Opinion ID: 4561573
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation Weigh

Text: Against the Majority’s Approach I do not agree with the majority that the interpretation it has imposed on the language of part 5.609(c)(16) is sufficiently reasonable to create a statutory ambiguity, but there is no need to debate the issue. The available extrinsic aids to interpretation also weigh against the majority’s reading. Its interpretation assigns an unfounded purpose to the part 5.609(c)(16) exclusion that will seriously distort the intended operation of the annual income calculation for families receiving caregiving income under IHSS. In turn, this distortion will not only introduce unintended inequities among Section 8 families, but it is also likely to materially reduce the funds available to support housing subsidies for other low-income families in California. These unfortunate consequences weigh strongly against the majority’s ruling.
majority’s reading The majority finds support for its interpretation in commentary on part 5.609(c)(16) published by HUD around 11 In addition to addressing part 5.609(c)(2), discussed above, which excludes payments to foster families, Ali cited part 5.609(c)(12), which excludes from annual income “[a]doption assistance payments in excess of $480 per adopted child.” (Ali, supra, 938 N.W.2d at p. 839.) 20 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting the time of its adoption. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11–16.) Reviewing the same materials, the Court of Appeal found them “unhelpful in resolving the interpretive issue before us,” and I agree. (Reilly, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.) As quoted by the majority (maj. opn., ante, at p. 12), the commentary never expressly addresses the issue before us — the distinction between state payments made to reimburse a family’s expenditures for services and those made to compensate the family’s own provision of services — and does little more than parrot the language of the regulation. The commentary does use the term “homecare payments,” but it characterizes those payments in the language of the exclusion itself. That is, “homecare payments,” as the term is used by HUD, are payments made “to offset the cost of services and equipment needed to keep a developmentally disabled family member at home, rather than placing the family member in an institution.” (60 Fed.Reg. 17388, 17389 (Apr. 5, 1995).) HUD’s use of the term is therefore of no help in resolving the question before us. The majority’s contrary conclusion is based on circular reasoning. Beginning with its assumption that “homecare payments” means any payment made by the state in connection with the care in the home of a developmentally disabled person, the majority concludes that by joining that term with the regulatory language HUD signaled its agreement with the majority’s broad interpretation. The 21 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting conclusion that “homecare payments” refers to any payment by the state, however, rather than only those intended to offset family expenditures, is unsupported by anything in the commentary. In fact, the commentary clearly uses “homecare payments” merely as a synonym for the type of payments that are excluded by part 5.609(c)(16). Its use therefore confirms the majority’s interpretation only if one assumes that the regulation should be interpreted in the manner adopted by the majority. In reality, the HUD commentary simply does not address the question before us. The policy argument advanced by the majority in connection with HUD’s commentary is, in essence, that because payments made by the state to compensate a family for caregiving services may be critical in keeping a developmentally disabled family member in the home, they must be included within the part 5.609(c)(16) exclusion. The flaw in this logic, as the Court of Appeal noted in rejecting the same argument below (Reilly, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 434), is that it ignores the language of the regulation. Merely because these payments are important in keeping a developmentally disabled family member in the home does not alone mean that they “offset the costs of service and equipment” necessary to that task. As explained above, to reach the majority’s conclusion it is necessary to read the phrase “offset the costs” as synonymous with “for,” a different and broader term. Because it is the regulation’s language 22 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting that must guide our interpretation, we are required to respect HUD’s word choice. 2. The majority’s interpretation misunderstands the limited function of the part 5.609(c)(16) exclusion The impetus underlying the majority’s interpretation of part 5.609(c)(16) seems to be to maximize the Section 8 subsidy for persons in plaintiff’s situation, given the difficulties of their circumstances. In other words, if some subsidy is good, more is better. Because the purpose of the exclusion is to help burdened, low income families, it is difficult to argue with the sentiment. Yet our interpretation must be guided not by our own view of proper public policy, but by the views of Congress and HUD, the agency tasked with administering the Section 8 program. In implementing the congressional plan, HUD is required to balance a wide variety of pertinent policy and equity considerations, not the least of which is the allocation of very limited public resources among many needy families. Its policy choice is reflected in the language of part 5.609(c)(16), which limits the exclusion to out-of-pocket expenses. As discussed below, HUD’s choice is consistent with the foundational concerns of Section 8. The majority’s more expansive view upsets the balance struck by Section 8, will create unintended inequities in its implementation, and will ultimately lead to a 23 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting diminution in the housing assistance available to other lowincome Californians. The purpose of the part 5.609(c)(16) exclusion is to ensure that the acceptance of state financial help by families who keep a developmentally disabled family member at home does not place the families at a disadvantage in receiving Section 8 housing assistance; they are to be “ ‘encouraged, and not punished.