Opinion ID: 755571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: krell's motion to recuse

Text: On December 3, 1996, the Krell and Kittle plaintiffs moved on an emergency basis to recuse the district judge from this case under 28 U.S.C. § 455, 126 alleging inter alia improper ex parte meetings and judicial interference with related state court proceedings. The court issued a show cause order dated December 5, 1996, requesting interested parties to oppose or support the motion, and scheduled a hearing for December 13, 1996. 127 Following oral argument, the court denied Krell's motion. Krell subsequently filed a petition for mandamus with this court, again seeking recusal. That petition was denied without opinion on February 7, 1997. On appeal, Krell once more raises the issue of the district court's recusal. Once more, we shall reject it. On appeal, Krell reasserts his claim that the district court should have recused itself based on its tireless and unrelenting bias in favor of the settling parties. According to Krell, the District Court did what was necessary to impose upon Prudential's policyholders one sweeping class action resolution providing global peace for Prudential. Krell Reply Brief at 67. But Krell's briefs offer no new arguments in support of his claims. We review under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir.1995).
The Krell objectors brought this motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a), 455(b)(1) and 455(b)(5)(iv). 128 A party seeking recusal need not show actual bias on the part of the court, only the possibility of bias. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). But, as we noted in Antar, [b]iases stemming from facts gleaned during judicial proceedings themselves must be particularly strong in order to merit recusal. 53 F.3d at 574. The court must reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147. Under § 455(a), if a 'reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality' under the applicable standard, then the judge must recuse. Antar, 53 F.3d at 574 (quoting In re Larson, 43 F.3d 410, 415 (8th Cir.1994)).
With these standards in mind, we now examine Krell's specific arguments.
First, Krell argues the court's remarks at an October 1996 hearing indicate the district judge had an off-the-record discussion of alleged document destruction with Attorney David Gross, counsel to former Prudential employee David Fastenberg. At that hearing, the judge stated that Fastenberg's own lawyers say there was no document destruction. Tr. of Hearing, Joint App. at 1975. According to Krell, this was an acknowledgment that the court had obtained off-the-record factual information concerning a material and disputed evidentiary matter (document destruction) then before it. Krell Brief at 17. We cannot agree. Prudential fired Fastenberg for allegedly allowing the destruction of documents in the office he supervised. In response, Fastenberg filed a wrongful termination suit against Prudential, denying his involvement in any document destruction. Consequently, Fastenberg's denial was already a matter of public record. In addition, as noted by the district court at the recusal hearing, Fastenberg's termination and his subsequent lawsuit were widely reported in the press. Joint App. at 4728; see also Joint App. at 11421-11438. Finally, Krell has offered no other evidence to support his contention that the district judge had an improper, ex parte meeting with Fastenberg's attorney. Based on the record before us, we se no abuse of discretion.
Krell also claims the district court held an improper, nonjudicial conference with insurance regulators and the news media on October 16, 1996, in order to discuss the proposed settlement. Krell claims that notice of this meeting was not provided to counsel of record, and thus he was deprived of the opportunity to present the court and the regulators with class concerns and objections. In addition, Krell takes issue with several statements made by the district court at the conference. The district judge addressed Krell's concerns about the content of the October 16 meeting during the recusal hearing, noting that the Court did not request the meeting, nor did it set the agenda. Joint App. at 4725. The meeting was organized by Lead Counsel and counsel for Prudential, and the insurance regulators were invited by the New Jersey Insurance Regulators. Id. Lead Counsel explained the meeting was called in mid-October to address the possibility of merging the two then-pending settlements--the Task Force settlement and the proposed national class settlement. The Task Force settlement called for Prudential to begin sending class notices and election forms to policyholders by November 1, 1998. The meeting on October 16 was called to discuss timing issues related to the November notice deadline and the Rule 23 approval process. Both Prudential and Lead Counsel contend the October 16 conference transcript demonstrates that the adequacy of the settlement was not discussed during this meeting. Once again, we see no abuse of discretion. As the settling parties note, and a review of the transcript confirms, the adequacy of the settlement was not discussed at the October 16 meeting. The primary issue considered by the parties at that conference was the timing of the notice Prudential was required to send under the Task Force Plan. The district court gave no indication that his decision was contingent upon or affected by Prudential's obligations under the Task Force plan. Consequently, Krell was not prejudiced by his counsel's absence. Krell next accuses the district court of using an off-therecord procedure to convene the October 16, 1996 conference. Krell Brief at 18 n. 19. According to Krell, there is no record as to how, when and why this conference came about, [and] there is no record which reflects why the Court determined not [sic] to inform various non-party insurance regulators and news reporters but not interested parties including Krell. Id. This statement is untrue. As the district court explained, the October 16 meeting was organized by Lead Counsel and Prudential, not the district court. Consequently, the court did nothing to prejudice Krell. 