Opinion ID: 1161647
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Properly Granted Bob's Motion to Modify the Original Dissolution Decree's Property Distribution.

Text: Tarie contends that the trial court erred when it set aside the property distribution contained in the dissolution decree under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(6). [7] Because Bob and Tarie's divorce decree incorporated their property settlement agreement, the property division is a final judgment. [8] But Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) authorizes a court to set aside a final judgment that is unjust. [9] Rule 60(b)(6) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment as long as the party moves for relief within a reasonable time. A party can invoke subsection (b)(6) only if none of the other five clauses apply and extraordinary circumstances exist: [10] In general, relief is given under clause (6) in cases in which the judgment was obtained by the improper conduct of the party in whose favor it was rendered or the judgment resulted from the excusable default of the party against whom it was directed under circumstances going beyond the earlier clauses of the rule....... The broad power granted by clause (6) is not for the purpose of relieving a party from free, calculated, and deliberate choices he has made. A party remains under a duty to take legal steps to protect his own interests. [11] We have articulated four factors that may constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to set aside a property division in a final divorce decree under Rule 60(b)(6): (1) the fundamental, underlying assumption of the dissolution agreement had been destroyed; (2) the parties' property division was poorly thought out; (3) the property division was reached without the benefit of counsel; and (4) the [property in dispute] was the parties' principal asset. [12] Because these factors merely serve as equitable factors for the court to consider, each factor need not be present in order for the court to properly grant Rule 60(b)(6) relief. [13] In support of the trial court's decision to grant the Rule 60(b)(6) motion, Bob first maintains that the underlying assumption of the parties that he and Tarie would continue to live together and share the marital assets had been destroyed. He relies on Foster v. Foster, [14] in which the parties assumed at the time of the divorce that they would continue living as a family unit after the final dissolution decree. With this understanding, the parties in Foster agreed to a property settlement that awarded the wife a one-half interest in the marital home upon sale but gave the husband sole discretion as to when it would be sold. The parties later ceased living together. Because the underlying assumption of the property agreement was destroyed, we concluded that modification of the original decree to provide for immediate payment to the wife for her share of the marital home was appropriate. [15] But the underlying assumption in this case is not so clear. At the time of dissolution, Bob and Tarie agreed that the primary motive in dissolving their marriage was to protect their assets from Nye Ford's lawsuit against Bob. [16] But the evidence does not indicate whether they intended to continue to live together after the dissolution. Bob testified that he and Tarie were having problems at the time of dissolution because Tarie had a boyfriend. On the other hand, Tarie claims that Bob promised to remarry her as soon as the Nye lawsuit ended. The trial court made no finding as to Bob and Tarie's underlying assumption at the time of their dissolution or how it had been destroyed. But the trial court's alternative basis for its decision to reopen the property division that the parties omitted several marital assets from the dissolution agreementprovides independent support for the trial court's decision. Here, the trial court granted Bob's motion to set aside the property distribution in part because the division was woefully incomplete. Indeed, the property agreement incorporated in the divorce decree allocated approximately $250,000 of the marital estate but did not include all of the parties' marital assets. The parties dispute the total sum of the omitted assets: Bob claims that the omitted assets total over $100,000 while Tarie asserts that the assets total $60,000. In either event, the trial court correctly granted the Rule 60(b)(6) motion to set aside the decree because the original property division failed to dispose of substantial items of marital property. [17]