Opinion ID: 281912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the severance motions

Text: 25 In his pretrial motion for severance appellant asserted that the various counts of the indictment, with the exception of 3, 4, 5 and 6, were improperly joined under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 40 and that even if properly joined a severance should be granted pursuant to Rule 14, 41 because of the likelihood of prejudice. 26 At oral argument on this motion, appellant's counsel represented that in his view a reasonable severance, in light of the basic dictates of fairness, would be to try together Counts 1 and 2, Counts 3 through 7, and Counts 8 and 9. 27 In denying appellant's motion, the District Court observed, first of all, that Defendant concedes the propriety, under Rule 8(a), of joining Count 1 with Count 2, Count 8 with Count 9, and Count 3 with Counts 4, 5, 6 and 7. 42 The judge then proceeded to consider whether Counts 1 and 2 may be properly joined with Counts 8 and 9 and whether these four counts may be joined with Counts 3 through 7. 43 He concluded that Counts 1, 2, 8 and 9 were of similar character, that the theft counts (3-7) were connected together with Count 2, and that all the counts were therefore properly joined. 44 He added that: 28 all the counts of the indictment reflect a common scheme or plan whereby the defendant obtained large sums of money which constituted taxable income while concealing the same from the Internal Revenue Service by falsifying the tax returns of himself and others.    45 29 On the Rule 14 aspect of the motion, the District Judge recognized that discretionary relief from prejudicial joinder was available notwithstanding that the counts were properly joined under Rule 8(a). He held, however, that because of the considerable overlap of proof among the various counts, appellant had not made a sufficient showing that he would be prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the proof relating to different counts to warrant the exercise of such discretion. 46 As to the more serious question whether appellant might be prejudiced because of his desire to testify on some counts but not on others, 47 he concluded that the possibility of such prejudice was problematical at that stage of the proceeding. 48 He therefore denied the request for Rule 14 relief without prejudice to its renewal: 30 If, at trial, the defendant decides he wants to testify only in respect to one series of the joined offenses, it will be open to him to renew his motion and to demonstrate what actual prejudice he would incur by testifying on the joined offenses. 49 31 One week later, in a pretrial conference, appellant's attorney represented that there was a sharp difference in appellant's position with respect to testifying on Counts 1 through 7 and testifying on Counts 8 and 9. Though he was unwilling to reveal in Government counsel's presence which set of counts appellant wished to testify on, he indicated his readiness to disclose to the court in camera appellant's exact intentions. 50 He argued further that if the question of severance were deferred until after the close of the Government's case substantial prejudice would already have accrued from the joint trial. Finally, he represented that the defense would be satisfied with separate trials of Counts 1 through 7 and Counts 8 and 9, and that if such a severance were granted he would not argue as a basis for appeal the failure to sever other counts. Following this colloquy the District Judge indicated that he would not rule right now on this question. I want to think it over and perhaps from time to time have the reporter read back to me what has been said. 32 The severance question was again brought up during trial, at the close of the Government's case. Appellant's counsel argued that if appellant were to take the stand and testify on certain counts but not on others, it would be a dramatic underscoring of his invocation of the Fifth Amendment which    would be prejudicial to him with respect to the counts on which he did not testify. He made clear, however, that because the Government had already introduced its evidence on all nine counts, the defense was not seeking simply an election by the Government as to which set of counts (1 through 7 or 8 and 9) it would go forward on, but that the relief requested was the declaration of a mistrial. At that point, the court stated: Well, in view of that, counsel, the Court will deny your motion and go forward. 33 Though he had apparently not done so previously, appellant's counsel then announced for the record appellant's desire to testify on Counts 1-7 but not to testify on Counts 8 and 9, and the reasons for his decision. He explained that in his opinion appellant had a valid legal defense to 8 and 9, and added: 34 And, secondly, we believe that there is a strong possibility that the defendant's testimony in defense of eight and nine, might form a chain, incriminatory in nature, vis-a-vis the conflict of interest statutes of the United States which have not yet been barred by the Statute of Limitations insofar as prosecutions are concerned. 