Opinion ID: 392158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Sense and Exhaustion

Text: 58 Appellant's most significant argument against the Secretary's rulemaking power is the claim that, even if the Secretary has some authority to promulgate criteria for the approval of state programs, the explicit permit application provisions of the Act were intended as the exclusive federal list of necessary data. Appellant deduces this limit on the Secretary's power from two premises a common sense rule of regulatory authority, and the exhaustive length and detail of the explicit statutory provisions. 59 Appellant insists that granting the Secretary the power to expand the permit information requirements would defy common sense: The Congress cannot reasonably be supposed to have created an administrative structure so bizarre that the agency which has the exclusive power to decide the issues is powerless to determine the information which it needs to reach that decision. Appellant's Supplemental Brief on Rehearing En Banc at 24. Because the state regulatory authority has the power, not subject to federal review, to make permit-issuing decisions, the state must have the power to specify the information that applicants submit. 60 Of course, the superficial appeal of this common sense argument is somewhat undercut when we recognize that the Secretary has only purported to promulgate minimum information requirements, and has not sought to limit the state's ability to require further data from applicants. And appellant must admit that the Act itself grossly violates this maxim: subsection 507(b) alone contains seventeen numbered paragraphs specifying information that the state regulatory authority must require. 61 The conclusive answer to appellant's common sense argument, however, is that even if individual state permit decisions are unreviewable, the state's overall performance in administering the Act is not. Congress believed that guaranteeing effective state enforcement required the vigilance of both the Secretary and the public, and so provided that permit applications, as well as inspection reports, must be available to the public. Act §§ 507(e), 517(f). Since the Secretary must use the information submitted with permit applications in evaluating the continuing compliance of the state permit process with the Act, there is nothing bizarre about allowing the Secretary to tell the states that they need more information to meet their responsibilities. 62 Appellant next argues that sections 507 and 508 of the Act are carefully devised, limited exceptions to the common sense rule, and that they were clearly intended to exhaust federal intervention into the information-gathering process. But the Act itself and its legislative history do not demonstrate such an intent. 63 We have already observed in passing that, although appellant refers to sections 507 and 508 as the only information requirements of the Act, other scattered sections in title V also demand information from permit applicants. See note 3 supra. This technical observation is relevant here, because it tends to rebut the suggestion that sections 507 and 508 comprise a compact, meticulous listing of all the information that Congress considered essential for permit decisionmaking. The addition of other information requirements in scattered sections suggests ad hoc responses to perceived needs for data rather than an integrated effort to produce a comprehensive list. 16 64 The House Committee report contains a more plausible explanation of the function sections 507 and 508 were intended to serve. After discussing the need for a thorough and comprehensive data base in language we have already quoted, the report continues: To meet this problem the bill delineates in detail the type of information required in permit applications in sections 507 and 508 and the criteria for assessing the merits of the application in section 510. H.R.Rep.No.218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 593, 622 (emphasis added). Because of the importance of information to a proper decision by the regulatory authority and to effective oversight by the Secretary, Congress included a detailed list of the type of information that would have to be at the state's disposal. Such a list is not necessarily exhaustive, and does not necessarily represent Congress' judgment that the states should be free to decide for themselves whether to seek any other information. 65 The Act itself contains a persuasive counterexample to the suggestion that detailed enumerations must be exhaustive. Section 515 spells out the Act's central environmental performance standards. Counting the pages in Statutes at Large, we find that section 515 is roughly twice the length of sections 507 and 508 combined. Section 515(b) alone contains twenty-five numbered paragraphs containing directives as specific as (to) refrain from the construction of roads or other access ways up a stream bed or drainage channel or in such proximity to such channel so as to seriously alter the normal flow of water, Act § 515(b)(18). Yet the legislative history makes absolutely clear the expectation that the Secretary would flesh out these requirements in his regulations: 66 The committee believes that it has struck a balance between legislation which merely frames performance standards in terms of general objectives and standards which are cast in terms more detailed than those generally found in regulatory legislation. In choosing a middle path, the committee is mindful of the past failures on the State level and thus bases its approval of H.R. 2 on the expectation that Federal regulations promulgated under the act will fully implement the environmental performance standards. Obviously, the mere reproduction of the statutory environmental performance standards in the regulations would be inadequate. 67 H.R.Rep.No.218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 593, 622. Although the legislative history does not contain a similar exhortation regarding permit applications, we cannot conclude that the mere length or specificity of portions of sections 507 and 508 manifests a desire to exclude the Secretary's rulemaking powers from their domain. 68 The Act contains numerous generally phrased and specifically detailed limitations on the freedom of surface mine owners to operate as they please. Some of these limitations are reflected in the permit application provisions, and some are not; the legislative history does not enlighten us as to the reasons for Congress' selectivity. Appellant would have us rule that the statutory list is exhaustive, and that the Secretary never has the power to supplement that list when he concludes that further information is needed for the proper administration of the Act. We find that sections 507 and 508 represent a diligent and comprehensive congressional effort to guide the Secretary with respect to the type of information a permit application should require. Appellant has not demonstrated a congressional intent to make these provisions an exclusive federal list.