Opinion ID: 1119473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Battered Women's Syndrome[3]

Text: (2a) Battered women's syndrome has been defined as `a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives.' ( State v. Kelly (1984) 97 N.J. 178, 193 [478 A.2d 364, 371]; see also People v. Aris (1989) 215 Cal. App.3d 1178, 1194 [264 Cal. Rptr. 167] [`a pattern of psychological symptoms that develop after somebody has lived in a battering relationship']; Note, Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers (1993) 106 Harv.L.Rev. 1574, 1578 [`a pattern of responses and perceptions presumed to be characteristic of women who have been subjected to continuous physical abuse by their mate[s]'].) ( People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 735, fn. 1 [35 Cal. Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388].) (3a) The trial court allowed the jury to consider the battered women's syndrome evidence in deciding whether defendant actually believed she needed to kill in self-defense. The question here is whether the evidence was also relevant on the reasonableness of that belief. Two Court of Appeal decisions have considered the relevance of battered women's syndrome evidence to a claim of self-defense. People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d at page 1185, applied the law of self-defense in the context of a battered woman killing the batterer while he slept after he had beaten the killer and threatened serious bodily injury and death when he awoke. There, unlike here, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense, but it did instruct on imperfect self-defense. The appellate court upheld the refusal, finding that defendant presented no substantial evidence that a reasonable person under the same circumstances would have perceived imminent danger and a need to kill in self-defense. ( Id. at p. 1192.) [4] The trial court admitted some evidence of battered women's syndrome, but the defendant argued that it erred by excluding expert testimony (1) that defendant was a battered woman based on the expert's psychological evaluation of the defendant and (2) `explaining how the psychological impact of being a battered woman affected her perception of danger at the time she shot her husband.' ( People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d at p. 1193.) Although the trial court did not instruct on perfect self-defense, the appellate court first concluded that battered women's syndrome evidence is not relevant to the reasonableness element. [T]he questions of the reasonableness of a defendant's belief that self-defense is necessary and of the reasonableness of the actions taken in self-defense do not call for an evaluation of the defendant's subjective state of mind, but for an objective evaluation of the defendant's assertedly defensive acts. California law expresses the criterion for this evaluation in the objective terms of whether a reasonable person, as opposed to the defendant, would have believed and acted as the defendant did. We hold that expert testimony about a defendant's state of mind is not relevant to the reasonableness of the defendant's self-defense. ( People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d at p. 1196, italics in original.) The court then found the evidence highly relevant to the first element of self-defense  defendant's actual, subjective perception that she was in danger and that she had to kill her husband to avoid that danger.... [¶] The relevance to the defendant's actual perception lies in the opinion's explanation of how such a perception would reasonably follow from the defendant's experience as a battered woman. This relates to the prosecution's argument that such a perception of imminent danger makes no sense when the victim is asleep and a way of escape open and, therefore, she did not actually have that perception. ( People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d at p. 1197.) The trial court thus erred in not admitting the testimony to show how the defendant's particular experiences as a battered woman affected her perceptions of danger, its imminence, and what actions were necessary to protect herself. ( Id. at p. 1198.) Concerned that the jury in a particular case may misuse such evidence to establish the reasonableness requirement for perfect self-defense, for which purpose it is irrelevant, the Aris court stated that, upon request whenever the jury is instructed on perfect self-defense, trial courts should instruct that such testimony is relevant only to prove the honest belief requirement for both perfect and imperfect self-defense, not to prove the reasonableness requirement for perfect self-defense. ( People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d at p. 1199.) The trial court gave such an instruction here, thus creating the issue before us. In People v. Day (1992) 2 Cal. App.4th 405 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 916], the defendant moved for a new trial following her conviction of involuntary manslaughter. Supported by an affidavit by Dr. Bowker, she argued that her attorney should have presented evidence of battered women's syndrome to aid her claim of self-defense. Relying on Aris, the appellate court first found that the evidence would not have been relevant to show the objective reasonableness of the defendant's actions. ( People v. Day, supra, at pp. 414-415.) It also found, however, that the evidence would have been admissible to rehabilitate the defendant's credibility as a witness. ( Id. at pp. 415-419.) Finding that counsel's failure to present the evidence was prejudicial, the court reversed the judgment. ( Id. at pp. 419-420.) The Attorney General argues that People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d 1178, and People v. Day, supra, 2 Cal. App.4th 405, were correct that evidence of battered women's syndrome is irrelevant to reasonableness. We disagree. Those cases too narrowly interpreted the reasonableness element. Aris and Day failed to consider that the jury, in determining objective reasonableness, must view the situation from the defendant's perspective. Here, for example, Dr. Bowker testified that the violence can escalate and that a battered woman can become increasingly sensitive to the abuser's behavior, testimony relevant to determining whether defendant reasonably believed when she fired the gun that this time the threat to her life was imminent. Indeed, the prosecutor argued that, from an objective, reasonable man's standard, there was no reason for her to go get that gun. This threat that she says he made was like so many threats before. There was no reason for her to react that way. Dr. Bowker's testimony supplied a response that the jury might not otherwise receive. As violence increases over time, and threats gain credibility, a battered person might become sensitized and thus able reasonably to discern when danger is real and when it is not. [T]he expert's testimony might also enable the jury to find that the battered [woman] ... is particularly able to predict accurately the likely extent of violence in any attack on her. That conclusion could significantly affect the jury's evaluation of the reasonableness of defendant's fear for her life. ( State v. Kelly (1984) 97 N.J. 178 [478 A.2d 364, 378], italics added, fn. omitted.) (2b) The Attorney General concedes that Hampton's behavior towards defendant, including prior threats and violence, was relevant to reasonableness (see People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065 [56 Cal. Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337]), but distinguishes between evidence of this behavior  which the trial court fully admitted  and expert testimony about its effects on defendant. The distinction is untenable. To effectively present the situation as perceived by the defendant, and the reasonableness of her fear, the defense has the option to explain her feelings to enable the jury to overcome stereotyped impressions about women who remain in abusive relationships. It is appropriate that the jury be given a professional explanation of the battering syndrome and its effects on the woman through the use of expert testimony. [Citation.] ( State v. Allery (1984) 101 Wn.2d 591 [682 P.2d 312, 316].) The Attorney General also argues that allowing consideration of this testimony would result in an undesirable battle of the experts and raises the specter of other battles of experts regarding other syndromes. The Legislature, however, has decided that, if relevant, expert evidence on battered women's syndrome is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 1107.) We have found it relevant; it is therefore admissible. We express no opinion on the admissibility of expert testimony regarding other possible syndromes in support of a claim of self-defense, but we rest today's holding on Evidence Code section 1107. Contrary to the Attorney General's argument, we are not changing the standard from objective to subjective, or replacing the reasonable person standard with a reasonable battered woman standard. Our decision would not, in another context, compel adoption of a `reasonable gang member' standard. Evidence Code section 1107 states a rule of evidence only and makes no substantive change. (Evid. Code, § 1107, subd. (d).) The jury must consider defendant's situation and knowledge, which makes the evidence relevant, but the ultimate question is whether a reasonable person, not a reasonable battered woman, would believe in the need to kill to prevent imminent harm. Moreover, it is the jury, not the expert, that determines whether defendant's belief and, ultimately, her actions, were objectively reasonable. (3b) Battered women's syndrome evidence was also relevant to defendant's credibility. It would have assisted the jury in objectively analyzing [defendant's] claim of self-defense by dispelling many of the commonly held misconceptions about battered women. ( People v. Day, supra, 2 Cal. App.4th at p. 416.) For example, in urging the jury not to believe defendant's testimony that Hampton shot at her the night before the killing, the prosecutor argued that if this defendant truly believed that [Hampton] had shot at her, on that night, I mean she would have left.... [¶] If she really believed that he had tried to shoot her, she would not have stayed. Dr. Bowker's testimony `would help dispel the ordinary lay person's perception that a woman in a battering relationship is free to leave at any time. The expert evidence would counter any common sense conclusions by the jury that if the beatings were really that bad the woman would have left her husband much earlier. Popular misconceptions about battered women would be put to rest....' ( People v. Day, supra, 2 Cal. App.4th at p. 417, quoting State v. Hodges (1986) 293 Kan. 63 [716 P.2d 563, 567].) [I]f the jury had understood [defendant's] conduct in light of [battered women's syndrome] evidence, then the jury may well have concluded her version of the events was sufficiently credible to warrant an acquittal on the facts as she related them. ( People v. Day, supra, 2 Cal. App.4th at p. 415.) (4) As Day recognizes, People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289 [283 Cal. Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563] supports this conclusion. There we held that expert testimony regarding parental reluctance to report child molestation was admissible to bolster a witness's credibility: Most jurors, fortunately, have been spared the experience of being the parent of a sexually molested child. Lacking that experience, jurors can rely only on their intuition or on relevant evidence introduced at trial.... [Evidence that parents often do not report child molestation] would therefore `assist the trier of fact' (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a)) by giving the jurors information they needed to objectively evaluate [the witness's] credibility. ( Id. at p. 1302, fn. omitted.) (2c) As in McAlpin, the expert testimony in this case was `needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions....' ( Id. at p. 1301.) It was relevant to explain a behavior pattern that might otherwise appear unreasonable to the average person. Evidence of [battered women's syndrome] not only explains how a battered woman might think, react, or behave, it places the behavior in an understandable light. ( People v. Day, supra, 2 Cal. App.4th at p. 419.) Thus, it was admissible under Evidence Code sections 801 and 1107. We do not hold that Dr. Bowker's entire testimony was relevant to both prongs of perfect self-defense. Just as many types of evidence may be relevant to some disputed issues but not all, some of the expert evidence was no doubt relevant only to the subjective existence of defendant's belief. Evidence merely showing that a person's use of deadly force is scientifically explainable or empirically common does not, in itself, show it was objectively reasonable. To dispel any possible confusion, it might be appropriate for the court, on request, to clarify that, in assessing reasonableness, the question is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have perceived a threat of imminent injury or death, and not whether killing the abuser was reasonable in the sense of being an understandable response to ongoing abuse; and that, therefore, in making that assessment, the jury may not consider evidence merely showing that an abused person's use of force against the abuser is understandable. [5] We also emphasize that, as with any evidence, the jury may give this testimony whatever weight it deems appropriate in light of the evidence as a whole. The ultimate judgment of reasonableness is solely for the jury. We simply hold that evidence of battered women's syndrome is generally relevant to the reasonableness, as well as the subjective existence, of defendant's belief in the need to defend, and, to the extent it is relevant, the jury may consider it in deciding both questions. The court's contrary instruction was erroneous. We disapprove of People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d 1178, and People v. Day, supra, 2 Cal. App.4th 405, to the extent they are inconsistent with this conclusion.