Opinion ID: 4669093
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Justification Instruction

Text: Tardif further argues that the justification instruction that the district court provided to the jury on the assault and battery claims was erroneous because it included a subjective element in the jury’s assessment of the reasonableness of the officers’ use of force. We agree. When charging the jury regarding the assault and battery claims prior to the commencement of deliberations, the district court instructed that assault is “the intentional placing of another person in fear of imminent harmful or offensive conduct,” and that battery occurs when a person “intentionally touches another person without that person’s consent and thereby causes an offensive bodily 40 contact.” App’x at 1076-77. The district court explained that, when an alleged assault or battery occurred during a lawful arrest, a plaintiff must prove that the police conduct or use of force was “unreasonabl[e] under the circumstances.” Id. at 1077; see also id. at 1078 (“If the alleged battery occurred during a lawful arrest, plaintiff must also prove that the officers’ use of force was unreasonable in light of the circumstances.”). The district court further instructed—over Tardif’s objection—that, in determining whether the officers “acted unreasonably under the circumstances,” the jury “may consider the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of any injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id. at 1077 (instruction concerning assault); see also id. 1078 (same with respect to battery). The district court failed to provide additional instructions regarding assault and battery claims in a non-arrest context. On the morning the deliberations began, the jury sent a note, requesting to view all video evidence involving Sergeant Mattera at standard speed and in slow motion, and asking whether there is “anything unique about a police [officer] carrying out a law enforcement function (but not a lawful arrest) that should be 41 considered when assessing an assault and battery claim.” Id. at 1203. The district court—again over Tardif’s objection—responded with a supplemental instruction that repeated the initial charge that was given for an arrest situation: The answer to your question is that because police have the obligation to maintain the public peace and to keep individuals safe, you can determine whether they acted reasonably, and in determining that . . . you may consider the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of any injury inflicted, whether the force was applied in good faith—in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline— or maliciously for the very purpose of causing harm. Id. at 1105. The district court’s instruction was based upon our decision in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), partially rejected by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), where we addressed the relevant factors for a Fourteenth Amendmentbased excessive force analysis for pretrial detainees. We conclude, as the City concedes, that the subjective intent language in the initial instruction, as well as in the supplemental instruction, was erroneous. It is well settled under New York law, with respect to assault and battery claims, that the use of force by a police officer is analyzed “under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness.” Hernandez v. Denny’s Corp., 114 N.Y.S.3d 147, 151 (4th Dep’t 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Harris, 62 N.Y.S.3d at 414. Thus, New York law is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 42 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as set forth in Graham, which explicitly rejected the argument that the use of Glick’s “malicious and sadistic” factor is “merely another way of describing conduct that is objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.” 490 U.S. at 397. The Graham Court explained that “[w]hatever the empirical correlations between ‘malicious and sadistic’ behavior and objective unreasonableness may be, the fact remains that the ‘malicious and sadistic’ factor puts in issue the subjective motivations of the individual officers, which our prior cases make clear has no bearing on whether a particular seizure is ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Thus, the Court emphasized that “[t]he Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of ‘objective reasonableness’ under the circumstances, and subjective concepts like ‘malice’ and ‘sadism’ have no proper place in that inquiry.” Id. at 399; accord Heath, 854 F.2d at 9 (“There is no room for consideration of the officer’s motives or intent under this standard . . . and no requirement that an officer have acted with an improper motive in order to have acted unreasonably.”). 16 16We also note that, even with respect to excessive force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment (from which the Glick framework derived), the Supreme Court has limited the application of the Glick factors and clarified the applicable standard for such claims brought by pretrial detainees. More specifically, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, although noting that the fourth Glick factor (i.e., a malicious and sadistic purpose to cause harm) “might help show that the use of force was excessive,” 576 U.S. 389, 402 (2015), the 43 In short, the jury should not have been told that, in assessing the reasonableness of the police officer’s use of force, they could consider “whether the force was applied in good faith—in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline—or maliciously for the very purpose of causing harm.” App’x at 1105 (supplemental jury instruction); see also id. at 1077-78 (initial jury instruction). Once it is demonstrated that an individual police officer intended to use force of some kind, the subjective motivations of that officer simply have no bearing on whether the particular degree of force used is unreasonable and excessive under the Fourth Amendment or New York law. Accordingly, because the district court’s initial instruction and supplemental instruction on the assault and battery claims incorporated a subjective element, those instructions were erroneous. C. Harmless Error Analysis Although conceding that the district court incorrectly charged the jury on the officers’ subjective intent, the City argues that Tardif has failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice warranting a new trial on her assault and battery claims. We Supreme Court emphasized that “the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is solely an objective one,” id. at 397; see also Edrei, 892 F.3d at 537 (describing Kingsley’s “new formulation” of an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment as “a modest refinement of Glick’s four-factor test” because “our own precedents . . . have repeatedly assessed excessive force claims without looking to subjective intent”). 