Opinion ID: 1906647
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plymouth Sedan's Definition of Quasi-Criminal Applies to Section 297

Text: Respondent argues, as the Court of Special Appeals opined below, that because Plymouth Sedan involved a case in which the penalty under the civil forfeiture action could exceed the criminal penalties, the term quasi-criminal is limited to those circumstances, making the current case distinguishable. In support of this argument, respondent notes that in the case before us, petitioner stands to lose his Corvette, yet in criminal court he would have faced up to twenty years of imprisonment, $25,000 in fines, and a mandatory minimum of five years imprisonment without parole. By contrast, in Plymouth Sedan, the punishment for the liquor offense was a $100 to $500 fine, but Mr. McGonigle's car was worth $1,000. [9] Noting this, the Supreme Court stated in Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 700-01, 85 S.Ct. at 1251, 14 L.Ed.2d 170, that the forfeiture is clearly a penalty for the criminal offense and can result in even greater punishment than the criminal prosecution. The Court reasoned that [i]t would be anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to hold that in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the forfeiture proceeding, requiring the determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same evidence would be admissible. Id. at 701, 85 S.Ct. at 1251, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. Respondent also alleges that when Plymouth Sedan referred to a forfeiture action such as the one involved here, the Court meant to limit its holding to forfeiture statutes similar to Pennsylvania's, which authorized a civil forfeiture action only after a criminal conviction. Respondent points out that under the Maryland forfeiture statute, criminal charges are irrelevant as to whether a forfeiture complaint may be filed under section 297 against the suspect property. Despite respondent's arguments, the conduct that gives rise to the forfeiture action under section 297 must, nevertheless, be criminal in nature. Under the statute, if there is no criminal conduct or criminal intent relating to the use of the object for which forfeiture is sought, no foundation for forfeiture exists. Subsection (b)(4) of section 297 provides that vehicles used or intended for use, to transport... property described in certain other paragraphs are subject to forfeiture. The property described in those paragraphs, subsections 297(b)(1) & (2), are controlled dangerous substances utilized in violation of the provisions of this subheading. The laws contained within the subheading, Health-Controlled Dangerous Substances, establish the criminality of the conduct at issue herethe illegal manufacture, distribution, or possession of controlled dangerous substances, including possession in sufficient quantities to indicate an intent to distribute. Although criminal charges may not be necessary, criminal conduct or criminal intent is. A more supportable interpretation of Plymouth Sedan is that it speaks in general terms, labeling as quasi-criminal any forfeiture action based upon inherently criminal activity, whether actually indictable or not, and no matter what the punishment. For instance, the Court noted that as Mr. Justice Bradley aptly pointed out in Boyd, a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law. Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 700, 85 S.Ct. at 1250, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. Moreover, immediately after noting the disparity in the forfeiture and criminal penalties in the case before it, the Plymouth Sedan Court noted in a footnote that Boyd rejected any argument that the technical character of a forfeiture as an in rem proceeding against the goods had any effect on the right of the owner of the goods to assert as a defense violations of his constitutional rights. Id. at 702 n. 11, 85 S.Ct. at 1251 n. 11, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (emphasis added). Considering the use of this broad language, the Court was referring impliedly not just to forfeitures based upon the specific statutes in Boyd or Plymouth Sedan, but to all forfeiture actions requiring evidence of a criminal nature, i.e., evidence of criminality. It is this general application of the exclusionary rule to most civil in rem forfeiture proceedings based upon criminal conduct, i.e., quasi-criminal proceedings, that the eleven federal circuits and thirty-four sister states have accepted and applied. See supra. We also note that the Supreme Court took great pains to distinguish its holding in Plymouth Sedan from United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) and Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 1224-35, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948). In those cases, the Court stated in dicta that contraband per se, illegally seized and subsequently suppressed under the exclusionary rule, need not be returned to the criminal defendant because the contraband itself is illegal to possess. See Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 698-99, 85 S.Ct. at 1249-50, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. By contrast, in Plymouth Sedan, the Court noted that possession of an automobile is not even remotely criminal. Id. at 