Opinion ID: 3135612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Question During Deliberations

Text: Averett argues that the jury’s note to the trial court during deliberations unmistakably asked a legal question on an element of the offense. The jury’s question showed confusion on the meaning of intent to deliver. Averett contends he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court’s response to the question failed to address the jury’s confusion on that legal issue. Averett acknowledges that he waived this issue by acquiescing in the trial court’s response to the jury’s question. He contends that reversal is required, however, under the plain-error rule or because his attorney was ineffective in agreeing to the trial court’s answer. The State agrees that Averett waived this issue because he invited any error by acquiescing in the trial court’s answer to the jury’s question. The State further contends Averett’s plain-error and ineffective-assistance claims fail because the trial court’s response was proper and defense counsel cannot be ineffective for agreeing to a proper response by the trial court. When a defendant acquiesces in the trial court’s answer to a question from the jury, the defendant cannot later complain that the trial court’s answer was an abuse of discretion. People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 491-92 (2000). Here, defense counsel and the prosecutor assisted the trial court in drafting its response to the jury’s question. Defense counsel agreed to the trial court’s answer. Thus, Averett waived this issue by acquiescing in the trial court’s response. To establish an ineffective-assistance claim, Averett must show his attorney’s performance was deficient and prejudice resulted from the deficiency. See People v. Bailey, 232 Ill. 2d 285, 288-89 (2009). An attorney’s performance is deficient only if it is objectively -16- unreasonable based on prevailing professional norms. Bailey, 232 Ill. 2d at 289. Averett contends his attorney was deficient in failing to object to the trial court’s response to the jury’s question. Thus, Averett’s claim hinges on showing the trial court’s response was improper. Generally, a trial court must provide instruction when the jury has posed an explicit question or asked for clarification on a point of law arising from facts showing doubt or confusion. People v. Millsap, 189 Ill. 2d 155, 160 (2000), citing People v. Childs, 159 Ill. 2d 217, 22829 (1994). A trial court may, nevertheless, exercise its discretion to decline answering a question from the jury under appropriate circumstances. Millsap, 189 Ill. 2d at 161, citing People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 39 (1990). Appropriate circumstances include when the jury instructions are readily understandable and sufficiently explain the relevant law, when additional instructions would serve no useful purpose or may potentially mislead the jury, when the jury’s request involves a question of fact, or when giving an answer would cause the trial court to express an opinion likely directing a verdict one way or the other. Millsap, 189 Ill. 2d at 161, citing Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39-40. In this case, the jury’s note stated, “Clarify the charges of intent to sell defined by the Court?” The note indicates that the jury explicitly sought clarification of the charges. The jury did not ask for a definition of “intent.” We find that the jury’s question was clearly in reference to clarifying the charges in this case. As noted, a trial court may exercise its discretion to decline answering a question if the jury instructions are readily understandable and explain the relevant law. Millsap, 189 Ill. 2d at 161, citing Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39-40. The jury had already received explicit instructions on the definition and elements of the charged offense. The trial court apparently determined that the written instructions answered the jury’s question on clarifying the charges. The trial court, therefore, directed the jury to review the jury instructions. We agree that the jury instructions were readily understandable and explained the charged offense. The trial court’s reference to those instructions should have been sufficient to clarify the issue for the jury. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in answering the jury’s question. Averett cannot show defense counsel was objectively -17- unreasonable by failing to object to the trial court’s proper response to the jury’s question. See Bailey, 232 Ill. 2d at 288-89 (2009) (ineffective-assistance claim requires a showing that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable). Accordingly, Averett has not established his ineffective-assistance claim in this case.