Opinion ID: 2446605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: powers of the lrc

Text: KRS 7.090 (1982) created, or more properly re-created, the LRC. In addition, the statute established the LRC's membership, meetings, compensation, direction, personnel and management. Section (1) provides that the LRC is, . . . an independent agency of state government . . . which is exempt from control by the executive branch and from reorganization by the governor. (Emphasis added.) KRS 7.100 (1982) sets out all the duties and authority of the LRC. Basically, the statute provides that the agency has those duties that involve fact-finding, investigation, information gathering, record-keeping, publishing, research and education. It is a service organization of the General Assembly. However, Section (8) of KRS 7.100 authorizes the LRC to: Conduct, while the general assembly is not in session, any and all business of the legislative department of government, except for the passage of legislation, which could be conducted by the legislative department of government or the general assembly if the general assembly was in session. (Emphasis added.) The trial court struck down KRS 7.090(1) which made the LRC an independent agency of state government. It declared that under Ky. Const. Secs. 27-28, there are three branches of government and that the net effect of the words independent agency of state government was to create a fourth branch of government. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the provisions of KRS 7.100(8), that broadened the authority of the LRC, when the General Assembly was in adjournment to include . . . any and all business of the legislative department of government, except for the passage of legislation . . . were constitutionally invalid. The trial judge declared that the LRC could not, because of the separation of powers doctrine, exercise any supervision over the executive branch and that for the same reason, the LRC could not exercise any authority over the judiciary. The trial court obviously felt that both violations were possible under the broad grant of powers in the questioned statutes. The trial court also declared that the provisions brought new life to the General Assembly following its adjournment and thus were violative of Ky. Const. Sec. 42. We agree with the trial court and affirm those portions of its judgment holding KRS 7.090(1) and KRS 7.100(8) unconstitutional. As we have said, it is clear that the LRC is totally an agent of the General Assembly and may aid and assist that branch of government. As we also have said, the LRC cannot do anything the General Assembly cannot do. KRS 7.090(1) declares that the LRC is an independent agency of state government. This does not comport with our previous analysis of the nature of the LRC, nor does it comport with our constitution which recognizes only three branches of government. There is, simply put, no fourth branch of government. The LRC was created by, is controlled by, and is a service type agency of the General Assembly. It is independent of the Governor; it is not subject to reorganization by the Governor, it is subject to the control of its creator, the General Assembly. It is an oversight and service organization for and on behalf of the General Assembly. As such, it is a part, albeit an important part, of the General Assembly, the legislative branch of government. It is part of the General Assembly by reason of its statutory birth and its statutory nourishing. We therefore, conclude that KRS 7.090(1), which declares the LRC to be an independent agency of state government is constitutionally invalid. KRS 7.100(8) attempts to grant all authority constitutional and otherwise, express and inherent, save only the power to pass legislation to the General Assembly's agent, the LRC. Such a grant of power includes, but is not limited to the power to confirm executive appointments, the power to reject or modify administrative regulations, and the power to generally exercise supervision over the executive and judicial branches of government. The testimony of a witness for the appellants at trial conceded the potential of such act by saying: [I] would say that the Legislature has all functions that are not specifically granted to the Governor or that are not specifically granted to the Judicial Branch. All other powers are inherent in the Legislature whether you term them legislative functions or whatever, they're still in the Legislature. Moreover, the same witness stated that while the General Assembly can delegate by statute certain powers to the Governor, it can rightfully put any strings that it wants to on that delegation of power and that the LRC can, in effect, act for the General Assembly in putting the strings on. The witness also described it another way when he said that the LRC could be used to limit the power given to the Governor, and that the LRC has review authority. He concluded that the LRC could [d]o anything short of performing legislative acts . . . Such a grant of power clearly is impermissible under Ky. Const. Secs. 27-28. It also violates Ky. Const. Sec. 42, in that such a provision brings new life to the General Assembly (through the LRC) following adjournment.