Opinion ID: 2844016
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Steadman’s Half-Sister

Text: [¶18] At the outset of the trial, Steadman offered into evidence the transcribed testimony of her half-sister. Pagels objected, claiming that it contained inadmissible evidence of his prior bad acts against her. The court overruled the 3 M.R. Evid. 404(b) has since been replaced, effective January 1, 2015, with restyled language that does not affect the substance of the rule. See M.R. Evid. 404(b) (restyled Maine Rules of Evidence). 9 objection, stating that “I am allowing evidence of prior acts as they related to plan, motive, opportunity, consistent practice, things like that, you know, not— obviously, not—obviously, I’m not considering with regard to character, but for those other things.” The court also noted that “it [would] have to go over [the deposition] after [it heard] all the testimony.” Because Pagels objected to the admission of this evidence, “we review the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) for clear error and its determination pursuant to Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion.”4 State v. DeMass, 2000 ME 4, ¶ 11, 743 A.2d 233; In re Rachel J., 2002 ME 148, ¶ 17, 804 A.2d 418. [¶19] In its written decision, the court issued findings, which are based on the testimony of Steadman’s half-sister, that Pagels had “inappropriate physical contacts with his stepdaughter” several times and that the contact ended when she entered college in the fall of 1997. The court further found that soon thereafter, “[t]he most serious sexual assaults on [Steadman] began.” As described by the court, the sole use of evidence that Pagels sexually assaulted the half-sister therefore was on the issue of Pagels’s motive and opportunity—that when one victim of Pagels’s sexual assaults left the family home, he redirected his attention to Steadman, which corresponds to and corroborates evidence that the assaults 4 Although Pagels did not renew his objection to the testimony later in the trial after the court had the opportunity to read the deposition transcript, he made his objection clear on the record when Steadman offered the transcript into evidence. Because the court was fully aware of Pagels’s opposition to the evidence, his objection remained preserved. 10 against her significantly worsened at that time. The court therefore considered this evidence for a “permissible purpose,” DeLong, 505 A.2d at 805, namely, the evolution of Pagels’s tortious conduct committed against Steadman herself. [¶20] This application of the evidence was relevant to the issues in the case and was not improper, because the court did not treat it as propensity evidence in violation of Rule 404(b). See State v. Larson, 577 A.2d 767, 770 (Me. 1990) (“[A] court sitting as the factfinder is presumed to accept admissible evidence only for the purpose for which it may be admitted.”). The court’s description of the evidence and its express discussion about its significance corroborates the assurance that it articulated on the record when it admitted the evidence over Pagels’s objection that it would not consider the deposition testimony as evidence of Pagels’s character but would consider it only for purposes not prohibited by Rule 404. [¶21] Further, although Pagels argues that the magnitude of the damages awarded to Steadman demonstrates that the court took an inflamed view of his conduct, the damages award is fully supported by a measured assessment of evidence of the harm he caused to Steadman. See Lee v. Scotia Prince Cruises Ltd., 2003 ME 78, ¶ 21, 828 A.2d 210. Therefore, nothing in the record supports a claim that the court violated its own ruling, and the court’s ruling that admitted the testimony of Steadman’s half-sister was not an erroneous application of Rule 404. 11 [¶22] Similarly, contrary to Pagels’s argument on appeal, admission of Steadman’s half-sister’s testimony was not improper pursuant to Rule 403 because the court was entitled to conclude that the probative value of that evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. See State v. Lockhart, 2003 ME 108, ¶ 37, 830 A.2d 433 (evidence determined to be admissible pursuant to Rule 404 is then subjected to scrutiny pursuant to Rule 403); Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 404.4 at 142 (6th ed. 2007). Any unfair prejudice created by the evidence would be the court’s misuse of it as proof of Pagels’s propensity to engage in the assaultive conduct alleged by Steadman. See State v. Thomes, 1997 ME 146, ¶ 11, 697 A.2d 1262 (the nature of the prejudice created by admission of evidence of prior bad acts is “an undue tendency to move the tribunal to decide on an improper basis.” (quotation marks omitted)); see also Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 404.5 at 145 (noting that when evidence of prior bad acts describes sex crimes, the risk of unfair prejudice is enhanced and requires the court to exercise “great caution” in deciding whether to admit the evidence). [¶23] Here the risk of unfair prejudice was ameliorated when the court stated on the record that it would not treat the evidence in a way that would improperly breach the prohibition against character evidence created in Rule 404(b). Because the evidence carried probative value to explain the chronology of abuse that Pagels inflicted on Steadman, and because the court 12 expressly circumscribed the use to which it would put the evidence, it acted within the bounds of the discretion created by Rule 403 when it admitted the evidence. 2. Testimony of Pagels’s Sister and the Family’s Babysitter [¶24] Pagels also argues that the court erred by admitting testimony from his sister and the family babysitter about his conduct toward them. We need not address these claims of error, however, because there is no indication that the court relied on this evidence or gave it any weight whatsoever in reaching its verdict. The court’s findings spanned nearly thirty pages, and, in contrast to findings based on the testimony of Steadman’s half-sister, they made no mention of the testimony presented by either of these witnesses of prior bad acts, and the findings did not even refer to either of those witnesses.5 Additionally, Pagels did not move for the issuance of further findings of fact to address the question of whether the testimony of either his sister or the former babysitter influenced the court’s verdict in any way. Thus, we are left without any suggestion in the court’s decision that it treated their testimony as material to its adjudication of Steadman’s claims. In fact, the absence of any reference to this evidence in the court’s findings suggests that the court placed no weight on it, even though the court had concluded that the 5 The court’s findings made reference to a babysitter who described Steadman’s behavior, but that babysitter was a different person than the one who testified about Pagels’s advances toward her. 13 evidence was admissible. Therefore, even if the court committed error6 when it admitted that testimony—an issue we need not decide—Pagels has not demonstrated that the evidence was a factor in the court’s decision, and any error was therefore harmless. See M.R. Civ. P. 61.