Opinion ID: 6498740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Crossover Collateral Estoppel

Text: ¶ 26. Collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion, “bars a party from relitigating an issue decided in a previous action.” State v. Pollander, 167 Vt. 301, 304, 706 A.2d 1359, 1361 (1997) (quotation omitted). “The underlying goal of . . . collateral estoppel[] is to promote judicial economy and finality in litigation.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Blount, 491 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). We articulated the factors courts should use to analyze collateral estoppel in Trepanier. 155 Vt. 259, 583 A.2d 583. Collateral estoppel will bar the subsequent litigation of an issue when the following factors are met: (1) preclusion is asserted against one who was a party or in privity with a party in the earlier action; (2) the issue was resolved by a final judgment on the merits; (3) the issue is the same as the one raised in the later action; (4) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action; and (5) applying preclusion in the later action is fair. Id. at 265, 583 A.2d at 588 (citing Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892 (Ca. 1942)). “The party opposing application of collateral estoppel has the burden of showing that it is appropriate to relitigate an issue.” In re P.J., 2009 VT 5, ¶ 13. ¶ 27. This Court has previously addressed the issue of crossover estoppel—the situation where an issue litigated in a civil action bars the relitigation of the same issue in a subsequent criminal action. See, e.g., State v. Stearns, 159 Vt. 266, 272, 617 A.2d 140, 143 (1992) (holding that State was not precluded from introducing evidence in subsequent DUI trial after being prevented from introducing same evidence in less formal administrative-suspension proceeding); see also State v. Brunet, 174 Vt. 135, 143, 806 A.2d 1007, 1013 (2002) (holding that State was not precluded from prosecuting defendant following probation-revocation proceedings decided adversely to State). In both Stearns and Brunet, we held that collateral estoppel did not apply against the State in subsequent criminal actions where the earlier civil proceedings had more relaxed evidentiary and procedural requirements. 11 ¶ 28. In State v. Pollander, we addressed the question of whether an acquittal in a jury trial precluded the State from relitigating the same issue in a subsequent civil action. 167 Vt. 301, 706 A.2d 1359. We held that the State’s failure to prove at trial that the defendant’s BAC was 0.08% did not preclude the State from relitigating the same issue in a subsequent civil-suspension hearing. Id. at 306-07, 706 A.2d at 1362. We reasoned that collateral estoppel was not appropriate under those circumstances because “what cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt may still be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 306, 706 A.2d at 1362. However, we have never addressed the situation we are presented with here: whether a guilty plea in a criminal prosecution has preclusive effect in subsequent civil actions. We address this question first.