Opinion ID: 804288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cat’s-Paw Theory of Liability

Text: Proof of Tullock’s racial animosity toward African Americans does not establish Toho’s liability, however, because Tullock was not the decisionmaker with regard to the relevant adverse employment action, Chattman’s final written warning. Instead, Lane and Verbruggen made the ultimate decision to discipline Chattman. We have recognized that a plaintiff can show discrimination by offering evidence of a “‘causal nexus’ between the ultimate decisionmaker’s decision to [discipline] the plaintiff and the supervisor’s discriminatory animus.” Madden, 549 F.3d at 677. Plaintiff must show that “[b]y relying on this discriminatory information flow, the ultimate decisionmakers acted as the conduit of [the supervisor’s] prejudice—his cat’s paw.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). A recent Supreme Court decision, Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011), published after the district court’s decision, elaborated on the cat’s paw theory of liability. Its reasoning is dispositive in this case.10 At issue in Staub was a disciplinary warning issued by Staub’s supervisor, who was shown to have discriminatory animus toward Staub’s military status. Id. at 1189. Staub’s ultimate termination, although not issued by the discriminatory supervisor, was based on that supervisor’s earlier disciplinary warning. Id. 10 While Staub dealt with a discrimination claim pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), the Court’s reasoning applies with equal force to claims brought under Title VII. Both employ a “motivating factor” standard of causation, 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), and the Staub Court launched its analysis from a discussion of that phrase, 131 S. Ct. at 1192. See also Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191 (noting the two statutes are “very similar”); Romans v. Mich. Dep’t of Human Servs., 668 F.3d 826, 836 (6th Cir. 2012) (considering Staub analysis for a Title VII claim). 14 No. 10-5306 Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am. Page 15 The Staub Court defined cat’s paw liability as follows: “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by [discriminatory] animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and that if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under the [Act].” Id. at 1194 (emphasis in original). The Court relied on principles of agency and tort law to impute a lowerlevel supervisor’s discriminatory animus to an otherwise unbiased decisionmaker, thereby rendering the employer liable for the non-decisionmaker’s discrimination. Id. at 1191-92. If the decisionmaker undertakes an investigation which results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action, the employer will not be liable. Id. at 1193. However, “the supervisor’s biased report may remain a causal factor if the independent investigation takes it into account without determining that the adverse action was, apart from the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely justified.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Court refused to completely absolve an employer based on its claim to have conducted an independent investigation. Id. (“We are aware of no principle in tort or agency law under which an employer’s mere conduct of an independent investigation has a claim-preclusive effect.”). Therefore, under Staub, Tullock’s racial animus can be imputed to Lane and Verbruggen where Chattman can show (1) Tullock “intended . . . to cause an adverse employment action” and (2) Tullock’s discriminatory action “is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action.” Id. at 1194.
This element is easily satisfied. Chattman has shown that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Tullock intended that Chattman be disciplined. Both Smith and Chandler denied making any recommendation about disciplining Chattman for the horseplay incident during their initial meeting with Tullock. Yet, Tullock called Lane and informed him that “Ben [Chandler] and I were both recommending termination and Scotty [Smith] as well.” After being told by Lane to conduct a further investigation, but without being informed of a disciplinary 15 No. 10-5306 Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am. Page 16 determination, Tullock then emailed Verbruggen, claiming that Lane had agreed to terminate Chattman during their phone conversation. Tullock made these recommendations knowing them to be false and notwithstanding the fact that horseplay was common at the plant and several white employees had engaged in horseplay without being terminated. The Staub Court made clear that [a]nimus and responsibility for the adverse action can both be attributed to the earlier agent [Tullock] if the adverse action is the intended consequence of that agent’s discriminatory conduct. So long as the agent intends, for discriminatory reasons, that the adverse action occur, he has the scienter required to be liable under [the Act]. 131 S. Ct. at 1192. There can be little doubt that Tullock desired Chattman’s termination when he made his recommendation and fabricated the agreement of the other supervisors in his communications with Lane and Verbruggen. We do not believe the fact that Chattman was ultimately issued a final written warning rather than terminated alters this or the proximate cause analysis.11
