Opinion ID: 1399479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The LMRDA

Text: Hylla's claims arise under § 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA. This section, titled Freedom of Speech and Assembly, provides: Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). Section 102, in turn, provides a private right of action for violations of § 101(a)(2). Section 102 reads in relevant part: Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 412.
Although on its face § 101(a)(2) claims are limited to union members, the Supreme Court has recognized that in some instances union members who hold elected office  like Hylla  may pursue claims pertaining to their status as an officer under § 101(a)(2). Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 354-55, 109 S.Ct. 639, 102 L.Ed.2d 700 (1989). Specifically, the Court has reasoned that [w]hether ... interference with Title I rights gives rise to a cause of action under § 102 must be judged by reference to the LMRDA's basic objective: to ensure that unions are democratically governed, and responsive to the will of the union membership as expressed in open, periodic elections. Id. at 354, 109 S.Ct. 639 (quotation, alteration omitted). In Lynn, this basic objective cut in favor of recognizing a cause of action, because [s]eeing Lynn removed from his post just five days after he led the fight to defeat yet another dues increase proposal, other members of the [union] may well have concluded that one challenged the union's hierarchy, if at all, at one's peril. This is precisely what Congress sought to prevent when it passed the LMRDA. It recognized that democracy would be assured only if union members are free to discuss union policies and criticize the leadership without fear of reprisal. Id. at 355, 109 S.Ct. 639 (footnote, quotation omitted). The Court also observed that Lynn himself, who was also a union member, paid a price for the exercise of his membership rights when he was discharged from his elected position as a business representative of the union in retaliation for his outspoken speech against a dues increase. Id. at 354, 109 S.Ct. 639. Both the rights of other union members to elect Lynn as their business representative and Lynn's free speech rights as a union member to campaign against the dues increase were chilled by the decision of the union president to discharge Lynn. The Court considered both sets of rights in the balancing analysis to determine whether Lynn's discharge was so undemocratic as to violate Lynn's § 101(a)(2) rights. The circumstances in Lynn may be contrasted with Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982), where there was no countervailing democratic interest to weigh against the decision of a newly elected union officer to replace previously appointed union officials with his own staff. In Lynn, however, the Court determined that on balance, § 101(a)(2) was violated when Lynn was discharged. Here, Hylla was an elected official, suggesting some similarity to Lynn. But, Hylla's discharge was not as a result of his representing the democratic will of the union membership. Rather, it was the result of his speech and conduct in protest of what he perceived to be a personal affront against him. We must therefore decide whether Hylla's discharge under such circumstances chilled or threatened any union democratic values protected by § 101(a)(2). In analyzing this question, we draw some guidance by analogy from the Supreme Court's observation that § 101(a)(2) was patterned after the First Amendment. Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S.Ct. 621, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989). [3] However, as the Court observed, the rights under § 101(a)(2) are subject to reasonable union rules that may restrict such rights, and thus, § 101(a)(2) is not strictly parallel with the First Amendment even though § 101(a)(2) was patterned after it. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982) (asserting Congress modeled Title I [of the LMRDA] after the Bill of Rights, and... the legislators intended § 101(a)(2) to restate a principal First Amendment value  the right to speak one's mind without fear of reprisal). In the First Amendment context, when deciding whether a public employee's speech is protected, [t]he threshold question... is whether the employee's speech may be `fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern...' Wingate v. Gage County Sch. Dist., 528 F.3d 1074, 1081 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983)). [W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684. However, when a government employee speaks `as a citizen'  that is, outside the scope of employment  on `matters of public concern,' the First Amendment offers protection if the speech survives the Pickering