Opinion ID: 1190343
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prosecution's Penalty Phase Argument

Text: Appellant points to six examples of allegedly improper argument by the prosecutor. (5) At the outset, by failing to interpose any objection at trial, defendant waived any error or misconduct emanating from the prosecutor's argument that could have been cured by a timely admonition. ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 220 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949]; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 891 [277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906].) As shown below, even assuming error or misconduct, each of appellant's examples could have been so cured. (6a) Initially, appellant faults the prosecutor for arguing deterrence as a basis for imposing the death penalty. The prosecutor's argument included the following remarks: So this will be the last time ... you will have to listen to me in this particular trial. So, I had to edit things out, because if I wanted to say everything I could to you, it would be beyond your limits of endurance and probably beyond mine, too. So I made some decisions, and they're right or wrong, on behalf of my client. I could talk to you about Scripture and verse from the Old Testament that supports capital punishment. But I'm not. And I could talk to you about the fact that the death penalty plays an indispensable role in the justice system as a deterrent for crime, but I'm not. There are statistics that could be cited for either side as to that. But as to the deliberations and what you should decide as to whether the defendant, Theodore John Wrest, should live or die, they don't make a difference. I could read you testimonials on the part of the people who have been convicted of serious crimes who said they stopped doing their crimes because of fear of the death penalty. But I'm not. And I'm not going to stand here and philosophically debate whether the merits of life without possibility of parole is probably a worse penalty than death. I'm not going to insult your intelligence by making that argument because we all know why it isn't or otherwise we'd have more people being asked to be executed in the State of California and we wouldn't be going through this process. And I'm not going to sit here and talk about rehabilitation and the role it could play. I'm not going to talk about the fact of whether the death penalty could provide someone with the opportunity to repent at the time of death or whether a long stay in prison will allow somebody to find God or find rehabilitation. (7) An argument that the death penalty should be imposed upon a particular person because of the deterrent effect it would have on others is generally inappropriate because it `addresses the minds of the jury to the deterrence of designated potential killers rather than the penalty to be adjudged to the defendants.... The sought imposition of the death penalty thus rests upon the unproven and illegitimate assumption that it acts as a deterrent to the described potential killers....' ( People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1105 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659]; People v. Purvis (1963) 60 Cal.2d 323, 341-342 [33 Cal. Rptr. 104, 384 P.2d 424].) (8) Moreover, the prosecutor's reference to Old Testament support for capital punishment was improper  such an argument tends to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and to imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions. (See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chambers (1991) 528 Pa. 558 [599 A.2d 630].) (6b) Although the prosecutor's comments here were strategically phrased in terms of what he was not arguing, they embody the use of a rhetorical device  paraleipsis  suggesting exactly the opposite. Repetition of the statement, I am not arguing X,  strongly implied the prosecutor was in fact asserting the validity and relevance of X, but, for lack of time, was concentrating on other, presumably more important topics. When considered in context, however, the prosecutor's remarks were not prejudicial. [2] The brief reference to deterrence was immediately undermined by the prosecutor himself, who represented that evidence existed on both sides of the issue and then immediately reminded the jury of its duty to judge this defendant as an individual in the context of his crimes. The reference came in the course of a long argument, the bulk of which was properly and specifically focused on the factors in aggravation and mitigation. Where, as in this case, the prosecutor ... frankly acknowledged the weakness of the deterrence theory as applied to the death penalty a brief reference to that topic was undoubtedly harmless and could not have affected the jury's verdict. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 770 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) The same can be said of the prosecutor's brief reference to Scripture, which was totally undeveloped in the course of the argument. (9) Appellant also points to several exhortations in the prosecutor's argument to imagine what was going through the minds of the victims and to consider what impact [appellant's acts] had upon the victims in this particular case. Six separate victims that can never, never have those memories taken away. The argument was proper. The impact of a capital defendant's crimes upon victims can be considered by a penalty phase jury. ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 111 S.Ct. 2597]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 839 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436].) As a part of victim impact argument, the jury can be urged to put itself in the shoes of the victim. ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 536 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640].) (10a) Appellant maintains the prosecutor prejudicially misstated the evidence in his opening statement at the penalty phase, citing eight supposed instances of misconduct in this regard. No objection was made to any of these instances at trial; appellant fails to demonstrate that, assuming misconduct, an admonition would have been an ineffective remedy. (11a) Moreover, remarks made in an opening statement cannot be charged as misconduct unless the evidence referred to by the prosecutor was `so patently inadmissible as to charge the prosecutor with knowledge that it could never be admitted.' ( People v. Martinez (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1204, 1225, fn. 5 [255 Cal. Rptr. 691].) (10b) As shown below, in each case, the variance between prosecutorial statement and actual proof is minor or nonexistent. In no case can an inference of misconduct be drawn. Appellant first claims the prosecutor falsely maintained that one victim, Eleanor Smith Bolin, lived in a house she had built for herself, on the assumption she would never be married. Ms. Bolin testified that at the time of the attack, she was single, lived alone, and had built her own home. Appellant also claims there was no evidence to support the prosecutor's statement that Bolin was so frightened after appellant's attack that her parents stayed with her, she then stayed with friends, and later moved out of the house. Ms. Bolin testified her parents stayed with her at her request on the evening after the attack. Thereafter, she stayed with her parents and friends until she moved back into her house, where she stayed by herself for some unspecified time before selling the house. The prosecutor stated that another of appellant's victims, Mrs. Peck, suffered a swollen black eye and lost part of her