Opinion ID: 2321578
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Robles-Benevides

Text: The evidence showed that appellant Robles-Benevides was in the car that caught up with Helm as he tried to escape the group chasing him up 14th Street. In the car, Robles-Benevides struggled over a knife with Velásquez, who used a knife to stab Helm. Benítez testified that Robles-Benevides told him, when they were both in jail, that he had fought with Velásquez about who was going to have the knife: [Robles-Benevides] said to me that he had a blade with him. That when he was in [Bonilla's] car, that [Robles-Benevides] and [Velásquez] were fighting over a knife. .... [Robles-Benevides] said to me that [Velásquez] was asking him for the knife.... [Robles-Benevides] said that [Velásquez] kept on asking him for the knife because he wanted to stab the deceased. [Robles-Benevides] said to [Velásquez] that he was going to do it. And so they were fighting over the knife, the two of them. When they got close to where the deceased was, Carlos gave the knife to [Velásquez].... Although there was no evidence that Robles-Benevides stabbed Helm, the eye-witnesses testified that he personally participated in the attack: García saw him kicking and punching Helm; Alemán, Benítez and José Pérez saw him hit Helm; and Hallner testified that he saw him deliver a vicious kick to Helm's chest while he was lying on the ground. Robles-Benevides argued that that he had done so in self-defense, because Helm had hit him first. The jury verdict shows that it rejected Robles-Benevides's claim of self-defense. [65] He argues, however, that the evidence that he hit and kicked Helm and had struggled with Velásquez over the knife does not reasonably permit an inference that he intended to kill Helm, only that he gave up the knife that, as it turned out, was used by someone else (Velásquez) to kill Helm during the assault. We have explained the mens rea required for first-degree murder: First-degree premeditated murder is murder committed with the specific intent to kill after premeditation and deliberation. Williams v. United States, 858 A.2d 984, 1001 (D.C.2004). Premeditation means that the defendant formed the specific intent to kill the victim for some length of time, however short, before the murderous act. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Deliberation, which is separate from premeditation, requires that there was the reflection and turning over in the mind of the accused concerning his existing design and purpose to kill. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, in order for a charge of first-degree premeditated murder to be sustained, the evidence must demonstrate that the accused did not kill impulsively, in the heat of passion, or in an orgy of frenzied activity. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 371 (D.C.1979). Kitt v. United States, 904 A.2d 348, 353 (D.C.2006). The government argues that in closing argument the prosecutor emphasized to the jury the significant role that Robles-Benevides played in the murder and pointed to his own premeditation and deliberation: What on earth do you think Carlos Robles-Benevides was thinking during that chase when he gave the knife to [Velásquez]?... he was fighting for that knife because he wanted to stab Mr. Helm. Premeditation and deliberation? That's right there. But the prosecutor made essentially the same argument to the jury with respect to appellants Bonilla and Villatoro, as to whom the government now concedes their first-degree murder convictions must be reversed. [66] Moreover, the prosecutor's argument that appellants had premeditated and deliberated was immediately followed by the prosecutor's offer to the jurors that they need not find for each and every one of these guys ... that this is premeditated and deliberated. Indeed, the jurors were relieved of any obligation to evaluate the evidence of individual intent by the prosecutor's erroneous admonition that all you have to do is conclude that the principals in this case, the guys who actually put the knives in Mr. Helm, Catinga [Velásquez] and Douglas [Ventura], that they premeditated and deliberated. With respect to appellants, the prosecutor advised, the only issue ... is one of foreseeability.... Now, what do you think is reasonably foreseeable when you're running up, when you're chasing this man and you're in a mob? We have held that there are instances where there is enough in the factual record to affirm a first-degree murder conviction on an aiding an abetting theory of liability despite an erroneous instruction like the one given in this case. In Kidd, a plain error case, we affirmed appellant's conviction for first-degree murder when he stood on one side of the victim while pointing a gun at his stomach; a second person stood on the other side with a gun; a third person came around the back and shot the victim in the head; and appellant immediately fled the scene. 