Opinion ID: 2270548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: modification of joint custody

Text: Largely because of divergent decisions from Kentucky's appellate courts, the issue of when and under what circumstances a joint custody arrangement may be modified remains unsettled in Kentucky. The opportunity to address the issue was first presented to this Court in Carnes v. Carnes. [40] In that case, the parties were granted joint custody of their children, the mother was granted the actual physical custody of the children for the greater part of the time, with the children to live with her, and the father was granted the right to have the children with him at reasonable times and for reasonable periods of time. Subsequently, the father successfully sought to modify joint custody and was awarded sole custody of the children. Although this Court, in upholding the trial court's modification of custody, recognized that the modification issue came within the purview of the general custody modification statute, KRS 403.340, [41] Carnes possesses scant, if any, precedential value as to the standard for modification of joint custody because the Court characterized the custody joint award in Carnes as being [i]n actuality an award of sole custody to the mother. [42] Because of this characterization, Carnes has been virtually ignored in subsequent cases addressing the modification of joint custody issue. With the ink barely dry on the Carnes decision, the Court of Appeals rendered Benassi v. Havens [43] a month later and squarely addressed the issue of modification in the joint custody context. In Benassi , the Court held that when joint custodians subsequently disagree, [44] modification should be made anew under [KRS 403.270] as if there had been no prior custody determination. [45] In the view of the Benassi Court, Kentucky's custody modification statutes, KRS 403.340 and KRS 403.350, [46] are applicable only to modifications of sole custody, and the Court held that a modification of joint custody came within the purview of KRS 403.270. The Court did not mention Carnes or cite to any authority in support of its holding; rather, the Court proclaimed that [a]s a practical matter, joint custody is no award at all when considering modification of the arrangement. [47] Benassi was followed three years later by Erdman v. Clements, [48] in which the Court of Appeals, citing Benassi , again held that, upon disagreement of the joint custodians, the trial court should conduct a de novo hearing to determine custody as if it had made no prior custody determination. Next, in Chalupa v. Chalupa, [49] the Court of Appeals addressed modification of joint custody in the context of an appeal from an award of sole custody and a denial of joint custody. The Court stated that [j]oint custody can be modified if a party is acting in bad faith or is uncooperative[,] and that [t]he trial court at any time can review joint custody and if a party is being unreasonable, modify the custody to sole custody in favor of the reasonable parent. [50] Thus, Chalupa appeared to change the standard for modification of joint custody from one of simple disagreement by the parties to one requiring a finding by the trial court that one of the parties is acting in bad faith or being uncooperative. Subsequent to the Court of Appeals's decisions in Benassi , Erdman , and Chalupa, this Court spoke to the modification issue in an appeal from a judgment granting joint custody. In Squires v. Squires , [51] we primarily addressed the appropriate use of joint custody, but also spoke to the problem of uncooperative joint custodians. In so doing, we indicated approval of Chalupa's statement that [j]oint custody can be modified if a party is acting in bad faith or is uncooperative[,] [52] and added that [i]t should not be overlooked that to achieve such cooperation, the trial court may assist the parties by means of its contempt power and its power to modify custody in the event of a bad faith refusal of cooperation. [53] Notably, however, we rejected Benassi's description of an award of joint custody as no award at all by declaring that joint custody must be accorded the same dignity as sole custody. [54] We therefore recognized that an award of joint custody is indeed a custody award just the same as an award of sole custody because both are custody awards under the same statuteKRS 403.270. Then, the year after Squires , the Court of Appeals once again addressed the modification issue. In Mennemeyer v. Mennemeyer , [55] the husband sought to modify joint custody because the wife, whom the parties had designated to have physical custody of the parties' child, intended to relocate with the child to another state for employment purposes. The trial court modified custody, but instead of awarding the husband sole custody as he requested, continued the joint custody arrangement, but modified it by transferring physical custody of the child from the wife to the husband. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, citing both Chalupa and Squires , reasoned that the trial court may intervene to modify a previous joint custody award only if the court first finds that there has been an inability or bad faith refusal of one or both parties to cooperate. [56] And, because the husband failed even to allege an inability or bad faith refusal of the parties to cooperate, the Mennemeyer Court held, that the trial court erred by modifying its joint custody award by changing the physical custody of the child from [wife] to [husband]. [57] Thus, with Mennemeyer , it appeared that the appellate courts had finally settled on the modification standard for a joint custody arrangement, i.e., first, a threshold finding of an inability or bad faith refusal of one or both parties to cooperate, [58] and then, and only then, evaluation of the need for modification in accordance with the best interest of the children upon consideration of the factors that are enumerated in KRS 403.270. [59] The issue's settlement appeared short lived, however. The following year, in Aton v. Aton , [60] the Court of Appeals, relying on Benassi and Erdman , ignored the threshold standard for modification only recently established by Chalupa, Squires and Mennemeyer and held that any time the joint custodians come before the trial court, calling the joint custody arrangement into question, the court should review the custody status as if no custody determination had been made, in accordance with the best interests of the child. [61] But, then, in several cases rendered after Aton , e.g., Stinnett v. Stinnett, [62] Jacobs v. Edelstein, [63] Briggs v. Clemons , [64] and Stroud v. Stroud , [65] the Court of Appeals returned to Mennemeyer's requirement of a threshold showing as a precondition to modification. However, after six years of faithful adherence to Mennemeyer , the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc in Scheer v. Zeigler , [66] conclude[d] that the approach of Benassi to joint custody was flawed and that it led to the improper threshold requirement of Mennemeyer .  [67] In support of its conclusion, the Court appropriately recognized Squires `s holding that joint custody is a form of custody: When the Benassi court held that joint custody is not an award of custody at all, that KRS 403.340 and KRS 403.350 do not apply to joint custody modifications, and that joint custody modification motions should be heard de novo in accordance with KRS 403.270, it ignored the reality that joint custody is, in fact, a form of custody. Not only has joint custody been awarded by courts as a form of custody for a number of years, but it has also been recognized and authorized by the General Assembly as a form of custody since 1980.... [T]he Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Squires ... recognized that so long as KRS 403.270(4) remains the law of Kentucky, joint custody must be accorded the same dignity as sole custody and trial courts must determine which form would serve the best interest of the child. Therefore, we conclude that Benassi was wrong in not recognizing joint custody as a form of custody. [68] Accordingly, the Scheer Court explicitly overruled Benassi and Mennemeyer and held that the standard utilized in connection with modifications in the sole custody context is equally applicable to modification of awards of joint custody: Rather than continue the flawed premise of Benassi and the subsequent efforts of Mennemeyer and its progeny to correct it, we overrule Benassi and Mennemeyer . We hold that joint custody is an award of custody which is subject to the custody modification statutes set forth in KRS 403.340 and KRS 403.350 and that there is no threshold requirement for modifying joint custody other than such requirements as may be imposed by the statutes. [69] Because, in Squires , this Court recognized that joint custody is on par with sole custody, we agree with Scheer `s holding that joint custody is itself a custody award and thus any modification must come within the purview of KRS 403.340 and .350. When the General Assembly amended KRS 403.270 to authorize joint custody, the statutes that governed the modification of custody were already on the books, and, because the General Assembly took no steps to enact additional statutes governing modification of joint custody awards, the legislature must have intended those prior provisions to apply equally to joint custody. In addition, we would also observe that the 2001 General Assembly amended KRS 403.340 to expressly encompass joint custody modifications, [70] and this subsequent enactment further supports the conclusion that joint custody modification is to be governed by the custody modification statutes. [71] To summarize, joint custody modification falls exclusively within the purview of KRS 403.340 and .350, and the previous judicially-created gateways to joint custody modification are inapplicable. Thus, joint custody is not subject to modification at the mere whim of a party or simply because the parties disagree as to a child-rearing decision. Nor is the lack of cooperation by one or both parties grounds for modification of joint custody unless it rises to the statutory level required for modification of custody under KRS 403.340.