Opinion ID: 3184455
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The intent of the 1979 legislation revisited

Text: From our review of the legislative history of former ORS 30.950 (1979) and former ORS 30.955 (1979), as well as this court’s prior decisions examining that legislative history, it does not appear that this court has previously considered the recordings of the 1979 legislative hearings on HB 3152 that we have discussed here. Instead, this court’s previous consideration of the legislative history appears to have been confined to committee minutes. See Sager, 296 Or at 37 n 2 (“legislative history” consisted of minutes from committee hearings); id. at 39 (“A thorough reading of the minutes of the committee hearings on HB 3152 fails to reveal a single mention of creating a claim in favor of injured patrons.” (Emphasis added.)). However, our review of the recordings indicates that the conclusions that this court drew from the legislative history before it in Sager, 296 Or at 38-39, Gattman, 306 Or at 23, and Hawkins, 307 Or at 267-68, were essentially accurate: In enacting former ORS 30.950 (1979) and former 30.955 (1979), the legislature ultimately approved the holding in Campbell and intended to limit the holding in Davis. At no time during hearings on HB 3152 did anyone suggest that its enactment would create statutory liability that was different from common law liability. On the contrary, the focus throughout the hearings was on whether the perceived reach of the Campbell and Davis decisions should be statutorily confined.16 16 See Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 3152, June 11, 1979, Tape 85, Side 2 (statement of Legislative Chairman John Van Horn, Oregon 786 Deckard v. Bunch The legislative history of HB 3152, as amplified by the full record of hearings on that bill, shows that its ultimate purpose was to limit the liability of alcohol providers in serving visibly intoxicated patrons. Comments made at the committee hearings on the bill repeatedly stated preferences for a common-law negligence standard and for rejecting a gross negligence standard.17 It is true that the proponents of HB 3152 and perhaps some legislators may have understood this court’s decision in Campbell as having prescribed a negligence per se standard for alcohol providers who serve visibly intoxicated persons.18 However, those statements do not Restaurant & Beverage Association) (supporting concept of limited liability in HB 3152 because recent court decisions had gone beyond law’s intent); id. (statement of Dave Dietz) (stating that recent case law led to problems for licensees in acquiring insurance and HB 3152 attempted to address concerns about extent of liability); id. (statement of Rep Dave Frohnmayer) (stating that recent court decision based on statute resulted in negligence per se, which went too far in many opinions, including his own); Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 3152, June 26, 1979, Tape 96, Side 1 (comments of Rep Dave Frohnmayer) (summarizing legislative intent by stating that liability situation had gotten out of hand and committee was addressing problem by retreating from recent court decisions; expressing desire for middle ground between Wiener and Davis because Davis had gone too far); id. (comment of Rep Rutherford) (stating that section 1 of HB 3152—expressing legislature’s acknowledgement of need to restrict liability of licensees and hosts—was redundant); id. (comment of Rep Bugas) (expressing displeasure with third party liability and desire to place restrictions on it); Tape Recording, Senate Committee on State and Federal Affairs and Rules, HB 3152, June 30, 1979, Tape 9, Side 1 (statement of Dave Dietz) (stating that HB 3152 was designed to back away from recent court decisions). 17 Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 3152, June 11, 1979, Tape 85, Side 2 (statements of Van Horn and Dietz); id. (statement of Rep Frohnmayer) (Negligence per se “was, in the minds of many, including my own, an extension of the law beyond that that I think the legislature intended.”); Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 3152, June 26, 1979, Tape 96, Side 1 (statement of Rep Lombard) (“[T]he standard    in the bill is basically negligence.”); id. (statement of Rep Rutherford) (“[W]e’ve adopted a negligence standard[.]”). 18 For example, Van Horn described Campbell as shifting the burden of producing evidence from the plaintiff to a defendant-licensee by requiring the licensee to show some specific knowledge that the intoxicated patron was not going to drive from the tavern. Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 3152, June 11, 1979, Tape 85, Side 2 (statement of Legislative Chairman John Van Horn, Oregon Restaurant & Beverage Association). Van Horn further described Campbell as reflecting this court’s theory “that a violation of the statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to    visibly intoxicated persons should constitute negligence per se   .” Id. Similarly, Dietz described the industry’s concern with the shift from Wiener—where no statutory presumption of liability existed—to Campbell—where common law negligence was based on statutes and OLCC regulations—to Davis—where common law negligence was extended to negligence per se. Id. (statement of Dave Dietz). Cite as 358 Or 754 (2016) 787 reflect a proper understanding of the holding of Campbell. As noted, to prevail in a common-law negligence claim based on overservice under Campbell, a