Opinion ID: 624233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Agee

Text: Agee was convicted of several offenses, including conspiracy to utter counterfeited securities (Count 12), 18 U.S.C. § 371. For his role, he was 4 sentenced to 22 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Agee argues that the sentencing judge erred in imposing a sentence that was substantially longer than those of co-defendants who pled guilty and who were involved in similar charged conduct.1 We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Specifically, “[w]e must evaluate whether the sentence imposed by the district court fails to achieve the purposes of sentencing as stated in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)” while recognizing that “there is a range of reasonable sentences from which the district court may choose.” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). The party challenging the sentence “bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of [the] record and the factors in section 3553(a).” Id. Although a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is not per se reasonable, we would ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. Id. The purposes of sentencing referenced in § 3553(a) include the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to 1 During the pendency of the appeal, Agee was released from prison and both sides requested dismissal on the grounds of mootness. However, in denying Agee’s unopposed motion to dismiss his appeal, we rejected the mootness contention and noted that the pendency of Agee’s supervised release left a ripe controversy for the court’s review. See Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884, 886 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995). 5 provide just punishment, to deter criminal conduct, and to protect the public from recidivism. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The sentencing court must also consider the nature of the circumstances of the offense and the history of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). The weight accorded to these factors is a matter within the sentencing court’s discretion. United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). Agee contends that his sentence is substantially higher than that of similar co-defendants such that it is unreasonable. Upon review of the record, we find no error. Specifically, we note that the sentencing court found that Agee was more culpable than the co-defendants who received lower sentences. Moreover, by sentencing Agee within the applicable guidelines range, the sentencing court ensured that there was no unwarranted disparity between Agee’s sentence and those normally imposed on similarly situated defendants. See United States v. Regueiro, 240 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that sentence disparity between co-defendants is seldom a basis for relief particularly where the sentence is in line with those who committed similar offenses in other cases). Accordingly, 6 Agee’s sentence is affirmed.