Opinion ID: 3170368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Commerce’s Determination Accords with Law

Text: Nan Ya does not contest Commerce’s decision to apply adverse facts available in determining its dumping margin, but principally argues that Commerce applied the incorrect legal standard in determining the margin. Appellant’s Br. 5 (“The [adverse facts available rate] here is contrary to . . . law.”); Appellant’s Reply Br. 1 (“Our argument is as to legal standards that Commerce must use for [a] lawful” adverse facts available rate. (emphasis modified)). Specifically, Nan Ya contends that Commerce violated 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) and (c) when it assigned the 74.34% rate to Nan Ya. See Appellant’s Br. 5. As discussed below, Commerce’s determination does not conflict with law. A. Nan Ya Misunderstands Commerce’s Duties Under the Statutory Scheme As an initial matter, Nan Ya bases a number of its allegations on the legal premise that Commerce must select an adverse facts available rate that reflects “commercial reality” and is “accurate.” Appellant’s Br. 5, 7, 8, 10, 14, 16, 18–19, 27, 31–32 (discussing “commercial reality”); id. at 3–4, 6, 20, 25–26, 34 (discussing “accurate”). Nan Ya’s arguments borrow these terms from past decisions of this court. The CIT similarly has relied upon these terms in 12 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES recent decisions, not only in cases involving adverse facts available determinations but also in other areas. See, e.g., Baoding Mantong Fine Chemistry Co. v. United States, No. 12-00362, 2015 WL 6685530, at  (Ct. Int’l Trade Nov. 3, 2015) (discussing “commercial reality” in adverse facts available context); Dongguan Sunrise Furniture Co. v. United States, No. 10-00254, 2015 WL 179003, at –5 (Ct. Int’l Trade Jan. 14, 2015) (same); see also Vinh Hoan Corp. v. United States, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1302–06, 1321 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015) (discussing the term “accurate” in the selection of a surrogate country and surrogate values under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(2), (4)); Albemarle Corp. v. United States, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1291–92 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013) (discussing “commercial reality” in the selection of the rate assigned to non-individually examined respondents in nonmarket economy antidumping proceedings). Our jurisprudence to date has not straightforwardly defined these terms; today, we clarify their meaning. In the early 1990s, we began to use the terms “com- mercial reality” and “accurate” in our trade remedy decisions in a variety of contexts. For example, we held: (1) that Commerce, consistent with the statute in effect at the time, may rely upon a rebuttable presumption that the highest margin calculated in a prior segment of the proceeding reflects a non-cooperating respondent’s pricing behavior during a later period, Rhone Poulenc, 899 F.2d at 1191 (using “accurately” to sustain Commerce’s interpretation of the predecessor to § 1677e(b)); 7 (2) that 7 The predecessor statute stated: In making [its] determinations under this subti- tle, [Commerce] . . . shall, whenever a party or any other person refuses or is unable to produce in- formation requested in a timely manner and in the form required, or otherwise significantly imNAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 13 Commerce must consider a widely-accepted accounting principle in imputing costs and may support its decision by relying upon a respondent’s records kept in the ordinary course of business, LMI-La Metalli Industriale, S.p.A. v. United States, 912 F.2d 455, 457–58, 460–61 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (favorably quoting Commerce’s use of “accurate” in calculating a respondent’s warehousing costs and discussing “commercial reality” in the context of time value of money); (3) that Commerce cannot assume absolute consistency in prices, but may compare foreign and domestic goods based on shared physical characteristics, U.H.F.C. Co. v. United States, 916 F.2d 689, 697–98, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing “commercial reality” in the context of consistency of prices and “accurate” when describing Commerce’s decision to match products with similar physical characteristics); and (4) that Commerce must account for a particular company’s sales practice when interpreting a contract, Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 106 F.3d 376, 379, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (using “commercial reality” and “accurate” to discuss contract terms). We also used the term “accurate” in maintaining that, when Commerce uses secondary information as adverse facts available, that secondary information must reflect an “estimate” constructed pursuant to the statutory method for calculating dumping margins to meet the corroboration requirement under § 1677e(c). De Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1032. And we used the terms while observing that a respondent’s dumping margin may change if the respondent changes its pricing behavior. See Parkdale Int’l v. United States, 475 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (using “commercial realit[y]” and “accurate[]” to describe the attendant changes in a dumping pedes an investigation, use the best information otherwise available. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (1988). 