Opinion ID: 3015048
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Timeliness of Wilson’s Habeas Petition

Text: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), habeas petitions filed by state prisoners are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. The limitations period begins to run on the latest of several dates, including “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Wilson argues that the discovery of the McMahon videotape constitutes 9 the “factual predicate” for his habeas claim. He further argues that he did not discover, and through the exercise of due diligence could not have discovered, the existence of the tape prior to April 6, 1997. Wilson’s habeas petition was filed on January 23, 2002, four years and 292 days after April 6, 1997. AEDPA provides that the limitations period is tolled during the pendency of state court postconviction proceedings. See id. § 2244(d)(2). Three years and 293 days elapsed from the date on which Wilson’s PCRA petition was filed (June 2, 1997) and the date on which the Supreme Court denied allocatur (March 22, 2001), hence, there is tolling for this period. Thus, if April 6, 1997, is used as the start of the limitations period, Wilson’s petition was timely by one day.4 We must therefore determine the precise date on which Wilson, through the exercise of due diligence, could have discovered the existence of the McMahon tape. In the District Court, the Commonwealth argued that the tape did not constitute the factual predicate for Wilson’s habeas petition, but it does not press this issue on appeal. It does contend, however, that McMahon could have discovered the existence of the videotape as early as April 1, 1997, and that, if he could, Wilson’s petition was filed four days too late. Certain facts are not in dispute. During the relevant period of time, Wilson was housed on death row in Graterford Prison. He had cable television in his cell and could have subscribed to local newspapers but apparently chose not to do so. At his first evidentiary hearing, Wilson testified that prisoners on death row are kept in individual cells but are permitted to exercise in a cage with one other prisoner for one hour each day. No incoming phone calls are permitted except for those from a prisoner’s attorney; outgoing calls are limited to four per month and must be scheduled one day in advance, while prison visits are limited to one per week. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9737 at  n.13. 4 These calculations assume that Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) is used in calculating the limitations period. This issue is discussed further below. See infra Part III.B. 10 The District Court found, and Wilson does not dispute, that the McMahon videotape received widespread attention on local newscasts on April 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. Id. at .5 The court found that each of the four major Philadelphia television stations reported on the tape “at numerous times” during the three-day period. Id. In addition, it is undisputed that, on April 3, 1997, the District Attorney’s Office mailed a letter to Billy Nolas, Wilson’s counsel in his capital case at that time, informing him of the existence of the McMahon tape. The date the letter was received is unknown. Wilson testified that he did not see any of the television reports concerning the McMahon tape and did not learn of its existence until he was contacted by another attorney on his case, Christina Swarns. The District Court, which found this testimony to be credible, noted that Swarns “was not involved with [Wilson’s] case” during the period of April 1-5, 1997. It therefore concluded that the phone call took place after April 5, 1997, and that Wilson did not have actual knowledge of the tape on or before that date. Id. at  n.12, . In support of this conclusion, the District Court further noted that Wilson testified that he never discussed his case with other inmates, and it found that he thus was unlikely to have learned about the tape from others in the prison. The Court also observed that Wilson “was not shy about asserting his rights,” id. at , and presumably would have acted had he learned about the tape’s existence during the period in question. On appeal, the Commonwealth does not argue that Wilson had actual knowledge of the tape’s existence prior to April 6, 1997. It instead argues that, given the widespread attention the tape received, Wilson could easily have discovered its existence prior to April 6, 1997. The District Court rejected this argument, finding that Wilson’s failure to discover the tape’s existence during the period in question was not due to a lack of diligence. While it is certainly true that Wilson could have discovered the tape’s existence fortuitously, AEDPA directs us 5 The first coverage of the tape was on the evening of March 31, 1997, the day Abraham released it. 11 to determine the “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (emphasis added). Thus, it is not enough to suggest that Wilson could have learned about the tape by happenstance; rather, it must be shown that, had he exercised due diligence, Wilson would have taken certain actions through which he would have learned about the tape prior to April 6, 1997. We have held that, to satisfy § 2244(d)(1)(D)’s “due diligence” standard, a prisoner must exercise “reasonable diligence in the circumstances.” See Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 2004). The ultimate question whether a petitioner exercised due diligence is one of fact which we will set aside only if it is clearly erroneous; however, we can review de novo the legal standard employed by the District Court in assessing the petitioner’s conduct. See Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. M§ “St. Constantine,” 705 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1983). As Schlueter makes clear, the question whether a habeas petitioner has exercised due diligence is context-specific. The fact that we require a petitioner in one situation to undertake certain actions does not necessitate that we impose the same burden on all petitioners. The District Court determined that Wilson had not failed to exercise due diligence during the period in question, finding that “it would not be logical or fair to read the concept of due diligence as imposing upon a criminal defendant the duty of continuously monitoring the local news for a period of 12 or more years in the hope of possibly learning facts which could be helpful to his case.” 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9737 at . We agree. No person in Wilson’s position would reasonably expect that the local news would be a source of information relevant to his case, given that his conviction had occurred thirteen years ago and his final appeal had been rejected by the Supreme Court the previous year. In some cases, a defendant will have reason to believe that the news will potentially be a source of information about his case, and in these situations it might not be unreasonable to expect the prisoner to monitor the news on a somewhat regular basis. But absent some reasonable basis for concluding that the local news is likely to be a source of information at the particular 12 time, due diligence does not require a prisoner in Wilson’s position to monitor the news on a regular basis on the unlikely chance that he might learn something which would be useful to his case. The Commonwealth has pointed to no evidence from which we could conclude that Wilson had a reason to expect that he would uncover any relevant information by monitoring the news, and we see none. We therefore conclude that his failure to learn about the tape was not a failure to exercise due diligence. The Commonwealth nonetheless argues that our decision in Schlueter requires that we reverse. Schlueter interpreted the due diligence standard under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(I)(D) in a case in which a prisoner filed his petition several years after his conviction became final. Schlueter alleged that he did not discover, and could not have discovered through the exercise of due diligence, the factual predicate of his claim, which was that one of the part-time public defenders who represented him during his plea negotiations was a law partner of the part-time Assistant District Attorney in the case. We held that if the petitioner had exercised due diligence, “he could have discovered [the relationship between the two attorneys] long before the AEDPA became effective” and therefore filed a timely habeas petition. 384 F.3d at 74. In reaching this conclusion, we concluded that it was “inconceivable” that the two attorneys could have hidden their relationship “from the relatively small legal community or the public in Northampton County.” We further noted that Schlueter could have learned about the relationship simply by interviewing the other part-time public defender in the case. Id. Finally, we acknowledged that the petitioner was incarcerated during the relevant period and that “physical confinement can limit a litigant’s ability to exercise due diligence,” but we noted that the petitioner’s parents had been heavily involved in his case and could have uncovered the relationship through their own investigation. Id. at 75. The Commonwealth argues that, because the relevant information in Schlueter was known to a relatively small community and the information in this case was widely disseminated through the media, Wilson does not satisfy Schlueter’s standard of due diligence. We disagree. The essential question is not whether the relevant information was 13 known by a large number of people, but whether the petitioner should be expected to take actions which would lead him to the information. In Schlueter, we found that the petitioner could have learned the relevant fact simply by interviewing his surviving trial counsel during the time in which a reasonable person in his position would be investigating opportunities for postconviction relief. In contrast, Wilson had no expectation that the news media would be a source of information about his case nearly thirteen years after his conviction. Therefore, we hold that he did not fail to exercise due diligence during the period of April 1–April 5, 1997, and that the limitations period did not begin to run before April 6, 1997.