Opinion ID: 2537968
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Act

Text: Even if the KJRA does not apply, the City contends that a limited review should apply to the district court's consideration of the administrative hearing examiner's decisions regarding relocation benefits because of the Kansas Legislature's intent to follow the Federal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq. While the Federal Act itself does not apply in this case because federal funding was not utilized, the parties agree that the Kansas Legislature enacted the Kansas Act, K.S.A. 58-3501 et seq., for the purpose of implementing the Federal Act by requiring Kansas agencies and departments to comply with its provisions when providing relocation payments and assistance. See K.S.A. 58-3501. The City takes this concept another step and argues that although the Kansas Act does not specifically direct courts to do so, the consistent, harmonious and sensible conclusion is that the legislature intended to apply the principles of administrative review that have been applied under the Federal Act. According to the federal courts, a denial of relocation benefits under the Federal Act is an administrative agency action that may be judicially reviewed under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq. (2006). See Starke v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Housing, 454 F.Supp. 477, 480 (W.D.Okla.1976). Under the APA, `de novo review is appropriate only where there are inadequate fact finding procedures in an adjudicatory proceeding, or where judicial proceedings are brought to enforce certain administrative actions.' [Citation omitted.] Kroger Co. v. Regional Airport Auth. of Louisville, 286 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir.2002); see also K.S.A. 77-619 (under KJRA a court may receive evidence, in addition to that contained in the agency record for judicial review, only if it relates to the validity of the agency action at the time it was taken and is needed to decide disputed issues regarding: [1] Improper constitution as a decision-making body; or improper motive or grounds for disqualification, of those taking the agency action; or [2] unlawfulness of procedure or of decision-making process.). Usually, under the APA `[t]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.' Kroger Co., 286 F.3d at 387 (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 [1973]). The APA, like the KJRA, provides that a court will review an agency's findings of fact under a substantial competent evidence standard. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006) with K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7). In this case, the district court applied this standard, although through operation of the separation of powers rather than the KJRA. Nevertheless, the district court noted that the end result was the same  i.e., under either chain of analysis the substantial competent evidence became the standard of review. The City suggests this commonality and the intent to implement the Federal Act require use of the substantial competent evidence standard and a recognition that de novo review is available only in the limited circumstances allowed under the APA. However, this argument is contrary to the plain language of K.S.A. 58-3509(a), which provides for a standard of review and states that standard as a trial de novo. In contrast, the Federal Act does not mention a right to appeal, an omission which initially caused some uncertainty and gave rise to arguments that the Federal Act committed the determination of relocation benefits to the agency's discretion and the decision was not subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Starke, 454 F.Supp. 477. Federal courts have generally rejected this argument and concluded the APA applies. E.g., Kroger Co., 286 F.3d at 387; Starke, 454 F.Supp. at 480; see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.). The same framework could have been established in Kansas, at least when KDOT was the agency providing benefits. Had the Kansas Legislature followed Congress' lead, it could have said nothing about judicial review or about allowing an appeal to district court. Under that scenario, the standard of review specified in the KJRA would have applied to any determinations made by KDOT because by its express terms the KJRA applies to all agencies and all proceedings for judicial review and civil enforcement of agency actions not specifically exempted by statute from the provisions. K.S.A. 77-603(a). Furthermore, the legislature could have extended the substantial competent evidence scope of review to all projects covered by the Kansas Act, even if the displacement resulted from an action by a political subdivision of the state, by simply restating the standard found in K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7) and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) or incorporating one of those provisions. Yet, the Kansas Legislature adopted K.S.A. 58-3509(a), specifically allowing for an appeal rather than judicial review and stating that [a]ny such appeal to district court shall be a trial de novo only on the issue of relocation benefits rather than adopting the standard of review in the APA or KJRA. By adopting this process, the Kansas Legislature clearly deviated from the Federal Act. Thus, even though there is clear expression of intent by the Kansas Legislature to implement the federal scheme for relocation benefits, there is an equally clear adoption of a different standard of review for an appeal of the decision allowing relocation benefits.