Opinion ID: 2724252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The FTC’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding whether summary judgment was appropriate, this Court views the “evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Himmel v. Ford Motor Co., 342 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). However, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists where “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id. at 249. In the instant case, the FTC’s summary judgment motion was unopposed because Defendants failed to file a brief in opposition to the motion. This did not, however, end the district court’s analysis. The court below acknowledged that it “may not grant Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for summary judgment without conducting its own, searching review.” E.M.A. Nationwide, 2013 WL 4545143, at . Even where a party “offer[s] no timely response to [a] [] motion for summary judgment, the District Court [may] not use that as a reason for granting summary judgment without first examining all the materials properly before it under Rule 56(c).” Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 65 (6th Cir. 1979). This is so because “[a] party is never required to respond to a motion for summary judgment in order to prevail since the burden of establishing the nonexistence of a material factual dispute always rests with the movant.” Id. at 64. Therefore, even where a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, a district court must No. 13-4169 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., et al. Page 20 review carefully the portions of the record submitted by the moving party to determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists.11
The district court considered the evidence submitted by the FTC with its initial motion for a TRO and a preliminary injunction as well as the evidence submitted with its motion for summary judgment (over 2,000 pages of documents) to find that no genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding Defendants’ violations of the FTC Act, the TSR, and the MARS Rule. E.M.A. Nationwide, 2013 WL 4545143, at –6. The district court also found that Defendants operated as a “common enterprise” and that Michaels and Benhaim could be held personally liable for injunctive and monetary relief for these violations. Id. at –8. On appeal, Defendants assert some arguments that were not presented to the district court due to their failure to oppose the motion for summary judgment. These arguments were waived because they were not first considered by the district court. Although parties may brief an issue before this Court, “the failure to present an issue to the district court forfeits the right to have the argument addressed on appeal.” Armstrong v. City of Melvindale, 432 F.3d 695, 700 (6th Cir. 2006). Therefore, rather than consider Defendants’ newly-asserted arguments, this Court reviews the district court’s articulated analysis to ensure that it did not overlook any genuine dispute of material fact.
Pursuant to Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC is “empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). “‘[M]isrepresentations of material facts made for the purpose of inducing consumers to purchase services constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices forbidden by Section 5(a).’” F.T.C. v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1029 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting F.T.C. v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1291 (D. Minn. 1985)). 11 However, “[n]either the trial nor appellate court . . . will sua sponte comb the record from the partisan perspective of an advocate for the non-moving party.” Guarino v. Brookfield Tp. Trs., 980 F.2d 399, 410 (6th Cir. 1992). No. 13-4169 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., et al. Page 21 To prevail on this claim and to establish Defendants’ liability under the FTC Act, the FTC must demonstrate that “(1) there was a representation; (2) the representation was likely to mislead customers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) the representation was material.” F.T.C. v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003). See also F.T.C. v. Int’l Comp. Concepts, Inc., No. 5:94cv1678, 1995 WL 767810, at  (N.D. Ohio Oct. 24, 1995).12 A representation is material if it is likely to affect a consumer’s decision to buy a product or service. Int’l Comp. Concepts, 1995 WL 767810, at . Defendants’ representations regarding their ability to negotiate incredible debt settlement deals were certainly material. A number of Defendants’ customers stated in their declarations that they had chosen not to sign with other debt relief service providers who were unable to make promises similar to those made by Defendants. Defendants’ statements promising up to 70 percent reductions in mortgage or credit card debt would affect any consumer’s decision to buy Defendants’ services. Determining whether the representations were deceptive and likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances is a slightly more complicated question in the instant case. To make this determination, a court need not find that defendants intended to deceive consumers. See F.T.C. v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 710, 712 (8th Cir. 1976)). Instead, we look to “the likely effect the promoter’s handiwork will have on the mind of the ordinary consumer.” Freecom Commc’ns, 401 F.3d at 1202 (citing F.T.C. