Opinion ID: 4126188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Law Enforcement Officers' Testimony

Text: The State offered seven victim impact witnesses during the resentencing proceeding. Several of them were colleagues of Sergeant Kubala at the Sumter County Sheriff's Office. These officers testified extensively about the impact of Sergeant Kubala's death on them personally, on the Sheriff's office generally, and on the community as a whole. Stone argues five particular components of the officers' testimony were inadmissible, and contends his trial counsel was deficient in not objecting when the State offered each into evidence. First, Major Gary Metts testified about a golf tournament organized in Sergeant Kubala's honor. Second, Major Metts explained that the tournament proceeds are used to fund college scholarships for the children of law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty.1 Third, Major Metts testified the Sheriff's Office maintained an Explorer 1 Stone actually argues four objectionable components, combining our first and second categories as one. As our discussion of this issue will indicate, however, we believe we can more effectively analyze Stone's claims if we treat the golf tournament and the use of its proceeds as separate categories. Group, a program designed to help children, for which Sergeant Kubala volunteered. Major Metts testified the program collapsed after Sergeant Kubala's death. Fourth, Captain Gene Edward Hobbs recounted to the jury how he went to Sergeant Kubala's house to tell Kubala-Hanvey about her husband's death. Fifth, Captain Hobbs described how the Sheriff's Office takes new recruits to visit the location where Sergeant Kubala died and to his gravesite to talk about the consequences of the job. Under South Carolina law, victim impact evidence is relevant for a jury to 'meaningfully assess the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness.' State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 457, 529 S.E.2d 721, 730-31 (2000) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 735 (1991)), overruled on other grounds by Rosemond v. Catoe, 383 S.C. 320, 330, 680 S.E.2d 5, 10 (2009). The State may present victim impact evidence for the purpose of demonstrating the 'uniqueness' of the victim and the specific harm committed by the defendant. Hughey, 339 S.C. at 457, 529 S.E.2d at 730 (quoting State v. Rocheville, 310 S.C. 20, 27, 425 S.E.2d 32, 36 (1993)). In State v. Bennett, we explained that evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant can includ[e] the impact of the murder on the victim's family and 'a quick glimpse of the life which the defendant chose to extinguish.' 369 S.C. 219, 228, 632 S.E.2d 281, 286 (2006) (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 822, 111 S. Ct. at 2608, 2607, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 735, 733). Under Payne, if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar. 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S. Ct. at 2609, 115 L. Ed. 2d. at 736. However, when victim impact evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief. 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S. Ct. at 2608, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 735. We begin our analysis of whether counsel's performance was deficient under the Sixth Amendment for not objecting to these five components of testimony by observing that the admission or exclusion of evidence in a capital trial is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21, 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004). We have specifically applied that principle to the admission of victim impact evidence in the penalty phase, stating, A trial judge has considerable latitude in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. State v. Bixby, 388 S.C. 528, 554-55, 698 S.E.2d 572, 586 (2010) (discussing our review of the trial court's decision to admit a seven minute video showing portions of [the officer's] funeral). In this context, we examine trial counsel's performance. At the PCR trial, Stone's PCR counsel asked trial counsel whether he considered objecting to Captain Hobbs' testimony, to which he replied, I considered objecting to a lot of this, but Judge King was being very liberal in what he was allowing in from the standpoint of victim's testimony. I mean I felt if he allowed in what Ms. Kubala said about her reaction to the appeal that he was probably going to allow this in. I didn't want to be perceived by the jury as—as jumping up and objecting to everything like I was trying to hide something. So yes, I did consider it. I didn't consider my chances of winning that objection . . . to be very good and I mean there's a lot of leeway that the courts have allowed in—in this kind of testimony. Stone's PCR counsel also asked trial counsel whether he considered objecting to Major Metts' testimony. He replied, I considered objecting to a lot of this, but