Opinion ID: 1616109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assignments of Error Numbers One, Three and Nine

Text: In these assignments, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible errors by denying his motions to sever the offenses, quash the indictment, and grant him a new trial. Defendant argues that each of these motions should have been granted because a joint trial of the attempted murder and armed robbery charges subjected him to double jeopardy and denied him a fair trial by confusing the jury. The defendant was not subjected to double jeopardy. The double jeopardy clause provides three separate constitutional protections: it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and, it protects against multiple punishments for the same offenses. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). In the present case, the defendant was not prosecuted a second time for the same offense after acquittal or conviction and, due to the action of the trial judge in quashing one conviction before imposing sentence, the defendant did not receive multiple punishment for the same offense. See State v. Doughty, 379 So.2d 1088 (La.1980). A presumption that the defendant was prejudiced by jury confusion resulting from the joinder of offenses is not warranted. The same violent misappropriation served both as an essential element of the attempted murder charge and as basis for the independent charge of armed robbery. The joinder of these offenses in the present case did not violate the statutory rule prohibiting joinder of dissimilar or unrelated offenses designed to prevent juror confusion or distraction. C.Cr.P. art 493. Nor does it violate the constitutional prescription against double jeopardy. State v. Doughty, supra ; State v. Beavers, 364 So.2d 1004, 1008 n. 4 (La.1978). Consequently, there is no justification for a legal presumption that the jury in this case rendered an improper verdict due to confusion. Additionally, a review of the record reveals no grounds for finding any actual prejudice due to jury confusion. The jury returned three times during its deliberations to request additional instructions on pertinent crime definitions and on the order in which it should consider the possible verdicts. On the last occasion, the foreman informed the judge that he had prematurely marked the verdict form to indicate a finding of guilty of armed robbery and requested a new form. The trial judge, however, instructed him to scratch out that verdict and to write on the same form whatever verdict the jury decided upon after further deliberations. When the jury returned the final time, it returned verdicts of guilty of attempted second degree murder and guilty of armed robbery. Upon polling all the jurors and receiving confirmation from the number of jurors required by law to support each verdict, the jury was discharged. We cannot infer from this that the jury was confused. A juror is free to ask for additional instructions and to change his mind during deliberations in the light of such further charges. C.Cr.P. art. 808. The defense counsel did not object to any of the proceedings or instructions given when the jury returned to the courtroom. If counsel was aware of any cause to believe that the jury was confused, it was his duty to object or request further clarifying instructions from the judge. Under these circumstances, we will not speculate about the jury's verdict. Cf. State v. Stewart, 400 So.2d 633 (La.1981).