Opinion ID: 1769131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: discipline analysis

Text: The Bar challenges the referee's recommended sanction of a thirty-day suspension, arguing instead that a ninety-one day suspension is more appropriate under the circumstances at issue. [5] Although a referee's recommendation as to discipline is persuasive, we do not pay the same deference to this recommendation as we do to the guilt recommendation because this Court has the ultimate responsibility to determine the appropriate sanction. Florida Bar v. Sweeney, 730 So.2d 1269, 1272 (Fla.1998). Although we generally will not second-guess a referee's recommended discipline if the recommendation has a reasonable basis in existing caselaw, Florida Bar v. Lecznar, 690 So.2d 1284, 1288 (Fla.1997), we find that in light of the duties violated in this case a thirty-day suspension lacks such support. The referee did not cite to any cases in support of the recommended thirty-day suspension; however, Varner cites Florida Bar v. Kravitz, 694 So.2d 725 (Fla.1997) (thirty-day suspension imposed where lawyer misrepresented to client's employee that he would be arrested if he failed to pay attorney money and made several misrepresentations to court and opposing counsel), and Florida Bar v. Rose, 607 So.2d 394 (Fla.1992) (imposing thirty-day suspension where lawyer misrepresented information to financial institution to obtain his children's money from a trust without ex-wife's authorization), in support of the referee's recommendation. Notably, however, these cases did not involve the commission of a criminal act or the use of court documents as a means to deceive others. These cases do not provide a reasonable basis for approving the referee's recommended sanction. However, the cases relied upon by the Bar as supporting a ninety-one-day suspension are likewise distinguishable from the instant case. The Bar likens this case to fraud cases in which this Court imposed disbarment. See Florida Bar v. Cramer, 678 So.2d 1278 (Fla.1996) (attorney with prior disciplinary record was disbarred for making fraudulent representations to lenders and failing to respond to the Bar's inquiry); Florida Bar v. Forbes, 596 So.2d 1051 (Fla.1992) (lawyer disbarred following felony conviction for bank fraud and making materially false statements in obtaining loans). As discussed, the basis for finding Varner guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(b) was that the conduct at issue involved an attempt to deceive, not an intent to defraud. Thus, the fraud cases relied upon by the Bar are distinguishable. We find Florida Bar v. Morse, 587 So.2d 1120 (Fla.1991), instructive in this case. In Morse, the attorney represented a client in a personal injury matter and rejected a settlement on the client's behalf. However, the attorney then failed to file suit against the insurance carrier and the statute of limitations ran. When the attorney discovered the error, his law partner, Morse, called the client and indicated that the insurance carrier refused to go above the offered settlement amount, and issued a check to the client in the amount of the settlement offer. This Court ordered a ninety-day suspension, based in part on the fact that Morse did not inform the client of the true outcome of his personal injury claim or of the fact that the firm had committed possible malpractice by letting the statute of limitations run, nor did he advise the client to seek other legal counsel, as a conflict of interest had arisen. Morse, 587 So.2d at 1121. Although the facts of Morse differ slightly from the instant case, we find the most troubling aspect of Morse is present here: an error is made in the representation of a client, but instead of the error being admitted, an attorney develops a deception to cover up the error so that it will go undetected. Varner's error in representing that a suit had been filed was pardonable and correctable upon his learning that such a suit had not in fact been filed. However, Varner, like Morse, instead chose to keep this truth to himself and hatched a scheme to conceal the error. Varner's decision to go forward with a deception rather than honestly admitting to his mistake is so contrary to the most basic requirement of candor that we cannot countenance a short-term suspension in this instance. Instead, we impose a ninety-day suspension, consistent with this Court's sanction in Morse.