Opinion ID: 1860646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the circuit court commit error in failing to dismiss travis's claim for improper joinder?

Text: ¶ 14. As to the second claim, ICRR contends that Travis is improperly joined under Rule 20(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 20(a) provides in pertinent part that: All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action. This Court has recognized that the Official Comments to Rule 20 call for consideration on a case-by-case basis utilizing a liberal approach toward joinder. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Alexander, ___ So.2d ___, ___, 2001 WL 83952  (Miss.2001). ¶ 15. ICRR argues that plaintiffs can only claim that they all worked for defendant at some time, at some place, and allegedly suffer from some asbestos-related injury, and that this does not establish that joinder is proper. ICRR points to a number of federal and state cases to support its claim of improper joinder that it contends share similar factual scenarios with the case at bar. ICRR cites Abdullah v. Acands, Inc., 30 F.3d 264 (1st Cir. 1994), stating that there the appellate court agreed with the lower court's denial of joinder stating that the different product exposure, causation and damages between the plaintiffs militated against it. ¶ 16. First, the court stated in Abdullah that the case was more appropriately viewed as a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 41(b) on the grounds that it did not follow the local rules in regard to its suit. 30 F.3d at 269. Second, the First Circuit did agree with the trial court's finding of misjoinder, however, it was based on the fact that the complaint was bereft of factual allegations indicating why 1000 plaintiffs and 93 defendants belong in the same action. Id. n. 5 (It gives no indication of whether plaintiffs were injured while serving on the same vessels or during the same time periods; no indication of whether they were injured by exposure to the same asbestos-containing products or equipment, nor any specification of the products or equipment to which they were exposed.); See The Seibels Bruce Group, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 1999 WL 760527 (N.D.Cal. Sept.21, 1999) ([Defendants' reliance on Abdullah] is misplaced. The court there did not dismiss plaintiffs subrogation claims because it aggregated all the individual asbestos' claimants; rather, it dismissed plaintiff's complaint because plaintiff failed to adhere to a court order requiring it to comply with the local rules governing joinder and specificity in asbestos litigation.). While ICRR might contend that the absence of claims regarding specific products is a fatal flaw in the present case, it must also be pointed out that there were 93 proposed defendants in Abdullah which would have made such an allegation much more important. In the case at bar, there is only one defendant, ICRR, and plaintiffs do list the materials and equipment that plaintiffs worked on or around while employed. ¶ 17. ICRR also relies on Saval v. B.L. Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027 (4th Cir.1983). In Saval, the court considered whether it was an abuse of discretion to deny joinder to several owners of Jaguar automobiles who claimed vehicle defects of six types. 710 F.2d at 1029. The court found that each vehicle had a different service history, had been driven differently, was purchased at different times, and further noted that the appellants had not demonstrated that the alleged problems resulted from a common defect. Id. at 1031. Further, the court found that the allegations of fraud and common warranties did not satisfy the transaction or occurrence test as [t]he only basis for presale allegations of fraud in this case consists of advertisements and warranties similar to those made by every automobile manufacturer who sells automobiles in this country. Id. at 1031-32. ¶ 18. One important difference between the case at bar and Saval is the procedural posture in which the cases were received on appeal. In the case at bar, this Court is reviewing the decision of a lower court judge to grant joinder under Rule 20(a). In Saval, the Fourth Circuit was reviewing a decision to deny joinder. This Court has recognized that it is inappropriate to substitute its judgment on such matters. Alexander, ___ So.2d ___, ___, 2001 WL 83952  (Miss.2001) (In discussing Bobby Kitchens, Inc. v. Mississippi Ins. Guaranty Ass'n., 560 So.2d 129 (Miss.1989), this Court stated: Although we felt that `the better choice would have been to allow joinder,' this Court correctly recognized that it could not substitute its own judgment.). This is the same rationale used by the Fourth Circuit when it distinguished a later case, Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611 (4th Cir.2001), from its holding in Saval. Hinson, 239 F.3d at 618. ¶ 19. ICRR cites Bobby Kitchens, Inc. for the proposition that joinder is improper where the only similarity between claims is that they are brought under the same general legal theory; however, in the discussion of the joinder issue, this Court merely stated the rule of joinder under Miss.R.Civ.P. 20, that the standard of review was abuse of discretion, then stated that the better choice would have been to allow joinder, but that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny it. 560 So.2d at 135. ¶ 20. ICRR also looks to Demboski v. CSX Transp., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 28, 30 (S.D.Miss.1994), to support its argument that joinder is inappropriate in the case at bar. Demboski dealt with four different plaintiffs suing CSX over four separate railroad crossing accidents. The district judge noted that the complaint involved different plaintiffs, separate accidents, different crossings, different train crews, different dates and times, different driver conduct, different vehicles, different injuries, different damages, different defensive postures, and different physical facts which relate to federal preemption. 