Opinion ID: 2611475
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The August 1996 Judgment

Text: The father, J.W., argues that the superior court improperly applied the Alaska standard for resolving a custody dispute between a parent and non-parent. He reasons that under Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1975), and Carter v. Novotny, 779 P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1989), the superior court must find that the parent is unfit or that it would be harmful to the child's welfare to be placed with the parent before the non-parent is awarded custody. He claims that there is insufficient evidence to make this finding. The stepfather, R.J., argues that the superior court correctly applied the Turner standard and clearly found that placement outside [R.J.]'s home would be detrimental to the child.... Turner v. Pannick stands for the proposition that parental custody is preferable and only to be refused where it is clearly detrimental to the child. 540 P.2d at 1055. Unless the superior court determines that the parent is unfit or has abandoned the child, or that the welfare of the child requires that the non-parent receive custody, the parent must be awarded custody. [3] Id. We reaffirmed these principles in B.J. v. J.D., 950 P.2d 113 (Alaska 1997); Rooney v. Rooney, 914 P.2d 212, 216 n. 8 (Alaska 1996); Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985, 988-89 (Alaska 1989); Carter, 779 P.2d at 1197; and Britt v. Britt, 567 P.2d 308, 310 (Alaska 1977). We agree with the father that the 1996 judgment is not supported by the fact findings necessary for an award of custody to a non-parent. The superior court recited the Turner standard, as set out in Carter, and also cited to Buness, but found that S.R.'s psychological and emotional development, as well as her overall welfare, requires that this relationship [with her stepfather] not be traumatically interrupted. The superior court based this finding on the fact that S.R. had lived most of her life with her stepfather, that he had become her psychological father in many ways, and that he could provide her a stable home. The superior court found that S.R.'s father had not known her for most of her life and that they had just recently become reacquainted. Yet the superior court also found that both men are fit parents who desire the best for [S.R.]. After determining that S.R.'s welfare required a parental role for the stepfather, the superior court then seemingly applied the statutory factors under AS 25.24.150 to determine that it was in S.R.'s best interest that the stepfather have custody during the school year and that the father have custody during the school vacations. There was no express finding that it would be detrimental for S.R. to be placed in her natural father's custody. [4] Although use of the word detrimental is not mandatory, the findings had to demonstrate that the Turner detriment standard was being applied. The court instead appears to have applied the best interest standard set out in AS 25.24.150. The court may have reasoned that the stepfather's assumption of an in loco parentis status gave him parental rights equal to the father's; its citation of Buness suggests that it may have considered that the relationship between the child and the stepfather conferred a parent-like standing on the stepfather that made it unnecessary to apply the Turner standard. Such an analysis, however, would have been contrary to the essential holding of Turner, that parental custody ... is preferable and only to be refused where clearly detrimental to the child. 540 P.2d at 1055. The relationship between the stepparent and the child, no matter how close, does not justify application of the best interests standard; the court may take the relationship into account, however, in deciding whether awarding custody to the biological parent would be detrimental to the child. Absent a finding in this case that the father is unfit, has abandoned the child or that the welfare of the child requires that a non-parent receive custody, the parental preference controls. We therefore reverse the superior court's 1996 award of custody to the stepfather, R.J., and remand [5] for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [6]
It is undisputed that S.R., her father, and her stepfather are Alaska Natives. The August 1996 order, citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1), concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act [25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. ] does not apply to this matter. The order did not explain the reason for that conclusion, but noted that both parties are Indian. It appears no formal notice of the 1996 and 1997 custody proceedings was given to any Indian tribe, including the village which apparently considers S.R. to be a tribal member. [7] The father, J.W., argues that it was error not to apply the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to the custody proceedings. He argues that before the superior court could place the child with her stepfather, it had to determine pursuant to § 1912(e) that there was clear and convincing evidence, including expert testimony, that serious emotional or physical damage would likely result if S.R. were placed with her father. He also argues that ICWA would not have applied if S.R. had been placed with him, S.R.'s father. The stepfather, R.J., argues