Opinion ID: 1661518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary Rulings. Three rulings on evidence are involved.

Text: (a) The defense was that defendant was not in control of the room the officers entered or of the devices seized. Defendant took the stand on his own behalf. His direct testimony was carefully limited to a description of the first room in the basement and of the adjoining rooms, and closed with this: On the evening of the arrest, the area, exclusive of the apartment, is where the events were occurring, and that this portion was not leased by the witness [defendant]. On cross-examination the State immediately took up the portion of defendant's answer as to where the events were occurring. The prosecutor wanted to know what events were occurring. He asked, Was poker or card-playing for money being played that evening? Defendant objected that the question was beyond the scope of direct examination. The trial court stated that defendant had been asked in substance on direct, Is that where this game or whatever it was [was] going on that night, and ruled, I think that opens it up. We believe the trial court was correct. But then the prosecutor ranged farther in his questions. To establish that defendant kept a gambling house, the State desired to show a course of gambling over a period of time. The prosecutor went beyond the night in question and asked if gambling had taken place there before. Defendant's objection, beyond the scope of direct examination, was overruled. The same objection was overruled to a question as to how many times poker had been played at this place. The latter objections squarely bring into focus § 781.13, Code, 1971: When the defendant testifies in his own behalf, he shall be subject to cross-examination as an ordinary witness, but the state shall be strictly confined therein to the matters testified to in the examination in chief. We may put aside as not involved here the cross-examination of a defendant as to credibility. As to that he is, in the language of the statute, subject to cross-examination as an ordinary witness. State v. Kelley, 161 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa). Our problem relates to defendant's testimony regarding the facts of the charges. Defendant insists the State was restricted to the matters testified to in the examination in chief, citing the statute, while the State claims that when defendant testified in chief on a matter relating to the offenses, he opened up the whole subject of his guilt or innocence, citing State v. Shepard, 247 Iowa 258, 73 N.W.2d 69. We are not concerned, of course, with the policy of the statute. As to that, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2276(d) at 448 (3rd ed.); Note, 24 Iowa L.Rev. 564. Our duty is to observe the statute faithfully. State v. Johnson, 261 Iowa 661, 155 N.W. 2d 512. We think the present case is an appropriate one in which to reexamine the Shepard decision. Shepard was charged with fourth-offense driving while intoxicated, and testified on his own behalf solely about the principal incident on trial. On cross-examination he was asked about the three prior offenses. His attorney objected, but not on the ground that the question went beyond the scope of direct. The objection was overruled by the trial court. State v. Shepard, supra, 247 Iowa at 264, 73 N. W.2d at 73 (Over an objection containing numerous grounds, none of which, however, was that of improper cross-examination, the defendant was required to answer.). The affirming decision of this court, however, was not placed on the inadequate objection but on the broader basis, favored by Wigmore, that the proper scope of cross-examination when the defendant takes the stand is the whole fact of guilt or innocence. We now think the Shepard interpretation unduly extends the statute. True, a defendant may testify so broadly on direct that he opens up the whole matter of his guilt or innocence, and he may do so very briefly. Cases of that sort are State v. Hathaway, 224 Iowa 478, 276 N.W. 207, and State v. Ragona, 232 Iowa 700, 5 N. W.2d 907. In Hathaway the defendant was charged with operating a house of ill fame during the spring and summer of 1935. Her counsel asked her only two questions on direct examinationone, her identity, and the other, this: Q. Mrs. Hathaway, did you operate during the spring and summer of 1935 a house of ill fame at 634 Walnut Street in Waterloo? A. No, sir. This court approved cross-examination on the whole matter of the defendant's guilt or innocence, saying, It will be noted that the question and answer propounded to the accused by her own counsel on direct examination was the ultimate question which the jury itself was to decide. 224 Iowa at 481, 276 N.W. at 209. When, however, the defendant is not asked the ultimate question in the case on direct by one or more questions but is asked only about specific matters, to allow the prosecutor to range over the whole question of guilt or innocence is to read out of the statute the restriction that cross-examination is limited to the matters inquired into on direct. On that point we now overrule the Shepard case. We do not mean to say the prosecutor can only parrot the questions propounded on direct. Cross-examination may deal with the matters inquired into on direct, and questions fairly within the area of those matters constitute proper cross-examination. As stated in 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 395 at 175, cross-examination of an accused is not restricted to a mere categorical review of the matters stated in the direct examination, but may cover any matter referred to, or within the fair purview of, direct examination. See also State v. Broten, 176 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa). Neither do we mean to erode the traditional discretion of trial courts in ruling on marginal questions during cross-examination. State v. Harrington, 178 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa); State v. Van Voltenburg, 260 Iowa 200, 147 N.W.2d 869. We realize that the present decision changes a rule of evidence for criminal trials. The new rule will not be applied retrospectively. It will be applied only to (a) the present case, (b) cases in which trial commences on or after the filing date of this opinion, and (c) cases tried before the filing of this opinion in which proper objection was made on trial and the error was properly preserved and (i) which are pending on direct appeal to this court on the filing date of this opinion or (ii) which can still timely be and are directly appealed to this court after the filing date of this opinion. See State v. Schatterman, 171 N.W.2d 890 (Iowa). In the present case defendant confined himself on direct examination to the matter of the physical layout of the basement. He mentioned only incidentally to his description of the premises that events were occurring, and then only with respect to the evening of the arrest. To allow the State to range back in its questions to show a prior course of gambling was error. (b) Green testified for the State and was asked by the prosecutor whether any of the participants or watchers at the poker games were armed. Defendant objected that the question was irrelevant and would inflame the jury. The objection was overruled. Green answered in substance that some of the individuals carried weapons at other places but not at the games. We think the objection should have been sustained. The presence of weapons is not an element of either offense charged. Cf. State v. Wallace, 259 Iowa 765, 145 N.W. 2d 615; 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 611 at 419. That some of the individuals carried arms at other places and on other occasions was especially irrelevant. If individuals at the game on the night of the search had been armed and this had been mentioned in the testimony describing the search, a different situation would exist. State v. Wilson, 173 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa); State v. Schenk, 236 Iowa 178, 18 N.W. 2d 169; State v. King, 190 Kan. 825, 378 P.2d 147; 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 712 at 967-968, § 603 at 409. But no one claims that any gambler or watcher was armed that night. The county attorney was present at the search and was aware of the facts. (c) As part of his evidence showing that defendant was in control of the place where the gambling occurred and of the gambling devices, the State sought to show that defendant lived at 217 Hilltop Road. The prosecutor asked a witness what defendant's address was according to the telephone directory. The objection of hearsay was overruled and the witness answered, It is listed as 217 Hilltop. The objection should have been sustained. Seay v. State, 93 Okl.Cr. 372, 228 P.2d 665. The remaining question on these evidentiary rulings is the matter of prejudice. Iowa adheres to the rule that error in admission of evidence must be prejudicial to an accused to constitute cause for reversal. State v. Wallace, 259 Iowa 765, 771, 145 N.W.2d 615, 619; see Model Code of Evidence, Rule 6(b). This court has said, A common test to determine whether a ruling on the admission of evidence was prejudicial is whether, upon a review of the record, it sufficiently appears the rights of the complaining party have been injuriously affected by the error or he has suffered a miscarriage of justice. State v. Mayhew, 170 N.W.2d 608, 619 (Iowa); State v. Wallace, supra, 259 Iowa at 771, 145 N.W.2d at 619. We think the erroneous evidentiary rulings entitle defendant to another trial. Since the case must be retried, we proceed to problems which will probably arise on retrial.