Opinion ID: 106879
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Around twenty. Q. Around twenty departments?

Text: A. Yes, sir. Q. All right, sir, is one of these departments considered a lunch counter or establishment where food is served? A. Yes, sir. That is a separate department. ..... Q. Now, I believe, is it true that you invite members of the public to come into your store? A. Yes, it is for the public. Q. And is it true, too, that the public to you means everybody, various races, religions, nationalities? A. Yes, sir. Q. The policy of your store as manager is not to exclude anybody from coming in and buying these three thousand items on account of race, nationality or religion, is that right? A. The only place where there has been exception, where there is an exception, is at our lunch counter. Q. Oh, I see. Is that a written policy you get from headquarters in New York? A. No, sir. Q. It is not. You don't have any memorandum in your store that says that is a policy? A. No, sir. ..... Q. Is it true, then, that if, that, well, even if a man was quiet enough, and a Communist, that he could sit at your lunch counter and eat, according to the policy of your store right now? Whether you knew he was a Communist or not, so his political beliefs would not have anything to do with it, is that right? A. No. Q. Now, sir, you said that there was a policy there as to Negroes sitting. Am I to understand that you do serve Negroes or Americans who are Negroes, standing up? A. To take out, at the end of the counter, we serve take-outs, yes, sir. Q. In other words, you have a lunch counter at the end of your store? A. No, I said at the end, they can wait and get a package or a meal or order a coke or hamburger and take it out. Q. Oh, to take out. They don't normally eat it on the premises? A. They might, but usually it is to take out. ..... Q. Of course, you probably have some Negro employees in your store, in some capacity, don't you? A. Yes, sir. Q. They eat on the premises, is that right? A. Yes, sir. Q. But not at the lunch counter? A. No, sir. ..... Q. Oh, I see, but generally speaking, you consider the American Negro as part of the general public, is that right, just generally speaking? A. Yes, sir. Q. You don't have any objections for him spending any amount of money he wants to on these 3,000 items, do you? A. That's up to him to spend if he wants to spend. Q. This is a custom, as I understand it, this is a custom instead of a law that causes you not to want him to ask for service at the lunch counter? A. There is no law to my knowledge, it is merely a custom in this community. C. The testimony in the following cases is less definitive with respect to why Negroes were refused service. In Griffin v. Maryland, ante, p. 130, the president of the corporations which own and operate Glen Echo Amusement Park said he would admit Chinese, Filipinos, Indians and, generally, anyone but Negroes. He did not elaborate, beyond stating that a private property owner has the right to make such a choice. In Barr v. City of Columbia, ante, p. 146, the co-owner and manager of the Taylor Street Pharmacy said Negroes could purchase in other departments of his store and that whether for business or personal reasons, he felt he had a right to refuse service to anyone. In Williams v. North Carolina, post, p. 548, the president of Jones Drug Company said Negroes were not permitted to take seats at the lunch counter. He did say, however, that Negroes could purchase food and eat it on the premises so long as they stood some distance from the lunch counter, such as near the back door. In Lupper v. Arkansas, 377 U. S. 989, and Harris v. Virginia, post, p. 552, the record discloses only that the establishment did not serve Negroes. APPENDIX III TO OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS. Corporate [1] Business Establishments Involved In The Sit-in Cases Before This Court During The 1962 Term And The 1963 Term. Reference (other than the record in each case): Moody's Industrial Manual (1963 ed.). 1. Gus Blass & Co. Department Store. Case: Lupper v. Arkansas, 377 U. S. 989. Location: Little Rock, Arkansas. Ownership: Privately owned corporation. 2. Eckerd Drugs of Florida, Inc. Case: Bouie v. City of Columbia, post, p. 347. Location: 17 retail drugstores throughout Southern States. Ownership: Publicly owned corporation. Number of shareholders: 1,000. Stock traded: Over-the-counter market. 3. George's Drug Stores, Inc. Case: Harris v. Virginia, post, p. 552. Location: Hopewell, Virginia. Ownership: Privately owned corporation. 4. Gwynn Oak Park, Inc. Case: Drews v. Maryland, post, p. 547. Location: Baltimore, Maryland. Ownership: Privately owned corporation. 5. Hooper Food Company, Inc. Case: Bell v. Maryland, supra, p. 226. Location: Several restaurants in Baltimore, Maryland. Ownership: Privately owned corporation.