Opinion ID: 836626
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: violation of defendant's due process rights

Text: Defendant argues that his constitutional due process rights were violated under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), and its progeny. We hold that the prosecution's repeated references to defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence violated defendant's due process rights under the United States Constitution. [6]
The United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. Const. Am. V. [7] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-439, 467-468, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), established guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow in order to protect the privilege against compelled self-incrimination during custodial police interrogations. Thus, under Miranda, every person subject to interrogation while in police custody must be warned, among other things, that the person may choose to remain silent in response to police questioning. Id. at 444-445, 86 S.Ct. 1602. As a general rule, if a person remains silent after being arrested and given Miranda warnings, that silence may not be used as evidence against that person. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 290-291, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). Therefore, in general, prosecutorial references to a defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence violate a defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. [8] See Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 290-291, 106 S.Ct. 634; Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618-620, 96 S.Ct. 2240. The United States Supreme Court has explained the rationales behind the constitutional prohibition against the use of a defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence. To begin with, a defendant's silence may merely be the defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent, as opposed to a tacit acknowledgement of guilt. [E]very post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous.... Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617, 96 S.Ct. 2240. Further, Miranda warnings provide an implicit promise that a defendant will not be punished for remaining silent. Id. at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240. Once the government has assured a person of his right to remain silent, breaching the implied assurance of the Miranda warnings is an affront to the fundamental fairness that the Due Process Clause requires. Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 291, 106 S.Ct. 634. Consistent with these rationales, a defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence cannot be used to impeach a defendant's exculpatory testimony, see Doyle, or as direct evidence of defendant's guilt in the prosecutor's case-in-chief, see Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 292-294, 106 S.Ct. 634. [9] What is impermissible is the evidentiary use of an individual's exercise of his constitutional rights after the State's assurance that the invocation of those rights will not be penalized. Id. at 295, 106 S.Ct. 634. There are limited exceptions to this general rule, but none applies here. [10] This Court has adopted this understanding of a defendant's due process rights and stated that post-arrest, post- Miranda silence may not be used substantively or for impeachment purposes since there is no way to know after the fact whether it was due to the exercise of constitutional rights or to guilty knowledge. People v. McReavy, 436 Mich. 197, 218, 462 N.W.2d 1 (1990). In general, any reference to a defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence is prohibited, but in some circumstances a single reference to a defendant's silence may not amount to a violation of Doyle if the reference is so minimal that silence was not submitted to the jury as evidence from which it was allowed to draw any permissible inference.... Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 764-765, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987). See also People v. Dennis, 464 Mich. 567, 577-580, 628 N.W.2d 502 (2001). For example, in Greer, there was no Doyle violation where the defense counsel immediately objected to a question by the prosecution about defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence, and the trial court twice gave a curative instruction to the jury. [11] Greer, 483 U.S. at 759, 764-765, 107 S.Ct. 3102.
In this case, the prosecutor made repeated references to defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence. In the prosecutor's opening statement, he said that the jury would hear that after defendant was arrested, he didn't say anything, not a word. [The officer] told him why he was being arrested, he was arrested and no statements were made. Next, in the presentation of the case-in-chief, the prosecutor deliberately elicited testimony from the arresting officer regarding defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence. The following exchange occurred regarding the circumstances of the arrest: A. [ The Arresting Officer ] I asked [defendant] if he knew what we were here aboutwhat we were there about and he stated he did not. I then placed him under arrest and informed him he was under arrest for criminal sexual conduct, advised him of his Miranda rights which is the right to remain silent and I'm sure we've all seen that, and I placed him in the rear of my patrol vehicle. He did not make any statements to me prior to getting to jail. Q. [ The Prosecutor ] So he never made any statements to you. He was fully aware of what you were arresting him for? A. Not reference [sic] the criminal sexual conduct, correct. On cross-examination, the defense attorney asked the arresting officer questions that clarified that the officer did not ask defendant any questions after arresting him and giving him his Miranda warnings. On the prosecutor's redirect examination, the prosecutor followed up with additional questions regarding defendant's silence: Q. [ The Prosecutor ] [Defendant] didn't make any statements about the CSC charge, did he? A. [ The Arresting Officer ] No, he did not. Q. Never asked you about it? A. No, he did not. After the prosecutor concluded presentation of his case, defendant testified in his own defense. Defense counsel asked why defendant was silent after he was given his Miranda warnings, and defendant stated that it was because he watched a lot of TV and with something like that I didn't know what to say, I mean I was shocked... so I just kept my mouth shut and I was going to wait until I talked to somebody. [12] When the prosecutor cross-examined defendant, the following exchange occurred: Q. [ The Prosecutor ] [Y]ou didn't say a single word about being arrested for criminal sexual conduct. Is that right? A. [ Defendant ] When I got to the police station Q. Yes or no. Is that right? A. Yes. Finally, the prosecutor began his closing argument by highlighting the significance of defendant's silence. The prosecutor stated: What we heard is that the defendant made no statements. We heard that he didn't ask Officer LaBonte any questions. Why? You're being arrested for CSC. You're being taken out of your home on a Sunday night. Why? Why? Because between June of 2004 and January of 2005 the defendant had been making his daughter do things that no person speaks about. Adults don't even talk about it between themselves.
It is clear that the prosecution's use of defendant's silence violated defendant's due process rights under the federal constitution. The prosecutor's examination of the arresting officer established that the silence to which the prosecutor referred occurred post-arrest and post- Miranda. A reference to a defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence generally constitutes a Doyle violation unless the reference was so minimal that silence was not submitted to the jury as evidence from which it was allowed to draw any permissible inference.... Greer, 483 U.S. at 764-765, 107 S.Ct. 3102. In this case, the prosecution clearly crossed this line by repeatedly using defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence as evidence of defendant's guilt in its case-in-chief and to impeach the defendant's testimony that he was innocent. The prosecutor impliedly asked the jury to infer guilt from defendant's silence through references to defendant's silence in his opening statement and his examination of the arresting officer. In his closing argument, the prosecutor expressly asked the jury to infer guilt from defendant's silence by explaining that the reason defendant had been silent was because the defendant had been making his daughter do things that no person speaks about. Further, in his cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor attempted to use defendant's silence to impeach defendant's credibility. In sum, the state gave defendant his Miranda warnings, which constituted an implicit promise that his choice to remain silent would not be used against him. The state then breached that promise by attempting to use defendant's silence as evidence. Depending on the circumstances of the case, even a single reference to a defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence, either as evidence of substantive guilt or impeachment, may violate a defendant's due process rights. Where, as in this case, the prosecution makes repeated references to a defendant's silence, both as substantive evidence of guilt and for purposes of impeachment, the violation is clear. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals holding that the prosecutor's repeated references to defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence violated the due process rights guaranteed to defendant by the United States Constitution.