Opinion ID: 763468
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: National's Interpretation of Definition 10(c)

Text: 25 Under National's construction, to qualify for coverage, the invasion offense must be committed by or on behalf of the owner, the landlord, or lessor. Applied to the facts in this case, National would be obligated to defend the county against claims of invasion only if the county were the owner, landlord, or lessor of the property at issue in the Acierno actions. 26 In support of this position, National cites three cases: (1) United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Goodwin, 950 F.Supp. 24 (D.Me.1996); (2) TerraMatrix, Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 939 P.2d 483 (Colo.Ct.App.1997); and (3) TGA Development, Inc. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 62 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir.1995). National's citations are instructive, yet ultimately we find the reasoning in these cases unavailing. 27 In Goodwin, the court held that language identical to definition 10(c) unambiguously requires that the wrongful entry be committed by the owner, landlord, or lessor of the room, dwelling, or premises. 950 F.Supp. at 27. We fail to understand the logic underlying Goodwin, however. Reviewing the same phrase, i.e., 28 [t]he wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor, 29 The Goodwin court found that the word its modifies room, dwelling or premises, and not person. 950 F.Supp. at 27. Yet, replacing its with any of the words the court found its to modify does not foreclose either National or the county's reading of the provision. For example, consider the following: The wrongful eviction from a room that a person occupies by or on behalf of the room's owner, landlord or lessor. Or, consider this: The invasion of the right of private occupancy of a premises that a person occupies by or on behalf of the premises' owner, landlord or lessor. Both examples illustrate the flaw in the Goodwin court's reasoning; that is, neither clarifies whether by or on behalf of requires the offense to be committed by the owner, landlord, or lessor, or whether it defines the possessory interest of the claimant. Thus, determining what its modifies neither strengthens nor undermines either of the competing interpretations of definition 10(c) forwarded by National and the county. 30 In TerraMatrix, the Colorado Court of Appeals also found language identical to definition 10(c) unambiguous and applicable only to entries, evictions and invasions committed by or on behalf of the owner, landlord or lessor. 939 P.2d at 489. Although the TerraMatrix court professed to be persuaded by the reasoning of other courts, it cited only Goodwin in support of its conclusion that the provision was unambiguous. Id. As we explained above, the reasoning in Goodwin is flawed at best. Because the TerraMatrix court does not offer any analysis of its own, without more, we cannot accord significant weight to its holding. 31 In TGA Development, the Eighth Circuit commented that it doubt[ed] very much that coverage is available under a personal injury provision identical to definition 10(c) because the insured could not even colorably be characterized as owner, landlord, or lessor. TGA Development, 62 F.3d at 1091 (internal quotation marks omitted). National points to this language to bolster its claim that the insured must be the owner, landlord, or lessor to qualify for coverage under definition 10(c). The Eighth Circuit's commentary is purely dicta, however. Indeed, the TGA court explicitly pass[ed] over the issue presented by this appeal. See id. Instead, the court based its conclusion that coverage was not available on the policy's exclusion of coverage clause prohibiting recovery for personal injury for which the insured has assumed liability in a contract or agreement. See 62 F.3d at 1091. The dicta from TGA Development has no binding authority on this Court. Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 911 F.2d 960, 967 (3d Cir.1990). 7 32 In addition to the above cases, the District Court also cited Patel v. Northfield Insurance Co., 940 F.Supp. 995 (N.D.Tex.1996), for the proposition that definition 10(c) is unambiguous. In Patel, the court found that language identical to definition 10(c) was unambiguous. The case is different in one fundamental respect, however. The Patel court based its finding on Decorative Center v. Employers Casualty, 833 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex.App.1992), which examines language different from definition 10(c). In Decorative Center, the personal injury offense was other invasion of the right of private occupancy. Id. at 1001. Importantly, it does not include the by or on behalf of language that forms the basis for this appeal. The Patel court dismissed the difference between the Decorative Center language and language identical to definition 10(c) as having no practical effect. Id. at 1001 n. 10. We, however, find that language critical to this case. Indeed, the sole focus of this appeal is definition 10(c)'s by or on behalf of language. 8 33 In sum, National has offered some authority that suggests definition 10(c) is not ambiguous. Upon close inspection of the cases, however, we find the authority to be unpersuasive or of limited precedential value. As such, standing alone, the authority forwarded by National does not resolve whether definition 10(c) is clear or ambiguous. With that we turn to the county's interpretation of definition 10(c). 34