Opinion ID: 1637489
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the judgment of fault divorce in favor of ann b. shavers and against john e. shavers is an absolute nullity due to federal removal.

Text: ¶23. John argues that the divorce judgment is invalid because, when it was granted on June 1, 2001, the matter had been removed to federal court, leaving the chancery court without jurisdiction. The matter was not remanded until August 17, 2001. This issue is without merit. ¶24. On January 2, 2001, John filed his Notice of Federal Removal in the federal court and with the chancery clerk. The federal court order remanding the matter was not issued until August 17, 2001. Additionally, on January 8, 2001, John filed an amended and supplemental notice of removal. However, it is clear from the notice and the pleading attached to it that John sought only to remove the attached Motion to Cite for Contempt of Court. Likewise, the amended and supplemental notice added only a Motion in Limine to Cite for Contempt of Court and a Motion to Lift Stay, which also relate only to the contempt proceedings. ¶25. Although contempt proceedings in divorce cases often are filed in the same cause number and proceed with the underlying divorce case, they are held to be separate actions, requiring new and special summons under Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 81. See Sanghi v. Sanghi, 759 So.2d 1250 (Miss.Ct.App.2000). This is further evidenced by the August 17, 2001, order remanding cases issued by the federal magistrate judge, which stated that removal proceedings were treated by the district court only in regard to the contempt and discovery issues identified in John's notices of removal and that they were remanded with John's agreement. ¶26. John's other actions in the proceedings in the chancery court during the divorce trial show that even he considered his removal efforts to be limited. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the removal petitions encompassed the divorce as well as the ancillary contempt matters, there is at least limited authority holding that by proceeding in the state court following removal, the defendant may waive objections to those proceedings. ¶27. In Mosher v. Conway, 51 Ariz. 275, 76 P.2d 231 (1938), Conway brought an action in an Arizona state court to quiet title to land. Mosher, one of the defendants, filed a general demurrer and a general denial. She also demanded a jury trial in open court. On the day set for trial, Mosher did not appear. Conway presented his evidence, and the trial judge instructed the jury to return a verdict for Conway. ¶28. On direct appeal, Mosher argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction because Collins, one of the other defendants, previously had removed the case to federal court. However, Mosher subsequently filed a motion to make the complaint more definite and certain. Later, she made demand in open court for a jury trial, and subsequently filed her answer to the complaint. Her motion for a new trial made no mention of the removal. ¶29. The Arizona Supreme Court stated that [o]n consent of all the parties the jurisdiction could, if lost, be resumed. If the court had no right to exercise jurisdiction over the case, good faith and fairness on defendant's part should require that she make some objection to the court's trying the case. Mosher, 76 P.2d at 233. The Arizona Supreme Court then held that the objection comes too late when presented for the first time in this court. ¶30. Although Mosher is not controlling in this Court, it is persuasive. The facts of the instant case strongly support a finding that John waived any such objection and is estopped from raising the objection in this Court. On May 29, 2001, prior to the district court entering its August 17, 2001, order remanding the matter, John and Ann submitted an agreement to the chancery court to consent to divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences and requested the court to decide controverted issues. The agreement expressly declared that each party voluntarily consents to the Court granting a divorce to the parties on the ground of Irreconcilable Differences and that each party hereby voluntarily consents to permit the Court to decide the issues upon which the parties cannot agree. (Emphasis added). ¶31. The trial proceedings lasted for several days with John present and represented by four attorneys. John offered motions in limine and to strike Koerber's valuation. His attorneys engaged in extensive cross-examination of witnesses, and at the conclusion of the trial, the parties announced a settlement which was approved by the chancellor. The settlement provided that Ann be granted a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and further disposed of financial issues. ¶32. By John's own actions, he confirmed that the federal removal was limited to the contempt proceedings. Further, the following colloquy between the trial judge and B.G. Perry, one of John's attorneys, verified the distinction between the divorce action and the contempt action concerning removal: THE COURT: If U.S. District Judge Bramlette will take this divorce trial, it will be a novelty and oh, it would be wonderful. MR. PERRY: Your Honor, we didn't send him the whole thing now. THE COURT: Oh, you sent him the contempt portion or tried to. . . . As stated before, there is no merit to this issue.