Opinion ID: 2532489
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the evidence was sufficient to support brown's conviction.

Text: ¶ 8. Brown argues that the evidence was insufficient to determine where Jones had obtained the cocaine, and thus, reasonable jurors could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown was guilty of the sale of cocaine. [I]n considering whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction in the face of a motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows `beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction.' Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss.2005) (quoting Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 889 (Miss. 1968)). The essential inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). This Court has stated further: If the facts and inferences so considered point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable [jurors] could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, granting the motion is required. May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss.1984). On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motionthat is, evidence of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded [jurors] in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offensethe motion should be denied. Edwards v. State, 469 So.2d 68, 70 (Miss. 1985). ¶ 9. In today's case, the State's burden was to prove that Brown knowingly or intentionally sold or transferred cocaine (less than 0.1 grams), a Schedule II controlled substance, to Jones, for a sum of money. See Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139 (Rev.2003). Jones testified that he had agreed to serve as an informant and that he had gone to Brown's residence on Joe Wheeler Avenue to purchase cocaine. He testified that Brown was indeed the person from whom he had purchased the cocaine for $35 and that he had known Brown for about a year and a half. Jones stated that before the sale or transfer, he had asked Brown if there was anything going on, meaning was there any crack there for sell (sic). He further testified that Brown had responded yeah. This Court has stated that a person may be found guilty on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness. Doby v. State, 532 So.2d 584, 591 (Miss.1988) (citations omitted). However, in today's case, we have more than just Jones's uncorroborated testimony. Officer Williams corroborated much of Jones's testimony. Officer Williams stated that Jones had agreed to cooperate with him and work as an informant. He testified that Jones's car had been searched prior to his departure to purchase drugs and upon his return with the cocaine purchased from Brown. Officer Williams had monitored the cocaine purchase from a safe following distance, and he testified that he had received what appeared to be cocaine from Jones upon Jones's return to the Narcotics Division office. Officer Williams also watched the video recording and identified Brown from previous knowledge as the one who is selling the cocaine on the video. This recording was played for the jury. Furthermore, a forensic scientist with the Mississippi Crime Laboratory identified the substance delivered to him by the Narcotics Division as cocaine. ¶ 10. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence to convict Brown of the sale of cocaine. Any reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the State had proven all the elements of the crime of sale of cocaine. As such, this issue is without merit.