Opinion ID: 351829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Security at the Kilmer Center.

Text: 14 At the time of Jessie's assault on Gibson, FEC had four or five unarmed, civilian security employees assigned to each shift. These security officers were not empowered to make arrests. One security dormitory at Kilmer was used to segregate enrollees who created disciplinary problems. That dormitory was identical to the other dormitories and had no special security features, bars, or locks. 15 Under its contract with OEO, FEC was responsible for taking all reasonable steps and precautions to prevent accidents and to protect the life and health of Contractor (FEC) . . . personnel performing or in any way coming in contact with the performance of . . . this contract. . . . (Part XIX of Contract). 6 FEC had authority to remove physically from the Center any enrollee causing disciplinary problems. 16 OEO also disseminated guidelines for controlling the conduct of the enrollee corpsmen. In Bulletin J/M 67-1, dated September 19, 1966 (Government Exhibit G-1), the OEO required that each Center must develop and enforce those rules that are necessary for its orderly functioning . . . . Beyond this, Centers have an obligation to create an atmosphere that promotes adherence to acceptable standards of behavior . . . . This same bulletin additionally provided that it was the responsibility of the Job Corps Headquarters (OEO) to define general policy regarding discipline, and the responsibility of each Center (FEC) to develop and enforce disciplinary rules. The Bulletin also specified that an on-site isolation facility should be maintained for corpsmen whose behavior constituted a threat to themselves or to any other person or property, and that physical restraint and isolation could be used, but only to the extent necessary to gain control of the corpsman who posed a threat. 17 Prior to the attack on Gibson there had been numerous incidents of misconduct by enrolled corpsmen, and the OEO had received reports concerning these disciplinary problems. In addition, FEC security personnel had discussed with the OEO on-site representative the need for a secure isolation facility and for deputization of the guards as Deputy U.S. Marshals with arrest authority. (In fact, this was part of an improvement plan (Exhibit P-7) prepared by the FEC staff at Kilmer, but never submitted to OEO for approval.) FEC, however, never requested assistance from OEO in dealing with its discipline problems, and never formally sought permission to build a security facility or to obtain arrest authority for its guards.II. 18 The facts found by the district court which we have summarized in part IB of this opinion, when examined in light of the recent decision in United States v. Orleans, supra, lead to the conclusion that the district court erred in imposing liability on the United States for the negligence of FEC, its independent contractor, under both of the district court's theories of vicarious liability. 19 The plaintiff in Orleans brought suit against the Government under the FTCA when he was injured in an automobile accident. The plaintiff alleged that his injury was caused by the negligence of an employee of a community action agency funded under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. That agency operated community centers under a contract with OEO. Its employees were not federal employees. 7 The Supreme Court concluded that since OEO did not exercise detailed control over the physical performance of the community agency's tasks, the community agency was an independent contractor, and as such the United States could not be held liable for the negligence of the agency's employees. The Court observed that the FTCA waived sovereign immunity only for the negligent and wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and that employee included employees of any federal agency, id. § 2671, but that a federal agency was defined in § 2671 as not including any contractor with the United States, id. The Orleans Court then characterized the question as not whether the community action agency receives federal money and must comply with federal standards and regulations, but whether its day-to-day operations are supervised by the Federal Government. 425 U.S. at 815, 96 S.Ct. at 1976 (emphasis added). 20 A. Respondeat Superior. 21 Applying the Orleans standard to the facts of the case sub judice compels us to conclude that the district court erred by its imposition of respondeat superior liability upon the United States. While it may be argued that the OEO exercised a greater degree of control over the Job Corps program and the FEC, than it did over community action agencies of the type involved in Orleans, nonetheless the district court specifically found that the Government exercised no operational, day-to-day control over Camp Kilmer or FEC's employees. 8 22 Under Orleans the United States may not be held vicariously liable for the negligence of FEC as an independent contractor (28 U.S.C. § 2671), or that of FEC's employees, in failing to supervise or control Jessie. This result is required by the language of the FTCA, as construed in Orleans. The fact of broad, supervisory control, or even the potential to exercise detailed control, cannot convert a contractor into an agent, nor can it be the basis for imposing vicarious liability on the United States. United States v. Orleans. Thus, the district court erred in concluding that the government could be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because it retained sufficient control of the manner in which FEC's work was to be performed. (Dist.Ct.Op. of Mar. 14, 1975 at 25, Appendix at 31a). See also Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 93 S.Ct. 2215, 37 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973). Indeed, this court and other courts have consistently held that the United States cannot be vicariously liable for injuries to workmen on Government construction sites, solely because the Government has retained control over the work and safety practices of the independent contractor whose negligence caused the injury. See Fisher v. United States, 441 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1971). Accord, e. g., U. S. v. DeCamp, 478 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1973); Gowdy v. U. S., 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960, 90 S.Ct. 437, 24 L.Ed.2d 425 (1969); Market Insurance Co. v. U. S.,415 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1969); Roberson v. U. S., 382 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1967); Lipka v. U. S., 369 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1966); Grogan v. U. S., 341 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S.Ct. 552, 15 L.Ed.2d 470 (1966). 23 B. Inherently Dangerous Activity. 24 The district court formulated an alternative theory of liability as follows: 25 There is another theory of liability, also based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, upon which responsibility may vest in the United States for the negligence of FEC. Simply stated, the contractee (the Government) is liable where the work performed is inherently dangerous and the contractor's (FEC's) negligence causes injury within the scope of that danger. 26