Opinion ID: 6346165
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. …

Text: Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. … Third, the error must have affected the appel- lant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. … Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (cleaned up). We recently addressed how the plain-error standard applies when a defendant’s criminal-history category is recalculated on a limited remand. In United States v. Hopper, 934 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Hopper I”), as here, a first appeal led us to vacate a defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing using a lower advisory offense level. As here, the district court on remand lowered the offense level but also increased the defendant’s criminal-history category because of a new conviction. And as here, the defendant raised no objection to these changes in the district court, but then argued on appeal that the entire topic of criminal history was beyond the scope 6 No. 21-2135 of the first appeal’s limited remand. See United States v. Hopper, 11 F.4th 561, 563, 570–71 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Hopper II”). Applying plain-error review, we concluded in Hopper II that the remand was limited, but we rejected the rest of the defendant’s argument. We held that “in fashioning an individualized sentence” on remand, a court “may consider intervening events that alter the assessment of factors made at the earlier sentencing.” Id. at 573. Because the “statutory scheme reflects the congressional realization that district courts sentence and resentence real persons in real time,” it “places no barrier on the district court’s consideration of developments that have occurred after the original sentencing that are relevant to the sentencing process.” Id. We emphasized that such events may include not only “intervening conviction[s]” but also things like “[p]roof of significant rehabilitation.” Id. In other words, reconsideration of criminal history on remand may redound to the benefit of a defendant, not just to her disadvantage. Id. The sequence of events at issue in Hopper II resembles the one now before us in every relevant respect. Carnell nonetheless attempts to distinguish Hopper II on the ground that here, but not there, the first appeal directly addressed criminal history. He suggests that by “referencing a Guidelines range that included a criminal history category III, Carnell [I] conclusively decided that Mr. Carnell had a criminal history category III.” The problem is that Carnell I did not mention “a criminal history category III.” As we already have said, its only reference to criminal history was a passing allusion to “increases and decreases for criminal history and acceptance of responsibility” in its account of the first guideline range No. 21-2135 7 calculation. 972 F.3d at 935. That is hardly enough to settle the issue. Carnell also urges that Hopper II is fundamentally irreconcilable with other decisions of this court, chiefly United States v. Husband, 312 F.3d 247 (7th Cir. 2002). Carnell reads Husband to have held that the court’s silence on an issue implies that the issue is not available for consideration upon remand. But Husband did not say that. It addressed two narrow situations: first, when an issue “could have been but was not raised on appeal”; and second, when an issue was “conclusively decided by this court on the first appeal.” Id. at 251. Neither fits the facts here, where the issue of Carnell’s new convictions arose for the first time on remand. Husband itself acknowledged that “[i]ssues that arise anew on remand are generally within the scope of the remand.” Id. at 251 n.4. In light of Hopper II, we thus find no error (plain or otherwise) in the district court’s recalculation of Carnell’s criminal-history category.