Opinion ID: 353218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retroactive Bargaining Order.

Text: 26 We conclude that a retroactive bargaining order is inappropriate in this case. 27 The Board first adopted a policy of making bargaining orders effective retroactively in Trading Port, Inc., 219 NLRB No. 76, 89 LRRM 1565 (1975). In doing so, it expressly reversed the position, announced a year earlier in Steel-Fab, Inc., 212 NLRB No. 25, 86 LRRM 1474 (1974), that bargaining orders cannot be retroactive. In Trading Port, the Board reasoned that a prospective bargaining order failed to provide a complete remedy for the employer's unlawful conduct: 28 In some instances, this left unremedied an employer's unilateral changes in working conditions made after a union had established its majority status.    (Thus) the Board's prospective bargaining order fell short of reinstating the situation as it would have been had (the employer) obeyed the law and allowed a fair election to proceed. (219 NLRB at 301, 89 LRRM at 1569.) 29 An 8(a)(5) violation is a prerequisite to a retroactive bargaining order under the Trading Port doctrine. Only if an earlier duty to bargain existed and was violated may the Board impose a bargaining order retroactively. 30 We hold that the Trading Port doctrine should not be applied in the present case. Our conclusion rests on two grounds. 31 First, we have already rejected the Board's finding of an 8(a)(5) violation, which is a prerequisite for a retroactive bargaining order under Trading Port. 32 Second, the Board's retroactive application of Trading Port in the present case was unfair to the Company. 5 Both the hearing and crucial actions by the parties occurred prior to the Board's decision in Trading Port. On February 26, 1975, five months before Trading Port, the Union offered to withdraw the picket line and return the strikers to work on the condition that the strikers be reinstated. The Company, having hired replacements, rejected the offer. In doing so, the Company relied on Steel-Fab as assurance that even if the Board ultimately issued a bargaining order, the order would operate prospectively only. 6 The Board, however, applied the new Trading Port doctrine when it reached its decision two years later. The Board looked for and found both a prior duty to bargain and an 8(a)(5) violation; then, on the basis of the 8(a)(5) violation, it characterized the strike as an unfair labor practice strike. See section IV infra. Thus, the retroactive application of Trading Port resulted not only in a retroactive bargaining order, but also in an order to reinstate the strikers, whom the Board considered to be unfair labor practice strikers, and substantial backpay liability. It would be fair to assume that the Company, had it known of the possibility of these penalties, might have given the Union's offer greater consideration. At the time of the offer, however, the Company had no way of knowing that the Board would soon change its approach to these issues. 33 The Company relied on the Board's earlier decisions in taking this crucial action. To apply Trading Port retroactively in this case would be detrimental to the Company, while accomplishing none of the benefits contemplated in Trading Port. 34 We therefore conclude that the Board should have considered this case under the principles of Steel-Fab, not those of Trading Port, and that a retroactive bargaining order is improper. 35