Opinion ID: 2581379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Scope & Effect of Appointment of Guardian under UVGA

Text: [¶ 29] Having herein determined that the appointment of the guardian and conservator for the estate of Andrews took place pursuant to the UVGA, we must now address whether this appointment deprives Andrews of his ability to validly convey the property of his estate. For the following reasons, we hold that it does not. [¶ 30] In 1929, Wyoming adopted the UVGA found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-6-102 through 3-6-119. 1929 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 6 § 18. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-6-118 and 3-6-119 expressly state the manner in which the UVGA shall be construed, interpreted, and applied: This act [§§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119] shall be construed liberally to secure the beneficial intents and purposes thereof, and shall apply only to beneficiaries of the bureau. and This act [§§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119] shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. This court has had previous occasion to interpret and construe the scope and effect of the UVGA in Matter of Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028 (Wyo.1988). In that case we held: The Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act does not specify any grounds for appointment of a guardian. Such a guardianship is of limited effect and relates primarily to the receipt of veterans' benefits. The conclusion of the Veterans' Administration as to incompetency does not depend upon a finding of insanity which would justify an adjudication in state courts. Annotation, Constitutionality, Construction, and Effect of the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act, 173 A.L.R. 1061 [(1948)]. The ordinary procedural safeguards involved in the creation of guardianship are not required under the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act. Furthermore, the appointment of a guardian or conservator in this state does not constitute any adjudication of unsoundness of mind or lack of testamentary capacity. Section 3-1-201, W.S.1977 (1985 Replacement). We hold that the creation of a guardianship pursuant to the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act does not result in any presumption of insanity or lack of testamentary capacity, a conclusion that is supported by authority elsewhere. Morse v. Caldwell, 55 Ga.App. 804, 191 S.E. 479 (1937); Annotation, 173 A.L.R. 1061, supra, and cases cited therein. Id. at 1036-37. [¶ 31] We find no reason to now depart from our holding in Estate of Roosa as to the limited effect of the appointment of a guardian under the UVGA. On the specific point of whether the appointment of a guardian under the UVGA strips a veteran ward of his ability to validly convey property, we again turn for reference to Annotation, Constitutionality, construction, and effect of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, 173 A.L.R. 1061 (1948) and cases decided by other jurisdictions. The effect of the appointment of a guardian under the uniform act is very limited as compared with the effect of an appointment under the general laws. In view of the nature of the grounds upon which a guardian may be appointed, the appointment is not an adjudication that the ward is mentally incompetent. In fact, one of the purposes of the uniform act is to secure a simplified procedure for the appointment of a guardian without the expense and notoriety of an inquiry as to the veteran's sanity. Accordingly, the appointment of a guardian under the uniform act has been held not to affect the legal capacity of the ward with respect to various matters other than the administration of property received from the United States under veterans' legislation. Thus, the ward may conduct litigation in person, he may make valid contracts notwithstanding the appointment of a guardian under the uniform act ... 173 A.L.R. § 12 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). In explanation of the reference to the simplified procedure of the uniform act, the annotation clarifies: To some extent the procedure is simplified by the provisions ... concerning prima facie evidence of the necessity for the appointment of a guardian. [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-6-107]. To a larger extent the procedure is simplified because it does not involve an inquiry into the sanity of the beneficiary, which often requires a trial by jury, testimony by psychiatrists, and a protracted trial, although the beneficiary may convert the proceeding into a complicated one if he wishes to contest the appointment. Another factor simplifying the actual appointment is the fact that even a mentally incompetent beneficiary can ordinarily be made to understand that the Veterans' Administration will not make payments without the appointment of a guardian, and so he is not apt to contest the appointment of a guardian for the limited purposes specified in the act. Annotation, 173 A.L.R. § 12 n. 7 (citations omitted). See also 77 Am.Jur.2d Veterans and Veterans' Laws § 50 (1997). [¶ 32] We find this reasoning persuasive. In the instant case, we also take specific note that in order to set aside the appellants' warranty deed as invalid, it was necessary for the district court to reference Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-202. This provision is located within the General Guardianship statutes and provides: (a) A ward who is a minor or a mentally incompetent person for whom a conservator has been appointed does not have the power to convey, encumber or dispose of property in any manner, except: (i) By will if he possesses the requisite testamentary capacity; or (ii) As provided by W.S. 2-1-203(a), 13-7-202 and 34.1-4-405. No similar provision is found within the UVGA, and it would violate basic rules of statutory construction as well as the mandates of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-6-119 for us to herein judicially enact such a provision. [4] [¶ 33] Therefore, we hold that the district court erred as a matter of law when it utilized Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-202 to void the warranty deed granted from Andrews to Ethel Sheets and Blanche Wood. However, in so holding we do not in any sense imply that Andrews was competent to execute a warranty deed on November 25, 1998. Rather, our holding herein simply requires that, should the guardian and/or co-conservators