35 On appeal, appellant challenges both the District Court's conclusion that there was no Rule 8 misjoinder, and its refusal to grant relief under Rule 14. We deal with these contentions separately. 36 a. Misjoinder — Rule 8(a) 37 Appellant attacks, first of all, the District Judge's finding that he conceded the joinability of Count 1 with Count 2, Count 8 with Count 9, and Count 3 with Counts 4, 5, 6 and 7. He contends that his remarks as to a reasonable severance were made in the context of his request for Rule 14 relief, and were not intended as a concession of proper joinder under Rule 8(a). Whether or not counsel's statement was properly understood as an abandonment of his Rule 8 claim as to these subsidiary joinders, we think it is clear that Counts 1 and 2 were joinable as charging offenses of the same character; that Counts 3 through 7 were joinable, whether as charging offenses of the same or similar character or as offenses based on acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan; and that Counts 8 and 9 were joinable, whether as offenses of similar character or as based on acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. And appellant makes no argument to the contrary, except to deny that he conceded these points below. 38 Similarly, there can be little question as to the joinability of Counts 1 and 2 with Counts 8 and 9, and Counts 3 through 7 with Count 2. Count 9 (the conspiracy count), like Counts 1 and 2, charged conduct whose purpose was to fraudulently understate appellant's income and thus avoid payment of tax. Indeed, the income-splitting scheme involved in Count 9 was nearly identical to the arrangement with appellant's associate, Tucker, which formed a major part of the Government's proof under Count 1. And we do not view it as material that Count 9 charged an unfulfilled conspiracy while Count 1 alleged actual non-reporting. As to Count 8, we think that counselling another to file a false return, with intent to deceive the Government, is conduct at least similar in nature to the wilful giving of false information on the defendant's own return. 51 Moreover, the acts which gave rise to Count 8 were intimately related to — and, on the prosecution's theory, the product of — the conspiracy charged in Count 9. 39 In concluding that Counts 3 through 7 were connected together with Count 2, the District Judge noted that the cash alleged to have been stolen in the former counts was that alleged to have been unreported in the latter, and thus that there would be a complete overlap of proof: 40 [I]f a separate trial were ordered for the theft counts, the Government would still be faced with proving those counts in order to establish the source of the defendant's unreported income as charged in Count 2.    52 41 We agree with the court's conclusion on this point. In determining whether offenses are based on acts or transactions connected together, the predominant consideration is whether joinder would serve the goals of trial economy and convenience; the primary purpose of this kind of joinder is to insure that a given transaction need only be proved once. 53 In view of this rationale, and the fact that the tax evasion charge could not be proved without establishing the theft as well, the District Court's conclusion that the offenses were connected together was fully warranted. 42 A more difficult question is whether, given these conclusions, a proper basis existed for joining all nine counts in a single indictment. The District Judge evidently felt that since Counts 1, 8 and 9 were joinable to Count 2, as offenses of the same or similar character, and since Counts 3 through 7 were joinable to Count 2 as connected offenses, it was proper to join all nine counts. 43 On appeal, the Government argues that since    the 1962 income tax charges, which inevitably required a finding as to conversion, were properly joined with the tax charges for 1961 and 1963-1964, the conversion charges were properly included in the indictment. We do not understand the Government's argument to be that counts joinable to a common count are always joinable to each other, but rather that where transactions are properly joined all offenses arising out of each transaction should be tried at the same time, unless to do so would unduly or prejudicially complicate the proceeding. 44 Apparently as an alternative basis for upholding 54 joinder, the trial court found the indictment as a whole to reflect a common scheme or plan. In supporting this ground, the Government argues that all the violations charged constituted part of a common scheme or plan whereby appellant endeavored to conceal from the internal revenue authorities significant sources and amounts of income obtained outside his official employment. It relies heavily on Daly v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 342 F.2d 932 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 853, 86 S.Ct. 102, 15 L.Ed.2d 91 (1965), in which this court upheld the joinder against a single defendant of 27 counts — charging false pretenses, unlawful practice of the healing arts, unlawful possession of drugs and unlawful delivery of drugs — noting that the offense with which the defendant was essentially charged was falsely holding himself out to the public as a licensed physician, and of performing acts in the course of that deception which a layman is forbidden to do. Id. at 354, 342 F.2d at 933. The Government argues that here, appellant's efforts to hide the sources and amounts of income he personally received outside his Government employment was the nexus of all the statutory violations. 