Opinion ID: 1772238
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court erroneously limit the testimony of the plaintiff's expert?

Text: ¶ 23. Donaldson argues that the trial judge improperly limited the testimony of his expert, John Exnicios. In addition to other testimony, Exnicios, a traffic engineer, was prepared to testify regarding the issues of adequate warning and causation. However, the trial judge determined that testimony regarding warning and causation required a witness trained in accident reconstruction and, therefore, limited the testimony by Exnicios. Donaldson alleges that this was a reversible error. ¶ 24. Questioned whether a lack of road markings would make the curve hazardous, Exnicios testified affirmatively and stated that the lack of markings would be one of the proximate causes of the accident. Objecting, the county argued that Exnicios was not qualified to answer the question. The trial court agreed and ruled that this line of questioning required an accidentologist. The ensuing dialogue occurred, with Roberts for Donaldson and Allen for the county: ROBERTS: Assume ... for a moment that Mr. Donaldson was traveling between 45 and 50 miles per hour north on Highway 49, that the weather conditions were or had been wet and he was driving a passenger van pulling a trailer with a backhoe and that as he drove north on the highway there were no signs marking this particular curve. Is it your opinion that there would have been a failure to adequately warn the driver on the part of the county in this situation? EXNICIOS: In my opinion, this curve required a signage. It was not an apparent curve to a motorist that wasn't aware of the curve. So, my opinion is that the signs should have been there, and they should be required because of the differences in speed [between] the legal limit on the approached road and then the tight curve which required a reduction in speed of some 30 miles an hour. So, I believe the signs were necessary. ROBERTS: And would that constitute a lack of warning was the other part of my question? ALLEN: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that. That calls again for [a] conclusion as an accidentologist. In his expertise, he's given his opinion as to whether the signs should be there..., and I think he's trying to take it too far. ROBERTS: Your Honor, if I may, he's addressing warning here and that is his ... COURT: Well, I think he can testify as to whether or not the absence of signs complies with the MUTCD standards. ROBERTS: MUTCD. COURT: Yeah. EXNICIOS: Is that the question? Excuse me. ROBERTS: Well, let me make sure I understand the court's ruling. Your Honor, are you saying that it would be improper for him to testify about the failure on the part of the county make a warning in his opinion? COURT: Yeah, because that's a legal question. Ordinary care is a legal question. ROBERTS: Okay. COURT: Of course, the facts determine whether or not the legal issue is met too ... I don't think it's proper to ask him is the failure to have signs a lack of ordinary care. I think that's a legal question. He can testify as to what the signs would accomplish as to how they would affect drivers and what the absence of signs would accomplish with regard to the effect on drivers, et cetera. ¶ 25. M.R.E. 702 provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Accordingly, Exnicios should have been allowed to testify whether the curve required signs, whether the warnings complied with the MUTCD, and whether the county failed to provide adequate warnings. ¶ 26. M.R.E. 704 provides: Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Generally, Rule 704 requires that opinions, before being admissible, satisfy the Rule 701 and 702, in that they must be helpful to a determination of the case. M.R.E. 704 cmt. ¶ 27. The trial judge incorrectly stated that ordinary care is a legal question. The standard of care is a question of fact reserved for the trier of fact. See Stewart ex. rel Womack v. City of Jackson, 804 So.2d 1041, 1049 (Miss.2002) (the issue of ordinary care is a fact question; the question of whether ordinary care was, in fact, exercised is for the trial court, sitting without a jury, to decide). Despite the error, the trial judge did include his analysis of ordinary care in the Findings of Fact. This Court concludes that, ultimately, the trial judge properly considered ordinary care as a factual issue. ¶ 28. Despite these objections, Exnicios was allowed to testify to extensively. The record reflects that the trial judge was fully advised as to the opinions of Exnicios. It is unlikely that the excluded testimony would have been a major factor on the decision of the trial court. The exclusion of such testimony does not constitute a reversible error nor would it have changed the findings of the trial court. Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.