Opinion ID: 777133
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constructive possession of contraband.

Text: 16 Cruz and Gonzales challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that they knowingly possessed methamphetamine with intent to distribute. In order to establish a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cruz and Gonzales knowingly possessed and intended to distribute the methamphetamine found inside the house. United States v. Sanchez, 252 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2001). [T]he possession need not be exclusive, but may be joint. Ortega v. United States, 270 F.3d 540, 545 (8th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). 17 Possession of contraband can be either actual or constructive. United States v. Moore, 212 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir.2000). We have held that an individual has constructive possession of contraband if he has ownership, dominion or control over the contraband itself, or dominion over the premises in which the contraband is concealed. United States v. McCracken, 110 F.3d 535, 541 (8th Cir.1997) (quoting Schubel, 912 F.2d at 955). 18 [M]ere physical proximity to contraband is insufficient to convict a person of possession with intent to distribute. United States v. Lemon, 239 F.3d 968, 970 (8th Cir.2001). However,  knowledge of presence, combined with  control over the thing is constructive possession. Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 18 F.3d 641, 647 (8th Cir.1994) (emphasis in original)). If there is knowledge, control is established by proof the person has `dominion over the premises in which the contraband is concealed.' Id. (quoting United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir.1989)). We have also noted it takes more evidence of knowledge and control to prove that a defendant constructively possessed contraband found in someone else's apartment, as opposed to his own residence. Id. To resolve the sufficiency challenge, we must examine the government's evidence that Gonzales and Cruz had constructive possession over the residence located at 1475 Dewolf Street. Trial testimony established the SAFT team had no knowledge of prior drug-related activity by the defendants before their arrest, and officers discovered no contraband in plain view. The evidence further established that Reynaldo Ramirez, 3 an indicted codefendant, possessed title to the vehicle driven by Gonzales and leased the house at 1475 Dewolf Street, not Gonzales or Cruz. 19 The government sought to prove that Gonzales exercised dominion over the residence by establishing he had access to the house, he had entered the house, and he had admitted to police that he stayed at the house. This proof, however, was subject to several factual qualifications. After police stopped the Jetta and transported Gonzales back to the house, officers found Gonzales in possession of a key ring containing three keys. Police identified one key as an ignition key to the Jetta owned by Ramirez, a second key was identified as a front door key to the house leased by Ramirez, and a third key was never identified. Surveillance officers had not observed Gonzales use the key to enter the house. Officers had only observed Gonzales and Cruz approach the house and exit approximately ten minutes later. No evidence established Gonzales's or Cruz's motive for entering the house or their activity inside the house. 20 The admission evidence was adduced on cross examination, when Officer Morton was asked whether Gonzales had said he lived at the house. Officer Morton responded that Gonzales had said he stayed there. When asked why officers had applied for a search warrant, Officer Morton responded that a warrant was obtained to ensure the search would be legal, adding that Gonzales had said he stayed there, and then he said he didn't stay there. The government did not develop the admission against interest on redirect examination. Officer Morton had spoken Spanish with Gonzales and was translating that conversation at trial. Thus, a jury could only speculate as to when and under what circumstances Gonzales may have stayed at the house, and when and why he recanted his statement. 21 The four SAFT officers who searched the house found no forensic or physical evidence suggesting that Gonzales lived at the house or that he intended to return. 22 Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and accepting all reasonable inferences supporting the verdict, we must conclude a reasonable jury could not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, Gonzales had dominion and control over the premises in which the contraband was concealed or Gonzales had knowledge of the concealed contraband. In reaching this conclusion, we have reviewed prior drug cases in this circuit challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for constructive possession. In each case where we have affirmed a jury verdict, the government has presented more evidence, consisting of eyewitness testimony coupled with forensic or physical evidence, establishing the defendant's control and dominion over the contraband or the premises. See, e.g., Boyd, 180 F.3d at 979-80 (testimony of girlfriend who leased the house that the bedroom was the defendant's and evidence of defendant's clothes and identification in the bedroom where drugs were found); McCracken, 110 F.3d at 541 (testimony of defendant and his daughter that defendant lived at the residence and evidence of personal items with defendant's nickname on them were recovered from rooms where drugs were discovered); United States v. Perkins, 94 F.3d 429, 436-37 (8th Cir.1996) (testimony of ex-girlfriend was corroborated by incriminating physical evidence found inside apartment which was listed as defendant's address in the local telephone book); and United States v. Holm, 836 F.2d 1119, 1121-25 (8th Cir.1988) (testimony of drug dealer and defendant's own admissions at trial of ownership of personal effects, including Holm's passport, which were discovered in a bedroom of the house where drugs were seized). 23 Comparing the evidence of constructive possession presented in these cases to evidence presented in this case, we conclude the government's case against Gonzales for possession with intent to distribute is exceptionally thin. The government presented no evidence that Gonzales actually knew of or exercised control over the concealed contraband discovered inside the house. No forensic evidence established his dominion and control over the contraband or the house. The search produced no personal effects or venue items belonging to Gonzales. No co-defendant, informant, or other fact witness, such as the landlord or a neighbor, testified that Gonzales had knowledge and control over the concealed contraband or that he resided at the house. 24 The government's evidence showed the house was leased to a co-defendant named Reynaldo Ramirez. As such, we will not lightly impute constructive possession of drugs or other contraband to one found in another's house. United States v. Dunlap, 28 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir.1994). Certainly, Gonzales's access to and presence inside the house were circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer he had constructive possession of contraband. Id. However, evidence of mere access and presence, without more, could not allow a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonzales had constructive possession of the methamphetamine. Id. Furthermore, no evidence was offered to show Gonzales had any knowledge of the hidden contraband and no evidence exists from which such knowledge can be reasonably inferred. As in Dunlap, the jury could only speculate that [Gonzales] was guilty of the charges against him: the evidence showed at most that he was probably guilty; it could not have established that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 827. 25 With respect to Cruz, the government advanced a theory that Cruz used multiple aliases and that documents found inside a shoe box in a bedroom identified Cruz and established his residency at 1475 Dewolf Street. In support of this theory, Officer Namanny testified individuals involved in the drug trade frequently use aliases, nicknames, and other peoples' identities to avoid detection by law enforcement. Officer Namanny identified multiple documents bearing the names Juvenal Cruz Varela, Cruz Cruz-Varela, Cruz Varela Juvenal, and Cruz Gubenal. Namanny also testified that a street address of 1931 Washington recorded on the bond receipt for Cruz Cruz-Varela did not exist in Des Moines. 26 To bolster the alias theory, the government contended that a black and white photocopy of an expired photo identification card issued in Mexico to a Juvenal Cruz Varela depicted Cruz. At trial, government counsel asked Officer Namanny if the photograph on the Mexican ID card appeared to be one of the defendants in this case, Barela Cruz. Officer Namanny responded, Yes, it does. Cruz's attorney did not object to the identification. 4 27 We conclude the government failed to prove its alias theory beyond a reasonable doubt. No evidence was adduced to support an inference Cruz had attempted to conceal his true identity. See, e.g., United States v. Wint, 974 F.2d 961, 967 (8th Cir.1992). The government presented no evidence establishing that Cruz had ever used any of the names Officer Namanny identified from seized documents. Police recovered no false identification on Cruz. The government failed to establish with sufficient evidence for a guilty verdict that Cruz did, in fact, reside at 1475 Dewolf Street. 28 Cruz also challenges the sufficiency of evidence presented to prove his firearm charge in Count IV. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) prohibits, inter alia, the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Because we conclude the government presented insufficient evidence of constructive possession to sustain Cruz's conviction under Count II, his conviction under Count IV must also be reversed. 29