Opinion ID: 3011942
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: History of the Current Litigation

Text: In August 1999, the Congregation entered into an agreement with the Sisters to purchase the property, and to use it as a place for worship. [304a]. The Congregation filed an application with the ZHB, seeking to use the property as an existing non conforming use, or for a variance, or special exception. [2795a]. The Congregation proposed the following regularly scheduled uses: (1) Shabbat services on alternate Fridays and Saturdays for up to an hour and a half; (2) Hebrew classes on Wednesdays from 4pm to 8pm; 11 and (3) religious classes for 2 hours on Sunday mornings. [1360a-1368a]. Other uses would include four High Holy Day services in the fall, religious meetings, Bar and Bat Mitzvah services, outdoor wedding ceremonies, and other similar celebrations and receptions to follow. [1369a-1379a, 1435a]. As part of its proposal, the Congregation sought permission to change the driveways, roadways, and parking lots on the property. [2798a]. The ZHB rejected the Congregation’s application, concluding that the principal use of the property by the Sisters was residential, and that the chapel was an accessory use to the property. The ZHB further noted that the principal use by the Monks was also residential. The ZHB concluded that the use of the property by the Sisters was as a residential use in the V-Residential District, which was lawfully permitted there. The ZHB ruled that if the use by the Sisters was non-conforming, the Sisters had abandoned the non-conforming use by filing a preliminary subdivision plan (and by its subsequent approval) but that, at all events, the grant of a variance to the Monks extinguished any non-conforming use. Since the Congregation’s proposed use of the property was for religious not residential purposes, there was no continuing non-conforming use from the Sisters or the Monks. Since religious institutions are not permitted in the R-1 Residential District, the ZHB denied the request for continuation as a non-conforming use. The ZHB also concluded that the Congregation had failed to show that it was entitled to a variance because there were no unique physical features of the property that would preclude it from being used as zoned, and that the Congregation had failed to demonstrate unnecessary hardship. In so concluding, the ZHB observed that the Ordinance does not impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of any person because religious institutions are permitted in three other zoning districts within the Township. [297a-320a]. The Congregation had the right to file an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County to challenge the ZHB’s decision. Instead, the Congregation filed the present lawsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District 12 of Pennsylvania, seeking injunctive, declaratory and compensatory relief for: alleged civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983; violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. S 2000 et seq.; the Municipalities Planning Code, 53 P.S. S 11001A-11005A; Article I, sections 3, 7, 20 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. [1a-29a]. The Congregation moved for partial summary judgment on its claim that the Ordinance is unreasonable on its face because it prohibits houses of worship from locating in residential neighborhoods. Essentially, this was a challenge to the facial validity of the Ordinance based on both state and federal constitutional law; the Congregation did not argue or present evidence that the Ordinance was unconstitutional as applied. The District Court granted the Congregation’s motion for partial summary judgment. In so doing, the Court declined to rule on the facial validity of the Ordinance. Instead, based on the argument presented in the Township’s cross-motion for summary judgment, the Court concluded that the Ordinance, as applied, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township, 161 F. Supp.2d 432, 435-37 (E.D.Pa. 2001). The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), which applied rational basis review to a zoning ordinance that required special-use permits to operate group homes for the mentally handicapped but not similar homes for other occupants, such as senior citizens and fraternities. The critical portions of the District Court’s ruling were terse. First, it explained the relevance of Cleburne: In that case, just as in the instant case, the defendant city argued that the ordinance was aimed at avoiding concentration of population and at lessening congestion of the streets. However, the Court concluded that these concerns obviously fail to explain why apartment houses, fraternity and sorority houses, hospitals and the like, may freely locate in the area without a permit. 13 Congregation Kol Ami, 161 F. Supp.2d at 436 (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450). In so doing, (here and later), the Court looked to only part of the analysis in Cleburne for the proposition that a zoning ordinance is not rational when the impact of permitted and non-permitted uses is similar. The Court then went on to state: Not only does a house of worship inherently further the public welfare, but defendants’ traffic, noise and light concerns also exist for the uses currently allowed to request a special exception. Indeed, there can be no rational reason to allow a train station, bus shelter, municipal administration building, police barrack, library, snack bar, pro shop, club house, country club or other similar use to request a special exception under the 1996 Ordinance, but not Kol Ami. Because the ZHB failed to consider whether traffic, noise, light or other disruptions warrant the denial of a special exception, and failed to apply the 1996 Ordinance in a way that accounts for that Ordinance’s differing treatment of Kol Ami from the other permitted uses by special exception, the Court finds that defendants denied plaintiffs rights secured by the Constitution. Congregation Kol Ami, 161 F. Supp.2d at 437. These statements were made without elaboration or citation. However, in their wake the Court granted injunctive relief to the Congregation, ordering the ZHB to conduct hearings on the Congregation’s application for a special exception. The Township moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The Township appealed and asked for a stay of the injunction, both in the District Court and in this Court, but these applications were denied. The ZHB held the special exception hearing between August 6 and August 9, 2001. On August 15, 2001, it concluded that the use would not adversely affect the health, safety and welfare of the community, and that it was consistent with the spirit, purpose, and intent of the Ordinance. [3907a]. Thus, the ZHB allowed the use by the Congregation, albeit with some limitations aimed at traffic, light pollution, and noise. [3907a-3909a]. Since then, The Township has also approved the Congregation’s land development plan. 14 However, the Congregation has not begun construction as it awaits the result of the appeals in this Court, and by neighbors in the Court of Common Pleas. See http://www.rluipa.com/cases/KolAmi.html. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo . See Olson v. General Electric Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996). We apply the same standard as the District Court in determining whether summary judgment was appropriate. Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1321 (3d Cir. 1995). Summary judgment should be granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is genuine if a reasonable jury could possibly hold in the nonmovant’s favor on that issue. Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 387, 393 (3d Cir. 1998).