Opinion ID: 1998034
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: impeachment of defense witness with juvenile delinquency adjudications

Text: The next issue raised by Williams concerns the ruling of the trial judge allowing the State to impeach a key defense witness using several of the witness's juvenile delinquency adjudications. The defense witness was another fellow inmate of Williams who testified that a vital State's witness, inmate Carl Spoone, was lying when he testified that Williams had confessed to the murders during a jailhouse conversation about God. The second inmate, Mark Wheelton, stated that he remembered being present during the conversation, and that Williams had not joined in the discussion. Wheelton further testified that he knew Williams for approximately three months while the two were incarcerated together, and that Williams never discussed the charges against him. Before Wheelton took the stand, defense counsel asked the court to rule on the question of whether the State would be allowed to impeach Wheelton with his recent murder conviction and with several juvenile delinquency adjudications. After discussion with lawyers for both sides, the court ruled that the State could not use Wheelton's murder conviction as impeachment evidence because the deadline for Wheelton to file an appeal from the conviction had not expired. [4] As to Wheelton's juvenile delinquency adjudications, the court ruled that under the holding of Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), the State could use the juvenile records to impeach Wheelton. As a result, the following cross-examination occurred: [STATE'S ATTORNEY]: [P]rior to ... being in the detention center you had in 1991 been found delinquent on three counts of breaking and entry, hadn't you? [WHEELTON]: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, may I have a continuing objection? THE COURT: You have a continuing objection. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Your Honor. [STATE'S ATTORNEY]: And also in 1991 you were found to have been delinquent in regard to larceny and breaking and entry? [WHEELTON]: Yes. [STATE'S ATTORNEY]: And in 1992 you were found delinquent regarding breaking and entry and theft? [WHEELTON]: Yes. [STATE'S ATTORNEY]: And again, in 1992 you were found, uh, delinquent regarding daytime housebreaking? [WHEELTON]: Yes. Williams contends that the trial judge erred in allowing the State to impeach Wheelton with the juvenile adjudications. We agree. A juvenile delinquency adjudication is not a criminal conviction. Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 3-824(a)(1). Hence, the rule is clear in Maryland that it is impermissible for the State to attack the credibility of a defense witness by directly asking him about his past record of juvenile offenses. [5] See Westfall v. State, 243 Md. 413, 423, 221 A.2d 646, 652 (1966). In Lancaster v. State, 86 Md.App. 74, 585 A.2d 274 (1991), aff'd on other grounds, 332 Md. 385, 631 A.2d 453 (1993), the Court of Special Appeals stated: The law is perfectly clear that it is `impermissible to attack the credibility of a witness by asking him about his past record of juvenile offenses, directly, or indirectly.' Indeed, any inquiry, `whether by record or by cross-examination, of determinations of prior juvenile delinquency is impermissible in any adjudicatory hearing.' (Citations omitted). 86 Md.App. at 86, 585 A.2d at 280. This rule is designed to protect the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. See Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., §§ 3-824(b) and (c). See also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42, at 147 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)(In statutes relating to proceedings in juvenile courts it is frequently provided that an adjudication of delinquency shall not be used in evidence against the child in any other court and shall not be deemed a `conviction.' These statutes are usually construed as precluding the finding from being used as a conviction to impeach credibility.). The trial judge's reliance upon Davis, supra, was plainly misplaced. Davis involved a defendant's constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to confront a State's witness with his prior juvenile record to show bias on the part of the witness. Davis, 415 U.S. at 318-19, 94 S.Ct. at 1111-12, 39 L.Ed.2d at 355. Davis is not authority for allowing the State to violate the confidentiality of juvenile records through its cross-examination of a defense witness. Davis was based on a defendant's right to effective cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The State has no constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment. Hence, Davis is inapposite. Furthermore, even if we were to interpret Davis as applying to both State and defense witnesses, it would still be inapplicable in the instant case. Davis involved particular narrow factual circumstances in which the defendant was attempting to demonstrate that a State's witness's status as a juvenile offender on probation may have biased his testimony against the defendant. Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court found that the State's interest in protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders was outweighed by a defendant's right to effective cross-examination directed at possible bias of the witness related to the witness's status as a juvenile delinquent. Davis, 415 U.S. at 319-20, 94 S.Ct. at 1111-12, 39 L.Ed.2d at 355-56. Davis does not stand for the proposition that a witness's general credibility may be impeached with juvenile adjudications. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 321, 94 S.Ct. at 1112-13, 39 L.Ed.2d at 356 (Stewart, J., concurring). In the instant case, there was no allegation that Wheelton may have been biased in favor of Williams and against the State, or any indication that Wheelton's juvenile delinquency adjudications may have somehow motivated his testimony. In fact, the record makes clear that the trial judge's ruling was based on his belief that the juvenile adjudications were relevant to Wheelton's credibility, not bias: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, may Imay I just say thatthat this is really not an issue of bias, it's an issue of credibility.    THE COURT: Well, isn't bias credibility? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, I think they're very different.    Credibility is, one, the ability to tell the truth. Bias is having an interest in the outcome. They can certainly question him on whether or not he had an interest in the outcome.... THE COURT: Well, but the problem is the problem comes down, here's a man that has been convicted ofof things that would tend to show he's nothe wouldn't tell the truth. It seems to me that's absolutely pertinent. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Again, I would call the court's attention that these are not convictions. THE COURT: Oh, I understand it clearly says that, it clearly says that.    But I do think it tends to show his credibility. And I'mI'm inclined to allow him to ask about that. The cross-examination of Wheelton was not directed at possible bias, but rather his general credibility. Hence, Davis is inapposite. See Committee Note to Md. Rule 5-609 (noting that evidence of juvenile adjudications is restricted, but that they may be used by a defendant to show bias pursuant to Davis ). We agree with Williams that the trial judge erred in allowing the State to impeach Wheelton's general credibility with the juvenile delinquency adjudications.