Opinion ID: 1794090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: People v. Musall

Text: Musall recounted in his statement that he had hit the victim in her face while they were traveling in the car. He also stated that he started to engage in fellatio with the victim, but then stopped because he was scared. He further admitted that he had been carrying a six-inch knife that night, and that he threw it away at the top of a hill after he and Fred started running when Copeland began stabbing the victim. There was also evidence that Musall cut his right hand during the evening. In his statement, Musall asserted that he cut it later in the car while looking for a lighter on the floor. In contrast, Copeland's girlfriend, Carol Keane, testified that Musall cut his hand by hitting a beer bottle on a mirror on Barrera's car. On cross-examination, she testified that Musall's hand was not cut when she first saw him on the morning of October 28, 1988. However, the prosecutor argued that Musall cut his hand while he was stabbing the victim. Musall was tried on alternate counts of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder. As in Barrera's case, the prosecutor repeatedly argued that this was a four against one gang attack. The prosecutor presented essentially three theories. First, as in the Barrera case, the prosecutor argued that Musall was guilty of premeditated murder under an aiding and abetting theory because this was a thought-out plan to rape, rob, and then kill the victim. Second, the prosecutor argued that Musall actually stabbed the victim, [26] drawing on inferences that he cut his hand sometime during the night. [27] And finally, the prosecutor argued that Musall was guilty of felony murder because his conduct demonstrated a wilful and wanton act, knowing that death or great bodily harm might occur because he participated in the four-against-one scheme, hit her in the car, and got to the park and stayed there, while forcing her to engage in oral sex with him. The prosecutor contended that this conduct satisfied the malice requirement. Musall's defense was that he had not intended that the victim die, that he did not participate in killing her, and that there was no preconceived plan to kill her. He admitted hitting her in the car, but contended that that occurred well before they reached the park. He argued that Copeland was the instigator of the group's activities and that Copeland, alone and spontaneously, stabbed the victim. We note that Musall's jury did hear testimony from a police officer that all of the defendants had stated that Copeland had done the actual stabbing. However, as in Barrera's case, the jury did not hear why Copeland stabbed her. This explanation of Copeland's motive for killing her was crucial to Musall's defense that he did not anticipate Copeland's actions. For the same reasons explained above with respect to Barrera, here too we consider the three-factor inquiry along with the Poole factors and reach the same conclusion: we believe that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Copeland's statement. This violated Musall's constitutional right to present his defense, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We find that the reasons for finding prejudicial error are even more compelling in Musall's case because the prosecutor's theory before the Musall jury was directly contradictory to his theory before Copeland's jury. In his closing statement before the Copeland jury, the prosecutor stated: I'm not quite sure how Mike avoided getting parts of his body cut off because, if this woman is performing oral sex on him, and [Copeland is] looking at them and, all of a sudden, [Copeland] pulls out a knife and starts chopping, Mike is, I guess, miraculously, not chopped up out there, too. If the prosecutor is not sure whether Musall stabbed the victim or whether he miraculously avoided being stabbed, then this Court cannot be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Musall's jury was sure either. Had the jury heard Copeland's explanation of why he killed the victim, it may have accepted Musall's defense, as the prosecutor apparently did in the subsequent trial. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the conviction, and remand for a new trial.