Opinion ID: 1343601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: liability of county defendants

Text: 2. The plaintiffs allege that the county was negligent in one way: deputy sheriff Duncan interrupted a private rescue without providing a meaningful alternative. Because I believe the public duty doctrine should encompass the provision of police services, I would apply it to the deputy sheriff's actions in this case. Specifically, Duncan is a law enforcement officer who performed traditional police services when he responded to the call for an ambulance, turned on his siren and blue lights while driving to the pool, and exercised crowd control at the emergency scene. AFFIRMATIVE ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE 3. The claim against the county is based on allegations that Duncan's affirmative acts of negligence made Hamilton's injuries worse. In Jordan, we left open the question whether a special duty is required despite evidence of an affirmative act of negligence. [11] I conclude that the public duty doctrine should apply to affirmative acts of negligence as well as the failure to act. [12] It is difficult to distinguish between acts of misfeasance and nonfeasance, [13] and the same behavior can be alleged as either a negligent act or a negligent failure to act. For example, if a police officer stopped a drunk driver and then released him or her, a person later injured by that driver could sue the officer either for failing to arrest the drunk driver (a failure to act) or for permitting the drunk driver to drive away (an affirmative act). Moreover, despite the greater likelihood of courts finding liability when a public employee commits an affirmative act of negligence, [14] that result is no reason for basing the duty owed to the public on the type of negligence alleged. Finally, the nature of the negligent act is more relevant to the issue of whether a special relationship exists than whether a special relationship is required. [15] For these reasons, I would evaluate allegations of affirmative acts of negligence as part of the special relationship analysis. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 4. In determining whether the plaintiff established that Hamilton and the deputy sheriff had a special relationship, I do not believe that this court is limited to the special relationship test set forth in the City of Rome v. Jordan . [16] As stated in footnote four of the Jordan opinion, we did not determine in that case whether a special duty may exist even in the absence of a special relationship where a police officer is present at the scene of a crime, has the knowledge and the resources to act to the benefit of the injured party, yet does not act. [17] That footnote suggests that a police officer may have a special duty to a specific individual without meeting the requirements of the special relationship test established in Jordan. Although a person generally does not have a duty to assist other persons in danger, [18] a person who undertakes a rescue generally has a duty not to increase the harm. [19] Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that one who undertakes to render services to another, which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other person, is subject to liability if he fails to exercise reasonable care and this failure increases the risk of harm. Addressing the duty of one who takes charge of a helpless person, section 324 provides that the person who takes charge is subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm caused to him by (a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other while within the actor's charge, or (b) the actor's discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so doing he leaves the other in a worse position than when the actor took charge of him. Thus, under the Good Samaritan doctrine, a rescuer voluntarily assumes a duty to avoid affirmative conduct that makes the condition of the helpless person worse. Since I believe these principles generally should apply to public employees as well as private citizens, I conclude that a police officer creates a special duty under the public duty doctrine when the officer voluntarily assumes a duty to act for the protection of injured persons at an emergency scene. [20] This duty is based not on a general duty to protect the public; rather, it is based on the specific actions of the police officer at the scene of the emergency in exercising control over an identifiable individual and voluntarily undertaking to assist that person. Like private persons who act as Good Samaritans, police officers who engage in the rescue of an injured person have a special duty not to make that person's situation worse or affirmatively increase the harm associated with that person's circumstances. [21] Applying this ruling, I conclude that the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff establish a special relationship between Hamilton and deputy sheriff Duncan that sets Hamilton apart from the general public and engenders a special duty owed by the county to her. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the private rescuer was administering CPR and Hamilton was responding positively to it when deputy sheriff Duncan assumed control of the emergency scene and ordered the rescuer to clear away. The plaintiff further alleges that Duncan did not attempt to administer CPR himself or allow anyone else to administer it for several minutes and that the delay made Hamilton's condition worse. Based on these facts, I would hold that Duncan had a special duty to not worsen Hamilton's condition by stopping an ongoing, private rescue effort that may have had successful results, without offering a reasonable alternative. This analysis is consistent with the rationale behind the public duty doctrine. Once Duncan had specifically identified Hamilton as a member of the public who needed assistance and took charge of her perilous situation, neither Duncan nor the sheriff's department was engaged in a resource-allocating function. Moreover, finding a special relationship in this case is consistent with the liability exposure of a private party for the actions of a third party. Because I find that a special relationship existed between Hamilton and the deputy sheriff, it is not necessary to reach the issue of detrimental reliance raised in the third certified question. By not reaching the detrimental reliance prong of the Jordan test, I do not mean to foreclose the possibility that the detrimental reliance prong could be satisfied under the circumstances of this case. CLAIMS OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE 5. OCGA § 35-1-7 addresses the liability of law enforcement officers who perform duties at the scene of an emergency. It provides: A law enforcement officer shall not be liable at law for any action or actions done while performing any duty at the scene of an emergency except for gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, or malfeasance. As used in this Code section, the term law enforcement officer means any peace officer who is employed by this state or any political subdivision thereof and who is required by the terms of his employment, whether by election or appointment, to give his full time to the preservation of public order or the protection of life and property or the prevention of crime. Such term shall include sheriffs and deputy sheriffs. By its terms, the statute does not create a duty. Instead, it provides immunity from liability where a duty exists. [22] Just as I would determine that the public duty doctrine applies to allegations of affirmative acts of negligence, I would hold that allegations of gross negligence are not exempt from the public duty doctrine. As illustrated by this case, there often is no difference between evidence of negligence and gross negligence and, although not binding on this court, other states generally have not distinguished between negligence and gross negligence in applying the public duty doctrine. [23] This refusal to distinguish between the two types of allegations prevents the plaintiff's description from controlling the duty owed by a public employee.