Opinion ID: 8123742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stare Decisis Analysis of In re N.A.C.

Text: Grandmother's appeal from these two post-termination orders requires us to address a threshold inquiry: whether the doctrine of stare decisis warrants our continued adherence to In re N.A.C. The doctrine of stare decisis provides that 'points of law established by a court are generally followed by the same court and courts of lower rank in later cases in which the same legal issue is raised.' State v. Clark, 313 Kan. 556, 565, 486 P.3d 591 (2021) (quoting Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc., 303 Kan. 358, 362-63, 361 P.3d 504 [2015]). 'The application of stare decisis ensures stability and continuity— demonstrating a continuing legitimacy of judicial review.' State v. Davidson, 314 Kan. 88, 93, 495 P.3d 9 (2021). Thus, we do not lightly disapprove of precedent. State v. Spencer Gifts, 304 Kan. 755, 766, 374 P.3d 680 (2016). 'While stare decisis is not an inexorable command, this court endeavors to adhere to the principle unless clearly convinced a rule of law established in its earlier cases 'was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent.' [Citations omitted.]' Clark, 313 Kan. at 565. In In re N.A.C., we determined that the Legislature had structured CINC proceedings as a sequence of steps and that the appealable orders listed in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2273(a)—orders of temporary custody, adjudication, disposition, unfitness, and termination of parental rights—corresponded to those steps. 299 Kan. at 1115-16. As a result, we held that an order terminating parental rights is the last appealable order in a CINC proceeding under K.S.A. 38-2273(a), and orders entered post-termination are not appealable. 299 Kan. 1100, Syl. ¶ 6. Grandmother contends that In re N.A.C.'s holding was erroneous. She claims that some post-termination orders (like the one that denied her custody motion) are properly classified as dispositional orders because they address custody and are entered after the 26 child has been adjudicated as a child in need of care. See 299 Kan. at 1119 (defining dispositional orders). Because K.S.A. 38-2273(a) allows an appeal from any . . . disposition, Grandmother reasons In re N.A.C. wrongly concluded that the statute precludes appellate review of post-termination orders addressing custody. The dissent in In re N.A.C. raised the same point, but the majority rejected this construction of the Revised Code's jurisdiction statute. See 299 Kan. at 1123 (Johnson, J., dissenting). We are not clearly convinced In re N.A.C.'s holding was originally erroneous. First, In re N.A.C.'s interpretation of the appellate jurisdiction statute is logical and better harmonizes this statute with other provisions in the Revised Code when read in pari materia. See State v. Mora, 315 Kan. 537, 543, 509 P.3d 1201 (2022) ([S]tatutes relating to the same subject should be considered in pari materia to achieve consistent, harmonious, and sensible results whenever possible.). As noted, K.S.A. 38-2273(a) identifies five categories of appealable orders under the Revised Code: An appeal may be taken by any party or interested party from any order of temporary custody, adjudication, disposition, finding of unfitness or termination of parental rights. But [n]one of the appealable orders listed in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2273(a) are defined in the Revised Code's definitional statute, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2202. In re N.A.C., 299 Kan. at 1110. Even so, In re N.A.C. reasoned that each [type of appealable order] is given context by its own statutory provisions that establish deadlines, notice requirements, and required underlying findings or legal conclusions. So, while the appealable orders are not explicitly defined, the governing statutes for each give description and meaning to the terms. 299 Kan. at 1110-11. Focusing on dispositional orders specifically, In re N.A.C. acknowledged that [t]here is more complexity to the statutory scheme governing dispositional orders than the other [appealable] orders. 299 Kan. at 1113. But again, the statutory scheme gives context and meaning to the phrase order of . . . disposition as used in K.S.A. 38- 27 2273(a). A summary of the statutory framework governing the dispositional and termination phases of a CINC proceeding helps illustrate this point. The timing for dispositional orders is dictated by K.S.A. 38-2253(b), which states [a]n order of disposition may be entered at the time of the adjudication if notice has been provided . . . but shall be entered within 30 days following adjudication, unless delayed for good cause shown. (Emphasis added.) The substance of the dispositional hearing and attendant order are addressed by K.S.A. 38-2253: (a) At a dispositional hearing, the court shall receive testimony and other relevant information with regard to the safety and well being of the child and may enter orders regarding: (1) Case planning which sets forth the responsibilities and timelines necessary to achieve permanency for the child; and (2) custody of the child. K.S.A. 38-2255(b) and (c) create two paths for custody during the dispositional phase—either the court places the child in the parent's custody or it removes the child from parental custody. 