Opinion ID: 786766
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The California Supreme Court's Affirmance of the Death Sentence

Text: 38 The jury found to be true four special circumstance allegations against Sanders: (1) that the murder was committed while he was engaged in a robbery ( see Cal.Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(A)); (2) that it was committed while he was engaged in a burglary (§ 190.2(a)(17)(G)); (3) that Allen was killed to prevent her testimony (§ 190.2(a)(10)); and (4) that the murder was heinous, atrocious and cruel (§ 190.2(a)(14)). People v. Sanders, 51 Cal.3d 471, 515, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561 (1990). The California Supreme Court invalidated the burglary special circumstance because the jury could have found the requisite mental state for burglary based on Sanders' intention to commit assault, not a murder, and then have impermissibly merged the burglary with the murder to create the burglary-murder special circumstance. Id. at 517, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561; see also People v. Wilson, 1 Cal.3d 431, 441, 82 Cal.Rptr. 494, 462 P.2d 22 (1969) (rejecting bootstrapping of burglary and felony-murder). The court also set aside the heinous-murder special circumstance because in a prior opinion it had found that special circumstance to be unconstitutionally vague. Sanders, 51 Cal.3d at 520, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561; see People v. Superior Court (Engert), 31 Cal.3d 797, 183 Cal.Rptr. 800, 647 P.2d 76 (1982). 39 The California Supreme Court issued its decision shortly after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), and before the Court's decision in Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 230, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). Thus, perhaps understandably, the California court did not follow the procedures constitutionally mandated for appellate review in a weighing state where an aggravating circumstance has been invalidated. The California court did not remand for resentencing. It also did not independently reweigh the aggravating and mitigating factors to ensure an individualized sentence. The state does not argue otherwise. 40 Although the California court did apparently conduct some type of harmless-error analysis, it did not find, as it was required to do, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Morales, 336 F.3d at 1147-48. The court first focused on the heinous-murder special circumstance and its effect on the jury in light of the prosecutor's closing argument. The court observed, Although the prosecutor mentioned the heinous-murder special circumstance in closing argument, he did not heavily rely on it. Sanders, 51 Cal.3d at 521, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561. It concluded, [A] reasonable juror would not have been swayed by abstract concepts of heinous, atrocious or cruel ... but would instead have focused on the actual circumstances of the offense which formed the foundation for finding those special circumstances to be true. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Then, the court turned to the burglary-murder special circumstance, noting that the prosecutor did not focus on the bare number of special circumstance findings but urged the jury to consider the brutality of the crimes. Id. It determined that there was little chance defendant was prejudiced by consideration of the burglary-murder special circumstance. Id. 41 We cannot uphold a state appellate court's harmless error review as adequate when we have substantial uncertainty about whether the state court actually concluded that the invalid aggravating factor was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992), a state trial court in Florida had found four aggravating circumstances and no circumstances in mitigation. 4 Id. at 530, 112 S.Ct. 2114. The Supreme Court of Florida invalidated one of the aggravating circumstances — the cold, calculated, and premeditated manner circumstance — because this factor required a heightened degree of premeditation that was not supported by the evidence in the case. See id. at 531, 112 S.Ct. 2114. Despite the error, the Florida court affirmed the death sentence and said: 42 The trial court carefully weighed the aggravating factors against the lack of any mitigating factors and concluded that death was warranted. Even after removing the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated there still remain three aggravating factors to be weighed against no mitigating circumstances. Striking one aggravating factor when there are no mitigating circumstances does not necessarily require resentencing. 43 Sochor v. State, 580 So.2d 595, 604 (Fla.1991). The United States Supreme Court concluded that the Supreme Court of Florida had not adequately performed a harmless-error review. The Court noted that the state court failed so much as to mention `harmless error.' Sochor, 504 U.S. at 539-40, 112 S.Ct. 2114. It also pointed out that [o]nly one of the four cases [cited by the Florida court] contains language giving an explicit indication that the State Supreme Court had performed harmless error analysis. The other three simply do not, and the result is ambiguity. Id. at 540, 112 S.Ct. 2114 (citation omitted). The Court thus held, Since the Supreme Court of Florida did not explain or even `declare a belief that' this error `was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' in that `it did not contribute to the [sentence] obtained, Chapman, [386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824,] the error cannot be taken as cured by the State Supreme Court's consideration of the case. Sochor, 504 U.S. at 540, 112 S.Ct. 2114. 44 The California Supreme Court's review in this case is similar to the Florida Supreme Court's review in Sochor. The California court never used the words harmless error or reasonable doubt in analyzing the effect of removing the special circumstance. Moreover, it appears that the California court erroneously believed that it could apply the rule of Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) — which is applicable only to nonweighing states — and uphold the verdict despite the invalidation of two special circumstances because it was upholding other special circumstances. See Sanders, 51 Cal.3d at 520, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561 (The United States Supreme Court has upheld a death penalty judgment despite invalidation of one of several aggravating factors [citing Zant ], and this court is in accord.). In these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the California Supreme Court found that the invalidation of the special circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 754, 110 S.Ct. 1441 (It is perhaps possible ... that the Mississippi Supreme Court intended to ask whether beyond a reasonable doubt the result would have been the same.... Because we cannot be sure which course was followed in Clemons' case, however, we vacate the judgment insofar as it rested on harmless error....). We therefore hold that Sanders did not receive the individualized death sentence to which he was entitled because the California Supreme Court did not conduct an adequate, independent appellate review.