Opinion ID: 2069959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Alleged Failure to Request an Enmund v. Florida Instruction

Text: Johnson next faults trial counsel for failing to request an instruction during the penalty phase, pursuant to Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), that an accomplice to a murder cannot be sentenced to death absent proof that he intended to take life or contemplated that life would be taken in the process. During the penalty phase, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: With regard to Damon Banks, there is one (1) aggravating circumstance that may be considered by you. That is, that at the time of the killing, Damon Banks was or had been involved, associated, or in competition with the defendant in the sale, distribution, or delivery of any controlled substance, and the defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing, and the killing resulted from or was related to that association, involvement or competition, to promote the defendant's activities in selling, distributing or delivering controlled substances. Since I have used the term accomplice again, and I, in no way can ask you what your verdicts were predicated upon yesterday, the Commonwealth needs to prove that the defendant killed or was an accomplice and cannot rely upon conspiracy liability for this aggravated circumstance. Therefore, I will briefly again tell you an accomplice isthe defendant is an accomplice of someone else if with the intent of promotion, or facilitating the commission of the crime, he solicits, commands, encourages, or requests the other person to commit it, or aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it. Sentencing N.T., 11/26/97, page 1033. We see nothing improper with this instruction as it clearly, adequately, and accurately reflects the law. Spotz, supra, 759 A.2d at 1287. Moreover, as we discussed above, the jury instruction on accomplice liability during the guilt phase was correct. As the jury had already determined that Johnson possessed the requisite intent to kill to support a finding of first-degree murder, the instruction was superfluous. In Commonwealth v. Chester, 526 Pa. 578, 587 A.2d 1367, 1385 (1991), cert. denied sub nom Laird v. Pennsylvania, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991) ( Chester I ), we held that by virtue of a jury finding a defendant guilty of first-degree murder based on a proper guilt phase accomplice liability instruction, as a matter of law, the defendant possessed the minimum culpability required under Enmund and its progeny. Accordingly, this issue does not present an avenue by which Johnson could obtain relief, as counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a claim that is devoid of arguable merit.