Opinion ID: 2327204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Controlling Effect of Agency Prerogative and Prior Practice

Text: In remanding the case to DOES to select the appropriate rule to govern jurisdictional determinations in cumulative trauma cases, the King court emphasized the deference this court normally owes an agency's decision about how to interpret its own statute: Ordinarily, . . . this court will not attempt to interpret the agency's statute until the agency itself has done so. Instead, we will remand to permit the agency to engage in the necessary analysis of the legislation it is charged with carrying out. In particular, a dispute over the coverage of the law  such as we have in the case now before us  is quintessentially a decision for the [agency] to make in the first instance, involving, as it does, a situation where an agency is delegated broad authority to administer a statutory scheme. King, supra, 742 A.2d at 466 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Moreover, this deference continues in any subsequent review of the agency's resolution of the matter: An agency decision must not be disturbed unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. . . . This deference extends to matters of statutory construction, relenting only where the director's interpretation of the Act is unreasonable in light of prevailing law, inconsistent with the statute as a whole, or plainly erroneous. Orius, supra, 857 A.2d at 1065. In rendering its decision, DOES did no more than accept the invitation that this court extended in King to resolve the issue of fixing the time of injury in cases of cumulative trauma. It closely adhered to the court's suggested guidelines and selected a manifestation rule from among the several discussed in that decision. We have located only one other DOES decision that squarely purports to apply King's jurisdictional guidelines for cumulative traumatic injuries: LeMay v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., H & AS No. 99-224 A, OWC No. Unknown, 2000 DC Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 14 (Jan. 21, 2000). In that case, the agency, while recognizing that several versions of the manifestation rule exist, held that the applicable time of injury is the date on which claimant sought medical attention for that specific . . . problem. Id. at . This variant is simply the latter half of the Blake Realty two-step inquiry that DOES applied to the petitioner's circumstances. Moreover, the WCA also requires the identification of a specific date of injury for purposes of determining whether timely notice of the injury was provided and whether the claim was timely filed. See D.C.Code §§ 32-1513(a)-1514 (a) (2001). Dozens of DOES decisions, both before and after King, have applied the Blake Realty two-step inquiry to fix the time of cumulative traumatic injury in these contexts. [6] Under these circumstances, the agency's decision can hardly been deemed arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, unreasonable, or plainly erroneous. See Orius, supra, 857 A.2d at 1065. Thus, the decision and order of the Compensation Review Board is accordingly Affirmed.