Opinion ID: 1543938
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tritaik's Case

Text: As reference to Part I.B, supra, will reveal, the facts upon which Tritaik's revocation was based showed more than a single conviction. There was, of course, a conviction for driving to the left of the center line of the road. But in addition, the hearing examiner learned some facts about the accident in which Tritaik was involved (including the death of another driver) and about some of Tritaik's activities shortly before the accident. The MVA insists that these additional facts are sufficient to uphold findings of both unsafe and habitually negligent. [7] As in Mohler's case, the hearing examiner was somewhat nonspecific in explaining just what was the basis for his suspension order. Maryland Code (1984), State Government Article, § 10-214 (Part of the Administrative Procedure Act) directs in no uncertain terms that: (b)(1) A final decision in a contested case shall contain separate statements of: (i) the findings of fact; and (ii) the conclusion of law. (2) If the findings of fact are stated in statutory language, the final decision shall state concisely and explicitly the facts that support the findings. If hearing examiners followed this directive scrupulously, it would be helpful to us, to the circuit courts, and to the hearing examiners themselves, for a careful statement of facts and conclusions would force the examiner to focus on the evidence presented and its sufficiency to support a particular conclusion. In any case, § 10-214(b) was given somewhat short shrift here. The examiner recited several pieces of information. He made few findings of fact, except to state that You [Tritaik] had left your lane to the other lane and hit a head-on  had a head-on accident in which there was a fatality and you had been drinking on this occasion. Later on, the examiner opined that he couldn't tell to what extent the consumption of alcohol had contributed to the accident. His inescapable conclusion (as we have recounted) was that You were involved in an accident in which there had to be a degree of recklessness because you did cross over into the next man's lane and had a head-on collision. He summarized: The evidence before me is that you did cross into the other lane on a dark wet night and did strike the victim's car head-on. The victim, Robert Cannon, did die. I think greater [care] should have been used due to the time and the road conditions. Today, ... I do feel that you operated the vehicle in [a] wanton and reckless manner and the license will be revoked. The examiner's language at once disposes of the MVA's contention that there was a finding of habitual recklessness. For something to be habitual, it must be done  or not done  over some period of time. There must be some evidence of habit. Whether Tritaik's prior record [8] could constitute enough evidence of habitual recklessness, we need not decide. The examiner did not rely on that record. He relied only on the event of 27 June 1987. When we review an administrative action, we may uphold the agency order only if `it is sustainable on the agency's findings and for the reasons stated by the agency.' Baltimore Heritage v. City of Baltimore, 316 Md. 109, 113, 557 A.2d 256, 258 (1989) (quoting United Steelworkers v. Bethlehem Steel, 298 Md. 665, 679, 472 A.2d 62, 69 (1984)). The findings and reasons disclosed here do not permit us to sustain any conclusion as to Tritaik's habitual negligence, even if the examiner intended to so conclude. As to unsafe, we are left with a single incident as a basis for the finding. The MVA tells us that the death of another driver supports a finding of unsafe. It does not, on this record. The death was a tragic event, but it tells us virtually nothing about why Tritaik might be found to possess the ongoing characteristics of an unsafe driver. Motor vehicle fatalities may occur even though no driver breaks the law; on the other hand, a case of the most egregiously unsafe driving might cause no fatality. The fact that § 16-207(a)(1)(i) gives the MVA discretion to call a licensee in for reexamination if there has been a fatal accident has no bearing on § 16-206(a)(1)(ii). As we already have explained, the two sections represent distinct and alternative routes to suspension or revocation. The MVA relies on Cutlip v. Connecticut Motor Vehicle Commissioner, 168 Conn. 94, 357 A.2d 918 (1975). It cites the case for the proposition that a driver determined to be at fault in a fatal accident should be removed from the highway. This decision, however, was made under a Connecticut statute (Gen.Stat. § 14-111(c)) that specifically authorized revocation or suspension in the event of a fatal accident, if the licensee was found responsible for the accident, and if the licensee had caused or contributed to the death by virtue of a violation of the Connecticut Motor Vehicle laws or by negligence or carelessness. Our statute is not remotely like the Connecticut statute, and in any case, the hearing examiner here did not make findings like those made in Cutlip. The MVA's other out-of-state cases suffer from the same deficiency as the serious conviction cases we discussed in Part II.A: the underlying statutory schemes are vastly different from Maryland's. Moreover, all involve facts quite distinct from those here. See, e.g., Hernigle v. Macduff, 305 N.Y. 367, 113 N.E.2d 520 (1953) (finding that accident causally related to respondent's drowsy condition, and that driver was aware he was dosing off, but continued to drive); Griffin v. Muzio, 10 Conn. App. 90, 521 A.2d 607, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 805, 525 A.2d 520 (1987) (same statute as that involved in Cutlip ); Farrell v. Adduci, 138 A.D.2d 944, 526 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1988) (drinking driver exceeded speed limit by at least 15 miles per hour, crossed center line, and crashed into guard rail, killing two passengers); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 184 Pa.Super. 75, 132 A.2d 739 (1957) (driver had 10-12 beers, and fell asleep at wheel, causing vehicle to travel 445 feet, striking posts and guard rails before stopping). We venture no opinion as to whether facts like these would justify suspension or revocation under § 16-206(a)(1)(ii). We point out only that the facts pertaining to Tritaik are different. They do not show that Tritaik, when he appeared before the examiner, possessed any characteristics likely to render him an unsafe driver. Accordingly, Judge Goudy did not err in reversing the hearing examiner.