Opinion ID: 1195356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Numerous bailiffs

Text: Defendant contends that the court violated his right to due process of law by permitting, in addition to the bailiffs normally assigned to the courtroom, the presence of additional armed bailiffs during the testimony of witness Jeffrey Bryant. At trial defendant objected to the appearance of three additional bailiffs in the courtroom during the in limine testimony of Jeffrey Bryant. The court conferred with one of the bailiffs, who explained that some silent communication between the witness and defendant's brother, who sat in the courtroom, caused him to order the additional security. The court noted that although it did not wish to provide excessive security, if the bailiff was of the opinion that additional security was necessary, the court would defer to the bailiffs decision. The court directed defense counsel to confer with the bailiff to resolve the difficulty. The following day, defense counsel objected that there had been extra bailiffs in the courtroom when witness Jeffrey Bryant testified, and asked that the number of bailiffs be reduced. Counsel noted that only a few of defendant's friends and relatives were attending the trial, and that because they had passed through the metal detector, they posed no danger. The court observed that the number of bailiffs fluctuated between three and four, that three was the bare minimum at a joint trial of two incarcerated defendants, that sometimes it was the presence of certain spectators rather than the identity of the witness that prompted additional security, that some of the bailiffs were not visible to the jury, that the presence of an additional bailiff was innocuous, and that there was no armed camp atmosphere, but on the contrary a low-key atmosphere had been preserved. Contrary to defendant's contentions, no abuse of discretion or abrogation of judicial authority over courtroom security appears. We have explained that pursuant to United States Supreme Court authority, the use of identifiable security guards in the courtroom during a criminal trial is not inherently prejudicial, in large part because such a presence is seen by jurors as ordinary and expected and because of the many nonprejudicial inferences to be drawn from the presence of such security personnel. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 114-115, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) We examine on a case-by-case basis the question whether a defendant actually has been prejudiced by the presence of security officers. ( Id. at p. 115, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) No prejudice appears in the present case. The record reflects that at least three officers were the minimum number sufficient to provide security in a joint trial of two incarcerated defendants, particularly when one officer was needed to attend to the metal detector. Some of the officers were not visible to the jury, and the court noted for the record that the atmosphere in the courtroom was not one of an armed camp, but on the contrary was relatively relaxed. There is no indication that defendant was prejudiced by the occasional presence of one or two uniformed bailiffs beyond the number constituting the bare minimum necessary to provide security. The court's extended comments on the record indicate that it did not abrogate its authority over the matter of security. Based on the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion or deprive the defendant of due process of law in regulating the number of security personnel present in the courtroom.