Opinion ID: 794817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Our Standard of Review of Lin's Withholding Claim

Text: 16 In order to qualify for withholding of removal under the INA, an applicant must establish that her life or freedom would be threatened in [the] country [of removal] based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). A rebuttable presumption of withholding eligibility attaches to an applicant who demonstrates that she suffered past persecution based on one of the enumerated grounds. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 339 (2d Cir.2006). Absent a showing of past persecution, an applicant for withholding must show that it is more likely than not that she would suffer future persecution based on a statutory ground if returned to the country of removal. See id.; Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 544 (2d Cir.2005) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)). 17 In accordance with our international human rights obligations, withholding of removal is a mandatory form of relief under the INA. Once an alien establishes her entitlement to withholding she cannot, with certain exceptions not relevant to this case, 4 be removed to the country in which she is likely to be persecuted. See Wu Zheng Huang v. INS, 436 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir.2006). 18 Our review of the IJ's factual findings, including his adverse credibility determination, is for substantial evidence. 5 Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). It remains challenging, however, to determine the appropriate course to take when the IJ's factual finding is based in part — but only in part — on what we have come to regard as analytic errors. Such errors include, for example, a misstatement of the facts in the record [or] bald speculation or caprice, Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir.2004); unreasonable demands for corroborative evidence where the applicant is otherwise credible, see Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 153-54 (2d Cir.2003); Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 285-90 (2d Cir.2000); overreliance on airport interviews and accounts thereof that do not bear indicia of reliability, see Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 180-81 (discussing why some airport interviews are more reliable than others); and reliance on inconsistencies that are not dramatic and self-evident and were never brought to an alien's attention, see Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir.2006). 19 Congress has specified that an IJ's administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 156-57; Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 73. The Second Circuit interprets this statutory standard to mean that the factual findings of an IJ merit deference so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See, e.g., Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 156 & n. 9; see also Diallo, 232 F.3d at 287 (stating that the agency's factual findings must be upheld if they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole (internal quotation marks omitted)). And, where an IJ's errors are relatively minor in light of the record as a whole, the understandable inclination is to assume the errors are harmless and deny review, just as we would affirm a district court judgment tinged with errors that do not affect the ultimate outcome of the proceeding. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004). 20 We must be equally mindful, however, of the instruction of SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943), that a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment. Id. at 88, 63 S.Ct. 454 (quoted in INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam)). It is precisely because factfinding in both the asylum and the withholding contexts is expressly committed to the discretion of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) that, when those findings rely upon legal errors, the appropriate remedy is generally to vacate those findings and remand to the BIA for reconsideration of an applicant's claim. See Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 94, 63 S.Ct. 454 ([I]f the [administrative] action is based upon a determination of law as to which the reviewing authority of the courts does come into play, an order may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law.); Twum v. INS, 411 F.3d 54, 61-62 (2d Cir.2005). 21 Our Court's asylum and withholding jurisprudence, then, remains on a continuing course of reconciliation between the twin commands neither to disturb substantially supported factual determinations nor to let stand determinations that rely, in whole or in part, on legal error. Two distinct but related formulations have emerged in recent cases. In Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 391 (2d Cir.2005), a case dealing with factfinding primarily in an asylum context, we recognized, for the first time explicitly, that not every minor error requires a remand. Id. at 401. The Cao He Lin court stated that, notwithstanding identified errors, remand to the BIA would be futile in at least three circumstances: first, if the IJ explicitly adopts an alternative and sufficient basis for her determination; second, where the IJ or BIA's reliance on an erroneous aspect of its reasoning is so tangential that there is no realistic possibility that the outcome would be different on remand; and third, where overwhelming evidence supporting the administrative adjudicator's findings makes it clear that the same decision would have been reached in the absence of the errors. Id. at 401-02. 22 More recently, in Xiao Ji Chen, a case dealing with factfinding in a withholding of removal context, we reaffirmed the general rule of Cao He Lin that an error does not require a remand if the remand would be pointless because it is clear that the agency would adhere to its prior decision in the absence of error. Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 161. Because (1) the panel in Cao He Lin ultimately directed a remand, and (2) the Cao He Lin panel rejected almost all of the IJ's credibility analysis, finding only one element of it to be permissible, the Xiao Ji Chen panel characterized as dicta the Cao He Lin panel's precise articulation of the circumstances in which remand would be futile. Id. The Xiao Ji Chen panel relied instead on somewhat broader language from Cao He Lin and said that [t]he overarching test for deeming a remand futile . . . is when the reviewing court can `confidently predict' that the IJ would reach the same decision absent the errors that were made. Id. at 162 (quoting Cao He Lin, 428 F.3d at 395). 23 As the Xiao Ji Chen Court recognized, it was not bound by any dicta in Cao He Lin. See id. at 161 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 232 n. 2 (2d Cir.2005) (Calabresi, J., concurring)) ([Dicta] is not and cannot be binding. . . .). It was bound, and all future panels are bound, only to Cao He Lin's holding. Thus, in cases which involve facts analogous to those in Cao He Lin, a subsequent panel is required not to deny review on futility grounds, but in cases with dispositively different facts, it need not do so. 24 Just as the Xiao Ji Chen panel was bound to the holding of Cao He Lin, so are we, of course, bound to the holdings of both cases. We have little difficulty, however, concluding that the two cases are reconcilable. Although Xiao Ji Chen employs broader language than Cao He Lin, the differences between the two standards are, in fact, more a matter of linguistics than law. Id. at 162. Taken together, Cao He Lin and Xiao Ji Chen establish that remand to the BIA is futile a) when the IJ articulates an alternative and sufficient basis for her determination; b) when her reliance on the erroneous aspect of her reasoning is substantially tangential to her non-erroneous findings; or c) when overwhelming evidence in the record makes it clear that the same decision is inevitable on remand, or, in short, whenever the reviewing panel is confident that the agency would reach the same result upon a reconsideration cleansed of errors. 6 25 We reiterate, then, that Cao He Lin and Xiao Ji Chen together provide a nonexclusive — but nevertheless binding — list of scenarios under which remand to the BIA is futile despite errors made by an IJ. These scenarios exemplify those occasions on which a reviewing panel may confidently predict that the agency 7 would reach the same conclusion absent the identified errors. Having discussed the appropriate standard of review of an IJ's factual findings, we turn to the adverse credibility finding in Lin's case.