Opinion ID: 2631813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: limitation of cross-examination of the state's witnesses to the scope of direct examination

Text: The last issue for consideration is Leitner's contention that the trial court denied her fundamental right to present a defense when it placed limitations on her ability to introduce evidence regarding her discordant marital relationship and specific instances of past physical abuse. More specifically, Leitner complains that the court erred when it ruled she could elicit evidence of specific instances of Michael's physical abuse only in her case in chief, rather than being allowed to elicit such information from the State's witnesses, Gary Hockett and Tammy Warner, on cross-examination. Leitner asserts that such evidence should have been allowed under the judicial marital homicide exception to K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 60-460 originally crafted in State v. Taylor, 234 Kan. 401, 408, 673 P.2d 1140 (1983). Leitner concludes that the trial court's actions denied her the right to confront witnesses and limited her ability to present a defense. Therefore, she contends that the trial court committed reversible error. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords an accused the right to cross-examination. The United States Supreme Court has `recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.' Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17, 39 L. Ed.2d 347, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974). The district court's decision ... concerning the scope of cross-examination is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. [Citation omitted.] State v. Albright, 271 Kan. 546, 550, 24 P.3d 103 (2001). A judge ... has broad discretion to control examination and `reviewing courts will not interfere unless discretion has been abused.' State v. Mitchell, 234 Kan. 185, 188, 672 P.2d 1 (1983). The appropriate standard of review is not one of constitutional error, but whether the trial judge abused her discretion. State v. Lyons, 266 Kan. 591, 601-02, 973 P.2d 794 (1999). Prior to trial, a motion in limine was filed by the State, which sought to limit the introduction of specific instances of Michael's misconduct. The State asserted that since self-defense was an issue in the case, evidence of Michael's turbulent character was admissible if confined to evidence of his general reputation in the community. The State asserted that language in State v. Deavers, 252 Kan. 149, 156-57, 843 P.2d 695 (1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 978 (1993), provided authority for its requested motion in limine: Where self-defense is an issue in a homicide case, evidence of the turbulent character of the deceased is admissible. Such evidence may consist of the general reputation of the deceased in the community, but specific instances of misconduct may be shown only by evidence of a conviction of a crime. 252 Kan. at 156-57. In her response to the State's motion, Leitner relied upon Lumley for the proposition that evidence of specific instances of the Michael's misconduct could be introduced under the marital homicide exception. In Lumley, this court reiterated the marital homicide exception first set forth in Taylor: `Evidence of prior acts between a defendant and a victim are admissible independent of K.S.A. 60-455 if the evidence is to establish the relationship between the parties, the existence of a continuing course of conduct between the parties, or to corroborate the testimony of the complaining witness as to the act charged. Cases have allowed prior conduct to be admitted into evidence where a family relationship existed.' 234 Kan. at 407. Lumley, 266 Kan. at 954. The trial court held a pretrial hearing on the motion but did not rule on the issue at that time. On August 25, 1999, the third day of trial, the issue was revisited. Counsel for Leitner twice requested permission to cross-examine a witness called by the State about specific incidents when Michael physically abused Leitner during their marriage. First, he asked to cross-examine Tammy Warner about evidence of marital discord between Leitner and Michael. The State indicated it would call Warner to testify regarding her conversation with Leitner in which Leitner threatened to kill Michael less than a month before the murder. The trial court sent the jury outside the courtroom and heard Warner's proffered testimony of her personal knowledge of physical violence between Michael and Leitner. Warner testified that although she had not witnessed the fight, she had personally seen Leitner with a black eye and that both Michael and Leitner told her how it happened. The court ruled that the proffered evidence would be outside the scope of the State's proposed direct examination, in that evidence allegedly showing her hatred towards the defendant was not the same as marital discord: The relationship has changed. She's no longer married to the defendant. Later in the trial, counsel for Leitner approached the court prior to the direct examination of Gary seeking to elicit on cross-examination his general knowledge of the violent nature of the relationship.... The trial court indicated that the permissiveness of the inquiry was dependent on the scope of his direct examination by the State, declaring: His response to that subject matter's going to determine whether it might open some doors or not. At trial, opposing counsel argued over whether defense counsel could inquire on cross-examination about specific instances of violent behavior for the reason that evidence of the relationship between the deceased and the accused is generally admissible. We have addressed the issue of relevance of evidence of a discordant relationship between a defendant and a victim in numerous cases and have held that admission of evidence of a discordant relationship is admissible independent of K.S.A. 60-455 and relevant to show the ongoing relationship between the parties, the existence of a continuing course of conduct, or to corroborate the testimony of witnesses as to the act charged. See State v. Hedger, 248 Kan. 815, 820, 811 P.2d 1170 (1991); State v. Taylor, 234 Kan. at 407; State v. Green, 232 Kan. 116, Syl. ¶ 4, 652 P.2d 697 (1982). In Hedger, we also discussed the remoteness of such evidence and held that any lapse of time between the acts described in the trial testimony and the acts alleged does not preclude the admission of evidence relative to motive and intent, but only goes to the weight to be given the evidence. 248 Kan. at 820 (citing State v. Green, 232 Kan. 116, Syl. ¶ 5). State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 470, 931 P.2d 664 (1997). Through her own testimony, Leitner was able to present evidence of approximately 70 acts of abuse against her by Michael. An instruction on self-defense was given to the jury. Leitner indicated she shared stories of the abuse with her sister, Tammy Warner. The trial court offered to extend the out-of-state subpoena of Warner so that Leitner could call her as a witness in her case in chief, but Leitner declined to do so. Leitner called Gary to the stand, and he testified that Leitner told him Michael had slapped her during fights, but Gary had never seen Michael hit Leitner. Here, the core issue is not whether evidence of Leitner and Michael's discordant relationship was admissible, but rather whether the judge's limitation of the cross-examination of witnesses to the scope of direct examination constituted an abuse of discretion. Because Leitner was given the opportunity to present evidence of marital discord during her own case in chief, the trial court's limitation of the cross-examination of witnesses Gary and Warner to the scope of direct examination was reasonable. Under the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Affirmed.