Opinion ID: 2179687
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Affidavits Deficient

Text: Probable cause to search Dorsey's two automobiles exists if the affidavit sets forth facts that would permit an impartial judicial officer to reasonably conclude that the items sought would be found in those locations. [13] In determining whether probable cause has been demonstrated, there must be a logical nexus between the items sought and the place to be searched. [14] Accordingly, when this Court reviews the affidavit to determine if probable cause existed to search Dorsey's vehicles for any clothing or items that appeared to have the presence of blood and an unknown caliber handgun, the information set forth within the affidavit's four corners, and any logical inference from the specific facts alleged, must demonstrate why it was objectively reasonable for the police to expect to find the items sought in those locations. [15] In Dorsey's case, the four corners of the affidavit do not comport with Section 2306's requirement that the complaint recite the facts why the items sought would be found in Dorsey's vehicles. [16] When the nine paragraphs in the four corners of the affidavit are parsed seriatim, there is no logical deductive basis for a neutral judicial determination that there was probable cause to believe that either bloody clothing or a hand gun would be found in Dorsey's vehicles. The first paragraph states Dorsey called the police to report the crime. The second paragraph recites that Dorsey waited for the police to arrive, identified himself as the owner of the premises, explained the circumstances, and reported that there were multiple boarders in his property. The third paragraph provides that the police checked the crime scene and found the victim had sustained a single gun shot wound to the head. The fourth paragraph recounts that the police were unable to locate a weapon at the immediate crime scene. The fifth paragraph represents that the police were still trying to identify and interview all of the other tenants. The sixth paragraph reflects that Dorsey stated he forced entry into Williams' room because he had tried to contact Williams for two days without success. The seventh paragraph reports that the police had executed a search warrant for the entire premises and had not yet located a firearm. The eighth paragraph states that Dorsey voluntarily consented to be tested for gunshot and metal residue but refused a request to search his vehicles. The ninth paragraph, without any further attempt to explain why evidence would reasonably be expected to be found in Dorsey's vehicles, simply states: the police  wish  to process Dorsey's two vehicles and  wish  to secure potential physical evidence of the crime. The Superior Court's written decision concluded that the affidavit does not specifically state facts to support a belief that the gun used in the shooting or bloody items of clothing would be in Dorsey's car. [17] Nevertheless, the Superior Court inferred probable cause from the nature of the crime and the items sought by the police. [18] The Superior Court did not base that inference on the information contained within the four corners of the affidavit, however, but instead based that inference on its own prior inference that the police suspected Dorsey. The Superior Court then speculated that if Dorsey did shoot Williams, he might have hidden the murder weapon in one of his nearby automobiles. Probable cause to search and probable cause to arrest are not fungible legal concepts, and each involves a distinctly separate inquiry. The focus of probable cause to search is upon a place, i.e., whether contraband or evidence will be found in a particular location. The focus of probable cause to arrest is upon a person, i.e., whether a criminal offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. Earlier this year in Whitner, the Third Circuit reiterated that probable cause to arrest does not automatically provide probable cause to search the arrestee's home. [19] The Third Circuit based that holding on the well-established legal distinction that search warrants are directed, not at persons, but at property where there is probable cause to believe that instrumentalities or evidence of crime will be found. [20] In Jones, the Third Circuit acknowledged, however, that although probable cause to arrest does not automatically provide probable cause to search the defendant's home, the fact that probable cause to arrest has been established increases the probability that the defendant is storing evidence of that crime in the defendant's residence. [21] The affidavit in support of the application to search Dorsey's vehicles does not state Dorsey had been arrested or even that he was suspected of committing any crime. The Superior Court inferred the police thought that Dorsey was a criminal suspect because they wished to search his vehicles. Assuming arguendo that the police suspected Dorsey, both the United States Constitution and Delaware Constitution require an impartial judicial officer to assess whether there is probable cause to conduct a search. [22] As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the purpose of the United States [and Delaware's] Constitution's requirement of demonstrating probable cause is not to deny law enforcement officers the support of usual inferences which reasonable individuals draw from objective evidence, but to require those inferences to be drawn by a detached judicial officer rather than the police officer. [23] If probable cause to arrest does not automatically provide probable cause to search the arrestee's home, then a fortiori the inference that someone is a suspect does not constitute probable cause to search that suspect's home or automobiles. Nevertheless, the State argues that even if Dorsey was not an arrestee and even if Dorsey was not a suspect, the Superior Court reasonably inferred that a murder weapon missing from a crime is likely to be concealed in an automobile parked in close proximity to the scene and registered to the person who first located the decedent. The State's argument is not the product of an orderly and logical deductive process. This Court has held firsthand knowledge that the items identified in a warrant application are actually located in the place to be searched is not always required in an affidavit to establish probable cause. [24] In addition, we have held there is no requirement that the owner of the property to be searched or seized is even suspected of criminal activity. [25] Instead, this Court has framed the question as whether, based upon the specific facts alleged within the four corners of the affidavit, one would normally expect to find those items at that place. [26] If so, then that inference will suffice to allow the valid issuance of a search warrant for that place. [27] It is illogical for the State to argue that it is normal to expect to find the murder weapon missing from a crime scene concealed in the automobile of the first person to discover a murder victim's body.