Opinion ID: 2515770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Death Selection Process

Text: Defendant challenges California's sentencing process in capital cases, claiming it suffers from a wide variety of statutory, procedural and substantive defects. We have previously rejected each of the arguments defendant raises in support of this contention. The use of section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider in aggravation [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance found to be true, is not unconstitutionally vague or imprecise, nor does it improperly weight the scales in favor of death. ( People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 192, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1050-1053, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Hawkins (1995)10 Cal.4th 920, 964, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574.) Section 190.3, factor (b), which permits the jury to consider in aggravation [t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence, does not violate state or federal constitutional requirements of due process, equal protection, or reliability in death sentencing ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 584, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1054, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1178, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384), and the standard jury instructions given here provided adequate guidance on the use of this factor ( People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 687, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175). Section 190.3, factors (d) (mental or emotional disturbance) and (h) (mental disease or defect, or intoxication), in their use of the word extreme and in their limitation to the time of the offense, do not impermissibly restrict the jury's consideration of relevant mitigating circumstances or make the factors impermissibly vague. ( People v. Anderson, supra, at p. 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1225, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; People v. Jenkins, supra, at pp. 1054-1055, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 768-769, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) The trial court is not required to omit inapplicable factors when instructing the jury. ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1225, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 381, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) Nor is the court required to instruct on the meaning of a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. ( People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 641, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 688-689, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) The trial court instructed the jury in these terms: To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating factors are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating factors that it warrants death instead of life without parole. When the jury is instructed in this way, the trial court need not also instruct the jury to return a verdict of life without parole if the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 381, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) Defendant contends the jury instructions were defective in failing to state that the jury could return a verdict of life without parole even if the circumstances in aggravation outweighed those in mitigation. Although such an instruction is not required ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 381, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169), the trial court gave a special instruction so stating: Each juror is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value he or she deems appropriate to each and all the various factors before him. You are free to reject death as inappropriate under the circumstances, even if you believe that the aggravating evidence predominates over the mitigating.