Opinion ID: 765760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidentiary Claim Barred by Teague v. Lane

Text: 29 In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989), the Supreme Court held that habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review. . . . The Court has made it clear that the application of Teague, while being a threshold question in a federal habeas case, is not 'jurisdictional' in the sense that [federal courts] . . . must raise and decide the issue sua sponte. Collins v.Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1994). Conversely, the Court has also made it clear that, if raised, a federal court must apply Teague: 30 We have recognized that the nonretroactivity principle is not 'jurisdictional' in the sense that [federal courts] . . . must raise and decide the issue sua sponte. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S. Ct. 783, 788, 127 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1994). . . . But if the State does argue that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule of constitutional law, the court must apply Teague before considering the merits of the claim. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 466-67, 113 S. Ct. 892, 897-898, 122 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1993). 31 Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) (emphasis added). However, until recently, the Court had not provided the lower courts with guidance as to what procedural formalities were necessary to constitute a properly raised Teague claim. See Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 371, 416 (1991). Indeed, in the aftermath of Teague, the circuits have grappled with what procedural requirements were necessary for a state to preserve its Teague argument -- i.e., what procedural requirements were necessary to render the Court's application of Teague mandatory. See, e.g., Wilmer v. Johnson, 30 F.3d 451, 454-55 (3rd Cir. 1994); Epperly v. Brooks, 997 F.2d 1, 9 n. 7 (4th Cir. 1993); Jordan v. DuCharme, 983 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1993); Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448, 457-59 (4th Cir. 1992); Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1534-37 (9th Cir. 1992). 32 Then, in the case of Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115 (1995), the Supreme Court brought clarity to the confusion by definitively announcing the procedural prerequisites necessary for a properly raised Teague claim. In Goeke, the habeas petitioner appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing that she had stated a procedural due process violation, and that the district court's denial of her petition should therefore be reversed. Id. at 117. At oral argument, the panel suggested that the petitioner's claim may have actually been based on substantive due process grounds, rather than procedural due process grounds. Id. The petitioner's counsel welcomed the suggestion and argued the substantive due process claim before the court. Id. This was the first time that the substantive due process argument was raised and argued. Id. In turn, the state argued that any substantive due process argument was barred by the application of Teague. Id. The record indicated that several questions and answers were exchanged at oral argument by the state and the panel regarding the application of Teague to the substantive due process claim. Id. at 118. Thereafter, the Eighth Circuit held that the petitioner's substantive due process rights had been violated, and reversed the district court's decision without addressing the state's Teague claim. Id. at 117. Then, after denying the state's motion for rehearing en banc, the majority modified its opinion to explain that it had not confronted the applicability of Teague to the petitioner's claim because the state had waived the issue. Id. (citing Branch v. Turner, 37 F.3d 371, 374-75 (1994)). 33 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Eighth Circuit, finding that the state had preserved the Teague argument as applied to the petitioner's substantive due process claim, even though the claim was addressed for the first time at oral argument. Id. at 118. The Court reasoned that because the state had made efforts to alert the Eighth Circuit to the Teague problem [so as to] provide[ ] the court with ample opportunity to make a reasoned judgment on the issue, . . . the state did not waive the Teague issue. 7 Id. In short, Goekenow makes it clear that a federal court's sua sponte application of Teague is discretionary; however, when raised by the state, a federal court's application of Teague is mandatory, even when raised for the first time at the first hearing on appeal as long as the state provides the appellate court with ample opportunity to make a reasoned judgment on the issue. 34 This conclusion is supported by a decision from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Ciak v. United States, the Second Circuit was asked to consider whether the district court erred in denying the petitioner a writ of habeas corpus under the automatic reversal rule, where the trial judge failed to inquire into the possible conflicts of interest of the petitioner's trial counsel. 59 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 1995). The state argued that the automatic reversal rule was not applicable because the rule only applied to cases on direct appeal. Id. The state did not, however, argue that the automatic reversal rule could not be applied to the petitioner's case under Teague. Id. at 302. In analyzing whether the district court erred in denying the writ, the Second Circuit found that the state had waived a Teague claim under Goeke because it did not argue in its brief or at oral argument that Teague bar[red] application of the automatic reversal rule. Ciak, 59 F.3d at 302 (citing Goeke, 514 U.S. at 118) (emphasis added). In other words, under Goeke, the Ciak Court would not have considered a Teague argument waived had the state raised the claim in its brief on appeal or at oral argument before the Court, even though the state had not raised Teague in the district court. 