Opinion ID: 2638406
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application to Inchoate Water Rights

Text: This court reviews the Board's orders under the state Administrative Procedures Act. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash.2d 68, 76-77, 11 P.3d 726 (2000); Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wash.2d 582, 589, 957 P.2d 1241 (1998). The court applies the standards of review in RCW 34.05.570(3) directly to the agency record. Postema, 142 Wash.2d at 77, 11 P.3d 726; Theodoratus, 135 Wash.2d at 589, 957 P.2d 1241. Relief may be granted where the agency's interpretation or application of the law is erroneous, the order is not supported by substantial evidence, or the order is arbitrary or capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3)(d),(e),(i); see Postema, 142 Wash.2d at 77, 11 P.3d 726; Okanogan Wilderness League, Inc. v. Town of Twisp, 133 Wash.2d 769, 776, 947 P.2d 732 (1997). Here, the facts are not disputed. Our review is of the agency's interpretation of the law and application of the law to the facts. Where statutory construction is concerned, the error of law standard applies. RCW 34.05.570(3)(d). Under this standard, the court determines the meaning and purpose of a statute de novo, although in the case of an ambiguous statute which falls within the agency's expertise, the agency's interpretation of the statute is accorded great weight, provided it does not conflict with the statute. Postema, 142 Wash.2d at 77, 11 P.3d 726. The burden of establishing the invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting the invalidity. RCW 35.04.570(1)(a); Postema, 142 Wash.2d at 77, 11 P.3d 726. The District contends that the Board erred in affirming Ecology's denial of a change in point of diversion of water under the 1980 inchoate water right. [2] The District argues that to the extent our decisions in Okanogan Wilderness League and R.D. Merrill Co. v. Pollution Control Hearings Board, 137 Wash.2d 118, 969 P.2d 458 (1999) hold that inchoate rights are not subject to change under RCW 90.03-380, they should be overruled. Applications for changes and transfers of surface water rights generally are governed by RCW 90.03.380. As we explained in Okanogan Wilderness League, 133 Wash.2d at 777-78, 947 P.2d 732, RCW 90.03.380 presumes that water has actually been put to beneficial use, thus permitting changes in point of diversion if, and to the extent that, the water has been beneficially used. See also R.D. Merrill, 137 Wash.2d at 125, 969 P.2d 458. As we noted, the statute thus accords with a number of western water law decisions. Okanogan Wilderness League, 133 Wash.2d at 778, 947 P.2d 732 (citing cases). The Distinct maintains, though, that we failed to distinguish between the first sentence of the statute and the second. RCW 90.03.380(1) provides in relevant part: The right to the use of water which has been applied to a beneficial use in the state shall be and remain appurtenant to the land or place upon which the same is used.... The point of diversion of water for beneficial use or the purpose of use may be changed, if such change can be made without detriment or injury to existing rights. In the District's view, the first sentence requires that water actually be beneficially used before it can become appurtenant to the land, but the second allows a change in point of diversion of water for a beneficial use prior to applying water to a beneficial use. We do not agree. First, statutes should be read as a whole and, here, when read as a whole the statute's reference to beneficial use in the second sentence indicates the same beneficial use requirement as in the first sentenceactual beneficial use. See Donovick v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 111 Wash.2d 413, 415, 757 P.2d 1378 (1988) (statutes should be read in its entirety). Second, where the Legislature has intended that unperfected rights be covered by a change statute, it has plainly provided so. Unlike the surface water change statute, the ground water change statute does authorize a change in the place of withdrawal under an unperfected right. RCW 90.44.100; see R.D. Merrill, 137 Wash.2d at 130, 969 P.2d 458. The difference in the two statutes shows that the Legislature intended they do not apply to the same type of rights. See Clallam County Deputy Sheriff's Guild v. Bd. of Clallam County Comm'rs, 92 Wash.2d 844, 851, 601 P.2d 943 (1979); State ex rel. Bell v. Superior Court for King County, 196 Wash. 428, 433, 83 P.2d 246 (1938); State v. Hubbard, 106 Wash.App. 149, 153, 22 P.3d 296, review denied, 145 Wash.2d 1004, 35 P.3d 380 (2001). We will not disturb the Legislature's deliberate choice to treat the two types of water rights differently. Third, the Legislature has confirmed our reading of RCW 90.03.380. In 1999, subsequent to our decision in Okanogan Wilderness League, the Legislature enacted two statutes providing for changes in point of diversion where inchoate rights are involved. In RCW 90.03.395, the Legislature stated that it intends to allow modification of the point of diversion in a water right permit when such a modification will provide both environmental benefits and water supply benefits and nothing in RCW 90.03.397 is to be construed as allowing any other change or transfer of a right to the use of surface water which has not been applied to a beneficial use. (Emphasis added.) RCW 90.03.397 states in relevant part: The department may approve a change of the point of diversion prescribed in a permit to appropriate water for a beneficial use to a point of diversion that is located downstream and is an existing approved intake structure with capacity to transport the additional diversion, if the ownership, purpose of use, season of use, and place of use of the permit remain the same. This section may not be construed as limiting in any manner whatsoever other authorities of the department under RCW 90.03.380 or other changes that may be approved under RCW 90.03.380 under authorities existing before July 25, 1999. (Emphasis added.) The Legislature has thus acknowledged our reading of RCW 90.03.380, created exceptions to the rule that inchoate surface water rights are not subject to change in point of diversion, and emphasized that no other change may be made if the water has not been applied to a beneficial use. Additionally, while the Legislature enacted these two statutes subsequent to Okanogan Wilderness League, it did not amend RCW 90.03.380 to allow for a change in point of diversion where inchoate water rights are concerned. Finally, in support of its interpretation of RCW 90.03.380, the District claims that it is likely that a change in point of diversion may be necessary in order to fully develop a water right, reasoning that engineering and other considerations will result in changes in some of the details relating to the best plans for use of a water right. However, a surface water right, involving as it does withdrawal from a visible source, does not present the engineering and planning difficulties that groundwater withdrawal may present, and this may be one distinction underlying the difference in the surface water and ground water change statutes vis-à-vis inchoate rights. [3] We conclude, as we did in Okanogan Wilderness League and R.D. Merrill, that RCW 90.03.380 requires that water must have been applied to beneficial use before a change in point of diversion is authorized under RCW 90.03.380. We uphold Ecology's denial of the change application for the 1980 inchoate right. The Board's grant of summary judgment in favor of Ecology on this issue is affirmed.