Opinion ID: 4541411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Second-Degree Forgery

Text: ¶21 We now turn to whether the trial court’s forgery instruction constituted a constructive amendment of Hoggard’s original second-degree forgery charge. Because we conclude that no constructive amendment occurred but that the instruction was nevertheless erroneous, we next determine whether the error requires reversal. We ultimately conclude that it does not because the error did not prejudice Hoggard and thus was not plain.
¶22 The U.S. and Colorado Constitutions guarantee defendants the right to be notified of the charges against them. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. “Because the notice requirement lies at the foundation of the due process of law,” the prosecution cannot require a defendant “to answer a charge not 6Because we conclude that any alleged error in the trial court’s instruction on the attempt to influence a public servant charge was not plain, we decline to address whether the General Assembly intended to limit the application of the mental state of “with the intent” to only certain elements of the crime. 14 contained in the information.” People v. Madden, 111 P.3d 452, 455 (Colo. 2005) (citing Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717 (1989)). ¶23 In Colorado, the prosecution provides a defendant with notice through the filing of a complaint, indictment, or information. § 16-5-101(1), C.R.S. (2019). An information is constitutionally adequate when “it advises the defendant of the charges he is facing so that he can adequately defend himself and be protected from further prosecution for the same offense.” Cervantes v. People, 715 P.2d 783, 785 (Colo. 1986) (quoting People v. Albo, 575 P.2d 427, 429 (Colo. 1978)). This notice requirement ensures that the defendant “is not taken by surprise by the evidence offered at trial.” Id. ¶24 A jury instruction that alters the charging instrument is constitutionally inadequate when it constructively amends the original charge. And a constructive amendment occurs when the instruction “changes an essential element of the charged offense and thereby alters the substance of the charging instrument.” People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 257 (Colo. 1996). A difference between the charging instrument and a jury verdict contravenes a defendant’s constitutional rights when it “effectively subject[s] [the] defendant to the risk of conviction for an offense that was not originally charged.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mosely, 965 F.2d 906, 915 (10th Cir. 1992)). 15 ¶25 With this framework in mind, we now consider whether the trial court’s forgery instruction here amounted to a constructive amendment of Hoggard’s second-degree forgery charge.
¶26 As relevant here, the General Assembly defined felony forgery under section 18-5-102(1), C.R.S. (2019), to apply to specific types of written instruments, including instruments that affect a legal right: (1) A person commits forgery, if, with intent to defraud, such person falsely makes, completes, alters, or utters a written instrument which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or to represent if completed: ... (c) A deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment, commercial instrument, promissory note, check, or other instrument which does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate, or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or status . . . . (Emphases added.) The General Assembly defined second-degree forgery similarly, but provided that it covers those types of documents not contained within the felony forgery statute: A person commits second degree forgery if, with intent to defraud, such person falsely makes, completes, alters, or utters a written instrument of a kind not described in section 18-5-102 . . . . § 18-5-104(1), C.R.S. (2019) (emphasis added). 16 ¶27 The trial court in this case provided the jury with the following forgery instruction, which included in element 5 the “legal right” language found in the felony forgery statute: The elements of the crime of Second Degree Forgery are:
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged, 3. with intent to defraud, 4. falsely made, completed, altered, or uttered a written instrument, 5. which was or purported to be, or which was calculated to become or represent if completed an instrument which does or may evidence, create, or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or status: namely, an email. (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the trial court added language that is not contained in the second-degree forgery statute. We have previously noted that “[a] trial court has a duty to instruct the jury correctly on the law applicable to the case.” Weinreich, 119 P.3d at 1076. By including language from the felony forgery statute, the trial court erred. But that does not necessarily mean that the error constituted a constructive amendment. ¶28 In arguing that the trial court’s forgery instruction amounted to a constructive amendment, Hoggard contends that second-degree forgery and felony forgery are mutually exclusive crimes because they apply to mutually exclusive sets of documents. Thus, in her view, the jury found that she committed 17 felony forgery, meaning it simultaneously acquitted her of the charged offense of second-degree forgery. ¶29 In making this argument, Hoggard contends that our decision in People v. Shields, 822 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1991), is dispositive. In Shields, we considered whether the first- and second-degree sexual assault statutes in effect at the time created mutually exclusive crimes. Id. at 18. Both offenses required proof that the defendant caused the victim’s submission to sexual penetration or intrusion. Id. at 19. The difference between the two crimes was the means by which that submission was caused: The second-degree sexual assault statute required that the defendant do so by means “other than those set forth in [the first-degree sexual assault statute].” Id.; see also § 18-4-403(1), C.R.S. (1986). We concluded that the crimes were mutually exclusive, reasoning that a defendant who caused the victim’s submission under the first-degree sexual assault statute could not simultaneously cause submission through means proscribed by the second-degree sexual assault statute. Shields, 822 P.2d at 19. ¶30 But this case differs from Shields. Under the statutes at issue in Shields, a defendant could only engage in