Opinion ID: 3064026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Agent Williams’s Testimony

Text: Delatorre argues that the district court erred by permitting Williams to testify as an expert regarding matters outside the scope of her expertise. In particular, he takes issue with Williams’s testimony regarding the proper interpretation of language in the wiretapped conversations and notebooks, which she asserted were coded drug references. Delatorre notes that since Williams was not an expert in Mexican drug traffickers, she should not have been allowed to testify regarding the meaning of certain terms allegedly used by such individuals. The government’s 12 failure to provide someone involved in the conspiracy who could independently corroborate Williams’s interpretations, he asserts, effectively usurped the jury’s ability to evaluate accurately and fully the evidence. In addition, Delatorre contends that the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial value and thus should have been inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. We review a district court’s decisions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony and the reliability of expert opinions for abuse of discretion.2 See United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The Federal Rules of Evidence permit expert witnesses to testify about any form of “specialized knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” so long as they are “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. The testimony is admissible if it is “based upon sufficient facts or data” and “is the product of reliable principles and methods” that the witness has applied reliably to 2 The government contends that we should review for plain error Delatorre’s argument regarding the failure to present evidence to verify the accuracy of Williams’s opinions since he did not raise the argument before the district court. Though Delatorre did not mention this issue to the district court, we will treat it as a subpart of his general objection to the admission of Williams’s testimony, an argument he has preserved. We thus will apply the abuse of discretion standard to Delatorre’s entire allegation. Given that we find the district court did not abuse its discretion, there would also be no plain error, so the ultimate outcome would be the same regardless of which standard of review we applied. 13 the facts of the particular case. Id. If we find that the district court improperly allowed evidence to be introduced, we then look at whether the error would be harmless in light of the non-problematic evidence produced. See United States v. Carrazana, 921 F.2d 1557, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that, even if drug lingo testimony was excluded, there was ample evidence in record to support defendant’s drug conspiracy conviction). Drug enforcement agents can provide expert testimony regarding drug dealing operations because of their ability “to help a jury understand the significance of certain conduct or methods of operation unique to the drug distribution business.” United States v. Garcia, 447 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). For much the same reason, we have found that a district court’s admission of expert testimony of policemen interpreting drug codes, slang, and other jargon does not violate Rule 702. See id. Delatorre correctly notes, however, that the officers whom we previously have permitted to testify as experts regarding drug jargon appear to have been more well-versed in the particular drug trafficking schemes at issue than Williams was here. See, e.g., id. (Mexican drug trafficking case in which officer took part in over 50 drug investigations, the majority of which involved Mexican drug traffickers); Carrazana, 921 F.2d at 1567 (officer in Cuban drug case was “a native 14 Spanish speaker with an understanding of slang peculiar to the Cuban dialect ”). Nevertheless, we find that Williams’s knowledge of and expertise in dealing with drug trafficking schemes was sufficient experience to allow her to testify as an expert about matters relating to such organizations, including drug jargon. See Garcia, 447 F.3d at 1335 (noting that officer’s past involvement with drug investigations and familiarity “with the coded language that some drug trafficking organizations use” was sufficient to make him “an experienced narcotics agent”) (quotation marks omitted). Delatorre’s Rule 403 argument also fails. Evidence regarding coded drug language can be highly probative because of the often secretive nature of discussions involving drug dealers. See id. This probative value generally is sufficient to outweigh any potential prejudice, and we see no reason to view the value of Williams’s testimony any differently. See id. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Williams to testify about drug jargon based on her own experience, especially since the jury could take into account her expertise in that area. In addition, the government presented ample independent evidence concerning Delatorre’s involvement in the drug conspiracy. Any error in admitting expert witness testimony therefore would be harmless. 15