Opinion ID: 601518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Severance or Separate Trial?

Text: 21 Shortly before the trial on McDaniel's claim was to begin, Force filed a motion entitled Third-Party Defendant's Motion for Severance/Motion for Separate Trial. Anheuser agreed with the motion provided that Force remained in the first trial on the contribution claim. The trial court ordered that Defendant Force Corporation's Motion for Severance/Motion for Separate Trial be granted. 22 We note initially that motions for severance and motions for separate trial are distinct and preferably should be treated as such. 19 Upon close analysis we find that, despite the ambiguous title of the instant motion and its equally ambiguous treatment by the district court, a separate trial rather than a severance was sought and granted. Force's motion contained a reference to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs separate trials, but contained no reference to Rule 21, which governs severances. Also, the motion tracked the language of Rule 42(b) when it stated that the ordering of separate trials in this matter would be more conducive to judicial expediency and economy. And even after the motion was granted, the subsequent proceedings for both trials continued to bear the same docket number. 23 Under Rule 42(b), a separate trial may be ordered in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy ... always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States. 20 Separation of issues, however, is not the usual course that should be followed. 21 24 There is an important limitation on ordering a separate trial of issues under Rule 42(b): the issue to be tried must be so distinct and separate from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice. 22 This limitation on the use of bifurcation is a recognition of the fact that inherent in the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury is the general right of a litigant to have only one jury pass on a common issue of fact. 23 This rule has an additional, pragmatic basis--if two juries were allowed to pass on an issue involving the same factual and legal elements, the verdicts rendered by those juries could be inconsistent, producing intolerably anomalous results. 24 25 Both the parties and the district court appear to have recognized the separate and distinct prerequisite for separate trials. In its motion, Force recites that the issues to be litigated and resolved between it and Third-Party Plaintiff Busch, are completely independent and separate from those to be litigated in the primary lawsuit initiated by McDaniel against the Railroad and Busch. The motion further recites that the ordering of separate trials in this matter would be more conducive to judicial expediency and economy. All points of contention specifically addressed in Force's motion are contractual issues; causation of the underlying tort claim is not mentioned at all. 25 26 Anheuser went along with Force's motion to try the contractual indemnity issue separately. At the motion hearing, counsel for Anheuser stated: Yes, we do agree with severing the contractual, Your Honor. We're going to keep them in with the contribution claim ... and if there is a contractual obligation we will pursue that later on. 26 27 At the conclusion of the motion hearing, the district judge noted: I believe the record reflects there are no objections to a motion for separate trial on the issue of the contractual liability or indemnity question between Anheuser-Busch and Force, and so that motion will be granted. 28 It is clear that the parties and the district court intended to try separately only issues arising from the contractual relationship between Anheuser and Force, including those relating to the disputed indemnity clause. Nevertheless, Force was to remain in the primary trial, and that trial was to decide McDaniel's tort claims. Causation of McDaniel's injuries was an essential element of his tort claim. Indisputably, the causation findings by the jury in that trial would also be the centerpiece of the second trial; causation could not be tried anew in the second trial. Under Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 27 if the first jury decides the causation issue, the second jury cannot consider that same issue. 28 E. Submission to the Jury
29 As noted, this case was submitted to the jury in special verdict form, pursuant to Rule 49(a). The use of a special verdict requires the jury to return a written finding on each submitted issue of fact. Of particular importance to the instant case are the rules governing waiver with respect to special interrogatories and instructions. Rule 49(a) provides in pertinent part: 30 If ... the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires the party demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict. 29 31 Rule 51, which governs instructions to the jury and objections to jury instructions, similarly provides in part: 32 At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that he court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests.... No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. 30 33 A party has the burden to request the submission of its issues to the jury and to request instructions on each such issue. If a party neither requests submission of an issue nor objects to the omission of that issue from the special interrogatories given to the jury, such party is deemed to have waived its right to have the jury determine that issue. 31 Likewise, failure to object to the wording of a special issue prevents a party from objecting to such wording on appeal. 32 Conversely, by requesting the submission of a special issue, a party prevents an adverse Rule 49(a) deemed finding by the court in the event that the requested issue is refused. 33 34 A party must inform the trial court of deficiencies in the charge in such a manner that the judge can act upon the objection. 34 Without more, a pretrial request for instructions or interrogatories is ordinarily insufficient to preserve error; theories of liability and defense frequently change during the course of a trial, and a trial judge will seldom make a final decision regarding the charge until the evidence is complete. 35 35 When, as here, an issue of causation is omitted from the jury charge and the trial court makes no specific finding regarding cause, that court will be deemed to have found proximate causation if such a finding is supported by the evidence and is consistent with the judgment. 36 36 Nevertheless, the requirement that a party request or object in order to prevent an adverse deemed finding is not absolute. This court has refused to deem the existence of a disputed fact where it appear[ed] that the district court, without objection by either party, specifically chose not to submit the issue to the jury. 37 Additionally, we will invoke the plain error doctrine to prevent a miscarriage of justice despite a party's failure to make a sufficiently specific objection under Rule 51. 38 These limited exceptions are inapplicable to the instant case, however; the issue of causation by Force was submitted to the jury, albeit in a conditioned form, and we find no fundamental error in the charge that could result in a miscarriage of justice. 37
