Opinion ID: 681058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did Gomez enter the United States on May 3?

Text: 9 Gomez first argues that because he entered the United States through proper immigration channels (i.e., the INS Legalization Office in New York), the five-year statute of limitations began to run when he entered the United States. Gomez claims that his entry to the United States occurred on May 3, 1988, so that the May 7, 1993 indictment is barred by the five-year statute of limitations. We disagree. 10 The five-year statute of limitations for prosecutions under Sec. 1326 begins running as soon as the offense is complete. United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d 128, 134-35 (3d Cir.1980). The offenses of entry and attempted entry are complete when the deported alien enters or attempts to enter through a recognized INS port of entry. Id. at 135 (entry); see United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir.1993) (attempted entry). Thus, when the alien enters (or attempts to enter) through a recognized port of entry, the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the (attempted) entry is effected. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d at 137. If, however, the alien's entry is surreptitious, there is no such entry 6 to trigger the statute to run. Id. In contrast to entry and attempted entry, a found in violation is a continuing violation that is not complete until the alien is discovered by immigration authorities. Only at this point does the statute of limitations on a found in violation begin to run. Id. 11 The magistrate judge's order and recommendation, which was sustained, adopted and incorporated by the district court, contained an explicit factual finding that: Between June 14, 1985, and May 2, 1988, defendant [Gomez] entered the United States surreptitiously without inspection by the INS. Order and Recommendation of United States Magistrate at 4 (Sept. 2, 1993). We must accept this factual finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365-66, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869-70, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). 12 This finding was taken virtually verbatim from the parties' joint motion to amend the stipulation of facts, and we find no evidence to contradict its substance. Indeed, the evidence before the magistrate judge supports this finding. This evidence indicates that the Amnesty Program under Sec. 1255a is a specially administered program designed to change the status of illegal aliens who have already entered the United States. See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255a(a)(2)(A) (alien must establish that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982) (emphasis added); 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255a(a)(3)(A) (alien must establish that the alien has been continuously physically present). The instructions to Form 687 parallel Sec. 1255a and confirm this analysis. INS Form I-687 Instructions at 1 (discussing Eligibility in terms of entry into the United States). Moreover, the Legalization Office is a distinct branch of the INS that normally is not to disclose information to regular immigration authorities. See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255a(c)(5). Gomez's visit to the INS Legalization Office on May 3, 1988, is therefore not an entry into the United States, and the district court's acceptance of the magistrate judge's finding of surreptitious entry prior to the May 3 visit is not clearly erroneous. 13 Because Gomez entered the United States surreptitiously, there was no recorded entry to trigger the statute of limitations. For this reason, Gomez's reliance upon DiSantillo is misplaced. DiSantillo was a prosecution under the entry provision of the statute, and merely held that an alien may not be indicted under Sec. 1326 more than five years after he entered or attempted to enter the United States through an official INS port of entry when the immigration authorities have a record of when he entered or attempted to enter. 615 F.2d at 137. The rationale for this holding is that in a regular entry through a recognized port, [t]he immigration authorities [know of the alien's] entry and could have, through the exercise of diligence typical of law enforcement authorities, discovered [the] violation at that time. Id. at 135. DiSantillo went on to state that [i]f no record is possible because the entry was surreptitious and 7 not through an official port of entry, the alien is 'found' when his presence is first noted by the immigration authorities. Id. at 137 (footnote added). This distinction is supported by principles of statutory construction, id. at 134-35, and the observation that when entry is surreptitious, there is no record of entry. Only the alien knows the precise date of his surreptitious entry which evinces a knowledge that the alien is in violation of the law. Id. at 135. Thus, DiSantillo is distinguishable because it involved an entry violation that is complete when entry is made whereas this appeal involves a surreptitious entry and the continuing offense of being found in the United States. DiSantillo addresses this distinction in dicta, and is therefore of no assistance to Gomez. Because the statute of limitations for the found in violation does not begin to run until Gomez was found, we turn to that issue. 14