Opinion ID: 1918027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proof of Criminal Acts.

Text: As their primary contention, the appellants claim that the record fails to establish facts which bring them within the  disorderly conduct statute. The appellants point to their quiet, passive, and nonviolent demeanor and contend that the holding of this case should be governed by recent United States supreme court cases in which breach-of-peace convictions were reversed because the defendants were publicly expressing their views under constitutional protections. Cox v. Louisiana (1965), 379 U. S. 536, 85 Sup. Ct. 453, 13 L. Ed. (2d) 471; Fields v. South Carolina (1963), 375 U. S. 44, 84 Sup. Ct. 149, 11 L. Ed. (2d) 107; Henry v. Rock Hill (1963), 375 U. S. 6, 84 Sup. Ct. 44, 11 L. Ed. (2d) 38; Edwards v. South Carolina (1963), 372 U. S. 229, 83 Sup. Ct. 680, 9 L. Ed. (2d) 697. Can it be said that the acts in the case at bar were protected because the defendants were validly exercising their constitutional rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition for the redress of grievances? The answer is No, and the reason is that such constitutional protections are not absolute. As the United States supreme court recently said in Cox v. Louisiana, supra, at page 554: The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy. The control of travel on the streets is a clear example of governmental responsibility to insure this necessary order. A restriction in that relation, designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, and not susceptible to abuses of discriminatory application, cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which, in other circumstances, would be entitled to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red light because this was thought to be a means of social protest. Nor could one, contrary to traffic regulations, insist upon a street meeting in the middle of Times Square at the rush hour as a form of freedom of speech or assembly. Governmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and available for movement. A group of demonstrators could  not insist upon the right to cordon off a street, or entrance to a public or private building, and allow no one to pass who did not agree to listen to their exhortations. A similar point of view was very recently expressed in Drews v. Maryland (1965), 381 U. S. 421, 85 Sup. Ct. 1576, 14 L. Ed. (2d) 693, in which a dissenting justice (Mr. Chief Justice WARREN, joined by Mr. Justice DOUGLAS) stated: In dissenting, I of course do not suggest that a civil rights demonstrator, or anybody else, has a right to block traffic, or bar access to a man's home or place of business. The Connecticut court faced a somewhat comparable problem in State v. Petty (1962), 24 Conn. Supp. 337, 190 Atl. (2d) 502. That case did not relate to the quarters of a public official, as do the cases at bar, but instead involved the waiting room of a real-estate firm. The Connecticut court noted that the defendants who had staged a sit-in demonstration in the waiting room were neither violent nor boisterous, but nevertheless the court concluded that the defendants created an offensive condition, and the demonstrators were adjudged guilty of disorderly conduct. The record in the instant case establishes that three of the defendants (Mr. Givens, Mrs. Weaver, and Mrs. Johnson) entered the waiting room of Mr. Grobschmidt's office and sat on the floor in that room, which was described as quite crowded. The record does not disclose the exact dimensions of the area in question. A photograph which was received into evidence is reproduced with this opinion. It suggests the confined quarters in which this sit-in was conducted. Although Mr. Grobschmidt testified that the presence of the protesters on the floor of his waiting room interfered with the usual activities of his office, we believe that the photograph establishes such fact with even greater force.   The right to demonstrate (even peaceably) in pursuance of our constitutional rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of grievances might be appropriate in one place and not in another. Picketing on a broad sidewalk is not comparable to a sit-in in the small confines of an office; a demonstration in an expansive public park is not comparable to a sit-in in the narrow corridor leading to a public official's office. Perhaps the facts just referred to sufficiently demonstrate that the sit-in in the instant cases met the requirements of the statute as to being disruptive of good order and tending to cause or provoke a disturbance. The majority of the members of the court, however, rely in affirming the judgments upon the further fact, in addition, that each defendant deliberately and knowingly violated commands of those in charge of the area. Those in authority over public buildings or particular areas therein must be accorded discretion to regulate conduct therein. Such regulation must be reasonably designed to preserve good order and facilitate the public uses for which the building was intended. Such regulation must not, of course, deprive anyone of his constitutional or other legal rights. Within these limits, new and temporary commands or requirements, such as limiting access to rooms ordinarily open, requiring people to stand so as to keep passageways open, and the like, may be appropriate to meet a particular set of circumstances as it emerges. In the instant cases, the limitation of access to room 214AA on the morning in question, and the requirement that people in the hallway keep moving or stand against the wall were not shown to be unreasonable. Such limitation and requirement did not violate the defendants' rights peaceably to assemble nor to petition for redress of grievances. There was evidence sufficient so that a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the requirements violated by each  defendant were made known to him, each was given a reasonable opportunity to comply, and each persisted in violation. In Feiner v. New York (1951), 340 U. S. 315, 320, 71 Sup. Ct. 303, 95 L. Ed. 295, the supreme court of the United States upheld a conviction for breach of the peace and considered as one of the important facts, among all the other circumstances, the refusal of the defendant, who was making a speech, to obey police requests to stop speaking. When an individual seeks to pursue his constitutionally protected rights, criminality is not to be assessed against him on a supersensitive standard. Thus, one who wishes to engage in his right to speak freely or to assemble with others for the purpose of protesting should not be prevented from pursuing such right merely because some hypercritical individual of delicate sensibilities is annoyed or discommoded. However, substantial intrusions which offend the normal sensibilities of average persons or which constitute significantly abusive or disturbing demeanor in the eyes of reasonable persons are cognizable under Wisconsin statute sec. 947.01 (1). In the cases at bar, the defendants' acts were deemed disorderly by two juries, and convictions were entered by two trial judges; this court also regards the defendants' acts as being abusive and tending to provoke a disturbance to the degree of being disorderly. We are satisfied from the record that guilt has been assessed on substantial grounds and not upon hypercritical or supersensitive grounds.