Opinion ID: 2831303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: History of Direct Appellate Jurisdiction

Text: A 1940 constitutional amendment gave the Legislature power to grant direct appeals to this Court.7 Not until 1944, though, did the Legislature do so.8 The original conferral allowed direct appeals from injunctions based on two grounds, either (1) the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a state statute, or (2) the validity or invalidity of certain state administrative orders.9 Today, the statutory grant of direct-appeal jurisdiction covers just one situation: “[A]n order of a trial court granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction on the ground of the constitutionality of a statute of this state.”10 I have found only forty-three cases where we have exercised direct-appeal jurisdiction. That is, while such jurisdiction has existed for nearly seventy years, we have exercised it stintingly. In twenty-four of the forty-three cases, our opinion made clear that the trial court either made a direct holding about a statute’s constitutionality or issued declaratory relief that a statute was or was not 7 See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Shell Oil Co., 206 S.W .2d 235, 238 (Tex. 1947). 8 Id. 9 Id. 10 T EX . G O V ’T C O D E § 22.001(c). The Constitution still allows the Legislature to provide for direct appeal from injunctions based on the validity of administrative orders, however. T EX . C O N ST . art. V, § 3-b. But the express constitutional grant of direct-appeal jurisdiction in Article 5, Section 3-b of the Constitution is arguably now unnecessary given the broadened wording of the general jurisdictional provision in Article 5, Section 3. See Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W .3d 85, 98 n.4 (Tex. 2001) (Phillips, C.J., dissenting) (“Since 1981, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction has extended to all civil cases ‘as . . . provided . . . by law,’ T EX . C O N ST . art. V, § 3, so that the Legislature could now provide for direct appeals without a specific constitutional grant of authority.”). Accordingly, the Legislature has now provided for direct appeal from certain trial court rulings that involve Public Utility Commission financing orders. T EX . U TIL . C O DE § 39.303(f). 5 constitutional.11 In eleven other cases, the trial court’s order clearly must have been based on constitutional grounds, either because the opinion implies that only constitutional issues were raised to the trial court12 or because the trial court granted an injunction enforcing a statute over constitutional objection, thus implicitly upholding the statute against constitutional attack.13 In two other cases, we summarily stated that the trial court granted or denied the injunction on the ground of a statute’s constitutionality.14 But in at least six direct-appeal cases, we did not make it clear why 11 See Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W .3d 746, 753–54 (Tex. 2005); State v. Hodges, 92 S.W .3d 489, 493 (Tex. 2002); FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W .3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000); Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W .2d 560, 567–68 (Tex. 1999); Maple Run at Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Monaghan, 931 S.W .2d 941, 945 (Tex. 1996); Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W .2d 618, 623, 625 (Tex. 1996); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W .2d 717, 727 (Tex. 1995); Richards v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 868 S.W .2d 306, 308 (Tex. 1993); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W .2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1993); Orange Cnty. v. Ware, 819 S.W .2d 472, 473 (Tex. 1991); O’Quinn v. State Bar of Tex., 763 S.W .2d 397, 398 (Tex. 1988); LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W .2d 335, 336 (Tex. 1986); Wilson v. Galveston Cnty. Cent. Appraisal Dist., 713 S.W .2d 98, 99 (Tex. 1986); Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Stamos, 695 S.W .2d 556, 558 (Tex. 1985); Shaw v. Phillips Crane & Rigging of San Antonio, Inc., 636 S.W .2d 186, 187 (Tex. 1982); Gibson Distrib. Co. v. Downtown Dev. Ass’n of El Paso, Inc., 572 S.W .2d 334, 334 (Tex. 1978); Tex. Antiquities Comm. v. Dallas Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 554 S.W .2d 924, 925–27 (Tex. 1977) (plurality opinion); Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W .2d 375, 375–76 (Tex. 1971); State v. Scott, 460 S.W .2d 103, 105 (Tex. 1970); State v. Spartan’s Indus., Inc., 447 S.W .2d 407, 409 (Tex. 1969); Jordan v. State Bd. of Ins., 334 S.W .2d 278, 278–80 (Tex. 1960); Smith v. Decker, 312 S.W .2d 632, 633 (Tex. 1958); Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 227 S.W .2d 791, 792–93 (Tex. 1950); Dodgen v. Depuglio, 209 S.W .2d 588, 591–92 (Tex. 1948). 