Opinion ID: 1127349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The stipulation to the court commissioner presiding over defendant's trial.

Text: (15) Commissioner Cowell presided over defendant's trial, acting as a temporary judge (see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21). Defendant renews the identical claim that he asserted in a prior habeas corpus petition filed in this court, namely that he never stipulated to the appointment of a court commissioner to preside at his trial and that, accordingly, Commissioner Cowell's exercise of jurisdiction over his case violated various of his rights under the state and federal Constitutions. In In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 86 [284 Cal. Rptr. 305, 813 P.2d 1335] ( Horton I ) we rejected this claim, holding that when defense counsel proceeded to trial without objection, knowing that the judge was a court commissioner, the stipulation necessary to vest the commissioner with authority to try the case could be inferred from the conduct of counsel. Our holding in Horton I is binding under the doctrine of law of the case ( People v. Mattson, supra, 50 Cal.3d 826, 850; People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 842 [120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 533 P.2d 211]) and therefore precludes defendant's current claim on appeal. Defendant contends that the evidence in the appellate record, allegedly indicating a total breakdown of the attorney-client relationship at the time of the commencement of the trial, serves to rebut any inference that he stipulated to the appointment of a court commissioner. The asserted lack of communication between defendant and appointed counsel, however, does not undermine our holding in Horton I, supra, 54 Cal.3d 82, that the attorney's conduct alone amounted to a de facto stipulation ( id. at pp. 92-93). Under Horton I, the attorney's conduct determines the validity of the de facto stipulation. Accordingly, we reject this constitutional challenge to Commissioner Cowell's action in presiding over defendant's trial.