Opinion ID: 2103784
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of Strict Scrutiny

Text: The next critical inquiry in our review is the nature of the State's interests and when each of the respective interests becomes compelling. In our view, the State has an interest in promoting the health and safety of all its citizens, and the State clearly has a compelling interest in maternal health from the beginning of pregnancy. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 1 (stating that the government is instituted for [the] peace, safety and happiness of its citizens); but see Roe, 410 U.S. at 163, 93 S.Ct. at 731 (With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the `compelling' point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester.). In Davis, we discussed the State's interest in potential life. There, we were concerned with the State's interest in the potential life of the four- to eight-cell preembryos, and we ultimately concluded that the State's interest in potential life was insufficient to permit an infringement on the parties' procreational autonomy. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602. We reviewed our state statutes which deal with potential human life and noted that Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-5-106(b) (1980) allowed a civil action for wrongful death of a viable fetus. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602 n. 26 (emphasis added). We further noted that pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-13-107 and -214 (1991), a person cannot commit a criminal offense against a fetus unless the fetus is viable. Id. Finally, we reviewed the trimester framework of our criminal abortion statutes. We reasoned that: Taken collectively, our statutes reflect the policy decision that, at least in some circumstances, the interest of living individuals in avoiding procreation is sufficient to justify taking steps to terminate the procreational process, despite the state's interest in potential life. Id. We thus concluded that the State's interest in the four- to eight-cell preembryos was at best slight and indicated that viability marks a critical developmental point in a woman's pregnancy. Id. at 602, 602 n. 26. We further noted in Davis that the abortion statute reveals that the increase in the state's interest is marked by each successive developmental stage.... Id. at 602. It follows that as the pregnancy progresses, the State's interest in potential life gradually increases and gradually comes into conflict with the woman's interest in procreational autonomy. In our view, therefore, it is clear that at some developmental point in the woman's pregnancy, the State's interest in potential life becomes compelling, and the woman's interest in procreational autonomy must yield to the State's interest. See id. at 602 n. 26; Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-5-106(c) (Supp.1999); Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-13-107 and -214 (1997). Accordingly, we hold that the State's interest in potential life becomes compelling at viability. Bearing these constitutional standards in mind, we now consider the challenged provisions.