Opinion ID: 753465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: claimed sentencing errors

Text: 24 Appellants contend that the district court erred by applying a three-level enhancement under USSG § 2A4.1(b)(5) because: (1) the Sentencing Commission acted contrary to Congressional intent when it enacted the enhancement; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the imposition of the enhancement. These contentions lack merit. 25 USSG § 2A4.1 provides [i]f the victim was sexually exploited, increase by 3 levels. USSG § 2A4.1(b)(5) (1995). USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1) provides that, in cases of jointly undertaken criminal activity, a defendant is accountable for the conduct of others that is in furtherance of the jointly undertaken activity and was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that activity. USSG 1B1.3(a)(1), (b) (1995). 26 Appellants argue that the Sentencing Commission has acted contrary to Congress's directive to differentiate between those who actually commit the act of sexual exploitation and those who merely allow it to happen. In support, appellants point to 18 U.S.C. § 1201(g) which directs the Sentencing Commission to provide for a three-level enhancement in cases where the defendant sexually exploited the victim and for a two-level enhancement if the defendant allowed the child to be sexually exploited by another person. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(g). However, even if we were to assume that Congress expressed a clear intent to have those who are not the actual perpetrators of sexual exploitation receive no higher than a two-level enhancement, it has expressed no such intent with regard to offenses involving adult kidnap victims subjected to sexual exploitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(g). 27 Nor did the district court err in applying the enhancement. The district court found that all appellants were either present for or participated in making the rape threats against Jane Doe. Appellants do not dispute these factual findings, but argue that the enhancement should not have been applied because they were not present when the actual rape occurred. They are incorrect; the rape of Jane Doe was reasonably foreseeable to each appellant. See USSG 1B1.3, comment nn. 1 & 2; cf. United States v. Zelaya, 114 F.3d 869, 870 (9th Cir.1997) (insufficient evidence to support determination that express death threat made by principal during robbery was reasonably foreseeable where there were no facts to show accomplice had reason to suspect threat would be made). 28 Appellants contend that the district court erred when it applied a two-level vulnerable victim enhancement under USSG § 3A1.1(b). This contention lacks merit. Contrary to appellants' assertions, the victims' isolation caused by their lack of familiarity with the American language and culture were appropriate factors for the court to consider. See United States v. Castellanos, 81 F.3d 108, 112 (9th Cir.1996). 29 Finally, appellants contend that the district court erred by applying a two-level serious bodily injury enhancement under USSG 2A4.1(b) because the victims did not require medical intervention. This contention lacks merit. The district court reasonably concluded that repeated beatings and cigarette burns amounted to serious bodily injury under the guidelines, based on evidence that the victims suffered extreme physical pain. See USSG 1B1.1, comment (n.1(j)) (serious bodily injury includes injury involving extreme physical pain ... or requiring medical intervention); see also United States v. Corbin, 972 F.2d 271, 272-73 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam). 30 Appellants' convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.