Opinion ID: 163221
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Imminent or Significant Danger

Text: The Act also authorizes citizen suits “against any person, including the United States . . . who has contributed . . . to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). The appellants assert that the district court erred in requiring them to prove that the appellees’ actions “present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment” because this phrase in RCRA is prefaced by the word “may.” According to the appellants, the word “may” in this sentence allows for allegations of potential or future harm, such that a showing of actual harm is not required. See Aplts’ Br. at 19-21; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that “may” is “expansive language”). That the district court omitted the word “may” in its order does not, however, demonstrate that it applied a test requiring actual current harm, as the 2 (...continued) was not unreasonable in declining to punish EG&G for the violation. See Sierra Club, 964 P.2d at 346. Therefore, the appellants are estopped from relitigating the issue in search of a different remedy. See Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 442 (Utah 1996) (“Issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of issues that have once been adjudicated even though the claims for relief in the separate actions may be different.”) -8- appellants claim. Rather, the district court’s language suggests that it was thinking not only about harm that had occurred, but about the possibility that harm would occur in the future. In its discussion of the § 6972(a)(1)(B) claims, for example, the district court discussed safety measures implemented “to prevent similar incidents from occurring.” Aplts’ App. at A-396. Moreover, although such a reading of the statute implies future orientation, that orientation cannot be very far into the future. “Imminent” harm by definition will occur almost immediately if action is not taken to prevent it. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996). A vague possibility of future harm cannot satisfy the statute, which applies to dangers that are both “imminent and substantial.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). For example, the appellants assert in their third amended complaint that “it is expected that such incidents will continue to occur,” Aplts’ App. at A-361, an open-ended allegation that simply does not satisfy the standards in RCRA. Finally, although the appellants cite caselaw from other circuits, they do not cite the more recent Meghrig decision, where the Supreme Court held that “[a]n endangerment can only be imminent if it threaten[s] to occur immediately[, which] implies that there must be a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until later.” Id. at 485-86 (quotations omitted). -9- The appellants’ argument, if adopted, would threaten to convert RCRA into a strict liability statute. However, Congress expressly limited citizen suits to cases of “imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). We agree with the district court that the appellants did not show imminent danger and that their claims therefore lacked merit.