Opinion ID: 152884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The BIA's Application of the Departure Bar

Text: In the present case, the BIA concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to enter its September 10, 2008 order reopening petitioner's removal proceedings because petitioner had already been removed from the United States. The Board vacated the order and dismissed the appeal, citing the departure bar and In re Armendarez-Mendez. Petitioner now argues that the departure bar regulation goes against the plain language of the portion of the regulation governing the BIA's sua sponte authority. However, the BIA rejected a similar contention in In re Armendarez-Mendez. We hold that the BIA's interpretation is entitled to deference and that it requires us to reject petitioner's argument. Under the current version of the INA, an alien who is to be removed pursuant to an order of the BIA typically has ninety days after the Board's decision becomes final to file a motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (c)(7)(C)(i); see also Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). [7] Petitioner's motion to reopen was untimely in this regard, as it was filed approximately five years after the removal order became final. The INA also enumerates statutory exceptions that allow this ninety-day time limit to be excused or extended. For example, an otherwise-untimely motion to reopen may be permitted if the alien seeks asylum based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). We have also held that the ninety-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen is subject to equitable tolling under appropriate circumstances. See Iavorski, 232 F.3d at 134 (holding that the limitations period for untimely motions to reopen can be equitably tolled to accommodate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel). However, petitioner's motion to reopen did not rely on any of the INA's statutory exceptions to the ninety-day time limit, and he did not argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Instead, petitioner asked the BIA to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen his removal proceedings. The wellspring of this authority resides, as it always has, in a regulation promulgated by the Attorney General: The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.... The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the restrictions of this section.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (emphases added). [8] However, after the Board realized that petitioner had been removed, it took the view that it was divested of jurisdiction to consider his motion based on the departure bar, which states that [a]ny departure from the United States, including the ... removal of a person who is the subject of ... removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). [9] The basis for the BIA's interpretation of the departure bar as a jurisdictional limitation on its sua sponte authority is In re Armendarez-Mendez. In that case, the BIA noted that it has had regulatory power to entertain motions, subject to such limitations as the Attorney General may prescribe, since 1940, but that there was no statute delineating the scope or limits of that power until Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1990. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 647, 654. Moreover, the Board reasoned, [a]s early as 1954 and in an unbroken string of precedents extending over 50 years, it has construed the departure bar rule as imposing a limitation on [its] jurisdiction to entertain motions filed by aliens who had departed the United States. Id. at 648 (citing, inter alia, In re G-Y B-, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 159-60). Based on those first principles, the BIA reaffirm[ed] its established understanding of the departure bar as a jurisdictional limitation on its sua sponte authority, and it rejected the Ninth Circuit's construction of the departure bar in Zi-Xing Lin v. Gonnzales, 473 F.3d 979, 981-82 (9th Cir.2007) (relying on the rule of lenity to hold that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) does not deprive an IJ of jurisdiction to consider a motion to reopen filed by a removed alien). In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 650-53, 660. [10] We review de novo legal questions decided by the BIA. See Phong Thanh Nguyen v. Chertoff, 501 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir.2007). However, we owe substantial deference to the BIA's interpretation of the applicable regulation in In re Armendarez-Mendez, unless we find that interpretation to be plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Padmore v. Holder, 609 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997). To be sure, the BIA's construction is anything but airtight. With respect to the departure bar, it is linguistically awkward to consider the forcible removal of an alien as constitut[ing] a withdrawal of any pending motions filed by the alien, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). See Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that the departure bar regulation amounts to saying that, by putting an alien on a bus, the agency may `withdraw' its adversary's motion); cf. Madrigal v. Holder, 572 F.3d 239, 245-46 (6th Cir.2009) (Kethledge, J., concurring). And, when the departure bar is read in isolation, it is not readily apparent why the withdrawal that it effects is jurisdictional in nature. See Marin-Rodriguez, at 593-94. Moreover, the portion of the regulation governing the BIA's sua sponte authority permits the Board to exercise that power at any time. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). But the BIA apparently understands the phrase at any time to mean at any time that the alien in question is physically present in the United States. Finally, although In re Armendarez-Mendez is couched in jurisdictional terms without qualification, it is unclear why a withdrawal under the departure bar would deprive the BIA of authority to either: (1) act in a purely sua sponte fashion, unprompted by a person who has been removed; or (2) consider a motion to reopen filed by DHS rather than a person who is being, or has been, removed. For example, in Marin-Rodriguez the BIA appears to have resolved a motion for reconsideration filed by DHS pursuant to the INA, despite knowing full well that the departure bar was in play because the petitioner had already been removed. See Marin-Rodriguez, at 591-92. Though we do not intend to create an exhaustive list of our concerns through these examples, the point is clear: Were we writing on a blank slate, we might reach a different conclusion than that of the BIA regarding the relationship between these portions of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. But, in light of In re Armendarez-Mendez, we are not presented with a blank slate. The BIA tells us that the departure bar serves as a jurisdictional limitation on its sua sponte authority. Under the circumstances of this casewhere petitioner filed an otherwise-barred motion to reopen and asked the BIA to invoke its sua sponte authoritywe cannot say that the Board's construction is plainly erroneous. First, even before the BIA offered its precedential interpretation, we indicated, in dicta, that an alien's voluntary departure from the country would result in a forfeiture of the right to file a motion to reopen. Singh v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir.2006) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)). And we were not alone in this regard. See Mansour v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1194, 1198 (6th Cir.2006); Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir.2003). But see Zi-Xing Lin, 473 F.3d at 981-82. Moreover, following In re Armendarez-Mendez, two Circuits have reached conclusions similar to that of the BIA and held that the departure bar deprives the Board of authority to consider a motion to reopen that would otherwise be defective under the INA. See Toora v. Holder, 603 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir.2010); Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir.2009); Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147, 1159-60 (10th Cir.2009); Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 296-97 (5th Cir.2009). That our Court and others have interpreted 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 in a fashion similar to the BIA supports the conclusion that the Board's view in In re Armendarez-Mendez is not plainly erroneous. Second, although certain language from In re Armendarez-Mendez cuts broadly, we need only examine the merits of the Board's position with respect to the situation presented here. Approximately five years after petitioner's removal proceedings became final, he filed a motion to reopen that asked the BIA to invoke its sua sponte authority. There is no dispute here that the Attorney General's decision to provide the BIA with such authority was a valid use of his rulemaking power under the INA. And petitioner has not argued that the sua sponte power itself is inconsistent with the statute. This comes as no surprise, as there was no statutory basis for his motion. Be that as it may, the BIA's position in In re Armendarez-Mendez has more force in the context of a motion in which an alien asks the BIA to rely on jurisdiction that comes from a regulation rather than a statute. If the Attorney General possesses the authority to vest sua sponte jurisdiction in the BIA and it is undisputed here that he does then it stands to reason that he would also have the authority to limit that jurisdiction and define its contours through, among other things, the departure bar. Third, when the text of § 1003.2 is viewed as a whole, it is not unreasonable to interpret the departure bar as a limitation on the BIA's sua sponte authority. Cf. In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 582 F.3d 422, 427 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that statutory interpretation calls for an examination of the specific context in which [the] language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole (internal quotation marks omitted)). Paragraph (a) of § 1003.2, which is titled General, refers to the Board's authority to not only reopen a proceeding sua sponte, but also to resolve motions to reopen or reconsider filed by either DHS or the party affected by the decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, the [g]eneral authority conferred upon the BIA by the Attorney General in § 1003.2(a), which may be exercised at any time, is not absolute. Id. Rather, paragraph (a) makes clear that the BIA's sua sponte authority is subject to the restrictions of ... section [1003.2]. Id. The more-specific departure bar, codified within this section at paragraph (d), may reasonably be interpreted as a restriction[ ] on the [g]eneral sua sponte provision in paragraph (a). Id.; see also Navarro-Miranda, 330 F.3d at 676. Therefore, at least insofar as the BIA's sua sponte authority is concernedand we need not go any further in this case the Board's interpretation of the departure bar as a jurisdictional limitation is not plainly inconsistent with the terms of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 when the regulation is read as a whole. Finally, the BIA's construction is supported by the historical evolution of this regulation. At least since