Opinion ID: 160827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Refusal to Issue a Dispositive Ruling on Arbitrability

Text: 17 On the merits, Conoco argues that the district court's postponement of a ruling on the arbitrability of the grievances violates established principles regarding the construction of collective bargaining agreements, depriving it of its right to a judicial determination of that issue. The union responds that Conoco has not been deprived of such a determination but instead must simply wait until the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings to receive it. 18 There is a longstanding federal policy of promoting industrial harmony through the use of collective bargaining agreements. AT&T Tech., Inc v. Communication Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 651 (1986). Federal policy also favors voluntary arbitration as a means of settling disputes about the terms of such agreements. See Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 430 U.S.243, 254 (1977). However, in spite of that federal policy, the question of whether the parties to a collective bargaining agreement are obligated to submit a dispute to arbitration is essentially a matter of construing the agreement. AT&T, 475 U.S. at 648-49. Thus, `a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.' Id. at 648 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)). 19 Importantly, the Court has also held that the question of arbitrability-whether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance-is undeniably an issue for judicial determination. Id. at 649. Unless the collective bargaining agreement clearly and unmistakably provides otherwise, the question of whether a dispute is arbitrable is for the court rather than the arbitrator to decide. Id.; see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v, Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Salinas Cooling Co. v. Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Workers, Local P-78-A, 743 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the strong policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes... does not relieve the district court of its duty to make the arbitrability determination). 20 In light of the courts' authority to decide whether a dispute is arbitrable, the Supreme Court has indicated that an arbitration should not proceed until a court has resolved the threshold question of whether the dispute is arbitrable: 21 The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collective bargaining agreement does in fact create such a duty. Thus, just as an employer has no obligation to arbitrate issues which it has not agreed to arbitrate, so a fortiori, it cannot be compelled to arbitrate if an arbitration clause does not bind it at all. 22 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964) (emphasis added). 23 Several circuits have applied that statement to conclude that district courts have erred in failing to resolve the arbitrability question before allowing the arbitration to proceed. For example, in Independent Lift Truck Builders Union v. Hyster Co., 2 F.3d 233 (7th Cir. 1993), the district court issued a ruling that appeared in one instance to conclude that the plaintiff union's grievance was arbitrable and in other instances to conclude that the question of arbitrability should be decided by the arbitrator. The Seventh Circuit concluded that, even though a court ruling on the issue of arbitrabilty might require the district court to rule on the merits of the grievance, the court was still required to decide that issue first. Thus, the district court erred in ordering the dispute to arbitration without first determining that it was arbitrable.... Only after the district court has determined that the parties intended the agreement to apply to [the employees who filed the grievances] may the court order the dispute to arbitration. Id. at 236-37 (emphasis added). 24 Similarly, in General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union 89 v. Moog Louisville Warehouse, 852 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1988), the district court concluded that the question of whether the plaintiff union had made a timely request for arbitration was a question to be decided by the arbitrator. It therefore granted the union's request for an order compelling arbitration. Reversing that decision, the Sixth Circuit concluded that [t]he fact that there is a general agreement, under certain circumstances, to afford arbitration as a last resort is not controlling. The court must first determine from the contract provisions dealing with arbitration, the particular grievances that are intended to be subject to arbitration. Id. at 875 (emphasis added). Other courts have characterized the district courts' duty to decide arbitrability in similar terms. See, e.g., Bell-Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, Local 13000, 164 F.3d 197, 201 (3rd Cir. 1999) (stating that parties may be sent to arbitration only after the court so directing them is satisfied that this was their intent and that both parties consented to do so in their contractual agreement and describing this decision as a threshold determination) (emphasis added); Kansas City S. Transport Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 41, 126 F.3d 1059, 1067 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the district court appropriately held an order compelling arbitration in abeyance pending an evidentiary hearing on arbitrability); Smith v. Currency Trading Int'l, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1190 (D. Colo. 1998) (concluding that  a judicial determination of whether an arbitration agreement exists should have been made before the matter was submitted to arbitration) (emphasis added), aff'd, no. 98-1311,1999 WL 565460 (10th Cir. Aug. 3, 1999). 2 25 We have found no case involving a decision precisely like the one at issue here: a postponement of a dispositive ruling on arbitrability until the conclusion of arbitration proceedings. However, because there is no clear and unmistakable evidence that the plaintiff union and Conoco agreed that the arbitrator should decide the arbitrability of the grievances, see First Options, 514 U.S. at 944, such a postponement is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in AT&T and John Wiley & Sons, as well as the lower court decisions applying them. The district court's postponement allows what those decisions forbid: a compulsory submission to arbitration [prior to a] judicial determination that the collective bargaining agreement does in fact create such a duty. John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 547. The possibility that the district court might revisit the arbitrability question at the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings is not an adequate substitute for a pre-arbitration ruling. Conoco is entitled to a ruling on arbitrability before it is compelled to submit to arbitration. AT&T, 475 U.S. at 648-49; John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 547.