Opinion ID: 1944516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: unitary trial procedure and newsletter articles

Text: We first address Poindexter's assignments of error pertaining to the unitary trial procedure. Poindexter asserts that the unitary trial caused the jury to be exposed to inflammatory newsletter articles that should have been appropriate only for sentencing. Although we specifically determined on direct appeal that there was no prejudicial error derived from the admission of the newsletters, Poindexter believes this holding is no longer valid when considered in the context of a unitary trial challenge and the newly discovered evidence pertaining to the 911 tape. Poindexter also argues that the unitary trial procedure forced trial counsel into a conflict by having to argue innocence and mercy for sentencing at the same time. Poindexter asserts that although counsel did not preserve the alleged error at trial or on appeal, we should recognize it now as plain error. Alternatively, Poindexter alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the unitary trial procedure during trial or on appeal. [3, 4] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. [12] It is clear that we have no jurisdiction over any of Poindexter's unitary trial claims. Poindexter failed to appeal from the postconviction court's determination in November 2003 that Poindexter's unitary trial claims were procedurally barred. Poindexter again failed to appeal from the postconviction court's determination in July 2005 that Poindexter's plain error and ineffective assistance characterizations of his unitary trial claim lacked merit. Failure to timely appeal from a final order prevents our exercise of jurisdiction over the claim disposed of in the order. [13] [5,6] An order granting an evidentiary hearing on some issues presented in a postconviction motion but denying a hearing on others is a final order. [14] Such an order affects a substantial right in a special proceeding and is thus final and appealable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2008). [15] In addition, an order denying an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim is a final judgment as to such claim under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3002 (Reissue 2008). [16] Poindexter asserts that his postconviction motion presented multiple claim[s] for relief and that thus, the November 2003 and July 2005 denials of his unitary trial claim[s] for relief cannot be final, appealable orders pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315 (Reissue 2008). We have already addressed and rejected this argument in State v. Harris. [17] A claim for relief under § 25-1315 is not synonymous with an issue or theory of recovery, but, rather, is equivalent to a separate cause of action. [18] A postconviction motion presents a single cause of action, and the various facts alleged as evidence that the defendant is entitled to postconviction relief are but multiple theories of recovery. [19] We have no jurisdiction over Poindexter's unitary trial theories of recovery, which were disposed of during the postconviction proceedings long before the final judgment currently before us.