Opinion ID: 406158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Permission to attend the police academy

Text: 37 An employer may not require sexual consideration from an employee as a quid pro quo for job benefits. 18 See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d at 1044; Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 983; Garber v. Saxon Business Products, Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1981). In order to establish a violation of Title VII on grounds of sexual harassment of this kind, an employee must prove a number of elements, many of which are similar to the proof required to establish the existence of a hostile or offensive work environment: 38 (1) The employee belongs to a protected group. 39 (2) The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment. 40 (3) The harassment complained of was based upon sex. 41 (4) The employee's reaction to harassment complained of affected tangible aspects of the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The acceptance or rejection of the harassment by an employee must be an express or implied condition to the receipt of a job benefit or the cause of a tangible job detriment in order to create liability under this theory of sexual harassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) & (2) (1981). As in the typical disparate treatment case, the employee must prove that she was deprived of a job benefit which she was otherwise qualified to receive because of the employer's use of a prohibited criterion in making the employment decision. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d at 953; Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1979). See generally Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094-95, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15, 97 S.Ct. at 1854 n.15. 42 (5) Respondeat superior. In a typical Title VII case, an employer is held liable for the discriminatory actions of its supervisors which affect the tangible job benefits of an employee on the basis of race, religion, or national origin. See, e.g., Gay v. Board of Trustees of San Jacinto College, 608 F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir. 1979); Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Association, 509 F.2d at 144 n.7; Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 441-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033, 95 S.Ct. 515, 42 L.Ed.2d 308 (1974); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972); Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 69 (4th Cir. 1978) (Butzner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 464 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1972); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F.Supp. 424, 436 (D.Utah 1971); cf. Northside Realty Associates, Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1353 (5th Cir. 1979) (corporation liable for violations by its agents of Fair Housing Act of 1968); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 993 (employer strictly liable under Title VII for discriminatory practices of supervisory personnel but may be relieved from responsibility if conduct is against employer's policy and prompt remedial action taken upon notice of discriminatory conduct). The reason for this stern rule is readily apparent: 43 When (the employer gave) its (supervisory personnel) authority to fire employees, it also accepted responsibility to remedy any harm caused by (the supervisors') unlawful exercise of that authority. The modern corporate entity consists of the individuals who manage it, and little, if any, progress in eradicating discrimination in employment will be made if the corporate employer is able to hide behind the shield of individual employee action. 44 Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F.Supp. at 436 (citation omitted). 45 It necessarily follows from this premise that an employer is strictly liable for sexual discrimination by supervisors that causes tangible job detriment. See Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc). Discrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful discrimination. H.R.Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.Cong. & Ad.News 2137, 2141. Sexual harassment resulting in tangible job detriment is a form of sex discrimination every bit as deleterious to the remedial purposes of Title VII as other unlawful employment practices. We hold that an employer is strictly liable for the actions of its supervisors that amount to sexual discrimination or sexual harassment resulting in tangible job detriment to the subordinate employee. See Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d at 213; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1981); 45 Fed.Reg. 74,676-77 (Nov. 10, 1980) (commentary issued in conjunction with proposed E.E.O.C. guidelines on sexual harassment). But see Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d at 1048-49 (requiring actual or constructive knowledge of supervisor's conduct and failure to take remedial action before holding employer liable for sexual harassment involving tangible job detriment). 19 46 We recognize that this holding requires differing treatment of respondeat superior claims in the two types of sexual harassment cases. In the classic quid pro quo case an employer is strictly liable for the conduct of its supervisors, while in the work environment case the plaintiff must prove that higher management knew or should have known of the sexual harassment before the employer may be held liable. The rationale underlying this difference in the treatment of the two cases is easily stated. The environment in which an employee works can be rendered offensive in an equal degree by the acts of supervisors, see Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d at 943; Compston v. Borden, 424 F.Supp. at 160-61, coworkers, Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d at 68 (Butzner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), or even strangers to the workplace, EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F.Supp. 599, 609-10 & n.16 (S.D.N.Y.1981); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1981). The capacity of any person to create a hostile or offensive environment is not necessarily enhanced or diminished by any degree of authority which the employer confers upon that individual. When a supervisor gratuitously insults an employee, he generally does so for his reasons and by his own means. He thus acts outside the actual or apparent scope of the authority he possesses as a supervisor. His conduct cannot automatically be imputed to the employer any more so than can the conduct of an ordinary employee. 20 47 The typical case of quid pro quo sexual harassment is fundamentally different. In such a case, the supervisor relies upon his apparent or actual authority to extort sexual consideration from an employee. Therein lies the quid pro quo. In that case the supervisor uses the means furnished to him by the employer to accomplish the prohibited purpose. He acts within the scope of his actual or apparent authority to hire, fire, discipline or promote. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d at 213; see Calcote v. Texas Educational Foundation, Inc., 578 F.2d at 98. Because the supervisor is acting within at least the apparent scope of the authority entrusted to him by the employer when he makes employment decisions, his conduct can fairly be imputed to the source of his authority. 21 48 In this case, Henson has alleged all of the elements of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. 22 The district judge, however, did not believe Henson's testimony that Sellgren insisted upon sexual favors as a condition to her attendance at the academy. He did not specify whether his credibility choice was based upon demeanor or lack of corroborating evidence. However, he found that two circumstances which would have corroborated Henson's story did not exist. Specifically, he found that Sellgren had never sexually propositioned Henson's female coworker, Dicks, and that no male dispatcher had ever attended the police academy. 49 Both of these specific factual findings are clearly erroneous. There is no evidence whatever in the record indicating that Sellgren did not proposition Dicks. Indeed, when Henson's attorney sought to question Dicks on this very subject, the judge sustained the defendant's objection to the testimony on relevancy grounds. 23 Also, undisputed testimonial and documentary evidence proved that two male dispatchers hired by the City of Dundee under the CETA program were sent to the police academy at the same time that Henson actively sought to attend. 24 50 This court is, of course, loathe to reevaluate a factual finding based upon a credibility choice of the district judge. See Barnes v. Jones County School District, 575 F.2d at 494. In this case, however, there is a substantial risk that the district judge based his evaluation of Henson's credibility upon a clearly erroneous view of the availability of corroborating evidence. 25 When the finder of fact proceeds upon a faulty theory to assess credibility, its finding based solely upon that assessment cannot stand. 26 Custom Recovery, Division of Keystone Resources v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 1041, 1045 (5th Cir. 1979). 27 Here, the district judge's thorough misapprehension of the factual situation surrounding Henson's testimony on the issue of the police academy assignment prevents us from deferring to his credibility finding. We conclude that Henson is entitled to a new trial on her claim for sexual harassment which allegedly prevented her from attending the police academy. 51 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 52