Opinion ID: 1991039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's Competence and Possible Insanity

Text: Because the obligation to order a competency examination and conduct a Frendak inquiry is triggered by the specific circumstances of the individual case, see Frendak, 408 A.2d at 380, we set out the pre-trial, trial and sentencing proceedings in detail as they pertain to appellant's mental condition.
At presentment on July 7, 2000  nine days after the offense  Judge Harold Cushenberry granted the government's request that appellant be held without bond and referred for a forensic screening due to his unusual behavior at the time of arrest. That same day Dr. Lawrence Oliver, a clinical psychologist, conducted a thirty-minute competency examination of appellant in the District of Columbia Superior Court cellblock. Dr. Oliver's report indicated that appellant had in the last year received inpatient treatment at St. Elizabeths Hospital, from August 23-September 1, 1999, when, according to appellant's recollection, he was there to detoxify from illicit drugs and alcohol, but he received no medications. The report noted that on June 28, 2000, the day after the charged offense occurred, appellant tested negative for cocaine, PCP, and opiates, but was not tested for cannabis or alcohol. Dr. Oliver observed that appellant's judgment and insight were distorted by unrealistic thinking. For example, he could not be dissuaded from the notion that his legal difficulties were minor because [he stated:] `they'll let me go. They always do.' In addition, [d]espite past experience with the criminal justice system, Mr. Phenis was unable or unwilling to demonstrate even the most basic knowledge of the judicial process and the roles of various court officials. He was also unable to demonstrate any knowledge of his plea options, rights and the concept of plea bargaining. He was unable or unwilling to retain simple explanations of these issues. Dr. Oliver concluded that [i]n his current state, Mr. Phenis would be unlikely to work effectively with his defense attorney or to maintain proper decorum in a courtroom. Dr. Oliver was not able to determine if appellant's behavior during the interview was the result of volitional characterological traits, mental illness, substance abuse, or some combination of these factors. A court order, issued on July 12, 2000, instructed Dr. Oliver to conduct a complete competency examination of appellant at the mental health unit of the District of Columbia Jail. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2000, but lasted only five minutes because appellant refused to participate in the evaluation. Dr. Oliver's report stated: In fact, he refused to leave his cell and when asked the reason for his refusal to participate said only I'm ready to return to society. They should give me bond. I don't want to talk to you about anything. Mr. Phenis spoke in a rapid and disjointed manner as he said this and then fell silent. Because he has refused to bathe for several weeks, his hair was matted and he had a strong and disagreeable smell. According to staff on the mental health unit, Mr. Phenis has refused to take any medications and has consistently refused to come to clinic, engage in any of the therapeutic activities on the unit, and refuses to speak to staff. . . . His condition has deteriorated from what it was when he was seen at court for a competency screening. The report noted that appellant had been on the mental health unit of the District of Columbia Jail in connection with previous charges, when he was more cooperative and responded to medication. However, since being placed on the unit again in early July of this year, he has refused all treatment. Consequently, Dr. Oliver concluded that it is my opinion that Mr. Phenis is incompetent to stand trial because mental health factors impair his capacity to have a factual and rational understanding of the proceedings against him, render him unable to work in any effective manner with his attorney, and diminish his ability to behave with decorum in a courtroom. On August 22, 2000, a probable cause hearing was held before Judge Noël Anketell Kramer, during which Metropolitan Police Officer Brandon Shafer, [6] who was one of the first officers to arrive on the scene, testified about his observation of the events of June 27, 2000, including appellant's behavior. Officer Shafer stated that appellant was acting distant, uncooperative, pretty erratic, and did not exhibit normal behavior as one would expect from a person whose apartment just burned down. He was rambling in his speech and moving his hands in the air. In the back of the car on the way to the station, appellant was singing show tunes. Once at the station, he had calmed down somewhat from the scene, and was answering the questions pretty straightforward, although he was rambling somewhat. Officer Shafer also testified that appellant's niece told him that appellant was acting crazy before the fire started. At the conclusion of the hearing, after finding probable cause, the court noted that appellant was not competent to stand trial, and therefore did not know whether a trial date should be set. Appellant's counsel said she anticipated that eventually it is going to become a Frendak issue. I do think that is going to happen just from [what] I know about this case. The court responded, [m]aybe a Frendak or Alford, or whatever. I don't know. The court ordered further evaluation of appellant on an inpatient basis at St. Elizabeths Hospital, with an updated competency report to be submitted by October 10, 2000. On September 29, 2000, a report was issued stating that Dr. Mitchell Hugonnet, a staff psychologist at St. Elizabeths Hospital, had examined appellant and several determinations had been made at a diagnostic staff