Opinion ID: 1450682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Role of Appointed Counsel

Text: Appellant also asserts the trial court erred by failing to allow him complete control of his defense and co-counsel. Appellant initially complained about the services of his appointed counsel in a letter to the trial court dated May 31, 2006, wherein he informed the court that he had instructed one of his attorneys to withdraw because he had tried to deal with her and had no success. He stated that his decision was based on a conversation with a receptionist at the Department for Public Advocacy (hereinafter DPA), during which he was told that his attorney was not available to speak with him. The trial court set a hearing for July 28, 2006, to address Appellant's motions and letters. During that hearing, Appellant spoke to the trial court at length about his abilities, his limitations, and his problems with counsel. Appellant argued that his primary concern was that he had a list of people that he needed to locate but that his attorneys did not want to locate them; [4] that he really wanted the trial court to appoint a particular attorney, which DPA had previously transferred to Kenton County; that he was mad that a receptionist had been rude to him and therefore he now refused to call his attorney's office. Appellant stated that he wanted an attorney who would raise the points Appellant felt were important to his defense, and that he may or may not want to be the ultimate decision maker. The trial court did not enter a finding but, instead, asked Appellant to share his feelings with his counsel and to trust his attorneys because they were excellent attorneys. Later, the Commonwealth requested an evaluation by Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (hereinafter KCPC) due to increasing concerns about Appellant's competency. Appellant's co-counsel agreed that a competency hearing was needed and stated that he had doubts concerning Appellant's competency, including his competency to assist counsel or to put on any defense pro se. Following an order requiring Appellant to undergo a competency evaluation, the trial court set a competency hearing for May 3, 2007. During the competency hearing, the KCPC psychiatrist, Dr. Timothy Allen, reported that Appellant's ability to process and analyze information was slow, but that he possessed average intellectual functioning, with a 107 verbal IQ, 110 overall, and appeared to have a good memory. Testimony also revealed that Appellant, as a result of a stroke in 1995, was literally missing the center two-thirds (2/3) of the right side of his brain. The two-thirds of the right side of Appellant's brain, which controls memory, emotion, speech, artistic expression, free thinking, the rhythm and tone of speech, and, according to some scientists, the ability to tell the truth, had seemingly died and had been reabsorbed and replaced by fluid. The left side of Appellant's brain, responsible for cognitive functions, problem solving, understanding, and word recognition, was unharmed and capable of performing its assigned tasks virtually unimpaired. Further, the psychiatrist discounted Appellant's claimed inability to recall events prior to the 1995 stroke, stating there was no evidence of memory dysfunction for current events. Dr. Allen said Appellant knew his own case in exhaustive detail, could describe specific statutes and rules of law, knew what evidence should not be admitted, knew about the jury process, and all functional aspects of his defense. He stated Appellant had no difficulty staying on task, no problem being decisive, and no problem focusing. He stated that Appellant, however, suffered from cognitive dysfunction (NOS), and processes information more slowly than an average person, but also stated that he was able to have a very complex conversation with Appellant. Thereafter, the trial court found Appellant competent to stand trial. Given the information from KCPC, the trial court held a second hearing on May 15, 2007, to address Appellant's complaints regarding his attorneys. In its order, the trial court found Appellant was not entitled to appointed counsel of his own selection, and that he had a long history of complaining about his attorneys, both past and present. Further, the trial court found the testimony of Dr. Allen of KCPC confirmed what the trial court had already observed (and what Appellant admitted), that Appellant had great difficulty processing information in circumstances that required quick action. Given Appellant's limitations, the trial court found that Appellant's competency to act as his own representative at trial was limited. It also determined that Appellant could conduct direct examinations because he could prepare his questions ahead of time, but other trial functions required Appellant to quickly analyze and respond to information, and Appellant lacked that ability. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by not informing him of the role he had a right to play in his defense, i.e., lead counsel. Appellant claims that by not specifically telling Appellant that he had a right to set trial strategy, direct the investigation, and set the theory of the defense, that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial. We disagree. The United States Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant has a constitutionally protected right to present his own defense in addition to a constitutionally protected right to be represented by counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-34, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). However, axiomatically, by electing to exercise one's constitutional right to present one's own defense, a defendant necessarily waives their constitutional right to be represented by counsel. United States v. Mosely, 810 F.2d 93, 97 (6th Cir.1987) ( quoting United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 908 (6th Cir.1970)) (The right to defend pro se and the right to counsel have been aptly described as `two faces of the same coin,' in that waiver of one right constitutes a correlative assertion of the other.) Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution also recognizes the ability of a defendant to proceed without counsel. Ky. Const. § 11 (In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel.). Further, Section 11 serves as the basis of the right to hybrid counsel, or the right to be heard by himself and counsel. See Ky. Const. § 11. Thus, in Kentucky, unlike in federal courts, an accused may make a limited waiver of counsel, specifying the extent of services he desires, and he then is entitled to counsel whose duty will be confined to rendering the specified kind of services (within, of course, the normal scope of counsel services). Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Ky.1974). In Wake, we held that, upon an unequivocal request to appear pro se or an unequivocal request to limit the role of appointed counsel, the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine that any such waiver is made knowingly and intelligently. 514 S.W.2d at 697. This comports with the requirements and protections afforded in Faretta . However, the protections of Faretta and Wake are only triggered if the requests are unequivocal and timely made. See Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 857 (Ky.2004). A waiver of counsel by a borderline-competent pro se defendant, adds, however, additional difficulties to an already complex clash of fundamental constitutional rights, i.e., the right to self-representation, the right to be represented by counsel, and the right to a fair trial. It is well-settled that a criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent and he may not waive his right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so competently and intelligently. In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) ( per curiam ), we held that the standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (internal citation omitted). Upon a finding of competence to stand trial, a criminal defendant is deemed to be competent enough to choose to waive any of his constitutional rights. This is so because: [a] defendant who stands trial is likely to be presented with choices that entail relinquishment of the same rights that are relinquished by a defendant who pleads guilty: He will ordinarily have to decide whether to waive his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), by taking the witness stand; if the option is available, he may have to decide whether to waive his right to trial by jury, id.; and, in consultation with counsel, he may have to decide whether to waive his right to confront [his] accusers, id., by declining to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution. A defendant who pleads not guilty, moreover, faces still other strategic choices: In consultation with his attorney, he may be called upon to decide, among other things, whether (and how) to put on a defense and whether to raise one or more affirmative defenses. In sum, all criminal defendants  not merely those who plead guilty  may be required to make important decisions once criminal proceedings have been initiated. And while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a profound one, it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial. (The decision to plead guilty is also made over a shorter period of time, without the distraction and burden of a trial.) This being so, we can conceive of no basis for demanding a higher level of competence for those defendants who choose to plead guilty. If the Dusky standard is adequate for defendants who plead not guilty, it is necessarily adequate for those who plead guilty. Id. at 398-399, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (emphasis in original). Thus, since there is no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights, a Dusky finding of competence to stand trial entails a finding of competence to exercise or waive any other constitutional right. Id. at 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680. Yet, when weighing competence against the right to counsel or self-representation under the Godinez standard, [w]e must keep in mind that our inquiry is whether [the defendant] competently waived his right, not whether he was competent to represent himself. Commonwealth v. Berry, 184 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Ky.2005) (internal citations omitted); see also Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156 (Ky. 2007). Indiana v. Edwards, ___ U.S. ____, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), recently decided, now squarely addresses this interplay between competence and the right to self-representation when a borderline competent defendant seeks to defend himself at trial. [5] Like here, Edwards involved a borderline-competent defendant who sought to assert his right of self-representation on retrial, yet the trial court denied his request. The defendant then went to trial with the assistance of his appointed counsel and was convicted. He appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court, which found that Faretta and Godinez required the state to allow Edwards to represent himself. The United States Supreme Court then accepted certiorari. The Court, in Edwards , defined the issue as a a mental-illness-related limitation on the scope of the self-representation right. ___ U.S. ____, 128 S.Ct. at 2384. The Court then distinguished Faretta , stating it does not answer the question before us both because it did not consider the problem of mental competency ( cf. 422 U.S., at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 ( Faretta was literate, competent, and understanding')), and because Faretta itself and later cases have made clear that the right of self-representation is not absolute. Edwards, ___ U.S. at ____, 128 S.Ct. at 2384. Here, as in Edwards , the borderline competent defendant sought to control his own trial proceedings raising additional considerations beyond the scope of Godinez or Chapman . Moreover,  Godinez involved a State that sought to permit a gray-area defendant to represent himself. Godinez 's constitutional holding is that a State may do so. But that holding simply does not tell a State whether it may deny a gray-area defendant the right to represent himself. Edwards, ___ U.S. at ____, 128 S.Ct. at 2385 (emphasis in original). To address the gray area, balancing competency with the right to self-representation, the Court in Edwards noted that the seminal mental competency cases, Dusky and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), focus directly upon the borderline defendant's present ability to consult with his lawyer, Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, a capacity ... to consult with counsel, and ability to assist counsel in preparing his defense. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171, 95 S.Ct. 896. (It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial Id. (emphasis added)). Thus, Dusky and Drope assume representation by counsel and emphasize its importance. In addition, the foundational self-representation case, Faretta , bases its analysis in part on pre-existing state law cases which are consistent with, or adopt, a competency limitation on the right of self-representation. See 422 U.S. at 813, and n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 2525, (citing sixteen (16) state-court decisions and two secondary sources); e.g., Cappetta v. State, 204 So.2d 913, 917-918 (Fla.App.1967), rev'd on other grounds, 216 So.2d 749 (Fla.1968) (assuring a mentally competent defendant the right to conduct his own defense provided that no unusual circumstances exist such as, e.g., mental derangement that would ... depriv[e] the defendant of a fair trial if allowed to conduct his own defense, 204 So.2d, at 917-918); id., at 918 (noting that whether unusual circumstances are evident is a matter resting in the sound discretion granted to the trial judge); Allen v. Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 558, 87 N.E.2d 192, 195 (1949) (noting the assignment of counsel was necessary where there was some special circumstance such as when the criminal defendant was mentally defective). Drawing on such precedent, Edwards also notes that sometimes an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky 's mental competence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel. Edwards, ___ U.S. at ____, 128 S.Ct. at 2386. Therefore, allowing such a defendant to try his own case would not affirm the dignity of a borderline competent defendant. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-177, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (Dignity and autonomy of individual underlie self-representation right). Moreover, the proceedings must not only be fair, they must `appear fair to all who observe them.' Edwards, ___ U.S. ____, 128 S.Ct. at 2386 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)). While application of Dusky 's basic mental competence standard can help in part to avoid an unfair result, given the different capacities needed to proceed to trial without counsel, there is little reason to believe that Dusky alone is sufficient. See Dean v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 900, 908 (Ky.1989) (overruled on other grounds by Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky.2003)) (Even if a defendant is found competent to stand trial, he may not be capable of making an intelligent decision about his defense.) Thus, the trial judge, particularly one such as the trial judge in this case, who presided over ... [Appellant's] competency hearings and his two trials, will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant. Id. In conclusion, Edwards found that: the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant's mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so. That is to say, the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. ___ U.S. ____, 128 S.Ct. at 2387-2388. Edwards thus recognizes a trial judge's right to take a realistic account of a particular defendant's mental capacities and to create an individualized representation specifically tailored to a defendant's abilities; a just mix designed to assure defendants, such as Appellant, a fair trial. In the case-at-bar, the trial court addressed the considerations raised in Edwards . [6] Several hearings were held and Appellant was found competent to stand trial with the assistance of counsel under the Dusky standard. As a result of his competence, Appellant was entitled to assert his right to self-representation, thereby waiving his right to counsel, or, in the alternative, to assert his right to hybrid counsel, dictating the extent of counsel's involvement pursuant to Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. After Appellant's assertion, [7] however, because of his borderline competency, the trial court had the right to deny the Appellant the right to proceed pro se and to structure the role and scope of hybrid counsel employed in this instance. This is consistent with our previous pronouncements in Dean, 777 S.W.2d at 908, and Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 412, 418 (Ky.1994) (For, even if a defendant is found competent to stand trial, he may not be capable of making an intelligent decision about his defense.) Moreover, in its May 15, 2007, order, the trial court properly included (as it should in these instances) an extensive explanation of its reasoning as to what sort of representation Appellant was capable of and/or needed. Amongst its findings: [Appellant] is not competent to completely participate in trial. While [he] has the ability to research and write when under no time constraints he does not have the ability to process information quickly enough to participate meaningfully in a Court of Law. To allow [Appellant] to try his own case would in effect mean that he will not receive a fair trial. Therefore, Major is specifically not competent to voir dire a jury, to make opening or closing statements or cross-examine witnesses. He is competent to directly examine witnesses provided he has prepared written questions to read from. If a trial were conducted by written questions [Appellant] could adequately perform. Unfortunately for [Appellant], his disabilities will not allow him to competently participate in the way our justice system has dictated that trials are to be conducted. He is intelligent enough to make a determination as to whether to take the stand as a witness but it is the intention of the Court to conduct an in camera hearing if [Appellant] chooses such a course of action to assure Faretta safeguards are met. Thus, in the present instance, there were compelling reasons weighing against full dismissal of Appellant's counsel, namely to safeguard against Appellant's demonstrated mental limitations. Thus, Appellant was properly precluded from appearing pro se during those phases of the trial as affected, but, nonetheless, was allowed to represent himself in those phases of the trial not so precluded, a right he left largely unexercised. Therefore, considering the extensive efforts put forth by the trial court to protect Appellant's rights to proceed pro se and by hybrid co-counsel, as well as his right to a fair trial, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's actions in this regard and thus, no error.