Opinion ID: 2387577
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence relating to Officer Ganz

Text: Over objection, four of Officer Ganz's sisters, his fiancée, the treating physician at the hospital, two fellow officers, and his police chief testified during the penalty phase; their testimony spanned several hours over two days. They described Officer Ganz's childhood hardships, his lifelong desire to be a police officer, his achievements, his engagement and future plans, his death, his funeral service, and the aftereffects of his death. The jury also viewed two videotapes and numerous photographs, and received other evidence memorializing Officer Ganz's achievements. Prior to the start of the penalty phase, defendant filed a motion to limit the scope and amount of victim impact evidence; he also made several evidentiary objections during the penalty phase. At various points, the trial court excluded from evidence photographs of Officer Ganz as a child, photographs of Don, an animated reenactment of the crime, and a poster captioned In Memory that displayed the funeral program and photographs of the crime scene, Officer Ganz's motorcycle helmet and gloves, the funeral, his gravestone, the Manhattan Beach police station, and the national police officers' memorial in Washington, D.C. Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting the victim impact evidence, asserting much of the evidence regarding Officer Ganz was excessive, inflammatory, irrelevant, and unduly prejudicial. He complains the proceedings effectively acted as an extended memorial service and more closely resembled a wake for the officer than a criminal trial. [11] (9) Unless it invites a purely irrational response, evidence of the effect of a capital murder on the loved ones of the victim and the community is relevant and admissible under section 190.3, factor (a) as a circumstance of the crime. (E.g., People v. Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 258.) The federal Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is so unduly prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. ( People v. Burney, at p. 258, citing Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825 [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 111 S.Ct. 2597].)
As noted, during the penalty phase Officers Karl Nilsson and Neal O'Gilvy testified extensively about how they learned of the shooting, their initial reactions to learning that the downed officer was their friend Officer Ganz, the efforts to save his life both at the scene and at the hospital, their immediate reaction to his death, and the effect his death had on their lives. Defendant characterizes their testimony as emotional, not objective, and of doubtful accuracy, [12] and observes Officer O'Gilvy, who was the prosecution's final witness, broke down on the stand, which meant the jury was left to contemplate this dramatic testimony until the trial resumed the next day. Defendant contends the testimony of these officers should have been excluded as inflammatory and cumulative to the guilt phase testimony. In support, he cites People v. Love (1960) 53 Cal.2d 843 [3 Cal.Rptr. 665, 350 P.2d 705], in which we reversed a death judgment. In Love, the jury saw a photograph of the murder victim lying dead on a hospital table; the photograph showed the expression of her face in death. The jury also heard a tape recording taken in the emergency room shortly before the victim's death in which she recounted the facts of how she was shot. The victim's doctor testified that she was in extreme pain before she died. As the jury already was aware of the facts of the shooting and the painfulness of her death, we reasoned the sole purpose of the tape recording and photograph was for the jury to hear the victim's groans and failing voice and to see her expression as she died. ( Id. at pp. 854-855.) We held this evidence was unduly inflammatory, as it tended only to prove facts already known to the jury and was of limited probative value in determining the defendant's sentence. ( Id. at pp. 856-857.) (10) Love predates the high court's ruling in Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. 808, and the enactment of section 190.3, both of which expressly allow the jury to consider the circumstances of the crimeincluding its immediate injurious impactas an aggravating factor. [13] (E.g., People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 351-352 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545].) Nonetheless, defendant contends Officer O'Gilvy's dramatic death bed story told by a distraught friend and fellow police officer was more inflammatory than the photograph and tape recording in Love and therefore prejudicial. We disagree. Emotional testimony is not necessarily inflammatory. (See People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 298-299 [finding no error when the victim's mother cried while testifying]; People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 132-134 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400] [finding no error when testimony from multiple family members caused some jurors to cry].) When exercising discretion in admitting emotionally laden evidence, however, courts must monitor the effect of the evidence on the jury and audience members and make a careful record of their observations. (See People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1289-1290.) The trial court here did so; it noted, for example, that audience members had reacted emotionally to some of the victim impact evidence. As the officers' testimony did not invite a purely irrational response or otherwise render defendant's trial fundamentally unfair (see People v. Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 258), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the officers to testify. To the extent defendant further contends that particular portions of the officers' courtroom testimony were overly emotional and thus prejudicially inflammatory, defendant did not object nor did he request the trial court to give the witnesses some time to compose themselves, consequently forfeiting the issue on appeal. (See Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); see, e.g., People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 652 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363].) Defendant also relies on People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436]. Although in Edwards we cautioned against prosecutors employing inflammatory evidence and arguments, we ultimately ruled the evidence presented and the prosecutor's argument in that case were not unduly inflammatory. ( Id. at pp. 832-836, 839-840.) We reached a similar conclusion in People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 859, 863-864 [180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776], another case upon which defendant relies. Defendant contends the officers' testimony was cumulative. Their