Opinion ID: 835865
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactive Application of Victim-Impact Evidence Provisions of ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) to Defendant's Remanded Penalty-Phase Proceeding

Text: As discussed above, in addition to adding a provision allowing for any aggravating evidence, the 1995 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(a) also provided for the admission of victim impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim or the impact of the crime on the victim's family. See 336 Or. at 432, 86 P.3d at 1111 (quoting Or. Laws 1995, ch. 531, § 2). The 1997 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) similarly required that the jury consider, as part of its consideration of the fourth question, any victim impact evidence as described in subsection (1)(a) of this section. See 336 Or. at 432, 86 P.3d at 1111 (quoting Or. Laws 1997, ch. 784, § 1). In defendant's third penalty-phase proceeding, the state introduced evidence of the victims' personal characteristics and of the impact that their murders had on their two daughters, on their niece and nephew, and on Rod Houser's brother. Defendant objected to the state's victim-impact evidence, arguing that, like the any aggravating evidence provisions of the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B), retroactive application of the victim-impact evidence provisions violated the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. The trial court disagreed, and the jury considered the evidence. On review, defendant renews both his state and federal challenges, which we discuss in turn below.
As defendant points out, under the 1989 version of the death-penalty statutory scheme in place at the time of his second penalty-phase proceeding (and, indisputably, under the 1985 version of that statute in place at the time of his crimes in 1987), the admission of victim-impact evidence constituted reversible error. Guzek II, 322 Or. at 270, 906 P.2d 272. Defendant argues that, accordingly, the victim-impact evidence provisions of the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) constituted one-sided changes in the law that now allow the state to introduce different evidence than it was permitted to introduce at the time when defendant committed his crimes. As with his challenge to the any aggravating evidence provision, defendant argues that retroactive application of those provisions violates the ex post facto prohibition of Article I, section 21, under Fugate. The state counters that the state constitutional ex post facto prohibition does not proscribe retroactive application of the victim-impact evidence provisions of the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) because those changes in the law were not one-sided. That is so, the state argues, because a defendant also conceivably could benefit from the introduction of victim-impact evidence. Alternatively, the state argues that, even if Article I, section 21, formerly proscribed the admission of victim-impact evidence against defendant, that proscription will not apply on remand because it has been superseded by Article I, section 42, of the Oregon Constitution, which, among other things, confers on victims the right    to be heard at sentencing in criminal proceedings. We need not resolve the parties' dispute as to whether retroactive application of the victim-impact evidence provisions of the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) would violate the state constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As explained below, even if defendant's state ex post facto analysis were correct, we agree with the state that a victim's right    to be heard under Article I, section 42(1)(a), of the Oregon Constitution supersedes any Article I, section 21, protection applicable to defendant, as explained below. The voters adopted what is now Article I, section 42, of the Oregon Constitution as a legislatively referred constitutional amendment in 1999. Among other things, that amendment provided that crime victims have [t]he right    to be heard at    the sentencing    disposition[.] Or. Const., Art I, § 42(1)(a). The amendment further provided that the rights set out therein applied to all criminal proceedings pending or commenced on or after the effective date of the amendment, that is, December 2, 1999. Or. Const., Art I, § 42(2). The state's argument that, on remand, Article I, section 42(1)(a) will require admission of relevant victim-impact evidence against defendant presents a two-part question. First, we must determine whether the state's offering of the type of victim-impact evidence that the 1995 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(a) describes, that is, evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim or the impact of the crime on the victim's family, qualifies as a victim's right    to be heard under Article I, section 42(1)(a). Because we conclude that it does, and because, by its terms, Article I, section 42, will apply to any subsequent penalty-phase proceeding in this case, we must address a second question: Whether the victims' right to be heard requires the trial court on remand to admit relevant victim-impact evidence against defendant despite any protection against ex post facto laws that Article I, section 21, might afford him. We begin with the text of Article I, section 42. See Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or. 101, 116-17, 36 P.3d 954 (2001), modified on recons. on other grounds, 334 Or. 11, 45 P.3d 107 (2002) (when interpreting referred constitutional provision, court's task is to discern intent of voters; best evidence of voters' intent is text of provision). It provides, in part: (1) To preserve and protect the right of crime victims to justice, to ensure crime victims a meaningful role in the criminal and juvenile justice systems, to accord crime victims due dignity and respect and to ensure that criminal and juvenile court delinquency proceedings are conducted to seek the truth as to the defendant's innocence or guilt, and also to ensure that a fair balance is struck between the rights of crime victims and the rights of criminal defendants in the course and conduct of criminal and juvenile court delinquency proceedings, the following rights are hereby granted to victims in all prosecutions for crimes and in juvenile court delinquency proceedings: (a) The right to be present at and, upon specific request, to be informed in advance of any critical stage of the proceedings held in open court when the defendant will be present, and to be heard at the pretrial release hearing and the sentencing or juvenile court delinquency disposition;      (2) This section applies to all criminal and juvenile court delinquency proceedings pending or commenced on or after the effective date of this section. Nothing in this section reduces a criminal defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States. Except as otherwise specifically provided, this section supersedes any conflicting section of this Constitution.    (3) As used in this section:      (c) `Victim' means any person determined by the prosecuting attorney to have suffered direct financial, psychological or physical harm as a result of a crime and, in the case of a victim who is a minor, the legal guardian of the minor. In the event that no person has been determined to be a victim of the crime, the people of Oregon, represented by the prosecuting attorney, are considered to be the victims.     (Emphasis added.) The text of Article I, section 42, permits us to answer the first question quickly. Article I, section 42(1)(a), confers the right    to be heard on those persons that the state deems to have suffered harm as a result of a crime (defined in section (3)(c) as [v]ictim[s]). We need not consider the full breadth of that right to conclude that it generally encompasses the more narrowly defined victim-impact evidence described in the 1995 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and, relatedly, in the 1997 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B). The right of a murder victim's family member (who also can qualify as a victim under Article I, section 42) to be heard in a penalty-phase proceeding means, at a minimum, the right to offer relevant evidence of the murder victim's personal characteristics and of the impact of the crime upon the murder victim's family. In the context of a capital penalty-phase proceeding, the state's ability to offer victim-impact evidence under ORS 163.150(1)(a) ordinarily will serve as the mechanism for a victim's exercise of that right. Because, as noted above, Article I, section 42, applies to all criminal    proceedings pending or commenced on or after December 2, 1999, it follows that the Housers' family members will have the right in any subsequent penalty-phase proceeding in this case to offer evidence of the Housers' personal characteristics and of the impact of the crimes on their family. That conclusion conflicts with defendant's contention that Article I, section 21, insulates him from the introduction of victim-impact evidence through its prohibition against ex post facto laws. Accordingly, assuming, without deciding, that defendant is correct respecting the applicability of Article I, section 21, we must determine which right will govern the question of the admissibility of victim-impact evidence in any further proceeding in this case: the victims' right to be heard or defendant's right to be free from application of an ex post facto law. To answer that question, we again turn to the text of the Article I, section 42. Article I, section 42(2), provides, in part: Nothing in this section reduces a criminal defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States. Except as otherwise specifically provided, this section supersedes any conflicting section of this Constitution. By providing that Article I, section 42, does not reduce[ ] a defendant's federal constitutional rights and that it supersedes any conflicting section of the Oregon Constitution, that text anticipates that the victim's right to be heard might be incompatible with a criminal defendant's constitutional right in a particular case. At the same time, the text establishes that the voters intended the anticipated conflict to be resolved in one of two ways, depending on the source of the criminal defendant's conflicting right. According to the first of the two sentences quoted above, the voters made clear that they did not intend to attempt to change any right previously guaranteed to a criminal defendant under the United States Constitution. Accordingly, in the event of a conflict between a victim's right to be heard and a criminal defendant's federal constitutional right, it is the victim's right to be heard that must give way. [13] By contrast to that deference to federal constitutional law, Article I, section 42, provides that it will supersede any conflicting section of the Oregon Constitution. Read in context, that statement makes clear that, in the event of a conflict between a victim's right to be heard under Article I, section 42(1)(a), and a criminal defendant's right under the Oregon Constitution, it is the victim's right that has constitutional priority. Applying the foregoing understanding of Article I, section 42, to this case, we conclude the following. In a subsequent death-penalty proceeding in this case, the Housers' family members will have the right under Article I, section 42(1)(a), to offer relevant victim-impact evidence as described in the 1995 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and later included in the 1997 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B). Although retroactive application of those amendments to defendant might implicate the ex post facto prohibition under Article I, section 21, defendant's right to be free from retroactive application of the amendments is superseded in this context by the right conferred on the Housers' family members under Article I, section 42(1)(a).
Defendant also argues that retroactive application of the victim-impact evidence provisions of the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) to his remanded penalty-phase proceeding violates the prohibition of ex post facto laws set out in Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution. See 336 Or. at 429 n. 5, 86 P.3d at 1109 n. 5 (setting out provision). The state counters that, according to the analysis that the United States Supreme Court set out in Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000), it does not. For the reasons set out below, we agree with the state's ex post facto analysis under federal law. When interpreting the prohibition against ex post facto laws set out in Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court relies on Calder's categories. The Court, like this one, has held that alterations to the rules of evidence in a manner that makes conviction more likely fall into the fourth category of laws under Calder that violate ex post facto principles. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 522-25, 120 S.Ct. 1620. [14] However, the Court has offered a specific interpretation, as a matter of federal constitutional law, of the kind of change in the rules of evidence that facilitates an easier conviction. Under Article I, section 10, as the Court explained in Carmell, a change in the rules of evidence that facilitates an easier convictionlike changes in the law relating to Calder's first three categoriesis one that subverts the presumption of innocence. [15] Id. at 532, 120 S.Ct. 1620. Specifically, the evidentiary change must be one that alters the sufficiency-of-evidence standard or otherwise reduc[es] the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof to convict. Id. at 532-33, 120 S.Ct. 1620. Applying that standard to a penalty-phase proceeding, we construe it as a standard that focuses on whether the change in the law lowers the minimum quantum of evidence required to obtain a sentence of death. With that standard in mind, we again turn to the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) that permit the admission of victim-impact evidence. We agree with the state that nothing about those amendments lowers the quantum of proof necessary for the state to obtain a sentence of death. The state must prove each issue submitted to the jury under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A) to (C) beyond a reasonable doubt, ORS 163.150(1)(d), just as Oregon law previously required it to do. Although the retroactive application of a change in the law that permits the state to introduce a new kind of evidence against a defendant might tip the balance in favor of the state, it does not unfair[ly] tip it, Carmell, 529 U.S. at 533 n. 23, 120 S.Ct. 1620, for purposes of the federal Ex Post Facto Clause, as does a change in the law that reduces the sufficiency of the evidence standard. That distinction is dispositive. As the Supreme Court explained in Carmell, not every rule that increases the state's likelihood of success on the merits constitutes an ex post facto law under Article I, section 10. For example, the Court observed that rules that permit evidence to be admitted at trial, whether one-sided or not,     do not at all subvert the presumption of innocence, because they do not concern whether the admissible evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption. Therefore, to the extent one may consider changes to such laws as `unfair' or `unjust,' they do not implicate the same kind of unfairness implicated by changes in rules setting forth a sufficiency of the evidence standard. Id. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the admission of victim-impact evidence against defendant under the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.