Opinion ID: 2974130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Postal Records

Text: Baker contends that the district court erred in allowing the government to introduce the postal records on the basis that the records constituted inadmissible hearsay; the government responds that the evidence was properly admitted as business records pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).
“‘In reviewing a trial court’s evidentiary determinations, this court reviews de novo the court’s conclusions of law and reviews for clear error the court’s factual determinations that underpin its legal conclusions.’” United States v. Jenkins, 345 F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 451 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also Field v. Trigg County 1 Baker’s codefendants include Peter Vasilakos, Debbie Lent, Terence Magrey, Rocky Edwards, and Jodi Hill. 2 All of the relevant activity occurred in the territory managed by Peter Vasilakos, who was Baker’s supervisor. 3 Baker initially worked as a sales agent, but his role shifted after he suffered a heart attack in 1996. At that point, he began handling all of the sales reports, as well as other administrative duties. 4 “The United States did not re-try appellant Baker on the mail fraud conspiracy.” Appellee Br. at 3. No. 05-3336 United States v. Baker Page 3 Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729, 735 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that this court reviews de novo “a district court’s conclusions of law, such as . . . whether evidence offered at trial constituted hearsay within the meaning of the Federal Rules of Evidence”); United States v. Dakota, 197 F.3d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 1999) (same). We note that we have also reviewed a district court’s evidentiary determinations for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 337 (6th Cir. 2005) (“We review evidentiary rulings by the district court, including alleged violations of the hearsay rule, under the abuse-of-discretion standard.”); Trepel v. Roadway Express, Inc., 194 F.3d 708, 716-17 (6th Cir. 1999) (same).5 The decision as to the correct standard of review will not affect the outcome of this appeal, as “the district court’s ruling on this issue should not be disturbed under either standard.” United States v. Carmichael, 232 F.3d 510, 521-22 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 974 (2001). However, we point out that these two standards of review are not in fact inconsistent, because “it is an abuse of discretion to make errors of law or clear errors of factual determination.”6 United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2005), quoted in United States v. Payne, 437 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2909 (2006); see also Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 135, 139 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[A] ‘district court abuses its discretion only when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard.’”) (quoting Fleischut v. Nixon Detroit Diesel, Inc., 859 F.2d 26, 30 (6th Cir. 1988)), quoted in United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1154 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1127 (1997).
The government points out that Baker’s counsel did not object to the admission of the evidence in question at trial, although counsel for Baker’s codefendant Edwards did so object.7 Appellee Br. at 9; J.A. at 251 (Trial Tr. at 732). “[W]hen a party fails to object to evidence at the trial court, his contention on appeal will prevail only if the trial court’s evidentiary decision was plainly erroneous, thus affecting his substantial rights and resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Evans, 883 F.2d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has set forth the following test for plain-error review: “there must be (1) ‘error,’ (2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (third alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). “If all three 5 The Trepel court explained as follows: The Supreme Court has recently stated that all evidentiary rulings are reviewed for “abuse of discretion.” See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, [141] (1997). There, the Court was not dealing with an alleged hearsay rule violation, but its sweeping “all evidentiary ruling” statement rather clearly means what it says. It is not clear to us how a trial court would have “discretion” to ignore the definition of inadmissible hearsay in Federal Rule of Evidence 801 or the foundation requirements for establishing exceptions to the hearsay rule under Federal Rules of Evidence 803 or 804, but it is not this court’s privilege to “question why.” Therefore, in disregard of our heretofore well-settled precedent that hearsay evidentiary rulings are reviewed de novo, see United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 668 (6th Cir. 1993), we shall review the district court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Trepel, 194 F.3d at 716-17. The issue before the Supreme Court in Joiner was “what standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).” Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138-39. 6 McDaniel thus concluded that Joiner did not require any change in our standard of review for evidentiary determinations at trial. United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2005). 7 In his brief, Baker states that “[o]bjections to this testimony were raised by each of the co-defendants.” Appellant Br. at 10. However, Baker offers no citation in support of this statement, and we have found nothing in the record to indicate that Baker’s counsel objected to the evidence in question. No. 05-3336 United States v. Baker Page 4 conditions are met, [we] may then exercise [our] discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. at 467 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732). However, the government acknowledges that in certain circumstances courts have excused such a failure to object in light of an objection by a codefendant. In an analogous case, we refused to consider defendants’ claims waived due to their failure to join in a codefendant’s pre-trial motion to suppress evidence; we explained that “[a]dditional fourth amendment challenges by the other appellants raising the identical legal issue would8 neither have altered the [trial] court’s ruling nor served the purposes of the pre-trial motion rule.” United States v. Cassity, 631 F.2d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1185 (5th Cir. 1997) (“We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below.”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1119 (1998); United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“We recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.”); United States v. Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d 310, 313 n.1 (2d Cir. 1960) (“We do not regard the failure of Dryja’s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz’s exception called the matter to the judge’s attention and further exception would have been fruitless.”). These cases emphasize the futility of requiring each defendant to raise a redundant objection. Westbrook, 119 F.3d at 1185. Baker’s objection would not have served any purpose in light of the fact that the district court was made aware of the basis for the objection by Baker’s codefendant. Accordingly, we do not subject Baker’s claim to plain-error review, and we proceed to the merits of his claim.
We have explained that: A business record must satisfy four requirements in order to be admissible under Rule 803(6): (1) it must have been made in the course of a regularly conducted business activity; (2) it must have been kept in the regular course of that business; (3) the regular practice of that business must have been to have made the memorandum; and (4) the memorandum must have been made by a person with knowledge of the transaction or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge. Jenkins, 345 F.3d at 935 (quoting United States v. Weinstock, 153 F.3d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 1998)). “This information must be presented through ‘the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness[.]’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(6)). Simmons acknowledged at trial that he was not the custodian of the records, but the district court concluded that Simmons was an “otherwise-qualified witness.” J.A. at 258 (Trial Tr. at 739). Baker argues that this conclusion was not supported by the evidence. “The phrase ‘other qualified witness’ is given a very broad interpretation.” 5-803 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.08 [8][a] (2006). “To be an ‘other qualified witness,’ it is not necessary that the person laying the foundation for the introduction of the business record have 8 The purposes of the “rule requiring criminal defendants to make their suppression motions before trial” are to avoid interruptions of trial proceedings and to provide sufficient notice to the government. United States v. Cassity, 631 F.2d 461, 465 (6th Cir. 1980). No. 05-3336 United States v. Baker Page 5 personal knowledge of their preparation.” Dyno Constr. Co. v. McWane, Inc., 198 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 1999). “All that is required of the witness is that he or she be familiar with the recordkeeping procedures of the organization.” Id. at 576. At trial, Simmons stated that he had been a postal inspector for fourteen years and that he was trained in the “interworkings of the Postal Service.” J.A. at 212 (Trial Tr. at 692) (Simmons Test.). Simmons clearly demonstrated his familiarity with the various details of the postal records during questioning. See, e.g., J.A. at 213-18 (Trial Tr. at 693-98) (discussing the details of Postal Form 1093). Finally, Simmons testified that he compared photocopies of the documents presented at trial with actual Post Office records to ensure that they were official records. Simmons’s testimony established that he was an “other qualified witness” as to the relevant records, and the district court did not err in admitting this evidence.