Opinion ID: 2586077
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judge Gleason's decision

Text: Hora's petition for a protective order was based on the allegation that Cooper had committed the crime of violating a protective order. Hora alleged that Cooper violated the order (1) at the bar convention, (2) at the Dimond Mall, (3) outside the barber shop, and (4) by pacing her on I Street. Judge Gleason applied Judge Suddock's previous rulings clarifying the November 28, 2003 order to Hora's first allegation. Hora claimed that Cooper had committed the crime of violating a protective order based on two theories. First, because his conduct amounted to stalking and stalking is prohibited by the protective order. Second, because his conduct amounted to contacting, which is also prohibited by the protective order. Judge Gleason concluded that the facts did not support entering a protective order under either theory. As to stalking, Judge Gleason recognized that the placing-in-fear element required objective fear and concluded that the proof did not satisfy that standard. As to the no-contacting order, Judge Gleason found that there had been no violation either at the bar convention or in the other instances alleged by Hora. In so ruling, Judge Gleason accepted Judge Suddock's ruling that merely being in the presence of another party at a public place was not prohibited contacting. She also found that conclusion to be consistent with the statutory language since the applicable statute, AS 18.66.100(c)(2), does not list precluding a respondent from being in the presence of the other party. As to each of the incidents described by Hora, at the bar convention and elsewhere, Judge Gleason found that they at most involved one to two second unplanned eye contact which did not constitute a violation of the protective order. She concluded: [B]ased on the testimony I've heard, I find by a preponderance of the evidence that those were not intentional acts by Mr. Cooper to place himself in a situation where he would be having eye contact with . . . Ms. Cooper. Judge Gleason also gave an example to illustrate her conclusion: Say he's at the barbershop, he's half shaved . . ., and all of a sudden Ms. Cooper walks in. Does he need to say then oops, sorry, got to go, and his physical countenance left in disarray? No, I don't see it that way. But does that mean that he can turn his chair and stare at Ms. Cooper? No. So that's how I would interpret the order as it was then, in a manner that is consistent with the statute. Hora argues that Judge Gleason applied an incorrect placing-in-fear standard with respect to stalking, and incorrectly interpreted the elements of the crime of violating a protective order with respect to the no-contacting order.