Opinion ID: 1826904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying collins' gender-based objection to peremptory challenges by the state.

Text: In Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d 1235 (Miss. 1994), this Court addressed the decision of the United States Supreme Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). This decision extended Batson to gender-based exclusion of jurors. In J.E.B. the Court held: ... the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than the fact that the person happens to be a woman or happens to be a man. As with race, the core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate ..., would be meaningless were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions which arise solely from the jurors [gender]. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. at 146, 114 S.Ct. at 1430 (1994) ( quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723). J.E.B., like Batson, requires one challenging a peremptory strike to make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination before the party exercising the challenge is required to explain the basis for the strike. 511 U.S. at 144-145, 114 S.Ct. at 1429-30. Again, the reason is not required to rise to the level of a challenge for cause, rather it merely must be based on a juror characteristic other than gender and the proffered explanation may not be pretextual. Id. Collins objects to the State's challenge of juror Joey Smart, a white male. During voir dire, Smart indicated that he had been sued by defense counsel. Defense counsel, after objecting to the State's challenge of Smart, argued that Mr. Horan, the Assistant District Attorney, utilized a pattern of excluding males from juries. Transcripts of prior cases in which Mr. Horan was the Assistant District Attorney were introduced and considered by the court. The Court then allowed the State to give its reasons for challenging Smart. The prosecutor indicated that Smart stated during voir dire that he had been sued by Mr. Walker. However, Smart stated that he could be fair. The prosecutor responded I struck him because Mr. Walker has sued him. The State then clarified for the record that Jurors No. 1, 5, 25, 35, 110, 120 were males and were not challenged by the State. The jury ultimately contained six male jurors. The prior relationship between defense counsel and Smart is sufficient to withstand a gender-based challenge. Here, the potential juror knew and had been sued by defense counsel. In Griffin v. State, 607 So.2d 1197 (Miss. 1992), this Court held that the fact that the juror knew defense counsel was a race-neutral reason for the peremptory challenge. The State articulated gender-neutral reasons for the challenge. The fact that Smart had been involved in prior litigation with the defense attorney is simply not related to his gender.