Opinion ID: 2774437
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clarification of the Judgment

Text: [¶7] Dexter first argues that the court erred by clarifying the spousal support provisions of the judgment and, as part of that clarification, by construing “retirement earnings” to include income in addition to his USPS and USAF retirement benefits.4 2 Patricia argues that Dexter’s appeal was untimely because it was not filed within 21 days of the date the court issued its clarification order. See M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3). The parties, however, treated the clarification issue as a component of the motion to modify. Consequently, an appeal from the clarification order would have been interlocutory because the motion to modify had not been fully adjudicated. See M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1). 3 After the court denied Dexter’s motion to modify, Patricia filed a motion to enforce the support obligation. Following a hearing held in May 2014, the court granted the motion, finding that Dexter was in arrears “simply [because of] his failing to budget realistically” and “choices that needlessly impair his ability to keep current” in the support payments owed to Patricia. The court entered judgment against Dexter for the amount of the arrearage and attorney fees, and ordered that income be withheld from his SSD benefits and his USAF and USPS retirement payments. Dexter has not appealed that order. 4 This appears to be a different argument than the one Dexter made to the trial court. There, Dexter argued that only money actually earned during retirement (i.e. his rental income) should be considered “retirement earnings,” but then said “at the very height” the definition might also include his USPS retirement benefits. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erroneously expanded the definition of “retirement earnings” to include Social Security benefits, rental income, and labor, rather than just income that he had “coming to him from his various retirement plans and pensions.” Therefore, because he has changed his position regarding whether his rental income, income from other labor, and USPS and USAF benefits should be included in the definition of retirement earnings, his only consistent argument is that Social Security benefits should be excluded from that term. Because we affirm the court’s clarification order on its merits, however, we need not reach the question of whether Dexter preserved his argument that income and benefits other than Social Security should be excluded from the definition of “retirement earnings.” 6 [¶8] In order to determine whether the court’s clarification of the divorce judgment was erroneous, we use a two-part test. First, we determine “whether the prior judgment was ambiguous as a matter of law.” Thompson v. Rothman, 2002 ME 39, ¶ 6, 791 A.2d 921 (quotation marks omitted). This is a de novo determination that centers on whether the language at issue is “reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.” Burnell v. Burnell, 2012 ME 24, ¶ 6, 40 A.3d 390 (quotation marks omitted). If the judgment is ambiguous, then “the court has the inherent and continuing authority” to clarify the judgment, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 582 A.2d 976, 977 (Me. 1990), and we consider, using an abuse of discretion standard, whether the clarification “is consistent with its language read as a whole and is objectively supported by the record.” Thompson, 2002 ME 39, ¶¶ 6-7, 791 A.2d 921. Where, as here, the judge who clarified the judgment is also the judge who initially issued the judgment, we give particular deference to the clarification because “it is the intention of the court that issued the judgment originally that is controlling.” Id. ¶ 8. [¶9] Here, for two reasons, the court did not err in issuing the order clarifying the judgment. First, because Dexter agreed that the court should issue an order clarifying the meaning of “retirement earnings,” he has waived his contrary argument that it was improper for the court to issue an order of clarification. See Foster v. Oral Surgery Assocs., P.A., 2008 ME 21, ¶ 22, 940 A.2d 1102. 7 [¶10] Second, a de novo examination of the phrase “retirement earnings” reveals that it is ambiguous. That language can reasonably be construed to mean all income that Dexter receives during retirement, regardless of its source or the reason why he is entitled to receive it. Alternatively, it could mean a smaller universe of benefits, such as benefits that Dexter receives because of his past employment. Even that more narrow view of “retirement earnings” is ambiguous because, in addition to retirement benefits paid through Dexter’s former employers, it may or may not include governmental benefits such as Social Security, which are also based on Dexter’s employment history. We therefore conclude that the language in the judgment is ambiguous as a matter of law and that the court did not err by clarifying that language. [¶11] The