Opinion ID: 627222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: comments by the district court

Text: On April 8, 2009, as LaCour was attempting to cross-examine a government witness and was, as a result, drawing objections from the government, the District Court stated: Let me interrupt for a second. Any information that Mr. LaCour puts in a question or any assertions he makes . . . do not constitute evidence and should not be considered by you as evidence. The only evidence that Mr. LaCour can put in is when he testifies under oath as this witness is doing. Any statements he makes in his capacity as representing himself that appear to be questions or statements of fact do not constitute evidence and you should not consider it as evidence. On April 20, 2009, LaCour began to present his defense. He called as his first witness a former employee of Jive Network, and he sought to elicit testimony regarding the fact that an undercover agent was hired to work at the company. The government objected on the ground that LaCour was trying to show prosecutorial misconduct, and after some back and forth, the District Court told LaCour: The jury does not have before it your claim of prosecutorial misconduct, nor are they to consider it. Please deal with facts that are relevant to the claims made by the government: [i].e., that you set up a process by which doctors and pharmacists filled prescription orders without ever seeing the patient. That's the problem you're faced with. Later, outside of the presence of the jury, the appellants moved for a mistrial. The District Court took the motion under advisement. The following morning, the District Court gave a curative instruction: Members of the jury, yesterday I suggested that Jude LaCour . . . deal with facts relevant to the claims made by the government. To the extent you recall my remarks, please understand that you and not myself are the triers of fact in this case. My responsibility is limited to advising you as to the law that applies to the case. I will provide you with an extensive written instruction before final argument begins. Accordingly, to the extent that you remember my suggestions to Jude LaCour, please ignore the same. Later, outside of the presence of the jury, the District Court denied the motions for mistrial in light of this instruction. LaCour, Tobin, Pickens, and Chebssi argue that the District Court's comment on April 20, 2009 constitutes reversible error. They assert that the comment either represented an incorrect statement of the law or evinced the District Court's view that LaCour was guilty. LaCour separately contends that the District Court's comment on April 8, 2009 prejudiced his right not to testify because it gave the impression that he was in fact required to do so. These arguments do not carry the day. A conviction will not be reversed based upon comments of the trial judge unless the comments are so prejudicial as to amount to denial of a fair trial, United States v. Ramos, 933 F.2d 968, 973 (11th Cir.1991), and the appellant shows that the comment had a clear effect on the jury. United States v. Morales, 868 F.2d 1562, 1576 (11th Cir.1989) (quotation marks omitted). A comment does not constitute reversible error if it 1) occupied but a few seconds of a lengthy trial, 2) the comment was directed to counsel rather than the jury, and 3) the trial judge advised the jury to disregard the comment. Id. The District Court's comment on April 20, 2009 that LaCour's problem was that he set up a process by which doctors and pharmacists filled prescription orders without ever seeing the patient was improper. However, the District Court provided a curative instruction that reminded the jury that it was the sole trier of fact and that the applicable law would be provided later on in the District Court's instructions. Beyond this, the trial lasted about a month, and the comment was directed at LaCour, and not the jury, in an effort to explain to him the basic requirement of relevance under the rules of evidence. The District Court's comment on April 20, 2009 does not constitute reversible error. [18] See id. at 1576-77. LaCour's complaint that the District Court's comment on April 8, 2009 prejudiced his right not to testify is also unpersuasive. For one thing, it takes the District Court's comment out of context. As the passage above indicates, the District Court was trying to remind the jury of the distinction between, on the one hand, questions and arguments by counsel and, on the other hand, evidence. This difference was something that may have been difficult for the jury to keep in mind given that LaCour was proceeding pro se. Later, the District Court instructed the jury that the defendants have an absolute right not to testify and that guilt may not be inferred from a defendant's silence. Under these circumstances, the District Court's comment does not constitute error. See Tampas, 493 F.3d at 1303; United States v. LaChance, 817 F.2d 1491, 1497 (11th Cir. 1987).