testimony in some respects did repeat information already known to the jury, such as the discovery of Officer Ganz at the crime scene, his condition, Jamie Timmons's holding his head in her lap to prevent him from choking on his own blood, and the medical response. This repetition, however, comprised a comparatively small amount of the officers' total testimony and is not unusual when multiple witnesses testify about the same event. Moreover, during the officers' testimony, trial counsel did not object to any specific portion as being cumulative, and thus the issue is forfeited on appeal. (E.g., People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 652.) Defendant next contends the evidence about Officer Ganz's character provided by his family was excessive and inflammatory. In support, he cites People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 731-733 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289], in which we upheld the admission of the victim impact evidence, but noted such evidence was limited to a single photograph of the victim with his children and one witness whose testimony was relatively short and subdued ( id. at p. 732); the trial court in Roldan (unlike the trial court in this case) had excluded a videotape prepared by the victim's widow and evidence of awards the victim received for his community service and heroism. Although the victim impact evidence presented in this case was more extensive than that presented in Roldan, the evidence here cannot be fairly characterized as inflammatory, as it did not divert the jury from the task at hand. (See Roldan, at p. 732.) For example, although the jury heard some testimony about Officer Ganz's childhood, it was brief and provided context for the testimony regarding his lifelong desire to become a police officer. Defendant relies upon cases from other jurisdictions that have limited the scope and quantity of victim impact evidence. ( Conover v. State (Okla.Crim.App. 1997) 933 P.2d 904, 918-923; Salazar v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) 90 S.W.3d 330, 335-339; see State v. Dennis (1997) 79 Ohio St.3d 421 [1997 Ohio 372, 683 N.E.2d 1096, 1107] [admission of a mother's statements eulogizing the accomplishments and character of the victim was harmless error]; Cargle v. State (1995) 1995 OKCR 77 [909 P.2d 806, 824-830] [admission of the amount and type of victim impact evidence was harmless error].) These cases are not binding on this court. The jury here heard traditional victim impact evidence: family members and friends extolled Officer Ganz's virtues and demonstrated they missed him. Neither the type nor the amount of evidence warrants reversal. (See People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 236-238 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593, 131 P.3d 995] [finding no error when multiple witnesses testified about the victim's character and the loss felt by family members and the community, including testimony about the erection of a statue of the victim]; People v. Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 132-134 [finding no error when testimony from multiple family members caused some jurors to cry].) Defendant also contends two family members improperly testified about the effect of Officer Ganz's murder. Don's mother, Rachael Ganz-Williams, testified Don opted not to testify during the penalty phase because he just couldn't do it. The testimony about Don was appropriate to dispel any potential negative implication that might be drawn from the prosecutor's failure to call him as a witness. ( People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 197.) Defendant's inability to cross-examine Don about the impact of the murder did not render the testimony inadmissible. (See, e.g., People v. Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 132-134 [family members testified about the effect of the crime on other family members who did not testify].) Accordingly, the trial court properly instructed the jury that it could consider the impact of the murder on the victim's family as a circumstance of the offense. (See id. at pp. 130-131; cf. People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 495 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790] [finding no error in the admission of victim impact evidence given that the trial court instructed the jury it could `consider only such harm as was directly caused by defendant's act' (italics added)].) In addition, over objection, another of Officer Ganz's sisters testified that their mother gave up on life and died six months after his murder. Although this testimony explained their mother's absence, it also constituted improper speculation as to the possible effect of Officer Ganz's death on their mother's health. (See People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 197.) Defendant, however, fails to demonstrate prejudice because there is no reasonable likelihood this error affected the penalty phase verdict. (See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 500 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947].) (11) Defendant further contends the trial court improperly admitted evidence regarding the effect of Officer Ganz's murder on his professional community, that is, the Manhattan Beach Police Department. Victim impact evidence, however, is not limited to family members, but may include the effects on the victim's friends, coworkers, and the communityincluding when the victim's coworkers are law enforcement personnel. ( People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 792-794 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 220 P.3d 820]; see also id. at pp. 793-794, fn. 17 [noting the defendant's reliance on Lambert v. State (Ind. 1996) 675 N.E.2d 1060 was misplaced because, unlike Cal. law, Ind. law at the time of the trial in that case did not include the circumstances of the crime as an aggravating factor]; e.g., People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 644-647 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 87, 229 P.3d 12] [allowing evidence of the loss felt by the staff and children at an afterschool program at which the victim volunteered].) Defendant finally contends victim impact evidence must be limited to understandable human reactions (see People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 398 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244]), whereas the reactions of Officer Nilsson, Officer O'Gilvy, and Pamela Magdaleno to Officer Ganz's death reflected severe maladjustment and psychopathological states demonstrating varying degrees of mental illness. Officer Ganz was Magdaleno's fiancé and Officers Nilsson's and O'Gilvy's friend and fellow officer who was murdered while on duty; the severity of their griefand how that grief manifested itselfwas well within the spectrum of human responses. (See People v. Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 792-793.)
