Opinion ID: 1288094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Immediate Appeal

Text: The first question presented by the certification order addresses the procedural issue of whether a trial court's denial of qualified immunity is subject to immediate appeal. The trial court and Appellant both view a ruling on the availability of qualified immunity as falling within that narrow category of orders that are subject to permissible interlocutory appeal. Ms. Robinson takes a converse position, arguing that immediate appeal is not permitted because this Court has not expressly ruled in favor of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling on the issue of immunity. In Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W.Va. 139, 479 S.E.2d 649 (1996), an opinion authored by Justice Cleckley, this Court acknowledged the need for early resolution of immunity rulings: We agree with the United States Supreme Court to the extent it has encouraged, if not mandated, that claims of immunities, where ripe for disposition, should be summarily decided before trial. Id. at 147, 479 S.E.2d at 657. Although we observed in Hutchison that the high court views pretrial immunity rulings as immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, we did not decide whether the denial of a dispositive motion [6] based on qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal in this state. [7] 198 W.Va. at 147, 479 S.E.2d at 657 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)); accord Parish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4 th Cir.2004) (holding that a district court's order denying a defendant's claim of qualified immunity is a qualifying order under the collateral order doctrine and thus is reviewable immediately); see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (recognizing that an order rejecting the defense of qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a `final' judgment subject to immediate appeal) (emphasis in original). Objections to allowing an appeal from an interlocutory order are typically rooted in the need for finality. The provisions of West Virginia Code § 58-5-1 (2005) establish that appeals may be taken in civil actions from a final judgment of any circuit court or from an order of any circuit court constituting a final judgment. Id. Justice Cleckley elucidated in James M.B. v. Carolyn M., 193 W.Va. 289, 456 S.E.2d 16 (1995), that [t]his rule, commonly referred to as the `rule of finality,' is designed to prohibit `piecemeal appellate review of trial court decisions which do not terminate the litigation[.]' 193 W.Va. at 292, 456 S.E.2d at 19 (quoting U.S. v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 265, 102 S.Ct. 3081, 73 L.Ed.2d 754 (1982)). Exceptions to the rule of finality include interlocutory orders which are made appealable by statute or by the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, or ... [which] fall within a jurisprudential exception such as the collateral order doctrine. James M.B., 193 W.Va. at 292-93, 456 S.E.2d at 19-20; accord Adkins v. Capehart, 202 W.Va. 460, 463, 504 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1998) (recognizing prohibition matters, certified questions, Rule 54(b) judgment orders, [8] and collateral order doctrine as exceptions to rule of finality). The collateral order doctrine, as we explained in James M.B., was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen [ v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)].... In Durm [v. Heck's, Inc. ], 184 W.Va. at 566 n. 2, 401 S.E.2d at 912 n. 2, we noted the doctrine as an exception to the federal interpretation of Rule 54(b), and we said that under Cohen, [a]n interlocutory order would be subject to appeal under this doctrine if it `(1) conclusively determines the disputed controversy, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the actions, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.' 193 W.Va. at 293 n. 4, 456 S.E.2d at 20 n. 4 (citation omitted). The three-factor Cohen test governs our determination of whether a qualified immunity ruling falls within the collateral order doctrine and is therefore subject to immediate appeal. With regard to the first factor of Cohen, which requires that the ruling at issue must be conclusive, the [trial] court's denial of summary judgment [on the issue of qualified immunity] finally and conclusively determines the defendant's claim of right not to stand trial on the plaintiff's allegations. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (emphasis in original). Because a ruling denying the availability of immunity fully resolves the issue of a litigant's obligation to participate in the litigation, the first factor of Cohen is easily met. As to the second factor which focuses on whether the immunity ruling resolves significant issues separate from the merits, there is little question that the claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his [or her] rights have been violated. Id. at 527-28, 105 S.Ct. 2806. As the high court explained in Mitchell, qualified immunity is a pure legal determination that is made independent of the plaintiff's averments: An appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a question of law: whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions or, in cases where the district court has denied summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that even under the defendant's version of the facts the defendant's conduct violated clearly established law, whether the law clearly proscribed the actions the defendant claims he took. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806. The final factor of the Cohen test requires us to consider whether a qualified immunity ruling is effectively unreviewable at the appeal stage. Postponing review of a ruling denying immunity to the post-trial stage is fruitless, as the United States Supreme Court reasoned in Mitchell, because the underlying objective in any immunity determination (absolute or qualified) is immunity from suit. 472 U.S. at 526-27, 105 S.Ct. 2806; see also Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George's County, Md., 309 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir.2002) (Because qualified immunity is an immunity from having to litigate, as contrasted with an immunity from liability, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.) (omitting internal citation); Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir.1997) (observing that denial of qualified immunity defense subjects the [government] official to the burdens of pretrial matters and opining that some of the rights inherent in a qualified immunity defense are [consequently] lost). Traditional appellate review of a qualified immunity ruling cannot achieve the intended goal of an immunity ruling: the right not to be subject to the burden of trial. Hutchison, 198 W.Va. at 148, 479 S.E.2d at 658. As a result, the third factor of Cohen is easily met. Application of the Cohen test demonstrates that a circuit court's denial of summary judgment that is predicated on qualified immunity is an interlocutory ruling which is subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Based on this determination, we answer the first certified question in the affirmative.