Opinion ID: 2567514
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Heading: The Trial Court's Rationale for Recusal: Representation of Third Parties

Text: The trial court based its recusal order on different grounds. It concluded that in this case a conflict arose when the prosecution sought to represent third-party interests in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The People contend this was error as a matter of law because they had independent standing to participate and to make arguments in the public interest, especially in a case where the state's compelling interest in minimizing the trauma to minor victims of sexual assault is implicated. Because they had standing, the People reason, they were not impermissibly representing third parties with interests potentially in conflict with the People's own interests. We agree that the People were allowed to participate in the third party discovery hearings, that in doing so they did not represent third party interests, and that the trial court therefore erred as matter of law in concluding they had represented such interests and had thereby created a conflict. Generally, actions may have one of three legal statuses: they may be prohibited, permitted, or protected. [7] In Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228, for example, we considered whether the prosecution's participation in Pitchess hearings [8] was protected; that is, whether the People were entitled as a matter of enforceable right to be present and submit argument. The Alford dissent on this issue concluded the People were so entitled ( Alford, at p. 1047, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228 (conc. & dis. opn. of Baxter, J.)), while the majority concluded participation was permitted, but not protected ( id., at pp. 1044-1046, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.) [holding prosecution entitled only to notice of the date and place of the hearing, but permitting it to respond to inquiries from the trial court]; id. at p. 1057, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228 (conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J.) [joining lead opinion on this point]). We briefly noted but did not decide the same question with regard to third party subpoena hearings. (See id., at pp. 1045-1046, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.); id. at pp. 1055-1056, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228 (conc. & dis. opn. of Baxter, J.).) Likewise, we need not decide here whether prosecutorial participation in third party subpoena hearings is permitted or protected; suffice it to say, as with Pitchess hearings, it is not prohibited. Critically, the governing statutes do not prohibit participation. Penal Code section 1326, which governs the issuance of third party subpoenas, does not speak to the role (if any) of opposing parties. It does, however, adopt the procedures of Evidence Code section 1560, subdivision (b) for delivery of subpoenaed documents. (See Pen.Code, § 1326, subds. (b), (c).) It also expressly precludes application of Evidence Code section 1560, subdivision (e) to criminal cases. (Pen.Code, § 1326, subd. (b).) Under Penal Code section 1102 and the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the remaining subdivisions of Evidence Code section 1560 apply in criminal cases. (See Pen.Code, § 1102 [The rules of evidence in civil actions are applicable also to criminal actions, except as otherwise provided in this Code].) In turn, Evidence Code section 1560, subdivision (d) contemplates at least some role for opposing parties, providing in relevant part: Unless the parties to the proceeding otherwise agree, or unless the sealed envelope or wrapper is returned to a witness who is to appear personally, the copy of the records shall remain sealed and shall be opened only at the time of trial, deposition, or other hearing, upon the direction of the judge, officer, body, or tribunal conducting the proceeding, in the presence of all parties who have appeared in person or by counsel at the trial, deposition, or hearing. Evidence Code section 1560 thus suggests that, as with Pitchess hearings, and in accordance with the due process principles we recognized in Alford v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 1044, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228, opposing parties have a right to notice and presence, but it leaves unanswered the degree of any further participation, neither guaranteeing nor prohibiting it. In the absence of a legislative determination that opposing parties are to be prohibited from any part in such proceedings, we may not adopt such a rule. The Courts of Appeal that have considered the question are divided. In Department of Corrections v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1087, 245 Cal.Rptr. 293, the Court of Appeal correctly acknowledged that ex parte third party discovery proceedings might be necessary to protect a defendant's constitutional rights, but concluded on the record before it that the trial court had gone too far in excluding the district attorney entirely from the third party discovery proceedings at issue there. Instead, the trial court should have conducted a limited in camera review of the defendant's submissions in support of discovery and otherwise conducted open proceedings. ( Id. at p. 1094, 245 Cal.Rptr. 293.) In so ruling, the Court of Appeal emphasized that [t]o assure due process, open proceedings involving the participation of both parties are the general rule in both criminal and civil cases. ( Id. at p. 1092, 245 Cal.Rptr. 293.) More recently, in Smith v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 205, 60 Cal. Rptr.3d 841, the defendant sought a similar order excluding the prosecution from participation in third party discovery proceedings directed at obtaining information from the county jury commissioner about the jury selection system. