Opinion ID: 1618300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the limitations statute tolled through fraudulent concealment?

Text: The Stevens first argue that Lake fraudulently concealed their cause of action by falsely asserting that Leo Stevens, Jr. had told him not to record the trust. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-67 (1972) provides: If a person liable to any personal action shall fraudulently conceal the cause of action from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the cause of action shall be deemed to have first accrued at, and not before, the time at which such fraud shall be, or with reasonable diligence might have been, first known or discovered. In evaluating this argument, we are presented with a two-fold question. First, we look at whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Lake lied when he told the Stevens that he had refrained from recording the trust at Leo Stevens, Jr.'s request. If a genuine issue of material fact exists on this issue, we must further determine whether the fraud remained undiscoverable by reasonable diligence for such a long time that the date on which the Stevens filed their complaint fell within the tolled limitations period. The Stevens insist that the appellees failed to show that no genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether Lake lied about what Leo Stevens, Jr. told him. The appellees retort by arguing that the Stevens have failed to clearly and convincingly show that Lake's representation was false. According to Haygood v. First Nat. Bank of New Albany, 517 So.2d 553 (Miss. 1987), in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. Id. at 555, quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 215 (1986). In actions involving fraud, plaintiffs must prove their claims by clear and convincing evidence. Martin v. Winfield, 455 So.2d 762 (Miss. 1984). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, however, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and gives the non-moving party the benefit of the doubt. See McMullan v. Geosouthern Energy Corp., 556 So.2d 1033, 1036 (Miss. 1990); Sherrod v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 518 So.2d 640, 642 (Miss. 1987); Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1985). In the case sub judice, the only evidence that Leo Stevens, Jr. did in fact tell Lake not to record the trust pending further instructions is Lake's own affidavit. However, the Stevens' evidence that Leo Stevens, Jr. did not tell Lake to hold the documents until further notice is also meager. They rely primarily on: (1) Lake's attempt to salvage the trust by recording Leo Stevens Jr.'s quitclaim deed on November 12; (2) the fact that Lake did not tell them about the failure to record when he presented the trust to them on November 14, 1979; and (3) Lake's November 15, 1979, letter to a creditor of the Stevens partnership in which he stated that the trust would withstand any attack. The Stevens infer from these alleged facts that Lake knew that the failure to record the trust was due to his own carelessness, not to Leo Stevens, Jr.'s instructions, and that he was seeking to cover up his negligence. To determine whether § 15-1-67 tolled the limitations period, we must resolve whether the plaintiffs discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, Lake's alleged fraud no earlier than October 22, 1982, six years prior to the date on which the complaint was filed. Most of the facts from which the Stevens draw an inference of fraud were known to them within days or weeks following Leo Stevens, Jr.'s death. For example, they learned of the posthumous recording of the quitclaim deed and the failure to record the trust in December of 1979. They were not aware of the letter in which Lake affirmed the validity of the trust, however, until attorney Joiner began to investigate the case in 1988. Even assuming arguendo that Lake misrepresented what Leo Stevens, Jr. told him, we find that the Stevens, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been able to discover his negligence prior to 1982. Our review of the record indicates that there is very little that the Stevens allege today that they did not know in December of 1979. Thus, their argument that the statute of limitations was tolled by Lake's fraudulent concealment of his negligent acts is without merit.