940 A.2d at 128. We held that [o]n the record before us, reasonable jurors could infer and conclude... that beyond a reasonable doubt [appellant] had thought about and reflected on killing [the victim], and further that he had the specific intent to participate in the killing.... Id. Based upon that evidence, which was countered only by defendant's self-serving statement that he was home at the time of the killing, and, importantly, the prosecutor's emphasis at the outset and end of its case before the jury on the elements of premeditation and deliberation, we were convinced that the first-degree murder conviction was based on the jurors having inferred `from the facts and circumstances surrounding [the] murder,' that [the defendant] had `the requisite mens rea. ' Id. (quoting Kitt, 904 A.2d at 353). In Downing v. United States, 929 A.2d 848 (D.C.2007), another plain error case, we likewise affirmed a first-degree murder conviction despite an erroneous aiding and abetting instruction, where we concluded that no reasonable juror could have concluded that [the defendant] had any intent other than to kill ... nor could a reasonable juror have concluded that the actions taken by [the defendant] were anything other than deliberate and premeditated. Id. at 863. In Downing, the evidence showed that the defendant, who was the first in the group to suggest killing the victim, directed others to the location where the murder took place, took the victim out of the car when they arrived at the location, and stood next to the person who actually fired the fatal shot. See id. Finally, in Wilson-Bey, on harmless error review, we affirmed appellant Wilson-Bey's first-degree murder conviction, where the evidence showed that after declaring I am going to kill that bitch for having beaten up her younger sister, Wilson-Bey led a group armed with various weapons to the victim's apartment, swung her knife multiple times at the victim, and stabbed the victim near the eye. 903 A.2d at 845. Based on that evidence, we determined that [a]ny impartial trier of fact who credited the prosecution's evidence would ... be bound to conclude that ... Wilson-Bey intended to kill the decedent, tried to kill her, and succeeded in doing so, either by personally causing her death or by abetting a knife-wielding confederate who actually inflicted the fatal wound if... Wilson-Bey did not. Id. at 846-47. Although we agree with the government that the evidence against Robles-Benevides was significant, and without a doubt sufficient for conviction of first-degree murder, it was not so compelling that we can say that there is no reasonable probability that the verdict was unaffected by the error. See Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81-82, 124 S.Ct. 2333. Neither Robles-Benevides's statement to Velásquez (as related by Benítez) that he was going to do it while they struggled over the knife in the car, nor his participation in the assault that resulted in Helm's death reflected the personally-expressed intent to kill of the assailants whose convictions we affirmed in Wilson-Bey and in Kidd, or the cool-headed direction and control of the fatal shooting in Downing, where we found the evidence overwhelming. Downing, 929 A.2d at 863-64. And, unlike in Kidd, where we relied on the prosecutor's emphasis to the jury that first-degree murder required premeditation and deliberation, see 940 A.2d at 128, in this case the prosecutor urged that the only issue that the jurors needed to decide was whether the killing of Helm was foreseeablethe very theory we concluded in Wilson-Bey is contrary to the aiding and abetting statute. 903 A.2d at 837. Rather, we find this case analogous to the more ambiguous situations in Wilson-Bey and Coleman, where we reversed the first-degree murder convictions of Marbury and Jones, respectively. In Wilson-Bey, we reversed defendant Marbury's conviction for first-degree murder as an aider and abettor because taking the evidence as a whole, an impartial juror might readily have a reasonable doubt whether Ms. Marbury in fact formed an intent to kill [the victim], as distinguished from an intent to join with others in beating up [the victim] and her friends. 903 A.2d at 845. There, cooperating witnesses testified that Marbury and her friends went to the victim's apartment to find out why she had beaten up Marbury and to fight her and her friends. Id. Unlike her sister (Wilson-Bey) whose first-degree murder conviction we affirmed, Marbury did not wield a knife and stab the victim. Also, while a witness's testimony that Marbury openly declared her intention to kill that bitch may have permitted the jury to find that she had deliberated and premeditated on the intent to kill, see id. at 844, we noted that the strength of that testimony was weakened by substantial impeachment. See id. at 845. Here, it is undisputed that Robles-Benevides did not use a knife at any time during the assault on Helm. Although it can be inferred from the evidence that, more than any other appellant, Robles-Benevides knew that a knife was in the equation when they reached and attacked Helm, this situation is indistinguishable from Marbury's, where a group of eight, including both [Marbury and Wilson-Bey], armed themselves with knives and baseball bats and set out in a van for [the victim's] apartment. Id. at 823. Furthermore, just as Marbury's comment that she was going to kill that bitch was impeached, Benítezwho was the sole witness to relate the conversation during which Robles-Benevides said that he wanted to do it as he struggled with Velásquez over the knifewas also impeached. Defense counsel pointed out that Benítez had pleaded out of trial and had a motive to testify favorably for the government by falsely accusing Robles-Benevides. Defense counsel suggested in cross-examination that it was really Benítez who had the knife, and that the government pressured him to finger Robles-Benevides instead. Gilfredo López, who had been in jail with Robles-Benevides and Benítez, testified that Benítez told him that the government wanted Benítez to testify that Robles-Benevides passed a knife to Velásquez. In Coleman, defendant Jones gave a machine gun to his confederate, Coleman, who then shot the victims to death, after Jones equivocally said: fuck em. 948 A.2d at 550-51. We held that while the evidence was sufficient to convict Jones for second-degree murder, see id. at 551, it was not so overwhelming to ease our concern that the jury might have convicted based on the `natural and probable consequences' theory. Id. at 554. In this case, Robles-Benevides