Opinion ID: 784129
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Material Witness Warrant

Text: 98 Having concluded that Awadallah was properly detained under § 3144 as a material grand jury witness, we now consider the district court's alternative basis for suppressing his grand jury testimony and dismissing the indictment. In Awadallah IV, the court assumed § 3144's applicability and asked whether Awadallah was appropriately detained in accordance with the requirements of that statute. 202 F.Supp.2d at 96. The court ruled, in essence, that the indictment must be dismissed because of material omissions and misrepresentations in the application for the arrest warrant. Id. at 85.
99 As explained in Part I, § 3144 permits the detention of a material witness [i]f it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena. 18 U.S.C. § 3144. Under the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Therefore, an application for a material witness warrant under § 3144 must establish probable cause to believe that (1) the witness's testimony is material, and (2) it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the witness by subpoena. See Bacon, 449 F.2d at 942-43 (holding that probable cause is the appropriate standard for § 3144 material witness warrants). 100 Ordinarily, a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant is presumed valid. In certain circumstances, however, a defendant may challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in the affidavit, and thereby undermine the validity of the warrant and the resulting search or seizure. 17 See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 717 (2d Cir.2000). In order to invoke the Franks doctrine, Awadallah must show that there were intentional and material misrepresentations or omissions in Agent Plunkett's warrant affidavit. A misrepresentation or omission is intentional when the claimed inaccuracies or omissions are the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. Canfield, 212 F.3d at 717-18 (quoting United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir.1998)). It is material when the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the [issuing] judge's probable cause finding. Id. at 718. We gauge materiality by a process of subtraction: 101 To determine if the false information was necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause determination, i.e., material, a court should disregard the allegedly false statements and determine whether the remaining portions of the affidavit would support probable cause to issue the warrant. If the corrected affidavit supports probable cause, the inaccuracies were not material to the probable cause determination and suppression is inappropriate. 102 Id. at 718 (citation omitted). The ultimate inquiry is whether, after putting aside erroneous information and material omissions, `there remains a residue of independent and lawful information sufficient to support probable cause.' Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Trzaska, 111 F.3d 1019, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1997).
103 On appeal, we review de novo the legal question of [w]hether the untainted portions [of the affidavit] suffice to support a probable cause finding. Canfield, 212 F.3d at 717 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Reeves, 210 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir.2000) (Whether probable cause is lacking because of alleged misstatements or omissions in the supporting affidavit is ... reviewed de novo. ). The issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of law and fact, or as a pure question of law, but [w]e are not bound by the findings of the district court under either characterization. United States v. Marin-Buitrago, 734 F.2d 889, 894 (2d Cir.1984) (citations omitted). However, [w]hether a person acted deliberately or recklessly is a factual question of intent that we review only for clear error. Trzaska, 111 F.3d at 1028 (citing United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 220-21 (2d Cir.1992), for the proposition that a district court's factual determinations during [a] Franks hearing are reviewed for clear error).
104 Within this framework, the district court saw two principal problems in Agent Plunkett's affidavit. First, the court ruled that Agent Plunkett could not have made an informed judgment about the materiality of Awadallah's testimony to the grand jury's investigation as he was never present in the grand jury. Awadallah IV, 202 F.Supp.2d at 97. Second, the court ruled that there were material misrepresentations and omissions in the affidavit such that, [i]f the misleading information had been removed and the omitted information disclosed, it is overwhelmingly likely that the court would have found that Awadallah's presence at the grand jury could have been secured by a subpoena. Id. at 98. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
105 As a threshold matter, we reject the idea that only a prosecutor, and not an FBI agent, may assess the materiality of a grand jury witness's testimony. See Awadallah IV, 202 F.Supp.2d at 97 (invalidating the warrant in part because the affidavit was submitted by Agent Plunkett based solely upon his personal knowledge and he could not have made an informed judgment about the materiality of Awadallah's testimony to the grand jury's investigation since he was never present in the grand jury). As the government observes (Appellant's Reply Br. at 43), Awadallah does not press this argument on appeal; and we have found no case prohibiting an FBI agent from signing an affidavit for a material witness warrant. True, a panel of the Ninth Circuit held in Bacon that, [i]n the case of a grand jury proceeding, we think that a mere statement by a responsible official, such as the United States Attorney, is sufficient to satisfy [materiality], 449 F.2d at 943 (emphasis added), but the panel did not say that only the United States Attorney could attest to materiality. 106 Under § 3144, a material witness warrant may issue only if it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 3144. In Trzaska, we stated that the person preparing the affidavit for a search warrant should have had at least some personal knowledge of what had transpired. 