Opinion ID: 71998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pierce's Additional Mitigating Evidence

Text: Pierce contends that additional mitigating evidence that he presented at sentencing and raised in his state habeas application and federal habeas petition, but that the district court did not discuss in its Penry analysis, provides further support for the district court's conclusion. [2] Pierce cites the testimony of his mother, Erline Pierce, that he was a good child with few behavioral problems until he was 13 or 14 years old, when he fell in with a crowd of older boys who exerted a bad influence. Erline Pierce further testified that, as a result of this corrupting influence, Pierce was sent to the Texas Youth Council (TYC) [3] twice for extended juvenile detention stays as a young teenager. She commented that Pierce had been locked up most of his young life, so he couldn't have a chance. Erline Pierce testified that her son had regularly attended church growing up and still ha[d] those same beliefs after his arrest. Finally, Erline Pierce testified that her son had emotionally matured and improved himself in prison by furthering his education, developing his reading skills, and developing his talent for art and woodworking by making jewelry boxes and picture frames for her. Pierce also cites the testimony of Sister Isabella Estrada, a principal for Holy Cross School in Bay City, Texas. Sister Estrada testified that she got to know Pierce during his years on death row, and she visited him regularly in the four years leading up to Pierce's third trial. She testified that Pierce grew from being depressed and angry about his situation to being more understanding. As he developed his ability to speak and articulate his thoughts, Pierce became more open and able to communicate his feelings. Pierce also cites comments by the prosecutor during voir dire that he asserts conditioned the prospective jurors to disregard his mitigating evidence. In one such instance, the prosecutor stated: Q. Would you also agree that under our law that the age of an individual, whether that be old or young age, in and of itself does not give anyone any special rights? Under our law when a person becomes the age of 17 they are an adult and are treated as such. Would you agree? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. So in that instance whether a person is 17 or they're 85, the law doesn't ask how old you are, what color you are, what your job is, what your sex is, what your education is, it asks that you follow certain norms and those norms determine the interaction between human beings and violation of those be tried by a jury if it be a criminal. Can you follow that concept in the purposes of our law? A. Yes, sir, I believe so. The prosecutor also sought and obtained the juror's oral confirmation that if the juror concluded that the answer to the two special issues was yes, he would not change one of those answers to no just to prevent the defendant from receiving the death sentence. Similarly, to another prospective juror, the prosecutor asked: Q. Now, would you agree with me . . . that our law doesn't distinguish as far as finding someone guilty in the law as it relates to an individual on the basis of their age or sex, their race or ethnic background? . . . I'm saying that our law, as far as making a person guilty or being charged with capital murderlike that doesn't distinguish whether or not that person happens to be 17 or 18 or black or white or a doctor or what I'm saying is race, sex, occupation, ethnic background, as far as whether or not they violate the law. A. I agree. Q. And would you feel that if the State presented evidence to you on Special Issue No. 2 that was beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to Special Issue No. 2 should be yes and you found that perhaps that individual was a particular age, a young person or so, would you necessarily answer that question no because of the age or despite what the State showed you? A. No. The State contends that the Texas special issues in fact permitted the jury to give meaningful consideration and effect to all of the mitigating evidence presented and rejects the proposition that any of the prosecutor's comments during voir dire or closing argument could have interfered with the jury's ability to do so.