Opinion ID: 2600609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Unconstitutionality of the Murder by Torture and Torture Special Circumstance Instructions

Text: As noted, the court instructed with CALJIC No. 8.24, the first degree murder by torture instruction and CALJIC No. 8.81.18, the torture special circumstance instruction, both of which use the word extreme and the phrase for any sadistic purpose. Defendant contends this language renders these instructions unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We have previously rejected such claims and do so again here. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 455; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 898-902 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712].)

As recounted above (see ante, at pp. 211-212), at the guilt phase, the trial court admitted the prosecution's photographs of the victim's fatal injuries. At the penalty phase, defense counsel urged the court not to allow the prosecutor to use these photographs, contending the photographs had no probative value at the penalty phase. The prosecutor responded that the photographs were part of the circumstances of the offense and thus were relevant to aggravation, and he indicated his intention to present one or two photographs during his closing argument. The trial court ruled the photographs admitted at the guilt phase were admissible at the penalty phase. During his penalty phase summation, the prosecutor showed the jury two of the photographs and briefly referred to them as part of his argument for imposing the death penalty. As an extension of his claim that the photographs were improperly admitted at the guilt phase, defendant contends they were also improperly admitted at the penalty phase. As we have concluded with respect to the photographs admitted at the guilt phase, we also conclude there was no error at the penalty phase. Because the photographs depicted the circumstances of the offense and were relevant to aggravation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs.
Defendant contends the trial court erred at the penalty phase in admitting evidence of defendant's act of violence against his niece because it did not conduct a proper hearing pursuant to People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29 [222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423]. As we explain, we conclude the trial conducted a proper Phillips hearing, and properly admitted the evidence.
As discussed above (see ante, at pp. 209-211), at the guilt phase, the prosecution cross-examined defendant about the incident in which he had physically abused his niece, Kayla, by breaking her leg. At the penalty phase, pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b), the prosecutor sought to introduce evidence of this incident by calling Dr. Mark Shallit, one of the doctors who had treated Kayla when she was brought to the emergency room on December 13, 1987. Defense counsel objected to the admission of this evidence and requested that the court hold a hearing pursuant to People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d 29, at which the prosecution would be required to prove there was sufficient evidence of the crime to permit its admission. The trial court held a Phillips hearing. Dr. Shallit testified that, although he had no recollection of the incident, based upon his records from that day, his opinion was that Kayla's femur had been deliberately broken. Following Dr. Shallit's testimony, the defense sought to introduce the testimony of Robert Sandoval, the child protective services (CPS) social worker who investigated the incident and decided not to file charges against defendant. He had been subpoenaed by the defense, but CPS officials refused to let him testify, citing confidentiality rules. The defense asked for a continuance of two days to sort through the confidentiality concerns and secure Sandoval's testimony at the hearing. The trial court denied the request for continuance and ruled the prosecution had shown sufficient evidence that the issue could go before the jury. As recounted above, Dr. Shallit, a police officer, and Sandoval then testified to the jury about the incident.
In Phillips, we admonished that in many cases it may be advisable for the trial court to conduct a preliminary inquiry before the penalty phase to determine whether there is substantial evidence to prove each element of other violent crimes the prosecution intends to introduce in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b). ( People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 72, fn. 25; see People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 476, fn. 48.) As we have clarified, such a hearing is not required, but if it is held, it need not include the presentation of live testimony. ( People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 477, fn. 51.) Moreover, a trial court's decision to admit `other crimes' evidence at the penalty phase is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and no abuse of discretion will be found where, in fact, the evidence in question was legally sufficient. ( Ibid. ) Defendant contends the trial court did not have all the relevant evidence to make the necessary determination for a Phillips hearing because it did not hear Sandoval's testimony. But the purpose of a Phillips hearing is to determine whether the prosecution has substantial evidence to support the other-crimes evidence it intends to introduce in aggravation. As the trial court correctly ruled, the prosecution presented substantial evidence of the other crime through the testimony of Dr. Shallit and thus met its burden. Furthermore, even assuming the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Phillips hearing because it failed to consider Sandoval's testimony at the hearing, defendant's claim still fails because the prosecution presented to the penalty phase jury sufficient evidence of defendant's abuse of Kayla through the testimony of Dr. Shallit and the police officer. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence of the incident involving Kayla.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing his numerous proposed penalty phase jury instructions. Defendant proposed jury instructions in three areas: first, the jury's task at the penalty phase as moral and normative; second, aspects of the notion of mitigation; and third, weighing aggravation against mitigation. The trial court refused these instructions, generally stating that their substance was covered by the CALJIC jury instructions. Defendant acknowledges we have previously rejected arguments similar to the ones he presents here, but urges us to reconsider this issue. We decline to do so, and we reaffirm our previous decisions explaining that the CALJIC jury penalty phase instructions `are adequate to inform the jurors of their sentencing responsibilities in compliance with federal and state constitutional standards.' ( People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 659, quoting People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1176-1177 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384].)
