Opinion ID: 2625399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Plain Language of Article II, Section 15

Text: {40} The majority, concluding that the protections embodied in Article II, Section 15 extend beyond the implied acquittal doctrine, has held that a defendant may not be tried for any offense or degree of offense greater than the one for which he or she was initially convicted. That conclusion is based on an interpretation of the phrase again be tried. Moving beyond the historical analysis of Article II, Section 15, I believe our case law also supports a different interpretation of that phrase than that adopted by the majority. {41} Only one prior case has construed the language at issue here. See State v. Martinez, 120 N.M. 677, 905 P.2d 715 (1995). In that case, the defendant was charged with attempted murder and aggravated battery. Id. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge, but convicted the defendant of aggravated battery. Id. The issue on appeal was whether the State could retry the defendant for attempted murder. Id. at 678, 905 P.2d at 716. The defendant, relying on both Article II, Section 15 and Section 30-1-10, argued that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of attempted murder and that the State could not retry him for attempted murder. Id. at 678, 905 P.2d at 716. The Court concluded that the defendant could be retried on the higher. Id. Because there was an affirmative showing that the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge, there was no implied acquittal of that charge. See id. at 679-80, 905 P.2d at 717-18. The State was free to retry the defendant on the attempted murder charge. See id. {42} The Martinez Court cited State v. Sneed, 78 N.M. 615, 617, 435 P.2d 768, 770 (1967), for the proposition that Section 30-1-10 precludes retrial of a greater offense only after acquittal of that offense. The Court of Appeals suggested that the interpretation adopted in Martinez was incorrect because it relied on an overly broad interpretation of Sneed. I agree that Sneed merely stated the general rule that the State can retry a defendant who successfully appeals his or her conviction. Sneed, 78 N.M. at 617, 435 P.2d at 770. Nonetheless, while the Martinez Court may have overstated the holding of Sneed, I think it adopted the correct interpretation of Article II, Section 15 and Section 30-1-10. I think that both Article II, Section 15 and Section 30-1-10 apply only in cases where a defendant has been charged with multiple degrees of a crime, or multiple crimes, but was convicted of a lesser degree or lesser crime. {43} If the majority's interpretation of the language were correct, then the subsequent prosecution would have been barred in Martinez as well. In that case, the indictment charged different offenses. After the defendant was convicted of the lesser charge, he was granted a new trial based on improperly admitted evidence. Therefore, Article II, Section 15 would have applied to the defendant in Martinez. Based on the majority's interpretation of the language, the defendant in that case could not have been retried on a higher charge than the one for which he was originally convicted. The Martinez Court, however, concluded that neither Article II, Section 15, nor its codifying statute barred retrial in that case. I believe the same is true here. {44} Defendant argues that Martinez is distinguishable because the jury failed to return a verdict on the higher charge in that case. Thus, according to Defendant, Martinez merely applied the general rule that the state can retry a defendant after a jury fails to return a verdict. Defendant is correct in observing that when a jury is unable to reach a verdict, the second trial is a continuation of the first, and the defendant therefore is only placed in jeopardy once. Martinez, 120 N.M. at 678, 905 P.2d at 716. The same is true, however, when a defendant successfully overturns a conviction. Retrial after reversal on any ground other than insufficient evidence is [a]t the opposite end of the spectrum from an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. County of Los Alamos v. Tapia, 109 N.M. 736, 743, 790 P.2d 1017, 1024 (1990). In such a case society's interest in administering its laws completely overrides the defendant's interest in freedom from [the] hardships [of retrial]. Id. As the United States Supreme Court explained, when a defendant is successful on appeal, his conviction is wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). [5] {45} Based on this analysis of the plain language of Article II, Section 15 and Section 30-1-10, I would conclude that the State may, without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of our state's constitution, amend the criminal information to allege a higher degree of crime against a defendant who has successfully appealed a conviction for the lesser degree of the crime. In this case, as in Martinez, there was no implied acquittal. Defendant thus stands in the same position he did before his first trial began. At that point, the State would have been entitled to file an amended information with new charges. In my opinion, the State can do the same thing now. Article II, Section 15 does not operate as a bar to bringing higher charges when reprosecuting a defendant who has successfully appealed a conviction. {46} Such a conclusion does not leave a defendant with no protection in such cases. Instead, the State's charging decision is constrained by the Due Process Clause, which prohibits vindictive prosecution. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974); State v. Brule, 1999-NMSC-026, ¶ 6, 127 N.M. 368, 981 P.2d 782. That doctrine prevents the State from bringing a higher charge as retribution for a defendant's successful appeal. In this case, the State claimed that its decision to bring new charges was based on new information that became available after Defendant's successful appeal. The trial court found that the State's decision was not motivated by vindictiveness. I agree with the majority that Defendant's due process claim is not before us at this time. {47} For the reasons stated above, I dissent. I CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice.