Opinion ID: 2341817
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: a multicounty agency.

Text: The Maryland Rules describe public record in still a different way. Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A) defines public records and reports for purposes of the public records exception to the hearsay rule, as including: a memorandum, report, record, statement, or data compilation made by a public agency setting forth (i) the activities of the agency; (ii) masters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by law, as to which matters there was a duty to report; or (iii) in civil actions and when offered against the State in criminal actions, factual finding resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. Another source, Black's Law Dictionary, defines public record as [a] record that a governmental unit is required by law to keep, such as land deeds kept at a county courthouse. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (7th ed.1999). These characterizations of public record contemplate only information that has been created or distributed by a government entity. Not all sources, however, consider public record to be a reference to materials produced by any government entity. Although Canon 20 of the 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics did not use the phrase information contained in a public record, its terms do furnish some instruction as to the meaning of the phrase. Canon 20 prohibited  ex parte reference to the facts of a case beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the court.  (emphasis added). Similarly, Local Rule 204 of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland prohibits an attorney from making certain extrajudicial statements after the arrest of an accused, except that the lawyer may quote from or refer to without comment to public Court records in the case. Thus, according to some sources, public records are limited to the exact information contained in documents on file with the court. Because there is no settled definition of information contained in a public record we agree with Gansler that MRPC 3.6(c)(2) does not provide adequate guidance for determining which extrajudicial statements would qualify under the safe harbor. For this reason, we construe the phrase in its broadest form as applied to Gansler in this case and to any other extrajudicial statements made prior to the filing of this Opinion. In this case, we consider information in a public record to include anything in the public domain, including public court documents, media reports, and comments made by police officers. Under this broad interpretation, it is clear that a number of Gansler's extrajudicial statements do not warrant discipline, as the hearing judge determined. Gansler did not violate MRPC 3.6 by commenting on the sneaker print matches in Cook's case because, shortly before Gansler's extrajudicial comments, a television reporter had broadcast an account of that evidence nearly mirroring Gansler's version. Additionally, in the Lucas case, Gansler made statements to the media about a shoe print at the crime scene that matched shoes Lucas had been observed wearing. This information was already public as recorded in the statement of charges filed by the police the day before. Also contained in the statement of charges was an account of Lucas's admission to police that he broke into the church rectory and murdered Monsignor Wells. Therefore, the next day, when Gansler relayed information about the admission to the media, he revealed information contained in a public record. We overrule Bar Counsel exceptions as they relate to Gansler's extrajudicial statements about physical evidence in the Cook and Lucas cases as well as the confession in the Lucas case. Gansler argues that the public record safe harbor also should protect his reference to Lucas's history of convictions. MRPC 3.6(b)(1) informs lawyers that extrajudicial statements relating to the criminal record of a party are ordinarily likely to be intolerably prejudicial. Nevertheless, during the June 18, 2003 press conference announcing the arrest of Lucas, Gansler mentioned that Lucas has a criminal record which includes residential burglaries. To support his assertion that this statement should be protected by the public record safe harbor, Gansler points to Deputy State's Attorney Winfree's testimony, characterizing Lucas's prior arrest and conviction record as part of the public record. Based on this testimony, we hold that Gansler's reference to Lucas's criminal record falls under our broad definition of information in a public record. We reach this result because we have inferred from Deputy State's Attorney Winfree's testimony that she was referring to publicly accessible court records in Maryland, either case files or docket sheets, which indicate that an individual has been convicted of a crime. Maryland law does not bar an ordinary citizen from combing these court documents to learn information about someone's criminal history. For this reason, Lucas's history of convictions could have existed in the public domain before Gansler spoke of it. Under the circumstances of this case, the extrajudicial reference to Lucas's convictions qualifies for the protection of the public record safe harbor, as we have broadly defined it for this Opinion. Because of the strong prejudicial impact of the public disclosure of criminal record information, future respondents will have the burden of establishing that such information was contained in a bona fide public court record accessible to the general public. [19] Additionally, lawyers who make extrajudicial statements in the future will not find shelter in the broad definition of MRPC (c)(2) that we apply here. Public policy mandates a more limited definition of information in a public record. We believe that, to best protect[ ] the right to a fair trial and safeguard[] the right of free expression, the phrase information in a public record should refer only to public government recordsthe records and papers on file with a government entity to which an ordinary citizen would have lawful access. To receive the protection of the public record safe harbor, the lawyer must not provide information beyond quotations from or references to public government records. The definition we establish in this case prevents attorneys from side-stepping the rule by directing or encouraging individuals not bound by the MRPC to publicize information so that attorneys can speak freely about it. Furthermore, by strictly limiting what is considered a public record, this definition enables all of the components of MRPC 3.6 to filter objectionable publicity, preventing the public record exception from swallowing the general rule of restricting prejudicial speech. In any event, no matter whether one defines information in a public record broadly to include everything in the public domain or narrowly, Gansler violated the MRPC 3.6 by making several extrajudicial statements at issue in this case. Initially, we must point out that Gansler has not challenged that his comments qualify, under MRPC 3.6(a), as statements that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication. The only contested issues in this case concern whether Gansler knew or should have known that his statements would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding and whether the statements are protected under the safe harbor provisions of MRPC 3.6(c). As we discuss in detail below, Gansler did violate MRPC 3.6 by commenting on Cook's confession, by discussing the plea offer to Perry, and by providing his opinion as to the guilt of Cook and Lucas. First, Gansler violated MRPC 3.6 by discussing Cook's confession to the Stottsmeister murder. MRPC 3.6(b)(2) provides that a statement relating to the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant is ordinarily likely to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Notwithstanding the cautionary language of the rule and prior to the filing of murder charges, Gansler publicly stated that police were able to obtain a confession from Cook. Apparently seeking shelter again under the public record safe harbor, Gansler points out that his reference to incredible details mirrored the information and even the language of the charging document. This observation fails to acknowledge that officials did not file the statement of charges against Cook until after the press conference. The public record safe harbor, whether construed narrowly or broadly, could not apply possibly to any statement that introduced information to the public for the first time. Gansler should have known that these statements, by themselves, would prejudice Cook in the public's eye. Not only did Gansler announce the existence of Cook's confession, but he also furnished specific information of the surrounding circumstances, including that Cook provided incredible details that only the murderer would have known. Gansler magnified the prejudicial effect of his statements by bolstering the believability of the confession. He stated that, before Cook traveled to the crime scene and went over in detail by detail every step of the murder, the police had provided him with a restful night's sleep. If we found no fault with such public disclosures, we would be allowing attorneys, in effect, to evade the operation of the exclusionary rule by taking advantage of the probative value of the confession without regard to its constitutionality or admissibility as evidence. That is, Gansler made Cook's confession public even though its contents might never reach the jury as a result of a constitutional challenge. His actions, in this regard, run afoul of our principles of criminal justice, as Chief Justice Rehnquist illustrated: The outcome of a criminal trial is to be decided by impartial jurors, who know as little as possible of the case, based on material admitted into evidence before them in a court proceeding. Extrajudicial comments on, or discussion of, evidence which might never be admitted at trial and ex parte statements by counsel giving their version of the facts obviously threaten to undermine this basic tenet. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1070, 111 S.Ct. at 2742, 115 L.Ed.2d at 920. Accordingly, with respect to Gansler's remarks on the Cook confession, we sustain Bar Counsel's exception because Gansler knew or should have known that his announcement would have a substantial likelihood of causing material prejudice. [20] Gansler also committed a violation of MRPC 3.6, as Judge Stevenson concluded, by commenting extrajudicially on the matter of Perry's plea bargain. MRPC 3.6(b)(2) states that a statement is ordinarily likely to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding if the statement relates to the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense. Gansler's reported statement in April of 2000 disclosed, for the first time, his decision to offer [Perry] a plea bargain. Gansler argues, though, that his comments to the Gazette about the plea offer should be covered by the public record safe harbor because the public already knew of his conversations with the victims' family members, in which they were consulted about whether to retry Perry or plea bargain. The public's general knowledge about plea bargains and how they normally play a part in every prosecution does not equate, however, to the public having actual knowledge that a plea bargain would be offered in this particular case. The decision to offer a plea bargain does not qualify as information contained in a public record, even under the broadest meaning of that phrase. Besides announcing the plea offer, Gansler also discussed the impending deadline for Perry to accept that offer, all during a very public and controversial prosecution of a multiple murder suspect. Public comments such as these place greater pressure on the defendant to accept the plea offer. More importantly, the comments likely influenced potential jurors in Perry's case by communicating that the lead prosecutor believed the defendant was guilty. See JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER § 12.16 (2nd ed. 1996) (Any ... statement [regarding the possibility of a plea of guilty] is, of course, a direct reference to an opinion of the speaker as to guilt of the accused or as to the belief of the accused as to his own guilt. It is tantamount to publication of an opinion as to guilt.). We, therefore, overrule Gansler's exception to Judge Stevenson's conclusion that the comments related to Perry's plea offer violated MRPC 3.6. MRPC 3.6(b)(4) specifically addresses attorney comments discussing any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Although several of Gansler's extrajudicial statements fall under this category of restricted speech and were not covered by any safe harbor, the hearing