Opinion ID: 414382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preclusive Effect of Mole Lake or Gunroe Cases

Text: 126 Each party to this controversy contends that the question whether the 1850 Removal Order was valid has been previously determined and that the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel preclude consideration of the question in this action. We first discuss the defendants' contention that Mole Lake Band v. United States, 139 F.Supp. 938 (Ct.Cl.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892, 77 S.Ct. 130, 1 L.Ed.2d 86 (1956), establishes that the Removal Order was valid and bars litigation of that issue in the present case. 127
128 In Mole Lake, three bands of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, including the LCO, sued the United States. The complaint alleged that in creating their reservations the United States purported to convey to the Indians an area of land that the federal Government had previously conveyed to the State. As a result, the Indians had allegedly been deprived of some of the lands within their reservations as well as the proceeds from the timber cut from these lands. The court notified Wisconsin of its right to intervene. The State did so, asserting its ownership of the swamplands in question and the right to proceeds therefrom. The State also reserved its rights to challenge the jurisdiction of the district court over both the subject matter of the litigation and over the State in its sovereign capacity. 129 Because of the State's reluctance to submit to the court's jurisdiction, the Mole Lake court declined to consider the State's position unless it was critical to the resolution sought between the Indians and the federal Government. The holding of the Mole Lake court was that the United States was obligated by the treaty creating the reservations to secure the enjoyment of the lands and the proceeds therefrom to the Indians. Id. at 941. Whether or not the State of Wisconsin ever has owned or does now own the swamp lands in the reservations is immaterial to the question of the obligation of the United States to the Indians, under the Treaty of 1854. Id. Because of this resolution, adjudication of the State's intervenor petition was unnecessary and the petition was accordingly dismissed by the court. Id. 130 The doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979); accord, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971). Considering the limited role played by the State of Wisconsin in Mole Lake, and the court's express dismissal of the State's petition without adjudication, we cannot conclude that the State was a party to Mole Lake in the sense envisioned by the Parklane Court. Further, the cause of action in Mole Lake differs from that in the instant case. Neither the issue framed by the parties in Mole Lake nor the court's holding required consideration of the 1850 Removal Order. Although the judge discussed the Removal Order in the context of the historical events which culminated in the grant of the reservations lands in 1854, 139 F.Supp. at 939, he neither expressed nor had reason to consider the validity of the Removal Order. 11 We conclude therefore that Mole Lake is not a bar to consideration of the validity of the 1850 Removal Order in the instant case. We next address the tribe's contention that State v. Gunroe, 53 Wis.2d 390, 192 N.W.2d 892 (1972), is determinative of this issue pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 131
132 We note initially that the defendants moved this court, prior to oral argument, to strike all references in the plaintiffs' combined responsive brief to the collateral estoppel argument premised on Gunroe. The defendants contend that the issue was not properly raised before the district court. Because this motion was not decided prior to oral argument and subsequent consideration of this case, the panel has considered the collateral estoppel argument. We have found it to be unpersuasive for the reasons indicated below. We conclude that, in light of the fact the argument did receive consideration in due course, the motion to strike should be denied and the collateral estoppel issue should be disposed of on its merits. 133 Under collateral estoppel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). 134 In Gunroe, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the charges that certain enrolled members of two bands of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians had violated Wisconsin law by gill-net fishing and fishing without a license in Lake Superior. The Indians defended on the ground that their right to fish in Lake Superior was guaranteed by the Treaty of 1854 which had established their reservations. The Treaty of 1854 made no explicit reference to whether the right to fish in Lake Superior existed. In finding that the Indians enjoyed the claimed rights, the Gunroe court reasoned that because Lake Superior was a traditional Chippewa fishing ground, the Indians would have assumed when they signed the 1854 Treaty that the right to fish granted them was not limited to the waters of their reservations but also included Lake Superior. 192 N.W.2d at 901. 135 The Gunroe court did discuss the State's contention that the 1850 Removal Order abrogated whatever fishing rights the Indians had, as well as the Indians' response that the 1850 Order did not revoke fishing rights because it was never enforced. The court apparently reasoned that the 1850 Order was relevant because if the Indians' fishing rights had then been revoked, the Chippewas' claim that Lake Superior had been their traditional hunting ground since the Sixteenth Century, and therefore was implicitly recognized in the 1854 Treaty, would be less forceful. See id. at 900. The Wisconsin court concluded that the 1850 Order did not result in an actual revocation of fishing rights, id., and that it had no effect upon the rights granted by the 1854 Treaty. 136 We do not believe that Gunroe precludes the State from urging the validity of the 1850 Order in the instant case. It is questionable whether any consideration of the Removal Order was necessary, Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979), to the Gunroe holding. To the extent the Order was deemed relevant by that court, it was in the limited context of determining whether issuance of the Order had actually curtailed the Chippewas' use of Lake Superior as a fishing ground. The validity of the Removal Order was not in issue. We therefore conclude that the defendants are not precluded from relying on the 1850 Removal Order in the instant appeals. 137 In light of this conclusion, we do not address the other arguments urged by the defendants as to why the doctrine of collateral estoppel is inapplicable to this controversy. In so doing, we imply no view whatsoever as to the merits of those arguments.