Opinion ID: 416443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Regulation as Applied

Text: 25 That CCNV's conduct comes within the scope of the first amendment, however, only begins our constitutional analysis. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), the Supreme Court noted that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. Id. at 376, 88 S.Ct. at 1678. The O'Brien Court then established that a governmental interest may be sufficiently justified 26 if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 27 Id. at 377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679. In short, O'Brien requires us to engage in a balancing of first amendment freedoms and their societal costs 21 that is structured to place a thumb on the first amendment side of the scales. 22 28 In approaching this task, we are mindful that CCNV seeks a permit for the exercise of first amendment rights on public parkland whose use for communication is of special importance: 29 There is an unmistakable symbolic significance in demonstrating close to the White House or on the Capitol grounds which, while not easily quantifiable, is of undoubted importance in the constitutional balance. Although this theory has been used to justify demonstrations near state capitols as well, see Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 [83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697] (1963), it is in Washington--where a petition for redress of national grievances must literally be brought--that the theory has its primary application. 30 Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273, 1287 (D.C.Cir.1972) (Wright, J., concurring). As the Supreme Court added in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972), [t]he right to use a public place for expressive activity may be restricted only for weighty reasons. 31 The Park Service argues that its prohibition of CCNV's sleeping in the symbolic tents is justified because such activity could: (1) deprive others of the use of nationally significant space; (2) cause significant damage to park resources; (3) create serious sanitation problems; (4) seriously tax law enforcement resources; and (5) increase requests for such activity in connection with other demonstrations that would, in turn, create pressure from nondemonstrating visitors for similar accommodations. 47 Fed.Reg. 24,302 (1982). These interests are identified by the Park Service in its brief in this case 23 and were also identified in its 1982 rulemaking to justify the flat prohibition of camping. Id. Camping, however, includes such non-sleeping activities as making fires, digging, earth breaking, and cooking. Id. at 24,305. Because CCNV neither seeks to do any of these activities, nor requests permission to establish medical or sanitation facilities, 24 to store personal belongings, 25 or even to serve food, 26 the government's interests must be weighed against only that activity which CCNV seeks to do: sleep within tents that they have been given permission to erect 27 and at which they have been allowed to maintain a twenty-four hour presence. 32 This is not to say, however, that the government's interest in prohibiting expressive sleeping at symbolic campsites that is part of a demonstration must be weighed in a vacuum. In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the government's interest in prohibiting first amendment activity must be assessed not in terms of letting just one group pursue the activity but in terms of letting all similarly situated groups do so. Id. at 654, 101 S.Ct. at 2567. Transposed to the first amendment activity involved in this case, therefore, Heffron requires us to determine if the government's interests in park preservation, law enforcement, and the like (outlined above) are furthered by prohibiting expressive sleeping by all individuals or groups similarly situated to CCNV--that is, by all those who wish to engage in sleeping as part of their demonstration and have been granted renewable permits to demonstrate on a twenty-four hour basis on sites at which they have also been allowed to erect temporary symbolic structures. The dissent insists that we weigh the government's interests in prohibiting sleeping by all groups--whether for first amendment purposes or not--lest we nickle and dime every regulation to death. Dissenting Opinion at 616. The dissent's addition of makeweights to the government's side of the balance, however, shortchanges the first amendment's premium on precision. Here, the Park Service has already established a renewable permit procedure that limits the number of people who are allowed to demonstrate or to erect symbolic structures. The interests of people who do not possess a permit are simply not at issue in this case. 33 Having properly focused the inquiry, it is difficult to imagine how the application of the Park Service's regulations to groups similarly situated to CCNV will further any important interest. Because such groups are already allowed to erect tents and maintain an all-night presence during which time they may sit, stand, or even lie down in the tents, there are no incremental savings of park resources, sanitation facilities, or law enforcement personnel to be gained by proscribing only sleep. Indeed, allowing an all-night presence by wakeful protestors would seem to tax sanitation facilities, law enforcement personnel, and the park resource itself to a greater extent than would allowing those same protestors simply to sleep. 