Opinion ID: 1287276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: monetary damages for the violation of the unnecessary rigor clause of the utah constitution

Text: Defendants next contend that article I, section 9 cannot be the basis for a recovery of damages against them. Article I, section 9 provides: Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. It has been recognized that the guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment focuses specifically on the methods or conditions of punishment, while the guarantee against unnecessarily rigorous treatment extends both to prisoners and to arrestees and protects them against unnecessary abuse. Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123, 129-30 (1981). See generally Wickham, 629 P.2d at 901; Bonahoon v. State, 203 Ind. 51, 178 N.E. 570, 571 (1931). However, this court has seldom found occasion to examine the full import of these guarantees, and the issue of whether a court can award a claimant damages for the violation of these guarantees is one of first impression. Article I, section 9 may provide the basis for an award of damages if it is a self-executing provision  which traditionally allows courts to award injunctions and invalidate conflicting statutes  and if it furnishes sufficient authority for remedies of money damages. Courts have developed the concept of self-execution as a means of determining whether a constitutional provision may be enforced without implementing legislation. A constitutional provision is self-executing if it articulates a rule sufficient to give effect to the underlying rights and duties intended by the framers. Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403, 21 S.Ct. 210, 211-12, 45 L.Ed. 249 (1900). In other words, courts may give effect to a provision without implementing legislation if the framers intended the provision to have immediate effect and if no ancillary legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed. In re Montello Salt Co., 88 Utah 283, 288-89, 53 P.2d 727, 729 (1936). In addition, the fact that the legislature may enact supplementary legislation to further protect or regulate a right in a constitutional provision does not prevent the provision from being self-executing. People v. Western Air Lines, 42 Cal.2d 621, 268 P.2d 723, 732 (1954), appeal dismissed by Western Air Lines, Inc. v. People of State of California, 348 U.S. 859, 75 S.Ct. 87, 99 L.Ed. 677 (1954); General Agriculture Corp. v. Moore, 166 Mont. 510, 534 P.2d 859, 862 (1975). Conversely, constitutional provisions are not self-executing if they merely indicate a general principle or line of policy without supplying the means for putting them into effect. In re Montello Salt, 53 P.2d at 729. Article I, section 9 is a self-executing provision. This provision does more than state general principles; it prohibits specific evils that may be defined and remedied without implementing legislation. Indeed, this court has already defined and enforced this provision without the aid of legislation. See, e.g., Wickham, 629 P.2d at 901. Also, the history of the provision indicates that the framers most likely intended it to have immediate effect without implementing legislation. It was drafted on the basis of similar state and federal cruel and unusual punishment clauses that arose from the English Bill of Rights of 1689, [2] which actively and immediately proscribed tortures and other barbaric practices and was enforced without further definition by parliament. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-70, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2923-24, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (citing Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L.Rev. 839, 852-53 (1969)). Like the English courts, American state and federal courts have interpreted and applied cruel and unusual punishment clauses without the aid of legislation. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-06, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290-92, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (giving effect to federal cruel and unusual punishment clause without implementing legislation); Naked City, Inc. v. State, 460 N.E.2d 151, 161 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984) (giving effect to the Indiana cruel and unusual punishment clause without implementing legislation). Further, this provision is a prohibitory provision, and such provisions are usually self-executing at least to the extent that courts may void incongruous legislation. Western Air Lines, 268 P.2d at 732; Alper v. Clark County, 93 Nev. 569, 571 P.2d 810, 811 (1977); State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp., 114 Mont. 52, 132 P.2d 689, 700 (1942); Pederson v. Moser, 99 Wash.2d 456, 662 P.2d 866, 869 (1983). Having determined that article I, section 9 is self-executing, we must now determine whether self-executing clauses provide an adequate basis for a recovery of damages. The decisions of other courts on this issue vary widely. While the states are divided, the United States Supreme Court has held that self-executing federal constitutional provisions may be the basis for an award of money damages. In the landmark ruling Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 407, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2010, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), the Court allowed a claimant to recover damages from federal narcotics agents directly under the Fourth Amendment for the violation of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Later, in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17, 24, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1470-71, 1474, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), the Court extended this ruling to allow a deceased prisoner's mother to recover damages from prison officials for violating her son's Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishments. However, federal courts have acknowledged that the ruling in Carlson does not constitutionalize prisoners' tort actions. Rather, a prisoner may recover damages for inadequate medical care only upon a showing of deliberate indifference, as defined by the United States Supreme Court in Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-06, 97 S.Ct. at 290-92. