Opinion ID: 1351998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: denial of motion to acquit on rape in the first degree

Text: Appellant argues that according to Rule 29(a) of the Hawaii Rules of Criminal Procedure [1] the trial judge should have granted his motion for acquittal on the rape in the first degree charge. The State failed, he argues, to present legally sufficient evidence to prove the essential elements of the offense. It is well settled that to deny a motion to acquit there must be sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case; the evidence must enable a reasonable mind fairly to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, giving full play to the right of the fact finder to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact. State v. Cannon, 56 Haw. 161, 163, 532 P.2d 391, 394 (1975); State v. Rocker, 52 Haw. 336, 345-46, 475 P.2d 684, 690 (1970). This test applies to both direct testimony and circumstantial evidence. State v. Cannon, supra . A prima facie case of attempted rape in the first degree would require a sufficient showing that: (a) appellant had the specific intent to engage in sexual intercourse, by forcible compulsion with Jessica Kachlic; and that (b) appellant engaged in conduct which, under the circumstances as he believed them to be, constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in his commission of that crime. [2]
Intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence. It rarely can be established by any other means. While witnesses may see and hear and thus be able to give direct evidence of what a person does or fails to do, there can be no eyewitness account of the state of mind with which the acts were done or omitted. But what a person does or fails to do may indicate intent or lack of intent to commit the offense charged. [3] In a strikingly similar case, Richardson v. State, 14 Md. App. 487, 287 A.2d 339 (1972), defendant entered the bedroom of an 18-month old girl and closed the door behind him. The victim was heard crying after defendant's entry. After he left the room, the victim continued crying and came out with blood inside and outside her diapers. A doctor's examination revealed a tear from the posterior of the victim's vagina to her anal opening, approximately one and a half inches long and one and a half inches deep. The trial court found the requisite intent to rape and the Supreme Court of that state affirmed. Likewise, we believe that the evidence presented by the State in this case was legally sufficient to support a finding that appellant had the specific intent to rape. As for the element of forcible compulsion, we have no doubt that the evidence was sufficient to show appellant's intention to use whatever force necessary to accomplish his end. Forcible compulsion is defined by section 707-700(12) of Hawaii Revised Statutes. It reads in part: Forcible compulsion is physical force that overcomes earnest resistance... . It is inconceivable that little Jessica would not earnestly resist efforts by an adult male to effect sexual intercourse with her, let alone, give consent. The resistance would, in fact, be an automatic response because of the inevitable pain that would result from such an attempt. As the State's medical witness had testified, the victim's vagina could not accommodate an erect adult's penis without tearing. Yet, the evidence presented was clearly sufficient to enable a reasonable mind to conclude that appellant intended to culminate his plan in spite of whatever resistance young Jessica could muster, and the impossibility of the victim's vagina to accommodate. Of particular relevance to show that appellant intended to effect sexual intercourse are the following: appellant's sexual interest in Jessica as evidenced by his touching her vagina on two occasions prior to the alleged crimes; the State's medical witness' testimony that Jessica's injury was probably caused by a large, blunt object, possibly an erect adult's penis; appellant's blood-stained shorts; the opportunity which appellant had secured for himself of being alone and in the nude with Jessica; and the comments appellant had made to the police officer who escorted him during the trial. B. Substantial Step. To constitute a substantial step toward commission of a crime, appellant's conduct must be strongly corroborative of his criminal intent. Sec. 500(3) Haw. Penal Code [HRS § 705-500(3)]. Appellant's conduct, especially his insistence upon putting Jessica to sleep, his removing her to the more remote, less visible shack, and his evident infliction of injuries upon her, included substantial steps toward commission of the intended crime. We therefore conclude that along with the other evidence, evidence of appellant's conduct and comments, before, during and after the incident, supported a prima facie case against appellant, and the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to acquit on the attempted rape charge.