Opinion ID: 787590
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Are mandatory expenditure limits the least restrictive means of advancing the State's interests?

Text: 137 The greater level of scrutiny accorded spending limits, as compared to contribution limits, requires that Vermont must also prove that Act 64's mandatory expenditure limit system is the least restrictive alternative for achieving the State's compelling time-protection and anti-corruption interests. This inquiry is essentially twofold. First, the State must prove that the type of regulation chosen was the least restrictive—that is, that no other type of regulation could have advanced the interests asserted while impinging less on First Amendment rights. Second, the least restrictive alternative inquiry requires scrutiny of the basis for the particular spending limits chosen—an inquiry not undertaken with respect to contribution limits. In evaluating the constitutionality of contribution limits, the Supreme Court has indicated that [i]f it is satisfied that some limit ... is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000, noting that [s]uch distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be said to amount to differences in kind. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. In the context of expenditure limits, and in light of the legislative history of Act 64, there may well be differences in kind as to the choice of specific spending limits that demand scrutiny.
138 Vermont argues that it had already explored less restrictive alternatives and found them to be ineffective. Specifically, in 1993, the State instituted a system of voluntary expenditure limits. Former Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, §§ 2841-42 (1991) (repealed 1997). Under this system, candidates had the option of signing an affidavit indicating that they would comply with the spending limits and, in exchange, received any favorable or unfavorable publicity from that decision. At trial, Vermont presented evidence that the voluntary spending limits in place from 1993 to 1997 were not working. Participation in the voluntary system fell dramatically each year, with 90 percent of candidates participating in the first year but less than 20 percent in the second year. Witnesses testified that Vermont's voluntary limits did not work because candidates attempted to gain an advantage in the fundraising arms race by ignoring the limits. Most tellingly, by 1998, not a single candidate for statewide office chose to abide by the voluntary expenditure limits. 139 Vermont's voluntary limits were quite different, however, than many of the voluntary spending limits in other states. 21 In Vermont, the only carrot exchanged for the voluntary agreement to the limits was the ability to publicize one's compliance. Most other states (and New York City) offer additional incentives such as public matching funds, a higher contribution limit, or other inducements. See, e.g., WRITING REFORM: A GUIDE TO DRAFTING STATE AND LOCAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS, V-8-19 (Deborah Goldberg ed., Brennan Center 2001) (describing variety of mechanisms used by states to encourage compliance with voluntary limits). And many of these types of provisions have been upheld by the federal courts of appeals in the face of a First Amendment challenge. See e.g. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1552-53 (8th Cir.1996) (upholding Minnesota's voluntary public financing scheme), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1229, 117 S.Ct. 1820, 137 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1997); see also Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir.1993) (holding that Rhode Island's voluntary public financing statute survives exacting scrutiny). 140 Indeed, this type of spending limit— voluntary, but with public funding as an inducement to comply—was in Act 64 as originally introduced in the House, but the provision appears to have been changed to mandatory in one of the House committees. (Ex. A, at E-0001, 0031.) It is unclear from the current record why this change occurred, and the District Court made no findings on this point. Similarly, it is possible that the Vermont legislature could have employed a public financing option for all offices, in addition to the option that was provided for Governor and Lieutenant Governor candidates. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: EARLY EXPERIENCES OF TWO STATES THAT OFFER FULL PUBLIC FUNDING FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES (May 9, 2003) (GAO-03-453) (assessing initial results of public funding of legislative candidates in Maine and Arizona). Notably, early versions of the bill appear to have contained such funding for a broader range of offices. (testimony of Karen Kitzmiller; Ex. 70, at E-2828.) On the other hand, after the voluntary affidavit system broke down, the legislature may have concluded that only mandatory expenditure limitations, together with contribution limitations, would adequately advance the State's interests. Indeed, there may have been still other reasons—not yet made part of the record—for the legislature's decision not to adopt, for all offices, voluntary expenditure limits with public funding incentives. 141 If Vermont could have utilized some of the same voluntary mechanisms employed by other states, offering either financial or other incentives for compliance with expenditure limits, then Vermont may not be able to prove that it employed the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 758, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 135 L.Ed.2d 888 (1996) ([W]e can take Congress' different, and significantly less restrictive, treatment of a highly similar problem at least as some indication that more restrictive means are not `essential' (or will not prove very helpful).) (emphasis in original). On remand, the District Court should make findings as to whether there were less restrictive alternatives available that could have been as effective in advancing the asserted interests. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986) (alternatives should serve the interest `about as well'). Should there be proven another type of regulation that would have similarly advanced the interests asserted, while impinging less on First Amendment rights, the District Court will have a basis to find that the provision is not narrowly tailored.
