Opinion ID: 1725241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A. Did the trial court err in allowing the state to present the testimony of police Detective Jimmy Carruth concerning the attributes of the .45 caliber pistol?

Text: Detective Jimmy Carruth testified as to the safety features of the particular brand of .45 caliber pistol recovered from the defendant. Carruth said there were six safety features incorporated into the design of the gun. He explained that the combined safety features required the following sequence of events before the gun would shoot: You have to have a magazine, you have to have it cocked, you have to have the safety on, you have to have a round in the chamber, you have to have a squeeze on the back strap of the gun and also the trigger at one time. Carruth maintained that the pistol would not fire any other way. Cotton contends that Carruth was permitted to give improper expert opinion testimony because he was never qualified or tendered as an expert witness, and that the introduction of this testimony was a violation of Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct.Pr. 4.06 because Carruth was not listed as an expert witness. The first issue is whether Carruth's testimony constituted expert testimony or whether it was admissible as lay testimony. Lay opinions are given limited admissibility under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 701 which provides as follows: [i]f the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to the clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Lay opinion testimony must meet a two prong test; the witness must have observed the fact or had first hand knowledge, and the opinion must be helpful to the determination of the issues. Comment, M.R.E. 701. The facts reveal that Carruth clearly failed the first prong. He certainly did not witness the events which allegedly occurred between Cotton and Dillon, and he even admitted that he had not inspected the specific weapon allegedly used in the assault. The requirement of personal knowledge as a prerequisite to lay opinion testimony is absolute. Wells v. State, 604 So.2d 271, 279 (Miss. 1992). This testimony did not qualify as admissible lay opinion. [W]here, in order to express the opinion, the witness must possess some experience or expertise beyond that of the average, randomly selected adult, it is a M.R.E. 702 opinion and not a Rule 701 opinion. Sample v. State, 643 So.2d 524, 530 (Miss. 1994); see Mississippi State Hwy Comm'n v. Gilich, 609 So.2d 367, 377 (Miss. 1992) (lay opinions require no specialized knowledge); Wells, 604 So.2d at 279 (Miss. 1992) (testimony requiring particular knowledge to assist trier of fact is expert testimony). In the present case, Carruth attempted to explain to the jury the mechanical features of the brand of gun allegedly used in this incident, and he gave the opinion that the weapon would not fire unless a specific sequence of events was followed. In order to assist the jury, he was indeed required to reveal particular knowledge about the Llama .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol. We find that the testimony given by Carruth constituted expert opinion. The record reveals that Carruth was never qualified and tendered as an expert witness. It is reversible error to allow expert testimony from a witness never qualified or tendered as an expert. Roberson v. State, 569 So.2d 691, 696 (Miss. 1990). The state's failure to list Carruth as an expert witness or provide any information regarding the substance of his testimony was also a violation of Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct.Pr. 4.06. In Sample v. State, 643 So.2d 524, 530 (Miss. 1994), this Court found that the trial court erred in permitting a police officer with a narcotics task force unit to testify as to the value, normal street usage and customary packaging of marijuana because the prosecution failed to qualify and tender the officer as an expert in this area. Compare Frierson v. State, 606 So.2d 604, 607 (Miss. 1992) (police officer's opinion as to meaning of word package contained in note written to defendant inadmissible since officer was not qualified expert) with Jackson v. State, 551 So.2d 132, 142 (Miss. 1989) (statement simply regarding officer's suspicion resulting from investigation is admissible lay opinion) and Whittington v. State, 523 So.2d 966 (Miss. 1988) (introduction of expert opinion without tendering police officer as expert found to be harmless as opinion merely indicated officer was suspicious of circumstances surrounding alleged accident). Because Carruth's expert testimony in the case at hand concerned the specific safety features of the alleged assault weapon, and the entire case ultimately centered on a determination of whether the gun fired by accident, this Court concludes that this case must be reversed and remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.