35 In fact, authority existed pre Goeke to support the same conclusion. In a habeas appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Court found that the state had waived its Teague argument by its failure to raise the issue at the district court level or at the first hearing before this court. Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448, 459 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991 (1992) (emphasis added). By using the disjunctive or as opposed to the conjunctive and, the Fourth Circuit expressly found that it would have considered a Teague argument raised for the first time at the first hearing before the Court. Therefore, authority existed before Goeke was decided to support the proposition that a state need not necessarily raise a Teague claim at the district court level in order to preserve the issue for appellate review. 36 Accordingly, in the instant case, the state properly preserved its Teague claim for our review because the state argued in both its brief on appeal to this Court as well as at oral argument that the application of Teague barred the relief sought. For example, at oral argument, the state argued its Teague claim as follows: 37 THE STATE: [I]t would seem then that if there is no federal case on point, then this evidence is inadmissible, then under Teague v. Lane, this would be a new rule. THE COURT: 38 (Moore, J.)Did you raise your Teague argument earlier? 39 THE STATE: No, but I would say this about it. In the district court I did not. I say it's not analogous to a default argument as the petitioner argues because it's not something that can be waived. It doesn't involve the questions of federalism and comity. It's an administrative rule actually. Administrative in the sense that it's the way that the Supreme Court says that we will handle these cases of new rules. So, I didn't say that, but I think it's subsumed in my argument when I say that this is not a federal question and Ihave consistently said that before the magistrate, the district court, this is not a federal question, it is a state evidentiary question. But also, the magistrate when he made his ruling, well the petitioner argued in response to me that the legal landscape would have required application of this rule and the legal landscape that he's referring to are those four state cases, which was also the basis for the magistrate's ruling. But three of those four cases were decided as a matter of state evidentiary law, only one of them -- a Connecticut case -- deals with federal constitutional matters. That was overlooked by the magistrate. Also, the fact that the dissenting justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that there were various jurisdictions that do permit the admissibility of this probability testimony, at least four of them I think the dissenting justice noted. THE COURT: 40 (Moore, J.)Counsel, you've used your full 15 minutes. 41 THE STATE:Thank you. THE COURT: 42 (Moore, J.)Thank you. 43 Lyons v. Stovall, No. 97-1894, Oral Argument by Respondent, June 19, 1998. In addition, Petitioner responded to the state's Teague claim in his brief on appeal to this Court, and argued why he believed that Teague did not bar his evidentiary claim. See Petitioner-Appellee's Final Brief on Appeal at 23-31. Accordingly, the record indicates that the state's efforts to alert this Court to the Teague problem provided th[e] court with ample opportunity to make a reasoned judgment on the issue. Goeke, 514 U.S. at 118. Thus, under Goeke, and as reinforced by Ciak and Williams, it is clear that the state properly raised and preserved its Teague claim, albeit for the first time on appeal; as such, this Court's application of the rule is mandatory. See Caspari, 510 U.S. at 389. Furthermore, as noted infra in this discussion, the improvidence of advancing new rules of law on collateral review provides support for finding that the preservation of Teague's application should not be limited or held to wooden literalness. See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 n.4 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). 44 However, relying upon Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804, 805 n.1 (6th Cir. 1995) and Kordenbrock, v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1104 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc), Petitioner claims that the state waived its Teague argument inasmuch as the state failed to raise this argument either to the magistrate judge or in its objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation that it submitted to the district judge. In light of Supreme Court precedent, the cases relied upon by Petitioner are distinguishable and ill-decided. For example, the case at hand is distinguishable from Kordenbrock. In that case, this Circuit found that the state's failure to raise a Teague argument at any stage of the proceeding constituted a waiver of the argument. 919 F.2d at 1104 n.4. True enough, a federal court may exercise its discretion and consider a Teague argument waived if not raised by the state at all; however, it is equally true that, once raised, a federal court must apply Teague. See Caspari, 510 U.S. at 389. Accordingly, although Kordenbrock was properly decided in that Teague was never raised by the state, it is also distinguishable from the facts of the instant case, and Petitioner's reliance on Kordenbrock is thus misplaced. 