Opinion ID: 695622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hansley's Other Claims

Text: 34 Hansley challenges his sentence on two other grounds. In considering Hansley's claims, we will review the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and its findings of fact for clear error. See United States v. Hall, 46 F.3d 62, 63 (11th Cir.1995).
35 Hansley argues that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for a two-level increase [i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed. The district court applied this specific offense characteristic because when officers executed the search warrant for Hansley's residence, they found a firearm. At his sentencing hearing, Hansley argued that the firearm that was seized from his house [was not] related to the commission of the offense. The government responded that the officers executing the warrant found the gun in the house near several drug-related items. 36 In Hall, this court explained that a section 2D1.1(b)(1) adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense. Hall, 46 F.3d at 63 (quoting U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1, comment. (n. 3) (1991)). Thus, [o]nce the prosecution has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the firearm was present at the site of the charged conduct, the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant to show that a connection between the firearm and the offense is clearly improbable. Hall, 46 F.3d at 63. In Hall, this court held that the two-level increase was proper because [t]he proximity of the handgun to several drug-related objects, located in the house where conversations concerning the [drug scheme] occurred, sufficiently show that the handgun was possessed during the offense. Furthermore, [the defendant] presented no evidence to suggest that a connection between the handgun and the [drug scheme] was clearly improbable. Hall, 46 F.3d at 64. 37 Likewise, in this case, the government showed that the agents found a firearm and other drug-related items in Hansley's residence, where he engaged in conspiratorial conversations. Furthermore, Hansley presented no evidence to suggest that a connection between the firearm and his drug conspiracy was clearly improbable. Thus, we find that the two-level increase, pursuant to section 2D1.1(b)(1), was proper.
38 In placing Hansley in a criminal history category of III, the district court accepted the calculations in the PSR, which assessed him a total of six criminal history points. Specifically, the PSR assessed Hansley one point for a 1990 conviction for possession of marijuana, pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.1(c). It also assessed him, pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.1(b), two more criminal history points for a January 20, 1986 conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. Hansley, who was a habitual offender, received a two-year sentence and two years of probation for this offense. 6 Thus, the PSR assessed two additional points, pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.1(d), because Hansley committed the instant offense while serving the above probation. Likewise, the PSR assessed one additional point, pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.1(e), because Hansley committed the instant offense less than two years after release from the above imprisonment. 39 Hansley argues that the assessment of these last three points was erroneous because he only began participating in this conspiracy in 1989; therefore, he was no longer serving probation, and he had been out of custody for over two years. Upon reviewing the record, however, we find that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Hansley's conspiracy started, at the very latest, the early part of 1986. As a result, the district court properly assessed the three additional points because Hansley committed the instant offense while serving probation and within two years of his imprisonment.