Opinion ID: 4462799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Mother’s Testimony

Text: [¶12] Sweeney contends that the court erred in admitting W.D.’s mother’s testimony about statements W.D. made to her soon after the incident in which Sweeney went into W.D.’s bedroom with a gun. [¶13] We review a “court’s decision to admit or exclude alleged hearsay evidence . . . for an abuse of discretion,” State v. Guyette, 2012 ME 9, ¶ 11, 36 A.3d 916, and if a court’s ruling is proper, we may affirm it “on grounds other than those stated by the trial court,” State v. Watson, 2016 ME 176, ¶ 10, 152 A.3d 152. We review factual findings underlying a decision to admit or exclude evidence for clear error. State v. Robinson, 2001 ME 83, ¶ 10, 773 A.2d 6 445; see M.R. Evid. 104(a). Furthermore, when a party does not move for additional findings of fact pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 23(c), we “infer that the trial court found all of the facts necessary to support its judgment, to the extent that those assumed facts are supported by competent record evidence.” Fournier, 2019 ME 28, ¶ 2, 203 A.3d 801. [¶14] “[S]ubstantial contemporaneity is the essence” of M.R. Evid. 803(1), State v. Ryne G., 509 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Me. 1986), and we agree with the parties that the court erred in admitting the mother’s testimony pursuant to the present sense impression exception to the rule against hearsay. As we noted, however, the court specifically ruled that the statement was not admissible as an excited utterance. Although the court’s ruling contained no express factual findings relevant to the excited utterance exception, see M.R. Evid. 104(a), 803(2); State v. Watts, 2007 ME 153, ¶ 5, 938 A.2d 21, the State did not move for additional findings of fact, see M.R.U. Crim. P. 23(c); State v. Legassie, 2017 ME 202, ¶ 46, 171 A.3d 589. Given this record, the court’s conclusion that the mother’s testimony was not admissible as an excited utterance was not clearly erroneous. See Fournier, 2019 ME 28, ¶ 2, 203 A.3d 801; Watts, 2007 ME 153, ¶ 5, 938 A.2d 21. Because the mother’s testimony was neither a present sense impression nor an excited utterance, and was therefore not admissible 7 pursuant to those exceptions to the rule against hearsay, the court erred in admitting it. [¶15] Although the court erred in admitting the mother’s hearsay testimony, the error here was harmless. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(a). An error is harmless when “it is highly probable that the error did not affect the factfinder’s judgment.” State v. White, 2002 ME 122, ¶ 16, 804 A.2d 1146 (quotation marks omitted). In addressing Sweeney’s objections to the mother’s testimony, the court stated that the testimony was “instructive on the relationship” between Sweeney and W.D., and the court also made clear that it was not using the testimony as propensity evidence. On the issue of the relationship, however, the court had a great deal of additional and pertinent evidence, including a letter Sweeney wrote to W.D. after the gun incident, Sweeney’s own description of that incident to two forensic examiners, and the testimony of other witnesses who discussed interactions they saw between Sweeney and W.D. and things they heard Sweeney say about W.D. Given this abundant evidence, it is “highly probable,” id., that any error in the court’s consideration of the mother’s testimony did not affect the court’s finding that Sweeney “had reached a level 8 of desperation and panic in his relationship with [W.D.]” in the months before the murder.4