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeal granted writ relief, relying entirely on our opinion in Alford v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1033, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228. ( Smith, at pp. 212-216, 60 Cal. Rptr.3d 841.) To the extent Smith read Alford as not only declining to protect, but affirmatively prohibiting, opposition party involvement in a third party discovery proceeding, it misread our opinion; as discussed, in Alford we concluded that in the Pitchess context prosecutors had no entitlement to participate, but were nevertheless entitled to notice, to be present, and to participate if the trial court so desired. Thus, Alford does not support the conclusion that opposing parties are prohibited from involvement in third party discovery. Consistent with the governing statutes, a canvass of the underlying proceedings in reported cases suggests trial courts regularly permit prosecutorial participation in third party discovery. (See People v. Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1120, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986; People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 516, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779; People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 686, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278; Mansell v. Otto (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 265, 269, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 276; People v. Reber (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 528-529, 223 Cal.Rptr. 139, overruled on other grounds by Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1117, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986; People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1017, 138 Cal. Rptr. 515; People v. Cohen (1970) 12 Cal. App.3d 298, 324-325, 90 Cal.Rptr. 612.) These cases do not establish any prosecutorial right to participate, but they do reflect a decades-long understanding by trial courts that courts are at least permitted to entertain argument from the prosecution on third party discovery issues. We conclude that understanding is correct: a trial court is permitted to entertain argument from the opposing party relating to third party discovery. [9] Arguing against the prosecution's standing claim, Humberto S. contends the better response to concerns about the preservation of the therapist-patient privilege for sex crime victims is for therapists to protect the privilege and courts to act as gatekeepers. (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court ( Laff ) (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703, 713, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 323, 23 P.3d 563 [custodian of records has a duty to assert privilege on behalf of privilege holder]; Rudnick v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 924, 932-933, 114 Cal.Rptr. 603, 523 P.2d 643 [court has discretion to protect privilege of absent third party on its own motion].) Whether or not this is so, our conclusion that trial courts may permit or solicit prosecutorial participation is fully consistent with Humberto S.'s suggested approach. It is undisputed that trial courts are authorized, indeed obligated, to regulate the use of subpoenas to obtain privileged third party discovery. (Evid.Code, § 916; see, e.g., People v. Pack (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 679, 685, 248 Cal.Rptr. 240 [court statutorily required to assert privilege on behalf of absent victim], overruled on other grounds by People v. Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1117, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986; Lemelle v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal. App.3d 148, 158, 143 Cal.Rptr. 450 [same]; People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 197, 132 Cal.Rptr. 265 [courts have inherent power to control the issuance of their own process and to preclude an abuse of the right to subpoena witnesses].) In fulfilling this gatekeeping function, a court may choose to permit or solicit prosecutorial input. (Cf. Alford v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1044, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228 [trial court may solicit prosecutorial input at Pitchess hearing].) The trial court in this case did not just permit the prosecution's participation in hearings on the third party discovery; it actively and continually solicited that participation. It specifically asked the prosecution for briefing on whether the subpoenaed records could lawfully be disclosed to the defense. It directed that the People procure the parents' presence at a hearing to determine whether disclosure should be ordered. It overruled multiple defense objections to the People's participation. Even as it announced its tentative ruling that Samantha's father's consent authorized disclosure, it asked the People for further argument. It then invited the People to investigate whether a family court order might exist that required joint consent, and it voluntarily reserved its ruling when the People accepted the opportunity. [10] Given the trial court's acceptance of the prosecution's initial concerns and its repeated solicitation of further argument, we conclude the prosecution stepped over no line in submitting