Opinion ID: 1301576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Religious Freedom under the U.S. Constitution

Text: ¶ 35 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S. Const. amend. I. The first portion of this provision contains what is called the Establishment Clause, and the second portion is called the Free Exercise Clause. ¶ 36 Ostlund asserts that the Establishment Clause provides the adjudicatory principles for this case. She argues, for example, that giving religious employers an exemption from non-discrimination laws dangerously encroaches upon the Establishment Clause's prohibition against furthering religion. Ostlund further asserts that the three-part Establishment Clause test announced by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), should govern our determination of whether application of the WFEA here violates CCS's constitutional rights. [11] Though at times mentioning the Free Exercise Clause, Ostlund argues that the only relevant question here is whether the WFEA creates excessive government entanglement with religion under the third prong of the Lemon test. ¶ 37 Supreme Court case law and common sense, however, lead to the conclusion that it is the Free Exercise Clause, and not the Establishment Clause, that is implicated in this case. The Supreme Court has stated that religious organizations generally have the power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952). The Supreme Court then went further, explaining that the Constitution forbids the state from interfering with a church's selection of its leaders, and that this protection was grounded in the free exercise of religion. Id.; see also Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168 (Any attempt by government to restrict a church's free choice of its leaders thus constitutes a burden on the church's free exercise rights.). This approach makes sense. We do not see how granting churches and religious organizations control over the selection of their leaders implicates the establishment of religion or the favoring of one religion over another. While excessive entanglement with religion is in some sense at issue, it is at issue only to the extent it burdens CCS's right to practice its faith freely. Thus, we analyze this case under the Free Exercise Clause. ¶ 38 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states that Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I. This provision was incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, that is, made applicable to the states as well as the federal government, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). It is well settled that this provision protects not only the right to freedom in what one believes, but extends (with limitations) to acting on those beliefs. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). This most basic of freedoms is not just an individual right, but a collective right. That is, both individuals and communities of individuals have a right to the freedom of religion. [12] See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167 (stating that religious freedom is guaranteed not only to individuals but also to churches in their collective capacities). ¶ 39 Courts around the country have universally recognized that the First Amendment protects houses of worship from state interference with the decision of who will teach and lead a congregation. Every jurisdiction to consider the question has adopted what had been called the ministerial exception. [13] The ministerial exception is grounded in the idea that the introduction of government standards [in]to the selection of spiritual leaders would significantly, and perniciously, rearrange the relationship between church and state. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168-69. It recognizes that perpetuation of a church's existence may depend upon those whom it selects to preach its values, teach its message, and interpret its doctrines both to its own membership and to the world at large. Id. ¶ 40 The state certainly has a strong interest in eradicating discrimination, but courts must distinguish incidental burdens on free exercise in the service of a compelling state interest from burdens where the `inroad on religious liberty' is too substantial to be permissible. Id. at 1169 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981)). Recognition of a church's authority to make hiring and firing decisions does remove the church's decisions in these matters from the jurisdiction of the courts with respect to anti-discrimination laws, laws that are a compelling part of our national character in their own right. But this freedom does provide protection for the church's First Amendment-sanctioned autonomy. Id. ¶ 41 The ministerial exception has deep roots in American history, but was first articulated in the context of non-discrimination claims in McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.1972). [14] The ministerial exception was clarified and so named in Rayburn. Ordination is not required to be considered ministerial. [15] See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168-69. Rather, it is the function of the position that is primary. [16] See id. ¶ 42 The Rayburn court proposed a test for deciding when a position should be considered ministerial. It suggested an employee is ministerial if his or her primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship. Id. at 1169. This inquiry necessarily requires a court to determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church. Id. The court in Rayburn ultimately concluded that a pastoral care associate at a