Opinion ID: 2219951
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Guilty Plea and Bench Trial

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his plea of guilty but mentally ill, and, in a related claim, argues that the trial court's bench trial verdict of guilty, rather than guilty but mentally ill, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The relief defendant requests in each instance is a new sentencing hearing. Defendant suggests he is entitled to a new capital sentencing hearing because the trial court's rejection of his GBMI plea tainted the weight and credibility of his mitigation evidence at his sentencing hearing. We begin this section of our analysis with a review of the applicable statutes and this court's pertinent opinions. The pertinent version of section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides: (c) A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense, was not insane but was suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved of criminal responsibility for his conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill. (d) For purposes of this Section, `mental illness' or `mentally ill' means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted a person at the time of the commission of the offense and which impaired that person's judgment, but not to the extent that he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior or is unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 720 ILCS 5/6-2(c), (d) (West 1994). The burden is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was mentally ill, as defined in subsections (c) and (d) of section 6-2. 725 ILCS 5/115-3(c)(3), 115-4(j) (West 2004); People v. Lantz, 186 Ill.2d 243, 254, 238 Ill.Dec. 592, 712 N.E.2d 314 (1999). When a trier of fact finds a defendant guilty but mentally ill, that verdict does not relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility. People v. Johnson, 146 Ill.2d 109, 131, 165 Ill.Dec. 682, 585 N.E.2d 78 (1991). A defendant who has been found guilty but mentally ill is subject to any sentence that could have been imposed upon a defendant who had been convicted of the same offense without a finding of mental illness, including the death penalty. Johnson, 146 Ill.2d at 131-32, 165 Ill.Dec. 682, 585 N.E.2d 78. Indeed, the only discernible difference between the two verdicts is that, upon a finding of guilty but mentally ill, the Department of Corrections must cause periodic inquiry and examination to be made concerning the nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of the defendant's mental illness and provide such psychiatric, psychological, or other counseling and treatment for the defendant as it determines necessary. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6(b) (West 2004); see People v. Morris, 237 Ill.App.3d 140, 145, 177 Ill.Dec. 822, 603 N.E.2d 1196 (1992). As is the case when a defendant raises a defense of insanity, for which a defendant also bears the burden of proof, the existence of mental illness, as defined in section 6-2, is a question of fact; thus, the trial court's resolution of that issue will not be overturned unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See Johnson, 146 Ill.2d at 128-29, 165 Ill.Dec. 682, 585 N.E.2d 78. The Criminal Code also provides for a plea of guilty but mentally ill. Section 115-2 of the Criminal Code governs pleas of guilty, as well as pleas of guilty but mentally ill. Subsection (b) of section 115-2 provides that a plea of guilty but mentally ill may be accepted by the court when, inter alia: (3) the judge has held a hearing, at which either party may present evidence, on the issue of the defendant's mental health and, at the conclusion of such hearing, is satisfied that there is a factual basis that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense to which the plea is entered. 725 ILCS 5/115-2(b)(3) (West 2004). Defendant initially argues that the trial court erred when it rejected his plea of guilty but mentally ill and, in doing so, decided that the legal standards for determining a factual basis for a traditional plea    were inapplicable to determining the factual basis for pleas of guilty but mentally ill. Citing this court's decision in People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill.2d 425, 256 Ill.Dec. 836, 752 N.E.2d 1078 (2001), defendant maintains that this aspect of his argument presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review. We agree with defendant as to the applicable standard of review. However, we otherwise reject the substance of his argument. Defendant notes that the language of subsection (b) of section 115-2, i.e., may be accepted, substantially mirrors the language of subsection (a), which addresses the traditional guilty plea. Ergo, defendant argues that cases interpreting standards applicable to subsection (a) should provide guidance as to the proper interpretation of subsection (b). Defendant conveniently overlooks a significant difference between the procedures set forth in subsections (a) and (b). Subsection (b) appears to provide for a contested hearing on the issue of defendant's mental health, a hearing at which either party may present evidence. Notwithstanding this difference, defendant maintains that proceedings on a plea of guilty but mentally ill should be governed by the identical principles applicable to the traditional guilty plea, and cites this court's decision in People v. Barker, 83 Ill.2d 319, 328, 47 Ill.Dec. 399, 415 N.E.2d 