111 F.3d at 1028. Applying this notion in the context of a material witness warrant, we believe that an FBI agent who works closely with a prosecutor in a grand jury investigation may satisfy the personal knowledge requirement. 18 107 Agent Plunkett stated in his affidavit that he had participated in the investigation of Usama Bin Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist group. He described previous indictments and recent convictions obtained in the Southern District of New York as part of the same overarching investigation. Based on information developed to date, including interviews with witnesses and analyses of other evidence, he described the focus of the ongoing grand jury investigation as a series of terrorist attacks that were carried out, apparently in coordinated fashion, on September 11, 2001. He stated that he had debriefed other agents and law enforcement officers who [had] been involved in this investigation, and that he reviewed relevant reports, documents and records in this investigation. The record shows that he worked closely with an AUSA in the Southern District of New York and was in close contact with the agents who were dealing with Awadallah in San Diego. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Agent Plunkett had personal knowledge sufficient to file an affidavit from which it appears ... that the testimony of [Awadallah was] material in a criminal proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
108 The district court identified five statements in Agent Plunkett's affidavit that it deemed misleading. First, the court believed the affidavit misled by stating that Awadallah had substantial family ties in Jordan and elsewhere overseas, but omitting that Awadallah had three brothers in San Diego, one of them a citizen. Awadallah IV, 202 F.Supp.2d at 97. Second, the court believed the affidavit misled by stating that Awadallah's phone number had been found in the car at Dulles Airport, but omitting that the phone number belonged to Awadallah at a prior residence eighteen months earlier. Id. at 98. Third, the court believed the affidavit misled by omitting that Awadallah had been cooperative with FBI agents on September 20 and 21. 19 Id. at 97-98. Fourth, the court believed the affidavit misled by stating that a box-cutter had been found in Awadallah's apartment, but omitting that it was really a carpet knife; that it had actually been found in his inoperative second car; and that witnesses had seen him install a carpet recently. Id. at 98 n. 27. Finally, the court believed the affidavit misled by referring to prior conduct for which Awadallah might have feared being investigated, when no such conduct was known. Id. at 97. 109 We do not see how the final statement can be regarded as misleading when read in context. The affidavit stated that Awadallah may also be concerned that his prior conduct, as set out above, may provide a basis for law enforcement authorities to investigate and possibly prosecute him. The district court failed to appreciate the limitation in the phrase as set out above, which makes clear that the statement references the preceding paragraphs of the affidavit itself and does not describe or suggest any additional conduct for which Awadallah could have been prosecuted. It does not matter that the conduct described in the affidavit was not prosecutable: the affidavit stated only that Awadallah may ... be concerned about prosecution and that he therefore had considerable incentive to flee. 110 It is a stretch to say that any of the four other statements identified by the district court were in fact misleading, but assuming that they are misleading for purposes of our Franks analysis, we find no basis to conclude that these misrepresentations and omissions were intentional. Awadallah must establish that the misleading statements were the result of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. Canfield, 212 F.3d at 717-18. The district court did not find that the statements were intentionally or recklessly misleading; it said they were not a result of mistake or accident. Awadallah IV, 202 F.Supp.2d at 98-99. Although we review factual findings on intent only for clear error, see Trzaska, 111 F.3d at 1028, this finding is insufficient as a matter of law under the Franks doctrine. 111 Our review of the record reveals no basis for a finding that Agent Plunkett intentionally misled the court or recklessly disregarded the truth. The evidentiary hearing held by the district court was limited in scope. See generally Awadallah II, 202 F.Supp.2d at 21 (discussing issues that required hearing). Agent Plunkett testified only with regard to (1) whether any information had been presented orally to Chief Judge Mukasey to supplement the warrant application; and (2) Awadallah's October 4 proffer to the government. The AUSA who helped Agent Plunkett prepare the affidavit did not testify. There was no examination of Agent Plunkett's intent or of additional knowledge that might have been imputed to him. 112 The affidavit itself disclaims any pretense of completeness: Because the limited purpose of this affidavit is to support the issuance of the requested warrant, I have not set forth all the facts known to me, or to other agents or law enforcement personnel concerning this nationwide investigation. The finding that omissions were not made by mistake or accident is compatible with this express disclaimer. But the mere intent to exclude information is insufficient, as the Fourth Circuit has observed: 113 An affiant cannot be expected to include in an affidavit every piece of information gathered in the course of an investigation. However, every decision not to include certain information in the affidavit is `intentional' insofar as it is made knowingly. If ... this type of `intentional' omission is all that Franks requires, the Franks intent prerequisite would be satisfied in almost every case.... [Rather,] Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead, the magistrate. 114 United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300-01 (4th Cir.1990) (emphasis in original). The district court, which was cognizant of this standard, made no finding of recklessness or bad intent. And the nature of the omissions does not itself suggest concealment. 20 Therefore, even assuming that four of the statements identified by the district court were misleading, there is no basis to conclude that they were intentionally or recklessly so.
