Opinion ID: 1674098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Acosta

Text: This cause of action began when, in August, 1987, Louis Acosta was killed when a multi-piece rim and wheel assembly exploded, causing part of the assembly to separate and strike him. In December, 1987, Maria Acosta, as personal representative of the estate, filed a wrongful death action against Firestone Tire & Rubber Company (Firestone) and Kelsey-Hayes Company (Kelsey), the manufacturers of the components of the rim assembly. Firestone and Kelsey moved for a summary judgment, asserting that Acosta's claim was time-barred under the 1975 statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975). In response, Acosta argued that her cause of action could be maintained because the statute of repose in product liability actions had been repealed in 1986. The parties stipulated to certain facts, which the trial court stated in its findings: (1) that the latest date of delivery to the initial purchaser was December 31, 1966; (2) that the effective date of Florida's product liability twelve-year statute of repose was January 1, 1975; (3) that the twelve-year statute of repose elapsed on December 31, 1978; (4) that the statute of repose was repealed by the Florida legislature on July 1, 1986; and (5) that the incident which gave rise to this litigation did not occur until August 18, 1987, twenty-one years after the product was delivered to the initial purchaser and seven and one-half years after the twelve-year repose period had expired. Acosta, 592 So.2d at 1103. The trial court granted Firestone's and Kelsey's motion for summary judgment, finding that the statute of repose was in effect when the repose period expired and, consequently, Acosta's cause of action was extinguished before it ever accrued. The trial court also held that, in 1978, when the repose period expired, the defendants had a vested right which prevented this cause of action and that this right could not constitutionally be affected by the subsequent repeal of the statute of repose. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed. The district court acknowledged that this Court, in Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 515 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1987), held that the legislative amendment abolishing the statute of repose in products liability actions did not apply retrospectively to an action that arose before the effective date of the amendment. However, it concluded that the repealed statute of repose was not applicable under any circumstances after its repeal and that this products liability action could be maintained. The district court reasoned that depriving the appellant of her cause of action in this case would have the effect of applying the repealed statute of repose prospectively. The district court rejected Firestone's contention that the statute conferred on them a vested right and, in so holding, acknowledged that its decision was in conflict with the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Walker.