Opinion ID: 1280343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Safeguards Under Arizona's Sentencing Scheme

Text: While sentencing procedures in other states may give rise to a need for comparative proportionality review as an additional safeguard against arbitrary or capricious sentencing, Pulley, 465 U.S. at 45, 104 S.Ct. at 877, Arizona's capital-sentencing scheme does not. Our death statute applies only to defendants found guilty of first-degree murder as defined under state law, and permits the death penalty only when the sentencing judge, during a separate sentencing hearing, finds that at least one of the 10 statutory aggravating circumstances is present and that no mitigating circumstances warrant leniency. A.R.S. ง 13-703(A)-(C), (E)-(G); Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 54, 659 P.2d at 13 (statute prohibits a death sentence when none of the aggravating circumstances are found). Decisions by this court give substance to the operative terms of the death statute and provide sufficient sentencing guidance to presume that death sentences in Arizona meet constitutional requirements. Walton, ___ U.S. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 3057-58. Limiting definitions placed on aggravating circumstances, for example, circumscribe the sentencer's discretion within narrow parameters to insure that the death penalty is not arbitrarily, capriciously, or freakishly imposed. See, e.g., Walton, ___ U.S. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 3058 (definition given to the especially cruel aggravating factor gives meaningful sentencing guidance). With respect to possible mitigating circumstances, the sentencing judge must consider any aspect of defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense relevant to determining whether the death sentence should not be imposed. McCall, 160 Ariz. at 131, 770 P.2d at 1177, citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). Taken together, these procedures strike the requisite balance between the need for flexibility in order to afford individualized decision-making essential in capital cases, and the need for appropriate standards to prevent the arbitrariness that accompanies unbridled discretion. State v. Mata, 125 Ariz. 233, 242, 609 P.2d 48, 57, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 338, 66 L.Ed.2d 161 (1980). Further, our review of death cases goes the second constitutional mile without the aid of comparative proportionality analysis. Although the Supreme Court does not require any specific or heightened standard of appellate review in capital cases, Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258, 96 S.Ct. at 2969, [5] we undertake an extensive, independent review of each death sentence handed down under Arizona law. As explained in State v. Watson , [a] finding merely that the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court was `factually supported' or `justified by the evidence' is not the appellate treatment that the death penalty warrants. 129 Ariz. 60, 63, 628 P.2d 943, 946 (1981). We must determine for ourselves, based upon an independent review of the entire record, whether we believe that the death penalty should be imposed. Id. This independent review includes a painstaking search of the entire record for error, an examination of the facts that establish the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and a separate determination of whether the latter circumstances outweigh the former when both are present. Richmond, 114 Ariz. at 196, 560 P.2d at 51; see, e.g., State v. Rockwell, 161 Ariz. 5, 15-16, 775 P.2d 1069, 1079-80 (1989) (death sentence reduced because mitigating evidence questioned the propriety of the penalty); State v. Prince, 160 Ariz. 268, 275-76, 772 P.2d 1121, 1128-29 (1989) (sentence reduced to life because state failed to prove an aggravating circumstance); State v. Mauro, 159 Ariz. 186, 207-08, 766 P.2d 59, 80-81 (1988) (sentence reduced to life because defendant's mental impairment was a substantial mitigating factor); Watson, 129 Ariz. at 64, 628 P.2d at 947 (death sentence set aside because mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating circumstances). To provide yet another screen in cases posing any doubt whether the death penalty should be imposed, this court has resolved such doubt in favor of a life sentence. Rockwell, 161 Ariz. at 16, 775 P.2d at 1080; State v. Valencia, 132 Ariz. 248, 250, 645 P.2d 239, 241 (1982). The value of comparative proportionality review, proponents say, is that it compels the court to coordinate its actions with prior decisions in similar cases, thereby fostering uniform results. The independent review referenced above, however, already focuses the court's attention on prior, comparable cases. Section 13-703(F), for example, simply lists the 10 possible aggravating circumstances applicable to any given case. To determine the exact meaning and parameters of a particular aggravating circumstance, we must look at previous cases to see how the court interpreted ง 13-703(F) in light of similar facts. See, e.g., Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 50-53, 659 P.2d at 9-12 (court held that the statutory phrase especially heinous, cruel, or depraved has been construed in a constitutionally narrow fashion and examined its application in individual cases). The court employs the same strategy to review mitigating circumstances under ง 13-703(G). See, e.g., Rockwell, 161 Ariz. at 15, 775 P.2d at 1079 (prior cases helped determine whether a defendant's age may be a substantial and relevant mitigating factor). By verifying that certain aggravating or mitigating circumstances apply only to cases involving similar facts, our independent review performs an appropriate comparative function. Moreover, because of the wide range of mitigating evidence a defendant may proffer, see McCall, 160 Ariz. at 131, 770 P.2d at 1177, this court occasionally weighs leniency afforded other defendants as a mitigating factor. Leniency granted to an accomplice under a plea agreement, for example, does not in itself prevent the imposition of the death penalty, State v. Marlow, 163 Ariz. 65, 72, 786 P.2d 395, 402 (1989) (emphasis added), but we will consider such leniency  along with other mitigating circumstances in determining whether to impose the death penalty. State v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 76, 673 P.2d 1, 14 (1983) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892, 105 S.Ct. 267, 83 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984). In my opinion, comparative proportionality review serves little, if any, purpose that is not already accomplished by way of Arizona's narrowly construed death statute and our independent review of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each case. A sufficiently narrow death statute alone insures that the death penalty will only be imposed for the most serious crimes [and] ... that [it] will only be imposed for the same type of offenses which occur under the same types of circumstances.  Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270, 96 S.Ct. at 2955 (emphasis added); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07, 96 S.Ct. at 2941 (jury is unable to impose a freakish death sentence if it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines). Once this court evaluates the sentencing judge's compliance with the state's death statutes and then performs a separate review to provide added protection against arbitrariness and caprice, comparative proportionality review becomes an empty ritual. See Walton, ___ U.S. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 3058 (comparative proportionality review by the Arizona Supreme Court is not required because the death statute is construed in a manner that furnishes sufficient guidance to the sentencer); Pulley, 465 U.S. at 49, 104 S.Ct. at 878-79 (comparative proportionality review by the Texas Supreme Court is constitutionally superfluous).