Opinion ID: 712827
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Comments on Defendant's Failure to Testify

Text: 30 The more troublesome assignment of error questions the prosecutor's references during argument to Thierman's failure to testify, in violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), reh'g denied, 381 U.S. 957 (1965). Under Griffin, a prosecutorial statement is impermissible if it is manifestly intended to call attention to the defendant's failure to testify, or is of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure to testify. Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir.1987). 31 We review a Griffin violation de novo, but will not reverse a conviction if the error is harmless. U.S. v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1185 (9th Cir.1994). We will examine each of the three challenged comments in turn. 32 (1) In regard to a conversation between defendant and witness Ed Byrd: Mr. Thierman did not dispute that when Ed Byrd testified. 33 In Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, this court distinguished between prosecutorial comments on the failure of the defense to present exculpatory evidence and prosecutorial comments on the failure of the defendant to do so. Id. at 1185. As here, in Mayans the prosecutor referred to the failure to contradict testimony regarding a conversation between only the defendant and the witness. Even though in reality only the defendant could have contradicted the testimony, the court found no error when the prosecution pointed out that the defense had not contradicted the testimony. Id. In reaching this holding the court contrasted the cases of U.S. v. Sehnal, 930 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 (1991), and Sunn, 807 F.2d 805. In Sehnal the prosecutor continued to say ask him, referring to defendant, Sehnal, 930 F.2d at 1424, while in Sunn the prosecutor repeatedly stated the only ... person who can tell us, and the only other person who can testify [is the defendant]. Sunn, 807 F.2d at 809, n. 1. 34 While not quite as egregious and pointed as the repeated references in Sunn and Sehnal, the prosecutor's remarks here refer specifically to the defendant rather than to the defense as in Mayans. We are not disposed to treat this particular exercise in dangerous gamesmanship as harmless. Reversal is mandated where such comment is extensive, where an inference of guilt from silence is stressed to the jury as a basis for the conviction, and where there is evidence that could have supported acquittal. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809. Such conditions exist here. For while there was substantial evidence of Thierman's guilt, it was far from overwhelming. Much of the prosecution's case depended upon the jury believing those witnesses whose credibility the prosecutor tried to bolster through repeated comments on Thierman's silence. 35 (2) Comment that a witnesses' testimony was not contradicted by the defendant or by any other witness. 36 This comment receives the same analysis as that above. We reject the government's attempt to paper over the blunder by saying the jury would be even less likely to take this statement than the prior statement as a comment on the failure of Thierman to testify since the prosecutor referred to the defendant and other witnesses. 37 In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969), the Supreme Court instructed us to review a claim of Griffin error by asking this: absent the prosecutor's allusion to the failure of the defense to proffer evidence to rebut the testimony of the victims, is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty? On this record, we cannot say that the above two Griffin errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 38 (3) Question to the jury, are you going to believe Mr. Hirsh, are you going to believe the defendant, or are you going to believe the evidence ... 39 The necessary implication of the quoted remarks reminded the jury of Thierman's failure to testify, or, because he obviously did not testify, to wonder why. This kind of pandering to a jury's curiosity on this very sensitive subject is exactly what the Griffin rule is intended to prevent. While the record reflects that the defendant did not object to this comment at the time it was made, the prosecutor's conduct amounts to plain error. The repeated Griffin errors call for a new trial.