Opinion ID: 1952977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Effect of Jury's Advisory Verdict

Text: Rule 39(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure states: In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or the court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right. Before the law and equity courts merged, [10] this Court held that it was an abuse of discretion for a trial justice sitting in equity in a contract dispute to decline to use the jury-trial option to determine the factual issues underlying the parties rights as dictated by the agreement. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Sasso, 98 R.I. 483, 488, 204 A.2d 821, 824 (1964). Some years later, this Court applied Sasso to the modern rules of civil procedure requiring the trial justice to conduct a jury trial for underlying legal issues in a civil action which were traditionally cognizable at common law when money damages were sought even when, as here, a complainant requests substantial equitable relief. Egidio DiPardo & Sons, Inc., 708 A.2d at 170. The jury heard the entire Filippi case. After reserving his right to decide the undue influence claim in equity, the trial justice did so on July 3, 2000, after the jury verdict and deemed the verdict on that claim purely advisory. The jury found for the plaintiff on counts 1 and 3 and the undue influence claim. In his decision of February 8, 2001, the trial justice found for defendants on the undue influence claim. He stated that although he did not lightly disregard the jury's advisory verdict, he found that Paul's conduct and Marion's impeachment disturbed the jury. Furthermore, he determined that the jury disregarded the undue influence instruction that [i]t is not undue influence    if [Paul] was influenced only by his affection and love for Marion and his three younger children. The question of whether undue influence exists is a fact-intensive inquiry. See Tinney v. Tinney, 770 A.2d 420, 438 (R.I.2001). This Court defines undue influence as the substitution of the will of [the dominant] party for the free will and choice [of the subservient party]. Id. at 437-38 (quoting Caranci v. Howard, 708 A.2d 1321, 1324 (R. I.1998)). In determining what constitutes undue influence in a particular case, then, a trial justice ordinarily examines the totality of circumstances, including the relationship between the parties, the physical and mental condition of the grantor, the opportunity and disposition of a person wielding influence, and his or her acts and declarations. Id. at 428 (citing 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds ( Undue Influence ) § 203 (1997); 25 Am.Jur.2d Duress and Undue Influence § 31 (1997)). The trial justice examined the totality of the circumstances and determined that there was no undue influence. We agree. Marion, Paul's wife of nineteen years had every right to exert influence over Paul, and she did just that. There is no evidence of her substituting her will for the free will of Paul. Because of his findings about the jury verdict on the undue influence claim, the trial justice considered the matter as if it appeared in the form of a motion for new trial. On that basis, he found that he would have granted a new trial because [t]his was not a case where reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. This was a case where based on the weight of the credible evidence and the more reasonable inferences there is only a single conclusion on the merits. Accordingly, he entered judgment for defendants. Although we agree that the advisory jury verdict should receive a great degree of deference in factual determination, it is still subject to the same scrutiny as that of other jury verdicts. If the jury verdict would not have withstood a motion for new trial in a case at law, then the same goes for an advisory jury verdict in an equity claim. We conclude the trial justice was not clearly wrong and did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in his determination.