Opinion ID: 1935720
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Most important, of course, is the matter of child custody.

Text: The best interest of the child must be our first and governing consideration. Rule 344(f)(15), Rules of Civil Procedure. We do not make a determination of custody to reward one of the parents or to punish the other. In re Marriage of Forest, 201 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1972); Spotts v. Spotts, 197 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1972). Following enactment of the marriage dissolution act (chapter 598, The Code) the majority of this court in In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Iowa 1972) held, [N]ot only the `guilty party' concept must be eliminated but evidence of the conduct of the parties insofar as it tends to place fault for the marriage break-down on either spouse must also be rejected as a factor in awarding property settlement or an allowance of alimony or support money. We do hold, however, that conduct of the parties, good and bad, is admissible in evidence as it bears on and reflects the character and fitness of the respective parties for custody of children. Application of this rule creates no enthusiasm for respondent as custodian of the child. On the other hand, petitioner's conduct after this proceeding commenced and at trial is not beyond reproach. Had an attorney been appointed to represent the child's interest as authorized in § 598.12, The Code, a proper record might have been made for placing custody in a third person, perhaps a near relative. John is now 16 and at trial expressed the wish that his custody be granted to respondent. His wishes, while not controlling, should be recognized and properly weighed. Jones v. Jones, 175 N.W.2d 389 (Iowa 1970); Halstead v. Halstead, 259 Iowa 526, 144 N.W.2d 861 (1966). Pragmatically, we cannot ignore the fact John has had no contact with his father for over two years. They have no rapport or communication, a most unfortunate circumstance. The repair of that breakdown could well consume the balance of John's minority. Neither may we ignore the reality that respondent, whatever her other shortcomings, has continued to make it possible for John to attend the academy, where counsel on both sides agree he should stay. It is undisputed Wentworth is molding a potential delinquent into a good and valuable citizen. We perceive this situation has the best opportunity to continue if custody remains in respondent, who is determined John shall remain in that resident learning environment. If the circumstance of his attending this academy should change, a petition for modification would permit reconsideration of the custody issue. II. We next turn to the valuation of the 36 acre farm, which issue assumes a limited importance only as it relates to the property settlement. This tract was purchased in November 1961, for $13,000. Petitioner put in all new fences, built a machine shed, installed a water system and substantially improved the house interior through his own labor and the expenditure of $1000. Each party, by stipulation, filed two appraisals, which ranged from $15,000 to $25,000. For the purposes of the property settlement, trial court fixed the value of this real estate at $18,000. This conformed more to petitioner's appraisals than to respondent's. The valuation found by trial court was well within the permissible range of the evidence and we are not inclined to disturb it. See Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398 (Iowa 1968); Riemenschneider v. Riemenschneider, 239 Iowa 617, 30 N.W.2d 769, supplemented, 32 N.W.2d 68 (1948). In the same proposition relied on for reversal petitioner contends trial court erroneously found respondent had made a $2500 farm payment out of the proceeds of a personal injury settlement. This issue also bears only on the amount of alimony and property settlement awarded below. Where, as here, the credibility of witnesses is a consideration in an equity case we give weight to the fact findings of the trial court although we are not bound by them. Rule 344(f)(7), R.C.P. Petitioner denied the $2500 payment was made out of his wife's funds, but was unsure of the payment source. He did not personally make the payment. His ambivalent testimony, contrasted with the positive testimony of respondent that she did personally make the payment with her funds, leaves us no reason to disagree with trial court's finding on this point. III. Petitioner's third proposition relates to the claimed excessiveness of the alimony and property award to respondent. Under Williams, supra, it is not only impermissible to consider the conduct of the parties insofar as it tends to place fault for the marriage breakdown on either spouse, but we also must reject such evidence in awarding alimony and property settlement. We may, however, consider those other criteria laid down in Schantz v. Schantz, supra. We have carefully examined the evidence in this case in light of the remaining Schantz criteria. Some relevant facts have already been indicated in our preliminary discussion of this case. Other facts are particularly noteworthy. It is true petitioner's hard labor played a large part in the accumulation of these assets. His exact inheritance was in an unspecified amount, but $9000 of it is traced into the farm payment. Similarly, a real estate contract with a balance of $4000 goes back to the same source and was awarded to him. A checking account was divided $910 to respondent and $980 to petitioner before the dissolution. Respondent contributed $1300 of her inheritance for John's benefit at a critical time in his life. Of course, both parents are responsible for his welfare. She also advanced $2500 from her own funds toward the purchase price of the homestead. She is now steadily employed although her earnings are modest. There is no evidence that either party is in ill health. Petitioner and respondent were married for more than 15 years. Apparently a number of those years were not unhappy for either party. We hold trial court's award in this respect was not unfair to petitioner. IV. Respondent's counsel has made application for attorney fees in the total amount of $1616.44 for services and travel expense in connection with this appeal. Services are itemized and the total charge is, we believe, fair and reasonable. However, under the circumstances here and particularly in view of the record regarding petitioner's present unemployment, we hold he should pay only $800 of this amount. Costs on appeal are also taxed to petitioner. Judgment shall be entered in trial court for such additional sums. The matter is therefore affirmed as modified and remanded with directions.