Opinion ID: 1059329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: uniformed law enforcement officers in the courtroom

Text: Bell contends that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to prohibit law enforcement officers from wearing their uniforms when attending the trial as spectators. The court did not actually deny his motion in full. Instead, the court ruled that any officer involved in the trial as a witness, bailiff, or security guard could wear a uniform. The court further held that it would not prevent any officer who was on duty from coming into the courtroom while in uniform. However, the court recognized that if too many officers attended the trial as spectators while in uniform, it could create an oppressive atmosphere. So, the court stated that it would address that situation if and when it occurred. Apparently, no such problem ever developed because Bell never raised an objection that too many uniformed officers were spectators in the courtroom. Therefore, we find no error in the court's ruling on this issue.

Bell assigns error to the circuit court's denial of his motion for appointment of a correctional specialist as an expert to provide testimony regarding the conditions of confinement under which Bell would be housed if he were sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life. Bell claims that he needed this expert to review information about Bell, to assess his likelihood of being a future danger in prison, and to testify concerning the correctional systems used in a maximum security prison to manage inmates and prevent acts of violence. Recognizing that this Court has rejected the relevancy of this type of evidence, see Burns, 261 Va. at 340, 541 S.E.2d at 893; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 310, 513 S.E.2d at 653, Bell, nevertheless, urges this Court to reexamine this issue because, in his view, our rulings are inconsistent with decisions of the United States Supreme Court and because trial courts in Virginia are not consistently following the decisions in Cherrix and Burns. Bell asserts that evidence concerning the prison conditions in which he would serve a life sentence is relevant not only in mitigation and in rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence of future dangerousness, but also to his future adaptability to prison life. A jury, argues Bell, cannot assess a defendant's likelihood of adjusting to life in prison if evidence describing the conditions of confinement is excluded from the jury's consideration. According to Bell, the common thread running through the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994); and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), is the Court's recognition that many inmates who would be dangerous if released are not dangerous when confined to the `structured environment' of prison. In Skipper, the defendant sought to introduce testimony from two jailers and a regular visitor to the jail regarding the defendant's good adjustment during the time he had spent in confinement. 476 U.S. at 3, 106 S.Ct. 1669. The only question before the Supreme Court was whether the exclusion from the sentencing hearing of the testimony [the defendant] proffered regarding his good behavior during the over seven months he spent in jail awaiting trial deprived [the defendant] of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment. Id. at 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669. In holding that the trial court's exclusion of this evidence impeded the sentencing jury's ability to fulfill its task of considering all relevant evidence concerning the character and record of the defendant, the Court specifically stated that it was not hold[ing] that all facets of the defendant's ability to adjust to prison life must be treated as relevant and potentially mitigating. Id. at 7 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 1669. The Supreme Court, in Williams, found that the defendant's counsel rendered ineffective assistance, in part, because counsel failed to introduce evidence at sentencing from two prison officials who described the defendant as among the inmates `least likely to act in a violent, dangerous or provocative way.' 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Counsel also failed to introduce evidence at sentencing from two experts who had testified at trial for the prosecution. In their trial testimony, they had opined that there was a high probability that the defendant would pose a continuing threat to society. Id. at 368-69, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Those experts, however, also surmised that the defendant would not pose a danger to society if kept in a structured environment, but the defendant's counsel failed to elicit that opinion at sentencing. Id. at 371, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Finally, in Simmons, the issue was whether the Due Process Clause requires a sentencing jury to be informed that a defendant is parole ineligible when that defendant's future dangerousness is at issue. 512 U.S. at 163-64, 114 S.Ct. 2187. Reiterating that a defendant's character, prior criminal history, mental capacity, background, and age are just a few of the many factors ... that a jury may consider in fixing appropriate punishment[,] the Court concluded that there may be no greater assurance of a defendant's future nondangerousness to the public than the fact that [the defendant] never will be released on parole. Id. Contrary to Bell's assertion, our decisions in Cherrix and Burns are not inconsistent with these three cases. To use Bell's term, the common thread in these cases is that evidence peculiar to a defendant's character, history and background is relevant to the future dangerousness inquiry and should not be excluded from a jury's consideration. This includes evidence relating to a defendant's current adjustment to the conditions of confinement. As the Court stated in Skipper, a defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is itself an aspect of ... character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing determination. 