Opinion ID: 1057714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allegations of Bias and Prejudgment by the Board

Text: The Plaintiff also asserts that it should be excused from all exhaustion requirements because the Board cannot provide fair and impartial review, thereby violating the Plaintiff's right to procedural due process. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975) (stating due process requires a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal in administrative adjudication). The Plaintiff makes a two-fold argument: (1) the Board has prejudged the issue by taking an official adverse position, and (2) there is insufficient separation between the Board and other branches of government. In support of its claim that the Board has prejudged the issue, the Plaintiff relies heavily upon Northwest Airlines v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization, 11 F.3d 70, 73 (6th Cir.1992). In that case, the Sixth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals held that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar a suit for injunctive relief against the Board of Equalization in the federal district court because there was no plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the state court; the Sixth Circuit explained that the Board was involved in pending litigation in which it had asserted a position directly adverse to Northwest Airlines's claim. Id. at 72. Because of these peculiar facts, the court permitted the case to proceed in the federal district court as a rare exception to the general rule under the Tax Injunction Act. Id. at 73. The Tax Injunction Act restrains federal courts only and has no application to the jurisdiction of the Davidson County Chancery Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law . . . .) (emphasis added). For this reason, the ruling in Northwest Airlines would apply only by analogy. We acknowledge, however, that one of the exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is when the administrative body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue before it. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 148-49, 112 S.Ct. 1081. Moreover, in extreme cases of administrative bias, the right to procedural due process might be abridged. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46-47, 95 S.Ct. 1456. These circumstances are not, however, analogous to those in Northwest Airlines. Here, there is no evidence that the Board of Equalization has taken a position contrary to the Plaintiff in pending litigation. Nw. Airlines, 11 F.3d at 72. The ANR Pipeline Co . case has been concluded. The ruling, of course, predated the passage of the amendment found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-501(9)(B)(iii), which is the central issue in this litigation. The Plaintiff also points out that certain employees of the Board may have lobbied the General Assembly to pass the amendment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 67-5-501(9)(B)(iii). In rejecting this same argument, federal District Judge Robert L. Echols observed that an agency's support of a public position on a policy issue does not disqualify the agency on the ground of bias from later acting in its adjudicative role. Colonial Pipeline Co., 231 F.R.D. at 531. We believe that the ruling comports with standards of review[a]dministrative decision-makers are presumed to carry out their duties with honesty and integrity. Jones v. Greene, 946 S.W.2d 817, 825 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996); see also Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456 (stating that there is a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators). That one or more members of the Board has advocated a change in the law does not warrant an exception to the exhaustion requirement. The Plaintiff also contends that because the Board of Equalization is not insulated from the executive and legislative branches, it is inherently biased. That the Board includes high-ranking members of the executive branch is insufficient, however, to overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity in the administrative adjudicator. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456. The United States Supreme Court has observed that `the mere union of the executive power and the judicial power . . . cannot be said to violate due process of law.' Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927)). Further, we have held that the mere fact that both investigative and adjudicative functions have been granted to an administrative body . . . does not of itself create an unconstitutional risk of bias in an administrative adjudication. Cooper v. Williamson County Bd. of Educ., 803 S.W.2d 200, 202-03 (Tenn. 1990). By its very nature, the Board of Equalization, like other administrative agencies, may perform some functions that might fall within the ambit of all three branches of government. [11] While there are limitations to an agency's ability to exercise the powers of other branches, see Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 452, nothing in our case law prohibits an agency from simultaneously taking on quasi-executive and quasi-judicial roles, absent specific allegations of bias or prejudgment. To the contrary, we recognize that some overlap with the executive branch may be necessary to maintain an efficient and responsive bureaucracy. Thus, the argument of inherent bias is without merit.