Opinion ID: 2519654
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Tripling of an Indeterminate Term's Minimum Period of Parole Ineligibility (Excluding Enhancements) Is Proper Under Option 1 of the Three Strikes Law.

Text: Cornelius argues the trial court erred in concluding that option 1 requires tripling of a minimum period of parole ineligibility where, absent the Three Strikes law, a defendant would receive an indeterminate term under another statute. He asserts that nothing in the Three Strikes law itself ... authorizes tripling of a minimum parole ineligibility period of an indeterminate life sentence. He recognizes that in Jefferson, we held the trial court should ... have doubled the minimum parole ineligibility term in sentencing the defendant, who had one prior strike and was eligible for an indeterminate term under a statute other than the Three Strikes law. However, he contends we should construe the tripling provision, i.e., option 1, differently because its language is notably different; [t]he doubling provision [expressly] requires multiplying of the `minimum term for an indeterminate term,' whereas the tripling provision does not. He also asserts that in Jefferson, we recognized that the plain language of the three strikes law permits doubling but not tripling of such a minimum parole period. [3] In Jefferson, we determined how the Three Strikes law's sentence-doubling provision, which governs defendants with one prior strike, applied to defendants convicted of attempted premeditated murder, which is punishable under section 664 by imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole. ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 90, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) The doubling provision provides that for a defendant with one prior strike, the determinate term or minimum term for an indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction. (§ 667, subd. (e)(1).) We initially explained that under this provision, if the statute under which defendant would be sentenced for the new felony absent the Three Strikes law expressly prescribes an indeterminate term of, for example, 15 years to life, then the defendant will receive a sentence of 30 years (2 times 15 years) to life. ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 90, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) We then considered the provision's application in connection with section 664, which prescribes an indeterminate term, [b]ut ... says nothing about service of a minimum term.... ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 90, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) We first determined that under the current Determinate Sentencing Act, the prison `term' for both determinate sentences and indeterminate life sentences with the possibility of parole is the actual time served in prison before release on parole.... ( Id. at p. 95, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) We then determined that a specified term of incarceration before being released on parole is a `minimum term' within the sentence-doubling language of section 667[, subdivision] (e)(1). ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 96, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) We next found that although section 664 did not specify such a minimum term, section 3046 did, because it requires that a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole serve `at least seven calendar years or ... a term as established pursuant to any other section of law that establishes a [greater] minimum period of confinement' before becoming eligible for parole.... ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 96, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) Thus, we held that the minimum period of parole ineligibility under section 3046 had to be doubled in calculating the defendants' sentences. ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 90, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) We then found that the period under section 3046 for the defendants was set by some other section of law: section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4), which specifies increased penalties for crimes committed in connection with criminal street gangs. ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 99, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) That section, we explained, sets forth a 15-year minimum term as an alternate penalty for the underlying felony itself, when the jury has determined that the defendant has satisfied the conditions specified in the statute. Thus, [it] establishes the punishment for the `current felony conviction' within the meaning of section 667[, subdivision] (e)(1), and its 15-year minimum term should have [been] doubled.... ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 101-102, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) Based on the substantial similarity between the language of option 1 and the doubling provision at issue in Jefferson, we conclude the calculation under option 1 requires tripling of a minimum period of parole ineligibility. The doubling provision specifies the method for calculating the minimum term for an indeterminate term (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)), and option 1, using substantially similar language, specifies one of three methods for calculating the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A).) The doubling provision requires multiplying the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)), and option 1, again using substantially similar language, requires multiplying the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(i).) The slight linguistic differences between these two provisions simply recognize that whereas the Three Strikes law requires an indeterminate life sentence for all defendants with two prior strikes regardless of other sentencing provisions, defendants with only one prior strike may receive