Opinion ID: 2634596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Whether she was denied due process of law.

Text: The basic elements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Winston v. Kansas Dept. of SRS, 274 Kan. 396, 409, 49 P.3d 1274, 1283 (2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1088 (2002). Whether due process has been accorded in a particular case is a question of law. In re Habeas Corpus Application of Pierpoint, 271 Kan. 620, 627, 24 P.3d 128 (2001). The district court identified the real issue to be addressed as whether the Workers Compensation Division engaged in any unlawful procedures or failed to follow proper procedure as required by K.S.A. 77-621(c)(5). K.S.A. 44-5,120(e) provides in relevant part: Whenever the director . . . has reason to believe that any person has engaged or is engaging in any fraudulent or abusive act or practice in connection with the conduct of Kansas workers compensation insurance, claims, benefits or services in this state, . . . the director . . . shall issue and serve upon such person a summary order or statement of the charges with respect thereto and shall conduct a hearing thereon in accordance with the provisions of the Kansas administrative procedure act. Complaints filed with the director . . . may be dismissed by the director . . . on [his or her] own initiative, and shall be dismissed upon the written request of the complainant, if the director . . . has not conducted a hearing or taken other administrative action dismissing the complaint within 180 days of the filing of the complaint. In concluding that the Division of Workers Compensation did not engage in any unlawful procedures or fail to follow proper procedure, the trial court found: [A] summary order/complaint was issued by the Director of the Workers Compensation Division, Phillip Harness, on January 3, 2001, thereby making Petitioner aware of the charges against her and satisfying the requirement of K.S.A. 44-5,120(e). Although more than 180 days passed between the filing of the summary order on January 3, 2001, and the fraud and abuse hearing conducted on September 21, 2001, Petitioner apparently never filed a request to have the complaint dismissed pursuant to K.S.A. 44-5,120(e), therefore, the issue is moot. The next requirement of K.S.A. § 44-5,120(e) mandates a hearing be conducted in accordance with the Kansas Administrative Procedure Act (KAPA) § 77-501 et seq. K.S.A. § 77-513 provides guidance on the applicable procedures for hearings.... Contrary to the assertions by Petitioner that she was denied the benefit of a hearing or the opportunity to present evidence, a fraud and abuse hearing was conducted on September 21, 2001, during which time Petitioner was given the opportunity to present evidence for herself. Statements made otherwise by Petitioner in her brief are a blatant misrepresentation of fact and are a disservice to the administration of justice. The Workers Compensation Act provides for a hearing in accordance with KAPA, which indicates in K.S.A. 77-513 that hearings are governed by K.S.A. 77-513 through 77-532. The Kansas legislature's intent, concerning which portions of KAPA are to be applied to a hearing, is unambiguous. Arguments made by Petitioner that K.S.A. 77-511, which is not one of the statutes enumerated by K.S.A. 77-513, imposes any duties upon the Division of Workers Compensation are erroneous and therefore irrelevant and will not be considered further. On appeal, Butanda first argues she was denied due process because the Division of Workers Compensation did not notify her of the complaint within 30 days and did not approve or deny the complaint within 90 days after receipt of the complaint pursuant to K.S.A. 77-511. Other than her own contention, Butanda provides no authority or reasons concerning her claim that K.S.A. 77-511 applies. Issues not briefed are deemed abandoned. State v. Brown, 272 Kan. 843, 844, 35 P.3d 910 (2001). Nevertheless, an examination of K.S.A. 77-511 and K.S.A. 77-513 reveals that the trial court determination that 77-513 applied is correct. K.S.A. 44-5,120(e) provides that the hearing should be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Kansas Administrative Procedure Act (KAPA). Both statutes are part of KAPA. K.S.A. 77-511 provides in part: (a) Except to the extent that the time limits in this subsection are inconsistent with limits established by another statute, a state agency shall process an application for an order on which a statute provides for a hearing under this act as follows: (1) Within 30 days after receipt of the application, the state agency shall acknowledge receipt thereof and inform the applicant of the name, official title, mailing address and telephone number of a state agency member or employee who may be contacted regarding the application. As soon as practicable, the state agency shall notify the applicant of any apparent errors or omissions. Failure to detect such errors or omissions does not preclude the state agency from raising them at a later stage of the proceeding. K.S.A. 77-513 provides: When a statute provides for a hearing in accordance with this act, the hearing shall be governed by K.S.A. 77-513 through 77-532, and amendments thereto, except as otherwise provided by: (a) A statute other than this act; or (b) K.S.A. 77-533 