Opinion ID: 1444447
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: a prescriptive easement exists in favor of the walkers and the martin group under the traditional claim of right theory.

Text: The elements necessary for establishing a prescriptive easement include `reasonably clear and convincing' proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use, under a claim of right, with the knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement, for the prescriptive period of five years. West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973) (citations omitted); I.C. § 5-203. The term under a claim of right means use without recognition of the rights of the owner of the servient estate. West, 95 Idaho at 557, 511 P.2d at 1333. The only element in dispute is whether use of the road across the Hollingers' property by the Walkers and the Martin Group was adverse, or under a claim of right. The Hollingers argue that when the Walkers and the Martin Group purchased their respective lots in the Wilderness Ranch Subdivisions, they were given permission by the subdivision developers to use the road across the Hollingers' property as a secondary means of access. Thus, they claim use of the road was not adverse. The district court disagreed with the Hollingers, holding that use of the road was made under a claim of right and, therefore, gave rise to a prescriptive right in favor of the Walkers and the Martin Group. In making its ruling, the district court relied on the intended but imperfectly created servitude theory first set forth in a tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Property. Under this theory, a prescriptive easement arises whenever the property owner and the user intend to create a servitude but fail to comply with a formal requirement imposed by law for creation of the servitude. Observance of the terms of the servitude for the prescriptive period substitutes for compliance with the required formality because it provides satisfactory proof of the existence and terms of the servitude and resolves any doubts as to the parties' intent that may have been created by their failure to comply with the formality. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 2.17 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1993). The Hollingers argue that the Restatement's theory is not the current law in Idaho, and even if it were, the facts in the record do not establish such an easement. It is not necessary to decide whether the Restatement's theory is the current law in Idaho, because the Court concludes that a prescriptive easement exists in favor of the Walkers and the Martin Group according to existing Idaho case law. As previously noted, a prescriptive right cannot be acquired if permission to use the land was given by virtue of a mere revocable license. West, 95 Idaho at 557, 511 P.2d at 1333. However, an oral grant of a permanent right to use one's land, supported by valuable consideration, can give rise to a prescriptive right. See Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 152 P.2d 585 (1944). In Checketts, a landowner orally agreed that the plaintiff, Checketts, could construct a waterhole and right of way for passage of his livestock to the waterhole on his property for consideration of $100. The defendant, who later purchased the servient estate, claimed that Checketts' use was permissive and, thus, he had not acquired a prescriptive right. Id. at 719-20, 152 P.2d at 586-87. The Checketts court disagreed, holding that because Checketts' use of the land was made pursuant to an express agreement, which was supported by consideration, his use of the land was based upon a claim of right. Id. at 720-21, 152 P.2d at 587. The Checketts court also held that once Checketts had expended money and labor in constructing the waterhole and fences around the right of way, after obtaining the grant, his rights became irrevocable. Id. at 721, 152 P.2d at 587. Because the evidence showed that Checketts' use had been open, continuous, and uninterrupted for the prescriptive period, and the defendant had failed to meet his burden of showing that the use was permissive, the Court ruled that a prescriptive easement existed in favor of Checketts. Id. The principle applied in Checketts was more recently explained in Lee v. Lozier, 88 Wash.App. 176, 945 P.2d 214 (Wash.Ct.App. 1997). In Lee, the court addressed the issue of whether certain subdivision residents owned a prescriptive easement over a dock which was located on the property of a neighboring lot owner. In determining whether use of the dock was adverse, the Lee court noted: The important question is whether the landowner permitted the use as a mere revocable license or whether an oral grant of a permanent right to use the property was intended. ... .... ... [T]he presence of consideration is helpful in determining whether the property owner intended to grant a permanent right or merely a revocable license to use the property. Id. at 218 (quoting and citing Washburn v. Esser, 9 Wash.App. 169, 511 P.2d 1387 (Wash.Ct.App.1973)). At the time the dock was built, the owner of the servient estate, Fogleman, had orally agreed to allow the subdivision residents to use a portion of the dock. Id. at 216. Fogleman had promised to record a letter memorializing his agreement, but he never did. Noting that the subdivision residents had not acquired a legal right to use the dock because no easement (or letter) was ever recorded, the court concluded that Fogleman's promise to record the letter indicated an intent to grant a permanent, irrevocable right to the subdivision residents. Id. at 218. The court stated: `When the owner of a servient estate confers upon another the right to use that property as if it had been legally conveyed, the resultant use is made under a claim of right, rather than by permission.' Id. (quoting Crescent Harbor Water Co. v. Lyseng, 51 Wash.App. 337, 753 P.2d 555, 558 (Wash.Ct. App.1988)). The court also indicated that, because the subdivision residents had shared the cost of building and improving the dock, it was satisfied that the subdivision residents were operating under a permanent right to use the dock. Id. at 218-19. The court ultimately concluded that use of the dock was based upon a claim of right and that a prescriptive easement existed in favor of the subdivision residents. In the present case, there is substantial evidence that the subdivision developers intended to convey a permanent right, and not a mere revocable license, to the Walkers and the Martin Group to use the road across the Hollingers' property. The subdivisions' Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC & Rs) state: The Daggett Creek Road[, a portion of which crosses what is now the Hollingers' property,] shall be used only as a secondary or emergency means of access. Identical language is found in the notes to the subdivisions' plat map. A copy of the CC & Rs and the plat map were given to all prospective purchasers of the lots in the subdivisions. The Walkers and the Martin Group testified that they interpreted the language in the CC & Rs and the notes to the plat as conveying a permanent right to them to use the road over the Hollingers' property as a secondary means of access to their property. Believing they had a permanent right to use the road, the Walkers and the Martin Group paid their homeowners' association dues, which, in part, were used to continuously maintain and repair the road across the Hollingers' property. Substantial improvements made to land in reliance on a right to use the land is evidence that use of the land is not merely permissive. Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 523, 365 P.2d 952, 957 (1961). See Checketts, 65 Idaho at 721, 152 P.2d at 587. Additional evidence of an intent to grant a permanent right can be found in the testimony of Myrl Schroeder, an officer and director of the general partner in Wilderness Ranch, Ltd. (the subdivision developers). Schroeder testified that, from the start of development, the developers intended the road across the Hollingers' property to be used as an alternate means of access to the subdivision. He also testified that the developers intended that the lot owners have a right to use the road across the Hollingers' property, but admitted that the developers had never specifically given the lot owners permission to use the road. Finally, the Hollingers have not presented any evidence to suggest that the Walkers' and the Martin Group's right to use the road was only a temporary right, revocable at any time by the subdivision developers. The evidence is clear and undisputed. A representative of the subdivision developers testified that the developers intended that the lot owners have a right to use the road across the Hollingers' property. The subdivisions' CC & Rs confirm this statement. The inclusion of the reference in the CC & Rs to use of the road is a clear indication that a permanent right was intended, not a temporary permissive right subject to revocation. The lot owners relied upon the representation that they would have the right to use the road across the Hollingers' property by paying the purchase price for their respective lots and by expending money to maintain the road. Based on the evidence presented, this Court concludes that use of the road across the Hollingers' property was made under a claim of right and, thus, gave rise to a prescriptive right in favor of the Walkers and the Martin Group. Because use of the road was also open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted, and made with the knowledge of the owner of the servient estate for the prescriptive period, the Court concludes that a prescriptive easement exists in favor of the Walkers and the Martin Group and that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.