Opinion ID: 2736728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Zamora’s Motion to Suppress

Text: When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, this Court reviews “factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the warrant or the reasonableness of an officer’s reliance on a warrant de novo.” United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 834 (5th Cir. 2010). We “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in this case, the United States.” Id.
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment, this Court conduct an alternative test. United States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2005). First, we consider whether the goodfaith exception applies, that is, whether “the officer executing the warrant relied on it in good faith.” Id. “For the good-faith exception to apply, the executing-officer’s reliance on the issuing-judge’s probable-cause 5 Case: 13-40203 Document: 00512780393 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 No. 13-40203 determination and the technical sufficiency of the warrant must have been objectively reasonable.” Id. at 358. A warrant will ordinarily establish good faith on the part of the officer executing the warrant. United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1988). But the warrant will not establish good faith if the affidavit supporting the warrant is bare bones, meaning it is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the good-faith exception applies, the inquiry ends; if this Court does not find good faith, we will next consider “whether the warrant was supported by probable cause.” Gibbs, 421 F.3d at 357 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even if both of these tests are met, this Court still applies a harmless error analysis, which asks “whether the trier of fact would have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt [if the evidence had been suppressed].” United States v. Willingham, 310 F.3d 367, 372 (5th Cir. 2002) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Zamora argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the search warrant used to search his house listed the wrong address. 3 He points out that the search warrant authorized the search of 2932 Fernando Salinas, Rio Grande City, Texas, but that the address of his home and the house the agents actually searched is 2930 Fernando Salinas, Rio Grande City, Texas. Zamora claims that because of the incorrect address, the warrant did not give the officers a basis for searching any residence other than 2932 Fernando Salinas. He also claims the good-faith exception does not apply 3 The agents who searched Zamora’s home found “a grenade, 46 firearms, various magazines for the firearms, two ballistic vests, a lot of ammunition, about 4 ounces of marijuana, a pair of night vision goggles, [a] steel baton, handcuffs, [an automobile], and miscellaneous documents.” At trial, the Government argued that finding the night-vision goggles at Zamora’s home corroborated the coconspirators’ testimony that they used nightvision goggles to get around the ranches while transporting drugs at night. 6 Case: 13-40203 Document: 00512780393 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 No. 13-40203 because the affidavit failed to state probable cause for the agents to search 2930 Fernando Salinas. The Government responds that “[t]he district court’s findings of fact, which were based on testimony offered at the suppression hearing, establish both the validity of the warrant and the agents’ reasonable reliance on it.” According to the Government, the warrant was not facially invalid because it accurately described the premises to be searched, and the agents’ reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable. We hold that the district court did not err when it denied Zamora’s motion to suppress because the good-faith exception applies. We focus on whether the warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient specificity to ensure that the officers could locate the premises without searching the wrong premises. See Darensbourg, 520 F.2d at 987 (“It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended. The test is one of reasonableness, and [t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.” (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). An incorrect address is not necessarily fatal. Indeed, this Court has previously upheld searches conducted pursuant to warrants with an incorrect house number, the wrong street name, and even the incorrect city. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 901 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1990) (even though the street name was wrong on the warrant, the good-faith exception applied because the defect was not apparent from simply looking at the warrant, “the affiant [who was] the executing officer . . . had recently viewed the location in question,” and “there was no possibility the wrong premises would be searched” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Avarello, 592 F.2d 1339, 1344 (5th Cir. 1979) (affirming denial of the motion to suppress where the warrant listed the wrong city because the 7 Case: 13-40203 Document: 00512780393 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 No. 13-40203 description of the premises allowed “the executing officers [to] locate and identify the premises to be searched with reasonable effort”); United States v. Darensbourg, 520 F.2d 985, 987 (5th Cir. 1975) (collecting cases where the Fifth Circuit has upheld the denial of a motion to suppress when the address was incorrect). Here, the officers initially set out to execute an arrest warrant for Zamora, which listed his address as 2930 Fernando Salinas. When they arrived at the street, they were unable to find 2930, but they saw Zamora’s car parked outside a house that had an electrical box labeled 2932. The agents executed the arrest warrant, and then sought a search warrant, which listed the address of the home as 2932 Fernando Salinas. The search warrant also gave a physical description of the home, noted that Zamora had been found inside the home, and stated that 2932 appeared on the home’s electrical box. The district court found that the warrant accurately described Zamora’s home so that the officers would not risk searching the wrong home. Zamora does not dispute the accuracy of the description of his home in the warrant; he only focuses on the incorrect address. But, as the cases above demonstrate, an incorrect address in a search warrant does not automatically invalidate the search. Because the warrant accurately described Zamora’s home, the officers were able to find his house and there was little risk that they would inadvertently search the wrong location. Thus, the district court correctly denied Zamora’s motion to suppress.