Opinion ID: 844211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Legislative History and General Policy

Text: (a) Legislative history of the 2002 amendment The Court of Appeal turned to the legislative history of the 2002 amendment in support of its analysis, and the dissenting opinions also have cited this record. [14] As we shall demonstrate, however, the relevant portions of these materials concern what the enactment of the bill would accomplish prospectively. Succeeding paragraphs, however, demonstrate that the Legislature was well aware that the revival of lapsed claims was a separate matter that was governed by the language of section 340.1, subdivision (c)indeed, that it was a separate matter requiring both a cautious balancing of policy and express language of revival. The Court of Appeal cited the following evidence of legislative intent that appeared in an analysis submitted to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: [T]his bill is essential to ensure that victims severely damaged by childhood sexual abuse are able to seek compensation from those responsible. While current law allows a lawsuit to be brought against the perpetrator within three years of discovery of the adulthood aftereffects of the childhood abuse, current law bars any action against a responsible third party entity . . . after the victim's 26th birthday. Unfortunately . . . for many victims their adulthood trauma does not manifest itself until well after their 26th birthday, when some event in their current life triggers remembrance of the past abuse and brings on new trauma. [¶] For example, a 35-year old man with a 13-year old son involved in many community and sporting events, may begin to relive his nightmare of being molested by an older authoritarian figure when he was 13 years old and about to enter puberty. While a lawsuit against the perpetrator is possible, that person may be dead, may have moved away to places unknown, or may be judgment-proof. However, any lawsuit against a responsible third party is absolutely time-barred after the victim passes this 26th birthday. [¶] This arbitrary limitation unfairly deprives a victim from seeking redress, and unfairly and unjustifiably protects responsible third parties from being held accountable for their actions that caused injury to victims. [15] This language explained why the proponents of the 2002 amendment felt the bill was necessary, but it is in a subsequent, separate four-page discussion that the analysis considers the problem of revival of lapsed claims (under the heading Extending limitations period past age 26 and reviving time-barred actions for one-year-window period has precedent). [16] It is this second portion of the analysis that describes the one-year revival period contemplated by section 340.1, subdivision (c). Indeed, the revival section of the analysis supports our conclusion, since it acknowledges the need for express language of revival, carefully describing the Legislature's authority to revive lapsed claims `by express legislative provision.' Through the following language the legislative history strongly suggests an understanding that a person with a late-discovered claim would have only the one-year revival period in which to institute an action. According to the analysis prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: In other words, this bill would provide those victims who discovered their adulthood trauma after age 26, whose action has been barred by the current statute of limitations, a one-year window to bring a case against a third party that otherwise would be time-barred. (Italics added.) [17] The analysis also carefully weighs policy considerations respecting the bill's language of revival, balancing the defendant's interest in repose and the victim's interest in compensation. It acknowledges that limitations periods `are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice . . . within the period of limitation and the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.' [18] The Court of Appeal cited additional language from the legislative materials: `People who discover their adulthood trauma from the molestation after the effective date of the bill will have three years from the date the victim discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the adulthood trauma was caused by the childhood abuse.' As noted in the Court of Appeal's opinion, however, the quoted legislative statements appear under the heading `WHO CAN SUE AFTER THE BILL PASSES AND WHEN,' under the subheading  Prospective application. (Italics added, underscoring omitted.) However, under the same general heading, but under its own subheading,  Retroactive application and revival of lawsuits, the material recounts that the bill would create a one-year window for victims to bring a lawsuit that would otherwise be barred by the age 26 limitation.  [19] Again, the report strongly supports rather than detracts from our conclusion. Plaintiffs refer to materials in the legislative history stating that [t]his bill would provide that the absolute age of 26 limitation in actions against a third party does not apply, and the broader `within three years of discovery' statute of limitations in subdivision (a) applies to defendants falling within section 340.1, subdivision (b)(2). [20] Again, however, the quoted language merely describes the prospective effect of the bill. The language is followed by a description of how a lapsed claim may be revived: This bill would provide that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, any action for damages against a third party as provided above which is barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has expired, is revived and a cause of action thereupon may be brought if commenced within one year of January 1, 2003. [21] Thus the analysis once again identifies the language of section 340.1, subdivision (c) as covering the subject of revival of lapsed claims. This history displays an evident understanding on the part of the Legislature that, prior to the 2002 amendment, all claims against third parties lapsed once the plaintiff reached the age of 26. These materials also indicate that the Legislature carefully considered what was to be the fate of lapsed claims and intended that new section 340.1, subdivision (c) should govern such claims. The Legislature was aware of settled law expounding the distinction between prospective application and retroactive application of expanded limitations periods. In sum, we disagree with plaintiffs that [i]n light of the Committee's description of the effect of [Senate Bill No.] 1779, it appears that the word `prospective' was used to demarcate between individuals who had made the connection contemplated by section 340.1(a) as of the effective date of [Senate Bill No.] 1779, and those who had not; as opposed to dividing individuals who were over the age of 26 on January 1, 2003 from those who were younger. (b) General