Opinion ID: 4099905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We review de novo the tax court’s dismissal of a petition for a lack of jurisdiction. Estate of Kunze v. C.I.R., 233 F.3d 948, 950 (7th Cir. 2000). Although we find that this case is indistinguishable from the Buffano line of cases, because we find that those cases were decided in error, we will affirm the tax court’s dismissal of Adolphson’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. A. The Improperly Authenticated Transcripts of Ac‐ count Do Not Affect the Outcome of Adolphson’s Appeal In this court, Adolphson principally argues that the tran‐ scripts of account attached to the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss were not admissible or, at the very least, not proper‐ ly authenticated. Adolphson is correct that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in the tax court, see 26 U.S.C. § 7453, and though transcripts of account are admissible if properly au‐ thenticated, these were not. See United States v. Ryan, 969 F.2d 238, 239 (7th Cir. 1992). That said, Adolphson’s argu‐ ment is a distraction; he treated the transcripts as valid be‐ fore the tax court and, more importantly, the tax court’s de‐ cision does not turn on their content. B. Under the Reasoning of Buffano, the Tax Court Should Have Invalidated the Levies The significant issue in this appeal is the one that Adolphson has been pressing since the beginning: the tax court should have invalidated the IRS’s levies under Buffano. We agree that this case is indistinguishable from Buffano. In Buffano, the IRS mailed a Final Notice of Intent to Levy to the address listed on the taxpayer’s most recently filed tax 8 No. 15‐2242 return (an address where the taxpayer no longer lived). On the same day, though, the IRS also mailed two unrelated let‐ ters to the taxpayer’s current address, which the agency had obtained through a Postal Service database. The IRS’s letters did not mention collection activity, and when the taxpayer learned later that the agency had levied on his wages, he promptly requested a CDP hearing. The IRS refused to con‐ duct a CDP hearing because the agency had received the taxpayer’s request more than 30 days after issuance of the Final Notice of Intent to Levy. The taxpayer nevertheless pe‐ titioned the tax court for review, and the Commissioner moved to dismiss for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction, cit‐ ing the absence of a notice of determination. Buffano, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 901, at –3. The tax court denied the Com‐ missioner’s motion to dismiss, yet still entered an order dis‐ missing for lack of jurisdiction—but only after invalidating the levies based on a finding that the IRS had mailed the fi‐ nal notice to the wrong address. The tax court reasoned that the taxpayer’s current address, which the IRS had obtained from the Postal Service database and used in the two letters sent to him, had superseded, for purposes of his “last known address,” the one listed on his most recently filed tax return. Id. at –5. This analysis—dismissing the taxpayer’s petition for lack of jurisdiction while still granting the very relief he seeks—is illogical, but Buffano is not an outlier. That 2007 decision has been relied upon to invalidate levies in situations analogous to Adolphson’s at least seven times in published decisions (and we cannot be sure that there are not even more, un‐ published instances). See Minemeyer v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 616, at  (2012); Roberts v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. No. 7222‐09S, at  (2010); Space v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) No. 15‐2242 9 328, at –4 (2009); Kennedy v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1121, at  (2008); Graham v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504, at  (2008); Downing v. Comm’r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 319, at  (2007); Schwengel v. Comm’r, No. 13979‐06L (T.C. Nov. 20, 2007). In other decisions, the tax court has relied on Buffano but sided with the Commissioner, dismissing petitions for lack of jurisdiction because the required notices had been proper‐ ly mailed and the petitions were, therefore, untimely. See, e.g., Anson v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504, at  (2010). To further complicate matters, the tax court has been incon‐ sistent; for example, in Walthers v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1793, at –3 (2009), it cited Buffano in concluding that the IRS had failed to properly mail notice to the taxpayer, but still refused to enjoin collection of the (invalid) levies, citing the absence of a notice of determination. C. Buffano Improperly Expanded the Scope of the Tax Court’s Jurisdiction in the Absence of a Notice of Determination The outcome of this case, therefore, turns on the validity of the Buffano line of cases. If the tax court has the power un‐ der § 6330 to evaluate the sufficiency of the IRS’s collection activities and invalidate levies where the agency fails to properly mail notice, then Adolphson should have pre‐ vailed. Direct evidence is required when the IRS must prove that it properly mailed notice, and a computer printout list‐ ing a mailing date but without an address will not suffice. Walthers, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1793, at . Here, the Commis‐ sioner cannot even say with certainty to what address Adolphson’s notice was mailed, much less prove that it was sent by certified mail to his “last known address.” And the tax court’s ground for distinguishing Buffano is untenable; 10 No. 15‐2242 the court rejected the petition due to “the paucity of infor‐ mation,” Adolphson’s failure to state what address was shown on his last tax return, and because, the court rea‐ soned, the address shown on the 2012 letter is “hardly de‐ terminative as to his ‘last known address’ for purposes of section 6330.” This reasoning improperly