Opinion ID: 2275605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Objection to Complainant's Testimony

Text: The defendant argued on appeal that during defense counsel's cross-examination of the complainant, the trial justice erred in sustaining the prosecution's objection to questions about why Amy was not presented as a testifying witness. The defendant contended that later the state was permitted to ask a similar question during its redirect examination that resulted in the admission of irrelevant testimony about Amy's absence. Moreover, even if the evidence was relevant, defendant argued, its prejudicial effect far outweighed its probative value, thereby rendering the inquiry inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. We reject both of these arguments. Rule 401 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Rule 402 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence allows all relevant evidence to be admitted into evidence unless otherwise provided by constitution, law, or rule. Relevant evidence can be excluded pursuant to Rule 403, however, if its admission creates unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleads the jury, or is simply redundant. This Court consistently has held that determinations of relevance and prejudice are within the sound discretion of the trial justice, and such determinations will be upheld absent a showing of abuse of this discretion   . DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677, 692 (R.I.1999). In this case, defendant based his claim of error on the following exchange in which the trial justice sustained the prosecution's objection to defense counsel's cross-examination of the complainant about Amy's absence: [DEFENSE COUNSEL] Now you testified here today that at some point [Amy] came out of the room, and she's nine years old, correct? [COMPLAINANT] I testified that I heard [Amy] screaming for him to leave me alone. I did not see her come out of the room. [DEFENSE COUNSEL] At any time did the police at all interview her? [COMPLAINANT] I don't know. [DEFENSE COUNSEL] After what  [COMPLAINANT] I don't know. [DEFENSE COUNSEL] Is she a witness here?  (Emphasis added.) By sustaining the prosecution's objection to this question, the trial justice prevented defendant from probing the reasons for Amy's absence. The trial justice, however, later permitted the prosecution, on redirect examination, to ask complainant: [PROSECUTOR] Now, when you spoke with me about the case, we talked about whether or not [Amy] would be giving a statement or testifying, is that accurate? [COMPLAINANT] Yes, we did. [PROSECUTOR] And [complainant], what did you decide? The trial justice overruled the defense counsel's objection to this last question and complainant testified that: I expressed to you that I did not want her to testify, and that if you wanted her to testify that I wouldn't testify. Because I don't want her to go through this again. The defendant argued that the complainant's answer to the prosecution's question was not relevant, evidenced by the trial justice's initial ruling that barred defense counsel from delving into that topic. Although the trial justice's limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination could suggest that testimony concerning Amy's absence was not relevant, it is our opinion that the trial justice properly determined that defendant's cross-examination opened thedoor to the previously unexplored area of why Amy was not testifying. As the trial justice correctly observed, defendant's line of questioning left the impression that [Amy] is not here and she's hiding something. By drawing the jury's attention to the empty chair, defendant implied that, if Amy testified, her statements would adversely affect the prosecution. State v. Small, 735 A.2d 216, 217 (R.I.1999) (mem.). Therefore, the trial justice's ruling on defendant's objection was reasonably calculated to avoid misleading the jury and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The defendant further argued that, assuming that this evidence was relevant, it nonetheless should have been excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. R.I.R.Evid. 403. The probative value of complainant's testimony, however, is evidenced by the fact that its admission resolved the potentially misleading line of questioning initiated by defendant. Although there exists no precise formula for determining the prejudicial effect of a statement, we 'evaluate its probable effect upon the outcome of the case by examining the remark in its factual context and determining whether this remark reasonably tended to increase' the probability of an issue of fact or law that is of consequence to the outcome of the case. State v. Ortiz, 609 A.2d 921, 929 (R.I. 1992) (quoting State v. Pugliese, 117 R.I. 21, 26, 362 A.2d 124, 126-27 (1976)). In this case, there is no basis for defendant's assertion that the complainant's testimony affected the outcome of the case by evoking sympathy for a traumatized child and her protective mother, while inspiring antipathy for defendant. Given complainant's testimony about the assault and the extent of her injuries and given that the prosecution already had established that Amy witnessed a violent attack on her mother, it is highly unlikely that complainant's explanation of Amy'sabsence produced any prejudice to defendant or improperly influenced the jury. Therefore, we conclude that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by admitting this testimony.