Opinion ID: 854128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Evidence of a Previous Battery

Text: McEwen next argues that the trial court erred in allowing Shawn Bowie to testify on rebuttal that three months before the killing he saw McEwen fire several gunshots at a car driven by Jackson in which Bowie was a passenger. McEwen renews in this appeal the same objections he made to the admission of this evidence in the trial court: (1) Bowie's testimony was improperly admitted for the sole purpose of allowing the jury to make the forbidden inference that he assaulted Jackson once, so he must have done so again (Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b)); and (2) any probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice (Rule 403). The State responds that Bowie's testimony was admissible to show McEwen's motive, intent, and relationship with Jackson, and to rebut McEwen's account that the stabbing was an accident.
Rule 404(b) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.... When the defendant objects to the admission of evidence on Rule 404(b) grounds, the following test is applied in deciding whether the challenged evidence is admissible: (1) the court must determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403. Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind.1997); Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 233 (Ind.1997). In sum, if the evidence bears on some issue other than criminal propensity and clears the balancing hurdle of Rule 403, it is admissible. We dealt with substantively similar evidence recently in Hicks. In that case, the defendant was convicted of murdering his girlfriend. Like McEwen and Jackson, the parties had a relationship characterized in part, if not frequently, by conflict. The State was allowed to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior assaults on and confrontations with the victim. Hicks upheld the admission of this evidence on the ground that it showed the relationship between the parties and, more precisely, a paradigmatic motive for committing the crimehostility. Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 222 (quoting United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1106-07 (4th Cir. 1992)). Hicks's hostility toward the victim bore on proving whether he killed her with the requisite criminal intent. The same is true here. Although there was ample evidence of hostility already in the record, Bowie's rebuttal testimony was relevant to show a pattern of hostility dating back before the night of the killing. This illustrated the depth of possible motive and was also relevant to assessing McEwen's claim that Jackson was stabbed accidentally. The next issue is whether Bowie's testimony should nonetheless have been excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The prior incident occurred slightly more than three months before the killing, which is not too distant in time for the evidence to lose its probative force for the point offered. Cf. id. at 223 (evidence of assault on victim that took place more than three years before the crime charged was of low probative value). The risk of a forbidden inference here is reduced because the weapon was different from that allegedly used in the crime charged; there was no allegation in this case that a gun played any role in Jackson's death. Accordingly, the trial court was within its discretion in concluding that probative value outweighed any prejudice.
McEwen alternatively contends that admission of Bowie's testimony was error because it was not admitted in accordance with a statutory requirement that applies in certain prosecutions when the State intends to offer evidence of a previous battery. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-14 (1993). The statute requires the State to file a written motion, including a specific offer of proof, not less than ten days before trial. If the offer of proof is found to be sufficient, the trial court shall order a hearing outside the presence of the jury in which the witness to the prior battery is available for questioning. § 35-37-4-14(d). At the end of the hearing, if the court finds the evidence to be admissible, it shall make an order stating what evidence may be introduced ... and the nature of the questions to be permitted. Id. McEwen objected to Bowie's testimony on the ground that he had not received notice in conformity with the statute. The trial court ruled that Bowie's testimony was admissible even though no pretrial hearing was held on its admissibility. Evidence of a previous battery is defined to mean a prior unrelated act of battery or attempted battery on the victimwhether or not charges were filed concerning the actthat took place within five years before the commission of the crime charged. §§ 35-37-4-14(a)-(b). We agree with McEwen that Bowie's testimony alleged an attempted battery by McEwen and therefore was evidence of a previous battery within the meaning of the statute. Firing a gun at another but fortuitously missing the target is an attempted battery. See, e.g., Henderson v. State, 534 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. 1989). This, however, is not the end of the inquiry. The State maintains that the Indiana Rules of Evidence, not the statute, control any requirement of pretrial notice. Indeed, the State ignored the statute in preparing for trial because it relied on Rule 404(b)'s provision that notice of intent to offer evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is not required unless the defendant requests advance notice. Because McEwen did not request notice in accordance with Rule 404(b), the State did not give it. On the notice issue alone, there is no apparent conflict between Indiana Code § 35-37-4-14 and Rule 404(b). The latter does not foreclose a statutory requirement of notice to the defendant irrespective of any request for notice. Ind.Evidence Rule 101(a) (statutory law applies if rules of evidence do not cover a specific evidence issue). There is, however, a conflict between the Evidence Rules and the statute's substantive provisions governing the admission of evidence of a previous battery. Specifically, Indiana Code § 35-37-4-14(c) provides that evidence of a previous battery is admissible into evidence in the state's case-in-chief for purposes of proving motive, intent, identity, or common scheme and design. This tracks some of the other purposes enumerated in the second sentence of Rule 404(b): [Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts] may... be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.... The statute thus is consistent with Rule 404(b)'s prohibition on the introduction of other acts of misconduct to show criminal propensity. However, the statute does not require the balancing of prejudicial impact and probative value currently provided for in Rule 403. By prescribing that evidence of a previous battery is admissible for the listed purposes without consideration of possible prejudicial impact, Indiana Code § 35-37-4-14 would admit evidence not necessarily admissible under our rules of evidence. Because the statute's substantive requirements for admissibility conflict with the Indiana Rules of Evidence, the statute is a nullity on that point: The statute and the rule both address the admissibility of evidence and they create two different standards. In instances where such a conflict exists, the conflicting statute is nullified. Humbert v. Smith, 664 N.E.2d 356, 357 (Ind. 1996) (noting conflict between Rule 803(6) and Indiana Code § 31-6-6.1-8(b)) (citation omitted). [4] More precisely, when an Evidence Rule and a statute address the same subject matter, the Rule controls [t]o the extent there are any differences. Williams v. State, 681 N.E.2d 195, 200 n. 6 (Ind.1997). Although this doctrine is ultimately based on separation of powers, id., there is no conflict between the judicial and legislative branches because this result is also consistent with a clearly expressed legislative policy that any statute conflicting with procedural rules enacted by this Court shall be of no further force or effect. IND.CODE § 34-5-2-1 (1993). Accordingly, the only remaining question is whether the notice provision in subsection (d) may be severed from the rest of the statute. Because Indiana Code § 35-37-4-14 offers no guidance on this issue, we turn to the general severability statute. The General Assembly has provided that every part and application of every statute is severable unless the remainder [of the statute] is so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the invalid provision or application that it cannot be presumed that the remainder would have been enacted without the invalid provision or application. IND.CODE § 1-1-1-8(b) (1993). We conclude that subsection (d) cannot be severed from the rest of the statute because it is inseparably connected with the invalid subsections. Subsection (d) governs the admission of evidence described in subsection (b). Subsection (b), in turn, defines evidence of a previous battery and subsection (c) provides that evidence of a previous battery is admissible without consideration of possible prejudicial impact. In sum, the notice requirement in subsection (d) specifically applies only to the admission of evidence under the (invalid) standards for admissibility set forth in the rest of the statute; as such it falls with the invalid substantive provisions. Indiana Code § 35-37-4-14's notice provision therefore was not controlling with respect to pretrial notice when Shawn Bowie's rebuttal testimony was admitted. [5]