Opinion ID: 1925642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Public Use Determination

Text: The EDC contends that the condemnation of a temporary easement in Garage B satisfies the public use requirement of the Takings Clause for three reasons: (1) the taking advanced the public purposes identified in the condemnation statute and thus was a public use; (2) a condemnation for airport parking is a public use; and (3) a taking resulting in state management of an airport parking facility qualifies as a public use. Further, according to EDC, any economic benefit derived from the taking was an incidental benefit and not its primary purpose. Despite these contentions, we are not persuaded that the condemnation of a so-called temporary easement in Garage B was an appropriate eminent domain maneuver or a fitting way to navigate the EDC condemnation statute. For the reasons that follow we are of the opinion that EDC failed to satisfy the public use requirement of the Takings Clause. This Court has acknowledged that traditional notions of public use for real property that is taken from private citizens must yield to the ever changing conditions of our modern society such that what constitutes a public use necessarily [varies] with the changing conceptions of the scope and functions of government   . Romeo v. Cranston Redevelopment Agency, 105 R.I. 651, 658, 254 A.2d 426, 431 (1969). In Romeo, we declared that the meaning of public use should be liberally construed at least with respect to redevelopment projects undertaken pursuant to legislative enactments in accordance with the state's redevelopment authority set forth in article 33 [15] of the state constitution. See Romeo, 105 R.I. at 658, 254 A.2d at 431. Further, [w]hen the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, the wisdom of the taking or the likelihood of success is not a subject for judicial debate. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984). Thus, it is not for this Court to question whether a taking authorized by the General Assembly will accomplish its intended goals because the constitution is satisfied if the Legislature  rationally could have believed that the [enactment] would promote its objective. Id. at 242, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (quoting Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648, 672, 101 S.Ct. 2070, 68 L.Ed.2d 514 (1981)). However, it is not the function of this Court to dissect a legislative declaration to glean a public purpose; nor will we engage in a syllogistic exercise in order to conclude that a particular taking was for a valid public purpose. Moreover, we have never retreated in any degree from our previous declarations on the public use prong of a Takings Clause analysis and continue to endorse the well-established rule that what constitutes a public use is a judicial question[.] Romeo, 105 R.I. at 664-65, 254 A.2d at 434. This Court is mindful of the extreme grant of power that rests in an agency vested with eminent domain authority; and if confronted with a showing that the agency has exceeded its delegated authority by an arbitrary, capricious or bad faith taking of private property, we unhesitatingly will declare it void. Romeo, 105 R.I. at 665, 254 A.2d at 434; see also Capital Properties, Inc. v. State, 749 A.2d 1069, 1086 (R.I.1999) ([A] showing that a [state] agency has exceeded its delegated authority by an arbitrary, capricious or bad faith taking of private property is a matter properly cognizable by the judicial branch.). Further, the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause serves as the guardian of the citizenry against arbitrary and capricious governmental action, even when the decision to take that action is made through procedures that are in themselves constitutionally adequate. Brunelle v. Town of South Kingstown, 700 A.2d 1075, 1084 (R.I.1997) (internal citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court's recent holding in Kelo v. City of New London, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005), while upholding a taking for economic development purposes, stressed the condemning authority's responsibility of good faith and due diligence before it may start its condemnation engine. In determining whether an economic development project qualifies as a public use, under the Takings Clause, the Supreme Court focused on the City of New London's deliberative and methodical approach to formulating its economic development plan. The Court held: Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us    to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Id. at 2665. The City of New London's exhaustive preparatory efforts that preceded the takings in Kelo, stand in stark contrast to EDC's approach in the case before us. Although we accord deference to the findings of the condemning authority in a declaration of condemnation as well as the enabling statute upon which the taking rests, these findings are far from dispositive. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 113 R.I. at 593, 324 A.2d at 645-46. Whether a public purpose is being served must be decided on a case by case basis, in light of the particular facts and circumstances of that case. Id. at 595, 324 A.2d at 647. The principal purpose and objective in a given enactment [must be] public in nature, and is designed to protect the public health, safety and welfare. Id. at 594, 324 A.2d 641, 324 A.2d at 656. If these conditions are met, then judicial approval is mandated, whether or not there will be an incidental benefit to private interests. Id. We have reviewed the condemnation of Garage B in the context of the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation Act (chapter 64 of title 42) and the quick-take statute. For the reasons that follow, based on the record developed before us, we conclude that the principal purpose for the taking in this case was not a valid public use. We are satisfied that the condemnation of a temporary easement in Garage B was inappropriate, motivated by a desire for increased revenue and was not undertaken for a legitimate public purpose.