55 45 We need not rely on either of these theories in order to reject appellant's claim that reversal is required because of misjoinder. For we think it is clear that, whether or not the theft counts could properly be joined with the four income tax counts, appellant was not harmed by any error in that regard. We have held that the four income tax counts could properly be tried together, since they were joinable as offenses of the same or similar character. As we have noted, evidence of the larceny was a necessary part of the proof of the 1962 tax evasion charge, and thus would have been admissible in any such joint trial. Addition of the theft counts, therefore, was in no way prejudicial to appellant insofar as his conviction on the tax charges is concerned. 46 It is true that the joint trial may have prejudiced appellant in defending against the larceny charges, since evidence not only of the connected 1962 offense was admitted but also evidence of unrelated income tax offenses for other years. But the concurrent sentences imposed by the District Court make unnecessary any inquiry by us into the possibility of such prejudice. 56 47 Appellant, however, contends that we are precluded from holding that any error as to joinder of counts was harmless — that upon a finding of Rule 8 misjoinder the court must ipso facto reverse the conviction without pausing to consider whether the error was prejudicial. The Government's response is to inquire why the harmless error rule (Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a)) should be inapplicable in this one situation when it applies to all other types of error, even, in a qualified form, to error of constitutional dimension. 57 48 Appellant's reasoning seems to be that the necessary implication of the Rule's provision that certain offenses may be joined is that offenses not within its terms may not be joined; and that any inquiry into prejudice after a finding of misjoinder would be effectively to read Rule 8 out of the law, since Rule 14 makes separate provision for dealing with prejudicial joinder. 49 But we think this argument ignores an important distinction between the prejudice that compels an appellate court to reverse for trial error, and the prejudicial effect of joinder, even when proper, which a trial judge must weigh in exercising his Rule 14 discretion. Because of the language of Rule 8 and the relationship of Rule 8 to Rule 14, it may readily be conceded that a trial judge has no discretion to deny a motion for severance when counts are misjoined, and that to do so would be error. 58 But that leaves unresolved the question whether the defendant was harmed thereby. As Judge Friendly has said, We see no reason why the undoubted truth that an appeal claiming misjoinder under Rule 8(b) 59 raises a question of law in the strict sense, whereas an appeal from denial of severance under Rule 14 normally raises only one of abuse of discretion, should carry exemption from the harmless error rule    as a corollary. United States v. Granello, 365 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1019, 87 S.Ct. 1367, 18 L.Ed.2d 458 (1967). 50 It has been said that any form of joinder not permitted by the terms of    Rule [8]    is conclusively presumed prejudicial. 60 In our view, however, this statement is too broad if it means that a violation of Rule 8 may never be deemed harmless. When unrelated offenses committed by separate defendants are joined for trial, in violation of Rule 8(b), 61 no further inquiry into special prejudice is required. 62 Such a rule is justified since the introduction at the trial of one defendant of evidence which in law is relevant only to the guilt of another in itself is prejudicial, and it would be inappropriate to speculate as to the extent to which that evidence may have affected the deliberations of the jury or embarrassed the defendant in presenting his defense. 63 But in a case where it is clear that no prejudice from the joinder could have occurred, we perceive no reason for ignoring the harmless error rule. 64 51 b. Prejudicial joinder — Rule 14 52 In Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App. D.C. 11, 331 F.2d 85 (1964), we described the principal reasons why a defendant may be prejudiced by joint trial of offenses, even if proper under Rule 8: 53 (1) he may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate defenses; (2) the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes charged to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from which is found his guilt of the other crime or crimes charged; or (3) the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find. A less tangible, but perhaps equally persuasive, element of prejudice may reside in a latent feeling of hostility engendered by the charging of several crimes as distinct from only one. 65 54 The District Judge weighed the possibility of such harm in ruling on appellant's pretrial severance motion. 