Opinion ID: 2740889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Merits of Ware’s Claims

Text: Ware raises challenges directed to the District Court’s judgment on his four 2 Ware asserts for the first time in his reply brief that he intended to demand a jury trial and believed he had done so. He does not argue even there, however, that the District Court erred in conducting a bench trial. To the contrary, he concedes that he did not properly demand a jury trial and he does not claim that he ever objected to proceeding with a bench trial in the District Court. 3 Following a bench trial, we review the District Court’s findings of fact only for clear error but review legal issues de novo. See In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 718 F.3d 184, 196 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1279 (2014). We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s ruling on discovery matters, case management, and matter of evidence, though we exercise plenary review to the extent that evidentiary rulings involve an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2025 (2013). 3 substantive claims. First, Ware claims that the officers unlawfully entered his bedroom. The District Court concluded that the entry was lawful because the officers had probable cause to believe that a burglary was in progress and a burglary in progress triggers the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See United States v. Mallory, — F.3d —, No. 13-2025, 2014 WL 4347198, at  (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2014) (“Warrantless searches of the home are presumptively unreasonable unless the occupants consent or probable cause and exigent circumstances exist to justify the intrusion.”) (quotation marks omitted). In particular, the District Court concluded that it was reasonable for the officers to suspect that a burglar was in Ware’s bedroom because the burglar alarm had sounded, the front door stood ajar, there was no one else in the house, Ware’s bedroom door was locked, and no one therein identified themselves when the officers knocked and announced.4 Ware concedes that the officers were justified in entering the house itself, and he does not challenge the District Court’s conclusion that a burglary in progress can constitute an exigent circumstance. See, e.g., United States v. McCullough, 457 F.3d 1150, 1164 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that other Courts of Appeals “unanimously agree . . . that . . . the exigent circumstances exception [applies] when the officer reasonably 4 Ware contends that the officers did not knock and announce, but both Riley and Pfaff testified that they did (ECF No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 143; ECF No. 95, N.T. 11/21/13, at 189), and the District Court did not clearly err in relying on that testimony. See Mallory, 2014 WL 4347198, at  (adopting standard of review for claims of exigent circumstances). 4 believes a burglary is in progress”). Instead, he argues that the District Court failed to resolve Riley’s and Pfaff’s allegedly differing accounts of how the officers gained entry to his bedroom. He also argues that Pfaff’s testimony that they may have done so by picking the lock instead of kicking down the door is inconsistent with exigency. Riley’s and Pfaff’s testimony on this point, however, did not actually conflict. Riley testified that the officers “forcibly entered the room” and may have “kicked [the door] or pushed against it” but that “I don’t remember exactly how.” (ECF No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 144.) Pfaff testified that she too did not remember exactly how the officers gained entry but that it was possible one of them may have “manipulated the door without forcing it.” (ECF No. 95, N.T. 11/21/13, at 205.) Riley did not testify that the officers actually kicked down the door as Ware alleges, and Riley’s testimony that the officers may have pushed against the door does not contradict Pfaff’s testimony that they may have manipulated the lock. Nor are we persuaded that exigency necessarily would have required them to immediately kick down the door before attempting to gain entry in some other way. Second, Ware claims that the officers’ seizure of him in his room was unreasonable because he was naked the entire time. The District Court acknowledged that, even if there is probable cause for a seizure, special consideration is required when the seizure is “conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual’s privacy.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996). The District 5 Court concluded that the seizure was reasonable because, inter alia, Ware was in his room and shielded from public view, he was not made to strip but merely to remain as he was, and the overall encounter lasted for a short period of time. Ware’s sole challenge to this ruling is that the District Court did not resolve the conflict between his testimony that officers would not let him dress until the end of the encounter (ECF No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 89, 94-95) and Pfaff’s testimony that she allowed Ware to dress because she never allows a suspect to “stand around naked while [she is] conducting an investigation” (ECF No. 95, N.T. 11/21/13, at 190). It is true that the District Court noted this conflict without expressly resolving it, but it was not necessary to do so. Even if the District Court had accepted Ware’s version of events, Ware testified that he remained naked only (1) while police questioned him in his room, (2) during a brief call to his landlord, and (3) while an officer went to a neighbor’s residence to verify his identity, which verification Ware testified took “a short time . . . I would say between five and ten minutes.” (ECF No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 93.) Thus, it was not clearly erroneous for the District Court to conclude that Ware remained naked only for a short period of time. Ware does not argue that the District Court erred in relying on that factor (or any other), and we cannot say that it did. Cf. L.A. Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007) (holding a search reasonable where police ordered naked couple out of bed at gunpoint and they remained naked for two or three minutes). Third, Ware claims that Pfaff unreasonably searched his business card holder for 6 identification after he already handed her his driver’s license. Pfaff, by contrast, testified that Ware refused to identify himself and that she searched the holder (which she referred to as a wallet) for his driver’s license only thereafter. (ECF No/ 95, N.T. 11/21/13, at 191-92.) The District Court concluded that Pfaff’s search for identification was reasonable because Ware refused to reveal his identity and that, even if the search was unreasonable, the call was close enough that Pfaff was entitled to qualified immunity. Ware raises no challenge to the second of these rulings. As to the first, he argues that the District Court’s finding is inconsistent with the alleged admission in “defendants’” answer that he voluntarily handed Pfaff his driver’s license before she searched his card holder. (Appellant’s Br. at 11.) But the answer he refers to is Riley’s (ECF No. 9), not Pfaff’s, and Riley testified that he did not see Pfaff search the card holder (ECF No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 148). In Pfaff’s answer, she admitted that she “took possession of Plaintiff’s driver’s license,” not that he voluntarily handed it to her. (ECF No. 61 at 2, ¶ 8.) That admission is fully consistent with her testimony and the District Court’s findings. Ware also argues that the officers could have ascertained his identity from pieces of mail that were in plain view. Ware offered no evidence to that effect, however, and items of mail bearing his name would not necessarily have identified him as a lawful occupant of the apartment in any event. See United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 1993). Finally, Ware claims that Riley used excessive force by knocking him to the 7 ground when Ware refused to state his name. Ware testified to that effect at trial. (ECF No. 94, N.T. 11/20/13, at 94.) Riley, by contrast, flatly denied that he even touched Ware and testified that there was “no use of force.” (Id. at 149, 151.) Ware’s primary argument on this claim is that the District Court failed to make a credibility determination or otherwise resolve this factual dispute. We disagree. District courts “must find facts specially” following a bench trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1), but we generally deem findings insufficient under this rule only when they fail to provide a “clear understanding of the basis of the decision,” In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 718 F.3d 184, 196 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1279 (2014). And although district courts generally “should make determinations of witness credibility where appropriate,” EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 273 (3d Cir. 2010), such determinations may be implied, see Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 245 (3d Cir. 2007). In this case, it is clear from the District Court’s opinion, particularly when viewed in the context of the proceeding as a whole, that the District Court deemed Riley’s testimony more credible than Ware’s and found that the alleged use of force did not occur. At closing, defense counsel argued that Ware’s testimony was not credible because, inter alia, it was not corroborated by any evidence and the evidence instead supported Riley’s testimony that he did not use force. In particular, defense counsel argued that Ware’s testimony was not credible because he did not file a formal complaint 8 against Riley, the officers did not file a use-of-force report, and Ware did not require any medical treatment. (ECF No. 95, N.T. 11/21/13, at 244-45, 247.) Then, in its conclusions of law, the District Court wrote: Plaintiff testified that force was used after he refused to answer Riley’s question about his identity. Riley flatly denies that he touched plaintiff. The court finds plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof on the issue that it is more likely than not that Riley used excessive force. There is no evidence of any injury to plaintiff and plaintiff did not seek medical attention. Nor was there a use-of-force investigation [by the police department] which is standard procedure when force is used by police officers. Finally, plaintiff testified that he did not seek medical attention and did not file a citizen’s complaint regarding Riley’s actions. (ECF No. 96, Dist. Ct. Op. at 15 ¶ 34.) This reasoning closely tracks defense counsel’s argument. Moreover, the District Court recognized in denying Riley’s motion for summary judgment on this claim that, if it found that Riley used force, then it would have to determine whether the use of force was excessive under the factors set forth in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). (ECF No. 58 at 12.) The District Court’s summary judgment opinion reflects a clear understanding of the circumstances that would prove relevant if it found that Riley used force. The fact that the District Court did not discuss those circumstances or otherwise apply the Graham factors after trial makes it abundantly clear that it found that Riley did not use force at all. That finding was not clearly erroneous, and we reject Ware’s other challenges to the District Court’s judgment on this 9 claim for the reasons summarized in the margin.5