seek to set aside the warranty deed granted to the appellants on the grounds of the incompetency of Andrews, they must do so in an evidentiary hearing consistent with this court's precedent on the issue. [¶ 34] Furthermore, the district court, though finding that the 1989 proceeding was a general adjudication, then decided that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-6-110(b) of the UVGA authorizes and requires the co-conservators in this manner to manage not only the assets of the ward derived from the Veterans' Administration, but any other property of the ward that may have been derived from other sources and said co-conservators have managed the ward's assets other than those derived from the Veterans' Administration pursuant to this statute and have reported lawfully and properly to this Court. While we presume that the guardian and conservators at all times were acting with the approval of the court, in Andrews' best interests in this case, and genuinely believed that their appointment authorized them to control the whole of Andrews' estate and further recognize that Andrews generally acquiesced in this treatment of his property by the guardian and co-conservators, we cannot agree that the UVGA grants a guardian appointed pursuant to it such broad authority. While some of the language contained within Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-6-110(b) may appear to grant the UVGA appointed guardian the option of administering property of the ward derived from sources other than the VA, this is not how this subsection has generally been interpreted in light of § 3-6-102(a)(iii) which defines estate and income as: The terms `estate' and `income' shall include only moneys received by the guardian from the bureau and all earnings, interest and profits derived therefrom. [¶ 35] We find the following reasoning of the California court in Estate of Vaell, 158 Cal.App.2d 204, 322 P.2d 579 (1958) referencing the annotation persuasive: As stated in the annotation on the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act found in 173 A.L.R., 1061, at page 1080: While the sections of the uniform act concerning the disposition of the `income' and the `estate' of the ward seem broad enough to include all income or estate, these provisions must be limited by the definitions of terms contained in section 1 of the original and revised acts. This view is strengthened by the facts that the original act requires an accounting only for moneys received from the Veterans' Bureau, that the revised act requires an accounting of moneys thus received and `earnings, interest or profits derived therefrom and all property acquired therewith,' and that the revised act also provides that where a guardian is accountable for property derived from other sources, the general laws of the state shall govern the accounting, and he shall not be limited to the compensation provided by the uniform act with respect to the management of such other property, although he may combine his accountings for both types of property in a single account or report. At pages 1077-1078: The effect of the appointment of a guardian under the uniform act is very limited as compared with the effect of an appointment under the general laws .... Accordingly, the appointment of a guardian under the uniform act has been held not to affect the legal capacity of the ward with respect to various matters other than the administration of property received from the United States under veterans' legislation. (Citations.) And on page 1079: Although it has been held that the uniform act is broad enough to authorize a decree giving a guardian control of all the ward's property, the better view is that the act deals only with property derived from the Veterans' Administration and the income of property acquired in whole or in part therewith citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, 201 Ga. 621, 40 S.E.2d 738; Morse v. Caldwell, 55 Ga.App. 804, 191 S.E. 479; Rentz v. King, 66 Ga.App. 292, 17 S.E.2d 896; In re Parks, 210 La. 63, 26 So.2d 289, 173 A.L.R. 1056, Borough of East Paterson v. Karkus, 136 N.J.Eq. 286, 41 A.2d 332; In re Farina, 253 App.Div. [A.D.] 510, 2 N.Y.S.2d 987, reversed on another ground In re Hewson [Farina], 279 N.Y. 780, 18 N.E.2d 865. As was said in Morse v. Caldwell, supra, 191 S.E. at page 484: What definition of `incompetent' is applied by the Veterans' Administration, in determining whether or not the condition of a hospital patient requires that a guardian be appointed to receive and disburse for him such benefits as he may be entitled to is not shown by the record. But, upon the issuance of the certificate by the Director or his authorized representative `setting forth the fact that such person has been rated incompetent,' etc., the court of ordinary may, upon a petition filed, appoint a guardian to handle the benefits due such person by the federal government. Except as to the relationship thus created for the special purpose named, it does not follow that the ward is not sui juris, and, with respect to his other property and purposes, entitled to assert for himself his full legal rights in and out of court. 322 P.2d at 583-84 (emphasis added). [¶ 36] The Vaell court ultimately concluded that because a guardianship under the UVGA was never intended as a substitute for the issuance of general letters of guardianship under the state's probate code, the lower court's order purporting to give the guardian care of the ward's property and estate was overly broad necessitating reversal. Id. at 584. [¶ 37] Upon examination of this issue, we find that the original purpose of the UVGA as enacted was to allow the Veterans' Administration a simplified procedure to ensure that recipients of federal funds were competent and capable of managing those funds. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-6-107 carries out this purpose by providing that the VA's rating of incompetency is to be prima facie evidence of the necessity for such appointment. Currently, however, the VA need not seek appointment of a guardian for one of its beneficiaries through state court pursuant to the UVGA but may appoint such a fiduciary through its own administrative procedures. [5] Nevertheless, in Wyoming if a guardian is appointed under the simplified procedures of the UVGA, it is undoubtedly a limited appointment. A proposed ward's incompetency is the issue to be decided through an adjudication of incompetency as a condition precedent before a general guardian or conservator may be appointed.