Opinion ID: 1288587
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impermissible Burden Shifting on Voluntary-Intoxication Defense

Text: The capital specification used against Wilson in the penalty phase of his trial alleged that he killed to avoid apprehension or detection and future trial for the offense of kidnapping. The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the trial court  in the guilt phase  improperly shifted the burden to Wilson to prove that he lacked the specific intent, due to intoxication, to commit kidnapping. The Ohio Supreme Court held, however, that this error was harmless. The Ohio Supreme Court conducted harmless-error analysis with respect to the kidnapping charge only; it did not conduct any harmless-error review of the evading-kidnapping death specification, which incorporated the identical burden-shifting instruction of the kidnapping charge from the guilt phase. The district court also concluded, for different reasons, that the error was harmless. Wilson challenges these rulings, and the State admits that Wilson properly preserved this claim for habeas review. As mentioned, at the penalty phase of the trial, the State elected to proceed only on Count I (murder by prior calculation and design) and specification one (evading detection or punishment for kidnapping). The trial court instructed the jury to refer to the definition of kidnapping in the instructions regarding the kidnapping count when determining whether this capital specification existed. (Joint Appendix (JA) 1268 (explaining that, as to specification one to count one, [t]he offense of kidnapping is defined for you in Count Four [kidnapping] of this charge).) Those instructions, in turn, included instructions regarding the voluntary-intoxication defense: For purposes of Count Four [kidnapping], and any count or specification where Kidnapping is an element, and only for Count Four, or any count or specification where Kidnapping is an element, you may consider the defense of voluntary intoxication. Intoxication exists when a person consumes a quantity of intoxicating beverage containing alcohol sufficient to advers[e]ly affect his mental processes and to deprive him of that clearness of intellect that he would otherwise have possessed. Intoxication is not an excuse for an offense. However, such evidence is admissible for the purpose of showing that the Defendant was so intoxicated that he was incapable of having the knowledge to commit the offense of Kidnapping. Knowledge is the element of this offense; and intoxication, even severe intoxication[,] can co-exist with knowledge. On this issue, the burden of proof is upon the Defendant to establish by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence that at the time in question he was so influenced by alcohol that he was incapable of having the knowledge to commit the offense. If you find by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence that the Defendant was incapable of having the knowledge to commit the offense, then you must find that the Defendant was not guilty of the offense of Kidnapping because knowledge is an essential element of the offense as I have previously instructed you. (JA 1269-72 (emphasis added).) Wilson contends that this instruction was erroneous and that the error was not harmless.
[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Additionally, due process prohibits requiring an accused to disprove an element of the crime charged. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the instruction here violated this prohibition by requiring Wilson to disprove knowledge, an element of the kidnapping offense. State v. Wilson, 659 N.E.2d at 306 (This instruction is unconstitutional under Winship because it required Wilson to disprove `knowledge,' which is an element of the offense of kidnapping.). The Ohio Supreme Court also explained, however, that Wilson made no claim that any error in this regard affected the death sentence in his case. Id. Yet the district court concluded that Wilson did claim that this same error affected the death sentence because it was incorporated in the evading-kidnapping specification. The district court further held that, though one could argue that the confusing instruction was not technically improper because the burden shifting occurred in the context of an affirmative defense, the Ohio Supreme Court properly determined that the instruction was unconstitutional (as to the kidnapping charge). Wilson, slip op. at 95 n. 69. The district court accordingly concluded that the instruction was unconstitutional as to the evading-kidnapping specification. We are not certain that an error regarding the knowledge element of a kidnapping offense necessarily translates into an error regarding the knowledge element of an evading-kidnapping specification. In other words, one might say it is conceivable that a person could lack the requisite knowledge to commit kidnapping, yet have the requisite knowledge to commit murder to evade detection for kidnapping  for example, where the person believes he has committed kidnapping (but actually has not, perhaps because of earlier intoxication), and then commits murder to evade detection for the kidnapping he (erroneously) believes took place. But we do not decide this question. Instead, we assume that the instruction was erroneous with regard to the evading-kidnapping specification and address whether it was harmless.
In assessing whether this error was harmless, we first provide a brief overview of the Ohio Supreme Court's and district court's different analyses, then provide a discussion of the applicable law regarding harmless-error review in this context, and, finally, apply that law to Wilson's case.
