Opinion ID: 1961252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the collective negotiation collective bargaining dichotomy.

Text: Plaintiffs argue that the terms collective negotiation and collective bargaining have the same connotation, and that disguising the latter in the cloak of the former in section 7 of Chapter 303, L. 1968, cannot change its legal effect. They point out that our 1968 Act grew out of the national experience in employer-employee relations in the private employment sector. In that sector collective bargaining became commonly accepted as signifying a process in which labor and management discussed terms and conditions of employment recognizing that the area is subject to bilateral control. And plaintiffs contend that section 7 undertakes to incorporate all of the substantial rights and privileges that are conferred on the private employer and employee by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. Particularly they call attention to the fact that section 7 gives public employees the right to form, join and assist any employee organization or to refrain from doing so; it provides for recognition of appropriate units of employees for purposes of organization; it excludes supervisory and managerial employees (with some exceptions) from such organizations; it authorizes designation or election of an exclusive bargaining agent by a majority of the employees in the unit; and it establishes such chosen representative as the sole negotiator with the employer respecting terms and conditions of employment, including grievances. The employer and the representative are directed to meet at reasonable times and negotiate in good faith concerning the matters just mentioned. And when agreement is reached it must be embodied in a writing and signed by the representative of the employer and the majority representative of the employees. Further the parties are mandated to negotiate written policies setting forth grievance procedures by means of which their employees or representatives of employees may appeal the interpretation, application or violation of policies, agreements, and administrative decisions affecting them, which shall be included in the written collective agreement mentioned above. The paragraph adds that [s]uch grievance procedures may provide for binding arbitration as a means for resolving disputes. Plaintiffs urge that these rights and duties and the results of their interplay come within the concept of collective bargaining as it is known on the national scene, and in fact is designated as such in the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157. From these premises they reason that by the 1968 Act our Legislature really created the type of relationship that operates on the national scene as collective bargaining. Since in the private employment sector nationally the term carries recognition of the right to strike if bargaining results in an impasse, they say we must construe the New Jersey Act as intending to authorize the same action for public employees. The argument seems to conclude on the note that the Act must fall because in totality the grant of exclusive agency to the majority representative coupled with the implied right to strike in public employment run counter to Article I, paragraph 19 of the Constitution. The logic of the plaintiffs' position is elusive. So far as the constitutionality of the grant of exclusive representation to the majority representative is concerned we have already disposed of that issue, and nothing has been said under this point to justify any retreat from the views expressed. The attempt to equate collective negotiating in section 7 with collective bargaining and its significance in the federal act is patently without merit. Aside from everything else it should not escape notice that the right to strike under the Labor Management Relations Act is not regarded as emanating from the provision for collective bargaining alone. Section 157 of that enactment (29 U.S.C.A. § 157) not only confers the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, but gives also the right to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection   . It was the sum of the language that cemented into the law the obvious Congressional intention to eliminate any doubt of the right of private employees to strike. See N.L.R.B. v. Peter C.K. Swiss Choc. Co., 130 F. 2d 503 (2 Cir.1942); and cf. Los Angeles Metro. Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 355 P. 2d 905 (1960). The New Jersey Legislature was aware of the possible implications of an authorization of collective bargaining in the statute it was about to enact. The Commission Report had scrupulously avoided using the term in making its recommendations. Instead it suggested that public employees be endowed with the right of collective negotiation, and it made no recommendation that the right to strike be given or recognized. Thus when the lawmakers authorized collective negotiation the choice of term was conscious and deliberate. In doing so, they clearly intended to avoid the problem experienced by the California Legislature when collective bargaining was authorized and thereafter construed by the Supreme Court to confer the right to strike. [6] See Los Angeles Metro. Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, supra ; Note, Collective Bargaining and the California Public Teacher, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 340, 350 (1969). Turning to the Report again, particularly to the section designated Basic Considerations, it said    the Commission's recommendations must give substance to the constitutional right of public employees to present `their grievances and proposals through representatives of their own choosing.' This significant phrase implies that public employees have substantial rights to collective representation and negotiation, although perhaps not the full right of collective bargaining accorded to persons in private employment. The critical distinction is in the right to strike, which is commonly regarded as an essential ingredient in free collective bargaining. Report, pp. 13-14. And the Commission went on to say that on balance [it] believes that neither the public employer nor the public employee has the right to withhold services as a form of coercion to induce settlement of disputes. Report, p. 14. Obviously it was a Legislature fully aware of the absence of the right to strike in the public employment sector that adopted L. 1968, c. 303. It did not grant the right expressly and every reasonable inference from the four corners of the Act demonstrates that it did not do so by implication. See Board of Ed., Borough of Union Beach v. N.J.E.A., supra, 53 N.J., at 46-48; Delaware River & Bay Auth. v. International Org., etc., supra, 45 N.J., at 147-148. Thus we see no substance to plaintiffs' claim that the broad scope of the 1968 Act envisions collective bargaining with all the implications the term carries in the private employment sector, including the right to strike. This conclusion also disposes of the contention based on the further unsound claim that since section 7 grants the right to strike it is unconstitutional because Article I, paragraph 19, bans strikes in public employment. In both the Union Beach and Delaware River & Bay Authority cases cited above we held that the Constitution is silent and neutral on the subject of such strikes, neither authorizing nor banning them. It is crystal clear that in using the term collective negotiations the Legislature intended to recognize inherent limitations on the bargaining power of public employer and employee. The reservation in section 7 of the Civil Service rights of the individual employee is a specific indication of that fact. The lawmakers were sensitive that Civil Service statutes in many areas provide for competitive employment examinations, eligible lists, fixed salary lists, for promotion, transfer, reinstatement and removal, and require all employees to be dealt with on the same basis. And undoubtedly they were conscious also that public agencies, departments, etc., cannot abdicate or bargain away their continuing legislative or executive obligations or discretion. Consequently, absent some further changes in pertinent statutes public employers may not be able to make binding contractual commitments relating to certain subjects. See Smith, supra, 67 Mich. L. Rev. at 904; Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments in Public Employee Bargaining, 67 Mich L. Rev. 919, 921-30 (1969); Wellington & Winter, supra, 78 Yale L.J at 1125-27; Note, Legality and Propriety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major and Minor Disputes in Public Employment, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 129 (1968); Annotation, Union organization and activities of public employees, 31 A.L.R. 2d 1142, 1170-1172 (1953); cf. Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A. 2d 482, 31 A.L.R. 2d 1133 (1951). In our judgment, therefore, the authorization for collective negotiations in the 1968 Act was designed to make known that there are salient differences between public and private employment relations which necessarily affect the characteristics of collective bargaining in the public sector. Finally, it signified an effort to make public employers and employees realize that the process of collective bargaining as understood in the private employment sector cannot be transplanted into the public service. Smith, supra, 67 Mich. L. Rev. at 896. No specific issue is before us now calling for decision or exposition of the specifics of collective negotiations, and we refrain from entering that field at this time. Obviously the Legislature envisioned a gradualistic approach with decisions both by PERC and the courts awaiting presentation of individual problems. We agree that in this untilled area expertise is distilled only from experience.