Opinion ID: 2639482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prosecutor's Reference to Gang Evidence

Text: At the penalty phase, defendant presented favorable character evidence through witnesses Beatrice Acosta (the mother of defendant's child), Cyndy Pitts (defendant's mother), Joseph Gueste (defendant's pastor), and Glenn Garbot (defendant's uncle). On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked those witnesses if they knew that defendant was a member of a Crips gang. Defendant contends these questions constituted misconduct and violated a ruling by the trial court that it would preview any gang evidence introduced at the penalty trial before the jury heard it. He further contends that the questions denied him his state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law and a reliable penalty determination, and that defense counsel's failure to object to the questions unconstitutionally deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. The jury had already heard gang evidence at the guilt phase of the trial, and we have previously concluded that the evidence was admissible. The prosecutor's questions to defendant's character witnesses did not elicit any additional evidence of gang activity. The prosecutor asked defendant's character witnesses if they knew of defendant's gang membership and activities, and how this would affect their opinion of defendant. The witnesses all answered that they did not know of any such matters, so no evidence on gang membership was presented through their testimony. The purpose of the prosecutor's questions was to rebut defendant's character evidence by showing that the witnesses were not aware of discreditable aspects of defendant's life. Once defendant had placed his character in issue, the prosecutor was entitled to rebut defendant's evidence with evidence that would offer a more balanced picture of his personality. Here, [m]embership in youth gangs was relevant to the issue of defendant's character and activities as a youth and specifically rebutted the direct testimony of the witnesses]. ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 238, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302; see People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 790-792, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113.) Defendant calls our attention to People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965, where we said: `Nothing in our discussion is meant to imply that any evidence introduced by defendant of his good character will open the door to any and all bad character evidence the prosecution can dredge up. As in other cases, the scope of rebuttal must be specific, and evidence presented or argued as rebuttal must relate directly to a particular incident or character trait defendant offers in his own behalf.' (Id. at pp. 1192-1193, 270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965, quoting People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 792, fn. 24, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113, italics added in Rodriguez. ) But defendant's witnesses did not limit themselves to describing defendant's childhood; each of them said that the charged criminal conduct was out of character for defendant, or words to that effect. The prosecution was entitled to inquire if the witnesses were familiar with defendant's more recent character and behavior, that of a member and leader of a criminal gang. Defendant argues that trial counsel should have inquired exactly what defense character evidence would open the door to prosecution questions about gang membership so defense counsel could limit his examination of the character witnesses to avoid such questions. Defendant claims there is no conceivable tactical purpose for not making that inquiry. We disagree. Knowing that the jury had already heard the gang evidence, but had not heard defendant's character evidence, defense counsel here could reasonably conclude that he should present character evidence despite any risk of rebuttal by the prosecution. That we can hypothesize a reasonable tactical basis for defense counsel's conduct does not, of course, prove that counsel did have a reasonable tactical basis for his action or inaction. But to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove that counsel had no such tactical purpose. ( People v. Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 526, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032.) The record on appeal does not furnish such proof.