Opinion ID: 2714
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Effect of the Parenthetical (or a Conspiracy or Attempt to Violate) .(1) The Statutory Language Is Ambiguous in Conveying Congress's Intent

Text: Because we conclude that an inchoate crime with a drug objective, such as Mizrahi's solicitation conviction, falls within the broad statutory language referencing a violation of . . . any law . . . relating to a controlled substance, we must consider whether Congress nevertheless expressed its clear intent for a narrower construction when it referenced certain inchoate crimes in the disjunctive parenthetical (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate). Indeed, we must consider whether the parenthetical's reference to only two of the three common inchoate crimes indicates Congress's clear intent to exclude solicitation as a ground for inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). The Ninth Circuit reached the latter conclusion in analyzing identical language in a predecessor version of the INA's drug deportability provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994) (subsequently recodified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)). See Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.1997) (The plain language of [the statute] limits convictions for generic crimes that may result in deportation to conspiracy and attempt. Simply put, solicitation is not on the list.). Mizrahi urges us to follow suit with respect to inadmissibility. We are not convinced, however, that such congressional intent can clearly be discerned from the parenthetical language in these parallel provisions. The strongest support for construing the parenthetical to limit the reach of these provisions is Congress's use of the word or at the start. It is a standard canon of statutory construction that words separated by the disjunctive are intended to convey different meanings unless the context indicates otherwise. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). The canon usefully serves to avoid interpretations that render statutory terms superfluous. See id. Thus, Congress's disjunctive reference to two inchoate crimes in the parenthetical might be construed to indicate its intent (a) that no inchoate drug crimes be included in the statute's otherwise broad reference to a violation of . . . any law . . . relating to a controlled substance, and (b) that only the specifically referenced inchoate crimes of conspiracy and attempt  not solicitation  support inadmissibility. However plausible this construction, we cannot conclude simply from the use of the word or that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, i.e., whether the solicitation of drug crimes renders an alien inadmissible. The rule that disjunctive phrases bear different meanings is general, not absolute. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358-60, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987) (declining to apply independent constructions to disjunctive phrases of mail fraud statute); see generally 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 21:14, at 179-91 (6th ed.2002) (discussing general rule and departures from it). Thus, even outside the context of Chevron analysis, courts resolving difficult issues of construction will consider how a disjunctive or conjunctive form fits into the statutory scheme as a whole. See Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 270 n. 1 (7th Cir.1986) (observing that courts must not rely too heavily on characterizations such as `disjunctive' form versus `conjunctive' form to resolve difficult issues of statutory construction, but instead must look at all parts of the statute). As we have already observed, in this case, the statute's non-parenthetical language referencing a violation . . . of any law . . . relating to a controlled substance is sufficiently broad, on its face, to include inchoate crimes. Construing the parenthetical to allow only two inchoate crimes, conspiracy and attempt, to stand as grounds for inadmissibility risks bringing the statute into tension with itself. We would have to conclude that Congress intended violations of any laws relating to controlled substances to support inadmissibility except inchoate crimes except for the inchoate crimes of conspiracy and attempt. Such stacking exceptions would be a curious way for Congress to express an intent to exclude solicitation, even with a drug crime objective, as a ground for inadmissibility. Indeed, the first exception  purportedly excluding all inchoate crimes from the phrase a violation of . . . any law . . . relating to a controlled substance  would be difficult to reconcile with federal law, which does not employ generic statutes to proscribe inchoate crimes with drug objectives but, instead, relies on specific sections of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963. [9] Precisely because these sections proscribe conspiracies or attempts to violate only drug laws, we could not sensibly conclude that they do not fit within the broad phrase any law . . . relating to a controlled substance. They can relate to nothing else. To the extent Mizrahi urges us to read the parenthetical to exclude at least generic inchoate statutes from the broad relating to language, that argument is difficult to reconcile with Bronsztejn v. INS, 526 F.2d at 1290, discussed supra at 162-63. [10] The version of the INA deportability provision at issue in Bronsztejn rendered deportable an alien who at any time has been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marijuana. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970) (emphasis added). Without discussing the possible limiting effect of the highlighted disjunctive reference to the inchoate crime of conspiracy, this court observed that Congress intended a stringent deportation policy regarding drug offenders, and we ruled that the broad statutory language extended to the unmentioned inchoate crime of attempted drug possession. Bronsztejn v. INS, 526 F.2d at 1292. [11] Bronsztejn 's conclusion may find added support in the punctuation employed to set off disjunctive references to inchoate crimes in the INA. In the provision at issue in Bronsztejn, the disjunctive reference to conspiracy was set off by commas. This court has previously recognized that such punctuation may indicate that a disjunctive phrase was not intended to have a distinct meaning from, but rather to illustrate or stand in apposition to, preceding language. Cf. United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir.2005) (observing that when words are `connected by or . . . and when no commas set off the second word to suggest that it stands in apposition to the first, we construe the disjunctive word to convey different meanings') (quoting Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190, 199 (2d Cir.2004)). Parentheticals can be used to the same effect. See Lawrence E. Filson, The Legislative Drafter's Desk Reference 280-81 (1992); see also Peters v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d at 309 (holding that parentheses reduced the grammatical import of the parenthetical reference to conspiracy and attempt in the INA's parallel deportability provision). Thus, the disjunctive parenthetical here at issue need not be assigned a different meaning from the preceding language to avoid being surplusage; it can reasonably be construed to illustrate or explain the broader proposition. That being said, Congress certainly could have used clearer language and punctuation in § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) if its intent was to use the disjunctive form merely to illustrate the broad scope of the phrase a violation . . . of any law . . . relating to a controlled substance. See Filson at 280-81 (noting that legislative parentheticals can be substantive as well as explanatory). But it could also have used clearer language if its intent was to limit this phrase to exclude solicitation crimes. Accordingly, we conclude that the disjunctive parenthetical in § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) gives rise to an ambiguity as to whether Congress intended that unspecified inchoate crimes, such as solicitation, could render an alien inadmissible. (2) Legislative History Does Not Resolve the Textual Ambiguity The Attorney General urges us to resolve the identified ambiguity in § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), consistent with the second step of Chevron analysis, by deferring to the BIA's conclusion in Matter of Beltran, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 528, which was relied on by the agency in finding Mizrahi inadmissible. While we ultimately agree that such deference is warranted, we must first explain why legislative history does not permit us to resolve the statutory ambiguity at Chevron step one. Generally, this court has been reluctant to employ legislative history at step one of Chevron analysis. See Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118, 127 & n. 3 (2d Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 546 U.S. 1147, 126 S.Ct. 1189, 163 L.Ed.2d 1125 (2006). We recognize, of course, that in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline , the Supreme Court stated that statutory structure, purpose, and history are properly considered at Chevron step one, but the Court was able to resolve ambiguity convincingly in that case because the interpretive clues [spoke] almost unanimously, making Congress's intent clear beyond reasonable doubt. 540 U.S. at 600, 586, 590, 124 S.Ct. 1236. That certainly is not this case. Nevertheless, we outline the relevant legislative history in some detail in light of a contrary conclusion suggested by the BIA itself in Matter of Hou, 20 I. & N. Dec. 513 (BIA 1992), a case decided on the same day by the same panel as Beltran. [12] In Hou, the BIA relied on a fragment of legislative history relating to the INA's drug deportability provision in concluding that Congress did not understand unspecified inchoate crimes to constitute grounds for deportation. See id. at 518-19. [13] In fact, the legislative history is considerably more extensive and ambiguous than Hou suggests. (a) 1931: Rendering Aliens Convicted of Specified Drug Violations Deportable In 1931, Congress amended the Immigration Act of 1917 to render deportable aliens convicted of drug trafficking. [14] That amendment stated, in relevant part: That any alien (except an addict who is not a dealer in, or peddler of, any of the narcotic drugs mentioned in this Act) who, after the enactment of this Act, shall be convicted and sentenced for violation of or conspiracy to violate any statute of the United States taxing, prohibiting, or regulating the manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, or exportation of opium, coca leaves, heroin, or any salt, derivative, or preparation of opium or coca leaves, shall be taken into custody and deported. . . . Act of Feb. 18, 1931, Pub.L. No. 71-683, 46 Stat. 1171 (emphasis added). As the highlighted language indicates, Congress initially used the disjunctive form to ensure the deportability of aliens convicted of both substantive and conspiratorial violations of the referenced statutes. It mentioned no inchoate crime other than conspiracy. It did not set off the conspiracy phrase with commas or parentheses to suggest that it stood in apposition to or merely illustrated the term violation. Moreover, it specifically required that the violated statute tax, prohibit, or regulate specified drug activities; it was not enough for the statute to relate to controlled substances. This textual structure might suggest that, in 1931, Congress intended violation to refer only to