Opinion ID: 2223778
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Heading: Restoration of Alimony.

Text: Our analysis of the first issue must start from Iowa Code section 598.21 (1981): 3. Upon every judgment of annulment, dissolution or separate maintenance, the court may grant an order requiring support payments to either party for a limited or indefinite length of time after considering all of the following: [criteria (a) through (j) itemized] .... 8. The court may subsequently modify orders made under this section when there is a substantial change in circumstances. Interpretations of similar predecessor statutes have evolved the familiar Iowa rule that if the decree in a divorce action is silent upon the question of alimony ..., or if the decree provides that no alimony is allowed ..., the decree can not be thereafter modified so as to allow ... alimony, although there may be a change in the circumstances of the parties .... Duvall v. Duvall, 215 Iowa 24, 27, 244 N.W. 718, 719 (1932); accord, e.g., Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149, 153, 60 S.Ct. 427, 429, 84 L.Ed. 665, 668 (1940); Cappel v. Cappel, 243 Iowa 1363, 1366, 55 N.W.2d 481, 483 (1952); Pedersen v. Pedersen, 235 Iowa 708, 712, 17 N.W.2d 520, 522 (1945); Handsaker v. Handsaker, 223 Iowa 462, 466, 272 N.W. 609, 611 (1937). This rule prevails among the various jurisdictions. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1387, 1391 (1955). The rationale undergirding this rule in Iowa was first expressed in Spain v. Spain, 177 Iowa 249, 158 N.W. 529 (1916). There the divorce decree made no mention of alimony. The ex-wife applied for a modification to provide for alimony, alleging a change in her former husband's financial affairs. Rejecting this application, the Spain court wrote: She was not entitled to any alimony at the time her case was decided, and from the time of that decree he was under no obligation to support her, because she was no longer his wife.... The former wife relinquished her right to future support when she failed to have it awarded in the original decree, and no such obligation exists independent of some decree. As there was no such decree, there is nothing to modify. Had there been a provision for future maintenance, then either might have had a modification thereof upon a change in conditions and some equitable reason given for either enlarging or reducing it. The decree granted the wife relieved the husband from supporting her in the future, and this decree is binding and not subject to revision. In this respect, the case differs from one where an allowance for future maintenance has been made, because in the latter case the duty has been cast on the former husband. This, we think, is the proper construction of the statute now under consideration as applied to the maintenance of the wife after divorce. Id. at 260, 158 N.W. at 533. In the case before us the dissolution decree did provide for alimony. This in turn triggered the statutory authority to make subsequent orders enlarging or reducing it. In effect, Richard would persuade us the subsequent order that eliminated (or reduced to zero) the obligation to pay operated as a nunc pro tunc corrective amendment, eliminating ab initio all reference to the support obligation, and thereby stripping trial court of the power to reinstate payments. Under this record, we are not persuaded this result should follow. Modification being only an alteration in the terms of the adjudicated obligation, Cartwright v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., 623 P.2d 606, 610 (Okla.1981), ordinarily is not used in the sense of completely setting aside the thing to be modified, Van Deusen v. Ruth, 343 Mo. 1096, 1101, 125 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1939). A modification operates prospectively, not retrospectively, and does not authorize the court to divest the parties of rights accrued under the original decree, Wren v. Wren, 256 Iowa 484, 489, 127 N.W.2d 643, 646 (1964); accord Pucci v. Pucci, 259 Iowa 427, 431, 143 N.W.2d 353, 356 (1966). An initial refusal to award alimony cannot be equated with an original award that is subsequently terminated. In a case such as this, alimony is an allowance to the ex-wife in lieu of the husband's legal obligation to support her. In re Marriage of Hitchcock, 309 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Iowa 1981). In refusing to make such an allowance in the dissolution decree the trial court, balancing the property provisions, the capabilities of the respective parties, and various other factors, determines the husband's obligation has ended with the marital relation. The parties then leave their union with all matters settled between them. When the court awards alimony, however, it refuses to wipe clean the marital slate. The court determines, instead, the husband has a continuing support obligation and the lots of the parties are to this extent still bound together. The reach of that obligation may vary with the financial fates of the parties, but the obligation has been created and it survives the marriage. The decisions relied on by Richard turn on the exhaustion or lack of jurisdiction in the trial court. See Eckert v. Eckert, 299 Minn. 120, 124, 216 N.W.2d 837, 839 (1974); Garver v. Garver, 102 Ohio St. 443, 133 N.E. 551 (1921). In Iowa, subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings belong. Powell