Opinion ID: 536265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant Alston's Batson Challenge.

Text: 16 Four of the government's six mandatory peremptory challenges were exercised against black members of the venire panel. The jury was comprised of eleven white persons and one black. Appellant Alston challenged the government's use of its peremptories in this fashion and the court held a hearing outside of the jury's presence. The court noted that there was a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), based exclusively upon the fact that the prosecutor had struck four black jurors and that the defendant was black. To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges, the defendant must raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptories to exclude a member of a recognized minority from the petit jury because of his or her race. 4 17 Once a prima facie case is demonstrated under Batson, the prosecutor must go beyond merely denying that he had a discriminatory motive and must provide a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 (footnote omitted). The prosecutor's explanation must be a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for exercising the peremptory challenges in the contested manner. Id. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 20. As stated by the Batson court, 'the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.'  United States v. David, 844 F.2d 767, 69 (11th Cir.1988), quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. 18 [A] finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court. [Citation omitted.] Since the trial judge's finding in the context under consideration here [i.e., in determining whether the prosecutor purposefully discriminated in exercising peremptories] largely will turn on an evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference. [Citation omitted.] 19 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21. Thus, a district court's finding regarding whether the prosecutor engaged in purposeful discrimination is subject to the clearly erroneous standard. See David, 844 F.2d at 769. 20 In this case, the district court held a full evidentiary hearing to determine whether the federal prosecutor removed four of the five black veniremen on the basis of their race. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the government rebutted the prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. The prosecutor provided specific explanations for striking the black venirepersons in question on the basis of friendship or acquaintance with the defendant; difficulty in hearing, which would make understanding the tape-recorded evidence to be used in the trial difficult; prior family involvement with drug charges; and a reputation with the local law enforcement community for involvement in the drug trade. Far from a mere hunch or poorly articulated motive, the prosecutor provided reasonably specific and neutral explanations. 5 21