Opinion ID: 4311008
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State Post‐Trial Proceedings

Text: Rhodes appealed. As relevant here, he argued that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment when it limited his cross‐examination of Nari. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals agreed with Rhodes. That court held that the trial judge had exceeded her “wide latitude” to impose reasonable limitations on cross‐ examination, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 329 Wis. 2d 268 at ¶10. The Court of Appeals also found that the State had not shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the harmless‐error standard that applies on 12 No. 17‐2223 direct review of Confrontation Clause violations. The Court of Appeals remanded for a new trial. 329 Wis. 2d 268 at ¶10 & n.1. In a divided opinion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court re‐ versed. The majority summarized United States Supreme Court precedent on the Confrontation Clause but then held that the balancing test under Wis. Stat. § 904.03—the equiva‐ lent of Federal Rule of Evidence 403—applied “to discretion‐ ary decisions” to exclude evidence “when the defendant’s right to cross‐examination under the confrontation clause may be implicated.” 336 Wis. 2d at 81–83, 799 N.W.2d at 859, ¶¶41, 44. The court applied § 904.03 and found that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion by excluding confusing and misleading evidence. 336 Wis. 2d at 90–91, 799 N.W.2d at 863, ¶¶68–70. The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not reach the question of harmless error. Two justices dissented, saying that the “defendant had a fundamental constitutional right to confront this witness and test the probative value of the testimony through cross‐ examination.” 336 Wis. 2d at 92, 799 N.W.2d at 864, ¶75 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). The dissent said the majority had erred by applying the § 904.03 balancing test to Rhodes’s constitutional challenge, urging that the “fundamental constitutional right of confrontation surely aﬀords the defendant more protection and leeway in cross‐examining a witness than the standard analysis used in discretionary evidentiary decisions” when that right is not implicated. 336 Wis. 2d at 93–94, 799 N.W.2d at 865, ¶80. No. 17‐2223 13