Opinion ID: 2599731
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are attempted carjacking and attempted kidnapping lesser included offenses of attempted kidnapping during a carjacking?

Text: As discussed above, the Court of Appeal majority held that neither attempted carjacking nor attempted kidnapping were lesser included offenses of an attempt to violate section 209.5(a). (See ante, at 61 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 680-681, 161 P.3d at pp. 190-191.) Defendant argues the majority erred because acts which facilitate the carjacking through the kidnapping are acts toward both crimes. So, where the intent of the kidnapping is to carjack, then the ineffectual acts toward the kidnapping must, necessarily, also be acts toward the carjacking. Thus, defendant asserts his conviction for the lesser included offense of attempted carjacking must be reversed. ( People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 355, 228 Cal.Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d 595 ( Pearson ) [multiple convictions may not be based on necessarily included offenses]; People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 763, 83 Cal.Rptr. 411, 463 P.2d 763 ( Moran ) [If the evidence supports the verdict as to a greater offense, the conviction of that offense is controlling, and the conviction of the lesser offense must be reversed].) The People concede that both attempt offenses are lesser included offenses, but disagree with defendant on the consequences that flow from this proposition. Even if the trial court did not instruct sua sponte on the lesser included offense of attempted kidnapping as to counts 1 through 5, and attempted carjacking as to counts 2 through 5, the People contend there was no prejudicial error. Although a defendant has a constitutional right to have a jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence and the failure to so instruct is error, a trial court is not required to instruct the jury as to all lesser included offenses, only those that find substantial support in the evidence. ( People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 312, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170.) In this context, substantial evidence is evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude `that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.' ( Ibid. ) In this case, there was no substantial evidence that the offense committed was less than that charged. As the Court of Appeal majority concluded: If the jury found that [defendant] intended to kidnap the Perez family, it must have also found that he intended to carjack, as he was running from the police and jumped into the van and attempted to start it, knowing the Perez family was inside. If [defendant] had successfully started the van and driven away, he would have simultaneously committed carjacking and kidnapping. There was no evidence he intended only one of those offenses and not the other, or, under the facts, he would have committed only one. Defendant also argues the Court of Appeal majority erroneously failed to dismiss count 6 against Rodriguez as duplicative because he was convicted of the greater offense of kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking in count 1. However, the People contend, reversal is not required because the court's stay of the count 6 sentence (§ 654) more than adequately protected defendant from double punishment. At bottom, the People ask that we modify the so-called Moran/Pearson rule to permit courts to stay, instead of strike, convictions for lesser included offenses to prevent defendants from receiving a windfall if a greater offense conviction is reversed or otherwise rendered unenforceable. (See Moran, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 763, 83 Cal.Rptr. 411, 463 P.2d 763; Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 355, 228 Cal.Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d 595.) Defendant counters that this issue is beyond the scope of issues on which we granted review, and, more importantly, the People offer no sound basis to abandon this longstanding rule. Because this issue is fairly included within the issues on which we granted review (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(1)), we will address it. For reasons that follow, we conclude that both attempted carjacking and attempted kidnapping are lesser included offenses of an attempt to violate section 209.5(a), and that the rule against multiple convictions for lesser included offenses should remain unchanged. Under California law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser. [Citations.] ( People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073 ( Birks ).) In general, a defendant may be convicted of any number of the offenses charged (§ 954), but section 654 prohibits multiple punishment. When section 954 permits multiple conviction, but section 654 prohibits multiple punishment, the trial court must stay execution of sentence on the convictions for which multiple punishment is prohibited. [Citations.] ( People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 353, 137 P.3d 184 ( Reed ).) However, an exception to this general rule allowing multiple convictions prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses. ( Ibid.; Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 355, 228 Cal.Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d 595.) At the outset, we agree with both parties that attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 215) and attempted kidnapping (§§ 664, 207) are lesser included offenses of attempted kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking (§§ 664, 209.5(a)). If a defendant has a specific intent to commit both a kidnapping and a simultaneous carjacking intended to facilitate that kidnapping, it follows that he necessarily has the intent to commit each offense individually. Likewise, if a defendant performs a direct but ineffectual act towards both the kidnapping and carjacking, that same act also constitutes a direct but ineffectual act towards each offense individually. In other words, attempted kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking cannot be committed without also committing an attempted carjacking or an attempted kidnapping. (See Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 117, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073.) However, we reject the People's urging to modify the rule against multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses. ( Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 355, 228 Cal.Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d 595; Moron, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 763, 83 Cal.Rptr. 411, 463 P.2d 763.) Notwithstanding several cases which have questioned the foundation of the Pearson rule, including Pearson itself, we see no justification to modify the rule here. (See Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 355, 228 Cal.Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d 595 [the reason for the rule is unclear]; People v. Scheldt (1991) 231 Cal. App.3d 162, 168, 282 Cal.Rptr. 228 [same]; People v. Rush (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 20, 29, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 15 (dis. opn. of Woods, J.) [same; rule is of murky origin].) [7] There is logic behind the rule prohibiting convictions for both a greater offense and a necessarily included offense: If a defendant cannot commit the greater offense without committing the lesser, conviction of the greater is also conviction of the lesser. To permit conviction of both the greater and the lesser offense ``would be to convict twice of the lesser.'' ( People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 306[, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].) There is no reason to permit two convictions for the lesser offense. ( Ortega, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 705, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48 (cone. & dis. opn. of Chin, J.).) There is also no prejudice to the People if a court strikes, rather than stays, the conviction. If a greater offense is reversed on appeal, the lesser included offense may be revived by operation of law. (§ 1260; see People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 528, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385 [prosecutor has option to retry greater offense or accept reduction to lesser included offense]; People v. Edwards (1985) 39 Cal.3d 107, 118, 216 Cal.Rptr. 397, 702 P.2d 555 [same].) [8] Based on our conclusion that defendant's five convictions for attempted kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking be affirmed (in particular, count 1 with respect to victim Rodriguez) (see ante, at 61 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 686, 161 P.3d at p. 195), his conviction for count 6 for the lesser included offense of attempted carjacking against Rodriguez is reversed.