Opinion ID: 1096680
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying ginn's motion in limine to suppress the search of the vehicle and continuing objections related thereto at the trial.

Text: ¶ 15. In sum, Ginn's third assigned error is that the police officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to approach the vehicle in the public parking lot when she was changing her shirt. Ginn further reasons that since there was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion, she was subjected to an illegal stop, search, and seizure. On this basis, Ginn contends that the fruits of the stop are inadmissible. The standard of review for admission of evidence in a criminal case is abuse of discretion. Harris v. State, 731 So.2d 1125, 1130 (¶ 29) (Miss.1999); Peterson v. State, 671 So.2d 647, 655-56 (Miss. 1996). ¶ 16. We agree with the trial court's assessment that the main consideration is the original stop. Ginn argues that although she was changing her shirt, her breasts were not exposed and, thus, she was not violating Mississippi's indecent exposure law. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-29-31 (Rev.2000) states: A person who wilfully and lewdly exposes his person, or private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any place where others are present, or procures another to so expose himself, is guilty of a misdemeanor.... Because her breasts were not bare, Ginn reasons that the officer had no reason to stop or even approach the vehicle. ¶ 17. In analyzing this type of situation, this Court has looked to whether an officer acts reasonably. We have held: The question is not whether a driver is suspected of a felony or misdemeanor, but whether a law enforcement officer acts reasonably in stopping a vehicle to investigate a complaint short of arrest. This Court stated in Singletary [ v. State, 318 So.2d 873, 876 (Miss.1975)]: Police activity in preventing crime, detecting violations, making identifications, and in apprehending criminals may be divided into three types of action: ... (2) Investigative stop and temporary detention: To stop and temporarily detain is not an arrest, and the cases hold that given reasonable circumstances an officer may stop and detain a person to resolve an ambiguous situation without having sufficient knowledge to justify an arrest.... Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 117-18 (¶ 28) (Miss.1999). In support of her contention, Ginn relies on Boyd v. State, 758 So.2d 1032 (Miss.Ct.App.2000), and McDuff v. State, 763 So.2d 850 (Miss. 2000). Unfortunately for Ginn, neither of these cases supports her position. In Boyd, the defendant was stopped based upon the officer's knowledge that the defendant's driver's license had been suspended eight years earlier. McDuff involved the involuntary and unknowingly drawing of blood for testing after a fatal motor vehicle accident. ¶ 18. In the case sub judice, the officer personally observed an ambiguous situationa woman removing her shirt within a vehicle in a public parking lot. It was reasonable for the officer to investigate to see what was actually occurring. Officer Bayles testified that as he approached the vehicle the male driver began to drive away. This action served to further raise suspicion, which lead to the investigatory stop. Things escalated from there; that is, Officer Bayles observed two syringe caps on the vehicle's dashboard in plain view and Hill, acting very nervous, produced altered driver's licenses and told the officer about the needle loaded with methamphetamine. A safety pat-down revealed that Hill had a concealed knife. At this point, the officer had more than probable cause to apprehend Hill and to further investigate the vehicle, its contents, and its passenger. ¶ 19. Based upon the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ginn's motion in limine. This issue is without merit.