Opinion ID: 6107079
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The adequacy of the October 19, 1998, hearing barring defendant from the trial

Text: At the hearing on October 19, 1998, the trial court described defendant's attack on Hauser in the jury assembly room, defendant's threats against Hauser and his family and his repeatedly spitting on Hauser,  and defendant's disruptive behavior while in the lockup cell adjacent to the courtroom. Based on those incidents of misconduct, the court concluded that defendant-who was not present at the hearing-should be barred from the courtroom. The court conveyed that it would view any promise of good behavior by defendant as a subterfuge to gain access to the courtroom and allow him to continue his offensive, violent and outrageous conduct. At the same hearing, the court ordered that defendant be offered an audio feed of the proceedings and daily transcripts of the trial. Defendant claims the trial court erred in deciding to bar him from trial during a hearing at which he was not present.  A capital defendant has a federal constitutional right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure (see Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730 , 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658 , 96 L.Ed.2d 631 ) and a state statutory right to be present at  'critical proceedings.'  ( People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302 , 311, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 30 , 132 P.3d 235 ; see §§ 977, 1043.) Under federal law, a capital defendant may voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive the right to be present. ( People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510 , 531, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 115 P.3d 417 .) Under California law, a capital defendant may be absent from the courtroom for only two reasons: (1) when he has been removed by the court for disruptive behavior under section 1043, subdivision (b)(1), and (2) when he voluntarily waives his rights pursuant to section 977, subdivision (b)(1). ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164 , 1210, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 .) 2 The Attorney General does not claim defendant waived his right to be present, nor does any waiver appear in the record. But he does assert that defendant forfeited his state and federal right to be present by physically attacking his counsel and disrupting the proceedings. We agree. In Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 ( Allen ), the high court explicitly held that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. ( Id . at p. 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057 .) Defendant complains he received no such warning from the judge prior to attacking counsel. But even if this is so, a warning is not a constitutional prerequisite to a forfeiture of the right to be present. Some misconduct, such as a violent assault in court, is so dangerous as to justify a defendant's removal even without a prior warning. (See King v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 929 , 943, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 585 [We read ... Allen ... to permit loss of a constitutional right in certain circumstances based on misconduct, even without a prior warning]; accord, Gilchrist v. O'Keefe (2d Cir. 2001) 260 F.3d 87 , 97 ;  People v. Wilkins (2006) 33 A.D.3d 409 , 822 N.Y.S.2d 271 , 272-273.) Because dignity, order, and decorum are essential to the administration of criminal justice, a trial court must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. ( Allen , at p. 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057 .)  In this case, defendant physically assaulted counsel in full view of hundreds of witnesses. He refused to let up even when he was set upon by  deputy sheriffs and his stun belt was activated, and managed to launch a second attack on counsel while swarmed by deputy sheriffs. Defendant visibly injured counsel and a deputy sheriff, and at no point in the proceedings expressed any contrition or remorse stemming from these attacks. The trial court could reasonably conclude that defendant's attack justified his exclusion from the courtroom, even though he had not specifically been warned about the consequences of such conduct. (See People v. Staffney (Mich.Ct.App. 1990) 187 Mich.App. 660 , 468 N.W.2d 238 , 240 [Defendant should not be permitted 'one free swing' at his attorney].) Nor was the trial court required to undertake a full evidentiary hearing, with notice to the defendant, an opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the appointment of new counsel, before making any ruling at the October 19 proceeding. Defendant's assault took place in open court, albeit while the court was convening in the jury assembly room, and was accompanied by profanity that was transcribed by the court reporter. (Cf. People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970 , 1032, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467 , 140 P.3d 775 [The court properly found, based on its own observations, that Oliver was dangerous in the courtroom. It did not need to summon outside witnesses to resolve the shackling question].) The trial court could, and in this case did, rely on its own observations of the events to determine that defendant was out of control, that his actions