Opinion ID: 2551818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discovery of a Malpractice Claim under La. R.S. 9:5605

Text: Under La. R.S. 9:5605(A), an action for legal malpractice must be brought within one year of the date of the act, omission, or neglect, or within one year of the date of discovering the act, omission, or neglect and within three years of the date of the act, omission, or neglect. In this case, the court of appeal found this Court had never directly addressed how and when discovery of a malpractice claim under La. R.S. 9:5605 should be interpreted. Despite this statement, the court of appeal subsequently relied upon this Court's ruling in Campo, a medical malpractice case, to determine the reasonableness of the date of discovery. In Campo, this Court stated, [prescription commences when a plaintiff obtains actual or constructive knowledge of facts indicating to a reasonable person he or she is the victim of a tort. 01-2707 at 11-12, 828 So.2d at 510 (citing Percy v. State, E.A. Conway Memorial Hosp., 478 So.2d 570 (La.App. 2 Cir.1985)). This Court further held a prescriptive period will begin to run even if the injured party does not have actual knowledge of facts that would entitle him to bring a suit as long as there is constructive knowledge of same. Constructive knowledge is whatever notice is enough to excite attention and put the injured party on guard and call for inquiry. Such notice is tantamount to knowledge or notice of everything to which a reasonable inquiry may lead. 01-2707 at 12, 828 So.2d at 510-11. The Court concluded such information or knowledge as ought to reasonably put the alleged victim on inquiry is sufficient to start the running of prescription. 01-2707 at 12, 828 So.2d at 511 (citations omitted). The Court in Campo further explained a plaintiffs mere apprehension something may be wrong is insufficient to commence the running of prescription unless the plaintiff knew or should have known through the exercise of reasonable diligence his problem may have been caused by acts of malpractice. Id. (citing Gunter v. Plauche, 439 So.2d 437, 439 (La.1983)). Since Campo was a medical malpractice case, the Court held even if a malpractice victim is aware an undesirable condition has developed after the medical treatment, prescription will not run as long as it was reasonable for the plaintiff not to recognize the condition might be treatment related. Id. (citing Griffin v. Kinberger, 507 So.2d 821 (La.1987)). According to the Court, the ultimate issue is the reasonableness of the patient's action or inaction, in light of his education, intelligence, the severity of the symptoms, and the nature of the defendant's conduct. Id. (citing Griffin, 507 So.2d at 821). In finding this Court has never addressed the issue of discovery in the context of a legal malpractice claim, the court of appeal was clearly in error. This Court directly addressed the issue in Teague v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., and explained the date of discovery from which prescription or peremption begins to run is the date on which a reasonable man in the position of the plaintiff has, or should have, either actual or constructive knowledge of the damage, the delict, and the relationship between them sufficient to indicate to a reasonable person he is the victim of a tort and to state a cause of action against the defendant. 07-1384 at 12, 974 So.2d 1266, 1275; See Bailey v. Khoury, 04-0620, p. 9 (La.1/20/05); 891 So.2d 1268, 1275 (interpreting the discovery rule as contained in the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act). Put more simply, the date of discovery is the date the negligence was discovered or should have been discovered by a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position. Teague, 07-1384 at 13, 974 So.2d at 1275. The Court then cited the above language from Campo and held: [b]ecause the provisions on prescription governing computation of time apply to peremption, the principles applicable in the computation of time under the discovery rule in the medical malpractice provisions, although prescriptive in nature, nevertheless should apply to the computation of time under the discovery rule of the peremptive period for legal malpractice. Teague, 07-1384 at 14, 974 So.2d at 1276 ( citing La. C.C. art. 3459). Applying Campo to a legal malpractice claim, the Court held peremption commences to run in a legal malpractice case when a claimant knew or should have known of the existence of facts that would have enabled him to state a cause of action for legal malpractice. A claimant's mere apprehension something may be wrong is insufficient to commence the running of peremption unless the claimant knew or should have known through the exercise of reasonable diligence his problem may have been caused by acts of malpractice. The Court further held even if the client is aware an undesirable result has developed arising out of the representation, peremption will not run as long as it was reasonable for the plaintiff not to recognize the result might be due to malpractice. 07-1384 at 14, 974 So.2d at 1276. In this case, the peremptive period began to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the existence of facts that would have enabled her to state a cause of action for legal malpractice. The act, omission, or neglect complained of in Jenkins' petition is Starns' failure to file a responsive pleading in the Medlock case and Starns' failure to appear and defend her at the April 16, 2007, hearing on the declinatory exceptions filed in response to her petition to annul judgment. Thus, the question before the Court is the date upon which Jenkins could reasonably discover the malpractice which triggered the running of the peremptive period. We find Jenkins had constructive knowledge of facts sufficient to state a cause of action against Starns when she received notice of the default judgment against her and Starns advised her a mistake had been made in January of 2007. When Jenkins received notice of the default judgment, she was put on notice the trial court had ruled against her in the Medlock case. When presented with this information, Jenkins contacted Starns who informed her he had made a mistake and would try to fix it. Clearly, these two acts are sufficient to show Jenkins had constructive knowledge of facts that would entitle her to bring suit. This is especially true considering it was enough notice to excite attention and put her on guard to call for inquiry, which she did by contacting Starns. When Jenkins received the default judgment and made an inquiry to her attorney, she had constructive knowledge of: (1) the damage [4] in the form of an $8,563.33 judgment against her; (2) the delict, or Starns' failure to file a responsive pleading; and (3) the relationship between Starns' action and the resulting default judgment, which she learned when he told her he had made a mistake. We find Jenkins' knowledge of the bad result coupled with the admission of counsel sufficient to put her on notice Starns was negligent in his representation and commenced the running of the one-year peremptive period. We need not consider the April 16, 2007, date listed in Jenkins' petition because it is clear she discovered the act of malpractice in January of 2007.