Opinion ID: 1176472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Arizona Authority

Text: The court of appeals compared the promise here to the indefinite promises in Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (App. 1982), and Edwards v. Hauff, 140 Ariz. 373, 682 P.2d 1 (App. 1984). Finding Diethrich's promise equally indefinite, the court felt compelled to declare it unenforceable. We, however, find Pyeatte and Edwards distinguishable. Pyeatte involved an agreement between a husband and wife that she would put him through law school in return for his later supporting her through a master's program. After the wife completed her performance, the husband decided he wanted a divorce and refused to honor his promise. Because there were no provisions in the agreement for the cost of the wife's education, the time the husband's performance was to commence or last, or the location where it was to take place, the court of appeals found a lack of the mutual understanding necessary to fix the husband's liability with certainty. 135 Ariz. at 350, 661 P.2d at 200. In contrast, Diethrich's promise lacked only the price term. See Restatement § 33 comment c (The more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement.). Diethrich and Schade understood their respective duties pursuant to the agreement. Edwards involved a claim that the defendant, Hauff, had appropriated an investment opportunity to himself in violation of his fiduciary duty to his principal, the plaintiff. Hauff counterclaimed that the plaintiff had earlier violated an oral agreement that neither would purchase an interest in property without first giving the other an opportunity to participate. The written contract contained no mention of such an agreement and the only evidence that it had been reached was Hauff's testimony that such was his understanding. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of the counterclaim, reasoning that it could have been justified by the lack of evidence showing any agreement at all or by the alleged agreement's indefiniteness as to each party's share of participation. The Schade-Diethrich agreement stands in sharp contrast to this alleged, unilateral understanding. Both parties in our case acknowledged the existence of the agreement and found its terms definite enough to begin performing immediately. We accordingly do not share the court of appeals' belief that Arizona caselaw has recognized the principle that promises such as Diethrich's are too vague to form the basis of a contract. Slip op. at 9. Indeed, such a holding would be contrary to established authority.