Opinion ID: 1726049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the constitutionality of the michigan obscenity statute under current federal and state law

Text: The Michigan criminal obscenity statute, 1957 PA 265 as amended, MCL 750.343a; MSA 28.575(1), prohibits the knowing dissemination (or possession with intent to disseminate) of obscene materials: Any person who knowingly either sells, lends, gives away, distributes, shows or transmutes or offers either to sell, lend, give away, distribute, show or transmute, or has in his possession with intent either to sell, lend, give away, distribute, show or transmute, or advertise in any manner, or who otherwise knowingly offers for either loan, gift, sale or distribution, any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent, sadistic or masochistic book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, story paper, writing, paper, phonograph record, picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, figure, image, wire or tape recording or any written, printed or recorded matter of an indecent character which may or may not require mechanical or other means to be transmuted into auditory, visual or sensory representations of such character, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 1 year or by a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or by both such fine and imprisonment. For the purpose of this section, possession of 6 or more identical copies, or 6 or more articles of any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, story paper, writing, paper, phonograph record, picture drawing, photograph, slide, motion picture film, figure, image, wire or tape recording, or any written, printed or recorded matter of an indecent character, shall be prima facie evidence of possession with intent to sell, lend, give away, distribute, show or transmute the thing. The standard to be employed by the trier of fact in determining whether certain materials are obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent, sadistic or masochistic is found in MCL 750.343b; MSA 28.575(2) (1958 PA 127): The test to be applied in cases under section 343a of this act shall not be whether sexual desires or sexually improper thoughts would be aroused in those comprising a particular segment of the community, the young, the immature or the highly prudish, or would leave another segment, the scientific or highly educated or the so-called worldly wise and sophisticated, indifferent and unmoved. But such test shall be the effect of the book, picture or other subject to complaint considered as a whole, not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach, that is, its impact upon the average person in the community. The book, picture or other subject of complaint must be judged as a whole in its entire context, not by considering detached or separate portions only, and by the standards of common conscience of the community of the contemporary period of the violation charged. In People v Bloss, supra , this Court was first presented with an opportunity to examine these two statutes in light of the test set forth in Miller, supra . However, the Court declined the invitation to decide whether the statutes could be validly applied to the dissemination of obscene material to consenting adults: We are persuaded that defendant's conviction cannot stand for the reason that at the time he did the act complained of this Court had not construed the obscenity statute (as permitted in Miller) to proscribe such conduct. We are unanimously of the opinion that the Michigan statutes regulating the dissemination of `obscene' material as applied to juveniles and unconsenting adults are valid and enforceable. We are divided as to whether such statutes can properly be construed by us without further legislative expression as proscribing the dissemination of `obscene' material to consenting adults. See Const 1963, art 1, § 5. The people once again invite us, and indeed argue that we are compelled, to authoritatively construe the foregoing statutes so as to conform to the Miller standards and thus preserve their constitutionality. Miller, supra, 24, fn 6. Also see Hamling v United States, 418 US 87, 112-116; 94 S Ct 2887; 41 L Ed 2d 590 (1974), and Ward v Illinois, 431 US 767; 97 S Ct 2085; 52 L Ed 2d 738 (1977). The defendant maintains that the instant statutes are constitutionally vague and overbroad, and fail to incorporate the minimum constitutional requirements set forth in Miller. Furthermore, the defendant contends that these statutes cannot be authoritatively construed to conform to Miller because the Michigan Constitution of 1963, art 1, § 5, contains a less restrictive definition of freedom of speech than that found in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Even a cursory comparison of the Michigan criminal obscenity statutes with the detailed requirements set forth in Miller reveals that the statutes lack the specificity required of a statute which seeks to regulate speech and thus unquestionably fail to pass Federal constitutional muster. The terms employed in MCL 750.343a; MSA 28.575(1)  obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent, sadistic or masochistic  are neither specifically defined nor carefully limited as constitutionally required of any statute designed to regulate speech or expression. Miller, supra . Likewise, MCL 750.343b; MSA 28.575(2) does not contain, inter alia, the necessary limitation that the material in question lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in order to be found obscene. Miller, supra . Insofar as this statute defines obscenity, it appears to adopt the since-abandoned test announced in Roth v United States, supra , by asking whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. 