Opinion ID: 3058598
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: La Bamba’s Internal Operations

Text: La Bamba was situated in a two-story building with a customer waiting area, a teller window area, and four offices. Caro’s office was downstairs, while Elaine Becerra and Chaoui’s offices were upstairs. La Bamba had branch offices, but they were not authorized to cash checks in large amounts. If someone presented a large check in one of those locations, the cashier was required to call the main office for approval from Caro, Chaoui, or Gonzalez. The same procedures applied when someone other than the registered representative sought to cash a check at a branch store or a mobile van. No CTRs were prepared at the branch stores or the mobile vans, even if they engaged in transactions over $10,000. In such a case, the information was sent to La Bamba’s main office where the CTR was prepared. Before cashing checks, La Bamba’s tellers or cashiers verified that the check was “okay” and that the person who was cashing the check was the proper person to cash the check. This was verified consulting La Bamba’s database, which contained the application that a company’s owner completed when first registering with La Bamba. If anyone other than an authorized person wished to cash a check, a supervisor, such as Caro or Gonzalez, was required to approve the transaction. Regardless of the where the transaction occurred, from 2004-2008, Elaine 25 Becerra prepared all of La Bamba’s CTRs. An immigrant from Cuba, Becerra had no background in finance or banking. But after receiving training from Teresita Caro, Caro’s sister, on filling out the CTRs, they were Becerra’s responsibility. Becerra was not solely responsible for the CTRs, however. Once they were completed, Becerra submitted them to Chaoui for his approval and signature. Chaoui also served as a resource if she had any questions about her work. Becerra was never able to observe the actual cashing of checks from her workstation. Instead she relied upon computer programs to assist her in the preparation of the CTRs. When Becerra began working at La Bamba, in 2004, she used a computer system, named Ideal, to create a database to record La Bamba’s customers. In 2005, Ideal was replaced by Power Check, and in 2006 Archive was added. Becerra used these tools simultaneously to retrieve the data that she needed to fill out a CTR. The databases contained a company’s ID number, its address, and the name of the person that cashed the check. Becerra trusted that if the check was payable to a person or company, that was the person or company that actually cashed the check. Becerra also relied upon certain pieces of information from the check itself to prepare the CTRs. The Archive computer program scanned the checks and placed them into the system. She relied upon the amount from the check, the date, and the name of the person who cashed the check. Becerra used the name of the 26 person or the company listed as the payee on the check to prepare a CTR, unless she was instructed otherwise. In gathering the information for the CTRs, Becerra also created her own alphabetical list of check-payees for each day. With this list, Becerra created a master list of the daily transactions. After she calculated the sum of the day’s transactions for each payee, Becerra determined whether the aggregate daily transactions exceeded $10,000, which triggered the reporting requirement. Becerra prepared the CTRs on a weekly basis and submitted them to Chaoui. Once signed, Becerra mailed them to the IRS. During her years at La Bamba, no one ever told Becerra that she was not performing her job correctly. The flaw in Becerra’s whole procedure was that she “trusted that the person who was actually cashing the check [was] the person registered with Power Check.” Consequently, the CTRs prepared by Becerra, approved by Chaoui, and filed by La Bamba stated that particular individuals had cashed checks at La Bamba on certain dates, although Becerra was unable to ascertain whether those individuals had actually done so. For example, Becerra’s log for June 29, 2006, reflected that Fast cashed checks amounting to $156,755. The CTR filed by La Bamba stated that the transaction was conducted by Jose Montenegro, Fast’s corporate officer, but Becerra had not seen Montenegro nor could she verify whether he actually cashed 27 those checks. Similarly, Becerra’s log for December 6, 2006, reflected that checks amounting to $102,992 had been cashed for Spirit. The CTR filed by La Bamba stated that Marroquin, Spirit’s corporate officer, had conducted the transaction, although Becerra did not know whether Marroquin had been at La Bamba to cash those checks. She simply assumed it was him. During her employment with La Bamba, Becerra participated in training meetings held twice yearly, which were run by Chaoui and Gonzalez. During those meetings it was discussed how important it was to obtain the proper information from people cashing checks to make Becerra’s job easier. Furthermore, Becerra took periodic tests to ensure she understood CTR preparation.