Opinion ID: 1058853
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Approval of Subdivision Plat

Text: We begin with the Board's contention that the trial court erred in reversing the decision of the Board and approving the preliminary subdivision plat. When a local governing body's decision regarding an application for approval of a preliminary subdivision plat is appealed, a trial court must sustain the decision unless the local governing body failed to comply with the applicable subdivision ordinances or acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the application. Code § 15.2-2260(E); Hanover County v. Bertozzi, 256 Va. 350, 355, 504 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1998). On appellate review, the trial court's judgment is presumed correct and will not be set aside unless the judgment is plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 57, 419 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1992). The Board claims that the trial court did not make an explicit finding that the Board either failed to comply with the applicable subdivision ordinances or acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Regardless, the Board asserts that it rejected Greengael's preliminary subdivision plat based on the undisputed fact that Greengael failed to comply with the requirement of the subdivision ordinance regarding submission of the utility letter. Therefore, the Board contends that its action was in accordance with the subdivision ordinance, was not arbitrary and capricious, and should have been sustained by the trial court. Greengael claims that the trial court's discussion in its letter opinion of the actions of the Board and County officials constituted a finding of arbitrary and capricious behavior sufficient to justify reversal of the Board's decision. The premise of Greengael's argument and the trial court's decision is that although Greengael diligently tried to obtain the utility letter from both the County and the Town, the Board and County officials manipulated the subdivision process to prevent Greengael from obtaining the utility letter and to avoid approving the subdivision plat for residential use. Greengael supports this conclusion by citing the trial court's recitation that the Board knew that ongoing improvements to the infrastructure surrounding the property would make adequate water and sewer services available in the foreseeable future, the Board wanted to service industrial and commercial users with water and sewer as evidenced by its formal agreement with the Town executed the same day as the denial of Greengael's subdivision application, and finally the Board used the Town's denial of Greengael's application as a shield for the Board's own denial, when a fair reading of the Town Council's meeting minutes indicated the Town only denied the application because it wanted to cooperate with the Board to bring service to the Development. Although we accord the trial court's findings of fact a presumption of correctness, Sansom v. Board of Supervisors, 257 Va. 589, 595, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999), we conclude that the record in this case does not support the trial court's conclusion that the Board manipulated or used the Town's actions as a shield to avoid approving the application, nor does it support the conclusion that the Board otherwise acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the application. Greengael argues, and the trial court's letter opinion implies, that County officials were involved in Greengael's failure to secure the utility letter. The record does not support this proposition. The County denied Greengael's initial request for water and sewer service because of the undisputed fact that the County operated no such service beyond that to its airport and because it had no formal agreement with the Town to resell such service to County customers. Though the Town, which Greengael next approached to request service, did operate water and sewer facilities, it was not required to provide service to customers in the County located outside Town boundaries. Provision of such utility services is a proprietary decision, exercised at the discretion of a town. Town of Rocky Mount v. Wenco of Danville, Inc., 256 Va. 316, 320, 506 S.E.2d 17, 20 (1998). As the trial court observed, the minutes of the Town Council's meeting regarding Greengael's application to the Town include a discussion as to whether, under the Memorandum of Understanding then in place between the County and the Town, [2] Greengael's request for water and sewer service should first be presented to the County to determine whether the County wanted to provide the service; however, nothing in the minutes indicates that the County influenced this discussion or the vote of the Town rejecting the request. [3] Accordingly, the record, while showing that the Town wanted to cooperate with the County, illustrated that such cooperation was related to process, not to rejection of the request for water and sewer service. Regardless of the Town's reasons for rejecting Greengael's request, nothing in the record supports the conclusion that the County manipulated this process. The record shows that from the time of Egertson's letter until the Town's denial of Greengael's request for water and sewer services, there was no communication between Town and County officials or any of their respective agents. [4] Thus, there is no support for the trial court's finding that members of the Board or County officials influenced the Town's decision to reject Greengael's application for water and sewer services. Greengael cites several other circumstances referenced in the trial court's letter opinion to support the trial court's decision. First, the County denied Greengael's application with knowledge that the upgrades to the Town's utility services were in the planning stage and would in the foreseeable