Opinion ID: 844233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Santa Clara pleads as an affirmative defense that we lack jurisdiction. Though it does not further argue the point, we have an independent obligation in this as in every matter to confirm whether jurisdiction exists. (See Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 267; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal 6 It follows that, if all redevelopment agency sponsors opted in and paid their pro rata shares, Assembly Bill 1X 27 would generate $1.7 billion in 2011-2012 and $400 million in each subsequent fiscal year. Of these sums, $4.3 million is scheduled to go to transit and fire districts in 2011-2012 and $60 million in each subsequent year, with the balance going to schools and community colleges via the ERAF. (§ 34194.4, subd. (a).) ERAF payments in 2011-2012 count against the state‘s Proposition 98 obligations; in future years, they do not. (§ 34194.1, subds. (b), (c).) 17 (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 302-303; Linnick v. Sedelmeier (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 12, 12; see also Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. 137, 173-175.) Assembly Bill 1X 26 provides that ―[n]otwithstanding any other law, any action contesting the validity of this part [1.8] or Part 1.85 . . . or challenging acts taken pursuant to these parts shall be brought in the Superior Court of the County of Sacramento.‖ (§ 34168, subd. (a).) We conclude this provision does not deprive us of jurisdiction. In filing a petition for writ of mandate with this court in the first instance, the Association has asked us to invoke our original jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is constitutional. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10 [vesting the Supreme Ct. with original jurisdiction ―in proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition‖].) It may not be diminished by statute. (Chinn v. Superior Court (1909) 156 Cal. 478, 480 [―[W]here the judicial power of courts, either original or appellate, is fixed by constitutional provisions, the legislature cannot either limit or extend that jurisdiction.‖]; see also Modern Barber Col. v. Cal. Emp. Stab. Com. (1948) 31 Cal.2d 720, 731; Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 557, 562; Lemen v. Edmunson (1927) 202 Cal. 760, 762.) The Legislature does retain the power to regulate matters of judicial procedure. (Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 98-110; Modern Barber Col. v. Cal. Emp. Stab. Com., supra, 31 Cal.2d at p. 731.) In some instances, the exercise of that power may appear to ―defeat or interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction or of the judicial power‖ and thus come into tension with the general prohibition against impairing a constitutional grant of jurisdiction. (Garrison v. Rourke (1948) 32 Cal.2d 430, 436.) We avoid such constitutional conflicts whenever possible by construing legislative enactments strictly against the impairment of constitutional jurisdiction: ― ‗[A]n intent to defeat the exercise 18 of the court‘s jurisdiction will not be supplied by implication.‘ ‖ (County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 87, quoting Garrison, at p. 436; see also Garrison, at p. 435 [―The jurisdiction thus vested [by Cal. Const., art. VI] may not lightly be deemed to have been destroyed.‖].) To avoid intrusion on our constitutional jurisdiction, section 34168, subdivision (a) is best read narrowly as applying only to, and designating a forum for, ―action[s]‖ (ibid.), over which we retain appellate jurisdiction, while having no bearing on jurisdiction over ―special proceedings‖ such as petitions for writs of mandate (see Public Defenders’ Organization v. County of Riverside (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1409; compare Code Civ. Proc., pt. 2, § 307 et seq. [regulating civil actions] with Code Civ. Proc., pt. 3, § 1063 et seq. [regulating special proceedings of a civil nature]). It follows that, notwithstanding the fact the Association‘s petition challenges the validity of parts 1.8 and 1.85 of division 24 of the Health and Safety Code, we have jurisdiction to address it. We will invoke our original jurisdiction where the matters to be decided are of sufficiently great importance and require immediate resolution. (E.g., Strauss v. Horton (2009) 46 Cal.4th 364, 398-399; Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 340; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 219.) Those circumstances are present here: Assembly Bills 1X 26 and 1X 27 place the state‘s nearly 400 redevelopment agencies under threat of imminent dissolution, while the Association‘s petition calls into question the proper allocation of billions of dollars in property tax revenue.