Opinion ID: 1927665
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's motion for transcript and discovery

Text: On April 8, 1976, defendant filed his motion for a transcript of his first trial and for the right to examine physical evidence it had used against him. He combined with it a motion for speedy trial. In our consideration we disregard the fact defendant first incorrectly filed this motion in the Supreme Court on March 31. It was withdrawn and properly filed in district court on April 8. From February 17 (when rehearing on the certiorari application was denied) until April 8 (when defendant's motion was filed) the state remained totally indifferent to defendant's right to be tried. During this fifty-one-day period, the state took no steps to fix a trial date. It showed no interest in bringing about a disposition of the case. In allowing fifty-one days to go by after final disposition of the certiorari proceedings without even asking about trial dates, the state made it virtually impossible to try defendant within sixty days of February 17. Coupled with the state's maximum delay in seeking certiorari in the first place, this demonstrates the state's total failure to implement the public policy considerations of § 795.2, as we have said the state is obligated to do. State v. Leonard, 240 N.W.2d at 692; State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 1972). The state argues the delay was attributable to defendant's motion for a transcript and for discovery, but this is simply not the case. When defendant's motion was filed, his right to a dismissal had already matured for the reasons we have just stated. VIII. No matter which way the state turns, it is confronted by its own inattention and neglect. We have considered all the state's arguments, including the one that several witnesses from the first trial had become unavailable, but we are unable to find any substantial evidence of good cause in any of them. The state relies on State v. Butler, 243 N.W.2d 232, but that case is not controlling. In Butler, the trial court had set a trial date within the sixty-day period. Trial was then postponed to permit compliance with defendant's request for two transcripts of prior trials. In granting the request, the court directed that trial should be within thirty days from the time transcripts were furnished. The total delay was forty-two days, less than the time necessary to complete the transcripts. We held the trial court had not abused its discretion in ruling there was good cause for the delay. Here the state had already slept on its rights before defendant's request for a transcript was made. No trial date had either been set or requested. When the case was dismissed, 183 days had elapsed. Giving the state the benefit of every possible time extension, we still cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in holding defendant was entitled to a dismissal. IX. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court order dismissing the charges against defendant. JUDGMENT OF COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED AND DISTRICT COURT ORDER DISMISSING CASE REINSTATED.