Opinion ID: 1436568
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim of Discriminatory Failure to Promote on the Basis of Gender

Text: In granting summary judgment on Mr. McFarland's claim of gender discrimination, Judge Zeldon applied a heightened standard articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit  though never adopted by this court  for cases alleging reverse discrimination. Under that standard, in order to establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs must show additional background circumstances that support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. Mastro v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 371 U.S.App. D.C. 68, 76, 447 F.3d 843, 851 (2006) (quoting Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C.Cir.1993), and Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 209 U.S.App. D.C. 215, 220, 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1981)). Appellant McFarland argues that we should not adopt this standard, and that even if we do it should not apply to him, because he is an African-American man and therefore not a member of the majority. According to Mr. McFarland, imposing additional burdens of proof on an African-American male overlooks hundreds of years of American history and presumes that [he] occupies a privileged spot at GW because he is male. Because Mr. McFarland has failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination even under the less-demanding traditional standard, see supra pages 346-47; Arthur Young, 631 A.2d at 361, we leave to another day the decision whether to adopt the D.C. Circuit's heightened standard for cases of reverse discrimination. [4] Under the second prong of the prima facie test, Mr. McFarland must show that he applied for and was qualified for the promotion he did not receive. [5] See Arthur Young, 631 A.2d at 361; United Planning Organization, 530 A.2d at 677 n. 3. Appellant's application is not in the record, but his resume and testimony are, and they do not demonstrate that he was qualified for the position. McFarland's conclusory statements about his own qualifications are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Hollins, 760 A.2d at 570; Hastie v. Henderson, 121 F.Supp.2d 72, 81 (D.D.C.2000) (plaintiff's own self-serving and conclusory statement that she was more qualified not sufficient; summary judgment granted), aff'd, 2001 WL 793715 (D.C.Cir.2001). Appellant argued that the fact that he received a Master of Business Administration degree from GW and had been working within GW for more than ten years qualified him for the Director position. The MBA degree and his familiarity with GW certainly are relevant, but they are far from sufficient. Mr. McFarland acknowledged that he had no supervisory experience before applying for the position, but the job announcement explained that the director will supervise approximately 15 managerial and clerical employees and that four years of relevant experience including supervisory responsibilities [were] required. Mr. McFarland also admitted that he had never managed a budget; the job description included oversight and expansion of approximately $4 million budget as one of the Director's responsibilities and stated that [p]revious budget/fiscal management experience [was] highly desirable. Because Mr. McFarland did not establish prong two of a prima facie case, it was appropriate to grant summary judgment against him. See Dunning v. Quander, 468 F.Supp.2d 23, 30 (D.D.C.2006) (no prima facie case of age discrimination; plaintiff failed to show that he was qualified for the position for which he applied); Lutes v. Goldin, 62 F.Supp.2d 118, 127 (D.D.C. 1999) (plaintiff failed to establish that he was qualified for a job upgrade, so summary judgment was appropriate). Even if we assume that Mr. McFarland was minimally qualified, his qualifications do not obviously exceed those of Ms. Hunter, and the evidence thus failed to raise the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. See page 8, supra. The fourth prong of our prima facie test requires the plaintiff to show that a substantial factor in the employment decision was [his] membership in the protected class. United Planning Organization, 530 A.2d at 677 n. 3; cf. Brown v. National Academy of Sciences, 844 A.2d at 1123 (that the decision not to hire her was based on the characteristic that placed her in the protected class). One way of meeting this requirement would be to show that Mr. McFarland was much better qualified than Ms. Hunter. If a factfinder can conclude that a reasonable employer would have found the plaintiff to be significantly better qualified for the job, but this employer did not, the factfinder can legitimately infer that the employer consciously selected a less-qualified candidate  something that employers do not usually do, unless some other strong consideration, such as discrimination, enters into the picture. Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 332 U.S.App. D.C. 256, 266, 156 F.3d 1284, 1294 (1998) (en banc). In order to justify an inference of discrimination, the qualifications gap must be great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination. Holcomb v. Powell, 369 U.S.App. D.C. 122, 130, 433 F.3d 889, 897 (2006) (affirming entry of summary judgment for employer on discrimination claim). Mattie Hunter began working for GW in October 1997 in a part-time capacity, handling distance learning. She became a full-time employee on July 1, 1998, and served as the Director for CEEP's Records and Information Management Programs. Before joining GW, she had been self-employed as a consultant and trainer in the telecommunications industry. She previously had spent more than ten years working for MCI, becoming Senior Manager of Corporate Training and Education. In that position she supervised a staff of eight and managed and maintained oversight of departmental expense budgets. She had also worked for Avon Products for several years, becoming a Division Sales manager. She led a staff of twenty district sales managers and developed and implemented strategic and tactical plans designed to maximize sales growth. She had earned a Master's degree in Human Resources and Organization Development and had served as interim director of CEEP for approximately two months. [6] Appellant McFarland has not established that he is on the favorable side of any qualifications gap. Claiming the benefit of hindsight, appellant McFarland asserts that once she became director, Ms. Hunter proved incompetent and CEEP lost vast sums of money under her leadership. However, neither a court nor a jury sits as a super-personnel department that re-examines an entity's business decisions. Holcomb, 369 U.S.App. D.C. at 130, 433 F.3d at 897 (citations omitted). Even if we assume his allegations are true, demonstrating discriminatory intent and pretext requires more than merely showing that the employer was mistaken. United Planning Organization, 530 A.2d at 679. [I]f the employer made an error too obvious to be unintentional, perhaps it had an unlawful motive for doing so, Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections, 318 U.S.App. D.C. 186, 189, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (1996), but Mr. McFarland has made no such showing here. Some courts would wait until step three of the McDonnell Douglas protocol to compare qualifications of the candidates. See, e.g., Lathram v. Snow, 357 U.S.App. D.C. 413, 419-20, 336 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (2003) (reasonable jury could conclude that there was a wide and inexplicable gulf between the qualifications of the candidates, that plaintiff was substantially more qualified than person selected, and that employer's assertions to the contrary were pretextual); McIntyre v. Peters, 460 F.Supp.2d 125, 136 (D.D.C.2006); see also Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 458, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (This is not the occasion to define more precisely what standard should govern pretext claims based on superior qualifications.). But see District of Columbia Housing Authority v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 881 A.2d 600, 615-16 (D.C.2005) (comparing qualifications of applicants in context of discussing whether plaintiff was qualified, an element of his prima facie case). We do not pursue that debate here. Mr. McFarland was required to present evidence raising an inference of purposeful discrimination. He did not do so, and summary judgment was appropriate.