Opinion ID: 2569097
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gravity of Any Conflict

Text: Out of an appropriate abundance of caution, the trial court also considered the second half of the recusal testwhether any conflict was so grave it would render a fair trial unlikely (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1))and concluded Haraguchi had failed to establish this element as well: I don't think there's any evidence of that. It has not been demonstrated or established that any publicity related to Ms. Dudley's book has been so extensive or interlinked with Mr. Haraguchi's case that he would be unlikely to receive a fair trial. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the publicity attending Intoxicating Agent was not so great as to render a fair trial unlikely. Haraguchi submitted evidence of only a smattering of local public appearances by Dudley in support of her novel. Essentially self-published, [14] the book has not been widely purchased. [15] Even if one were to reach a different conclusion on the question of conflict, and hold as the Court of Appeal did that Intoxicating Agent's publication created at least a reasonable possibility Dudley's discretionary decisions might be influenced, the minimal publicity and sales indicate any financial incentives she might have to act differently are de minimis and do not establish the likelihood of unfair treatment the statute requires. In addition, the trial court found any potential taint to the jury pool from the promulgation of the views in Intoxicating Agent could be handled through a sequestered voir dire. It proposed that in voir dire, attorneys could inquire whether prospective jurors were familiar with any of the writings of either the prosecutor or defense attorney (who it appears had various writings of his own); if any answered yes, further questioning to deal with any possible bias could be conducted out of the presence of the rest of the jury pool. This is precisely the sort of discretionary trial-management decision we vest trial courts with, and the trial court did not err in concluding this sort of potential prejudice could be dealt with in that fashion. In defending its decision to require recusal, the Court of Appeal offered its view that allowing Dudley to prosecute Haraguchi would be unseemly. It acknowledged that unseemliness alone is not a basis for recusal. Section 1424 does not allow disqualification merely because the district attorney's further participation in the prosecution would be unseemly, would appear improper, or would tend to reduce public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the criminal justice system. ( People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 592, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310; see also People v. Neely, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 777-779, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 886; People v. McPartland (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 569, 574, 243 Cal.Rptr. 752.) Only an actual likelihood of unfair treatment, not a subjective perception of impropriety, can warrant a court taking the significant step of recusing an individual prosecutor or prosecutor's office. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal deemed it Unseemly that Intoxicating Agent presents a one-sided view of the criminal justice system and that Dudley would take advantage of her office for financial gain by using the Santa Barbara County District Attorney's Office as the backdrop for her novel. But the first of these does not, as we have discussed, create any semblance of a conflict, and whatever one might think of the propriety of the second of these, it likewise does not lead to a reasonable possibility that Dudley would fail to exercise the discretionary duties of her office in a fair and evenhanded manner. Consequently, whether or not the Court of Appeal was justified in disapproving Dudley's perceived misuse of her office, recusal is not the remedy. In upholding the trial court's exercise of discretion, we do not condone actions that place a prosecutor's literary career ahead of, or at odds with, her fealty to the fair and evenhanded pursuit of justice and the community interest. Writers are often encouraged to write what they know, but the prosecutor who follows that advice in ways that touch on pending matters may compromise her ability to carry out her duties to represent the People and to seek justice impartially. [16] In this case, the trial court concluded based on substantial evidence that no such disabling conflict had arisen. Giving the trial court the deference due its judgment, we conclude that determination should not have been disturbed.