Opinion ID: 223100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Agent Moreland's Testimony About the Recordings

Text: Finally, Gaytan objects to a short line of inquiry during Agent Moreland's testimony after the government played a portion of the April 18 recorded phone call in which Worthen reminded Gaytan that he had recently got those two big ones from Gaytan. The prosecutor asked Agent Moreland how he knew from this exchange that the deal was on for the next day for two ounces of crack cocaine. Agent Moreland responded: Because the source initially asked for two big ones and referred to a previous drug purchase on March 8, 2006. The defendant responded, Yeah. And when the source [set] the time at 2 o'clock, the defendant asked, For sure? And the source said, Yes. And they agreed on the time of 2 o'clock. Gaytan characterizes this response as expert testimony about the meaning of the phrase two big ones in narcotics parlance. Because the government did not qualify Agent Moreland as an expert under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Gaytan argues that permitting him to testify about the meaning of two big ones was error. He did not object to this part of Agent Moreland's testimony below, so again our review is for plain error. See Rangel, 350 F.3d at 650. The government characterizes Agent Moreland's testimony as permissible lay-opinion testimony under Rule 701, which provides: If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. FED.R.EVID. 701. A law-enforcement officer's testimony is a lay opinion if it is limited to what he observed . . . or to other facts derived exclusively from [a] particular investigation. United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 603 (7th Cir.2007). On the other hand, an officer testifies as an expert when he brings the wealth of his experience as a narcotics officer to bear on those observations and ma[kes] connections for the jury based on that specialized knowledge. Id. We have held that translating drug jargon and code words that might seem entirely innocuous to an untrained jury is expert testimony under Rule 702. York, 572 F.3d at 423. In York the government properly identified and qualified an officer who testified as an expert to interpret the defendant's recorded drug-coded language, but then elicited problematic dual testimony from another officer about drug jargon, essentially treating the second officer as both a fact witness and an expert. See id. at 423-27. We held that eliciting the dual testimony from the officer was error. Id. at 426. Here, as in York, the government identified a law-enforcement expert (Officer Coleman) who would offer opinion testimony about the meaning of the drug code in the audio recordings. The government did not identify or qualify Agent Moreland as an additional expert for this purpose, but unlike the second officer in York, Moreland was never treated as a dualcapacity witness. He was not asked to define two big ones or any other coded language on the recordings. Perhaps Agent Moreland's testimony can be understood to contain an implicit expert opinion. He explained that he knew the April 19 deal would involve two ounces of crack cocaine based on the April 18 recorded conversation, which contained a discussion of Worthen's earlier request for two big ones. This testimony suggests that the reference to two big ones meant two ounces of crack cocaine, and Moreland's familiarity with this terminology might have been attributable to the Gaytan investigation in particular or to his training and experience as a narcotics officer in general, or perhaps both. See York, 572 F.3d at 423; Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 603. Admitting dual expert and lay testimony by a witness generally requires precautionary instructions to the jury. See United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir.2005) (if a witness testifies in a dual capacity, the court should give cautionary instructions); see also York, 572 F.3d at 426 (court erred in admitting agent's expert interpretations of code words in the midst of his lay testimony without flagging for the jury that he was now testifying in his expert role). We need not decide whether Agent Moreland's testimony about two big ones crossed the line and amounted to expert testimony. Under a plain-error standard, a defendant's conviction will stand if the claimed evidentiary error was harmless. York, 572 F.3d at 429. Harmlessness means that the jury would have convicted even absent the error[ ]. Id. As we have noted, the evidence in this case, though mostly circumstantial, was very strong. The government did not rely on Agent Moreland's testimony to interpret Worthen's reference to two big ones or to establish that the substance Gaytan distributed was in fact crack cocaine. In closing argument the prosecutor referred to the April 18 recording not to establish the meaning of two big ones or to highlight Agent Moreland's testimony, but instead to remind the jury that Worthen [was] talking about that March deal. In York we held that an error in admitting an officer's dual testimony as both a transactional witness and an expert on drug jargon was harmless (and thus not plain error); we found it impossible to conclude that the exclusion of this small portion of the agent's testimony would have caused the jury to reach a different verdict. Id. at 429-30. The same is true here. Even if Agent Moreland's comment about two big ones was improper expert opinion, the admission of this small bit of testimony does not qualify as plain error. [2] AFFIRMED.