Opinion ID: 1955068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: rulings on motions to suppress during trial

Text: The State also asserts that the trial court was without authority to grant the motion to suppress during trial. This Court's decision in Savoie and the wording of rule 3.190(h)(4) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure dispose of the State's argument. Rule 3.190(h)(4) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Time for Filing. The motion to suppress shall be made before trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court may entertain the motion or an appropriate objection at the trial. (Emphasis supplied.) [6] In Savoie, this Court held that the defendant's failure to file a pretrial motion to suppress does not result in an absolute waiver of the defendant's right to file a motion to suppress during trial. 422 So.2d at 311. We recognized that rule 3.190(h)(4) expressly grants the trial judge discretionary authority to entertain either a motion to suppress or an objection to the introduction of certain evidence made during the course of the trial. Savoie, 422 So.2d at 311. As we explained in Savoie: This discretionary authority is necessary in order to avoid the sixth amendment ramifications which might result from the application of an absolute waiver rule against a defendant whose counsel failed to comply with the requirements of rule 3.190(h). Likewise, the rule does not affect the inherent power of the trial court to reconsider, while the court has jurisdiction of the case and upon appropriate motion or objection by either counsel, a ruling previously made on a motion to suppress. Id. at 311-12. In exercising the discretionary authority to entertain a motion to suppress during trial, the judge must balance the rights of the defendant to due process and effective assistance of counsel with the rights of the State to have an opportunity to appeal an adverse ruling on a motion to suppress. Id. at 312. This authority vests the trial court with discretion in circumstances where new facts come to light during trial that demonstrate a meritorious basis for granting the motion to suppress. [7] The question becomes how to strike the appropriate balance. [8] The Court explained that the general requirement that a motion to suppress be made before trial is designed to promote the orderly process of trial by avoiding the problems and delay caused when the trial judge must interrupt trial, remove the jury from the courtroom, and hear argument on a motion to suppress that could have been disposed of before trial. 422 So.2d at 311. Further, when the ruling is issued before trial, the State is given the opportunity to appeal the ruling of a trial judge in the event the evidence is suppressed. See id.; Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(B). In an attempt to balance these competing interests, this Court in Savoie suggested the possibility that under certain circumstances, the State could appeal a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress that was made during trial. As stated in Savoie, The state could retain the right to appeal if the defendant consented, prior to the hearing on the motion, to a mistrial in the event the trial court suppresses the evidence. 422 So.2d at 312 n. 1. Although we did not say so explicitly, the Court was relying on the principle that if a mistrial is granted at the defendant's request, reprosecution is not barred on double jeopardy grounds absent a showing of intentional prosecutorial bad faith or judicial conduct designed to produce the mistrial. See Rutherford v. State, 545 So.2d 853, 855 (Fla.1989); State v. Zamora, 538 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982)). We explained the governing principles regarding mistrials and double jeopardy in Fuente v. State, 549 So.2d 652, 657-58 (Fla.1989): The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution bars repeated prosecutions for the same offense. Where a mistrial is granted over defense objection, a second trial is barred unless a manifest necessity for the mistrial is established. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). Double jeopardy is generally no bar to a subsequent prosecution when a mistrial was granted in the original trial upon the defendant's motion. Id. at 673, 102 S.Ct. at 2088; Bell v. State, 413 So.2d 1292, 1294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In Oregon v. Kennedy , the United States Supreme Court held that there is a narrow exception to this rule where it can be shown that the prosecution's conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. 456 U.S. at 679, 102 S.Ct. at 2091. In rejecting the overreaching standard for determining when retrial is barred that was adopted by the Oregon Court of Appeals, the Court explained that prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or overreaching sufficient to justify a mistrial, is insufficient to bar a retrial absent such an intent. Id. at 675-76, 102 S.Ct. at 2089-90. Only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to `goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion. Id. at 676, 102 S.Ct. at 2089. Thus, absent improper governmental action intended to provoke the defendant's mistrial request and subject the defendant to the substantial burden imposed by multiple prosecutions, the defendant waives his or her constitutional double jeopardy rights where the defendant moves for a mistrial, consents to one, or by his or her conduct causes one. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083; United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976). Assuming that double jeopardy principles would not bar reprosecution if the defendant filed a motion to suppress during trial and agreed to a mistrial if the motion to suppress was granted, the question remains whether the trial court's order granting a mistrial, even with the defendant's consent, could be immediately appealed by the State. Although our dicta in Savoie was relied on in State v. Stevens, 563 So.2d 188, 189-90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), and cited with approval by the Fourth District in Gaines, Judge Ervin in Stevens questioned under what authority the State could appeal trial court orders suppressing evidence during trial after a mistrial was granted with the consent of the defendant. See Stevens, 563 So.2d at 190 (Ervin, J., dissenting). As Judge Ervin pointed out, the applicable rules of appellate procedure do not provide the State with a mechanism to appeal a trial court's order granting a mistrial or to appeal an adverse ruling suppressing evidence entered after the jury has been sworn, even if the defendant moves for or consent to a mistrial. See id.; see generally Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(A)-(M). Because this precise issue has not been addressed by the parties and because it is not entirely clear to us how the current rules would provide the State with the immediate right to appeal an adverse ruling on a motion to suppress entered after the jury has been sworn, we refer this matter to the Florida Bar Criminal Procedure Rules Committee and the Appellate Court Rules Committee to study whether any proposed changes to the rules are necessary and to make any recommendations that are consistent with the State's right to appeal and the applicable constitutional considerations. We also suggest the possibility of another alternative, utilizing the current procedural rules, that would likewise avoid double jeopardy implications. The trial court could exercise its discretion to withhold ruling on the merits of the motion to suppress and motion for a judgment of acquittal and allow the case to be submitted to the jury. See Scott, 437 U.S. at 100 n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 2187 n. 13. If the defendant is acquitted, no further proceedings regarding the motion to suppress or motion for a judgment of acquittal would be necessary. However, if the jury finds the defendant guilty of the crime charged, the trial court could then consider the motion to suppress post-trial in conjunction with the defendant's renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal or motion for new trial. [9] If the trial court finds the defendant's motion to suppress to be meritorious, the trial judge could then grant either the defendant's motion for new trial or motion for judgment of acquittal. If there is no other legally sufficient evidence, then a judgment of acquittal would be appropriate. If there is other evidence the State could rely on to obtain a conviction, the trial court could grant the defendant's motion for a new trial. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.600(a)(2) (mandating the court grant a new trial if the verdict is contrary to law or the weight of the evidence). Under this scenario, the State would be afforded the right to bring an immediate appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(C), which provides the State with the right to appeal orders granting a new trial, or rule 9.140(c)(1)(E), which allows the State to appeal an order granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict. [10] While this alternative may not be appropriate in all cases, it would provide the trial court with a means to consider a belatedly filed motion to suppress without violating double jeopardy concerns or eliminating the ability of the State to appeal an adverse ruling.