Opinion ID: 184895
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Townsend's Constitutional Arguments

Text: 36 Our conclusion that the district court properly treated the 1994 sentence as a sentencing package necessarily undermines Townsend's argument that because his term of imprisonment on the remaining counts was fully served, resentencing on those counts violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Citing Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), and In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 63 S.Ct. 470, 87 L.Ed. 608 (1943), Townsend begins with the premise that a defendant who has satisfied the sentence imposed for an offense may not be resentenced for that offense. However, because the 1994 sentence was properly viewed as a package, Townsend had not satisfied his sentence on the remaining counts in any meaningful sense. His sentences were, in essence, 'one unified term of imprisonment,'  Easterling, 157 F.3d at 1224 (quoting Smith, 103 F.3d at 535). Thus we join the other circuits which have addressed this question in concluding that even where the term originally allocated to the remaining counts of a package has been served, a defendant can have no legitimate expectation of finality regarding the sentence previously allocated to certain counts while simultaneously challenging his sentence on other counts of the package. See Smith, 115 F.3d at 246; United States v. Benbrook, 119 F.3d 338, 340-41 (5th Cir.1997); Pasquarille, 130 F.3d at 1222; Smith, 103 F.3d at 535; United States v. Alton, 120 F.3d 114, 115-16 (8th Cir.1997); McClain, 133 F.3d at 1194; Easterling, 157 F.3d at 1223-24. 2 37 Townsend framed his arguments on appeal almost exclusively in terms of the Double Jeopardy Clause, but to the extent that he relies on the Due Process Clause, such reliance is also unavailing. Because Townsend could not expect finality of his sentence on some counts even while he challenged others, resentencing was not fundamentally unfair. See Pasquarille, 130 F.3d at 1223; Woodhouse v. United States, 934 F.Supp. 1008 (C.D.Ill.1996), aff'd, 109 F.3d 347 (7th Cir.1997). At oral argument, Townsend suggested a due process argument not raised below or meaningfully discussed in his briefs--that the increase in the sentence on his non-924(c) counts would give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). However, even assuming appellant has properly raised this argument, given that the existing sentence was properly viewed as a package, the fact that the sentence allocated to certain counts increased gives rise to no presumption of vindictiveness. For sentences within a package, Pearce analysis is conducted in the aggregate rather than count by count. United States v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 370, 374 (10th Cir.1992). As we noted in Morris, there is no indication of vindictiveness in resentencing a defendant to exactly the sentence that the defendant would have received but for the erroneous application of § 924(c). Morris, 116 F.3d at 506. See also Mata, 133 F.3d at 202. 38 We need not determine today the full range of cases in which a sentence on multiple counts may properly be treated as a package. In particular, we do not address whether such treatment would be appropriate where there was no indication in the record at the time of the earlier sentencing that a package was intended, or where there were indications to the contrary. Nor do we address whether a sentence could properly be treated as a package where the distinct counts involved conduct more tenuously related than the drug and weapons charges at issue here. Cf. Rodriguez, 112 F.3d at 30-31 (approving sentencing package concept for situations where Guidelines contemplate an interdependent relationship). We hold only that in this case, where the vacated and remaining counts are closely related and the judge indicated an intention to arrive at a formula for reaching the overall sentence desired after the downward departure in 1994, treating the sentence as a unitary package is appropriate. 39 For the reasons stated above, the decision of the district court is 40 Affirmed.