45 Furthermore, Petitioner's reliance on Sinistaj is misplaced because that case was wrongly decided in light of Goeke. In Sinistaj, a case decided post-Goeke, a panel of this Court held that the state waived its Teague argument because it raised the issue for the first time in its motion to amend the district court's judgment.66 F.3d at 806 n.1. The Sinistaj court relied upon Caspari in support of its finding. Id. However, Caspari simply states that a federal court need not raise and decide Teague sua sponte. 510 U.S. at 389. Goeke, on the other hand, specifically states that Teague need only be raised by the state to the extent that it allows the appellate court ample opportunity to make a reasoned judgment before Teague's application is mandatory -- even when the state raises Teague for the first time at the first hearing before the appellate court. 514 U.S. at 117-18. Therefore, inasmuch as Goeke had already been decided at the time the Sinistaj court rendered its decision, Sinistaj is in direct contravention to Supreme Court precedent, and Petitioner's reliance on Sinistaj is also misplaced and unfounded. 46 Accordingly, in the case at hand, having found that the state properly preserved its Teague argument, and that Teague must therefore be applied, it is dispositive. As argued by the state, any decision announcing that the presumption of innocence is violated by the use of evidence which assumes a statistical probability of guilt would be a new rule under Teague, and therefore cannot be used as grounds for granting the petition for habeas relief. 8
47 Under Teague, a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. Id. In determining whether the relief requested would constitute a new rule, the question becomes 'whether a state court considering [the petitioner's] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution.' Caspari, 510 U.S. at 390 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990)). 48 There are two exceptions to Teague's general proposition that new rules should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The first exception applies to those rules that plac[e] certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. 9 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted). The second exception to Teague's nonretroactivity permits the application of 'watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). A rule that qualifies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This exception encompassesa small core of rules requiring 'observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311) (internal quotation marks omitted). The rule espoused in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), that a defendant has the right to be represented by counsel in all criminals trials for serious offenses, is often cited as an example of a rule falling within this exception, although the precise contours of this exception may be difficult to discern. See Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495. 49 Here, although Petitioner argues that the state waived its Teague argument, he also contends that should the Court find otherwise, the application of Teague does not bar the relief sought because the district court did not state a new rule of law in holding that probability evidence which assumes a statistical probability of guilt violates the presumption of innocence; and that, even assuming that a new rule was espoused, it falls into Teague's second exception for nonretroactivity. Both of Petitioner's contentions are meritless. 50 First, the district court clearly set forth a new rule under Teague because the Michigan appellate courts had no legal basis at the time that they adjudicated Petitioner's case to feel compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [Petitioner sought] was required by the Constitution. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488. Precedents which inform or even control or govern the intervening decision do not keep it from being a new rule if the precedents do not compel the decision. Id. 51 Petitioner argues that if the Michigan appellate courts had conducted a survey of the legal landscape at the time Mr. Lyons' conviction became final in April 1995, they would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule he seeks was then required by the Constitution. Petitioner relies upon case law from other state court jurisdictions in support of his contention. However, the Michigan courts were not bound by decisions from these other state jurisdictions and therefore surely would not have felt compelled to embrace them 10 . 52 In addition, Petitioner also claims that his legal proposition, that the use of evidence that assumes a statistical probability of guilt violates the presumption of innocence, is not a new rule because it flows directly from bedrock principles stated in long-established federal law cases embracing the presumption of innocence. However, Petitioner's argument is without merit because those cases did not speak to the specific violation of the presumption of innocence alleged here. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). In Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817, 821-22 (6th Cir. 1991), this Court concluded that the rule espoused by Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) -- that jury instructions containing a presumption indicating that one intends the consequences of his voluntary actions are unconstitutional because they abridge the principles of presumption of innocenceand allocation of burden of proof thereby denying a defendant due process of law -- was a new rule under Teague despite these long-established federal cases embracing the presumption of innocence. 53 As the Court in Cain recognized, a legal ruling sought by a federal habeas petition will be deemed 'new' as long as the correctness of the rule is susceptible to debate among reasonable minds. 