Opinion ID: 1466405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plain Language of Section 81

Text: Our analysis begins with the plain language of Section 81, not only because that is the natural starting point dictated by all accepted canons of statutory construction but also because the statute's unequivocal present-tense use of the word is does a tremendous amount of the legwork in settling one of the main questions raised on this appeal. In full Section 81(a) defines the term Indian lands as (emphases added): lands the title to which is held by the United States in trust for an Indian tribe or lands the title to which is held by an Indian tribe subject to a restriction by the United States against alienation. Section 81(b) then prescribes: No agreement or contract with an Indian tribe that encumbers Indian lands for a period of 7 or more years shall be valid unless that agreement or contract bears the approval of the Secretary of the Interior or a designee of the Secretary. In this instance the Tribe-NGV contract was not within the purview of Section 81 because it plainly did not implicate Indian lands in statutory terms. Section 81(a)'s use of the present tense in defining Indian lands unambiguously prescribes that title to the real estate must already be held by the United States in trust for a tribe. Had Congress intended that Section 81 also extend to lands that might later be held in trust, it would have been the simplest of matters to word the statute differently. That it did not do so is not a linguistic decision to be treated lightly (see SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir.2003), explaining that Congress's explicit decision to use one word over another in drafting a statute is material and adding that [i]t is a decision that is imbued with legal significance and should not be presumed to be random or devoid of meaning; Biehl v. CIR, 351 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir.2003), writing that courts will not stretch the statutory language to cover a situation not contemplated by Congress). Here the parties entered into their contract expressly contemplating  specifically intendingthat land would later be identified and acquired and then still later transferred to the United States to be held in trust for the Tribe. But no such lands existed when the Tribe and NGV entered into their contract. Hence the portion of Section 81 that limits the duration of encumbrances on Indian lands is simply inapplicable to this case.