Opinion ID: 2324752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Police Statement by Unavailable Witness

Text: Next, defendant asserts that the trial justice erred by not allowing him to admit a witness statement given by a witness, one Abdullah Alnhas, who apparently could not be located for trial. According to a statement given to the police on the night of the robbery, Alnhas witnessed the robbery and followed the getaway car, but he was unable to read the license-plate number. However, Alnhas no longer lived at the address listed on his statement and he could not be reached at the phone number he gave to the police. The defendant wanted to admit Alnhas' statement to cast doubt on another eyewitness' ability to identify defendant. The trial justice granted the state's motion in limine to exclude Alnhas' witness statement. In doing so, he seems to have considered the evidence under Rule 803(6) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, the hearsay exception for records of regularly conducted activities. For example, he reasoned that Alnhas' statement was not kept in the regular course of business because a witness to a crime is not required to record that information. He also stated that there was no guarantee of its trustworthiness. The defendant argues that the statement should have been allowed under either Rule 804(b)(5) or Rule 803(24) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence  the so-called catchall exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. However, the admission of such pretrial statements is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial justice, and such a decision will not be disturbed upon review absent an abuse of that discretion. In re Vannarith D., 731 A.2d 685, 689 (R.I.1999); State v. Sharp, 708 A.2d 1328, 1330 (R.I.1998)(per curiam). Here, Alnhas' statement was somewhat less than probative in that it failed to identify the distance from which he observed the car and there was no evidence pertaining tothe quality of his eyesight. In addition, as noted by the trial justice, the statement actually would have corroborated the other eyewitness' observation that the car was a silver wagon, and that its lights were off. Moreover, the fact that Alnhas could not read the license-plate number does not necessarily cast doubt on the other eyewitness' ability to identify defendant. In any event, even if the trial justice had erred in excluding this statement, it appears to us that any such error would have been harmless. `In determining whether an error is harmless, this [C]ourt considers such factors as the importance of the witness' testimony, the question of whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of corroboration or contradiction of the testimony, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the case.' Neri v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 719 A.2d 1150, 1153 (R.I.1998) (quoting New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Clark, 624 A.2d 298, 303-04 (R.I.1993)) (citing State v. Ramos, 553 A.2d 1059, 1064 (R.I.1989)). Considering these factors, we believe the exclusion of the statement was harmless. The overwhelming weight of the evidence pointed to defendant's guilt, and the admission of this statement would not have affected the outcome of this case.