Opinion ID: 1894142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred by denying defendant's amended motion to exclude search warrant evidence dealing with the seizure of evidence beyond the items named in the search warrant.

Text: Albright claims that items known to be stolen and suspicioned to be in Albright's house were not specifically enumerated in the search warrant, but yet were seized by the officers, and therefore such items should have been suppressed. State argues that the officers were legitimately on the premises pursuant to a valid search warrant and that the items seized, but not named in the warrant, were either in plain view, were of an incriminatory nature, or were voluntarily pointed out by Albright as being stolen. Generally, when a search is conducted pursuant to a search warrant, `... the officer making the search cannot seize property other than that which is specifically described in the warrant.' State v. Watkins, 89 S.D. 661, 664, 237 N.W.2d 14, 16 (1975) (citations omitted). We have stated that [a] suggested test of the existence of the requisite particularity is whether the warrant places a meaningful restriction on the objects to be seized ... such particularity requires that an officer does not have any discretion with regard to what is to be seized. State v. Weiker, 342 N.W.2d 7, 9 (S.D.1983) (citations omitted) cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1069, 104 S.Ct. 1422, 79 L.Ed.2d 747 (1984). However, this court has recognized the plain view exception to the general rule. This exception arises where a police officer while in the course of a lawful search pursuant to a valid search warrant inadvertently uncovers evidence of another crime. In such a case, the police officer may seize the evidence although it was not described in the warrant. State v. Wellner, 318 N.W.2d 324, 329 (S.D.1982) (emphasis added) citing State v. Larkin, 87 S.D. 61, 64-5, 202 N.W.2d 862, 864 (1972); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). Furthermore, Wellner requires that the original search be directed in good faith toward finding objects described in the search warrant. Wellner, supra at 329. The basis for requiring such limiting language is the fear that an exception to the warrant requirement, such as the plain view doctrine, might be extended to something in the nature of an exploratory search. See Coolidge, supra . One commentator has suggested that if the `inadvertent discovery' limitation is to make any sense at all, it must at least mean that a discovery is inadvertent, without regard to the personal hopes or expectation of the officers lawfully within the premises, if there were not sufficient grounds to justify issuance of a search warrant for those objects. See 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure, § 6.7(c) at page 725 (2d ed. 1987). Applying this exception to the facts in the case at bar, we conclude that the seizure of the items taken from Northern Hills was anything but inadvertent, as law enforcement officials had previously suspected Albright of taking such items and were aware that he had sold some of the other items. Watkins, supra . As stated earlier, at the motions hearing Charles testified that prior to executing the affidavit for search warrant he had information regarding the stolen Northern Hills property and knew that Albright was a suspect in that incident. Furthermore, Charles had a list of the property that had been taken from Northern Hills, including those items Albright had sold to the Rapid City pawn shop. Charles further believed that the shoe tread information gathered from both the Northern Hills and country club burglaries were similar. (In fact, shoes with the particular tread mark were seized from Albright's residence.) However, it should be observed that the authorities had no specific information that the property from Northern Hills was located in Albright's house. In addition, when asked at trial what items the officers were looking for when they conducted the search, Charles replied [w]hen we went in there, we were looking for items taken from the Spearfish Canyon golf club clubhouse, more fireworks and also items taken from the Northern Hills Forest Products .... The prosecutor further asked Now, you indicated that some of the items you were looking for were some items regarding Northern Hills Forest Products sawmill? Answer Yes. We conclude that Judge Moses did not err in refusing to suppress the omitted property stolen from the country club (e.g. champagne and PA system). A fair reading of the entire documentation leads us to the opinion that the omission was an oversight amounting, at worst, to excusable neglect. On the other hand, it is obvious that the authorities, at the time of the search, had in mind items other than those taken from the country club. We conclude that the Northern Hills items should have been enumerated in the warrant and as to those items, it rose to the level of an exploratory search. We therefore hold that Judge Moses erred in not suppressing the items seized relating to Count III of the indictment. In spite of the above ruling, we do not believe that reversal of the conviction on Count III is necessary. It must be noted that defendant was not charged or convicted for the theft of the specific property. Rather, he was charged and convicted of the offense of third-degree burglary, a violation of SDCL 22-32-8, which reads as follows: Any person who enters or remains in an unoccupied structure, with intent to commit any crime therein, [in this case theft] is guilty of third degree burglary.... (Emphasis added.) In order to sustain a conviction for third-degree burglary, State need not establish that a defendant stole specific property. Rather, State must prove that a person had an intent to commit a crime, (here, theft). Even disregarding the property seized in the search, State presented clear and unrefuted evidence that Albright sold some of the stolen Northern Hills property at a pawn shop in Rapid City, which is certainly some strong evidence of theft. More important, Albright subsequently confessed to the burglaries (see Issue II below). We therefore determine that the evidence, which should have been suppressed, was cumulative. State v. Davis, 293 N.W.2d 885 (S.D.1980); State v. Johnson, 87 S.D. 43, 202 N.W.2d 132 (1972).