Opinion ID: 1189139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process and Revocation Proceeding

Text: In People v. Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d 711, we explored when a court, over objection by the defendant, may admit a preliminary hearing transcript to be used in lieu of live testimony at a revocation hearing. We concluded that the use of such testimony was best determined on a case-by-case basis, and in that instance it was improper to admit the transcript. In reaching that result, we focused on the facts that the testimony at issue was that of the sole percipient witness to the alleged parole violation, a finding of no legal unavailability was made in the underlying proceedings in which the charges were then dismissed, no additional evidence was introduced which established the witness' unavailability, and the court made no specific finding of good cause for denying the right to confront and cross-examine. (29 Cal.3d at p. 719.) However, we stressed that within this context the right of confrontation is not absolute. ( Ibid. ) Our decision rested upon and was consistent with that of the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. 471, in which the high court observed that We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second stage [the hearing procedure] of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial. (P. 489 [33 L.Ed.2d p. 499].) This emphasis on flexibility was echoed the next year in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 783, footnote 5 [36 L.Ed.2d at p. 662], where the court observed While in some cases there is simply no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to foreclose the States from holding both the preliminary and the final hearings at the place of violation or from developing other creative solutions to the practical difficulties of the Morrissey requirements. Paying heed to the goal of flexibility and accommodation firmly reiterated in both state and federal authority, we now review approaches which courts have taken in the wake of Morrissey and Gagnon. [3] In one recent decision, the Seventh Circuit observed that The use of hearsay as substantive evidence at a revocation hearing is not per se unconstitutional. ( Egerstaffer v. Israel (7th Cir.1984) 726 F.2d 1231, 1234; see also Taylor v. United States Parole Com'n (6th Cir.1984) 734 F.2d 1152, 1155.) The court in Egerstaffer reiterated, however, that a hearing examiner was not permitted to admit unsubstantiated or unreliable evidence as substantive evidence at revocation hearings. Sanctioning the use of such hearsay would certainly eviscerate the safeguards guaranteed probationers by Morrissey and Gagnon. Nonetheless, where hearsay bears a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness, the flexible revocation proceeding allows its use. (726 F.2d at p. 1235.) The circuit court then approved reliance on a recorded unsworn interview by the victim of an assault which formed part of the basis for revocation, and found as indicia of reliability the facts that: (1) the statements were detailed; (2) the victim told substantially the same story to three persons in different settings reducing the probability of fabrication; (3) eyewitness testimony corroborated part of the account; and (4) the defendant had admitted many of the facts. A review of other cases shows a similar willingness to consider otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence when accompanied by reasonable indicia of reliability. For example, in United States v. Penn (11th Cir.1983) 721 F.2d 762, a probation officer testified to results of urine tests over defendant's objection and the court admitted laboratory reports and an unsworn letter from the laboratory summarizing various test results. The appellate court found that the trial court reasonably determined that the laboratory reports were trustworthy and reliable and therefore worthy of consideration because they were the regular reports of a company whose business it is to conduct such tests. In addition, Although there was no corroboration of the specific results of the lab reports, there was general corroboration of the allegation that Penn had been taking drugs. ( Id., at p. 766.) (See also United States v. McCallum, supra, 677 F.2d at p. 1026 [letter from Salvation Army center sufficiently reliable: official report to probation officer from the center's program coordinator and caseworker. Reliability also established by McCallums' testimony in which he admitted loss of his job and infractions of the center's rules]; United States v. Burkhalter (8th Cir.1978) 588 F.2d 604, 607 [overruling defendant's objection to probation officer's reliance on and admission into evidence of vocational school instructor's letter to probation officer: The sources are people who were familiar with appellant. They have not mistaken his identification nor his activities for those of any other individual. Their jobs require that they not only be aware of appellant's activities but also monitor his general behavior.... Furthermore, appellant's own admission ... supports the reports.... Testimony as to appellant's falsification of his weekend destination has an