Opinion ID: 777147
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Orr's Tort Claims Are Unsupported by Evidence.

Text: 70 The error, however, was not prejudicial. Orr's surviving tort claims fail for lack of evidence. These claims are based on BOA's alleged submission of disparaging information about Orr to the FDIC. However, there is no admissible evidence to support this claim. Orr's reliance on Bourdeau's deposition testimony in Exhibit B is unavailing because it is inadmissible hearsay. 71 Moreover, the record supports BOA's position. Orr admits in her deposition that she does not know with certainty whether BOA submitted disparaging documents about her to the FDIC. Castle and Underwood assert in their affidavits that they disclosed nothing about Orr to the FDIC. Further, the FBI agent who administered Orr's polygraph test said he did not disclose its results to BOA or anyone outside the FBI. 72 Orr's contention is further undermined by the Nevada Supreme Court's holding in Bourdeau, which suggests that information disclosed by BOA employees to the FDIC in its investigation of Orr's fitness to serve as an officer of Tahoe Bank would be subject to conditional privilege. BOA would not be liable unless it made the statements with actual malice, knowledge of their falsity, or reckless disregard for their truth. See Bourdeau, 115 Nev. at 266, 982 P.2d 474. 73 Orr has failed to establish that BOA made any statements about her to the FDIC. Nor can she establish that the alleged statements were made with actual malice, knowledge of their falsity, or reckless disregard for their truth. Orr's tort claims thus fail for lack of evidence. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (the moving party's burden to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact can be met simply by showing an absence of evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to[the nonmoving] Party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.); Beyene, 854 F.2d at 1181-82. 74 IV. There Is No Triable Issue of Material Fact as To Orr's Claims for Violation of RICO, the Sherman Act, and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act.
75 To maintain a viable private RICO action, Orr must establish that BOA engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398-99 (9th Cir.1986). Racketeering activity is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) as any act indictable under enumerated criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which criminalizes mail fraud, and 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which criminalizes wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B). The elements of mail and wire fraud consist of (1) a scheme or artifice devised with (2) the specific intent to defraud and (3) use of the United States mail or interstate telephone wires in furtherance thereof. See Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d at 1469. 76 Orr contends BOA engaged in a scheme to defraud the organizers of Tahoe Bank by submitting negative information about her to the FDIC in an attempt to prevent the formation of Tahoe Bank. However, Orr has presented no admissible evidence to substantiate this claim. Indeed, Orr cannot establish that BOA was ever in possession of her polygraph test results or the corresponding FBI memo that allegedly suspected her of criminal conduct. 77 Nor can Orr establish that BOA submitted negative information about her to the FDIC. The only evidence supporting this accusation is contained in Exhibits B and S, which are inadmissible hearsay. In the absence of evidence of a scheme to defraud, Orr cannot establish a pattern of racketeering activity. Thus, Orr's RICO claim fails. See Rothman v. Vedder Park Mgmt., 912 F.2d 315, 316 (9th Cir.1990); Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d at 1469.
78 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits [e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations. 15 U.S.C. § 1. To prevail under § 1 of the Sherman Act, Orr must establish that (1) BOA entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy, (2) which unreasonably restrained trade, (3) affected interstate commerce, and (4) caused her injury. 31 Compare Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir.1995), with Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1104(9th Cir.1986) ([W]ithout a showing of injury, plaintiff cannot recover.). 79 In her antitrust claim, Orr contends that BOA entered into an agreement with other banks in Incline Village to restrain competition by preventing the formation of Tahoe Bank, and that it accomplished this by submitting disparaging information about Orr to the FDIC. However, there is no evidence of an agreement among BOA and other banks in Incline Village to prevent the formation of Tahoe Bank. Indeed, Orr admits in her deposition that she is not aware of any such agreement. Moreover, Orr's reliance on Bourdeau's deposition testimony in this regard is unavailing because it is inadmissible hearsay. Nor can Orr establish a restraint of trade because the Nevada Banking Company purchased Tahoe Bank and opened a branch in Incline Village that became successful beyond [Orr's] wildest dreams. 80 Orr has failed to present any admissible evidence in support of her antitrust claim. To defeat summary judgment, she must respond with more than mere hearsay and legal conclusions. Kaiser Cement Corp., 793 F.2d at 1104. She must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (antitrust case). The district court's grant of summary judgement on this claim was therefore proper. 32 See Sicor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 81
82 The EPPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09, restricts employers from using, taking adverse employment action on the basis of, or disclosing information obtained from an employee's polygraph test. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2002, 2008; Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 968 F.2d 877, 880(9th Cir.1992); Veazey v. Communications & Cable, 194 F.3d 850, 858 (7th Cir.1999). Section 2008 of the EPPA prohibits an employer from disclosing information about an employee's polygraph test to anyone other than the following: (1) the employee or a person designated in writing by him, (2) the employer that requested the test, (3) any court[or] governmental agency ... pursuant to an order from a court of competent jurisdiction, and (4) a governmental agency, but only insofar as the disclosed information is an admission of criminal conduct. 29 U.S.C. § 2008. 33 83 Orr contends BOA disclosed her polygraph test results to the FDIC in violation of the EPPA. In support of her position, she relies on Exhibits B, X, and Y. However, none of these exhibits are admissible. Exhibit B is inadmissible hearsay. Exhibits X and Y are not authenticated. Orr's EPPA claim thus fails for lack of evidence establishing that BOA disclosed the results of her polygraph test. 84 V. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Orr's Request for a Continuance. 85 Orr contends the district court abused its discretion in denying her request to continue the June 6, 2000 summary judgment hearing because her counsel was in trial at the time and the FDIC had not produced certain subpoenaed documents. 86 We review the district court's denial of Orr's request for a continuance for an abuse of discretion. See Weinberg v. Whatcom County, 241 F.3d 746, 750-51 (9th Cir.2001); United States v. Shirley, 884 F.2d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.1989). There was no such abuse. 87 The district court had continued pretrial dates on two prior occasions. The final pretrial order set discovery cut-off for April 18, 2000 and the last day for hearing dispositive motions for June 6, 2000. It stated: No further continuances will be permitted. Given the discovery cut-off of April 18, 2000, Orr's request for a continuance to obtain additional discovery from the FDIC was groundless. Orr should have filed a motion to compel production of documents prior to the discovery cut-off. 88 Orr's request for a continuance due to scheduling conflicts was likewise devoid of merit because two previous continuances to pretrial dates had been granted. Moreover, Orr had notice from December 7, 1999 that the final day for filing dispositive motions was June 6, 2000 and that no further continuances would be granted. That Orr's counsel was in the midst of another trial on the day of the summary judgment hearing does not as a matter of right entitle her to a continuance. Orr lacked diligence as she waited for two weeks after being served with the summary judgment papers before seeking a continuance. Despite this, the district court gave Orr five days to cure the evidentiary defects in her opposition papers following the hearing. She failed to do so. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying Orr's request for a continuance. See Canada, 831 F.2d at 925-26. 89