66 He noted the considerable overlap of proof between Count 2 and Counts 3 through 7, and between Counts 8 and 9, from which he concluded that whatever cumulative effect, if any, the presentation of proof in this case [has] would not be eliminated by severing the various counts. 67 And he found no indication that defendant's case will not be presented to and impartially considered by a trier of facts under proper instructions on the law applicable to evidence appropriately admissible. 68 55 In Drew, we recognized that the principal elements of prejudice from a joint trial are largely absent in a situation where evidence of each of the joined offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other, under the rules governing admissibility of other crimes evidence. 69 The standard we there laid down requires a severance unless evidence of the joined offenses would be mutually admissible, or if not, the evidence is sufficiently simple and distinct to mitigate the danger of cumulation. 70 56 The Government does not claim that all the details of its proof under Counts 1, 2, 8 and 9 would have been mutually admissible in separate trials 71 but asserts that significant portions would properly have been received, and with this we agree. Wilfullness was an element of each of the income tax offenses charged, and evidence as to intent was of prime importance. Evidence of prior false reporting, failure to file or failure to pay taxes due is commonly received in income tax cases as bearing on intent. 72 Such evidence need not relate to prior acts of precisely the same character, but is admissible as broadly probative of the defendant's attitude toward reporting and payment of taxes generally. 73 Moreover, the evidence relating to Counts 1 and 2 would have had particular relevance to appellant's defense of reliance on advice of counsel as to Counts 8 and 9, as showing prior wilful deception of the Government at a time before that when counsel's advice was sought. 74 And we think it is also true that evidence of the offenses charged in 8 and 9 would have been admissible in a trial of 1 and 2, notwithstanding that the former evidence would relate to years subsequent to those at issue. 75 57 Thus, evidence as to Counts 1 and 2 and Counts 8 and 9 would have been mutually admissible in separate trials, if not all the details that came out in the joint trial. We view this as sufficient to satisfy the Drew test, for that standard does not require that every item of evidence relating to one offense be admissible in a separate trial for the other, but rather looks in a broader sense to whether the rules relating to other crimes evidence have been satisfied. 76 And, at least in the case of non-violent crimes, it is ordinarily the fact of the defendant's having engaged in prior or subsequent criminal conduct that is likely to be damaging in the eyes of the jury rather than the details of its commission. 58 Thus, the possibility of criminal propensity prejudice or cumulation was not enlarged by the joinder of 1 and 2 with 8 and 9 since the evidence of each would have been admissible in a separate trial for the other. 77 Moreover, we think that the evidence relating to the four tax counts, if not simple, was at least sufficiently distinct to enable the jury to keep it separate, thus mitigating to some degree the danger of cumulation. Apparently, it is quite common for the Government to try jointly income tax offenses relating to two or more years. 78 Not only is this economical, in view of the liberal rules as to reciprocal admissibility already discussed, but the danger of confusion is probably less than in other types of cases since usually each offense relates to a return filed for a particular year. Though this was arguably more complex than the typical income tax case, the circumstances do not convince us that the four tax counts could not fairly be tried together. 79 59 Appellant, however, argues that whatever might have been the case in a trial of the income tax counts alone, the addition of the larceny counts was fatally prejudicial. As we have previously observed, however, a trial of the income tax counts would necessarily have entailed proof of the offenses embodied in Counts 3 through 7. It is true that little if any of the evidence of the income tax offenses would have been admissible in a separate trial of the theft counts, but we need not consider whether the District Judge abused his discretion in failing to cure prejudice affecting those counts alone. 80 60 Appellant also contends that he was embarrassed and confounded in presenting his defense, in that he wished to testify as to Counts 1 through 7 but to remain silent on Counts 8 and 9. In Cross v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 335 F.2d 987 (1964), we held that such circumstances may constitute sufficient prejudice to require that a severance be granted. 