Opinion ID: 2623148
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Attorney Scrivener's Testimony

Text: Generally, [a]ll relevant evidence is admissible. K.S.A. 60-407(f). Relevant evidence is defined as `evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.' K.S.A. 60-401(b). State v. Dreiling, 274 Kan. 518, 549, 54 P.3d 475 (2002). There can be no serious question in this case regarding the relevance of the scrivener's testimony. Beyond relevance, the admission of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. An appellate court's standard of review regarding a trial court's admission of evidence is abuse of discretion. See Wendt v. University of Kansas Med. Center, 274 Kan. 966, 975, 59 P.3d 325 (2002). An abuse of discretion must be shown by the party attacking the evidentiary ruling and exists only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district court. Jenkins v. T.S.I. Holdings, Inc., 268 Kan. 623, 633-34, 1 P.3d 891 (2000). Defendants argued that the 1984 wills were unambiguous and that Fielder's testimony therefore was barred by the parol evidence rule. In fact, our previous cases do not establish ambiguity as the analytical touchstone defendants want to make it. This court has held: Extrinsic evidence is admissible in connection with the instruments themselves to show that separate wills, which are mutual and reciprocal in their bequests and devises, were executed in pursuance of an agreement between the testators, notwithstanding the absence of recitals in the wills designating or referring to such agreement. Such evidence may consist of writings, acts and declarations of the parties, testimony of other persons, and evidence of all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Eikmeier v. Eikmeier, 174 Kan. 71, Syl. ¶ 1, 254 P.2d 236 (1953). This court has also stated that the rule that parol evidence is never admissible to change or vary the terms and provisions of an unambiguous will does not render inadmissible extrinsic evidence that a will was executed pursuant to an agreement. In re Estate of Tompkins, 195 Kan. at 474 (citing Eikmeier, 174 Kan. 71, Syl. ¶ 2). The admission of such evidence may result in proving the will to have been non-contractual as well as contractual. [Citations omitted.] Tompkins, 195 Kan. at 474. In Eikmeier, 174 Kan. at 72-73, Fred and Mary D. Eikmeier concurrently executed separate wills. Mary D.'s will left a life estate in her property to Fred; and, at his death, the estate was to pass to their three children. Fred's will left Mary D. a life estate in a quarter section of land; and, at her death, that land was to pass to their son Lee, with the remainder given to their three children. Neither will mentioned the other, and neither contained contractual language. Mary died shortly after the wills were executed, and Fred married Mary A. On his wedding day, he executed a deed conveying the quarter section of land to Mary A. at his death. Lee brought suit to have the wills between Fred and Mary D. declared contractual. Testimony by the attorney who prepared Fred's and Mary D.'s wills was introduced. Fred and Mary A. objected to the testimony. The court held that the attorney's parol evidence could be introduced  not to contradict the written instrument but to prove the existence of the contract between Fred and Mary D. 174 Kan. at 76-81. There was no necessity that the language of the wills be characterized as ambiguous before the parol evidence was admitted. In Tompkins, Charles and Louisa Tompkins executed a joint and mutual will leaving property first to the surviving spouse, then to their niece, cousins, and friends. Louisa died, and the niece and Charles changed some property to joint tenancy in their names. The other beneficiaries objected. This court relied on Eikmeier and upheld the admission of the scrivener's testimony regarding the existence of an agreement between Charles and Louisa. 195 Kan. at 474. We determined that the language of the will and the parol evidence supported the existence of a contract. 195 Kan. at 471-72, 474. Again, no ambiguity in the language of the will was necessary before the parol evidence was considered. Many other Kansas cases also support the approach taken by the district court here. See, e.g., In re Estate of Stratmann, 248 Kan. 197, 207, 806 P.2d 459 (1991) (where wills contain no contractual language, court must search extrinsic evidence for guidance); In re Estate of Wade, 202 Kan. 380, 387, 449 P.2d 488 (1969) (proof of existence of agreement between testators may be developed through extrinsic evidence); In re Estate of Zahradnik, 6 Kan. App. 2d 84, 91-93, 626 P.2d 1211 (1981) (error for district court not to allow extrinsic evidence to establish existence of contract, even though will contained no contractual language, where distributions of property identical and wills use plural pronouns). It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to allow Fielder's testimony. The language of the wills supported the existence of a mutual understanding between Sarah and John to leave the bulk of their estate to the surviving parent for full use during that person's lifetime, then to the six children and one set of grandchildren evenly. Testimony regarding such an agreement was not barred by the parol evidence rule. See Eikmeier, 174 Kan. 71, Syl. ¶ 1; Tompkins, 195 Kan. at 474. Plaintiffs were not required to demonstrate first that the language of the wills was ambiguous in order to admit testimony regarding the oral agreement. Third-party plaintiffs nevertheless continue to argue that Fielder's testimony was admissible only to the extent that it proved the existence of an agreement regarding distribution of seven equal shares. They claim Fielder's testimony about the further agreement that the surviving parent would have a right to alter the shares of his or her own children should have been inadmissible. We disagree. Fielder's further testimony about this topic explained more than the choice of the word absolutely. The testimony did not alter or amend the language of the wills; it further demonstrated the existence of the basic agreement to divide the bulk of the estate into sevenths; and it demonstrated the existence of a sensible limitation on that agreement, reserving to the surviving parent the right to alter the distributions to his or her own children. It was not an abuse of discretion to allow Fielder's testimony regarding this additional facet of the oral agreement between John and Sarah.