Opinion ID: 2174363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Kidnapping Exemption Statute

Text: Appellants argue that they were entitled to the benefit of the kidnapping exemption statute since the restraint of Milby was incidental to the commission of the burglary. Again, we disagree. The exemption, which is found in KRS 509.050, provides, in relevant part: A person may not be convicted of unlawful imprisonment in the first-degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second-degree, or kidnapping when his criminal purpose is the commission of an offense defined outside this chapter and his interference with the victim's liberty occurs immediately with and incidental to the commission of the offense, unless the interference exceeds that which is ordinarily incidental to the commission of the offense which is the objective of his criminal purpose. Application of the exemption is determined on a case-by-case basis. Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 836 S.W.2d 872 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1034, 113 S.Ct. 1857, 123 L.Ed.2d 479 (1993), overruled on other grounds, St. Clair v. Roark, Ky., 10 S.W.3d 482 (1999); Gilbert v. Commonwealth, Ky., 637 S.W.2d 632 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1149, 103 S.Ct. 794, 74 L.Ed.2d 998 (1983). A three-part test must be satisfied before the exemption is applicable. First, the criminal purpose must be the commission of an offense defined outside Chapter 509; second, the interference with the victim's liberty must occur immediately with and incidental to the commission of the underlying offense; and finally, the interference with the victim's liberty must not exceed that which is normally incidental to the commission of the underlying offense. Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 610 S.W.2d 602 (1980); see also Griffin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 576 S.W.2d 514 (1978). Here, the first prong of the test is satisfied since the underlying offense was first-degree burglary, defined in KRS 511.020. The question then becomes whether the interference with Milby's liberty was incidental to the commission of the burglary and of a type normally associated with such offense. In Timmons v. Commonwealth, Ky., 555 S.W.2d 234, 241 (1977), we held that if the victim of a crime is going to be restrained of his liberty in order to facilitate its commission, the restraint will have to be close in distance and brief in time in order for the exemption to apply. The duration of Milby's restraint exceeded the scope of time necessary for Appellants to commit the burglary. Appellants entered Milby's home between 11:00 p.m. and midnight on the night in question, and proceeded to bind her wrists and ankles as well as cover her eyes and mouth with tape. Milby was not released until approximately 10:30 a.m. the next morning when she was discovered by a neighbor. Thus, the duration of her restraint exceeded ten and one-half hours, and would have been longer had she not been found. It is reasonable to infer that as far as Appellants were concerned, she would be restrained indefinitely. Clearly, ten and one-half hours went far beyond the time necessary to accomplish the mere theft of her purse. Moreover, the nature of the restraint was more than necessary to commit a burglary. While a temporary binding of Milby's hands and ankles certainly may have been associated with accomplishing a burglary, there was no reason to cut her arms and locks of her hair. The kidnapping exemption statute is to be strictly construed and the burden is upon a defendant to show that it should apply. Timmons, supra . The trial court has the duty to determine if a kidnapping charge is excessive or unfounded under the circumstances of the case. Calloway v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 501 (1977). The trial court made such determination and found that Appellants had not demonstrated entitlement to the exemption. In the absence of any abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's decision.