Opinion ID: 883902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the District Court err in its valuation of the marital estate?

Text: Marillen alleges that the District Court erred in its valuation of the marital estate because the court failed to determine the net worth of the marital assets at or near the time of the dissolution. Instead, the District Court valued the assets given to Joe at the time of trial but valued the assets given to Marillen at the time of separation. Generally, a district court must determine the net value of the marital estate at or near the time of dissolution, prior to dividing the property. In re Marriage of Lippert (1981), 192 Mont. 222, 627 P.2d 1206; In re Marriage of Stephenson (1989), 237 Mont. 157, 772 P.2d 846. However, this Court has recognized that under [some] circumstances, selection of a single evaluation point for determining net worth of the parties could create an inequitable disposition. Lippert, 627 P.2d at 1208. A net valuation by the district court therefore is not always mandatory. Rather, the test is whether the findings as a whole are sufficient to determine the net worth and to decide whether the distribution is equitable. Stephenson, 772 P.2d at 848 (citing In re Marriage of Nunnally (1981), 192 Mont. 24, 625 P.2d 1159). In this case, several assets last known to be in Marillen's possession had disappeared by the time of trial. In particular, Marillen claimed that two diamond rings, other jewelry, and a large amount of cash were stolen from her car during the time the parties were separated. The District Court valued these missing assets at close to $30,000 and charged their loss against Marillen's share of the estate. It found that, if these items were in fact stolen, the loss resulted from her negligence and carelessness in keeping such items in her car. In effect, the District Court determined that Marillen had dissipated this part of the estate. Such dissipation can justify a district court's selection of separate valuation dates for the estates of the respective parties. In re Marriage of Hurley (1986), 222 Mont. 287, 297, 721 P.2d 1279, 1286. Marillen also disputes the inclusion of $5000 in her share of the estate, when she had used that money to pay a retainer to her attorney prior to trial. Again, the District Court found that such payment was properly charged to Marillen as an expense incurred on her behalf during the separation. For this reason, it valued the asset as if it were still in her possession. Under the facts of this case, the valuation of the parties' assets at different times was not an abuse of discretion.