Opinion ID: 2544598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The DOE's Cross-Appeal

Text: The DOE argues that the circuit court: (1) wrongly concluded that the STLA did not cloak the DOE with immunity from liability for its alleged negligence and NIED; (2) wrongly concluded that the plaintiffs' NIED claim was compensable in the absence of physical injury; (3) wrongly imposed new duties upon the DOE in concluding that the DOE owed the plaintiffs a duty not only to supervise students, but to take such reasonable measures as would be taken by reasonable parents to avoid injury to students; (4) clearly erred in finding that its employees had breached the new duties; and (5) clearly erred in finding that the breaches were each a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' psychological injuries. We address the DOE's arguments seriatim.
Pursuant to HRS ง 662-2 (1993), the State ... waives its immunity for liability for the torts of its employees and shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances[.] This court has held that, in so providing, the legislature definitely expressed the intent ... that, for purposes of determining [the] liability of the State in tort cases, all the accepted tort law relating to private parties is applicable. Upchurch v. State, 51 Haw. 150, 151, 454 P.2d 112, 114 (1969). However, several exceptions to the general waiver of immunity from tort claims are set forth in HRS ง 662-15 (1993 & Supp. 2001). Consequently, we have held that, if a private party would be liable under the circumstances[, then] the State would also be liable, except for [those] claims enumerated in [HRS ง 662-15]. Id. at 152, 454 P.2d at 114. The DOE invokes the intentional tort exception, set forth in HRS ง 662-15(4), to argue that it is immune from the plaintiffs' negligence and NIED claims. The intentional tort exception provides in relevant part that the STLA's general waiver of sovereign immunity, see HRS ง 662-2, does not apply to [a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. HRS ง 662-15(4). Citing United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985), the DOE posits that, inasmuch as the plaintiffs' negligence and NIED claims arise out of Norton's assault and battery of Melony and Nicole or Sosa's misrepresentation to the military, it retains its sovereign immunity from liability for those claims, pursuant to HRS ง 662-15(4). In response, the plaintiffs contend that their negligence and NIED claims against the DOE do not directly arise out of Norton's molestation of the girls. [32] The plaintiffs observe that their negligence and NIED claims are predicated upon breaches of the DOE's duty of care that were committed by employees other than Norton. According to the plaintiffs, simply because Norton's molestation of the girls was a foreseeable result of the unreasonable conduct of other DOE employees does not transform their negligence and NIED claims into claims that arise out of Norton's conduct. The STLA is modeled after the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. งง 1346(b) and 2671 et seq. See, e.g., Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 383-84, 604 P.2d 1198, 1206 (1979); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 167, 472 P.2d 509, 517 (1970). Accordingly, this court may, in the absence of other authority, [33] turn to federal case law construing parallel provisions of the FTCA for guidance in construing the STLA. Cf. Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96 Hawai`i 408, 425, 32 P.3d 52, 69 (2001) (noting that, [n]ot having previously dealt with a retaliation claim under HRS ง 378-2..., we may look in construing HRS ง 378-2, `to interpretations of analogous federal laws by the federal courts for guidance' (quoting Shoppe v. Gucci Am., Inc., 94 Hawai`i 368, 377, 14 P.3d 1049, 1058 (2000)) (additional citations omitted)); State v. Crisostomo, 94 Hawai`i 282, 287-88, 12 P.3d 873, 878-79 (2000) (noting that, [b]ecause [Hawai`i Rule of Penal Procedure] Rule 24(c) [(1996) ] is nearly identical to its federal counterpart, i.e., Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [ ] Rule 24(c) (1999),[] this court may look to parallel federal law for guidance (citations omitted)). Pursuant to 28 United States Code (USC) ง 1346(b), the district courts of the United States are vested with exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the federal government while acting within the scope of his [or her] office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. (Quoted in Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 394 n. 1, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988).) This provision is substantially similar to HRS งง 662-2 and 662-3. Like the STLA, the FTCA does not apply to [a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights[.] [34] 28 USC ง 2680(h) (quoted in Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 394 n. 1, 108 S.Ct. 2449). The DOE urges that we adopt the reasoning of a plurality of the United States Supreme Court, which, in Shearer, held that the FTCA's intentional tort exception encompass[es] claims sounding in negligence. 473 U.S. at 57, 105 S.Ct. 3039. Vernon Shearer was a private in the United States Army. Id. at 53, 105 S.Ct. 3039. While off duty and away from the Army base at which he was stationed, another serviceman, Private Andrew Heard, kidnapped and murdered him. Id. Shearer's mother, as his administratrix, attempted to sue the United States under the FTCA, claiming that the Army's negligence caused her son's death. Id. at 54, 105 S.Ct. 3039. More specifically, she claimed that the Army, which knew that Private Heard was dangerous because he had been convicted of manslaughter by a German court while assigned to an Army base in Germany in 1977, negligently and carelessly failed [ (1) ] to exert a reasonably sufficient control over him, (2) to warn other persons that he was at large, and (3) to ... remove [him] from active military duty. Id. at 54, 58, 105 S.Ct. 3039. In a decision in which Justice Powell took no part, four justices of the United States Supreme Court believed it clear that respondent's claim arises out of the battery committed by Private Heard. Id. at 54-55, 105 S.Ct. 3039. According to the Shearer plurality, [n]o semantical recasting of events can alter the fact that the battery was the immediate cause of Private Shearer's death and, consequently, the basis of respondent's claim. Id. at 55, 105 S.Ct. 3039. The plurality noted that Shearer's mother could not avoid the reach of [28 USC] ง 2580(h) by framing her complaint in terms of negligent failure to prevent the assault and battery, reasoning that 28 USC ง 2580 does not merely bar claims for assault or battery; in sweeping language it excludes any claim arising out of assault or battery. Id. (emphases in original). Accordingly, the Shearer plurality held that this provision ... cover[s] claims ... that sound in negligence but stem from a battery committed by a [federal g]overnment employee. Id. Thus, in the Shearer plurality's view, the express words of the statute bar respondent's claim against the [federal g]overnment, id. (citation and internal quotation signals omitted), because it is inescapable that the phrase `arising out of assault [or] battery' is broad enough to encompass claims sounding in negligence, id. at 57, 105 S.Ct. 3039. [35] The plaintiffs, however, observe that a majority of the United States Supreme Court apparently has retreated from the Shearer plurality's draconian view of the FTCA's intentional tort exception, noting that, subsequently in Sheridan, the Court acknowledged that, in at least some situations[,] the fact that an injury was directly caused by an assault or battery will not preclude liability against the [federal g]overnment for negligently allowing the assault to occur. 487 U.S. at 398-99, 108 S.Ct. 2449. The salient facts before the Sheridan Court were as follows: After finishing his shift as a naval medical aide at the hospital, Carr consumed a large quantity of wine, rum, and other alcoholic beverages. He then packed some of his belongings, including a rifle and ammunition, into a uniform bag and left his quarters. Some time later, three naval corpsmen found him lying face down in a drunken stupor on the concrete floor of a hospital building. They attempted to take him to the emergency room, but he broke away, grabbing the bag and revealing the barrel of the rifle. At the sight of the rifle, the corpsmen fled. They neither took further action to subdue Carr, nor alerted the appropriate authorities that he was heavily intoxicated and brandishing a weapon. Later that evening, Carr fired the shots that caused physical injury to one of the petitioners and property damage to their car. 487 U.S. at 395, 108 S.Ct. 2449. In suing the federal government under the FTCA, the plaintiffs contended that the general ruleโ i.e., that the federal [g]overnment is not liable for the intentional torts of its employeesโwas inapplicable because they were relying, not on the fact that Carr was a [federal g]overnment employee when he assaulted them, but rather on the negligence of other [federal g]overnment employees who failed to prevent his use of the rifle. Id. Upon the foregoing facts, a majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held that the plaintiffs' claim was foreclosed by its precedents, specifically Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (affirming district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' negligence claim because it arose out of postal employee's sexual indecencies with two minor girls while on his mail route and not as result of supervisor's purported negligence in allowing him to remain in position where he came into contact with children after he had pled guilty to similar sexual offense), and Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393 (4th Cir.1986) (affirming district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' negligence claim because it arose out of naval corpsman's sexual indecencies with two minor girls while they were hospitalized at naval hospital and not as result of Navy's negligent supervision of offending corpsman). Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 395-97 & n. 1, 108 S.Ct. 2449. Chief Judge Winter, however, dissented. Id. at 397-98, 108 S.Ct. 2449. In Chief Judge Winter's view, cases such as Hughes and Thigpen, which involved negligent hiring or retention and negligent supervision claims, were inapposite to situations in which the basis for the [federal g]overnment's alleged liability has nothing to do with the assailant's employment status. Id. at 397. As quoted by Justice Stevens, writing for the Sheridan majority, Chief Judge Winter had believed that claims of negligent hiring and/or supervision are essentially grounded in the doctrine of respondeat superior. In these cases, the government's liability arises, if at all, only because of the employment relationship. If the assailant were not a federal employee, there would be no independent basis for a suit against the government. It is in this situation that an allegation of government negligence can legitimately be seen as an effort to `circumvent' the [28 USC] ง 2680(h) bar; it is just this situationโ where government liability is possible only because of the federal paychecksโthat [28 USC] ง 2680(h) was designed to preclude.... On the other hand, where governmental liability is independent of the assailant's employment status, it is possible to discern two distinct torts: the intentional tort (assault and battery) and the government negligence that precipitated it. Where no reliance is placed on negligent supervision or respondeat superior principles, the cause of action against the government cannot really be said to arise out of the assault and battery; rather it is based on the government's breach of a separate legal duty. Id. at 397-98, 108 S.Ct. 2449 (quoting 823 F.2d 820, 824) (internal citations omitted) (some internal quotation signals omitted) (emphasis in original). Recognizing a split among the federal appellate circuits that mimicked the split between the majority and dissenting opinions in the Fourth Circuit's Sheridan opinion, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide... whether the plaintiffs' claim is one `arising out of an assault or battery within the meaning of 28 USC ง 2680(h); a majority of