Opinion ID: 2360438
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: NRS 50.320 permits the admission of an affidavit when an affiant has been previously qualified as an expert witness in district court

Text: An affidavit is generally inadmissible hearsay. However, in 1995, the Legislature enacted NRS 50.320, see 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 708, § 1, at 2712, which allows the admission of an affidavit in certain proceedings, including driver's license revocation proceedings, from a person who has been previously qualified by a district court to testify as an expert witness about an individual's blood-alcohol content. [2] See DeRosa v. Dist. Ct., 115 Nev. 225, 229, 985 P.2d 157, 160 (1999) (stating that NRS 50.315, 50.320, and 50.325 provide... statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule), overruled on other grounds by City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 121 Nev. 899, 906, 124 P.3d 203, 208 (2005). NRS 50.320 permits the use of an affidavit to prove a person's blood-alcohol content as follows: 1. The affidavit or declaration of a chemist and any other person who has qualified in the district court of any county to testify as an expert witness regarding the presence in the breath, blood or urine of a person of alcohol ... which is submitted to prove: .... (b) The concentration of alcohol ... is admissible in the manner provided in this section. 2. An affidavit or declaration which is submitted to prove any fact set forth in subsection 1 must be admitted into evidence when submitted during any administrative proceeding, preliminary hearing or hearing before a grand jury. The court shall not sustain any objection to the admission of such an affidavit or declaration. Accordingly, in certain instances, an affidavit from an expert witness may be admitted in lieu of live testimony. The DMV acknowledges that Stypa's affidavit fails to state that he was qualified in district court to testify about blood-alcohol concentration but instead argues that because driver's license revocation hearings are civil in nature and do not require safeguards as stringent as those required in criminal proceedings, see Weaver, 121 Nev. at 498-99, 117 P.3d at 197, hearing officers possess discretionary authority to admit an affidavit from a person who has not previously been permitted to testify as an expert witness in district court. We reject this argument on two grounds. First, a plain reading of NRS 50.320 demonstrates that the statute imposes a duty upon a hearing officer in an administrative hearing to admit an affidavit from an affiant who has previously been allowed to testify as an expert witness in district court regarding the concentration of alcohol in a person's blood, breath, or urine. [3] However, nothing in NRS 50.320 grants a hearing officer the discretionary authority to admit an affidavit from a proposed expert who has not been qualified by a district court to offer testimony to prove that a person's blood-alcohol content exceeded the legal limit at the time the test was conducted. See Dep't of Taxation v. DaimlerChrysler, 121 Nev. 541, 548, 119 P.3d 135, 139 (2005) ([O]missions of subject matters from statutory provisions are presumed to have been intentional.); Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d 237, 246 (1967) (The maxim `EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS', the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, has been repeatedly confirmed in this State.). [4] A person submitting an affidavit does not appear before the hearing officer; therefore, there is generally no opportunity to examine the witness regarding his qualifications. See State, Dep't Mtr. Veh. v. Evans, 114 Nev. 41, 45, 952 P.2d 958, 961 (1998) (citing NRS 233B.123(4)) (stating that a defendant in an administrative proceeding is entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him). While we have previously stated that the DMV's blood-testing procedures are inherently reliable, State, Dep't Mtr. Veh. v. Bremer, 113 Nev. 805, 809, 942 P.2d 145, 148 (1997), we have never concluded, nor implied, that blood-alcohol tests conducted by a person who is not qualified to testify as an expert regarding the presence of alcohol in a person's blood are equally reliable. Allowing an affidavit from a proposed expert, which lacks the reliability and trustworthiness of an affidavit from one who has been qualified to testify as an expert, would violate NRS 50.320's plain meaning and lead to absurd results, including the revocation of driver's licenses based on a lay-person's affidavit. See Fierle v. Perez, 125 Nev. ___, ___, 219 P.3d 906, 911 (2009) (stating that this court seeks to avoid interpretations of statutory provisions that produce absurd results). We conclude that there is no reason for us to read NRS 50.320 more broadly than the plain language allows, even in the context of a driver's license revocation hearing. Second, the DMV's position is inconsistent with NRS 50.275's qualification standards for the admission of an opinion by an expert witness. NRS 50.275 provides that [i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify to matters within the scope of such knowledge. [5] Accordingly, the three overarching requirements for admissibility of expert witness testimony are (1) qualification, (2) assistance, and (3) limited scope requirements. Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. ___, ___, 222 P.3d 648, 658 (2010). The district court, in its role as a gatekeep[er], has wide discretion when determining the admissibility of expert testimony. Id. at ___, 222 P.3d at 658. This court has consistently stated that in performing its gatekeeping duties, the district court must first determine that the witness is indeed a qualified expert. Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 13, 992 P.2d 845, 852 (2000) (emphasis added); Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. 492, 499, 189 P.3d 646, 650 (2008). In Hallmark, this court established a nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered by the district court when qualifying a witness to testify as an expert witness, including the witness's formal education, training, licensing, and employment experience. 124 Nev. at 499, 189 P.3d at 650-51. The standard enunciated in NRS 50.275 sets a degree of regulation upon admitting expert witness testimony, without usurping the trial judge's gatekeeping function. Higgs, 126 Nev. at ___, 222 P.3d at 658-59. In the Cramer appeal, the DMV does not point to, nor did we locate, any evidence in Stypa's affidavit or elsewhere in the record indicating that he was previously qualified as an expert in district court. Because NRS 50.320 plainly limits the admission of an affidavit to prove a person's blood-alcohol content to one from a person who previously qualified to testify as an expert witness in a district court, we conclude that Stypa's affidavit was inadmissible. Consequently, it was an abuse of discretion for the administrative law judge to admit Stypa's affidavit to prove Cramer's blood-alcohol content.