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963)). “The important criterion in determining the meaning of an advertisement is the net impression that it is likely to make on the general populace.” Nat’l Bakers Servs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 329 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1964). See also Int’l Comp. Concepts, 1995 WL 767810, at  (“In determining the message conveyed by a representation, it is the overall net impression that 12 Although the FTC is not required to prove consumer reliance to establish a § 5 violation and to obtain an injunction against a wrongdoer, “such proof is necessary to establish the right to consumer redress.” F.T.C. v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1205 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). The FTC need not establish that a particular consumer relied on and was injured by Defendants’ misrepresentations. Instead, “[t]o raise a presumption of reliance, the FTC need only show (1) the business entity made material misrepresentations likely to deceive consumers, (2) those misrepresentations were widely disseminated, and (3) consumers purchased the entity’s products.” Id. at 1206 (citing F.T.C. v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 765 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). In the instant case, there is ample evidence that Defendants’ misrepresentations were likely to deceive and were widely disseminated to consumers. Additionally, reams of evidence in the record demonstrate that many consumers purchased Defendants’ services and lost thousands of dollars without obtaining anything in return. No. 13-4169 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., et al. Page 22 counts. Fine print or ineffective disclaimers do not change the message conveyed if the overall net impression is different.”). Defendants do not appear to contest that the representations were made or that they were material. Defendants do, however, assert that the net impression of those representations is an issue of fact that must be decided by a jury, precluding summary judgment. They point to their written materials, including contracts and debt relief guides, which more accurately identify the services provided by Defendants, to assert that the overall net impression of those representations was not likely to mislead and improperly induce consumers to purchase their services. Although defendants claim that the net impression of their representations is a question of fact to be determined by a jury, courts may decide this issue on summary judgment. See GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 1999) (On summary judgment, “’we must decide whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’”). For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in F.T.C. v. Cyberspace.Com, LLC, after finding that fine print notices placed on the reverse side of documents sent to consumers were insufficient to overcome the overwhelmingly deceptive nature of the front side of the communications. 453 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006) (summarizing case law from other circuits in which fine print disclaimers are insufficient to overcome evidence of deceptive messaging). See also F.T.C. v. Dinamica Financiera LLC, No. CV 09–03554 MMM PJWx, 2010 WL 9488821, at  7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2010) (granting summary judgment for the FTC where numerous declarations in the record demonstrated that consumers believed the defendant’s misrepresentations); F.T.C. v. Gill, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d, 265 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2001) (granting summary judgment on an FTC Act claim even after the defendants presented evidence of more accurate statements and disclaimers found in consumer contracts). Although Defendants later provided written documents, including a contract that more accurately characterized their services, there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the net impression of Defendants’ representations to consumers. A court need not look past the first contact with a consumer to determine the net impression from that contact, and a court may No. 13-4169 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., et al. Page 23 consider individual advertisements or messages to determine the net impression. As the First Circuit has stated with regard to advertisements, [e]ach advertisement must stand on its own merits; even if other advertisements contain accurate, non-deceptive claims, a violation may occur with respect to the deceptive ads. Disclaimers or qualifications in any particular ad are not adequate to avoid liability unless they are sufficiently prominent and unambiguous to change the apparent meaning of the claims and to leave an accurate impression. Anything less is only likely to cause confusion by creating contradictory double meanings. Removatron Int’l Corp. v. F.T.C., 884 F.2d 1489, 1497 (1st Cir. 1989) (internal citation omitted). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit explained that in cases where a defendant deploys a marketing campaign with a series of discrete communications with consumers, “each advertisement must stand on its own merits; even if other advertisements contain accurate, non-deceptive claims, a violation may occur with respect to the deceptive advertisements.” F.T.C. v. Fin. Freedom Processing, Inc., 538 F. App’x 488, 489–50 (5th Cir. 2013). See also F.T.C. v. Med. Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 283, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Therefore, the FTC Act is violated “if the first contact or interview is secured by deception . . . , even though the true facts are made known to the buyer before he enters into the contract of purchase.” Carter Prods. v. F.T.C., 186 F.2d 821, 824 (7th Cir. 1951) (internal citation omitted). See also Resort Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. F.T.C., 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1975); Exposition Press, Inc. v. F.T.C., 295 F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir. 1961). In the instant case, Defendants provided clearer descriptions of their services and disclaimers regarding mortgage payments in their written materials. However, these materials were only sent to consumers after the initial telephone conversations during which consumers provided personal contact and financial information and agreed to enroll in Defendants’ programs. Numerous consumer declarations and scripts from E.M.A. and First United confirm that the initial telephone