Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted Violation of Code of Civil Procedure Section 226

Text: Defendant contends the trial court's system of jury selection violated Code of Civil Procedure section 226, [30] as well as the federal Constitution. We disagree. As stated, counsel for Richard Avila objected to the method of jury selection imposed by the court, instead requesting that the parties be allowed to direct all for-cause challenges against the entire jury panel, that is, all of the prospective jurors in the courtroom (see Code Civ. Proc., § 194, subd. (q)), before they were required to use peremptory challenges. He argued that section 226 of the Code of Civil Procedure mandated such a procedure. Defendant joined in the objection. The court reiterated the procedure it would follow: [W]e are taking challenges for cause before peremptories. The only question is whether it should be to all of the jurors in the courtroom or only 12 or 18, or in this case 24, and I see nothing in the statute or in any cases that say that you have to question and pass for cause all of the jurors in the courtroom before you can begin exercising peremptories. I think that is one alternative way of doing it. The court further noted that to conduct voir dire in the manner requested by counsel was a terribly inefficient way to proceed. Peremptory challenges generally are exercised under either of two methods. Under the jury box method, which is the system utilized in California, 12 prospective jurors are questioned, subjected to challenges for cause, and replaced until 12 qualified jurors remain. Both sides then exercise peremptory challenges. A juror removed by peremptory challenge is replaced by another juror, who is then questioned and challenged both for cause and peremptorily. This process continues until peremptory challenges have been exhausted or waived. ( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 397, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221; United States v. Thompson (2d Cir.1996) 76 F.3d 442, 451; United States v. Blouin (2d Cir.1981) 666 F.2d 796, 796.) Under the struck jury method, a large initial panel of prospective jurors is drawn and subjected to challenges for cause before peremptory challenges are exercised. If, after each side exercises its peremptory challenges, there remain more than 12 jurors, the court decides which 12 will constitute the jury. ( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 397, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221; United States v. Blouin, supra, 666 F.2d at pp. 796-797.) The trial court apparently employed a variation of the jury box system in this case. Defendant argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 226 dictates that all challenges for cause must be exercised before any peremptory challenges may be exercised, and that a procedure (like the one the trial court here used) whereby challenges are exercised in groups, even if within each group challenges for cause are exercised before peremptory challenges, violates the statutory mandate. That section, however, must be read in light of Code of Civil Procedure section 231, which entitles each party to have a full panel before exercising any peremptory challenge  panel here apparently always having been understood by California courts as the subse of the members of the whole venire who are called to fill the jury box during voir dire. In other words, defendant was entitled to have a panel of 12 jurors before he exercised any peremptory challenges, but the governing statutes have never been interpreted to require that the entire venire be subjected to for-cause challenges before the exercise of any peremptory challenges, a procedure that  in a capital case entailing a large venire  would further add to the time-consuming nature of the process. (See, e.g., People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 396, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221 [where we assumed, without discussion, that, in former Penal Code section 1088, which stated in pertinent part that each party shall be entitled to have the panel full before exercising any peremptory challenge, the phrase full panel meant a full complement of 12 jurors].) Under the system of jury selection employed by the court here, defendant directed his peremptory challenges against 12 individuals seated in the jury box. No statutory violation occurred. Defendant maintains that, under the variation of the jury box system employed here, he was unable to make informed exercise of peremptory challenges because he did not know the composition of the final jury. Although knowledge of the composition of the entire panel can be relevant to the exercise of a peremptory challenge against an individual juror, the fact that a particular procedure used may have made exercising initial peremptory challenges less informed does not in itself require reversal. ( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 397, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221.) A court commits reversible error if its procedures deny a party's right of peremptory challenge. ( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 397-398, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221; see also Pointer v. United States (1894) 151 U.S. 396, 408-409, 14 S.Ct. 410, 38 L.Ed. 208; United States v. Blouin, supra, 666 F.2d at p. 797.) But defendant here was not prohibited from exercising all of his allotted peremptory challenges; indeed, he exercised them all. No error occurred.