Opinion ID: 2419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Batton's 1995 Conviction

Text: Batton first contends the district court erred in admitting evidence of his 1995 conviction in Ohio. We review legal interpretations of the Federal Rules of Evidence de novo. United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1328 (10th Cir.1998). Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which means we will not disturb the district court's ruling absent a distinct showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of judgment. United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th Cir.2005) (quotations omitted). The district court admitted the evidence of the 1995 conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which addresses propensity evidence in the context of sexual assault. See United States v. Benally, 500 F.3d 1085, 1089 (10th Cir.2007). In general, the rules of evidence prohibit the admission of evidence for the purpose of showing a defendant's propensity to commit bad acts. Id.; see FED.R.EVID. 404(a). But Rule 413 provides an exception: In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. FED.R.EVID. 413(a). To establish admissibility under Rule 413, the prosecution must show (1) the defendant is currently accused of an offense of sexual assault; (2) the proffered prior acts evidence is of the defendant's commission of another offense of ... sexual assault, FED.R.EVID. 413(a); and (3) the proffered evidence is relevant. See Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1328 (10th Cir.1998). Rule 413 defines an offense of sexual assault as, among other things, (1) contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body or an object and the genitals or anus of another person, FED. R.EVID. 413(d)(2); (2) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in [such] conduct, FED. R.EVID. 413(d)(5); or (3) any conduct proscribed by [18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2246]. [1] FED.R.EVID. 413(d)(1). 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2246, in turn, prohibits any conduct proscribed in an enumerated series of sexual assault crimes. Just as Rule 413 permits the introduction of prior offenses of sexual assault evidence, Rule 414 similarly allows the admission of evidence of prior offenses in child molestation cases. As we noted in United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir.1998), Congress enacted these rules because these types of cases often raise questions regarding the victim's credibility and a defendant's prior conduct can be especially probative. Id. at 1431. Additionally, the rules are based on the premise that evidence of other sexual assaults is highly relevant to prove propensity to commit like crimes. Id. The district court properly concluded that both Batton's prior conviction and the crime with which he is charged in this case qualify as sexual assault for Rule 413 purposes. Because 18 U.S.C. § 2243 clearly proscribes the conduct that led to Batton's 1995 convictionoral sex with a fourteen year old boythe conviction meets Rule 413's definition of a sexual assault. Section 2243(a) provides: Whoever ... knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who(1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and (2) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a). The statute defines a sexual act as the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to ... arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(D). Batton was charged and convicted in Ohio of engaging in prohibited sexual acts with a 14-year-old family friend whom he had known for many years. His underlying conviction thus falls squarely under Rule 413's definition of a sexual assault. Similarly, the charge against Batton in this case also qualifies as an offense of sexual assault for Rule 413 purposes. Batton is charged with knowingly transporting J.D. across state lines with the intent of engaging in illicit sexual activity. The illicit sexual activities involving genital contact, which J.D. testified took place in Chicago, clearly fit the conduct described in § 2243(a), qualifying the activity as a sexual assault pursuant to Rule 413. See FED. R.EVID. 413(d)(1). Moreover, the charged sexual activity also meets Rule 413's internal definition of sexual assault, which is contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body or an object and the genitals or anus of another person. [2] FED.R.EVID. 413(d)(2). Batton makes two arguments against the application of Rule 413. First, he contends the offense with which he is chargedtransporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in illicit sexual activitydoes not have as an element the conduct contemplated by Rule 413 and therefore the rule does not apply. Second, he contends the district court improperly conflated the standards of Rule 414 in its analysis of Rule 413. We disagree with both arguments. The first contention fails because Rule 413(d)(5) provides that sexual assault includes not only the conduct described above but also any attempt or conspiracy to engage in [such] conduct. Id. Defendants need not, therefore, complete sexual acts before their conduct constitutes a sexual assault for Rule 413 purposes. Our case law supports this result. In United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir.1997), for example, we approved the district court's decision to allow into evidence a past conviction for child molestation in a case in which the charge was identical to that against Batton in this case. Id. at 1495. There, the defendant faced charges of transporting a girl between the