Opinion ID: 1438901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: standard for the admissibility of expert scientific evidence

Text: A much-debated evidentiary question is the proper standard for determining the admissibility of new or novel scientific evidence. The admissibility of DNA typing evidence is one of the most prominent areas of debate. Nelson argues that the Superior Court erred in failing to apply the standard articulated in Frye, supra, or a variation of that test, to determine whether the State's DNA typing results were admissible. The State counters that Frye is no longer the rule in Delaware and that the analysis of the evidence undertaken by the Superior Court is consistent with the Delaware Rules of Evidence. When faced with a question that requires the determination of the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, many, though not all, jurisdictions in the past have adopted the standard expounded in Frye. See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 2nd Cir., 955 F.2d 786, 794, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 104, 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992). Under this standard, the admissibility of scientific evidence hinges upon whether the scientific technique has been sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added). The underlying assumption of the Frye standard is that general acceptance indicates reliability and that only reliable evidence should be admissible. See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 794. The codified Delaware Rules of Evidence (D.R.E.) became effective July 1, 1980. Before and since the codification of these rules we have held that the general acceptance test of Frye is not the sole criteria for assessing the admissibility of scientific test results or evidence. See Santiago v. State, Del.Supr., 510 A.2d 488, 489 (1986) ( Frye not sole test for judging admissibility); Fensterer v. State, Del. Supr., 493 A.2d 959, 962 n. 3 (1985) (rejects Frye as independent controlling standard of admissibility), rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985); [3] Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 1346, 1354-55 (1981) ( Frye not only criteria employed to assess admissibility), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910, 102 S.Ct. 1258, 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982). The State contends that, under this Delaware precedent, the trial court's failure to apply the Frye test was not error. We agree. The United States Supreme Court recently reconsidered Frye and its standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), vacating 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.1991). Daubert involved the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the correlation between the ingestion of the drug Bendectin by a pregnant woman and serious birth defects of the child born following that pregnancy. The Court found the Frye standard to be superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and ruled that the admissibility of expert scientific testimony at federal trials is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (FRE 702). [4] Id. ___ U.S. at 2794, 113 S.Ct. at ___. The Court also found nothing in the text of FRE 702 to require the general acceptance standard articulated in Frye to be an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Id. Our decisions in Santiago, Whalen and Fensterer are consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert. Most recently, we stated that for an expert to testify as to his or her opinion based upon the results of a test he or she performed, the expert must establish that the test is reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Santiago, 510 A.2d at 490 (citing D.R.E. 703). Beyond our reliance upon D.R.E. 703, as in Santiago, we have found other rules of evidence pertinent to determining whether scientific evidence should be admissible. [5] Thus, in Delaware, scientific evidence, rather than being governed by Frye, must satisfy the pertinent Delaware Rules of Evidence concerning the admission of scientific testimony or evidence. See Fensterer, 493 A.2d at 962 n. 3; Whalen, 434 A.2d at 1354 (scientific evidence admissible because it satisfied admissibility, relevance and reliability requirements). For scientific evidence or testimony to be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a trial court must also find the evidence sought to be admitted relevant and reliable. Daubert, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2794. [6] The Delaware Rules of Evidence are no different. [7] Turning to this case, we find the Superior Court's analysis of the DNA typing evidence to comply with the Delaware Rules of Evidence. The Superior Court applied a five-step test invoking the applicable evidentiary rules. Presumably borrowing the test articulated in State v. Pennell, Del.Super., 584 A.2d 513, 515 (1989), the Superior Court found that it needed to determine: 1) that the expert witness was qualified [D.R.E. 702]; 2) that the evidence offered was otherwise admissible, relevant and reliable [D.R.E. 401 & 402]; 3) that the bases for the opinion are those reasonably relied upon by experts in the field [D.R.E. 703]; 4) that the specialized knowledge being offered will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue [D.R.E. 702]; and 5) whether such evidence would create unfair prejudice, confuse the issues or mislead the jury [D.R.E. 403]. We affirm the court's rejection of Frye and its application of the Delaware Rules of Evidence for determining the general admissibility of the State's DNA expert testimony.