Opinion ID: 1918264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The prima facie case of retaliation.

Text: Dr. Carter-Obayuwana's retaliation claim arises under Title VII's so-called opposition clause, which makes it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against any individual ... because he [or she] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a); see also Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 209 U.S.App.D.C. 215, 222, 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (1981). It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's... sex, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1), and the opposition clause thus makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee for opposing sex discrimination in his or her workplace. In order to make out a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII's opposition clause, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she was engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) that her employer took an adverse employment action, and (3) a nexus between the two. McKenna v. Weinberger, 234 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 304, 729 F.2d 783, 790 (1984); cf. Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 361 n. 17 (D.C.1993) (relying on Title VII standard to establish requirements for prima facie showing of retaliation under DCHRA). [T]he plaintiff does not have to prove that the conduct opposed was in fact a violation of Title VII. Goos v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 715 F.Supp. 2, 3 (D.D.C. 1989). [T]he opposition activity is protected even when it is based on a mistaken good faith belief that Title VII has been violated. Id. (quoting Love v. Re/Max of America, Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir.1984) (internal alterations omitted)). [19] [M]aking the protected nature of an employee's opposition to alleged discrimination depend on the ultimate resolution of [her] claim would be inconsistent with the remedial purposes of Title VII. Parker, supra, 209 U.S.App.D.C. at 222, 652 F.2d at 1019. The dispositive issue in this case is whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity prior to the employer's alleged acts of reprisal. More specifically, the relevant question is whether in writing her letter of December 15, 1992 the plaintiff was exercising rights secured by Title VII. Both trial judges appear to have assumed that the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity until August 1994, when she filed her complaint with the OHR. At the first trial, Judge Satterfield allowed the retaliation count to go to the jury under Title VII, but he excluded from evidence testimony regarding any events that occurred prior to August 1994. At the second trial, Judge Winfield relied on Judge Satterfield's earlier ruling as the basis for her decision excluding any evidence concerning the University's reduction in 1993 of the plaintiff's salary. According to Judge Winfield, [t]he protected activity was determined by Judge Satterfield to be the formal filing of a discrimination complaint before the EEOC in either August or September 1994. Whether actions by an employee constitute protected activity is a question of law, and we therefore review the trial courts' conclusions de novo. See, e.g., Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 45-47 (D.C.1994). [20] The plaintiff engaged in protected activity, for purposes of Title VII's opposition clause, if she opposed conduct that she reasonably believed to violate Title VII. See, e.g., id. at 46; Parker, supra, 209 U.S.App.D.C. at 222, 652 F.2d at 1019. Protected activity need not take the form of a lawsuit or of a formal complaint to an enforcement agency such as the EEOC or the OHR. On the contrary, the protections of Title VII extend to an employee's informal complaints of discrimination to his or her superiors within the organization. See, e.g., Parker, supra, 209 U.S.App.D.C. at 222, 652 F.2d at 1019. In fact, internal complaints have been held to constitute clearly protected activity. McKenna, supra, 234 U.S.App.D.C. at 305, 729 F.2d at 791; see also Goos, supra, 715 F.Supp. at 4; cf. Green, supra, 652 A.2d at 46-47 (examining employees' complaints to their superiors at Howard University to determine whether these complaints were protected). A plaintiff claiming retaliation must also demonstrate that he or she voice[d the] complaint about ... the allegedly unlawful activity. Green, supra, 652 A.2d at 46. In other words, the plaintiff is required to alert the employer [and make the employer aware of the fact] that [he or] she is lodging a complaint about allegedly discriminatory conduct. Id. The employee need not, however, employ any magic words such as discrimination, for the communication of a complaint of unlawful discrimination ... may be inferred or implied from the surrounding facts. Id. at 47 (emphasis in original, citations omitted). In this case, neither trial judge explicitly focused on the question when the plaintiff first opposed a discriminatory practice within the meaning of Title VII's opposition clause. Judge Satterfield's evidentiary rulings, however, presuppose that protected activity first occurred in August 1994, and not December 1992. Judge Winfield, apparently viewing herself as bound by the law of the case, adopted Judge Satterfield's implicit ruling. To the extent that both trial judges appear to have assumed that the plaintiff was not engaged in activity protected by the opposition clause until she filed her complaint with the OHR, we cannot agree with that assumption. See, e.g., Parker, supra, 209 U.S.App.D.C. at 222, 652 F.2d at 1019. The plaintiff's December 15, 1992 memorandum satisfied all of the prerequisites for protected activity. In that memorandum, the plaintiff communicated to Dr. Harper and to university management, including Dean Hoover and Vice President Ladner, her allegation that Dr. Harper was unlawfully discriminating against her on the basis of sex. She made specific reference to Dr. Harper's sexist mentality, and she stated that she would not hesitate to seek advice and/or redress outside the University if [Dr. Harper's] sexism... do[es] not cease. [S]exism is defined as [d]iscrimination based on gender, especially discrimination against women. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1654 (3d ed.1992). The plaintiff's references to sexism and a sexist mentality, combined with her allusion to possible redress, would therefore put any reasonable employer on notice that she was complaining of or opposing discrimination in employment based on sex, that is, conduct which, if it occurred, constituted an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1). It is true that the memorandum did not specifically refer to discrimination but, as we have noted, no such talismanic language was required. Green, supra, 652 A.2d at 47. Indeed, [c]ourts have not imposed a rigorous requirement of specificity in determining whether an act constitutes `opposition' for purposes of [the opposition clause]. E.E.O.C. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir.1983). Given this relatively lenient standard, the conclusion is inescapable that the plaintiff's December 1992 memorandum was a complaint about sexually discriminatory conduct. That Dr. Carter-Obayuwana considered that conduct unlawful can reasonably be inferred from her expressed intention, if necessary, to seek outside assistance or redress. Consequently, the plaintiff's memorandum constituted protected opposition on her part to alleged discriminatory practices. See Parker, supra, 209 U.S.App.D.C. at 222, 652 F.2d at 1019. This case is unlike Green, supra, 652 A.2d 41, in which we held that the plaintiff's internal complaints did not constitute protected activity. In Green, a suit alleging employment discrimination against heterosexuals, the plaintiff had never complained to anyone at Howard University about the existence of sexual orientation discrimination until she filed her lawsuit. Id. at 46. Specifically, the plaintiff had never expressly [told] ... any higher Howard University management official of the allegedly discriminatory conduct to which she claimed to have been subjected. Id. (citation omitted). In this case, on the other hand, Dr. Carter-Obayuwana not only complained to Dr. Harper about his alleged sexism, but also reported her complaint to higher Howard University management official[s]. Id. The plaintiff's claim of sexually discriminatory conduct was made several months before the University's decision to reduce her salary, and she continued to complain to management about Dr. Harper's actions in subsequent communications to Dr. Cash and Dr. Ladner in August and September of 1993. In our view, this case is more analogous to McKenna, supra, in which the court held that a female employee's complaints to management regarding her co-workers' allegedly sexist treatment of her was held to be clearly protected activity, 234 U.S.App. D.C. at 305, 729 F.2d at 791, than to Green. [21] See also Goos, supra, 715 F.Supp. at 4 (holding that an employee engaged in protected activity when she orally complained to her superiors that the termination of a non-white employee that she had been instructed to effectuate was unethical and seemingly racially motivated). [22] The other two elements that an employee must establish to present a prima facie case of retaliation, namely, adverse action and causation, McKenna, supra, 234 U.S.App.D.C. at 304, 729 F.2d at 790, need not detain us long. There can be no doubt that an improperly motivated reduction in salary was adverse to the plaintiff. See Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 825 (8th Cir.2000). The existence vel non of a causal nexus between the plaintiff's protected activity and the reduction of her salary may well be a hotly contested issue at trial. [23] At this stage of the case, however, we are satisfied that the plaintiff's evidence, which includes testimony that she repeatedly complained of retaliatory treatment (one of her complaints having been made only two days before the salary reduction was officially recommended), was sufficient to go to the jury. See Arthur Young, supra, 631 A.2d at 368 (The causal connection may be established by showing that the employer had knowledge of the employee's protected activity, and that the adverse personnel action took place shortly after that activity.) (alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted). This temporal proximity is enough to survive summary judgment, Goos, supra, 715 F.Supp. at 4, or, as in this case, to avert the direction of an unfavorable verdict. Moreover, the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could fairly be construed as supporting the claim in her brief that Frederick Harper's own words reflect a particularly thin skin towards plaintiff's protected complaints, deriding them as `disruptive and accusatory behaviors' and `libelous statements' and `threats' in memoranda to his colleagues. Lest we be misunderstood, we emphasize that we are expressing no opinion as to whether the plaintiff will be able to establish, at trial, that the reduction of her salary was in fact retaliatory. Cases like this one present the opportunity for posturing by plaintiffs and defendants alike. A malcontent with no valid grievance can pose as a victim of invidious discrimination, and may sometimes trivialize, thwart, or even pervert the noble aims of our civil rights laws. By the same token, an unscrupulous employer who has engaged in discriminatory practices may sometimes falsely depict a person with a legitimate complaint as a meritless trouble-maker; the effects of the employer's wrongful conduct may then be compounded by the undeserved ad hominem condemnation of and calumny against a plaintiff who deserves better. However that may be, these issues can only be sorted out at trial. There, cross-examination and other tools of the search for truth should enable the court and jury to separate the wheat from the chaff and reach a just result. In this case, in our view, the plaintiff should have been permitted to present to the jury her claims regarding the 1993 reduction of her salary.