Opinion ID: 2453092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: James's Due Process Right To Confront And Cross-Examine Adverse Witnesses Was Violated.

Text: James argued during the administrative and superior court proceedings that basing his disciplinary determination solely on hearsay evidence in the incident report was a due process violation. [27] James makes related claims on appeal, namely that Mathey and Richey were not at the disciplinary hearing and only hearsay evidence was presented. The gravamen of James's argument is that because the incident report was written by Mathey rather than Richey, and because neither Mathey nor Richey appeared at the disciplinary hearing, James did not have an opportunity to confront and cross-examine his accusers. [28] Though James characterizes this as an evidentiary issue, he also claims that it violated his constitutional rights, and whether certain testimonial evidence may be admissible under the rules of evidence does not resolve whether using such evidence against an accused is constitutionally permissible. [29] Thus, the relevant consideration on appeal is whether James's due process confrontation right was violated during the disciplinary proceedings. An inmate's right to call witnesses in the inmate's defense and the right to confront adverse witnesses are separate, distinguishable due process guarantees. [30] In explicitly extending the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses to inmates, the McGinnis court cited the premise that the rights to confrontation and cross-examination are fundamental prerequisites to a fair hearing. [31] As we explained, `[c]ross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested,' and `the main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.' [32] We recognized that in some instances allowing an inmate to confront accusers could become erosive of authority and order in prison but concluded that those concerns did not justify a blanket denial on the part of inmates to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. [33] Ultimately, we held that an inmate should have the right to call witnesses and the right of cross-examination unless there are compelling reasons ... for abridging those rights. [34] We confirmed the importance of the confrontation right in Abruska, where we determined that a disciplinary committee's failure to question the staff member who wrote the incident report when the author was at the disciplinary hearing constituted a due process violation. [35] An inmate's due process right to confront accusers in disciplinary proceedings is specifically addressed by state regulations at 22 AAC 05.435. Among other things, the regulation provides that if the accused prisoner... requests the disciplinary tribunal to call as a witness the member of the facility staff who wrote the disciplinary report, the staff member shall appear as a witness and the proceedings shall be postponed if the staff member is temporarily unavailable. [36] The provision also states that an accused may only be excluded from the hearing during witness testimony if the hearing officer orally notes the reasons for denying confrontation for the record. [37] Several other regulations regarding prison disciplinary proceedings also reflect a concern for an inmate's confrontation right. For example, 22 AAC 05.455(a) directs that an incident report may be considered as evidence and serve as the sole basis for a disciplinary determination only [i]f a prisoner does not request the presence of the facility staff member who wrote the disciplinary report. [38] And as noted below, while state regulations provide that an inmate must request witnesses who will testify on the inmate's behalf with a 24-hour advance written notice, there is no similar procedural requirement for requesting the presence of adverse witnesses. [39] Pursuant to this regulation, the accused prisoner will have an opportunity to confront accusers unless the prisoner forgoes that option. In addition, we have required that the disciplinary committee must question the staff member who wrote the disciplinary report whenever the inmate has requested the appearance of the writer of the report. [40] Another regulation, 22 AAC 05.410(b), provides that a disciplinary report must be written by the staff member with the most direct knowledge of the incident. This requirement ensures that an inmate and the disciplinary hearing officer will be able to identify the inmate's accuser, and that the accuser has direct knowledge and can testify regarding facts and observations rather than report hearsay evidence. The superior court determined that James's due process rights had not been infringed because there was no evidence in the record that James complied with the 24-hour advance written notice requirement for requesting witnesses. [41] As an initial matter, the implied characterization of Richey and Mathey as James's own witnesses is incorrect. As explained above, Richey, as the officer with the most direct knowledge of the incident, should have written the incident report. [42] While failure to follow a state regulation is not a per se constitutional violation, [43] here the regulation at issue, designed to protect an inmate's opportunity to confront accusers, implicated James's due process rights. Mathey's writing the incident report was qualitatively different than the situation in Brandon I, where two officers were in an inmate's room at the same time and one found the contraband but the other ultimately wrote up the report. [44] We recognized that [t]echnically, the officer who finds the alleged contraband is required to write up the disciplinary report but concluded that the other officer's writing the report did not violate due process because the inmate failed to show that any deficiency ... in any way prejudiced [him]. [45] In contrast, James demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the fact that the report was not authored by Richey because he maintained that [w]hat was actually said in the conversation with [Richey] is a lot different than the hearsay report of the security chief. Thus, James had the right to confront both Richey, who had the conversation with James that formed the basis of the incident report's charge and should have written the report, and Mathey, who did write up the account of the incident. Both were James's accusers for confrontation purposes. The superior court was therefore incorrect in concluding that James was required to request Richey's and Mathey's presence with 24-hour advance written notice. While the state regulations provide that an inmate may call witnesses on the inmate's behalf by requesting those witnesses with a 24-hour advance written notice, there is no identical procedural requirement to make a written request for the presence of the inmate's accusers. [46] Rather, the author of the incident report shall appear if the accused prisoner requests the disciplinary tribunal to call that person as a witness. [47] The fact that Mathey improperly wrote the report in Richey's stead, in violation of the regulation's requirement, does not transform Richey into James's own witness. [48] James alleges that he requested Richey's and Mathey's presence at the beginning of the disciplinary hearinghe asked how come the writer of the report, and my witness, Mr. Rich[ey], are not here and was informed that they don't have to be here if they don't want to be. Because Mathey and Richey were not James's own witnesses but James's accusers, and because James sought their presence at the disciplinary hearing, James's failure to comply with the 24-hour written notice required for calling witnesses in the accused prisoner's defense did not excuse Mathey and Richey from attending the hearing, and their absence violated James's due process confrontation right. Our conclusion finds support in cases from New Jersey, which also extends the confrontation right to inmates in disciplinary proceedings when necessary for an adequate presentation of the evidence, particularly when serious issues of credibility are involved. [49] One New Jersey court held that an inmate was entitled to confront the accusing officer where the outcome turned on whether the inmate had intentionally blocked a doorway, explaining that if an inmate's alleged infraction turns on the credibility of the officer or the inmate the inmate is entitled to confront and cross-examine the officer. [50] The court explained this type of case could not be resolved exclusively by reference to the charging officer's report; rather the inmate is entitled to challenge the officer's perceptions by developing why the officer thought the incident was purposeful as opposed to accidental. [51] Three years later, a New Jersey court again held that a disciplinary hearing violated an inmate's due process confrontation right, reasoning: When [the inmate] was denied in-person confrontation and cross-examination ... of... his accuser, he was deprived of the fundamental opportunity to develop his defense by revealing the weaknesses in the accusation against him either on the basis of the accuser's credibility or otherwise. The hearing officer's decision was based on a credibility finding favorable to [the accuser]. It was a determination that could not be fairly reached without affording [the inmate] the opportunity to address the credibility issue effectively.... Nothing substitutes for the trier of fact's opportunity, in measuring truth or falsity, to view the witness's demeanor in presenting his allegations.[ [52] ] Because Mathey and Richey were James's accusers, James did not have to do more than request their presence during the disciplinary hearing and their absence was a due process violation.