policy The Court of Appeal believed its interpretation best served the language and purpose of the enactment, adding that as a remedial statute, section 340.1 should be construed broadly to carry out its overall purpose. The appellate court referred to Doe v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 42 Cal.4th 531, in which we characterized section 340.1, subdivision (b)(2) as remedial, and stated that the Legislature intended [it] to be construed broadly to effectuate the intent that illuminates section 340.1 as a whole; to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to hold to account individuals and entities responsible for their injuries. ( Doe v. City of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 536.) We are urged to honor the salutary remedial purpose served by the expanding limitations period set out in section 340.1 and to give effect to an evident legislative intentin the wake of public exposure of sexual abuse by priests against children that had been condoned and covered up by the Catholic Church for so many yearsto call to account those persons and entities that committed or condoned such heinous offenses against children. We acknowledge the important remedial purpose of section 340.1 and that the measure should be interpreted in a manner that will carry out its apparent intent. Reliance upon the general purpose of the enactment, however, does not alter the circumstance that the Legislature chose to deal with the problem of lapsed claims by offering a one-year window period reviving those claims. Moreover, the Legislature has not abolished the limitations period for childhood sexual abuse claims, and even a liberal construction does not change the general rule that an enlarged limitations period does not apply to lapsed claims in the absence of express language indicating legislative intent to revive lapsed claims. (See DiGenova, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 174 [a rule of liberal construction does not require that a statute should be interpreted to apply retroactively]; Davis v. Harris (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 507, 512 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 591] [rule of liberal construction of remedial statutes does not mean that a court may read into the statute that which the Legislature has excluded, or read out that which it has included]; Gallo, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1383 [Simply because the Legislature intended to afford additional protection to victims by lengthening the statute of limitations does not mean the Legislature also intended to revive already expired causes. These are different matters.].) Moreover, as we have seen, over the years the legislative expansion of the limitations period has been measured and deliberate, with due concern for affording adequate and reliable notice to potential defendants, and `promot[ing] justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared'demonstrating a recognition that `the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.' [22] The dissenting justices posit that the Legislature could not reasonably have intended to supply only a one-year revival period for claims that were, after all, unknown to potential plaintiffs. But we have not been able to identify in the language of the statute an intent to do anything else. Moreover, it would not be unreasonable or anomalous to provide only a one-year revival period for hitherto undiscovered claims. Although we are unreservedly sympathetic to the plight of persons who were subjected to childhood sexual abuse, we note that the preexisting limitations period, along with the one-year revival period created by the 2002 amendments, afforded victims a very considerable time following the abuse in which to come to maturity, or even middle age, and discover the claim. As for the assertion that the purpose of the 2002 amendment of section 340.1 would be defeated if it were interpreted to apply prospectively to the subcategory of third party defendants identified by the 2002 amendment, we are not convinced. A prospective application of the expanded period in which to bring claims against this subcategory of third party defendants certainly has an effect in that it deters negligence on the part of third parties in the futurethe Legislature could reasonably believe such an application would encourage various entities, beginning on the effective date of the 2002 amendment, to ensure that they would always afford appropriate protection for their charges, in order to avoid the very open-ended risk that failure to protect a child could subject the entity to suit for an indefinite period. That the Legislature has decided that from now on, third party defendants may be liable for a relatively indefinite period in the futureperhaps for a child victim's entire lifetimedoes not mean that the Legislature must have intended the same extensive period of liability to apply to all third party malfeasance that occurred, for example, 60, 70, or more years in the past, without any limitation. The Legislature was aware that it was striking a balance between the strong interest of victims of abuse in redress of grievous injury and the burden on third party defendantswho may have discarded records in reliance on prior law and lost access to witnessesof being required to defend stale claims. We add that it is not unheard of for the Legislature to impose a strict limit even on undiscovered but deserving claims (see §§ 337.15 [10-year limit on latent, i.e., undiscovered, construction defect claims], 340.5 [limitations period of three years from injury or one year from discovery for medical malpractice claims]; Pen. Code, § 803, subd. (g) [for offenses committed prior to Jan. 1, 2002, a criminal complaint may be filed within one year of the date on which the identity of the suspect is established by DNA testing if the evidence was analyzed no later than Jan. 1, 2004].) (23) Plaintiffs also ask us to consider the public policy in favor of disposing of litigation on the merits rather than on procedural grounds that would result in the forfeiture of a plaintiff's rights. We acknowledge the policy in favor of disposing of claims on the merits but must also give weight to the equally strong policy in favor of affording reposea policy also considered by the Legislature. (See Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 592 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 904 P.2d 1205] [`even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and . . . the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them']; Krusesky v. Baugh (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 562, 566 [188 Cal.Rptr. 57] [The policy behind statutes of limitations is as meritorious as the policy of trying cases on their merits].) [23]
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter is remanded to that court for further action consistent with this opinion.