Opinion ID: 1155733
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Unadjudicated Prior Offenses

Text: During the penalty phase, the prosecution was permitted (see § 190.3, factor (b)) to introduce evidence of various prior offenses of defendant, namely, the killing of Thomas Davis, the killing of Arthur Gray, and the armed robbery and attempted murder of Mr. and Mrs. Edwin Davis. Defendant had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing Thomas Davis; the remaining offenses were unadjudicated. (16) Defendant contends admission of evidence of the prior unadjudicated offenses was improper under the due process and equal protection guarantees of the state and federal Constitutions. We have frequently held that neither the state nor federal Constitution forbids admitting evidence of the defendant's uncharged and unadjudicated offenses that involve force or violence, or the threat or attempt to use force or violence. (See People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1188 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146]; People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 906-907 [274 Cal. Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282]; People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 42 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631 [767 P.2d 1109]; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) In a related contention, defendant argues the court erred in allowing the People to introduce evidence of the circumstances surrounding defendant's prior offenses involving force or violence. According to defendant, section 190.3, factor (b), permits the People to prove only the fact that defendant committed the offense, not the underlying circumstances. We have frequently rejected similar contentions. (See People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 47; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 754 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1203 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) Defendant's equal protection claim is based on asserted restrictions on the admissibility of evidence of prior offenses or convictions in noncapital cases. (But see People v. Ratcliffe (1981) 124 Cal. App.3d 808, 823 [177 Cal. Rptr. 627], and cases cited.) It seems sufficient to observe that capital case sentencing involves wholly different considerations than ordinary criminal sentencing and properly allows the jury to focus on the defendant's prior criminal conduct and propensity for violence, factors deemed relevant as possible aggravating circumstances affecting the jury's ultimate penalty decision. (See People v. McDowell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 551, 568 [250 Cal. Rptr. 530, 758 P.2d 1060].) This distinction between capital and noncapital cases adequately justifies the differences in treatment cited by defendant. (See People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1188 [denying equal protection challenge]; People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 906-907 [same]; cf. People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1286-1288 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115].)
(17) Defendant contends the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to elicit evidence regarding the circumstances of defendant's prior conviction of voluntary manslaughter for the killing of Thomas Davis. (See § 190.3, factor (c).) Defendant asserts that, in light of the manslaughter conviction and the implied acquittal of murder charges, the jury's consideration of evidence tending to show malice or premeditation violated the proscriptions against double jeopardy in the state and federal Constitutions. We have repeatedly rejected similar contentions. (See People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 71 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388]; People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 217; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 756, fn. 17.) As stated in Visciotti, The presentation of evidence of past criminal conduct at a sentencing hearing does not place the defendant in jeopardy with respect to the past offenses. He is not on trial for the past offense, is not subject to conviction or punishment for the past offense, and may not claim either speedy trial or double jeopardy protection against introduction of such evidence. [Citation.] (2 Cal.4th at p. 71.)