court’s construction of the term “retirement earnings” to mean “all money paid to or received by” Dexter following his retirement, including SSD and rental income, was also not erroneous. [¶12] The court’s order did not set out its analysis or findings of fact, but because neither party moved for the issuance of findings or conclusions, we assume that the court made the findings and conclusions necessary to support its decision. See Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME 139, ¶ 23, 955 A.2d 202. The spousal support ordered in the judgment was clearly intended to be general support, because its evident purpose was “to provide financial assistance to a spouse with 8 substantially less income potential than the other spouse so that both spouses can maintain a reasonable standard of living after the divorce.” 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A) (2014); see also Miele v. Miele, 2003 ME 113, ¶ 10, 832 A.2d 760 (holding that the purpose of general spousal support is “to provide maintenance and support for the future needs of the payee spouse” (quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, in its order denying the motion to modify, the court confirmed that the purpose of spousal support in this case was to allow Patricia “to maintain a reasonable standard of living which would be comparable to the reasonable standard of living [Dexter] should be able to arrange to maintain.” Particularly given the long duration of their marriage, the court’s broad construction of the term “retirement earnings” is consistent with its original objective, reflected in the judgment, of providing Patricia with a meaningful amount of ongoing support for the rest of her life unless and until she were to remarry. [¶13] If the definition of “retirement earnings” were as limited as Dexter contends, it would exclude significant sources of income that he would become eligible to receive, and the amount of support that Patricia would receive as a percentage of Dexter’s total income would be materially reduced following his retirement. Any such exclusion would artificially deprive Patricia of the material support necessary to maintain a reasonable standard of living, and it would disproportionately and unfairly work to Dexter’s financial benefit by protecting 9 certain sources of income from the support calculation. See Sorey v. Sorey, 1998 ME 217, ¶ 13, 718 A.2d 568 (holding that it is proper for the court to consider “justice or fairness” in determining the amount of spousal support). For that reason, the court was entitled to conclude that the judgment should not be construed to exclude from the support calculation several potentially important sources of income and benefits that Dexter might receive after he retired. The court’s conclusion is therefore consistent with and supported by the provisions of the divorce judgment. [¶14] Additionally, although the question presented here involves spousal support, some guidance may be drawn from an analogous statute governing child support, which defines “earnings” in part as compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus or otherwise, and specifically includes periodic payments pursuant to pension or retirement programs, or insurance policies of any type, . . . and unemployment compensation benefits and workers’ compensation benefits. 19-A M.R.S. § 2101(6) (2014). This statutory definition includes all of the types of income that the court included in the definition of “retirement earnings.” [¶15] Contrary to Dexter’s argument, the court did not err by failing to separately consider the parties’ own intentions about the meaning of “retirement earnings.” During the conference where the parties addressed the issue of 10 clarification, Dexter did not request an opportunity to present evidence on that issue. Further, any such request would have been futile because in construing a judgment, even one that is predicated on the parties’ written settlement agreement, the dispositive inquiry is the court’s intention and not that of the parties. See Wardwell v. Wardwell, 458 A.2d 750, 752 (Me. 1983). Here, particularly because the same judge issued and then clarified the original judgment, the court properly examined the judgment on its own terms without considering the parties’ intent. See Thompson, 2002 ME 39, ¶ 8, 791 A.2d 921. [¶16] Dexter also argues that the court’s construction of the phrase “retirement earnings” constitutes a material alteration of the original support order and is therefore erroneous. The court’s clarification, however, was not a change to the spousal support provision of the judgment; it merely clarified the meaning of that provision to make it more precise. Consequently, it did not exceed the scope of the court’s authority. Cf. Corcoran v. Marie, 2011 ME 14, ¶ 17, 12 A.3d 71. [¶17] Therefore, the court did not err when it clarified the spousal support provisions of its own judgment, because the clarification was consistent with the judgment as a whole and supported by the record.