Opinion ID: 2799297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Condition Compliance Order

Text: [¶21] Because we conclude that DEP’s CCO was an agency enforcement action, we review its merits.9 The CCO was issued following Fox Island’s noise infractions on July 17 and 18, 2010, and it requires Fox Island to implement certain noise reduction mechanisms when the wind conditions match those present during those noncompliance periods. Specifically, the CCO requires Fox Island to implement a particular operational plan between 7:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. whenever the wind direction is between 200 and 250 degrees, or south-southwest, and the wind shear falls within a specific range. [¶22] DEP’s formal determination of noncompliance noted that Fox Island “is likely to exceed the required sound compliance level . . . when there is a significant vertical and directional shear.” The record on which the CCO was issued included evidence that wind shear is “most possible” with a south-southwest wind in the Gulf of Maine, as was the case on July 17 and 18, 2010. The record also contained evidence that wind shear is possible with other wind directions as well, that not all wind shear would result in a noise violation, and that the level of shear should be measured by the “wind shear coefficient.” However, DEP 9 FIWN has standing to challenge the CCO because it has demonstrated a particularized injury, namely the claim of negative impact from excessive noise emanating from the wind energy development. See Great Hill Fill & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 641 A.2d 184, 184 (Me. 1994). Further, there is no separation-of-powers issue because this is an enforcement action, a final agency action for which judicial review is expressly authorized by statute. See 5 M.R.S. §§ 11001, 11007 (2014); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985). 12 concluded that, other than wind direction, there was no clear evidence of what factors affect this coefficient. [¶23] FIWN argues that DEP could not, based on this record evidence, have rationally adopted a CCO that addresses only the speculative factor of wind direction to the exclusion of what FIWN contends is the one clear causative factor: wind shear of a certain coefficient. Essentially, FIWN contends that the CCO did not go far enough to address potential noise violations because its terms were limited to the wind direction present on July 17 and 18, 2010, when winds blowing from other directions might be just as harmful. [¶24] However, the possibility of noise violations under meteorological conditions other than those present during the July violations does not negate the substantial record evidence supporting the CCO. See 5 M.R.S. § 11007(4)(C)(5) (2014) (providing that the court may reverse an administrative decision if it is “[u]nsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record”). The CCO addressed Fox Island’s operations under weather conditions that DEP knew to have resulted in the only formal instances of noncompliance in the record. While these may not be the only conditions under which Fox Island’s operations result in noise violations, DEP rationally focused on wind direction in issuing the CCO. [¶25] This is not a case where DEP refused to undertake any enforcement action. The CCO, much like a consent decree, was an agreement reached by the 13 parties in lieu of DEP’s pursuing further enforcement action such as sanctions or greater conditions imposed upon Fox Island. The petitioners do not complain that DEP refused to take any enforcement action; rather, they complain that DEP’s action did not go far enough. This goes to the essence of prosecutorial discretion: agencies have a great deal of discretion when it comes to enforcement of the laws under their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lindemann v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 2008 ME 187, ¶ 17, 961 A.2d 538; Herrle v. Town of Waterboro, 2001 ME 1, ¶¶ 10-11, 763 A.2d 1159. As a matter of policy, an agency’s chosen level of enforcement may be more or less than that which is sought, but our review must give deference to the agency so long as its action is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Contrary to FIWN’s argument, DEP’s decision to enter into an agreed upon order rather than push for further conditions was supported by substantial record evidence and was within the agency’s discretion.