Opinion ID: 2610
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: fairness of the proceedings

Text: Having rejected Ali's first two legal claims, we now address his third: that the proceedings below were fundamentally unfair, resulting in a decision that cannot be reviewed in any meaningful way. All aliens within the United States, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent, are entitled to procedural fairness. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001); see also Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.2007) (Aliens, of course, are entitled to due process.). In the removal context, that means that an alien who has passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953). At a minimum, she must be afforded the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, Burger, 498 F.3d at 134 (internal quotation marks omitted), by an impartial and disinterested tribunal, Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980), and in a proceeding that is adequate to allow judicial review, United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987). Thus, when an IJ's conduct results in the appearance of bias or hostility such that we cannot conduct a meaningful review of the decision below, we remand. Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir.2006); see also Guo-Le Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142, 148 (2d Cir.2006) (ordering remand because of the IJ's apparent bias and hostility toward the petitioner). Ali's fairness argument is multi-faceted. He has alleged that the agency failed to give meaningful consideration to his evidence. He has further alleged that IJ Vomacka engaged in impermissible prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and conjecture. And he has suggested that the entire proceedingfrom the timing of the Government's motion to reconsider his grant of deferral of removal, to the unusual change of venue, to IJ Vomacka's continued refusal to defer to IJ Iskra's credibility findingamounted to a violation of due process. We confine our discussion to IJ Vomacka's inappropriate comments, as these alone are enough to require a remand and review by a new IJ. [20] We begin with the displeasure IJ Vomacka expressed at being told that he was to reconsider the case, taking into account the record of proceedings in Virginia. At a preliminary hearing on June 9, 2005, IJ Vomacka stated that he was not ... particularly happy to know that on appeal the issue was raised that I should have relied on those tapes because he thought that it was made clear to the parties that [he] was not going to pay any attention to the prior tapes. He also said that [he] honestly d[id] not understand the idea that as a Judge, [he] should base [his] decision on a prior decision by another Judge. And when he issued a decision on Ali's case on October 15, 2005, IJ Vomacka devoted multiple pages to explaining his disagreement with the remand, including a paragraph in which he compared himself favorably to IJ Iskra. These comments, in and of themselves, do not exhibit the level of bias that we have said deprives a petitioner of a fair hearing, but in combination with what followed, they are more than merely troubling. We believe IJ Vomacka clearly abrogated his responsibility to function as a neutral, impartial arbiter, Islam, 469 F.3d at 55, when, without reference to any support in the record, he voiced stereotypes about homosexual orientation and the way in which homosexuals are perceived, both in the United States and Guyana. First, when discussing Ali's claims for relief, which were based on two different aspects of his identity, IJ Vomacka relied on what he called the common understanding of criminals and homosexuals: It seems to the Court that the common understanding, which I believe would apply from the U.S. to Guyana, would suggest that violent dangerous criminals and feminine contemptible homosexuals are not usually considered to be the same people.... Therefore, he concluded, Ali was less likely to be viewed in Guyana as a member of either disfavored group and less likely to be tortured. IJ Vomacka cited no evidence in the record to support this conclusion, and from our reading of the record, there was none. Further, these comments demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the basis for Ali's CAT claim. Ali claimed that he would likely be tortured in Guyana (a) because he is a homosexual, and (b) because he is a criminal deportee, but also (c) because he is a homosexual criminal deportee. In other words, he is a homosexual who, because of his criminal deportee status, almost certainly would be detained by government authorities upon arrival. By treating aspects of Ali's identity as incompatible, IJ Vomacka essentially dismissed, without consideration, a crucial component of Ali's application for relief. IJ Vomacka made a second improper remark about homosexuals when he suggested that no one would perceive Ali as a homosexual unless he had a partner or cooperating person. This comment appears to derive from stereotypes about homosexuality and how it is made identifiable to others. It is certainly not grounded in the record, which, as IJ Vomacka noted in another part of the decision, suggests that an unmarried adult man with no children would be suspected of being a contemptible homosexual in Guyana. IJ Vomacka's improper comments were not limited to those just mentioned. When discussing whether Ali would be able to demonstrate that he was actually a homosexual by walking down the street with a boyfriend, IJ Vomacka stated that given [Ali's] criminal record, his professed mental problems, the length of time he's been detained in prison and other factors about [Ali] and his background, it's not clear that [he] will, in fact, be likely to form a strong or close homosexual relationship whether in Guyana or the United States. IJ Vomacka then went on to note problems with [Ali's] personality. For example, he described Ali as not particularly communicative or articulate and not particularly skilled and mature in the way he expresses himself, shows his feelings, etc. Later in the proceeding, IJ Vomacka indicated (continuing to operate from the unfounded assumption that Ali would not be perceived as a gay man unless he consciously did something explicitly homosexual) that he doubted Ali would make his homosexuality obvious in public or draw the attention of the authorities or the police because he is a person who mostly tries to avoid conflict, slide away from problems, etc., as opposed to a person who deals directly with his difficulties. These comments reflect an impermissible reliance on preconceived assumptions about homosexuality and homosexuals, as well as a disrespect for the petitioner. And taken together, they amount to the type of conduct that we have said results in the appearance of bias or hostility such that we cannot conduct a meaningful review of the decision below and we must remand. [21] Islam, 469 F.3d at 55; see also Guo-Le Huang, 453 F.3d at 150 (remanding because of the IJ's apparent bias and hostility toward [the petitioner]); Floroiu v. Gonazles, 481 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2007) (remanding because the IJ's use of language of religious intolerance taints the proceedings, erodes the appearance of fairness and creates substantial uncertainty as to whether the record below was fairly and reliably developed); Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir.2005) (remanding [b]ecause the IJ's disbelief of Petitioner rested on personal speculation, bias, conjecture, and prejudgment about domestic violence and because he refused to hear testimony that would have challenged those assumptions). To the extent that the BIA found otherwise, we disagree. Floroiu, 481 F.3d at 974 (The BIA's conclusion that the IJ did not violate due process is a conclusion of law which we review de novo.). We also note that the BIA's review of this case in no way cured the defects of the proceeding below. While the BIA decision affirming IJ Vomacka's ruling expressly disavowed some of IJ Vomacka's inappropriate comments, it did not mention some of IJ Vomacka's most egregious statements and inferences. And some of those statements and inferences seem likely to have infected the BIA's consideration of the merits of this case. Notably, the BIA did not mention how the intersection of criminal deportee status and homosexuality would affect Ali's likelihood of torture in Guyana. In this respect, it may well have followed IJ Vomacka in treating those traits as incompatible. Other aspects of the BIA's decision, meanwhile, cast doubt upon whether the BIA reviewed the record with care. For example, at one point the BIA stated that [n]othing in the record indicates that criminal deportees have been harmed or tortured by Guyanese authorities, when, in fact, the record shows that the Guyana Police Force, which has been pressured to monitor the whereabouts and activities of [criminal] deportees on a regular basis, has initiated a policy of intercepting deportees at the airport, resulting in interceptions that include intensive interrogations involving severe physical abuse, arbitrary detentions and extrajudicial killings. The record also includes evidence that the police and police-connected vigilantes have taken violent action against supposed criminals, including criminal deportees. In sum, it is impossible to be confident that Ali has had a fair and full opportunity to have his case considered, Islam, 469 F.3d at 55.