Opinion ID: 2518032
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possession of a Destructive Device

Text: Lisa Nevolo testified that, while sitting in her car near Joseph's market, she saw defendant holding a tire iron and a glass bottle of fluid with a rag on top. Moments after he disappeared from her view, Nevolo saw a large flash. Sergeant John Mosely responded to the scene and recovered from the burned area of the parking lot a glass bottle fragment with a charred rag inside. He described the object that had caused the fire as a Molotov cocktail. In arguing for its admission, the prosecutor urged that defendant's conduct was a violation of section 12303.3, possession of a destructive device with intent to injure, intimidate or terrify. [15] Section 12301, which defines destructive devices, includes [a]ny breakable container which contains a flammable liquid with a flashpoint of 150 degrees Fahrenheit or less and has a wick or similar device capable of being ignited, other than a device which is commercially manufactured primarily for the purpose of illumination. (§ 12301, subd. (a)(5).) [16] Defendant acknowledges that Molotov cocktails may fall within section 12301, subdivision (a)(5). (See People v. Quinn (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139] [device defined by § 12301, subd. (a)(5) is apparently a `Molotov cocktail'].) But defendant asserts that the liquid-filled bottle here, even if described as a Molotov cocktail, was not a destructive device as defined by statute because there was no evidence of the flashpoint of the liquid. Because the evidence failed to establish a necessary element of section 12301, subdivision (a)(5), we presume the evidence was insufficient. [17] (12) Nevertheless a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant engaged in criminal activity involving an implied threat of violence. The proper focus for consideration of prior violent crimes in the penalty phase is on the facts of the defendant's past actions as they reflect on his character, rather than on the labels to be assigned ... to those crimes. ( People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 73 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].) At a minimum, defendant aided and abetted an act of vandalism. While evidence regarding the liquid-filled bottle in defendant's possession might not satisfy the technical elements of sections 12301 and 12303.3, the evidence is undisputed that the parking lot was burned just moments after defendant was seen holding the bottle and tire iron. Given the earlier altercation between defendant and Joseph, the burning of the parking lot could reasonably be considered an attempt to intimidate Joseph by an implied threat of violence. ( People v. Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 770-771 [admitting evidence of vandalism of van]; see People v. Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 397-398 [admitting evidence of arson of apartment]; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 824 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481] [admitting evidence of car arson].) That the conduct was given an inappropriate label is not prejudicial, particularly since the jury was never instructed with the elements of the offense. The actualand properfocus of the penalty phase was defendant and his capital crime. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 680-681 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705].) The incident with the Molotov cocktail was of marginal significance to the picture presented of the murder and the murderer. Similarly, any inappropriate label attached to the [incident] would have added little. Therefore, a label of this sort could not have affected the outcome within any reasonable possibility, and hence must be held harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id. at p. 681.)