Opinion ID: 1391000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Place of Public Accommodations

Text: The threshold question presented is whether the SSAC is a place of public accommodations under the Human Rights Act, W.Va.Code, 5-11-1, et seq., and thereby subject to the provisions of W.Va.Code, 5-11-9(f)(1) (1987). [18] The phrase place of public accommodations is defined in W.Va.Code, 5-11-3(j): The term `place of public accommodations' means any establishment or person, as defined herein, including the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof, which offers its services, goods, facilities or accommodations to the general public, but shall not include any accommodations which are in their nature private[.] [19] The SSAC argues that it is not a place of public accommodations because participation in interscholastic athletics is not open to the general public, but rather is limited to secondary school students who meet certain age, residency, and academic requirements. We do not believe this statute is that narrowly confined. We dealt with the public accommodations issue in Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep't v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, ___ W.Va. ___, 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983). There, two volunteer fire departments argued that they were not places of public accommodations and, therefore, did not have to admit women to membership. The fire departments contended that because our Human Rights Act is patterned after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq., as amended, this Court should follow the definition of place of public accommodations provided in the federal act. [20] We declined the volunteer fire departments' invitation for several reasons. First, we found our public accommodations definition to be broader than its federal counterpart. Second, we reiterated the liberal construction of the Human Rights Act which is required under its terms. [21] See State Human Rights Comm'n v. Pauley, 158 W.Va. 495, 212 S.E.2d 77 (1975), disapproved on other grounds, State Human Rights Comm'n v. Pearlman Real Estate Agency, 161 W.Va. 1, 239 S.E.2d 145 (1977). Accordingly, we held in Syllabus Point 1 of Shepherdstown that the fire departments were places of public accommodations. [22] In reaching this conclusion in Shepherdstown, we identified two factors to determine whether an entity is a place of public accommodations: (1) if it is created and operated pursuant to the laws of the State of West Virginia, and (2) whether it receives funding from public sources. This definition is, of course, not exclusive. Certainly, as other courts have indicated, establishments receiving no public funds can also be places of public accommodations. In National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., supra , the court determined that a place of public accommodations is dependent upon whether the organization engages in activities in places in which an unselected public is given an open invitation. It also concluded that this result obtained even though the entity was a nonprofit or membership organization rather than a commercial enterprise, or [did] not have exclusive use or possession of the site of its operations. 127 N.J.Super. at 531-32, 318 A.2d at 38. A similar result was reached in United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981), where the court held that under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the question whether an entity was a place of public accommodations turned ultimately on whether the organization invited only a screened and selected portion of the public, or whether instead it engaged in activities in places in which an unscreened, unselected, and unlimited number of persons from the general public was invited. A volunteer group of power boat enthusiasts was found to meet the public accommodations definition in United States Power Squadron v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 401, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871, 452 N.E.2d 1199 (1983). New York's highest court concluded that the group conducted its activities at public schools, public buildings, public waterways, public parks, and public marinas. Thus, the place where the petitioner's meetings and activities occurred was a place of public accommodations. Other courts have also concluded that lack of control or possession of a particular meeting site does not preclude an organization from being a place of public accommodations. See Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (1987). Cf. Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal.3d 72, 219 Cal.Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212 (1985) (Boys' Club which operated a community recreational facility was a business establishment under Unruth Civil Rights Act). Because we find the foregoing authority persuasive, we reject the SSAC's argument that because the general public does not participate in interscholastic sports and because it does not operate any facility that is open to the public, it does not fall within the public accommodations definition. The critical point is that the SSAC regulates interscholastic athletics and its membership, all of which have a direct impact on the public school system. Thus, this entire activity is permeated with a general public interest through open spectator invitation to the sporting event which is generally conducted at a public facility. This is sufficient to meet the public accommodations definition. Moreover, because the SSAC was legislatively created and endowed with powers legislatively prescribed to provide services in supervising interscholastic athletics, it also falls within the ambit of the Human Rights Act definition of public accommodations. Finally, the SSAC receives membership dues from the public schools, as well as gate receipts from the athletic events. [23]