44 hold that the charging error prejudiced Tardif’s assault and battery claims involving Sergeant Mattera (as asserted against the City), but that the error was harmless as to her claim against Sergeant McManus, as well as the corresponding respondeat superior claim against the City. An erroneous instruction requires a new trial if we find that the error is not harmless. See Uzoukwu v. City of New York, 805 F.3d 409, 418 (2d Cir. 2015). Error in a jury instruction is not harmless “when an appellant can show that the instructions considered as a whole prejudiced [her].” Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, 145 F.3d 516, 521 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 118 (2d Cir. 2003) (erroneous instruction not harmless when “th[e] evidence could support a jury’s reaching the opposite conclusion” had it been instructed correctly). With respect to Sergeant Mattera, there are several factors that collectively preclude us from finding that the erroneous instruction was harmless. As a threshold matter, this is not a situation where the jury was initially provided with a correct instruction, and the district court then misspoke in re-stating the law at some other juncture in the charge. The jury was given the erroneous instruction on subjective intent during the initial charge when the elements of the assault and 45 battery claims were set forth, and that same erroneous instruction was reiterated in response to a jury note. Thus, the jury was never provided with the correct instruction on those claims. The City points to a portion of the initial charge where the district court discussed how the plaintiff must show that “any force used was objectively unreasonable” and “without regard to his underlying intention or motivation.” App’x at 1069. Importantly, however, that instruction related to the excessive force claim under Section 1983 against Sergeant McManus. We have no reason to believe that the jury would have assumed that such language would apply to a different defendant on different claims, especially where the actual instruction on the assault and battery claims not only omitted the critical language as it relates to this issue (that is, “objectively” and “without regard to his underlying intention or motivation”) but also affirmatively told them that good faith did apply to those claims. See, e.g., Hudson v. New York City, 271 F.3d 62, 6970 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that, even though the district court referenced “objective reasonableness” at some point in its instruction, it did not cure the defect caused by earlier reference to defendant’s intent because it made it “confusing as to whether intent to do wrong was required to find a violation of [plaintiff’s] Fourth 46 Amendment rights”). Therefore, we disagree with the City’s assessment that the error in the instruction was “technical[]” or “minor.” Appellee’s Br. at 2, 18. Moreover, we need not guess as to whether the jury was focused upon this particular instruction during their deliberations as it relates to the assault and battery claims involving Sergeant Mattera, because there was a note during deliberations that makes that focus abundantly clear. As noted above, at around 10:20 a.m. on the first day of deliberations, the jury sent a note, requesting to view all video evidence involving Sergeant Mattera at standard speed and in slow motion, and asking whether there is “anything unique about a police [officer] carrying out a law enforcement function (but not a lawful arrest) that should be considered when assessing an assault and battery claim.” App’x at 1203. Tellingly, because the initial charge only referenced the reasonableness standard in the context of an arrest situation, the jury astutely sent this note asking what standard applied when the officer used force in a non-arrest situation, as they were simultaneously seeking to review evidence regarding Sergeant Mattera. In response to that note, the district court again repeated the erroneous instruction, thus advising the jury that the analysis included “whether the force was applied in good faith—in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline—or 47 maliciously for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id. at 1105. The district court then replayed the requested videos for the jury. At around 2:15 p.m., after several additional hours of deliberation, the jury again requested to review video recordings of the incident with Sergeant Mattera and also requested to review transcripts of both Sergeant Mattera’s and Tardif’s testimony regarding their encounter. After viewing the video of the encounter with Sergeant Mattera multiple times and conducting additional deliberations over the course of the next ninety minutes, the jury reached a verdict in favor of the City and the individual defendants. In short, the substance and timing of the note, in the overall context of the jury’s undeniable focus on the evidence involving Sergeant Mattera, together raise a substantial concern that the jury’s decision on the assault and battery claims involving Sergeant Mattera may have been impacted by the erroneous instruction. See, e.g., Heath, 854 F.2d at 8-9 (new trial required where the district court gave an instruction when initially charging the jury, and again when receiving a note, erroneously stating that a finding of malice was required for plaintiff to prove the officer’s unreasonable use of deadly force). The receipt of the note and the potential effect of the erroneous instruction are further magnified by the nature of the proof that the jury was considering as 48 to Sergeant Mattera’s conduct, which could have naturally placed his intent at the forefront of the jury’s discussions. Although the parties provided different accounts regarding the lead-up to Sergeant Mattera’s grabbing of Tardif, Sergeant Mattera admitted that he “grabbed” Tardif, “pull[ed] her off to the side,” which caused her body to “twist[] around,” and that he then “lost grip of her and she fell down.” App’x at 781, 797. A frame-by-frame video recording of the incident, although evolving rapidly, also shows Sergeant Mattera grabbed her. However, a significant portion of Sergeant Mattera’s testimony related to his motivations and good faith, thereby implicating the erroneous instruction. For example, Sergeant Mattera testified that Tardif suddenly appeared in his field of vision and it looked like she was about to run into the back of another police officer. To “prevent the situation from further escalating,” he “instinctively” used force against her in order to prevent a possible collision. Id. at 801. Sergeant Mattera further stated that he did not intend for Tardif to fall to the ground and that he was unable to break her fall. He also testified that he believed that he had used “the minimal amount of force that [he] needed to use.” 17 Id. at 803. 