Opinion ID: 199459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 8 In assessing Burgos's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution supports the guilty verdicts. See id. 9
10 Burgos was convicted of attempting to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) 1 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 846. 2 He argues that a rational jury could not have convicted him because there was no actual cocaine involved in the transaction between him and O'Neil. The government concedes that Burgos was arrested before he came into possession of any cocaine, and that O'Neil did not have any cocaine with him when he met Burgos to complete the transaction. 11 Contrary to Burgos's assertion, neither O'Neil nor Burgos had to possess cocaine at the time of the contemplated transaction to satisfy the elements of this crime. To prove attempt, the government must establish both an intent to commit the substantive offense and a substantial step towards its commission. United States v. Argencourt, 996 F.2d 1300, 1303 (1st Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The step towards completion of the crime must be more than mere preparation. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, an individual accused of attempt to possess cocaine does not have to get very far along the line toward ultimate commission of the object crime in order to commit the attempt offense. United States v. Doyon, 194 F.3d 207, 211 (1st Cir. 1999). 12 A rational jury could have found easily that Burgos demonstrated an intent to commit the substantive offense of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it. Law enforcement officers testified that Burgos arranged the transaction with O'Neil over the course of six telephone calls. Shortly before the agreed-upon meeting time, surveillance officers observed Burgos leave his home in a car, closely followed by an individual in another car. The drug agents testified that the presence of this second car was consistent with the practice of bringing security to a narcotics transaction. The officers then observed Burgos arrive at the location that he and O'Neil had specified carrying $44,000 in cash, a sum corresponding to the price and quantity of cocaine he had agreed to purchase - two kilograms at $22,000 each. Burgos approached O'Neil and was immediately arrested. This evidence establishes Burgos's criminal intent and further constitutes a substantial step towards commission of the substantive offense of possessing cocaine. Whether he or O'Neil did in fact possess cocaine at some point during the transaction is irrelevant.
13 Burgos was convicted of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). 3 He claims that the government failed to prove that his attempt to exchange $44,000 in cash for two kilograms of cocaine had a sufficient link to interstate commerce. As we have already noted, section 1956 defines financial transaction as a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(4)(A) (emphasis added). In interpreting this provision, we have held that [a] minimal effect on interstate commerce is sufficient to support a conviction. Owens, 167 F.3d at 755. 14 For reasons we have already discussed, a rational jury could have found that Burgos attempted to purchase two kilograms of cocaine for $44,000 cash. The government presented additional evidence from which a jury could have inferred that the cash was derived from Burgos's involvement in trafficking narcotics. For example, financial and employment records seized during a search of Burgos's home indicated that his family's expenditures far exceeded the legitimate income produced by him and his wife. Plastic bags containing marijuana residue were also found during the search. Government witnesses further testified that O'Neil told Burgos when they arranged the transaction that the person delivering the cocaine to O'Neil had just arrived from New York and was impatient to return there. Therefore, the facts of the transaction as Burgos believed them to be establish the element of interstate commerce. See United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, the act is a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in a crime (quoting American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §§ 5.01(1)(c)(1985))). Additional evidence indicated that most of the cocaine in the area of Springfield, Massachusetts at the time of Burgos's arrest came from New York, and that both the cocaine and the money used to purchase it would thus be likely to travel across state lines. 15 It is a well-settled proposition that drug trafficking is precisely the kind of economic enterprise that substantially affects interstate commerce. Zorilla, 93 F.3d at 8. We have held in other cases that involvement in the drug trade satisfies the effect on interstate commerce prong of the money laundering statute. See, e.g., Owens, 167 F.3d at 755 (affirming the conviction where there was evidence that the money involved in the transaction was generated by a drug enterprise transporting cocaine and cash between Providence and Boston); Gonzalez-Maldonado, 115 F.3d at 21 (affirming conviction under §§ 1956 where the jury could have inferred that the defendant engaged in telephone conversations that were part of illegal drug activity and not a legitimate business). Therefore, we reject Burgos's claim that there was insufficient proof of a link between his attempted financial transaction and interstate commerce.