Opinion ID: 1313550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reverse-Spreigl

Text: Profit alleges that the district court impermissibly excluded evidence essential to his defense. While on their face Profit's claims may appear persuasive, an analysis of the record leads us to conclude that: (1) the district court did not exclude nearly as much evidence as Profit asserts; and (2) based on the foundational evidence the court had before it, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence that was suppressed. [E]very criminal defendant has the right to be treated with fundamental fairness and `afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.' State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn.1992) (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984)); accord U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. However, the accused `must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.' Richards, 495 N.W.2d at 195 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973)). Thus, even when a defendant alleges that his constitutional rights were violated, evidentiary questions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Gustafson, 379 N.W.2d 81, 84 (Minn. 1985). Contrary to Profit's allegations, the district court did not prohibit him from asserting that Kelly killed Bell. Testimony concerning Kelly's access to the Grand Am and Profit's wallet was admitted, as was evidence that Kelly had left the state. In his closing argument, Profit's counsel reiterated the evidence linking Kelly to the Bell killing and argued that [i]f you look closely at the evidence in this case there is more evidence    to suggest that Paul Kelly is involved in this case than there is Mr. Profit himself. Moreover, the district court did not prevent Kelly from testifying. In ruling on the state's motion in limine, the court said, [i]f, in fact, Mr. Kelly has information relevant to the specific cases before us,    Mr. Kelly will obviously be allowed to testify. Profit has admitted that the reason Kelly did not testify at trial was that the defense ceased its efforts to bring Kelly to Minnesota after the trial court's ruling on the state's motion in limine. Profit claims that there was no longer any purpose in bringing Kelly to Minnesota if he could not question Kelly about the KARE letter in which Kelly allegedly confessed to one of the purported serial killings  that of Phothisane. [1] But it must be remembered that the issue in the case was not whether Kelly was involved in the Phothisane killing. The issue was whether Profit killed Bell. Thus, evidence of the purported serial killings and Kelly's possible participation in the Phothisane killing is only relevant insofar as it tends to show that Profit did not murder Bell. We have recognized that a defendant may seek to introduce evidence of other crimes or misconduct of a third person to prove that the third person, rather than the defendant, committed the crime charged. State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 433 (Minn. 1997); see generally Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Before such reverse- Spreigl  evidence will be admitted, however, the defendant must show: (1) clear and convincing evidence that [the third person] participated in the [reverse-] Spreigl incident; (2) that the [reverse-] Spreigl evidence is relevant and material to the [defendant's] case; and (3) that the probative value of the [reverse-] Spreigl evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d at 433 (holding that the foundational requirements for reverse- Spreigl evidence are the same as for traditional Spreigl evidence). To satisfy the relevancy requirement when reverse Spreigl evidence is offered to establish the identity of the perpetrator, the reverse Spreigl incident must be similar to the charged offense either in time, location, or modus operandi. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d at 449 (citing Johnson, 568 N.W.2d at 428). We acknowledge that the record reveals numerous similarities between the Bell murder and the purported serial killings and that the police investigation of the Bell murder as one of the purported serial killings indicates the crimes bore signature elements. [2] However, while such similarities may permit an inference that the same person committed all of the killings, this inference was of little value to Profit unless he also provided clear and convincing evidence that someone other than he  in this case, Kelly  committed the killings. Providing clear and convincing evidence of Kelly's participation in the Phothisane killing is a threshold requirement for the admission of that evidence. See State v. Shannon, 583 N.W.2d 579, 584 (Minn.1998). Clear and convincing evidence is more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1978). The evidentiary burden is met when the truth of the facts sought to be admitted is highly probable. Id. Clear and convincing evidence of participation in a crime has been found on the strength of a conviction, a victim's clear identification of the defendant as the assailant, or the defendant's own confession of participation in the incident. Shannon, 583 N.W.2d at 584. We have refused to admit Spreigl evidence when the foundational evidence presented did not clearly show the person's direct participation in the other crime. Id. On appeal, Profit crafts a well-packaged argument attempting to link Kelly to the Phothisane murder. However, our function as a reviewing court is not to determine the factual merits of Profit's claim. That job belongs to the district court. Our function is to look at the evidence presented to the district court and determine whether, in light of the record, the district court clearly abused its discretion in suppressing evidence of the purported serial killings. [3] In analyzing the evidence that was actually presented at trial, we first note that Profit never briefed the reverse- Spreigl issue to the district court, but only raised the issue as an oral objection well after the court had already ruled on the state's motion in limine. More importantly, the evidence that Profit provided to the district court did little to support his claims that Kelly or anyone other than Profit committed the purported serial killings. Profit offered very little evidence about Paul Kelly, the man whom he accuses of committing the purported serial killings. The record shows that the defense knew where Kelly was and had hired counsel in Texas to