I did not feel that the objection would be sustained. I didn't want to be perceived as—as trying to hide things and . . . I just think Judge King would have—would have let it in. Trial counsel is repeatedly required during any trial—particularly a capital trial— to make split-second decisions on many subjects, including whether to object to testimony. There are a variety of reasons counsel may soundly choose not to make such an objection, including the reality that not all evidence offered by the State is harmful to the defendant. Under certain circumstances, therefore, counsel may employ a strategy of not objecting—even when counsel has a good argument for exclusion—if counsel reasonably perceives the benefits of doing so are outweighed by some other consideration. See Watson v. State, 370 S.C. 68, 72–73, 634 S.E.2d 642, 644 (2006) (finding counsel's performance was not deficient in making the decision not to object to inadmissible testimony because his strategy—that doing so might lead to the more damaging introduction of other evidence—was sound). The necessity of making these and other strategic decisions is part of the difficulty of trying any case, and these difficulties are intensified in a capital trial. For these and other reasons, we defer to reasonable strategies employed by counsel at trial. As the Supreme Court explained in Strickland, Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95 (citations omitted). Stone argues trial counsel's decision not to object was an invalid strategic decision because the reasons counsel gave for employing the strategy were not sound. As we have often stated, counsel's strategic decisions will not be found to be deficient performance if he articulates a valid reason for employing the strategy. E.g., Smith v. State, 386 S.C. 562, 567-68, 689 S.E.2d 629, 632-33 (2010); Caprood v. State, 338 S.C. 103, 110, 525 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2000); Stokes v. State, 308 S.C. 546, 548, 419 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1992). The necessary converse of this principle is that counsel's decision to employ a certain strategy will be deemed unreasonable under the Sixth Amendment if the reasons given for the strategy are not sound. See Dawkins v. State, 346 S.C. 151, 157, 551 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2001) (finding counsel's performance was deficient in making a decision not to object to the admission of testimony when the underlying strategy was not sound). Stone's trial counsel gave three reasons for not objecting to the law enforcement officers' testimony. First, trial counsel stated Judge King was being very liberal in what he was allowing in from the standpoint of victim's testimony. Second, trial counsel stated—specifically as to Captain Hobbs—he felt if [Judge King] allowed in what [Kubala-Hanvey] said about her reaction to the appeal that he was probably going to allow this in. Third, trial counsel stated he didn't want to be perceived by the jury as . . . as jumping up and objecting to everything like [he] was trying to hide something. We agree with Stone that none of counsel's reasons for not objecting were sound strategic reasons. As to the first reason, although the trial court has wide discretion in making a ruling on the admissibility of victim impact evidence, counsel has potentially good arguments for its exclusion. See supra, discussion of Bennett, Hughey, and Payne. This is particularly true when the State offers evidence that pushes the limits of permissible victim impact. See United States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 947 (10th Cir. 2008) (Including the community in the victim-impact inquiry is fraught with complication.). Of the five components of victim impact evidence to which Stone argues his counsel should have objected, we find the fourth component—Captain Hobbs' testimony about informing Sergeant Kubala's widow of his death—would almost certainly have been properly admitted. While we stress that such decisions are within the discretion of the trial court, we can hardly imagine a more direct impact of a victim's death than the events and circumstances surrounding his family learning of it. See Bennett, 369 S.C. at 228, 632 S.E.2d at 286 (explaining that permissible victim impact evidence includes 'the specific harm caused by the defendant,' including the impact of the murder on the victim's family). On the other hand, we find the second component—the use of the proceeds from the golf tournament—and the fifth component—the testimony about taking new recruits to Sergeant Kubala's gravesite—are more likely to have been excluded. We find it difficult to relate this evidence to the definitions we have previously given of permissible victim impact evidence because these two components show primarily the general impact of Sergeant's Kubala's death on the community, as opposed to showing his unique qualities or a specific harm caused by the murder. See