Opinion ID: 2823540
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: An appeal may be taken from—

Text: (A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title, (B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed, 9 (C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration, (D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or (E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
continuing, or modifying an injunction against an arbitration that is subject to this title; or
arbitration that is subject to this title. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a). As the Supreme Court instructed in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), “we apply the ‘plain language of the statutory text’ in interpreting the FAA.” Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 88). “We do not look past the plain meaning unless it produces a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters or an outcome so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 535 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “statutes authorizing appeals are to be strictly construed.” Office of Senator Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 550 U.S. 511, 515 10 (2007) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 43 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). That command carries extra force for statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals, which are exceptions to the final decision rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and “the longestablished policy against piecemeal appeals.” Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978). Thus, “we must construe the scope of the provision with great care and circumspection” and “approach this statute somewhat gingerly lest a floodgate be opened that brings into the exception many pretrial orders.” Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Switz. Cheese Ass’n v. E. Horne’s Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the plain language of the FAA provides no support for exercising jurisdiction over an order denying a motion for summary judgment. Even when motivated by a conclusion that claims are not subject to arbitration, an order denying summary judgment is not an order “denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C); see Harrison, 111 F.3d at 349. And under the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“the express mention of one thing excludes all others”), Congress’s enumeration of several categories of appealable orders, but not orders denying summary judgment, indicates that Congress intended orders denying summary judgment to fall outside the scope of § 16. See, e.g., Delaware Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 747 F.3d 215, 221 (3d Cir. 2014).