Opinion ID: 6346965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity

Text: Plaintiffs also contend that “there can be no doubt that the States have consented to suit pursuant to ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.” (Appellants’ Br. 45.) They add that “[u]nless the legal reasoning is that the ‘several States’ hid their fingers crossed behind their backs when ratifying U.S. Const. amend. XIII, it cannot be logically argued that the ‘several States’ retained sovereign immunity . . . against suit for violation of U.S. Const. amend. XIII . . . .” (Id. at 46.) However, Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence suggests otherwise. The text of the Eleventh Amendment provides as follows: The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. U.S. Const. amend. XI. Simply put, the “Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state or its agencies in federal court.” Brent v. Wayne Cty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 681 (6th Cir. 2018). The text itself “applies only if the plaintiff is not a citizen of the defendant State.” Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (2020). But the Supreme Court “has long understood [the] Amendment to ‘stand not so much for what it says’ as for the broader ‘presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms.’” Id. (citation omitted). Based on that presupposition, the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of the Amendment’s plain language in two significant ways. First, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1890), the Supreme Court held that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity applies to private suits commenced against a state by citizens of the same state. See also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 140–41 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Second, in Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985), the Court made the Eleventh Amendment applicable to state officials sued in their official capacity. However, even with these expansions, there are “three exceptions to sovereign immunity: (1) when the state has waived immunity by consenting to the suit; (2) when Congress has expressly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity, and (3) when the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), applies.” Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 410 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 598 (6th Cir. 2016)). In No. 21-6183 Smith v. Commonwealth of Ky. Page 8 this case, Kentucky has not waived immunity. (See Appellee’s Br. 13; Second Mot. to Dismiss, R. 10, Page ID # 102); see also id., 865 F.3d at 410 (concluding that “appearance in court to present certain defenses, such as a statute of limitations argument, is not a defense on the merits indicating waiver of immunity”) (citing Akers v. Cty. Of Bell, 498 F. App’x 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2012)). Nor does the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young apply because Plaintiffs do not “bring claims for prospective relief.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 412 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court’s analysis is limited to whether the Thirteenth Amendment expressly abrogates Kentucky’s sovereign immunity. See id. at 410. The text of the Thirteenth Amendment and relevant authority show that it does not. The Supreme Court has clarified that Congress may only abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity by “unequivocally” expressing its intent to abrogate immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of power. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55–56 (1996); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). The Thirteenth Amendment lacks such unequivocal language explicitly, or implicitly, expressing that states “shall not be immune” from actions that may stem from its provisions. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1001; U.S. Const. amend. XIII; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 57 (concluding that “the numerous references to the ‘State’” in the text of the provision providing the cause of action and remedial scheme at issue “make it indubitable that Congress intended . . . to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from suit”). This is also true of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Supreme Court has compared to the Thirteenth Amendment in the context of congressional enforcement. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1883); see also U.S. Const. amends. XIII § 2, XIV § 5. Importantly, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment itself does not abrogate sovereign immunity merely through its ratification by the states; rather, Congress may “carve out” such an exception via statutes promulgated under its enforcement authority. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1976) (finding clear evidence of congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of Title VII). And this Court has concluded that even if “one assumes arguendo” that “the implementing clause of the thirteenth amendment,” like the implementing clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “also gave Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity,” a plaintiff must still point to “evidence of a clear No. 21-6183 Smith v. Commonwealth of Ky. Page 9 congressional purpose to use [that] power [].” Foulks v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 713 F.2d 1229, 1232–33 (6th Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original). In other words, both the Supreme Court and this Court have concluded that ratification is insufficient to establish clear intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs insist that because the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing without any ancillary legislation, the amendment itself abrogated state sovereign immunity without any need for Congress to act. However, this argument is foreclosed for similar reasons: despite the selfexecuting nature of both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, this Court and the Supreme Court have concluded that a clear statement regarding abrogation is necessary to overcome sovereign immunity. See id.; Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 451–52. Other circuits have unanimously agreed. See, e.g., Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 748 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (concluding that the text of the Thirteenth Amendment does not provide an “express and unequivocal” abrogation of the Cherokee Nation’s sovereign immunity); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the text of the Thirteenth Amendment does not abrogate sovereign immunity regardless of any self-enforcing construction that may or may not be attached to it). Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that Kentucky’s sovereign immunity barred Plaintiffs’ claims. In its order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the district court stated the following: The allegations in this case are awful. If true, the victims undoubtedly suffered harm and deserve relief. But the Court cannot carve a new cause of action against Plaintiffs’ preferred defendants and despite Kentucky’s sovereign immunity. The Constitution is not a Swiss Army knife judges carry to whittle away inconvenient aspects of state law. Not every injury––not even the most profound––finds a remedy in the U.S. Constitution. (Op. & Order, R. 13, Page ID # 181.) The alleged conduct is indeed awful, and it sets out the possibility of a number of state and federal law violations. It also raises broader policy questions regarding the limitations periods that apply to constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Owens, 488 U.S. at 250 (concluding that courts considering § 1983 claims should apply the limitations period established by the state’s general or residual statute for personal injury actions); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a) (establishing a limitations period of one year for No. 21-6183 Smith v. Commonwealth of Ky. Page 10 personal injury actions); see generally Collard, 896 F.2d at 180. However, the district court did not err when it dismissed Plaintiffs’ suit because they did not bring their claims pursuant to a viable cause of action. Additionally, even if Plaintiffs had done so, the state of Kentucky has not waived its immunity, and the Thirteenth Amendment does not otherwise abrogate its sovereign immunity. See Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284–85 (2011); Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 55. While the Court acknowledges the severity of Plaintiffs’ allegations, controlling precedent limits its capacity to craft a new path for relief where Plaintiffs simply failed to timely file their complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Azul-Pacifico, Inc., 973 F.2d at 705.