Opinion ID: 883852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: state proportionality review

Text: Article II, Section 22, of the Montana Constitution, provides that cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted. Montana may interpret this section more strictly than the United States Supreme Court interprets the federal equivalent because [s]tates are free to grant citizens greater protections based on state constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme Court divines from the United States Constitution. State v. Bullock (1995), 272 Mont. 361, 383, 901 P.2d 61, 75. As we stated in Bullock: We have chosen not to `march lock-step' with the United States Supreme Court, even when applying nearly identical language. Bullock, 272 Mont. at 384, 901 P.2d at 75. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the state court's role in death sentence review. In Cabana v. Bullock (1986), 474 U.S. 376, 106 S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded a case to the state court system to make factual findings consistent with the Eighth Amendment as mandated by Enmund. According to the Court: [I]t is the [state court], therefore, not the federal habeas corpus court, which should first provide [the defendant] with that which he has not yet had and to which he is constitutionally entitled  a reliable determination as to whether he is subject to the death penalty.... Cabana, 474 U.S. at 391, 106 S.Ct. at 699. The Court further noted that [c]onsiderations of federalism and comity counsel respect for the ability of state courts to carry out their role as the primary protectors of the rights of criminal defendants. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 391, 106 S.Ct. at 699 (citing Younger v. Harris (1971), 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669). The Supreme Court has also observed that in capital cases, as in other constitutional contexts, the states are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires. California v. Ramos (1983), 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3460, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171. It is therefore appropriate to analyze the death penalty pursuant to not only the federal constitution, but our state constitutional standards as well. This approach was undertaken by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Gerald, 549 A.2d 792. In Gerald, the issue before the court was whether a sentence of death is disproportionate for a defendant who had no intent to kill his or her victim, but rather intended only to inflict serious bodily injury, even though the injury did in fact result in death. Gerald, 549 A.2d at 811. The court first worked through the federal proportionality analysis and determined that: Defendant's conduct in this case appears (or so a jury could find) to fall within the Tison category of nonintentional murders that manifest a reckless indifference to human life. Gerald, 549 A.2d at 810. However, the court held that: The federal constitutional analysis, of course, does not end the inquiry .... . . . Resort to a state-constitutional analysis is especially appropriate in light of the fact that capital punishment is a matter of particular state interest or local concern and does not require a uniform national policy. Gerald, 549 A.2d at 810-11 (citation omitted). The Gerald Court did look to the Supreme Court for guidance where it deemed the Court's language persuasive: We sometimes look to aspects of the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis, where persuasive, for guidance in establishing principles under our state constitution. We observe at the outset that the death penalty statute must limit imposition of the penalty to what is assumed to be the small group for which it is appropriate. (Citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 310 [92 S.Ct. at 2762-63] (White, J., concurring).) We also record our agreement with the Tison Court's statement that [d]eeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful the conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished. Tison, 481 U.S. at 156, 107 S.Ct. at 1687. Gerald, 549 A.2d at 811 (citation omitted). Although we agree with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding and rationale in Enmund and the language from Tison cited by the New Jersey Court in Gerald, we do not believe that wholesale application of Tison to the Montana Constitution would sufficiently distinguish between various forms of conduct for purposes of imposing the death penalty. Montana's statute which requires proportionality review strengthens our conclusion, as does the U.S. Supreme Court's apparent inclination to further erode its holding in Enmund. As one source stated: Though [ Pulley v. Harris [6] (1984), 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29] arguably departs from the Court's previous ringing endorsement of proportionality review as a constitutional requirement, it does not contradict the language in [ Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859] indicating that proportionality review is important because it can help eliminate wanton and freakish death sentences. In addition, Pulley is not particularly important in states that, by providing statutorily mandated proportionality review, go beyond what the United States Constitution requires. Comment, A Critical Evaluation of State Supreme Court Proportionality Review in Death Sentence Cases, 73 Iowa L.Rev. 719, 725 (emphasis added). Tennessee is another state with a statutory requirement of proportionality review. In 1992 the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the issue of the proportionality of the death penalty to the crime of felony murder. State v. Middlebrooks (Tenn.1992), 840 S.W.2d 317, 335-47. Like the Gerald court, the Tennessee Supreme Court first applied the minimum standards for determining whether a sentence of death may be constitutionally imposed under the United States Constitution for felony murder by applying the Enmund/Tison analysis. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 337. The Court continued, however: These federal standards do not, however, answer the question under the state constitution.... [W]e may not impinge upon the minimum level of protection established by Supreme Court interpretations of the federal constitutional guarantee, but may impose higher standards and stronger protections than those set by the federal constitution. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 338. The Court ultimately relied on its own statutory provision to determine that its state constitution required stronger protections for felony murderers: An integral part of the death penalty statute that must be construed in pari materia is the automatic review of every death sentence by this Court. Subsection (c) of that statute enumerates our duties that include eliminating any arbitrary, excessive, or disproportionate imposition of the death penalty.... Accordingly, rather than an absolute rule of per se disproportionality, this Court has in the past relied on its statutory duty of review under [Tennessee statute] to assure that the sentence in each case is not disproportionate or excessive. We agree with that approach and with Justice Blackmun's rejection of the per se proportionality approach in his dissent in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 613-619, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2969-71, 57 L.Ed.2d 973. He observed in that connection that a sentence in felony murder should be based on evidence of a particular defendant's participation in homicide and his mens rea in regard to the homicidal act. We, therefore, reaffirm the rejection of a per se proportionality approach in favor of the required statutory proportionality review. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 339-40. Like the Tennessee court, we do not today adopt a rule that the death sentence can never be imposed on someone convicted of felony murder. What we do hold is that, pursuant to statute and the Montana Constitution, each case has to be reviewed on the basis of its unique facts to assure that the death sentence is not disproportionate to the degree of that defendant's culpability for a victim's death. We reject wholesale adoption of the Supreme Court's language in Tison because we agree that it lacks any identifiable core which provides us with a meaningful way of delineating under our own constitution between those felony murder participants who possess sufficient culpability to warrant imposition of the death penalty and those who lack any intent whatsoever to cause the death of another. We conclude that a finding of mere reckless indifference is not sufficient for imposition of the death penalty under the proportionality review required pursuant to the Montana Constitution, and that the reckless indifference standard allows courts to provide only superficial regard to a defendant's blameworthiness before imposing a punishment, which, if imposed without regard to blameworthiness, would be cruel and unusual. Furthermore, we conclude that imposition of the death penalty without a requirement that there have been some intent to kill on the part of the defendant would serve no purpose of deterrence. If a person has no intent to kill from the beginning, then the fact that he might suffer the imposition of a death penalty cannot enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799, 102 S.Ct. at 3377 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186, 96 S.Ct. at 2931). Although the deterrent purpose of the death penalty is not its only purpose ( see Enmund and Tison ), it is one factor to consider in the course of our individualized review for proportionality. After thorough review of the record in this case, we conclude, on independent state constitutional grounds, that because Vernon Kills On Top was not present when John Etchemendy was killed, did not inflict the injuries which caused his death, and because there was no reliable evidence that he intended his death  but instead evidence that he sought to avoid it  the imposition of his death sentence was disproportionate to his actual conduct, cannot withstand individualized scrutiny, and must be set aside. To the extent that State v. Vernon Kills On Top (1990), 243 Mont. 56, 793 P.2d 1273, is inconsistent with this opinion, it is reversed. Nothing in this opinion precludes the imposition of any other penalty provided by law for the crimes of which Vernon was convicted (should his conviction survive further challenge), including life in prison as provided for in §§ 45-5-102(2) and -303(2), MCA.