Opinion ID: 1014470
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Action Against Thaxton & Kwascha

Text: Freeman brought state law claims of tortious interference with contract and unfair and deceptive trade practices against two of his supervisors, alleging that they intentionally induced Duke Power to terminate his employment. The district court determined that the interference with contract claim was completely preempted by § 301 because it required interpretation of Thaxton’s and Kwascha’s supervisory authority as defined in the CBA, as well as a determination of whether Freeman violated the Grievance Resolution and Amendment. We agree. As discussed above, a state law claim is completely preempted by the LMRA if it relates to contracts between employers and labor organizations, or if resolution of the claim depends substantially on the interpretation of a CBA. See Davis, 110 F.3d at 247. To state a claim for tortious interference with contract against Thaxton and Kwascha under North Carolina law, Freeman had to establish that (1) he had a valid contract with Duke Power that gave Freeman contractual rights; (2) the defendants knew of the contract; (3) the defendants intentionally induced Duke Power not to perform the contract; (4) the defendants acted without justification; and (5) Freeman was thereby damaged. Embree Const. Group, Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 411 S.E.2d 916, 924 (N.C. 1992). Freeman stated in his complaint that he had an employment agreement with Duke Power that gave him certain legal rights and privileges, that Thaxton and Kwascha intentionally induced Duke Power to terminate the contract, and that Thaxton’s and Kwascha’s conduct was outside of the scope of their employment (as Freeman’s supervisors), in bad faith, for a wrongful purpose, with malice, and without any legal justification. (J.A. at 231-32.) A court would need to interpret the Grievance Resolution, the Amendment, and the CBA in an effort to determine Freeman’s contractual rights, the extent of ThaxFREEMAN v. DUKE POWER CO. 9 ton’s and Kwascha’s supervisory authority, and whether Duke Power failed to perform its obligations to Freeman. We therefore hold that Freeman’s claim against Thaxton and Kwascha for tortious interference with contract was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Covenant Coal Corp., 977 F.2d 895, 899 (4th Cir. 1992) (Clearly, the third element of this cause of action [under Virginia law], requiring a breach or termination of the contractual relationship, necessitates interpretation of the [CBA].); Steinbach v. Dillon Cos., 253 F.3d 538, 540 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a tortious interference claim alleging that a third party caused the employer to wrongfully terminate an employee was preempted by § 301 where the claim required a determination of whether the employer failed to perform the contract); Kimbro v. Pepsico, Inc., 215 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that an employee’s state law claims for tortious interference with contract against a supervisor and a third party were preempted by § 301 where the claims would require interpretation of the CBA). The district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Freeman’s case against Thaxton and Kwascha.