Opinion ID: 2104969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Commonwealth v. Jerry Paul Wilson

Text: Appellee, Jerry Paul Wilson, was charged with and convicted of the rape and indecent assault of Barbara Marie Hager. Prior to trial, appellee issued a subpoena duces tecum on Alice Paul House, an Indiana County rape crisis center, requesting the production of the Center's entire file on Barbara Hager. Counsel for Alice Paul House filed a motion to quash the subpoena which was granted on the basis of the privilege purportedly provided by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1. In both of these cases the defendants, appellees herein, appealed. The Superior Court reversed, basing its determinations in these cases on the decision of this Court in In the Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, ( PAAR ), 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126 (1981). In PAAR, we were faced with a factual situation substantially similar to that of the instant case. In PAAR the defendant sought access to statements made by the victim which were contained in a written report kept on file by PAAR. The defendant's purpose in requesting these reports was to ascertain the existence of any prior inconsistent statements made by the victim which would support defense counsel's theory that the victim had consented. The PAAR Court, noting that no statute existed to support PAAR 's assertion of absolute privilege regarding counselor-victim communications, declined to create such a privilege. Instead the court created a limited privilege by which defense counsel would be permitted to inspect notes that are verbatim accounts of the complainant's declarations and notes that the complainant has approved as accurately reflecting what she said. Id., 494 Pa. at 28, 428 A.2d at 132. However, any information solely relating to the counseling service provided and having no bearing whatsoever on the facts of the alleged offense would be withheld from inspection. The Court in PAAR attempted to balance the public interest in helping the victim to cope with the trauma that inevitably results from a sexual assault against the right of the accused to discover what the complainant has said. Id., 494 Pa. at 24, 428 A.2d at 130, 132. The Court concluded that despite the compelling interest in the victim's well-being, the accused could not be denied the rights to confrontation and to have the benefit of exculpatory evidence. Accordingly, the defendant was permitted to infringe upon the victim's privacy to inspect only those statements of the complainant contained in the file which bear on the facts of the alleged offense. The court, however, must not permit defense inspection of statements of the complainant having no bearing on the facts of the alleged offense and relating instead only to the counseling services PAAR provides. The trial court shall not permit defense review of any other aspect of the file. Id., 494 Pa. at 19, 428 A.2d at 127-28. The Superior Court concluded that the PAAR rationale was applicable in the Aultman and Wilson cases and rejected the applicability of section 5945.1 because appellees had sought not to question the counselors themselves but to examine only the record developed through consultation. Commonwealth v. Aultman, 387 Pa.Super. 113, 563 A.2d 1210 (1989); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 375 Pa.Super. 580, 544 A.2d 1381 (1988). The Commonwealth appealed in both cases, requiring us to consider the effect of the legislative enactment upon our decision in PAAR and upon defendants' constitutional rights. The statutory privilege provides, in pertinent part: A sexual assault counselor has a privilege not to be examined as a witness in any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim being counseled by the counselor as to any confidential communication made by the victim to the counselor or as to any advice, report or working paper given or made in the course of the consultation. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1(b). [2] Confidential communications are defined as Information transmitted between a victim of sexual assault and a sexual assault counselor in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the victim is aware, does not disclose the information to a third person other than those who are present to further the interests of the victim in consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or an accomplishment of the purposes for which the sexual assault counselor is consulted. The term includes all information received by the sexual assault counselor in the course of that relationship. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1. [3] The Commonwealth argues that by enacting section 5945.1 the General Assembly plainly intended to create a broad privilege and overturn our decision in PAAR. The Commonwealth contends that the Superior Court's decision effectively abrogates the statute by permitting a defendant to circumvent its provisions through the use of a subpoena duces tecum. It is submitted that the legislative history indicates the General Assembly's intent to provide complete confidentiality for rape victims and their counselors, rather than just to prohibit the oral testimony of a sexual assault counselor, because even the production of documents has a testimonial component that is prohibited by the statute. The defendants argue that the explicit language of the statute prohibits only the subpoena of a sexual assault counselor as a witness in a proceeding, and that PAAR established the procedure governing pretrial inspection of counselling records. Defendants submit that this procedure is a fair balancing of the competing interests presented by the situation. Section 5945.1 was enacted in December of 1981, subsequent to the PAAR decision of January, 1981. The issue we must consider in this case concerns the effect of Section 5945.1 on our decision in PAAR. We must decide whether the statutory mandate can be reconciled with the PAAR procedure or must be interpreted to override the PAAR decision. As appellees note, the language of the statute explicitly prohibits the subpoena of a sexual assault counselor as a witness regarding confidential communications by a victim or any records developed during the course of treatment. However, since appellees sought to subpoena only the records in these cases, we must determine whether the statutory language was intended to prohibit the production of documents as well.