The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the burden-shifting error was harmless in the context of the kidnapping charge: [W]e find the error to be harmless under the facts of this case since the kidnapping of Lutz continued into the late morning and early afternoon. At that point, he clearly knew what he was doing and intoxication would not reasonably be available as a defense to negate `knowledge.' State v. Wilson, 659 N.E.2d at 306. As mentioned, the Ohio Supreme Court did not undertake harmless-error analysis with regard to the evading-kidnapping death specification; the court concluded that Wilson made no argument to that specific point. The district court disagreed with the Ohio Supreme Court's reasoning. The district court concluded that Wilson met the standard under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), to show that this error affected the outcome of the trial: Clearly, this trial error[,] which permitted the jury to find Wilson guilty of kidnapping and the single aggravating circumstance to Count One even if the State had not sustained its burden with respect to the knowledge element, had `a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' Id. (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710). The district court explained further: Had the jury been more clearly instructed as regards the burden of proof, it is possible that it might have concluded, in the face of all of the testimony and Wilson's assertion of intoxication, that the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson had the requisite knowledge for either the kidnapping charge of the indictment or the kidnapping specification to the aggravated murder charge. Id. at 96-97. Therefore, had the kidnapping specification been the only specification for which Wilson had been found guilty, the district court stated that it would probably be inclined to grant the writ on this claim because, finding a constitutional error, [the district court] would be left with the `grave doubt' described in O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995), about whether that error is harmless. Id. at 98. The district court ultimately denied relief, however, because it concluded that there was an independent reason to deem the error harmless. The court explained that Wilson was found guilty of two capital specifications (which, as mentioned, establish eligibility for the death penalty) in addition to the evading-kidnapping specification: (1) committing the offense during kidnapping, and (2) committing the offense during an aggravated arson. The district court further noted that, during the penalty phase of a trial, where two or more aggravating circumstances arise from the same act or indivisible course of conduct and are thus duplicative, the duplicative aggravating circumstances will be merged for purposes of sentencing. Id. at 99 (quoting State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984) (¶ 5 of syllabus)). The state trial court noted that, based on this law, the State viewed these two additional specifications as merging with the first specification (murder to evade kidnapping), and the State therefore chose to proceed on only the first specification. Id. at 99-100. The district court concluded that [h]ad the State proceeded instead on the third specification relating to aggravated arson, for which there is no challenge as to the jury instructions and no challenge as to the sufficiency of evidence, undoubtedly the jury would have recommended the death penalty. Id. at 100. Therefore, the district court continued, the result would have been no different, that is, there is no `actual prejudice.' Id. Concluding that the error regarding the burden-shifting with respect to the first specification was harmless in this way, the district court denied habeas relief on this claim. Id.
To assess properly the Ohio Supreme Court and district court's analyses here, we must consider the proper standard for applying harmless-error review, the doctrine's emphasis on the error's actual (not hypothetical) impact, and the doctrine's application where the error occurs in the unique context of capital sentencing. This subsection addresses those points.
Before the enactment of AEDPA, the Supreme Court articulated two harmless-error standards. Eddleman v. McKee, 471 F.3d 576, 582 (6th Cir.2006). On direct review, before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). On collateral review, however, the State's burden is lessened: In those proceedings, courts should deem an error harmless unless the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710. When Congress enacted AEDPA, it complicated this dichotomy because AEDPA provides that habeas relief shall not be granted unless the state-court decision was either (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Eddleman, 471 F.3d at 582 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). We nonetheless continued to apply only the Brecht substantial-and-injurious-effect standard after AEDPA's enactment because we concluded that if a petitioner meets that standard, he will surely have demonstrated that the state court's finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt  the Chapman standard  resulted from . . . an unreasonable application of Chapman.  Id. (quoting Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir.1999)). In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003), however, we reconsidered this position in Eddleman and held that AEDPA replaced the Brecht standard with the standard of Chapman plus AEDPA deference when, as here, a state court made a harmless-error determination. Eddleman, 471 F.3d at 583. In other words, when assessing a state court's harmless-error review, we asked whether that review was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Chapman. See id. at 585 (We now must determine whether the [state-court] decision that admitting Eddleman's confession was harmless error was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Chapman. ). While Wilson's appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court rejected this approach. In Fry v. Pliler, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007), the Court unanimously concluded that regardless whether a state court applied Chapman 's harmless-error standard on direct review (i.e., that the state must prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), a federal habeas court applies the stricter (more state-deferential) Brecht standard (i.e., harmless unless the error had substantial and injurious effect on the outcome). In so holding, the Court explained that AEDPA did not replace the Brecht standard. Id. at 2326-27. The petitioner in Fry argued (just as the Eddleman court concluded) that, because of AEDPA, a federal habeas court conducting harmless-error review had to ask whether the state court unreasonably applied Chapman to determine whether habeas relief was warranted. Id. The Supreme Court explained, however, that it is implausible that, without saying so, AEDPA replaced the Brecht standard of `actual prejudice,' with the more liberal AEDPA/ Chapman standard which requires only that the state court's harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt determination be unreasonable. Id. at 2327 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). That said, the Court continued, it certainly makes no sense to require formal application of both tests (AEDPA/ Chapman and Brecht ) when the latter obviously subsumes the former. Id. In other words, a federal habeas court technically applies Brecht in light of AEDPA, but because the Brecht test is stricter (i.e., tougher on the petitioner) than AEDPA/ Chapman, any petitioner that meets the Brecht standard will necessarily meet the AEDPA/ Chapman standard. Thus, when conducting harmless-error review, we simply apply the Brecht standard and ask whether Wilson has shown that the error had substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury's verdict.
