Opinion ID: 2581010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Asserted interference with right to self-representation

Text: Defendant asserts that assuming his waiver of counsel was proper and that he correctly was permitted to represent himself during nine months of pretrial proceedings, he thereafter was coerced by improper limitations placed upon the scope of his advisory counsel's authority, and as a consequence his right to self-representation was violated. Specifically, defendant argues that advisory counsel should have been given authority to question witnesses on defendant's behalf, and that the refusal of Judges Arnason and Sepulveda to permit such participation by James in turn forced defendant to forgo self-representation. Defendant also asserts that because capital defendants who are represented by counsel in complex cases may, in the trial court's discretion, be entitled to the appointment of second counsel ( Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108 ( Keenan )), he was constitutionally entitled both to represent himself and to have counsel appointed to assist him as a second, fully participating counsel. We held in People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698 ( Bloom ): [A] defendant who elects representation by counsel does not have a constitutionally protected right to appear as cocounsel [citations] and a defendant who elects self-representation does not have a constitutional right to choreograph special appearances by counsel ( McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 183, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122). Thus none of the hybrid forms of representation, whether labeled cocounsel, advisory counsel, or standby counsel, is in any sense constitutionally guaranteed. [ ] As the courts of other jurisdictions have expressly recognized [citations], the powers and responsibilities which attend the representation of a criminally accused person should never be conferred jointly and equally on the accused and the attorney. Rather, in all cases of shared or divided representation, either the accused or the attorney must be in charge. Stated otherwise, at all times the record should be clear that the accused is either self-represented or represented by counsel; the accused cannot be both at once.... [A] self-represented defendant who wishes to obtain the assistance of an attorney in an advisory or other limited capacity, but without surrendering effective control over the presentation of the defense case, may do so only with the courts permission and upon a proper showing. ( Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1218-1219, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) As is disclosed by the record set out above, defendant did not object to the challenged limitations at the time they were imposed, nor later when he claims to have been coerced into relinquishing his self-representation. Nor did defendant ever request or attempt to justify appointment of second counsel under  or by analogy to  Keenan, supra, 31 Cal.3d 424, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108. Moreover, as the September 1990 transcript reveals, Judge Sepulveda expressly advised defendant that the court might reconsider the challenged limitations  including the bar against advisory counsel's participation in witness examination  upon request by defendant or counsel (Now as I say, he may convince me otherwise or you may convince me otherwise. If you even want him to do something like that later on...). Defendant did not resubmit the request at a later time or present a showing of a need for expanded participation by advisory counsel. In the absence of an objection or request at trial, defendant may not raise the present claims on appeal. In any event, on the present record, the lower courts did not err in restricting the role of advisory counsel by precluding examination or cross-examination by advisory counsel.