Opinion ID: 2176972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Revolving-Door Question

Text: The Governor first challenges § 36-14-5, subsections (n) and ( o ), as well as Ethics Commission Regulations XX-XX-XXXX and XX-XX-XXXX. Section 36-14-5(n) provides: No state elected official, while holding state office and for a period of one (1) year after leaving state office, shall seek or accept employment with any other state agency, as defined in § 36-14-2(4)(a), other than employment which was held at the time of the official's election or at the time of enactment of this subsection, except as provided herein. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit any general officer or the general assembly from appointing any state elected official to a senior policy-making, discretionary, or confidential position on the general officer's or the general assembly's staff, and in the case of the governor, to a position as a department director; nor shall the provisions herein prohibit any state elected official from seeking or accepting a senior policy-making, discretionary, or confidential position on any general officer's or the general assembly's staff, or from seeking or accepting appointment as a department director by the governor. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit a state elected official from seeking or being elected for any other constitutional office. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit the Rhode Island Ethics Commission from authorizing exceptions to this subsection where such exemption would not create an appearance of impropriety. Section 36-14-5( o ) places similar restrictions on persons holding senior policy-making, discretionary, or confidential position on the staff of any state-elected official or of the General Assembly. Subsection ( o ) contains exclusions similar to those noted under subsection (n) and adds an exclusion for those persons holding senior policy-making, discretionary, or confidential staff positions with a minimum of five years of uninterrupted state service. Regulation 36-14-5006 provides: No elected or appointed official may accept any appointment or election by the body of which he or she is or was a member, to any position which carries with it any financial benefit or remuneration, until the expiration of one (1) year after termination of his or her membership in or on such body, unless the Ethics Commission shall give its approval for such appointment or election, and, further provided, that such approval shall not be granted unless the Ethics Commission is satisfied that denial of such employment or position would create a substantial hardship for the body, board, or municipality. Regulation 36-14-5007 provides: No member of the General Assembly shall seek or accept state employment as an employee or consultant, not held at the time of the member's election, while serving in the General Assembly and for a period of one (1) year after leaving legislative office. For the sake of brevity and to ensure ease of judicial analysis, we choose to analyze several of the Governor's claims against the aforementioned statute and regulations together, under a revolving door analysis. Before we can group the statute and regulations for review purposes, we must first dispose of an argument asserted by the Ethics Commission (commission). The commission contends that § 36-14-5, subsections (n) and ( o ), is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with Ethics Commission Regulations XX-XX-XXXX and XX-XX-XXXX in violation of article 3, section 8, of the Rhode Island Constitution. We have ruled that the terms of article 3, section 8, expressly confer upon the commission the limited and concurrent power to enact substantive ethics laws. Accordingly, it logically follows that such an affirmative grant of power to the commission necessarily implies a limitation of the same on the part of the General Assembly or any other body. This is not to say, however, that the General Assembly is prohibited from enacting ethics laws altogether; rather, the General Assembly is merely limited to enacting laws that are not inconsistent with, or contradictory to, the code of ethics adopted by the commission.  (Emphasis added.) In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d 1, 14 (R.I. 1992). The commission asserts that the General Assembly has created exceptions to Regulations XX-XX-XXXX and XX-XX-XXXX by allowing exemptions for about 2 dozen top administrative positions on the staffs of general offices, as well as a small number of [other] long-term staff members. The commission argues that the regulations would delay appointments of all advisors and directors whereas § 36-14-5, subsections (n) and ( o ), would not. Section 36-14-5, subsections (n) and ( o ), allows the commission to grant an exemption in circumstances in which the exemption does not create an appearance of impropriety. The commission argues that the regulations grant an exemption only in stricter circumstances, when a candidate has unique and necessary qualifications for a position. We have determined that the commission has the concurrent power to enact ethics laws. See 612 A.2d at 14. [S]tatutes that relate to the same subject matter should be considered together so that they will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general objective scope.    This rule of construction applies even though the statutes in question contain no reference to each other and are passed at different times. Rhode Island Higher Education Assistance Authority v. Rhode Island Conflict of Interest Commission, 505 A.2d 427, 428 (R.I. 1986). The statute's subsections, while less constrictive than the regulations, are not inconsistent. Our preference is to interpret statutes that relate to the same subject matter so that each may be given its full effect. See id. In light of the more narrow nature of the commission's regulations, it is not persuasive to suggest that the regulations supersede the statute. Id. at 430. The regulations complement the statute which broadens their application to a larger group of individuals. An individual could be found to have violated the regulations while being in compliance with the statute. The statute and the regulations are not inconsistent but are compatible. The General Assembly has properly enacted the statute under its concurrent jurisdiction in the ethics arena.
