Opinion ID: 179514
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Defendant's Presence at Critical Stage

Text: A half-hour after the jury had been excused from the courtroom to begin their deliberations at 2:04 p.m. on Friday June 22, 2007, the jury indicated that they wished to adjourn for the day and begin deliberations the following Monday. The district judge addressed this request with counsel on the record in the courtroom in the absence of defendant Henderson, who was held in the custody of the Marshals. Both defense counsel and the Assistant U.S. Attorney preferred to have the jury begin deliberations right away. The judge elected to bring the jury back into the courtroom to deliver this answer and inquired as to whether defense counsel would waive defendant's right to be present. Counsel so waived. Then, in the absence of the defendant, the court, without incident, instructed the jury to commence deliberating. The jury continued deliberating until 5:35 p.m., when they decided to adjourn for the day. The court dismissed them with instructions to return and continue deliberating on Monday at 9:00 a.m. Although Henderson stated no objection at the time, he now contends that he had a right to be present for the court's communication with the jury and that his attorney's waiver of this right was ineffective because not made knowingly and intelligently. He contends this denial of his right to be present during a critical stage of the trial violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Henderson acknowledges that his claim is subject to plain error review. Thus, he must show not only that the trial court committed plain error by not insisting, over his attorney's waiver, that Henderson be brought into the courtroom so that the court could again instruct the jury to begin deliberating, but also that such error adversely affected his substantial rights and the fairness, integrity and public reputation of the trial. Mayberry, 540 F.3d at 512. Henderson has not even tried to meet the latter two requirements. He has not even argued that any prejudice resulted from his absence. Instead, he contends the error is reversible per se, citing United States v. Barnwell, 477 F.3d 844, 852 (6th Cir.2007). Barnwell is clearly distinguishable. In Barnwell, the court was faced with repeated ex parte communications between the court and the prosecuting attorney and the jury forepersoni.e., without the presence of the defendant or his counsel or even their knowledge that the meetings were taking place. The court held these errors prejudiced the effectiveness of Barnwell's legal representation and violated his right to due process of law. Id. Here, in contrast, defense counsel was present for all communications with the jury and expressly waived Henderson's right to be present during what was a purely technical procedure that had no bearing on Henderson's substantive rights. We have recognized that a defendant's right to be present at every stage of the trial is not absolute, but exists only when his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. United States v. Brika, 416 F.3d 514, 526 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987)). In other words, the defendant's presence is not guaranteed when it would be useless, but only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence. Id. In Brika, the court held that where the judge did nothing more than give the jurors a technical and perfunctory rereading or explanation of previously-given instructions, we fail to see how [defendant's] absence... thwarted a fair trial. Id. at 527. The same reasoning applies here. Henderson has failed to show any error, much less remediable plain error.