Opinion ID: 163852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislation

Text: 14 The Controlled Substances Act makes it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense any controlled substance, except as authorized by the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Possession is also criminalized except as authorized. Id. § 844(a). 15 The CSA classifies controlled substances according to five schedules, based on required findings of a drug's safety, the extent to which it has an accepted medical use, and its potential for abuse. Schedule I, the most restrictive list, encompasses drugs with a high potential for abuse, no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, and a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision. Id. § 812(b)(1)(A)-(C). Included in Schedule I is any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, including DMT. Id. § 812. No individual or entity may distribute or dispense a Schedule I controlled substance except as part of a strictly controlled research project registered with the DEA and approved by the Food and Drug Administration, or for limited industrial purposes excluding human consumption of the substance. Id. § 823(f). 16 The 1971 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances embodies an international effort to prevent and combat abuse of [psychotropic] substances and the illicit traffic to which it gives rise. Convention, Preamble. The treaty classifies substances according to their degree of safety and medical usefulness, with Schedule I representing substances, including DMT, that are particularly unsafe and lack any medical use. Parties to the Convention, more than 160 nations in all, must [p]rohibit all use except for scientific and very limited medical purposes. Id. Art. 7(a). 17 The Convention also bans unauthorized import and export of the substances and provides, a preparation is subject to the same measures of control as the substance which it contains. Id. Art. 3(1). With respect to religious use of Schedule I substances, the Convention allows signatories to make reservations exempting a substance from the provisions of Article 7 under the following circumstances: A State on whose territory plants are growing wild which contain psychotropic substances from among those in Schedule I and which are traditionally used by certain small, clearly determined groups in magical or religious rights, may, at the time of signature, ratification, or accession, make reservations concerning these plants, in respect of the provisions of article 7, except for provisions relating to international trade. 18 Id. Art. 32(4). Under this provision, the United States made a reservation for Native American religious use of peyote. Neither the United States nor Brazil has made a reservation for DMT. 19 The First Amendment states, Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S. Const. amend. I. Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith held the Free Exercise Clause did not require Oregon to exempt from its criminal drug laws the sacramental ingestion of peyote by members of the Native American Church. 494 U.S. 872, 885-890, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). Generally applicable laws, the Court concluded, may be applied to religious exercises regardless of whether the Government demonstrates a compelling interest for its rule. Id. By contrast, a law that is not neutral and not generally applicable must be justified by a compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). 20 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, enacted after Smith, provides: 21 (a) In general 22 Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 23 (b) Exception 24 Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person — 25 (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 26 (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 27 (c) Judicial Relief 28 A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim ... in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. 29 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. RFRA restores the pre- Smith compelling interest test espoused in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). Congress explicitly stated, the term `demonstrates' means meets the burden of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2. 30 Following Congress' passage of RFRA, the Supreme Court found it unconstitutional as applied to the states. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). However, because we held RFRA is binding on the federal government, Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 959, pre- Boerne case law is applicable here.