Opinion ID: 2830408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether reconsideration was warranted

Text: The plaintiffs argue that the law-of-the-case doctrine or, alternatively, the mandate rule prevents the district court from reconsidering its previous order denying the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. The law-of-thecase doctrine “is not a jurisdictional rule, but a discretionary practice” that “merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power.” United States v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652, 657 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Unpublished opinions are precedential for purposes of the law of the case. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. The same theory and rules apply to the mandate rule, which “provides that a lower court on remand must implement both the letter and the spirit of the appellate court’s mandate and may not disregard the explicit directives of that court.” Matthews, 312 F.3d at 657 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The rule does not apply when: “(1) [t]he evidence at a subsequent trial is 6 Case: 14-41213 Document: 00513167856 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/25/2015 No. 14-41213 substantially different; (2) there has been an intervening change of law by a controlling authority; and (3) the earlier decision is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Id. The district court concluded that Crawford represented an intervening change in the law, fitting within an exception to the law-of-the case doctrine and the mandate rule. The plaintiffs contend that decision was incorrect because the Crawford panel did not consider the provider agreements’ no nonparty rights provision. That provision states that “no term or provision . . . is for the benefit of any person who is not a party to the [p]rovider [a]greement . . . .” The plaintiffs have argued throughout this litigation that this provision prohibits the non-signatory defendants from compelling arbitration. The Crawford panel did not address that provision. The plaintiffs make no other attempt to distinguish the facts of this case from those in Crawford. They also argue that Crawford could not overrule Muecke I, citing several cases in which we held that one panel of this court cannot overrule another even if it perceives error in the precedent. The magistrate judge specifically concluded that Crawford required a different analysis than the one used when first considering the issue. The Crawford court considered California precedent to find the relevant law. In Muecke I, the magistrate judge had only applied Arizona law. Because an intervening precedential Fifth Circuit decision used a distinctly different analysis for the same contract, the magistrate judge here concluded there was an intervening change of law by a controlling authority. We agree that Crawford represents an intervening change of law by a controlling authority. It is a published opinion in which the court applied a completely different analysis than the one the district court used prior to our decision in Muecke I. Moreover, we need not determine whether the law-ofthe-case doctrine or mandate rule applies because they are merely procedural. 7 Case: 14-41213 Document: 00513167856 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/25/2015 No. 14-41213 See Matthews, 312 F.3d at 657. “So long as a case remains alive, there is power to alter or revoke earlier rulings.” Id. at 657 n.5 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The district court retained control of this case and altered its earlier ruling. Under Matthews, it had the authority to do so. See id. Regarding the argument that Crawford could not have overruled Muecke I, our rules make clear that an unpublished opinion such as Muecke I is not precedential. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Thus, the Crawford court was not bound by Muecke I. B. Whether the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration The plaintiffs argue that Crawford incorrectly applied Arizona law and incorrectly held that California law required compelling arbitration under the equitable estoppel doctrine. They urge this court to ignore Crawford and apply an analysis similar to that in the Muecke I district court decision. Crawford is controlling precedent, however, and the decision shaped the Fifth Circuit’s equitable estoppel analysis as applied to Arizona contracts. The Crawford analysis, discussed at length above, leads to the conclusion that the non-signatory defendants here may compel arbitration under the equitable estoppel doctrine because the elements for the plaintiffs’ claims are bound up with the provider agreements. See Crawford, 748 F.3d at 261. The district court correctly concluded that liability for a Texas trade secret misappropriation claim arises when trade secrets are obtained through improper means or disclosed or used in a manner that breaches confidence. See Lamont v. Vaquillas Energy Lopeno Ltd., LLP, 421 S.W.3d 198, 212 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (quoting Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 769 (Tex. 1958)). The only way to determine how the defendants received the information and the manner in which they were allowed to use it is by referring to the provider agreements. Those claims therefore are bound up 8 Case: 14-41213 Document: 00513167856 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/25/2015 No. 14-41213 with the provider agreements. See Crawford, 748 F.3d at 261. As a result, under Crawford, the district court did not err in granting the non-signatory defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. The no non-party rights provision does not affect the Crawford analysis. Equitable estoppel is based on the premise that “[o]ne should not be permitted to rely on an agreement containing an arbitration clause for its claims, while at the same time repudiating the arbitration provision contained in the same contract.” Id. at 260 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Equitable estoppel, therefore, overrides a no non-party rights provision in the same way that it overrides an arbitration provision stating that it only applies to disputes between parties. Equitable estoppel recognizes that a non-signatory to the provider agreements would not be able to exercise rights to compel arbitration but for the opposing party’s use of the contract for its claims. Because the plaintiffs are suing the defendants as if the defendants were parties to the contract, the plaintiffs cannot then claim the defendants are not parties to other portions of the contract. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have not directed us to any case law in which a no non-party rights provision barred the application of equitable estoppel. The general equitable estoppel or contract interpretation cases the plaintiffs cite do not discuss such provisions. Crawford controls the equitable estoppel analysis. The district court did not err in granting the motion to compel. AFFIRMED. 9