Opinion ID: 1194287
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: duty to support

Text: With reference to incapacity, I prefer to simply refer to a well recognized, but not universally recognized, exception to the general proposition that there is no obligation on the part of a parent to support an adult child, which exception continues the parental obligation to support where the child is of weak body or mind. Annotation: Parent's obligation to support adult child, 1 A.L.R.2d 910, § 5; see 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child, § 103, referring to cases with language such as: `Generally, the obligation of a parent to support a child ceases when the child reaches majority, but an exception arises when the child is, from physical or mental deficiencies, unable to support himself.' Fincham v. Levin, Fla.App., 155 So.2d 883, 884 (1963), quoting from Perla v. Perla, Fla., 58 So.2d 689 (1952). It is true, as respondent suggests, that generally at common law a parent's obligation to support his child ends when the latter becomes of age. But there is an important, widely recognized exception to this rule where the child because of weak body or mind is unable to care for itself upon attaining majority. The obligation to support such a child ceases only when the necessity for the support ceases. Courts throughout the land have so held emphatically and eloquently. This case plainly falls within this exception to the general rule. Davis v. Davis, 246 Iowa 262, 67 N.W.2d 566, 568 (1954). Appellant refers to the following quotations in Wantulok v. Wantulok, 67 Wyo. 22, 214 P.2d 477, 21 A.L.R.2d 572 (1950) as authority for placing Wyoming in a position contrary to making an exception to the general rule in favor of an incapacitated child. (The case concerned a question as to whether or not a trust should be imposed upon certain property. An issue was presented relative to the liability for a debt resulting from sickness and death of an adult daughter):    It is said in 46 C.J. 1269: `In the absence of statute, a parent ordinarily is under no legal obligation to support an adult child; but the legal liability for the support of the child ceases when it reaches the age of majority.'    (Emphasis added.) 214 P.2d at 483. In referring to such quotation, appellant overlooks two things: (1) the word ordinarily in the quotation, and (2) the balance of the quotation taken from 46 C.J. Parent and Child, p. 1269. The quotation continues:    unless the child elects to remain the servant of its father, under his roof, and receive support from him, or unless it is in such a feeble and dependent condition physically or mentally as to be unable to support itself ;    (Emphasis added.) I do not read into § 20-2-113(a), W.S. 1977 [2] an intention of the legislature to change this law. The entire rationale for imposing support on a parent for a minor child is that the child usually cannot be on its own and fend for itself in the business and social world because it has not yet attained full physical and mental ability to do so. When such physical and mental ability has not yet been obtained even upon reaching the age of majority, the rationale for automatic emancipation at that age does not exist. When it does not exist, the result coming therefrom cannot be. The child simply is not emancipated. It still has need for care, custody and maintenance. The duty and responsibility for parental support remains. The question of whether or not the child is so physically and mentally incapacitated as to preclude emancipation at age nineteen is one of fact. Historically, the obligation for child support has ceased when the child is emancipated. Emancipation can result under various circumstances, such as the child's marriage, his entry into the armed forces, and upon his reaching the age of majority (19 years of age since 1973, see § 14-1-101, W.S. 1977, infra). But an exception exists when the triggering event is the reaching of the age of majority, i.e., emancipation will not result upon the child's reaching the age of majority if the child is then unable to care for or maintain himself because of physical or mental deficiencies. In such case, the parental duty to support remains until such physical or mental deficiency no longer prevents the child from caring for and maintaining himself. The language of § 20-2-113(a), W.S. 1977 [3] does not conflict with this determination. It does not say that emancipation occurs in any specific fashion. It provides that the disposition shall be as appears most expedient and beneficial for the well being of the child, and that the care, custody and maintenance of the child shall be as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children require. The intent for support to cease when the necessity for it ceases is evident. When a child enters the armed services or when he gets married, the cessation of necessity occurs. Emancipation results. The obligation of parental support ceases. The time at which age of the child attaches a responsibility or privilege to him and removes such from the parent varies with the nature of the specific responsibility or privilege. Following are some examples: If the minor is under the age of fourteen (14) years, the court or judge may nominate and appoint his guardian. If he is fourteen (14) years of age or older he may nominate his own guardian,   . (Emphasis added). Section 3-2-102, W.S. 1977 (part of the Article pertaining to Guardian and Ward). [4] Whoever takes, leads, carries, decoys, or entices away a child under the age of twelve (12) years, with intent unlawfully to detain or conceal such child from its parents, guardian, or other person having the lawful charge or custody thereof;    [commits a crime]. (Emphasis and bracketed material added.) Section 6-4-202, W.S. 1977. When any parent, living apart from the other parent who by express agreement or court order has the physical custody or control of a child under the age of fourteen (14) years, takes, leads, carries, decoys or entices away the child    [commits a crime]. (Emphasis and bracketed material added.) Section 6-4-203, W.S. 1977. (a) Any actor who inflicts sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim commits [the crime of] sexual assault in the second degree if, under circumstances not constituted sexual assault in the first degree:       (v) At the time of the commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age and the actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim; (Emphasis and bracketed material added.) Section 6-4-303(a)(v), W.S. 1977. An actor who is at least four (4) years older than the victim and who inflicts sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years is guilty of [the crime of] sexual assault in the fourth degree. (Emphasis and bracketed material added.) Section 6-4-305, W.S. 1977.    