Opinion ID: 2441541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Warrantless Search of Pontiac

Text: First, Fultz challenges the trial court's refusal to suppress evidence found in her husband's Pontiac Firebird. Specifically, she argues that the search and seizure violated her federal and state constitutional rights. Notably, Article 2, section 15, of the Arkansas Constitution provides the same degree of protection as the Fourth Amendment. See Stout v. State, 320 Ark. 552, 557-58, 898 S.W.2d 457 (1995). When we review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances, and reverse only if the trial court's ruling was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Wofford, 330 Ark. at 17, 952 S.W.2d 646. As a general rule, searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established exceptions. Those who seek to prove an exception must demonstrate that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative and the burden is on that party to show its need. Fultz, 332 Ark. at 626, 966 S.W.2d 892 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (plurality opinion)). Moreover, when the appeal involves a challenge to the legality of a warrantless search and seizure, the State has the burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement. See Wofford, 330 Ark. at 17, 952 S.W.2d 646. Here, the State asserts that the officers were entitled to seize the Pontiac pursuant to the plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. When police officers are legitimately at a location and acting without a search warrant, they may seize an object in plain view if they have probable cause to believe that the object is either evidence of a crime, fruit of a crime, or an instrumentality of a crime. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 464-74, 91 S.Ct. 2022. Significantly, even if the police did not inadvertently discover the object, the seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Horton, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). Similarly, the Arkansas Constitution provides the same constitutional safeguards as the Fourth Amendment. Assuming that the police do not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place where the object can be plainly viewed, to justify a warrantless seizure, first, the object must be in plain view and its incriminating character must be immediately apparent. Second, the officer must be lawfully located in a place to plainly view the object and must have a lawful right of access to the object. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301. In short, inadvertent discovery is not a requirement of a warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view, and Article 2, section 15, of the Arkansas Constitution, is not violated merely because the discovery was not inadvertent. Given the evidence that two days prior to the officers' seizure and search of the car, Mr. Fultz admitted that he had used the car to transport methamphetamine from California and had paid for the Pontiac with drug money, the officers had probable cause to believe that the car was evidence of a crime and an instrumentality of a crime. Acting under the authority of an arrest warrant, the police were lawfully on the premises and in close proximity to the car at the time of arrest. Mr. Fultz's indication to the police that a gun might be in the car provides additional compelling evidence. The officers were then entitled to perform an inventory search of the car after having legally seized it pursuant to the plain-view exception. In sum, given the totality of the circumstances, the trial court's admission of the evidence seized pursuant to the Pontiac search was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.