Opinion ID: 4471258
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Revocation Sentence

Text: Brown raises several challenges to his revocation and accompanying sentence. He did not raise any of these arguments in the district court, so we apply plain error review. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134–35 (2009). To establish plain error, Brown must show that (1) there was an error, (2) the error was “clear or obvious,” and (3) the error “affected [his] substantial rights.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. If Brown makes that showing, we have discretion to remedy the error only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Brown first contends that he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead true to the allegations in the revocation petition. He asserts that the parties and the district court were uncertain about the allegations to which he admitted and that the confusion prevented him from entering an informed plea. He maintains that as a result of this confusion and the district court’s failure to assess whether his plea was entered intelligently, his due process rights were violated. Brown relies upon Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–44 (1969), requiring a knowing and voluntary plea, contending it applies to revocation 3 Case: 18-50962 Document: 00515265825 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/09/2020 No. 18-50962 c/w No. 18-50963 proceedings. We have not previously decided this issue, and we need not do so here. See United States v. Johns, 625 F.2d 1175, 1176 (5th Cir. 1980) (declining to decide whether Boykin applies to revocation proceedings); see also United States v. Botello, 769 F. App’x 147, 148 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 298 (2019) (mem.). Several of our sister circuits have held that Boykin does not apply to revocation proceedings, 2 and an error is not clear or obvious when our law is unsettled and other circuit courts have reached different results on the issue, see United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d 750, 759 (5th Cir. 2007). Thus, even if the district court did not expressly assess whether Brown’s plea was knowing and voluntary, such failure would not be plain error. Brown also argues a lack of knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a full revocation hearing. See United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 651– 52 (5th Cir. 2006). As discussed above, at the joint revocation and sentencing (for the felon-in-possession charge) hearing, Brown pleaded true to the relevant allegations, thus waiving his right to a full hearing on the merits. Assuming arguendo that the district court failed in some procedural aspects of this waiver process, Brown has not shown that any error affected his substantial rights. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. Specifically, Brown has not established a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have admitted to the violations in the second revocation petition. See id.; see also United States v. Dominguez-Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004). He has thus not shown reversible plain error. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. Brown next asserts that his revocation sentence was unreasonable. We review revocation sentences under the “plainly unreasonable” standard of 2See, e.g., United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 63, 67–68 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Rapert, 813 F.2d 182, 184–85 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1296– 1301 (9th Cir. 1977). 4 Case: 18-50962 Document: 00515265825 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/09/2020 No. 18-50962 c/w No. 18-50963 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). See United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 2011). We will uphold a revocation sentence unless it is “in violation of the law or plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 791 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under our precedent, because Brown did not challenge the reasonableness of his sentence in district court, we would review for plain error only. See United States v. Gonzalez, 250 F.3d 923, 930 (5th Cir. 2001). 3 Under either standard, however, Brown’s arguments fail. At the time of sentencing, a district court “shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). “The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007); see United States v. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 256, 261–62 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying Rita in the revocation context). Brown argues that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court did not explain its decision to order his revocation and felon-in-possession sentences to be served consecutively. We agree that the district court could have given a more robust explanation. But, even applying the preserved-error “plainly unreasonable” standard, we conclude that reversible error is not shown particularly given that the court followed the sentencing policy recommendation of a consecutive sentence. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), p.s. (“Any term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of probation or supervised release shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving, . . . .”). 3 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case challenging our precedent on this point. Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2666 (2019) (mem.). However, even applying the “plainly unreasonable” standard applicable to preserved challenges, we find no reversible error. 5 Case: 18-50962 Document: 00515265825 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/09/2020 No. 18-50962 c/w No. 18-50963 Brown also claims that his revocation sentence was unreasonable because he in effect received consecutive sentences for the same conduct. Put differently, Brown contends that he was sentenced both for committing the felon-in-possession offense and for violating his supervised release on that basis. But a revocation sentence is meant to punish the violation of supervised release; this punishment is distinct from the sentence for the new offense that may trigger the revocation. See United States v. Zamora-Vallejo, 470 F.3d 592, 596 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). We have repeatedly upheld revocation sentences that were ordered to run consecutively to sentences for new offenses that prompted the revocation. 4 Brown has not shown that the district court committed reversible error.