Opinion ID: 2791274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unenforceability Due to Indefinite Terms or Illusory Promises

Text: ¶ 29. Our conclusion that the agreement before us contains an implied condition that father exercise his right to accept or reject daughters’ college choices in a reasonable way resolves two other arguments raised by father on appeal. Father argues that the agreement is too vague and indefinite to enforce, because it does not specify whether father is required to pay 100% of tuition or address whether he is required to pay for graduate school or six years of undergraduate tuition, and because the parties have different understandings as to whether and under what circumstances father can refuse to accept a choice of college. In a related argument, father contends that because his obligation to pay was conditioned on his acceptance of his daughters’ respective choices—a factor entirely within his control—the agreement was illusory, and is unenforceable for that reason. ¶ 30. T he indefiniteness of the terms of an agreement is not necessarily a basis for setting aside the agreement. Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc. , 526 A.2d 1192, 1201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (“Vague and indefinite agreements are routinely enforced as long as courts are able to supply ‘reasonable’ terms.”). The lack of specific figures in the contract does not render the agreement unenforceably indefinite, as father argues. While the contract could have been made more clear, its terms did provide “ ‘a reasonably certain basis’ for a court ‘to fashion an appropriate remedy.’ ” In re Estate of Rosser , 2003 PA Super 132, ¶ 19, 821 A.2d 615 (quoting Dahar v. Grzandziel , 599 A.2d 217, 221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)); see also Hathaway v. Hathaway , 98 S.W.3d 675, 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (implying a “condition of reasonableness” in agreement obligating parent to pay for college expenses). ¶ 31. Similarly, a promise is illusory only when the promisor commits himself or herself to nothing, so that “the promise is entirely optional with the promisor.” Rosser , 2003 PA Super 132, ¶ 18 (quotation omitted). The agreement here was not illusory. As set forth above, father’s ability to avoid his obligations by declining to accept his daughters’ choices is not unlimited. See Restatement § 34 cmt. b (explaining that problems created by apparently unlimited choice given to one party to a contract are often avoided by virtue of express or implied limits on that power of choice, and “[o]ften the choice made must be reasonable in the circumstances.”). ¶ 32. Paragraph 4 was part of a marital-settlement agreement involving mutual commitments concerning asset distribution and support. The context of the agreement reflects that the promise was bargained-for, and the agreement contains the requisite mutuality of obligation. As the magistrate concluded, a reasonable interpretation of the parties’ intent at the time they entered into the separation agreement would be that father was undertaking an obligation to contribute some amount towards his daughters’ college educations, but that father was also reserving some measure of discretion to limit the extent of his financial obligation based on his ability to pay and all of the other circumstances existing at the time of the college matriculation. ¶ 33. We conclude, therefore, that the agreement is not illusory and is not unenforceably indefinite. Because we do not rely on father’s past performance in assessing father’s legal obligation, we do not address father’s challenge to the superior court’s application of the doctrine of past performance.