Opinion ID: 6111649
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Attorney’s Testimony

Text: Sadler next argues that the district court erred by allowing his former attorney—Doraid Elder—to testify at trial because that testimony violated the attorney-client privilege. “[W]hether the attorney-client privilege applies is a mixed question of law and fact, subject to de novo review.” Automated Sols. Corp. v. Paragon Data Sys., Inc., 756 F.3d 504, 517 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reg’l Airport Auth. of Louisville v. LFG, LLC, 460 F.3d 697, 712 (6th Cir. 2006)). “The purpose of attorney-client privilege is to ensure free and open communications between a client and his attorney.” Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 511, 519 (6th Cir. 2006)). “The burden of establishing the existence of the privilege rests with the person asserting it.” United States v. Dakota, 197 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 1999). In deciding whether a communication is privileged, we have held that: “(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection is waived.” Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 355–56 (6th Cir. 1998). While this definition seemingly only applies to the client’s statements, courts generally agree that an attorney’s statements to a client can also fall within the privilege if that communication would reveal client confidences or legal advice. See In re Grand Jury Procs., 616 F.3d 1172, 1182 (10th Cir. 2010). However, those communications are not protected “when an attorney conveys to his client facts acquired from other persons or sources.” Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Elder testified that he gave Sadler the witness list in this case shortly before Sadler made threatening calls to Francine Leatherwood (Dennis’ mother) and sent threatening messages to Andrea Leatherwood (Dennis’ sister). The government sought to admit this evidence because the temporal proximity of these events circumstantially showed that Sadler intended to “influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding” as required to prove witness tampering. The district court allowed Elder to testify, but limited Elder’s testimony to the following issues: (1) whether Elder had conversations with Sadler between March 19 and 23, 2018; (2) whether Elder and Sadler met on March 23, 2018; (3) whether Elder Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 45 gave Sadler a witness list and the grand jury testimony transcript on that day; and (4) whether those materials identified cooperating witnesses. Whether these types of communications are privileged is a matter of first impression. We agree with the district court that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Defazio, 899 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1990), is instructive here. In Defazio, the defendant was charged with tax fraud. During the course of the IRS’s pre-indictment investigation, the defendant’s attorney met with IRS agents to discuss his audit. [899 F.2d] at 634. The agents told the attorney that the IRS “had completed their investigation and are ready to refer the case [for prosecution] and that if you have any defenses you would like to present, he would be glad to listen to them.” Id. Later, the attorney met with the defendant to discuss his meeting with the IRS, and the fact that criminal prosecution was likely. Id. After this discussion, the defendant transferred assets, for nominal consideration, to a newly created corporation. Id. The Government sought to prove that the transfers were part of the defendant’s willful attempt to evade income taxes by calling the attorney to testify “only to what the IRS agent said to him, and that he later relayed those statements to [the defendant].” Id. at 635. The trial court allowed the attorney to testify to this effect, and the defendant appealed. The Seventh Circuit upheld the trial court’s decision, concluding that “the content of [the attorney’s] testimony is unprivileged because it did not reveal, either directly or implicitly, legal advice given [to the defendant] or any client confidences.” Id. Accordingly, allowing the attorney to testify as to what the IRS agent told him, and that he later relayed the IRS agent’s statements to the defendant, did not violate attorney-client privilege. (Dist. Ct. Order, R. 653 at 5–6). As the district court noted, Elder’s testimony did not disclose the contents of any meetings or conversations with Sadler beyond those facts that the government relayed to Elder. “Like the IRS statements in Defazio, this information did not reveal either directly or implicitly, legal advice or any client confidence.” (Id. at 6). Elder’s testimony merely indicated when Sadler received specific types of information from the government—vis-à-vis his attorney—about the case. In this context, the communications are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.