Opinion ID: 2615075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: one sentence

Text: It is improper to impose two sentences, one for the underlying felony, and one for the habitual charges. The effect of two sentences would be tantamount to sentencing a defendant for being an ex-convict. Separate sentences would violate the double jeopardy prohibition. Evans v. State, supra, 655 P.2d at 1225. A separate sentence cannot be imposed for an habitual-criminal conviction because there is no crime of habitual criminal. Evans v. State, supra, 655 P.2d at 1225. We will hold that the trial judge imposed but one sentence: life imprisonment. The burglary sentence was enhanced on the basis of the jury finding that defendant was an habitual criminal as defined by § 6-1-110, supra. The record fully supports our holding on this issue. Before oral sentencing, in a discussion with counsel, the trial judge said:    [A]s I understand, [we must] not regard this as two separate sentences but one enhancing sentencing.  (Emphasis added.) The trial judge then sentenced the defendant as follows: James Schuler, it will be Judgment and Sentence of the Court that in the burglary case, Case 8645, you be remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Natrona County and be by him conducted to the Wyoming State Penitentiary, there to serve a term of not more than four years and not  excuse me  not less than four years and not more than eight years, with credit against both the minimum and maximum on account of the time that you may have spent in jail here, pursuant to this charge. That further, with respect to Case 8827, which is the habitual criminal charge, this sentence previously passed, I think is the way to say it, be enhanced per statute to a sentence of life imprisonment.  (Emphasis added.) The language in the two judgment and sentence orders parallels that at oral sentencing: NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that you, JAMES SCHULER, be remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Natrona County, Wyoming, to await transfer to the Wyoming State Penitentiary in Rawlins, Wyoming, to serve a term of not less than four (4) years nor more than eight (8) years with credit for 248 days already served in the Natrona County Jail, to be deducted from both the minimum and maximum terms. Judgment and Sentence, Criminal Action No. 8645, dated January 11, 1983. The judgment and sentence in Criminal Action 8827 again emphasizes that the sentence is enhanced:    to serve a term of life imprisonment which shall be an enhanced sentence for the imprisonment ordered in Criminal Action No. 8645,   . (Emphasis added.) Dated January 11, 1983. In addition, a February 1, 1983, letter from the trial judge to defendant indicates that one sentence was imposed. There is but one sentence of life imprisonment in the burglary case, 8645; in that case the sentence to a term of years is enhanced to life by the separate action in which you are charged as an habitual criminal. I repeat; There is but one sentence for these two cases, not a sentence to a term of years in addition to a life sentence. (Emphasis added.) We refer back to the language in Whiteley v. State of Wyoming, supra, 293 F. Supp. at 386, where the defendant also was sentenced first on the underlying felony and then given an enhanced sentence (although there was only one judgment and sentence form): The record does not support petitioner's claim that he was    given one penalty for the crime of breaking and entering and another penalty for being an habitual criminal. In the instant case, both the sentencing record and the record as a whole are crystal clear. We have said that the record of judgment is not dispositive when it conflicts with the actual sentence imposed orally by the trial judge in open court. Lane v. State, Wyo., 663 P.2d 175 (1983). No such conflict between the two appears in this record. We cannot say why the judge entered two sentence orders to impose but one sentence. Perhaps this was a response to the formal defect of two separately numbered informations filed in this case. At any rate, the language utilized by the trial judge at oral sentencing, in the orders and in the follow-up letter, leaves no doubt that a single, enhanced sentence was imposed.