Opinion ID: 594745
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Proceeding

Text: 36 This court does not dispute the district court's characterization of the Wisconsin disciplinary procedure as judicial in nature. The Leaf case involved a six-day hearing with four witnesses and an appeal to Wisconsin's highest court. The nature of the claims and defense forced the state court to investigate, declare and enforce liabilities as they stood on present and past facts and under laws already in existence. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 477, 103 S.Ct. at 1312. The state court did not act in a legislative role; it promulgated no new rules. Neither did the court act in an administrative or ministerial role; instead it fully adjudicated and rejected Leaf's claim of a present right. See Greening v. Moran, 953 F.2d 301, 305 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 77, 121 L.Ed.2d 42 (1992) (attorney disciplinary proceeding before state supreme court is judicial in nature). 37 We do question, however, the district court's conclusion that Rooker- Feldman bars that court from hearing Haynes's claims. The Wisconsin Supreme Court disciplined only Linda Leaf; Andrew Haynes was neither an attorney nor a party to the Wisconsin disciplinary proceedings. Concededly, the Plaintiffs did not strenuously argue the different posture of these two individuals. Nonetheless, the Plaintiffs did argue the following in their April 1989 Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss: 38 The attorney disciplinary action alleged does not include Plaintiff Haynes, a non-attorney. If there is, in fact, a Wisconsin judicial proceeding to protect federal constitutional rights, it is closed to Haynes, a black man. Therefore, contra to the assertions of Defendants, Younger cannot apply to him.... 39 (Opp'n Br. at 3-4.) Moreover, this distinction was again raised by the Plaintiffs in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration. In this memorandum Plaintiffs argued that because Haynes was not a party to the disciplinary proceedings, his claims have not been heard in any forum. The Plaintiffs reiterated this argument on appeal. 40 We find that the district court erred in failing to distinguish between Leaf and Haynes. There is, therefore, no judgment against Haynes. Haynes was not required to utilize state judicial remedies before, or instead of, bringing a Section 1983 action in federal court. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2568, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). Rather, Haynes was at liberty to bring federal claims in federal court--a liberty that Haynes exercised. And because there is no state court judgment with respect to Haynes, the district court was not deprived of jurisdiction to proceed on Haynes's federal claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This does not mean, as we explain below, that Haynes's claims are without other jurisdictional problems.