Opinion ID: 1427536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of evidence duplicity

Text: We turn now to defendant's contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of both first-degree murder and thirteen of the fourteen separate counts of child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm. Specifically, defendant argues that the state failed to establish the elements of first-degree murder, including proof that he acted with deliberate intent as required by NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1984). Our review of the record, including the evidence previously summarized herein, indicates that defendant's conviction of first-degree murder is amply supported by the evidence. Proof of the multitude of injuries inflicted upon the child, covering more than 90% of his body, and evidence depicting the nature and severity of the injuries, together with the jail mate's testimony that defendant admitted beating and kicking the child because he was in the way, provided substantial evidence upon which the court properly could determine that defendant committed each element of the charge of first-degree murder. SCRA 1986, 14-201. See also State v. Gutierrez, 88 N.M. 448, 541 P.2d 628 (Ct.App. 1975). Did defendant's multiple convictions and concurrent sentences for child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm, however, infringe upon the constitutional protections against double jeopardy? § 30-6-1. This issue raises troublesome questions involving the prosecutorial charging pattern relied upon in this case and the nature of the evidence underlying the multiple charges of child abuse. Resolution of defendant's double jeopardy claims necessarily involves a determination of whether the legislative intent in enacting Section 30-6-1 was such that separate prosecutions and convictions were authorized for each individual injury received by a child under our child abuse statute. See State v. Ellenberger, 96 N.M. 287, 629 P.2d 1216 (1981) (multiple punishments violate double jeopardy when the legislature has not authorized multiple punishments); State v. Smith, 94 N.M. 379, 610 P.2d 1208 (1980) (multiple criminal acts may be divided into multiple criminal counts if legislative policy so permits). The applicable statute defining abuse of a child is NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1(C) (Repl.Pamp. 1984) [2] . Prior to its amendment in 1989, the statute read in applicable part: C. Abuse of a child consists of a person knowingly, intentionally or negligently, and without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be: (1) placed in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health; or (2) tortured, cruelly confined or cruelly punished; [or] (3) exposed to the inclemency of the weather. ... If the abuse results in the child's death or great bodily harm, he is for the first offense, guilty of a second degree felony, and for the second and subsequent offenses, is guilty of a first degree felony. The United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2264, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980), enumerated three separate constitutional protections which arise from the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause, observing that it (1) protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) protects against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. See also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Defendant's claim in the instant case involves the third category of protection accorded under state and federal constitutions. In Ellenberger, this court quoted from the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun in Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 697, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1440, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), observing that the only function the Double Jeopardy Clause serves in cases challenging multiple punishments is to prevent the prosecutor from bringing more charges, and the sentencing court from imposing greater punishments, than the Legislative Branch intended. (Emphasis in original.) See also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499, 104 S.Ct. at 2540 (protection against cumulative punishments designed to ensure courts' sentencing discretion is confined to limits legislature establishes). Examination of the charging pattern utilized in the instant case indicates the state charged defendant with three counts of alleged child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm caused by blows to the head and neck resulting in three different injuries to the brain and spinal cord (Counts 7, 8 & 9), and twelve counts of child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm caused by injuries to the thorax and abdomen, comprising lacerations of the heart (Count 10), hemorrhage of fat around the heart (Count 11), contusions to the lungs (Count 12), bleeding into the chest cavity (Count 13), lacerations to the liver (Count 14), lacerations to the right posterior peritoneum (Count 15), lacerations ... or hemorrhage of the mesentery, peritoneum and small bowel (Count 16), severe hemorrhage to the pancreas (Count 17), extensive hemorrhage to the retroperitoneal, perirenal, periadrenal and retrocecal soft tissues (Count 18), hematoma of the right adrenal gland (Count 19), blood in the abdomen (Count 20), and fracture of the sixth rib, left (Count 27). [3] Additionally, defendant was charged with child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm caused by blows inflicted to the child's right arm resulting in displaced fractures of ... (radius and ulna) (Count 21). The trial court found defendant guilty of Count 7, together with those alleged in Counts 10 through 21, 23, 24 and 27, but found him not guilty of Counts 8 and 9 because they were duplicative of Count 7. Thus, defendant was convicted of a total of fourteen charges of child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm contrary to Section 30-6-1(C), and two counts of child abuse not resulting in death or great bodily harm. Under the record before us, we conclude the evidence supports only one of the two charges against defendant of child abuse not resulting in death or great bodily harm and only one charge of child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm. These offenses merged into the greater offense of first-degree murder. Both the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution preclude the imposition of multiple punishments for one act or offense. See State v. Boeglin, 90 N.M. 93, 559 P.2d 1220 (Ct.App. 1977) (a single offense may not be split into many parts and made the subject of multiple prosecutions); see also State v. Sandoval, 90 N.M. 260, 561 P.2d 1353, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 637, 567 P.2d 486 (1977) (merger is an aspect of double jeopardy and involves a determination of whether more than one offense has occurred); State v. Altgilbers, 109 N.M. 453, 786 P.2d 680 (Ct.App. 1989). We hold that defendant's convictions under Counts 23 and 24 for child abuse not resulting in death or great bodily harm constitute a single offense because the evidence does not establish that the two charges occurred at a time