Opinion ID: 1442340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Saddler argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to support the drug conspiracy, firearm possession and firearm conspiracy convictions. We have recently summarized the standard of review for such arguments: We review de novo a district court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and we draw all reasonable inferences in the government's favor[.] We will uphold the verdict if there is any interpretation of the evidence that could lead a reasonable-minded jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Both direct and circumstantial evidence can be the basis of a conviction. Furthermore, we must not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 530 F.3d 657, 661 (8th Cir.2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alteration omitted).
To establish that a defendant conspired to distribute drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove: (1) that there was a conspiracy, i.e., an agreement to distribute the drugs; (2) that the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the conspiracy. Id. (quoting United States v. Rolon-Ramos, 502 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir.2007)). An agreement to join a conspiracy need not be explicit but may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Mendez, 336 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2003)). Saddler argues that the Government failed to present evidence showing an agreement between him and Earsery, Davis, Leaks, Latiker, Wade, Richardson or Jackson to distribute crack cocaine, cocaine and marijuana. Rather, Saddler suggests that they each worked separately selling drugs out of the same houses. However, after reviewing the evidence presented to the jury, we conclude that the district court did not err by denying Saddler's motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to his drug conspiracy conviction. Davis testified that he, Earsery and Saddler had the same source for controlled substances in Chicago and that he and Saddler traveled to Chicago together to obtain cocaine from their source and transported the cocaine back to Waterloo. Earsery testified that all of the residents, including Saddler, sold crack cocaine out of the 1264 West Mullan Avenue and the 630 West Mullan Avenue residences. Earsery indicated that they shared customers and provided each other drugs when needed to complete a sale. Two of Saddler's customers testified that they purchased drugs not only from Saddler but also from others at the 630 West Mullan Avenue residence. Additionally, the evidence presented to the jury ties Saddler to the 112 Hartman Street residence, where police seized large quantities of marijuana, cocaine, crack cocaine, money, packaging materials and a scale. See United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 363 F.3d 788, 796 (8th Cir.2004) (holding that a jury could reasonably infer that a conspiracy existed where evidence showed it was unlikely that the defendant grew, processed, packaged and loaded large quantities of drugs without assistance or that the drugs were for personal use). Earsery testified that Saddler, along with Richardson, Latiker, Wade and Jackson, had access to the basement at the Hartman residence to store and retrieve their belongings. In fact, Saddler's personal documents were also located in the basement of the Hartman Street residence near large quantities of drugs. Buls testified that Saddler had a key to the residence and was the main person to use the basement. She had also observed Saddler in the kitchen weighing crack cocaine on the scale. Because the alleged co-conspirators had the same source and traveled together to obtain drugs from that source, possessed large quantities of drugs, had a common storage area and unfettered access to it, and shared customers and drugs, a jury could reasonably infer that Saddler entered into an agreement with Earsery, Davis, Leaks, Latiker, Wade, Richardson or Jackson to distribute drugs. Saddler challenges the testimony of Earsery, Davis and Buls because these individuals were testifying in an attempt to avoid or reduce their own criminal sentence. However, our role is not to assess the credibility of the witnesses. See Garcia-Hernandez, 530 F.3d at 662. Rather, the jury assessed the witnesses' credibility and reasonably determined that Saddler was part of a crack cocaine, cocaine, and marijuana distribution conspiracy.
The district court also did not err in denying Saddler's motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to his firearm possession conviction. To establish that a defendant possessed a firearm in violation of § 924(c), the Government must prove that (1) he committed a drug trafficking crime, and (2) he possessed a firearm in furtherance of that crime. Id. (internal quotation omitted). Because we have already held that sufficient evidence supported Saddler's drug distribution conspiracy conviction and because Saddler does not challenge his possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base convictions, we turn to the second element, whether sufficient evidence supports the jury's conclusion that Saddler possessed a firearm in furtherance of that conspiracy. Possession may be actual or constructive and need not be exclusive. United States v. Williams, 512 F.3d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2918, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2008). Proof of constructive possession requires evidence that a defendant knowingly has the power and intention to exercise control over the firearm.... Id. Such possession may be established by showing the defendant had dominion over the premises where the firearm is kept. United States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 887 (8th Cir.2006). The Government proved that Saddler had both actual and constructive possession of the firearms. Davis and Earsery testified that they observed Saddler in actual possession of the firearms, specifically one of the 9mm Bryco Jennings pistols. Buls testified that Saddler had a key to the Hartman residence and that Saddler was the main person to use the basement where the firearms were stored; the police found Saddler's personal documents near the guns; and Earsery testified that Saddler had access to the firearms. Because of Saddler's dominion over the basement, he also had constructive possession of those firearms. Nonetheless, Saddler argues that there is no evidence of a nexus between his possession of a firearm and the drug trafficking convictions. See United States v. Thorpe, 447 F.3d 565, 568 (8th Cir.2006) (To convict a defendant of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, the jury must have found a nexus between the defendant's possession of the firearm and the drug offense.). [W]e have repeatedly held that a jury may find the requisite nexus when a firearm is discovered in close proximity with drugs so as to support an inference that the firearm is for the protection of the drugs. Williams, 512 F.3d at 1044. Here, the firearms were loaded and kept in the basement of the Hartman Street residence. Thus, the firearms were quickly accessible and in close proximity to 701.8 grams of marijuana and 80.26 grams of cocaine, to a safe that contained an additional 122.56 grams of cocaine, 65.42 grams of crack cocaine and $21,514.42 in cash, and to the other parts of the house that contained 2212 grams of marijuana, 597.74 grams of powder cocaine and 217.1 grams of crack cocaine. See United States v. Close, 518 F.3d 617, 619 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that a quickly accessible firearm in close proximity to drugs helps establish a nexus between the defendant's possession of the firearm and the drug crime). Additionally, Davis testified that he had seen Saddler in possession of three of the firearms, including one of the 9mm Bryco Jennings pistols, at different times when they sat out in front of the 1264 West Mullan Avenue residence, where they sold crack cocaine. Davis also testified that Davis, Earsery and Saddler would probably be the main ones strapped, ready, whatever. Based on this testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that Saddler possessed the firearms to protect, and thereby further, the drug distribution operation. See United States v. Smith, 535 F.3d 883, 885, 2008 WL 2906537, at  (July 30, 2008) (We recognize the role of firearms in protecting drugs, drug proceeds, and drug transactions.). Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support Saddler's conviction of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Finally, the district court did not err in denying Saddler's motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to his firearm conspiracy conviction. To establish that a defendant conspired to use, carry or possess a firearm in violation of § 924(c) and (o), the Government must prove: (1) that there was a conspiracy, i.e., an agreement either to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime or to possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; (2) that the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (o); cf. Garcia-Hernandez, 530 F.3d at 661; United States v. Cannon, 475 F.3d 1013, 1020 (8th Cir.2007). Saddler argues that no evidence was presented showing an agreement between him and the alleged co-conspirators. However, Earsery testified that the firearms were house guns and that Earsery, Saddler, Latiker, Wade, Leaks and Jackson all had access to the guns and all sold drugs out of the West Mullan Avenue residences. Davis testified that he, Earsery and Saddler would probably be the main ones strapped, ready, whatever. From this evidence and the evidence previously detailed, we conclude that a jury could reasonably infer that Saddler had implicitly agreed to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime or to possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.