v. Khodari-Intergreen Co., 303 N.W.2d 171, 173 (Iowa 1981); Wederath v. Brant, 287 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Iowa 1980). The Iowa district court has jurisdiction to hear and determine cases involving alimony and modification of alimony awards. Where, as here, the dissolution decree provides for alimony, Iowa Code section 598.21(8) invests the court with statutory power to make subsequent changes in alimony. In this state an order terminating, or ceasing, alimony payments neither divests the court of jurisdiction nor amends the statute that provides the power to make subsequent changes. There remains for us to consider only the effect of the prior modification decree. Preliminarily, we observe that Iowa has established a precedent of rejecting the application of simplistic and arbitrary principles in this area. In In re Marriage of Woodward, 229 N.W.2d 274, 280 (Iowa 1975), we disavowed the rule that remarriage automatically terminated alimony, applying instead the rule that remarriage make[s] out a prima facie case which requires the court to end it, in the absence of proof of some extraordinary circumstances justifying its continuance. We quoted with approval the following from Wolter v. Wolter, 183 Neb. 160, 163, 158 N.W.2d 616, 619 (1968): Even cases which adopt the automatic termination approach tend to concede that there may be exceptional circumstances under which alimony might be considered as continuing, or that, at least, judicial determination of the question as to whether it continues might be advisable. Peters v. Peters, 214 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 1974), involved a dissolution decree that awarded alimony, but further provided all alimony payments shall cease upon the ... remarriage of Lela Peters. Id. at 153. The ex-wife remarried in Texas but the marriage was annulled about two months later. In Peters we examined the rule, prevailing in several jurisdictions, that a ceremonial marriage, later annulled, nonetheless invariably and automatically terminated the alimony obligation. We characterized that rule as inflexible, rigid, and in derogation of ordinary principles of equity. Id. at 156. Rejecting the rigid rule as amount[ing] to judicial prejudgment of a situation which may be entirely different than that presupposed by it, id. at 157, we examined the intent of the court entering the dissolution decree, in light of extrinsic evidence received under the doctrine of Hamilton v. Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 154 N.W.2d 164 (1967). We then reinstated the alimony payments. Applying the Peters approach in the case before us, we are not persuaded the trial court that executed the 1977 modification order intended to extinguish all right to future alimony payments, or to eliminate Jacqueline's right to make a subsequent application for support, based on a showing of substantial change in circumstances. Bypassing any consideration of the validity of the prior modification where there were no supporting pleadings, we note the modification decree purports to be based on a joint oral application as to a  change in future payments (emphasis added). The court's reference to the parties' stipulation does not suggest the concept of an unqualified and permanent extinction of the right to future payments. The reference to the oral stipulation must be viewed in light of the testimony of the parties in this proceeding indicating there was no prior understanding that the right to make future alimony changes would be cut off. It seems highly improbable that any judge would intend to order a permanent cessation of alimony after finding that the recipient thereof was immediately in need of at least $1500.00. Nor would such an interpretation be in accord with the policy that our courts should be slow to approve a stipulation that impoverishes one spouse, Kjar v. Kjar, 261 Iowa 334, 339, 154 N.W.2d 123, 127 (1967). In this instance the trial court, assuming it evaluated the concessions Jacqueline was willing to make in order to keep the home for her children, would likely have concluded [s]he was willing to vary, but not to make void, the obligation which the [original] court had put upon her husband, Capell v. Capell, 164 Va. 45, 49, 178 S.E. 894, 895 (1935). In short, we hold that the trial court's use of the word termination in this instance does not evidence an intent to prohibit a later resort to the section 598.21(8) right to modify. We believe it is clear that former spouses may waive the right to secure a modification reinstating alimony pursuant to section 598.21(8) and secure an implementing order if the court approves, or may lose that right by decree following a contested hearing. In other circumstances, even the language used in the 1977 modification order before us might suffice to show the court's intent to follow such an agreement or reach such independent determination. Upon this record, however, we cannot reach that conclusion. Finally, we are convinced that the application of a simplistic and rigid rule to reach the trial court's intent in this instance would violate those principles of equity that initially launched, and still justify, the existence of equity courts. Having arrived at the conclusion Jacqueline is not foreclosed from making this application for modification, we turn to the question whether she has demonstrated a change of circumstances from the time of the prior decree.