Opinion ID: 2067575
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Aggravation-Mitigation Phase

Text: Defendant next contends that the post-conviction judge's ruling that defendant was afforded effective assistance of counsel during the aggravation-mitigation portion of his capital sentencing hearing was manifestly erroneous. Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective at the sentencing phase of his trial because counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence of defendant's medical background, specifically, his organic brain damage. According to defendant, had Levin performed even the most minimal investigation, he would have learned of defendant's life-long brain damage, history of seizures, and other neurological impairments from medical records, school records, and defendant's criminal file. In addition, defendant's friends and family could have provided Levin with vivid recollections of defendant's medical problems since childhood. Defendant further asserts that counsel was ineffective because counsel also failed to introduce evidence of defendant's abused and deprived childhood. In finding that defense counsel's performance during defendant's capital sentencing hearing was not deficient, the post-conviction judge found that Levin did an adequate job based upon the information he had, which consisted of knowledge of a prior mental condition. The judge also found that there was nothing in the record to indicate that counsel should have investigated further or presented any other evidence in relation to defendant's possible brain damage. The conclusion of the post-conviction judge that counsel had no notice of this potential mitigating evidence, and that, even if counsel had such notice, counsel had no reason to conduct an investigation, is contrary to both this court's well-established precedent and to the facts presented in this case. We hold that the post-conviction judge's finding that defense counsel satisfied the performance prong of Strickland is manifestly erroneous. This court has repeatedly observed that [m]itigating evidence is extremely important under the Illinois capital sentencing scheme. Once an aggravating factor is found sufficient to impose the death penalty, there must be mitigating evidence sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. People v. Perez, 148 Ill.2d 168, 194, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984 (1992). Because of the critical importance of mitigating evidence, it is well established that defense counsel has a duty to make a reasonable investigation for mitigation evidence to present at the capital sentencing hearing, or must have a sound reason for failing to make a particular investigation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695; Towns, 182 Ill.2d at 510, 231 Ill.Dec. 557, 696 N.E.2d 1128; Orange, 168 Ill.2d at 170, 213 Ill.Dec. 589, 659 N.E.2d 935. Therefore, if mitigating evidence exits, counsel then has a duty to introduce it in support of defendant. Towns, 182 Ill.2d at 510, 231 Ill.Dec. 557, 696 N.E.2d 1128; see also Griffin, 178 Ill.2d at 86, 227 Ill.Dec. 338, 687 N.E.2d 820; Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 369 (7th Cir.1989). The record in this matter establishes that defense counsel violated his affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable investigation into potential sources of mitigation evidence in connection with defendant's medical condition. Counsel's failure in this regard is magnified by the fact that, contrary to the determination of the post-conviction judge, the record is replete with evidence that defense counsel was on notice of defendant's history of mental health problems. During the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, defendant's sister, Ruby Roberts, testified that Levin was hired by defendant's mother the same day defendant was arrested, and that the first time Levin was informed of defendant's seizures and related medical problems was shortly after his hiring. According to Roberts, Levin assured her mother that he would get on it right away. Roberts further testified that she and her mother reminded Levin of defendant's seizures and his need for medical treatment in prison, and that Levin responded that he was on top of it. Roberts' testimony that Levin was aware of defendant's medical problems from virtually the beginning of the case is corroborated by Levin's actions during the sentencing phase of defendant's capital trial. During his opening statement at the aggravation-mitigation stage of the sentencing hearing, Levin told the court he would present evidence regarding medical testimony as to the problems medically that the defendant has had and still suffers from. During the sentencing hearing, Levin also stipulated to the admission into evidence of a 1978 presentence investigation report which noted that defendant suffered continuing seizures after receiving a blow to the head at age eight. Additional evidence that Levin was on notice of defendant's condition is found in Levin's questioning of defendant's mother, Josephine Rogers, during the mitigation phase of the trial. Levin asked Rogers whether defendant had been hurt as a youngster and if defendant sometimes do[es] things that he is not responsible for when he fails to receive medical care or medication. Levin also asked Rogers: Since eight years old until today's date, has [defendant] had problems as a result of the spot on his brain? Finally, Levin inquired of defendant's mother if she was aware that unless [defendant] takes his medication defendant has problems functioning. Levin's knowledge of defendant's medical condition is further confirmed by his statement to the judge during the sentencing hearing after the judge denied counsel a continuance to call other witnesses. Levin conveyed to the judge that defendant wanted the judge to know that defendant was receiving medication and had prior