Opinion ID: 2196869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction to Consider Appeal.

Text: C.W.R. asks us to dismiss this appeal for three reasons: (1) the State failed to appeal to the district court as a prerequisite to an appeal to this court; (2) no appeal is allowed from an interlocutory order in a juvenile matter; and (3) if the State is allowed to appeal, the juvenile's right to equal protection of the laws is violated. We address each contention separately below. A. C.W.R. argues that we should dismiss the State's appeal because the State did not follow the proper procedure for appeals set out in section 602.7103. He claims that section 602.7103 requires the State to seek direct review of the order entered by the associate juvenile judge in the district court before appealing to our court. The State contends that section 602.7103 gives parties the right to appeal to the district court but does not preclude a direct appeal to the appellate court if properly requested pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.133 for final orders or pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 for interlocutory orders. We agree with the State. Section 602.7103(3) provides in part: The parties to any [proceeding other than a termination of parental rights proceeding] heard by an associate juvenile judge are entitled to appeal the order, finding, or decision of an associate juvenile judge, to the district court. Iowa Code § 602.7103(3) (1993). Before its amendment in 1992, this section used substantially the same language in referring to appeal rights from the ruling of a referee in juvenile matters: The parties to a proceeding heard by the referee are entitled to a review by the judge of the juvenile court of the referee's order, finding, or decision, if the review is requested within ten days after the entry of the referee's order, finding, or decision. Iowa Code § 602.7103(3) (1991). In considering section 602.7103 prior to the 1992 amendment, we said that parties are not required to seek a juvenile court judge's review of a referee's decision in order to render the decision final for purposes of review. In re D.L.C., 464 N.W.2d 881, 882 (Iowa 1991); In re D.W.K., 365 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1985). We give amended section 602.7103 a consistent interpretation. The language entitled to a review is the same in both the new and old statutes. We read this language to mean that the parties may seek review by the district court of the associate juvenile judge's order but are not required to do so as a prerequisite to review at the appellate level. B. C.W.R. next argues that an order denying or granting a waiver motion is interlocutory and may not be appealed. He cites the case of In re Clay, 246 N.W.2d 263 (Iowa 1976). In Clay, we explained that an order transferring a cause from one state court to another is ordinarily deemed to be interlocutory, therefore, not final and appealable of right. Clay, 246 N.W.2d at 264. We noted that appeals from the juvenile court must follow the same rules applicable to appeals from the district court. Id. at 265. Because the juvenile in Clay had not obtained permission to appeal the juvenile court's interlocutory order transferring jurisdiction to adult court, we dismissed the juvenile's appeal. Id. at 266. In contrast, here the State requested and was granted an interlocutory appeal. See Iowa R.App.P. 2. Consequently, we have jurisdiction to review the associate juvenile judge's order denying the State's waiver motion. C. C.W.R.'s final argument supporting dismissal of this appeal is based on the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. He correctly contends that whatever avenue of appeal is allowed in juvenile proceedings must be applied equally to both parties. See Shortridge v. State, 478 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 1991) (statute giving the State but not inmates the right to a direct appeal from prison disciplinary decisions violated inmates' right to equal protection of the laws). C.W.R. claims that allowance of an interlocutory appeal here coupled with the dismissal of the appeal in Clay establishes different standards for appeal by the State and the juvenile. However, C.W.R. ignores the procedural distinction discussed above between this case and Clay. In Clay, the juvenile filed a direct appeal from an interlocutory order without permission. Here, the State requested permission to appeal and was granted that right. C.W.R.'s equal protection claim fails because there is no disparate treatment of juveniles and the State. Either party may apply for an interlocutory appeal; the juvenile in Clay simply failed to do so. [1]