Opinion ID: 2972882
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Young’s Motion for a New Trial

Text: We first consider Young’s assertion that the district court abused its discretion in denying Young’s motion for a new trial because “the verdicts were against the clear weight of the evidence.” Rule 33(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part, “Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” While the district judge may act in the role of a “thirteenth juror” in assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence to insure that there is no miscarriage of justice, our role is to determine whether the district court’s ruling that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence was an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 589 n.6 (6th Cir. 2003). In support of his argument, Young points to the fact that Fugate, an admitted conspirator, testified in Young’s defense and that he had nothing to gain by doing so. While Fugate testified that Young was not involved in any way in the escape plot, 8 however, Manning testified that Young did indeed intend to escape with the others and that he had braided the rope to be used in the escape. Reid corroborated Manning’s testimony insofar as he stated that he saw Young braiding the rope in his cell. Although Young correctly points out that the testimony of Manning and Reid is inconsistent in that Manning said that he walked the linen strips down to Young’s cell while Reid testified that it was Fugate who had done so, that inconsistency is not “so egregious or extraordinary” as to warrant a finding that the district court committed a clear and manifest abuse of discretion in denying Young’s motion for a new trial. See United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 589 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that while the defendant had argued that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because of conflicts in the testimony, he failed to show that the conflicts were “so egregious or extraordinary” to warrant a finding that the district court abused its discretion). The inconsistency between the testimony of Manning and Reid was on a relatively minor issue. Their testimony is consistent on the central point, which is that Young provided substantial assistance in constructing the rope that the conspirators intended to use in the escape. Regarding the motives of Manning and Reid in testifying in Young’s case, Young offered no credible reason why either man would truthfully divulge the details of the escape plot to the authorities but then lie about Young’s involvement in it. Young also supports his argument by asserting that he could not possibly have 9 escaped because he could not have gotten out of his cell. The evidence was in conflict on this issue. A prison official testified that there was constant trouble with the old doors and locking mechanisms in East Four South. Cell 3 was not a pop-out cell and Fugate did testify that Young’s cell could not be jammed, but both Manning and Reid stated that Young’s cell could be jammed and that it was possible that he could leave his cell even during lock down hours. It was not unreasonable for the jury or the district court to adopt the latter view. Young’s argument on this issue amounts to a claim of factual impossibility. Significantly, he has only been charged with attempted escape and conspiracy to commit escape. However, factual impossibility is not a defense to attempt or conspiracy. See United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1175-76 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Under the traditional approach, legal impossibility but not factual impossibility is a defense to a charge of attempt.”); see also United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1269 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that “it is no defense [to conspiracy] that success was impossible because of unknown circumstances”) (internal quotation omitted). Young next supports his argument by asserting that it is irrational to assume that he would have joined a scheme with little or no chance of success. He notes that the escape was “doomed” by the time he is alleged to have joined it. However, the conspirators that testified at Young’s trial believed they had a chance of success. 10 Manning stated that although the blades were “worn,” they were still “usable,” and that the conspirators were “extremely close” to cutting the third bar out. The men also believed that the window frame next to the catwalk could be kicked out. Manning even stated that while an escape attempt would have been dangerous, “I think I could have got out and got away and got down the side of the building.” The jury and the district court were convinced that Young took a substantial step toward escaping by making the rope and that he agreed to join the conspiracy. Whether the escape plot would ultimately succeed is irrelevant to attempt and conspiracy. See Peete, 919 F.2d at 1175-76; Hamilton, 689 F.2d at 1269. Young’s self-serving statement that he would not have joined a “doomed” escape plot is not availing. Finally, Young supports his argument by noting that there was no physical evidence in his cell which linked him to the crime. While that is true, the testimony of Manning and Reid represents direct evidence that Young was involved in the escape conspiracy. Moreover, some of the details of Manning’s testimony were corroborated. He informed the authorities about the cut bars, the rope, and the fact that the hacksaw blades were hidden in a bible. All of these items were later discovered. It is not our role to sit as the “thirteenth juror” and re-weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. See Solorio, 337 F.3d at 589 n.6. The jury and the district court apparently found Manning and Reid to be more credible than 11 Fugate. We cannot say that the district court’s determination that the verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence was a clear and manifest abuse of discretion.