Opinion ID: 681591
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: do the complaints allege conduct prejudicial to the

Text: 22 EFFECTIVE AND EXPEDITIOUS ADMINISTRATION OF THE 23 BUSINESS OF THE COURTS? 24 The central question presented for review is whether complainants have alleged conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts. 25 The primary business of the courts of this circuit is, of course, the resolution of cases or controversies within the jurisdiction conferred by Article III of the Constitution. See generally Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) (case or controversy requirement defines and limits role of courts in tripartite allocation of powers, and guards against intrusion into areas committed to the other branches). The Special Division's authority to appoint an independent counsel arises not from Article III, however, but from the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673-79, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2609-13, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988). If the business of the courts is viewed as the exercise of Article III judicial power, then the conduct of a member of the Special Division, at least with respect to the exercise of the Division's appointment power, is entirely unrelated to, and can have no direct prejudicial effect on, the administration of Article III business. 26 The legislative history and scholarly comments on the Judicial Councils Act support the view that section 372(c) was not intended to reach all allegations of misconduct, even those unrelated to the exercise of judicial power. See, e.g., S.REP. NO. 362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315, 4317 (complaints of conduct not connected with the judicial office are outside the scope of this legislation); 125 CONG.REC. 30,064 (1979) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (extrajudicial behavior covered by Act only if it affects performance on the bench); 4 James R. Browning, Evaluating Judicial Performance and Related Matters, 90 F.R.D. 197, 204 (1981) (noting administrative thrust of Act, as distinguished from state disciplinary procedures aimed at misconduct or conduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute). Consistent with this narrow reading of the prejudicial conduct standard, a number of Chief Judges and Judicial Councils have dismissed complaints alleging misconduct not directly related to judicial activities (e.g., comments by judges in speeches or newspaper interviews, participation in family members' legal actions, and perjury allegedly committed before taking the bench). See Richard L. Marcus, Who Should Discipline Federal Judges, and How?, 149 F.R.D. 375, 404-07 (1993) (citing dismissal orders). 27 It may be, however, that the business of the courts should be construed broadly enough to encompass the Special Division's administrative duties, which are, after all, conferred by a congressional grant of authority equal to, albeit separate from, the grant of Article III judicial power. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 678-79, 108 S.Ct. at 2612-13. Alternatively, and more importantly, it is possible to interpret the statute to mean that the prejudicial conduct to which 28 U.S.C. Sec. 372(c)(1) refers includes any conduct that adversely affects the administration of the business of the courts. Thus, if a judge engages in any misconduct, even in his or her private life, it may be within the scope of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 372(c)(1) if the conduct has the proscribed effect. Indeed, the Court of Appeals of this circuit, in upholding the Judicial Councils Act against vagueness and overbreadth challenges, described the statutory standard as including other conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. Hastings v. Judicial Conf. of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 106 (D.C.Cir.1987) (quoting Senate Report 362 at 9), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014, 108 S.Ct. 1487, 99 L.Ed.2d 715 (1988). This suggests that conduct causing only an indirect effect on the courts' judicial function may be subject to discipline. But see Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U.PA.L.REV. 283, 303 n. 79 (1982) (noting deletion of disrepute language from S. 1873). 28 In the instant case, it is unnecessary to determine the breadth of the statutory standard in order to dispose of the pending complaints. For however broadly the statutory standard is to be read, complainants do not allege conduct by the subject judge that could have even an indirect prejudicial effect on the administration of the business of the courts. Complainants' allegations, broadly referring to the appearance of impropriety and citing ethical strictures purportedly applicable to the judge's conduct, are grounded in a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Special Division's authority. 29 The Supreme Court made clear in Morrison, 487 U.S. at 678-79, 108 S.Ct. at 2612-13, that, in considering and acting on an Attorney General's application for the appointment of an independent counsel, the Special Division is not exercising judicial power under Article III, but a species of Article II appointment power. 5 This power is, by its very nature, entrusted to the discretion of the appointing authority. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (Article II appointment power of the President). In an adversarial judicial proceeding under Article III, however, there are competing parties who present evidence in support of a legal claim; and a judge looks solely to the record and the applicable rules of law to decide the case. A judge in a judicial proceeding who reaches outside of the record to decide a case defiles the process. Even an appearance of impropriety is unacceptable in such a setting, so judicial proceedings are subject to stringent constitutional (e.g., procedural due process), statutory (e.g., the commands of the Administrative Procedure Act), and ethical (e.g., the prohibition against ex parte contacts embodied in Canon 3(A)(4)) rules. These safeguards that are employed to ensure fairness in judicial proceedings are mostly irrelevant in connection with exercises of the appointment power. 30 The appointment functions of the Special Division certainly do not constitute adversarial proceedings. And in creating the Special Division, Congress recognized the difference between the appointment and judicial powers by making it clear that a judge who participates in the selection of an independent counsel while a member of the Special Division cannot thereafter participate in a judicial proceeding involving the independent counsel: 31 [N]o member of [the Special Division] of the court who participated in a function conferred on the division ... involving an independent counsel shall be eligible to participate in any judicial proceeding concerning a matter which involves such independent counsel while such independent counsel is serving in that office or which involves the exercise of such independent counsel's official duties, regardless of whether such independent counsel is still serving in that office. 32 28 U.S.C. Sec. 49(f). 33 It makes little sense to think that an authority acting pursuant to the Appointment Clause of Article II might be forbidden from consulting with others regarding candidates for appointment. It is hard to imagine how anyone would go about that task without seeking advice. Indeed, in the context of the President's exercise of the appointment power, the benefit of unfettered outside consultation is deemed so important that it may enjoy Constitutional protection. See Washington Legal Found. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 691 F.Supp. 483, 491-96 (D.D.C.1988) (application of Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) to Presidential use of ABA committee on judicial nominations unconstitutionally burdens appointment power), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989); see also id., 491 U.S. at 482-89, 109 S.Ct. at 2581-84 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ([A]pplication of FACA would constitute a direct and real interference with the President's exclusive responsibility to nominate federal judges.). 34 It is equally anomalous to regard a person who acts under the Appointments Clause as one with the authority to adjudicate claims (as is true under Article III). I do not mean to suggest that Congress could not, consistent with the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers, place restrictions on the Special Division's ability to gather information to assist it in exercising its statutory authority; however, this possibility does not transform the appointment process of the Special Division into a judicial proceeding subject to rules meant to protect Article III adversary proceedings. 35 Complainants would doubtless argue that, whether or not the members of the Special Division are acting pursuant to Article II or Article III, the Ethics in Government Act does place restrictions on the authority of the Special Division. In complainants' view--a view that I recognize may be shared by some members of the public, the press, and even the legal community--the Ethics Act was intended to take the appointment process out of the world of partisan politics, to insure that the selection would not be influenced by the very sort of political considerations that the Act was adopted to avoid. See Chesterfield Smith, et al., Joint Statement Regarding Independent Counsel Selection Process 1 (Sept. 20, 1994). This view has been endorsed by five former Presidents of the American Bar Association. Id. 6 It is noteworthy, however, that neither the ABA Presidents' statement nor the complaints in this case cite any support for their reading of the Ethics Act. This is because there is nothing in the language or legislative history of the independent counsel provisions of the Act suggesting that the members of the Special Division are barred from consulting with others in the exercise of their appointment authority. 36 The Ethics Act, as amended, merely provides that the Special Division shall appoint an appropriate independent counsel upon receipt of an application from the Attorney General. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 593(b)(1). The Act places few limits on the Division's discretion in selecting an appropriate counsel, requiring only that the appointee have appropriate experience, be a person who will conduct her duties in a prompt, responsible, and cost-effective manner, and without undue delay. Id. Sec. 593(b)(2). The one absolute qualification imposed by the Act is that the independent counsel may not be a person who holds any office of profit or trust under the United States. Id. 7 The Act is utterly silent as to whether, or to what extent, the Special Division may solicit or consider the views of persons other than its own members. 37 The legislative history of the Ethics Act is similarly silent on this question, with one interesting exception. The Act provides that the Attorney General's application for appointment of an independent counsel shall contain sufficient information to assist the division of the court in selecting an independent counsel and in defining that independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(d). The Senate Report on this provision expressly contemplates that the information provided may include suggestions as to the names of individuals who would make good special prosecutors, which information would be of assistance to the division of the court. S.REP. NO. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4272. If [t]he entire purpose of appointing a temporary special prosecutor is to get someone who is independent, both in reality and appearance, from the President and the Attorney General, id. at 65-66, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4281-82, it is unlikely that Congress would find suggestions from the Attorney General permissible, yet assume that the Special Division would otherwise insulate itself from outside influences unconnected with the President or his administration. 38 When it is kept in mind that the entire purpose of the independent counsel statute was to provide independence from the Executive Branch, it is easy to see that complainants' view of the appointment process as a cloistered, apolitical judicial proceeding is quite far-fetched. The legislative history of the Ethics Act shows a clear emphasis on establishing a prosecutorial office free of any conflict of interest that might arise where officials of the Executive Branch are called upon to investigate their colleagues or superiors. See Senate Report 170 at 5-7, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4221-23. In addition, Congress sought in the Ethics Act to protect the independent counsel from interference at the hands of Executive Branch officials, such as the premature dismissal experienced by Archibald Cox during his Watergate investigation. See House Report 1307 at 5 & n. 10 (citing Watergate history, and quoting Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629, 55 S.Ct. 869, 874, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935) ([O]ne who holds his office during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter's will.)). However, Congress has never expressed an intention to make the appointment process itself independent of all nonjudicial influences outside of the Executive Branch. This may be an aspiration that is now embraced by significant segments of society, but it finds no support in applicable constitutional, statutory, or ethical precepts. 39 Finally, it is not without significance that the Special Division's past practice, to which no prior objection seems to have been directed, is plainly inconsistent with complainants' view of the Division's proper role. According to a published description of the Special Division's appointment process (an account based on personal interviews with members of the Division and former independent counsel), Division members have routinely relied on consultations with and recommendations from judicial colleagues, former professional associates, and other members of the so-called old-boy network. See KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 150-51 (1992). Even had the subject judge in this case discussed the pending application with his congressional friends and considered the submissions to the Division by other members of Congress, 8 he would have at most engaged in the same consultative process relied on by former members of the Special Division in connection with prior appointments. That those persons consulted might be political opponents of the President or his party should not expose the selection process to an anti-administration taint, any more than the Division's consideration of an Attorney General's recommendation should expose it to a charge of pro-administration partiality.