Opinion ID: 801038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The Federal Magistrate Act provides that `[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court.' Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 585, 123 S.Ct. 1696, 155 L.Ed.2d 775 (2003) (alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)). So far as it concerns full-time magistrate judges, . . . § 636(c)(1)[ ] speaks only of `the consent of the parties,' without qualification as to form, and § 636(c)(3) similarly provides that `[t]he consent of the parties allows' a full-time magistrate judge to enter a final, appealable judgment of the district court. Id. at 587, 123 S.Ct. 1696 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (second alteration in original). Although § 636(c)(2) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b) provide specific referral procedures for magistrate judges, a defect in the referral to a full-time magistrate judge under § 636(c)(2) does not eliminate that magistrate judge's `civil jurisdiction' under § 636(c)(1) so long as the parties have in fact voluntarily consented. Id. Consent, then, is the the touchstone of magistrate judge jurisdiction. Anderson, 351 F.3d at 914. We are satisfied that Plaintiff voluntarily consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by Magistrate Judge Cohn. Plaintiff unambiguously consented to the jurisdiction of  a United States Magistrate Judge by selecting the consent box on the court-provided form. (Emphasis added.) That same form provided an alternative to decline jurisdiction of the particular magistrate judge named on that form (Magistrate Judge Austin). The difference in wording between the consent option covering a magistrate judge generally and the decline optionwhich specifies the randomly assigned judgesupports reading the completed form as expressing consent to jurisdiction by any magistrate judge (as opposed to an Article III judge). [4] Plaintiff asserts that his consent was limited to the particular judge named in the form's introduction (but not referred to in the text associated with the consent option). That reading is incorrect because it ignores the distinction between the two options and because the listing of Magistrate Judge Austin was merely informational; indeed, § 636(c)(2), which provides the procedure for obtaining consent, does not require that the form list the name of the judge. The extra information does not render the consent ambiguous. Plaintiff can identify only one real defect in the consent formthat the form came from the magistrate judge himself rather than from the clerk, as required by § 636(c)(2) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b)(1). [5] Under Roell, such a procedural defect, especially one so minor, does not eliminate jurisdiction if voluntary consent is present. Even if Plaintiff's consent were not clear from the consent form itself, in the alternative he impliedly consented to the jurisdiction of Magistrate Judge Cohn. As Roell held, a court may infer consent where the litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case before the Magistrate Judge. 538 U.S. at 590, 123 S.Ct. 1696. Here, the initial form advised Plaintiff of the need for consent and his right to refuse it. At a minimum, he agreed to have Magistrate Judge Austin hear his case. But then he presented his case to Magistrate Judge Cohn without objection, voluntarily amending his complaint after seeking an extension of time to do so. Those facts are sufficient to meet the Roell standard for implied consent. [6] To the extent that we have previously held that we can never infer consent, we have been overruled by the Supreme Court in Roell. See, e.g., Nasca v. Peoplesoft (In re Nasca), 160 F.3d 578, 579 (9th Cir.1999) (`We will not permit our jurisdiction to depend on inferences when both the statute and common sense call for precision.' (quoting Alaniz v. Cal. Processors, Inc., 690 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam))); see also Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (explaining that a three-judge panel may recognize that a precedent of this court has been effectively overruled by a later Supreme Court case). In substantially similar circumstances, the Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion. See Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir.2011) (involving reassignment from a first magistrate judge to a second). The Seventh Circuit requires consent to § 636(c) jurisdiction to be on the record, clear, and unambiguous. Id. at 883. Under that rule, the Seventh Circuit found such consent with respect to a second magistrate judge by relying, in part, on the objecting party's having expressly consented in writing to a first magistrate judge. Id. at 884. The court saw some ambiguity as to whether the consent applied to `a' magistrate judge generally [or] `the' magistrate judge specifically, but found that ambiguity insignificant because the objecting party had impliedly consented to the reassignment to [the second magistrate judge] by proceeding . . . through discovery and summary judgment without objection. Id. (citing Roell, 538 U.S. at 590-91, 123 S.Ct. 1696). [7] In the wake of Roell, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits also have revised their previously strict consent rules. See Holt-Orsted v. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 233-35 & n. 3 (6th Cir.2011) (recognizing that circuit's rule requiring a clear and unambiguous statement in the record indicating that the parties consented to the exercise of plenary jurisdiction by the Magistrate, but finding implied consent under Roell (internal quotation marks omitted)); Chambless v. La.-Pac. Corp., 481 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir.2007) (Although we have required that consent to a magistrate judge's jurisdiction be express and on the record, the Supreme Court held in [ Roell ] that consent to a magistrate judge's jurisdiction can be inferred from a party's conduct during litigation. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). The Fifth Circuit had a long-standing pre- Roell rule that `[c]onsent to trial by a magistrate under section 636(c) cannot be implied.' Mendes Jr. Int'l Co. v. M/V Sokai Maru, 978 F.2d 920, 924 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting EEOC v. W. La. Health Servs., Inc., 959 F.2d 1277, 1281 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also Trufant v. Autocon, Inc., 729 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (We have held before that such consent must be explicit, and will not be casually inferred from the conduct of the parties. (citing Glover v. Ala. Bd. of Corr., 660 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.1981))). Although the Fifth Circuit has not squarely addressed Roell's effect on its implied consent rule in a published opinion, we do not think that its pre- Roell rule survives because Roell itself reversed a Fifth Circuit case in which that court had reaffirmed its prior holding that `§ 636(c) consent must be express; it cannot be implied by the parties' conduct.' 538 U.S. at 585, 123 S.Ct. 1696 (quoting Withrow v. Roell, 288 F.3d 199, 201 (5th Cir.2002) (citing W. La. Health Servs., 959 F.2d at 1281; Trufant, 729 F.2d at 309)). The Fifth Circuit seems to have recognized as much in unpublished decisions. See, e.g., Marquez v. Woody, 440 Fed.Appx. 318, 321 n. 4 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (although Woody did not explicitly consent to proceed before a magistrate judge, the Supreme Court has held that `consent can be inferred' and, [i]n this case, Woody's conduct indicates that she consented to proceed before a magistrate judge (quoting Roell, 538 U.S. at 582, 123 S.Ct. 1696)); Bejaran v. Cruz, 79 Fed.Appx. 73, 73 (5th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (Although the record does not contain written consent by the defendants to proceed before the magistrate judge as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), we may infer their consent from the record as a whole. (citing Roell, 538 U.S. at 586-91, 123 S.Ct. 1696)). Accordingly, we hold that Plaintiff consented to have Magistrate Judge Cohn decide his case.