Opinion ID: 734877
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: failure to move to sever the robbery and car-theft charges

Text: 20 Palmer argues that his counsel was ineffective in not moving to sever the robbery and car-theft charges. California allows offenses of the same class to be joined. Cal.Penal Code § 954. California has a strong legislative policy in favor of joinder of charges unless there is prejudice. People v. Gomez, 24 Cal.App.4th 22, 28 (Cal.Ct.App.1994). Under California law, a motion to sever properly joined offenses may be granted if 21 (1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a 'weak' case has been joined with a 'strong' case ... so that the 'spillover' effect of aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome. 22 Franks v. Superior Ct., 770 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Cal.1989) (citations omitted). In reviewing Palmer's federal habeas petition, the magistrate found that robbery and the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, both involving theft, are the same class of offense. Palmer does not contest this finding, but argues that the trial court could have granted a motion to sever because the robbery charge was weaker than the car theft charge and the potential prejudicial effect of joint trial would have justified severance. 23 However, neither crime was of a particularly inflammatory nature. See People v. Daly, 8 Cal.App.4th 47, 56 (Cal.Ct.App.1992) (joining robbery, kidnapping, and attempted murder was not inflammatory). Evidence that Palmer and his female codefendant knew each other and were together in the early-morning hours on consecutive nights would have been cross-admissible to corroborate the eyewitness identifications and to show identity. 3 See People v. Garceau, 862 P.2d 664, 697 (Cal.1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 144 (1994). Finally, the car-theft case was not significantly stronger than the robbery case against Palmer, considering the robbery victim's identifications of Palmer. 24 Palmer's trial counsel has explained that he did not make a motion to sever because it would have a snowball's chance in hell of prevailing and would border upon being a spurious motion. Counsel did not deliver a deficient performance by failing to make a meritless motion to sever. See Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir.1982) ([F]ailure to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.); People v. Mattson, 789 P.2d 983, 1017 (Cal.) (habeas petitioner must show motion would have been meritorious to establish ineffective assistance claim), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1017 (1990). 25 Furthermore, even if counsel's failure to move for severance fell below the standard of reasonable professional representation, Palmer was not prejudiced by that failure. The trial court instructed the jury that it must find that the People had proven beyond a reasonable doubt each element of each separate offense. The trial court also instructed the jury that [y]ou must decide separately whether each of the defendants is guilty or not guilty as to each count. Palmer has presented no evidence that the jury disregarded these instructions; he therefore has failed to show a reasonable probability that a motion to sever would have led to a different trial result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694.