Opinion ID: 2366093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 519 Pa. at 463, 549 A.2d at 87.

Text: The facts of Blystone are distinguishable from those of the case sub judice. Unlike both Blystone and Henlen, the instant case involves conversations taking place in the sanctity of one's home. If nowhere else, an individual must feel secure in his ability to hold a private conversation within the four walls of his home. For the right to privacy to mean anything, it must guarantee privacy to an individual in his own home. As then Justice Roberts stated in Commonwealth v. Shaw, 476 Pa. 543, 550, 383 A.2d 496, 499 (1978) (Citations omitted): Upon closing the door of one's home to the outside world, a person may legitimately expect the highest degree of privacy known to our society. In Shaw, the defendant was engaged in his own affairs on the second floor of his family's home. The police were admitted to his family's home to inquire of his knowledge of a recent robbery and killing. An eyewitness to the shooting had informed the police that one of the perpetrators was a friend of a man by the name of Shaw. When the police entered the house and called out to the defendant, a detective heard feet shuffling on the second floor. Because the defendant did not respond to the detective's call, three police officers ran upstairs without a warrant or permission. We held in that instance that the governmental intrusion was unreasonable given the defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy in his own home and therefore the intrusion violated the defendant's right against unreasonable searches and seizures. While the facts of Shaw differ from the case sub judice, the principle involved is identical. An individual has a constitutionally protected right to be secure in his home. Clearly then, our case law recognizes that an individual can reasonably expect that his right to privacy will not be violated in his home or other domain through the use of any electronic surveillance. Furthermore, in this instance, there is no evidence to suggest that Appellee committed any act which would reasonably lead to the conclusion that he did not have an expectation of privacy within his domain. Based upon this record, we must conclude that Appellee had a legitimate expectation that his conversation would not be subject to electronic surveillance. Because the right to privacy in one's domain is sacrosanct, we hold that Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution precludes the police from sending a confidential informer into the home of an individual to electronically record his conversations and transmit them back to the police. So that there be no confusion, it is to be noted that Section 5704(2) of the Act is devoid of any specific language which requires probable cause and we emphatically reject the analysis heretofore enunciated by the Superior Court that you may read into Section 5704(2) of the Act an implied probable cause requirement. Finally, we need not address the Commonwealth's assertion that even if § 5704(2) is unconstitutional, its actions should be shielded by the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. This is because in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991), we found that under Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, there is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, I would affirm the Order of the Superior Court and remand the case for a new trial. MONTEMURO, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter. FLAHERTY and CAPPY, JJ., join in this Opinion in Support of Affirmance. NIX, C.J., files an Opinion in Support of Reversal in which LARSEN and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join. LARSEN, J., files an Opinion in Support of Reversal. PAPADAKOS, J., files an Opinion in Support of Reversal.