Opinion ID: 75971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the contempt finding and award of attorney's fees

Text: 71 (ORDERS 7 & 8) 72 Approximately four months after the district court enjoined Riccard from filing any new action, complaint, or claim for relief against Prudential, its affiliates, or subsidiaries [in] federal court, state court, or any other forum unless he first obtained leave from the district court, Riccard, without obtaining leave of court, filed a host of what he styled Complaints against Prudential. Those complaints, signed by Riccard with his thanks for listening, consisted of court orders, transcript excerpts, letters, pleadings, and affidavits, for a total of two-hundred pages of exhibits, and they complained about Prudential's alleged criminal activity, reiterating Riccard's accusations about Prudential fraudulently misrepresenting its NASD membership status to courts and charging Prudential with obstruction of justice. Riccard filed those complaints with the NASD, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance, the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida, and the Florida Department of Agriculture, with copies to various newspapers. And Riccard also filed ethical grievances against Prudential's attorneys with the New York State Bar Association and the Florida Bar Association. 73 Understandably upset, Prudential filed a motion asking the district court to hold Riccard in contempt for violating its injunction. After notice and a show cause hearing, the district court did hold Riccard in civil contempt for filing the complaints and grievances, finding clear and convincing evidence that Riccard had violated a clear, unambiguous, valid, and lawful order of the court — its previously issued injunction against further filings without leave of court. 74 An injunction can be enforced, if necessary, through a contempt proceeding. Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037, 1064 (11th Cir.2001). A finding of civil contempt — willful disregard of the authority of the court — must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 2000). The clear and convincing evidence must establish that: (1) the allegedly violated order was valid and lawful; (2) the order was clear and unambiguous; and (3) the alleged violator had the ability to comply with the order. Id. In determining whether a party is in contempt of a court order, the order is subject to reasonable interpretation, though it may not be expanded beyond the meaning of its terms absent notice and an opportunity to be heard. United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529, 537 (7th Cir.1974); see also Bush, 261 F.3d at 1063-64; Reynolds v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 2000). We review a district court's determination of civil contempt only for an abuse of discretion. In re Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS, 92 F.3d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir.1996). 75 Earlier in this opinion, we concluded that the district court's injunction against further filings without leave of court was valid. And Riccard does not contend that he lacked the ability to comply with it. Instead, his primary position is that all of his post-injunction filings did not violate any clear and unambiguous terms of the injunction. He says that the language prohibiting him from filing in state court, federal court or any other forum did not clearly prohibit him from filing complaints against Prudential with administrative agencies and other executive branch departments of state and federal government. We disagree. 76 Context is often important to meaning, and so it is here. True, the injunction was issued in part to prevent Riccard's bitter campaign from further burdening the federal and state court system (state courts were apparently included based upon a prediction of where else Riccard might take his campaign). But as the district court pointed out in holding Riccard in contempt, the injunction was also issued in part to prevent further harassment of Prudential. That purpose supports interpreting the injunction to cover non-judicial filings. Moreover — and this is more important — the any other forum language has to refer to non-judicial fora, because all state and federal courts were already covered by the language which preceded that phrase. If we were to interpret any other forum to include only state and federal courts, then the language is meaningless because they are already covered by the words in state court, federal court. The phrase any other forum has to mean something other than state and federal judicial fora, because that is what other means, and the meaning of the phrase any other is broad because the meaning of the word any is broad. See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11th Cir.2001) (holding adjective any is not ambiguous; it has well-established meaning and means all); Coronado v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 222 F.3d 1315, 1321 (11th Cir. 2000) (any has an expansive meaning, that is, one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind). The critical language of the injunction is broad enough to clearly and unambiguously cover all fora to which complaints are made, including federal and state administrative and executive agencies and departments. We agree with the district court about that. 77 The ethical grievances Riccard filed with the bar associations of two states against attorneys representing Prudential are another matter. They raise a question involving not the any other forum language, but the language describing the forbidden targets of any further filings — Prudential, its affiliates, or subsidiaries. The district court thought that Riccard's ethical complaints against Prudential's attorneys amounted to complaints against Prudential. Maybe. But maybe is not close enough when measured against the clear and unambiguous standard which we must apply. The injunction prohibited Riccard from filing, without leave of court, any new action, complaint, or claim for relief against Prudential, its affiliates, or subsidiaries. The attorneys who have represented Prudential in its struggles with Riccard are not Prudential, nor are they its affiliates or subsidiaries. The injunction said nothing about Prudential's attorneys. For these reasons, we conclude that it did not clearly and unambiguously prohibit Riccard from filing with bar associations ethical complaints against those attorneys. 78 To summarize, we have concluded that one basis for the district court's decision that Riccard's post-injunction filings amounted to contempt of court is proper, but the other one is not. The proper basis (Riccard's filing of complaints against Prudential with state and federal administrative agencies and executive departments) being sufficient to support a finding of contempt, and having no doubt that the district court would have reached the same conclusion if it had disregarded entirely the improper basis (Riccard's filing of ethical complaints against Prudential's attorneys), we affirm the order holding him in contempt. The one exception to that affirmance is that we must vacate the district court's order insofar as it required him to send withdrawal letters to the bar associations. 79 Riccard also challenges the district court's decision to impose as a sanction against Riccard for his contempt of court an award to Prudential of $33,357.00, which represents the attorney's fees and costs it incurred in connection with the contempt proceedings. We cannot tell if the amount awarded would have been less if the district court had known that it could hold Riccard in contempt for only his post-injunction filings against Prudential and not for those against its attorneys. Accordingly, we will vacate the award of attorney's fees as a contempt sanction and instruct the district court to reconsider whether the amount of it should be adjusted in light of our conclusion that Riccard's filings against Prudential's attorneys were not a violation of the injunction.