Opinion ID: 383717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Description of Place Searched

Text: 19 Whitney's second contention is that the court below erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from the N. Maryland residence because the warrant failed to describe with sufficient particularity the place to be searched. Before discussing the real substance of Whitney's contention, we take this opportunity to address the government's position that Whitney lacked standing to challenge the search. 20 Much of the controversy involved in this case centers around the automatic standing rule for persons charged with possessory offenses, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), and its continued vitality in light of subsequent decisions. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). Subsequent to the submission of this case on appeal, the automatic standing approach of Jones was overruled. United States v. Salvucci, --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). In fact, the type of standing requirement discussed in Jones is now analyzed under substantive fourth amendment doctrine, rather than under the procedural standing rubric. Rakas, supra, 439 U.S. at 138-140, 99 S.Ct. at 428. Viewed in this way, the bottom line is that, ... an illegal search only violates the rights of those who have 'a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.'  Salvucci, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 100 S.Ct. at 2553, 65 L.Ed.2d at 628. 21 Since the question of whether Whitney can challenge the searches here involved is not a threshold jurisdictional question, we find it unnecessary to make that determination. This is so because even if he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in both apartments searched at the N. Maryland residence, we cannot conclude that the warrant is constitutionally invalid. 22 Whitney argues that the warrant was insufficient because it described the house as a single family dwelling, when, in reality, it was composed of two separate apartments. Moreover, he alleges that the officers involved were aware of this arrangement and, therefore, their failure to reveal this to the magistrate was an intentional act of deception. Whitney claims that this deception prevented the magistrate from requiring the necessary information for determining probable cause to search the lower apartment. These allegations are unsupported by the record and are without merit. 23 Whitney has framed this contention as one involving the constitutional requirement of particularity in description of the places to be searched and is thus an attack on the facial sufficiency of the warrant. This appears to be a misconception. The classic statement of the standard for testing the sufficiency of a warrant's description appears in Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U.S. 498, 45 S.Ct. 414, 69 L.Ed. 757 (1925), wherein the Court stated, It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. Id. at 503, 45 S.Ct. at 416. Undoubtedly, the warrant involved here meets the test. We think Whitney's challenge, properly characterized, is one of probable cause. See United States v. Poppitt, 227 F.Supp. 73, 76 (D.Del.1964). As the court recognized in United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1955), ... the scope of the warrant to search is dependent upon the extent of the showing of probable cause. The command to search can never include more than is covered by the showing of probable cause to search. Id. at 325. 24 Therefore, when the structure under suspicion is divided into more than one occupancy unit, probable cause must exist for each unit to be searched. Hinton, supra, 219 F.2d at 326. The general rule in such instances is that, a warrant which describes an entire building when cause is shown for searching only one apartment is void. Id. The rule is not without exceptions. As the Court noted in Hinton, the general rule would not apply if the entire building is actually being used as a single unit. Id. 3 25 The court below upheld the warrant, finding that even though the N. Maryland residence was later discovered to be divided into two apartments, Whitney had full control of the house. This being so, probable cause existed for the search of the entire residence. We cannot say that the district court's finding is clearly erroneous. 26 The affidavit described the structure as a single unit because the officers were unaware of the existence of two separate apartments until entrance into the house was actually made. From what the informant had told them, the officers believed a search of the entire house was warranted. 27 We can find no evidence in the record that suggests any form of misstatement, deception, or misconduct by the officers. The informant told them that he had been in the house several times, knew its layout, and had been in all parts of the house. He informed them that Mr. Williams also resided there, but there is no evidence that the living arrangement was ever described as one involving two separate apartments. The record indicates that the informant described the arrangement as Whitney utilizing the upper level and Williams utilizing the lower level. We cannot say that either the informant's characterization or the officers' understanding was unreasonable. Such a living arrangement is not uncommon where two individuals share a two-story rental house as tenants in common. Furthermore, at the time of the search, there was only one house number on the outside of the residence and one mailbox. The inside door leading upstairs was unmarked, as was the door leading into the lower living quarters. The informant had told the officers that Whitney had the run of the residence, and had actually seen narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia on both levels of the house. 28 Affording the proper degree of deference to the magistrate's determination of probable cause, as did the district court below, we find that the warrant was sufficient. 29 By claiming that the officers knowingly and intentionally deceived the magistrate by concealing the dual occupancy of the N. Maryland residence, Whitney has challenged the veracity of an affidavit which is valid on its face. To do so, he must show (1) the affidavit contains intentionally or recklessly false statements, and (2) the affidavit purged of its falsities would not be sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); United States v. Lefkowitz, supra, 618 F.2d at 1317. Based on the discussion above, Whitney's claim falls far short of establishing the existence of intentionally or recklessly false statements, and we reject it without further comment.