Opinion ID: 1413966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: part x (b) of errors

Text: (1) On page 11 of his recent version, Justice Johnson has written that Gugelman construed the portion of the statute referring to a `permanent physical impairment' to mean `any permanent condition which reasonably could constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or reemployment.' The author of Gugelman did not engage in the doing of any such construing. There is a statute which provided that construction and it is set forth at page 358 of 102 Idaho, and cited, to wit, I.C. § 72-332(2). (2) All that I can make of this error is to note that it is followed immediately by the sentence reading: This Court also interpreted the pre-1981 version of the statute to require that before a pre-existing physical impairment could constitute a hindrance to employment `the condition must be manifest.' Royce, 103 Idaho at 294, 647 P.2d at 750, 115 Idaho at 917, 772 P.2d at 124. This, too, is in error. The author of Royce made no pretense of finding a requirement by reason of interpreting any statute. Playing it again, the author first adroitly misstated the issue as, The question presented under the facts of this case is whether a reasonable employer would be reluctant to hire Royce. As the author well knew, the issue in such situations has been otherwise stated by the legislature: `Permanent physical impairment' is as defined in section 72-422, Idaho Code, provided, however, as used in this section such impairment must be a permanent condition, whether congenital or due to injury or disease, of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or to obtaining reemployment if the claimant should become employed. This shall be interpreted subjectively as to the particular employee involved, however, the mere fact that a claimant is employed at the time of the subsequent injury shall not create a presumption that the preexisting permanent physical impairment was not of such seriousness as to constitute such hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment. I.C. § 73-332(2) (emphasis added). (3) Further error is found in Part III of Justice Johnson's opinion. There he upholds the Commission's failure to find, as the evidence required, that Horton was totally and permanently disabled, which he assuredly was. On page 6 of his own opinion, Justice Johnson states the nature of Horton's argument, which is not exactly the same as my own analysis, but not much different either. Horton is a total permanent disability. He is not eligible for reemployment. His former employer is restricted from taking him back by a reason of a union agreement. Being totally and permanently disabled, he is entitled to be so rated. But, that is not to say, and I have not said, how that liability should be apportioned. The point which I am unable to get across to Justice Johnson is that it is one thing to isolate his right hip and evaluate its impairment and then his disability from work as seen through tunnel vision, and quite another thing to properly rate him for what he is  a worker totally disabled from working, and then properly apportion that disability to the various causes, i.e., so much attributable to the work-related injury, and so much to the non-work related impairments. It is patently wrong and a miscarriage of justice to not require that such be done. Horton is entitled, in any further proceeding which he may bring against ISIF, to start out with the facts as they really exist. Additionally, he is entitled to have an apportionment made as to a wholly disabled body, and not to one isolated joint. It is bad enough that in 1989 he is the victim of a change in the statutory law which one member of this Court was able to manage. Hopefully the sureties doing business in Idaho, and the practitioners who believed in the fair play statutory provisions will ask the legislature to put an end to such nonsensical destruction of a worker's just entitlement. The ghost of Royce continues to haunt the working men and women of Idaho. It was wrong when it was decided and one can only lament in its subsequent application by this Court. As one learned jurist observed: Stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is not a universal, inexorable command. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238, 44 S.Ct. 302, 309, 68 L.Ed. 646 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).