Opinion ID: 1830007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Detective Romagni's testimony

Text: The defense's cross-examination of lead detective Romagni was dedicated to demonstrating omissions in the investigation conducted by the police. Specifically, the defense focused on the failure of the police to pursue the person the defense argued should have been the prime suspect, Joseph Stewart. The thrust of the defense's cross-examination was to demonstrate that the police essentially chose to believe Stewart: Q. Okay. So for two weeks, after he tells you he knew that these homicides had occurred and he felt that what he disposed of was involved in a homicide, he still didn't call you to say, Hey, I've got something that may be important here? A. He was afraid that he would have been charged. Q. He was afraid he would be charged with this crime? A. He was afraid he would be charged with a crime he had nothing to do with. Q. When you say he had nothing to do with it, sir you choose to believe Joseph Stewart; correct? A. I chooses [sic] to believe that your client duped Joseph Stewart. . . . . A. The reason he didn't tell mehe didn't tell me everything, and the reason he didn't tell me is because he didn't want to get that involved. He wanted to turn the evidence over, and he didn't want to get deeply involved. Q. That's what you choose to believe? A. That's what he told me. Q. And you chose to believe him? A. I have no reason not to believe him. I haven't seen anything to the contrary not to believe him. On redirect the State responded to the defense's intimation that the police simply chose to believe Stewart's version of events by asking Romagni about the evidence the police had in their possession supporting there decision to arrest Dennis. The defense objected, arguing that the line of questioning called for inadmissible hearsay. The court overruled the defense's objection, based primarily on the State's representation that much of the evidence Romagni would refer to would be properly admitted through other witnesses. The following is a portion of Romagni's testimony on redirect: Q. Did you speak to any witnesses as to the defendant's jealousy of Timwanika Lumpkins? A. Yes. Q. Did you speak to any witnesses as to the defendant spying on Timwanika Lumpkins and other persons? A. Yes. Q. Did you speak to any witnesses as to the defendant finding out where Marlin Barnes lived just months before his murder? A. Yes. Q. Did you speak to any witnesses about the fact that this defendant was spying on Timwanika and Marlin and their being together? A. Yes. Q. Did you speak to any witnesses that could tell you that the defendant knew at the time of the murders that Watisha's car was available that weekend and where it was left? A. Yes. Q. Did you speak to any witnesses that knew that around seven o'clock in the morning the defendant came dressed in black to Zemoria Wilson's apartment? A. Yes. Q. Asking for Joseph Stewart? A. Yes. Q. Did you speak to any witnesses that knew the defendant had possession of the murder weapon? A. Yes. Q. During the time of the murders? A. Yes. The State argues that the defense's cross-examination of Romagni opened the door to this line of questioning. We agree. In Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29 (Fla.2000), we explained the concept of opening the door: As an evidentiary principle, the concept of `opening the door' allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible testimony to `qualify, explain, or limit' testimony or evidence previously admitted. The concept of `opening the door' is `based on considerations of fairness and the truth-seeking function of a trial.' Id. at 42 (citations omitted). Here the defense's cross-examination of Romagni opened the door to the State's line of questioning aimed at rebutting the defense's implication that the officers' investigation was less than thorough, relying solely on Stewart's word to arrest the defendant. Even if we were to conclude that it was error to allow the State to pursue this line of questioning, any such error was harmless. Each and every point mentioned in Romagni's testimony on redirect was properly admitted into evidence through the testimony of other witnesses. See, e.g., Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 684-85 (Fla.1995) (finding no error in the admission of hearsay evidence concerning the sequence of events and why the police focused their investigation on the defendant where the same evidence was admitted through the testimony of other witnesses). Dennis claims that Romagni's testimony was especially harmful to the extent it referred to Zemoria Wilson's purported corroboration of Stewart's testimony. During redirect Romagni testified as follows: Q. When you interviewed Joseph Stewart, other than the cell phone records, what other witnesses did you interview that corroborated what Joseph Stewart said? A. Zamoria Wilson, Bernadette Hard[y]. Although Dennis argues that this reference to Wilson, who did not testify at trial, was devastating because she was not subject to cross-examination, this isolated reference to Wilson was hardly the centerpiece of the State's case. Stewart's testimony was corroborated by, among other things, Dennis's cell phone records and the testimony of Bernadette Hardy and Deborah Scales. While we have cautioned against the admission of this kind of testimony under the guise of establishing the chronology of a police investigation, the instant reference to Wilson pales in comparison to testimony this Court has found worthy of reversal. Compare Keen v. State, 775 So.2d 263, 275-76 (Fla.2000) (finding reversible error in allowing detective to testify that insurance company investigation had concluded that, contrary to the defendant's claim, the defendant's wife did not die accidentally, but was murdered); and Wilding v. State, 674 So.2d 114, 119 (Fla.1996) (finding reversible error in the admission of a detective's testimony that the police began their investigation of the defendant after receiving an anonymous tip identifying the defendant as the perpetrator); with State v. Baird, 572 So.2d 904, 908 (Fla.1990) (finding error in the admission of a detective's testimony that the police targeted the defendant after receiving information that he was involved in the charged offenses harmless where the testimony was not featured by the State and there was independent evidence corroborating the testimony of coconspirators). Dennis raises a similar claim as to the testimony of Detective Clarence Poitier. During cross-examination the defense challenged Poitier's testimony that the evidence pointed to one, not multiple assailants. Eventually, defense counsel had the following exchange with Poitier: Q. Certainly whether there was one assailant or more, you do not know whether they [the assailants] were surprised by Mr. Little trying to enter the apartment, do you, for a fact? A. Based on the facts in evidence I've experienced in this case, it points to Dennis being there. After further examination, defense counsel finally got Poitier to concede that he did not know for a fact there were not multiple assailants. On redirect, the State attempted to ask Poitier what facts led him to the conclusion that Dennis committed the crime. The defense objected on hearsay grounds and the State argued that the defense opened the door to the inquiry. The court agreed with the State and the following transpired: Q. Detective Poitier, what are the facts that you are aware of that leads you to [the] conclusion that the defendant is the person that committed these murders? A. The fact that Joseph Stewart spoke to Detective Romagni. Q. Anything else? A. The domestic abuse history with the defendant and Ms. Lumpkins. Q. Anything else, Detective? A. Not that I could think of. As with the testimony elicited from Detective Romagni, we hold that any error in the admission of this testimony was harmless as everything the detective referred to on redirect was testified in detail by other witnesses: Joseph Stewart testified extensively at trial and evidence of Dennis's abuse of Lumpkins was admitted through the testimony of Lumpkins' friend Chaka Kahn Williams and her uncle Patrick McKeithan. Indeed the State's redirect cured any impression that the police had information the jury was not privy to as Poitier mentioned evidence the jury eventually heard. Lastly, although Dennis complains that Poitier's testimony amounted to an impermissible opinion as to guilt, he has not preserved that claim on appeal as he only objected on hearsay grounds at trial. See Jennings v. State, 782 So.2d 853, 862 (Fla. 2001) ([I]n order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.) (quoting Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982)). We do not find that Poitier's testimony reached the level of fundamental error.