Opinion ID: 1495900
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Comparison of Section 490.065 with FRE 702, FRE 703, and Daubert.

Text: The parties and the AHC seem to assume that section 490.065 and FRE 702 and FRE 703, as interpreted in Daubert , are effectively identical, and that the standard set out in section 490.065 mirrors that Daubert adopted for use in the federal courts. Daubert held [t]hat the Frye test was displaced by the [Federal] Rules of Evidence. 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. It found that FRE 702 provides a more flexible standard for admissibility focused on the scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. Id. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (noting that [t]he focus ... must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate). Daubert set out a non-exclusive list of factors for consideration in determining whether the evidence in question meets the flexible standard, including: (1) whether [the theory or technique] can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) `general acceptance.' Id. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Supreme Court summarized its holding by emphasizing the difference between Daubert and the Frye test that the federal courts had previously employed, stating: `General acceptance' is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence.... Id. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Few cases have interpreted section 490.065. To the extent that section 490.065 mirrors FRE 702 and FRE 703, as interpreted and applied in Daubert and its progeny, the cases interpreting those federal rules provide relevant and useful guidance in interpreting and applying section 490.065. See Giddens v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 29 S.W.3d 813, 820 (Mo. banc 2000) (The construction given by the federal courts to their rules does not control the interpretation of our state rules, even if the rules themselves are nearly identical. However, the experiences of those courts in applying rules similar to our own are illustrative). To the extent that the two approaches differ, however, the standard set out in section 490.065 must govern. The standard set out in section 490.065 is very similar to that initially adopted by the federal courts in Daubert and set out in FRE 702. Indeed, at the time Daubert was decided, FRE 702 was identical to section 490.065.1, stating, If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, except that section 490.065.1 added a preliminary phrase [i]n any civil action. [12] While the parties presume that section 490.065.3 is also effectively identical to FRE 703, review of the two rules reveals important differences. Section 490.065.3 begins by stating, The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. The first sentence of FRE 703 is identical except for minor stylistic variations. But, section 490.065.3 goes on to require that the facts or data on which an expert bases an opinion or inference must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and that these facts and data must be otherwise reasonably reliable. Sec. 490.065.3. Thus, section 490.065.3 expressly requires a showing that the facts and data are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject of the expert's testimony. The court must also independently assess their reliability. Id. By contrast, under FRE 703 whether the facts or data relied upon are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject is relevant only to determine whether the facts or data must be otherwise admissible in evidence. For this reason, unlike in Missouri, Daubert held that in the federal courts an expert need not necessarily identify the relevant scientific community, or field, in which the data and facts are accepted. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786.