Opinion ID: 463230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Other traffic tickets and stuff?

Text: 39 Q. Yes. 40 A. I'm not that sure. My partner did that. I was at a different place in the station when he was running through Unit 800. 41 Q. When you say arrest, that could mean a number of things. He could have been arrested for murder. That's not what you said. 42 A. I don't remember what his record looked like, no. 43 Q. Did you remember he had one? Did you even look at it? 44 A. Yes. 45 Record, vol. 3, at 128-29. A prosecutor may properly argue facts brought out on cross-examination, Walder v. United States, 201 F.2d 715, 717-18 (8th Cir.1953), affirmed on other grounds, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954), and appellant should not complain of error which he invited upon himself. United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697, 708 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860, 98 S.Ct. 186, 54 L.Ed.2d 133 (1977). PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY 46 Finally, appellant argues that it was plain error for the government to introduce without objection certain prejudicial testimony. Appellant refers to the introduction of this testimony as the injection of evidentiary harpoons. 3 47 The first testimony to which appellant objects is Officer McLerran's statement that appellant had refused to submit to a blood test to determine the presence of intoxicants in his body. Appellant relies on McCullick v. State, 682 P.2d 235 (Okl.Crim.App.1984), a case in which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that evidence of refusal to submit to a blood test is inadmissible in a trial for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). A close reading of that case, and the cases cited therein, makes clear that the Oklahoma court's holding was not based on constitutional principles, but rather on the court's interpretation of an Oklahoma statute granting persons arrested for DUI an absolute right to refuse to submit to a blood-alcohol test. [N]either the statutes nor decisional law of the forum state control the admissibility of evidence in any phase of a federal criminal action. United States v. Turner, 497 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir.1974). Thus, appellant's reliance on McMullick is misplaced. Moreover, a constitutional challenge to the admissibility of refusal to submit to a blood test has been foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564, 103 S.Ct. 916, 923, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), where the Court held that the admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not offend the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 48 Appellant next argues that the trial judge committed reversible error by permitting Officer McLerran to testify that appellant was carrying a pocket knife at the time of his arrest. He maintains that this testimony unfairly implied a criminal propensity. We find this argument to be totally without merit. 49 Appellant also asserts that the following testimony of Officer McLerran was prejudicial because it created the distinct impression that appellant had previous contact with the police: 50 Q. And then what did he say later about that date of birth and social security number? 51 A. If I remember right, he changed--gave us the one that matched up in our bureau of records which is our files on everybody that they have records on that's been registered through our department. 52 Q. Going to another matter, was PCP detectible on your clothing? 53 Record, vol. 3, at 125-26. As we have already noted, defense counsel's cross-examination of Officer McLarren made clear to the jury that appellant did in fact have an arrest record. In these circumstances, the reference to appellant being registered through the police department does not constitute plain error. 54 AFFIRMED. 55