Opinion ID: 3050386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the chevron framework

Text: In determining whether OCE’s four claims challenge nondiscretionary obligations under the Act, our first point of reference is the statute itself. We must first address whether Congress resolved the contested issues in the statute. If so, “the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Chevron deference is not due where the clear dictates of the statute counsel an interpretation different from the Agency’s. See Bonneville Power Admin. v. FERC, 422 F.3d 908, 920 (9th Cir. 2005). We “must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. OUR CHILDREN’S EARTH v. EPA 14225 In the event that congressional intent cannot be determined or is ambiguous, the second step of the Chevron analysis considers whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is a reasonable one. Id. at 843. Even if an opposing construction of the statute is better supported by policy considerations, we do “not sit to judge the relative wisdom of competing statu- tory interpretations.” Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 134 (1985). As long as the agency’s construction “is not inconsistent with the language, goals, or operation of the Act,” the agency should prevail. Id. However, the agency “may not ignore factors Congress required be taken into account.” Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 484 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007). Although the line between a congressional mandate and an area of agency discretion is not difficult to state, ascertaining that line is not always as easy. When Congress specifies an obligation and uses the word “shall,” this denomination usually connotes a mandatory command. See Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001). On the other hand, “[a]bsent some provision requiring EPA to adopt one course of action over the other, we can only conclude that EPA’s choice represented an exercise of discretion.” Farmers Union Cent. Exch. v. Thomas, 881 F.2d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1989). However, not every decision is so easily categorized. As the Supreme Court teaches, the decision-making process does not necessarily collapse into a single final decision. “It is rudimentary administrative law that discretion as to the substance of the ultimate decision does not confer discretion to ignore the required procedures of decisionmaking.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 172 (1997). In Bennett, considering a citizen suit provision parallel to that in the CWA, the Supreme Court held, “[s]ince it is the omission of these required procedures that petitioners complain of, their . . . claim is reviewable.” Id. at 172 (emphasis added). With these general principles in mind, we consider the CWA provisions relevant to each of OCE’s claims to deter14226 OUR CHILDREN’S EARTH v. EPA mine whether the particular claim relates to a mandatory obligation or discretionary agency function under the Act.