Opinion ID: 2338714
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Samuels' Impeachment Evidence

Text: Newman and Samuels raise many allegations of error on appeal, three of which require detailed treatment. The first is Samuels' contention that the trial judge erred in refusing him permission to introduce evidence tending both to reveal Hungerford's bias against himher motive to lieand to show that another man, not Samuels, was among Hungerford's accomplices responsible for Williams' murder. [2]
At the first trial, Samuels attempted to impeach Hungerford with an uncharged previous crime. According to the defense proffer, premised on a police report and on a victim's willing testimony, Hungerford committed a crime on June 3, 1993just two weeks before the Williams shootingsimilar to the crime at issue here. Specifically, Samuels proffered that Hungerford had asked a stranger named Keith Bego to buy her beer and then accompany her back to her godmother's apartment to drink. Once there, according to the proffer, Hungerford and several other friends drank with Bego and then asked him to buy them more liquor. At that point, according to Samuels, Hungerford, assisted by two women friends and three male friends, attacked Bego while yelling give it up. One of the three male assailants was significantly darker complected and taller than the other two. When Bego resisted and tried to flee, Hungerford stabbed him with a pair of scissors while one of the shorter males and the other women blocked his way and restrained him. The taller, darker complected man and the other shorter, lighter complected man stripped Bego of his shoes, socks, and pants, and then took his money. Finally, according to the proffer, the group gave Bego back his clothes and told him to go. Bego reported the incident to the police and led them back to the scene, where he identified Hungerford and although he did not learn their namesthe taller, darker complected man and the shorter, lighter complected man. Hungerford's other accomplices apparently had fled when the police arrived. Hungerford never was charged with this crime, and she received immunity from prosecution as a result of her plea agreement to testify in the present murder case. Samuels supported his proffer with the police report of the incident, which had an extensive narrative of the June 3 crime consistent with Samuels' proffer. He also told the judge that Bego was available in court and would testify not only to the truth of the proffer but also to the fact that Samuels definitely was not involved in the earlier crime. Samuels therefore proffered, by reference to the other, recent crime, that Hungerford had engaged in a pattern of setting men up and robbing them, as evidenced by the similarity of the two crimes. According to the defense theory, Hungerford worked with a group of accomplices, including two male accomplices who acted as her primary enforcersone tall and dark complected, the other shorter and lighter complectedand these were the men who actually had shot Williams. Hungerford, according to Samuels, thus deliberately misidentified Newman and Samuels to protect her real accomplicesa classic case of a biased witness. Defense counsel also proffered that the evidence had another purpose: as reverse other crimes evidence to demonstrate that another person, not Samuels, had participated in Williams' murder. The trial judge ruled, to the contrary, that the incident reflected by the proffer was collateral and went solely to Hungerford's credibility, not to bias. The judge also declined to consider the reverse other crimes theory. Finally, the judge expressed concern about holding a trial within a trial to get out the facts of the earlier crimea distraction that would confuse the jury. The judge accordingly permitted Samuels to ask Hungerford about her involvement in the alleged June 3 robbery and to argue his theory to the jury; but the judge prohibited the use of extrinsic evidence of the June 3 crime, including Bego's testimony, to impeach Hungerford if she denied her involvement. After the court ruled, counsel for Samuels asked Hungerford about the June 3 robbery; Hungerford denied participating in any robbery of Keith Bego on June 3. She also denied identifying Samuels falsely to hide the identity of her true accomplice. Samuels renewed his proffer before the same judge at the second trial and received the same ruling. Again, defense counsel asked Hungerford about her involvement in the alleged June 3 robbery, and again she denied that she ever had tried to rob Bego or that she falsely had identified Samuels to protect her true accomplice.
