Opinion ID: 202116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Delay of Trial

Text: 97 The district court justified its delay of the trial, as we infer from its stated reasons, on the theory that if it did not stay the trial, under Mechanik, a conviction after trial by the petit jury would cure any error in the indictment, and that would deprive the court of its power to dismiss the indictment. If this was the intent of the court, it is based on a clear error of law and the stated premises are backwards. Matters of a court's own disciplinary power, which could be easily handled by other remedies if there were Rule violations, may not be elevated above the public interest in trial of criminal defendants. 98 Since none of the irregularities alleged here could have resulted in dismissal of the indictment, as there was no demonstrable prejudice to the defendants, there was no reason to stay the trial. The defendants' only claim of prejudice is that the third grand jury was somehow tainted by leaked information from the second grand jury. It is doubtful that adverse publicity claimed to affect a grand jury states a basis for dismissal. 19 Here, this argument falls flat, since the government can cure any misinformation by re-presenting information from one grand jury to another. Dismissal of the indictment is not appropriate when secrecy violations could not have affected the charging decision. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 259-60, 108 S.Ct. 2369. There was no viable claim that the charging decision by the third grand jury was substantially influenced by any eavesdropping. 99 Further, the court's apparent reasoning was that, on the basis of alleged grand jury misconduct, it could delay the trial. This ran afoul of the public interest in having the trial of the case promptly commence. The Supreme Court has explicitly discouraged the delay and disruption in criminal proceedings caused by judicial review of claims of prosecutorial misconduct. See 2 Beale et al., Grand Jury Law and Practice § 9:1, at 9-3 to 9-4 (2001). That was the theme in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956), reinforced later in Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561. Costello announced the rule that [a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. 350 U.S. at 363, 76 S.Ct. 406. The Court noted that the hearing of challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury would result in interminable delay but add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial. Id. at 364, 76 S.Ct. 406. 100 This court, too, has expressed the same concerns about delay. We have invalidated a local rule promulgated by a district court, when the court impermissibly interfered with grand jury secrecy. Stern, 214 F.3d 4. In doing so, we noted that one of the vices of the rule was its potential as an incubator for delay. Id. at 16 (citing United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 111 S.Ct. 722, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991)). Delay of criminal trials imposes costs not only on the government, but on society: delay may compromise society's `interest in the prompt administration of justice,' and impede accomplishment of the objectives of deterrence and rehabilitation. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72, 106 S.Ct. 938 (quoting Hasting, 461 U.S. at 509, 103 S.Ct. 1974).