Opinion ID: 777955
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice Exception

Text: 20 Dixon contends that even if his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was defaulted, this Court should consider and grant his petition under the exception to the procedural bar rule made for fundamental miscarriages of justice. In Coleman, the Supreme Court explained that 21 [i]n all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 501 U.S. at 750 (emphasis added). In the event of a fundamental miscarriage of justice, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, the Court has recognized that a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639. To establish actual innocence, petitioner must demonstrate that `in light of all the evidence,' `it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.' Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) ( quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995)) (further citation omitted). `[A]ctual innocence' means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. Id. at 623-24, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (citation omitted); see also Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 363 (2d Cir.1997) ([S]erious constitutional questions would arise if a person who can prove his actual innocence on the existing record — and who could not have effectively raised his claim of innocence at an earlier time — had no access to judicial review.). 22 Dixon argues that, in spite of his procedural default, he merits habeas relief on the grounds that he is factually innocent of first degree possession of a controlled substance because there was insufficient evidence that he knew the weight of the drugs he possessed and, due to the earlier misunderstanding of the law, the element of knowledge of weight was never proved beyond a reasonable doubt at his trial in violation of the Constitutional requirements set out in Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316, 99 S.Ct. 2781 and In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. The Government responds that the evidence at Dixon's trial was sufficient to prove that he knew the weight of the heroin and therefore he cannot make the threshold showing of actual innocence necessary to invoke the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural bar. Since the question of Dixon's actual innocence depends on the evidence at trial and its sufficiency, we turn to that issue now.