Opinion ID: 2590371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to Strike Jury Panel Member for Cause

Text: Ransom's last argument is that the district judge's refusal to remove Prospective Juror C for cause improperly [led] the jury panel ... to believe that [Ransom] was not entitled to the presumption of innocence. He does not accept the district judge's belief or the State's insistence that Instruction Nos. 1 and 10 cured any potential problem. The State also responds that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to remove Prospective Juror C for cause because: The panel member never stated that she could not follow the presumption; the district court clearly stressed the importance of the presumption to all the prospective jurors; Ransom's counsel, during a posttrial hearing, stated that he was not unhappy with the jury; and Prospective Juror C did not ultimately sit on the jury. The parties disagree on the applicable standard of review. Ransom urges us to employ a de novo review on a ruling he regards as a question of law. The State contends that we may not disturb a district judge's determination that a prospective juror is qualified to sit unless the judge has abused his or her discretion. The State is correct. This court has long held that a [district] judge is in a better position than an appellate court to view the demeanor of prospective jurors as they are questioned; thus, appellate courts review decisions on challenges for cause under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Franklin, 280 Kan. 337, 346, 121 P.3d 447 (2005). Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by a district judge, then it cannot be said that the judge abused his or her discretion. State v. Reed, 282 Kan. 272, 280, 144 P.3d 677 (2006). The party asserting abuse of discretion bears the burden of showing it. State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, 303, 173 P.3d 612 (2007). Also, [t]he failure to excuse a juror for cause is not a ground for reversal unless the defendant was prejudiced as a result. Franklin, 280 Kan. at 346, 121 P.3d 447. Ransom has not demonstrated an abuse of the district judge's discretion in refusing to remove Prospective Juror C for cause. Prospective Juror C did not say that she would be unable to presume Ransom was innocent; she merely acknowledged difficulty in doing so. The judge removed two other jurors for cause because they went farther than Prospective Juror C; they stated they could not presume Ransom was innocent. Moreover, the district judge instructed the jurors who actually were selected from the venire that [they] must presume that [Ransom] is not guilty unless [they] are convinced from the evidence that he is guilty. We are skeptical that the district judge's refusal to strike Prospective Juror C for cause could have caused any misunderstanding of the presumption of innocence among Ransom's eventual jury. But, even if we are wrong about that, the judge's other strikes and instructions would have remedied any problem. Affirmed.