that ICWA does not apply. He alternatively asserts, however, that because he qualifies as S.R.'s Indian custodian, he is entitled to receive the benefit of ICWA protections against removal of a child, and that applying ICWA for the father's benefit would lead to the absurd result of removing the child from her Indian custodian. ICWA's protections, if applicable, include the clear and convincing burden of proof for removing an Indian child from a parent or Indian custodian [8] and a requirement that the child's Indian tribe be allowed to intervene in the proceeding. [9] 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911, 1912. The legislative history of ICWA reveals that Congress was concerned with two goals: protecting the best interests of Indian children and promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families. See H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, at 8 (1978); see also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1602, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989); A.B.M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Alaska 1982). Although ICWA provides procedural protections for parents and Indian custodians, see, e.g., § 1912(e) (imposing higher burden of proof for foster care placement), it also protects the tribes and the Indian children, see, e.g., § 1911 (giving tribes exclusive jurisdiction in custody disputes on reservations, and the right to intervene in state court custody proceedings). Congress determined that tribal participation in custody proceedings would better reflect Native values, and that placement decisions would better reflect the best interests of Indian children. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5); Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 34-37, 109 S.Ct. at 1600-1602; H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, at 10, 19 (1978). Applying ICWA to custody disputes between parents and non-parents allows the tribe an opportunity to intervene and offer its insight into the relative fitness of the contestants. Congress was also concerned with state action, including judicial action, in custody decisions involving Indian children. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5); H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, at 19 (1978). Although our state standard for awarding custody of a child to a non-parent is higher than the best interests standard usually applied in custody disputes, ICWA imposes an even higher standard of proof before an Indian child may be removed from the custody of a parent or Indian custodian. [10] ICWA applies to child custody proceedings involving an Indian child. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i)-(iv). The only type of child custody proceeding relevant here is a foster care placement, which ICWA defines as: any action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i). The definition contains four requirements: (1) an action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian, [11] (2) temporary placement in a foster home, institution, or home of a guardian or conservator, (3) inability of the parent or Indian custodian to have the child returned upon demand, and (4) absence of termination of parental rights. The last three requirements clearly existed here: S.R.'s 1996 placement with the stepfather was a temporary placement in the home of a guardian; [12] after the court awarded custody to the stepfather, the father could not obtain S.R.'s return upon demand; and no parental rights had been terminated. It also appears that this case involves an action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian. All proceedings thus far involved the potential, if not actual, removal of the child from the father. Although he did not previously have physical custody, the proceedings still removed the child from the father's legal custody. See In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 111 N.J. 155, 543 A.2d 925, 937 (1988) (stating that phrase, from whose custody such child was removed, in § 1914 refers to legal rather than actual physical custody of child); In re Welfare of W.R. and A.R., 379 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Minn.App. 1986) (finding § 1912 provision of the continued custody of the child by the parent does not refer to the physical custody of the child); In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 490 (S.D. 1990) (the custody referred to in § 1912(f) is legal rather than physical custody). We consequently conclude that the custody proceeding was a foster care placement within the meaning of ICWA, § 1903(1)(i). The stepfather argues that ICWA does not apply because its purpose is to restrict placements outside the Indian home and away from the existing family thereby causing the breakup of the Indian family. [13] This reading of ICWA's purpose is too narrow. As we noted above, one purpose of ICWA is to permit tribal participation in state custody proceedings. This purpose is advanced by permitting the child's tribe to express its preference or comment on the relative fitness of the contestants. This opportunity increases the likelihood non-Indians will recognize and appreciate cultural and social values thought by the tribe to be important in resolving the custody dispute. Similar proceedings have been held to be foster care placements. The New Mexico Court of Appeals found that the placement of children after a parent's death was a foster care proceeding under ICWA because the children had not been placed with their aunt, who was their Indian custodian under tribal custom, and therefore were removed from her. In re Ashley Elizabeth R., 116 N.M. 416, 863 P.2d 451, 453 (N.M.App. 1993). Other courts, while not specifically addressing the removal issue, have held that ICWA applied to custody disputes between parents and non-parents. See In re Custody of A.K.H., 502 N.