either a determinate or an indeterminate sentence, depending on the sentencing provisions that would otherwise apply. (§ 667, subd. (e); see In re Cervera (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1073, 1075, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 16 P.3d 176.) These linguistic differences do not, as Cornelius argues and as Justice Werdegar asserts in her concurring and dissenting opinion, establish, or even suggest, that we should not apply Jefferson's construction of the doubling provision to option 1. As a matter of statutory construction, a word or phrase repeated in a statute should be given the same meaning throughout. [Citation.] ( People v. Nguyen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 197, 205, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 198, 980 P.2d 905.) Thus, Jefferson's construction of the doubling provision governs option 1 because the two provisions are worded almost identically and deal[] with the same subject matter. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 929, 93 Cal. Rptr.2d 216.) Cornelius argues this construction would render meaningless the reference to section 3046 in option [3]. For defendants who, absent the Three Strikes law, would receive an indeterminate term under another statute, the minimum term under option 3 for third strike offenders is any period prescribed by Section 190 or 3046. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(iii).) Cornelius argues that under People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 254, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224 ( Jenkins ), enhancements (including serious felony priors) are included as part of the minimum period of parole ineligibility prescribed by section 3046. Thus, he continues, if option [1] require[s] tripling of the minimum period established by section 3046, it would also require tripling of any applicable enhancements. ... Such tripling would always result in a greater figure than the untripled option [3].... This construction would render meaningless the part of option 3 that specifies the minimum term as any period prescribed by Section 190 or 3046 (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(iii)), because the minimum term calculated under that part would always be less than the minimum term calculated under option 1. Thus, Cornelius concludes, [i]n order to give meaning to the explicit reference to section 3046 in option [3], option [1] cannot be interpreted to permit tripling of the parole ineligibility period of section 3046. Initially, we agree with Cornelius's implicit assumption that Jenkins applies to the Three Strikes law and establishes that the calculation under option 3 includes certain enhancements. In Jenkins, we construed section 667.7, which is a habitual offender statute that predates the Three Strikes law. ( Jenkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 238-239, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224.) For qualifying offenders who have served two prior separate prison terms, section 667.7, subdivision (a)(1), prescribes a life sentence with the minimum term of required imprisonment being the greatest of three options, one of which is any period prescribed by Section 190 or 3046. In Jenkins, we held that the calculation under this option includes any applicable enhancement that would be used to lengthen a term of imprisonment imposed under statutes other than section 667.7. ( Jenkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 252, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224.) We based our conclusion largely on language in section 3046 that incorporates by reference other relevant sections prescribing the minimum period of time a person sentenced to a life term must be imprisoned before becoming eligible for parole. ( Jenkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 251, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224.) Option 3 of the Three Strikes law contains language identical to that in section 667.7, subdivision (a)(1); the minimum term under option 3 for third strike offenders who, absent the Three Strikes law, would receive an indeterminate term under another statute is any period prescribed by Section 190 or 3046. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(iii).) No basis exists for construing this language differently in the context of the Three Strikes law. Thus, we conclude the minimum term under option 3 includes any applicable enhancement that would be used to lengthen the term the defendant would receive absent the Three Strikes law. (Cf. People v. Cartwright (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1142, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 351 [interpretation of language in one habitual criminal statute[] ... controls the interpretation of the identical language in another habitual criminal statute[ ] that is in pari materia with the first].) However, Cornelius's argument fails because applying Jefferson to a defendant with two prior strikes does not require tripling of enhancements under option 1. Both defendants in Jefferson were convicted of attempted premeditated murder and were subject to various mandatory consecutive sentence enhancements. ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 90-91, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) We concluded that in applying the Three Strikes law's doubling provision to the indeterminate sentence for attempted premeditated murder, section 3046 establish[ed] the minimum term. ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 99, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) However, in applying this conclusion, we did not double the term for defendants' mandatory consecutive sentence enhancements; we doubled only the 15-year minimum term specified in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4). ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 102, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) Thus, properly understood, Jefferson held that the minimum term to be multiplied under the Three Strikes law's doubling provision was the term that, absent the Three Strikes law, would apply under section 3046, excluding enhancements. This understanding of Jefferson is consistent with our discussion of option 1 in People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56 ( Dotson ). There, the defendant was convicted of first degree burglary, had four prior strikes, and was subject to four 5-year enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a), for prior serious felony convictions. ( Dotson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 550-551, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56.) In discussing the defendant's sentence, we explained that under option 1, the minimum term for the indeterminate term of a third strike offender is calculated by tripling `the term otherwise provided as punishment' for the current conviction, and that because the defendant was sentenced to six years for first degree burglary, his minimum term under option 1 would be eighteen years. ( Id. at p. 552, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56.) Thus, in calculating the minimum term under option 1, we did not triple the enhancements. This discussion is consistent with the conclusion that under Jefferson, the minimum term to be multiplied under both option 1 and the Three Strikes law's doubling provision is the term that, absent the Three Strikes law, would apply under section 3046, excluding enhancements. (See People v. Ruiz (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1662-1664, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 [excluding enhancements in tripling under option 1 the 15-year minimum term for second degree murder]; People v. Anderson (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 587, 596, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 [under only logical reading of the Three Strikes law, enhancements are included in calculating the minimum term under option 3, but not under option 1].) Moreover, because enhancements are included in calculating the minimum term under option 3 but not under option 1, our construction of option 1 does not, as Cornelius argues, render option 3 partially meaningless. Cornelius contends that a passage from the majority opinion in Jefferson precludes us from construing option 1 to require tripling of an indeterminate term's minimum period of parole ineligibility (excluding enhancements). In Jefferson, the dissent asserted we should not refer to section 3046 to determine the minimum term of an indeterminate term to be doubled under the Three Strikes law. ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 102-108, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) The dissent reasoned in part: [W]hen the drafters did make [express] use of section 3046 [in option 3], they did not require the court to multiply the seven-year period of parole ineligibility set out therein. For the rare third strike case not covered by another provision of the Three Strikes law, the drafters apparently were satisfied to rely on the Board of Prison Terms to decide when, if ever, after the period set out in section 3046, such an offender would be released on parole. How can we justify doubling the period set out in section 3046 for a second strike defendant when the drafters left the same period unmultiplied for a third strike defendant? ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 105, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) The majority replied: We see no inconsistency between the Legislature's decision to double the parole ineligibility period set by section 3046 for second strike offenders and its decision not to multiply that period for third strike offenders. As to third strike offenders, section 3046 comes into play only in a very limited number of cases: those in which the minimum term of confinement is (1) more than three times the term provided as punishment for the current conviction and is (2) more than twenty-five years. The Legislature may have seen no need to multiply these extremely long sentences, notwithstanding its conclusion that the shorter parole ineligibility period in section 3046 should be multiplied for second strike offenders. ( Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 99, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) For several reasons, we reject Cornelius's reliance on this discussion in Jefferson. First, Jefferson involved the proper calculation of the minimum term for a second strike offender, and thus did not directly present the question now before us, i.e., how to calculate the minimum term for a third strike offender under option 1. Second, the discussion Cornelius cites responded to an argument of the dissent, not to an argument the parties addressed in briefing. (See Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 98, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) Third, the majority in Jefferson chose to answer the dissent on its own terms, without examining its underlying assumption that option 1 does not provide for tripling of the term that, absent the Three Strikes law, would apply under section 3046. Indeed, the majority had no need to consider this question in depth, because, as we have noted, Jefferson did not present the question of the proper construction of option 1. On further consideration here, in cases that directly present the question, we conclude for the reasons already discussed that option 1 requires tripling of the minimum period of parole ineligibility (excluding enhancements) that, absent the Three Strikes law, would apply under either section 3046 or some other statutehere, the One Strike law. [4] This construction completely avoids the anomaly the dissent in Jefferson posited, where the doubled minimum term of a second strike offender is greater than the unmultiplied minimum term of a third strike offender convicted of the same crime.