conference. The report stated that appellant was competent to stand trial by virtue of having a factual and rational understanding of the proceedings pending against him and being able to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Additionally, the report indicated that appellant had been diagnosed with PCP [phencyclidine] dependence, PCP-Induced Psychotic Disorder, Alcohol Dependence and Personality Disorder NOS [not otherwise specified] with Antisocial Features. Significantly, the report stated that appellant was currently receiving the medications Haldol and Cogentin, and that he should remain on medication pending trial to assure continued competency. With such medication, according to the report, appellant did not need to remain hospitalized. On October 10, 2000, at a preliminary hearing before Judge Kramer, the court noted that appellant had been found competent to stand trial and inquired whether appellant was going to challenge the competency finding. Defense counsel stated that it would not be challenged and that appellant was fine and cooperative and a different person, and that he wanted very much to take his meds and was grateful when he was on them and he's cooperative and fine and easy to deal with. When discussing whether appellant should be held without bond, defense counsel stated that the psychiatric circumstances that existed at the time of this offense, this alleged offense, do not, they don't exist anymore. Mr. Phenis is on medication, he is certainly in control of himself. He seems to be fine. The medical workers at St. Elizabeths indicated that he was not at risk of danger to himself or to others. . . . Continuing, defense counsel stated that she thought appellant had stopped taking his medication at the time of the incident, and that may have led to all kinds of problems, and I don't think that exists now. . . . He was relieved he was on the medication again and I think this is a different person. . . . Judge Kramer said she understood that, as a legal matter, defense counsel seemed to be arguing kind of an NGI [not guilty by reason of insanity] defense . . . that he did this because of this mental illness. Although defense counsel responded she was not asserting insanity at [this] point, the court noted that that was the thrust of [defense counsel's] argument. . . . At the request of defense counsel, the trial court allowed appellant to remain at St. Elizabeths, because it's clear that he's benefitted from that, and that it was a good idea to keep him competent. On October 18, 2000, new counsel entered her appearance on behalf of appellant. On January 3, 2001, a fourth competency report was issued by Dr. Mitchell Hugonnet at St. Elizabeths, which essentially repeated the findings of the report issued the previous September: that appellant remain[ed] competent to stand trial by virtue of having a factual and rational understanding of the proceedings pending against him and being able to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; and that appellant had been diagnosed with PCP Dependence, PCP-Induced Psychotic Disorder, Alcohol Dependence and Personality Disorder NOS with Antisocial Features. It stated that appellant was then taking the medication Mellaril, and that he should remain on medication pending trial to assure continued competency. As before, the report concluded that, with medication, appellant did not need to remain hospitalized. On January 5, 2001, a hearing was held before Judge Kramer at which Barbara McClinton, a representative of the Pretrial Services Intensive Supervision Program, was present. McClinton reported that she had evaluated appellant in October, when he was rejected from the intensive supervision program due to the fact of comprehensive mental health issues that needed mental health, and extensive mental health supervision. . . . McClinton stated that she had concerns about putting appellant in intensive supervision because of his mental health issues and the medication and the treatment which he needs to be compliant with to remain competent to stand trial. After extensive discussions about which sort of program would best ensure that appellant would continue to receive his medication and necessary treatment, the court released appellant from St. Elizabeths and placed him in a pretrial services intensive supervision program pending return of an indictment. While in the program, the court ordered that appellant be monitored for drugs and alcohol and that he participate in mental health treatment and continue to take his medication. Appellant was indicted on April 4, 2001. On April 23, 2001, the third judge in the case, Judge John Campbell, issued a work-release order instructing appellant, again, to participate in the court ordered-drug treatment and alcohol testing, as well as mental health treatment and medical compliance. However, on May 21, 2001, appellant was re-admitted to St. Elizabeths Hospital for treatment, [7] where he remained throughout trial. At a status hearing before Judge Campbell on June 25, 2001, defense counsel asked the court to order a special Criminal Responsibility Test to assess appellant's mental illness at the time of the offense: Your Honor, there is an issue. (Indiscernible) asked, and I have mentioned this to [the government], that since Mr. Phenious (phonetic) is still at St. Elizabeths because Judge Winston has not released him in her case, I have spoken with Doctor Ritchie and asked his opinion regarding whether or not Mr. Phenious had his mental illness at the time, not for an [N]GRI Screening but as a mitigating factor because the jury instructions in arson do speak to mitigating factors as a defense. And we are not asking for [N]GRI, but we do plan as a second defense  our first defense is that he did not do it. But at the same time, we also want