Opinion ID: 150472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Ban on Contributions by Contractors and Associated Individuals

Text: In assessing the CFRA's ban on contributions by contractors and associated individuals, we first determine whether the ban furthers a sufficiently important interest; we then determine whether the ban is closely drawn to achieve that interest. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200
As set forth above, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions in response to a series of scandals in which contractors illegally offered bribes, kick-backs, and campaign contributions to state officials in exchange for contracts with the state. The ban was designed to combat both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption caused by contractor contributions. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 303. Such an anticorruption interest, see Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 903, 130 S.Ct. 876, has been recognized as a legitimate reason to restrict campaign contributions. Beginning with Buckley, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that laws limiting campaign contributions can be justified by the government's interest in addressing both the actuality and the appearance of corruption. 424 U.S. at 26, 96 S.Ct. 612; accord McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143, 124 S.Ct. 619 (Our cases have made clear that the prevention of corruption or its appearance constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits.). The record before us, moreover, shows that the General Assembly had good reason to be concerned about both the actuality and the appearance of corruption involving contractors. Connecticut's recent corruption scandals showed that contributions by contractors could lead to corruption. And it took no great leap of reasoning to infer that those scandals created a strong appearance of impropriety in the transfer of any money between contractors and state officialswhether or not the transfer involved an illegal quid pro quo. The scandals reached the highest state offices, leading to the resignation and eventual criminal conviction and imprisonment of the state's governor. They were, as a result, covered extensively by local media and garnered the attention of national media outlets as well. See Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 307 n. 9 (providing examples of newspaper articles covering Connecticut's corruption scandals). Thus, corruption spurred by state contractors became a salient political issue in Connecticut, and there arose an appearance of impropriety with respect to all contractor contributions. See Meadow Decl. ¶ 30 (May 24, 2007) (describing a public opinion poll in which 76% of Connecticut voters believed that campaign contributions Governor Rowland received influenced him in awarding government contracts). Accordingly, we conclude that the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions furthers sufficiently important government interests. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200. There is sufficient evidence in the record of actual corruption stemming from contractor contributions, and in light of the widespread media coverage of Connecticut's recent corruption scandals, the General Assembly also faced a manifest need to curtail the appearance of corruption created by contractor contributions.
The more difficult question, however, is whether each aspect of the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions is closely drawn to achieve the state's anticorruption interest. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200. We first describe the standard for determining whether a statute is closely drawn to achieve the state's interest, and we then apply that standard to the provisions of the CFRA banning contributions of state contractors, prospective state contractors, principals of state contractors, and the spouses and dependent children of state contractors.
On only one occasion has the Supreme Court held that a contribution limit was not closely drawn to the government's interests. In Randall v. Sorrell , the Supreme Court applied a multifactor test and struck down a Vermont law that limited the amount of money that any single individual could contribute to a campaign for state office. See 548 U.S. at 253-62, 126 S.Ct. 2479. A plurality of the Court found the law too restrictive because, among other things, its limits were so low that they prevent[ed] candidates from `amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy.' Id. at 248, 253, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612) (second alteration in Randall ). The District Court relied extensively on Randall's multifactor test in determining whether the CFRA's contribution bans were closely drawn to the asserted government interests. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 309-16. We disagree with that approach. Randall addressed general contribution limits that applied to all citizens. The law in Randall, for instance, prohibited any Vermont resident from contributing more than $400 to a candidate for governor. See 548 U.S. at 238, 126 S.Ct. 2479. Thus Randall's multifactor test was concerned primarily with the effect the contribution limits would have on the electoral system as a whole. See, e.g., id. at 248-49, 126 S.Ct. 2479 ([C]ontribution limits that are too low can ... harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability. (emphasis added)). Here, however, plaintiffs are not challenging the provisions of the CFRA that impose general contribution limits on all Connecticut citizens. See generally Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-611 (imposing, for instance, a limit of $3500 on any individual's contributions to a gubernatorial campaign). Rather, plaintiffs are challenging the provisions of the CFRA that impose contribution bans on discrete groups of Connecticut citizens. And unlike the situation in Randall, there is no serious argument here that the challenged contribution bans will harm the electoral process by stifling candidates' ability to raise sufficient campaign funds. See 548 U.S. at 248-49, 126 S.Ct. 2479. Indeed, contributions by contractors and lobbyists have, in the past, made up only a small fraction of the total amount of money given as campaign contributions in Connecticut. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 316. Accordingly, the First Amendment inquiry in this case does not focus on the electoral process, for the issue is notas it was in Randall whether the law in question prevent[s] candidates from `amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy.' Randall, 548 U.S. at 248, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612) (second alteration in Randall ). We will not, therefore, look to Randall's multifactor test as a means of evaluating whether the CFRA's ban on contributions is closely drawn to the state's interests. The issue, instead, is whether the CFRA's contribution bans impermissibly infringe the First Amendment rights of the discrete groups of citizens it regulatescontractors, lobbyists, and associated individuals. To address that issue, we are required to examine how the CFRA applies to the different groups of individuals it regulates and determine, in each case, whether the law is closely drawn to the state's interest in combating corruption and the appearance of corruption. The CFRA's ban on contractor contributions, in particular, applies not only to individuals who currently have contracts with the state, but also to prospective state contractors who seek (but do not currently have) state contracts. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(E), (2)(A)-(B). It also applies to any principal of an entity that has (or is seeking) contracts with the state, see id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2)(A)-(B), and it applies to any spouse or dependent child of a covered individual, see id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v), (1)(G), (2)(A)-(B). To survive First Amendment scrutiny, the CFRA's contractor contribution bans must be closely drawn to the state's anticorruption interest with respect to each of those groups of individuals.