instances involving a spot on the brain which was supposed to have been traceable to an injury which occurred when he was eight years old. The evidence adduced during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing further reveals that despite being aware of defendant's mental condition and brain damage, defense counsel failed to conduct an investigation into this relevant potential mitigation evidence. Several of the affidavits submitted by defendant in support of his petition contain statements by the affiants that they were never contacted by defense counsel during trial, and that they would have been willing to provide information and testify in defendant's behalf if asked to do so. Further, the testimony of Ruby Roberts during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing indicates that defense counsel never inquired of her or her mother regarding potential mitigation evidence or witnesses. Importantly, during his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, Levin stated that he could not independently recall defendant's case, and, because the case file was missing, he could not testify as to whether he interviewed witnesses or reviewed any documents in connection with defendant's brain damage. The record additionally reveals that defense counsel failed to inquire about defendant's family history. The evidence presented during the post-conviction proceedings revealed defendant's abused and violent childhood, and showed that defendant's attorney failed to contact numerous individuals familiar with defendant's background who were willing to testify on defendant's behalf at sentencing. The State contends that Levin's representation of defendant did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. The State relies upon Levin's testimony during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that his conversations and contacts with defendant led him to believe that investigation into defendant's mental state was unwarranted. We find that the State's argument lacks merit. As stated, the record clearly establishes that defense counsel was on notice that defendant suffered from medical problems involving his brain damage and mental deficiency. Furthermore, Levin's testimony at the evidentiary hearing was contradictory on its face: after repeatedly stating that he had no independent recollection of defendant's case and no case file, Levin then testified in detail concerning various interactions with defendant during his period of representation. For example, after testifying that he had no recollection of defendant or his case, Levin stated that defendant was able to converse with Levin without difficulty, and that during their course of dealings, defendant never blanked out, lost his train of thought, mumbled, appeared impulsive or angry, or suffered seizures. The State also argues that defense counsel cannot be faulted in failing to further investigate defendant's mother's vague assertions regarding her son's past seizure activity, because such vague and general evidence would not have necessarily suggested to Levin, a layman with no evidence of medical training, that he should delve more deeply into defendant's mental health history. We have repeatedly held that the duty to make a reasonable investigation concerning potential mitigation evidence is imposed on counsel and not upon a defendant. Towns, 182 Ill.2d at 511, 231 Ill.Dec. 557, 696 N.E.2d 1128; Perez, 148 Ill.2d at 193, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984. Moreover, we have also held that defense counsel's duty to investigate is not limited to matters about which defendant has informed defense counsel. Towns, 182 Ill.2d at 511, 231 Ill.Dec. 557, 696 N.E.2d 1128. We therefore reject the State's implication, under the facts of this case, that defense counsel's duty to investigate potential mitigation evidence is somehow lessened by the lack of the specificity of information conveyed by members of defendant's family. The State further contends that because Levin was faced with a lack of mitigation evidence, he adopted a strategy of pleading for the judge's mercy at the sentencing hearing. According to the State, Levin's strategic choice did not amount to incompetence. The State's argument is without merit. We are mindful that great deference is accorded to a trial counsel's strategic decisions regarding the presentation of mitigating evidence. People v. Steidl, 177 Ill.2d 239, 257, 226 Ill. Dec. 592, 685 N.E.2d 1335 (1997); Orange, 168 Ill.2d at 170, 213 Ill.Dec. 589, 659 N.E.2d 935. It is well established, however, that such deference is not warranted where, as in the instant matter, the lack of mitigation evidence stems from counsel's failure to properly investigate and prepare a defense. Towns, 182 Ill.2d at 514, 231 Ill.Dec. 557, 696 N.E.2d 1128; Steidl, 177 Ill.2d at 257, 226 Ill.Dec. 592, 685 N.E.2d 1335; Orange, 168 Ill.2d at 170, 213 Ill. Dec. 589, 659 N.E.2d 935. There can be no legitimate strategy where counsel has failed to make any investigation into mitigating circumstances. People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill.2d 368, 385, 226 Ill.Dec. 791, 686 N.E.2d 574 (1997); People v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509, 535-36, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919 (1995); see also Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 749-50 (7th Cir.1997); Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1367 (11th Cir.1995); Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1514 (11th Cir.1995). The evidence shows that counsel totally failed to investigate or present evidence of defendant's medical history or social background from readily available sources. Therefore, we hold that counsel's failure to investigate was not a strategic choice among available options. This court has previously held that defense counsel's failure to investigate and present evidence of a defendant's