Opinion ID: 2975226
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nelson’s Discovery Motion

Text: In United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1988), this Court held that the defendant’s motion for discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 did not toll the Speedy Trial Clock. The Court held that “the district court, consistent with the thrust of Rule 16, viewed [the defendant’s] motion as merely a pro forma request for discovery directed at the government, rather than an invitation for district court intervention.” Id. at 329. Thus, the motion did not toll the Speedy Trial Clock. In contrast, in United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir. 1992), this Court held that the defendant’s motions for discovery did toll the Speedy Trial Clock. The Court noted that the defendant’s motions elicited a response from the government and a ruling from the district court, which treated the discovery motions “as full-fledged motions that required disposition well in advance of the trial date.” Id. at 1210. Nelson’s motion in the instant case falls somewhere in between the ones in Mentz and Chalkias. Nelson’s motion was entitled “Motion for discovery and disclosure pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” JA at 13. Nelson’s motion was resolved between the -6- No. 06-3027 U.S.A. v. Nelson parties without the intervention of the district court. Thus, Nelson’s motion could be interpreted as a pro forma request for discovery directed at the government. On the other hand, the government did file a response to the motion, indicating that at one time the government viewed the matter as requiring judicial intervention. The Court need not decide this issue. Because the Court finds that the district court properly granted a continuance constituting excludable delay, the 70-day limit did not expire, regardless of whether the Speedy Trial Clock was tolled for Nelson’s discovery motion.