476 U.S. at 7, 106 S.Ct. 1669. But, as we had already stated, [e]vidence regarding the general nature of prison life in a maximum security facility is not relevant to that inquiry, even when offered in rebuttal to evidence of future dangerousness. Burns, 261 Va. at 340, 541 S.E.2d at 893. While we do not dispute that Bell's future adaptability in terms of his disposition to adjust to prison life is relevant to the future dangerousness inquiry, Bell acknowledged on brief that the individual that he sought to have appointed has been qualified previously as an expert in prison operations and classification, The testimony that Bell sought to introduce through the expert concerned the conditions of prison life and the kind of security features utilized in a maximum security facility. That is the same kind of evidence that we have previously rejected as not relevant to the future dangerousness inquiry. See Burns, 261 Va. at 340, 541 S.E.2d at 893; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 310, 513 S.E.2d at 653. Nor is such general evidence, not specific to Bell, relevant to his future adaptability or as a foundation for an expert opinion on that issue. Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying Bell's motion. Bell failed to show a particularized need for this expert. Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 462, 544 S.E.2d 299, 305, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 481, 151 L.Ed.2d 395 (2001). In light of the inadmissibility of the evidence that Bell sought to introduce through the expert, he also failed to establish how he would be prejudiced by the lack of the expert's assistance. See id.
Bell contends that the admission of evidence regarding unadjudicated criminal conduct during the penalty phase of his trial violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and deprived him of life without due process of law. We have previously decided this issue adversely to Bell's position. See, e.g., Lenz, 261 Va. at 459, 544 S.E.2d at 303; Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 453, 470 S.E.2d 114, 122, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887, 117 S.Ct. 222, 136 L.Ed.2d 154 (1996); Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 536, 450 S.E.2d 365, 371 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161, 115 S.Ct. 2616, 132 L.Ed.2d 858 (1995); Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 421 S.E.2d at 826; Stockton, 241 Va. at 210, 402 S.E.2d at 206; Watkins, 238 Va. at 352, 385 S.E.2d at 56. Bell presents no compelling reason why we should depart from our prior rulings.
Bell contends that the circuit court's denial of his motion to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the Commonwealth's methods of execution violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also contends that the court erred by refusing to prohibit death penalty proceedings because the imposition of the death penalty as currently applied in Virginia does not comport with evolving standards of decency. We have already ruled that execution of prisoners by electrocution does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413, 419, 437 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1993), vacated in part on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1217, 114 S.Ct. 2701, 129 L.Ed.2d 830 (1994), cert. denied after remand, 514 U.S. 1085, 115 S.Ct. 1800, 131 L.Ed.2d 727 (1995); Stockton, 241 Va. at 215, 402 S.E.2d at 209-10; Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 439, 271 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1980); Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 743-44, 109 S.E. 582, 587 (1921). While this Court has not specifically determined whether execution by lethal injection likewise does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the basis of Bell's motion and the affidavit evidence he proffered in support of the motion allege that the Commonwealth's current procedures for administering a lethal injection as a means of execution pose substantial and unwarranted risks of subjecting a prisoner to extreme physical pain and suffering during the execution. This is the same type of allegation that this Court rejected when upholding the constitutionality of death by electrocution. See Martin, 221 Va. at 439, 271 S.E.2d at 125. See also Ramdass, 246 Va. at 419, 437 S.E.2d at 569. [11] Without more, we conclude that Bell was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this issue. See Dawson v. State, 274 Ga. 327, 554 S.E.2d 137, 144 (2001) (recognizing lethal injection as reflective of societal consensus that the `science of the present day' has provided a less painful, less barbarous means for taking the life of condemned prisoners). Furthermore, pursuant to the provisions of Code § 53.1-234, Bell has the right to choose whether his execution will be by lethal injection or by electrocution. Because Bell has that choice and we have already ruled that execution by electrocution is permissible under the Eighth Amendment, it would be an unnecessary adjudication of a constitutional issue to decide whether lethal injection violates the Eighth Amendment. See Bissell v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 397, 400, 100 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1957). We decline to do so, and likewise cannot say that the circuit court erred in denying Bell's motion for an evidentiary hearing to decide the constitutionality of lethal injection as a method of execution. Thus, we find no error in the court's denial of Bell's motion.