sight in that eye. Mrs. Peck testified that appellant hit her really hard in the left eye, blackening that eye. She also testified to serious spinal and back injuries. The prosecutor also described Ms. Croom's life as hard and referred to her little room. Witness John Logan testified that Ms. Croom was a street person who wandered the streets and stayed in a hotel. The prosecutor stated Robert Gilmore, a person whom appellant allowed to enter Salvation Army facilities where appellant was living, would testify that appellant left town immediately after the murders and hid in Santa Monica for several weeks. Gilmore actually testified that appellant unlocked the door of the Salvation Army facility and allowed Gilmore to sleep in the chapel on the night of the murders. According to Gilmore, appellant told him he would return at 5 a.m. to let him out of the chapel before anyone noticed his presence. Appellant did not appear as promised. When Gilmore next saw appellant several weeks later, appellant explained he had gone south, which Gilmore thought meant Santa Monica or Huntington Beach. The prosecutor also said Gilmore would testify appellant was not particularly intoxicated when Gilmore last saw him on the night of the murders; Gilmore testified that appellant was intoxicated to some degree. The prosecutor stated that John Logan would testify Nancy Croom flirted with appellant to induce him to buy her a bottle of wine. Mr. Logan testified that he saw appellant and Ms. Croom together in front of the Filipino Community Center in downtown Santa Barbara. When appellant made sexual overtures toward Ms. Croom she pushed him back, threw wine on him, and said, I don't want to hear it. Appellant replied: That's not how you acted when I bought you the mickey of wine. Finally, the prosecutor stated that what Kimi Hansel thought were blows to her back and other parts of her body were actually eight stab wounds. Appellant complains the record does not show the number of stab wounds suffered by Ms. Hansel. It does, however, reveal she had received, at appellant's hands, multiple stab wounds around her neck, upper shoulder, left arm, left wrist, including an almost lethal puncture wound in the back of her neck. Ms. Hansel testified she received what she thought were hard hits to her back. As these examples show, every claim of misconduct made by appellant involves either a permissible argument from the evidence or a minor deviation therefrom. Even assuming one or more of appellant's claims constituted error or misconduct, he is not entitled to reversal of the penalty phase judgment. (11b) [P]rosecutorial misconduct in an opening statement is not grounds for reversal of the judgment on appeal unless the misconduct was prejudicial or the conduct of the prosecutor so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair trial. ( People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1080 [255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619].) (10c) In this case, no objection was made to any of the alleged instances. The jury was informed that the prosecutor's opening statement was not evidence. Any inconsistency between the opening statement and the evidence was inconsequential. Appellant was permitted to confront all witnesses and to challenge and rebut all evidence offered against him. Under these circumstances, appellant suffered no conceivable prejudice. ( People v. Barajas (1983) 145 Cal. App.3d 804, 809 [193 Cal. Rptr. 750].) (12) Appellant next accuses the prosecutor of introducing evidence of nonviolent criminal activity (two burglaries and theft of a gun) in aggravation of his violent crimes. Although the jury heard of appellant's burglary of the Alton residence, the evidence emanated from statements made to Ms. Alton by appellant himself during his violent attack on her. As appellant tied and gagged Ms. Alton, he told her he had been inside her house before, at a time when she was home, and had taken $10 from the kitchen counter. Appellant blamed Ms. Alton's husband, who he claimed had left the garage door open, for facilitating the commission of his crime. This evidence was properly admitted for the purpose of showing the context of appellant's violent crime; the jury could reasonably infer appellant's statements were made to induce fear in his victim. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 757 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) The jury also heard evidence, in the form of a stipulation, that the rifle appellant used in his attack on Ms. Alton and left in her yard was stolen during a burglary at Hope Ranch some time before the attack. Appellant's fingerprints were found on an ammunition box at the scene of the Hope Ranch burglary. This evidence was also properly admitted for an independent purpose  to show appellant's identity as Ms. Alton's attacker. Contrary to appellant's view, the prosecutor did not refer in final argument to appellant's nonviolent crimes as evidence in aggravation. Both the prosecutor, in argument, and the court, in instructions, referred to the three identified episodes of violent crime as the aggravating evidence. No other crimes or incidents were mentioned by the prosecution in this regard. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 757.) (13) Appellant next contends the prosecutor incorrectly informed the jury it must decide the issue of penalty as a group, without resort to individual opinions and beliefs. To the contrary, the prosecutor's few references to the jury, to deliberations as a jury, and to the 12 of you in no way implied that each juror was not to make an individual decision. The court instructed that both the People and the defendant were entitled to the individual opinion of each juror and that: Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after a discussion of the evidence and instructions with the other jurors. It also charged the jurors they were not to be influenced to decide any question in a particular way because a majority of jurors, or any of them, favor such a decision. The prosecutor himself asked the jury to rely on the court's instructions rather than his own statements. No error or misconduct occurred. (14) Finally, appellant argues that the prosecutor told the jury that the death penalty should be imposed simply because appellant had admitted the special-circumstance allegations. Appellant takes the prosecutor's remarks out of context. Although the prosecutor implied that appellant had crossed the line between murders with special circumstances and other murders, he also stated that crossing that line was essential for appellant to be eligible for the death penalty in California. Moreover, the court's instructions emphasized the jury was to decide which of the alternative penalties  life in prison without possibility of parole or death  was to be imposed on appellant in light of the aggravating and mitigating factors as shown by the evidence. In the absence of anything in the record to the contrary, we presume the jury followed these instructions. ( People v. Frank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 718, 728 [274 Cal. Rptr. 372, 798 P.2d 1215].) (15) We have also considered appellant's contention that he was denied a fair trial by the cumulative effect of the allegedly improper arguments set forth above. Each of appellant's claims lacks merit, was waived, or was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Their cumulative effect did not infringe on any of appellant's state or federal constitutional, statutory, or other legal rights. ( People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1249 [283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163].)