Opinion ID: 2784454
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: A. First Certified Question: Is Iowa Code Section 216.6A Prospective or Retroactive? In 2009, the general assembly adopted an act “providing that wage discrimination is an unfair employment practice under the Iowa civil rights Act and providing an enhanced remedy.” 5 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 96, preamble. Among other things, the amendment added a new section to the ICRA, section 216.6A. See id. § 2. Previously, the ICRA made it an unfair or discriminatory practice for an employer “to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for employment, to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment . . . because of the age, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, or disability” of the employee or job applicant. Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). The new section, section 216.6A, provides as follows: 216.6A Additional unfair or discriminatory practice — wage discrimination in employment. 1. a. The general assembly finds that the practice of discriminating against any employee because of the age, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, or disability of such employee by paying wages to such employee at a rate less than the rate paid to other employees does all of the following: (1) Unjustly discriminates against the person receiving the lesser rate. (2) Leads to low employee morale, high turnover, and frequent labor unrest. (3) Discourages employees paid at lesser wage rates from training for higher level jobs. (4) Curtails employment opportunities, decreases employees’ mobility, and increases labor costs. (5) Impairs purchasing power and threatens the maintenance of an adequate standard of living by such employees and their families. (6) Prevents optimum utilization of the state’s available labor resources. (7) Threatens the well-being of citizens of this state and adversely affects the general welfare. b. The general assembly declares that it is the policy of this state to correct and, as rapidly as possible, to eliminate, discriminatory wage practices based on age, race, 6 creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, and disability. 2. a. It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any employer or agent of any employer to discriminate against any employee because of the age, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, or disability of such employee by paying wages to such employee at a rate less than the rate paid to other employees who are employed within the same establishment for equal work on jobs, the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions. An employer or agent of an employer who is paying wages to an employee at a rate less than the rate paid to other employees in violation of this section shall not remedy the violation by reducing the wage rate of any employee. b. For purposes of this subsection, an unfair or discriminatory practice occurs when a discriminatory pay decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory pay decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory pay decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice. Iowa Code § 216.6A(1)–(2). The section goes on to delineate certain affirmative defenses for the employer: 3. It shall be an affirmative defense to a claim arising under this section if any of the following applies: a. Payment of wages is made pursuant to a seniority system. b. Payment of wages is made pursuant to a merit system. c. Payment of wages is made pursuant to a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production. d. Pay differential is based on any other factor other than the age, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, or disability of such employee. Id. § 216.6A(3). 7 The legislature simultaneously enacted a separate, enhanced remedy for violations of section 216.6A. 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 96, § 3 (codified at Iowa Code § 216.15(9)(a)(9)). Specifically: (9) For an unfair or discriminatory practice relating to wage discrimination pursuant to section 216.6A, payment to the complainant of damages for an injury caused by the discriminatory or unfair practice which damages shall include but are not limited to court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and either of the following: (a) An amount equal to two times the wage differential paid to another employee compared to the complainant for the period of time for which the complainant has been discriminated against. (b) In instances of willful violation, an amount equal to three times the wage differential paid to another employee as compared to the complainant for the period of time for which the complainant has been discriminated against. Iowa Code § 216.15(9)(a)(9). In contrast, plaintiffs prevailing on any other ICRA claim are entitled to recover court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and “actual damages.” Id. § 216.15(9)(a)(8). The first certified question requires us to determine whether section 216.6A and the enhanced remedy in section 216.15(9)(a)(9) should apply retroactively to claims arising before the statute’s July 1, 2009 effective date. 1 “Legislative intent determines if a court will apply a 1The certified question assumes these ICRA amendments became effective April 28, 2009, i.e., the date the governor approved them. See 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 96 (“Approved April 28, 2009.”). However, legislation passed at a regular session does not go into effect until July 1 of the session year unless the legislature expressly provides for a different date, and it did not do so here. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 26 (“An act of the general assembly passed at a regular session of a general assembly shall take effect on July 1 following its passage unless a different effective date is stated in an act of the general assembly.”). Another federal district court in Iowa has ruled that Iowa Code section 216.6A applies prospectively only. See Forster v. Deere & Co., 925 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1065–66 (N.D. Iowa 2013); Lenius v. Deere & Co., 924 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1014–15 (N.D. Iowa 2013). The court there concluded that “the statute created, defined, and regulated a 8 statute retrospectively or prospectively.” Iowa Beta Chapter of Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. State, 763 N.W.2d 250, 266 (Iowa 2009). There is a general presumption that newly enacted statutes apply only prospectively. See Iowa Code § 4.5 (“A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective.”); Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Iowa 1995) (discussing the legislative preference for prospectivity). We have summarized the relevant principles in the past: It is well established that a statute is presumed to be prospective only unless expressly made retrospective. Statutes which specifically affect substantive rights are construed to operate prospectively unless legislative intent to the contrary clearly appears from the express language or by necessary and unavoidable implication. Conversely, if the statute relates solely to a remedy or procedure, it is ordinarily applied both prospectively and retrospectively. . . . Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights. Procedural law, on the other hand, is the practice, method, procedure, or legal machinery by which the substantive law is enforced or made effective. Finally, a remedial statute is one that intends to afford a private remedy to a person injured by a wrongful act. It is generally designed to correct an existing law or redress an existing grievance. Anderson Fin. Servs., LLC v. Miller, 769 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The first step in determining whether a statute has retroactive effect is to assess whether the legislature expressly stated its intent that a statute should apply retrospectively. Id. Here, the legislature did not include express language in section 216.6A to make it retroactive. ___________________________________ new right.” Forster, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 1066; Lenius, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1015. That ruling, of course, is not binding on us. 9 The next step is to ascertain whether “the statute affects substantive rights or relates merely to a remedy.” Id. at 579. If the law “is substantive, we presume it operates prospectively only.” Id. If the statute is remedial, we presume it operates retrospectively. Id. A statute is not remedial merely because one might say, colloquially, that its purpose is to “remedy” a defect in the law. See id. at 580. “[I]f a mere legislative purpose to remedy a perceived defect in the law made a statute remedial, very few statutes would not fall within this classification.” Id. at 580 n.4. Thus, in Anderson Financial, our most recent foray into this subject, we held that a cap on certain finance charges was not “remedial” but “substantive,” because it effected a substantive change in permissible conduct. Id. at 580–81. When a statute creates new rights or obligations, it is substantive rather than procedural or remedial. See id. at 578, 580–81; see also Davis v. Jones, 247 Iowa 1031, 1033, 1035–36, 78 N.W.2d 6, 7–9 (1956) (holding a new statute enabling jurisdiction over certain nonresidents could not be considered remedial or procedural because “a new right was created by the amendment”). In Hiskey v. Maloney, we declined to retroactively apply a statute that established a new tax liability because retroactive application “does not extend to statutes creating new rights or imposing new obligations.” 580 N.W.2d 797, 799 (Iowa 1998). Despite the fact the legislature characterized the statute in Hiskey as remedial, such “labeling . . . [does not] override the statutory presumption of prospective application . . . when the statute in question creates a new personal liability.” Id. On the other hand, “we do allow a statute to apply retrospectively when the statute provides an additional remedy to an already existing remedy or provides a remedy for an already existing loss.” Iowa Beta Chapter, 763 N.W.2d at 267. 10 Dindinger and Loring maintain that section 216.6A is not substantive. They argue the section is merely procedural because it shifts the burden of proof from the employee to the employer. They further contend section 216.6A is merely remedial because it provides an enhanced remedy—double or treble damages—for a preexisting cause of action of wage discrimination. After careful consideration, we disagree with Dindinger and Loring. Under preexisting law, unlawful discrimination occurred only when a person was subjected to adverse treatment “because of” her membership in a protected class. See Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). It is true that the McDonnell Douglas framework could assist the plaintiff in proving discriminatory intent by allowing an inference of intent and shifting the burden of production to the employer when the plaintiff makes a certain showing. See, e.g., Jones v. Univ. of Iowa, 836 N.W.2d 127, 147–48 (Iowa 2013) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973)). Yet if each side met its burden of production and made its required showing, the plaintiff still had the ultimate burden of proving unlawful discrimination was “the real reason.” Smidt v. Porter, 695 N.W.2d 9, 14–15 (Iowa 2005); see also Farmland Foods, Inc. v. Dubuque Human Rights Comm’n, 672 N.W.2d 733, 741 n.1 (Iowa 2003) (“It is not necessary to follow the McDonnell Douglas analysis once a case has been fully tried because the burden ultimately rests with the plaintiff to establish the claim and show the adverse employment action resulted from discrimination.”); Bd. of Supervisors of Buchanan Cnty. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1998) (stating that the pre-2009 “employment 11 discrimination provisions of chapter 216 . . . require a showing of intent to discriminate”). 