Opinion ID: 223504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proceedings in the Eastern District of New York: Decisions Rendered and Appeals Withdrawn

Text: By Memorandum and Order filed on October 15, 2008, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York addressed Brown's motion to remand. The court noted Brown's contention that the presence... of defendants Noxubee General and Baptist Memorial creates incomplete diversity, so that remand to state court is required. The court also noted Lilly's contention that the non-diverse defendant hospitals had been fraudulently joined and that the case therefore had been properly removed. In reviewing the rule of fraudulent joinder, the court stated, inter alia, that [w]here a plaintiff has added a defendant against whom there is no reasonable basis for recovery, joinder of that party is fraudulent; and that, in this case, [t]o decide whether joinder is fraudulent, the court looks to Mississippi state law to determine if there is a valid claim against the non-diverse defendants. Applying the provisions of the MTCA, providing for the assertion of claims against governmental entities, the District Court found (1) that Noxubee, as a community hospital, is a governmental entity; (2) that there is a one-year statute of limitations for the commencement of actions against governmental entities, see Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3); (3) that Brown's action was commenced approximately 22 months after the actionable conduct; (4) that a Notice of Claim must be served on a governmental entity within ninety days of filing an action in court, see Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1), and contain certain specific information, see Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(2); and (5) that the Notice that Brown served on Noxubee failed to include adequate responses to the items of required information. Accordingly, the court concluded that Brown's claim against Noxubee was time-barred as well as deficient for failure to comply with the Notice of Claim requirements and that Noxubee therefore was fraudulently joined. Following its determination as to fraudulent joinder, the court observed that Noxubee's motion for summary judgment remained open and that Brown would be given the opportunity to argue that motion although [t]here appears to be little if any merit in plaintiff's claim against Noxubee. As to Baptist, the court found that [t]he record does not make clear whether Baptist Memorial is a community hospital subject to the same statute and defenses as Noxubee. The court also noted an additional issue as to Baptist: whether Brown complied with the Mississippi requirement that an expert be consulted prior to the filing of a malpractice complaint. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-58. Discovery on the questions of community hospital status for Baptist and compliance with the expert consultation requirement were referred to Magistrate Judge Mann. In concluding that it was not yet able to determine finally the remand motion, the court ruled that, [u]pon completion of discovery, Baptist Memorial may renew its motion for summary judgment and Lilly may renew its motion to declare joinder of Baptist Memorial fraudulent for removal purposes. The District Court granted Noxubee's motion for summary judgment by order filed on November 14, 2008, following oral argument held on November 7, 2008. Referring to the discussion in its earlier order determining that Noxubee was fraudulently joined, the court rested its grant of summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations governing suits against community hospitals under the MTCA; and (2) that the Notice of Claim requirements of the MTCA were not met in that the Notice failed to include facts relating to at least three categories of information required to be included in the Notice. The court rejected Brown's arguments that Noxubee's failure to provide complete medical records excused its failure to comply with the statute of limitations as well as its failure to comply with the Notice requirements of the MTCA. The court took notice of Noxubee's certification that all records had been furnished to Brown and denied Brown's motion for additional time for discovery, holding that, in any event, [n]othing in any additional records would satisfy [Brown's] failure to comply with the MTCA. By documents filed on January 9, 2009, the District Court certified final judgment for Noxubee General Hospital and against [Brown], there being no good reason for delay, such judgment being final for all purposes including appeal under and pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown filed his Notice of Appeal from this final judgment on February 6, 2009. (A subsequent final judgment, similar in form to the one filed on January 9, was filed on May 1, 2009, but no appeal was taken therefrom.) By stipulation filed on June 15, 2009, executed by counsel for Brown and Noxubee, the appeal was withdrawn. The stipulation, SO ORDERED by Staff Counsel on behalf of the Clerk of Court, recited that the District Court purported to grant certification under FRCP 54(b), but without including a brief, reasoned explanation of why there is no just reason for delay. It also provided as follows: This stipulation shall not preclude any appeal from a final judgment in conformity with FRCP 54(b), which includes a statement of reasons for certification, or from a final judgment adjudicating all the rights and liabilities of all the parties herein. Following discovery ordered by the District Court and overseen by Magistrate Judge Mann on the question of Brown's compliance with the Mississippi state law requirements for expert consultation, Baptist, on December 15, 2009, renewed its motion to dismiss first made in the District Court of Mississippi. In discovery, Brown's counsel revealed by affidavits that he had consulted