Opinion ID: 1405837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Brown/Caldwell.

Text: In its 1978 version, section 190.3 provides among other things that the sentencer shall consider, take into account, and be guided by the enumerated aggravating and mitigating factors and shall impose a sentence of death if [it] concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.... (17) Defendant contends the trial court erred by rejecting his extensive proffered instructions explaining how the jury was to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors and determine the appropriate penalty. These proposed instructions would have advised in effect that (1) mitigating factors are not limited by the statute, (2) any mitigating circumstance standing alone can support a decision that death is inappropriate, (3) aggravating factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt while mitigating factors are established by any credible evidence, (4) jurors may assign whatever weights they deem appropriate to each aggravating and mitigating factor, (5) combined weight, not combined numbers, is dispositive, and (6) the sentencer must reject death if it has any reasonable doubt about the appropriate penalty. In People v. Brown, supra , we concluded that the 1978 law's shall/outweigh language, properly construed, does not impermissibly deprive the jury of its constitutional discretion and responsibility to decide the appropriate punishment for the individual offense and offender. (40 Cal.3d at p. 541; see Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 328 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 238-239, 105 S.Ct. 2633].) We explained that the statutory weighing process is not mechanical or arbitrary and that each juror may assign whatever moral or sympathetic value he deems appropriate to each relevant factor. A juror, we said, need not vote for the death penalty unless, upon completion of the `weighing' process, he decides that death is the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances.... (40 Cal.3d at pp. 540-541.) However, we acknowledged that instructions in the literal statutory language are potentially confusing. For the future, we approved proposed CALJIC instructions explaining the weighing and sentencing process. We also undertook to evaluate every pre- Brown case on its own merits to determine whether the jury might have been misled about its duties and powers. (40 Cal.3d at pp. 544, fn. 17, 545, fn. 19.) In each such case, we examine the instructions and arguments as a whole to determine whether they conveyed a mistaken impression about the nature of the weighing process or the jury's duty to determine the appropriate penalty under all the circum- stances. ( People v. Myers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 250, 274-276 [233 Cal. Rptr. 264, 729 P.2d 698]; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1276-1280 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115].) Here the instructions actually given by the court adequately explained these matters. First, they advised (as defendant had urged) that any facts used in aggravation, specifically including other crimes, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, they directed the sentencer to give independent consideration to the defendant's personal history and family background. Third, as noted, they explained that the jury must reject death if mitigating factors outweighed aggravating, and were free to do so even if aggravating factors outweighed mitigating. Thus, while the jury received no specific directions on how to weigh, the instructions made clear that its fundamental task was to determine the proper punishment from the full range of relevant aggravating and mitigating evidence. They suggested that aggravating factors were more strictly construed than mitigating. Any inference that death was mandatory in any case was specifically refuted, and the instructions logically implied that the death penalty should not be imposed if the sentencer doubted it was the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances. Hence, the court's refusal to give defendant's additional proffered instructions is no basis for reversal. (See People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 641 [51 Cal. Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366].) Assuming there was any potential confusion, the prosecutor did not exploit it. The prosecutor told the jury it must balance and weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, assigning each any weight the jury wished. He listed factors from his own perspective and argued their weights, but he never suggested the law required any result. He simply urged that the death penalty was warranted, under a concept of Justinian justice, in light of defendant's conduct, attitude, and history. Defense counsel stressed that leniency was required if mitigating factors outweighed aggravating, but that you don't have to vote for death even if aggravating factors were deemed to outweigh mitigating. Under these circumstances, the jury was not misinformed.