Opinion ID: 2595301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: compliance with the act

Text: ¶ 4 On appeal Gurule asserts that he complied with the notice of claim provision because, he alleges, the County Clerkthe person to whom notice is to be directed actually received the notice of claim after its delivery to a county commissioner. In the alternative, Gurule argues that his delivery of the notice of claim to the county commissioner should be deemed sufficient because it represents reasonably strict compliance. ¶ 5 The Act mandates that a person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity ... shall file a written notice of claim with the entity. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (Supp.2002). In the case of a claim against a county, the notice must be directed and delivered to the county clerk, not to a county commissioner. Id. § 63-30-11(3)(b)(ii)(B). This court has long required strict compliance with these provisions. See, e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109, ¶¶ 12-14, 37 P.3d 1156 (noting history and recognizing 1998 amendments to the Act). Indeed, even actual notice of the claim, received by the appropriate governmental official, has been deemed insufficient to give the courts jurisdiction when a claimant fails to strictly comply with the statute. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 17. ¶ 6 In this case it is evident that Gurule did not deliver his notice of claim to the county clerk. Although both parties agree that during a commission meeting the notice was discussed and referred to the District Attorney's Office over the signature of a deputy county clerk acting as the Commission's clerk, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the county clerk ever saw or was in possession of the notice. Accordingly, Gurule did not strictly comply with the Act by delivering his notice of claim to a county commissioner. ¶ 7 Likewise, Gurule's notice is not saved by reasonably strict compliance with the statute. Gurule argues that ambiguity in the statute renders his compliance reasonable. The only authority for allowing less than strict compliance is found in cases which depended upon ambiguities in the Act; ambiguities clarified by the 1998 amendments. See, e.g., Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998) (allowing claim where statute was unclear as to where notice was to be filed). The 1998 amendments to the Act specifically list the county clerk as the proper official to receive the notice of claim for a county. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(3)(b)(ii)(B) (Supp.2002). We find no ambiguity in section 63-30-11's command that notice be delivered to the county clerk, therefore, Gurule's cited authority for allowing reasonably strict compliance is inapplicable in this case. ¶ 8 This case is also unlike Nuñez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, which Gurule cites in support of his reasonably strict compliance argument. In that case, a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff sued a doctor employed by the University of Utah, a state institution. In order to comply with statutory requirements for filing a malpractice action, Nuñez filed a notice of claim with the doctor and the Utah Attorney General. Id. at ¶ 3. The doctor filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing he was immune from suit as an employee of the University. Id. at ¶ 5. Nuñez moved to amend her complaint to include the University as a defendant, but the trial court held that Nuñez failed to comply with the separate notice of claim provision of the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. at ¶ 6. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred because the notice of claim complied with the statutory requirements, which did not require the University of Utah or its medical school to be separately named. Id. at ¶¶ 23-27. The Nuñez case merely represents an application of the strict compliance standard and does not support the concept of reasonably strict compliance. Thus, we follow our long-held rule requiring strict compliance with the notice of claim provisionsa standard not met in this case.