Opinion ID: 606336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: 10 Our readership should now know by memory that we review the grant of a summary judgment motion under the same standards which guided the district court. 14 The standards provide that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 15 In determining whether the grant was proper, we view all fact questions in the light most favorable to the nonmovant; questions of law are reviewed de novo. 16
11 In Chevron, the Supreme Court established a two-step method for judicial review of an agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers. 17 The threshold inquiry in a Chevron analysis is whether Congress clearly expressed its intent in the plain language of the statute. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the Court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 18 The first step in determining the intent of Congress is to examine the language of the statute. 19 For, if the language is unambiguous on its face, then the first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.'  20 In deciding whether the intent of Congress is clear, courts are to employ the traditional rules of statutory construction. 21 12 If, but only if, the language of the statute is determined to be either ambiguous or silent on the particular issue, the reviewing court is to proceed to the second Chevron inquiry: whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 22 As long as the agency's interpretation is reasonable, the court should defer to that interpretation and not impose its own construction on the statute. 23 Congressional Intent 13 The Associations insist that the language of the statute is clear in the context of the PPIA: Congress intended that foreign poultry products be subject to inspection standards identical to those imposed on like domestic products. In support of the portion of its argument which urges that the context of the statute controls, the Associations cite the rule that specific words within a statute may not be read in isolation from the remainder of the entire statutory scheme. 24 Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used.... 25 14 To illustrate this latter point, the Associations refer to other sections of the PPIA, in which the words the same mean identical. 26 As the Associations note, another established canon of construction provides that a word used in different parts of the statute should be construed to have the identical meaning throughout the entire statute. When only one meaning of a word can be used consistently throughout the statute, that meaning is plain and unambiguous. 27 15 In complementary fashion, the Associations refer us to other sections of the PPIA in which the words at least equal to are used. For example, other sections of the PPIA require that the inspection programs of the several states be at least equal to the federal program. 28 As the Associations note, [t]he use of different words or terms within a statute indicates that Congress intended to establish a different meaning for those words. 29 16 On the other hand, the Agency argues that the language of the statute is ambiguous and thus, under Chevron, it need only show that its interpretation of the ambiguous statutory language is reasonable. In support of its contention, the Agency relies on secondary dictionary definitions of the adjective same. Conceding that the primary meaning of the adjective is resembling in every way, the government notes that other, secondary definitions include closely similar and comparable, with synonyms of equivalent and tantamount. 30 At oral argument, counsel for the Agency proclaimed that if Congress had used the word identical instead of the term the same as, I don't think we'd be here today. We fail to see the distinction: Even these secondary meanings are synonymous with the same as but not with at least equal to. 17 Although we acknowledge that [t]he existence of alternative dictionary definitions of the word ... each making some sense under the statute, itself indicates that the statute is open to interpretation, 31 this rule does not advance the Agency's position in the instant case. As the Associations have demonstrated using well established canons of statutory construction, at least equal to as a substitute for the same as does not make sense under this statute. In any event, we find the Agency's argument disingenuous. Just as there are no degrees of uniqueness, there are no degrees of identity; any fair reading of the dictionary definition of the same overwhelmingly demonstrates that the same is congruent with identical. 32 And the Agency's protestations about permissible deviations from an absolute requirement of identity are shown to be unfounded; such de minimis variances are encompassed by the Committee Report's authorized exceptions for technical deviations. 18 If the Secretary ever harbored non-frivolous quibbles as to Congress' intent in choosing the term the same as, they were absolutely eliminated by the subsequent congressional declaration in the 1990 Farm Bill. In that Act, Congress stated emphatically and unequivocally that the Agency has misinterpreted the same as standard. The Agency's efforts to make much of Congress' failure actually to amend the statute is a red herring. There simply was no need for Congress to amend the statute; it already stated precisely what Congress wanted it to state. Congress desired the same as language, and that is the language it placed in the statute. It is not required to respond to the Agency's disregard of unequivocally expressed congressional intent by amending a statute that is both clear and unambiguous on its face. 19 The Agency also argues that construing the same as to mean identical would lead to an absurd result, one which for example would prevent the importation of poultry products processed under superior systems. Even if the Agency is correct, however, we cannot agree that the result is absurd. Had the Agency labeled the actions of Congress protectionism, we would not necessarily disagree. But, while that may be deemed in some quarters to be unwise or undesirable, it cannot be labeled absurd in the context of divining the result intended by Congress. The Agency's complaint, therefore, is one implicating the clear policy choice of Congress--a choice made, undoubtedly, in response to effective lobbying by domestic poultry producers. It is not within the purview of the Agency, however--or of the courts for that matter--to alter, frustrate, or subvert congressional policy. Our third branch role under the constitutional scheme of separation of powers is limited--as is the role of the Agency--to determining whether that policy is clearly expressed. We conclude that it is in this instance. 20 In another variation on the absurdity theme, the Agency insists that the interpretation urged by the Associations is absurd because it would place the PPIA in violation of the 1) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 33 2) the ongoing trade negotiations under the auspices of GATT (the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations), 34 and 3) the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement (FTA). 