if any brother or sister, being of the age of sixteen (16) years or upwards, shall have sexual intercourse together    he or she shall be deemed guilty of incest   . (Emphasis added.) Section 6-5-102, W.S. 1977. (a) Every person who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any person under the age of nineteen (19),    is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Any person under the age of nineteen (19) who has any alcoholic or malt beverage in his possession    is guilty of a misdemeanor.    (Emphasis added.) Section 12-6-101, W.S. 1977. (a) Any property owner is entitled to recover damages from the parents of any minor under the age of seventeen (17) years and over the age of ten (10) years who maliciously and willfully damages or destroys his property.    (Emphasis added.) Section 14-2-203, W.S. 1977. (a) Any person legally responsible for the support of a child under the age of eighteen (18) years who abandons, deserts, neglects or unjustifiably fails to support the child is liable for support of the child.    (Emphasis added.) Section 14-2-204, W.S. 1977. Anyone who solicits, procures or knowingly encourages anyone under the age of sixteen (16) years to engage in illicit sexual penetration or sexual intrusion    is guilty of a felony   . (Emphasis added.) Section 14-3-104, W.S. 1977. (a) At the time of marriage the parties shall be at least sixteen (16) years of age except as otherwise provided. (Emphasis added.) Section 20-1-102(a), W.S. 1977. (a)    [A]ny parent who without just cause or lawful excuse deserts, or fails or refuses to provide adequately for the care, support and maintenance of his child or children under the age of eighteen (18) years, is guilty of a crime   . (Emphasis added.) Section 20-3-101(a), W.S. 1977. (a) A person may register to vote not less than thirty (30) days before an election, or at a primary election, who satisfies the following qualifications:       (ii) He will be at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of the next election. (Emphasis added.) Section 22-3-102(a)(ii), W.S. 1977. (a) As used in this act    [requiring payment of minimum wage to employees]:       (iv) `Employee' includes any individual employed by an employer but shall not include:       (F) All minors under eighteen (18) years of age   . (Emphasis and bracketed material added.) Section 27-4-201, W.S. 1977. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to employ, permit or suffer any child under the age of sixteen (16) years to work at any gainful occupation except farm and domestic service,    [unless the child has a work permit, which permit will not be issued in any event for employment in extra hazardous occupations]. (Emphasis and bracketed material added.) Section 27-6-107, W.S. 1977. Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 14-2-204(a) and 20-3-101(a), supra, in divorce decrees, as already noted, the time at which a parent is normally relieved of the duty to support his children is nineteen, the age fixed by § 14-1-101, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1981: (a) Upon becoming nineteen (19) years of age, an individual reaches the age of majority and as an adult acquires all rights and responsibilities granted or imposed by statute or common law, except as otherwise provided by law. (b) A minor may consent to health care treatment to the same extent as if he were an adult when: (i) The minor is or was legally married; (ii) The minor is in the active military service of the United States; (iii) The parents or guardian of the minor cannot with reasonable diligence be located and the minor's need for health care treatment is sufficiently urgent to require immediate attention; or (iv) The minor is living apart from his parents or guardian and is managing his own affairs regardless of his source of income. (c) The consent given pursuant to W.S. 14-1-101(b) is not subject to disaffirmance because of minority. (Emphasis added.) Reading this section, as we must, in harmony with common law and other statutes and decisions of the court, Civic Ass'n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 116 P.2d 236 (1941); Matter of Adoption of Voss, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481 (1976); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Wyo., 568 P.2d 908 (1977); Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295 (1979), and in light of the purpose to be accomplished, School Districts Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10, Campbell County v. Cook, Wyo., 424 P.2d 751 (1967); Hoffmeister v. McIntosh, Wyo., 361 P.2d 678 (1961), emancipation occurs when the child reaches the age of nineteen years unless the child is then unable to care for or maintain himself because of physical or mental deficiencies, in which event the emancipation occurs at the time he becomes able to care for and maintain himself. The foregoing is also dispositive of the question as to whether or not the district court has jurisdiction to make such decree.    By and large, however, the great majority of cases in this country hold that in a divorce action the father may be required to support an adult child who is incapable, from physical or mental disability, of supporting himself. There is some authority to the contrary, but it is rare, mostly outdated, and contrary to enlightened views on the responsibilities of parents. Clark on Domestic Relations, § 15.1, p. 495. See Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953, 113 A.L.R. 889 (1937) (statutory grant of power is not limitation on court's independent equitable powers), and McBride v. Lomheim, 82 S.D. 263, 144 N.W.2d 564 (1966) (parent's liability to support substantially handicapped daughter may be enforced in divorce action). My affirmance is for the reasons indicated.