Opinion ID: 13570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We employ a two-tiered standard in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress. We first review the factual findings for clear error and then review the trial court’s ultimate conclusion as to the constitutionality of the law enforcement action de novo.9 Our holding today turns on the latter. The admissibility of the cocaine hinges on the validity of taking possession of the Suburban for purposes of an inventory search. An inventory search is a welldefined exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment to the 8 Vicencio is not a party to this appeal. 9 United States v. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1993). 6 United States Constitution.10 It is a search of property lawfully seized and detained. Such searches are conducted in order to protect the property that has been lawfully seized, to protect the police against claims of lost or stolen property, and to protect the police from potential danger.11 An inventory search is permitted and is deemed reasonable only if conducted according to standardized procedures.12 More importantly, an inventory search is reasonable and lawful only if conducted for purposes of an inventory and not as an investigatory tool to produce or discover incriminating evidence. 13 An inventory search may not be used by police as a “ruse for a general rummaging.”14 If police use an inventory search in such a manner, any evidence discovered during the course of that search is subject to suppression. Applying these rubrics to the taking into possession and search of the Suburban convinces us that the cocaine discovered must be suppressed. The Constitution clearly mandates such a result. We entertain no doubt that the search of the Suburban was conducted for investigatory rather than protective administrative purposes. We can reach no other reasonable legal conclusion on the 10 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 11 Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369. 12 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 n.6 (“Our decisions have always adhered to the requirement that inventories be conducted according to standardized criteria.”). 13 Florida v. Wells, 110 S.Ct. 1632 (1990). 14 Id. at 1635. 7 record before us. The Polk County search was not a lawful search. Castro and Gomez were the focus of a massive effort by numerous federal and local drug enforcement agents to uncover evidence of illegal drug activity. The agents conducting the surveillance of Castro and Gomez followed them first through the City of Houston and, finally, through several Texas counties. At no time did either Castro or Gomez do anything that conceivably could have served as the basis for a finding of probable cause of a drug violation. Consequently the agents obviously concluded that they were not able to make a legal stop or arrest of Castro or Gomez for any drug related violation. If these numerous federal and state law enforcement agents had, or believed that they had, probable cause to arrest, it defies all logic and reason to believe they would not have done so during the early surveillance or at some time in the 100-plus miles of trailing through several Texas counties. Instead, the agents orchestrated a routine traffic stop,15 contacting a local deputy sheriff and instructing him to “create his own probable cause.” The deputy sheriff did as instructed and, while the agents stood by and watched, ostensibly arrested Castro and Vicencio for a seat belt violation.16 When Castro refused to consent to a search of the Suburban, the deputy sheriff took possession of it, presumably to safeguard its contents while Castro and Vicencio were in custody on 15 A pretextual traffic stop does not violate the fourth amendment. See Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996). 16 As discussed supra in footnote 5, the legality of this arrest remains to be determined. 8 the seat belt violation. None of the occupants of the Suburban was cited for that traffic violation -- no ticket was issued and no charges were filed. Further, no inventory search was ever undertaken at the Polk County sally port. Prior to any deputy sheriff commencing an inventory search, a drug dog was summoned. The drug dog alerted, a search was made as a consequence thereof, and the cocaine was discovered. The occupants of the Suburban and the Suburban then were taken from Polk County to Houston. The contents of the Suburban ultimately were inventoried in Houston. We are persuaded that a routine inventory search -- conducted for the sole purpose of legitimately creating an accurate inventory of the contents of a vehicle -- would not immediately be preceded by such an obvious attempt to discover the incriminating evidence of which the deputy sheriff initially had been advised. We perforce must conclude that taking possession of the Suburban for purposes of an inventory search was nothing more than a ruse to perform an unauthorized search and the officers, particularly the federal officers, were fully aware of such. The cocaine discovered as a result of the search of the Suburban must be and is suppressed. For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the convictions of Castro and Gomez, suppress the evidence obtained in the illegal search of the Suburban, and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent herewith. ENDRECORD 9