Opinion ID: 2550107
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the Trustees' argument

Text: The Trustees argue that the circuit court erred in ruling that DCS Rules § 1-2 and ROH § 38-1.2 can be reconciled because the administrative rule expands the definition of owner-occupant beyond the plain language of the ordinance. As noted supra, an administrative agency's interpretation of the ordinance that it is responsible for implementing is normally accorded great weight. Coon, 98 Hawai`i at 251, 47 P.3d at 366 (citations omitted). Additionally, although the application of strict scrutiny precludes doubtful inferences and mandates that the grant of the power of eminent domain be found in the ordinance, either expressly or by necessary implication[,] [t]he express purpose of the ordinance promulgated by the City Council must, in turn, be effected to the fullest extent possible through interpretation of its language and the resolution of ambiguities in accordance with the liberal construction rule. Id. at 247 n. 18, 47 P.3d at 362 n. 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). ROH § 38-1.2 requires, inter alia, that the subject condominium unit serve as the applicant's principal place of residence and that the applicant retain complete possessory control of the premises. DCS Rules § 1-2 allows the department to consider exceptions to the occupancy requirement. Inasmuch as neither ROH chapter 38 nor the DCS Rules establish an occupancy requirement, it is unclear whether, on their face, the definitions of owner-occupant in DCS Rules § 1-2 and ROH § 38-1.2 are inconsistent. Because ROH chapter 38 clearly establishes that applicants must meet the residency and possessory control requirements articulated in ROH § 38-1.2, the Trustees are correct that DCS Rules § 1-2 cannot be interpreted to create exceptions to these requirements. See Coon, 98 Hawai`i at 251, 47 P.3d at 366. However, ROH § 38-1.2 clearly expresses the City Council's intent to allow the department to establish rules as to how applicants prove that their unit served as their principal place of residence and that they retained complete possessory control of their units. [4] Thus, the department may consider occupancy as a factor in determining whether the condominium unit serves as the applicant's principal place of residence. Additionally, as the circuit court noted, it is reasonable for the department to establish rules for proving residency and possessory control that accommodate for situations where an applicant does not occupy his or her unit for a period of time, such as in-patient care in a medical facility or military deployment. Therefore, in giving the effect to the City Council's intent to allow the department to establish rules for proof of residency and possessory control to the fullest extent possible, we hold that the language of DCS Rules § 1-2 allowing the department to consider exceptions to the occupancy requirement for serious illness, employment requirements, military obligations, and educational sabbatical is consistent with ROH § 38-1.2, which allows the department to establish rules of proof of residency and possessory control. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in ruling that the definitions of owner-occupant contained in ROH § 38-1.2 and DCS Rules § 1-2 may be reconciled.