Opinion ID: 1387454
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appeal of Final Order of Removal

Text: Guled petitions this court for review of the BIA's final order of removal, which affirmed the IJ's decision finding him removable and denying his applications for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. He argues: (1) legal errors committed by the IJ and BIA violated his due process rights; (2) the IJ misapplied the balancing test used to determine whether cancellation of removal is appropriate; (3) the IJ abused its discretion in denying his claim for asylum and in failing to consider his claims for withholding of removal and relief under Article III of the Convention Against Torture.
When the Court reviews a BIA determination regarding eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention Against Torture, the substantial evidence standard is utilized. See Diallo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 451, 454 (8th Cir.2007). Such is an extremely deferential standard of review. Id. (citing Salkeld v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 804, 809 (8th Cir.2005)). The INA, as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, states the court of appeals is to decide the petition for review of a finals order of removal only on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). It also provides the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). The Attorney General's discretionary decision not to grant asylumdelegated to the IJ, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.14(a)is conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D). The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish eligibility for relief, and the alien may sustain this burden by his own testimony, if credible. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(a), 1208.16(b) & 1208.16(c)(2).
Guled appeals the BIA's order denying his application for cancellation of removal, arguing misapplication of law and a violation of his due process rights; An alien may apply for relief in the form of cancellation of removal if he meets the requirements set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). Once an alien has cleared the non-discretionary legal requirements for eligibility, the IJ makes a discretionary determination whether the alien merits the relief of cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The decision to grant cancellation of removal is a discretionary act by the Attorney General which this Court may not review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). We may review the non-discretionary determinations underlying such a decision, such as the predicate legal question whether the IJ properly applied the law to the facts in determining an individual's eligibility. Reyes-Vasquez v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir.2005). We may also review constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). It is undisputed Guled met the eligibility requirements set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). He appeals the IJ's non-reviewable discretionary determination he did not merit relief. He argues his appeal of the denial of cancellation of removal is properly before this Court because he brings a constitutional claim, arguing the IJ deprived him of his Fifth Amendment right to due process by allowing a witness to testify without giving him proper notice. We do not have jurisdiction to review the denial of cancellation of removal on this basis. Cancellation of removal is a discretionary remedy, roughly equivalent to executive clemency, over which the executive branch has unfettered discretion. INS v. Yang, .519 U.S. 26, 30, 117 S.Ct. 350, 136 L.Ed.2d 288 (1996). Because adjustment of status amounts to a power to dispense mercy, an alien can have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in such speculative relief and cannot state a claim for a violation of due process rights. Etchu-Njang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577, 585 (8th Cir.2005) (citing Nativi-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir.2003)). The failure to receive discretionary adjustment-of-status relief does not constitute the deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty interest. Nativi-Gomez, 344 F.3d at 808. For this reason, Guled cannot state a claim for a violation of due process rights. Guled further argues his appeal of the denial of cancellation of removal is properly before this Court because the IJ misapplied the legal standard when making its discretionary determination; he argues this is a reviewable question of law. He agrees the IJ and BIA each applied the appropriate standard, as outlined in Matter of Marin, 16 I & N Dec. at 584-85, but argues the IJ improperly weighed the factors in the proper balancing test. Despite his characterization of the appeal as a question of law, what he challenges is the discretionary conclusion of not meriting a favorable exercise of discretion. This Court does not have jurisdiction to review the denial of cancellation of removal of such a basis. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).
Guled also appeals the denial of his application for asylum. He first argues the IJ erred by discounting several critical parts of his testimony and asks this Court to determine the IJ did not have valid grounds on which to conclude he was not credible. The IJ found the testimony relating to Guled's clan membership, which is the heart of his asylum claim, to be substantively inconsistent. Substantive inconsistencies on key issues of an asylum claim can support an adverse credibility finding. See Hong Zhang Cao v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 657, 661 (8th Cir.2006: Where an adverse credibility finding is at the heart of an alien's asylum claim, such credibility determination can be dispositive as to whether the alien merits asylum. See Sheikh v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1077, 1080-81 (8th Cir.2005); Jalloh v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 894, 898-99 (8th Cir.2005). [A]n IJ making a credibility determination must give reasons that are specific enough that a reviewing court can appreciate the reasoning behind the decision and cogent enough that a reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to reach the contrary conclusion. Chen v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 797, at 803 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted) (citing Singh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 553, 557-58 (8th Cir.2007)). Our review of the record confirms the discrepancies described by the IJ are actually present and provide cogent reasons to conclude his testimony was not credible. As the IJ noted, he did not provide a convincing explanation for the discrepancies in the record regarding his clan membership. The evidence was not so strong that any reasonable factfinder would be compelled to conclude he belonged to the Madhiban clan and had a well-founded fear of persecution. We see no reason to disturb the IJ's adverse credibility determination. Guled next argues the IJ erroneously concluded he was ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We disagree. The IJ found he did not qualify for asylum because he could not credibly demonstrate as to being a refugee within the meaning of Section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA. Since substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the IJ's findings he could not prove being a refugee and could not prove a well-founded fear of persecution, we cannot say the IJ's decision to deny his application for asylum was manifestly contrary to law or an abuse of discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D).
An application for asylum automatically includes a request for withholding of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(b); see INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 420 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984). An alien may not be removed if the alien shows there is a clear probability his life or freedom would be threatened in [the alien's] country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The standard for withholding of removal is a clear probability of persecution, which is more rigorous than the well-founded fear standard for asylum. Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 613 (8th Cir.2004); Wondmneh v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir.2004). Therefore, an alien who cannot meet the standard for asylum cannot meet the standard for establishing withholding of removal. Ngure, 367 F.3d at 992. Accordingly, having found Guled failed to meet the well-founded fear of persecution standard for asylum, we conclude the BIA did not err in concluding he could not meet the standard for withholding of removal.
An applicant seeking relief under the Convention Against Torture bears the burden of establishing it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Ngure, 367 F.3d at 992. Although the IJ's adverse credibility determination and adverse decisions on asylum and withholding of removal are not determinative of a Convention Against Torture claim, Guled has not met his burden. The record contains no evidence that would establish any government would have reason to torture him. For the reasons he failed to carry his burden for asylum and withholding of removal, he likewise fails to carry his burden for relief under the Convention Against Torture. Guled argues the IJ erred by not independently analyzing his claim for relief under Article III of the Convention Against Torture. A separate analysis, however, is required only when there is evidence the alien may be tortured for reasons unrelated to his claims for asylum and withholding of removal. Alemu v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 572, 576 (8th Cir.2005). Guled does not point to any evidence in the record, nor have WE? found any, which indicates he may be tortured for reasons unrelated to his claims for asylum and withholding of removal. Thus, we conclude the BIA did not err.