115 We also conclude that the material witness warrant was valid because Agent Plunkett's affidavit, even with any necessary emendations, established probable cause to believe that Awadallah's testimony was material to the grand jury investigation and that it might become impracticable to secure his presence by subpoena. Before proceeding with this materiality analysis, we must first consider an additional category of information that the district court could (and probably should) have excised from the affidavit. 116 We have held that [e]vidence seized during an illegal search should not be included in a [search] warrant affidavit. 21 Trzaska, 111 F.3d at 1026. While [t]he mere inclusion of tainted evidence in an affidavit does not, by itself, taint the warrant or the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, the court should excise the tainted evidence and determine whether the remaining, untainted evidence would provide a neutral magistrate with probable cause to issue a warrant. Id. (citations omitted). 117 As further discussed in Part III below, the district court held that FBI agents subjected Awadallah to unreasonable searches and seizures on September 20 and 21, 2001, before obtaining the warrant for his arrest. The court ruled that, if the prosecution proceeds, statements and physical evidence obtained by the FBI during these searches and seizures must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Awadallah IV, 202 F.Supp.2d at 100-07. The government assumes for purposes of this appeal (or at least does not contest) that Awadallah was illegally seized on September 20 and again on September 21, as Judge Scheindlin found, focusing instead on the district court's application of the exclusionary rule. (Appellant's Br. at 122.) 118 Based on this Fourth Amendment ruling, the district court probably should have excised the fruits of the improper searches and seizures from Agent Plunkett's affidavit. First, the affidavit should not have referenced at all the three videotapes, the box-cutter, and the bin Laden photographs seized from Awadallah's apartment and cars. Second, the affidavit should not have stated that Awadallah entered the United States on a student visa in 1999, that he admitted knowing Al-Hazmi, that he admitted being associated with the phone number, or that he has family overseas, since all of this information was gleaned from interviewing Awadallah. 119 The district court did not consider excising these fruits of the improper searches and seizures from the affidavit, no doubt because it found sufficient reason to invalidate the warrant without them. Awadallah does not appeal from the district court's failure to make these additional excisions, and he addresses the issue only in passing. (Appellee's Br. at 101.) In the interest of completeness, however, we exercise our discretion to incorporate the additional excisions into our analysis. Because the FBI obtained the videotapes, the box-cutter, the photographs, and Awadallah's admissions during their searches and seizures on September 20 and 21, we assume that this information, like the misleading statements, should not have been used in the government's warrant application. 120 Nonetheless, even after excising the information obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and emending the four misleading statements discussed above, there remains a residue of independent and lawful information sufficient to support probable cause. Canfield, 212 F.3d at 718 (citation omitted); see also Trzaska, 111 F.3d at 1027-28. The corrected affidavit includes the following undisputed facts: 121 &#x2022; Nawaf Al-Hazmi was a passenger on American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon; 122 &#x2022; Al-Hazmi entered the United States at the Port of Los Angeles, California, in January 2000; 123 &#x2022; A car registered to Al-Hazmi and discovered at Dulles Airport on September 11 contained documents belonging to Khalid Al-Mihdhar, another passenger on Flight 77, documents that linked Al-Mihdhar to San Diego, California; 124 &#x2022; The car also contained a piece of paper, on which the following name and number were written: `Osama 589-5316;' 125 &#x2022; An FBI search of telephone databases revealed that the phone number belonged to Awadallah approximately eighteen months earlier at an address in La Mesa, California; 126 &#x2022; On September 20, 2001, Agents of the FBI located and interviewed Osama Awadallah in La Mesa, California; 127 &#x2022; Awadallah's connection to the hijackers was under investigation; 128 &#x2022; Awadallah was cooperative with the FBI agents in the sense that he responded to questions; 129 &#x2022; Given Awadallah's connections to one or more of the hijackers who committed the terrorist attacks that are the subject of the grand jury's investigation, Awadallah may have an incentive to avoid appearing before the grand jury and/or deprive the investigation of relevant information; 130 &#x2022; Awadallah may also be concerned that his prior conduct, as set out above, may provide a basis for law enforcement authorities to investigate and possibly prosecute him; and 131 &#x2022; [T]here is no assurance that [Awadallah] would appear in the grand jury as directed. 132 (Affidavit of Agent Ryan Plunkett, dated Sept. 21, 2001, at 5-7.) 22 This information makes clear that at least one of the September 11 hijackers possessed Awadallah's home phone number and lived in the same vicinity as Awadallah for some length of time. The same piece of paper supports the inference that Awadallah knew one or more of the hijackers. These facts alone establish probable cause to believe that Awadallah's testimony would be material to the grand jury investigating the September 11 attacks. 