Opinion ID: 2973076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Partial Grant of Summary Judgment

Text: This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Killian v. Healthsource Provident Adm’rs, Inc., 152 F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir. 1998). The Court must examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Noble v. Chrysler Motors Corp., Jeep Div., 32 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Massey v. Exxon Corp., 942 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1991)) (quotations omitted); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (“[T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (quotations & citations omitted). If there exists a genuine issue of material fact – one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law” – the summary judgment must be overturned. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 3
In its partial grant of summary judgment, the district court accurately noted that “[i]t is well settled that federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims unless the claimant explicitly files the claim in an EEOC charge or the claim can be reasonably expected to grow out of the EEOC charge.” J.A. 382 (quoting Doan v. NSK Corp., 266 F. Supp. 2d 629, 635 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Strouss v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 250 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2001))); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); EEOC v. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d 836, 839 (6th Cir. 1994). In the present case, Hopson filed only one claim with the EEOC and could not “provide[] the court with any reason to conclude that his other race discrimination and retaliation claims could be reasonably expected to grow out of the EEOC charge.” J.A. 383. Consequently, the court found that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over any of the Title VII claims except for the one charge Hopson filed with the EEOC. Hopson asserts that DaimlerChrysler waived its ability to question the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over his Title VII claims because it did not raise the issue during this case’s first appeal. See Final Br. Appellant at 26. However, lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a waivable defect and may be raised sua sponte at any time during the proceedings.1 See Ambrose v. Welch, 1 In the alternative, Hopson invites the Court to extend the scope of the “single filing rule” set out in Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d at 839-40. In that case, this Court held that in actions concerning numerous employees with the same grievances, “where a substantially related non-filed claim arises out of the same time frame as a timely filed claim, the complainant need not satisfy Title VII’s filing requirement to recover. Id. at 840. The Court declines this invitation. 4 729 F.2d 1084, 1085 (6th Cir. 1984). Therefore, this Court AFFIRMS the district court’s finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claims unrelated to Hopson’s EEOC filing.
Retaliation claims under ELCRA are subject to the same burden-shifting analysis that applies to Title VII claims. See Hazle v. Ford Motor Co., 628 N.W.2d 515, 521-22 (Mich. 2001). To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under the act, a plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence“(1) that he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) that the exercise of his civil rights was known to the defendant; (3) that, thereafter, the defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Harrison v. Metro. Gov’t, 80 F.3d 1107, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 667 (6th Cir. 1999); see DeFlaviis v. Lord & Taylor, Inc., 566 N.W.2d 661, 663-64 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). If the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant must present a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for its conduct. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). The burden then returns to the plaintiff, who must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s stated reasons serve as a pretext for retaliation. See id. In its ruling below, the district court found that Hopson could establish a prima facie case for retaliation and that the affidavit of David E. Stepaniak presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for DaimlerChrysler’s conduct. J.A. 384. However, the court found that Hopson produced no evidence that could substantiate that DaimlerChrysler’s claimed reasons for its employment 5 actions constituted a pretext for discrimination. J.A. 384-85. The evidence Hopson presented to the court for this purpose – Slater’s opinion, the Sase statistics, and Hopson’s employment record – showed race discrimination rather than retaliation and therefore “failed to show that Defendant’s proffered reasons for adverse employment actions are pretext to mask retaliation[.]” J.A. 385 (emphasis added). Due to this evidentiary inadequacy, the court correctly granted summary judgment for DaimlerChrysler on the ELCRA claims. Accordingly, this Court AFFIRMS the district court’s decision.