Opinion ID: 2337015
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preemption of UIFSA by the Federal FFCCSOA

Text: Ms. LeTellier alternatively alleges that the Federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, confers jurisdiction upon the Juvenile Court for Davidson County, Tennessee. FFCCSOA and UIFSA therefore conflict, and FFCCSOA, as federal law, controls. See, e.g., Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Tenn.1997) (noting that federal law controls in a direct conflict with state law). FFCCSOA provides for modification of out-of-state child support orders as follows: (e) Authority to modify orders.A court of a State may modify a child support order issued by a court of another State if (1) the court has jurisdiction to make such a child support order pursuant to subsection (i); and (2)(A) the court of the other State no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the child support order because that State no longer is the child's State or the residence of any individual contestant.... 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(e). Subsection (i), regarding jurisdiction, states as follows: (i) Registration for modification.If there is no individual contestant or child residing in the issuing State, the party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and enforce, a child support order issued in another State shall register that order in a State with jurisdiction over the nonmovant for the purpose of modification. Subsection (i) differs from UIFSA in that it does not contain the non-resident requirement found at § 36-5-2611(a)(ii). Ms. LeTellier contends that jurisdiction is proper in the Tennessee court under FFCCSOA in spite of her status as a resident of Tennessee because of the doctrine of federal preemption. We again disagree. Application of general rules of federal preemption leads us to conclude that FFCCSOA and UIFSA do not conflict. We begin with a presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt UIFSA. See Riggs, 941 S.W.2d at 48-49; BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Greer, 972 S.W.2d 663, 671 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997). There are several ways in which preemption can occur: Preemption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear intent to preempt state law, when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law, where compliance with both federal and state law is in effect physically impossible, where there is implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation, where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress. Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 789 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tenn.1989) (citations omitted). The purpose of Congress in enacting a federal law is, therefore, the `ultimate touchstone' of preemption analysis. Riggs, 941 S.W.2d at 49. FFCCSOA does not contain an express preemption clause. Accordingly, we look to the legislative history of the statute to determine the purpose of enacting FFCCSOA. In 1988, Congress established the United States Commission on Interstate Child Support (Commission) to offer recommendations on the resolution of interstate child support problems. As part of its recommendations, the Commission declared its support for the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. H.R.Rep. No. 102-982 (1992). FFCCSOA was signed into law in 1994. See Pub.L. No. 103-383, § 3(a) (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738B). From its inception, FFCCSOA was intended to be consistent with UIFSA. [5] In 1996, Congress enacted a law requiring all fifty states to adopt UIFSA by January 1, 1998. 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1996). The necessity of amending FFCCSOA to comply with UIFSA was anticipated. [6] While conflicts between the two laws were recognized, they were characterized as unintentional. [7] Subsequent revisions to FFCCSOA were intended to correct any conflicts and make FFCCSOA consistent with UIFSA. [8] Congress clearly did not intend for FFCCSOA to preempt UIFSA. Indeed, it appears that FFCCSOA was intended to follow the contours of UIFSA. There is unsurprisingly no indication in the text of FFCCSOA or its legislative history of any intent to preempt UIFSA. The very fact that Congress mandated that all fifty states adopt UIFSA strongly mitigates against a construction of FFCCSOA that would impliedly preempt UIFSA to any degree. We, therefore, hold that the jurisdictional provisions of FFCCSOA do not preempt the jurisdictional provisions of Tennessee's UIFSA. In the absence of preemption, we apply traditional rules of statutory construction to reconcile both statutes. See, e.g., BellSouth, 972 S.W.2d at 671 (The proper approach is to reconcile the federal and state laws rather than to seek out conflict where none clearly exists. (citation omitted)). This Court's role in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and to effectuate the legislature's intent. Freeman v. Marco Transp. Co., 27 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tenn.2000). In interpreting statutes, we are required to construe them as a whole, read them in conjunction with their surrounding parts, and view them consistently with the legislative purpose. State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn.1995). We are restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used by the legislature in the statute, unless an ambiguity requires resort elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent. Halbert v. Shelby County Election Comm'n, 31 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Tenn.2000). A statute is ambiguous if the statute is capable of conveying more than one meaning. Bryant v. HCA Health Servs. of N. Tenn., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 804, 809 (Tenn.2000). Once we conclude that the proper interpretation is left open to dispute, it is appropriate to turn to the legislative history of the statute for guidance. Chapman v. Sullivan County, 608 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tenn.1980). We must seek a reasonable construction in light of the purposes, objectives, and spirit of the statute based on good sound reasoning. State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn.1995). The word jurisdiction as used in FFCCSOA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(i), is ambiguous. FFCCSOA does not specify whether jurisdiction refers to personal jurisdiction alone or to both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the legislative history of FFCCSOA consistently addresses UIFSA and FFCCSOA in tandem and expresses that the statutes were intended to work together without conflict. In light of this legislative history, we find it appropriate to construe the ambiguous jurisdictional provisions of FFCCSOA to be in harmony with UIFSA to the greatest extent possible. A consistent reading of UIFSA and FFCCSOA requires only that jurisdiction under subsection (i) of FFCCSOA be construed as referring to both personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. Accord Gentzel v. Williams, 25 Kan.App.2d 552, 965 P.2d 855, 860-61 (1998). This construction is consistent with the specific jurisdictional provisions of UIFSA and with the intent of FFCCSOA. Accordingly, under FFCCSOA, a state has jurisdiction to modify an out-of-state support order only when the petitioner registers the order in a state having personal and subject matter jurisdiction for the purpose of modification. Since, under § 36-5-2611(a) of UIFSA, Tennessee courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the District of Columbia's order because Ms. LeTellier is a resident of Tennessee, the Juvenile Court for Davidson County did not have jurisdiction over the nonmovant for the purpose of modification under FFCCSOA. See id.