Opinion ID: 2630559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Because Representatives Hanley and Foster Acted Within the Scope of Their Legislative Duties, Legislative Immunity Protects Them from the Whalens' Defamation Claims.

Text: The Whalens advance various theories why legislative immunity does not bar their claims against Representatives Hanley and Foster. Thus, they contend that Representatives Hanley and Foster had no legislative duty to question the Department of Administration's authority to settle the claims against Whalen and others. They contend that Representatives Hanley and Foster lost their immunity by knowingly or recklessly disregarding the falsity of their statements. They assert that the defendants lost their immunity by excessive publication, by failing to restrict their statements to executive session, and by failing to redact information identifying Ronald Whalen. They argue that defendants had only conditional immunity, which they lost by publishing statements that did not advance a legislative purpose. And they contend that by exceeding their authority, the defendants lost their immunity because they acted outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. [10] At the heart of the Whalens' arguments is their contention that legislative immunity only protects legislators with respect to statements they make in the exercise of their legislative duties. They argue that Representatives Hanley and Foster acted outside the scope of their legislative duties when they question[ed] Boyer's authority to enter into a settlement on the COLD payment issue. The Whalens argue that only the State Affairs Committee has jurisdiction over activities of the Department of Administration, and therefore only that Committee had the legislative duty to question the actions of that department. [11] Representatives Hanley and Foster respond that the review and discussion of the COLD settlement at a legislative committee hearing meets the definition of a core legislative activity that is protected by immunity. The Alaska Constitution and the Alaska Statutes both provide immunity to legislators for statements made in the exercise of their legislative duties. [12] We have held that legislative duties include activities internal to the legislature, such as voting, speaking on the floor of the House or in committee, authoring committee reports, introducing legislation, and questioning witnesses in legislative hearings. [13] Legislative immunity allows the legislature to question acts by the executive without intimidation. [14] It also protects legislators from the burdens of forced participation in private litigation. [15] Legislative immunity, where it applies, is absolute, and not merely qualified. [16] To avoid summary judgment, the Whalens at a minimum had to demonstrate that Representatives Hanley and Foster had some personal and identifiable role outside their legislative duties in disseminating the Boyer memorandum. Representatives Hanley and Foster's motion for summary judgment successfully argued that even if the document the Whalens allege was affixed to the minutes of the hearingthe defendants contended that it was notsuch actions are quintessential legislative acts that fall squarely within the scope of legislative immunity. Legislative immunity under Alaska's constitution is patterned after the federal speech or debate clause. [17] We therefore look to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of federal immunity as a model for determining the scope of legislative immunity under Alaska's constitution: The Supreme Court interprets federal legislative immunity broadly for actions properly within the legislative sphere and declines to impose liability regardless of whether the Court considers the legislative acts useful or necessary. [W]e have no authority to oversee the judgment of the Committee ... or to impose liability on its Members if we disagree with their legislative judgment. [18] Ronald Whalen's affidavit opposing summary judgment merely states that on March 20, 1996 the House Finance Committee discussed the COLD payments and the settlement, and that the minutes of that meeting, when published, included the Boyer memorandum. But the Whalens made no showing that the discussion of the payments or the settlement was outside the legislative sphere. At most Ronald Whalen's affidavit attributes the distribution of the identifying documents to Representatives Hanley and Foster. Although there may be a genuine factual dispute about whether they actually had any part in the public dissemination of the Boyer memorandum, it is not a material dispute. Assuming they caused its public distribution, the question here is whether they are nonetheless protected by legislative immunity, as the superior court held. This case does not require us to define with precision the ultimate limits of protection conferred by legislative immunity, or the scope of a committee's legislative duties protected by immunity. Taking all permissible factual inferences in favor of the Whalens, it cannot reasonably be said that these legislators acted outside the legislative sphere. The alleged publication of Whalen's name occurred while Representatives Hanley and Foster were carrying out legislative duties. The Whalens' remaining appellate contentions concerning immunity require no extended discussion. Somesuch as arguments that the legislators knowingly or recklessly made false statements or should have limited the publicationare founded on an inaccurate assumption that legislative immunity is conditional, not absolute. We therefore hold that the superior court did not err in granting summary judgment to Representatives Hanley and Foster. [19]