Opinion ID: 513195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Sentencing

Text: 13 With respect to the sentencing issues raised herein, the government favors remand of the case for clarification of sentencing; the appellant urges us to vacate the sentence and to remand for plenary resentencing. The government has appropriately conceded that it would be constitutional error for a court to consider the number of children fathered by a criminal defendant in imposing sentence. The government has also largely conceded that the record is ambiguous with respect to whether the district court ascertained that appellant and his counsel examined the presentence investigation report prior to Trzaska's sentencing. Although the government argues that neither of these possible errors mandates resentencing, we agree with appellant that there is enough room for doubt as to the propriety of the sentence to justify vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing. Accordingly, in light of the court's inappropriate consideration of appellant's fertile proclivities, and in light of the ambiguity in the record as to whether the district court complied with the requirements of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1), we vacate Trzaska's sentence, and remand to the district court for plenary resentencing. 14 We do not believe, however, as appellant argues, that the case should be remanded to a different judge. A review of the minutes of the December 10, 1987 hearing in which the district judge sentenced appellant reveals that the judge had sufficient legitimate reasons to impose the sentence that he did. Moreover, prior to appellant's violation of the special condition of his probation relating to firearms, the district judge had shown considerable leniency towards the defendant. Therefore, because we believe that there has been no showing that the sentencing judge's fairness or the appearance of the judge's fairness is seriously in doubt, United States v. Bradley, 812 F.2d 774, 782 n. 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 107, 98 L.Ed.2d 67 (1987), we conclude that remand to another judge would be inappropriate at this time and this request is denied.