Opinion ID: 2461173
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Determining whether public trust land is transferable

Text: Resolution of disputes over title to public trust land is a matter of state law. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484-85, 108 S.Ct. 791, 98 L.Ed.2d 877 (1988). Thus, state courts considering the public trust doctrine have developed their own frameworks for examining the administration of lands held in public trust. See District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C.Cir.1984) (In this country the public trust doctrine has developed almost exclusively as a matter of state law.). Although several approaches to making a determination regarding the transferability of public trust land exist, the approach taken by Arizona deserves concerted attention, as its constitution contains a gift clause nearly identical to Nevada's. [4] Moreover, Arizona's approach is instructive because it faces many of the same challenges that this state faces in maintaining its public trust property, given its arid desert climate and rapidly expanding urban population. See Tracey Dickman Zobenica, The Public Trust Doctrine in Arizona's Streambeds, 38 Ariz. L.Rev. 1053, 1054 (1996). In Arizona Center for Law v. Hassell, 172 Ariz. 356, 837 P.2d 158 (App.1991), a case with facts and issues remarkably similar to those presented here, the Court of Appeals of Arizona extensively considered the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the Arizona gift clause. In Hassell, the Arizona Legislature enacted legislation relinquishing, through an uncompensated quitclaim, the state's claim to any interest in all watercourses other than the Colorado, Gila, Salt, and Verde Rivers and in all lands formerly within those rivers but outside their current beds. Id. at 162. The legislation also allowed record titleholder[s] of lands in or near the beds of the Gila, Salt, or Verde Rivers to obtain a quitclaim deed for just $25 per acre. Id. The Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest and several individuals (collectively, Arizona Center) commenced a lawsuit against Arizona Land Commissioner Milo J. Hassell, the state land department, and the State of Arizona (collectively, Land Commissioner). Id. at 163. Arizona Center sought to invalidate the legislation, alleging that it violated the gift clause of the Arizona Constitution... and the state's sovereign duty to protect the public [interest]. Id. (citations omitted). The trial court granted the Land Commissioner summary judgment, determining that [e]ven if the rivers were navigable at statehood, ... the state could legally relinquish its claims to the riverbeds for the purpose of `unclouding title.' Id. Arizona Center appealed. Id. Although the parties in Hassell briefed the gift clause and public trust issues separately, the Arizona Court of Appeals considered them in unison. Id. at 166. The court explained, Because the gift clause of the Arizona Constitution explicitly limits governmental freedom to dispose of public resources, it provides an appropriate framework for judicial review of an attempt by the legislative and executive branches to divest the state of a portion of its public trust. Id. Relying upon Arizona's gift clause jurisprudence, the Hassell court then fashioned the following test for reviewing the validity of dispensations of trust property: [W]hen a court reviews a dispensation of public trust property, ... public purpose and fair consideration[ ] must be shown.... [A]ny public trust dispensation must also satisfy the state's special obligation to maintain the trust for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations. Id. at 170. Applying this test, the Hassell court concluded that the legislation being challenged was invalid under the public trust doctrine and [the gift clause] of the Arizona Constitution. Id. at 173. Because we find the reasoning enunciated in Hassell persuasive and harmonious with our own gift clause and public trust jurisprudence, we adopt the Hassell approach to reviewing dispensations of public trust property. Accordingly, when assessing such dispensations, courts of this state must consider (1) whether the dispensation was made for a public purpose, (2) whether the state received fair consideration in exchange for the dispensation, and (3) whether the dispensation satisfies the state's special obligation to maintain the trust for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations. Id. at 170. The first two considerations are common to any dispensation of public trust property, see, e.g., State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, 332-34, 512 P.2d 1321, 1322-23 (1973); Clark County v. Lewis, 88 Nev. 354, 357, 498 P.2d 363, 365 (1972), while the third consideration is specific to navigable waterways under the public trust. Hassell, 837 P.2d at 169-70. In addition, cognizant of the fact that public trust land may ... undergo[ ] such changes over time that it is no longer suitable for public trust purposes, id. at 170, when reviewing the third consideration, courts should also evaluate the following factors to determine whether a given conveyance comports with the state's trustee duties: [T]he degree of effect of the project on public trust uses, navigation, fishing, recreation and commerce; the impact of the individual project on the public trust resource; the impact of the individual project when examined cumulatively with existing impediments to full use of the public trust resource ...; the impact of the project on the public trust resource when that resource is examined in light of the primary purpose for which the resource is suited, i.e. commerce, navigation, fishing or recreation; and the degree to which broad public uses are set aside in favor of more limited or private ones. Id. at 170-71 (quoting Kootenai Environ. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085, 1092-93 (1983)). Finally, we note that when the Legislature has found that a given dispensation is in the public's interest, it will be afforded deference. See id. at 171; Lewis, 88 Nev. at 357-58, 498 P.2d at 365-66. This is not to say that the courts of this state will merely rubber-stamp the Legislature's finding. Hassell, 837 P.2d at 171. Rather, while courts will give the Legislature due deference, they will carefully examine whether the Legislature made an informed and appropriate conveyance under the rubric set forth above.