Opinion ID: 595259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proof of policy or custom.

Text: 15 At trial, Gillette claimed that he was disciplined pursuant to a policy or custom that Eugene fire fighters should remain silent, cooperate, and complain later and that his First Amendment rights were violated as a result of the application of this policy or custom. Gillette claimed that municipal liability could be imposed under each of the three theories described above. Specifically, he claimed: (1) that the violation of his constitutional rights resulted from city policy because the disciplinary sanction imposed by Battalion Chief Delmore and Fire Chief Hall was ratified by City Manager Michael Gleason, an official policymaker; (2) that the City had a long-standing, unstated policy or custom of disciplining employees who publicly criticized public safety operations; and (3) that Hall was an official policymaker for the City and that his actions therefore were attributable to the City. Before trial, the district court ruled that as a matter of Oregon law only the City Manager and City Council were official policymakers for purposes of section 1983. Thus, only Gillette's first and second theories remained viable when the case went to the jury. 16
17 In denying the City's motion for JNOV, the district court reasoned that a City Manager may make city policy by acquiescing in discipline imposed on a city employee.... [A] City Manager may be held to have 'affirmatively commanded' a constitutional violation by failing to overrule the imposition of a disciplinary sanction. The court held that municipal liability had been established because [t]he City Manager here was aware of the imposition of plaintiff's discipline and did not overrule it, but instead defended the sanction in a formal arbitration proceeding. We disagree with the district court's reasoning. 18 In Pembaur, the Supreme Court held that a single decision by a municipal policymaker may be sufficient to trigger section 1983 liability under Monell, even though the decision is not intended to govern future situations. See 475 U.S. at 480-81, 106 S.Ct. at 1298-99. There must, however, be evidence of a conscious, affirmative choice. Municipal liability under section 1983 attaches only where a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84, 106 S.Ct. at 1300 (plurality opinion); accord City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2436, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (plurality opinion) ([T]he word 'policy' generally implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives.). 19 Gillette contends that the City Manager, by not countermanding the Fire Chief's final decision to terminate Gillette and by not objecting to the hiring of counsel to represent the City in the arbitration of Gillette's grievance, ratified the Fire Chief's decision and thereby effectively made employment policy. Gillette relies primarily on the statement in Praprotnik that [i]f the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final. 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926. 20 The cases make clear that the unconstitutional discretionary actions of municipal employees generally are not chargeable to the municipality under section 1983. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126, 108 S.Ct. at 926 (observing that [i]f the mere exercise of discretion by an employee could give rise to a constitutional violation, the result would be indistinguishable from respondeat superior liability). In Praprotnik, the Court considered whether a policymaker's deferential review of a subordinate's discretionary decision constituted a delegation of policy-making authority. The plurality concluded that there was no delegation and thus no basis for section 1983 liability, but observed that it would be a different case if a particular decision by a subordinate was cast in the form of a policy statement and expressly approved by the supervising policymaker ... [or] if a series of decisions by a subordinate official manifested a 'custom or usage' of which the supervisor must have been aware. Id. at 130, 108 S.Ct. at 927-28. 21 Gillette's evidence is not sufficient under Pembaur or Praprotnik to establish section 1983 liability based on the City Manager's alleged acquiescence in Gillette's termination. Pembaur requires that an official policymaker make a deliberate choice from among various alternatives to follow a particular course of action. See Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir.1992), quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84, 106 S.Ct. at 1300. Likewise, Praprotnik requires that a policymaker approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it before the policymaker will be deemed to have ratified the subordinate's discretionary decision. See Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir.) (Bouman ) (citing Praprotnik ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 640, 116 L.Ed.2d 658 (1991). Gillette has produced no evidence of affirmative or deliberate conduct by City Manager Gleason that may be said to have ratified Chief Hall's decision to fire Gillette. 22 Gillette relies on Hammond, 859 F.2d at 802-03, for the proposition that a policymaker's ratification of a subordinate's decision can occur long after the original decision and still give rise to municipal liability. Hammond, however, is inapposite because in that case the relevant policy-making body played a significantly more active role than the City Manager played in Gillette's suspension. See id. at 802-03 (holding the county liable for unconstitutional trespasses on plaintiffs' land where the county board actively participated in the deprivation of appellant's property rights). 23 Gillette also points to our recent statement in Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.1991), that evidence that [Police] Chief Gates, an authorized policymaker on police matters, made, or ratified a decision that deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional rights would suffice for official liability under Pembaur. Id. at 646 (citation omitted). This excerpt from Larez merely recites the rule that proof of ratification by an official policymaker will trigger municipal liability. It does not alter our conclusion that City Manager Gleason's inaction in Gillette's case does not amount to ratification under Pembaur and Praprotnik. 