404 (1980), for the following proposition: In evaluating the sufficiency of the factual basis to support a plea of guilty, a trial judge is in much the same position and would apply similar standards as those used in determining the sufficiency of the State's evidence at trial to withstand a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty. Defendant's argument suggests that the trial court was obligated to accept his plea, and thus find he was mentally ill as defined in section 6-2 of the Criminal Code, if defendant presented some evidence to support such a finding, irrespective of evidence to the contrary presented by the State. Defendant's position is untenable. It would seem self-evident that a proceeding in which there are no contested issues may be subject to different standards than one in which a controversy exists. In this case, the State chose to dispute the existence of mental illness, as defined in section 6-2 of the Criminal Code. Because there was a dispute regarding an element of the guilty plea, this case does not present a traditional guilty plea, we are not concerned with one party's evidence alone, and the standard for sufficiency referenced in the quoted passage from Barker cannot ultimately apply. Whether evidence could support a particular finding or verdict (the inquiry upon a motion for directed verdict) is a different question from whether the evidence does in fact support that finding or verdict after a full evidentiary hearing. See People v. Connolly, 322 Ill.App.3d 905, 915, 256 Ill. Dec. 382, 751 N.E.2d 1219 (2001). In the latter instance, the trier of fact necessarily weighs all the evidence and passes upon the credibility of witnesses in resolving disputed issues. Connolly, 322 Ill.App.3d at 915, 256 Ill.Dec. 382, 751 N.E.2d 1219. Because the State contested the existence of mental illness, that is what the trial court was obligated to do in this case. Acceptance of defendant's argument would allow defendants who plead guilty but mentally ill to effectively evade the burden of proof that the legislature has placed upon those who raise the issue at trial. The legislature could not have intended such a result. As we have noted, a defendant whose case is tried would have to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she is mentally ill, as defined in subsections (c) and (d) of section 6-2. 725 ILCS 5/115-3(c)(3), 115-4(j) (West 2004). A preponderance of the evidence is evidence that renders a fact more likely than not. Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill.2d 264, 279, 282 Ill.Dec. 799, 807 N.E.2d 423 (2004); see Lindsey v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 354 Ill.App.3d 971, 986, 289 Ill.Dec. 361, 819 N.E.2d 1161 (2004). Thus, at trial, following the presentation of evidence by both the defendant and the State, a trial court would have to determine whether it was more likely than not that defendant suffered from a mental illness, as defined in the statute, at the time he or she committed the offense. A defendant pleading guilty but mentally ill should have the same burden of proof. He cannot absolve himself of that burden by admitting an element he has the burden of proving. The directed verdict standard, mentioned in Barker, cannot apply to a contested proceeding, where evidence is adduced to controvert defendant's claim of mental illness. We also find meritless defendant's claim that the trial court erred in rejecting his plea of guilty but mentally ill, and his contention that the trial court's verdict of guilty, as opposed to guilty but mentally ill, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. As the foregoing analysis indicates, defendant had the burden of proving his mental illness by a preponderance of the evidence. As our subsequent discussion will show, the court's determination, that he did not sustain that burden, was not against the weight of the evidence. As Illinois courts have noted, the credibility and weight to be given psychiatric testimony are matters for the trier of fact, who is not obligated to accept the opinions of defendant's expert witnesses over those opinions presented by the State. People v. Mahaffey, 166 Ill.2d 1, 18, 209 Ill.Dec. 607, 651 N.E.2d 1055 (1995); see People v. Dresher, 364 Ill.App.3d 847, 855-56, 301 Ill.Dec. 652, 847 N.E.2d 662 (2006). In fact, [e]ven if several competent experts concur in their opinion and no opposing expert testimony is offered, it is still within the province of the trier of fact to weigh the credibility of the expert evidence and to decide the issue    in light of all of the facts and circumstances of the case   . In re Glenville, 139 Ill.2d 242, 251, 152 Ill.Dec. 90, 565 N.E.2d 623 (1990). In this case, the trial court found that defendant had not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was mentally ill, as defined in section 6-2, when he killed Cassandra Corum. In announcing that ruling, the trial judge stated he found the testimony of Dr. Dietz substantially more persuasive and more convincing than that of the defense experts. However, the court also found the facts of the case themselves a compelling refutation of testimony given by the defense experts. As previously noted, Dietz testified that defendant suffered principally from a personality disorder, and he displayed obvious characteristics of a sexual sadist. Dietz did not consider personality or anxiety disorders to be mental illnesses, as defined in section 6-2 of the Criminal Code. He believed that defendant's criminal