Opinion ID: 1482032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidentiary Burden for the Damage Awards

Text: We reject defendant's contention that a plaintiff should be required to present a threshold amount of evidence about a defendant's financial status as a condition precedent to an award of punitive damages or that a plaintiffs failure to offer such evidence precludes the need for the defendant to mitigate the damages with his own presentation of evidence. It is true that it is plaintiffs burden to both prove the elements of his civil claim and to demonstrate to the fact-finder that defendant's actions should be punished through exemplary damages. However, our law does not require a further demonstration of the depth of the reservoir from which resources could be drawn to satisfy a punitive damage award. Although defendant concedes that the law in this state currently does not require plaintiff to bear this burden, he urges this Court to adopt such a requirement, as is consistent with the law in California. See Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal.3d 105, 284 Cal.Rptr. 318, 813 P.2d 1348 (1991). We decline to do so. Rhode Island decisional law is clear on this issue and we decline defendant's invitation to change it. See Greater Providence Deposit Corp. v. Jenison, 485 A.2d 1242 (R.I. 1984). Naturally, a defendant need not sit idly by, fated to pay a punitive award based strictly on what the fact-finder discerns solely from plaintiffs presentation of the case. Indeed, a defendant is remiss if he does not introduce evidence to mitigate the damages, to inform the fact-finder of the limits of his ability to satisfy a punitive damage award. The defendant relies heavily on this Court's decision in Palmisano v. Toth, 624 A.2d 314 (R.I.1993), to support his proposition that plaintiff must bear an initial and adequate evidentiary burden of demonstrating defendant's financial means before punitive damages can be fairly calculated by the jury. The inference defendant draws from that case is misplaced. In Palmisano, this Court addressed the issue of when a plaintiff may demand discovery of a defendant's personal finances in furtherance of a claim for punitive damages. Careful to balance the demands of the plaintiff with the burden that such a demand places upon a defendant, we adopted a clear standard to be met by a plaintiff before he is permitted to inquire into a defendant's private financial information. Id. at 320. Palmisano established a procedure whereby a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing at an evidentiary hearing [4] that a viable claim exists for an award of punitive damages before discovery of defendant's financial worth may be undertaken. That procedure is initiated by a motion to strike the claim for punitive damages followed by an evidentiary hearing to determine if plaintiff has established a prima facie case for a punitive damage award. If the motion to strike is denied, then the plaintiff may proceed to seek discovery to the extent relevant for a determination of the extent of defendant's ability to pay exemplary damages. Id. at 320-21. This Court has made it clear that the plaintiffs Palmisano burdens are limited only to occasions in which financial information is sought for discovery purposes. We stated, the procedure set forth in Palmisano that requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to punitive damages is applicable only when a plaintiff has made a demand for discovery of a defendant's financial condition. Mark v. Congregation Mishkon Tefiloh, 745 A.2d 777, 781 (R.I.2000). Moreover, [a] plaintiff who is not seeking to delve into a defendant's financial net worth during the pretrial discovery stage does not have to bear the burden at a Palmisano hearing of meeting the rigorous standard necessary for imposing punitive damages, particularly in the early stages of litigation, simply because a claim for punitive damages has been included in the plaintiff's complaint. Id. Notwithstanding the narrow application of Palmisano, defendant infers an obligation on the part of a plaintiff to present evidence of financial means to the fact-finder. He questions why a discovery procedure exists if the plaintiff is exempt from meeting a threshold level of proof for punitive damages. The defendant's argument is without merit. The plaintiff must present adequate facts to support an award of punitive damages; this is a question of law for the court to decide. Such exemplary damages are warranted upon proof of willful, wanton, or malicious conduct to punish the offender and deter future misconduct. Jenison, 485 A.2d at 1244; Sherman