Opinion ID: 1450946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sec 491.075.1.

Text: To the extent that Mr. Perry is making a facial challenge to the constitutionality of section 491.075, his challenge clearly fails. A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). Crawford specifically states that prior testimonial statements are admissible if the witness is unavailable and if the person has been subject to prior cross-examination, or if the prior statements are non-testimonial. As this Court noted in Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 881, section 491.075(b) clearly is consistent with the Confrontation Clause to the extent that it permits introduction of non-testimonial statements, such as the statements made to Mother and Stepfather here prior to the involvement of the police, or to the extent it permits introduction of statements as to which prior cross-examination was available. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Further, Crawford expressly states that when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. Id. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Section 491.075 permits introduction of child witness statements in all of these circumstances. As there are circumstances in which section 491.075 can be applied constitutionally, it is not facially invalid. Neither is the statute invalid as applied to Mr. Perry. As noted, Victim did testify in this case. Thus, the only portion of section 491.075 that is relevant here is that which governs admission of prior statements where a child witness testifies at the proceeding. Under section 491.075.1(1) and (2)(a), a prior statement of a testifying child witness is admissible as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, sec. 491.075.1(1), if it presents sufficient indicia of reliability, sec. 491.075.1(2). Mr. Perry focuses on the fact that section 491.075.1 requires that a statement have sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted and suggests that, even though Crawford says that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated where the witness is available for cross-examination at trial, the reference to indicia of reliability violates the Confrontation Clause because Crawford disapproved Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), which in turn had said admissibility under the Confrontation Clause turns solely on whether testimony meets certain indicia of reliability. While Mr. Perry is correct that Roberts is no longer the law in regard to whether prior testimonial statements are admissible under the Confrontation Clause, [4] if the Confrontation Clause otherwise is satisfied or not implicated, there is no bar to section 491.075 additionally requiring that evidence also must satisfy the hearsay rule or show other indicia of reliability to be admitted. The exception applied here permits introduction of prior statements of a child witness if the witness testifies at trial and if the court finds that sufficient indicia of reliability are present. Sec. 491.075.1(2). As Crawford notes, in such a circumstance there is no Confrontation Clause violation. 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Because the Victim was present at trial, if her testimony was subject to cross-examination and met the necessary indicia of reliability under section 491.075.1(2), it was admissible. Mr. Perry alternatively argues that, even if the Confrontation Clause is not implicated where he has an opportunity to cross-examine the witness, his opportunity to cross-examination Victim was not meaningful because Victim did not repeat at trial the key allegation that, after he put his foot under her nightgown, he rubbed it in a circular fashion on her vagina. While a meaningful opportunity for cross-examination is necessary, the Confrontation Clause guarantees only `an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.' United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557, 108 S.Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988) (Court holding Confrontation Clause not violated by witness's loss of memory at trial). It has long been the law that the prosecution may rely on out-of-court statements concerning the crime as substantive evidence. See Glass v. State, 227 S.W.3d 463, 472 (Mo. banc 2007). When this occurs, the defense can bring out the fact that the witness has not repeated certain of his or her prior statements at trial as a fact in defendant's favor, going to credibility. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990) (elements of effective confrontation not only permit a defendant to confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult, but may well aid a defendant in eliciting favorable testimony from the child witness). Mr. Perry had that opportunity here. Victim did not simply sit silent on the stand. While she was reluctant to testify at first, after some preliminary questioning and a break, she did repeat most of her allegations, including the allegation that the defendant placed his foot underneath her nightgown and that what he did made her feel bad. Victim was subjected to cross-examination, during which defense counsel had the opportunity to bring out such matters as any possible motivation of Victim to fabricate a story, possible influences on Victim's statement, or to question her about why she did not repeat her prior specific description and to argue to the jury that her failure to do so negated its credibility. While no doubt defense counsel had to weigh his desire to engage in such questioning with his desire not to bully a child witness and not to repeat her most damning allegations, this is the type of strategy decision that occurs in any cross-examination. In the end, the traditional protections of the oath, cross-examination, and opportunity for the jury to observe the witnesses' demeanor [all contribute to satisfying] the constitutional requirements. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158-161, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). [5]