Opinion ID: 1725638
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Admiralty jurisdiction would be proper in this case if the incident of which Choat complains meets two criteria set forth by the United States Supreme Court. First, the type of incident involved must potential[ly affect] maritime commerce. Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 2896, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990). Second, the type of activity involved must bear `a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.'  Id. at 362, 110 S.Ct. at 2895 (quoting Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 675 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 2658 n. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982)).
To determine the potential effect on maritime commerce, we must imagine an incident of the same general character as the incident under consideration as having occurred, not in the location in which it actually occurred, but in the busiest conceivable sea lane. From that premise, we must then postulate the possible effect on commercial shipping of the occurrence in that latter location. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363, 110 S.Ct. at 2896 (a court must assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether such an incident is likely to disrupt commercial activity); Price v. Price, 929 F.2d 131, 135 (4th Cir.1991) (under Foremost and Sisson, we must project more generally the composite genre of the tort or its essential elements and determine whether traditional maritime commerce will be affected). Thus, in Foremost, the Court held that a collision on the Amite River in Louisiana between an eighteen foot pleasure boat towing a water skier and a sixteen-foot `bass boat' potentially interfered with maritime commerce, notwithstanding the facts that neither vessel had ever been engaged in commercial maritime activity and that the situs of the accident had been seldom, if ever, used for commercial activity. Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 678, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 2660, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). The Foremost Court, as Sisson later more fully explained, supported [its] finding of potential disruption... with a description of the likely effects of a collision at the mouth of the St. Lawrence Seaway, ... an area heavily traveled by commercial vessels. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363, 110 S.Ct. at 2896 (emphasis added). In Sisson itself, the Supreme Court held that an action based on fire damage to a Lake Michigan marina and to vessels docked therein invoked admiralty jurisdiction, notwithstanding the facts that the vessel in which the fire originated was a 56-foot pleasure yacht, id., at 360, 110 S.Ct. at 2894, and that no commercial vessels were docked at the marina at the time of the fire. Id. at 363, 110 S.Ct. at 2896. Because, the Court noted, fire poses a perennial danger to commercial vessels, the genre of the occurrence involved in Sisson fire on a vessel docked at a marina on navigable watersconstituted a potential hazard to maritime commerce. Id. at 362-63, 110 S.Ct. at 2895. Under these principles, we must conclude that the incident of which Choat complains a fatal collision on navigable waterpotentially affects maritime commerce. Were an incident of this genre to occur at the mouth of the St. Lawrence Seaway, Foremost, 457 U.S. at 675, 102 S.Ct. at 2658, emergency personnel could be called to rescue victims or to retrieve casualties. Such rescue activities could interrupt commercial shipping. See Complaint of Bird, 794 F.Supp. 575, 579 (D.S.C.1992) (commotion conceivably arising from attempts to rescue a [man overboard] in a crowded seaway would potentially have an impact on maritime commerce); Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 602 (3d Cir.1991) (possibility that commercial vessels would be diverted to respond to distress signals to aid a diver suffering from decompression sickness potentially affected maritime commerce). Thus, because the occurrence of an incident of this general character potentially affects maritime commerce, the first criterion of the jurisdictional analysis is met.
