Opinion ID: 1113754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wilson's Cross-Appeal

Text: Six issues are raised in Wilson's cross-appeal.
Wilson contends there is no clear and convincing evidence that he engaged in conduct ... that would constitute a crime as defined in Title 97 of the Mississippi Code of 1972 ... and/or ... engag[ed] in conduct likely to deceive, defraud, or harm the public. We hold the board's findings that Wilson's conduct fell within the purview of sections 73-15-29(1)(j) and 73-15-29(1)(k) was supported by clear and convincing evidence and substantial, credible evidence, respectively. The complaint lodged against Wilson alleged that certain conduct constituted the crime of false pretenses as defined by Miss. Code Ann. § 97-19-39. Wilson contends the board presented no evidence of his fraudulent intent. We disagree. Under M.C.A. § 97-19-39 (1972) and the cases interpreting this section, the crime of false pretenses occurs when one makes a false representation of a past or existing fact with the intent to deceive and with the result that the accused obtains something of value from the party deceived. State v. Allen, 505 So.2d 1024, 1025 (Miss. 1987); See also State v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 669, 671 (Miss. 1987). An intent to defraud, to be sure, is an essential ingredient of the crime of obtaining money by false pretense. Woodfork v. State, 377 So.2d 912 (Miss. 1979). The standard of proof required for a decision of the Board of Nursing in cases involving fraud or conduct deemed quasicriminal in nature is clear and convincing evidence. Hogan v. Mississippi Board of Nursing, 457 So.2d 931, 934 (Miss. 1984); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983). We hold the proof of intent to defraud passes muster under this standard. It is enough to say the testimony of the employee conflicted with the testimony elicited from Wilson. The employee testified she was asked to pay for her drug screens; Wilson, on the other hand, testified she was making a voluntary donation to the patient trust fund. The testimony, viewed as a whole, was sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Wilson obtained a check from the employee for $80 made payable to Wilson as payment for drug screens for which there was no charge and that Wilson converted the money to his own use. Wilson freely admitted he endorsed the check, deposited it in his personal account, and never reimbursed the employee. He testified that after he was unable to reach her, he dismissed the whole thing and did not even think of it anymore. Wilson claimed he had no intent to defraud the employee; rather, his receipt of her check was simply an informal method of reimbursing the hospital for her drug screens. According to Wilson there was no culpability on his part and the entire matter surrounding the check was simply a big misunderstanding. This same conduct was also conduct likely to deceive, defraud, or harm the public. We reject Wilson's claim that at the worst he is guilty of nothing greater than an isolated lapse in judgment. In Newburn v. State, 205 So.2d 260, 265 (Miss. 1967), we talked about intent: Intent is an emotional operation of the mind, and is usually shown by acts and declarations of the defendant coupled with facts and circumstances surrounding him at the time. Defendant's intention is manifested largely by the things he does. [emphasis supplied]. In Shanklin v. State, 290 So.2d 625, 627 (Miss. 1974), we further opined: Intent to do an act or commit a crime is also a question of fact to be gleaned by the jury from the facts shown in each case. The intent to commit a crime or to do an act by a free agent can be determined only by the act itself, surrounding circumstances, and expressions made by the actor with reference to his intent. [emphasis supplied] See also Ryals v. State, 305 So.2d 354, 356 (Miss. 1974), quoting from Newburn, supra; Jackson v. State, 254 So.2d 876, 879 (Miss. 1971). It is well settled that intent may be shown by circumstances. Hollingsworth v. State, 392 So.2d 515 (Miss. 1981). This is a wise rule of law because, as we stated in Lee v. State, 244 Miss. 813, 146 So.2d 736 (Miss. 1962), the ... criminal intent of a defendant, dwelling in his mind, invisible to the outward sight, can never be proven by direct testimony of a third person, (except when verbally expressed or admitted), and it need not be, because a person is presumed to intend that which he does, or which is the natural and necessary consequence of his act. [Citations omitted] Moreover, the court and the jury are not bound by the evidence of the accused as to what his intention was in the doing of a particular act. [Citations omitted] [emphasis supplied]. A reasonable hypothetical member of the board could have found that Wilson intentionally lied to the employee about the cost of the drug screens and that he intended this falsity to induce her to part with her money, which she did. There is clear and convincing evidence in the record that Wilson possessed the requisite intent to defraud the employee. Accordingly, the chancellor found correctly that the board met its burden of proof with regard to Wilson's violation of § 73-15-29(1)(j) and (k).
