Opinion ID: 1442267
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the Standard

Text: (8) Petitioner contends the other misconduct warranting discipline standard under which the review department recommended discipline is unconstitutionally vague. Her view finds some support in our earlier opinion in In re Fahey, supra, 8 Cal.3d at page 853, in which we held that [o]ffenses that do not involve moral turpitude or affect professional performance should not be a basis for professional discipline simply because they fall short of the highest standards of professional ethics or may in some way impair the public image of the profession. (Cf. Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214, 224-226 [82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 461 P.2d 375] [schoolteacher discipline case in which we declined to apply moral turpitude standard without regard to fitness to teach, given potential vagueness problems].) It is true, of course, that if a disciplinary standard is so vague that no reasonable consensus may be formed as to its proper meaning, its application is constitutionally suspect. ( Morrison v. State Board of Education, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 231-233.) We do not believe, however, that our application of the challenged standard to the facts presented here encounters constitutional difficulties. It is well established that one to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness. (See Cranston v. City of Richmond (1985) 40 Cal.3d 755, 764 [221 Cal. Rptr. 779, 710 P.2d 845], quoting Parker v. Levy (1973) 417 U.S. 733, 756 [41 L.Ed.2d 439, 457-458, 94 S.Ct. 2547].) Thus, even if a disciplinary standard is so broad that people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application ( Connally v. General Constr. Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [70 L.Ed. 322, 328, 46 S.Ct. 126]), this fact alone is insufficient to sustain a vagueness challenge where the misconduct at issue is clearly within the scope of the disciplinary standard. We think it clear that attorneys should realize that repeated failure to conform their conduct to the requirements of the criminal law and court orders specially imposed on them may call into question their integrity as officers of the court and their fitness to represent clients. Given our inherent power to control the practice of law in order to protect the profession and the public, attorneys must understand that such misconduct may therefore warrant professional discipline. Such a standard does not hold attorneys to an arbitrarily high moral code of conduct. It requires nothing more than that attorneys conform to the requirements of the law in the manner of all other persons. For these reasons, the other misconduct warranting discipline standard is not impermissibly vague as applied to petitioner's criminal conduct.