In order to understand clearly what issues emerged from the court's ruling, it is important to focus more precisely on the interchange between counsel and court after the defense completed its proffer that Hungerford had committed a similar crime just two weeks earlier, but with different accomplices. [SAMUELS' COUNSEL]: And my position, our theory is, number one, she [Hungerford] in fact did set up the events with Sharon Bost, that she did it in conjunction with others, that she is not only lying about her own role but the role of others and that she's identifying my client in order to protect the real person involved in this offense. .... [PROSECUTOR]: Well, I would submit that the only reason that the earlier armed robbery can be questioned about is the possible bias. As specific[ally] we have a Brown [3] - Beal[e] [4] issue here. THE COURT: That's right. .... [NEWMAN'S COUNSEL]: This is Drew [5] evidence. THE COURT: Is she [Hungerford] on trial for something here? Is she on trial for something here? .... [PROSECUTOR]: It still comes back to the Brown and Beal[e] problem. She could have done a hundred other robberies. There is absolutely nothing to tie anybody involved in any other robbery with Ms. Hungerford to this case. .... [SAMUELS' COUNSEL]: What I am trying to do is impeach her credibility with respect to the issue that she identified my client because my client was involved in this case. And I am trying to show that she has a motive for keeping out, just as she said my client came to her and threatened her, I am trying to show that she has a motive for minimizing her own conduct and keeping out informationand hiding information from the government and the jury of others who are involved. .... THE COURT: Well, I think on the credibility issue, I think you have got a problem. If I let you ask her these questions on credibility, I still view this matter as a collateral issue. .... [SAMUELS' COUNSEL]: My understanding is that bias is not a collateral matter. THE COURT: You can call everything bias, that doesn't make it bias. [SAMUELS' COUNSEL]: I understand. It strikes me that her motivation to lie is directly an issue, that does constitute bias and that can be impeached by extrinsic evidence. .... THE COURT: I will permit the question, but you are going to be stuck with the answer. [SAMUELS' COUNSEL]: In order not to violate the ruling, I want guidance. I can ask the question as I indicated to the Court but I am stuck with the answer? THE COURT: That's right. [NEWMAN'S COUNSEL]: But that is the guts of what Drew is all about. You and I have litigated Drew many, many times. THE COURT: Not with respect to witnesses. [NEWMAN'S COUNSEL]: Drew applies to anybody who testifies. THE COURT: Not here in this case, it isn't the law here. (Emphasis added.) When Samuels renewed the proffer the next day, adding that Keith Bego was present and willing to testify that Samuels definitely was not one of the men who had attacked him, counsel for Samuels elaborated his bias theory: [SAMUELS' COUNSEL]: Again, Mr. Bego's testimony I think is directly relevant to her [Hungerford's] motivation to lie, to falsely implicat[e] my client in order to protect the people with whom she has engaged in virtually identical robberies just two weeks before. Counsel for Newman then emphasized the similarity of the crimes and argued that they established a modus operandi for Hungerford, admissible under a reverse Drew  theory. [NEWMAN'S COUNSEL]: This is a classic [Federal Rules of Evidence] 404[/]608 evidence involving withdealing with uncharged evidence of other crimes and uncharged misconduct. And whether the Government wants to bring in Mr. Harvey and Mr. Nicholas to see if they can identify these two [defendants], I have no problem with that. But the jury has a right to know that this is her modus operandi, this is almost like a reverse Drew. The government argued that differences between the crimes negated such a showing and, in any event, that the previous robbery had no relevance to Hungerford's testimony about the June 18 robbery and murder. As indicated earlier, Judge Alprin agreed with the government, replying that he could hardly think of a more collateral issue and that to allow defendants to proceed would create a trial within a trial.