Bell asserts several reasons why the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied in Virginia. We have previously rejected his arguments: (1) future dangerousness predicate is unreliable and vague-rejected in Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 355, 551 S.E.2d 620, 626 (2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1928 (2002); (2) use of unadjudicated criminal conduct violates requirement of heightened reliability-rejected in Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 421 S.E.2d at 826; (3) unconstitutional for trial court to use pre-sentence report that contains hearsay evidence-rejected in Cherrix, 257 Va. at 299, 513 S.E.2d at 647; and (4) Virginia's appellate review of death penalty cases violates the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause-rejected in Lenz, 261 Va. at 459, 544 S.E.2d at 304. Bell has provided no compelling reason why we should depart from these precedents.
In accordance with our decision in Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 347, 374, 519 S.E.2d 602, 616 (1999), the circuit court instructed the jury that [t]he words `imprisonment for life' mean imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. During the penalty phase deliberations, the jury inquired, Understanding that imprisonment for life means no possibility of parole, is there any other way to be released from prison? Recognizing that geriatric release is not available to a defendant convicted of capital murder, the court's proposed answer was, No. Not when the Defendant has been convicted of capital murder. Bell agreed with this response, but the Commonwealth objected because there could be other ways for a defendant convicted of capital murder to be released early, such as by an act of executive pardon or clemency. To answer the question truthfully would therefore require that the jury be informed about such things, argued the Commonwealth. Concluding that the Commonwealth's position was correct, the court told the jurors that they would have to rely on the evidence that they heard, and the instructions already presented in deciding the punishment. In the circuit court's view, a truthful answer to the jury's question would have opened the door to matters that were speculative and inappropriate for the jury to consider. Bell argues that the circuit court erred by not answering the jury's question and instructing that other forms of early release are not available to defendants convicted of capital murder. He contends that the question indicated that the jurors were speculating about whether, despite the instruction that life means life without parole, Bell could still receive some form of early release. He claims that this speculation, which remained unresolved, caused the jury to impose the death penalty instead of life imprisonment. Thus, Bell argues that his sentence of death was rendered in violation of Virginia law, see Yarbrough, 258 Va. at 373, 519 S.E.2d at 616, his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171, 114 S.Ct. 2187, and his rights to a fair and reliable sentencing determination under the Eighth Amendment, id. at 172-73, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (Souter, J., concurring). However, Bell acknowledges that the court's proposed response to the jury's question was not accurate. Even though a defendant convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for certain forms of early release, such as geriatric release under Code § 53.1-40.01, an act of executive pardon or clemency is still available for such a defendant. Bell, nevertheless, argues that the circuit court had a duty to fashion an appropriate response to the jury's question and suggests that such a response would have been that a life sentence for Bell would permit no parole, no community supervision, no early release program, or any other credits that would reduce the mandatory imprisonment. Recognizing that even this answer does not address the possibility that the jury was concerned about release by an act of executive pardon or clemency, Bell suggests that the court should also have told the jury not to concern itself with anything else. We agree that, when a principle of law is materially vital to a defendant in a criminal case, a trial court cannot merely refuse a defective instruction, but must correct the instruction and then give it in the proper form. Whaley v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 353, 355-56, 200 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1973), cited in Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104, 117, 532 S.E.2d 629, 635 (2000). The issue in this case is not whether the circuit court failed to correct a defective instruction. Instead, we must decide whether the court's answer to the jury's question was, in fact, defective. Stated differently, the issue is how the jury's question in this case should have been answered so that [the jury could be] properly informed and [could] render a fair trial to both parties while preserving ... the separation of the judicial branch's function of assessing punishment and the executive branch's function of administering the punishment. Fishback, 260 Va. at 113-14, 532 S.E.2d at 633. To address this issue and the response that Bell now puts forward as a proper answer to the jury's question, we must first examine our decision in Fishback. There, the question was whether a defendant convicted of a non-capital felony was entitled to have the jury instructed that parole has been abolished in Virginia for offenses committed after January 1, 1995. 