Opinion ID: 452077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the hourly rates

Text: 30 In its cross-appeal, plaintiff contends that the district court did not set forth an explanation of its determination of a reasonable hourly rate that allows us to conduct careful appellate review. See Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir.1983). Plaintiff asserts that what little explanation there is suggests that the court gave inadequate attention to the experience and background of several of DVCCCA's attorneys and to the equivalent rates charged by lawyers in private practice. 31 The explanation of which plaintiff complains was given by the district court as follows. In its opinion, the court stated that it had evaluated the status, reputation and experience of the individual attorneys who performed the [relevant] activity. The court stated that, in its view, $100 was a reasonable average hourly rate 8 for work that it found to be most difficult. For work that the court found could have been done by an attorney working at the associate level, an average hourly rate of $65 was applied. For work associated with legal work but which required little or no legal ability, the court granted an average hourly rate of $25. 32 Plaintiff argues that this evaluation was not sufficiently detailed and that the evaluation was not reflected in the hourly rate calculation. Plaintiff asserts that the court ignored the varying experience and expertise of DVCCCA's attorneys and disregarded the salaries earned by private attorneys with similar experience and expertise in equivalent litigation. More specifically, plaintiff complains that attorneys Albert Slap, Michael Churchill, Thomas Gilhool, and Jerome Balter were lawyers of great experience and stature who were entitled to high hourly rates, particularly in this complex and prolonged litigation that involved, in the district court's own estimation, new and novel issues. Plaintiff also points to higher hourly rates awarded to some of these same attorneys by judges of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in other litigation. 33 The Commonwealth rejoins by pointing to other evidence in the record of rates awarded by courts and charged by Philadelphia law firms in the general range awarded by the district court. The Commonwealth also submits that, to the extent that Gilhool and Churchill were awarded low rates, it was only for performing activities of marginal legal character for which no original legal analysis was required. 34 As an initial matter, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fixing hourly rates of $100 for partner level work, $65 for associate level work, and $25 for work of only marginal legal character. We believe, however, that the court's decision to award the lower rates for certain hours presents a more difficult question, especially with respect to a small number of hours of the work of Gilhool and Churchill, both experienced and extremely able counsel. The district court justified its action (awards of $65 and $25 per hour for certain work) on the grounds that the work at issue--even though carried out by such accomplished advocates--was either at the associate level or was mundane or minor in character and that the attorneys were therefore not entitled to their normal rate. In In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir.1984), we reviewed similar action by a district court, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the rates for substantial amounts of partner time to associate level. Id. at 591-93 (the court's ruling ... may be set aside only if predicated on clearly erroneous findings of fact or if it is so arbitrary and capricious as to amount to abuse.). 9 35 We review the district court's action here under the same standard as in Fine Paper. Although the question is close, recognizing that the district court had intimate familiarity with the case and that it took great care in scrutinizing the fee petitions, we must defer to the court's conclusion that Balter was directing the litigation and that Gilhool and Churchill's services were, in some instances, either at the associate level or ministerial in character. 10 In sum, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion, and thus the court's decisions on hourly rates will be affirmed.VI. THE SECOND CHAIR 36 Plaintiff appeals the district court's disallowance of time spent by more than one attorney at hearings because only one attorney spoke on behalf of the DVCCCA. Plaintiff concedes that multiple attendance at hearings may sometimes, or even often, be unnecessary, but asserts that the adoption of a per se rule that multiple representation is always unreasonable is arbitrary and incorrect. In plaintiff's view, the court ignored the underlying reasonableness of the common practice of attorneys to have more than one person present. 37 The course followed by the district court here was similar to that followed by the district court in Fine Paper. In that case we considered the district court's exclusion of fees for representation by more than one attorney at pretrial conferences and affirmed its decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 595. We conclude that the district court in this case carefully examined the need for the second chair at particular hearings, and that it did not abuse its discretion in denying fees therefor. We also conclude that denying fees for the second chair attorney does not conflict with the Clean Air Act. We will therefore affirm the district court's denial of fees for the second chair.