299 Kan. at 1113. If the district court chooses the latter option, In re N.A.C. identified the various findings and orders that the district court must make under the Revised Code: For example, it must find probable cause that certain conditions exist, such as 'allowing the child to remain in [the] home is contrary to the welfare of the child.' K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2255(c)(1)(B). And if the court makes the required findings and removes the child from the parent's custody, it may award custody to: (1) a child's relative; (2) a person with whom the child has close emotional ties; (3) any other suitable person; (4) a shelter facility; (5) a youth residential facility; or (6) the Secretary. This custody order 'shall continue until further order of the court.' K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2255(d). In addition, if the person to whom custody is awarded is not a parent, a permanency plan 28 that conforms to the requirements of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2264 (permanency hearing: purpose, procedure, time for hearing, and authorized orders) must be prepared. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2255(e). Once a dispositional order is entered, the court may rehear the matter on its own motion or the motion of a party or interested party. And if there is a rehearing, the court may enter any dispositional order authorized by the Revised Code, except modification of a registered child support order. 299 Kan. at 1113-14. See K.S.A. 38-2256. In re N.A.C. reasoned that the statutory requirements and timelines governing each phase of a CINC proceeding provide meaning to the types of appealable orders identified in K.S.A. 38-2273(a). The terms 'order of temporary custody,' 'adjudication,' and 'disposition' must be seen as terms of art, each with a particular meaning within the Revised Code that clearly establishes a sequence of court-supervised events all marching toward permanency. This is evidenced by the time limitations within the Revised Code for each phase's duration, which ensure progress toward permanency is achieved; the differences at each phase in factual findings and legal conclusions; and in the options available to the district court in each phase. 299 Kan. at 1116. And under this sequencing, dispositional orders are limited temporally. Reading the CINC provisions together, an order of disposition is defined as those orders concerning child custody entered after the child is adjudicated a child in need of care. But this dispositional phase ends once an order terminating parental rights is entered, precluding appellate review of any later orders because post-termination orders are not considered 'dispositional orders.' [Citations omitted.] 299 Kan. at 1119. This is true, in part, because the termination of parental rights statute limits the actions the court can take once parental rights have been terminated—the court can authorize an adoption, appoint 29 a permanent custodian, or order continued permanency planning. 299 Kan. at 1120; see K.S.A. 38-2269(g)(2). Notably absent is the authority to enter a dispositional order under K.S.A. 38-2255. 299 Kan. at 1120. This, of course, makes sense because when parental rights have been terminated, it is necessarily true that the district court is no longer doing what the disposition phase requires: weighing whether the parent should have custody and, if not, whether reintegration is possible. That ship has sailed. 299 Kan. at 1120-21. In re N.A.C.'s construction of K.S.A. 38-2273(a) is thus consistent with the statutes governing dispositions and termination of parental rights. It is also consistent with the Legislature's decision to limit the appealable issues under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 382273(a). 