Opinion ID: 3029606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Meaningful Consideration

Text: Smith contends that his sentence was unreasonable because the District Court failed to satisfy the “meaningful consideration” requirement. Specifically, because the Court did not state explicitly and with specificity its reasons for the sentence imposed, it failed to create a record demonstrating meaningful consideration of the Section 3553(a) sentencing factors. The shortcomings include: not mentioning which of the Section 3553(a) subsections were being considered; not comparing Smith’s 84-month sentence with sentences of similarly situated defendants; including no additional written explanation of Smith’s sentence in the Statement of Reasons; and not explaining why an 84-month sentence, imposed consecutively, reflected the seriousness of the offense, promoted respect for law, and provided just punishment and deterrence, as required under Section 3553(a)(2) and 3553(c), while a lesser sentence – e.g., 77 months to run concurrently – would not. Without these clear and detailed statements, Smith argues, the District Court’s ruling is unreviewable by this Court, and thus not legally sufficient. As a threshold matter, district courts are not required to expressly address in detail -6- how each of the Section 3553(a) factors impacts their sentencing decision if it is clear from the record that the factors were in fact taken into consideration. See United States v. Charles, 467 F.3d 828, 831 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that district courts need not fully and explicitly articulate their consideration of each Section 3553(a) factor when giving reasons for imposing a sentence); United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir.2005) (holding “nothing in Booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors”) (cited with approval in Cooper at 329). Rather, a sentence is reviewable for “meaningful consideration” when district courts “‘state adequate reasons for a sentence on the record so that [we] can engage in meaningful appellate review.’ [W]e will not elevate form over substance.” United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 505- 6 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United State v. Charles, 467 F.3d 828, 831 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 196-7 (3d Cir. 2006))). Reasonable sentences require meaningful consideration of only “relevant ” factors. Charles, 467 F.3d at 831 (original emphasis) (quoting Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329). Furthermore, the court need not address arguments made by the defendant that are “clearly without merit.” Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329. Based on our review of the record, it is clear that the District Court gave meaningful consideration to the relevant 3553(a) factors. For example, the Court adopted without change the PSR, which comprehensively reviewed defendant’s history, the circumstances of the offense at issue, and sentencing options (e.g., custody, supervised -7- release, probation, fine, and restitution). The Court also stated that it read, understood, and was “impressed” with arguments in defendant’s sentencing memo, which addressed defendant’s background, the circumstances of this offense, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, the types of sentences available (concurrent or consecutive), and Sentencing Commission reports. Many of these same arguments were also repeated during the hearing, such as defendant’s youth and attempts at overcoming his gambling addiction. The Court also heard testimony from defendant himself about the reasons for his actions. See United States v. Vargas, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3486,  (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) was meaningfully considered after defendant discussed his background and offense in court). The Court considered § 3553(a)(4) by consciously sentencing within the Guidelines, which makes it more likely that the sentence was reasonable. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 330-31. The Court naturally focused its ruling on certain factors that it deemed to outweigh others. It stated that interfering with the duties of correctional officers by threat of harm was “of maximum importance,” “totally unacceptable,” and “of critical importance.” The Court clearly felt that the requirements for the sentence to account for the nature of the offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), to promote respect for the law, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), and to deter similar activity, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), far outweighed the history and characteristics of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Mere brevity in addressing other possible mitigating circumstances does not per se constitute error. United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 2006). Based on the record, we are -8- satisfied that the Court meaningfully considered the Section 3553(a) factors, but ultimately considered certain factors less relevant or irrelevant to the circumstances of the case.