Opinion ID: 479187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Free Speech Rights of Elected Officials

Text: 14 Whether, in light of Finnegan, an elected union official may be removed from office for the exercise of free speech rights guaranteed by the LMRDA presents a question of first impression in this circuit. 3 We hold that, at a minimum, a retaliatory removal from elective office violates section 102 of the LMRDA when it occurs as a purposeful and deliberate attempt ... to suppress dissent within the union. See Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir.1973). 4 15 In Finnegan, the Court held that section 609 of the LMRDA protects an appointed union official only in his status as a member and not in his status as an officer. See Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 437-39, 102 S.Ct. at 1871-72. Similarly, the Court emphasized that section 101 of the LMRDA defines an individual's rights as a member of the union, and not his rights as a union officer or employee. Id. Thus, an individual may state a cause of action under section 101 only for those acts which violate his membership rights, and not for those which infringe upon whatever rights he may have acquired by virtue of his status as an officer or employee. 16 However, the Court also said that section 102 of the LMRDA, which protects [a ]ny person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed ..., 29 U.S.C. Sec. 412 (emphasis added), provides independent authority for a suit against a union based on an alleged violation of Title I of the Act. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 439, 102 S.Ct. at 1872. Thus, under certain circumstances, an official who alleges that union actions have infringed upon his Title I rights may state a cause of action under section 102. The question before us is whether Lynn's removal from his elected position infringed upon his Title I membership rights. 17 In this case, Lynn, as a member, clearly had the right under section 101(a)(1) to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings ..., 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411(a)(1), and also the right to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon ... any business properly before the meeting ..., section 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411(a)(2). See Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 437, 102 S.Ct. at 1871 (right to campaign for a candidate protected under section 101); Sullivan v. Laborers' International Union of North America, 707 F.2d 347, 350 (8th Cir.1983) (right to run for office protected by section 101). Thus, when Lynn attended the July 24, 1982 meeting to vote on Hawkins's proposed dues increase and spoke against it, even though he was an officer, he was exercising a membership right protected by section 101(a). 5 18 The next question which arises is whether Lynn's removal from office infringed upon his exercise of his Title I membership rights. In Finnegan, the Court said that the removal of the officials from office constituted only an indirect interference with their membership rights. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 440, 102 S.Ct. at 1872. Like the officials in Finnegan, Lynn did not suffer any direct infringement of his Title I rights; that is, he was not prevented from attending or speaking at the meeting which considered the dues increase. Rather, like the officials in Finnegan, he, too, was ultimately forced to choos[e] between [his] rights of free expression ... and [his] job[ ]. Id. (quoting Retail Clerks Union Local 648 v. Retail Clerks International Ass'n, 299 F.Supp. 1012, 1021 (D.D.C.1969)). 19 This fact is not dispositive, however, for the Finnegan Court neither defined the scope of a section 102 claim nor held that only a direct infringement of a Title I right was actionable. Further, it is evident that its decision in Finnegan was based on Congress's intent in enacting the LMRDA: ... [T]he Act's overriding objective was to ensure that unions would be democratically governed, and responsive to the will of the union membership as expressed in open, periodic elections. Id. at 441, 102 S.Ct. at 1873. Thus, as in Finnegan, permitting an elected president to select appointed administrators who reflect his views furthers the growth of union democracy. Id. 20 However, as the Court noted, the power to remove an official from office may also be used to suppress dissent, either through retaliation, id. (citing Schonfeld ), or through intimidation. The removal of an official under these circumstances can only impede the democratic governance of the union. Here, it is clear that Lynn's removal was precipitated by his outspoken opposition to the proposed dues increase, a position which also reflected the views of the majority of the union membership. 6 This is not a case involving a union patronage system; rather, it concerns an elected officer who is speaking not only for himself as a member, but also as a representative of those members who elected him. 7 We hold that, under these circumstances, Lynn alleged a cause of action under section 102.