Opinion ID: 200820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Monaghan's Acquittal

Text: Although North disclaims any argument for acquittal based on inconsistent verdicts, he argues that since Monaghan was acquitted of the conspiracy charge, he too must be acquitted. He offers several theories to bridge this gap. First, North argues that Monaghan's acquittal requires that all references to her must be read out of the indictment, thus allegedly rendering the indictment insufficient for lack of specificity. As the government sensibly rejoins, the sufficiency of an indictment is not determined by hindsight but by whether it gave fair notice at the outset, stated all the elements of the offense, and enabled a plea of double jeopardy. As discussed above, the indictment passed this test. Second, North argues that Monaghan's acquittal logically means that there was insufficient proof against him of the one conspiracy concretely noticed in the indictment, i.e., a North/Monaghan conspiracy. This tautology, too, must be rejected. In United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d 593 (1st Cir. 1990), we rejected a nearly identical argument, holding that the acquittal of the only other named co-conspirator did not mean that there existed no conspiracy between the two but might instead mean, among other possibilities, that the jury was disposed to lenity toward the other co-conspirator. Id. at 595. Lenity seems to be an especially plausible explanation for Monaghan's acquittal, -14- since the government's proof against Monaghan suggested that, by comparison to North, she played a very limited role. The bottom line is that, despite North's creative interpretation of the indictment, it expressly charged a conspiracy that implicated other persons. Thus, even if we were to apply a rule requiring consistency, (i.e., requiring reversal of a conspirator's conviction when all other alleged coconspirators have been acquitted), there is no perceived inconsistency where the convicted defendant was alleged and shown to have conspired with one or more persons who were unapprehended, dead, or simply unknown, . . . [or where] any [other] coconspirator's case was disposed of other than on the merits. Id. at 595 n.3. North's conviction obviously fits into the latter category, so there was no inconsistency here. In a third variation on this theme, North argues that the court's charge to the jury that each defendant's participation in the conspiracy should be separately determined amounted to a constructive amendment. In light of what we already have said, the instruction was correct. Upon de novo review of the jury instruction, we find that it was faithful to the indictment's charge and there was no constructive amendment. -15-