Opinion ID: 601587
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Count by Count Waiver

Text: 28 We must now resolve a question of first impression for this court: whether a defendant who presents evidence on one count, but no evidence on another count, preserves his right to have the nonrebutted count reviewed based on the government's case alone. Because we believe that a defendant's rights are preserved when he refrains from presenting evidence on one count, outside of allowable cross-examination, we reverse the district court as to the gun count because there was insufficient evidence at the close of the government's case to convict Thomas on this count. 29 From the wording of the rule, which refers to the granting of a judgment on one or more offenses charged in the indictment, it is obvious that a defendant can gain a judgment of acquittal as to an individual count without proving insufficient evidence as to each and every count. Indeed, the district judge was aware of this flexibility as evidenced by the fact that he denied defendant Johnson's Rule 29 motion on the conspiracy count but reserved ruling on the gun count. 30 Because district judges have Rule 29 authority to grant judgments of acquittal on a count by count basis, it follows that a defendant can reserve review of those decisions by a district court, also on a count by count basis. In this instance, Thomas made a Rule 29 motion encompassing both counts. The district court denied both motions. Thomas then presented evidence only on Count One, the conspiracy count, and offered absolutely no testimony which in any way addressed Count Two, the gun count. The only information concerning the gun was offered through the testimony of co-defendants Johnson and Calloway. 31 Just as it would be improper to permit the government to rely on a testifying codefendant to supply missing links in its case, Belt, 574 F.2d at 1236, it is improper to rely on that same testimony to supply missing links on issues that defendant has chosen not to rebut. If we were to hold otherwise, we would be encouraging the government to engage in fishing expeditions, charging a defendant with one supportable claim and several questionable claims in the hope of obtaining useful evidence from the testimony of co-defendants. Defendants would then be faced with the distasteful choice between 1) rebutting the government's case as to any valid claims and risking becoming embroiled in the unsupported claims through the testimony of co-defendants and 2) refraining from presenting any evidence on any counts in order to preserve their rights to have reviewing courts consider only the government's case-in-chief in determining which counts had been sufficiently supported by the government's evidence. 3 32 We conclude that by refraining from offering any evidence on the gun count, Thomas reserved his right, under Rule 29, to have this court review that count by considering only the evidence offered by the government during its case-in-chief. As mentioned above, we find that evidence insufficient to sustain Thomas's conviction for aiding and abetting in the possession of a gun during the commission of a drug related crime. Consequently, we vacate Thomas's conviction on Count Two. 33 III. Thomas's Second Rule 29 Motion and the District Court's Erroneous Reservation of Ruling on Calloway's Motion 34 Thomas also challenges the denial of his Rule 29 motion made at the close of all evidence (Second Motion). He argues that the district court erroneously reserved ruling on Calloway's Rule 29 motion made at the close of the government's case-in-chief 4 . Thomas claims that Calloway would never have offered incriminating testimony concerning Thomas's involvement with the gun if the district court had immediately ruled on Calloway's motion. Although the district court did err when it reserved ruling on Calloway's Rule 29 motion, the ruling did not cause Thomas to suffer any redressable harm. 35 There is no doubt that district courts are not permitted to reserve ruling on Rule 29 motions made at the close of the government's case-in-chief. The wording of the Rule states that reservation is appropriate at the close of all evidence, thus indicating by exclusion that reservation is not appropriate for rulings on Rule 29 motions made at the close of the government's case: 36 If a motion for judgment of acquittal is made at the close of all the evidence, the court may reserve decision on the motion, ubmit the case to the jury and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict. 37 Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(b) (emphasis added). Early in the life of the Rule, the former Fifth Circuit explicitly stated that a district court's authority to reserve ruling only applies to Rule 29 motions made at the close of all evidence and not to motions made at the close of the government's case. Jackson v. United States, 250 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir.1958). In 1980, this circuit stated similarly that: 38 It is settled law in this Circuit that, when a motion for judgment of acquittal is made at the close of the Government's case, the trial court is not permitted to reserve its ruling.... Rather, the trial court must issue its ruling before the defense presents its case. 39 Rhodes, 631 F.2d at 44. Therefore, the district court erred when it refrained from ruling on Calloway's Rule 29 motion made at the close of the government's case-in-chief. 40 Thomas argues that because the district court erred in this manner, this court should review Thomas's Second Motion without regard to Calloway's testimony. In general, courts consider all evidence presented at trial when reviewing a denial of a Rule 29 motion made at the close of a defendant's case. Thomas claims that but for the district court's erroneous ruling, Calloway would never have testified and consequently the jury would never have heard Calloway's statement that Thomas gave him the gun. Thomas relies on this circuit's holding that if the trial court erroneously defers ruling on the motion for acquittal and the defendant presents evidence, the appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence will only consider the evidence presented in the Government's case in chief. Rhodes, 631 F.2d at 44; accord Cook, 586 F.2d at 576. This quote, however, applies to the standard of review and the evidence reviewable in assessing a Rule 29 motion made by the same defendant who made the original motion erroneously ruled upon by the judge. It is far from clear that Thomas gets the benefit of this holding when the error was committed by the district court in ruling on a co-defendant's motion. 5 41 Assuming arguendo that Thomas has standing to contest the court's ruling on Calloway's motion, Thomas has not proven that he was harmed by the ruling. He claims that Calloway's testimony would never have reached the jury if the district court had granted Calloway's motion immediately. Thomas, however, ignores the fact that had the judge granted Calloway's motion, Calloway could have been subpoenaed to testify to the same information that he offered while still an accused defendant. Because Thomas has shown neither standing to contest a ruling made on a co-defendant's motion, nor harm from such ruling, we decline to limit the evidence we may consider when evaluating Thomas's Second Rule 29 Motion. 42 After considering all the evidence, including Calloway's testimony, we conclude that the district court correctly denied Thomas's Second Motion.