the specifically catalogued substantive acts, with conspiracy being the only inchoate crime supporting deportation. This statutory scheme, however, was displaced in 1952 with the enactment of the INA. (b) 1952: Enactment of the INA The INA effected a comprehensive revision in federal immigration law. INA § 212(a)(23), the predecessor of the inadmissibility provision here at issue, rendered excludable, inter alia: [a]ny alien [1] who has been convicted of a violation of any law or regulation relating to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, or [2] who has been convicted of a violation of any law or regulation governing or controlling the taxing, manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, exportation, or the possession for the purpose of the manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, or exportation of opium, coca leaves, heroin, marihuana, or any salt derivative or preparation of opium or coca leaves, or isonipecaine or any addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining opiate. . . . INA, Pub.L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(23), 66 Stat. 163, 184 (1952) (emphasis added). Employing almost identical language, Section 241(a)(11) of the INA rendered deportable, inter alia, any alien: [1] who at any time has been convicted of a violation of any law or regulation relating to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, or [2] who has been convicted of a violation of any law or regulation governing or controlling the taxing, manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, exportation, or the possession for the purpose of the manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation or exportation of opium, coca leaves, heroin, marihuana, any salt derivative or preparation of opium or coca leaves or isonipecaine or any addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining opiate. Id. § 241(a)(11), at 66 Stat. at 206-07 (emphasis added). The language of these provisions indicates Congress's intent to sweep broadly, a conclusion supported by the legislative history. The final House Report states that one of the basic changes effected by the INA was to broaden[ ] the grounds for exclusion and deportation of criminal aliens. H.R.Rep. No. 82-1365, at 28 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1679. Thus, the first criterion for inadmissibility and deportability applies to aliens convicted of any law or regulation, not simply federal law. Further, the laws at issue are not limited to those catalogued in the 1931 statute. Rather, they can be any laws relating to narcotics trafficking. Although Congress employed the disjunctive to reiterate and expand the 1931 list of drug activities proscribed by law, its goal appears to have been to ensure completeness rather than to identify a separate and distinct category of violations because it is difficult to envision a violation of law governing or controlling the taxing, manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, [or] exportation of narcotics that would not also qualify as a violation of law relating to narcotics trafficking. [15] At the same time, however, in these 1952 provisions, Congress referenced only a violation of law. It did not repeat the 1931 statute's disjunctive reference to a conspiracy to violate specified laws. Nothing in the legislative history indicates whether Congress expected inchoate drug crimes to come within the new broad reference to violations of law relating to narcotics trafficking or whether it sought to limit the grounds for inadmissibility and deportability to substantive crimes. We note only that the latter possibility appears somewhat at odds with the statute's overall expansive purpose. In 1954 and 1955, the BIA attempted to resolve this ambiguity in two cases involving aliens confronting deportation based on convictions for inchoate drug crimes. In Matter of G, 6 I. & N. Dec. 353, 354 (BIA 1954), the BIA concluded, with little discussion, that a conviction for attempted possession of narcotics with intent to distribute subjected an alien to deportation. A few months later, however, in Matter of N, 6 I. & N. Dec. 557, 559 (BIA 1955), the BIA reached a different conclusion with respect to a conviction for narcotics conspiracy in violation of the federal generic conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1952). [16] Noting Congress's explicit inclusion of conspiracy violations in the 1931 deportability statute and their omission from the 1952 statute, the BIA decided (with no mention of Matter of G ) that conspiracy does not constitute a conviction of a violation of a law relating to the illicit traffic in narcotics drugs. Matter of N, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 559. On review of Matter of N, the Attorney General reversed. See 6 I. & N. Dec. at 561 (A.G.1955). Acknowledging that a § 371 conspiracy was a separate and distinct crime from the offense that was the conspiracy's objective, the Attorney General nevertheless ruled that the controlling phrase in the INA's deportability provision was relating to, which [o]n its face . . . is broad enough to cover a conviction for conspiracy to violate the narcotic laws. Id. In so holding, the Attorney General cited a Subcommittee Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee as evidence of legislative intent to broaden the coverage of the immigration laws with respect to aliens convicted of laws `pertaining to narcotics.' Id. (citing S.Rep. No. 81-1515, at 375 (1950)). Thus, it appears that over fifty years ago, Matter of G and Matter of N established the administering agency's construction of the phrase relating to  used in both the INA's deportability and inadmissibility provisions pertaining to drug crimes  as sufficiently broad to extend to inchoate violations of law when the underlying object is a drug crime. (c) The 1956 Amendments Soon after Matter of N, Congress amended the INA's inadmissibility and deportability provisions to replace the phrase convicted of a violation of any law with the phrase convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law. Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub.L. No. 84-728, § 301(a), 70 Stat. 567, 575 (emphasis added). While the highlighted disjunctive language might indicate Congress's intent to exclude inchoate crimes, except for conspiracy, from the statute's broad reference to convictions for a violation of . . . any law . . . relating to narcotics trafficking, because this disjunctive phrase, in contrast to that enacted in 1931, is set off by commas, it could also be construed as simply an illustration of the intended breadth of relating to, consistent with the recent agency ruling in Matter of N. See supra at 165-66. The legislative history on this point is not clear. Committee reports indicate that the amendment includ[ed] conspiracy to violate a narcotic law, and the illicit possession of narcotics, as additional grounds for excluding [or deporting] any alien. H.R.Rep. No. 84-2546, at 17 (1956) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3315, 3321 (emphasis added); see also S.Rep. No. 84-1997, at 16 (1956) (observing that amendment include[s] conspiracy to violate a narcotic law, and the illicit possession of narcotics as additional grounds for excluding [or deporting] any alien (emphasis added)). While the term additional suggests more than a clarifying illustration, we hesitate to assign the word determinative weight as an indicator of legislative intent. Precisely because Matter of N had already held the statute to reach conspiracy, we cannot determine whether members of Congress supported the amendment because they thought conspiracy was otherwise excluded from the statutory language or because they thought the amendment usefully clarified already broad language. Our ability to discern Congress's intent is further complicated by ambiguities in the supporting letters of the Justice Department, which apparently proposed the amendment, and the INS. [17] The Justice Department letter states: [S]ection 212(a)(23) [regarding inadmissibility] specifically covers only substantive violations of the narcotic laws and regulations; it is silent with respect to convictions of conspiracy to violate those laws and regulations. Section 201(a) would amend section 212(a)(23) to cure these deficiencies. Section 201(b) of the bill makes corresponding changes in section 241(a)(11) of the 1952 act [regarding deportability]. Like section 212(a)(23), section 214(a)(11) is silent with respect to convictions of conspiracy to violate the narcotics laws. Letter from William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, to Hon. Price Daniel, Chairman, Subcommittee for the Improvement of the Federal Criminal Code, Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate (May 4, 1956), as reprinted in S.Rep. No. 84-1997, at 17 (1956). While the letter implies that the amendment was necessary to fill a statutory gap, this seems curious in light of the Attorney General's own ruling in Matter of N that narcotics conspiracies already qualified as crimes relating to drug trafficking under the 1952 Act. Thus, the letter might also be read to urge Congress to remove any ambiguity on this point created by the statute's specific[] reference to substantive violations and its silen[ce] with respect to convictions of conspiracy. Such a reading is consistent with a supporting letter from the INS indicating that the amendment usefully strengthens and clarifies the INA's existing inadmissibility and deportability provisions. Letter from J.M. Swing, INS Commissioner, to Hon. Price Daniel, Chairman, Subcommittee for the Improvement of the Federal Criminal Code, Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate (May 1, 1956), as reprinted in S.Rep. No. 84-1997, at 22 (1956). But that hardly allows us to determine Congress's clear intent. Almost twenty years after the 1956 amendments, in 1974, the BIA ruled that the inchoate crime of attempt, not then specifically mentioned in the INA's drug inadmissibility or deportability provisions, qualified as a violation of law relating to narcotics trafficking when the object of the attempt was illicit drug possession. See Matter of Bronsztejn, 15 I. & N. Dec. 281 (BIA 1974). The BIA had already reached this conclusion twenty years earlier in Matter of G, 6 I. & N. Dec. 353. The significance of Bronsztejn is that the BIA reiterated this conclusion after Congress had explicitly inserted a disjunctive reference to conspiracy in the statute. As discussed, supra at 162-63, our court affirmed this construction of the statute in Bronsztejn v. INS, 526 F.2d 1290. (d) The 1986 Amendments Bronsztejn triggered no congressional response. When, more than a decade later, in 1986, Congress enacted identical amendments to the INA's inadmissibility and deportability provisions, it provided simply that any law or regulation would thereafter read any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570, § 1751(a)-(b), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-47. Congress further replaced both the statutory reference to narcotics trafficking and the catalogue of drug-related conduct in these two provisions with the more general phrase relating to a controlled substance. Id. While both actions seem to have been intended to clarify the expansive reach of the statute, they offer no insight into Congress's intent with respect to the use of drug solicitation crimes as grounds for inadmissibility or deportability. (e) The 1990 Amendments In 1990 amendments to the INA, Congress renumbered what had been 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23) so that inadmissibility would henceforth be treated under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). At the same time, Congress placed the 1956 conspiracy amendment in a parenthetical and extended inadmissibility beyond aliens formally convicted of drug-related crimes to those who admitted such crimes. Thus, it rendered inadmissible any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a violation of (or a conspiracy to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance [as defined by federal law]. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5067. The 1990 amendments to the statute's deportability provision were not identical. Notably, the grounds for deportability, unlike those for inadmissibility, were not extended beyond convictions to admissions. Nevertheless, the conspiracy clause in the deportability provision, like that in the inadmissibility provision, was placed in a parenthetical. This deportability provision  but not the inadmissibility provision  was amended to add attempt to the parenthetical. Thus, the 1990 amendments rendered deportable [a]ny alien who at any time after entry has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance. . . . Id. §§ 508, 602, 104 Stat. at 5051, 5080. [18] Nothing in the conference report for these amendments indicates why the conspiracy clause was moved to a parenthetical or why attempt was included in the deportability provision but not in the inadmissibility provision. See H.R.Rep. No. 101-955 (1990) (Conf.Rep.), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784. That report states simply that the conference version of the legislation provides for a comprehensive revision of all the existing grounds for exclusion and deportation, including the repeal of outmoded grounds, the expansion of waivers for certain grounds, the substantial revision of security and foreign policy grounds, and the consolidation of related grounds in order to make the law more rational and easy to understand. Id. at 6793. The references in this passage to existing grounds and consolidation of related grounds might be read to suggest no congressional intent to expand or contract the grounds for inadmissibility and deportability except with respect to security and foreign policy. But these references fail to reveal Congress's intent with respect to inchoate crimes generally or solicitation crimes specifically. Against this backdrop we consider the fragment of history relied on in Matter of Hou, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 517-18. As Hou observed, the inclusion of attempt in the INA's deportability provision had also been provided for in another bill pending in 1990, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990, H.R. 5269. [19] The House Judiciary Committee Report on that legislation observed: Current law [8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1988)] renders deportable aliens who have been convicted of violating, or conspiring to violate, any Federal or state law regarding controlled substances. It does not make attempts to violate such law a deportable offense. By contrast, a conspiracy or attempt to traffic in controlled substances makes an alien an aggravated felon. Section 1507 corrects this oversight by making a conviction for attempting to violate controlled substances laws a deportable offense. H.R.Rep. No. 101-681(I) (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6555-56. Hou concluded from this language that Congress clearly intended to make a substantive change in the law without which attempt crimes did not otherwise give rise to deportability under that provision. Matter of Hou, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 518. We are less confident of Congress's intent. The report might only have been making the obvious point that the INA's deportability provision did not specifically make attempt to violate a narcotics law a deportable offense. As the report notes, both narcotics conspiracies and attempts were already recognized as aggravated felonies under the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1988). Because an aggravated felony conviction rendered an alien deportable, see id. § 1251(a)(4)(B) (1988), the proposed amendment usefully eliminated a potentially confusing statutory discrepancy. This appears to be the oversight for which the Committee urged correction. H.R.Rep. No. 101-681(I). If the Committee had intended further to take exception to long-standing agency and judicial interpretations of the statute's relating to language as broad enough to reach even unspecified inchoate crimes with drug objectives, one might expect it to have said so. (f) The 1994 Amendments In 1994, two years after the BIA decisions in Matter of Beltran and Matter of Hou, Congress amended the INA to create the inadmissibility provision here at issue by inserting or attempt after conspiracy. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-416, § 203(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4311. The amendment was entitled a [c]larification, id. at 4311, and, in a section-by-section analysis of a Senate bill containing the amendment, its purpose was described as  to make clear that an `attempt' or `conspiracy' to commit certain criminal offenses serve as a basis for exclusion of aliens, 139 Cong. Rec. S8553-03, 1993 WL 23 9719 (providing section-by-section analysis of Senate bill on day that bill passed Senate) (emphasis added). These references might be construed to indicate that Congress's intent was only to clarify what it thought was already expressed in the statute's broad reference to a violation of . . . any law . . . relating to a controlled substance, and not to make a substantive change in the statute. But, here again, that construction is not so compelling that we can confidently resolve textual ambiguity about drug solicitation crimes at Chevron step one. [20] In sum, whether we review the seven decades of relevant legislative