Opinion ID: 771982
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Malpractice Damages

Text: 23 Under New York law, a claim for legal malpractice has three elements: (1) the negligence of the attorney; (2) that the negligence was the proximate cause of the loss sustained; and (3) proof of actual damages. Davis v. Klein, 637 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139 (1st Dep't 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hanlin v. Mitchelson, 794 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1986). Dorfman argues that Baker failed to prove any malpractice loss because a New York cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot be predicated on an HIV-test misdiagnosis. 24 As a preliminary matter, Dorfman raises this argument for the first time on appeal. 3 In general, a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 98 S. Ct. 2868, 2877 (1976); see, e.g., Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1999). That rule, however, is one of prudence and not appellate jurisdiction. We retain broad discretion to consider issues not raised initially in the District Court. Lo Duca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1104 (2d Cir. 1996). We are more likely to exercise our discretion (1) where consideration of the issue is necessary to avoid manifest injustice or (2) where the issue is purely legal and there is no need for additional fact-finding. Readco, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 81 F.3d 295, 302 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Coogan v. Smyers, 134 F.3d 479, 487 (2d Cir. 1998). Dorfman's argument presents a pure question of law. We therefore choose to reach the merits. See, e.g., id. at 487 (reaching the merits of a purely legal issue that is easily resolved). 25 Under New York law, a plaintiff may establish [a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress] in one of two ways: (1) the 'bystander' theory; or (2) the 'direct duty theory.' Mortise v. United States, 102 F.3d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1996). Under the bystander theory, which is obviously inapplicable, 26 a defendant's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to a plaintiff and such conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about injuries to the plaintiff in consequence of shock or fright resulting from his or her contemporaneous observation of serious physical injury or death inflicted by the defendant's conduct on a member of the plaintiff's immediate family in his or her presence. 27 Bovsun v. Sanperi, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (1984). Under the direct duty theory, a plaintiff suffers emotional distress caused by defendant's breach of a duty which unreasonably endangered [plaintiff's] own physical safety. Mortise, 102 F.3d at 696; see Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 423-24 (1983). Baker's physical safety was not unreasonably endangered by the City's negligence, and he does not argue that his claim against the City was a direct duty case. 28 However, New York also recognizes a cause of action in cases where there is an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from . . . special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious. Johnson v. State, 372 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (1975) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Johnson, the Court of Appeals upheld a claim by a woman who was negligently misinformed by a hospital that her mother had died. The court held that, in that situation, the requisite guarantee of genuineness could be supplied by evidence of the causation and substantiality of the harm suffered. Id. at 643. 29 The Court of Appeals of New York has not yet said whether a negligent HIV misdiagnosis amounts to special circumstances. But the First Department has held that such allegations state a cause of action: the erroneous report of an HIV positive finding following blood analysis is a 'special circumstance' that provides assurance that a claim to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of the erroneous report is genuine and not spurious. Schulman v. Prudential Ins. Co., 640 N.Y.S.2d 112, 112 (1st Dep't 1996) (citing Johnson, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 642); accord Harvey v. Cramer, 653 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (1st Dep't 1997) (The distress resulting from a negligent misdiagnosis of HIV is actionable . . . .); see also McLarney v. Community Health Plan, 680 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283 (3d Dep't 1998) (citing Schulman as an instance where 'special circumstances' exist which provide an indication of the genuineness of [the] claim). As in Schulman, the City's lab technicians who handled [Baker's] blood sample and issued the erroneous report owed a duty of care . . . to [Baker], even in the absence of a direct relationship with him. Schulman, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 112 (emphasis added). 30 It is settled in New York that people who are negligently exposed to HIV may recover for the emotional distress resulting from their fear of contracting AIDS. See, e.g., McLarney, 680 N.Y.S.2d at 282; Bishop v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 669 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 (1st Dep't 1998); Brown v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880, 886 (2d Dep't 1996). Dorfman emphasizes that in an AIDS-phobia case, the plaintiff must prove actual exposure to HIV. See Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 886; see also McLarney, 680 N.Y.S.2d at 282. Baker, who may have been able to do that, did not press the point. In any event, the actual-exposure requirement in the AIDS-phobia cases is intended to ensure that the fear is genuine and prevent the courts from being flooded by every person who suffers an accidental cut or prick. The requisite guarantee of genuineness, which in an AIDS-phobia case is supplied by evidence of actual exposure to infection, is supplied in Baker's case by the positive test result. Johnson, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 643; cf. Fosby v. Albany Mem'l Hosp., 675 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232-33 (3d Dep't 1998) (upholding negligent infliction of emotional distress claim based on special circumstances where defendant unreasonably refused to test for HIV the needle that had pricked the plaintiff). If anything, the anguish of the positive test result is a more direct and predictable emotional impact than the anxiety of having insufficient information. 31 We therefore predict that the New York Court of Appeals would hold that a cause of action lies for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the case of a negligent positive result on an HIV test.