Opinion ID: 1706522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ex Parte Communication to Judge

Text: Petitioner charged, in specification number 5 That on August 31, 1988 during the morning hours, you did place a telephone call to James E. Clark, Judge of the First Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana. That at the time you made the phone call you were not counsel of record for either the State of Louisiana, nor [sic] Tina Brumlett in a matter entitled State of Louisiana v. Tina Brumlett, number 142066 pending in the First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish, before the Honorable James E. Clark, Judge. That in the above detailed telephone call, you did proceed to inform the Judge of a number of matters which were detrimental to the defendant, Tina Brumlett, in a matter pending before the Judge on his docket. That you did this by telephone; that you did this exparte [sic]; and that you did this without permission, advice, or knowledge of counsel representing either the State of Louisiana or Tina Brumlett in the above referenced criminal case. The telephone call you made to the Judge was not solicited by the Judge and the Judge tried to explain to you that it was absolutely forbidden for you to have such a discussion with the Judge in an attempt to influence him. That you have engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; that you have used means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden a third person; that you have sought to influence a judge by means prohibited by law; that you have made an exparte [sic] communication with a judge when you were not permitted to do so by law; all of the above in violation of Rules 3.5, 4.4, and 8.4(a) (c) (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Louisiana State Bar Association. [7] Petitioner has presented clear and convincing evidence that Harrington did, in fact, make the telephone call in question to Judge Clark. Harrington admitted making the telephone call during the August 17, 1989 Committee hearing. Petitioner has also filed in the record the transcript of the proceedings in the Brumlett case which contains Judge Clark's account of the telephone conversation. This account substantiates the allegations set forth in specification 5. Judge Clark related that Harrington told him during the telephone conversation that he, Harrington, had represented Brumlett's boyfriend and Brumlett had become upset with him because he would not share information with her concerning that case. Harrington told the judge Brumlett had thrown an object through the front door of his home, she was from out of state, and would probably jump bond. [8] The judge was quite frankly shocked and surprised that a member of the bar who knows better or ought to know better would have done that.... We conclude Harrington's action violated Rule 8.4(d), and a fortiori Rule 8.4(a), by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Harrington easily could have sought to intervene in open court at the bond hearing. Instead, operating surreptitiously, he sought to provide the judge with advance information, prejudicial to the defendant, which could not be disputed by the defendant. That such an action violates established legal norms is clear beyond peradventure. We determine also respondent's contact with Judge Clark violates Rule 3.5(a) & (b). The Commissioner concluded Harrington did not seek to influence a judge by means prohibited by law. He reasoned the Rule 3.5(a) phrase by means prohibited by law must be construed narrowly to include only such activities as would amount to obstruction of justice, public bribery, or other criminal acts. We disagree. Petitioner notes the phrase by means prohibited by law is discussed in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1984). Conduct `prohibited by law' clearly includes violations of criminal law and presumably includes other acts that violate statutes, court rules, or other legal norms. Id. at 232. We have held the Code of Professional Responsibility, superseded on January 1, 1987, by the Rules of Professional Conduct, has the force and effect of substantive law. E.g. Succession of Cloud, 530 So.2d 1146, 1150 (La.1988). Similarly, the Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by this Court, has the force of law. Canon 3A(4) provides [e]xcept as permitted by law, a judge should not permit private or ex parte interviews, arguments or communications designed to influence his judicial action in any case, either civil or criminal. We hold an attempt to induce a judge to violate this Canon is a means prohibited by law. Harrington made an ex parte communication to Judge Clark. The telephone conversation with the judge was clearly intended to influence the judge to set a higher bail than he might otherwise have been inclined to set. The information was adverse to the accused on the merits of the issue before Judge Clark and was communicated in a manner which sought to induce a violation of Canon 3A(4). Hence, Harrington's telephone call sought to influence a judge by means prohibited by law. The Commissioner further found Harrington did not violate Rule 3.5(b), prohibiting ex parte communications with a judge except as permitted by law. He concluded the rule is unreasonably vague, noting the lack of legislative or jurisprudential authority setting forth circumstances under which an attorney may communicate on an ex parte basis with a judge. The Commissioner believes Rule 3.5(b) should be read to prohibit only those ex parte communications seeking to influence a judge on a matter in which the attorney is counsel for one of the parties. We respectfully disagree with the Commissioner's restrictive reading. As an attorney, Harrington is presumed to be familiar with the Code of Judicial Conduct. He should have known his telephone call, designed to influence the judge in a matter pending before him the same day, could not have been permitted by law. Under the ABA Model Rules, ex parte communications are barred even if it is not clear that the lawyer intended to influence the judge. Annotated Model Rules at 234. A lawyer need not represent a party to a case to be subject to the Rule 3.5(b) proscription against ex parte communication. Id. It is thus clear that the intention of the Model Rule, adopted in Louisiana verbatim, is that the communication need not be made by the attorney while representing a client and, in fact, need not be made with the intent to influence the judge. We conclude Harrington's unsolicited, ex parte communication to Judge Clark violated Rule 3.5(b).