Opinion ID: 6076390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prill’s Subjective Allegations

Text: Prill disagrees with the ALJ’s ﬁndings on her various subjective allegations, from when her alleged disability started, to whether she performed heavy work before retirement, and how to consider her daily activities, medical records, and examination results. Prill’s alleged onset of disability the same month as her planned retirement. The ALJ found Prill’s statements about the persistence and severity of her symptoms mostly unsupported. Prill says she is credible, as shown by her strong work history, to which Prill contends the ALJ gave insuﬃcient attention. See Hill v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2015). Prill is correct that her work history bolsters her credibility. “But work history is just one factor among many, and it is not dispositive,” nor does it operate to negate other evidence that supports an ALJ’s adverse credibility ﬁnding. Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Summers, 864 F.3d at 528–29. Prill’s work history does not dictate the conclusion she suggests: that the ALJ could not consider the timing of her alleged onset of disability or ﬁnd her only partially credible. 12 No. 21-1381 The timing of Prill’s application for beneﬁts is suspicious. She applied nearly immediately after her planned retirement date at age 55, despite working at a job requiring heavy exertion for the previous several years. The ALJ was entitled to consider that the timing of Prill’s alleged onset of disability coincided precisely with her planned retirement, suggesting that Prill did not become disabled then. Whether Prill performed heavy work before her retirement. Prill submits the ALJ gave too much weight to her years of pain complaints prior to 2014, contending that just because she worked until age 55 does not mean she was not disabled during some of that time. The Commissioner responds the ALJ was entitled to account for Prill’s work despite her complaints of pain, as she was doing heavy work through her retirement, which was inconsistent with the disabling limitations that she described at the hearing before the ALJ. Prill replies she was not in fact performing heavy work but instead receiving accommodations that allowed her to perform the functional equivalent of light work. At the hearing, Prill testiﬁed that her coworkers performed many heavy-duty tasks for her—between December 2013 and August 2014—so that she did not have to do them. Prill has not established that she was not doing heavy work in the months before she retired. An April 4, 2014 note from a chiropractor states that Prill was “sweeping/mopping etc[.] for light duty type work.” The medical records do not specify how long the light-duty work persisted. On May 9, 2014, Prill told Dr. Bodeau that she would be doing manual labor during the summer of 2014, but she reported that was because she had missed training sessions rather than because No. 21-1381 13 of any work restrictions. That leaves Prill’s testimony at the hearing. But, as mentioned above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Prill was not entirely credible regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting eﬀects of her symptoms. The ALJ was entitled to discount Prill’s assertions about the extent of the help she received from coworkers during the last few months of her employment with Eau Claire County. Because that credibility determination was not patently wrong, we cannot disturb it. See Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019); Curvin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2015). Daily activities. When evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms, an ALJ should consider the claimant’s daily activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). Prill next contends the ALJ improperly analyzed her daily activities in and around her home without considering the difficulties they imposed on her. As Prill asserts, there are limits on an ALJ’s use of a claimant’s daily activities to undermine assertions of disabling symptoms. Indeed, this court has “cautioned ALJs not to equate such activities with the rigorous demands of the workplace.” Alvarado v. Colvin, 836 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). “But it is entirely permissible to examine all of the evidence, including a claimant’s daily activities, to assess whether testimony about the effects of his impairments was credible or exaggerated.” Id. (quoting Loveless, 810 F.3d at 508) (internal quotation marks omitted). So, the ALJ appropriately considered that—despite Prill’s claimed limitations related to standing, sitting, kneeling, squatting, and crouching—she cooked, baked, vacuumed, did 14 No. 21-1381 laundry, loaded the dishwasher, drove, played cards, gardened, and cared for minor children. Several of Prill’s activities are not consistent with her claim that she could not sit, stand, or walk for an extended period and could only rarely kneel, squat, or crouch. In particular, gardening undercuts her claimed limitations because it is a voluntary activity that involves many of the tasks she argues she cannot perform, at least on a sustained basis. As the Commissioner notes, Prill did not have to garden, but rather chose to do so. Gardening involves kneeling, stooping, squatting, and crouching, which Prill stated she was only able to do on a rare basis—five to ten percent of the time—because it caused her pain. Prill reported being unable to garden continuously without pain, but she nevertheless engaged in a voluntary activity that would have aggravated the conditions she alleges were disabling. 