its views. More to the point in this recusal case, a prosecutor's submission of argument at a third party discovery hearing, whether permitted or solicited by the trial court, does not amount to the representation of third party interests. In such instances, the prosecution's interests and arguments may align with those of one or more third parties, but the prosecution does not thereby assume representation of those parties any more than an amicus curiae whose interests align with a party represents that party by submitting arguments that support its position. Indeed, the two situations are simply two sides of the same coin; as a nonparty may, with the court's permission, submit argument supporting the interests of a party, so a party may, with the court's permission, submit argument supporting the interests of a nonparty. Our comment in Alford that a prosecutor who actively challenges defense third party Pitchess discovery advance[s] the interests of the third party custodian and police officer ( Alford v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1045, 130 Cal. Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228) should not be taken to mean that the prosecution in doing so literally represents the third party custodian or police officer; as a matter of law, it does not. Rather, the prosecution's arguments in such circumstances simply benefit the interests of the third party custodian and police officer. Nor did the prosecution assume representation of any third party when it sought to have a guardian ad litem appointed to represent Samantha's interests. The scheme for appointment of guardians ad litem expressly contemplates that other parties to a proceeding may propose to the court that a guardian be appointed for a minor or an incompetent. (Code Civ. Proc, § 373.) Such a proposal does not thereby render the party the representative of the minor's interests; instead, it is the court itself, and the guardian ad litem if one is appointed, that bears that responsibility. (See In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 683, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 472, 115 P.3d 1133; Williams v. Superior Court (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 36, 47, 49, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 13.) The statutory scheme recognizes that the interests of justice are served best if the broadest range of those involved in legal proceedings are vested with the capacity to bring to a court's attention the need to ensure protection of a minor's rights. When it appears those rights may go unprotected, a party properly may act to avoid a potentially irreversible mistake. Here, for example, Samantha's considerable statutory and constitutional interest in the privacy of her communications with her therapist was at stake. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; Evid.Code, § 1014; see People v. Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1127, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986 [psychotherapist-patient privilege is an aspect of the constitutional right of privacy]; People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511, 194 Cal.Rptr. 431, 668 P.2d 738 [same]; People v. Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 518, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779 [there is a strong policy of protecting a patient's treatment history].) The trial court proposed to hold that Samantha's father's consent waived her privilege to preserve the confidentiality of these communications, despite the facts that (1) Samantha's mother, a legal guardian entitled to assert the privilege on Samantha's behalf (Evid.Code, §§ 1013, subd. (b), 1014, subd. (a)), was asserting the privilege, and (2) Samantha's father, as the brother of defendant Humberto S., had a manifest conflict of interest. Parental conflicts of interest may in some instances disqualify parents from waiving or asserting privileges on behalf of their minor children (see In re Daniel C. H., supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 828, 269 Cal.Rptr. 624; In re Troy D. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 889, 900-901, 263 Cal.Rptr. 869) and in other instances support the appointment of an independent guardian ad litem (see, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 48, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 13). Thus, at stake here were the constitutional rights of a nine-year-old alleged victim of a sex crime, at a point in time when disagreement between her parents, and one parent's conflict of interest, might have prevented her parents, her legal guardians, from effectively protecting those rights. If the prosecutors discerned the potential for a minor's interests to go unrepresented, Code of Civil Procedure section 373 allowed them to bring this to the court's attention without thereby assuming representation of Samantha. [11] As the Court of Appeal properly recognized, Bullen v. Superior Court (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 22, 251 Cal.Rptr. 32, which Humberto S. relies on, is inapposite. There, the prosecution had a formal relationship with the third party: it represented the widow of a crime victim in writ proceedings challenging defense access to the crime victim's dwelling. ( Bullen, at p. 25, 251 Cal.Rptr. 32.) Because a district attorney has no authority to prosecute civil actions absent specific legislative authorization, [12] this representation was unauthorized. The Court of Appeal remedied the situation by recusing the district attorney from the civil unit proceeding; lacking jurisdiction, it had no authority to, and