Opinion ID: 2166559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Events after the Court of Appeals' Opinion

Text: Approximately one and one-half years after he authored the Powell opinion, Judge Amundson resigned his seat on the court of appeals. Soon afterward, Judge Amundson pleaded guilty to theft of over $300,000 from a trust fund for which he was acting as a trustee. On March 10, 2002, in one of its series of articles regarding Judge Amundson, the Star Tribune newspaper mentioned that the trust in question was represented by trust attorney R. Thomas Greene Jr. Greene is a partner at the Rider Bennett law firm. According to Greene's affidavit submitted in this case, he began representing [Amundson] in his capacity as trustee of the trust    on October 25, 1995; he joined Rider Bennett in March 1996; and he withdrew from representing Amundson in this capacity on September 27, 2001, for reasons unrelated to this proceeding. Greene was therefore at Rider Bennett, representing the trust for which Judge Amundson served as a trustee, for the entire duration of the court of appeals' proceedings in Powell. [4] Powell's counsel saw the Star Tribune article, recognized Greene's name, and filed a motion in the court of appeals to vacate the court's earlier decision based on the attorney-client relationship between Judge Amundson and Rider Bennett. A new panel of the court of appeals unanimously denied the motion. The court wrote: Appellant has not established that the relief sought is authorized by Minnesota law or is warranted. The unanimous decision in this case was made by a panel, and that decision is the decision of the entire court. Minn.Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 1 (2000). After a careful review of the internal handling of this matter, the submissions of all parties, and the appellate record, the panel has concluded that there has not been a sufficient showing for the extraordinary remedy sought. Powell again filed a petition for further review; this time we granted the petition. The parties apparently agree that jurisdiction to vacate a final decision of the court of appeals arises under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 102, which provides that, for good cause shown, the supreme court or the court of appeals may suspend the requirements of the appellate rules. Such jurisdiction also exists in this court under our supervisory power to ensure the fair administration of justice. See, e.g., State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn.1994). We further note that in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988), a case with comparable facts to this one, the United States Supreme Court held that it had the power to vacate a final district court judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which is substantially identical to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(f). We view this appeal as presenting two separate questions:

We have had only rare occasion to address the question of the disqualification of an appellate judge. In one of those cases, State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361 (Minn.1977), we looked for guidance on such a question to the ABA Standards of Judicial Administration, Standards Relating to Appellate Courts. We do so again now.