Opinion ID: 8916
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Securities Industry Association, Inc. (SIA)

Text: Prior to Dillard II, the district court had dismissed the antitrust claims against SIA for failure to state a claim. In Dillard II, this court reversed after noting that Dillard was not required to produce facts to support his allegations at that stage in the proceedings. Dillard II, 961 F.2d at 1159. Dillard filed an amended complaint in 1993, asserting causes of action for antitrust and RICO violations against SIA. SIA moved for summary judgment on the antitrust and RICO claims on January 20, 1994, and the district court granted the motion on March 27, 1995. Dillard now appeals. We review de novo the district court’s order granting summary judgment. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-movant must come forward with specific, admissible evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Matsushita, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. In order to prevail on his antitrust claim, Dillard must prove (1) the existence of a conspiracy (2) affecting interstate commerce (3) that imposes an unreasonable restraint of trade. Dillard II, 961 F.2d at 1158. If defendants had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with equally plausible, legal explanations, the conduct does not 7 give rise to an inference of conspiracy. Matsushita, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. To survive a motion for summary judgment, Dillard must present evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently. Id. SIA submitted evidence that brokerage firms use arbitration because it is a quicker and less expensive way to resolve litigation. This meets SIA’s burden under Rule 56(c). Dillard failed to present any evidence of an alleged conspiracy, admitting in his deposition that he lacks specific facts to support his assertion that SIA and its members conspired to establish adhesion arbitration clauses in brokerage contracts. Dillard also admitted that SIA had no control over its members and did not compel members to include arbitration clauses in their contracts governing margin and option accounts. Dillard argues, however, that sufficient discovery has not been conducted, and that the district court’s denial of additional time for discovery was an abuse of discretion. This contention is meritless. The district court points out that this case has been pending for seven years and related litigation for ten years. SIA responded to Dillard’s discovery requests and he served no additional requests on SIA for more than a year before the judge ruled on SIA’s motion for summary judgment. Dillard filed no Rule 56(f) affidavit, and although his response to SIA’s motion for summary judgment detailed discovery that Dillard believed should have been produced by SIA and Merrill Lynch, he never explained why the information was essential to justify his 8 opposition to SIA’s motion, as Rule 56(f) requires. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Dillard was particularly concerned about copies of newsletters, bulletins, and letters allegedly sent from SIA to the membership “exhorting them to adopt the model [arbitration] clause.” Dillard failed to establish, in his motion opposing summary judgment or elsewhere, how an exhortation to adopt an arbitration clause gives rise to an inference of antitrust conspiracy. Simply put, Dillard has failed to present any evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently. See Matsushita, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (requiring antitrust plaintiffs to come forward with such evidence or lose on summary judgment). For all of these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the motion for summary judgment before allowing Dillard additional time for discovery. Because Dillard did not introduce evidence raising a fact issue about the existence of a conspiracy, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Dillard’s antitrust claims. Dillard’s RICO claims fail for the same reason. To establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege and prove the commission of at least two predicate acts. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1961(5). The predicate acts Dillard alleged all depended on violations of the antitrust laws. Dillard’s failure to establish an antitrust violation requires summary judgment on the RICO claims as well. 9