Opinion ID: 752417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Solicitation of Grievance

Text: 40 Greenwood argues that the NLRB erred in finding that it illegally solicited a grievance, promised to rectify the problem, and actually rectified the problem, in violation of section 8(a)(1). An employer violates section 8(a)(1) if it solicits grievances during a union organizational campaign and promises to address those grievances if the union activity ceases. See HarperCollins, 79 F.3d at 1330. A pre-election solicitation of a grievance is not a per se violation of § 8(a)(1) of the Act, but it is an unfair labor practice ... where the solicitation is accompanied by the employer's express or implied suggestion that the grievance will be resolved or acted upon only if the employees reject union representation. Torbitt & Castleman, Inc. v. NLRB, 123 F.3d 899, 907 (6th Cir.1997); see also Rollins, 494 F.2d at 83-84. 41 In the instant case, employee Garcia testified that Greenwood director of development Wilcox, referring to the union activity, asked, [w]hat brought this on? Garcia testified that she told Wilcox that it was the lack of knowledge of benefits among employees and the favoritism displayed in disseminating such information. According to Garcia, Wilcox then said she would see what she could do. Within a few days, Wilcox presented Garcia with the first summary of existing benefits. The NLRB found that this inquiry by Wilcox and the subsequent provision of the benefits summary constituted an improper solicitation of a grievance because it was followed by a fulfilled promise to provide benefits information. The NLRB apparently concluded that the promise and its fulfillment were somehow conditioned on the rejection of the Union. We disagree with the NLRB's determination that the facts presented on this issue justified the conclusion that there was a violation of section 8(a)(1). 42 The benefits summary was provided prior to the election, and Greenwood clearly did not condition the conferral of either the benefits or the provision of the benefits summaries on the cessation of union activity by the employees. Indeed, having information on existing benefits in hand, the employees were perhaps in a better position to choose or reject the union. 43 Moreover, this is not a circumstance where, after inquiring as to what motivated the union activity, an employer learns that poor working conditions, low wages, or lack of benefits precipitated the activity. In those cases, any promise or remedial effort would have involved the provision of new or improved benefits, or better working conditions. Here, there was confusion concerning the existing benefits available to Greenwood employees. As we have noted, even though the discussion or publication of existing benefits might have some effect on an employee's decision to vote for or against union representation, it is a legitimate campaign strategy for an employer to comment on existing benefits. See Ideal Macaroni 301 N.L.R.B. at 507. Consequently, because the discussion between Wilcox and Garcia resulted in the imparting of information regarding existing benefits, protected speech under section 8(c) was implicated. See Selkirk Metalbestos, N.A. v. NLRB, 116 F.3d 782, 788 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that Section 8(c) protects the right of an employer to make truthful statements of existing facts.). 44 If, as the NLRB found, Wilcox promised to provide, and did provide, information regarding existing benefits, the promise and fulfillment of the promise were not prohibited by the NLRA or by NLRB precedent. See e.g., Ideal Macaroni, 301 N.L.R.B. at 507. The fact that the information came in response to an employee's expression of concern after inquiry by the employer during a union organization campaign should make no difference. Restricting the publication of existing benefits information at any time would seriously handicap an employer's ability to fairly communicate benefits it has been willing to provide to its employees. See NLRB v. Pratt & Whitney Air Craft Div., United Technologies Corp., 789 F.2d 121, 134 (2d Cir.1986) (Granting an employer the opportunity to communicate with its employees does more than affirm its right to freedom of speech; it also aids the workers by allowing them to make informed decisions....).