the Alien Registration Act of 1940, Congress has delegated to the Attorney General broad authority to establish rules and regulations to enforce the nation's immigration laws. See Pub.L. No. 670, § 37(a), ch. 339, 54 Stat. at 675. Relying on that congressional delegation, the Attorney General established the departure bar in 1952 and later empowered the BIA to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte. Since 1954, the Board has taken the position that the departure bar operates as a limitation on its jurisdiction to consider motions to reopen. See In re G-Y B-, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 160. This limitation must be understood in connection with the BIA's position within the larger immigration bureaucracy. In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 656. By divesting the BIA of authority over persons removed from the country, the Attorney General preserved the jurisdictional primacy of DHS and the State Department over the inspection and admission of aliens from abroad. Id. Congress, through decades of silence on this subject despite repeated amendments to the INA, [11] has acquiesced in the BIA's understanding of the authority granted to it by the Attorney General. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986); United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 158, 172-73 (2d Cir.2009); see also William, 499 F.3d at 344 (Williams, C.J., dissenting) (Given the INA's silence with respect to the departure bar, I understand Congress's failure to explicitly repeal 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) as acquiescence to its continued operation.). Although the INA was enacted in 1952, see Pub.L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. at 163, Congress provided no limitations on the scope of the BIA's authority to consider motions to reopen until the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. at 5066. Even then, Congress left it to the Attorney General to consider in the first instance the policy decisions regarding appropriate limitations to be imposed on these motions. See id. When the Attorney General responded to that legislative mandate in 1996, she saw fit to retain the departure bar. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1996). In the same year, 1996, Congress revised the INA by passing the IIRIRA. See Pub.L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. at 3009-546. Although the IIRIRA repealed the portion of the INA that precluded judicial review of a BIA decision after an alien leaves the country, see id. § 306, 110 Stat. at 3009-607, the Act was silent as to both the departure bar and the BIA's sua sponte authority. There is nothing incongruous about retaining the latter but excising the former, for judicial review of an alien's petition for review with respect to a final order of removal is not the same as BIA review of a motion to reopen. William, 499 F.3d at 343 (Williams, C.J., dissenting) (emphases in original). By allowing courts to review BIA decisions even after the alien leaves the United States, Congress empowered us to oversee, inter alia, the manner in which the BIA polices its jurisdictional boundaries. In any event, the congressional silence in the IIRIRA regarding § 1003.2 is not inconsistent with the BIA's position. Therefore, for all of these reasons, we cannot conclude that In re Armendarez-Mendez, as it applies to the facts of this case, is plainly erroneous. There is some superficial tension between our conclusion and a recent decision of the Seventh Circuit. See Marin-Rodriguez, at 593-95. In Marin-Rodriguez, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration approximately one month after the BIA dismissed his appeal. See id. at 591. Thus, unlike in this case, the motion was timely under the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). The Board granted the motion and remanded to the IJ, apparently unaware at the time that the petitioner had been removed from the country while the motion was pending. See Marin-Rodriguez, at 591-92. The DHS then filed a motion for reconsideration of its own, which the BIA granted based on the departure bar. Id. Because the petitioner's only motion for reconsideration was timely under the INA, the facts of Marin-Rodriguez resemble those considered by the Fourth Circuit in William. See 499 F.3d at 334 n. 5. But the Seventh Circuit rejected the Fourth Circuit's understanding of the INA. Marin-Rodriguez, at 593. Referring to the Supreme Court's analysis in Dada v. Mukasey , the Marin-Rodriguez court reasoned as follows: If the Supreme Court sees no incompatibility between a statutory right to apply for [voluntary departure] and an implied-withdrawal approach [to situations where an alien seeks to reopen his removal proceedings after agreeing to voluntarily depart], it is hard to fault the Board for adopting a similar view. Thus an alien with a right to move for reconsideration [under the INA] may give up that right by a specified act [such as departing from the country]. Id. [12] Nevertheless, the court went on to reason that the validity of the particular condition the Board has attached on motions to reopen i.e., physical presence in the United Statesmust be ascertained on other grounds. Id. With the issue thus framed, the court went on to hold that, [a]s a rule about subject-matter jurisdiction, § 1003.2(d) is untenable. Id. at 593-94. It reasoned that, although the INA authorizes the Board to reconsider or reopen its own decisions, the statute does not make that step depend on the alien's presence in the United States. Id. [S]ince [the IIRIRA was passed in] 1996 nothing in the statute undergirds a conclusion that the Board lacks `jurisdiction'which is to say, adjudicatory