Opinion ID: 2365094
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Prove Aggravating Factor 4(g)

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the penalty-phase jury that it was required to accept the murder verdicts of the guilt-phase jury in its deliberations on the 4(g)murder in the course of murderaggravating factor. In support, defendant cites to the death penalty statute, which states that evidence presented at trial that is relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors need not be reintroduced at the penalty phase if the factfinder is the same at both stages. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(c). Defendant maintains that the implication of that provision is that evidence from the guilt phase must be re-introduced at the penalty phase if, as was the case here, the factfinder is different. To impose the death penalty, the jury must find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 158-59, 548 A. 2d 887. This Court has declared that a trial is constitutionally defective if the State is not required to prove, over the defendant's objection, the essential elements of the offense charged. The requirement is so basic and fundamental that it admits of no exception no matter how inconsequential the circumstances. State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 293, 566 A. 2d 531 (1989) (holding trial court committed reversible error for failing to instruct jury on State's burden to prove that defendant did not have permit for handgun found in his possession). The necessity of a jury's reconsideration of the elements of a crime established during an earlier portion of a bifurcated trial was recognized in State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189, 519 A. 2d 1361 (1986). In Ragland, the jury convicted the defendant of several offenses, including unlawful possession of a weapon in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5. Id. at 192, 519 A. 2d 1361. Another charge, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7, was severed to avoid prejudice, but was tried before the same jury. Ibid. Before the jury deliberated on the severed count, the trial court instructed the jury that: [i]f you find that the defendant ... was previously convicted for the crime of robbery and that he was in possession of a sawed-off shotgun, as you have indicated ... then you must find him guilty as charged by this Court. Ibid. That jury instruction had the effect of directing a guilty verdict on the possession of a weapon by a convicted felon charge. Id. at 193, 519 A. 2d 1361. The Court held that it is essential ... that the jury be instructed in no uncertain terms to consider anew the evidence previously admitted [and] to disregard completely its prior verdict. Id. at 195, 519 A. 2d 1361. The sole function of a penalty-phase jury is to determine the appropriate sentence, and the evidence presented by the State need only be relevant to that issue and not to a defendant's guilt. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 71, 524 A. 2d 130. However, the distinct nature of the penalty phase allows the jury to reach conclusions concerning aggravating factors and mitigating factors different from and inconsistent with the findings at the original sentencing proceeding. Id. at 72, 524 A. 2d 130. Further, although the defendant may lose whatever advantage inheres in the `residual doubts' that the original jury may have had regarding defendant's guilt, the State may also lose whatever `advantage' inheres in the emotional impact that often surrounds the initial guilt phase. Id. at 71, 524 A. 2d 130 (citation omitted). That proposition served in part as a basis for our decision in State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991), where we held that the State's burden at the penalty phase remains even when an aggravating factor duplicates an element of a crime found by the jury during the guilt phase. Id. at 138-39, 586 A. 2d 85. The aggravating factor alleged, namely that the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment, was analogous to an element of the crime for which he was convicted during the guilt phase of the trial. Id. at 138, 586 A. 2d 85. The defendant argued that by not instructing the jurors to disregard their former factual finding and deliberate anew, the trial court allowed a directed verdict on the aggravating factor in contravention of Ragland. Id. at 138-39, 586 A. 2d 85 (citing to Ragland, supra, 105 N.J. at 195-96, 519 A. 2d 1361). Marshall held that penalty-phase jurors are not bound by findings of fact made by guilt-phase jurors. Id. at 139, 586 A. 2d 85. Because the guilt and sentencing phases are separate proceedings under the Capital Punishment Act, a trial court should instruct a penalty-phase jury of its duty to deliberate anew concerning any facts established by the verdict in the guilt-phase determination that the State relies on to prove an aggravating factor, and of its right to reach a different conclusion concerning such facts in the penalty phase. Ibid. The Court acknowledged that it would be a rare case where a penalty-phase jury, especially one not presented with any new evidence in the penalty phase, would make penalty-phase determinations that contradict its verdict in the guilt phase. Ibid. However, the Court concluded that reversal was unwarranted under the facts of the case before it because this jury understood clearly that the penalty proceedings were separate from the guilt phase of the case, and required the jury's fresh determination on the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. Ibid. The Court's holding in Marshall is reflected in the model jury charge on the 4(e) aggravating factorthat the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value. When the guilt-phase jury finds that the defendant procured a murder by payment or promise of payment, the trial court must instruct the penalty-phase jury to deliberate anew: While you have already determined that the defendant procured the commission of the murder by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value during the guilt phase of the trial, that finding is insufficient for this sentencing proceeding. That is so because the guilt and sentencing phases are considered as separate proceedings. Therefore, you must deliberate anew regarding any facts established by your verdict in the guilt phase determination that the State relies on to prove an aggravating factor, and you have the right to reach a different conclusion about such facts in the penalty phase. [ Judges Bench Manual For Capital Causes, Appendix J-22 (July 17, 2000).] A similar instruction is required when the alleged aggravating factor is 4(g), that the defendant committed murder in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing after committing or attempting to commit felony murder (murder in the course of robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnaping, or the crime of contempt in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9b). Judges Bench Manual, Appendix J-26. However, when the defendant is alleged to have committed murder in the course of murder, the instruction apparently is not required to be given. Judges Bench Manual, Appendix J-26 n. 41. Instead, the trial court need only state: I charge you that in order to find the existence of this aggravating factor, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the following: (a) the commission of a [murder] AND (b) that the killing of another victim was caused by the defendant at some time within the course of the commission of that crime which can include flight after the commission of the murder. [ Judges Bench Manual, Appendix J-26.] The issue raised by defendant is whether the State should be required to reprove the elements of murder to establish that he committed murder in the course of murder pursuant to aggravating factor 4(g). In cases of felony murder, the model jury charge on aggravating factor 4(g) requires the trial court to instruct the penalty-phase jury to disregard the guilt-phase jury's conclusion that the defendant did commit the predicate felony. That is because the commission of the predicate felony constitutes an element of aggravating factor 4(g). Similarly, in the case of murder within murder, where the predicate felony is murder and where murder constitutes an element of aggravating factor 4(g), it follows that the penalty-phase jury should be instructed to deliberate anew in conformance with this Court's holding in Marshall. Although the jury in Marshall was the same for the guilt and penalty phases, that does not distinguish the Marshall holding such that application of the principle of deliberation anew should not occur here. Further, to accomplish that deliberation, the prosecution is required under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(c) to reintroduce relevant guilt-phase evidence when the factfinder at the penalty phase is different from the factfinder at the guilt phase. Defendant argues not that the penalty-phase jury should have been permitted to acquit him of the murders, but that it should have been given an opportunity to consider anew the evidence supporting his convictions and to view it from a different perspective than that of the guilt-phase jury. Properly instructed, the penalty-phase jury could have concluded that the 4(g) aggravating factor should have been accorded less weight in the balancing process in conformance with this Court's holding in Biegenwald. Although the guilt-phase verdict would have remained intact, defendant might have received a sentence of imprisonment in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3. We conclude, therefore, that the instruction as it appears in our Judges Bench Manual, and as used here, requires correction. Because the charge had the capacity to affect seriously the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors by a separate penalty-phase jury, its use would have necessitated reversal of defendant's penalty-phase judgment but for our ruling on the jury's own-conduct determination that itself warrants reversal of defendant's death sentence.