Opinion ID: 1293219
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Physical Evidence of 1977 Offense

Text: (37) Defendant next asserts that a number of items of physical evidence (a saw, knives, cleaver, rope, tape and women's underwear), found in the desert under a tarp in the sand within a few feet of where defendant apparently took the undercover policewomen, were erroneously admitted at the penalty phase as evidence of defendant's preparation in a plan to commit murder (defendant allegedly placed the items in the sand before returning to the same spot with the intended victims a few hours later). Defendant claims the evidence should have been excluded as substantially more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. Again, defendant's argument misconceives the court's role in admitting other-crimes evidence at the penalty phase. Permitting the People to rely on physical evidence of a crime ending in a plea of nolo contendere or a dismissed charge (here, attempted murder) falls within the scope of aggravating evidence the penalty jury may consider under section 190.3, subdivision (b) ( Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 774), and its admissibility is not unduly prejudicial to the defendant, for he is entitled to an instruction which requires that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed. ( Ibid., italics omitted; see also Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21, 53.) Such an instruction was given here. Moreover, in People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 641 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189], we stated that the court does not have discretion to prevent introduction at the penalty phase of all evidence of ... a prior violent felony. ( Id., at pp. 641-642, fn. 21, italics added.) Rather, the court retains discretion to regulate, under section 352, the manner in which the evidence is presented. ( Ibid. ) The evidence at issue here was not presented in an unduly prejudicial manner. Thus, because the items were admitted during the penalty phase to support the People's claim that the 1977 solicitation occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, we conclude the trial court correctly permitted its presentation at the penalty phase under factor (b) of section 190.3. ( Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d 612, at p. 641; Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713; see People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 128-129 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37].)