Opinion ID: 608132
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Racist motivation

Text: 33 McAninch submitted a written statement to the court in connection with his sentencing in which he explained his actions in part as follows: 34 I committed these crimes due to the psychological problems I was and am experiencing.... 35 In the Spring of 1987 my sister told me she had married a [Peruvian] Indian man due to the fact that white men are sexually inferior to other men.... I became obsessed over the fact that women potentially viewed me as inferior.... 36 I honestly felt that if minority males (i.e. black men, hispanic men, indian men, etc.) were sexually superior to white men, it would hurt my chances of landing a woman. My problems were more sexual and psychological than racial. I am not a racist.... 37 (E.R. 7 attachment (Statement of Donald McAninch) at 1-2.) 38 The district court considered but ultimately rejected McAninch's explanation of his behavior: 39 I cannot tell whether or not [your problems] are racially motivated or whether they are delusional, as you indicate.... 40 The fact remains, to the outward appearance and to everybody who has observed the case or read about the case or knows anything about it, it appears to be a hatred crime, not a delusional crime. 41 (S.T. at 40.) The district court concluded that the racist nature of McAninch's actions warranted an upward departure. McAninch contends that the court's determination was erroneous because he was psychologically impaired when he committed the crimes in question. 42 A sentencing court may impose a sentence above the one prescribed by the guidelines if it finds that there was an aggravating circumstance not adequately taken into consideration by applicable guidelines provisions. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (1991); Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d at 746. The Sentencing Guidelines do not explicitly address racist motivation for criminal conduct. 9 43 Although the race of the defendant can never be a ground for departure, see U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10 (1991), courts have, on occasion, considered the race of the victim in assessing whether an upward adjustment is warranted under section 3A1.1 because of the victim's particular vulnerability to racist acts. See, e.g., United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1376-78 (9th Cir.) (increase of two levels under vulnerable victim section in cross-burning case warranted due to African-American family's particular susceptibility to such criminal conduct in predominantly white neighborhood), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 353, 116 L.Ed.2d 275 (1991); United States v. Salyer, 893 F.2d 113, 115-16 (6th Cir.1989) (same). A vulnerable victim adjustment is not appropriate, however, unless the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 (1991). Such an adjustment, therefore, is not available when the defendant cannot be shown to have had the requisite state of mind with respect to the vulnerability of the victim. Furthermore, because it turns on the status of the victim, rather than the actions of the defendant, section 3A1.1 is not applicable to all potential forms of racist conduct, such as, for example, an attack stemming from the perpetrator's misperception regarding an individual's ethnic background. Because it is not otherwise treated in the guidelines, we therefore agree with the district court that a defendant's racist motivation is a valid ground for departure. 10 44 Next we consider the court's factual finding that McAninch was racially motivated. The judge acknowledged McAninch's psychological problems, but in the final analysis, she decided that his crime was not one of delusion, but of hatred. This finding was not clearly erroneous. The psychologist's report submitted by McAninch in connection with his sentencing noted that McAninch had reported no hallucinations or delusions, that his cognitive processes were intact, that he was of above average to superior intelligence, and that there was no evidence of a formal thought disorder. (Certified Record 28 attachment at 6.) The acts charged in count nine, which included the mailing of a Ku Klux Klan oath and a photograph with a swastika on it, embraced well-recognized forms of racial harassment. Cf. United States v. McInnis, 976 F.2d 1226, 1230-31 (9th Cir.1992) (racially derogatory items seized from defendant's home were evidence of racist motivation in case involving violation of Fair Housing Act). McAninch's own description of his conduct in his statement to the court, namely, that he wanted to intimidate minority men because he couldn't stand to see them with white women, can fairly be seen as an admission that his actions were racially motivated. The district court did not clearly err in rejecting McAninch's attempt to justify his racial animus with psychological excuses. 45 Finally, there is no indication that the district court looked beyond the counts of conviction in determining that the facts supported a departure for racial motivation. McAninch's statement to the court was a general explanation of his behavior that did not mention any of the dismissed counts; nor did the presentence report's justification for this departure refer to dismissed counts. The court's finding of racial animus was based on information properly before it.