Opinion ID: 1196260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: attorney sanctions

Text: ¶ 15 We turn now to the Halls' assertion that the trial court erred in imposing sanctions against Atkin for his failure to inform NACM's counsel, Lee, of the continuance of a scheduling conference. Atkin argues that (1) he was entitled to a hearing prior to the trial court entering the Order, (2) neither Lee's affidavit nor the Order itself identifies the legal basis upon which the award is based, (3) there was, in fact, no such legal basis, and (4) the attorney fees were excessive. We will address each of these contentions in turn. ¶ 16 First, Atkin maintains that because he was not afforded a formal hearing concerning the sanctions, the imposition of the sanctions was improper. He complains that the Order was entered before any motion, memorandum, or hearing was allowed, asserting that the rules provide for the orderly dispensation of justice through the filing of motions supported by memoranda and supporting evidence. ¶ 17 The language ordering sanctions was initially in the minute entry for Lee's April 25, 1996, appearance before the trial court. On May 15, 1996, in response to this language, Atkin filed an Objection to Proposed Order and a supporting affidavit. The Order was not entered formally until May 16, 1996, after the court received Atkin's objection. ¶ 18 By the objection's caption  Objection to Proposed Order Atkin showed that he considered the sanctions to be proposed only, not a finalized, formal court order. He cannot now argue to this court that he considered the Order to have been entered and final before he filed his objection. Furthermore, the fact that the trial court waited to receive and review the objection before signing the Order fulfilled Atkin's desire to see an orderly dispensation of justice. The trial court thereby afforded him the opportunity to object to its proposed order, supported by his affidavit. We therefore reject his first argument. ¶ 19 Second, Atkin contends that the Order is improper because (a) Lee's affidavit, filed in support of the Order, fails to specifically set forth the legal basis behind the award, citing Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-505; and (b) the Order itself failed to set forth any legal basis, citing Butler, Crockett, & Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1995) ( Butler Crockett ). ¶ 20 Rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires that affidavits supporting the award of attorney fees be filed with the trial court and must set forth specifically the legal basis for the award. Atkin's assertion that Lee's affidavit fail[ed] to set forth any such legal basis is true. However, the omission was harmless error. ¶ 21 The purpose of the requirement that an affidavit in support of an award of attorney fees state the legal basis for the award is to inform the court and opposing counsel of the ground relied upon because fees are not routinely awarded in every case and can be awarded only on certain narrow grounds. In this case, the award of fees had its genesis in the minute entry made by the court on April 26 when Lee appeared in St. George for a scheduling conference that had been continued, after Atkin had failed to notify Lee of that fact. The court and both counsel always knew the basis for the proposed award of fees because it arose at that particular time. At no time was the court or counsel ever without knowledge as to the purpose behind the proposed fees. Atkin has not been prejudiced by the omission. We do not reverse the trial court for committing harmless error. ¶ 22 Moving to Atkin's assertion that the Order itself lacked language setting forth a legal basis for the sanctions, we need only look to Butler Crockett and the Order itself. In Butler Crockett, we reviewed a trial court's written finding concerning a pro se plaintiff/attorney's failure, both at a hearing and at trial, to disclose his ownership of real property involved in the dispute. The trial court's findings were fact specific and detailed. Following plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment, the trial court struck the detailed findings and inserted a single finding that read as follows: [Plaintiff] failed to disclose or negligently misrepresented to the Court and Counsel at the November 1, 1991 hearing and at the trial the full facts as to his ownership of property above Roosevelt Trail. That this action by [plaintiff] caused the Court and Counsel for Defendants to have to pursue this matter resulting in damages to the Defendants for attorneys fees in the sum of $10,000. Butler Crockett, 909 P.2d at 231. We held that the district court's lone finding is insufficient to support the imposition of sanctions because we cannot tell under what authority the court purported to act and, consequently, under what standard [plaintiff's] conduct was being judged. Id. We stated that the Butler Crockett finding was insufficient in two ways: (i) it does not make clear, and we cannot tell from our reading of the record, upon what legal ground the sanctions are imposed (i.e., rule 11 or the district court's contempt powers); and (ii) it does not explain how the misrepresentation affected either the court or defendants. Id. at 232. We were concerned that the trial court had, by its brevity, made it impossible for us to determine the appropriateness