Opinion ID: 2378907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Closing ArgumentTrial Phase

Text: Shurn claims that much of the prosecutor's closing argument is improper. The standard of review for alleged error in closing argument depends upon whether defense counsel objects. Where defense counsel objects, appellate courts will reverse the trial court's decision with regard to closing argument only upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. McDonald, 661 S.W.2d 497, 497 (Mo. banc 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 105 S.Ct. 1875, 85 L.Ed.2d 168 (1985). However, where defense counsel does not object, appellate courts may review only for plain error. Rule 30.20. Plain error review mandates reversal only if the error results in manifest injustice. Id. Plain error review also requires that the argument have a decisive effect on the jury's determination. State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Mo. banc 1992). Defense counsel failed to object to most of the prosecutor's comments. Citing State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82, 97-98 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 225, 112 L.Ed.2d 179 (1990), the state requests this Court to review alleged errors in closing argument only where defense counsel objected. This Court may review closing argument claims for plain error, if manifest injustice is legitimately raised, and the argument decisively affected the jury. See, e.g., State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 651 (Mo. banc 1993). Shurn first complains that the prosecutor improperly commented on the evidence. The prosecutor stated, You could be a juror on a hundred cases and I could try a thousand cases and you would be hardpressed after you see a set of facts where guilt is more obvious on their face. Defense counsel did not object. However, this Court has consistently held such statements do not constitute reversible error. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 491 S.W.2d 271, 272-73 (Mo.1973). Shurn next contends that the comment that Shurn was streetwise and thus knew that Taylor was a witness in his brothers' trials was improper closing argument. Defense counsel did not object. The prosecutor may make reasonable inferences from the evidence. McDonald, 661 S.W.2d at 506. The evidence indicates that the prosecutor's statement was a reasonable inference: Larry Shurn saw federal prosecutors interviewing Taylor at the federal courthouse during Larry's trial; Shurn testified that Larry mentionedafter Larry's trial and before Charles' trialsomething about Taylor's testifying; and Taylor was active in Larry and Charles's drug business. Third, Shurn argues that the prosecutor's statements that Shurn participated in the family drug business were improper argument. The prosecutor referred to the Shurns as being a drug family, involved in drug empires, and stated that at least one of the Shurns was a high-level drug dealer. Defense counsel did not object. Most of these statements implicate Shurn's family, not Shurn himself. The evidence indicated that two of Shurn's brothers were convicted of drug-related offenses and that Shurn himself was convicted of possession of heroin, and Shurn testified that his brothers were involved in a large-scale drug business. The prosecutor's statements regarding the Shurn family were reasonable inferences from the evidence. Next, Shurn complains about the prosecutor's statement that he could have produced more witnesses but enough is enough. Defense counsel did not object. A prosecutor may not make statements that imply a knowledge of facts not before the jury. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d at 511. This statement refers to a knowledge of facts not in evidence. However, the statement alone does not rise to a level of manifest injustice. Taken in context, the statement related to uncalled witnesses who saw Shurn at the crime scene and heard the shots. Shurn's testimony corroborated that he was at the scene and a shooting occurred. The prosecutor's statements that he could have produced more witnesses on this point did not prejudice Shurn. Fifth, Shurn attacks statements by the prosecutor that allegedly assert the truth of out-of-court statements. The prosecutor stated that Taylor told Detective Leyshock that he feared the Shurns, and that Taylor was right in fearing the Shurns because he's buried now. Defense counsel did not object. The prosecutor's comments do not rise to the level of manifest injustice. Immediately before the statement that Shurn attacks, the prosecutor stated, I'm talking about his [Taylor's] state of mind, and I'm not arguing the truth of his [Taylor's] remarks. Detective Leyshock's testimony was admissible to show Taylor's state of mind, and the prosecutor could reference the state of mind. Sixth, Shurn contends that the prosecutor hurled epithets by stating that if Taylor had shot Weaver and Shurn, there would be cause for celebration because two pieces of scum would be dead. Defense counsel did not object. As a general rule, especially during the guilt phase, the prosecutor should refrain from ad hominem attacks on the defendant and other irrelevant statements that only inflame the jury. Id. at 511. However, no manifest injustice resulted, because Shurn does not show that this isolated insult decisively affected the jury. Seventh, Shurn argues that the prosecutor denied him his Sixth Amendment right to defend the charge by referring to his note-taking throughout the trial. Defense counsel did not object. Taken in context, the prosecutor was arguing that Shurn's testimony was not true and that he had the opportunity to make up a story to conform to the evidence. The prosecutor may comment on the credibility of the defendant in this manner. See State v. Underwood, 642 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Mo.App.1982). Next, Shurn complains about statements by the prosecutor during rebuttal. Parties have considerably more leeway when the argument is retaliatory. State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 109 (Mo. banc 1992). The prosecutor stated that Taylor was a front man for the Shurns. Defense counsel did not object, and in fact stated during closing argument that Taylor had been fronting for the Shurns. The prosecutor also stated that Taylor faced jail if he did not testify against Shurn's brothers. Defense counsel did object to this statement. Defense counsel himself stated, in closing argument, that Taylor was testifying to get the Shurns out of the way, and benefit by keeping the property that the Shurns had titled in Taylor's name. The prosecutor may rebut the defense explanation with an alternative supported by the evidence, or an inference from the evidence. Because Taylor was subpoenaed for the federal trial of at least one of Shurn's brothers, the evidence supports the prosecutor's argument. Shurn also takes exception to the following comment by the prosecutor during rebuttal: [I]f a guy like this [Shurn] doesn't get found guilty and either put away for life or sent to the gas chamber, then what's he [Detective Leyshock] doing it for? Because one false move and he gets sliced by the razor. Shurn complains that this implies that he will kill police officers. Shurn misconstrues the statement. The prosecutor was emphasizing the credibility of Detective Leyshock, not that Shurn will kill police officers. Finally, Shurn complains about the prosecutor's statement, I do have the strongest evidence. Defense counsel objected to this statement; the trial court sustained the objection and directed the jury to disregard the comment. This was a sufficient response because this statement did not result in an unfair trial to Shurn. State v. Callies, 663 S.W.2d 350, 351 (Mo.App. 1983).