Opinion ID: 1355792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the superior court improperly instruct the jury on causation?

Text: At the conclusion of the second trial, the superior court instructed the jury in part as follows: In the instructions that follow you will be asked to determine if particular items of loss claimed by the Plaintiffs were legally caused by the helicopter accident involved in this case. Legal cause exists where the accident was more likely than not a substantial factor in bringing about an injury or loss. Legal cause is not demonstrated by the mere fact that an injury or loss has occurred. For the helicopter accident to be a substantial factor in bringing about an injury or loss the evidence most prove that it is more likely than not that: (1) the injury or loss would not have occurred but for the helicopter accident, and (2) the accident was so important in bringing about the injury or loss that reasonable men would regard it as a cause and attach responsibility to it. In addition to this causation instruction the superior court gave the following instruction concerning Glen Buoy's claim for damages resulting from his depressed mental condition. A person is never liable where he has done no more than insist on his legal rights in a permissible way. You may not penalize either party for asserting its rights in litigation. You have heard evidence concerning the effect that the accident may or may not have had on Mr. Buoy's mental condition. In considering whether the accident was a substantial factor in bringing about any mental condition such as stress, anxiety or depression, you must consider whether the accident was a substantial factor in bringing about only a portion of Mr. Buoy's stress, anxiety or depression. You may award damages against ERA Helicopters only to the extent that the accident was a substantial factor in bringing about such portion of the mental condition. You may award damages for any of Mr. Buoy's mental or emotional suffering that you find was more likely than not caused by the helicopter accident; you may not award any damages for any mental or emotional suffering which was not more likely than not caused by the accident. [5] The Buoys argue that the superior court erred in giving this causation instruction in combination with the above quoted instruction on stress. They contend that the trial court should have given the following multiple cause instruction: [I]f a cause of Buoy's depression was the helicopter crash, then that is sufficient for an award of damages. It is not necessary that the crash be the one and only cause of BUOY's depression... . (Emphasis in original.) In short the Buoys argue that the superior court should have instructed the jury that there can be more than one legal (or proximate cause) of an injury. In a related contention, the Buoys maintain that the but for causation instruction given by the court enabled ERA to argue that Glen Buoy's depression was not compensable to the extent that it was worsened or prolonged by the litigation process. The Buoys argue that ERA should be liable for Glen Buoy's damages even to the extent those damages were increased by Buoy's litigation-induced depression because litigation was a natural consequence of the helicopter crash. We think it would have been preferable for the trial court to have explicitly instructed the jury that there can be more than one legal (or proximate) cause of an injury. Nevertheless, we conclude that the superior court did not err in giving the questioned instructions or in refusing to give the requested instruction. Here the court's proximate cause instruction did not imply that there could be only one legal (or proximate) cause of an injury or mental condition. Nothing in the court's instructions precluded the jury from awarding damages for the prolongation of Glen Buoy's depression if it determined that the crash of the helicopter was a substantial factor in causing this injury. The Buoys also imply that the superior court infringed on their right to pursue legal claims against ERA by permitting ERA to argue that it was not liable for psychological injuries Buoy suffered as a result of litigation. The Buoys argue that to avoid litigation-caused depression, Glen Buoy would have had to abandon his legal claims against ERA. However, as we noted earlier, the superior court instructed the jury that it could not penalize either party for asserting its legal rights. Furthermore, ERA never suggested to the jury that the Buoys should not have litigated their claims. In linking Glen Buoy's depression to the litigation process, ERA attempted to establish that the helicopter crash was not a substantial factor in bringing about Buoy's mental condition. Given the foregoing, we conclude the superior court did not infringe upon the Buoys' right to litigate their claims when it permitted ERA to argue that it was not liable for Buoy's litigation-induced depression.