Opinion ID: 1366816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of the Multiple Jury System.

Text: The utilization of the multiple jury process is an issue of first impression in this court. Therefore, a brief discussion regarding the device's history and current status in other jurisdictions is appropriate. The multiple jury procedure is a fairly recent development in this country. It was designed to combat the problem where a codefendant's out-of-court admission was introduced at trial and implicated the accused. David Carl Minneman, Annotation, Joint TrialMultiple Juries, 41 A.L.R. 4th 1189 (1985). This dilemma was first described in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), where the Supreme Court held that the accused's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment was violated by admitting such a statement at a joint trial. By empaneling multiple juries, codefendants can still be tried together and the court can screen one jury from hearing the out-of-court admission by simply removing the affected jury from the court room. Due to apparent popularity, however, the device has developed in areas outside the Bruton -type dilemma. For example, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice advocate using multiple juries where general problems of prejudicial evidence may present themselves in joint trials. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, § 13-3.2, commentary at 13-36 (2d ed. 1980). Moreover, several reported decisions reference the ability to conserve judicial resources by empaneling more than one jury in a single proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040, 103 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed.2d 608 (1982); Hedlund v. Sheldon, 173 Ariz. 143, 146, 840 P.2d 1008, 1011 (1992); State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 623-24, 710 P.2d 526, 533-34 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S.Ct. 2260, 90 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986). The multiple jury procedure has received both praise and criticism in recent appellate court decisions scattered throughout the country. Some courts view the process as an attractive way of preserving the joint trial method of prosecution by eliminating the impact of codefendants' antagonistic defenses. See, e.g., United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 830-31 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 843, 108 S.Ct. 135, 98 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987); People v. Wardlow, 118 Cal.App.3d 375, 173 Cal.Rptr. 500 (Ct.App.1981); Feeney v. State, 359 So.2d 569 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1978). Other courts characterize the procedure as ladened with administration difficulties and an aggravator of what it was designed to eliminateunfair prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 19 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996, 104 S.Ct. 492, 78 L.Ed.2d 686 (1983); Scarborough v. State, 50 Md.App. 276, 437 A.2d 672 (1981); People v. Ricardo B., 130 A.D.2d 213, 518 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (N.Y.), appeal granted, 70 N.Y.2d 749, 520 N.Y.S.2d 1024, 514 N.E.2d 1376 (1987), order affirmed by, 73 N.Y.2d 228, 538 N.Y.S.2d 796, 535 N.E.2d 1336 (1989). Aside from this competing commentary, these same courts universally agree that the multiple jury process is constitutional and that a conviction obtained thereunder will be upheld, absent specific instances of reversible prejudice. [5] California's approach to this issue aptly illustrates the point. In People v. Harris, 47 Cal.3d 1047, 255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619 (1989), the court examined use of multiple juries in a murder, kidnapping, and robbery trial. The issue was one of first impression at the California Supreme Court level. As a result, the opinion serves as a thorough and historical review of the multiple jury device. Defendant Harris and his confederate Davidson were charged with the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of a seventeen-year-old individual. Both men abducted the victim during a dairy/convenience store hold-up. They drove the victim to a secluded part of the desert and shot him in the back as he was attempting to flee. Harris and Davidson were tried together with the trial court empaneling two juries. Multiple juries were used because extrajudicial statements made by Davidson implicated Harris. The prejudicial impact of these statements was effectively eliminated by excusing the Harris jury when this evidence was introduced at trial. Harris was convicted of all three crimes. Id. 255 Cal.Rptr. at 356-63, 767 P.2d at 623-30. On appeal, Harris attacked the validity of using multiple juries, claiming that it was unduly prejudicial. Specifically, he alleged that the procedure was cumbersome, increased the duration of the trial, frustrated the jurors with unnecessary delay, and invited individual jurors to speculate that damaging evidence was being considered by the court while they were excluded. Harris also asserted that the procedure was not expressly authorized under California law. Id. 255 Cal.Rptr. at 365-67, 767 P.2d at 633-34. The court rejected all these contentions and held that empaneling multiple juries was an acceptable way to facilitate the mandate of California Penal Code § 1098, which requires that the accused be tried jointly, unless the court orders separate