133 With regard to the impracticability of securing Awadallah's presence by subpoena, it is telling that the FBI agents located Awadallah on September 20. This means that, in the wake of a mass atrocity and in the midst of an investigation that galvanized the nation, Awadallah did not step forward to share information he had about one or more of the hijackers, whose names and faces had been widely publicized across the country. 23 134 It is of course possible, even plausible, that Awadallah feared what might happen to him if he presented himself to the FBI in the days following September 11. It is also possible he did not remember Al-Hazmi or Al-Mihdhar until FBI agents asked him about them, or that he did not see their names in the newspapers and on television. But the relevant inquiry is not whether Awadallah has some explanation for avoiding the FBI. The question is whether his failure to come forward, in combination with the other facts listed above, establishes probable cause to believe that he had information material to the grand jury and that it might become impracticable to secure his presence by subpoena. In the circumstances presented in this case — in which the totality of the circumstances known to the court included the terrorist attacks known to everyone else on the planet, and the implicit threat of further attacks — we hold that it does. 135 For these reasons, we conclude that the material witness warrant was valid, that Awadallah's grand jury testimony should not have been suppressed, and that the indictment must therefore be reinstated. 24 136 III. Applicability of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule to Evidence Obtained on September 20 and 21 137 Although the district court dismissed the indictment, it applied and extended its analysis to rule that, in a trial, certain evidence would be excluded as the fruit of Fourth Amendment violations. The court expressly did this to obviate an interlocutory appeal that might otherwise result if the dismissal of the indictment were reversed. See Awadallah IV, 202 F.Supp.2d at 85. We have reversed the dismissal of the indictment, and we now consider the application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. 138 The district court ruled that statements and evidence obtained from Awadallah by the FBI on September 20 and 21, 2001 had to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree because the FBI violated Awadallah's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. See Awadallah IV, 202 F.Supp.2d at 100. The court ruled that the FBI agents seized Awadallah illegally on September 20 when they confronted him at his home and took him to their office, and that they did so again the next day after his polygraph test. It also ruled that Awadallah's consent to the September 20 searches was involuntary and tainted by that day's illegal seizure. Id. at 101-07. 139 As noted above, the government does not dispute in this appeal that Awadallah was illegally seized on September 20 and again on September 21, as Judge Scheindlin found. (Appellant's Br. at 122, 128.) Rather, the government challenges the district court's application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, arguing that this Court's decision in United States v. Varela, 968 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.1992), prohibits the suppression of evidence when the perjury alleged in the indictment was committed after the constitutional violation. 25 We conclude that the district court erred by ordering suppression of the evidence obtained on September 20 and 21. A. Standard of Review 140 When examining a ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo,  viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.2001); see also United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724 (2d Cir.1998). The applicability of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is a question of law reviewed de novo.  Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 409 (4th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1140 (4th Cir.1997)); see also United States v. Ienco, 182 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir.1999). B. Analysis 141 The Fourth Amendment provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). The wrong condemned by the [Fourth] Amendment is fully accomplished by the unlawful search or seizure itself, and the use of the fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 142 In order to discourage or prevent such violations, however, the courts have fashioned an exclusionary rule [that] operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through the rule's general deterrent effect. Id. (citations omitted). As with any remedial device, the rule's application has been restricted to those instances where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. Where `the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use ... is unwarranted.' Id. at 11, 115 S.Ct. 1185 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976)). Moreover, [i]ndiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule ... may well `generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration of justice.' Leon, 468 U.S. at 908, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976)). 