Opinion ID: 3010248
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiff's Military Obligation

Text: In Defendants' memoranda of law, adopted by the district court as its rationale, it is continually argued that Plaintiff's discharge was conditioned upon further military service, to wit, his acceptance of a reserve commission. This was an attempt to show the absence of a complete break in status under the Code. However, this simply is not the case. At the 10 time Plaintiff entered the Marines, he had a statutory obligation of six years of service. See 10 U.S.C. § 651. After completion of these six years, Plaintiff had no further military obligation. Consequently, he submitted his resignation, was honorably discharged, and accepted a reserve commission. Discharge orders were issued to reflect such facts. If Plaintiff decided not to accept the reserve commission, new orders would have been issued honorably discharging him with no further military obligation. See Letter from Asst. U.S. Attorney Brysh to Third Circuit Court of Appeals 2 (Oct. 19, 1995) (On file with Clerk's office) [hereinafter Brysh Letter]. In a letter from the Commandant of the Marine Corps to Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff's resignation, the Commandant stated: Your request for resignation . . . is approved. In response to your request, you have been considered for and are tendered a Marine Corps Reserve commission. . . . . . . . Should you not desire the Reserve commission tendered you, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (MMSR- 3) must be notified immediately. These orders are cancelled and new orders will be issued. Letter from Commandant of the Marine Corps to Captain Michael A. Murphy (April 27, 1988). (App. at 184.) There is no indication from any source in the record that a decision by Plaintiff not to request the reserve commission would have changed his military obligation. The following discussion contained in the Navy's Courts-Martial Regulations also supports Plaintiff's position: 11 A member of a regular or reserve component remains subject to court-martial jurisdiction after leaving active duty for offenses committed prior to such termination of active duty if the member retains military status in a reserve component without having been discharged from all obligations of military service. . . . A complete termination of military status refers to a discharge relieving the servicemember of any further military service. It does not include a discharge conditioned upon acceptance of further military service. Discussion to Rules for Courts-Martial 204(d) (1995) (emphasis added). Moreover, Plaintiff's Honorable Discharge Certificate contains no conditions to discharge. (App. at 55.) Lastly, it is indicated in a Memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy that Plaintiff requested a reserve commission which was Not Obligated. (App. at 60.) Thus, Plaintiff's military obligation was completely terminated in that his discharge was not conditioned on further military service, i.e., acceptance of a reserve commission. In an attempt to show continuing jurisdiction over Plaintiff and avoid the application of Hirshberg, Defendants now contend on appeal that because Plaintiff chose to submit his resignation with a request for a reserve commission, his resignation and acceptance of commission as a reserve officer were handled as a single transaction. Brysh Letter at 2. Therefore, they argue, there was no lapse in military service and Plaintiff remained subject to court-martial jurisdiction. Defendants have cited no authority to support their position nor has any come to our attention. Even if we were to assume that 12 Plaintiff's resignation and acceptance of a reserve commission were handled as a single transaction, his status under the Code still lapsed upon his honorable discharge from the regular component. Additionally, Plaintiff's situation is unlike those cases holding that there is no interruption in one's status subject to the Code upon an early discharge for the purpose of reenlistment. See, e.g., Clardy, 13 M.J. at 315-16. Defendants also attach some relevance to the fact that Plaintiff remained a commissioned officer, albeit a reservist. However, this fact is of no consequence. For it is not status as a officer which is determinative of court-martial jurisdiction; rather, it is status as a person belonging to the general category of persons subject to the Code. See United States v. Poole, 20 M.J. 598, 600 (N.M.C.M.R. 1985); see also United States v. Spradley, 41 M.J. 827, 830 (N.M.C.C.A 1995) (noting `subject to recall' is not the same as `subject to the Code'). It is apparent to this Court that Plaintiff was under no obligation to accept a reserve commission. When discharged, Plaintiff's status as a person subject to the Code completely terminated upon his separation from the regular component, notwithstanding his reserve affiliation. Moreover, Plaintiff did not join a reserve unit for more than three months after his discharge from the regular component. This alone evidences a clear break in status under the Code. Accordingly, we hold that at the moment Plaintiff's discharge from the regular component 13 became effective, his status as a person subject to the Code terminated subject only to a subsequent restoration of that status through possible applicable statutory exceptions. We turn to that possibility.