Opinion ID: 1405125
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Superior Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Enter the Original Child Support Order.

Text: Michael argues that the 1985 support order is void under Civil Rule 60(b)(4) because the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to establish child support for Tisha. [7] A judgment may be attacked as void under Rule 60(b)(4) on the basis of subject matter jurisdiction. See Perry v. Newkirk, 871 P.2d 1150, 1153 n. 5 (Alaska 1994). A court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction is without power to decide a case. Wanamaker v. Scott, 788 P.2d 712, 713 n. 2 (Alaska 1990). Helen asserts that Michael's motion is untimely and therefore waived. Her argument is not well-taken. A Rule 60(b)(4) motion attacking subject matter jurisdiction may be brought at any time and is not subject to the reasonable time limitation found in Civil Rule 60(b). Burrell v. Burrell, 696 P.2d 157, 163 n. 11 (Alaska 1984); DeVaney v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. ex rel. DeVaney, 928 P.2d 1198, 1199 n. 1 (Alaska 1996); Kennecorp Mortgage & Equities, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 685 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Alaska 1984). A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point during the litigation. See Wanamaker, 788 P.2d at 713 n. 2 ([N]o matter how disingenuous it may be for a party which has previously invoked a state's jurisdiction later to challenge it in a related case, this court must ensure that the superior court's order is not `void.') (citation omitted). Further, a judgment may be collaterally attacked for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See DeNardo v. State, 740 P.2d 453, 456-457 (Alaska 1987); Burrell, 696 P.2d at 162. Therefore Michael's motion is properly before this court. Michael relies on a literal reading of the dissolution statutes referring to minor children born of the marriage or adopted by the petitioners to support his argument. [8] Michael reasons that because Tisha was literally neither born nor adopted during the marriage, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to order child support. We rejected a similar argument in J.C. v. M.L.C., 668 P.2d 1351 (Alaska 1983). In J.C., the husband and wife stipulated in the dissolution petition that one child was born of the marriage, that the wife would have custody, and that the husband would have reasonable visitation and pay child support. Id. at 1352. The superior court then entered a dissolution decree incorporating this agreement. See id. Over one year later, the husband denied paternity and sought to set aside his child support obligation. See id. He argued in part that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the child was not a child of the marriage, as described in the dissolution statutes. Id. at 1352-53. We held that the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the child support order because the court was competent to render judgment concerning child custody and support[.] Id. at 1353. We commented: Moreover, the petition can be interpreted as an agreement to support the child regardless of its paternity. We know of no reason why the superior court would lack authority to enforce such an agreement. Id. We are persuaded that the superior court had jurisdiction to enter the initial child support order. At the time of the dissolution proceedings, the statutory scheme allowed the superior court to consider and incorporate the parties' agreements concerning child support. See, e.g., AS 25.24.210(e)(6) (1983) (petition shall state in detail the terms of agreement as between the spouses with regard to ... child support ... [and] other facts and circumstances which the petitioners believe should be considered); AS 25.24.220(d)(2) (1983) (court shall consider whether child support agreements are fair, just, and equitable as between the spouses and in the best interests of the children of the marriage); AS 25.24.230(a)(2) (1983) (court shall provide relief as to child support agreements if not grossly unfair, unjust, or inequitable and are in the best interests of the children of the marriage). The current statutes also recognize such agreements. The superior court's jurisdiction in this area is broad. The dissolution statutes contemplate agreements between the parties regarding child support. And we have not limited the court's jurisdiction in this context. See, e.g., Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477, 481 (Alaska 1993) (summarily denying Rule 60(b) relief to father who later denied paternity of child listed as child of the marriage in dissolution decree); Adrian v. Adrian, 838 P.2d 808, 809 n. 1 (Alaska 1992) (reviewing child support order between parties who agreed in divorce proceedings that mother's stepdaughter was child of the marriage). [9] In Perry v. Newkirk, 871 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1994), we discussed the contours of subject matter jurisdiction: The question therefore is whether the public interest in observance of the particular jurisdictional rule is sufficiently strong to permit a possibly superfluous vindication of the rule by a litigant who is undeserving of the accompanying benefit that will redound to him. The public interest is of that strength only if the tribunal's excess of authority was plain or has seriously disturbed the distribution of governmental powers or has infringed a fundamental constitutional protection. Id. at 1155 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 cmt. d (1982)). Strong public policy favors enforcement of express, voluntary agreements to support children, especially where it cannot be said that the subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority[.] Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982). We therefore conclude that the superior court did not lack jurisdiction to enter a child support order based on Michael's express agreement to support Tisha.