Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Moral culpability

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing that a mitigating factor is one that [is] considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability of the defendant and which tends to support the imposition of a sentence of life without possibility of parole. [28] Defendant argues that the reference in this instruction to moral culpability prevented the jury from considering and giving effect to the full range of permissible mitigating evidence. Defendant relies upon People v. Lanphear (1984) 36 Cal.3d 163, 203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081 ( Lanphear ), in which we reversed the death sentence because of instructions that explicitly precluded the jury from considering sympathy for the defendant. In Lanphear, the jury was instructed that `[m]itigating circumstances are circumstances that do not constitute a justification or excuse of the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, must be considered in extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability.' ( Id. at pp. 165-166, 203 Cal. Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081.) We rejected the Attorney General's argument that this instruction cured the prejudicial effect of the no-sympathy instruction, reasoning that the extenuation instructions given suggested that only circumstances that lessen moral culpability are to be considered. ( Id. at p. 166, 203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081.) An instruction defining mitigation in terms of moral culpability for the crime might, under some circumstances (such as those present in Lanphear ), lead a jury to believe that it could consider only mitigating circumstances that related to the defendant's moral culpability for the crime. But such an instruction does not require reversal if, in context of the instructions as a whole, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled as to the scope of mitigating evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 594, 15 Cal. Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344 [definition of mitigating circumstance as an extenuating circumstance was not misleading, when instructions made clear that the jury could consider any aspect of the defendant's character or record offered by the defendant as a basis for a life sentence]; People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1189-1192, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353 [instruction that a mitigating factor makes a crime less severe was not misleading in light of other instructions that made it clear that mitigating factors need not be related to the crime].) Defendant's jury specifically was instructed that pity and sympathy for the defendant would be a proper consideration if you should find them to be warranted in the circumstances. Included in the list of mitigating factors the jury was instructed to consider was any sympathetic aspects of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to it [ sic ] offense for which he is on trial. The jurors were told not to limit your consideration of mitigating factors to those specific factors. You also may consider any other circumstances relating to the case or to the defendant as shown by the evidence as reasons for not imposing the death penalty. (Italics added.) Furthermore, the jury was informed that any one of the mitigating factors or any other mitigating evidence standing alone may support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case. (Italics added.) Accordingly, the instruction made clear that the jury could consider any circumstance related to defendant and any sympathetic reaction to that evidence as a basis for a life sentence.