Opinion ID: 214086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The BIA's Refusal to Sua Sponte Reopen

Text: Even though Pllumi's motion to reopen and reconsider was untimely, the BIA retains the discretion to reopen his proceedings sua sponte. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). As earlier noted, the BIA said the following when it declined to reopen Pllumi's case: Pllumi's concerns about his future healthcare on his return to Albania are not relevant to his persecution claim. We separately note that the respondent may address a request for humanitarian parole for medical treatment to the DHS, as requests for deferred action are within the jurisdiction of DHS, not the Immigration Courts or this Board. (App. at 4.) This can be read as disclaiming any power to reopen immigration proceedings if the argument for reopening bears on the adequacy of healthcare in the country of removal. If that is what the BIA meant, it has misapprehended the breadth of its own authority. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii) the BIA can grant relief to an applicant who has suffered past persecution but does not face a reasonable possibility of future persecution. Sheriff v. Att'y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 595 (3d Cir.2009). [11] That particular avenue of relief is typically called humanitarian asylum and it is available upon a showing of at least one of two types of circumstances: either that [t]he applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the past persecution[,] 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A), [12] or that the applicant has established that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country[,] 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). Only the latter type of humanitarian asylum, that based on other serious harm, is at issue here. We have determined that other serious harm means harm that may not be inflicted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political group, but harm so serious as to equal the severity of persecution. Sheriff, 587 F.3d at 596 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have noted the Department of Justice's position that economic disadvantage and the inability to practice one's chosen profession are examples of harms that do not qualify as other serious harm in the context of humanitarian asylum. Id. While those two examples may not pass muster as other serious harm, we have considered possible situations that would. Id. For example, we have cited a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluding that debilitation and homelessness appear[ed] to constitute serious harms for the purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). Id. (quoting Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 577 (7th Cir.2008)). In that case, the underlying facts were that the petitioner, if returned to Russia, would be without the only medications that controlled his mental illness and would thus be incapable of functioning on his own and unable to obtain housing and medical treatment. Kholyavskiy, 540 F.3d at 577. Because it appeared that the petitioner's situation might be one that would qualify as serious harm, the Seventh Circuit remanded to the BIA for further consideration on that issue because neither the IJ nor the BIA had explored the availability of the other serious harm variety of humanitarian asylum. Id. Just as debilitation and homelessness resulting from the unavailability of specific medications arguably fall within the ambit of other serious harm, id., it is conceivable that, in extreme circumstances, harm resulting from the unavailability of necessary medical care could constitute other serious harm under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). We hasten to add and to emphasize that we are not suggesting that differing standards of healthcare around the world are, in themselves, a basis for asylum. We are only holding that the issue of health care is not off the table in the asylum context, as the BIA seemed to say when it remarked that [Pllumi's] concerns about his future healthcare on his return to Albania are not relevant. (App. at 4) On the contrary, it is within the BIA's authority to consider health concerns and associated harms resulting from deportation when it exercises its discretion in deciding whether to grant humanitarian asylum. To the extent, then, that the BIA considered Pllumi's health issues irrelevant to its decision on sua sponte reopening because it thought those issues could not be considered, it erred. [13] Given the possibility that the BIA mistakenly thought it did not have the authority to consider Pllumi's health concerns as other serious harm under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B), we will follow Mahmood and remand to the BIA for clarification of the basis for its decision declining to exercise its discretion to reopen Pllumi's case. If the BIA misperceived the legal background for its exercise of discretion, Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 469, it should now take its full authority into account. We note that, though it is within the BIA's jurisdiction to consider Pllumi's health concerns, the BIA is not required to find that those concerns qualify as other serious harm under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B), and nothing we have said here should be taken as implying otherwise. If on remand the BIA declines to exercise its sua sponte authority but does so in a manner that does not indicate a misunderstanding of its authority, then that decision will be unreviewable.