Opinion ID: 880245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: A.R. 5(c) provides, in relevant part:

Text: (c) Procedure for Issuance of Writs. Special writs, except writs of habeas corpus, shall issue as herein provided. . . . The court may enter an order providing for briefrng and oral argument prior to issuance of a writ . . . . If such an order is entered, briefing shall be conducted in the manner outlined in the order as supplemented by these rules. The briefs shall be in the form prescribed by Rule 32(e). Supreme Court. The Commission is correct that Leavitt's verified petition fails to comply with the Rule because, while the petition is verified by Leavitt's attorney, it is not verified by Leavitt, the party beneficially interested in the petition. While we note the deficiency, we also recognize that the defect is easily curable. Therefore, in consideration of the parties' interest in an expedited resolution of this matter, we will address the merits of Leavitt's claim for relief.3 C. Leavitt does not have an adequate remedy at law that would preclude issuance of an extraordinary writ. Leavitt's complaint is predicated upon his contention that Idaho's open meetings law, I.C. $$ 67'2340, et seq., required that the Commission conduct an open hearing on his request for hearing on his petition for commutation rather than decide the maffer in executive session. The Commission argues that the requested writ of mandamus may not issue because Leavitt has an adequate remedy at law, specifically, the ability to pursue a civil action for the claimed violation of the open meeting law ptnsuant to I.C. S 67-2347(6). The Commission's argument ignores the existence of I.C. $ 19-2708, which provides: No judge, cowt or officer, can suspend the execution of a judgment of death, except as provided in sections 19-2715 and 19-2719, Idatro Code. These statutes do not permit a magistrate judge, considering a claimed violation of Idaho's open meetings law, to stay execution of the death warrant that is in place and which directs that Leavitt be put to death on Tuesday, June 12,2012. If there is merit to Leavitt's contention that the Commission's actions violated the open meetings law, it is manifest that pwsuing a civil action in the magistrate division of the district court will not provide Leavitt with a timely, adequate remedy. D. The Commission was not required to grant Leavitt a full, open session hearing regarding his commutation petition. Leavitt argues that by failing to hold a full, open session hearing on the denial of his commutation petition, the Commission violated his right to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We note that Leavitt does not argue that he has due process rights independent of those granted by the relevant Idatro statutes and rules. Rather, he argues that the due process violation is a consequence of the Commission's ' Similar considerations led this Court to disregard the fact that Leavitt's complaint named two former members of the Commission. Rather, this Court elected to order amendment of the caption of this action. failure to comply with the existing procedural guarantees provided by Idaho law and the Idaho Constitution. l. The Commission's decision did not violate the Idatro Constitution. The pertinent portion of article IV, $ 7 of the Idaho Constitution, governing the board of pardons, provides: Said board, or a majority thereof, shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures, and, only as provided by statute, to grant commutations and pardons after conviction and judgment, either absolutely or upon such conditions as they may impose in all cases of offenses against the state except treason or conviction on impeachment. The legislature shall by law prescribe the sessions of said board and the manner in which application shall be made, and regulate proceedings thereon, but no fine or forfeiture shall be remitted, and no commutation or pardon granted, except by the decision of a majority of said board, after a full hearing in open session, and until previous notice of the time and place of such hearing and the release applied for shall have been given by publication in some newspaper of general circulation at least once a week for four weeks. The proceedings and decision of the board shall be reduced to writing and with their reasons for their action in each case, and the dissent of any member who may disagree, signed by him, and filed, with all papers used upon the hearing, in the offrce of the secretary of state. Idaho Const. art. IV, $ 7. There are two aspects of article IV, $ 7 that pertain to this appeal. First, there is a specific grant of authority to the legislature to prescribe procedures governing applications for clemency. Second, article IV, $ 7 provides that no commutation or pardon may be granted without the Commission first having conducted an open hearing following notice and publication. Leavitt argues that while the first provision authorizes the legislature to determine the process by which applications for commutation are made and considered, the second provision limits that power. To the extent that Leavitt is arguing that article IV, $ 7 gives rise to a duty to grant a full hearing and notice prior to denial of a petition for clemency, we disagree, and hold that the Commission's decision to deny his petition for commutation in executive session did not violate the Idaho Constitution. [G]enerally, the statutory rules of construction apply to the interpretation of constitutional provisions. State ex rel. Kempthorne v. Blaine Cnty.,l39 Idaho 348,350,79 P.3d 707,709 (2003) (citing Sweeney v. Otter, 1 19 Idaho 135, 138, 804 P.2d 308, 31 I (1990). When interpreting statutes, we begin[] with the literal words of a statute, which are the best guide to 7 determining legislative intent. St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Gooding Cnty.,149 Idaho 584, 593, 237 P.3d l2l0,I2l9 (2010) (citing Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idatro 427,430,224P.3d 494,497 (2009). Where a statute is clear and unambiguous the expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect. McNeal v. Idaho Pub. Uilities Comm'n, I42Idaho 685, 690-91, 