Characterizing an error as harmless might have either of two meanings. On the one hand, an error might be deemed harmless if it played such an inconsequential role in the actual trial in which it occurred that it assuredly had no impact on the trial's verdict. 2 R. Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice & Procedure § 31.4d (5th ed.2005). On the other hand, an error might be deemed harmless  even if it played an important role in the actual trial  if a hypothetical new trial absent the error would likely produce the same outcome as did the actual trial. Id. The Supreme Court has indicated that of these two meanings the proper one is the first (i.e., whether the error had an actual impact on the outcome), and not the second (i.e., whether a hypothetical new trial would likely produce the same result): Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee, the question . . . the reviewing court [is] to consider is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand. Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict. The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered  no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be  would violate the jury-trial guarantee. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (citations omitted) (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991)). Likewise, as the Brecht Court explained, [t]he standard for determining whether habeas relief must be granted is whether . . . the . . . error `had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. ' Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) (emphasis added)).
Crucial to this appeal is how the harmless-error principles discussed above apply in the capital-sentencing context when, as here, the jury considers an invalid aggravating factor when imposing a death sentence. One question is whether federal habeas courts can even conduct harmless-error review in that situation. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 126 S.Ct. 884, 163 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006), casts some doubt on our current view that federal courts can do so. To fully assess these issues, one must first consider the development of the law in this area, including the Supreme Court's past reliance on the distinction between so-called weighing States and non-weighing States. Since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (per curiam), the Supreme Court has required States to limit the class of murderers to which the death penalty may be applied. Sanders, 546 U.S. at 216, 126 S.Ct. 884. This narrowing requirement is usually met when the trier of fact finds at least one statutorily defined eligibility factor at either the guilt or penalty phase. Id. (citation omitted). Once the narrowing requirement has been satisfied, the sentencer is called upon to determine whether a defendant found eligible for the death penalty should receive it. Id. Most States channel this function by specifying the aggravating factors (sometimes identical to the eligibility factors) that are to be weighed against mitigating considerations. Id. The question facing courts in cases like the present one is what happens when the sentencer imposes the death penalty after at least one valid eligibility factor has been found, but under a scheme in which an eligibility factor or a specified aggravating factor is later held to be invalid. Id. To answer that question, the Supreme Court has distinguished between so-called weighing and non-weighing States. Id. This terminology is somewhat misleading because the Court has held that in all capital cases the sentencer must be allowed to weigh the facts and circumstances that arguably justify a death sentence against the defendant's evidence. Id. at 217-18, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982)). The Court identified as weighing States those in which the only aggravating factors permitted to be considered by the sentencer were the specified eligibility factors. Id. (citations omitted). Ohio is such a weighing state. See, e.g., Lundgren, 440 F.3d at 770. Because the eligibility factors by definition identify distinct and particular aggravating features, if one of them is invalid then the jury cannot consider the facts and circumstances relevant to that factor as aggravating in some other capacity. Sanders, 546 U.S. at 218, 126 S.Ct. 884. In a weighing State, therefore, the sentencer's consideration of an invalid eligibility factor necessarily skews its balancing of aggravators with mitigators. Id. (citation omitted). By contrast, a non-weighing State permits the sentencer to consider aggravating factors different from, or in addition to, the eligibility factors. Id. (It would be clearer to call these States complete weighing States, because the jury can weigh everything that is properly admissible. See id. at 229-30, 126 S.Ct. 884 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Because the sentencer can consider aggravating factors that are different from the eligibility factors, an invalid eligibility factor does not automatically skew the sentence as it does in a weighing state. Id. at 217, 126 S.Ct. 884. The question here is a reviewing court's role when an invalid eligibility factor (i.e., evading kidnapping), in a weighing State like Ohio, skews the jury's balance of mitigating circumstances against that aggravating factor. Supreme Court decisions provide some reason to believe that a federal habeas court is simply not permitted to conduct harmless  error review  only a state court can do so. In Stringer v. Black, for example, the Supreme Court explained that an invalid aggravating factor in the weighing process invalidates the sentence and at the very least requires constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing in the state judicial system. 