Opinion ID: 186689
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: DHS's Asserted Power to Unilaterally Abrogate Collective Bargaining Agreements

Text: 121 The most extraordinary feature of the Final Rule is that it reserves to the Department the right to unilaterally abrogate lawfully negotiated and executed agreements. This is plainly impermissible under the HSA. If the Department could unilaterally abrogate lawful contracts, this would nullify the statute's specific guarantee of collective bargaining rights, because DHS cannot ensure collective bargaining without affording employees the right to negotiate binding agreements. The District Court's decision on this point is exactly right: 122 The Regulations fail because any collective bargaining negotiations pursuant to its terms are illusory: the Secretary retains numerous avenues by which s/he can unilaterally declare contract terms null and void, without prior notice to the Unions or employees and without bargaining or recourse. 123 Chertoff I, 385 F. Supp 2d at 25. 124 There can be no doubt that the Final Rule authorizes DHS to unilaterally abrogate any collective bargaining agreement that is negotiated under the HR system, not just those in existence when the Final Rule was promulgated. Indeed, the Government conceded this point, before the District Court, in its briefs to this court, and during oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 6-9 (Government counsel explicitly affirmed his understanding of the provisions in Subpart E as permitting DHS to override any collectively bargained agreement it enters, not just those extant when the regulations take effect.). We `give substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations.' Castlewood Prods., L.L.C. v. Norton, 365 F.3d 1076, 1082 (D.C.Cir.2004) (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994)). Accordingly, `the agency's interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' Id. (quoting Shalala, 512 U.S. at 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381). 125 As the District Court found, the Government's proffered interpretation of the regulations is consistent with the language employed in key provisions of Subpart E. An agreement negotiated pursuant to the HR system will not take effect if found by DHS officials to be inconsistent with Department rules or regulations. Id. § 9701.515(d)(1)-(2). Even if not explicitly disapproved, an agreement takes effect only if it comports with, inter alia, the Department's implementing directives and other policies and regulations. Id. at § 9701.515(d)(3). Most significantly, the regulations give DHS ongoing authority to render collective bargaining agreements unenforceable if an authorized agency official determines that they are contrary to. . . Departmental implementing directives. . . and other policies and regulations. Id. § 9701.515(d)(5). Moreover, in elaborating the list of management rights, the regulations state that nothing in [Subpart E of the regulations] may affect the authority of any management official or supervisor of the Department . . . to take whatever . . . actions may be necessary to carry out the Department's mission. Id. § 9701.511(a), (a)(2). Read together, these provisions permit unilateral abrogation of collectively bargained contracts. 126 In the Government's view, the provisions at issue represent a reasonable, and therefore permissible, understanding of collective bargaining. Congress required DHS to craft a HR system that is flexible and contemporary, 5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. II 2002), and the Government insists that DHS deserves deference in weighing those objectives in its efforts to ensure collective bargaining. The Government's arguments on this point are completely unconvincing, because they ignore Congress' explicit command that any HR system ensure that employees may . . . bargain collectively, 5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(4) (Supp. II 2002). A system that gives the Department a free hand to selectively vitiate collectively bargained agreements does not obey that command. 127 As noted above, collective bargaining is a term of art, defined in other statutory schemes, and DHS was not free to treat it as an empty linguistic vessel. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 233, 125 S.Ct. 1536. None of the major statutory frameworks for collective bargaining allows a party to unilaterally abrogate a lawfully executed agreement. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7102(2), 7103(a)(12) (2000) (federal sector bargaining); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) & (d) (2000) (private sector bargaining); 39 U.S.C. § 1206 (2000) (U.S. Postal Service); 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Fourth) (2000) (common carriers). Indeed, no statutorily mandated collective bargaining system that we are aware of dispenses with the premise that negotiated agreements bind both parties — no matter what the scope of bargaining was ex ante. Indeed, when pressed at oral argument, the Government could provide no counterexample. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 9-10. 128 The HR system embodied in the Final Rule has no antecedent, because it undermines the very idea of collective bargaining. Structuring collective bargaining so that labor and management meet to negotiate terms until they reach an accord or an impasse only makes sense on the assumption that each side's evolving bargaining position will reflect a series of tradeoffs that move the parties toward a mutually satisfactory end point. It is therefore dispositive that the HSA refers to collective bargaining — not merely consultation or notification — in describing the Department's obligations under § 9701(b)(4). When Congress intended to deny collective bargaining rights and provide only advisory roles to employee representatives, it used different language. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(4) (Supp. II 2002) (bargain collectively), with id. § 9701(e) (collaboration or consultation through meet and confer process), and 5 U.S.C. § 7113 (2000) (national consultation rights). 129 Finally, the Government's position not only defies the well-understood meaning of collective bargaining, it also defies common sense. As noted above, collective bargaining is a method of structuring the formation of labor contracts, and the notion of mutual obligation is inherent in contract law. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 3 (1979) (An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons. A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange performances.). To imagine that a system might ensure collective bargaining without imposing mutual obligations is simply bizarre. 130 We emphasize that our holding relates only to DHS's power to abrogate collectively bargained contracts executed pursuant to the HR system. The Unions do not contest the Department's authority to supersede labor contracts inherited from the previously independent agencies that now constitute DHS. See 5 C.F.R. § 9701.506(a) (2006). Our holding does nothing to undercut the Department's authority to exercise that power.