Opinion ID: 765047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII Standards Are Instructive

Text: In Batson, the Supreme Court made clear its intent that Title VII burden of proof rules and review standards apply to Batson challenges. 476 U.S. at 94 n.18, 98 n.21. With respect to Title VII, we have held that a determination whether the plaintiff established a primafacie case is reviewed de novo. See Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1982). Now that we are confronted with a case involving a constitutional right, the standard of scrutiny should be nothing less. Batson outlines a three-part burden-shifting scheme for establishing purposeful discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Our focus here is on the first prong -establishing a prima facie case. To satisfy this threshold inquiry, a defendant must raise[ ] the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. 1 476 U.S. at 96. This minimal burden of production, which simply shifts the burden to the prosecutor to provide a neutral explanation, must be contrasted with the defendant's ultimate burden of persuasion to establish purposeful discrimination. Although the Supreme Court has not announced a standard of review for the Batson prima facie case, the clearest signal can be found in its unambiguous reference in this context to Title VII: Our decisions concerning 'disparate treatment' under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have explained the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Following the Supreme Court's lead, we should look to our precedent involving the standard of review applicable to the prima facie test under Title VII. 2 In Gay, we held that the trial court's factual findings supporting the prima facie showing are reviewed only for clear error, but further explained that the ultimate determination whether a prima facie case has been established is a legal question reviewed de novo: [T]he court's determination whether the facts so proved were sufficient to establish an inference of discrimination, in other words whether the plaintiff's proof established a prima facie case thus shifting the burden of production to the defendant, is a legal Conclusion freely reviewable on appeal. 694 F.2d at 540 (emphasis added) (acknowledging inconsistencies in prior Ninth Circuit authority). The similarities between the burden-shifting approaches under Batson and Title VII, and the constitutional nature of the Batson inquiry, provide strong support for de novo review of a prima facie showing under Batson. In support of its Conclusion that the concerns of judicial administration tip in favor of the clear error standard, the majority quotes a single sentence from Batson: We have confidence that trial Judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges create[ ] a prima facie case of discrimination. 476 U.S. at 97. I do not believe this sentence informs our opinion because the sentence must be read in context and because the sentence and surrounding text make no reference to the standard of review for a Batson challenge. Just before the referenced sentence appears in the opinion, the Court, having outlined the elements of a prima facie challenge, provides illustrative examples to assist trial courts in assessing whether the defendant has made the requisite showing. The Court specifically states that a `pattern' of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination. Id. Then, indicating its reluctance to establish any bright-line rules, the Court offers the quoted sentence. Read in context, this sentence merely acknowledges the reality of the trial court's role and evidences the Court's reluctance to impose evaluative standards that might prove too rigid or inflexible. More importantly, this sentence neither addresses nor appears in the context of a Discussion concerning the standard for reviewing the prima facie determination. Rather, with respect to review standards, the Court's only references in Batson are to its Title VII jurisprudence, as discussed above. See id. at 94 n.18; see also id. at 98 & n.21 (The trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. In a recent Title VII sex discrimination case, we stated that a `finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact' entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court.). Thus, the sentence at issue does not provide any guidance concerning the standard of review applicable to the prima facie determination, and the majority's reliance on it is misplaced.