Opinion ID: 172567
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Causation Evidence

Text: Plaintiffs failed to raise in district court a genuine issue of fact regarding factual causation. That is, they failed to present to the court evidence, or even an argument, that Uravan radiation was either a but-for cause of any medical condition suffered by one of the Plaintiffs or that Uravan radiation was a necessary component of a causal set that would probably have caused one of those conditions. Plaintiffs presented five expert witnesses. Dr. Colin K. Hill, who was offered only as an expert with respect to the medical-monitoring Plaintiffs, testified regarding how radiation injures cells and begins the process that can lead to cancer and other ailments. Dr. A. James Ruttenber addressed only general causation, that is, whether radiation at Uravan had the capacity to cause the cancers and thyroid diseases that the Plaintiffs developed. See Neiberger v. Fed Ex Ground Package Sys., Inc., 566 F.3d 1184, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing general and specific causation); Restatement (Third) of Torts § 28 cmt. c(3), c(4) (same). Dr. F. Owen Hoffman provided the raw data upon which the final two experts relied. He estimated the mean dose of radiation received by each Plaintiff from Uravan operations. And for the Plaintiffs claiming thyroid diseases, he estimated their radiation exposure from the detonation of atomic weapons at a testing site in Nevada (the Nevada Test Site or NTS) conducted between 1959 and 1970. In addition, for the cancer Plaintiffs (including the one who suffered thyroid cancer) he converted the Uravan dosage into a figure representing the Excess Risk of Diagnosed Cancer and an Assigned Share figure that can be used to compare the number of cancers expected in a population exposed to that level of radiation to the number that would be expected in an unexposed population. Aplt.App., Vol. X at 1869, 1872. To prove specific causation for each Plaintiffthat is, to prove that the Uravan radiation caused the specific ailment of which the Plaintiff complainedPlaintiffs relied on the remaining two experts: Drs. Inder J. Chopra and Robert Peter Gale. Dr. Chopra addressed the Plaintiffs with thyroid disease (including the one case of thyroid cancer) and Dr. Gale addressed the remaining Plaintiffs, all of whom had suffered cancer. Dr. Chopra prepared a report that assessed each thyroid Plaintiff and concluded that the Plaintiff's exposure to radiation from Uravan and NTS fallout was a substantial factor contributing to the Plaintiff's thyroid disease. See, e.g., id., Vol. IX at 1562. A substantial factor, he explained, is intended to mean that the exposures were one of the variables that contributed to the observed health effect (thyroid disease). Id. at 1556. He defined substantial as an amount that is not trivial, id, concluding that if the contribution of any one source to [a Plaintiff's] total exposure to irradiation was 5% of the total, its contribution was substantial, Id. at 1557. Because at least 5% of the radiation exposure for each Plaintiff came from Uravan, the Uravan radiation was a substantial contributing factor. Dr. Chopra's report did not, however, state with respect to any Plaintiff that Uravan radiation was a but-for cause of the Plaintiff's thyroid disease or was a necessary component of a causal set that probably would have caused the Plaintiff to suffer the disease. For the Plaintiffs with cancer (other than thyroid cancer), Dr. Gale's report opined that to a reasonable medical probability exposure to ionizing radiations was a substantial factor contributing to each plaintiff developing cancer(s). Id. at 1642 (emphasis omitted). The report did not define substantial contributing factor, but it noted that, based on Dr. Hoffman's data, each of the Plaintiffs had an assigned share exceeding 10%, and he later submitted a declaration that this meant that there is greater than a 10% likelihood [that a] Plaintiff's cancer was contributed to by the additional radiation exposure from Defendants' uranium operations. Id. Vol. XII at 2075. As was true of Dr. Chopra, however, Dr. Gale did not opine that Uravan radiation was either a but-for cause of any Plaintiff's cancer or was a necessary component of a causal set that would have caused the cancer. Thus, the evidence relied on by Plaintiffs did not show that Uravan radiation was a factual cause of any of their ailments. In reaching this conclusion we are not being hypertechnical. The problem for Plaintiffs is not that their experts failed to utter some magic words, such as but for. Nor are we relying on any expertise of this court in analyzing the data and opinions from Plaintiffs' experts. We claim no such expertise. For all we know, the data would support but-for claims of some, or even all, Plaintiffs. The problem for Plaintiffs is that they did not make a timely argument that they had produced evidence of but-for causation, and they have never (not even in this court) contended that they have produced evidence that Uravan radiation was a necessary component of a causal set that probably would have caused the Plaintiffs' ailments. Our conclusion in this regard follows from an examination of how the issue was joined below. The Defendants' summary-judgment motion on the personal-injury claims was premised on the absence of but-for evidence. Defendants stressed that agents other than radiation can cause the Plaintiffs' ailments and that neither Dr. Chopra nor Dr. Gale had opined that those ailments would not have occurred `but for' [the Plaintiffs'] exposure to the radioactive substances attributable to Defendants' activities. Id. Vol. XI at 1928. In response, Plaintiffs argued that they need not establish but-for causation and that their expertsnamely Drs. Chopra and Galecreated a triable issue of fact by opining that exposure to radiation at Uravan substantially contributed to the development of each Plaintiff's disease. Id. Vol. XII at 1992, 1997-98. At a hearing on the matter the district court rejected Plaintiffs' substantially contributed standard and stated that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the Plaintiffs' experts ha[d] not offered the requisite opinion of `but for' causality. Id. Vol. XIII at 2208. A few seconds after stating that conclusion, the court asked whether there was [a]ny need for clarification or further explanation with regard to the ruling on this motion? Id. Plaintiffs' counsel responded No, your Honor. Id. Ten days later Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The motion asserted, for the first time, that their evidence could satisfy the but-for requirement (if one were erroneously imposed). But even then the specific arguments that Plaintiffs raised amounted to no more than the assertion that the substantial-factor test actually subsumes the `but for' test. Id. at 2357. They pointed to no evidence that their ailments would not have occurred in the absence of Uravan radiation. Moreover, a Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing. See Grynberg, 538 F.3d at 1354 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs make better but-for arguments on appeal. [7] But they come too late. Based on the evidence and arguments properly before the district court, summary judgment on all personal-injury claims was appropriately granted. See Hutton Contracting Co. v. City of Coffeyville, 487 F.3d 772, 782 (10th Cir.2007) (Absent special circumstances, we will not reverse on a ground not raised below.).