Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: State Action Allegedly Interfering with Coffman's Presentation of a Defense

Text: Coffman contends that certain actions by the prosecution effectively dissuaded certain witnesses from testifying on her behalf, thus suppressing favorable evidence within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 and depriving her of her federal constitutional rights of compulsory process and to a reliable determination of guilt and penalty. She also contends that the San Bernardino County Superior Court denied her due process by failing to pay on time certain authorized investigative expenses, resulting in the unavailability, during the guilt phase, of witness Katherine Davis, the former wife of defendant Marlow, who would have testified about Marlow's physical and emotional abuse during their marriage. [12] Coffman raised these contentions in an unsuccessful pretrial motion to strike the special circumstance allegations against her and in a motion for new trial. She now reasserts them as a basis for reversal of the judgment. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the contention lacks merit. As relevant to the claim that the prosecution dissuaded potential witnesses, at an evidentiary hearing on the motion to strike the special circumstance allegations, Coffman's counsel presented defense investigator Barbara Jordan's testimony to the effect that her efforts to obtain witnesses in Page, Arizona, had been hampered by disinformation Redlands Police Sergeant Larry Scott Smith had spread there. Jordan further testified that potential witness Judy Scott, who had roomed with Coffman, reported to Jordan that she felt the police had pressured her not to talk to Coffman's defense team; they told her Coffman was a lesbian and asked her how close she and Coffman were and whether Coffman had brought prostitution customers to the house when the two were living together. According to Jordan, other potential witnesses who had spoken with the police declined to speak with Coffman's investigators and treated them with hostility. Jordan stated that Scott and another witness, Debbie Pugh, denied using words or making statements attributed to them in the Redlands police reports, which omitted information exculpatory as to Coffman. Sergeant Smith acknowledged visiting Page with Detective Dalzell of the Redlands Police Department and interviewing Judy Scott; Smith testified he asked Scott if Coffman was bisexual, but elicited no information in that regard; following up on information received in Page, he also asked Scott about Coffman's possible involvement in prostitution. The trial court denied the motion, commenting: I have seen nothing, either in the offer of proof or in the questioning of this witness, which substantiates any [allegation of improper conduct by police in relation to prospective witnesses]. All I have heard so far is that witnesses are telling somewhat different stories to different people, and you've been in this business long enough to know that that's not a novel concept. `Governmental interference violative of a defendant's compulsory-process right includes, of course, the intimidation of defense witnesses by the prosecution. [Citations.] [ļ] The forms that such prosecutorial misconduct may take are many and varied. They include, for example, statements to defense witnesses to the effect that they would be prosecuted for any crimes they reveal or commit in the course of their testimony. [Citations.]' ( In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 30 [241 Cal. Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374].) Threatening a defense witness with a perjury prosecution also constitutes prosecutorial misconduct that violates a defendant's constitutional rights. ( People v. Bryant (1984) 157 Cal. App.3d 582 [203 Cal.Rptr. 733].) ( People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 835, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Due process also is violated when the prosecution makes a material witness unavailable by, for example, deportation. ( United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 873, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 [due process mandates dismissal of charges when defendant makes a plausible showing that the deported witness's testimony would have been material and favorable to the defense, in ways not merely cumulative to the testimony of available witnesses].) The record before us contains no evidence that the prosecution engaged in witness intimidation or other conduct depriving Coffman's defense of a material witness. The circumstance that a witness is reluctant to assist one side or the other of a criminal prosecution, or tells different stories to different investigators, is, as the trial court observed, far from unusual and does not, in itself, support a claim that the prosecution interfered with a defendant's right of compulsory process or suppressed material evidence within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, even if we assume Brady applies in this situation, where the prosecution did not control the witnesses. Consequently, the trial court committed no error in denying Coffman's motion to strike the special circumstance allegations, and reversal of the judgment is unwarranted. Coffman also urges that the court's delay in paying investigative expenses incurred in developing her defense of battered woman syndrome deprived her of a potential witness in the guilt phase of trial, namely, defendant Marlow's former wife Katherine Davis, and thus violated Coffman's right to due process as articulated in Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 80-83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53. Davis did testify in Coffman's case in mitigation during the penalty phase concerning Marlow's abusive conduct during their marriage some years before the present offenses. Because Coffman made no offer of proof sufficient to enable us to determine that Davis would have given relevant, admissible testimony during the guilt phase, and because Coffman's argument before the trial court focused on the failure to pay the expenses of investigators for trips to such places as Missouri and Kentucky, rather than the delay in paying Davis's expenses in coming to California to testify in this trial, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in denying Coffman's motion to strike the special circumstance allegations.