Opinion ID: 2541567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Point Two: Improper Cross-Examination of Defense Expert

Text: Tisius asserts the circuit court abused its discretion and plainly erred in overruling his objections to the State's cross-examination of his expert, Dr. Shirley Taylor (hereinafter, Dr. Taylor). Tisius believes the State referred to irrelevant and prejudicial information and did not lay a foundation for his questions by: (1) questioning Dr. Taylor about facts in a book by David Pelzer without demonstrating it was an authoritative scientific text; (2) questioning Dr. Taylor about the Rosenhan study (hereinafter, the study) without demonstrating it was an authoritative scientific text; and (3) telling the jury that Tisius did not plead guilty. Tisius failed to object to the State's questions regarding the foundation of either the book or the study. It is particularly important that where an inadequate foundation has been laid for admission of evidence that the objection made be specific as such foundation deficiencies can frequently be remedied. We will not review the contention of inadequate foundation raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Butler, 24 S.W.3d 21, 25-26 (Mo. App. W.D.2000) (quoting State v. Blue, 875 S.W.2d 632, 633 (Mo.App. E.D.1994)). Hence, plain error review is not afforded to Tisius' challenges to the foundation of the book or the study. Tisius preserved the issue regarding cross-examination of Dr. Taylor regarding the relevance of the book for appeal. A circuit court's decision allowing evidence for the purpose of cross-examination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Tyson v. State, 249 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Mo. banc 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court's ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration. Winfrey, 337 S.W.3d at 5 (quoting State v. Gonzales, 153 S.W.3d 311, 312 (Mo. banc 2005)). This Court reviews the circuit court's decision for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if the error was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id. (quoting State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 452 (Mo. banc 1999)). Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. State v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 618, 639 (Mo. banc 2010). Relevancy has two tiers. Id. Evidence is logically relevant if it tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less probable. State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529, 538 (Mo. banc 2010). Logically relevant evidence is admissible only if it is also legally relevant. Id. Legal relevance weighs the probative value of the evidence against its costsunfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness. Id. If the prejudice of the logically relevant evidence outweighs its probative value, it should be excluded. Id. In this case, the evidence was admissible. In questioning a defendant's expert, the State is afforded wide latitude in the cross-examination of witnesses to test qualifications, credibility, skill or knowledge, and the value and accuracy of the expert's opinion. State v. Zink, 181 S.W.3d 66, 72 (Mo. banc 2005) (quoting Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Mo. banc 2003)). Dr. Taylor, Tisius' expert, testified that she was familiar with the book and its author, a man who suffered a similarly horrible childhood, but who overcame his background to become a productive member of society. These questions were logically relevant to refute Dr. Taylor's assertions that Tisius' poor childhood necessarily led him to suffer some mental illnesses and to commit murder to earn the approval of another. Additionally, it was not unduly prejudicial. It merely demonstrated that a poor childhood does not necessarily result in mental illness and a willingness to commit murder. Tisius next argues the circuit court plainly erred in allowing the State to cross-examine Dr. Taylor regarding the study because it was not relevant to the case at bar. The State cross-examined Dr. Taylor regarding her familiarity with the study. Dr. Taylor was not immediately familiar with the study until the State explained its premisea number of normal patients visited various doctors and each patient received incorrect psychological diagnoses. At that point, Dr. Taylor stated she was familiar with the study, but did not know its name. Further, Dr. Taylor testified she was familiar with a number of studies like that, and she concluded that those studies demonstrate that we can all be fooled. Tisius believes this line of questioning misled the jury. Since this claim was not included in the motion for new trial, Tisius requests plain error review under the manifest injustice standard of Rule 30.20. The State's cross-examination of Dr. Taylor was relevant and admissible. Dr. Taylor admitted the accuracy of a diagnosis is dependant upon truthful self-reporting by a patient as recognized by the study. Here, the issue of Tisius' accuracy in his self-reporting to Dr. Taylor was contested. The State sought to challenge Dr. Taylor's diagnosis of Tisius because Dr. Taylor admitted there was some error rate in her profession based upon the need for a patient to self-report truthfully for an accurate diagnosis. Accordingly, the State argued that Tisius attempted to mislead Dr. Taylor in her diagnosis. The circuit court did not plainly err. Finally, Tisius claims that informing the jury that he did not plead guilty was misleading, especially in light of the other evidence and argument presented by the State that he was not remorseful. Tisius asserts on appeal that he wanted to plead guilty but the State would not make any offer less than death. Since this claim was not included in the motion for new trial, Tisius requests plain error review under the manifest injustice standard of Rule 30.20. On direct examination by Tisius' counsel, Dr. Taylor testified about how she believed he was sorrowful for his actions, how he wanted to apologize to the families for his actions, and how she thought he demonstrated expressions of remorse. On cross-examination, the State queried into the issue of whether Tisius had a motivation to lie to her, to avoid a potential death sentence. Dr. Taylor believed Tisius' remorsefulness indicated he did not care if he were found guilty nor did he have a motivation to lie because [h]e knew he was guilty of murder. The State then questioned the extent of his remorse, stating But did he plead guilty? No. Right? He didn't plead guilty. Dr. Taylor never answered this question. When a party inquires into part of an act, occurrence, or transaction they have `opened the door' to testimony regarding that act, occurrence, or transaction, and the opposing party is entitled to inquire into other parts of it in order to rebut possible inferences that may be drawn from an incomplete version presented by the adversary or to prove the party's own version of events. State v. Newsom, 299 S.W.3d 784, 789 (Mo.App. S.D.2009). Here, Tisius sought testimony from Dr. Taylor demonstrating his remorse and sorrow for murdering two peace officers. The State's cross-examination of Dr. Taylor was an attempt to discredit the veracity of Tisius' feelings as he related them to Dr. Taylor. Further, had this Court not reversed and remanded the penalty phase of Tisius' trial, this jury would have sat during the guilt and sentencing portions of his trial. Accordingly, the jury would have known Tisius did not plead guilty as it would have determined his guilt or innocence. The circuit court did not plainly err in allowing this cross-examination.