Opinion ID: 769911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expungement of Offenses for Crimes Generally Under State Law

Text: 23 As we stated earlier, the BIA held as early as 1951 that offenses for crimes expunged under state rehabilitation laws would not count as convictions for deportation purposes. While the BIA subsequently excluded drug offenses from this rule, the law concerning expungements for other offenses continued to develop. Although the law was relatively simple when there were only a few state rehabilitation statutes, it became more complex as the number and diversity of those statutes increased. Indeed, as the INS explained in its brief, there was considerable debate within the agency over the propriety of the general rule that expungements under state law should be honored for purposes of federal immigration law, regardless of the nature of the offense. Opponents argued that the effect of the rule was to allow aliens to escape deportation based on lenient state policies, despite the fact that they had committed criminal offenses and would otherwise be eligible for deportationbased on the straightforward application of federal statutes in an area traditionally dominated by considerations of federal policy. Nonetheless, the BIA adhered to its rule that offenses expunged under state law could not serve as the basis for deportation, although in some cases the INS urged the opposite result. See e.g., Matter of G-, 9 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1960). The BIA felt compelled to honor expungements outside the narcotics context because, inter alia, it concluded that it owed deference to dispositions under state law. See id. 24 A related but distinct set of problems arose because of the existence of one particular form of rehabilitation statute, known as deferred adjudication laws. Under such laws, a person found guilty (or who pled guilty) could be put on probation even though no conviction was ever entered. Then, if that person violated the terms of probation, further proceedings might or might not be necessary before the person could be convicted and sentenced. In deferred adjudication cases, it was not clear whether a conviction existed sufficient to support a deportation order prior to the completion of proceedings, because, while guilt had been established, no judgment of conviction had been entered. In short, the INS was not certain whether it could deport persons who were still in a deferred adjudication status, even though it was free to deport persons whose convictions had not yet been vacated or set aside. In 1955 the Supreme Court held, in an extremely short per curiam opinion, that where a Massachussetts rehabilitative procedure, which resembled at least some forms of contemporary deferred adjudication laws, was employed, the alien, whose case had been placed in an on-file status, had not been convicted and could not be deported. Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955) (per curiam). 19 After this decision, the BIA attempted to develop a uniform federal standard for purposes of determining whether a defendant had been convicted, and thus whether he could be deported even though he was in deferred adjudication status. 20 25 The most recent attempt by the Board to create a uniform standard came in Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988). 21 The definition announced in that case drew a sharp line between two different kinds of deferred adjudication statutes. Under the Board's decision, a deferred adjudication would be considered a conviction for deportation purposes if a formal judgment of conviction could be entered immediately following a probation violation, but not if further proceedings were required first. The BIA stated thatAs in the past, we shall consider a person convicted if the court has adjudicated him guilty or has entered a formal judgment of guilt . . . . 26 Where adjudication of guilt has been withheld, however, further examination of the specific procedure used and the state authority under which the court acted will be necessary. As a general rule, a conviction will be found for immigration purposes where all of the following elements are present: 27 (1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or he has entered a plea of guilty or nolo-contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty; 28 (2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the person's liberty to be imposed . . . and 29 (3) a judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the person violates the terms of his probation or fails to comply with the requirements of the court's order, without availability of further proceedings regarding the person's guilt or innocence of the original charge. . . . 30 We note that a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may not support an order of deportation if it has been expunged. We shall continue in this regard to follow the rule which was set forth by the Attorney General in Matter of G-, supra, and subsequently reaffirmed in Matter of IbarraObando, 12 I&N Dec. 576 (BIA 1966, A.G. 1967), and Matter of Gutnick, 13 I&N 672 (BIA 1971). Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. at 551-52. 22 31 Notably, the Board's decision in Ozkok left intact the longstanding rule that, in general, a conviction may not support an order of deportation if it has been expunged.  Id. at 552. Thus, under Ozkok, regardless of the form of deferred adjudication, once a defendant has completed the requisite term of probation and has succeeded in having his offense expunged, he no longer stands convicted. 32 Ozkok's primary focus was on the resolution of the question whether persons whose cases are being processed under a deferred adjudication statute may be deported after a finding of guilt but before completion of probation and the expungement of their record. See, e.g., Matter of Garcia, 19 I&N Dec. 270, 274 (BIA 1985) (finding defendant not convicted for purposes of deportation where defendant was subject to deferred adjudication, and INS sought to deport him prior to expiration of probationary period). The third prong of the test quoted above deals with this subject by distinguishing between the two types of deferred adjudication statutes. Under the third Ozkok prong, when the state statute in question provides that upon a probation violation a judgment of conviction may be entered without further proceedings, the defendant stands convicted, but when the statute requires further proceedings prior to entering the conviction and imposing punishment, no conviction occurs. The rule adopted in Ozkok may have made some sense from a strictly legalistic standpoint, but it made the question of an alien's deportability depend on the procedural niceties of the particular statutory provision rather than on anything having to do with the alien's criminal conduct or the court's assessment of it. As a result, it failed to end the debate over the effect to be given deferred adjudications in deportation cases in general. 33