did not, address whether recusal should extend as well to the underlying criminal action. Moreover, the district attorney's formal representation of the victim in Bullen v. Superior Court, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d 22, 251 Cal.Rptr. 32, gave it a structural incentive (its duty of loyalty to its client) potentially at odds with the prosecution's duty to seek justice in a fair and evenhanded manner. Our cases upholding recusal have generally identified a structural incentive for the prosecutor to elevate some other interest over the interest in impartial justice, should the two diverge. (See, e.g., People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th 580, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310 [receipt of income from the victim created an incentive to pursue prosecution beyond what the merits might warrant]; People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 193 Cal.Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5 [status of deputy district attorney as victim and witness created an incentive to pursue prosecution beyond what the merits might warrant]; People v. Superior Court ( Greer ) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 137 Cal.Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 1164 [status of district attorney's office employee as witness, relative of the victim, and beneficiary of the prosecution created an incentive to pursue prosecution beyond what the merits might warrant].) In true third party representation cases, a material risk exists that a prosecutor will continue to represent the third party interests even when those interests diverge from the People's interest in the evenhanded pursuit of justice. (E.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et fils S.A. (1987) 481 U.S. 787, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 [attorneys appointed to prosecute criminal contempt for violation of an injunction against trademark infringement had a conflict because they also represented the trademark holder].) A prosecutor who has undertaken an attorney-client representation of the victim in a case might in the future feel pressure from the loyalty owed his or her client to pursue the case more vigorously than the merits otherwise dictate. Here, in contrast, there was no formal representation of any third party, no corresponding duty of loyalty, and no divided loyalty or structural incentive potentially at odds with these prosecutors' duty to handle the prosecution of Humberto S. fairly. Rather, the prosecution vigorously advocated a legal position that happened to align with the interests of various third parties at one moment in time. In doing so, it was representing not the third party, but its own interest in promoting victim cooperation. [13] There was no reason to believe that if in the future the interests of the prosecutor and victim diverged, these prosecutors would choose to elevate the victim's interests over their duty to act fairly. (Cf. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et fils S.A., supra, 481 U.S. at p. 807, fn. 18, 107 S.Ct. 2124 [becoming overzealous and overcommitted to a conviction is a personal issue, not a structural one].) To summarize: This court explained in Alford v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1033, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228, that a prosecutor is not entitled to submit argument in certain types of third party discovery proceedings. This does not mean the prosecutor is prohibited from doing so; certainly with the trial court's consent, he or she is allowed to do so. Indeed, as even the Alford majority acknowledged, the prosecutor is entitled to notice of the hearing and may there address any questions the trial court has. ( Id. at p. 1044, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228.) Having been allowed to participate in the hearing, the prosecutor is not for that reason then subject to recusal unless he or she has, as in Bullen v. Superior Court, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d 22, 251 Cal.Rptr. 32, and like cases, formally assumed representation of a third party. Only then does the prosecutor's appearance ripen into a structural incentive to represent interests at odds with the duty to seek evenhanded justice. Consequently, the trial court's conclusion that various prosecutors had a conflict because of their representation of third parties was wrong as a matter of law. The trial court could, as in hearing after hearing it did, permit and indeed invite the prosecution to participate over defense objection. Only after multiple hearings indeed, after writ review had been completed and the underlying documents discloseddid the trial court apparently change its mind and decide the prosecution's participation created an impermissible conflict of interest. But the trial court was correct initially, when it allowed during these many hearings the prosecution's participation. The prosecutors' advocacy in these hearings of positions in line with the interests of third parties did not involve actual representation of those parties' interests and thus created no ongoing conflict or divided loyalty that might jeopardize Humberto S.'s right to a fair trial. Nor can we affirm on the Court of Appeal's alternate theory that zeal in pressing an otherwise lawful position may become excessive and rise to the level of obstruction, thus creating a conflict; again, absent bad faith, as a matter of law it cannot. Accordingly, because the trial court's decision to recuse numerous prosecutors in this case rested on an error of law, it was an abuse of discretion. [14]