Opinion ID: 2263509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Constitutional Right to Hold Public Employment.

Text: In holding that the Ordinance invaded the rights of County employees to hold their employment in violation of the 1st, 4th, 5th, 9th and 14th amendments to the federal constitution and Articles 2, 7, 8, 19, 23, 35, 40 and 45 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the lower court relied upon a number of cases holding that a public employee cannot be removed from his employment for reasons that contravene due process e.g., Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 82 S.Ct. 275, 7 L.Ed.2d 285 (1961). From averments made in the bill of complaint that the Ordinance may drive some employees from their jobs, the court concluded that forced financial disclosure constitutes a form of involuntary discharge, or constructive discharge without due process of law. While it is true that government employment may not be denied on the basis of invidiously discriminatory criteria, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973); that government employees retain their first amendment rights to speech and assembly, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); and that public employees may not, in some instances, be deprived of their employment without procedural due process, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), there is no constitutional right to public employment as such which will be protected against infringement on its own account apart from violation of other constitutional rights. Nothing in the provisions of the Ordinance now before us prohibits persons from holding public employment. If a County employee fails to comply with the disclosure provisions of the Ordinance, and if the County Attorney thereby takes action against him, and if a court issues the appropriate writ, the employee's salary will be suspended pending compliance with the requirements imposed by the Ordinance, and he may be subjected to existing personnel disciplinary rules. That an employee may choose to resign rather than make a public disclosure of his finances does not mean that he is being unconstitutionally excluded from public employment. Where, as here, the Ordinance promotes a compelling state interest, and is not substantially overbroad, no unconstitutional or impermissible infringement upon any constitutional right of the complaining employees is involved. The cases so hold. See Fritz v. Gorton, supra ; Stein v. Howlett, supra ; County of Nevada v. MacMillen, supra . Compare Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra and United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, supra .