Opinion ID: 1384330
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: weston's statement at storage unit

Text: Weston moved out of his mother's apartment the weekend of August 21, 1998, and moved into an apartment on Confederate Avenue, owned by his friend, Francis Perna. Perna helped Weston move into the apartment, retrieving Weston's personal belongings both from the apartment in Harbison, and from a Public Storage Unit on Broad River Road. When they arrived at the storage unit, they found a search warrant. Weston read the search warrant and said, I need a lawyer. Weston asserts the trial court erred in allowing Perna to comment that he stated I need a lawyer. He contends this was an improper comment on his right to an attorney and that, in any event, it was impermissible under Rule 403, SCRE, as its prejudice outweighed its probative value. We disagree and find Weston has not shown reversible error from admission of this single comment. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state prosecutor seeks to impeach a defendant's exculpatory story, told for the first time at the trial, by cross-examining him about his post-arrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings. Doyle also prohibits the State from commenting upon the defendant's request for an attorney. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986); Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 345, 534 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2000). The rationale for Doyle is that it would be a violation of due process to allow comment on the silence which Miranda warnings have encouraged. Subsequent to Doyle, in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), the Supreme Court clarified that Doyle was applicable only in situations in which the government had induced, via Miranda warnings, a defendant's belief that his exercise of a constitutional right would not be used against him. 455 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. 1309 (in the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to post arrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand.) See also State v. Bell, 347 S.C. 267, 554 S.E.2d 435 (Ct.App.2001) (recognizing that Doyle is applicable only after Miranda warnings have been given). Doyle is simply inapplicable here. Unlike Doyle, Weston was not under arrest at the time he told Perna that he needed a lawyer, nor had he been given Miranda warnings by authorities. Under Fletcher, it is clear Doyle is inapplicable to Weston's statement to his friend. Accord State v. Baccam, 476 N.W.2d 884, 886 (Iowa Ct.App.1991).