conversations used to solicit consumers consisted almost entirely of material misrepresentations that did, in fact, induce consumers into purchasing Defendants’ services at very high costs. Defendants cannot make considerable material misrepresentations to consumers and then bury corrections and disclaimers in subsequent communications. See F.T.C. v. Gill, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d, 265 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding No. 13-4169 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., et al. Page 24 that disclaimers appearing in contracts signed by consumers were insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact “because each representation must stand on its own merit, even if other representations contain accurate, non-deceptive information.”). Some courts have noted that “[w]hile proof of actual deception is unnecessary to establish a violation of Section 5, such proof is highly probative to show that a practice is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.” F.T.C. v. USA Fin., LLC, 415 F. App’x 970, 973 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also F.T.C. v. Affiliate Strategies, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1106 (D. Kan. 2011) (finding persuasive the fact that all consumer declarations in the record “state[d] that they purchased [the] services from [the defendant] based on telemarketers’ assurances that they were guaranteed or highly likely to receive a grant. They each paid thousands of dollars . . . with the understanding that [they would receive the promised service].”). In the present case, it is clear from the evidence in the record that Defendants’ messages actually deceived consumers, leading them to sign contracts for services promised during their initial telephone conversations with Defendants’ telemarketers. Although actual consumer deception is not necessary to establish Defendants’ violation of Section 5, the fact that so many consumers were persuaded by Defendants’ representations is highly probative of their deceptiveness. Even when viewed together, the net impression of the various contacts between consumers and Defendants is one of misrepresentation and deception. The disclaimers and more accurate information were buried in written documents received by consumers only after they were misled into purchasing Defendants’ services. And even after consumers signed the more accurate contracts and received the debt management guides, Defendants continued to mislead their clients. It is clear from the record that Defendants’ telemarketers continued to deliver inaccurate and deceptive messages during subsequent follow-up calls. Consumer declarations demonstrate that numerous communications before and after the contract-signing led them to pay thousands of dollars for Defendants’ services. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on this claim. No. 13-4169 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., et al. Page 25
Like the FTC Act, the TSR targets deceptive messaging by prohibiting sellers or telemarketers from using “deceptive telemarketing acts or practices.” 16 C.F.R. § 310.3. “Identical principles of deception from Section 5 of the FTC Act apply to the TSR, and a violation of the TSR amounts to both a deceptive act or practice and a violation of the FTC Act.” F.T.C. v. Wash. Data Res., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2012). See also F.T.C. v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929–30 (9th Cir. 2009). The FTC asserted and the district court agreed that Defendants violated the TSR by (1) misrepresenting the total cost of their services, in violation of 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(i); (2) misrepresenting material aspects of their services, in violation of § 310.3(a)(2)(iii); (3) requesting and receiving fees before negotiating or settling the terms of consumers’ debts, in violation of § 310.4(a)(5)(i); and (4) calling numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, in violation of § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B). Sufficient evidence in the record establishes that Defendants’ telemarketers made each of the above-mentioned material misrepresentations, leading consumers to purchase their services. Additionally, numerous declarations in the record establish that Defendants’ telemarketers called consumers whose numbers were listed on the National Do Not Call Registry. For example, declarant Jeffrey Berry stated that since January 15, 2006, he has been registered on the FTC’s Do Not Call Registry. Despite that fact, he was contacted by a First United representative in March 2012, who sought personal information from him, including his Social Security number. Another declarant, Vivian Allen, indicated that her number was registered on the Do Not Call Registry at the time she received her first phone call from a New Life representative. Neither of these individuals had prior existing business relationships with Defendants. The only argument asserted by Defendants regarding their violations of the TSR is that the contracts signed by consumers correctly set forth the fees to be paid and services to be rendered by Defendants. As explained above, however, the net impression of the telemarketers’ representations to consumers was deceptive and likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. No. 13-4169 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., et al. Page 26
