Opinion ID: 2548141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Remedy for Batson violation

Text: We further find the trial court erred in formulating a remedy for the alleged Batson violation. In addition to reseating those jurors for whom the court rejected defendants' race-neutral reasons, the court ruled that those peremptory challenges would not be restored to defendants. Moreover, the court ordered that no party would be permitted to strike any of the re-seated jurors. While we find no error in the trial court's decision to reseat prospective jurors accompanied by peremptory forfeiture, we hold the trial court erred in refusing to allow each defendant to use his remaining peremptory strikes on jurors who were re-seated to remedy discriminatory acts by his co-defendant's attorney. The Court in Batson did not prescribe a particular remedy if discrimination is found, but left it to the state and federal courts to fashion their own remedy: In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how best to implement our holding today. For the same reason, we express no view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding of discrimination against black jurors, for the trial court to discharge the venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with the case or to disallow the discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n. 24, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (internal citations omitted). Nationally, courts have formulated various remedies for a Batson violation, including recalling excused jurors, dismissing the entire venire, or granting a mistrial. [12] Further, it appears that a majority of courts have delegated to the discretion of the trial court the determination of the appropriate remedy. [13] In some cases, courts have found the more reasonable approach is to reseat improperly struck jurors and proceed with jury selection. [14] The rationale behind this approach is that quashing the entire venire does not correct the Batson violation because while the parties are able to select from a new venire, the excluded jurors have still been subjected to discrimination.. . . Second, judicial resources are conserved by not having to go though the time and expense of selecting an entirely new venire. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo.1992). However, other courts have required the discharge of the entire venire whenever a Batson violation has been found. This remedy is generally premised on concerns that arise when reinstated jurors have been tainted by the Batson inquiry. [15] To codify and implement Batson in Louisiana, the legislature enacted La. C. Cr. P. art. 795. This article gives broad discretion to the trial court to formulate corrective action to remedy a Batson violation. Specifically, the article provides that [t]hose jurors who have been peremptorily challenged and for whom no satisfactory racially neutral or gender neutral reason is apparent or given may be ordered returned to the panel, or the court may take such other corrective action as it deems appropriate under the circumstances. La. C. Cr. P. art. 795(E). We find the trial court's decision to reseat the improperly challenged jurors authorized by Article 795 and consistent with national jurisprudence. We are mindful of the risk that an excused juror may be exposed to prohibited outside influences prior to being recalled. However, we find this potential problem can be handled without requiring dismissal of the entire venire. Here, juror Angela Maher was questioned by the court after being recalled, and admitted to reading a newspaper article about the case. After full examination, the court dismissed her for cause. Thus, we find no error in the trial court's decision to reseat the jurors. This Court has not previously addressed the issue of whether the associated peremptory strikes should be forfeited after these jurors are re-seated. Our examination of national jurisprudence reveals that some courts have found it appropriate to grant replacement strikes to the striking party. [16] Other courts have refused to grant new peremptory strikes, finding that doing so would reward offending conduct by the striking party. Discussion of the appropriateness of forfeiting misused strikes is generally conducted in terms of punishment and deterrence. [17] After considering the authority given to the trial court pursuant to Article 795 and reviewing relevant national jurisprudence, we hold that forfeiture is a permissible remedy within the discretion of the trial court, and consistent with Batson and its progeny. In People v. Luciano, 10 N.Y.3d 499, 860 N.Y.S.2d 452, 890 N.E.2d 214 (N.Y.2008), the court implied that requiring a litigant to forfeit improperly exercised challenges is consistent with the Batson inquiry and within the district court's broad discretion when necessary to punish sufficiently egregious misconduct. The court explained: In holding that forfeiture is a permissible remedy, we note that the free exercise of peremptory challenges is a venerable trial tool that should be denied only in rare circumstances. In fashioning the proper remedy, a trial judge may consider, among other factors, whether the challenged juror is available to be re-seated, whether the litigant appears to be engaging in a pattern of discrimination, and the number of peremptory challenges that remain to be exercised. While even a single instance of discriminatory conduct may warrant forfeiture, where the finding of discrimination is close, forfeiture may not be an appropriate remedy. Luciano, 860 N.Y.S.2d 452, 890 N.E.2d at 219. Similarly, we hold that forfeiture of peremptory challenges is an acceptable remedy in some cases. The purpose of the Batson rule is to eliminate discrimination. To forbid forfeiture as a remedy offers no deterrent effect for using discriminatory challenges. Although we find the first two parts of the trial court's remedy to be acceptable and within its discretion, we find the trial court legally erred to the extent it ordered that no party could thereafter strike a re-seated juror. We find no support in the law for the trial court's action. The trial court clearly grappled with the ramifications of a reverse- Batson challenge lodged against co-defendants who were represented by different counsel. Underlying the court's choice of remedy was the fact that defendants collaborated in exercising their peremptory challenges. Defendants complained they were being penalized for the collaboration, even though they did not collaborate to avoid Batson. In reviewing the trial court's ruling, the court of appeal mischaracterized the collaboration of defendants. The court opined there was no reason for the judge to allow Defendants a second opportunity to peremptorily challenge the re-seated jurors. . . because of the judge's finding that Defendants had already excluded these jurors primarily because of their race. Nelson, 41 So.3d at 657. However, the court ignored the fact that each defendant was represented by separate counsel and that the race-neutral reason offered for each challenged white juror was offered only by the defendant who lodged the challenge. The record reflects that defendants collaborated only to the extent necessary to avoid duplication of peremptory challenges. [18] Although defendants collaborated on peremptory challenges to avoid duplication, punishing one co-defendant for misconduct attributed to the other is a consequence disconnected from the racially-motivated behavior and therefore of little value as a deterrent or punishment. Moreover, the trial court's restriction prohibiting either defendant from lodging a peremptory challenge against a re-seated juror originally excused by his co-defendant is not supported by law. The Louisiana Constitution grants to criminal defendants the right to challenge jurors peremptorily. La. Const. art. 1, § 17. [19] This Court has long held that so well established and protected is the right to peremptory challenges by our constitution and laws, it cannot be denied unless the accused voluntarily chooses not to avail himself thereof. It has been called an absolute right. State v. Sevin, 243 La. 1023, 150 So.2d 1, 3 (1963). In cases involving co-defendants, each defendant has a statutory right to twelve peremptory challenges. La. C. Cr. P. art. 799. [20] In turn, the State is provided with twelve peremptory challenges for each defendant. Id. Thus, by law, both Nelson and Goldman each had use of twelve peremptory challenges. And, while the defendants collaborated on those peremptory challenges to prevent duplication, they were entitled to, and did, exercise their challenges individually. Counsel for each defendant provided his own individualized reasons for exercising his peremptory challenges. If counsel for one defendant is found to have improperly struck a prospective juror on the basis of race, the trial court cannot assume that counsel for the other defendant did, or would do, the same. The co-defendant may have a different and valid reason for exercising a peremptory challenge on the same juror. Because Batson requires a finding of purposeful discrimination, it necessarily requires an individualized determination of the motivation and intent of the particular party exercising the peremptory strike. See, Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859; Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The sole focus of the Batson inquiry is the intent of the proponent at the time he exercised his peremptory strikes. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Treating defendants as one entity for purposes of Batson allowed the trial court to improperly impute one defendant's motives for striking a juror onto the other defendant. The trial court's decision to regard defendants as a single entity and not allow either one to use his remaining peremptory challenges on any of the re-seated jurors, regardless of who exercised the challenge initially, violated each defendant's constitutional and statutory right to use his peremptory challenges. See, La. Const. art. 1 § 17; La. C. Cr. P. art. 799.1. [21] This court has held that an erroneous ruling of the court which deprives a defendant of one of his peremptory challenges is a substantial violation of his constitutional right to a fair trial and requires reversal. Sevin, 150 So.2d at 3; see also, State v. Ross, 623 So.2d 643, 644 (La.1993). The practical effect of the trial court's ruling was to deny defendants use of their available peremptory challenges. Thus, we find the court of appeal erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to allow the defendant who had not exercised the strike an opportunity peremptorily challenge the re-seated jurors.