Opinion ID: 204050
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Violation of Chapter 93A

Text: Finally, Sonoran asserts that PerkinElmer violated Chapter 93A, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 11. Chapter 93A creates a cause of action for unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The specific allegation here is that PerkinElmer violated Chapter 93A by: (1) making almost no effort to develop, market, and sell Sonoran's CTP products; (2) promising to amend the earnout and other incentive payment clauses in the contract; and (3) misrepresenting its intention to develop a strong marketing and sales program for the CTP Business through the end of 2003. In considering PerkinElmer's motion for summary judgment on this claim, the district court noted: [t]o the extent a party's Chapter 93A claims are based only on failed common law or statutory grounds, several courts have refused to find Chapter 93A liability. Sonoran, 590 F.Supp.2d at 212 (citations omitted). It then granted PerkinElmer judgment as a matter of law on the claim because the Plaintiffs [Chapter 93A] claims derive entirely from the same set of operative facts as their failed common law grounds. Id. In addition, PerkinElmer sought summary judgment on the alternative ground that the pertinent events did not occur primarily and substantially in Massachusetts, as Chapter 93A requires. We agree with PerkinElmer's alternative argument and need not reach the issue addressed by the district court. Chapter 93A states that: No action shall be brought or maintained under this section unless the actions and transactions constituting the alleged unfair method of competition or the unfair or deceptive act or practice occurred primarily and substantially within the commonwealth. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 11 (emphasis added). Courts apply this standard by considering the facts in the context of the entire § 11 claim, and then determining whether the center of gravity of the circumstances that give rise to the claim is primarily and substantially within the Commonwealth. Kuwaiti Danish Computer Corp. v. Digital Equip. Co., 438 Mass. 459, 781 N.E.2d 787, 799 (2003); see also Kenda Corp. v. Pot O'Gold Money Leagues, Inc., 329 F.3d 216, 234-35 (1st Cir.2003). Sonoran contends that the alleged Chapter 93A violations occurred primarily and substantially in Massachusetts because [i]n-house counsel and Perkin Corporate, based in Massachusetts, were intertwined with California employees and had the final say. Massachusetts was in control of the negotiations and made all of the important decisions. Pls.-Appellants' Br. 46. Sonoran further asserts that PerkinElmer's failure to make Bogen a better offer and disclose the Lithography Division's financial difficulties occurred through PerkinElmer Corporate, located in Massachusetts. We do not think this is sufficient for Massachusetts to be the center of gravity. In Bushkin Assoc., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622, 473 N.E.2d 662 (1985), a New York investment banker sued a Massachusetts corporation under Chapter 93A, alleging that deceptive statements were made to him in the course of telephone calls between Massachusetts and New York. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that the alleged unfair or deceptive conduct did not occur primarily in Massachusetts because, despite the fact that the allegedly deceptive phone calls were made from Massachusetts, the telephone calls were received and acted upon in New York and the plaintiffs' losses were incurred in New York. Id. at 672. As a result, the court rejected the Chapter 93A claim. Id. This case is similar to Bushkin. Just as the losses in Bushkin did not occur in Massachusetts, Sonoran's losses were incurred in Arizona where Donahue and the CTP Business were located. Sonoran also received and acted upon PerkinElmer's allegedly deceptive conduct in Arizona. Indeed this case is less favorable to the plaintiffs than Bushkin. Unlike Bushkin, where the allegedly deceptive statements were uttered in Massachusetts, the alleged misconduct here occurred primarily in Arizona and California where the Lithography and Optoelectronics Divisions were located. The fact that the Purchase Agreement provided that Massachusetts law would govern does not require a finding that the center of gravity for Chapter 93A liability is in Massachusetts. In Bushkin, the court determined that Massachusetts law controlled (even without a clause explicitly providing so) but still found that the alleged unfair or deceptive conduct did not occur primarily and substantially in Massachusetts and thus that there could be no Chapter 93A liability. Bushkin, 473 N.E.2d at 636, 638. Thus, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Sonoran, PerkinElmer was entitled to summary judgment on the Chapter 93A claim as the alleged unfair or deceptive conduct of PerkinElmer did not occur primarily and substantially in Massachusetts.