Opinion ID: 1742511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Letter as Dubious Evidence of Remorse

Text: In this case, the trial judge determined that the letter offered only a guilty plea in return for a life sentence and was not an offer of an open-ended plea after which a jury would decide the penalty. In ruling that the defense could not introduce the letter, the trial court essentially ruled that any marginally probative value in defense counsel's letter was far outweighed by the risk of jury confusion and diversion in determining whether the letter reflected a genuine expression of remorse. La.C.E. art. 403 (Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.). The trial court and defense counsel could not agree on what the letter proposed, and jurors were in no better position to decide. The equivocal tone of the letter rendered it minimally probative of remorse. Moreover, if the offer did represent an invitation to bypass the guilt stage and proceed directly to the penalty phase, the letter's probative value was substantially undercut by the defense of insanity, offered to negate responsibility. The insanity defense may not absolutely preclude remorse, but neither is it consistent with remorse. The insanity plea in this case, when considered alongside the, at best, equivocal letter, indicates that the letter was mere trial strategy, more an indication of a desire to be spared than an expression of remorse. In sum, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in excluding the letter.