Opinion ID: 185615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Whistleblower Claims

Text: 17 The District Court correctly dismissed Ms. Stella's WPA claims for want of jurisdiction. At the time appellant's claims arose, she could not bring them to the OSC and the MSPB. Although the Ford Act opened this avenue for FAA employees retroactively to April 1, 1996, appellant argues that the District Court should have asserted jurisdiction to avoid the injustice of sending her back to the OSC and MSPB at this late stage. To understand why the court must reject appellant's argument, we must review the statutory background of the Ford Act. 18 The WPA provides most federal agency employees with protection against agency reprisals for whistleblowing activity, such as disclosing illegal conduct, gross mismanagement, gross wasting of funds, or actions presenting substantial dangers to health and safety. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Under the procedures set forth in Title 5 of the U.S. Code, an employee who believes she is the victim of an unlawful reprisal must first bring her claim to the OSC, which investigates the complaint. Id. § 1214; Weber v. United States, 209 F.3d 756, 758 (D.C.Cir.2000) (describing whistleblower protection procedures under Title 5). If the OSC finds that there was a prohibited personnel action as defined by § 2302, it reports its findings to the MSPB, and it can petition the MSPB on the employee's behalf. Weber, 209 F.3d at 758. If the OSC finds no agency wrongdoing, then the employee herself may bring an action before the MSPB. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221; 1214(a)(3); Weber, 209 F.3d at 758. The MSPB's decision is appealable to the Federal Circuit. 5 U.S.C. § 7703; Weber, 209 F.3d at 758. Under no circumstances does the WPA grant the District Court jurisdiction to entertain a whistleblower cause of action brought directly before it in the first instance. 19 Unfortunately for Ms. Stella, the Title 5 avenue was not open to FAA whistleblowers between 1996 and 2000, because Congress, in 1995, enacted the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-50, § 347, 109 Stat. 436, 460 (1995), as amended by Pub.L. No. 104-122, § 1, 110 Stat. 876, 876 (1996) (DOT Act). In the DOT Act, Congress directed the FAA to establish its own personnel management system that would address the unique demands of its workforce. Id. The FAA accordingly established the FAA Personnel Management System. See Federal Aviation Administration Personnel Management System (Mar. 28, 1996), reprinted in J.A. 108-49. Under the applicable grievance procedure, an FAA employee in Ms. Stella's position was required to file an internal grievance with her supervisor and then file a formal grievance with a second-line manager. See id. Chapter III, § 4, reprinted in J.A. 137-41. The decision of the second-line manager was not subject to review in any forum. Id. § 4(f)(ii), reprinted in J.A. 140. 20 Nor could an FAA employee in Ms. Stella's position have brought a whistleblower action in the OSC and MSPB, and appealed an adverse decision to the Federal Circuit. Under DOT Act § 347(b), while § 2302's substantive prohibition against reprisals still applied to FAA whistleblowers, the sections of Title 5 providing for OSC and MSPB enforcement jurisdiction over those matters did not. See DOT Act § 347(b), 109 Stat. at 460; Diefenderfer v. MSPB, 194 F.3d 1275, 1278-79 (Fed.Cir.1999). Thus, under the DOT Act, FAA employees were protected against whistleblowing reprisals in the abstract, but their recourse lay solely within the FAA personnel system and under its procedures. Diefenderfer, 194 F.3d at 1279. It would therefore have been futile for Ms. Stella to bring her claims to the MSPB at the time they arose. 21 In April, 2000, Congress enacted the Ford Act, amending Title 49 of the U.S. Code. There, Congress provided that FAA employees could submit appeals to the MSPB and seek judicial review of its decisions. Ford Act § 307(a), 114 Stat. at 124-25 (amending 49 U.S.C. § 40122(g)(3)). Congress also provided that FAA employees would once again be subject to the whistleblower protection procedures of Title 5, this time  including the provisions for investigation and enforcement as provided in Chapter 12 of title 5. Id. (amending 49 U.S.C. § 40122(g)(2)(A)) (emphasis added). Congress made this part of the Ford Act retroactive to April 1, 1996. Id. (amending 49 U.S.C. § 40122(g)(4)); see also Miller v. Dep't of Transp., 86 M.S.P.R. 293, 297-98 (2000) (holding that Congress made § 307 of the Ford Act retroactive to April 1, 1996, as an exception to the general effective date for other provisions of the Act). 22 Since the enactment of the Ford Act, the MSPB has taken the position that it now has jurisdiction over cases of FAA employees for any actions appealable to the MSPB as of March 31, 1996. See Miller, 86 M.S.P.R. at 298. The MSPB has also recently clarified that an employee in Ms. Stella's position must file a new complaint with the OSC and allow it to be investigated under the OSC's retroactive Ford Act authority before proceeding to the MSPB. See Schaefer v. Dep't of Transp., 87 M.S.P.R. 37, 42 (2000) (finding that the purpose of the exhaustion requirement would be thwarted if the OSC were not given a chance to investigate the whistleblower's complaint under the retroactive authority given to the OSC by the Ford Act). 23 From the foregoing, it should be clear that Ms. Stella may now file a new complaint with the OSC, which has retroactive authority under the Ford Act to investigate it. If she is not satisfied with the OSC's disposition of her case, Ms. Stella may proceed to the MSPB, also vested with retroactive authority over the cases of FAA whistleblowers. She may then appeal the MSPB's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 24 Appellant argues that the District Court should have exercised its discretion to excuse her failure to exhaust administrative remedies, given that it was impossible for her to do so at the time the case arose. In so arguing, appellant invokes the fact that had she been able to bring both discrimination and WPA claims to the MSPB as a mixed case, and had the MSPB rendered an unfavorable decision, appellant could have joined all of her claims and appealed to the District Court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2), (c); Barnes v. Small, 840 F.2d 972, 979 (D.C.Cir.1988) (stating that where the MSPB decides a case combining discrimination and non-discrimination claims, the District Court takes jurisdiction over appeals from both determinations). The mixed case argument does not save appellant's claims, however, because even that route to District Court would have required her to initiate her action at the MSPB, which she did not, and could not, do. Furthermore, because the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a whistleblower claim in the first instance, the court lacked the power to excuse Ms. Stella's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. 25 Even if the District Court had the discretion to hear Ms. Stella's claims, it did not abuse that discretion by declining to do so. Appellant expresses the concern that her claims will now be stale by MSPB standards, or that there will be some other time bar to her initiating the OSC/MSPB process. At oral argument, the FAA stated its position that there were no time bars to appellant's now bringing her claims to the OSC and the MSPB. The FAA agreed that, under both the Ford Act and the prevailing case law, Ms. Stella's claims are not too old to be pursued before the OSC, MSPB, and, if necessary, the Federal Circuit. The FAA also stated that it would have no jurisdictional objection to Ms. Stella bringing this case to the OSC and going forward with the OSC/MSPB route. Thus, if Ms. Stella follows this route, she has FAA's assurance that the agency will not argue that her claims are untimely or wanting for lack of jurisdiction.