Opinion ID: 2752606
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ambiguities in the Act

Text: First, the Act is unclear as to what it requires registered sex offenders to provide. The district court—at the urging of the State—adopted narrowing constructions to clarify the meanings of “Internet identifier” and “Internet service provider.” The district court construed the Act’s requirement that Internet identifiers be reported to require only reporting of identifiers used to engage in “interactive communication,” not those used for shopping or reading content. It also construed the Act to require a registered sex offender to report a new Internet identifier only once he or she actually uses the identifier for a communicative purpose. As to ISPs, 26 DOE V. HARRIS the district court construed the Act to require disclosure only of ISPs with which registered sex offenders have an open account, and not friends’ or family members’ accounts or publicly available WiFi that does not require an account. Despite the district court’s valiant effort at applying narrowing constructions, we are reluctant to adopt a narrowing construction where, as here, the terms of the statute itself—including its definition section—are ambiguous and arguably inconsistent. See White, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 1312 (holding that a statute using the term “interactive online communication” chilled a sex offender’s right to anonymous free speech because the term is too ambiguous). Although we will adopt a narrowing construction where a contrary construction might raise “serious constitutional doubts,” we can “impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is ‘readily susceptible’ to such a construction.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 884 (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)). First, the Act is not readily susceptible to the district court’s limitation of the Act to require registered sex offenders to report only new Internet identifiers that a sex offender actually uses for a communicative purpose. Although it is true that the Act in one place refers only to “identifier[s] used for the purpose of . . . Internet communication,” Cal. Penal Code § 290.024(b) (emphasis added), elsewhere the Act requires registered sex offenders to provide “[a] list of any and all Internet identifiers established or used by the person,” id. § 290.015(a)(4) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Act is not readily susceptible to the district court’s limitation of the Act to require registered sex offenders to report only ISPs with which they have an open DOE V. HARRIS 27 account. Again, the Act is inconsistent. One provision requires registered sex offenders to report when they add or change an “account with an Internet service provider,” id. § 290.014(b) (emphasis added), but another provision requires them to disclose “any and all Internet service providers used by the person,” § 290.015(a)(5) (emphasis added).5 And even if the Act were readily susceptible to the constructions adopted by the district court, our adoption of those constructions would not necessarily alleviate the chilling effect caused by the ambiguities in the Act. As the district court noted, “[t]he uncertainty surrounding what registrants must report—and the resultant potential chilling effect—is greater in this case because the [district court’s] interpretation of the Act is not definitive guidance to registrants about what they must report” because it “is not binding on state courts, where the registrants would face prosecution for failure to register.” Thus, whether narrowly construed or not, the ambiguities in the statute may lead registered sex offenders either to overreport their activity or underuse the Internet to avoid the difficult questions in understanding what, precisely, they must report. “This uncertainty undermines the likelihood that the [Act] has been carefully tailored to the [State’s] goal of protecting minors” and other victims. Reno, 521 U.S. at 871. 5 The broader reporting requirement found in § 290.015(a)(5)— requiring registered sex offenders to report ISPs that they use, which presumably can include hot spots and open wireless systems—is entirely consistent with the Act’s definition of the term “Internet service provider” as any “entity . . . through which a person may obtain access to the Internet.” Cal. Penal Code § 290.024(a). 28 DOE V. HARRIS And this uncertainty is particularly troubling because unclear laws inevitably lead citizens to “‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (alteration in original) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)). The State suggests that even if the CASE Act is unclear, registrants have the opportunity to ask questions when annually registering in person, and if a registrant makes an honest mistake, he or she will not be prosecuted because the law only penalizes knowing failure to register. But notwithstanding the State’s assurances that it will not prosecute “honest mistakes,” “we cannot assume that, in its subsequent enforcement, ambiguities will be resolved in favor of adequate protection of First Amendment rights.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). We therefore conclude that the Act’s ambiguities as to what registrants are required to report, combined with the criminal sanctions for failure to report, unnecessarily chill protected speech. b. Standards for release of identifying information Second, the Act burdens registered sex offenders’ ability to engage in anonymous online speech. Our nation has “a respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343. This tradition is worth protecting because “[a]nonymity . . . provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do not like its proponent.” Id. at 342. “Accordingly, an author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions DOE V. HARRIS 29 concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.” Id. Although this is not what some might call the classic anonymous-speech case, where speakers allege they are required to disclose their identities directly to their audience, we conclude that the Act nevertheless chills anonymous speech because it too freely allows law enforcement to disclose sex offenders’ Internet identifying information to the public. California’s sex offender registration law provides that, in general, information provided by registered sex offenders “shall not be open to inspection by the public.” Cal. Penal Code § 290.021. But in order “to allow members of the public to protect themselves and their children from sex offenders,” id. § 290.45(a)(2), the Act now provides that [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, . . . any designated law enforcement entity may provide information to the public about a person required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Section 290, by whatever means the entity deems appropriate, when necessary to ensure the public safety based upon information available to the entity concerning that specific person. Id. § 290.45(a)(1) (emphasis added).6 6 Notably, § 290.45 prohibits law enforcement agencies from disseminating such information through the Internet. Cal. Penal Code § 290.45(c)(1). 