Opinion ID: 24455
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence and Judgment

Text: 34 As a Matter of Law in Federal Diversity Cases 35 We review de novo the district court's ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same legal standard as the trial court. Flowers v. S. Reg'l. Physician Servs., 247 F.3d 229,235 (5th Cir.(La. 2001)) (citing Ford v. Cimarron Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 828, 830 (5th Cir. 2000); Brown v. Bryan County, Oklahoma, 219 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1734 (2001)). 36 Whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury or will permit the court to enter judgment as a matter of law is governed by federal rather than state law. Thrash v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 992 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1993); Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969)(en banc), overruled on other grounds by Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 337 & 339 (5th Cir. 1997). This is the majority rule of the federal circuits. 9A charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2525 (2d ed. 1994)(Wright & Miller); id. at 118 (Supp. 2001); 9 James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 50.66 (3d ed. 1999). Moreover, [c]oncerning matters covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, . . . [i]t is settled that if the Rule on point is consonant with the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, and the Constitution, the Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary state law. Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 n.7 (1996)(citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965); Burlington No. R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987)). See also Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 726 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1984); Affholder, Inc. v. So. Rock, Inc., 746 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1984). In the absence of Nut Hustler's demonstration of the invalidity of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, and our own inability to detect any, we conclude that Rule 50 clearly applies to the present case for purposes of determining whether a judgment as a matter of law should be granted. Id. 37 Under Rule 50, a court may not render judgment as a matter of law unless a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000). In entertaining a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law the court must review all of the evidence in the record, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. at 150 (citing Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-55 (1990); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51, 254 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 'Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.' Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150-51 (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). Although the court must review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Id. at 151 (citing 9A Wright & Miller § 2529). Thus, the court must give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses. Id. (quoting Wright & Miller § 2529). 38 D. There Was a Legally Sufficient Evidentiary Basis For A Reasonable Jury to Find for Mr. Ellis on the Issue of Reasonably Anticipated Use; The District Court Correctly Denied Nut Hustler's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. 39 In denying Nut Hustler's motion for a judgment as a matter of law, the district court stated: 40 In this case, there was sufficient evidence that Ellis used the pecan harvester for the exact purpose for which it was intended, gathering pecans. Further, there was testimony that Ellis was inspecting the machine when his shirt became twisted in the rotating machine. Such a use is consistent with the purpose of the product. 41 (citing Kampen v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306, 309 (5th Cir. 1998)(enbanc)(The LPLA's objective inquiry requires us to ascertain what uses of its product the manufacturer should have reasonably expected at the time of manufacture.)). 14 After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court correctly analyzed the evidence and applied Rule 50, not simply for the district court's stated reasons, but also because of additional evidence in the record from which the jury reasonably could have found that Nut Hustler should have reasonably expected or actually did expect that an ordinary person operating the pecan harvester would inspect the harvester or walk between the tractor and the harvester while the harvester machinery was running. 42 For example, Mr. Ellis testified that in inspecting the malfunctioning pecan harvester he followed the procedure that he had been taught by two experienced pecan farmers. He was instructed to leave the tractor motor running in neutral gear, with the drive shaft engaged to the power take-off, while he inspected the harvester. The purpose of leaving the harvester operational during the inspection was to distinguish working from non-working parts, so as to facilitate identification of the part of the harvester that was broken, stuck, or otherwise impaired. The plaintiff's expert in agricultural machinery also testified that this was the normal procedure for detecting the trouble with such machinery in the field. He said that many problems could not be detected unless the machine was activated. The jury reasonably could have inferred that it would not have been practicable or reasonably expected for a farm worker to haul the harvester to the shop each time it malfunctioned without first performing a field inspection. Further, the jury reasonably could have found that the manufacturer's own expert agreed that Mr. Ellis's use of the harvester during his inspection of it was a reasonably anticipated use. 43 The jury