future provide adequate service to the development. The trial court further commented that based on the formal agreement between the County and Town signed ironically the same day the County rejected Greengael's application, the County could have provided the service itself if the Development was an industrial project. Neither of these circumstances supports a conclusion that the County acted in a capricious or arbitrary manner. The subdivision ordinance does not require that utility facilities be in place at the time an application for preliminary subdivision approval is presented. It only requires that an applicant produce evidence of an agreement to provide such services. Neither the County's knowledge of planned upgrades in Town water and sewer facilities nor the execution or substance of the formal agreement provides an adequate basis for establishing the required assurance that the Town or County could or would provide water and sewer services to the Development. The record is clear that at the time of Greengael's application, the Town had insufficient wastewater treatment and pumping capacity to serve the Development and would need to undertake significant line extensions, such as the completion of the new McDevitt relief sewer. Even though certain system upgrades to enhance capacity were in the planning stage, as the trial court noted, the record is also clear that such system upgrades had not occurred even at the time of trial. The formal agreement between the County and Town allowed, but did not obligate, the County to purchase capacity from the Town, even for industrial customers. Finally, Greengael's application was originally scheduled for consideration on April 1, 2003. Execution of the formal agreement on the same day the Board rejected Greengael's application, June 3, 2003, was a function of the two deferrals Greengael requested and received for consideration of its application, not a function of nefarious action by the Board. Greengael also cites as support for the trial court's decision, the trial court's statements that County officials told Greengael that it was wasting its time in seeking to develop the Property as residential because the County wanted industrial and not residential development on the site. [5] Regardless of any statements made by individual county officials, the County had determined in 2000 that commercial and industrial development of the Property was more desirable for the County and amended its Comprehensive Plan accordingly. After the adoption of the Plan, the planned commercial and industrial development in the area was public knowledge to all investors who purchased property, including Greengael. This preference by the County is not arbitrary or capricious. Finally, the trial court discussed as part of its rationale examples of cooperation between the County, Town, and other developers that resulted in provision of water and sewer service for projects that the County wants to approve. Greengael argues that this cooperation resulted in three-party agreements, which the County accepted thereby waiving the utility letter requirement. The County's failure to waive the requirement in a similar manner for Greengael or to consider the requirement satisfied by its own investigation, according to Greengael, was arbitrary and capricious. Greengael's waiver argument is unavailing. The Board cannot waive a provision of a subdivision ordinance. Code § 15.2-2254 provides that a developer cannot subdivide land without fully complying with the provisions of the subdivision ordinance. See Parker v. County of Madison, 244 Va. 39, 42, 418 S.E.2d 855, 856 (1992). Any independent investigation regarding the provision of water and sewer service undertaken by the County, regardless of the information acquired, cannot substitute for the written assurance that water and sewer would be provided. [6] Furthermore, the projects to which the trial court and Greengael refer as examples of cooperation, including a Lowes Homestore, a Ryan Homes regional office, and a Richmond American Homes residential development, have little in common with the circumstances of this case. While the exhibits and testimony regarding these projects do not always make clear whether the developers first approached the Town or County for service, they do illustrate that each project conformed to the County's Comprehensive Plan, that the Town approved extension of water and sewer service based on its determination that it could presently or in the near future provide adequate water and sewer service to the proposed developments, and that the developers sought County approval for the Town's agreements to extend water and sewer service. In contrast, Greengael's project did not conform to the Comprehensive Plan, Greengael did not receive Town approval of its request for extension of water and sewer service, and Greengael categorically refused to include the County as a party to its negotiations with the Town. [7] The trial court's discussion of cooperation therefore does not support a finding of arbitrary and capricious behavior on the part of the Board. In sum, the County had no means of providing water and sewer service to Greengael when asked to do so; the County was not asked to approve or acquiesce in the Town's provision of such service to Greengael; the Town had no obligation to provide water and sewer service to Greengael; and there is no evidence that the County influenced the Town's decision to reject Greengael's application. Because Greengael's application did not contain the utility letter required for approval of a preliminary subdivision application, the Board acted in compliance with the applicable subdivision ordinance in denying approval, and its decision was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, we will reverse that part of the trial court's judgment overturning the Board's decision and approving the preliminary subdivision plat.