132 P.3d 442, 447-48 (2006) (quoting State, Dept. of Low Enforcement v. One 1955 Willys Jeep, l}}Idaho 150, 153, 595P.2d299,302 (1979)). Leavitt's reliance on article IV, $ 7 is misplaced. The plain language of article IV, $ 7 does not require that all decisions relating to clemency be the product of open sessions following notice and publication. Rather, the requirement of an open session following notice and publication applies only to the Commission's decisions to grant clemency. In this case, as recognized in Leavitt's briefing, clemency was effectively denied. There is no textual basis for infening a reciprocal requirement of notice, publication and open hearing in the event that the Commission determines that clemency will not be considered. Therefore, we hold that the Commission's decision to deny Leavitt's petition in executive session did not violate article IV, $ 7 of the Idaho Constitution. applications. Leavitt argues that under Idaho's open meetings law, the denial of a commutation petition is a defacto [sic] final decision, which may not be made in executive session. The Commission replies that the open meetings law expressly permits the Commission to make decisions about commutations in executive session. Where more than one statutes are related to the same subject, the statutes arc in pari materia. Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, I24Idatro l, 4, 855 P.zd 462, 465 (1993). When construing such statutes, the specific statute will control over the more general statute. Gooding Cnty. v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201,204, 46 P.3d 18,21 (2002) (citing State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378,987 P.zd 290 (1999)). Further, it is the well-settled rule in Idaho that where an irreconcilable inconsistency exists between statutes in pari materia, the latest will control. Grand Canyon Dories, l24Idaho at 5, 855 P.2dat expression of the legislature 466 (citingUnion Pac. R.R. v. Bd. of Tm Appeals, 103 Idaho 808,811,654P.zd901,904 (1e82). Idaho's open meetings law was enacted to further the policy of this state that the formation of public policy is public business and shall not be conducted in secret. I.C. $ 672340. Under the open meetings statutes, all meetings of a governing body of a public agency shall be open to the public . . . , and [n]o decision at a meeting of a governing body of a public agency shall be made by secret ballot. I.C. $ 67-2342(l). However, the statutory scheme expressly authorizes executive sessions, which may be held by, among others, the commission of pardons and parole, as provided by law. I.C. S 67-2345(lxg). In tum, [d]eliberations and decisions concerning the granting, revoking, reinstating or refusing of paroles, or the granting or denying of pardons or commutations, may be made in executive session . . . . Idaho Code $ 20213A(lXa). Thus, the plain language of the relevant statutes permits the Commission to meet in executive session. To the extent there is conflict between the open meetings law and the statutes governing the Commission, the laffer control. Here, the more general statutes are the open meetings law, Idalro Code gg 67-2342 and -2345, which are modified by the more specific provisions of I.C. $$ 67-2345(I)(g) and 20-213A(l)(a), which permit decisions concerning the . . . the granting or denying of pardons or commutations . . . to be made in executive session. Significantly, these narrow statutory provisions were simultaneously enacted. 1986Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 59, $$ l-2, p. 168-69. These narrow provisions were enacted under the grant of authority to the legislature found in article IV, $ 7, of the Idatro Constitution. There is simply no merit to the proposition that the decision to deny a petition for clemency may not be made in executive session.a public hearing. Leavitt's petition may also be read broadly as suggesting that once a petition for clemency has been filed with the Commission, there is an unqualified right to a public hearing. This is inconsistent with the nature of clemency proceedings and the rules governing applications for clemency. In Stote v. Ramirez,34 Idatro 623,203 P.279 (1921), abrogation by statute on other grounds recognized in State v. Freitag,53 Idaho 726,27 P.2d68,72 (1933), this Court expressly recognized the discretionary nature of clemency proceedings: n here, we note that to the extent that I.C. $ 20-213A(lXa) purports to While it is not relevant to our decision authorize the Commissionto grant clemency in executive session, it clearly runs afoul of the requirements of article IV, $ 7 of the Idaho Constitution. Commutation can be granted only by the chief executive of the state, and is granted as a matter of clemency. The judicial power to modify a judgment and sentence and the executive power to pardon, parole, or commute are wholly distinct in their nature. The one is an award of justice, and the other is an act of grace. Commutation is a matter of discretion, and may be refused. Id. at 635-36, 203 P. at 283 (quoting Fritz v. State, 128 P. 170, 177 (Okla. l9l2)). The rules adopted by the Commission reflect the discretionary nature of executive clemency. IDAPA 50.01.01.450.02 governs applications for commutation and states: The scheduling of a hearing is at the complete discretion of the Commission; if a commutation hearing is scheduled, the Commission will determine the date of the hearing. IDAPA 50.01.01.450.03 recognizes that [o]nly rarely will circumstances be extraordinary enough to approve a petition for a commutation hearing or to grant a commutation. Given the discretionary nature of clemency proceedings and the standards governing the limited instances in which a writ of mandate is appropriate, Leavitt has not demonstrated that the requested writ of mandamus or alternative writ should issue. Leavitt has asked this Court to enter its order staying his scheduled execution in order to permit the Commission to honor his request for an open session following notice and publication. As the Commission was not required to consider Leavitt's application for clemency in an open session, we deny Leavitt's request for an order for stay of execution.