Opinion ID: 1723720
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: San Martin's Statement

Text: Franqui also asserts that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence at their joint trial codefendant San Martin's confession incriminating Franqui and by denying his motion to have his trial severed from that of San Martin. Specifically, he argues that the trial court's failure to grant a severance violated his federal constitutional right to confront San Martin, who did not testify at their joint trial, as to those portions of San Martin's confession admitted at trial which incriminated Franqui in the crime and in the shooting death of Lopez. While the issue which Franqui raises on appeal is the denial of the motion to sever the codefendants' cases, the admissibility of the codefendant's confession is a subissue within this issue. Franqui argued that he was prejudiced by having a joint trial with San Martin in which San Martin's verbal confession was admitted as direct evidence against Franqui. Franqui's argument was that because San Martin's verbal confession was not sufficiently interlocking with Franqui's own confession, San Martin's confession failed to meet the indicia of reliability required by the United States Supreme Court in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986), as interpreted by the same Court in Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987). In opposition, the State argued that the two confessions did sufficiently interlock to provide that indicia of reliability. In Lee, the Court confronted the situation in which the trier of fact used a codefendant's confession as substantive evidence against the defendant when the defendant's own confession also was admitted into evidence. The Lee court stated that the issue before it was whether [the] substantive use of the hearsay confession denied Petitioner [Lee] rights guaranteed her under the Confrontation Clause. Lee, 476 U.S. at 539, 106 S.Ct. at 2061 (quoting respondent's brief at 11). In holding that the codefendant's confession did not bear sufficient indicia of reliability to be directly admissible under the Confrontation Clause, the Court rejected the State's argument that because the two confessions interlocked on some points, the codefendant's confession was reliable. Id. at 545, 106 S.Ct. at 2064. The Court stated: If those portions of the codefendant's purportedly interlocking statement which bear to any significant degree on the defendant's participation in the crime are not thoroughly substantiated by the defendant's own confession, the admission of the statement poses too serious a threat to the accuracy of the verdict to be countenanced by the Sixth Amendment. In other words, when the discrepancies between the statements are not insignificant, the codefendant's confession may not be admitted. Id. (emphasis added). The Cruz Court held that the giving of a limiting instruction cannot cure the Confrontation Clause violation resulting from the admission of a codefendant's interlocking confession which implicates the other defendant in the crime even in cases in which the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 191-92, 107 S.Ct. at 1718-19. The Court reasoned that the codefendant's confession which implicated the defendant was all the more harmful to the defendant if it interlocked with the defendant's own confession. Notwithstanding, the Court also stated: Of course, the defendant's confession may be considered at trial in assessing whether his codefendant's statements are supported by sufficient indicia of reliability to be directly admissible against him (assuming the unavailability of the codefendant) despite the lack of opportunity for cross-examination, see Lee .... Id. at 193-94, 107 S.Ct. at 1719-20. Thus, the citation in Cruz to Lee appeared to suggest the possibility that a codefendant's confession still may be admitted under some circumstances as direct evidence against a defendant upon a showing of sufficient indicia of reliability resulting from the interlocking nature of the confessions. Lee, 476 U.S. at 545, 106 S.Ct. at 2064. It was upon this analysis of Cruz that we held in Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d 833, 838 (Fla.1988): Taylor's [the codefendant's] statement interlocks with and is fully consistent in all significant aspects with all three statements that [defendant] made to Hancock, Allen, and Brewer and which were directly admissible against [defendant]. The indicia of reliability are sufficient to have permitted introduction of Taylor's statement as evidence against [defendant]. However, in 1990 the United States Supreme Court modified its earlier indicia of reliability analysis and held that to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness rather than by reference to other evidence introduced at trial. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). In Wright, the Court addressed the issue of whether admission of certain hearsay statements made by a child declarant to an examining pediatrician violated the Confrontation Clause. The Court found that to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, the hearsay statements must possess sufficient indicia of reliability from either their admission through a firmly rooted exception or by a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. at 816, 110 S.Ct. at 3147 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)). In determining what constitutes such a showing, the Court held that the relevant circumstances only include those that surround the making of the statement and those that render the declarant worthy of belief. