Opinion ID: 2452000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: alleged prosecutorial misconduct and harmless error

Text: ¶ 48 I agree that the prosecutor made several problematic expressions over the course of a month-long trial. I do not agree, however, that reversal of Monday's convictions is the appropriate remedy. The convictions should be affirmed based on the jury's proper application of the law to the evidence, not reversed in the name of deterrence. It is possible to deter any improper trial conduct without delaying or denying justice for Francisco Green and his family and disregarding their constitutional rights under article I, section 35. ¶ 49 Unfortunately, the majority misconstrues what the prosecutor said and does not consider the context of the statements, as our case law requires. [6] This is what prosecutor said: [T]he only thing that can explain ... why witness after witness ... is called to this stand and flat out denies what cannot be denied on that video is the code. And the code is black folk don't testify against black folk. You don't snitch to police. VRP (May 30, 2007) at 29. The prosecutor's reference was made in the context of a month-long trial in which several witnesses recanted earlier statements made to police and expressed reluctance to testify. Indeed, the trial court noted, [V]irtually every lay witness has been very reticent to testify in this case, and the memory of virtually every lay witness has had significant holes in places where one would not expect. ... VRP (May 23, 2007) at 98. Although the statement black folk don't testify against black folk without this background is problematic, the prosecutor's broader statement about snitching to the police and the code describes a too common occurrence: the unwillingness of individuals (no matter their age or race) to identify by name others who may be involved in crime. [7] The prosecutor's general reference to a code was a persuasive point in closing argument before this jury and not misconduct warranting reversal. Even Monday's defense counsel referenced an unwritten code and its potential effect on witness testimony. [8] ¶ 50 Second, although the transcript has the prosecutor saying police for part of Ms. Sykes' direct examination, the transcript has both him and Ms. Sykes saying po-leese. VRP (May 21, 2007) at 146-209; VRP (May 22, 2007) at 2-55. The transcript has the prosecutor saying po-leese after the prosecutor had difficulty interacting with Ms. Sykes throughout her direct examination, and the prosecutor said we'll use your term then once before in an unfortunate effort to elicit Ms. Sykes' testimony. See VRP (May 22, 2007) at 14 (using the word arguing instead of confrontation in describing the surrounding events). ¶ 51 I would agree that the prosecutor's intonation of the word police  transcribed as po-leese at certain places in the record  was inappropriate and unprofessional. VRP (May 21, 2007) at 146-209; VRP (May 22, 2007) at 2-55. But this does not mean the prosecutor employed racially derogatory language de facto by saying po-leese while questioning Adonij ah Sykes, or more importantly, that the jury was unable to discount it. We surely cannot conclude that the prosecutor was employing racially derogatory language de facto based on the text of the transcript alone, and the references surely do not justify reversing this jury's murder and assault convictions. ¶ 52 We should hold as the trial court did in its response to the prosecutor's tone: [L]et the jury decide. ... I'm sure they have the ability to do that. VRP (May 22, 2007) at 20. A reasonable jury found Monday guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder in the first degree and two counts of assault in the first degree. The trial court could not have overturned the jury's verdict under our civil rules. [9] Neither should this court, given that the jury alone decides guilt and innocence in our criminal justice system. Overturning this jury verdict despite overwhelming evidence is so fundamentally opposed to our founding principles, values, and fabric of our justice system that it should not need to be explained. Majority at 557. ¶ 53 Third, and perhaps most vexing, the majority fails to honestly apply the holding of tried, tested, and controlling precedent. Appellate courts do not assess `[t]he prejudicial effect of a prosecutor's improper comments... by looking at the comments in isolation but by placing the remarks `in the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the instructions given to the jury.' State v. Yates, 161 Wash.2d 714, 774, 168 P.3d 359 (2007) (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 561, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)). The majority disregards the context of the total argument. The majority does not look to the issues in the case. The majority does not look to the evidence or to the instructions given to the jury. The majority looks to several comments in isolation. ¶ 54 In contrast, I would look to the context of the argument and the context of a month-long trial in which several witnesses recanted earlier statements made to police and were reluctant to testify. Most importantly, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the overwhelming videotape evidence throughout his argument. [10] Finally, I would look to the instructions given to the jury and find that this jury's verdict was fair, unbiased, and impartial. [11] ¶ 55 This court has employed a specific test for prosecutorial misconduct for at least 40 years: we examine the allegedly improper conduct in the full context of the trial. The conviction will be reversed only if (1) the conduct was improper and (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the misconduct affected the jury's verdict. State v. McKenzie, 157 Wash.2d 44, 52, 134 P.3d 221 (2006). The defendant carries this burden. State v. Fisher, 165 Wash.2d 727, 747, 202 P.3d 937 (2009). This is the constitutional test for preserving a defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury, as enshrined in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution. See id. at 746-47, 202 P.3d 937. We never meddle with such established constitutional protections, unless a compelling showing is made that the current test has failed and is causing harm. ¶ 56 The majority's refusal to thoroughly engage in the second prong of our constitutional analysis is tacit acknowledgment that the defendant was not prejudiced. The corollary of this conclusion is that the jury's verdict was sound.