independent basis in his own admission and was therefore properly admitted]; United States v. Pattman (8th Cir.1976) 535 F.2d 1062, 1064 [use of out-of-state police report of arrest proper to establish fact of arrest where it contained defendant's name, accurate physical description, and defendant had admitted to probation officer that he was in area of arrest at time in question]; but see United States v. Caldera (5th Cir.1980) 631 F.2d 1227 [laboratory report improperly admitted based on testimony of police officer who did not participate in chemical analysis or personally perform test].) In another recent case, Taylor v. United States Parole Com'n, supra, 734 F.2d 1152, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a letter from an out-of-state probation officer regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of a parolee was admissible and could be considered as evidence of a parole violation. However, the court disagreed with the action of the regional parole commission which revoked parole after deciding that the letter justified a finding that Taylor had engaged in new criminal conduct. ( Id., at p. 1154.) The court's concern was with the paucity of reliable evidence of petitioner's criminal conduct and not with the hearsay nature of the evidence which was presented. A finding of criminal conduct based solely upon a probation officer's summary of an arrest report is but a step away from a finding of criminal conduct based solely upon evidence of a parolee's arrest with no account of the underlying circumstances. ( Id., at pp. 1155-1156, fn. omitted.) (2) Taylor thus stands for the proposition that hearsay may be admissible but its substance must be treated with care before it provides grounds for revocation. The present case is a close one. We conclude that the invoice from Hertz, accompanied by the hotel receipt, both of which were seized from defendant's home, here provided a sufficient basis for the court to revoke probation. The significant factor is the uncontroverted presence of defendant's signatures on the invoice. The invoice bears the Hertz emblem and stamped in the box in which is printed Vehicle Rented at (City/State) are the words O'Hare Field, Chicago, IL. This stamp is followed by an additional handwritten inscription: Hyatt. The invoice also includes on its face a printed agreement for the rental of the car in which it is stated in capital letters that The vehicle is rented upon the conditions shown on this page and upon the reverse hereof. Customer represents that he has read, understands and agrees with the conditions. This language is followed by the signature of Donald L. Maki. The invoice is date-stamped January 27 and the date due listed on the agreement is January 29, 1983. It is signed again by defendant in the section Refund Received By which indicates that a refund was paid on the deposit made on the rental. The second document also considered by the court is headed by the printed words Hyatt Regency O'Hare. Entitled Customer Receipt, it states that a sum was received from `Maki' and is dated 1-28-83. The date, name, and sum are entered in unidentified handwriting on the otherwise printed form. Standing alone, this receipt has at best minimal probative value. It would constitute an insufficient basis upon which to revoke probation. However, when viewed in conjunction with the Hertz invoice showing rental of a car at the O'Hare Field, Chicago, IL `Hyatt', it serves to corroborate the information in the invoice indicating that defendant was in Chicago in January 1983. If the invoice were simply printed and filled out by an unidentified hand and devoid of defendant's signature, our conclusion would be that it alone, or even accompanied by the hotel receipt, would be insufficient to find a violation of probation. [4] However, the identification of defendant's signature on the printed invoice and the fact that it is an invoice of the type relied upon by parties for billing and payment of money, lead us to find it sufficient here. (See United States v. Penn, supra, 721 F.2d at p. 766 [laboratory reports admissible despite no testimony by anyone from the laboratory who had been involved in either the testing which led to reports or preparation of reports themselves. In the absence of any evidence tending to contradict Penn's drug usage or the accuracy of the lab tests, his confrontation rights were not infringed by the admission of Busby's [the probation officer who had requested the tests] testimony or the exhibits.]) Imprinted with a Hertz emblem, the invoice appears to be a typical one utilized by Hertz in transacting business, and it contained internal evidence of its place of issue to which had been affixed an identifiable signature by defendant. In the absence of any evidence tending to contradict the information contained in the invoice and the accuracy of the inference that defendant was of necessity in Chicago signing the invoice on January 27, 1983, we believe that the documents here were properly considered by the trial court and provided a sufficient basis from which it could conclude that defendant violated the terms of his parole by leaving the area without permission. The judgment is affirmed.