Opinion ID: 606331
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the claim

Text: 19 Jackson has also asserted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Kimel individually. In order to support her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under North Carolina law, Jackson must show that Kimel engaged in (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which was intended to cause and did cause (3) severe emotional distress. Hogan, 340 S.E.2d at 119. Jackson must also demonstrate that the alleged extreme and outrageous conduct occurred within the three-year statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1981). 20 Kimel argues that under a recent North Carolina case, Waddle v. Sparks, 331 N.C. 73, 414 S.E.2d 22, 28-29 (1992), we should look only at the acts alleged during the three-year statute of limitations period in determining whether Jackson has stated a claim. The only act alleged within the three-year period prior to the filing of Jackson's complaint is the invitation to go to Grandfather Mountain. Kimel contends that the invitation, alone, is not sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Jackson responds that Kimel engaged in an ongoing pattern of harassment, similar to a continuing violation under Title VII, 3 and therefore we should not limit our review to acts within the three year period. 21 In Waddle, summary judgment was granted on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiff, Simpson, failed to demonstrate that any of the conduct of the defendant, Sparks, occurred within the limitations period. 414 S.E.2d at 29. Simpson stated that all of the questionable conduct occurred during her employment, but she could not remember the day, month, or year when any of the conduct occurred. Id. In affirming the grant of summary judgment to defendant Sparks, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated: 22 If plaintiff Simpson could have testified that any of the specific incidents with Sparks occurred [within the three year statute of limitations period], her evidentiary forecast of Sparks' conduct would have been sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion based on the statute of limitations. Simpson, however, was not able to state a date--even within a year--when any one of the various specific incidents she alleges against Sparks occurred. 23 Under Waddle, Jackson's allegation that Kimel invited her to go to Grandfather Mountain satisfies the requirement of some specific act alleged to have occurred within the three-year statute of limitations. According to Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325, 336 n. 11 (1981), we can look to acts prior to the three-year period for the context of this invitation, even if those acts are not compensable. 276 S.E.2d at 336 n. 11. Therefore, we hold that the invitation to Grandfather Mountain, when placed in the context of the prior alleged acts, is enough for Jackson's claim to survive summary judgment as to the statute of limitations defense. 24 Kimel also argues that because he could not have carried out the threats that Jackson alleges he made (to terminate her employment or to withhold assistance with attendance related problems), her allegations are insufficient to establish either that his conduct was extreme and outrageous or that he intended to inflict emotional distress. Kimel argues that under the collective bargaining agreement, attendance policies, and grievance procedures, he could not possibly have taken any baseless adverse employment action against Jackson. Kimel also asserts that, given Jackson's involvement with the union, the fact that she had previously filed a grievance for harassment against another supervisor, and her admitted knowledge of the attendance policies, the alleged threats could not have been reasonably perceived to have any coercive force. According to Kimel, these facts make it impossible for Jackson to support her claim either that his conduct was extreme and outrageous or that he intended to inflict emotional distress. 25 Nevertheless, Kimel asserts no legal authority for his theory that the efficacy of his threats is central to determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Kimel is correct that courts should not determine in a vacuum the extremity or outrageousness of his conduct or his intention to inflict emotional distress. See McCormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 535 (4th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 912, 116 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992). In our view, however, taking the evidence in a light most favorable to Jackson, as we must, the conduct which she has alleged may reasonably be found to be sufficiently outrageous as to permit recovery. Hogan, 340 S.E.2d at 121. Jackson's perceptions, their reasonableness, and whether an adequate basis existed to support Jackson's belief that Kimel could carry out the coercive actions he threatened are not questions for resolution at summary judgment. These issues are for the jury to consider in determining whether the conduct complained of is sufficiently extreme and outrageous and was intended to cause emotional distress so that liability should result. Id. Jackson has stated a claim against Kimel for intentional infliction of emotional distress.