17Although the City’s summation primarily focused on the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct without reference to mental state, we note that there was a reference in the summation to the officers not being “these cruel, violent monsters” as plaintiff implied, id. at 1050-51, which also could have, in combination with Sergeant Mattera’s testimony 49 Given Sergeant Mattera’s testimony, even if the jury credited Tardif’s and Daniel Shockley’s testimony and found that the degree of force employed by Sergeant Mattera was excessive under the circumstances, they could have also credited Sergeant Mattera’s testimony and concluded that he had no bad motive in using the excessive force. Such findings, if considered in the context of the erroneous instruction, could have led the jury to find in Sergeant Mattera’s favor because, even though he applied objectively unreasonable force, he did so “in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” and not “maliciously for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id. at 1105 (supplemental jury instruction). That verdict, if based on those findings and the erroneous instruction, would have been contrary to New York law and thus prejudiced Tardif. See Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that erroneous instruction that allowed consideration of subjective intent of the police officer was not harmless because “[u]nder the district court’s instruction, the jury could have concluded that there was no violation because [the officer] did not intend to use enough force to break [plaintiff’s] jaw”); see also Callahan v. Wilson, 863 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2017) and the faulty instruction, erroneously (though perhaps inadvertently) further focused the jury on the issues of subjective intent, such as good faith or malice. We further note that the City’s summation was silent on whether the reasonableness standard was objective or subjective. 50 (holding that erroneous instruction on the use of deadly force was not harmless because it “allowed the jury to decide the case on different grounds than [the law] permits”). In reaching this decision, we recognize that it is also entirely possible that the jury’s verdict in favor of the City on Sergeant Mattera’s conduct could have been based upon a finding, entirely independent of his motive, that his use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. To find harmless error, however, we must be “convinced that the error did not influence the jury’s verdict.” Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2000). That standard has simply not been met as it relates to the assault and battery claims pertaining to Sergeant Mattera when the erroneous instruction is considered, in light of the substance of the jury note and the nature of the proof surrounding his conduct. See Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 67 F.3d 435, 439 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that charging error required retrial because “[w]e d[id] not know what the jury would have done had it received a correct instruction”). Accordingly, Tardif is entitled to a new trial on the respondeat superior claim against the City based upon Sergeant Mattera’s alleged assault and battery. 51 With respect to the assault and battery claims against Sergeant McManus, the focus of the evidence and issues were entirely different, and we thus find that the district court’s charging error was clearly harmless. Unlike the testimony regarding the force used by Sergeant Mattera, the jury was presented with no evidence regarding Sergeant McManus’s subjective intent for using force because he testified that he never used any force against Tardif. Sergeant McManus testified that he first noticed Tardif when she was on the ground approximately fifteen feet from him. He categorically and repeatedly denied having any physical contact with Tardif. See, e.g., App’x at 827 (“Q. You didn’t shove her in her chest while she was on crutches? A. No.”); id. at 833 (“Q. But it’s possible you made contact with her, isn’t that right? A. No.”); id. at 837-38 (“Q. Would you push a woman off of her crutches simply because she was asking you for the name of another officer? A. Absolutely not.”). To be sure, Tardif testified that Sergeant McManus came “through the [police] line . . . and . . . pushed” her off of her crutches while she was attempting to locate the officer from the incident earlier that morning. Id. at 905. However, if the jury credited Tardif’s testimony, that gratuitous use of force would have been unreasonable no matter what the circumstances. In fact, in the City’s summation, 52 Tardif’s testimony was summarized as claiming “for no reason at all Sergeant McManus comes running out of the police line, his brow is furrowed, his skin is blazing red, and he is filled with rage, and he pushes her off her crutches like some villain from a Charles Dickens novel.” Id. at 1037-38. The City, in addition to questioning Tardif’s credibility as to whether any officer did that at all, argued to the jury (from the testimony and photos) that it could not have been Sergeant McManus. Therefore, even in the face of these starkly different versions of events, the jury would have had no occasion under either version to consider whether Sergeant McManus subjectively used force in good faith, and thereby rely on the incorrect elements of the instruction. The only question—assuming the jury found that a police officer had gratuitously pushed Tardif off of her crutches—would have been whether Sergeant McManus was that officer or not. Given the limited nature of the evidentiary dispute regarding the claims against Sergeant McManus, we are confident that the erroneous instruction regarding subjective intent could not possibly have influenced the jury’s verdict in Sergeant McManus’s favor on those claims and, therefore, the error was harmless. See, e.g., Hill v. Kemp, 833 F.2d 927, 930 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that erroneous instruction on intent was harmless 53 where alibi defense was asserted and there was no argument that a lack of intent existed for the person who committed the offense); Hill v. Quigley, 784 F. App’x 16, 20 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (holding that any error from reference to intent in a use of lethal force instruction was harmless because “intent was not at issue at trial”). Accordingly, no new trial is warranted as to the assault and battery claims against Sergeant McManus and the respondeat superior claim against the City related to his conduct based upon the erroneous instruction.