Opinion ID: 552915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Disclose Part of the Plea Agreement

Text: 4 Petitioners cite Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), in support of their argument that they were denied due process by the prosecution's failure to disclose the side deal with Meyer's counsel. In Giglio, 5 The Government's case depended almost entirely on [the testimony of the witness with whom the undisclosed deal had been made]; without it there could have been no indictment and no evidence to carry the case to the jury. [The witness'] credibility as a witness was therefore an important issue in the case, and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it. 6 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55, 92 S.Ct. at 766. 7 In the present case, there was evidence independent from Meyer's testimony that connected the petitioners to the murder. This evidence included (1) testimony of petitioner Willhoite's ex-girlfriend that connected him to the knife used to stab the victim, (2) testimony of another witness concerning incriminating statements petitioner Syzemore had made with reference to the killing, and (3) testimony of a third witness that linked both petitioners to incriminating statements made regarding the victim's death. Thus, unlike Giglio, while Meyer's testimony was important, there was sufficient evidence apart from it to carry the case to the jury. Cf. Giglio at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766. 8 Moreover, the agreement by which the charge against Meyer was reduced from second degree murder to assault with intent to commit grave bodily harm, in exchange for Meyer's testimony, was disclosed. Impeachment evidence based upon this agreement was presented during the petitioners' trial. The obvious generosity of this agreement provided ample opportunity for the defense to challenge, and for the jury to weigh, Meyer's credibility. There is no doubt that had the jury also been informed that the district attorney had agreed with Meyer's counsel to support an application for a reduction in Meyer's sentence, the jury would have had complete information about the plea bargain. But this additional information would not have assisted the jury in assessing Meyer's credibility. There was no showing that Meyer knew, or even suspected any arrangement had been made pertaining to modification of his sentence at the time he testified. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 884 (11th Cir.1985). 9 The present case also differs from Giglio in that here the witness Meyer did not testify falsely at trial. So far as Meyer knew, the only agreement which had been reached in exchange for his testimony was that the charge against him would be reduced. His lawyer knew about the side deal relating to reduction of Meyer's sentence, but Meyer did not. 2 Therefore, unlike the situation in Giglio, Meyer's testimony was not affected by the undisclosed portion of the agreement. 10 This case is also unlike Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir.1979). There, the prosecution witness' attorney did not inform the witness of the plea agreement prior to his testimony but did tell him that if he testified everything would be alright, and that there were things going on that it would be better for him not to know. The Fourth Circuit construed this as a tentative promise of leniency made to the only witness who could link the defendant to the crime charged, and remanded the case to the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the state elected to retry defendant within a reasonable time. 11 Here, except for the agreement which was disclosed at the outset, there was no showing that Meyer was told anything until the trial was over to suggest that he might receive some additional benefit. Moreover, there was substantial evidence independent of Meyer's testimony which connected the petitioners to the murder. 12 We conclude that the petitioners were not denied due process by the prosecution's failure to disclose the sentence modification aspect of the agreement for Meyer's testimony. 13