history as a whole or attempt to parse individual passages, we cannot conclude that Congress's interpretive clues speak directly or clearly to the point in dispute. General Dynamic Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. at 586, 124 S.Ct. 1236; see also Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 240, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (observing that, while scattered statements in legislative history lent some support to litigant's argument, totality did not clearly indicate Congress's intent). Accordingly, even with the benefit of legislative history, we cannot resolve the identified statutory ambiguity in this case at Chevron step one. c. The BIA Reasonably Concluded that Aliens Who Commit Solicitation Crimes with Drug Objectives Are Inadmissible Under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) In this case, the BIA resolved the ambiguity created by the disjunctive parenthetical in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) by relying on its prior decision in Matter of Beltran, 20 I. & N. Dec. 521. Beltran held that, even though solicitation was not among the inchoate crimes specifically referenced in the parallel deportability provision of the INA, it constituted a violation of . . . any law . . . relating to a controlled substance when its intended object was a drug crime. See id. at 526-27. We conclude that Beltran 's analysis is reasonable and warrants Chevron deference as we review Mizrahi's challenge to the agency's reliance on Beltran in holding him inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). [21] In reaching this conclusion we note first that in Beltran, the BIA recognized, as we have ourselves, that the broad language at issue, apart from the parenthetical, has long been construed to give inclusive meaning . . . to the phrase `relating to,' thereby supporting the conclusion that Congress meant this language to encompass . . . inchoate or preparatory crimes . . . when the underlying substantive crime involves a drug offense. 20 I. & N. Dec. at 526 (collecting cases). Second, Beltran correctly recognized that solicitation, like other inchoate offenses, presupposes a purpose to commit another crime. Id. at 526-27. As we have observed, that purpose is the requisite mens rea element of a solicitation crime. Precisely because this element is identified by the object statute, the solicitation of a drug offense categorically qualifies as a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance. See supra at 160-63. Thus, it was entirely reasonable for the BIA to conclude that when the underlying [object] offense involves a drug violation, . . . it is consistent with congressional intent to likewise consider a conviction for solicitation to commit that crime to be a violation of a law `relating to a controlled substance.' Matter of Beltran, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 527. Finally, Beltran reasonably concluded that Congress's explicit reference to certain inchoate offenses as grounds for deportation did not indicate its intent to exclude others not so referenced. See id. at 526 n. 12. Acknowledging the construction maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, [22] Beltran observed that the maxim's reliability might nevertheless be questioned to the extent `it stands on the faulty premise that all possible alternative or supplemental provisions were necessarily considered and rejected by the legislative draftsmen.' Id. (quoting National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C.Cir.1973)). Without discounting the maxim's usefulness as a tool of construction in many cases, we note that the BIA's skepticism reasonably extends to this case where our own review of the legislative history fails to indicate any congressional consideration, much less rejection, of drug solicitation crimes as grounds for deportability or inadmissibility. We conclude that the BIA in Beltran reasonably determined that a solicitation conviction with a drug objective constituted a violation of a law . . . relating to a controlled substance. Accordingly, we defer to that construction. Because the same language is at issue in Mizrahi's case, we identify no error in the BIA's reliance on Beltran to conclude that Mizrahi's conviction for solicitation of a drug sale rendered him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). 3. Mizrahi's Other Arguments Are Unsupported by Law We have considered the other arguments advanced by Mizrahi and conclude that they are without merit. To the extent Mizrahi urges us to apply the rule of lenity to construe § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) in his favor, his argument is foreclosed by our decision in Ruiz-Almanzar v. Ridge, 485 F.3d 193 (2d Cir.2007). The rule of lenity is a doctrine of last resort, and it cannot overcome a reasonable BIA interpretation entitled to Chevron deference. See id. at 198. Insofar as Mizrahi faults the IJ for suggesting that he was in possession of drugs, a conclusion going beyond the facts admitted in his plea, we note simply that the alleged error was not repeated by the BIA, which based its decision only on Mizrahi's crime of conviction. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005) (When the BIA issues an opinion, [that] opinion becomes the basis for judicial review. (internal quotation marks omitted)). That crime, solicitation of a drug sale, is supported by Mizrahi's plea and relates to a controlled substance for the reasons discussed in this opinion. Finally, without citation to relevant authority, Mizrahi invites this court to look beyond his crime of conviction and to consider the equities of his individual circumstances in ruling on his petition. Our limited authority to review questions of law does not extend to such an equitable inquiry. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D).