Opinion ID: 1943364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Victim's Time Capsule Statements

Text: The defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of the victim's so-called time capsule. We review challenges to a trial court's evidentiary rulings under our unsustainable exercise of discretion standard and reverse only if the rulings are clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of a party's case. State v. Forbes, 157 N.H. 570, 572, 953 A.2d 433 (2008).
The time capsule was a sixth grade school project that required the victim to write information about herself on a piece of paper, seal the paper in an envelope, and open the envelope two years later. On the paper, the victim wrote: [S]omething about me that would surprise most people is ... I have sex with my father. When the victim was in eighth grade, she opened the envelope and wrote: I'm not a virgin or have a virgin mouth. She then resealed the envelope. Although the trial court had initially excluded evidence of the time capsule, after hearing the defendant's theory of the case and his testimony, the court allowed the State to: (1) call the victim as a rebuttal witness to testify about the time capsule as well as about the prior uncharged assaults themselves; and (2) introduce the time capsule into evidence as a full exhibit. The defendant's theory of the case, as explained by defense counsel in his opening statement, was that he was innocent, caught in a nightmare of unfounded allegations, a nightmare caused by a willful, rebellious, yet brilliant daughter and police who were overeager to believe her. Defense counsel told the jury that the victim's rebelliousness escalated when the defendant forbade her from obtaining her driver's license although she was old enough to have one. Her rebellion against the defendant allegedly came to a head on September 11, 2006, as a result of a heated argument among the victim, her sister, L.W., her brother, J.W., and the defendant. As defense counsel told the jury, that night, L.W. was at the stove with a giant pot full of water that [was] boiling hot. When she walked over to the sink to dump the water from the pot, the victim was in her way. Despite being told repeatedly to get out of the way, the victim refused to move. Eventually, the defendant pushed her out of the way, and [the victim] went crazy and began yelling at him. According to defense counsel, [t]hings escalated, and, soon, everyone was yelling at everyone else. Eventually, J.W. called the police, who came to the apartment, and, after being assured that everyone was safe, left without arresting anyone. After the police left, the victim and J.W. slowly got ready for bed and could be heard talking to each other in the bathroom and then in their bedroom. J.W. decided to confront the defendant about the incident. J.W. emerged from the bedroom and began to yell at the defendant. The defendant, feeling exasperated, eventually yelled: [D]o you want to raise my children? Do you want to discipline my children? Then go someplace else. J.W. called his bluff, so to speak, and ... left. Upon seeing this, the victim threw another teenage temper tantrum and began yelling at the defendant just like she had done earlier in the night over the pot of water. The defendant asked another daughter to call the police and, when the officers arrived, the victim was behaving hysterically, telling them that she just want[ed] to get out of the house and that she[][was] going to do it any way she [could], including jumping off the third floor balcony. According to defense counsel, at this point, the victim, seeing an opportunity to get out of the house and have more freedom, told the police that her father sexually assaulted her. As defense counsel explained to the jury, by so doing, this willful and rebellious teenage girl engaged the police, who began to look[] for evidence of a crime that didn't happen, that never occurred. The defendant testified consistently with this theory of the case. He denied ever having sexual contact with his children. He testified that he could not do something... traumatizing to [his] children and that he found it disturbing to think of committing incest. He testified that it was just horrifying to think of having sex with his children and that it made him throw up. He testified: [T]here's no way I could ever do that to my children, I mean not even [to] an enemy. He testified that having sex with them was something I can never do ... I can never do that to my children, never, ever. When asked why he thought that the victim would say that he had sexually assaulted her, the defendant testified: [J.W.] and [the victim] are very tight, andyou now, tight as in closeness and the fact that [on September 11, 2006,] I had told [J.W.] to leave and I don't think also she believed she [ sic ] was going to leave, and [the victim] is one of those very willful people, and I think once she started this whole thing of rape, she just wants to be right, and she just wants to continue with it. I mean, that's who