Opinion ID: 2646278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Boggan’s Argument on Appeal

Text: On appeal, Boggan concedes that two of his three prior convictions (the 1985 robbery and the combined 1985 kidnapping and rape) qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA, although he did contest this in the district court. His argument on appeal is that his first conviction in 1981 for third-degree burglary in Alabama does not qualify as a violent felony and, therefore, the district court erred in deciding that he qualified for an enhanced sentence under the ACCA. Specifically, he argues that his 1981 conviction does not qualify as a violent felony because Alabama’s third-degree burglary crime is a non-generic version of common-law burglary. 1. The enumerated crime of burglary in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(ii) The United States Supreme Court has defined the type of burglary conviction that qualifies for the enumerated crime of burglary in § 924(e)(2)(ii). “In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (1990), the Supreme Court held that ‘a person has been convicted of burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement if he is convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.’” United States v. Rainer, 616 F.3d 1212, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599, 110 S.Ct. at 2158). “Regardless of its state law label, a burglary that 5 Case: 12-14296 Date Filed: 12/17/2013 Page: 6 of 15 includes those elements is a ‘generic burglary’ and qualifies as a ‘violent felony’ for ACCA purposes.” Id. “Burglaries that do not include all of the elements essential to generic burglary are non-generic.” Id. at 1214. Nevertheless, “[a] conviction under a non-generic burglary statute still counts as ‘burglary’ under the ACCA if the defendant was actually found guilty of the elements of a generic burglary.” Id. at 1215. Therefore, if Boggan was found guilty in 1981 of committing the elements of generic burglary, his conviction could still qualify for an ACCA enhancement for the enumerated crime of burglary. 2. Boggan’s application of the ACCA to his 1981 third-degree burglary conviction Alabama’s third-degree burglary statute included the following definition of “building” at the time Boggan was convicted: [A]ny structure which may be entered and utilized by persons for business, public use, lodging or the storage of goods, and includes any vehicle, aircraft or watercraft used for the lodging of persons or carrying on business therein. Where a building consists of two or more units separately occupied or secured, each shall be deemed both a separate building and a part of the main building. Ala. Code § 13A-7-1(2) (1979). Boggan argues that Alabama’s third-degree burglary statute is non-generic because it includes vehicles, aircraft, or watercraft used for the lodging of persons or transaction of business within its definition of “building.” This court reached the same conclusion in Rainer, holding, “Alabama’s third-degree burglary statute is a 6 Case: 12-14296 Date Filed: 12/17/2013 Page: 7 of 15 non-generic burglary statute because it covers some vehicles, aircraft, and watercraft, which are places or property falling outside the scope of generic burglary.” Rainer, 616 F.3d at 1215. Yet, as this court also held in Rainer, “[t]he finding that Alabama’s thirddegree burglary statute is a non-generic burglary statute does not end our inquiry. A conviction under a non-generic burglary statute still counts as ‘burglary’ under the ACCA if the defendant was actually found guilty of the elements of a generic burglary.” Id. To that end, “enquiry under the ACCA to determine whether a plea of guilty to burglary defined by a nongeneric statute necessarily admitted elements of the generic offense is limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1263 (2005). These pieces of evidence are collectively known as “Shepard” documents. Here, Boggan argues that the record from the district court does not sufficiently show that the district court made a finding of fact from Shepard documents that Boggan was convicted of burglarizing a “building or structure” in 1981, a required element for generic burglary. At Boggan’s sentencing hearing, the district judge read a portion of the 1981 indictment, which stated, “[Boggan] did 7 Case: 12-14296 Date Filed: 12/17/2013 Page: 8 of 15 knowingly enter or remain unlawfully in a building of Cecil McClure with the intent to commit a crime therein, to wit, theft.” Relying on this court’s analysis of Alabama’s third-degree burglary statute in Rainer, Boggan argues that it would be mere speculation to determine that this “building” was an actual building instead of a vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft. In Rainer, this court had to determine whether statements in the indictments and judgments from 1980 and 1982 convictions established that the defendant had burglarized a “building or structure.” Rainer, 616 F.3d at 1216. The statements at issue in Rainer were (1) “[the defendant] did knowingly enter or remain unlawfully in a building of Richie’s Shoe Store, Inc., a corporation, with intent to commit a crime therein, to wit: theft of property” and (2) “[the defendant] did knowingly enter or remain unlawfully in a building of, to wit: Whiddon’s Gulf Service Station, owned by Wilson M. Whiddon, with intent to commit a crime therein, to wit: theft of property.” Id. The defendant in Rainer argued that these statements could have been referring to vehicles instead of buildings because the definition of “building” in the Alabama statute includes “vehicles.” Because the statute also requires that a qualifying “vehicle” be “used for lodging of persons or carrying on business therein,” the court determined that a gasoline service station business could not plausibly be run out of a vehicle and the possibility of a shoe store run out of a 8 Case: 12-14296 Date Filed: 12/17/2013 Page: 9 of 15 vehicle was too far-fetched to undermine the court’s “conviction that Rainer’s two previous convictions were for burglary of a building in the generic burglary sense of the word.” Id. Boggan contrasts the statement read at his own sentencing with those in Rainer to argue that the government did not meet its burden to prove what exactly he was convicted of burglarizing in 1981. The statement the district court read from the 1981 indictment was “a building of Cecil McClure.” According to Boggan, because this statement does not include the level of detail in the statements in Rainer (i.e., “building of Richie’s Shoe Store, Inc.” and “Whiddon’s Gulf Service Station”), this court cannot reach the same common-sense conclusion here that it did in Rainer. We need not, however, resolve this issue of the sufficiency of the Shepherd documents because Boggan’s burglary conviction qualifies, in any event, as a violent felony under the residual clause as explained below.