Opinion ID: 419941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: KVUE's Position

Text: 11 Our inquiry cannot always turn on either the standing or the case or controversy requirement alone. The concepts are sometimes so interrelated that the determination can be made only by considering both. For example, in Younger, the Court held that three of the four plaintiffs, who had never been arrested, indicted, or even threatened with prosecution, lacked standing to sue because their complaint alleged only that they felt inhibited in their desire to distribute handbills by the statute they challenged. This fear, the Court held, was imaginary or speculative. 401 U.S. at 42, 91 S.Ct. at 749, 27 L.Ed.2d at 674. As to them the Court focused attention on the standing aspect of justiciability, not on the existence of a controversy. The fourth plaintiff, who was actually being prosecuted in state court, had an obvious controversy with the state, id. at 41, 91 S.Ct. at 749, 27 L.Ed.2d at 673, 15 but was required nonetheless to present his constitutional argument in the criminal proceeding in state court. 12 In Steffel, however, the Court found an actual controversy because the plaintiff had been twice warned to stop distributing handbills and had been told that, if he continued to pass out the leaflets, he would likely be prosecuted. In addition, his handbilling companion had been prosecuted. The Court stated that this evidence was ample demonstration that petitioner's concern with arrest has not been 'chimerical.' In these circumstances, it is not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights. 415 U.S. at 459, 94 S.Ct. at 1215-16, 39 L.Ed.2d at 514 (citation omitted). It was not necessary for the plaintiff to allege or demonstrate irreparable injury. 16 13 In Babbitt, the Court considered a challenge to several provisions of a statute affecting the plaintiffs' conduct. The Court posed two situations: first, a case in which the plaintiff allege[s] an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [in which] there exists a credible threat of prosecution ....; second, a case in which plaintiffs  'do not claim that they have ever been threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely possible ....'  17 In the former instance, the Court stated, the plaintiff need not wait for the state to initiate criminal proceedings in order to secure relief; in the latter, the plaintiffs do not allege a dispute susceptible to resolution by a federal court. 442 U.S. at 299, 99 S.Ct. at 2309, 60 L.Ed.2d at 906-907. 18 14 KVUE charged the advertising rates required by the statute until October 1981, losing some $2,300 in revenue in 1980 and $2,100 in 1981. It filed suit on October 29, 1981, and obtained a temporary restraining order preventing enforcement of the statute. Until November 17, 1981, when the restraining order was vacated, it charged rates greater than Sec. 14.09(B) permits, and, during this period at least, suffered no loss of revenue as a result of the statute. 15 The state and county assert that KVUE also lacks standing because it has no real basis for apprehending that it will be prosecuted for charging rates in excess of those permitted by the statute. County Attorney Margaret Moore testified that she had not threatened KVUE with prosecution because she had not received a complaint, but had only advised people what information she would require before undertaking a prosecution. She stated that she did not anticipate prosecuting KVUE but would not issue advisory opinions about the likelihood of a prosecution without having a set of facts before her. She referred to the ambiguous language of Article 14.09(B), which might conceivably authorize the political advertising rates presently charged by KVUE and stated: 16 This statute ... has some problems in it, ... and I'll be honest with you, I would be hard pressed to prosecute anyone under that statute without some sort of clarification as to a number of different items. In other words, there are a number of problems in there for a prosecutor if you are really going to talk about putting a case together, so it's safer for me to say I'm not going to prosecute anyone than it is to say I am given the situation at this time. 17 The Attorney General of Texas has since released a formal opinion clarifying the statute. See Op.Tex.Att'y Gen. MW-488 (July 7, 1982). We take judicial notice of this opinion and consider the effect, if any, of the Attorney General's opinion on KVUE's standing without remanding the case for the district court's views. 19 18 The district judge concluded that the County Attorney's testimony would clearly allay any reasonable fear of prosecution. We do not find the testimony so reassuring even without the clarification provided by the Attorney General's opinion. 19 The threat to KVUE looms between the chimerical apprehension that the Younger Court labeled too unreal to warrant litigation and the fear that the Steffel Court treated as sufficiently real to warrant judicial consideration. The station alleges that it desires to violate the statute and has demonstrated that the county attorney, pursuant to her statutory duty to enforce the law and despite her concerns about the statute's possible ambiguity, would not rule out prosecution. The county attorney's concerns about the statute's ambiguity should indeed have been allayed by the Attorney General's opinion, creating the likelihood that this would no longer be a deterrent. Furthermore, the possibility that an advertiser may file a complaint with the county attorney is not entirely supposititious. Several advertisers filed written protests with KVUE when it did not charge the lowest unit rate and another inquired of the county attorney's office what might be done, testifying that he would at least consider filing a complaint to settle the question. 20 In addition, KVUE offered evidence that it suffered actual monetary losses during the time it obeyed the law and that it has in fact violated the statute since vacation of the restraining order. The combination of these facts persuades us that KVUE has standing to sue and has presented us with a live controversy between adverse parties. 21 The threat is more immediate than that held insufficient to confer standing in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). In Lyons, the Supreme Court held that a person who had been once subjected to an allegedly illegal chokehold lacked standing to seek an injunction barring the future use of such chokeholds. The Court stated: That [the plaintiff] may have been illegally choked by the police on October 6, 1976 ... does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he [will] again be stopped ... by an officer ... who [will] illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation or resistance on his part. Id. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 1667, 75 L.Ed.2d at 686. 22 KVUE has suffered actual financial loss as a result of the enforcement of the statutes. Should we refrain from deciding the case, KVUE will have to comply with the law and suffer a loss of revenue or defy it and face the likelihood of prosecution. Therefore, this case is not controlled by Lyons; it is more like Kolender v. Lawson, --- U.S. ----, ---- n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1857 n. 3, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 908 n. 3 (1983), in which the Court held that a plaintiff stopped by police 15 times in two years had standing because of the existence of a credible threat that he might again be detained. 20 23 That the statute has not been enforced and that there is no certainty that it will be does not establish the lack of a case or controversy. The state has not disavowed enforcement. As the Court stated in Babbitt: 24 [W]hen fear of criminal prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional statute is not imaginary or wholly speculative a plaintiff need not first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge [the] statute. The ... criminal penalty provision applies in terms to [a]ny person ... who violates any provision of the Act. Moreover, the State has not disavowed any intention of invoking the criminal penalty provision against [the plaintiffs]. Appellees are thus not without some reason in fearing prosecution .... In our view, the positions of the parties are sufficiently adverse with respect to the ... provision ... to present a case or controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court. 25 442 U.S. at 302, 99 S.Ct. at 2310-11, 60 L.Ed.2d at 909 (citations and footnote omitted).