Opinion ID: 3022466
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Intrusion Upon Seclusion Claim

Text: Clegg claims that her seclusion was intruded upon when Levers secretly tape recorded her private conversation. To maintain an intrusion upon seclusion claim under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show that (1) there was an intentional intrusion; (2) upon the solitude or seclusion of the plaintiff, or his or her private affairs or concerns; and (3) that the intrusion was substantial; and (4) highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable person. See Larsen v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 543 A.2d 1181, 1186-87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).10 Summary judgment for Falcon and Nugent was appropriate because Falcon and Nugent were not vicariously liable for Levers’ conduct. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can only be held liable for the conduct of a employee if the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment. “For an act to be within the scope of employment it must: 1) be the kind the actor was employed to perform; 2) occur substantially within the authorized time and space limits and 3) it must be actuated, at least in part, by a desire to serve the master.” Tucker v. Merck & Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7672, at -40 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing Shuman Estate v. Weber, 419 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)). Levers’ taping of Clegg’s conversation was certainly not the 10 The District Court granted summary judgment to Falcon and Nugent on Clegg’s intrusion upon seclusion claim and subsequently dismissed the claim against Levers without prejudice so that Clegg could pursue it in state court. Clegg does not challenge the dismissal on appeal. 17 kind of act that he was employed to perform, nor can it realistically be argued that he was motivated by a desire to serve Falcon. Thus, his action was outside the scope of his employment and Falcon cannot be held vicariously liable. Clegg argues that “the acts of an agent can be ratified by inaction which manifests consent,” and that “a jury could draw the inference from the evidence that Nugent either approved or at least ratified Levers’ conduct” when he initially told her that it was not illegal to tape someone’s conversations and that her taking the tape recorder could be considered theft. This argument is undermined by the fact that Nugent clearly expressed to Clegg that the company did not give anybody permission to record her, and Levers was given a “formal written reprimand” for taping the conversation.11 Given these undisputed facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that Nugent or Falcon approved or ratified any taping of Clegg’s phone conversation. Summary judgment was, therefore, appropriate.