Opinion ID: 6219164
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The third Breit prong

Text: {45} We conclude that the judge acted “in willful disregard of the resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal” by allowing the trial to proceed under the circumstances. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 32. When analyzing the third prong of Breit, the appellate court 20 “will carefully examine the [official’s] conduct in light of the totality of the circumstances of the trial,” and determine whether the conduct amounts to “willful disregard of the resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal.” Id. ¶ 40. In Breit, we defined “willful disregard” as “a conscious and purposeful decision by the [official] to dismiss any concern that his or her conduct may lead to a mistrial or reversal,” while “emphasizing that the [official] is actually aware, or is presumed to be aware, of the potential consequences of his or her actions.” Id. ¶ 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). {46} The State argues that the judge did not act in willful disregard of a possible reversal because he gave Seeger every opportunity to participate. The State contends that even if the judge knew of Seeger’s intention to not participate at trial, he could not take Seeger’s “threat to violate his client’s constitutional rights at face value.” The State asserts that after witnessing Seeger refuse to participate in jury selection, the judge “could have reasonably assumed that, once trial began in earnest, Seeger would fulfill his duty to represent Defendant.” We are not persuaded. {47} The totality of the trial demonstrates that the judge made a “conscious and purposeful decision” to proceed with trial despite any concern that his conduct may result in reversal. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 34. The State’s argument that the judge did not know whether Seeger would represent his client “once trial began in earnest,” neglects the fact that the judge had witnessed Seeger fail to participate in voir dire, 21 juror challenges, opening statement, and witness examination by the time Seeger made his second motion for mistrial. {48} Additionally, the judge acknowledged the likelihood of a reversal on appeal when he stated that Defendant “would have . . . excellent grounds for appeal on incompetency of counsel,” if Seeger did not participate. And after lunch, it became clear that it was not just that Defendant had been denied effective assistance of counsel, but that Defendant had also been prejudiced by the State’s late disclosures. The judge is presumed to be aware that by continuing with a trial where Defendant was not represented and where Defendant was prejudiced by the State’s late disclosures, the result “may lead to a mistrial or reversal.” Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 34. Again, this is no “subtle point of law, and one we can presume any . . . attorney [or judge] to know.” McClaugherty, 2008-NMSC-044, ¶ 65 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {49} Accordingly, we conclude that under the narrow facts of this case, the judge acted in willful disregard of the resulting reversal thus satisfying the third prong of Breit. Retrial is barred.