serve process on Kelly. Yet, although Profit alleges that evidence of Kelly's involvement in the purported serial killings was essential to his defense, he never brought Kelly to Minnesota to testify at the pretrial evidentiary hearing so that the district court could hear what Kelly would say. No formal statements from Kelly appear in the record. No testimony showing that Kelly had either the motive or the opportunity to kill Phothisane was offered. Instead, to support his claim that Kelly killed Phothisane and therefore Bell, Profit relies almost exclusively on (1) an alleged alibi for one of the purported serial killings, which alibi first surfaced on appeal, and (2) the KARE letter and police affidavits discussing the origins of the letter. [4] On appeal, Profit claims that he had an alibi for the night of one of the purported serial killings. But Profit never raised this claim at trial, and on appeal he fails to cite any evidentiary support in the record for the claim. Because the district court never heard Profit's alibi claim, and because the claim is completely unsubstantiated by the record, we give little weight to the claim in our analysis of whether the district court abused its discretion. Profit also relies on the KARE letter, which he calls a confession, as clear and convincing evidence that Kelly killed Phothisane. In the past, we have held that a confession by a defendant may be admitted as Spreigl evidence, even when that confession was subsequently retracted by the defendant. See State v. Spaeth, 552 N.W.2d 187, 195 (Minn.1996). In Spaeth, the defendant, as part of an arrangement set up by his attorneys and the police, provided a statement to the police admitting to two burglaries in return for the promise that he would not be prosecuted for those burglaries. Id. at 193. When the state subsequently sought to use those confessions as Spreigl evidence in a different case, the defendant denied committing the burglaries, saying he only confessed because he was pressured by the police into doing so. Id. at 194. At the hearing, however, the defendant's former attorney testified that the defendant was never required to speak to police about the burglaries and that no harm would have befallen him had he not confessed. Id. Thus, the validity of the confession admitted in Spaeth was supported by the fact that the confession itself was an express and unequivocal admission of guilt by the defendant and extrinsic evidence showing that the defendant's subsequent retraction of that confession was baseless. In contrast to the Spaeth confession, the circumstances surrounding the KARE letter, at least insofar as they are reflected in the record, do little to ensure its validity. Because Kelly was not brought to Minnesota to testify and no witness testified as to the circumstances surrounding the KARE letter's creation, the only evidence in the record putting the KARE letter into context are police affidavits supporting warrants to search Profit's property. The police affidavits show that Kelly wrote the KARE letter and that he provided police with information linking Profit to the crime. But despite the fact that both Profit and the dissent have labeled the KARE letter a confession, the affidavits indicate that Kelly never actually told anyone that he committed the Phothisane killing. According to the affidavits, even after he admitted to writing the unsigned KARE letter, Kelly told police that he wrote the letter only because Profit ordered him to do so. From the affidavits, it appears that the police investigated Kelly's story, believed him, and then relied upon Kelly's information to investigate and subsequently charge Profit. The affidavits indicate that the police suspected Profit, not Kelly, had committed the killings. Although Profit relies almost exclusively on these affidavits to put the KARE letter into context, he fails to offer any evidence to counter the affidavits' conclusions that Profit, not Kelly, was the serial killer. Without any evidence of what Kelly would say if called to testify, the import of the KARE letter is further reduced. The KARE letter is an out-of-court statement offered to show that its author killed Phothisane. Thus, the letter is hearsay. See Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). As such, not only is the KARE letter's veracity inherently suspect, but the letter itself would be inadmissible except to impeach Kelly's testimony. Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1), 802. If Kelly was unavailable to testify, which Profit did not show, the KARE letter would not be admissible under any exception to the hearsay prohibition absent some independent guarantee of trustworthiness. See Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (providing that a hearsay statement against the declarant's interest is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement). Because the only evidence in the record supplying context to the unsigned, barely legible KARE letter was police affidavits suggesting that the letter was not what Profit asserted it to be, a confession by Kelly, the necessary indicia of trustworthiness were simply not present. In addition to exposing the weaknesses in the KARE letter, the record contains additional, circumstantial evidence linking Profit, and not Kelly, to the purported serial killings. On cross-examination, Profit admitted that he had been familiar with Theodore Wirth Park. He grew up in that area and, in 1981, picked up one of his rape victims near there. In addition, at the hearing on the motion in limine, the state indicated that Kelly had an alibi for the night of the Phothisane killing. While this claim was not detailed, let alone conclusive, the defense presented no evidence to counter the inferences suggested by the claim. If the record contained additional or different evidence implicating Kelly as Phothisane's killer, our conclusion concerning the district court's exclusion of the KARE letter might well be different. However, taken as a whole, the record does more to suggest that Profit committed all of the purported serial killings than to show clear and convincing evidence that Kelly participated in any of them. In evidentiary matters, we accord great deference to the discretion of the district court. We refuse to second-guess the court based on the speculative and untrustworthy nature of the evidence contained in the record before us. Accordingly, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the purported serial killings.
