Opinion ID: 2521471
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Provocation and Second-Degree Murder

Text: Prior to 1996, our criminal code contained a separate offense named heat of passion manslaughter. Ch. 295, sec. 13, § 18-3-104, 1996 Colo. Sess. Laws 1840, 1844-45. The manslaughter statute provided that: (1) A person commits the crime of manslaughter if: ... (c) Such person knowingly causes the death of another person under circumstances where the act causing the death was performed upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a serious and highly provoking act of the intended victim, affecting the person who performs the killing sufficiently to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person; but, if between the provocation and the killing there is an interval sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing is murder. § 18-3-104, 8B C.R.S. (1995 Supp.); Ch. 295, sec. 13, § 18-3-104, 1996 Colo. Sess. Laws 1840, 1844-45. Heat of passion manslaughter was classified as a class 3 felony. § 18-3-104; Ch. 295, sec. 13, § 18-3-104, 1996 Colo. Sess. Laws 1840, 1844-45. The General Assembly amended our criminal code in 1996 and eliminated the separate offense of heat of passion manslaughter. A homicide committed in the heat of passion, or upon provocation, is now treated as a less culpable form of second-degree murder. [5] Thus, the issue of provocation is treated as a factor in mitigation of second-degree murder affecting the applicable felony classification, and is located within section 18-3-103. § 18-3-103(3)(b), 6 C.R.S. (2003); People v. Ramirez, 56 P.3d 89, 94 (Colo.2002). The current second-degree murder statute provides that: (1) A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if the person knowingly causes the death of a person. ... (3)(a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (3), murder in the second degree is a class 2 felony. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (3), murder in the second degree is a class 3 felony where the act causing the death was performed upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a serious and highly provoking act of the intended victim, affecting the defendant sufficiently to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person; but, if between the provocation and the killing there is an interval sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing is a class 2 felony. § 18-3-103. If found by the jury, the mitigator reduces a conviction for second-degree murder from a class 2 to a class 3 felony. § 18-3-103(3)(b). This reduces the presumptive sentencing range from eight to twenty-four years to four to twelve years. § 18-1.3-401, 6 C.R.S. (2003). A provocation instruction is warranted whenever a defendant shows some supporting evidenceregardless of how incredible, unreasonable, improbable, or slight it may beto establish each factor described in subsection (3)(b) of the second-degree murder statute. Mata-Medina, 71 P.3d at 979; People v. Garcia, 826 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Colo.1992). Specifically, the defendant must produce evidence in support of the second-degree murder mitigator showing that: (1) the act causing the death was performed upon a sudden heat of passion; (2) caused by a serious and highly provoking act of the intended victim; (3) which was sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person; and (4) between the provocation and the killing, an insufficient interval of time passed for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard. § 18-3-103(3)(b). When the jury is instructed on the mitigator, the prosecution bears the burden of disproving the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Sepulveda, 65 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Colo.2003). The jury will be asked to complete a special verdict form that indicates its finding as to the presence or absence of the mitigating circumstances. Robert J. Dieter, Colorado Criminal Practice and Procedure § 18.163 (1996 Supp.2003). It is the function of the jury, not the trial court, to weigh and consider the evidence to determine which grade of criminal homicide, if any, the defendant committed. Mata-Medina, 71 P.3d at 979 (quoting Read, 119 Colo. at 509, 205 P.2d at 235). Therefore, unless there is an absence of evidence in support of the mitigating factors, the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on provocation is error. Id. (quoting Read, 119 Colo. at 509, 205 P.2d at 235); People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375, 379 (Colo.1982) (quoting Crawford, 12 Colo. at 292, 20 P. at 770).