Opinion ID: 6317118
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: KRE 804(a)(5) and the Good Faith Requirement

Text: Among the several scenarios to determine witness availability, a witness is unavailable if he is “absent from the hearing and the proponent of the statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means.” KRE 804(a)(5). The Court of Appeals premised its ruling below on the belief that Roark had a lesser standard of proof to demonstrate unavailability than the Commonwealth. The court also believed the Commonwealth’s heightened burden “has not been proven to be all that onerous as out-of-court testimony has been admitted even without an effort to subpoena the witness or submit proof of true unavailability based on bare assurances from the Commonwealth that a witness is unavailable.” This statement was supported by citations to Lovett v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 72, 83-4 (Ky. 2003), and St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510, 539-40 (Ky. 2004). The Commonwealth does indeed have a constitutional burden of proof to demonstrate a good faith effort pursuant to the Confrontation Clause. Barber v. 5 Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1969). But as Professor Lawson aptly notes, our rule also “intends to require a good faith effort to procure the attendance of the declarant at trial even when he is beyond the court’s jurisdiction.” Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 8.40[6][f], at 645 (5th ed.). In a word, KRE 804(a)(5) embraces the Barber rule. KRE 804(a)(5) makes no distinction between Commonwealth and defendant, speaking only of the “proponent of the statement . . .” Thus, the good faith requirement is equally applicable to all parties, and there is no basis within the rule to find a heightened burden for the Commonwealth. In Marshall v. Commonwealth, we held “[a] trial court cannot merely rely on the Commonwealth's assurances of unavailability in deciding to admit hearsay evidence that is conditioned upon unavailability.” 60 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Ky. 2001). Importantly, we cited to the case of Justice v. Commonwealth, 987 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Ky. 1998), for that holding. The Justice case, however, did not involve the Commonwealth asserting the unavailability of a witness but rather the accused defendant. Id. Thus, we have consistently held KRE 804(a)(5) requires the proponent of a witness, whether the Commonwealth or a defendant, to demonstrate a good faith effort to procure the witness by process or other reasonable means. Moreover, we have disapproved of trial courts relying merely on the assurances of a proponent to predicate a finding of unavailability. As we remarked before, the requirement of KRE 804(a)(5) that the proponent of the introduction of the statement must show that he was unable to produce the declarant through process or other reasonable means is a logical safeguard against self-serving fabrication; i.e., if the declarant's testimony is critical to the defense [or prosecution], 6 then it stands to reason that the defendant [or prosecutor] would do all he reasonably could to put the declarant before the jury. Id. at 314. The Court of Appeals’ understanding of our holdings in Lovett and St. Clair to the contrary does not withstand scrutiny. In Lovett, the defendant had entered an Alford plea and appealed the trial judge’s order that an unavailable witness’ deposition be taken by video tape in South Dakota with both the defendant and his counsel present. Lovett, 103 S.W.3d at 77. Thus, the issue was not whether introduction of witness testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. “In fact, because Appellant entered a plea before trial, the trial judge never made a final ruling on the admissibility of the deposition at trial; indeed, the deposition was never taken.” Id. at 82. Lovett then is completely inapposite to the case at bar and its peculiar factual scenario suggests a limited range of application. Moreover, the issue of the Commonwealth’s good faith effort was not that the trial court had relied only upon the Commonwealth’s mere verbal assurances of unavailability, but the Commonwealth had not followed the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings.4 We held the Commonwealth had no mandatory duty to resort to that law in order to satisfy the good faith effort requirement. Id. at 84. Therefore, we believe the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Lovett is misplaced. Lovett is both factually and legally distinguishable. Additionally, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Lovett’s import is directly contrary to otherwise clear statements of law on point. Justice, 987 S.W.2d at 314; Marshall, 60 S.W.3d at 519. 4 KRS 421.230 - 421.270. 7 The reliance upon St. Clair is equally misplaced. In fact, Part III(D)(4) of that opinion—addressing the determination whether a witness, Van Zandt, was unavailable—divided this Court in several ways. No position advocated on that issue commanded a majority. The memorandum opinion’s discussion in Part III(D)(4), endorsed only by Justice Graves, equivocated on the issue; noting only that a doctor’s letter stating Van Zandt could not travel due to pregnancy complications was handed to the defense counsel but not to the trial judge nor ever submitted in the record. St. Clair, 140 S.W.3d at 540. After noting “the Commonwealth could have made a much cleaner record . . . [,]” Justice Graves concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Id.