Opinion ID: 1755814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: DUNCAN v. STATE

Text: The Fourth District in the instant action certified conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in Duncan v. State, 686 So.2d 701 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). See Matthews, 854 So.2d at 240. In Duncan, the defendant was sentenced in three separate cases at one sentencing proceeding and received two guidelines sentences and a habitual offender sentence. See Duncan, 686 So.2d at 702. Duncan was sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by probation for one of the guidelines sentences as well as a concurrent term of probation as a habitual offender. See id. [7] Duncan served his prison term pursuant to the guidelines sentence and was placed on probation as a habitual offender. See id. Subsequently, Duncan violated his probation. See id. Upon revocation of probation, Duncan was sentenced to prison as a habitual offender without credit for the time he previously served in prison under the sentencing guidelines. See id. On appeal, Duncan contended that Tripp entitled him to credit for the time he served pursuant to the guidelines sentence to be applied to his habitual offender sentence imposed upon resentencing. The Second District disagreed. In recognizing the holding in Tripp, the Second District focused on this Court's reasoning in Tripp that awarding credit is necessary to preserve the intent of the sentencing guidelines. See id. The Second District wrote: Duncan's sentence in this case, however, is a habitual offender sentence to which the guidelines do not apply. Consequently, Duncan is not entitled to credit for the time he served pursuant to the guidelines sentence. The danger sought to be avoided by Tripp  the imposition of prison time in excess of that mandated by the guidelines in circumstances where probation on one or more counts follows prison time on one or more others  simply does not inhere in the context of a habitual offender sentence for which the guidelines do not apply. Id. Since the Second District did not apply Tripp to Duncan's habitual offender sentence, it is in conflict with the decision in Matthews, where the Fourth District expressly held that Tripp was applicable to habitual offender sentences.