Opinion ID: 1889874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Obvious Danger

Text: Because both parties stipulated that Alhambra constructed the wall in accordance with the plans and specifications provided by Grist and that Alhambra had no part in the design or engineering of those architectural plans, plaintiff was required to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Grist's plans were so obviously defective that no competent contractor would have followed them in order to avoid summary disposition. It is the general rule in Rhode Island that a party opposing summary judgment has an affirmative duty to set forth, by affidavit or otherwise, specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact. Mills v. Toselli, 819 A.2d 202, 205 (R.I.2003); Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co., 705 A.2d 969, 971 (R.I.1998). However, conclusory assertions in an affidavit filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are inadequate to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and therefore do not afford a basis for reversal of a trial justice's ruling granting a motion for summary judgment. Roitman & Son, Inc. v. Crausman, 121 R.I. 958, 959, 401 A.2d 58, 59 (1979) (mem.). In this case, the only evidence plaintiff offered in response to defendant's motion for summary judgment was the affidavit of a civil engineer, Donald Dusenberry. Dusenberry's affidavit offers several general opinions, none of which is relevant to the pertinent issues in this case. Moreover, the document is conclusory and fails to set forth any facts from which a jury could find on the issues vital to plaintiff's case, namely, whether the lack of a guardrail on the retaining wall presented an obvious danger such that no competent contractor would have followed the building plans. Dusenberry's affidavit, therefore, did not present a genuine issue of material fact concerning Alhambra's liability. In addition, as the motion justice succinctly stated, Mr. Dusenberry's opinion that the need for a guardrail was `forseeable' [could] not establish a duty. Only the court can determine what constitutes a duty as a matter of law. In urging that we reverse the hearing justice, the plaintiff calls our attention to the Indiana Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Blake v. Calumet Construction Corp., 674 N.E.2d 167, 173 (Ind.1996), in which that court found that the absence of a guardrail on a construction project in itself created an adequate issue of material fact as to whether the project was left in an inherently or imminently dangerous condition. In that case, however, the evidence presented at trial indicated that the contractor had deviated from the architectural plans by failing to install the guardrail. Blake, 674 N.E.2d at 169. In addition, there was a question of fact as to whether the contractor had completed the project and turned it over to the property owner at the time of the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 170-72. Here, there is no question that the defendant built the retaining wall in accordance with the plans and specifications that the architect provided. It is also beyond dispute that Alhambra had completed its work and had fully relinquished control of the project to National Velour at the time of the plaintiff's fall. Accordingly, we reject the contention that reasoning in Blake has any application to this case. [4]