Opinion ID: 76622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: District Court's Conduct

Text: 54 Levy also argues that the district court deprived him of due process when it called victims to testify and questioned the victims about their losses in the investment scheme. Levy further contends that the district court deprived him of due process by allowing the restitution counsel, Kozyak, to address the court and make comments against Levy. Levy asserts that the district court assumed a prosecutor role in establishing the facts necessary for the vulnerable victim enhancement. We disagree. 55 First, in his plea agreement, Levy waived his right to appeal the manner in which his sentence was imposed. Thus, Levy is not entitled to appeal based on the district court's method of sentencing. 56 Second, there was no due process violation in any event. The United States Code provides: No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3661. Likewise, the Sentencing Guidelines provide few restrictions on what evidence the sentencing court may consider during sentencing. The Guidelines provide, In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). Further, the commentary to § 6A1.3 provides that [a]ny information may be considered, so long as it has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 cmt. The commentary even permits [o]ut-of-court declarations by an unidentified informant ... where there is good cause for the non-disclosure of the informant's identity and there is sufficient corroboration by other means. Id. 57 This Court's jurisprudence reinforces the Code's and Guidelines' broad approaches to allowing reliable evidence to be considered during sentencing. In United States v. Wilson, this Court instructed, A court may consider any information (including hearsay), regardless of its admissibility at trial, in determining whether factors exist that would enhance a defendant's sentence, provided that the information is sufficiently reliable. 183 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir.1999). 58 Accordingly, we conclude that the sentencing court did not deprive Levy of due process by considering Kozyak's and the victims' statements in determining whether to apply the vulnerable victim enhancement. There is no indication that either Kozyak's or the victims' comments were unreliable. Rather, Kozyak was quite familiar with the details of the investment scheme and the victims were imminently qualified to speak about their experiences relating to the scheme. Nor did the district court's hearing this testimony turn the court into a prosecutor or breach the government's plea agreement. Instead, the district court gave Levy's counsel the chance to cross-examine these witnesses, and there was no due process violation. Therefore, the district court did not err in hearing from Kozyak and the victims or in considering their testimony.