Opinion ID: 853980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defer all or only some claims

Text: Some courts resolve these varying considerations by holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is waived if withheld until the collateral stage unless the petitioner has a valid reason for the postponement. Under this view, good cause for waiting can be shown by any one of either (1) trial counsel was also appellate counsel; (2) the claim could not be developed without new facts; or (3) at the time of the direct appeal, it reasonably appeared that new evidence would be needed, even though it has since become clear that the trial record was adequate grounds for judging the merits of the claim. Guinan, 6 F.3d at 472. [16] We have recognized the first of these. Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (Ind.1995); cf. Matter of Sexson, 666 N.E.2d 402 (Ind.1996) (trial counsel violated Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b) by arguing own ineffectiveness on direct appeal). The second and third grounds of this approach are theoretically sound, but ultimately in our view generate more complexity and unpredictability than is desirable. In application this approach raises the thorny problem of identifying the ineffectiveness claims that are available on direct review. There are bound to be complications and uncertainty in determining whether extrinsic evidence reasonably appeared to be needed at the time of direct appeal to assess the merits of the claim. The postconviction court will have to undertake the difficult task of seeing the case through appellate counsel's eyes, possibly long after the direct appeal was decided. The potential exists for efforts of both counsel and courts to be wasted on both direct appeal and collateral review in satellite litigation over the application of a complicated waiver standard. [17] Permitting all claims of ineffectiveness to be raised in postconviction proceedings if ineffectiveness was not raised on direct appeal offers a bright-line rule that is understandable. It is preferable over requiring ineffectiveness to be raised on direct appeal because the track record for ineffectiveness claims demonstrates that most require additional evidence to assess their merits. Cf. Guinan, 6 F.3d at 473 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (No surprise, then, that my colleagues have been unable to find a single case in which this circuit reversed a conviction on direct appeal because of deficient performance by trial counsel.). Finally, and more importantly, assessment of a claim of ineffective representation requires consideration of the overall performance of counsel and a reasonable probability that the alleged error affected the outcome. State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ind.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1528, 140 L.Ed.2d 678 (1998). Because these factors rarely lend themselves to resolution in isolation, the effectiveness of the representation should be resolved in a single proceeding. [18] For the reasons outlined, a postconviction hearing is normally the preferred forum to adjudicate an ineffectiveness claim. We nonetheless agree that potential for administrative inconvenience does not always outweigh the costs of putting off until tomorrow what can be done today: If there is no reason for delay in presenting a claim, the delay should not be countenanced, for there is a considerable social interest in the finality of criminal proceedings. Taglia, 922 F.2d at 418. If we are dealing with an improperly incarcerated defendant, the cause of justice is plainly better served by making that determination as soon as possible. The same is true even if a retrial is required. Resolving record-based ineffectiveness claims on direct review also has some doctrinal appeal because it is more consistent with the residual purpose of postconviction proceedings. Langley, 256 Ind. at 204-05, 267 N.E.2d at 541 ([T]he permissible scope of review on direct appeal is well defined and broader than that permitted by collateral attack through post conviction relief.). These considerations can be largely met under a procedure that allows a defendant to suspend the direct appeal to pursue an immediate petition for postconviction relief. Davis v. State, 267 Ind. 152, 368 N.E.2d 1149 (1977); see also Hatton v. State, 626 N.E.2d 442 (Ind.1993) (reiterating vitality of Davis procedure). This should cover the exceptional case in which the defendant prefers to adjudicate a claim of ineffective assistance before direct appeal remedies have been exhausted. Because of the Davis procedure, the direct appeal is not necessarily an obstacle to speedy adjudication of the adequacy of the representation, as recent cases in which the procedure was invoked for that purpose demonstrate. See Coleman v. State, 694 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. 1998); Brown v. State, 691 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. 1998). Although not to be used as a routine matter in adjudicating the issue of trial counsel's effectiveness, [19] a Davis request may be appropriate where the claim asserted arguably requires a certain level of fact finding not suitable for an appellate court. Lee v. State, 694 N.E.2d 719, 721 n. 6 (Ind.1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Sept. 24, 1998) (No. 98-6205).