Opinion ID: 2515784
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Heading: Procedure Used to Challenge Prospective Jurors for Cause

Text: Defendant contends that several aspects of the procedure the trial court required the parties to follow in making challenges for cause were arbitrary and unreasonable, and made selecting a fair and impartial jury impossible, in violation of statutory requirements. He also asserts violations of his rights to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment, due process and fundamental fairness under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and a reliable judgment under the Eighth Amendment. [22]
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excused for cause four prospective jurors based solely on their written answers to a jury questionnaire concerning their views on the death penalty, and without any opportunity for follow-up questioning during which the court and counsel might have been able to clarify the responses and determine whether, in fact, the prospective jurors should be disqualified from service. He asserts the excusals violated various provisions of the federal Constitution enumerated above. The trial court, after soliciting comment from all counsel, prepared a 24-page written questionnaire consisting of 108 questions. Several pages of the questionnaire focused on the prospective jurors' views concerning the death penalty. [23] Based on the questionnaires completed by the first 75 prospective jurors, the trial court proposed to excuse for cause 14 individuals without questioning them orally because their responses to the questionnaire very clearly indicated that either they were not death qualified  because they would always impose the death penalty or would never consider imposing the death penalty  or they had read or heard something about the case that created a strong belief in defendant's guilt. Defendant objected unsuccessfully to the excusal of four of the 14 prospective jurors: C.H., R.V., O.D., and R.W. [24] Decisions of the United States Supreme Court establish the circumstances under which a prospective juror's views on the death penalty properly may serve as the basis for a challenge for cause. In Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot be sentenced to death if the jury that imposed it was chosen by excluding prospective jurors for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. In Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, the high court clarified its decision in Witherspoon and held that a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment if those views would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of his or her duties as a juror in accordance with the trial court's instructions and his or her oath. (Accord, People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) But neither Witherspoon nor Witt requires that a prospective juror automatically be excused if he or she expresses a personal opposition to the death penalty. Those who firmly oppose the death penalty may nevertheless serve as jurors in a capital case as long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs and follow the law. ( Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137; accord, People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1146, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) Generally, a trial court's rulings on motions to exclude for cause are afforded deference on appeal, for appellate courts recognize that a trial judge who observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that person's responses (noting, among other things, the person's tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the record. ( People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 451, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271 ( Stewart ).) But such deference is unwarranted when, as here, the trial court's ruling is based solely on the cold record of the prospective jurors' answers on a written questionnaire, the same information that is available on appeal. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, reviewing the record de novo, we conclude the trial court did not err in excusing for cause four prospective jurors based solely upon their written responses to the jury questionnaire. [25] Stewart is distinguishable. There, we held that the trial court erred in excusing for cause five prospective jurors, over the defendant's objections, based solely upon their responses to a three-part question on the written jury questionnaire that focused on views concerning the death penalty. We therefore reversed the defendant's death sentence without an inquiry into prejudice. ( Id. at pp. 445-455, 15 Cal. Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) Our concerns, however, were centered on the particular circumstances of that case. At the outset, we stressed a material flaw in the Stewart questionnaire itself. It asked whether the prospective juror had a conscientious opinion or belief about the death penalty that `would prevent or make it very difficult ' for the juror to vote for first degree murder, find a special circumstance true, or impose the death penalty. ( Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 442, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271, italics added.) As we observed, even one who gave a straightforward yes answer to such questions would not necessarily demonstrate disqualification under Witt, because mere difficulty in imposing the death penalty does not, per se, prevent or substantially impair the performance of a juror's duties. The prospective juror might nonetheless be able to put aside his or her personal views and deliberate fairly under the death penalty law. Yet the Stewart questionnaire did not inquire whether the prospective juror could do so. Hence, in many cases, followup questioning was essential to assess whether the juror could overcome personal reservations and properly weigh and consider the aggravating and mitigating factors. ( Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 447, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) Each of the five prospective jurors whose excusals for cause were challenged in Stewart had answered the flawed questionnaire in ways that indicated strong reservations about the death penalty but did not negate the possibility the jurors could set aside their feelings and deliberate fairly. As a result, we held those jurors should have been subject to clarifying followup examination. ( Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 444-449, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) The court's failure to conduct such an examination was apparently based on its misunderstanding and misapplication of the standard necessary to excuse a prospective juror for cause based on his or her death penalty views. ( Id. at pp. 444-445, 447, 451, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) In Stewart, we noted: [W]e need not and do not hold . . . a trial court never may properly grant a motion for excusal for cause over defense objection based solely upon a prospective juror's checked answers and written responses contained in a juror questionnaire. We are, however, unaware of any authority upholding such a practice. ( Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 449-450, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271, fns. omitted.) Indeed, we did not criticize 17 stipulated excusals for cause, based solely upon written responses to the Stewart questionnaire, stating that many of the responses submitted in those 17 cases revealed unambiguous and entrenched support for or opposition to the death penalty. ( Id. at p. 444 & fn. 11, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) Thus, nothing in Stewart indicates that an excusal without oral voir dire is improper where the prospective juror's answers to a jury questionnaire leave no doubt that his or her views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties in accordance with the court's instructions and the juror's oath. The question left undecided in Stewart is squarely presented here, and we now hold that a prospective juror in a capital case may be discharged for cause based solely on his or her answers to the written questionnaire if it is clear from the answers that he or she is unwilling to temporarily set aside his or her own beliefs and follow the law. (See Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758.) The questionnaire at issue here did not suffer from the defect cited in Stewart. It asked whether a prospective juror held such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence or the strength of proof, he or she automatically would refuse to return a first degree murder verdict, find a special circumstance true, or impose the death penalty. Any juror who automatically would vote in ways that precluded the death penalty would clearly be disqualified under Witt. Thus, this questionnaire format, unlike the one presented in Stewart, included more expansive and detailed questions on capital punishment and gave jurors the clear opportunity to disclose views against it so strong as to disqualify them for duty on a death penalty case. Moreover, unlike in Stewart, the death penalty-related answers given by the prospective jurors whose excusals defendant challenges here were sufficiently unambiguous to allow the court to identify disqualifying biases on the basis of their written responses alone. With respect to each of these excusals, we conclude that the trial court's determinations, based solely on the questionnaire responses, were correct. Prospective Juror R.V. indicated she strongly opposed the death penalty and would in every case automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, regardless of the evidence that might be produced during trial. She indicated she could not set aside her personal feelings and follow the law if the death penalty were involved. Her responses were clear, unequivocal, and internally consistent. The trial court did not err in excusing her for cause based solely on her responses to the jury questionnaire. Prospective Juror C.H. indicated she strongly opposed the death penalty because her religion taught her that killing was wrong. She indicated she could not set aside her personal feelings and follow the law, explaining: I would have such difficulty with the death penalty that I don't think I could weigh evidence without my beliefs influencing me. To the question inquiring whether she entertained such conscientious opinions about the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence that might be developed during trial she would in every case automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, she wrote, I couldn't vote. Although she did not simply check Yes or No to this question as directed, we understand her written response to mean that she would be unable to carry out her duties as a juror in the case because of her views about the death penalty. Her responses were internally consistent and unambiguous. The trial court did not err in excusing her for cause based solely on her responses to the jury questionnaire. Although Prospective Juror O.D. indicated he strongly opposed the death penalty, he also acknowledged that one of the duties of a juror was to follow the law and indicated he could set aside his personal feelings and follow it. Given only these two answers, we might not be able to say that O.D.'s opposition to the death penalty was clear and unequivocal. But he also indicated that he entertained such conscientious opinions regarding the death penalty that he would, in every case and regardless of the evidence presented, automatically vote for something other than first degree murder so as not to reach the penalty phase, automatically vote for a verdict of not true as to the special circumstances alleged so as not to reach the penalty phase, and, automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if there were a penalty phase. O.D. also strongly disagreed with the following three statements based on his religious beliefs: (1) Any person who intentionally kills another person, unless the killing was in self-defense or the defense of another, deserves the death penalty; (2) Convicted murderers should be swiftly executed once they are convicted; and (3) belief in the adage An eye for an eye. When asked to explain his answers, O.D. answered: I was taught that there should be no reason to kill and I will continue to think this way. We find that, taken together, O.D.'s answers to the jury questionnaire professed an opposition to the death penalty that would prevent him from performing his duties as a juror. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in excusing him for cause based solely on his responses to the jury questionnaire. Lastly, Prospective Juror R.W. indicated he strongly opposed the death penalty based on his religious beliefs and believed the death penalty should never be used. R.W. also answered unknown to questions whether he would in every case automatically vote for something other than murder in the first degree because such a verdict would end the death penalty question once and for all; and whether he would in every case automatically vote for a verdict of not true as to the special circumstances alleged because such a verdict would end the death penalty question then and there. But he acknowledged he entertained such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence that might be developed during trial, he would in every case automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In other words, he expressed doubt he could put aside his pro-life bias even when voting on guilt and special circumstance issues, and made clear he would not be able to do so if deliberations proceeded to the issue of penalty. Thus, as with Prospective Juror O.D., we find that R.W.'s responses, taken together, reflected opposition to the death penalty that would prevent him from performing his duties as a juror. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in excusing him for cause based solely on his responses to the jury questionnaire. [26]
