Opinion ID: 2402072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The State Highway Administration's Use of a Portion of the Conveyance

Text: Respondents also have argued that Mrs. Selig is not entitled to exercise the right to reacquire the property because the SHA has used a portion of the property. The SHA maintains that this use has destroyed Mrs. Selig's reacquisition right in several ways: First, the widening of Maryland Route 193 (Greenbelt Road) constitutes a transportation use, thus, negating the conclusion that the project was abandoned and rendering impossible the satisfaction of the conditions precedent. Second, the SHA maintains that the property as described in the contract and the deed identifies the original 4.7135 acre parcel, not some lesser portion that may be subject to re-acquisition. [19] And, third, the statute makes no provision for determining a pro-rata price to be paid for receipt of anything less than the original parcel. Petitioner urges that if the property were to signify the entirety of the parcel, it then becomes incumbent upon the SHA to use the entire parcel for the transportation purpose, thus rendering hollow the statute's reconveyance provisions. The Court finds the argument that the entire parcel must still exist unused in order that the right of first refusal would vest to be less than a powerful argument. [20] Were that the rule, the State might defeat any possibility of reconveyance of any property acquired for transportation purposes by selling a mere square foot of the property to a third party, or use of a square foot. Moreover, § 8-309(b) would be rendered a superfluous legislative enactment, hamstringing the SHA from changing projects according to need and having flexibility in carrying out its transportation mandates. It, or any property owner, subject to a right of first refusal could completely defeat the bargained for right by selling off the remainder, or could divide the parcel into two pieces and sell them individually even to the same purchaser. If that were the law, rights of first refusal would effectively cease to exist. In determining this legislative intent, a court must read the language of the statute in context and in relation to all of its provisions. In addition, it may consider the statute's legislative history and administrative interpretations, and must consider its purpose. Department of State Planning v. Hagerstown, 288 Md. 9, 14, 415 A.2d 296, 299 (1980).