Opinion ID: 853805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Taped Statement

Text: Williams first asserts that the tape-recorded statement admitted at trial should have been excluded, as it was not voluntarily given. He further contends that the admitted statement was tainted by the lack of voluntariness and the illegality of the first statement, (Appellant's Br. at 6), i.e., the unrecorded statement that was made to Detective Moore and Sergeant Crooke after the polygraph examination had been administered. (Appellant's Br. at 7.) In considering the admission of a confession, the trial court must assess whether the State's behavior was such as to overbear the defendant's will to resist and to bring about a confession not freely self-determined. Smith v. State, 543 N.E.2d 634, 637 (Ind.1989). On appeal, we consider any uncontroverted evidence and, in the case of conflicting evidence, that which supports a trial court's decision. Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 941 (Ind.1994), cert. denied 516 U.S. 1077, 116 S.Ct. 783, 133 L.Ed.2d 734 (1996). A confession is voluntary if, looking at the totality of the circumstances, it was free and voluntary, not induced by any violence, threats, promises, or other improper influences. Bivins, 642 N.E.2d at 941-42 (citing Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1298 (Ind.1985)). A defendant who is questioned following a polygraph examination that was accompanied by a Miranda advisement is considered to have waived his right to counsel at questioning following the examination unless the circumstances have changed so significantly that his answers are no longer voluntary, or his waiver is no longer knowing and intelligent. Bivins, 642 N.E.2d at 939 (citing Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 103 S.Ct. 394, 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (questioning following polygraph did not require renewed Miranda warning where the questions put to [defendant] after the examination would not have caused him to forget the rights of which he had been advised and which he had understood moments before.)). The circumstances adequately demonstrate that Williams' statement was free and voluntary, rather than compelled. In fact, Williams initiated the interview with the police. He requested transportation to the police station. Although Williams was kept in a locked room during the period of questioning, he made few requests to leave the room, including two requests to visit a restroom (both of which were accommodated). Williams was not placed under arrest until after his unrecorded statement, which was made following a Miranda warning and a polygraph examination. The final tape-recorded statement admitted into evidence was made after Williams, by his own testimony, re-initiated discussion with police officers, (R. at 657), and waived his previous request for counsel in writing. (R. at 693A.) During the hearing on the admissibility of the tape-recorded confession, Williams also acknowledged that he understood his Miranda rights when he gave the statement and that he just wanted it over with. (R. at 657.) Although he claims on appeal that lack of sleep affected the voluntariness of his confession, he admits that he had slept the night before and also that he slept during a portion of the polygraph examination. (R. at 653-54.) Detective Moore testified, contrary to Williams' assertion that the death penalty was mentioned in order to induce Williams to confess, that no such discussion took place. (R. at 645.) In total, the record contains substantial and probative evidence that the statement admitted at trial was voluntarily given. Williams claims his recorded confession was tainted by a previous statement that the trial court suppressed. The trial judge, wishing to err on the side of caution, if at all, suppressed the unrecorded statement that Williams gave following the polygraph examination, largely on the basis that a new interrogator was in the room. [4] (R. at 665.) We think this laudable caution falls far short of anything suggesting that the admitted statement was the fruit of a poisonous tree. Williams also asserts that the admitted statement was tainted because it occurred shortly after Williams invoked his right to counsel. (Appellant's Br. at 7.) In Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262 (Ind.1996), the defendant requested the assistance of counsel after hearing her Miranda rights. A police officer responded that counsel could not be arranged until the next day, and went on to ask administrative and background questions in order to fill out paperwork related to the request for an attorney. The police officer agreed to call the defendant's parents and prepared to leave, saying that she would return if the defendant wished to talk. The defendant then indicated her willingness to talk without counsel, tore up the form she had signed requesting counsel, signed a second waiver of rights, and confessed to having killed the victim. Id. at 1269-70. We held that the trial court in Mayberry could have concluded that the State met its burden of proof of knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendant's right to counsel and her right not to incriminate herself. We found no abuse of discretion in the admission of the videotaped confession. Id. at 1270. Similarly, in this case, Williams changed his mind and decided to make a statement voluntarily shortly after invoking his rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel. Contrary to Williams' assertion on appeal, the fact that there was only a brief period between his request for counsel and his agreement to talk with police without counsel present does not render his statement involuntary per se, absent other evidence that Williams' will was overborne. The trial court was correct to admit Williams' tape-recorded statement.