260 Va. at 108, 532 S.E.2d at 630. We answered that question affirmatively. Id. at 115, 532 S.E.2d at 634. In addition, we also concluded that, because Code § 53.1-40.01 is in the nature of a parole statute, where applicable juries shall also be instructed on the possibility of geriatric release pursuant to that statute. Id. at 115-16, 532 S.E.2d at 634. To clarify our new rule, we further stated that the task of the trial courts will require only that instructions with regard to the abolition of parole be tailored to the facts of a particular case. Thus, when a defendant's age and the permissible range of punishment for the offense in question totally negate the applicability of Code § 53.1-40.01, the jury will be instructed that the defendant is not eligible for parole in accordance with Code § 53.1-165.1. In those cases where geriatric release is a possibility, then the jury will be instructed in accordance with the applicable provisions of Code § 53.1-40.01 along with the instruction that parole is otherwise abolished. Id. at 116, 532 S.E.2d at 634. Implicit in this holding is the recognition that fairness to both the defendant and the Commonwealth requires that jurors be told that, despite the abolition of parole, certain defendants still qualify for geriatric release. But when a defendant does not qualify for geriatric release, the jury need only be informed that the defendant is not eligible for parole. In the present case, Bell's conviction of capital murder totally negated the possibility of geriatric release under Code § 53.1-40.01. Thus, pursuant to our direction in Fishback, the jury was instructed that Bell was not eligible for parole, i.e., that life means life without the possibility of parole. As we stated in Fishback, geriatric release is in the nature of parole, and thus, when a defendant does not qualify for geriatric release, an instruction that a defendant is not eligible for parole is correct, and nothing more is required in order to have truth in sentencing. Id. at 113, 532 S.E.2d at 632. Hence, the jury in this case was properly instructed with regard to the abolition of parole, and when it asked whether there is any other way to be released from prison, the court properly referred the jury to its prior instructions. With regard to the issue of sentencing credits under Code § 53.1-202.2, we recognized in Fishback that a defendant's eligibility for this type of early release remains dependent upon the prisoner's conduct and participation in various programs established by the Department of Corrections, and on the executive branch's subjective assessment of that conduct and participation. Id. at 115, 532 S.E.2d at 634. Thus, a jury could not, without engaging in speculation, factor the possibility of sentencing credits into its determination of an appropriate sentence. Id. at 116, 532 S.E.2d at 634. For that reason, we held that juries are not to be instructed with regard to sentencing credits available under Code § 53.1-202.2. Id. Unlike the defendant in Fishback, Bell's conviction of capital murder precludes the possibility of his earning sentencing credits. Thus, the reasons underlying our conclusion in Fishback that juries are not to be instructed about sentencing credits do not apply to Bell's situation. However, because the nature of Bell's conviction negates the applicability of Code §.§ 53.1-202.2 and-202.3, just as with geriatric release, we conclude that the circuit court's instructions were correct and that, in response to the jury's question, the court again properly referred to its prior instructions. This leaves only the question whether the jury should have been advised about the availability of early release through an act of executive pardon or clemency. Even Bell does not advocate inclusion of that information in responding to the jury's question. Instead, he argues that the circuit court should have instructed the jury that geriatric release and sentencing credits are not available to him and that the jury should not concern itself with anything else. Bell's suggested response highlights the anomaly presented by the jury's question in this case. If the jury had inquired about a specific form of early release, such as geriatric release, then the court could have answered that question accurately and dispelled any possible speculation by the