Opinion ID: 1942017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Abney's Excluded Testimony.

Text: Appellant Abney contends that the trial judge abused his discretion when he excluded a statement from Angelic Elliott which Abney's counsel attempted to elicit on cross-examination. Abney's counsel proffered that the witness would have relayed that she heard Abney state, after he had come into the Abney house on the night in question, that he was not aware that Smith had been stabbed, and that he would retaliate against Walker. The trial court excluded these statements, reasoning that they were self-serving hearsay statements which would have implicated Walker, and thereby would have bolstered an otherwise frivolous motion for a severance. Where a defendant has repeatedly filed motions to sever his or her case, and these motions have been denied, the trial court assumes a heightened obligation to assure that the defendant was not prejudiced as a result of the joinder. See, e.g., Hordge v. United States, 545 A.2d 1249, 1258 (D.C.1988); Carpenter v. United States, 430 A.2d 496, 501 (D.C.) (en banc) (once a severance issue is presented the court has a continuing duty to take adequate measures to guard against unfair prejudice from joinder), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 852, 102 S.Ct. 295, 70 L.Ed.2d 143 (1981). Abney contends that the trial court should have admitted these statements under one of three exceptions to the hearsay rule: (1) excited utterance; (2) present sense impression; or (3) a statement of then existing mental condition. The trial court determined that although there may be some reasons to admit this testimony, it also agreed with the prosecutor's characterization of the statements as a self-serving declaration. The elements constituting a spontaneous utterance are: (1) the occurrence of a startling event which `causes a state of nervous excitement or physical shock in the declarant, (2) a declaration made within a reasonably short period of time after the occurrence so as to assure that the declarant' did not reflect upon the event and possibly fabricate a statement, and (3) `circumstances, which in their totality suggest spontaneity and sincerity of the remark.' Price v. United States, 545 A.2d 1219, 1226 (D.C.1988) (quoting Alston v. United States, 462 A.2d 1122, 1126-27 (D.C.1983)). Abney fails to satisfy the first and third elements, and thus the trial court properly excluded this testimony. Absent evidence that Abney `suffered mental disturbance or shock as a result of the event,' id. (quoting Alston, supra, 462 A.2d at 1127), the first element remains unsatisfied. If the declaration is a calm narrative of a past event, it loses the character of a spontaneous utterance. Alston, supra, 462 A.2d at 1127. There is no indication, in this proceeding, demonstrating that Abney, the declarant, was distraught, in shock, or in a state of nervous excitement at the time the statement was uttered. [7] Accordingly, the trial court had no basis, in the existing evidence, to find that the first element had been satisfied. Abney also failed to satisfy the third element because it is apparent that the circumstances surrounding the incident, in its entirety, suggested a lack of spontaneity and sincerity. For instance, Angelic Elliott testified that after the fight, when Abney returned inside the house, and was questioned by one of the witnesses as to why he did it, Elliott stated that he [Abney] said because II didn't forget what he hadwhat he had done to me. Other witnesses in the Abney house testified that when questioned as to why he did it, Abney referred to some pole incident, which alluded to a previous confrontation with Smith. Similarly, Abney's claim that these statements constituted a present sense impression is without merit. The present sense rule requires that a statement must describe or explain an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. See Burgess v. United States, 608 A.2d 733, 739 (D.C.1992) (per curiam). Clearly, Abney's statement to Elliott, that he was unaware of the stabbing, fails to fall within the requirements for present sense impression since it did not describe the event, but instead related a fact which the declarant did not perceive. Abney's statement of avenging the stabbing by retaliating against Walker does not satisfy the state of mind exception either because Abney's state of mind was not at issue in the case. Rather, the issue centered on Abney's knowledge of Walker's actions during the fight, not his state of mind. The threshold requirement to admit an out-of-court statement under the state of mind exception rests on whether the declarant's state of mind is at issue in the case. Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 596 (D.C.1991) (citations omitted). The law is clear that when a declarant's state of mind is at issue, extrajudicial statements which reveal that state of mind are admissible. Id. Abney's state of mind was not at issue in the case, and therefore his extrajudicial statements about Walker are not admissible under the state of mind exception. [8] Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in excluding Abney's testimony.