Opinion ID: 55743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statement to Sergeant Kahn

Text: Gutierrez argues that the district court erred when it refused to hold a Jackson v. Denno hearing before admitting his written statement taken by Sergeant Kahn.5 Under Jackson v. Denno, “[a] defendant objecting to the admission of a confession is entitled to a fair hearing in which both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of his confession are actually and reliably determined.” to October 1, 1981. 4 In his argument, Gutierrez uses interchangeably the terms subject matter jurisdiction and venue. To the extent Gutierrez argues that the Southern District of Georgia, Augusta Division, was an improper venue for him to be tried, he has waived that argument by failing to raise it in the district court. See United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2006). 5 The government argues that Gutierrez’s statement was not a confession for purposes of Jackson v. Denno because it was not inculpatory. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(e) (codifying Jackson v. Denno and defining a confession as “any confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any selfincriminating statement made or orally given or in writing”). Because we conclude that Gutierrez failed to allege facts warranting a hearing in any event, we need not resolve whether Gutierrez’s statement was a confession. 11 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 380, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 1783 (1964). Such a hearing, to be conducted outside the presence of the jury, “is constitutionally mandated for a defendant who timely urges that his confession is inadmissible because not voluntarily given.” United States v. Davidson, 768 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 1985). However, we will not remedy a district court’s failure to hold a Jackson v. Denno hearing unless the defendant “allege[s] facts which would, if proven true, indicate the involuntariness of his confession.” Id. Here, Gutierrez failed to allege facts indicating that his statement given to Sergeant Kahn was involuntary. After the return of the superseding indictment, Gutierrez filed a motion to suppress stating that, “[s]ince discovery and defense investigation are still incomplete, the Defendant files this Motion in general form to preserve h[is] right to challenge the legality of any search or seizure of evidence that the Government might introduce against hi[m] at trial as well as any statements.” The district court later directed Gutierrez to particularize his suppression motion within ten days or a hearing would not be scheduled on his suppression motion. Gutierrez did not file a more particularized motion. At trial, Gutierrez objected to the admission of the statement during the government’s direct examination of Sergeant Kahn. Specifically, Gutierrez’s counsel stated that “if they are going to attempt to introduce this statement I will 12 ask that we have a Jackson v. Denno hearing before it is introduced before the jury.” Gutierrez’s counsel did not articulate the basis for suppression or identify any facts suggesting that Gutierrez’s statement was involuntary. After the district court denied Gutierrez’s impromptu request for a Jackson v. Denno hearing, Gutierrez renewed his objection, but did not argue that the statement was involuntary. In addition, none of the evidence presented at trial indicates that Gutierrez’s statement was involuntary. Sergeant Kahn met with Gutierrez at the hospital and directed him to meet her at the military police statement to give a statement. Gutierrez drove himself to the military police station, completed his statement within a half hour, and was irritated but cooperative. The interview took place in an office within the military police station with only Sergeant Kahn present. An MP patrolled the halls outside as a security measure. Sergeant Kahn advised Gutierrez of his Miranda rights, including his right to remain silent. Gutierrez then executed a Miranda waiver, which also advised him that he could remain silent. Sergeant Kahn reviewed Gutierrez’s version of events with him a couple of times and then asked Gutierrez to write it down on the narrative portion of the statement form. Gutierrez did so. Sergeant Kahn then completed the question and answer portion of the statement form. Gutierrez was permitted to verify the 13 questions and answers and initialed each to show that he agreed with the answers Sergeant Kahn had written. The affidavit portion of the statement, which Gutierrez signed, avers that Gutierrez was not threatened or forced to give a statement. On appeal, the only fact Gutierrez points to in support of his claim that he was entitled to a Jackson v. Denno hearing is that Sergeant Kahn admitted on cross examination that during the interview Gutierrez was not free to leave the military police station. The mere fact that Gutierrez was in police custody when he gave his statement does not, alone, establish coercion. See United States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a finding of involuntariness under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires as a prerequisite coercive government conduct such as “subjecting the accused to an exhaustingly long interrogation, the application of physical force or the threat to do so, or the making of a promise that induces the confession” (quotation marks omitted)). On this record, we cannot say the district court erred in denying Gutierrez’s request for a Jackson v. Denno hearing.6