with at least one expert prior to filing the complaint; that he had concluded from the consultation that there was a reasonable basis for the action; and that all consultations had occurred on or before August 17, 2007, a date before the action was commenced. He specifically identified a Mississippi psychiatrist, Dr. Wood Hiatt, as an expert that he had consulted. In its renewed motion, Baptist argued that Dr. Hiatt was not qualified to give an expert opinion as to Brown's claim against Baptist and therefore that Brown had failed to comply with the expert consultation requirement. The District Court converted Baptist's renewed motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment after notice to the parties. Baptist's motion was argued at a hearing held on March 26, 2009. During the course of the hearing, the court offered counsel for Brown the opportunity for an adjournment for the purpose of taking the testimony of Dr. Hiatt at a Daubert hearing. Counsel declined the offer, and the court granted the motion in a Memorandum, Order and Judgment filed on April 15, 2009. In granting the motion, the court first reviewed the pre-filing consultation requirement of the MTCA: For plaintiff to satisfy the pre-filing requirement, the individual consulted must be an expert qualified pursuant to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and the Mississippi Rules of Evidence who is qualified to give expert testimony as to standard of care or negligence with respect to plaintiff's claim. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-58. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702 allows one to qualify as an expert based on knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. .... To be qualified to give expert testimony as to a medical standard of care or negligence in Mississippi state courts, an expert must be familiar with the relevant specialty. See Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 958 (Miss.2007). Examining Dr. Hiatt's background, the District Court found that Dr. Hiatt's expert testimony has been limited to psychiatry; he has not been qualified as an expert in general medicine, emergency medicine, or other specialties relevant to plaintiff's claim against Baptist Memorial. Because Dr. Hiatt's clinical experience, research, and education were limited to the field of psychiatry, the District Court concluded that Dr. Hiatt could not be considered qualified to give expert testimony as to standard of care or negligence with respect to Brown's claim against Baptist as required by Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-58. In view of the failure of Brown's cause of action, the court determined that Baptist was fraudulently joined. Accordingly, in the same opinion, the court ruled on Brown's motion to remand as follows: All non-diverse defendants have been dismissed. Since plaintiff is a Mississippi citizen and the sole remaining defendant, Lilly, is not, complete diversity exists. The court maintains subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). An Amended Final Judgment was filed on May 29, 2009, certifying the summary judgment in favor of Baptist as final pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). A Notice of Appeal from this judgment was filed on August 5, 2009. Although Noxubee was named as a defendant in the title of the Notice of Appeal, the Notice recited only that appeals were taken from orders and judgments in favor of Baptist, including the Amended Final Judgment certified for appeal. Both Noxubee and Baptist moved to dismiss the appeal. By Order filed on December 14, 2009, we dismissed the appeal with respect to Noxubee because, as Appellant has acknowledged, his Notice of Appeal covered only Orders pertaining to the separate judgment in favor of Baptist entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Noxubee Gen. Hosp., No. 09-3337-cv (order of Dec. 14, 2009). In the same Order, we determined that dismissal of the appeal as to Baptist also was warranted: To the extent that Appellant seeks to appeal the Rule 54(b) Final Amended Judgment entered in favor of Appellee Baptist or the Order that preceded it, this Court lacks jurisdiction because the Notice of Appeal was untimely filed. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1). Id. Brown's appeal also sought review of the denial of a motion that Baptist had made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to certify an interlocutory appeal of the dismissal of the claims against Baptist. As to that matter, we determined that this court lacks jurisdiction because an Order denying § 1292(b) certification is not appealable. Id. Following dismissal of the claims against, the non-diverse party defendants, the District Court turned to the motion made by Eli Lilly for summary judgment. In denying the motion by Memorandum, Order, and Judgment filed on January 11, 2010, the Court noted that it had issued a Case Management Order requiring Brown to submit a case-specific expert liability Report by August 13, 2009, and that the deadline had passed with no Report having been submitted. It further noted that a joint proposal had been approved on September 28, 2009, providing that plaintiff may have until October 30, 2009 either to produce an expert or to dismiss the claims against Lilly. No expert report was proffered by the amended deadline, and the court, after a full review of all the evidence presented to it, concluded as follows: No expert or evidence has connected [Ms. Brown's] cause of death or any medical problem to Zyprexa. Her claim [against Eli Lilly] cannot stand. Recognizing and rejecting Brown's attempt to reargue the summary judgments dismissing the non-diverse hospital defendants in connection with its opposition to Lilly's motion, the District Court stated: In light of those dismissals, there is no obstacle under the Mississippi statute to dismissing plaintiff's claim against Lilly.