Opinion ID: 2239861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the Amendment

Text: This Court has never addressed directly the issue of whether a reduction in the statutory period of redemption is constitutional. A survey of other states that have discussed this issue reveals two views. A minority of the states considers the relationship between state and the delinquent taxpayer to be of a contractual nature. This position appears in decisions rendered in the last century. According to this view, the creation of a period of redemption by the state gives rise to a right in the taxpayer  the right to have a prescribed period to redeem his property. This right vests in the taxpayer at the time of the tax sale. It cannot be divested by statute after the time of the sale. Adams v. Beale (1865), 19 Iowa 61. The majority position is that the period of redemption does not represent a right in the delinquent taxpayer, but rather a remedy available to the delinquent taxpayer. The redemption period represents a period of grace afforded the taxpayer by the state. Consequently, the state can increase or decrease the length of the period as it wishes, provided such change is not wholly unreasonable. Baker v. State Land Office Board (1940), 294 Mich. 587, 293 N.W. 763; State v. Gray (1949), 132 W. Va. 472, 52 S.E.2d 759. We agree with this latter, majority position. As noted in the Court of Appeals decision in Metro v. Mitchell, the situation is somewhat analogous to a change in a statute of limitations period. Altering the length of time in which one is required to seek redress does not eliminate the possibility of redress. It does not take away the right to seek an action. It merely alters the period of time in which this right can be pursued. In tax sale redemption cases, the amendment did not deprive delinquent taxpayers of the right to redeem their property. The amendment merely requires that such redemption occur within one year as opposed to two.