Opinion ID: 712067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The appropriateness of a bargaining order in this case.

Text: 72 At worst, Kinney committed one sustainable hallmark violation during the course of the 1991 election, plus an assortment of lesser infractions. 5 Given the facts of this case, the bargaining order issued by the NLRB was an abuse of discretion. 73 As discussed above, Gissel bargaining orders may be issued either (a) if an employer has engaged in exceptional misconduct, or (b) if the employer has engaged in lesser misconduct under Gissel, and the union can demonstrate that (1) the union was at some point supported by a majority of the bargaining unit employees; and (2) the employer's unfair labor practices undermined the union's majority strength and 'the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight.'  J.L.M., Inc. v. NLRB, 31 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614-15, 89 S.Ct. at 1940-41). This case falls into neither of these categories. 74 a. Exceptional Misconduct. Not every hallmark violation amounts to exceptional misconduct under Gissel. In Windsor, for example, we found that the actual dismissal of two employees did not rise to that outrageous level: 75 While the unlawful layoffs violation, if not outrageous, is certainly a hallmark violation as that term has come to be used in this circuit, in no sense can the violation be said to be pervasive under Gissel; this was essentially one layoff, albeit of two men. This [is] not ... a class one case.... 76 Windsor, 730 F.2d at 865 (citations omitted). A fortiori, Kinney has engaged in no exceptional, pervasive, and outrageous behavior: a threat is by nature less outrageous than actual dismissal; actual dismissal is a management message calculated to reach all the members of the unit whereas Kinney's threat was made to two employees and disseminated to others by them, not by Kinney; and Kinney acted to limit its threat, whereas the employer in Windsor took no remedial action until after unfair labor charges had been filed. 77 b. Lesser Misconduct. If the Board's bargaining order is to be enforced, it must satisfy the requirements outlined by Gissel for cases marked by a lesser degree of misconduct than exceptional hallmark violations. The Board must first establish that there existed majority employee sentiment once expressed through cards in favor of the union. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614, 89 S.Ct. at 1940. Twenty-five signature cards are included in the record. The unit contained 41 individuals, including the seven whose votes were contested. 6 We conclude below that the NLRB erred in rejecting Kinney's challenges to four of the seven contested ballots. Of these four employees, two had signed cards. Retrospectively, therefore, the original unit consisted of 37 individuals, a majority of 23 of whom signed cards. 78 Of these 23 cards, Kinney challenges five that were signed by employees who testified that they signed because they believed the only consequence of doing so would be the authorization of an election, and not necessarily because they wanted to vote in favor of a union. However, a review of the transcript pages cited by Kinney does not support this allegation. All five of the employees who signed these ballots indicated that they favored a union. 79 Kinney further contends that two additional signatures were induced by the false assertion that a majority of the other employees had already signed the cards. However, the NLRB deems this false statement to be within the range of puffery that solicitors are allowed. See Montgomery Ward & Co., 288 N.L.R.B. 126, 128-29, 1988 WL 213700 (1988). Finally, Kinney points out that three of the 23 cards were signed after the union made its formal demand for recognition on September 25. See A. at 604, 612, 636. 7 It is questionable whether these cards may be included in the final count, see Tall Pines Inn, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1392, 1406, 1984 WL 36122 (1984), but the exclusion of these three cards would reduce the total number of valid cards to 20, which is still a majority of 37. 80 Nevertheless, even if the union had majority support in September 1991, the bargaining order was an excessive remedy. Absent exceptional misconduct (as defined in Gissel ), a bargaining order is justifiable only if the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies ... is slight. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614, 89 S.Ct. at 1940. The test is whether or not a fair and reliable election can be had. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). 81 The finding of a hallmark violation such as the threats to Woods and Les McClure, does not necessarily justify a bargaining order, even in the absence of mitigating factors. Windsor, 730 F.2d at 866. Here, however, Kinney's hallmark violation was substantially mitigated by Cognetti's November 19 letter, which disclaimed any reprisal in the event the union lost. The NLRB concluded that the November 19 letter was an ineffective repudiation because it was not categorical, but the NLRB erred in failing to consider the letter's substantial mitigating effect. A union victory would reduce management's ability to take reprisals with impunity, as any union supporter would assume. When Woods and Les McClure called a meeting to publicize the threat to their jobs, union adherent Drew Koerick stepped up to tell the audience that the only way to protect Woods and McClure from discharge was to vote for the union. Since union supporters would be (or feel) most vulnerable if the union lost, Cognetti's letter thus disclaimed management's most potent threat. 82 In considering whether to enforce a bargaining order in the absence of exceptional misconduct, courts may also consider whether the alleged violations involved acts or mere threats to act, see NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208, 214 (2d Cir.1980), as well as lapse of time, employee turnover and other significant factors. Windsor, 730 F.2d at 867. The ultimate analysis must focus on whether a bargaining order is appropriate under the conditions facing the Board at the time of its decision. J.L.M., 31 F.3d at 84. Our preference not to enforce a bargaining order in all but the most extreme of circumstances reflects the important policy that employees not have union representation forced upon them when, by exercise of their free will, they might choose otherwise. NLRB v. Marion Rohr Corp., 714 F.2d 228, 230 (2d Cir.1983). It needs saying that, in a union representation election, the NLRB has no vote. 83 In J.L.M.--a case in which an employee was actually terminated as a reprisal for union organizing--we rejected the Board's bargaining order largely because the Board had failed to consider such circumstances as the intervening lapse of time, and turnover in the unit. Kinney's hallmark violation was far less egregious than that committed by the employer in J.L.M., and Kinney's other alleged labor practices are trivial even in the aggregate. Moreover, the bargaining order in this case was entered without consideration of other circumstances that bear upon fairness: the turn-over in the unit (as to which no inquiry was apparently made) and the thin margin of the vote. In short, the NLRB has failed to convince us that a bargaining order is warranted.... See J.L.M., 31 F.3d at 85. 84 We decline to enforce the NLRB's July 12, 1994 bargaining order insofar as it is based upon the unfair labor practices committed by Kinney in connection with the November 1991 election. 85