Opinion ID: 213920
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: $123,000 award on Plaintiffs' dwelling claim

Text: At the close of trial, the district court judge concluded that the cost of repairs to the Plaintiffs' dwelling would exceed or at least equal the dwelling limit of $338,000 on their homeowners policy. He thus awarded the difference between the amount Allstate had already paid the Plaintiffs on their dwelling claimroughly $215,000and the dwelling limit of $338,000, an amount equal to $123,000. Several findings persuaded the district judge that the Plaintiffs were entitled to their policy limit on the dwelling. First, he determined that the Plaintiffs had introduced sufficient evidence at trial to demonstrate that the cost to repair the extensive damage to their home would exceed the dwelling limit. LaGrange, for instance, had testified that the total wind damage to the Plaintiffs' home equaled $452,378.99, well above the dwelling limit. The judge noted in his oral ruling that he was not convinced this estimate was all justifiable; for one, LaGrange appeared to have based that [estimate] on replacement cost and not ACV. But the judge found the Plaintiffs' overall evidence on this factual question persuasive. Second, the judge found that Allstate's estimates had consistently lowballed the amount of the Plaintiffs' damages. Finally, the judge noted that prior to trial, he had visited the Plaintiffs' home and observed firsthand its damaged condition. At trial, the Plaintiffs and Allstate provided damage estimates that were, in the district court's words, all over the board, and thus the question of the cost of wind damage to the Plaintiffs' home turned essentially on witness credibility. The district court, as the finder of fact in a bench trial, is best positioned to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Dickerson, 556 F.3d at 295. We are not persuaded that the district court's findings are against the preponderance of credible testimony, as Allstate urges us to hold. On this record, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the Plaintiffs offered the more credible account of the ACV of the wind damage to their home. Allstate also argues that the $123,000 award to the Plaintiffs constitutes an impermissible windfall because it permits the Plaintiffs to recover more in insurance proceeds than the value of the home. In Louisiana, an insured may not recover in excess of his actual loss, although he may recover under each policy providing coverage until the total loss sustained is indemnified. Wegener v. Lafayette Ins. Co., ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL 880339, at  (La. Mar. 15, 2011) (quoting Cole v. Celotex, 599 So.2d 1058, 1080 (La.1992)); see also Bradley, 620 F.3d at 521 (An insured party in Louisiana may generally `recover under all available coverages provided that there is no double recovery.' (quoting Cole, 599 So.2d at 1080)). Where the insured has not repaired, rebuilt, or replaced his damaged property, the appropriate measure of the [insured's] actual loss is the ACV of the property. Bradley, 620 F.3d at 522. As the district court noted in its oral ruling, by the start of trial Allstate had paid the Plaintiffs $215,292.88 for wind damage to the dwelling, and the flood insurer had paid $171,708 for flood damage to the dwelling. The Plaintiffs had thus recovered a total of $387,000.88 in insurance proceeds for Katrina-related damage to their home. With the district court's award of $123,000, the Plaintiffs' total recovery for their home climbed to $510,000.88. Allstate argues that $510,000.88 exceeds the Plaintiffs' actual loss to their home, and therefore the award gives them a double recovery. We note that Allstate raised this very argument in the district court both before trial, in its proposed findings of fact, and after trial, in its Rule 52(b) motion. Both times the argument was rejected: the district court declined to adopt Allstate's position at the close of trial; and, in denying Allstate's Rule 52(b) motion, the district court implicitly reaffirmed that the Plaintiffs' pre-trial recovery fell short of indemnifying them for their losssufficiently so that the additional award for wind damage did not constitute a double recovery. We cannot say that this finding was clearly erroneous. The calculation of the Plaintiffs' actual lossthe ACV of the damaged propertyis a question that must be determined by the factfinder. See Bradley, 620 F.3d at 522 (The fact-finder must determine, or the parties may stipulate, the ACV of the property.). We reiterate that the district court was best positioned to make credibility determinations of the witnesses to ascertain the Plaintiffs' actual loss. Moreover, there was sufficient evidence at trialas Allstate itself points outthat the ACV of the Plaintiffs' dwelling, and the Plaintiffs' corresponding actual loss, exceeded $510,000.88. [9] We thus hold that there is a preponderance of evidence in the record sufficient to support the district court's award and its finding that the award does not constitute an impermissible double recovery. Finding no clear error, we affirm.