the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's opinion. Id. at 394, 398, 108 S.Ct. 2449. The Sheridan Court initially observed that the intentional tort exception to the FTCA was unquestionably broad enough to bar all claims based entirely on an assault and battery. Id. at 398, 108 S.Ct. 2449 (emphasis in original). However, citing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963) (holding that a federal prisoner, who was assaulted by other inmates, could recover damages against the United States because prison officials negligently failed to prevent the assault), the Sheridan Court, as we have noted, acknowledged that in at least some situations[,] the fact that an injury was directly caused by an assault or battery will not preclude liability against the [federal g]overnment for negligently allowing the assault to occur. Id. at 398-99, 108 S.Ct. 2449. In the Sheridan Court's view, two quite different theories might explain why Muniz's claim did not `arise out of' the assault perpetrated by the other inmates. [36] Id. at 399, 108 S.Ct. 2449. The first theory was that, insofar as Muniz alleged that the prison officials were negligent, his claim did not arise solely, or even predominately, out of the assault. Id. Under this theory, the focus is upon the negligent acts or omissions of a federal employee rather than upon the assault, which is simply considered as part of the causal link to the injury. Id. Thus, it was not the assailant's individual involvement, but, rather, the antecedent negligence of [federal employees] from which Muniz's claim would arise under the first theory. Id. However, the Sheridan majority relied exclusively on the second theory, which makes clear that the intentional tort exception is simply inapplicable to torts that fall outside the scope of [28 USC] ง 1346(b)'s general waiver of sovereign immunity for the conduct of federal employees. Id. at 400, 108 S.Ct. 2449. Under the second theory, espoused by the Sheridan Court, the intentional tort exception is read against the rest of the [FTCA], and, therefore, appl[ied] only to claims that would otherwise be authorized by the basic waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. Since the FTCA only waives sovereign immunity for personal injuries `caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his [or her] office or employment, id. at 400-401, 108 S.Ct. 2449 (citation omitted) (some emphasis added and some in original), the intentional tort exception only applies in cases arising out of assaults by federal employees, id. at 400, 108 S.Ct. 2449. As such, the Sheridan Court believed that the better reading of Muniz was that the FTCA's intentional tort exception did not apply because the prison inmates who actually assaulted Muniz were not federal employees. Id. at 400-401, 83 S.Ct. 1850. Accordingly, as to the facts before it, the Sheridan Court observed that, [i]f nothing more was involved here than the conduct of Carr at the time he shot at [the plaintiffs], there would be no basis for imposing liability on the [federal g]overnment, insofar as he was not on duty at the time he shot at the plaintiffs and, therefore, was not acting within the scope of his federal employment. Id. at 401, 108 S.Ct. 2449. Thus, in the Sheridan Court's view, the FTCA did not waive sovereign immunity for any alleged liability arising from Carr's conduct in the first instance, even had his conduct been merely negligent. Id. Yet, the Sheridan Court noted that the case before it did not simply arise from Carr's conduct; rather, the plaintiffs attempted to hold the federal government liable for the negligence of other [federal g]overnment employees who allowed a foreseeable assault and battery to occur. Consequently, the Sheridan Court construed the plaintiffs' negligence claim as one that did not seek to hold the federal government liable on the sole basis that Carr was a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment; rather, the court construed the claim as one in which the negligence of other Government employees who allowed a foreseeable assault and battery to occur may furnish a basis for Government liability that is entirely independent of [the intentional tortfeasor's] employment status. Id. However, the Sheridan Court did not expressly answer the question on the basis of which it had granted certiorari, see 487 U.S. at 394, 108 S.Ct. 2449, insofar as it ultimately held that the intentional tort exception did not apply to the plaintiffs' claim. Rather, the Court held that the federal government, by voluntarily adopting regulations that prohibit[ed] the possession of firearms on the naval base and that require[d] all personnel to report the presence of any such firearm, as well as by further voluntarily undertaking to provide care to a person who was visibly drunk and visibly armed, had, under Maryland law, assumed ... [a] responsibility to `perform [its] good Samaritan task in a careful manner.' Id. at 401, 108 S.Ct. 2449 (citations omitted) (some brackets added and some in original). In light of the federal government's voluntary assumption of a good Samaritan duty, which was wholly distinct from and did not arise out of Carr's federal employment, the fact that Carr happened to be a federal employee was irrelevant; the Sheridan Court expressly noted that it [was] not appropriate in this case to consider whether negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or negligent training may ever provide the basis for liability under the FTCA for a foreseeable assault or battery by a [federal g]overment employee. Id. at 402-03 & n. 8, 108 S.Ct. 2449. In the wake of Sheridan, the federal circuits have generally agreed, with the notable exception of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that a plaintiff's negligence claim against the federal government that is predicated upon the federal government's hiring, training, or supervision of an employee who commits a foreseeable intentional tort against the plaintiff is subsumed within, and therefore barred by, the FTCA's intentional tort exception because such a claim stems from the intentional tortfeasor's employment relationship with the federal government and, therefore, is said to arise out of a federal employee's intentionally tortious conduct. See, e.g., Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750, 756 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that causes of action distinct from those excepted under [the intentional tort exception] are nevertheless deemed to be barred when the underlying governmental conduct `essential' to the plaintiff's claim can fairly be read to `arise out of' conduct that would establish an excepted cause of action, i.e., an intentional tort (citation omitted)); McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the reach of the intentional tort exception by framing his [or her] complaint in terms of negligent failure to prevent the excepted harm); see also Ryan v. United States, 156 F.Supp.2d 900, 904 (N.D.Ill.2001) (citing, inter alia, Franklin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1492, 1499 (10th Cir.1993); Westcott v. Omaha City, 901 F.2d 1486, 1490 (8th Cir.1990); and Guccione v. United States, 847 F.2d 1031, 1035-37 (2d Cir.1988), reh'g denied, 878 F.2d 32, 33 (2d Cir.1989), as having interpreted `arising out of' broadly, and, consequently, as holding that a negligent hiring or supervision claim necessarily arises out of an underlying assault or battery). The Ninth Circuit, however, has adopted a narrow view of the FTCA's intentional tort exception. Senger v. United States, 103 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir.1996), is exemplary in this regard. The Senger court viewed its sister circuits' reasoning as flawed on the basis that granting broad immunity to the federal government for the negligence of one employee simply because a foreseeable result of that employee's negligence was that another federal employee would commit an intentional tort was inconsistent with the FTCA's avowed purpose to `provide a forum for the resolution of claims against the federal government for injury caused by the government's negligence.' Id. at 1441 (quoting Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir.1986)). Rather than demarcating the boundaries of the intentional tort exception solely upon whether the intentional tortfeasor was or was not a federal employee, the Senger court drew a line between negligence claims based entirely on a theory of respondeat superior, which, in its view, were foreclosed by the intentional tort exception, and claims predicated upon independent negligent acts or omissions by the [federal g]overnment that are legal causes of the [plaintiff's] harm, which fell outside the scope of the intentional tort exception, even if the plaintiff's harm was directly caused by a federal employee's intentionally tort. Id. (citing Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1504). See also Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that an employee's negligent supervision claim predicated on Forest Service's failure to supervise plaintiff's supervisor, who had raped her and subjected her to continuing sexual harassment, and to supervise her coworkers, who had retaliated against her for filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the supervisor, was not barred by the FTCA's intentional tort exception); Morrill v. United States, 821 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that negligent supervision claim advanced by go-go dancer, who the Navy hired to perform in club for enlisted men and who was assaulted and raped by enlisted man, was not barred by FTCA's intentional tort exception); Kearney v. United States, 815 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that negligent supervision claim predicated upon federal employee's release of an Army officer, initially detained for rape, who subsequently murdered plaintiff's wife, was not barred by FTCA's intentional tort exception). In Bennett, a pre- Sheridan decision upon which the Senger court relied, the Ninth Circuit observed that the policy underlying the FTCA's intentional tort exception was to insulate the government from liability for acts it was powerless to prevent or which would make defense of a lawsuit unusually difficult. 803 F.2d at 1503 (citation omitted). In the Bennett court's view, a third person's assault or battery is especially difficult to prevent where there is no known history of similar behavior, which was why, at common law, a third person's crime or intentional tort constituted an `independent, intervening cause' that would, generally speaking, preclude a defendant's antecedent negligence from being a legal cause of the assaulted or battered person's injuries. Id. (citation omitted). The Bennett court emphasized, however, that, in the case before it, the plaintiffs had not based their claim upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, under which they would have asserted that, as the employer of an intentional tortfeasor, the federal government was liable for the intentional tortfeasor's acts and omissions committed within the scope of his or her employment. Id. at 1503-04. Rather, the plaintiffs had predicated their claim upon the federal government's negligent supervision, hiring, and investigation of the intentional tortfeasor, i.e., upon the negligent acts and omissions of employees other than the assailant. Id. Expressing its disagreement with the Shearer plurality's apparent distinction between assailants who are federal employees and those who are not, see id. at 1504-05, the Bennett court regarded the historical evidence for drawing such a distinction as far from clear. Id. at 1504. The Bennett court noted that its review of the FTCA's plain language and legislative history unearthed no explanation as to why Congress would waive sovereign immunity from liability for claims arising out of negligent supervision of federal wardsโsuch as inmates and patientsโbut retain immunity with respect to claims arising out of intentional acts committed by negligently supervised federal employees. Id. In the Bennett court's view, the intentional tort exception's arising out of language appeared to appl[y] equally to batteries by federal employees and by nonemployees. Id. Thus, the Bennett court concluded that predicating the application of the FTCA's intentional tort exception solely upon whether the intentional tortfeasor (as opposed to the employee who was negligent in some manner) was a federal employee was irrational. Id. Consequently, the Bennett court held that the FTCA's intentional tort exception did not insulate the federal government from a negligence claim predicated upon its failure to investigate a teacher before hiring him, where he had admitted in his application for employment that a valid bench warrant remained outstanding with regard to an Oklahoma criminal charge of [o]utrage to [p]ublic [d]ecency, as well as upon its retention and failure to supervise the teacher after his conduct put his supervisors on notice that he was molesting children. Id. at 1502-03. The Bennett court, therefore, deemed the federal government's own negligenceโrather than the teacher's kidnapping, assault, and rape of several studentsโto be the legal cause of the injury sued on and, thus, held that the FTCA's intentional tort exception did not preclude the plaintiffs from obtaining relief for the federal government's negligence. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit appears to be the lone federal circuit court to embrace the narrow view of the FTCA's intentional tort exception, a few state supreme courts have adopted similar constructions with respect to their respective state tort liability acts. The Idaho Supreme Court, for example, has held, in the context of a negligent retention claim, that the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA)โ which contains an intentional tort exception (similar to HRS ง 662-15(4)), which provides in relevant part that a governmental entity is not liable for any claim which `[a]rises out of assault [or] battery,' Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238, 1243 (1986); see also Kessler v. Barowsky, 129 Idaho 647, 931 P.2d 641, 648 (1997)โdoes not immunize a school district from liability under the ITCA's intentional tort exception where students were molested by a teacher whom the school district should have reasonably anticipated... would commit an intentional tort. Durtschi, 716 P.2d at 1245. Eschewing the construction of the FTCA's intentional tort exception that most of the federal courts had adopted and under which the plaintiffs' negligence claims would have been barred, the Durtschi court reasoned that [i]t is clearly unsound to afford immunity to a negligent defendant because the intervening force, the very anticipation of which made his [or her] conduct negligent, has brought about the expected harm. Durtschi, 716 P.2d at 1244 (citation omitted). As such, the Durtschi court ruled that the children's injuries arose out of the basic negligence of the school district and that their injuries were the foreseeable consequence of the school district's negligence in retaining [the teacher] despite full knowledge of his proclivities. Id. at 1243. On the other hand, the Durtschi court recognized that, of course, a plaintiff cannot merely point to an assault and battery and then claim, based simply on its occurrence, that the state was negligent in not preventing it. Id. at 1245. We agree, insofar as such a claim is, in essence, little else than a semantical recasting, Shearer, 473 U.S. at 55, 105 S.Ct. 3039, which attempts to cloak a respondeat superior claim in negligence clothing so as to circumvent the intentional tort exception. However, we also agree, where the government entity should have reasonably anticipated that one of [its] employees would commit an intentional tort, Durtschi, 716 P.2d at 1245, that the STLA's intentional tort exception does not insulate the governmental entity from liability. As the Durtschi court opined: The fact that the foreseeable danger was from intentional or criminal misconduct is irrelevant; the school district had a ... duty to make reasonable efforts to protect its students from such a danger. A breach of that duty constitutes negligence .... [Thus, the teacher's] actions [do not necessarily] constitute a supervening cause, and the school district's tortious conduct [does] not arise out of the assault and battery. Rather, the roots of the assault and battery [lie] in the district's own negligence. Id. at 1244. In the context of a negligent supervision claim, the Idaho Supreme Court has subsequently held that the ITCA's intentional tort exception would not, therefore, constitute a bar so long as those who had the duty to supervise should have reasonably anticipated that those subject to their supervision would commit a battery. Kessler, 931 P.2d at 648. Finally, we note that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has similarly rejected a broad construction of the intentional tort exception contained in the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., Dobos v. Driscoll, 404 Mass. 634, 537 N.E.2d 558, 569 (1989) (holding that where the supervisory officials allegedly had, or should have had, knowledge of a public employee's assaultive behavior, it is the supervisor's conduct, rather than the employee's intentional conduct, that is the true focus of the plaintiff's negligence claim). We have repeatedly held that the STLA should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to compensate the victims of negligent conduct of state officials and employees in the same manner and to the same extent as a private person in like circumstances. Breed v. Shaner, 57 Haw. 656, 665, 562 P.2d 436, 442 (1977) (citing Rogers v. State, 51 Haw. 293, 296-98, 459 P.2d 378, 381-82 (1969) (refusing to emasculate the STLA by broadly construing the discretionary function exception to include operational level acts of state employees)); cf. Hawaii Community Federal Credit Union v. Keka, 94 Hawai`i 213, 229, 11 P.3d 1, 17 (2000) (`Remedial statutes are liberally construed to suppress the perceived evil and advance the enacted remedy.' (Quoting Cieri v. Leticia Query Realty, Inc., 80 Hawai`i 54, 68, 905 P.2d 29, 43 (1995) (brackets omitted).)). That being the case, we believe that the Ninth Circuit and the Idaho and Massachusetts high courts have articulated the better view of the intentional tort exception, as opposed the broad view espoused by the majority of the federal appellate courts. Adoption of the latter, grudging construction would irrationally restrict the remedial purpose of the STLA to compensate victims of the negligent conduct of state employees. [37] In the present matter, the plaintiffs' negligence and NIED claims are not duplicitous of their respondeat superior claim. Under the latter, the plaintiffs posit that the DOE, as Norton's employer, is vicariously liable for his molestation of the girls because Norton's acts of molestation occurred within the scope of his employment with the DOE; the conduct of other DOE employees, such as Norton's supervisors, is irrelevant to the DOE's potential liability, because the only material question is whether Norton's molestation of the girls constituted a negligent act that was within the scope of his employment. See, e.g., Wong-Leong v. Hawaiian Independent Refinery, Inc., 76 Hawai`i 433, 438, 879 P.2d 538, 539 (1994) (to recover under [a] respondeat superior theory, a plaintiff must establish: 1) a negligent act of the employee, in other words, a breach of a duty that is the legal cause of plaintiff's injury; and 2) that the negligent act was within the employee's scope of employment (citations omitted)). It is precisely such a theory of liability that the STLA's intentional tort exception precludes, where the allegedly negligent act of the employee is asserted to be assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. [38] HRS ง 662-15(4). In other words, the plaintiffs' respondeat superior claim must aris[e] out of Norton's assault and battery of the girls because his molestation of them is the sole basis of the plaintiffs' claim against his employer, the DOE. On the other hand, the plaintiffs' negligence and NIED claims are not predicated upon Norton's molestation of the girls per se. Rather, the plaintiffs posit that other DOE employeesโspecifically, Estomago, Schlosser, and Sosaโbreached a duty that legally caused the plaintiffs' injuries. [39] The plaintiffs' theory of negligenceโpredicated, as it is, upon the acts and omissions of Norton's supervisorsโdoes not, therefore, arise out of Norton's molestation of Melony and Nicole. To the contrary, Norton's molestation of Melony and Nicole arises out of Estomago's, Schlosser's, and Sosa's antecedent negligent acts and omissions in reinstating and in failing to supervise him. We agree with the Idaho Supreme Court's disbelief that the ... legislature, by creating an exception to governmental liability for actions arising out of assault and battery, thereby intended to relieve state agencies from any duty to safeguard the public from employees whom they know to be [or reasonably should anticipate will become] dangerous.... Surely the ... legislature could not have intended that school districts could ignore their ... duty [to students and parents] and retain known child molesters in the classroom with total impunity[.] Durtschi, 716 P.2d at 1245. Based on the foregoing discussion, we hold that, where a plaintiff's negligence claim against the State seeks to hold the State vicariously liable for a state employee's assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the State is, pursuant to HRS ง 662-15(4), immune from the plaintiff's claim. However, where the plaintiff's negligence claim seeks to hold the State liable for the conduct of state employees other than the alleged intentional tortfeasor, pursuant to theories of negligent hiring, retention, supervision, or the like, the plaintiff's claim does not necessarily arise out of the hired, retained, or supervised employee's intentional tort. Rather, if the State knew, or reasonably should have anticipated, that one of its employees would commit an intentional tort against a person to whom the State owed a duty of care, the State is liable for the negligence of those employees who were in a position to take reasonable precautions against the anticipated harm. In light of the foregoing, we further hold, to the extent that the plaintiffs predicate their negligence and NIED claims upon the DOE's negligent retention and supervision of Norton, that the STLA's intentional tort exception does not insulate the DOE from liability; given that the plaintiffs have alleged that the DOE reasonably should have anticipated that Norton would molest the girls, their negligent retention and supervision claims do not arise out of Norton's acts of molestation. Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiffs' negligence and NIED claims are predicated upon the allegation that Schlosser's interrogation of the girls and his failure to notify the girls' parents of their accusations legally caused some of their injuries, HRS ง 662-15(4) is not implicated at all, see supra note 39. However, HRS ง 662-15(4) expressly precludes the plaintiffs from holding the DOE liable for Sosa's misrepresentation to the military that the DOE's internal investigation absolved Norton, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
