Opinion ID: 1499122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: discretionary or ministerial

Text: Discretionary acts or functions are those involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment. . . . Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522. We have also said that discretionary duties are those as necessarily require the exercise of reason in the adaptation of a means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether the act shall be done or the course pursued. Discretion in the manner of the performance of an act arises when the act may be performed in one of two or more ways, either of which would be lawful, and where it is left to the will or judgment of the performer to determine in which way it shall be performed. Collins v. Commonwealth of Ky. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 10 S.W.3d 122, 125 (Ky.1999) ( quoting Franklin County, Ky. v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 201 (Ky.1997), reversed on other grounds by Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky.2001)). Further examples of discretionary acts are Minger v. Green, 239 F.3d 793 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that the implementation of a security system by director of public safety at a state university was a discretionary function); Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.1983) (holding that the determination of jeopardy is within the discretion of the acting IRS District Director); Burnette v. Gee, 137 Fed.Appx. 806 (6th Cir.2005) (finding that the investigation of a man's attempted suicide and his seizure was a discretionary rather than ministerial act); Stratton v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.3d 516 (Ky.2006) (holding that Cabinet's actions subsequent to its initial investigation into allegations that child was abused were discretionary); Lamb v. Holmes, 162 S.W.3d 902 (Ky.2005) (finding that the actions of teachers/administrators in searching students were discretionary in nature); Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Peerce, 132 S.W.3d 824 (Ky.2004) (holding that county judge/executive's decision to terminate former county corrections department officer was discretionary); Greenway Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Frankfort, 148 S.W.3d 298 (Ky. App.2004) (holding that the City Manager and Sewer Director, in advising the City to deny hookups until the current system was repaired, was a discretionary function); Estate of Clark ex rel. Mitchell v. Daviess County, 105 S.W.3d 841 (Ky.App.2003) (holding that the decision of the Daviess County Fiscal Court, the engineers, and road foreman with respect to whether and how a portion of a certain road was guarded using guardrails and warning signs was a discretionary function); James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875 (Ky.App.2002) (holding that the enactment of safety rules is a discretionary function for which school employees could not be held liable); Thompson v. Huecker, 559 S.W.2d 488 (Ky.App. 1977) (holding that the re-employment of the plaintiff was a discretionary function). A ministerial act, on the other hand, is one that requires only obedience to the orders of others, or when the officer's duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act arising from fixed and designated facts. `That a necessity may exist for the ascertainment of . . . facts does not operate to convert the act into one discretionary in nature.' Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522 (internal citation deleted). For example, in Collins v. Commonwealth of Ky. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 10 S.W.3d 122, 126 (Ky.1999), the court noted [t]he regulations specifically required that water control structures for the roads be designed with a discharge capacity capable of passing the peak runoff from a 10-year, 24-hour precipitation event. The majority in Collins held inspecting drainage culverts to assure they conform to the regulations does not require any `significant judgment, statutory interpretation, or policy-making decisions' and the regulations could be enforced in a `routine, ministerial manner.' Stratton v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.3d 516, 520 (Ky.2006) (quoting Collins, 10 S.W.3d at 126). And in Stratton, supra , we noted that the portions of the investigative responsibilities as set out in regulations, which were particular in their directive, were ministerial, but we noted that others, which required the exercise of judgment, were not. Such investigations do have certain mandated statutory requirements as to who shall be interviewed, etc., but [after this] they also involve discretionary decisions by the case workers, just as in police investigations. After performing their ministerial duties, the case workers must determine what action, if any, should be taken to resolve each claim . . . . Id. at 521. The first part was ministerial, but what followed was held to be discretionary. Furthermore, rule-making is an inherently discretionary function. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 529. Yet, we have held that enforcement of a well known rule for safety is ministerial, i.e., the batting helmet rule in Yanero . Id. at 529. And, as we have said: [e]valuating the credentials of a prospective employee is an inherently subjective process which, of course, is the essence of a discretionary function. However, there is also a ministerial aspect to the hiring process in that the person or persons to whom the hiring of subordinates is entrusted must at least attempt to hire someone who is not incompetent. Id. at 528. Further examples of ministerial acts are Roberts v. U.S. ex rel. Valentine, 176 U.S. 221, 20 S.Ct. 376, 44 L.Ed. 443 (1900) (holding that the duty of the treasurer of the United States to pay interest pursuant to the act of Congress, was a ministerial duty); Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463 ( 6th Cir.1989) (holding that a clerk implementing an order at direction of the judge was a ministerial act); Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057 ( 8th Cir.1973) (acts performed by a court clerk are ministerial); Jones v. Lathram, 150 S.W.3d 50, 53 (Ky.2004) (act of safely driving a police cruiser, even in an emergency, is not an act that typically requires any deliberation  thus it is ministerial); Williams v. Kentucky Dept. of Educ., 113 S.W.3d 145 ( Ky.2003) (compliance with Board of Education Code of Conduct was a ministerial duty); Kea-Ham Contracting, Inc. v. Floyd County Development Authority, 37 S.W.3d 703 ( Ky.2000) (erroneous conveyance of information by chairman of county development agency that interim financing for project had been obtained was ministerial error); Upchurch v. Clinton County, 330 S.W.2d 428 ( Ky.1959) (employing a dog warden and establishing a dog pound were ministerial duties); Bronaugh v. Murray, 294 Ky. 715, 172 S.W.2d 591 (Ky. 1943) (duty of school board to require school bus operators to carry liability insurance was ministerial). As Justice Cooper noted in Yanero , [t]eachers assigned to supervise juveniles during school-sponsored curricular or extracurricular activities have a duty to exercise that degree of care that ordinarily prudent teachers or coaches engaged in the supervision of students . . . would exercise under similar circumstances. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 529. The premise for this duty is that a child is compelled to attend to school. Id. Admittedly, a more stringent compulsion applies to the incarceration of prisoners as the jailer has custody, rule and charge of the jail and all persons therein pursuant to KRS 71.020. And, [t]he law imposes the duty on a jailer to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence to prevent unlawful injury to a prisoner placed in his custody, but he cannot be charged with negligence in failing to prevent what he could not reasonably anticipate. Lamb v. Clark, 282 Ky. 167, 138 S.W.2d 350, 352 (1940.); see also, KRS 71.040 (stating that [he] shall treat them humanely). Here, however, the similarity ends, as managing children ain't nuthin' like managing prisoners. Ultimate liability, [then], depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. Sudderth v. White, 621 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Ky.App.1981); see also Franklin County, Ky. v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 200 (1998), reversed on other grounds by Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky.2001). And, a single tragic incident involving jail personnel is not sufficient to establish a claim of inadequate training, Franklin County, Ky., 957 S.W.2d at 200 (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985)), and [t]he duty of ordinary care to prevent [harm] arises only upon the discovery of some fact which would lead a reasonable person to believe there is some likelihood of . . . injury. Franklin County, Ky., 957 S.W.2d at 200. In all societies, there is a line, or a seam, between appropriate conduct and inappropriate conduct. Sometimes it is a broad line, sometimes thin. This line, or seam, is defined or established by law. And by our interpretive rulings, this court can more clearly define, or inadvertently obscure, or even move the line, or seam, characterizing conduct in our society. Thus, we should always realize that every ruling we make, or seam we define, obscure, or adjust, has a composite effect, however large or small, on the efficiency of the society we live in. In this sense, it is important to note that society has looked (and is looking) for alternative programs in the corrections area with consistent objectives of punishment and rehabilitation in order to lower our incarceration rate. Work programs, as are at issue here, are at the front of these initiations. Having a great stake in the fortunes of tomorrow, we should not be inclined to fashion rules that unduly hinder, or impede, an honest search for solutions, absent the command of law. Here, we have a road program that has been operated by Rowan County for many years. It is voluntary, thus no prisoner is forced to do the work for which they are paid $1.25 per day by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. In the prior years of the program, there had never been an injury (other than minor ones), even though brush and trees had been cut on prior occasions. The prisoners generally worked picking up trash, but, from time to time, were given other directions by the County Judge Executive and/or the Magistrates. In this case it was to clear the brush along this road. Here there were a lot of small bushes, some small trees, and obviously a few bigger trees. The one ultimately involved was 20-30 feet in height, not primeval timber by any means. The brush was on a bank beside and above the road  the road was narrow  but, one side was safe, the other maybe, maybe not. Several people were on the safe side, at least one or more were still cutting brush or trees on the bank. And by his own admission, the plaintiff walks into an area that will soon be brushed by a falling tree, yet the plaintiff somehow is unaware of the circumstances going on around  or for that matter, above him. One man, Henderson, a nine year deputy jailer, is in charge of this crew. He has to watch them, and try as best he can to anticipate what they might do, correct them as necessary, determine their capabilities, sometimes by asking them forthright whether they can or can't do the job, assign the duties and see that the work is performed. Work somewhat similar to work one would do around his house or farm, in cleaning brush or trees off a bank or out of a field. Work done this day with chainsaws. Chainsaws that you can buy in any hardware store, which many people operate and many of which have had kickbacks. One would imagine there are many other things you might think about while managing a work crew of six state prisoners, but what has been set out is enough. It is as discretionary a task as one could envision. No school children, no college professors or academicians, but state prisoners on a highway with one deputy jailer. Moreover, even one tree angling sideways after being cut and knocking over a neighbor's mailbox is not a good harbinger of warning that one of your crew is going to amble over by the chipper and get hit by a falling tree. There are many reasons a tree could fall the wrong way, yet the evidence would leave us to speculate. And likewise, the kickback from a saw blade would not put a reasonable person on notice that one state prisoner is going to walk over to the other side of the road by the chipper where a tree would fall on him  of which he will never be aware, cigarette or not. Sometimes things just happen. As to the stricture in KRS 441.125(2)(6), that no prisoner shall be assigned to unduly hazardous work that would endanger the life or health of the prisoner or others, suffice it to say, that everyday people  every day  use chainsaws cutting brush and trees, including prisoners. Dangerous it can be, but unduly dangerous, it is not. And too, the training of the staff and state prisoners, under the evidence at hand in this case, was a discretionary act or function. Sloas alleges that possibly Carl Lewis, who cut the tree that fell on him, didn't know how to use a chain saw or cut a tree, but admits that he didn't really know. The evidence from Carl Lewis' deposition is to the contrary  he had used a chainsaw and cut trees and brush for years. Even Sloas admits that Henderson only assigned a chainsaw to those that told him they knew how to use them, including Sloas  who admits he knew how to use a chainsaw. This makes it all the more astounding that he wasn't paying attention at the time. One could surely wonder how you would ever respond legally to Sloas's allegations that there was a failure in the training program since the inmates were not shown how to stay out of the way of other inmate's falling trees. It just goes to show there are some things you just can't train people for. But that doesn't make training, under these circumstances, ministerial. Ministerial training is where you are mandated to train to avoid the event that occurred. This was not the case here. Thus, we conclude that the functions, acts, or omissions for which Hall and Henderson are faulted were in fact discretionary functions.