Opinion ID: 763623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Murphys' Cross-Appeal

Text: 27 In addition to joining many of the arguments of the County as appellees, the Murphys' cross-appeal from the district court's judgment. They claim that: (1) the district court erred in ruling on a motion to strike portions of certain declarations; (2) in the event of remand, they are entitled to relief on their counterclaim for cost of improvements to the property; (3) the United States failed to exhaust state administrative remedies and is barred by limitations from doing so now; and (4) they are entitled to attorneys fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. 28 Claims (1) and (2) are not properly raised because the Murphys wholly prevailed in district court when the court granted judgment against the United States on the pleadings. A party who is not aggrieved by a judgment ordinarily may not appeal from it. See Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980). The rulings challenged by the Murphys are not collateral matters that fall within an exception to this rule. See id. at 333-34, 100 S.Ct. 1166. 9 29 For the same reason, claim (3) is not a proper subject of cross-appeal, although failure to exhaust can be raised in the main appeal as an alternative argument in support of the district court's judgment. See Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii, Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 874 (9th Cir.1987) (We may affirm the district court on any ground supported by the record, even if the ground is not relied on by the district court). With regard to the claims of the United States that the County violated its sovereign immunity or discriminated against the United States in violation of its intergovernmental immunity, the Murphys' contention is without merit. The United States need not exhaust state remedies before raising claims arising under federal law in district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345 (1993); Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 357-58, 87 S.Ct. 464, 17 L.Ed.2d 414 (1966); United States v. Broward County, 901 F.2d 1005, 1007-08 (11th Cir.1990). On the state-law question whether three parcels were properly classified as non-agricultural land, we prefer to have the district court rule in the first instance on the question of exhaustion and state limitations for exhaustion. We therefore leave that matter for disposition by the district court on remand, as the government concedes to be appropriate. 30 With regard to the Murphys' claim for attorneys fees, the issue is premature. The Equal Access to Justice Act provides for the award of fees to a prevailing party ... unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). In light of our disposition of this appeal, the Murphys have not established themselves as a prevailing party. Whether they prevail to any extent upon remand in a manner to require an award of fees is yet to be determined; the Murphys may renew their request in district court at the conclusion of further proceedings.CONCLUSION 31 Lewis County may tax property held by the FSA pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 1984, even though Washington law exempts state and local government property (including that of the Housing Commission) from taxation. Congress did not waive federal sovereign immunity from state or local interest, penalties, and foreclosure with regard to FSA property in Washington. The Murphys' cross-appeal is without merit. 32 The parties will bear their own costs in these appeals. 33 No. 97-35510 (Main Appeal): AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED. 34 No. 97-35720 (Cross-Appeal): AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.