Opinion ID: 687305
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Flanigan's Role in the Strip Search

Text: 77 The appellant argues that the magistrate judge erred in finding that Flanigan had not requested the strip search at the jail but that the officer had probable cause to believe that Kraushaar was attempting to conceal something in his clothing. As explained in detail above, we find that Flanigan had a reasonable suspicion that Kraushaar may have been hiding contraband in his pants and, therefore, Kraushaar was properly subjected to a strip search at the jail. Because there was no violation of Kraushaar's constitutional rights with respect to that search, we need not determine whether Flanigan had actually requested the search or otherwise participated in it to a degree that would subject him to liability. 78 The appellant points out, however, that the magistrate judge failed to address the appellant's claim that a strip search occurred at the scene of the arrest. Kraushaar and Newnam testified that Flanigan had unbuttoned Kraushaar's pants, causing them to fall around his thighs and expose his underwear. Flanigan and Winterroth testified that Flanigan had merely stuck his thumb inside Kraushaar's waistband as part of the pat-down search. Unfortunately, the magistrate judge's findings make no reference whatsoever to any of this contradictory evidence. 6 79 Although the magistrate judge found probable cause for the arrest and found no evidence that the officers had used unnecessary force in effecting the arrest, those findings do not resolve the question of whether Flanigan unbuttoned the plaintiff's pants. Obviously, the magistrate judge rejected plaintiff's testimony regarding the use of force in effecting the arrest. But he made no findings whatsoever regarding the credibility of Kraushaar's statements concerning the search at the scene. While it may seem likely that Kauffman found Kraushaar's testimony incredible in its entirety, this court cannot make that blanket assumption because a factfinder may believe some parts of a witness's testimony while rejecting other parts. See United States v. Colston, 936 F.2d 312, 315 (7th Cir.) (Generally, juries may reject parts of a witness's testimony while accepting other parts.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 951, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991). 80 Our discussion regarding the reasonableness of the search conducted at the jail does not dispose of the appellant's claim regarding a search at the scene of his arrest. Under the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence described above, the reasonableness of a search turns upon the need for the particular search as balanced against the level of intrusiveness. The search at the jail is justified by the need to ensure that weapons and contraband do not get into a detention facility. The alleged search at the scene, however, would come under the rubric of a search incident to arrest, which is justified by the need to ensure the safety of the officer making the arrest. A traffic arrest normally will not present the type of danger that would justify a strip search at the scene. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2609, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983) (stating, in dictum, that the interests supporting a search incident to arrest would hardly justify disrobing an arrestee on the street....). 7 81 The District of Columbia Circuit has recently upheld a search in which an officer unbuttoned a suspect's pants at the scene of the arrest. United States v. Ashley, 37 F.3d 678, 680-82 (D.C.Cir.1994). In that case, however, the pants were unbuttoned only enough to allow the officer to reach in and remove a bag that was sticking out the top of the suspect's underwear. The opinion further states that precautions were taken to insure the public would not see that the suspect's pants were unbuttoned. In the case at bar, on the other hand, the plaintiff's evidence suggests that he was standing behind his truck--presumably in full view of other motorists--with his pants around his thighs and his underwear exposed. Taking this evidence to be true, such a search would be much more intrusive than the search in Ashley. 82 Given the conflicting evidence, disposition of this issue necessarily turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, which is a factual matter that should be resolved by the trial court. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291-92, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1791-92, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) ([F]actfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate courts, and ... the Court of Appeals should not have resolved in the first instance [a] factual dispute which had not been considered by the District Court.); 5A James Wm. Moore and Jo Desha Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice p 52.06 (1994). Accordingly, we find that the judgment must be vacated as to Count VIII of the complaint and the case remanded to the magistrate judge to make a specific finding on this claim. 8