2 In contrast, under section 216.6A of the Iowa Code, an employer that pays lower wages for equal work to a person in a protected class violates the law without regard to the employer’s intent. Note the distinct wording of section 216.6A. It makes it illegal “to discriminate against any employee . . . by paying wages to such employee at a rate less than the rate paid to other employees.” Iowa Code § 216.6A(2)(a). Thus, rather than requiring discrimination based on protected status to be independently proved, section 216.6A defines discrimination as the act of paying lower wages. As the amicus curiae supporting the plaintiffs puts it, [T]he Iowa Legislature enacted § 216.6A to ensure that all forms of discrimination would be exposed and addressed— even those that were falling through the cracks under traditional discrimination analysis. .... Section 216.6A addresses this issue by including additional remedies and making the claim intent-neutral. Under § 216.6A, it does not matter why the wages are discriminatorily less; it matters only that they are less. Section 216.6A of the Iowa Code therefore creates an entirely new cause of action: strict liability on the part of employers for paying unequal wages. Its wording is similar to the Federal Equal Pay Act. Compare id., with 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) (providing that no employer subject to the Act “shall discriminate . . . between employees on 2Of course, prior law also recognized “disparate impact” claims. See Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 517–18 (Iowa 1990). But for such a claim, the plaintiff generally must show that “a particular employment practice has an adverse impact on a protected group.” Id. at 517. Thus, to establish liability, the plaintiff still had to prove more than a difference in wages. 12 the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex”). We previously recognized that “[u]nlike Title VII and the employment discrimination provisions of chapter 216, which require a showing of intent to discriminate based on gender, the Equal Pay Act requires no showing of discriminatory intent.” Bd. of Supervisors of Buchanan Cnty., 584 N.W.2d at 255; see also Bauer v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 680 F.3d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 2012) (contrasting the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, and noting that the former, “a strict liability statute, does not require plaintiffs to prove that an employer acted with discriminatory intent; plaintiffs need show only that an employer pays males more than females”). The plaintiffs argue that, as a practical matter, section 216.6A of the Iowa Code only shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant because one of the statutory affirmative defenses allows the employer to prove the wage differential was due to a factor other than the employee’s protected status. See Iowa Code § 216.6A(3)(d). But this does not alter the fact that the legislation establishes a new cause of action with fewer elements than before. And it is not open to dispute that there are some cases where the employee will be able to prevail now and would not have been able to prevail before. In that middle group, section 216.6A imposes liability that did not previously exist. In some ways, section 216.6A presents a clearer case for prospective-only operation than a law that made it easier to obtain personal jurisdiction by personal service, see Davis, 247 Iowa at 1033– 36, 78 N.W.2d at 7–9, or a law that imposed personal in addition to in rem liability for nonpayment of property taxes, see Hiskey, 580 N.W.2d at 798–99. Neither of those statutes altered the scope of what was and 13 was not permissible conduct under Iowa law. See id. at 798–99; Davis, 247 Iowa at 1033–36, 78 N.W.2d at 7–9. Yet we considered both to be substantive rather than remedial or procedural changes. See Hiskey, 580 N.W.2d at 799; Davis, 247 Iowa at 1036, 78 N.W.2d at 8–9; cf. State ex rel. Turner v. Limbrecht, 246 N.W.2d 330, 333 (Iowa 1976) (finding that the consumer fraud act had retroactive effect because “the attorney general was still required to allege and prove reliance and damages,” and “[a]ccordingly we find no difference between the actionable fraud alleged by the attorney general and the common law action for fraud available to injured parties on an individual basis prior to the advent of [the act]”), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Miller v. Hydro Mag, Ltd., 436 N.W.2d 617, 622 (Iowa 1989). 3 3Dindinger and Loring cite three cases where this court gave retroactive effect to legislation. See City of Waterloo v. Bainbridge, 749 N.W.2d 245, 250–51 (Iowa 2008); Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 370, 375–76 (Iowa 2000); Emmet Cnty. State Bank v. Reutter, 439 N.W.2d 651, 653–54 (Iowa 1989). We find them distinguishable. The statute involved in Bainbridge was “not a substantive statute.” 749 N.W.2d at 250–51. It simply had the effect of shortening the time for a tax sale buyer to exercise its option to give notice of the right of redemption. Id. The statute in Tank Fund, according to the legislative findings, established a clean-up fund for “past and existing petroleum leaks.” 606 N.W.2d at 375 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This “clearly revealed an intent for the act to apply retroactively.” Id. at 376. The statute in Emmet County required state banks that purchased land at a foreclosure sale to offer it to the prior owner on the same terms before consummating any resale. 