she is. She is, you know, very, very willful, and she also wants, you know, I believe also the freedom because she seemed to be excited of [ sic ] getting her license, you know. After the defendant testified, the trial court ruled that he had opened the door to evidence about the prior uncharged assaults to which the victim's statements in her time capsule referred. The trial court ruled that this evidence was admissible to rebut the defendant's claim that the victim had fabricated the allegations against him. See N.H.R. Ev. 801(d)(1)(B). The court determined that even though this was evidence of prior bad acts, it was admissible under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence (Rule) 404(b) and that its probative value outweighed its potential prejudice to the defendant, see N.H. R. Ev. 403. Before allowing the victim to testify about the time capsule, the trial court instructed the jury that her time capsule statements were being admitted only to rebut any suggestion that the defendant may have made that she fabricated her allegations. See N.H. R. Ev. 801(d)(1)(B). The court admonished the jury that, to the extent that these statements referred to any uncharged sexual assaults, the jury could not use them as evidence of the defendant's propensity to commit such assaults, to say, well, gee,if he committed some earlier offenses, he must have committed these offenses. See N.H. R. Ev. 404(b). In its final instructions, the court told the jury: In deciding whether to believe a witness, you may consider whether the witness made statements before trial, which are inconsistent with the witness' testimony at trial. Keep in mind that you may only use a prior statement in assessing the witness' credibility. You may not use a statement made before trial as proof that the facts in the prior statement are true. There is one exception to this. You have received in evidence... the so-called time capsule. That constitutes a prior statement of [the victim].... You may use that as substantive evidence in the case for its truth on the issue of whether or not ... the [victim] ... had some motivation to make a recent fabrication of her testimony at trial. You may consider that prior statement contained in the time capsule... for its truth for that purpose.
The defendant concedes that he opened the door to the victim's testimony about the uncharged assaults themselves, and that this testimony was admissible. See State v. Carlson, 146 N.H. 52, 56-58, 767 A.2d 421 (2001); State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 99-101, 649 A.2d 375 (1994). He argues that the trial court erred, however, when it admitted the time capsule and the victim's testimony about her statements in it into evidence. He contends that the time capsule and the victim's testimony about her statements are hearsay that do not fall within a hearsay exception and were, thus, inadmissible for the truth of what they asserted. He argues that while he may have opened the door to the victim's testimony about the prior assaults, he did not open the door to this hearsay evidence. The opening the door doctrine comprises two doctrines, the curative admissibility and specific contradiction doctrines. State v. Morrill, 154 N.H. 547, 549-50, 914 A.2d 1206 (2006). The curative admissibility doctrine applies when inadmissible prejudicial evidence has been erroneously admitted, and the opponent seeks to introduce testimony to counter the prejudice. State v. White, 155 N.H. 119, 124, 920 A.2d 1216 (2007). The specific contradiction doctrine is more broadly applied when one party has introduced admissible evidence that creates a misleading advantage and the opponent is then allowed to introduce previously suppressed or otherwise inadmissible evidence to counter the misleading advantage. Id. The parties agree that this case involves the specific contradiction doctrine. For the specific contradiction doctrine to apply, a party must introduce evidence that provides a justification, beyond mere relevance, for the opponent's introduction of evidence that may not otherwise be admissible. Id. The initial evidence must, however, have reasonably misled the fact finder in some way. Id. The rule thus prevents a party from successfully excluding evidence favorable to his opponent, and then selectively introducing this evidence for his own advantage, without allowing the opponent to place the evidence in proper context. Id. The fact that the door has been opened does not, by itself, permit all evidence to pass through. State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 21, 490 A.2d 295 (1985). The doctrine is intended to prevent prejudice, and is not to be subverted into a rule for the injection of prejudice. Morrill, 154 N.H. at 550, 914 A.2d 1206. The trial court is in the best position to gauge the prejudicial impact of particular testimony. Carlson, 146 N.H. at 56, 767 A.2d 421. Therefore, we will not upset the trial court's ruling on whether the defendant opened the door to prejudicial rebuttal evidence absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. See id.; White, 155 N.H. at 123, 920 A.2d 1216. The defendant concedes that when he testified that he could never sexually assault his children, it opened the door to evidence that he had sexually assaulted the victim in the past. See Carlson, 146 N.H. at 56-58, 767 A.2d 421; Taylor, 139 N.H. at 99-101, 649 A.2d 375. As he admits, the jury logically could have interpreted his testimony as an assertion that it was not within his character to sexually assault his own children. See Carlson, 146 N.H. at 57, 767 A.2d 421. The court could reasonably have concluded that introducing evidence of the prior uncharged assaults was, therefore, necessary to counter this misleading advantage. See id. The defendant contends, however, that he did not open the door to evidence of the victim's statements in her time capsule. These statements, he asserts, are hearsay and, thus, were inadmissible. To the extent that the defendant argues that he never actually opened the door to evidence of the victim's statements, we disagree. While the defendant's testimony about his good character may not have opened the door to evidence of the victim's statements in her time capsule, the trial court reasonably could have found that his claim that her testimony at trial was the result of fabrication did open the door. The trial court reasonably could have determined that the victim's testimony about the prior uncharged assaults, alone, was insufficient to counter this claim, and that her testimony about the time capsule statements and the time capsule itself were necessary. In this way, this case is distinguishable from Morrill, 154 N.H. at 551-52, 914 A.2d 1206. In Morrill, the trial court had allowed the State to introduce statements by the victim's father to the police regarding why he had delayed reporting the defendant's sexual abuse of the victim. Morrill, 154 N.H. at 549, 914 A.2d 1206. Because the victim's father died before trial, the statements were introduced through a police officer. Id. On appeal, the State conceded that the statements constituted inadmissible hearsay. Id. The trial court had admitted the statements, in part, because it found that the defendant had opened the door to them. Id. We concluded that this was error because whatever misleading impression the defendant may have given the jury about the father's delay in reporting his daughter's abuse had already been countered by admissible evidence that directly countered this theory. Id. at 551-52, 914 A.2d 1206. Because the State had presented admissible evidence supporting its alternative explanation for [the father's] delay, introducing ... inadmissible hearsay for the same purpose was unnecessary. Id. at 552, 914 A.2d 1206. By contrast, here, the admissible evidence the victim's testimony about the prior assaults themselvesdid not directly counter the defendant's theory that she fabricated her allegations against him because her testimony about the prior assaults could have been the result of the same rebelliousness as the defendant alleged her testimony about the charged assaults was. Accordingly, the trial court reasonably could have determined that introducing otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence of statements made before the rebellion incidents was necessary. Moreover, the trial court's limiting instruction to the jury mitigated the potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant from admission of the victim's time capsule statements. See State v. Dean, 129 N.H. 744, 750, 533 A.2d 333 (1987) (defendant's claim of prejudice from potential substantive use of prior consistent statement unfounded, especially in light of trial court's limiting instruction). The court twice instructed the jury that it could consider the victim's time capsule statements to the extent that they were relevant to rebut the defendant's charge that the victim had fabricated her allegations. The jury was told that it could not consider the statements as evidence of the defendant's propensity to assault his children. Further, to the extent that the defendant argues that the opening the door doctrine does not allow the admission of hearsay evidence, he is mistaken. Under either the curative admissibility doctrine or the specific contradiction doctrine, the court has the discretion to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence. Morrill, 154 N.H. at 549-50, 914 A.2d 1206. The defendant observes that the trial court did not, in fact, admit the victim's testimony about her statements and the time capsule itself under the opening the door doctrine. He contends that they were admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), which he argues, was error. We will assume, without deciding, that the defendant is correct. We affirm the trial court, nonetheless, because where the trial court reaches the correct result on mistaken grounds, we will affirm if valid alternative grounds support the decision. State v. Beede, 156 N.H. 102, 106, 931 A.2d 1258 (2007) (quotation and brackets omitted).