Opinion ID: 77055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Dr. Clark's Testimony

Text: 18 Tran next argues that the district court erred in excluding the testimony of Dr. Charles Clark. Tran proposed to present Dr. Clark as an expert witness to testify about Tran's neck injury from a micro perspective. Appellants' Brief at 18. Tran was able to offer the testimony of the treating physician, Dr. Michael Cheatham. In addition, Tran presented the expert testimony of Dr. Joseph Burton, whose testimony Tran characterizes as encompassing a macro perspective on the collision and Tran's injury. Id. at 17. 19 After Dr. Burton testified, Toyota objected to Dr. Clark's testimony as cumulative. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. The court examined Dr. Clark's deposition and expert witness report, and extensively examined Dr. Clark's qualifications. The court concluded that Dr. Clark's opinions, and the bases for these opinions, were the same as those of Dr. Burton. The court sustained Toyota's objection and excluded Dr. Clark from testifying. 20 The district court has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb the court's judgment absent a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir.1998). An abuse of discretion can occur where the district court applies the wrong law, follows the wrong procedure, bases its decision on clearly erroneous facts, or commits a clear error in judgment. United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir.2005) (discussing admissibility of expert testimony) (citing McClain v. Metabolife Intern., Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir.2005)). 21 Tran relies on Johnson v. United States, 780 F.2d 902 (11th Cir.1986). In that case, we held that the exclusion of a third expert witness as cumulative was an abuse of the district court's discretion. Id. at 906. We noted that the excluded expert's analysis was somewhat different, his testimony was more comprehensive, and the witness had different, and arguably better qualifications than the other experts. Id. The same is not true here. 22 Drs. Burton and Clark relied on the same medical evidence in forming their opinions. In addition to testimony about the collision and inertial forces, Dr. Burton testified about Tran's neck injury and the impact of the seat belt. These micro issues are the same as those about which Dr. Clark would have testified. Moreover, the treating physician, Dr. Cheatham, testified about Tran's injury as well. In sum, Tran presented extensive testimony to the jury suggesting that the seat belt caused her injury, and it is not at all clear that Dr. Clark would have added any different information that Tran could not have presented through Drs. Burton and Cheatham. Additionally, unlike in Johnson, Dr. Clark's qualifications are not significantly greater than the other doctors'. Finally, Tran could have called Dr. Clark when given an opportunity for rebuttal, but did not call him at that time. While we note that in Johnson we held that a third expert witness was not cumulative, whereas Dr. Clark was excluded from testifying as a second expert witness, the mere number of witnesses is not conclusive when these other factors support the district court's decision. 23 District courts have broad authority over the management of trials. Id. at 905. Part of this authority is the power to exclude cumulative testimony. Fed.R.Evid. 403; Johnson, 780 F.2d at 905. Inherent in this [abuse of discretion] standard is the firm recognition that there are difficult evidentiary rulings that turn on matters uniquely within the purview of the district court, which has first-hand access to documentary evidence and is physically proximate to testifying witnesses and the jury. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1285 (11th Cir.2003). 24 [U]nder the abuse of discretion standard of review there will be occasions in which we affirm the district court even though we would have gone the other way had it been our call. Rasbury v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir.1994). On this record, we cannot say that the court would have abused its discretion had it allowed Dr. Clark to testify. The testimony likely would not have unduly prolonged the trial, Dr. Clark's practice and experience was somewhat different from that of the other doctors, and Tran might have presented her evidence differently had she known earlier that Dr. Clark would be excluded. Given our deferential standard of review, however, we cannot say that the district court's decision fell outside its permissible range of choice. United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 745 (11th Cir.1989). Therefore, we affirm the court's order excluding Dr. Clark's testimony as cumulative.