Opinion ID: 462493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Out-of-Court Statement of Co-Conspirator

Text: 179 DiSalvo challenges the admission into evidence of several out-of-court statements of Benjamin Ruggiero, an unindicted co-conspirator. He contends that their admission violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, because the government did not show that Ruggiero was unavailable to testify. 180 Five courts of appeals have held that the admission of out-of-court statements of a co-conspirator under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence without a showing that he is unavailable does indeed violate the Confrontation Clause. 37 But this court is not among them. We have steadfastly held that the Confrontation Clause does not require a showing of the co-conspirator's unavailability before his out-of-court statements may be admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 38 181 The courts that side with DiSalvo rely on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). In Roberts the Court said the following: 182 The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case ... the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant. 183 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 2538 (emphasis added). Later the Court said: 184 In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. 185 Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 (emphasis added). 39 186 We have emphasized the phrases in the usual case and normally because they show that the Court recognized that the rule admits of exceptions. Indeed, the one exception expressly noted by the Court, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970), see 448 U.S. at 65 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. at 2538 n. 7, involved the admissibility of an out-of-court statement of a co-conspirator under a state rule of evidence. 187 DiSalvo has not shown us why the out-of-court statements of co-conspirators that are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) should not generally be exceptions to the rule of Roberts. The right of confrontation, while fundamentally important, is not absolute. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). It may be balanced against society's interest in law enforcement in the context of criminal conspiracies, which are clandestine by their nature, and in which the leaders typically take extraordinary measures to cover their tracks. We have made it clear that we will not overrule our previous cases on this question unless we are given very persuasive reasons or a command from a higher authority. United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 610 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---- - ----, 105 S.Ct. 1354-55, 84 L.Ed.2d 377 (1985). DiSalvo has not given us those very persuasive reasons. 188 The question is now before the Supreme Court in United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812 (3d Cir.1984), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2653, 86 L.Ed.2d 271 (1985). Until the Supreme Court tells us otherwise, we shall continue to apply our precedents. See United States v. Molt, 772 F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir.1985) (similar result).