Opinion ID: 3029606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable Application

Text: Smith also argues that his sentence is unreasonable because it fails the second prong for the Cooper test: reasonable application of the Section 3553(a) factors to the circumstances of this case. Instead of applying the factors reasonably, Smith argues, the District Court treated the Guidelines as mandatory. Defendant’s latter conclusion is not only unsubstantiated but also contrary to the record. The Court certainly took note of the correct sentencing range under the Guidelines, as is proper under both § 3553(a)(4) and this Circuit’s case law. See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that sentencing courts should first correctly calculate the Guidelines range). But the Court began its ruling by stating, “In passing sentence on you, the sentence I will impose satisfies the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C., Section 3553(a),” and listing those factors. App. at 60-61. The District Court was not required to state that it knew the Guidelines were only advisory after Booker, but we are satisfied that it was aware of this and ruled accordingly. The sentence imposed by the District Court was logical and consistent with the Section 3553(a) factors. These factors require a sentencing court to consider the nature and seriousness of an offense, deterrence (both specific and general), and protection of the public. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) - (C). These considerations logically warrant a -9- punishment more serious than that requested by Smith. Smith’s two prior criminal felony convictions both involved communicating a threat in conjunction with either a violent crime (robbery, sodomy) or conspiracy to commit a violent crime (conspiracy to commit arson). Furthermore, as the Court stressed, given the close confines of a prison and the importance of maintaining order inside, it is important not to send a wrong message to other inmates by an overly lenient sentence. In a separate written judgment, the court also formally recommended that the Bureau of Prisons “afford the defendant the opportunity to participate in gambling addiction treatment” and “to participate in sexual offender assessment and/or treatment.” App. at 4. This logically relates to Smith’s need for medical care and correctional treatment under § 3553(a)(2)(D). We apply a deferential standard when reviewing application of the Section 3553(a) factors because the trial court is in “the best position to determine the appropriate sentence in light of the particular circumstances of the case.” Cooper, 437 F.3d at 330. The Court was not required to compare a 77-month concurrent sentence with an 84-month consecutive one. “[R]easonableness is a range, not a point.” United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoted in Cooper, 437 F.3d at 332 n. 11). The 84-month sentence in this case is still one year less that the Guidelines maximum sentence and three years less than the statutory maximum. We cannot say that this was unreasonable.