Opinion ID: 2611904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Court's Definition of Occupant Is Unpersuasive.

Text: The court concludes that an occupant is one who occupies a particular place or premises and has an equitable interest in the improvements thereon. [3] The first half of the definition is simply a self evident dictionary definition. The second half presumably distinguishes one kind of tenant from another kind of tenant. [4] However, the appended language does not appear to correct the problem the distinction allegedly addresses. The court remarks that the dictionary definition would require a reconveyance to an occupier who is merely a tenant of the owner of the improvements.... [I]n some cases this would be unjust to the owner of the improvements, as where the owner holds under a long-term lease and would be protected for the term of the lease under section 14(g), while the tenant, whose sole residence is on the premises, would have a claim to title under 14(c)(1)... . [I]n the analogous townsite context [it] seems to be clear that one who is merely a tenant is not an occupant. ..... It is necessary therefore in tenancy cases to add to the dictionary definition a requirement that the occupier have an equitable interest in the improvements. Opinion at 1072-1073. The language appended by the court merely narrows the category of tenants who will divest their landlords; it does not eliminate the problem. Under the definition crafted by the court, the tenant (sub-lessee) of the holder of a long-term government lease (sub-lessor), who occupies the land as a primary residence or business and who has an equitable interest in improvements put on the premises with the sub-lessor's consent, would become the owner of the property the sub-lessor leased to that tenant. The definition employed by the court creates an impossible situation. The patent, by which the Village Corporation obtains title from the United States, is subject to the lessee/sub-lessor's complete enjoyment of all rights, privileges, and benefits thereby granted him [by the lease]. Section 14(g). The described sub-lessee is entitled to a conveyance of title from the Village Corporation without consideration. Section 14(c)(1). Thus the sub-lessee's title is subject to the sub-lessor's existing rights, which may include entitlement to rent from the sub-lessee, who is now the owner. Presumably if the sub-lessee defaults in the payment of rent, the lessee/sub-lessor may evict the person who is now the owner of the property. I am unpersuaded that this attempted differentiation between various kinds of tenants, one of whom obtains title and the other of whom occupies in accordance with the terms of a lease which cannot be transformed into title, justifies the court's definition of occupant. The definition will exacerbate the problem. A tenant by any other name will still be a tenant. The problem will be the same: the tenant's Section 14(c)(1) rights will conflict with the United States' lessee's Section 14(g) rights. The court's definition of occupancy is flawed even when viewed only in the context of Section 14(c)(1). As used in Section 14(c)(1), occupant applies to four classes of activity on land: (1) primary place of residence, (2) primary place of business, (3) subsistence campsite, or (4) headquarters for reindeer husbandry. Acknowledging the inadequacy of its craftsmanship, the court restricts its definition of occupant to the first two classes of occupants. As it states, in the other categories improvements may be either non-existent or relatively unimportant. Opinion at 1073 n. 17. While that may be true, on what basis can such a definitional distinction be made between category 1 and 2 occupants on the one hand, and category 3 and 4 occupants on the other? I suggest there is none. Furthermore, given the nomadic culture of many of Alaska's Natives, an equitable interest in improvements is a concept of questionable utility.