Opinion ID: 774266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Copyright Owner

Text: 9 To interpret the statutory provisions at issue here, we must start with the concept of divisibility of copyright. Subsection 201(d)(2) of the Copyright Act provides: 10 Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright... may be transferred... and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title. 11 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2000). As this language indicates, what may be divided are the various rights (such as publication, distribution, and reproduction) that make up a copyright, but not the copyright itself. [T]here is never more than a single copyright in a work, notwithstanding the author's exclusive license of certain rights. 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer On Copyright § 10.02[C][2], at 10-28 (2000). It would therefore stand to reason that an owner of a particular right -- as opposed to the copyright itself -- would not be a copyright owner. See id. at 10-29 (extension of protection and remedies under § 201(d)(2) does not create a new copyright in the exclusive licensee.) 12 Morris, however, argues that there is a doctrine of divisibility of copyright ownership. She points to the definition of copyright owner contained in Section 101 of the Copyright Act which states that a '[c]opyright owner,' with respect to any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). She also notes that Section 101 defines a transfer of copyright ownership as an assignment, mortgage, [or] exclusive license... of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright. Id. Given a close reading, this statutory language does not support Morris's notion that an exclusive licensee is a copyright owner. 13 Section 101's definition of a copyright owner is, by its words, limited to owners of exclusive rights. It therefore does not actually address who owns the underlying copyright, but rather illuminates how the Copyright Act refers to the owners of particular rights in its various provisions. See 3 Nimmer § 10.02[C][2], at 10-30 to 10-31 (suggesting that Section 101's definition of copyright owner bears such a meaning only when the term is used 'with respect to any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright.' (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101)). Section 101's definition of transfer of copyright ownership simply carries through on this manner of reference. 14 Under Section 101's definition, an exclusive licensee may be regarded as the copyright owner of the rights thus licensed. See 2 Nimmer § 7.16[B][2], at 7-165 n.105.4 (emphasis added). Being regarded as an owner and actually being an owner are, of course, two separate things. While it is perhaps unfortunate that the Act's drafters chose to call owners of copyrights and owners of exclusive rights by the same name, we think that Section 101's definition reflects the fact that exclusive licensees are treated as copyright owners for the purpose of protection and remedy pursuant to § 201(d)(2). In other words, Conde Nast would stand in Morris's shoes with respect to infringement of the publication rights it exclusively licensed -- and, as pointed out in the above quote from Nimmer, only for that particular right. Morris, in contrast, would have standing as the owner of the copyright to bring an action for infringement of any of the rights comprised therein. 15 Indeed, the construction of § 201(d)(2) itself mandates the conclusion that an exclusive licensee is not a copyright owner. The subsection states that [t]he owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2). As analyzed by Nimmer: 16 The copyright owner in this context must refer to the licensor, not the licensee, notwithstanding the definition in 17 U.S.C. § 101 whereby the 'copyright owner,' with respect to any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right. If the copyright owner in this context referred to the licensee, the sentence would be tautological. That is, it would mean: The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all the protections and remedies accorded to [the owner of such particular exclusive right]. 17 3 Nimmer § 10.02[C][2], at 10-29 n.52. Subsection 201(d)(2) thus draws a distinction between a copyright owner and an exclusive licensee that precludes the argument for divisibility of copyright ownership urged by Morris. 18 Based on our understanding of the above provisions, we conclude that Section 101 cannot be read to mean that an owner of an exclusive right is also, thereby, an owner of the underlying copyright. Conde Nast was therefore not a copyright owner of Morris's articles when it registered the issues of Allure as collective works. 19 Our conclusion is bolstered by the Circular for Copyright Registration on Form SE, which concerns the form used by Conde Nast to register the issues of Allure as serial publications. In the Circular, the Copyright Office states: 20 The claimant registering a serial may claim copyright not only in the collective-work authorship for which the claimant is responsible but also in any independently authored contributions in which all rights have been transferred to the claimant by the contributors. 21 If the serial issue includes any independently authored contributions in which all the rights have not been transferred by the contributor to the claimant for the serial issue as a whole, those contributions are not included in the claim being registered, because the claimant in these contributions is different from the claimant in the entire serial issue. 22 Copyright Office Circular No. 62 (Serials) (emphasis in original). This language highlights that if all rights in a constituent work have not been transferred to the claimant -- in other words, the claimant is simply an exclusive licensee -- a collective work registration will not apply to the constituent work. If, on the other hand, all rights have been transferred to the claimant, making it the owner of the copyright, then the constituent work is included in the registration. 23 While we recognize that the Copyright Office has no authority to give opinions or define legal terms, and [that] its interpretation on an issue never before decided should not be given controlling weight, Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 946-47 (2d Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted), we nevertheless take comfort from the Office's agreement with our interpretation of what copyright ownership means in the context of collective work registrations. 3 Unless the copyright owner of a collective work also owns all the rights in a constituent part, a collective work registration will not extend to the constituent part. 24 Because we find that Conde Nast was not a copyright owner of Morris's articles when it registered the issues of Allure as collective works, her articles did not fall within Conde Nast's collective works registrations as constituent parts.