Opinion ID: 6321798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Investigator’s Statements

Text: The defendant next argues that the trial court erred when, during the State’s re-direct examination of the lead investigator, it admitted testimony about interviews the investigator conducted during the investigation. On direct examination, the State asked the investigator questions about his investigation, and on cross-examination, defense counsel attacked his investigation by establishing that the investigator did not swab the grandmother’s hands or search her home, and that the investigator did not personally search her or three other individuals. On re-direct examination, the State inquired as follows: Q Defense counsel asked you about [four individuals]. Remember that? A Yes. Q Were the people they were with on November 27th interviewed? A Yes, they were. Q To account for their whereabouts? A Yes. Defense counsel objected and moved to strike the investigator’s responses, arguing that they were inadmissible hearsay. The court overruled the objection and admitted the testimony, reasoning that it was admissible non-hearsay because no statement had been elicited. The defendant argues on appeal that the testimony was hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. 7 We do not reach the merits of the defendant’s hearsay argument because we agree with the State that, even if the trial court erred when it admitted the investigator’s statements, any error was harmless. As described above, the State presented overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The investigator’s responses could arguably have informed the jury that nontestifying declarants had vouched for the whereabouts of the four named individuals. However, even if the investigator’s responses did suggest to the jury that none of the four named individuals were at the apartment when the victim was injured, the defendant’s repeated statements that he was alone with the victim in the apartment provided substantial evidence of that fact. See id. at 592. Because the challenged testimony was cumulative and inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt, we hold that the trial court’s error, if any, was harmless. See id. at 588-89. C. False-Exculpatory-Statement Jury Instruction We turn now to the defendant’s third claim of error. The defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request to broaden the false-exculpatory-statement jury instruction to encompass individuals other than the defendant. At trial, the State requested that the court provide the jury with a falseexculpatory-statement instruction. Such instructions permit the jury to infer consciousness of guilt from evidence that the defendant had made a false statement in order to demonstrate his innocence. See Evans, 150 N.H. at 420. The defendant objected to the State’s requested instruction, and proposed a different version of the false-exculpatory-statement instruction that would apply not only to him, but also to other witnesses — specifically, one of the defendant’s friends and the grandmother. The court overruled the defendant’s objection and gave the following instruction: [I]f you find that the [d]efendant intentionally made a statement or statements tending to demonstrate his innocence, and the statement or statements were later discovered to be false, then you may consider whether the statements show a consciousness of guilt and determine what significance, if any, to give to such evidence. It is your decision as jurors as to whether false exculpatory statements, if made, constituted or indicate consciousness of guilt or nothing at all. On appeal, the defendant does not challenge whether giving a falseexculpatory-statement jury instruction was itself permissible; rather, he argues that the trial court erred when it failed to give his version of the instruction. 8 We have twice before rejected arguments similar to the defendant’s argument in this case. See State v. Bruneau, 131 N.H. 104, 116-18 (1988); Evans, 150 N.H. at 422. In both Bruneau and Evans, we held that the defendants in those cases were not entitled to instructions about the false exculpatory statements of other witnesses because “a factual argument that tend[s] to indicate someone else [is] guilty” constitutes a “theory of the case,” not a “theory of defense.” Bruneau, 131 N.H. at 117, 118; Evans, 150 N.H. at 422. Whereas “[a] requested charge on a party’s theory of defense must be given if such theory is supported by some evidence,” State v. Aubert, 120 N.H. 634, 635 (1980) (emphasis added), whether to instruct the jury about the defendant’s theory of the case “is an issue reserved to the trial court’s sound discretion.” Evans, 150 N.H. at 422. The defendant acknowledges that his requested instruction pertained only to a theory of the case, not a theory of defense. However, he asks us to revisit Bruneau and its progeny and reject the distinction between theories of defense and theories of the case. We decline to do so. See id. (reaffirming the distinction between theories of defense and theories of the case). “We assume, without deciding, that it may be appropriate in some instances for the jury to be instructed on the false exculpatory statements of others,” id. at 422. However, like the defendant in Evans, the defendant here has not demonstrated that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion by failing to give the instruction. See id. at 422-24. Whether an instruction is necessary in a particular case is an issue reserved to the trial court’s sound discretion. Id. at 422. “We review the denial of a proposed instruction in the context of the entire charge and all evidence presented at trial, reversing only if the instructions did not adequately state the relevant law.” Id. The trial court’s decision not to expand the false-exculpatory-statement instruction was a sustainable exercise of discretion. All of the factors that supported our decision in Evans are present here. The defendant had “ample opportunity to present his theory and the jury was free to consider it.” Id. at 424 (quotation omitted). The defendant’s attorneys vigorously argued in their opening and closing remarks that either the grandmother or the defendant’s friend murdered the victim and, during trial, defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine both individuals. Additionally, as in Evans, the court’s other jury instructions included “extensive information to help the jury evaluate witness credibility.” Id. Indeed, the jury in this case was given an instruction — the same instruction that the jury in Evans was given — that outlined “various factors for the jury to consider” when evaluating witness credibility. Id. Therefore, viewing the jury instructions as a whole, we cannot conclude that the jury was incapable of evaluating the defendant’s theory of the case absent a false-exculpatory-statement instruction that pertained to individuals other than him. See id. 9