Opinion ID: 1246974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: confession of codefendant floyd

Text: (21a) Prior to the penalty trial, Milton's counsel had moved to sever the trial on the ground that codefendant Floyd had made a confession to a psychiatrist, Dr. Tweed, which implicated Milton. The court denied the motion, but instructed Floyd's counsel and the prosecutor to admonish Tweed to delete all references to Milton and to testify only on those matters pertaining to the possibility of Floyd's rehabilitation. Milton's counsel suggested that it would be impossible effectively to delete such testimony, and requested the court to review Tweed's report, but the court indicated that such a reading would be premature, stating that I want to meet this issue clear-cut at the time I am confronted with it. Floyd did not testify at either the guilt or penalty trials. At the penalty trial, Dr. Tweed related to the jury Floyd's confessions to Tweed that he had robbed and shot the busdriver. The point of the testimony was to show that Floyd did not intend to shoot the busdriver, but that all of a sudden the gun went off. At no time did Tweed use Milton's name in relating Floyd's confession. However, during Tweed's examination, the following testimony was elicited: Q [by Floyd's counsel]: Did he [Floyd] say where he had gotten the gun? A Yes, he said he had gotten the gun from some friend. Q Did he say where he was taking it? A He stated he was taking it to a relative of this friend from whom he had gotten the gun. Milton's counsel did not object to the foregoing testimony. However, after Tweed was excused, and in the judge's chambers, Milton's counsel requested a mistrial on the penalty phase, on the ground that the only possible inference from Tweed's testimony was that Floyd had obtained the gun from Milton, since other evidence disclosed that the gun was found in the apartment of Milton's half-brother, where defendants had been apprehended. The court denied the motion, but subsequently instructed the jury that the psychiatrist's testimony during this penalty trial which disclosed defendant's statements should be considered only for the purpose of exposing the information upon which the psychiatrist based his opinion [regarding Floyd's rehabilitation] and not as evidence of the truth of the statements. In Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 129-130 [20 L.Ed.2d 476, 481-482, 88 S.Ct. 1620], the Supreme Court held that the introduction into evidence of a codefendant's extrajudicial statement which inculpates the defendant violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him even though the jury is instructed not to consider the statement as evidence against him. ( People v. Flores, 68 Cal.2d 563, 568 [68 Cal. Rptr. 161, 440 P.2d 233].) However, the court in Bruton made it clear that not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; the challenged evidence must present a substantial risk that the jury will ignore the instruction. (391 U.S. at p. 135 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 484].) Accordingly, in Flores, supra, we refused to overturn a conviction where the inadmissible evidence provided, at most, only a tenuous basis for an inference of defendant's guilt, and other evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated defendant's culpable knowledge. (68 Cal.2d at p. 568; see also Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 [23 L.Ed.2d 284, 89 S.Ct. 1726].) Prior to the Bruton decision, we had recognized in People v. Aranda, 63 Cal.2d 518, 530 [47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265], that the introduction of such statements could be prejudicial and that a mere instruction to the jury to disregard the confession as to the codefendant might be inadequate. Consequently, we established alternative procedures for situations in which the prosecution proposes to introduce the extrajudicial statement of one codefendant which implicates another codefendant. If the prosecution wishes a joint trial all parts of the extrajudicial statements implicating any codefendants must be effectively deleted without prejudice to the declarant. Milton contends that Aranda and Bruton apply to both the penalty and guilt phases of a criminal proceeding, and that Aranda and Bruton apply whether the incriminating statement is introduced by the prosecution or, as in the instant case, by a codefendant. He further contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance at the penalty trial. (22) We agree that Aranda and Bruton apply to the penalty phase of a criminal proceeding. The importance of the right to timely cross-examination has been sufficiently emphasized by this court and the United States Supreme Court and requires no prolonged discussion. (See, e.g., Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 721 [20 L.Ed.2d 255, 258, 88 S.Ct. 1318]; Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 404 [13 L.Ed.2d 923, 926, 85 S.Ct. 1065]; People v. Green, 70 Cal.2d 654, 664-665 [75 Cal. Rptr. 782, 451 P.2d 422]; People v. Johnson, 68 Cal.2d 646, 651-652 [68 Cal. Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d 111]; People v. Boggs, 255 Cal. App.2d 693, 702-703 [63 Cal. Rptr. 430] [assuming the applicability of Aranda and Bruton to the penalty phase].) (23) At least where one defendant makes a timely objection to the introduction of the extrajudicial statement of a codefendant, we can see no reason why Aranda and Bruton should not apply to such statements when it is the codefendant, rather than the prosecution, who seeks to introduce the statement. To hold that the interests of codefendants in a joint trial  especially a joint penalty trial  are identical is to defy reality. Frequently, as in the instant case, one defendant attempts to show that he is less, or his codefendant more, blameworthy, in the hope of avoiding the death penalty. (Cf. People v. Chacon, 69 Cal.2d 765, 775 [73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106].) (21b) The contention that, under Aranda, the trial court was required to grant Floyd and Milton separate penalty trials is without merit. (24) The trial court has full discretion to determine a motion for severance, and that discretion will not ordinarily be disturbed by a reviewing court. ( People v. Clark, 62 Cal.2d 870, 883 [44 Cal. Rptr. 784, 402 P.2d 856]; People v. Gant, 252 Cal. App.2d 101, 112 [60 Cal. Rptr. 154].) Aranda makes clear that a separate trial is required only if all parts of the extrajudicial statements implicating any codefendants are not or cannot be effectively deleted without prejudice to the declarant. (63 Cal.2d at p. 530; see also, People v. Massie, 66 Cal.2d 899, 918 [59 Cal. Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869].) (21c) The testimony complained of did not relate to the question of rehabilitation, the subject of Dr. Tweed's testimony, and could easily have been deleted. However, although defendants were not entitled to a separate penalty trial, Milton did have a right, under Aranda, to exclude any portions of Floyd's admission which incriminated Milton. The question arises whether or not Milton waived that right by failing to object to the admission of Dr. Tweed's testimony regarding Floyd's statements to him. We have seen that the court previously had instructed counsel to admonish Tweed to delete all references to Milton. Further, the court indicated that it would meet the issue regarding the implications of Tweed's testimony as deleted, at the time I am confronted with it. Thus, Milton's counsel was forewarned that at the trial, Tweed might be asked certain questions which could implicate his client. Nevertheless, although counsel did object to various questions asked of Tweed, he failed to object to the questions Did he [Floyd] say where he had gotten the gun? and Did he say where he was taking it? Since these questions clearly had no relevance to the subject of Floyd's rehabilitation, an objection could have been made on that ground, and the challenged testimony excluded without disclosing to the jury that the testimony would have implicated Milton. (25a) However, we need not rely solely upon counsel's failure to object to the introduction of this evidence, for we have concluded that any violation of the principles of Bruton or Aranda was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) (26) As we stated in People v. Flores, supra, 68 Cal.2d 563, 568, footnote 5, The improper admission into evidence of a codefendant's extrajudicial statement does not automatically require reversal of the defendant's conviction. (25b) In relating Floyd's confession, Tweed made no mention of Milton by name, and in fact did not even indicate that Floyd spoke of an accomplice. Although the jury conceivably could have inferred that Milton was the friend who, according to Floyd, gave Floyd the gun, we cannot conclude that any substantial risk was thereby created that the jury would believe Floyd, ignore the court's instruction, and sentence Milton to death. Other evidence was admitted to show that on at least three prior occasions Milton had committed armed robbery; on two such occasions he was accompanied by Floyd. Seen in this light, the admission of evidence that Milton possessed a gun and gave it to Floyd cannot be characterized as substantial error ( People v. Hines, 61 Cal.2d 164, 168-170 [37 Cal. Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398]), which reasonably may have influenced the jury to impose the death penalty.