through 77-541, and amendments thereto. In this case, neither the complaint nor the summary order is an application for an order under K.S.A. 77-511. In contrast, K.S.A. 77-513 unambiguously provides that when a statute provides for a hearing in accordance with KAPA, as does 44-5,120, the hearing is governed by other statutes which do not include K.S.A. 77-511. As such, Butanda was not denied due process by the Director's failure to comply with K.S.A. 77-511. Butanda next argues that she was denied due process of law when the director waited over a year after receiving the results of the investigation on November 17, 1999, before issuing the summary order. She argues there was no need to protect the public interest pursuant to K.S.A. 77-537(2). Butanda also contends that she was denied due process of law when she was not given a right to a hearing before she was found guilty in the summary order. K.S.A. 77-537 provides in relevant part: (a) A state agency may use summary proceedings, subject to a party's request for a hearing on the order, if: (1) The use of those proceedings in the circumstances does not violate any provision of law; and (2) the protection of the public interest does not require the state agency to give notice and an opportunity to participate to persons other than the parties. (b) The state agency shall serve each party with a copy of the order in a summary proceeding in the manner prescribed by K.S.A. 77-531, and amendments thereto. The order shall include at least: (1) A statement of the state agency's action and, if unfavorable action is taken, a brief statement of the reasons for the action; (2) notice of the time and manner for requesting a hearing on the order, as provided in K.S.A. 77-542. Although there was a delay in the issuance of the summary order, the director complied with this provision of KAPA by issuing a summary order on January 3, 2001, and informing Butanda that she must request a hearing within 15 days of service of the order. See K.S.A. 77-542. Butanda was provided a full hearing on the matter before the hearing officer on September 21, 2001, where she had the opportunity to be heard, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. Butanda argues she was denied due process of law when the hearing officer denied her motion to take the deposition of the director. She claims she had a right to ask him about the factual basis for the complaint and the right to ascertain the exact date that the complaint was received. The summary order issued by the director provided Butanda with the specific charges she was alleged to have violated subject to her request for a hearing. If she requested no hearing, the allegations in the order are deemed admitted. However, she was granted a full hearing upon her request with the right to confront witnesses through cross-examination and present her own evidence. The need to depose the director to determine the factual basis for the complaint was therefore properly denied. Her further contention that the director would establish a date for the complaint was based upon her contention that K.S.A. 77-511 applied. Our determination that K.S.A. 77-513 applied demonstrates that a deposition of the director for this purpose was not necessary. The denial of her request to depose the director did not deny Butanda due process. Butanda argues she was denied due process of law when the hearing officer who serves as a special administrative law judge for the Division of Workers Compensation refused to recuse himself. She argues that he was not an objective trier of fact because he is under the supervision of the director, the complainant in this case. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 77-514(a) provides that the agency head, one or more members of the agency head, an administrative law judge assigned by the office of administrative hearings, or, unless prohibited by K.S.A. 77-551, one or more persons designated by the agency head may be the presiding officer. The director complied with this statute by appointing a special administrative law judge, Larry Karns, to serve as the hearing officer. Butanda's argument is akin to a defendant arguing that he cannot be represented by a public defender because the State is paying his fees. This argument is without merit. Likewise, Butanda argues that she was denied due process when the director appointed a nonobjective trier of fact in Secretary Designee Hager because he is an attorney for the Kansas Department of Human Resources and represents the interest of the director and the Division of Workers Compensation. This argument likewise fails, as the appointment was within his authority pursuant to K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 77-514(a), and Butanda failed to petition for his disqualification under K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 77-514(c). Pursuant to K.S.A. 44-5,120(e), Butanda was given notice of the complaint by receipt of the summary order. Although the hearing was conducted beyond 180 days later, Butanda failed to request that the case be dismissed as required by the statute. Butanda was given the opportunity to be heard at the fraud and abuse hearing on September 21, 2001, and she has had the benefit of two additional levels of appeal. Butanda was not deprived of her right to due process.