Opinion ID: 2354151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross-examination of State's Witness Jamie Merrill

Text: [¶ 17] As previously explained, McGowan's trial attorney's cross-examination of witness Jamie Merrill employed a strategy of eliciting damaging statements Merrill may have made concerning McGowan, and then disproving the statements through the testimony of other witnesses. As part of this strategy, Merrill was asked if she remembered reporting to police that McGowan was a felon and that he had walked away from other murders. Rather than confirming that she had made statements to this effect, Merrill responded, No. No further substantive evidence was introduced by McGowan or by the State regarding them. [5] [¶ 18] The court concluded that the failure to affirmatively disprove the statements so as not to let the jury believe that McGowan was a convicted felon and had walked away from other murders constituted a serious mistake which an ordinary fallible attorney would not have made. The court also found that the strategy had resulted in prejudice and that McGowan was entitled to a new trial: The prejudice to the petitioner as to these . . . accusations is obvious. Merrill accused him of being a felon and involved in prior homicides for which he had escaped liability. The jury was left with these unrebutted claims, and, if believed by them, would have so tainted the petitioner that his trial must be seen as fundamentally unfair. Because counsel was ineffective in this important respect and prejudice likely resulted, the petitioner is entitled to a new trial and the amended petition will be granted on this basis. [¶ 19] The trial attorney's cross-examination strategy of seeking to elicit testimony from Merrill that was damaging to McGowan, and then disproving it in order to present Merrill as incredible, was surely apparent to the jury. The attorney's failure to introduce follow-up evidence with respect to the two questions that involved statements that Merrill had no memory of and, therefore, did not confirm the truth of, would not have led a reasonable jury to conclude that the statements were, in fact, true. Contrary to the court's conclusion, no evidence introduced at trial suggested that Merrill had accused McGowan of being a felon and involved in prior homicides. Rather, she testified that she did not remember making such accusations to the police. There was no other evidence submitted at trial suggesting that she had. [¶ 20] In addition, these questions were but two of many questions McGowan's trial counsel asked in his effort to discredit Merrill's credibility. [6] Considered in the context of the entire cross-examination, the trial attorney's failure to rebut the accusations that McGowan was a felon and had walked away from other murders was unremarkable, especially because Merrill did not claim to have made such accusations. [¶ 21] Accordingly, even if it is assumed that the trial attorney's failure to revisit these questions constituted ineffective assistance, the resulting prejudice, if any, was insubstantial and did not deprive McGowan of a fair trial. Under either a clear error or de novo standard of appellate review, we cannot affirm the court's contrary conclusion.