Opinion ID: 1928076
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Both Zanders and Harris moved for judgment of acquittal after the government's case. See Super.Ct.Crim.R. 29(a). [4] Zanders did not renew his motion at the end of all testimony; however, he presented no evidence in his defense. The government argues that the sufficiency of the evidence to convict Zanders is not properly before us on appeal, and that his argument is governed by the manifest error standard of review. See Noaks v. United States, 486 A.2d 1177, 1178-79 (D.C.1985). In United States v. Sherod, 295 U.S.App. D.C. 148, 149-51, 960 F.2d 1075, 1077 (1992), the court ruled that: When a defendant offers evidence in his defense after a Rule 29(a) motion, his objection to the denial is waived. He cannot thereafter successfully appeal his conviction based on insufficient evidence without renewal of the motion at the close of all evidence. Here Zanders offered no evidence in his defense. Only Harris presented a defense witness, Special Agent Stanko, and Zanders posed no questions to this witness. In United States v. Belt, 574 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1978), Belt moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's case. The motion was denied. He put on no evidence, but his attorney cross-examined his co-defendant and also called witnesses to rebut his co-defendant's testimony. On these facts, the court held that there was no waiver of his objection to the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal: In the circumstances of this case we hold that Belt did not forego appellate review of his mid-trial motion for judgment of acquittal by cross-examining his codefendant and calling witnesses to rebut the codefendant's testimony. 574 F.2d at 1236. In United States v. Thomas, 987 F.2d 697 (11th Cir.1993), Thomas made a motion for judgment of acquittal both at the end of the government's case, and at the close of all evidence. He was charged in a two count indictment with conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute; and aiding and abetting his codefendant in the use and carrying of a firearm during a drug felony. He did not put on any evidence relating to the second count. The court held that he reserved his right to review of the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's evidence: We conclude that refraining from offering any evidence on the gun count, Thomas reserved his right, under Rule 29, to have this court review that count by considering only the evidence offered by the government during his case-in-chief. 987 F.2d at 704. Similarly, we conclude that since Zanders offered no evidence in his defense after his motion for judgment of acquittal following the close of evidence put on by the government, he did not waive his objection to the denial of his motion. Hence, we review the denial of both Zanders' and Harris' motions for judgment of acquittal according to our usual standard. In reviewing [the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on] the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine if it was sufficient to permit reasonable jurors to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Dyson v. United States, 450 A.2d 432, 436 (D.C.1982) (referencing Byrd v. United States, 388 A.2d 1225, 1229 (D.C.1978))). Moreover, [i]t is only where the government has produced no evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that this court can reverse a conviction. Gayden v. United States, 584 A.2d 578, 580 (D.C.1990) (quoting Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 371 (D.C.1979)). See also Curington v. United States, 621 A.2d 819, 824 (D.C.1993).