To prevail on their negligence claim, the plaintiffs had to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the DOE owed them a duty of care, which (2) the DOE breached, thereby (3) legally causing (4) actual injury to them. In other words, there are four primary elements to a negligence claim: 1. A duty or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks; 2. A failure on the defendant's part to conform to the standard required: a breach of the duty; 3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and 4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another. Dairy Road Partners v. Island Ins. Co., Ltd., 92 Hawai`i 398, 419, 992 P.2d 93, 114 (2000) (citations omitted). However, where the alleged actual injury is for psychological distress alone, there is a need to strike a balance between avoiding the trivial or fraudulent claims that have been thought to be inevitable due to the subjective nature of [such] injur[y], on the one hand, and promoting the underlying purpose of negligence law, i.e., compensating persons who have sustained emotional injuries attributable to the wrongful conduct of others, on the other. Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tenn.1996); see also Guth v. Freeland, 96 Hawai`i 147, 152, 28 P.3d 982, 987 (2001) (noting that, in general, courts are prompted to limit recovery for emotional distress because (1) it is temporary and often trivial, (2) it may be imagined and is easily feigned, and (3) it may seem unfair to hold defendants, whose actions were merely negligent, financially responsible for harm that appears remote from the actual conduct); Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 74 Haw. 1, 40, 837 P.2d 1273, 1292, reconsideration granted in part and denied in part, 74 Haw. 650, 843 P.2d 144 (1992) (noting that recovery for NIED is generally restricted because the difficulty of distinguishing between fraudulent, trivial, and serious injuries will result in unlimited liability and because of the fear that mental distress recoveries will impose burdens on defendants disproportionate to their culpability); Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 172-73, 472 P.2d at 520. Different jurisdictions have developed sundry variants of what is known as the physical injury rule, under which, generally speaking, the plaintiff's emotional distress must be accompanied by a physical injury or symptom, see, e.g., Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 440-43 (surveying cases); John & Jane Roes, 1-100 v. FHP, Inc., 91 Hawai`i 470, 473 & n. 5, 985 P.2d 661, 664 & n. 5 (1999) (noting variations of the physical injury rule, e.g., the rules that the plaintiff must experience a physical impact, or exhibit physical symptoms attributable to his or her emotional distress, or be in the zone of danger created by the defendant's negligent conduct), to separate the wheat of genuine psychological distress claims from the chaff of trivial or fraudulent claims. This court was the first to eschew such physical injury rules when we held in Rodrigues that a plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, absent any physical manifestation of his or her psychological injury or actual physical presence within a zone of danger, where a reasonable [person], normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case. Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520; John & Jane Roes, 91 Hawai`i at 473, 985 P.2d at 664 (noting that, due to Rodrigues, Hawai`i `became the first jurisdiction to allow recovery [for NIED] without a showing of physically manifested harm' to the plaintiff (quoting Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Haw. 557, 560, 632 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1981))). Thus, an NIED claim is nothing more than a negligence claim in which the alleged actual injury is wholly psychic and is analyzed utilizing ordinary negligence principles. Larsen, 74 Haw. at 41, 837 P.2d at 1293 (citing Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520-21). Although Rodrigues established that an NIED claimant did not need to establish that he or she was himself or herself physically injured by the defendant's conduct in order to recover for a purely psychological injury, we have consistently held, as a general matter, that the plaintiff must establish some predicate injury either to property or to another person in order himself or herself to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress. See Guth, 96 Hawai`i at 150, 28 P.3d at 984; John & Jane Roes, 91 Hawai`i at 474, 985 P.2d at 665 (collecting cases in which this court has subscribed to the principle that `recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress by one not physically injured is generally permitted only when there is `some physical injury to property or [to] another person' resulting from the defendant's conduct' (quoting Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawai`i) Ltd., 76 Hawai`i 454, 465-66, 879 P.2d 1037, 1048-49 (1994) (brackets and some citations omitted) (emphasis in original))). The foregoing principle, however, has been modified somewhat by HRS ง 663-8.9 (1993), which requires a predicate physical injury to the NIED claimant before he or she may recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, where he or she claims that the psychological distress arises solely out of damage to property or to material objects. John & Jane Roes, 91 Hawai`i at 474 & n. 6, 985 P.2d at 665 & n. 6. As such, the law as it currently stands in Hawai`i is that an NIED claimant must establish, incident to his or her burden of proving actual injury ( i.e., the fourth element of a generic negligence claim, see Dairy Road Partners, 92 Hawai`i at 419, 992 P.2d at 114), that someone was physically injured by the defendant's conduct, be it the plaintiff himself or herself or someone else. See John & Jane Roes, 91 Hawai`i at 474 & n. 6, 985 P.2d at 665 & n. 6. However, in cases that present unique circumstances, which provide the requisite assurance that the plaintiff's psychological distress is trustworthy and genuine, we have not hesitated to carve out [] exception[s] to our general rule that recovery [for psychic injury standing alone] is permitted only where there is a predicate physical injury to someone, be it a plaintiff or a third person. Id. (emphasis in original). In John & Jane Roes, for example, we held that exposure to HIV-positive blood `involve[s] circumstances which guarantee the genuineness and seriousness of the claim' (quoting Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 171, 472 P.2d at 519), and, therefore, we carved out an exception that permitted relief . . . where [the plaintiff] alleges, inter alia, actual exposure to HIV-positive blood, whether or not there is a predicate physical harm. 91 Hawai`i at 476-77, 985 P.2d at 667-68 (some brackets added and some in original). Similarly, in Guth, we recognized another exception in cases involving the mishandling of corpses, because we believed that those who are entrusted with the care and preparation for burial of a decedent's body have a duty to exercise reasonable care encompassing the obligation to avoid negligently causing emotional distress to the decedent's immediate family members who were aware that the defendant was preparing the decedent's body for funerary purposes. 96 Hawai`i at 154-55, 28 P.3d at 989-90 (adopting the minority view, under which the plaintiff claiming that the defendant was negligent in the course of preparing the body of an immediate family member for funeral, burial, or crematory purposes, could recover for emotional distress standing alone, without establishing that his or her emotional distress [had] manifest[ed] itself in a physical injury). To the extent that the plaintiffs in the present matter attempted to establish the actual loss or damage element of their negligence claim solely by proving that the DOE's negligence resulted in psychological injury, their negligence claim is consubstantial with their NIED claim. Consequently, in order to recover for their purely psychic injuries, the plaintiffs would be compelled by our precedent to establish a predicate physical injury to a person as a guarantee of the trustworthiness of their claim. See, e.g., Guth, 96 Hawai`i at 150, 28 P.3d at 984; John & Jane Roes, 91 Hawai`i at 474, 985 P.2d at 665. The DOE asserts as much, noting that none of the plaintiffs had been physically injured by Norton's conduct. Assuming arguendo, that Norton's molestation of Melony and Nicole would not constitute the requisite physical injury, we believe nonetheless that the circumstances of the present matter, like those present in John & Jane Roes and in Guth, warrant the recognition of yet another exception to the general requirement that the plaintiff seeking redress solely for emotional distress must establish a predicate physical injury to a person. Reinstating a teacher accused of child molestation to a position of trust that puts him or her in close (and generally unsupervised) proximity with children, without first ascertaining that it is, at the very least, more likely than not that he or she is actually innocent of the accusation, certainly, as we explain more fully infra in sections III.A.2.a and b, renders it particularly foreseeable, see John & Jane Roes, 91 Hawai`i at 474, 985 P.2d at 665 (citation omitted), that the teacher may molest one of his or her students. Put simply, where such circumstances are present, and the teacher in fact molests a student while the child is in attendance at school, we believe it self-evident that the child's resulting psychological trauma, as well as that of the child's parents, involve[s] circumstances [that] guarantee [its] genuineness and seriousness[.] See Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 171, 472 P.2d at 519. Like negligently exposing a person to HIV, negligently placing a child in an environment where he or she is left unsupervised with an accused child molester, without undertaking any reasonable effort to ascertain whether it can be anticipated that the accused will molest again, makes the threat of [molestation] much more of a real possibility to be feared and far more than a speculative worry. See John & Jane Roes, 91 Hawai`i at 476, 985 P.2d at 667. In the words of Dr. Annon, whose testimony was uncontradicted, reinstating Norton after his acquittal without requiring that he undergo a psychological evaluation and without imposing any restrictions upon his conduct or subjecting him to heightened supervision constituted a real risk to the children. See supra note 20. That being the case, the DOE urges us in vain to preclude the plaintiffs from recovering any of their damages at all, simply because they did not prove a predicate physical injury to a person. We turn, then, to the DOE's challenges to the circuit court's determinations as to the remainder of the elements that the plaintiffs were required to establish in order to recover for their psychic injuriesโ i.e., duty of care, breach of duty, and legal causation.
As a general matter, a person does not have a duty to act affirmatively to protect another person from harm by a third person. Lee v. Corregedore, 83 Hawai`i 154, 159, 925 P.2d 324, 329 (1996). Thus, `[a] prerequisite to any negligence action is the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiffs[]' that `require[s] the [defendant] to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of [the plaintiff] against unreasonable risks.' Id. at 158-59, 925 P.2d at 328-29 (quoting Maguire v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 79 Hawai`i 110, 112, 899 P.2d 393, 395 (1995), and Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, 73 Haw. 359, 366, 833 P.2d 70, 74 (1992)); see also Touchette v. Ganal, 82 Hawai`i 293, 299, 922 P.2d 347, 352 (1996) (citing, as the general rule, Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 314, at 116 (1965): [t]he fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his or her part is necessary for another's ... protection does not of itself impose upon him or her a duty to take such action (brackets omitted)). Whether a person owes another a duty reasonably to protect the other from foreseeable harm by a third person depends upon whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of such a duty. If, for example, there is a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff, or between the defendant and a third person, then the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty to control the conduct of [the] third person so as to prevent him or her from causing physical harm to the plaintiff. Touchette, 82 Hawai`i at 298-99, 922 P.2d at 352-53 (quoting Cuba v. Fernandez, 71 Haw. 627, 631-32, 801 P.2d 1208, 1211 (1990) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 315, at 122 (1965))). Accordingly, because of the special relationship shared between a common carrier and its passengers, an innkeeper and his or her guests, a possessor of land (who holds his or her land open to the public) and his or her invitees, and a custodian and his or her ward, the law imposes upon the former the duty to take reasonable steps to protect the latter from foreseeable harms. Id. at 299, 922 P.2d at 353 (quoting Cuba, 71 Haw. at 631-32, 801 P.2d at 1211 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 314A, at 118 (1965))). The section 314A list is not, however, exhaustive, and other circumstances may engender a special relationship, such that the defendant will owe the plaintiff a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect the plaintiff from the conduct of a third person. Id. at 299, 922 P.2d at 353. Thus, we have expressly held that, if the State has entered into a custodial relationship [40] with a particular