Counsel were making two arguments: (1) that another recent, similar crime involving Hungerfordand involving accomplices other than Samuels and Newmangave Hungerford a motive to lie to protect her accomplices, and thus she was a biased witness subject not only to cross-examination about the prior crime but also to impeachment with extrinsic evidence of it; and (2) that extrinsic evidence of this other crime also was admissible as defensive or reverse Drew [6] evidence, meaning that evidence of a recent, similar crime with a distinct modus operandiwhich the defendant could be shown not to have committedwas admissible as tending to prove that someone other than the defendant committed the crime charged. See Groves v. United States, 564 A.2d 372, 378 n. 15 (D.C.1989), amended, 574 A.2d 265 (D.C.1990). Akin to defensive or reverse Drew evidenceand sometimes properly characterized as a subset of such evidenceis so-called Winfield [7] (formerly Brown/Beale ) [8] evidence. Winfield evidence tends to show that someone other than the defendant was the real culprit. As elaborated below, Winfield evidence may, but does not necessarily, reflect that someone other than the defendant had committed another crime like the one before the court; but even when a prior crime is not involved, the evidence can be admissible because the proffered motive and opportunity to commit the crime are probative of criminality in the way that Drew or reverse Drew evidence is probative. From the colloquy among court and counsel, it is clear that the prosecutor and the judge recognized that the defense proffer purported to embrace Brown/Beale (now Winfield ) evidence, whereas defense counsel stressed the Drew terminologyperhaps because the proffer concerned a crime, not less culpable behavior as is sometimes proffered in a Winfield situation. We believe it appropriate under the circumstances to analyze the defense proffer not only under the bias and reverse Drew headings but also under Winfield, since the trial judge recognized that such an issue (identified by the prosecutor as Brown /Beale ) was in the case, and further because this court, sitting en banc, for all practical purposes folded Winfield evidence into the reverse Drew category. See Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1, 4, 7 (D.C.1996) (en banc); Morris v. United States, 622 A.2d 1116, 1127 (D.C.1993). We turn first to bias, then to reverse Drew/Winfield.
The trial judge erred in failing to recognize that the defense properly was proffering the June 3 robbery to show bias. Although defense counsel once said, What I am trying to do is impeach her credibility, Samuels correctly claims on appeal that the defense proffer also sought to impeach Hungerford for biasfor a motive to lie to protect her real accomplices both from the earlier and from the present, more serious crime. [W]e require a foundation for the admission of extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness with bias, In re C.B.N., 499 A.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C.1985), and thus counsel must proffer facts sufficient to permit the trial judge to evaluate whether the proposed question is probative of bias, Jones v. United States, 516 A.2d 513, 517 (D.C.1986). Specifically, counsel must proffer some facts which support a genuine belief that the witness is biased in the manner asserted. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Samuels proffered a detailed version of a recent crime involving Hungerford, based on a police report and on Bego's ready testimony, that was similar in many, unusual details to the crime charged here and included the victim'sBego'sword under oath that Samuels had not been involved. If credible, Bego's testimony would allow the jury to draw a rational inference that Hungerford was biased, i.e., had a motive to lie, because of her fear that, if Samuels and Newman were not convicted, the authorities likely would infer and eventually prove that, given the similarities of the two crimes, Hungerford's actual male associates (whom she wanted to protect) had committed both the June 3 and the June 18 offensesincluding, now, a murder. When defense counsel cross-examines a government witness for bias, counsel is not limited to accepting the witness's answer, as the trial judge required of Samuels here; while a witness may be impeached for bias by cross-examination, he [or she] can also be so impeached by character evidence, conduct, prior conviction, etc., i.e., by extrinsic evidence. Bassil v. United States, 517 A.2d 714, 717 (D.C.1986). The trial judge's failure to permit the proffered, extrinsic evidence here was error.