12 See Conlen Grain & Mercantile, Inc. v. Tex. Grain Sorghum Producers Bd., 519 S.W .2d 620, 621–22 (Tex. 1975); Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W .2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1974); Itz v. Penick, 493 S.W .2d 506, 508 (Tex. 1973); Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W .2d 827, 829 (Tex. 1968); Shepherd v. San Jacinto Junior Coll. Dist., 363 S.W .2d 742, 742–43 (Tex. 1962); King v. Carlton Indep. School Dist., 295 S.W .2d 408, 409 (Tex. 1956); Dallas Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 3 v. City of Dallas, 233 S.W .2d 291, 292 (Tex. 1950). 13 See Gibson Prods. Co. v. State, 545 S.W .2d 128, 129 (Tex. 1976); Dancetown, U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 439 S.W .2d 333, 334 (Tex. 1969); Schlichting v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 310 S.W .2d 557, 558–59 (Tex. 1958); H. Rouw Co. v. Tex. Citrus Comm’n, 247 S.W .2d 231, 231–32 (Tex. 1952). 14 See State v. Project Principle, Inc., 724 S.W .2d 387, 389 (Tex. 1987); Duncan v. Gabler, 215 S.W .2d 155, 156–57 (Tex. 1948). 6 we thought the trial court’s injunction was based on constitutional grounds.15 These cases address jurisdiction rather cursorily, and only one of the opinions garnered a dissent on the jurisdictional issue,16 to which the majority opinion declined to respond.17 But in the vast majority of cases where we have exercised direct-appeal jurisdiction, it has been abundantly clear that the trial court issued or denied an injunction on the ground of a statute’s constitutionality. We have also issued at least eleven opinions in which we dismissed attempted direct appeals for want of jurisdiction because the statutory test was not met.18 We have variously explained that our direct-appeal jurisdiction “is a limited one,”19 that we have been “strict in applying” or have “strictly applied” direct-appeal jurisdictional requirements,20 and that “[w]e have strictly construed our direct appeal jurisdiction.”21 Therefore, we have held that to meet the jurisdictional 15 See Del Rio, 67 S.W .3d 85 (majority opinion); Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W .2d 454 (Tex. 1997); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W .2d 489 (Tex. 1992); Ass’n of Tex. Prof’l Educators v. Kirby, 788 S.W .2d 827 (Tex. 1990); Parker v. Nobles, 496 S.W .2d 921 (Tex. 1973); Dobard v. State, 233 S.W .2d 435 (Tex. 1950). 16 Del Rio, 67 S.W .3d at 98–100 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting). 17 Id. at 89, 95 (majority opinion). 18 See Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 817 S.W .2d 60 (Tex. 1991); Querner Truck Lines, Inc. v. State, 652 S.W .2d 367, 368 (Tex. 1983); Mitchell v. Purolator Sec., Inc., 515 S.W .2d 101 (Tex. 1974); Holmes v. Steger, 339 S.W .2d 663 (Tex. 1960); Standard Sec. Serv. Corp. v. King, 341 S.W .2d 423 (Tex. 1960); Gardner v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 333 S.W .2d 585 (Tex. 1960); Bryson v. High Plains Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1, 297 S.W .2d 117 (Tex. 1956); Corona v. Garrison, 274 S.W .2d 541 (Tex. 1955); Lipscomb v. Flaherty, 264 S.W .2d 691 (Tex. 1954); Boston v. Garrison, 256 S.W .2d 67 (Tex. 1953); McGraw v. Teichman, 214 S.W .2d 282 (Tex. 1948). 19 Gardner, 333 S.W .2d at 588. 20 Querner Truck, 652 S.W .2d at 368; Mitchell, 515 S.W .2d at 103. 21 Garcia, 817 S.W .2d at 61. 7 prerequisites, a trial court must actually “pass upon the constitutionality of [a] statute,”22 “determin[e]” a statute’s constitutionality,23 or “base its decision” on constitutional grounds.24 Indeed, “[i]t is not enough that a question of the constitutionality of a statute may have been raised in order for our direct appeal jurisdiction to attach in injunction cases; in addition the trial court must have made a holding on the question based on the grounds of the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the statute.”25 A close examination of the eleven cases where we dismissed for want of jurisdiction reveals strict adherence to the Legislature’s restricted framework. For example, we held “no jurisdiction” where the trial court made the injunction decision based on res judicata26 or where the trial court was directed to do so by a writ of prohibition by the court of civil appeals.27 That is, because the trial court did not decide the merits of the constitutional issue, we lacked direct-appeal jurisdiction.28 Similarly, we held that we did not have such jurisdiction where the trial court denied an injunction because the plaintiffs lacked “the necessary justiciable interest” to sue.29 We even held that we lacked jurisdiction over a direct appeal of a temporary injunction involving a “serious question” of 22 Corona, 274 S.W .2d at 541–42. 23 King, 341 S.W .2d at 425; Bryson, 297 S.W .2d at 406. 24 Holmes, 339 S.W .2d at 663–64. 25 Mitchell, 515 S.W .2d at 103 (emphasis in original). 26 Lipscomb, 264 S.W .2d at 691–92. 27 Gardner, 333 S.W .2d at 589. 28 Corona, 274 S.W .2d at 541–42. 29 Holmes, 339 S.W .2d at 664. 8 the constitutionality of a statute, because the real purpose of the temporary injunction was merely to preserve the status quo, and the trial court did not make any holdings finally determining the constitutional issue.30