The MARS Rule, almost all of which went into effect on December 29, 2010,13 prohibits entities offering mortgage relief services from making certain representations and engaging in certain deceptive practices. Among other things, these entities are prohibited from doing the following: (1) representing that a consumer “cannot or should not contact or communicate with his or her lender or servicer”; (2) misrepresenting “[t]he likelihood of negotiating, obtaining, or arranging any represented service or result”; (3) misrepresenting that “a mortgage assistance relief service is affiliated with, endorsed or approved by, or otherwise associated with . . . [t]he United States government . . . [or t]he maker, holder, or servicer of the consumer’s dwelling loan”; and (4) “[r]equest[ing] or receiv[ing] payment of any fee or other consideration until the consumer has executed a written agreement between the consumer and the consumer’s dwelling loan holder.” 12 C.F.R. §§ 1015.3, 1015.5. Additionally, as the district court properly recognized, mortgage assistance relief service providers must make disclosures that they are “not associated with the government, . . . [that their] service is not approved by the government or [the consumer’s] lender[,]” and that they may cancel the service at any time. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1015.4(a)(1), (b)(1). There is clear, undisputed evidence in the record that Defendants made verbal representations in violation of the MARS Rule and that their written documents violated elements of the Rule as well.14 First, there is ample evidence that after the effective date of the Rule, Defendants told consumers not to speak with their mortgage lenders (both orally and in their written materials). For example, in July 2011, consumer Gloria Bernardo was instructed by a New Life representative not to pay her mortgage lender and not to answer the lender’s calls. Elisea R. Cadaoas received similar instructions from a New Life representative in June 2011. She described her encounter with New Life as follows: 13 The advance fee ban contained in 12 C.F.R. § 1015.5 went into effect on January 31, 2011. 14 Although Defendants claim that they could not have violated the MARS Rule because their “customer contracts explicitly provided that New Life contracted to provide its customers financial consulting services—not mortgage assistance relief services,” Defs.’ Br. at 54, it is clear from consumer declarations that New Life represented itself as an entity providing mortgage relief services and consumers relied on those representations. No. 13-4169 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., et al. Page 27 Kane instructed me to no longer send my mortgage payment directly to American Home Mortgage. Instead, I would now pay New Life . . . and New Life would pay American Home Mortgage. . . . Kane told me that I did not have to accept calls from American Home Mortgage unless I wanted to do so. Kane also told me not to worry. I put my trust in Kane and New Life. (R. 5-3, Mot. for TRO Ex. Vol. II, at 514.) Defendants’ own debt appraisal guide, which Bernardo, Cadaoas, and others received after enrolling in Defendants’ mortgage debt relief services, instructed consumers not to contact their lenders. The Guide states, “If you are in the process of dealing with collectors, you must always remember: DO NOT SPEAK TO YOUR CREDITORS UNTIL YOU HAVE MAPPED OUT A CLEAR SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM!” (Id. at 382.) Further, the record contains undisputed evidence that Defendants misrepresented the amount of relief consumers could obtain from their services and requested fees from consumers without first obtaining agreements from their lenders. For example, Katherine Patten explained in her declaration that she began receiving calls from First United in May 2012 offering her incredible mortgage debt relief and requesting fees before ever procuring an arrangement with her lender. During those calls, she explains, “[Their representative] told me that 1st United could eliminate the $110,000 that I was in arrears on my mortgage and bring my payments down to $550.00 per month for four months. [I believed] that if I successfully paid 1st United . . . , they would begin negotiations with Chase.” (R. 5-4, Mot. for TRO Ex. Vol. III, at 748.) Defendants also failed to make disclosures regarding their lack of association with the government, the fact that their service was not approved by the government or the lender, and that the service could be canceled at any time. For example, during a conversation between First United representative Brandon Smith and an undercover FTC agent, Smith failed to include any of the required disclosures. Additionally, “none of the scripts [in the record] include a disclosure that the Defendants are not associated with the government or consumer’s lenders.” (R. 157-2, Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. Vol. I, at 2935.) In fact, many of Defendants’ representatives made false representations that the program was affiliated with the Obama administration. For example, one consumer’s declaration described a telephone conversation with a New Life telemarketer as follows: “Kane told me New Life helped homeowners lower their mortgage [loans] . . . through a program initiated by President Obama.” (R. 5-3, Mot. for TRO Ex. Vol. II, at 536.) No. 13-4169 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., et al. Page 28 Defendants claim that “[e]ven if New Life made such representations or engaged in this conduct, it is not evidence that E.M.A. violated the law . . . . [because] the District Court cites to no evidence that E.M.A. represented it would provide mortgage assistance relief services, or made any prohibited representations in connection with . . . such services.” Defs.’ Br. at 55. Although none of the evidence in the record links E.M.A. to mortgage debt relief services or any substantial activity after the effective date of the MARS Rule, each of these corporations is to be held jointly and severally liable as they are part of a common enterprise, as explained below. d. Imposition of Joint and Several Liability Against All Defendants
