Opinion ID: 1470157
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Police Presence

Text: Appellant argues that the presence of numerous uniformed police officers in the courtroom and surrounding areas during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial created an inherently prejudicial atmosphere thereby depriving him of a fair trial. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570-71, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1347, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986) (We do not minimize the threat that a roomful of uniformed and armed policemen might pose to a defendant's chances of receiving a fair trial.). Appellant supports this contention by observing that both the Commonwealth and defense counsel noted the officers' presence on the record, see N.T. October 8, 1991, at 98-99, 131-32, and with numerous declarations from persons present at trial, which he claims demonstrate the overwhelming numbers of police present in the courtroom and their effect on the jury, see Declaration of Karim Shabazz, ¶ 10-11; Declaration of Leora Johnson, ¶ 10 (Aug. 11, 1999); Declaration of Niema Williamson, ¶ 11 (Aug. 12, 1999) (Williamson Declaration); Declaration of Kevin Bryant, ¶ 5-7 (Aug. 13, 1999); Declaration of Joan Gibson, ¶ 15 (Mar. 2, 1999). Appellant analogizes the present matter to Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 833 (9th Cir.1990), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that an implied message, which may impact the fairness of the proceedings, is all the more dangerous precisely because it was not a formal accusation. As such, the accusation stood unchallenged, lending credibility and weight to the state's case without being subject to the constitutional protections to which such evidence is ordinarily subjected. Id. Appellant further asserts that previous counsel were ineffective for failing to object at trial and failing to raise this claim on direct appeal. In response, the Commonwealth observes that courts must be open to the public, see Commonwealth v. Contakos, 499 Pa. 340, 343, 453 A.2d 578, 579 (1982); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2825, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), and that police are expected to be present during the trial of one accused of murdering a fellow officer, see Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir.1995) (noting that if you kill a policemen [sic] and are put on trial for the crime, you must expect the courtroom audience to include policemen). The Commonwealth further explains that a courtroom condition will not inherently prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial unless it is demonstrated that an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 570, 106 S.Ct. at 1346-47 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)). The Commonwealth emphasizes that there is no evidence of the number of uniformed police officers who attended Appellant's trial and no indication that those officers disrupted the proceedings in any fashion. In addition, the Commonwealth distinguishes Norris, as the situation in that case involved spectators wearing buttons with the words Women Against Rape, which the court believed impliedly accused the defendant of the crime with which he was charged. See Norris, 918 F.2d at 829. Thus, the Commonwealth contends that, as the PCRA court concluded, the presence of police officers in the courtroom during Appellant's trial was not inherently prejudicial. We agree with the Commonwealth and the PCRA court that Appellant's proffer was insufficient to demonstrate that his contentions with respect to the presence of police officers at his trial might have arguable merit. The only record evidence of the officers' presence is contained within the arguments of defense counsel and the prosecutor. If we took all of these police officers off and put them on the streets where they should be, because this case is over and their only interest in the case at this point should be to go find and solve crimes someplace else, but they are here. They are here and they are here in uniform. And their purpose for being here, I suggest to you, is to play on your sympathy because a fellow officer is dead and to intimidate you by daring you to consider the defense in this case at all, or to suggest as you sit here that they and the people who talk to them are in fact telling the truth . . .    . . . So what do they do to you on the day when I have to talk to you and when he has to talk to you and the Judge is going to tell you what the law is and you are going to take the case out? They fill up the courtroom with cops, and the effort is to deal with your mind in a fashion where you would be persuaded to consider the evidence in this case in consideration of who died. N.T. October 8, 1991, at 98-99 (closing arguments of defense counsel). [Defense counsel] talked about the presence of police officers here and none of those people are here because they have to be, and he submits to you there is a reason for their presence here. Well, I submit to you they are here because a fellow officer was killed, much the same way that persons from any particular profession who have an affinity, comradeship with each other would appear in circumstances such as this. This does not come close to the number of persons present at his funeral but that is all the room will hold, and they are here because they care. But the thing I really want to say about that is this: This case exists before you now and Mr. Gaskins said what he said about an angle for why we are here, because Officer Dukes has been referred to time and time and time again as Officer Dukes, but he is a human being and I would be here were it not Officer Dukes involved in this case, if only Vernae Nixon were involved in this case, because she is a person too. And it is a tragedy that Mr. Gaskins said nothing about her. N.T. October 8, 1991, at 131-32 (closing arguments of prosecutor). These brief references, tempered by the assistant district attorney's statement that the case would still be prosecuted if no police officer had been killed, see id. at 132, do not create an unacceptable risk that the jury would consider impermissible factors in reaching its verdict and sentence. See Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 570, 106 S.Ct. at 1346-47. Moreover, the declarations proffered by Appellant, from his friends and family members, do not establish that the jury was intimidated by the unknown number of police officers present in the courtroom. The defense investigator, for example, states that [t]he courtroom was packed by police officers throughout the trial, but concedes that only some were in uniform. See Shabazz Declaration, ¶ 10. Further, several declarations proffered by Appellant indicated that the police would make noises in favor of the prosecution and against the defense, but Appellant has not identified any portion of the record that would substantiate these statements. See Shabazz Declaration, ¶ 11; Johnson Declaration, ¶ 10; Williamson Declaration, ¶ 11; Bryant Declaration, ¶ 6-7; Gibson Declaration, ¶ 15. [20] In addition, we find Smith to be more analogous to the present matter than Norris. In Smith, the Seventh Circuit directly addressed the effect of a prosecutor's reference to the presence of police officers and, recognizing the potential for intimidation posed by such spectators, concluded that brief statements and an unknown number of officers did not deny the defendant a fair trial. See Smith, 59 F.3d at 664-65. Similarly, we acknowledge that police officers' attendance at trial may cause concern with regard to jurors' perceptions and courtroom atmosphere. However, where the record does not indicate the number of uniformed officers present or any disturbance caused thereby, we conclude that Appellant cannot demonstrate that an unacceptable risk of the jury considering impermissible factors was created. Cf. Meadows v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1112, 1123-24 (Ind.App.2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in permitting up to ten uniformed police officers to attend the defendant's trial); Brown v. State, 132 Md.App. 250, 752 A.2d 620, 631 (2000) (holding that the presence of an unknown number of uniformed officers, without more, did not sufficiently demonstrate that the defendant was denied a fair trial); State v. Hill, 501 S.E.2d 122, 126 (S.C. 1998) ([W]ithout anything more than the mere assertion that six officers were present in the courtroom, we cannot find appellant has shown any inherent prejudice.). Accordingly, the PCRA court correctly determined that this was not a circumstance in which Appellant demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the officers' attendance at his trial, and his ineffectiveness claim fails.