to introduce evidence that he had mental illness at the time. And if the jury should think that his actions could have caused an arson [sic], then we would like them to also consider his mental illness as a mitigating factor. And Doctor Ritchie said in order to testify to that, he would have to conduct what he calls a Criminal Responsibility Test. When government counsel expressed uncertainty whether it would go toward mitigation under arson or it just goes to the standard insanity defense, defense counsel clarified that my client does not wish to plead not guilty by reason of insanity, but he does wish to use it as a mitigating circumstance if necessary. The government did not oppose the productivity report, and the trial court ordered that it be prepared. Judge Campbell, who was new to the case, asked whether a competency exam had been conducted, and why, and the government responded that when the defendant was brought in, when he was presented and after he was arrested, his behavior seemed very inappropriate for the circumstances. For example, he was singing in the back of the police car. His behavior was  he seemed to be . . . he had mental health issues and he just wasn't  he didn't seem to have a whole lot of control over those thoughts and was just generally behaving inappropriately at the time. [8] On July 10, 2001, appellant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police officers at the time of his arrest, arguing in part that he was suffering from mental illness on that day to the extent that if affected adversely what he said to the police. On July 16, 2001, the Forensic Inpatient Services Division of the District of Columbia Department of Mental Health wrote the court to ask that it be given more time to conduct the criminal responsibility examination. The letter indicated that appellant had been diagnosed with Phencyclidine Dependence, In a Controlled Environment and Phencyclidine-Induced Psychotic Disorder, In Remission, and that he was receiving the medication Risperdal Concentrate. While the results of the criminal responsibility exam were pending, the government and appellant filed, on July 21, 2001, a joint motion to convert the then-scheduled trial date to a status hearing, because the parties have a good-faith basis to believe that the defendant may not have been on the date of the offense criminally responsible by reason of insanity. . . . Additionally, appellant filed a motion to late-file a notice of intent to use the insanity defense on July 23, 2001, stating that both the Defense and the Government have learned additional information through discovery and investigation and it now appears to both sides that a stipulated not guilty by reason of insanity plea may be the appropriate disposition in this case. Further, [appellant] has decided that this is the way he would like to proceed. On August 17, 2001, the Forensic Inpatient Services Division issued its productivity report to the trial court. The entirety of the report's conclusions follows: Dr. William Richie, a staff psychiatrist, recently examined Mr. Phenis and the following determinations were made at a diagnostic staff conference. On or about June 27, 2000, the date of the alleged offenses, he was not suffering from a mental disease or defect that substantially impaired his capacity to recognize the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. He has been diagnosed Phencyclidine-Induced Psychosis and Phencyclidine Dependence. He is currently receiving Risperdal Concentrate 2 mgs po q AM and 6 mgs po q HS. Further, Mr. Phenis should remain on medication pending trial to assure continued competency. However, he does not need to remain hospitalized. The report did not detail the nature or extent of Dr. Ritchie's examination, did not mention whether he had reviewed the four previous reports submitted by Doctor Oliver and Dr. Hugonnet, and did not note the repeated history of appellant's acute deterioration when he did not comply with his medication regime. In a hearing conducted before Judge Campbell on August 24, 2001, the court accepted the report finding that appellant could be held criminally responsible for the charged offenses, over defense counsel's strong objections to the report. First, counsel explained that because appellant had tested negative for PCP when he was arrested, the doctor's conclusion that he was PCP-dependent and was suffering from PCP psychosis at the time of the offense could not be correct. [9] Counsel also objected to the report's one-sentence unexplained conclusion that appellant did not meet the legal definition of insanity when the crime was committed. Continuing, defense counsel pointed out a number of documented facts in the course of the proceedings to date that called the report's diagnosis into serious question: 1) the people at the apartment building who called 911 said appellant was actually crazy; 2) another witness said appellant had gone crazy; 3) the police said he was acting crazy; 4) upon appellant's presentment, a competency exam was immediately requested by the government and ordered by the court; 5) appellant was ordered by the court to undergo inpatient extensive forensic examination for 60 days; 6) that examination concluded he was incompetent but had been made competent only with the use of medication; 7) while in jail, his condition deteriorated significantly, to the point where he was found incompetent again, and had to be sent back to the hospital because he was so sick; 8) after being put back on medication, he did well again. The court mentioned during the hearing that defense counsel was talking about an NGI plea, and counsel confirmed that she was referring to an insanity defense, although not necessary an NGI plea, stating: Well, Your Honor, I don't know that [government counsel] is looking at