Opinion ID: 564961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second Summary Judgment

Text: 16 Appellants argue that the second summary judgment was predicated on an erroneous application of the harvest exemption. The second motion for summary judgment, which was not opposed by appellants, expressly relied on the earlier district court ruling that the [four] remaining plaintiffs were barred from claiming compensation for overtime worked during the harvest season.... 12 Azucarera submitted time cards purporting to demonstrate that the overtime claims of the four remaining appellants were based entirely on work performed during the harvest season. The district court allowed Azucarera's second motion for summary judgment because appellants neither interposed opposition nor submitted any evidence to rebut defendant's factual contentions. Reiterating its earlier conclusion of law, the district court mistakenly dismissed all remaining claims in their entirety, on the ground that appellants could not pursue an action for overtime wages for work performed during the sugar cane harvesting season. 17 The moving party invariably bears both the initial and the ultimate burden of demonstrating its legal entitlement to summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Just as [t]he nonmoving party cannot fend off summary judgment unless it makes a competent demonstration that every essential element of its claim or defense is at least trialworthy, Price v. General Motors Corp., 931 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir.1991) (emphasis in original), the moving party cannot prevail on its motion for summary judgment if any essential element of its claim or defense requires trial. See Meyers v. Brooks Shoe Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed.Cir.1990) (moving party must demonstrate that undisputed facts establish every element of [its] claim or defense.); Paul v. Monts, 906 F.2d 1468, 1474 (10th Cir.1990) ([W]here the moving party has the burden--the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense--his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.); see also Bias v. Advantage International, Inc., 905 F.2d 1558, 1560-61 (D.C.Cir.) (moving party must explain its reasons for concluding that the record does not reveal any genuine issues of material fact, and must make a showing supporting its claims insofar as those claims involve issues on which it will bear the burden at trial.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 387, 112 L.Ed.2d 397 (1990). Only on a properly supported motion for summary judgment does the burden shift[ ] to the nonmovant to establish the existence of a genuine material issue. F.D.I.C. v. Municipality of Ponce, 904 F.2d 740, 743 (1st Cir.1990) (citation omitted); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). See generally 6 Moore's p 56.15. 18 The employer bears the burden of establishing that it comes within the harvest exemption. See Secretary of Labor v. DeSisto, 929 F.2d 789, 797 (1st Cir.1991) (citing Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, 361 U.S. 388, 394 and n. 11, 80 S.Ct. 453, 457 and n. 11, 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960)); see also Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 485-86 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 785, 112 L.Ed.2d 848 (1991). On its second motion for summary judgment, Azucarera bore the burden of establishing that no portion of the overtime claims of the four remaining appellants was actionable in the face of the harvest exemption. In order to sustain its burden, Azucarera would have had to demonstrate, inter alia, that the four remaining appellants never worked over ten hours a day or over forty-eight hours a week during the harvest season. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 213(h)(2)(A), (B). 13 Azucarera has never intimated that all hours worked by the appellants during the harvest season were within these exemption limits, but merely that all of their claims were for work performed during the harvest season. Thus, Azucarera failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the entire amount of the overtime claims of each appellant. 19 The fact that appellants failed to interpose timely opposition to the second motion for summary judgment is not conclusive. The failure of the nonmoving party to respond to a summary judgment motion does not in itself justify summary judgment. Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.1989). Rather, before granting an unopposed summary judgment motion, [t]he court must inquire whether the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate undisputed facts entitling it to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 20. See also Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 929 (1st Cir.1983) (where motion does not establish absence of genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even though unopposed); 6 Moore's p 56.22 at 56-777 ([T]he party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that he is entitled to judgment under established principles; and if he does not discharge that burden then he is not entitled to judgment. No defense to an insufficient showing is required.) II