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819, 110 S.Ct. at 3148. The Court observed that the presence of corroborating evidence would more appropriately indicate that the error in admitting the statement was harmless than provide a basis for presuming the declarant to be trustworthy. Justice Kennedy, writing for the four dissenting justices, pointed out how the majority opinion had altered the rationale of Lee and Cruz. In any event, the bottom line of Wright is that the interlocking nature of the confessions cannot provide a basis upon which to determine whether there are sufficient indicia of reliability to introduce the codefendant's hearsay confession as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. Wright 's impact on this case is obvious because it was the interlocking nature of the confession which prompted the trial court to conclude that San Martin's confession had sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome the presumption of unreliability which attaches to accomplices' hearsay confessions that incriminate the defendant. Lee, 476 U.S. at 541, 106 S.Ct. at 2062. Having determined that the interlocking nature of the confessions did not provide sufficient indicia of reliability to avoid the Confrontation Clause, we proceed to the question of whether San Martin's confession possesses inherent trustworthiness to be directly admissible on another basis. In Wright, the Court gave the following guidance: We think the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness required for admission under the Confrontation Clause must likewise be drawn from the totality of circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. Our precedents have recognized that statements admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception are so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to their reliability. Wright, 497 U.S. at 820-21, 110 S.Ct. at 3149-50. Thus, the question of the admissibility of San Martin's confession against Franqui becomes whether San Martin's confession comes within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception or whether the totality of the circumstances in which San Martin's confession was made makes the statement inherently trustworthy and renders the declarant particularly worthy of belief. While a statement against penal interest is an exception to the hearsay rule under section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), we cannot say that it is a firmly rooted exception. Prior to the adoption of the Evidence Code, this Court first recognized the statement-against-penal-interest exception in Baker v. State, 336 So.2d 364 (Fla.1976). [1] The exception was thereafter codified as section 90.804(2)(c), and included the following sentence: A statement or confession which is offered against the accused in a criminal action, and which is made by a co-defendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused, is not within this exception. See also Nelson v. State, 490 So.2d 32 (Fla.1986). However, in 1990, the legislature deleted this sentence, thereby allowing for the admission of self-inculpatory statements of nontestifying codefendants. See generally Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 804.4 (1995). Since that section of the Evidence Code specifically excluded such a statement as being an exception to the hearsay rule until 1990, See Nelson, this exception is not firmly rooted. Finally, we cannot say that the totality of the circumstances under which San Martin made his confession demonstrated the particularized guarantee of trustworthiness sufficient to overcome the presumption of unreliability of a codefendant's statement which implicates the defendant. Moreover, our analysis of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court now requires us to recede from that portion of Grossman which relied upon the interlocking nature of the confession to provide the requisite indicia of reliability. For the same reason, we also recede from that portion of Farina v. State, 679 So.2d 1151 (Fla.1996), in which we indicated that the defendant's confession could be considered in assessing whether a codefendant's statements are supported by sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. at 1155. However, in Farina, because the defendant and the codefendant discussed the crime with each other, that case is a unique example of when a codefendant's statements, although implicating the defendant, had a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness so as to be introduced against him based solely upon the circumstances under which the statements were made. See also Puiatti v. State, 521 So.2d 1106 (Fla.1988) (reliability clearly established by joint confession). San Martin was interviewed a second time after his arrest by Detective Albert Nabut. San Martin's statement to Detective Nabut was also admitted against Franqui at their joint trial. In this instance, the statement was essentially limited to San Martin's actions in disposing of the weapons used in the crime which further implicated him in the crime and his efforts to destroy evidence connecting him to the crime. He made no reference to Franqui in this statement. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994), is instructive with respect to whether San Martin's statement to Detective Nabut was admissible. In Williamson, the Court clarified the scope of the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, see Fed R.Evid. 804(b)(3), in determining the admissibility of an accomplice's confession. The Court narrowly construed this exception to the hearsay rule and found only the self-inculpatory portions of the statement contained within the confession would be admissible. Id. at 602-03, 114 S.Ct. at 2436-37. While Williamson dealt with a hearsay question and the instant case deals with a Confrontation Clause objection, Williamson is significant for the purpose of this discussion because it naturally follows that if the self-inculpatory portions of an accomplice's confession meet this hearsay exception, then these portions can be found to have sufficient inherent trustworthiness to also meet the test of admissibility under the Confrontation Clause as announced in Wright. The Court in Williamson stated that [e]ven the confessions of arrested accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603, 114 S.Ct. at 2436. Similarly, Justices O'Connor and Scalia directly recognized in Williamson that the very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatory is itself a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness that makes a statement admissible under the Confrontation Clause. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605, 114 S.Ct. at 2437-38 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (citing Lee v. Illinois ). [2] Accordingly, we hold that the substance of San Martin's interview with Detective Nabut concerning the whereabouts of the weapons used in the crime was admissible because it was individually self-incriminatory. While the weapons recovered provided the State with additional evidence against Franqui, San Martin's statement as to the disposition of the weapons was focused on his own actions and bore the requisite sufficient indicia of reliability and particularized guarantees of trustworthiness to render it admissible against Franqui at their joint trial. Having determined that the admission of San Martin's initial confession was error because it contained statements which were incriminating as to Franqui, we move to the issue of whether the admission of that confession was harmless error. Though there is language in Cruz which may lend to an argument that error in the admission of interlocking confessions prohibits the error from being harmless, upon close analysis we conclude that both Cruz and Wright authorize a harmless-error review. We point specifically to that portion of Cruz which states: We hold that, where a nontestifying codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even if the defendant's own confession is admitted against him. Of course, the defendant's confession may be considered ... on appeal in assessing whether any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193-94, 107 S.Ct. at 1719-20 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Our conclusion is bolstered by recognizing that in an earlier portion of the Cruz opinion Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court was adopting the approach espoused by Justice Blackmun in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979). In that case, a plurality of four justices held that where interlocking confessions were introduced, there was no Confrontation Clause violation. Three other justices subscribed to the view expressed by Justice Blackmun that while the introduction of the defendant's own interlocking confession might render the violation of the Confrontation Clause harmless, it could not prevent the introduction of the nontestifying codefendant's confession from constituting a violation. See id. at 81, 99 S.Ct. at 2143-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun alone went on to find that the interlocking nature of the confessions in that case made the error harmless so as to produce a majority for affirmance of the convictions. In fact, Justice Blackmun observed that in most interlocking-confession cases, any error in admitting the confession of a nontestifying codefendant will be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 442 U.S. at 79, 99 S.Ct. at 2142 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). The Cruz decision suggested the obvious question of why be concerned about whether an interlocking confession is admissible against the defendant if its admission is always going to be harmless error because it is interlocking. The dissenting opinion in Cruz answered the question by explaining how the Cruz opinion would affect future trials. That the error the Court finds may be harmless and the conviction saved will not comfort prosecutors and judges. I doubt that the former will seek joint trials in interlocking confession cases, and if that occurs, the judge is not likely to commit error by admitting the codefendant's confession. 481 U.S. at 198, 107 S.Ct. at 1721-22 (White, J., dissenting). Our analysis with respect to harmless error is reaffirmed in Wright, which states: [W]e think the presence of corroborating evidence more appropriately indicates that any error in admitting the statement might be harmless rather than that any basis exists for presuming the declarant to be trustworthy. 497 U.S. at 823, 110 S.Ct. at 3151 (footnote omitted). In sum, it is now clear that a nontestifying codefendant's confession which implicates the defendant cannot be introduced simply because it interlocks with the defendant's confession. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the interlocking nature of the confession is likely to render the Confrontation Clause violation harmless on appellate review. Thus, while that portion of San Martin's confession which implicated Franqui should not have been introduced into evidence, the fact that it mirrors Franqui's confession in so many respects strongly indicates that the error was harmless. Of course, Franqui's confession is powerful evidence of his guilt. [3] Further, Franqui's confession is corroborated by other evidence in the case, including the manner in which the crime was committed. Further, as noted previously, the evidence relating to the police having recovered the guns at San Martin's direction was properly admitted. The State's forensic expert testified that the bullet that killed Lopez was fired from a revolver. One of the guns the police recovered was a revolver, and Franqui confessed that he was the only one of the codefendants armed with that kind of gun. The other two guns recovered by the police and all of the guns carried by the victims were inconsistent with the fatal bullet. Because the revolver was rusty, the expert could not say with certainty that the fatal bullet came from that revolver. However, he did say that the bullet which killed Lopez came from the same gun as another bullet which was lodged in the passenger mirror of the grey Suburban, and the trajectory of a hole in the passenger window lined up with that bullet, thereby indicating that it was fired from within the vehicle. Franqui was the only occupant of the grey Suburban, and he admitted firing a .357 revolver toward Lopez's vehicle. The jury specifically found Franqui guilty of first-degree murder either by premeditated design or in the course of a felony, [4] and evidence supporting both theories is extensive. At the very least, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as it relates to Franqui's conviction of first-degree felony murder. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). As his third issue, Franqui claims two errors were made in the jury selection process. First, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Franqui's voir dire examination of the jury regarding specific mitigating circumstances. The scope of voir dire questioning rests in the sound discretion of the court and will not be interfered with unless that discretion is clearly abused. Vining v. State, 637 So.2d 921, 926 (Fla.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1022, 115 S.Ct. 589, 130 L.Ed.2d 502 (1994). In Lavado v. State, 492 So.2d 1322 (Fla. 1986), the issue presented was whether the trial court erred in refusing defense counsel's request to ask prospective jurors about their willingness and ability to accept the defense of involuntary intoxication. See also Brown v. State, 614 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (similar issue). We decided that the trial court's restriction of defense counsel's questioning on voir dire denied Lavado his right to a fair and impartial jury. Lavado, 492 So.2d at 1323. We adopted the reasoning of the dissent of Judge Pearson where he stated: [W]here a juror's attitude about a particular legal doctrine (in the words of the trial court, the law) is essential to a determination of whether challenges for cause or peremptory challenges are to be made, it is well settled that the scope of the voir dire properly includes questions about and references to that legal doctrine even if stated in the form of hypothetical questions. Pait v. State, 112 So.2d 380 (Fla.1959) (no error where prosecutor propounded question to prospective jurors on voir dire concerning their attitudes toward a finding of guilt on a homicide charge based solely on a theory of felony murder); Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 438, 94 So. 865, 869 (1922) (no error where prosecutor explained legal doctrine of criminal responsibility of aiders and abettors to prospective jurors and then asked them if they would render a verdict of guilty of all necessary elements for conviction under doctrine present). Lavado v. State, 469 So.2d 917, 919-20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Judge Pearson also noted the importance of the nature and purpose of the question in each case, and indicated that asking whether jurors would acquit based on hypothetical testimony rather than asking jurors about their attitudes towards a particular defense would be improper. See id. at 920 n. 3; compare Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 94 So. 865 (1922) with Dicks v. State, 83 Fla. 717, 93 So. 137 (1922). [5] In this case, during voir dire, defense counsel asked: Do you feel that the defendant's young age would be a factor you would take into effect, take into your mind in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty? [6] The State objected and the court sustained the objection directing defense counsel to [a]sk the question generically. In sustaining the objection the court explained: I think that you can ask them hypotheticals. If the court were to say to you that the fact that the Defendant has never had a traffic infraction, is a mitigating circumstance, do you follow up an instruction even if you did not feel that it was a mitigating circumstance, or any subject like that? That is what I mean by generic. Not specifically addressing any particular mitigating circumstance. The State argues that this explanation meant that defense counsel was welcome to inquire regarding the process so long as the questions were put in the context of the jurors' ability to follow the law, rather than eliciting a promise that the juror would factor in a specific mitigating circumstance. We agree. Our examination of the record reflects that the trial court left defense counsel with plenty of latitude to discuss mitigating circumstances with the jurors in the context of the legal instructions that would be given by the court. We find no abuse of discretion. As his second jury selection issue, Franqui maintains that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him access to the jury questionnaires after they were returned by the potential jurors. The State responds that this claim is procedurally barred, and even if it were not, it would be meritless. We agree that this claim is procedurally barred but find that in the absence of the bar, the error would nevertheless be harmless since appellant was not prejudiced. The very same, and limited, information in the questionnaires was elicited from the prospective jurors by the trial court in appellant's presence before the trial began. Finally, Franqui asserts that his convictions for attempted murder must be reversed on the authority of State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995). In Gray, this Court held that the crime of attempted felony murder no longer existed in the State of Florida and directed that our decision would be applied to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final. Consequently, the effect of State v. Gray upon Franqui's convictions for attempted murder must be considered. On each of the two counts, the jury was instructed on both attempted premeditated murder and attempted felony murder, and the jury returned a verdict of guilt on both charges. Thus, Franqui's convictions for attempted murder must be reversed upon the authority of Valentine v. State, 688 So.2d 313, 317 (Fla.1996), petition for cert. filed, No. 96-9047 (U.S. May 16, 1997), in which this Court held: Valentine next argues that his conviction for attempted first-degree murder is error. We agree. The jury was instructed on two possible theories on this count, attempted first-degree felony murder and attempted first degree premeditated murder, and the verdict fails to state on which ground the jury relied. After Valentine was sentenced, this Court held that the crime of attempted first-degree felony murder does not exist in Florida See State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995). Because the jury may have relied on this legally unsupportable theory, the conviction for attempted first-degree murder must be reversed. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991).