Opinion ID: 542873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Continued Use of Perjured Testimony

Text: 25 Smith also argues that given present knowledge of perjury, his conviction cannot be left undisturbed. Smith relies on Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218 (2d Cir.1988), which found that a state violates due process if it allows a conviction to stand after an eyewitness credibly recants material testimony. To be material, according to Sanders, perjured testimony must be of an extraordinary nature[,] ... leav[ing] the court with a firm belief that but for the perjured testimony, the defendant would most likely not have been convicted. Id. at 226. At its core, Sanders disputes the necessity of demonstrating prosecutorial involvement in or knowledge of the perjured testimony. Id. at 224-25. 26 As Sanders itself notes, its pronouncement differs from the rule adhered to in the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 222 n. 2 (citing United States v. Jones, 614 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945, 100 S.Ct. 2174, 64 L.Ed.2d 801 (1980)). Given the understanding of United States v. Agurs expressed above, this court's rule appears more consistent with the view taken by the Supreme Court, and Smith does not present an argument for its change.