Opinion ID: 2399732
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Delaware Family Court's Jurisdiction

Text: Mother first contends that Father should be estopped from raising the issue of whether the Delaware Family Court has continuing jurisdiction over the matter because he voluntarily appeared in the Connecticut action and agreed to modify the Delaware Modification Decree. It is, however, well-established Delaware law that parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court. [4] We, therefore, find Mother's argument to be without merit. Mother next contends that Delaware no longer has continuing jurisdiction over the parties because the Delaware Modification Decree was registered in Connecticut and Connecticut is now the home state of the child and the mother. Further, she argues that all the information necessary to determine whether to modify the Delaware Modification Decree is before the Court in Connecticut. This argument raises the issue of whether the Delaware Family Court properly interpreted the Uniform Act when it determined that it had continuing subject matter jurisdiction, an issue of law which this Court reviews de novo. [5] In order to determine whether the Family Court has continuing jurisdiction over the parties and jurisdiction to enforce its Delaware Modification Decree, we must consider the interplay between several provisions of the Uniform Act, and its general purposes. [6] We must also consider the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. [7] The general purposes of the Uniform Act are outlined in Section 1(a) of the Act: [8] (a) The General purposes of this Act [Chapter] are to: (1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on the well being of such children; (2) Promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody decree will be rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the child; (3) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of the child takes place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training and personal relationships is most readily available, and that the courts of this State decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection with another state which has enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act; (4) Discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interests of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child; (5) Deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards; (6) Avoid the relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this State insofar as it is feasible; (7) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states; (8) Promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this State and those of other states concerned with the same child; and (9) Make uniform the law of those states which enact child custody jurisdiction legislation. While the Uniform Act specifically addresses a court's initial jurisdiction in Section 3 [9] and a court's ability to modify another court's decree in Section 14, [10] it does not specifically address the issue of competing claims of jurisdiction in two or more courts. [11] Recognizing this gap in the Uniform Act, in 1980 Congress passed the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (Federal Act), [12] in an attempt to eliminate some of the legal and pragmatic difficulties arising from interstate child kidnapping, and to address the recognition problems sometimes existing under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act when more than one court sought to assert jurisdiction over a custody issue. [13] The Federal Act's jurisdictional provisions, which are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, supersede any inconsistent state laws under the supremacy clause of the Constitution. [14] Section (d) of the Federal Act specifically addresses the issue of continuing jurisdiction and states: (d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant. [15] Subsection (c)(1) provides: A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the provisions of this section only if  (1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and (2) one of the following conditions is met:       (E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this section. [16] Section 14 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, [17] even without the Federal Act, makes it clear that the Delaware Family Court has continuing jurisdiction in this matter. It, therefore, precludes Connecticut, which also has adopted the Uniform Act, from modifying the Delaware Modification Decree because: (a) If a court of another state [Delaware] has made a custody decree, a court of this state [Connecticut] shall not modify that decree unless: (1) It appears to the court of this State, [Connecticut], that the court which rendered the decree, [Delaware], does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this chapter, or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree; and (2) The court of this State [Connecticut] has jurisdiction. [18] Professor Bodenheimer, the reporter for the drafting committee of the Uniform Act has written extensively on jurisdictional issues under the Uniform Act and has concluded that: [T]he continuing jurisdiction of the prior court is exclusive. Other states do not have jurisdiction to modify the decree. They must respect and defer to the prior state's continuing jurisdiction. Section 14 is the key provision which carries out the Act's two objectives of (1) preventing the harm done to children by shifting them from state to state to relitigate custody, and (2) preventing jurisdictional conflict between the states after a custody decree has been rendered.... Exclusive continuing jurisdiction is not affected by the child's residence in another state for six months or more. Although the new state becomes the child's home state, significant connection jurisdiction continues in the state of the prior decree where the court record and other evidence exists and where one parent or another contestant continues to reside. Only when the child and all parties have moved away is deference to another state's continuing jurisdiction no longer required. [19] Further, Professor Bodenheimer has dispelled any argument that concurrent jurisdiction can exist, concluding that the concept of concurrent jurisdiction is incompatible with the clear language of the Uniform Act. [20] Specifically, she points to the provision in Section 14, of the Uniform Act that provides that a state which rendered a decree has continuing exclusive jurisdiction because other states do not have jurisdiction to modify the decree unless the original state has lost its jurisdiction. [21] The majority of courts that have considered the issue of continuing jurisdiction have followed Professor Bodenheimer's reading of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and have held that the state in which the initial decree was entered has exclusive continuing jurisdiction to modify the initial decree if: (1) one of the parents continues to reside in the decree state; and (2) the child continues to have some connection with the decree state, such as visitation. [22] This Court in Trader v. Darrow [23] followed the majority rule and found that the Delaware Family Court did not have jurisdiction to modify a Maryland consent order granting father custody of the parties' daughter when the father continued to reside in Maryland, and the Maryland court had not conceded its continuing jurisdiction to Delaware. [24] In the case of In the Interest of Shockley, the Family Court of Delaware confronted the same issue now before this Court. [25] In that case, mother and child had relocated to Wisconsin for over six months when mother filed a petition in Wisconsin to modify the Delaware custody order. [26] The Wisconsin court then entered an order prohibiting the father's visitation rights. [27] Once the Wisconsin court learned of the Delaware Family Court's concern over the matter, the Wisconsin court held its order in abeyance pending action in Delaware. [28] Father filed a contempt petition and the Delaware Family Court, in the interest of judicial economy, ruled on the jurisdictional issue, holding that it retained jurisdiction to modify its decree because the father continued to reside in Delaware. [29] In its opinion, the Shockley court highlighted the distinction between initial and modification jurisdiction by citing the California Supreme Court: Initial jurisdiction is determined by the guidelines of section 5152 [§ 3 UCCJA, § 1903 in Delaware], which point to the closest connections to the child and to information about his present and future well-being. Modification jurisdiction is perhaps best viewed as an extension of the recognition and enforcement provisions of the Uniform Act. (§ 5152; Bodenheimer, 65 Cal.L.Rev. 978, 983-984.) California is not effectively enforcing the New York decree if it modifies the decree as soon as the child has spent six months within its borders. Under section 5163 [§ 14 UCCJA, § 1914 in Delaware], the strong presumption is that the decree state will continue to have modification jurisdiction until it loses all or almost all connections with the child. [30] Like a majority of courts, we find Professor Bodenheimer's reading of the Uniform Act and the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act persuasive. We, therefore, adopt the majority rule and hold that the Delaware Family Court has exclusive continuing jurisdiction over its 1995 Modification Decree as long as the child, one of the child's parents, or a person acting as the child's parent continues to reside in Delaware, and the child continues to have some contact with the State of Delaware, such as visitation in state. In the present case it is undisputed that Delaware had jurisdiction over the child when it properly entered the initial custody/visitation order and the modifications to that order. As both the Family Court and the Connecticut Court noted, the child's father, maternal grandparents and several cousins continue to reside in Delaware. The child attends summer camp in Delaware each year and visits her father in Delaware each month and on certain holidays. We, therefore, find that the Family Court continues to have subject matter jurisdiction over the child for custody and visitation proceedings, to the exclusion of the State of Connecticut. [31]