Opinion ID: 794714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 16 On appeal, Mr. Buchanan asserts that the Veterans Court committed legal error by improperly interpreting 38 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a), 5107(b), 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(a), (b), and 3.307(b) to require that lay evidence of medical symptoms be accompanied by contemporaneous medical records in order to support an award of service-connected benefits. Specifically, he argues that the Veterans Court erred because it accepted certain statements by the Board that applied the legally erroneous interpretation requiring contemporaneous medical records. 17 The Secretary of Veterans Affairs (the Secretary) essentially asserts two arguments in response. First, the Secretary argues that we lack jurisdiction to review a finding by the Veterans Court that the evidence Mr. Buchanan submitted was not sufficient to support his claim for service connection and that the determination of the Board denying his claim was not clearly erroneous. Second, the Secretary asserts that the Veterans Court's decision cannot be faulted because the court recognized that the Board analyzed the lay and medical evidence and determined that credible evidence did not support Mr. Buchanan's claim for service connection. In this context, the Secretary argues that the Board did not hold as a matter of law that lay statements are inadequate in the absence of corroborating clinical records, and thus that the Veterans Court decision did not implicitly endorse the allegedly erroneous interpretation argued by Mr. Buchanan. 18 In this case, Mr. Buchanan challenges the Veterans Court's endorsement of the Board's legal interpretation of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions pertaining to the types of evidence which may support a claim for benefits. Contrary to the Secretary's assertion, Mr. Buchanan is not challenging the application of law to the particular facts of his case, nor asking us to re-weigh the relevant facts. Thus, we have jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c) to review the Veterans Court's interpretation of those provisions. 19 Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a), the Secretary was required to include, in regulations pertaining to service connection, additional provisions in effect requiring that in each case where a veteran is seeking service-connection for any disability due consideration shall be given to ... all pertinent medical and lay evidence .... (emphasis added). In addition, 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) provides that 20 [t]he Secretary shall consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case before the Secretary with respect to benefits under laws administered by the Secretary. When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 21 (Emphases added.) In accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(b), [t]he factual basis [for establishing a chronic disease] may be established by medical evidence, competent lay evidence or both.... Lay evidence should describe the material and relevant facts as to the veteran's disability observed within such period, not merely conclusions based upon opinion. (Emphasis added.) Finally, 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) provides that each disabling condition for which a veteran seeks service connection, must be considered on the basis of ... all pertinent medical and lay evidence.  (Emphasis added.) 22 As these provisions make clear, lay evidence is one type of evidence that must be considered, if submitted, when a veteran's claim seeks disability benefits. In fact, 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(b) clearly states that the factual basis for proving the existence of a chronic disease may be established by medical evidence, competent lay evidence or both. Thus, nothing in the regulatory or statutory provisions described above require both medical and competent lay evidence; rather, they make clear that competent lay evidence can be sufficient in and of itself. 23 The Veterans Court here stated that the Board found no competent evidence of record to substantiate Mr. Buchanan's claim that his psychiatric condition began during his first period of service or within the first year after service and thus, the Board's decision was not clearly erroneous. The Board's decision, however, does not reflect a determination on the competency of the lay statements. Rather, it reveals that the Board improperly determined that the lay statements lacked credibility merely because they were not corroborated by contemporaneous medical records. 24 The Board stated that [r]ecollections of medical problems some 20 years after the veteran's separation from service have slight probative value and lack credibility absent confirmatory clinical records to substantiate such recollections. (Appellant App. 21.) This statement reflects the Board's view that it considered the lay statements to be of slight probative value because of the significant time delay between the affiants' observations of Mr. Buchanan's behavior and the date on which the statements were written. That determination by the Board is completely within the Board's discretion to weigh the evidence submitted by the veteran in support of a claim for benefits and it does not appear to be the subject of Mr. Buchanan's challenge here. The second portion of the Board's statement, that the lay statements lack credibility absent confirmatory clinical records to substantiate such recollections, however, is another matter. The second portion of the Board's statement reflects a legally untenable interpretation of the above enumerated statutory and regulatory provisions: that absent confirmatory medical evidence, lay evidence lacks credibility. While the lack of contemporaneous medical records may be a fact that the Board can consider and weigh against a veteran's lay evidence, the lack of such records does not, in and of itself, render lay evidence not credible. Such an interpretation is unreasonable because it would render portions of the statutes and regulations meaningless as it would read out the option of establishing service connection based on competent lay evidence. 25 We also note that the Board found the opinion of the 2002 DVA examiner to be the most persuasive evidence of record because it relies on the objective medical documents in the record rather that [sic] the slight probative recollections of the veteran, his relatives, acquaintances, and a service comrade. (Appellant App. 22.) The examiner, however, ultimately relies not on the objective medical evidence, but rather the absence of such in reaching her opinion that the onset of Mr. Buchanan's psychiatric symptoms did not occur during his first period of service or within one year following that service. 1 As the opinion summary states: Thus, given the absence of any medical documentation from the veteran's [first] period of active duty service ... and given the absence of any medical documentation of psychiatric symptoms or treatment within the one-year presumptive period, ... the veteran's onset of symptoms of schizophrenia did not occur during his first period of active service or during the one year presumptive period. (Appellant App. 52.) 26 This is not to say that the Board may not discount lay evidence when such discounting is appropriate. Rather, the Board, as fact finder, is obligated to, and fully justified in, determining whether lay evidence is credible in and of itself, i.e., because of possible bias, conflicting statements, etc. Nor do we hold that the Board cannot weigh the absence of contemporaneous medical evidence against the lay evidence of record. Under the correct interpretation of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions, however, the Board cannot determine that lay evidence lacks credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence. If the Board concludes that the lay evidence presented by a veteran is credible and ultimately competent, the lack of contemporaneous medical evidence should not be an absolute bar to the veteran's ability to prove his claim of entitlement to disability benefits based on that competent lay evidence.