34 Our review of the prefatory rationale to the revised regulations reveals at most only one attenuated governmental interest in precluding CCNV's demonstrators from sleeping: 35 Experience with administering the court's decision allowing sleeping has revealed that sleeping activity by demonstrators expands to include other aspects of living accommodations such as the storage of personal belongings and the performance of necessary functions which have converted the sleeping area into actual campsites. 36 47 Fed.Reg. at 24,301. But this justification must be found wanting under O'Brien 's no greater [restriction] than is essential test; any interest in preventing other camping activity can be furthered by less restrictive means. 28 Here, the Park Service's renewable permit procedure provides a mechanism whereby permits can be revoked if illegal activities occur. See 36 C.F.R. Sec. 50.19(f) (1982). 29 37 The government's interest in preserving parkland for the use of others is also not furthered by its ban on sleep. If anything, the nighttime enjoyment of Lafayette Park and the Mall by nondemonstrators would probably be enhanced if the 150 CCNV demonstrators were asleep. Because CCNV has already been granted a renewable seven-day, twenty-four hour permit to demonstrate at its two discrete sites, a ban on sleeping simply does not preserve those parts of the parks for the use of others. To the extent that other demonstrators wish to use the space temporarily allocated to CCNV, the Park Service's permit procedures already provide for nonrenewal of CCNV's weekly permit. See id. Sec. 50.19(e)(5). 38 We are next urged to consider the government's interest in preventing pressure for similar living accommodations from nondemonstrating visitors to Washington, D.C. 47 Fed.Reg. at 24,302. As a practical matter, we seriously question whether there is a large market for living accommodations in sparse tents on the Mall, in the winter, without heating, cooking, medical, or sanitation facilities. Even assuming that such a market is theoretically possible, we note that such an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). 30 As a constitutional matter, moreover, the Park Service is free to apply its anti-camping regulations to such nondemonstrators who, by definition, have no first amendment interests to balance against the regulation. We add that any governmental interest in not treating certain groups--even those exercising first amendment rights--differently from others would appear to be marginally insignificant. Demonstrators are already accorded privileges not permitted nondemonstrators, such as the right to stay in the park all night despite the anti-loitering regulation, 36 C.F.R. Sec. 50.25(k) (1982), and the right to erect temporary structures, id. Sec. 50.19(e)(8). The additional privilege of sleeping at the demonstration site as part of the demonstration would seem of minimal consequence to the distinctions on treatment already drawn. 39 Finally, the government suggests that requests for convenient camping by persons pursuing speech activities would increase. If by this the government means that additional camping requests will be made by those who merely wish to sleep in parks near the sites of daytime demonstrations, such requests may be denied. It would seem an entirely permissible distinction to permit sleeping that is expressive as part of a twenty-four hour vigil, but not to permit sleeping that is a mere convenience to daytime demonstrators. See Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 402 U.S. 926, 91 S.Ct. 1398, 28 L.Ed.2d 665 (1971); VVAW, 506 F.2d 53 (D.C.Cir.1974). 31 If, on the other hand, the government anticipates an increase in applications for symbolic campsites, with requests for permission to sleep during all night demonstrations, it may not deny all such requests merely because it expects a large number of people to apply. 40 Our holding does not mean, however, that the Park Service must grant every request, at any time, for any number of temporary structures or sleepers. Merely because we have held that expressive sleep may not be prohibited on the basis of the message conveyed does not mean that all forms of regulation are foreclosed to the government. 32 Thus, the government may use valid, content-neutral, time, place, or manner regulations provided that such regulations are both reasonable and narrowly tailored to further the government's substantial interests. See Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 n. 8, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2293 n. 8, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 115, 92 S.Ct. at 2302. The government may, for example, limit the number of tents, the size of tents or campsites, 33 and the number of persons allowed to sleep. 34 It may continue its current practice of issuing permits on a renewable weekly basis, under which one group's permit will not be renewed if another group requests the space, and under which the permit may be revoked if the demonstrators engage in such prohibited activities as cooking or making fires. It may set aside certain times when no demonstrations are allowed in order to accommodate other particularly heavy uses of the parks. See 36 C.F.R. Sec. 50.19(d)(1), (e)(8) (1982). And possibly, it may be able to set aside some of the more serene areas of the Memorial Core area as sanctuaries at which round-the-clock demonstrations are never compatible. 35 41 In sum, the Park Service has failed to demonstrate that the government's interests will be furthered by keeping these putative protestors from the sleeping activity which is the sole point in dispute. We reverse, therefore, because the indiscriminate line the government seeks to draw against sleeping cannot pass first amendment muster. Accordingly, we grant CCNV the injunctive relief it seeks, enjoining the Park Service from prohibiting sleep at CCNV's demonstration.