Opinion ID: 884140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the District Court err in denying Sidmore's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction related to the use by the State of his 1990 BAC conviction and his 1988 Idaho DUI conviction, for felony enhancement, because those convictions were expunged?

Text: Sidmore was charged and convicted of felony DUI, fourth offense, pursuant to § 61-8-714, MCA (1995), which provides in pertinent part: (4) On the fourth or subsequent conviction, the person is guilty of a felony offense and shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than 1 year or more than 10 years and by a fine of not less than$1,000 or more than $10,000.... .... (6) For the purpose of determining the number of convictions under this section, conviction means a final conviction, as defined in 45-2-101, in this state, conviction for a violation of a similar statute in another state, or a forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the defendant's appearance in court in this state or another state, which forfeiture has not been vacated. An offender is considered to have been previously convicted for the purposes of sentencing if less than 5 years have elapsed between the commission of the present offense and a previous conviction, unless the offense is the offender's fourth or subsequent offense, in which case all previous convictions must be used for sentencing purposes. If there has not been an additional conviction for an offense under this section for a period of 5 years after a prior conviction under this section, then all records and data relating to the prior conviction are confidential criminal justice information, as defined in 44-5-103, and public access to the information may only be obtained by district court order upon good cause shown. (7) For the purpose of calculating subsequent convictions under this section, a conviction for a violation of 61-8-406 also constitutes a conviction for a violation of 61-8-401. [Emphasis added.] To support the charge of felony DUI, fourth offense, pursuant to § 61-8-714, MCA (1995), the District Court counted Sidmore's two prior DUI convictions as well as his one prior BAC conviction. Sidmore argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, and, therefore, that the charge of felony DUI, fourth offense, should be dismissed. Sidmore concedes that under § 61-8-714(7), MCA (1995), both BAC and DUI convictions can be counted to determine the total number of DUI convictions a defendant has received. However, he asserts that both his 1990 BAC conviction and his 1988 Idaho DUI conviction may not be counted for the purposes of presently charging him with felony DUI, fourth offense, pursuant to § 61-8-714, MCA (1995), because these convictions should have been expunged by operation of law. Sidmore explains that under the expungement provision of § 61-8-722(6), MCA (1989), he was entitled to have his 1990 BAC conviction expunged from his record because he did not receive a subsequent BAC conviction within the five-year period following his 1990 BAC conviction. Sidmore also asserts that pursuant to the plain language of § 61-8-722(6), MCA (1989), his 1994 DUI conviction did not prevent expungement of his 1990 BAC conviction. In this same regard, Sidmore explains that under the expungement provision of § 61-8-714(5), MCA (1987), he was entitled to have his 1988 Idaho DUI conviction expunged from his Montana record because he did not receive a subsequent DUI conviction within the five-year period following his 1988 Idaho DUI conviction. Sidmore also asserts that pursuant to the plain language of § 61-8-714(5), MCA (1987), his 1990 BAC conviction did not prevent expungement of his 1988 Idaho DUI conviction. The State responds that Sidmore's expungement arguments concerning both his 1990 BAC conviction and his 1988 Idaho DUI conviction are without merit. Additionally, specifically regarding Sidmore's argument concerning the expungement of his 1988 Idaho DUI conviction, the State asserts that Sidmore did not properly preserve this argument for appeal. Therefore, the State argues that for the purposes of the sentence enhancement statute of § 61-8-714, MCA (1995), Sidmore's present offense is his fourth DUI offense. Consequently, the State asserts that the District Court properly denied Sidmore's motion to dismiss. We disagree. It is black-letter law that: [i]n the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Section 1-2-101, MCA. In this case, we need only look to and apply the plain and unambiguous language of the statutes at issue, particularly § 61-8-722(6), MCA (1989), and § 61-8-714(5), MCA (1987), to conclude that Sidmore's arguments are correct. Additionally, we note that Sidmore did raise arguments before the District Court concerning expungement, under Montana law, of both his 1990 BAC conviction and his 1988 Idaho DUI conviction from his Montana record. Therefore, we will address the merits of both expungement arguments raised under Issue 1.