14 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES margin following a respondent’s change in pricing behavior). Since 2010, we began to use the terms with greater frequency. For example, in reviewing a Commerce adverse facts available determination made during the first administrative review of an order, we said that the petition rate Commerce selected “did not . . . represent commercial reality” within the industry in light of the dumping margins calculated at the end of the investigation for cooperative respondents. Gallant Ocean, 602 F.3d at 1323–24; see also id. (favorably quoting the use of “accurate” in De Cecco). We have repeated that statement when reviewing the same kind of Commerce determination in other appeals. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Shrimp, 802 F.3d at 1361 (quoting Commerce’s use of “commercial reality” and favorably quoting the use of “accurate” in De Cecco); Dongtai Peak Honey Indus. Co. v. United States, 777 F.3d 1343, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (using “commercial reality” to describe a margin that Commerce calculated using another respondent’s verified information and that Commerce applied as adverse facts available in a later segment and holding that accuracy concerns cannot overcome Commerce’s ability to enforce its procedural deadlines); KYD, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.3d 760, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (favorably quoting use of “commercial reality” in Gallant Ocean). We also have stated that the rate Commerce assigns to a non-individually examined respondent in a nonmarket economy antidumping proceeding should reflect that respondent’s “commercial reality.” See Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United States, 716 F.3d 1370, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also id. (favorably quoting use of “accurate” in Rhone Poulenc and Gallant Ocean); 8 cf. Changzhou Wujin Fine Chem. Factory Co. v. 8 Our decision in Bestpak used “commercial reality” and “economic reality” synonymously. 716 F.3d at 1378– NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 15 United States, 701 F.3d 1367, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (favorably quoting use of “accurately” and “accurate” in Parkdale and Gallant Ocean, respectively); id. at 1384 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (explaining that an adverse facts available rate need not reflect a non-individually examined respondent’s “commercial reality”). We clarify that “commercial reality” and “accurate” represent reliable guideposts for Commerce’s determinations. Those terms must be considered against what the antidumping statutory scheme demands. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (holding that agencies and the courts must follow Congress’s unambiguous directive or the agencies otherwise must provide a permissible construction of an ambiguous statute). The term “commercial reality” does not appear in the statutes that Commerce administers, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 et. seq, and the term “accurate” appears only once, id. § 1677m(b) (explaining that a party that provides factual information to Commerce “shall certify that such information is accurate and complete to the best of that person’s knowledge”). 9 Congress has provided specific methods for Commerce to employ when it executes its duties, such as in calculating normal value or export price, §§ 1677a (export price), 1677b (normal value), or when the agency assigns rates on the basis of adverse facts available, § 1677e(b). When Congress directs the agency to measure pricing behavior and 80. In that decision, we borrowed the statement “economic reality” from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Eurodif, id. at 1378, which held that “public law is not constrained by private fiction” because the statute directed Commerce to treat the leasing arrangements at issue in that case as sales of goods, rather than services rendered. See Eurodif, 555 U.S. at 317–18. 9 None of our decisions to date have quoted the term “accurate” from § 1677m(b). 16 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES otherwise execute its duties in a particular manner, Commerce need not examine the economic or commercial reality of the parties specifically, or of the industry more generally, in some broader sense. See Eurodif, 555 U.S. at 317–18 (explaining that “public law is not constrained by private fiction” when Congress has entrusted Commerce to take particular action). The statute, or Commerce’s permissible interpretation of it, provides the backdrop against which we must review the agency’s determination. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. Our case law and the statute thus teach that a Com- merce determination (1) is “accurate” if it is correct as a mathematical and factual matter, thus supported by substantial evidence; and (2) reflects “commercial reality” if it is consistent with the method provided in the statute, thus in accordance with law. See Essar Steel Ltd. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1268, 1275–76 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (sustaining a Commerce determination as “accurate” because it was supported by substantial evidence and “determined in accordance with the statutory requirements” (citation omitted)); KYD, 607 F.3d at 768 (discussing same); see also Gallant Ocean, 602 F.3d at 1323–24 (explaining that a rate did not reflect “commercial reality” because of concerns that the numbers used in the underlying calculations later proved not to be “credible,” meaning that Commerce had not used a lawful method to assign a dumping margin under § 1677e(b) (citation omitted)). Our holding reflects what the statutory scheme already requires of Commerce to support its determinations. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (explaining that Commerce’s determination will be sustained unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). And it reflects the familiar principle that “[a]dministrative decisions should be set aside . . . only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute, . . . not simply because the court is unhappy with the result reached.” Vt. Yankee NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 17 Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (internal citation omitted). As we have said before about the antidumping law, “[o]ur duty is not to weigh the wisdom of, or to resolve any struggle between, competing views of the public interest, but rather to respect legitimate policy choices made by [Commerce] in interpreting and applying the statute.” Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). The court does not use “accurate” and “commercial reality” in some broader sense, such as to require Commerce to apply the statutory methods to determine the industrywide “commercial realities prevailing” during a particular time period. Albemarle, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 1292. Nor must Commerce “prove a negative” about a respondent’s pricing behavior if that respondent fails to provide evidence that would yield more representative calculations of its pricing behavior, see, e.g., Home Meridian Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 772 F.3d 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2014), for the statute permits Commerce to use adverse facts available in that situation to assign the respondent a margin, 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b); see also PSC VSMPO–Avisma Corp. v. United States, 688 F.3d 751, 760 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that “absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances[,] the administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)). The statutory scheme measures through specific methods non-commercial pricing behavior deemed unfair by Congress—namely, dumping. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 et. seq. To obligate Commerce to account for other market conditions that the statute does not “misconceives not only the scope of the agency’s statutory responsibility, but also the nature of the administrative process,” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 550, and could subject Com18 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES merce to allegations that it acts ultra vires in future administrative proceedings, see City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2013) (explaining that an agency’s “power to act and how [it is] to act is authoritatively prescribed by Congress, so that when [it] act[s] improperly, . . . what [it] do[es] is ultra vires”). It also would permit courts to reach “results-oriented” outcomes not intended by Congress. See, e.g., Viraj Grp. v. United States, 476 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (a court errs in adopting an interpretation of a statute that “would create a tremendous burden on Commerce that is not required or suggested by the statute”); see also JBF RAK LLC v. United States, 790 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing same). “Indeed, the pursuit of what the court perceives to be the best or correct result would render judicial review totally unpredictable.” PSC, 688 F.3d at 761 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). B. Nan Ya Fails to Demonstrate Error by Commerce Nan Ya alleges that Commerce’s determination does not comport with what 19 U.S.C. 1677e(b) and (c) demand. Appellant’s Br. 5–35. We discuss each set of arguments in turn. 1. Commerce’s Decision to Use Shinkong’s Highest Transaction-Specific Margin as a Total Adverse Facts Available Rate Is Permitted by the Plain Terms of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(4) Section 1677e(b)(4) permits Commerce to use “any other information placed on the record” as adverse facts available. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(4). In its remand redetermination, Commerce found that language ambiguous because it does not directly address whether the agency may use the highest “transaction-specific margin from an ongoing segment . . . as a total [adverse facts available] rate.” S.A. 111. Nevertheless, Commerce found that the statute reasonably could be read to allow such use beNAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 19 cause it reflects “a model-specific comparison of a respondent’s U.S. sale price to its home market sale price— the quintessential comparison for a dumping margin.” S.A. 112–13. Finally, it found that the SAA supports its interpretation. S.A. 113. We disagree with Commerce that the phrase “any other information placed on the record” in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(4) is ambiguous and, instead, hold that the statute’s plain terms permit the agency to apply Shinkong’s highest transaction-specific margin as Nan Ya’s adverse facts available rate. Under the first step of Chevron, “we must first carefully investigate the matter to determine whether Congress’s purpose and intent on the question at issue is judicially ascertainable,” using “traditional tools of statutory construction.” Timex V.I., Inc. v. United States, 157 F.3d 879, 881–82 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). One such canon explains that, in the absence of a statutory definition, “we construe . . . statutory term[s] in accordance with [their] ordinary or natural meaning.