Opinion ID: 2112763
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: defenses stricken on demurrer

Text: The Barelmanns claim that the district court improvidently struck their assertions that the bank failed to make an appropriate demand before instituting this action, levied on exempt property, and refused to execute a lien waiver on a corn crop maturing after the replevin action was commenced, and that the Barelmanns were not given an opportunity to post a bond, as contemplated by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1098 (Reissue 1989), rather than have the replevied property delivered to the bank. In addition, the Barelmanns complain that the district court struck the paragraph of their answer which concludes that their allegations constitute the affirmative defenses of accord and satisfication [sic], dirress [sic], estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, payment and waiver. We begin this aspect of our review by recalling the rule that in considering a demurrer, a court accepts the truth of the facts well pled and the factual and legal inferences which may reasonably be deduced therefrom, but does not accept the conclusions of the pleader. Matheson v. Stork, 239 Neb. 547, 477 N.W.2d 156 (1991); Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769 (1991). Although this rule is generally encountered in the context of a demurrer to a petition, it has equal application to a demurrer to an answer. See Newman Grove Creamery Co. v. Deaver, 208 Neb. 178, 302 N.W.2d 697 (1981). That rule takes care of the first two of the Barelmanns' contentions, for they allege no facts supporting a conclusion that in the context of this replevin action, the bank had any duty to make a prior demand or that any of the property it seized was exempt from the operation of the subject notes and the security agreement of April 19, 1985. The rule also takes care of the Barelmanns' concern with their claim that they were not given an opportunity to post the bond contemplated by § 25-1098, as they did not allege facts showing that they were ready, willing, and able to post such a bond, had the opportunity been presented. It is true that leave to amend should ordinarily be granted when a demurrer has been sustained; but such leave is not necessary if there is no reasonable probability that the pleader can remedy the defect. See, Kane v. Vodicka, 238 Neb. 436, 471 N.W.2d 136 (1991); Schmuecker Bros. Implement v. Sobotka, 217 Neb. 114, 348 N.W.2d 130 (1984). Given the language of the notes and security document, there were no allegations the Barelmanns could make to require a demand or make the replevied property exempt. Their ability to plead that they were ready, willing, and able to post a bond of at least double the value of the property replevied, as § 25-1098 requires, is negated by the bankruptcy. The Barelmanns' third contention, that the bank failed to execute a lien waiver on a crop maturing after this action was instituted, is resolved by the rule that rights of possession are to be determined as of the time the replevin action was commenced. See Brown v. Hogan, 49 Neb. 746, 69 N.W. 100 (1896). As stated in Alliance Loan & Investment Co. v. Morgan, 154 Neb. 745, 747, 49 N.W.2d 593, 594 (1951), the focus is on the rights of the parties when the action is filed, and [w]hat takes place thereafter is immaterial in the consideration and determination of the case. The remaining contention, that the district court committed prejudicial error in striking the characterization of the legal nature of the facts pled, is also without merit. Either the facts alleged support a legal theory of defense, or they do not. That inquiry is the subject of the analyses which follow.