The Governor claims that § 36-14-5, subsections (n) and ( o ), and Ethics Commission Regulations XX-XX-XXXX and XX-XX-XXXX (revolving-door legislation) violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and the Rhode Island Constitutions by creating an unconstitutional classification of individuals who may not be considered for public office. The Governor asserts that the revolving-door legislation mandates that those parties who have been employed by the state within the past year cannot be considered for certain public offices. The Governor, relying on Cummings v. Godin, 119 R.I. 325, 377 A.2d 1071 (1977), and Dwyer v. Conflict of Interest Commission, 646 F. Supp. 707 (D.R.I. 1986), contends that the revolving-door legislation restricts a public official's right to hold a successive public office and, accordingly, should be subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny. [T]he constitutional amendment that became art. 1, sec. 2, was passed to bring Rhode Island equal-protection law on par with federal equal-protection law. Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d 734, 738 (R.I. 1992). Therefore, by applying the federal analysis in the equal-protection area, we shall answer the Governor's question under both the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. Our analysis pursuant to an equal-protection claim commences with a consideration of the level of judicial scrutiny that the challenged legislation or action requires. A rational-basis scrutiny is applied to social or economic legislation, presuming it to be valid if the classification drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1985). Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receive an intermediate standard of review and will survive such scrutiny if they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 440-41, 105 S.Ct. at 3254-55, 87 L.Ed.2d at 320-21. Classifications based on race, alienage or national origin, or classifications that impinge upon fundamental rights, are subject to strict scrutiny and will survive an equal-protection claim only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d at 320; see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 1914, 100 L.Ed.2d 465, 471 (1988). The Governor asserts that the revolving-door legislation restricts a public official's right to hold a successive public office. The Governor relies on Cummings for the proposition that the holding of public office is a significant form of political expression and thus is one of the rights included within the ambit of the First Amendment. Cummings, 119 R.I. at 335-36, 377 A.2d at 1076. Consequently, the Governor avers, a high level of scrutiny must be applied. The Cummings court analyzed a municipal ordinance under the First Amendment and did not consider an equal-protection argument. Id. at 329-36, 377 A.2d at 1073-76. To the extent that the Cummings decision mandated that all barriers to a person's right to hold public office demand a high level of judicial scrutiny, or to the extent that Cummings identified candidacy for public office as a fundamental right, those beliefs must be revisited in light of Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982).  Far from recognizing candidacy as a `fundamental right,' we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot `does not of itself compel close scrutiny.' (Emphasis added.) Id. at 963, 102 S.Ct. at 2843, 73 L.Ed.2d at 516. Since candidacy for public office is not a fundamental right, then neither can the right to be appointed to a public office be a fundamental right. There is no per se fundamental right to government employment. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 524 (1976). The Supreme Court has departed from traditional equal-protection analysis in two lines of ballot-access cases. Clements, 457 U.S. at 964-66, 102 S.Ct. at 2844-45, 73 L.Ed.2d at 516-17. The Court has applied something more than the traditional rational-relationship test in ballot-access cases involving classifications based upon wealth and those classifications that burden small political parties or independent candidates. Id. Neither type of classification is implicated by the revolving-door legislation. Because this is an advisory opinion, we indulge in a digression suggested by the Attorney General and in fact struggle to identify the instant situation as one that involves access to the ballot or as a ballot-access question. Subsections (n) and ( o ) of § 36-14-5 have a specific exclusion for seeking election to state constitutional office. Regulation 36-14-5007 has been interpreted by the commission as also allowing a public official to seek elective office. ( See part II E of this opinion.) Our primary concern is with the tendency of ballot access restrictions `to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose.' Therefore `[i]n approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters.' Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1569, 75 L.Ed.2d 547, 556 (1983). Our ballot access cases    focus on the degree to which the challenged restrictions operate as a mechanism to exclude certain classes of candidates from the electoral process. The inquiry is whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the `availability of political opportunity.' Clements, 457 U.S. at 964, 102 S.Ct. at 2844, 73 L.Ed.2d at 516. The public positions to which the revolving-door legislation applies are appointed positions or are positions elected from a state or a municipal governing body. They are not positions that are elected by the general electorate. Therefore, the voters' interest or influence is extremely diluted and attenuated at best. The unrestricted vote they cast is for the person or the body exercising the power to appoint or elect. The revolving-door legislation does not unfairly burden those with political opportunities or aspirations. See id. We do not view the revolving-door legislation as per se restricting an individual's access to the electoral ballot since the general electorate has a de minimis impact on the person appointed or elected. Even if this were a narrower ballot-access restriction, the one-year waiting period dictated by the revolving-door legislation places a  de minimis burden on the political aspirations of a current office holder.    A `waiting period' is hardly a significant barrier to candidacy. (Emphasis added.) Clements, 457 U.S. at 967, 102 S.Ct. at 2846, 73 L.Ed.2d at 518 (holding that a two-year waiting period was insignificant and required only a rational predicate to survive an equal-protection challenge). The revolving-door legislation does not directly interfere with an individual's right to be a candidate for public office. The revolving-door legislation simply limits one employment option, for a one-year period, available to the covered class of individuals. Consequently any suggestion by Cummings that a higher level of scrutiny applies has been replaced by the implications of the Clements decision. Because the challenged legislation does not fall within a category that would require heightened scrutiny and since we view the legislation as social, the rational-relationship test is applicable. In order for the revolving-door legislation to pass constitutional equal-protection muster, it must be shown that the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The mere fact that the legislation could have been drawn more precisely will not invalidate the statute.    `The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.' In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO), 593 A.2d 943, 950 (R.I. 1991). A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 (1961). The revolving-door legislation addresses the imbroglio of public officials who use their present positions and contacts as unfair bargaining tactics in gaining future employment with the state or a municipality. [A] democracy is effective only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions   . United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562, 81 S.Ct. 294, 315, 5 L.Ed.2d 268, 295 (1961). The legislative aim of the revolving-door provisions is to ensure that public officials adhere to the highest standards of conduct, avoid the appearance of impropriety, and do not use their positions for private gain or advantage. See R.I. Const., art. 3, sec. 7. The integrity of our government officials is quintessential to our system of representation. In general the purpose of revolving-door provisions is to prevent government employees from unfairly profiting from or otherwise trading upon the contacts, associations and special knowledge that they acquired   . Forti v. New York State Ethics Commission, 75 N.Y.2d 596, 605, 554 N.E.2d 876, 878, 555 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (1990). The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men [or women] who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.  (Emphasis added.) The Federalist No. 57, at 383 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961). We believe that the revolving-door legislation is an effective device by which the public trust may be enhanced. There is a legitimate purpose in abridging the abuse of public office. The drafters of the revolving-door legislation could have reasonably concluded that the possibility of one's unjustly entrenching oneself in a public position, by moving from one state or municipal position to another, could be greatest for those positions to which the one-year waiting period was made applicable. This court imposes similar one-year waiting periods on former law clerks wishing to practice before this court (with a complete ban on any consultation and assistance on any case that was pending during the clerk's position) and on any former government attorney wishing to represent a private client before the agency in which he or she was once employed. ( See R.I. Supreme Court Rules Article II, Rule 11, and R.I. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.11(b).) The drafters may have concluded that the risk of undue influence is great in the positions that it identified. Their actions, taken as a whole, were a result of the difficult task of reaching an acceptable compromise among the important competing concerns, most notably the need to impose stricter controls while, at the same time, ensuring that government service does not become so unattractive that talented individuals are deterred from entering government service. Forti, 75 N.Y.2d at 604-05, 554 N.E.2d at 878, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 237. No government branch is immune from influence peddling, and we believe that there was an adequate basis for the ethical restraints imposed. See id. at 613, 554 N.E.2d at 883, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 242. The [drafters are] certainly entitled to consider that `[e]vils in the    field may be of different dimensions and proportions' so that different remedies are required. Id. The revolving-door legislation rests on a rational predicate and promotes integrity and public confidence in government.
