Opinion ID: 1961989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Meaning of During the Marriage

Text: As part of the Divorce Reform Act of 1971, L. 1971, c. 212, courts were given power to divide marital assets upon divorce: In all actions where a judgment of divorce or divorce from bed and board is entered the court may make such award or awards to the parties, in addition to alimony and maintenance, to effectuate an equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by them or either of them during the marriage. [ N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23] In upholding the constitutionality of this legislation, this Court explained that the division of property upon divorce is responsive to the concept that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many ways it is akin to a partnership. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229 (1974). We were first called upon to rule on the meaning of the words during the marriage in the companion cases of Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186 (1974), and Painter, supra . As Justice Mountain noted in Painter, While apparently clear on its face, the phrase may, in its application, present difficulties. 65 N.J. at 217. In part these difficulties result from the absence of any statutory definition of the term and from the total lack of relevant legislative history. [2] In Painter we rejected a literal reading of the statute that would have fixed the terminal point of the marriage on the day the judgment of divorce was granted. Such an interpretation would have necessitated bifurcated trials in most cases, since [i]t would normally not be practicable to introduce at the trial, evidence as to the value of asserts determined as of that day. Id. At the other extreme, we rejected an interpretation that would exclude assets acquired after it could be shown that there was an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage  . Id. Since the latter rule could not be applied with reasonable accuracy, we considered it unworkable. The companion case of Chalmers held that fault was not a relevant factor for determining equitable distribution. 65 N.J. at 193. We therefore rejected the accrual of a cause of action for divorce  in that case, adultery  as marking the end of a marriage. Id. at 194. After rejecting these alternatives in Painter and Chalmers, we concluded that in general the better rule was to adopt the filing date of the complaint as the end of the marital partnership. Painter, 65 N.J. at 218. We recognized, however, that this rule would not provide certain and ready answers in all cases involving equitable distribution. Id. at 218 n. 7. This acknowledgement proved correct in the later companion cases of Smith, supra, and Carlsen v. Carlsen, 72 N.J. 363 (1977). In Smith we reaffirmed the premise of Painter that the precise date on which the enterprise collapses  on which the marriage irretrievably breaks down  is generally impossible or extremely difficult to determine. 72 N.J. at 361. We noted that [t]he formulation of Painter was an attempt to avoid promulgating an unworkable rule. Id. The facts then before us, however, presented an opportunity to fashion a workable alternative to the date of complaint rule, since the parties in Smith had entered into a formal separation agreement accompanied by physical separation. We concluded that it would be clearly irrational to regard the duration of the marriage as continuing beyond the date of the execution and delivery of such an agreement. Id. We therefore held that [W]hen the parties to a divorce action have previously entered into an agreement of this nature, accompanied by separation in fact, the date at which the marriage will be held to have terminated, for purposes of determining and valuing assets eligible for equitable distribution, will be the date of the agreement. [ Id. at 361-362] We also held that this rule should apply when such an agreement is made in conjunction with a judicial decree for separate maintenance. Carlsen v. Carlsen, 72 N.J. at 370-371. After the Appellate Division decision in the present case, this Court decided DiGiacomo v. DiGiacomo, 80 N.J. 155 (1979). There we recognized that application of the Painter rule was inappropriate even though, unlike in Smith and Carlsen, the parties had not entered into a written separation agreement. The parties in DiGiacomo had separated and divided a large part of their assets in a manner orally agreed upon by them. We held that this arrangement was a property settlement, and although not in writing, [was] as valid and effective, upon sufficient proof, as if it had been more formally memorialized. Id. at 159. We therefore held that [p]roperty acquired by either spouse subsequent to the agreement is not eligible for [equitable distribution]. Id. These cases following Painter recognize that there can be reliable indicia of an end of the marital partnership other than the filing of a complaint for divorce. We must now consider whether the facts presented in this case afford a proper occasion for again deviating from the Painter rule.