Opinion ID: 1982659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions on Right to Arrest and Detain.

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court improperly charged the jury on liability for false arrest/false imprisonment, [3] claiming the following instruction was erroneous: In this regard, I instruct you that defendant Cumberlander is not liable for false arrest and imprisonment with respect to the initial detention simply because you find she was in fact, mistaken about the plaintiff. (Emphasis added.) Appellant asserts that the simply ... mistaken language of the instruction does not accurately charge the jury on the law which requires that the arresting officer possesses a good faith and reasonable belief that his conduct is lawful. See Henderson v. District of Columbia, 493 A.2d 982, 994 (D.C.1985) (citing Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857, 862-63 (D.C.1973)). [4] Since 1884 this jurisdiction has adhered to the rule that the court must look at the whole charge, and if they see that, in the very next paragraph, an apparent error in one part is corrected, then no injury on the whole is done and the exception will not be sustained. Carpenter v. Washington & Georgetown R.R. Co., 14 D.C. (3 Mackey) 225, 228, aff'd, 121 U.S. 474, 7 S.Ct. 1002, 30 L.Ed. 1015 (1884). See also Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 337 F.Supp. 421 (1972). In the instant case, immediately following the statement to which appellant takes exception, the court stated to the jury: [A]s long as you find that she believed in good faith that the plaintiff had committed or was about to commit a crime, and if you find that the belief was reasonable. (Emphasis added.) Taken as a whole, these two statements unequivocally instructed the jury that liability could be based only upon a finding of lack of good faith and reasonable belief. The words simply ... mistaken in the instruction was merely an elaboration by the trial court upon the test. The court's charge did not instruct the jury to impose a lesser standard than good faith and reasonable belief. Thus, a fair reading of the full text of the court's instructions shows no error. Appellant also claims error in the instruction that defendants were legally entitled to continue to keep Curry in custody unless they knew or were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that further detention was unwarranted. [5] He argues that the same good faith and reasonable belief standard used to determine the validity of the initial detention should control in challenges to continued detention. At the outset, we note that there is no standard civil jury instruction regarding continued detention in false arrest claims. The source of the portion of the instruction to which appellant takes exception is RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 134 comment f (1965), which provides: f. Actor's duty to release other. If the actor, whether a private person or a police officer, has arrested another without a warrant ... and has ascertained beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspicion upon which the privilege to arrest is based is unfounded, he is no longer privileged to keep the other in custody and must release him, unless the other indicates his desire to be taken before a court, body, or official, in order that the stigma which the other believes that the arrest has put upon him may be officially removed, or unless the other objects to his release in the belief that it will endanger his bodily security or entail expense. (Emphasis added.) In our opinion, this provision of the RESTATEMENT correctly sets forth the standards to be applied when the lawfulness of an arrest and detention is disputed. As we have found no holding in this jurisdiction to the contrary, we deem this instruction a proper guideline for a jury to follow.