Opinion ID: 2166291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counts II, III, VII, and X

Text: The statute of limitations begins to run when the facts which form the basis of the claim are discovered, or reasonably should be discovered in the exercise of due diligence. King v. Kitchen Magic, Inc., 391 A.2d 1184, 1186 (D.C.1978); Fontana v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 124 U.S. App. D.C. 168, 169, 363 F.2d 297, 298 (1966); see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397, 66 S.Ct. 582, 585, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946). In the District of Columbia, however, [a] defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiff's action if he has done anything that would tend to lull the plaintiff into inaction and thereby permit the statutory limitation to run against him. Property 10-F, Inc. v. Pack & Process, Inc., 265 A.2d 290, 291 (D.C.1970) (footnote omitted); accord, Dominique v. Ralph D. Kaiser Co., 479 A.2d 319, 323 & n. 6 (D.C.1984) (citing cases). The effect of such an estoppel is not necessarily to toll the running of the statute. If ample time to file suit within the statutory period exists after the circumstances inducing delay have ceased, there is no estoppel against pleading the bar of the statute. Property 10-F, Inc. v. Pack & Process, Inc., supra, 265 A.2d at 291; see Howard University v. Cassell, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 75, 81, 126 F.2d 6, 12 (1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675, 62 S.Ct. 1046, 86 L.Ed. 1749 (1942). To decide whether the statute of limitations bars any of the claims in counts II, III, VII, and X, we need look no further than the maxim that no man may take advantage of his own wrong. Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232, 79 S.Ct. 760, 761-762, 3 L.Ed.2d 770 (1959). This principle may be employed to bar inequitable reliance on statutes of limitations. Id. at 233, 79 S.Ct. at 762 (footnote omitted). Appellants have alleged that they were lull[ed] ... into inaction [20] when Paul made promises to Antonia in 1966 to induce her to drop her suit in federal court, and that they did not discover Paul's intention not to keep his promises until 1981. Paul, on the other hand, has denied that any such promises were made. If appellants' allegations are true, then Paul would be estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as to these four counts. Property 10-F, supra . If they are not true, or if appellants failed to bring suit within a reasonable time after the circumstances inducing their forbearance ceased, then the statute of limitations may well bar these claims. See Brown v. Lamb, 134 U.S. App. D.C. 314, 414 F.2d 1210 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907, 90 S.Ct. 904, 25 L.Ed.2d 88 (1970). Thus there are two material issues of fact affecting the applicability of the statute of limitations: whether Paul actually made the promises in 1966, and whether appellants, in reliance upon these promises, were lulled for fifteen years into not bringing suit against Paul for fraud and breach of his fiduciary duty. The presence of these issues in the case precludes the granting of summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. [21]