also could have reasonably drawn the inference that Nut Hustler actually anticipated or should have expected that the harvester's users would leave it running while inspecting it for problems because Nut Hustler presented no evidence to the contrary. Nut Hustler did not ask any of its witnesses, which included its owners, officers, and farm machinery expert, whether the type of operational field inspection conducted by Ellis was a use of the product that the manufacturer should reasonably expect of an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances. Finally, the jury reasonably could have inferred that Mr. Savage and Mr. Goforth, Nut Hustler's owners and operators, actually anticipated or reasonably should have expected farm hands to walk near the tractor and the harvester while these machines were operating in idling mode for inspections for the following reasons: The designer of the machinery had given them notice on the design drawings that they used in manufacturing the harvesters that a shield should be placed over the drive shaft at the point where Mr. Ellis was pulled into it; Mr. Savage placed such a shield on all harvesters made in the Oklahoma plant; Mr. Savage told Mr. Goforth that he should place such shields on the harvesters manufactured in the Texas facility; and Mr. Savage and Mr. Goforth attached similar shields in many places on the Nut Hustler harvesters other than on the drive shaft to prevent farm workers from being injured by moving parts. Also, Mr. Mayeaux testified that at the time of Nut Hustler's manufacture of the pecan harvester the American Society of Agricultural Engineers, the Society of Automotive Engineers, and the American National Standards Institute had generated standards that required a shield to cover any protruding object on a drive shaft. 44 Nut Hustler's principal argument on appeal appears to be that Mr. Ellis's leaving the machinery fully operational while he walked around the harvester with loose-fitting clothing to look for a possible malfunction was a use but not a reasonably anticipated use of the product. 15 In its main argument, however, Nut Hustler does not directly address the evidence in attempting to explain why a reasonable jury could not have found for Mr. Ellis on that issue. Instead, Nut Hustler presents an argument based on a complex inexplicit analogy drawn from a detailed survey of Louisiana court opinions containing factual findings for manufacturers on the reasonably anticipated use issue. In Nut Hustler's case sample, however, the facts and circumstances, the products, the product uses, and the product users differ considerably from those in the present case. Nevertheless, Nut Hustler argues that these Louisiana court decisions, none of which involved a pecan harvester, somehow show that the jury was unreasonable in finding for Mr. Ellis on the reasonably anticipated use issue in the present case. 45 Nut Hustler asserts that [t]he Louisiana decisions over the last ten years leave no doubt that the answer to that question must be in the negative and that [t]here is a pattern in all of these cases, and the pattern dictates the result in this case. Thus, there is an excluded middle in Nut Hustler's argument. Nut Hustler does not even attempt to explain exactly how the widely-varying facts and circumstances of its sample of cases demonstrate that no reasonable jury could have found for Mr. Ellis on the quite different anticipated use issue created by the unique circumstances, product, and use in the present case. 46 More important, as indicated in our discussion of the distinction between interpretations of law and findings of fact in Louisiana cases, the findings of fact on the issue of reasonably anticipated use in Nut Hustler's case sample do not constitute creations or interpretations of Louisiana law. Therefore, those factual findings are not binding on federal courts or juries in diversity cases. Furthermore, as noted previously it has long been settled in this circuit that a federal court may not base its ruling upon a motion for judgment as a matter of law (or, formerly, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict) upon findings of facts in Louisiana cases in a diversity civil jury action. See Wright, 198 F.2d at 307-08; Miskell, 439 F.2d at 791; Shirey, 327 F.2d at 552 (5th Cir. 1964); Inkenbrandt, 306 F.2d at 119; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 302 F.2d at 328; Davis, 266 F.2d at 764; LaBuff, 126 F.Supp. at 763; Boeing, 411 F.2d at 379 n.4 (Rives, J., concurring). 47 Nut Hustler's other argument in support of its motion for judgment as a matter of law is also without merit; it alludes to several different theories but fully develops none, perhaps because they are not supported by the evidence and the applicable law. Essentially, Nut Hustler recounts evidence tending to show that (1) Mr. Spotsville had removed and failed to replace some of the original shields covering other moving parts (different from the spinning drive shaft) of the pecan harvester, and (2) after the original bolt in the drive shaft and several of its replacements had broken, Mr. Spotsville inserted a longer bolt that protruded further out of the drive shaft than the original bolt. From this premise Nut Hustler leaps to the conclusion that [t]he sum total of all of the foregoing testimony, when compared to the results in analogous cases, requires the conclusion that plaintiff was not engaged in a 'reasonably anticipated use' of the product at the time of this incident. 48 This argument seems to be an amalgam of Nut Hustler's main argument based on factually analogous Louisiana cases (discussed and rejected above), impermissible attacks upon the verdict's finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous and a proximate cause of the accident not challenged on appeal, and the notion that the manufacturer reasonably should not have expected an ordinary farm worker like Mr. Ellis to use the pecan harvester with a long replacement bolt in its drive shaft, a slightly different approach from its earlier argument that a field inspection during the harvester's dysfunctional operation was not reasonably expected. 