Opinion ID: 900539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due Process Termination

Text: [¶ 12.] The gravamen of Hollander's complaint is that he was not afforded due process in his termination. Success in such a claim depends in large part on the presence of a property right in continued employment. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494, 501 (1985) (citations omitted). A property interest worthy of due process protection must be granted or defined by a source independent from the Constitution, such as state law. Id. See also Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 975 (8th Cir.1999)(citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561 (1972)). [¶ 13.] South Dakota is an employment at will state: An employment having no specified term may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other.... SDCL 60-4-4; Butterfield v. Citibank of South Dakota, 437 N.W.2d 857, 859 (S.D.1989)(citing Larson v. Kreiser's Inc., 427 N.W.2d 833, 834 (S.D.1988)). Personnel in an employment at will arrangement may be dismissed at any time for any reason. Petersen v. Sioux Valley Hosp. Assn., 486 N.W.2d 516, 520 (S.D. 1992). Employment at will, therefore, creates no constitutionally protected property interest. Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125-26, 119 S.Ct. 489, 492, 142 L.Ed.2d 502, 508 (1998) (citations omitted). [¶ 14.] Hollander argues that he was covered by the Douglas County Disciplinary Action and Grievance Procedure, taking his employment outside South Dakota's employment at will law. [2] In Osterkamp v. Alkota Manufacturing , we recognized a narrow exception: it applies when an employer's discharge policy provides that termination will occur only for cause. See Butterfield, 437 N.W.2d at 859 (S.D.1989)(discussing Osterkamp v. Alkota Manufacturing, 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983)). The exception can develop in one of two ways. First, an agreement to discharge for cause arises when an employee handbook explicitly provides, in the same or comparable language that discharge can occur for cause only. Butterfield, 437 N.W.2d at 859 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Johnston v. DLORAH, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 201, 202 (S.D. 1995). Second, a contract providing that termination will not occur absent cause will be implied where the handbook contains a detailed list of exclusive grounds for employee discipline or discharge and, a mandatory and specific procedure which the employer agrees to follow prior to any employee's termination. Butterfield, 437 N.W.2d at 859. [¶ 15.] Our central inquiry is whether the county disciplinary policy expressed a clear intention to surrender the statutory right to terminate employees at will. See Johnston, 529 N.W.2d at 202. If Hollander can show that he could have been fired only for good cause, he has a protected property interest in continued employment. See Hopkins, 199 F.3d at 975 (citing Spitzmiller v. Hawkins, 183 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir.1999)). Douglas County's grievance policy provides: