Opinion ID: 511846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Time of Completion Warranty Instruction

Text: 48 The County's objection on this issue is twofold. It first submits that the court incorrectly instructed the jury that the construction contract implies a warranty by the County that Briscoe, if it complies with the contract documents, would be able to complete the work within the contemplated period of time. The County also challenges Judge Foley's rejection of a proposed instruction stating that Briscoe, by submitting its bid and entering into the contract, warrants that it can perform the work in the contemplated period of time and complete the project by the due date. 49 Jury instructions need not be perfect to withstand challenge on appeal. Our inquiry is whether, considering the charge as a whole, the district court's instructions fairly and adequately covered the issues presented, correctly stated the law, and were not misleading. Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1337, modified, 773 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir.1985). In a civil trial, erroneous instructions need only be more probably than not harmless. Id. 50 The instruction given by the court relates to a duty imposed by law on the owner of a project who provides work instructions and specifications. This implied warranty was established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 39 S.Ct. 59, 63 L.Ed. 166 (1918). Plaintiff there sought payment on a contract to build a Navy dry-dock. The project specifications required Spearin to relocate an adjacent sewer, which burst during the construction. The Court found that the government, 51 [by] the insertion of the articles prescribing the character, dimensions and location of the sewer imported a warranty that, if the specifications were complied with, the sewer would be adequate. This implied warranty is not overcome by the general clauses requiring the contractor, to examine the site, to check up the plans, and to assume responsibility for the work until completion and acceptance. 52 Id. at 137, 39 S.Ct. at 61 (footnotes omitted). 53 The wording of the time of completion warranty instruction challenged by the County closely tracks language in two opinions from the former United States Court of Claims construing Spearin. See Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 956, 964 (Ct.Cl.1965); Laburnum Constr. Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 451, 457 (Ct.Cl.1963). Similarly, in J.D. Hedin Constr. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 235, 241 (Ct.Cl.1965), the court held that by preparing a project's specifications, the government implicitly warranted that if the specifications are complied with, satisfactory performance will result. Cf. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 75, 78-79 (Ct.Cl.1981) (no time of completion warranty where contractor failed to present any evidence regarding cause of delay). 54 The County does not question the continuing vitality of the Spearin doctrine, but argues that the court in this case imposed an independent warranty of completion by a particular date on the County irrespective of whether it supplied faulty specifications. This is simply incorrect. None of the special interrogatories submitted to the jury can be read to impose liability for work delays absent specific acts or omissions by the County causing the delay. We reject the notion that the County was subjected to strict liability for delays in the plant's completion. 55 The court's instruction correctly stated the law and directly related to an issue in the case. The sixth interrogatory asked the jury whether the County breached the contract by submitting defective, inadequate and incomplete contract documents and specifications. The time of completion instruction, requiring Briscoe's compliance with the contract documents, and the instruction which followed, stating that the County warranted that the documents were correct, adequate, and suitable for their intended purpose, were crucial for the jury to accurately evaluate whether the parties performed their duties under the contract. 56 The County makes only passing reference to its second claim, that the court should have instructed the jury that Briscoe, by entering into the contract, warranted that it could complete the project within the specified time. Although the County has not argued the merits of this issue, our review of the contract's scheduling provisions indicates that such a reciprocal instruction should have been given. We nevertheless conclude that the court's error was harmless for at least two reasons. 57 First, an instruction roughly equivalent in substance to the one requested by the County was given by the court: Briscoe, having undertaken to construct the [plant] ... is under a duty to the owner by virtue of the relationship created by the general contract to see to it that the job is performed in a workmanlike manner, according to the contract plans and specifications. The contract documents, of course, included deadlines for completion of the project. Second, in its answers to the special interrogatories, the jury determined that the County was responsible for 612 of the 667 days Briscoe was delayed in completing the project. A time of completion warranty by Briscoe would have been excused to the extent the delay was caused by the County. The $275,000 remittitur ordered by the court compensated the County for the additional fifty-five days of delay.