354 US 476, 489. To define obscenity for constitutional purposes solely in terms of the capacity of the material to excite sexual thoughts or desires is clearly incompatible with Miller v California . Under Miller, statutes designed to suppress obscene material must, as written or construed, be limited not only to works which (a) appeal to prurient interests, but also to those which (b) depict or describe, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and which (c) taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. MCL 750.343a; MSA 28.575(1) and MCL 750.343b; MSA 28.575(2) are not so limited. These statutes are vague and overbroad, [10] and therefore unconstitutional on their face, as the people concede. [11]
It is clear, as the defendant contends and the people concede, that the Michigan criminal obscenity statute, as presently written, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under First Amendment and Miller analysis. However, the people urge us to construe this obscenity statute, as Miller expressly permits, [12] to conform to the Miller standards and thus prospectively preserve its constitutionality. [13] It is axiomatic that this Court will presume that all legislation is constitutional and will attempt to construe legislation so as to preserve its constitutionality: We are duty bound under the Michigan Constitution to preserve the laws of this state and to that end to construe them if we can so that they conform to Federal and state constitutional requirements. People v Bricker, 389 Mich 524, 528; 208 NW2d 172 (1973). The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: Congress shall make no law    abridging the freedom of speech. This First Amendment right to freedom of speech is guaranteed to citizens of the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Book Tower Garage, Inc v Local No 415, International Union, UAWA(CIO), 295 Mich 580, 586; 295 NW 320 (1940). But, as we discussed earlier, the United States Supreme Court has determined that obscenity is not within the scope of speech protected by the First Amendment. Miller, supra, 23. Therefore, we hold that the Michigan criminal obscenity statute, under the authoritative construction as to definitional limits [14] given it today, does not conflict with the First Amendment. However, the freedom of expression guarantee found in the Michigan Constitution is phrased somewhat differently: Every person may freely speak, write, express and publish his views on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right; and no law shall be enacted to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. Const 1963, art 1, § 5. The defendant, among others, [15] urges us to hold that Michigan's freedom of expression clause has a wider scope than the First Amendment and confers greater protection than its Federal counterpart on the dissemination of obscene materials to consenting adults. [16] While we agree that, in certain instances, the Michigan Constitution may confer broader protection upon certain types of expression, we do not agree that the right to freedom of expression in Michigan is unlimited. Furthermore, upon careful examination, we find nothing either in the provision itself or in the history [17] of the constitutional convention which even remotely leads us to believe the drafters intended to afford obscenity unlimited constitutional protection. On the contrary, the phrase being responsible for the abuse of such right indicates that the drafters foresaw situations in which certain types of speech would not fall within the protection guaranteed by the provision. We believe that obscenity, as presently defined by the United States Supreme Court, represents an abuse of such right and therefore does not fall within the purview of the protection assured. Additionally, we must not forget that constitutional provisions must be interpreted within the context of the times. Weems v United States, 217 US 349; 30 S Ct 544; 54 L Ed 793 (1910). The drafters of such provisions, even those who drafted such provisions as recently as the early 1960's, could not anticipate all societal needs. The proliferation of obscene publications and films together with the commercial establishments which deal in such items have become commonplace in many areas and, as such, constitute a blight on our commercial and residential neighborhoods. The Legislature has determined that the dissemination of obscene materials within this state is injurious to society. Therefore, the Legislature has decided, as a matter of public policy, to proscribe the dissemination of obscene materials. The public policy of this state is a mandate upon us. Bricker, supra, 529. We do not agree that the intervening [18] 1963 Michigan Constitution, art 1, § 5, provides greater protection for the knowing dissemination of obscene materials to consenting adults than that afforded by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Nor do we find any indication of legislative intent that the instant statute be applied only to the dissemination of obscene materials to juveniles and unconsenting adults, but not to consenting adults. See Bloss, supra .