Opinion ID: 2087240
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Minnesota Antitrust Law

Text: Minnesota antitrust law is generally interpreted consistently with federal antitrust law. Minn. Twins P'ship v. State, 592 N.W.2d 847, 851 (Minn.1999). As the purposes of Minnesota and federal antitrust law are the same, it is sensible to interpret them consistently. Minnesota is not required, however, to abide by federal antitrust standing limitations. See Snyder's Drug Stores, 301 Minn. at 31-32, 221 N.W.2d at 165. The desire for harmony between federal and state antitrust law relates more to prohibited conduct than to who can bring a lawsuit. `The purpose behind both state and federal antitrust law is to apply a uniform standard of conduct so that businesses will know what is acceptable conduct,' but `to achieve this uniformity or predictability, we are not required to define who may sue in our state courts in the same way federal courts have defined who may maintain an action in federal court.' Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington, PLC, 206 Ariz. 9, 75 P.3d 99, 106 (2003) (quoting Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 446 (Iowa 2002)); see Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 446 (noting that the purpose of Iowa's antitrust harmonization statute was to achieve uniform application of the state and federal laws prohibiting monopolistic practices, not to define who can sue under state antitrust law); see also 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.14 (2d ed. 1984) (Federal courts have stated that state law of standing should be applied as to state rights   .). In 1984, our legislature added the words directly or indirectly to Minn.Stat. § 325D.57 to make clear that, contrary to Illinois Brick, Minnesota antitrust law permits indirect purchasers to recover. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d at 497; Hearing on Sen. F. 1807, Sen. Jud. Comm., 73rd Minn. Leg., Mar. 19, 1984 (minutes) (Statement of Steve Kilgriff, Assistant Attorney Gen.) (All we're saying is that under Minnesota law we recognize that indirect purchasers should have his or her [sic] rights to determine damages as well as the direct purchaser.). Minnesota is one of 25 states to enact such  Illinois Brick repealer statutes. Daniel R. Karon,  Your Honor, Tear Down that Illinois Brick Wall! The National Movement Toward Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer Justice, 30 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 1351, 1361 (2004). Eight other non-repealer states permit indirect purchasers to sue under state consumer protection statutes or under judicial construction of state antitrust acts. Id. Altogether, 33 states and the District of Columbia allow claims by indirect purchasers. Id. This court's only substantive discussion of antitrust standing since the 1984 amendment to section 325D.57 occurred in Philip Morris Inc., where we noted that Minnesota antitrust law contains an expansive grant of standing designed to protect Minnesota citizens from sharp commercial practices. 551 N.W.2d at 496-97. We held that Blue Cross, a nonprofit health services organization, had standing to sue tobacco companies under Minnesota antitrust law for increased health care costs due to the tobacco companies' conspiracy to suppress research on the deleterious effects of smoking and to manipulate nicotine levels in cigarettes in order to induce addiction in smokers. Id. at 491-92. We based our holding on the plain language of section 325D.57, stating that [i]t is clear that this expansive grant of standing reaches the injuries suffered by Blue Cross. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d at 496.