Opinion ID: 530543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Compensation for Paralegal Time

Text: 37 The district court awarded $1,042,882.55 in attorney's fees for non-lawyers' services. The NFL argues that the district court erred in declining to follow our decision in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir.1974), where we stated that time billed for paralegals and other non-lawyers cannot be considered as input in the fee award determination. Id. at 473. The district court, citing [v]arious intervening developments in the law, as well as a practical evaluation of the billing practices of law firms,United States Football League, 704 F.Supp. at 483, concluded that Grinnell was no longer good law. Id. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989), confirms that the district court's analysis was correct. 38 In Jenkins, which involved the determination of a reasonable attorney's fee under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, the Supreme Court stated that [c]learly, a 'reasonable attorney's fee' cannot have been meant to compensate only work performed personally by members of the bar. Rather, the term must refer to a reasonable fee for the work product of an attorney. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 2468-69. Accordingly, the Court t[ook] as [its] starting point the self-evident proposition that the 'reasonable attorney's fee' provided for by statute should compensate the work of paralegals, as well as that of attorneys. Id. Thus, without specifically mentioning it, Jenkins effectively overruled Grinnell on this issue. Paralegals' time is includable in an award of attorney's fees. 39 After deciding that attorney's fees awards could include time billed by paralegals and other non-lawyers, the Supreme Court in Jenkins went on to address [t]he more difficult question [of] how the work of paralegals is to be valuated in calculating the overall attorney's fee. Id. The Court concluded that the prevailing practice in a given community is to govern whether paralegals' time is billed separately, and whether it is billed at cost or at market rates. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 2471-72. 40 The district court did not have the benefit of Jenkins when it made its determination regarding paralegals' fees. Therefore, it did not make a finding of fact concerning the prevailing practices in New York law firms for billing paralegals' time. However, an inference that the practice of New York law firms is to bill paralegal time at hourly or market rates may be drawn from the affidavits of Mark E. Segall of Myerson & Kuhn, counsel for the USFL. Regarding the fees for paralegals, Segall stated that, based on his personal experience and familiarity with the billing rates ordinarily charged by comparable New York City firms for comparable work, the rates at which recovery is sought are reasonable. The evidence that is in the record that the billing rates were reasonable was not controverted by the NFL. 41 Given the Supreme Court's endorsement of billing at market rates, we hold that the hourly market rate for paralegal services in New York City is includable in the attorney's fees award in this case. We agree that billing for paralegals' time in this manner makes economic sense, and  'encourages cost-effective delivery of legal services.'  Jenkins, --- U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 2471-72 (quoting Cameo Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Senn, 738 F.2d 836, 846 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106, 105 S.Ct. 780, 83 L.Ed.2d 775 (1985)). 42 The district court's decision foreshadowed the Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins. We are satisfied that the district court would have reached the same conclusion under the Jenkins test. Therefore, we see no need to remand for a determination of the prevailing practice in New York law firms for billing paralegals' time. It was neither error nor an abuse of discretion to include paralegals' fees in the attorney's fees award. Consequently, the award will stand.