Opinion ID: 169028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Grant a New Trial

Text: 17 Rule 33 authorizes trial courts to grant new trials if the interest of justice so requires. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a). A motion for a new trial is not regarded with favor and is only issued with great caution. United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1394 (10th Cir.1998). We ordinarily review the denial of a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Quintanilla, 193 F.3d 1139, 1146 (10th Cir.1999). A decision is an abuse of discretion only if it is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable. United States v. Combs, 267 F.3d 1167, 1176 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotes omitted). 18 Motions for new trial filed more than seven days after a verdict or a finding of guilt must be grounded on newly discovered evidence. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b). Since Herrera filed this motion four months after trial, newly discovered evidence is the only ground available to Herrera for a new trial. For Herrera to prevail on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, he must show that: 19 (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) the failure to learn of the evidence was not caused by his own lack of diligence; (3) the new evidence is not merely impeaching; (4) the new evidence is material to the principal issues involved; and (5) the new evidence is of such a nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal. 20 United States v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir.1997) (internal quotes omitted). 21 In this case, Herrera's newly discovered evidence does not bear on the probability of his acquittal, but rather on his competence to stand trial. It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). Thus, where the newly discovered evidence pertains not to the defendant's guilt, but to his competency to stand trial, the relevant inquiry is whether the new evidence indicates that the defendant did not have `sufficient . . . [present] ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and `rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' United States v. McCarthy, 54 F.3d 51, 55 (2d. Cir.1995) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)); see also Maynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 676 (10th Cir.2006). 22 The district court denied the motion for two reasons: (1) the evidence was not newly discovered; and (2) Herrera did not raise a bona fide doubt he was incompetent during trial. We agree with both conclusions. 23
24 The district court denied the Rule 33 motion on the ground that Herrera failed to show that the evidence in question was newly discovered after trial. While Herrera's specific diagnosis of diabetes was made a day or two after trial, the district court concluded that the symptoms or physical manifestations of the illness, rather than its formal diagnosis by a physician, formed the basis for his competency claim. The district court held that such symptoms or physical manifestations do not qualify as newly discovered evidence for purposes of Rule 33. 25 According to the record, Herrera was aware of the symptoms of his medical condition prior to trial. The district court found that Herrera had consulted a doctor before trial and had advised his trial counsel of various health problems both before and during trial. Indeed, doctors suspected Herrera suffered from diabetes as early as August of 2004, well before trial. What Herrera did not know was the formal diagnosis of his diabetes. And, in at least one post-trial medical opinion, a doctor suggested to trial counsel that the untreated diabetes coupled with his staph infection could have some effect on a person's cognitive abilities. 26 Nonetheless, the district court was satisfied that Herrera (while not knowing the precise diagnosis) was well-aware during trial that he was experiencing certain physical symptoms. Those symptoms were communicated to his lawyer, who concluded they were not serious enough to advise the court. The district court, moreover, saw nothing in Herrera's demeanor and behavior at trial to suggest that he could not consult with his trial counsel or understand the proceedings against him. In these circumstances, the diagnosis of his medical condition does not constitute new evidence justifying a new trial. 27 This is not to say that a post-trial diagnosis of a serious medical condition cannot satisfy Rule 33. Several cases suggest that diagnoses made available only after trial could in some circumstances form a basis for a new trial, even where the symptoms were known or knowable during trial. See, e.g., Nagell v. United States, 354 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.1966) (holding that a previously unknown brain injury the defendant suffered more than ten years prior is newly discovered evidence of his competence even though defendant knew about the injury); United States v. Massa, 804 F.2d 1020, 1022-23 (8th Cir.1986) (disagreeing with a district court holding that a post-trial psychiatric assessment could not be newly discovered evidence because the factual circumstances supporting the evaluation were known to defendant at trial); United States v. Escobar, 68 Fed.Appx. 836 (9th Cir.2003) (finding that a post-trial re-evaluation of defendant's intelligence could be newly discovered evidence); Smith v. United States, 996 F.2d 1219, 1993 WL 206559, 1993 U.S.App. LEXIS 14520 (7th Cir. June 14, 1993) (deciding that an after trial diagnosis of possible paranoid schizophrenia could be newly discovered evidence, even though motion was rejected on other grounds). 28 These cases, of course, involve serious mental conditions and not physical infirmities that might affect the defendant's ability to assist counsel. Suffice it to say that the evidence must firmly point to a serious mental or physical condition that affected the competency of the defendant at trial to assist in his defense. 29 Here, given (1) Herrera's knowledge of his physical symptoms prior to or during trial, and (2) the lack of any suggestion at trial from counsel or the defendant that he could not understand the proceedings, the district court correctly concluded that the post-trial diagnosis that Herrera suffered from diabetes and a staph infection did not qualify as newly discovered evidence under Rule 33. 30
