Opinion ID: 1354603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Altering the Terms of Demis' Supervised Release

Text: Although the cases most directly on point in this circuit have held that an appeal is moot under the circumstances presented here, we recognize that there is a line of cases from other circuits reaching a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Levine, 455 F.3d at 76-77; Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 991, 993-95 (9th Cir.2005). For the reasons set forth below, however, we decline to follow Levine and Mujahid. In Levine, the Second Circuit declined to dismiss as moot an appeal challenging the same regulations at issue here despite the petitioner's release during pendency of his appeal. In that court's view, the petitioner remained in custody during the term of his supervised release. 455 F.3d at 77. The Levine court also reasoned that the case was not moot because, if the petitioner prevailed, the district court might, because of our ruling[,] modify the length of Levine's supervised release. Id. Similarly, in Mujahid, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government's argument that a challenge to a BOP regulation not at issue here was moot due to the petitioner's release from prison, likewise reasoning that the petitioner remained in custody during his supervised release and that it remained possible that the district court would reduce the terms of the petitioner's supervised release on remand. 413 F.3d at 993-95. Relying on Levine and Mujahid, Demis suggests that his appeal is not moot because he remains in custody during his supervised release and because the district court could alter the terms or length of his supervised release. As we have done previously, see Brock, 256 Fed.Appx. at 750 n.2, we find the reasoning of Levine and Mujahid to be too tenuous. Even if we were to accept the notion that Demis remains in custody during the term of his supervised release, the district court would not be able to grant effectual relief on remand. The effectual relief identified by the Second and Ninth Circuits seems hardly an appropriate remedy for the harms Demis claims to have suffered. While shortening the term of supervised release may well be appropriate for a petitioner who challenges the length of his sentence, e.g., United States v. Verdin, 243 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir.2001), such relief does not address the particular injuries Demis complains of here. Indeed, now that he is no longer incarcerated or in a CCC, shortening the period of his supervised release will not restore Demis' alleged foregone opportunities to transition into the community. Pet'r Br. at 10. In general, federal courts have wide latitude in structuring the terms of habeas relief. See Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987) (a court has broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief). Here, however, Demis' habeas petition challenged only the validity of the BOP's CCC placement regulations, and thus did not seek relief from the terms or length of his supervised release. Consequently, it is unclear on what grounds the district court could sua sponte determine that such relief was appropriate or how that would redress Demis' alleged injury of not being transferred to a CCC at an earlier date.