Opinion ID: 1510615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Wrongful Death Act Claim

Text: We turn now to the issue of whether appellant's amendment seeking to reflect a change in the capacity in which he was suing under the Wrongful Death Act relates back under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 15(c) to the filing of the original complaint. The trial court, in denying leave to amend, relied principally upon three decisions in this jurisdiction: Paris v. Braden, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 234 F.2d 40 (1956); Harris v. Embrey, 70 App.D.C. 232, 105 F.2d 111 (1939); and Fleming v. Capital Traction Co., 40 App.D.C. 489 (1913). These cases are not controlling here, however, for in none of them did the court have before it the factor of the relation back of amendments under Rule 15(c), so far as it appears. [9] The earlier two cases simply hold that a wrongful death action must fail if not brought by decedent's personal representative. [10] The latest of those cases, Paris v. Braden , held that the plaintiffs, who were surviving children, but not appointed executors or administrators of the decedent, were not personal representatives within the meaning of the Wrongful Death Act. The court also found no abuse of discretion in a denial by the trial court of an application by the plaintiffs for additional time to qualify as personal representatives; but the latter point was disposed of without discussion in a single sentence, and the applicability of the relation back doctrine was not considered. Appellant argues that because no new or different cause of action has been introduced and defendant was put on notice that he might have to defend such a claim, reason and our rules of procedure [11] require that he be allowed to amend his original complaint. On the other hand, appellee, relying on several state cases, [12] argues that because appellant was not appointed administrator of the estate until after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations, the filing of the original complaint was void ab initio due to appellant's lack of capacity to sue. He further argues that if the original complaint was void, there is nothing to which an amendment could relate back. [13] While there is a split of authority on the issue of whether amendments seeking to change the capacity in which a plaintiff is suing relate back to the original filing, [14] federal courts and state courts which have adopted the substance of Fed.R. Civ.P. 15(c) [15] have interpreted the rule as permitting relation back. E.g., Longbottom v. Swaby, 397 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1968); Crowder v. Gordons Transports, Inc., 387 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967); Russell v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 303 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1962); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Shaw, 123 Ga.App. 848, 182 S.E.2d 683 (1971); Gogan v. Jones, 197 Tenn. 436, 273 S.W.2d 700 (1954). These cases have found that there is no substantial prejudice to the defendant because there is no change in the parties before the court [and] all parties are on notice of the facts out of which the claim arose. Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[4.-1] (1974). We think this reasoning is sound. Rule 15 seeks to ensure that litigation be decided upon the merits rather than upon technical pleading rules. See generally Moore's, supra at ¶ 15.02[1]. Thus, subsection (c) of the rule allows a plaintiff (or defendant) to amend his pleadings after the running of the statute of limitations whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. The rationale behind the rule is that if, within the statute of limitations, the defendant was put on notice that the plaintiff was attempting to enforce a claim against him because of a certain occurrence or event, then there is no cognizable prejudice to the defendant when, after the running of the limitations period, plaintiff is allowed to amend the complaint to reassert the claim that was deficiently stated the first time. See, e. g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line, 323 U.S. 574, 65 S.Ct. 421, 89 L.Ed. 465 (1945); C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1497 (1971). Although Rule 15(c) does not specifically address itself to amendments changing the capacity in which a plaintiff is suing, by an amendment in 1966 there was provided a formula for determination of when an amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted will relate back to the filing of the original complaint. Relation back is allowed whenever the party (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that but for the mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him. The major concern in this test is that of adequate notice to the defendant that the claim is being asserted. The Committee Notes on the amendment to the federal rule state that the attitude taken in revised Rule 15(c) toward change of defendants extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs. [Emphasis added.] [16] It is only sensible that it should extend also to amendments changing the capacity in which a plaintiff is suing. In the case before us the defendants were on notice that they would have to defend a claim arising out of the death of appellant's father. See generally Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 40, 325 F.2d 613 (1963) (allowing relation back of amendment changing plaintiff even before the 1966 amendment when the defendant was put on notice as to the nature of the claim against him.) Consequently, it is our view that this case presents circumstances in which the relation back doctrine should, in reason, be applied. [17] We note that even before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and our adoption of Rule 15(c), the Supreme Court held, under circumstances similar to those before us, that an amendment to change the capacity in which a plaintiff sues ought to relate back to the original filing. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570, 33 S.Ct. 135, 57 L.Ed. 355 (1913) ( see note 13 supra ). Wulf involved an action brought under the Federal Employee's Liability Act of 1908 (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970), which like our wrongful death statute, requires an action to be brought both in the name of the personal representative of the decedent for the benefit of the next of kin [18] and within a specified period after the date the cause of action accrued. [19] The plaintiff, a sole surviving parent, originally sued in her individual capacity in the trial court, relying upon Kansas law, and after the limitation period had expired she received an appointment as administratrix of her deceased son's estate and tendered an amended complaint with a claim under the FELA. The defendant argued, inter alia, that the amended petition set up an entirely new and distinct action which could not relate back to the original complaint. The Supreme Court found that aside from the changed capacity in which the plaintiff brought the suit, the amended complaint was essentially the same as the original complaint and that it was not the equivalent to the commencement of a new action, so as to render it subject to the two years' limitation prescribed by § 6 of the employers' liability act. The change was in form rather than in substance. [Citation omitted.] It introduced no new or different cause of action, nor did it set up any different state of facts as the ground of action, and therefore it related back to the beginning of the suit. [Citations omitted.] [226 U.S. at 576, 33 S.Ct. at 137.] Both Rule 15(c) and Wulf, supra, require that because there was no new or different cause of action introduced in the tendered amended complaint and because the cause of action in the amended complaint arose out of the same conduct set forth in the original complaint, the tendered amendment should be accepted by the trial court and such amendment will relate back to the date of the original pleading. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.