Opinion ID: 1956231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Negligence of Charles Binette

Text: Mr. Binette claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict that he was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the accident and was equal to the negligence of the defendant. He quotes the rule that the burden of proving the causal negligence of the tortiously injured party now falls upon his adversary, who must support this burden by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Crocker v. Coombs, Me., 328 A.2d 389, 392 (1974). Mr. Binette argues that there is no evidence from which the jury could reasonably determine by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he was causally negligent. Assuming without deciding that the issue is reviewable [1] by this Court, we find no error in the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on this ground. Upon a motion for a new trial, the movant must show that the jury verdict was so manifestly or clearly wrong that it is apparent that the conclusion of the jury was the result of prejudice, bias, passion, or a mistake of law or fact. Kennebec Towage Co. v. State, 142 Me. 327, 334, 52 A.2d 166, 169 (1947). The verdict must stand unless there is found in the record no credible evidence to support it. Larsen v. Lane, 156 Me. 66, 68, 158 A.2d 759, 760 (1960). Moreover, on a motion for a new trial, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the successful party. Fossett v. Durant, 150 Me. 413, 416, 113 A.2d 620, 622 (1955). The conflict in the evidence concerning Mr. Binette's negligence basically involved the question whether he had activated his left directional light when he stopped to make a left turn onto the side street. Both Charles Binette and Claire Binette testified that he had engaged his directional signal at the time he intended to turn. On the other hand, the defendant testified that she saw no signals from the Binette car. Apparently, the jury chose to believe Ms. Deane, and considered Mr. Binette's failure to signal as negligence which contributed to the ensuing collision. A failure by Mr. Binette to provide a turn signal under the circumstance would be a violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1191. Failure to give the warning signal when required is prima facie negligence. White v. Schofield, 153 Me. 79, 87, 134 A.2d 755, 759 (1957). The defendant's testimony that she saw no directional signal from the Binette car was sufficient to place that issue before the jury. Since a jury question as to Mr. Binette's causative negligence was presented, the comparative fault of the parties was a matter exclusively for the jury. 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (Comparative Negligence Act); Ferguson v. Bretton, Me., 375 A.2d 225, 227 (1977). We find no reason to disturb the jury's verdict in this case. Where the evidence . . . discloses that two arguable reasonable theories were presented to the jury for adoption, both being sustained by credible evidence, and one is reflected in the verdict, it would have been an abuse of discretion for the Justice below to override the jury decision and set aside the verdict. The degree of credibility to which witnesses are entitled is for the jury and not the court to decide. Avery v. Brown, Me., 288 A.2d 713, 715 (1972).