Opinion ID: 1938488
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: motion to dismiss counts 5 through 10

Text: Preliminarily, we should note that the issue before us is not whether Tracy would have been entitled to a continuance. The State does not suggest that Tracy could be compelled to stand trial eleven days after being indicted for counts 5 through 10. The trial judge offered and reoffered to continue the trial, but Tracy steadfastly refused a continuance and insisted on a dismissal of the new counts. Tracy's first contention is that dismissal is mandatory because the addition of six new counts constituted an amendment of the charging document which changed the character of the offense charged, and since it was not consented to, the amendment was improper under Md. Rule 4-204. That rule provides: On motion of a party or on its own initiative, the court at any time before verdict may permit a charging document to be amended except that if the amendment changes the character of the offense charged, the consent of the parties is required. If amendment of a charging document reasonably so requires, the court shall grant the defendant an extension of time or continuance. Amendments contemplated by Rule 4-204 are changes, alterations, or modifications to an existing charge in an existing charging document. Bringing new charges by new charging documents are not amendments. It is generally recognized that the word amendment implies something upon which the change, correction, alteration, or reformation can operate, something to be reformed, corrected, rectified, or altered. Logic and reason would dictate that a criminal defendant should have the right to preclude the State from making material changes to an existing charge. However, the rule was not meant to require, and should not require, consent of a defendant before the State can file additional charging documents charging new offenses. In the instant case, the additional six counts charged in the indictment were not amendments to the four counts in the criminal information, and did not require Tracy's consent before they could be filed. Tracy next maintains that counts 5 through 10 should have been dismissed because if these counts are not amendments, then they were improperly joined with counts 1 through 4. He does not contend that the charges involve separate criminal events and should not be joined; instead he argues that absent a motion for joint trial by either party, the trial court lacked authority to order a joint trial. Even if Tracy is correct, the proper remedy for an improper joinder is a severance, not a dismissal. Tracy knew that the additional charges were joined for trial with the prior charges, but he never asked for a severance. The only relief he requested was dismissal of the indictment charging counts 5 through 10. He was not entitled to have the indictment dismissed even if we assume it was improperly joined for trial with another charging document. By failing to specifically request a severance of counts 5 through 10, Tracy waived any right to a severance. A defendant can lose his rights under joinder and severance law by failing to assert them in a timely fashion. This is true even in the instances of misjoinder.... 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 17.3(d), at 378 (1984). See also Erman v. State, 49 Md. App. 605, 612, 434 A.2d 1030, 1036 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908, 102 S.Ct. 1756, 72 L.Ed.2d 165 (1982); Sye v. State, 55 Md. App. 356, 361, 468 A.2d 641, 644 (1983). We should also note that Tracy was not prejudiced by the joint trial on all counts since the charges were so interrelated and bound together by a common scheme that the evidence as to all charges was mutually admissible. Frazier v. State, 318 Md. 597, 569 A.2d 684 (1990). Tracy's final contention regarding counts 5 through 10 is that requiring him to stand trial on these counts, only eleven days after the indictment, violated Md. Rule 4-242(b)(3), which provides in part: In circuit court the defendant shall initially plead within 15 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court pursuant to Rule 4-213(c). Tracy asserts that a defendant cannot be required to stand trial during that fifteen day period if he has not yet entered a plea. He may be correct, but the short answer is that Tracy was not required to stand trial within fifteen days of the indictment. He not only failed to request a continuance; he even rejected the judge's offer of a continuance. He cannot now complain that he was tried too expeditiously on these counts. In Gray v. State, 216 Md. 410, 140 A.2d 643 (1958), immediately prior to trial, the State's Attorney made a motion to amend the charging document. The Defendant objected, claiming that the warrant was a nullity. On appeal, the Defendant requested that at least the case should be remanded for a new trial presumably on the ground that he did not have time to prepare his defense after the amendment. This Court stated, [i]f he was surprised by the amendment or was not ready to go to trial forthwith, he should have moved for a postponement.... [A]n appeal is of no avail to counteract a failure to act in the lower court. Id. at 417, 140 A.2d at 646-47. If Tracy felt aggrieved by having to stand trial on counts 5 through 10, only eleven days after the indictment on these charges, he should have requested a continuance to which he was entitled rather than a dismissal to which he was not entitled.