Opinion ID: 2786086
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: As the majority notes, it is undisputed that facilitation is a lesser included offense of the sale of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school. See Bryant, 2013 WL 4401166, at  (AThe law is well-settled that facilitation is a lesser included offense to the charged offenses.@); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 466-67 (Tenn. 1999) (AAn offense is a lesser-included offense if . . . it consists of . . . facilitation of the offense charged . . . .@). The failure to request a lesser included offense may constitute deficient performance by trial counsel if Athe record contains any evidence which reasonable minds could accept as to the lesser included offense,@ and such evidence, viewed Aliberally in the light most favorable to the existence of the lesser included offense[,] . . . is legally 4 sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense.@ Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-18-110(a) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 469. With these standards in mind, I must respectfully disagree with the majority=s conclusion that the Petitioner has Apresented no evidence of facilitation@ that would warrant an instruction on the lesser included offense. The offense of facilitation is defined as follows: AA person is criminally responsible for the facilitation of a felony, if, knowing that another intends to commit a specific felony, but without the intent required for criminal responsibility under [section] 39-11-402(2), the person knowingly furnishes substantial assistance in the commission of the felony.@ Tenn. Code Ann. ' 39-11-403(a). When parsed, the offense of facilitation is comprised of three elements: (1) that the defendant knew another person intended to commit the charged felony; (2) that the defendant lacked the requisite intent to be found guilty under a theory of criminal responsibility; and (3) that the defendant knowingly furnished substantial assistance in the commission of the felony. In my view, a rational juror could have found each of these three elements from the evidence presented relating to the second and third drug transactions. As to the first element of facilitation, the post-conviction court denied relief on the mistaken basis that Athe proof in this case fail[ed] to establish the . . . existence of >another person= who participated in the commission of the crime[s].@ Bryant, 2013 WL 4401166, at . The evidence showed that the second and third transactions were initiated by Knowles, who implored the Petitioner to aid him in the acquisition of ecstasy pills. There was no evidence that the Petitioner had possession of the drugs at any time prior to the second or third transactions with Knowles. Instead, on both occasions, the Petitioner acquired the drugs from an unidentified third person contemporaneously to his meetings with Knowles.3 In my view, this evidence is sufficient to establish the first element of facilitation because the Petitioner knew that another personCthe unidentified drug dealer who brought the ecstasy pills to the second and third transactions with KnowlesCintended to sell or deliver a controlled substance. As to the second and third elements of facilitation, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury, properly instructed, to have found that the Petitioner substantially 3 Although the Petitioner was acquitted of the charges related to the first transaction, the evidence of this transaction also shows that the direct participation of Aanother person@ was necessary for Knowles to acquire the ecstasy pills. As in the second and third transactions, there was no evidence that the Petitioner possessed any drugs prior to Knowles= first request for ecstasy pills in February of 2008. The Petitioner testified at trial that he was in possession of the drugs at the time he met with Knowles for the first transaction only because Knowles had failed to meet the Petitioner as scheduled but Athe guy had already brought [the drugs] to [the Petitioner].@ But for Knowles= failure to arrive as scheduled to purchase the drugs, the first transaction could have taken place in the same manner as the second and third transactions. 5 assisted the dealer in selling or delivering a controlled substance but lacked the requisite intent to be found guilty under a theory of criminal responsibility. Although the intent of the Petitioner was a key factor in the post-conviction court=s denial of relief, see Bryant, 2013 WL 4401166, at , , the majority opinion does not address the criminal responsibility statute that is referenced within the definition of facilitation, see Tenn. Code Ann. ' 39-11-403(a) (stating that to be convicted of facilitation a person must act Awithout the intent required for criminal responsibility under [section] 39-11-402(2)@). Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-402(2) (2014) states that a person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by another if, A[a]cting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense.@ In consequence, the second and third elements of facilitation would be met in this instance if there was any evidence that the Petitioner provided substantial assistance to the unidentified drug dealer but lacked the intent to promote or benefit from the sale of ecstasy pills to Knowles. There was proof at trial that the Petitioner had repeatedly declined to acquire ecstasy pills for Knowles until Knowles explained that he needed the Petitioner=s help in obtaining drugs that he could sell in order to make money to feed his family. That each transaction was initiated at the behest of Knowles is not in dispute. On the second and third occasions, the Petitioner made contact with an unidentified dealer, took the money provided by Knowles to the dealer, and transferred the pills supplied by the dealer to Knowles. There was no proof that the Petitioner possessed the pills prior to the transactions, that he solicited Knowles or any other potential buyers on behalf of the dealer, or that he kept any of the money exchanged between the dealer and Knowles. In fact, during the transaction on March 21, 2008, the Petitioner returned ten dollars in change to Knowles after retrieving 100 ecstasy pills from the dealer at the scene. Viewing this proof in the light most favorable to the existence of the lesser included offense, a rational juror could have concluded that the Petitioner merely acted as a Ago-between@ in these transactions, thereby providing substantial assistance to the unidentified dealer in the sale of a controlled substance without intending to promote or benefit from the offenses.4 See State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 188 (Tenn. 2002) (finding 4 In my view, there is no evidence supporting the conclusion by the majority that the Petitioner Adid not merely furnish substantial assistance in the drug sale[s], but instead[] was the seller of the drugs.@ First, the majority states that A[t]he uncontroverted evidence shows that [the Petitioner] set the price for the drugs,@ when in fact the Petitioner testified repeatedly that the price for ecstasy pills in various quantities was Acommon knowledge@ in his neighborhood. Second, the majority states that the Petitioner never argued that he was Amerely assisting the drug supplier,@ even though the Petitioner testified several times about the direct involvement of the drug dealer who, at the time of the transactions, supplied the pills to the Petitioner who then turned them over to Knowles. Likewise, the majority states that the Petitioner Anever testified he was a middle-man for the sale[s],@ despite the testimony of the Petitioner that he arranged the 6 the evidence warranted a facilitation instruction where A[t]here was no evidence that [the defendant] received any proceeds of the robbery@); State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tenn. 2000) (finding the evidence warranted a facilitation instruction where the defendant Aparticipated substantially [in the aggravated robbery] by kicking and beating the victim@ but lacked the intent to promote or benefit from the crime Abecause he took no property from the victim@).