 1031. Her harassers were two foremen who were sometimes present at some of the sites. Id. at 1032-33. The plaintiff “did not work exclusively at the same sites at which [the harassers] worked. Rather, she worked with approximately ten foremen at various sites.” Id. at 1034. Nor did she work sideby-side with the harassers because she was usually driving a truck. Id. The powers wielded by the harassers, “[a]t most, [consisted of] . . . tell[ing] [plaintiff] where to dump or pick up a load.” Id. The harassers’ “authority was so limited that they did not assign employees to particular sites and could not require Parkins’ presence on a job site.” Id. They certainly did not have the power to -27- evaluate the plaintiff. Nor did the employer in Parkins consider the harassers to be the plaintiff’s supervisors in any sense. 10 Because the harassers enjoyed no “more than minimal authority, and exercised almost no control over truck drivers [such as the plaintiff],” the Seventh Circuit held that no reasonable person would have believed they had sufficient authority to qualify as supervisors and thus no apparent authority existed. Id. at 1035. Every relevant fact missing in Parkins is present here. The Sheriff considered Sergeant Benson to be Ms. Kramer’s supervisor. The Sergeant worked at the same site with Ms. Kramer every day, where he was Ms. Kramer’s only immediate manager. The County assigned to Sergeant Benson the tasks of telling Ms. Kramer what to do every day, evaluating her performance, and reporting on her performance to higher management. Because of the authority given to him by the County, Sergeant Benson could assign Ms. Kramer to distinctly different tasks in different locations: he could assign her to the magnetometer, give her road training, assign her to courtrooms, or order her to transfer prisoners. Sergeant Benson could also decide what days she worked and whether and when she got vacation or sick leave. The harassers in Parkins had no input into the plaintiff’s 10 Compare Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1034-35 (“Civil Constructors President and EEO Officer Bruce Helm also testified about the limited authority of foremen: Q. Is the foreman ever considered the immediate supervisor? A. No.”), with Aplt. App. at 160 (Deposition of Undersheriff Todd Bonner: “Q: Was [Sergeant Benson] considered a supervisor? A: Yes. Who did he supervise? A: Camille [Kramer].”). -28- performance evaluations, assignments, or leave days and, unlike Sergeant Benson, were not specifically assigned to evaluate and make recommendations about the plaintiff. Under the circumstances here, given the County’s and the Sheriff’s manuals, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Ms. Kramer was reasonable in believing that Sergeant Benson had additional powers – such as the power to transfer, discipline, demote, or fire her. Cf. id. A jury is especially likely to conclude such beliefs were reasonable because Sergeant Benson repeatedly told Ms. Kramer he did in fact possess such powers: Q: Could he have fired you? A: Yes. Q: What makes you think he could have fired you? A: He told me. He reminded me of that on a daily basis. Q: Are you aware that in the sheriff’s policies and procedures manual that the only person that could do the terminations is the sheriff? A: I’m not aware of that. Q: What about promotions? Could he give you a promotion? A: Yes. Q: What about a demotion, do you feel he could give you a demotion? A: Yes. Q: You’re not aware of the policies and procedures manual, I take it, that only the sheriff can have control over that? A: I’m not aware of that, no. Aplt. App. at 62-63 (emphasis added) (Kramer Dep.). For all of these reasons, whether Sergeant Benson qualifies as a “supervisor” under apparent authority principles is a fact issue that precludes summary judgment on Sergeant Benson’s “supervisor” status.