balancing test.... McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, Dist. # 2, 471 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir.2006) (referring to Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)). Similar criteria must be applied in the LMRDA context as well. Namely, instead of the First Amendment inquiry that asks whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the threshold inquiry in the LMRDA context is whether the speech at issue may be fairly characterized as a matter of union concern. And like in the First Amendment context, speech that involves entirely personal interests is not, absent the most unusual circumstances, a matter of union concern. See, e.g., Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8, 14 (1st Cir.1981) (asserting, [i]n drawing the `fine line' between insubordination and freedom of speech in `removal from union position' cases, we must balance plaintiffs' interest in free speech and expression against whatever legitimate union concerns may warrant limitations upon those activities (citation omitted)). As such, we agree with the district court that § 101(a)(2) protection is limited to speech that relates to the general interests of the union membership at large. In addition to § 101(a)(2)'s relation to the First Amendment, our disposition of this issue is bolstered by the Supreme Court's observation in Lynn that Title I of the LMRDA was founded on Congress' desire to protect the democratic governance of unions. Because a union's democratic governance will not be undermined by speech that is entirely personal, it is appropriate that no cause of action would arise for such expression. Thus, as this court has previously recognized, § 101(a)(2) protects labor organization members' reasonable rights of assembly and speech relating to their labor organization .... Marshall v. Local Union No. 6, Brewers & Maltsters and Gen. Labor Dep'ts, 960 F.2d 1360, 1365-66 (8th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). It does not, however, go beyond what would be provided for under the First Amendment, to protect speech that is of an entirely personal interest. In arguing that § 101(a)(2) protection is not so limited, Hylla chiefly relies on Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963). Salzhandler involved a case in which the plaintiff, who was an elected financial secretary of a union, accused union officers of embezzlement and distributed a flier to the union membership describing the officers as thieves, scabs, robbers, scabby bosses, bums, pimps, f-bums, (and) jailbirds. Id. at 447. In response to this conduct, which the union leadership contended was libelous, the plaintiff was removed from his position and prohibited from participating in the affairs of the union for five years. The plaintiff sued, asserting that his conduct was protected under Title I of the LMRDA. The Second Circuit agreed. Id. at 449-51. To the extent that Hylla argues that Salzhandler stands for the notion that § 101(a)(2) protects speech that is not a matter of union concern, he is mistaken. The speech in Salzhandler was clearly related to the general interests of the union. Namely, it involved allegations that union funds were being misappropriated, a matter about which the general union membership would no doubt have an interest. Hylla's reliance on Turner v. Air Transport Lodge 1894 of International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 590 F.2d 409 (2d Cir.1978), Stachan v. Weber, 535 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.1976), and Williams v. United Steel Workers of America, 234 F.Supp.2d 542 (M.D.N.C. 2002), is similarly misplaced. The conduct that gave rise to the § 101(a)(2) claims in each of these cases did not involve matters of an entirely personal nature, but instead, concerned matters that implicated the interests of the union as a whole. Specifically, Turner involved the espousal of communist ideas during a campaign for union office in violation of an express union constitutional provision that made it misconduct by a member to advocate communism or any other totalitarian philosophy. Stachan, meanwhile, involved speech concerning a general union policy that required a flag salute and the recitation of the pledge of allegiance during each union meeting. Finally, Williams involved speech about the Confederate flag by a local union leader when there was in fact a general Confederate flag controversy swirling about the plaintiff's workplace and that had led to turmoil in the union's governance. Although the court in Williams held that the speech was protected by § 101(a)(2), it was so disruptive to the functioning of the union that it was properly regulated under the proviso allowing unions to establish reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligation.
