Opinion ID: 1674612
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutional challenge to trial court's decision.

Text: The fundamental attack that defendant makes on his conviction is that the exclusion of alibi evidence because the required notice was not given violates his sixth amendment right to compel attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, and denies him federal due process under the fourteenth amendment. This position is based on Wardius v. Oregon . This constitutional issue is raised for the first time on this review. Thus the defendant cannot claim review of the issue as of right. We choose, nevertheless, to consider that issue, especially in view of Wardius. In Wardius [17] the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause forbids enforcement of nonreciprocal notice-of-alibi statutes. In the case presently before us, Oregon prevented a criminal defendant from introducing any evidence to support his alibi defense as a sanction for his failure to comply with a notice-of-alibi rule which, on its face, made no provision for reciprocal discovery.... We hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants. Since the Oregon statute did not provide for reciprocal discovery, it was error for the court below to enforce it against petitioner, and his conviction must be reversed. The Wisconsin statute applicable at the time, sec. 955.07, is similar to the Oregon nonreciprocal notice-of-alibi statute struck down in Wardius, and is, therefore, unconstitutional. In order to determine whether defendant is entitled to a new trial because sec. 955.07, Stats. 1967, is unconstitutional we must decide to what extent this determination is retroactive. The criteria for determining if procedural requirements affecting criminal prosecutions should be retroactively applied were discussed in State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady . [18] The court must consider (1) the purpose of the rule, (2) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standard. The retroactivity of a decision is not automatically determined by the provision of the constitution on which the decision is based. Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved. [19] The supreme court has retroactively applied the right to counsel [20] and its holding that the issue of coerced confessions was not an issue for the jury. [21] On the other hand, the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, [22] although applied to cases pending at the time of the decision, was not applied to cases which were final at that time. [23] The decision which required counsel at identification confrontations was applied prospectively only, [24] as were the Escobedo and Miranda decisions. [25] We conclude that under State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady this ruling should be retroactive only to the extent of being applied to cases that are not finalized and where the defendant attempted at trial to present alibi evidence and was denied that effort because he had not given notice under sec. 955.07, Stats. 1967. The failure of the state to supply a list of rebuttal witnesses `never assured the [petitioner] a fair determination' of his guilt or innocence. [26] As for the integrity of the fact-finding process, we are not convinced that that process is so adversely affected by the inability to supply alleged alibi evidence that the ruling here should be made retroactive to any greater extent than we have ruled. It is true that the factfinding process is affected somewhat by eliminating surprise if the increased opportunity to discovery is given. But the existence of a notice-of-alibi statute without reciprocal discovery does not affect the totality of the fact-finding process and does not render the accuracy of the verdict suspect. [27] If the ruling here is confined to cases that are not finalized and where alibi evidence was attempted to be put in despite absence of notice, we conclude that the basic purpose of the ruleto balance the forces of discovery between accused and state will be served. Reliance has been had on sec. 955.07, Stats. 1967 (or sec. 971.23 (8) in its current form), and such reliance was reasonable. Applying the ruling as retroactive to the limited extent as allowed here in will not have an adverse effect on the administration of justice. The only defendants who can use the ruling are those (1) whose cases are not finalized, and (2) who attempted to put in alibi evidence despite no notice and preserved that claim of error. Since this case has not been finalized and defendant has preserved the error by his attempt to put in evidence despite his failure to give alibi notice, the rule would benefit him except for the fact that the error is harmless error. Applying the rule of Wold, [28] that error is harmless unless the result would reasonably have been different, we have no doubt that the error here is harmless. Although the victim left out some obvious distinguishing features (lump on forehead, missing finger on right hand, severe stutter) in her initial description of her assailant to the police, both girls picked out the defendant's photograph in an apparently unassailable identification procedure. The girls had looked over hundreds of photos at the police station without identifying anyone. Then the next day the police presented nine photographs, one of which was of the defendant. Both girls separately identified the defendant's photograph as being of the assailant. The defendant became a suspect because his automobile fitted the description given by both girls and because he fled when approached by the police. A barrette worn by the victim on the day of the attack was found in the defendant's car, as was a knife which she identified as the one wielded by her assailant. Although the victim did not report that her assailant stuttered, she testified that he said very little to her and that what he did say was difficult to understand. It is possible that his stuttering problem would not have been revealed if he spoke only a few short sentences to the victim. As to the effect of this ruling on the present notice-of-alibi statute, the last sentence of sec. 971.23 (3) (a) providing This section shall not apply to rebuttal witnesses or those called for impeachment only. is stricken as unconstitutional and since that sentence is severable, [29] sec. 971.23 (3) (a) would read: (a) A defendant may, not less than 15 days nor more than 30 days before trial, serve upon the district attorney an offer in writing to furnish the state a list of all witnesses the defendant intends to call at the trial, whereupon within 5 days after the receipt of such offer, the district attorney shall furnish the defendant a list of all witnesses and their addresses whom he intends to call at the trial. Within 5 days after the district attorney furnishes such list, the defendant shall furnish the district attorney a list of all witnesses and their addresses whom the defendant intends to call at the trial. Thus, sec. 971.23 (8), Stats., is constitutional because after notice of alibi is given the state would have a duty to submit a list of rebuttal witnesses under sec. 971.23 (3) (a). This satisfies the due process requirement of reciprocity. [30] By the Court. Judgment and order affirmed.