143 We are therefore appropriately cautious about any extension of the exclusionary rule: 144 [A]ny extension of the rule beyond its core application — normally, barring use of illegally seized items as affirmative evidence in the trial of the matter for which the search was conducted — must be justified by balancing the `additional marginal deterrence' of the extension against the cost to the public interest of further impairing the pursuit of truth. 145 Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir.1982) (citations omitted). In determining whether exclusion will have the requisite deterrent effect, the key question is whether the particular challenged use of the evidence is one that the seizing officials were likely to have had an interest in at the time, that is, whether it was within their predictable contemplation and, if so, whether it was likely to have motivated them. Id. at 311. [I]f law enforcement officers are already deterred from Fourth Amendment violations by a prohibition against using illegally seized evidence to secure convictions for the offenses they are investigating, the further question is whether some significant incremental deterrence is achieved by prohibiting use of the evidence for additional purposes. Id. 146 The present case lies outside the core application of the exclusionary rule. Federal agents seized Awadallah and searched his property in the course of determining whether he had information material to the grand jury investigation; they had no probable cause to believe he had committed any crime. Having detained Awadallah as a material witness and presented him to the grand jury, the government now prosecutes him for making allegedly false statements during his testimony. The charged crime was thus committed twenty days after the improper searches and seizures. 147 Applying the test described above to these facts, we ask whether excluding the fruits of the improper searches and seizures from Awadallah's perjury trial would have sufficient deterrence value to justify application of the exclusionary rule. We have confronted analogous circumstances in two cases. In United States v. Ceccolini, 542 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.1976), rev'd in part, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978), an illegal search led police to question an employee in a store owned by Ceccolini. Based on the information thus obtained, the government subpoenaed Ceccolini to testify before a grand jury about illegal gambling. 542 F.2d at 138. In his testimony, Ceccolini denied taking bets at his store. Id. The employee contradicted this statement, and the government indicted and prosecuted Ceccolini for perjury. Id. After the illegal search came to light, the district court suppressed the employee's testimony as fruit of the illegal search and set aside Ceccolini's guilty verdict. Id. at 139. 148 As here, the prosecutor in the Ceccolini appeal did not dispute that the search in question was illegal, but challenged the suppression. See id. at 140 & n. 5. A divided panel rejected the prosecutor's argument that the rule excluding the fruit of an illegal search is inappropriate in a perjury prosecution, especially when the perjury occurred after the illegal intrusion. Id. at 142. We saw no sufficient basis for distinguishing trials of perjury charges from trials on charges of other serious crimes to which the exclusionary rule would apply in the Government's direct case at trial. Id. Without elaboration, we disagree[d] with the Government's contention that the exclusionary rule serve[d] no purpose in the case. Id. at 143. 149 That assessment was one of two grounds for affirming the suppression of the employee's testimony and the district court's decision to set aside the guilty verdict. We also rejected the government's argument that the employee's testimony was an act of free will sufficiently removed from the illegal search as to purge any taint: the road to [the employee's] testimony from [the officer's] concededly unconstitutional search [was] both straight and uninterrupted.... Id. at 142. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that we erred in holding that the degree of attenuation was not sufficient to dissipate the connection between the illegality and the testimony. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978). The Supreme Court therefore [did] not reach the Government's contention that the exclusionary rule should not be applied when the evidence derived from the search is being used to prove a subsequent crime such as perjury. Id. at 273, 98 S.Ct. 1054. 150 The district court here cited Ceccolini in support of its decision to suppress the evidence obtained illegally on September 20 and 21. See Awadallah II, 202 F.Supp.2d at 48-49. Like the district court, we think that what remains of Ceccolini supports the view that the exclusionary rule may be applied in perjury prosecutions even though the charged perjury occurred after the illegal search or seizure. But Ceccolini does not require application of the exclusionary rule in such cases. Rather, as in other situations, we must determine whether the exclusionary rule serves [a] purpose here. Ceccolini, 542 F.2d at 143. 