Opinion ID: 2171696
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Foundation and Authentication

Text: Defendant next asserts that he was prejudiced by the admission at trial of improper evidence. First, he maintains that the authenticity of the faxed letter and cover sheet was not established. Defendant asserts that the letter was admitted into evidence after the testimony of Flynn and Murphy, and that their testimony failed to establish the proper authenticity. Defendant notes that neither witness claimed to have written the letter. Further, Flynn's testimony that his secretary placed the faxed letter and transmittal sheet on his desk does not authenticate the author of the letter or show that the letter actually came from the facsimile machine in Flynn's office. Murphy's testimony that the documents appear to be facsimile documents is insufficient, since she did not know where the original documents were and she did not recall reading the transmittal sheet. Further, defendant cites Dick v. Zimmerman (1903), 105 Ill.App. 615, aff'd (1904), 207 Ill. 636, 69 N.E. 754, and other cases for the proposition that where there is no evidence that the addressee of a letter ever received it or that the letter was mailed, the letter is not admissible. Defendant contends that in the instant case, there is a lack of proof of the author of the letter and that the letter was received by the addressee. First, we find that the evidence belies defendant's assertion that the faxed letter was not received by the addressee. The evidence shows that the transmittal cover sheet which defendant filled out named Mike Flynn as the addressee; and Flynn testified that he received the letter which defendant sent. Second, we reject defendant's contention that Flynn was not able to attest that the documents were received through his facsimile machine. Flynn testified that he received the documents when his secretary put them on his desk. Flynn stated that printed on the documents was the facsimile telephone number to the facsimile machine in his office. This information indicated to him that the documents were sent to his office and received from the facsimile machine in his office. We find that this evidence, in addition to Murphy's corroborative testimony as to the addressee of the documents and that she sent the document through the facsimile machine, was sufficient to prove that the documents were received from the facsimile machine in Flynn's office. Further, we find that the evidence was sufficient to establish the authentication of the faxed documents. This court has not squarely addressed the issue of the foundation requirements of facsimile documents. We look for guidance to another case in which this court considered foundation requirements for computer printouts. Grand Liquor Co. v. Department of Revenue (1977), 67 Ill.2d 195, 10 Ill.Dec. 472, 367 N.E.2d 1238, addressed the question of the evidentiary effect given to a Department of Revenue tax correction based upon a computer printout resulting from electronic data processing. (See also People v. Mormon (1981), 97 Ill.App.3d 556, 52 Ill. Dec. 856, 422 N.E.2d 1065, aff'd (1982), 92 Ill.2d 268, 65 Ill.Dec. 939, 442 N.E.2d 250.) In Grand Liquor Co., we cited the Mississippi Supreme Court case of King v. State ex rel. Murdoch Acceptance Corp. (Miss. 1969), 222 So.2d 393, 398, for guidelines for determining the admissibility of computer printouts of business records stored on electronic computing equipment. We held that such printouts are admissible where it is shown that: (1) the electronic computing equipment is recognized as standard equipment; (2) the entries are made in the regular course of business at or reasonably near the time of the occurrence of the event recorded; and (3) the foundation testimony satisfies the court that the sources of information, method and time of preparation indicated its trustworthiness and justify its admission. Grand Liquor Co., 67 Ill.2d at 202, 10 Ill.Dec. 472, 367 N.E.2d 1238, citing King, 222 So.2d at 398. We are concerned here with the third prong of the test set out in Grand Liquor Co., because defendant's objection is based on the foundation requirement. Accordingly, it was necessary that the sources of information, method and time of preparation indicated the trustworthiness and justify the admission of the faxed letter. Evidence which can establish the foundation requirement, by establishing the trustworthiness of such a document, includes testimony by a person who can explain a business' procedures for compiling information and methods for checking for mechanical and human error; explain the operation of the machine and testify that the machine properly did what it was supposed to do; and testify as to the mechanical reliability of the machine. Tapper, Evidence from Computers, 8 Ga.L.Rev. 562, 595 n. 193 (1974). We find that the foundation requirements of the facsimile transmittal were properly established. Murphy testified as to Mailboxes, Etc.'s procedures for sending a document via the facsimile machine. She stated that the customer fills out the cover sheet indicating the person to whom the document is directed and the facsimile number of the addressee. Murphy also stated that the facsimile machine was programmed to reflect the store's name on transmitted documents, and that the machine recorded the time and date of transmittal accurately. Murphy stated that her name appeared on all cover sheets, including the one sent with defendant's letter, in case the document needed to be resent. The evidence indicates that resending, however, was unnecessary. Murphy did not indicate that there was any problem with the transmittal of the document. Further, Flynn testified that he received the document on the afternoon on which it was sent. In addition, defendant testified that he had used the facsimile machine at the Mailboxes, Etc. store 50 or 60 times before, and defendant did not testify that there ever was a problem with the use of the machine. We also note that Mary Riley testified, and defendant also admitted, that in March 1989, defendant gave the same letter as the one faxed to Flynn, to Riley through her boss, Ron Garvey. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to establish the authenticity or foundation of the facsimile documents. Finally, defendant asserts that the faxed letter and transmittal sheet are inadmissible hearsay documents, since the meaning of the writing on the documents, both printed and handwritten, was testified to by third parties, other than the authors of the writing. Defendant contends that the facsimile-machine-generated computations as to time, date, and sender constitutes inadmissible hearsay of whoever programmed the facsimile machine. Testimony by anyone else is hearsay since it is not based on personal knowledge. Defendant failed to raise these objections in his post-trial motion in the trial court. Accordingly, defendant failed to preserve these issues for appeal, and we need not consider them. People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. Appellate court affirmed.