Opinion ID: 1564079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the trial court err in striking Gracie's affidavit?

Text: Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., states: Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. Gracie mailed a response to FedEx's summary-judgment motion on September 2, 2005; she submitted her affidavit at that time. FedEx moved to strike Gracie's affidavit, asserting four separate grounds: (1) that the affidavit was untimely filed in light of the trial court's order and Rule 56(c)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.; (2) that the affidavit represented hearsay, speculation, and contradictory testimony and was based on an absence of personal knowledge; (3) that the affidavit contained legal conclusions; and (4) that the affidavit included an unauthenticated photograph of the house in front of which the FedEx truck was parked at the time of the accident. The trial court, after careful consideration of [FedEx's] separate motion, [Gracie's] response thereto, as well as argument presented by counsel at the hearing, granted the motion to strike on October 31, 2005, without stating a reason. The affidavit was filed with Gracie's response to FedEx's summary-judgment motion in an effort to create a factual issue and thereby prevent the entry of a summary judgment. In Lady Cor[inne] Trawlers, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 507 So.2d 915 (Ala. 1987), we adopted the reasoning of Van T. Junkins & Assoc. v. U.S. Industries, 736 F.2d 656 (11th Cir.1984), which held that on a motion for summary judgment, a party may not create an issue of fact `with an affidavit that merely contradicts without explanation, previously clear testimony.' 736 F.2d at 657. Likewise, the contradiction between Enoch's affidavit and his deposition testimony cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment when no basis or explanation is given for that contradiction other than recollection three years later. Enoch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 534 So.2d 266, 269-70 (Ala.1988); see also Power Equip. Co. v. First Alabama Bank, 585 So.2d 1291, 1299 (Ala.1991). Gracie argues that the trial court erred in striking her affidavit. In her affidavit, Gracie stated: As we approached the intersection I observed that the FedEx truck had its left front wheel on the highway blacktop and its front bumper was nearly aligned with the edge of Freeman Avenue to my left. I am absolutely certain that the left front wheel of the FedEx truck was resting on the blacktop of highway 36.  (Emphasis in original.) In her deposition taken on December 1, 2004, Gracie indicated that she could or did not remember whether any portion of the FedEx vehicle was on the highway. However, after a recess, she testified that the left front wheel of the vehicle was on the blacktop; however, she could not testify as to how far the wheel was onto the road. She said that the diagram on the police report refreshed her recollection and that she recalled seeing the driver's side front wheel on the blacktop. She decline[d] to estimate the inches the wheel protruded into the roadway. (Gracie's brief at 31.) In addition to statements based on personal knowledge, Gracie's affidavit was replete with legal conclusions. Such conclusions were couched in language like negligently drove, at a speed that was excessive, willfully drove, dangerous and negligent to park, willfully drive, and [t]he negligence of the FedEx driver, thereof also of defendant FedEx, combined with the negligence of defendant Diane M. Hyde and the willful conduct of Evelyn A. Van Voorst to cause the injury to myself and my child, Cheyenne Van Voorst. Her affidavit also included such statements as Hyde ... not having clear vision of the intersection and Evelyn certainly knew. Rule 56(e) `plainly requires (the word shall being mandatory) that an affidavit state matters personally known to the affiant.' Jameson v. Jameson, 176 F.2d 58, 60 (D.C.Cir.1949). See, also, Wright, Miller, and Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2738, p. 467 (1983). .... `In Moore's Federal Practice, we find the following language regarding affidavits in support of, or in opposition to, summary judgment: `Affidavits containing statements made merely `on information and belief' will be disregarded. Hearsay testimony and opinion testimony that would not be admissible if testified to at trial may not be set forth in an affidavit. The affidavit is no place for ultimate facts and conclusions of law, nor for argument of the party's cause.... `6 J. Moore & J. Wicker, Moores Federal Practice, Paragraph 56.22[I] at 56-1312 through 56-1317 (2d ed.1982) (footnotes omitted). See, also, Day v. Merchants Bank of Mobile, 431 So.2d 1254 (Ala.1983).' Ex parte Head, 572 So.2d 1276, 1279 (Ala. 1990) (quoting Osborn v. Johns, 468 So.2d 103, 108 (Ala.1985)). Gracie also attached an unauthenticated photograph of the house in front of which the FedEx truck was parked to her affidavit. Affidavits shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence.... Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. For a photograph to be admitted into evidence, the following two conditions must satisfied: First, the picture must be properly verified and secondly, the photograph must tend to prove or disprove some relevant fact or must corroborate or disprove some other evidence offered or to be offered. Harrison v. Woodley Square Apartments, Ltd., 421 So.2d 101, 103 (Ala.1982). Gracie commented on the photograph in her affidavit, but provided no authentication of it. In determining admissibility under Rule 56[, Fed.R.Civ.P.,] the same standards apply as at trial. ... Thus, in ruling upon summary judgment motions, courts refuse to consider hearsay ...; unauthenticated documents ...; inadmissible expert testimony ...; documents without a proper foundation ...; parol evidence ..., and even evidence barred by the dead man's rule. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F.Supp. 1125, 1139 (E.D.Pa.1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.1983). FedEx's motion to strike was also based on the untimeliness of the affidavit. The trial court's order setting the hearing on the summary-judgment motions instructed the parties that any materials in opposition should be served at least two days before the scheduled hearing. The court's instruction was in accord with Rule 56(c)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., which provides that: any statement or affidavit in opposition shall be served at least two (2) days prior to the hearing. FedEx received its copy of the affidavit on Tuesday, September 6, the day before the September 7 hearing. Gracie mailed the affidavit on Friday, September 2, but Monday, September 5, was the Labor Day holiday, so there was no possibility of a timely delivery two days before the hearing. Rule 6, Ala. R. Civ. P. (When the period of time prescribed or allowed [by the Rules] is less than eleven (11) days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.). Although the trial court did not state a reason for striking the affidavit, there were multiple valid grounds. `[T]he trial court has great discretion in determining whether evidence ... is relevant and whether it should be admitted or excluded.' Sweeney v. Purvis, 665 So.2d 926, 930 (Ala.1995). When evidentiary rulings of the trial court are reviewed on appeal, `rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.' Bama's Best Party Sales, Inc. v. Tupperware, U.S., Inc., 723 So.2d 29, 32 (Ala.1998), citing Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 589 So.2d 165 (Ala.1991). Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So.2d 63, 71 (Ala.2001). The trial court did not exceed its discretion in striking Gracie's affidavit.