947 F.2d at 821 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990)). Here, it is susceptible to debate as to whether the probability of paternity statistics violate the presumption of innocence, inasmuch as courts have allowed the use of these statistics without finding error. See State v. Wisconsin, 426 N.E.2d 320, 329 (Wis. 1988) (Steinmetz, J., dissenting) (collecting cases from jurisdictions that allow the use of the statistics in question); see also Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 353 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that a result is not dictated by precedent when courts have reached divergent results on an issue before resolution by the Supreme Court); Cain, 947 F.2d at 821 (noting the fact that the jury instructions found to be unconstitutional were routinely given without challenge rendered their correctness susceptible to debate among reasonable minds). Therefore, Petitioner's claim that the rule he advocates is not a new rule under Teague is without merit. 54 Furthermore, Petitioner's alternative claim that the rule falls under Teague's second exception to nonretroactivity -- those rules which implicat[e] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding -- is also without merit. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. Petitioner argues that the rule falls under Teague's second exception inasmuch as the rule is based upon protecting a defendant's presumption of innocence which lies at the cornerstone of this country's criminal justice system. However, because the new rule lacks the primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in Gideon, it does not rise to the level of the second exception. See Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495. 55 As noted, the petitioner in Cain v. Redman sought to apply retroactively the new rule espoused by the Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979), which was also premised upon a defendant's presumption of innocence; namely, that jury instructions containing a presumption indicating that one intends the consequences of his voluntary actions are unconstitutional because they abridge the principles of the presumption of innocence and the allocation of the burden of proof, thereby depriving a defendant of due process of law. Cain, 947 F.2d 817, 819-22 (6th Cir. 1991); see supra note 3 and accompanying text. The district court found that the petitioner could not invoke the Sandstrom rule inasmuch as this new rule did not fall under either of Teague's exceptions, specifically Teague's second exception, and this Court agreed. Id. at 822 (citing Cain v. Redman, 757 F. Supp. 831, 835 (W.D. Mich. 1990)). This Court noted that the new rule was not within the narrow category of fundamental bedrock procedural elements that come within this exception, and adopted the district court reasoning as follows: 56 The second Teague exception is reserved for 'watershed rules of criminal procedure' that are necessary to the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding. Sawyer v. Smith, [--- U.S. ---], 110 S. Ct. [2822] at 2831 [111 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1990)] (citing Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1263). Although the precise contours of this exception may be difficult to discern, the Supreme Court has usually cited Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), holding that a defendant has the right to be represented by counsel in all criminal trials for serious offenses, to illustrate the type of rule coming with the exception. Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1264. To fit within the second exception, a newrule must do more than improve the accuracy of the trial; it must alter the understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2831. Against these standards, I conclude that Sandstrom does not represent one of the watershed rules envisioned by Teague. 57 Cain, 947 F.2d at 822 (quoting Cain v. Redman, 757 F. Supp. at 835). 58 Accordingly, inasmuch as a panel of this Court has held that a new rule which found that a jury instruction is unconstitutional because it violated a defendant's due process rights by infringing upon the defendant's presumption of innocence did not fall under Teague's narrow second exception, the similar new rule proposed in this case -- that use of evidence which assumes a statistical probability of guilt infringes upon a defendant's presumption of innocence -- would likewise not rise to the level of one of the watershed rules envisioned by Teague. In fact, the Sandstrom rule presents an even more compelling case for finding such an exception, inasmuch as the rule deals with a jury instruction that infringed upon the defendant's presumption of innocence, as opposed to the situation in this case where it is alleged that evidence which the jury could weigh and consider as it saw fit infringed upon Petitioner's presumption of innocence. 59 Furthermore, the new rule proposed by Petitioner is along the lines of that pronounced in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1989), which the Supreme Court later found to be a new rule that did not fit into either of the two exceptions set forth under Teague. See Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990). Caldwell held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty where it was found that the sentencer had been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's capital punishment lie elsewhere. 472 U.S. at 328-29. The petitioner in Sawyer argued that the rule espoused in Caldwell should fall under the second exception to nonretroactivity. 497 U.S. at 242. The petitioner contended that the second exception should be read to include new rules of capital sentencing that 'preserve the accuracy and fairness of capital sentencing judgments.' Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the petitioner, because his argument disregarded the second requirement of the exception; namely, that the rule must also 'alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essential to the fairness of a proceeding. