Opinion ID: 167688
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff’s Post-Judgment M otions

Text: Plaintiff also challenges the district court’s denial of his M otion to Amend Order filed August 31, 2005, and his M otion to Request Relief From Order filed September 1, 2005. He argues that the court erred in finding his motions time-barred under Rule 59 and that he should have been permitted to file an amended complaint and sur-reply in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. W hile plaintiff is technically correct that his motions were timely under Rule 59(e), 1 his appeal nonetheless fails because the substantive bases of his post-judgment motions lacked merit. As a pro se litigant, the district court construed his motions in the most favorable light possible and decided them on the merits pursuant to Rule 60(b). The court concluded that its dismissal of plaintiff’s claims based on res judicata was not a mistake of law because plaintiff’s pending appeal in M ambo I did not effect the finality of the state court judgment. It also rejected plaintiff’s contention that because of its disposition on 1 “The ten-day period prescribed by Rule 59(e) begins to run only upon entry of a final judgment.” Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 1988). In this case, it appears that the district court never entered a separate judgment pursuant to Rule 58, and the August 18, 2005, order does not satisfy Rule 58’s separate document requirement. See Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 182, 185 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a district court order containing detailed legal analysis and reasoning, standing alone, could not trigger appeal process). Under these circumstances, judgment was not entered for purposes of Rule 59 until 150 days after entry of the court’s order in the civil docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(2)(B). -5- summary judgment, M ambo I was not decided on the merits. The court concluded that plaintiff had failed to show extraordinary circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b) and that therefore, the filing of an amended complaint was not permissible. Our standard of review is abuse of discretion, whether the district court construed plaintiff’s motions pursuant to Rule 59(e) or 60(b). Adams v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1179, 1186 n.5 (10th Cir. 2000) (Rule 59(e)); Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 439 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2006) (Rule 60(b)). In this case, plaintiff’s post-judgment motions simply rehashed arguments made in response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which we have already held w as properly granted. W e likew ise conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the post-judgment motions. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court M ary Beck Briscoe