Opinion ID: 797369
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase

Text: 33 Nields first argues that several statements made by the prosecutor to the jury during the penalty phase regarding Patricia Newsome's state of mind impermissibly allowed the jury to consider nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. Specifically, Nields cites the prosecutor's penalty-phase closing argument, in which the prosecutor stated, among other things, How about Patricia—how Patricia Newsome felt when she was being viciously beaten? and How did Patricia Newsome feel, what was going through her mind as the defendant stole her property and inflicted serious physical harm on her person? 34 Because Nields's counsel did not object to these allegedly improper statements at the time, this claim is procedurally defaulted. To excuse the default for the purpose of habeas review, Nields must establish both cause and prejudice. See Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986). He has failed to do so.
35 Prior to this appeal, the scope of Nields's prosecutorial-misconduct claim was rather broad. It covered, and the Ohio Supreme Court correspondingly considered, not only the prosecutor's allegedly improper statements during the penalty phase, but also those made during both voir dire and the guilt phase. Regarding the specific comments at issue in this appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that defendant's failure to object waived all but plain error. Nields, 752 N.E.2d at 895. It then found that, although the prosecutor's comments referring to what the victim was feeling or thinking may constitute error, any error was not plain because these comments were not egregious enough to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Id. In addition, regarding those few comments to which Nields's counsel did object, [t]he trial court cured any error by reminding the jury that arguments of counsel are not evidence, and it was for them to determine what the evidence showed. Id. at 896.
36 The magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation adopted by the district court concluded that the bulk of Nields's prosecutorial-misconduct claim was procedurally defaulted and that he makes no effort in his Traverse to show excusing cause and prejudice. In addition, [w]ith respect to those claims of prosecutorial misconduct which survive procedural default, Petitioner has not shown how any such claimed misconduct either was indeed misconduct or how, cumulatively, such instances of misconduct as the Ohio Supreme Court found deprived Petitioner of a fair trial. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Ohio Supreme Court's decision on this claim was an objectively unreasonable application of the relevant United States Supreme Court precedent [in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)].
37 We agree with the district court that the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Although counsel was deficient in failing to object to the prosecutor's unquestionably improper comments to the jury during the penalty phase, this deficiency did not prejudice Nields. The judge specifically instructed the jury at the conclusion of the penalty phase that arguments by the attorneys did not constitute evidence. In addition, consideration of a non-statutory aggravating circumstance, even if contrary to state law, does not violate the Constitution. Smith v. Mitchell, 348 F.3d 177, 210 (6th Cir.2003) (citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 956, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983)). Finally, where, as here, the state appellate courts independently reweigh only the relevant, statutorily recognized aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors and determine death to be an appropriate sentence, the jury's consideration of an irrelevant, nonstatutory aggravating factor is generally not prejudicial. See Fox v. Coyle, 271 F.3d 658, 667 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 956, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983), and Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 104 S.Ct. 378, 78 L.Ed.2d 187 (1983)). 38 Nields attempts to overcome this analysis by arguing that procedural default is an improper framework within which to evaluate his claim. Because, in his opinion, [t]he Ohio Supreme Court has applied its contemporaneous objection rule unevenly and inconsistently with regard to similar claims alleging prosecutorial misconduct, Nields contends that this court cannot honor the rule as an independent and adequate state ground under the four-pronged, procedural-default test established by this court in Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135 (6th Cir.1986). But in the Report and Recommendation adopted by the district court, the magistrate judge explicitly conducted a Maupin analysis and concluded that Nields's claim was procedurally defaulted. Nields's argument, moreover, is squarely foreclosed by several of this court's later precedents. In Mason v. Mitchell, most notably, the court began its prosecutorial-misconduct analysis by first not[ing] our previous holding `that Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule constitutes an adequate and independent state ground that bars federal habeas review absent a showing of cause and prejudice.' 320 F.3d 604, 635 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Hinkle v. Randle, 271 F.3d 239, 244 (6th Cir.2001)). 39 Nields argues separately that this court erred in granting him a COA as to only one particular instance of prosecutorial misconduct during the prosecutor's closing argument at the penalty phase. He contends that the effect of prosecutorial misconduct can be adequately judged only in the larger context of an entire trial, especially because one of the factors for reviewing such claims is whether the alleged misconduct was isolated or part of a larger pattern in light of the totality of the circumstances. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868)). Although this argument correctly states the proper legal standard, it does not alter the conclusion that the Ohio appellate courts—which, as part of their independent reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, did consider more than the single instance of prosecutorial misconduct at issue here—reasonably applied federal law in upholding Nields's death sentence. See Nields, 752 N.E.2d at 894 (addressing Nields's contention that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct throughout all phases of the trial  by separately analyzing the alleged improprieties during voir dire, the guilt phase, and the mitigation phase) (emphasis added). 40 In other words, we would reach the same conclusion even if we had extended the scope of Nields's prosecutorial-misconduct claim in the COA to cover the entirety of the prosecutor's arguments and conduct during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. The words of the district court bear repeating: With respect to those claims of prosecutorial misconduct which survive procedural default, Petitioner has not shown how any such claimed misconduct either was indeed misconduct or how, cumulatively, such instances of misconduct as the Ohio Supreme Court found deprived Petitioner of a fair trial. (Emphasis added.) 41