The Governor next contends that the revolving-door legislation violates due process as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution. The Governor first avers that the revolving-door legislation violates due process by relying on an irrebuttable presumption that certain public officials are not appropriate candidates for state employment. The Governor contends that irrebuttable legislative presumptions are constitutionally disfavored. In support of his position the Governor cites a number of cases, principally, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973). Upon a review of Vlandis, and the other cases cited in support of the Governor's position, we note that the deprivations questioned in the cases upon which the Governor relies are of a more permanent nature than the deprivation that is now before us. In Vlandis, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that provided, that if a student's address was outside the state at the time of his or her application to a state university, that person remained a non resident so long as he or she remained at the state university. See id. We hold only that a permanent irrebuttable presumption    is violative of the Due Process Clause   . (Emphasis added.) Id. at 453, 93 S.Ct. at 2237, 37 L.Ed.2d at 72; see also Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.Minn. 1970), summarily affirmed, 401 U.S. 985, 91 S.Ct. 1231, 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971) (upholding Minnesota's residency requirement because the student could rebut the presumption, after having lived in the state for one year, by presenting some evidence of residency status). The Governor's irrebuttable-presumption argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the presumption in the revolving-door legislation is not permanent; rather, it is for a limited duration, a one-year period. Second, the presumption is rebuttable as the legislation so provides. Section 36-14-5, subsections (n) and ( o ), provides that the commission is authorized to grant exemptions in situations in which the exemption would not create an appearance of impropriety. Regulation 36-14-5006 provides the commission with the opportunity to grant an exemption if the denial of the questioned employment would create a substantial hardship. The presumption contained in the revolving-door legislation is either rebuttable, temporary, or both. Consequently the revolving-door legislation does not violate due process because it does not contain an irrebuttable presumption. The Governor contends that the revolving-door legislation also violates due process because it is arbitrary and irrational. In his initial memorandum the Governor did not explicitly state whether he was challenging the revolving-door legislation on a substantive or on a procedural due-process basis but rather relied on cases from both constitutional realms. In his subsequent reply memorandum the Governor clarified his position and stated that he was not raising a procedural due-process challenge. When local economic or social regulation is challenged as violating substantive due process, courts consistently defer to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory schemes. Unless a state law trammels fundamental personal rights, we are to presume that state legislatures have acted within their constitutional power and are to require only that the law `bears a reasonable relation to the state's legitimate purpose.' (Emphasis added.) The Oklahoma Education Association v. The Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission, 889 F.2d 929, 935 (10th Cir.1989) (quoting Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564, 575 (10th Cir.1984) and Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 125, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 2213, 57 L.Ed.2d 91, 99 (1978)); see also In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 519 A.2d 578, 582 (R.I. 1987) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) and Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 47 L.Ed.2d 708 (1976)). The Governor avers that the sweeping stigmatization of a significant pool of candidates for public office lacks a rational relationship to any legitimate state purpose and violates due process. The Governor readily admits that the level of judicial scrutiny in the due-process arena is the rational-relationship test. Our holding in the first part of this opinion under our equal-protection analysis applies equally to the Governor's due-process claim. Because the revolving-door legislation does not affect any fundamental right, a deferential rational-relationship test applies, and the revolving-door legislation passes constitutional muster under a substantive due-process analysis. ( See rational-relationship analysis at part II A of this opinion.) From our conclusion under equal protection, however, it follows a fortiori that the [revolving-door legislation] does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659, 673 n. 12 (1981). Because the Governor challenges the revolving-door legislation on the grounds that it arbitrarily denies a person the opportunity for individual consideration of his or her qualifications and cited both substantive and procedural due-process cases in his initial memorandum, we deem it appropriate to respond to this clouded challenge on what we perceive to be a procedural due-process vein. [P]rocedural due-process requires certain minimal standards of notice, hearing, and opportunity to respond adequately before a governmental