Opinion ID: 1303466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The nature of the compensation.

Text: By the act the equivalent is to be in land. No just compensation can be made except in money. Money is a common standard, by comparison with which the value of any thing may be ascertained. It is not only a sign which represents the respective values of commodities, but is an universal medium, easily portable, liable to little variation, and readily exchanged for any kind of property. Compensation is a recompence in value, a quid pro quo, and must be in money. True it is, that land or any thing else may be a compensation, but then it must be at the election of the party; it cannot be forced upon him. His consent will legalise the act, and make it valid; nothing short of it will have the effect. It is obvious, that if a jury pass upon the subject; or value of the property, their verdict must be in money. To close this part of the disclosure: It is contended that the Legislature must judge of the necessity of interposing their despotic authority; it is a right of necessity upon which no other power in government can decide: That no civil institution is perfect; and that cases will occur, in which private property must yield to urgent calls of public utility or general danger. Be it so. But then it must be upon complete indemnification to the individual. Agreed: But who shall judge of this? Did there also exist a state necessity, that the Legislature, or persons solely appointed by them, must admeasure the compensation, or value of the lands seized and taken, and the validity of the title thereto? Did a third state necessity exist, that the proprietor must take land by way of equivalent for his land? And did a fourth state necessity exist, that the value of this land-equivalent must be adjusted by the board of property, without the consent of the party, or the interference of a Jury? Alas! how necessity begets necessity. They rise upon each other and become endless. The proprietor stands afar off, a solitary and unprotected member of the community, and is stript of his property, without his consent, without a hearing, without notice, the value of that property judged upon without his participation, or the intervention of a Jury, and the equivalent therefor in lands ascertained in the same way. If this be the Legislation of a Republican Government, in which the preservation of property is made sacred by the Constitution, I ask, wherein it differs from the mandate of an Asiatic Prince? Omnipotence in Legislation is despotism. According to this doctrine, we have nothing that we can call our own, or are sure of for a moment; we are all tenants at will, and hold our landed property at the mere pleasure of the Legislature. Wretched situation, precarious tenure! And yet we boast of property and its security, of Laws, of Courts, of Constitutions, and call ourselves free! In short, gentlemen, the confirming act is void; it never had Constitutional existence; it is a dead letter, and of no more virtue or avail, than if it never had been made. II. But, admitting the confirming act to be Constitutional and valid, the next subject of enquiry is, what is its operation, or, in other words, what construction ought to be put upon it. It is contended, on the part of the defendant, that on the passing of the act, the estate was divested from the Pennsylvania claimants, and instantly vested in the Connecticut settlers. To decide upon this question, it will not be amiss to lay down a rule or two of exposition, applicable to the act under consideration. A statute shall never have an equitable construction in order to overthrow or divest an estate. Every statute, derogatory to the rights of property, or that takes away the estate of a citizen, ought to be construed strictly. Let us test this act by the foregoing rules. The act is entitled, An act, for ascertaining and confirming to certain persons, called Connecticut claimants, the lands by them claimed within the county of Luzerne, and for other purposes therein mentioned, and was passed the 28th of March, 1787. The first five sections, being material in the discussion of this part of the subject, run in the following words. (Here the Judge read the Law.) The act requires, That the Connecticut settlers shall prefer their claims to the commissioners. That they shall support their claims by reasonable proof. That the commissioners shall adjudicate upon or confirm the claims. That they shall have the lots, to which claims are set up and admitted, surveyed; that they shall make return of their surveys and their book of entries to the Supreme Executive Council, who shall cause patents to be issued for their confirmation, and each patent shall comprehend all the parcels of land, which are to be confirmed to the same claimant, to whom, by the return of the commissioners, the same shall be found to belong. The mere offering or presenting of the claim is not sufficient. It must be supported by reasonable proof, and ascertained, and established by the Commissioners. There acts must be performed before the estate passes out of the Pennsylvania claimants, and is vested in the Connecticut settlers. They are antecedent acts, and in nature of a condition precedent. Now conditions precedent are such as must happen or be performed before the estate can vest or be enlarged; they admit of no latitude; they must be strictly, literally, and punctually performed. It is a known maxim, that where the estate is to arise upon a condition precedent, it cannot vest till that condition is performed; and this has been so strongly adhered to, that even where the condition has become impossible, no estate or interest grew thereupon. Where a condition copulative precedes an estate, the whole must be performed before the estate can arise; or where an act is previous to any estate, and that act consists of several particulars, every particular must be performed before the estate can vest or take effect. Co. Lit. 206, 218. 1 Atk. 374. 376. Com Rep. 732. The estate of the Pennsylvania claimants was not divested on the passing of the act; it was not divested on presenting the claim on the part of the Connecticut settlers. Other acts were previously necessary, and, in particular, the commissioners must pass upon and confirm the claim, before the estate is divested from the one party and vested in the other. These things precede, and must be done before any estate can vest in the defendant; but they have not been done, and therefore the estate remains in the plaintiff. This construction corresponds with the meaning and spirit, the tendency and scope, of the act itself. The intention of the Legislature was to vest in Connecticut claimants of a particular description a perfect estate to certain lands in the County of Luzerne; but then it was upon condition; it was to operate upon, secure, and sanctify, such claims only as should be admitted and ascertained, approved and established, by the Commissioners. This is further evident from the powers and functions of the commissioners, who were to enquire, examine, hear proofs, &c. respecting the claims; and for what purpose? Why, that they might admit and approve of such as were supported by satisfactory evidence, and make return thereof to the Executive Council, who should thereupon cause patents to be issued for their confirmation. Until the commissioners had decided in favor of a claim, it remained in statu quo; the act did not cover and protect it. Further, if the act will admit of two constructions, that one certainly ought to be adopted, which is in favor of the legal owner, and which will not divest his estate, till the terms specified in the act shall have been fully complied with. When the Legislature undertake to give away what is not their own, when they attempt to take the property of one man, which he fairly acquired, and the general law of the land protects, in order to transfer it to another, even upon complete indemnification, it will naturally be considered as an extraordinary act of legislation, which ought to be viewed with jealous eyes, examined with critical exactness, and scrutinized with all the severity of legal exposition. An act of this sort deserves no favor; to construe it liberally would be sinning against the rights of private property. Besides, it was the manifest intention of the makers of the act, that a just compensation should be made in land, to the Pennsylvania claimants; upon this principle the act proceeds; and therefore, if it appear, that such compensation cannot be made, or that it is very dubious, whether it can be effected, the Court ought not to give such a construction, as will deprive the owner of his estate, with little or no prospect of being recompensed in value. If either party ought to be driven to the necessity of controverting the question with the state of Pennsylvania, it ought to be the Connecticut settlers, who have no legal title to the land, and not the Pennsylvania claimants, in whom is vested a good estate at law. Deeming the construction, which has been put upon the act, to be the found one, it precludes the enquiry, how far a patent of confirmation was necessary to substantiate the claim of the defendant, so as to render it available in a court of common law.