Opinion ID: 203641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Silva's Pro Se Arguments

Text: Silva raises three additional claims in his pro se briefhis trial counsel was ineffective in counseling Silva to sign statute of limitation waivers; a stipulation of the parties and the jury instruction related to that stipulation contained errors; and Silva received inadequate notice regarding his co-defendant's plea colloquy. First, Silva argues that the seventeen counts stemming from his 2000 conduct are untimely and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to assert a statute of limitations defense and by counseling Silva to sign statute of limitations waivers. Silva never objected to the timeliness of the indictment or quality of his representation before, during, or after his trial. Therefore, this Court reviews for plain error. United States v. Jimenez, 512 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.2007). It is a highly unusual case when we decide questions of inefficient assistance of counsel on direct appeal as there are often factual issues that need to be determined in the first instance. See United States v. Muriel-Cruz, 412 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.2005) (Absent extraordinary circumstances ... we consult only the record extant at the time the district court rendered its decision.) (citation omitted). Where an attorney fails to raise an important, obvious defense without any imaginable strategic or tactical reason for the omission, his performance falls below the standard of proficient representation that the Constitution demands. Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 48 (1st Cir.1999) (citations omitted). It is impossible for us to make such a finding here, lacking evidence about the waivers, [13] the conversations between Silva and his attorney, and the attorney's reasoning for advising Silva to sign the waivers. Silva explains that the waivers were signed during negotiations that occurred concurrent to a grand jury investigation, suggesting there may have been a tactical reason for the attorney to encourage them. In any event, if Silva wishes to raise these claims, he must do so on collateral review. See United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1063 (1st Cir. 1993) (appellant generally cannot raise fact-specific claims of ineffective assistance on direct review of criminal conviction). Next, Silva asserts that a stipulation of the parties contained an error and that the district court later improperly instructed the jury on materiality. At trial, the parties stipulated that [a] forged prescription contains a material misstatement for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 [(§ 1001)], whether it is in the form of a false date, false address or forged doctor's signature. Silva has waived his objection to the stipulation [14] because a stipulation as to facts also functions as a waiver of legal defenses to the establishment of the particular element to which the parties have stipulated and therefore is not reviewable on appeal. United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 223 (1st Cir.1999). Meanwhile, because Silva did not object to the court's materiality instruction, we review for plain error. United States v. Riccio, 529 F.3d 40, 46 (1st Cir.2008). The court instructed the jury on the essential elements of a § 1001 violation, see United States v. Hatch, 434 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2006), and previously had instructed the jury on material, material misrepresentation, and material fact in instructions for other crimes. We find no error, and certainly not plain error, in these proceedings. Third, and finally, Silva takes issue with the district court's alleged failure to give advance warning of its intent to rely on evidence contained in Silva's co-defendant wife's plea colloquy to apply a two-level leadership rule adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). The Government referred to the colloquy in its sentencing memorandum and attached the transcript. At sentencing, the court announced its intention to rely on the colloquy for imposing the role enhancement but first offered Silva the opportunity to continue the hearing to call his wife as a witness; Silva declined. Regardless of our standard of review, [15] no due process violation occurred. Silva was alerted to the Government's use of his wife's testimony in its sentencing memorandum, and the district court offered him the time and opportunity to cross-examine her.