Opinion ID: 2634864
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Involuntary Manslaughter (Efrem Baldia, Rita Motel)

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred when if failed to instruct the jury on its own motion that involuntary manslaughter was a lesser included offense of the charged murder of Efrem Baldia at the Rita Motel. We disagree. Manslaughter is deemed to be related to murder as a lesser included offense. (See, e.g., 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Defenses, § 327, p. 379; compare Pen.Code, § 187, subd. (a) [defining murder as the `unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought'] with id., § 192 [defining manslaughter as the `unlawful killing of a human being without malice'].) As relevant here, manslaughter is voluntary, i.e., `upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion' ( id., § 192, subd. (a)), or involuntary, i.e., `in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection' ( id., § 192, subd. (b)). ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1080, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury on murder and, as noted earlier, it also instructed on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense as to the killings committed at the Las Playas restaurant, Fort Knots bar, and the Rita Motel. The court did not instruct on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense with regard to any of the charged murders, and defendant did not ask it to do so. In support of his contention that the trial court should have instructed on its own motion on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of the murder of Efrem Baldia at the Rita Motel, defendant relies upon two items of evidence adduced at the trial: his own statement to investigating officers that, upon drawing his firearm from his waistband and placing the barrel against the victim's stomach, he pushed Baldia backward as the weapon discharged, and the testimony of Dr. Rogers that two of Baldia's five gunshot wounds were fatal, one to the lower left back and the other to the right side of the chest. Defendant posits that the latter wound was the only one that could have been inflicted in the manner [defendant had] described to the investigating officers. In light of this evidence, defendant asserts that a reasonable juror could have concluded that [defendant] shot Baldia by mistake, while negligently attempting to defend against a perceived threat[, a] finding that would have supported a conviction for involuntary manslaughter, not premeditated murder. As also noted earlier, we independently determine whether an instruction on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter should have been given. (See Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 733, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) There was no error. A court is not obligated to instruct sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense unless there is substantial evidence, i.e., evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 325 [185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311]) that the defendant killed his victim `in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection' (Pen.Code, § 192, subd. (b)). ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40; see also People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094 [`Substantial evidence' in this context is `evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude []' that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.].) There was no such evidence here. The killing of Efrem Baldia can only be characterized as having been intentional. The victim suffered two fatal and three nonfatal gunshot wounds inflicted at close range. Even if we were to accept defendant's statement, made during his hospital interview with Detective Olmedo, that the first shot simply discharged when defendant pushed the victim, the autopsy evidence introduced in the testimony given by Dr. Rogers established that defendant thereafter inflicted a second fatal wound when, by defendant's own admission to Detective Olmedo, he continued shooting the victim as the victim was falling to the ground. Thus, even if defendant unintentionally fired the first shot, the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter in view of the circumstance that defendant intentionally kept firing his weapon, inflicting at least one other fatal wound. The jury's verdict finding defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Efrem Baldia implicitly rejected defendant's version of the events  whether that version sought to establish voluntary manslaughter based upon a theory of imperfect self-defense, or involuntary manslaughter based upon a theory that defendant accidentally discharged his firearm  eliminating any doubt that the jury would have returned the same verdict had it been instructed on involuntary manslaughter. (See People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th 610, 646, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) Accordingly, even if were to assume for the sake of discussion that the trial court's failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter violated defendant's constitutional rights, we would find the error harmless. (See People v. Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th 596, 621, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152.)