Opinion ID: 2619
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Posttrial Brady Motion

Text: Following his conviction, Douglas unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the ground that the government had failed to disclose to him prior statements by Vitetta and Sarin and notes of their interviews by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (collectively the Vitetta/Sarin documents) until the Friday before the Monday on which the trial began, thereby violating his due process rights as declared in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, and its progeny, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). He pursues this contention on appeal. Under Brady and its progeny, the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material to the accused's guilt or punishment, Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Materiality encompasses the notions that the suppressed evidence is favorable to the accused and that he was prejudiced by its suppression. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (the constitutional duty is triggered by the potential impact of favorable but undisclosed evidence). Thus, as discussed further below, [t]here are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the [prosecution], either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued, Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Where a defendant's  Brady claim was raised in a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, we review the denial of the motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2002) ( Gil ). For the reasons that follow, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Douglas established none of the three components of his Brady claim. To begin with, Douglas does not complain that the Vitetta/Sarin documents were not disclosed, but only that he received them just one business day (three calendar days) before trial. The record in this case does not lend itself to the conclusion that the timing of the government's disclosure of these documents constituted their suppression within the meaning of Brady. With respect to when the prosecution must make a disclosure required by Brady, the law . . . appears to be settled. Brady material must be disclosed in time for its effective use at trial, see, e.g., Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir.2001), or at a plea proceeding, see United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 804 (2d Cir.1999); Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir.1992). In re United States (Coppa), 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir.2001) (emphasis in original). Brady material that is not disclos[ed] in sufficient time to afford the defense an opportunity for use may be deemed suppressed within the meaning of the Brady doctrine. Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir.2001). But as long as a defendant possesses Brady evidence in time for its effective use, the government has not deprived the defendant of due process of law simply because it did not produce the evidence sooner. There is no Brady violation unless there is a reasonable probability that earlier disclosure of the evidence would have produced a different result at trial. . . . In re United States (Coppa), 267 F.3d at 144. In Gil, we held that a document that was exculpatory and impeaching Brady material, given to the defendant on the Friday before a Monday trial, was in effect suppressed within the meaning of Brady as it was buried in the midst of five reams of paper labeled '3500 material,' Gil, 297 F.3d at 103, 106. Although Douglas relies on Gil for his contention that the Vitetta/Sarin documents were suppressed, Gil is readily distinguishable. In that case, the documents delivered to the defendant on the Friday before trial consisted of more than 600 exhibits, totaling some 2,700 pages. Further, Gil 's focus was a memorandum written by and to persons other than the witness whose testimony it would impeach; and the entry for that document in the 41-page index to the exhibits identified the document only by the initials of the witness, without mention of the names of its author or addressee. We concluded that, given the delivery of the document in that obscure fashion, the defense was not in a position to read it, identify its usefulness, and use it. Id. Here, in contrast, the documents given to Douglas on the Friday before trial totaled only some 290 pages. They were grouped according to the witness to which they pertained and were easily recognizable as such, with the documents relating to a given witness fastened with a clip. The Vitetta/Sarin documents related only to the statements of Vitetta and Sarin themselves, respectively, not to statements by others. The documents relating to Vitetta totaled just 11 pages. The documents relating to Sarin totaled 7 pages, plus an eighth page that was inadvertently omitted on Friday and was sent by fax on the following afternoon. The 19 pages of Vitetta/Sarin documents were easily found and fathomed. We cannot conclude that they were suppressed. Nor did Douglas establish that he was prejudiced by not having received the Vitetta/Sarin documents earlier. As to Vitetta, Douglas focuses in particular on an FBI report and handwritten notes stating that when Vitetta first entered the parking lot to work on his car, he saw the Toyota idling and thought the man he saw in the driver's seat was darker-skinned than the man he saw standing behind the Toyota just after Moran's body had been dumped into it. As to Sarin, Douglas complains particularly about not having had the affidavit discussed in Part II.C.2. above, which stated that the man Sarin had seen driving the SUV out of the parking lot was possibly white, along with an FBI report and notes to the same effect. Douglas argues first that these documents could be used to impeach the credibility of Vitetta and Sarin by clearly discredit[ing] their trial testimony that Douglas was the one and only person they saw at the scene. (Douglas brief on appeal at 56.) But that impeachment potential reveals no prejudice, for the district court noted that the documents were in fact used to attempt the impeachment of both witnesses on cross-examination, to emphasize discrepancies on summation, and to argue on summation substantively that there was another person at the crime scene. See Decision Denying Motion for a New Trial, dated January 30, 2006 (Decision Denying New Trial), at 16. The court observed that the information contained in the supposedly suppressed documents . . . was used at trial, to the best possible effect. Id. Douglas also argues that late disclosure of the Vitetta/Sarin documents deprived him of the opportunity to follow up on any leads from the descriptions or from Vitetta or Sarin (Douglas brief on appeal at 57). The district court, in rejecting this argument in Douglas's new-trial motion, noted that Douglas made no proffer of any defense efforts made to locate or speak with Vitetta or Sarin, in person or by telephone, in the four days between disclosure of their prior statements and their testimony, and that Douglas did not seek an adjournment of the proceedings. Decision Denying New Trial at 17. More importantly, we note that Douglas provides no hint as to what sort of leads could have been gleaned from the Vitetta/Sarin documents; and none come to mind, given Douglas's testimony that, inter alia, he knew who had killed Moran but just did not know the man's name. Finally, Douglas did not establish that the information in the Vitetta/Sarin documents was material. [The] touchstone of materiality is a reasonable probability of a different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d at 104. [S]trictly speaking, there is never a real  Brady violation unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936. The contents of the Vitetta/Sarin documents plainly do not meet this test. Although Vitetta was recorded by one investigator as having stated that he had thought the man in the idling Toyota was darker-skinned than the man he saw standing behind the Toyota just after Moran's body was put in the trunk, Vitetta testified that upon seeing Douglas's picture in the photographic array he realized they were the same man because the facial characteristics were the same. Moreover, even if they were not the same man, Vitetta's prior statement provided no substantive support for Douglas's version of the events, for (1) Vitetta said he saw only one person in the idling Toyota, whereas in Douglas's version of the events, both the unnamed man and Moran were in that vehicle; and (2) whereas Vitetta had stated that the dark-skinned man was in the driver's seat of the Toyota, according to Douglas's testimony the unnamed manthe only person whom Douglas described as darker-skinned than himselfforced Moran to drive the Toyota. Thus, the prior Vitetta statement was inconsistent with Douglas's own scenario. Similarly, to the extent that Sarin had said that the driver of the SUV was possibly white, that statement provided no substantive support for Douglas's defense. In his version of the events, Douglas did not mention any white person. Further, all Sarin saw, according to her testimony and the documents, was a man backing the SUV (whose licence plate she noted) out of a parking space and driving it out of the parking lot. Sarin maintained at trial and in a preliminary hearing that she had said, and was confident, that the driver was a heavyset black man; she had selected the picture of Douglas as the driver; and Douglas himself testified that he had driven the SUV out of the lot. In sum, the contents of the Vitetta/Sarin documents were not favorable to Douglas for they were inconsistent with his version of the events, and they provide no basis for finding any reasonable probability that earlier disclosure of those documents would have produced a different verdict. The district court properly rejected Douglas's Brady claim.