Opinion ID: 852652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Consecutive and Enhanced Sentencing

Text: As a result of our holdings in Part I, the two convictions for B felony arson and five of the six convictions for A felony arson are vacated, leaving Dorsey's sentence at 105 years as imposed by the trial court for consecutive terms of sixty years (murder) and forty-five years (Class A felony arson). Dorsey challenges his executed sentence, contending that the trial court erred when ordering the sentences to be run consecutively and abused its discretion in enhancing his sentences. The sentence was imposed in 1994, long before Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) and Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind.2005) and is not subject to those cases. The imposition of consecutive sentences is a separate and discrete decision from sentence enhancement, although both may be dependent upon the same aggravating circumstances. Ajabu v. State, 722 N.E.2d 339, 343 (Ind.2000). As with sentence enhancement, even a single aggravating circumstance may support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Sanquenetti v. State, 727 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Ind.2000). In its sentencing statement, the trial court acknowledged that there was one mitigating factor, a generally law abiding life, but found it outweighed by three aggravating circumstances. As aggravating circumstance, the trial court found: That the nature of the crimes are such that less than an enhanced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. The Court believes that Arson is akin to domestic terrorism. That Arson can result in the deaths of more innocent victims than almost any other crime besides terrorism. The court next found that Dorsey was in need of corrective treatment that can only be found at a prison setting noting Dorsey's aid in an escape attempt from the jail. Last, the court found that Dorsey was unrepentant about the criminal acts for which he was found guilty. Dorsey argues that the trial court relied on improper aggravating circumstances to enhance his sentences and to order them to be run consecutively. Dorsey first argues that this Court has consistently held that the depreciate the seriousness of the offense be used as an aggravating factor only when the court is considering the imposition of a shorter sentence than the presumptive. This is not an accurate statement. To the contrary, we have held that it is not error to enhance a sentence based upon the aggravating circumstance that a sentence less than the enhanced term would depreciate the seriousness of the crime committed. See Walter v. State, 727 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ind.2000); Huffman v. State, 717 N.E.2d 571, 577 (Ind.1999); Ector v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind.1994); Evans v. State, 497 N.E.2d 919, 923-24 (Ind.1986). However, depreciation of the seriousness of the crime should not be relied upon as a factor to order sentences to be served consecutively. See Sherwood v. State, 702 N.E.2d 694, 700 (Ind.1998); Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 715 (Ind.1998). Therefore, the trial court did not err when it relied on its conclusion that less than an enhanced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the offense as an aggravating circumstance for sentence enhancement. The other two aggravating factors support the trial court's decision to order the sentences to be served consecutively. Dorsey next argues that the court did not explain why he required correctional or rehabilitative treatment at a penal facility beyond the presumptive sentence. See Bailey v. State, 763 N.E.2d 998, 1004 (Ind. 2002) (court needs to explain why the defendant requires treatment beyond the presumptive sentence). We think the trial court's references to Dorsey's involvement in an escape attempt from jail were sufficient support for this finding. Dorsey also contends that it is improper . . . to rely on a defendant's maintaining his innocence as an aggravator. See Angleton v. State, 686 N.E.2d 803, 816 (Ind.1997). This is a correct proposition of law, but it is inapplicable here. Angleton noted that a defendant's lack of remorse can serve as an aggravator. Id. at 816 n. 11; see also Veal v. State, 784 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind.2003). Here, the trial court found that Dorsey was unrepentant about the criminal acts, not that he maintained innocence. Finally, Dorsey argues that sentences of this length should be reserved for the worst offenders. The trial court equated Dorsey's criminal act to domestic terrorism and cited the many lives that could have been lost as a result of his arson. We do not believe the trial court's decision to enhance Dorsey's knowing murder and Class A felony arson sentences was inappropriate. [3]