Opinion ID: 1350555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts

Text: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. One expert may reasonably rely on another expert's opinion in forming his own. Analysis of Rule 703 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 703, the identical counterpart to Rule 703 WVRE, supports this conclusion. This means that the expert is permitted to learn the facts prior to trial by a variety of means such as personal examination, first-hand investigation, files, reports of other specialists, or the reports or comments of professional observers. The only requirement is that the sources be reliable in the sense that they are normally relied on in the expert's field, even though these materials may not qualify for admission into evidence. [Emphasis added] Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence, at 490 (2nd ed. 1987). Rule 703 does not limit admissibility of expert opinions to opinions formed solely on the basis of first-hand experience. Franklin Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers, § 7-3(B) (3rd ed. 1994). The ultimate determination of an expert's qualifications to state an opinion is left to the discretion of the circuit court. Jones v. Garnes, 183 W.Va. 304, 395 S.E.2d 548 (1990). The circuit court decision will generally not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Id. In this case, we find no abuse of discretion. The final discovery issues will be deposed of briefly. The appellant asserts that the admission into evidence of the deposition transcript of Richard Chaffee was erroneous because the statements contain inadmissible hearsay. [3] Under Rule 32(a) WVRCP [1989], deposition testimony may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition.... Although Mr. Gates was acting pro se at time of the deposition, he was present and had full opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Chaffee and object at that time. The circuit court judge reviewed the transcript and ruled on the admissibility of the portions read into evidence. We decline to disturb his judgment. Mr. Gates also claims that his request, one month before trial, to depose the opposing party's expert witness, Mr. DiMagno, was wrongfully denied. We disagree. Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no absolute right to take a discovery deposition of the other party's testifying expert witness. The rule requires interrogatories to be used first and leaves to the discretion of the trial court whether further discovery is warranted. Syl. pt. 9, King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 182 W.Va. 276, 387 S.E.2d 511 (1989). There was clearly no abuse of discretion here. Mr. DiMagno had been deposed twice before, albeit by a lawyer no longer involved in this case. As for Mr. Gates' claim that the circuit court erred by refusing to allow him to present two experts as rebuttal witnesses, which he identified for the first time two days after trial began, we disagree. The Appellant's Reply Brief offers the excuse that Mr. DiMagno's testimony caught the defendant by surprise. Appellant's Reply Br. at 13-14. Therefore, Mr. Gates was unable to determine that the experts were needed as rebuttal witnesses before the trial began. Yet the evidence reveals that Mr. DiMagno's expert reports were submitted six months before trial. We find no reason that Mr. Gates shouldn't be expected to comply with the circuit court's pretrial order under Rule 16, WVRCP, [1988] requiring disclosure of experts before trial.