Opinion ID: 1225502
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Refusal to Give Benefit of the Doubt Penalty Instruction

Text: (22) At the close of the penalty phase, defendant sought, and the trial court refused to give, the following instruction: If you have a doubt as to which penalty to impose, death or life in prison without the possibility of parole, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and return a verdict fixing the penalty at life in prison without the possibility of parole. Instead, the court instructed the jury in accordance with language this court had approved in People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at page 545, footnote 19, as conform[ing] to our opinion. Among other points, the instruction advised the jurors that [i]n weighing the various circumstances, you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. [¶] To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. The instruction also told the jurors that any mitigating evidence standing alone may be the basis for deciding that life without possibility of parole is the appropriate punishment. [¶] [Y]ou may consider sympathy, pity, compassion, or mercy for the defendant that has been raised by any aspect of the offense or of the defendant's background or character in determining the appropriate punishment. Defendant contends it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to give his requested benefit of the doubt instruction. That claim lacks merit. We recently reviewed and rejected a miscellany of related attacks on the principal penalty phase sentencing instruction, including the one raised here. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 781-782 [47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2]; see also People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 145-146 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559]; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 761 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) Not only is the requested instruction not constitutionally compelled ( Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231, 246 [108 S.Ct. 546, 555, 98 L.Ed.2d 568]), but the jury was adequately informed of its sentencing responsibility by the instructions the trial court did give.