Opinion ID: 772959
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of Information

Text: 20 Allen argues that because the FDPA allows the introduction during the sentencing phase of information rather than only evidence, a jury's sentencing decision under the FDPA is inherently unreliable in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We reject this claim. The FDPA allows either party to introduce any information relevant to an aggravating or mitigating factor, regardless of its admissibility under the federal rules of evidence, but provides that the information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). Thus, not only does the statute protect a defendant from both irrelevant information and overly prejudicial information, the relaxed evidentiary standard also works to a defendant's advantage in helping to prove mitigating factors and to disprove aggravating factors. Allen's reliance on California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987), which used the term evidence rather than information in its opinion, is misplaced because the distinction between evidence and information was not at issue. We therefore reject Allen's facial challenge to the FDPA's relaxed evidentiary standard during sentencing. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204 (We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision.); Jones, 132 F.3d at 242 (holding that the [FDPA's] relaxed evidentiary standard does not impair the reliability or relevance of information at capital sentencing hearings, but helps to accomplish the individualized sentencing required by the [C]onstitution). 21