Opinion ID: 1981116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ruling on business records.

Text: Menard identified exhibits 1, 2 and 3 as duplicate copies of the daily reports for October 1, 2, and 3, prepared by defendant in longhand and recovered from a file in the manager's desk in Sam's Self-Service Restaurant. Exhibits 4 and 5 were identified as spread sheets for September and October, 1974, used to chart and analyze basic data from the daily reports. Menard testified the spread sheet entries were made in the regular course of business by a bookkeeper under his direct supervision and occasionally were entered by him. Exhibit 6 was the October bank statement for McBluffs, Inc. When these exhibits were initially identified and offered, defendant received permission to reserve his objections. Following Menard's cross-examination defendant objected to exhibits 1 through 6 for the reasons that these documents are books and records of a business corporation and there has not been any sufficient showing to bring them within the admissibility rules of the Iowa law because they are still without sufficient foundation. They are hearsay. They are not binding upon the defendant without that foundation. After ascertaining from the witness these records were regularly kept in the usual and ordinary course of business, trial court overruled the objection. At close of State's evidence (defendant offered none) defendant moved to strike Menard's testimony and the above exhibits for the reason that in a criminal trial    under the provisions of Section 622.28,    it must be shown that any shopbook records were entered by the defendant himself, and if there is no showing to that effect, that evidence is inadmissible. Defendant cited as authority State v. Glaze, 177 Iowa 457, 159 N.W. 260 (1916). This motion was overruled. On appeal, defendant assigns as error that § 622.28, The Code, requires trial court to make more than a cursory examination of business record exhibits offered and where the record shows that the trial court failed to do so, reversible error occurred. As we interpret defendant's brief, he argues trial court, when overruling his objection, was required by § 622.28, The Code, to articulate foundational fact findings on the record to justify admission of the business records. Disregarding the patent inconsistency between defendant's objections below and the error he asserts here, it is clear exhibits 1, 2 and 3 were properly admitted into evidence. These daily reports were prepared by defendant and could successfully be offered against him as an admission without reliance on § 622.28, The Code. See State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Iowa 1973) and State v. Kidd, 239 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Iowa 1976) (adopting definition of hearsay in rule 801, Federal Rules of Evidence); Section 801(d)(2), Federal Rules of Evidence (A statement is not hearsay if    the statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own Statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity   .) Turning to exhibits 4 and 5, the company's spread sheets, we are satisfied the record made met the admissibility requirements of § 622.28, The Code. See State v. Fisher, 178 N.W.2d 380, 382-385 (Iowa 1970); State v. Anderson, 159 N.W.2d 809, 814 (Iowa 1968). Examination of the statute and these interpretive opinions confirms there is no requirement the record be in defendant's handwriting. The 1916 opinion relied on by defendant below, State v. Glaze, supra, involved records offered as an admission exception to the hearsay rule and emphasized the necessity of a personal involvement or knowledge of the defendant in the preparation or maintenance of the records. Glaze, supra, 177 Iowa at 471, 159 N.W. at 266. Of course, Glaze antedated adoption of our modern business records act in 1961. Acts 59 G.A., Ch. 288, § 1; State v. Hall, 259 Iowa 147, 160-161, 143 N.W.2d 318, 325-326 (1966). Exhibit 6, the bank statement received by McBluffs, Inc., presents a different issue. Menard simply testified this two-page exhibit was a bank statement from Council Bluffs Savings Bank covering the period October 1 to October 31, 1974, received in the company offices two or three days after the 31st of October. He testified the statement did not show the deposit for October 3rd business which was reflected on the daily report. This was not an instrument prepared by Menard or McBluffs, Inc. See State v. Jackson, 210 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Iowa 1973). There was no evidence the bank prepared the statement in the regular course of its business or that the methods and circumstances of its preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness. See § 622.28, The Code; State v. Fisher, supra, 178 N.W.2d at 382; State v. Anderson, supra, 159 N.W.2d at 814. This instrument was not admissible as a business record under § 622.28 if proper objection was raised. Was defendant's § 622.28 objection that the exhibits were without sufficient foundation legally adequate? We have held it is ordinarily incumbent upon the objecting party to lodge specific objections to enable trial court to determine the admissibility of the proffered evidence. State v. Berch, 222 N.W.2d 741, 745 (Iowa 1974). In Twin-State Eng. & Chem. Co. v. Iowa State Hwy. Com'n, 197 N.W.2d 575, 581 (Iowa 1972) we said [r]eversible error may not be predicated upon a general objection that no proper foundation has been laid for admission of evidence. A party objecting to the offer of evidence for this reason must point out in what particular or particulars the foundation is deficient so the adversary may have opportunity to remedy the alleged defect, if possible. See State v. Raue, 214 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa 1974); 2 Vestal & Willson, Iowa Practice, § 38.04, at 192. Defendant's objection failed to meet this requirement. These authorities also indirectly and adversely answer the subsumed contention defendant raises here, that trial court, on the record, was required to make affirmative factual findings the foundational evidence satisfied § 622.28. It is not the court's burden to exhaustively review the record in light of the foundational requirements, attempting to ascertain the undisclosed deficiency the objecting party may have in mind. It is the obligation of the objector to indicate with some specificity wherein the evidence fails to fit the foundational matrix prescribed by § 622.28. We hold the § 622.28 language that the court find certain foundational facts does not carry with it an obligation to spread those findings of record upon the occasion of every undefined objection the foundation is lacking. See State v. Anderson, supra, 159 N.W.2d at 814. Admission of exhibits I through 6 into evidence was not reversible error. III. Finally, defendant asserts as ground for reversal trial court's action in imposing the maximum sentence without a stated explanation or reasons. He contends this violated his due process rights under the United States Constitution, Amendment 5, made applicable to the states by Amendment 14, citing as supporting authority Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) and an article by M. Berkowitz,  The Constitutional Requirement for a Written Statement of Reasons and Facts in Support of the Sentencing Decision: A Due Process Proposal, 60 Iowa L.Rev. 205 (1974). We consider this issue although, with respect to State action, due process is safeguarded by the due process clause of Amendment 14 and not Amendment 5 of the United States Constitution. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 1256, 86 L.Ed. 1595, 1601-1602 (1942); Jacobs v. Chariton, 245 Iowa 1378, 1393, 65 N.W.2d 561, 569 (1952). The record discloses the sentencing court and parties had studied the pre-sentence report, which contained matters favorable to defendant and recommended probation. But the report also disclosed defendant's alleged threats to Sam's Self-Service Restaurant personnel who testified against him, and two previous larceny convictions, one of which occurred subsequent to his arrest on this charge. Defendant did not deny these incidents. Neither during the sentencing proceedings nor in its extended calendar judgment entry did trial court set out any reasons for selecting the sentence imposed. See A.B.A. Standards, The Administration of Criminal Justice, Appellate Review of Sentences, § 2.3(c), Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, § 5.6(i), (ii). At the outset it should be noted defendant does not rely on the usual abuse of discretion ground, nor the concept we should adopt the above A.B.A. Standards as a matter of sound policy. The majority of this court continues to reject these grounds, see, e.g., State v. Smith, 244 N.W.2d 325, 326 (Iowa 1976); State v. Peckenschneider, 236 N.W.2d 344, 346-348 (Iowa 1975), although agreeing an articulation of the rationale undergirding a sentence would assist both trial court and this court on review. State v. Horton, 231 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa 1975). Rather, defendant argues failure to assign reasons is a per se violation of his federal constitution due process rights. This concept was advanced in the special concurrence in State v. Horton, supra, 231 N.W.2d at 40-41, as a reason for adopting the standards. However, we do not find an adjudicated appeal in this jurisdiction where it was ever directly raised as an issue. Defendant's reliance on Morrissey, supra, is best understood by study of the cited article in 60 Iowa L.Rev. 205. The Morrissey court found minimum requirements of due process necessitated a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d at 499. The identical requirement was imposed in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-565, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2979, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 956 (1974) with respect to disciplinary action leading to a prison inmate's loss of good time. Although in its most recent decisions the United States Supreme Court has refused to accord the Morrissey minimal panoply of due process rights to prisoners in other circumstances, see Meachum v. Fano, ___ U.S ___, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d ___ (44 U.S.Law Week 5053, filed June 25, 1976); Montanye v. Haymes, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d ___ (44 U.S.Law Week 5051, filed June 25, 1976), the court did consider it significant, in upholding Florida's statutory death-sentencing procedure, that [s]ince    the trial judge must justify the imposition of death sentence with written findings, meaningful appellate review of each such sentence is made possible   . Proffitt v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2966, 49 L.Ed.2d ___, ___ (44 U.S.Law Week 5256, 5258, filed July 2, 1976). While the United States Supreme Court has invoked the constitutional due process requirement of stating reasons for actions in administrative proceedings, Wolff, supra; Morrissey, supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1022, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 301 (1970) and in juvenile court transfer proceedings, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1055, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 95 (1966), our research is in accord with that of the third circuit court of appeals: While there has been spirited debate on the proposition that a judge should enunciate his reasons for imposing sentence in every case, see Frankel, Criminal Sentences (173); ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences § 2.3(c), Approved Draft (1968), no federal court has yet held it to be a constitutional imperative. Washington v. Regan, 510 F.2d 1126, 1129 (3 Cir. 1975). Confronted with a closely related issue (whether a federal sentencing judge should be required to state reasons for finding a defendant would receive no benefit from treatment under the Federal Youth Corrections Act) the United States Supreme Court refused to address defendant's due process constitutional contention because it was not raised below. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431-432, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3047, 41 L.Ed.2d 855, 862, n. 7 (1974). As indicated in Washington v. Regan, supra, the concept of requiring reasoned sentences has fared poorly in federal courts. While articulating forceful public policy reasons for adoption of the rule, the second circuit, following precedent, refused to adopt this concept in an appeal which did not raise the due process issue. United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1172-1173 (2 Cir. 1973) (Such a rule would be `a powerful safeguard against rash and arbitrary decisions' at this critical stage of the criminal process where the defendant's liberty is at stake). Two months later, in United States v. Velazguez, 482 F.2d 139, 142 (2 Cir. 1973) the court reiterated from Brown its firm belief that a statement of reasons by the sentencing judge would be a most salutary practice but declined to impose the rule as a constitutional due process requirement. Based on a careful study of the language in the above decisions we conclude the United States Supreme Court will not, as a due process requirement under the federal constitution, impose on sentencing judges the same obligation to give reasons for their decisions that the court has required of administrative agencies and judges in other specified proceedings, however anomalous the result. So finding, we conclude the alleged error defendant asserts furnishes no ground for reversal. Defendant has not contended failure to assign reasons for a sentence violates the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution, Art. I, § 9, nor do we here express any opinion on that issue. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. MOORE, C.J., and REES and UHLENHOPP, JJ. concur. LeGRAND, J., concurs specially in the result.