Opinion ID: 767140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Neilson's Incompetence

Text: 50 At the time the district court was considering the appointment of a guardian ad litem, a genuine question existed as to Neilson's competence. We believe that it was reasonable for the district court, in that circumstance, to decide that there would be little probable value to a formal, adversary hearing. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970) (The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.); Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 209 U.S. App. D.C. 153, 652 F.2d 146, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (explaining that adequacy of process is determined with reference to the characteristics of the group who have to use it). 51 We recognize, of course, that particularly extensive efforts to provide notice may often be required when the State is aware of a party's inexperience or incompetence. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799, 77 L. Ed. 2d 180, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983) (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-15, 56 L. Ed. 2d 30, 98 S. Ct. 1554 (1978); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146-47, 100 L. Ed. 1021, 76 S. Ct. 724 (1956)). But those extensive efforts are only required when there is some likelihood that they would be more effective than the procedures actually used. In Memphis Light, the Court required a utility company to explain the procedures available for challenging a bill in a way that could be understood by the company's uneducated, inexperienced customers. See Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 14 n.15. In the circumstances of this case, however, it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that, given Neilson's mental state, there was no way it could provide an explanation that would have been suited to her condition. In Covey, the Court found notice of a foreclosure by publication in a newspaper to be unconstitutional with respect to a known incompetent. See Covey, 351 U.S. at 146-47. But Judge Rakoff's procedure in this case was far more protective of Neilson's interests than mere publication of notice in a newspaper. The district court informed Neilson by written order that it was considering appointing a guardian ad litem and ordered an examination by an independent psychological expert. The district court weighed the expert's report, its own interactions with Neilson, as well as the documentary evidence before finally deciding that a guardian ad litem should be appointed. Moreover, the district court considered conducting a hearing and only dispensed with it upon concluding that the submissions of the parties rendered it unnecessary. See Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dispensing with hearing prior to appointment of next friend on ground that facts submitted to the court were sufficient to establish need for appointment). 5 52 The enduring lesson of Memphis Light and Covey is that, when considering whether notice is reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances to inform the recipient of the nature of pending proceedings, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950), the mental capacity of the recipient is one of the circumstances to be considered. We believe that in light of the genuine question that existed as to Neilson's competence, the notice (as well as other procedures) chosen by Judge Rakoff was reasonable and, therefore, did not violate the Due Process Clause. This is not to say that Judge Rakoff committed an error which was harmless in light of Neilson's incompetence, but that Judge Rakoff's personal observation of Neilson and his experience with her inconsistencies were such that the district court's notice was reasonable and was therefore not erroneous. 53 For these reasons, we believe that neither providing Neilson with a copy of Dr. Pulver's report nor providing more elaborate notice would have been of significant probable value in protecting Neilson's interests and that no worthwhile purpose would have been served by conducting a formal, evidentiary hearing. On the other hand, to require the district court to conduct a formal, evidentiary hearing before appointing a guardian ad litem would consume a significant amount of judicial resources, cause delay, and accomplish little. Balancing these factors, we conclude that the risk of erroneous deprivation was low, given the procedures used by the district court, and that the probable value of the proposed additional procedures was limited. Although we find Neilson's interests to be compelling, we do not believe the proposed additional safeguards would have offered sufficient protection of those interests as to justify another additional delay not only to the court system but to the furnishing of a remedy to Neilson, who was in need of immediate relief. See infra at 7696. The Due Process Clause does not, therefore, require the district court to have used the proposed procedures before finding Neilson incompetent and appointing a guardian ad litem.