Opinion ID: 793892
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Retain a Neuropsychologist

Text: 46 Carter also argues that, had trial counsel retained an expert neuropsychologist, the neuropsychologist would have concluded that Carter suffers from organic brain impairment, and that such evidence could have been presented at mitigation to support a lower sentence. In his postconviction motion, Carter presented affidavits from three mental health experts: Dr. James C. Tanley, Dr. Judith H. Skillings, and Dr. Newton L.P. Jackson. Specifically, Carter argues that a mental health expert could have put Mr. Carter's life and personality in a context the jury would have understood, and that expert testimony was relevant to whether Carter 'lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of [his] conduct or to conform [his] conduct to the requirements of the law.' (Petr.'s Br. 39 (quoting Frazier v. Huffman, 343 F.3d 780, 793 (6th Cir. 2003)) (alterations in original)). 47 Dr. Skillings is a clinical psychologist who specializes in chemical dependency and cross-cultural issues. She concluded that Carter's antisocial acts are the result of being subjected to violence and alcoholism during his youth and of the trauma from racial harassment, and are not per se part of an antisocial personality structure. 48 However, Dr. Skillings never even met with Carter or any members of his family. Her opinions were based entirely on the affidavits of Carter's family members, the sentencing phase trial transcript, and Carter's school records. An examination of these records shows that many of her findings are questionable, however. For example, Dr. Skillings remarked that there was little structure or discipline in the home. There is no similar statement from the records Dr. Skillings referenced. To the contrary, Carter's step-father, William Walton, and siblings all mentioned Walton's attempts to strictly discipline the children. Also, Dr. Skillings concluded that Carter was affected by the frequent violence between his parents. However, George, Jr. was the only family member who mentions any violence between Brenda Walton and George, Sr., saying, My father may have hit my mother once or twice (emphasis added). To the extent any such incident did occur, it would have been when Carter was still very young, meaning its effects on Carter would be entirely unclear, at least for someone relying entirely upon the limited information before Dr. Skillings. 49 Dr. Jackson is a forensic psychologist (like Dr. Manges, incidentally). He concluded that Carter suffered from a type of organic brain dysfunction that causes a loss of control during violent incidents. 4 He also stated that Carter's tests results were inconsistent with those generated by individuals who commit premeditated acts of violence, implying that Carter's attack was likely not premeditated. 50 Contrary to Dr. Jackson's opinions, the prosecution presented significant evidence at trial that prior to any violent incident, Carter had been planning to attack Allen in retaliation for changing the channels on the jailhouse television. Further, several witnesses testified that Carter had broken off his attack of Allen more than once, only to resume beating him. Inmate Richard Cunningham testified that Carter kept on beating [Allen] until he heard the [guards'] keys. He heard the keys, he went on back to his cell. In short, the evidence at trial completely contradicts Dr. Jackson's conclusions that Carter lost his self-control during the altercation and that Carter was not likely to have committed a premeditated act of violence. 51 Dr. Tanley was the only neuropsychologist Carter retained in support of his postconviction claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not hiring a neuropsychologist. Dr. Tanley stated that Carter has difficulty understanding the spoken word and struggles with complex information and novel situations. He ultimately concluded that a competent clinical psychologist should have recommended a complete neuropsychological evaluation for [Carter]. 52 Despite Carter's claim that a neuropsychologist would have diagnosed Carter as having organic brain disorder, Dr. Tanley did not diagnose Carter as suffering from organic brain dysfunction or brain damage. He stated only that there is a likelihood that Carter has some kind of brain related difficulty. He even admitted that Carter's score on the Impairment Index is below the normal cutoff . . . for reliably stating that brain damage exists. Carter, then, wholly failed to show any error relating to trial counsel's decision not to hire a neuropsychologist. See Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 613-15 (6th Cir.2002) (rejecting petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where petitioner failed to point to any mitigating evidence defense counsel would have uncovered through further investigation into his background); Campbell v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 531, 555 (6th Cir.2001) (rejecting petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to discover that petitioner suffered from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), where petitioner failed to point to anything in the record showing that he actually suffered from PTSD or any other psychological disorder). Trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective, since even at this late date, there is no medical proof of . . . a [mental] condition. Lorraine, 291 F.3d at 439. 53 Moreover, Dr. Tanley did not provide any temporal relationship between Carter's possible brain damage and his altercation with Johnny Allen. Dr. Tanley evaluated Carter nearly five years after Carter killed Allen, but Dr. Tanley did not address what impact events in the intervening five years could have had on his diagnosis. In other words, Carter failed to show that the brain damage, if any, even existed at the time of the incident. 54 Finally, Dr. Tanley did not make any connection between Carter's possible brain damage and his violent altercation with Allen. Similarly, the nebulous references in Carter's briefs to Dr. Tanley's diagnosis do not establish a causal link. Carter focuses on Dr. Tanley's statements that Carter performs poorly in novel, complex situations that require thinking through a problem, and has trouble understanding the spoken word. It is difficult to see how Carter's diminished capacity in novel, complex situations and his trouble understanding the spoken word are at all relevant to the events at issue. The evidence at trial showed that Carter had been planning an attack for days. At more than one point during the altercation, Carter ceased beating Allen only to resume a short time later. One witness recounted that at some point Carter went to his cell, stabbed himself in the leg, and returned to continue beating Allen. Another recalled that twice Carter interrupted his beating of Allen to clean his shoes with a mop. In other words, the evidence at trial did not show this to be a novel, complex situation that Carter was incapable of thinking through, but rather the act of a calculating, cold-blooded killer. Rather, his preparation and attempts to establish exculpatory circumstances during the event demonstrate that he fully appreciated the situation and its potential consequences. 55 In Lorraine, like here, petitioner claimed his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to uncover evidence of organic brain damage. Id. at 436. Similarly, petitioner's habeas counsel did not find evidence of organic brain damage. Id. The court concluded that if habeas counsel could not find evidence of organic brain damage, then trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective . . . . Nor can there be any prejudice. Id. 56 Absent actual, probative evidence relating to Carter's mental health that trial counsel missed, there can be no prejudice and therefore no ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. In short, Carter offered no evidence to show, under the facts of his case, that trial counsel's decision not to retain a different specialist was objectively unreasonable. We conclude, then, that the Ohio Court of Appeals' decision denying Carter relief on this claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Thus, we affirm the denial of the writ on this issue. 57