Opinion ID: 836201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sentencing court discretion to grant jail credit

Text: We also reject defendant's argument that a sentencing court retains discretion to grant credit [19] regardless of the applicability of the jail credit statute. [20] As explained, the statutory scheme pertaining to parolees dictates that defendant's 98 days in jail were served against his original maximum sentence. The sentencing court had no discretionary authority to circumvent the operation of the statutory scheme. MCL 769.11b neither requires nor permits sentencing credit except as provided in the statute. Prieskorn, supra at 340, 381 N.W.2d 646. The enactment of [MCL 769.11b] reflects the Legislature's intention to entitle every defendant in a criminal case to the sentence credit described in the statute, instead of leaving the matter to the discretion of sentencing courts. Id. at 333, 381 N.W.2d 646, see also Hoerstman Gen. Contracting, Inc. v. Hahn, 474 Mich. 66, 74, 711 N.W.2d 340 (2006), quoting Millross v. Plum Hollow Golf Club, 429 Mich. 178, 183, 413 N.W.2d 17 (1987), citing 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed.), § 50.05, pp. 440-441 (`In general, where comprehensive legislation prescribes in detail a course of conduct to pursue and the parties and things affected, and designates specific limitations and exceptions, the Legislature will be found to have intended that the statute supersede and replace the common law dealing with the subject matter.'). Accordingly, the sentencing court lacked the authority to grant defendant credit against his new minimum sentence.