Opinion ID: 523229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Lawyers' Liability.

Text: 15 Since plaintiffs cannot bypass the provisions of CSRA and sue the union directly in district court, our inquiry reduces to whether they can sue the lawyers. Because the latter were engaged by and working for the union when they offered the challenged advice, we think them immune to suit. It would be equally as disruptive to permit plaintiffs to accomplish indirectly (by suing PATCO's lawyers) what Karahalios bars them from accomplishing directly (by suing PATCO). 16 The Court has long held that union agents are not personally liable to third parties for acts performed on the union's behalf in the collective bargaining process. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 247-49, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 1324-25, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962). This immunity obtains in contract or tort, or both, ... or in a separate action for damages. Id. at 249, 82 S.Ct. at 1325. More recently, the Court widened the embrace of Atkinson, ruling that damages immunity remained in effect even if the union had not authorized the actor's conduct. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 417, 101 S.Ct. 1836, 1845-46, 68 L.Ed.2d 248 (1981). 17 The policy which undergirds the Atkinson rule is straightforward. Congress was deeply concerned by the use of private lawsuits against workers as a union-busting device. 3 Consequently, in section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, Congress declared its view that only the union was to be made to respond for union wrongs, and that the union members were not to be subject to levy. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 247-48, 82 S.Ct. at 1324. With monotonous regularity, court after court has cited Atkinson to foreclose state-law claims, however inventively cloaked, against individuals acting as union representatives within the ambit of the collective bargaining process. See, e.g., Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1256-57 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122, 106 S.Ct. 1642, 90 L.Ed.2d 187 (1986); Universal Communications Corp. v. Burns, 449 F.2d 691, 693-94 (5th Cir.1971) (per curiam); Suwanchai v. Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 528 F.Supp. 851, 861-62 (D.N.H.1981). This principle has become so embedded in our jurisprudence that it brooks no serious challenge. 18 Faced with such a powerful line of authority, appellants concentrate most of their energies on a multifaceted claim that Atkinson is inapposite to the facts and circumstances at bar. They offer a handful of reasons, four of which merit decurtate discussion. 19 1. The CSRA Difference. Appellants point out, correctly, that Atkinson and its progeny were private-sector cases not involving government employees. That distinction, while true, cuts against appellants' position. Fair representation claims by private-sector employees are cognizable in federal district court because Congress, when it passed the labor statute giving rise to the duty, had not yet granted the National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181-82, 87 S.Ct. 903, 912-13, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (union member can maintain suit under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185 for breach of duty of fair representation). In the federal employee arena, on the other hand, the statute originally establishing the FLRA and granting it exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims not only established the duty of fair representation but also simultaneously constituted breach thereof as an unfair labor practice. Karahalios, 109 S.Ct. at 1287-88. Consequently, district courts cannot entertain federal employees' fair representation suits. Id. 20 Inasmuch as Congress decided that a public-sector union cannot itself be sued for unfair labor practices, it would defy logic to allow disgruntled union members to accomplish much the same result by circumnavigation. Compare Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 249, 82 S.Ct. at 1325 (national labor policy cannot be evaded or truncated by the simple device of suing union agents). To preserve the integrity of CSRA's statutory scheme, the Atkinson rule must fully apply in the public sector. The CSRA difference hawked by plaintiffs is a difference bereft of a meaningful distinction. 21 2. Absence of Damages Remedy. In a variation on the CSRA difference theme, plaintiffs complain that pretermitting their suit leaves them without any damages remedy. That may well be so. As we understand the statute, Congress intended (1) to shield unions from tort (or similar) liability for acts related to the collective bargaining process, and (2) to resolve complaints against unions through an administrative process. That injured employees might be left without a means of recovering money damages is a necessary consequence of the construct. Congress, in its wisdom, was fully entitled to prefer administrative enforcement to civil trials. 4 Cf. Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871 F.2d 166, 173-74 (1st Cir.1989) (in Copyright Act of 1976, Congress fashioned a right for which it ceded no corresponding damages anodyne against certain infringers; court will not imply one). As Justice Stevens has written in a kindred case: 22 The question is not what remedy the court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy.... That question obviously cannot be answered simply by noting that existing remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff. The policy judgment should be informed by a thorough understanding of the existing regulatory structure and the respective costs and benefits that would result from the addition of another remedy.... 23 Bush, 462 U.S. at 388, 103 S.Ct. at 2416-17. Performing the requisite analysis in this case leads to the inescapable conclusion that Congress intended to preempt state-law tort actions. 5 24 3. Lawyers Are A Breed Apart. Appellants claim that attorneys should not be considered union agents within the sweep of Atkinson. Yet, the single pertinent authority points in precisely the opposite direction. In Peterson, plaintiff sued union attorneys who, he claimed, had furnished inaccurate advice upon which he relied in pursuing a grievance against his ex-employer. 771 F.2d at 1251. The panel concluded that attorneys who perform services for and on behalf of a union may not be held liable in malpractice to individual grievants where the services the attorneys perform constitute a part of the collective bargaining process. Id. at 1256. 25 This result seems eminently reasonable. The appropriate test for Atkinson immunity ought not to be the actor's identity, occupation, or formal position, but rather, the role that he played. As the Ninth Circuit explained, one must essay a functional assessment. Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1259. It is not much in doubt that, ordinarily, an attorney is the client's agent within the traditional legal import of that term. See, e.g., Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir.1978) (in American legal system, an attorney is his client's agent and representative); Ampex Credit Corp. v. Bateman, 554 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir.1977) ([a]t the very least, a lawyer has the authority of any other agent); cf. LeBlanc v. INS, 715 F.2d 685, 694 (1st Cir.1983) (litigants are customarily bound by their lawyers' conduct). A union-retained attorney conducting strike-related business falls unarguably within that encincture. As in Peterson, the lawyer acts as an arm of [the] union. 771 F.2d at 1258. Where counsel has been delegated a function that often is performed by a union's business agents or representatives, id. at 1258, disregarding the Atkinson rule is not warranted or permissible merely because a union chooses to employ an attorney. Id. at 1259. Doctrinally, Atkinson fits this situation like a well-worn glove. 26 Furthermore, there are strong policy considerations which favor extending Atkinson to lawyers. In the first place, permitting malpractice suits whenever a union's legal strategies fail would inevitably impede the speedy processing and determination of industrial disputes. State statutes of limitations for legal malpractice are typically far more generous 6 than the six-month deadline for prosecuting unfair labor practice charges under CSRA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7118(a)(4), or the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b), or for bringing a hybrid action against both union and employer, DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2293, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). As the Court pointed out in DelCostello, application of a ... [three-year] malpractice statute ... would preclude the relatively rapid final resolution of labor disputes favored by federal law. Id. at 168, 103 S.Ct. at 2292. Appellants' approach, we fear, would likely resurrect workplace grievances long buried, transferring the battles to a tort arena and in the bargain upsetting delicate equilibria which federal law seeks to sustain. A long period of controversy and conflict can be a serious burden, both for the grievant and for the management, and can poison the relationship between the contracting parties that the contract was designed to establish and preserve. Communications Workers of America v. Western Electric Co., 860 F.2d 1137, 1142 (1st Cir.1988) (quoting Teamsters Union Local 315 v. Great Western Chemical Co., 781 F.2d 764, 766 (9th Cir.1986)). 27 Then, too, the negligence test employed in state-law malpractice actions differs materially from the federal-law test for unfair representation. Under the latter, plaintiffs must prove that a union's conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190, 87 S.Ct. at 916; see also National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 800 F.2d 1165, 1171 (D.C.Cir.1986) (Congress in CSRA adopted for government employee unions the private sector duty of fair representation). Allowing the action proposed here would create an anomalous situation in which certain union agents would be held to a far higher standard of care than the union itself. Such an outcome makes precious little sense. 28 Finally, the original concerns which led to development of the Atkinson rule remain salient here. Were disaffected union members allowed to sue the union's legal advisers, 29 the union attorney would often be the only defendant against whom a disappointed grievant could proceed. He would become the natural, and only, target in large numbers of what would normally be ... fair representation suits. 30 Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1259-60. Attorneys would be at risk for strike-related damages which in fact flowed from the union's political or tactical choices. This could, in turn, severely hamper unions in enlisting qualified representatives. By requiring that employees dissatisfied with union conduct proceed against the union alone (if at all), the Atkinson rule removes precisely this sort of threat to the collective bargaining process. 7 31 In fine, lawyers may be a breed apart--but for purposes of the Atkinson principle, they must be treated the same as other union agents. 32 4. Scope of Collective Bargaining Process. CSRA's definitions of employee, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7103(a)(2)(B)(v), and labor organization, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7103(a)(4)(D), exclude participants in a strike. Relying upon this language, appellants propound the following syllogism: (1) the federal collective bargaining process does not countenance strikes; (2) defendants met with union members solely to encourage and ensure that a strike would take place; therefore, (3) defendants' actions were wholly unrelated to the collective bargaining process. We think the argument brazen--the pot can scarcely call the kettle black. 33 That the ATCs' strike was illegal did not make it any less a collective bargaining activity. The measure was designed to put coercive pressure on management and secure the union's bargaining objectives. The strike climaxed a core dispute that gr[ew] out of the collective bargaining relationship, National Treasury Employees, 800 F.2d at 1170. No more was necessary to invoke the prophylaxis of the Atkinson principle. 34 We find controlling authority in Reis. The Court there held union members harmless from suit over a wildcat strike that violated the collective bargaining agreement and had not been authorized by the union. 451 U.S. at 415-16, 101 S.Ct. at 1844-45. The Reis Court left no doubt as to its rationale: 35 Congress deliberately chose to allow a damages remedy for breach of the no-strike provision of a collective bargaining agreement only against unions, not individuals, and, as to unions, only when they participated in or authorized the strike. 36 Id. at 416, 101 S.Ct. at 1845. (emphasis in original). In our view, Reis ends the matter, foreclosing the argument that Atkinson protection vanishes if illegal tactics are employed in a labor dispute. 37 Before leaving this subject, we add an eschatocol of sorts. Ex-ATCs, such as plaintiffs, stand in a singularly poor position to assert a right of recovery against lawyer-defendants for counseling the commission of an unlawful act. It was plaintiffs' union which masterminded the strike effort. See PATCO v. FLRA, 685 F.2d 547, 575-86 (D.C.Cir.1982) (reviewing evidence of PATCO's backing for strike). It was no secret that strikes against the federal government were illegal, see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. Sec. 3333(a) (federal employees must execute affidavits attesting that they will not strike against the government), and these suitors admitted in their complaint that they knew a work stoppage would be unlawful. The bad advice which the attorneys reportedly gave was that plaintiffs would probably incur no penalty for violating the statute because there is no way that the government can ... fire 15,000 air traffic controllers.... Appellants' Brief at 14. Thus assured that they could act with impunity, the ATCs, plaintiffs included, proceeded to flout the law. Having been caught in toils of their own construction, plaintiffs have little basis for asking us to poke a hole in CSRA's regulatory net for their aid and succor.