Opinion ID: 1143918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: contractual assumption of the risk of damage

Text: Graham maintains that by virtue of the custom of the trade and by prior express conversations and dealings, Rockman assumed the risk of nonwillful destruction of the aircraft. The rule whereby a bailee bears the risk of injury to the bailed property resulting from his negligence can be modified by the contractual agreement between the parties [6] or by custom or usage. [7] The agreement by which Graham rented the airplane from Rockman was oral. The evidence as to the parties' understanding of that agreement is conflicting. Rockman stated that he told Graham to obtain his own insurance. Graham denied this and testified that his understanding of the agreement was that Rockman would bear the risk of loss of the aircraft. There thus was a conflict of evidence on the question of whether Rockman had agreed to assume the risk of loss of the aircraft. Graham's answer expressly alleged that under terms and conditions of the rental of the aircraft to him, Rockman assumed all risks of damage to or loss of the airplane except for damage or loss intentionally caused. The court, however, made no specific findings on this issue. Included in the Conclusions of Law is the statement: The defendant is liable for all injuries to plaintiff resulting proximately from the event of August 28, 1969, and which were foreseeable and has no defenses to such liability. Despite this conclusion making reference to the absence of defenses, we are unable to determine whether the trial court specifically judged this issue, and if so, whether he considered that the defense failed due to a legal theory or inadequate proof of requisite facts. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) specifies: In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court shall find the facts specially... . In Merrill v. Merrill we stated: As one well recognized authority points out, findings of fact under Rule 52(a) have a threefold purpose: as an aid in the trial judge's process of adjudication; for the purposes of res judicata and estoppel by judgment; and as an aid to the appellate court on review. To particularize, the requirement that the trial judge file findings of fact gives assurance that he has exercised care in ascertaining the facts, and has employed both skill and judgment in reducing his thoughts on contested matters to precise and pertinent findings while the evidence is still fresh in his mind. Further, under Rule 52(a), it is the duty of the trial court by sufficiently detailed and explicit findings to give the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision, and to enable it to determine the ground on which the trial court reached its decision. [8] (Footnotes omitted) Since we are unable to determine the basis of the court's decision on the issue of an express contract dealing with the risk of loss of the airplane, it will be necessary to remand the case for further findings on this issue. Graham also alleged that there was a custom in Southeast Alaska, among other places, regarding the rental of aircraft whereby the person owning the airplane assumed all risk of damage except for damage intentionally caused. Extensive testimony was presented as to the existence of such a custom and there was also some testimony to the contrary. [9] Rockman argues that such a custom could not be established in a relatively small community such as Ketchikan where there are but two aircraft rental businesses; particularly when the owner of one of the businesses (Rockman) contended that he did not follow the practice of assuming the risk of non-intentional loss to his aircraft. That argument, however, fails to make a necessary distinction between a custom or usage peculiar to a particular locality and one applicable to a trade or business. In Stock and Grove, Inc. v. City of Juneau, [10] this court stated That the clear and unambiguous terms of a contract may be interpreted by the general and accepted usage of the trade or business involved is the general rule of law. (Footnote omitted) The proffered evidence in that case dealt with the practice in the construction industry, generally, not just in the City of Juneau, where the contract was performed. Nevertheless, for Graham to prevail on this issue, it was necessary for him to establish that there was such a custom or usage in the airplane rental business which was either known by Rockman or should have been known by him. A person entering into a contract in the ordinary course of business is presumed to have done so in reference to any existing general usage or custom relating to such business... . And this is so whether he knew of the custom or not. [11] (Citations omitted) Since the lower court made no specific findings as to whether a custom or usage was established by the evidence, we find it necessary to remand for further findings on this issue.