Opinion ID: 71120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Medical Vocational Guidelines

Text: We first address Wolfe's argument that, in the current application, the ALJ was compelled to find him disabled pursuant to grid rule 202.09 because he was approaching advanced age and illiterate. Wolfe also contends that, as of September 28, 1991, he was at advanced age and thus under grid rules 202.01 or 202.02, he would be considered disabled. The Secretary asserts that the ALJ correctly used grid rule 202.12 to conclude that Wolfe is not disabled. During the adjudicated period, Wolfe's age, as defined in the grids, ranged from closely approaching advanced age (54) to advanced age (56). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(c) & (d) (1995). The ALJ found that Wolfe functioned at a marginal educational level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(2) (1995). Finally, the ALJ concluded that Wolfe's prior relevant work at General Motors was semi-skilled with transferable skills. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(b) & (d) (1995). Wolfe claims that he is illiterate, rather than educated at a marginal or limited level as described in the three ALJ decisions. The regulations define illiteracy as the inability to read or write. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(1). We consider someone illiterate if the person cannot read or write a simple message such as instructions or inventory lists even though the person can sign his or her name. Generally, an illiterate person has had little or no formal schooling. Id. The record reflects that Wolfe had formal education through the seventh grade, but he testified that he could neither read nor write, although he could count and make change. At the second hearing, a vocational expert testified that Wolfe read at below the third grade level. The vocational expert's report indicated that Wolfe could read a total of five words that were at approximately the first grade level. Wolfe's own vocational expert reported that Wolfe is functionally illiterate in regard to reading and spelling and is only able to do basic adding, subtracting, and multiplying. R2-16-539.4 4 The third ALJ rejected Wolfe's vocational expert's report as not credible because (among other reasons unrelated to Wolfe's educational level) the vocational expert terms the claimant as functionally illiterate,' a term of art which is not specifically correct in terms of the claimant's at least marginal reading and spelling at the second grade level and math at the fifth grade level as defined under existing regulations. (20 CFR Both the first and second ALJs concluded that Wolfe had a limited education. In 1992, the third ALJ found that the two prior determinations that Wolfe functioned at the limited level were erroneous. Instead, the ALJ concluded that Wolfe functioned at the marginal level. Marginal education means ability in reasoning, arithmetic, and language skills which are needed to do simple, unskilled types of jobs. We generally consider that formal schooling at a 6th grade level or less is a marginal education. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(2). We do not find substantial evidence to support the third ALJ's conclusion that Wolfe possesses a marginal education. Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla, i.e., evidence that must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established, and such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir.1995) (citation omitted). We should not reweigh the evidence nor should we substitute our discretion for that of the ALJ. See id.; Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir.1992). The only specific evidence of Wolfe's reading level came from the vocational expert, who testified that Wolfe could read only five first grade words. This is not substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that Wolfe has a reading and spelling level tested just below third grade level or in a second grade level of functioning. R2-16-35. Furthermore, a determination that Wolfe has a second grade educational level does little to shed light on whether he can read and write a simple message. 404.1563). R2-16-45. We find no cases in this circuit that address the issue of educational level in a case such as this one. We turn, therefore, to other circuits that have faced this issue. When examining the difference between the definitions of marginal education and illiteracy in the regulations, the Seventh Circuit noted: These definitions are helpful, but they do not (and perhaps in the nature of things could not) establish clear rules over the whole range of potential disputes, such that once the facts are found the legal outcome can be obtained by a mechanical application of the rules. The regulations make clear that being able to sign your name doesn't make you literate and that you can be illiterate even if you have had a significant amount of formal schooling (it may not have taken). Beyond that, the picture dims. Glenn v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 814 F.2d 387, 390 (7th Cir.1987). In Skinner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 902 F.2d 447, 449 (6th Cir.1990), the claimant was given a Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT), the same test given to Wolfe by the vocational expert. Skinner's test results placed his reading level at below the third grade. Id. The vocational expert in Skinner testified that a person who reads and writes on the third grade level is functionally illiterate. Id. Nevertheless, the Secretary concluded that Skinner possessed a marginal education. Id. at 448. A magistrate judge found that the ALJ's determination was wrong and that Skinner was illiterate, but the district court rejected that magistrate judge's report and recommendation finding