Opinion ID: 2811263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Issues Regarding Count 2

Text: Madrid next contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss Count 2 as time-barred. We review a district court’s legal conclusions regarding the statute of limitations de novo. See United States v. Irby, 703 F.3d 280, 282-83 (5th Cir. 2012). Madrid argues that he cannot be liable for criminal activity that was completed before December 14, 2006—five years before the original indictment was returned. The district court denied Madrid’s motion to dismiss but limited the allegations in Count 2—the substantive bribery charge, alleging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)—to conduct that fell within the five years immediately preceding the return of the original indictment. Accordingly, the acts allegedly taken in violation of Count 2 were limited to the December 21, 2006, payment from Garcia to Zavala and the December 23, 2006, payment from Zavala to Briones. Madrid’s argument that he cannot be liable for these acts because Garcia wrote and transmitted the checks to Zavala, is unavailing. “Well settled is the principle that a party to a continuing conspiracy may be responsible for a substantive offense committed by a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, even though that party does not participate in the substantive offense[.]” United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 999 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946)). The jury found Madrid guilty of conspiring with Garcia and others to bribe Briones under Count 1. Garcia’s foreseeable act in furtherance of that conspiracy which took place during the covered period—hand delivering Zavala a check in Accordingly, Briones’s letter was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the bribery and the scheme to defraud the United States because it was mailed for the very purpose of perpetuating the illusion that LKG was satisfactorily completing its duties under the federally funded contract. 31 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 32 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 order to funnel funds to Briones—renders Madrid liable for the substantive criminal charge under § 666(a)(2) even if he did not himself participate in the physical act of delivering Zavala the check. See, e.g., United States v. Tilton, 610 F.2d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 1980) (reasoning that the defendant “can be held responsible for the substantive offenses committed by the co-conspirators if acts were committed in furtherance of a conspiracy even though [the defendant] neither participated in the act . . . nor actually knew about it.”). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying Madrid’s motion to dismiss Count 2 as time-barred.
Madrid also challenges the district court’s jury charge regarding Count 2, contending that the judge failed to adequately inform the jury that, under Pinkerton, he may only be convicted of crimes completed by his coconspirators where those acts were “in furtherance and as a foreseeable consequence of that conspiracy.” See Pattern Jury Instructions: Fifth Circuit, Criminal Cases, §2.22 (2012) (emphasis added). Madrid and the government dispute whether he preserved this issue for review and, thus, debate whether our review should be for an abuse of discretion or for plain error. Because we conclude that Madrid has not demonstrated reversible error under either standard of review, we will assume arguendo that Madrid adequately preserved the error and analyze the issue under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 2012). Assuming arguendo that the district court’s Pinkerton instruction here amounted to an abuse of discretion, any error in the jury charge was harmless and, therefore, does not require that we vacate Madrid’s conviction on Count 2. See generally United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2007) 32 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 33 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 (“An error in a jury instruction is subject to harmless error review.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As noted above, because of the fiveyear statute of limitations, the district court limited the acts charged under Count 2 to the payment from Garcia to Zavala on December 21, 2006, and the payment from Zavala to Briones on December 23, 2006. With a proper Pinkerton charge, the jury would have been instructed to convict Madrid of Count 2, the substantive count charging Madrid with the bribery of Briones, only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that these two monetary transactions were acts committed by Madrid’s coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. The evidence overwhelmingly established that Garcia’s purpose in hand-delivering Zavala the $3,000 check on December 21, 2006, and Zavala’s delivery of $2,000 to Briones on December 23, 2006, was to funnel money to Briones to further the conspiracy to pay Briones in exchange for her support in the maintenance and renewal of the LKG contract. Accordingly, assuming error in the district court’s jury charge, based on our review of the record, “we are convinced that the error could not have affected the outcome of the case,” United States v. Montgomery, 747 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2014), and, therefore, any error in the Pinkerton charge is harmless.