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (citation omitted). The statute does not define the phrase “any other information placed on the record.” The word “any” is the key modifier in the phrase in question. “Any” means “one that is selected without restriction or limitation of choice.” Any, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1986). The absence of a “restriction or limitation” means that the statute gives Commerce substantial discretion to decide which record information to use and certainly encompasses Shinkong’s single highest transaction-specific margin. That conclusion finds support in the broad reach that the Supreme Court has given to the word “any.” See, e.g., United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 (1945) (equating “any” with “all”); see also Barseback Kraft AB v. United States, 121 F.3d 1475, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing same). And our conclusion is consistent with what we have said 20 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES before, albeit not in precise Chevron terms. See Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, 298 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is within Commerce’s discretion to presume that the highest prior margin reflects the current margins.” (citation omitted)). Our conclusion finds further support in the structure of § 1677e. As explained below, Congress did not require Commerce to corroborate information that it uses in the subject review if the agency obtained the information in the course of that segment; however, Congress required Commerce to corroborate information from a prior segment of the proceeding that it uses as adverse facts available in a later segment. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)–(c). That Congress decided not to require Commerce to corroborate information obtained in this review, such as Shinkong’s, further evinces that Commerce has broad discretion to choose among the available record information. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“‘[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” (citation omitted)). Because the statute’s text “answers the question, that is the end of the matter.” 10 Timex, 157 F.3d at 882 (citation omitted). Nan Ya alleges that Commerce unlawfully interpreted “any other information placed on the record” in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(4) as allowing it to use the highest transactionspecific margin on the record of the review. According to Nan Ya, Commerce’s interpretation unreasonably: (1) 10 We observe that the SAA mentions only that Commerce may use “other information placed on the record”; it does not provide any limitation on which information the agency may use. SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199. NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 21 incorporates within its ambit “a de minimis amount of sales” that results in a margin “that is many multiples more than all calculated margins,” Appellant’s Br. 5 (capitalization omitted); (2) permits the agency to use a margin that is “aberrant” and otherwise falls outside the “continuum” of calculated margins in view of various statistical analyses, id. at 8, 13–17; (3) relies upon incomplete criteria in light of other statutory and regulatory criteria, id. at 17–21; (4) relies upon the absence of a request from Shinkong to exclude the transaction giving rise to the 74.34% rate, id. at 23–25; and (5) creates a per se rule that is inconsistent with agency practice, id. at 21– 23. As an initial matter, we observe that Nan Ya fails to make these arguments within the operative Chevron framework. That misstep typically warrants a finding of waiver. See United States v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 738 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“It is well established that arguments that are not appropriately developed in a party’s briefing may be deemed waived.” (citations omitted)); Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding waiver when “counsel has made no attempt to address the issue” because “[t]he premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as selfdirected boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them”); see also Zhejiang Sanhua Co. v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1358 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015) (citing Great American Insurance and Carducci in holding that a party waived its arguments for failing to raise them within the operative Chevron framework); JBF RAK LLC v. United States, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1356 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014) (citing Great American Insurance in reaching the same conclusion); MTZ Polyfilms, Ltd. v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1308–09 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009) (citing Carducci in reach22 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES ing same conclusion). Nevertheless, for clarity, we address Nan Ya’s contentions. Nan Ya fails to recognize that neither “any other information placed on the record” in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(4), nor any other provision in subsection (b) contains any of the requirements it alleges. Section 1677e(b) states: If [Commerce] . . . finds that an interested party has failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with a request for information from [Commerce] . . . , [Commerce] . . . , in reach- ing the applicable determination under this subtitle, may use an inference that is adverse to the interests of that party in selecting from among the facts otherwise available. Such adverse inference may include reliance on information derived from— (1) the petition, (2) a final determination in the investigation under this subtitle, (3) any previous review under section 1675 of this title or determination under section 1675b of this title, or (4) any other information placed on the record. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). The statute simply does not require Commerce to select facts that reflect a certain amount of sales, yield a particular margin, fall within a continuum according to the application of particular statistical methods, or align with standards articulated in other statutes and regulations. Congress decided what requirements Commerce must fulfill in reaching its determinations, § 1677e(b), and we do not impose conditions not present in or suggested by the statute’s text. See, e.g., JBF, 790 F.3d at 1368; Viraj Grp., 476 F.3d at 1357–58. NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 23 Nan Ya’s remaining arguments also fail. Although Nan Ya alleges that Commerce’s remand redetermination establishes “that Commerce may per se use the highest calculated dumping margin as [adverse facts available],” Appellant’s Br. 25, its argument ignores Commerce’s statement in that determination, S.A. 127 (Commerce’s remand redetermination “does not create a per se rule that automatically requires use of the highest transaction-specific margin.”); S.A. 127 (explaining that Commerce “ultimately applied a margin significantly lower than Nan Ya’s highest transaction-specific margin [from the immediately-preceding review that is] on the record” of this review). Commerce articulated that the use of the highest transaction-specific margin will depend upon the facts of a particular case. S.A. 120, 127 (explaining that, if the highest weighted-average margins from any segment of the proceeding are “insufficient to induce cooperation,” then it will use other transaction-specific margins). Finally, Nan Ya argues that Commerce’s decision to apply adverse facts available impermissibly “rest[s] wholly (100%) on deterrence (punishment).” Appellant’s Br. 25–28. The legislative history belies Nan Ya’s argument. The SAA explains that [w]here a party has not cooperated, Com- merce . . . may employ adverse inferences about the missing information to ensure that the party does not obtain a more favorable result by failing to cooperate than if it had cooperated fully. In employing adverse inferences, one factor [Com- merce] will consider is the extent to which a party may benefit from its own lack of cooperation. SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199. On remand, Commerce explained that, “[b]ecause the highest weighted calculated margin applied in this proceeding is Nan Ya’s own previous [adverse facts available] rate of 18.30[%], a major consideration for [Commerce] was 24 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES selecting a rate sufficient to induce Nan Ya to cooperate in the future.” S.A. 127–28; see also S.A. 231 (finding that the 18.30% rate “was calculated for Nan Ya during the most recently completed administrative review and Nan Ya still chose to not cooperate” (emphasis added)). Thus, Commerce’s consideration of the deterrent effect of its determination reflects the law’s expectation. 2. Commerce Correctly Followed the Unambiguous Terms of the Statute and Found that the Corroboration Requirement in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) Does Not Apply Nan Ya next argues that Commerce’s determination “violates the statutory corroboration requirement” because Commerce did not corroborate Nan Ya’s information from the immediately-preceding review that it used to support its selection of the 74.34% rate. Appellant’s Br. 28 (capitalization omitted). Nan Ya’s argument overlooks the plain language of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). Before we address Nan Ya’s argument, we first must determine what § 1677e(c) requires. Section 1677e(c) states that [w]hen [Commerce] . . . relies on secondary infor- mation rather than on information obtained in the course of an investigation or review, [Com- merce] . . . shall, to the extent practicable, corroborate that information from independent sources that are reasonably at [its] disposal. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). Commerce properly found that § 1677e(c) unambiguously does not require the agency to corroborate information obtained during the course of the subject segment (i.e., primary information) when it uses that information NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 25 as facts available, adverse or otherwise. 11 S.A. 108–10 & nn.2 & 3. The statute’s text contrasts “information obtained in the course of . . . [a] review,” such as Shinkong’s, with information from a prior segment of the proceeding (i.e., secondary information). 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). That dichotomy supports Commerce’s interpretation that the corroboration requirement does not apply when Commerce uses primary information, rather than secondary information, when selecting from among the adverse facts available. See Russello, 464 U.S. at 23. The SAA confirms that primary information does not meet the definition of “secondary information” that requires corroboration. See SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199 (contrasting primary and secondary information, defining the latter as “information derived from the petition that gave rise to the investigation . . . , the final determination [from the investigation], or any previous re- view . . . concerning the subject merchandise”). And we previously have recognized, albeit not in precise Chevron terms, that § 1677e(c) unambiguously does not require Commerce to corroborate primary information. See Gallant Ocean, 602 F.3d at 1324 (“Ta Chen was not a corroboration case as Commerce relied on primary information.” (discussing 298 F.3d at 1339)). The CIT erred to the extent that it held that the corroboration requirement in § 1677e(c) applies when Commerce relies upon primary information. Nan Ya II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1367–68. It found that Commerce made “a fairly airtight argument” under “a straightforward Chevron step one” analysis of § 1677e(c), in which the agency 11 During oral argument, Nan Ya conceded that 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) unambiguously does not require Commerce to corroborate primary information. See Oral Argument at 8:28–9:54, http://oralarguments.cafc.us courts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-1054.mp3. 