Opinion ID: 4678698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instruction Regarding “Similar Acts”

Text: Naidoo argues that the jury should not have been instructed as to the purposes for which evidence of similar acts may be considered and contends that the instruction improperly directed the jury to consider the Kristen stories as similar acts relevant to his motive. Naidoo again argues that the district court’s pre-trial ruling foreclosed any evidence related to his motive. Naidoo has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on the relevance of similar acts. Contrary to Naidoo’s assertion, the instruction was indeed a principle of law “applicable to the factual issues confronting [the jury].” United States v. Daniel, 933 F.3d 370, 380 (5th Cir. 2019). Nothing in the district court’s pre-trial order precluded such evidence from being introduced for a permissible purpose such as “proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid.404(b)(2). Rather, the court merely barred both sides from offering “expert testimony about the defendant’s sexual predilections” because of the risk of jury confusion. As explained supra, the district court did not act inconsistently with this ruling when it admitted the Kristen stories, and it did not err when instructing the jury on the limited purposes for which such extrinsic evidence can be considered.