Operating a vessel is a traditional maritime activity. Lipworth v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 592 So.2d 1151, 1153 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 974, 113 S.Ct. 465, 121 L.Ed.2d 373 (1992). Therefore, in connection with the second step of the jurisdictional inquiry, the parties have devoted considerable attention to the question whether a Jet Ski is a vessel. This question has not been unanimously resolved, and at least one court has answered the question in the negative. In Complaint of Roffe, 724 F.Supp. 9, 10-11 n. 2 (D.P.R.1989), the operator of a WaveJammer that she had rented from Roffe, was killed when she collided with a yacht. Id. at 9. Roffe began an action pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C.App. § 183, seeking to limit his liability to $2500, the cost of the Wave-Jammer. 724 F.Supp. at 9. Reasoning that the application of the Act to pleasure crafts, and, in particular, to the relatively inexpensive WaveJammer, would often inadequately compensate for serious injuries or death, the court held that the Act did not apply to pleasure crafts. Id. at 10. As an alternative basis for excluding the owner of the WaveJammer from the application of the Act, the court stated: [W]e decline to rule that the WaveJammer, one of a new breed of aquatic motorbikes, is a vessel within the meaning of the statute. As described in the literature submitted by the petitioner ..., it is a vehicle characterized as a personal watercraft designed for only one rider. Id. at 10-11 n. 2 (emphasis in original). Complaint of Roffe, however, did not involve the jurisdictional question involved in this case, that is, whether admiralty jurisdiction was proper. In our view, the rationale for defining such machines as nonvessels for purposes of the Limitation of Liability Act is entirely separate from, and probably inapplicable to, the question whether such devices are vessels for jurisdictional purposes. Nevertheless, at least one court has concluded that a Jet Ski is a vessel, even for purposes of the Limitation of Liability Act. Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893 F.2d 1225 (11th Cir. 1990) (collision involving a Jet Ski and a motorboat). More on point are Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., 800 F.Supp. 1061 (D.Conn.1992) (Jet Ski collided with a motorboat), vacated on other grounds, 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct. 1060, 127 L.Ed.2d 380 (1994), and Lipworth v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 592 So.2d 1151 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.) (Jet Ski collided with a dock), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 974, 113 S.Ct. 465, 121 L.Ed.2d 373 (1992). Both of those cases, like this case, involved products liability claims against Kawasaki. Both courts regarded Jet Skis as vessels and held that maritime law applied. Wahlstrom concluded that the operation of a motorized Jet Ski, like [the operation of] a small motor boat, sufficiently implicates traditional maritime activities. 800 F.2d at 1062. Lipworth discerned no reasonable distinction between small motor boats capable of being used as a means of transportation on water and a Jet Ski, which is also capable of substantially equivalent transportation on water. 592 So.2d at 1153. Wahlstrom and Lipworth both relied, in part, on 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) (the general provisions section), which defines vessel in the broadest of terms. Specifically, § 3 defines the term vessel as including every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water. Indeed, this definition might well include `the three men in a tub,' or `Jonah inside the whale.' McCarthy v. The Bark Peking, 716 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir.1983) (quoting Burks v. American River Transportation Co., 679 F.2d 69, 75 (5th Cir.1982)), cert. denied sub nom. South Street Seaport Museum v. McCarthy, 465 U.S. 1078, 104 S.Ct. 1439, 79 L.Ed.2d 760 (1984). Also significant is the manner in which the owner's manual and similar material provided with the Jet Ski in this case characterize the machine. For example, this material states in part: The Jet Ski is not a toy; it is a high performance class A power boat. With a lightweight rider, a Jet Ski accelerates more quickly and has a higher top speed than with a heavier rider. (Emphasis added.) Additionally instructive are characterizations of the Jet Ski contained in correspondence to Kawasaki from the United States Coast Guard. In a letter issued on March 9, 1983, the Coast Guard, pursuant to Kawasaki's request, granted Kawasaki an exemption from various federal standards, including the Certification of Compliance standard, set forth in 33 C.F.R. § 181(B); the Safe Loading Standard, the Flotation Standard, the Electrical Systems Standard, the Fuel Systems Standard and the powered ventilation portion of the Ventilation Systems Standard, set forth in 33 C.F.R. § 183(B)-(C), (F), (I)-(K). In considering an exemption from the safe loading standard, the Coast Guard, in the letter to Kawasaki, stated that the Jet Ski boat could not, as a practical matter, be tested in accordance with the language of the standard which is intended to deal with a conventional boat of open hull