Opinion ID: 2608848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: third issue: reasonable relationship between section 6 of the regulation and its purpose

Text: That previously said with reference to the first two issues reflects that Section 6 of the regulation does have a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. It is reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes. It thus satisfies the necessary element of due process of law. Appellants cite Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 463 U.S. 29, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) and 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law § 303 (1962) with reference to those requirements, but appellants argue the applicability of the requirements only on the basis that Section 6 of the regulation is no more than an interference in market decisions between OEM and non-OEM parts. The authorities cited by appellants require the administrative rule to be reasonable. The reference to 2 Am.Jur.2d, supra, concerns the reasonable requirement. It is followed by § 304, which reads: The requirement of reasonableness of an administrative regulation means no more and no less than that the regulation must be based upon reasonable grounds  that is, it must be supported by good reasons. The reasonableness of rules and regulations, and exemptions therein, is determined by their relationship to the statutory scheme they are designed to supplement, protect, and enforce. Reasonableness is determined in view of the stated objectives of the legislation, and if a regulation is within the purpose of the statute it is reasonable. Whether a regulation is reasonable depends on the character or nature of the condition to be met or overcome, and the nature of the subject matter of a rule may affect its reasonableness. Thus, the regulation of certain activities involving mere privilege, such as the sale of intoxicating liquor or the conduct of horse racing, is accorded liberal judicial support, and the court is slow to find such regulations unreasonable. An administrator has a large range of choice in determining what regulations or standards should be adopted. It is not necessarily a valid objection to his choice that another choice could reasonably have been made, that experts dis[a]greed over the desirability of a particular standard, and that some other method of regulation would have accomplished the same purpose and would have been less onerous. It is enough that the administrator has acted within the statutory bounds of his authority, and that his choice among possible alternatives adopted to the statutory end is one which a rational person could have made. In order to set aside a regulation, it must be clearly unreasonable. If reasonable minds may well be divided on the question, the administrator must be upheld. It must be shown that no reasonable administrator would have made such a regulation and that it is so lacking in reason that it is essentially arbitrary. As set out supra under the first two issues, Section 6 of the regulation is primarily directed to protection of the insured, to allow the insured to receive the benefit of his bargain, to further define the ambiguous word kind in the policy as approved by the Commissioner, and to promote the safety and welfare of the public. As such, it has a reasonable relation to the purpose for which made.