Opinion ID: 769070
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriateness of the District Court's Denial of the Motions

Text: 20 To make out a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must show the existence of a duty. See Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1319 (Ohio 1997). In Ohio, '[t]he existence of a duty depends on the foreseeability of the injury . . . . The test for foreseeability is whether a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated that an injury was likely to result from the performance or nonperformance of an act.' Id. (quoting Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 472 N.E.2d 707, 710 (Ohio 1984)) (omission and alteration in original). 21 The district court was correct to find that DP&L owed a duty of ordinary care to Conte, because DP&L voluntarily undertook to perform services for the benefit of Conte and the other Kessler painters. The Court of Appeals of Ohio adopted the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 in Wissel v. Ohio High School Athletic Association, 605 N.E.2d 458 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). That section states as follows: 22 One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if 23 (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking. 24 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965); see Wissel, 605 N.E.2d at 464-65; see also Best v. Energized Substation Serv., Inc., 623 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (When one voluntarily assumes a duty to perform, and another reasonably relies on that assumption, the act must be performed with ordinary care.); Smith v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 600 N.E.2d 325, 327 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the defendant utility assume[d] a general duty to its customer to exercise reasonable care when it elected to respond to a customer's call for emergency assistance). 5 25 It is undisputed in this case that DP&L undertook to aid GHC in making its workplace safe, and it is undisputed that Conte relied on the joint actions of GHC and DP&L when performing his job of painting the water tower. In order to show reliance under § 323(b), the Ohio Court of Appeals has held, the plaintiff must show actual or affirmative reliance, i.e., reliance 'based on specific actions or representations which cause the persons to forego other alternatives of protecting themselves.' Wissel, 605 N.E.2d at 465 (citation omitted). The fact that the Kessler employees waited for the DP&L worker to de-energize the power lines before beginning their work serves as evidence that they relied on DP&L's and GHC's efforts to render the workplace safe and that they would not have begun painting if they believed that there was a possibility of electrical shock. Exactly what DP&L undertook to do to render the GHC workplace safe is less clear, however; but the scope of the duty undertaken by DP&L was for the jury to determine. SeePeyer v. Ohio Water Serv. Co., 720 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Detrick v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 629 N.E.2d 1081, 1082 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 26 Furthermore, the fact that DP&L did not own or exercise control over GHC's power lines does not affect the existence of DP&L's duty. A utility may still owe a duty to guard the safety of customers and others, regardless of who actually owns or controls the power lines. See Fortman v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 609 N.E.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). Therefore, if the jury found that DP&L had undertaken a duty to make GHC's workplace safe by de-energizing the primaries as well as certain secondaries, it could find that DP&L owed a duty to Conte, regardless of the fact that DP&L did not own the power lines or have the right to de-energize them without GHC's permission. 27 Having determined that DP&L did owe a duty to Conte, we have no difficulty in concluding that the jury could reasonably find that that duty included de-energizing the primary wires, and that DP&L exhibited negligence with respect to that duty. Based on the testimony of Nowicki, Large, and William Hershfeld, a maintenance supervisor at GHC, the jury could have concluded that DP&L had explicitly agreed to de-energize the primary lines; or it could have found that DP&L agreed to de-energize those lines that had to be de-energized in order to render the workplace safe; or it could have found that DP&L undertook together with GHC to decide which lines should be de-energized. If it found any of those duties to be included within the scope of DP&L's undertaking, the jury clearly could have found that DP&L performed negligently by only de-energizing -- or by only agreeing to de-energize -- the secondary lines attached to the legs of the tank. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying DP&L's motion for judgment as a matter of law.