Having determined that § 101(a)(2) is limited to speech concerning matters of union concern, we must next determine whether Hylla's conduct was so related. In the First Amendment context, [w]hether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684. As this court has observed in McGee, when a government employee speaks `as an employee upon matters only of personal interest,' such as many personnel matters, the First Amendment does not offer protection. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708. On the other hand, when a government employee speaks `as a citizen'  that is, outside the scope of employment  on `matters of public concern,' the First Amendment offers protection if the speech survives the Pickering balancing test.... 471 F.3d at 920. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006), the Supreme Court further clarified Connick by holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. Applying these notions to the LMRDA context, it is clear that when a union member or elected officer speaks out about matters that relate solely to that individual's interest, § 101(a)(2) protection does not arise. [4] In this case, there were two incidents for which Hylla was allegedly disciplined: (1) his use of profanity towards Swanson, and (2) his alleged threat towards Gilbertson. We conclude that Hylla's conduct in neither instance involved a matter of union concern, but instead was solely focused on Hylla's personal interests. When Hylla remarked well, fuck you to Swanson, he was agitated that he was being singled out by Swanson's decision to record workplace attendance. Thus, almost by its very terms, Hylla's remark did not relate to the general interests of the union membership, but rather related to a concern about his unique situation. This is not the type of speech that § 101(a)(2) was designed to protect. Hylla's remark had little connection to any general union interest and instead may be more readily understood as individual insubordination. At best, the speech was directed at a particular administrative policy  that according to Hylla's own pleadings was adopted in order to single out a particular officer  rather than anything concerning the governance of the union generally. Hylla's conduct towards Gilbertson was of a similarly personal nature. Even if it is assumed, as Hylla argues, that his conduct was non-threatening, the conduct did not implicate the general interests of the union. Gilbertson was a clerical employee who had no control over the attendance policy and was acting at the direction of Swanson. Under such circumstances, no matter of general union interest was involved in Hylla's confrontation with Gilbertson. Nevertheless, in arguing that his conduct did implicate the general interests of the union, Hylla contends that [n]ot only was [he] complaining about being singled out, he was complaining that Swanson, [Tom] Truhler and Gilbertson and the office as a whole were not keeping accurate track of his time. (Emphasis added.) By its very terms, however, this argument demonstrates the personal nature of Hylla's conduct. Hylla's remarks did not relate to anything that involved the interests of the union generally, but instead were personal grievances about the way he was being treated. Just as such speech would not be protected in the First Amendment context, Congress did not intend for such speech to be protected under Title I of the LMRDA. Hylla, however, counters that because the System Board's policies impacted his performance as an elected union officer, the general interests of the union membership were implicated when he complained about these policies directed against him. Although in a very remote sense this may be true, it does not serve to convert [Hylla's] personal grievances into a matter of [union] concern. Crain v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of Metro. Police Dep't of St. Louis, 920 F.2d 1402, 1411 (8th Cir.1990). As this court observed in Crain, where it was argued that what were purely personal grievances were a matter of public concern because they impacted the griever's family, [a]ny management decision, e.g., the size of a salary increase or the number of company holidays, affects the employees and their families; this is decidedly not the proper test for determining what speech implicates a matter of public concern. Id. Similarly, any nuance in Hylla's working conditions, whether it be his parking space or office temperature, could potentially affect his performance as an elected union officer. To say that such concerns implicate the general interests of the union, however, would swallow the rule. In every case, if we were to go down the rabbit's hole far enough, it would be hyperbolized that the general interests of the union  or for that matter the public  would be implicated. As such, we reject Hylla's argument. To better illustrate why Hylla's argument fails, it is helpful to juxtapose Hylla's conduct with that which the Court found to create a cause of action under § 102 in Lynn. In Lynn, an elected union officer spoke in opposition to a proposed dues increase pursued by other members of the union leadership. 488 U.S. at 349-50, 109 S.Ct. 639. After the proposed dues increase was defeated by a vote of the union membership, the elected officer was notified that he was being removed `indefinitely' from his [elected] position... specifically because of his outspoken opposition to the dues increase. Id. at 350, 109 S.Ct. 639. Because the elected officer's dismissal was specifically predicated upon his outspokenness regarding a matter of union governance, it was clear that his § 101(a)(2) rights had been violated and that a chilling effect may arise that would harm the union's democratic governance. Clearly in contrast to Lynn, the concerns raised by Hylla do not beget any such issues. At the core, Hylla was removed because of his individualized insubordination. There was no union interest in allowing Hylla to conduct himself as he did. His dispute is purely personal in nature. It does not implicate union interests nor did his termination threaten to chill TCIU's democratic governance. As such, Hylla's claim that he was terminated for such conduct is not protected under § 101(a)(2) and therefore the courts lack jurisdiction of the claims under § 102 of the LMRDA.