Opinion ID: 1588454
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Majority Incorrectly Distinguishes Richmond.

Text: ¶ 40. The majority says that it distinguishes the Richmond case simply because the trial court denied the State's motion to amend. The majority holds that if the trial court denies a party's motion to amend an indictment, Richmond is applicable. If the trial court grants a party's motion to amend, the majority's newly-crafted four-part test is applicable. To make a distinction on such a matter provides an unnecessary complication of our doctrine of amending indictments and will no doubt lead to immense confusion at the trial level. Contrary to the majority's assertion, the Richmond case has everything to do with the issue of whether a motion to amend an indictment should be granted or denied. If the majority wishes to so limit our precedent in Richmond, they should simply overrule the case rather than further confound the issue and burden our trial courts. ¶ 41. Additionally, the four-part test presented by the majority is redundant and overly complicated. The test is simple. Richmond correctly requires that the prosecution prove any extra substantive elements erroneously included in the indictment. 751 So.2d at 1046. To determine whether an element is one of substance or one of form, the trial judge should apply the test laid out in Griffin: whether the amendment will (1) materially alter the essential facts of the offense, or (2) materially alter a defense that the defendant had under the original indictment so as to prejudice the defendant's case. 584 So.2d at 1275-76. This is all that should be asked of trial judges when determining whether an amendment to an indictment is proper. ¶ 42. Finally, Richmond is distinguishable from this case, but for more pertinent reasons than the majority holds. In Richmond, it was possible to prove the value of the stolen item. In rape and sexual battery cases involving minors, it is legally impossible to prove that a child under 14 consented to the sexual acts. The defendant argues that by removing the phrase without her consent, the court denied him a complete defense. However, this defense was a legal nullity which he never had under the original indictment, as children under the age of 14 cannot consent to sexual acts. Even if the State had been forced to prove the consent element, all the law would require is proof that the victim was under 14. Because the amendment did not change the essential facts or alter Lee's defense in any way, the amendment was permissible.