of sanction imposition as a matter of law and whether it had abused its discretion in formulating both the type and amount of the sanction. See id. As a result, we reversed the award of sanctions in Butler Crockett and remanded for more detailed findings. ¶ 23 In the instant case, however, the trial court, while still not explicitly pointing to a legal basis, made findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient for us to make the determination required by Butler Crockett. The trial court's findings consisted of twenty-two numbered paragraphs, each setting forth separate facts leading to the sanction imposition. Viewing these findings both individually and as a whole, it is apparent to us that the trial court was exercising its prerogative to assess sanctions under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16 to remedy damages suffered by NACM and Lee pursuant to a pretrial scheduling conference. ¶ 24 Rule 16, dealing with pretrial and scheduling conferences, dictates that the trial court, upon motion or its own initiative, may order sanctions. Rule 16 indicates that the basis for such sanctions include situations where a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order. Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d). The rule permits the trial court to require the party or the attorney representing him or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 25 Here, the trial court directed Atkin to notify Lee of a date change for the scheduling conference. 5. On or about April 22, 1996, Mr. Atkin initiated a telephone call to the Court in which Mr. Reece was included but in which Mr. Lee was not included. During said telephone conference, the Court agreed to continue the April 25, 1996, Scheduling Conference. During said telephone conference, the Court gave Mr. Atkin specific direction to contact Mr. Lee personally and advise him of said continuation. (Emphasis added.) This specific direction amounted to an informal pretrial order relating to a scheduling conference. The trial court noted several times that [a]s of 7:00 p.m. April 24, 1996, Mr. Lee had received no notice from Mr. Atkin of the continuance, and that Mr. Atkin failed to notify Mr. Lee as directed by the Court. By repeatedly stressing Atkin's failure to carry out its direction, the trial court makes it clear that Atkin violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16. ¶ 26 Butler Crockett also requires an explanation of how the noncompliance affected either the court or the other party. The trial court makes this clear in its findings of fact, stating: 10. Mr. Lee had to travel to St. George, Utah, from Salt Lake City, Utah, to appear at said Scheduling Conference, a distance of 300 miles, did appear at said Scheduling Conference and then had to return to Salt Lake City, Utah, causing Mr. Lee to be out of his office and unable to apply his efforts to any other client's account for one full day. Again, in its conclusions of law the trial court explained: It is reasonable for Mr. Blake S. Atkin personally to pay to Mr. Lee the total sum of $1,264. Said sum should not be the responsibility of Mr. Atkin's clients, the Halls, because it was Mr. Atkin's failure to properly notify Mr. Lee of the continuance that resulted in Mr. Lee's travel to St. George, Utah. (Emphasis added.) Based on the facts contained both in Lee's affidavit and in the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Order meets our established guidelines. We therefore reject his second argument. ¶ 27 Third, Atkin argues that there was, in fact, no actual legal basis on which sanctions could be imposed. To the contrary, as discussed above, under rule 16, there was in fact a legal foundation upon which sanctions could be awarded in this case. The federal analog to this rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f), reinforces the rule's intention to encourage forceful judicial management. 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1351, at 306 (1990); see also Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993). In support of that goal, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16 grants the trial court the discretion to impose sanctions where necessary to assure the timely and orderly disposition of the case. See Arnold, 846 P.2d at 1310. Based on the foregoing examination of Lee's affidavit and the trial court's findings and conclusions, the trial court has not abused its discretion. We therefore reject Atkin's third argument. ¶ 28 Fourth, Atkin argues that the attorney fees are excessive as imposed, maintaining that Lee failed to disclose why a full eight hours is billed for attendance at a scheduling conference. Again, we disagree. As the trial court found, Lee is entitled to reimbursement for attorney[] fees for one full day's work which should be set at eight hours at his normal rate as established by his affidavit. Lee's affidavit stated that his normal hourly rate was $140, or $1,120 for the day. The trial court found this to be reasonable based upon Lee's affidavit, education, expertise, and other local attorneys' rates. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding an attorney forced to make a 600-mile trip lost eight or more hours of working time; nor can we say the amount awarded is unreasonable, given the facts. We therefore reject the argument that the fees imposed were excessive.