Opinion ID: 799761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entry into the Southerland Home: Probable Cause Claim

Text: On June 9, 1997, having procured a court order under New York Family Court Act § 1034(2) (McKinney 1997), Timothy Woo entered the Southerland home in order to conduct an investigation mandated by New York Social Services Law § 424. The latter statute requires child welfare authorities, upon receipt of a complaint of possible child abuse or neglect, to commence, within twenty-four hours, an appropriate investigation which shall include an evaluation of the environment of the child named in the report and any other children in the same home and a determination of the risk to such children if they continue to remain in the existing home environment. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 424(6)(a). Meanwhile, New York Family Court Act § 1034(2) permits courts to authorize a home entry even without parental consent upon finding probable cause to believe that an abused or neglected child may be found on premises. In procuring a § 1034(2) warrant to enter the Southerland home, Woo submitted an affidavit stating that he believed that named children in the residence were neglected or abused because (1) one child, sixteen-year-old Ciara Manning, had tried to kill herself by swallowing non-toxic paint, and her custodial father, Southerland, had not obtained any treatment for her; [2] and (2) Southerland had refused to allow child welfare workers into his home to speak to other named children on the premises. Southerland v. City of N.Y., 680 F.3d at 134-35 n. 5 (quoting Woo application in entirety). The fact that Woo's challenged entry was pursuant to a court order gives rise to a presumption that it was objectively reasonable for [him] to believe that the entry was supported by probable cause, thereby affording him qualified immunity from suit for a purported violation of the Fourth Amendment. Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 115 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir.1997); see Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S.Ct. at 1245 (Where the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or, as we have sometimes put it, in objective good faith. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d at 155-56. To overcome this presumption, plaintiffs were obliged to make a substantial preliminary showing (1) that Woo knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or material omissions to secure the entry order; and (2) that the allegedly false statements or material omissions were necessary to the finding of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); accord Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d at 155-56; see Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 115 F.3d at 115. Toward that end, plaintiffs alleged that Woo's § 1034(2) application contained a number of knowing or reckless misstatements and omissions that defeated probable cause. In rejecting this claim, the district court relied on the corrected affidavit doctrine, which affords qualified immunity if, when false material is set aside, or omitted information is supplied, the corrected affidavit would have supported a reasonable officer's belief that probable cause existed. Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 115 F.3d at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d at 158. Reversing, the panel reasons that insofar as Woo's § 1034(2) application identified Ciara Manning as the neglected or abused child to be sought in the Southerland home, the required probable cause to believe that she would be found on premises was defeated if Woo's affidavit were corrected to include the omitted facts that (1) school reports indicated that Ciara might be staying outside the Southerland home, over the opposition of her father; and (2) Southerland had told Woo that Ciara was a runaway not living at home. See Southerland v. City of N.Y., 680 F.3d at 144-46. The conclusion that these corrections defeat probable cause to think that Ciara Manning might be found in the Southerland home is wrong as a matter of law. While probable cause requires more than mere suspicion, Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957), it does not demand hard certainties, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Indeed, probable cause does not even require that something be more likely so than not so, the preponderance standard of proof. See id. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (cautioning that [f]inely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in probable cause determination). Rather, probable cause is a fluid concept, concerned simply with probabilities. Id. at 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317. In assessing what is probable, a judicial officer must look to `the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.' Id. at 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)); accord Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d at 156-57. With these principles in mind, it is important to note exactly what New York Family Court Act § 1034(2) requires be probable to authorize entry into a home, i.e., that an abused or neglected child may be found on premises. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1034(2) (emphasis added). In short, it need not be probable that an abused or neglected child will be found on the premises; it need only be probable that such a child may be found there. Among the various probabilities required by law to justify searches or seizures serving different purposes, § 1034(2)'s may be found requirement is not a particularly demanding one. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 121-29 (2d Cir. 2010) (contrasting probable cause requirements for criminal and national security surveillance and recognizing flexibility of Constitution's warrant requirement, such that different probable cause standards may be compatible with Fourth Amendment in light of different purposes and practical considerations at issue). Indeed, plaintiffs do not dispute that a may be found requirement is consistent with the purpose being pursued, which in the case of a § 1034(2) entry is not prosecutorial but protective, i.e., promptly to locate and assist an at-risk child. See generally Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir.2003) (Few matters are closer to the core of a State's essential function than the protection of its children against those who would, intentionally or not, do them harm.). Thus, while an entry into a criminal target's home to execute a warrant for his arrest requires a reasonable belief that the suspect is within, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); see United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 214 (2d Cir.1995), an entry into premises to locate a neglected or abused child requires a probability only that the child may be found on those premises. In identifying the places where a neglected or abused child may be found, this court should clarify that there is always probable cause to think that a child may be found at her legal residence, i.e., the residence of her custodial parent, at least absent conclusive evidence to the contrary. Indeed, it is the first place that any reasonable and prudent person would look for a child. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317. The addition of the omitted information to Woo's affidavit warrants no different conclusion. School reports that Ciara Manning might be staying some place other than her legal residence referenced, at most, a possibility, which is not enough to defeat the probability that the child nevertheless may be found at her residence. Cf. United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that possible innocent explanation for facts alleged does not negate probable cause to infer criminality from those facts). As for Southerland's characterization of his daughter as a runaway, the law does not require that such a statement be credited. See generally Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir.1987) (stating that officials need not defer action merely because parent protests innocence or promises future protection if evidence indicates parent's past unwillingness or inability to assure child's safety and well-being). Any different conclusion would yield the perverse result of an abusive parent having only to deny a child's presence on the premises to preclude a caseworker from obtaining or executing a warrant to investigate reports of abuse. Precisely to avoid the risk that any such argument could be derived from the panel opinion, the court needs to clarify en banc that there is always probable cause to think that an at-risk child may be found at the residence of her custodial parent absent conclusive evidence that she is in fact somewhere else. [3] With that understanding of the law, a corrected affidavit in this case discloses no genuine dispute as to the existence of probable cause to enter the Southerland home to look for the identified neglected child, Ciara Manning. Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d at 158 (emphasis in original). In any event, because five judges of this court hold that view of the law, the panel can hardly maintain that no officer[ ] of reasonable competence could have reached the same conclusion. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092; Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d at 154 (collecting cases). Thus, Woo is plainly entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment illegal entry claims. [4]