judge determined that the evidence did not show that any material prejudicial effect stemmed from them. Gansler's statements, indicating that they had apprehended the person who committed the crimes in the Cook and Lucas cases, came soon after the defendants had been arrested and well before the eve of trial. This, coupled with the fact that neither Lucas's nor Cook's attorneys claimed that Gansler's statements caused prejudice, persuaded the hearing judge to conclude that Bar Counsel had not shown a substantial likelihood of material prejudice. We disagree with the hearing judge's conclusion that the evidence failed to show that Gansler knew or should have known that his statements of opinion would have a substantial likelihood of material prejudice. In considering the propriety of a statement under MRPC 3.6, we determine the likelihood that a particular statement will cause prejudice at the time the statement was made, not whether that statement, in hindsight, actually worked to the detriment of a defendant. Whether Cook or Lucas claimed at their trials to be prejudiced by Gansler's statements, therefore, does not weigh in our analysis. Rather, we concentrate on the point in time when Gansler offered his public comments to determine the probability of prejudice. According to the hearing judge, the point in time when Gansler made the extrajudicial statements minimized whatever prejudicial effect flowed from his remarks. As support for this conclusion, the hearing judge cited Part II of Justice Kennedy's minority opinion in Gentile. Justice Kennedy suggested that statements made well before a defendant's trial have less prejudicial impact than statements made closer to the empaneling of a jury. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1044, 111 S.Ct. at 2729, 115 L.Ed.2d at 904 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Gentile had made his controversial statements six months prior to voir dire, enough time, according to Justice Kennedy, for the content of the message to fade from the public's memory. Id. The timing of Gentile's statement, however, was not the only factor that Justice Kennedy considered in determining that no prejudice had occurred in that case. He also analyzed the contents of Gentile's message, which, Justice Kennedy stated, lack any of the more obvious bases for a finding of prejudice. Id. at 1046, 111 S.Ct. at 2730, 115 L.Ed.2d at 905. We agree with Gansler's theory that the timing of an extrajudicial statement may affect its prejudicial effect, but we do not believe that the timing element in this case neutralizes the obvious prejudicial content of Gansler's statements of opinion. Like in Gentile, the timing of Gansler's statements came well before the beginnings of Cook's and Lucas's trials; however, Gansler's proclamation that they had apprehended the persons who committed the crimes in the Cook and Lucas cases directly contravened the provisions of MRPC 3.6(b)(4) (opinion on guilt of innocence). The comments blatantly expressed Gansler's opinion of the guilt of the defendants. In contrast to the lawyer in Gentile, who refused to comment on confessions and evidence from searches, see Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1046, 111 S.Ct. at 2730, 115 L.Ed.2d at 905 (Kennedy J., dissenting), Gansler supported his opinions of guilt by pointing to specific circumstances, such as confessions and physical evidence, to make his views more reliable. Gentile differs from the case before us for yet another reason: Gansler is a prosecutor, not a defense lawyer. Prosecutors play a unique role in our system of criminal justice. We recognized this recently in Walker v. State, 373 Md. 360, 394-95, 818 A.2d 1078, 1098 (2003), where Judge Harrell for the Court stated: Prosecutors are held to even higher standards of conduct than other attorneys due to their unique role as both advocate and minister of justice. The special duty of the prosecutor to seek justice is said to exist because the State's Attorney has broad discretion in determining whether to initiate criminal proceedings. Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 90, 40 A.2d 319, 321 (1944). The office of prosecutor is therefore not purely ministerial, but involves the exercise of learning and discretion, and he or she must exercise a sound discretion to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent. Id. The responsibilities of the prosecutor encompass more than advocacy. The prosecutor's duty is not merely to convict, but to seek justice. His obligation is to protect not only the public interest but the innocent as well and to safeguard the rights guaranteed to all persons, including those who may be guilty. Sinclair v. State, 27 Md. App. 207, 222-23, 340 A.2d 359, 369 (1975). In addition to their special role as ministers of justice, prosecutors have limitations not experienced by criminal defense attorneys in that defense attorneys have the benefit of their client's presumption of innocence. In other words, a criminal defense attorney may announce an opinion that his or her client is innocent with a lesser risk of causing prejudice because the law, itself, presumes the defendant's innocence. On the other hand, a prosecutor's opinion of guilt is much more likely to create prejudice, given that his or her words carry the authority of the government and are especially persuasive in the public's eye. See Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, The Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L.REV. 865, 886 (1990) (When the prosecutor speaks publicly about a pending case, he cannot separate his representational role from his speech, and he thereby involves the state in the extrajudicial comment.). As lawyers, prosecutors are so distinct that some commentators have argued that the rules against extrajudicial statements should apply only to them. See, e.g., Freedman & Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys, 29 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1977). Although we do not embrace this position, it nonetheless reinforces the notion that prosecutors, in particular, should be even more cautious to avoid making potentially prejudicial extrajudicial statements. [21] Because we hold that Gansler knew or should have known that his public opinions of Cook's and Lucas's guilt would have a substantial likelihood of material prejudice, we sustain Bar Counsel's exception with respect to those statements. [22]