Opinion ID: 1907814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The Balancing Test in General

Text: This case demonstrates the importance of the balancing of probative value against the potential for unfair prejudice that trial judges must perform whenever relevant evidence poses a danger of unfair prejudice. When the Drew rule applies but the proffered evidence falls within one of its exceptions, just as in this case of direct proof not subject to Drew, the trial court must weigh the apparent probative value of the evidence against the unfairly prejudicial effect that it is likely to have, and thereby determine whether to admit it. In close cases, at least, that determination may be controlled by whether (1) admission is appropriate only where probative value exceeds prejudicial impact or, conversely, (2) admission should be permitted unless prejudicial impact exceeds (or substantially exceeds) probative value. The difference is not merely semantic, as it may spell the difference between admission and exclusion; indeed, the choice we make says much about our system's confidence in juries and hence its receptivity to evidence that is conceded to be relevant. Cf. Winfield, supra, 676 A.2d at 7. In cases where Drew is applicable, we have stated the rule both ways. See, e.g., Campbell, supra, 450 A.2d at 430; Jones v. United States, 477 A.2d 231, 237 (D.C.1984). In cases not subject to Drew, there has also been a lack of consistency. [12] We think it important that the rule be stated clearly. Therefore, we take this opportunity to clarify that, regarding the admission of evidence generally, this jurisdiction will follow the policy set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 403  evidence [otherwise relevant] may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . ., [13] and will apply that policy in the other crimes context as well. We will discuss briefly the considerations that have led us to these conclusions. Several of our opinions have cited FRE 403 as authoritative. See, e.g., Reed v. United States, 584 A.2d 585, 591 (D.C.1990); Lampkins v. United States, 401 A.2d 966, 970 & n. 9 (D.C.1979). Thus, a treatise could state that FRE 403 is consistent with practice in the District of Columbia. STEFFEN GRAAE & BRIAN FITZPATRICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA iv-12 (1995); see also Report of the Committee on Court Rules of Division IV of the District of Columbia Bar Proposing Rules of Evidence for the Superior Court Based on the Federal Rules of Evidence, Comment to Rule 403 (Feb. 2, 1984). Most significantly, however, this court relied upon Rule 403 in affirming a trial court ruling excluding certain evidence because its probative value . . . was substantially outweighed by danger of [prejudice]. Reed, supra, 584 A.2d at 591. While in Reed the trial court apparently had not expressed the outcome of its consideration of the proposed evidence in those terms, this court inferred from the trial court's explanation of its ruling that it had found that prejudice substantially outweighed probative value. Id. at 587 n. 1, 591. Because we announce that we will follow FRE 403, we should take note of its requirement that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweigh probative value before relevant evidence may be excluded. While the commentary to the Federal Rules of Evidence and the legislative history of the rules are quite extensive, they do not discuss why the word substantially was used. See GREGORY JOSEPH & STEPHEN SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA  THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES § 13.3 at 5 (1987). The substantially outweighs approach is apparently the product of the general federal policy promoting the admission of as much relevant evidence as reasonably possible. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688-89, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1500-01, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); JACK WEINSTEIN, MARGARET BERGER & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE (WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE), Preface at xvi (1995 ed.); CLIFFORD FISHMAN, 2 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 11:10 (7th ed.1994); see also Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190, 195 (D.C.1979) (en banc). Federal Rule of Evidence 403, or at least its requirement that the danger of unfair or undue prejudice substantially outweigh probative value, has been adopted by at least forty of the states. [14] Only Alaska, which otherwise wholly adopted FRE 403, chose not to include the qualifier substantially. [15] While it has been suggested that the import of adding the word substantially may not be great, [16] it is reasonable to anticipate that trial judges will exercise their discretion to admit such evidence in some instances in which they otherwise might not do so. Cf. Allen v. United States, 603 A.2d 1219, 1224 (D.C.) (en banc), cert. denied 505 U.S. 1227, 112 S.Ct. 3050, 120 L.Ed.2d 916 (1992) (Probative evidence should not be excluded because of crabbed notions of relevance or excessive mistrust of juries.) (quoting Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 698 (7th Cir. 1987)). Having considered the matter, we have determined to use the formulation set forth in FRE 403, including the word substantially, in connection with the admission of evidence generally when it is challenged as unfairly prejudicial. Our doing so will further the policy of admitting as much relevant evidence as it is reasonable and fair to include, and will also gain for this jurisdiction the advantage that uniformity with the federal rule and the vast majority of state rules affords for interpretation and application. We conclude that we should also follow that same policy regarding evidence that is subject to a Drew analysis but qualifies for admission under any of the exceptions to Drew. We recognize that the prevailing view at common law was that the proponent of such evidence had the burden of persuading the trial judge that on balance the probative value outweighed unfair prejudice. See IMWINKELREID, supra, § 8:27. Since the adoption of FRE 403 and FRE 404(b), [17] however, the balancing procedure in federal courts has evolved. The Supreme Court settled the question decisively for federal courts in Huddleston, supra, 485 U.S. at 681, 108 S.Ct. at 1406-97, when it used the FRE 403 requirement that probative value be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice in its analysis of an issue arising under FRE 404(b) involving other crimes. Id. at 687, 691, 108 S.Ct. at 1500, 1502; [18] see JOHN STRONG, I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 811 (4th ed.1992). In summary on this point, then: if other crimes evidence is offered to prove propensity to commit an offense, it is inadmissible. If other crimes evidence subject to a Drew analysis is offered, it may be admitted only if it qualifies for an exception to the Drew rule restricting its use. We reiterate that, when evidence is correctly analyzed as coming within Drew's purview, the prosecutor has the burden of showing that the evidence falls within one or more of the recognized exceptions. Thompson, supra, 546 A.2d at 424 n. 18. Furthermore, we do not consider here, and therefore leave intact, the requirement that evidence that defendant committed the other crime in question must be established preliminarily by clear and convincing evidence. See note 18, supra. Even if the evidence so qualifies, the trial judge should [19] still exclude it if the danger of unfair prejudice that it poses substantially outweighs its probative value. In identifying the preferable approach to the admission of such evidence under FRE 403, we are in accord with the following statement by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: The government must carry the burden of showing how the proffered [other crimes] evidence is relevant to one or more issues in the case, and must demonstrate that, on balance, its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Conners, 825 F.2d 1384, 1390 (9th Cir.1987) (citation omitted). On the other hand, if relevant evidence could theoretically support additional charges but is not subject to Drew analysis because the other crimes are not independent of the crime charged and the evidence is direct proof of the crime charged, it must surmount only the final hurdle that all evidence of whatever sort must clear, i.e., the evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice it poses. In all instances, the proponent of the evidence must satisfy the court that it should be admitted.