Opinion ID: 3034855
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requesting A Stay Of Voluntary Departure

Text: [6] The government also argues that Azarte is inapplicable here because Barroso failed to request a stay of his removal or voluntary departure. In Azarte, we noted that we did not need to “reach the question whether filing a motion to reopen automatically tolls the voluntary departure period” because the petitioners in that case had requested a stay of removal. 394 F.3d at 1288, n.20. However, the Azarte court observed that automatically tolling the voluntary departure period upon the filing of a motion to reopen “would be consistent with the legislative scheme.” Id. For the reasons explained below, we 18 In so holding, we are not extending the voluntary departure time period in contravention of INS regulations; “we are simply determining which date should be counted as the thirtieth day.” Salvador-Calleros, 389 F.3d at 965. 19 We express no view as to the computation of the end-date of the voluntary departure period when there is no motion to reopen or reconsider filed. We do observe, however, that it would be reasonable to apply a uniform rule in calculating the end-date of the voluntary departure period, regardless of whether a motion to reopen or reconsider has been filed. BARROSO v. GONZALES 15419 now take the next step which Azarte’s rationale demands and hold that the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider automatically tolls the voluntary departure period. Such a conclusion best effectuates Congress’ purpose in enacting the voluntary departure and motion to reopen/reconsider provisions, and follows “the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). First and foremost, as Azarte explained, automatic tolling is “consistent with the legislative scheme.” 394 F.3d at 1288 n.20. Indeed, in issuing the latest interim rule concerning “the effect of a motion or appeal to the Immigration Court, BIA, or a federal court on any period of voluntary departure already granted,” the Department of Justice stated: the Department considered several options, but has not adopted any position or modified the interim rule. The Department has identified three possible options: no tolling of any period of voluntary departure; tolling the voluntary departure period for any period that an appeal or motion is pending; or set- ting a brief, fixed period of voluntary departure (for example, 10 days) after any appeal or motion is resolved. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10325-26 (March 6, 1997) (interim rule) (emphasis added). As the interim rule makes clear, the Justice Department considers automatic tolling to be a logical resolution to the question of the interrelationship between the statute’s motion to reopen/reconsider and voluntary departure provisions. In fact, two of the three approaches being considered by the agency contemplate that the alien always be allowed to remain in the country until after the 15420 BARROSO v. GONZALES motion to reconsider/reopen is decided. As the interim rule has never been replaced by a final one, it remains our best guidance on this question.20 [7] In addition, we note that IIRIRA contains no requirement that an alien must file an affirmative request to stay voluntary departure. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c, § 1229a; Desta v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741, 749 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that IIRIRA made no “provision for requiring an affirmative request to stay voluntary departure.”).21 Nor do the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security regulations on voluntary departure contain any provisions regarding staying the voluntary departure period. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26, § 240.25. Although the BIA’s regulations limit the authority to “extend the time within which to depart voluntarily specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board”, § 1240.26(f),22 automatic tolling does not extend the amount 20 See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1289 n.21 (“When promulgating the interim rule, the Justice Department explicitly stated that its rule did not resolve how motions to reopen and voluntary departure periods should be construed together . . . [and] avoided making a regulatory decision until the adoption of a final rule.”). 21 We note that the statute does instruct that “service of a petition [for review with the court of appeals] does not stay the removal of an alien pending the court’s decision on the petition, unless the court orders otherwise.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B). However, this provision is inapposite here because it addresses petitions for review filed with the court of appeals, not motions for reconsideration filed with the BIA. Moreover, unlike 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) which provides that an alien forfeits any pending motion to reconsider if he departs, a court of appeals “may entertain a petition after the alien has departed.” Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1171 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, petitions for review to the court of appeals do not present the same “conundrum” with which we are presented here. Moreover, this circuit has held that it has the equitable power to stay the voluntary departure period while reviewing a removal order. See El Himri v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1261, 1262 (9th Cir. 2003). 22 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) provides, in part: “Authority to extend the time within which to depart voluntarily specified initially by an immigration BARROSO v. GONZALES 15421 of time granted for voluntary departure. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining “toll” as “to stop the running of” a time period and an “extension” as “[a] period of additional time to take an action”). “A suspension of a voluntary departure period merely tolls the running of that period; it does not extend it.” Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 269 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Desta, 365 F.3d at 747 (“[W]hile we are stopping the clock from running on the time petitioner has to depart voluntarily, we are not adding more time to that clock.”). Therefore, tolling the voluntary departure period while the BIA considers the merits of a motion to reopen or reconsider neither violates the statutory time limit in 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2), nor intrudes on the district director’s authority to extend the time limit as specified in 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f). Although the government failed to mention it either in its briefs or at oral argument, and thus does not rely on it on this appeal, we note that there is one Department of Justice regulation which might be argued to preclude automatic tolling of the time for voluntary departure and to require the filing of a separate stay motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f) (2005) provides that “the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not stay the execution of any decision made in the case. . . . unless a stay of execution is specifically granted by the Board, the Immigration Judge, or an authorized officer of the Service.”23 We conclude that the regulation is not applicable and that tolling the time for voluntary departure does not constitute “stay[ing] the execution of a[ ] decision made in the case” within the meaning of section 1003.2(f). judge or the Board is only within the jurisdiction of the district director, the Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, or the Director of the Office of Juvenile Affairs.” See also Desta, 365 F.3d at 747 (noting that extending the period for voluntary departure would be “in contravention of INS regulations.”). 23 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f) contains an exception for motions filed pursuant to the provisions of §§ 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) and 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A), neither of which is applicable here. 15422 BARROSO v. GONZALES The “execution of a decision” is best understood in terms of a deportation order; in fact, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f) is headed “Stay of deportation.” When the government puts an alien on a plane or a bus in order to send him back to his native country, it is “executing” the deportation decision. However, when an alien who has been given permission by the BIA to depart voluntarily does so, he is not “executing” the voluntary departure order. Indeed, it is only the government that “executes” a decision in an immigration proceeding, not an individual alien.24 Therefore, tolling the time in which an alien has been granted permission to depart does not “stay the execution of a[ ] decision made in [his] case.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f) (emphasis added). As a result, we conclude that the regulation does not apply to a grant of voluntary departure. Moreover, were the BIA to construe 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f) as applying to a grant of voluntary departure, such an interpretation would not, in light of Azarte, be “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). We reject agency interpretations of the INA that “would produce absurd results.” Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992)). More specifically, “when interpreting IIRIRA, we avoid an interpretation that would lead to an absurd result, such as the expenditure of unnecessary judicial resources or overly severe consequences toward aliens.” Desta, 365 F.3d at 746. 24 The only Ninth Circuit case of which we are aware to address this regulation (albeit in its earlier but identical incarnation as 8 C.F.R. 3.2(f)) held that it applies to the BIA’s decision to rescind an alien’s status as a lawful permanent resident. See Baria v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). Like a deportation order, and unlike a grant of voluntary departure, a rescission order is a decision which must be executed by the government. Thus, the Baria court’s holding is entirely consistent with our reasoning here. BARROSO v. GONZALES 15423 Our decision in Azarte illustrates why applying § 1003.2(f) so as to require the filing of a separate stay motion would “create[ ] absurd results when viewed in light of the larger statutory scheme.” Bona v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 663, 670 (9th Cir. 2005). Were we to require the filing of an additional motion along with a motion to reopen or reconsider, then under Azarte, the BIA would be obligated to grant every such motion in order to afford aliens “their statutory right to a determination on the merits of motions to reopen.” Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1282. Because Azarte requires that the BIA decide a motion to reopen or reconsider on the merits when the motion is filed within the voluntary departure period, the BIA would not be permitted to deny the request for a stay in these circumstances. See id. at 1289. As a result, requiring aliens to file a separate stay motion along with their timely filed motion to reopen or reconsider would amount to nothing more than an empty procedural requirement that would simply place an additional bureaucratic burden on aliens who in any event often have difficulty following the complex procedural requirements of our immigration laws. At the same time, it would generate unnecessary paperwork for all parties involved, including the overworked and undermanned bureaucracy that is currently struggling to keep up with the rapidly increasing number of filings of motions, notices, stays, orders, decisions, appeals and other types of papers. [8] In sum, to deny those aliens who, for whatever reason, fail to file a separate stay motion, the opportunity to receive a ruling on the merits of their timely filed motion to reopen or reconsider, while granting relief to those aliens whose counsel are sufficiently sophisticated to enclose the additional document, would be contrary to the statutory purpose and to our reasoning in Azarte. Automatic tolling ensures “a workable procedure for motions to reopen [or reconsider] in cases in which aliens are granted voluntary departure, and [ ] effectuate[s] the purposes of the two statutory provisions.” Id. We therefore conclude that the timely filing of Barroso’s motion 15424 BARROSO v. GONZALES to reconsider automatically tolled his time in which to voluntarily depart. We note finally that our decision is required by Azarte, because in that case, while a request for a stay was filed, the request had not been acted upon. If a voluntary departure date could be tolled only by action of an immigration official, officer or entity, as a ruling that the regulation is applicable here would require, the date would not have been tolled in Azarte; as a result, we would have been compelled to deny rather than grant the petition for review. Thus, in addition to being compelled for the reasons set forth above, the result we reach here is required in order to maintain consistency in our circuit law. [9] Accordingly, we hold that the BIA abused its discretion in denying Barroso’s motion to reconsider on the ground that he failed to depart the United States within his thirty-day voluntary departure period.25