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Minn.App. 1993) (finding that custody dispute between parents and grandparents was a foster care proceeding and that ICWA applied); In re Custody of S.B.R., 43 Wash. App. 622, 719 P.2d 154, 156 (1986) (same). The stepfather also argues that this dispute falls within the exclusion to ICWA for custody disputes between parents in a divorce proceeding. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1). He reasons that this dispute is really the equivalent of a custody dispute between two parents because he was S.R.'s Indian custodian and psychological parent, who has acted in loco parentis for most of her life, and who may be treated as a parent under state law. The child custody proceedings to which ICWA applies do not include a placement based ... upon an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1). ICWA defines parent to mean any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, including adoptions under tribal law or custom. It does not include the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9). Neither stepparents acting in loco parentis nor Indian custodians are included in this definition. Furthermore, stepparent is included in the definition of extended family member. [14] 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2). A stepparent is clearly not a parent within ICWA usage, and therefore a dispute between a parent and stepparent does not fall within the ICWA exclusion for custody disputes between parents. We conclude that ICWA applied to the proceedings below. Because the April 1996 interim custody order and the August 1996 judgment violated the provisions of § 1911 and possibly § 1912, they must be vacated and this case remanded for further proceedings consistent with ICWA. 25 U.S.C. § 1914. [15] The effects of this conclusion are not completely clear. Certainly the superior court proceedings removed the child from the legal custody of a parent or Indian custodian without giving the child's tribe an opportunity to participate. As a result, any findings weighing the fitness of the contestants were made without benefit of the tribe's comments. That deficiency can be remedied only if the proper tribe is given notice and the opportunity to participate on remand. The father invokes § 1912(e) for its requirement of clear and convincing evidence before an Indian child is removed from a parent or Indian custodian. The stepfather argues that if ICWA does apply, he qualifies as the Indian custodian, and therefore is also entitled to the benefit of the ICWA protections. It is unclear whether the stepfather is an Indian custodian. Although the stepfather alternatively argued below that he qualified as the child's Indian custodian, he does not appear to have sought a finding of fact to that effect. On remand, the superior court must determine whether the stepfather was S.R.'s Indian custodian within the meaning of § 1903(6). [16] If the stepfather does not establish that he was the child's Indian custodian, he has no arguable right to invoke the ICWA heightened standard of proof. Instead, the father will have the benefit of § 1912(e). A finding on remand that the stepfather is the child's Indian custodian will squarely raise the legal question whether § 1912(e) applies reciprocally in a dispute between a parent and Indian custodian. Subsection 1912(e) expresses a strong preference for custody by the parent or Indian custodian. The subsection treats parents and Indian custodians as coequals, as does the definition of foster care placement in § 1903(1)(i). No section of ICWA indicates that Congress preferred a parent to an Indian custodian if the parent did not previously have physical custody. Although § 1916 states that the protections of ICWA do not apply when an Indian child is removed from a foster care home and returned to the parent or Indian custodian from whose custody the child was originally removed, we cannot assume that Congress generally preferred parents to Indian custodians. The purposes behind ICWA are consistent with restricting § 1912(e) to disputes between persons having favored status  parents and Indian custodians  and others who are neither parents nor Indian custodians. There would appear to be no logical reason consistent with the statutory purpose to apply § 1912(e) in a contest between two equally favored contestants. We therefore hold that if the stepfather proves on remand that he is S.R.'s Indian custodian, § 1912(e) will not apply and the superior court should instead apply the Alaska standard for custody disputes between parents and non-parents discussed in Part III.C.1. [17] See 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (In any case where State or Federal law ... provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided under this subchapter, the State or Federal court shall apply the State or Federal standard.).