Opinion ID: 1096122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Authority to Disregard Jury Verdict

Text: It is contended by the State that the trial court grossly exceeded its function as set by statute and in essence usurped the exclusive province of the sentencing jury in the capital sentencing scheme. Abram contends simply that the trial court in fact properly granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. Our first task is to determine, if possible, exactly what the trial judge did. First, it is not at all clear that the trial judge actually set aside the death sentence. Prior to the sentencing phase, and again prior to the retirement of the jury for sentencing, Abram reasserted his Enmund and proportionality claims, but the court kept those matters under advisement. It was not until the jury returned a sentence of death that these issues were resolved. At the hearing on this matter, the trial judge stated: [T]he Court finds that under the statute it has no authority, in fact, is mandated to impose the sentence of the jury, that being the sentence of death, and the Court is prepared to impose that at this time. However, because of these legal issues and what is going to happen in that regard, then I will stay, will not set a date for the execution as the statute requires, but will delay that until a decision has been reached on this constitutional question. Later, the trial judge stated: There is no doubt in this Court's mind that the decision [on Enmund ] is correct. For that reason, the Court did accept it and make its ruling that the death penalty, the imposition of the death penalty in this particular case under the facts in this particular record is unconstitutional. Being as that is the case, the Court finds that the verdict of death must be stayed and that the defendant must be committed to the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections to serve the rest of his life imprisoned in their custody without any eligibility for parole. Still later, the trial judge stated: That law [ Enmund ] is changing ... That, as I say, is changing, and that is the reason I have originally just stayed  if you'll notice in that order, I'm just staying the execution of the death penalty, thereby, that I feel like if the case is appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court ... that the Mississippi Supreme could set aside my stay of that execution and impose the death penalty. I think that is still an option that is available if the defendant appeals this case. I kept it open like that for that reason. Following this, the trial judge expressly overruled Abram's post-trial motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Thus, regardless of what the trial judge did, he at least thought he was not granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; instead, he was merely staying the imposition of the jury's sentence. He admitted his belief that the jury did make a proper interpretation or determination on proper instructions. In the Order of Conviction and Sentence, it is stated: That the Court finds that the verdict was in the proper form and that the Defendant should, under the jury verdict, be sentenced to death with an execution date to be set by the Court under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-49.       IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by the Court that Donald Ray Abram is guilty of CAPITAL MURDER. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by the Court that Donald Ray Abram be and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death on the charge of CAPITAL MURDER as set by the jury. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the date for setting the execution of death be and the same is hereby stayed until the Court rules on the motions raised in the Enmund v. Florida, supra, and subsequent decisions regarding the felony murder doctrine on one not directly participating in the murder. In ultimately ruling on these motions, the trial judge entered an Order Permanently Staying Imposition of Death Sentence and Committing Defendant to Life Imprisonment Without Eligibility for Parole. It stated in part: II. That the Court on April 6, 1984 in accordance with the verdict and Mississippi law, entered an order of conviction of guilty of capital murder and sentencing to death, but stayed the setting of an execution date to consider this motion of the Defendant.       IV. That in this case the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Donald Ray Abram had the requisite mental intent to murder and therefore his sentence of death cannot be constitutionally imposed. V. That under Section 99-19-107 of the Mississippi Code of 1972 ... this Court has no other recourse but to permanently stay the imposition of the death sentence ... IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the sentence of death heretofore given the Defendant, DONALD RAY ABRAM, be and the same is hereby stayed and permanently prevented from being carried out as long as this Court retains jurisdiction over Defendant. In form, the trial judge merely stayed imposition of the death sentence. But, as paragraph IV of the final order set forth immediately above indicates, the trial judge in fact ruled that the State's evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding of a requisite Enmund factor. This fact is made clearer elsewhere in the record. In its Opinion on Application of the Death Sentence, the circuit court engaged in a lengthy review of the evidence offered by the State, and applied the law as it understood it to that evidence. The court's opinion stated in relevant part: At the sentencing trial there must now be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was involved in more than the underlying felony and had the mental intent sufficient to be personally culpable for the distinct crime of murder ... For infliction of the death penalty on Abram there must be proof that the defendant ... There is no way to constrain this record by any rational trier of the facts, taking the facts as presented at this trial and all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the State but without extending them beyond what they are, to say that Donald Ray Abram armed himself, that he knew that a life would be taken, that there was any intent on his part to take a life, that he was present during the killings or that he aided, abetted, or participated in or facilitated in any manner the actual killings themselves. This Court finds that ... the imposition of the death penalty ... absent proof of personal culpability of this defendant for this crime of murder in this case, would violate the Eight and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional requisites of the United States Constitution as set out in Enmund v. Florida, supra. (emphasis added). As set forth earlier, the circuit court stated in its final Order that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a requisite Enmund factor. The trial judge's standard of review of the evidence, as set forth above, is identical to the standard employed when ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; it is a non-movant biased review of the sufficiency of the evidence. See e.g., Harper v. State, 478 So.2d 1017, 1019 (Miss. 1985). Elsewhere in the record, the Court stated that evidence of [c]arrying a shotgun in for the commission of an armed robbery... is insufficient  to support an Enmund finding. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the arguments of counsel precipitating this ruling were directed at the meaning of Enmund and the sufficiency of the evidence to support an Enmund finding. As confusing as this scenario is, the State's argument is more so. The State goes to great lengths arguing over the form of the lower court's ruling without regard to the substance of that ruling. The State challenges the judge's authority to stay or suspend a death sentence duly returned by a jury, though never precisely settling on exactly what the trial judge accomplished. In our view, the lower court registered a finding that the evidence of the State was insufficient to support a requisite Enmund finding. The State acknowledges that the trial court's ruling is functionally tantamount to stating that there was insufficient evidence presented by the State to carry the issue to the jury. Brief of Cross-Appellant at 11. Thus treated, the State's argument on cross-appeal evaporates for they readily concede that [u]nder powers historically accorded trial judges, the judge may let the case go to the jury and analyze these claims anew in the context of a post-verdict motion for new trial or in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Brief of Cross-Appellant at p. 10-11; accord Dycus v. State, 440 So.2d 246, 259 (Miss. 1983) (Roy Noble Lee, specially concurring); Williams v. State, 427 So.2d 100, 106 (Miss. 1983) (recognizing power of trial court in capital case to rule against death penalty via judgment notwithstanding the verdict). Accordingly, the question we are left with is whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied Enmund v. Florida to the facts in this case.