157 F.R.D. at 29-30. Based on this, the judge found that [a]lthough Plaintiffs may develop some evidence indicating negligence on the part of Defendant that will be common to all claims, this Court is persuaded that common sense dictates that the evidence in other instances as to each specific incident will be so dissimilar that it would be very difficult to manage a consolidated trial. Id. at 30. ¶ 21. Demboski cites Sun-X Glass Tinting of Mid-Wisconsin v. Sun-X Int'l, Inc., 227 F.Supp. 365 (W.D.Wis.1964), for an illustration of when joinder is inappropriate: For example assume 4 automobiles, A, B, C, and D. A and B collide, causing B to strike C, which in turn strikes D, parked at a curb. Here is a series of events which produce multiple claims. However, all possible claims will have stemmed from a common transaction or event, namely the collision of A and B. Further, assume A was at fault in the example; and further assume that 10 minutes earlier on the same highway, A negligently caused a collision involving E. Could it fairly be said that the claims of B, C, and D have any common question of law or fact with E's claim against A? There are separate series of events or transactions. Id. at 374-75. Just as in the illustration, the Court finds that the different crossing accidents did not stem from a common transaction or event, rather the crossing accidents stem from separate transactions which do not amount to a series of transactions or occurrences. Demboski, 157 F.R.D. at 30. ¶ 22. ICRR also cites to Grayson v. K-Mart, 849 F.Supp. 785 (N.D.Ga.1994), which this Court discussed in Alexander, ___ So.2d ___, 2001 WL 83952 (Miss. 2001). Grayson involved eleven former K-Mart store managers who sued K-Mart for age discrimination under the ADEA and intentional infliction of emotional distress under the laws of four states. Joinder in Grayson would have involved eleven different factual situations, eleven sets of work histories, eleven sets of witnesses and testimony, and the laws of four different states. Alexander, ___ So.2d ___, ___, 2001 WL 83952 . In Grayson, the district court stated that: Plaintiffs have not ... directed this Court's attention to any discrete program or procedure employed by K Mart that affected each of the plaintiffs in this litigation. Absent some causal link between a common and identifiable wrongful act on the part of the defendant and the adverse action taken with respect to each plaintiff, the first prong of Rule 20(a) is not satisfied. 849 F.Supp. at 788. Grayson further stated that the second prong of Rule 20(a) was not met as: [E]ach demotion decision affecting the plaintiffs in these cases was a discrete act by the defendant. As indicated, the factual and legal questions between the plaintiffs and the defendant are based upon the wholly separate acts of the defendant with respect to each plaintiff. Id. (quoting Smith v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515, 524 (N.D.Okla.1970)). ¶ 23. Finding that the plaintiffs in Alexander were appropriately joined, this Court stated that: It is clear that all of the plaintiffs' claims arise out of the same pattern of conduct, the same type of insurance, and involve interpretation of the same master policy. All of the plaintiffs' claims are similar with the exception of the actual dollar amount charged on premiums.... [Further], [i]n the case at hand, individual treatment did not take place but instead the same fraudulent scheme or course of conduct was allegedly involved. Id. ¶ 24. As for whether plaintiff Travis is properly joined in the case at bar, two considerations must be addressed. First, whether the causes of action arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. Second, whether there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs. Travis argues that these claims arise out of ICRR's policy of not warning or protecting its workers from the hazards of asbestos exposure, and breaching its non-delegable duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work. ¶ 25. As to the second prong of the Rule 20(a) test, Travis argues that there are multiple questions of law and fact that are common to all plaintiffs. Common questions of law, alleged by plaintiffs, include: a) ICRR's negligence in failing to warn its employees of the dangerous hazards of asbestos b) ICRR's negligence in failing to provide asbestos exposed employees' respirators, protective clothing and/or proper ventilation c) ICRR's negligence in not providing plaintiffs and plaintiffs' decedents a reasonably safe place to work d) ICRR's negligence in not substituting non hazardous materials for asbestos e) ICRR's negligence in failing to test or monitor the work environment of plaintiffs and plaintiffs' decedents for the presence of dangerous concentrations of asbestos dust. Common questions of fact, alleged by plaintiffs, include: one employer defendant for all plaintiffs; each plaintiff worked on the same or similar equipment and machinery owned by ICRR; each plaintiff claims asbestos disease; ICRR had actual knowledge of the hazards of asbestos by 1935; ICRR, in 1937, drafted rules for the prevention of asbestosis which it failed to followthese rules include a written policy of not informing its employees that asbestos could be hazardous; ICRR failed to warn these plaintiffs; and ICRR failed to provide protective gear for these plaintiffs. ¶ 26. Travis cites In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 579 (E.D.Tex.1996), to support its argument that Rule 20(a) joinder requirements are met. In Norplant, the defendants attempted to argue that plaintiffs could not be joined together unless they had their Norplant system inserted by the same physician or at the same medical facility. 168 F.R.D. at 581. The judge rejected this reasoning and agreed with plaintiffs that the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences requirement of Rule 20(a) is met by [Plaintiffs'] allegation that Defendants, in the same series of acts and omissions specified in sealed Exhibit A, failed in their nationwide promotional materials to adequately warn Plaintiffs of the risks and severity of side effects associated with the use of Norplant. Id. He further agreed that the second prong of Rule 20(a) was met given that common questions of law or fact exist in Plaintiffs' allegations of negligence, misrepresentation, and fraud arising out of the alleged series of acts and omissions committed by Defendants. Id. ¶ 27. We find that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the joinder of these Plaintiffs.