Opinion ID: 2292925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Board's Denial of the Right of Cross-examination

Text: When the Board decided that the proceedings before it were not adversary in nature and that therefore the appellants did not have the right to cross-examine the witnesses of the applicants for the special exception, and when Judge Shook affirmed that decision, neither had the benefit of Chief Judge Prescott's opinion, for the Court, in Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966). In Hyson, Chief Judge Prescott, after a thorough examination of the cases and authorities, held, for the Court, that in a proceeding such as the one involved in the present case, reasonable cross-examination must be permitted. He found that the appellants had, in effect, waived their right to cross-examine any specific witness or material (242 Md. at 68) and that therefore there had been no prejudicial error, but his opinion makes clear the rule that in an adversary proceeding before an administrative board, the opportunity for reasonable cross-examination is a basic right. In the case before us, unlike Hyson, counsel for the protestants specifically claimed the right to cross-examine each witness offered by the applicants and consistently noted their objections to the Board's adverse rulings. In Gorin v. Board of County Comm'rs, 244 Md. 106, 223 A.2d 237, 239 (1966), we said, citing Hyson : While proceedings before an administrative board are informal and the strict rules of evidence do not apply, when the board is funtioning in an adversary proceeding, the fundamentals applicable to the decision of adjudicative facts by any tribunal must be preserved; and in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Nationwide Constr. Corp., 244 Md. 401, 224 A.2d 285 (1966), we said that, however informal in nature the proceedings may be [T]he fundamentals of fairness are requisite to the validity of an adversary proceeding in any tribunal. Compare Union Investors, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 244 Md. 585, 224 A.2d 453 (1966). In the argument before us, counsel for the appellees properly conceded that, under our decisions, the proceedings before the Board were adversary in nature, but they contend that the Board's procedure in allowing the appellants to call the applicant's experts and to examine them as hostile witnesses was the substantial equivalent of the right of cross-examination. We disagree. In the words of Mr. Justice Lamar, in Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913): [T]he more liberal the practice    the more imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules of evidence by which rights are asserted or defended    All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered, and must be given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses    In no other way can a party maintain its rights or make its defense. The right of a party to call hostile witnesses as its own after the testimony of the adverse party has been completed, in our opinion, is not the substantial equivalent of the right to cross-examine immediately after the direct testimony of the witness has been concluded. The techniques of advocacy so essential to our system of justice are largely stultified when resort must be had to such a cumbersome and delayed substitute for immediate and direct cross-examination. [2] The appellants' contention that actual prejudice must be shown before denial of procedural due process can be established is without merit. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Wks., 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915); Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 123 (1873). See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966). See also Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965) and State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965). It would be a mockery of justice to hold that a person cannot complain of the denial of the right to cross-examine unless he can show what the result of the cross-examination would have been; that result is often as unexpected as it is revealing. Chief Judge Prescott's statement in Hyson, at 242 Md. 71-72, that, under the circumstances, any denial of the right of cross-examination has not been shown to have prejudiced the protestants' cause is to be taken in the context of his finding that cross-examination, in effect, had been waived. There was no prejudice because there had not been, in substance, a denial of the right. In this case, the right had been vigorously and repeatedly asserted, and its denial vitiated the proceedings. The ruling of the Board, before Hyson, that there was no right of cross-examination as a matter of law was understandable error, but the Board had accorded that right in similar proceedings for several years, and withdrew it without public notice or notice to the bar or even prior notice to counsel at the beginning of the hearing. This action was arbitrary and capricious and of itself, would have been ground for reversal of the Board's order.