Opinion ID: 473998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Allegations Concerning Casey's Desire to Wind Up His Estate

Text: 39 Kas's final challenge to the proxy statement also concerns the paragraph quoted in Part II.B, supra, concerning the negotiations between Casey and the representatives of FGB Holding Corporation. According to Kas, the proxy statement was materially false and misleading because it failed to disclose that Casey was old, sick and infirm, and motivated by a singular desire to wind up his affairs because he felt the end was getting near. The District Court held that Casey's personal motives for selling were immaterial as a matter of law. 40 We need not today adopt the District Court's suggestion that a proxy statement's failure to disclose facts indicating the potentially grave impairment of an individual's judgment is legally immaterial even when the proxy statement presents that individual's valuation in support of the offering price for shares in a merger. Such a legal conclusion may well be overbroad and is certainly unnecessary for the disposition of Kas's claim. In the present case, Kas's contention that Casey's ill-health was material is based on mere speculation. At summary judgment, the defendants presented affidavits to the effect that Casey's mental activity was at all relevant times unimpaired, notwithstanding the various physical ailments from which Casey might have suffered. See Defendants' Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue p 22 (citing Clifford Deposition at 26-29). Kas, on the other hand, has presented no facts to support his argument that Casey's judgment capacity had in any way deteriorated due to age or illness, and of course Kas can rely on no presumption that age and physical illness by themselves indicate mental impairment. When faced with defendants' motion for summary judgment Kas was required to go beyond his pleadings to show that a jury question existed on the issue of the materiality of the alleged defect in the proxy statement. See Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 41 Similarly, in support of Casey's supposed singular desire to wind up his affairs Kas can point to only one passage from Casey's deposition: 42 Q. Was it told to you by anybody at that time that your acceptance of a price for the A stock would be necessary before the arabs made a tender offer for the rest of the A stock? 43 A. No.... 44 .... 45 It's just my judgment that I had better take what was offered me and run. After all, I was getting close to the end, and I had some dispositions to make of my stock, of my estate, so that is the reason why I took it. As I said before, I had never met the arabs. I didn't know what kind of people they are. 46 Q. You mentioned in your previous answer that you were concerned about settling your estate? Is that a fair statement? 47 A. Yes. 48 Q. That was a factor in your thinking about accepting a price for the A stock? 49 A. Lots of things. I think the main thing was I was going to get some money, and I was going to distribute it around with my children. 50 Casey Deposition at 32-33. 51 Casey's personal plan for how he would use the proceeds from the sale of his Class A stock is not a material fact which would play a role in the deliberations of a reasonable shareholder. Kas has come forward with no factual support for his suggestion that Casey felt any singular desire to wind up his estate that might lead him to sell his stock at an unreasonable price. In the face of defendants' affidavits in support of Casey's sound business judgment, Kas's claim cannot withstand defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Berg v. First American Bankshares, 796 F.2d 489, 497, (D.C.Cir.1986). 3