Opinion ID: 532034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Crimes as Other Offenses Under 18 U.S.C. Sec.

Text: 2517(5) 13 Appellant next argues that Judge Rohl's amendment of the initial order to allow surveillance for evidence of federal tax offenses was invalid under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2517(5). That section states: 14 When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in intercepting wire, oral, or electronic communications in the manner authorized herein, intercepts wire, oral, or electronic communications relating to offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents thereof, and evidence derived therefrom 15 may be disclosed under oath at official proceedings if authorized or approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction. 16 Appellant contends that the phrase in the manner authorized herein requires that amended orders address only such offenses as are specified in Section 2516. That section contains an extensive list of offenses for which surveillance is authorized but, as appellant notes, it does not specify federal tax offenses--the offenses on which he was to be questioned by the grand jury. 2 17 This issue--whether an amended order can authorize use of communications revealing evidence of crimes that could not have been investigated under an original order--is one of first impression in this Circuit. We hold that other offenses under Section 2517(5) may include offenses, federal as well as state, not listed in Section 2516 so long as there is no indication of bad faith or subterfuge by the federal officials seeking the amended surveillance order. The Government here concedes that the federal tax offenses at issue could not properly be investigated in the first instance by a Section 2516 order. We believe, however, that Congress intended that amended orders under Section 2517(5) could encompass federal crimes not listed in Section 2516. The Senate Report accompanying Section 2517(5) states that other offenses under that section need not be designated 'offenses,'  an apparent exemption from the requirement that the offense be among those designated in the Section 2516 list. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 2112, 2189 (hereinafter Legislative History). Our holding in United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 63, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973), lends further support to this construction of the statute. Although we did not address this issue directly, we upheld an amended order under Section 2517(5) even though the offenses regarding which evidence was to be used--federal securities law violations--are not included in Section 2516. See id. at 781-83. 18 Appellant responds that allowing amended orders to permit use of evidence relating to offenses that may not be the subject of original orders would subvert the detailed scheme of Section 2516 and threaten the privacy interests the statute aims to protect. The Senate Report reveals, however, that Congress accommodated these concerns in the statute. It states that amended orders are permitted only upon a showing that the original order was lawfully obtained, that it was sought in good faith and not as [a] subterfuge search, and that the communication was in fact incidentally intercepted during the course of a lawfully executed order. Legislative History at 2189. 3 19 Each of these requirements is met here. Appellant does not contend in his brief, nor did he contend at oral argument, that the federal officials on the Task Force instigated the state's request for the first order largely to secure evidence of violations of federal tax crimes or that there was otherwise bad faith or deception on their part. The record demonstrates that the communications naming appellant were in fact incidentally intercepted under the authority of the first surveillance order. While Judge Rohl noted in the order that the targeted conversations would relate to, among other things, theft of federal, state and local taxes, the supporting affidavit came from a state official, an investigator in the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, and the order authorized the use of the intercepted communications only in prosecutions for state crimes. Through the Task Force, local, state, and federal officials were engaged in a cooperative effort to combat organized crime on Long Island. While it was of course possible that the surveillance relating to state crimes would reveal evidence of federal crimes--motor fuel is subject to both federal and state taxation--there is no indication, nor even any assertion by appellant, that the disclosures regarding federal crimes were anything other than an incidental by-product of the first surveillance. Based on that surveillance, a Suffolk County grand jury indicted Levine, the initial target of the investigation, charging him with numerous violations of New York penal law. See Levine, 690 F.Supp. at 1171. Moreover, the state's interest in pursuing schemes such as Levine's is apparent: The affidavit supporting the first authorization stated, for example, that New York was losing at least $90 million per year in state tax revenue from such schemes. 20 In short, there is no showing that the federal authorities, by connivance with the state authorities, used the initial order as a pretext for uncovering evidence of crimes unauthorized by Section 2516. See Levine, 690 F.Supp. at 1169-71; accord United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir.1983) (Evidence of crimes other than those authorized in a wiretap warrant are intercepted 'incidentally' when they are the by-product of a bona fide investigation of crimes specified in a valid warrant.); United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 564 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909, 95 S.Ct. 1558, 43 L.Ed.2d 774 (1975). 21 Acceptance of the appellant's position would jeopardize the essential state-federal cooperation envisioned by the federal wiretapping statute and embodied in this case by the Task Force. We noted in United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 707 (2d Cir.1976), for example, that Congress, in enacting the surveillance statute, specifically envisioned cooperation among law enforcement authorities of different jurisdictions where appropriate to enhance the effectiveness of electronic surveillance operations. The New York statute envisions similar cooperation by allowing surveillance to be conducted by both state and federal law enforcement officials. See United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 598 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied sub nom. LaCosa v. United States, 417 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 2651, 41 L.Ed.2d 240 (1974). 22 We noted in dicta in Marion that where state and federal officials jointly pursue an investigation and the surveillance reveals communications relating to federal offenses not listed in the initial authorization, such interceptions would not ... be incidental. Id. at 707 n. 20. We now hold that the interceptions naming the appellant in the instant case were revealed incidentally and without subterfuge, as the statute requires, even though they were the product of federal-state law enforcement cooperation. 23 C. Judge Rohl's Authority to Permit Surveillance Relating to Federal Crimes 24 Appellant relies on our opinion in Marion to support his argument that the federal law enforcement officials improperly applied to a state judge for authorization to conduct surveillance for federal crimes. His reliance is misplaced. Like the instant case, Marion involved a surveillance order issued by a state judge to discover evidence of state crimes, which order was amended by the same judge to encompass evidence of additional, federal offenses. We found that the affidavit of the Assistant District Attorney requesting the judge's amendment clearly provided the state judge ... with notification that possible federal offenses might be implicated and thus satisfied Section 2517(5). Id. at 703. In contrast, because the federal grand jury in Marion also questioned the defendant based on information obtained from a different, unamended surveillance order, we found that the Government had failed to obtain the subsequent judicial approval required by Section 2517(5), and reversed the convictions for those offenses. Id. at 704. We expressly stated, however, that the statute does not restrict ... the grant of subsequent judicial approval ... solely to federal judges. Id. at 708. 25 Moreover, Judge Rohl is a judge of competent jurisdiction, expressly authorized under Section 2517(5) to amend surveillance orders. Section 2510 of the statute defines a [j]udge of competent jurisdiction as either (a) a judge of a United States district court or court of appeals or (b) a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is authorized by a statute of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions of wire, oral, or electronic communications. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510(9). Appellant has not challenged Judge Rohl's authority under New York law. 26 Judge Rohl's amendment of the order in this case constitutes adequate judicial approval even though it encompassed federal criminal offenses that could not have been the legitimate subject of surveillance in the first instance. It would make little sense, and would serve no public policy, to deny federal law enforcement agencies the use of evidence that has been serendipitously discovered in the course of surveillance conducted according to law.