Opinion ID: 221737
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to Associate with Counsel

Text: Merrifield claims that Defendants imposed the harsh sanction of termination because it disapproved of his retaining a lawyer to represent him in the disciplinary matter. This retaliation, he contends, violated his First Amendment freedom of association. We are not persuaded. The First Amendment (which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Deutsch v. Jordan, 618 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir.2010)) generally prohibits the government from imposing burdens on freedom of speech, [freedom] of the press, ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and [the right of the people] to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. U.S. Const. amend. I. When, however, the relationship of the government to the person is that of an employer, those First Amendment rights are limited. Speech, for example, can be insubordinate, disruptive, or demoralizing; and government employers are not required to let such misconduct pass. As the Supreme Court wrote in Garcetti v. Ceballos: When a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom. Government employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees' words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services. 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006) (citation omitted). To accommodate the government's interest as an employer, the Supreme Court has developed a five-element test to determine the validity of a claim that the government has improperly retaliated against an employee based on the employee's speech. See Dixon v. Kirkpatrick, 553 F.3d 1294, 1302 (10th Cir.2009). [1] The component of that test that requires our attention on this appeal is the requirement that the claim be based on employee speech that is on a matter of public concern. Id. [P]ublic concern is something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004). The public-concern requirement serves to limit the protection of speech by an employee to speech that the employee makes in his capacity as a citizen, rather than simply as an employee. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (employee is protected against retaliation only if the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern). Very recently the Supreme Court decided that the public-concern requirement should likewise apply when a government employee complains of retaliation based on his exercise of the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2488, 2495, 180 L.Ed.2d 408 (2011). Guarnieri alleged that the Borough had retaliated against him for filing two petitions: his union grievance challenging his termination by the Borough and a later lawsuit claiming that he had been retaliated against for filing the grievance. See id. at 2492. Barring Guarnieri's claim because the petitions did not raise a matter of public concern, the Court explained: The substantial government interests that justify a cautious and restrained approach to the protection of speech by public employees are just as relevant when public employees proceed under the Petition Clause. Petitions, no less than speech, can interfere with the efficient and effective operation of government. A petition may seek to achieve results that contravene governmental policies or impair the proper performance of governmental functions. Id. at 2495 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, it said that [w]hen a petition takes the form of a lawsuit against the government employer, it may be particularly disruptive, id. at 2496, and proceeded to expand at length on how [u]nrestrained application of the Petition Clause in the context of government employment would subject a wide range of government operations to invasive judicial superintendence, id. The issue joined by the parties in this appeal is whether the public-concern requirement also applies to a claim by a government employee that he was retaliated against because of his exercise of the freedom of association. To resolve that issue, we must begin with an understanding of what is encompassed by freedom of association. The Supreme Court has pointed out that its decisions have referred to constitutionally protected `freedom of association' in two distinct senses. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). The two senses are sometimes labeled as the intrinsic sense, which relates to certain intimate human interactions, and the instrumental sense, which relates to associations necessary to engage in the enumerated First Amendment rights. Id. at 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244. The first type of association is protected as a component of substantive due process. The second is protected as a means of effectuating First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has explained the two senses as follows: In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment  speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties. Id. at 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (emphasis added). On this appeal we need not determine whether the public-concern requirement applies when a government employee claims retaliation based on the employee's exercise of the intrinsic right of freedom of association. This court has expressed doubt whether that requirement should apply in that context, as have others. See Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 498 n. 6 (10th Cir.1990); Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1564 n. 7 (10th Cir.1989); Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir.2005); Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1044-45 (6th Cir.2003) (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see generally Mark Strauss, Note, Public Employees' Freedom of Association: Should Connick v. Myers' Speech-Based Public Concern Rule Apply?, 61 Fordham L.Rev. 473, 476-89 (1993). We also need not determine whether the public-concern requirement applies when the alleged protected association is for the free exercise of religion. We consider only the instrumental right of freedom of association for the purpose of engaging in speech, assembly, or petitioning for redress of grievances. Association with an attorney can be protected as such a right. This was recognized by the Supreme Court first in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), and then in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1113, 