503 U.S. 222, 237, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992) (emphasis added). Additionally, in Richmond v. Lewis, the Court stated, Where the death sentence has been infected by a vague or otherwise constitutionally invalid aggravating factor, the state appellate court or some other state sentencer must actually perform a new sentencing calculus. 506 U.S. 40, 49, 113 S.Ct. 528, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992) (emphasis added). We relied on these decisions when deciding cases involving invalid aggravating factors in weighing States, requiring States to conduct the new sentencing calculus. For example, in Houston v. Dutton, 50 F.3d 381 (6th Cir.1995), a Tennessee (weighing State) jury sentenced the defendant after finding that the State established the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator. Id. at 387. The State admitted on appeal that the aggravator was invalid because of an overly vague instruction. Id. Relying on Richmond 's language quoted above, we explained that habeas relief was properly granted because the Tennessee courts did not conclude that the instruction was erroneous and therefore had not performed a new sentencing calculus. Id. (emphasis added); accord Cone v. Bell, 492 F.3d 743, 752 (6th Cir.2007) (Cone is not entitled to a new sentence unless the Tennessee Supreme Court did not (1) conduct a proper harmless error analysis; or (2) reweigh the mitigating and aggravating factors in examining his sentence. (citing Stringer, 503 U.S. at 230, 112 S.Ct. 1130)). In Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1998), however, we held that, although we may not perform reweighing when a jury considers an invalid aggravator in a weighing state, we may engage in harmless-error analysis. Id. at 334. In reweighing, we explained, a state court effectively vacates the original sentence and resentences the defendant; this process is hardly appropriate in the course of collateral review by a federal court. Id. In harmless-error analysis, by contrast, a court determines that the original sentence is not constitutionally infirm in the first place, a process that is quite appropriately performed on federal collateral review. Id. The Coe decision explained that in Houston we did not address the harmless-error question; rather, we held only that reweighing must be performed by a state court. Id. at 335. Further, the Coe decision explained that conducting harmless-error analysis as a federal habeas court was consistent with the Supreme Court's statement in Richmond that state reweighing is required when the death sentence has been infected by a constitutionally . . . invalid aggravating factor because, by definition, . . . an error that is harmless does not `infect' the sentence and does not require reweighing by the state. Id. Finally, Coe reconciled Stringer 's language requiring constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing in the state judicial system by concluding that the phrase `state judicial system' modifies `reweighing' only, and not `harmless-error analysis.' Id. (emphasis added). Coe then concluded that the instructional error there  an overly vague instruction regarding the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator  was harmless (under the Brecht standard) because the jury ignored the problematic aspect of the instruction. Id. at 336. Coe 's holding  that a federal habeas court can conduct harmless-error review where a jury considers an invalid aggravator in a weighing State  continued as the law in this Circuit. See, e.g., Cone v. Bell, 359 F.3d 785, 798 (6th Cir.2004) (conducting such a harmless-error analysis after noting that Coe drew a distinction between re-weighing and harmless error analysis and held that a federal habeas court is permitted to undertake the latter), rev'd on other grounds by Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 459-60, 125 S.Ct. 847, 160 L.Ed.2d 881 (2005) (holding that we erred in concluding that state court failed to cure faulty heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator instruction); see also Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1252 (7th Cir.2007) (noting that the Seventh Circuit had yet to endorse federal harmless error review of death sentences based on invalid sentencing factors when the state appellate court has not performed its own harmless error analysis and joining the five circuit courts of appeals [that] have authorized such an approach) (citing Coe, 161 F.3d 320). Our holding in Coe is more questionable in light of the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanders. To be sure, the Sanders Court was faced with harmless-error in the context of a non-weighing State. The Court explained that the weighing/non-weighing scheme is accurate as far as it goes, but it now seems . . . needlessly complex. . . . Sanders, 546 U.S at 219, 126 S.Ct. 884. We think it will clarify the analysis, the Court continued, and simplify the sentence-invalidating factors we have hitherto applied