1 The ALJ did not err in considering and weighing Prill’s self-reported daily activities, including gardening. Those daily activities were appropriately determined to be inconsistent with the severity and limitations of her claimed symptoms. Medical records. Prill also argues the ALJ improperly cherry-picked evidence that her symptoms were improving while ignoring evidence that some of them were persistent or 1 This court has approved of ALJs considering whether a claimant gardens in reference to whether the claimant’s symptoms were as limiting as the claimant alleged, albeit in unpublished orders. See Densow v. Saul, 858 F. App’x 928, 931–32 (7th Cir. 2021); Molnar v. Astrue, 395 F. App’x 282, 285, 288 (7th Cir. 2010). No. 21-1381 15 worsening in their intensity. Specifically, Prill believes the ALJ erroneously relied on Dr. Bodeau’s August 2014 treatment note indicating that Prill was “already feeling mildly better as regards her back” while ignoring that the same treatment note says Prill “still ha[d] significant low back and radicular left leg pain.” We do not agree with Prill that the ALJ took the August 2014 treatment note out of context. See Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425–26 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s analysis where the ALJ “specifically addressed all the evidence that [the claimant] point[ed] out” but declined to “assign the significance to it that [the claimant] prefer[red]”). For instance, the treatment notes from Prill’s visit with Dr. Israel—which also took place in August 2014—support the ALJ’s conclusion about the intensity and persistence of Prill’s symptoms. Dr. Israel reported Prill was “doing okay” with respect to her left knee. He also wrote that conservative treatment was recommended for Prill, including aquatic therapy, physical therapy, and activity modifications, and Dr. Israel noted that Prill was happy with the proposed treatment plan. And, in both February 2015 and April 2015, Dr. Bodeau wrote that Prill was available for unrestricted activity. These medical records bolster the finding that the record did not support Prill’s allegations about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, and they dictate that the ALJ did not improperly cherry-pick evidence. Prill also disputes the ALJ’s consideration of other medical records. An ALJ is entitled to consider the course of a claimant’s treatment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(v). Prill’s treatment—injections, orthotics, and physical therapy—was 16 No. 21-1381 conservative. See Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 450 (8th Cir. 2000). Prill claims the ALJ placed too much weight on the conservative course of treatment. She cites Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2013), where this court suggested that the ALJ was incorrect in determining that a claimant was treated conservatively. But Schomas does not entirely support Prill’s position, as the claimant there “underwent major surgery.” Id. Here, Prill did not undergo major surgery during the period of time under consideration, and the most aggressive treatment she received consisted of the injections that have been described as conservative treatment. 2 So, the ALJ did not err in considering that Prill received conservative treatment. Relatedly, Prill contends an improvement in her condition is not sufficient to demonstrate a lack of disabling symptoms. While the evidence is not conclusive on this point, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that pain medications enabled Prill to manage her pain well enough to perform medium work, subject to the restrictions the ALJ set out in the RFC assessment. In May 2014, Dr. Bodeau noted that it was important for Prill to have access to her midday doses of Gabapentin, Ibuprofen, and Tramadol to manage her pain 2 This court has characterized epidural injections as conservative treatment, although in unpublished orders. See Olsen v. Colvin, 551 F. App’x 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Singh, 222 F.3d at 450); Burnam v. Colvin, 525 F. App’x 461, 464–65 (7th Cir. 2013). No. 21-1381 17 while at work. And in April 2015, Dr. Bodeau recommended that Prill continue with those same three medications while simultaneously noting that Prill “remain[ed] retired but available for unrestricted activity.” These treatment notes support the ALJ’s finding that the pain medications facilitated improvements in Prill’s symptoms that enabled her to function at work, and they preclude us from holding that the ALJ’s analysis of the effect of Prill’s pain medications was unsupported by substantial evidence. Examination results. Next, Prill argues the ALJ misinterpreted the results of the various medical examinations, many of which showed major objective deficits that limited her functioning. Prill points to the IME performed by Dr. Monacci, which described range-of-motion loss and diminished sensation, and a September 2015 treatment note describing diminished grip strength. The ALJ analyzed the findings from Dr. Monacci’s IME but emphasized other aspects of his report, such as the finding of “normal tone without atrophy in all muscle groups of the upper and lower extremities” and that Prill “had normal heel and toe and tandem gait.” While the ALJ noted the exam showed some abnormalities—such as cervical spine narrowing, degeneration in the cervical spine and lumbar region, and a mildly limited range of motion in the neck—she nevertheless concluded that the medical evidence did not support Prill’s alleged loss of functioning. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to assign differing weights to the various medical records. Despite the reports of range-of-motion loss and diminished sensation, Dr. Schuldt wrote in July 2017 that Prill had “full range of motion of all joints” and “[n]ormal movement and sensation of all 18 No. 21-1381 extremities.” Likewise, Dr. Marozava stated that in March 2016, Prill had normal reflexes at her extremities, full strength, normal knees, and a normal gait. Prill also does not cite any authority that suggests the ALJ erred in emphasizing that Dr. Monacci found Prill had normal tone without atrophy in her extremities and a normal gait. The ALJ properly considered the timing of Prill’s alleged onset of disability, and her performance of heavy work shortly before her retirement. There was no error in the ALJ’s ﬁnding that Prill’s daily activities contradicted her assertions about the persistence and limiting eﬀects of her knee- and back-related symptoms. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Prill’s account of her subjective symptoms was not consistent with her medical records. Further, the ALJ appropriately considered and weighed the conservative treatment Prill received and the competing medical interpretations of her examination results.