Opinion ID: 586964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Moeller

Text: 16 Moeller asserts error in the district court's finding that his First Amendment rights to free speech and association had not been infringed. The practice of patronage dismissals clearly infringes First Amendment interests unless dismissals are limited to employees in policymaking positions. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360, 367, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2683, 2686, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 1294, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). Moeller does not dispute the district court's finding that he was in a policymaking position. He argues, rather, that he is protected from termination by a Nebraska statute which provides that no employee of the state ... shall be prohibited from participating in political activities. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 20-160 (Reissue 1987). This is purely a question of state law. Accordingly, we find that we lack jurisdiction to answer the question. 17 The issue was raised by Moeller in district court but was not addressed by the district court. We presume that the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim. 18 [I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 19 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (West Supp.1991). A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if:(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 20 (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 21 (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or 22 (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 23 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (West Supp.1991). The present action clearly fits within subsection (c)(3) above. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the issue.