Opinion ID: 2074018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overriding a Jury Recommendation

Text: An Indiana trial court need not accept the jury's recommendation either for or against the death penalty. The capital sentencing statute provides, The court is not bound by the jury's recommendation. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (Burns 1985 Repl.). The question in this case is the standard which must be met to justify overriding a jury's recommendation against death. Our review of this question proceeds from the Indiana Constitution, which provides: The Supreme Court shall have, in all appeals of criminal cases, the power to review and revise the sentence imposed. Ind.Const. Art. 7, § 4. In particular, this Court must review the imposition of a sentence of death to determine if the penalty is appropriate to the offender and his crime. Van Cleave v. State (1987), Ind., 517 N.E.2d 356, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 819, 102 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). Although the Indiana Rules for Appellate Review of Sentences say that a reviewing court will not revise a sentence unless no reasonable person could find such sentence appropriate, in a capital case, those rules stand more as guideposts for our appellate review than as immovable pillars supporting a sentence decision. Spranger v. State (1986), Ind., 498 N.E.2d 931, 947 n. 2, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct. 1965, 95 L.Ed.2d 536 (1987). This Court has on one occasion affirmed a trial court's decision to override the jury's recommendation and impose the death penalty. Schiro v. State (1983), Ind., 451 N.E.2d 1047, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003, 104 S.Ct. 510, 78 L.Ed.2d 699. In Schiro, the trial court had reason to believe that the jury had been tricked into recommending against the death penalty. The defendant had tried to delude the jurors into thinking he was mentally unstable by rocking back and forth in their presence. 451 N.E.2d at 1059. [1] In this case, there is no evidence that Martinez Chavez misled the jury through his actions at trial or sentencing. Thus, Schiro does not dispose of this case. Thirty of the thirty-seven states that provide for the death penalty give the life-or-death decision solely to the jury. Of the remaining seven states only Florida, Alabama and Indiana allow a judge to override a jury's recommendation against death. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 463 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3164 & n. 9, 82 L.Ed.2d 340, 354 & n. 9 (1984). The Florida Supreme Court has set the following standard: In order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). The Florida high court has not hesitated to reverse a trial court if it derogates the jury's role. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 437 So.2d 1091 (Fla. 1983); Cannady v. State, 427 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1983). It has also affirmed a trial court's decision to override the jury's recommendation against death. E.g., Spaziano v. State, 433 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1983). The United States Supreme Court has upheld the Florida Supreme Court's decision to impose the death penalty despite the jury's recommendation against it. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). The Court noted that the Florida Supreme Court applied a rigorous standard of review in such cases based upon Tedder and that that standard afforded capital defendants a significant safeguard. 468 U.S. at 465, 104 S.Ct. at 3165, 82 L.Ed.2d at 356. On another occasion, Justice Rehnquist termed the Tedder standard a crucial protection of Florida's capital punishment scheme. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 295, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2299, 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 357-358 (1977). Today we adopt a similar standard. [2] The role of juries in Indiana's death penalty proceedings is a critical one. While the General Assembly has authorized a trial court to override a jury's recommendation, consideration of the jury's recommendation cannot amount to a simple entry noting its existence. Williams v. State (1988), Ind., 525 N.E.2d 1238. This Court regards the recommendation of the jury as a very valuable contribution to the process, in that it comes from a group representative of the defendant's peers, who are likely to reflect, collectively, the standards of the community. Brewer v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 338, 373, 417 N.E.2d 889, 909, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122, 102 S.Ct. 3510, 73 L.Ed.2d 1384 (1982). The United States Supreme Court has recognized, the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2930, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 880-881 (1976). Although the trial court is the final arbiter of the sentence, it is bound to make its decision on the same standards used by the jury, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(e), and it should heed the jury's recommendation. The task today is to develop a standard appropriate to the separate roles of judge and jury. The United States Supreme Court has declared that the discretion of the sentencing authority, whether judge or jury, must be limited and reviewable. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 462, 104 S.Ct. at 3163, 82 L.Ed.2d at 354. Meaningful review by the state supreme court is an important safeguard to assure that imposition of the death penalty is not arbitrary or discriminatory, [3] regardless of whether the judge and the jury agree that death is appropriate or the judge overrides the jury's recommendation of life. Id. at 466, 104 S.Ct. at 3165, 82 L.Ed.2d at 356. In order to sentence a defendant to death after the jury has recommended against death, the facts justifying a death sentence should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could disagree that death was appropriate in light of the offender and his crime. A trial court cannot override the jury's recommendation unless the facts meet this standard. None of the twelve jurors in this case had conscientious objections to the death penalty that would deter them from recommending it. See Ind. Code § 35-37-1-5 (Burns 1985 Repl.). The jury showed it was capable of recommending death because it found a death sentence appropriate for Rondon, the codefendant. The trial court made careful findings and did not lightly override the jury's recommendation, but it concluded that Rondon and Martinez Chavez were equally culpable. The facts suggest that reasonable people could differ on the question of whether the death penalty was appropriate for Martinez Chavez. Most of the evidence implicated Rondon rather than Martinez Chavez. Rondon said he would kill Alarcon. He asked Amiotte to drive. He had the victim's dog tags, bracelet, and key to a safety deposit box together with a stash of blood-stained cash. He gave two knives to his girlfriend the morning after the murder. The evidence established Rondon, not Martinez Chavez, as the leading personality. While an accomplice may be found guilty of the crime largely executed by his principal, it does not follow that the same penalty is appropriate. Justice Frankfurter has written, [T]here is no greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 184, 70 S.Ct. 519, 526, 94 L.Ed. 734, 749 (1949) (dissenting opinion). Because reasonable people could differ on the appropriateness of the death penalty for Martinez Chavez, the trial court should not have overridden the jury's recommendation.