Opinion ID: 2453894
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Troopers' Actions In The First And Second Interviews Tainted Kalmakoff's Statements Made In The Third And Fourth Interviews.

Text: [A] criminal defendant can seek suppression of his or her statements to the police on the ground that those statements are tainted by a prior illegality. [70] For example, a defendant may claim that his or her confession is the product of statements made at an earlier interview in which the police violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. [71] Kalmakoff argues that the illegalities in the first and second interviews tainted the statements he made in the third and fourth interviews, ultimately requiring that all four interviews be suppressed. [72] Whether a defendant's subsequent statement is tainted by a prior constitutional violation is a question of law, and we therefore independently determine whether, under the superior court's findings of historical fact, the defendant's decision to speak with the police was voluntary and sufficiently insulated from the prior illegality to escape its taint. [73] Because the law regarding whether a subsequent admission is tainted by a previous illegality has evolved over time, we first address the test we apply to determine whether Kalmakoff's later statements were tainted.
Alaska courts have historically used a single legal test to determine whether a previous violation of a criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment rightseither an involuntary statement or a statement taken in violation of Miranda tainted the defendant's subsequent statement. [74] The court of appeals explained this test in its leading opinion on this subject, Halberg v. State : As a preliminary matter, the government had to show that the defendant's subsequent statement was voluntary and, if the defendant was in custody during the subsequent interrogation, that the defendant received proper Miranda warnings and waived his or her rights. Assuming these foundational matters were proved, courts then analyzed the totality of the circumstances to assess whether the defendant's decision to give a subsequent statement was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.[ [75] ] The totality of the circumstances analysis has also been described as whether there was a break in the stream of events ... sufficient to insulate the [subsequent] statement from the effect of all that went before [76] and as whether the connection between the illegal conduct of the police and the challenged evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. [77] The Halberg test is based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Illinois . [78] In Brown, the United States Supreme Court clarified that whether the taint had dissipated was not a but for inquiry, rejecting the argument that suppression was always required when a defendant's subsequent statement was the result of prior illegality and instead held that [t]he question whether a [subsequent] confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. [79] The Court further explained that [t]he temporal proximity of the [initial illegality] and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant circumstances to consider. [80] The Alaska Court of Appeals agreed with this approach in Halberg: The question is not whether the content of the second and subsequent interviews would have been the same if the initial interview had not taken place. Instead, the question is whether [a defendant's] decision to submit to the [subsequent interview] was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the ... taint of the Miranda violation at the first interview.[ [81] ] To answer this question, the court of appeals in Halberg instructed courts to consider a number of relevant factors: [T]he purpose and flagrancy of the initial illegal act, the amount of time between the illegal act and the defendant's subsequent statement, the defendant's physical and mental condition at the time of the subsequent statement, whether the defendant remained in custody or was at liberty during this interval, whether the defendant had the opportunity to contact legal counsel or friends during this interval, whether the subsequent interview took place at a different location, whether the defendant's interrogators were the same officers who committed the prior illegal act, whether the evidence obtained from the prior illegal act affected the defendant's decision to submit to a subsequent interview, whether the police used lies or trickery to influence the defendant's decision, and whether there were other intervening events that affected the defendant's decision.[ [82] ] As we noted in our June 2010 order, the court of appeals correctly looked to the factors articulated in Halberg to determine whether Kalmakoff's statements from the third and fourth interviews were tainted by the prior illegalities. [83] In its initial briefing to this court, the State urged us to apply the test outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Elstad [84] rather than the Halberg factors. The Elstad Court held that when the only prior illegality is a simple failure to administer the [ Miranda ] warnings, [85] a careful and thorough administration of the Miranda warnings prior to the subsequent statement serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible. [86] Neither our court nor the court of appeals has ever decided whether to adopt Elstad as a matter of state constitutional law. [87] But we do not need to decide that question in this case because the facts here fall well outside of Elstad 's purview. Elstad involved only a failure to administer Miranda warnings, and the Elstad Court made clear that its decision did not apply to at least two scenarios: first, cases where the initial unwarned statement [was] obtained through overtly or inherently coercive methods which raise serious Fifth Amendment and due process concerns and second, cases concerning suspects whose invocation of their rights to remain silent and to have counsel present were flatly ignored while police subjected them to continued interrogation. [88] This case falls squarely within the second exception. The troopers did commit two procedural violations of Miranda when they failed to administer the warnings to Kalmakoff prior to the first and second interviews. But they also flatly ignored Kalmakoff's repeated invocations of his right to remain silent after they finally administered Miranda warnings midway through the second interview. This violation rises above the prophylactic concerns of Miranda and intrudes upon the constitutional right to remain silent in the face of police interrogation, a right that we have recognized as one of the most fundamental aspects of our constitutional jurisprudence. [89] When the police fail to properly administer Miranda warnings, we presume that a suspect's statements are compelled in order to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination. [90] But when the police refuse to honor a suspect's invocation of his right to silence, any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. [91] Because the troopers in this case not only failed to administer Miranda warnings but also violated Kalmakoff's constitutional right to silence, we look to the factors articulated in Halberg v. State to determine whether Kalmakoff's decision to speak with the troopers in the third and fourth interviews was sufficiently insulated from the prior illegalities to escape their taint.