After the close of testimony, the district court, pursuant to a motion by the state, changed the dates of the offenses on the Bell murder indictment from on or between May 21, 1996 and May 23, 1996 to on or about May 21, 1996. The court then instructed the jury using the amended timeframe. Profit claims that the amendment was an impermissible response to defense tactics made after the defense had closed its case. We review amendments at trial of an indictment for an abuse of discretion and will only reverse such decisions upon a showing of prejudicial error. See State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 922 (Minn.1995). A district court may permit an indictment to be amended at any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. Minn. R.Crim. P. 17.05. [I]n order to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant, it must be shown that the amendment either added or charged a different offense. Gerdes v. State, 319 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn.1982). In Gerdes, we addressed a question similar to the one presented here. In Gerdes, the state moved to amend the date of the alleged offense after the defendant's testimony showed that he could not have committed the charged crime on the date set forth in the original complaint. Id. at 711-12. We recognized that where the date is not the essential element of the crime the trial court may properly allow an amendment of the complaint so that it comports with the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 712. Accordingly, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the complaint to be amended. Id. Contrary to Profit's claims, the amendment to the Bell indictment did not represent a fundamental shift in the prosecution's theory. As early as its opening arguments, the state conceded that it's somewhat difficult to determine exactly when [Bell] died and that the murder could have occurred within one day to one week before her body [was] recovered. Dr. Morey, a state's witness, said Bell could have been killed up to a week before her body was discovered on May 23. Bell's mother testified that she last spoke to Bell on May 18, 1996. Because the amended date on the Bell indictment is consistent with the case the state presented throughout the course of the trial, we conclude that Profit suffered no prejudice from amending the indictment after the close of testimony.
Profit challenges the sufficiency of the state's circumstantial evidence to support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of Bell's murder. Profit was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.185(1) and (2) (1998) and one count of intentional second-degree murder under Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (1998). Section 609.185(1) requires the state to prove that the defendant killed a human being with premeditation and intent. Section 609.185(2) requires the state to prove that the defendant killed a human being while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence. Section 609.19, subd. 1 requires a showing that the defendant cause[d] the death of a human being with intent    but without premeditation. While a conviction based only on circumstantial evidence warrants stricter scrutiny, such `evidence is entitled to the same weight as any evidence so long as the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.' State v. Ashby, 567 N.W.2d 21, 27 (Minn.1997) (quoting State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Minn.1988)) (additional citations omitted). In analyzing a challenge to the sufficiency of the state's evidence, we review the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.1989). In so doing, we must recognize that the jury is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and assume that, after due consideration, the jurors believed the state's witnesses. See Ashby, 567 N.W.2d at 27; State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn.1989). In the present case, the state offered the testimony of Dr. Morey who concluded that Bell's death was a homicide. The evidence linking Profit to that crime included the following: Profit's wallet was found within several feet of where Bell's body had been discovered; Profit drove the Grand Am in which police discovered threads and fibers that experts concluded were indistinguishable from threads and fibers found on the ligature used to strangle Bell; and Profit told investigators that he always drove the Grand Am because it was the only car he was insured under. A natural inference from this evidence is that Profit killed Bell. This inference is buttressed by the state's Spreigl evidence and the state's evidence of the Johnson assault, which the district court found was sufficiently similar to the Bell murder to indicate a common plan. The Spreigl evidence showed Profit's pattern of abducting women, removing their clothes, tying them up with their clothes, and then raping them. Johnson, an African-American prostitute from the Broadway Avenue area of Minneapolis was picked up in that area and induced to smoke crack cocaine, taken to Theodore Wirth Park, assaulted, and left nude. The state's evidence suggested that Bell, an African-American woman, was a prostitute who worked in the Broadway Avenue area of Minneapolis; that she used cocaine within a few hours before her death; that her nude body was found in Theodore Wirth Park; and that a ligature resembling the waistband from an article of clothing had been tied around her head and neck. From these similarities, the jury could reasonably infer that if Profit committed the Spreigl and Johnson crimes, he also killed Bell. To support the verdicts, however, the state also had to