Opinion ID: 2051555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does the Regulation Directly Advance the Asserted Governmental Interest?

Text: The Court of Appeals held that the ban on home occupation signs did not directly advance the city's interest in protecting the character of residential neighborhoods. In particular, the Court stated that [t]he banning of home occupation signs does nothing to stem the growth of home businesses; it just prevents homeowners from posting signs on their property touting their wares and services. 224 Mich.App. at 328, 568 N.W.2d 832. It also believed that the regulation did not directly advance the city's interest in aesthetics because the city allowed a variety of other types of signs to be posted in residential areas that are no more or less aesthetically offensive than home occupation signs. However, we believe that the analysis of the Court of Appeals undervalues the relationship between the city's goals and the home occupation sign ban. To begin, there is no doubt that signs or billboards on a person's property, by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived as an `esthetic harm.' Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981). Indeed, signs often present unique regulatory difficulties for local government. While signs are a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause, they pose distinctive problems that are subject to municipalities' police powers. Unlike oral speech, signs take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, displace alternative uses for land, and pose other problems that legitimately call for regulation. [ City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 48, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994).] This is particularly true when the government is concerned not about the content of the message contained on the sign, but rather the appearance of the sign itself. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510, 101 S.Ct. 2882. [4] In other words, the substantive evilvisual blightis not merely a possible byproduct of the activity, but is created by the medium of expression itself. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810, 104 S.Ct. 2118. In this case, the city is not concerned with the content of the message on a home occupation sign; it is concerned about the visual characteristics of the sign. The ordinance in question is designed to preserve the character of residential areas within the city. It attempts to advance this interest by prohibiting commercial signs that are at odds with this residential character. Further, the ordinance is not concerned with the content of the message because it leaves open ample means for a home business to get across its commercial message to customers. For example, defendant could advertise through the local newspaper, phone book, mailings or fliers, or she could erect a sign in an area zoned for commercial use. The ordinance does not prevent defendant from expressing the substance of her commercial speech through any of these other mediums. It only prevents her from expressing her message in a specific and limited way. [5] See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 633-634, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (a thirty-day prohibition against a certain form of legal solicitation was upheld because it left so many other channels of communication open to lawyers). The Court of Appeals rejected this line of analysis because the city's regulatory scheme allowed several other types of signs in residential areas. [6] However, we are not persuaded by the Court of Appeals reasoning. First, the city is not required to remove all signs from residential areas in order to further its goal of preserving the character of residential neighborhoods. As the United States Supreme Court has stated in the context of political or expressive speech: [e]ven if some visual blight remains, a partial, contentneutral ban [on signs] may nevertheless enhance the City's appearance. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 811, 104 S.Ct. 2118. Second, we agree with the city that the types of signs that are allowed in residential areas are consistent with the character of residential neighborhoods. The permitted signs are of a different nature than home occupation signs because they are either noncommercial in nature, are protected as expressive or political speech, are informational in nature (such as street signs or subdivision signs), or are temporary signs (such as garage sale or real estate signs). Just because the city has concluded that the interest in noncommercial or temporary signs outweighs its municipal interest in preserving the character of residential neighborhoods does not mean that it must also give similar weight to all other commercial advertising. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512, 101 S.Ct. 2882. [7] In short, we believe that the ban on home occupation signs may directly advance the city's interest in preserving the character of its residential neighborhoods. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized as much. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (the banning of billboards is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics), and Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810, 104 S.Ct. 2118 (a ban on signs responds precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns the City). Thus, the ordinance is not necessarily unconstitutional under the third prong of the Central Hudson test. While we agree with the city that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the ordinance in question is unconstitutional under the third prong of the Central Hudson test, this holding does not alleviate the city's burden of establishing the validity of its regulation. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 416, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993). In particular, a commercial speech regulation `may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose.' 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996). In this case, the complaint against defendant was dismissed before the city had the opportunity to produce testimony or evidence establishing the link between the home occupation sign ban and preserving the residential character of its neighborhoods. Therefore, we believe it is appropriate to remand this case to the trial court so that the city may have the opportunity to establish the proper factual link between the purpose and the effect of the ordinance.