Opinion ID: 2595540
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Canto's drug dealing and third party culpability

Text: Before trial the prosecution moved in limine to exclude 23 items of evidence proffered by defendant, which included, inter alia, two separate but related areas of evidence of Canto's drug dealing: (1) circumstantial evidence of Canto's alleged drug-related activities as witnessed by his neighbors and family; and evidence of alleged drug-related items found in his home and in his possession at the time of his murder in Chicago in 1995; and (2) the statements of Melvin Walford and Cleveland James attesting to their involvement in Canto's drug dealing business and the details surrounding Canto's murder. Defendant had sought to introduce this evidence to challenge Canto's credibility by establishing Canto's status as a drug dealer, and to support his theory of third party culpability in the murders of Allen and her fetus. The court excluded all of this proffered evidence. Defendant now claims that in doing so, the court abused its discretion and violated various of his constitutional rights. We conclude that the court abused its discretion in excluding some of the evidence but find no prejudice. The principles governing the admission of evidence are well settled. Only relevant evidence is admissible (Evid.Code, §§ 210, 350), and all relevant evidence is admissible unless excluded under the federal or state Constitutions or by statute. (Evid.Code, § 351; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d).) ( People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 973, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53.) The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends `logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference' to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive. ( People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 177, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664.) In determining the credibility of a witness, the jury may consider any matter that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing, including but not limited to: a witness's character for honesty or veracity or their opposites; the existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive; his attitude toward the action in which he testifies or toward the giving of testimony; and his admission of untruthfulness. (Evid.Code, § 780.) Past criminal conduct involving moral turpitude that has some logical bearing on the veracity of a witness in a criminal proceeding is admissible to impeach, subject to the court's discretion under Evidence Code section 352. (See People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 295-296, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938.) Possession of drugs for sale, which involves the intent to corrupt others, is conduct involving moral turpitude. ( People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 317, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111.) The trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence. (See People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 132, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence. ( People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 972, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53; People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897.) The proffered circumstantial evidence of Canto's alleged drug dealing included the following: Canto's ex-wife would have testified that she was married to Canto for 10 years and that the marriage ended nearly two years before his death, that he never held a regular job, had a lot of money, and traveled extensively, and she was of the opinion that he was a drug dealer; neighbors would have testified to a large amount of foot traffic at Canto's house at all hours of the day and night; Canto's coworker would have testified that he accompanied Canto when Canto drove to two homes and went inside for a short period of time, from which the coworker assumed Canto was delivering drugs; the coworker also would have testified he saw Canto carrying a concealed weapon and heard him admit to having shot some Bloods in Chicago; and police officers would have testified that the search of Canto's house following the murders revealed three bulletproof vests and a large amount of ammunition. [5] The proffered statements of Walford and James, then awaiting trial in Chicago for Canto's murder, would have included contentions that they had been employed by Canto for several years to transport large quantities of cocaine between Los Angeles and Chicago, and that they shot and stabbed Canto, causing his death, after a disagreement during a drug deal in November 1995. The trial court considered the admissibility of all of this evidence in a lengthy pretrial hearing on the motion in limine, and revisited the admissibility of the statements of Walford and James at the end of the prosecution's case-in-chief and again during defendant's case. When first considering the admissibility of the circumstantial evidence during the hearing on the motion, the court recognized that it knew very little about the case to come; indeed, it did not know of defendant's contention that he and Canto were dealing drugs, or of the statements of Walford and James and details of Canto's murder during the drug deal in Chicago. The court ruled the circumstantial evidence irrelevant, and stated clearly in the guilt phase the court sees no relevance of the defense's desire to see Mr. Canto as a narcotic dealer and to suggest that somebody else killed him or somebody else tried to kill him [and Allen] other than the defendant. [¶] That is far from being relevant third party culpability evidence. It simply seeks to cast doubt upon Mr. Canto and to, I assume, imply to the jury that others may have had reasons to want a drug dealer dead, all of which is absolutely speculative. The court also stated, if, however, the defendant testifies that these matters become relevant based upon his testimony or any other defense witness, we will revisit the issue. Later, during the hearing on the motion, the court learned of and considered the admissibility of the proffered statements of Walford and James. The court concluded this did provide more substantial evidence of Canto's drug dealing and therefore did have a bearing on Canto's credibility, but the statements were hearsay, inadmissible as third party culpability evidence, substantially more prejudicial than probative, and therefore inadmissible. During trial the court reconsidered the admissibility of the statements of Walford and James regarding Canto's murder. Defendant made an offer of proof that he would testify to his and Canto's drug dealing business and the details of the drug deal of the night of the murders on August 9, 1994, and argued the statements of Walford and James were relevant to challenge Canto's credibility and support defendant's contention that Canto was a drug dealer, as would the contention that Canto carried a gun and was believed by his coworkers to be a drug dealer. The court issued a written ruling, again finding the evidence of Canto's murder irrelevant, and the statements of Walford and James to be hearsay and substantially prejudicial and to be excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, and inadmissible as third party culpability evidence pursuant to People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99. We conclude that defendant's offer of proof that he would testify about Canto's drug dealing provided the foundation for the relevancy of the circumstantial evidence that had been missing when the court initially ruled on its admissibility. The circumstantial evidence suggesting Canto was a drug dealer was no longer speculative and was relevant and admissible to challenge Canto's credibility. (See People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 295-296, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938.) The court should have admitted the circumstantial evidence at this point. However, the jury heard substantial other evidence challenging Canto's credibility: police officers testified that they found several boxes each of plastic wrap and fabric softener in Canto's house on West Marine Avenue, items often used to disguise distinctive odors in the packaging and transportation of large amounts of marijuana; Canto lied to the Gardena police when he said he did not know who shot him; he gave a false name on the rental application for the house on West Marine Avenue; he lied to the Chicago police before he died; he admitted he harbored bias and animosity toward defendant and wanted to take care of business and kill defendant himself; and defendant himself testified in detail to Canto's involvement in drug dealing. The exclusion of the circumstantial evidence of Canto's drug dealing did not keep the jury from learning facts from which it could assess Canto's character and credibility. No prejudice resulted from the court's decision to exclude the circumstantial evidence of Canto's drug dealing. We find no error in excluding the statements of Walford and James. To be admissible, the third party evidence need not show `substantial proof of a probability' that the third person committed the act; it need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. At the same time, we do not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to show a third party's possible culpability. As this court observed in [ People v. ] Mendez [(1924) 193 Cal. 39, 223 P. 65], evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime. ( People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99.) [C]ourts should simply treat third-party culpability evidence like any other evidence: if relevant it is admissible ([Evid.Code,] § 350) unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion (§ 352). ( People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99.) Evidence regarding Canto's murder in Chicago would not raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant's culpability for the murder of Allen and her fetus. The prosecution established that defendant shot Canto, that defendant was in the house when Allen and her fetus were murdered, and that the same gun was used to shoot Canto and Allen. Defendant himself testified that he was dealing drugs with Canto and was in Canto's house when Allen was murdered. Neither party presented evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which placed Walford or James in Canto's house at any time. The fact that Canto was involved in drug dealing and was himself subsequently murdered by Walford and James in Chicago in November 1995, in the course of drug dealing, neither demonstrated that Walford or James was involved in the killings in Canto's house in August 1994, nor disproved the prosecution's theory that it was defendant who shot Allen. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these statements.