Opinion ID: 2604077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: calculation of the fee award

Text: (10a) Next, we must consider whether the trial court erred in calculating the amount of attorney fees. Defendants contend that the trial court's fee award should be reversed because (1) the court failed to issue a statement of decision pursuant to section 632, and (2) the court did not make findings regarding the lodestar or touchstone figure for attorney fees based on the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney. Without a statement of decision or findings, defendants claim that they are hampered in attacking the court's award. Before the section 1021.5 hearing in this action, defendants requested that the trial court issue a written statement of decision pursuant to section 632 explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision regarding attorney fees. [6] The court's order granting the motion for attorney fees contains certain findings, [7] but does not contain findings on the factual issues of attorneys' hours or rates. Cases decided under section 632 generally have held that a statement of decision is not required upon decision of a motion. (See, Lavine v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan (1985) 169 Cal. App.3d 1019, 1026 [215 Cal. Rptr. 708]; In re Marriage of Simmons (1975) 49 Cal. App.3d 833, 836 [123 Cal. Rptr. 213] [findings of fact are only required on issues joined by the pleadings where the decision of the court following the findings is a judgment]; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Trial, § 371, pp. 377-378.) Courts have created an exception for proceedings involving custody of children ( Michael U. v. Jamie B. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 787, 792 [218 Cal. Rptr. 39, 705 P.2d 362]; In re Rose G. (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 406, 418 [129 Cal. Rptr. 338]). However, we have discovered no case requiring a statement of decision for an order on a motion for attorney fees. (11) In Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49 [141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303] ( Serrano III ), we promulgated guidelines by which courts calculate the amount of attorney fees under section 1021.5. These guidelines require the trial court first to determine a touchstone (or lodestar) figure based on the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney involved in the case. ( Id., at p. 48.) The touchstone figure may be increased or decreased by the trial court depending on other factors involved in the lawsuit. [8] The lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees set forth in Serrano III is designed expressly for the purposes of maintaining objectivity. ( Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 324.) The trial judge ultimately has discretion to determine the value of the attorney services. However, since determination of the lodestar figure is so `[f]undamental' to calculating the amount of the award, the exercise of that discretion must be based on the lodestar adjustment method. ( Id. at p. 322, citations omitted.) (10b) Prior to the attorney fees hearing in this action both parties alerted the trial court to the factors that should be considered in awarding such fees. Plaintiffs submitted a lodestar figure of $45,171 and requested that it be multiplied by a factor of 1.5 to reflect the novelty and difficulty of the legal issues, their skill in presenting these issues and the contingent nature of recovery. Accordingly, plaintiffs claimed a total fee of $67,757, for legal services leading up to the preliminary injunction and its enforcement. Plaintiffs supported their claim with affidavits from each attorney explaining the hourly rate claimed, the prevailing market rate for legal services in the community, the number of hours spent, and the tasks involved. Defendants submitted a memorandum of points and authorities relying on Serrano III factors to oppose plaintiff's claim. The trial court awarded $40,000 to plaintiffs as reasonable attorney's fees, amounting to an 11 percent reduction of their lodestar amount and a 41 percent reduction of their total claim. The court's failure to specify in its written order the basis of its calculation of the award, and the absence in the appellate record of a transcript of the fee hearing or a settled statement of that proceeding (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4(e)) make it impossible for us to determine whether the trial court based its award on the lodestar adjustment method. We find it unnecessary, however, to remand this case to redetermine attorney fees. It is the burden of the party challenging the fee award on appeal to provide an adequate record to assess error. ( In re Kathy P. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 91, 102 [157 Cal. Rptr. 874, 599 P.2d 65]; Calhoun v. Hildebrandt (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 70, 72 [40 Cal. Rptr. 690]; In re Salazar (1962) 205 Cal. App.2d 102, 105 [22 Cal. Rptr. 770].) Here, defendants should have augmented the record with a settled statement of the proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4(e); In re Kathy P., supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 102; Ehman v. Moore (1963) 221 Cal. App.2d 460 [34 Cal. Rptr. 540].) Because they failed to furnish an adequate record of the attorney fee proceedings, defendants' claim must be resolved against them. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed with directions to affirm the trial court's judgment. Moreover, plaintiffs are to be awarded attorney fees for their attorneys' time spent defending their award in this appeal. ( Serrano IV, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 639.)