Opinion ID: 2960565
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claimed Violation of the Plea Agreement

Text: (1) Standard of review. Although we have previously ruled that a defendant need not object in the trial court in order to preserve for appeal a claim that a plea agreement has been violated, see, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 510 F.3d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Lawlor, 168 F.3d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1999), the Supreme Court -6- has more recently ruled that such claims are to be reviewed only for plain error in the absence of objection in the trial court. See Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1428-33. To prevail on plain error review, an appellant must show that (1) there is error, (2) it is plain, (3) it affects a substantial right, and (4) it seriously affects the fairness of the judicial proceedings, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Zvi, 168 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir. 1999). (2) Applying plain error review. For the first time on appeal, MacPherson contends that his sentence violated the plea agreement. His claim is based not only on the Government’s advocacy of a sentence based on the seven kilograms of heroin that were not included in the Pimentel estimate, but also on the sentence in the plea agreement in which the defendant “stipulates that his sentence should be calculated based on a drug type and quantity of fifteen kilograms or more of a substance containing cocaine.” He contends that the Government’s advocacy that his sentence should be based on the seven kilograms of heroin, which were known to the Government at the time of the plea agreement, shows that the Government’s estimate was in bad faith and justifies an opportunity to withdraw his plea. Whether this contention survives plain error review requires some consideration of two recent decisions concerning sentences that exceed Government Pimentel estimates, United States v. Palladino, 347 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2003), and United States v. -7- Habbas, 527 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2008). Palladino ruled that the plea could be withdrawn after the prosecutor advocated a higher sentencing range than the range estimated in the plea agreement. However, in similar circumstances, Habbas ruled that the plea could not be withdrawn, stating: [W]e reject [the defendant’s] argument that the government violated his rights under the plea agreement by advocating a higher Guidelines level than it had estimated in the plea agreement. Habbas, 527 F.3d at 270. In addition, Habbas explicitly rejected the claim that Palladino “established a broad rule, categorically prohibiting the government from deviating from a Pimentel estimate, absent newly discovered facts.” Id. at 272. In view of these conflicting outcomes concerning plea withdrawal in two cases where the prosecutor advocated a sentencing range higher than the range estimated in the plea agreement, the prosecutor’s similar conduct in the pending case cannot have precipitated plain error, if any error at all. Nor does the prosecutor’s advocacy of a sentence based on the seven kilograms of heroin constitute plain error just because the plea agreement stated that the defendant “stipulates that his sentence should be calculated based on a drug type and quantity of fifteen kilograms or more of a substance containing cocaine.” Initially, we note that, whereas typical contract stipulations state that the parties -8- stipulate to some agreed upon terms, the agreement in this case states only that the defendant stipulates to a sentence based on the cocaine quantity. In any event, the agreement and the plea colloquy put the defendant on notice that the Pimentel estimate was not binding on the prosecutor and that if the estimate was wrong, the plea could not be withdrawn. In such circumstances, there was no plain error.