Opinion ID: 2395704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Count FourRetaliatory Discharge

Text: The Appellants next pleaded a count for retaliatory discharge, which included the following allegations: (38) Plaintiff Roth was actively engaged in work within the scope of her employment when she was subjected to sexual discrimination and/or harassment, an activity protected under West Virginia Code § 5-11-1 et seq. (39) Defendant DeFeliceCare and/or Defendant DeFelice, through Defendant DeFelice was aware that Plaintiff Roth was continuously subjected [to] sexual discrimination and/or harassment. (40) Plaintiff Roth's wrongful discharge/termination followed her unwanted sexually explicit observations of defendant DeFelice and Michelle Kelly and such sexual discrimination and/or harassment was within a time period that retaliatory discharge can be inferred. (41) Plaintiff Roth did not commit any dischargeable offense. (42) As a direct and proximate result of the employment discrimination of Plaintiff Roth, which was known by Defendant DeFeliceCare to be unlawful, in violation of the public policies of the State of West Virginia, and in violation of Defendant DeFeliceCares' own policies and procedures. In reviewing the foregoing allegations, the Appellants alleged that being actively engaged in work within the scope of employment is a protected activity. Additionally, in the Appellants' response to the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss, the Appellants argued that not being subjected to nudity or sexual acts in public is a protected activity. Finally, the Appellants argued that reporting or expressing her displeasure for actions she believes is a violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, is a protected activity. The circuit court, in dismissing this count, determined that there is nothing in the Complaint identifying Tricia Roth as being engaged in any protected activity and no argument was made during briefing that she was. If she was not engaged in a protected activity, she cannot be the victim of retaliatory discharge and therefore, this claim must be dismissed. In order to establish a retaliatory discharge claim, this Court has held the following: `In an action to redress an unlawful retaliatory discharge under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va.Code, 5-11-1, et seq., as amended, the burden is upon the complainant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the complainant engaged in protected activity, (2) that complainant's employer was aware of the protected activities, (3) that complainant was subsequently discharged and (absent other evidence tending to establish a retaliatory motivation), (4) that complainant's discharge followed his or her protected activities within such period of time that the court can infer retaliatory motivation.' Syl. pt. 4, Frank's Shoe Store v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 365 S.E.2d 251 (1986). Syl. pt. 1, Brammer v. Human Rights Commission, 183 W.Va. 108, 394 S.E.2d 340 (1990). Hanlon, 195 W.Va. at 103, 464 S.E.2d at 745, Syl. Pt. 5. Additionally, regarding what type of conduct constitutes a protected activity the Court has held that Protected activity under the West Virginia Human Rights Act includes opposition to a practice that the plaintiff reasonably and in good faith believes violates the provisions of the Act. This standard has both an objective and a subjective element. The employee's opposition must be reasonable in the sense that it must be based on a set of facts and a legal theory that are plausible. Further, the view must be honestly held and be more than a cover for troublemaking. Thus, even if there was no actionable sexual harassment, the plaintiff could still have been engaged in a protected activity if she complained about being sexually harassed. Syl. Pt. 7, Conrad v. ARA Szabo, 198 W.Va. 362, 480 S.E.2d 801 (1996). This Court has recognized that the being terminated because of the filing of a sexual discrimination complaint against an employer involved the employee being engaged in a protected activity. Frank's Shoe Store v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 179 W.Va. 53, 61, 365 S.E.2d 251, 259 (1986). [8] From the Court's review of the allegations contained in the Appellants' Complaint, as well as those facts contained in the Appellants' response to the Motion to Dismiss, and accepting those allegations as true, there simply are no allegations that satisfies the necessary element of the retaliatory discharge cause of action that Mrs. Roth was terminated because she was engaged in a protected activity. We reach this conclusion by reviewing the Appellants' allegation in the light most favorable to the Appellants' juxtaposed against the Court's holdings regarding the type of activity that constitutes protected activity. There simply are no averments that Mrs. Roth was terminated because she either had complained or filed a complaint sounding in sexual harassment or discrimination. Neither are than any allegations that Mrs. Roth was terminated from her employment because she opposed an employment practice that she reasonably and in good faith believed violated the provisions of the West Virginia Human Rights Act. Conrad, 198 W.Va. at 367, 480 S.E.2d at 806, Syl. Pt. 7. Consequently, the Court affirms the circuit court's dismissal of the Appellants' cause of action for retaliatory discharge.