mental health, neuropsychological difficulties, and social background constituted deficient performance which satisfies the first prong of Strickland. In People v. Perez, 148 Ill.2d 168, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984 (1992), this court determined that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the defendant's capital sentencing hearing in failing to investigate and present evidence of the defendant's mental history and background. Evidence adduced during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing established that at the time of the defendant's sentencing hearing, defense counsel had in his possession the defendant's school records, which revealed that the defendant was mentally deficient and had been placed in special classes for the mentally handicapped. Defense counsel, however, failed to present this evidence to the sentencing jury. This court concluded that the defense attorney was unaware of the contents of the school reports at the time of the sentencing hearing due to his lack of diligence, which consequently prevented counsel from investigating and presenting important mitigating evidence contained in the records. Perez, 148 Ill.2d at 189, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984. In Perez, this court noted that although counsel stated that he had been provided no information about the defendant to investigate, defendant's school records contained family information such as the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the defendant's relatives, as well as the names of the defendant's schools, his teachers' initials, and the names of the qualified school psychologists who prepared the reports. In finding that the actions of defense counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, this court concluded that counsel's failure to investigate was the result of ignorance of the family information contained in the various records he possessed. Perez, 148 Ill.2d at 192, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984. Levin's total failure to conduct any investigation in the case at bar falls below even the minimal efforts of defense counsel found to be deficient in Perez. Defense counsel in Perez had obtained Perez's school records. Levin obtained no records or documents concerning defendant's medical history or social background, and conducted no investigation of potential mitigation evidence, even though he was patently aware of the severe medical problems involving defendant's brain and defendant's mental limitations. Levin's failure to conduct an investigation into potential mitigation evidence is magnified by the fact that defendant's mother and sister were almost always present in the courtroom, and were willing and able to assist. Similarly, in People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill.2d 368, 226 Ill.Dec. 791, 686 N.E.2d 574 (1997), this court found defense counsel's performance during the defendant's capital sentencing hearing to be below minimal professional standards. In Ruiz, evidence introduced during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing showed that defense counsel never inquired into the defendant's family background, school records, drug and alcohol usage, or about individuals who might have been able to supply information about him. Also, an evaluation by a clinical psychologist revealed that the defendant had cognitive dysfunction, dysfunction in the left central hemisphere of the brain, diffuse misfunction of the frontal lobe, and several other problems peppered throughout the brain. The expert in the Ruiz case testified that the defendant's neuropsychological dysfunctions could have contributed to his participation in a violent triple murder. We determined in Ruiz that counsel's failure to investigate and present this mitigation evidence was attributable to neglect rather than strategy. Ruiz, 177 Ill.2d at 385-86, 226 Ill.Dec. 791, 686 N.E.2d 574. Defense counsel in Ruiz showed the same deficiencies demonstrated by Levin in the instant matter. In both cases, defense counsel failed to undertake any meaningful investigation of defendant's background and character, did not obtain the assistance of anyone to investigate potential mitigation issues, failed to introduce documentary evidence in mitigation such as school or medical records, and did not obtain evaluations by experts to analyze and interpret potential mitigating evidence. We conclude that Levin's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence, which would have readily been revealed by a thorough investigation of defendant's medical history and social background, constituted representation which fell below objective standards of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Therefore, defendant has satisfied the first prong of Strickland. We now determine whether the second prong of the Strickland analysis is met, that is, whether Levin's deficient performance so prejudiced defendant as to deny him a fair sentencing hearing. We conclude that it did. Assessing the potential prejudice of an asserted deficiency in counsel's performance at a capital sentencing hearing requires that we examine the effect of counsel's conduct upon the sentencer's decision. Tenner, 175 Ill.2d at 384, 222 Ill. Dec. 325, 677 N.E.2d 859; People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill.2d 472, 490-91, 215 Ill.Dec. 59, 662 N.E.2d 1199 (1996). The relevant question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer    would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. Moreover, we must assess prejudice in a realistic manner based on the totality of the evidence. Accordingly, it is improper to focus solely on the potential mitigating evidence. As our cases illustrate, the nature and extent of the evidence in aggravation must also be considered. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d at 538, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919. Defendant contends that Levin's failure to investigate defendant's organic brain damage and social background prejudiced him at sentencing, because there is a reasonable probability that presentation of this evidence in mitigation would have avoided a sentence of death. Defendant contends that prejudice is particularly apparent in the instant matter, where the absent mitigating evidence helps explain not only the aggravating evidence presented by the State at defendant's capital sentencing hearing, but also defendant's actions at the time of the homicides. We agree. A review of the comments made by the trial court judge at the time defendant's death sentence was imposed reveals that the judge was clearly influenced in his sentencing decision by the lack of evidence in mitigation. In sentencing defendant to death, the trial court judge stated that he had considered defendant's background, which was one of all criminal conduct. The judge explicitly stated that the only mitigation evidence presented on defendant's behalf was Rosemary Thomas' testimony that she lived with defendant for many years and that he treated her and the children well. Because Levin had failed to investigate and present readily available mitigation evidence, the judge was unaware not only of defendant's severe life-long brain damage and neurological impairments, but also of defendant's abused childhood. This evidence would have provided the court with a portrait of defendant that may have influenced the choice of sentence. Concerning the circumstances of the crime, the judge commented that there wasn't any rhyme, there wasn't any reason to the senseless killings. We determine that there is a reasonable probability that Levin's failure to present any evidence of defendant's brain damage, seizures and neurological impairments deprived the judge of the rhyme and reason for which he was searching to explain defendant's behavior in this crime. Finally, the trial court judge noted that although imposing the death penalty was very distasteful, he nevertheless had a job to do. Under the Illinois death penalty statute, if no sufficient mitigation factors are found, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/9-1(h) (West 1994). In the case at bar, because no evidence was presented in mitigation, the trial court judge believed he was required to impose the death sentence. We cannot say that the absent mitigation evidence could not have altered the judge's decision that there was no evidence that militated against imposition of the death sentence. The comments of the sentencing judge reveal a nexus between his imposition of the death penalty and defense counsel's failure to present any mitigating evidence other than two unprepared family character witnesses, whose testimony accounted for only 10 pages of trial transcript. The State nevertheless contends that the record establishes that defendant was not prejudiced by any actions on the part of Levin. Initially, the State discounts the significance of the evidence concerning defendant's brain damage on the basis that defendant's medical experts did not find him to be significantly below average intelligence. However, defendant's experts stated that a person can have a relatively normal IQ, yet still suffer damage to the frontal lobes of the brain. We note that during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the State introduced no expert testimony to refute the conclusions of defendant's experts. The State argues that counsel's failure to present evidence of defendant's brain damage did not prejudice defendant, because much of the mitigating evidence that counsel might have introduced could have been characterized or viewed as evidence in aggravation. This court has held that evidence concerning a defendant's mental or psychological impairment is not inherently mitigating. Sanchez, 169 Ill.2d at 491-92, 215 Ill.Dec. 59, 662 N.E.2d 1199. The State argues that the evidence introduced concerning defendant's alleged brain damage during the post-conviction proceedings was replete with factors in aggravation. The State points to Dr. Pincus' conclusion in his affidavit that defendant's brain damage resulted in aggressive and violent behavior, and that defendant's aggressive impulses have been engendered by abuse. The State cites to Dr. Rybicki's affidavit, wherein he noted that the manner in which defendant responded to certain neurological testing has been known to correlate with hostile impulses and emotional outbursts. The State also relies upon Dr. Rybicki's statement during the evidentiary hearing that defendant's exposure to violence taught him that violence is sometimes an acceptable solution to problems. The State additionally notes that the affidavits submitted by defendant's family and friends include aggravating information. For example, one affiant stated that he saw defendant become violent for no reason at all, and another stated that [o]ne time when you would see [defendant] he would be fine and the next time hostile and paranoic. The State contends that this evidence is even more aggravating when viewed in light of defendant's criminal history and the heinous and brutal manner in which the homicides of Merkson and Motley were conducted. The State additionally argues that because the aggravation evidence in the cause at bar was overwhelming, it cannot be said that but for counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence, the judge would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors did not warrant the death penalty. Under Illinois' death penalty statute, the finder of fact is required to weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence, and to determine whether there are mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g), (h) (West 1994). Previous decisions demonstrate that the presence of aggravating evidence does not foreclose the conclusion that a defendant