Opinion ID: 785301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appeal of Cruz-Mercado

Text: 6 Cruz asserts generally that, in light of his substantial assistance to the government, he is entitled to be sentenced in accordance with his plea agreement. Presumably recognizing that the district court was not bound by the agreement, he particularizes that contention by identifying three specific flaws in his sentencing: (1) he was improperly denied a downward departure for substantial assistance; (2) his sentence should not have been calculated based on the total loss alleged in the indictment, $4.3 million; and (3) the court made several statements during sentencing that reflected bias toward him. We address each in turn. 7 A. Downward Departure. Under Cruz's plea agreement, the government was obliged to move for downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 if prosecutors determine[d] that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. The agreement also provided that it was conditioned upon the defendant providing full, complete, truthful and substantial cooperation, and that the government would be released from compliance if the defendant failed in any way to fulfill his obligations. 8 Cruz acknowledged that, in one instance, he did not tell the truth, admitting in a sentencing motion that he had failed to remember a 1996 check that became important at trial and crucial to the position of the U.S. Attorney. He consequently stipulated to a two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice. 9 Cruz maintains that this single episode does not negate the extensive cooperation he provided, which included substantial testimony before the Grand Jury and delivery of more than 150 incriminating documents. He notes that he would have testified at trial as well had the proceedings not been cut short by the government. 10 Although it appears that Cruz provided significant assistance in the prosecution of this case, his cooperation agreement explicitly gave the government the authority not to request a downward departure in the event Cruz failed to meet his obligation to be truthful. Cruz does not dispute his lack of veracity or the relevance of his untruthfulness, seeking only to minimize its weight in light of his otherwise full cooperation with the government. Whether or not we agree with the government's judgment not to recommend a downward departure is of no consequence. In the absence of an unconstitutional motivation or arbitrariness, see United States v. Davis, 247 F.3d 322, 325-26 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Doe, 233 F.3d 642, 644 (1st Cir.2000), and in the face of Cruz's admitted obstruction of justice, the government's decision was within its discretion. Cf. United States v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2000) (A defendant who has entered into a plea agreement with the government, and himself fulfills that agreement, is entitled to the benefit of his bargain.) (emphasis added); see also Davis, 247 F.3d at 326 (government's burden in defending a decision not to file a substantial assistance motion, at least where there is a plea agreement, is modest, only one of production, not of persuasion). 11 To the extent Cruz separately challenges the district court's denial of his motion for a downward departure under the general departure guideline, U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, his claim is without merit. We repeatedly have stated that departures for substantial assistance must come within the confines of U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, United States v. Sandoval, 204 F.3d 283, 285 (1st Cir.2000), and that a district court consequently is not empowered to independently grant a departure for that reason under § 5K2.0, see, e.g., Davis, 247 F.3d at 328; Sandoval, 204 F.3d at 285; United States v. Alegria, 192 F.3d 179, 189 (1st Cir.1999). The court therefore did not err in denying his motion. 12 B. Calculation of Loss. Cruz maintains that the court improperly utilized the total loss alleged in the indictment, $4.3 million, in calculating his sentence, resulting in an erroneous seven-level increase in his base offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(H). 3 He contends that his sentence should have been based on the amount of loss attributed to him in his plea agreement, $600,000, which would have triggered only a three-level increase. 13 It is undisputed that Cruz was not personally implicated in the full $4.3 million loss charged in the indictment. At sentencing, however, the district court expressed its view that Cruz and Fajardo were equally culpable partners in crime. The court also noted that the factual allegations indicated that the money involved in the conspiracy significantly exceeded the 4.3 million dollars reflected in the indictment, which simply was the amount the government felt it could prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Because of the scope of the scheme and appellant's admitted obstruction of justice, the court found that it was not bound by the plea agreement and that a sentence at the high end of the applicable range, based on the full $4.3 million, was appropriate. The court noted that there were grounds for imposing an upward departure, but decided against doing so. 14 Appellate review of a district court's application of the Guidelines typically involves a two-part inquiry: [W]e scrutinize the district court's legal determinations... de novo and check its factual determinations for clear error. Mateo, 271 F.3d at 13. Here, Cruz challenges the court's factual finding that he is accountable for the full $4.3 million loss. We see no clear error in that judgment. Cruz pled guilty to Count One, which charged a conspiracy to interfere with commerce by extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Although Cruz did not participate in each act allegedly a part of the conspiracy, it is well established that co-conspirators may be sentenced based on all reasonably foreseeable acts of others in furtherance of the conspiracy — i.e., all relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. See United States v. Laboy, 351 F.3d 578, 582-83 (1st Cir.2003); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Based on Cruz's extensive involvement throughout the relevant six-year period, as detailed in his plea and cooperation agreement, the court supportably found that he shared responsibility as a partner for the full amount of the loss. 15 C. Judicial Bias. Cruz claims that two comments by the district judge, one at his sentencing hearing and the other at Fajardo's bail revocation hearing, reflected bias sufficiently prejudicial to warrant his re-sentencing by another judge. He points to the judge's comment that Fajardo, Cruz and co-defendant Ruperto Vazquez Lopez operated like mafiosos, particularly when they allocated among themselves specific percentages of the illegal extortion and kickback proceeds they anticipated collecting. Cruz also challenges the judge's description of him as the enforcer in the conspiracy. 16 We need not dwell on this issue. First, Cruz neither objected to these comments nor sought recusal of the trial judge based on partiality, limiting our review to assessing only whether plain error occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Arache, 946 F.2d 129, 140 (1st Cir.1991). Whatever one's view of the judge's rhetoric, we think it beyond debate that it reflected a fact-based assessment of the type of conduct in which the defendants engaged and not a fundamentally unfair bias toward Cruz. 17 [J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. 18 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (emphasis in original). The remarks here reveal neither, and Cruz's claim is thus unavailing.