Opinion ID: 1304358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The nature and character of the charge for which Stroh was disbarred.

Text: This court held in In re Stroh, 97 Wn.2d at 295 that the crime of tampering with a witness strikes at the very core of the judicial system, and necessarily involves moral turpitude. `For an attorney at law to actively procure or knowingly countenance the commission of perjury is utterly reprehensible.' In re Stroh, at 295-96 (quoting In re Allen, 52 Cal.2d 762, 768, 344 P.2d 609 (1959)). Further, Stroh requested and the jury was instructed that the crime of which he was charged required proof of criminal intent. In re Stroh, at 296. Stroh does not contest his conviction or the seriousness of his crime. In considering reinstatement for disbarment resulting from a criminal conviction, this court must treat guilt of the crime as an established fact. In re Lonergan, 23 Wn.2d 767, 771, 162 P.2d 289 (1945). Nevertheless, we do not believe that Stroh demonstrated such moral turpitude as to forever bar him from the practice of law. It appears that Stroh's initial conversation with and letter to the police officer were with the prosecuting attorney's consent and knowledge. This indicates that Stroh did not set out on a deliberate course of illegal conduct. We are also sensitive to the fact that Stroh abandoned his appeal of the conviction in reliance on the Board's dismissal of his disciplinary case at the urging of his partners to put the matter to rest. A more crucial issue than the seriousness of the crime is whether the applicant is rehabilitated. E.g., In re Walgren, at 561. We agree with the Board's analysis that it is unlikely that Stroh will engage in the future in conduct such as that which led to his witness tampering conviction.