Opinion ID: 1195356
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limitation on resources available to defendant

Text: Defendant next contends that he was left bereft of all assistance and unable to contact and interview witnesses due to restrictive conditions of confinement at the county jail and restrictive security measures in the courtroom, pointing to federal cases establishing that it is a violation of the constitutional right of self-representation to deprive a defendant of all means of presenting a defense. It is certainly true that a defendant who is representing himself or herself may not be placed in the position of presenting a defense without access to a telephone, law library, runner, investigator, advisory counsel, or any other means of developing a defense ( Milton, supra, 767 F.2d at pp. 1445-1446), but this general proposition does not dictate the resources that must be available to defendants. Institutional and security concerns of pretrial detention facilities may be considered in determining what means will be accorded to the defendant to prepare his or her defense. ( Id. at p. 1446; United States v. Nash, supra, 73 F.3d at p. 1491; United States v. Robinson, supra, 913 F.2d at p. 717; State v. Drobel, supra, 815 P.2d at p. 736, fn. 23.) When the defendant has a lawyer acting as advisory counsel, his or her rights are adequately protected. ( Milton, supra, 767 F.2d at p. 1446; United States v. Wilson, supra, 690 F.2d at pp. 1271-1272; State v. Henry, supra, 863 P.2d at p. 876.) The record demonstrates that defendant's investigator and his sentencing consultant sometimes had difficulty in securing adequate opportunities to speak with defendant, that the courtroom bailiff prohibited defendant from speaking to his assistants or his witnesses at the courthouse, and that defendant returned to the county jail too late on some court days to telephone witnesses or meet with his investigator or his consultant. We do not believe defendant was deprived of the ability to act as his own counsel and to present a defense. The court ordered that defendant be given unlimited access to the telephone once defendant's difficulties were brought to the court's attention, and similarly ordered that the county jail make the attorney visiting room available to defendant over the weekend to permit further consultation with his assistants. The record also establishes that defendant worked assiduously in the county jail law library and worked closely with counsel during the extended guilt phase of the trial, and that counsel asserted that defendant knew the facts and issues in the case better than most attorneys would. The adequacy of the resources made available to defendant also is demonstrated by the circumstance that before undertaking pro se status, defendant stated he had contacted his prospective penalty phase witnesses repeatedly during the guilt phase. When he sought pro se status, he reiterated that he had contacted his witnesses, knew what they would say, and was prepared to go forward. He thereafter was able  perhaps on a limited basis  to meet with his investigator and his consultant, and it appears that counsel and the investigator did contact some witnesses. It also appears that defendant preferred to speak to witnesses himself and had access to a telephone in the county jail, that several of the days between the time he assumed pro se status and rested the defense case were not court days, affording defendant additional time and opportunity to prepare free from the limitations imposed upon him while he was in court, and finally that defendant refused the two-day continuance offered him on August 18, 1988  22 days after the entry of the guilt verdict  that would have afforded him additional time to telephone witnesses. Defendant's contention that he was deprived of the ability to present a defense also is belied by the defense case he actually presented at the penalty phase. Defendant called 13 witnesses, examined them at length over a period of three days, and introduced 26 exhibits. He performed remarkably well in examining his witnesses and in performing redirect examination. He elicited testimony regarding his mother's chronic mental illness, his placement in a foster home, his merit as a father, his love of children, his lack of racial prejudice, and his acts of kindness to his family and in his community and also to strangers. We do view with concern the court's refusal to permit defendant to interview an out-of-state expert witness with whom defendant never had spoken  and whom counsel refused to interview  before defendant called him to testify. Assuming error, however, no prejudice appears, because the witness's testimony was excluded as irrelevant after extended colloquy between defendant, advisory counsel, and the court, and defendant does not contend that an opportunity to interview the witness before his testimony would have altered the court's decision to exclude the evidence as irrelevant. Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention that he was deprived of the ability act as his own counsel and to put on a defense.