Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements to Probation Officer

Text: Defendant argues that counsel should have moved to suppress statements that he made to a probation officer during a presentence interview concerning an unrelated robbery conviction. As in the prior claim, he contends that the officer violated his rights to counsel and against self-incrimination, and further, that the possibility of those statements being used against him during cross-examination prevented him from testifying at trial. Had those statements been suppressed, he claims he would have testified that Dunn actually killed Huggins. To support his claimed intention to testify, defendant points to his pre-trial affidavit, in which he cited that desire as grounds for bifurcating the trial phases.
According to a presentence report, on December 20, 1992, three days after Huggins's murder, defendant approached a woman on the street, jumped in front of her, pulled out a gun, and placed it against her forehead. The victim fell in fear, and Harris threatened to kill her. An acquaintance of the victim approached in a car and yelled out, Are you alright? Harris responded that she was, and he took her purse and walked away. On January 6, 1993, the police, conducting an investigation into an unrelated sexual assault, executed a search warrant for the personal property of Harris. At that time, Harris was in a corrections facility being held on weapons charges. During their search, the police found property belonging to the December 20th robbery victim. In May, 1994, Harris was convicted of first-degree robbery and other crimes related to that incident. To prepare a presentence report (PSR), Probation Officer Douglas Meckel interviewed defendant. Harris's attorneys at the time, Abatemarco and Hamilton, have submitted affidavits in this PCR stating that they do not recollect advising Mr. Harris that he could, and ought to, decline any effort by the Probation Department to interview him. They also attest that they were not present during the interview and did not learn of the Probation Department's intention to interview Harris. According to the PSR, defendant stated to Meckel that he could never be `normal' because he was `a descendant of slaves,' and is now the victim of a racist society and slavery. He described himself as a real man, and a real black man, emphasizing that he took and tak[es] what [he] want[s]. When asked if he had children, defendant responded that he may have a couple out there, stating that he lets the women take care of them and likening himself, in that way, to a wolf or a bear. [4]
If defendant cannot show that his statements prejudiced him, then his IAC claim fails. He cites this Court's comment in Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 160, 716 A. 2d 458, that there may have been a reason he did not testify besides his criminal record, and now asserts that the looming presence of the PSR constituted that reason. However, we have no basis to suppose that Harris would have testified but for the PSR. Indeed, although many of his prior crimes would have been sanitized under State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 625 A. 2d 1085 (1993), the jury still would have learned of the number of his convictions and the degrees of those offenses. Id. at 391, 625 A. 2d 1085. We know that among defendant's convictions were possession of stolen property, larceny, burglary, robbery, attempt to commit robbery, and unlawful possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes. Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 157, 716 A. 2d 458. As the State contends, that prior record, along with Harris's conduct during trial, support Scully's testimony describing the Meckel statements as, perhaps, a minor impediment to Harris testifying when considered with the extraordinary mountain of impediments that existed. Scully's testimony reveals a reasonable strategy, is uncontradicted, and amply supports the conclusion that there was no appreciable prejudice from the PSR in view of the other obstacles to Harris testifying. It was ... so abundantly clear I believe to both counsel that it would be an error of immeasurable proportion to put Mr. Harris on the stand based on his ongoing behavior during the course of the trial, based on that would possibly open the door to Mr. Meckel's report. That presentence report pales in comparison to the other concerns I had with respect to impediments placing Mr. Harris on the stand. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant cannot satisfy the prejudice prong necessary for his ineffective assistance claim. Although we have addressed the prejudice prong first because it so readily disposes of this claim, we add that counsel's performance was not deficient in this respectit simply is unnecessary to engage in any lengthy discussion on the point. We note only that, in respect of defendant's right to Fifth Amendment protections, Miranda aims to protect suspects from the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogations. State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 113, 703 A. 2d 901 (1997). Because a presentence interview, which is conducted by a court officer for sentencing purposes, is not considered inherently coercive, the majority of courts that have addressed this issue under the federal constitution have held that Miranda warnings are not required. See State v. Cyr, 169 Vt. 50, 726 A.2d 488, 492 (1999) (citing numerous federal circuit courts decisions). Furthermore, even if Meckel violated defendant's Fifth Amendment rights by not administering Miranda warnings to him, the State still could have used the PSI statements for impeachment purposes. Statements taken in violation of Miranda may be used for impeachment when they were given freely and voluntarily. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1971); State v. Burris, 145 N.J. 509, 525, 679 A. 2d 121 (1996). It is doubtful that Harris's will was overborne in likening himself to a wolf or a bear, or in giving his other statements, to Meckel. Finally, as to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, that right is triggered at critical stage[s] of those [adversarial] proceedings where counsel's absence, or lack of advice, might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. Baumann v. United States, 692 F. 2d 565, 577-78 (9th Cir.1982); see Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1408-09, 89 L.Ed. 2d 631, 639-40 (1986). Although we do not reach the question, we note that courts that have considered whether the right attaches during presentence interviews have determined that such interviews do not represent a critical stage in adversarial proceedings. See e.g., United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 885 (4th Cir.1991); United States v. Jackson, 886 F. 2d 838, 843-45 (7th Cir.1989); Brown v. Butler, 811 F. 2d 938, 941 (5th Cir.1987); Baumann, supra, 692 F. 2d at 578. Thus, pursuant to that case law, although defendant had a right to have counsel present if he wished during the interview, the Sixth Amendment does not compel that counsel be present. In light of that existing case law, we do not regard counsel's failure to move to suppress, based on the argument defendant now asserts, to constitute deficient assistance.