Opinion ID: 219133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Abuse of the Writ Doctrine

Text: On the assumption that the abuse of the writ doctrine may otherwise be applicable here, the majority suggests that [t]he government bears the burden of pleading abuse of the writ, . . . but it did not do so here. Majority Op. at 1049 (internal citation omitted). The abuse of the writ, as it is generally understood, applies where a prisoner files a petition raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition, or engages in other conduct that disentitle[s] him to the relief he seeks. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318 n. 34, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the government generally bears the burden of pleading abuse of the writ, there is also general agreement that the abuse of the writ may be raised sua sponte. Indeed, in Stanko v. Davis, 617 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir.2010), upon which the majority exclusively relies in holding that Alaimalo could file multiple petitions pursuant to § 2241 without any statutory restraint, the Tenth Circuit sua sponte invoked the abuse of the writ doctrine and dismissed Stanko's successive habeas corpus petition. Id. at 1270-72. Accord United States v. Talk, 158 F.3d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir.1998) (holding court may raise procedural default sua sponte if doing so will further the interests of judicial efficiency, conservation of scarce judicial resources, and orderly and prompt administration of justice) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); Femia v. United States, 47 F.3d 519, 522-23 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Fallon, 992 F.2d 212, 213 (8th Cir.1993); Andre v. Guste, 850 F.2d 259, 261-62 (5th Cir.1988); cf. Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1111 n. 6 (9th Cir.2000). These holdings reflect the obvious fact that successive petitions implicate more than just the interests that one party may have in preserving the result of an earlier proceeding. As Professors Wright and Miller observe with respect to the closely analogous context of the failure to plead preclusion, the doctrine goes beyond the interest of at least one party in repose and avoiding the burden of relitigation. Courts share these interests, and are concerned as well with avoiding inconsistent decisions. As courts became increasingly concerned with their own interests in forestalling repetitive litigation, it has become increasingly common to raise the question of preclusion on the court's own motion. 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4405 (2d ed. 2002). Indeed, we have had occasion to observe that the [p]reclusion doctrine encompasses vindication of both public and private interests. . . . [T]he most purely public purpose served by preclusion rules is that of preserving the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same manner were twice litigated to inconsistent results. Clements v. Airport Auth., 69 F.3d 321, 330 (9th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The public purpose is implicated for yet another reason in habeas corpus cases for, as Judge Friendly observed, the most serious single evil with today's proliferation of collateral attack is its drain upon the resources of the communityjudges, prosecutors, and attorneys appointed to aid the accused. . . . Today of all times we should be conscious of the falsity of the bland assumption that these are in endless supply. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgment, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 148 (1970).