Opinion ID: 2548945
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retroactive Application of the UTC Language

Text: Goodlander argues alternatively that the language of the UTC, which defines a distribution subject to a trustee's discretion as a mere expectancy, should not be applied retroactively in this case because its application is highly injurious to him. See RSA 564-B:8-814(b). We do not find this argument persuasive. Here, the UTC specifically states that this chapter applies to all trusts created before, on, or after its effective date, and that this chapter applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after its effective date. RSA 564-B:11-1104(a)(1)-(2). The provision containing the mere expectancy language at issue, RSA 564-B:8-814(b), became effective September 9, 2008. Thus, the question here is whether the application of the UTC provisions to the SAT and EMT trusts, which were created before September 9, 2008, is prohibited. Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution states that [r]etrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the punishment of offenses. In Tuttle, we noted that every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights, acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective. Tuttle, 159 N.H. at 641, 992 A.2d 624 (quotation omitted). As we have previously stated: Unless otherwise inhibited by either the State or Federal Constitutions, the Legislature may change existing laws, both statutory or common, at its pleasure, but in so doing, it may not deprive a person of a property right theretofore acquired under existing law. Those rights are designated as vested rights, and to be vested, a right must be more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from the demand of another. If, before a right becomes vested in a person, the law upon which it is based is repealed, that particular person no longer has a remedy to enforce his claim, and if final relief has not been granted to him on the enforcement of a demand before such repeal, then no relief can be granted on his demand after the effective date of the repeal. Goldman, 151 N.H. at 774, 868 A.2d 278 (quotation omitted). Therefore, retroactive application of a new law is prohibited only if it affects an individual's substantive, vested rights. Id. at 772, 868 A.2d 278. In order to discern whether Goodlander had a vested right prior to the 2008 enactment of RSA 564-B:8-814, we must look to the language of the prior statute. We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448, 451, 879 A.2d 1161 (2005). When examining the language of a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Bennett v. Town of Hampstead, 157 N.H. 477, 483, 953 A.2d 388 (2008). We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Farmington Teachers, 158 N.H. at 456, 969 A.2d 422 (quotation omitted). Here, an analysis of the previous version of RSA 564-B:8-814 does not lead us to conclude that Tamposi's beneficial interest in the EMT Trust is equivalent to a vested right. See RSA 564-B:8-814 (2007). Prior to the adoption of the mere expectancy language in 2008, the relevant portion of RSA 564-B:8-814 read as follows: (a) Notwithstanding the breadth of discretion granted to a trustee in the terms of the trust, including the use of such terms as absolute, sole, or uncontrolled, the trustee shall exercise a discretionary power in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. (b) [U]nless the terms of the trust expressly indicate that a rule in this subsection does not apply: (1) A person other than a settlor who is a beneficiary and trustee of a trust that confers on the trustee a power to make discretionary distributions to or for the trustee's personal benefit may exercise the power only in accordance with an ascertainable standard; and (2) a trustee may not exercise a power to make discretionary distributions to satisfy a legal obligation of support that the trustee personally owes another person. This language gives no indication that a beneficial interest in a trust is equivalent to a vested interest. Indeed, it merely indicates that commonly used terms for the discretionary power of a trustee, such as absolute, sole, and uncontrolled, nonetheless require a trustee to act in accordance with the terms of the trust and in the interests of the beneficiaries. Here, the terms of the trust provide that a trustee, who is not also a beneficiary, has the discretion to distribute sub-trust funds to the beneficiaries for their education and maintenance in health and reasonable comfort, bearing in mind that the trustee has a fiduciary duty to all beneficiaries of the trust. However, as noted above, Tamposi is not empowered to direct the funds from the EMT Trust for her benefit because, under the terms of the SAT Trust, the EMT trustee is permitted the discretion to retain funds within the sub-trust or to distribute funds for the benefit of any one beneficiary, taking into account what is in the best interests of all the beneficiaries. Thus, Tamposi's interest in future trust distributions was not vested prior to the 2008 enactment of RSA 564-B:8-814(b) because the previous statute did not grant her legal title to future distributions, or the right to force distributions for her own benefit. See Goldman, 151 N.H. at 774, 868 A.2d 278. As we have determined that Tamposi, as a beneficiary, has no vested right to the future distribution of funds from the EMT Trust, Goodlander, whose status is that of a non-beneficiary spouse, does not possess a vested, substantive right to any future distributions of the EMT Trust. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in retroactively applying the provisions of the UTC. See RSA 564-B:8-814(b).