Opinion ID: 185357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Ripeness Period

Text: 13 The Commission imposed a ripeness period co-extensive with the time period in which competitors had the right to file competing applications. The point apparently was to avoid granting applications under the old system when the time period for others to file a mutually exclusive application had not yet expired. The Commission originally used a 60-day period, representing the period during which prospective applicants could file competing applications under the Commission's rules.See 47 C.F.R. § 21.31(b) (1995); but see supra note 3 (contemplating shorter filing period under some circumstances). It later shortened the period to 30 days, explaining that it is our practice to process applications as soon after the close of the 30-day public notice period as possible. See 14 F.C.C.R. at 12,430 & 12,449; see also 47 C.F.R. § 101.37(c) (1998) (Commission cannot grant application until 30 days after application appears on public notice). 14 The Communications Act, with a few exceptions not relevant here, forbids the Commission to grant an application earlier than thirty days following issuance of public notice by the Commission of the acceptance for filing of such application or of any substantial amendment thereof. 47 U.S.C. § 309(b). The Commission reasonably determined that its ripeness period will assure fairness to potential applicants who were precluded by the freeze from filing competing applications in time to be entitled to comparative consideration. 11 F.C.C.R. at 4989 n.197. Had the Commission granted applications filed less than 30 days before the freeze date, it would have denied potential competing applicants the 30-day filing period the Act guarantees them. 15 The Supreme Court long ago recognized the procedural rights the Communications Act guarantees to those who file mutually exclusive applications. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), held that the Commission could not grant one mutually exclusive application without holding the comparative hearing required by the Communications Act. See also McElroy, 86 F.3d at 253. In Kessler v. FCC, 326 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1963), we decided that Ashbacker procedural rights apply also to potential applicants whose applications would have been mutually exclusive but for an application freeze. In Kessler, the Commission froze applications effective close-of-business on May 10, 1962. Appellants in that case filed applications between May 11 and June 15, 1962. Some of the late applicants claimed their applications were mutually exclusive with applications on file. Unlike the present case, the Commission employed no ripeness period; it processed all applications pending on the freeze date. We held that the Commission's refusal to process mutually exclusive applications filed after the freeze but that were otherwise timely denied those applicants their Ashbacker rights: those appellants who tendered applications which are, or become, in fact mutually exclusive with an application pending on May 11, 1962, or one accepted for filing since that date, are entitled to participate in a comparative hearing on that application under the Ashbacker case--if any grant is to be made--and [ ] the Commission may not deprive them of this right when their applications were timely but were rejected only because of a temporary freeze on accepting new applications. 326 F.2d at 687-88. We reasoned that the substantial effect of a contrary view would be not only to freeze the acceptance for filing of a timely application but to freeze new applicants permanently out of a right of substance--the comparative hearing on the pending application to which they are entitled when their application is timely. Id. at 688. 16 Kessler's reasoning applies here. Without the ripeness period, the Commission could have granted applications filed less than 30 days before the freeze date, abrogating the Ashbacker rights of prospective applicants who could have filed timely competing applications but for the freeze. The ripeness period quite sensibly guarantees that all applications that are granted were on public notice for the 30 days required by the Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(b). 7