Opinion ID: 2459828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hunt Decree

Text: Appellant argues that his case was not properly triable in the First Division of the Pulaski County Circuit Court. Asserting that the Consent Decree entered by the United States District Court in Hunt v. State, No. PB-C-89-406 (Nov. 7, 1991), divided the Sixth Judicial District (Pulaski and Perry Counties) into two separate judicial districts, he claims that the murders occurred outside the area from which First Division Circuit Judge Marion Humphrey was elected; therefore, Judge Humphrey was without territorial jurisdiction to hear his case. Very recently, in State v. Webb, 323 Ark. 80, 913 S.W.2d 259, 261 (1996) a case involving the territorial jurisdiction of municipal courts, we reviewed the law on this subject as follows: If the allegation of a charging instrument were that an offense occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, then a judgment rendered by the court would be void. Waddle v. Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993); Williams v. Reutzel, 60 Ark. 155, 29 S.W. 374 (1895); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 (1982). The law in this State is that a criminal trial must be held in the county in which the crime was committed, provided that venue may be changed, at the request of the accused, to another county in the judicial district in which the indictment is found. Ark. Const. art. 2, § 10; Waddle v. Sargent, supra . These authorities limit a circuit court to trying a criminal case in the county in which the crime was committed unless the accused requests the trial be moved to another county which, in any case, must be a part of the judicial district served by the court. [O]ur circuit courts are thus limited to trying accusations of crimes which occurred in the counties, or judicial districts, in which they sit.... 323 Ark. 80 at 83, 913 S.W.2d 259. In Caldwell v. State, 322 Ark. 543, 910 S.W.2d 667 (1995), we addressed, for the first time, whether the electoral subdistricts contemplated in the Hunt Consent Decree are judicial districts under our Constitution and statutes. Appellant Caldwell, convicted of first-degree murder, argued that the jury venire in his case should have been quashed because it was not made up solely of registered voters from the judicial district where the crime was committed. According to Caldwell, the Hunt Decree, while establishing new judicial districts favoring the election of minority judges, also required that juries be selected from registered voters who lived in these new districts when crimes were committed there. Caldwell further argued that while the offense was committed in a new district, only three jurors who were registered voters of the new district served on his jury, which violated Arkansas law and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In rejecting Caldwell's argument, we stated: The Consent Decree invoked by Caldwell in this appeal did have as its purpose to provide African American voters improved and equal access to the political processes for electing judges to the trial courts of general jurisdiction in the State of Arkansas and to enhance the political participation and awareness of all citizens. The Consent Decree also states that the lines of existing judicial districts will not be disturbed by the remedy except to the extent that electoral subdistricts are created. The Decree then goes forward and creates majority African American and majority white population electoral subdistricts in Judicial Districts One, Two, Six, Ten, and Eleven West.... . . . . In the case at hand, there is no constitutional or legislative provision that divides the Tenth Judicial District into two judicial districts. Added to this point is the fact that the language of the Consent Decree states that its remedy is directed at violations of the United States Voting Rights Act, and it specifically states that it will not disturb existing district lines of the present judicial districts except to the extent that it creates electoral subdistricts.... Other than inserting this new electoral district for the purposes of electing minority judges, no other aspects of the Tenth Judicial District were to be affected. According to the Consent Decree, the judges elected from the electoral subdistricts would exercise jurisdiction district-wide, and there was no requirement that each judge reside within the electoral district. 322 Ark. 543 at 548-549, 910 S.W.2d 667. In this case, the appellant argues that, under the Arkansas Constitution, the defining characteristic of a circuit judge is that he or she be chosen by all and not merely some of the qualified electors of the judicial district in which he or she is to presides. In support of this argument, appellant cites Ark. Const. art 7, § 17, which states: The judges of the circuit court shall be elected by the qualified electors of the several circuits, and shall hold their offices for a term of four years. As we recognized with respect to the Tenth Judicial District in Caldwell , there is no constitutional or legislative provision that divides the Sixth Judicial District into two judicial districts. We see nothing in the plain language of Ark. Const. art. 7, § 17, that effects such a division. Appellant further relies on our decision in Riviere v. Hardegree, 278 Ark. 167, 644 S.W.2d 276 (1983). In that case, we considered whether the General Assembly, in passing Act 432 of 1977, had created one or two separate judicial circuits to serve the area of Garland, Polk, and Montgomery counties. The Act stated that one circuit, Eighteenth Circuit-East, would be composed of Garland County, and the other, Eighteenth Circuit-West, would be composed of Polk and Montgomery counties. However, in a separate act, the General Assembly had made an appropriation for only one prosecuting attorney. Adhering to the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation, we held that the clear language of the Act created two circuits, and that Ark. Const. art 7, § 24, [1] plainly requires each circuit to have an office of prosecuting attorney. Riviere is distinguishable, as it involved statutory interpretation of an act of the General Assembly. We recognized in Caldwell that [t]here simply has been no effort by the General Assembly to convert the electoral subdistricts [created in Hunt ] into entirely separate and self-contained judicial districts with all the attendant ramifications. We hold that the electoral subdistricts within the Tenth Judicial District are not judicial districts and that the venire in this case was properly drawn from Drew County as a whole. 322 Ark. 543 at 549, 910 S.W.2d 667. Appellant also maintains in his opening brief that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by his prosecution in the First Division of Pulaski County Circuit Court. Similarly, the appellant in Caldwell maintained that he had a Sixth Amendment [2] right to have the jurors in his case selected from the electoral subdistrict where the crime was committed. In rejecting Caldwell's claim, we reasoned that we do not perceive the new subdistricts as having been created for reasons other than for the elections of minority judges. We hold that the Tenth Judicial District remains intact under state law and that the state's judicial districts are the districts referenced in the Sixth Amendment as opposed to the electoral subdistricts established in the Consent Decree. Id. at 549-550, 910 S.W.2d 667 (Emphasis added). In sum, we see no reason to depart from our recent decision in Caldwell , and conclude that territorial jurisdiction was proper in this case.