Opinion ID: 1365567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The motion to decline jurisdiction.

Text: Appellant contends the trial court erred in refusing to decline jurisdiction on the ground the Maryland court, which had jurisdiction under its own law, was the proper forum under both the doctrine of forum non conveniens and under the Uniform Act. He also contends respondent and the child Aimee could not have attained a domicile in this state under the clean hands doctrine, and thus failed to establish any jurisdictional basis upon which the Washington court could enter a custody decree. [1] A Washington court has jurisdiction to determine the permanent custody of a child who is a domiciliary of this state. In re Marriage of Dunkley, 89 Wn.2d 777, 575 P.2d 1071 (1978); In re Marriage of Saucido, 85 Wn.2d 653, 538 P.2d 1219 (1975); In re Mullins, 26 Wn.2d 419, 174 P.2d 790 (1946). A court may decline jurisdiction, however, if certain circumstances are present. If a parent brought the child into Washington in violation of a permanent and valid custody decree of a sister state, the court will decline jurisdiction under the clean hands doctrine on the ground the parent could not have obtained the requisite domicile. In re Mullins, supra . This doctrine is embodied in section 8 of the Uniform Act as a matter within the trial court's discretion. Uniform Act, supra at 115. The Uniform Act extends the doctrine to circumstances of wrongful conduct in taking or retaining a child, not just to violations of valid custody decrees. Maryland's legislature has adopted the Uniform Act, including this provision for declining jurisdiction. Md. Ann. Code, art. 16, § 190 (1978 Cum. Supp.). Although this court continues to commend the Uniform Act to the legislature as we did in In re Marriage of Dunkley, supra , the act is not the law of the State of Washington. The Washington rule is mandatory and requires a court to decline jurisdiction, but only where the circumstances show the parent has violated a binding and permanent custody decree. In this case respondent did not violate such a decree. She was fully entitled to obtain a separate domicile for herself and her children under both Maryland and Washington state law. See Miller v. Miller, 247 Md. 358, 231 A.2d 27 (1967); Pickler v. Pickler, 5 Wn. App. 627, 489 P.2d 932 (1971). We conclude there was no bar to the exercise of Washington jurisdiction under the clean hands doctrine. We note, however, that even under section 8 of the Uniform Act our court would not have been required to decline jurisdiction. Section 8 contemplates consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances, and the exercise of discretion by the trial court to determine what is just and proper under the circumstances. In this case respondent justifiably feared for the emotional well-being of her children as well as her own physical and emotional safety, if they stayed in the Maryland home. She fled to the comfort of her own parents and siblings, who were also able to extend security and love to her children. The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, could well have found her conduct was not wrongful and did not require it to decline jurisdiction under the Uniform Act. [2] A second, and discretionary, ground for refusal to exercise jurisdiction which is urged by appellant, lies in the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This doctrine will be applied in child custody cases where, for example, custody litigation is pending in another state, or that state is exercising continuing jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, and the relevant witnesses and accumulated court testimony are present in that other state. In re Marriage of Dunkley, supra . This doctrine is codified in section 7 of the Uniform Act, and Maryland has a corresponding provision. We find no bar created by the Washington rule, or the Uniform Act provision, Md. Ann. Code, art. 16, § 189 (1978 Cum. Supp.), to the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. At the time appellant first moved the Washington court to decline jurisdiction Aimee had lived in Washington for more than a year. The important witnesses regarding her welfare  her teacher, the family court investigator, the child psychiatrist, her friends and relatives  were all in this state. Appellant had submitted evidence in the nature of affidavits and financial statements. He had demonstrated that he was financially able to appear personally in Washington to represent his own interests, while respondent clearly could not afford to vigorously litigate custody proceedings in Maryland. The Washington court had received a full report on Aimee from the family court, and had been involved in these custody proceedings for 6 months. At the time of the second trial the proceedings had been in progress for more than 1 year and a second family court report was available. The Maryland court, on the other hand, had heard no witnesses on respondent's behalf and had conducted no investigation of Aimee's situation. Its proceedings were commenced long after appellant had appeared in Washington court and begun to vigorously litigate the custody issue. The court did not err in refusing to decline jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens. Finally, there can be no question that respondent and Aimee were in fact domiciliaries of this state. Respondent came to Washington with the intent to reside here, near her own family, and to become a domiciliary. As pointed out above, there was no legal bar to her doing so. She did not violate any custody decree. Under these circumstances it would have been an abuse of discretion for the court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide Aimee's custody. We note also that at the time appellant filed his complaint for divorce in Maryland the courts of that state could have properly declined to exercise jurisdiction under Maryland law. Pursuant to Maryland's version of the Uniform Act, a Maryland court is precluded from exercising its jurisdiction to determine custody of a child where a proceeding concerning such custody is pending in another jurisdiction, unless certain other circumstances, not present here, are shown. Md. Ann. Code, art. 16, § 188 (1978 Cum. Supp.). Indeed, the clear intent of the Uniform Act, and of Maryland's substantially identical provision, is to allow priority in time to determine which court will proceed, absent a determination by the state having priority that forum non conveniens or some other appropriate reason requires a different result. See Comment to section 6, Uniform Act, supra at 112. We may assume that if appellant had fully and candidly informed the Maryland court of his participation in the Washington proceedings, that court might well have declined to exercise jurisdiction on this ground.