Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: 72, a.76-77, a.83, b.5, e.23)

Text: The six claims in this subcategory include four alleged Brady violations consisting of the State's failure to disclose certain documents concerning expenses incurred by the State on behalf of McKinnon or his family. Also included is one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to counsel's failure to renew, prior to McKinnon's testimony, defendant's motion for discovery after the State had failed to disclose any discovery concerning financial accommodations made on McKinnon's behalf. The final claim addressed in this subcategory alleges that McKinnon's plea agreement itself violated defendant's constitutional rights, because it gave McKinnon irresistible reasons to provide perjured testimony against his co-defendants. As we recounted in Marshall I, McKinnon, indicted for conspiracy to murder Maria Marshall and for purposely or knowingly causing the death of Maria Marshall as an accomplice, pled guilty only to conspiracy to commit murder, and was sentenced to five years imprisonment in exchange for his testimony at trial. See 123 N.J. at 27, 41, 586 A. 2d 85. The [plea] agreement was introduced in evidence and read to the jury. McKinnon agreed to give a full statement identifying everyone involved in the murder of Maria Marshall, to waive immunity, and to testify before a grand jury and at the ensuing trial. In return, McKinnon would be permitted to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit murder, stipulated to be a non-Graves Act offense, the State would recommend a term not in excess of five years without parole ineligibility to be served for security purposes at the State Prison in Clinton, and the prosecutor's office would recommend that he be paroled at the earliest possible date. The State also agreed to relocate his family to a safe location for their protection, and to support their entry into the witness-protection program. [ Id. at 41, 586 A. 2d 85.] We also observed that McKinnon was subjected to extensive cross-examination, defense counsel emphasizing particularly the generous terms of his plea bargain, which would allow McKinnon to be paroled soon after the completion of the trial. [Co-defendant] Thompson's counsel pressed McKinnon to concede that the State would not have offered McKinnon such generous terms if he had been the shooter, and McKinnon acknowledged that no evidence other than his testimony implicated Thompson in the murder. Thompson's counsel questioned McKinnon persistently about his explanation of Thompson's role in the homicide, implying that McKinnon himself had murdered Mrs. Marshall and had fabricated Thompson's involvement in order to negotiate a favorable plea bargain. [ Id. at 49, 586 A. 2d 85.] In Marshall I, we considered the materiality of the nondisclosure of certain documents concerning expenses incurred by the State on behalf of McKinnon's family and determined that there [wa]s no reasonable possibility that the further impeachment of McKinnon by reference to the financial support his family received from the State would have affected the verdict. Id. at 207, 586 A. 2d 85. We briefly recount the circumstances leading to our adjudication of that issue on direct appeal to provide context for our consideration of defendant's similar claims before us on PCR review. Defendant's pretrial discovery motion included a demand that the State disclose [a]ny and all considerations or promises of consideration given to or on behalf of the witnesses or expected or hoped for by the witnesses. By consideration, defendant refers to absolutely anything, whether bargained for or not, which arguably could be of value or use to a witness or to persons of concern to the witness, including but not limited to    criminal, civil or tax immunity grants; and anything else which could arguably reveal an interest, motive or bias in the witness in favor of the plaintiff or against the defense or act as an inducement to testify or color testimony. [ Id. at 171, 586 A. 2d 85.] Approximately three years after the trial concluded, we granted defendant's motion for a hearing to determine whether the State's failure to disclose certain documents had violated the strictures of Brady, supra . See Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 171-72, 586 A. 2d 85. During the course of that hearing, the trial court ordered that the State produce its entire correspondence file for inspection. Defense counsel reviewed the file and discovered what appeared to be additional Brady material concerning expenses incurred by the State on behalf of McKinnon and his family. See id. at 181, 188-89, 205, 586 A. 2d 85. Specifically, counsel found two letters in which the Ocean County Chief of Detectives had requested reimbursement from the New Jersey State Police for monies to house and to otherwise assist McKinnon's family during the trial (the