The defense proposed two different instructions on the definition of life without the possibility of parole, stating that life without possibility of parole means exactly what it says, and that it means that defendant is not eligible for parole. The trial court refused to give either instruction. Defendant acknowledges that we have stated that a California penalty jury is instructed that one of the sentencing choices is life without parole, and that this is a common phrase requiring no further definition. ( People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 352-353 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758].) Defendant asks us to reconsider our position, but we decline to do so.
Defense counsel requested four instructions dealing with mercy. The defense also requested a special mercy verdict, which informed the jurors they could sentence defendant to life without parole even if they felt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating. The trial court refused to give any of these instructions and refused to read the mercy verdict. But the court did read a limited instruction in which mercy was mentioned. The court also gave CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88, which we have stated are sufficient to convey to the jury that it may consider mercy. (See People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 497 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790]; People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 569-570 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137]; People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 403.) As defendant concedes, no specific mercy instruction is required if other pertinent instructions are given. (See Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 403.) Defendant asks us to reconsider this conclusion, but we decline to do so.
Defendant requested an instruction informing the jury it could not sentence him to death based solely upon the same facts that caused it to find him guilty of first degree murder, and a similar instruction reminding the jury that it could use neither the fact of the first degree murder conviction nor the special circumstance as an aggravating circumstance. The trial court refused to give these instructions. We have previously rejected the claim that it is error for a trial court to refuse such instructions and do so again here. ( People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 39-41; People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 900-901 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15].)
Defendant raises various challenges to California's death penalty law. We affirm the decisions that have rejected similar claims, and decline to reconsider such authorities, as follows: Death qualification and the resulting excusal of several prospective jurors for cause based on their views on the death penalty is constitutional. ( People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 306 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585].) The absence of intercase proportionality review does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. ( People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1368 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 157 P.3d 950]; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 48; see also Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 104 S.Ct. 871] [intercase proportionality review not required by the federal Constitution].) The death penalty scheme is not unconstitutional because it fails to allocate the burden of proofor establish a standard of prooffor finding the existence of an aggravating factor, or because it does not require the jury to find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 618 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104]; People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 573.) The United States Supreme Court's recent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee ( Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856]; United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220 [160 L.Ed.2d 621, 125 S.Ct. 738]; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531]; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428]; Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466) have not altered our conclusions in this regard. ( People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 167; People v. Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 926.) The penalty phase instructions were not defective in failing to assign a burden of persuasion regarding the jury's penalty decision ( People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 370-371 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 107 P.3d 229]), in failing to require juror unanimity on the aggravating factors ( People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 533 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 161 P.3d 58]), nor in failing to include an instruction on the presumption of life. ( People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Section 190.3, factor (a), is neither vague nor overbroad, and does not impermissibly permit arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. ( People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1165.) The jury may properly consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity under factor (b) of section 190.3. ( People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 499.) The use of the adjective extreme in factor (d) of section 190.3 does not render the statute unconstitutional. ( People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 276 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123].) Written findings regarding the aggravating factors are not constitutionally required. ( People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 275.) The trial court was not constitutionally required to inform the jury that certain sentencing factors are relevant only in mitigation, and the statutory instruction to the jury to consider whether or not certain mitigating factors were present did not unconstitutionally suggest that the absence of such factors amounted to aggravation. ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1078-1079 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68].) The death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection. ( People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 913 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981].) The death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment. ( People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1255 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321].) International law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements. ( People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1164.)
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the asserted guilt and penalty phase errors require reversal of his conviction and death sentence even if none of the errors is prejudicial individually. We conclude that there was no cumulative effect requiring reversal.
We affirm the judgment in its entirety.