construction. (Emphasis added.) The Coast Guard also noted that the provisions of the ventilation standard are not dispositive as to the Jet Ski, because it is designed to be capable of being capsized and partially submerged without causing the engine to cease operating, and because the boat is equipped with a carburetor that has no float bowl and is sealed against leakage. (Emphasis added.) As to a requested variance in the format and placement of certification labels, the Coast Guard reasoned that as long as the label continues to be visible to the operator when boarding the boat or getting the boat underway, the... placement of the label on the rear portion of the engine cover [should be considered] as meeting the requirement for the visibility of the label. (Emphasis added.) In considering an exemption from the floatation standard, the Coast Guard found that the amount of flotation material provided in the Jet Ski boat [was] sufficient to float the weight of the boat, its permanent appurtenances and the operator, and thus [met] the intent of the Floatation Standard. (Emphasis added.) The Coast Guard concluded that, as to the Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A. boats known as the `Jet Ski,' the requested exemptions would not adversely affect boating safety. (Emphasis added.) That the Jet Ski is not a conventional boat is not the dispositive consideration. It is a self-propelled device without nonaquatic function or capacity. The definitions and descriptions cited above lead us to hold that, at least for jurisdictional purposes, a Jet Ski is a vessel, and, consequently, to characterize its operation and steerage as navigation. In this connection, we must disagree with Choat's characterization of this case as one not involving allegations of improper navigation. Brief of Appellant, at 15. The complaint alleges that the Jet Ski was defective because of its unreasonably dangerous operating and handling characteristics, and because of its lack of warning that it [would] not turn without engaging [the] throttle and that when [the] throttle [was] disengaged it [would] tend to go straight even when the operator attempt[ed] a turn. (Emphasis added.) These allegations demonstrate the logical difficulty in separating the activity of navigation from Choat's cause of action. Navigation was, after all, the activity that rendered the alleged design defect dangerous. Because we regard the operation of a Jet Ski as the navigation of a vessel, we need not determine whether Connie' s floatation device also was a vessel. Admiralty jurisdiction is invoked by an activity involving the navigation of a vessel into, or over, (1) a swimmer, Oliver v. Hardesty, 745 F.2d 317 (4th Cir.1984); Hogan v. Overman, 767 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir.1985) (waterskier struck by a vessel); Medina v. Perez, 733 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.1984) (swimmer struck by a pleasure boat), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106, 105 S.Ct. 778, 83 L.Ed.2d 774 (1985); or (2) a stationary object, McCormick v. United States, 680 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.1982) (action involving a pleasure boat's collision with a piling); Hebert v. Outboard Marine Corp., 638 F.Supp. 1166 (E.D.La.1986) (action involving a homemade skiff's collision with a piling). This case is, therefore, distinguishable from Woltering v. Outboard Marine Corp., 245 Ill.App.3d 684, 185 Ill.Dec. 791, 615 N.E.2d 86 (1993), appeal denied, 152 Ill.2d 582, 190 Ill.Dec. 912, 622 N.E.2d 1229 (1993), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. January 4, 1994) (No. 93-1098). In that recent case, cited by Choat, the court held that an action arising from the death of a passenger who was thrown from a pleasure craft and fatally injured by the propeller of the boat's outboard motor did not invoke admiralty jurisdiction. Woltering, unlike this case, contained no evidence of a navigational malfunction. Significantly, the court noted: While negligent navigation is not necessary to invoke admiralty jurisdiction, its presence strongly suggests the propriety of applying admiralty law. 245 Ill.App.3d at 688, 185 Ill.Dec. at 794, 615 N.E.2d at 89 (emphasis added). Thus, Woltering provides no authority for the application of state law in this case. Indeed, the United States Supreme Courtsee Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996), which shall be discussed more fully in Part II of this opinionrecently considered a case involving the collision of a WaveJammer piloted by a minor child with a vessel that was anchored in the water before a beachfront hotel in Puerto Rico. Preferatory to its discussion of the issue of remedies, the Court summarily concluded: Because this case involves a watercraft collision on navigable waters, it falls within admiralty's domain. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 361-367, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 2895-2898, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 2659, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982). ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 623. We conclude, therefore, that the second criterion of the jurisdictional inquiry is satisfied, and that maritime law governs Choat's claims against Kawasaki.