was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to investigate and present available mitigating evidence. E.g., Ruiz, 177 Ill.2d at 379-80, 226 Ill.Dec. 791, 686 N.E.2d 574 (defendant, a gang member and drug user, shot someone other than the three murder victims, and fired a rifle into a crowded parking lot); People v. Caballero, 126 Ill.2d 248, 279, 128 Ill.Dec. 1, 533 N.E.2d 1089 (1989) (defendant was convicted of three brutal murders, had a past conviction for possession of a gun, and showed no remorse); Hall, 106 F.3d at 748 (sentencing judge commented that he was [f]aced with `all the aggravating factors    stacked against the defendant'); Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898, 907 (7th Cir.1996) (defendant had a continuous record of truancy and criminality from early youth). We agree with the State that the heinous nature of the multiple murders for which defendant was convicted is an aggravating factor. Nevertheless, we conclude that the evidence regarding defendant's severe organic brain damage may have provided the court with knowledge of defendant which would have influenced the sentence imposed. This court has previously acknowledged the critical importance of evidence of a capital defendant's mental or emotional problems. Ruiz, 177 Ill.2d at 388, 226 Ill.Dec. 791, 686 N.E.2d 574. To this end, this court has held that the resulting prejudice to defendant is clear when counsel fails to investigate a defendant's mental history and background ( Perez, 148 Ill.2d at 194-95, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984), especially where a great deal of mitigating evidence existed which counsel failed to investigate and introduce ( Ruiz, 177 Ill.2d at 387, 226 Ill.Dec. 791, 686 N.E.2d 574). The prejudice suffered due to defense counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence is magnified where, as in the instant matter, the record indicates that the sentencing judge was clearly influenced by the failure to present evidence in mitigation on defendant's behalf. During the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Dr. Pincus testified that, based upon his personal examination of defendant, his review of defendant's medical and school records, and his study of defendant's social history, defendant has had severe organic brain damage since infancy. Dr. Pincus testified that defendant suffers from severe bilateral dysfunction of the frontal lobes of the brain, as well as from more diffused damage to other portions of his brain. Dr. Pincus testified that as a result of frontal lobe damage, a person has extremely poor judgment, suffers changes in personality and behavior, and cannot understand the consequence of his actions. Importantly, Dr. Pincus testified that the physical damage to defendant's frontal lobes causes defendant to be short tempered and unable to check his impulses, and that there is a direct connection between the damage to defendant's brain and the conduct described as part of the State's case in aggravation during the death penalty hearing. For example, in connection with defendant's battery of Joseph Smoot, Dr. Pincus testified that defendant's brain damage caused defendant to have a paranoid thought concerning Smoot, and because of the damage to his brain, defendant was unable to check his impulsive, irrational behavior. Significantly, Dr. Pincus also testified that defendant's brain damage was the determining factor in his behavior at the time of the murders of Motley and Merkson. Dr. Pincus testified that the manner in which the offenses were carried out was characteristic of defendant's frontal lobe damage, revealing stimulus-bound behavior and excessive paranoia. Dr. Pincus stated that, because of the damage to defendant's brain, defendant misinterpreted Motley's telephone calls as posing a danger, even though Motley was defendant's long-time friend and did nothing threatening concerning defendant. Dr. Pincus testified that, when Motley commented in connection with defendant's instruction to Gregson to dance without her clothes, because of defendant's brain damage, he over responded to that comment and shot Motley. The effect of defendant's brain damage was also evident in what Dr. Pincus described as defendant's absurd cleaning up of Motley's body by attempting to fit it into a dresser drawer. Dr. Pincus also testified that defendant's stimulus-bound behavior caused defendant to shoot Merkson when Merkson refused to stop joking. In addition, Dr. Pincus testified that defendant's brain damage affected his actions in connection with Gregson, as there was no clear purpose in placing her in the bathroom, taking her to the motel, and chasing the motel attendant. Dr. Pincus concluded that defendant would not have conducted himself the way he did at the time of the offenses had the frontal lobes of his brain not been damaged. Dr. Rybicki also diagnosed defendant with extreme impairments to the frontal lobes of his brain, and testified that these impairments were caused by encephalitis at the age of 20 months. Dr. Rybicki testified that defendant's physical brain damage is so severe that 98% of the general population has a brain which is more intact than defendant's. According to Dr. Rybicki, defendant's brain damage causes him to suffer from paranoid ideation, which impairs his social judgment and his ability to think in logical sequences. Dr. Rybicki testified that because of his brain damage, at the time of the offenses defendant's paranoia caused him to misconstrue the actions of Motley and Merkson and to react in an irrational manner. We find that the testimony of Dr. Pincus and Dr. Rybicki concerning defendant's severe organic brain damage explains defendant's violent conduct as related in the State's case in aggravation, as well as defendant's conduct at the time of the homicides. Both experts testified that there was a definite link between the physical damage to defendant's