plaintiff still had to plead and prove that the defendant knew or should have known that a visibly intoxicated patron would create an unforeseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to others off the defendant’s premises. See Chartrand, 298 Or at 694-95 (“Judicial notice cannot replace the need for proof of an essential element of the tort claim as alleged in this case, i.e., proof that the defendant knew or should have known that the customer would drive a vehicle from the tavern.”). In former ORS 30.950 (1979) and former ORS 30.955 (1979), the legislature effectively said that liability may go as far as Campbell but no farther. The result was legislation that limited liability for alcohol providers by describing the only circumstances under which they could be liable in a common-law negligence claim—i.e., for serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person. Consistently with that purpose, the legislation as enacted did not state that an alcohol provider is liable for serving visibly intoxicated persons, which could indicate that one or more aspects of foreseeability would not need to be shown; instead, the legislation provided that no alcohol server is liable unless, which indicates a limitation on liability. Because, as the record shows, legislative committee members expressed skepticism toward even a negligence per se standard, it seems highly unlikely that they would have consciously approved legislation creating statutory liability that would hold an alcohol provider liable for overservice without regard to foreseeability. Unfortunately, this court stated in dictum in Chartrand that, after the gross negligence standard was removed from HB 3152, the bill’s effect was not to limit alcohol provider liability but, rather, to expand it. Chartrand, 298 Or at 697. As discussed, there is no indication in the legislative record that the rejection of the proposed gross negligence standard signaled such a change in the bill’s purpose. That standard was meant to “roll back the law” from ORBA’s understanding of Campbell as setting a negligence per se standard and to retreat to what ORBA understood to be an earlier state of the law. See Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 3152, June 11, 1979, 788 Deckard v. Bunch Tape 85, Side 2 (comments of Rep Dave Frohnmayer). It is illogical to infer that the legislature’s rejection of the gross negligence standard was more than a partial retreat from the proponents’ goals. After the gross negligence standard was removed, committee members continued to state that the bill was intended to limit liability for alcohol providers who serve visibly intoxicated persons.19 Moreover, when the amended bill was presented to the Senate committee, industry representative Dietz still described the intent of HB 3152 as backing away from recent court decisions and protecting alcohol providers. Tape Recording, Senate Committee on State and Federal Affairs and Rules, HB 3152, June 30, 1979, Tape 9, Side 1 (statement of Dave Dietz). In short, the 1979 legislature ultimately enacted compromise legislation that rejected both a gross negligence standard and a negligence per se standard for alcohol providers and, as a middle ground, endorsed this court’s common-law negligence standard in Campbell. Because that standard requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant knew or should have known that its conduct created an unreasonable and unforeseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff and limits liability to reasonably foreseeable harm, there is no basis to conclude that, by enacting HB 3152, the legislature intended to create a form of statutory liability that eliminated those foreseeability requirements. In fact, to so conclude would directly contradict the legislative history that this court has reviewed in its decisions since 1979. Which brings us to back to Chartrand. In light of the foregoing analysis, we must disavow the dictum in Chartrand stating that, by enacting former ORS 30.950 (1979), the legislature intended to create statutory liability for alcohol providers that effectively dispensed with a foreseeability requirement. See, e.g., ODOT v. Alderwoods (Oregon), Inc., 358 Or 501, 520 n 8, __ P3d __ (2015) (disavowing 19 See id. (comments of Rep Dave Frohnmayer) (summarizing legislative intent by stating that liability situation had gotten out of hand and committee was addressing problem by retreating from recent court decisions); (comment of Rep Rutherford) (stating that section 1 of HB 3152—expressing legislature’s acknowledgement of need to restrict liability of licensees and hosts—was redundant); (comment of Rep Bugas) (expressing displeasure with third party liability and desire to place restrictions on it). Cite as 358 Or 754 (2016) 789 dictum that was “not supported by any authority”); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 40, 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that extended, without explanation, overbreadth analysis beyond free-speech cases). As noted, the student comment on which the court relied to state that the legislation ultimately expanded liability for alcohol providers did not support the court’s dictum. In addition, the court’s reliance on Sager for that proposition was misplaced. As discussed, this court in Sager held that the purpose of HB 3152 was to approve the common-law negligence standard set out in Campbell, which, as this court stated in Chartrand, retained a foreseeability requirement.20