agency may effectively deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property. State v. Manocchio, 448 A.2d 761, 764 n. 3 (R.I. 1982); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). [C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government[al] function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748-49, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230, 1236 (1961). Because the Governor has not specifically identified what deprivation of life, liberty, or property interest is unconstitutionally affected by the revolving-door legislation, our analysis appears meaningless. It is our position that the Governor does not propose a clear enough claim for this court to analyze it under a procedural due-process examination. In rejecting a similar procedural due-process challenge, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the proponents of the argument misunderstood the nature of procedural due process. When the legislature passes a law which affects a general class of persons, those persons have all received procedural due process  the legislative process. 2 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, 2nd § 17.8 at 646 (1992). The purpose of procedural due process is to provide a hearing to ensure that the statute's commands are fairly and not erroneously applied to an individual.    But `there is no requirement of a procedure to determine the basis for a[] [state] action which affects an individual where there are no factual issues in dispute.' The Oklahoma Education Association, 889 F.2d at 936. In Oklahoma Education Association state employees sued the Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission, seeking a declaration that a state constitutional provision precluding state employees from working in the liquor industry was unconstitutional. The Oklahoma Education Association court rejected the state employees' claim that individualized hearings were necessary to redress the arbitrariness of the challenged statute on the grounds that it was nothing more than a veiled challenge to the substance of the [statute]. Id. at 936. The court held that it was undisputed that the state employees were in fact state employees and therefore were expressly prohibited from obtaining liquor licenses in the state. Id. Our Legislature and the commission have rejected the individualized-hearing approach and have instead adopted a flat one-year waiting period. Had we a sufficient claim upon which to analyze the revolving-door legislation under a procedural due-process inquiry, we are inclined to believe that we would have followed the analysis outlined in the Oklahoma Education Association decision and thus would have rejected any procedural due-process challenge.
The Governor claims that subsections (n) and ( o ) of § 36-14-5 are overly broad because the statute excludes from consideration a substantial pool of eligible candidates while leaving less qualified persons available for the positions. The Governor, relying on Cummings and Martin v. State Board of Elections, 119 R.I. 556, 381 A.2d 234 (1977), claims that the state has no sufficient interest in barring a public official from succeeding to another state position. The Governor avers that the statute goes beyond the scope of what is relevant to the well-being of state government. An overbroad statute is one that is designed to burden or punish activities which are not constitutionally protected, but the statute includes within its scope activities which are protected by the first amendment. (Emphasis added.) 4 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, 2nd § 20.8 at 26 (1992). [T]he Court has altered its traditional rules of standing to permit  in the First Amendment area  `attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his [or her] own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.'    Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.  (Emphasis added.) Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 840 (1973). But the plain import of our cases is    that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset    forbids the State to sanction moves from `pure speech'    [to] conduct   . (Emphasis added.) Id. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917, 37 L.Ed.2d at 842. In challenges not implicating the First Amendment, the Court will not hear a case from a person to whom application of the legislation is constitutional on the basis that its application may be unconstitutional in regard to other people in different situations. See 4 Rotunda, § 20.8 at 26-27. Consequently, in order for the Governor to challenge subsections (n) and ( o ) of the statute, under the overbreadth doctrine he must identify a specific First Amendment restraint. The restrictions challenged in both Cummings and Martin prohibited an individual from holding any elective office. See Cummings, 119 R.I. at 328, 377 A.2d at 1072, and Martin, 119 R.I. at 557-58, 381 A.2d at 235. Those restraints may have more severe First Amendment implications than the interest affected in this instance. We believe that a person's interest in obtaining state employment, as minimally restricted by the statute, does not fall within the ambit of the First Amendment, nor does the statute reach the harshness of the restrictions noted in Cummings and Martin. Consequently, because the Governor fails to identify a First Amendment interest involved in this situation, the Governor does not have the necessary standing to raise an overbreadth challenge to subsections (n) and ( o ).
