Opinion ID: 2556523
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Resemblance to a Guilty Plea Agreement.

Text: If anything, the rather peculiar miscellaneous agreement in this case resembles a guilty plea agreement (as was the case in Sutton ). The State, however, argues that the agreement was simply between the trial court and Williams, unlike a plea agreement, which must involve the State. We believe the State consented to the agreement here explicitly or implicitly. In its brief, the State concedes that it can be inferred . . . that the State expressed reluctance, when the miscellaneous agreement was being forged, at giving either defendant an `empty chair' defense, if at all possible. . . . Moreover, we doubt whether the agreement would have been struck, in the first place, without the State's acquiescence. Thus, the agreement seems to have been agreed upon by all the parties, including the trial judge, save Morris. Further demonstrating that this agreement was the functional equivalent of a plea bargain is the fact that Williams was found guilty of attempted second-degree murder. At the sentencing hearing, Williams's counsel voiced concern that the plea agreement was [only] to the attempted robbery. After some consideration, the trial court agreed to grant a new trial, presuming that the State would then enter the matter nolle prosequi. If the proceeding was a bona fide trial, the trial court would not have ordered a new trial and, in the process, overturned the jury's finding of guilt. [17] In the final analysis, this miscellaneous agreement may be characterized fairly as a plea agreement with escape clauses for the State and Williams. If the State, despite the significant procedural advantages in its favor fashioned by the trial court, bungled presentation of its case against Williams, Williams might have left the courtroom that day as a free man, but the State was free to pursue the unrelated charges against him. In short, it does not appear that Williams, like the defendants in Smith and Ogonowski, assented simply to face a certain type of fact-finder. Rather, he conceded, in effect, his guilt, pending no extraordinary and clearly unexpected misstep on behalf of the State. [18]