Opinion ID: 2084881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Application of Those Controlling Principles

Text: In our judgment, the language of the notarized release document at issue in this case is unambiguous. We are struck by the sweeping and comprehensive nature of the language that the release document contains. It is replete with such straightforward English words as any and all. [8] We are quite unable to read the document other than as an all-encompassing release, whereby plaintiff released, acquitted, and forever discharged defendants from  all claims and demands, actions and causes of action    on account of, or in any way growing out of any personal injuries    resulting or to result from any and all incidents or injuries occurring during my employment   . (Emphasis added.) The phrase in any way growing out of any personal injuries which we have italicized in the release document that we quoted in the Facts and Travel section of this opinion is of special significance. It is clear to us that plaintiff's physical handicap discrimination claim came into being as a result of the personal injury that she sustained at the workplace; in other words, the physical handicap discrimination claim came into being as a result of the workplace injury. [9] In view of our conclusion as to the unambiguous nature of the release language, there is no reason not to accept the release document and apply it at face value. [10] See Gorman, 883 A.2d at 739 n. 11 (Under established contract law principles, when there is an unambiguous contract and no proof of duress or the like, the terms of the contract are to be applied as written.); see also Rivera v. Gagnon, 847 A.2d 280, 284 (R.I.2004) (If the contract terms are clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is at an end for the terms will be applied as written.); Zarrella, 824 A.2d at 1259 (If the terms are found to be unambiguous,    the task of judicial construction is at an end and the parties are bound by the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms of the contract.); Clark-Fitzpatrick/Franki Foundation Co., 652 A.2d at 443 (In situations in which the language of a contractual agreement is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids.). We acknowledge the fact that Ms. Young does not consider the release agreement to have the clear meaning that we believe it has. While we respect plaintiff's right to assert her position, the mere fact that parties differ as to the meaning of an agreement does not necessarily mean that the agreement is in fact ambiguous. See City Investing Company Liquidating Trust v. Continental Casualty Co., 624 A.2d 1191, 1198 (Del.1993) ([T]he language of an agreement    is not rendered ambiguous simply because the parties in litigation differ concerning its meaning.). When, as in this case, we are confronted with unambiguous contractual words, what is claimed to have been the subjective intent of the parties is of no moment. Vincent Co. v. First National Supermarkets, Inc., 683 A.2d 361, 363 (R.I. 1996) (When a contract is unambiguous,    the intent of the parties becomes irrelevant.); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Dial Media, Inc., 122 R.I. 571, 581 n. 10, 410 A.2d 986, 991 n. 10 (1980) ([T]he intent we seek is not some undisclosed intent that may have existed in the minds of the contracting parties but is instead the intent that is expressed in the language of the contract.). [11] It would be difficult to improve upon the articulation by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania of this crucially important principle of contract law; in the case of Shovel Transfer and Storage, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 559 Pa. 56, 739 A.2d 133, 138 (1999), that court wrote as follows: It is firmly settled that the intent of the parties to a written contract is contained in the writing itself.    When the words of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent is to be found only in the express language of the agreement. Our ruling today is not at all inconsistent with this Court's holding in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Farr, 594 A.2d 379 (R.I.1991). [12] In that case, Shirley Farr, the defendant in a declaratory judgment action brought by Aetna, had been injured in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist while she was driving a vehicle that was owned by her employer and insured by Aetna, which company was also the workers' compensation carrier for her employer. Ms. Farr filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits and eventually signed a release in favor of both Aetna and her employer in exchange for the payment to her of $40,000. [13] At the time that this release was executed, Aetna was apparently aware that Ms. Farr intended to pursue a claim for uninsured motorist benefits ( id. at 381); and, after signing the just-referenced release, she did in fact institute an action to recover such benefits. Id. at 380. The release that was signed by the defendant in Farr specifically referred to her workers' compensation claim, but it made no mention of an uninsured motorist claim. That release document included language releasing claims which ha[d] been the subject matter[] of certain proceedings under said Workers' Compensation Act   . Farr, 594 A.2d at 381. Although the release also contained language that was consistent with a general release, the Court determined that the omission of any reference in the release to Ms. Farr's uninsured motorist claim gave rise to an ambiguity and, as a result, summary judgment was inappropriate. Although at first blush there appears to be some commonality between Farr and the case at bar, upon sustained analysis it becomes clear that Farr is not controlling precedent with respect to the instant case. [14] Unlike the release in Farr, the language of the release in the instant case released defendant from all claims and demands, actions and causes of action, damages    on account of, or in any way growing out of any personal injuries, whether known or unknown to me at the present time   . This language is similar to the language contained in the release at issue in W.P. Associates v. Forcier, Inc., 637 A.2d 353 (R.I.1994). In W.P. Associates, the agreement released any and all obligations relating to certain enumerated events. Although the phrase promissory note was not used in the release, this Court held that the promissory note at issue in that case was clearly referenced and released by the agreement since it arose from actions taken with respect to certain of the enumerated activities. Id. at 355, 357. Similarly, the language in the release document at issue in this case applies to both Ms. Young's discrimination claims and her workers' compensation claim since both arose from the injury that she incurred on July 11, 1996. We can perceive no reason for invalidating the instant release or its all-encompassing scope. See generally, Guglielmi v. Rhode Island Trust Financial Corp., 573 A.2d 687, 689 (R.I.1990) (discussing the factors to be considered when the validity of a release is at issue). That being so, we must respect the instant release as we would any other contractual agreement that has been properly entered into. In the words of one distinguished jurist: Were it otherwise, signed contracts would be little more than scraps of paper, subject to the selective recollection of the parties in interest. D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Systems, Inc., 570 F.Supp. 708, 714 (D.R.I.1983) (Selya, J.).