Opinion ID: 1351466
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duty of Trial Court to Render an Admonition Sua Sponte

Text: (8) Finally, defendant contends that even if we do not find ineffective assistance, we must conclude that the trial court should have given sua sponte a limiting instruction with respect to evidence of defendant's prior drug dealing and violent coercive behavior unrelated to the crime, particularly in light of the prosecutor's comments on this evidence during closing argument. We do not agree. In People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63-64 [177 Cal. Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534, 23 A.L.R.4th 776], we held that the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on the limited admissibility of evidence of past criminal misconduct. In People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 251-252 [246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669], we extended this rule to apply to evidence of defendant's past misconduct whether or not criminal. As we explained, `Neither precedent nor policy favors a rule that would saddle the trial court with the duty either to interrupt the testimony sua sponte to admonish the jury whenever a witness implicates the defendant in another offense, or to review the entire record at trial's end in search of such testimony.' ( Id. at p. 251, quoting People v. Collie, supra, at p. 64.) These decisions control the case before us. It is true that both cases recognize an exception to the foregoing no-duty rule when the prior crime or misconduct introduced by the prosecutor is a dominant part of the evidence against the accused, and is both highly prejudicial and minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose. ( Collie, supra, at p. 64; Milner, supra, at pp. 251-252.) None of the arguable instances of defendant's misconduct in this case was in any sense a dominant part of the evidence.