person, then the State owes that person an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to prevent any harmโ which the State foresees or should reasonably anticipateโbefalling its ward, either by his or her own hand or by that of another. See, e.g., Lee, 83 Hawai`i at 161, 925 P.2d at 331 ([w]hen one party is in the custodial care of another, as in the case of a jailed prisoner, the custodian has the duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the protection of the life and health of the person in custody (quoting City of Belen v. Harrell, 93 N.M. 601, 603 P.2d 711, 713 (1979))); id. at 174, 925 P.2d at 344 (Levinson, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the proposition quoted from Belen); Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 376-80, 604 P.2d 1198, 1202-04 (1979) (judicial commitment of juvenile to Hawai`i Youth Correctional Facility placed the State under the duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the juvenile's suicide). Absent a duty to adhere to a particular standard of care by virtue of the State and either the plaintiff or the third person sharing a special relationship (or, alternatively, because a statute or administrative rule or regulation mandates that the defendant adhere to a particular standard of care, see, e.g., Tseu ex rel. Hobbs v. Jeyte, 88 Hawai`i 85, 90-92, 962 P.2d 344, 350-51 (1998); Upchurch, 51 Haw. at 154, 454 P.2d at 115), the State is, as is any person, generally required to exercise only ordinary care in the activities it affirmatively undertakes to prevent foreseeable harm to others. Upchurch, 51 Haw. at 152, 454 P.2d at 114; see also, e.g., Lee, 83 Hawai`i at 162, 925 P.2d at 332 ([i]n general, anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise the care of [a] reasonable [person] to protect [others] against an unreasonable risk of harm to them arising out of the act (quoting Touchette, 82 Hawai`i at 301-02, 922 P.2d at 355-56 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 302 Comment a, at 82 (1965)))) (emphasis omitted) (brackets in original). Regardless of the source of a particular duty, a defendant's liability for failing to adhere to the requisite standard of care is limited by the preposition that the defendant's obligation to refrain from particular conduct [or, as the circumstances may warrant, to take whatever affirmative steps are reasonable to protect another] is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct [or omission] unreasonably dangerous. John & Jane Roes, 91 Hawai`i at 473, 985 P.2d at 664 (quoting Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 174, 472 P.2d at 521). Thus, if it is not reasonably foreseeable that the particular plaintiff will be injured if the expected harm in fact occurs, the defendant does not owe that plaintiff a duty reasonably to prevent the expected harm. See, e.g., Acoba v. General Tire, Inc., 92 Hawai`i 1, 18, 986 P.2d 288, 305 (1999) ([a]n actionable duty is generally owed to foreseeable plaintiffs subjected to an unreasonable risk of harm created by the actor's negligent conduct (quoting Seibel v. City and County of Honolulu, 61 Haw. 253, 257, 602 P.2d 532, 536 (1979))). Similarly, but not synonymously, if the harm is not reasonably foreseeable, the defendant will not be deemed to have breached the duty of care that he or she owes to a foreseeable plaintiff. See, e.g., Knodle, 69 Haw. at 385, 388, 742 P.2d at 383, 385 (noting that what is reasonable under the circumstances of any given negligence case for purposes of determining whether the defendant's conduct breached his or her duty of care is marked out by the foreseeable range of danger and, thus, there must be some probability of harm sufficiently serious that [a reasonable and prudent person] would take precautions to avoid it (citations omitted)). With the foregoing general principles in mind, we address the DOE's arguments challenging the circuit court's determination that the DOE owed each of the plaintiffs a duty to refrain from negligently inflicting emotional distress upon them, or, in other words, to take reasonable precautions to avoid the foreseeable risk that Norton would molest Melony and Nicole. Quoting Miller v. Yoshimoto, 56 Haw. 333, 340, 536 P.2d 1195, 1199 (1975), the circuit court noted that the DOE is under the duty to reasonably supervis[e] public school students during their required attendance and presence at school. Moreover, relying on our citation in Lee of Eisel v. Board of Education, 324 Md. 376, 597 A.2d 447 (1991) (holding that school counselor owes a duty to use reasonable means to attempt to prevent student's suicide if he or she is on notice of student's suicidal ideation), and Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 903 P.2d 73 (1995) (holding that school district and teacher were subject to statutory duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising students and preventing foreseeable harm to them), the circuit court concluded that, because the DOE stood in the position of a parent with regard to its students, the DOE was specifically subject to a duty not only to supervise students, but [also] to take such reasonable measures as would be taken by reasonable parents to avoid injury to students. See Lee, 83 Hawai`i at 171, 925 P.2d at 341 (distinguishing Eisel and Brooks from the record before it on the basis that, in those cases, children [were] under the care, protection, control and supervision of their respective schools, a role which the Brooks court `described as one in loco parentis' (quoting Brooks, 903 P.2d at 79)); see also Eisel, 597 A.2d at 451-52 (the relation of a school vis[-]a[-]vis a pupil is analogous to one who stands in loco parentis, with the result that a school is under a special duty to exercise reasonable care to protect a pupil from harm (as quoted in Lee, 83 Hawai`i at 171, 925 P.2d at 341)). The DOE takes particular exception to the circuit court's Conclusion of Law (COL) No. 35 to the effect that, on the facts of this case, the requisite standard of care included the following specific duties: a. to conduct a reasonably thorough administrative investigation of T.Y.'s allegations against Norton, so as to avoid the possibility of similar actions against other students . . . ; b. to adequately supervise its employees, including teachers, who are in a position to cause injury to students; c. to provide adequate training to its administrators in appropriate issues, such as the proper methodology for conducting administrative investigations, pedophilia, and the procedures for conducting interviews of [] students who may be victims of sexual molestation by a teacher; d. to not make misrepresentations of fact to others who rely on representations made by DOE administrators regarding issues that concern and directly impact the safety of students; and e. to properly conduct interviews of students who may be victims of sexual molestation by a teacher, and to immediately contact the parents of such students, unless good cause exists not to contact the parents. The DOE also challenges the circuit court's COL No. 36, which concluded that these duties extend not only to the students themselves, but to the parents of the students, because it is reasonably foreseeable that the parents of students would also be foreseeably endangered by breaches of these duties. The DOE maintains that it merely owes students a duty of reasonable supervision during their required attendance at school; in support of its position, the DOE cites Kim v. State, 62 Haw. 483, 491-92, 616 P.2d 1376, 1381-82 (1980). Thus, the DOE perceives the circuit court's ruling as greatly expand[ing] the standard of care to which it must conform its conduct in superintending Hawai`i's public schools. Indeed, in the DOE's view, the circuit court imposed new duties upon it that, in essence, hold it to the standard of care of detectives, attorneys, and mental health counselors. The DOE argues that the circuit court erroneously predicated its conclusions with respect to the duty that the DOE owed to the plaintiffs on its findings with regard to the foreseeability of the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. In this vein, the DOE contends that, [a]ccording to the circuit court, the DOE could foresee that: (1) [Schlosser's] interview of [Melony and Nicole] as potential witnesses to the assault on A.C. would result in statements by the girls that they too were molested; (2) [n]either the girls nor the military police, in the course of their investigation, would directly inform the parents of the sexual assaults; (3) [Schlosser's] specific inquiry into the nature of Norton's assaults upon Melony and Nichole would exacerbate their emotional distress to such an extent that the girls could never be effective witnesses against Norton in a subsequent criminal trial; (4) [a]s a result, two juries would not find [Melony's and Nicole's] allegations credible; and (5) Norton would be acquitted, for a second time, of sexual assault charges. The DOE urges us to hold that such harms were not reasonably foreseeable and, therefore, should not predicate the imposition of any new duties upon it. Finally, the DOE asserts that, in any event, mere foreseeability of the harm, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis upon which to predicate the imposition of a duty of care. In our view, the circuit court was correct in concluding that the DOE's duty ran, not only to Melony and Nicole, but to their respective parents, because it was reasonably foreseeable that both the students and their parents would suffer emotional distress in the event that Norton molested the students. Nor do we construe the circuit court's conclusions regarding the duty of care that the DOE owed to the plaintiffs as imposing anything new upon the DOE. Rather, as we explain below, our case law supports the circuit court's determination that the DOE, standing in loco parentis, owes students and their parents a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent reasonably foreseeable harms to its students. In Miller, this court held that the State has a duty of reasonably supervising the public school students of Hawaii during their required attendance and presence at school and while the students are leaving school immediately after the school day is over. 56 Haw. at 340, 536 P.2d at 1199 (citing Titus v. Lindberg, 49 N.J. 66, 228 A.2d 65, 68 (1967)). The duty of reasonable supervision entails general supervision of students, unless specific needs, or a dangerous or likely to be dangerous situation calls for specific supervision. Id. Miller, a student at a public intermediate school, was struck in her left eye with a rock thrown by Yoshimoto, one of her fellow students, while walking across the school campus on her way home shortly after classes had been dismissed for the day. Id. at 333-37, 536 P.2d at 1196-98. As a result, Miller's left eye had to be replaced with an artificial eye. Id. at 337, 536 P.2d at 1198. Miller sued, inter alia, the State, claiming that the school's administrators and teachers had been negligent in supervising students at the time of the incident. Id. at 333, 536 P.2d at 1196. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the State, and Miller appealed. Id. On appeal, this court held that rules and regulations that the DOE had adopted provid[ed] the necessary guidelines and requirements for the personnel of the State educational system to perform its supervisory duties. [41] Id. at 340, 536 P.2d at 1199. We noted that numerous school administrators and teachers had been stationed around the school at the time of Miller's injury for the purpose of supervising the students' departure for the day, but that no one had been specifically assigned to supervise the area of the school grounds where Miller was injured. Id. at 340-41, 536 P.2d at 1200. Absent evidence that the area in which Miller was injured was dangerous in character or likely to be dangerous because of known deviant conduct of students or of others, thereby requiring specific supervision, this court held that the school was not subject to a duty to single out either the area or Yoshimoto. Id. at 341, 536 P.2d at 1200. We explained that [t]he duty of reasonable supervision does not require the [DOE] to provide personnel to supervise every portion of the school buildings and campus area. However, if certain specific areas are known to the [DOE] as dangerous, or the [DOE] should have known that a specific area is dangerous, or the [DOE] knew or should have known that certain students would or may conduct themselves in a manner dangerous to the welfare of others, [the DOE's] duty of reasonable supervision would require specific supervision of those situations. Id. However, because Miller had failed to establish that the DOE had breached the duty of care that it owed her, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the State. Id. at 341-42, 536 P.2d at 1200-201. Because the Miller court grounded the duty of care that the DOE owed to Miller in the DOE's policies and regulations, it did not discuss whether the DOE shared a special relationship with students and their parents. In Kim, we held the DOE to the duty of care that we had articulated in Miller, without further elaboration as to its source. Several high school students were engaging in disruptive behavior, i.e., giggling, scooting of chairs, whispering, and some gestur[ing] that apparently [was] directed at Kimโa new student at the schoolโduring class. 