The trial court explained to all parties that it would conduct voir dire in the following manner: 24 prospective jurors would be called and questioned as a group by the court and then by counsel, with counsel for each defendant and the prosecutor allotted 10 to 15 minutes each to question the group; if all the parties passed the group for cause, then peremptory challenges would be directed to the 12 of the 24 seated in the jury box; each prospective juror dismissed on a peremptory challenge would be replaced, in order, by those seated in seat numbers 13 through 24; when the initial group of 24 was reduced to the 12 seated in the jury box, another group of 13 would be called and questioned as a group by the court and then by counsel, with counsel for each defendant and the prosecutor allotted 10 minutes each to question the subsequent group. Subsequent groups of 13 would be called and the process repeated until a jury was impaneled. Using this system, the court predicted that the jury would be selected in five days. Defendant joined in codefendant Richard Avila's general objection to the method of jury selection imposed by the trial court. Although defendant did not specifically object to the time limit imposed by the court for counsel to question prospective jurors, he did argue that it was impossible to select a fair and impartial jury in five days. The court, however, reiterated that it would adhere to its proposed system of jury selection. Counsel for the defendants then opted to pool their time allotment, such that counsel for defendant would have 45 minutes to question the first group of 24 prospective jurors on behalf of all three defendants, counsel for Richard Avila would have 30 minutes to question the second group on behalf of all three defendants, counsel for Jeffrey Spradlin would have 30 minutes to question the third group on behalf of all three defendants, and so on. The court informed counsel that, on request and for good cause shown, it would allow additional time to question prospective jurors. Although the court denied defense requests for sequestered voir dire, it contemplated that some individual voir dire might be necessary because of either publicity that they've heard about concerning the case or because they want to answer some things privately. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court arbitrarily and unreasonably limited the amount of time defense counsel could spend questioning prospective jurors during voir dire in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. We conclude that defendant's general objection to the method of jury selection imposed by the trial court and argument that he could not select a fair and impartial jury in five days preserved the claim for appeal. The claim, however, is without merit. At the time of trial in this matter, Code of Civil Procedure section 223, enacted by Proposition 115 (approved by the electorate effective June 6, 1990), provided for court-conducted examination of prospective jurors in a criminal case, including death penalty cases, in the presence of the other jurors. Upon a showing of good cause, the court could permit the parties to supplement the examination or itself submit to the prospective jurors additional questions by the parties as it deemed proper. Section 223 further provided that the court's exercise of discretion in the manner in which it conducted voir dire would not cause any conviction to be reversed absent a miscarriage of justice, as specified in section 13 of article VI of the California Constitution. [27] Because the court was not required to afford defendant any time at all to question prospective jurors under section 223 as then in effect, it did not abuse its discretion in setting a time limit on counsel-conducted voir dire, either individually or in the aggregate. Defendant's reliance on People v. Hernandez (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 715, 156 Cal. Rptr. 572 is inapposite. There, the defendant argued that the trial court violated former Penal Code section 1078 in setting a time limit for voir dire. Although the court ultimately held that the defendant was precluded from arguing that the trial court improperly curtailed voir dire examination of prospective jurors because he did not exercise all of his peremptory challenges, it noted that the fixing of an arbitrary time limit for voir dire in advance of trial is dangerous and could lead to a reversal on appeal. ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d at p. 719, 156 Cal.Rptr. 572.) But former section 1078, which had required trial courts to permit reasonable examination of prospective jurors by counsel for the People and for the defendant ( id. at p. 719, 156 Cal.Rptr. 572), was repealed in 1988 (see Stats.1988, ch. 1245, § 36, p. 4155) and thus did not govern defendant's trial. In arguing that the trial court erred in placing time limitations on voir dire, defendant identifies a number of prospective jurors who he contends should have been further questioned. Contrary to defendant's view, we do not agree that the court abused its discretion in restricting further voir dire of these prospective jurors. For example, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his request to further question Prospective Juror T.G. based on her statements during voir dire that she would find it difficult to sit as a juror in a case involving the Bulldog gang, that she did not know if she could be fair to both sides, and that she believed criminal defense attorneys were slime. [28] But the court and the prosecutor explored these matters after defense counsel concluded his voir dire, and T.G. stated that she would give all parties a fair hearing, and would follow the court's instructions and base her decision solely on the evidence presented. In any event, although the court denied the defense's challenge for cause as to T.G., defendant exercised a peremptory challenge against her. In another example, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his request to further question Prospective Juror G.M. based on his statement to the court that his wife was a criminal investigator with the Internal Revenue Service, and that the denial prejudiced him because G.M. was ultimately seated as a juror in this case. [29] The court denied the request as untimely because it was made a day after G.M. had been questioned, and noted that there was no basis for excusing him for cause in any event. Although G.M.'s wife may have been generally aligned with law enforcement, G.M. did not make any responses suggesting he himself may have been so aligned. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for further questioning. As for other prospective jurors defendant contends were inadequately questioned because of lack of time, defense counsel either did not request additional time or did not make a showing of good cause. Defendant concedes, moreover, that the court did, in some instances, allow counsel to ask additional questions upon request. The court thus did not abuse its discretion in restricting defense counsel's examination of prospective jurors. We similarly reject defendant's federal constitutional claim. The United States Constitution does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury. ( Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492; see also People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 613, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1179, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) The trial court, moreover, has a duty to restrict voir dire within reasonable bounds to expedite the trial. ( People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 419, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221.) The court's logistical planning of voir dire and limitation thereof were reasonable, especially considering the multidefendant nature of the trial. Moreover, as stated, the court's willingness to permit additional time for counsel-conducted voir dire upon a showing of good cause ameliorated any potential concern that the limitation would somehow be unfair or violate the right to an impartial jury.
