Opinion ID: 740289
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: hhc's liability

Text: 20 Hilton argues that there is no foundation in Nevada law for the judgment awarding punitive damages against the parent corporation HHC. Specifically, Hilton contends that the agency theory of punitive damages liability relied upon by the jury as they were instructed by the court has no basis in Nevada law. Hilton argues that Nevada law allows a jury to disregard corporate form only under an alter ego theory of liability. Hilton's argument ignores another theory on which the jury was instructed it could award punitive damages against HHC: a finding that HHC itself had acted with conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. Hilton implicitly assumes that there was insufficient evidence to support this finding. We disagree. Therefore, we need not address whether Nevada law allows an award of punitive damages under an agency theory of liability. 21 The jury was not instructed that HHC could be found liable on Coughlin's punitive damages claim only under an agency theory. Rather, the jury was instructed that LVHC or HHC could be held liable for punitive damages if they found by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was guilty of malice or oppression. The jury was instructed that malice means conduct carried on by a defendant with a conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others, and that oppression means subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. Also, the jury was instructed that a defendant acts with conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others when it is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of its conduct and willfully and deliberately fails to avoid those consequences. 22 Hilton does not challenge the jury instructions on Coughlin's punitive damages claim. Therefore, we must affirm the jury's finding that HHC acted with a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others if there is substantial evidence to support such a finding. See Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir.1994). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence. Id. 23 Our review of the record reveals substantial evidence that supports the jury's finding that HHC acted with a conscious disregard for the rights or safety of hotel guests. Testimony established that HHC's security personnel oversaw the details of LVHC's security operations, performing audits and inspections. In fact, LVHC's director of security reported to HHC management. Other testimony showed that HHC's President, Barron Hilton, had a special relationship with Tailhook. An LVHC employee testified that as a result of this special relationship, he was instructed to let [Tailhook convention attendees] have their fun. Barron Hilton himself testified that he knew the Tailhook group was boisterous. 24 Together with the evidence establishing HHC's oversight of LVHC's security operations, the jury could have inferred that HHC knew about the dangers created by allowing the Tailhook convention to proceed unfettered in the third-floor area. Evidence established that LVHC knew about convention-related assaults in the hallways outside the hospitality suites as early as 1988. The jury saw reports from LVHC security guards reporting a gauntlet attack on an 18-year old woman that left her half-naked. Nevertheless, the evidence indicated that HHC's management took inadequate steps to ensure the safety of Hilton guests such as Coughlin in the third-floor area during the 1991 Tailhook Convention. 25 Although this evidence is not by any means overwhelming, we believe it is sufficient to support the jury's finding that HHC was guilty of malice or oppression and thus subject to an award of punitive damages. We conclude that this evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that HHC was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of its conduct and willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. Thus, we uphold the jury's finding that HHC acted with conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.