31 Even if the evidence were newly discovered, the district court also found that the totality of the circumstances do[es] not raise a bona fide doubt or support a reasonable inference that [Herrera] was not competent to stand trial in November 2004. I Aplt.App. at 82. Herrera contends that the district court erred in reaching this conclusion without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. 32 A claim complaining of a trial court's alleged failure to hold a competency hearing is a procedural due process claim. McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 952 (10th Cir.2001). A violation of a procedural competency claim occurs when a reasonable judge should have had a bona fide doubt as to [the defendant's] competence at the time of trial and no further competency inquiry was afforded the defendant. Id. at 954; see also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). 1 Accordingly, Herrera would have been entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial if his motion papers raised a bona fide doubt about his competence at the time of trial. The district court concluded that Herrera failed to show a contemporaneous inability to communicate with counsel at trial. 33 The well-settled legal standard for assessing competency is that the defendant must have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding [and have] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788. In determining whether bona fide doubt of competence exists, courts may look to the defendant's irrational behavior, demeanor at trial, any prior medical opinion[,] evidence of mental illness[,] and any representations of defense counsel[.] McGregor, 248 F.3d at 954-55. We examine the totality of the circumstances. . . . The question is . . . whether the trial court `failed to give proper weight to the information suggesting incompetence which came to light during trial.' Id. at 955 (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 179, 95 S.Ct. 896). 34 With these standards in mind, we turn to the district court's determination that Herrera failed to raise a bona fide doubt as to his competence at trial. The district court first found the documents supporting his motion for a new trial were not credible. For example, Herrera's affidavit claimed that he felt faint, nauseous, and . . . delirious during the trial, but neither Herrera nor his counsel alerted the court to any health concerns during trial nor were these conditions reflected in the summary of his medical records. In fact, Herrera specifically asserted his right to a speedy trial and did not seek a continuance of his trial based on his medical condition. Herrera failed to offer any explanation as to why he was unable to communicate these health complaints to his counsel or the court. 35 Furthermore, we find no fault with the district court's assessment of Herrera's demeanor at trial. The district court did not notice anything unusual in Herrera's demeanor or behavior during trial, which Herrera concedes on appeal. The district court observed no signs that Herrera was inattentive, bleeding, faint, nauseous, delirious, lackadaisical, or otherwise in distress. On the other hand, the court found Herrera appeared to communicate with his counsel and attend to the proceedings in a normal manner during the entire trial. In addition, there was nothing out of the ordinary or unusually strenuous in the proceeding of the trial. The district court allowed breaks at regular intervals and Herrera enjoyed several days off trial for a holiday and weekend. 36 Nor does the proffer of Dr. Goldstein warrant a different conclusion. Dr. Goldstein's curriculum vitae indicates he is board-certified in pulmonary and internal medicine, but nothing suggests he has medical expertise in diabetes or mental health in general. Moreover, Dr. Goldstein never personally examined Herrera, but intended to present testimony of general conclusions about possible cognitive deficits associated with diabetes and a staph infection. The medical personnel who actually did examine Herrera prior to trial made no note of any mental infirmities or cognitive deficiencies in his medical records. 37 Finally, we consider trial counsel's affidavit describing Herrera's medical conditions during trial and his post hoc determination that Herrera was unable to assist counsel effectively during trial. Understandably, defense counsel is often in the best position to determine whether a defendant's competency is questionable. McGregor, 248 F.3d at 960. Nevertheless, the concerns of counsel alone are insufficient to establish doubt of a defendant's competency. Id. at 959-60. While important evidence, those concerns must be weighed against the ability of the district court to assess the behavior of the defendant at trial. When coupled with the fact that no doctor opined that Herrera was incompetent before or even during trial, we see no clear error in the district court's ruling. Indeed, the behavior of Herrera was not significant enough for experienced trial counsel to advise the court during trial proceedings of any inability to effectively represent his client. Nor has counsel pointed to anything specific at trial that Herrera did not understand or could not review, only that the confluence of events raised concerns about Herrera's condition. See Walker v. AG, 167 F.3d 1339, 1346-47 (10th Cir.1999) (rejecting petitioner's procedural incompetency claim, in part because trial counsel never raised the issue of petitioner's competency at trial). 38 In sum, we do not find the district court ignored evidence that, viewed objectively, raised a bona fide doubt as to [defendant's] competency. Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d 1162, 1171 (10th Cir.1999) (internal quote omitted). Even if Herrera's post-trial diagnosis with diabetes is properly newly discovered evidence under Rule 33, it would not alter the district court's calculation that no bona fide doubt existed as to his competency. 2 39 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Herrera's motion for a new trial without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing on competency.