Opinion ID: 12484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-Employment Service

Text: The district court determined that the language of the relevant section of the VRRA clearly and unambiguously provided reemployment rights only if the total of any service performed by that person after August 1, 1961, does not exceed four years. (emphasis added). The court recognized that the two cases to address the issue reached contrary conclusions. Finding the 3 discussion of the issue in White v. Frank, 718 F.Supp. 592 (W.D.Tex.1989), aff'd, 895 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 890, 111 S.Ct. 232, 112 L.Ed.2d 192 (1990), controlling, the district court found unpersuasive the contrary holding in Hall v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R., 240 F.Supp. 797 (N.D.Ill.1964). Sykes and C&G each contend that the language of 38 U.S.C. § 2024(a) is clear and unambiguous, albeit with different results. Section 2024(a) provides, in full: (a) Any person who, after entering the employment on the basis of which such person claims restoration or reemployment, enlists in the Armed Forces of the United States (other than in a Reserve component) shall be entitled upon release from service under honorable conditions to all of the reemployment rights and other benefits provided for by this chapter in the case of persons inducted under the provisions of the Military Selective Service Act (or prior or subsequent legislation providing for the involuntary induction of persons into the Armed Forces), if the total of such person's service performed between June 24, 1948, and August 1, 1961, did not exceed four years, and the total of any service, additional or otherwise, performed by such person after August 1, 1961, does not exceed five years, and if the service in excess of four years after August 1, 1961, is at the request and for the convenience of the Federal Government (plus in each case any period of additional service imposed pursuant to law). 38 U.S.C. § 2024(a).1 Sykes contends that the plain language of section 2024(a) makes clear that only military service performed subsequent to the employment to which VRRA rights are asserted should count towards 1 38 U.S.C. § 2024(a) was transferred and renumbered as 38 U.S.C. § 4304 pursuant to the Veterans' Benefit Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-568 § 506(a), 106 Stat. 4340, 4341. The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-353 § 8(a)(1), 108 Stat. 3149, amended 38 U.S.C. § 4304 extensively, but provided that the amendments would be effective with respect to reemployments initiated on or after October 13, 1994. The former section 4304 (which, in turn, was the former section 2024) continues to apply to reemployment actions, like that of Sykes, initiated prior to October 13, 1994. 4 the limitation period. Under Sykes' reading of section 2024(a), the introductory phrase after entering employment limits the relevant military service to that performed post-employment; thus, the total of any service language at the end of the section simply refers to this post-employment military service. In support of his position, Sykes relies on Hall. C&G contends that the phrase total of any service, additional or otherwise qualifies the reemployment rights set forth at the beginning of section 2024(a) and operates to bar the assertion of VRRA rights by veterans whose combined pre- and post-employment military service exceeds the four-year period. C&G argues that the after entering employment language merely requires that the private employment to which reinstatement is sought precede the military service. The district court followed this interpretation, finding the statute clear and unambiguous. Language in White supports this interpretation. At least two district courts, the Department of Labor (DOL), and the parties to each case have disagreed as to the proper construction of section 2024(a). The Hall court relied on the history and purposes of the [VRRA] and the White court found its position supported by the face [of] the Act. We cannot say that the district court's interpretation is unreasonable. Indeed, its interpretation may well be the most reasonable construction of the wording of section 2024(a). But although we always hesitate to go beyond the plain language of a federal statute, we believe that this case presents us with an extremely rare situation where to 5 apply the statute as construed by the district court—even assuming the language of section 2024(a), parsed with the utmost grammatical propriety, to be virtually unambiguous—would lead to an absurd result. See United States v. A Female Juvenile, 103 F.3d 14, 16-17 (5th Cir.1996) (Axiomatic in statutory interpretation is the principle that laws should be construed to avoid an absurd or unreasonable result); United States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 92-93 (5th Cir.1994) (same); Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 15 F.3d 1275, 1285 (5th Cir.1994) (same), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126, 115 S.Ct. 933, 130 L.Ed.2d 879 (1995); Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir.1993) (same). We therefore conclude that section 2024(a)'s service limitation applies to post-employment service only, notwithstanding the risk that such a result may not flow from [t]he most natural grammatical reading of the section. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68, 115 S.Ct. 464, 467, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994). See also McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139, 111 S.Ct. 1737, 1740, 114 L.Ed.2d 194 (1991) ([S]tatutory language must always be read in its proper context.); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 156-58, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1001, 108 L.Ed.2d 132 (1990) (In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 433 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1213 n. 12, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (stating that resort to legislative history is appropriate to determine whether there is clearly expressed legislative 6 intention' contrary to that language); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 219-21, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2493, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (stating that a statute should not be interpreted inconsistently with its purpose and admonishing not [to] be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but [to] look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy) (citation omitted); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 69-71, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1538, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982) (Statutes should be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable results whenever possible.); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-02, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 2726, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979) (rejecting a literal construction that would  bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute' ) (quoting United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315, 73 S.Ct. 706, 718, 97 L.Ed. 1020 (1953)); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-61, 12 S.Ct. 511, 512, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892) (It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.); Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 527-28, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1994, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (I think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials ... to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable disposition ... was indeed unthought of .... ); cf. Stephen Bryer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L.Rev. 845, 848-49 (1992) (discussing the uncontroversial use of legislative history to 7 avoid an absurd result). Under the interpretation of section 2024(a) advanced by C&G and embraced by the district court, veterans who entered civilian employment after having served in the armed forces for four or more years would be denied reemployment rights that would otherwise attach to a subsequent enlistment following their civilian employment without regard to the duration of their subsequent enlistment or the time that elapsed between their departure and subsequent demand for reinstatement, and without regard to the inconvenience, if any, to the employer. The interpretation advanced by C & G would preclude a significant portion of veterans from ever asserting reemployment rights under the VRRA upon returning to civilian life after a subsequent enlistment.2 This result is simply incompatible with the obvious and patent purpose of the VRRA to confer quite broad reemployment rights to veterans of the United States armed services subject only to a limited restriction regarding the permissible length of post-employment service. As this four-year restriction was designed specifically to address employers' concerns about reemployment rights of indefinite duration and not to penalize veterans on the basis of their pre-employment service, we find no articulable basis for 2 A recent GAO report states that the first enlistment term of duty ... typically is 4 years. Government Accounting Office, Pub. No. B-257481, Military Recruiting: More Innovative Approaches Needed (Dec. 22, 1994). By statute, however, the various armed services may accept original enlistments ... for a period of at least two but not more than six years. 10 U.S.C. § 505(c) (West Supp.1996). Accordingly, under C & G's interpretation, a service member could exceed section 2024(a)'s service limitation during his original enlistment. 8 including a veteran's pre-employment service in section 2024(a)'s limitation period. To the contrary, the history and purpose of the VRRA, the Supreme Court's consistent admonition to interpret the VRRA's provisions consistently with its purpose to benefit veterans, the legislative history of subsequent amendments to section 2024(a), the consistent and longstanding interpretive pronouncements of the DOL, and the legislative history of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), the VRRA's statutory replacement, all support the reading advanced by Sykes. We therefore reject C&G's plain language interpretation of section 2024(a) and hold that, in light of the contrary history and purpose of the VRRA discussed below, section 2024(a)'s four-year limitation period must be read to limit reemployment rights eligibility in terms of post-employment service only.