Opinion ID: 1746147
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Heading: The State's Liability or Vandalized Stop Signs Under Section 101.060

Text: Here, no one disputes that vandals removed the stop signs at the intersection where the accident occurred. However, the parties disagree about whether the court of appeals correctly relied on section 101.060(a)(2) to determine that the Act waived TxDOT's immunity. Based on the Act's plain language, we conclude that subsection (a)(3) expressly controls when third parties remove or destroy stop signs. Accordingly, we conclude that subsection (a)(2) does not apply here to waive the State's immunity. In construing section 101.060, we begin with its plain language. See Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 865. Subsection (a)(3) expressly applies when third persons remove or destroy traffic signs, signals, or warning devices. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.060(a)(3). Under this subsection, the State retains immunity unless it fails to remedy the removal or destruction within a reasonable time after actual notice. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 101.060(a)(3). Thus, subsection (a)(3) imposes a duty on the State to correct a sign's removal or destruction by a third person upon receiving actual notice. Here, Gonzalez's claims arise from an accident that allegedly occurred because a third person removed a stop sign. Thus, subsection (a)(3) expressly applies to determine TxDOT's liability. Here, however, the court of appeals concluded that severe and pervasive vandalism constitutes a condition under subsection (a)(2). 24 S.W.3d at 538. Under subsection (a)(2), the State generally retains immunity from claims based on a sign's condition unless the State fails to correct the condition within a reasonable time after notice. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.060(a)(2). For example, trees or branches obstructing a stop sign create a condition for which subsection (a)(2) may waive immunity. Lorig, 629 S.W.2d at 701. Likewise, faded pavement markings constitute a condition within subsection (a)(2)'s meaning. See Sullivan, 33 S.W.3d at 12. Conversely, one court of appeals has concluded that a stop sign's susceptibility to easy removal did not constitute a condition for which the Act waives immunity. See Lawson, 524 S.W.2d at 356. In Lawson, two vehicles collided at an intersection where vandals had removed a stop sign. Several plaintiffs sued the State under an earlier version of subsection (a)(2), asserting that the sign was in a `dangerous condition' because it was easily removable.... Lawson, 524 S.W.2d at 356. Evidence produced at trial showed the State knew that vandals had repeatedly stolen signs at the intersection and that vandals could easily remove the signs using only a crescent wrench. Lawson, 524 S.W.2d at 356. The Lawson court concluded that the term condition does not refer to whether thieves could easily remove a sign. Lawson, 524 S.W.2d at 356. Rather, the court explained, condition must refer to the State's maintenance of a sign or signal in a condition sufficient to properly perform the function of traffic control for which it is relied upon by the traveling public. Lawson, 524 S.W.2d at 356. The court reasoned that this must be so, because the Act's former version also contained another provisionnow subsection (a)(3)which expressly reliev[es] the State from liability for claims growing out of the removal of signs, signals and devices by third parties without a reasonable time for replacement after actual notice to the State of the removal. Lawson, 524 S.W.2d at 356. We agree with the Lawson court's analysis. Nothing in the Act's plain language suggests the Legislature intended that subsection (a)(3) should control only claims arising from isolated or occasional vandalism, or that subsection (a)(2) should control claims arising from repeated or pervasive vandalism. Rather, under the Act's plain and common meaning, subsection (a)(3), not subsection (a)(2), expressly applies whenever a third person removes or destroys a traffic sign or signal. See Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 865. Here, Gonzalez argues that TxDOT could have made the stop signs more vandal proof by changing installation methods, using additional signs or warning devices, ordering more inspection patrols, or establishing a twenty-four hour hotline to report downed signs. Even assuming these suggestions have merit, TxDOT retains immunity for such discretionary decisions under the Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code §§ 101.056, 101.060(a)(1); Miguel, 2 S.W.3d at 251; Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d at 85. Gonzalez cannot characterize TxDOT's failure to make certain discretionary decisions affecting a stop sign's susceptibility to repeated vandalism as a failure to correct the sign's condition under subsection (a)(2) in order to sue under the Act. See Villarreal v. State, 810 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied) (refusing to characterize discretionary actions as maintenance actions). To do so would contradict the Legislature's express intent to impose liability in cases involving a third person vandalizing a traffic sign only if the State fails to correct the vandalized sign after receiving actual notice. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.060(a)(3); see also Lawson, 524 S.W.2d at 356. In sum, we hold that under section 101.060's plain language, subsection (a)(3) expressly applies to claims arising from third-party vandalism. We reject the court of appeals' conclusion that a sign's susceptibility to vandalism is a condition under subsection (a)(2).