Opinion ID: 1440058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Maryland Wiretap Act

Text: The issue presented before this Court requires us to analyze and interpret the statutory language of the Maryland Wiretap Act. To the extent possible, it is the explicit statutory language of the Act upon which we primarily base our determination of legislative intent. See Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490, 507, 784 A.2d 1086, 1096 (2001); Marriott Employees Federal Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 445, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997)(stating that where the statutory language is free from ambiguity, courts do not look beyond the language of the statute); State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133, 669 A.2d 1339, 1340-41 (1996)(stating that the primary source of legislative intent is, of course, the language of the statute itself) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 731 (1986)). The General Assembly, as well as Congress, expressly provided definitions for most of the pivotal terms in the Act; where definitions were not explicitly provided, as was the case for the term telephone equipment, we determine the intended scope of the term by applying the language's natural and ordinary meaning, by considering the express and implied purpose of the statute, and by employing basic principles of common sense, the meaning these words intend to convey. See Maryland Dept. of the Env't v. Underwood, 368 Md. 160, 175, 792 A.2d 1130, 1138 (2002)(stating that the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature)(quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)); Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 346, 772 A.2d 1225, 1235 (2001)(affirming that the statutory language must be viewed from a commonsensical perspective); Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985) (indicating that the Court will reject a proposed statutory interpretation if its consequences are inconsistent with common sense). We review the language of the contested provision in the context of the statute as a whole and with respect to the clear purposes the legislature conveyed. See Giant Food, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 356 Md. 180, 189, 738 A.2d 856, 861 (1999) (quoting Tucker, 308 Md. at 73, 517 A.2d at 732)(stating that a plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to extend or limit the scope of its operation); Prince George's County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658, 667 A.2d 898, 901 (1995)(stating that courts may confirm the meaning reached by reference to the words of the statute by considering the purpose, goal or context of the statute); Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 138, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994)(when considering the context of a statute, courts may review related statutes, pertinent legislative history and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal)(internal citations and quotations omitted). The Maryland Wiretap Act makes it unlawful to wilfully intercept ... any wire, oral, or electronic communication. Md. Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.), § 10-402(a)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. [6] The Wiretap Act defines intercept as the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device. Md.Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 10-401(3). The contentious issue in the present case is, of course, whether the respondent's conduct could be categorized as an interception under the Maryland Wiretap Act. That the respondent acquired the content of countless communications is undisputed; whether this acquisition was through the use of an electronic, mechanical, or other device, however, is ardently disputed and depends entirely upon whether, as a matter of law, respondent's Racal recording equipment is such an intercepting device. An electronic, mechanical or other device is defined, in relevant part, as any device ... other than [a]ny telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or other facility for the transmission of electronic communications, or any component thereof that is furnished by the subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of the [telecommunications] service and used in the ordinary course of its business. [7] Md.Code, § 10-41 (4)(i)(a)(emphasis added). Thus, the default rule is that the device is an intercepting device forbidden by the Maryland Wiretap Act. In its simplest terms, the statutory exception to this blanket prohibition is for telephone equipment (or component thereof) used in the ordinary course of business. Both criteria must be met to satisfy the telephone exemption and each will be addressed independently, to the extent necessary. Prior to reviewing the dual prongs of the telephone exemption, we must note that when interpreting and applying the Maryland Wiretap Act, federal jurisprudence is both useful and applicable because our Act was modeled extensively after its federal counterpart, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (hereinafter Title III), 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2510-2522 (2000). See Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 507, 781 A.2d 787, 798 (2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 122 S.Ct. 1175, 152 L.Ed.2d 118 (2002)(stating that Title III, which set forth minimum standards for protections against interceptions of communications, was the model for Maryland's Act); State v. Bailey, 289 Md. 143, 151, 422 A.2d 1021, 1026 (1980)(acknowledging the Maryland's Wiretap Act is an offspring of Title III). [8] While modeling the Maryland Wiretap Act after Title III, our State Legislature unequivocally has demonstrated its intent to create an Act more protective of privacy interests than that which is promoted by Title III. See Miles, 365 Md. at 508, 781 A.2d at 798; Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 343-44, 748 A.2d 478, 487-88 (2000)(noting that Maryland's Act, while very similar to the Federal Act, actually provides more protection from wiretapping than does the Federal Act). As Judge Harrell declared in Standiford v. Standiford, 89 Md.App. 326, 598 A.2d 495 (1991), cert. denied, 325 Md. 526, 601 A.2d 1101 (1992), while on the Court of Special Appeals, [t]he alterations that were made [to Title III] by the General Assembly before enacting the Maryland Act were obviously designed to afford the people of this State a greater protection than Congress provided in Title III. Standiford, 89 Md.App. at 334, 598 A.2d at 499. Under Maryland law and contrary to federal law, for example, interception of communications is only authorized if consent of all parties to the interception is obtained. Miles, 365 Md. at 508, 781 A.2d at 798 (noting that before a communication may be recorded or intercepted, Maryland requires consent of all parties); Perry v. State, 357 Md. 37, 60-62, 741 A.2d 1162, 1175-76 (1999)(noting the longstanding interest in Maryland in protecting the conversations of private individuals); Mustafa, 323 Md. 65, 74, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991) ([t]he two-party consent provision of the Maryland Act is aimed at providing greater protection for the privacy interest in communications than the federal law.). Requiring the consent of all parties is one example of the Legislature's intent to establish strict protections for the privacy interests of the citizenry-it is with this intent in mind that we must consider the scope of the telephone exemption.