brain and defendant's criminal conduct. The State adduced no expert medical testimony during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. In the absence of any countervailing evidence from the State, the conclusions of defendant's experts stand unrefuted. We determine that there is a reasonable probability that the impact of the aggravating evidence presented by the State could have been diminished by evidence of the effect upon defendant's conduct caused by defendant's brain deficits and impairment. In addition, evidence of a defendant's background, including family history, parental abuse, and neglect is important to the sentencing decision and can be an influential mitigating factor. Towns, 182 Ill.2d at 519, 231 Ill.Dec. 557, 696 N.E.2d 1128; Ruiz, 177 Ill.2d at 388, 226 Ill.Dec. 791, 686 N.E.2d 574; Coleman, 168 Ill.2d at 537, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919; Perez, 148 Ill.2d at 194-95, 170 Ill. Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984. In the case at bar, the evidence of defendant's abused upbringing, testified to in great detail by Ruby Roberts, would have provided the trial court judge with a better knowledge and understanding of defendant's conduct. Further, defendant may have been prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to present medical evidence relating to defendant's brain damage, as counsel indicated he would do at the time he presented his opening argument at the aggravation-mitigation phase of the sentencing proceedings. The record reveals that the only testimony during the entire trial referring to defendant's severe brain impairment was the comment made by defendant's mother that defendant has a spot on his brains and that if he does not take his medication, he has these seizures, and he's a complete blank    he don't know what he's doing. Counsel's closing argument at the aggravation-mitigation phase of the sentencing proceedings compounded the prejudice. Counsel's argument consisted of irrelevant and incoherent religious references and nonsensical pleas, with no effort to focus on any mitigating evidence. For example, counsel began by stating: If human beings, such as yourself, feel it appropriate to rectify the wrong and [mete] out a punishment, which is an eventuality of punishment, which is meted out by somebody else who is far more knowledgeable than you or I, who is the person who decides. The giver of life then-then I would suggest that this court has taken a step towards immortality which should not be done. Apparently responding to the State's assertion in its closing argument that the defense had failed to present any evidence in mitigation on defendant's behalf, Levin argued that when somebody has suggested that there is no mitigation, there is no right, that there is no love, they're wrong. Mothers love their children. Wives love their husbands. Fathers love their children. But love is espoused by somebody much bigger than somebody who is not here today. In what appears to be an attempt to explain the lack of mitigation evidence presented on behalf of defendant, Levin concluded that [m]itigation many times is not something that can be directly spelled out by the mouth, by the words. Mitigation is not something which individuals come before this Court and say, I apologize, I forgive, I have sinned. Mitigation is the process of individuals. Mitigation is the love that is shown by individuals. Mitigation, in fact, Judge, is the being of human beings. At no point in his closing argument at the aggravation-mitigation stage of the proceedings did counsel mention the severe physical damage to defendant's brain or the impact that damage had upon defendant's behavior. Had counsel fulfilled his duty to investigate the wealth of mitigation evidence available in this case, he would have discovered the severe extent of defendant's brain damage and the profound effect that damage had on defendant's ability to control his conduct. Defense counsel would also have discovered the extent of the abuse defendant suffered throughout his childhood, as well as defendant's learning disabilities. Counsel's failure to investigate mitigation evidence, coupled with counsel's nonsensical closing argument, left the court with a prejudicial imbalance in the court's determination that there were no factors in mitigation to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. We note that, in previous decisions, this court has addressed post-conviction claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at the capital sentencing hearing, and has held that, despite the violent nature of the offenses and the fact that the defendants had been convicted of multiple murders, the failure of defense counsel to present and investigate mitigating evidence so prejudiced the defendants as to warrant vacating their death sentences and ordering new sentencing hearings. We find those cases to be instructive here. See Ruiz, 177 Ill.2d at 388-89, 226 Ill.Dec. 791, 686 N.E.2d 574; Perez, 148 Ill.2d at 195-96, 170 Ill.Dec. 304, 592 N.E.2d 984. The ultimate focus of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be upon the fundamental fairness of the proceedings challenged. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699. The court must scrutinize and remain vigilant in determining whether the proceedings are unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699. We conclude that such a breakdown occurred in this case, and that the errors of defense counsel during the aggravation-mitigation phase of the sentencing proceedings raise a serious doubt as to the propriety of defendant's sentence. We therefore affirm defendant's convictions but vacate his death sentence and remand this cause to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing. As a consequence, we find it unnecessary to address the remainder of defendant's claims. Convictions affirmed; death sentence vacated; cause remanded.