Opinion ID: 1947466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finality Language

Text: One source of confusion under Mafrige has been uncertainty about what language triggers its finality rule. In Mafrige, we held that a partial summary judgment is treated as final for appeal purposes when the order contains a Mother Hubbard clause stating that all relief not expressly granted is denied or other language purporting to dispose of all claims or parties. 866 S.W.2d at 590 & n. 1, 592. We further clarified that other finality language includes a statement that the summary judgment is granted as to all claims asserted by the plaintiff, or a statement that the plaintiff takes nothing against defendant. Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 590 n. 1.; see also Inglish, 945 S.W.2d at 811 (holding statement that [d]efendant is entitled to summary judgment in this case, and that plaintiff should take nothing on account of his lawsuit rendered partial summary judgment final for purposes of appeal); Springer v. Spruiell, 866 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex.1993) (holding that summary judgment order reciting plaintiffs have and recover nothing purported to dispose of all parties and issues). Despite these examples, some lower courts have refused to hold orders containing this exact language final for purposes of appeal. E.g., Carey v. Dimidjian, 982 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1998, no pet.) (holding that order containing Mother Hubbard clause was not final and appealable where the motion was labeled Partial Summary Judgment and the parties treated the order as interlocutory); Hinojosa v. Hinojosa, 866 S.W.2d 67, 69-70 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, no writ) (holding that order containing Mother Hubbard clause did not render judgment final because it did not dispose of counterclaim). Other courts have struggled with what other language purports to render a judgment finaloften reaching opposite conclusions about identical clauses. Compare Postive Feed, Inc. v. Guthmann, 4 S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding that order granting defendant's summary judgment in all things purported to be final), with St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Mefford, No. 05-96-01581-CV, 1998 WL 821537 (Tex.App.-Dallas Nov. 30, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 1998 WL 821537, at  [2] (holding that order granting defendant's summary judgment in all things did not purport to be final). While the Court recognizes that the routine inclusion of [a Mother Hubbard clause] in otherwise plainly interlocutory orders and its ambiguity in many contexts have rendered it inapt for determining finality, 39 S.W.3d at 192, it ignores the obvious problems courts have faced interpreting other language purporting to dispose of all claims or parties. Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 592. In fact, despite the Court's extensive analysis and discussion, its holding represents but a minor departure from Mafrige. Its modified rule has two parts. The first represents no change in Texas law. It simply reiterates that a summary judgment order that actually disposes of all parties and issues is final for purposes of appeal. 39 S.W.3d at 192. The second part provides that a Mother Hubbard clause is no longer enough to invoke the fiction that an otherwise interlocutory order is treated as final for purposes of appeal. Instead, to invoke the Mafrige fiction, an interlocutory order must now clearly and unequivocally state[ ] that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties. 39 S.W.3d at 205. The Court further explains that the statements plaintiff take nothing by his claims in the case and [t]his judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable clearly and unequivocally state that an order is final. 39 S.W.3d at 205. In essence, the Court's rule does no more than replace one set of magic language with anotherwhile ignoring the reality that courts will likely face the same challenges deciding what language clearly and unequivocally states that an order is final, 39 S.W.3d at 205, as they did deciding what other language clearly purport[s] to dispose of all claims or parties under Mafrige. 866 S.W.2d at 592.