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). Inasmuch as the Court found that Caldwell failed to meet this latter requirement, it affirmed the Fifth Circuit's denial of the writ. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 495. 60 In addition, the Supreme Court has found it unlikely that a new rule will emerge in modern jurisprudence which alters our understanding of the criminal procedure essential to the accuracy and fairness of a trial. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 313 (finding that it is unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge). Accordingly, the new rule purported here fails to alter our basic understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding, particularly where this Court has found that a similar new rule did not fall under this narrow exception and where it is rare to find such a rule in today's jurisprudence. 61 The [a]pplication of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 (citing Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 150 (1970)). Perhaps Justice Powell best summarized the improvidence of advancingnew rules on collateral review in his concurrence in Solem: 62 Retroactive application on habeas corpus of constitutional rules governing criminal procedure is unnecessary to advance the purposes of habeas corpus, even under a regime that permits the federal courts on habeas to vacate a final conviction on any properly preserved ground of federal constitutional error. Review on habeas to determine that the conviction rests upon correct application of the law in effect at the time of conviction is all that is required to forc[e] trial and appellate courts . . . to toe the constitutional mark. Nor will fundamental fairness require complete retroactivity, except in rare instances. Because retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law generally does little to advance the purposes of collateral relief on habeas, it is particularly difficult in such cases to justify imposing upon the state the costs of collateral review. These are not insubstantial. They include the burden on judicial and prosecutorial resources entailed in retrial and the miscarriage of justice that occurs when a guilty offender is set free only because effective retrial is impossible years after the offense. Retroactive application of constitutional rules frustrates the state's enforcement of its criminal law despite the state's careful adherence to the federal constitutional standards that governed at the time of the prisoner's conviction. 63 Solem, 465 U.S. at 653-54 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted). For the reasons set forth herein and best summarized by Justice Powell, retroactive application of the new rule proposed by Petitioner is barred by Teague v. Lane.
64 In the dissent, Judge Moore begins her analysis with the presumption that the state, like any other litigant, loses a defense it fails to raise, and notes that [t]his presumption is consistent with our general approach to waivers of claims and defenses in civil litigation, and is consistent with our strict enforcement of the procedural requirements imposed on criminal defendants and habeas petitioners. 11 However, in making this presumption, and ultimately finding that the state waived its Teague defense, Judge Moore fails to hold Petitioner to this presumptive standard. In other words, Judge Moore focuses on the state's failure to raise the exhaustion and Teague defenses; however, in doing so, she palliates Petitioner's failure to exhaust his state court remedies on his evidentiary claim, as well as his what would likely be his apparent procedural default. Therefore, it appears that Judge Moore is using the procedural requirements in this case as both a sword and a shield, where she holds the state and Petitioner to a double standard. On the one hand she excuses the Petitioner's failure to exhaust his state court remedies and apparent procedural default; and yet, on the other hand, she refuses to excuse the state's failure to raise the exhaustion and Teague defenses. Under the facts of this case, such an outcome particularly unsettling. 65 Furthermore, when applying the factors such as federalism, comity, and finality to determine whether to apply Teague sua sponte in this case, as suggested by Judge Moore, it is clear that these factors weigh in favor of Teague's application. As notedin Section I., there are strong comity concerns in this case, and it would serve in the best interests of finality to apply Teague inasmuch as the district court itself -- the court which granted Petitioner's application for the writ -- found that there is a strong likelihood of reconviction here. This is likewise true for the factor that Judge Moore believes weighs particularly in favor of declining to apply Teague sua sponte -- the interests of justice. Judge Moore notes in her dissent that the interests of justice include actual innocence, whether the proper resolution of the merits of the claim is clear, and whether the district court granted habeas relief. However, a thorough application of these factors weighs in favor of applying Teague here. First, as noted, there is a strong likelihood that Petitioner would be convicted of this crime again; therefore, his innocence is highly questionable. Second, the resolution of the merits of Petitioner's claim is far from clear and the case law from the several jurisdictions which allow the use of the statistical data in question. See State v. Wisconsin, 426 N.E.2d at 329 (collecting cases from jurisdictions which allow the use of the statistics in question). Third, although it is true that the district court granted habeas relief, it also refused to release Petitioner from prison pending this appeal. Accordingly, in the interests of justice, Teague should be applied here. 12