Opinion ID: 579953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: J51 Program

Text: 15 Kraebel challenges the city's administration of the J51 program as violative of her rights to equal protection and due process. However, because we agree that the district court properly dismissed Kraebel's J51 claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we do not reach the merits of her constitutional claims.
16 The district court held that the principle of comity underlying the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, barred federal court jurisdiction over challenges to the administration of the J51 program. 17 The Tax Injunction Act bars federal injunctive challenges to state tax laws in federal courts. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 105, 102 S.Ct. 177, 180, 70 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981). It provides that [t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State. 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Its underlying principle of comity also bars federal court consideration of a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of state tax laws. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 1072, 87 L.Ed. 1407 (1943). More recently, in Fair Assessment, the Supreme Court held that the principle of comity extended as well to prohibit § 1983 claims for damages against the administration of a state tax scheme. Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 116, 102 S.Ct. at 186. These bars to federal court jurisdiction essentially recognize the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations. Id. at 110, 102 S.Ct. at 183 (quotations and citations omitted). 18 Federal jurisdiction over challenges to state tax schemes is not precluded, however, if state remedies are inadequate. Just as there is no bar to injunctive actions if state remedies are not plain, speedy and efficient, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, there is no bar to declaratory judgment or damage actions if state remedies are not plain, adequate, and complete, Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 116, 102 S.Ct. at 186, and the effect of these two standards is exactly the same. Id. at 116 n. 8, 102 S.Ct. at 186 n. 8. 19 Thus, in order for the district court to have properly dismissed Kraebel's J51 claims, it must have concluded, first, that the J51 program constituted a tax assessment scheme subject to the Tax Injunction Act and the principle of comity, and second, that the state remedies available to Kraebel were adequate. We agree that both conclusions apply to this case. 20 We are not persuaded by Kraebel's argument that the J51 program is not a property tax scheme but is primarily a rent-subsidization program whose review in federal court would not interfere significantly with the state's taxing powers. The program provides landlords who rehabilitate their buildings with exemptions from and abatements to real property taxes. Part of the adjustment is carried out through reductions, or non-increases, in the tax assessments on the improved properties; part contemplates a direct credit against the property taxes otherwise payable. N.Y.Real Prop.Tax Law § 489. Clearly, then, the scheme focuses on the assessment and collection of real property taxes, with which federal courts may not interfere. The fact that the scheme may also have significant implications for housing policies does not remove it from the scope of state actions that are insulated from challenge in federal court. 21 We also reject Kraebel's second argument, that even if the J51 program is a tax scheme within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act and the principle of comity, the state remedies available to her are not adequate. In Long Island Lighting Co. v. Town of Brookhaven, 889 F.2d 428, 431 (2d Cir.1989) (hereinafter, LILCO ), we reviewed the remedies available under New York State procedures to challenge real property tax assessments claimed to be improper, and concluded that they were, indeed, adequate. Kraebel has presented nothing to persuade us to reject our LILCO analysis and conclusion. In short, under the Tax Injunction Act and its underlying principle of comity, we are left with no choice but to affirm the district court's dismissal of Kraebel's J51 claims for lack of federal jurisdiction.
22 Kraebel raises for the first time on this appeal the claim that the city's requirement that all landlords seeking J51 benefits file a no harassment affidavit constitutes a bill of attainder in violation of Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the constitution. She claims that when the city finally divulged its reason for not paying her J51 benefits, that reason was her alleged failure to file a no harassment affidavit, which declares that she had not harassed any of her tenants during the prior five years. Kraebel argues that such a requirement deems property owners guilty of harassment without proof and inflicts a penalty by withholding payments without a trial. She also complains that the city does not publish this requirement in the J51 regulations distributed to J51 applicants by the city. 23 While her argument is interesting, we cannot entertain it on this appeal. We have repeatedly held that if an argument has not been raised before the district court, we will not consider it, Grace Towers Tenants Ass'n v. Grace Housing Development Fund Co., 538 F.2d 491, 495 (2d Cir.1976); First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Pepper, 454 F.2d 626, 635-36 (2d Cir.1972), and we adhere to that holding here.