Opinion ID: 1959985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Darlene Grant

Text: Defendant claims that the trial court's dismissal of Darlene Grant for cause because of her views on the death penalty violated his rights to due process and an impartial jury. Defendant maintains that Grant's feelings about capital punishment as elicited during voir dire did not meet the legal threshold for removal for cause. Trial courts possess considerable discretion in determining the qualifications of prospective jurors. State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 218, 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993); State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 589, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990). A trial court's removal of a prospective juror for cause will not be reversed unless the court has abused its discretion. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 589, 575 A. 2d 816; State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 260, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987). The wide latitude afforded trial courts in the determination of a prospective juror's qualifications stems from the inability of appellate courts to appreciate fully the dynamics of a trial proceeding. As we noted in Ramseur, supra : We can profit from an occasional reminder of the limitations that our isolation from the courtroom imposes on a full appreciation of the trial dynamics. As Judge Jayne once put it, even the best and most accurate record of oral testimony is like a `dehydrated peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor of the peach before it was dried.' Trusky v. Ford Motor Co., 19 N.J. Super. 100, 104, 88 A. 2d 235 (App.Div. 1952); A bloodless record conceals subtle nuances; although we cannot always sniff them out, they do not often escape detection by our trial judges. [106 N.J. at 260, 524 A. 2d 188 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 547, 511 A. 2d 1150 (1986)).] Nonetheless, `a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath.' Id. at 255, 524 A. 2d 188 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581, 589 (1980)). If the reason for exclusion is other than an inability to follow the law or abide by one's oath as a juror, the death penalty may not stand. Id. at 255-56, 524 A. 2d 188. The improper removal for cause of a prospective juror violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 105 S.Ct. 844, 851, 83 L.Ed. 2d 841, 851 (1985). In determining whether a prospective juror's views on the death penalty warrant removal for cause, a trial court need not demonstrate the prospective juror's bias with unmistakable clarity. Ramseur, supra , 106 N.J. at 256, 524 A. 2d 188. In fact, to warrant removal for cause a juror's opposition to the death penalty need not be automatic. Yet, `nervousness, emotional involvement [and] inability to deny or confirm' that the gravity of the task would not have any effect on their ability or willingness to perform their duties is not `equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability on the part of the jurors to follow the court's instructions and obey their oaths, regardless of their feelings about the death penalty.' Ibid. (quoting Adams, supra, 448 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. at 2529, 65 L.Ed. 2d at 592-93). No hard-and-fast rules exist to determine whether the removal for cause was proper. In the end, a trial court in the exercise of sound discretion, must decide whether the responses elicited from a prospective juror indicate a view that would prevent or substantially impair that juror's performance in accordance with court's instructions and that juror's oath. Grant's responses during voir dire establish her inability to perform as a juror in a capital case. Court: ... The jury is going to have to make a decision whether he should go to prison, and if he goes to prison, he's got to go for 30 years without parole. Juror: Yes. Court: And I can sentence him up to life imprisonment but there's another alternative. The jury may decide to sentence the Defendant to death. That is the choice for this jury, between life and death. Do you understand that? Juror: Yes. Court: Could you make that choice? Juror: I don't think so. Court: Pardon me? Juror: No, I don't think so. Court: Okay, tell me why it troubles you? Tell me why you couldn't make that choice? Juror: Well, I would probably think about it a lot, you know, it would bother me afterwards, I would keep thinking about it about whether I should not or shouldn't [sic], you know about whether I made the right decision or whatever. [Emphasis added.] Although Grant did not feel compelled by any religious or doctrinal belief to oppose capital punishment, she indicated that she would not be able to look at the evidence as it was presented. Court: Is there anything in your  do you have any particular religious training that instructs you either way with respect to the death penalty? Juror: No. .... Court: Okay. Is there any ethical or moral view that you have of your own that says that the death penalty is either right or wrong punishment for murder? Juror: I don't think, I would have to look at so many things, your Honor, why  how it was committed. Court: Would you be willing to look at it and consider those things? Juror: Not really. .... Court: Why not? Let's take an example of a murder for hire, suppose it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a Defendant had murdered somebody to get money. Is that somebody who you would be leaning towards death as punishment or away from death as a punishment in terms of what would be appropriate? Juror: I wouldn't say death. .... Court: Is there anything in your personal views that would prevent you from returning a verdict of death in a murder case? Juror: I just wouldn't want to do it. [Emphasis added.] When repeatedly pressed by defense counsel, Ms. Grant did respond affirmatively when asked if she thought she could do her duty as a citizen, could listen and could evaluate the case fairly. She also hesitatingly agreed at one point under defense counsel's questioning that capital punishment could be an appropriate punishment in some cases and that she could engage in discussions about the case with other jurors. Yet, in the end, she repeated that she did not believe she could vote to sentence a defendant to death. Court: Would you be able to sentence a Defendant to death? Juror: I am not sure, honestly. Court: What is that? Juror: Honestly speaking? Court: All we're asking you to do is to be honest. Would you be able to sentence a Defendant to death, ma'am? Juror: Whatever, I don't think so. We are satisfied that Ms. Grant's entire testimony reflects more than the significant uncertainty [that] is to be expected in the average citizen when asked to discharge the task [of deciding between a sentence of life or death]. Ramseur, supra , 106 N.J. at 257, 524 A. 2d 188. Although some of Grant's responses on cross-examination demonstrate a willingness to listen to the evidence and to consider the relevant law, we are mindful that further questions ... calculated to draw out only such answers as would rehabilitate her as a juror are not conducive to a sound determination of whether a juror should be dismissed for cause. State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 439-40, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988). Although Grant's opposition to capital punishment was not grounded in a verifiable religious or moral code, her inability to serve as a capital juror was nevertheless apparent. We have approved the excusal of prospective jurors for cause in similar situations. See Martini, supra, 131 N.J. at 217-18, 219, 619 A. 2d 1208 (upholding exclusion for cause of juror who expressed significant doubts about his ability to impose a death sentence under any circumstances, despite juror's assurance that he could follow oath and vote for death and upholding exclusion for cause of juror who expressed ambivalence about the possibility of voting for a death sentence); State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 29, 594 A. 2d 172 (1991) (upholding exclusion for cause of juror who expressed dissatisfaction with sentencing options and indicated that it would be `very difficult' for him to vote to impose death); State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 96, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991) (upholding exclusion for cause of juror who expressed significant doubts about her ability to follow the court's instructions); State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 456-57, 585 A. 2d 864 (1991) (upholding exclusion for cause of juror who expressed unwillingness to vote for death sentence and upholding exclusion for cause of juror who stated that she would find it difficult to vote for death sentence); State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 358, 558 A. 2d 1259 (1989) (upholding exclusion for cause of juror who stated that she would not want and probably could not vote for death sentence). Applying the Adams-Witt test, we find that Grant's scruples substantially impaired her ability to follow the law. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing her for cause.