v. McDermott, 114 R.I. 107, 109, 329 A.2d 195, 196 (1974). Although not insurmountable, this requirement sets the bar quite high for a plaintiff to recover punitive damages. If adequate facts are presented, the fact-finder must decide whether a plaintiff is entitled to such an award. Jenison, 485 A.2d at 1244. Although a defendant's ability to pay may well play a role in the jury's estimation of the amount of damages to award, see Palmisano, 624 A.2d at 318, a punitive award is not per se void because such evidence is not present. This Court's discussion in Jenison is illustrative. In that case, a defendant against whom punitive damages were awarded argued that the trial justice erred in allowing an award without evidence in the record of his ability to pay. Jenison, 485 A.2d at 1244. The Court noted that relevant case law does not require proof of ability to pay as a condition precedent to a holding that the case was a proper one for punitive damages. Id. at 1245 (citing Sherman, 114 R.I. at 110, 329 A.2d at 197). In fact, our cases hold that it is the defendant who has an affirmative obligation to present evidence of financial condition if he hopes to lessen a potential award. We stated, [c]ase law    and logic demand that a defendant carry the burden of showing his modest means, facts particularly within his power, if he wants this matter considered in mitigation of damages. Id. at 1245. Moreover, that defendant's appeal was denied in part because [he] was on notice that punitive damages were being sought, and he made no effort to introduce any evidence of his modest means. Under these circumstances    he should [not] now be heard to complain about their absence or paucity. Id. The same can be said for Battista in the instant matter. By not coming forward with evidence of his financial means, defendant either took a risk or made a tactical decision that did not bear fruit. We are satisfied that the trial justice properly found adequate facts to support an award of punitive damages and correctly submitted the decision to a jury. An abundance of evidence was offered at trial to support plaintiffs version of events and to indicate that defendant's conduct was willful, wanton, and malicious. This was not a case of mere simple assault; it was a home invasion involving an armed intruder. We agree with the trial justice that the punitive damages award is neither clearly excessive nor represents the passion and prejudice of the jury. Further, we give great weight to the trial justice's finding that plaintiff's testimony was credible and very compelling and that defendant's testimony was riddled with inconsistencies, half-truths, and untruths. She carefully considered the criminality of Battista's actions and reasonably affirmed the punitive award, less $25,000 for the duplicative liability of infliction of emotional distress. This Court gives great deference to a trial justice's ruling on a motion for a new trial which is conditioned on a remittitur in punitive damages. See Mazzaroppi v. Tocco, 533 A.2d 203, 206 (R.I.1987) (citing Zarrella v. Robinson, 460 A.2d 415, 418-19 (R.I. 1983)). We do not believe the trial justice overlooked or misconceived relevant evidence on a material issue in respect to damages, and she was not otherwise clearly wrong. Mazzaroppi, 533 A.2d at 206-07 (citing Wood v. Paolino, 112 R.I. 753, 315 A.2d 744 (1974)). The $300,000 award was not grossly excessive. Further, the jury did have a point of: reference with respect to defendant's means because there was testimony at trial that he was president of his company, owned multiple residences, and purchased luxury items. Undeniably, Battista's actions made him a deserving candidate for punishment and deterrence. We affirm the punitive damages award with no hesitation and decline defendant's request to further remit the amount. Similarly, we affirm the award of compensatory damages. The `task of assessing compensatory damages is peculiarly within the province of the jury'; however, [t]he trial justice may order a new trial on damages if he or she independently concludes `that the award is so excessive in comparison to the injuries sustained as to fail to work substantial justice between the parties.' Soares v. Ann & Hope of Rhode Island, Inc., 637 A.2d 339, 349 (R.I.1994) (quoting Paquin v. Tillinghast, 517 A.2d 246, 249 (R.I.1986)). Based on these standards, and based on our review of the record demonstrating the great toll that defendant's actions took on plaintiff's physical and mental well-being, we affirm the $150,000 compensatory damage award. It is neither excessive, nor does it fail to work substantial justice between the parties.