Opinion ID: 3053462
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Special Use Permit

Text: McFarland contends that the denial of his special use permit was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with the law. McFarland expressly asserts that the Park Service “failed to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its decision.” [6] McFarland’s reliance on Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n (Motor Vehicle) v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983), and Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 784 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1986), is misplaced. An agency must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action . . .” Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43 (citation omitted). However, the critical factor in Motor Vehicle was that the agency “submitted no reasons at all” for its decision. Id. at 50. Similarly, in Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, we declined to enforce an agency order due to its “total failure to articulate any reason for refusing to impose labor protections[,]” making it “impossible for us as a reviewing court to understand why the [agency] chose to deny rather than impose protections . . .” 784 F.2d at 975. [7] McFarland contends that the Park Service did not consider facts unique to his situation. However, a court “will . . . uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may be reasonably discerned.” Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The National Park Service’s written decision and other correspondence clearly explained its reasons for closing the road and declining to make an exception for McFarland. The agency’s path to its decision is easily followed by reading the corresponMCFARLAND v. KEMPTHORNE 14051 dence between the Park Service and McFarland. Ultimately, the Park Service determined that its concerns for wildlife and recreation in the national park justified closing Glacier Route 7 to motorized vehicles during the winter season. [8] “If an agency’s determination is supportable on any rational basis, we must uphold it.” Voyageurs Nat’l Park Ass’n v. Norton, 381 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “This is especially true when an agency is acting within its own sphere of expertise.” Id. (citation omitted). As in Voyageurs National Park Ass’n, the Park Service acted within the sphere of its expertise when it decided not to grant McFarland’s request. Cf. id. at 763-64 (deferring to the Park Service in an analogous circumstance). Therefore, we conclude that the Park Service did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or in violation of law when it denied McFarland’s permit request.