Opinion ID: 2995090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ill July 19, 2000). The court determined

Text: that Bickel/2 could not have caused this same injury based upon the following analysis: 1) Altheimer alleged that the Alpers never instructed it not to transfer the wholesale business to DTS; 2) If this were true, the non-compete claims filed in state court would have had little merit because the Alpers would then have had no protectable interest in preventing Avers from competing; 3) If the jury finds that Altheimer failed to provide an adequate cause of action for Avers’ defection, then, to seek contribution, Altheimer will have to argue that Bickel was negligent in failing to maintain a state court claim cause of action that was inadequate; 4) Under Roberts v. Heilgeist, 465 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), attorneys do not have a duty to pursue fruitless litigation. See Alper, 2000 WL 1006740, at -3. The district court thus held that Bickel could not have caused the same injury as did Altheimer. See id. This analysis does not address the fact that what is at issue here is a motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When reviewing such a motion, a court must be careful not to require more than what is mandated by Rule 8: a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Altheimer does not have to prove its factual and legal allegations at this stage, it must only show that relief is possible. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957); Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992). Further, it is entitled to plead in the alternative, even if the pleadings are inconsistent. 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure sec. 1283 (2d ed. 1990, Supp. 2001). Various constructions of the facts in this case would permit Altheimer to recover from Bickel. For example, even if Altheimer negligently drafted the transaction documents, DTS and Avers could still have fraudulently induced the Alpers to sell their merchandising business. If the Alpers had viable claims against DTS and Avers, it is possible that Bickel’s negligence prevented the Alpers from recovering on those claims. If the jury were to find that Altheimer injured the Alpers by losing the merchandising business, then Altheimer could seek contribution from Bickel for its role in that injury. We thus find that Altheimer has properly stated a claim for contribution under the Contribution Act because Bickel and Altheimer both allegedly failed to protect the Alpers’ interests with respect to DTS and Avers. We note that our decision today does not speak to the merits of Altheimer’s contribution claim. If the Alpers prevail on their claim against Altheimer, the trier of fact will then determine whether Bickel is liable for contribution. B. Public Policy Considerations The district court found that Altheimer could not pursue a contribution claim in part based upon its determination that public policy considerations militated against this type of third-party malpractice claim. Though no Illinois case has declared such a bar, the district court was persuaded by a state court case from Utah, Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1979). As noted by the district court, Hughes expressed policy concerns about imposition of a duty on successor counsel in favor of his predecessor. Alper v. Altheimer & Gray, No. 97 C 1200, 2000 WL 1006740, at  (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2000). A subsequent Illinois case, Roberts v. Heilgeist, 465 N.E.2d 658, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), did cite to Hughes, but only in dicta. Roberts did not reach the issue of whether public policy considerations prevent a malpractice plaintiffs’ former attorney, who is the defendant in the malpractice action, from seeking contribution in that action from the plaintiff’s current attorney but noted that there is substantial merit to the rationale of other courts that have considered this question and have held that . . . suits by a former lawyer against a current or succeeding lawyer contravene public policy. Id. It does not appear, however, that any Illinois courts have ever followed the rationale of Roberts. See, e.g., Horizon Fed. Sav. Bank v. Selden Fox & Assoc., No. 85 C 9506, 1988 WL 71244, at  (N.D.