We are satisfied that Samuels' proffer also put forward defensive or reverse Drew evidence. See Morris, 622 A.2d at 1127; Groves, 564 A.2d at 378 n. 15. The June 3 and 18 incidents were similar enough to each other to suggest reasonable inferences that Hungerford had the same male accomplices on both occasions, and that because Samuels (according to Bego) was not present on June 3, he was not involved on June 18. The Supreme Court of New Jersey noted almost two decades ago that [i]t is well established that a defendant may use similar other-crimes evidence defensively if in reason it tends, alone or with other evidence, to negate his guilt of the crime charged against him. State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 388 A.2d 587, 591 (1978) (remanding for determination of whether to admit four episodes of child molesting similar to fifth episode for which defendant was charged, where defendant had alibi for all but two episodes). The court added that other crimes evidence offered by the prosecution requires for admission a fairly rigid standard of similarity, to be sure the defendant is not convicted for mere propensity to commit crime; but, when the defendant is offering that kind of proof exculpatorily, prejudice to the defendant is no longer a factor, and simple relevance to guilt or innocence should suffice as the standard of admissibility, since ordinarily, and subject to rules of competency, an accused is entitled to advance in his defense any evidence which may rationally tend to refute his guilt or buttress his innocence of the charge made. Id. The defense-proffered Bego testimony, therefore, was eligible for admission under ordinary defensive other crimes (Drew) analysis, as elaborated by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Before Winfield, however, this court had not expressly embraced defensive or reverse Drew theory in general. See, e.g., Morris, 622 A.2d at 1127; Groves, 564 A.2d at 378 n. 15; Gates v. United States, 481 A.2d 120, 125 (D.C.1984). In Winfield, moreover, we dealt with a particular species of reverse Drew evidence which had received considerable attention in other cases and apparent tight restriction on admissibility. We therefore turn to Winfield to inform the reverse Drew application here. For years, this court applied the rule that, before evidence of the guilt of another can be deemed relevant and thereby admissible, the evidence must clearly link the other person to the commission of the crime. Brown v. United States, 409 A.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C.1979) (emphasis added); accord Beale v. United States, 465 A.2d 796, 803 (D.C.1983). Later, in Johnson v. United States, 552 A.2d 513 (D.C.1989), this court announced that the clearly link test meant proof of facts or circumstances which tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other than the defendant committed the charged offense. Id. at 516; accord Freeland v. United States, 631 A.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. 1993). Despite Johnson, however, there was confusion as to whether clearly link suggested a standard of relevance stricter than the standard employed in other contexts. [9] Recently, therefore, in Winfield, we took occasion to announce en banc that there is only one standard of relevance, 676 A.2d at 3, that set forth in Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353 (D.C.1977): that which tends to make the existence or nonexistence of a fact more or less probable than would be the case without the evidence, id. at 1358, quoted in Winfield, 676 A.2d at 4. We then reaffirmed Johnson's formulation: the proffered evidence need only `tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other than the defendant committed the charged offense.' Winfield, 676 A.2d at 4 (quoting Johnson, 552 A.2d at 516). Furthermore, because [t]he `focus' of the standard is not on the third party's guilt or innocence, but on `the effect the evidence has upon the defendant's culpability,' it follows that `[t]here is no requirement that the proffered evidence must prove or even raise a strong probability that someone other than the defendant committed the offense.' Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 552 A.2d at 517). On the other hand, we cautioned that a defendant's proffer of evidence that other individuals had even stronger motives to murder the victim than the accused [is] insufficient, without more, to establish the [required] link to the offense charged. Id. at 5 (alterations and emphasis added by original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the trial judge ordinarily may exclude evidence of third-party motivation unattended by proof that the party had the practical opportunity to commit the crime, including at least inferential knowledge of the victim's whereabouts. Id. Finally, we emphasized in Winfield that a determination that particular evidence is relevant does not exhaust the trial judge's responsibility in deciding whether to admit it. The judge must also balance the probative value of the evidence against the risk of prejudicial impact, including the risk of jury confusion from a trial-within-a-trial that could result from admitting the proffered evidence followed by government rehabilitative evidence. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In adopting Johnson 's reasonable possibility formulation (while expressly discarding the clearly linked language), see Winfield, 676 A.2d at 3, 4, we compared the test for relevance with the roughly reverse situation where the government seeks to introduce proof of other criminal acts by the defendant, id. at 4, citing Drew. Accordingly, we said as a general rule that if other prescribed limitations on admissibility are met (e.g., probative value outweighs prejudicial impact), the type of evidence admissible under Winfield as tending to show a third party committed the crime charged against the defendant is akin to the kind of evidence admissible under Drew as tending to prove the defendant committed other crimes or bad acts. If a prior crime, in other words, were similar enough to the present crime for admissibility against the defendant under Drew to show identity, for example, it should be admissible for the defendant under Winfield when that evidence tends to indicate someone else was the culprit in a recent, similar crime and thus likely was involved, rather than the accused, in the present crime. As we summarized: [E]vidence of the type appellant seeks to admit hererecent assaults against the victim stemming from identical motivationhas been considered highly probative by this court in the reverse setting of admission of other crimes evidence to support guilt. Unduly restricting admission of third-party perpetrator evidence would raise concerns of unequal treatment. Winfield, 676 A.2d at 7 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). We therefore now commonly refer to Winfield (formerly Brown-Beale ) evidence as a species of reverse Drew evidence. [10] We stressed in Winfield that the trial court must resolve close questions of admissibility in this setting in favor of inclusion, not exclusion, 676 A.2d at 6, because a defendant's constitutional right of `a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense' is implicated, id. at 7 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986)). As to the present case, while there were differences between the June 3 and June 18 crimes, there also were similarities sufficient for us to be confident that, if the situation were presented under Drew, a trial judge very likely would admit the other crimes evidence under the identity or the common scheme exception. The crimes took place only two weeks apart. See Gates, 481 A.2d at 123 (affirming government use of other crimes evidence where similar robberies/sexual assaults occurred nineteen days apart). They concerned similar modes of operation in that Hungerford initially socialized, and attempted to negotiate a transaction, with the victimspossibly ascertaining that they had moneybefore attempting a robbery. See id. at 122 (noting that robbery turned into sexual assault in charged and uncharged crimes); Bartley v. United States, 530 A.2d 692, 696 (D.C.1987) (concluding that government established similar modus operandi when robbers showed preference for supermarkets in same chain). And, in both cases, the robbers required the victims to remove their shoes, socks, and pants and told them to give it up. See Cox v. United States, 498 A.2d 231, 238 (D.C.1985) (concluding that similar instructions to each victim and similar means of tying victim with clothing to prevent escape supported admissibility under Drew ). Finally, for admissibility the crimes need not be identical if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates a reasonable probability that the same man attacked both complainants. Cox, 498 A.2d at 238. In translating Drew analysis to the reverse- Drew  context, it is important to note that the present case is not the kind where the defense points to another person who has a motive and practical opportunity to commit the crime. Here, but for the proffer that Bego would testify unequivocally that Samuels was not involved in the June 3 robbery, Hungerford's June 3 accompliceswhose descriptions matched appellantscould just as well have been Newman and Samuels. Put another way, but for Bego's proffered testimony exculpating Samuels, the government arguably could have used the June 3 incident as Drew evidence inculpating both appellants. For this reason, Newman can get no benefit from the proffer (as his counsel on appeal appears to recognize, see supra note 2). But Samuels' case is different. By proffering Bego's testimony that Samuels was not present on June 3, that potential Drew evidence was converted, powerfully, into reverse- Drew  evidence in his favor. By thus assuredly demonstrating a reasonable possibility that someone other than Samuels committed a similar crime with Hungerford on June 3, Samuels proffered evidence that especially because it connects Hungerford with an assailant other than Samuels tend[ed] to create a reasonable doubt that [Samuels] committed the offense. Winfield, 676 A.2d at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Put in terms of the applicable standard of relevance, Bego's proffered testimony tend[ed] to make the existence ... of a factSamuels' alleged presence at Williams' robbery/murderless probable because of evidence tending to show he was not Hungerford's accomplice in a similarly executed crime two weeks earlier. As we have indicated, the fact that Samuels could not proffer the identity of the person who Bego said was not Samuels may go to the weight of the proffered evidence but not to its admissibility. See id. at 5-6. The trial judge, therefore, not only erred in failing to recognize that Samuels' proffer went to Hungerford's bias, not merely to her credibility, but also erred in declining to find the proffered extrinsic Winfield (reverse Drew ) evidence relevant to Samuels' defense. In reviewing the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion, however, we must inquire not only whether the judge erred in the ruling but also whether the error was of a magnitude requiring reversal. See ( James W.) Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 366 (D.C.1979).
