Opinion ID: 683222
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: timing of the conduct underlying DeSalvo's conviction.

Text: 46 To determine whether the District Court's use of the amended version of the VWPA violated the ex post facto clause, we must examine the indictment itself to determine when the charged conduct took place. DeSalvo argues that the conduct underlying her conviction, as charged in the Government's indictment, ended in October, 1990, prior to the effective date of the 1990 amendment to the VWPA (November 29, 1990). Thus, she claims that the District Court should have sentenced her to restitution under the pre-amendment statute, which would have limited restitution to the loss attributable to the specific conduct underlying the conviction, that is, $68,384.36. See United States v. Sharp, 941 F.2d 811, 815 (9th Cir.1991). The Government responds to DeSalvo's contention by asserting that the conduct charged in its indictment continued through October, 1990 and into 1991, beyond the effective date of the 1990 amendments to the VWPA. 47 In DeSalvo's indictment, the preamble to both the conspiracy to defraud, and the mail fraud charges reads the same: Beginning at a date unknown to the Grand Jury but not later than April 23, 1990 and continuing through October 1990 in the State and Northern District of California and elsewhere ... 5 DeSalvo contends that this language in the indictment indicates that the conduct underlying her conviction was over by the end of October, 1990, one month before the effective date of the 1990 amendments to the VWPA. This is thus the basis for her ex post facto claim. 48 The Government counters by making two assertions: (1) that the word through as used in the indictment means continuing past October, 1990, and (2) that additional language specific to the mail fraud charges indicates that the indictment did contain allegations of conduct continuing past the November 29, 1990 effective date of the VWPA amendment. 49 Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that an indictment be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1). The indictment should be read in its entirety, construed according to common sense, and interpreted to include facts which are necessarily implied. United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574, 584 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 953, 106 S.Ct. 321, 88 L.Ed.2d 304 (1985); United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839, 97 S.Ct. 111, 50 L.Ed.2d 107 (1976). When, as in this case, a defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the indictment until after the verdict, the court will generally review it under a more liberal standard. 6 See United States v. Zavala, 839 F.2d 523, 530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831, 109 S.Ct. 86, 102 L.Ed.2d 62 (1988). 50 The Government's contention that use of the phrase through October, 1990 in the indictment should be interpreted as meaning at least through October, 1990 is plausible, if not readily apparent. The Government supports its interpretation by citing additional language in the indictment charging DeSalvo with mail fraud. Specifically, the indictment alleged that it was a part of the [mail fraud] scheme to cease operations of H.W. Care [HWC] after a sufficient number of 'lost charge audits' drew regulatory scrutiny and to recommence the scheme using fictitious business names. The Government argues that since it is uncontested DeSalvo did recommence business under a different name in 1991, the scheme alleged in the indictment continued past the effective date of the 1990 VWPA amendment, and the amended version of the Act should therefore apply. 51 While the Government's interpretation of the indictment may be reasonable, some courts have expressed particular concern with the sufficiency of an indictment when it alleges the existence of a scheme, and such a scheme is an element of the crime with which a defendant is charged. 7 In the context of a restitution order, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Bennett, 943 F.2d 738 (7th Cir.1991), stated: The scheme concept is by its nature an amorphous one, and may only support an award of restitution if it is defined with specificity. A contrary rule would allow vague allegations of a scheme to support restitution based upon broad, unsubstantiated conduct. Id. at 741; see also United States v. Turino, 978 F.2d 315, 318 (7th Cir.1992) (stating that in order to sentence a defendant to pay restitution, the initial indictment must specifically define the fraud scheme), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2969, 125 L.Ed.2d 668 (1993); United States v. Brothers, 955 F.2d 493, 497 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 142, 121 L.Ed.2d 94 (1992). The Seventh Circuit's restrictive reading of the indictment in restitution sentences stems from the Supreme Court's holding in Hughey v. United States that the conduct underlying the offense of conviction establishes the outer limits of a restitution order. 495 U.S. 411, 420, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 1984, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990). 52 Thus, unless the mail fraud scheme on which DeSalvo was indicted was described in sufficient detail in her indictment, restitution based on that scheme must be restricted. As to the Government's claim that a broader scheme should be implied, the Hughey Court's restrictive interpretation of the VWPA precludes such speculative awards. Bennett, 943 F.2d at 741. 53 Recognizing the special concerns raised by restitution awards in the context of mail fraud, we adopt the Seventh Circuit's approach and read DeSalvo's indictment narrowly. 8 This approach places the burden on the Government, which has control over the drafting of the indictment, to include language sufficient to cover all acts for which it will seek restitution. More importantly, a restrictive reading will prevent the Government from using vague allegations of a scheme to support restitution based upon broad, unsubstantiated conduct. Bennett, 943 F.2d at 741. In the present case, the Government gives no justification for its failure to specifically allege that the scheme on which it was indicting DeSalvo continued into 1991. Nor does it support its contention that the phrasing April 23, 1990 and continuing through October 1990  indicated an intent to cover conduct in 1991, other than by saying that such an interpretation is a plausible one. Adopting the Seventh Circuit's rationale for giving an indictment alleging a scheme a restrictive reading, the Government's interpretation must fail. 54 We therefore interpret DeSalvo's indictment as alleging a scheme ending in October, 1990, before the effective date of the 1990 VWPA amendment. So finding, the District Court should have applied the pre-amendment version of the VWPA, assuming as discussed below, that the amendment effected a substantive change in the law of restitution and thereby subjected DeSalvo to the possibility of a harsher sentence. 55