Opinion ID: 794138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: State unconscionability

Text: 186 Before the district court, Plaintiffs also challenged the enforceability of the arbitration agreements on the basis of Massachusetts unconscionability law. We have focused on a vindication of statutory rights analysis, which draws on the federal substantive law of arbitrability. The relationship between the two approaches merits comment. See also supra n. 22. 187 Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that written arbitration agreements shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2. In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996), the Supreme Court reiterated that because of this language, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2. Id. at 687, 116 S.Ct. 1652. As a result, when deciding whether certain claims can go forward in arbitration, federal courts have invalidated or refused to enforce arbitration agreements on the basis of these state contract law doctrines. 188 In effect, these state contract law doctrines, by operation of the FAA, become part of the federal substantive law of arbitrability. As stated by the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone: The effect of [§ 2 of the FAA] is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act. 460 U.S. at 24, 103 S.Ct. 927 (emphasis added). When it comes to the arbitrability of a particular dispute, [f]ederal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state or federal court. Id. Although Plaintiffs' challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration agreements could be evaluated through the prism of state unconscionability law, we have chosen to apply a vindication of statutory rights analysis, which is also part of the body of federal substantive law of arbitration, to the question of whether Plaintiffs' federal and state antitrust claims are arbitrable under the Policies & Practices. See Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77 (D.C.Cir.2005) (applying vindication of statutory rights analysis to claims of race discrimination and wrongful constructive discharge under District of Columbia law); Popovich v. McDonald's Corp., 189 F.Supp.2d 772 (N.D.Ill.2002) (applying vindication of statutory rights analysis to, inter alia, claims of breach of contract and consumer fraud). 189 As a practical matter, there are striking similarities between the vindication of statutory rights analysis and the unconscionability analysis. In fact, many of Plaintiffs' unconscionability arguments are merely reiterations of their vindication of statutory rights arguments. For example, as to the unconscionability of the class mechanism bar, Plaintiffs state that the class action ban is oppressive to Plaintiffs because it prevents them from vindicating their statutory rights. 190 Moreover, any unconscionability analysis under Massachusetts law would have to include the severance provisions that have featured so prominently in our vindication of statutory rights analysis. Those severance provisions, viewed through the lens of unconscionability, would save the arbitral forum, just as they have in our vindication of statutory rights analysis. With new ground rules, arbitration could proceed. Thus, we see no need to conduct a separate unconscionability analysis under Massachusetts law.