62 Haw. at 485, 492, 616 P.2d at 1378, 1383. The classroom teacher rebuked the disruptive students. Id. at 485, 616 P.2d at 1378. The following day, the teacher overheard several students conversing in an unruly manner in the hallway outside her classroom; Kim was inside the teacher's classroom at the time. Id. Minutes later, a large male student, a newly-enrolled tenth grader the teacher did not know at that time, entered the room and advanced determinedly and aggressively towards Kim. Id. at 486, 616 P.2d at 1378. The teacher fled the classroom, seeking the principal's and vice-principal's assistance, both of whom occupied offices adjacent to the classroom. Id. at 486, 616 P.2d at 1379. Meanwhile, the intruding student pummeled Kim, who sustained serious injuries as a result. Id. Arriving quickly on the scene, the principal and the vice-principal, apparently with some difficulty, overcame Kim's assailant and restore[d] order. Id. Kim sued the State, claiming that his injuries were legally caused by the DOE's negligence in failing adequately to police, control, and supervise the classroom where he had been attacked, as well as in otherwise neglecting to adopt measures to ensure his safety. Id. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the State and Kim appealed. Id. at 484, 616 P.2d at 1378. On appeal, we reiterated that the DOE's duty reasonably to supervise students entails `general supervision of students, unless specific needs, or a dangerous or likely to be dangerous situation calls for specific supervision.' Id. at 491-92, 616 P.2d at 1381-82 (quoting Miller, 56 Haw. at 340, 536 P.2d at 1199). With respect to whether the school's administrators and teachers should have been aware of the imminent danger of an intrusion by a student with a propensity for violence, this court determined that the students' disruptive behavior the previous day was not such [conduct] that would give rise to a probability of an invasion of the classroom by another student with a proclivity for harm. Id. at 492, 616 P.2d at 1382. This court therefore held that, [a]s the peril was neither known nor reasonably foreseeable, there was no basis for the imposition of a duty of specific supervision upon the DOE to cope with the danger. Id. Although neither Miller nor Kim expressly determined that there was a special relationship between the DOE and either its students or its students' parents, in Lee, as we have noted, we cited with approval to two other jurisdictions that have held that a school or school district stands in the shoes of a student's parents when the student is in the school's custody. The issue sub judice in Lee was whether the State and its employee, Manuel Corregedore, owed a duty to Anthony Perreira to prevent his suicide. 83 Hawai`i at 156, 925 P.2d at 326. At the State of Hawai`i's Office of Veterans' Services, the State employed Corregedore as a Veterans' Services Counselor IV; at the time he committed suicide, Perreira, a disabled Vietnam veteran, regularly met with and received help from Corregedore. [42] Id. In a wrongful death claim maintained by Perreira's estate, the plaintiffs asserted that Corregedore was subject to an affirmative duty, arising from his professional relationship with Perreira, to prevent Perreira's suicide. Id. at 156, 158, 925 P.2d at 326, 328; accord id. at 177 n. 3, 925 P.2d at 348 n. 3 (Levinson, J., dissenting) (noting that the plaintiffs assert only that Corregedore owed Perreira a duty to take reasonable action to prevent his suicide (emphasis omitted)). On appeal, a majority of this court held that Corregedore did not owe Perreira such a duty. Id. at 172-73, 925 P.2d at 342-43 (declining to impose such a duty upon Corregedore as a matter of common law and holding that HRS ch. 363, relating to veterans' rights and benefits, did not impose a statutory duty of care upon Corregedore to prevent Perreira's suicide). In a lengthy discussion of the policy considerations that, in the Lee majority's view, ultimately militated against imposing a duty upon Corregedore to prevent Perriera's suicide, see Lee, 83 Hawai`i at 166-72, 925 P.2d at 336-42, the Lee majority distinguished Eisel and Brooks as follows: We are aware of one instance in which a court held that school counselors [at a middle school] have a duty to use reasonable means to attempt to prevent a [student's] suicide when they are on notice of a child or adolescent student's suicidal intent. Eisel [,] . . . 597 A.2d [at] 456[ ]. In addition, another court held that a high school teacher had a duty to exercise reasonable care in preventing a high school student's suicide. Brooks [,] . . . 903 P.2d [at] 79[ ]. However, both Eisel and Brooks are clearly distinguishable from the instant case. While the suicide victim in the instant case, Perreira, was an independent, forty-two year old adult man, Eisel's claim involve[d] suicide by an adolescent[,] Eisel, 597 A.2d at 451, and Brooks involved the suicide of fourteen-year-old Jeffrey Brooks. Brooks, 903 P.2d at 75. Thus, while Perreira had the freedom, as an adult, to enter or leave the Veterans Administration Clinic and the Office of Veterans' Services, accepting or refusing medical treatment as he pleased, the suicide victims in Eisel and Brooks were children under the care, protection, control[,] and supervision of their respective schools, a role which the Brooks court described as one in loco parentis. Brooks, 903 P.2d at 79 (emphases in original). Likewise, the Eisel court recognized the doctrine that the relation of a school vis a vis a pupil is analogous to one who stands in loco parentis, with the result that a school is under a special duty to exercise reasonable care to protect a pupil from harm. Eisel, 597 A.2d at 451-52 (emphases added; quotation marks and citations omitted). The Eisel and Brooks courts also based their holdings on statutes that imposed a duty on schools to protect children from suicides. In Eisel, the Maryland General Assembly ha[d] made it quite clear [through the Youth Suicide Prevention School Programs Act] that prevention of youth suicide is an important public policy, and that local schools should be at the forefront of the prevention effort. Eisel, 597 A.2d at 453. In a clear reference to the distinction between adults and children, the Eisel court noted that [t]he Act d[id] not view . . . troubled children as standing independently, to live or die on their own. Id. at 454. Likewise, in Brooks, the Idaho legislature [had] enacted I.C. ง 33-512(4), which created a statutory duty . . . requir[ing] a school district to act reasonably in the face of foreseeable risks of harm and to act affirmatively to prevent foreseeable harm to its students. Brooks, 903 P.2d at 79. In contrast to school children, adults such as Perreira have much greater personal autonomy and decision-making freedom with respect to their own health care. Lee, 83 Hawai`i at 171, 925 P.2d at 341 (some brackets and ellipsis points added and some in original). In Eisel, the plaintiff (thirteen-year-old Nicole Eisel's father) brought a wrongful death action against the Maryland Board of Education, in which he argued that school counselors have a duty to intervene to attempt to prevent a student's threatened suicide. 597 A.2d at 448. During the week preceding her suicide, Nicole informed several friends that she intended to commit suicide; these friends related Nicole's intention to their school counselor, who, in turn, related it to Nicole's school counselor. Id. at 449. Both counselors confronted Nicole with their knowledge of her statements to her friends, but Nicole denied making those statements. Id. Neither counselor, however, informed Nicole's parents or school administrators about Nicole's intent to commit suicide. Id. at 450. The specific issue on appeal was whether the school had breached its duty of care by failing to inform Nicole's parents of her reported suicidal ideation. Id. at 448. With respect to the duty of care that the school owed to Nicole, the Eisel court acknowledged that a special relationship between a defendant and the suicidal person creates a duty to prevent a foreseeable suicide, but noted that [r]ecent attempts to extend the duty to prevent suicide beyond custodial or therapist-patient relationships have failed. Id. Nevertheless, the Eisel court believed that a number of factors distinguished the case before it from those cases finding an absence of any duty on the basis that the custodial relationship between the suicide victim and the defendant was other than that of hospital and patient or jailer and prisoner. Id. at 451. Those factors were: (1) that the suicide in Eisel was that of an adolescent; (2) that the school's conduct at issue in Eisel was its failure to communicate the child's reported suicidal ideation to her father, rather than a failure to physically prevent the child's suicide; (3) that the relationship between school counselor and students was not devoid of therapeutic overtones, as reflected in the official job description of school counselors and in Nicole's counselor's specific qualifications; and (4) that the Maryland Court of Appeals (the state's court of last resort) had previously recognized that the relation of a school vis[-]a[-]vis a pupil is analogous to one who stands in loco parentis, with the result that a school is under a special duty to exercise reasonable care to protect a pupil from harm[.] Id. at 451-52. For the last proposition, the Maryland Court of Appeals cited, inter alia, the Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 320, at 130 (1965), which we discuss infra. Id. at 452. In the Eisel court's view, the foregoing factors reflected that it is an open question whether there is a duty to attempt to prevent an adolescent's suicide, by reasonable means, including, in this case, by warning the parent. Id. The Eisel court resolved this open question by considering six variables, [43] which led it to hold that school counselors have a duty to use reasonable means to attempt to prevent a suicide when they are on notice of a child or adolescent student's suicidal intent. Id. at 452-56. In Brooks, the plaintiffs (Jeffrey Brooks's family and estate) alleged that Jeffrey's high school English teacher and the school district owed a duty to take affirmative action to detect and assist students who suffer from depression or suicidal ideation. 903 P.2d at 75-76. More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the school district owed a duty to warn Jeffrey's parents of his suicidal tendencies, which, they alleged, he had, albeit elliptically, conveyed in a journal, which he kept as part of an English assignment and which his teacher had read. Id. at 75, 79. In this regard, the Brooks court held: (1) that the school had not voluntarily assumed a duty to help Jeffrey because his teacher had, in the past, helped other troubled students, id. at 78; (2) that a custodial relationship did not give rise to a duty a warn, id. at 78-79; but (3) that, under the Idaho Code (I.C.), the school owed a duty to protect the health and morals of students, id. (citing I.C. ง 33-512(4)), which, as Idaho Supreme Court precedent established, created a statutory duty [that] requires a school district to act reasonably in the face of foreseeable risks of harm, id. at 79 (citations omitted). Thus, the Brooks court construed and applied its own precedent as follows: Previously, we have ruled that when the legislature enacted I.C. ง 33-512(4), it created a statutory duty [that] requires a school district to act reasonably in the face of foreseeable risks of harm. Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint School Dist., 116 Idaho 326, 331, 775 P.2d 640, 645 (1989); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986). We again discussed this statutory duty in Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 778 P.2d 336 (1989). In that opinion we noted that this statutory duty exemplifies the role of the state to the children in school, which is a role described as one in loco parentis. Id. at 588, 778 P.2d at 338. We quoted favorably from a Washington opinion[,] which pointed out that the duty a school district owes to its pupils is `[t]o anticipate reasonably foreseeable dangers and to take precautions protecting the children in its custody from such dangers.' Id. at 590, 778 P.2d at 340 (quoting Carabba v. Anacortes Sch. Dist. No. 103, 72 Wash.2d 939, 435 P.2d 936, 946 (1967)). [44] Thus, under our previous case law[,] we have determined that a school district has a duty, exemplified in I.C. ง 33-512(4), to act affirmatively to prevent foreseeable harm to its students . . . . Therefore, we find that the question of whether [Jeffrey's teacher] had a duty to seek help for Jeff[rey] is essentially a question that has already been addressed by this Court. Accordingly, we find that there is a duty [that] arises between a teacher or school district and a student. This duty has previously been recognized by this Court as simply a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising students while they are attending school. Brooks, 903 P.2d at 79 (some brackets added and some in original). In our view, Miller and Kim are reconcilable with Lee's tacit acknowledgment that the DOE shares a special relationship with its students, which, we believe, extends to the students' parents as well. Miller and Kim expressly held that the DOE is subject to a duty reasonably to supervise students. In both cases, the students in question had been injured as an alleged result of their respective school's negligent supervision. Impliedly, then, the purpose of requiring the DOE to exercise reasonable supervision over the students entrusted to them by their parentsโunder, we note, the compulsion of law, see HRS ง 298-9 (1993) [45] โis to ensure that the children's educational custodians provide them with a safe environment in which they will be reasonably protected against foreseeable harms that the DOE can or reasonably should anticipate. Moreover, in other contexts, we have approved the rule, set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 314A (1965), that [o]ne who is required by law to take ... the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his [or her] normal opportunities for protection is under a duty to the other to protect [him or her] against unreasonable risk of physical harm. See, e.g., Touchette, 82 Hawai`i at 298-99, 922 P.2d at 352-53. A particularized application of this rule is set forth in greater detail in the Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 320, at 130 (1965), which provides: One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another[,] under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his [or her] normal power of self-protection or to subject him [or her] to association with persons likely to harm him [or her], is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them from intentionally harming the other or so conducting themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to him [or her], if the actor (a) knows or has reason to know that he [or she] has the ability to control the conduct of the third persons, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. Comment a to ง 320 remarks that the rule is applicable, inter alia, to teachers or other persons in charge of a public school. Id. at 130. Comment b to ง 320 clarifies that the foregoing is true because [t]he circumstances under which the custody of another is taken and maintained may be such as to deprive him [or her] . . . of the protection of someone who, if present, would be under a duty to protect him [or her]. . . . Id. at 130-31. Because a child[,] while in school[,] is deprived of the protection of his [or her] parents or guardian, the actor who takes custody ... of [the] child is properly required to give him [or her] the protection [of] which the custody or the manner in which it is taken has deprived him [or her.] Id. at 131. As we have observed, pursuant to HRS ง 298-9, the state required that children attend school and, thereby, deprived them of the protection from reasonably foreseeable harm that their parents normally provide. The Washington Supreme Court has reasoned that, in doing so, the state usurps a parent's protective custody of his or her child, replacing it with that of school teachers and administrators. See Carabba, 435 P.2d at 946-47, discussed supra in note 44. We agree, and in accord with the rules expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts งง 314A and 320, we believe that the DOE shares a special relationshipโ i.e., a quasi-parental or in loco parentis custodial relationshipโwith its students, which obligates the DOE to exert reasonable care in ensuring each student's safety and welfare, as would a reasonably prudent parent. In other words, the DOE owes its students the duty to take whatever precautions are reasonable to prevent harms that it anticipates, or reasonably should anticipate, may befall them. Because it is foreseeable that, should harm befall a student because the DOE breaches the foregoing duty, the student's parents will, at the very least, suffer emotional distress, the DOE's duty runs not only to its students, but to their parents as well. Thus, we read Miller and Kim as addressing a specific aspect of the general standard of care to which the DOE must conform its superintendence of public schools. Miller and Kim stand for the proposition that the DOE fulfills its duty to students and parents by reasonably supervising students while they are attending school or participating in school activities. Our general characterization in Miller and Kim of the DOE's duty as one of providing reasonable supervision does not encyclopedically describe the application of the standard of care to which it must conform under all circumstances, but simply enumerates a particular aspect of the DOE's duty to students and parents in the particularized contexts presented in those cases. Furthermore, as this court noted in both Miller and Kim, generalized supervision does not suffice where the DOE is on notice, or reasonably should be aware, that there is a specific danger to the safety and welfare of students. In other words, the DOE is required to take affirmative steps specifically to ensure the safety and welfare of students if it reasonably anticipates, or reasonably should anticipate, a particular harm. In Miller, the record failed to establish that the DOE knew or reasonably should have anticipated that an unsupervised area of the school grounds was dangerous; thus, the DOE did not owe a duty specifically to supervise that area because it was not reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would be injured there. 56 Haw. at 341-42, 536 P.2d at 1200-201. Similarly, in Kim, because the DOE neither knew nor reasonably should have foreseen that a particular student would harm another, it did not owe a duty specifically to supervise either the assailant or the student harmed by him. 62 Haw. at 491-93, 616 P.2d at 1381-82. What is significant for present purposes, however, is that in neither Miller nor Kim could a duty reasonably to supervise arise under any circumstances if the DOE did not, in the first instance, owe a general duty to students to anticipate foreseeable harms and take whatever reasonable steps were necessary to prevent that harm. Cases like Eisel and Brooks exemplify the proposition that, if a school knows, or reasonably should foresee, that a student intends to commit suicide, then a duty arises to take reasonable steps to prevent the child's suicide, including, at the very least, to warn the child's parents or guardian of his or her suicidal ideation. Both the Eisel and Brooks courts expressly recognized that the specific duty to warn parents of their child's suicidal ideation arises out of the school's general duty to anticipate reasonably foreseeable harm to students and to exert reasonable care to prevent that harm. Accordingly, we hold that the duty of care that the DOE owes to students and their parents is, on a general level, a duty to take whatever precautions are necessary reasonably to ensure the safety and welfare of the children entrusted to its custody and control against harms that the DOE anticipates, or reasonably should anticipate. Although we have not expressly said so in the past, it is readily apparent that the foregoing duty arises from the special relationship that the DOE shares with its students and their parents, which the DOE policies received into evidence in this case, [46] as well as those upon which this court relied in Miller, see supra note 41, confirm. Thus, whether the DOE's duty is characterized as one of reasonable supervision of its students, as we did in Miller and Kim, or as a special duty, in loco parentis, to exercise reasonable care to protect a student from foreseeable harm, as the Eisel and Brooks courts did, does not alter what the DOE's duty quintessentially entailsโto exercise reasonable care in ensuring that students are educated in a safe environment free from any unreasonable risks of harm. See, e.g., Brooks, 903 P.2d at 79; Carabba, 435 P.2d at 946-47, discussed supra in note 44. It therefore follows that the circuit court did not, as the DOE suggests, greatly expand the duty of care that the DOE owes to students and their parents when it expressed the self-evident, namely, that the DOE's duty stems from its custodial relationship, in loco parentis, with students and, thus, obligates the DOE reasonably to anticipate, as would a reasonably prudent parent, foreseeable harm and to take whatever action is reasonable to protect a student from that foreseeable harm. Cf. Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 376, 604 P.2d 1198, 1202 (1980) (The State's duty to Michael to exercise reasonable care arises from the relationship created between the two as a result of Michael's commitment to the Boys' Home by the Family Court and so long as he was in the custody, the law provides that the director of social services shall be the guardian of the person of every child committed to or received at [the Boys' Home]. HRS ง 352-9 (1976); see Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 314A(4).). As a final matter, however, we note that the circuit court may have inartfully characterized as included duties the DOE's obligations to: (1) conduct a reasonably thorough administrative investigation of T.Y.'s allegations against Norton; (2) adequately supervise its employees, including teachers, who are in a position to cause injury to students; (3) provide adequate training to its administrators in appropriate issues, such as the proper methodology for conducting administrative investigations, pedophilia, and the procedures for conducting interviews of [ ] students who may be victims of sexual molestation by a teacher; (4) properly conduct interviews of students who may be victims of sexual molestation by a teacher; and (5) immediately contact the parents of such students unless good cause exists not to contact the parents. The circuit court's characterization of the foregoing as duties should be read in conjunction with its findings relating to the specific means by which the DOE breached its general duty of care on the facts of this case. So read, the circuit court did not, as the DOE urges, impose law enforcement responsibilities upon the DOE's administrators to investigate allegations of child abuse or to hold DOE administrators to a standard of care requisite to mental health professionals or attorneys. Rather, the circuit court highlighted the particular conduct that, on the record before it, was unreasonable and that, therefore, constituted breaches of the DOE's duty to exert reasonable care in ensuring the safety and welfare of its students.