to non-weighing States, if we are henceforth guided by the following rule: An invalidated sentencing factor (whether an eligibility factor or not) will render the sentence unconstitutional by reason of its adding an improper element to the aggravation scale in the weighing process unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances. Id. at 220, 126 S.Ct. 884 (citation and footnote omitted) (first emphasis added). In other words, [i]f all the evidence was properly admitted and if the jury can use that evidence when it considers other aggravating factors, any error . . . must be harmless. Id. at 239, 126 S.Ct. 884 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This rule apparently modifies the analysis for non-weighing States, but leaves intact the Court's prior jurisprudence regarding weighing states. See Hertz & Liebman, § 31.3 (6th ed. Supp.2006) (noting that the pre- Sanders jurisprudence for `weighing states' . . . apparently remains intact but that Sanders reshaped the analysis . . . [it had] hitherto applied to non-weighing States) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Adams v. Bradshaw, 484 F.Supp.2d 753, 787 n. 6 (N.D.Ohio 2007) (noting that Sanders does not apply to invalid-aggravator claim under Ohio law because Sanders involves a non-weighing state). When discussing weighing States, however, the Supreme Court in Sanders made a statement that might be taken to undercut Coe 's holding that a federal, not state, court may conduct harmless-error review where a jury considers an invalid aggravator. The Supreme Court first noted, as we did in Coe, that [i]n a weighing State . . . the sentencer's consideration of an invalid eligibility factor necessarily skewed its balancing of aggravators with mitigators. Sanders, 546 U.S. at 217, 126 S.Ct. 884 (citing Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232, 112 S.Ct. 1130). The Supreme Court then stated that, under Stringer, this skewing required reversal of the sentence (unless a state appellate court determined the error was harmless or reweighed the mitigating evidence against the valid aggravating factors). Id. (citing Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232, 112 S.Ct. 1130) (emphasis added). This reading of Stringer implicitly rejects the Coe Court's interpretation that Stringer 's language requiring constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing in the state judicial system allows a federal habeas court to conduct harmless-error review and merely limits reweighing to states. See Coe, 161 F.3d at 335 (noting that the phrase state judicial system in Stringer modifies `reweighing' only, and not `harmless-error analysis'); cf. Adams, 484 F.Supp.2d at 788(Recently the Supreme Court [in Sanders ] noted that in a weighing state, the sentencer's consideration of an invalid eligibility factor necessarily upsets its balancing of the aggravating circumstances with the mitigating factors requiring reversal of the sentence unless a state appellate court determined the error was harmless or reweighed the mitigating evidence against the valid aggravating factors.) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Leading commentators appear to share this view: [I]n a weighing State, when an eligibility or aggravating factor is found to have been invalid, the federal courts may not themselves engage in either a reweighing or in harmless error analysis; the condemned individual has a constitutional right to have either the state courts or the original sentencer reweigh the valid aggravating and mitigating factors. Hertz & Liebman § 31.3 (6th ed. Supp.2006) (discussing Sanders and citing cases such as Richmond ). Although Sanders 's statements imply that only a state court may conduct harmless-error review in this situation, those statements are dicta, see Jennings, 490 F.3d at 1252 (noting that none of the Supreme Court decisions regarding this issue squarely addresses the issue of federal district courts conducting harmless error review in place of state courts), and do not demand that we change our current state of the law. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit's recent endorsement of our view in Coe (that federal courts may conduct harmless-error review in this context) considered Sanders. See id. In light of these considerations, we continue to hold that federal courts may conduct harmless-error review of invalid aggravating factors even where the state court has not done so. Though a contrary holding would be plausible in light of Sanders 's language, cf. Eddleman, 471 F.3d at 583 (Today, we reconsider our position in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell v. Esparza , which strongly implied that courts should apply only the Chapman plus AEDPA deference standard of review. (emphasis added)), we believe that should arise only from a clear statement from our en banc court or the United States Supreme Court. [3]
