Opinion ID: 1929336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: This court `accept[s] the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record.' In re McLain, 671 A.2d 951, 953 (D.C.1996) (quoting In re Micheel, 610 A.2d 231, 234 n. 10 (D.C.1992) (other citation omitted)). Moreover, this court will adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(g)(1). Because the Board concluded that respondent was inexperienced; did not act out of evil or corrupt intent; and had no other rule violations; and because of the delay in the disposition of this case, respondent contends that public censure rather than a sixty-day suspension is the appropriate sanction. The Board rejected this contention. We agree with the Board's recommended sixty-day suspension, without a fitness requirement. The factors we consider in deciding whether to adopt the Board's recommendation are: the `nature of the violation, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the absence or presence of prior disciplinary sanctions, the moral fitness of the attorney, and the need to protect the legal profession, the courts, and the public.' McLain, supra, 671 A.2d at 954 (quoting In re Lenoir, 604 A.2d 14, 15 (D.C.1992)). The first factor to be considered in determining whether the proposed disposition is appropriate is the nature of the violation. [5] The violations with which respondent was charged are extremely serious. When she knew Mrs. Wallace was represented by counsel, respondent approached her without the permission of Mr. Lyon, the attorney for Mrs. Wallace. She convinced Mrs. Wallace to execute an agreement which substantially altered her living arrangement, and authorized respondent and her husband to move in rent-free. She then took on the representation of Mrs. Wallace, despite the fact that Mrs. Wallace was incapacitated and represented by Mr. Lyon, while living rent-free in her home, thus making improper contact regarding representation, and engaging in a prohibited business transaction with a client, without full disclosure, or fair and reasonable terms. Upon assuming the representation of Mrs. Wallace, respondent was in a clear conflict of interest because she also represented the Longs, who were the beneficiaries of Mrs. Wallace's estate. [6] Even when she was advised of the clear conflict in 1992, she maintained that she had explained the conflict and that Mrs. Wallace had waived it. However, the Board found that there was no disclosure of the conflicts and Mrs. Wallace was incompetent to give her consent to the conflict-burdened representation. Several of respondent's representations in her petition for appointment as guardian of Mrs. Wallace and conservator of her estate obviously were false or misleading, or constituted significant omissions. There was no valid durable power of attorney naming her as conservator and guardian. [7] She failed to disclose the November 18, 1991 agreement, her representation of Mrs. Wallace and the interest of her clients, the Longs, in Mrs. Wallace's home. Moreover, as the Board stated in agreement with the Hearing Committee: Given the significance of the Respondent's assertion that she had been nominated to be conservator and guardian and given Respondent's recent conduct in displacing Mr. Lyon as attorney for Mrs. Wallace, we find it difficult to credit Respondent's assertion that the false statement and omissions were not intentional. Even if they were, at least in part, attributable to Respondent's haste in preparing the petition, the false statement and omissions were of such significance to the issues before the court that we believe her conduct was at least reckless.... In preparing and having Mrs. Wallace sign a $250 check after the court had appointed a conservator and given that individual control over Mrs. Wallace's finances, respondent seriously interfered with the administration of guardianship and conservatorship proceedings. Even though respondent spoke with the guardian and conservator on the very day Mrs. Wallace had to be transported by ambulance, she did not seek permission to incur the cost of transportation, or to be reimbursed by having an incapacitated individual sign a check. Clearly there was substantial evidence to support the Board's findings and disposition with regard to the nature of the violation. The violations were extremely serious and akin to those in McLain. [8] While McLain is not identical to this case, it is sufficiently similar to support the appropriateness of the recommended disposition. [9] Two other factors should be addressed with respect to the appropriateness of the Board's disposition: the aggravating and mitigating factors; and the need to protect the legal profession, the courts and the public. Mrs. Wallace was a bedridden, incontinent, incapacitated, elderly, vulnerable woman. When Mrs. Noonan-Jones spoke to her about the November 18, 1991 agreement, Mrs. Wallace did not recall signing it and indicated that she did not wish to change the arrangements for her care. The rules of professional responsibility are designed to protect persons in Mrs. Wallace's situation. The rules also are applied to protect members of the legal profession in Mr. Lyon's situation. He rendered legal services to the Wallaces, and after Mr. Wallace's death, attempted to care for the legal and financial interests of his longtime friend's wife. His efforts were ended abruptly when respondent approached Mrs. Wallace directly, without the permission of Mr. Lyon, and subsequently had Mrs. Wallace dismiss him as her attorney. In addition, the rules are designed to protect the court against false and misleading statements in petitions for guardianship and conservatorship; and against actions which ignore its orders appointing guardians and conservators. Respondent asserts that there are mitigating factors in this case, including the lack of any other disciplinary record, her inexperience, and the delay in this matter. While respondent has no other disciplinary record, and was inexperienced when the events first began, it should be noted that she graduated from law school in 1983 and was first admitted to the Bar in 1986. The acts which are the subject of the charged violations extended from 1987 to 1992. The record before us reveals that from 1988 through most of 1991, respondent performed legal work as of counsel and as an associate in two different law firms. In short, while she began her practice as an inexperienced attorney, she had acquired law firm experience when she continued violating the Rules of Professional Conduct into 1991 and 1992. In In re Williams, 513 A.2d 793 (D.C.1986) (per curiam) ( Williams II ), we recognized delay as a mitigating factor. [10] Id. at 798. However, as we said in In re Fowler, 642 A.2d 1327 (D.C.1994): [T]he circumstances of the individual case must be sufficiently unique and compelling to justify lessening what would otherwise be the sanction necessary to protect the public interest. Id. at 1331. The circumstances here are not sufficiently unique or compelling to dispose of this case by public censure, instead of a sixty-day suspension. The delay here generally is not attributable to Bar Counsel, as it was in Williams II, supra . Unfortunately, in this case, respondent's first counsel died before he was able to represent her at the hearing committee level. However, much of the delay in respondent's case was attributable to working out mutually agreeable hearing dates. In short, we agree with the Board that this is not the type of case where delay should be treated as a mitigating factor. Indeed, the aggravating factors here outweigh the mitigating factors claimed by respondent. We conclude that the sanction imposed by the Board, a sixty-day suspension, without a requirement of fitness, would not foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct, and would not be unwarranted. See McLain, supra . Accordingly, we order the suspension of Betty Jones-Terrell for a period of sixty days. Respondent's attention is drawn to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g) and § 16 regarding the required filing of an affidavit and the effect on reinstatement of the failure to file that affidavit. So ordered.