either conduct proscribed by the first-degree sexual assault statute or conduct proscribed by the second-degree sexual assault statute. But in this case, the trial court’s forgery instruction required that the jury find that Hoggard forged an email and not a specific written instrument included 18 in the felony forgery statute, such as a deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment, commercial instrument, promissory note, or check. The forgery instruction simply placed an additional burden on the prosecution to prove more about that email. In other words, the forgery instruction required the prosecution to prove not only that the document was an email, but also that the email had some sort of legal impact. In this way, the effect of the additional language in the forgery instruction was that it elevated the import of the email that was forged; it did not require the prosecution to prove that the email was an entirely different type of document. Thus, we are not persuaded by Hoggard’s contention that Shields controls. But we must still consider whether the trial court’s erroneous instruction nevertheless amounted to a constructive amendment. ¶31 As discussed above, a constructive amendment occurs when the court “changes an essential element of the charged offense and thereby alters the substance of the charging instrument.” Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 257. Thus, to determine whether a constructive amendment occurred here, we must compare element 5 of the trial court’s forgery instruction to the initial notice that Hoggard received. ¶32 The information originally charged Hoggard with second-degree forgery under section 18-5-104, but it did not state what document was allegedly forged. Prior to trial, however, the court granted the People’s motion to amend the 19 information to specify that Hoggard was accused of forging an email. As a result, Hoggard was on notice that the prosecution had to prove that she, with the intent to defraud, falsely made, completed, altered, or uttered a document, which in this case was an email. See § 18-5-104(1). At trial, the instruction required the jury to find that Hoggard committed all of these acts. Indeed, the first four elements of felony forgery and second-degree forgery are the same. Element 5, the erroneous portion of the trial court’s forgery instruction, stated that the document forged either “was or purported to be, or . . . was calculated to become or represent if completed[,] an instrument which does or may evidence, create, or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or status: namely, an email.” To be sure, some of this language was derived from the felony forgery statute—that the document “affect[ed] a legal right, interest, obligation, or status.” But ultimately, the jury was asked if Hoggard forged an email, and an email is not one of the written instruments specifically identified in the felony forgery statute. In effect, the erroneous language imported from the felony forgery statute merely required the prosecution to prove more about the email; it did not require proof that the document was different from an email. ¶33 In simple terms, Hoggard was accused of forging an email, and she was found guilty of forging an email. Therefore, she received sufficient notice of the charge that she was convicted of, and she could adequately prepare to defend 20 against it. Accordingly, we hold that, although the trial court erred in including language from the felony forgery statute when instructing the jury on the second-degree forgery charge, the instruction did not amount to a constructive amendment.7 Thus, we now consider whether the trial court’s error nevertheless requires reversal.8
¶34 Hoggard contends that even if no constructive amendment occurred, the trial court’s instruction nevertheless amounted to plain error. For an error to be deemed plain, it must be both obvious and substantial. Miller, 113 P.3d at 750. To begin then, we must first determine whether the error found in the trial court’s forgery instruction was obvious. Unlike the second-degree forgery statute, the felony forgery statute prohibits a person from forging a written instrument that affects a legal right. See § 18-5-102(1)(c). And the trial court imported that 7 We need not address the court of appeals’ conclusion that second-degree forgery is a lesser included offense of felony forgery under section 18-1-408(5)(c), C.R.S. (2019), because we ultimately conclude that no constructive amendment occurred on separate grounds. 8Because we conclude that no constructive amendment occurred here, we need not consider whether such an amendment constitutes structural error. Cf. People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 47 n.4, 416 P.3d 893, 903 n.4 (declining to consider the same question because a constructive amendment clearly took place, and the error was plain). 21 language from the felony forgery statute in its instruction. Thus, we conclude that the error here was obvious. ¶35 Next, we must consider whether the error was substantial. For an error to be deemed substantial, the defendant must demonstrate that the error caused her prejudice. Miller, 113 P.3d at 750. Hoggard argues that the error prejudiced her because it deprived her of the use of a potential defense at trial: “that she did not forge a document within the scope of the second-degree forgery statute.” We disagree because the forgery instruction did not list specific types of written instruments that fall within the scope of the felony forgery statute, such as a deed or will; instead, it stated that the document was an email. The error in the forgery instruction simply required the prosecution to further prove that the email affected some type of legal right. Moreover, Hoggard knew well ahead of trial that the document at issue was an email. And Hoggard never disputed the type of document forged; instead, her defense pertained to identity. At trial, Hoggard’s counsel argued that Hoggard did not alter the email purportedly written by Javier, telling the jury during her closing argument that “Shawna Hoggard is not the only person that could have altered [the email].” See People v. Fichtner, 869 P.2d 539, 543 (Colo. 1994) (When a trial court gives an erroneous instruction on a single element of an offense, it does “not rise to the level of plain error if that element was not at issue in the case.”). Thus, we conclude that the instructional error was not 22 substantial because it did not cause Hoggard prejudice; hence, the error was not plain.