only reluctantly relinquished the knife to Velásquez, who later stabbed Helm to deathas opposed to Jones who gave the machine gun to Coleman. In reversing Jones's conviction in Coleman we explained that the jury may not have understood the statement fuck emas an execution order because the jury also could have interpreted the comment as indicating a desire not to kill the victims, i.e., `never mind,' or a disinterested I don't care. Id. at 553. Similarly, Robles-Benevides's conversation with Velásquez in the car does not compel a finding that he had the specific intent to kill and that he premeditated or deliberated. Nowhere in the conversation did Robles-Benevides explicitly say that either he or Velásquez wanted to kill the victim. Rather, he said Velásquez told him that he wanted to stab the deceased, and that he fought over the knife because he himself was going to do it. Here, the jury could infer that, rather than killing Helm, Robles-Benevides expressed a desire to use the knife to inflict a wound by stabbing, and understood Velásquez to mean the same. While premeditation and deliberation can take place in a few seconds, see Downing, 929 A.2d at 862, and it is certainly possible that Robles-Bonilla premeditated and deliberated Helm's death during the car chase while fighting over the knife with Velásquez, it is at least equally plausible that he did not intend to kill Helm at all, but only to injure Helm by stabbing him with the knife. [67] Although the evidence in this case clearly established that Robles-Benevides participated in the assault on Helm, the evidence from which the jury could have inferred that he himself had the specific intent to kill Helm and did so with premeditation or deliberation was circumstantial and its source was impeached. The erroneous jury instruction, however, could well have relieved the jurors from having to make that assessment, by misleading them into convicting appellant of first-degree murder as an aider and abettor even if it found that, although Robles-Benevides did not himself premeditate or deliberate Helm's murder, the natural and probable consequence of his participation in the assault was Helm's death. As in Wilson-Bey, where we reversed Marbury's first-degree murder conviction because the jury might have been misled by the erroneous instruction, so that a juror who believed that Ms. Marbury's intent was merely to join in an assault ... could nevertheless reasonably find Ms. Marbury guilty of aiding and abetting armed premeditated murder, 903 A.2d at 845, the jury in this case also could have been misled into convicting Robles-Benevides of first-degree murder so long as it found that he hit and kicked Helm in the course of the assault that ended in a fatal stabbing by someone else. That is all the more likely here because, in addition to the erroneous instruction given to the jury, the prosecutor told the jurors in closing that all they needed to find in order to convict appellants of first-degree murder was that the principals had premeditated and deliberated, so long as the stabbing and killing were foreseeable. In the absence of compelling evidence that Robles-Benevides personally had the intent to kill and acted with deliberation and premeditation in doing so, the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome of the proceeding, Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052), and it would be a miscarriage of justice to let him stand convicted of a crime that he did not commit. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770. We conclude, however, that on this record Robles-Benevides can be convicted of murder in the second degree. [68] See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 306, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996); Willis v. United States, 692 A.2d 1380, 1382-83 (D.C.1997). We have extended our ruling in Wilson-Bey to second-degree murder which requires a particularized showing of mens rea. See Coleman, 948 A.2d at 552-53 (citing Kitt, 904 A.2d at 356). For second-degree murder, the intent required is malice, which can be proven by evidence of a specific intent to kill, specific intent to inflict serious bodily harm, or wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human riskalso known as depraved heart murder. [69] Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 38-39 (D.C.1990) (en banc). Second-degree murder is a lesser-included offense of first-degree premeditated murder, see Woodard v. United States, 738 A.2d 254, 259 n. 10 (D.C.1999), and the jury was properly instructed on second-degree murder. Here, the jury might not have found that appellant acted with premeditation and deliberation, or even had the specific intent to kill, but it surely must have found beyond a reasonable doubt that in his desire to use a knife (enough to fight over it with Velásquez) Robles-Benevides at least had the intent to inflict serious bodily harm, or that he acted with wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable risk to human life when he gave the knife to Velásquez, knowing that he would use it to harm Helm. Moreover, such an intent could also be inferred even if the jury discounted the evidence that Robles-Benevides gave a knife to Velásquez (due to impeachment of Benítez and testimony of López), through his joining in a group assault and viciously kicking Helm. Thus, because the erroneous aiding and abetting instruction would not have affected appellant's substantial rights had he been convicted of second-degree murder while armed, [70] we reverse the conviction for first-degree murder while armed and remand the case to the trial court with the instruction to vacate that conviction and enter judgment of conviction and resentence for murder in the second-degree while armed.