Opinion ID: 1904242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: lower courts' rationales

Text: Before we address the rationales of the courts below, it will be helpful to review the distinction made in common law legal systems between issues of fact and issues of law. 5 R. Pound, Jurisprudence 544 (1959) presents, as the best judicial discussion of the subject, excerpts from the opinion of Lord Denning in British Launderers' Association v. Borough of Hendon Rating Authority, [1949] 1 K.B. 470, 471-72: Primary facts are facts which are observed by witnesses and proved by oral testimony or facts proved by the production of a thing itself, such as original documents. Their determination is essentially a question of fact for the tribunal of fact, and the only question of law that can arise on them is whether there was any evidence to support the finding. The conclusions from primary facts are, however, inferences deduced by a process of reasoning from them. If, and in so far as, those conclusions can as well be drawn by a layman (properly instructed on the law) as by a lawyer, they are conclusions of fact for the tribunal of fact; and the only questions of law which can arise on them are whether there was a proper direction in point of law; and whether the conclusion is one which could reasonably be drawn from the primary facts.... If, and in so far, however, as the correct conclusion to be drawn from primary facts requires, for its correctness, determination by a trained lawyer  as, for instance, because it involves the interpretation of documents or because the law and the facts cannot be separated, or because the law on the point cannot properly be understood or applied except by a trained lawyer  the conclusion is a conclusion of law on which an appellate tribunal is as competent to form an opinion as the tribunal of first instance. [5 R. Pound, supra, at 549-50 (footnote omitted).] We shall assume, without deciding, that there is no dispute of material, primary fact in the instant case. From the primary facts some tribunal must deduce when the plaintiffs were on notice. That ultimate fact is ordinarily a question for the trier of facts going to the merits. `[W]hether or not the plaintiff's failure to discover his cause of action was due to failure on his part to use due diligence, or to the fact that defendant so concealed the wrong that plaintiff was unable to discover it by the exercise of due diligence, is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.' New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Swain, 100 Md. 558, 574, 60 A. 469, 472 (1905) (quoting Faust v. Hosford, 119 Iowa 97, 100, 93 N.W. 58, 59 (1903)); see also Herring v. Offutt, 266 Md. 593, 599, 295 A.2d 876, 880 (1972); Cummings v. Bannon, 8 A. 357 (Md. 1887); cf. Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484, 471 A.2d 297 (1984) (whether the facts, as found by the trier of fact, in a malicious prosecution action show the absence or presence of probable cause is a question for the court). Both the trial court and the Court of Special Appeals correctly recognized that the question of when the plaintiffs were on notice was a question of fact. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded, erroneously, that this question of fact could be decided by the court. The Court of Special Appeals accepted that premise so that it reviewed the circuit court summary judgment under the inapplicable standard of whether the trial judge's fact-findings were clearly erroneous. The circuit court, making a credibility determination, rejected, as arbitrary and contrived, Michael's account of how discovery had come about. The trial judge said that there were substantial limitations-related facts on which this court can base a determination that plaintiffs' cause is barred by limitations. She then found that on the basis of inference which reasonable persons would have drawn from the news reports, the plaintiffs, James and Michael, at least have been put on notice to investigate the alleged wrongs more than three years before their suit was filed. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed as to Michael and James on the ground that limitations is still a matter for the judge rather than the jury even if the facts concerning discovery are disputed. O'Hara v. Kovens, 60 Md. App. at 629, 484 A.2d at 280. These holdings cannot be reconciled with fundamental summary judgment law. In reaching their results both courts relied upon Moy v. Bell, 46 Md. App. 364, 416 A.2d 289, cert. denied, 288 Md. 740 (1980) and Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202, 422 A.2d 389 (1980), cert. denied, 289 Md. 735 (1981). Moy was an appeal from a judgment for the defendants entered on a motion to dismiss granted under former Maryland Rule 535 at the end of the plaintiffs' case. The judgment was premised on limitations as to which there were conflicting, material, factual inferences. The Moy court affirmed, saying: If there is a legal question raised, which would end it if factually found to apply in the plaintiff's own case, the judge, while still in his judicial capacity, is charged with deciding the appropriate facts necessary to deciding that legal issue. Here, when the motion to dismiss was offered raising the statute of limitations as a bar, the trial judge sat in both seats simultaneously. Our review on appeal then must carefully differentiate the purposes for which the facts were found. Because the ultimate issue to be decided on the motion was the applicability of the statute of limitations, we may not set aside the facts found by the trial judge in relation thereto unless he was clearly in error. Md.Rule 1086. [46 Md. App. at 368-69, 416 A.2d at 293.] We would serve no useful purpose in analyzing whether Moy correctly stated how former Md.R. 535 operated, because the power of the trial court to make factual determinations in ruling on a motion for judgment at the close of a plaintiff's case in a bench trial is now governed by Rule 2-519(b) which is in part new. [6] Moy, however, went on to say that [t]he application of a statute of limitations is strictly a legal question and it is apparent that the facts necessary to determine its application, such as when a cause of action accrues, if a cause of action accrues, etc., must be made by the judge in his judicial role. 46 Md. App. at 370, 416 A.2d at 293-94 (footnote omitted). This oversimplification is wrong. The same oversimplification led the Court of Special Appeals in Decker v. Fink, supra , to review a judgment based upon limitations which had been rendered on a directed verdict granted at the close of the plaintiff's case by applying a clearly erroneous standard to fact-findings made by the trial judge rather than by resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the plaintiff. The notion that all aspects of a limitations defense, including the resolution of conflicting facts and inferences, is a function of the court alone can be traced to misinterpretation in certain opinions by the Court of Special Appeals of decisions by this Court concerning the discovery rule in the era prior to Poffenberger, 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677. Moy v. Bell, 46 Md. App. at 370, 416 A.2d at 293-94, supported the position that only judges are involved in ruling on limitations by citation to Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 74-75, 394 A.2d 299, 302 (1978) and to Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 145, 215 A.2d 825, 830 (1966). Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. at 210-11, 422 A.2d at 393-94, supported the proposition by citation to Moy v. Bell and to Jones v. Sugar, 18 Md. App. 99, 305 A.2d 219 (1973). Jones v. Sugar was a medical malpractice case in which the trial court had granted motions for summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on limitations. The court concluded its discussion of limitations in professional malpractice actions by saying: The question when a cause of action accrues is a judicial one; it is for the court to determine, and not the trier of fact. Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, supra, [241 Md.] at 145 [215 A.2d 825] quoting, patently with approval, 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, 685, 686 (4th ed. 1916). [18 Md. App. at 105, 305 A.2d at 223 (footnote omitted).] In a footnote to the above-quoted passage the court presents a long quotation from Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973) which clarifies that the court's intent in Jones is to place fact issues, including credibility, in the domain of the court. Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, supra , also involved a limitations defense to a medical malpractice claim. The citations to Waldman in Moy and in Jones focus on the following sentence which formed part of Waldman's discussion of a New Jersey decision, Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961): The [New Jersey] Court then quoted 1 Wood Limitation of Actions, 685, 686 (4th ed. 1916) that the question when a cause of action accrues is a judicial one, and to determine it in any particular case is to establish a general rule of law for a class of cases, which rule must be founded on reason and justice, and held that in foreign object or substance cases limitations fairly and justly should run from the time of discovery of the right of action, its previous decision to the contrary notwithstanding. [241 Md. at 145, 215 A.2d at 830.] Prior to the general adoption of the discovery rule in Poffenberger, this Court had said that the word accrues in Courts Article § 5-101 generally referred to the time when the alleged wrong occurred. The discovery rule was an exception which had been applied to certain kinds of actions beginning with medical malpractice in Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917) and thereafter to other specific types of wrongs as cases arose. See Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 40 nn. 2-9, 501 A.2d 446, 451 nn. 2-9 (1985); Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 634-36, 431 A.2d at 679-80. Prior to Poffenberger, whether the discovery or the occurrence of the wrong test was to be applied was for the court to determine just as, following Poffenberger, how the discovery rule operates in different types of cases is for the court to determine. See Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, supra (latent disease actions accrue at the earlier of discovery or death). It was that judicial function of establishing the rule governing accrual in various types of cases to which Waldman referred. Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 284 Md. at 75, 394 A.2d at 302, did not enlarge the judicial function when it said that [a]bsent such statutory definition, the question of when a cause of action accrues is left to judicial determination. [7] These statements do not mean that fact-finding on limitations issues is always for the court. This Court's Poffenberger refutes that concept. There a homeowner sued the builder upon discovering that the house violated a setback requirement. The trial court applied a discovery rule but granted summary judgment for the defendant because it found that the plaintiff had not been diligent. The Court of Special Appeals disagreed on that phase of the case but affirmed on the ground that constructive notice based on land records had started the statute running. Poffenberger v. Risser, 46 Md. App. 600, 421 A.2d 90 (1980). [8] This Court, applying a discovery rule, held that land record notice did not trigger the statute and reversed the Court of Special Appeals. We directed remand to the circuit court for further proceedings because of a factual dispute which had to be resolved. [T]he record seems to establish no contest as to the fact that the respondent lacked express knowledge with respect to the side lot line infringement until the time the adjoining lot was surveyed. However, there is reflected a factual dispute regarding whether, sometime prior to that survey, the petitioner possessed knowledge from which actual notice may be inferred. Consequently, the granting of summary judgment was error and its entry must be reversed. [290 Md. at 638, 431 A.2d at 681.] If the position taken by the Court of Special Appeals in the case now before us were correct, then this Court need not have remanded to the circuit court in Poffenberger. If resolving conflicting facts is the function of the trial judge on a summary judgment motion raising a limitations defense, then the trial judge in Poffenberger had already performed that function. See James v. Weisheit, 279 Md. at 46, 367 A.2d at 486 ([W]hether a cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact that may be taken from the jury only when the court determines as a matter of law that the suit was not instituted within the proper time.); Merchants Mortgage Co. v. Lubow, 275 Md. 208, 339 A.2d 664 (1975) (grant of summary judgment for defendant on limitations grounds reversed and case remanded; reasonable diligence affected by fiduciary relationship). Numerous other decisions in this Court demonstrate that questions of fact on which a limitations defense will turn are to BE DECIDED BY THE JURY OR, WHEN SITTING AS A JURY, BY THE COURT. These issues of fact include: when a notice of assessment on an insurance policy was sent, where that date determined accrual, Lichtenberg v. Joyce, 183 Md. 689, 39 A.2d 789 (1944); when services were rendered, where that date determined accrual, Wash., Balto. & Annap. Elec. R.R. Co. v. Moss, 130 Md. 198, 100 A. 86 (1917); whether and/or when a new promise had been made which would have the effect of removing the bar of limitations, Brown v. Hebb, 167 Md. 535, 175 A. 602 (1934), Gill v. Donovan, 96 Md. 518, 54 A. 117 (1903), Shipley v. Shilling, 66 Md. 558, 8 A. 355 (1887), Newman v. McComas, 43 Md. 70 (1875), Guy v. Tams, 6 Gill 82 (1847), and Oliver v. Gray, 1 H. & G. 204 (1827); whether a part payment on account had been made so as to remove the bar of limitations, Quynn v. Carroll, 10 Md. 197 (1856); and whether the plaintiff's action for malicious interference with a contractual relationship had been concealed by fraud, Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. DeWitt, 120 Md. 381, 87 A. 927 (1913).