shifts the burden to Adolphson to prove that the IRS met its own statutory duty to notify him before levying his assets. It strikes us as non‐ sensical to fault the taxpayer for not establishing where the IRS should have mailed notice if the agency concedes, as it did here, that it cannot say if notice was mailed to New York or Los Angeles or somewhere in between. Moreover, this question of burden‐shifting aside, Adolphson’s contention that the IRS should have used his Illinois address has merit. In the tax court, the agency assert‐ ed that twice it had updated Adolphson’s address using the Postal Service database—presumably to his Illinois address, where the 2012 letter was mailed—yet the agency conceded that it “most likely” sent the Final Notices of Intent to Levy to Iowa. See Gyorgy v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 466, 475–76 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that treasury regulations treat an updated ad‐ dress in the Postal Service database as “clear and concise no‐ tification” of taxpayer’s address); McPartlin v. Comm’r, 653 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1981) (explaining that notice sent by certified mail will be deemed insufficient if Commissioner cannot produce return receipt); Pyo v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 626, 636–37 (1984) (concluding that taxpayers were reasonably entitled to assume, after receiving correspondence from IRS at new address, that future mailings would be sent to same address). In other words, had the tax court followed Buffano and required the Commissioner to prove proper mailing, the No. 15‐2242 11 “paucity of information” should have led to a win for Adolphson. Hearing the Commissioner’s views on Buffano would have been enlightening, but, unfortunately, the Commis‐ sioner’s response brief is particularly unhelpful. Indeed, when asked at oral argument if we should invalidate the Buffano line of cases, the Commissioner specifically dis‐ claimed any request for us to do so. This reticence is surpris‐ ing given that it would seem that the IRS has a strong inter‐ est in asking us to overturn these decisions. Meanwhile the Commissioner makes no attempt to justify the IRS’s collec‐ tion activities in this case and fails even to acknowledge the agency’s inability to prove that it sent notice to Adolphson. Instead, the Commissioner insists that Adolphson is relegat‐ ed either to an administrative claim before the IRS or a re‐ fund suit in district court, while maintaining that “whether the IRS mailed a Notice of Intent to Levy to taxpayer’s last known address is not relevant in this case.” The Commis‐ sioner also makes no attempt to defend the tax court’s ground for distinguishing Buffano, stating only that Adolph‐ son’s argument is “misconceived.” But instead of explaining why Adolphson’s reliance on Buffano is “misconceived,” the Commissioner simply chang‐ es the subject and asserts that Adolphson, proceeding pro se, erred by asking the tax court to enjoin further collection ef‐ forts and refund money already collected, rather than asking the court to invalidate the levies. Because the tax court had no jurisdiction to issue injunctions or order refunds, the Commissioner argues, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the specific relief requested. This is not helpful; the issue is whether the tax court had the power to determine the suffi‐ 12 No. 15‐2242 ciency of the IRS’s mailings, not whether Adolphson knew to specifically ask for invalidation as opposed to an injunc‐ tion. The Commissioner continues to pretend that Buffano and its progeny do not exist, while simultaneously arguing that the tax court lacks jurisdiction absent a notice of deter‐ mination. Notwithstanding this unwillingness to confront the sali‐ ent issue, the Commissioner is correct that, absent a notice of determination, the tax court lacks jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d). See 14 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 50:22 (Jane C. Bergner ed., 2016) (explaining that a notice of determination is a taxpayer’s “ticket” to tax court and that court lacks jurisdiction over claim by taxpayer who fails to timely request, and receive, a CDP hearing); Hauptman v. Comm’r, 831 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 2016) (recogniz‐ ing that a notice of determination is a prerequisite to tax court jurisdiction under § 6330). A decision invalidating ad‐ ministrative action for not following statutory procedures is a quintessential merits analysis, not a jurisdictional ruling. The Buffano line of cases therefore represents an improper extension of the tax court’s statutorily defined jurisdiction. This practice of invalidating collection activity where the tax court lacks statutory authority to proceed also violates the Tax Anti‐Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), which (with exceptions inapplicable here) provides that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person.” This statute deprives courts of jurisdiction to enter pre‐collection injunc‐ tions and “protects the Government’s ability to collect a con‐ sistent stream of revenue” by ensuring that “taxes can ordi‐ narily be challenged only after they are paid, by suing for a No. 15‐2242 13 refund” under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582 (2012); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 669 (7th Cir. 2013). By invalidating levies despite the absence of a notice of determination under § 6330—a taxpayer’s jurisdictional hook to enter tax court—decisions such as Buffano stand in direct opposition to the Act. We note that, as far as we can tell, this framework for in‐ validating levies through a jurisdictional dismissal appears to have originated in a related but distinct context. The tax court in Buffano extended (without discussion) a much older and less problematic practice related to a different area of the tax court’s jurisdiction. When the IRS determines that a taxpayer (who, presumably, has filed tax returns) underpaid for a particular year, it issues a notice of deficiency (not to be confused with the notice of determination at issue here). The taxpayer may then immediately petition the tax court for re‐ determination of the alleged deficiency under 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a). In other words, no agency appeal is re‐ quired—a taxpayer may go straight to the tax court as long as the petition is filed within 90 days of the deficiency notice. But when the taxpayer does not learn of the deficiency and petition for redetermination until more than 90 days af‐ ter assessment, the IRS typically moves to dismiss the peti‐ tion for lack of jurisdiction on timeliness grounds. The tax court then analyzes the IRS’s proof of mailing to determine whether the deficiency notice met statutory requirements. If notice was properly mailed, the case will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as untimely. See Lee v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1634, at –3 (2011). But if the IRS cannot produce records or the tax court finds that the address used is not the taxpayer’s legal “last known address,” the court will side 14 No. 15‐2242 with the taxpayers and deem the notice insufficient (prevent‐ ing further collection activity until the IRS complies with procedural requirements). See King v. Comm’r, 857 F.2d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 1988); Crum v. Comm’r, 635 F.2d 895, 900–01 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (reversing tax court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction to give taxpayer “the opportunity, as provided by statute, to seek in the Tax Court a redetermination of the 1969 deficiency prior to payment upon the filing of a timely petition”). This makes sense because the Congressional in‐ tent of providing taxpayers a forum to resolve a disputed deficiency is met, and because the jurisdictional require‐ ment—a deficiency assessed by the IRS—must exist for the IRS to pursue any collection efforts, whether or not the tax‐ payer physically possesses the notice. Over time, this morphed into a practice by which taxpay‐ ers who wish to argue that the IRS never properly served notice of a deficiency will file a petition, then immediately move for dismissal of their own petition for lack of jurisdic‐ tion on the ground that a deficiency was not properly sent. See, e.g., Pyo v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 626, 631–32 (1984); Mulder v. Comm’r, 855 F.2d 208, 210–12 (5th Cir. 1988). Although call‐ ing this ground for dismissal “jurisdictional” is a misnomer, the logical underpinning is the same: The tax court is deter‐ mining whether the IRS has met statutory requirements to proceed with collection, but there isn’t a question of whether or not the jurisdictional hook exists (were there no deficien‐ cy, there would be nothing to collect). Buffano applied the analysis long used for cases in which a taxpayer challenges a notice of deficiency, but applied it to a case where the IRS had never issued a determination notice, without analyzing the significant differences between the No. 15‐2242 15 two grants of jurisdiction. Buffano, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 901, at –5. The tax court improperly transferred this longstanding practice to a new context without considering that under § 6330, absent a notice of determination concerning levy ac‐ tivities, the tax court has nothing to review. No circuit court has directly addressed the practice of in‐ validating a levy through a jurisdictional dismissal, although the D.C. Circuit recently remanded to the tax court for it to consider, among other arguments, whether it has jurisdic‐ tion over a claim identical to that in Buffano. Edwards v. Comm’r, 791 F.3d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The absence of rele‐ vant case law perhaps is not surprising, however, since the Commissioner chose not to appeal any adverse decision rest‐ ing on Buffano. Instead, the IRS’s Chief Counsel has advised the agency to maintain better mailing records than applica‐ ble regulations require because, “if [a] taxpayer alleges that he never received a CDP notice and the Service cannot prove that it mailed the notice by certified or registered mail, the [tax] court will dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that the CDP notice was invalid.” IRS Chief Counsel Advice 200842042, 2008 WL 4610126. The framework used in Buffano to scrutinize the IRS’s compliance with its statutory obligations does have equita‐ ble appeal; a taxpayer to whom the IRS fails to mail a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and, through no fault of her own, misses the 30‐day window to request a CDP hearing might otherwise be left without an opportunity to petition the tax court prior to seizure of her assets. This is the system de‐ vised by Congress, however, and at least one circuit decision has rejected an argument that the tax court must have juris‐ diction to address this apparent problem. In Boyd v. Commis‐ 16 No. 15‐2242 sioner, 451 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 2006), taxpayers argued that the IRS “negate[d] Congress’s grant of jurisdiction by withhold‐ ing the very process [a CDP hearing] that is designed to give taxpayers fair opportunity to challenge the agency’s deci‐ sion‐making.” In rejecting the argument that the tax court has equitable power to hear such claims despite the absence of a notice of determination, the court noted that an ag‐ grieved taxpayer unable to access the tax court has an alter‐ nate remedy: a refund suit in district court. Id. at 11. Trou‐ bling though this “remedy” may be, given the expense and potential delays inherent in such a suit, there is no lawful basis for expanding the tax court’s jurisdiction to resolve the perceived problem. Absent a notice of determination, the tax court simply has no lawful authority to hear a taxpayer’s claim under § 6330(d).