Opinion ID: 2517841
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Misconduct by Detective Shave

Text: Defendant sought various forms of relief at the penalty phase on grounds Detective Shave manipulated and antagonized two potential defense witnesses while interviewing them, or trying to interview them, before trial. The trial court found no misconduct, and no violation of defendant's right to due process, compulsory process, or a reliable death verdict under the federal and state Constitutions. Defendant repeats these arguments on appeal. No error occurred. At issue are two motions defendant filed shortly before the guilt trial that affected the eventual penalty trial. One motion sought sanctions against the prosecution in the form of barring the death penalty or, alternatively, denying discovery of defense evidence at the penalty phase. This written motion was coupled with an oral request for an evidentiary hearing in which the defense planned to ask Shave to admit the alleged misconduct, as described below. Defendant's second written motion sought discovery of Shave's personnel file insofar as it disclosed similar misconduct in other criminal investigations. (See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305 ( Pitchess ).) Exhibits supporting the motions included transcripts of (1) Detective Shave's taped interview with Mitchell DePriest, and (2) a hearing in an unrelated capital case in which another Orange County judge heard testimony about Shave's conduct in the present case. The substance of each motion was the same, namely, that Detective Shave had poisoned Mary and Mitchell DePriest (defendant's mother and cousin, respectively) against the defense, and had interfered with their testimony at the penalty phase. First, when Mary expressed regret for what had happened, Shave remarked that parents should not feel responsible for their children's acts. Mary assured Shave that she did not blame herself. This exchange occurred after Mary declined Shave's request for an interview. Second, based largely on information contained in defendant's parole file, Shave asked Mitchell whether he was the person with whom defendant had reportedly engaged in underage homosexual relations. Shave had no reason to believe that Mitchell (as opposed to another male) was involved. Mitchell denied the charge, and it bothered him. The court and counsel discussed the foregoing matters at several hearings. Regarding the motion to bar either the death penalty or prosecutorial discovery, the trial court saw no need to hold an evidentiary hearing and delay the start of trial. The court concluded, based on defense exhibits and common sense, that the alleged misconduct had not caused any harm and did not warrant such drastic sanctions. The court could not conceive that Mary and Mitchell DePriest would base their willingness to support defendant, with whom they had lifelong family ties, on their brief contact with Detective Shave, a prosecution agent. Hence, the motion was denied. However, the court agreed to reconsider the matter if the penalty trial disclosed that the defense lost critical evidence because of Shave. Next, the court and counsel discussed the People's request for discovery of defense evidence at the penalty phase. Defendant basically renewed his request to bar such discovery based on Detective Shave's interview techniques. To ease ongoing concerns over Shave and facilitate reciprocal discovery, the prosecution offered to stipulate to certain conditions, such as preventing Shave from interviewing defense witnesses unaccompanied by another prosecution agent. The court signed an order adopting the stipulated terms. Finally, the trial court denied discovery of Detective Shave's personnel file. The court found no reason to depart from statutory provisions barring such discovery except for good cause and under narrow circumstances not present here. (See § 832.7; see also, Evid.Code, §§ 1043-1047.) Again, the motion was denied without prejudice in the event the facts changed. Defendant now contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to seek the death penalty and obtain reciprocal discovery, and in denying access to Detective Shave's personnel records. Though he would have preferred an evidentiary hearing on the issue, defendant insists he presented ample evidence below of wrongful interference with beneficial witnesses in violation of constitutional law. Defendant contends that Shave affected the substance of Mary DePriest's testimony, and that he deterred Mitchell DePriest, who did not appear at trial, from testifying at all. Defendant acknowledges that he must establish three elements to prevail on this claim. First, the misconduct must be so egregious and improper as to turn a willing defense witness into an unwilling one. Second, the misconduct must deprive the defendant of the witness's testimony, or be a substantial cause of such deprivation. Third, the lost testimony must be material and favorable to the defense. ( People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 457, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; In re Williams (1994) 7 Cal.4th 572, 603, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, 870 P.2d 1072; In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 31-32, 241 Cal.Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374.) The record defeats the claim of governmental interference. Nothing establishes that Detective Shave acted inappropriately. Even assuming the contrary were true, defendant did not lose Mary DePriest as a beneficial witness at the penalty phase. She declined Shave's request for an interview, and appeared and testified on defendant's behalf. ( Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th 395, 461, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790 [rejecting claim of prosecutorial intimidation of defense witness who appeared at guilt and penalty phases]; accord, People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 835, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) She described his troubled upbringing, and placed the blame squarely on herself. Detective Shave's conduct had no prejudicial effect on Mary. We reach a similar conclusion as to Mitchell DePriest. Defendant has not established that Mitchell would have appeared at trial and provided beneficial defense testimony absent Detective Shave's alleged misconduct. Defendant assumes that family members always provide helpful testimony at capital trials, and that Mitchell would have done so too. Yet, the trial court could properly conclude that all inferences ran to the contrary here. In his recorded interview with Shave, Mitchell said that the defense team gave up on me [because] I wasn't gonna be really that good of a character witness in Tim's defense. Mitchell explained to Shave that he did not have extensive contact with defendant growing up, and that he (Mitchell) felt more sorry for the [murdered] girl's parents than I d[o] for [defendant]. Mitchell emphasized his reluctance to aid defendant and his disgust over the capital crime. In sum, defendant has not shown that Detective Shave deprived defendant of beneficial testimony, that the trial court mishandled the issue, or that constitutional violations occurred. [19]