Seventh-day Adventist Church was so significant in the expression and realization of Seventh-day Adventist beliefs that state intervention in the appointment process would excessively inhibit religious liberty. Id. at 1168. ¶ 43 This test for determining whether a position is ministerial has subsequently been called the primary duties test. In practice, the primary duties test has proved to be a flexible test without an answer key and has not yielded predictable results. See Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties Test, 121 Harv. L.Rev. 1776, 1788 (2008) ([J]udicial evaluation of the role of employeesfrom parochial school teachers to church organistshas not created any discernibly consistent pattern.) (footnotes omitted); Janet S. Belcove-Shalin, Ministerial Exception and Title VII Claims: Case Law Grid Analysis, 2 Nev. L.J. 86, 115 (2002) (Applying these guidelines to specific cases has not yielded consistent results.). ¶ 44 The crux of the problem with the application of the primary duties test is what the word primary means. Some courts have interpreted it to mean that religious tasks must encompass the largest share of the position, what might be called the quantitative approach. These courts will look, in the education context, for example, at the amount of time spent on particular subjects deemed secular versus subjects deemed religious, or at the number of job duties that can be classified as religious or deemed secular. See, e.g., Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F.Supp.2d 849 (S.D.Ind.1998) (holding that ministerial status did not apply to a teacher at a Catholic elementary school where the vast majority of her duties involved teaching secular classes); Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F.Supp.2d 211, 221 (E.D.N.Y.2006) (holding that ministerial status did not apply to an elementary school teacher because plaintiff's teaching duties were primarily secular, and those religious in nature were limited to only one hour of Bible instruction per day and attending religious ceremonies with students only once per year.). This line of argument is the approach advanced by Ostlund in this case, and adopted by ALJ Brown, [17] LIRC, [18] the circuit court, [19] and the court of appeals. [20] ¶ 45 Another, and we think better, way to view the ministerial exception is from what might be called the functional approach. This perspective focuses more on the second statement in Rayburn: whether a position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. This is a more holistic approach in which activities such as teaching, church governance, and supervision of or participation in worship are relevant evidence as to the importance of the position to the spiritual and pastoral mission of a house of worship or religious organization. The primary concern here is the function of the employee, not only the enumerated tasks themselves. ¶ 46 We reject a primary duties test that looks to see if the vast majority of tasks are religious, or whether a majority of the employee's time is spent on quintessentially religious tasks. This narrow view does not, in our view, sufficiently respect the constitutional imperatives of the free exercise of religion. It also serves to minimize or privatize religion by calling a faith-centered social studies class, for example, secular because it does not involve worship and prayer. What the quantitative approach means as a practical matter is that the state can interfere with the hiring and firing of the leaders of religious organizations and houses of worship so long as the leaders are spending (presumably) 49 percent or less of their time or tasks on whatever the court determines to be religious activities. This redounds in an intrusiveness inconsistent with the free exercise of religion. [21] ¶ 47 A functional analysis of the ministerial exception involves significantly less intrusion into the affairs of houses of worship and religious organizations. It envisages a more limited role for courts in determining whether activities or positions are religious. A functional analysis avoids reducing the significance of a position to a rote quantitative formula. In short, a functional analysis is truer to the First Amendment's protection of religious freedom. [22] ¶ 48 A functional analysis of the ministerial exception has two steps. The first step is an inquiry into whether the organization in both statement and practice has a fundamentally religious mission. That is, does the organization exist primarily to worship and spread the faith? Any inquiry will be highly fact-sensitive. It may be, for example, that one religiously-affiliated organization committed to feeding the homeless has only a nominal tie to religion, while another religiously-affiliated organization committed to feeding the homeless has a religiously infused mission involving teaching, evangelism, and worship. Similarly, one religious school may have some affiliation with a church but not attempt to ground the teaching and life of the school in the religious faith, while another similarly situated school may be committed to life and learning grounded in a religious worldview. ¶ 49 The second step in the analysis is an inquiry into how important or closely linked the employee's work is to the fundamental mission of that organization. This again will be highly fact-specific. Relevant evidence as to the employee's importance to the religious mission of the organization will include objective employment indicators such as hiring criteria, the job application, the employment contract, actual job duties, performance evaluations, and the understanding