Opinion ID: 3022692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tinsley’s Hearsay Argument

Text: Tinsley also argues that the District Court erred in excluding the testimony of Kadedra Holmes. He claims that evidence was admissible either under the Rule 803(3) state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, or as an excited utterance under Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). The majority rejects his claim, not because Tinsley is wrong, but because of the “minimal proffer [he] made at the time.” Maj. Opn. at 10. Although I concede that it is a “close call,” I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the proffer precludes relief. I also disagree with the majority’s statement of the applicable standard of review. When offering Holmes as a witness, defense counsel stated that “she was present with Mr. Tinsley when he received threatening phone calls on his cell phone.” App. at 615. In 18 arguing for the admission of that evidence, counsel stated that he was offering it: one, for a nonhearsay purpose, and that is his state of mind. Whether these particular people were really going to kill him or not, I’m not offering it for the truth of the matter asserted. . . But this is classic state of mind evidence. It goes to his state of mind in terms of what he reasonably believed, and it gives us an alternative explanation, alternate from the furtherance of the drug traffic offense explanation for possession a firearm. So that’s the purpose of it, the nonhearsay purpose for state of mind. And even if, as counsel suggests, there were a hearsay issue here, this is clearly an excited utterance. But that is not really what I need to offer it for. Just for his state of mind is because it goes to the intent which is what the inference either way is. (sic). Whether its for self protection or whatever it’s for a furtherance of drug trafficking, it’s an intent issue, a state of mind issue. This is classic state of mind evidence. App. at 615-16. A short while later, after Holmes took the witness stand, defense counsel asked for a sidebar conference during which he again asked that Holmes be permitted to testify about the threatening phone calls. Counsel again argued that Holmes was present when phone calls were made to the defendant’s cell phone. Defense counsel argued that Tinsley told Holmes that “the threats - - that I have just been threatened with my life, so she is aware of it. It clearly goes to state of mind, his state of mind, and is clearly relevant. Its not being offered for hearsay purposes, and I would renew my request to offer that evidence. It’s classic nonhearsay purpose is state of mind.” App. at 623. My colleague’s rejection of that argument is based upon an ultra-technical application 19 of the rules of evidence. They explain: “[t]he proffer . . did not include any indication that Holmes would testify that Tinsley said, ‘I’m afraid’ – an actual statement of his state of mind. There was no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence based on this proffer.” Maj. Opn. at 10. Yet, in rejecting Tinsley’s Sixth Amendment argument based upon the District Court’s failure to articulate the required balance, the majority proclaims it “will not elevate form over substance and require a District Judge to state explicitly his or her cognizance of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel[.]”5 Maj. Opn. at 7-8. However, we are willing to elevate form over substance in denying Tinsley relief by relying upon a very technical interpretation of Tinsley’s proffer and thereby upholding a decision to deny admissible testimony. Tinsley was clearly attempting to have Holmes testify that Tinsley had been threatened. Evidence of the purported threats was not hearsay. See United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2000). The testimony was not offered to establish the truth of any threat of harm, but to establish the theat was made, and therefore support Tinsley’s claim that he had the gun for self defense unrelated to any involvement with illegal drugs. In Saada, we stated: “[N]ot every extrajudicial statement constitutes hearsay. Rather, [i]f the significance of an offered statement lies soley in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of the matter asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.” Id. at 218 n.8 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 5 Of course, it is not the court’s knowledge of Tinsley’s right to counsel that is at issue, but whether the court balanced that right on the record. 20 I realize that defense counsel did not argue that the purported threats amounted to a “verbal act,” and to that extent I agree his proffer was lacking. However, the District Court’s ruling was not based upon that technicality, nor the one relied upon by my colleagues. Rather, in explaining the rejection of that testimony, the court stated: “I’m not going to permit it because the government has absolutely no way of testing the veracity. And while you may be entering it for a state of mind, it really does rely upon the truth of the matter of what was said, and I’m not going to permit it.” App. at 623-624. However, admissibility of evidence does not turn on the ease with which the party opponent can refute its veracity. Testimony that is admissible under the Rules of Evidence is not transformed into inadmissible testimony merely because the party opponent has only cross-examination to attack its accuracy. Nor is nonhearsay transformed into hearsay merely because jurors may infer the truth of matters that are not offered for the truth of the assertion. Were that the rule, there would be precious few, if any, exceptions to the hearsay rule as the same problem exists with almost any excited utterance or state of mind testimony. In fact, the problem is endemic in the nature of hearsay and its exceptions and is present whenever a court instructs a jury not to accept an out of court statement for the truth of the matter but for the limited purpose of the applicable exception to the hearsay rule. Here, the court’s concern that the jury would misuse the evidence should have been addressed by giving a limiting instruction, not by preventing the jury from hearing the testimony. The majority reviews this claim of error for an abuse of discretion. However, the 21 District Court’s rejection of Holmes’ testimony was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the Rules of Evidence. Our review of the District Court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is plenary; we do not review legal error for an abuse of discretion. See States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2001). The latter is applied to evidentiary rulings “premised on a permissible view of the law.” United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 199 (3d. Cir. 1992). Tinsley’s defense was, in part, that he possessed the gun because he had received threats unrelated to any involvement with drugs. The jury certainly may have rejected that claim even if it had heard Holmes’ testify about the alleged threats, but Tinsley was entitled to rely upon that testimony in placing his defense before the jury. Accordingly, I am not comfortable relying upon an argument that precluding Holmes’ testimony was harmless error. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 630 (3d Cir. 1993) (District Court’s improper exclusion of evidence is not harmless error when it is highly probable that the error contributed to the jury’s judgment of conviction). The jury had to decide whether the gun was possessed in connection with Tinsley’s drug distribution or for self-defense unrelated to that criminal activity. The jury did hear evidence that he tried to break up a barroom fight several months before his arrest. That evidence, by itself, could have raised a reasonable doubt about why Tinsley had the gun he was arrested with. However, Holmes’ testimony about telephoned threats may well have given the testimony about the barroom fight an added dimension that 22 could have raised a reasonable doubt about his motive for having the gun. Since the jury was not allowed to hear that testimony, I must respectfully disagree with the analysis of my colleagues. 23