Opinion ID: 110093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In the present case, the jury was told:

Text: Our Penal Law also provides that the presence in an automobile of any machine gun or of any handgun or firearm which is loaded is presumptive evidence of their unlawful possession. In other words, [under] these presumptions or this latter presumption upon proof of the presence of the machine gun and the hand weapons, you may infer and draw a conclusion that such prohibited weapon was possessed by each of the defendants who occupied the automobile at the time when such instruments were found. The presumption or presumptions is effective only so long as there is no substantial evidence contradicting the conclusion flowing from the presumption, and the presumption is said to disappear when such contradictory evidence is adduced. Undeniably, the presumption charged in this case encouraged the jury to draw a particular factual inference regardless of any other evidence presented: to infer that respondents possessed the weapons found in the automobile upon proof of the presence of the machine gun and the hand weapon and proof that respondents occupied the automobile at the time such instruments were found. I believe that the presumption thus charged was unconstitutional because it did not fairly reflect what common sense and experience tell us about passengers in automobiles and the possession of handguns. People present in automobiles where there are weapons simply are not more likely than not the possessors of those weapons. Under New York law, to possess is to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property. N. Y. Penal Law § 10.00 (8) (McKinney 1975). Plainly, the mere presence of an individual in an automobilewithout moredoes not indicate that he exercises dominion or control over everything within it. As the Court of Appeals noted, there are countless situations in which individuals are invited as guests into vehicles the contents of which they know nothing about, much less have control over. Similarly, those who invite others into their automobile do not generally search them to determine what they may have on their person; nor do they insist that any handguns be identified and placed within reach of the occupants of the automobile. Indeed, handguns are particularly susceptible to concealment and therefore are less likely than are other objects to be observed by those in an automobile. In another context, this Court has been particularly hesitant to infer possession from mere presence in a location, noting that [p]resence is relevant and admissible evidence in a trial on a possession charge; but absent some showing of the defendant's function at the [illegal] still, its connection with possession is too tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of guilt`the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary . . . .' Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 467. United States v. Romano, 382 U. S., at 141. We should be even more hesitant to uphold the inference of possession of a handgun from mere presence in an automobile, in light of common experience concerning automobiles and handguns. Because the specific factual inference recommended to the jury in this case is not one that is supported by the general experience of our society. I cannot say that the presumption charged is more likely than not to be true. Accordingly, respondents' due process rights were violated by the presumption's use. As I understand it, the Court today does not contend that in general those who are present in automobiles are more likely than not to possess any gun contained within their vehicles. It argues, however, that the nature of the presumption here involved requires that we look, not only to the immediate facts upon which the jury was encouraged to base its inference, but to the other facts proved by the prosecution as well. The Court suggests that this is the proper approach when reviewing what it calls permissive presumptions because the jury was urged to consider all the circumstances tending to support or contradict the inference. Ante, at 162. It seems to me that the Court mischaracterizes the function of the presumption charged in this case. As it acknowledges was the case in Romano, supra, the instruction authorized conviction even if the jury disbelieved all of the testimony except the proof of presence in the automobile. [7] Ante, at 159 n. 16. The Court nevertheless relies on all of the evidence introduced by the prosecution and argues that the permissive presumption could not have prejudiced defendants. The possibility that the jury disbelieved all of this evidence, and relied on the presumption, is simply ignored. I agree that the circumstances relied upon by the Court in determining the plausibility of the presumption charged in this case would have made it reasonable for the jury to infer that each of the respondents was fully aware of the presence of the guns and had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the weapons. But the jury was told that it could conclude that respondents possessed the weapons found therein from proof of the mere fact of respondents' presence in the automobile. For all we know, the jury rejected all of the prosecution's evidence concerning the location and origin of the guns, and based its conclusion that respondents possessed the weapons solely upon its belief that respondents had been present in the automobile. [8] For purposes of reviewing the constitutionality of the presumption at issue here, we must assume that this was the case. See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S. 607, 613 (1946); cf. Leary v. United States, 395 U. S., at 31. The Court's novel approach in this case appears to contradict prior decisions of this Court reviewing such presumptions. Under the Court's analysis, whenever it is determined that an inference is permissive, the only question is whether, in light of all of the evidence adduced at trial, the inference recommended to the jury is a reasonable one. The Court has never suggested that the inquiry into the rational basis of a permissible inference may be circumvented in this manner. Quite the contrary, the Court has required that the evidence necessary to invoke the inference [be] sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact . . . . Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S., at 843 (emphasis supplied). See Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 407 (1970). Under the presumption charged in this case, the only evidence necessary to invoke the inference was the presence of the weapons in the automobile with respondentsan inference that is plainly irrational. In sum, it seems to me that the Court today ignores the teaching of our prior decisions. By speculating about what the jury may have done with the factual inference thrust upon it, the Court in effect assumes away the inference altogether, constructing a rule that permits the use of any inference no matter how irrational in itselfprovided that otherwise there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding of guilt. Applying this novel analysis to the present case, the Court upholds the use of a presumption that it makes no effort to defend in isolation. In substance, the Court applying an unarticulated harmless-error standardsimply finds that the respondents were guilty as charged. They may well have been, but rather than acknowledging this rationale, the Court seems to have made new law with respect to presumptions that could seriously jeopardize a defendant's right to a fair trial. Accordingly, I dissent.