jury. Here, however, the question was general and could not have been accurately answered without telling the jury about executive clemency or pardon. Yet, we have never allowed a jury to have that information because of the potential for jury speculation resulting in a harsher sentence than would otherwise be warranted. See Yarbrough, 258 Va. at 372, 519 S.E.2d at 615. So, the only response that would have comported with our precedent was to instruct the jurors that geriatric release and sentencing credits were not available to Bell and that they should not concern themselves with anything else. Yet, that kind of response would have suggested that there is some other form of early release still available to Bell and would have, in fact, invited the jury to speculate. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 170, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (trial court's admonishment that jury should not consider parole and that parole was not a proper issue for the jury to consider actually suggested that parole was available but that the jury, for some unstated reason, should be blind to this fact). Such speculation is inconsistent with a fair trial both to the defendant and the Commonwealth. Fishback, 260 Va. at 115, 532 S.E.2d at 634. Given the nature of the jury's question, we conclude that the circuit court did not err when it responded by directing the ... jury to rely on the evidence that it had heard and the instructions that had been given. Any other answer would either have been inaccurate or have led to further speculation by the jury. The instruction that imprisonment for life means life without the possibility of parole was correct under our holdings in Yarbrough and Fishback. Nothing more was required in this case. Thus, Bell's rights under our case law, the Due Process Clause, and the Eighth Amendment were not violated.
Pursuant to Code 17.1-313(C)(1), we are required to determine whether the death sentence in this case was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors. Bell asserts only that, because of the circuit court's alleged errors previously argued by him, his sentence of death was based on arbitrary factors. Our review of the record does not disclose any evidence to suggest that the imposition of the death penalty in this case was based on or influenced by any passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor. We also do not believe that any of the circuit court's alleged errors, which we have already separately addressed, created an atmosphere of passion or prejudice that influenced the sentencing decision. We are also required by the provisions of Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) to determine, whether Bell's sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. In accordance with Code § 17.1-313(E), we have accumulated the records of capital murder cases reviewed by this Court, including not only those cases in which the death penalty was imposed, but also those cases in which the trial court or jury imposed a life sentence and the defendant petitioned this Court for an appeal. See Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 81, 286 S.E.2d 162, 171, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 181, 74 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982). To comply with the statutory directive that we compare this case with similar cases, we have focused on cases in which a law enforcement officer was killed and that killing was for the purpose of interfering with the performance of official duties, and in which the death penalty was imposed based upon the future dangerousness predicate. Based on our review, we conclude that Bell's sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to sentences generally imposed in this Commonwealth for capital murders comparable to Bell's murder of Sergeant Timbrook. While our review encompasses all capital murder cases presented to this Court for review and is not limited to selected cases, see Burns, 261 Va. at 345, 541 S.E.2d at 896-97, we cite the following cases as examples: Royal v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 110, 458 S.E.2d 575 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1097, 116 S.Ct. 823, 133 L.Ed.2d 766 (1996); Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 397 S.E.2d 385 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824, 112 S.Ct. 88, 116 L.Ed.2d 60 (1991); Delong v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 357, 362 S.E.2d 669 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929, 108 S.Ct. 1100, 99 L.Ed.2d 263 (1988); Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 521, 352 S.E.2d 342, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct. 3277, 97 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987); Evans v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 468, 323 S.E.2d 114 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1025, 105 S.Ct. 2037, 85 L.Ed.2d 319 (1985).