Opinion ID: 781793
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The show hands order constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Text: 26 The Government argues that the marshals' order to Enslin to show his hands did not constitute a seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. We disagree. The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. 22 The appropriate inquiry is whether the marshals' order in some way restrain[ed] Enslin's liberty such that a reasonable person under the circumstances would not have felt free to disregard the order. 23 Even if the official interference with an individual's liberty is brief, provided that it is some sort of meaningful interference ... with an individual's freedom of movement, it constitutes a seizure. 24 27 We think that the show hands order was a meaningful interference with Enslin's freedom. He had his hands covered and two armed marshals ordered him to reveal his hands. A reasonable person in Enslin's situation would not have felt free to ignore the request of the marshals, who likely had their hands on their weapons when they gave the order. 25 Therefore, the marshals' order to Enslin to show his hands constituted a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 28 2. The show hands order did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was not an unreasonable seizure. 29 Our conclusion that the show hands order was a seizure does not end the inquiry, [f]or the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. 26 The marshals' order to Enslin to show his hands, although technically a seizure, does not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was not an unreasonable seizure under the circumstances. The obligation placed upon Enslin to reveal his hands for officer safety during the search for a fugitive was de minimis and thus constitutionally reasonable. 27 30 Any inquiry into the reasonableness of a seizure requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. 28 In this case, that balance affirmatively favors the Government's interest in officer safety, leading us to conclude that the marshals' order was constitutional. On Enslin's side of the balance, requiring an individual to reveal his hands does force him to show a part of his person that was otherwise concealed. However, the nature and quality of the intrusion are minimal. 29 31 On the Government's side of the balance, we have the substantial and important interest in preserving officer safety. 30 The marshals were searching an unfamiliar residence for a fugitive. During their search, 31 they came across an unknown adult male. They knew the man was not the fugitive, and requested that he reveal his hands. 32 In Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court held that, during a house search, the risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation. 32 Further, in United States v. Garcia, 33 we held that officers may restrain an individual by placing him against a wall even during a consent search of a house while the officers completed a protective sweep. 34 Compared to restraining an individual up against a wall during a protective sweep, it is clear that merely requiring an individual to show his hands while the marshals complete their search of a single room is a less significant intrusion into the individual's liberty. 33 Therefore, upon conducting the required balancing of interests pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that the balance substantially favors the Government's interest in preserving officer safety during a consent search for a fugitive. Enslin does have a minimal liberty interest in keeping his hands beneath the covers while the marshals searched the room, just as a driver or passenger in a vehicle has a minimal liberty interest in remaining inside the vehicle during the stop. However, similar to the mere inconvenience of being ordered out of the vehicle, 35 being required to show one's hands is simply too small an intrusion into Enslin's liberty to overcome the weighty interest in protecting officer safety. Because the marshals' order to Enslin to show his hands was a constitutionally reasonable seizure, the district court correctly refused to suppress the gun that the marshals saw in plain view after Enslin complied with their order. 34 C. No mens rea is required for the felon status element of the felon in possession statute. 35 Enslin argues that his indictment was fatally flawed for failure to allege a mens rea for the felon status element of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). However, in United States v. Miller, this court held that the knowledge requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) only applies to the possession element of § 922(g)(1), not to ... felon status. 36 In an attempt to avoid the clear requirements of precedent, Enslin urges us to call for en banc review of Miller, contending that Miller 's holding should be reconsidered in light of Staples v. United States 37 and United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. 38 Staples and X-Citement Video implied a knowledge requirement into certain criminal statutes to avoid criminalizing a vast range of otherwise innocent conduct when the defendant would have no reason to suspect that the conduct might be problematic. 39 36 We decline Enslin's invitation to call for en banc review of Miller. The cases upon which Miller relied explicitly considered and rejected, after a thorough analysis, the application of Staples and X-Citement Video that Enslin urges us to adopt. 40 Miller was correctly decided. 37 Attempting to bolster his argument, Enslin relies upon United States v. Wilson 41 for support. However, a thorough analysis of Wilson shows that Enslin cannot garner support from that case. In Wilson, the defendant made a due process argument contending that he had no notice of the statute. 42 In rejecting that contention, the court mentioned in passing that the defendant has not argued that he did not have knowledge of the actions constituting the offense (i.e., that he was possessing a gun in his car and was subject to an order of protection). 43 Such a brief assertion, without supporting analysis, does not provide substantial support for Enslin's argument. Further, even if Wilson can be read to directly support Enslin's argument, this court has held, under similar factual circumstances to Wilson, that a defendant need not have knowledge that his possession violates the law. 44 Therefore, the district court appropriately refused to dismiss the indictment.