The Governor further contends that the revolving-door legislation violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. The Governor asserts that appointing qualified and experienced individuals to assist him in running the affairs of the state is an integral element of his duties. The revolving-door legislation, he asserts, substantially impinges on his duty by severely curtailing the pool of candidates from which he can choose his appointees. The doctrine of separation of powers is an inherent and integral element of the republican form of government. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d at 18. `[O]ne branch of government may exercise some of the powers of the other departments    when it is not an assumption of the whole power of another department,    .' Id. We have adopted the separation-of-powers test as formulated in Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.1980), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983); see State v. Jacques, 554 A.2d 193, 195-96 (R.I. 1989). `[T]he twin purposes of preventing concentrations of power dangerous to liberty and of promoting governmental efficiency are served if we define a constitutional violation of the separation of powers as [1] an assumption by one branch of powers that are central or essential to the operation of a coordinate branch, [2] provided also that the assumption disrupts the coordinate branch in the performance of its duties and [3] is unnecessary to implement a legitimate policy of the Government.' Id. at 196. The Governor contends that subsections (n) and ( o ) of § 36-14-5 impermissibly impinge on his appointment power. According to the first prong of the Chadha test, we must first determine whether the legislative branch has assumed powers that are essential to the operation of the executive branch. See Jacques, 554 A.2d at 196. The Legislature has assumed no power through the administration of the statute and cannot force upon the Governor appointments that he deems unacceptable. The Legislature has imposed certain minimal temporary restrictions on the pool of available applicants. Subsections (n) and ( o ) do not contain any language that vests the Legislature with any appointment power. Consequently the Legislature has not, directly or indirectly, assumed any essential power of the Governor. Thus subsections (n) and ( o ) survive the first prong of the Chadha test. Likewise, the subsections also survive the second and third prongs of the Chadha test. See Jacques, 554 A.2d at 196. Although the statute does have a minimal impact on the number of available candidates that the Governor may choose from, that impact does not disrupt his ability to carry out his duties. We view the definition of disruption as the act of throw[ing] into confusion or disorder. The American Heritage Dictionary, 408 (Second College Ed. 1982). The Governor is unlimited in his choices of appointments to important policy-making, confidential, and discretionary positions. The subsections temporarily limit the Governor's choices for other appointments to the judiciary, various commissions, and state agencies. The restriction is limited to a one-year period and applies to a very small number of candidates when compared to the entire pool of applicants available to the Governor. This finite restriction cannot be said to throw into confusion the Governor's ability to carry out his duties. We are not persuaded that the Governor's inability to appoint this limited number of individuals would render him incapable of performing the necessary duties of his office. As we have discussed in an earlier part of this opinion, the legislative aim of the revolving-door legislation is to ensure that public officials avoid the appearance of impropriety and enhance public confidence and integrity in our system of representation. We believe that the statute is designed to achieve a legitimate purpose. See Jacques, 554 A.2d at 196. In our view, subsections (n) and ( o ) of § 36-14-5 do not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. The Governor also contends that Regulations XX-XX-XXXX and XX-XX-XXXX violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. The Governor contends that Regulation 36-14-5007 substantially impinges on his appointment power while Regulation 36-14-5006 restricts legislators and local officials from fulfilling their duty to make appointments to public office. This court has specifically stated that the commission cannot assume powers that are central or essential to the operation of the Governor's office or of the General Assembly. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1992). This court has reserved the power to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether the actions of the commission have violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. Id. at 20. [T]he commission may not set standards that seriously impinge upon the executive or the legislative branch's ability to perform the usual or ordinary duties for which each is elected, including the appointment of various officials to public office.    [U]nless the commission is usurping the power of another [branch] or coercively influencing the [other branch], there is no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 19. The instant regulations do not deprive the Governor or the General Assembly or local officials of their power to make appointments. As we have stated, the de minimis restriction that is placed on the power to make appointments is temporary and is not seriously intrusive of either the executive or the legislative branch's power. For the same reasons stated in the previous section in which we analyzed subsections (n) and ( o ) of § 36-14-5, we believe that the regulations do not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.
The Governor further asserts that Regulation 36-14-5007 violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 21, of the Rhode Island Constitution by infringing on an individual's right to seek an elective office. The Governor claims that the regulation will prevent present legislators from seeking election to other state offices for one year after leaving legislative office. If the regulation contained such a ban, there may be constitutional implications warranting a stricter analysis. The commission does not interpret Regulation 36-14-5007 as denying legislators a right to seek elective office. In its memorandum, the commission admits that [t]he Commission's interpretation of its Regulation 36-14-5007 would not prohibit legislators to run for elected office. [T]he Commission does not interpret Regulation 5007 as preventing the members of the General Assembly from immediately seeking election to an office, considering that the potential for influence peddling in one's current position is negligible in connection with a subsequent election to an office by popular vote. Neither the commission's interpretation nor our interpretation of the regulation would bar access to elective office; hence, we do not analyze the regulation under the Governor's First Amendment challenge.