Opinion ID: 2077815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [¶ 10] We first address the appeal of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. Salisbury argues that neither the Board nor the Superior Court had jurisdiction to undertake an appellate review of the CEO's decision to issue the certificate of occupancy. Salisbury relies on our decision in Herrle v. Town of Waterboro, 2001 ME 1, ¶¶ 10-11, 763 A.2d 1159, 1161-62, where we held that courts lack jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by municipalities. Because we couched the language in terms of decisions to enforce an ordinance, Salisbury attempts to bring the issuance of the certificate of occupancy within Herrle's limitations by arguing that its issuance constituted a decision not to enforce the ordinance. [¶ 11] Herrle does not, however, support Salisbury's argument. Herrle precludes the court's intrusion into municipal decision-making when a municipality decides whether or not to undertake an enforcement action. If the municipality undertakes a subsequent enforcement action, that action may be subject to judicial scrutiny if review is authorized by an appropriate law and ordinance. [¶ 12] The Bar Harbor Land Use Ordinance broadly authorizes appeals of the CEO's decisions to the Board of Appeals. The Board of Appeals may, upon written application of an aggrieved party received by the Planning Department within thirty (30) days of a decision of the Planning Board or Code Enforcement Officer, hear appeals from such decision. BAR HARBOR LAND USE ORDINANCE § 15.11.02.02. [¶ 13] The question, then, is whether the issuance of the certificate of occupancy was a decision of the CEO. In Charlton v. Town of Oxford, 2001 ME 104, n. 8, 774 A.2d 366, 373, we suggested that the issuance of a certificate of occupancy was an appealable event. We now hold that the issuance or denial of a certificate of occupancy is a decision subject to judicial review. Once the Town issued the certificate of occupancy, the Utsches filed a timely appeal, which the Board of Appeals had authority to consider. See BAR HARBOR LAND USE ORDINANCE § 15.11.02.02. [¶ 14] An appeal of a certificate of occupancy may not, however, substitute for an appeal of the underlying permit. See Juliano v. Town of Poland, 1999 ME 42, ¶¶ 7-8, 725 A.2d 545, 548 (holding that an appeal of a stop work order constituted a challenge to the decision to issue the underlying permit and, therefore, was untimely). If the permittee has complied with the terms of a valid permit, an abutter may not challenge the issuance of the certificate of occupancy based on a defect in the permit. If, however, the permittee has meaningfully exceeded the authority contained in the permit, or otherwise violated conditions of the permit, the issuance of the certificate of occupancy may be challenged. Here, the Board of Appeals found that the square footage of the new building fell outside the outline of the original footprint and exceeded the square footage of the old building by 473.5 square feet. It also found that the new volume exceeded the old volume by 7409.9 cubic feet  approximately 60%. The permit allowed Salisbury to build only within the footprint of the original building. Thus, the allegation that the building exceeded the scope of the permit was appropriately addressed by the Board of Appeals, the Board's decision could be challenged in court, and the Superior Court did not err in affirming the Board's decision. [¶ 15] Because we conclude that the Board of Appeals and the Superior Court had authority to review the issuance of the certificate of occupancy, and Salisbury does not challenge the Board's conclusion that the building exceeded both the permit and the applicable ordinance, we need not reach the issue of whether revocation of the stop work order was reviewable.