Opinion ID: 1036927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Circuit court proceedings continued

Text: Petitioners’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction was heard on April 8, 14, 21, and 23, 2008. On April 23, 2008, the circuit court granted the motion, preliminarily enjoining the MCC “from engaging in any conduct that enforces, implements or otherwise treats as validly enacted” the Wailea 670 bills, “purporting to have passed first reading on February 14, 2008, purporting to have passed second reading on March 18, 2008, and purporting to have been signed into law on April 8, 2008, until further order of this Court.” On May 28, 2008, the circuit court granted Honua#ula’s motion to intervene in the action. On October 17, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties agreed that there were no disputes as to any material facts and agreed to submit the matter to the circuit court for a final decision on the merits based on a stipulated joint record. The cross-motions for summary judgment were withdrawn and the court set November 17, 2008 for trial on the merits. On November 17, the court granted judgment in favor of Respondents MCC, County of Maui, and Honua#ula and against Petitioners as to all claims and vacated its order granting Petitioners’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 21  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  The circuit court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on December 15, 2008. The circuit court concluded as a matter of law that the agenda for the October 18, 2007 LUC meeting “provided adequate notification of the item to be considered at the meeting.” The court denied Petitioners’ contention that HRS § 92- 7(d), which provides that “[i]tems of reasonably major importance not decided at a scheduled meeting shall be considered only at a meeting continued to a reasonable day and time,” only allows for a single continuance of a meeting. The court relied on HRS § 1- 17, which provides that words “in the singular or plural number signify both the singular and plural,” to conclude that the term “day” in HRS § 92-7(d) means both “day” and “days.” The court also entered a conclusion of law that the Hawai#i Attorney General had “opined that recesses until a subsequent day are permitted if a board or commission cannot complete its business on the date that the meeting was publicly noticed . . . provided that it announces at the publicly noticed 22  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  meeting the date, place, and time of the continued meeting.”12 (quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the circuit court entered a conclusion of law that the legislative history of the Sunshine Law revealed that the legislature “expressly rejected” a “provision that would have precluded items of major importance from being continued to a later date[.]” The court concluded there was no indication “that the legislature intended to place a limit on the number of times a meeting could be continued.” The court concluded, “The continuation of meetings which remain open to the public, following the public’s opportunity to testify, does not conflict with the stated policies embodied in HRS §§ 92-1(2) and 92-1(3)[.]” 12 Relatedly, the court cited the October 14, 2008 declaration of David Raatz, a legislative attorney for the Office of Council Services, which was attached as an exhibit to the MCC and County of Maui’s reply memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment. Mr. Raatz stated in his declaration that in 2004, he contacted the Office of Information Practices (OIP) regarding a meeting before the Planning and Land Use Committee of the MCC, which he anticipated would “take several days to be completed.” Prior to the agenda for the meeting being posted, Mr. Raatz contacted an OIP staff attorney and provided her with a copy of the draft agenda. The draft agenda specifically noted that it might be necessary to continue the meeting and provided the date, time and location of the anticipated continued meetings. The staff attorney responded by email, stating, “We think it suffices to reconvene the meeting, so long as the date, time and place of the continued meeting are also announced at the time the meeting is adjourned subject to the announced continuation.” The attorney did not cite authority for this statement. After eight continuations of the noticed meeting, Mr. Raatz again contacted the OIP to discuss the committee’s ability to continue reconvening the meeting. He was advised that it was appropriate to continue meeting “provided that no individual recess lasts more than five days” and provided the “recesses did not appear to be based on any inappropriate purpose, such as to ‘dodge’ issues or decrease openness in government.” According to Mr. Raatz, it was his understanding that “the Office of Council Services has continued to follow the advice given by OIP[.]” 23  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Considering the above, the court concluded that the “LUC was permitted by law to recess and reconvene the October 18, 2007 meeting on 12 successive days[.]” The court reasoned that HRS § 92-7(d) permitted the LUC to continue the decision-making portion of its October 18 meeting to “reasonable days and times” and that because the October 18 meeting was recessed and reconvened rather than adjourned, “it was not necessary for a new Agenda to be posted for each of the successive dates[.]” In regard to Petitioners’ argument that the recessed and reconvened meetings violated the public oral testimony requirement of the Sunshine Law, the circuit court concluded that oral testimony was not required to be taken once the LUC’s decision-making deliberations began. The court noted that “Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the Sunshine Law, which would require hearing public testimony at every reconvened meeting, could create logistical problems that might adversely impact the legislative process.” Based on these conclusions, the circuit court held that the recessing and reconvening of the October 18, 2007 LUC meeting did not violate the Sunshine Law. The court applied the same reasoning to the recessing and reconvening of the February 8, 2008 MCC meeting, finding no violation of the Sunshine Law. 24  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Regarding the MCC’s memoranda on proposed amendments, the circuit court entered the following relevant findings of fact: 93. These memoranda were prepared as a matter of courtesy to the other Council members. 94. There is no evidence that there were any discussions or interactions of any sort, outside of the public meeting, by and between any Council members about the memoranda . . . . 95. None of the memoranda in question attempted to secure a Council Member’s commitment to vote for the proposed amendments or reconsideration of conditions. 96. There is no evidence that any Council member attempted to have other Council members commit to vote for any proposed amendments or reconsideration of conditions. (Citations omitted). Based on these findings, the circuit court concluded that Petitioners “failed to provide authority that the circulation of written proposed amendments under these circumstances violates the Sunshine Law.” The court further concluded that Petitioners’ reliance on Right to Know Comm. v. City Council, City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 117 Hawai#i 1, 175 P.3d 111 (App. 2007) to demonstrate that the memoranda violated the Sunshine Law was misplaced, given that Right to Know involved a written resolution introduced jointly by a group of council members. The circuit court concluded that Right to Know did not prohibit an individual council member from “putting amendments in writing so that other members might more easily comprehend and consider” them. 25  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  The court also concluded that the memoranda “contain no request for a vote outside of the meeting.” The court concluded on this issue: 59. Hawai#i’s Sunshine Law does not prohibit a single board member from memorializing in writing proposed floor amendments and other proposals that a board member intends to raise at a public board meeting, and providing that to other board members in advance of the public meeting. Whether this represents sound council policy or operating procedure is a question for the public and council to determine, provided the actions of the legislative body do not conflict with applicable law. 60. The Memoranda submitted by some Council members outlining amendments they intended to propose at the public hearing of the February 8, 2008 meeting were not efforts by Council members to get other Council members to commit to vote for the Amendments to be proposed. 61. The Memoranda . . . were not “discussions, communications or interactions” between Council members prohibited by HRS Chapter 92, Part I. (Emphasis added). The circuit court entered its Final Judgment in favor of Respondents and against Petitioners on January 22, 2009.