Opinion ID: 182792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Capitol's Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: The district court denied Capitol's motion for summary judgment because it found there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Capitol Sprinkler was escorted by a Guest Services employee . . ., whether and to what extent Guest Services operated as an agent of Gallaudet, and whether and to what extent [the relevant standard of the National Fire Protection Association was] incorporated into the Inspection Agreement between Capitol Sprinkler and Guest Services. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc., 573 F.Supp.2d 152, 178-79 (2008). Capitol argues the court should have granted its motion for summary judgment because Guest did not oppose the motion, as required by Local Civil Rule 7(h) and by the district court's scheduling order. As Guest correctly points out, however, Rule 7(h) provides the district court may assume facts not denied in an opposition have been admitted, thus leaving the matter to the district court's discretion, and this court has long recognized that the district court does not abuse its discretion by declining to invoke the requirements of the local rule in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 518 (D.C.Cir.2002) (addressing predecessor rule). The district court's scheduling order did not limit this discretion because, being interlocutory, the district court retained the power to revise the order at any time prior to appeal. See Langevine v. District of Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018, 1023 (D.C.Cir. 1997). In the present case, in which Guest had filed a cross-motion addressing the same issues that would have been addressed in a response to Capitol's motion, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant Capitol's summary judgment motion for want of an opposition thereto. Capitol also argues the district court erred by denying the summary judgment motion on its merits, a decision we review de novo. McFadden v. Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, 611 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C.Cir.2010). Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in its favor, Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 929 (D.C.Cir.2008), there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. FED. R.CIV.P. 56(a). As to the merits, Capitol's first but cursory argument is that the district court erred by weighing the evidence. This argument is beside the point because our review is de novo. See Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 156 (D.C.Cir.2007) (because we review the [d]istrict [c]ourt's decision de novo, we conduct an independent evaluation of the record). Capitol also fails to establish it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Guest was responsible for the acts and omissions of the escort. One of Capitol's inspectors testified in his deposition the escort was assigned to provide access to certain rooms but did not say by whom he was assigned. There was an affidavit before the district court from Capitol's other inspector conclusorily stating the escort was an agent of Guest Services, Inc. Even assuming  as did the district court, see 573 F.Supp.2d at 161  this is evidence upon which a jury reasonably could find the escort worked for Guest, summary judgment for Capitol is inappropriate because, as Guest notes, the testimony falls short of establishing the escort's employment status as a matter of law, such that a jury could not find otherwise. Next, Capitol argues that, unlike the district court, we should consider Guest's conduct before and on the day the pipe burst, not the least of which was [its] failure to timely terminate water flow. Notwithstanding its use of the phrase the least, Capitol identifies no other conduct the court should have considered. As Guest argues, the alacrity with which it staunched the flow of water is relevant only to the measure of damages, which is not at issue in this appeal. Finally, Capitol's argument that it could have proven its case using St. Paul's expert or its own so-called hybrid fact-cum-expert witnesses, is off the mark because, again as Guest notes, the testimony of those witnesses would not bear upon the relationship between Guest and the escort. Therefore we affirm the order of the district court denying Capitol's motion for summary judgment.