30 DOE V. HARRIS The problem is that § 290.45(a)(1) contains no standards for judging what is “necessary to ensure the public safety.” Without such standards, the Act impermissibly “plac[es] unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency.” City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988). In Lakewood, a municipal ordinance gave the mayor the right to grant or deny applications for newsrack permits on public property. If the mayor denied the application, he had to state the reasons for the denial. According to the Court, “nothing in the law as written require[d] the mayor to do more than make the statement ‘it is not in the public interest’ when denying a permit application.” Id. at 769. The Court rejected the idea that it should presume the mayor would deny permits “only for reasons related to the health, safety, or welfare of Lakewood citizens.” Id. at 770. Without limits “made explicit by textual incorporation, binding judicial or administrative construction, or well-established practice,” the constraints on the mayor’s authority were “illusory.” Id. at 769–70. We cannot find any constraining principle in § 290.45. “Public safety”—like “public interest”—is much too broad a concept to serve as an effective constraint on law enforcement decisions that may infringe First Amendment rights.7 See White, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 1311 (expressing 7 For this reason, this case is distinguishable from the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Shurtleff, which upheld the constitutionality of Utah’s sex offender registration statute. In that case, the Utah legislature amended its sex offender registration statute after the statute was found unconstitutional by the district court. Reviewing the amended statute, the Tenth Circuit determined that Utah had limited law enforcement officials’ use of Internet identifiers to “investigating kidnapping and sex-related crimes” and only permitted them to share such information “among law enforcement agencies, not the public at large.” 628 F.3d at 1221, 1225. DOE V. HARRIS 31 concern about a law allowing law enforcement to disclose sex offenders’ Internet identifiers “to protect the public” because “[i]t is conceivable, if not predictable, that a person in law enforcement might determine that Internet Identifiers for offenders ought to be released so that the public can search for and monitor communications which an offender intends to be anonymous”). And the promise from the State that it will use the power appropriately is not sufficient: “[T]he First Amendment protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige. We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010). The State argues that the Act, construed with existing constraints on law enforcement activities, cabins the discretion of law enforcement officials to use Internet identifying information because to conduct investigation or surveillance, “specific and articulable facts causing the officer to suspect that some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur” are required and the suspicion “that the person he or she intends to place under surveillance is involved in that activity” is also required. Given the limited purposes for which identifiers could be shared among law enforcement agencies, the court concluded that “the statute include[d] sufficient restrictions so as not to unnecessarily chill Mr. Doe’s speech.” Id. at 1225. 32 DOE V. HARRIS But these general principles of good police practices for investigation or surveillance tell us nothing about the kind of judgment required by § 290.45 for disclosure of information to the public “when necessary to ensure the public safety.” We do not believe that law enforcement would ignore § 290.45—that section also penalizes law enforcement’s misuse of sex offenders’ private information. But sex offenders’ fear of disclosure in and of itself chills their speech. If their identity is exposed, their speech, even on topics of public importance, could subject them to harassment, retaliation, and intimidation. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341–42 (“The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.”); Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 100 (1982) (holding that disclosure requirements may subject unpopular minority groups to “threats, harassment, and reprisals”). Anonymity may also be important to sex offenders engaged in protected speech because it “provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do not like its proponent.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342; see also Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“Internet anonymity facilitates the rich, diverse, and far ranging exchange of ideas.”). We thus agree with the district court that the standards for releasing Internet identifying information to the public are inadequate to constrain the discretion of law enforcement agencies and that, as a result, registered sex offenders are unnecessarily deterred from engaging in anonymous online speech. DOE V. HARRIS 33 c. 24-hour reporting requirement Third, the Act’s 24-hour update requirement “undeniably impedes protected First Amendment activity.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 355. Although registered sex offenders do not have to register before they communicate online, they must register within 24 hours of using a new Internet identifier—a shorter time than is given by registration laws in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., White, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 1294 (Georgia statute requiring registrants to provide updated information within 72 hours). This burden is particularly onerous for sex offenders who live in remote areas or who, like other citizens, have multiple Internet identifiers. See Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d. at 1122 (granting a preliminary injunction because a blog-reporting requirement that “[r]equir[ed] sex offenders to constantly update the government . . . [wa]s unnecessarily burdensome and . . . [wa]s likely to deter the offender from engaging in speech that is perfectly appropriate”). Moreover, anytime registrants want to communicate with a new identifier, they must assess whether the message they intend to communicate is worth the hassle of filling out a form, purchasing stamps, and locating a post office or mailbox. The mail-in requirement is not only psychologically chilling, but physically inconvenient, since whenever a registered sex offender obtains a new ISP or Internet identifier, he must go somewhere else within 24 hours to mail that information to the State. Cf. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307 (holding that a law requiring addressees of “communist political propaganda” to request in writing that the mailing be delivered “[wa]s almost certain to have a deterrent effect”). The Act’s 24-hour reporting requirement thus undoubtedly chills First Amendment Activity. Of course, that 34 DOE V. HARRIS chilling effect is only exacerbated by the possibility that criminal sanctions may follow for failing to update information about Internet identifiers or ISP accounts. See NAACP, 371 U.S. at 433 (“The threat of sanctions may deter the[] exercise [of First Amendment rights] almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.”). The 24-hour reporting requirement is not only onerous, it is also applied in an across-the-board fashion. The requirement applies to all registered sex offenders, regardless of their offense, their history of recidivism (or lack thereof), or any other relevant circumstance. And the requirement applies to all websites and all forms of communication, regardless of whether the website or form of communication is a likely or even a potential forum for engaging in illegal activity. (If for example a sex offender establishes a username on a news outlet’s website for purposes of posting comments to news articles, it is hard to imagine how speedily reporting that identifier will serve the government’s interests.) In short, we have a hard time finding even an attempt at narrow tailoring in this section of the Act. See White, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 1309 (“A regulatory scheme designed to further the state’s legitimate interest in protecting children from communication enticing them into illegal sexual activity should consider how and where on the internet such communication occurs.”).