142 If the District Court finds, however, that mandatory spending limits were the only type of regulation that could sufficiently advance Vermont's time-protection and anti-corruption interests, then the court must also inquire into the basis for the particular amount of the spending limits chosen. There was evidence presented at trial that Act 64's spending limits were intended to map onto existing spending levels from past campaigns. In defendants' proposed findings of fact after trial, defendants indicated that the legislature considered factors such as population, historical information on past spending levels and campaigns, Vermont's previous voluntary spending limits, and the testimony of numerous witnesses concerning the appropriate level for the limits, with the legislature balancing different viewpoints as is necessary with most pieces of legislation. This is consistent with the District Court's findings that the average spending on past races was consistently under the limits imposed by Act 64. 118 F.Supp.2d at 471-472. See also Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1769 (2001) (suggesting that median spending levels of candidates in recent races could be an appropriate basis for spending limits). 143 Nonetheless, the specific basis for the final limits is not entirely clear from the existing record. Defendants noted that for the Governor's race, the Senate bill would have set a $250,000 limit, while the House bill originally set a $400,000 limit. In the final bill as adopted, the limit was set at $300,000. Similarly, the limits for one-seat Senate races varied in the various committee bills, either $4,000, $5,000 or $6,000, with an additional $2-3,000 for each additional seat in the district. The final limits were those that emerged out of the Senate Finance Committee (the lowest in any of the committee bills)—$4,000 plus an additional $2,500 for each additional seat. Such decisions, of course, could be the product of typical legislative compromise— a process into which we will not intrude. However, plaintiffs also presented evidence that the ultimate decision as to the amount of certain statewide spending limits was motivated by a desire to preserve the public fisc, because of Act 64's public financing option for gubernatorial and Lieutenant Governor candidates. 22 Particularly in the context of expenditure limits, these choices demand greater scrutiny. 144 Thus, in undertaking its least restrictive means analysis on remand, the District Court should make additional findings on the impact of the legislative choices as to the appropriate spending limits on candidates' and voters' First Amendment rights. Even if Act 64's spending limits are sufficiently high to permit effective advocacy as defined in Shrink, as the District Court found and as we have affirmed, the precise level of the limits chosen can have a significant impact on how restrictive the provision is on First Amendment rights. Of course, a $2 million limit for State Senate races is quite unlikely to restrict First Amendment rights, but equally unlikely to impact the arms race mentality and thereby advance the interests asserted. Moreover, there will always be distinctions in degree that could be seen as less restrictive —$305,000 is less restrictive than $300,000; $310,000 less restrictive than $305,000, etc. And such an inquiry has no logical endpoint. 145 However, the specific choices made by the Vermont legislature among the different spending limits contained in various bills may be differences in kind with respect to the impact on the First Amendment rights of candidates and voters. Inquiries into the First Amendment impact of challenged regulations have been undertaken in analogous contexts by other courts, see, e.g., National Black Police Ass'n v. D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics, 924 F.Supp. 270, 277 (D.D.C.1996) (considering a variety of factors in assessing whether the reduction in campaign funds was so substantial that it affected the candidates' ability to reach voters), vacated as moot sub nom. National Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C.Cir.1997), and, although necessarily speculative here, should be undertaken on remand. If the choice of the lower spending limit—for example, $4,000 for a Senate race as opposed to $6,000—is significantly more restrictive, while no more effective in advancing the interest asserted, then the lower spending limit is not consistent with the First Amendment. Assessing the legislative alternatives, then, requires evaluating both (1) the extent to which the higher spending limit is less restrictive of the First Amendment rights of candidates and voters 23 ; and (2) the extent to which the higher spending limit would be as effective in advancing the anti-corruption and time-protection interests. The answers to these questions will determine whether the spending limits chosen not only allow for effective campaigns but also are the least restrictive alternative, and therefore narrowly tailored.