439 N.W.2d at 653. We noted that the law referred to resales of “agricultural land held pursuant to this subsection” and thus “appl[ied] to agricultural land owned by a state bank on the effective date of the amendment, regardless of when the land was acquired.” Id. at 654 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a sense, the laws in Bainbridge and Emmet County were not retroactive at all because they only set standards for conduct occurring after their enactment—i.e., a city could seek title to abandoned land, Bainbridge, 749 N.W.2d at 250–51, and a state bank had to offer foreclosed property on the same terms to the prior owner before selling it to a new owner, Emmet Cnty., 439 N.W.2d at 653. Here, by contrast, Dindinger and Loring seek to have the substantive law set forth in Iowa Code section 216.6A applied to conduct that predated the enactment of the statute, i.e., things their employer did or did not do before the law was adopted in 2009. In the Tank Fund case, the legislature overcame the presumption of prospective-only operation by expressly 14 As the title of section 216.6A indicates, its purpose is to recognize an “[a]dditional unfair or discriminatory practice – wage discrimination in employment.” Iowa Code § 216.6A (emphasis added); cf. In re Estate of Sampson, 838 N.W.2d 663, 667 (Iowa 2013) (relying on section titles as an aid to interpretation); State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201–03 (Iowa 2004) (same). Liability for this additional practice creates a new obligation for employers. Apparently, therefore, the general assembly believed it was making a substantive change in the law, which again, is the trigger for a presumption of forward-only effect. See State v. Jones, 298 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Iowa 1980) (“The legislature is presumed to know the state of the law, including case law, at the time it enacts a statute.”); see also Iowa Beta Chapter, 763 N.W.2d at 266 (“Legislative intent determines if a court will apply a statute retrospectively or prospectively.”). 4 In sum, after taking into account (1) Iowa Code section 4.5, (2) our precedent that substantive changes in the law are presumed to apply prospectively only, (3) the fact that section 216.6A creates a new strict liability cause of action for wage discrimination, and (4) the general ___________________________________ stating that the law applied to “past and existing” leaks. 606 N.W.2d at 375–76 (emphasis omitted). 4The plaintiffs also argue that we should follow federal precedent that has applied the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (FPA), Pub. L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (2012)), amending federal civil rights law, retroactively to conduct that occurred before its 2009 enactment. See, e.g., Kramer v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty., 788 F. Supp. 2d 421, 426– 28 (D. Md. 2011); Russell v. Cnty. of Nassau, 696 F. Supp. 2d 213, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Schengrund v. Pa. State Univ., 705 F. Supp. 2d 425, 432–33 (M.D. Pa. 2009). However, two distinctions should be noted. The FPA did not amend the underlying substantive law; it merely changed the statute of limitations. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act § 3 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)). Further, the FPA is expressly retroactive; Congress provided that it would take effect “as if enacted on May 28, 2007” and that it “appl[ied] to all claims of discrimination in compensation . . . that are pending on or after that date.” Id. § 6 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5). 15 assembly’s own statement that it was legislating an “[a]dditional unfair or discriminatory practice,” Iowa Code § 216.6A, we conclude that section 216.6A applies on a prospective basis only to conduct occurring after its effective date of July 1, 2009. B. Second Certified Question: To What Extent May a Plaintiff Recover Damages for Wage Discrimination Under Iowa Code Section 216.6? Because we have concluded that Iowa Code section 216.6A operates prospectively and not retroactively, we now turn to the district court’s second certified question. This concerns the ability of plaintiffs to recover damages for wage discrimination under the preexisting law, namely, section 216.6. 5 Section 216.6 states in relevant part, It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any: a. Person to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for employment, to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against any applicant for employment or any employee because of the age, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, or disability of such applicant or employee . . . . Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). Prevailing plaintiffs can recover “actual damages, court costs and reasonable attorney fees.” Iowa Code § 216.15(9)(a)(8). 5The defendants urge that the plaintiffs have not pled and thus have not preserved a wage discrimination claim under Iowa Code section 216.6 in federal court. However, resolving that question of federal court claim preservation is not our responsibility. As noted above, we do have discretion not to answer a certified question. See Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 808 N.W.2d 417, 427 (Iowa 2011). Here, we do not have “a situation where the answers to the questions are fact-dependent or the facts are in conflict.” Id. Accordingly, we will answer the second question and leave any question of claim preservation to the federal district court to resolve. 16 Claims under section 216.6 are also subject to a limitations period: “[A] claim under this chapter shall not be maintained unless a complaint is filed with the [Iowa Civil Rights C]ommission within three hundred days after the alleged discriminatory or unfair practice occurred.” Iowa Code § 216.15(13). This provision mirrors similar language in federal law. Compare id., with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) (requiring a charge to be filed “within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred” or “within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” depending on the situation). We have no difficulty concluding that wage discrimination is potentially actionable under Iowa Code section 216.6. The section prohibits an employer from “otherwise discriminat[ing] in employment.” Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). This catchall provision demonstrates the legislature’s intent to prohibit all discriminatory practices relating to employment under section 216.6, even those not specifically enumerated. Payment of wages is a mainstay of any employment relationship, and section 216.6 therefore encompasses discriminatory pay practices. For example, in a 1996 case before our court, a female plaintiff brought a claim for loss of income, emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney fees based on the allegation her employer paid her less than it paid men. Dutcher v. Randall Foods, 546 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Iowa 1996). The employer did not cross-appeal, so “we accept[ed] as established that Randall violated the . . . Iowa Civil Rights Act by paying Dutcher less than males in comparable positions.” Id. at 892; see also Bd. of Supervisors of Buchanan Cnty., 584 N.W.2d at 258 (acknowledging 17 that pay disparities could be evidence of gender-based discrimination for purposes of proving a claim under the ICRA). We now turn to the real question in controversy—namely, the time period for which damages are recoverable. Dindinger and Loring argue that they should be able to recover for the entire period they were subject to discrimination in pay, so long as at least one paycheck fell within the 300 days prior to their filing a complaint with the commission. Allsteel and Mills urge us to conclude that the employer’s initial pay-setting decisions were the relevant discriminatory practices, and because Dindinger and Loring filed complaints with the commission more than 300 days thereafter, their claims are time-barred. For reasons explained below, we adopt neither position, and instead conclude each paycheck is a discriminatory practice and a new 300-day limitations period applies to each check. This is essentially the view of the dissenters in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643–45, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2178–79, 167 L. Ed. 2d 982, 1001–03 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.), and we believe it is both logical and consistent with Iowa precedent. We begin by reviewing our relevant caselaw and its interplay with intervening decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Our narrative begins in 1990, when we addressed an ICRA claim brought by a woman of Vietnamese heritage who, for years, had been passed over for additional hours or for promotion. See Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 528–29 (Iowa 1990). While the plaintiff established a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on national origin, the record also showed that the employer 18 sexually segregated its work force, reserving stocker positions (that were needed for promotion) to men. Id. at 521–24. We rejected the employer’s argument that the employee’s complaint was untimely because the discriminatory conduct began outside the limitations period in Iowa Code section 601A.15 (1983), even though it continued into that period. Id. at 527–30. We elaborated on the elements of a continuing violation by analogizing to federal cases decided under the ICRA’s federal counterpart, Title VII. See id. at 528– 29. We stated, [T]he “continuing violation” doctrine does not excuse compliance with the time limits for filing a charge. But if a violation is continuing, the time does not begin to run when the discrimination first happens. Instead the action is considered filed in time if there are discriminatory acts within the limitations period. Id. at 527. Relying primarily on decisions of federal courts of appeals, we went on to describe two types of continuing violations, “a series of acts with one independent discriminatory act occurring within the charge-filing period” and the “maintenance of a system or policy which discriminates.” Id. at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted). We explained that the first “series of acts” type of continuing violation is discerned by a multifactor approach that considers whether the conduct is recurring and frequent, yet seemingly nonpermanent. See id. at 528–29. We upheld the ICRC’s findings that the employer’s national origin discrimination was a continuing violation under the first theory, and its sex discrimination was a continuing violation under the second theory. Id. at 528–30. Without further discussing the continuing violation doctrine, we then upheld the ICRC’s decision to award back pay to the employee for 19 the entire time period when the employer failed to promote her or give her full-time status. Id. at 530–32. Twelve years after our decision in Hy-Vee Food Stores, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision that clarified when the continuing violation doctrine applies in federal employment discrimination cases. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2071, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106, 120–21 (2002). That case involved an African-American employee of Amtrak who alleged he had been subjected to repeated acts of racial discrimination. Id. at 105, 122 S. Ct. at 2068, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 117. The Court there rejected the idea that a series of related but separate acts constituted a continuing violation. Id. at 111, 122 S. Ct. at 2071, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 120–21 (“There is simply no indication that the term ‘[employment] practice’ converts related discrete acts into a single unlawful practice for the purposes of timely filing.”) The Court explained, “[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.” Id. at 113, 122 S. Ct. at 2072, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 122. Significantly, the Court quoted with approval a prior decision holding that “ ‘[e]ach week’s paycheck that deliver[ed] less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII . . . .’ ” Id. at 112, 122 S. Ct. at 2071, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 121 (quoting Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395, 106 S. Ct. 3000, 3006, 92 L. Ed. 2d 315, 328