61 Prejudice may develop when an accused wishes to testify on one but not the other of two joined offenses which are clearly distinct in time, place and evidence. His decision whether to testify will reflect a balancing of several factors with respect to each count: the evidence against him, the availability of defense evidence other than his testimony, the plausibility and substantiality of his testimony, the possible effects of demeanor, impeachment, and cross-examination. But if the two charges are joined for trial, it is not possible for him to weigh these factors separately as to each count. If he testifies on one count, he runs the risk that any adverse effects will influence the jury's consideration of the other count. Thus he bears the risk on both counts, although he may benefit on only one. Moreover, a defendant's silence on one count would be damaging in the face of his express denial of the other. Thus he may be coerced into testifying on the count upon which he wished to remain silent. It is not necessary to decide whether this invades his constitutional right to remain silent, since we think it constitutes prejudice within the meaning of Rule 14. 81 62 Appellant cites Cross for the proposition that a timely and bona fide election by the accused to testify as to some counts and not as to others requires a Rule 14 severance. We think this reading of Cross is far too broad. Such a rule, in fact, would divest the court of all control over the matter of severance and entrust it to the defendant. 82 63 The essence of our ruling in Cross was that, because of the unfavorable appearance of testifying on one charge while remaining silent on another, and the consequent pressure to testify as to all or none, the defendant may be confronted with a dilemma: whether, by remaining silent, to lose the benefit of vital testimony on one count, rather than risk the prejudice (as to either or both counts) that would result from testifying on the other. Obviously no such dilemma exists where the balance of risk and advantage in respect of testifying is substantially the same as to each count. Thus unless the election referred to by appellant is to be regarded as conclusive — and we think it should not be — no need for a severance exists until the defendant makes a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other. 83 In making such a showing, it is essential that the defendant present enough information — regarding the nature of the testimony he wishes to give on one count and his reasons for not wishing to testify on the other — to satisfy the court that the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it intelligently to weigh the considerations of economy and expedition in judicial administration against the defendant's interest in having a free choice with respect to testifying. 84 64 Here, counsel for appellant represented to the court that appellant desired to remain silent on Counts 8 and 9 in order to avoid disclosing to the jury his disobedience of the instructions of the Majority Leader of the Senate regarding outside business activities, and because he feared prosecution under conflict of interest laws. He added that in his opinion appellant had a legal defense to Counts 8 and 9. No mention, however, was made of the nature and importance of the testimony he wished to give on the other counts. 65 Moreover, our examination of appellant's testimony at trial leaves us unconvinced that he had ample reason not to testify on [Counts 8 and 9]    and would not have done so if [those counts]    had been tried separately. 85 In Cross we noted that the defendant's testimony on Count 1 was plainly evasive and unconvincing, and on cross-examination he was open to questioning concerning his generally tawdry way of life and his prior convictions. 86 No such harmful consequences resulted here from appellant's decision to testify on Counts 8 and 9. 87 66 It is true that appellant's defense on those counts required him to reveal his disobedience of the instructions of his employer. But the explanation for the fee arrangement with Bromley, given by appellant in connection with Counts 8 and 9, was the same as that for the similar understanding with Tucker, which was a major part of the Government's proof of the 1961 tax evasion charge. It would appear, therefore, that appellant could not have escaped the need to give such testimony in a separate trial of Counts 1 through 7. 67 Nor are we persuaded by appellant's assertion that he had a legal defense to Counts 8 and 9 which made his testimony on those counts superfluous. At most, his defense of reliance on advice of counsel was relevant to the mechanics of filling out Bromley's 1963 return, involved in Count 8, and had no bearing whatever on numerous aspects of the conspiracy charged in Count 9. The Government's evidence as to the agreement that Bromley would report appellant's fees on his own return was strong, and would have been entirely unrebutted in the absence of a denial by appellant. And we think it is significant in this regard that appellant's testimony concerning the instructions of the Majority Leader and his forbidden moonlighting activities was brought out on direct examination rather than on cross-examination by the prosecution. 88 68 For these reasons, we decline to disturb appellant's convictions for the District Court's refusal to grant his request for separate trials.