299 Kan. at 1119-20. The dispositional rehearing statute, K.S.A. 38-2256, does not undermine In re N.A.C.'s holding or its supporting rationale. K.S.A. 38-2256 permits the court to rehear the matter after it has entered a dispositional order. The statute does not expressly limit rehearing to those motions entered before the termination of parental rights. Thus, one might argue the rehearing statute supports a broader definition of the phrase order of disposition in K.S.A. 38-2273(a)—one that includes post-termination orders affecting the child's custody. But as we explained in In re N.A.C., construing an order of disposition to be limited temporally to those disposition orders entered after adjudication but before termination of parental rights gives meaning to the rehearing statute and K.S.A. 382273(a): But this reasoning [that the rehearing statute allows for post-termination orders of disposition] oversimplifies and wrongly dispenses with the prior caselaw, which does not necessarily deny an appeal of a dispositional order issued after a rehearing. After all, 30 the time period between a first order of disposition and a termination of parental rights may be significant, and more than one order of disposition might be required, especially if the goal is to first attempt parental reintegration. Nothing in the jurisdictional statute prevents an appeal from any dispositional orders entered after rehearing. But the cutoff under the Revised Code's structure . . . is the order terminating parental rights . . . . [Citations omitted.] 299 Kan. at 1120. And In re N.A.C.'s construction better harmonizes the rehearing statute and K.S.A. 38-2273(a) with the termination of parental rights statutes. As noted, those statutes limit the district court's authority to enter orders of disposition post-termination because at that stage of the CINC proceeding the district court is no longer considering whether the parent should have custody or whether reintegration is possible. 299 Kan. at 1120-21. In re N.A.C.'s construction not only brings the various provisions of the Revised Code into harmony, but it is also consistent with the legislature's obvious intent to limit the types of appealable issues so there is timely closure in these cases. Otherwise, it is easy to see how these cases could turn into back-and-forth campaigns of endless litigation and appeals by persons other than the child's parents. 299 Kan. at 1121. Grandmother's proposed construction fails to read the statutory provisions in pari materia and conflicts with the Legislature's intent to promote timely resolution of CINC proceedings. In fact, Grandmother's interpretation of a disposition order could leave children exposed to an endless circle of appellate custody battles. 299 Kan. at 1120. Granted, In re N.A.C.'s holding insulates detrimental placement decisions from appellate review. But our district court judges who are tasked with presiding over these difficult CINC cases are well aware of the stakes. 299 Kan. at 1122. And this concern is simply part of the cost-benefit analysis the Legislature employed when it adopted the Revised Code and chose to limit the scope of appealable orders in CINC proceedings to ensure timely progression towards permanency. The separation-of-powers doctrine 31 prevents us from second-guessing the Legislature's judgment on this public policy matter, as another Court of Appeals panel observed: We simply cannot create a new category of appeals so that appeals like this one may be heard. Nor should we. The legislature has worked hard to create a comprehensive Code for Care of Children. It has attempted to balance the protection of the rights of children, parents, and other interested parties against the need for speed sufficient to ultimately allow children to move on and live their lives. We respect the choice the legislature has made here. In re A.F., 38 Kan. App. 2d 742, 746, 172 P.3d 63 (2007). See Double M Constr. v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 288 Kan. 268, 274, 202 P.3d 7 (2009) (It is not the function of the courts to substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of the legislature or to determine whether a statute is wise or necessary.). In sum, In re N.A.C.'s holding is logical, and its construction of K.S.A. 38-2273(a) is preferable when reading the various provisions of the Revised Code in pari materia. And In re N.A.C.'s holding was not groundbreaking. Several panels of the Court of Appeals had adopted the same construction of K.S.A. 38-2273(a) long before In re N.A.C. See 299 Kan. at 1115 (The vast majority of appeals under the Revised Code and its predecessor have been decided by our Court of Appeals with little review from this court. Over time, numerous Court of Appeals panels have developed caselaw consistently viewing both the Revised Code and its predecessor as creating a statutory framework of sequential steps or phases.). For these reasons, we are not clearly convinced that the holding in In re N.A.C. was originally erroneous. Nor are we clearly convinced In re N.A.C.'s holding is no longer sound because of changing conditions. In the eight years since In re N.A.C., the Legislature has expressed no disagreement, through statutory amendment, with our interpretation of K.S.A. 38-2273(a). See State v. Quested, 302 Kan. 262, 278, 352 P.3d 553 (2015) (The 32 doctrine of stare decisis is particularly compelling in cases where, as here, the legislature is free to alter a statute in response to court precedent with which it disagrees