Opinion ID: 1111328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The plaintiff's bill bases its theory of personal jurisdiction on Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 13-3-57 (Supp. 1986), which states in part: Any non-resident person ... who shall ... commit a tort in whole or in part in this state against a resident ... shall by such act or acts be deemed to be doing business in Mississippi. The allegations of the bill, if accepted as true, do describe a tort committed in whole or in part in this state against a resident. That is the tort of deceit. In Smith v. Temco, Inc., 252 So.2d 212, 216 (Miss. 1971), this Court held that the tort is not complete until the injury occurs and if the injury occurs in this state, then under the amended statute the tort is committed at least in part in this state... . See also Thompson v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1167 (5th Cir.1985). In short, there is no question that Mississippi has in personam jurisdiction over the defendant in this action, provided such jurisdiction can be reconciled with the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution. A good discussion of these requirements appears in Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund v. Cooley, 462 So.2d 696, 702-05 (Miss. 1984). Mississippi may not subject a non-resident defendant to a suit in its courts unless that defendant has certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945). This standard also applies to quasi in rem actions directed against property held in the forum state against a non-resident defendant. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). Anita Rudolph contends that she lacks the requisite minimum contacts with Mississippi. She characterizes her contacts with the state as the sort of random, fortuitous and attenuated contacts that do not support the forum state's personal jurisdiction. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 542 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1477, 79 L.Ed.2d 790, 796 (1984); Tulane Educational Fund, supra, 462 So.2d at 703. Admittedly, occasional visits to the plaintiff in Mississippi involving such things as the use of the state's highways would probably not constitute sufficient contacts with the state to justify personal jurisdiction. However, as the plaintiff points out, it is undisputed that after presenting the document to Mrs. Anderson, the defendant drove her to Purvis where the document was notarized at the chancery clerk's office by an official of the state of Mississippi. The Supreme Court has held that personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is proper where that defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 1298 (1958); Tulane, supra, 462 So.2d at 704. In a recent case the Supreme Court stated that where individuals purposefully derive benefit from their interstate activities... it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to account in other states for consequences that arise proximately from such activities... . Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at 473-74, 105 S.Ct. at 2182, 85 L.Ed.2d at 541. The plaintiff contends the defendant's use of Mississippi's legal process for executing documents satisfied the purposeful availment test. Apparently, no court has confronted the issue of whether the use of a notary public in the forum state constitutes purposeful availment for due process purposes. However, if the question is cast in terms of the larger issue of the execution of the document, we do have an instructive case. In Hertz Corp. v. Domerque, 293 So.2d 463 (Miss. 1974), the well-known car rental agency sued a Mississippi citizen who had rented one of its cars in Nevada, damaged it and refused to pay. The action was based on Nevada's long-arm statute, but in deciding whether or not to give full faith and credit to the Nevada judgment, this Court was bound to consider whether or not Nevada's personal jurisdiction over the defendant was permissible under the standards of International Shoe and its progeny. We held that the execution of the lease contract and the ensuing use of the leased vehicle on the streets and highways of Nevada were not such a single and isolated contact with that state as to prevent jurisdiction of the Nevada court from attaching... . 293 So.2d at 466. Admittedly, in this case, not only the execution of the contract but the use of the vehicle in Nevada was involved. However, we did not choose to rely on the use of the vehicle alone; the language of the opinion, implies that either the execution of the lease or the use of the car would constitute a sufficient contact. The due process analysis of personal jurisdiction has one other component, a foreseeability test deriving from World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). There the Supreme Court stated: The foreseeability that is relevant to due process analysis ... is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being hailed into court there. 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567, 62 L.Ed.2d at 501. Anyone executing a legal document in a certain state should certainly not be surprised that any litigation arising from it should be filed in that state. We conclude that in the present case, both the statutory and constitutional requirements for in personam jurisdiction were satisfied, insofar as the chancellor's dismissal was based on lack of personal jurisdiction, he erred. As for subject-matter jurisdiction, it is predicated on MCA § 9-5-81 (1972), which states that the chancery courts shall have jurisdiction over suits to cancel deeds or other documents conveying land. It is sometimes suggested that Mississippi courts lack the power to enter any order affecting title to land in another state. This problem was discussed in Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454 (Miss. 1983), where we said: It is true that a Mississippi Court cannot try title to Louisiana property. Zorick v. Jones, 193 So.2d 420 (Miss. 1966). Nonetheless, if the suit is not one to try title but is a suit against the person of the defendant, the question is not one of subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of the location of the property, but rather is a question of the choice of law to be applied by the court having jurisdiction over the litigants' persons. 431 So.2d at 458-59. Similarly, in Spragins v. Louise Plantation, Inc., 391 So.2d 97, 103 (Miss. 1980), we found no jurisdictional obstacle to a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land located in Arkansas, though we held that under Arkansas law the agreement could not be enforced. The present action is not a suit to try title, but an action against Mrs. Rudolph for the cancellation of an instrument. The fact that the affected land is in Louisiana may make the law of that state controlling under our center of gravity test, e.g., Spragins, supra, 391 So.2d at 99; Craig v. Columbus Compress & Warehouse Co., 210 So.2d 645, 649 (Miss. 1968), but it does not, of itself, defeat the jurisdiction of our courts.