Opinion ID: 1976846
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is the Act Remedial or Procedural?

Text: An exception to the general rule is recognized where a statute is remedial or procedural in nature. Hansen-Snyder Co v General Motors Corp, 371 Mich 480; 124 NW2d 286 (1963). Thus, statutes which operate in furtherance of a remedy or mode of procedure and which neither create new rights nor destroy, enlarge, or diminish existing rights are generally held to operate retrospectively unless a contrary legislative intention is manifested. In Selk, we found the interest rate on overdue compensation payments related to a remedy or mode of procedure and was but an incident and not the essence of a right or liability. Selk, p 11. The issue in this case is distinguishable from that in Selk. In essence, interest is a payment for the use of someone else's money. As we noted in Selk, this is not a matter of substance going to the individual's right to compensation. Rather, it is a matter of procedure. Unlike the interest statute in Selk, the statute here in question may not be regarded as wholly procedural in character. Its effect, if applied, would result in taking from the plaintiff the substantive right to receipt of compensation payments which existed prior to enactment of § 358. Consequently, only a clear statement of legislative intent could justify retroactive application. [25] Nor are we persuaded that § 358 should be applied retroactively because it can be characterized as remedial. This Court has been reluctant to apply this exception without extensive exploration of legislative intent. See, e.g., Rookledge v Garwood, 340 Mich 444; 65 NW2d 785 (1954); Lahti v Fosterling, 357 Mich 578; 99 NW2d 490 (1959). We agree with the Court of Appeals that [w]hile § 358 is `remedial' in the sense that it was adopted to effect a reform which, in the eyes of many, will correct certain injustice in the system, [retroactive application would] also significantly and detrimentally affect the substantive right of certain injured employees to receipt of workers' compensation benefits. 122 Mich App 186. In addition, such a construction would appear to reward employers who are found to have incorrectly withheld payment of workers' compensation benefits and correspondingly penalize those who timely made such payments prior to January 1, 1982. We cannot attribute to the Legislature an intention to reward those in defendant's position. We find nothing to overcome the presumption that prospective operation only was intended, and therefore conclude that unemployment compensation paid for weekly periods before the January 1, 1982 effective date of § 358 is not deductible from workers' compensation benefits payable for the identical pre-1982 periods, but that weekly payments of workers' compensation that become due on or after January 1, 1982, are to be reduced by unemployment compensation benefits paid or payable for the same periods.