period different from each other or that they were inflicted during separate episodes of child abuse other than the incident which resulted in the child's death. The charges of child abuse not resulting in death or great bodily harm merged into the offense of child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm and first-degree murder. See State v. DeMary, 99 N.M. 177, 655 P.2d 1021 (1982); State v. Jacobs, 102 N.M. 801, 701 P.2d 400 (Ct.App. 1985). When the facts underlying both offenses are different and they are shown to have occurred at different times, there is no impediment precluding a defendant from being convicted of both first-degree murder, of child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm, and of child abuse not resulting in death or great bodily harm. Section 30-6-1(C)(2) makes it a crime to knowingly, intentionally, or negligently, and without justification, cause or permit a child to be tortured, cruelly confined, or cruelly punished. The charges in this case could have rested with equal validity on the theory that defendant tortured his victim or cruelly punished his victim. In their ordinary senses, these terms connote both (1) multiple acts of violence in a continuous series, and (2) isolated acts of violence. Therefore, we interpret Section 30-6-1(C)(2) as evincing a legislative intent to permit multiple convictions of child abuse under facts such as those here present only when each conviction is supported by evidence indicating that: (1) a single abusive act or a continuous series of abusive acts was interrupted and then another act or series was commenced, and (2) each separate act or series of acts was accompanied by the requisite unlawful conduct. Each single act or series of acts then would constitute a separate episode of child abuse. Although the issue is not directly argued in the present case, we note that the statute creates alternative ways of characterizing the same abusive act or episode. Under the present language of Section 30-6-1(C), if a defendant is found guilty of having both tortured and cruelly punished the victim based on the same underlying abusive act or episode, only one conviction is proper. See State v. Williams, 105 N.M. at 216-17, 730 P.2d at 1198-99 (only one conviction of aggravated CSC may be based on a single touching, even if more than one aggravating circumstance is present). In the instant case, the state did not charge or offer proof that the acts of child abuse arose as separate and distinct episodes. The pathologist testified concerning three different ages of injury to the pancreas and tissue around the liver: those occurring within 12-24 hours of the child's death; injuries which were several days old; and older injuries in the process of healing. Instead of alleging separate charges of child abuse arising from separate episodes of abuse, the state charged multiple counts of child abuse based upon proof of multiple injuries. Division of the act of child abuse into multiple offenses based solely upon proof of multiple injuries is contrary to legislative intent in enacting Section 30-6-1(C), and violates double jeopardy limitations. See State v. Boeglin ; see also State v. Prouse, 244 Kan. 292, 767 P.2d 1308 (1989). Moreover, the record indicates that the offense of child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm merged into the conviction for first-degree murder. In Prouse, the Kansas Supreme Court considered a case similar to the instant case. There defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and child abuse. The court, quoting from State v. Lucas, 243 Kan. 462, 759 P.2d 90 (1988), observed: `A single assaultive incident of abuse of a child ... which results in the death of the child merges with killing and constitutes only one offense.' Id. at 297, 767 P.2d at 1313. Depending on the facts of a particular case, the offense of child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm, contrary to Section 30-6-1(C), may be a lesser included offense of first-degree murder as defined in Section 30-2-1(A)(1). The former is distinguished from the offense of first-degree murder in that the latter requires proof that the killing was perpetrated with a deliberate intent. See State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786, 653 P.2d 162 (1982); NMSA 1978, 14-201. The rule of merger precludes an individual's conviction and sentence for a crime that is a lesser included offense of a greater charge upon which defendant has also been convicted. See State v. Sandoval . Although the state properly may charge in the alternative, State v. Roque, 91 N.M. 7, 569 P.2d 417 (Ct.App. 1977), where defendant is convicted of one or more offenses which have merged into the greater offense he may be punished for only one. See State v. Maes, 100 N.M. 78, 665 P.2d 1169 (Ct.App. 1983). The state asserts that, even if defendant's multiple convictions of child abuse were duplicitous or merged into the homicide conviction, because the sentences for child abuse were ordered to be served concurrently with the homicide charge, any error arising from the multiple convictions was rendered harmless. We disagree. In Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985), the Supreme Court held that, when Congress had not provided for separate punishments for the fenses in question, it was error to enter multiple convictions, and that this error was not rendered harmless by imposing concurrent sentences. See also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983); United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1582 (9th Cir.1989). Ball observed: The second conviction, whose concomitant sentence is served concurrently, does not evaporate simply because of the concurrence of the sentence. The separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored. For example, the presence of two convictions on the record may delay the defendant's eligibility for parole or result in an increased sentence under a recidivist statute for a future offense. Moreover, the second conviction may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility and certainly carries the societal stigma accompanying any criminal conviction... . Thus, the second conviction, even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment. 470 U.S. at 864-65, 105 S.Ct. at 1668 (emphasis in original). Based upon the record before us, it was error to impose multiple sentences for child abuse resulting in death or great bodily harm. See id.; see also State v. Fickes, 36 Or. App. 361, 584 P.2d 770 (1978). Similarly, it was error to also impose sentences for two counts of child abuse not resulting in death or great bodily harm where the state did not charge and prove that such acts of child abuse occurred at a time period different from the episode resulting in the child's death. To the extent that State v. Srader, 103 N.M. 205, 704 P.2d 459 (Ct.App. 1985), and other cases of this court or the court of appeals conflict with this opinion, they are overruled. Where offenses merge, defendant can be charged with each offense, but the double jeopardy clause precludes entry of multiple sentences on such convictions, thereby punishing defendant more than once for the same offense. Ohio v. Johnson . See Ball v. United States .