151 Would exclusion of the evidence obtained by the FBI on September 20 and 21 yield significant deterrence value? On this question, we are guided by United States v. Varela, 968 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1992), the second case in which we confronted a similar factual scenario. In Varela, the defendant made incriminating statements regarding cocaine trafficking after police arrested him without probable cause. Id. at 260. By reason of the Fourth Amendment violation, a district court suppressed his statements and dismissed the drug charges against him. Id. Several months later, Varela appeared before a grand jury to testify about cocaine trafficking by his alleged co-conspirators, and he made false statements that contradicted his previously suppressed statements. Id. at 261. The previously suppressed statements were then used to prosecute and convict him for perjury. Id. 152 We affirmed Varela's conviction. Balancing the deterrence value of a particular application of the exclusionary rule against society's interest in bringing all probative evidence to bear on the questions before the court, id. at 261, we held that statements obtained as fruit of an illegal arrest may be introduced in a perjury trial, if the alleged perjury occurred after the illegal arrest and there is no actual evidence of collusion between the proponents of the evidence and the arresting officers, id. at 263. Since the law enforcement officials already [were] prohibited from using unlawfully seized evidence to convict [the] defendant of the offenses under investigation, we asked whether any incremental deterrence [would] result[ ] from excluding the same evidence in a subsequent proceeding. Id. at 262. We found that any incremental deterrence failed to outweigh society's interest in using the evidence, because we would have [had] to make the unlikely assumption that when the ... agents arrested Varela unlawfully and solicited his cooperation, they were motivated in part by the belief that Varela would later choose to lie to a grand jury. Id. That possibility was too remote to serve as a motivating factor. Id. We therefore join[ed] the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits in concluding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in such a case. Id. at 260 (citing United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 845 (1st Cir.1983); United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1976); and United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 667 (5th Cir.1976)). 26 153 As the district court observed, there are distinctions between Varela and Awadallah's case. First, Varela's statements had already been suppressed once in the prior prosecution for which they were initially obtained, whereas the evidence obtained by the FBI while questioning Awadallah as a possible material witness would first be used in his forthcoming perjury prosecution. See Awadallah II, 202 F.Supp.2d at 52. Second, a court had already determined that Varela's prior statements were obtained unlawfully by the time he uttered false statements to a grand jury, whereas no court had yet found the seizure of Awadallah to be unlawful when he appeared before the grand jury. See id. 154 Thus our case differs from Varela insofar as the Fourth Amendment violations have not yet caused the government to suffer a disadvantage in prosecuting Awadallah. However, Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule jurisprudence does not require that law enforcement officials and the public be penalized by an actual exclusion of evidence — and a frustrated prosecution — before one may conclude that the circumstances of the case require no further exclusion of evidence or exaction of penalty. 27 So long as the deterrent force created by exclusion has already been brought to bear, there is no significant need to suppress the evidence in a subsequent prosecution for criminal conduct (here, perjury) that post-dates the Fourth Amendment violation. 155 On the facts of this case, we think the incentive to avoid exclusion was sufficiently strong at the time of the search and seizure. The FBI agents detained and questioned Awadallah as a possible material witness, but they must have had a lively sense that their investigation could potentially evolve into a criminal prosecution. Awadallah's telephone number was in the possession of one of the September 11 hijackers, and he was therefore one of the few people known, at that time, to have some connection to them; he lived in the vicinity of the hijackers for some length of time; and he had not come forward to assist an investigation that galvanized the rest of the country. 156 The district court looked at these circumstances and thought that perjury was a foreseeable consequence of the FBI agents' conduct. See Awadallah II, 202 F.Supp.2d at 52. As a matter of law, however, we must ask not just whether the particular challenged use of the evidence... was within [the seizing officials'] predictable contemplation, but also whether it was likely to have motivated them. Tirado, 689 F.2d at 311. Here, the government's motivation may have evolved as the investigation proceeded in ensuing days, but viewing this case (as we must) in light of all the circumstances, we think it is untenable to say that the FBI agents, just ten days after the September 11 attacks, sought to elicit perjury rather than truthful information. Cf. United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 667 (5th Cir.1976) (refusing to assume that the police could be so confident that an immunized search victim would prevaricate before a grand jury that they would be willing to seize evidence of a crime illegally, and thus to forego the possibility of direct prosecution). 157 We therefore conclude that the law enforcement officers [were] already deterred from Fourth Amendment violations, and that no significant incremental deterrence is achieved by prohibiting use of the evidence in Awadallah's perjury prosecution. Tirado, 689 F.2d at 311. The information and evidence obtained by the FBI on September 20 and 21, twenty days before Awadallah appeared before the grand jury, is not excludable as fruit of the improper searches and seizures.