Opinion ID: 1401004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Second Degree Murder Instruction

Text: Mr. Wilson next argues that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct on the lesser included offense of second degree felony murder. We recently denied a similar claim in Brown, 515 F.3d at 1085-86, and we do the same here. Under Beck v. Alabama, a sentence of death [may not] constitutionally be imposed after a jury verdict of guilt of a capital offense, when the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included non-capital offense, and when the evidence would have supported such a verdict. 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). Mr. Wilson must demonstrate that he presented sufficient evidence to warrant a lesser included instruction. Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297, 1306 (10th Cir.1999). He must also show that the evidence presented at trial would permit a rational jury to find him guilty of the lesser included offense and acquit him of first degree murder. Young v. Sirmons, 486 F.3d 655, 670 (10th Cir.2007); Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1223-29 (10th Cir.1999). Mr. Wilson claims that he presented sufficient evidence at trial to warrant a jury instruction on second degree felony murder. A person commits first degree felony murder when he takes the life of a human being during, or if the death of a human being results from, the commission or attempted commission of [certain listed felonies, including] . . . robbery with a dangerous weapon. . . . Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.7(B). Homicide is murder in the second degree when it is perpetrated by a person engaged in the commission of any felony other than the unlawful acts set out in § 701.7. 21 Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.8(2). Second degree felony murder encompasses murder committed during a robbery by force or fear, which is not an enumerated felony in the first degree murder statute. See Brown, 515 F.3d at 1086. The use of the weapon is what distinguishes robbery by force or fear from robbery with a dangerous weapon: once the state has established that a defendant used a dangerous weapon in the course of a robbery that results in death, the offense of second degree murder is no longer an option under Oklahoma law. Fowler v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir.2000) overruled on other grounds by Moore v. Marr, 254 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir.2001); see also Brown, 515 F.3d at 1086; Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1454 (10th Cir.1995) overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. United States, 254 F.3d 1180, 1188 n. 1 (10th Cir.2001). Nonetheless, Mr. Wilson argues that a second degree instruction was appropriate because the perpetrators brought a dangerous weaponthe baseball batinto the QuikTrip only after they subdued Yost, and thus it was not used to effectuate the robbery. Mr. Wilson also asserts that he did not have the requisite intent to kill with a dangerous weapon because he was not present in the back room when Yost was beaten to death. The OCCA rejected both versions of the argument, stating that [i]n this case, the evidence clearly showed that the victim was beaten to death with a baseball bat, a dangerous weapon which was used to complete the robbery. . . . There was no evidence other than the evidence that a dangerous weapon was used to commit the robbery. Accordingly, we find no error. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 463; see also Wilson III, 2006 WL 2289777, at  (affirming). The evidence, as found by the OCCA, demonstrates that the bat was used during the course of the robbery. We afford this finding a presumption of correctness unless it is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), a high burden which Mr. Wilson has not met. It is impossible to disaggregate the robbery from the murder. Mr. Wilson stood behind the counter at the QuikTrip, attempting to pull out the safe, as the other co-defendants murdered Yost, the sole witness to the robbery, with the bat. Additionally, Mr. Wilson confessed that the group planned to kill Yost as part of the robbery. The OCCA's decision was not contrary to federal law, nor was it an unreasonable application of the facts to that law. See Brown, 515 F.3d at 1086.