Opinion ID: 885953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 24 Did the District Court properly deny Tichenor's motion to dismiss the felony stalking count? ¶ 25 Tichenor argues that there should have been only one count of misdemeanor stalking and that his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated when he was charged and convicted twice for the same offense. He also contends that if he did commit two stalking offenses, they were both misdemeanor offenses. Finally, Tichenor contends that the facts that gave rise to the second stalking count happened before the facts that gave rise to the first stalking count, therefore, there could not have been a second or subsequent offense that would constitute a felony charge. ¶ 26 County attorneys in Montana are charged with a duty to conduct, on the State's behalf, all prosecutions for public offenses. Section 7-4-2716(1), MCA. In discharging that duty, a county attorney has broad discretion to determine whether to prosecute an offender and what offense to charge. State ex rel. Fletcher v. District Court (1993), 260 Mont. 410, 414-15, 859 P.2d 992, 995. ¶ 27 We agree with the State that the prosecutor properly exercised her discretion in charging two counts of stalking as the evidence supported two distinct charges. Stalking is defined as follows: (1) A person commits the offense of stalking if the person purposely or knowingly causes another person substantial emotional distress or reasonable apprehension of bodily injury or death by repeatedly: (a) following the stalked person; or (b) harassing, threatening, or intimidating the stalked person, in person or by phone, by mail, or by other action, device, or method. Section 45-5-220, MCA. ¶ 28 Shortly after Tichenor's arrest on November 4, 1999, on the charges of burglary and partner or family member assault, Judge Jewell ordered Tichenor not to have any contact with Nall. Yet, between November 11 and November 16, 1999, Tichenor's cell phone records showed that he called Nall a total of 69 times. Tichenor committed a second offense of stalking when, following his arrest on November 23, 1999, for violating the first no-contact order, he was again ordered by Judge Jewell not to have any contact with Nall, yet he repeatedly harassed her by phone and by mail from the county jail. The acts committed from the jail were aimed not only at Nall, but at her daughter as some of the mail was directed to Nall's daughter. Given the fact that Tichenor violated two separate orders issued by Judge Jewell, the fact that Tichenor's November 23, 1999 arrest was a break in his course of conduct, and the fact that Tichenor now included a second individual in his harassment, Nall's daughter, we hold that the prosecutor acted within her discretion in charging two offenses, as opposed to one. ¶ 29 Tichenor also argues that under § 46-11-410(2)(e), MCA, he cannot be convicted of more than one offense if that offense is defined to prohibit a continuing course of conduct. He maintains that the term repeatedly in the stalking statute is the same as the phrase continuing course of conduct in § 46-11-410, MCA, thus he could only be charged with one count of stalking for his numerous phone calls to Nall. ¶ 30 However, Tichenor's argument raising § 46-11-410, MCA, is being raised for the first time on appeal. It is well settled that this Court will not review issues raised for the first time on appeal and we will not hold a district court in error where the court was never given an opportunity to correct itself. State v. Baker, 2000 MT 307, ¶¶ 29-30, 302 Mont. 408, ¶¶ 29-30, 15 P.3d 379, ¶¶ 29-30; State v. Weeks (1995), 270 Mont. 63, 85, 891 P.2d 477, 490. Moreover, objecting parties must make the basis and grounds for their objection clear to the court. Baker, ¶¶ 29-30; Weeks, 270 Mont. at 85, 891 P.2d at 490. And, the objection must be specific enough to inform the court or the prosecutor of the issue. See State v. McKeon (1997), 282 Mont. 397, 408-09, 938 P.2d 643, 649-50. Having failed to reference § 46-11-410, MCA, in the District Court, Tichenor is barred from relying upon that statute as a basis of error. ¶ 31 Tichenor next argues that if he did indeed commit two offenses, they were both misdemeanor offenses and the felony charge must be dismissed. On the contrary, by identifying the second count of stalking as a felony, the State gave Tichenor notice that if he were convicted of both counts, the second count would be treated as a felony for sentencing purposes. See § 45-5-220(3), MCA. Whether a person has committed a prior offense of stalking is a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense of stalking. See Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (holding that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Baker, 2000 MT 235, 301 Mont. 323, 8 P.3d 817 (holding that age factor in sexual assault statute pertains only to sentencing and is not an element of the offense). ¶ 32 In opposing Tichenor's motion to dismiss, the State noted that if Tichenor were convicted of only one offense of stalking, he would receive a misdemeanor penalty, but that if he were convicted of both offenses, he would be sentenced for both a misdemeanor and a felony. Consequently, once the jury convicted Tichenor of both offenses, it was then proper for the District Court to sentence him to a felony on the second offense pursuant to the sentencing provisions of § 45-5-220(3), MCA: For the first offense, a person convicted of stalking shall be imprisoned in the county jail for a term not to exceed 1 year or fined an amount not to exceed $1,000, or both. For a second or subsequent offense... the offender shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term not to exceed 5 years or fined an amount not to exceed $10,000, or both. Hence, if the jury failed to convict Tichenor on one of the stalking counts, the District Court would have been precluded from imposing a felony sentence. ¶ 33 Tichenor also maintains that the second stalking charge should have been dismissed because there was no prior conviction upon which to base the felony charge. However, § 45-5-220, MCA, does not require that there be a prior conviction before the offender receives a felony sentence. Rather, the statute refers to a second or subsequent offense.  ¶ 34 Tichenor's final argument on this issue is that since the facts giving rise to Count VI (calling Nall from his cell phone) took place prior to those giving rise to Count V (calling Nall from jail), Count VI could not have been a second or subsequent offense requiring a felony sentence. This argument lacks merit. The jury convicted Tichenor of two counts of stalking and the judge sentenced the second count as a felony. The order in which the stalking counts were listed on the Information and on the verdict form is irrelevant, the fact remains that Tichenor was convicted of two counts of stalking. ¶ 35 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err in denying Tichenor's motion to dismiss the felony stalking count.