Opinion ID: 1277356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Admission of Evidence Related to Defendant's Prior Convictions

Text: At the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of defendant's 1973 assault on Debra B. Because defendant had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges in that case, the prosecution introduced evidence pertaining to this allegation under section 190.3, factor (b). [31] The prosecution also introduced evidence involving the 1975 attempted burglary with intent to commit rape, involving Deborah T. Because defendant had pleaded guilty to this felony offense, the prosecution introduced testimonial evidence pertaining to this allegation under section 190.3, factor (c). [32] On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to present evidence of the facts and circumstances of defendant's prior convictions. Specifically, he contends that the admission of this evidence over his objection (set forth in a motion to exclude) violated the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy (by impermissibly allowing the jury to hear evidence in support of defendant's conviction of an offense greater than the one of which defendant was convicted by the prior jury), resulted in the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, and violated his rights to equal protection of the laws, to a speedy trial, and to a reliable sentencing determination. Defendant's position lacks merit. [33] We previously have rejected arguments that double jeopardy and speedy trial principles apply to the admission of evidence in aggravation presented at the penalty phase. (See, e.g., People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 71-72, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224 [double jeopardy]; People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 199-200, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664 [same]; People v. McDowell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 551, 568, 250 Cal.Rptr. 530, 763 P.2d 1269 [speedy trial].) Nor was the evidence of defendant's prior convictions irrelevant or unduly prejudicial; defendant's choking attack upon Debra B. clearly involved force or violence within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (b), and his conviction of attempted burglary with the intent to commit rape, stemming from the incident involving Deborah T., fell squarely within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (c), allowing consideration of any prior felony conviction. Contrary to defendant's equal protection argument, the prosecution was not limited to showing that defendant had, in fact, been convicted, but was free to elicit the testimony of witnesses for the purpose of establishing the criminal conduct underlying defendant's prior convictions. (See People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 640, 250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189; People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1203, 240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301.) We previously have held that the use of live testimony to establish a defendant's prior criminal conduct does not violate a defendant's right to a reliable sentencing determination. (See, e.g., People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1339, 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.)