Opinion ID: 1187847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nampa Christian is Operated Primarily for Religious Purposes and is Principally Supported By an Association of Churches.

Text: As is true for the word church, no definition of the term convention or association of churches exists in the Idaho Code or in case law. As mentioned above, see Part II.A., supra, this Court considered the issue in Allied Christian Forces, supra, 105 Idaho at 314-15, 669 P.2d at 203-04, but did not need to define the term in order to decide the case. Now that we are required to define the term, we are persuaded by the definition proposed by the defendants in that case. This Court articulated the defendants' definition in the following manner: [Allied], on the other hand, has argued that association, as used in I.C. § 72-1316A(g)(1), should be given a broader definition, that being: The act of associating, or the state of being associated; fellowship; combination for a common purpose, quoting Britannica World Language Edition of Funk & Wagnalls New Practical Standard Dictionary. Thus, [Allied] argues that the term applies to a cooperative undertaking by churches of differing denominations, quoting Rev.Rul. 74-224, 1974-1, C.B. 61. Id. at 314, 669 P.2d at 203 (emphasis added). Under this definition, it is clear that the several different churches which are united by their relationship to Nampa Christian constitute an association of churches for purposes of I.C. § 72-1316A(g)(1)(ii). But see, Lutheran Social Service, supra, 758 F.2d at 1287-88. The question we turn to, then, is whether Nampa Christian (1) is an organization operated primarily for religious purposes; and (2) whether it is operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by this association of churches. See I.C. § 72-1316A(g)(1)(ii). We hold that it satisfies both questions. The evidence shows that Nampa Christian is operated for religious purposes. Our extensive review of the school's intent and operations reveals that it is a school with a religious mission and purpose. It therefore qualifies as an organization operated primarily for religious purposes. Id. [7] In its brief before the Industrial Commission, the Department articulately argued that there is no evidence in the record which shows that Nampa Christian is operated, supervised, or controlled by the various churches which have members attending the school. Department's Brief, pp. 10-13. We agree. We disagree with the Department's argument, however, that the school is not principally supported by this group of churches. The Department argued that because only a small fraction of Nampa Christian's revenue comes from local churches, the school is not principally supported by these churches. The Department dismissed as unpersuasive Nampa Christian's argument that without the moral support of these churches the school would cease to exist. Ex. No. 17, p. 3. We disagree. The statutory language of I.C. § 72-1316A(g)(1)(ii) does not require a church's or group of churches' support to be financial in order for that to be recognizable under the statute. The statute merely states support. While a contribution of money is strong indicia of one's support, it cannot be held, statutorily, to be the only way in which to support an organization. There is no logical reason to differentiate between the types of support an organization may receive. Likewise, there is no statutory command to do so. The key is the quality of the support. Section 72-1316A(g)(1)(ii) requires the organization to be principally supported by a church or group of churches in order for it to qualify for the tax exception. Such is the case here. The Commission made the finding of fact that Nampa Christian could not exist as a private school without the moral support of those several churches. R., Vol. 2, p. 14 (emphasis added). Substantial and competent evidence supports this finding. We therefore may not set aside this finding of fact. Johnson v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 108 Idaho 765, 768, 702 P.2d 803, 806 (1985); Paulson v. Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 900, 591 P.2d 143, 147 (1979). We hold that this type of support constitutes principal supportif the school could not exist without the churches' support, it is dependent upon that support. Such dependency constitutes principal support for purposes of I.C. § 72-1316A(g)(1)(ii). Our holding today is not broad. It does not mean that mere moral support offered by a church or group of churches to an organization operated for religious purposes will qualify that organization for tax exemption status under Idaho's Employment Security Act. Rather, our decision states that before tax exemption status can be granted, the Commission must find as fact that such support is necessary for the religious organization's continued operation. Furthermore, substantial and competent evidence must be in the record to support that finding. Because these qualifying conditions exist here, we affirm the Industrial Commission's decision that Nampa Christian is not required to pay unemployment taxes under I.C. § 72-1301 et seq. We do so, however, upon the basis of the exception found in § 72-1316A(g)(1)(ii) and not upon constitutional grounds. We therefore affirm the result reached by the Commission. No costs or attorney's fees. DONALDSON, C.J., and BAKES and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur. SHEPARD, J., concurs in the result.