Opinion ID: 718818
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Public Hearings

Text: 40 The Plaintiffs' third argument under the CWA is that the Corps violated requirements by failing to provide the public any hearings on the landfill project and by failing to provide the public with information regarding possible effects of the project on the Florida Panther and the Eastern Indigo Snake. The CWA mandates an opportunity for public hearings. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). However, the statute does not state that the Corps itself must hold its own public hearings regardless of how many other hearings have been held on a project. The applicable regulations provide the Corps discretion to hold hearings on permit applications on an as needed basis. 33 C.F.R. § 327.4. If the Corps determines that it has the information necessary to reach a decision and that there is no valid interest to be served by a hearing, the Corps has the discretion not to hold one. Id. § 327.4(b). 41 Here, the Corps recognized that two public hearings on the project had already been conducted under the state process. Given the information generated from these hearings and the voluminous written information submitted to the Corps by opponents of the project, including the Plaintiffs, the Corps concluded that holding its own additional public hearing was unlikely to generate any new information that was not already in the Corps' possession. Moreover, the Plaintiffs point to no such information. Under these circumstances, we are persuaded that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or abuse its discretion in deciding to forego further public hearings on the matter. 42 The Plaintiffs also argue that the public notice provided by the Corps was defective because: (1) it failed to specifically state that the project could potentially affect the Florida Panther and the Eastern Indigo Snake; and (2) it did not mention or illustrate the creation of a three-mile access road on the Walton Tract. These arguments are meritless. First, the notice of the permit application was widely disseminated in June of 1990 as required by 33 C.F.R. § 325.3(a). The notice informed the public that several threatened or endangered species may be expected to be present on the site and invited comment. Nothing in the applicable statutes or regulations requires a species-by-species listing in the notice, and no further notice is required by statute or regulation. 43 Second, while the Plaintiffs are correct that the public notice did not mention the access road, the applicable regulations give the Corps discretion about whether to issue supplemental public notice about such matters. Such notice is to be distributed by the district engineer if in his view there is a change in the application data that would affect the public's review of the proposal. 33 C.F.R. 325.2(a)(2). The Corps considered the road to be a minor change in the application data and declined to issue supplemental notice. Given that the road's construction affects less than one-half acre of additional wetlands, this conclusion was not arbitrary or capricious.B. Preparation of Environmental Impact Statement Under the National Environmental Policy Act. 44 The Plaintiffs allege that the Corps' decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement violated NEPA and its implementing regulations by ignoring evidence of the project's harmful effects. The NEPA requires a federal agency to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement if the agency proposes to undertake a major federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The statute imposes procedural but not substantive requirements on the agency. NEPA does not work by mandating that agencies achieve particular substantive environmental results. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. at 371, 109 S.Ct. at 1858. Instead, NEPA works by requiring that the environmental consequences of an action be studied before the proposed action is taken. Id. 45 In deciding whether to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for a proposed action, an agency must initially determine if the action is of a type that (1) normally requires the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement, or (2) normally does not require either an Environmental Impact Statement or an Environmental Assessment. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a). If the proposed action falls into neither category, the agency must prepare an Environmental Assessment. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b). The Environmental Assessment is expected to be a brief and concise document containing sufficient evidence and analysis for the agency to determine whether to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement or a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). The purpose of an [Environmental Assessment] is to determine whether there is enough likelihood of significant environmental consequences to justify the time and expense of preparing an environmental impact statement. River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of U.S. Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1055, 106 S.Ct. 1283, 89 L.Ed.2d 590 (1986). 46 The role of the court in reviewing the sufficiency of an agency's consideration of environmental facts is limited both by the time in which the decision was made and by the statute mandating review. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 555, 558, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1217, 1219, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978). Moreover, this Circuit has stated that a court's only role [under NEPA] is to ensure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences of the proposed action. Druid Hills Civic Ass'n v. Federal Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700, 709 (11th Cir.1985) (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 2730 n. 21, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976)). 47 The Plaintiffs contend that the Corps' decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement in this case fell short of the requisite hard look and that the Corps' actions were a mere paperwork exercise. Appellants' Br. at 43. In response, the Corps and Sarasota County argue that the Environmental Assessment prepared in this case satisfied the need for a hard look at the project and that the Environmental Assessment supported the Corps' FONSI, which obviated the need to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement. 48 The Corps prepared its Environmental Assessment for the project in April of 1995. The Environmental Assessment resulted in a FONSI, meaning that the Corps concluded that no Environmental Impact Statement was required for the project. At this point, the Corps had the benefit of two separate no jeopardy F.W.S. Biological Opinions regarding the Florida Panther and the Eastern Indigo Snake, approval by the E.P.A., voluminous information (including expert opinions) provided by the Plaintiffs, and information resulting from the two public hearings the state had held on the project. In light of the five preceding years of extensive administrative review, it would be difficult for us to conclude that the Corps failed to take a hard look at the project before deciding to forego the time and administrative costs of preparing an Environmental Impact Statement. Instead, we hold that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by concluding that it had before it sufficient information to determine that the project would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and that preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement was therefore unnecessary. As explained by the Supreme Court: 49 [O]nce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive. 50 Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227, 100 S.Ct. 497, 499, 62 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 51 C. Challenges Pursuant to the Endangered Species Act. 52 The Plaintiffs claim that § 4(f) of the ESA requires the Corps and the F.W.S. to implement the 1987 Recovery Plan for the Florida Panther and that the Corps and the F.W.S., in violation of the ESA, are failing in that regard. 15 The Plaintiffs' reasoning can be summarized as follows: (1) the ESA requires that recovery plans shall be developed and implemented for endangered species; (2) the F.W.S.'s 1987 Recovery Plan for the Florida Panther includes a Habitat Preservation Plan stating that areas proposed for habitat preservation, which include the Walton Tract, should be monitored to the maximum extent possible to obviate adverse habitat modifications; (3) the F.W.S. fails to implement the Recovery Plan if it issues a no jeopardy opinion for a suitable Florida Panther habitat as specified by the Recovery Plan; and (4) the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously in relying on the F.W.S. no jeopardy Opinions in granting a permit to Sarasota County. 53 The Plaintiffs' line of reasoning is flawed in several respects. First, the practical effect of the Plaintiffs' position would be to elevate the 1987 Recovery Plan into a document with the force of law. We cannot take such an approach. Section 1533(f) makes it plain that recovery plans are for guidance purposes only. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f). By providing general guidance as to what is required in a recovery plan, the ESA breathe[s] discretion at every pore. Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir.1975). 54 Second, the Plaintiffs' position cannot be reconciled with the Corps' statutory duty under § 7 of the ESA to consult with the F.W.S. about the environmental impact of proposed agency actions and the F.W.S.'s duty to arrive at a biological opinion based upon the best scientific data available. There would be absolutely no point to the consultation and preparation of a biological opinion if the F.W.S.'s opinion were predetermined based upon whether proposed project lands fell within the borders of properties discussed in one of any number of recovery plan documents. The Plaintiffs thus misconstrue the interrelationship and legal effect of the 1987 Recovery Plan on the 1995 F.W.S. Biological Opinion. 55 Third, the F.W.S. identified reasonable justifications for issuing its no jeopardy Biological Opinions. To begin with, there have been no verified Florida Panther sightings either on the Walton Tract or near it within the last ten years. According to the Florida Panther Habitat Protection Plan (HPP), there is no occupied Florida Panther territory anywhere in Sarasota County. 16 The HPP concludes, some anecdotal evidence notwithstanding, that no occupied Florida Panther habitat exists in Sarasota County or, for that matter, anywhere north of the Caloosahatchee River. Moreover, the contested land has not been designated as critical habitat under the ESA. It is a major flaw in the Plaintiffs' argument to assume that the project will destroy or adversely modify the Florida Panther's critical habitat when it has not been determined that this particular site is a critical habitat. The land included in the HPP's recommendation for a critical habitat designation area is not anywhere in Sarasota County. In addition, the Walton Tract has not been identified as a reintroduction site for Florida Panthers, nor is it adjacent to any such sites. See F.W.S. Opinion at 20-21. Because the Walton Tract is not in proximity to areas of known Florida Panther use, it does not possess an important characteristic of areas suitable for Florida Panther reintroduction. 56 In summary, because the Recovery Plan is not a document with the force of law divesting all discretion and judgment from the F.W.S., and because the F.W.S. identified reasonable justifications for issuing no jeopardy Biological Opinions with respect to the Walton Tract, we hold that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that the F.W.S. acted arbitrarily and capriciously by issuing the Opinions. Likewise, we hold that the Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously by relying on these Opinions when consultation with the F.W.S. is exactly what is required by the relevant statutory scheme. 57 D. Disallowing Discovery. 58 At oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs presented a government document demonstrating contact between Senator Bob Graham and the United States Department of Justice. The document is a memorandum providing an account of a meeting that was held between the Corps and Sarasota County during the time that the landfill permits were suspended while the F.W.S. and the Corps completed the new § 7 consultation that was initiated as a result of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit. The memorandum states that Senator Graham had contacted the Attorney General with regard to the litigation, and that Sen. Graham was working to see if [the Department of] Justice would withdraw [a] recommendation that a draft environmental assessment be made available for public comment. See A.R. Tab 137. At oral argument, the Plaintiffs' counsel brought this document to the attention of the district court and requested that, should the court deny the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs be permitted to take discovery on the extent to which Senator Graham's involvement may have influenced the agencies' decisions in this case, particularly the Corps' decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement. The district court denied this discovery request. The Plaintiffs claim that this denial was improper. We conclude that the district court's order denying discovery must stand because it was not an abuse of discretion. 59 None of the cases upon which the Plaintiffs rely provides a basis for permitting discovery on the issue involving the memorandum from Senator Graham. For example, in ATX, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation, 41 F.3d 1522, 1527 (D.C.Cir.1994), members of Congress strongly voiced opposition to ATX's airline application to the Department of Transportation (D.O.T.). Several members of Congress wrote letters directly to D.O.T. Secretary Federico Pena urging him to deny the ATX application, and the record contained letters from over 125 members of Congress to other transportation department officials. Id. In holding that the congressional pressure was insufficient to invalidate D.O.T.'s adjudication, the D.C. Circuit noted that  'the proper focus is not on the content of congressional communications in the abstract, but rather upon the relation between the communications and the adjudicator's decision-making process.'  Id. (citation omitted). There, as here, congressional input neither created an appearance of impropriety nor actually affected the outcome. Id. As discussed in Section IV.B of this opinion, it is clear that the Corps' decision not to complete an Environmental Impact Statement was based on the merits of this case. Furthermore, the legal issue raised in the controversial memorandum--whether to circulate a draft Environmental Assessment for public comment--is irrelevant. Even if such a recommendation had been made and withdrawn, there is no legal requirement that an Environmental Assessment be circulated publicly and, in fact, they rarely are. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it disallowed discovery on this issue.