Opinion ID: 2519714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: statutory and regulatory duties

Text: ¶ 20 We next examine whether the District owed Young any regulatory or statutory duties of care. With respect to this question, Young contends that the District had a mandatory regulatory duty to (1) prepare... a [safe] routing plan for students attending Dilworth Elementary, (2) outline... areas of concern in that plan, and (3) send that plan to local and state jurisdictions that have responsibility for highways within the [school's] boundaries. Utah Admin. Code R920-5-2(A)(3) (1996). He then argues that, based on these explicit regulatory duties, the District had a duty to inform Salt Lake City of known dangerous parking conditions existing near the crosswalk at which he was injured. We disagree. ¶ 21 Although imposing some obligations on school districts, rule 920-5-2(A)(3) of Utah's Administrative Code does not expressly impose liability on the District for not informing Salt Lake City of dangerous parking conditions of which it had knowledge. Moreover, we decline to infer liability from the wording of the regulation because the stated purpose behind rule 920-5-2(A)(3) is to ensure uniformity in traffic control devices and crossing guards, Utah Admin. Code R920-5-1(B) (1996) (declaring that the sole purpose behind rule 920-5-2(A)(3) is to standardize, as much as possible, applications of traffic control devices and crossing guards on all public highways in the State of Utah), not to make school districts liable for any resulting inconsistencies. Further, in the absence of a clear indication from the regulation itself, we are not generally in the habit of implying a private right of action.... Broadbent v. Bd. of Educ. of the Cache County Sch. Dist., 910 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct.App.1996); see also Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974) (holding that where a criminal statute did not provide for a private right of action, the matter was best left to the Legislature). The regulation at issue includes no such clear indication. Accordingly, we hold that no private right of action existed. [8] ¶ 22 Relying on subsection 41-6-20.1(3) of the Utah Code, Young next asserts that the District had a duty to provide a crossing guard at the crosswalk the night he was injured. Pointing to that same subsection, he also alleges that the District had a duty to provide flashing warning lights. We conclude that the statutory provision on which Young relies does not support either contention. Specifically, subsection 41-6-20.1(3) of the Utah Code declares that [f]or all reduced speed school zones on highways. . . the local authority shall . . . provide, train, and supervise school crossing guards [and] provide for the[] operation of ... warning lights .... Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-20.1(3)(a)-(b) (1996) (emphasis added). The District does not qualify as a local authority as defined by the Code, however, because it cannot enact traffic laws. Indeed, for the purpose of chapter 6 of title 41 of the Utah Code, a local authority is restricted to every county, municipal, and other local board or body having authority to enact laws relating to traffic under the constitution and laws of the state. Id. § 41-6-1(17). Accordingly, the plain language of subsection 41-6-20.1(3) of the Utah Code imposes no statutory duties on the District. See Rife, 908 P.2d at 149 (examining an almost identical statute and concluding that the school district clearly does not fall within the definition of a `local authority').