In conducting this inquiry we must first ascertain the legislative intent supporting the enactment. We find that the legislative history clearly demonstrates that this statute was response to our decision in PAAR and was intended to remedy what the legislature perceived as a grave injustice committed against those who, because of lesser economic means, were forced to seek counseling from a public center rather than a private therapist. A statement recorded at the time of the statute's enactments [4] reveals the intent to provide for the rape crisis center client the same confidentiality that would exist if that victim were to seek private psychotherapeutic treatment. [5] Statement of Representative Alden, 1981 Pa.Legislative Journal  House, pp. 1738-39 (October 14, 1981). It was also noted that the court's decision in PAAR had severely undermined the effectiveness of rape counseling centers. [6] Thus, we can infer that the legislature, in enacting Section 5945.1, intended to reverse the effect of our decision in PAAR, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c), by preventing the acquisition of all confidential communications by the victim whether in the form of live testimony or through the production of records or other documents. [7] This interpretation of the legislative intent is essential if any privilege is to exist between the sexual assault counselor and the victim, and the need for such a privilege cannot be disputed. It is without question that the privilege would exist if the victims had sought private psychotherapeutic treatment. The legislature has recognized that communications between a licensed psychologist and a patient are confidential. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5944. See supra note 3. This statutory privilege has been interpreted as being absolute and has not been outweighed by a defendant's due process rights. See Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987), appeal denied 518 Pa. 617, 541 A.2d 744 (1988). Sexual assault counselors serve an equally important function for the rape victim. Extensive research has been conducted documenting the severe psychological, emotional, and social difficulties suffered by rape victims, which cause a condition known as rape trauma syndrome. The devastating effects of this condition create a compelling need for a confidential counseling relationship to enable the victim to cope with the trauma. It is generally recognized that rape traumatizes its victim to a degree far beyond that experienced by victims of other crimes. Rape crisis centers have been developed nationwide to help victims of this most degrading offense recover from its debilitating effects. Rape crisis centers are service facilities staffed with counselors extensively trained in crisis counseling. These counselors provide victims with much needed physical, psychological and social support during the recovery period that the victims otherwise might not be able to afford. At the onset of counseling the victim is informed that her communications will be confidential, and her willingness to disclose information quite obviously is based upon that expectation. The very nature of the relationship between a counselor and the victim of such a crime exposes the necessity for the same confidentiality that would exist if private psychotherapeutic treatment were obtained. If that confidentiality is removed, that trust is severely undermined, and the maximum therapeutic benefit is lost. The inability of the crisis center to achieve its goals is detrimental not only to the victim but also to society, whose interest in the report and prosecution of sexual assault crimes is furthered by the emotional and physical well-being of the victim. Clearly, our state has significant interest in protecting the confidentiality of communications between victim and counselor which requires the existence of an absolute privilege as to those communications. Therefore, the statutory privilege considered here must extend to the subpoena of records and other documents developed throughout the counseling relationship, any other interpretation of the statute would render the entire privilege meaningless. If the statute were read to permit a defendant to obtain those records, even to ascertain whether any exculpatory or impeachment evidence could be found therein, the confidentiality in which the statute purports to cloak the statements of the victim would cease to exist. Insulating the counselor from giving testimony would be inconsequential, as most information the counselor might give would be available in the records themselves. This interpretation would yield an absurd result, in contravention of our principles of statutory construction. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922. Accordingly, we hold that the privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1 is intended to be absolute, applying to the production of the documents therein described as well as to the testimony of counselors as explicitly stated.