behavior was driven by sexual desire, anger, and a kind of predatory desire for conquest. If defendant's judgment was impaired, Dietz believed those were the factors causing impairment, not mental illness. Dietz also rejected Merikangas' diagnosis of organic brain disease, noting that defendant's 2004 MRI was within the normal range, and defendant's actions at the time of Corum's murder did not bespeak someone who suffered from significant impairment of the central nervous system. Dietz noted that the murder required planning  defendant brought handcuffs, duct tape, a knife, and a gun with him  a certain degree of physical prowess and coordination  defendant was able to overpower Corum, drive her 100 miles, murder her, and carry her body to a bridge, where he threw her into the river  and rational thought  insofar as defendant decided to drive Corum to a secluded location, where he could kill her without being observed. The trial court observed that the principal defense witnesses disagreed in their primary diagnoses. Cuneo believed that defendant suffered, primarily, from PTSD; Killian's principal diagnosis was dissociation; and Merikangas determined that defendant suffered from organic brain disease. Merikangas disagreed with Killian's and Cuneo's diagnoses of PTSD and dissociative personality disorder. Killian and Cuneo believed that defendant was legally sane, but mentally ill, as defined in section 6-2(d). Merikangas testified that defendant was insane. In addition to their conflicting diagnoses, the court noted that the testimony of defendant's experts also failed to account for defendant's ability to function adequately in the Marine Corps, and later as a security guard, while suffering from the diagnosed illnesses. Their diagnoses failed to explain how a person thus afflicted could successfully plan, execute, and conceal eight murders over a period of 10 years. Disagreeing with the assessments of Merikangas and Killian  that defendant's crimes were not characterized by planning and organization  the court noted that defendant brought a gun, a knife, duct tape, and handcuffs on the night of Corum's murder. The court believed that defendant's actions during the offense were inconsistent with those of a person overcome by anger, noting, on the night defendant killed Cassandra Corum, he drove well over an hour, and approximately 100 miles, after he supposedly became angry and kidnapped her. It would appear that defendant had time to cool off, but defendant killed Corum anyway. We have held that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence when an opposite conclusion is apparent, or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary or not based on the evidence. Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill.2d 213, 242, 216 Ill.Dec. 703, 665 N.E.2d 1260 (1996). After careful review of this record, we cannot say that the trial court's rulings in this regard were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although defendant argues that Dietz's definition of mental illness was unduly restrictive and his views diverged from those generally accepted in the psychiatric community, a review of an expert opinion recently rendered in another capital case would seem to refute defendant's position. We note the testimony of Dr. Andrew Kowalkowski, as summarized in People v. Thompson, 222 Ill.2d 1, 304 Ill.Dec. 589, 853 N.E.2d 378 (2006). Like Dr. Dietz, Kowalkowski believed that mental disorders or illnesses are characterized by evidence of delusions, false fixed beliefs, or misinterpretation of external reality. Thompson, 222 Ill.2d at 24-25, 304 Ill. Dec. 589, 853 N.E.2d 378. Kowalkowski differentiated such delusional disorders from behavioral disorders, such as personality disorders, which are not significant mental disorders. (Emphasis in original.) Thompson, 222 Ill.2d at 39, 304 Ill.Dec. 589, 853 N.E.2d 378. Kowalkowski believed that Thompson's personality disorder manifested itself in    his impulsiveness, his irritability and aggressiveness, his repeated failure to maintain consistent work behavior and his lack of remorse. Thompson, 222 Ill.2d at 25, 304 Ill.Dec. 589, 853 N.E.2d 378. Kowalkowski testified that Thompson's killing spree could be explained by his personality disorders. Thompson, 222 Ill.2d at 40, 304 Ill.Dec. 589, 853 N.E.2d 378. The similarities between Dietz's and Kowalkowski's diagnoses, and Thompson's and this defendant's symptoms, are so obvious as to require no further comment. Dietz's opinion does not appear to be out of the mainstream of his profession, and it finds support in the facts of record. As the trial court's ruling suggests, the attendant facts and circumstances of defendant's crimes are themselves a compelling refutation of testimony given by the defense experts, independent of Dietz's testimony. For the foregoing reasons, we find no basis for reversing the trial court's determination that defendant failed to sustain his burden on the issue of mental illness. We would add, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the circuit court erred in rejecting defendant's plea of guilty but mentally ill, defendant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing, as he argues before this court. As we will explain later, the circuit court's rejection of defendant's plea did not affect defendant's ability to present mitigating evidence of his mental condition at sentencing, and references to defendant's unsuccessful insanity defense were proper and duly circumscribed.