Opinion ID: 522974
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellants lack standing to appeal the equal value determination

Text: 34 In addition, appellants do not have standing to challenge the equal value determination of Interior and thus neither the district court nor this court has jurisdiction to hear that issue. Although the district court ruled that plaintiffs-appellants did have standing and ruled on the merits of their equal value claims, the standing issue is jurisdictional and must be addressed before this court can reach the merits of the claim. Fair v. Environmental Protection Agency, 795 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir.1986). Since the standing issue goes to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction, it is a matter of law reviewablede novo. United States v. City of Twin Falls, Idaho, 806 F.2d 862, 866 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct. 3185, 96 L.Ed.2d 674 (1987). 35 The district court found that plaintiffs-appellants had standing to sue, relying primarily on its decision in National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 677 F.Supp. 1445, 1453-56 (D.Mont.1985), appeal argued and submitted (February 1989) (9th Cir. No. 87-4375). 675 F.Supp. at 1241. There, the district court held that plaintiffs who lived in impacted communities had standing to challenge allegedly underpriced coal leases because fewer federal funds would be available under the revenue sharing act to mitigate the adverse environmental and socioeconomic effects of the coal development. 677 F.Supp. at 1455-56; 30 U.S.C. sections 191, 201(a)(3)(C). It is the environmental interest protected by 30 U.S.C. section 191 which confers standing to sue upon appellants. Merely alleging injury to their status as taxpayers (i.e., fewer federal funds from the coal development would result in higher taxes for appellants) does not confer standing because it does not create an interest in favor of appellants distinguishable from that of the general public. Sheldon v. Griffin, 174 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir.1949). 36 To assert standing to sue, appellants must show with reasonable precision the linkage between the challenged policy and the asserted injury. Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 12-17 (D.C.Cir.1987). Mere conjecture demonstrating potential injury is not sufficient. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). Appellants have not alleged an injury related to Interior's equal value determination; they merely state that Interior's decision might consequently cause the revenue loss appellants envision once coal development occurs. Appellants have failed to provide any declarations, affidavits, or other evidence that the federal tract was worth less after the exchange than it was before the exchange. Only if the federal holdings decreased in value would the federal revenue sharing funds be affected under 30 U.S.C. section 191. In fact, Interior found that the federal tract increased in value. Appellants put forward no evidence to contradict this finding. Thus, appellants have not demonstrated the requisite injury to assert standing, and their appeal on these claims must be dismissed on these jurisdictional grounds as well. 37 C. Interior's interpretation that the exchange conformed with the operative federal land use plan and did not require BLM to amend the existing Redwater Management Framework Plan. 38 Appellants contend that the exchange does not conform with the Redwater Management Framework Plan (MFP), the operative federal land use plan. Appellants contend that the MFP bars the exchange because that document only provides a land use plan for coal leasing, and does not expressly provide for an exchange. 39 The applicable regulations are 43 C.F.R. sections 1601, 2200.1(a), and 2200.2(b). To conform with the public land use plan, a resource management action shall be specifically provided for in the plan, or if specifically mentioned, shall be clearly consistent with the terms, conditions, and decisions of the approved plan or plan amendment. 43 C.F.R. 1601.0-5(c). The exchange regulations provide that federal lands may be exchanged where disposal is in conformance with the land use planning provisions contained in Subpart 1601. 43 C.F.R. section 2200.1(a)(1984). 40 The MFP states that coal in the Circle West area could be considered for leasing, that licenses to mine coal there could be issued, and that development could be allowed. The Decision Document/Lands Report relies on Decision 5.1 of the Redwater MFP to support its conclusion that BLM was not required to amend the existing MFP prior to the Circle West exchange. This decision was concurred in by the BLM State Director and by the Assistant Secretary of Interior in the September 1983 Decision Document on Protests. 41 The district court found BLM's interpretation of the MFP, and Interior's subsequent determination that the exchange conformed with the MFP, to be a reasonable interpretation of its own regulations: 42 At the heart of the Circle West exchange is the facilitation of coal development, the United States possessing a unified area so as to promote coal leasing. As stated in [Interior's] Decision Document/Lands Report: 43 Development clearly indicates coal leasing and provision for site development. The coal exchange proposal is an alternative method to achieve both the lands and minerals objectives reached in the [Redwater] plan. 44 In short, the Court cannot say that the Circle West exchange is inconsistent or not otherwise in conformance with the REdwater [sic] MFP. The Interior's reasonable interpretation that its own regulation was satisfied is conclusive. 45 675 F.Supp. at 1247 (reference and citation omitted). 46 This factual determination can only be overturned on review if it is clearly erroneous. Vesey v. United States, 626 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir.1980). An agency's interpretation of its own regulations can only be overturned if plainly erroneous or clearly inconsistent with the regulation. Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940, 107 S.Ct. 1593, 94 L.Ed.2d 782 (1987). Appellants have not met this heavy burden. The exchange action need not be specifically mentioned, so long as it is clearly consistent with the plan. 43 C.F.R. section 1601.0-5. Though appellants argue that the MFP was merely a preliminary decision, the MFP was in fact a final decision that coal mining and leasing could occur. Finally, appellants mistakenly contend that the exchange must conform to Section 206 of FLPMA. That section requires only a public interest determination by Interior, and does not require Interior to issue a conforming land use plan. 43 U.S.C. section 1716. Thus, since appellants have not met their burden of demonstrating clear error by the district court, we affirm the district court's finding that Interior reasonably interpreted the exchange to conform with the existing MFP, and that no amendment to the existing MFP was required prior to the exchange. D. Summary 47 In sum, we find that the district court properly held that the Circle West exchange complied with the National Environmental Policy Act requirements regarding adequate environmental impact analyses. As to the equal value claim, appellants have no private cause of action to invalidate the Circle West exchange because they cannot assert any fee interest in the land at issue. Moreover, appellants lack standing to raise the equal value determination on the record presented on this appeal. Finally, the district court properly upheld the Department of the Interior's determination that the Circle West Exchange conformed with the existing land use plan. 48 AFFIRMED.