Opinion ID: 1417789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: First Instructions as Law of the Case

Text: Demers made numerous objections in both trials to the court's giving and refusing to give instructions. Only a few of these are material at this point. The Court of Appeals in its last opinion held that four instructions on informed consent and one on circumstantial evidence that were given and not objected to by Dr. Gerety in the first trial became the law of the case and should have been given in the second trial. Before determining whether these instructions were proper, it is necessary to analyze other instructions that were given in the first trial. Regarding Demers' written consent to surgery the jury was instructed that the law presumes that a person was competent at the time he signed a written instrument; that it is plaintiff's burden to overcome the presumption of his competency; that he must do this by clear and convincing evidence; that evidence is only clear and convincing if it instantly tilts the scales in the affirmative; that it is the duty of every person to read an instrument before he signs; that, if he fails to read the instrument, he cannot claim his intentions were other than as represented in the instrument. The giving of the above instructions was sustained by the Court of Appeals by its first two opinions, except that the second opinion found error in the first trial court's failure to instruct that if a party is incompetent (or under such sedation as would destroy competency) at the time of entering in a contract, that agreement is invalid. (Citations omitted). Demers, supra, 87 N.M. at 54, 529 P.2d at 280. Demers applied for certiorari to review only a small number of the issues involving the consent, and the writ was denied by this Court. Demers, supra, 87 N.M. 47, 529 P.2d 273 (1974). If we follow Demers' admonition that instructions given in the first trial become the law of the case, he has snared himself with his own noose. In fact, Demers tendered instructions in the second trial that contained most of the language set forth in the instructions given in the first trial. The issue of the application of written contract law to Demers' written consent was fully litigated and erroneously decided adversely to Demers' position. N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 8.1 specifies that malpractice is a form of negligence. In Schrib v. Seidenberg, 80 N.M. 573, 458 P.2d 825 (Ct.App. 1969) it was so held. Contract law is patently inapplicable and the Court of Appeals was in error in this regard. This decision on the law became more important on remand than merely a holding that instructions once given and not objected to become the law of the case. The Court of Appeals held that competency is presumed in the law, and that plaintiff must rebut that presumption. Demers, supra, 87 N.M. at 53, 529 P.2d at 280; Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash.2d 304, 422 P.2d 812 (1967). At the time the second trial judge was assessing Demers' proof that he was drugged and incompetent to sign the consent to revise his ileostomy, the judge had before him the decisions of the Court of Appeals. He relied upon the law of written contracts to decide whether there was a proper quantum of evidence to warrant submission of the question of informed consent to the jury. He applied the presumptions called for in the first instructions and the clear and convincing test to Demers' claim of incompetency and found that there was insufficient evidence to warrant submission to the jury. There being no justiciable issue, the instructions bearing on informed consent were refused by the trial judge. We find no abuse of discretion since the evidence introduced to support Demers' claim that he was under sedation when he signed the consent to the operation was obviously short of being clear and convincing, and there was no substantial evidence of failure to properly inform Demers. Since informed consent was not properly an issue in the second trial, giving the instructions from the first trial on that issue would have introduced false questions before the jury that would have been clearly misleading. The law of the case as to the application of written contract law was properly applied. Varney, supra . Demers did not take the necessary steps to establish as the law of the case the Court of Appeals' decision that there was no consent or informed consent to surgery. We reverse the part of the last decision of the Court of Appeals holding that these instructions should have been given. As to Demers' claim that the court erred in failing to give his requested instruction on circumstantial evidence, he did not call the attention of the trial court or of either appellate court to evidence in the record that justified the submission of this instruction. We will not review the record to find support for Demers' claim. Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 553 P.2d 703 (Ct.App. 1976). We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on this question.