Opinion ID: 75949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: SeFPC's Motion to Intervene

Text: 50
51 SeFPC's members have contracts to purchase hydropower from SEPA. The contracts do not obligate SEPA to deliver a certain amount of hydropower to SeFPC, but instead are output contracts pursuant to which SEPA must deliver all of the hydropower available. SEPA receives its power from the Corps, which generates the power at Buford Dam on Lake Lanier. Under the arrangement between SEPA and the Corps, the Corps is obligated to deliver to SEPA the amount of surplus power generated. If less hydropower is generated at the Dam, the Corps delivers less hydropower to SEPA, and SEPA in turn delivers less hydropower to SeFPC. 52 SeFPC argues that it has a direct, substantial and legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit because if Georgia's water supply request is granted, it will diminish the amount and value of power that SeFPC members receive from the Buford Project, thereby reducing the value of the contracts those members have for power. SeFPC notes that Congress authorized the Buford Project for hydropower production and flood control, and stresses that the Corps must comply with the specific Congressional authorization in managing, operating, and administering the Buford Project. SeFPC argues that Congressional authorization of the Project, along with other applicable requirements such as the Flood Control Act of 1944 and the Federal Power Marketing Program, creates a zone of interest for preference customers, like the SeFPC members, that Congress has specifically identified as beneficiaries of the Buford Project's operation. If the district court were to find that municipal and industrial water supply is a purpose of the Buford Project, SeFPC contends, then the Project's hydropower purpose would be jeopardized. 53 Georgia argues that SeFPC's argument is foreclosed by Greenwood Utils. Comm'n v. Hodel, 764 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.1985). In Greenwood, we stated that § 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944, 16 U.S.C. § 825s, does not establish an entitlement to power. See id. at 1464-65. In reviewing Greenwood's claim that SEPA wrongly refused to sell it power, we held that the plaintiff never had a property interest in the subject power that would entitle it to due process. Even preference entities have no entitlement to federal hyrdroelectric power. Id. at 1465. Georgia contends that this holding establishes that SeFPC has no legally protectable interest in the litigation, because it has no legally protectable interest in the amount of power it receives from the Buford Project. 54 SeFPC concedes that it does not have a legally protectable interest in a particular amount of power from the Buford Project, but denies that a claim to a certain amount of power forms the basis of its motion to intervene. Rather, SeFPC wishes to intervene in the litigation to show that the only congressionally authorized purposes of the Buford Project are hydropower and flood control — in other words, that municipal water supply would be an illegal project purpose. The basis of its motion to intervene is thus to help the court determine whether municipal and industrial water supply has a right to the Buford Project's water storage, as claimed by Georgia, or whether hydroelectric production has a right to that water storage, as claimed by SeFPC. Thus, while preference customers may have no statutory entitlement to a specific amount of power, SeFPC argues that they do have a right to seek preclusion of unlawful uses of water storage that is used to produce hydropower, if those unlawful uses reduce the hydropower available for preference customers. 55 SeFPC argues that Greenwood is not applicable to this case because in Greenwood we found that there was simply no law to apply. There, we concluded that the Secretary of Energy had unfettered discretion to distribute and allocate surplus power among preference customers, so there was no legal basis for Greenwood's claim that it was wrongfully denied the right to purchase surplus power generated at the Corps' flood control dams. Greenwood, 764 F.2d at 1465. By contrast, according to SeFPC, where either the customer or the use of the water is unauthorized, there is law to apply, and the preference customers have a due process property interest in that hydropower and can challenge any attempt to reduce its availability. 56 SeFPC points out that in United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156, 73 S.Ct. 609, 97 L.Ed. 918 (1953), the Supreme Court held that preference customers had standing to challenge the issuance of a hydroelectric license to a private utility that would have precluded federal development of the project and the resulting availability of hydropower to preference customers. If preference customers have standing in cases involving the allocation of hydropower between preference customers and non-preference customers, as was the case in Chapman, then according to SeFPC, they must also have standing to challenge a reduction of hydropower caused by the allegedly unlawful use of the water used to produce that power. 57 We agree with SeFPC that this case is more closely analogous to Chapman than to Greenwood. While SeFPC may not claim an entitlement to a certain amount of power vis-a-vis other preference customers, they do have a legally protectable interest in the production of hydropower at the Buford Project. Since the granting of Georgia's water supply request would result in a diminution of the overall production of hydropower, we find that SeFPC has a direct, substantial and legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit. 58
