Opinion ID: 371005
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the statement made in argument as to social policy

Text: Appellant Fowler contends: 19 The prosecutor, during his rebuttal argument, attempted to prejudice Fowler's defense by bringing matters to the jury's attention that had absolutely no basis in evidence. After characterizing the offenses charged against the defendants as dirty and salacious, he continued: 20 What's really dirty is putting the women to prostitution because of the Clark and Eubanks show. (Mr. Ringell, Gibson's attorney) said they are innocent of selling themselves on the street, that is not an innocent act, but what they are innocent about is the consequences of what happens to them when they are prostitutes, sold between pimps, addicted to narcotics. (Tr. Oct. 25 at p. 113). 21 These remarks strongly suggested to the jury that they should consider, while deliberating the Specific charges against the defendants, the General social consequences of prostitution related activity especially the selling of women among their pimps And the addiction of prostitutes to narcotics. The prosecutor, however, had introduced no evidence during trial to support any of his assertions. Fowler's attorney made an immediate objection to the remarks, which the court overruled by saying it would Take judicial notice of things. 22 Fowler Br. 17 (emphasis added). While it does not completely excuse the latter remark by the court, it is significant that the court's passing remark did Not instruct the jury to take judicial notice of anything. 23 Gibson's counsel characterizes the prosecutor's remarks in the following terms: 24 In the instant case, the prosecutor, in closing argument, made improper and unwarranted references to the economic status of the transported women and to their asserted innocence of the social consequences of prostitution, including sales between pimps and addiction to narcotics. 25 Gibson Br. 24-25. 26 A complete answer to the attack on the prosecutor's remarks and the court's comment necessitates a brief review of the facts of the offense and the strength of the Government's case. 27 Fowler and Gibson were friends in Buffalo, New York, who induced (we use abbreviations instead of the victim's actual names) A and C to come to Washington, D.C. to make some money from prostitution (b)ecause it was easier down here. Tr. I 82. The girls were both young: 20 and 18 (maybe 17), respectively. C had just finished high school and neither victim according to their testimony had ever previously engaged in prostitution. Shortly before Fowler requested A to go to Washington he had discussed with her whether she could prostitute and give a man the money. . . . She replied I think so if I thought that the man was in my corner or if he was going to provide for me and take care of me. Id. 17. Fowler had also discussed with A: Just whether or not I thought I could make money for a man. Id. 72. Accord: Id. 50, 74. Gibson also had a prior conversation with C about coming to Washington to make money. Id. 82. 28 In the vernacular of the parties this meant to make money from commercial prostitution. Tr. I 72. The vernacular of various criminals is not a shield to understanding their meaning which may be the subject of evidence, inference and deduction by juries and trial and appellate courts. Batsell v. United States, 217 F.2d 257, 262 (8th Cir. 1954); Parente v. United States,249 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1957); Wiley v. United States, 257 F.2d 900, 908 (8th Cir. 1958); Enriquez v. United States, 293 F.2d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 1961); Mack v. United States, 326 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v. Austrew, 202 F.Supp. 816, 820 (D.Md.1962). 29 Both A and C agreed with Fowler and Gibson to come to Washington for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. When Fowler (with Gibson) picked them up in Buffalo in a 1976 Lincoln Continental, two other women that we shall call B and D, were in the car and were to be passengers on the trip for the same purpose. This appearance of a stable (s)urprised A and C. Tr. I 18. 30 The entire party arrived in the Washington area about noon and went to a house in nearby Maryland belonging to a friend of Fowler. The women then bathed, ate and rested and that night the four victims were immediately driven by Fowler with Gibson, to 14th & K Street. Tr. I 19, 84-85. On the trip to 14th Street there was discussion on how much to accept and . . . how much you were not supposed to accept. Id. 20. It was agreed that the women should charge $25 for oral sodomy and $35 for sexual intercourse. Id. 20, 88, 107, 108. Fowler cautioned that they should not . . . accept a smaller amount of money for what (they) were going to do with whoever. Id. 21. The prices C actually offered to a plainclothes police officer were within the range agreed upon. Id. 129. 31 Fowler and Gibson left the victims on 14th Street and spent the late evening and early morning hours together, apart from any of the women, in several night clubs. Tr. II 25-28. A testified that when the victims were let out of the car: 32 We were told (by Fowler) that a young lady would approach us and tell us all we wanted to know about working on the street in D.C. 33 MR. RINGELL: Excuse me, Your Honor. Could she be more specific as to who we are talking about? 34 THE COURT: I think that would be helpful. 35 THE WITNESS: I can't recall the young lady's name but 36 THE COURT: She was going to come up to you; was that it? 37 THE WITNESS: Yes. 38 THE COURT: What was she going to tell you? 39 MR. RINGELL: Your Honor, the question is who told her this. 40 MR. HARDY: I think counsel will have a good opportunity in cross examination to go into these matters. 