Opinion ID: 1819644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Barnes' Fees were Unreasonable.

Text: ¶ 15. Barnes alleged in his complaint that he was owed $21,234.69, of which $5,062 was billed for his tax work. The parties did not dispute that Barnes' fees for his tax work were reasonable, but the plaintiffs alleged that the other $16,172.69 in fees was excessive. The chancery court agreed with the plaintiffs and found Barnes was entitled only to $15,000. Barnes has appealed the award, arguing he was entitled to the entire billed amount. [2] ¶ 16. The chancery court noted in its opinion the eight factors used to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee: (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) The amount involved and the results obtained; (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. In re Estate of Johnson, 735 So.2d 231, 237 (Miss.1999) (internal citations omitted). Applying these factors to the evidence, the court found that roughly $6,000 of Barnes' fees were unreasonable. ¶ 17. Although the chancellor's opinion did not make factual findings as to the specific charges that were unreasonable, it summarized the evidence presented at trial  most importantly, the expert testimony of Kenneth Rector. [3] Rector testified that Barnes' bill for his work was reasonable in light of his expertise and the time he spent researching and writing a requested tax opinion. However, in his opinion, the amount of time spent on certain tasks was excessive, including opening the estate (23 hours), the sale of Ms. Cappaert's car (12.4 hours), obtaining fee approval for attorney's fees (21.9 hours), removal and reinstatement of BancorpSouth as executor (14.0 hours), delivery of bequests (4.6 hours), and the release of a lien on California property (10.3 hours). He also testified that the number of hours billed for each task performed by an associate attorney was in excess of what a reasonable attorney with the same experience would need to complete it. Rector also noted that these tasks were not routine and not complicated and that Barnes should not have billed for secretarial duties because they should have been included in overhead expenses. He ultimately concluded that $10,000 was a fair amount of fees for the work performed by the firm. ¶ 18. The opinion also noted the conflicting testimony of Barnes. Barnes argued that ancillary work resulted in higher fees than the original estimate of $8,500 to $12,000. Barnes specifically referred to the removal and subsequent rehire of BancorpSouth as executor, the sale of the Estate's vehicle (even though the will permitted such a sale without court approval), and other work involving estate property in California and Florida. ¶ 19. In light of this evidence, and because the court utilized the proper legal standard, it cannot be said that the chancellor abused her discretion in finding that Barnes was entitled to $15,000.