699, 85 S.Ct. at 1250, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. Rather, the Court stated, [i]t is only the alleged use to which this particular automobile was put that subjects Mr. McGonigle to its possible loss. Id. The Court went on to explain that like in Boyd, the property involved in the forfeiture proceeding was not intrinsically illegal in character. Id. at 700, 85 S.Ct. at 1250, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. Just as there was nothing even remotely criminal in possessing a 1958 Plymouth, it was not criminal for petitioner to own a 1995 Corvette. To prove, therefore, that the derivative contraband in this case, the Corvette, should be forfeited under section 297, respondent must provide evidence of a drug crime or the intention to commit one by petitioner related to the use of the vehicle, just as the Commonwealth in Plymouth Sedan had to prove evidence of contraband per se, the unsealed liquor, to seize Mr. McGonigle's car. A section 297 forfeiture action is, therefore, quasi-criminal litigation because criminality is at the basic foundation of the conduct from which a forfeiture suit may arise under the Maryland statute. [10] Finally, we reject respondent's argument that section 297, unlike the statute in Plymouth Sedan, does not require the actual commission of a crime to trigger a forfeiture action. Respondent cites United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984), and One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972), for this proposition that Plymouth Sedan covered only forfeiture actions triggered by a criminal conviction. Both of these cases, however, addressed the Double Jeopardy Clause, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly held does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings the Legislature does not intend to be punitive. See generally Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549. That a civil forfeiture statute requires a criminal conviction prior to filing is more relevant under the Double Jeopardy Clause, which, as we have noted, seeks to prevent multiple punishments for the same offense. Considering Austin, the punitive terminology is of much lesser relevance, if applicable at all, in Fourth Amendment cases. Moreover, Boyd, upon which Plymouth Sedan relied heavily, concerned a revenue law that authorized forfeiture as a criminal penalty for failure to pay customs duties. Nevertheless, rather than initiating criminal proceedings, the government, in order to utilize a statute authorizing the issuance of a subpoena in non-criminal matters, filed a civil in rem action against the imported goods. The government's intention was obvious: the importer's papers were essential to prove the importer had not paid duties on the goods in question. The federal statute used by the government authorized it to issue a subpoena compelling production of such papers [i]n all suits and proceedings other than criminal, arising under any of the revenue laws of the United States. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 619, 6 S.Ct. at 526, 29 L.Ed. 746 (emphasis added). The government based its subpoena on its showing that said action is a suit or proceeding other than criminal, arising under the customs revenue laws of the United States, and not for penalties. Id. (emphasis added). That the forfeiture derived from an act [authorizing subpoenas,] which expressly excludes criminal proceedings from its operation, (though embracing civil suits for penalties and forfeitures,) and ... an information not technically a criminal proceeding, id. at 633, 6 S.Ct. at 534, 29 L.Ed. 746, made little difference. The Court emphasized that because the government proceeded using a non-criminal action should not relieve the proceedings or the law from being obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment. Id. We, too, deal with a statute that does not create a criminal proceeding, even though criminal evidence or contraband per se, i.e., the drugs, is typically necessary to prove a forfeiture case as to derivative contraband, i.e., the car, under section 297. As Boyd points out, [i]t is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Id. at 635, 6 S.Ct. at 535, 29 L.Ed. 746. Like the Boyd Court, we decline to allow the government to avoid compliance with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as traditionally applicable in criminal cases by proceeding under the auspices of a civil action that authorizes the taking of private property, but only if that property is used, or intended to be used, for criminally-related purposes. To do otherwise might facilitate a practice in which a car or other property, and the financial benefits resulting from forfeiture, might become the primary purpose of the actions rather than the apprehension and conviction of the criminals and their removal from society. See William Patrick Nelson, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Constable Blundered? Gaining Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of Asset Forfeiture, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1325-33 (arguing that pragmatic concerns, i.e., increased budgetary revenue, the ability to use valuable assets in future undercover operations, and an appearance of stronger job performance, have encouraged greater use of forfeiture laws).