Opinion ID: 2514189
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Refusal to Grant For-Cause Challenges

Text: ¶ 25 We start with the traditional and sound rule that a trial court's determination of whether to excuse a prospective juror for cause should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981); State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318, 319 (Utah 1977). We review such a decision with just deference because of the trial judge's somewhat advantaged position in determining which persons would be fair and impartial jurors. Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536. We view the trial court's exercise of discretion, however, in light of the fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting another. Id. ¶ 26 Rule 18(e)(14) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the appropriate standard under which Wach's claim that prospective jurors No. 3 and No. 21 should have been dismissed for cause is to be tested: (e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the following grounds: . . . (14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging [the juror] . . . . ¶ 27 Once statements are made during voir dire that facially raise a question of partiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is removed by the court or unless the court or counsel investigates further and finds the inference rebutted. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988). Rebuttal is accomplished by showing that a juror's statement was merely the product of a `light impression' and not one that would `close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition.' Id. (quoting State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980)). With this standard in mind, we turn our attention to the disputed for-cause rulings in the instant case.
¶ 28 Wach argues that the trial court erred by failing to remove for cause prospective juror No. 3 because she indicated during voir dire that she had been the victim of a similar crime. Specifically, juror No. 3 disclosed that she had previously been the victim of an assault. ¶ 29 As the court of appeals correctly noted in State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 823 (Utah Ct.App.1994), a question of potential bias arises when a prospective juror indicates that he or she has been the victim of a similar crime. Therefore, as explained above, when such a question arises, the court or counsel must investigate further to determine if the juror can be impartial despite the past experience. See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451. If, after further investigation into the juror's state of mind, the trial court is satisfied that the juror can act impartially, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to remove the prospective juror for cause. See id. at 451-52. ¶ 30 In this case, Wach correctly notes that because juror No. 3 disclosed during voir dire that she had previously been the victim of an assault, a facial question was raised concerning her impartiality. However, after juror No. 3 made the above disclosure, the trial court conducted a rehabilitative inquiry. Specifically, the trial court inquired into the circumstances of the assault, asking juror No. 3 whether the crime was perpetrated against her by a family member, whether the perpetrator was male or female, and whether the incident had been resolved. Juror No. 3 responded that unlike the case at hand, she was not assaulted by a family member, the perpetrator was female, and the incident had been resolved for over two years. Thereafter, the trial court asked juror No. 3 whether her experience would affect [her] ability to be fair and impartial. Juror No. 3 responded unequivocally, No, Your Honor. It won't. The trial court further queried, You think you can do it without any problem? Juror No. 3 again affirmatively responded, Yes. ¶ 31 In light of the above, none of prospective juror No. 3's responses to the trial court's rehabilitative inquiry indicated any bias as a result of having been the victim of a similar crime. Rather, juror No. 3's unequivocal responses indicated that she could act in an impartial manner and had an open mind regarding the testimony to be offered despite her past experience. Moreover, juror No. 3's responses also indicated that the circumstances of her past experience were different than those in the present case in many important respects. Therefore, the trial court's rehabilitative inquiry in this case was sufficient to rebut any question of bias that was raised by the fact that juror No. 3 had been the victim of a similar crime. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove prospective juror No. 3 for cause.
¶ 32 Wach also argues that the trial court erred by refusing to remove prospective juror No. 21 for cause because she indicated during voir dire that as a result of her employment at a hospital, she had strong feelings about criminal behavior and was therefore biased. The trial court asked juror No. 21 if she could set [her bias] aside, to which inquiry juror No. 21 gave no response. The trial court then explained that criminal defendants have a presumption of innocence until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and asked juror No. 21 a second time if she could set aside her bias and return an impartial verdict. Juror No. 21 responded, I believe I could. ¶ 33 It is not enough if a juror believes that he or she can be impartial and fair. Indeed, this court has previously noted that [a] statement made by a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial loses much of its meaning in light of other testimony and facts which suggest a bias. Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981). Accordingly, [t]he court, not the juror, must determine a juror's qualification. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987) (citing State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981)). ¶ 34 In this case, although juror No. 21 stated that she believe[d] she could remain fair and impartial, her statement does not alter the fact that she indicated that as a result of her experience working at a hospital she had witnessed numerous instances of criminal behavior and was therefore biased. The trial court's one question, although asked twice, was not sufficient to rebut this inference of bias. See State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980) (holding that court's one question was insufficient to rebut prospective juror's statement that he would favor police officer's testimony). Hence, the trial court had insufficient evidence upon which to base a conclusion that prospective juror No. 21 was not biased and abused its discretion in failing to remove her for cause.