Opinion ID: 478833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Liability for the Delivery of Cash to the Behars

Text: 12 Appellant is liable for conspiracy with and aiding and abetting the Behars in failing to file CTRs. The definition of financial institution includes [e]ach agency, branch, or office within the United States of any person doing business ... [as a] bank ... and [a] person who engages as a business in dealing in or exchanging currency.... 31 C.F.R. Sec. 103.11. The definition of person includes individuals, unincorporated associations, and partnerships as well as corporations. Id. See also United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1436-37 (9th Cir.1986) (individual can be a financial institution under 31 C.F.R. Sec. 103.11). The indictment charges, and appellant acknowledges, that the Behars acted as a financial institution in accepting funds from him. Because each payment appellant made to the Behars exceeded $10,000, the Behars were required to file a CTR for each payment. 13 The conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 371, subjects to criminal liability two types of conspiracies: conspiracies to defraud the United States and conspiracies to commit an offense against the United States. A conspiracy under this statute has three elements: (1) the existence of an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective; (2) the defendant's knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy; and (3) the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir.1986) (per curiam); United States v. Lignarolo, 770 F.2d 971, 978 n. 9 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1948, 90 L.Ed.2d 358 (1986). A financial institution's failure to file CTRs is an unlawful act and impedes the government's legitimate efforts to collect data on large currency transactions. Therefore, a customer's collusion with a financial institution to avoid filing CTRs that the financial institution has a duty to file constitutes an unlawful conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 371. United States v. Sans, 731 F.2d 1521, 1533-35 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied sub nom. United States v. Weaner, 738 F.2d 451 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 791, 83 L.Ed.2d 785 (1985); United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627, 630-32 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Everett v. United States, 469 U.S. 847, 105 S.Ct. 162, 83 L.Ed.2d 98 (1984). 14 The indictment contains sufficient facts to establish that appellant conspired with the Behars to avoid the reporting requirement and to defraud the government. 1 Appellant was aware both that the Behars were required to file CTRs and that they never filed any. Furthermore, he actively participated in conduct that encouraged and rewarded the Behars for their unlawful conduct. The subsequent structured transactions further demonstrate appellant's and the Behars' awareness of the reporting requirement and their intent to avoid that requirement in transactions between them. Thus, the indictment states sufficient grounds for a conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 371. 15 Appellant's involvement with the Behars also makes appellant liable for failing to file CTRs, in violation of 31 U.S.C.A. Secs. 5313 and 5322(b) and 31 C.F.R. Sec. 103.25, and for concealing material facts, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1001. As 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2(a) provides, whoever aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures the commission of an offense against the United States is punishable as a principal. The statute goes on to state that whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2(b). Thus, a person with no duty to file CTRs can be prosecuted under both 31 U.S.C.A. Sec. 5322(b) and 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1001 on account of aiding and abetting a financial institution's failure to file CTRs. United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d at 632-34; United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir.1983). 16 The cases cited by appellant to refute this proposition are inapposite. In United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 679-83 (1st Cir.1985), the court held that a bank customer could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1001 and 31 U.S.C.A. Sec. 5322. That holding, however, rested on the fact that the bank was not required to file CTRs for the structured transactions involved in that case. Likewise in Denemark, 779 F.2d at 1561-64, the court held that a bank customer could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1001, but there too the court concluded that the bank was not required to file any CTRs. The courts in both Dela Esperiella, 781 F.2d at 1435, and United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 761-63 (9th Cir.1986), reached this result for the same reason. In this case, however, there is no question that the deliveries of cash to the Behars constituted transactions within the scope of 31 U.S.C.A. Sec. 5313. Therefore, appellant is liable under 18 U.S.C.A. Secs. 1001 and 2 and 31 U.S.C.A. Sec. 5322(b). 17