Opinion ID: 2540614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the reference to fines and costs in the judgment

Text: Smith also challenges the inclusion of the language Defendant's court costs and fines are credit time served in the final judgment. He contends that the provision may be interpreted to mean that the equivalent of the fine and costs are [sic] to be subtracted from the 261 day jail time credit awarded at sentencing or some other credits[.] He alleges that he faces the danger of having the Corrections Department relying on this nebulous statement in its calculations of his actual time to serve ... [and that] Corrections may charge off the fine against jail credit or subtract it from the credits calculated upon receipt into the state corrections system. While Smith did not object to this language in the judgment at trial, he may raise this issue on appeal. See Travis, 327 S.W.3d at 459. Subsection (4) of KRS 534.040 provides that [f]ines required by this section shall not be imposed upon any person determined by the court to be indigent pursuant to KRS Chapter 31. Similarly, KRS 23A.205(2) provides for the mandatory imposition of court costs unless the court finds that the defendant is a poor person as defined by KRS 453.190(2) and that he or she is unable to pay court costs and will be unable to pay the court costs, in the foreseeable future. KRS 453.190(2) defines a poor person as a person who is unable to pay the costs and fees of the proceeding in which he is involved without depriving himself or his dependents of the necessities of life, including food, shelter, or clothing, See Maynes v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 922 (Ky.2012) (distinguishing between indigent and poor person.). While it does not appear that the trial court formally made the necessary findings to establish whether Smith was either an indigent not subject to fines under KRS 534.040 or a poor person not subject to costs under KRS 23A.205(2), the judgment does not specifically impose either penalty, which implies that the trial court determined that he was not eligible for either punishment. Further, at the time of trial, Smith was receiving the services of a public defender, was granted the right to appeal in forma pauperis, and the Commonwealth does not contest Smith's allegation that he is not subject to payment under either statute. Assuming that we are correct that everyone is in agreement that Smith is not eligible to be assessed either fines or court costs, there was no reason to include any reference to them in the judgment. Moreover, there is no method by which a trial court may indirectly impose fines and court costs against a defendant by reducing his pretrial jail time credit. Consequently, any attempt by a trial court to do so would be improper. Given, in the context of this case, the meaningless nature of the phrase Defendant's court costs and fines are credit time served, it is highly unlikely that the provision poses a threat to Smith's pretrial credit time by actions of the Department of Corrections. The provision seems to be pointless surplus language that serves no apparent utility. However, lest at some future date, it be applied to some purpose detrimental to Smith, we vacate the language and order that it be stricken from the judgment.