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12 [quoting HUD explanation].) To accomplish this, part 5.609(c)(16) excludes from the families’ annual income funds provided by the state that the family spends on services and equipment to support at-home care of the disabled family member. By excluding this type of payment, the regulation ensures that the acceptance of state aid by families maintaining a developmentally disabled family member does not inflate their annual income and result in a diminished Section 8 subsidy. Instead, the family receives the same housing subsidy as other Section 8 families having a similar disposable income. There is no indication in the language of the regulation itself or the limited regulatory history that, in adopting part 5.609(c)(16), HUD intended to go further and provide affirmative advantages to families with a developmentally disabled member at home. HUD did not say such families should be preferentially benefitted, and not punished. Yet such a preferential benefit is the consequence of the 24 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting majority’s interpretation of part 5.609(c)(16), since it affords families who are paid to provide at-home care of a developmentally disabled family member substantially greater Section 8 housing subsidies than to other low-income families with the same family income. Section 8 housing subsidies are determined by a participating family’s income — that is, the funds available to the family to pay for rent and other daily needs.12 The part 5.609(c)(16) exclusion is necessary because the regulations defining “annual income” for purposes of Section 8 are very broad, including “all amounts, monetary or not” that “[g]o to, or on behalf of, the family head or spouse . . . or to any other family member.” (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(a)(1) (2020).) Given this comprehensive definition, any payments made by the state to a family for the care of a developmentally disabled family member are included in annual income under part 5.609(a), even if the payments are not available to the family to pay for rent and other daily needs because they merely offset family expenditures for at-home care. Properly understood, part 5.609(c)(16) prevents a family’s annual income from being inflated by payments covering such out-of12 Literally, it is not the subsidy that is determined by a family’s income. Rather, annual income determines the amount the family is required to contribute to its rent payment. The subsidy is then the difference between this contribution and the family’s actual rent. For purposes of this analysis, the difference is immaterial. 25 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting pocket expenses, recognizing that those payments should not be treated as income because they do not increase the resources available to the family for daily expenses. In the absence of the exclusion, the acceptance of such aid would reduce the family’s Section 8 subsidy without improving its standard of living — in the words of HUD, such families would be “punished.” This highlights the fundamental difference, for purposes of Section 8, between IHSS funds that are given to reimburse expenditures by a family and funds that compensate a family for the care of the disabled family member. Unlike funds that reimburse a family’s expenditures, funds provided by the state to compensate for the family’s caregiving activities are available to meet the family’s daily needs. That is their purpose. In accepting compensation for their caregiving activities, IHSS participants are effectively selling their labor to the state, and the resulting income is indistinguishable, in its impact on the family’s standard of living, from money earned working outside the home. For that reason, HUD has determined that this compensation is properly characterized as income under Section 8. This is particularly true of parents who are hired to provide caregiving responsibilities under IHSS. As noted above, the state precludes a parent’s acceptance of full-time work outside the home if the parent is receiving IHSS 26 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting compensation; such funding is available to parents only if “the [parent] leaves full-time employment or is prevented from obtaining full-time employment because no other suitable provider is available.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12300, subd. (e).) In other words, to receive funds from IHSS a parent must accept their disabled child’s care as, in effect, their job. Plaintiff is an example. So far as the appellate record reveals, caring for her daughter is her full-time activity, and IHSS compensation is her only income. The majority argues that the acceptance of compensation from IHSS is not “ ‘an employment for all purposes.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.) The issue here, however, is not whether IHSS “employs” caregivers for all purposes. As defined by part 5.609, “annual income” includes any “compensation for personal services,” not just income from formal employment. (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(b)(1) (2020).) The issue is therefore whether the compensation received from IHSS by persons like plaintiff should be treated the same as income received by Section 8 participants from other types of compensable labor. By limiting the exclusion of part 5.609(c)(16) to offsetting payments, HUD has declared that it should. The majority may disagree with HUD’s policy 27 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting choice, but it is HUD’s choice, not that of the majority, that must govern our interpretation.13 Excluding IHSS compensation from a Section 8 family’s annual income, as the majority requires, artificially reduces the family’s income and, consequently, increases the family’s housing subsidy above the level justified by its actual income. The effect can be substantial. Take, as an example, plaintiff. As noted above, a Section 8 family is ordinarily required to contribute 30 percent of its annual income toward rent. The remainder of its rent is paid by the program. Plaintiff’s family income in the latest year for which we have information was more than $52,000, consisting primarily of plaintiff’s $41,000 income from IHSS; the remainder was $11,000 in disability payments to K.R. If plaintiff’s IHSS compensation is included in her annual income for purposes of Section 8, the family would be expected to contribute $1,300 toward its monthly rent. Here, the majority would exclude plaintiff’s $41,000 in IHSS compensation from the 13 The majority also finds support in the exclusion of inhome care payments from “income” under the Internal Revenue Code. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 26–27.) Because Section 8 and the Internal Revenue Code are quite different statutes with very different aims, there is no reason why the exclusion of IHSS payments from federal taxable income should weigh in favor of their exclusion from “annual income” under Section 8. 28 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting family’s annual income. Plaintiff’s family will therefore be treated as though it had an annual income of $11,000, although it was living on an actual income of $52,000 per year. As a result, the family’s expected rent contribution will be reduced to $275.14 The remaining $1,005 of the family’s monthly rent payment, an annual gap of more than $12,000, must be made up from the Authority’s Section 8 funds. It is noteworthy that the majority nowhere acknowledges, let alone attempts to explain or justify, that its interpretation will treat a family with an annual income exceeding $52,000, more than three times the federal poverty level for a family of two, as though it were living far below the poverty line.15 Yet that is the clear and unavoidable import of its decision. Low-income families caring for a developmentally disabled family member at home face daily challenges 14 This assumes the resulting subsidy does not exceed the maximum permitted. Section 8 housing subsidies are capped by a “payment standard,” which is determined by local rental conditions. (See Nozzi v. Housing Authority (9th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3d 1178, 1184–1185; 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(b) (2020); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2).) The appellate record does not contain sufficient information from which we may determine whether plaintiff’s subsidy, as re-jiggered by the majority, would be capped. 15 The 2020 federal poverty level for a family of two is an annual income of $17,240. (See U.S. Dept. Health & Human Services, Poverty Guidelines (Jan. 2020) [as of Aug. 28, 2020].) 29 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting unknown to the rest of us. Few would begrudge such families a generous housing subsidy, above and beyond that provided to other low-income families with a similar income — if there was evidence that Congress or HUD intended to provide them such assistance. But as noted above, the part 5.609(c)(16) exclusion was intended to ensure that families receiving aid from IHSS are simply treated the same as, not better than, other families — to ensure that they were not punished, rather than to preferentially benefit them. 3. The majority’s interpretation will introduce unintended inequities into Section 8 implementation and reduce the availability of Section 8 housing assistance in California As discussed above, the majority’s reading of the part 5.609(c)(16) exclusion is contrary to its language and achieves the result, unintended by HUD, of granting IHSS participants like plaintiff substantially greater Section 8 subsidies than are justified by their actual income. That alone, of course, would be sufficient to reject the reading. But we should be particularly wary of imposing a rule HUD did not write, given the serious public policy consequences that will follow. As explained below, these consequences are of two types. First, the interpretation adopted by the majority will create inequities among families participating in the IHSS and Section 8 programs. Families that are paid through IHSS to care at home for a developmentally disabled person 30 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting will receive a far larger housing subsidy than families of similar income that (1) IHSS funds to hire a third party to care for a developmentally disabled family member in their home or (2) receive IHSS funds to care for a medically disabled family member. Second, and just as important, the majority’s interpretation will reduce, by an unknown but potentially sizable amount, the number of families that can obtain Section 8 housing assistance in California. The majority’s decision will not increase by a single dollar the Section 8 funds reaching California. Yet it will require the state’s counties to steer a significantly larger portion of their Section 8 housing funds to families that receive IHSS compensation for caring for a disabled member in the home. These increased subsidies can come from only one place: The funds available to other low-income families who are, or would have been, receiving housing assistance under Section 8. The majority’s expansive interpretation will come at the cost of assistance to other families in need. First the inequities. IHSS provides families with the funds necessary to maintain a developmentally disabled family member in their home. The Authority or the family can use these funds to hire a third-party caregiver or, alternatively, a member of the family for the same role. Both approaches serve the purposes of IHSS and the part 5.609(c)(16) exclusion by (1) keeping the 31 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting developmentally disabled family member out of an institution and (2) ensuring that the family is not disadvantaged in the receipt of Section 8 funds by doing so. So far as appears, neither HUD nor IHSS favors one option over the other; certainly there is no language in either Section 8 or IHSS reflecting a preference, as the majority acknowledges. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21 [“despite no expressed preference for family providers per se”].) Yet under the majority’s reading a family that provides its own compensated care will receive a far larger Section 8 housing voucher than the family that uses IHSS funds to hire a nonfamily member to provide the same care, even if both families have identical incomes. This occurs because, under the majority’s interpretation, some or all of the income of the first family, consisting of compensation received from IHSS, is excluded from the annual income, while the income of the second family, earned outside the home, is fully included. Assuming both families end up with similar disposable income, the first family will receive a far larger subsidy under Section 8 due to the exclusion of a significant portion of its disposable income. (See Reilly, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 437–438.) There is no indication in the language of part 5.609(c)(16) or the regulatory history to suggest that HUD intended this result; in its amicus curiae brief, HUD expressly disavows such an intent. 32 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting The majority seeks to explain away this disparity by claiming that persons needing 24-hour care “ ‘are more likely to receive better continuous care from relatives living with them whose care is more than contractual.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 21, quoting Miller v. Woods (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 870.) Neither Miller nor our appellate record contains evidence to support the proposition that third-party caregivers provide substandard care, compared to family members.16 But more to the point, the majority cites no evidence that HUD believed this to be true or that it crafted part 5.609(c)(16) based on any assumptions about the relative competence of family members versus third-party caregivers. Much of the majority’s policy justification for its interpretation is a recognition of the importance and difficulty of the work done by persons who care for a developmentally disabled family member at home. And I agree, there is no doubt that this work is difficult and important. If preferentially benefitting families who care for developmentally disabled members themselves, rather than 16 The majority notes that IHSS does not pay for 24-hour care. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26.) Although true, that is of no policy consequence here. Families that hire a third-party to provide care for a developmentally disabled family member in their home must provide the same type of uncompensated off-hours care for the dependent as families that receive IHSS compensation. 33 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting retain a third-party caregiver, were actually a motive underlying part 5.609(c)(16), however, one would expect some express indication that HUD intended to favor family care over care by third-party providers. As noted above, there is no such indication. In fact, the regulation is entirely silent, and therefore presumably neutral, on that issue.17 The majority’s interpretation will create a similar inequity between families that receive IHSS compensation to care for a developmentally disabled family member and families that receive IHSS funds to care for a medically disabled family member. (See Reilly, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 438.) Like families maintaining a developmentally disabled member in the home, families that maintain a medically disabled family member in the home can receive IHSS reimbursement for expenditures necessary to keep that person at home as well as compensation for caregiving by a family member. The Section 8 exclusion covering families with a medically disabled member, however, allows the 17 The majority also claims that if IHSS compensation is not excludable under part 5.609(c)(16), the two programs, IHSS and Section 8, will be at “cross-purposes,” presumably because accepting IHSS compensation will reduce a family’s Section 8 subsidy. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.) Accepting IHSS compensation, however, is no more at cross-purposes with Section 8 than is employment generally, since all income reduces a family’s Section 8 subsidy to the same degree. In any event, there are no cross-purposes. The supplement to a family’s income from accepting IHSS compensation far exceeds any corresponding decline in its Section 8 subsidy. 34 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting exclusion from annual income only of “[a]mounts . . . that are specifically for, or in reimbursement of, the cost of medical expenses . . . .” (§ 5.609(c)(4).) Although families caring for a medically disabled family member face challenges similar to those of families caring for a developmentally disabled family member, the enhanced Section 8 subsidy made available by the majority’s interpretation of part 5.609(c)(16) is unavailable to families with a medically disabled member. Such families will also receive a materially reduced Section 8 subsidy compared to families that benefit from the majority’s interpretation of part 5.609(c)(16). The majority responds that this disparity “is inherent in the federal regulation itself” because part 5.609(c)(4) permits recovery only of payments to third-party providers. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.) The argument misses the point. Part 5.609(c)(16) has a materially wider scope than part 5.609(c)(4) only because the majority has interpreted it that way. If “offset the cost of services and equipment” is interpreted to cover only the reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenditures, the two exclusions have a similar scope. It is not “the federal regulation itself,” but the majority’s interpretation of it, that creates an inequity. The majority otherwise fails to explain what possible public policy supports giving families with a developmentally disabled member far 35 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting more advantageous treatment under Section 8 than families with a medically disabled family member.18 The second unfortunate policy consequence of the majority’s interpretation of part 5.609(c)(16) is its inevitable diminution of the funds available to other low-income participants in the Section 8 program. In an ideal