Opinion ID: 2026801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Kouzoukas' Claim for Duty Disability Benefits

Text: In the case at bar, the Board concluded that Kouzoukas was not disabled, that she could return to full active duty, and that the Chicago police department could assign Kouzoukas to a full duty position with or without restrictions. One reason for this determination was the Board's finding that Kouzoukas' complaints of pain were subjective and that she was unable to produce any objective findings of a back, spine or SI joint injury. The Board's conclusions also rested on its findings that Kouzoukas and her physician, Dr. Yapor, lacked credibility. The Board argues that its factual findings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the lower courts erred in reversing the Board's decision because the courts reweighed the evidence and substituted their own judgments for that of the Board. The Board also contends that, because it had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, its credibility determinations are not subject to review and [this] Court should decline any invitation to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. Although it is true that the Board's credibility determinations should be afforded considerable weight, they are not immune from review. As we said in Wade, [e]ven under the manifest weight standard applicable in this instance, the deference we afford the administrative agency's decision is not boundless. Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill.2d at 507, 315 Ill.Dec. 772, 877 N.E.2d 1101. When reviewing an administrative agency's decision, we may put aside any findings which are clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence. Sangamon County Sheriff's Department v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 233 Ill.2d 125, 330 Ill.Dec. 187, 908 N.E.2d 39 (2009). That is the case here. Although no medical test, X-ray or MRI scan revealed a deformity or abnormality which would explain the reason for Kouzoukas' pain, this does not mean that Kouzoukas failed to present objective evidence of her pain, nor does it mean that Kouzoukas did not prove that she is disabled. The Board's determination that Kouzoukas' pain was subjective and not demonstrated by objective proof ignores the fact that every doctor who examined Kouzoukas believed that she was, indeed, experiencing pain. Moreover, the doctors' examinations revealed that Kouzoukas had back spasms, point tenderness, and decreased range of motion. These doctors diagnosed Kouzoukas' condition as lumbar myofasciitis and chronic lower back pain. The doctors' observations and diagnoses are, themselves, objective evidence of Kouzoukas' pain. In denying Kouzoukas disability benefits, the Board relied heavily on the brief reports submitted by Dr. Spencer after he examined Kouzoukas in 2005. Having seen Kouzoukas only twice, Dr. Spencer opined, based on the pristine appearance of her MRI, that Kouzoukas' pain did not stem from an identifiable injury to her lumbar spine and that her pain was not incapacitating. Of course, Dr. Spencer did not testify at the hearings and, therefore, the exact meaning of his reports could not be explored. At the March Board hearing, the Board asked Dr. Yapor to provide his understanding of Dr. Spencer's reports. Dr. Yapor explained that Dr. Spencer had used the terms back and spine interchangeably, although he sometimes meant different things. Dr. Yapor further stated that he agreed with Dr. Spencer that Kouzoukas did not have an injury to her spine and that there was nothing surgically wrong with her back, that is, there was no injury which required the intervention of a spine surgeon such as Dr. Spencer. Dr. Yapor then stated his belief that Kouzoukas had sustained an injury to the muscles and tendons of her back, particularly at the SI joint. He did not believe this diagnosis was in conflict with Dr. Spencer's reports. Even if we discount Dr. Yapor's interpretation of Dr. Spencer's reports, as the Board apparently did, what the Board fails to acknowledge is that even Dr. Spencer agreed that Kouzoukas was actually experiencing pain, although he could not identify its source. Furthermore, Dr. Spencer's opinion that Kouzoukas' pain was not incapacitating stands alone in opposition to the opinions of the several other doctors who treated Kouzoukas since her injury on July 25, 2004. From the outset, every medical professional who examined Kouzoukas found that she suffered pain as a result of a lower back strain that occurred on July 25, 2004, and that the pain, in turn, prevented her from returning to work as a full duty police officer. Beginning with the emergency room of Resurrection Medical Center and MercyWorks Occupational Medical Center, Kouzoukas was diagnosed as having lower back or acute lumbar strain due to her July 25, 2004, work-related injury, and was told that she should not return to work at that time. When her pain did not resolve, Kouzoukas was then treated for an extended period of time by Chicago police department authorized physician, Dr. Lewis, who diagnosed Kouzoukas' condition as acute dorsal and lumbar myofasciitisan inflammation of the muscle and its fascia. [2] Despite many consultations with Dr. Lewis, Kouzoukas' pain still did not completely abate. Kouzoukas sometimes returned to work, at her doctor's direction, for a restricted duty assignment. But even her limited duty assignments exacerbated her back pain. Kouzoukas was then treated by Dr. Yapor, who referred her to Dr. Konowitz for pain management. Dr. Yapor and the Board's own physician, Dr. Demorest, agreed that Kouzoukas suffered from chronic lower back pain that was neither faked nor exaggerated and which prevented Kouzoukas from returning to a full duty position in the Chicago police department. Based on all of the evidence that was before the Board, Dr. Spencer's reports do not provide sufficient support for the Board's decision to deny Kouzoukas disability benefits. Other than Dr. Spencer, every doctor to have examined Kouzoukas believed that Kouzoukas sustained a work-related injury that resulted in a persistence of disabling lower back pain. As a result, we find the Board's determination that Kouzoukas is not disabled and can return to a full duty position to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. We also reject the Board's finding that Dr. Yapor was not a credible witness. Our review of Dr. Yapor's testimony reveals no evasiveness or inconsistency. Moreover, the Board's own physician, Dr. Demorest, agreed with Dr. Yapor that Kouzoukas' pain was real, that she was not malingering or faking her pain, and that her pain prevented her from returning to full active duty. Although Dr. Demorest had not included in his report a finding that Kouzoukas was disabled, he testified at the hearings that he did not believe returning Kouzoukas to full duty would be appropriate or prudent. Finally, we reject the Board's finding that Kouzoukas was not credible and that she failed to sustain her burden of proof. The overwhelming majority of the documentary evidence and expert testimony presented by Kouzoukasincluding the testimony of the Board's own physician supported her claim that she suffered from debilitating pain which prevented her return to full active duty in the Chicago police department. The fact that Kouzoukas missed some of her physical therapy sessions and took two trips within the two years after her injury does not change the fact that she presented abundant proof of her inability to perform as a full duty police officer. Therefore, we agree with the circuit and appellate courts below that the Board's decision to deny Kouzoukas disability benefits because she could return to a full duty position with or without restrictions is against the manifest weight of the evidence.