“To obtain injunctive relief against an individual for a business entity’s acts or practices, the FTC must prove the entity violated § 5. The FTC must further show the individual participated directly in the business entity’s deceptive acts or practices, or had the authority to control them.” Freecom Commc’ns, 401 F.3d at 1203 (internal citation omitted). Additionally, the FTC must put forth evidence to show that the individual defendant “knew or should have known of the alleged deceptive misrepresentation.” Wash. Data Res., 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1276. Finally, in order to obtain monetary redress from any defendant, “the FTC must proffer evidence tending to show consumers actually relied on the entity’s deceptive acts or practices to their detriment.” Freecom Commc’ns, 401 F.3d at 1203. In the instant case, there is no genuine dispute of fact regarding whether Michaels and Benhaim, who repeatedly identified themselves as president and vice president of each of the corporate entities and who controlled the bank accounts for the Canadian corporations, participated in the corporations’ deceptive acts. If status as a controlling shareholder of a closely-held corporation creates an inference that an individual had authority to control corporate acts, see id. at 1205, then the president and vice president of these corporate defendants certainly had such authority. Additionally, it is clear that Benhaim and Michaels knew or should have known of the corporate defendants’ misrepresentations. The record demonstrates that third party payment processors forwarded consumer and state attorneys general complaints to Benhaim at james@newlifeconsultants.net and jb@emaonline.net. Benhaim replied to a number of these emails, demonstrating his knowledge of consumers’ frustrations with his companies. Additional No. 13-4169 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., et al. Page 29 evidence in the record, including the individual defendants’ involvement in the leadership of these entities, establishes that Benhaim and Michaels had or should have had knowledge regarding the defendant corporations’ activities and had the authority to control their deceptive acts. Finally, as explained above, consumers clearly relied on Defendants’ deceptive acts and communications—numerous consumers, who now face bad credit and/or foreclosure due to their interactions with Defendants, paid thousands of dollars in reliance on Defendants’ misrepresentations. Therefore, the district court did not err in holding Benhaim and Michaels liable for the acts of the corporate defendants.
Although the common enterprise theory of liability had not been adopted by this Court prior to this case, numerous other courts have applied this principle to similar factual situations, and we agree with the district court that it should apply here as well.15 Under this theory, “[i]f the structure, organization, and pattern of a business venture reveal a ‘common enterprise’ or a ‘maze’ of integrated business entities, the FTC Act disregards corporateness.” Wash. Data Res., 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. Courts generally find that a common enterprise exists “if, for example, businesses (1) maintain officers and employees in common, (2) operate under common control, (3) share offices, (4) commingle funds, and (5) share advertising and marketing.” Id. Under a somewhat similar theory, this Court in P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. F.T.C., 427 F.2d 261, 270 (6th Cir. 1970), considered a number of similar factors to find that a parent company “so dominated and controlled the acts of its . . . subsidiaries, that the corporate identities of the latter [could] be ignored, and the parent held vicariously liable for their acts.” The Court found that “many of the men who directed the policy and operations of [the parent company] also directed the policy and operations of its wholly-owned subsidiaries,” id. at 267– 68, and that the subsidiaries were created, dissolved, and replaced “often for purposes unessential and unrelated to the maintenance of corporate vitality,” id. at 268. Additionally, the Court observed that “corporate agents of the old and new subsidiaries were practically all the same 15 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 2005); Zale Corp. & Corrigan-Republic, Inc. v. F.T.C., 473 F.2d 1317, 1321–22 (5th Cir. 1973); Del. Watch Co. v. F.T.C., 332 F.2d 745, 746 (2d Cir. 1964); F.T.C. v. J.K. Publ’ns, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1201–02 (C.D. Cal. 2000); F.T.C. v. Wolf, 1997-1 Trade Cases P71, 713, 1996 WL 812940, –8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 1996). No. 13-4169 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., et al. Page 30 people, albeit, perhaps, with different titles and occupying different positions,” id. at 269, that “elements within the [defendant’s] corporate complex ha[d] never dealt with each other as independent commercial entities, and that they ha[d] interchanged business functions as the circumstances warranted in a manner which was wholly inconsistent with any purported corporate separation between the [companies],” id. at 270. Although P.F. Collier & Son is not entirely on point, the factors considered by that Court are instructive in this case, as are the factors generally considered under the common enterprise theory. The record could not be clearer that each of the corporate and individual defendants made up a messy maze of interrelated business entities, meeting each of these factors. Benhaim sent emails as president of E.M.A. concerning the administration of New Life and copied Michaels. The corporations had many overlapping employees and administrators, which is evidenced by declarations, corporate documents, and emails between Defendants, their employees, and their third party payment processors. The Canadian corporations paid wages to employees of the three American corporations, and funds were transferred frequently between the American and Canadian corporations’ bank accounts. The corporations shared phone numbers, and the same individuals purchased URLs and email accounts for the corporate entities. Finally, each American corporation was dissolved and replaced by another corporation that followed almost identical business models and used similar written materials when interacting with clients. The district court did not err in imposing joint and several liability because there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding Defendants’ interrelated activities. III.