Opinion ID: 166442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim 1: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: 27 Mr. Patton first argues that the OCCA unreasonably applied federal law by concluding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his first-degree murder conviction. Mr. Patton invokes the testimony of Dr. John Smith, the psychiatrist who examined Mr. Patton and reviewed his medical records. 28 According to Dr. Smith, Mr. Patton was incapable of forming the intent necessary to commit first-degree murder. In particular, when Mr. Patton's trial counsel asked Dr. Smith whether [i]n your professional opinion after [Mr. Patton] entered [Mrs. Kauer's] home do you think he was capable of forming the intent to commit a crime? Dr. Smith responded, Not in a cognitive, logical sense like we think of. I think from then on he was in fact simply reacting to the cocaine intoxication once he saw her. Tr. Trans. vol. IX, at 143. 29 Dr. Smith then described the cocaine-induced psychosis suffered by Mr. Patton as a discharge from the brain of inten[se] aggression and inability to control his reaction. Id. According to Dr. Smith, [s]ome of [the] things [that Mr. Patton] said in the police report [indicated that] he was out of his body watching it. He couldn't control it. He didn't know why he was doing it. He couldn't stop it. Id. at 143-44. 30 In advancing this argument, Mr. Patton faces a high hurdle. The appropriate inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (internal citations omitted). This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. 31 Moreover, the AEDPA adds an additional degree of deference to state courts' resolution of sufficiency of the evidence questions. See Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1237 (10th Cir.2000) (Under AEDPA, however, where a habeas petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence challenge has already been decided in state court, we employ a more limited review.). Thus, the question before us is whether the OCCA's conclusion that the evidence was sufficient constituted an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. See Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir.2003). 32 On this question, the opinions of the OCCA and the federal district court explain the evidence upon which a rational juror could have relied in rejecting Mr. Patton's intoxication defense and concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Patton possessed the intent necessary to support the first-degree murder charge. In particular, after initially denying any involvement in the killing of Mrs. Kauer, Mr. Patton admitted driving to Mrs. Kauer's house and stabbing her. Moreover, after the killing, Mr. Patton had the presence of mind to clean himself up and exchange his bloody clothes for those of his coworker Mr. Williams. Finally, the prosecution introduced testimony from both Sandra Moore, Mr. Patton's girlfriend, and from Mr. Williams, that Mr. Patton's demeanor seemed normal on the day of the killing, evincing no signs of delirium or strange behavior. 33 Although Dr. Smith's testimony that Mr. Patton was suffering from a cocaine delirium conflicted with some of this evidence, a rational jury could have rejected that testimony, relying on the prosecution's evidence that Mr. Patton possessed the requisite intent, and convicted Mr. Patton of the first-degree murder charge. Accordingly, the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Patton's conviction.