Opinion ID: 303767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of the Pre-Trial Photo Identification

Text: 49 Among other reasons for suppressing Mrs. Edgecomb's identification of the lineup photo, the trial judge enunciated two which did not relate to denial of counsel: First, that she did not pick the people out at the time of the lineup; and, second, that she had seen photographs over a period of time and had not identified the two defendants in them. 17 This might appear that the court was stating a Fifth Amendment ground for suppression of the pre-trial photo identification. But, before the first statement, between the two statements, and after the second, the trial judge made a finding of fact-It appears that Mrs. Edgecomb did have an ample opportunity to observe the two defendants while in the store (2a, supra)-and conclusions of law-There is no question in the court's mind that there was nothing improper insofar as her having seen the photograph in Mr. Shuker's office (2c, supra), and I don't feel there was anything at all improper about counsel's having shown her the photograph or actually her looking it over (2f, supra)-which completely negate any due process violation. 50 We conclude that the trial court's ruling really rested unambiguously on Sixth Amendment grounds, but whether or not the trial court relied on a Fifth Amendment rationale, there is nothing in the record to support such reliance. The photograph depicted a lineup, which we and the trial court have found to be fair, during which appellees were represented by counsel. Mrs. Edgecomb and Detective Pierson were vigorously cross-examined regarding the 19 May interview, and there is nothing in the record which hints at anything in any way suggestive concerning the manner in which the photograph was presented to Mrs. Edgecomb or any other actions taken to influence Mrs. Edgecomb's testimony.
51 Appellees' brief makes a Fifth Amendment denial of due process argument as justification for the trial court's suppression of Mrs. Edgecomb's pre-trial photographic identification. 52 In support of this argument, appellees recite and dwell at length upon the times at which Mrs. Edgecomb did not make an identification of Proctor and Brown. Specifically, on 25 October 1969, when shown ten photographs including both Proctor and Brown, she was unable to identify anyone. On 26 October 1969, she was shown eight photographs, including Proctor and Brown, out of which she liked Brown and one other not involved in the crime, but was not at all certain. On 4 November 1969 at the lineup, already discussed in detail, she made no identification, in fact no attempt to pick out anyone because of the reasons previously stated. She did, however, ask for a photograph of this lineup, because she felt that without the glaring lights, the attendant confusion, and the nearby presence of suspected criminals she might identify at least one person in that lineup. On 19 May 1970 she was shown this photograph, and without any suggestion whatsoever proceeded in her own way to identify both Proctor and Brown. Appellees also cite Mrs. Edgecomb's reluctance to talk about the crime with her husband or anyone else as an indication of uncertainty in her identification. 53
54 Appellees interpret Mrs. Edgecomb's hesitancy in firmly identifying the two perpetrators of this murder and robbery as implying a lack of accuracy in her identification and as justifying invalidating her subsequent identification. Neither conclusion is correct. Mrs. Edgecomb's testimony is replete with indications of her awareness of the seriousness of the crime, and of the seriousness of her identification of anyone perpetrating murder. We interpret her hesitancy as the hesitancy of the responsible citizen knowingly performing an important act. It has been frequently observed that, sad to relate, the more glib and self-assured witness sometimes makes a stronger impression on an unsophisticated jury than does a careful and conscientious witness, who registered fairly his certainties and uncertainties on different aspects of his testimony. The appellees urge us to draw the same false conclusion, i. e., take the conscientious effort of Mrs. Edgecomb to be absolutely fair and careful in her identification as the mark of an unreliable or influenced witness, when in fact it is probably the mark of reliability and independence of judgment. 55 It is significant that the photos shown to the witness in October, allegedly of Brown and Proctor, do not at all resemble the appellees as they appear in the lineup photo. In reliance on both briefs' statement that Proctor's photo was included in each group, we believe Proctor is identifiable in two individual photos, one in each group shown. (Mrs. Edgecomb was not told a definite suspect was in either group, and had twice previously been shown many photos in which Brown and Proctor were not included; she made no identification on either occasion.) As for Brown, there appears one photo in each group that is similar to Brown's picture in the lineup, but these two individual photos appear to be of two different men. 56 We draw these conclusions: First, that it is thoroughly understandable why Mrs. Edgecomb made no identification of Brown and Proctor from the individual photos shown her in October. Second, we conclude that neither her identification of Brown and Proctor in the lineup photograph nor her possible identification of the appellees at trial was or would be tainted by viewing the individual photos; rather, such identification would be made in spite of such viewing. It follows that appellees' due process violation argument based on repeated showings of photographs of the accused to the witness-on the facts of this case-is not sustainable. And, third, it appears that Mrs. Edgecomb did have an ample opportunity to observe the two defendants while in the store. 57 To whatever extent the argument about Mrs. Edgecomb's hesitancy in making her identification of Proctor and Brown has validity or affects the strength of her testimony, it is an argument which appellees can make to a jury. But it is not a valid due process argument for suppressing her identification of the lineup photograph. 58 In considering the admissibility of identification evidence at trial, constitutional infirmities will bar its admission, but testimonial infirmities go only to the weight of the evidence. We start with the principle, well phrased by Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger in a different context but thoroughly applicable here: When an eyewitness is willing to give testimony, under oath and subject to all the rigors of cross-examination and penalties of perjury, he must be heard. 18 59