Opinion ID: 2328582
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Willful conduct

Text: Two of the three § 14-404 provisions that the Board concluded Petitioner had violated (i.e., § 14-404(a)(11) and (36)) require a finding that Petitioner acted willfully. Petitioner asserts that inclusion of the term willfully in those provisions required the Board to prove that he knew his statements were false and intended to deceive the Board by inducing it to act to its detriment by renewing his license. Petitioner, pursuant to that understanding of the term, adds that there was legally insufficient evidence to prove that he acted willfully in failing to disclose the pending Wagner case. To the contrary, he asserts, any suggestion of willfulness is belied by the evidence (1) of his demonstrated English language limitations and (2) that he disclosed the pending malpractice action on his previously filed hospital privileges renewal application. The Board counters that willful does not require the intent to deceive, but rather only that the act be purposeful conduct, which requires neither a bad motive nor knowing unlawfulness. (citing Deibler v. State, 365 Md. 185, 199, 776 A.2d 657, 665 (2001)). The Board further asserts that the ALJ's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence because Petitioner admitted that he was aware of the pending case when he filed his application, yet he nevertheless indicated on his license renewal application that there were no malpractice claims pending against him. The ALJ's decision, adopted by the Board's Final Decision and Order, relied on the definition of willful endorsed by this Court in Deibler, 365 Md. 185, 776 A.2d 657. In that case, we considered the meaning of willful under the Maryland criminal wiretap statute and discussed four distinct definitions of the term. Id. at 192-93, 776 A.2d at 661. We explained: [W]illful has received four different constructions from the courts. The first, and most restrictive, is that an act is willful only if it is done with a bad purpose or evil motivedeliberately to violate the law. A second interpretation considers an act to be willful if it is done with an intent to commit the act and with a knowledge that the act is in violation of the law. That construction does not require that the defendant possess a sinister motivation, but, like the first interpretation, it does require knowledge that the act is unlawful. The third interpretation requires only that the act be committed voluntarily and intentionally as opposed to one that is committed through inadvertence, accident, or ordinary negligence. Under that approach, [a]s long as there is an intent to commit the act, there can be a finding of willfulness even though the actor was consciously attempting to comply with the law and was acting with the good faith belief that the action was lawful. What is required is an objective intent to commit the act but not necessarily a knowledge that the act will bring about the illegal result. Finally... some courts have gone so far as to find an act willful even though it was not committed intentionally, but through oversight, inadvertence, or negligence. Id., 776 A.2d at 661 (quoting S. Brogan, An Analysis of the Term Willful in Federal Criminal Statutes, 51 Notre Dame Lawyer 786 (1976)) (second alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). We concluded that most applications of willful, if not all, fell within the third definition: a willful act is committed voluntarily and intentionally, not necessarily with the intent to deceive. Id. at 195, 776 A.2d at 663. The ALJ correctly recognized (and, by its adoption of the ALJ's findings and conclusions, so too did the Board), that we have rejected the conclusion that willful means that a person acts with a deceitful or fraudulent motive, in the context of attorney grievance proceedings. See, e.g., Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Jarosinski, 411 Md. 432, 451, 983 A.2d 477, 488-89 (2009) (stating that, [i]n the context of attorney grievance matters, willfulness is defined as `the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty not requiring a deceitful or fraudulent motive.' A hearing judge need not have evidence of a deceitful or fraudulent motive to conclude that an attorney's conduct was willful and concluding that the attorney willfully misappropriated client trust funds (quoting Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Nussbaum, 401 Md. 612, 636, 934 A.2d 1, 15 (2007) (internal citation omitted))). Similarly, the Court of Special Appeals has defined willful as intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental, in the context of civil litigation. See Bond v. PolyCycle, Inc., 127 Md.App. 365, 381, 382, 732 A.2d 970, 978 (1999) (concluding that appellant acted willfully in deleting files from computers even though he believed that he was entitled to take the technology) (quoting Pac. Mortg. and Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Horn, 100 Md.App. 311, 332-33, 641 A.2d 913, 923 (1994)). The intermediate appellate court has concluded also that this definition is not erroneous in other administrative contexts. See Bereano v. State Ethics Comm'n, 174 Md.App. 146, 162, 176-77, 920 A.2d 1137, 1146, 1155 (2007), reversed on other grounds and remanded, 403 Md. 716, 756-57, 944 A.2d 538, 561-62 (2008) (adopting the Commission's definition of knowin[g] and willfu[l] as intentional, or knowing, or voluntary as distinguished from accidental (internal quotation marks omitted)). Despite the broad support in Maryland caselaw for the definition of willfulness that the Board employed in applying § 14-404, Petitioner insists that, [t]o establish a prima facie case for `willfully making a false representation' to obtain a license or renewal of a license[,] the State must prove ... that [Petitioner] intended to deceive the [Board] by inducing it to act to its detriment. For support of that notion, Petitioner cites Maryland Board of Physicians v. Elliott, 170 Md.App. 369, 907 A.2d 321, cert. denied, 396 Md. 12, 912 A.2d 648 (2006). Petitioner's reliance on Elliott is misplaced. Elliot was charged with obtaining his license fraudulently or deceptively; unprofessional conduct in the practice of medicine; and willfully mak[ing] a false representation when seeking or making application for licensure. Id. at 403, 907 A.2d at 341. The Board concluded that Elliot had obtained his license by fraud or deceit; the Board therefore found it unnecessary to render a decision on the two latter charges. Id., 907 A.2d at 341. Nothing in Elliott remotely suggests that willfully requires an independent showing of intent to deceive or fraud. In short, granting to the Board the deference it is due in interpreting the statute, we hold that the Board did not erroneously interpret willful in the context of § 14-404. Willful, for purposes of § 14-404, requires proof that the conduct at issue was done intentionally, not that it was committed with the intent to deceive or with malice. [8] Applying that definition of willfulness to Petitioner's case, we conclude that there was substantial evidence that he acted willfully in making a false statement on his application for renewal of his medical license. In fact, Petitioner's testimony supported the ALJ's credibility determination that Petitioner's explanation of misunderstanding and inadvertence was illogical and unconvincing. Petitioner testified that he understood the difference between and and or. He also testified to his extensive professional experience in the United States that he has conducted in English. Petitioner nevertheless argues to us that his English language limitations were evident in the transcript of the proceedings. But it is not our role to reevaluate the evidence presented to the administrative agency or to make credibility determinations anew. Banks, 354 Md. at 68, 729 A.2d at 380-81. The ALJ found that Petitioner came to the United States over thirty years ago, completed a three year residency in English, took oral and written tests for Board certification in English, and speaks English in his medical practice, both in treating patients and speaking with colleagues. From those first-level findings the ALJ made the ultimate factual findings that [Petitioner] intended to provide the false statements that he submitted in his license renewal application and that his responses were not accidental or inadvertent. The Board accepted the ALJ's findings in determining for itself that Petitioner willfully ma[de] or file[d] a false report or record in the practice of medicine, under § 14-404(a)(11); and willfully ma[de] a false representation [while] seeking or making application for licensure, under § 14-404(a)(36). The Board's decision is not premised on an erroneous conclusion of law and is supported by substantial evidence. We therefore uphold it.