or characterization of a position by the organization. [23] Teaching, evangelizing, church governance, supervision of a religious order, and overseeing, leading, or participating in religious rituals, worship, and/or worship services will serve as important factors, rather than the only evidence we measure or consider as under the quantitative approach. These quintessentially religious tasks will evince a close link and importance to an organization's religious mission. ¶ 50 It is helpful to review two cases that illustrate the approach we adopt today. In Pardue v. Center City Consortium Schools of the Archdiocese of Washington, Inc., 875 A.2d 669 (D.C.2005), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the ministerial exception applied to a Catholic elementary school principal, thereby precluding her race discrimination and retaliation claims against the Archdiocese of Washington. Id. at 670. ¶ 51 The court's analysis focused, correctly in our view, on the directive in Rayburn to determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. Thus, the court's analysis initially focused on the school's mission, concluding that the Catholic schools in the Archdiocese had a pervasive religious mission where instruction on faith and morals was part of the total educational process. These Catholic schools were, the court found, an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church. Pardue, 875 A.2d at 675 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615-16, 91 S.Ct. 2105). ¶ 52 After this, the court examined the principal's function, which the lower court concluded was to communicate the school's message, one founded on religious belief, to the staff, students, and parents. Id. at 676-77. The court rejected the argument that because most of her daily responsibilities were no different from a public school principal, she could not have been a ministerial employee. The court explained: [M]erely enumerating the duties in Pardue's job description, many under secular-sounding headings such as `materials management' and `office management,' tells us little about whether her `position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.' Id. at 677 (citing Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169). Instead, the court concluded that her responsibilities when viewed as a whole were inextricably intertwined in the school's mission. Id. ¶ 53 Similarly, in an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit looked primarily at the mission of a Seventh-day Adventist school in determining that the ministerial exception precluded an elementary school teacher's discrimination claims. Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 97-2648, 166 F.3d 1208 (table), 1998 WL 904528,  (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998). The court noted that the school's mission, or primary purpose, was the salvation of each student's soul through his or her indoctrination in Seventh-day Adventist theological beliefs. Id. at . Teachers were a vital part of this mission, and were encouraged to look at teaching as a holy vocation. Id. at . The court explicitly rejected the teacher's arguments that he was not ministerial because only one of his thirteen stated responsibilities was religious in nature. Id. at . It found that the teacher taught the Bible, incorporated church teachings throughout the curriculum, and led the students in prayer, worship, and witnessing activities. Id. at . ¶ 54 In short, the court applied a functional analysis, choosing to understand teaching a secular class as not purely secular in the context of that religious school. Teachers were considered to have significant roles in the propagation of the faith even though a majority of their tasks and time was spent teaching a traditional academic curriculum. Id. The primary duties test was not a quantitative test, the court stated. Id. Instead, based on a total view of the facts, the central constitutional question is whether enforcement of the teacher's action would substantially infringe upon the Chesapeake Conference's right to choose its spiritual leaders. Id. The court explained: While the relative quantity of time an employee of a religious entity spends directly teaching and spreading the faith, providing church governance, supervising a religious order, or supervising or participating in religious ritual and worship is important in determining whether those activities are the primary duties of such employee, the degree of the church entity's reliance upon such employee to indoctrinate persons in its theology is equally important. Id. The court then concluded that for the reasons previously set forth, the quantitative and qualitative combination of factual circumstances in the present case compels us to conclude that the primary duties test is satisfied. Id. ¶ 55 A functional analysis of the ministerial exception makes sense because, though it departs in form from the analysis used by many other courts, it gets to the real heart of the ministerial exception, which is preventing the state from intruding into the mission of religious organizations or houses of worship. The state surely has a strong interest in ensuring fair employment opportunities regardless of age, race, and other such factors. Nonetheless, we conclude that the Wisconsin legislature oversteps its constitutional authority when its otherwise laudable efforts at fairness interfere with the hiring and firing of employees who are important and closely linked to the religious mission of a religious organization. Such actions impermissibly intrude upon the organization's exercise of religious liberty.