Opinion ID: 4398284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: N.H., C.H., and B.H.

Text: In this appeal, the petitioner argues that because she successfully completed her improvement period, the circuit court erred by not finding that it was in the children’s best interests to be returned to her custody. According to the petitioner, the only concern expressed by CPS worker Morgan Perrine at the disposition hearing pertained to her continued use of Subutex. However, Ms. Perrine acknowledged that the petitioner never failed a drug screen during the pendency of the proceeding and that she had been directed by her physician to slowly wean from the Subutex because of her pregnancy and subsequent breastfeeding of her newborn. With respect to the domestic violence, the petitioner points out that M.L. underwent counseling and anger management training during the proceeding and successfully completed his improvement period such that his custodial visitation arrangement he had with his biological children was restored.9 9 During oral argument, the DHHR noted that rather than completing the usual thirty-week program for anger management, M.L. only completed a two-week online course. 7 Therefore, the petitioner maintains that there was no clear and convincing evidence that that it would be unsafe to return her children to her custody. Conversely, the DHHR and guardian ad litem argue that termination of petitioner’s parental rights was warranted despite her compliance with services during her post-adjudicatory improvement period because she failed to change her overall attitude and approach to parenting, which was necessary for reunification with her children. In that regard, the respondents point out that the evidence established that the children were still traumatized by the domestic violence they witnessed and remained afraid of M.L. Yet, the petitioner continued her relationship with M.L., became pregnant, and gave birth to his child during the course of this proceeding. The respondents contend that the petitioner’s lack of insight into how her relationship with M.L. has affected her children shows that she failed to change her overall attitude and approach to parenting. The respondents further argue that the petitioner failed to make the necessary changes with regard to her substance abuse because she was still using Suboxone at the time of the final disposition hearing, reflecting her failure to understand the urgency to become drug free so that her children could be safely returned to her care. Finally, the respondents argue that the petitioner failed to make meaningful changes to show that she has the ability to provide proper care for her children given their special needs. They note that the petitioner remained disengaged and disinterested in the special needs of her children throughout the proceeding below, never asking to attend any of their medical appointments or even expressing concern when she was told that one of her children could possibly have a brain tumor. In sum, the respondents 8 maintain that the circuit court properly determined, based upon all the evidence, that the best interests of the children necessitated the termination of the petitioner’s parental rights.10 It has long been established that “although parents have substantial rights that must be protected, the primary goal in cases involving abuse and neglect, as in all family law matters, must be the health and welfare of the children.” Syl. Pt. 3, In re Katie S., 198 W.Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996). Indeed, “‘[i]n a contest involving the custody of an infant the welfare of the child is the polar star by which the discretion of the court will be guided.’ Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Cash v. Lively, 155 W.Va. 801, 187 S.E.2d 601 (1972).” Syl. Pt. 4, In re J.S., 233 W.Va. 394, 758 S.E.2d 747 (2014). Accordingly, this Court has held that [a]t the conclusion of the improvement period, the court shall review the performance of the parents in attempting to attain the goals of the improvement period and shall, in the court’s discretion, determine whether the conditions of the improvement period have been satisfied and whether sufficient improvement has been made in the context of all the circumstances of the case to justify the return of the child. 10 The guardian ad litem also notes that this is a not a case where additional time for improvement could be granted because the children had been in foster care for twentyseven months at the time of the disposition hearing, exceeding the statutory time frame for improvement periods. See W.Va. Code § 49-4-610(9) (2015) (setting time limit for improvement periods to preclude child from being in foster care more than fifteen months of last twenty-two months absent compelling circumstances). 9 Syl. Pt. 6, In re Carlita B., 185 W.Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991) (emphasis added). As we have explained, “the ultimate goal [of an improvement period] is restoration of a stable family environment, not simply meeting the requirements of the case plan.” W.Va. Dep’t of Human Serv. v. Peggy F., 184 W.Va. 60, 64, 399 S.E.2d 460, 464 (1990). Consequently, [t]he question at the dispositional phase of a child abuse and neglect proceeding is not simply whether the parent has successfully completed his or her assigned tasks during the improvement period. Rather, the pivotal question is what disposition is consistent with the best interests of the child. In re Francis J.A.S., 213 W.Va. 636, 646, 584 S.E.2d 492, 502 (2003). In other words, [i]n making the final disposition in a child abuse and neglect proceeding, the level of a parent’s compliance with the terms and conditions of an improvement period is just one factor to be considered. The controlling standard that governs any dispositional decision remains the best interests of the child. Syl. Pt. 4, In re B.H., 233 W.Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 743 (2014). In this case, the circuit court found that although the petitioner had substantially complied with the terms and conditions of her improvement period, she still “demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse and neglect” and that reunification was not in the best interests of the children. Upon review of the record, we find that the evidence supports the circuit court’s findings. Despite the improvement period, the petitioner failed to demonstrate a willingness to meet the needs of her children and the ability to correct the conditions of abuse and neglect. In particular, the petitioner made no attempt to educate herself about her children’s medical and psychological 10 diagnoses and never obtained a driver’s license so that she could take them to their doctors’ appointments. The final order indicates that during the disposition hearing, the petitioner was asked what she had learned about autism since the beginning of the proceeding. She replied, “During this case, nothing.” When asked why she had not taken any steps to prepare herself to maintain the level of care her children had received during the pendency of this case, the petitioner said, “I guess, I never really thought about it.” It is also evident that the petitioner failed to understand her children’s fear of M.L. and desire to have no further contact with him. According to the record, the children were too afraid to participate in family counseling with M.L. during the improvement period. In addition, N.H. testified11 that she was afraid that if she went home she would get hurt. She also stated that she was did not think her brother and sister would be safe, either. 12 Referring to M.L., N.H. explained that “he beat my mom up and I always got in the middle of it and I didn’t [sic] want to go back there, because I’m afraid it’s going to happen again.” When asked what M.L. did to her mommy, N.H. replied, “punch[ed] her in the face and choke[d] her.” When asked if she ever got hurt, N.H., testified, “Almost . . 11 Prior to disposition, the circuit court received in camera testimony from N.H. As this Court has explained, “[c]ases involving children must be decided not just in the context of competing sets of adults’ rights, but also with a regard for the rights of the child(ren) . . . and [therefore, the children’s] own feelings and emotional attachments should be taken into consideration by the lower court.” In the Matter of Brian D., 194 W.Va. 623, 636, 461 S.E.2d 129, 142 (1995). 12 According to the guardian ad litem, N.H. has also expressed concern for the safety of the baby, i.e., the petitioner’s fourth child who was born during course of this case. 11 . when I was trying to get them away from each other I almost got punched [by M.L.].” Although the petitioner was aware of her children’s fear of M.L. and indicated at the beginning of the case that she would end her relationship with M.L. so her children could be returned to her custody, she did not do so. Instead, she pursued her relationship with M.L. and gave birth to his child while this case was pending before the circuit court. In sum, while the record shows the petitioner made some changes in order to comply with the requirements of her case plan, it also reflects that the petitioner did not modify her behavior to correct the conditions of abuse and neglect. “We have recognized that it is possible for an individual to show compliance with specific aspects of the case plan while failing to improve . . . [the] overall attitude and approach to parenting.” In re B.H., 233 W.Va. at 65, 754 S.E.2d at 751 (additional quotations and citations omitted). Such is the case here. Simply put, in the context of all the circumstances, the petitioner failed to make sufficient improvement to justify the return of her children. See Carlita B., 185 W.Va. at 616, 408 S.E.2d at 368, syl. pt. 6. This Court has explained, “[i]n the difficult balance which must be fashioned between the rights of the parent and the welfare of the child[ren], the paramount and controlling factor must be the child[ren]’s welfare.” Id. at 629, 408 S.E.2d at 381. To that end, “courts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement before terminating parental rights where it appears that the welfare of the child will be seriously threatened[.]” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980). Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm 12 the circuit court’s August 29, 2018, disposition order terminating the petitioner’s parental rights to her three oldest children. In light of our decision affirming the termination of the petitioner’s parental rights to N.H., C.H., and B.H., the DHHR must make every effort to obtain permanency for these children as soon as possible. According to the status updates filed with this Court pursuant to Rule 11(j) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the children are currently residing in three separate foster homes in close proximity to one another, and each foster family has expressed a willingness to adopt the child placed in their care and to facilitate visitation between children. Given that these children have been in foster care for more than three years, the need for each child to have a stable and permanent home cannot be overstated. Rule 39(b) of the Rules of Procedure for Child and Abuse and Neglect Proceedings requires: At least once every three months until permanent placement is achieved as defined in Rule 6, the court shall conduct a permanent placement review conference, requiring the multidisciplinary treatment team to attend and report as to progress and development in the case, for the purpose of reviewing the progress in the permanent placement of the child. Moreover, permanent placement for the children must occur within twelve months of the date of the disposition order. As this Court has held: 13 [t]he [twelve]-month period provided in Rule 43 of the West Virginia Rules of Procedures for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings for permanent placement of an abused and neglected child following the final dispositional order must be strictly followed except in the most extraordinary circumstances which are fully substantiated in the record. Syl. Pt. 6, In re Cecil T., 228 W.Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). It is well established that “an adoptive home is the preferred permanent outof-home placement.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v. Michael M., 202 W.Va. 350, 504 S.E.2d 177 (1998). Consequently, [i]n determining the appropriate permanent out-ofhome placement of a child under [West Virginia Code § 49-4- 604(b)(6) (2015)], the circuit court shall give priority to securing a suitable adoptive home for the child and shall consider other placement alternatives, including permanent foster care, only where the court finds that adoption would not provide custody, care, commitment, nurturing and discipline consistent with the child’s best interests or where a suitable adoptive home can not be found. Id. at 352, 504 S.E.2d at 179, syl. pt. 3. Obviously, “[t]he guardian ad litem’s role in abuse and neglect proceedings does not actually cease until such time as the child is placed in a permanent home.” Syl. Pt. 5, James M. v. Maynard, 185 W.Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991).