Opinion ID: 169392
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Spear's Duties Lack Substantial Discretionary Authority

Text: 27 We start with Spear's job as an Examinations Assistant. Although the record does not contain great detail, the district court relied primarily on written performance evaluations Spear's managers used to assess her job responsibilities. 28 The relevant performance evaluation included seven categories of duties for which Spear was responsible. For purposes of the enhancement, the district court focused on four categories: (1) Assists in developing practices, procedures, and work patterns for the work of the clerical unit and proposes appropriate changes; (2) Conducts on-going analysis of work load data, productions, and other reports; determines whether procedures are being followed and makes suggestions for improvements; (3) Performs liaison [sic] and answers inquiries from individuals, attorneys, or groups from the general public and from other service and non-service organizations and professional conduct; and (4) Collects, records, verifies, safeguards and deposit [sic] fees for applications. Sent. Tr. at 26-28. 29 In evaluating these four categories, the district court concluded that Spear exercised a position of trust. While we agree the court assessed the correct job categories, we disagree with its conclusion. None of these particular duties implicates substantial discretionary authority. 30 Several reasons support our conclusion. First, the fact that Spear assist[ed] and ma[de] suggestions for improvements, (categories 1 and 2) simply means that Spear assisted her superiors and made suggestions to them. Nothing in the evaluations suggests Spear exercised individual authority over particular applications. Neither category indicates Spear was in a position to set protocol or to depart from protocols already set by others. An employee who places suggestions in a box does not stand on the same sentencing ground as the employee who empties the box and determines which suggestions will be implemented or discarded. The former's duties are ministerial, while the latter's constitute a position of trust. 31 Next, the tasks outlined in category 3— [c]ollects, records, verifies, safeguards and deposit [sic] fees for applications— are similarly ministerial. 32 Finally, the duties listed in category 4— acting as a liaison and answering questions from the public—come the closest to managerial discretion indicating a position of trust. But there is no indication in the record that Spear's responsibilities in this regard left her with decision-making authority or discretion over the immigration applications that crossed her desk in a manner that could facilitate her crime. 33 In short, Spear's embezzlements are not characterized as flowing from any authority on Spear's part, nor did her job as Examinations Assistant significantly facilitate the crime or impede its detection. In fact, Spear employed a crude method of depositing money orders that were submitted with applications to USCIS into her own bank account and then throwing away the accompanying applications. After complaints from applicants, the scheme was promptly uncovered. No evidence exists that Spear used any discretionary authority to facilitate or conceal her crime. She did not have discretion to approve or deny applications, nor does the record show she could reject applications that were incomplete or inaccurate. Her only authority was to process new applications and put them in the pipeline for substantive review. Her theft was accomplished by being in the right place at the right time, i.e., opportunity and access, not by exercising the cloak of authority to stave off inquiry or decision-making power to cover her tracks. 34 The district court arrived at a different result by applying the Guidelines inconsistently with the ruling of Edwards. The district court made the appropriate inquiry by reviewing Spear's duties to determine whether she held a position of trust. It then compared Spear's duties to those of a bank teller and hotel clerk, two positions mentioned by the Guidelines as not involving a position of trust. See Sentencing Tr. at 26-27 (referring to Spear's duties as more than just simply a bank teller; [s]omething more than simply being a teller or hotel clerk, certainly; and [a]gain, that is something more than the typical hotel clerk or bank clerk). The commentary for § 3B1.3 contemplates a continuum of discretion from bank teller to professional. Somewhere along the continuum an employee moves from ministerial to discretionary in the performance of job duties. 35 But instead of asking whether Spear's duties included tasks more sophisticated than the typical bank teller or hotel clerk, the district court should have asked whether those duties gave Spear functional managerial or professional discretion—such as the responsibility to (1) differentiate case-by-case situations, (2) set policies and protocols, (3) diverge from policies and protocols (thereby indicating managerial or professional discretion)—or whether her duties were primarily subject to non-discretionary rules (thereby indicating the ministerial or clerical nature of her work). 36 In applying the enhancement, the district court also relied heavily on a letter from a USCIS supervisor labeling Spear's position as one of trust. The conclusory opinion of a supervisor does not substitute for the functional analysis required by Edwards (job titles themselves do not control [the position of trust inquiry]; actual duties and authorized activities do, 325 F.3d at 1187). Even so, the court found relevant the letter's emphasis on Spear's oath to perform the duties of her office with honor. But, again, a position of trust for purposes of § 3B1.3 turns upon discretionary authority, not on one's veracity or a pledge to fulfill a position honestly. 3 See United States v. Hirsch, 239 F.3d 221, 227 (2d Cir.2001) (An abuse of trust enhancement may not be imposed on a defendant convicted of fraud solely because of a violation of a legal obligation to be truthful and a victim's reliance on a misrepresentation.). 37 Finally, the district court was influenced by the harm that Spear inflicted on the unfortunate victims whose applications crossed her desk. Spear was throwing a monkey wrench of huge proportion into the gears that grind through this Byzantine immigration process . . . . Sent. Tr. at 29. While such considerations are entirely appropriate when applying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, it is inappropriate to use the results of Spear's wrongdoing in deciding whether the § 3B1.3 enhancement applies. Nothing in the language of § 3B1.3 or its application notes look to the outcome of the misconduct, rather it is the position and its responsibilities that matter in this inquiry. Even a lower level employee can wreak havoc. 38 In sum, the district court correctly identified Spear's duties as the appropriate object of inquiry for whether she occupied a position of trust, but the court guided that inquiry by applying the wrong legal standard. The proper standard asks whether Spear's duties were bounded by predetermined rules and protocols so as to be ministerial or whether she had the substantial freedom in her duties that arises from discretionary authority signifying a position of trust. Applying this standard, she did not. 39