Opinion ID: 2375795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: were the instructions improper?

Text: There is a two-pronged attack on the instructions. Movant Raine argues that they are in error because the trial court instructed the jury that the two attorneys owed a duty of ordinary care to the two doctors in their filing of the malicious prosecution action. The Court of Appeals disagreed, but reversed and remanded because if felt that the ordinary care instruction may well have unduly confused the jury in its award of punitive damages. In instruction No. 1, the trial court did place two duties on the attorneys. It was emphasized, however, that before a recovery could be had by the plaintiff doctors, both duties must be breached. The appropriate section is as follows: It was the duty of the defendants . . . in filing the malicious prosecution suit against [the doctors] . . . to know and exercise that degree of care which ordinarily careful, skillful and prudent attorneys know and exercise under circumstances like or similar to those shown in this case. It was the further duty not to institute a legal proceeding against [the doctors] without probable cause and/or to institute such proceedings maliciously. If you believe from the evidence that the defendants negligently failed to exercise the duties imposed upon them . . . you will find for the plaintiffs . . . . (emphasis added). Instruction No. 2 defined probable cause. It states that probable cause means such grounds as would induce an attorney of ordinary prudence to believe that the person sued for malpractice had committed the act charged. Instruction No. 3 defined malice and stated, properly, that it could be inferred from a lack of probable cause. Instruction No. 4 defined ordinary care as that degree of care that an ordinarily careful and prudent lawyer would exercise under the same circumstances. Instruction No. 5 set out the elements of compensatory damages recoverable by the plaintiff doctors. It was limited to a sum that would fairly and reasonably compensate them for any humiliation or mortification or loss of reputation, and such pain and suffering, mental or physical, as you believe from the evidence they have endured and which is reasonably probable they will endure in the future as the result or (sic) the defendants' acts . . . . Instructions Nos. 6 and 7 deal with punitive damages. In No. 6, the jury was told if the conduct of the defendant attorneys was gross negligence they could award, in addition to compensatory damages, punitive damages. Gross negligence was defined as wanton or reckless disregard or a willful and malicious act. Instruction No. 7 defined compensatory damages as an adequate equivalent of the loss or injury sustained. Punitive damages were defined as such damages as are given in addition to compensatory damages for a wrong or anything done or inflicted wrongfully upon another. Raine argues that the instruction No. 1, which, in part, required the attorney to exercise ordinary care was improper under the case of Hill v. Willmott, Ky.App., 561 S.W.2d 331 (1978). Raine identifies that case as a malicious prosecution case. It clearly is not a malicious prosecution case. The complaint sounded in negligence, claiming a duty was owed by the plaintiff's attorney to the defendant, prior to filing a malpractice action. The Court of Appeals correctly decided that, as the basis for a negligence action, no such duty existed. However, the Court pointed out that the attorney's  alleged failure to investigate the facts and law prior to filing of the suit (malpractice action) would have been material as to the question of `probable cause' in a malicious prosecution action if such had been pleaded.  Id., at 335. (emphasis added). Hill obviously does not sustain Raine's position but rather corroborates that of the doctors. The Court of Appeals, using Hill as authority, stated that the instruction was improper, but not prejudicial. As we view instruction No. 1, it required two duties of the attorneys: (1) Prior to filing the malpractice action, they should act in the same manner as a prudent attorney, and (2) that the suit should not have been filed without probable cause. No recovery can be had by plaintiff doctors unless both duties are breached. The prerequisite of probable cause is added to by the requirement of ordinary care. The duty of ordinary care is not owed to the defendant doctors in the sense of a negligence case; Hill, supra , but rather is owed in establishing probable cause (or a lack thereof). We find neither error nor prejudice to the attorneys. Indeed, if there was a prejudice it was to the doctors. As stated, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a retrial on the question of punitive damages. The court stated that the right of the doctors not to be prosecuted negligently (pursuant to instruction No. 1), may well have played a part in the weighing of the degree of culpability of the attorneys, and thereby increasing the amount of the punitive damages which the court described as being not parsimonious. The basis of this ruling was the court's view that instruction No. 1 was improper, and in the matter of punitive damages, was prejudicial. As stated, we do not agree that instruction No. 1 was improper. Therefore, we do not agree that any prejudice resulted in Raine. There is no doubt that punitive damages may be awarded in malicious prosecution actions. W.T. Grant v. Taylor, 223 Ky. 812, 4 S.W.2d 741 (1928); Jefferson Dry Goods v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73, 199 S.W.2d 994 (1947). In order to justify an award of punitive damages, the evidence must show malice, wilfulness or wanton disregard of the rights of others. Stamper v. McCally, 312 Ky. 619, 229 S.W.2d 54 (1950). W.T. Grant v. Taylor, supra . Instructions Nos. 6 and 7 stated, if not artfully, accurately, the requirements for an award of punitive damages. We hold that the instruction was proper.