Opinion ID: 2090042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Defendant's Mistrial Motion

Text: Finally, defendant argues that the court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial following Detective Danforth's testimony that she believed that some of defendant's statements from the October 7 Bethel barracks interview had been suppressed. As discussed previously, the court allowed defendant's statements prior to Mr. Mears' invocation of defendant's right to silence, but suppressed all statements after the father's invocation. At trial, however, the following colloquy between Detective Danforth and defense counsel took place during cross-examination: Defense Counsel: [Defendant] continued to tell you that he wanted to kill himself by using a gun to his head, right? Detective Danforth: That's correct. Q: And this is during the time period when you are trying to interview this person, right? A: Yes. Q: And once you had confronted him with the evidence that you knew that you had he became more upset about it, right? A: Yes, he did. Q: He kept telling you that he just wanted to kill himself? A: I believe those statements have been suppressed. Defense counsel objected to Detective Danforth's testimony that certain statements had been suppressed. At a bench conference, defendant moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the testimony revealed to the jury that statements had been suppressed and indicated that defendant was hiding information from their consideration. The court denied the mistrial motion, but gave this curative instruction  which met with defendant's approval  to the jury: The last statement that the officer made should be disregarded. Let me give you a little explanation about suppression, so that you are not left with the impression that we are withholding anything from you that you should be considering. I have previously ruled that when Mr. Mears, acting as guardian for Jason, told Officer Danforth that Jason would no longer talk to her, a statement that Jason made in the brief period of time that they were all together thereafter was not to [be admitted as] evidence in the trial. Now, Officer Danforth thought that the question Mr. Griffin asked referred to that statement. And that was not Mr. Griffin's intention and he will ask another question. You are instructed to disregard both the question that Mr. Griffin asked and the answer that Officer Danforth gave, the last question and the last answer only. And you are further instructed not to speculate regarding any matter that I have ruled not in evidence in this case. Defendant now contends that the court erred in denying his mistrial motion, and that he suffered prejudice as a result of Detective Danforth's testimony. The court has discretion in ruling on a mistrial motion, but should not grant the motion unless the moving party establishes prejudice. State v. Jones, 160 Vt. 440, 449, 631 A.2d 840, 847 (1993). We will uphold the court's ruling unless the court's discretion was either totally withheld or exercised on grounds clearly untenable or unreasonable. State v. Roberts, 154 Vt. 59, 73, 574 A.2d 1248, 1255 (1990). In determining whether a defendant has suffered prejudice, we examine the totality of the circumstances, considering the testimony within the context of the entire proceedings. See State v. Covell, 142 Vt. 197, 199, 453 A.2d 1118, 1119 (1982). Here, the State presented testimonial and physical evidence that overwhelmingly established that defendant was the assailant. Indeed, as defendant states on appeal, the defense did not contest the attack or its brutality. Furthermore, as the trial court noted in a bench conference with defense counsel, the counsel's cross-examination questions elicited a response that you have to, in part, be responsible for. Finally, the court's immediate and unequivocal curative instruction was sufficient to cure any potential prejudice. State v. LaBounty, 168 Vt. 129, 140, 716 A.2d 1, 8 (1998). Thus, any possible prejudice visited upon defendant was minimal. The court was in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial effect of a response induced by defendant's cross-examination, and it committed no error in denying defendant's mistrial motion. See Jones, 160 Vt. at 449, 631 A.2d at 847. Moreover, defense counsel expressly declined to object after the court read the instruction; thus, defendant has failed to preserve the issue he now raises for appellate review. State v. Calloway, 157 Vt. 217, 219, 596 A.2d 368, 370 (1991). Our review reveals no plain error in the court's action here. See id. Affirmed.