26 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES determined that it is not required to corroborate primary information. Id. at 1367. Nevertheless, the CIT held the corroboration requirement under § 1677e(c) applies to primary information and, thus, so does De Cecco. Id. at 1367–68. That holding conflicts with the plain language of § 1677e(c), the guidance provided in the SAA, and other CIT decisions. See § 1677e(c) (contrasting “information obtained in the course of . . . [a] review” with secondary information); SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199 (same); see also iScholar Inc. v. United States, No. 1000107, 2011 WL 109014, at –3 (Ct. Int’l Trade Jan. 13, 2011) (where the CIT did not require Commerce to corroborate adverse facts available pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) when the agency selected information from the subject segment); Ass’n of Am. Sch. Paper Suppliers v. United States, 32 Ct. Int’l Trade 1196, 1202–04 (2008) (same). The CIT’s interpretation of § 1677e(c) appears motivated by the fact that “Commerce did not simply select Shinkong’s highest transaction specific margin in setting Nan Ya’s rate, and leave it at that.” Nan Ya II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1367. That Commerce relied upon corroborating evidence (i.e., Nan Ya’s data from the immediatelypreceding review) to support its use of primary information does not change the text of § 1677e(c), which explains that Commerce is not required to corroborate primary information. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (holding that agencies and the courts must follow Congress’s unambiguous directive). Turning to Nan Ya’s argument, the statute does not require Commerce to corroborate corroborating data (i.e., Nan Ya’s data from the immediately-preceding review); rather, it explains that Commerce “shall, to the extent practicable, corroborate [secondary] information.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). As the CIT correctly observed, to hold otherwise would lead to the absurd result in which ComNAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES 27 merce corroborates “ad infinitum.” Nan Ya II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1371. 12 3. Exhaustion and Waiver Bars Nan Ya’s Remaining Arguments Finally, Nan Ya asserts that other “popular statistics methodologies”—namely, the “Hampel Identifier Test” and the “Box & Whisker Plot”—demonstrate that the transaction from which Commerce derived the 74.34% rate is an outlier. Appellant’s Br. 16, 32. Nan Ya never raised these statistical methodologies in its comments on 12 Notwithstanding its unequivocal statement that it has raised only legal challenges in this appeal, Appellant’s Reply Br. 5, Nan Ya contends that “even erroneously assuming use of uncorroborated data is permissible, Commerce’s own continuum test as to such data indicates that the 74.34% [adverse facts available rate] is not supported by substantial evidence,” Appellant’s Br. 29 (capitalization omitted); see id at 29–35 (discussing other evidence). It also contends that Commerce erred in relying upon the absence of a request from Shinkong to exclude the transaction giving rise to the 74.34% rate. Id. at 23–25. These arguments contest the weight that Commerce afforded to competing evidence, which we may not disturb. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In any event, we agree with the CIT that substantial evidence supports Commerce’s selection of the 74.34% rate because the transaction underlying that rate “involved a larger quantity than many of Shinkong’s other sales and differed from other models in the least important physical characteristics” and “Nan Ya was capable of dumping at 74.34[%] as evidenced by Nan Ya’s own data” from the immediately-preceding review. Nan Ya II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1369–70 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 28 NAN YA PLASTICS CORP. v. UNITED STATES Commerce’s draft remand or in its opening brief, remand comments, or reply to remand comments before the CIT. S.A. 59–75 (reply to remand comments), 77–96 (remand comments), 148–58 (comments on draft remand), 162–81 (opening brief). Nan Ya has thus both failed to exhaust its remedies before the agency and also waived these arguments. See, e.g., Qingdao Sea-Line Trading Co. v. United States, 766 F.3d 1378, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Commerce regulations require the presentation of all issues and arguments in a party’s case brief, and we have held that a party’s failure to raise an argument before Commerce constitutes a failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.” (footnote omitted)); Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“With a few notable exceptions, . . . appellate courts do not consider a party’s new theories[] lodged first on appeal.”). Nan Ya conceded during oral argument that it had not preserved these arguments for appeal. See Oral Argument at 0:59–1:35, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-1054.mp3.