world, the majority’s award of greater Section 8 housing subsidies to low-income families receiving state compensation to care for disabled family members at home would be financed by additional congressional appropriations for the Section 8 program. In our real world, it does not work that way. Already, Section 8 housing subsidies are available only to a relatively small subset of all eligible families. The Authority, for example, is authorized to serve less than one-third of the families that qualify for its help. Yet even that does not fully capture the inadequacy of the program. Presumably because 18 The majority’s claim that HUD believes that families with a developmentally disabled member would “receive unfair treatment” if they were not allowed to exclude income (maj. opn., ante, at p. 20) is based entirely on HUD’s comment that such families should be “ ‘encouraged, and not punished’ ” (ibid., italics omitted). Because no other class of Section 8 participants, besides foster parents, is able to exclude such income, restricting the exclusion to reimbursement of expenditures hardly constitutes punishment. The majority argues that such families will be punished if their income is not excluded because they might not qualify for Section 8 subsidy. (Ibid.) Again, the same is true of all other families who have too much income to qualify for Section 8; it is not a punishment. 36 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting of congressional underfunding, the Authority actually provides vouchers to only 1,957 families, rather than the 2,153 it is authorized to help. The majority’s generosity toward plaintiff and similar IHSS participants does not come without cost, and that cost will likely be borne by other low-income families in California. The funding available to the Authority will not be increased by $12,000 per year merely because the majority has decreed that plaintiff must receive an additional annual subsidy of $12,000. Instead, given the fixed and inadequate budgets available under Section 8, it is likely that every additional dollar of subsidy provided to families with a developmentally disabled member at home will come directly from the funds available to subsidize the housing of other low-income families that are, or could have been, served by the Authority. By skewing the allocation of Section 8 housing subsidies to families receiving IHSS compensation, contrary to HUD’s express intent, the majority’s misinterpretation of the regulation will likely lead to a reduction in the housing subsidies available to other low-income families in California, and these will likely be reduced in an amount equal to the 37 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting enhanced subsidies given by the majority to IHSS participants.19 If the language of part 5.609(c)(16) required this result, we would be duty-bound to implement it. In fact, the result is eminently avoidable. To bring it about, the majority stretches the language of the regulation and fails to account for the serious public policy implications weighing against its decision. Further, the dubious end result is to require the Authority to treat a family with an income of more than $50,000 as though it were living on $11,000. In the process, the majority will divert the Authority’s all-too-scarce lowincome housing assistance away from other needy families. Every other court to consider the issue has avoided this result, and this court should as well. CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. We Concur: CORRIGAN, J. KRUGER, J. 19 We lack the evidence necessary to estimate the financial impact of the majority’s interpretation, but the limited information available suggests that it could be substantial. According to the state data cited above (see ante, fn. 6), there are currently 250,000 “live-in relative providers” caring for a disabled family member under IHSS. If just a tiny proportion of those live-in relatives care for a developmentally disabled person, participate in the Section 8 program, and receive IHSS compensation similar to that of plaintiff, the majority’s ruling will divert millions of dollars in Section 8 housing subsidies from other low income families state-wide. 38 See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion Reilly v. Marin Housing Authority __________________________________________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion Original Appeal Original Proceeding Review Granted XX 23 Cal.App.5th 425 Rehearing Granted __________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S249593 Date Filed: August 31, 2020 __________________________________________________________________________________ Court: Superior County: Marin Judge: Paul M. Haakenson __________________________________________________________________________________ Counsel: Law Offices of Frank S. Moore, Frank S. Moore; Autumn M. Elliott, Ben Conway and Deborah Gettleman for Plaintiff and Appellant. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Thomas M. Peterson and Jordan Mundell for Association of Regional Center Agencies, Autism Society of Los Angeles, CASHPCR, Disability Voices United, Fairview Families and Friends, Inc., Housing Choices, Jewish Los Angeles Special Needs Trust (JLA Trust), National Disability Rights Network, Professor Alison Morantz and Public Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. Munger, Tolles & Olson and Michael E. Soloff for National Housing Law Project and Western Center on Law and Poverty as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. Ilya Filmus; WFBM, Randall J. Lee, Anne C. Gritzer; Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker and Robert Cooper for Defendant and Respondent. Paul Compton, Miniard Culpepper, David M. Reizes, Alexandra N. Iorio, Joseph H. Hunt, Alisa B. Klein, Melissa N. Patterson and Brad Hinshelwood for United States as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): Autumn M. Elliott Disability Rights California 350 S. Bixel Street, Ste. 290 Los Angeles, CA 90017 (213) 213-8000 Robert Cooper Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP 555 S. Flower Street, Suite 2900 Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 443-5100 Brad Hinshelwood