Opinion ID: 836476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requirements for Establishing a Single/Common Scheme or Plan

Text: The underlying premise throughout these cases is that a simple string of similar offenses, in and of itself, is not sufficient to establish a single common scheme or plan. Rather, the cases cited by the majority all involve situations in which each joined offense was committed with a particular motive or goal underlying the defendant's conduct. [24] That common motive is what established the common scheme or plan and made joinder appropriate. [25] Hence, each of these cases involves situations in which the joined offenses were either planned in advance of their commission or committed to further the defendant's unified goal. This interpretation is what distinguishes acts committed as part of a single scheme or plan from acts that are of the same or similar character. [26] That these two distinct provisions are not intended to capture the same connection between offenses is evidenced by the fact that the rules in many jurisdictions include both. [27] The commentary to the revised American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice supports this interpretation. It states: [Common plan] offenses involve neither common conduct nor interrelated proof. Instead, the relationship among offenses (which can be physically and temporally remote) is dependent upon the existence of a plan that ties the offenses together and demonstrates that the objective of each offense was to contribute to the achievement of a goal not attainable by the commission of any of the individual offenses. A typical example of common plan offenses is a series of separate offenses that are committed pursuant to a conspiracy among two or more defendants. Common plan offenses may also be committed by a defendant acting alone who commits two or more offenses in order to achieve a unified goal.[ [28] ] By contrast, the commentary describing offenses of the same or similar character states, Similar character offenses normally involve the repeated commission of the same offense[,] often with the same modus operandi. [29] Michigan has not adopted the same or similar character language as part of MCR 6.120. The majority implicitly does so here by denying severance of offenses that are of the same or similar character under the misnomer of a single scheme or plan. Contrary to the majority's conclusion, defendant's acts of packaging cocaine for distribution do not meet the threshold for establishing a single scheme or plan. Unlike in Fortenberry, defendant in this case did not commit both drug offenses as part of a plan to exact revenge. Unlike in Graham, defendant's motive for committing these offenses did not stem from his participation in a militia organization based on an underlying distrust of government. In this case, there is no evidence that defendant either planned his two drug offenses in advance of their commission or that he had a unified goal for committing them. The intent to engage in drug trafficking, or earn money by selling cocaine, is the intent to engage in the conduct itself, not evidence of a unified goal motivating the commission of the offenses. [30] Labeling this conduct as a plan to package cocaine for distribution is nothing more than wordplay designed to evade this determination. Although the drug offenses in this case involve conduct of the same or similar character, this similarity is not included in the definition of related offenses in MCR 6.120. Thus, although joinder under the federal rule might be appropriate, [31] MCR 6.120 mandates severance upon the defendant's timely motion to sever.