Opinion ID: 1373338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Theft of Real Property

Text: Parga asserts that he was charged with theft of real estate and that real property cannot be the subject of theft. 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-4-401. [2] He contends that he could have been charged with obtaining the signature of Carl Swanson by deception in violation of 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-5-112, [3] but that the prosecutor elected to charge him with the wrong crime. Parga requests that we declare that real property is not included within the theft statute and that real property does not qualify as anything of value within the meaning of the statute. If we were to adopt Parga's theory, we would be compelled to ignore the clear intent of the legislature. In pertinent part, 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-4-401 [4] provides:  18-4-401. Theft. (1) A person commits theft when he knowingly obtains or exercises control over anything of value of another without authorization, or by threat of deception, or knowing said thing of value to have been stolen; and (a) Intends to deprive the other person permanently of the use or benefit of the thing of value. The definitional sections of the statute, as well as the history of the statute, fully answer Parga's claim that real property cannot be the subject of theft. Within the purview of the theft statute, thing of value is defined to include real property. 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, XX-X-XXXX(3)(r) (definitions governing chapter 40). [5] The legislative history of the theft law further buttresses our construction of Section 401. As reported by the Colorado Legislative Council, the Colorado theft provisions were patterned after the Illinois statutes and the Model Penal Code. Colorado Legislative Council, Colorado Criminal Law, Research Publication No. 68 at 99-100 (1962). Consequently, we look to the Illinois statutes for guidance in interpreting our theft statute. The Illinois statute provides that [a] person commits theft when he knowingly: (a) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner. Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 38, § 16-1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1970). The Illinois legislature further defined property to include real property. Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 38, § 15-1 (Smith-Hurd 1970). In addition, the Model Penal Code has taken a similar approach. Model Penal Code §§ 223(6) and 223.2(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Moreover, the Illinois legislature defined obtains control in terms which directly apply to real property and has provided: [T]he phrase `obtains or exerts control' over property, includes but is not limited to the . . . sale, conveyance, or transfer of title to, or interest in, or possession of property. Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 38, § 15-8 (Smith-Hurd 1970). The Model Penal Code has defined obtain more explicitly, although in similar terms, with the statement that: [O]btain means: (a) in relation to property, to bring about a transfer or purported transfer of a legal interest in the property, whether to the obtainer or another. Model Penal Code § 223(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Accord, Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 18, § 3921 (1973). Cf. State v. Turner, 238 N.C. 411, 77 S.E.2d 782 (1953); Commonwealth v. Meinhart, 173 Pa.Super. 479, 98 A.2d 392 (1953); State v. Nelson, 195 Tenn. 441, 260 S.W.2d 170 (1953). In view of the statutory language enacted by the Colorado legislature and the substantive bases for the theft provisions, we conclude that real property may be the subject of theft and that the defendant was correctly charged.