Opinion ID: 1763781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: the victim's mother properly testified during the sentencing phase pursuant to krs 532.055 and krs 421.500.

Text: During the sentencing phase of the trial, Bettina's mother, Betty Derossett, was called to provide the victim impact statement as authorized by KRS 532.055(2)(a)(7). Hunt argues that pursuant to the definitional provisions of KRS 421.500(1), Bettina's daughter, Veronica Harris, was the only person authorized to be called to present the victim impact statement. At the time of Hunt's trial, KRS 532.055(2)(a)(7) authorized the Commonwealth in the penalty phase to present evidence concerning [t]he impact of the crime upon the victim, as defined in KRS 421.500, including a description of the nature and extent of any physical, psychological, or financial harm suffered by the victim [.] (emphasis added). [11] In turn, at the time of trial, KRS 421.500(1) defined a victim, as relevant here, as follows: ... If the victim is deceased and the relation is not the defendant, the following relations shall be designated as victim for the purpose of exercising those rights contained in KRS 421.500 to 421.575: (a) The spouse; (b) An adult child if paragraph (a) of this subsection does not apply; (c) A parent if paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection do not apply; (d) A sibling if paragraphs (a) through (c) of this subsection do not apply; and (e) A grandparent if paragraphs (a) through (d) of this subsection do not apply. (Emphasis added). [12] Hunt argues that the language of the statute (as in effect at that time) provides that if an adult child of the murder victim is alive and available to testify, then only she may be properly classified as a victim under KRS 421.500(1); and, in turn, only she may give the victim impact statement in the sentencing phase of the trial. Bettina's daughter, Veronica, fits that description. In Terry v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 794 (Ky.2005), Theodore Suggs was murdered by Terry. Suggs's widow, his adult daughter, and his sister were all present in the courtroom during the penalty phase of the trial. The widow chose not to testify. Over Terry's objection, the trial court permitted both the daughter and the sister to present emotionally-charged victim impact evidence. We held that it was improper for the trial court in Terry to have permitted both Suggs's daughter and sister to give victim impact statements. However, in addressing the appropriateness of skipping down the list even though Suggs's widow was alive and present in the courtroom, we stated: Appellant contends that since the secondary victim, the widow, was present and declined to testify, neither the daughter nor the sister should have been permitted to testify in her place. We disagree. Paragraph ( l )(b) of the statute states, if paragraph (a) of this subsection does not apply; it does not state, if there is no spouse. When the widow declined to testify, paragraph (a) did not apply and the adult daughter became the secondary victim who was entitled to present victim impact evidence. If she had declined to testify, the sister would have become the secondary victim. Id. at 805. In the present case, Veronica, Bettina's daughter, is placed ahead of Bettina's mother, Betty, on the victim priority list contained in KRS 421.500(1). The record does not disclose why Betty testified instead of Veronica. If Veronica, declined then this case would fall squarely within Terry ; and her testimony would be deemed proper without further question. Assuming, however, that Veronica did not specifically decline and, thus, would have been the definitional victim under the plain language of KRS 421.500(1), we believe any error was harmless. See RCr 9.24 (No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order, or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.). Be it Veronica or Betty, the Commonwealth was entitled to put on victim impact testimony. Hunt refers to Betty's testimony as being very personal and emotional testimony ... particularly about the impact of the loss of Bettina on her grandchild[.] But if Veronica had taken the stand, she would have been testifying about the loss of her mother, and also, it stands to reason, would have noted how Bettina's murder deprived Katrina of her primary caregiver. No doubt Veronica, too, would have become emotional as she told the jury about the loss of her mother with whom she had prior difficulties but with whom she had reconciled prior to the shooting. In light of this, and the overwhelming evidence of Hunt's guilt, we believe any error resulting from Betty testifying instead of Veronica was harmless.