Opinion ID: 2329759
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Improper Delegation of Legislative Powers

Text: The lower court also held that sections 606(a) and 606(b) violated Article II, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. [12] That court reasoned that the legislature improperly delegated its authority to define what constitutes a crime and to set the penalty for the crime. Lower court slip op. at 5. From what we have stated in the preceding sections, it is apparent that the legislature has delegated none of its authority to the prosecutors and agencies. Quite to the contrary, the Act specifically and unambiguously establishes what constitutes a crime, and specifically and unambiguously establishes the full range of penalties possible for commission of those crimes. That the legislature has allowed the prosecutor some discretion and much flexibility in choosing from among the full panoply of civil, criminal and equitable remedies does not delegate any of the legislative power or function to the executive branch. The Commonwealth Court has correctly rejected a non-delegation challenge to those portions of the Act delegating enforcement authority to the counties, holding: Although Article I, section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit delegation of the legislative function, the legislature may confer authority and discretion upon another body in connection with the execution of a law. Where the legislature sets primary standards, it may impose the duty to carry out the legislative policy on another governmental unit. . . . However, such a grant of authority must contain adequate standards to guide and restrain the exercise of the delegated administrative function. In determining whether adequate standards have been established, we are not limited to the letter of the law. We must look, as well, to the underlying purpose of the statute and to its reasonable effect. . . . Chambers Development Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, ex rel. Allegheny County Health Department, 81 Pa.Cmwlth. 622, 474 A.2d 728, 731-32 (1984) (citations omitted). That court concluded that the Act was quite specific both as to the policies sought to be advanced and as to its administration and enforcement and so concluded that the Act did not delegate legislative powers and authority to the prosecutors. That holding was squarely in line with this Court's decisions under Article II, section 1 wherein legislative enactments were challenged as improper delegations of legislative authority. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cherney, 454 Pa. 285, 289-90, 312 A.2d 38 (1973) and Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 10-12, 331 A.2d 198 (1975). As the United States Supreme Court has stated, the provisions of the Omnibus Act at issue plainly demarcate the range of penalties that prosecutors and judges may seek and impose. In light of that specificity, the power that [the legislature] has delegated to those officials is no broader than the authority they routinely exercise in enforcing the criminal laws. United States v. Batchelder, supra at 442 U.S. 126, 99 S.Ct. at 2205. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the legislature has not improperly delegated its authority under Article II, section 1, and we reverse the trial court's decision to the contrary. In declaring sections 606(a) and 606(b) of the Solid Waste Management Act unconstitutional, the lower court has given little, if any, consideration to the strong and fundamental presumption of constitutionality that must attend judicial review of a legislative enactment. That presumption is further strengthened in this case by the explicit purpose of the Act to implement Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, a remarkable document expressing our citizens' entitlement and right to clean air, pure water, and  to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. The courts of this Commonwealth, as part of a co-equal branch of government, serve as trustees of Pennsylvania's public natural resources, no less than do the executive and legislative branches of government. The legislature has enacted a comprehensive, flexible and effective piece of legislation in the Solid Waste Management Act, designed to protect the people and the environment from improper and inadequate solid waste practices [which create] public health hazards, environmental pollution, and economic loss, and cause irreparable harm to the public health, safety and welfare. . . . Section 102, 35 P.S. § 6018.102. The legislature has reposed in the executive branch (DER, county health departments and municipalities) broad powers of and responsibilities for enforcement and has given the prosecutors a vast array of legal mechanisms with which to battle the tide of pollution and environmental catastrophe that has accompanied man's progress toward a highly mechanized, industrial and disposable society. And, the legislature has instructed the courts that the terms and provisions of [the Solid Waste Management Act] are to be liberally construed, so as to best achieve and effectuate the goals and purposes hereof. Section 901, 35 P.S. § 6018.901. As one of the trustees of the public estate and this Commonwealth's natural resources, we share the duty and obligation to protect and foster the environmental well-being of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Failure to act with vigilance so as best to achieve and effectuate the goals and purposes of the Solid Waste Management Act would be detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare, and would be a breach of the public trust. Therefore, we uphold the validity of sections 606(a) and 606(b) of the Act and the authority of the Office of the Attorney General to prosecute appellees for misdemeanors of the third degree for their alleged violation of that Act.