Opinion ID: 2383570
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Appeal Delay

Text: The defendant Walker, as noted earlier, was convicted after jury trial on May 20, 1987. On June 8, 1987, his motion for new trial was denied, and he was thereafter, on July 30, 1987, sentenced. Walker's counsel filed a timely notice of appeal and ordered the trial transcripts as required by Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. Shortly following the trial, Nancy Seal (Seal), the trial court stenographer, left Rhode Island without transcribing her trial notes. As a result Walker was not able to obtain the necessary trial transcripts, and the delay in perfecting his appeal commenced. After several months of unsuccessful attempts to locate Seal, the state enlisted the aid of the Rhode Island State Police to assist in locating her. The State Police ultimately found Seal in Florida and were able to obtain the original trial and pretrial hearing stenographic notes. Another court stenographer was assigned to transcribe Seal's stenographic notes and encountered difficulty in so doing. On December 2, 1988, the trial justice, after having been informed of the transcription difficulties, directed trial counsel to attempt to reconstruct certain unavailable portions of the record in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 10. Counsel collaborated with the court stenographer to reconstruct the record. All parties were able to come to agreement on the jury selection and jury trial records but were unable to agree upon and to reconstruct and transcribe the record of the pretrial motion and suppression hearings. Counsel for Walker and the state were able to stipulate concerning the jury selection and trial record, as transcribed by the court stenographer, and those agreed upon records were filed with the trial court. The trial justice in November 1990, pursuant to Rule 10, ordered appellate and trial counsel once again to attempt reconstruction of the pretrial records so that he could certify a complete record for purposes of defendant Walker's appeal. Janet L. Novack (Novack), one of defendant's trial counsel, prepared a narrative of the pretrial hearings from her pretrial hearing notes. That narrative was given to the state's prosecutor, Michael Burns, who, after comparing Novack's notes to his own hearing notes, proposed certain changes and modifications. Appellate counsel for Walker reviewed the proposed changes and modifications submitted by the state prosecutor and agreed to all, with the exception of five proposed changes. Those five areas of disagreement were then submitted to the trial justice for his resolution. By letter of March 15, 1993, the trial justice scheduled a hearing for purposes of resolving the dispute. That hearing was held on April 30, 1993. The defendant Walker was present at that hearing and filed a pro se objection to the entire record reconstruction process. He alleged in his pro se motion that the pretrial and trial stenographer, Seal, did not take accurate notes and that as a result he would not be able to determine the accuracy and completeness of the reconstructed record. Walker himself argued his pro se objection to the record reconstruction process. Despite Walker's objections, appellate counsel for Walker and for the state both presented their respective positions to the trial justice and, to accommodate Walker, stipulated that his trial counsel's narrative to the trial justice would include Walker's recalled version of the pretrial hearing evidence. The trial justice, thereafter, on May 17, 1993, entered an Order in which he certified those portions of the record that had been transcribed from Seal's notes as the record of the jury selection and trial proceedings. He also certified the narrative of the pretrial hearings as prepared by Novack and the supplement thereto, consisting of defendant Walker's testimony, along with the modification to Novack's narrative agreed upon by counsel. The trial justice also overruled Walker's objection to the record reconstruction process. However, the trial justice treated one of Walker's blanket objection contentions, namely, that in view of the state of the record he should be granted a new trial, as a second motion for new trial, and denied it. On May 20, 1993, the trial justice by further Order, resolved the five unresolved factual pretrial hearing record disputes and certified what was the final portion of the appellate record. Five days later, on May 20, 1993, defendant Walker filed a pro se notice of appeal from the trial justice's denial of his motion for new trial, along with another pro se objection to the record certification process undertaken to perfect his appeal. Shortly thereafter, on July 7, 1993, Walker's appellate counsel from the Public Defender's office, filed their motion in this court seeking permission to withdraw as his counsel. In that motion appellate counsel stated: ... appellate counsel, having actively engaged in that same reconstruction process, which admittedly took years to complete, and having stipulated to the completeness of the record as certified by the Superior Court, except for the few matters ultimately resolved by the trial judge, find themselves to be in absolute and irreconcilable conflict with Mr. Walker and, consequently are unable to continue to represent him on appeal. This court granted appellate counsel's motion to withdraw on June 16, 1993, and on October 14, 1993, appointed new counsel for Walker. That counsel, after various motions for continuances so as to permit review of the extensive record, was ordered finally to file Walker's appellate brief on or before April 9, 1995. That was done. Walker contends here on appeal that because of the six year period required to prepare and certify his pretrial and trial record, that he was denied his due process right to a speedy trial. He urges that we read into Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), an appellate delay extension, and that we should proceed to evaluate the appellate delay here in light of the four-part speedy trial test set out in Barker. That we decline to do. We have adopted the Barker four-part test with regard to a defendant's right to a speedy trial. State v. Perez, 605 A.2d 1305, 1310 (R.I. 1992). We see no reason, on the facts in this case, to expand our holding in Perez. We find no prejudice resulting to defendant in the delay caused by the reconstruction and certification process of his Superior Court pretrial and trial record. He makes no claim that there is any appellate prejudice resulting from the delay. With regard to any personal prejudice in being held without bail pending his appeal, such prejudice, if any, is illusory. Shortly after his convictions here in Newport, he was transferred to the State of New York to stand trial there on two separate sexual assault charges, and after trials he was sentenced on September 6 and November 30, 1988, to serve consecutive prison terms of twelve and one-half to twenty-five years. The delay here, accordingly, although unusual, has not prejudiced Walker's right to meaningful appellate review. We are satisfied here that the trial justice acted in compliance with Supreme Court Rule 10(c), which provides for completion of the required appellate record in circumstances such as are present in this case. We find no error in the proceedings as undertaken by the trial justice to complete and certify the trial court record. In fact, we note that his proceedings were not only in accord with Rule 10(c) but also in substantial accord with precedential decisions of this court that predate adoption of our Rule. Baffoni v. Baffoni, 76 R.I. 291, 69 A.2d 503 (1949); McSherry v. Peckham, 50 R.I. 473, 149 A. 380 (1930). The United States Supreme Court in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499, 83 S.Ct. 774, 780-781, 9 L.Ed.2d 899, 908 (1963), has held that a defendant in a criminal case on appeal must be furnished with a record of sufficient completeness to permit full and fair appellate review of his or her appellate claims. See also United States v. Kenney, 911 F.2d 315, 318 (9th Cir.1990); People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455, 460, 218 P.2d 769, 773 (1950); State v. Vitale, 190 Conn. 219, 223, 460 A.2d 961, 965 (1983); Commonwealth v. Harris, 376 Mass. 74, 77, 379 N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (1978). We are satisfied in this case that Walker was provided with a sufficiently complete and accurate pretrial and trial hearing record that permits meaningful appellate review of his claims of error in the proceedings against him in the Superior Court. We next address those claims.