Having determined that the privilege is absolute, we next must consider whether the absolute privilege violates the defendants' constitutional rights. Appellees assert that a privilege completely denying access to the information sought deprives them of their right to confrontation and compulsory process under the federal and state constitutions. For the following reasons we find that appellees' constitutional objections have no merit. Under the United States Constitution, an accused is guaranteed the right to confront the witnesses against him. U.S.C.A. Const. amend. VI. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 50, 107 S.Ct. 989, 997, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18-19, 106 S.Ct. 292, 293-94, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). The defendants' allegations amount to an assertion that their right to conduct effective cross-examination has been denied. We find the analysis employed by the Supreme Court in Ritchie, supra, to be helpful to our resolution of the instant case. As the Ritchie court noted, the Confrontation Clause protects a defendant's trial rights. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at 53 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. at 999 n. 9. It should not be constrained to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected information that might be used at trial to impeach or otherwise undermine a witness' testimony; such an interpretation would transform the Confrontation Clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Nothing in the case law supports such a view. Id. at 52, 107 S.Ct. at 998, citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1934, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) ([I]t is this literal right to confront the witnesses at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (The right to confrontation is basically a trial right). The Confrontation Clause merely guarantees a defendant the ability to question adverse witnesses; that ability does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. Id. 480 U.S. at 53, 107 S.Ct. at 999. In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Delaware v. Fensterer, supra, 474 U.S. at 20, 106 S.Ct. at 294, (emphasis in original). Thus, the right to confront one's witnesses is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses. [8] In the instant matters both victims testified at the respective trials. At appellee Wilson's trial the victim testified to the facts surrounding the incident. On cross-examination, defense counsel was given wide latitude as he attempted to test the victim's recollection of those events, and he was permitted, although he declined, to question her about possible other sexual activity on or near the date of the alleged rape. In appellee Aultman's case the victim testified, and again defense counsel was permitted wide latitude in challenging her recollection and in attempting to shift the blame to the co-defendant. [9] Clearly, in each of these cases the defendant's right to confrontation was satisfied. The Supreme Court in Ritchie also considered the applicability of the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause, and a majority of the Court concluded that claims of the type asserted by Ritchie were best analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 480 U.S. at 56, 107 S.Ct. at 1000. In Ritchie, a defendant accused of committing various sexual offenses against his minor daughter attempted to obtain through discovery a file maintained by Children and Youth Services (CYS) pertaining to the charges. CYS refused to comply with the subpoena, claiming that the records were privileged under 11 Pa.C.S. § 2215. [10] The United States Supreme Court in Ritchie concluded that the defendant's due process rights had been denied despite the Commonwealth's asserted compelling interest in the confidentiality of the records sought. The Court reasoned that the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the files could not be compelling, as suggested, because the statute itself provided for disclosure of the files in certain limited circumstances. [11] Id. at 59, 107 S.Ct. at 1002. The recognition by the legislature of those instances of disclosure, the Court found, certainly raised an inference that the defendant could be permitted access to information material to his case. Id. The instant case is easily distinguishable from Ritchie. First, as discussed supra, we here are concerned with the absolute privilege which prohibits the disclosure of records under any circumstances absent the victim's consent. See id. at 57, 107 S.Ct. at 1001. The enactment of an absolute privilege indicates the Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting the confidentiality of the rape victim's records. The broadly drawn privilege is nevertheless narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest in protecting the victim's privacy so that her treatment and recovery process will be expedited. See supra, 528 Pa. 516, 602 A.2d 1295. Therefore, defendant's federal constitutional rights have not been violated. Defendants also claim that the recent case of Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989), mandates the conclusion that the denial of defense counsel's access to these records violates the defendants' rights under the state constitution. In Lloyd, the defendant sought to obtain from Medical College of Pennsylvania the psychotherapeutic records of a six-year-old girl whom he allegedly had raped. The trial court denied his request. This Court reversed, holding that defendant's state constitutional rights to confrontation and compulsory process required that he be permitted to inspect the records. The Court voted, however, that the Lloyd case, unlike the Ritchie case, did not involve a statutory privilege. Rather, the Court in Lloyd was concerned with a common law privilege which could not defeat a defendant's constitutional rights. Implicit in the distinction drawn by the Lloyd court is the recognition that the existence of a statutory privilege is an indication that the legislature acknowledges the significance of a particular interest and has chosen to protect that interest. As the Supreme Court stated in Ritchie, supra, Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all eyes. Cf. 42 Pa Cons Stat § 5945.1(b) (1982) (unqualified statutory privilege for communications between sexual assault counselors and victims). Rather, the Pennsylvania law provides that the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances, including when CYS is directed to do so by court order. PA Stat Ann, Title 11, § 2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp 1986). Given that the Pennsylvania Legislature contemplated some use of CYS records in judicial proceedings, we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclosures in criminal prosecutions. In the absence of any apparent state policy to the contrary, we therefore have no reason to believe that relevant information would not be disclosed when a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the information is material to the defense of the accused. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at 57-58, 107 S.Ct. at 1001-02. As previously noted, the statutory privilege instantly at issue provides even greater protection than did the statute asserted in the Ritchie case. Therefore, an objection based on the protections afforded by the state constitution must also fail. Accordingly, the orders of the Superior Court are reversed. McDERMOTT, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. LARSEN, J., files a concurring opinion in which PAPADAKOS, J., joins. ZAPPALA, J., files a dissenting opinion.