Opinion ID: 212383
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dovetail's Standing

Text: We first consider whether Dovetail had standing to pursue a civil conspiracy claim against Defendants, reviewing this jurisdictional issue de novo. See New Eng. Health Care Emp. Pension Fund v. Woodruff, 512 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 2008). A civil conspiracy is not actionable under Kansas law without commission of some wrong giving rise to a tortious cause of action independent of conspiracy. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1268 (10th Cir.2005). In this case, Mr. Meyer and Mr. Pratt alleged that Mr. Christie and Mr. Glenn committed the independent tort of breach of fiduciary duty against them. Dovetail, however, alleged no such independent tort. Dovetail asserts that it nevertheless had standing to sue as a third-party beneficiary to the joint venture agreement. However, Dovetail brought no contractual claims under that agreement, and, even if it had, such claims would not state an independent tortious cause of action against Defendants. See id. (holding that a defendant could not be liable for civil conspiracy under Kansas law where the only actionable claim asserted against it was contractual). Whether or not Dovetail could have successfully pursued a contractual claim against Defendants as a third-party beneficiary to the agreement, Dovetail's theoretical contractual claims do not give it standing to pursue a conspiracy claim against Defendants. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 2007) (Each plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief in each claim.). Plaintiffs also suggest that a civil conspiracy claim requires only a showing that at least one plaintiff has an actionable tort claim against at least one defendant. However, we see no basis under Kansas law for allowing a plaintiff to assert a conspiracy claim based on a tortious injury suffered by another plaintiff. Plaintiffs cite to no Kansas cases permitting such a result. Moreover, we have previously interpreted Kansas law to hold that a conspiracy claim cannot be maintained against a defendant where there is no actionable tort claim asserted against this particular defendant, regardless of whether other defendants have committed independent torts, see Pepsi-Cola, 431 F.3d at 1268, and we see no basis for interpreting Kansas's independent tort requirement for conspiracy claims more broadly for plaintiffs than for defendants. We therefore hold that each plaintiff asserting a conspiracy claim under Kansas law must have suffered some wrong giving rise to a tortious cause of action independent of conspiracy, see id., and may not simply adopt the tortious injury suffered by another. Because Dovetail failed to allege Defendants committed any actionable tort against it, we hold that Dovetail lacked standing to pursue its civil conspiracy claim against Defendants. Dovetail was accordingly not entitled to recover any damages based on this claim. Indeed, because this was the only claim for legal damages Dovetail brought, Dovetail may not recover any portion of the damage award. We also agree with Defendants that the jury's undifferentiated awards to Plaintiffs of $1,907,372 in lost contracting profits and $118,370 in unreimbursed expenses were likely based at least in part on the impermissible inclusion of Dovetail in Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim. We therefore reverse the jury's awards for these damages and remand for further proceedings on the issue of Mr. Meyer's and Mr. Pratt's damages, if any, relating to lost contracting profits and unreimbursed expenses. We are not persuaded, however, by Defendants' argument that the addition of Dovetail to the civil conspiracy claim caused impermissible evidence to be introduced that prejudiced the entire trial. Defendants do not contest Dovetail's standing to pursue its unjust enrichment claim at trial, nor are we persuaded Dovetail lacked standing as to that equitable claim. Moreover, Defendants have not identified any evidence that would have been excluded if the trial had been limited to Mr. Meyer and Mr. Pratt's claims. We thus reject Defendants' argument that we must reverse the entire trial based on Dovetail's lack of standing as to the civil conspiracy claim.