Opinion ID: 55788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Base offense level for a prior conviction of a controlled substance offense

Text: Le acknowledges that he did not object to the determination of the base offense level at trial, and therefore review is for plain error only. United States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir.2005). On plain error, the defendant must establish (1) error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected substantial rights, and (4) that the court should use its discretion to correct the error because failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 358-59. The district court determined that Le's base offense level should be twenty because the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2004). The relevant guidelines section defines controlled substance offense: The term controlled substance offense means an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). [3] The government must prove by a preponderance of the relevant and sufficiently reliable evidence that the prior conviction permits the guidelines classification. United States v. Herrera-Solorzano, 114 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted). Generally, courts employ the so-called categorical approach from Taylor v. United States, which instructs the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense. 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). In a narrow range of cases, like the drug offense presented here, courts may examine the statutory definition of the offense, the charging paper and jury instructions. United States v. Allen, 282 F.3d 339, 343 (5th Cir.2002) (referencing Taylor ). Under Shepard v. United States, the Supreme Court defined this inquiry with respect to a case involving a guilty plea to include the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. 544 U.S. 13, 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005). The parties agree that the prior conviction was for Manufacture or Delivery of Substance in Penalty Group 2 under section 481.113(a) of the Texas Health & Safety Code. This statute states that a person commits an offense if the person knowingly manufactures, delivers, or possesses with intent to deliver a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 2. Id. One can violate this Texas statute in at least five ways: 1) manufacture, 2) an offer to sell; [4] or 3) possession with intent to deliver; or through knowing delivery by 4) actual transfer; or 5) constructive transfer. Lopez v. State, 108 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). [5] Le argues that the guidelines classification was improper because engaging in an offer to sell, the second way to violate the Texas statute, would not constitute a controlled substance offense as defined in the guidelines. The Texas statute of conviction permits a conviction under its delivery section by virtue of an offer to sell without possession, Lopez, 108 S.W.3d at 297, and in order for Le's conviction to be classified as a controlled substance offense under the guidelines, it must involve possession of drugs. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 2005). But cf. United States v. Palacios-Quinonez, 431 F.3d 471, 476 (5th Cir.2005) (distinguishing Garza-Lopez by holding that possession with intent to distribute can include constructive possession attained by one who purchases drugs for future sale). The materials Le himself attached to the record on appeal indicate that he possessed the drugs. One of the documents is a guilty plea in which Le said, in a signed statement, that he committed the offense of possession of a controlled substance on June 1, 2000 along with Benjamin Dang and Rathna King who had joint possession of the ecstasy, knew of it and were also exercising care, custody, and control over it.  This written plea document is admissible. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254; see also United States v. Castillo-Morales, 507 F.3d 873, 875-76 (5th Cir.2007) (holding that when a defendant stipulates that a factual basis for his plea is present in court documents, courts may use any uncontradicted facts in those documents to establish an element of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes). The guilty plea document negates the possibility that Le's conviction was for conduct that did not involve possession. Le specifically stated that he pleaded guilty to possession of drugs. It is clear from this document that Le was not pleading guilty to delivery by an offer to sell without possession. The only way to violate the Texas statute of conviction by possessing drugs is to do so with intent to distribute in some way; the Texas statute does not permit a conviction for possession without intent to manufacture, delivery, or distribute. See Lopez, 108 S.W.3d at 297. Accordingly, the only way for Le to have pleaded guilty to violating the Texas statute of conviction by virtue of possession of a controlled substance, is to have possesse[d] with intent to delivery a controlled substance. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.113(a). Such a conviction qualifies as a controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). See United States v. Ford, No. 06-21042, 509 F.3d 714, 717-18, 2007 WL 4303800, at -4 (5th Cir. Dec. 11, 2007) (holding that possession with intent to deliver under the Texas statute is indistinguishable from possession with intent to distribute, and thus qualifies as a controlled substance offense under the guidelines). We therefore reject this basis for reversal of Le's sentence.