Opinion ID: 1468395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: failure of the atlantic city charter commission to comply with the sunshine law

Text: As the Appellate Division correctly noted, the trial judge found that each and every meeting conducted by the commission violated the Act, particularly N.J.S.A. 10:4-9 and 10, in one or more ways, including the failure to give adequate notice of meetings. This finding of fact is not disputed by defendants who concede that the vast majority of their meetings technically violated the Act. Thus, the only question remaining is the significance which should attach to these violations. The thrust of defendants' argument is that the Court should uphold the Commission's recommendation on the basis of its substantial compliance with the Sunshine Law. They assert (1) that there was no attempt to meet secretly or without some notice to the public, as found by the Appellate Division, and (2) that any meeting at which formal votes were taken complied with the Act, thereby satisfying the requirements of the law. Although, on these facts, we impute to the Commission no wrongful motivation for choosing to conduct its business as it did, lack of wrongful intent cannot excuse noncompliance with the Act. Such a reading of the statute would invite abuse and would contravene the legislative intent in enacting the provision. N.J.S.A. 10:4-15 specifies that any governmental action shall be declared void if the court shall find that the action was taken at a meeting which does not conform to the provisions of this act, .... Contrary to defendants' assertion that there is an exception to the Act where there is substantial compliance with its provisions, N.J.S.A. 10:4-8(d) spells out in detail what must be done in order to provide the public with adequate notice. Additionally, in place of the narrow exceptions to the law found in N.J.S.A. 10:4-9 (dealing with emergencies) and 12, see ante at 575, n. 8, defendants would allow a charter commission or any other governmental agency to disregard the dictates of the law whenever there would be substantial compliance. Rather than providing a new exception to the rule, we believe that defendants' suggestion would swallow the rule. Accordingly we reject this argument completely and hold that strict adherence to the letter of the law is required in considering whether a violation of the Act has occurred. Acceptance of defendants' final contention that we need look only at the notice given before the last two meetings  when the Commission took formal action  would undermine the entire purpose of the Act. This would allow an agency to close its doors when conducting negotiations or hammering out policies, and then to put on an appearance of open government by allowing the public to witness the proceedings at which its action is formally adopted. Such an interpretation of the statute would conflict with N.J.S.A. 10:4-15 (a) which provides that a public body may take corrective or remedial action by acting de novo at a public meeting held in conformity with this act. [Emphasis added.] Surely it cannot be realistically contended that the September 2 and 3 meetings constituted a de novo reaffirmation of the activities which had transpired at the previous meetings. Consequently, even assuming the Commission did comply with the Act at these last two meetings, [9] we do not believe that its actions were sufficient to correct the past violations which the trial judge found.