Opinion ID: 72908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Exclusion of Millers’ Fire Expert

Text: Millers contends that the trial court erred in striking the testimony of William Buckley, their expert on the fire’s origin. We review the trial court’s legal decision to apply Daubert to Buckley’s testimony regarding the origin of the fire de novo. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Millers argues, in light of Carmichael, that the district court’s determination that their expert should be held to the standard articulated in Daubert was in error, and as such, the trial court’s decision to strike the testimony of Buckley was in error. Millers 7 argues that Carmichael made clear that the Daubert criteria apply only to scientific testimony, and the testimony of their expert was not based on scientific principles but rather was based on his years of experience, and on his skill and experience-based observations.12 We disagree and find no error in the application of the Daubert criteria to this expert’s testimony. We do not hesitate in finding that Buckley’s testimony was science-based, rather than experience-based, and as such is subject to Daubert’s inquiry regarding the reliability of such testimony. See Carmichael, 131 F.3d at 1435. Unlike the expert witness in Carmichael, who made no pretense that he was basing his testimony on anything other than his own experience in analyzing failed tires, Buckley held himself out as an expert in fire sciences,13 and testified that he could determine the origin of the fire through his knowledge of the science of fires. During his direct examination, Buckley testified that he had complied with the scientific method within his field of science in determining the cause and origin of the fire.14 Moreover, counsel for Millers, in their 12 Fundamentally, in applying the Daubert criteria, the trial court must render an “assessment of whether the reasoning or scientific methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” 509 U.S. at 592-593. 13 From the cross-examination of Buckley during trial: Q: Well, let’s just stop for a second, you hold yourself out as an expert in the area of fire science, don’t you? A: Yes. 14 From the direct exam of Buckley during trial: Q: Sir, are you familiar with the scientific method and procedure in your field, in your field, science field, of determining the cause and origin of fires? A: Yes. Q: And did you comply with that accepted method and procedure? A: Yes, I did. Q: And as a result of that accepted method and procedure, have you come to the expert opinions you’ve shared with the jury here today? 8 briefs to this court filed before Carmichael was issued, took pains to stress the scientific nature of Buckley’s inquiry into the fire’s origin.15 The use of “science” to explain how something occurred has the potential to carry great weight with a jury, explaining both why counsel might seek to couch an expert witness’s testimony in terms of science, as well as why the trial judge plays an important role as the gate-keeper in monitoring the evidentiary reliability of such testimony. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. Because of the manner in which this expert’s testimony was presented to the jury, we find no error by the trial court in determining Daubert applied to the testimony at issue. Millers next argues that even if Daubert does apply to their expert’s testimony, the trial court erred in striking the testimony of Buckley since his opinion testimony regarding the fire’s origin was supported by reliable procedures and scientific methodology. We disagree. Abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review of a trial court’s evidentiary rulings. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517 (1997). It is very much a matter of discretion with the trial court whether to permit the introduction of such evidence, and we will not reverse the decision of the trial court regarding the exclusion or admission of such evidence unless the trial court’s decision is “manifestly A: Yes, I did. 15 “Mr. Buckley meticulously went through the photographs of the fire scene, explaining the science and methodology of his determination. . . .” (App. Brief at 20); “Mr. Buckley conducted a meticulous and scientific deductive analysis . . . .” (App. Brief at 22); Buckley “testified that he did apply the scientific method to this fire investigation by developing hypotheses and testing them.” (App. Brief at 22). Daubert, published in 1993, made clear that its criteria only applied to scientific testimony of experts under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and that Rule 702 also applied to “technical, or other specialized knowledge.” 509 U.S. at 590 n. 8. Additionally, Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349-1350 (6th Cir. 1994), quoted in Carmichael, 131 F.3d at 14351436, with its illustrative “bee-keeper v. aeronautical engineer” analogy, makes clear that if an expert’s testimony is based on his experience, and not on science, then such non-scientific expert testimony is not to be held to the Daubert standard. Accordingly, we do not consider it unfair to hold Millers’ counsel to their decision to introduce their expert’s testimony as scientific expert testimony rather than experiential, non-scientific expert testimony. 9 erroneous.” Id. At trial, Millers’ fire causation expert tried to explain how he came to the conclusion that the fire in the Benfield home was intentionally set. Buckley stated at trial that he came to his opinion that the fire was intentionally set by eliminating all accidental causes, and by determining that, given that the fire began on the dining room table, there were no other possible sources of ignition of the fire. Essentially, the testimony of Buckley reveals that he came to his opinion that the fire was incendiary largely because he was unable to identify the source of the ignition of the fire. In determining that the fire was incendiary, Buckley performed no tests and took no samples. At trial, Buckley was unable to describe the chandelier that hung over the table and unable to explain the methodology by which he eliminated the chandelier as a possible ignition source for the fire. After telling the jury on direct that he believed someone poured lamp oil from the lamp oil bottle over the clothes and set the clothes ablaze, on cross-examination Buckley admitted that he did not know even if the lamp oil bottle had contained lamp oil before the fire and that there was no scientific basis for such an opinion. With such testimony as a backdrop, the district court granted the motion by Mrs. Benfield to strike the testimony of Buckley, finding that while Buckley held the opinion that the fire was intentionally set, he was unable to rationally explain how he came to that conclusion. “[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Joiner, 118 S. Ct at 519. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the exclusion of such testimony.