Particularly because the government's three eyewitnessesHarvey, Nicholas, and Hungerfordall identified Samuels as a participant on June 18, the centerpiece of Samuels' defense was his proffered impeachment of Hungerford with evidence tending to show, by reference to the recent and similar June 3 incident, that someone other than Samuels had committed the crime on June 18. The trial judge did allow Samuels' counsel to ask Hungerford about the alleged June 3 incident, but, because the judge would not allow impeachment with extrinsic evidence, Hungerford's denial was the end of counsel's impeachment effort. The attempt to impeach Hungerford with extrinsic evidence of bias, which was cut off entirely, went to the core of the defense. Stack v. United States, 519 A.2d 147, 151 (D.C.1986). The court's error, therefore, was of constitutional magnitude violating Samuels' Sixth Amendment right to confront government witnessesif the proffer of Bego's testimony was credible. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-80, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1434-36, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Jenkins v. United States, 617 A.2d 529, 531-34 (D.C.1992); Stack, 519 A.2d at 151, 154. Strictly speaking, the judge here did not curtail cross-examination; rather []he restricted extrinsic testimony. C.B.N., 499 A.2d at 1221. Nonetheless, because the purpose of admitting the extrinsic evidence is the same as cross-examination, the same harmless error test applies. Id.; accord Clark v. United States, 639 A.2d 76, 81 (D.C. 1993) (Where, for example, the trial court's evidentiary ruling wholly deprived the defendant of any opportunity to cross examine a witness or present evidence concerning bias or a central issue in the case, we may only affirm if we are convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.... (emphasis added)). Likewise, as we previously have indicated, the failure to admit reverse- Drew  evidence will be subject to constitutional harmless error analysis if the evidence goes to the heart of the defense theory. Stack, 519 A.2d at 154. [11] Hungerford was a key government witness, particularly in light of Harvey's and Nicholas' failure to identify Samuels before the appearance of a newspaper article picturing Samuels and identifying him as a suspect in the murder of Williams. Her credibility, therefore, was a central issue in the case, and, for that reason, we must examine the exclusion of extrinsic evidence of her bias for constitutional error. See C.B.N., 499 A.2d at 1221; United States v. Hudson, 970 F.2d 948, 955 (1st Cir.1992) (finding constitutional error where court excluded proffered extrinsic testimony of defense witness regarding bias of key government witness). Because Samuels' proffer of extrinsic evidence both to impeach Hungerford for bias and to show a reasonable possibility that someone else committed the crime implicated both the right of confrontation and the right to present a defense, Bassil, 517 A.2d at 716, we are satisfied that the constitutional harmless error standard applies here. Our next step, therefore, is to determine whether the exclusion of the proffered evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680-81, 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1435-36, 1438; Jenkins, 617 A.2d at 532-34; Stack, 519 A.2d at 154; C.B.N., 499 A.2d at 1221. If Bego's testimony conforms with the proffer, we cannot find exclusion of that proffered evidence harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to Samuels on this record; we cannot say that a jury necessarily would believe only the inculpatory evidence as to Samuelsthe eyewitness testimony of Hungerford, Harvey, and Nicholasrather than Bego's Winfield evidence tending to prove that someone other than Samuels committed both crimes. Although both Harvey and Nicholas identified Samuels in the June 18 incident, there was testimony that they both had been smoking crack and drinking brandy at the time. In addition, both men had failed to identify Samuels until after his picture had appeared with a newspaper article identifying him as a suspect in the Williams murder. Finally, the proffer itself would impeach Hungerford. The jury, therefore could have discounted the identification testimony of all three witnesses. Furthermore, there was no physical evidencesuch as a wallet, as in Newman's caseto locate Samuels at the crime scene on June 18; there was no inculpatory statement by Samuels, as there arguably was by Newman; and there was no testimony by Hungerford indicating she had known Samuels (as she had known Newman) before the June 18 murder. Accordingly, it would be for the jury, not this court, to decide what evidence was credible; and, if Samuels' proffer were to hold upto have substancehe would be entitled to reversal and a new trial.
