Opinion ID: 618994
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qi Hui

Text: The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Qi Hui did not timely file his asylum application and that no exceptions to the filing deadline applied. Qi Hui does not challenge that determination on appeal. 4 We have previously explained that the term “withholding of removal” was changed to “restriction on removal” as part of amendments made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 100 Stat. 3009, and that “we use the statutory term restriction on removal,” despite the fact that the regulations and the agency continue to use the term withholding of removal. Ismaiel v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 1198, 1200 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008). -6- Although the BIA upheld the IJ’s determination that Qi Hui’s asylum application was untimely, it nevertheless considered his claim under the asylum standard, which has a lower threshold showing than restriction on removal, see Ba, 539 F.3d at 1271. The BIA agreed with the IJ that the “evidence of record is insufficient to demonstrate that [Qi Hui] suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground.” Admin. R. at 3. Because Qi Hui failed to meet the standard for asylum, he necessarily failed to meet the higher showing required for restriction on removal. See id. Qi Hui first argues that we should consider the cumulative effects of the harm he suffered, citing to Witjaksono v. Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 977 (10th Cir. 2009). He contends that the cumulative effect of his three-day detention–which included beatings and deprivation of food and water–and his wife’s forced sterilization, constitute past persecution. “In this circuit, the determination whether an alien has demonstrated persecution is a question of fact.” Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 974 (quotation omitted). “The BIA’s findings of fact are conclusive unless the record demonstrates that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Niang, 422 F.3d at 1196 (quotation omitted). Here, the BIA “agree[d] with the [IJ’s] findings that, even if the evidence had established that [Qi Hui’s] wife had suffered a forced sterilization, and [he] had demonstrated that he engaged in other -7- resistance [to the family-planning policy], he had failed to show that he experienced harm rising to the level of persecution.” Admin. R. at 4. 5 In similar circumstances, we have upheld the agency’s determination that a brief detention and beating did not rise to the level of persecution. See Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that alien’s two-day detention that involved interrogation and beating did not rise to the level of past persecution). Likewise, in the Ritonga and Witjaksono cases, both of those petitioners, like Qi Hui, suffered minor injuries from a “lone occasion” when they were physically harmed; we concluded that those circumstances did not constitute persecution. Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 976; Witjaksono, 573 F.3d at 977. There is nothing in Qi Hui’s case that compels a different conclusion. As for his wife’s sterilization, spouses are not per se eligible for relief based on the forced sterilization of the other spouse. See Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Matter of J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 537-38 (BIA 2008). Accordingly, the sterilization of Qi Hui’s wife standing alone does not compel the conclusion that Qi Hui suffered persecution. Even considering the sterilization in conjunction with the detention and beatings, as the BIA did, the record does not compel the conclusion that a reasonable 5 We note that the IJ made an adverse credibility finding as part of its decision, but the BIA did not rely on that finding to affirm the denial of relief. -8- adjudicator would have reached a conclusion contrary to the BIA’s determination that Qi Hui did not suffer harm rising to the level of persecution. Qi Hui next contends he is eligible for restriction on removal because he demonstrated that it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted if he returns to China. The BIA, however, agreed with the IJ that the record evidence was insufficient to support Qi Hui’s claim for future persecution. See Admin. R. at 4. Qi Hui argues that “[t]he substantial evidence in the record demonstrates that his spouse was summoned to the village office for interrogation . . . [and] [o]fficials demanded that [Qi Hui] return to China in order to face punishment for his opposition to the family planning policy.” Pet’r Br. at 18. Qi Hui further argues that “[t]he Agency seemed to ignore this aspect of [Qi Hui’s] testimony in assessing his eligibility for [restriction on removal.” Id. While it is true that the BIA did not specifically mention this evidence, it was not required to do so. See Hadjimehdigholi v. INS, 49 F.3d 642, 648 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he BIA is not required to discuss every piece of evidence when it renders a decision.”). “[A]ll that is necessary is a decision that sets out terms sufficient to enable us as a reviewing court to see that the Board has heard, considered, and decided.” Id. (quotation omitted). We see nothing in the BIA’s decision that indicates it failed to consider this evidence. Rather, the BIA agreed with the IJ that the record evidence was insufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. The record does not compel the conclusion that a reasonable -9- adjudicator would reach a decision contrary to the BIA’s determination. See Niang, 422 F.3d at 1196.