Opinion ID: 1821031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the prosecutor make improper comments regarding the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt during voir dire and in closing?

Text: During voir dire the prosecutor asked the jury as follows: Do each of you now tell me that that burden of proof, to prove this Defendant guilty in this case beyond a reasonable doubt, that you will hold us to that burden. That you will make us prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but that you won't make us go any further than the law requires us to go, such as beyond a shadow of a doubt or beyond all doubt or, that you'll hold us to the burden... . BY MR. TUCKER: (interposing) Your Honor, I'm going to object to, uh, to that comment by the Prosecution about the shadow of a doubt and, uh, all doubt. BY THE COURT: Overruled. BY MR. TUCKER: It's an obvious attempt, uh, on his part to placate the natural caution of the Jurors. BY THE COURT: Overruled. During the state's closing argument, the prosecutor said the following: BY MR. SMITH: Of course, Counsel refers to the reasonable doubt of proof and that's what the burden of proof is  that the State of Mississippi must prove this Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. You know, that began the argument in the entire beginning of the case by Counsel as we were voir diring the Jury... . BY MR. TUCKER: (Interposing) Judge, he's, uh, arguing outside the record right now. BY THE COURT: Overruled. BY MR. SMITH: And that began the entire case as he was arguing about a reasonable doubt, as we were voir diring the Jury. You know, it doesn't say beyond all doubt. It doesn't say beyond a shadow of a doubt. BY MR. TUCKER: I object. He's instructing the Jury as to the law and erroneously instructing them at that. BY THE COURT: Overruled. BY MR. SMITH: I object to that. BY THE COURT: Overruled. Gillum urges that the prosecutor's language in the case sub judice during voir dire and argument was not materially distinguishable from the arguments condemned in Edge v. State, 393 So.2d 1337 (Miss. 1981); Clemons v. State, 320 So.2d 368 (Miss. 1975); and Nobles v. State, 241 So.2d 826 (Miss. 1970), to the effect that the law does not require you to know that this man is guilty. All you have to do is believe it beyond a reasonable doubt. In Nobles, supra, we recognize that such instruction is ... palpably unfair and misleading. It is obviously an effort to placate the natural caution on the part of the jury to require satisfactory evidence of guilt. 241 So.2d at 827. Gillum would have this Court hold that the prosecutor's argument that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof beyond a shadow of a doubt or all doubt is equivalent to the you don't have to know argument condemned in Edge. Counsel for Gillum points out that know is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Second Edition, 1969) page 725 as: to be certain of; regard or accept as true beyond doubt.  Gillum contends that, therefore, knowing a proposition is synonymous with being convinced of it beyond all doubt, as argued by the prosecutor. The state cites Thorne v. State, 348 So.2d 1011, 1013 (Miss. 1977), in which the defendant challenged an instruction in the following language: The State does not have to prove the charge beyond all possible doubt before a conviction can be had, but the State must prove the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before you can convict. Specifically the state relies upon the following remarks by this Court: We agree that the instruction is objectionable in attempting to emphasize the distinction between reasonable doubt, as used in the other instructions, and all possible doubt and should not have been given. However, it does not reach the prejudicial proportions of the you do not have to know instruction condemned in Pryor. The instruction is argumentative, and although it may be suggested that the argument is legally correct, such matters should be limited to the remarks of counsel, not embodied in instructions emanating from the court. Considered in the context of the numerous instructions given touching the State's burden, we have concluded that in this case substantial prejudice did not result to appellant from it. (emphasis added) Id. at 1015. The prosecutor in this case did no more than follow the direction of this Court in Thorne, supra, by limiting his distinctions between reasonable doubt and all possible doubt or beyond a shadow of a doubt to remarks during voir dire and closing. Applying Thorne, supra, to the facts in this case, we find there is no merit to this assignment of error.