Opinion ID: 2166291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counts IV and V

Text: The complaint stated in counts IV and V that Paul failed to keep three promises which he made to Antonia in 1966 to induce her to drop her suit in federal court. The first alleged promise was that Paul would provide for Andrew throughout his life, whatever his needs may be, and the second was that Paul would reimburse Antonia for any and all legal expenses, costs and attorney's fees arising out of the dismissal of the suit. The trial court ruled that both appellants' claims based on the first promise were barred by the statute of limitations. As to the second promise, the court made the same ruling on Antonia's claim, and held that Andrew had no cause of action because the promise was personal to Antonia. The third alleged promise was that upon his death Paul would convey Guy's Place to Andrew (presumably by will) without further consideration. The trial court ruled that Antonia's claim based on this promise [22] was barred by the statute of limitations and that Andrew's claim must fail because in fact no such promise was made. We hold that the statute of limitations barred any claim by either appellant based on the first two promises. [23] With respect to the third promise, however, we hold that summary judgment was erroneously granted because there are material issues of fact as to both the applicability of the statute of limitations and the exact terms of the promise. We also hold that the statute of limitations cannot bar appellants' claim that a constructive trust should be imposed on Guy's Place because a constructive trust is an equitable remedy, and therefore not subject to the statute. The claims based on Paul's alleged promises (count IV) all sound in contract and thus are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. D.C. Code § 12-301 (7) (1981). As to the fraud claim (count V), the action must be brought within three years from the time the fraud was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered. D.C. Code § 12-301 (8) (1981); see King v. Kitchen Magic, Inc., supra, 391 A.2d at 1186. Assuming that Antonia gave Paul a reasonable time to pay her legal fees, we conclude that as to her the statute of limitations began to run no later than a year or two after the dismissal of the suit in 1966. As to Andrew, even if he had a claim based on Paul's promise to pay Antonia's legal expenses (see note 23, supra ), the statute began to run on his eighteenth birthday, which was in June 1970. See D.C. Code § 12-302(a)(1) (1981). Since more than three years have passed since either of those dates, we hold that any claims for damages resulting from Paul's failure to pay Antonia's legal expenses in 1966, as he allegedly promised, are barred by the statute of limitations. With respect to Paul's alleged promise to provide for Andrew throughout his life, we conclude that appellants were on notice that Paul was not going to keep this promise no later than 1973, when Andrew inquired about obtaining some money from the trust fund to pay off a bank loan and was told that Paul would not give him anything unless he dismissed his pending suit in Maryland. Since the complaint in this case was not filed until 1982, nine years later, we affirm the trial court's ruling that appellants' claims for damages based on this promise  assuming arguendo that it was made  were barred by the statute of limitations. Summary judgment should not have been granted, however, on the claims predicated on the third alleged promise, which was that Paul would convey Guy's Place to Andrew upon his death. In the first place, the statute was inapplicable to the claim that a constructive trust should be imposed on Guy's Place because an action to create a constructive trust is equitable in nature. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, supra, 327 U.S. at 396, 66 S.Ct. at 584; Naselli v. Millholland, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 237, 240, 188 F.2d 1005, 1008 (1951); Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F.Supp. 1089, 1112 (D.D.C.1971). With regard to Antonia's claim for damages based on the third promise, there is a material issue of fact as to when appellants found out that Paul was not going to convey Guy's Place to Andrew (or Antonia). Andrew asserts that he, and thus his mother, did not learn of Paul's intention not to fulfill his promise until 1981, little more than a year before this action was filed. Whether this assertion is true, whether appellants should have discovered Paul's intention earlier through the exercise of due diligence, and whether Paul even made such a promise in the first place are unresolved factual issues precluding summary judgment against Antonia on this claim. Finally, as to Andrew's claim based on the third promise, the court concluded that Paul had never promised that he would convey the property to Andrew. In so ruling, the court relied on Antonia's testimony that she remembered no promises concerning Guy's Place other than Paul's statement that the place is going to be yours, i.e., Antonia's. Unfortunately, the court overlooked Andrew's testimony that Paul had promised to leave the property to both Andrew and Antonia. Because of this critical factual dispute concerning the exact wording of the alleged promise, summary judgment should not have been granted.