Opinion ID: 2192923
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arguments in Support of Act 72's Unconstitutionality

Text: Though not identical, the arguments forwarded by the Judges are similar and overlapping; accordingly, for ease of exposition, we shall summarize them as one. The Judges argue that Act 72's repeal of the Act 44 formula, a formula which led to an immediate increase in the compensation provided to the Judiciary, diminished judicial compensation during their terms of office, and that the single exceptional circumstance recognized by the Constitution which would allow for such reduction โ i.e., where the compensation for all salaried officers of the Commonwealth is also diminished โ is not implicated here. The Judges argue that the constitutional exception was intended only for a circumstance where governmental solvency is threatened in a period of economic stress. See Preparatory Committee's Reference Manual No. 5, The Judiciary, at 67. [19] Thus, the Judges contend, the Pennsylvania Constitution sets a high bar before judicial compensation may be reduced, limited to a specific, extraordinary circumstance. If that circumstance is not implicated, the unambiguous prohibition against reducing judicial compensation is necessary to ensure the independence of the Judiciary, one of the three coordinate and equal branches of government. See, e.g., Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 353 A.2d 833, 837 (1976) ([T]he well-established purpose of the prohibition against diminishing the compensation of the Judiciary during their terms of office, contained in Section 16(a) but explicitly or implicitly present in the Pennsylvania Constitution since the Constitution of 1790, is to maintain the independence of the Judiciary from encroachment by the other branches of government.) (footnote omitted). The Judges' argument that Act 72 diminished judicial compensation is straightforward. Act 44's formula operated to immediately increase the compensation paid all Pennsylvania judges; Pennsylvania judges actually began receiving the new salaries as of July 8, 2005; the General Assembly reduced those salaries during the judges' terms of office four months later with the November 16, 2005 enactment of Act 72; and, after November 16, 2005, Pennsylvania judges' salaries in fact were rolled back to their previous levels. Turning to the question of the applicability of the Section 16(a) exception, the Judges first note that Act 72 was not passed in order to address any particular economic crisis in the Commonwealth, which might have warranted a reduction in the compensation of all salaried officers of the Commonwealth. The Judges note that the period between July 2005 and November 2005 was not marred by severe economic stress threatening the Commonwealth. Instead, they assert that Act 72 was motivated by a political crisis facing the General Assembly in the wake of their constituents' reactions to certain aspects of Act 44. Leaving aside whether the purpose of the legislation implicates the Section 16(a) exception, the Judges then posit three independent reasons why Act 72 does not fall within the narrow exception provided in Section 16(a). First, the Judges argue that Act 72 does not diminish, or even address, the compensation of many other salaried officers of the Commonwealth. The Judges concede that the specific constitutional phrase salaried officers of the Commonwealth has not been addressed or defined by any court in this Commonwealth, but the Judges cite to other precedent from this Court in support of their assertion that a reliable definition is easily discernible. See Werner v. Zazyczny, 545 Pa. 570, 681 A.2d 1331, 1337 (1996) (determining that Special Investigator III in Inspector General's Office was not an officer under Article VI, Section 7 of Pennsylvania Constitution, and explaining that [a] person will be deemed a public officer if the person is appointed or elected to perform duties of a grave and important character, and which involve some of the functions of government, for a definite term.); Vega v. Borough of Burgettstown, 394 Pa. 406, 147 A.2d 620, 623 (1958) (concluding that police chief was not public officer but merely a public employee under a statute outlining the procedure for the removal of borough police officers, and noting that the test to be applied in determining a public officer is ... [whether] the officer is chosen by the electorate, or appointed, for a definite and certain tenure in the manner provided by law to an office whose duties are of a grave and important character, involving some of the functions of government, and are to be exercised for the benefit of the public for a fixed compensation paid out of the public treasury ....) (quoting Alworth v. County of Lackawanna, 85 Pa.Super. 349, 352 (1925)); Richie v. City of Philadelphia, 225 Pa. 511, 74 A. 430, 431 (1909) (determining that term public officer in Article III, Section 13 of then-applicable Pennsylvania Constitution encompassed appointed real estate assessor; factors to be examined are the nature of the service to be performed by the incumbent, the duties imposed upon him, whether those duties are of a grave and important character, involving in the proper performance of them some of the functions of government, and a fixed term.). [20] The Judges further argue that other provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution containing the term officer make clear that the term is intended to be broad and inclusive; for that reason, the Judges submit, the Constitution contemplates officers beyond those explicitly named. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. VI, ง 1 (entitled Selection of Officers Not Otherwise Provided for in Constitution, and providing, All officers, whose selection is not provided for in this Constitution, shall be elected or appointed as may be directed by law.). The Judges additionally note that Section 16(a) adds two important qualifications that must be accounted for when discerning a proper definition for the term officer. First, the officers must be salaried; and second, they must be officers of the Commonwealth. Therefore, the Judges cogently reason that the term officer in Article V, Section 16(a) refers to all salaried holders of state offices, whether elected or appointed to those posts, whose offices impose grave and important duties and involve performance of some functions of government. Brown Brief at 13; Herron Brief at 7. Applying this logical definition, the Judges argue that no less than seven cabinet positions in the executive branch did not suffer a reduction in compensation by operation of Act 72, including: the General Counsel, see 71 P.S. ง 732-301; the Secretary of Planning and Policy; the Secretary of Legislative Affairs; the Director of Health Care Reform; the Director of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, see 35 Pa.C.S. ง 7312(e); the Secretary of the Budget, see 71 P.S. ง 229; and the Inspector General, see 4 Pa.Code ง 1.291. The Judges contend that cabinet-level officers certainly must qualify as salaried officers of the Commonwealth. In this regard, and as an example, Judge Herron notes that the General Counsel is an officer established by statute to undertake the grave and important role of serving as the legal advisor to the Governor and '[r]ender such legal advice, and such representation prior to initiation of any action, as are required concerning every matter and issue arising in connection with the exercise of the official powers and duties' of each executive and independent agency. Herron Brief at 8 (quoting 71 P.S. ง 732-301(3)). Additionally, the Judges contend that Act 72 did not reduce the salaries of the following officers, all of whom are appointed by the Governor, by and with the consent of the Pennsylvania Senate: the members of the Turnpike Commission, see 36 P.S. ง 651.5; the members of the Unemployment Compensation Board, see 43 P.S. ง 763; the members of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, see 66 P.S. ง 301; the members of the Pennsylvania Securities Commission, see 70 P.S. ง 1-601; the members of the State Civil Service Commission, see 71 P.S. ง 741.201; the Physician General, see 71 P.S. ง 1401; the members of the Environmental Hearing Board, see 35 P.S. งง 7511-16; the Commissioner of the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, see 63 P.S. ง 1401-305; and the Consumer Advocate, see 1976 Pa. Legis. Serv. 423 (West). Other officers who did not have their salaries reduced by Act 72, the Judges note, include: the State Fire Commissioner; the Deputy Secretaries of Community Affairs and Development, Information Technology, and Human Resources and Management; and the Executive Directors of the Game Commission, the Philadelphia Regional Port Authority, the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, and the Fish and Boat Commission. The Judges conclude their first point by emphasizing that the list of officers they have identified above is not exhaustive of all such unaffected salaried officers of the Commonwealth. But the list alone, the Judges assert, proves that Act 72 did not diminish or even address the compensation of all salaried officers of the Commonwealth in the same manner that it directly diminished judicial compensation. The Judges assert that, for this reason alone, the exception in Section 16(a) does not apply, and Act 72 therefore violates Article V, Section 16(a). The second independent reason for concluding that the exception does not apply, according to the Judges, is that Act 72 does not diminish the current salaries of the executive officers who were specifically enumerated in Act 44. The elected executive officers identified in Act 44, whose increased compensation was specifically addressed in Act 44, include the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the State Treasurer, the Auditor General, and the Attorney General. Act 44, ง 3 (amending 71 Pa.C.S. งง 1102-03). The appointed Cabinet members identified and affected by Act 44 were the Adjutant General, the Secretary of Aging, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Banking, the Secretary of the Commonwealth, the Secretary of Community and Economic Development, the Secretary of Conservation and Natural Resources, the Secretary of Correction, the Secretary of Education, the Secretary of Environmental Protection, the Secretary of General Services, the Secretary of Health, the Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth, the Secretary of Labor and Industry, the Secretary of Public Welfare, the Secretary of Revenue, the Pennsylvania State Police Commissioner, and the Secretary of Transportation. Id. (amending 71 Pa.C.S. ง 1102(c)). Under Act 44, the Judges note, the salary increases applicable to the named elected executive positions were only available to those individuals elected to these positions after the July 7, 2005 effective date of the Act. See Act 44, ง 4(4). Similarly, the salary increases provided for the named appointed Cabinet positions were to apply only to individuals appointed to these positions after December 31, 2006. See Act 44, ง 4(3). Unlike the compensation increases that the Act 44 formulas provided to the legislators (in the form of unvouchered expenses) and the Judiciary, the increases in salaries provided to these named executive officers never took effect because Act 44 was repealed by Act 72 before any of these officers were either elected or appointed. Because no executive officers โ including the ones specifically identified in Act 44 โ had their compensation actually increased by Act 44, by definition, none saw their salaries decreased when Act 72 was adopted. For this separate and independent reason, the Judges argue, the Section 16(a) all salaried officers exception does not apply, and Act 72 must be deemed unconstitutional insofar as it reduced judicial compensation. Third, the Judges argue that the exception is inapplicable because the Act 72 salary reduction does not apply generally. This is so, the Judges note, because the salary reductions in Act 72 do not apply evenly โ i.e., by the same amount