Opinion ID: 2613958
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identification of Garcia at Preliminary Hearing

Text: The prosecutor asked Detective Williams on direct examination whether Vargas had positively identified Garcia at a preliminary hearing. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. After the prosecutor asserted it was a prior identification, the trial court overruled the objection. The detective then testified that Vargas did identify Garcia in court. Under Evidence Code section 1238, evidence of a statement of identification is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when the statement would have been admissible if made by the witness while testifying and the following additional foundational requirements are met: [¶] (a) The statement is an identification of a party or another as a person who participated in a crime or other occurrence; [¶] (b) The statement was made at a time when the crime or other occurrence was fresh in the witness' memory; and [¶] (c) The evidence of the statement is offered after the witness testifies that he made the identification and that it was a true reflection of his opinion at that time. (8a) Defendant contends there had been no evidence, from Vargas or any other witness, that the occurrence was fresh in her mind at the time of her statement. (Evid. Code, § 1238, subd. (b).) He also asserts that Vargas had not previously testified that she made an identification of Garcia at the preliminary hearing. ( Id., § 1238, subd. (c).) Defendant argues that these foundational deficiencies severely undermined any asserted reliability of the purported identification. Once admitted, he contends, Vargas's prior identification of Garcia served to show that she had consistently identified Garcia, thereby lending significantly more credibility to her allegedly less certain identification of defendant. Even if the foundational requirements for a prior identification were not all satisfied, the admission of the challenged evidence could not possibly have prejudiced defendant. First of all, the evidence was essentially cumulative of other evidence in the record demonstrating Vargas's recognition of Garcia. Vargas testified both on direct and redirect examination that, although she did not initially identify Garcia at his live lineup because she was afraid for herself and her child, she nonetheless recognized Garcia as one of the men she saw. Vargas was also able to recognize and identify Garcia from a photograph at the time of trial. More significantly, Vargas's recognition and identifications of defendant were not, as defendant suggests, uncertain. At trial, Vargas explained that although she recognized defendant as one of the fleeing men when initially shown his photo in 1987, she chose not to identify him at that time because she was afraid. However, Vargas overcame her fear and stepped forward to identify defendant both at his preliminary hearing and at a subsequent photographic lineup. She also identified him at trial. Since Vargas's testimony was both consistent and unwavering in this regard, it is not reasonably probable that the admission of Vargas's identification of Garcia at his preliminary hearing affected the verdict. [21] ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Finally, defendant argues that his constitutional right of confrontation was abridged because he was unable to cross-examine Vargas at Garcia's preliminary hearing and because Vargas was excused as a witness before Detective Williams took the stand. Not only was this claim waived by the failure to assert it below (Evid. Code, § 353), it is without merit. (9) Where the witness is available at trial for cross-examination, the principal danger of admitting hearsay evidence is not present (see People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 626-627 [7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865]), and neither the federal nor the state constitutional right of confrontation is violated ( California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 153-164 [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 494-501, 90 S.Ct. 1930]; People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 349-361 [161 Cal. Rptr. 762, 605 P.2d 401]; see also People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1220 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1]). (8b) Here the record shows that Vargas had not been excused, but had testified on rebuttal in response to other new evidence elicited by the defense during its cross-examination of Detective Williams. Because Vargas apparently was available for recall and cross-examination on this matter had defense counsel so requested, defendant's right of confrontation was not abridged. [22]