Opinion ID: 2065929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Tolling of the Statute of Limitations by Filing in the Wrong Forum

Text: I additionally disagree with the majority opinion that the filing of the claim with the Health Care Office, an administrative entity, within three years of the alleged injury, tolled the general statute of limitations which relates, in the context of the present case, only to the filing of negligence claims with the courts. The majority first attempts to justify this drastic extension of our holding in Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361, 216 A.2d 723 (1966), by describing the difficulty that persons have, or may have, determining whether injuries they have received are medical injuries for purpose of determining whether it was necessary to file a claim with the Health Care Office prior to filing an action in a circuit court. The majority states: While we hold that Mrs. Swam did not incur a `medical injury,' our opinions have recognized that the phrase `medical injury' and its statutory definition are somewhat ambiguous. Ante at 539, 919 A.2d at 39. While I agree that the phrase medical injuries may give rise to some difficult judgment calls, I do not understand what such ambiguous language in a statute relating to the administrative processing of medical injuries, has to do with the clear, unambiguous, language of the general statute of limitations applicable to civil actions, i.e., § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In discussing this issue, the majority relies on Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 905 A.2d 340 (2006), in addition to the Bertonazzi case. The majority also mentions the 1880 case of Weaver v. Leiman, 52 Md. 708, for the proposition that the judicial authority can establish `certain and well-defined exception[s]. . . .' Ante at 543, 919 A.2d at 41. I do not believe that any holding in either of the three cases justifies what the Court is now doing. All three of the cases only involved actions and proceedings in strictly judicial proceedings. Bertonazzi involved the filing of a case in the wrong county, in Baltimore County when it should have been filed in Baltimore City. Christensen concerned actions conducted exclusively within the judicial branches of government. It involved no administrative agencies. In Christensen, the Court held that, with certain limitations, the filing of a class action in court might toll the running of the statute of limitations as to the putative members of the class. Weaver involved only a single court case and whether the statute of limitations applied. It, in its totality, supports the views of this concurrencenot the majority opinion. The Court held that the statute of limitations had not been tolled in that case. As specially relevant to the present case, the Court stated: The complainant could have safely brought his suit immediately after this sale, even if it would have been difficult for him to have asserted his rights before. In short, we find nothing in any, or all of these objections combined, to affect the running of limitations. Mere doubt as to the right, or difficulty in the way of its assertion, will not do. Apart from the savings and disabilities expressed in the Statute itself, there must, in order to defeat its operation, be some insuperable barrier, or some certain and well-defined exception clearly established by judicial authority. In Green v. Johnson, 3 G. & J. 394, the court expressed in very strong terms its disapproval of all attempts to remove the safeguards, and fritter away the provisions of this most important Statute, by judicial refinements and subtle exceptions, or to increase the number of interpolations or constructive innovations that have already been engrafted upon it. (Emphasis added.) Weaver, 52 Md. at 717-18. In my view, Weaver offers little, if any, support for the position the majority takes in this case. Bertonazzi appears to be the seminal case in this state for judicial attacks on the legislatively created statutes of limitations. Only eleven years after its filing, however, even this Court was reluctant to extend its holding. In Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 281 Md. 207, 378 A.2d 1100 (1977), a certification from the federal courts, we discussed the general rule of law and its application in Bertonazzi: This policy of repose has fostered a traditional rule concerning the tolling of statutes of limitation that can be fairly termed one of strict construction. Early on we adopted this rigorous stance: `The principle of law is indisputable, that when the Statute of Limitations once begins to run, nothing will stop or impede its operation.' The rule has lost little of its vitality. . . . [ S]ee McMahan v. Dorchester Fert. Co., 184 Md. 155, 160, 40 A.2d 313 (1944) (`where the Legislature has not made an exception in express words in the Statute of Limitations, the Court cannot allow any implied and equitable exception to be engrafted upon the statute merely on the ground that such exception would be within the spirit or reason of the statute.') This venerable rule, which defers to the legislative intent expressed in the statute of limitations itself, and avoids implied exceptions or strained constructions, is also applicable in cases such as the one at bar where an action filed initially within the required period fails for some technical, procedural defect falling short of a full decision on the merits. Absent a statutory provision saving the plaintiff's rights, the remedy is barred where limitations has run during the pendency of the defective suit. . . . At first blush, Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361, 216 A.2d 723 (1966), would appear to stand as authority for the broad proposition that under Maryland law the running of the limitations period is tolled by a procedurally defective action which is timely filed. This is not borne out, however, by an analysis of that case. There, suit was commenced well within the three year period of limitations, but in Baltimore County instead of Baltimore City where the defendant resided. . . . In Bertonazzi, the Court carved out a narrow exception to the traditional rule against engrafting implied exceptions upon the statute of limitations in certain situations where the sole reason for the dismissal of the prior action was improper venue. . . . Just how narrow the Bertonazzi exception was intended to be was promptly demonstrated in Burket v. Aldridge, 241 Md. 423[, 216 A.2d 910 (1966)], decided a day later. There, suit was initially filed within the required three-year period, but the sheriff's return of `mortuus est' revealed to the plaintiff that the defendant had died. Service was then made upon the personal representative within the six months required by Art. 93, § 112, but not within the three-year statute of limitations. In affirming the dismissal, we held that it was necessary for the suit to be filed `both within three years from the date of the injuries and within six months from the qualification of the personal representative.' Id. at 430, 216 A.2d 910. Bertonazzi stands alone, then, confined to the special circumstances which culminated in the filing of the suit in the