(12) Trial courts must be cautious about admitting victim impact evidence by way of videotape or other visual or auditory aids. (E.g., People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1240 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 574, 210 P.3d 1171].) In particular, trial courts must be cautious about admitting `lengthy' videotapes. ( Ibid. ) Here, the trial court admitted two videotapes that, together, were approximately 10 minutes long. Although length alone is not dispositive, we have upheld the admission of longer videotapes. ( Ibid. [citing cases].) The trial court properly informed its exercise of discretion by viewing the videotapes before allowing the jury to view them, and we have done likewise. We discuss each videotape.
The jury viewed a four-minute, edited videotape depicting Officer Ganz celebrating Christmas, two days before his murder, with his family. It consisted primarily of Officer Ganz handing out presents to one of his sisters and some of his young nieces and nephews, who excitedly opened the gifts. At one point, Officer Ganz and his sister hug. This videotape depicted a rather ordinary eventa family holiday celebration. It is a brief home movie that depicted real events; it was not enhanced by narration, background music, or visual techniques designed to generate emotion; and it did not convey outrage or call for vengeance or sympathy. Like the videotape of the family trip to an amusement park we ruled admissible in People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 783-785 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 78, 209 P.3d 1], it humanized Officer Ganz and provided some sense of the loss suffered by his family, and it supplemented but did not duplicate their testimony. (Accord, State v. Gray (Mo. 1994) 887 S.W.2d 369, 389.) As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.
The jury also viewed a six-minute, edited videotape highlighting Officer Ganz's memorial and funeral services. [14] The videotape began with Officer Ganz's casket draped in an American flag and with his officer's peaked cap on top of it; the casket was near a church chancel and numerous uniformed officers filed in and sat down. The officers then were seen leaving the church, and the casket was escorted out of the church and into a hearse. Next was an overhead shot of the funeral procession, which included numerous police motorcycles. The procession arrived at the gravesite, and Officer Ganz's mother refused to get out of her vehicle. Officer Ganz's police motorcycle, towed in a trailer, then arrived. There were several shots of various people crying, including a Marine in full dress uniform, who was Officer Ganz's best friend. A bagpiper led the procession to the gravesite, and numerous officers saluted the casket as it passed. An honor guard folded the American flag and presented it to one of Officer Ganz's sisters, who in turn gave it to their mother. Three members of an honor guard then were seen performing a three-volley rifle salute. Don was crying as he was presented with Officer Ganz's cap, and he was seen being comforted by his family. The videotape concluded with several officers passing by the casket; one left flowers on top of it. Other than the rifle salute and two clips of the bagpipes playing, the only audio on the videotape consisted of brief periods of church bells tolling and a woman singing. The prosecutor indicated a television station had shot the footage, but it was not professionally edited. Defendant cites other jurisdictions' prohibition of gravesite evidence. ( State v. Storey (Mo. 2001) 40 S.W.3d 898, 909 [admission of a photograph of the victim's tombstone was harmless error]; Welch v. State (2000) 2000 OKCR 8 [2 P.3d 356, 373] [admission of testimony about placing flowers on the victim's grave was harmless error].) In contrast, we have not prohibited such evidence. ( People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 351-352 [photographs of the victim's gravesite were relevant to the effect the murder had on her family; testimony about the effect of the accidental opening of the victim's closed casket during the funeral service was harmless error]; see People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 367-368 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 181 P.3d 105] [rejecting a challenge to the grave marker photographs included in a videotaped montage]; People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 797 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 171 P.3d 548] [videotape ended with a brief view of the victim's grave marker]; People v. Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 133-134 [finding no error in the admission of testimony concerning relatives' visits to the victim's gravesite].) Defendant also cites Salazar v. State, supra, 90 S.W.3d 330, and U.S. v. Sampson (D.Mass. 2004) 335 F.Supp.2d 166 in challenging the use of videotape evidence. We have acknowledged the constitutional issues implicated by these cases. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 796-799; People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1286-1291; People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 652.) But in contrast to the videotapes in Salazar and Sampson, the videotape here was shorter in length, did not include images of Officer Ganz as a child, was not a eulogy (as all actual eulogies from the ceremony were edited out), was not enhanced by narration or visual imagery, and was not accompanied by an extensive audio track playing sentimental music. Although the videotape was prepared for the penalty phase, it depicted actual events and was not of professional quality. (13) To be sure, the videotape did emphasize Officer Ganz's death (cf. People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 796-797), and some of the images on the videotape were evocative: The flag ceremony, the rifle salute, and the bagpipes were not particularly relevant to the effect of Officer Ganz's murder on his family and friends, and tended to produce an emotional response from the viewer. Emotional evidence of how a community mourns the loss of a beloved citizen, however, does not necessarily violate the federal or the state Constitutions. (See People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 780 [victim's school conducted a memorial service]; People v. Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 237-239 [statue of the victim erected by the community].) Moreover, victim impact evidence need not be limited to testimony that merely implies loss, grief, and anguish; it may also demonstrate it. ( People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 211-212 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 153, 226 P.3d 276] [upholding the admission of a videotape capturing the victim's boyfriend's reaction to news of her death]; see People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 618-619 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322, 208 P.3d 78] [upholding the admission of a photograph of the victim's visibly upset mother taken on the night of the crime].) In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this videotape.