129 Krell also objects to the district judge's reference to the proposed settlement as my settlement. Krell claims that Judge Wolin demonstrated a bias in favor of the settlement when he exhorted those present to hang together [so that we may] accomplish what we have to accomplish for all our respective interests. We accept the district court's explanation that he was merely using the expression my settlement as a convenient method to distinguish between the Proposed Settlement and the Task Force Settlement. Joint App. at 4726. At the October 16th hearing, the district court made it clear that it had not yet made any decisions regarding the terms of the proposed settlement or the proposed settlement class. No one should leave here today thinking that Judge Wolin's silence, Judge Wolin's nod, a smile at a particular time, means that he will approve this settlement. I don't have the slightest idea. I don't know who the objectors are. I haven't heard any evidence. Tr. of October 16 Hearing at 38. Clearly, Krell's allegation has no merit.3. Rutt v. Prudential Third, Krell argues the district court attempted to influence the Pennsylvania state court proceeding in Rutt v. Prudential, scheduled before Judge Allison in the Court of Common Pleas for Lancaster County. According to Krell, the record indicates that Prudential's attorney informed Judge Allison that the district judge was receptive to a discussion with Judge Allison regarding potential ethical improprieties implicating both cases. Krell also claims that, at the show cause hearing on December 2, 1996, Judge Wolin stated he could speak with any state court and saw nothing wrong with the use of the Court's name in the way it was used by Prudential to influence Judge Allison in Rutt. Krell Brief at 18-19. The settling parties note the district court expressly denied attempting to influence Judge Allison. See Tr. of December 2, 1996 Show Cause Hearing at 6-7. In late 1996, Prudential moved to disqualify Bruce Miller, lead counsel in the parallel actions filed against Prudential by a group of former Prudential agents, on the grounds that Miller had arranged for one of his clients to be paid for testimony in a state court action against Prudential in Alabama. The district court requested and received from Mr. Miller certain documents relating to the Alabama case of Key v. Prudential and reviewed those documents in camera. Concerned that the documents raised certain ethical concerns, the district court issued an order to show cause on November 20, 1996 why those documents should not be released to Prudential. Prudential, concerned about Miller's representation in the Pennsylvania state court case Rutt v. Prudential, sought to raise the issue of possible ethical improprieties with Judge Allison. During an on-the-record conference in Judge Allison's chambers, Harold Hirshman, Prudential's attorney and a partner of Prudential's counsel in this matter, provided Judge Allison with a copy of the district court's November 20th letter and show cause order with respect to Mr. Miller. Mr. Hirshman also informed Judge Allison that [t]he one thing we did learn in addition to what I've already said, or my office learned, I did not speak to Judge Wolin's office myself, is that Judge Wolin is receptive to a discussion with Your Honor by telephone about his views, and we have no objection to that telephone call going ahead. Tr. of November 26, 1996 Hearing in Rutt v. Prudential at 4. Mr. Hirshman goes on to suggest that Judge Allison place such a call to Judge Wolin and see what he has to say. Id. at 5. According to Krell, this was a clear attempt by the district court to influence the Rutt litigation, and demonstrates a bias in favor of Prudential. We disagree. We do not impute any bias to the district court. There is no indication the district court asked Mr. Hirshman to make such a representation to Judge Allison. On the contrary, during the show cause hearing on December 2, 1996, the district court explicitly stated that he did not send any representative to see Judge Allison in the Pennsylvania case of Rutt v. Prudential.  Tr. of December 2, 1996 Show Cause Hearing at 6-7. According to the district judge, he had merely stated that, if a state court judge called him, he would speak to that judge as a matter of courtesy. Id. at 7. There is nothing in the record, save the statements made by Mr. Hirshman, to support Krell's contention. Finally, we note that we see nothing wrong with members of the federal and state judiciary trying to coordinate where their cases overlap. Coordination among judges can only foster the just and efficient resolution of cases. There is no basis for believing the district court was attempting to influence the state court proceedings in Rutt. Krell's claims, now before us for the second time, are clearly without merit. We find no abuse of discretion here. The resolution of a class action, especially one as large as this, is never a simple task. Based on our review of the record, we note the extraordinary manner in which the district judge addressed the complex legal and factual issues raised by this case and handled the myriad procedural and administrative responsibilities which accompany a class action of this size.VIII. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the certification of the proposed class and the approval of the settlement, and vacate and remand on the issue of attorneys' fees.