Opinion ID: 4520685
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Express Consent and Express Invitation or

Text: Permission Are Interchangeable The plain language of the TCPA shows that “express consent” and “express invitation or permission” are interchangeable and applicable to both phone calls and faxes. Our analysis of the TCPA “is guided by the statute’s text, the [FCC’s] interpretations of the statute, the statute’s purpose, and our understanding of the concept [in question].” Daubert, 861 F.3d at 389 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The TCPA does not define either “express consent” or “express invitation or permission,” and when phrasing in a statute is undefined, we give it its ordinary meaning. Id. “The ordinary meaning of express consent is consent ‘clearly and unmistakably stated.’” Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 346 (9th ed. 2011)). Consent is “[a] voluntary yielding to what another proposes or desires; agreement, approval, or permission regarding some act or purpose, esp. given voluntarily by a competent person; legally effective assent.” CONSENT, Black’s Law Dictionary 368 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). Similarly, express permission is “clearly and unmistakably granted by actions or words, oral or written,” and permission is “the official act of allowing someone to do something.” PERMISSION, Black’s Law Dictionary 13211322 (10th ed. 2014). Notably, the definition of “consent” contains “permission.” 14 Further, and as stated above, “[o]n the issue of prior express consent the FCC has found that ‘persons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called at the number which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.’” Daubert, 861 F.3d at 389 (quoting 7 F.C.C. Rcd. at 8769). Likewise, the FCC has found that calls received after “prior express invitation or permission” are not “unsolicited calls.” See In re Rules & Regulations, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. at 8766 n.47 (defining “telephone solicitation” and using the “prior express invitation or permission” language as opposed to “express consent” language) (emphasis added).8 The TCPA prohibits telephone calls save in part for those made with “prior express consent.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)-(B). It also separately defines “telephone solicitation” as the “initiation of a telephone call or message . . . but such term does not include a call or message (A) to any person with that person’s prior express invitation or permission . . . .” Id. § 227(a)(4) (emphasis added). Thus, both the TCPA and the FCC use the two phrases—“express consent” and “express invitation or permission”—interchangeably within the context of telephone calls. And so, why then should the two phrases not be deemed interchangeable in the context of faxes? Express consent and express invitation or permission are interchangeable. Courts have recognized that the FCC deems the knowing release of a phone number in the telephone context can be deemed to 8 The FCC has also noted that: “Express permission to receive a faxed ad requires that the consumer understand that by providing a fax number, he or she is agreeing to receive faxed advertisements.” In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act (TCPA) of 1991, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14129 (2003). 15 constitute express consent, invitation, or permission to receive calls. Here, we extend that reasoning to the realm of faxes (i.e., that the knowing, voluntary release of a fax number, and the receipt of a fax related to why the number was provided, constitutes express consent such that the faxes would be deemed solicited). It is true that the TCPA prohibits faxes save those communicated with “express invitation or permission,” and does not say “express consent,” but both the language’s plain meaning and the FCC’s interpretation show that “express consent” is interchangeable with “express invitation or permission.” Compare id. § 227(b)(1)(A)-(B), with id. § 227(b)(1)(C), and id. § 227(a)(4)-(5). And while the statute has different subsections under “Prohibitions” for telephone calls and faxes, the language used in each subsection—the primary issue here—and as defined elsewhere in the statute, is interchangeable as shown above. Compare id. § 227(a)(4), with id. § 227(a)(5) (exemplifying that the statute itself uses “prior express invitation or permission” in both the telephone and fax sections). While PHI suggests that the District Court “applied the lower standard for ‘consent,’” arguing the standards for fax advertisements (those bound by “express invitation or permission”) are “more stringent” than those for phone calls, we must disagree. See Appellant’s Br. 19–20. “Express consent” and “express invitation and permission” are synonymous in the context of the TCPA, and accordingly the standards are not different. The District Court was thus correct in finding that there was undisputed evidence establishing that PHI provided business cards with its fax number to drug company representatives, 16 thereby giving express consent, invitation, and permission to receive related information, and thus in finding that the two faxes were solicited. See Physicians Healthsource, 340 F. Supp. 3d at 452–54.9 9 In addition to finding that “PH[I] provided business cards containing its fax number to drug company representatives to enable those representatives to fax information to Dr. Martinez,” the District Court also found that there was undisputed evidence that Dr. Martinez himself gave “representatives permission to send him additional information about the subject matters they discussed.” Physicians Healthsource, 340 F. Supp. 3d at 453. We note that PHI strongly opposes this latter finding. We also note, as did the District Court, that deposition testimony and the general record indicate that Dr. Martinez agreed to receive follow-up information about the drugs discussed with the Defendants. But regardless, the voluntary provision of the fax number by PHI constituted express invitation and permission in and of itself. Thus, absent a definitive expression to not be sent any information, which the record does not reflect, the fax number provided is sufficient to establish express invitation and permission. We note here, that we are not, as our dissenting colleague suggests, flipping the burden that a party seeking to prove consent must carry the burden of proof—rather, we are finding that Defendants have met that burden. Further, as the TCPA indicates, and as the FCC has itself noted, the statute is not meant to curb communication in established business relationships. Though the statute is silent with regard to solicited advertisements in the context of an established business relationship, it explicitly permits unsolicited fax advertisements so long as there is, in part, “an established 17