were intentional, and that they were planned for one more time to try to disrupt the proceedings and delay [the trial]. (See People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175 , 202, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593 , 131 P.3d 995 ; cf. U.S. v. Leggett (3d Cir. 1998) 162 F.3d 237 , 250 [upholding forfeiture of the right to counsel without an evidentiary hearing; An evidentiary hearing was not necessary because Leggett assaulted [counsel] in full view of the district court]; State v. Lehman (Minn.Ct.App. 2008) 749 N.W.2d 76 , 81 [upholding forfeiture of the right to counsel, without an evidentiary hearing, where the defendant attacked counsel and punched him repeatedly; various federal and state courts have ... determined that the right to counsel can be summarily forfeited for extremely serious misconduct similar to that which occurred here].) Defendant contends an evidentiary hearing was required here because the trial court's ruling relied in part on defendant's threats against counsel and his family, which were uttered outside the court's presence. We disagree. Defendant's physical assault against counsel, followed by his repeated disruption of the subsequent hearing by banging on the metal door of his lockup cell, were sufficient in themselves to justify his exclusion from the courtroom. And defendant himself concedes that his attack on Hauser was clearly the primary reason for excluding him from the trial. Even if the trial court erred by considering defendant's threats against Hauser and his family in addition to the other instances of misconduct, the error was harmless under any standard. Before defendant ever uttered those threats, the court had already  indicated that defendant would be excluded from the courtroom. Its ruling at that time was based on the attack and the record, which was replete with the outrageous conduct of Mr. Johnson. The court determined that defendant is out of control. I will not allow him back in this courtroom. (See State v. Lehman , supra , 749 N.W.2d at pp. 85-86.) Moreover, nothing in the record tends to justify or mitigate any of defendant's misconduct, suggest that it did not occur, or indicate that a hearing would  otherwise have been beneficial to defendant. (See People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th 510 , 533, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 115 P.3d 417 ; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468 , 518, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 788 P.2d 640 ; accord, Jones v. Murphy (2d Cir. 2012) 694 F.3d 225 , 239 [Any argument that Jones had a right to be present during the discussion of the consequences  of his own violent and disruptive behavior would be circular, and would imply that a court could never exclude a defendant under Allen ]; Campbell v. Rice (9th Cir. 2005) 408 F.3d 1166 , 1169, fn. 1, 1172-1173 ; Diaz v. Castalan (C.D.Cal. 2008) 625 F.Supp.2d 903 , 921.) Indeed, the trial court reasonably believed that despite any promises to the contrary, Mr. Johnson will continue to do any and everything possible to prevent the trial from proceeding. We likewise reject defendant's claim that the trial court was obligated to appoint new counsel to represent him at the October 19 hearing. Defendant relies on King v. Superior Court , supra , 107 Cal.App.4th 929 , 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 585 , but that case is different in key respects. In King , the defendant had uttered threats and committed violence against a succession of appointed attorneys, culminating in a hearing at which the trial court determined that he had thereby forfeited his right to counsel. ( Id . at pp. 934-936, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 585 .) The Court of Appeal found the trial court erred by allowing the most recently appointed defense attorney, who had likewise been threatened by the defendant, to continue representing the defendant at the forfeiture hearing-but only because that attorney violated the duty of loyalty by offering evidence of King's other violent behavior, evidence ... obtained in his position as King's attorney and actively argued against him. ( Id . at pp. 950, 949, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 585 .) In this case, by contrast, Hauser did not disclose or volunteer any threats or misconduct by defendant, nor did he disclose privileged information he acquired in the course of the representation. To the contrary: Hauser consistently represented defendant's interests, despite defendant's hostility towards him. Even after defendant repeatedly spit on counsel in court, Hauser successfully objected to the proposal to bring defendant to the jury room in shackles. Following the attack, Hauser sought to minimize what had occurred and pledged that he could represent Mr. Johnson with equal vigor as if this had never happened. 3 Because the  trial court had no reason or basis to conclude that Hauser was unable to fulfill his duty of loyalty-and had no other indication that Hauser's ability to represent defendant was in any way impaired-the trial court could reasonably conclude that no actual conflict existed. (See People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646 , 675, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360 , 110 P.3d 289 ; cf. King, at p. 950, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 585 .)