or proportion โ to the various officers affected, as some officers' salaries are reduced by one amount, others by a different amount, etc. The Judges dismiss appellees' argument that Act 72 merely reduces salaries by the same amount that they were increased by Act 44 as unavailing, reiterating that the constitutional provision addresses reductions alone and it makes clear that, once salaries have been established at a certain amount, a law reducing those salaries does not apply generally unless it reduces them evenly across-the-board, either directly or proportionately. Turning to the second issue in this Court's briefing order, the Judges argue that the General Assembly's policy declarations contained in Sections 1(b) and (c) of Act 72 may reflect a legislative awareness of the obvious Section 16(a) dilemma, but the declarations themselves do not dissipate the direct and patently unconstitutional effect that the Act has on reducing judicial compensation. Regarding Section 1(b)'s declaration that Act 72 was not intended to diminish or infringe on, or otherwise interfere with, the independence of the judicial system, the Judges assert that this is not the relevant constitutional test. To the contrary, the Judges note, the test is specifically set forth in Section 16(a) itself, and it looks to whether judicial compensation has been diminished by a law that does not apply generally to all salaried officers of the Commonwealth. That test does not include an exception for instances where the reduction in judicial compensation ordered by the General Assembly was accompanied by a legislative declaration that it did not intend the reduction to interfere with the independence of the Judiciary; and this Court has never held that a statute diminishing judicial compensation survives constitutional scrutiny where the General Assembly claims that it did not thereby intend to interfere with the independence of the Judiciary. See, e.g., Catania v. Commonwealth, State Employees' Ret. Bd., 498 Pa. 684, 450 A.2d 1342 (1982) (plurality opinion). As for the General Assembly's policy declaration in Section 1(c) of Act 72, which purports to define the constitutional term salaried officers of the Commonwealth solely for purposes of this Act and rolling back compensation levels, the Judges argue that this declaration likewise does not bind the Court. In the Judges' view, the Constitution does not afford the General Assembly the authority to attempt to define away a violation of Section 16(a). To grant the General Assembly the ability to do so, the Judges contend, would eliminate the Constitution's authority to impose limitations or prohibitions on the legislative branch, in clear contravention of fundamental separation of powers principles. Further, the Judges note that the General Assembly's declaration as to which officers constitute the salaried officers of the Commonwealth is inconsistent with: prior decisions of this Court interpreting the term officer, see, e.g., Werner, supra ; the Constitution's considerable guidance in determining who is an officer, see, e.g., PA. CONST. art. IV, ง 1, art. VI, ง 1; and the General Assembly's own prior positions on this issue โ most tellingly, the revived Act 39 itself, the title of which plainly acknowledged that it did not establish new salaries for every Commonwealth officer, as it employed the terms certain public officials and certain other State officers. Thus, the Judges argue, this Court is not bound by the General Assembly's attempted pre-emptive definition. The amicus briefs filed by the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Philadelphia Bar Association emphasize, as the Judges do, that Act 72 violates Section 16(a) because it does not apply to all salaried officers of the Commonwealth as that phrase was intended, and because many executive branch officers specifically mentioned in Act 44 itself did not have their existing salaries at all diminished by Act 72. The amici also assert that the General Assembly's declarations in Sections 1(b) and (c) of Act 72 fail to save the Act from its patently unconstitutional effect upon judicial salaries. Indeed, the Philadelphia Bar Association argues that the General Assembly, in seeking to bind the courts to a one-time definition of the term salaried officers of the Commonwealth, a definition which was obviously designed only in the hope of insulating Act 72 against a constitutional challenge, sought to usurp the function of the Judiciary as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. In the view of the Philadelphia Bar Association, this legislative declaration of policy highlight[s] the danger of an overreaching legislature against which the Compensation Clause was designed to protect. Philadelphia Bar Association's Brief at 9. The Pennsylvania Bar Association adds that the very occasion for the enactment of Act 72 negates any suggestion in its declaration of policy, or in appellees' arguments, that the Act passes constitutional muster. The Pennsylvania Bar Association posits that the sole reason the General Assembly passed Act 72 was in response to the public scorn and discontent which followed upon adoption of Act 44. However, the Pennsylvania Bar Association contends, that political reason for rolling back compensation is the very type of retributive action that Section 16(a) expressly prohibits when judicial compensation is involved. The Pennsylvania Bar Association perceptively notes that, the General Assembly [is] free to reduce [its] own compensation in response to the electorate's perception of impolitic legislative action, but [it] may not reduce judicial remuneration by reason of public criticism, or as a reaction to public dissatisfaction with their legislative action. Pennsylvania Bar Association Brief at 7. In the view of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, the General Assembly's misuse of its control over appropriations, by virtue of Act 72's repeal of Act 44, represents a direct encroachment on the integrity and independence of the Judiciary as a co-equal branch of government.