McKinnon letters). See id. at 205, 586 A. 2d 85. Defendant argued that had the letters been produced prior to McKinnon's testimony, they could have been used to impeach his credibility, which conceivably could have affected the outcome of the trial. See ibid. We determined that there [wa]s no reasonable possibility that the further impeachment of McKinnon by reference to the financial support his family received from the State would have affected the verdict. McKinnon's fundamental interest in testifying was to obtain a reduction of charges against him from capital murder to conspiracy, thereby reducing his maximum possible punishment from a death sentence to a five-year prison term with no parole disqualifier. Those facts were clearly conveyed to the jury during defense counsel's cross-examination of McKinnon. Any possible incremental effect on McKinnon's credibility from the additional revelation that financial accommodations were made to support his family would have been merely cumulative.... McKinnon's plea bargain included an undertaking by the prosecutor to recommend McKinnon's acceptance in the Federal Witness Protection program, see 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3521 to -28, which specifically authorizes the payment of basic living expenses for an immediate family member of a protected witness. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3521(b)(1)(D). We conclude that there was no reasonable possibility that a different verdict would have arisen had the letters been disclosed. We therefore reject defendant's claim that the State's failure to have disclosed the McKinnon letters requires reversal of defendant's conviction. See [ State v. ] Carter, ... 91 N.J. [86,] 114-15 [449 A. 2d 1280 (1982)]. [123 N.J. at 207, 586 A. 2d 85.] As noted above, defendant's petition for post-conviction relief includes four Brady claims relating to the nondisclosure of certain documents concerning expenses incurred on behalf of McKinnon and his family. Two of those claims allege the nondisclosure of the McKinnon letters; those claims are dismissed under Rule 3:22-5. The remaining two claims allege the nondisclosure of an internal memorandum from State Investigator Susan Brandt to Prosecutor Edward Turnbach concerning lodging and meals provided to McKinnon's family on May 23 and 24, 1985 (the Brandt memorandum), and an accounting of the expenses incurred by Investigator Brandt on those dates and referred to in the Brandt memorandum. We reject those two claims for the same reasons that we rejected, in Marshall I, supra, defendant's claims based on the nondisclosure of the McKinnon letters: [T]here [i]s no reasonable possibility that a different verdict would have arisen had the [documents] been disclosed. 123 N.J. at 207, 586 A. 2d 85. As we explained in Marshall I, [a]ny possible incremental effect on McKinnon's credibility from the additional revelation that financial accommodations were made to support his family would have been merely cumulative. Ibid. Defendant also argues, based on the belated discovery of the McKinnon letters and the Brandt memorandum, and the fact that the State has never provided the expense accounting referred to in the Brandt memorandum, that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which he can subpoena the testimony of [Ocean County Prosecutor's Office] representatives ... [to] establish the extent of benefits McKinnon received which were hidden by the State. We reject defendant's claim as speculative, and we note that the alleged nondisclosure would be immaterial. See ibid. We also reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to renew defendant's discovery motion seeking disclosure of financial accommodations made on behalf of McKinnon after the State failed to furnish any such discovery to defendant prior to McKinnon's testimony. We conclude that any failure by counsel in that regard was immaterial to the outcome of the trial, in view of the immateriality of the nondisclosure of such information. The final claim in this subcategory contends that the State's plea agreement with McKinnon violated defendant's due-process rights because it allegedly provided McKinnon irresistible reasons to provide perjured testimony against his co-defendants. We determine that that claim is wholly without merit. That McKinnon may have been motivated to lie does not establish that McKinnon in fact perjured himself concerning material aspects of his testimony against Marshall. In addition, defendant cites no legal precedent that would preclude the State from entering into a plea agreement with one co-defendant in exchange for his or her truthful testimony against other co-defendants, nor are we aware of any. In that regard, we note that the State's plea agreement with McKinnon was conditioned on McKinnon's truthful cooperation... and ... truthful testimony. 2. Other Claims Relating to McKinnon's Credibility