Opinion ID: 475767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure of the Louisiana Supreme Court to Apply Cage

Text: 28 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Cage found that the jury commission discontinued the service of subpoenas upon persons residing in the project during the preparation of the venire from which the grand jury was selected in this case. 337 So.2d at 1123. When confronted by Atwell's appeal, that Court acknowledged that the Cage motion to quash [was] based upon the identical grounds advanced by the present defendant [Atwell]. State v. Harvey, 358 So.2d 1224, 1230 (La.1978) (emphasis added). The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, relying on its ruling in State v. Ferguson, 358 So.2d 1214 (La.1978), and on the fact that the practices were terminated, refused to apply Cage retroactively to Atwell's indictment. Harvey, 358 So.2d at 1230. Ferguson states: 29 We have determined that Cage should be applied only prospectively to jury venires improperly constituted by reason of the practices reprobated by the Cage holding, especially since the practices were terminated as a result of the Cage decision. The interest at stake (proper selection of jury venires) has been adequately served by Cage and the corrective measures thereafter instituted. No individual unfairness has resulted in the present case. 30 As in Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 95 S.Ct. 704, 42 L.Ed.2d 790 (1975), the application of Cage prospectively only to venires selected after the date of its decision, will adequately vindicate the constitutional interest at stake.... Under these circumstances, the vindication of the constitutional interest protected by Cage does not require reversal of other convictions, fairly tried before petit juries selected from properly confected venires, because of Cage defects in the method of selecting the grand jury which indicted the accused. 31 358 So.2d at 1216-17. 32 The failure of the Louisiana Supreme Court to grant retroactive effect to Cage should not be given any credence by federal courts. First, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in stating that no individual unfairness has resulted, either relied upon suspect harmless error analysis or failed to appreciate the necessity for mandatory reversal. If this were not sufficient, the Louisiana Supreme Court misapplied Daniel. 33 Daniel itself considered whether the decision in Taylor v. Louisiana [wa]s to be applied retroactively to other defendants whose opportunity to raise a timely objection to the jury-selection procedures had passed as of the date of [the] decision in Taylor. 95 S.Ct. at 705 (emphasis added). Since defendant Atwell raised a timely objection at his trial, based upon the Cage testimony and the quashing of Cage's indictment, Daniel is wholly inapposite. Further, Cage did not enunciate new legal standards, but followed Thiel; there is thus nothing to apply retroactively under Daniel. Even were there some question whether the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision should be retroactively applied, the Cage affirmance should relate back to the Cage trial court's quashing of the indictment, requiring prospective application in Atwell's case. 34