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17, 100 S.Ct. at 1470-71; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 406 (9th Cir.1985); Mosby v. Marby, 697 F.2d 213, 215 (8th Cir.1982); West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir.1978). State courts have taken several different approaches in interpreting state constitutional provisions. Some courts entirely reject attempts to recover damages for the violation of state constitutional rights. Medina, 871 P.2d at 1385; Figueroa, 604 P.2d at 1205. Others have followed the United States Supreme Court and have allowed recovery under state cruel and unusual punishment clauses upon a showing of deliberate indifference. Naked City, 460 N.E.2d at 160-61. Some courts have held that while money damages are available for constitutional violations, government employees are entitled to good faith immunity if their challenged actions were not in violation of any clearly established constitutional right as articulated in case law. Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So.2d 1081, 1094 (La. 1990). Other courts allow claimants to collect damages from government employees upon a showing of intentional, reckless, or careless disregard or fraud or misdoing. Bull v. Armstrong, 254 Ala. 390, 48 So.2d 467, 470 (1950); Jackson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 484 S.W.2d 315, 319 (Mo.1972). The only common feature of all of these cases is that they hold that simple negligence is not sufficient justification for a damage claim. But see Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 300 Md. 520, 479 A.2d 921, 923 (1984). After examining the reasoning of courts that have ruled on the issue of whether self-executing provisions allow awards of money damages, we find those cases allowing awards to be more persuasive. In recognizing a claim for money damages under the Fourth Amendment, Justice Brennan, writing for the United States Supreme Court asserted: [I]t must ... be recognized that the Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities; at the very least, it strikes me as no more appropriate to await express congressional authorization of traditional judicial relief with regard to these legal interests than with respect to interests protected by ... statutes. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407, 91 S.Ct. at 2010. We agree. The history of individual rights as embodied in the Magna Charta and other fundamental documents supports this view. Under English law, individuals had access to remedies of money damages for violations of their individual rights, Moresi, 567 So.2d at 1092; Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 924 (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765); Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft's 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763); Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763)), and these rights, enumerated in fundamental documents, were the forerunners of many of the provisions adopted in federal and state bills of rights. Thus, the framers of the Utah Constitution, who adopted article I, section 9 against this background, most likely contemplated an award of money damages for the violation of these rights. We also recognize that if prisoners' rights under article I, section 9 are violated, injunctive relief may not be adequate to remedy prisoners' injuries. We cannot deny such prisoners monetary relief simply because many jurisdictions have not clearly established that such relief is available for the violation of constitutional rights. Thus, we conclude that self-executing constitutional provisions allow for awards of money damages. Next, we must determine whether self-executing provisions provide a basis for an award of damages against state employees or only from the state. In arguing against a recovery of damages from state employees, defendants assert that courts have never allowed recovery against private individuals without implementing legislation. Defendants point out that it took an act of Congress in the form of the `Klu Klux Klan Act' of 1871 to provide a tort-like remedy for the violation of a citizen's rights under the United States Constitution (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170-71, 81 S.Ct. 473, 475-76, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). We acknowledge that in cases involving sexual or racial discrimination by private businesses and institutions, this court, along with other courts, has refused to impose liability in the absence of implementing legislation. See Beehive Medical Elecs. v. Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53, 59 (Utah 1978); Armwood v. Francis, 9 Utah 2d 147, 150, 340 P.2d 88, 90-91 (1959); de la Ysla v. Publix Theatres Corp., 82 Utah 598, 604, 26 P.2d 818, 820 (1933). However, we reject defendants' argument for two reasons. First, the cases cited by defendants did not involve self-executing constitutional provisions such as article I, section 9. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17, 24, 100 S.Ct. at 1470-71, 1474; Moresi, 567 So.2d at 1094; Naked City, 460 N.E.2d at 161. Second, state employees cannot be categorized as purely private individuals because they have a unique capacity to harm which private individuals do not have. We recognize that injuries inflicted by officials acting under color of law are substantially different in kind than those inflicted by private parties. Moresi, 567 So.2d at 1093. The actions of officials are apparently authorized by the law, and an agent acting ... in the name of the state possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own. Id. This is particularly true in the case of prisoners, who have no choice but to accept the actions of officials that directly affect their daily lives. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 169-73, 96 S.Ct. at 2923-25; Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 494-95 (10th Cir. 1983). Thus, we find that prisoners may collect damages from prison employees for the violation of their rights under article I, section 9. Although we hold that prisoners are entitled to recover damages from prison employees, it does not follow that employees may be held liable for any injury. A prison employee's lot is not so unhappy that he cannot possess any human frailties of forgetfulness, distractibility, or misjudgment without rendering himself liable for a constitutional violation. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). Neither must he choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not carry out the instructions of his superiors and being mulcted in damages [for a constitutional violation] if he does. Id. To engender liability, an employee's conduct must be voluntary and sufficiently culpable to contravene a prisoner's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments and unnecessary rigor. We hold that a prisoner may not recover damages under article I, section 9 unless he shows that his injury was caused by a prison employee who acted with deliberate indifference or inflicted unnecessary abuse upon him. The deliberate indifference standard protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishments, and the unnecessary abuse standard protects prisoners from unnecessary rigor. See Utah Const. art. I, § 9. We explore each of these standards separately. The deliberate indifference standard differentiates between inadvertent misconduct, which does not give rise to liability under article I, section 9, and the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, which does. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 291-92. For example, a physician who is guilty of medical malpractice is not guilty of a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. Id. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292; El'Amin v. Pearce, 750 F.2d 829, 832 (10th Cir.1984); Brown v. Schiff, 614 F.2d 237, 239 (10th Cir.1980). Similarly, a prison worker's inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care would not support a constitutional claim for damages. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 291-92; Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1476-77 (10th Cir.1993); Daniels v. Gilbreath, 668 F.2d 477, 488 (10th Cir.1982). Moreover, a prison worker would not be liable for failing to administer unnecessary medical treatment desired by an inmate, such as female hormone therapy requested by a transsexual inmate, Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 963 (10th Cir.1986), or treatment for nonexistent claustrophobia and agoraphobia. Frohmader v. Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir.1992). Finally, a prison official would not be liable for a decision necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and ... without the luxury of a second chance. Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495 (10th Cir.1990) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1088, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)). On the other hand, a prison physician would be liable under the deliberate indifference standard for choosing an `easier and less efficacious treatment' than professional judgment dictates, such as throwing away the prisoner's [viable] ear and stitching the stump. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 n. 10, 97 S.Ct. at 291 n. 10 (quoting Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.1974)). A physician would also be liable for refusing to treat a prisoner's allergic reaction to a drug after administering the drug with knowledge of the prisoner's allergy. Id. Likewise, prison guards would be liable for intentionally denying or delaying access to medication or medical treatment. Id. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 291-92. Unlike the deliberate indifference standard, the unnecessary abuse standard has not been widely explored. This standard was pioneered by the Oregon Supreme Court under the unnecessary rigor clause of the Oregon Constitution, article I, section 13. The court, noting that the heart of the unnecessary rigor provision was its ability to embody evolving touchstones of humanity, based this standard upon internationally accepted standards of humane treatment as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1955. Sterling, 625 P.2d at 131. Under this standard, the main consideration is whether a particular prison or police practice would be recognized as an abuse to the extent that it cannot be justified by necessity. Id. at 130. The definition of abuse focuses on needlessly harsh, degrading, or dehumanizing treatment of prisoners. Id. at 131. For example, although police may use reasonable and necessary force in making an arrest, the prohibition against unnecessary rigor does not allow police officers to commit assault and battery on a criminal suspect. Bonahoon, 178 N.E. at 571. The Oregon Supreme Court has further noted that the unnecessary rigor standard does not apply to the quality of the charges that bring a defendant into custody, only to the conditions of his incarceration. State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 786 P.2d 111, 142 (1990). We emphasize that unnecessary rigor must be treatment that is clearly excessive or deficient and unjustified, not merely the frustrations, inconveniences, and irritations that are common to prison life. Having established the applicable standards of liability under article I, section 9, we address defendants' argument that jury instruction 43 allowed the jury to find liability merely on the basis of a deviation from the accepted standard of care in the medical community, rather than on a finding of deliberate indifference or unnecessary abuse. In examining the record, we find that jury instruction 43 was intended solely as an instruction on the issue of proximate causation and that the trial court articulated the deliberate indifference and the unnecessary abuse standards in jury instructions 68 and 69. See State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) (explaining that jury instructions must be read and evaluated as a whole). As we have repeatedly held, if the jury instructions as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible error does not arise merely because one jury instruction, standing alone, is not as accurate as it might have been. State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981). Although defendants objected to instructions 68 and 69 in the trial court, they have not assigned the instructions as being in error nor have they argued this point in their brief on appeal. Where an appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is waived. Reid v. Anderson, 116 Utah 455, 455, 211 P.2d 206, 206 (1949). Consequently, we will not examine those instructions for error.