Opinion ID: 578193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Variance Between Indictment and Evidence at Trial

Text: 49 A variance between an indictment and proof at trial occurs when 'the charging terms are unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.'  Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902, 910 (6th Cir.1986)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1693, 114 L.Ed.2d 87 (1991). When such a variance occurs,  'convictions generally have been sustained as long as the proof upon which they are based corresponds to an offense that was clearly set out in the indictment.'  Id. at 599 (quoting United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 136, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 1815, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985)). A variance is fatal only when the defendant is prejudiced in his defense because he cannot anticipate from the indictment what evidence will be presented against him or is exposed to the risk of double jeopardy. Id. 50 On appeal, Haddock seems to argue two different variances. He first contends that although the indictment charged Haddock with violating policies and laws prohibiting conflicts of interest, evidence at trial showed that he made proper disclosures and abstained from voting so that he did not commit such violations. We note that this alleged error is not in the nature of a variance as described in our cases because--as Haddock's argument concedes--the indictment warned Haddock of the need to defend against conflict-of-interest accusations. Furthermore, after reviewing the indictment's language, we conclude that the few references to Haddock's conflict-of-interest responsibilities did not substantially prejudice his rights. 13 51 Haddock also contends that the government argued at trial that Haddock violated conflict-of-interest rules. This argument is more in the nature of a variance argument because the indictment's charging language does not refer to such violations. However, after reviewing the record, we conclude that the few innocuous references related to conflict-of-interest rules were closely related to the charges in Counts 3 and 5 that Haddock engaged in a scheme to defraud the Bank of White City. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence at trial did not prove facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.