supra, discussion of Bennett and Hughey. But see Bixby, 388 S.C. at 556, 698 S.E.2d at 587 (finding the admission of victim impact evidence permissible because it showed the traditional trappings of a law enforcement officer's funeral, demonstrating the general loss suffered by society). The other two components—the golf tournament itself and the collapse of the Explorer Program—are close calls, subject to the discretion of the trial court. These two components do show more than the victim's uniqueness and the specific impact of the murder, but they also illustrate the qualities of Sergeant Kubala that made him special and unique. For instance, that his colleagues would hold a golf tournament in his honor, and his extensive involvement in the Explorer Program such that it could not continue in his absence, show the kind of person Sergeant Kubala was. See Riddle v. State, 314 S.C. 1, 11-12, 443 S.E.2d 557, 563-64 (1994) (holding testimony about victim's standing in the community was allowable to establish the victim as a unique human being). We do not intend with this discussion to define which of the five components would have been permissible for the trial court to admit within its discretion. Rather, we discuss them to demonstrate that, with varying degree, the admission of each one was debatable. Without an objection, however, there can be no debate; and the trial court has no opportunity to exercise its discretion. Here, even if the trial court was being liberal in allowing victim impact testimony, trial counsel should have objected to those components of the law enforcement officers' testimony as to which counsel felt he had a reasonably persuasive argument for exclusion. If he had objected in those instances, the trial court may have sustained the objection. But in any event, counsel would have at least tested the trial court's discretion. See Ard, 372 S.C. at 331, 642 S.E.2d at 597 (When evaluating the reasonableness of counsel's conduct, 'the court should keep in mind that counsel's function . . . is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case.' (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695)). The fact the trial court has such wide discretion does not justify the decision not to object. Rather, the debate that precedes the exercise of that discretion is part of the adversarial process Ard and Strickland require trial counsel to test. In this case, counsel testified he made the decision not to object for reasons other than the strength of his argument for exclusion. In fact, we read counsel's testimony to say he made the decision not to object despite his belief that he had good grounds for the objection. A capital defendant would generally prefer to exclude victim impact evidence where possible because it is favorable to the State. This was not a situation in which trial counsel made several unsuccessful objections and then decided further objections were futile. Instead, the transcript reveals trial counsel did not make a single objection during either Major Metts' or Captain Hobbs' testimony. Under these circumstances, counsel's belief the trial court would overrule his objection does not justify the decision not to make it. As to the second reason, trial counsel claims he did not object to Captain Hobbs' testimony, in part, because the trial court allowed Kubala-Hanvey to testify about her suicide attempt. This is not a valid explanation. In addition to the reasons we explained above, the transcript reveals Captain Hobbs testified the day before Kubala-Hanvey. The trial court's rulings during her testimony could not possibly have affected trial counsel's earlier decision not to object to Captain Hobbs' testimony. Trial counsel's other explanation for not objecting—his concern the jury might think he was trying to hide something—is also not valid. See Dawkins, 346 S.C. at 157, 551 S.E2d at 263 (holding counsel's failure to object because he did not want to confuse or upset the jury was not a valid strategic decision); Gallman v. State, 307 S.C. 273, 276-77, 414 S.E.2d 780, 782 (1992) (holding trial counsel's failure to object because he did not want to give the jury the idea that something was being hidden was not a valid strategic decision). If trial counsel was truly concerned about the effect his objections would have on the jury, he should have sought a determination as to admissibility outside the jury's presence. See Dawkins, 346 S.C. at 157, 551 S.E.2d at 263 (To eliminate the possibility of confusing or upsetting the jury, counsel could have sought a determination as to the inadmissibility of the . . . testimony out of the hearing of the jury . . . .). Trial counsel failed to articulate any valid strategic reason for not objecting to important victim impact testimony the trial court had the discretion to exclude. Therefore, the decision not to object does not meet an objective standard of reasonableness, and Stone has satisfied the first prong of Strickland.