The CFRA applies to contributions made by any current state contractor, as well as any prospective state contractor, id. § 9-612(g)(2)(A)-(B), which is defined to include, in essence, any individual or entity that submits a response to a call for bids on state contracts, see id. § 9-612(g)(1)(E). That aspect of the CFRA is, without question, closely drawn to meet the state's interest in combating corruption and the appearance of corruption. It is undisputed that nearly all of the corruption scandals that gave rise to the CFRAincluding the scandal involving Governor Rowlandinvolved both current and prospective state contractors offering bribes in exchange for assistance in winning new state contracts. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 304-06. Contributions by current and prospective state contractors, therefore, lie at the heart of the corruption problem in Connecticut. Thus, insofar as it applies to campaign contributions made by both current and prospective state contractors, see Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(D)-(E), (2)(A)-(B), the CFRA is closely drawn and survives First Amendment scrutiny.
If an artificial entity, rather than an individual, is awarded (or seeks) a state contract, the CFRA bans contributions made by any principal of that entity. [10] See id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2)(A)-(B). A principal is defined to include, among other things, (1) any member of the entity's board of directors, [11] (2) any individual who has an ownership interest of five per cent or more in the entity, (3) the president, treasurer or executive vice president of the entity, [12] and (4) any officer or employee of either a business entity or a nonprofit organization who has managerial or discretionary responsibilities with respect to a state contract. [13] The definition of principal sweeps broadly and prevents a wide range of individuals from contributing to campaigns for state office. We have some doubts, therefore, as to whether the provision is indeed closely drawn to achieve the state's anticorruption interest. Nonetheless, we are mindful of the teachings of the Supreme Court that we, as judges, cannot consider each possible permutation of a law limiting contributions, and thus we cannot determine with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the statute's legitimate objectives. Randall, 548 U.S. at 248, 126 S.Ct. 2479. Moreover, in light of the troubling episodes involving state contractors in Connecticut's recent history, we are reluctant to second-guess the judgment of the General Assembly when it defines which individuals associated with an artificial entity are likely to attempt to exert improper influence over a state official. We will, therefore, follow the ordinar[y] approach in evaluating the ban on principal contributions and defer[ ] to the legislature's determination of such matters. Id. The ban on principals' contributions strikes us as bordering on overboard, but the record shows that the dangers of corruption associated with contractor contributions are so significant in Connecticut that the General Assembly should be afforded leeway in its efforts to curb contractors' influence on state lawmakers. We thus conclude that, insofar as it applies to campaign contributions made by principals of state contractors or prospective state contractors, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2)(A)-(B), the CFRA is closely drawn and withstands First Amendment scrutiny.