To survive summary judgment, the second prong of the Staub rule requires Chattman to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tullock’s actions were a proximate cause of Chattman’s discipline. Cat’s paw liability attaches when the biased intermediate employee’s actions are “a causal factor of the ultimate employment action.” Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1193. The intermediate employee’s actions need not be the sole cause of the adverse action; “[t]he decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment is also a proximate cause of the employment decision, but it is common for 11 The Staub Court recognized that it was not presented with the situation where a discriminatory supervisor intends to cause an adverse action and a different adverse action results. Id. at 1192 n.2. However, the Court noted that “[u]nder the traditional doctrine of proximate cause, a tortfeasor is sometimes, but not always, liable” is such situations. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) Torts §§ 435, 435B & cmt. a). Here, though Tullock desired a greater level of punishment, his actions were a causal factor in the punishment that was issued. “The employer is at fault because one of its agents committed an action based on discriminatory animus that was intended to cause, and did in fact case, an adverse employment decision.” Id. at 1193. 16 No. 10-5306 Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am. Page 17 injuries to have multiple proximate causes.” Id. at 1192 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). An employer will not be liable for its intermediate employee’s discrimination if “the employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action.” Id. at 1193. However, if the adverse employment action is related to the discriminatory action, the employer may be liable. Neither independent investigation nor independent judgment on the part of the employer provides a per se defense.12 For example, if the intermediate supervisor makes a biased report to the ultimate decisionmaker, it may be a causal factor in the adverse action if the independent investigation by the employer “takes it into account without determining that the adverse action was, apart from the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely justified.” Id. Also, if “the independent investigation relies on facts provided by the biased supervisor,” id., then the investigation was not, in actuality, independent and the employer is liable. As Toho points out, Staub’s causation analysis is not contrary to the cat’s paw case law that already exists in this Circuit. We have previously held that an employer is liable for an intermediate employee’s discrimination when there is proof of a “causal nexus” between the discrimination and the adverse action, Madden, 549 F.3d at 677, or when the intermediate employee “influences the unbiased decision-maker” to take an adverse action, Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 604 n.13 (6th Cir. 2008). To the extent these cases are not inconsistent with Staub, we look to them for additional guidance. Chattman has demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Tullock’s actions were a proximate cause of his discipline. In Madden we held that the biased supervisor’s “discrimination in what information [he] presented to senior managers” was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find 12 To the extent our prior case law holds otherwise, it is overruled by Staub. See, e.g., Wilson v. Stroh Cos., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir. 1992). 17 No. 10-5306 Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am. Page 18 causation. 549 F.3d at 677. Chattman has presented parallel evidence. Like Madden, Chattman alleges that Tullock knew that white employees engaged in horseplay but never reported any of those incidents to upper management, instead reporting the only incident on record of a black employee engaging in horseplay. In Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., we held that a biased employee’s “position [of] influence” is probative of that employee’s ability to influence the ultimate decisionmaker. 154 F.3d 344, 355 (6th Cir. 1998). Like the biased supervisor in Ercegovich, who was head of retail sales, Tullock’s position as Human Resources Director doubtlessly gave him some authority over personnel decisions. Further, Tullock was “involved in some parts of the discussion” regarding Chattman’s discipline and non-promotion, a factor the Ercegovich Court found indicative of the intermediate employee’s influence over the employment decisions. Id. Thus, we cannot say that the investigation conducted by Verbruggen and Lane was “unrelated” to Tullock’s actions. Tullock was the Human Resources manager, and he actively inserted himself in the decisionmaking process. He both misinformed and selectively informed Lane and Verbruggen about the incident. A reasonable factfinder could find Tullock’s actions were a proximate cause of the adverse decisions. Because Chattman has presented evidence of Tullock’s discriminatory animus and offered sufficient proof under the Staub rule to create genuine issues of fact as to intent and causation, this evidence will be imputed to Toho. Thus, summary judgment was improper. The adverse employment actions alleged by Chattman and any damages flowing therefrom are matters to be resolved by a jury.