Opinion ID: 867977
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Schneider’s Termination

Text: Madry argues that the precise reason for Schneider’s termination is “open to doubt,” and labels her as a “problem employee.” Madry cites Schneider’s final performance review and her reputation among other employees. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Madry, at best it could be found that Schneider was terminated for multiple reasons, but a lack of work would be one of those reasons. Moreover, this argument cannot negate Gibraltar’s proffered reason for -6- No. 12-1286 Madry v. Gibraltar Nat’l Corp. Madry’s termination by itself. Gibraltar has offered Schneider’s termination as an example of another similarly situated employee who was terminated around the same time as Madry for a lack of work. Even if Schneider was terminated for additional reasons, Gibraltar’s proffered reason, a lack of work, cannot be rebutted as pretextual on this ground. Thus, this argument is not persuasive. 2. Economic Data from October 2008 through January 2009 Madry’s main contention involves the interpretation of the economic data. She notes that the combined sales for the Detroit and Flint facilities from October 2008 through January 2009 increased by 1.7% when compared with sales from October 2007 through January 2008. Additionally, she notes that the total number of units produced in 2008 was 7.7% higher than in 2007. Based on these figures, Madry argues that it is hard to give credence to Gibraltar’s assertion that her termination “was the product of declining sales.” Madry does not argue that a lack of work would be an insufficient reason for her termination. We have previously found that the restructuring of a business was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating an employee who had incidentally taken FMLA leave. See Skrjanc, 272 F.3d at 315 (employee laid off after the company restructured its operations for economic reasons). Thus, the specific issue here is whether there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether there was a lack of work. Madry’s argument falls short of creating a genuine dispute of material fact. Although sales may have been slightly up (1.7%) during the entirety of the four months that Madry was on leave, the most important time to consider is the month or months immediately prior to Madry’s termination. This is so because in order for an employer to deny restoration, it must be able to show -7- No. 12-1286 Madry v. Gibraltar Nat’l Corp. “that an employee would not otherwise have been employed at the time reinstatement is requested . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) (emphasis added). Madry requested reinstatement around the end of January 2009, making December 2008 and January 2009 the most relevant periods in assessing Gibraltar’s proffered reason. During those months, sales were down 24% and 14%, respectfully, from the previous year. Further, production units were down 32% and 47%, respectively, during those same months. Despite any other time period assessments, it is clear that Gibraltar’s business was in decline during the two months prior to Madry’s termination. Thus, we reject Madry’s interpretation of the economic data. Moreover, to the extent that Madry argues that Gibraltar is required to show that her termination was economically required, her argument fails. Reducing labor costs and improving efficiency are valid business reasons for conducting layoffs, even when the degree to which such actions are motivated by economic hardship is debatable. See Aldridge v. City of Memphis, 404 F. App’x 29, 37-39 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding, against a charge of race and sex discrimination, that the municipality’s reorganization of the rank system for its police officers on “grounds of efficiency” was not pretextual regardless of whether the decision was based on “a ‘serious financial situation’ requiring cost-cutting or a mere desire to eliminate financial inefficiency”); Gatch v. Milacron, Inc., 111 F. App’x 785, 791 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that even if the reduction in force “was not entirely necessary from a business standpoint,” it was not a pretext for age discrimination because the “evidence simply d[id] not permit a finding that age discrimination rather than business judgment motivated” the decision). -8- No. 12-1286 Madry v. Gibraltar Nat’l Corp. 3. Terminations after February 2009 In its opinion and order granting Gibraltar’s motion for summary judgment, the district court noted that Gibraltar had met its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Madry’s termination and cited several pieces of evidence in the record for support. This included the fact that Gibraltar “laid off three additional employees in late 2009, nine employees in 2010, and two more employees in early January of 2011 all due to ‘lack of work.’” However, the terminations by Gibraltar after February 2009 should not be considered in determining whether Gibraltar’s proffered reason was pretextual at the time of Madry’s termination. See Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n order for an employer’s proffered non-discriminatory basis for its employment action to be considered honestly held, the employer must be able to establish its reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made.”). Nevertheless, this evidence is not necessary in finding Gibraltar’s proffered reason legitimate, as the decrease in sales and production units in December 2008 and January 2009, as well as the layoffs in November 2008, amply support Gibraltar’s burden of production. 4. Company Communications Madry lastly contends that Gibraltar’s proffered reason is pretextual because if it were legitimate, there would have been some sort of company communication announcing the necessity for the company to lay off employees around the time of her termination. This is irrelevant. “In deciding whether an employer reasonably relied on the particularized facts then before it, we do not require that the decisional process used by the employer be optimal or that it left no stone unturned. -9- No. 12-1286 Madry v. Gibraltar Nat’l Corp. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse employment action.” Smith, 155 F.3d at 807. Here, Struzik, the Plant Manager, and Harbin, Madry’s supervisor, made the decision to lay her off after sales had declined for two months. Struzik reported that “as manager, it’s up to us to manage the business, and with sales declining as they were we have to look at everything, and labor of course is right at the top of the list, and that’s where a decision [was] made.” The fact that Gibraltar produced no formal communications regarding the necessity to lay off employees does not render its decision unreasonable. Thus, this argument does not create a genuine dispute.