Opinion ID: 2640681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Applicable Medical-Rehabilitative Limit is $11,000.

Text: Having thus established that the $13,900 medical-rehabilitative limit was effective from August 12, 1996 through August 31, 1996, the final question is what medical-rehabilitative limit applied to the period from September 1, 1995, through August 12, 1996. Kramer argues that the applicable medical-rehabilitative limit was $11,000 because the medical-rehabilitative limit from the preceding no-fault policy term continued to remain in full force and effect. Although Kramer does not provide any support for this conclusion, we believe that it has merit for the following reasons. First, pursuant to the plain language of HAR § 16-23-10(d) (1993), in effect at the time of Kramer's accident, the medical-rehabilitative limit for the period commencing on September 1, 1994 and terminating on August 31, 1995 was $11,000. It is therefore clear that the $11,000 medical-rehabilitative limit terminated on August 31, 1995 and did not continue in full force and effect. Accordingly, there was a period of time during which the insurance commissioner had not implemented an effective medical-rehabilitative limit. HRS § 431:10C-308 does not dictate specific remedial measures in the event that there is no effective medical-rehabilitative limit, and therefore the statute is ambiguous as to how to deal with the present situation. However, HRS § 1-15(2) (1993) states that [w]here words of a law are ambiguous . . . [t]he reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it, may be considered to discover its true meaning. According to HRS § 431:10C-102(a)(3) (1993), one of the primary purposes of the chapter is to limit tort liability for motor vehicle accidents. Consistent with that purpose, HRS § 431:10C-306 abolished tort liability for motor vehicle accidents except in certain limited situations. HRS § 431:10C-306(a)-(b). The specific exception applicable in the present case allowed a tort claim to proceed if the injured person's paid or accrued expenses exceeded the medical-rehabilitative limit. HRS § 431:10C-306(b)(2). In light of the foregoing abolition of tort liability, it is clear that to permit a period of time with no medical-rehabilitative limit would be inconsistent with the reason and spirit of the law. HRS § 1-15(2). Furthermore, as previously mentioned, there is evidence in the plain language of HRS § 431:10C-308(c) that the legislature contemplated the situation where the commissioner [was] unable to revise the medical-rehabilitative limit within the one-year period. Rather than authorizing the commissioner to retroactively apply the medical-rehabilitative limit, HRS § 431:10C-308(c) provided that the medical-rehabilitative limit shall continue. . . for the next no-fault policy term year. . . . While the legislature was not speaking in general terms, but was only referring to the specific no-fault policy term year commencing on September 1, 1992 and terminating on August 31, 1993, it nonetheless provided some evidence of its intention in the event that no medical-rehabilitative limit was established for a given period of time. See supra note 3. Consequently, considering the reason and spirit of the law, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in HRS § 431:10C-308(c) to suggest that the legislature would intend the medical-rehabilitative limit from the preceding no-fault policy term to carry over if, as here, the commissioner was unable to revise the medical-rehabilitative limit during the one-year period.