Opinion ID: 1360775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: conclusion

Text: The legislation authorizing tax increment financing is constitutional on its face. It does not usurp the power of the county excise board, Okla. Const., art. 10, § 9(a), nor is it a legislative attempt to surrender, suspend or contract away the power to tax, Okla. Const., art. 10, § 5. Moreover, the statute mandated apportionment by the county excise board, 11 O.S.Supp. 1983, § 38-123, does not violate Okla. Const., art. 10, § 26, because it does not authorize a municipality to become indebted to an amount exceeding the income and revenues for that year without certification and approval under art. 10, § 26. In other words, the provisions of § 38-123 are subject to art. 10, § 26. Regardless of the characterization given debts of an urban renewal authority of a municipality by 11 O.S.Supp. 1983, § 38-115(B), if the municipality is obligated to pay a certain amount over a year or more to retire the debt of its urban renewal authority, the municipality is indebted. If a municipality becomes indebted pursuant to the tax increment financing legislation, such indebtedness must not violate the strictures of art. 10, § 26. In the case at bar, it is difficult to determine whether the indebtedness of the City of Muskogee violates art. 10, § 26, because the issue of whether the City has become indebted to an amount in excess of the income and revenue for that year remains to be answered. Therefore, we must remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. TRIAL COURT WRIT OF MANDAMUS DISSOLVED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED. ALMA WILSON, C.J., KAUGER, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, SIMMS, HARGRAVE and WATT, JJ., concur. HODGES and OPALA, JJ., dissent. SUMMERS, J., not participating.