Opinion ID: 2198146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Trial Court Exceed its Authority in Acting Upon A Motion for Preliminary Determination of Law

Text: Although the parties do not raise this issue, we do so sua sponte because we believe the trial court exceeded its authority to preliminarily determine the law in this case. For that reason, we accept transfer, vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and reverse the trial court's preliminary rulings. Ind. Code § 16-9.5-10-1 grants to a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to a proposed complaint filed with the commissioner the power to preliminarily determine any affirmative defense or issue of law or fact that may be preliminarily determined under the Indiana Rules of Procedure; or (2) compel discovery in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Procedure; or (3) both. In Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc. (1980), 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. In so doing, this Court discussed the function of the medical review panel and said: The statute contemplates that the panel will function in an informal and reasonable manner. It is guided by a trained lawyer who presumptively will not deny to each party a reasonable opportunity to present its evidence and authorities. The scope of the panel's function is limited. It does not conduct a hearing or trial and does not render a decision or judgment. There is, therefore, no reason to mandate that the statute relegate burdens of proof or production and to otherwise specify procedures applicable in hearings and trials. The panel is conducting a rational inquiry into the extent and source of the patient's injuries for the purpose of forming its expert opinion. The absence from the statute of specific procedures is reasonable in light of this limited purpose and function and does not raise a serious constitutional question on the ground of vagueness or indefiniteness. 273 Ind. at 390-1, 404 N.E.2d at 596. From that time to now, this Court has not been called upon to determine the interplay between the legislature's intended informal functioning of the panel and its empowering of the trial court to preliminarily determine certain matters pursuant to Ind. Code § 16-9.5-10-1. In view of the fact that the legislature clearly intended for the medical review panel to function in an informal manner in rendering its expert medical opinion, we believe that the legislature did not simultaneously intend to empower trial courts to dictate to the medical review panel concerning either the content of the panel's opinion or the manner in which the panel arrives at its opinion, or the matters that the panel may consider in arriving at its opinion. In other words, the grant of power to the trial court to preliminarily determine matters is to be narrowly construed. A narrow construction of this grant of power leads to the conclusion that the legislature specifically limited a trial court's power on motions for a preliminary determination to two functions, both governed by the Indiana Trial Rules. First, the court can determine either affirmative defenses or issues of law or fact that may be preliminarily determined under the Indiana Trial Rules and, secondly, it may compel discovery in accordance with the Indiana Trial Rules. Therefore, we must turn to the Indiana Trial Rules to further define the courts' power. Our review of the rules reveals that Trial Rule 8(C) contains a listing of affirmative defenses, Trial Rule 12(B) and (C) sets forth a listing of matters which can be preliminarily determined by motion, and Trial Rules 26 through 37, inclusively, contain the discovery rules. We hold that Ind. Code § 16-9.5-10-1 specifically limits the power of the trial courts of this State to preliminarily determining affirmative defenses under Trial Rules, deciding issues of law or fact that may be preliminarily determined under Trial Rule 12(D), and compelling discovery pursuant to Trial Rules 26 through 37, inclusively. We further hold that the trial courts of this State do not have jurisdiction to instruct the medical review panel concerning definitions of terms and phrases used in the Medical Malpractice Act, the evidence that it may consider in reaching its opinion, or the form or substance of its opinion. In other words, the medical review panels should be allowed to operate in the informal manner contemplated by the legislature and approved by this Court's opinion in Johnson, 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585. Because of this holding, we need not consider the additional issues raised by the parties, but would refer the parties to the opinion which we are handing down simultaneously with this opinion in the case of Culbertson v. Mernitz (1992), Ind., 602 N.E.2d 98, concerning the requirement of expert medical testimony to prove a prima facie case of medical malpractice where the claim is a lack of informed consent. Therefore, we accept transfer of this action, vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. SHEPARD, C.J., and GIVAN, J., concur. DeBRULER and DICKSON, JJ., concur, except as to the role of expert witnesses in informed consent cases, and as to the approval of Culbertson v. Mernitz , to which they dissent.