49 Nut Hustler did not challenge the jury's verdict that Mr. Ellis's injury was proximately caused by Nut Hustler's product that was unreasonably dangerous in design or in its lack of an adequate warning. Consequently, Nut Hustler's second argument is precluded insofar as it suggests that Mr. Spotsville's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident; or insofar as it suggests that the product was not unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the control of the manufacturer but was rendered unreasonably dangerous only because of an alteration or modification of the product that reasonably should not have been anticipated. These arguments cannot be entertained for two reasons. First, they are outside the scope of Nut Hustler's sole appeal from the denial of judgment as a matter of law based exclusively on the contention that Mr. Ellis's injury did not arise from a reasonably anticipated use of the product. Second, they are inconsistent with the unchallenged jury verdicts that assigned only 30% of the fault to Mr. Spotsville and that found that the pecan harvester was unreasonably dangerous in its design or because of an inadequate warning and that the unreasonably dangerous nature of the pecan harvester was the cause of Mr. Ellis's accident. 50 Moreover, there was a legally sufficient basis for rejecting Nut Hustler's arguments and finding that Mr. Ellis's injury arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the pecan harvester. The evidence is undisputed that the accident was not caused by the missing original equipment shields but by the drive shaft which was uncovered or unshielded when it left the control of the manufacturer. The record contains evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Nut Hustler's owners actually or reasonably should have anticipated that farmers would replace broken bolts in the harvester's drive shaft by using longer bolts if they did not have bolts of the exact length as the original bolts on hand. One of Nut Hustler's owners, Mr. Goforth, stated that replacing a broken bolt on a harvester by rigging it with a larger bolt was a typical farmer deal-one that was common among all your farmers. There also was a legally sufficient basis for the jury's finding that at the time the product left the manufacturer's control there existed an effective alternative design, i.e., an economical and feasible safety shield covering the open drive shaft, that was capable of preventing Mr. Ellis's injury regardless of the length of the bolt in the drive shaft. Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could find that because of the absence of a drive shaft safety shield, Mr. Ellis's jacket would have become caught in the open drive shaft even if the original bolt had not been replaced: there was evidence that the original bolt was not flush with the shaft but also protruded, although to a lesser extent than the replacement bolt; and there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the spinning drive shaft, even if its surface had been smooth, would have been capable of catching and wrapping a farm worker's clothing. There was legally sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that the breaking of the original bolt in the drive shaft and its replacement with the more protrusive bolt was either a change arising from ordinary wear and tear or a change that Nut Hustler should reasonably expect to be made by an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances. 16 Finally, for all of the foregoing reasons, including the reasons given in our discussion concluding that the type of field inspection used by Mr. Ellis was a reasonably expected use of the harvester, the evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding that Nut Hustler reasonably should have expected ordinary farm workers to use the harvester with a longer bolt in the drive shaft in the circumstances presented by this case. 51 Nut Hustler also argues that Mr. Ellis's conduct in wearing a loose-fitting coat while inspecting the harvester was not reasonably expected in connection with his use of the machine. However, there was no evidence that the jacket was either unusual apparel for a pecan farm worker or extremely ill-fitted for Mr. Ellis. Mr. Ellis testified without contradiction that Mr. Spotsville and Mr. Valle wore similar jackets in the pecan orchards. No witness testified that the jacket was unusual or unreasonably big or long for Mr. Ellis or his work. Pecans are harvested in the fall and winter. The jury reasonably could have found that Nut Hustler reasonably should have expected that farm workers using the harvester to pick up pecans in February would wear long, heavy jackets during their work on cold days. See Johnston v. Hartford Ins. Co., 623 So. 2d 35, 36-37 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir. 1993) ([T]he manufacturer is obligated to anticipate the environment in which the product will be used and to give notice of the potential risks arising from [reasonably anticipated] use in the foreseeable environment.)(citing Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 843 (La. 1987)). 52 Applying the standards dictated by Rule 50 and Reeves it is apparent that Nut Hustler is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. After reviewing all of the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, refraining from credibility determinations or weighing the evidence, and disregarding all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury was not required to believe, we conclude that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for Mr. Ellis on the issue of reasonably anticipated use.