trials. The court reasoned that multiple juries eliminated the prejudice of antagonistic defenses of codefendants and still maintained the advantages of a joint trial. The court specifically referenced saving judicial resources, diminishing inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoiding delay in the administration of justice. Harris, 255 Cal.Rptr. at 365, 767 P.2d at 633. The court also reasoned that it was wrong to summarily dismiss the multiple jury process based on novelty alone. Instead, it adopted the universal position taken in other jurisdictions that using multiple juries is not inherently prejudicial. Id. 255 Cal.Rptr. at 366-69, 767 P.2d at 634-37. Rather, convictions obtained by using the device would be upheld unless the defendants could identify particular instances of reversible prejudice. The Harris court then subjected appellants' claims of prejudice to individual examination and the harmless error rule. In short, the court determined that Harris simply did not substantiate that his trial was unduly prejudicial. The record indicated that the process was administered effectively, the issues were not procedurally complex, the jurors were separately instructed and advised regarding the process, and the call of witnesses was scheduled to minimize continual shuffling of jurors. In light of the overall record, the court held that Harris could not prove that his trial results would have been more favorable had he been tried in a separate proceeding. Id. 255 Cal.Rptr. at 369, 767 P.2d at 637. In essence, we agree with the California Supreme Court's approach to appellate review of convictions obtained using the multiple jury process. A conviction obtained thereunder will be upheld absent specific instances of reversible prejudice. Yet unlike the Harris decision, we do not share the California Supreme Court's apparent optimism regarding the use of multiple juries. The case at hand illustrates that the device can become a breeding ground for confusion in process and results alike. What should have been a relatively simple trial took four weeks to conduct in the lower court. Much of the time, expense, and confusion complained of on appeal was the natural result of having three different defense lawyers practicing law in front of three different juries. The length of the trial, the curious results of the verdicts, and the length of this appeal indicate that the multiple jury process should be engaged with great caution. In addition to these administrative concerns, the Nevada Rules of Criminal Procedure do not authorize empaneling multiple juries. Unlike some federal courts and state courts in other jurisdictions, our rules do not contain any provisions or language sanctioning the procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir.1972) (finding authority under Fed.R.Crim.P. 57, granting trial court power to proceed in any manner not inconsistent with rules), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1127, 93 S.Ct. 948, 35 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973); Harris, 255 Cal.Rptr. at 365, 767 P.2d at 633 (interpreting California Penal Code § 1098, requiring that defendants must be tried jointly, unless the court orders separate trials). NRS 174.165 merely states that the trial court may grant separate trials and provide whatever relief justice requires. This language cannot mean that a trial judge has the authority to empanel thirty-six jurors and alternates to hear the joint trial of three codefendants. Our skepticism is further enhanced by the fact that this court has not approved any guidelines for steering the district court through such an ambitious and complicated process. Jurisdictions outside Nevada have cautioned against experimentation with multiple juries in the absence of instructive guidelines. See, e.g., State v. Watson, 397 So.2d 1337, 1342 (La.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 903, 102 S.Ct. 410, 70 L.Ed.2d 222 (1981). Again, our trepidation has been solidified by the facts of the instant appeal. The court below empaneled three juries to hear the respective trials of Webb, Ewish, and Nelson. As a result, the threat of prejudice and impropriety was multiplied by three. The procedure is administratively cumbersome with two juries present, and it appears nearly unworkable ushering thirty-six individuals plus alternates in and out of the courtroom. Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court's maiden voyage with the multiple jury device was unauthorized by Nevada's Rules of Criminal Procedure and this court. Yet remaining consistent with the great weight of authority in other jurisdictions, we conclude that novelty alone is not enough to reverse appellants' respective convictions. See, e.g., Hayes, 676 F.2d at 1359; Smith v. DeRobertis, 758 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 838, 106 S.Ct. 118, 88 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985); United States v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, Barber v. United States, 434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 609, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977); United States v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, Jackson v. United States, 423 U.S. 949, 96 S.Ct. 368, 46 L.Ed.2d 284 (1975); People v. Wardlow, 118 Cal.App.3d 375, 173 Cal.Rptr. 500 (Ct.App.1981). Therefore, we turn to the specific claims of prejudice forwarded by Webb and Ewish.