Opinion ID: 2974477
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dendinger’s State-Law Claims

Text: Finally, Dendinger asserts claims under Ohio state law for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and for gender discrimination in violation of OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 4112.02(A). The district court granted summary judgment on both claims, concluding that the IIED claim was unsupported by evidence and that the § 4112.02(A) claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The district court was correct on both counts. As a threshold matter, we note that, although BCI & I’s First Amended Answer asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity against Dendinger’s IIED claim in federal court, BCI & I failed to include the immunity argument in its summary judgment motion, which instead addressed only the merits of the claim. On appeal, BCI & I again neglected to brief or argue the immunity issue with respect to the IIED claim. A state may waive Eleventh Amendment immunity through its litigation conduct. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002); Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1584 (2006). See also Wis. Dep’t of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment grants the State a legal power to assert a sovereign immunity defense should it choose to do so. The State can waive the defense. Nor need a court raise the defect on its own. Unless the State raises the matter, a court can ignore it.”) (internal citations omitted); Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2006) (“If a State refuses to invoke its sovereign immunity as a threshold 11 defense . . ., it cannot credibly be heard to complain about the indignity of the federal courts resolving the merits of its case — and in its favor no less.”). Accordingly, and at the urging of both parties, we address the merits of Dendinger’s IIED claim. To state a cause of action for IIED in Ohio, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant, “by extreme and outrageous conduct[,] intentionally or recklessly cause[d] severe emotional distress.” Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, 453 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ohio 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have previously held that “an employee’s termination, even if based upon discrimination, does not rise to the level of ‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ without proof of something more. If such were not true, then every discrimination claim would simultaneously become a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying Ohio law). Dendinger has established neither that BCI & I terminated her nor that its actions were otherwise extreme or outrageous. Accordingly, the district court correctly entered summary judgment against her on the IIED claim. BCI & I did make an Eleventh Amendment immunity argument with respect to Dendinger’s OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 4112.02(A) claim, both in its motion for summary judgment and in its appellate brief. BCI & I and the district court are correct that, absent state waiver or express congressional abrogation, the Eleventh Amendment deprives the federal courts of the power to entertain suits on claims such as this. U.S. CONST . amend. XI; In re Hood, 319 F.3d 755, 759-60 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004). Because neither waiver nor abrogation applies here, Dendinger’s § 4112.02(A) claim may be adjudicated only by the Ohio courts pursuant to Ohio law. See OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 2743.02(A)(1). 12