wrong county. Whatever facts may have been present in Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. at 370-71, 216 A.2d 723, that moved us to relax the anti-tolling rule, they do not exist here. . . . In addition, the policy considerations on which our established rule is founded weigh heavily against any departure in this case. If, despite the absence of a saving statute, a plaintiff were permitted to toll the statute of limitations by filing suit which was later dismissed as being procedurally defective, he could effectively postpone the running of the statute for an indefinite period of time. Even the typical saving statute imposes a time restriction, usually one year, on the suspension of limitations. Arguably, appellees were on notice of Walko's claim once the motion to intervene was filed. As we have indicated, however, Walko's approach to this case was hardly one of vigilance. The statute of limitations reflects a legislative judgment of what is deemed an adequate period of time in which `a person of ordinary diligence' should bring his action. (Footnote omitted.) (Some citations omitted.) (Some emphasis added.) Walko, 281 Md. at 210-215,378 A.2d at 1101-04. Although this Court has crafted other rules that have limited the applicability of statutes of limitations, i.e., the discovery rule, it has, up until now, sought, generally, to defer to the policy created by the legislative branch, and has never, as far as I have discovered, looked to actions initiated outside the judicial branch in order to toll the running of the statute of limitations. In Gary v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 631 A.2d 429 (1993), a case in which parents were asserting that their claim for medical expenses incurred for a minor child should be joined with the child's claim in order that the statute of limitations, as to the parents' claim, would be tolled until the child reached majority, the Court stated: For reasons we now explain, in this state the parents' claim for medical expenses is not required to be joined in the same action brought by the injured minor to recover for its own personal injuries. Consequently, the assertion that the parents' claim for medical expenses may be tolled during the minority of the child by § 5-201 of the Courts Article is without merit. . . . Furthermore, by not requiring the parents' claim for medical expenses to be joined with the minor's own claim and allowing both to be tolled by § 5-201 of the Courts Article, we remain loyal to the well established principle `that where the legislature has not expressly provided for an exception in a statute of limitations, the court will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it. . . . By failing to file an action within three years of the accident, the parents' claim for all medical expenses incurred as a result of the accident prior to emancipation of the minor is barred by limitations. 332 Md. at 353-60, 631 A.2d at 436-40. In Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp. 304 Md. 615, 500 A.2d 641 (1985), a case involving the attempt to apply the continuous course of treatment rule to construction defect cases, [7] a property owner discovered a leak in a commercial building caused by a contractor. The contractor attempted to repair the leak, but was apparently unsuccessful. More than three years after the discovery of the leak the owner brought an action against the contractor. When the contractor raised the defense of limitations, the property owner argued that the period during which the contractor was attempting to repair the leak tolled the running of limitations. We said in that case: Under § 5-101 of the Courts Article, an action must be filed within three years of the date that it `accrues.' The question of when a cause of action accrues is left to judicial determination. . . . Because Huntingfield knew, or reasonably should have known of Booth's negligence in June of 1976, its cause of action accrued at that time and suit was therefore barred by the three-year limitations period under § 5-101. . . . We have long adhered to the principle that where the legislature has not expressly provided for an exception in a statute of limitations, the court will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.[ [8] ] Indeed the General Assembly has expressly provided exceptions to § 5-101 in those instances where it determined that a time limitation should be computed differently. . . . Where repairs have been held to toll limitations, courts have done so largely on principles of equitable estoppel. . . . In Maryland, however, it is well settled that equitable estoppel will not toll the running of limitations absent a showing that the defendant `held out any inducements not to file suit or indicated that limitations would not be pleaded.' The record does not disclose that Booth held out any inducements to Huntingfield not to file suit, or that it indicated in any way that limitations would not be pleaded. Nor is there any showing of an unconscionable, inequitable or fraudulent act of commission or omission by Booth upon which Huntingfield relied in delaying the initiation of its lawsuit. (Citations omitted.) Booth Glass, 304 Md. at 619-24, 500 A.2d at 642-45. There is no act by the appellee in the instant case that can be remotely construed as having misled Swam as to the applicability of the general statute of limitations. This is not a case of equitable estoppel in the first instance, but even if it were, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that the appellee in any way improperly interfered with Swam's ability to file her action in court at any time from the moment of the needle stick. We are reminded by our opinion in Hill, supra, that the purpose of the statutory scheme creating the medical arbitration statute (including its own statutes of limitation and repose) was to contain the `long-tail' effect of the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases by restricting, in absolute terms, the amount of time that could lapse between the allegedly negligent treatment of a patient and the filing of a malpractice claim related to that treatment. 304 Md. at 700, 501 A.2d at 32 (emphasis added). What the majority does in the present case is to create an extraordinary exception to the general statute of limitations by holding that the involvement of Swam with the Health Care Office under a statute designed to limit the time for the filing of certain claims, actually extends the time for the filing of a distinctly different claim in a judicial forum. For the first time, as far as I have discovered, the Court is extending a period of limitations without there being any legislatively created exception because of something that happened administratively in another branch of government. Now that the majority has crossed that line, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for this Court, in any principled fashion, to retreat back across the line when myriads of litigants who have first proceeded before any number of administrative agencies, then belatedly file claims in court, and cite to Swam as authority for the tolling of the running of the general statute of limitations. Judge HARRELL joins in this concurrence.