Opinion ID: 2329269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jurisdiction and Choice of Law

Text: Respondent has taken and subscribed to the oath of admission, was admitted to the Colorado bar on September 16, 1980, and is registered upon the official records under attorney registration number 10381. Although Respondent was licensed to practice law in Texas, where he maintained his office, he is currently suspended from the practice of law in both states. Respondent contends that the PDJ and the Hearing Board lack jurisdiction in this matter and that his conduct should be judged under Texas disciplinary rules, rather than Colorado disciplinary rules. [9] The basis for both arguments is that (1) he practiced from an office in Texas and (2) his client was housed at ADMAX, which he claims is a federal enclave that is not part of the State of Colorado. The PDJ first considers the jurisdictional and choice of law issues in light of Respondent's argument regarding his Texas-based practice; the PDJ then examines whether the federal nature of ADMAX alters his conclusions. [10] C.R.C.P. 251.1(b) provides that [e]very attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Colorado is subject to the disciplinary and disability jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in all matters relating to the practice of law. In addition, Colo. RPC 8.5(a) states that [a] lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. Here, Respondent is licensed to practice law in Colorado and this proceeding concerns his practice of law. As such, the fact that Respondent practiced from an office in Texas does not divest the Colorado Supreme Court, the PDJ, or the Hearing Board of jurisdiction over this matter. The choice of law in Colorado disciplinary proceedings is governed by Colo. RPC 8.5. Where the conduct of a lawyer licensed in Colorado is not connected with a matter pending before a tribunal, as here, Colo. RPC 8.5(b) requires the PDJ to apply the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur. Here, Respondent practiced from an office in Texas and was considering filing a motion on Allen's behalf in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. But in other respects, Respondent's representation of Allen involved substantial connections to the State of Colorado: Allen is housed in a correctional facility in Colorado, Respondent traveled to Colorado to meet with Allen, Respondent arranged for a psychiatrist to meet with Allen in Colorado, and Respondent communicated with Allen through telephone calls and letters to Colorado. The PDJ determined in his first motion granting partial judgment on the pleadings that, although it was debatable whether Respondent's conduct occurred in Colorado or in Texas, the predominant effect of Respondent's representation of Allen was in Colorado. [11] Given that Allen was incarcerated in Colorado and had hired Respondent to obtain his release from prison, Respondent's conduct in this matter primarily affected Allen, who is located in Colorado. Under these facts, there is no basis for Respondent to have reasonably believe[d] the predominant effect of [his] conduct would occur elsewhere. Accordingly, the PDJ applied Colorado law in considering both of the People's motions for partial judgment on the pleadings. At the disciplinary hearing, the People introduced additional evidence of the relationship between Respondent's conduct and the State of Colorado, in the form of an August 8, 2008, letter from Respondent soliciting Allen's business. In the letter, Respondent recommends filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in federal court in Denver and claims: I am also a full member of the Colorado Bar, the U.S. District Court in Denver, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and know most of the Denver AUSAs [Assistant United States Attorneys] and District Court judges in whose courts I have regularly practiced since becoming a licensed member of that Bar since [sic] 1980. Yet at the disciplinary hearing, Respondent testified that his legal experience in this state is limited to one sentencing matter in U.S. District Court in Denver and one argument before the Colorado Supreme Court. Respondent offered the untenable argument that his letter referred to his appearance in a Tenth Circuit case in Wyoming, during the course of which he gained some familiarity with Tenth Circuit judicial opinions and spoke by telephone with an AUSA about extensions for filing legal briefs. The PDJ finds that Respondent's reference to purportedly significant legal connections and practice in Colorado in the course of soliciting Allen's business provides further support for applying Colorado disciplinary rules in this matter. Respondent argued at the sanctions hearing for the first time that the PDJ and the Hearing Board lack jurisdiction and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply here because Allen resides in a federal enclave, which is not part of the State of Colorado. The PDJ is reluctant to address this argument for several reasons: Respondent did not raise it earlier, he cited no supporting legal authority, and the PDJ already determined that Colorado law applies in this matter. However, the PDJ briefly analyzes this argument for purposes of judicial economy. A federal enclave is defined as a portion of land over which the United States government exercises exclusive federal jurisdiction. [12] Although the PDJ is unaware of any case law explicitly addressing whether state disciplinary rules govern the provision of legal services in federal enclaves, Colorado case law suggests that the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct apply to legal services provided to ADMAX inmates. In a 1960 decision, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that the federal government's `exclusive legislative' jurisdiction over the Fort Logan military reservation does not operate as an absolute prohibition against state laws but has for its purpose protection of federal sovereignty. ... [13] As such, the court rejected the argument that Arapahoe County, which encircles Fort Logan, could avoid making public assistance payments to an otherwise qualifying individual who lived on the reservation. [14] In that decision, the court found that federal purchase or a state's cession of territory under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution does not establish a unique and unreservedly exclusive sovereignty within the federal enclave. [15] As noted in decisions from other jurisdictions, federal jurisdiction over federal enclaves is intended to protect the federal government against conflicting regulations. [16] As a result, states generally may enforce on federal enclaves state laws concerning topics over which the federal government has failed to exercise jurisdiction, such as certain voting, public education, and welfare matters, because such laws do not infringe upon federal sovereignty. [17] Here, applying state disciplinary rules to representation of an ADMAX inmate poses no apparent conflict with federal jurisdiction. The regulation of attorney conduct is a matter of state sovereignty, [18] and no federal code of attorney conduct exists. As such, the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct do not conflict with federal laws or regulations. Moreover, if lawyers counseling inmates in federal prisons were not bound by the disciplinary rules of the surrounding state, a dangerous vacuum of attorney oversight would form. [19] Accordingly, the fact that Allen is incarcerated in a federal facility does not alter the PDJ's conclusion that the PDJ and the Hearing Board have jurisdiction over this matter and that application of Colorado's disciplinary rules is appropriate here.