Opinion ID: 654620
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Richard Lawler.

Text: 65 The defendants also contend that the district court erred in granting the government's motion in limine regarding the cross-examination of Richard Lawler. They wanted Lawler to testify about how badly the government had treated him before his grand jury testimony in order for the jury to have understood Lawler's state of mind during that testimony. The defendants also maintained that this evidence would have enabled the jury to have better judged Lawler's credibility during his trial testimony. At trial, the defendants made the following offer of proof, drawn from Lawler's colloquy with the defense during its pretrial investigation: 66 Question [by defense]: Did you have occasion to be debriefed or spoken to at all before you went in to the grand jury? 67 Answer [by Lawler]: Yes, I did. 68 Question: Who was in the grand jury besides yourself? 69 Answer: Don Glanzer and the Washington agent. 70 Question: What did they say to you at this time? 71 Answer: They told me I had better start telling the truth or I'm going to f[---]ing jail, and then I told them I was telling the truth. Then they sort of stood up in front of me and said, You're a f[---]ing liar, and get your f[---]ing lawyer in here right now because you're going to f[---]ing jail. 72 Question: Was it Glanzer who said that or that Washington guy? 73 Answer: I think the Washington guy was the one doing that in there. 74 Question: Was he introduced as a U.S. Attorney from Washington, an FBI agent, or what? 75 Answer: I think he was a U.S. Attorney. 76 We find no error in the district court's ruling to exclude the testimony regarding the alleged threats made to Lawler. The jury had already heard Lawler, a hostile albeit insignificant 11 witness, testify on direct examination that an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) had threatened him with jail prior to his testimony before the grand jury. Such testimony was sufficient to raise any doubts in the minds of the jury members about Lawler's credibility or state of mind, without having Lawler testify about the profanity the AUSA had allegedly used with him. Such a matter, as the district court correctly pointed out to the defendants, was better suited for the court to consider, after the verdict, on a motion to dismiss the indictment based on prosecutorial misconduct: Any broader inquiry into the existence of prosecutorial misconduct was not the province of the jury, but was more properly left to the court to be decided as a matter of law. Hayward, 772 F.Supp. at 404 (citing United States v. Swiatek, 819 F.2d 721, 726 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 903, 108 S.Ct. 245, 98 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987)). The court also properly instructed the jury members that they could consider questions and comments made by defendants' attorneys pertaining to alleged governmental misconduct to the extent that the material bore on the credibility of witnesses. Id. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in curtailing the cross-examination of Lawler. SeeMuhammad, 928 F.2d at 1466-67. 77