Having concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court did not conduct a harmless-error review of the (presumed) invalid evading-kidnapping aggravating factor, and having concluded that we may nonetheless conduct harmless-error review, we determine that any improper-burden shifting in this regard was harmless. The only element of the kidnapping charge and specification at issue is the knowledge element. The trial court instructed the jury that [a] person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist. (JA 1270-71.) The court continued, Knowingly means that a person is aware of the existence of the facts and that his acts will probably cause a certain result. (JA 1271.) After these instructions, the trial court provided the voluntary-intoxication instructions referred to above. To recap, those instructions provided that [i]ntoxication exists when a person consumes a quantity of intoxicating beverage containing alcohol sufficient to advers[e]ly affect his mental processes and to deprive him of that clearness of intellect that he would otherwise have possessed. (JA 1271.) The trial court further instructed that [i]ntoxication is not an excuse for an offense, but that such evidence is admissible for the purpose of showing that the Defendant was so intoxicated that he was incapable of having the knowledge to commit the offense of Kidnapping. Knowledge is the element of this offense; and intoxication, even severe intoxication[,] can co-exist with knowledge. (JA 1271.) At this point, the trial court provided the (presumed) improper burden-shifting instruction (placing the burden on Wilson to establish that he was so intoxicated that he was incapable of having the knowledge to commit the offense). (JA 1272.) The district court explained that the record reveals the following testimony with respect to Wilson's drinking: 1. Bonnie Menges, who managed and bartended at the Empire Tavern, testified that on May 3, 1991, she worked from 3:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. When she arrived shortly before her shift, Wilson was already there, and when she left he was still there. He was drinking vodka and orange juice. Although Menges did not believe Wilson was intoxicated, he was putting them down pretty good that day[,] faster than he normally does. Wilson, slip. op. at 96 n. 71. 2. Doug Pritt, Lutz's good friend whose band played at the Empire Tavern, testified that he arrived there around 9:30 p.m. on May 3, 1991. According to Pritt, Wilson did not arrive until around 10:30 p.m. Pritt left the bar at 1:00 a.m. on May 4, 1991; Lutz walked out with him to say goodbye and then returned to the bar. Pritt testified that Lutz was drinking beer and he saw her offer to buy Wilson a drink, but he did not know what kind. Id. 3. Gregory McKinney, who worked at the Empire Tavern and had the 7:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. shift on May 3-4, 1991, testified that he was not sure when Wilson came into the Tavern, but estimated it was about 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. On cross-examination, McKinney admitted that Wilson could have been there when he arrived for his shift, but was not sure. Wilson was drinking beer and vodka and orange juice and shooting pool with Lutz and her friend, Doug Pritt. After Pritt left at about 12:30 a.m., Lutz remained. Although Lutz and Wilson were still drinking beer and, in addition, had a few shots of Jack Daniels, McKinney did not believe they were drunk. Id. 4. Darlene DeBolt, Wilson's good friend, testified that she saw him a few minutes before 6:00 a.m. on May 4, 1991, as she was opening the Gastown business where she worked. She asked him if he had been drinking all night because [she] smelled alcoholic beverages on him. He said that he had a few beers. He did not appear intoxicated to her. Id. at 96-97 n. 71. 5. Rodney Lee Mele, Wilson's cousin, testified that he first saw Wilson around 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. on May 3, 1991 sitting on his car out in the street. Around 10:30 p.m., the two of them walked to a local Convenient store where Wilson bought a six-pack of beer. Id. at 97 n. 71. 6. Additionally, there were apparently tapes played for the jury of the interview conducted by Detective Riley in which Wilson stated that he had spent approximately $25 to $30 on alcohol on the afternoon of May 3, 1991, and the same amount in the evening. He further stated that he and Lutz had consumed more beer at his trailer after they left the bar when it closed in the early morning hours of May 4, 1991. Id. During the penalty phase, defense expert Dr. Robert Forney, a forensic toxicologist, testified on cross-examination that, although an alcoholic drink that a person had at 2:30 a.m. (the approximate time that Wilson left the bar with Lutz) would be completely gone from his or her system by 1:30 p.m. (the time the fire department was called to the scene of the car fire), if that person were an alcoholic, or a heavy chronic drinker, there is residual damage to the brain and nervous system which may remain even when the alcohol is gone. Id. at 97 n. 72. Therefore, it was not [his] opinion that judgment . . . would be unaffected or that the brain would be unaffected during periods when alcohol was absent. . . . Id. Evidence suggested that Wilson was an alcoholic. Id. (noting, for example, testimony that Wilson never went a single day without drinking). Countering this general evidence was specific, and strong, evidence that Wilson had the requisite knowledge for the evading kidnapping-aggravator, that is, that he committed the murder to evade detection for kidnapping Lutz. The Ohio Supreme Court referred to portions of Wilson's statement to the police in which he stated that he recalled thinking, when Lutz was locked in the trunk, How am I going to get out of this? State v. Wilson, 659 N.E.2d at 292 (syllabus). In this statement, Wilson also explained that after he let Lutz out to go to the bathroom, she said that she'd go home and forget about it, but that Wilson didn't believe her and thought to himself, `How can you forget about being locked in a trunk?' Id. When asked why he did not simply leave her in the trunk, Wilson replied that he figured . . . eventually somebody would find her. She'd get out and tell who [he] was.  