The CFRA not only bans contributions by contractors, prospective contractors, and the principal of any contractor or prospective contractor; it also bans contributions by the spouse or dependent child of any of those covered individuals. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v), (1)(G), (2)(A)-(B). Defendants do not attempt to justify the ban on family-member contributions by arguing that a contractor's family members will themselves attempt to exert improper influence over a state official. See Appellees' Br. 80-83, 98. That is for good reason, as there is no record evidence to suggest that the spouses or dependent children of state contractors have been in any way involved in Connecticut's recent corruption scandals (or, for that matter, any other corruption scandals of which the parties have made us aware). Rather, defendants attempt to justify the ban on family-member contributions by arguing that it is a reasonable measure to avoid circumvention of the prohibition of contributions by [contractors]. Id. at 80. That is, defendants argue that contractors and other covered individuals will avoid the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions by siphoning their improper contributions through their spouses and children. The Supreme Court has recognized that, in regulating campaign contributions, the legislature must be given room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political process. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137, 124 S.Ct. 619; see also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155, 123 S.Ct. 2200. Nonetheless, the Court has struck down so-called anti-circumvention provisions where the government has put forward only scant evidence of a particular form of evasion. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232, 124 S.Ct. 619. Here, the record in support of the ban on contributions by contractors' spouses and dependent children is by no means overwhelming. There is little direct evidence suggesting that contractors will use their spouses or children to circumvent the CFRA's contribution bans. Nevertheless, the recent corruption scandals in Connecticut have shown that contractors are willing to resort to varied forms of misconduct to secure contracts with the state. That, we think, is far more than the scant evidence required by McConnell. See id. In light of the recent corruption scandals, therefore, the General Assembly must be given room to anticipate and respond to concerns about the circumvention of the bans on contractor contributions. Id. at 137, 124 S.Ct. 619. Indeed, were we to affirm the ban on contributions by contractors but strike down the ban on contributions by their family members, we would invite the very circumvention that the General Assembly was trying to prevent. Thus, we conclude that the CFRA's ban on contributions by contractors' spouses and dependent children, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F)(v), (1)(G), (2)(A)-(B), is closely drawn to avoid the circumvention of the ban on contractor contributions.
Finally, we consider the fact that the CFRA imposes an outright bannot a mere limiton contributions made by contractors, prospective contractors, and their principals. That fact, as discussed above, does not require us to review the law under the strict scrutiny standard. But we must nevertheless determine whether an outright ban on contractor contributions is closely drawn to the state's anticorruption interest. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (It is not that the difference between a ban and a limit is to be ignored; it is just that the time to consider it is when applying scrutiny at the level selected, not in selecting the standard of review itself.). The majority of campaign laws reviewed by the Supreme Courtand other courtshave involved limits on contributions, not bans. See, e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at 246, 126 S.Ct. 2479; Nixon, 528 U.S. at 381, 120 S.Ct. 897; Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 184, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court has, however, upheld the longstanding federal ban on direct corporate contributions. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154, 123 S.Ct. 2200. That is enough to demonstrate that laws banning contributions by a discrete group are not unconstitutional per se. Yet a ban is a drastic measure. A limit on contributions causes some constitutional damage, as it  restrict[s] `one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association.' Randall, 548 U.S. at 246, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25, 96 S.Ct. 612) (emphasis added). But a ban on contributions causes considerably more constitutional damage, as it wholly extinguishes that aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association. A limit, moreover, leaves intact the contributor's right to make the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution. Id. at 247, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612). But a ban infringes that constitutional right, as it precludes the symbolic expression that comes with a small contribution. There are, therefore, undoubtedly many situations in which a strict contribution limitas opposed to an outright contribution banwill adequately achieve the government's objectives. In those situations it will be difficult for the government to establish that a contribution ban is closely drawn to its asserted interests. Instead, such a ban risks being struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad. Here, for example, a limitas opposed to a banwould likely be sufficient to address the General Assembly's interest in addressing actual corruption. If, for example, the CFRA were to allow contractors to make small contributions (say, $50 per election) to state officials, it is unlikely that a contractor could exert any influence over an official with the promise of such a modest sum. Yet such a limit would not wholly extinguish a contractor's associational rights, and it would allow the contractor to make the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution. Id. at 247, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612). Thus, if the state's only interest in this case were combating actual corruption, the CFRA's outright ban on contractor contributions would likely be held overbroad. Combating actual corruption, however, is not the state's only interest here; the CFRA is also meant to address the appearance of corruption caused by contractor contributions. See Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 303. As discussed above, Connecticut's recent corruption scandals were widely publicized, and corruption involving state contractors became a major political issue in Connecticut in recent years. See subsection I.B.1, ante. A limit on contractor contributions would have partially addressed the perception of corruption created by those incidents, but such a limit still would have allowed some money to flow from contractors to state officials. Even if small contractor contributions would have been unlikely to influence state officials, those contributions could have still given rise to the appearance that contractors are able to exert improper influence on state officials. The CFRA's ban on contractor contributions, by contrast, unequivocally addresses the perception of corruption brought about by Connecticut's recent scandals. By totally shutting off the flow of money from contractors to state officials, it eliminates any notion that contractors can influence state officials by donating to their campaigns. Thus, although the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions is a drastic measure, it is an appropriate response to a specific series of incidents that have created a strong appearance of corruption with respect to all contractor contributions. We hold, as a result, that in light of Connecticut's recent experience with corruption scandals involving state contractors, the CFRA's imposition of an outright ban on contributions by contractors, prospective contractors, and their principals, see Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-612(g), is closely drawn to the state's interest in combating the appearance of corruption.