Opinion ID: 2608751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Hearing Officer's Failure to Exercise His Discretion in Weighing the Evidence Requires Reversal for Future Administrative Hearing

Text: Plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate required the trial court to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subds. (b), (c).) The court adopted the Commissioner's findings of fact and conclusions of law. [8] These findings were that (1) Arneson was a real estate broker, (2) he was convicted of conspiracy in the federal court on his plea of nolo contendere, and (3) conspiracy was a felony and a crime involving moral turpitude, and the crime was substantially related to the qualifications, duties, and functions of a real estate licensee within the meaning of section 490. The findings also stated by way of mitigation, aggravation or explanation Arneson was a willing instrument of the officers of the corporation [U.S. Financial] who made its policies and directed its affairs. The administrative hearing was brief. The Commissioner, subject to examining Arneson, rested his case after he introduced the indictment, Arneson's nolo plea, and the conviction. Counsel for Arneson made an opening statement to satisfy the dual purpose of furnishing the hearing officer an overview of the facts plus introducing evidence in narrative form of Arneson's limited involvement in U.S. Financial's affairs. Arneson's direct testimony confirmed and buttressed his counsel's explanation and furnished additional information relating to his proper handling and accounting for millions of dollars of real property and cash. The confusion as to the evidentiary significance of the conviction based on the nolo plea is apparent from the record. At different times, the hearing officer said: The conviction points in one direction. It points towards guilty. You have painted a picture here that points in the exact opposite direction, and Based on what you tell me, no aiding or abetting took place, at least none of a criminal nature, and [Y]ou haven't said anything that would indicate that the respondent was implicated in any of these transactions, and if he was not, why was a plea of nolo contendere entered? When Arneson tried to respond to these inquiries by introducing a written explanation as to why he had pleaded nolo, the evidence was rejected as irrelevant. During cross-examination when counsel for the Commissioner was trying to probe into the underlying facts set out in the indictment to deal with Arneson's theory of defense, the hearing officer declined to recess to permit Arneson to review the indictment, stating: I think we have spent more time than we should on this case. It's now ten after three. We've been going since 1:30. I don't know how much further we're going to go, and I would like to wind it up as soon as possible. When reminded that the time estimate was two to three hours, the hearing officer said: Listening to the evidence here at this time, it seems to me it's a substantial overestimate. On another occasion when asked to recess so he might look at the indictment, he commented: No, counsel, I'm not going to do that at this time. We have spent two hours, and I'm not going to sit down and go through the indictment. I'm going to confine your questions to the area that is relevant at this point. The comments made by the hearing officer, his rejection of the explanation underlying Arneson's nolo plea, and his statement that a two-hour hearing was an excessive time estimate to resolve the factual questions presented in the indictment all point to the hearing officer's determination that nothing further was required as a basis for imposition of discipline other than the nolo plea and the conviction based on the plea. The Attorney General in this appeal makes the same argument. The finding that Arneson was a willing instrument of the officers of U.S. Financial was drawn only by inference from the conviction and was treated as a conclusive presumption, for no other evidence was presented on this question. We conclude in the exercise of discretion, not only must the hearing officer decide the weight to be given to a conviction ( Arenstein v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, supra, 265 Cal. App.2d 179, 190), but where the conviction is based on a plea of nolo contendere, he must decide whether the underlying acts constituting the crime were actually committed. In those cases where a licensee asserts his innocence after a prima facie case against him has been made, he is entitled to a full hearing to guarantee him the panoply of legal protection to which he is entitled in protecting his right to practice his profession. ( Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 75 [64 Cal. Rptr. 785, 435 P.2d 553].) Due process are more than buzz words. To be meaningful they must be energized from the theoretical to the practical through well-prepared lawyers and patient triers of fact. Where, as here, the Commissioner failed to exercise his discretion in the manner required by law, Arneson is entitled to a new hearing.