Opinion ID: 1297661
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Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Credit for Settlement Agreements

Text: It is clear in West Virginia that when a settlement agreement is reached with one joint tort-feasor other joint tort-feasors are entitled to receive credit for the settlement amount paid. This principle was established firmly in Syllabus Point 5 of Board of Education of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 182 W.Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796 (1990), which states: `Where a payment is made, and release obtained, by one joint tort-feasor, the other joint tort-feasors shall be given credit for the amount of such payment in the satisfaction of the wrong. Point 2, Syllabus, Hardin v. The New York Central Railroad Company, 145 W.Va. 676 [116 S.E.2d 697 (1960)].' Syllabus Point 1, Tennant v. Craig, 156 W.Va. 632, 195 S.E.2d 727 (1973). We further emphasized in Zando that an injured plaintiff should receive but one recovery in complete satisfaction for the wrong suffered. 182 W.Va. at 604, 390 S.E.2d at 803. Public policy strongly disfavors a plaintiff obtaining a double recovery. 182 W.Va. at 606, 390 S.E.2d at 805. Thus, we held a nonsettling defendant shall receive a pro tanto, or dollar-for-dollar, credit for partial settlements against any verdict ultimately rendered for the plaintiff. 182 W.Va. at 606, 390 S.E.2d at 805. (Citations omitted). Despite this clear mandate, the plaintiffs in the present case argue that the defendant's actions were malum in se, that is to say [a] wrong in itself, [9] and, therefore, the defendant is not entitled to contribution from his co-defendant, Tri-State Airport Authority. Accordingly, the plaintiffs assert that the settlement agreement should not be credited towards the jury award. As support, the plaintiffs cite Mackey v. Irisari, 191 W.Va. 355, 445 S.E.2d 742 (1994); Haynes v. City of Nitro, 161 W.Va. 230, 240 S.E.2d 544 (1977); Hutcherson v. Slate, 105 W.Va. 184, 142 S.E. 444 (1928); and Buskirk v. Sanders, 70 W.Va. 363, 73 S.E. 937 (1912). Upon review of each of these cases, we find no merit to the plaintiffs' argument that the defendant should not receive credit for the settlement paid. The general principle set forth in each of these cases is illustrated by Syllabus Point 3 of Haynes v. City of Nitro, 161 W.Va. 230, 240 S.E.2d 544 (1977), which states: In West Virginia one joint tort-feasor is entitled to contribution from another joint tort-feasor, except where the act is malum in se. See also Cline v. White, 183 W.Va. 43, 393 S.E.2d 923 (1990); W.Va.Code, 55-7-12 (1923) [10] ; W.Va.Code, 55-7-13 (1923). [11] However, in each of these cases, it is plain that the right to assert an act is malum in se to avoid contribution belongs to a joint-tortfeasor. To permit a plaintiff to raise this issue in cases like the one at bar merely serves to give the plaintiff an amount of money greater than what the jury determined was necessary for complete satisfaction for the wrong suffered. Under the facts of this case, we can think of no reason why the plaintiffs should receive a double-recovery windfall, nor are we cited any cases that permit such a windfall. [12] Thus, the defendant in the present case was entitled to credit for the $50,000 settlement of the Tri-State Airport Authority. Awarding credit for a settlement amount usually is accomplished in one of two ways. As we described in Cline v. White, 183 W.Va. 43, 46, 393 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1990), [13] the first way it may be accomplished is by informing the jury of the settlement before deliberations and instructing the jurors to deduct the settlement amount from the verdict. The second way credit is given is by not informing the jury of the settlement and leaving to the trial court the responsibility of deducting the settlement amount from the verdict prior to entering the judgment. 183 W.Va. at 46, 393 S.E.2d at 926. As previously indicated, the jury in the present case was not informed of the settlement amount prior to its deliberations. As a result, it became the responsibility of the trial court to give credit to the defendant before it entered the final judgment. Indeed, in the final order, the trial court concedes that the defendant was entitled to the credit but declined to amend the order on the grounds that the defendant filed an untimely motion under Rule 59(e). We find that the order should have been amended pursuant to Rule 60(a).