Opinion ID: 526161
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qualified immunity inquiry in a First Amendment context.

Text: 102 Determining whether a public employee has been discharged in violation of his First Amendment rights requires a case-by-case analysis: initially to determine if the speech was on a matter of public concern, and, secondly, to determine how the balancing of competing interests should be resolved in light of particular facts. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). We must now determine how the individualized nature of this inquiry can be reconciled with Harlow 's requirement that the law be clearly established before qualified immunity can be defeated. 103 The Fifth Circuit recently addressed this issue in Noyola v. Texas Department of Human Resources, 846 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.1988). In Noyola, a former employee of the Texas Department of Human Resources sued officials of the Department, claiming that he was fired for exercising his First Amendment right of freedom of speech. The Fifth Circuit held that the speech at issue was not protected. Even assuming arguendo that it was protected, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because the balancing process required by this type of case showed that neither the 'contours' of [the employee's] rights were so clearly outlined nor was the 'unlawfulness' of terminating [him] so 'apparent' that [the officials] should forfeit their qualified immunity. Id. at 1026 (citing Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3039). 104 The Seventh Circuit has also recognized that: 105 [T]here is one type of constitutional rule, namely that involving the balancing of competing interests, for which the standard may be clearly established, but its application is so fact dependent that the law can rarely be considered clearly established. ... With Harlow 's elimination of the inquiry into the actual motivations of the official, qualified immunity typically casts a wide net to protect government officials from damage liability whenever balancing is required. 106 Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986) (footnote omitted) (cited with approval in Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1213). In Rakovich, the complainant sued a police chief and police officers under section 1983 claiming that they had launched an investigation of him in retaliation for comments protected by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff had not shown that defendants retaliated against him for his protected speech. The court alternatively concluded that the officials had qualified immunity for conduct which, at the time of the alleged violation, did not violate clearly established law. 107 In Roth v. Veteran's Administration, 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.1988), the Ninth Circuit rejected the Benson analysis on which Rakovich relied. Roth involved a suit by a physician and former employee of the Veteran's Administration medical center in San Francisco. Plaintiff sued his former superiors in their individual capacities, charging that they fired him in retaliation for his activities as a whistleblower in exposing wastefulness, mismanagement, unethical conduct, violations of regulations, and incompetence.... Id. at 1403. 34 108 The Ninth Circuit held that Roth's speech was on a matter of public concern, 856 F.2d at 1406, and that factual disputes concerning the disruptive nature of Roth's statements precluded summary disposition. Defendants relied on the rationale of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Benson in arguing their entitlement to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument stating: 109 If we accepted defendants' argument for a broader reading of Benson, we essentially would be holding that public employees can never maintain [an] action alleging retaliation for exercise of their first amendment rights because adjudicating these claims requires particularized balancing. We decline to adopt a rule that would effectively eviscerate whistleblower protection for public employees. 110 Id. The court noted that it and others had found the law to be established with sufficient clarity to deny defendants the protection of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage in cases comparable to Roth's. Id. at 1408. 111 We understand the concerns which prompted the Ninth Circuit's determination not to give Benson a broader reading. These cases illustrate how difficult it is to apply Harlow in the setting of Pickering balancing. A simple black letter rule is not possible. What is clear is that Harlow places the presumption in favor of immunity for public officials acting in their individual capacities. 35 Harlow is intended as a shield against liability but cannot become an insuperable barrier; therefore, public officials lose immunity in the face of clearly established law. However, because a rule of law determined by a balancing of interests is inevitably difficult to clearly anticipate, it follows that where Pickering balancing is required, the law is less likely to be well established than in other cases. We believe that except for case-by-case analysis and application, the rule cannot be better stated than in Harlow itself with careful consideration of its underlying principles. 112 In some circumstances, the fact-specific nature of the Pickering balancing may preclude a determination of clearly established law, thereby giving rise to qualified immunity under Harlow. This is most likely to occur in situations where supervisors, in a reasonable and good-faith exercise of their duties, discipline employees without the direction that would come through analogous cases. 36 We believe that the approach we adopt gives proper consideration to the concerns which prompted the Supreme Court to recognize qualified immunity, while it protects individuals from unprincipled behavior by a public employee's supervisors acting under color of law. 113 We now turn to the application of those principles to the facts before us. Qualified immunity analysis requires the court to consider the operation of the rule in the context of 'the circumstances with which [the official] was confronted.'  Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79, 85 (2d Cir.1988) (quoting Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3039). 37 Consequently, our inquiry is: At the time these events took place, was the protected nature of Mr. Melton's speech sufficiently clear that defendants should have been reasonably on notice that the City's interest in its disciplinary rule would not survive a balancing inquiry? 114 This case presents an extremely close question as to whether the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants should have been clearly on notice that Mr. Melton's trial testimony constituted protected speech under the First Amendment. See Smith v. Hightower, 693 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.1982). In our mind, a reasonable official would have been on notice that the City's interest in the effective and efficient functioning of its enterprise cannot outweigh an employee's right (and a citizen's duty) to testify truthfully at trial. See Reeves v. Claiborne County Bd. of Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir.1987) (To allow a government employer to retaliate ... against an employee's unfavorable trial testimony would undermine the ability of the witness to speak truthfully without fear of reprisal.) Therefore, under Harlow no immunity could exist for retaliatory action based on Mr. Melton's trial testimony. 115 We conclude, however, that defendants do enjoy qualified immunity to the extent that their liability is predicated on their recommendation of dismissal for Mr. Melton's communications with defense counsel. We have concluded that under Pickering the balance to be struck between the City's interest in smooth intergovernmental relations is outweighed by Mr. Melton's interest in speaking to defense counsel. However, the balancing of these competing interests would not have been so clear to a reasonable official under these circumstances that we can say it constituted clearly established law under Harlow. We cannot expect individual defendants to have understood at the time of Mr. Melton's discharge that it was unconstitutional to fire Mr. Melton for his communications with Mr. Page's counsel, particularly in view of their belief that this discussion constituted a breach of confidentiality. 116 We have ordered a new trial on Mr. Melton's claim that his trial testimony was a substantial or motivating factor in his dismissal from the Oklahoma City Police Department. If on retrial the jury so finds, the individual defendants will not be shielded by Harlow from personal liability for any damages which may be awarded on that basis. Because Harlow immunity shields the individual defendants from the alternative basis of First Amendment liability (Mr. Melton's communications with defense counsel), no purpose would be served by a retrial on that basis since damages could not be collected. 117