the NGI plea. This is just another plea that I just discussed it again with my client. There was no agreement at all. But I believe we are going to have to go to trial and we would ask . . . we are asking for a bifurcated trial. . . . First that he is not guilty because he  I've talked to him so many times, I don't even think I can let him plead guilty. And I did discuss a plea offer (indiscernible) possible plea this morning, but speaking with him and his mother again, he does not want to plead guilty at this time to anything and I'm not sure I can let him given what he's always told me that if the fire was started by the man with the mask (indiscernible). And so we are asking for a bifurcated trial. I will be filing an ex parte motion for an expert which we had discussed at the last hearing. There is substantial information and I strongly believe that a different expert would write a report and explain everything and come to  conclusion. And I also feel that it's a jury question whether or not I definitely want an expert, whether or not we have an expert that the jury would find that he was  At that point, the court interjected that it was not the time to address matters regarding the structure of the trial, but that counsel can file whatever papers counsel wishes. Appellant's counsel requested that, notwithstanding the conclusion of the productivity report, appellant not be sent back to the jail pending trial, since the last time he was in jail his condition deteriorated and he became incompetent again. Judge Campbell, in apparent agreement, ordered that he remain at St. Elizabeths. On October 4, 2001, appellant appeared at a hearing before Judge Campbell and defense counsel informed the judge that appellant would like to plead guilty to the charge of malicious destruction of property, and, in exchange, the government would dismiss the other two charges, waive enhancement papers, and reserve the right to ask the trial court to hold appellant in jail pending sentencing. However, during the Rule 11 colloquy, when the trial court asked appellant about the specific events giving rise to the charges, he did not admit to intentionally or maliciously setting fire to his mother's apartment or its contents, but stated that the fire began accidentally when he threw a lit match at an ashtray as he was leaving the apartment. Appellant said he did not realize that the match missed the ashtray or that a fire had started until some time afterward, at which point he tried to put the fire out. Because appellant would not admit to the charged crime, the trial court did not allow him to enter the guilty plea. Defense counsel explained that she had discussed this matter with appellant many, many times, but she never could predict what he would say in court; she explained that we've been going round and round on this for the last two years, and that it was a problem. She admitted that if the trial court could not accept his plea, then we would have to try to go to trial. After further, unsuccessful efforts to secure the plea, the trial court and the parties eventually decided to set a trial date later that month, October 29, 2001. The trial court agreed, at defense counsel's request (since she would want him to [be] competent again), to send appellant back to St. Elizabeths pending trial. The case went to trial before the fourth judge to be assigned to the case, Judge Thomas Motley, on January 3, 2002. Before the trial began, the court heard arguments on appellant's motion to suppress statements made at the time of arrest on the ground that they were involuntary. At the hearing, many questions were asked about appellant's demeanor at the time of his arrest. The officer testified that appellant was singing in the back of the police transport car, and that at the time of the arrest, he looked very incoherent. He had a glazed look over his eye that was consistent with someone who was a drug user. The officer initially thought, because of appellant's slurred speech, glazed eyes, and very animated movements, that appellant was high on drugs at the time of his arrest. [10] The glazed look remained in his eye throughout his transport and questioning at the station. When appellant was questioned at the station, he appeared coherent and did not display any sort of irrational behavior, although he continued to gesture with his hands, his eyes were glazed over, and he sometimes muttered. The officer further testified that, after observing appellant at the suppression hearing, appellant still had that distant, glazed look. Not as drastic as that particular day, but somewhat similar. The trial judge noted that defense counsel's suppression argument seemed to hinge on appellant's mental condition, but that there was no evidence, other than the officer's observations, as to appellant's mental condition at the time of his arrest. In denying appellant's motion to suppress the statements, the judge noted that there was a lot of talk about his mental state. And there was some testimony indicating that, in the words of counsel, the conduct was bizarre, singing in the squad car, the glazed look, et cetera. Those may be described as bizarre. Nonetheless, the judge continued, I do not find any link that indicated that he was suffering from anything that the police knew about, took advantage of, or was coercive in that sense. His bizarre conduct was described fully, but it was not such that you would think that the defendant did not understand . . . what was going on. Later, the judge commented that there is nothing to indicate that because of his mental condition that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver. The judge did not refer to the two times appellant was found incompetent to stand trial, on the first and sixth weeks after appellant's arrest on the day of the fire.
