Opinion ID: 318462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prosecution impropriety

Text: 11 Defense witness Anthony Crowner testified that he and appellant had been together inside a store until just before appellant's arrest. The prosecutor asked Crowner whether he knew that 'the man had been shot right down there.' His purpose apparently was impeachment, since he understood Crowner's testimony to say that when Crowner left the store, and saw the arrest, all was calm on the street. But the court had ruled that the prosecutor would be prohibited from informing the jury that appellant was arrested for assault with a deadly weapon or that a man had been shot where appellant was arrested. Defense counsel strenuously objected to the prosecutor's question particularly since the court had grudgingly agreed, in an earlier and lengthier colloquy, that it would permit only a narrower, more hypothetical, version of the question. When his request for a mistrial was denied, defense counsel alternatively requested a curative instruction advising the jury that there was no factual con nection between appellant's case and any shooting. That request was granted, 6 and the court instructed the jury that 'anyone shot down the street except as crowds may have gathered, has nothing to do with this case . . ..' 12 Appellant now claims error in denial of a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor's question placed before the jury highly prejudicial information with little materiality to any permissible issue at trial. The Government contends that the question was relevant on the issue of Crowner's credibility, in that he had at least impliedly asserted that the situation of the street was calm when he left the store. 13 There is little doubt both that the question should never have been asked, and that the prosecutor had been alerted as to its inflammatory nature. It is an axiom of the law of evidence that information will be excluded when its probative effect is outweighed by its prejudice to the opposing party. See Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 403 (1972); McCormick on Evidence 185 (2d Ed. 1972) and authorities cited therein. See also Macklin v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 347, 410 F.2d 1046 (1969); Jackson v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 392, 395 F.2d 615 (1962). Crowner testified that both the and appellant were inside at the time the alleged shooting occurred; by his account, the crowd was substantially dispersed by the time he left the store. Therefore, it would have hardly been inconsistent for him not to have noticed that a man had been shot. The damage to his credibility would have been slight indeed. Weighed against this was the prejudice inhering in the implied suggestion to the jury that appellant was somehow involved in the shooting down the street. 14 However, the District Court's response was prompt and unequivocal. Immediately after the offending question was asked, the court instructed the jury that 'There is no connection shown in any way between the guns in this case and any shooting of anybody down the street, no connection at all.' The fair implication of the court's statement is that there was neither legal connection, nor factual connection. There could hardly have been a more efficacious curative instruction, and we think that it virtually eliminated the possibility for prejudicial error. 7 15 Affirmed. 16