Opinion ID: 1449946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Horizon's Status as a Health Care Provider

Text: Auld also challenges the cap's application to her claim by arguing that Horizon failed to conclusively prove or obtain a jury finding that it was a health care provider as defined in the statute. The court of appeals held that Auld's fourth amended petition alleging that her suit is a health care liability claim, and that Horizon is a nursing home and a health care provider as those terms are defined in article 4590i, section 1.03(a), relieved Horizon of any burden to either plead its affirmative defense of entitlement to the article 4590i cap, to prove that defense, or ask for a jury finding on that defense. Auld argues that because Horizon did not offer any evidence or obtain a jury finding that it was licensed or chartered by the State of Texas to provide health care to Hary during her residency at the nursing home, Horizon failed to meet the statute's definition of health care provider. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 4590i, § 1.03(a)(3) (defining health care provider as a corporation ... duly licensed or chartered by the State of Texas to provide health care as a ... nursing home). Even though Auld's pleadings referred to Horizon's negligent operation of the nursing home, Auld disagrees with the court of appeals' implied holding that claims against nursing home operators are `health care liability claims' against `health care providers,' regardless of whether the operator was licensed or chartered by the State. Horizon responds that Auld's judicial admissions and evidence at trial established Horizon's status as a health care provider under article 4590i, relieving Horizon of any burden to introduce evidence or obtain a jury finding that it was a health care provider under the statute. A judicial admission must be a clear, deliberate, and unequivocal statement, see Regency Advantage Ltd. Partnership v. Bingo Idea-Watauga, Inc., 936 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex.1996), and occurs when an assertion of fact is conclusively established in live pleadings, making the introduction of other pleadings or evidence unnecessary, see Chilton Ins. Co. v. Pate & Pate Enters., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). A judicial admission `not only relieves [an] adversary from making proof of the fact admitted but also bars the party himself from disputing it.' See id. (quoting Gevinson v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 449 S.W.2d 458, 466 (Tex.1969)). Once a fact is conclusively established by judicial admission, jury questions concerning the fact need not be submitted. See id. at 886. Auld's Fourth Amended Petition contained numerous clear and unequivocal assertions of fact constituting judicial admissions that Horizon (by owning and operating Heritage) was a health care provider and that Auld's claim was a health care liability claim as those terms are defined in article 4590i. For example, in that petition, she incorporated portions of Hary's original petition, including a statement that Hary had complied with article 4590i's notice and expert-report provisions found in sections 4.01 and 13.01, respectively. Article 4590i requires the plaintiff to give presuit notice to each health care provider against whom such claim is being made. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 4.01(a). The section 13.01 expert-report provisions apply to every health care liability claim and require the plaintiff to file an expert report for each defendant health care provider. See id. § 13.01(a)(3). Certainly Hary's statements in her original petition alleging she had met the conditions precedent would not have been incorporated by reference into Auld's live pleading if Auld were avoiding the application of article 4590i to her case.