Opinion ID: 1296917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The WCP and the 2001 Legislative Redistricting Plans

Text: The expanded question before this Court, in light of the VRA, is whether the WCP is now entirely unenforceable, as defendants contend, or, alternatively, whether the WCP remains enforceable throughout the State to the extent not preempted or otherwise superseded by federal law. When federal law preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause, it renders the state law invalid and without effect. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, ... shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.); see also Pearson v. C.P. Buckner Steel Erection Co., 348 N.C. 239, 244, 498 S.E.2d 818, 821 (1998). The primary inquiry in determining whether a state provision is preempted by federal law is to ascertain the intent of Congress. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 689, 93 L.Ed.2d 613, 623 (1987) (noting that federal law may supersede state law in several different ways). Congress may state an intention to preempt state law in express terms, id., or congressional intent to preempt may be inferred where a comprehensive federal scheme is imposed on an area occupied by state law, leaving state law no room in which to continue operating, id. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683, 690, 93 L.Ed.2d at 623. As a third alternative, in those areas where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation, federal law may nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law. Id. (emphasis added). The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field.... Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248, 256-57 (1963) (noting that where federal and state law both operate, a coexistence is formed). Because Congress has not preempted the entire field of state legislative redistricting and reapportionment, state provisions in this area of law not otherwise superseded by federal law must be accorded full force and effect. See Growe, 507 U.S. at 34, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 1081, 122 L.Ed.2d at 400; see also Chapman, 420 U.S. at 27, 95 S.Ct. 751, 766, 42 L.Ed.2d at 785; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1394, 12 L.Ed.2d at 541. The State Constitution similarly delineates the interplay between federal and state law: The people of this State have the inherent, sole, and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and police thereof, ... but every such right shall be exercised in pursuance of law and consistently with the Constitution of the United States. N.C. Const. art. I, § 3. [N]o law or ordinance of the State in contravention or subversion [of the United States Constitution and government of the United States] can have any binding force. N.C. Const. art. I, § 5. The people of North Carolina chose to place several explicit limitations upon the General Assembly's execution of the legislative reapportionment process. None of these express limitations, including the WCP, are facially inconsistent with the VRA or other federal law. Thus, the State retains significant discretion when formulating legislative districts, so long as the effect of districts created pursuant to a whole-county criterion or other constitutional requirement does not dilute minority voting strength in violation of federal law. Issues concerning the proper construction of the Constitution of North Carolina `are in the main governed by the same general principles which control in ascertaining the meaning of all written instruments.' Preston, 325 N.C. at 449, 385 S.E.2d at 478 (quoting Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 444, 75 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1953)). In Sessions v. Columbus Cty., 214 N.C. 634, 638, 200 S.E. 418, 420 (1939), this Court stated that [r]econciliation is a postulate of constitutional as well as of statutory construction. Thus, reconciliation is a fundamental goal, be it in constitutional or statutory interpretation, and North Carolina courts should make every effort to determine whether State provisions, as interpreted under State law, are inconsistent with controlling federal law before applying a severability analysis to strike State provisions as wholly unenforceable. As part of our constitutional interpretation, it is fundamental to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. Perry, 237 N.C. at 444, 75 S.E.2d at 514. More importance is to be placed upon the intent and purpose of a provision than upon the actual language used. Id. [I]n arriving at the intent, we are not required to accord the language used an unnecessarily literal meaning. Greater regard is to be given to the dominant purpose than to the use of any particular words.... Id. This Court will consider the history of the questioned provision and its antecedents, the conditions that existed prior to its enactment, and the purposes sought to be accomplished by its promulgation when interpreting the State Constitution in light of federal requirements. Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 613, 264 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1980); see also Perry, 237 N.C. at 444, 75 S.E.2d at 514. We observe that the State Constitution's limitations upon redistricting and apportionment uphold what the United States Supreme Court has termed traditional districting principles. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2827, 125 L.Ed.2d at 528. These principles include factors such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions. Id. (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has emphasize[d] that these criteria are important not because they are constitutionally requiredthey are notbut because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines. Id. at 647, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2827, 125 L.Ed.2d at 528-29 (citation omitted). We recognize that, like the application or exercise of most constitutional rights, the right of the people of this State to legislative districts which do not divide counties is not absolute. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-2 (2d ed.1988); John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 16.7 (5th ed.1995) (noting that although the provisions of the First Amendment appear absolute, they are subject to a balancing of interests). In reality, an inflexible application of the WCP is no longer attainable because of the operation of the provisions of the VRA and the federal one-person, one-vote standard, as incorporated within the State Constitution. This does not mean, however, that the WCP is rendered a legal nullity if its beneficial purposes can be preserved consistent with federal law and reconciled with other state constitutional guarantees. The 2001 legislative redistricting plans violate the WCP for reasons unrelated to compliance with federal law. Although the WCP demonstrates a clear intent to keep county boundaries intact whenever possible during the legislative redistricting process, the 2001 Senate redistricting plan divides 51 of 100 counties into different Senate districts. The 2001 House redistricting plan divides 70 out of 100 counties into different House districts. The General Assembly may consider partisan advantage and incumbency protection in the application of its discretionary redistricting decisions, see Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973), but it must do so in conformity with the State Constitution. To hold otherwise would abrogate the constitutional limitations or objective constraints that the people of North Carolina have imposed on legislative redistricting and reapportionment in the State Constitution. Accordingly, the WCP remains valid and binding upon the General Assembly during the redistricting and reapportionment process, as more fully explained below, except to the extent superseded by federal law. [3]