Opinion ID: 2076678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: murder in the course of an attempted armed robbery

Text: Defendant asserts that since he was convicted of attempted armed robbery, which is not, he alleges, listed as one of the crimes for which he would be eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(6)(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(c)), then he was not eligible for the death penalty. Section 9-1(b)(6) provides in pertinent part: the murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony if:    (c) the other felony was one of the following: armed robbery, robbery, rape, deviate sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, forcible detention, arson, burglary, or the taking of indecent liberties with a child. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(c). At the conclusion of stage one of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel filed a motion to bar imposition of the death penalty, arguing that defendant was not eligible because attempt was not one of the enumerated qualifying felonies. The trial judge rejected the defendant's theory and denied the motion. The judge gave the following instruction to the jury: When I use the words `in the course of another felony,' I mean a person was attempting to commit or was committing another felony. The other felony need not be completed. The State maintains that the defendant was subject to the death penalty where he murdered an individual in the course of an armed robbery. The State argues that a murder perpetrated pursuant to an attempted armed robbery is necessarily committed in the course of an armed robbery, so that the plain, unambiguous meaning of the statute defining the applicable aggravating factor includes an attempt to commit an armed robbery. The State asserts that People v. Walker (1982), 91 Ill.2d 502, is dispositive of this issue. We agree. In Walker this court dealt with the exact issue raised by the defendant. We held: The statute [death penalty statute] does not require that the accused be convicted of the commission of one of the listed aggravating felonies. Whether the murder is committed in association with the actual completion of the aggravating felony or only with the attempted felony is not crucial. The aggravating factor which triggers the application of the death penalty statute is that the murder be committed `in the course of' the aggravating felony. A murder may be committed `in the course of' an armed robbery whether or not the actual armed robbery is consummated. 91 Ill.2d 502, 510. In response to defendant's argument that if the legislature had wanted to include attempts in section 9-1(b)(6)(c) it would have expressly included attempts, this court held in Walker : This misconstrues the fact that the statutory aggravating factor is, as noted above, not the conviction of armed robbery or attempted armed robbery, but murder `in the course of' armed robbery. It is true, of course, that some of the same facts may go to prove both the attempted felony and the aggravating factor because one of the elements of `attempt' is taking a substantial step toward the commission of a crime (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 8-4(a)). 91 Ill.2d 502, 512.