Defendant contends the trial court's system of jury selection violated Code of Civil Procedure section 226, [30] as well as the federal Constitution. We disagree. As stated, counsel for Richard Avila objected to the method of jury selection imposed by the court, instead requesting that the parties be allowed to direct all for-cause challenges against the entire jury panel, that is, all of the prospective jurors in the courtroom (see Code Civ. Proc., § 194, subd. (q)), before they were required to use peremptory challenges. He argued that section 226 of the Code of Civil Procedure mandated such a procedure. Defendant joined in the objection. The court reiterated the procedure it would follow: [W]e are taking challenges for cause before peremptories. The only question is whether it should be to all of the jurors in the courtroom or only 12 or 18, or in this case 24, and I see nothing in the statute or in any cases that say that you have to question and pass for cause all of the jurors in the courtroom before you can begin exercising peremptories. I think that is one alternative way of doing it. The court further noted that to conduct voir dire in the manner requested by counsel was a terribly inefficient way to proceed. Peremptory challenges generally are exercised under either of two methods. Under the jury box method, which is the system utilized in California, 12 prospective jurors are questioned, subjected to challenges for cause, and replaced until 12 qualified jurors remain. Both sides then exercise peremptory challenges. A juror removed by peremptory challenge is replaced by another juror, who is then questioned and challenged both for cause and peremptorily. This process continues until peremptory challenges have been exhausted or waived. ( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 397, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221; United States v. Thompson (2d Cir.1996) 76 F.3d 442, 451; United States v. Blouin (2d Cir.1981) 666 F.2d 796, 796.) Under the struck jury method, a large initial panel of prospective jurors is drawn and subjected to challenges for cause before peremptory challenges are exercised. If, after each side exercises its peremptory challenges, there remain more than 12 jurors, the court decides which 12 will constitute the jury. ( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 397, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221; United States v. Blouin, supra, 666 F.2d at pp. 796-797.) The trial court apparently employed a variation of the jury box system in this case. Defendant argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 226 dictates that all challenges for cause must be exercised before any peremptory challenges may be exercised, and that a procedure (like the one the trial court here used) whereby challenges are exercised in groups, even if within each group challenges for cause are exercised before peremptory challenges, violates the statutory mandate. That section, however, must be read in light of Code of Civil Procedure section 231, which entitles each party to have a full panel before exercising any peremptory challenge  panel here apparently always having been understood by California courts as the subse of the members of the whole venire who are called to fill the jury box during voir dire. In other words, defendant was entitled to have a panel of 12 jurors before he exercised any peremptory challenges, but the governing statutes have never been interpreted to require that the entire venire be subjected to for-cause challenges before the exercise of any peremptory challenges, a procedure that  in a capital case entailing a large venire  would further add to the time-consuming nature of the process. (See, e.g., People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 396, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221 [where we assumed, without discussion, that, in former Penal Code section 1088, which stated in pertinent part that each party shall be entitled to have the panel full before exercising any peremptory challenge, the phrase full panel meant a full complement of 12 jurors].) Under the system of jury selection employed by the court here, defendant directed his peremptory challenges against 12 individuals seated in the jury box. No statutory violation occurred. Defendant maintains that, under the variation of the jury box system employed here, he was unable to make informed exercise of peremptory challenges because he did not know the composition of the final jury. Although knowledge of the composition of the entire panel can be relevant to the exercise of a peremptory challenge against an individual juror, the fact that a particular procedure used may have made exercising initial peremptory challenges less informed does not in itself require reversal. ( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 397, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221.) A court commits reversible error if its procedures deny a party's right of peremptory challenge. ( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 397-398, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221; see also Pointer v. United States (1894) 151 U.S. 396, 408-409, 14 S.Ct. 410, 38 L.Ed. 208; United States v. Blouin, supra, 666 F.2d at p. 797.) But defendant here was not prohibited from exercising all of his allotted peremptory challenges; indeed, he exercised them all. No error occurred.
Because we conclude the trial court did not err in any aspect of its jury selection procedures, we reject defendant's claim of cumulative error resulting in prejudice under the federal Constitution.