Opinion ID: 1730477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of unreliable testimony of anthony washington.

Text: Carr alleges it was error for the trial court to allow Anthony Washington to testify at trial concerning statements Carr made to Washington while both were incarcerated in the Tate County jail. He maintains such testimony was unreliable. Carr states that the only evidence that Carr was anything but a mere accessory after the fact in this crime was Washington's testimony. Washington's proposed testimony was a focal point of an extensive pretrial suppression hearing. During the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked Washington on cross-examination if in fact he had come forward with the information regarding Carr because you saw an opportunity to help yourself. Washington responded that he did not. Defense counsel asked Washington why he did not tell anyone sooner about the information he had regarding Carr and the Parker murders. Washington replied that nobody had asked him. Following Washington's testimony at the suppression hearing, Carr conceded that there was insufficient proof that Washington had been acting as an agent of the State. At that point the trial court found the statements Carr made to Washington were spontaneous or made as a matter of conversation between two inmates. The court found that Washington was not acting as an agent for the State or any way subject to the control of the State. It was also noted by the court that Washington did not report the statements until a week after they were made. The trial court denied the defense motion to suppress Carr's statement to Washington. Carr cites McNeal v. State, 551 So.2d 151 (Miss. 1989), to show this Court's disdain for a prosecutor's reliance on the testimony of a jail house snitch. Id. at 158. Carr cites a string of authority condemning the use of snitches, and pointing up the inherent unreliability in the testimony. However, most of this Court's mistrust in snitch testimony is predicated on the fact that the snitch gets something in exchange for his testimony, usually a reduced sentence. See McNeal, 551 So.2d at 158. In Sudduth v. State, 562 So.2d 67 (Miss. 1990), this Court found that the admission of the testimony of three convicts regarding statements against interest made by the defendant in jail was not error. The credibility of a witness, even a convict witness, is for the jury. Id. at 70 ( citing Bevill v. State, 556 So.2d 699 (Miss. 1990)). Carr also contends that a cautionary jury instruction should have been given, warning jurors that snitch testimony should be viewed with suspicion. Carr did not request such a cautionary instruction. Failure to request an instruction serves as a bar to raising the point on appeal. Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 937 (Miss. 1986). A thorough suppression hearing and extensive cross-examination produced no evidence to indicate that Washington was offered any kind of reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony. In the absence of evidence that he stood to gain anything by his testimony against Carr, Washington's statement was not inherently unreliable. Washington's criminal record, character, motivation, reliability, and the circumstances surrounding his recitation of statements made by Carr were all factors properly left to the jury to weigh. Instruction C-1 properly instructed the jury as to the weight and credibility to be given such testimony. It was not error for the trial court to permit Washington's testimony concerning statements Carr made to him during their incarceration. There is no merit to this assignment of error.