41 THE COURT: It would be helpful, Mr. Hardy, if we found out ahead of time. 42 Who told you someone was going to meet you? 43 THE WITNESS: Mr. Fowler did. 44 THE WITNESS: He (Fowler ) Told us that a young lady would approach us and ask us if we were from Buffalo and she would give us all the information we wanted to know. BY MR. HARDY: 45 Q Did such a woman approach you? 46 A Yes, she did. 47 Q Now, what happened after you got out of the car with these instructions?A We got out of the car and we were on 14th and we just waited until the young woman came and approached us and asked us if we were from Buffalo. 48 THE WITNESS: And we told the young lady yes, we were and She answered all the questions that we had to ask her. BY MR. HARDY: 49 Q Were you given directions as to where to take the tricks or the Johns, whatever they are called 50 A Yes. 51 Q Where was that supposed to be? 52 A She really didn't give a name of the hotel. She just pointed in a direction and she said that most of the girls in D.C. just rode around in the cars to a parking lot. I don't know the name of the street, but it's right around the corner from 14th. 53 Tr. I 22-24 (emphasis added). 54 C was arrested that evening charged with solicitation for prostitution, jailed and eventually testified before the grand jury. She never rejoined the Fowler-Gibson party. The other three victims stayed in the Washington vicinity for two more days and on both nights were transported, by Fowler and Gibson, from the house in Maryland to 14th Street to engage in prostitution. Following C's arrest Fowler and Gibson warned A, B, and D, Just to be careful more or less. Tr. I 27. This is highly persuasive evidence of Fowler's and Gibson's knowing participation in prostitution. But despite the cautionary instructions, A and D were subsequently arrested. 55 At trial, Gibson refused to take the stand while Fowler testified and admitted practically all the physical facts but denied that he or Gibson knew that the women intended to engage in prostitution in Washington. The jury obviously disbelieved him and we must accept the facts most favorable to their verdict. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1, 13 (1978); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Anderson, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 509 F.2d 312, 331 (D.C.Cir.1974), Cert. denied 420 U.S. 991, 95 S.Ct. 1427, 43 L.Ed.2d 672 (1975). 56 The facts here are typical of those in the reported Mann Act cases, except that the case against appellants is exceptionally strong, and appellants' crimes are particularly egregious. Fowler and Gibson involved very young women, one just graduated from high school, in commercial prostitution. This was not merely a personal venture with two young friends. When appellants surprised A and C by showing up with B and D for the trip to Washington, it became apparent that they had recruited a stable and that for them prostitution was big business. Appellants' knowledge of white slave traffic was corroborated by the rapidity with which they dumped the four victims at 14th and K Streets, the local center for on-street prostitution. In addition, most telling is appellants' apparent relationship with an on-street representative of the local organization, whom the victims were told would meet and instruct them in the local Modus operandi. The victims were met and instructed as promised, and it would be naive to think that this service was performed without prior understanding that the instructor was to be compensated from the proceeds of the prostitution. In short, Fowler and Gibson were engaged in supplying young women for what appears to be organized prostitution in Washington, and this is what Fowler must have been referring to when he told C that it was easier in Washington. 57 With this background, we consider the prosecutor's statement that prostitutes are sold between pimps, addicted to narcotics, (Tr. II 113), and the court's answer to defense objections that (t)he jury are not naive. . . . We will take judicial notice of things. Id. We do not doubt that the prosecutor accurately depicted conditions that are very prevalent in the profession. It could be argued that such facts are not subject to reasonable dispute in that they are either (1) generally known . . . or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). But there was never any proffer on that basis. And while the prosecutor's statement may be accurate, not all truthful statements are admissible. Despite the prevalence of the conditions mentioned by the prosecutor, on this record the remark was error because those conditions are not relevant to the guilt or innocence of the appellants, and the court's comment was also erroneous. The question, then, is whether these errors justify reversal of the conviction and a new trial? We hold that they do not. 58 The test as to whether an error is reversible is delineated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946): 59 If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress. . . . But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand. 60 Similarly, we stated in Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C.Cir.1969): 61 where timely objection was made and pressed on appeal, we must carefully examine the error committed to determine whether it sufficiently prejudiced appellants to call for reversal. 62 . . . The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. 63 Applying this standard, we find that the case was not close, that the comments did not address any essential factual element in the case that was relevant to the guilt or innocence of the defendants, that it is common knowledge that prostitution is a very great evil, that the jury were instructed to consider only testimony heard . . . from the witness stand (and) the single exhibit (Tr. II 120), and that the verdict was not substantially swayed by the error. Kotteakos, supra. We therefore conclude that no substantial rights of appellants were affected, and that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The convictions are affirmed. 64 Judgment accordingly.