Opinion ID: 615928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unlawful Retaliation Under the First Amendment

Text: The plaintiffs argue that Sheriff Clarke retaliated against Hutchins for his comments on the Eric Von Show when he disclosed Hutchins' disciplinary history on the radio show, and that this retaliation was in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a deprivation of Hutchins' First Amendment rights. The district court found that all the elements of the § 1983 claim were satisfied, using the purported Open Records Law violation as grounds for finding an adverse action. We disagree. It is well established that a public employee retains First Amendment rights to free speech. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); Vargas-Harrison v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 964, 970 (7th Cir.2001). As a general rule, the government cannot retaliate against its employees for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. Vargas, 272 F.3d at 970. When a plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim for retaliation in violation of First Amendment rights in the employment context, our analysis involves three steps. First, the court must determine whether the employee's speech was constitutionally protected under the Connick-Pickering test. Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 790 (7th Cir.2006). Second, the plaintiff must establish that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action. Id. Finally, if the plaintiff satisfies the first two steps, the defendant has an opportunity to establish that the same action would have been taken in the absence of the employee's protected speech. Id. The dispute in this case centers around the second factor. The appellants argue that the retaliatory action Hutchins complains ofthe on-air disclosure of his disciplinary historyis not an adverse employment action to support his § 1983 retaliation claim. The district court addressed this concern, recognizing that Sheriff Clarke's comments on the Eric Von Show did not relate to the conditions of Hutchins' employment, but nevertheless completed the analysis and found the action to be sufficiently adverse. A § 1983 retaliation claim does not require an adverse employment action within the same meaning as other anti-discrimination statutes. Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 941 (7th Cir.2004); Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2000). [7] We have explained that what was meant by adverse employment action in the § 1983 context is that the action of which the employee is complaining must be sufficiently adverse to deter the exercise of the individual's right to free speech. Power, 226 F.3d at 820-21. Therefore, Hutchins need only show that Sheriff Clarke's disclosure was sufficiently adverse to chill his free speech. While the district court used the purported Open Records Law violation as a basis for finding an adverse employment action and, consequently, a § 1983 violation, we cannot conclude that Sheriff Clarke violated Wisconsin's Open Records Law, so we disagree with the district court's reasoning and undertake our own analysis on the matter. The appellants say that in undertaking this analysis, the court must take into consideration Sheriff Clarke's own right to free speech, and they are correct. We cannot afford one party his right to free speech while discounting the rights of the other party. Other circuits and courts within our circuit have addressed this situationwhere the alleged retaliatory action is in itself speechby limiting a finding of an adverse action only to situations where the defendant's speech is threatening, harassing, or intimidating. See Owens v. Ragland, 313 F.Supp.2d 939, 949 (W.D.Wis.2004); Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 687 (4th Cir.2000) ([W]here a public official's alleged retaliation is in the nature of speech, in the absence of threat, coercion, or intimidation intimating that punishment, sanction, or adverse regulatory action will imminently follow, such speech does not adversely affect a citizen's First Amendment rights, even if defamatory.). Here, Sheriff Clarke called the Eric Von Show and expressed his opinion that Hutchins' criticism was a result of Hutchins carrying a grudge against him for a past disciplinary action. Sheriff Clarke then went on to discuss that disciplinary action. Sheriff Clarke's comments about Hutchins' disciplinary history pertain to a past disciplinary action and in no way intimate any future disciplinary action against Hutchins with regard to that closed matter. Sheriff Clark's disclosure of Hutchins' disciplinary history did not constitute a threat, coercion, or intimidation that punishment, sanction, or adverse regulatory action would immediately follow, and so were not actionable under § 1983. Even if some harassment and ridicule might be retaliatory speech under § 1983 ( See Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982)), Sheriff Clark's statements did not rise to that level. The appellees direct our attention to the Sixth Circuit, which has heard cases in which a public official has responded to an individual's criticism by revealing intimate and embarrassing details about that individual. See, e.g., Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 679-80 (6th Cir.1998). That circuit recognizes that in some cases where the alleged retaliation is speech, causing embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress that is damaging to the plaintiff may be actionable under § 1983, regardless of any lack of threat. Id. at 679-80. Even if we were to follow this thinking, Hutchins' case differs greatly from those cases. In Bloch, the plaintiff, a rape victim, was interviewed by a newspaper about the lack of progress in the rape investigation and her statements were published in articles that were critical of the county sheriff's department. In response to the articles, the county sheriff held a public press conference, where he released highly personal and extremely humiliating details of the rape that even the plaintiff's husband had not been made aware. Sheriff Clarke's comments do not rise to the level of the comments made in Bloch. The record demonstrates that Sheriff Clarke's retaliatory conduct in discussing Hutchins' disciplinary history was not accompanied by threat, coercion, or intimidation intimating punishment. Accordingly, it is not actionable under § 1983, and we reverse the decision of the district court.