but declines to do so.). Perhaps the most significant development to occur since In re N.A.C. is that the composition of our court has changed. But we should be highly skeptical of reversing an earlier decision where nothing has changed except the composition of the court. State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 577, 102 P.3d 445 (2004) (McFarland, C.J., dissenting); see also Davidson, 314 Kan. at 95 (Standridge J., concurring) (A change in the membership of this court cannot, in and of itself, justify a departure from the basic principle of stare decisis.). We therefore reaffirm the holding in In re N.A.C.: an order terminating parental rights is the last appealable order under K.S.A. 38-2273(a), and post-termination orders are not appealable, even if they address custody. See 299 Kan. 1100, Syl. ¶ 6. 2. Application of In re N.A.C. to Challenged Orders Having reaffirmed In re N.A.C., we next apply this precedent to the December 2020 and January 2021 journal entries from which Grandmother has appealed. As noted, the December 2020 journal entry memorialized the district court's posttermination permanency decisions. This journal entry included the district court's finding that DCF had failed to make reasonable efforts or progress toward adoptive placement and its attendant orders terminating DCF custody and placing N.E. in the custody of foster parents for adoption. In In re N.A.C., the appellant challenged nearly identical orders. We found appellate jurisdiction lacking over the district court's post-termination decisions, including: 33 (1) the district court's finding that the responsible state agency failed to make reasonable efforts or progress toward adoptive placement; and (2) its attendant orders, which were contingent under the statute upon that first finding, removing the child from state agency custody and placing her directly with her foster parents with permission to adopt. 299 Kan. at 1101. Grandmother has challenged the December 2020 journal entry, which made the same findings and entered the same attendant custody orders at issue in In re N.A.C. Thus, In re N.A.C. is apposite and controls the jurisdictional question presented here. Thus, K.S.A. 38-2273(a) does not provide appellate courts with jurisdiction to review the December 2020 journal entry. Grandmother also appeals from the January 2021 journal entry. There, the district court found that various pandemic-related issues had required it to take Grandmother's custody motion under advisement (after the October 2020 evidentiary hearing on the motion and until all parties could be heard at the December 2020 post-termination permanency hearing). Then, the district court ruled that all matters it had taken under advisement, which necessarily included Grandmother's custody motion, were resolved by the custody orders in the December 2020 post-termination journal entry on permanency. Under In re N.A.C., K.S.A. 38-2273(a) likewise forecloses appellate review of the January 2021 journal entry because this order was entered months after the district court terminated parental rights. But we recognize that the timeline of events and procedural history here could raise more complicated questions of equity and fairness. On May 22, 2020, prior to the termination of parental rights, Grandmother moved for custody of N.E. The district court set that motion for evidentiary hearing on August 4, during the dispositional phase of N.E.'s CINC proceedings. In the meantime, on June 17, the State moved for findings of unfitness and termination of parental rights. The district court set that motion for evidentiary hearing on August 20. 34 Had matters progressed as scheduled, the district court would have ruled on Grandmother's custody motion during the dispositional phase before it terminated parental rights. And if the district court had ruled on the motion during the dispositional phase, we see no reason why Grandmother could not have pursued a timely appeal of the decision as a dispositional order under K.S.A. 38-2273(a). But disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the scheduling and progression of the proceedings. The district court continued the August 4 evidentiary hearing on Grandmother's custody motion because the State's attorney was in quarantine. That evidentiary hearing was reset to September 8, 2020. In the meantime, no party moved to continue the hearing on the State's motion to terminate parental rights. And the district court conducted that hearing as scheduled on August 20, where it terminated parental rights and set the matter for a permanency hearing on September 3. The district court memorialized these findings and conclusions in the August 28th journal entry, thus terminating the dispositional and termination phases of N.E.'s CINC proceedings. After the district court entered its termination orders, Grandmother expressed concern that