ages of eight and ten between state lines with the intent to engage in sexual activity. Id. at 1491. The district court admitted evidence that the defendant had molested his two stepdaughters thirty years before when they were young girls. Id. We upheld the district court's decision, noting that Rules 413 and 414 permit prior act evidence in such a case. Id. at 1495. Because the charge against Batton is identical to that in Meacham, the decision there supports the admission of Batton's prior conviction. Batton's second contention is likewise unpersuasive. Both Rule 413 and Rule 414 serve the same purposeto provide exceptions to Rule 404(a)'s prohibition on the admission of propensity evidence. Rule 413 applies to offenses of sexual assault, whereas Rule 414 applies to offenses of child molestation. The two rules use similar definitions for their respective offenses, but Rule 414 limits itself to acts committed against children under the age of 14. Rule 414 also includes in its definition of child molestation the offenses involving child pornography in Chapter 110 of the federal criminal code. Batton argues Rule 414's definition of child molestation is broader than Rule 413's definition of offense of sexual assault. He then appears to imply the district court improperly applied Rule 414's broader definition when it concluded that Rule 413 should apply in this case. This argument fails because, as explained above, Batton's conduct meets Rule 413's definition of sexual assault regardless of Rule 414's definition of child molestation. The district court did not rely on Rule 414's definition of child molestation when it determined Rule 413 applied in this case, and thus it did not err. Finally, we agree with the district court that the evidence of Batton's 1995 conviction is relevant. Despite the passage of time, the similarities between the victims and the conduct in each of the cases is strikingthey fully support a pattern of grooming [3] and assaulting young male victims.
Yet the analysis does not end with Rule 413. Evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 413 is still subject to Rule 403's balancing of probative value and prejudice. See United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 884 (10th Cir.1998). Under the required balancing test, a district court may nonetheless exclude that evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. FED.R.EVID. 403 (emphasis added). In general, the district court must consider 1) how clearly the prior act has been proved; 2) how probative the evidence is of the material fact it is admitted to prove; 3) how seriously disputed the material fact is; and 4) whether the government can avail itself of any less prejudicial evidence. United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. More specifically, in assessing the probative value of the evidence, the court must consider (1) the similarity of the prior acts and the charged acts, (2) the time lapse between the other acts and the charged acts, (3) the frequency of the prior acts, (4) the occurrence of intervening events, and (5) the need for evidence beyond the defendant's and alleged victim's testimony. Benally, 500 F.3d at 1090-91. The court assesses the prejudicial dangers by considering 1) how likely is it such evidence will contribute to an improperly-based jury verdict; 2) the extent to which such evidence will distract the jury from the central issues of the trial; and 3) how time consuming it will be to prove the prior conduct. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433 (citations omitted). The district court did not err in this balancing. First, the prior act the government tried to introduce is neither speculative nor unclear. It is a prior conviction, already established through the adversary process. Second, its probative value lies in its ability to show Batton has a propensity for grooming and sexually assaulting teenage boys. Indeed, the prior crime's similarity to what J.D. alleged is obvious. Third, Batton claimed at trial that he did none of the acts of which J.D. accused him, making the 1995 conviction a crucial piece of evidence to help the jury determine the validity of J.D.'s accusations. Regarding the evidence's probative value, we have already noted how similar the prior incident is with the charged acts in this case. We also recognize the remoteness in time of the prior crime must weigh in the calculus. We spoke to this in Meacham, emphasizing, [s]imilarity of prior acts to the charged offense may outweigh concerns of remoteness in time. 115 F.3d at 1495. In this case, the similarity of the two incidents is so obvious the intervening years are not sufficient to dilute the probative value of the prior act evidence. Further, no intervening acts occurred between the prior incident and the Chicago incident that militate against the government introducing the prior act. Finally, the government needed little evidence, time, or resources to show what happened in the prior crime. Regarding the evidence's prejudicial effect, the trial court clearly instructed the jurors that they were not to find guilt in this case based on prior convictions. The 1995 conviction evidence therefore did not contribute to the jury's reaching an improperly based verdict. Our review of the record also confirms that the testimony regarding the prior incident was not so time consuming that it risked distracting the jury from the central issue at trial. In sum, the probative value of the proffered evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to Batton. The district court did not err in admitting the evidence of Batton's 1995 conviction.