Opinion ID: 169088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jefferson Chemical Preclusion Argument

Text: 11 CHS argues that because the Board in Mimbres I considered whether the company had withdrawn recognition from the union, the issue of withdrawal cannot be litigated again in later proceedings. In support of its argument, the company points to the NLRB's 1972 decision in Jefferson Chemical Co. In that decision, the Board held that where the General Counsel had already once litigated a broad refusal-to-bargain charge, fairness concerns and the interests of administrative economy precluded him from later litigating a related charge that turned on the same set of facts: [T]he General Counsel is dutybound to investigate all matters which are encompassed by the [original] charge, and to proceed appropriately thereafter. Jefferson Chemical, 200 NLRB at 992 n. 3. [M]ultiple litigation of issues which should have been presented in the initial proceeding constitutes a waste of resources and an abuse of our processes. . . . Id; see also Peyton Packing Co., 129 NLRB 1358 (1961). 12 The Board has made clear that this restriction is policy-based, not jurisdictional, and is limited to those instances when the General Counsel attempts to litigate the same act or conduct as a violation of different sections of the Act or relitigates the same charges in different cases. Cresleigh Mgmt., Inc., 324 NLRB 774, 774 (1997) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis removed). 13 CHS claims that Mimbres II and Mimbres III fit squarely within the Jefferson Chemical prohibition. We fail to see the application. The General Counsel has not attempted in these cases to relitigate claims raised and decided in Mimbres I. Though unlawful withdrawal of recognition is a charge made in all three cases, two separate withdrawals are at issue. The General Counsel argued in Mimbres I that the company had unlawfully withdrawn recognition of the union on or by March 23, 2000. The Board rejected this argument and found that no withdrawal had occurred. In Mimbres II and III, the General Counsel has claimed that the company's failure to bargain after the decision in Mimbres I constituted an unlawful withdrawal of recognition. These are distinct factual scenarios, giving rise to distinct claims. 1 The Jefferson Chemical doctrine is inapplicable because the facts and circumstances giving rise to the . . . allegation did not take place until after the [earlier] case . . . was heard and decided. New Surfside Nursing Home, 330 NLRB 1146, 1151 (2000); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 NLRB 893, 908 (1993) (employer domination suit not barred by earlier case alleging employer domination because the allegations in the second case occurred months after the trial in the first case began); Great Western Produce, Inc., 299 NLRB 1004, 1009 n. 1 (1990) ( Jefferson Chemical does not apply to a claim premised on facts that occurred more than a year after the hearing in the first case closed). 14 CHS tries to salvage its argument by claiming that the Board's factual findings in Mimbres I reveal it lawfully withdrew recognition from the union in November 1999. 2 Apparently CHS believes that if the withdrawal of recognition in 1999 was lawful, the General Counsel may not argue that the company's withdrawal became unlawful at a later date. But this argument is misconceived. The Board in Mimbres I explicitly found that CHS had not withdrawn recognition as of late March 2000, 337 NLRB at 1005, and this Court is in no position to revisit that factual finding. 15 At oral argument, Respondent's counsel offered a variation on this theme, contending that CHS had constructively —and lawfully—withdrawn recognition from the union in the fall of 1999. Counsel placed great weight on the distinction between constructive and actual withdrawal. We note that CHS made no such distinction in its briefing to this Court, so to the extent the distinction makes a difference, CHS has waived the argument. However, we doubt the distinction amounts to much in this case. The Board in Mimbres I, II, and III considered and rejected the argument CHS now offers as to why its constructive withdrawal in 1999 was lawful— namely, that the union had lost majority status. Mimbres I, 337 NLRB at 1005, Mimbres II, 342 NLRB at 401, Mimbres III, 342 NLRB at 348-49. CHS complains that the Board in Mimbres II and III precluded it from offering evidence pre-March 2000 regarding the union's majority status. Even were this true, we fail to see the relevance. Surely if the union had not lost majority status by May 2000, as held in Mimbres I, it had not lost it in November 1999, only to regain it later. Given the factual findings in all three cases, if CHS did in fact constructively withdraw in 1999, it was unlawful. But the company's actions in the fall of 1999 are not at issue in this appeal. If CHS truly believed it had constructively, and lawfully, withdrawn recognition, it should have made that argument in Mimbres I. Its failure to do so will not prevent the Board from considering whether it unlawfully withdrew recognition thereafter. 16 CHS was free to contest the Board's conclusions in Mimbres II and Mimbres III that the withdrawal of recognition after March 2000 was unlawful—but that argument has nothing to do with Jefferson Chemical. To be sure, the Administrative Law Judge found, in Mimbres II, that [o]n November 2, 1999, Respondent [CHS] withdrew recognition of the Union. 342 NLRB at 400. She did not, however, make any findings with regard to the withdrawal's lawfulness, as that issue was not properly before her. Instead, she expressly found that CHS unlawfully withdrew recognition after March 28, 2000, and she reached that finding relying only on conduct alleged to have occurred after the conclusion of Mimbres I. 342 NLRB at 401. The claims the ALJ considered and ruled upon, then, were not litigated in Mimbres I and are not subject to Jefferson Chemical preclusion. 17 In sum, the Board was not precluded from considering evidence of unlawful withdrawal after March 2000 simply because the company had successfully defeated an earlier charge that it withdrew unlawfully before March 2000. Consequently, the company has not demonstrated that the Board's conclusions were without foundation in the record.