Opinion ID: 4123136
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count One: Attempted Sexual Abuse

Text: LaVictor first argues that there is insufficient evidence to convict him of Count One. The relevant statute, § 2242(2)(B) prohibits “knowingly . . . engag[ing] in a sexual act with another person if that other person is . . . physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating willingness to engage in, that sexual act.” LaVictor contends that the government failed to provide any evidence that C.B. was incapable of declining participation in a sexual act at the time of the alleged attempt. This argument is refuted by the record. Because LaVictor is charged with the inchoate crime of attempt, the government need only show that he took a “substantial step” toward committing the sexual act. Incapacity can arise due to sleep, intoxication, or drug use and is punishable under the statute. See United States No. 15-1580 United States v. LaVictor Page 32 v. Fasthorse, 639 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2011) (a reasonable jury may conclude that a person who is asleep when a sexual act begins is physically unable to decline participation); United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 1017, 1028 (8th Cir. 2005) (sufficient evidence existed even though the victim was awake but under the effects of marijuana because this “may have hindered her ability to object.”). C.B. testified that there was a moment after midnight that she could not recall and when she woke up she was lying on the floor naked. She further testified that upon asking for her clothes, LaVictor became violent. From this testimony, a reasonable jury could conclude that LaVictor took a substantial step toward engaging in sex by undressing her at a time when she was incapable of consenting.