Opinion ID: 1763320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: .2 From Other Courts.

Text: (a) When a federal court or state appellate court considers a question that Michigan law may resolve and that is not controlled by Michigan Supreme Court precedent, the court may on its own motion or that of an interested party certify the question to the Michigan Supreme Court. (Emphasis added.) It is widely understood that the rule which has been adopted in many states is designed to serve the interest of comity between state and federal courts by enabling state courts to declare first what state law means when federal law requires the application of state law. The United States district courts sitting in Michigan and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit have employed this rule with increasing frequency in recent years. It is a sound and wisely conceived rule which serves the interests of the efficient administration of justice, promotes comity between federal and state courts, and, when appropriately invoked, clarifies and respects the jurisdictional prerogatives of state and federal courts. The rule has not been properly invoked in this case. The action before the federal court is a suit for declaratory judgment brought under 42 USC 1983. The plaintiffs in the case have asked the federal court to declare the Michigan indecent exposure statute, MCL 750.335a; MSA 28.567(1), to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad both as applied to the plaintiffs before the federal court and facially. In the early stages of the federal litigation, the plaintiffs before that court requested a preliminary injunction to restrain the defendant Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney and local police authorities from enforcing the statute pending the federal court decision on its constitutionality. In August of 1982, the federal district judge to whom the case is assigned, in a Memorandum and Order Denying the Requested Preliminary Injunction, discussed the facts of the case, described the theories of the contesting parties, observed that the court was faced with a vagueness and overbreadth challenge, rejected the idea that the federal court should abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction in this case, and announced it would submit to this Court the certified question which is quoted above. In the course of its opinion, however, the federal court, remarkably, but unequivocally, declared that the statute apparently does not pass constitutional muster and suggested that it would be held unconstitutional unless this Court responded to a certified question giving a saving construction to § 750.335a. Specifically, the federal court declared: We believe it clear that, in the absence of a limiting construction from a state court, § 750.335a does not speak with the clarity required of a criminal statute. We do not believe that a person of ordinary intelligence could determine from the words `open or indecent exposure' precisely what type of dancing is proscribed by § 750.335a. For example, the statute could well be interpreted to apply to all nude dancing; if that is the proper construction, the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad.    [O]n the other hand, the statute could well be meant to apply to the following types of conduct only: 1) patently offensive exhibitions of ultimate sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; 2) patently offensive exhibitions of masturbation or excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. The Supreme Court, in Miller v California, 413 US 15 [93 S Ct 2607; 37 L Ed 2d 419] (1973), listed the conduct described above as examples of conduct that is not constitutionally protected and thus is subject to prohibition. Thus, if the Michigan indecent exposure statute were construed as being applicable to the above conduct only, then the statute would not be overbroad. We believe that these two possible interpretations of § 750.335a are equally plausible. And, We believe that it is proper to give the Michigan Supreme Court    an opportunity [to give a limiting construction to § 750.335a]. We note that Michigan General Court Rule 797.2 permits federal courts to certify questions of state law to the Michigan Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.) And, Thus, we believe that if a case involving the facial constitutionality of § 750.335a were to come before the Michigan Supreme Court, it would in all probability `save' § 750.335a by giving that statute the same limiting construction which it gave [MCL] 750.343a [MSA 28.575(1)] in [ People v Neumayer, 405 Mich 341; 275 NW2d 230 (1979)]. Were the Michigan Supreme Court to limit § 750.335a in the same manner that it limited § 750.343a in Neumayer, the statute would then be neither overbroad nor vague. Thus, it is plain that the certified question procedure has not been employed to obtain an expression of this Court's opinion on a matter of Michigan law at all, or, even simply to obtain this Court's opinion how    the words `open [or] indecent exposure' as used in [MCL 750.335a] should be defined. It has been employed instead to obtain a ruling from this Court on a question of First Amendment federal constitutional law with very explicit instructions from the federal court to this Court how that answer should be written to avoid federal court adjudication that the statute is unconstitutional. The rhetorical questions, of course, are by what authority does this Court tell the federal court how the litigation before it challenging the constitutionality of our statute should be decided and by what authority does this Court save the statute from the probability of federal court nullification by ruling upon its constitutionality? There is no litigation before this Court challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Indeed, there is no law-suit on the matter before this Court at all. There is a mere request for an advisory opinion not about Michigan law as is required by GCR 1963, 797.2, but about the constitutionality of a Michigan statute under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, a question of federal constitutional law, thinly veiled behind a purported request to advise the federal court how    the words `open [or] indecent exposure' as used in [MCL 750.335a] should be defined, accompanied by advice as to precisely how the question should be answered. Presumably, had the plaintiffs in the case wished to have this Court adjudicate the First Amendment constitutionality of the language in question, they would have filed the litigation in one of the courts of this state. Plainly, that is not what they are after. Because the question certified actually seeks no advice concerning Michigan law as is required to trigger application of our rule, we decline to answer the question certified.