Opinion ID: 2191641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Judge Levin's alleged clear and absolute error of law relative to Kerpelman's fee dispute with Malcomb

Text: In this exception Kerpelman states: 32. Levin committed a clear and absolute error of law in coming to his conclusion that Malcomb had been overcharged. At page 63 of Levin's opinion he referred to the Respondent's continuing to contend, to argue, in Malcomb's behalf, upon the question of whether Malcomb should pay support when one child was awarded to him and one child was awarded to the mother. Levin states the question was not still open. [(Emphasis in original.)] At page 64 of his opinion Levin, with emphasis, states: Despite Merle's (the mother's) earning capacity (she was not then employed) and marriage, it was decidedly unrealistic to expect any court to not require a father (earning near $22,000 per year  as per Malcomb's Answer 3 to Merle's Interrogatory  as prepared by Respondent) to pay something for the support of his child. This is a complete and total misstatement of the law as it existed at the time in question, which was 1976. At that time the law was enunciated in the case of Hare v. Hare, a per curiam decision filed February 22, 1974, No. 443, September Term, 1973. This is an unreported decision and it is not referred to here as a citation. Rather it is referred to to show what the Court of Special Appeals itself has said the law was at that time, and because reference to it was part of the trial testimony. The unrefuted, uncontradicted, evidence in the case before Levin was that this was the law at that time. The Respondent specifically so testified. But no, Levin takes matters into his own hands and states the law another way, and erroneously. At page 7 of the Hare opinion it is stated: The amount of support each will be required to provide is to be determined by an evaluation of each party's relative financial status, work history and earning capacity. (Emph. supp.) Thus Levin's finding was clearly erroneous as a matter of law. A copy of Hare v. Hare is attached hereto. The Hare v. Hare test of earning capacity was not changed until Rand v. Rand, [280 Md. 508,] 374 A.2d 900 [(1977)], wherein, in 1979 [sic], the court seems to have changed the test to something else. But the rule set forth in Hare is the rule as it existed at the time in question. Kerpelman testified in the case below that this was the law and there was no contradiction. Nor can any citation be produced against this proposition. Kerpelman testified that he had this above quoted passage memorized and it was the test in all of his cases at that time. It is also pointed out that the testimony was that the mother was married to a spouse who was earning around $30,000 per year, and therefore had negligible or no overhead expenses of her own, so that whatever money or earning capacity she had, was entirely available for the support of the child in question. [Emphasis in original.] What Judge Levin said on page 63 of his opinion was: It is undisputed that Respondent never discussed any of his escalating bills with Malcomb beginning with the Six Hundred Fifty Dollar ($650.00) bill. He simply sent them to Malcomb. As to Respondent's August 26, 1976 bill of One Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ... (Additional final fee based on successful result,) if the July 20, 1976 conference (at 2:00 P.M.) with Judge MacDaniel left matters so up in the air as Respondent contended (subject to all sorts of wavering winds of change ... open at that time, was the question of whether Malcomb should pay support, it was still open to contest), why would Respondent charge Malcomb an additional fee for successful result? According to Respondent, he felt that the July 20, 1976 decision reached by Judge MacDaniel (requiring Malcomb to pay Twenty-five Dollars ... per week as support for Heather) was unreasonable and unfair and felt it would be preferable to have a formal hearing. Obviously, in Respondent's mind, this could not be called a successful result under such unfair circumstances even if Malcomb did retain Kirsten (whom he had before Respondent came to represent him). The quotation by Judge Levin on page 63 concerning subject to all sorts of wavering winds of change, etc., was from Kerpelman's response to Bar Counsel's demand for admission of relevant facts. The demand was that Kerpelman admit that in [a] telephone call [previously referred to in the demands he] advised John D. Malcomb that the `custody matter,' referring to the decision in the case of Malcomb v. Malcomb, Equity No. 78654, was not yet settled. Kerpelman denied the statement, saying he ha[d] no recollection as to this but by virtue of the fact situation, [it was] quite unlikely that this would have been stated, adding that the question [was] designed as a conscious trap for the tryer [sic] of fact in this case. He then went on to claim that custody matters and in fact all equity matters are in fact still open until decree is signed. He then made the other statements quoted by Judge Levin. We agree with Judge Levin that under the law as it has existed and continues to exist it is unrealistic to expect a court not to require a father earning $22,000 per year to pay something for the support of his child. Kerpelman is in error when he suggests that the trial judge came to a conclusion that Malcomb had been overcharged. He reached no such conclusion. He determined, as we have earlier indicated, that Kerpelman represented to Malcomb that his total fee for representation would be $1,000.00 and no more, but that in violation of this agreement Kerpelman charged or attempted to charge Malcomb fees over and above the agreed upon amount, that Kerpelman made a wilful misrepresentation to Malcomb as to the fee, and that Kerpelman maliciously and improperly escalated the fee charges to Malcomb without any basis, without any agreement, without any warning and without the escalated charges bearing any relationship to the amount of work done.