Opinion ID: 198181
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion Requesting a Status Conference

Text: 41 The excludability of the next segment of time turns on whether the government's motion to set a status conference filed on January 24, 1996 is a pretrial motion within the meaning of section 3161(h)(1)(F). Barnes argues that such a motion does not qualify as a pretrial motion because it is not of a substantive nature. For its part, the government insists that it is a pretrial motion and argues that time should be excluded from the moment the motion was filed until the date of the requested status conference. 42 We hold that a motion requesting the scheduling of a pretrial conference is a pretrial motion so as to trigger an exclusion under the Speedy Trial Act. Section 3161(h)(1)(F) states, rather expansively, that delay resulting from any pretrial motion shall be excluded. It does not distinguish between more significant or complex pretrial motions and simple or routine motions. For this reason, we have read the term pretrial motion broadly to encompass all manner of motions, ranging from informal requests for laboratory reports, see United States v. Jorge, 865 F.2d 6, 11 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1027, 109 S.Ct. 1762, 104 L.Ed.2d 198 (1989), to implied requests for a new trial date, see Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d at 17. A motion requesting the scheduling of a status conference has undeniable pretrial significance: all kinds of matters affecting the course of trial, including discovery, motions, and trial dates may be discussed at such a conference. Cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 17.1 ([T]he court upon motion of any party or upon its own motion may order one or more conferences to consider such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.). There seems to be no good reason to exclude a motion for a status conference from the universe of possible pretrial motions. See, e.g., United States v. Bellucci, 737 F.Supp. 706, 710 (D.Mass.1990) (Tauro, D.J.) (holding that motion for status conference was pretrial motion for purposes of tolling Speedy Trial Act). Hence, in this case, the clock stopped as soon as the government filed its motion seeking a status conference on January 24, 1996. 43 The next question is how much time should be tolled. The Supreme Court has construed subsection (F) as setting forth a two-tiered approach to determining the extent of excludable delay caused by the submission and disposition of pretrial motions. See Henderson, 476 U.S. at 329-30, 106 S.Ct. 1871. For a pretrial motion on which a hearing is held, the entire period from the filing of the motion to the date of the hearing, regardless of when the hearing is scheduled, plus up to 30 additional days while the motion is under advisement is automatically excluded. See id.; Rodriguez, 63 F.3d at 1163. By contrast, when motions that require no hearing are involved, time is tolled only until the prompt disposition of the motion, which ordinarily cannot exceed the 30-day under advisement period. 3 Henderson, 476 U.S. at 329, 106 S.Ct. 1871; see Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d at 17; S.Rep. No. 96-212, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 34 (1979) ([I]f motions are so simple or routine that they do not require a hearing, necessary advisement time should be considerably less than 30 days.). A motion is deemed to be taken under advisement when  'the court receives all the papers it reasonably expects.'  Rodriguez, 63 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Henderson, 476 U.S. at 329, 106 S.Ct. 1871). 44 Because a motion requesting only the scheduling of a status conference requires no hearing--marked by oral argument, factual findings, or legal rulings--but involves merely the simple administrative act of setting a date, it must be resolved within 30 days of the date the Court has received all it expects to properly consider the request. See Rodriguez, 63 F.3d at 1165-66; United States v. Ferris, 751 F.2d 436, 440 (1st Cir.1984); 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(J). It follows that such a motion is resolved as soon as the conference is actually scheduled--not when the various matters for possible discussion, in fact, are broached--and that the clock will start again the following day. The government disagrees, arguing that the clock should be tolled until the actual date of the conference, which it calls a hearing; but to adopt this reasoning would contravene the language of the Act. Because the setting of the date resolves the motion in its entirety, the conference cannot possibly represent a hearing on ... such motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F). 45 In United States v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596 (1st Cir.1996), we held that a hearing is any on-the-record colloquy in which the district court hears the arguments of counsel and considers those arguments prior to deciding a pending motion. Id. at 602. Our reasoning today is entirely consistent with that decision. Once a conference has been set down on a court's calendar, there is no longer any pending motion to decide. The motion seeking a status conference has already been resolved. 46 Needless to say, there are varieties of motions that may or may not require a hearing. But we need not wander too deeply into this thicket today, for we hold only that motions seeking nothing more than the scheduling of a conference must be acted upon within 30 days. In doing so, we emphasize that, consistent with the letter and spirit of the Speedy Trial Act, relatively simple motions should be disposed of expeditiously or the clock will resume ticking. 47 Applying the foregoing principles to the present facts, we find that the clock was tolled from January 24 until January 31, 1996. The clock ran for the next six days and stopped again on February 7, 1996, when Reynaldo Barnes moved to adjourn the conference. Although the court made no express findings in granting the motion, the letter motion itself makes clear that Reynaldo Barnes's counsel was unavailable until at least the first of March due to conflicts with his work and personal schedules. Thus, the court's decision to grant the continuance comports with the requirements of section 3161(h)(8)(A). See United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 507 (1st Cir.1984) ([I]t is not necessary for the court to articulate the basic facts when they are obvious and set forth in a motion for a continuance.), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004, 105 S.Ct. 1355, 84 L.Ed.2d 378 (1985). The clock resumed on March 5, 1996, the day after the conference. The clock temporarily stopped again on March 18 due to defendants' two overlapping requests to postpone the trial, and remained stopped until October 8, 1996. 48 At this point, 61 nonexcludable days had already accrued. 49