Id. (emphasis added). The district court concluded that the error was not harmless. The district court explained that the Ohio Supreme Court made no factual findings and merely made the conclusory statement that . . . the error was `harmless under the facts of this case [in the context of the kidnapping charge], since the kidnapping of Lutz continued into the late morning and early afternoon [when Wilson] . . . clearly knew what he was doing. . . . Wilson, slip op. at 90 (quoting Wilson, 659 N.E.2d at 306). Had the jury been more clearly instructed as regards the burden of proof, the district court explained, it is possible that it might have concluded, in the face of all of the testimony and Wilson's assertion of intoxication, that the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson had the requisite knowledge for either the kidnapping charge of the indictment or the kidnapping specification to the aggravated murder charge. Id. at 97. Although it is possible that the jury might not have found the evading-kidnapping specification beyond a reasonable doubt, we cannot say, as we must to grant relief under Brecht, that the burden-shifting error had substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. Crucial to our conclusion are Wilson's own statements. Although the Ohio Supreme Court did not reference those statements in the specific portion of its opinion addressing the burden-shifting error on the kidnapping charge, the court nonetheless relied on them, explaining, for example, that Wilson did not simply leave Lutz in the trunk of his car because [s]he'd get out and tell who [he] was. State v. Wilson, 659 N.E.2d at 292 (syllabus); cf. Cone, 492 F.3d at 752 (assessing harmless-error review and relying on Tennessee Supreme Court's discussion of penalty-phase evidence in a section immediately preceding a discussion of the claims . . . raised on appeal). We cannot discern what Wilson's statements such as this one could mean, if not that Wilson knew his actions could lead to kidnapping charges and he therefore committed the crime to escape detection. Moreover, after receiving this erroneous instruction, the jury was properly instructed that the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the essential elements of the offense of Kidnapping to reach a guilty verdict on that count. (JA 1273.) In sum, the error did not ha[ve] substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Wilson is therefore not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. Before addressing Wilson's remaining claims, we note briefly a concern with the district court's analysis. As mentioned, the district court concluded that, although the Ohio Supreme Court's harmless-error analysis regarding the burden shifting was incorrect, the error at issue was harmless for an independent reason: Had the prosecution gone forward with the arson aggravator at sentencing, the district court said, the jury surely would have relied on that aggravator to impose death. This analysis appears to posit improperly a hypothetical scenario forbidden by Supreme Court precedent when determining whether a state court properly deemed an error harmless. As discussed above, Sullivan explains that to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact renderedno matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be would violate the jury-trial guarantee. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078. Similarly, for the district court to hypothesize a sentencing outcome, based solely on the arson aggravator, that was never in fact renderedno matter how inescapable the findings to support that sentence might bewould seem to violate the jury-trial guarantee. The question is . . . not [whether the jurors] were . . . right in their judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict [or sentence]. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764, 66 S.Ct. 1239. It is rather what effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision. Id. Simply put, harmless-error review looks . . . to the basis on which `the jury actually rested its verdict,' Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (citation omitted), and Wilson's jury did not actually rest his death sentence on the arson aggravator-they never even considered it. This is true even though the arson specification and the evading-kidnapping specification involve substantially the same course of conduct and therefore merged at sentencing. The jury indeed concluded at the eligibility phasethat Wilson committed the killing during an aggravated arson. But the prosecution chose to proceed at sentencing with the evading-kidnapping specification, and that is the sole aggravator the jury placed on death's side of the scale. The jury never considered how the arson aggravator would tip that same balance. To hypothesize about thatno matter how inescapable the findings to support that [death sentence] might beappears to improperly remove the question from the jury. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078.