We begin by using the Halberg factors to analyze Kalmakoff's third interview with the troopers. We agree with the court of appeals that some of the Halberg factors suggest that there was a break in the stream of events between the interviews: Kalmakoff was not in custody during the few hours that elapsed between the interviews and thus had the opportunity to speak with friends or family at home or at school; the third interview took place at Kalmakoff's home, rather than the city building; the third interview lasted less than 25 minutes; Kalmakoff's grandparents were present at the third interview; and the troopers did not use lies or trickery to convince Kalmakoff to submit to the interview. [92] But our analysis differs from that of the court of appeals with respect to three significant factors: the troopers flagrantly violated Kalmakoff's rights during the second interview; they obtained important incriminating information through those violations; and they proceeded to use that illegally obtained information to convince Kalmakoff to submit to the third interview. Given this sequence of events, it is impossible to say that the connection between the troopers' illegal conduct and Kalmakoff's third interview statements was so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. [93] The United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois instructed that the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct is a particularly important factor in determining whether a subsequent statement is insulated from the prior illegality. [94] Although there is no indication that the subjective intent of the troopers was to violate Kalmakoff's rights, the misconduct that occurred in this case was flagrant. The court of appeals described the troopers' violations in the second interview as egregious. [95] The court of appeals stated that the troopers repeatedly disregarded Kalmakoff's requests to leave the interview; failed to honor [Kalmakoff's] invocation of his right to silence; and implied that [Kalmakoff] did have to speak to them. [96] Moreover, the troopers implied that Kalmakoff's only choice was whether to be questioned alone or in the presence of his grandparents; demanded to know why Kalmakoff was not willing to speak to them; and tried to get [Kalmakoff] to agree to be interrogated on a question-by-question basis. [97] But the court of appeals decided that it must draw a distinction between the troopers' conduct at the first interview and the troopers' conduct at the second interview. [98] The court thus concluded that even assuming the troopers violated Kalmakoff's Miranda rights in the first interview, [99] that violation was not flagrant because the tone of the interview was polite and Kalmakoff was not lied to, threatened, or bullied. [100] Although it may be true that this violation standing alone is not flagrant, we cannot ignore the reality that by the time of the third interview, Kalmakoff had been subjected to a pattern of violations: the failure to administer Miranda warnings at the first interview; the failure to properly administer the warnings at the beginning of the second interview; the refusal to honor his requests to leave the second interview before the warnings were administered; and the failure to honor his invocation of his constitutional right to silence after the warnings were given. We have previously recognized that ignoring or rebuffing a suspect's invocation of his or her constitutional rights will convince the suspect that such rights are illusory. [101] This consequence is undoubtedly greater when the suspect's rights are repeatedly and persistently violated. The pattern of violations in this case is thus greater than the sum of its parts, and accordingly increases the flagrancy of the official misconduct. The court of appeals also underestimated the significance of the information obtained through the troopers' misconduct. The court of appeals concluded that in the first interview, Kalmakoff admitted only two violations of the law: under-age drinking, and temporarily stealing a pistol and blanks so that he and his friend ... could go back to [the friend's] house and shoot the gun. [102] As we explained in our June 2010 order, we do not agree with this assessment: Our review of the transcripts indicates that during the first half of the first interview, Kalmakoff made three highly significant admissions that may have influenced his later decision to confess in the third interview: that he was drinking on the night of the murder; that he and his cousin found the murder weapon in the house where the victim was sleeping and took it with them; and that he and his cousin returned to check on the victim several times and the victim became angry with him.[ [103] ] Given Trooper Stephenson's remark to Trooper Mlynarik that they were hot on the trail now after Kalmakoff gave these statements, it seems that the troopers also thought these admissions were significant. Similarly, the court of appeals concluded that the troopers obtained little information from the violations that occurred in the second interview, stating that Kalmakoff made only one self-incriminating admission: that he had consumed about half a pint of whiskey on the evening of the homicide. [104] But this ignores a crucial passage from the second interview. After Kalmakoff asked to leave the interview and return to school, the troopers pressed him on why he did not want to talk to them. In response, Kalmakoff said, I don't know, sorta scared. When Trooper Allen asked what he was scared about, Kalmakoff replied, That I did it. Finally, we disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that Kalmakoff's decision to participate in the third interview was not materially affected by the statements obtained from him during the first and second interviews. [105] When the troopers first asked Kalmakoff if he would speak with them in the presence of his grandparents, Kalmakoff did not respond. Trooper Allen then encouraged Kalmakoff to participate in the interview: Because you know there'sthere's some things that you might've told us already that they might not even know about. You