Opinion ID: 4567666
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Statements Issues

Text: Roberts moved to suppress statements he made while being questioned in Detective Payton’s vehicle as his residence was being searched. He argues that he was interrogated while in custody without being provided the constitutionally required Miranda warnings, and that all his incriminating statements in the vehicle and later at the Bettendorf police station were involuntarily obtained in violation of his due process rights. Lieutenant Majeske and Detective Payton testified at the suppression hearing. The district court found both to be credible. The record also included the audio recording of nearly seven hours of conversation between Roberts and the officers in Payton’s vehicle and at the police station. The court concluded that Roberts was not in custody prior to the time when Detective Payton gave him Miranda warnings and that his statements were not involuntary. 1. The Custody Issue. Law enforcement officials must administer Miranda warnings before interrogating persons in their custody. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Here, the officers in testifying generally described their lengthy questioning of Roberts as an interview of a potential witness to the shooting. But it is undisputed that their questioning in the police vehicle was interrogation under Miranda, so the issue is whether Roberts was in custody. See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions, including the question of custody, de novo. United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (standard of review), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1145 (2005). Absent formal arrest, the police must give Miranda warnings when a suspect’s freedom of movement is restricted to a degree akin to a formal arrest. California v. -7- Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). The issue turns on whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would have felt free to end the interview. United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476, 481 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 866 (2011). We consider the totality of the circumstances confronting the defendant. United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1060 (2005). The inquiry typically focuses on six non-exclusive factors enumerated in United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir 1990), which the district court considered in this case. However, “it is important to recall that the [Griffin] factors are not by any means exclusive, and that ‘custody’ cannot be resolved merely by counting up the number of factors on each side of the balance.” Czichray, 378 F.3d at 827. “The most obvious and effective means of demonstrating that a suspect has not been taken into custody . . . is for the police to inform the suspect that an arrest is not being made and that the suspect may terminate the interview at will.” Griffin, 922 F.2d at 21349. This is “powerful evidence that a reasonable person would have understood that he was free to terminate the interview.” Czichray, 378 F.3d 826. This principle is of particular importance in a case such as this, where the questioning occurred during the execution of a warrant search that involved a high risk to officer safety, the investigation of a shooting crime. Some Griffin factors that suggest a suspect is in custody in other circumstances are inherent in this situation. The police are there in numbers and armed; the place to be searched had to be forcefully entered when no one responded; and Roberts when he emerged was flex-cuffed and escorted away from the premises for the officers’ and his own safety. See United States v. Williams, 760 F.3d 811, 815 (8th Cir. 2014).2 Moreover, it is well established that the police may detain persons found in the home for the duration of the search to 2 Even in less dangerous circumstances, handcuffing for officer safety and supervision during an interview do not render the interrogation custodial. See United States v. Giboney, 863 F.3d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 527 (2017); Czichray, 378 F.3d at 825, 830; United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 907 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1272 (2007). -8- “prevent flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found” and facilitate “the orderly completion of the search.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981); see L.A. Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 613-14 (2007); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98-99 (2005). Depending on the totality of the circumstances, questioning of those being detained during a warrant search may or may not cross the line and become custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. See United States v. Burns, 37 F.3d 276, 280-81 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1149 (1995) (no custody). But the remaining Griffin factors, though relevant, are of little help in drawing that line. When interviewing a person present during a warrant search, efforts by the officers to assure the person that he is not under formal arrest or obligated to answer questions become even more significant than in the more typical witness interview. See United States v. Sutera, 933 F.2d 641, 646-48 (8th Cir. 1991). Here, the recorded questioning makes clear that both Lieutenant Majeske and Detective Payton repeatedly assured Roberts he was not under arrest and could stop the questioning at any time, and that Roberts understood his freedom to do so. At the start of the questioning, the officers assured Roberts he was not under arrest, that he did not need to talk to the officers, and that he could stop at any time. “[W]hile advising someone that he or she is not under arrest helps to mitigate an interview’s custodial nature, an explicit assertion that the person may end the encounter is stronger medicine.” United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1138 (8th Cir. 2006). After forty five minutes, Majeske told Roberts firearms were found in the residence, and Roberts said he “guessed he was under arrest now.” Majeske again said he was not under arrest. Later, after Sanders returned, Payton moved his vehicle directly in front of the Davenport residence. Sanders knocked at the passenger window, where Roberts was sitting, and asked Payton if Roberts was under arrest. Payton again said he was not under arrest and agreed to Sanders’s request that she speak with Roberts outside the vehicle. As in Bordeaux, after a three-minute private conversation with Sanders, Roberts walked back and reentered the vehicle. 400 F.3d -9- at 559. Lieutenant Majeske returned to the vehicle and suggested they continue the interview at the station because a news van was searching the scene. Roberts objected, Payton said it was up to Roberts, and questioning continued in the vehicle. Roberts argues these assurances did not negate the perception Roberts was in custody because the officers did not tell him “you are free to leave at any time.” In many situations, that may be an effective way to tell a person he is not under formal arrest. But being free to leave may not necessarily be accurate when officers have discretion to detain a person during execution of a warrant search. Cf. United States v. New, 491 F.3d 369, 373-74 (8th Cir. 2007) (immobile hospital patient not in custody when told he was free to terminate the interview). Of course, there is discretion to end detention of persons present during a warrant search. But when a person is lawfully detained, the assurances the officers repeatedly gave Roberts -- you are not under arrest and may stop answering our questions at any time -- are likely sufficient to refute the notion he is in custody under Miranda. As we said in Czichray, “[a]gainst a backdrop of repeated advice that he was free to terminate the interview, [Roberts’s] decision not to terminate the interview . . . suggests an exercise of free will, rather than restraint to a degree associated with formal arrest.” 378 F.3d at 829, citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 655-58, 663-65 (2004). Roberts further argues the interrogation was coercive because the officers emphasized he had a lot to lose if he did not cooperate as a witness, including his children and his job. But the interrogation did not become custodial simply because the officers “advise[d] [Roberts] of the potential course[s] and consequences of a criminal investigation,” letting him weigh his options and make an informed decision whether cooperation that involved incriminating disclosures might be in his best interest. Czichray, 378 F.3d at 829. The officers spoke in a conversational tone, repeatedly emphasizing it was Roberts’s decision whether to cooperate. -10- For these reasons, we agree with the district court that Roberts was not in the officers’ custody when he made incriminating statements prior to being given Miranda warnings after he was told firearms were found in his residence. 2. The Voluntariness Issue. Roberts further argues that his incriminating statements must be suppressed because they were not voluntary. A statement is involuntary when it was extracted by threats, violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to overbear the defendant’s will and critically impair his capacity for selfdetermination. Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1132 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924 (2001). Voluntariness is determined based on the totality of the circumstances. LeBrun, 363 F.3d at 724. Roberts argues his statements were involuntary because the officers pressured him to cooperate by offering to help him avoid eviction if he cooperated, made it clear the only way to avoid arrest and potential prosecution as a shooter was to cooperate, confronted him with the possibility of federal charges and losing his children and his job, and halted the arrest process during the interrogation because Roberts “had more he wants to say.” We agree with the district court that none of these tactics amounted to improper threats or promises that overbore Roberts’s will. As the officers testified, they believed Roberts drove the Durango the night of the shooting but did not shoot the victim. Therefore, in the interview, they tried to persuade Roberts to become a witness against the shooters and put psychological pressure on him to do so. Roberts understood his rights and carefully weighed the risks and benefits of incriminating cooperation throughout the protracted interview, showing that his will was not overcome at any point. See Simmons, 235 F.3d at 1133-34. Absent improper threats, use of physical force, or intimidation tactics, psychological pressure almost never renders a confession involuntary. See Lebrun, 363 F.3d at 724; Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 1993). The district court properly denied Roberts’s motion to suppress. -11-