Opinion ID: 1153415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: alleged errors in instructions and admissibility of evidence

Text: The Title Company contends that Mrs. Ramsey had constructive notice of the recorded revocation of the power of attorney so as to preclude recovery on a theory of reliance on the Title Company. A title company is in no position to contend that a client is barred from recovery due to constructive notice of a recorded instrument, since ascertaining the status of records is one of its principal functions. The trial court did not err in refusing to give the Title Company's requested instructions concerning that contention. General contentions are raised that other instructions were lacking and misleading and that the court erred in giving other requested instructions. We refuse to consider such general objections. [18] We likewise find no merit in the Title Company's contention that evidence was improperly admitted. Evidence of a title insurance policy subsequently issued by the Title Company to the First National Bank of Fairbanks, Alaska, on the property in question was admitted into evidence. That policy also failed to mention that the power of attorney had been revoked. The evidence was relevant in: (1) reflecting on the credibility of witness Johnson when he testified that in his original conversation with Mrs. Ramsey, he had qualified his opinion with a warning that the power had been revoked; (2) tending to prove that the failure to find the revocation was due to negligence in Transamerica's title search procedures; and (3) tending to prove that the omission of the revocation was not due to the lack of a specific request, but was due to the company's negligence since the bank would have requested a search of all instruments relative to Mrs. Ramsey's ability to convey title. In addition, Transamerica has failed to show why the introduction of the policy was prejudicial and, in fact, inquired into the nature of the policy in its own case. Thus, the objection is without merit. The Title Company also contends that it was error for an expert witness, Mrs. Loennig, a former vice-president of the company and the supervisor of Mr. Johnson in 1966 to testify as to the duty of the Title Company to Mrs. Ramsey. In the context of the witness' prior testimony it appears that she was giving evidence as to the customary procedures followed by the Title Company. The operations of a title company are not matters of general knowledge and accordingly it is the type of subject on which expert testimony may be of assistance to the jury. In Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250, 268-269 (Alaska 1971) we said: Although appellees also rely on the argument that the witness should not have been permitted to testify regarding an ultimate issue in the case, we must expressly reject such a position. We held in Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893, 900 (Alaska, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 56, 82 S.Ct. 189, 7 L.Ed.2d 128 (1961), that if the jury  could receive appreciable help or assistance from the opinion of the expert witness, then his testimony was admissible. It would not be a ground for objection in the latter instance that the opinion embraced the ultimate issue to be decided, i.e., the cause of the fire. The jury decides this issue  not the expert witness  and all that is done is to permit the jury to receive some assistance where it is needed and from a person who, because of his training, experience and observations, is able to render that assistance. (Emphasis added.) We further note that Mrs. Loennig had previous given testimony concerning the duties of the company without objection, so that at most the objected testimony was cumulative and any error in permitting the testimony would not have been prejudicial. [19] The Title Company further argues that it was error to admit evidence of Mrs. Ramsey's good character in the community contending that it was irrelevant and that there had been no effort made to impeach her. As the trial judge recognized, the evidence of her prior reputation was directly relevant to the issue of damages since she was contending that her reputation had been damaged as a result of her erroneous attempt to convey the property. The judgment below is affirmed as to the liability of the Title Company, but the case is remanded with directions that the judgment as to damages be vacated and a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $17,331.37. [20]