Opinion ID: 2341473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Double Jeopardy Was Raised.

Text: Rofkar, in his opening brief to the court of appeals, clearly raised the issue of whether his double jeopardy rights were violated. He argued that the test for determining multiplicity that was first expressed by this court in Whitton v. State required merger of the maintaining count with the other previously merged counts. [5] Rofkar also discussed at some length federal authority on double jeopardy. Despite this argument the court of appeals declined to consider the merits of Rofkar's double jeopardy claim. After setting out a portion of the Whitton test the court stated: We previously applied this test in Davis v. State to determine whether the double jeopardy clause prohibits separate convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and maintaining a dwelling for keeping or distributing cocaine. We concluded that these offenses differ markedly in the conduct that they prohibit and in the specific social interests that they seek to preserve. We therefore held that the entry of separate convictions did not violate the defendant's protection against double jeopardy. In his reply brief, Rofkar asserts that the Davis case is in error. But we are bound to follow a prior decision unless we are clearly convinced that the precedent is erroneous or no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from overturning the case. Because of the way that this issue has been raised, the parties have not had the opportunity to argue whether the Davis case should be overruled. We conclude that Rofkar has failed to make the argument necessary for us to overrule this precedent.[ [6] ] In our view, when an appellant adequately raises an issue in an opening brief, the fact that the appellant does not argue that important authority must be overruled, or distinguished, until a reply brief does not justify refusing to consider the issue on its merits. Instead, the court may sua sponte, or on motion of the appellee, grant an opportunity for supplemental briefing. Here Rofkar's failure to discuss the Davis case in his initial brief was poor advocacy, but it did not waive his double jeopardy claim. [7]