Opinion ID: 2344070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Promissory estoppel caselaw is irrelevant to whether res judicata applies

Text: Next, the County directs our attention to several Kansas cases holding that promissory or equitable estoppel and estoppel by laches do not apply to matters relating to public welfare, taxation, or the exercise of police powers, specifically: Skinner v. Mitchell, 108 Kan. 861, 197 P. 569 (1921) (doctrine of laches); Harvey County Comm'rs v. School District, 139 Kan. 457, 32 P.2d 812 (1934) (promissory estoppel); and Shriver v. Board of County Commissioners, 189 Kan. 548, 552-53, 370 P.2d 124 (1962) (promissory estoppel). But none of these cases involve an attempt to relitigate a tax exemption from the same tax year, and a closer review of Shriver actually supports barring the County's suit in this case. In Shriver, for example, a commercial building was exempted from taxes because it was held in a trust benefiting the City of Wichita. The petition for the exemption order only sought a determination regarding the 1937 tax year. But the City removed the building from its tax rolls until 1959 when it assessed taxes for that tax year. The trustees appealed the 1959 tax order. The district court vacated the 1959 tax assessments, holding that the 1938 exemption order was final and binding on that date and as long as the same statutes and owners existed. This court reversed, holding that the 1938 order only granted an exemption for the 1937 tax year because the petition did not seek a determination for any subsequent years and the district court erred in finding the City bound by it for the 1959 tax year. 189 Kan. at 552-53, 370 P.2d 124. Notably, the City was not seeking the taxes exempted in the 1938 order or trying to retroactively assess taxes from 1938 to 1958. The Shriver court's treatment of the 1938 judgment suggests an attempt to relitigate the final exemption order would not have been well taken. But the County cites the case for a different proposition. It focuses on the trustees' claim that the City acquiesced to the district court's 1959 decision that the property was exempt by refunding the first half of the 1959 taxes the trustees had paid under protest. And in response to that argument, this court held that [i]n matters relating to the public welfare, taxation, or any exercise of the police powers, the state or one of its political subdivisions is not estopped to assert or protect public rights. 189 Kan. at 556, 370 P.2d 124. In other words, the City's decision to refund the 1959 taxes as ordered by the court did not prevent it from appealing the order to establish the property was not in fact exempt. This holding cannot be read, as argued by the County, as establishing that preclusion doctrines do not apply to final tax orders. Similarly, the other cases cited by the County are inapplicable to the questions presented because they do not address the same factual scenario and do not support the County's effort to reach back and tax property exempted under a final BOTA order. Again, we find this argument by the County to be without merit.