Opinion ID: 746516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bowen's contract claim

Text: 21 To date, Feres and its progeny have been applied only to claims sounding in tort or to assertions of constitutional wrongs. Accordingly, the Feres doctrine does not resolve the propriety of the district court's dismissal of Bowen's breach of contract claim. We conclude that the district court's action was correct because Bowen's claim is nonjusticiable. 22 In Mier v. Owens, we refused to entertain the Title VII claim of a National Guardsman due to the fact that the discriminatory personnel actions [alleged by the Guardsman] are integrally related to the military's unique structure. 57 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1103, 116 S.Ct. 1317, 134 L.Ed.2d 470 (1996). We noted that challenges to discharge by the Guard ... are nonjusticiable because judicial review 'would seriously impede the military in performance of its vital duties.'  Id. (quoting Christoffersen v. Washington State Air Nat'l Guard, 855 F.2d 1437, 1444 (9th Cir.1988)); see also Sebra v. Neville, 801 F.2d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir.1986) (courts are properly wary of intruding upon military transfer decisions). 23 In Mier, we recognized that personnel actions are not always integrally related to the military's unique structure. Mier, 57 F.3d at 750. For example, a Title VII claim challenging the refusal to allow a female civilian employee to embark on a Naval aircraft carrier was held to be justiciable in Bledsoe v. Webb, 839 F.2d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir.1988). We held in Bledsoe that the claim was justiciable because the plaintiff was a civilian employee and the challenged conduct did not implicate a military policy. We specifically distinguished the conduct involved in Bledsoe from inherently military determinations such as termination decisions. See id. 24 Unlike the Title VII claim in Bledsoe, the termination decision challenged by Bowen does implicate inherently military concerns. Thus, Mier and the cases upon which it relies dictate that Bowen's breach of contract claim--which is at heart an objection to the military's decision to discharge him from the AGR program--is nonjusticiable. Therefore, the district court's decision to dismiss this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was correct.