During jury selection, appellant was singing and swinging in his chair. On the first day of trial, he was instructed by the judge: [y]ou are not to communicate with the jury by saying hi to them or waving to them, or speaking to them in some way because that's communication with the jurors. So you must not do that, saying good bye to them. So I'm admonishing you not to do that. Is that clear? Appellant responded, [y]es, sir. Later the same day, however, during the government's direct examination of its first witness, the court noted at a bench conference that appellant was talking to the jury right now just like he did before. He needs to be instructed. You can tell him that he is not supposed to be communicating with the jury. That is a form of testimony. The judge addressed appellant again, saying: Every time there's a bench conference, you try to communicate to the jury by mouthing words to them or talking to them. Appellant responded that he was not talking to the jury, but to himself. The judge disagreed, saying I have seen you do that. I want you  when [you] do that, I want you to turn in your seat, because I don't want you appearing to communicate with them. Appellant again responded that he wasn't talking to them, but to himself. The judge asked if he could stop talking in a way that appears as if he was talking to the jury, and appellant said yes. The judge advised that, [i]f you need to talk to yourself, do it silently like the rest of us. Appellant responded, [o]kay.
After the jury returned its verdict of guilty, appellant was sent back to St. Elizabeths pending sentencing. A hearing was conducted on January 29, 2002, so that defense counsel could be heard regarding St. Elizabeths request that appellant be transferred to the jail. Defense counsel asked to have an independent expert witness examine appellant to determine whether he had a mental illness, noting that appellant had a long history of mental illness before this incident ever happened, and that he had spent time at a psychiatric hospital while he was in jail in North Carolina when he was eighteen or nineteen years old. Defense counsel explained that she wanted an independent expert because she did not agree with the government doctor's assessment that his mental illness was solely PCP-induced. The judge responded that I may agree with you that he has mental illness. I may agree with you. Then the question is how best we can fashion this sentence to assist him. The judge ultimately determined, however, that an independent expert was not necessary, and instead ordered a mental-health examination of appellant to aid in sentencing to be conducted by the District's Forensic Services Administration. On January 31, 2002, appellant was transferred from St. Elizabeths to the District of Columbia Jail's Mental Health Ward, where he was interviewed and evaluated for one hour and forty minutes on February 19 and 20, 2002. Dr. Janet Fay-Dumaine, who performed the evaluation, also reviewed all of appellant's files and interviewed defense counsel and the government attorney. Dr. Fay-Dumaine's report noted that the court had ordered a competency evaluation at the outset of the case, on July 7, 2000, the report of which recommended further evaluation after determination of his need for mental health treatment and compliance with any recommended treatment. After admission to St. Elizabeths and further treatment, appellant was considered competent for trial as of September 29, 2000, and further hospitalization was not recommended. Upon his release from St. Elizabeths on January 5, 2001, his diagnosis was Phencyclidine (PCP) Induced Psychotic Disorder, PCP and Alcohol Dependence, and Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified with Antisocial Features. The records from a follow-up mental health visit on May 1, 2001 indicated that appellant was assessed to have loose associations of thought, auditory hallucinations, and delusions of persecution. Dr. Fay-Dumaine's report also noted that when appellant refused medication, his condition did not improve and that appellant was currently on two anti-psychotic drugs (Risperdal and Haldol) and one for related side effects (Cogentin). The report also noted that a June 27, 2000 criminal responsibility report opined that Mr. Phenis was criminally responsible for the instant offense, but Dr. Fay-Dumaine did not offer her own view of appellant's mental condition at the time of the offense. After a thorough examination of appellant's background and mental history, Dr. Fay-Dumaine concluded that appellant has a long history of substance abuse and psychotic symptoms that appear to be secondary to the abuse of substances. He did not appear to be suffering from symptoms of a major mental illness at the time of this evaluation. His history suggests a psychotic disorder induced by substance abuse, with a history of Antisocial Personality Disorder that predates his psychotic disorder. The report noted that appellant's condition worsens significantly when he is not on medication, and that he should continue to receive intensive mental health and substance abuse treatment. At the sentencing hearing on March 20, 2002 before Judge Motley, defense counsel informed the court that she had spoken with a doctor at the jail who told her they [the Jail] still have Mr. Phenis listed with schizophrenia as his diagnosis. And, I believe that's an informed part of this and his mental illness should be considered in the sentence. In his allocution, appellant said that he had been hallucinating and intoxicated at the time of the fire. He said that he had been trying to help his mother pay bills and rent, because my mother is sick and stuff, too. Like I'm sick. My mother's sick, too, a little bit. The judge ultimately recommended that appellant serve his time at the Federal Corrections Center in Butner, North Carolina, which has mental health facilities, because of the mental health issues surrounding the case, and I do understand that there are some.