Opinion ID: 70940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to Counsel for Purposes of Showing Cause

Text: On this appeal, Williams again raises a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and in support of that claim, again proffers evidence which has never been considered in any other proceeding. Before a federal court may consider evidence of Williams's unstable childhood and psychological history in assessing whether Collins's representation during the penalty phase was ineffective, Williams must show cause for failing to present that evidence on his motion for a new trial when he first asserted his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Williams contends that the failure to present this evidence was caused by inadequate representation of appellate counsel (Allen) at the hearing on the motion for new trial. However, attorney error constitutes “cause” only when there is a constitutional right to counsel at the stage when the error is committed. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986). Therefore, as a threshold issue, we must determine if a Georgia capital defendant has a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in the presentation of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim at the motion for new trial stage of Georgia's Unified Appeal Procedure. It is well-established that under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel during trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795-97 (1963), during the penalty phase of a capital case, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), 9 and at various critical stages of a criminal prosecution where “substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected,” Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 88 S.Ct. 254, 256-57 (1967) (right to counsel attaches to deferred sentencing proceeding); see also, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1876 (1981) (psychiatric interview); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937 (1967) (pretrial line-up); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 1051 (1963) (preliminary hearings). Furthermore, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to counsel during the first appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 389, 398, 105 S.Ct. 830, 836 (1985); Douglas v. People, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57, 83 S.Ct. 814, 816 (1963). The right to effective assistance of counsel during the first appeal attaches because once a state has created a right of appeal, the state must ensure that all persons have an equal opportunity to enjoy the right. Id. at 356-57, 83 S.Ct. at 816. However, once a defendant's claims of error are organized and presented in a lawyerlike fashion during the first appeal as of right, the obligation of ensuring equal access to the court system is no longer constitutionally required. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 615-16, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2446-47 (1974). The duty of the State . . . is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process. Id. Because meaningful and equal access to the state court system 10 is adequately provided through the direct appeal process, there is generally no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in state collateral proceedings. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 12, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2771-72 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1993 (1987). In particular, a criminal defendant is not constitutionally entitled to effective assistance of counsel in state habeas proceedings after a constitutional claim has been exhausted on direct appellate review. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555, 107 S.Ct. at 1993. With respect to ineffective assistance claims, Georgia’s Unified Appeal Procedure is intended to remedy issues involving counsel “prior to and during trial,” rather than “after conviction and the imposition of the death penalty.” Sliger v. State, 248 Ga. 316, 319, 282 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982). As in trial proceedings, the defendant has the right to be present and mentally competent at the motion for new trial proceedings. Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 75, 295 S.E.2d 727, 735 (1982), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 906 (1991). More importantly, a challenge to the effectiveness of trial counsel must be made in a motion for new trial; indeed, if the defendant fails to raise an ineffective assistance claim in a motion for new trial, such a claim is deemed waived in all further proceedings, including the direct appeal. Thompson, 257 Ga. at 388, 359 S.E.2d at 665. The purpose of Georgia’s waiver rule is to ensure that allegations of ineffective assistance are heard at the earliest practicable moment, i.e., during the [evidentiary] hearing on the [] motion. Id. Consequently, if the evidence underlying an ineffective 11 assistance claim is not presented during the evidentiary hearing on a motion for new trial, courts are forever foreclosed from reviewing that evidence. With respect to claims of ineffective assistance in Georgia, then, a defendant's claims of error are organized and presented in lawyerlike fashion, Ross, 417 U.S. at 615-16, 94 S.Ct. at 2446-47, for the first and only time upon the motion for new trial.4 Thus, the motion for new trial is a critical stage of the initial proceedings because it is at this stage that the constitutional right to equal and meaningful access to the courts, particularly through effective representation by counsel, attaches, and that the defendant’s substantial rights on direct appeal may be adversely affected. We therefore hold, and Georgia’s Attorney General concedes, that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to effective representation by counsel at the motion for new trial stage of Georgia's Unified Appeal Procedure.5 4 The intent of the General Assembly in instituting the process was to make certain that all possible matters which could be raised in defense have been considered by the defendant and defense counsel and either asserted in a timely and correct manner or waived in a court with applicable legal requirement so that, for purposes of any pretrial review and the pretrial and post-trial review, the record and transcript of proceedings will be complete for a review by the Sentencing Court and the Supreme Court of all possible challenges to the trial, conviction, sentence, and detention of the defendant. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-36(b). 5 This holding also comports with Georgia precedent which holds that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel in the motion for new trial stage because it is a critical proceeding in the state's prosecution. Adams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 541, 543, 405 S.E.2d 537, 539 (1991). Other circuits also have held that post-trial motions for a new trial are critical stages in a criminal proceeding, which trigger a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment 12