Opinion ID: 874119
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants' Defenses.

Text: Defendants raised several defenses to Jacklin's motion for summary judgment. They argue that the district court erred in rejecting those defenses. Defendants contend that none of the CC & R's could have been incorporated into the Agreement after the 1990 amendment, which states: All restrictions of the 1990 and prior CCRs as apply [sic] to Lots 1-17. . . are terminated. The same lots are specifically and intentionally excluded from the superseding 1990 CCRs. According to Defendants, as a result of that amendment the CC & R's were terminated and became null and void, preventing them from being incorporated by reference into a contract. Defendants cite no authority for this argument. The 1990 amendment did not render the CC & R's null and void. It only made them inapplicable to the seventeen lots as recorded CC & R's. However, the Agreement incorporated Articles 2 through 6 of the CC & R's by reference, making those provisions applicable to the seventeen lots. Defendants contend that Jacklin cannot obtain injunctive relief because it cannot show irreparable harm and any harm it suffers can be remedied by monetary relief. Defendants rely upon Jacklin's deposition testimony given pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) [1] in which its designee stated that he could not quantify any monetary damage or injury that Jacklin had suffered as a result of Blue Dog's operation, that such operation had not as of yet caused any irreparable harm to Jacklin, and that he could not identify a single tenant or land sale that Jacklin had lost because of such operation. We have not held that permanent injunctions cannot under any circumstances issue without a finding of irreparable harm. For example, in Cazier v. Economy Cash Stores, 71 Idaho 178, 228 P.2d 436 (1951), we held that a business owner could enjoin a competitor from using a deceptively similar business name without having to show any actual damages. Injunctive relief is available as a remedy against the breach of a restrictive covenant. 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 262 (2005) (footnote omitted). As a general rule, a restrictive covenant may be enforced irrespective of the amount of damage which would result from the breach and even though there is no substantial monetary damage to the complainant by reason of the violation. Id. at § 265 (footnotes omitted). Restrictive covenants are typically created with the intent of enhancing the value of property and often involve restrictions intended to promote aesthetics. Requiring proof of actual damages would often leave a covenantee remediless, because the nature of covenants would make proof of actual damages by any accurate standard unlikely. The right to enjoin the breach of restrictive covenants does not depend upon whether the covenantee will be damaged by the breach; the mere breach is sufficient ground for interference by injunction. Id. (footnote omitted). We hold that Jacklin was not required to show that it will suffer irreparable harm in order to be granted injunctive relief to enforce the restrictive covenants. Because the only legally supportable violation of the covenants found by the district court was the violation regarding Blue Dog's sign, the district court can enforce compliance with that covenant by an injunction. Defendants assert that the district court erred in granting Jacklin injunctive relief because it too was in breach of the Agreement. They argue that clause (ii) of the Development Agreement contractually obligated Jacklin `to work together' with KLP `to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center' and that Jacklin refused to do so. Defendants contend that this failure was a breach of the Agreement and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As stated above, Part (ii) of the Agreement does not apply to the four undeveloped lots. Blue Dog's operation is not the shopping center, and Jacklin was not required to work with Blue Dog to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for Blue Dog's operation. Defendants claim that Jacklin waived the right to enforce the CC & R's or should be estopped from doing so because it allegedly assured Blue Dog that its sales operation would be compatible in the Riverbend Commerce Park. The only valid violation found by the district court was the violation of Article 4.1 relating to signs. Defendants do not allege any conduct by Jacklin that would constitute a basis for applying waiver or estoppel to that provision of the CC & R's. Finally, Defendants also contend that [t]he landscaping (Article 2), parking (Article 3), signage (Article 4), design and construction limitations (Article 5) all contemplate development of the property before the specific obligations are triggered. They do not cite any specific language in the CC & R's in support of that contention, nor do they support it with any argument. We will not consider assignments of error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). None of the defenses raised by Defendants would prevent the district court from enjoining the violation of Article 4.1 of the CC & R's. Therefore, the district court did not err in failing to grant summary judgment that those defenses barred such injunctive relief.