Opinion ID: 2779015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Catalyst Theory

Text: As a preliminary matter, ODMPED argues that Mr. Frankel is not actually eligible to receive any fees because he did not “prevail[] in whole or in part” under 4 Mr. Frankel also argues that the trial court erred by finding that only two of the four Fraternal Order of Police factors for determining whether a party is entitled to attorney‟s fees were in his favor. See Fraternal Order of Police v. District of Columbia, 52 A.3d 822 (D.C. 2012). The trial court did rule that Mr. Frankel was entitled to a fee award under that four-factor balancing test, however. “[W]e review judgments, not findings,” Beraki v. Zerabruke, 4 A.3d 441, 445 (D.C. 2010), so we do not address the reasoning behind the trial court‟s decision if no party has protested the result. Mr. Frankel argues that the court might have awarded him more fees had it found four instead of two factors in his favor, but the four factors are used to determine entitlement to an award, not its size, and nothing in the trial court‟s order suggests that the amount it awarded was based on the strength of Mr. Frankel‟s showing under the four factors. 6 D.C. Code § 2-537 (c). ODMPED contends that the D.C. FOIA does not allow fee recovery under the “catalyst theory” in which “a plaintiff is a „prevailing party‟ if it achieves [its] desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant‟s conduct.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 601 (2001). Instead, ODMPED argues that fee awards are only available when a plaintiff “has been awarded some relief by the court,” see id. at 603, and that Mr. Frankel was not eligible for a fee award here because “the District voluntarily produced the requested documents after the plaintiff filed his complaint but before any judicial award of relief on the merits.”5 In 1992, this court noted that attorney‟s fee awards were proper in FOIA cases when there was a “causal nexus . . . between the action [brought in court] and the agency‟s surrender of the information.” McReady v. Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 618 A.2d 609, 616 (D.C. 1992) (brackets in original).6 This standard is a version of the catalyst theory. ODMPED argues, however, that McReady has been “effectively overrule[d].” ODMPED‟s argument can be 5 ODMPED did not cross-appeal the trial court‟s order awarding fees, so it does not challenge the award Mr. Frankel already received. It simply argues that this court should not enlarge an award for which Mr. Frankel was never legally eligible. 6 This issue was not central to the appeal, but the court stated that the “causal nexus” standard was correct and cited D.C. Circuit case law for support. Id. 7 summarized as follows: McReady recognized the catalyst theory for D.C. FOIA suits. 618 A.2d at 616. The Supreme Court later held in Buckhannon that the words “prevailing party” in two federal civil rights statutes did not include the catalyst theory. 532 U.S. at 605. The D.C. Circuit subsequently held that Buckhannon applied to the federal FOIA. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Dep’t of Energy, 288 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 2002). This court then adopted Buckhannon when interpreting “prevailing party” in D.C. Code § 1-606.08 pertaining to suits within the Office of Employee Appeals. Settlemire v. District of Columbia Office of Emp. Appeals, 898 A.2d 902, 907 (D.C. 2006). As a result, in ODMPED‟s view, Buckhannon applies to the D.C. FOIA as well. We disagree. First, Settlemire was not a FOIA case, and its holding does not control the interpretation of a different statute containing different language. The provision at issue in Settlemire—D.C. Code § 1-606.08—only provides awards to a “prevailing party,” whereas the FOIA statute provides awards to a party that “prevails in whole or in part.” D.C. Code § 2-537 (c). This difference suggests that the D.C. Council intended to authorize attorney‟s fees in FOIA cases more often than in other types of cases. Second, the D.C. Circuit‟s opinion in Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers was superseded by statute when Congress amended the federal FOIA to codify the 8 catalyst theory, explicitly authorizing attorney‟s fees when the plaintiff obtains relief through “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant‟s claim is not insubstantial.” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(E)(ii)(II) (2012); see Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2011). To the extent that we look to the federal FOIA as persuasive authority when interpreting our own FOIA, see Fraternal Order of Police, 52 A.3d at 829, we note that Buckhannon does not apply to federal FOIA suits and we interpret the D.C. FOIA similarly.7 OMDPED argues that because Congress amended the federal FOIA after Buckhannon but the D.C. Council did not amend our FOIA, we must “continue” to apply Buckhannon and Settlemire here. Yet we have not ever applied Buckhannon or Settlemire to attorney‟s fees disputes under the D.C. FOIA. 7 ODMPED correctly points out that we engage in this practice only “when the provisions of the District‟s law „mirror‟ the federal law.” The fee award provisions here are nearly identical, however: federal law awards plaintiffs who “substantially prevail[],” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(E)(i) (2012), whereas D.C. law awards those who “prevail in whole or in part,” D.C. Code § 2-537 (c). The federal amendment at issue merely interprets the ambiguous statutory term “prevail[].” As explained by Superior Court Judge Anthony Epstein in a similar case, “If federal courts had supplied the definition of the „substantially prevailed‟ eligibility standard in the federal FOIA, D.C. courts would follow the federal case law in interpreting the same ambiguous test in the D.C. FOIA. The result is the same when Congress has supplied that definition.” Fraternal Order of Police v. District of Columbia, No. 2012 CA 4125 B, slip op. at 8 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2013). 9 Instead, the catalyst theory has been a part of the D.C. FOIA since its inception. When drafting FOIA, the D.C. Council stated its intent to craft enforcement sanctions mirroring the “federal model,” see D.C. Council Report on Bill 1-119 at 10 (Sept. 1, 1976), and in 1976 this included attorney‟s fee awards based on the catalyst theory. See Vt. Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976) (attorney‟s fees proper if FOIA action is “reasonably . . . regarded as necessary” and has “substantial causative effect on the delivery of the information”); Goldstein v. Levi, 415 F. Supp. 303, 305 (D.D.C. 1976); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Burke v. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F. Supp. 251, 252 (D. Kan. 1976), aff’d, 559 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1977). We reaffirmed use of the catalyst theory in McReady, 618 A.2d at 616. And Congress acted to “clarif[y] that the Supreme Court‟s decision in Buckhannon . . . does not apply to [federal] FOIA cases,” 153 CONG. REC. S15,830-01 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy), which eliminated any likelihood that this court would apply Buckhannon to FOIA simply by adopting contemporary federal FOIA law. Cf. Fraternal Order of Police, 52 A.3d at 829. Given this backdrop, we decline to infer that the D.C. Council intended to abolish the longstanding catalyst theory through its inaction. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Noble, 693 A.2d 1084, 1103 (D.C. 1997) (noting “the hazard of attempting to impute meaning to legislative inaction”). 10 Finally, the catalyst theory accurately reflects the purposes of the FOIA attorney‟s fee provision. The D.C. Council intended FOIA to contain strong enforcement measures because under the prior regime, “agencies risk[ed] practically nothing by not responding to a request.” D.C. Council, Report on Bill 1-119 at 7 (Sept. 1, 1976). The D.C. FOIA contains a statement of purpose emphasizing that “provisions of this subchapter shall be construed with the view toward expansion of public access and the minimization of costs and time delays to persons requesting information.” D.C. Code § 2-531. The Council further stated that the fee award provision is meant to “encourage citizens to seek the release of information wrongfully withheld.” D.C. Council, Memorandum on Bill 1-119 at 8 (July 23, 1975). The catalyst theory advances these goals by allowing more litigants to recover attorney‟s fees and creating an incentive for the D.C. government to disclose more documents in the first place. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 639, 644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the catalyst theory encourages defendants “to conform . . . conduct to the legal requirements before litigation is threatened” and “encourages private enforcement of laws”). For these reasons, we hold that the catalyst theory continues to operate in D.C. FOIA cases, and a party “prevails in whole or in part” under § 2-537 (c) when he demonstrates a “causal nexus . . . between the action [brought in court] and the 11 agency‟s surrender of the information.”8 McReady, 618 A.2d at 616. The trial court here deemed it “undisputed” that Mr. Frankel was eligible for fees under the catalyst theory. We agree that the extensive litigation in this case had a “causal nexus” to ODMPED‟s ultimate production of documents9 and that Mr. Frankel was eligible for attorney‟s fees.10