Opinion ID: 795993
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Count Three—Misrepresentation of Material Facts

Text: 40 Firishchak next argues that the government failed to prove that he willfully misrepresented material facts in order to gain admission into the United States. Such misrepresentations would render him ineligible for admission under § 10 of the DPA. Again, this argument was waived. PIE Nationwide, 894 F.2d at 892. The parties stipulated that Firishchak's wartime activities, including his alleged membership in the UAP, were material facts, and the trial court agreed. A misrepresentation is material under the DPA if it has a natural tendency to affect the decision of the Displaced Persons Commission regarding visa eligibility. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988). 41 Even if this argument were not waived, Firishchak could not prevail. In his visa application, Firishchak told immigration officials that he was a laborer for a Ukrainian cooperative in L'viv from December 1941 to April 1944. However, the trial court found that he was serving in the UAP during this time. This inconsistency demonstrates that Firishchak misrepresented his wartime activities, and the truth would have influenced his visa eligibility. Though Firishchak suggests that UAP service is not a material fact, two trial witnesses testified to the contrary. First, Everett Coe, the vice consul who processed Firishchak's visa application, stated that he would not have issued Firishchak a visa had Firishchak truthfully disclosed his wartime activities. Second, Mario DeCapua testified that the Commission routinely rejected the applications of persons known to have served in Nazi-directed police forces. Given these facts, the district court properly concluded that Firishchak made material misrepresentations during the visa application process. 42