show that Profit killed Bell intentionally, with premeditation, and while committing or attempting sexual assault. [T]he jury may infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions. State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn.1997). A jury may also infer the defendant's intent to kill from the nature of the killing. Id. Premeditation may also be inferred from the nature of the crime. State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Minn.1992). To support a verdict of premeditated murder, however, the state's evidence must show that the defendant considered, planned or prepared for, or determined to commit, the act prior to its commission. Minn.Stat. § 609.18 (1998). A finding of premeditation does not require proof of extensive planning or preparation to kill, nor does it require any specific period of time for deliberation. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d at 180. Rather, [t]he requisite plan to commit first degree murder can be formulated virtually instantaneously. State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 335 (Minn.1991). In the present case, the manner of the killing sufficiently supports findings of both intent and premeditation. Dr. Morey testified that the ligature used to strangle Bell was wrapped tightly around [Bell's] neck once and secured behind her neck    with a knot, and that one end of the ligature went across [Bell's] mouth and    underneath her tongue within her mouth. Dr. Morey also testified that the loop around Bell's neck was approximately five inches shorter than the circumference of her neck, left a one-half inch deep furrow in her neck, and was secured so tightly that he had difficulty inserting his fingers between it and her neck. While the strangulation alone does not support an inference of premeditation, such an inference may be supported by the circumstances surrounding the strangulation. See Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d at 335. The natural consequences of tying an elaborate noose around a person's neck and tightening it to such extremes would be the death of that person. The intricate manner in which the ligature was looped and tied indicates that some appreciable time must have passed between the beginning of the strangulation and the end. The tightness of the ligature and the fact that it was knotted in that position suggest that the assailant was determined to kill Bell. In addition, according to state witnesses, Profit had said he would go to extreme measures to destroy evidence of his rapes. Such evidence reasonably supports findings of intent and premeditation. Although it presents a closer question, we also conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict Profit of killing Bell while engaged in or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct. Profit asserts that, because there were no injuries to Bell's vagina or any place other than her neck, and because no semen was found, there was insufficient evidence of criminal sexual conduct. Profit alleges that even if the jury could reasonably have inferred that Bell had sex prior to her death, the state presented no evidence that the sex was not consensual. For the jury to find a defendant guilty under Minn.Stat. § 609.185(2), the state must show the defendant killed the victim while committing or attempting sexual penetration or sexual contact by force or violence. See Minn.Stat. § 609.343 (1998) (defining second-degree criminal sexual conduct). Like premeditation and intent, the existence of such sexual conduct can be inferred from the manner of the crime. See Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d at 336 (holding that evidence of the position of the body, dirt and debris found in the buttocks and pubic area, the blood stained undergarments, the disheveled clothes, the manual strangulation, and the bruising in the left breast area was sufficient to support a conviction of murder under Minn.Stat. § 609.185(2)). The inference that Bell had sexual contact prior to her death is reasonably supported by the fact that she was a reputed prostitute, was found naked, and had mud packed onto her vaginal area and upper torso. The fact that no seminal fluid or vaginal injuries were found is not dispositive, especially in light of Dr. Morey's testimony that the decomposition of Bell's body and the waters of Basset Creek could have destroyed such evidence. Furthermore, the testimony of two witnesses indicated that Profit knew the importance of not leaving physical evidence behind after a rape. The conclusion that there was sexual contact and that it was forced rather than consensual is also supported by the state's Spreigl evidence. The evidence of Profit's prior crimes showed that his pattern was to abduct, strip, bind, and then rape his victims. The state showed many similarities between the Bell killing and Profit's prior rapes, including evidence that Bell was naked, had been bound with an article of clothing, and was from north Minneapolis. While the Spreigl crimes occurred 15 years prior to Profit's trial, Profit spent the vast majority of those 15 years in prison. The passage of time between the Spreigl and charged crimes has little effect on the relevance of the Spreigl crimes if, during that time, the defendant was in prison without any opportunity to commit subsequent crimes. See State v. Scott, 323 N.W.2d 790, 793 (Minn.1982). Furthermore, testimony indicated that even while confined Profit continued to plan and strategize rapes. Based on this evidence, we hold that the jury could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Profit killed Bell while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct. Affirmed.