conducting a permanency hearing before the evidentiary hearing on her custody motion could render the latter moot. Thus, Grandmother moved to continue the September 3rd post-termination permanency hearing to September 8—the date set for the hearing on the custody motion. The district court granted Grandmother's request. But the State moved to continue the September 8, 2020 consolidated hearings on permanency and custody because one of its key witnesses was in COVID-19 quarantine. The district court rescheduled the hearing for October 9. On that date, the district court took evidence on the custody motion. But not all interested parties were present—counsel for foster parents could not attend because of illness related to COVID-19. The district court took evidence from the available parties on the custody motion and continued the 35 rest of the consolidated hearing to November 13. It took Grandmother's custody motion under advisement until all parties could be heard at the November permanency hearing. But again, the November 13th hearing was continued because Grandmother's attorney was ill and foster parents' expert witness was unavailable. The district court conducted the consolidated hearing on December 18, where it terminated DCF custody and placed N.E. in the custody of foster parents for adoption, as memorialized in the December 2020 journal entry. And, in its January 2021 journal entry, the district court confirmed that its December post-termination permanency decisions had resolved Grandmother's custody motion. These facts reveal that the district court's ruling on Grandmother's custody motion did not follow the same progressive sequencing of CINC phases contemplated in the Revised Code. This may prompt concerns that the district court violated Grandmother's due-process rights or otherwise erred by ruling on Grandmother's custody motion (filed before termination of parental rights) only after the dispositional and termination phases had ended and the matter had progressed to the post-termination phase. But appellate courts cannot create equitable exceptions to statutory jurisdictional requirements. State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 369, 277 P.3d 1091 (2012). And even if the district court's sequencing of the CINC proceedings and the timing of its orders could constitute error, Grandmother did not raise those concerns in the district court or on appeal. See Bussman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 298 Kan. 700, 729, 317 P.3d 70 (2014) ([C]onstitutional grounds for reversal cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.); see also State v. Davis, 313 Kan. 244, 248, 485 P.3d 174 (2021) (Issues not briefed are deemed waived or abandoned.). Thus, Grandmother waived or abandoned any claim of error based on the timing or sequencing of the CINC phases. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Grandmother objected to the State's request to continue the August 4, 2020 evidentiary hearing on her custody motion. 36 Nor is there any evidence that Grandmother objected to the August 20th setting for the hearing on the State's motion to terminate parental rights. Grandmother did not move to continue the August 20th termination hearing to ensure that the district court ruled on her custody motion during the dispositional phase before it terminated parental rights. In fact, Grandmother appeared in person and by counsel at the August 20th termination hearing and there is no evidence in the record that Grandmother objected to moving forward with the hearing as scheduled. Quite simply, Grandmother allowed the termination hearing to proceed on August 20 and allowed the district court to enter orders terminating parental rights on August 28 without objection. And nothing in the record suggests that the district court scheduled or rescheduled these matters intentionally to deprive Grandmother of her right to appeal the ruling on her custody motion. To the contrary, the record confirms that the district court's schedule was impacted most significantly by complications related to the pandemic. In short, Grandmother preserved no objection at the district court and waived any objection on appeal to the timing or progression of the CINC proceedings—specifically, the district court's decision to proceed to the post-termination phase before ruling on the custody motion filed during the dispositional phase. Thus, we reserve for another day whether a district court errs by proceeding in such a manner. We hold that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review the district court's December 2020 and January 2021 post-termination journal entries. Because we also hold that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review the June 2020 placement order and the August 2020 termination order under K.S.A. 38-2273(a), we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal is affirmed. 37