think that'd be fair, you think? ... Eventually all the information's gonna be available.... [unknown indiscernible speaker] [W]ould you like to start off so that you can bring your [g]randparents up to speed on everything that you've talked to us about already [?] (Emphasis added.) When Kalmakoff said that he didn't know where to start, Trooper Allen prompted him by referring to a specific admission from the first interview: [D]id you talk with Trooper Stephenson about about a gun? Two things about this exchange demonstrate that Kalmakoff's decision to submit to the third interview was substantially affected by his earlier statements. [106] First, by telling Kalmakoff that it was only fair to tell his grandparents what he had told the troopers because [e]ventually all the information's gonna be available, Trooper Allen communicated to Kalmakoff that refusing to participate in the interview would be futile given his earlier incriminating statements. [107] Second, the message that it was futile to resist was compounded by Trooper Allen's direct references to the illegally obtained statements both generally, by asking Kalmakoff to bring his grandparents up to speed regarding the earlier statements, and specifically, by prompting Kalmakoff to talk about the gun. Later in the interview, the troopers asked more specific questions about Kalmakoff's earlier admissions, including about checking on the victim and the victim's angry response toward Kalmakoff. By using these statements to induce Kalmakoff to participate in the third interview, the troopers connected that interview back to the flagrant violations of Kalmakoff's rights that they had committed only a few hours earlier. We therefore conclude that Kalmakoff's statements in the third interview were not sufficiently insulated from the taint of the prior illegalities, and those statements must be suppressed.
Many of the same considerations lead us to conclude that Kalmakoff's statements made during the fourth interview were also tainted by prior illegalities. The same troopers conducted the fourth interview, and our analysis of the flagrancy of the prior illegalities and the information obtained from the earlier illegalities remains the same. We recognize that several of the Halberg factors weigh in favor of admitting the fourth interview: there was a break of almost 24 hours between the third and fourth interviews; Kalmakoff was at liberty during this interval; and the fourth interview took place at a different location. But given the exchange between the troopers and Kalmakoff at the beginning of the fourth interview, we cannot say that these factors created a break in the stream of events ... sufficient to insulate the [fourth] statement from the effect of all that went before. [108] The State argues that the fourth interview was sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegalities because the troopers were not in any way overbearing, and at the beginning of the interview advised Kalmakoff of his Miranda rights and made it clear that the choice to participate in the interview was Kalmakoff's. But this characterization of the beginning of the fourth interview is not completely accurate. As described previously, [109] the troopers again went to Kalmakoff's school to remove him from class. Kalmakoff repeatedly asked the troopers when he could return to class, and they initially provided misleading answers, telling Kalmakoff that he could go back to school in a few hours. [110] Trooper Allen then told Kalmakoff, I wanna have you talk with us about what happened so that we can understand it very clearly ... okay, so that nobody ... has any questions about stuff okay[,] would you like to go around with us and do that? Kalmakoff responded, I guess so. Thus, prior to administering Miranda warnings, and after misleading Kalmakoff about when he could return to school, the troopers had Kalmakoff agree to repeat the information that he had already provided to them. This exchange alone demonstrates that Kalmakoff's earlier incriminating statements materially affected his decision to participate in the final interview. Kalmakoff asked the troopers what was going to happen to him, and Trooper Allen eventually told Kalmakoff that the troopers would be taking him back to Anchorage to appear in front of a judge. Kalmakoff then made several additional incriminating statements, telling the troopers repeatedly that he didn't do it on purpose. The troopers reassured Kalmakoff that they understood and that they hadn't told the victim's family about Kalmakoff's involvement. It was only at that pointafter Kalmakoff had agreed to participate in the interview and made more incriminating statementsthat Trooper Allen administered Miranda warnings to Kalmakoff. Trooper Allen qualified the warnings by telling Kalmakoff, I want to go through this with you real quick and reminding him that we did this before. To fulfill their role as a critical constitutional safeguard, the Miranda warnings must effectively advise the suspect that he [has] a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that juncture and they must reasonably convey that [the suspect can] choose to stop talking even if he had talked earlier. [111] Even if the troopers had advised Kalmakoff of his Miranda rights at the outset of the fourth interview, the pattern and flagrancy of the previous violations would have raised the question whether those warnings were effective. But the troopers did not administer the warnings until Kalmakoff agreed to go over the information he had already provided and had made further incriminating statements. Trooper Allen's language also implied that the warnings were merely a formality. The administration of the warnings here thus could not have provided Kalmakoff with a meaningful choice and was not sufficient to insulate the fourth interview from the prior violations of Miranda and Kalmakoff's constitutional right to remain silent. We therefore conclude that Kalmakoff's decision to submit to the fourth interview was not sufficiently an act of free will to purge the taint of the earlier violations, and Kalmakoff's statements must be suppressed.