Opinion ID: 1444170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Constitutionally Ineffective Counsel

Text: Well-established legal criteria govern the assessment of an ineffective counsel claim. Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant effective assistance of counsel. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 686, 691-692, 104 S.Ct. 2052; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) The right of a criminal defendant to counsel entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather' to effective assistance. ( In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 180, 249 Cal. Rptr. 342, 756 P.2d 1370.) Specifically, he is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent and conscientious advocate. ( In re Cordero, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 180, 249 Cal.Rptr. 342, 756 P.2d 1370.) This means that before counsel undertakes to act, or not to act, counsel must make a rational and informed decision on strategy and tactics founded upon adequate investigation and preparation. ( In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 602, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 727, 822 P.2d 435 (Marquez) ; see also( People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 215, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) While our scrutiny of an attorney's conduct of the defense is deferential, that deference is limited. [I]t must never be used to insulate counsel's performance from meaningful scrutiny and thereby automatically validate challenged acts or omissions. Otherwise, the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel would be reduced to form without substance. ( People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 217, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) A habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of proof of the facts on which an incompetent counsel challenge to the validity of the judgment under which the petitioner is restrained is predicated, by a preponderance of the evidence. ( In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 351, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 801, 926 P.2d 987.) To do so on a theory that he received constitutionally inadequate representation by counsel at the penalty phase of his trial, he must establish that counsel's performance did not meet an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that he suffered prejudice thereby. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) Prejudice is established when `there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors [of counsel], the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.' [Citations.] As in the guilt phase, reasonable probability is defined as one that undermines confidence in the verdict. ( Marquez, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 606, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, 822 P.2d 435.) Alternatively, the petitioner may establish that as a result of counsel's inadequacy, the prosecution case was not subject to meaningful adversarial testing, thereby raising a presumption that the result is unreliable. ( United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 658-659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657.) Before these criteria are applied, we address factual disputes which appear in the return and traverse where resolution is necessary to determine the merits of petitioner's claim of constitutionally ineffective representation by counsel at the penalty phase of his trial.