By virtue of Miss. Code Ann. § 73-15-29(2) a nursing license is a revocable privilege. It, much like a license to practice medicine and dentistry, represents a property interest, not a fundamental right. Ramirez v. Ahn, 843 F.2d 864, 867 (5th Cir.1988); Neuwirth, D.D.S. v. Louisiana State Board of Dentistry, 845 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir.1988). Wilson was not denied procedural due process. He was given ample notice of both the time and place of the disciplinary hearing, as well as notice of the specific charges used as a basis for revoking his license. Wilson appeared at the hearing, testified in his own behalf, and was represented by counsel of his own choice. He had an opportunity to present his own witnesses and documentary evidence and to cross-examine witnesses produced by the other side. This satisfies the requirements of both the Mississippi and the United States Constitutions.
Wilson claims the Board of Nursing violated the Open Meetings Act codified in § 25-41-1 by declaring an executive session to consider his objection to the hearing and his motion to strike the charges brought under § 73-15-29(1)(h). This argument is devoid of merit because of the litigation exception found in § 25-41-7(4)(b) which authorizes a public body to hold executive sessions for the purpose of [s]trategy sessions or negotiations with respect to prospective litigation, litigation or issuance of an appealable order when an open meeting would have a detrimental effect on the litigating position of the public body.
Wilson's claim that the board failed to properly authenticate bank and hospital records introduced into evidence is, likewise, without merit. Our statutory, as well as, our case law hold that administrative hearings are not bound by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence or the Mississippi Rules of Procedure. Section 73-15-31(3) states that the board ... shall not be bound by strict rules of procedure or by the laws of evidence in the conduct of its proceedings, ... Cf. Merchant v. Pearl Municipal Separate School District, 492 So.2d 959 (Miss. 1986) [School boards proceed informally and are not bound by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence]; Love v. Mississippi State Board of Veterinary Examiners, 230 Miss. 222, 92 So.2d 463 (1956). A copy of the $80 check was accompanied by a sworn affidavit executed by the President of the Planters Bank in Tunica attesting to the fact that it was, inter alia, a true and correct copy. The employee produced the original check, and there was no harm, no foul, and certainly no prejudice to Wilson. With respect to the hospital records, the sworn affidavit of Sonya Thornhill of the medical record department of the Mississippi State Hospital complied in substance with our statutory requirements.
Wilson complains that Dr. Milhorn was allowed to give expert testimony based upon his review of four (4) transcripts that had neither been authenticated nor introduced into evidence at the time of his testimony. Marcella McKay, records custodian for the Board of Nursing, authenticated the four transcripts immediately after Wilson testified. Their authenticity has not been assailed on appeal. Wilson himself relies upon portions of their contents. Dr. Milhorn's conclusion that Wilson has had a long history of problems with drugs was corroborated by Wilson's admissions during the present hearing as well as Wilson's testimony during the hearings preceding it. One of Wilson's complaints on appeal is that the Legislature did not define drug addiction and chemical dependency in § 73-15-29(1)(h). Clinical definitions of both terms were supplied by the expert opinion of Dr. Milhorn whose credentials were impeccable. We cannot agree that the testimony elicited from Milhorn, who was cross-examined at great length, violated Wilson's right to fundamental fairness.
The order issued by the board setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law was adequate. While embellishment may have been preferable, any defect in this regard is certainly not fatal. The board, by virtue of paragraph 3 of its findings, found as a fact that Wilson was addicted to or dependent on alcohol or other habit-forming drugs, primarily cocaine, and that he engaged in conduct constituting a crime and conduct likely to deceive, defraud, or harm the public. State agencies are not required to make detailed findings of fact. Ultimate fact-finding is sufficient. Mississippi Public Service Commission v. AAA Anserphone, Inc., 372 So.2d 259, 264-65 (Miss. 1979); Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Jackson Ready-Mix Concrete, 243 Miss. 72, 137 So.2d 542, 546 (1962).