Opinion ID: 1356156
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Police Threats Are Presumptively Coercive.

Text: Although we have repeatedly stated that a police officer's promissory inducement represents only one factor in the totality of circumstances approach, we have never expressly evaluated a police officer's threat of harsher treatment under the same analysis. The issue of whether courts should analyze promises and threats identically constitutes the central issue in the present appeal, and it is one of first impression for this court. Beavers asks us to hold police threats per se coercive, obviating judicial examination of the other factual circumstances surrounding an accused's confession. The state argues that a threat should, like an officer's promise of leniency, represent merely one of several factors for consideration under this court's totality of circumstances approach. A criminal suspect's right to remain silent in the face of police interrogation represents one of the most fundamental aspects of our constitutional jurisprudence. [25] It includes the right to terminate an interrogation at any time. [26] We regard any potential encroachment upon this right with the utmost concern. A law enforcement officer's threat of harsher than normal treatmenthowever phrasedessentially conveys to criminal suspects that they will be punished for their silence, including any refusal to give further answers. [27] Threats of harsher treatment for refusing to confess present suspects with the same type of choice which we found to be unacceptable in Webb. [28] Suspects are told, in effect, that they must give up their constitutional right to silence or they will suffer greater punishment. We view such threats with disfavor. [29] Where they are used, the resulting confession should be considered involuntary unless the state can show affirmatively that the confession was voluntarily made. [30] In reaching our conclusion, we draw guidance from the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Harrison . [31] Harrison was suspected by federal authorities of money laundering. Without warning, fifteen federal agents entered Harrison's house with weapons drawn, arrested Harrison and her companion, and searched her home. [32] The agents advised Harrison of her Miranda rights, after which an agent informed her of evidence linking her to the crime under investigation. [33] The agent then told Harrison that she could potentially receive a twenty-year sentence for her participation in the crime, and asked whether she thought it would be better if the judge was told of her cooperation or noncooperation. [34] Harrison responded that it would be better if the judge was informed of her cooperation, and she proceeded to confess her criminal involvement to the agents. [35] The district court found Harrison's confession voluntary and ultimately convicted her of money laundering. [36] The Ninth Circuit reversed Harrison's conviction, holding her confession involuntary. [37] While expressing its continued adherence to the totality of circumstances approach, the court nevertheless established an exception for confessions induced by police threats to inform the prosecutor of a suspect's refusal to cooperate. According to the court, there are no circumstances in which law enforcement officers may suggest that a suspect's exercise of the right to remain silent may result in harsher treatment by a court or prosecutor. [38] The Harrison court reiterated the permissibility of confessions secured by an officer's promise of leniency. [39] The court also acknowledged the arguable equivalence between such promises and police threats to inform the prosecutor of a suspect's refusal to cooperate, noting that [i]n many ways, both types of statements are simply different sides of the same coin: `waive your rights and receive more favorable treatment' versus `exercise your rights and receive less favorable treatment.' [40] The Ninth Circuit determined, however, that [t]he two types of statements are not entirely interchangeable. Defendants may get some benefit from learning about the possibility of reduced sentences, though that benefit would hardly vanish if the government communicated the prospect of leniency through defendants' attorneys rather than at the time of arrest. We also have observed that in most circumstances, speculation that cooperation will benefit the defendant or even promises to recommend leniency are not sufficiently compelling to overbear a defendant's will. [41] In distinguishing promises to communicate a suspect's cooperation to the prosecutor from threats to inform the prosecutor of the suspect's lack of cooperation, the Harrison court reasoned: Refusal to cooperate is every defendant's right under the fifth amendment. Under our adversary system of criminal justice, a defendant may not be made to suffer for his silence. Because there is no legitimate purpose for the statement that failure to cooperate will be reported and because its only apparent objective is to coerce, we disapprove the making of such representations. [42] The Ninth Circuit thus rejected the government's request to examine Harrison's inculpatory statement in context of all the circumstances involved in the case and held the agent's suggestion that he might inform the judge of Harrison's failure to cooperate inherently coercive. [43] We find Harrison 's reasoning persuasive and agree with the Ninth Circuit's distinction between promises of leniency and threats of harsher treatment. We also note that at least two other cases have taken a similar approach. In United States v. Tingle , a credit union employee (Tingle) was under suspicion of stealing funds. [44] After claiming that she had been attacked by an unknown assailant who had tied her up and stolen money from the safe of the credit union, Tingle was escorted by two FBI agents to their vehicle for further questioning. [45] During the hour-long interview, Tingle initially repeated the alibi she had given earlier. [46] The agents accused her of lying and explained to her the advantages of truthfully cooperating with the investigation. [47] They enumerated the crimesand corresponding prison termsfor which she might be found guilty. [48] Tingle continued to deny the accusations. [49] The agents explained to Tingle that it was in her best interest to cooperate, and told her that, depending on her decision, they would inform the prosecutor either of her cooperation with the investigation or her refusal to do so. [50] They also indicated that she might lose contact with her young child if she was ultimately jailed. [51] Tingle began to sob and visibly shake during the interview. [52] She eventually confessed to the crime and was convicted. [53] The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the agent's threats had invalidated her confession. [54] In State v. Strayhand, a theft and robbery suspect was arrested and interrogated at the police station. [55] The interviewing detectives repeatedly threatened Strayhand with enhanced punishment for failure to cooperate with the investigation, warning him that they would ask for a lot of jail time, would hang him in court, and would have it made after informing the judge of his refusal to confess. [56] During a subsequent interview later that day, Strayhand admitted his guilt and was eventually convicted at trial. [57] The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed Strayhand's conviction, holding his confession involuntary due to the detectives' threats of harsher treatment. [58]