Opinion ID: 2394524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Circuit Court's Failure To Enter A Declaratory Judgment

Text: Before reaching the substantive issues of this case, we must first address an important procedural matter. This case came before this Court, in part, as an appeal of a declaratory action. In issuing its written opinion on or about December 23, 2005, the Circuit Court disposed of the case by stating: In accordance with the foregoing memorandum opinion, and upon consideration of the arguments of the parties and the record from the administrative agency below, it is on this 23rd day of December, 2005, by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, ORDERED, that the decision of the Civil Service Board of the City of Annapolis be and hereby is REVERSED; and it is further, ORDERED, that the case be and hereby is REMANDED to the Annapolis City [sic] Service Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We hold the Circuit Court failed to enter a written declaration of the rights of the parties, as required by Maryland law. This Court, on numerous occasions, has reiterated that whether a declaratory judgment action is decided for or against the plaintiff, there should be a declaration in the judgment or decree defining the rights of the parties under the issues made. Case v. Comptroller, 219 Md. 282, 288, 149 A.2d 6, 9 (1959); accord Bushey v. Northern Assurance Company of America, 362 Md. 626, 651, 766 A.2d 598, 611 (2001); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 87, 660 A.2d 447, 455 (1995); Christ v. Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources, 335 Md. 427, 436, 644 A.2d 34, 38 (1994). To do otherwise, we have held is error. See Ashton, 339 Md. at 87, 660 A.2d at 455, and cases cited therein. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 363 Md. 106, 117 n. 1, 767 A.2d 831, 837 n. 1 (2001), we explained this requirement further: [W]hen a declaratory judgment action is brought and the controversy is appropriate for resolution by declaratory judgment, the court must enter a declaratory judgment and that judgment, defining the rights and obligations of the parties or the status of the thing in controversy, must be in writing. It is not permissible for the court to issue an oral declaration. The text of the judgment must be in writing. No[t] since the 1997 amendment to Maryland Rule 2-601(a), is it permissible for the declaratory judgment to be part of a memorandum. That rule requires that [e]ach judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. When entering a declaratory judgment, the court must, in a separate document, state in writing its declaration of the rights of the parties, along with any other order that is intended to be part of the judgment. Although the judgment may recite that it is based on the reasons set forth in an accompanying memorandum, the terms of the declaratory judgment itself must be set forth separately. Incorporating by reference an earlier oral ruling is not sufficient, as no one would be able to discern the actual declaration of rights from the document posing as the judgment. This is not just a matter of complying with a hyper-technical rule. The requirement that the court enter its declaration in writing is for the purpose of giving the parties and the public fair notice of what the court has determined. (Internal citations omitted) (second emphasis added). Accord Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 379 Md. 301, 307-08 n. 7, 841 A.2d 858, 862-63 n. 7 (2004); Jackson v. Millstone, 369 Md. 575, 593, 801 A.2d 1034, 1045 (2002). This error by the Circuit Court, however, is not jurisdictional and is not fatal to our reaching the merits of Petitioners' appeal. Bushey, 362 Md. at 651, 766 A.2d at 611; Salamon, 379 Md. at 307 n. 7, 841 A.2d at 862-63 n. 7; Jackson, 369 Md. at 593, 801 A.2d at 1045. This Court may, in its discretion, review the merits of the controversy and remand for the entry of an appropriate declaratory judgment by the circuit court. Bushey, 362 Md. at 651, 766 A.2d at 611. Therefore, as this Court did in Bushey, we shall order that on remand, the Circuit Court shall enter an appropriate declaratory judgment order consistent with this opinion, stating the rights of the parties. The Circuit Court may include, in addition to the declaration of rights, ancillary relief as necessary (e.g., directions to the Civil Service Board to implement the declaratory judgment).
The Civil Service Board's Determination That Section 3.36.150A1 Does Not Apply to Permit Petitioners To Receive Increases In Their Pension Payment In Tandem With Pay Scale Increases Given To Active City Employees. Petitioners argue that the Civil Service Board erred in determining that Mr. Bowen was not entitled to have his pension increased by the same percentage as `any' pay scale increases granted to active members of the Police and Fire Departments who had `the same rank and years of service' as Mr. Bowen. Petitioners contend that the statutory language of Section 3.36.150A1 is clear and unambiguous in its intent: The `Old Plan' in Section A is based upon `any' pay scale increases for active members, with a discretionary cost-of-living provision . . . added in the second sentence of [Section] 3.36.150A1 as a `safety net' if active members do not get a pay scale increase in a given year. Petitioners argue, in reading the sentence at issue in Section 3.36.150A1, that `any' increase in the pay scale means any increase in the pay scale, regardless of how it is denominated by the City. Petitioners assert that any other reading of this operative sentence results in a reinvent[ing of] the reading of the statute: Unless this Court construes the clear, mandatory language of the first sentence of [Section] 3.36.150A1 as it is written, [Mr. Bowen] will never get an increase in [his] pension[], unless the City Council, in its complete discretion, decides at some time to give [retired employees] a cost-of-living adjustment. The City maintains that the phrase increase in the pay scale contained in Section 3.36.150A1 is ambiguous, requiring this Court to look beyond the plain language of the provision to its legislative history. The City argues that while there is no dispute that active employees received an increase in pay following the implementation of the Yarger and Hendricks Studies, . . . it does not follow that an `increase in the pay scale' occurred when the public safety pay scale was readjusted in 1995 and 2001. The City contends that the implementation of both the Yarger and Hendricks Studies, the provision's title and preamble, and the code's legislative history indicate that the equalization provision deals only with cost-of-living adjustment increases, not whole-scale changes to the pay scale structure. We disagree with the City's position and hold that Section 3.36.150A1 is clear and unambiguous in its intent.