Opinion ID: 2532374
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Trial Court's Response to a Jury Question

Text: McGirth next contends that the trial court erred in its response to a question posed by the guilt phase jury during deliberations. A trial court has discretion in instructing the jury during deliberations, and an appellate court will disturb a trial court's ruling only when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. Green v. State, 907 So.2d 489, 496 (Fla.2005) (quoting White v. State, 817 So.2d 799, 806 (Fla.2002)); see Perriman v. State, 731 So.2d 1243, 1246 (Fla.1999) (citing Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.410). During deliberations, the jury asked whether it could have a discussion with the trial judge regarding the jury instruction on principals. The court responded that it could not engage in general discussions with the jury, but would be willing to address any specific questions the jury might have. Nine minutes later, the jury posed the following question relating to the jury instruction on principals: Is cautious [sic] intent the same as premeditation in that it can occur a few seconds before the crime was committed? Outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge consulted the lawyers and observed that the standard jury instruction on principals did not define conscious intent. [8] After rejecting McGirth's objection to providing the jury with any information beyond what is contained in the written jury instruction, the trial court answered the jury's question as follows: Is conscious intent the same as premeditation in that it can occur a few seconds before the crime was committed? Specifically, is conscious intent the same as premeditation? The answer is no. The law does not fix the exact amount of time that must pass for the formation of conscious intent. (Emphasis added.) The trial court denied defense counsels subsequent motion for mistrial. A trial judge is not restricted to the written jury instructions when a jury poses a question during its deliberations, and may clarify a point of law for a confused jury with a brief, clear response. See Perriman, 731 So.2d at 1246-47. In the present case, the question posed to the court demonstrated the jury's confusion about the meaning of conscious intent as it related to principals, and the trial court was well within its discretion to provide the jury with a response. McGirth contends that the trial court defined the conscious intent element of the principal jury instruction in the same terms used to define the premeditated intent element of the first-degree murder instruction, thus blurring the distinctions between the two elements. [9] We disagree and find that the trial court did not err in its response to the jury's question on principals. Here, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury that conscious intent (an element contained in the principals instruction) and premeditation (an element contained in the first-degree premeditated murder instruction) do not share the same meaning. In addressing whether conscious intent, as set forth in the principals instruction, can occur a few seconds before the crime was committed, the judge correctly informed the jury that the law does not fix the exact amount of time that must pass for the formation of conscious intent. Because the trial court did not err in its response to the jury's question regarding the conscious intent component of the principals jury instruction, there is no basis for relief on this claim.