Whether there was a breach of duty or not, i.e. [,] whether there was a failure on the defendant's part to exercise reasonable care, is a question for the trier of fact. Knodle, 69 Haw. at 386, 742 P.2d at 383; see also Bidar v. Amfac, Inc., 66 Haw. 547, 552, 669 P.2d 154, 159 (1983). Generally, the defendant's conduct is measured against what a reasonable and prudent person would . . . have done under [the] circumstances in determining whether there has been a breach of a duty of care owed to the plaintiff. Knodle, 69 Haw. at 387, 742 P.2d at 384 (citations omitted). However, [t]he conduct of [the mythical reasonable and prudent] person will vary with the situation with which he [or she] is confronted because what is reasonable and prudent in the particular circumstances is marked out by the foreseeable range of danger. Id. (citations omitted) (some brackets added and some in original). This court has observed that [d]anger in this context necessarily involves a recognizable danger, based upon some knowledge of the existing facts, and some reasonable belief that harm may possibly follow. ... The test of what is reasonably foreseeable is not one of a balance of probabilities. That the danger will more probably than otherwise not be encountered on a particular occasion does not dispense with the exercise of care. Tullgren v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., 82 N.H. 268, 276, 133 A. 4, 8 (1926). The test is whether there is some probability of harm sufficiently serious that [a reasonable and prudent person] would take precautions to avoid it. Id. .... As the gravity of the possible harm increases, the apparent likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly less to generate a duty of precaution. ... And [a]gainst this probability, and gravity, of the risk, must be balanced in every case the utility of the type of conduct in question. Id. at 387-88, 742 P.2d at 385 (some citations omitted) (some brackets added and some in original). The circuit court found that the DOE had breached the duty of care that it owed to the plaintiffs in several respects, only three of which are relevant for present purposes. First, the circuit court found that the DOE's failure to conduct a reasonably thorough investigation in connection with T.Y.'s allegation against Norton was unreasonable. Second, the circuit court found unreasonable the DOE's failure properly to train its administrators regarding the problem of pedophilia, such that, presumably, they would have anticipated the danger that Norton posed even though he had been acquitted of criminal charges in the T.Y. matter. Third, the circuit court found that Schlosser's interviews of Melony and Nicole and his failure to inform their parents of what they reported to him was unreasonable. [47] The DOE argues that, because the circuit court erred in defining the duty of care that the DOE owed to the plaintiffs, it clearly erred in finding that the DOE breached that duty. The DOE asserts that it acted within the standard of care applicable to DOE employeesโwhich, it contends, is generally to supervise students unless it is on notice that special circumstances necessitate specific supervisionโand that it was not reasonably foreseeable that Norton would molest Melony and Nicole. According to the DOE, [f]rom an objective view, an educator, acting within the duties of school administrators and other DOE personnel, and believing, from all of the available facts adduced during the investigation and prosecution of Norton[,] that there was no evidence to support T.Y.'s allegations, would not be on notice that Norton presented a specific risk to Melony and Nicole. More precisely, the DOE argues, in light of the fact that no further allegations against Norton arose for approximately a year and a half, that it had no specific, advance warning that Melony and Nicole were at risk from Norton's unknown deviate nature. Accordingly, the DOE concludes that it fulfilled its duty to the plaintiffs. With regard to the DOE's investigation of the T.Y. incident and its reinstatement of Norton, we believe that Estomago's initial school level investigation and Sosa's subsequent district level investigation, as cursory and biased as they may have been, were reasonably conducted through the point at which Norton was acquitted in the criminal proceedings arising out of T.Y.'s accusations. Neither Estomago nor Sosa was able to interview Norton or T.Y. concerning the latter's accusations until Norton was acquitted. Norton was counseled to invoke his right against self-incrimination in the face of Estomago's and Sosa's attempts to elicit his version of events. Similarly, the HPD instructed T.Y. and her mother not to discuss the incident with the school. Quite literally, there was very little that the DOE could do pending the outcome of Norton's criminal trial, other than, as it did, to remove Norton from a teaching position. Nevertheless, once Norton was acquitted in the T.Y. criminal matter, the foregoing impediments to the DOE's administrative investigation into Norton's alleged misconduct were no longer present. For that matter, nothing precluded the DOE from observing the criminal proceedings. Instead of resuming its investigation after Norton was acquitted, however, the DOE inaccurately and naively assumed, apparently without consulting its legal advisors, that Norton's acquittal signified that a jury had determined that he was innocent beyond a reasonable a doubt. This assumption was patently unreasonable. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984) (observing that an acquittal on criminal charges does not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt and that a jury's verdict acquitting a defendant in [a] criminal action d[oes] not negate the possibility that a preponderance of the evidence could show that the defendant had engaged in the activity for which he or she was criminally prosecuted and, thus, holding that the difference in the relative burdens of proof in the criminal and civil actions precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel); accord State v. Tuipuapua, 83 Hawai`i 141, 152 n. 27, 925 P.2d 311, 322 n. 27 (1996) (observing that HRS ง 712A-11 (1993) provides that `[a]n acquittal or dismissal in a criminal proceeding shall not preclude civil proceedings under this chapter' (emphasis omitted)); Marsland v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. 119, 125-26, 657 P.2d 1035, 1039-40 (1983) (agreeing with other courts that had addressed the issue sub judice and holding that an acquittal in a criminal prosecution for violation of a zoning ordinance is not res judicata in a civil proceeding for the enforcement of the zoning ordinance); and Mew Sun Leong v. Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., Ltd, 52 Haw. 138, 144, 472 P.2d 505, 509 (1970) (observing that [t]he fact that [a civil defendant] was acquitted in the criminal proceedings (brought against him in connection with the accident [that was the basis of the civil proceeding] ) is not admissible in evidence, nor should [it] be mentioned by counsel to the jury). On the basis of its unreasonable assumption, the DOE believed that any further investigation that it might undertake was without purpose or justification and, thus, summarily reinstated Norton without conducting any further inquiry into the matter. The reinstatement, without more, was unreasonable, and the circuit court did not clearly err in so ruling. We do not believe that a reasonably prudent parent would have done what the DOE did. At the very least, a reasonably prudent parent would have ascertained the legal significance of Norton's acquittal before allowing him unsupervised contact with his or her child. Upon discovering that an acquittal was not a finding or adjudication of innocence โ beyond a reasonable doubt, or otherwiseโand that, to the contrary, the acquittal merely signified that the prosecution had failed to convince twelve people that Norton was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we are convinced that a reasonably prudent parent would not have permitted Norton unfettered access to his or her child. In a nutshell, the DOE should have known that the question whether Norton actually molested T.Y. remained an open one and, therefore, should have resumed its investigation into Norton's alleged misconduct, confronting him, at the very least, with T.Y.'s videotaped accusations, free from the shield that his right against self-incrimination had afforded him prior to his acquittal. Under the circumstances, then, there [was] some probability of harm sufficiently serious [โ i.e., that Norton would molest a M&omacr;kapu studentโ] that a reasonably prudent [parent] would [have] take[n] precautions to avoid it[.] Knodle, 69 Haw. at 388, 742 P.2d at 385 (citation and brackets omitted). That it is, ultimately, unknowable whether the DOE would have concluded that Norton had molested T.Y. or unearthed his extensive history of pedophilia does not affect our analysis because, [a]s the gravity of the possible harm increases, the apparent likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly less[.] Id. at 388, 742 P.2d at 385 (citation omitted). Thus, there need only be a reasonable possibility that, had the DOE investigated, it would have at least anticipated the potential threat that Norton posed and, thus, would have imposed some reasonable restrictions upon his contact with children, such as precluding him from gathering students in his room during the lunch recess, or requiring him to adhere to the DOE's unspoken policy that teachers not touch students in any manner that might be misinterpreted, or, indeed, forbidding him from touching students at all. In the absence of any determination that Norton had not actually molested T.Y. as she claimed, we hold that the DOE should have reasonably anticipated that Norton posed a potential threat to students and, therefore, that it was reasonably foreseeable that he would molest other students. Furthermore, the foreseeability that Norton would do so increased once, after being reinstated, he resumed issuing hall passes, gathering students in his room (particularly female fourth and fifth graders with light-colored hair) during recesses, and hugging them as they departed his room. All of this conduct is precisely what had given rise to T.Y.'s accusations in the first place. It does not require specialized training or education as a mental health professional for such conduct to trigger an alarm that Norton potentially posed a risk to M&omacr;kapu students. Indeed, as we have noted, we have no doubt that a reasonably prudent parent would, upon learning that Norton was once again exhibiting the precise pattern of behavior that gave rise to T.Y.'s allegations, have restricted his access to their child. As such, we hold that it was unreasonable at that point for the DOE to have failed specifically to supervise Norton and to restrict him from issuing hall passes and hugging students. That being the case, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the DOE's failure to supervise Norton or restrict his conduct constituted a breach of the duty that it owed to the plaintiffs. We further hold that the circuit court correctly determined that Schlosser's interrogations of Melony and Nicole constituted breaches of the DOE's duty of care. Indeed, he acknowledged in his testimony that the DOE's regulations precluded him from conducting such interviews and that he was aware that mental health professionals were specifically trained to conduct them so as to minimize the potential psychological trauma that disclosure might cause the girls. Nor can it be gainsaid that Schlosser acted unreasonably in failing promptly to notify the girls' respective parents regarding their disclosures to him, insofar as he advanced no reason for failing to do so. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's findings that the DOE breached the duty that it owed to the plaintiffs by (1) reinstating Norton without conducting a reasonable investigation to ascertain whether he had molested T.Y. as she had alleged, (2) failing to supervise Norton or restrict his contact with children after Schlosser became aware, or should have become aware, that Norton had resumed the very conduct that gave rise to T.Y.'s prior accusation, (3) Schlosser's personally interviewing Melony and Nicole and inducing them to disclose to him whether Norton had molested them, notwithstanding his awareness that he lacked the requisite training to minimize the trauma associated with such disclosures, and (4) Schlosser's failure to notify the girls' parents of their disclosures to him.
We have held that an actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his or her conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his or her negligence has resulted in the harm. Taylor-Rice, 91 Hawai`i at 74, 979 P.2d at 1100 (citations and brackets omitted). The first prong of the test for the presence of legal causation contemplates a factual determination that the negligence of the defendant was more likely than not a substantial factor in bringing about the result complained of. Id. at 74-75, 979 P.2d at 1100-01 (citations omitted). In this regard, a defendant's negligence need not have been the whole cause or the only factor in bringing about the harm. It [i]s enough that his or her negligence was a substantial factor in causing [the] plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 74, 979 P.2d at 1100 (citations, brackets, and emphases omitted). The second prong contemplates... whether there are policy concerns or rules of law that would prevent imposition of liability on the negligent party although his [or her] negligence was clearly a cause of the resultant injury. Id. at 75, 979 P.2d at 1101 (citation omitted). For present purposes, it is significant that the circuit court found that (1) the DOE's failures (a) to conduct a reasonably thorough administrative investigation in connection with T.Y.'s allegations and (b) reasonably to supervise Norton after it reinstated him, (2) Schlosser's failure to conduct proper interviews of Melony and Nicole, and (3) Schlosser's failure to inform the girls' respective parents of what they had reported to him were all substantial factors in causing the plaintiffs' injuries. Although the DOE's argument with respect to the first prong of the test for legal causation is less than clear, it appears that it is contending that any conclusion that the failure to conduct a different type of investigation was a legal cause of [the plaintiffs'] damages is speculative at best. The DOE defends the actions of its employees, generally observing that their assessments of Norton's and T.Y.'s credibility were not arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous such that, presumably, the circuit court should not have determined otherwise. The DOE also appears to believe that the circuit court should not have determined that the negligent conduct of its employees legally caused forty-nine percent of the plaintiffs' damages because the plaintiffs' damages included trauma directly caused by the ultimately unsuccessful criminal proceedings against Norton. Correlatively, the DOE contends that the plaintiffs' participation in the criminal proceedings against Norton conducted in connection with Melony's and Nicole's accusations is a superceding, intervening cause of their damages. [48] Thus, the DOE urges us to hold that, to the extent that any of its employees were negligent, their negligence was not a legal cause of the plaintiffs' damages. We perceive no clear error in the circuit court's determinations regarding legal causation. That the plaintiffs' respective trauma includes that associated with Norton's molestation of Melony and Nicole, as well as that associated with their participation in subsequent criminal proceedings conducted in connection with his molestation of the two girls, is irrelevant. See, e.g., Taylor-Rice, 91 Hawai`i at 74, 979 P.2d at 1100 (a defendant's negligence need not have been the whole cause or the only factor in bringing about the harm). Moreover, such trauma is a part of the very harm that the DOE was subject to a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent, given the foreseeability (a) that Norton's molestations would be criminally prosecuted and (b) Norton could be acquitted, given Dr. Annon's testimony, see supra note 20, that pedophiles were often acquitted of criminal charges. Insofar as the DOE's negligent acts contributed to the conditions that facilitated Norton's molesting the girls, the DOE's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' injuries. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the DOE's negligence legally caused the plaintiffs' various psychological injuries.