Opinion ID: 2582746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Litigation Privilege Protects the Communicative Act of Filing a Declaration of Service, the Gravamen of the Abuse of Process Claim in This Case.

Text: Rusheen argues that the Courts of Appeal in Drum and in this case correctly determined that the wrongful act of levying on property in execution of judgment is a noncommunicative act in its essential nature and is thus unprivileged. However, even if levying on property involves a noncommunicative physical act, those courts failed to address the relevant question of whether the gravamen of the action was communicative or noncommunicative conduct. [3] Drum assumed without analysis that the gravamen of the judgment debtor's cause of action for abuse of process was based on the physical act of levying on property, rather than on the communicative process of applying for the writ of execution. But it is arguable that the gravamen of the action there was the judgment creditor's application for writ of execution in violation of the court-ordered stay, and that the subsequent levy on property during the stay merely resulted from the writ of execution. (Cf. Olszewski v. Scripps Health (2003) 30 Cal.4th 798, 831, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 69 P.3d 927 [defendant's filing of statutory liens resulting in allegedly unlawful seizure of funds was communicative conduct protected by litigation privilege]; Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 355, 357, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244 ( Hagberg ) [citizen reports of suspected criminal activity to law enforcement resulting in alleged false arrest and imprisonment of another was communicative conduct protected by litigation privilege].) Similarly, the Court of Appeal here concluded that the filing of a perjured proof of service may have been communicative but executing on the resulting default judgment was not. It further concluded that the gravamen of the action was a conspiracy to enforce a judgment obtained through the use of perjured declarations of service, which culminated in the noncommunicative conduct of enforcing the judgment. It thus appears that the Court of Appeal identified two, rather than a single, gravamen of the action: (1) the alleged conspiracy; and (2) the actual enforcement by way of levy. However, as Cohen points out, the Court of Appeal's reliance on an alleged conspiracy was misplaced. The second amended cross-complaint (the operative pleading here) no longer contained a claim of conspiracy against Cohen. The conspiracy cause of action had been previously dismissed without leave to amend the first amended cross-complaint. Additionally, a civil conspiracy does not give rise to a cause of action unless an independent civil wrong has been committed. The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are (1) formation and operation of the conspiracy and (2) damage resulting to plaintiff (3) from a wrongful act done in furtherance of the common design. ( Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 39, 44, 260 Cal.Rptr. 183, 775 P.2d 508.) The Court of Appeal failed to identify any allegedly wrongful conduct by Cohen other than simply filing perjured declarations of service. Although the court stated that the conspiracy culminated in the noncommunicative conduct of enforcing the judgment, enforcement of a judgment (in this case by way of levy) is simply the object of any civil action for damages. ( Brown, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 49, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 891 [enforcement proceedings are an extension of the judicial process and related to a litigation objective].) Indeed, the court further stated (somewhat inconsistently) that the gravamen of the complaint here is that . . . Cohen and his coconspirators obtained a judgment by default by using false proofs of service (italics added), conduct that is manifestly communicative. On close analysis, the gravamen of the action was not the levying act, but the procurement of the judgment based on the use of allegedly perjured declarations of service. Because these declarations were communications (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action ( Silberg supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365), the litigation privilege applies to the declarations and protects against torts arising from the privileged declarations. ( Id. at p. 214, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365.) Moreover, as Cohen argues, since a party may not be liable for submitting false testimony or evidence in the course of judicial proceedings, which are used to obtain a judgment, the party should likewise be immune from abuse of process claims for subsequent acts necessary to enforce it. Otherwise, application of the litigation privilege would be thwarted. Thus, where the gravamen of the complaint is a privileged communication (i.e., allegedly perjured declarations of service) the privilege extends to necessarily related noncommunicative acts (i.e., act of levying). Extending the litigation privilege to postjudgment enforcement activities that are necessarily related to the allegedly wrongful communicative act is consistent with public policy considerations. The purposes of section 47, subdivision (b), are to afford litigants and witnesses free access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions, to encourage open channels of communication and zealous advocacy, to promote complete and truthful testimony, to give finality to judgments, and to avoid unending litigation ( Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 213-214, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365.) To effectuate these purposes, the litigation privilege is absolute and applies regardless of malice. ( Id. at pp. 215-216, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365.) Moreover, [i]n furtherance of the public policy purposes it is designed to serve, the privilege prescribed by section 47(2) has been given broad application. ( Id. at p. 211, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365.) Conversely, expansion of the litigation privilege here necessarily narrows the scope of the tort of abuse of process in the judgment enforcement context. (See Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365 [application of the litigation privilege eliminates the threat of tort liability for communications made during judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative and other official proceedings].) But, despite Drum's concern for the potential abolishment of the common law tort of abuse of process ( Drum, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1028, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 602), modern public policy seeks to encourage free access to the courts and finality of judgments by limiting derivative tort claims arising out of litigation-related misconduct and by favoring sanctions within the original lawsuit. (See Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1198-1199, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044; Brown, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 45, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 891; see also Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 464, 469-471, 478, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 976 P.2d 223 [no cause of action for intentional third party spoliation of evidence]; Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 8-13, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d 511 ( Cedars-Sinai Medical Center ) [no cause of action for intentional first party spoliation of evidence]; Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 872-874, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498 [limitations on malicious prosecution