Opinion ID: 1584710
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The trial judge erred in refusing to allow Bunge's claim for conversion against Tharp to go to the jury.

Text: To instruct the jury on a certain point, there must be sufficient testimony in the record to support it. Johnson v. Foster, 202 So.2d 520, 526 (Miss. 1967). Thus, there must be a sufficient presentation in the record of the issue of conversion for the jury to be instructed on conversion. Conversion requires an intent to exercise dominion or control over goods which is inconsistent with the true owner's right. Walker v. Brown, 501 So.2d 358, 361 (Miss. 1987). See also Masonite Corp. v. Williamson, 404 So.2d 565, 567-568 (Miss. 1981). The trial court improperly withheld Bunge's conversion theory from the jury as it denied the following jury instructions offered by Bunge: JURY INSTRUCTION P-4 You are instructed that in order to establish that Tony Tharp conspired to convert property of Bunge Corporation, Bunge Corporation must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Tony Tharp or others with whom he was acting in a conspiracy intentionally acquired possession and/or control over money belonging to Bunge Corporation so as to deprive Bunge Corporation, without its consent, of the money. JURY INSTRUCTION P-5 You are instructed that if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Tony Tharp acted in a conspiracy with other persons to convert property or money of Bunge Corporation, then you [sic] verdict must be for Bunge Corporation against Tony Tharp. Bunge clearly offered evidence of Tharp's possible involvement in a conversion scam. Both of its witnesses testified that Tharp was involved in the conspiracy and that he received a portion of the proceeds. Bunge rightfully argues that it provided proof that: (1) there was a conspiracy or scheme to wrongfully take Bunge's money; (2) Tharp was a part of the scheme, and in fact, received part of the money; and (3) as a result of the scheme, Bunge lost $77,499.20. Tharp argues that even if the refusal of these instructions was technical error, Bunge nevertheless received a fair trial. Thus, according to Tharp, the refusal would be harmless error. He further maintains that errors in instructions will not be cause for reversal where the interest of the complaining party has not been prejudiced. The refusal of the trial judge to submit the conversion issue to the jury was, however, extremely prejudicial, since the issue that was submitted (conspiracy to defraud) carries with it the `fraud' burden of proof  by clear and convincing evidence. Conversion, on the other hand, may be shown by a simple preponderance of the evidence. Although Tharp was found not guilty of fraud, this in no way means that a jury could not have found him guilty of conversion since conversion carries with it a less stringent burden of proof. The trial judge matter-of-factly denied instructions P-4 and P-5 although Bunge presented several witnesses who named Tharp as a participant in the scheme. It is settled within our law that: (a) party ... is entitled to have jury instructions given regarding all material issues presented in the pleadings or evidence. Glorioso v. Young Men's Christian Association of Jackson, 556 So.2d 293, 295 (Miss. 1989); Barkley v. Miller Transporters, Inc., 450 So.2d 416 (Miss. 1984). Likewise, a party is entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the jury through instructions, provided there is evidence to support it. Alley v. Praschak Mach. Co., 366 So.2d 661 (Miss. 1979). PACCAR Financial Corp. v. Howard, 615 So.2d 583, 590 (Miss. 1993). Upon examining the record, we conclude that there existed at trial sufficient evidence to allow the jury to consider the issue of conversion, and Bunge was prejudiced when the trial court so refused. Having carefully reviewed the record, we find that the lower court erred in granting Bunge's JNOV motion. Further, the circuit court erred in not granting jury instructions P-4 and P-5. This Court reinstates the general verdict of the jury in the amount of one hundred thirteen thousand eight hundred twenty-eight dollars ($113,828.00) in favor of Tharp, together with statutory interest. We reverse that portion of this case regarding the issue of conversion for trial consistent with this opinion. We also affirm the fraud verdict in favor of Tharp. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ., concur. PRATHER, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion joined by HAWKINS, C.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ.