Opinion ID: 198811
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: McDonnell Douglas-Burdine-Hicks

Text: Under this framework, the plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing of age discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53. Because it is conceded for purposes of this appeal that Domnguez-Cruz established a prima facie case, we do not describe the required components. Once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee is created and the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the dismissal. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07. The defendant's burden at this stage is only a burden of production; the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff at all times. See id. If the defendant meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie case drops away and the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination. See id. at 507-08. At this final stage of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine-Hicks framework, this burden merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; Thomas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 144 F.3d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1998) (The plaintiff bears the 'burden of proving that his years were the determinative factor in his discharge, that is, that he would not have been fired but for his age.' (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1335 (1st Cir. 1988)). Where, as here, the plaintiff has raised a prima facie case and the defendant has met the burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine-Hicks framework becomes less relevant.See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510. At the summary judgment phase, courts should not unduly complicate matters . . . by applying legal rules which were devised to govern the basic allocation of burdens and order of proof. Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).Instead, the focus should be on the ultimate issue: whether, viewing the aggregate package of proof offered by the plaintiff and taking all inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the termination of the plaintiff's employment was motivated by age discrimination.Id. at 824-25; see Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espaa, 82 F.3d 533, 536 (1st Cir. 1996); Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535 (1st Cir. 1996); Olivera v. Nestle Puerto Rico, Inc., 922 F.2d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 1990). We hold that there was evidence presented on summary judgment from which a jury could (although need not) infer that the employer's claimed reasons for terminating Domnguez-Cruz's employment were pretextual and that the decision was the result of discriminatory animus. First, the evidence put forth by the plaintiff in making his prima facie case clearly established that Dean Ovitt, who was the plaintiff's direct supervisor and twelve years younger than him, and Jeffrey Berg, who was two years younger than the plaintiff, made the decision to terminate the plaintiff, with Sampson's approval. After his termination, Domnguez-Cruz's job responsibilities were assumed by Ovitt, Mario Medina, Suttle Caribe's Operations Manager, Nilda Torres, Suttle Caribe's then Quality Control Supervisor, and Adalberto Sierra, Suttle Caribe's Personnel Manager. All four individuals are younger than Domnguez-Cruz (although Sierra only by one year). In fact, the evidence showed that Domnguez-Cruz was the oldest Suttle Caribe employee. In addition, while Suttle Caribe claims that Luis (Tony) Hernndez, the Costa Rica plant manager, did not assume any of the plaintiff's job responsibilities, there is evidence that Hernndez, who is ten years younger than the plaintiff, oversees Medina and Sierra and was selected for this position rather than the plaintiff. Second, and in addition to the evidence supporting Domnguez-Cruz's prima facie case, the defendant presented explanations for Domnguez-Cruz's termination that could be viewed as inconsistent. When Domnguez-Cruz was informed by Ovitt and Janice Wielke, a Suttle Apparatus personnel manager, that he was being dismissed, he was told that his position was being eliminated as a result of the restructuring plan. That same day, a memorandum from Ovitt was distributed to all employees, informing them that some organizational changes would be made as a part of the restructuring of the organization. Ovitt's notes made shortly before the plaintiff was informed of the decision support the restructuring explanation: This reorganization is not a performance issue. This was a difficult decision of restructuring the company to combine operation resourses [sic] and better utilize resourses [sic] available. When Domnguez-Cruz contacted Sampson for an explanation, he received a letter stating that Hernndez had been selected rather than himself to sit on the committee that would oversee Suttle Caribe operations. When the plaintiff met with Sampson a week or so later, Sampson told him that while there had been some complaints about his performance, they were not important. However, in its answer to Domnguez-Cruz's complaint, Suttle Caribe changed its reasons for the termination of plaintiff's employment. It denied that the plaintiff was discharged as a result of restructuring, instead claiming that Plaintiff was terminated for his repeated failure to abide by company policies and to commit to the team efforts as required.At another point in the answer, Suttle Caribe stated that the plaintiff's termination was determined exclusively because of his violations to [sic] company policies and referred to his inability to commit to the managerial efforts directed by the parent corporation, covering up employee misconduct which required termination, and his failure to abide by previous commitments to his immediate supervisor with respect to team work and reorg[an]ization. The depositions betray a similar inability to settle on an explanation for Domnguez-Cruz's dismissal. At one point, Ovitt stated that [t]he reason that he was terminated was because of his performance, it was performance issues. At another point, Ovitt acknowledged that he told the employees of the corporation, other than the executive staff, that the dismissal was not related to performance. Later, he indicated that the plaintiff was fired because of his refusal to take the direction that the company was going and his insubordination. Finally, Ovitt referred to Domnguez-Cruz's failure to abide by company policies. Sampson, in contrast, stated in his deposition that Domnguez-Cruz was doing a good job and was very adequate and that [t]he primary reason for termination was always that they wanted to eliminate the position, they didn't think it was necessary any more. A company may have several legitimate reasons to dismiss an employee. But when a company, at different times, gives different and arguably inconsistent explanations, a jury may infer that the articulated reasons are pretextual. See Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1167 (6th Cir. 1996) (An employer's changing rationale for making an adverse employment decision can be evidence of pretext.), opinion amended by 97 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1996); Kobrin v. University of Minnesota, 34 F.3d 698, 703 (8th Cir. 1994) (Substantial changes over time in the employer's proffered reason for its employment decision support a finding of pretext.); Castleman v. Acme Boot Co., 959 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1992) (A jury's conclusion that an employer's reasons were pretextual can be supported by inconsistencies in or the unconvincing nature of the decisionmaker's testimony.); Alvarado v. Board of Trustees, 928 F.2d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1991); Schmitz v. St. Regis Paper Co., 811 F.2d 131, 132-33 (2d Cir. 1987). A jury could, at trial, accept the employer's explanation that it initially chose not to discuss the plaintiff's performance issues publicly out of a desire to avoid humiliating him. This explanation, however, does not fully explain its failure to mention these issues to Domnguez-Cruz when he inquired as to the reasons for his dismissal. At the summary judgment stage, viewing the evidence as a whole and given that the court should not engage in credibility assessments, see Brennan v. GTE Gov't Sys. Corp., 150 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1998), the evidence in this case can support an inference of pretext. Third, and further supporting a possible inference that Suttle Caribe's explanations are pretextual, there is evidence suggesting that restructuring was not the reason for the termination of the plaintiff's employment. First, there is evidence that, in 1994 or earlier, Ovitt had offered the plant manager position to Medina. Medina told another employee that he was considering taking the offer. Second, the plaintiff had no prior notice that the company was considering eliminating the plant manager position, even though he was integrally involved in the restructuring efforts at Suttle Caribe. Third, while Suttle Caribe maintains that the plan had always been to eliminate the plant manager positions in both Puerto Rico and Costa Rica, the position in Costa Rica had not, as of the time of the depositions, been eliminated. The performance explanation also suffers from some deficiencies. At least one of the alleged violations of company policy upon which Suttle Caribe relies occurred approximately two years before Domnguez-Cruz was dismissed, and his 1993 evaluation, at roughly the same time, called him an outstanding employee. And there is at least some question whether Domnguez-Cruz was directly responsible for two of the alleged violations. Further, the fact that the other employees involved in some of these violations were not terminated may cast doubt on the veracity of this explanation.Finally, Domnguez-Cruz's record at the company may undermine the performance explanation. He had a strong record with the company, received a positive performance evaluation in 1993, was given a letter of commendation from Berg in August of 1994, and received a merit pay increase in 1995. A jury could conclude that the alleged performance problems only arose once the plaintiff came under Ovitt's supervision; Ovitt terminated the plaintiff within three years of becoming his supervisor. Finally, evidence of age-related comments could support an inference of pretext and discriminatory animus. The record reflects that Ovitt -- the plaintiff's direct supervisor and the key decisionmaker regarding his termination -- referred to the plaintiff, more than once, as an old fart in front of other employees, including Medina and Sierra. Medina, in turn, was heard by another employee referring to Domnguez-Cruz as el viejo (the old one or the old man) in the course of saying that he had been offered Domnguez-Cruz's job. In addition, there are the notes made by Wielke, the personnel manager. Wielke, in some way, participated in the dismissal and flew to Puerto Rico with Ovitt to inform plaintiff that his employment was terminated. Her notes about the decision to terminate the plaintiff contain his full name and include the phrases cover up so Alberto doesn't, all over 40, Tony -- age, and age descrim. [sic]. Perhaps the discussion memorialized in these notes was about how to comply with the law, but, if so, the cover up language is an odd choice. These notes, as well as the remarks made by the key decisionmaker and another employee, could lead a reasonable jury to infer that age discrimination was at work. This recitation of the facts has taken the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Levy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 7 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1st Cir. 1993). It is not a description of what the jury must find, but is rather a description of the permissible inferences that could be drawn from the facts and that suffice to defeat summary judgment. The plaintiff does not have to prove by a preponderance of the additional evidence that discrimination was in fact the motive for the action taken. All a plaintiff has to do is raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether discrimination motivated the adverse employment action. Olivera, 922 F.2d at 50. We find that Domnguez-Cruz has done so and should be allowed to take his claims to a jury. See Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 1998) ([W]here a plaintiff in a discrimination case makes out a prima facie case and the issue becomes whether the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination, courts must be 'particularly cautious' about granting the employer's motion for summary judgment. (citation omitted)); Mulero-Rodrguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 677 (1st Cir. 1996) (reversing summary judgment and noting that determinations of motive and intent, particularly in discrimination cases, are questions better suited for the jury (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Brennan, 150 F.3d at 30 (reversing directed verdict entered for defendant in ADEA case); Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1092 (1st Cir. 1995) (reversing summary judgment for defendant in ADEA case).