Opinion ID: 6343803
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Estate’s ADA Claim

Text: The district court granted summary judgment to Mesa County on the Estate’s ADA claims. We reject the Estate’s challenge to that ruling. Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “This provision extends to discrimination against inmates detained in a county jail.” Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007). 20 On appeal, the Estate contends the district court’s holding regarding Monell liability “was incorrect and in direct contravention of . . . well-established precedent.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 68. The Estate maintains that, even absent a constitutional violation by an individual employee, the district court should still have considered whether CHC was liable under Garcia and its progeny. See Garcia v. Salt Lake Cnty., 768 F.2d 303, 310 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Although the acts or omissions of no one employee may violate an individual’s constitutional rights, the combined acts or omissions of several employees acting under a governmental policy or custom may violate an individual’s constitutional rights.”); see also Crowson v. Washington Cnty., 983 F.3d 1166, 1191 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he municipality may not escape liability by acting through twenty hands rather than two.”). But the Estate did not present this theory of liability to the district court. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011) (applying waiver where legal arguments were raised for the first time on appeal and plaintiff further failed to argue for plain-error review). And regardless, the Estate’s custom-or-practice claims fail on the merits because it does not point to any evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer CHC acted with deliberate indifference by enacting the alleged customs or policies. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998). 42 Appellate Case: 21-1010 Document: 010110688637 Date Filed: 05/25/2022 Page: 43 To state a claim under Title II, the Estate must show: (1) Mr. Beauford is a “qualified individual with a disability”; (2) he was “excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of [MCDF’s] services, programs, or activities”; and (3) “such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.” Id. In granting summary judgment to Mesa County on the Estate’s ADA claim, the district court found the Estate “produced no evidence of any specific service [Mr. Beauford] wanted access to and was denied” and, consequently, the Estate was “ask[ing] the court to assume that [Mr. Beauford] was necessarily denied access to the Detention Facility’s services or programs because he was segregated” in single cell housing in Cedar Pod. Aplt. App. vol. 12 at 3327-28. The district court characterized the Estate’s arguments as “conclusory and insufficient” and rejected them. Id. at 3327. We do the same. On appeal, the Estate merely reprises the arguments it made in the district court, without persuasively explaining why the district court erred. The gist of the Estate’s argument is Mr. Beauford’s mere placement in administrative segregation was a de facto denial of access to all MCDF’s programs, services, and benefits available to detainees not in administrative segregation. But to show a violation under Title II, the Estate must identify evidence in the record of a specific service, program, or activity requested by, but denied to, Mr. Beauford. See Hockaday v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 766 F. App’x 572, 575 (10th Cir. 2005). The Estate has not 43 Appellate Case: 21-1010 Document: 010110688637 Date Filed: 05/25/2022 Page: 44 made this showing or explained why it is relieved of the burden imposed on it by applicable law to do so.21 Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the County on the Estate’s ADA claims. 2. Mesa County’s Personal Jurisdiction Arguments The Mesa County Defendants raised a lack of personal jurisdiction defense in district court. The district court did not address the merits of this argument, however, concluding any challenge to personal jurisdiction was moot because all claims against the County had been dismissed on summary judgment. On appeal, the County again advances the lack of personal jurisdiction defense. The district court never obtained jurisdiction over Mesa County or the Mesa County Sheriff, the argument proceeds, because the Estate “failed to properly sue the board of county commissioners of Mesa County and sued the wrong sheriff.” Cnty. Answer Br. at 38.22 Because we reverse in part the grant of summary judgment to the Mesa County Defendants, the personal jurisdiction question is no longer moot, as the 21 In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the Estate’s remaining contention that any such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of Mr. Beauford’s disability. 22 To the extent the County’s arguments regarding Sheriff Lewis involve insufficient service of process rather than personal jurisdiction, they fail for similar reasons. Service, like personal jurisdiction, is a waivable defense if not timely asserted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). 44 Appellate Case: 21-1010 Document: 010110688637 Date Filed: 05/25/2022 Page: 45 district court assumed.23 We now consider the Mesa County Defendants’ lack of personal jurisdiction defense and reject it. “Until the court has established personal jurisdiction [over a party], any assertion of judicial power over the party violates due process.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982). However, unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, the defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction and service are waived if not timely asserted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Oaklawn Apartments, 959 F.2d 170, 174-75 (10th Cir. 1992). It is well settled that “jurisdiction over a party may be conferred upon a court . . . by voluntary appearance of a party.” Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); see also Hunger U.S. Special Hydraulics Cylinders Corp. v. Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co., No. 99-4042, 2000 WL 147392, at  (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2000) (“After its lengthy participation in this litigation, efforts to seek affirmative relief, and settlement of claims, [Defendant] may not pull its personal jurisdiction defense out of the hat like a rabbit.”) (citation omitted)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 “not only contemplates the lodging of certain defenses at the earliest point in a lawsuit, it mandates a waiver of those defenses if not presented at the first 23 In the interest of judicial efficiency, we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of the personal jurisdiction issue instead of remanding the issue to the district court. The standard of review for questions of personal jurisdiction is de novo, see ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bowers, 651 F.3d 1200, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011); there are no appellate preservation problems; the parties have had an opportunity to brief the issue; and the facts are undisputed. 45 Appellate Case: 21-1010 Document: 010110688637 Date Filed: 05/25/2022 Page: 46 available opportunity.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Unistar Fin. Serv. Corp., 35 F. App’x 787, 787 (10th Cir. 2002). By the time the County raised personal jurisdiction as a defense, it had been actively defending against the Estate’s lawsuit for years. Under the circumstances, we conclude the County and the Mesa County Sheriff waived any personal jurisdiction or service defenses.24