Opinion ID: 1315014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: evidence from the appellant's hotel room

Text: The appellant contends that the admission of the evidence taken from his room was reversible error. He argues that this evidence was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree, since it was seized after the police had taken an allegedly illegal view of the room. We disagree. We find that the evidence was taken as a result of a valid consent search which followed a valid arrest. Therefore, regardless of whether the view into the room was constitutional, the evidence was admissible because it was seized on the basis of competent information gained independently from the questionably illegal police conduct. [4] It has long been the rule in West Virginia and other states that police officers may make warrantless felony arrests in public places upon probable cause to believe that the arrested person has committed a felony. State v. Craft, W.Va., 272 S.E.2d 46, 54 (1980). This rule is consistent with the standard set out in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 1820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). In Watson the United States Supreme Court discussed the history of warrantless felony arrests at length and concluded that such arrests may be made in public places upon probable cause and nothing more. The Court justified its holding by noting that: ... the judgment of the Nation and Congress has ... been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like. Id. at 423-24, 96 S.Ct. at 827-828. Where warrantless felony arrests are made, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment requires that, before a person can be subjected to any significant pretrial restraint, a judicial determination of probable cause must be made either before or promptly after the arrest. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), the Court recognized the necessity of allowing warrantless arrests based on probable cause, but went on to state that once a suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. Id. at 114, 95 S.Ct. at 863. The Court reasoned that: [W]hile the state's reasons for summary action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family's relationship ... when the stakes are this high, detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty. Id. In this case there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest in a public place and the appellant was given a prompt hearing by a magistrate. At the time of the arrest in front of the Worthy Hotel, the police knew that Hawkins' identification bracelet and personalized belt buckle had been found in the trash cans intermingled with the victim's identification, the bloodstained sheets and clothing, and the murder weapon. They knew that Hawkins lived in the same hotel in which the murder took place, and they had heard from an informant that Hawkins said that he had killed somebody. The police knew all this before the illegal view into the appellant's hotel room. We hold that on these facts the police had probable cause to arrest the appellant even without the added information they obtained from the view into his room. Kanawha County magistrate Jack Kinder confirmed the finding of probable cause later that same day. Following the arrest, the appellant signed a consent to search form. Before he signed it, the police read him the Miranda rights twice. The police also read the consent to search rights to him and went over the consent to search form with him. At no point did the police try to pressure the appellant into signing the form by saying either that they had looked into his room already or that they were getting a search warrant anyway. From the circumstances of this case it is clear that the appellant's consent to search was freely and voluntarily given. [5] See State v. Williams, W.Va., 249 S.E.2d 758 (1978). Hence the seizure of the evidence followed a valid arrest and a valid search. Since we have determined that the arrest and the consent search both took place on the basis of information other than that gathered during the view into the hotel room, the evidence subsequently taken from the room was admissible regardless of whether the view by the police were constitutional. There are three generally recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule: (1) where evidence sought to be introduced has an independent source, (2) where the evidence would inevitably have been discovered, and (3) where the connection between the unconstitutional police conduct and the discovery of the evidence is so attenuated as to remove any taint of the original illegality. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1249, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980). In this case the challenged evidence was seized during the execution of a valid consent search. Therefore, even if we were to assume, without so deciding, that the view of the room were illegal, we would still hold that the evidence was admissible because its seizure came about from a source independent of the police conduct.