Opinion ID: 2757451
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Administrative Leave and Discharge

Text: Regarding valid comparators for her claims based on administrative leave and termination, Torres-Skair points out that Abigail Capito, who had similar average prescription numbers (40 per week) as Torres-Skair, was put on a “performance focus plan” (“PFP”), while Torres-Skair was not. Torres-Skair also contends that she need not show a comparator because Medco violated its own policies by firing her without first giving her a PFP. The record shows that Medco’s policies provide for a progressive disciplinary system to address deficient job performance. First, pharmacists receive coaching. If no improvement is shown, Medco will institute a PFP for the pharmacist. After a pharmacist fails to meet the components of a PFP, Medco will 3 Nonetheless, unlawful discrimination may be shown where an employer fails to accommodate pregnant employees in the same way that employees with temporary disabilities are accommodated, see Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1312-13, or disallows pregnant employees to take sick leave for pregnancy-related conditions where such relief is available to other non-pregnant employees, see Byrd v. Lakeshore Hosp., 30 F.3d 1380, 1382-83 (11th Cir. 1994). 15 Case: 13-14476 Date Filed: 12/04/2014 Page: 16 of 21 implement a final written PFP, which may result in further disciplinary action or, eventually, termination. In this case, Torres-Skair’s supervisors agreed in February 2011 that a PFP was necessary to address her performance issues. Powrie in fact drafted such a plan and submitted it to Narducci for her review. However, Medco never implemented the PFP for Torres-Skair. Nevertheless, we disagree that Medco’s failure to implement a PFP for Torres-Skair before she was terminated shows that the company treated her differently than a similarly situated pharmacist or violated its own policies. Notably, Torres-Skair has not shown that the only way in which an employee may be fired is after being placed on a PFP or related plans. Medco’s stated reason for Torres-Skair’s discharge was a violation of Work Rule 11, among other issues not directly related to deficient production. Work Rule 11 specifically provides that hanging up on a customer or otherwise inappropriately terminating a call is a “serious infraction which could lead to discharge without prior warning or other disciplinary action.” The director of pharmacy practice at Medco testified that this rule was “zero tolerance.” Torres-Skair has not pointed to any evidence in the record where Medco used a PFP to address a violation of a Work Rule. In view of the foregoing, the fact that Torres-Skair was not placed on a PFP does not indicate either (1) that she was treated differently than Capito, because there is no evidence that Medco believed that Capito also had hung up on a 16 Case: 13-14476 Date Filed: 12/04/2014 Page: 17 of 21 customer; or (2) that Medco violated its own policies. Consequently, the district court did not err in finding that Torres-Skair had failed to establish a prima facie claim based on her placement on administrative leave and subsequent termination. In any case, even assuming that Torres-Skair established a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, she failed to show that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by Medco were pretextual. Medco offers three such reasons: (1) Torres-Skair hung up on a customer; (2) she refaxed prescription requests; and (3) she avoided calls. Medco claims that these reasons are not independent because each contributed in some way to the decision to terminate Torres-Skair. We might be more inclined to disturb the district court’s ruling if Medco relied on refaxing alone. Torres-Skair presented evidence that other pharmacists engaged in refaxing, that Powrie told pharmacists how to refax, and that refaxing generally, at least under certain circumstances, was an accepted practice that would generate an additional prescription credit. As it stands, however, Medco provided multiple, intertwined, nondiscriminatory reasons for its administrative leave and termination decisions. Torres-Skair has not rebutted Medco’s other reasons, particularly Medco’s belief that she inappropriately terminated a call with a customer. Torres-Skair argues that Medco’s invocation of Work Rule 11 was pretextual because Medco also had in 17 Case: 13-14476 Date Filed: 12/04/2014 Page: 18 of 21 place a Workplace Harassment Policy, which prohibited employees or customers from engaging in “name calling, slurs, or derogatory remarks,” and “verbal abuse or ridicule based on some personal group characteristic.” If Work Rule 11 required her to stay on the phone while the customer referred to her as a “dot head,” she asserts, then it violated the harassment policy. Although Torres-Skair attempts to frame the harassment policy and Work Rule 11 as directly in conflict, she has not presented any evidence supporting that contention. Unrebutted testimony established that hanging up on a patient was never appropriate, and Medco policy listed hanging up on a patient as a ground for termination, potentially without prior warning. Nowhere in the harassment policy does it authorize an employee to terminate a call when she believes she is the subject of harassment. Rather, the policy provides that an employee who believes she has been the victim of harassment should report the incident to her supervisor or someone in management, which will trigger an investigation. Nor has TorresSkair presented a similar instance in which Medco retained a non-pregnant employee who terminated a call because of a derogatory remark. Torres-Skair’s own conviction that she did not inappropriately hang up on the customer in violation of Medco rules is insufficient to show pretext. She has presented no evidence that Medco did not honestly and in good faith believe that she violated a rule. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1997) 18 Case: 13-14476 Date Filed: 12/04/2014 Page: 19 of 21 (“The inquiry into pretext centers upon the employer’s beliefs, and not the employee’s own perceptions of his performance.”). Finally, Torres-Skair contends that the temporal proximity of her request for FMLA leave and the administrative leave and termination decisions shows that Medco’s reasons were pretextual. However, the report that served as the basis for her termination was requested by a manager who was not Torres-Skair’s supervisor and prepared by Schumm, another manager who also was not Torres-Skair’s supervisor, and there is no evidence indicating that either had knowledge of Torres-Skair’s request for FMLA leave or even her pregnancy when those actions were taken. 4 Yet the only evidence in the record indicates that the conference call and subsequent termination were predicated upon the findings of the report written by Schumm. Nor is there evidence that Narducci or Bannon, the relevant decision makers, had knowledge of Torres-Skair’s request for FMLA leave before the conference call during which Torres-Skair was placed on administrative leave. For these reasons, Torres-Skair has not presented sufficient circumstantial evidence by which a jury could reasonably infer that Medco’s non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual or that Medco otherwise was motivated to discriminate against her on the basis of her pregnancy. 4 To the extent that Torres-Skair argues that Medco violated the FMLA, she did not raise such a claim before the district court and we decline to consider her arguments with respect to any purported violations of the FMLA on appeal. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that issues not raised in the district court and raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered). 19 Case: 13-14476 Date Filed: 12/04/2014 Page: 20 of 21