Opinion ID: 1725347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Question of Venue

Text: In Louisiana it is ordained by the constitution that all trials shall take place in the parish in which the offense was committed. La.Const. art. 1, § 9 (1921). The constitution also authorizes the legislature to provide for a change of venue in criminal cases. La.Const. art. 7, § 45 (1921). In keeping with this authority the Code of Criminal Procedure enacted by the legislature declares that the parish in which the offense was committed is called the venue; and the removal of a case for trial from the parish in which the offense was committed to another parish is called a change of venue. La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 289 et seq. (1928). The Code provides the procedure for a change of venue and declares in Article 293 that if a fair and impartial trial can not be had in the parish in which the crime shall be charged to have been committed and in which the case is pending the venue shall be changed to an adjoining parish of the same judicial district, or to a parish of an adjoining district. It is a fact that East Baton Rouge Parish is not in the same judicial district as St. Mary and St. Martin Parishes from which the cause was removed, nor is East Baton Rouge in an adjoining district. Thus, the action which removed this case to East Baton Rouge Parish runs counter to the language of Article 293. Nevertheless, the court to which the venue is changed has no discretion in accepting the change, for that court is without authority to review the action of the removing court. In State v. Morgan, 147 La. 205, 84 So. 589 (1920), where the court to which a cause had been removed refused to acknowledge that it had venue, this court said, concerning the action of the court in refusing venue, It was not sitting as an appellate court in the matter, and it was without right to remand the case under any consideration. The ruling in the Morgan Case rests on sound reason and logic. If it were otherwise, one district court would be reviewing the action of another and, in some cases, we may assume, reversing the action of a court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction. In effect, that is what occurred in the instant case. We are of the opinion that the court which orders the change of venue is authorized by the legislature to designate the court to which the venue is changed. La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 289 et seq. (1928). Only review by the Supreme Court or application for change of venue in the court to which the cause has been removed can alter this designation. We are further of the opinion that, though the removal here was contrary to the cited provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the removal was made necessary when the accused contended in his application for the second change of venue that he could not be granted a fair and impartial trial in St. Martin Parish and that contention was upheld by the trial court trying the change of venue motion. A finding that an impartial jury could not be selected to try the accused is the strongest reason for disregarding a legislative pronouncement which would deny the removal. For a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of constitutional due process. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). When constitutional rights are properly invoked, legislation which collides with those rights must succumb to the authority of the constitution. Recently this court announced this proposition in these terms:    (A) change of venue is, primarily, to insure the rights of an accused to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, as guaranteed under the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution    and when procedural legislation setting out the rules governing such change conflict with these basic constitutional rights, to the extent the legislative enactments deprive an accused of due process of law, then they must yield. State v. Rideau, 246 La. 451, 455, 165 So. 2d 282, 284 (1964). Because the second hearing held in St. Martin Parish was based upon a pleading denominated Motion for Rehearing, an argument could be made that the removal to East Baton Rouge Parish was not a second removal under Article 294. But we are satisfied that the title assigned to this pleading did not alter its real character, which was a motion for a second change of venue. We treat it as such. Just as Article 293 of the Code runs counter to the constitutional due process requirement of a fair trial in this instance, Article 294 also offends constitutional requirements of a fair trial. It would deny a second change of venue where there has been a finding that an impartial jury cannot be selected. That is to say, the mandate of the article applied to the instant case would require that the accused be tried in a parish where he cannot have a fair trial. Such a result would be repugnant to our constitutional concept of due process. Under these circumstances Article 294 cannot be applied. East Baton Rouge Parish has venue of this case.