Opinion ID: 1412158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Juror Bias

Text: The Appellant also contends that the lower court erred by failing to sua sponte order a mistrial or to remove a juror once it was discovered that the juror had read a newspaper article concerning the trial. The lower court extensively questioned the juror concerning his perusal of the news article and specifically asked Appellant's counsel whether he had any further questions of the juror. Appellant's counsel replied, No, I think you covered it. Most significantly, when asked by the lower court whether there was any objection to its finding that the juror had not been prejudiced in any way, Appellant's counsel responded, No, Your Honor. Specifically, the following exchange occurred: Q. Mr. Twitty [Appellant's counsel], do you wish to inquire? MR. TWITTY: No. I think you covered it. JUDGE GAUGHN: I'm going to find that he's not been prejudiced in any way. The indictment contains all the same information in much greater detail than what that portion of the article has. I'm not going to excuse this juror. I don't believe he's been tainted in any way. Do you have any objection to that? MR. TWITTY: No, Your Honor. Thus, it is uncontested that no objection was preserved on the issue of juror prejudice. We further find that Appellant's counsel affirmatively waived any argument the Appellant may have had concerning the alleged juror bias. The existence of such affirmative waiver and intentional relinquishment of the right to object to the court's findings precludes this Court from utilizing the plain error doctrine to reverse on this issue. As this Court stated in syllabus point eight of State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995): Under the plain error doctrine, waiver of error must be distinguished from forfeiture of a right. A deviation from a rule of law is error unless there is a waiver. When there has been a knowing and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right, there is no error and the inquiry as to the effect of a deviation from the rule of law need not be determined. By contrast, mere forfeiture of a right  the failure to make timely assertion of the right  does not extinguish the error. In such a circumstance, it is necessary to continue the inquiry and to determine whether the error is plain. To be plain, the error must be clear or obvious. This Court also observed in State v. Knuckles, 196 W.Va. 416, 473 S.E.2d 131 (1996), that waiver necessarily precludes salvage by plain error review. 196 W.Va. at 421, 473 S.E.2d at 136. In other words, `[w]hen a right is waived, it is not reviewable even for plain error.' State v. Myers, 204 W.Va. 449, 460, 513 S.E.2d 676, 687 (1998) (quoting State v. Crabtree, 198 W.Va. 620, 631, 482 S.E.2d 605, 616 (1996)); see also Morris v. Painter, 211 W.Va. 681, 686, 567 S.E.2d 916, 921 (2002) (Davis, Chief Justice, dissenting). Based upon the foregoing analysis, we find that the Appellant is not entitled to relief on the issue of alleged juror bias.