Opinion ID: 1190882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Public Use of Ocean Beaches State ex rel Thornton v. Hay

Text: The state claims a public right to the dry-sand area of Little Whale Cove on the strength of this court's decision in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, supra . That case began as an action on behalf of the state to enjoin the defendants Hay, who were owners of a tourist facility at Cannon Beach, from fencing off a section of the dry sand beach between their facility and the ocean. The Hays intended to reserve that portion of the beach for their paying guests. A trial court granted the state's requested injunction. The Hays appealed to this court. On appeal, the state argued two theories: (1) the public had acquired an easement by prescription over the subject beach; and (2) the state had the right, by virtue of zoning controls contained in a recently enacted portion of the Oregon Beach Bill, ORS 390.640, [7] to prevent any construction of any structure on the beach between mean high tide and the upland 16-foot contour line. This court affirmed the decision of the trial court, but on a theory slightly different from those argued to it  it found that the public had acquired a right to use the dry-sand beaches of the state for recreational use by virtue of the ancient common-law doctrine of custom. The court first identified the area it was addressing, viz., the dry-sand area, as being assumed to be the land lying between the line of mean high tide and the visible line of vegetation. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, supra, 254 Or. at 586, 462 P.2d 671 (footnote omitted). The vegetation line was identified as the seaward edge of vegetation where the upland supports vegetation. It falls generally in the vicinity of the sixteen-foot-elevation contour line, but is not at all points necessarily identical with it. Id. The court explained the relevance of the dry-sand area as follows: The dry-sand area in Oregon has been enjoyed by the general public as a recreational adjunct of the wet-sand or foreshore area since the beginning of the state's political history. The first European settlers on these shores found the aboriginal inhabitants using the foreshore for clam digging and the dry-sand area for their cooking fires. The newcomers continued these customs after statehood. Thus, from the time of the earliest settlement to the present day, the general public has assumed that the dry-sand area was a part of the public beach, and the public has used the dry-sand area for picnics, gathering wood, building warming fires, and generally as a headquarters from which to supervise children or to range out over the foreshore as the tides advance and recede.    Perhaps one explanation for the evolution of the custom of the public to use the dry-sand area for recreational purposes is that the area could not be used conveniently by its owners for any other purpose. The dry-sand area is unstable in its seaward boundaries, unsafe during winter storms, and for the most part unfit for the construction of permanent structures. While the vegetation line remains relatively fixed, the western edge of the dry-sand area is subject to dramatic moves eastward or westward in response to erosion and accretion. Id. at 588-89, 462 P.2d 671. The public's general assumption that it had an interest in the dry-sand areas of the coast had some foundation in law before 1935. As this court went on to explain: The public's assumption that the dry sand as well as the foreshore was `public property' had been reinforced by early judicial decisions.    These cases held that landowners claiming under federal patents owned seaward only to the `high-water' line, a line that was then assumed to be the [permanent] vegetation line [inland from the water's edge]. In 1935, the United States Supreme Court held that a federal patent conveyed title to land farther seaward, to the mean high-tide line.    While this decision may have extended seaward the record ownership of upland landowners, it was apparently little noticed by Oregonians. In any event, [that]    decision had no discernible effect on the actual practices of Oregon beachgoers and upland property owners.      The disputed [dry-sand] area is sui generis. While the foreshore is `owned' by the state, and the upland is `owned' by the patentee or record-title holder, neither can be said to `own' the full bundle of rights normally connoted by the term `estate in fee simple.' Id. at 589-90, 91-92, 462 P.2d 671 (footnote and citations omitted). This discussion of the history of public use of the dry-sand area led directly into a review of the common-law doctrine that this court found to be most applicable to such a situation, viz., the doctrine of custom: Because many elements of prescription are present in this case, the state has relied upon [that] doctrine in support of the decree below. We believe, however, that there is a better legal basis for affirming the decree. The most cogent basis for the decision in this case is the English doctrine of custom. Strictly construed, [the doctrine of] prescription [relied upon by the state] applies only to a specific tract of land before the court, and doubtful prescription cases could fill the courts for years with tract-by-tract litigation. An established custom, on the other hand, can be proven with reference to a larger region. Ocean-front lands from the northern to the southern border of the state ought to be treated uniformly. The other reason which commends the doctrine of custom over that of prescription as the principal basis for the decision in this case is the unique nature of the lands in question. This case deals solely with the dry-sand area along the Pacific shore, and this land has been used by the public as public recreational land according to an unbroken custom running back in time as long as the land has been inhabited. Id. at 595, 462 P.2d 671. [8] The court then explained the origin of the doctrine in the common law and recited its seven traditional elements: (1) an ancient practice; (2) exercised without interruption; (3) peaceable and free from dispute during its long exercise; (4) reasonableness in use; (5) applied to a clearly defined area; (6) obligatory on all landowners; and (7) not repugnant with other customs or other law. The court found on the facts established in the case that each of the seven elements had been met. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, supra, 254 Or. at 594-96, 462 P.2d 671. The court concluded, [b]ecause so much of our law is the product of legislation, we sometimes lose sight of the importance of custom as a source of law in our society. It seems particularly appropriate in the case at bar to look to an ancient and accepted custom in this state as the source of a rule of law. The rule in this case, based upon custom, is salutary in confirming a public right, and at the same time it takes from no man anything which he has had a legitimate reason to regard as exclusively his. Id. 254 Or. at 599, 462 P.2d 671.