Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to amend the indictment.

Text: ś 294. Following the commencement of voir dire on September 7, 1993, the State made an ore tenus motion to amend the indictment to include the language with design [8] in order to reflect the exact language of the statute and to conform to the proof to be presented at trial. Evans objected on the basis that the amendment constituted a material change in the substance of the indictment which adversely affected his trial strategy. The trial court granted the State's motion. ś 295. In Holmes v. State, 660 So.2d 1225 (Miss.1995), this Court addressed the amendment of an indictment: Mississippi statutory law allows amendments to indictments at trial. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-13 (1994). However, such amendments may not be material to the merits of the case and the defendant must not be prejudiced in his defense on the merits. Id. The State may not seek amendments altering the material set of facts in the indictment or materially alter(ing) a defense to the indictment ... to prejudice the defendant's case. Griffin v. State, 584 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Miss.1991) ( Griffin II ). The test for determining whether an amendment will prejudice the defendant's case is whether a defense as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made. Griffin v. State, 540 So.2d 17, 21 (Miss.1989)( Griffin I ). Id. at 1226. [A]mendments as to the substance of the charge must be made by the grand jury. Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852 (Miss.1995). ś 296. Evans now argues that the amendment prejudiced his defense to the charge of capital murder. Evans argues that his trial strategy was to admit to killing Beatrice, but argue that the killing was not intentional or that he suffered from diminished capacity at the time of the killing. Evans also argues that the injection of the with design element had serious ramifications with regard to sentencing. ś 297. The indictment clearly stated that Evans was indicted for the offense contained within Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) which provides that the killing of a human being is capital murder: [w]hen done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or in any attempt to commit such felonies. (emphasis added). ś 298. In Quick v. State, 569 So.2d 1197 (Miss.1990), the defendant was indicted by the grand jury for the offense of aggravated assault pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. 97-3-7(2)(b). The original indictment charged that Quick did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, purposely and knowingly commit an aggravated assault upon one Gene Baker, a human being, with a deadly weapon.... However, on the morning of trial the State moved to amend the indictment to include language from subsection (a) of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2) which allowed the jury to convict if they found Quick recklessly caus[ed] serious bodily injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Id. at 1199. In reversing the conviction, this Court concluded that the amendment proposed a change of substance and not of form. Id. at 1200. ś 299. The case sub judice may be distinguished from Quick in that the amendment in the present case does not alter the substance of the offense. In fact, the same offense is charged prior to and after the amendment. Despite Evans' claims, § 97-3-19(2)(e) defines capital murder as that which is done during the commission of one of the listed felonies, when done with or without any design to effect death. Regardless of Evans' intent, he faced a charge of capital murder. By virtue of the statute, Evans had clear notice of the charge he was facing. Lacy v. State, 629 So.2d 591, 594 (Miss.1993). ś 300. In Rhymes v. State, 638 So.2d 1270 (Miss.1994), the defendant was indicted for the crime of sexual battery of a female under the age of fourteen years under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-65(1) (1972). Following the impaneling of the jury, the indictment was amended to change under fourteen years to over fourteen years pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-65(2) (1972). This Court held that the amendment permitted Rhymes to be charged with violation of Miss.Code Ann. 97-3-65(2), not subsection (1) as indicted by the grand jury. As a result, this Court concluded that Rhymes' defense that [the victim] was not under fourteen years of age but twenty-six years old at the time would have required the jury to return a verdict of acquittal. Id. at 1276. ś 301. Again, the case sub judice may be distinguished. Here, the offense for which Evans was indicted was not changed by the amendment due to the express language of the statute. The offense is the same regardless of the killer's intent. Thus, the injection of with design does not alter the indictment nor did this language render Evans' defense strategy a nullity as in Rhymes. ś 302. Moreover, it makes little sense for Evans to now argue that he was prejudiced by the amendment of the indictment when he states that his trial strategy was to admit the killing but claim it was unintentional. Clearly, this same defense strategy would remain after the amendment or as an argument for mitigation during the sentencing phase. Evans was not deprived of a defense by virtue of the amendment. ś 303. In Contreras v. State, 445 So.2d 543 (Miss.1984), the indictment charged that the defendant used force in obtaining the victim to perform the unnatural act. However, the evidence showed that no physical force was used. As a result, the State moved to amend the indictment by deleting the word forcing. There, we held the amendment to be simply one of form and ... properly allowed by the court. Id. at 545 ( citing Porter v. State, 339 So.2d 564 (Miss.1976); Hannah v. State, 336 So.2d 1317 (Miss.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101, 97 S.Ct. 1125, 51 L.Ed.2d 551 (1977); Shelby v. State, 246 So.2d 543 (Miss.1971)). ś 304. Evans, citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), also claims that the amendment carried with it serious ramifications with regard to sentencing. The jury could have found two of the Enmund [9] factors whether or not the indictment was amended. Moreover, whether Evans acted intentionally or unintentionally, he remained subject to the same penalties. ś 305. Because Evans had clear notice of the charge he faced and the express language of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) encompasses intentional and unintentional homicides, there was no prejudice to Evans' defense at trial. Moreover, at the time the State moved to amend the indictment, Evans did not seek a continuance to review his defense strategy.