Opinion ID: 873654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶22] Dennis argues there was insufficient evidence, in the absence of his extrajudicial statements, to convict him of aggravated burglary. He asserts his extrajudicial statements could not be used to convict him because the State did not present sufficient independent evidence of the crime as required by the corpus delicti doctrine. He also argues evidence was not presented to contradict the innocent intent he alleges was present in his extrajudicial statements. Dennis contends that he intended the gun be returned to the Johnsons after he used it to commit suicide, therefore he lacked the requisite intent to deprive. [¶23] We recently reiterated our standard of review for claims of insufficient evidence: [W]e examine and accept as true the State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it. We do not 6 consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard applies whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial. Craft v. State, 2013 WY 41, ¶ 18, 298 P.3d 825, 831 (Wyo. 2013) (quoting Dawes v. State, 2010 WY 113, ¶ 17, 236 P.3d 303, 307 (Wyo. 2010)). [¶24] “In Wyoming, ‘independent proof of the corpus delicti must exist apart from a defendant’s extrajudicial confession or admission.’” Mersereau v. State, 2012 WY 125, ¶ 65, 286 P.3d 97, 121 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting Jones v. State, 2010 WY 44, ¶ 11, 228 P.3d 867, 870 (Wyo. 2010)). However, that corroborating evidence need only consist of substantial evidence that the offense has been committed, so that the evidence as a whole proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1199 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93, 75 S.Ct. 158, 164-65, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954)). “It is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth. Those facts plus the other evidence besides the admission must, of course, be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Opper, 348 U.S. at 93, 75 S.Ct. at 164-165. Each case is unique and therefore the quantity and type of independent corroborating evidence depends upon the facts of each case. Simmers, 943 P.2d at 1199 (citation omitted). Corroborating evidence may include circumstantial evidence. Id. [¶25] In his initial conversation with Jones, Dennis admitted he entered the Johnsons’ home and removed an item from under their bed. In the same conversation, he asked Jones to return the item for him and he provided a detailed description of the Johnsons’ home for Jones. When Dennis was confronted by Mr. Johnson at church, he disputed that his actions constituted a burglary because the home was unlocked. He asked Mr. Johnson to tell the police that the incident in question involved a nail gun and not a pistol. When he questioned Jones about what she told law enforcement, Dennis admitted to Jones that the item he removed from the home was a gun and that he returned it to Mr. Johnson’s truck. [¶26] The record in this case contains independent evidence of the crime which corroborates Dennis’ extrajudicial statements. Mr. and Mrs. Johnson testified that the pistol was usually stored under Mrs. Johnson’s side of the bed. They also testified no one had permission to enter their home or remove the pistol. The Johnsons did not place the pistol in the truck where it was eventually found. Mr. Johnson testified that Dennis knew he would be out of town when he made arrangements with him to return a borrowed nail gun by putting it in Mr. Johnson’s unlocked truck. Deputy Wagner testified that there was no sign of forced entry into the home. 7 [¶27] Jones’ testimony also corroborated Dennis’ extrajudicial statements. Jones testified she never went into the Johnsons’ home, but was able to tell the Johnsons they were missing an item from underneath their bed. The Johnsons in turn testified they knew the item was a pistol because that was the only item they kept under their bed. The evidence in the record, when viewed in total, provides sufficient corroborating evidence of an aggravated burglary. [¶28] Dennis argues there was insufficient evidence to contradict the innocent intent he expressed in his extrajudicial statements. He contends the inherent intent in his statements was that he only borrowed the pistol to commit suicide. As such, he disputes the evidence sufficiently demonstrated he had a larcenous intent when he took the Johnsons’ pistol. [¶29] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a) (LexisNexis 2011) defines larceny: (a) A person who steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of larceny. Deprive is defined as: (A) To withhold property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a major portion of its economic value or with intent to restore only upon payment of reward or other compensation; or (B) To dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover it. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-401(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011). [¶30] “The intent to steal can be established by a wide variety of direct and circumstantial evidence.” Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 967 (Wyo. 1995). The return of property does not defeat proof of an initial intent to steal. E.g., Wetherelt v. State, 864 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1993) (holding there was sufficient evidence for a larceny conviction even when a defendant returned some of the victim’s property). Nevertheless, “[w]e have consistently held that, even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence which has been presented, the jury has the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.” Swanson v. State, 981 P.2d 475, 479 (Wyo. 1999) (citations omitted). [¶31] Dennis told Jones he had been inside the Johnsons’ home before the pistol was discovered missing. He gave Jones a detailed explanation of the layout of the home, and 8 he admitted he entered the home without permission when the Johnsons were not present. He also sought to conceal his crime. He asked Jones to return the stolen pistol. He told Mr. Johnson that he was never supposed to find out about the missing gun. He quizzed Jones about the exact language she used to describe the incident to law enforcement and asked Mr. Johnson to tell authorities the whole incident was about a nail gun instead of a pistol. Attempts at concealing a crime support an inference of an intent to deprive. E.g., Walston v. State, 954 P.2d 987, 989 (Wyo. 1998) (“[e]vidence to support the inference of appellant’s intent to steal includes the fact that . . . he initially denied being in the home when questioned by an officer; he pawned the stolen items using an alias . . . .”); Leppek v. State, 636 P.2d 1117, 1119 (Wyo. 1981); Mirich v. State, 593 P.2d 590, 593 (Wyo. 1979); see e.g. Dreiman v. State, 825 P.2d 758, 761 (Wyo. 1992) (holding that the return of keys and a calendar after copying them still qualified as an intent to deprive the victim of their property). [¶32] Dennis insists that his intent upon entering the Johnsons’ home does not qualify as an intent to deprive because his statements make clear he borrowed the Johnsons’ pistol to commit suicide. He relies on Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215, 226 (1942), to argue his alleged innocent motive cannot be disregarded and that, accordingly, there was no proof of his intent to deprive the Johnsons’ of their pistol. In Eagan we said: Where an accused is the sole witness of a transaction charged as a crime, as in the case at bar, his testimony cannot be arbitrarily rejected, and if his credibility has not been impeached, and his testimony is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent therewith, then his testimony should be accepted. 128 P.2d at 226 (citations omitted). The State argues Eagan is inapplicable here because Dennis’ credibility was impeached. After a review of the record, we agree with the State. [¶33] Dennis’ admissions raised considerable doubt about his credibility. He asked Mr. Johnson to lie to law enforcement about the details of the incident and told him he was never supposed to know that Dennis had taken the gun. Dennis admitted entering the Johnsons’ home without their permission and tried to have Jones re-enter the home, again without the Johnsons’ permission, to return the pistol for him. When viewing these admissions in a light most favorable to the State, a jury could have reasonably doubted Dennis’ credibility. [¶34] Alternatively, Dennis’ alleged intent upon entering the home is not inconsistent with an intent to deprive. Dennis asserts his intent upon entering the home was to borrow the Johnsons’ gun to commit suicide. A reasonable jury could find that, by entering the home with such an intent, he did not plan on returning the pistol--if he had accomplished 9 his goal of committing suicide, then he would have lacked the capacity to return the gun. As a result, Dennis’ own alleged intent for entering the home was consistent with an intent to permanently deprive the Johnsons of their pistol or to dispose of it so as to make it unlikely that the Johnsons would recover it.