What disposition, therefore, is required? We have said that defendants are entitled to have the trial judge exercise ... discretion unfettered by erroneous legal thinking. Wright v. United States, 508 A.2d 915, 919 (D.C.1986). Therefore, unless on a particular record the trial judge would have but one option, id. at 920 (internal quotation marks omitted), we must remand for reconsideration of the ruling under the proper standard. See id. at 919-20; Collins v. United States, 596 A.2d 489, 494 (D.C.1991); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 636 n. 17 (D.C.1979); ( James W.) Johnson, 398 A.2d at 363. In this case, we cannot say as a matter of law that the trial judge had but one option: to admit Samuels' proffered extrinsic evidence. Because the trial judge did not believe he had discretion to admit the evidence for bias and reverse Drew purposes, he did not exercise the kind of discretion to which the defense and the government both were entitled. Furthermore, even though we conclude that Samuels' profferif the evidence supports itindicates admissibility of the Bego testimony and related evidence, the fact is that we do not have the benefit of the trial judge's perceptions about the reliability of that proffer, since the judge did not examine Bego out of the jury's presence or otherwise probe Samuels' extrinsic evidence to ensure that Bego would, in fact, testify in accordance with the proffer. Such scrutiny of the proffer would have been a perfectly properand, on this record, probably an indispensable step before any court could say the bias and reverse Drew ( Winfield ) evidence at issue here should, or should not, have been admitted. In evaluating the reliability of the proffer, however, the court must not seek to evaluate the reliability of the witness. See Martin v. United States, 606 A.2d 120, 129 (D.C.1991) ([T]he question of [the excluded witness's] credibility was for the jury, not the judge.). As the Supreme Court has warned: We cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge of the credibility of a witness, would have accepted this line of reasoning had counsel been permitted to fully present it. But we do conclude that the jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them so that they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on [the witness's] testimony which provided a crucial link in the proof of petitioner's act. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted); accord Martin, 606 A.2d at 129; King v. United States, 550 A.2d 348, 356-57 (D.C.1988). We remand, therefore, for the trial court to determine whether Bego's actual testimony sufficiently matches the defense proffer so that his testimony tends to make the existence of Hungerford's motive to lie, and the likelihood that her alleged accomplice from the June 3 robbery actually committed the offense, more probable than if the evidence were not presented. See Winfield, 676 A.2d at 4. Although the trial court's inquiry into the nature of Bego's testimony is limited, there is a second inquiry the trial court must undertake if it does conclude that Bego's testimony reasonably matches the defense proffer. As the court made clear in Winfield, a trial judge must weigh the probative value of the proffered evidence against the possibility of jury confusion if the defense evidence, coupled with the government's rebuttal, would become a distracting mini-trial. See id. at 5. Although the trial judge did express concern that the proffered evidence could lead to a trial within a trial, he did not rule it out on that basis and, more importantly, did not consider it with reference to the constitutionally based policies favoring admission of such evidence when relevant to presenting `a complete defense'. Winfield, 676 A.2d at 7 (quoting Crane, 476 U.S. at 690, 106 S.Ct. at 2146). Furthermore, the trial court did not consider the deleterious effect on the defense of allowing the defendant to ask questions regarding bias, but refusing to allow the defendant to show the jury the basis for this line of questioning. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111 (concluding that because defendant could not demonstrate underlying reason for bias theory, the jury might well have thought that defense counsel was engaged in a speculative and baseless line of attack); see also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 687-88, 106 S.Ct. at 1439-40 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (discussing importance of cross-examination); Scull v. United States, 564 A.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. 1989) (concluding that inability of counsel to cross-examine regarding witnesses' own fear of prosecution forced defendant to tie questions to dubious theory without apparent support). Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial judge for a hearing on whether Samuels' proffered but previously rejected evidence should be admitted. In exercising that discretion the court should evaluate whether the evidence available is in keeping with the proffer and whether its probative value outweighs the hazard of jury confusion. The court also should keep in mind several policy considerations that pertain particularly to reverse Drew evidence. First, this is not like the typical Drew situation where there is a concern that admission of other crimes evidence for the government will unfairly imply that the defendant is a bad person with a propensity to commit crime. In the reverse Drew  situation here, the only concern is admission of marginally relevant evidence creating the danger ... [of] distract[ing] the jury from the issue in this case. Winfield, 676 A.2d at 5; see Garfole, 388 A.2d at 591. Second, the defendants obviously have a strong constitutional interest in `a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,' Winfield, 676 A.2d at 7 (quoting Crane, 476 U.S. at 690, 106 S.Ct. at 2146)an interest substantially more significant than any problem likely to be caused by jury confusion over admission of the evidence. [12] Finally, it would appear, as a general rule, that if the evidence could have been admitted in a standard Drew context, it presumptively should be admitted in a reverse Drew  context. On remand, the trial court shall decide, after an appropriate hearing, whether Samuels' proffered bias and Winfield (reverse Drew ) evidence should have been admitted. If the court says no, Samuels' convictions shall stand affirmedsubject, of course, to his right to appeal the court's ruling. If the court says yes, then it shall order a new trial for Samuels. Although we have concluded, on the basis of Samuels' proffer, that the court's errors were not harmless, the court is free on remand, if it decides again to exclude the proffered evidence, to find facts that bear on harmlessness. See Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 41-42 (D.C.1989) (en banc).