Opinion ID: 2410903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: current status

Text: In contrast to its growth during the first part of this century, the doctrine of implied assumption of risk has lately been on the decline. The proliferation of Workers' Compensation Statutes in all the states and the District of Columbia have abrogated the doctrine in the very context in which it gained acceptance with such unseemly haste. [12] Moreover in other areas of tort law, the doctrine has been a subject of controversy and confusion because, as previously discussed, the term has been used by courts to refer to at least two different legal concepts, primary and secondary implied assumption of risk, which also overlap both with the basic common-law principles of duty and with aspects of the doctrine of contributory negligence. [13] In its primary sense, implied assumption of risk focuses not on the plaintiff's conduct in assuming the risk, but on the defendant's general duty of care. [14] The doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk technically is not a defense, but rather a legal theory which relieves a defendant of the duty which he might otherwise owe to the plaintiff with respect to particular risks. Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 351 (Minn. 1979); see also Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287, 291 (Fla. 1977) (primary assumption of risk ... is subsumed in the principle of negligence itself.). Clearly, primary implied assumption of risk is but another way of stating the conclusion that a plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case by failing to establish that a duty exists. On the other hand, secondary implied assumption of risk is an affirmative defense which must be asserted by the defendant after a negligent breach of duty has been established. As Professor Mutter points out in her analysis, this type of implied assumption of risk refers to both unreasonable and reasonable conduct by the plaintiff in assuming a known risk. [15] Secondary implied assumption of risk has been further subdivided by courts and commentators into unreasonable or qualified secondary assumption of risk and reasonable or strict or pure secondary implied assumption of risk. [16] Qualified or unreasonable secondary assumption of risk is functionally indistinguishable from contributory negligence. [17] The confusion engendered by the overlap of the doctrine of assumption of risk with the common law concepts of duty and contributory negligence, as well as the harsh results of the defense, has resulted in criticism of the doctrine, and has led legal commentators to call for the doctrine's abrogation. [18] For example, Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R, 318 U.S. at 68-69, 63 S.Ct. at 452, criticized the indiscriminate use of the term stating, [t]he phrase assumption of risk is an excellent illustration of the extent to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas. However, the greatest blow to the doctrine of implied assumption of risk has been the overwhelming acceptance and adoption by most states of comparative fault or comparative negligence principles. [19] Of the forty-five states, other than Tennessee, that apply principles of comparative fault, only five states  Georgia, Nebraska, Mississippi, Rhode Island and South Dakota  retain assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery. [20] Ten states abolished the doctrine entirely as a separate affirmative defense before, or without any reference to, the adoption of the state's particular comparative-negligence law. [21] Ten other states by statute have abolished or subsumed the defense of assumption of risk into their comparative fault schemes. [22] The remaining nineteen states which have judicially considered the appropriate role of assumption of risk in light of a statutory or judicial adoption of comparative negligence or fault principles have also altered or abolished the common law doctrine. [23] Whether by statute or by judicial decision, those states which have tailored assumption of risk to mesh with comparative negligence or fault principles appear to follow one of three approaches. Some states have merged secondary implied assumption of risk into the comparative negligence scheme, while retaining the principle of primary implied assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery. [24] After concluding that the situations to which both primary and secondary implied assumption of risk have been applied are just as amenable to resolution under the common law concepts of duty and comparative fault, other jurisdictions have abolished implied assumption of risk entirely, and dispensed with using assumption of risk terminology. [25] Finally, some jurisdictions have combined the doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk with the common-law concept of duty, while retaining the defense of secondary implied assumption of risk as a factor for comparison in the same manner as any plaintiff's negligence and not as a complete bar to recovery. [26] In spite of the diversity of opinion as to the proper role of the various categories of implied assumption of risk in a comparative negligence scheme, commentators and courts almost unanimously agree that even in a system of comparative fault, express assumption of risk should remain an absolute bar to recovery. [27] The uniformity of decision on this issue has been attributed to the fact that express assumption of risk involves an affirmatively demonstrated, and presumably bargained upon choice by the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of his legal duty... . Prosser and Keeton, § 68, at 496. Again we emphasize that express assumption of risk occurs when a party specifically agrees, prior to the time of injury, to accept a particular risk of harm resulting from another party's conduct. [28] The law of express assumption of risk is generally uniform among the states. [29] Tennessee's case law in this area is typical. Specifically, an express release, waiver, or exculpatory words by which one party agrees to assume the risk of harm arising from another party's negligent conduct will be enforced by the courts so long as it does not extend to liability for willful or gross negligence and does not otherwise offend public policy. Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 759-60 (Tenn. 1992); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tenn. 1977).