Opinion ID: 1433768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing: Constitutional and Prudential Components

Text: The question of standing involves a consideration of whether a plaintiff has asserted a legal basis on which a claim for relief can be predicated. Board of County Comm'rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assoc., 830 P.2d 1045, 1052 (Colo.1992). Standing therefore is that concept of justiciability that is concerned with whether a particular person may raise legal arguments or claims. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1950, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) (no justiciable controversy is presented when there is no standing to maintain the action).
As we have previously held, the constitutional requirements for standing, and hence, exercise of the judicial power of government, are set forth in the two-step test announced in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977). The Wimberly test of standing is satisfied if: (1) the plaintiff was injured in fact; and (2) that injury was to a legal right protected by statutory provisions which allegedly have been violated. See Wimberly, 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. The existence of standing necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of our courts depends upon a showing that the action complained of has caused or threatens to cause injury to an interest protected by law. See Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 516 (Colo.1985). The first step, the injury in fact requirement, is derived from the state constitutional limitation on judicial power requiring the presence of an actual controversy, which is demonstrated by a real injury. Douglas County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Public Util. Comm'n, 829 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Colo.1992) (citing Colo. Const. art. VI, § 1; Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1323). The second step requires that a plaintiff show that its interest is derived from a recognized legal interest, such as a statute, creating a legally cognizable interest that is concrete and particularized. See Douglas County, 829 P.2d at 1309.
Our standing inquiry, however, involves both constitutional and judge-made prudential considerations. Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317, 1324 (Colo.1989) (citing Lamm, 700 P.2d at 515-16). In addition to the two-part standing test set out in Wimberly, prudential considerations follow the general rule that counties do not have standing to obtain judicial review of a decision of a superior state agency. Id. (citing Lamm v. Barber, 192 Colo. 511, 519, 565 P.2d 538, 544 (1977)). This judge-made prudential rule exists so that courts do not unnecessarily intrude into matters which are more properly committed to resolution in another branch of government. See Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1323 ([W]e have concluded that absent contrary statutory authority, disputes between a subordinate and a superior state agency are properly to be resolved within the executive branch without resort to judicial review.). This is particularly apparent in a dispute between two executive agencies involving intra-agency relationships. That is, standing does not exist unless, of course, the legislature has exercised its prerogative to grant to the subsidiary agency by an express statutory right the ability to sue a superior agency. See Martin v. District Court, 191 Colo. 107, 109, 550 P.2d 864, 866 (1976). The rule of Martin, in essence, represents our considered judgment of twenty years, as evinced in our precedent, see Martin, 191 Colo. at 109, 550 P.2d at 866; Barber, 192 Colo. at 519, 565 P.2d at 544; Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1323; Douglas County, 829 P.2d at 1309-10, that we leave to the General Assembly the answer to the question that controls our deliberations today: whether we acknowledge the right to judicial review as an attribute of any subordinate agency. Thus, without a plain and unmistakable expression of such intent by the legislature, the judiciary will not expand the rights of a subordinate agency to include the right to obtain judicial review of the actions of a superior agency. In other words, without an express statutory right to secure judicial intervention, we assume that any intra-agency dispute is better saved for determination through the political, and not judicial, process. In that regard, we find wisdom in our precedent and practice that defers to the political process the protection of an alleged right or interest that may not be properly determined here but left to our sister branches of government. Hence, until the General Assembly speaks otherwise, the intra-agency dispute is not one suitable for resolution by the courts and, prudently, is not justiciable. We recognize in our judge-made rule, of course, that where the General Assembly expressly provides that a subordinate agency may seek judicial review of the actions of a superior state agency, standing does exist. This is so where a statute explicitly confers a right upon a subordinate agency to seek judicial review of the superior agency decision. See Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1323; Martin, 191 Colo. at 109, 550 P.2d at 866. In Maurer, we highlighted that both tests apply to the standing analysis where a subordinate agency sues the state: The rule of Martin is a specialized one that operates to preclude standing in certain instances where we have concluded that absent contrary statutory authority, disputes between a subordinate and a superior state agency are properly to be resolved within the executive branch without resort to judicial review. However, in order to establish standing, a plaintiff must still demonstrate that she satisfies the requirements of the general standing analysis developed in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977). Maurer, 779 P.2d at 1323. Therefore, in a case like the one before us, involving a subordinate agency seeking review of the action of a superior agency, we apply both tests for standing: the two-part inquiry as enunciated in Wimberly, and the rule of Martin.