Opinion ID: 1637413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to comply with Section 63-11-9 of the Mississippi Code

Text: ¶ 17. Deeds claims that the State failed to preserve the chain of custody of the blood sample because it failed to identify the individual who drew his blood. Deeds asserts that because the nurse who drew his blood was not identified, he was denied the safeguard afforded by Mississippi Code Section 63-11-9, [6] which specifies that any qualified person acting at the request of a law enforcement officer may withdraw blood pursuant to Section 63-11-7. [7] Deeds relies exclusively on the language of the statute and contends that because the State did not prove that the individual was qualified to perform the procedure, the results of the blood alcohol content test were inadmissible. ¶ 18. Deeds's argument that the blood test results were inadmissible due to failure to comply with Section 63-11-9 is simply misplaced. Admissibility of evidence is governed by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, not by statutory enactment. This Court has held that the Mississippi Rules of Evidence supercede statutory provisions which would render inadmissible evidence that otherwise would be admissible under the Rules of Evidence. Whitehurst v. State, 540 So.2d 1319, 1323 (Miss.1989). Since the enactment of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence on January 1, 1986, this Court has consistently held that matters regarding admission of evidence are to be decided through judicial pronouncement rather than through the legislative process. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 1103 provides that all evidentiary rules, whether provided by statute, court decision, or court rule, which are inconsistent with the Mississippi Rules of Evidence are hereby repealed. Stated otherwise, the Legislature cannot dictate through statutory enactment what is, or is not, reliable or relevant evidence. These are judicial determinations, and at the core of the judicial function is our responsibility to establish the judicial process which tests both the relevance and the reliability of evidence. See Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338 (Miss.1989). Further, [t]his Court's rule-making power is a function of our constitution's command that the three great governmental powers be separate. Id. at 1345. ¶ 19. Thus, having found that the admissibility of the blood test results is not governed by compliance with statutory requirements, we shift our analysis to whether the results of Deeds's blood test were admissible under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Deeds's argument that the State failed to prove chain of custody is a challenge to the authenticity of the evidence. However, Deeds never substantively questioned the genuineness of the blood sample. Rather, Deeds merely suggests that because the prosecution could not provide the name of the individual who drew Deeds's blood, tampering or contamination could have taken place. Officer Gibbs testified that he witnessed the attending nurse draw the blood and that the nurse signed her name on the blood sample before she gave it to him. Officer Gibbs, however, did not otherwise note the nurse's name in his report, and the Mississippi Crime Laboratory disposed of the blood sample as a biological hazard six months after analysis, pursuant to standard procedures. ¶ 20. Rule 901 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides that [t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims. Miss. R. Evid. 901(a). Our precedent is clear that Mississippi law has never required a proponent of evidence to produce every handler of evidence. Ellis v. State, 934 So.2d 1000, 1005 (Miss.2006). In order for the defendant to show a break in the chain of custody, there must be an indication or reasonable inference of probable tampering with the evidence or substitution of the evidence. Spann v. State, 771 So.2d 883, 894 (Miss.2000). The defendant has the burden of proving tampering or substitution of the evidence, and [a] mere suggestion that substitution could possibly have occurred does not meet the burden of showing probable substitution. Ellis, 934 So.2d at 1005. Deeds has not attempted to prove that such tampering or substitution occurred. ¶ 21. The trial judge found no indication or reasonable inference of tampering with evidence or substitution of evidence. In examining the record, we find sufficient evidence, under an abuse of discretion standard, to support the judge's finding that the blood sample was what it was claimed to be. For the reasons stated, we find this argument to be without merit.