Opinion ID: 201060
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The express jurisdictional element

Text: 26 As previously discussed, the statute only reaches child pornography if that visual depiction was produced using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means.... § 2251(a). Importantly, the jurisdictional element discussed here, and the requirement of a substantial impact on interstate commerce, discussed in the next section, are distinct inquiries. At a minimum, the presence of a jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is in pursuance of Congress's regulation of interstate commerce. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612, 120 S.Ct. 1740. In addition to this express invocation of Commerce Clause power, the jurisdictional element may also serve to ensure that the defendant's conduct has at least some explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce and limit the statute's reach to such cases. Id. at 611-12, 120 S.Ct. 1740. 27 Morales complains that because Puerto Rico is an island heavily dependent on imports, the jurisdictional element of § 2251(a), which requires only that the materials of production have moved in interstate commerce, does not limit the statute's reach at all. He makes a fair point about this jurisdictional element that applies to any locale in the United States. As the Third Circuit observed in ruling on the same statute: as a practical matter, the limiting jurisdictional factor is almost useless here, since all but the most self-sufficient child pornographers will rely on film, cameras, or chemicals that traveled in interstate commerce.... United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir.1999). 28 There are instances, however, where the jurisdictional element of a statute will more effectively limit the number of cases that fall under the purview of the statute, as envisioned by the Supreme Court. For example, in passing a federal arson statute, Congress criminalized damaging or destroying, by means of fire or an explosive, any ... property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.  18 U.S.C. § 844(i)(Supp. IV 1994)(emphasis added). In Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000), the Supreme Court reversed a conviction under this statute for the arson of a purely private residence. The Court found that by criminalizing the arson of property only if it was `used in' commerce or commerce affecting activities, id. at 850-51, 120 S.Ct. 1904, Congress did not intend to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause, leaving residential arson cases to the law enforcement authorities of the states. Id. at 859, 120 S.Ct. 1904. As the Supreme Court noted: The key word is `used.' `Congress did not define the crime described in § 844(i) as the explosion of a building whose damage or destruction might affect interstate commerce....' Id. at 854, 120 S.Ct. 1904 (quoting United States v. Mennuti, 639 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir.1981)). The Supreme Court read the jurisdictional element of § 844(i) as evidence of Congress's recognition of the distinction between legislation limited to activities `in commerce' and legislation invoking Congress's full power over activity substantially `affecting ... commerce.' Jones, 529 U.S. at 856, 120 S.Ct. 1904 (quoting Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859-60, 105 S.Ct. 2455, 85 L.Ed.2d 829 (1985))(alteration in original). The jurisdictional element of the federal arson statute, then, required a somewhat heightened nexus between the defendant's conduct and an effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Fenton, [367 F.3d 14], 2004 WL 943624, at  (1st Cir. May 4, 2004)(explaining that the Jones Court concluded that an owner-occupied private dwelling did not have a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to satisfy the jurisdictional element because the owner was not actively using the property in a way that affected interstate commerce.) As Fenton and Jones itself make clear, Congress limited the reach of the arson statute to property that was used directly in interstate commerce or that was used in activities that affected interstate commerce. 29 In passing § 2251(a), however, Congress formulated a broader jurisdictional element that both invokes its Commerce Clause power and purports to exercise that power by reaching any child pornography that was produced using materials that moved in interstate commerce. Although this jurisdictional element ensures that any prosecuted conduct has a minimal nexus with interstate commerce, that minimal nexus may not meet the substantial effect requirement of Morrison. In Rodia, the Third Circuit found it at least doubtful... that the jurisdictional element adequately performs the function of guaranteeing that the final product regulated substantially affects interstate commerce. Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473. We agree with this observation. 30 If the jurisdictional element bore sole responsibility for establishing that the impact of the regulated activity on interstate commerce is substantial or direct, the language of § 2251(a) likely would not be up to the task. The jurisdictional element focuses on things such as film, cameras, videotapes, and recorders moving in interstate commerce, which are then used to produce child pornography. As a matter of logic, this Commerce Clause premise has the kind of flaw so worrisome to the Supreme Court in Lopez and Morrison — it could justify federalizing a vast array of crimes now prosecuted by the states, solely because the criminal used materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate of foreign commerce by any means. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (explaining that if Congress could regulate criminal acts simply because they have external costs or affect national productivity, it [would be] difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States have historically been sovereign.) Moreover, the congressional findings about the link between the regulated activity (production of child pornography) and interstate commerce did not claim that the market for child pornography was increasing the demand for film and cameras. The focus, instead, was on a different link — the relationship between local production of child pornography and the national market for the child pornography itself. This is the link that is the focus of the separate inquiry in the following section about the substantial effect of the regulated activity on interstate commerce. 31 However, the disconnect between the interstate commerce activity described in the jurisdictional element of § 2251(a) and the interstate commerce activity (the national market for child pornography) that prompted Congress to criminalize the production of child pornography is not fatal to the constitutionality of the statute. Indeed, even a complete absence of a jurisdictional element in the text of a statute is not fatal to a statute challenged on Commerce Clause grounds. [I]n Lopez, the Court simply did not state or imply that all criminal statutes must have such an element, ... or that any statute without such an element is per se unconstitutional. United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir.1995). See also Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C.Cir.2003)([T]he absence of such a jurisdictional element simply means that courts must determine independently whether the statute regulates activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect[] interstate commerce.) (quoting United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir.1999)). On the other hand, any statute enacted pursuant to the Congress's Commerce Clause power that does not regulate channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, must regulate activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Otherwise, courts will strike it down as unconstitutional. We now turn to that substantial effect inquiry. 32