Opinion ID: 2074915
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: court's response to jury question

Text: The trial court submitted instructions to the jury which explained the offense of burglary and its essential elements. One of the elements of the offense of burglary is that accused not be licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to enter or remain in the building or occupied structure. NDCC § 12.1-22-02(1). During their deliberations, the jury asked the trial court for the definition of otherwise privileged. The trial court responded that [o]therwise privileged means having some legal right to enter the premises. Haugen's only objection to the definition pertained to the trial court's use of the word legal to describe the right to enter the premises. Haugen contends that the language used by the court was too restrictive, and that the absence of the word legal would have allowed the jury to determine that Helferich had permitted his presence on the premises. It has been well established that jury instructions must correctly and adequately inform the jury of the applicable law and must not mislead or confuse the jury. State v. Saul, 434 N.W.2d 572, 576 (N.D.1989). Jury instructions must be considered as a whole and if, when so considered, they correctly advise the jury as to the law, they are sufficient, even though part of the instructions standing alone may be insufficient or erroneous. State v. Raywalt, 444 N.W.2d 688 (N.D.1989); State v. Rott, 380 N.W.2d 325 (N.D.1986); State v. Halvorson, 346 N.W.2d 704 (N.D.1984). If a jury instruction, when read as a whole, is erroneous, relates to a central subject of the case, and affects the substantial rights of the accused, it is a ground for reversal. State v. Raywalt, supra ; State v. White, 390 N.W.2d 43 (N.D.1986); State v. Bonner, 361 N.W.2d 605 (N.D.1985). The word privilege has been defined as a  right,  power, or immunity held by a person. [Emphasis added.] See Black's Law Dictionary 1077 (5th ed. 1979). In the instant case, it is apparent that the trial court followed a similar definition when it instructed the jury that privilege meant some legal right to enter the premises. A person who has no legal right to be in the premises would not be privileged to be there. Nevertheless, while the definition in Black's Law Dictionary provides some insight, courts in states with burglary statutes similar to North Dakota have fleshed out the common-law meaning of when a person is privileged to enter another person's premises. These courts have held that: [A] person is `privileged,' within the meaning of a burglary statute, if he may naturally be expected to be on the premises often and in the natural course of his duties or habits.... Further, a person who is privileged may still commit a burglary if he enters at a time when he would not reasonably be expected to be present or if he goes into a room as to which his privilege does not extend. [Emphasis in original.] Commonwealth v. Corbin, 300 Pa.Super. 218, 223, 446 A.2d 308, 311 (1982); State v. Thaxton, 120 N.H. 526, 528, 419 A.2d 392, 393 (1980). See also 33A Words and Phrases, Privileged 117 (Supp.1989). We approve of the definition of the term privileged as set forth in Corbin and Thaxton, and accordingly recommend that definition for purposes of future burglary instructions. However, we do not believe that the definition of privileged submitted to the jury by the trial court in this case was necessarily erroneous and misleading so as to cause prejudice to the substantial rights of Haugen. Both the trial court's definition of privileged, and the version which we currently adopt from Corbin and Thaxton, connote some legitimate or natural purpose for entering the premises of another. The trial court's instruction, taken as a whole, was not prejudicial. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and GIERKE and LEVINE, JJ., concur.