Opinion ID: 1386250
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Claims of Constitutional Error

Text: (16) Defendant argues that allowing the jury to consider evidence of the New York robbery placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense. (See U.S. Const., Amend. V; Cal. Const., art. I, ง 15; United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 127-128 [66 L.Ed.2d 328, 339, 101 S.Ct. 426].) As defendant acknowledges, we have consistently rejected substantially similar contentions, holding that the constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy do not apply when the prior criminal activity is considered by the penalty jury as a proper aggravating factor under section 190.3, factor (b). ( People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d 468, 528; accord People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 756, fn. 17.) Defendant presents no persuasive reason to reconsider these holdings. (17) Defendant also contends that to permit the jury to decide that death is the appropriate punishment without jury unanimity on the existence of the other-crimes evidence does not meet the heightened need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment, as compelled by the Eighth Amendment. ( Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 305 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961-962, 96 S.Ct. 2978].) We disagree. People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-55 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279], requires a trial court to instruct a penalty phase jury that, before considering evidence of the defendant's other crime(s) as a circumstance in aggravation (ง 190.3, factor (b)), it must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the uncharged crime(s) occurred. Here, the trial court did so. It had no sua sponte obligation to instruct the jury that its finding of uncharged criminal activity must be unanimous. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 773 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) We explained in Ghent that to require jury unanimity as to each incident of uncharged criminal activity disclosed during the penalty phase would immerse the jurors in lengthy and complicated discussions wholly collateral to the penalty determination which confronts them. ( Id. at pp. 773-774.) In Ghent, the trial court instructed the jury that `to make a determination as to the penalty, all twelve jurors must agree'; that instruction, we held, was sufficient under existing law.... ( Id. at p. 773.) Here, too, the trial court gave such an instruction. Defendant interprets Ghent as holding that the instruction satisfies due process of law. He argues, however, that we have yet to decide whether the instruction comports with the Eighth Amendment's reliability requirement. Although we did not mention the Eighth Amendment when we discussed this instruction in Ghent, we impliedly rejected the argument defendant makes here when we concluded that the instruction was sufficient under existing law. ( Ibid. ) (18) In addition, defendant argues that the cumulative impact of permitting the same jury that considered guilt to hear the other-crimes evidence and to decide penalty without instruction on the elements of those crimes violates both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant acknowledges that in People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205, we rejected a challenge to section 190.3, factor (b), on the ground that it violated due process by allowing a jury which has already decided defendant's guilt to consider, on the issue of penalty, other violent crimes on which defendant was neither charged nor convicted. Defendant, however, claims that in Balderas we resolved the issue only in terms of due process and we therefore did not reject the argument on Eighth Amendment grounds. Not so. In People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pages 204-205, we considered the challenged procedure in light of the relevant United States Supreme Court authorities and concluded it was neither `prejudicial,' `unreliable,' `irrelevant,' [n]or `fundamentally unfair.' ( Id. at p. 205, fn. 32.) We also have rejected the other part of defendant's cumulative-impact argument when we previously held that a trial court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of the underlying other crimes. ( People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 773.) Evaluation of defendant's cumulative impact argument is therefore unnecessary in light of our rejection on the merits of both of its components. ( People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1249 [283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163].) (19) Finally, defendant contends that the procedures for proving other crimes under section 190.3, factor (b) are less stringent than those for proving prior felonies for purposes of sentence enhancement (see ง 667.5; People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343 [243 Cal. Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150]), arguing that the penalty phase procedures violate principles of equal protection. As we have stated, The penalty phase is unique, intended to place before the sentencer all evidence properly bearing on its decision.... ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 205, fn. 32.) The facts of a capital defendant's [p]rior violent criminality are obviously relevant to this decision. ( Ibid. ) The purpose served by the rules governing sentence enhancement is not similar. (See People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1037-1039 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627].) Under these circumstances, there is no equal protection violation. (See People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 945 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676].)