Opinion ID: 842363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: plaintiff waived the right to object to use of the lot as a dog park

Text: Because I would hold that the use as a dog park is a residential purpose, I find it unnecessary to determine whether plaintiff waived the right to enforce the deed restriction. But, because the majority holds that plaintiff can enforce it, I will offer my thoughts on this issue. The majority finds that plaintiff is estopped from contesting use of the lot as a park. Lot 52 has been in a park for at least 75 years. Plaintiff was well aware of this use. Yet, at no time did it object to or take action to stop it. Even now, plaintiff does not ask the Court to prevent lot 52 from reverting to being part of Springdale Park. Even if it did, the majority opines, equity would bar plaintiff from preventing use of the land as a park. See Cherry v. Bd. of Home Missions of Reformed Church in United States, 254 Mich. 496, 503-504, 236 N.W. 841 (1931). Nonetheless, the majority holds that plaintiff may challenge use of the lot as a dog park. The reason it gives is that a dog park is a more serious violation of the deed restriction than a city park. Once again, I disagree. In Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v Goodlove, [8] this Court was called upon to decide whether the plaintiff homeowners association was estopped from enforcing deed restrictions limiting the property in question to single dwelling houses. Goodlove, 248 Mich. at 627, 227 N.W. 772. The defendant, a practicing physician, had incorporated his medical office into his home and worked there for years without objection. Id. at 628, 227 N.W. 772. When the defendant, because of increasing business, decided to build an office building on the land, the plaintiff objected, claiming that this use violated the deed restrictions running with the property. The issue was whether the plaintiff had waived the right to enforce the restriction by failing for years to object to use of the property as a doctor's office. Id. at 629, 227 N.W. 772. The Court decided that the plaintiff could enforce the restriction. It stated: While it is true that there has been no objection made to the defendant's practicing medicine at his home and using it as a doctor's office where patients consulted him, nevertheless, the defendant should not be able to violate further rights of plaintiffs on account of his theretofore slight breach of the restrictive covenants in his deed. Plaintiffs are not estopped from preventing a most flagrant violation of the restrictions on account of their theretofore failure to stop a slight deviation from the strict letter of such restrictions. While it is true that by their acquiescence they may not be able to enjoin defendant from continuing to use his present home to the extent that it has been heretofore used as a doctor's office, they are still in a position to stop the more serious violation of the restrictions that would result from the erection of a new or adjoining building, one story in height, without basement, etc., which does not conform with the restrictions of the subdivision. [ Id. at 629-630, 227 N.W. 772.] Accordingly, the general rule is that a plaintiff is not estopped from preventing a most flagrant violation of the restrictions on account of their theretofore failure to stop a slight deviation from the strict letter of such restrictions. Id. at 629, 227 N.W. 772 (emphasis added). See also Jeffery v. Lathrup, 363 Mich. 15, 22, 108 N.W.2d 827 (1961) (a deed restriction that has been violated in some degree does not thereby become void and unenforceable when a violation of a more serious and damaging degree occurs). In Cherry, this Court applied this rule and decided whether the plaintiff property owners should be estopped from enforcing deed restrictions that limited use of certain property. Cherry, 254 Mich. at 497-499, 236 N.W. 841. Despite the fact that the deed restricted the property to dwelling house purposes, the defendant planned to replace its existing church with a new church on the same property. Id. at 499, 236 N.W. 841. Ultimately, this Court refused to allow the plaintiffs to enforce the deed restriction. We are not impressed with plaintiffs' claim that defendant's building program will constitute an extension of the violation of the building restrictions which has already been countenanced. It is true the new building as planned will be somewhat larger, will occupy a different portion of the lots and will face on Dexter boulevard instead of Joy road. But a church is a church; and it cannot well be asserted that only so much of a church site as is actually occupied by the edifice located thereon is used for church purposes. It is common practice to use the adjacent lot area for parking purposes. It is by no means uncommon for outdoor church gatherings to make use of the whole or any part of the church yard. Defendant clearly has the right so to use its premises. [ Id. at 501, 236 N.W. 841.] Cherry is important because it illustrates that a use that is of the same nature as a previous, unobjected-to use will not amount to a flagrant violation. [9] Here, plaintiff acquiesced in the use of the lot as a park. Plaintiff objected only when defendant began using the lot as a dog park. A dog park is of the same nature as a park. Hence, because the proposed use is of the same nature as the unobjected-to use, plaintiff cannot enforce the deed restriction against the dog park. Indeed, just as Cherry determined that the plaintiffs there could not enforce the deed restrictions because a church is a church, plaintiff here cannot enforce the deed restriction because a park is a park. [10] The majority reaches the opposite conclusion and decides that a dog park is a more serious violation. In so doing, it considers a number of statements presumably drawn from the briefs and affidavits used during the motion for summary disposition. Ante at 678-679. However, there are no court findings substantiating these statements. For example, the majority takes as fact that the dog park has generated more automobile traffic. The trial court made no such finding. [11] Also, the majority incorrectly asserts that dogs were prohibited from being on the property before lot 52 was transformed into a dog park. The trial court did not make this finding. [12] Given that defendant contests most or all of these points, it is error for the majority to rely on them as true. [13] See appellant's brief, pp. 26-28. [14] No factual findings were ever made to suggest that the dog park has brought continual and systematic use of lot 52 where before the use was irregular. Yet, the majority relies on this as a fact. The majority also assumes that establishment of the dog park required a structure where no structure had previously been permitted. No factual findings support that assumption. In fact, it appears that three sides of the lot were already fenced. Given that three sides of the lot were already fenced, it is bizarre, and obviously wrong, for the majority to conclude that no structure previously existed on the lot. If these facts are disregarded, as they must be, only one of the statements identified and relied on by the majority remains to support its conclusion: residents of Birmingham have been encouraged to bring their dogs to run off-leash in the dog park. This cannot constitute a more serious violation of the restriction. [15] Another serious fault of the majority decision is that it effectively gives people broad discretion to pick and choose which violations of the restrictive covenant will be tolerated. This will encourage someone to try to enforce a restriction after a very minor change in usage. Using today's decision, a plaintiff could disregard for years a use that is arguably contrary to a deed restriction, then object and prevent another use that is only marginally different. Besides being fundamentally unfair, permitting this pick-and-choose approach will enhance unpredictability in the law and increase lawsuits. As a result of the above problems, the majority's approach should be rejected. In its place, I would hold that a use that is of the same nature as a previously unobjected-to use cannot amount to a flagrant violation. And because a dog park is of the same nature as a city park, I would find that plaintiff cannot enforce the deed restriction that runs with lot 52.