Opinion ID: 2545071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Conflicting Opinion Testimony

Text: Next, Durousseau argues that the trial court erred in rejecting the unrebutted opinion of the mental health expert regarding Durousseau's mental mitigation. This Court will not disturb a trial court's rejection of a mitigating circumstance if the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's rejection of the mitigation. See Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377, 381, 385 (Fla.1994); Nibert v. State, 574 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Fla.1990). There must be a rational basis for the trial court's rejection of such mitigation at a capital sentencing proceeding. Lebron v. State, 982 So.2d 649, 660 (Fla.2008). [T]he trial court may accept or reject the testimony of an expert witness just as the judge may accept or reject the testimony of any other witness. Roberts v. State, 510 So.2d 885, 894 (Fla.1987). The trial court is entitled to reject apparently unrebutted testimony of a defense mental health expert if the trial court finds that the facts do not support the testimony. See generally Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 531 (Fla.2003). We have articulated a distinction between factual evidence and opinion testimony. As a general rule, uncontroverted factual evidence cannot simply be rejected unless it is contrary to law, improbable, untrustworthy, unreasonable, or contradictory. Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381, 390 (Fla.1994) (citing Brannen v. State, 94 Fla. 656, 114 So. 429 (1927)). This rule applies equally to the penalty phase of a capital trial. Walls, 641 So.2d at 390. We further stated that [o]pinion testimony, on the other hand, is not subject to the same rule, and explained that [c]ertain kinds of opinion testimony clearly are admissibleand especially qualified expert testimonybut they are not necessarily binding even if uncontroverted. Opinion testimony gains its greatest force to the degree it is supported by the facts at hand, and its weight diminishes to the degree such support is lacking. Walls, 641 So.2d at 390-91. Moreover, [a] debatable link between fact and opinion relevant to a mitigating factor usually means, at most, that a question exists for judge and jury to resolve. Id. at 391. During the penalty phase, defense expert Dr. Dorothy Lewis testified that, in her opinion, Durousseau suffered from bipolar mood disorder and schizoaffective disorder. Dr. Lewis further testified that, in her opinion, assuming Durousseau murdered Mack, Durousseau was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and that he was under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder. Durousseau claims that the trial judge improperly rejected the mitigation in favor of the judge's own personal opinion. In support of this argument, Durousseau refers the judge's statement that the expert's descriptions of his illness were not indicative, from a layperson's viewpoint, of a person with a mood disorder. A trial judge cannot reject an uncontroverted expert opinion regarding a medical diagnosis in favor his or her own unqualified lay opinion. See Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Phillips, 613 So.2d 56, 58 (Fla.1st DCA 1992). In the present case, the trial judge found that certain lay testimony regarding Durousseau's behavior as a child and as an adult was in conflict with the expert's opinion that Durousseau suffered from bipolar mood disorder and would have exhibited signs and symptoms of bipolar mood disorder since early childhood. In the Sentencing Order, the trial judge explained: To support this opinion, Dr. Lewis relied upon information that the Defendant cried a lot as a young child; would fool around and was kind of difficult to manage; took many risks; talked in class, and sometimes talked and talked without being able to shut-up. She described him as having grandiose ideas about his own persona, citing his statement to her that he was irresistible to women. She considered interviews with girlfriends who testified that sometimes he wanted sex constantly and then other times he did not seem interested. She also considered the Defendant's statement that sometimes he just stayed in his room and didn't want to go out and see people. She also considered the Turner Syndrome studies and hypothyroidism, as previously discussed. The Court is aware that it may not have received the identical information regarding the Defendant's history that was received by Dr. Lewis, however, it did receive penalty phase testimony from many witnesses including family and friends. Those who knew the Defendant years ago, gave vastly different accounts of the Defendant's younger days than those relied upon by Dr. Lewis. Dr. Lewis stated that the Defendant was difficult to manage as a child. Delores Sheen, the principal at Sheenway Educational and Cultural Center, where the Defendant attended school from 1985 to 1987 testified that she never once had to discipline him. Although records substantiate that he was not a good student, he participated in all school activities and attended school there five or six days per week. June Orr, a close family friend of his mother, described him as humorous, a nice child, always willing to help and lend a hand to others. Family friends Latonya Street and Kiana Michelle Williams Medina testified he was always respectful, courteous and polite. Dr. Lewis had information that the Defendant was a risk taker. John Simms, a close friend of Defendant's brother, Dennis Paige, testified the Defendant shied away from physical contact because he was afraid of getting hurt. Because of this fear, he did not participate in sports other than running track. According to Mr. Simms, he was kind of shy and meek, but he was always positive. His cousin, Eric Moten, who was raised with the Defendant and his brothers, described him as always together, and the one who was the easiest going of us all. He further stated, I never saw him do anything out of line. Mrs. Medina described him this way: He made every effort to keep things balanced. I mean that was one thing that as a young man and as a man, he was very even-keeled, he wanted things to be smooth sailing, easy going, very laid back . . . You know, if things were in a despair mode, that all you could see was despair, he had a joke for you. Although witnesses did verify that the Defendant cried a lot as a young child, these descriptions are not consistent with Dr. Lewis' information, nor indicative, from a layperson's viewpoint, of a person with a mood disorder. Dr. Lewis found in her interviews with the Defendant that he has a grandiose opinion of his own persona. In reaching this conclusion, she referenced his statement that he is irresistible to women. She found that this supported her opinion that he was in a manic state. Accepting that this was not said in jest, but noting that more than one witness described the Defendant as humorous, the Court finds Dr. Lewis' conclusion that this is indicative of a person in a manic state to be highly improbable. The Defendant, in his testimony in the guilt phase of the trial, claimed to have had a very active sex life with a significant number of partners. He has fathered four children from three different women. Regardless of his opinion about himself, the evidence established that there are women who are attracted to him, or at least willing to have sexual relations with him, which might form a basis for his own conclusions. Where expert testimony is admitted, it is still the sole province of the jury or court as trier of facts to accept or reject such testimony, even if it is uncontroverted. Wuornos, 644 So.2d at 1010. [A] jury may reject expert medical testimony when there exists relevant, conflicting lay testimony . . . . Weygant v. Fort Myers Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 640 So.2d 1092, 1094 (Fla.1994). The trial judge's role shifts to that of fact finder when considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See generally Spencer v. State, 842 So.2d 52 (Fla.2003). As a general rule, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and appellate courts are obligated to give great deference to the findings of the trial court. Riggins v. State, 830 So.2d 920, 921 (Fla.4th DCA 2002); Porter v. State, 788 So.2d 917, 923 (Fla.2001) (We recognize and honor the trial court's superior vantage point in assessing the credibility of witnesses and in making findings of fact.). In the instant case, Dr. Lewis did not testify that Durousseau's constellation of illnesses could only manifest itself from the time of infancy. She speculated that one or some of the conditions may have been genetic and that it was possible Durousseau suffered from those illnesses from a young age. Because she did not have any personal knowledge of Durousseau's behavior as a child, Dr. Lewis relied on information she obtained from Durousseau's mother as a basis for her testimony. However, the trial judge noted that the lay witness testimony regarding Durousseau's behavior as a child conflicted with the behavioral problems that Dr. Lewis testified would have been present in a child suffering from bipolar mood disorder or schizoaffective disorder. Testimony from many other family members, friends, teachers, and coworkers painted Durousseau as nice, quiet, and shy boy. Thus, the record reveals competent, substantial evidence supporting the trial judge's rejection of the mental mitigation. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the expert's opinion in favor of conflicting lay testimony regarding Durousseau's mental mitigation.