Opinion ID: 882846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Employment Arrangements, Past Practices and Propert Interests.

Text: Talley argues here that he is entitled to a reasonable expectation of the opportunity for continuing employment. Such an expectation, argues Talley, is differentiated from his tenure argument. FVCC argues that Talley can have no such expectation because of the clear wording of his term-by-term contracts. FVCC contended, and Talley did not deny, that every term contract signed by Talley contained the following phrase: It is understood and agreed that acceptance of this contract confers no right on the part-time faculty member to tenure, credit toward tenure, or any other permanent faculty status. (Emphasis added.) The wording of this phrase clearly indicates that any expectation of permanent status cannot be rooted in the term-by-term contracts which Talley has signed. First, Talley argues that in his 1982 contract the aforementioned paragraph contained another sentence, part of which reads: but may be renewed upon the same terms by mutual agreement, made in writing between the parties. (Emphasis added.) Talley argues that because this phrase was in his earlier contracts, that it must be read into all subsequent contracts which did not contain the wording. Courts may not disregard the express language of contracts. New Hampshire Ins. Group v. Strecker (1990), 244 Mont. 478, 798 P.2d 130. The express wording of the contract signed by Talley indicates that the term contract cannot be the foundation for any kind of expectation of permanent employment. While he has used the phrase opportunity for continuing employment such a phrase is not legal and is an exercise in semantics. The essence of Talley's argument is that he was entitled to continuing employment at FVCC. We considered a similar argument in Farris v. Hutchinson (1992), 254 Mont. 334, 838 P.2d 374. Farris was employed under a series of term contracts prepared by the Montana University System. The last contract was effective between July 1, 1990, and June 30, 1991. Pursuant to a notice provision in her last contract, Farris received notice in February of 1991 that her contract would not be renewed. No reason for non-renewal was given. Farris argued that she could show objective manifestations of job security beyond the term contract and thus, a genuine issue of material fact existed and summary judgment should not be granted. Farris, 254 Mont. at 337, 838 P.2d at 376. That is exactly the argument that Talley makes here. He argues that he was given oral manifestations of continued employment despite the wording of his contract. In Farris we pointed out that an agreement made in writing cannot be altered except by another writing or by an executed oral agreement. In response to the same argument as that made here by Talley, we further stated in Farris that no obligation can be implied which would result in the obliteration of a right expressly given under a written contract. Farris, 254 Mont. at 339, 838 P.2d at 377. Talley's contract is clear in regard to the very nature of his employment. No obligation can be inferred which would indicate an alteration of that agreement. Talley further argues that he had a property right in his position as a part-time instructor at the college. Such a property interest, contends Talley, requires that he be given notice and a hearing before termination. FVCC argues that Talley did not have a property interest in his employment. We have recognized that a property interest in one's position must be created by existing rules and regulations, state laws, or understandings between employee and employer. Medicine Horse v. Big Horn Co. School District (1991), 251 Mont. 65, 70, 823 P.2d 230, 233. In Medicine Horse, an employee argued he had a property interest in his employment despite the lack of any such indication in his employment contract. We refused to read a property right into Medicine Horse's contract. Unlike Medicine Horse's contract, Talley's contract specifically precludes any property right. In the face of such plain wording, Talley's subjective belief that he had a property interest in his job simply does not create such an interest. A subjective expectancy can create no constitutionally protected interest. Medicine Horse, 251 Mont. at 71, 823 P.2d at 233; citing Perry v. Sindermann (1972), 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570. It is the Sindermann case which Talley cites for the argument that he has a property right in his position at FVCC. He does not explain that statement, nor do we find anything in Sindermann which confirms his analysis of the case. Sindermann merely determines that a property right in employment may be created by past practices or mutually explicit understandings of employer and employee. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 601, 92 S.Ct. at 2699, 33 L.Ed.2d at 580. The manifestations that Talley indicates existed are not objective but are totally subjective. The clear wording in his contract precludes any objective expectation of continuing employment. We conclude that the contract between FVCC and Talley is clear and unambiguous on its face and creates no expectations of continuing employment with the college. FVCC met its burden by presenting the clear, unambiguous language of the contracts signed by Talley. Talley has not successfully rebutted this evidence nor shown that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We hold the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to FVCC on Count One of Talley's Amended Complaint.