35 The Agency adamantly insists that Congress cannot violate an international obligation without making a clear statement that it intends to do so. The Agency maintains further that a clear statement is especially appropriate in the instant case because the Executive Branch has exclusive responsibility for conducting international affairs. We discern fatal flaws in the Agency's position. 21 The Agency has obfuscatorily intertwined its arguments, but when they are untangled there appear three separate but related maxims governing the construction of statutes which implicate international obligations. First, Congress may abrogate a treaty or international obligation entered into by the United States only by a clear statement of its intent to do so. 36 Second, the extraterritorial application of domestic laws requires a clear statement of congressional intent so as to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord. 37 And finally, [i]t has been a maxim of statutory construction since the decision in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804), that 'an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.'  38 Even when we grant arguendo that these truisms of statutory construction exist, we find them inapplicable and therefore not controlling in the instant case. 22 Despite the Agency's claim that Congress must clearly express its intention to violate the GATT, it fails to cite us to any authority for that specific proposition and we are aware of none. In fact, we are aware of strongly instructive authority to the contrary. The Federal Circuit 39 recently rejected out of hand the argument that a statutory provision should be read consistently with the obligations of the United States as a signatory of GATT--the very position argued here by the Agency. The court reasoned that 23 even if ... [the] Commerce[ ] [Department's] interpretation conflicts with the GATT, ... the GATT is not controlling. While we acknowledge Congress's interest in complying with U.S. responsibilities under the GATT, we are bound not by what we think Congress should or perhaps wanted to do, but by what Congress in fact did. The GATT does not trump domestic legislation; if the statutory provisions at issue here are inconsistent with GATT, it is a matter for Congress and not this court to decide and remedy. 40 24 We conclude that this same, flawless reasoning applies to the instant case and mandates that we give effect to Congress' intent, even if implementation of that intent is virtually certain to create a violation of the GATT. 25 Our adoption of this reasoning is unaffected by the maxims of statutory construction cited above. The first maxim--that a clear statement of Congress is required to abrogate a treaty--does not require a different result here because Congress is not abrogating a treaty or an international obligation. Abrogation or repeal involves nullifying an obligation. In the instant case, Congress has at most evinced an intent to place the PPIA in violation of the GATT. Certainly, the United States has passed laws that, in a subsequent proceeding before a GATT panel, have been declared in violation of the GATT. Yet these violations have not signified the end of American involvement in the GATT. 41 26 Second, there is no need here for an Arabian American Oil Co. clear statement as required when Congress intends for its legislation to violate the GATT. The instant case is distinguishable from the situation in Arabian American Oil Co., which only requires such a clear statement when the intent of Congress is to apply domestic legislation extraterritorially, so as to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which would result in international discord. 42 Also irrelevant to this case is the Agency's citation of Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for Southern District of Iowa, 43 in which the Court stated that we have long recognized the demands of comity in suits involving foreign states, either as parties or sovereigns with a coordinate interest in the litigation. 44 27 The factual circumstances in both of these cases are distinguishable from those in the instant case. In Arabian American Oil Co, the question was whether Title VII applied to American corporations located in Saudi Arabia. Obviously, courts must be hesitant to apply American law when it would displace the law of the foreign forum. Similarly, in Aerospatiale, the defendants were corporations owned by the Republic of France, so for all practical purposes a foreign sovereign was a party in the lawsuit. In both cases the key issue is clear: application of American law would directly affect the sovereignty of a foreign nation. That cannot be said of the case now before us. There is absolutely no issue of sovereignty in the instant case; in the absence of such an issue the concerns voiced in Arabian American Oil Co. and Aerospatiale are not implicated. 28 Like the first two maxims, the third--that an act of Congress should not be construed to violate the law of nations if there is an alternative construction available--cannot apply here. The Agency directs our attention to no supporting authority for its contention that the GATT--or for that matter any multi-lateral trade agreement--falls under the rubric of the law of nations; and again we have been unable to find any. 45 Neither have we found a single case in which this canon was applied to international commercial law. Rather, all cases relying on the law-of-nations canon of construction either involve traditional rules of public international law or implicate the sovereignty of a foreign nation. 46 We are loath, therefore, to extend this maxim to multi-lateral trade agreements. To do so in the absence of controlling authority would be to exercise raw judicial fiat. 29 The additional Agency argument--that a clear congressional statement is especially appropriate in this instance because the Executive Branch has exclusive authority over foreign affairs--borders on frivolity. The Agency overlooks or conveniently ignores the well recognized distinction between foreign affairs and foreign commerce. 47 Even though the Executive Branch does have exclusive jurisdiction over foreign affairs, the Constitution grants Congress power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. 48 To the extent that a dispute exists over possible foreign policy implications to the GATT, we decline to enter the fray. 30 This final argument exposes the true nature of this case as a dispute between the Executive and Legislative branches over the propriety of Congress' policy choices. Although the Agency makes a compelling argument that the at least equal to language is the better standard, it simply is not the court's role to judge which branch has proposed the preferable rule. Congress has made clear that the same as requires identical inspection and processing procedures, and the fact remains that it is Congress that has the right to make the choice, even if it proves to be the wrong choice. As our colleagues of the Federal Circuit have stated: [W]e are bound not by what we [or the Agency] think Congress should or perhaps wanted to do, but what Congress in fact did. 49 Regardless of whether Congress' choice should prove to be unwise or disruptive, that choice itself has been made absolutely. III