Opinion ID: 187107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Detainees' Counsel's Access to Classified Government Information.

Text: Bismullah II also attempts to corral the Government Information, much of which, as the Government's submissions make clear, is classified, that must be disclosed to the detainees' counsel by emphasizing the exceptions from disclosure for Information that is `highly sensitive . . . or . . . pertain[s] to a highly sensitive source or to anyone other than the detainee.' Bismullah II, 503 F.3d at 142 (quoting Bismullah 501 F.3d at 187) (alteration in original). [4] Bismullah II, however, may be unrealistically sanguine about the Government's resulting burden if the presumption is that it must disclose all Government Information except what fits within the exceptions; according to the Government's submissions, which, I submit, we are ill-equipped to second-guess, the exceptions swamp the disclosable information. Cf. Krikorian v. Dep't of State, 984 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C.Cir.1993). [5] But the alternative is not necessarily limited to what Bismullah II describes, namely, the only solution is [for the Government] to turn over none of [the Government Information]. Bismullah II, 503 F.3d at 142. If the record on review is more limited as discussed supra, the detainees' counsel's access likewise contracts. Again, should we not all consider this alternative? We have heard by unclassified declarations from Michael V. Hayden, Director of the. Central Intelligence Agency; Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defense; Keith Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency; Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence. We have heard by Secret declaration from FBI Director Mueller. And we have heard ex parte and in camera by Top Secret-SCI declarations from CIA Director Hayden and NSA Director Alexander. In the unclassified declarations, the five officialscharged with safeguarding our country while we are now at warhave detailed the grave national security concerns the Bismullah I holding presents. Without doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making them. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (citing Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530,' 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (noting reluctance of courts to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs)). In Hamdi, the Government represented that military officers who are engaged in the serious work of waging battle [will] be unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by litigation half a world away, and discovery into military operations [will] both intrude on the sensitive secrets of national defense and result in a futile search for evidence buried under the rubble of war. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-32, 124 S.Ct. 2633. The High Court agreed, declaring [t]o the extent that these burdens are triggered by heightened procedures, they are properly taken into account. Id. at 532, 124 S.Ct. 2633. I believe our Court should likewise take these burdens into account sitting en banc. [6] For the foregoing reasons I dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc and join Judge Randolph's dissent.