Opinion ID: 1060758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: validity of verdict form

Text: The defendant committed his offenses in 1993 and was sentenced in 1995. The trial judge, however, submitted to the jury outdated verdict forms that were used before the sentencing laws changed in 1989. The pre-1989 forms permitted sentences of death to be imposed on a lower burden of proof than that required by the 1989 amendment. The defendant argues that submission of the improper forms denied him his fundamental right to be sentenced to death based upon the appropriate burden of proof. The State advances two alternatives in rebuttal to the defendant's assertions. First, the State urges this Court to find that the error is waived because defense counsel failed to raise an objection when the pre-1989 verdict forms were submitted to the jury. Alternatively, the State argues that the trial judge verbally instructed the jury as to the proper standard and that the jury is presumed to have followed those instructions. We find the State's waiver position to be devoid of merit. Pursuant to State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 553-54 (Tenn.1994), we hold that the submission of outdated verdict forms in this case substantially affected the defendant's fundamental right to be sentenced to death based on the proper standard of proof. See also Camargo v. State, 327 Ark. 631, 940 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Ark.1997) (holding submission of a verdict form containing improper sentencing standard not waived because the error concerned a matter essential to the jury's imposition of the death penalty itself and the error was not cured by subsequent juror polling). An error that affects a substantial right of a defendant may be raised at any time where necessary to do substantial justice. Tenn.R.App. P. 36(b); Tenn. R.Crim. P. 52(b); Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 553-54. Accordingly, we shall address the merits of the defendant's claim. Prior to 1989, a defendant could be sentenced to death provided the jury found no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstances. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-203(g) (This section was transferred to Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204 in 1990). Following the Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, however, the legislature codified a higher burden of proof for sentencing in capital cases. The post-1989 burden of proof mandates that any aggravating circumstances not only be proven beyond a reasonable doubt but that the aggravating circumstances must also outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-204(g). The jury was properly instructed as to the post-1989 standard. While the jury was presumed to follow the trial judge's instructions, the jury deliberated with and signed the pre-1989 sentencing verdict forms which stated in pertinent part: We, the Jury, unanimously find that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstances so listed above. Following the jury's deliberations with these forms, the judge read from the incorrect verdict forms when sentencing the defendant to death. We hold that the jury's use of and signing of the improper verdict forms rebut the presumption that the jury followed the trial judge's verbal instructions. Our legislature has mandated that a jury, when sentencing a defendant to death, must [s]ignify that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g)(2)(A)(ii). A jury must signify this finding by signing a form that substantially complies with the form set forth in our statute. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (g)(2)(B). The statutory form states: We, the jury, unanimously find that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (g)(2)(B). By signing the verdict form, jurors signify they have followed the legislative mandate and employed the correct standard. In State v. Stephenson , this Court reversed a death sentence because: (1) the court gave conflicting instructions as to the burden of proof; and (2) the sentencing verdict form failed to signify the jury used the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 557-58. Under the capital sentencing statute, the death penalty may be imposed only upon a unanimous finding that any aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 555. In Stephenson , this Court found the verdict form failed to conform to the legislative mandate. The jury's signing of the pre-1989 verdict forms in this case signifies that the defendant was sentenced to death under a standard that did not comport with the legislative mandate. Accordingly, the defendant's sentences of death are premised upon verdict forms that are illegal, void, and of no effect. This Court is charged with ensuring that a sentence of death is not imposed in any arbitrary fashion. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(A). As we stated more than 100 years ago: If the least departure from the mode or extent of punishment prescribed by the law of the land for the commission of crime is encouraged or tolerated, how great a departure will be allowed? Where is a limit to be found? The laws of the land prescribing the mode and extent of punishment will be practically nullified, and stand as dead letters upon the statute books; and in lieu thereof, the mode and extent of punishment which may be inflicted upon persons convicted of crime will be regulated by, and depend alone upon, the taste, fancy, whim, caprice, partiality or prejudice of the particular court or jury trying the offender, and such taste, fancy, whim, caprice, partiality or prejudice, will be the law of the case. Murphy v. State, 47 Tenn. 516, 523-24 (1870). We cannot find this error harmless as the verdict forms sentencing the defendant to death are void and of no effect. [4] To uphold two death sentences based upon illegal verdicts would countenance a degree of arbitrariness and capriciousness in the defendant's death sentences that is incompatible with our duty. See State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 389 S.E.2d 48, 65 (N.C.1990) (holding that the signing of a proper verdict containing the proper sentencing standard was mandatory to support a sentence of death). We cannot condone error of such a prejudicial nature. Accordingly, the defendant's sentences of death are reversed and this case is remanded for resentencing to be conducted in a manner consistent with this opinion.