Opinion ID: 2720490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Keith Curry Attacks

Text: Bryant and Smith challenge admission of the attacks on Keith Curry while he was romantically involved with Bryant‘s ex-wife. The trial court heard Curry‘s testimony in limine, considered extensive arguments, and provided a comprehensive ruling. It admitted the testimony about two attacks, but excluded proffered evidence of a third in which Curry was shot by an unknown assailant. The trial court explained its ruling as follows: ―The evidence is highly relevant in the court‘s opinion, as I indicated today. It does tend to show that Mr. Smith, not as a person of bad character, although the other 79 evidence may suggest that, but the manner in which the evidence can be utilized by the jury is to show that there is a relationship between Mr. Smith and Mr. Bryant of the type that would allow Mr. Smith — cause Mr. Smith at Mr. Bryant‘s behest to commit violent acts either out of loyalty for Mr. Bryant or because that‘s his job in this organization. The jury will have to determine those issues. But there is sufficient evidence to allow the jury to do so. The evidence is quite probative.‖ The court acknowledged that in weighing the potential prejudicial effect, ―the conduct is similar; homicidal, violent, and the jury will have that in mind,‖ but ―on balance, the court feels that with a limiting instruction . . . explaining to the jury the use to which they may put this evidence that the potential for prejudice . . . is outweighed by the clear and concrete relevance.‖ The court noted that before the evidence would be admitted the prosecution would have to establish that Bryant was aware of and angered by the affair. Before Curry testified the court instructed, ―the evidence that you will hear has to do with some — an act of violence alleged to have been committed by one of the defendants in this case. [¶] That evidence may not be considered by you as tending to show that any defendant in this case has a propensity to commit violent acts or a propensity to commit crimes of the type alleged in this case or of any type for that matter. [¶] However, the evidence may be considered by you on the following limited issues: . . . on the issue of the existence of any intent which is a necessary element of the crime charged, the identity of the person who committed any crime with which the defendant is accused, any motive for the commission of the charged offenses[,] and as it may tend to prove the relationship between Mr. Bryant and Mr. Smith in this case. [¶] You are not to consider this evidence for any other purpose. [¶] The court is not suggesting that the 80 evidence is probative on any of the points that I listed, but only [that] you may consider it on those particular issues and no other.‖32 Defendants first label the evidence irrelevant because the prosecution failed to show Bryant was so angered by the affair that he would want to kill Curry. That argument fails. A witness testified Tannis said Bryant admitted he had put the bomb in Curry‘s car, and would continue to try to kill Curry until he succeeded.33 Bryant argues the testimony was privileged as a marital communication under Evidence Code section 980. As we discuss post, in part III.B.6, the trial court properly rejected that assertion. Smith similarly contends the trial court should have instructed the jury not to consider the Curry bombing evidence ―against‖ him. Smith was not entitled to such an instruction. The jury could infer that a jealous Bryant wanted to kill Armstrong and that the others participated in the shootings on Bryant‘s orders. The parties at times have referred to Bryant‘s jealousy as an alternative motive separate from a desire to protect Family operations. These motives are not necessarily unconnected. The jury could reasonably infer that Bryant acted on both. Defendants also contend the trial court erroneously instructed that the Curry attacks could be used to establish the identities of the Wheeler Avenue murderers. As mentioned above, the court somewhat vaguely told the jury the evidence could be 32 The instruction also told the jury to consider the Curry evidence ―only as to‖ Bryant and Smith, and not as to Settle and Wheeler. As we explained ante, in part II.E.2., however, evidence of Bryant‘s motive to kill Armstrong was relevant as to all defendants in the sense the jury could reasonably infer that their motives derived from Bryant‘s. Wheeler‘s counsel objected to the admission of the Curry evidence. We assume Wheeler may join in Bryant‘s and Smith‘s appellate claims, despite the trial court‘s instruction. 33 When questioned by the prosecution, Tannis denied having heard Bryant make the statements at issue or speaking to anyone about them. The witness‘s testimony that she heard Tannis talking about Bryant‘s statements was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement under Evidence Code section 1235. 81 considered ―on the issue of . . . the identity of the person who committed any crime with which the defendant is accused.‖ Assuming arguendo that the court‘s instruction was wrong, or at least potentially confusing, any error was harmless. The Curry evidence itself was properly admitted to support inferences other than identity. The section 352 determination was properly made. There is little chance the jury would have drawn an impermissible ―identity‖ inference that the crimes were so similar and distinctive that the same person committed them. (See Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 472.) No instruction from the court or argument from the parties relied on the evidence for that purpose. To the extent we assume the evidence was insufficient to support an inference of identity under section 1101(b), we can presume that any rational juror would have followed the trial court‘s instruction and found that the facts of the crimes simply did not support the particular inference that the same persons committed all of them. (People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 49 (Nunez).)