38 The charge submitted to the jury in the trial of McDaniel's claims included the following special interrogatories and instructions: 39 Instruction 16 In order to find AnheuserBusch liable to the Plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance of the evidence the following: First: That AnheuserBusch had actual or constructive knowledge of some unreasonable risk of harm to McDaniel; Second: That AnheuserBusch did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or to eliminate the risk of harm to McDaniel; and Third: That AnheuserBusch's failure to use such care proximately caused McDaniel's personal injuries. Question 2 Did the negligence, if any, of those named below proximately cause the injury in question? Answer Yes or No for each of the following: AnheuserBusch, Inc. No Harold McDaniel Yes Question 3 For each person found by you to have caused the injury in question, find the percentage caused by-- AnheuserBusch, Inc. 0 % Harold McDaniel 100 % Railroad 0 % Total 100 % If in answer to Question 2 you have found that the negligence of AnheuserBusch caused the injury in question, then answer the following Questions, otherwise do not answer the following Questions. Question 4 Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in question that Force Corporation failed to perform the switch maintenance requested by AnheuserBusch on Switch # 23? Answer Yes or No. Answer: ________ Question 5 Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in question that such a failure, if any, was negligent? Answer Yes or No. Answer: ________ Question 6 Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries? Answer Yes or No. Answer: ________ If you have answered Question 6 Yes and only in that event, then answer the following Question. Question 7 For each person found by you to have proximately caused the injury in question, find the percentage caused by-- AnheuserBusch, Inc. ____ % Force Corporation ____ % Total 100 % 40 McDaniel originally pleaded a broad based negligence claim against Anheuser 39 but by the time the case was submitted to the jury, Anheuser had succeeded in narrowing McDaniel's claim to one grounded only in a theory of land occupier liability. Under Texas law, a suit based on land occupier liability is a simple negligence action. 40 Therefore, when McDaniel's tort claim was finally submitted to the jury, Anheuser's contribution claim against Force was limited to whether Force's maintenance of switch # 23 was negligent. 41 41 Under Texas law, a premises occupier who hires an independent contractor to maintain the property in safe condition is not relieved of liability for the negligent maintenance of the property. 42 In keeping with that maxim, and of significance to this appeal, the jury charge actually submitted was so structured that the jury could not assign any causation to Force unless and until it first assigned some percentage of causation to Anheuser. 42
43 The record is devoid of requested and refused special issues or interrogatories. Only one instruction that was requested and refused is found, and it is not germane to the issue here under consideration. 43 There is no evidence that any objection to the interrogatories or instructions was made. Undoubtedly, Anheuser could have made any number of requests or objections to ensure that the McDaniel jury would address causation with regard to Force, including an objection to the conditioning of questions relating to the liability of Anheuser and Force. 44 An objection complying with the requirements of Rule 51 is required to preserve error regarding improper conditioning. 44 If an issue goes unanswered as a result of its conditional submission after the proponent of the issue has failed to object to that conditional submission, and the trial court makes no express finding on that issue, then under Rule 49(a) the trial court will be deemed to have found on that issue in accord with the judgment. 45 45 Questions regarding Force's causation were submitted to the jury conditionally, without objection by Anheuser. Faithfully following the conditioning instructions, the jury did not answer the questions directly pertaining to Force's causation. In the questions that were answered by the jury, McDaniel was found to have been the sole cause of his own injuries. 46 Anheuser correctly points out that the jury did not affirmatively find a lack of causation by Force. Anheuser had the burden under Rules 49(a) and 51, however, to ensure that its issues (including causation by Force) were properly submitted to the jury in such a manner that the jury could and would decide those issues. Having failed to do so, Anheuser has waived its right to have any jury determine the issue of causation by Force. 47 As Anheuser waived its right to a jury determination of the causation issue, Rule 49(a) would have permitted the trial court to make a finding on that issue. Anheuser again correctly points out that the court made no express findings with regard to causation by Force. The court did, however, enter a take-nothing judgment for McDaniel based on the jury findings. 46 48 The plain language of Rule 49(a) provides that the court may make a finding on a given issue if it is omitted [from the jury charge] without such demand. 47 The district court is not obligated to make express findings on any such issue. Rule 49(a) further provides, however, that if the district court does not make express findings it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict. 48 Under the circumstances of the instant case, the district court is deemed to have found Force to be free of causation, just as the jury found Anheuser and the Railroad free of causation. All of this is totally consistent with the judgment of the court. 49 But we need not rest our affirmation on the fiction of a deemed finding here, however. The jury implicitly found Force free of causation when it found Anheuser free of causation. 50 Although Anheuser's reasoning for its actions regarding the severance and the submission of the charge is not stated in the record or in Anheuser's brief to this court, it appears to have been part of a trial strategy that was, after all, substantially effective. By the time Force made its motion for separate trial, the Railroad had already entered into a Mary Carter agreement with McDaniel. 49 The other defendants--Anheuser and Force--apparently acted in concert to present a unified opposition to McDaniel's claims and to narrow the jurors' focus in their determination of liability. 51 Even though the manner in which the charge and special interrogatories were submitted eventuated to Anheuser's detriment on the contractual indemnity issue, it did prevent the jurors from considering anything other than a narrowly defined land occupier liability theory when they determined whether Anheuser was liable. Furthermore, obvious trial strategy suggests that if the jury directly considered the conduct of both Anheuser and Force and found Force partially liable, it would also almost certainly assign some liability to Anheuser. 52 Ironically, Anheuser cannot prevail in the instant action because its strategy against McDaniel worked so well. If the jury had found that Anheuser caused any percentage of McDaniel's injuries, Anheuser would not be in its present position. As the situation stands, Anheuser will not recover the $47,241.74 it was seeking from Force, but neither did it have to pay any of the over $1,128,000.00 sought by McDaniel. Considering the results, we cannot categorically state that Anheuser's actions were ill considered. If, on the other hand, we have erroneously construed a lack of foresight as clever strategy, Anheuser would be even less deserving of sympathy. Either way, however, we find Anheuser deserving of no indemnification for the expense of its eminently successful defense of claims of injury not found to have been caused by the indemnitor. III