that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding. Id. The Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the record was replete with evidence that Mr. Skinner is illiterate. Id. at 450. In Dixon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 506, 509-10 (10th Cir.1987), the court reversed the district court's affirmation of the Secretary's denial of benefits finding that the record did not provide substantial evidence of the claimant's literacy. The court defined substantial evidence as more than a mere scintilla,' but less than a preponderance, and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'  Id. at 510 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)). The court then analyzed the faults in the ALJ's reasoning as follows: The ALJ's apparent reliance on Dixon's marginal education to establish her literacy is misplaced. Although Dixon reported six or possibly seven years of formal schooling, the Secretary's regulation provides for use of numerical grade level to determine educational abilities only if there is no other evidence to contradict it. Especially when many years have passed since completion of formal education, as in Dixon's case, the numerical grade level ... completed in school may not represent actual educational abilities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b). Id. at 510. We overturn the district court's finding that the ALJ's determination that Wolfe is marginally educated is supported by substantial evidence. This does not mean that we find substantial evidence to support a classification of Wolfe as illiterate. We simply find that this record is lacking in evidence to support any classification of Wolfe's educational level. We find it necessary, therefore, to remand this case for further findings of fact on whether or not Wolfe is illiterate. In the alternative, Wolfe argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the ALJ's determination that there are jobs in the national economy that he can perform. Wolfe claims the ALJ erred in not making specific findings on whether his nonexertional limitations, namely pain, weakness, and illiteracy, preclude a finding that Wolfe is not disabled. Wolfe also claims that the third ALJ circumvented the grid rules, which, he argues, would dictate a finding that he is disabled, by calling on a vocational expert to identify jobs that Wolfe still could perform.5 When the Secretary determines that a claimant is unable to return to his past work, the burden is on the Secretary to show that there is other work in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir.1985). The ALJ must take into account the claimant's age, education, and previous work experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1991 & Supp.1995). The ALJ should not rely exclusively on the grids when the claimant has a nonexertional impairment that significantly limits his basic work skills or the claimant cannot perform a full range of employment at the appropriate level of exertion. Francis, 749 F.2d at 1566. If nonexertional impairments exist, the ALJ may use the grids as a framework to evaluate vocational factors, but also must introduce independent evidence, preferably through a vocational expert's testimony, of the existence of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Welch v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 436, 439-40 (11th Cir.1988) (per curiam). Wolfe's argument that his illiteracy was a nonexertional impairment that the ALJ failed to consider is without merit because 5 A nonexertional impairment is one that significantly impairs the claimant's ability to meet the demands of a job other than the strength demands. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569a(a) & (c). illiteracy is not a nonexertional impairment. Examples of nonexertional mental impairments include difficulty maintaining attention or concentrating, and difficulty understanding or remembering detailed instructions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(c)(ii) & (iii). Wolfe cites Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200 (11th Cir.1989), in support of his proposition that illiteracy is a nonexertional impairment, but that case involved a claimant who was borderline mentally retarded. While mental retardation is considered a nonexertional impairment, the record clearly indicates that Wolfe functions within the I.Q. range of a person of average intelligence and is not mentally retarded. There is nothing in the regulations or case law to indicate that illiteracy, in and of itself, should be considered a nonexertional impairment. Wolfe also claims that the ALJ did not consider properly his pain and suffering as a nonexertional impairment. There is evidence in the record that Wolfe testified about his back and chest pains at the 1992 hearing. R2-16-110, 117, 119. The ALJ discredited this testimony, however, based on the fact that evidence existed that Wolfe had lifted rocks and had an ongoing advocation [sic] of mobile home washing during the adjudicated period. R2-16-40. The ALJ also noted that Wolfe's course of treatment for his spinal, heart and thyroid conditions during the period in issue were entirely conservative in nature. R2-16-41. We find that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision to discredit Wolfe's testimony regarding nonexertional impairments. This court has recognized that the grids may be used in lieu of vocational testimony on specific jobs if none of the claimant's nonexertional impairments are so severe as to prevent a full range of employment at the designated level. Passopulos v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 642, 648 (11th Cir.1992). The ALJ found no credible evidence of nonexertional limitations suffered by Wolfe. Therefore, the ALJ was under no obligation to use vocational expert testimony to supplement the grids to determine if Wolfe was disabled.