24 At most, Gillette has established that the City Manager did not overrule a discretionary decision by the Fire Chief and did not object to the retention of counsel to represent the City in an arbitration proceeding pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The Fire Chief did not cast his decision to discipline Gillette in the form of a policy statement, and the City Manager's testimony that he did not object to hiring counsel for Gillette's arbitration is at least equally consistent with a general policy of routinely hiring lawyers to defend the City in all litigation or labor grievance proceedings. There is no evidence that the City Manager made a deliberate choice to endorse the Fire Chief's decision and the basis for it. 25 The fact that the City Manager did not overrule the Fire Chief in this instance thus cannot form the basis of municipal liability under section 1983. To hold cities liable under section 1983 whenever policymakers fail to overrule the unconstitutional discretionary acts of subordinates would simply smuggle respondeat superior liability into section 1983 law under the guise of Pembaur's single decision rule. We decline to endorse this end run around Monell. 26
27 Gillette also argued at trial that he was disciplined pursuant to a preexisting policy or custom of the City--namely, that public safety employees wishing to criticize emergency operations should be silent, cooperate, and complain later or risk disciplinary reprisals. To prevail on this theory, Gillette had to prove the existence of a widespread practice that ... is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926 (internal quotations omitted). A section 1983 plaintiff may attempt to prove the existence of a custom or informal policy with evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officials were not discharged or reprimanded. See McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir.1986). No such evidence was produced by Gillette. Nor did Gillette present evidence of a pattern of similar dismissals in violation of employees' First Amendment rights. In fact, there is no evidence in the record that any other City employee has ever been disciplined for publicly criticizing the handling of an emergency call. 28 Gillette also failed to present evidence that the City Manager or the City Council helped formulate or were aware that any such informal policy existed. When questioned at trial, the City Manager flatly denied that the City had a work now--grieve later policy. Additionally, Gillette did not present any evidence as to how long this alleged informal policy existed, which is a crucial element of the inquiry given the Supreme Court's emphasis that the practice be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). Fire Chief Hall did testify that remaining silent during an emergency and complaining later was a practice [among fire fighters] that we want to have followed. However, to infer from this statement that the City had an informal policy of disciplining or terminating fire fighters who did not follow this practice requires too large a leap. We therefore conclude that a reasonable jury could not have found that Gillette was terminated pursuant to an informal City policy of work now--grieve later. 29
30 Gillette also argues that the district court erred in its pretrial ruling that Fire Chief Hall was not a policymaker whose individual decision could be attributed to the City under Monell, Pembaur, and Praprotnik. Gillette contends that Hall had final authority with respect to disciplining fire fighters and had been delegated de facto authority to establish personnel policy within the Fire Department. See Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, 109 S.Ct. at 2723 (holding that district courts must identify official policymakers based on state and local positive law, as well as 'custom or usage' having the force of law) (internal quotations omitted); see also Bouman, 940 F.2d at 1231 (remanding to the district court for a determination whether the county Board of Supervisors had delegated to the Sheriff the authority to establish final employment policy within the Sheriff's Department). We review the district court's ruling on this issue de novo. Brooks v. Hilton Casinos, Inc. 959 F.2d 757, 759 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 300, 121 L.Ed.2d 224 (1992). 31 In Pembaur, the Court held that under certain circumstances a municipality may be held liable for a single decision by a municipal policymaker. 475 U.S. at 480, 106 S.Ct. at 1298. Municipal liability does not attach, however, unless the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. The fact that a particular official--even a policy-making official--has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion. Id. at 481-82, 106 S.Ct. at 1299 (footnote omitted); accord Collins v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 341 (9th Cir.1988) (Collins). Thus, in a situation factually similar to the one presented here, the plurality in Pembaur pointed out that the personnel decisions of a County Sheriff, who has discretion to hire and fire employees but is not the county official responsible for establishing county employment policy, could not be attributed to the municipality. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n. 12, 106 S.Ct. at 1300 n. 12; see also Collins, 841 F.2d at 341-42 (holding that the actions of a police sergeant with discretion to recommend hiring, firing, and discipline of employees could not be attributed to the municipality because the sergeant was not responsible for establishing final employment policy). 32 Here, Fire Chief Hall possessed the discretionary authority to hire and fire employees. This alone, however, is not sufficient to establish a basis for municipal liability. Municipal liability could be imposed on the basis of Hall's actions only if he was responsible for establishing the City's employment policy. In making this determination, a federal court would not be justified in assuming that municipal policymaking authority lies somewhere other than where the applicable law purports to put it. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126, 108 S.Ct. at 925. The district court held that the Eugene City Charter and ordinances grant authority to make City employment policy only to the City Manager and the City Council. Gillette points to neither law nor evidence that suggests the district court erred in relying on or interpreting the applicable municipal law to determine who made final employment policy for the City. We therefore hold that the court did not err in concluding that only the City Council and City Manager were final policy makers for the City.