Opinion ID: 1656419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred by allowing closing argument statements.

Text: ¶ 38. The test in determining whether a lawyer has made an improper argument which requires reversal is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument ... create[s] an unjust prejudice against the [opposing party] result[ing] in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 701-02 (Miss.1988). This Court further explained in Clemons v. State, 320 So.2d 368 (Miss.1975), that: So long as counsel in his address to the jury keeps fairly within the evidence and the issues involved, wide latitude of discussion is allowed; but, when he departs entirely from the evidence in his argument, or makes statements intended solely to excite the passions or prejudices of the jury, or makes inflammatory and damaging statements of fact not found in the evidence, the trial judge should intervene to prevent an unfair argument. Id. at 371. This Court has also established that: While an attorney making a closing argument may not make remarks which are unfairly calculated to arouse passion or prejudice, and while we do not condone appeals to sectional prejudices of the jury, the control of such argument is left largely to the discretion of the trial judge, who is in a much better position to observe and determine what is improper. James W. Sessums Timber Co. v. McDaniel, 635 So.2d 875, 882 (Miss.1994). ¶ 39. During closing argument, Michelle's counsel made the following remarks: MR. DALLAS: Tomorrow, Dr. Eckman will leave this courtroom or leave his house, and he'll go hack to his office or to the hospital and he'll practice medicine. Michelle Moore, no matter what you do, is not going to have Jason Taylor Moore back. She will  she will have a child to raise, she will have other things to do. You may not believe it, but what you do here is important. It's important in the larger context. There is a standard of care that you've heard them talk about is passing, but that standard means something. IT means that physicians and hospitals are not above the law. It means that they must comply with what is reasonable under the circumstances. And if they know that they're above the law, that they don't have to comply with that standard of care, they're not going to be held responsible for their actions, then the standard of care suffers. If they know that that standard of care is ample and when somebody calls out and when you're asked to do something, or something that's reasonable in terms of the care of that person, they they're going to think about that. They're going to think, if I don't do this, will I be held responsible. And quite frankly I don't think they believe that a Lee County jury will hold them responsible. They think that they're above the law. If they spent half as much time taking care of Taylor Moore as they have on defending this lawsuit  MR. R. UPCHURCH: May it please the Court? Excuse me, Counsel. That's uncalled for to argue that these Defendants think they are above the law and that  that's improper and we request the jury be advised to disregard that. THE COURT: I don't believe it exceeded the bounds. It'll be overruled. You may proceed. ¶ 40. In Shell Oil Co. v. Pou, 204 So.2d 155 (Miss.1967), this Court found error in the trial court's submitting the punitive damage issue to the jury which was compounded when Pou's counsel in his closing argument was permitted over objection, to state, after reading the instruction of the court authorizing the award of punitive damages, that the defendant was a corporation, had no soul, could neither go to heaven nor hell and that the way that the law punishes a corporation for not paying their debts in a case like this, if you find that they owe actual damage, is to require them to pay a punitive damage. Id. at 157. This Court, finding that the cumulative effect of the errors denied the appellants a fair trial and required the case be reversed and remanded for a new trial, held: The only legitimate purpose of the [closing] argument of counsel in a jury case is to assist the jurors in evaluating the evidence and in understanding the law and in applying it to the facts. Appeals to passion or prejudice are always improper and should never be allowed. Id. ¶ 41. In Woods v. Burns, 797 So.2d 331, 334 (Miss.Ct.App.2001), applying Shell Oil, the Court of Appeals determined that in order to reverse a judgment based on an improper argument claim, the court must find first an `abuse, unjustified denunciation or a statement of fact not shown in the evidence.' (citing Brush v. Laurendine, 168 Miss. 7, 13-14, 150 So. 818, 820 (1933)), and then must find that it was probable that this improper argument had a harmful influence on the jury. Id. ¶ 42. Arguing that a party thinks he is above the law does not fall within the bounds of a case regarding standard of care. The purpose of this argument was not to assist the jurors in evaluating the evidence, but it was to excite their passions and prejudices and, thus, improperly influence them. Therefore, we find the trial court erred in overruling the objection made by Dr. Eckman and in finding that this improper argument did not exceed the bounds of the evidence.