recovery]; Pollock v. University of Southern California, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1430-1431, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 [no civil causes of action for perjury or abuse of process for filing false declarations]; Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 640-641, 99 Cal. Rptr. 393 [no cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress].) In an analogous context, we weighed the social benefits of creating a tort cause of action for the intentional first party spoliation of evidence against the costs and burdens it would impose. ( Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 8, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d 511.) We concluded that the benefits of creating a tort remedy for intentional first party spoliation were outweighed by: (1) the policy against creating derivative tort remedies for litigation-related misconduct; (2) the strength of existing nontort remedies for spoliation within the underlying action itself rather than through an expansion of the opportunities for initiating one or more additional rounds of litigation after the first action has been concluded; and (3) the uncertainty of the fact of harm in spoliation cases. ( Id. at pp. 8-9, 11, 13, 15, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d 511.) Similarly, with the litigation privilege, it is desirable to create an absolute privilege . . . not because we desire to protect the shady practitioner, but because we do not want the honest one to have to be concerned with [subsequent derivative] actions. . . . ( Thornton v. Rhoden (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 80, 99, 53 Cal.Rptr. 706.) For our justice system to function, it is necessary that litigants assume responsibility for the complete litigation of their cause during the proceedings. To allow a litigant to attack the integrity of evidence after the proceedings have concluded, except in the most narrowly circumscribed situations, such as extrinsic fraud, would impermissibly burden, if not inundate, our justice system. ( Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 214, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365, citing Briscoe v. LaHue (1983) 460 U.S. 325, 333, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96.) Thus, the salutary policy reasons for an absolute [litigation] privilege supersede individual litigants' interests in recovering damages for injurious publications made during the course of judicial proceedings. ( Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 218, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365.) Here, Rusheen's abuse of process claim poses a threat to the goal of finality of judgments. In denying Rusheen's motion to vacate the default judgment, the trial court found that Rusheen had been personally served with the documents and thus, that the declarations of service of process were not perjured. On the appeal of the default judgment, the Court of Appeal did not overturn that factual finding. Rusheen's abuse of process claima derivative tort for litigation-related misconductwould be another round of litigation to decide the same issue that had already been decided. Moreover, the denial of an abuse of process claim is mitigated by the fact that Rusheen had adequate alternative remedies. Indeed, Rusheen exercised one of those remedies by successfully moving to set aside the default judgment. On remand, Rusheen will have an opportunity to defend against Han's claims. There were additional nontort remedies for the allegedly wrongful conduct: moving to recall and quash the writ of execution (see Brown, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 50, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 891; Stegge v. Wilkerson (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 1, 5, 10 Cal.Rptr. 867; Colby v. Colby (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 602, 605, 274 P.2d 417; Meyer v. Meyer (1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 48, 49, 251 P.2d 335); posting an undertaking or seeking a writ of supersedeas to thwart enforcement efforts ( O'Keefe, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 135-136, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 602); or filing a claim of exemption from execution ( C.L. Vineyard v. Sisson (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 931, 938, 272 Cal.Rptr. 914). Nevada has similar remedies against improper execution. (See Maki v. Chong (2003) 119 Nev. 390, 75 P.3d 376 [claims of exemption]; Daniel v. Barengo (1978) 94 Nev. 697, 585 P.2d 1348 [motion to quash writ of execution].) Also, the litigation privilege does not bar criminal prosecutions for perjury. ( Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 361, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244.) Finally, we note that the process itself of enforcing money judgments is subject to judicial supervision. After entry of judgment and on application of the judgment creditor, the court clerk issues a writ of execution directed to the levying officer and to any registered process server. (Code Civ. Proc., § 699.510, subd. (a).) The levying officer must serve a copy of the writ of execution and notice of levy on the judgment debtor and return the writ to the court with a report of the officer's actions and an accounting of amounts collected and costs incurred. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 700.010, 699.560, subd. (a).) Given the alternative remedies for improper service and the procedural protections against improper enforcement, we agree with those cases that have applied the litigation privilege to limit the availability of the tort of abuse of process in the judgment enforcement context. ( Brown, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 49-51, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 891; O'Keefe, supra, 84 Cal. App.4th at pp. 135-136, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 602.) We disapprove Drum to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. ( Drum, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 1009, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 602.) Accordingly, we conclude that if the gravamen of the action is communicative, the litigation privilege extends to noncommunicative acts that are necessarily related to the communicative conduct, which in this case included acts necessary to enforce the judgment and carry out the directive of the writ. (See Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1195, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044 [fact that defendants' communications necessarily involved related acts does not destroy privilege]; Brown, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 50, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 891; O'Keefe, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 134, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 602.) Stated another way, unless it is demonstrated that an independent, noncommunicative, wrongful act was the gravamen of the action, the litigation privilege applies. Here, because the execution of the judgment did not provide an independent basis for liability separate and apart from the filing of the false declarations of service, the gravamen of the action was the procurement of the judgment, not its enforcement. Thus, the enforcement of the judgment in reliance on the filing of privileged declarations of service was itself privileged. Because the trial court correctly found that there was no reasonable probability Rusheen's abuse of process claim would prevail on the ground Cohen's allegedly wrongful conduct was privileged (Civ. Code § 47, subd. (b)), it properly granted the anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), struck the cross-complaint against Cohen, and entered judgment in his favor.