12 L.Ed.2d 89 (1964), and United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 88 S.Ct. 353, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967). As the Court explained in the last of these opinions: We start with the premise that the rights to assemble peaceably and to petition for a redress of grievances are among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. These rights, moreover, are intimately connected both in origin and in purpose, with the other First Amendment rights of free speech and free press. All these, though not identical, are inseparable. The First Amendment would, however, be a hollow promise if it left government free to destroy or erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no law is passed that prohibits free speech, press, petition, or assembly as such. We have therefore repeatedly held that laws which actually affect the exercise of these vital rights cannot be sustained merely because they were enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legislative competence, or even because the laws do in fact provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil. The foregoing were the principles we invoked when we dealt in the Button and Trainmen cases with the right of an association to provide legal services for its members. United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 222, 88 S.Ct. 353 (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). We will assume, without deciding, that Merrifield's retention of an attorney for his disciplinary proceedings amounted to associating with an attorney to exercise his speech and petition rights in the employment dispute. (If his retention of an attorney could not be so characterized, it would receive no First Amendment protection whatsoever.) In our view, the public-concern requirement applies to a claim that a government employer retaliated against an employee for exercising the instrumental right of freedom of association for the purpose of engaging in speech, assembly, or petitioning for redress of grievances. To begin with, the public-concern test in speech-retaliation cases has its origin in freedom-of-association cases. The public-concern requirement was first set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), the leading decision addressing freedom of speech in the employee-retaliation context. As later recounted in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), the Court in Pickering found its justification for the requirement in Supreme Court doctrine regarding employee freedom of association: In ... the precedents in which Pickering is rooted, the invalidated statutes and actions sought to suppress the rights of public employees to participate in public affairs. The issue was whether government employees could be prevented or chilled by the fear of discharge from joining political parties and other associations that certain public officials might find subversive. The explanation for the Constitution's special concern with threats to the right of citizens to participate in political affairs is no mystery. The First Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection. [ Pickering ] followed from this understanding of the First Amendment. Id. at 144-45, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (brackets, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 692 (6th Cir.1985) ( Pickering and Connick ... are based upon freedom of association cases.) It would be ironic, if not unprincipled, if the public-concern requirement derived from freedom-of-association cases did not likewise apply to retaliation for such association. Moreover, to give special status to retaliation claims based on nonreligious instrumental freedom of association  by eschewing the public-concern requirement in those cases  would violate the Supreme Court's teaching that the political First Amendment rights should be treated equally, at least in the government-employment context. In McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985), the Court rejected the argument that exercise of the right to petition for redress of grievances should be absolutely immune from suit for defamation. It held that the test for liability should be the same malice test applied with respect to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Id. at 485, 105 S.Ct. 2787. The Court wrote: To accept petitioner's claim of absolute immunity would elevate the Petition Clause to special First Amendment status. The Petition Clause, however, was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble. These First Amendment rights are inseparable, and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions. Id. (citations omitted). Just recently, in Guarnieri, the Court warned against reading McDonald to presume that there is always an essential equivalence among First Amendment rights; but it held that claims of retaliation by public employees do not call for [a] divergence in the treatment of petition and speech claims. Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. at 2495. In particular, it expressed concern about the practical consequences of using different rules for evaluating retaliation claims based on different clauses of the First Amendment. It explained: Articulation of a separate test for the Petition Clause would aggravate potential harm to the government's interests by compounding the costs of compliance with the Constitution. Id. at 2498. We think it highly doubtful that the Supreme Court would not impose the public-concern requirement on claims that the government retaliated against an employee for associating with an attorney to speak or petition the government when it does impose the requirement on claims that the government retaliated against an employee for speaking or petitioning the government. The majority of our fellow circuits that have addressed the issue have also concluded that the public-concern requirement applies to claims that a government employer retaliated for exercise of the instrumental right of association. See Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir.2004); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 249-50 (4th Cir.1999); Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (7th Cir. 1991); Boals, 775 F.2d at 692; cf. Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 697-98 (9th Cir. 2005) (involving a hybrid speech and association claim). We recognize that two circuits have ruled to the contrary. But we are not persuaded by those opinions. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Hatcher v. Board of Public Education, 809 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir.1987), gave the issue short shrift, only one paragraph. The court did not consider the Sixth Circuit's contrary holding in Boals, and did not grapple with the arguments that we find convincing. In particular, Hatcher did not address the Supreme Court's opinion in McDonald or the roots of the public-concern requirement of Pickering and Connick in freedom-of-association decisions. It justified its conclusion by saying only that Connick did not retreat from NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (reversing order requiring association to disclose its members' identities), a freedom-of-association case not involving government employment. See Hatcher, 809 F.2d at 1558. Likewise, the Fifth Circuit's leading opinion, Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1158 (5th Cir.1991), did not address the contrary authority from the Sixth and Seventh Circuits and did not address the Supreme Court opinions that we find convincing. To support its rejection of the public-concern requirement, the court relied on Supreme Court decisions that found dismissals of public employees based solely on patronage or political affiliation to violate the First Amendment. Coughlin, 946 F.2d at 1158. But because we think that the public-concern requirement would be satisfied in those cases, we are not persuaded by Coughlin that they stand for the proposition that there is no public-concern requirement in freedom-of-association retaliation cases. (We also note with interest that although Coughlin stated that the employee in that case was not subject to the threshold public concern requirement, id., the alleged association for which he was retaliated against was affiliation with a political campaign, an association that we would consider to be an association on a matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (questionnaire asking fellow public employees whether they `ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns' touched on a matter of public concern).) True, Coughlin has generally been followed in the Fifth Circuit's later freedom-of-association retaliation cases; but those later panels have been bound by circuit precedent. We also reject Merrifield's contention that Tenth Circuit precedent requires rejection of the public-concern requirement in this context. He relies on Butcher v. City of McAlester, 956 F.2d 973 (10th Cir.1992); Morfin v. Albuquerque Public Schools, 906 F.2d 1434 (10th Cir.1990); and Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.1981). But none of those cases discussed whether the public-concern requirement would apply to association-based retaliation claims. It is elementary that an opinion is not binding precedent on an issue it did not address. See Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925) (Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.). For some time we have recognized that the issue we are deciding today has been open in this circuit. In an opinion postdating the ones cited by Merrifield, Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir.2006), for example, we said that we had not determined, as a general matter, whether Pickering 's public concern requirement applies to freedom of association claims, although we noted that in the specific context of public-employee labor unions, we have rejected the requirement that a worker demonstrate that his association with the union be a matter of public concern. Id. Finally, we turn to Merrifield's alternative argument that he has satisfied the public-concern requirement. Merrifield's appellate briefs do not attempt to explain how his association with counsel was to enable him to speak or petition on a subject of legitimate news interest. City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83-84, 125 S.Ct. 521. His argument consists of one sentence in his reply brief. He asserts that the attorney-client relationship categorically qualifies as a matter of public concern because it is of a concern to the community, our social way of life, at the core of our system of justice. Aplt. Reply Br. at 15. Merrifield's assertion amounts to saying that all association with counsel  in contrast to speech and petitions to the government  is on a matter of public concern. But association with counsel, which is protected only as a means to effectuate rights to speak and petition, cannot be entitled to more protection through the First Amendment than the enumerated First Amendment rights themselves. And when we consider the specific functions of Merrifield's attorney in this case, it is apparent that his role was not to pursue matters of public concern. As the Supreme Court said in rejecting a right-to-petition retaliation claim: A petition filed with an employer using an internal grievance procedure in many cases will not seek to communicate to the public or to advance a political or social point of view beyond the employment context. Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. at 2501. Addressing grievance proceedings like the one before us, it wrote: A petition that involves nothing more than a complaint about a change in the employee's own duties does not relate to a matter of public concern and accordingly may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of justification on the government employer. The right of a public employee under the Petition Clause is a right to participate as a citizen, through petitioning activity, in the democratic process. It is not a right to transform everyday employment disputes into matters for constitutional litigation in the federal courts. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Merrifield has provided no reason to treat his association with his attorney as concerning anything more than an everyday employment dispute[]. Id. Because Merrifield has failed to establish that his association with counsel involved a matter of public concern, his retaliation claim fails as a matter of law. Hence, we need not address his arguments that the district court erred in striking portions of his former coworkers' affidavits or that the court erred in finding that the defendants were not motivated to fire Merrifield because he had retained an attorney. We affirm the summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the First Amendment claims.