59 Although the district court concluded that SeFPC did not have an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, it also found that denial of SeFPC's motion to intervene would not impede its ability to continue to negotiate with the Corps and to enforce its contracts regarding hydropower production or its ability to pursue its claims against the Corps in another lawsuit. 60 In the months prior to the case filed by Georgia in the district court, SeFPC sued the Corps in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the Corps had illegally allowed water withdrawals at Lake Lanier for the benefit of Georgia's municipal and industrial water users. See Southeastern Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, No. 1:00-CV-02975-TPJ (D.D.C. filed Dec. 12, 2000). SeFPC's suit is based upon the contention that water supply is not a primary purpose of the Buford Project and that the Corps is improperly operating the Buford Project. SeFPC thus argues that its ability to protect its interest could be impaired by the potential stare decisis impact of an decision in this lawsuit on the project purposes and operation of the Buford Dam. Georgia does not address this argument, but instead argues that SeFPC would have to address any claims arising out of the delivery of hydropower to SEPA, and SEPA is not a party to this lawsuit. Moreover, even if SEPA were a party, Georgia suggests that the district court would not have jurisdiction to hear SeFPC's claims against SEPA because disputes arising under contracts with the United States are to be resolved in accordance with the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. § 601, et seq. We find it unnecessary to address this argument because no contractual claims are at issue in this lawsuit. 61 In Chiles, we said that [w]here a party seeking to intervene in an action claims an interest in the very property and very transaction that is the subject of the main action, the potential stare decisis effect may supply the practical disadvantage which warrants intervention as of right. 865 F.2d at 1214. Because a final ruling in this case may adversely impact SeFPC's ongoing lawsuit against the Corps, we find that its interests could be impaired by the denial of intervention. 62
63 As discussed supra, the proposed intervenor has a minimal burden of showing that the existing parties cannot adequately represent its interest. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n. 10, 92 S.Ct. 630 (1972). SeFPC argues that the Corps cannot adequately represent its interest because it believes that the Corps has been illegally diverting water at Lake Lanier for the allegedly unauthorized use of water supply since 1986 — and, as noted above, has sued the Corps in another proceeding over the water diversions. Thus, it contends that the Corps cannot be expected, in this proceeding, to protect SeFPC's interest in ensuring the continued production of hydropower at Lake Lanier in accordance with SeFPC's view of the congressionally mandated project purposes. 64 Georgia replies that, whatever the relationship between the Corps and SeFPC in other contexts, in this proceeding their positions are identical: they both believe that Georgia's water supply request should be denied. As SeFPC notes, however, agreement on that conclusion does not mean that the Corps and SeFPC have identical positions or interests. The Corps seeks to protect its decision making process, whereas SeFPC seeks to protect the economic and statutory interests of its members. We do not believe that a federal defendant with a primary interest in the management of a resource has interests identical to those of an entity with economic interests in the use of that resource. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1207-08. Accordingly, we believe that SeFPC has met its light burden of showing that the Corps will not adequately represent its interests. 65
66 As a final matter, Georgia argues that SeFPC's motion to intervene should be denied because it was untimely filed. In determining whether a motion to intervene was timely, we consider (1) the length of time during which the proposed intervenor knew or reasonably should have known of the interest in the case before moving to intervene; (2) the extent of prejudice to the existing parties as a result of the proposed intervenor's failure to move for intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably should have known of its interest; (3) the extent of prejudice to the proposed intervenor if the motion is denied; and (4) the existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a determination that their motion was timely. Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213. However, we must also keep in mind that [t]imeliness is not a word of exactitude or of precisely measurable dimensions. The requirement of timeliness must have accommodating flexibility toward both the court and the litigants if it is to be successfully employed to regulate intervention in the interest of justice. Id. (quoting McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir.1970)). 67 Georgia contends that SeFPC's motion is untimely because SeFPC knew of the litigation and had copies of the papers in the case since February 2001, and did not move to intervene until August 2001, after discovery was largely complete and the parties had agreed upon a schedule for the briefing of the case. We do not believe that a delay of six months in itself constitutes untimeliness. See id. (finding motion timely when filed seven months after the case was filed). Although in Chiles we observed discovery had not yet begun, in this case SeFPC's intervention did not delay the proceedings and the court had yet to take significant action. Therefore, we do not believe that the existing parties will be prejudiced by SeFPC's intervention, and SeFPC would be prejudiced if its motion is denied. See id. Accordingly, we find that its motion to intervene was timely. 68 Because we find that SeFPC was entitled to intervene as of right, we need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in denying SeFPC's motion for permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2). 12