Opinion ID: 2357828
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: (1) Defendant claims the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for the Dunbar crimes and the special circumstance finding. He also attacks the evidentiary sufficiency for the attempted murder of John Doe. The claims lack merit. [5] In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we `examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidenceevidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid valuesuch that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citations.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] The same standard of review applies to cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence and to special circumstance allegations. [Citation.] `[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.' [Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness's credibility. [Citation.] ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1129 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321]; see People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 323, 190 P.3d 664].)

Christie Hervey identified defendant as the gunman who walked swiftly toward her and who looked back at the body of Mr. Dunbar. (See ante, pt. I.A.1.a.) Defendant claims Ms. Hervey's testimony was insubstantial because she was 100 feet away, could have seen the man only briefly, had to study the photo lineup for 20 minutes before identifying defendant, and could not say whether the man had a mustache or beard. His argument fails. According to Ms. Hervey and Detective Cade, Ms. Hervey was 40 to 75 feet from the gunman. The scene was brightly lit and her view was unobstructed. (See ante, pt. I.A.1.a.) Ms. Hervey not only identified defendant in the photo lineup, but also at the preliminary hearing and again at trial. ( Ibid. ) Moreover, defendant admitted to Glenn Johnson that he killed a man during a failed carjacking at the West Palms apartment complex, the scene of Dunbar's murder. Johnson saw him in possession of the pistol used to kill Dunbar. ( Ibid. ) Finally, the same pistol was used in the attempted murder of Miguel Cortez, and Mr. Cortez identified defendant as his attacker. (See ante, pt. I.A.2.)
Defendant claims the evidence of robbery was insubstantial because no one saw him take Mr. Dunbar's car keys, he did not admit having taken them, and they were not discovered in his possession. However, there was substantial circumstantial evidence of the taking. Mr. Dunbar left his apartment with his keys and used them to drive to the murder scene. They were not found on his person or at the scene, although his other personal effects were. (See ante, pt. I.A. 1.a.) We held substantially similar circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a robbery-murder special circumstance finding in People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]. The victim was last seen in Maury's company. She had a roll of cash and announced her intention to buy marijuana with it. However, neither money nor drugs were found when her body was later discovered. We concluded the jury could reasonably infer that Maury had stole[n] either the money or marijuana from [her]. ( Id. at p. 402.)
Defendant claims the evidence of attempted carjacking was insubstantial. He argues it was far more likely than not that there was no intent or attempt to take the vehicle, as the victim was incapacitated and nothing prevented the assailant from taking the victim's car. To the contrary, the jury was entitled to conclude that defendant, having taken Mr. Dunbar's car keys, would have taken the car itself, but that the gunshots drew the security guard to the scene and may have prompted neighbors to call the police, as Ms. Hervey did. (See ante, pt. I.A. 1.a.) Defendant himself told Glenn Johnson that he killed a man at the West Palms complex because he resisted an attempted carjacking. Further, the gun defendant later abandoned was conclusively linked to the murder through ballistics evidence. ( Ibid. )
(2) As with the underlying crimes, substantial evidence supported the special circumstance finding that the murder occurred in the commission of robbery or attempted carjacking. From evidence that a defendant killed another person and at the time of the killing took substantial property from that person, a jury ordinarily may reasonably infer that the defendant killed the victim to accomplish the taking and thus committed the offense of robbery. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 357 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]; People v. Kipp [(2001)] 26 Cal.4th [1100,] 1128 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450]; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 688 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].) ( People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 553 [[127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931] [special circumstance finding supported by substantial evidence].)

(3) Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing. (Pen. Code, § 21a; People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176].) ( People v. Superior Court (Decker) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 7 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 421, 157 P.3d 1017].) Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence that he intended to kill John Doe, the driver of the Jeep. (4) When Doe drove through the intersection, defendant pulled himself up onto the window frame on the passenger side of his car, braced his arms on the roof, and aimed at Doe. He changed his target only when he noticed the patrol car and shot at the officers, instead. (See ante, pt. I.A.3.) The evidence supported the jury's conclusion that defendant intended to kill the officers. Defendant does not challenge those convictions here. The evidence is also compelling that defendant aimed at Doe intending to kill him. Indeed, at trial defense counsel argued that defendant was shooting at Doe, not at the officers. Simply pointing his gun at Doe under these circumstances is sufficient to support a finding of attempted murder. As we noted in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 455 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697], the law of attempts would be largely without function if it could not be invoked until the trigger was pulled, the blow struck, or the money seized. Also instructive is our decision in People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 220 P.3d 820]. In Ervine we concluded that sufficient evidence supported a conviction for attempting to murder a third police officer, because the evidence indicated that the defendant wanted to kill all the officers at the scene but had undertaken a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing by firing ... at the [two] officers who posed the most immediate threat. ( Id. at p. 786.) In the present case, as in Ervine, it appeared that defendant was first trying to eliminate the threat posed by the police officers who were pursuing him, before returning his attention to Doe, the attempted murder victim.
Defendant contends the evidence was also insufficient to support the jury's verdict that the attempted murder of Doe was premeditated and deliberate. (5) An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the result of reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. ( People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 543 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182]; People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159].) However, the requisite reflection need not span a specific or extended period of time. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity, and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly. ( People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1286-1287 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 185 P.3d 727] ( Harris ); People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335].) A conviction will be upheld on any reasonable theory supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 577 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614]; People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 370.) Defendant clearly formed an intent to kill and took several steps to achieve that end. He took up a firearm, climbed out of a moving car, sat on the window frame, reached across the roof, braced himself, and aimed at Doe. He had ample time to premeditate and deliberate. (See Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1287.)