Opinion ID: 1785060
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of Ordinances.

Text: In addition to seeking a reversal of the district court's summary judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff also raises on appeal the district court's failure to grant his motion for summary judgment on count I of the petition, in which he claims the Iowa City ordinances are unconstitutional. As noted earlier, Baker's challenge to the ordinances is twofold: he contends the inclusion of small employers, as well as the prohibition of discrimination based on marital status, are inconsistent with chapter 216. Therefore, he argues, the ordinances exceed the City's home rule power.
The Iowa Constitution gives municipalities authority to regulate matters of local concern, subject to the superior power of the legislature: Municipal corporations are granted home rule power and authority, not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly, to determine their local affairs. . . . Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A; see also Iowa Code § 364.1 (allowing cities to exercise powers and perform functions if not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly). This type of home rule is sometimes referred to as legislative home rule because the legislature retains the power to trump or preempt local law. Berent, 738 N.W.2d at 196. An exercise of a city power is not inconsistent with a state law unless it is irreconcilable with the state law. Iowa Code § 364.2(3). A municipal ordinance is irreconcilable with a law of the General Assembly and, therefore, preempted by it, when the ordinance `prohibits an act permitted by statute, or permits an act prohibited by a statute.' City of Des Moines v. Gruen, 457 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1990) (quoting City of Council Bluffs v. Cain, 342 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1983)); accord Goodenow v. City Council of Maquoketa, 574 N.W.2d 18, 26 (Iowa 1998); cf. Goodell v. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d 486, 500 (Iowa 1998) (applying same analysis to identical provisions governing county home rule authority). In determining what the legislature has permitted and prohibited, we look to the legislative intent in enacting the state statutes and we require that any local ordinance remain faithful to this legislative intent, as well as to the legislative scheme established in the relevant state statutes. Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 500.
any employer to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, upgrade or refer for employment, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against any other person or to discharge any employee because of age, color, creed, disability, gender identity, marital status, national origin, race, religion, sex or sexual orientation. Iowa City City Code § 2-3-1 (emphasis added). As noted earlier, section 2-1-1 of the city code defines employer in relevant part as all entities, wherever situated, who employ one or more employees within the City. (Emphasis added.) In contrast, Iowa Code section 216.6 states in pertinent part:
a. Person to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for employment, to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against any applicant for employment or any employee because of the age, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion, or disability of such applicant or employee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation. . . . . . . . 6. This section shall not apply to: a. Any employer who regularly employs less than four individuals. For purposes of this subsection, individuals who are members of the employer's family shall not be counted as employees. Iowa Code § 216.6(1)( a ), (6)( a ) (emphasis added). The issue before us for decision is whether the City's application of its prohibition against unfair employment practices to employers who would be excluded under state law prohibiting unfair and discriminatory employment practices creates an irreconcilable conflict between the ordinance and the state statute. We first address the City's assertion that chapter 216 expressly permits variations between local and state discrimination laws such as the difference at issue here. Iowa Code section 216.19 provides that [n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as limiting a city or local government from enacting any ordinance or other law which prohibits broader or different categories of unfair and discriminatory practices. Id. § 216.19 para. 2. The defendants contend their prohibition of discrimination by employers with less than four employees is the prohibition of discrimination by a broader or different category. This argument ignores the statutory language qualifying the noun categories: of unfair and discriminatory practices. When read in its entirety, section 216.19 expressly allows cities latitude only with respect to discriminatory practices. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1780 (unabr. ed.2002) (defining a practice as a mode of acting or proceeding). The class of small employers added to the City's ordinance is not a different category of practices. We conclude, therefore, that section 216.19 does not authorize the defendants to apply the city's prohibition of discriminatory employment practices to a broader category of employers. Having concluded the legislature did not expressly authorize the difference under consideration, we return to an evaluation of whether the city ordinance is otherwise inconsistent with section 216.6. We think the answer to this question lies in the legislative intent underlying the exemption of small employers from the state employment discrimination statute. The exclusion of small employers from employment discrimination prohibitions was enacted as part of revisions made to Iowa's civil rights statute in 1965. See 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 121, § 7. Those revisions, including the small-employer exemption, were substantially based on changes advocated in a 1964 law review article. See U.S. Jaycees v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 427 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Iowa 1988) (citing Arthur Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Proposals, 49 Iowa L.Rev. 1067 (1964) [hereinafter Bonfield Article]). In United States Jaycees, this court relied on statements in this law review article as an expression of the rationale underlying the legislature's adoption of the suggested revisions, id., and we do so again here. In the article, the author urged enactment of an employment discrimination statute that included a small-employer exemption. Bonfield Article, 49 Iowa L.Rev. at 1108. In advocating for the adoption of this exemption, the author explained: Almost all fair employment practices acts exempt small employers, which are defined as employers with less than a specified number of employees. The general consensus seems to be that notions of freedom of association should preponderate over concepts of equal opportunity in these situations because the smallness of the employer's staff is usually likely to mean for him a rather close, intimate, personal, and constant association with his employees. Id. at 1109 (footnotes omitted); see also Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 802 A.2d 731, 741 (2002) (stating one reason for small-employer exemption was legislature's desire to protect the `intimate and personal relations existing in small businesses' (quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir.1995))). The exemption suggested in this article was subsequently adopted nearly verbatim by the Iowa legislature. We think, therefore, that the legislature made the policy decision that freedom of association should preponderate over concepts of equal opportunity in situations involving small employers. As noted above, [i]n determining what the legislature has permitted and prohibited, we look to the legislative intent in enacting the state statutes and we require that any local ordinance remain faithful to this legislative intent. . . . Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 500. Iowa Code section 216.6(6)( a ) reflects the legislature's intent to recognize and protect small employers' associational interests. To allow local communities to bar employment discrimination by these same small employers would thwart this legislative intent. Therefore, we conclude the Iowa City ordinance subjecting small employers to its prohibition of unfair employment practices conflicts with state law and exceeds the City's home rule authority. The district court erred in failing to rule the ordinance was unconstitutional in this respect. C. Constitutionality of Ordinances Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Marital Status. As previously discussed, the Iowa City City Code prohibits discrimination in employment and housing on the basis of marital status, a class not mentioned in the state civil rights statute. Compare Iowa City City Code § 2-3-1 (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of marital status), and id. § 2-5-1 (prohibiting discrimination in housing on the basis of marital status), with Iowa Code § 216.6(1)( a ) (prohibiting employment discrimination on several bases, but not mentioning marital status), and id. § 216.8 (prohibiting discriminatory housing practices on several bases, but not including marital status). Unlike the small-employer exemption, there is no express indication in chapter 216 that the legislature made a policy decision to allow employment and housing decisions to turn on a person's marital status. To the contrary, this variation between local law and state statute falls within the regulatory latitude the legislature bestowed on cities in section 216.19 to enact ordinances that prohibit broader or different categories of unfair or discriminatory practices. Discrimination on the basis of marital status is a class of discriminatory practices. Therefore, the City has authority under section 216.19 to prohibit such conduct. Because the City's enactment of ordinances prohibiting discrimination in employment and housing on the basis of marital status is not inconsistent with state law, such ordinances are within the City's home rule authority. The district court did not err in failing to rule the City's ordinances were unconstitutional in this respect.