Opinion ID: 1399120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Refusal of Instructions Requested by Defense

Text: 1. Refusal of Instruction on Lingering Doubt (47) Citing People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137 [37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381], defendant proposed that the jury be instructed as follows: Possible innocence is a mitigating factor which you may consider in determining the appropriate penalty in this case. You are permitted to demand a greater degree of certainty of guilt for the imposition of the death penalty. Therefore, any lingering doubt you may have concerning the guilt of the Defendant may be considered by you as a mitigating factor upon which to base a sentence less than death. The trial court refused to give the requested instruction, but commented that this is appropriate argument. Defendant contends that the refusal to give his lingering doubt instruction violated his rights to due process of law, to protection against cruel and unusual punishment, to freedom from a death sentence that is arbitrarily and unreliably imposed, and to trial by a fair and impartial jury. In People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351], we concluded that while a defendant may not be precluded from offering evidence on or arguing the relevance of lingering doubt in mitigation at the penalty phase, neither the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution nor the California Constitution require that the jury be instructed to consider residual doubt as to the extent of defendant's participation in the offense, except as statutorily provided. (53 Cal.3d at p. 677.) We noted that our holding in People v. Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d 137, on which defendant here relies, neither imposed nor contemplated an obligation to instruct on lingering doubt. Terry established no constitutional mandate to do so; and defendant offers no rationale for interpreting our state guaranties any more stringently than comparable federal provisions. ( People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 678.) We did, however, observe that [a]s a matter of statutory mandate, the court must charge the jury `on any points of law pertinent to the issue, if requested' [citations]; thus, it may be required to give a properly formulated lingering doubt instruction when warranted by the evidence. ( People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 678, fn. 20.) We rejected the defendant's proffered instruction in Cox because it erroneously prescribed that the jury evaluate lingering doubt in a particular manner. ( Ibid. ) Assuming for the sake of argument that defendant's proffered instruction suffered no similar infirmity, we are still unable to conclude that the court's refusal to give the proffered instruction caused prejudice. Trial counsel did not argue that the jury should base its decision on any residual doubt as to defendant's guilt of the murder of Urell. In fact, counsel  perhaps mindful of the pitfalls of lingering doubt arguments (see People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 455 [285 Cal. Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273] [`Lingering doubt' arguments are often unwise, for they risk antagonizing a jury that has already found defendant guilty.])  twice specifically stated that that issue had already been decided. Even so, without comment and without objection, he read the text of his proposed lingering doubt instruction to the jury. Under these circumstances, we do not believe defendant would have derived any additional benefit had the requested instruction been given. 2. Refusal of Instruction on Specific Mitigating Facts (48) Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution by refusing a special jury instruction he proffered. The instruction read as follows: Defendant request [ sic ] that added to the mitigating factors in CALJIC 8.84.1: [¶] 1. Defendant's loving family ties. [¶] 2. Personal difficulties or deprivations. [¶] 3. His waiver of extradition to come to California to stand trial. [¶] 4. His caring and sensitivity towards his friends. [¶] 5. The absence of any criminal conduct prior to or after the incidences [ sic ] alleged in this trial. The trial court instead instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 8.84.1. [27] The trial court also read the following instructions requested by defendant: Mercy, pity and sympathy for the defendant are proper considerations in determining the penalty in this case, should you find them to be warranted under the circumstances. [¶] Evidence of mitigating factors related solely to the defendant's background and character must be carefully weighed and may serve as a basis for a sentence less than death. Although the court was not obliged to do so, it also read the following special instructions requested by defendant: In determining the penalty in this case, you are obligated to weigh and consider evidence that the defendant, quote, `was a loving and helpful man in his relationships with his relatives and friends,' end quote. Such evidence is proper for your consideration as to whether or not you determine to spare the defendant's life. The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's special instruction. In large part it duplicated other instructions given ( People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1134 [248 Cal. Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049]); it was also flawed in that it was argumentative, i.e., it merely highlighted certain aspects of the evidence without further illuminating the legal standards at issue ( People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 442 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]; see also People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 804-806 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330]; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1276-1277 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251]). The instructions given, in our view, adequately covered the defense theory and provided sufficient guidance to the jury. To the extent that defendant is complaining that inapplicable sentencing factors were not deleted from the jury instructions, we have already resolved that issue unfavorably to him. ( People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 551 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129].)