Opinion ID: 202779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guidelines Enhancement for Deportation After Conviction of a Prior Crime of Violence

Text: 49 This court reviews the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Alli, 444 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir.2006). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error. Id. 50 At Earle's sentencing, defense counsel objected to a 16-level enhancement pursuant to section 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, on the basis that Earle's prior state conviction was not for a crime of violence. Section 2L1.2(b)(1) provides: If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after — (A) a conviction for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence . . . increase [offense level] by 16 levels. The Guidelines in turn define crime of violence as 51 any of the following: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. 52 Id. cmt. n. 1(B)(iii) (emphasis added). The district court held that Earle had pled guilty to a state crime, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A(b), that had as an element of the offense the use or threatened use of physical force against another person. 53 On appeal, Earle argues that the December 1997 criminal complaint against him in state court did not charge a crime against a person, but only against an entity, the Commonwealth. He relies on language in the complaint, which stated that he did, by means of a dangerous weapon, MOTOR VEHICLE, assault and beat COMM OF MASS, in violation of G.L. c. 265, s.15A (emphasis added). 54 The parties agree that the approach used in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), is applicable to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. See United States v. Londono-Quintero, 289 F.3d 147, 151 n. 3 (1st Cir.2002) (applying Taylor approach in considering claim that a state conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony). 55 In Taylor, the Supreme Court held that a district court should follow a two-step analysis when determining whether a previous burglary conviction under state law qualifies as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). First, the district court should determine, based on the definition of the state offense, whether conviction under the state statute necessarily implies that the defendant has been found guilty of all the elements of generic burglary. 495 U.S. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143. If not, then the district court may consider the charging document and the jury instructions in determining whether the conviction was in fact for generic burglary. Id. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143. 56 In Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), the Court considered previous convictions obtained through guilty pleas and held that a district court, when considering predicate offenses under the ACCA, is generally limited to examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Id. at 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254. 57 We begin with the statutory definition. The version of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A in effect in 1997 contained two subsections. Subsection (b) set out the appropriate punishment for [w]hoever commits assault and battery upon another by means of a dangerous weapon. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A(b) (2000) (emphasis added). The statutory definition admits to no interpretation other than a crime that involves the use of physical force against another person. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Ford, 424 Mass. 709, 677 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (1997) (noting that, under § 15A, a defendant charged with assault and battery must have either used intentional and unjustified . . . force upon the person of another  or intentionally committed a wanton or reckless act . . . causing physical or bodily injury to another  (quoting Commonwealth v. Burno, 396 Mass. 622, 487 N.E.2d 1366, 1368-69 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 58 The dispute here is whether the district court erred in relying on the state statutory definition of the crime, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A(b), rather than on the face of the complaint. Although the criminal complaint technically charged Earle with assault and battery with a dangerous weapon against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the state court gave short shrift to the argument that the complaint did not properly charge Earle with a crime under § 15A(b). Earle, hoping to overturn his conviction, made this same argument before the state court, and it was rejected. As there is no indication that U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 contemplates collateral attack, we will not question the state court's conclusion that Earle was properly convicted under § 15A(b). Cf. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 491-93, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994). 59 The district court committed no error in applying the 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. 13 60