Opinion ID: 2085464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mutual Admissibility

Text: We next consider defendant's argument that the charges in the indictment were not mutually admissible, and, as a result, he suffered prejudice arising from the jury's inference of criminal disposition and cumulation of evidence. There can be no question that a potential for prejudice to a defendant can arise from admitting at trial evidence of other criminal activity that could tend to show the defendant's propensity to commit the particular crime charged. Whitman, 431 A.2d at 1231. In general, the right to a fair trial is not prejudiced by the joinder of charges in cases in which the outcome would have been the same if separate trials had been held. State v. Evans, 742 A.2d 715, 718-19 (R.I.1999). When the evidence admitted in a trial on the joined charges would be mutually admissible in separate trials, it is not likely that the defendant can show that he actually was prejudiced by the joinder. See, e.g., Day, 898 A.2d at 706; State v. Cline, 122 R.I. 297, 331-32, 405 A.2d 1192, 1211 (1979); see also Drew, 331 F.2d at 90 (If    the evidence of each of the crimes on trial would be admissible in a separate trial for the other, the possibility of `criminal propensity' prejudice would be in no way enlarged by the fact of joinder.). Conversely, when the evidence may not be mutually admissible in separate trials, we are not compelled to assume that the defendant has been prejudiced. Indeed, federal courts have, in general, found no prejudicial effect from joinder when the evidence of each crime is simple and distinct, even though such evidence might not have been admissible in separate trials. Drew, 331 F.2d at 91 & n. 13 (citing federal court decisions). In this case, when the trial justice denied defendant's motion to sever the charges, he ruled that the evidence of each offense would be admissible in separate trials because the allegations supported a clear pattern of behavior despite the twenty-one years that may have elapsed. He further said that: things that should be considered, as allowed in the trial of all matters together, is the defendant's activity to show sexual gratification, to prove that there was a common scheme or MO, so to speak, with young girls who he had control or influence over to show that there was an opportunity to abuse children of like age and also to counter any possible defenses of mistake or accident, and also explain why the defendant's niece did not report his abuse of her until many years after it occurred, and further to explain the context of the defendant's admission that he had previously sexually molested his niece. We cannot say that the trial justice clearly was wrong when he decided that the evidence would have been mutually admissible. It is likely that evidence submitted to support the charge pertaining to defendant's abuse of his daughter may well have been admitted in a trial involving defendant's abuse of his niece to explain her delay in reporting the assault and to give context to defendant's admission that he had abused her. See State v. Hopkins, 698 A.2d 183, 185-86 (R.I.1997) (evidence of sexual misconduct occurring ten years prior was admissible to explain belated report of abuse). The evidence of defendant's abuse of his niece also may have been admissible in a separate trial pertaining to his abuse of his daughter to rebut an implied charge of fabrication. See id. (evidence of sexual misconduct also admissible to rebut implication that victim fabricated complaints, motivated by a stormy relationship). Nevertheless, we need not decide this issue based upon whether the evidence submitted at trial would have been mutually admissible in separate trials. Instead, we affirm the trial justice's decision because the evidence was straightforward, simple, and distinct and defendant has failed to show that he has suffered any real and substantial prejudice. [6] In most instances, severance is not required under Rule 14 when `the evidence related to each one of the counts is straightforward, simple, and distinct.' Day, 898 A.2d at 705 (quoting Rice, 755 A.2d at 144); see also Sharbuno, 120 R.I. at 718, 390 A.2d at 918. Experience has proven that juries are able to respond impartially to the trial evidence with the assistance given by instructions from the trial justice. State v. LaRoche, 683 A.2d 989, 998 (R.I.1996). In this case, not only was the evidence presented by the state on each charge straightforward, simple, and distinct, but the trial justice also gave appropriate instructions. The state brought only three charges, involving only two victims. Each victim testified solely about the assault that she had experienced at the hands of defendant. The testimony and the evidence were uncomplicated. The trial justice also provided the jury with scrupulously appropriate instructions. He explained to the jury that to find defendant guilty of the charges, each alleged violation must be found separately. He said, [i]f you find the defendant guilty of one of the charges you cannot automatically assume that he's guilty of any other charge. He also instructed the jury that Kim's testimony relating to other uncharged instances of abuse by defendant could be considered only for the limited purpose of whether defendant showed a lewd disposition towards her, and for no other purpose. We are not blind to the possibility that a jury could become hostile and misuse evidence to infer a criminal disposition, particularly in a trial involving allegations of sexual misconduct, see State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 627, 382 A.2d 526, 533 (1978) (recognizing that evidence of other sexual misconduct is uniquely apt to arouse the jury's hostility). Here, however, the jury acquitted defendant of one of the charges. When we consider the trial justice's instructions, coupled with the jury's acquittal of defendant on count 3, we see no reason to believe that the jury became hostile, cumulated the evidence, or was prejudiced by inferring that defendant had a criminal disposition from which it assumed his guilt. See LaRoche, 683 A.2d at 998 (the defendant failed to show prejudice when he was acquitted on the two counts he alleged to be most damaging to his right to a fair trial); Goodreau, 560 A.2d at 322 (the defendant failed to show prejudice from joinder of sexual assault offenses when jurors acquitted the defendant on charges involving one of the victims); Patriarca, 112 R.I. at 30-31, 308 A.2d at 311 (the defendant failed to show that the jury cumulated the evidence, inferred criminal disposition, or showed hostility when the jury found the defendant guilt of conspiracy but returned no verdict on the substantive charges). In the circumstances of the case before us, Pereira has not demonstrated that he has suffered any real or substantial prejudice that would outweigh this Court's consideration of the trial justice's legitimate concerns for judicial economy. Therefore, we will not disturb the trial justice's decision denying severance.