Opinion ID: 2531898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Miranda Warnings Generally

Text: In accordance with the holdings of Miranda and its progeny, this Court has held that, to ensure the voluntariness of confessions, the self-incrimination clause of article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution requires that before being subjected to custodial interrogation, suspects must be told that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say will be used against them in court, that they have a right to a lawyer's help, and that if they cannot pay for a lawyer one will be appointed to help them. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 965-66 (Fla.1992) (footnote omitted). If a suspect is not warned of his rights, the prosecution will be barred from using statements obtained during the interrogation during its case in chief. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990); Cuervo v. State, 967 So.2d 155, 167 (Fla.2007). Further, once custodial interrogation begins, these rights must be strictly observed by the interrogating officers: Under Section 9, if the suspect indicates in any manner that he or she does not want to be interrogated, interrogation must not begin or, if it has already begun, must immediately stop. If the suspect indicates in any manner that he or she wants the help of a lawyer, interrogation must not begin until a lawyer has been appointed and is present or, if it has already begun, must immediately stop until a lawyer is present. Once a suspect has requested the help of a lawyer, no state agent can reinitiate interrogation on any offense throughout the period of custody unless the lawyer is present, although the suspect is free to volunteer a statement to police on his or her own initiative at any time on any subject in the absence of counsel. Traylor, 596 So.2d at 966 (footnote omitted). Thus, whether a suspect is in custody determines whether officers are required to advise the suspect of his or her Miranda rights and at what point those rights must be enforced. The standard for custody is whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would feel that his freedom of movement has been restricted to a degree associated with an actual arrest. Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 573 (Fla.1999); see Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but `the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest.) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983)). As under the seizure analysis, the standard is based on how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have perceived the situation. Ramirez, 739 So.2d at 573 (quoting Davis v. State, 698 So.2d 1182, 1188 (Fla.1997)). In Ramirez, this Court adopted a four-factor analysis, originally applied by the Supreme Court of Iowa, to determine whether a reasonable person would consider himself to be in custody under the totality of the circumstances. Factors to be considered are: (1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave the place of questioning. Id. at 574 (citing State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Iowa 1997)). [4] In that case, the Court noted that Ramirez was a juvenile and that he was questioned in a small room at the police station by two detectives, he was never told he was free to leave, and all of the questions indicated that the detectives considered him a suspect. Id. at 574. Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, we concluded that Ramirez had been subjected to custodial interrogation and that Miranda warnings had been required before questioning began. Id. [5] We emphasize that Miranda warnings are not required in any police encounter in which the suspect is not placed under arrest or otherwise in custody under Ramirez. See McCarty, 468 U.S. at 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (noting the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda ). In a noncustodial setting, officers are not required to discontinue questioning when a suspect indicates that he wishes to exercise his right to remain silent, nor are they required to provide a lawyer on the suspect's request. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding.); see also United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 949 (6th Cir.1998) ([B]ecause of the very cursory and limited nature of a Terry stop, a suspect is not free to leave, yet is not entitled to full custody Miranda rights.). In the present case, it is clear that Caldwell was not placed under arrest prior to his initial confession, nor was he taken into custody. The Miranda warnings were therefore unnecessary at the time they were given. With this fact in mind, we must evaluate the impact of the warnings in light of the seizure analysis enunciated in Mendenhall.