competenceto issue decisions that affect the legal rights of departed aliens. Id. (internal citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit then cited Union Pacific Railroad v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 584, 175 L.Ed.2d 428 (2009), for the proposition that an administrative agency is not entitled to contract its own jurisdiction by regulations or by decisions in litigated proceedings. Marin-Rodriguez, at 593-94. In the court's view, Union Pacific was dispositive in favor of the holding in William though on a rationale distinct from the [F]ourth [C]ircuit's. Id. at 593-94. Properly understood, the analysis in Marin-Rodriguez does not conflict with ours. The point is made clear by reference to the source of BIA jurisdiction that was invoked by the petitioner in each case. In Marin-Rodriguez, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was explicitly authorized by the INA; Congress, by enacting the IIRIRA, gave the BIA jurisdiction to consider one such motion if it is filed within ninety days after the removal decision becomes final. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). In this case, however, petitioner was not eligible to avail himself of this statutory entitlement under the INA. Instead, in support of his motion, he invoked the regulation in which the Attorney General authorized the BIA to consider motions to reopen sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Consequently, we need not decide if the Attorney General, by promulgating § 1003.2, has improperly contract[ed] the jurisdiction given to the BIA by Congress pursuant to the IIRIRA. Marin-Rodriguez, at 593-94. We leave that question for another day. See supra note 2. The sua sponte power that is at issue here isand always has beena creature of regulations promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to a valid delegation from Congress. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2). The Attorney General's power to limit this aspect of the BIA's jurisdiction is subsumed within his more expansive power to create it. Therefore, the BIA's understanding of the departure bar as a limitation on its sua sponte jurisdiction, as opposed to its jurisdiction to consider timely motions to reopen under the INA, cannot be said to be untenable. In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the admonition from Union Pacific that the word `jurisdiction' has been used by courts ... to convey `many, too many, meanings,' and that profligate use of the term is to be avoided. 130 S.Ct. at 596 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)). In Union Pacific, the Supreme Court considered the nature of provisions in the Railway Labor Act (RLA) that required parties to labor disputes to attempt to reach a settlement in conference before submitting the matter to arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB). See id. at 591-92 n. 3 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152 Second, Sixth). The NRAB had characterized the in conference requirement as a limitation on its jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court disagreed. Congress vested the NRAB with jurisdiction over  all disputes between carriers and their employees `growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.' Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 240, 70 S.Ct. 577, 94 L.Ed. 795 (1950) (emphasis added) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i)). Moreover, Congress gave the [NRAB] no authority to adopt rules of jurisdictional dimension. Union Pac., 130 S.Ct. at 597 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (v)). Based largely on the absence of such a delegation, the Court held that the RLA's in conference requirement did not limit the NRAB's statutory jurisdiction and the NRAB lacked authority to characterize it in that fashion. See id. at 598. As such, the requirement is merely a claim-processing rule, and any defenses based on non-compliance with it are forfeitable. Unlike in Union Pacific, this is not an instance where a statute vests an agency with broad authority that the agency has declined to exercise. Whereas the NRAB's jurisdiction is established in the statute that created it and the NRAB's rulemaking authority is rather limited, Congress delegated the authority to define some aspects of the BIA's jurisdiction to the Attorney General. Compare 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (v) (authorizing the NRAB to adopt such rules as it deems necessary to control proceedings before the respective divisions and not in conflict with the provisions of this section), with 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (authorizing the Attorney General to establish such regulations, prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers, issue such instructions, review such administrative determinations in immigration proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such other acts as the Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying out this section (emphasis added)). It is undisputed in this case that the delegation to the Attorney General includes the authority to promulgate regulations definingindeed, expandingthe BIA's jurisdiction to consider motions to reopen otherwise-final removal proceedings. And petitioner has not argued that the manner in which the Attorney General has chosen to define the BIA's jurisdiction conflicts with the INA or leads to some sort of interpretive problem under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Thus, we are mindful of the analytical approach taken by the Supreme Court in Union Pacific, as well as that of the Seventh Circuit in Marin-Rodriguez, but the holdings in those cases are inapposite. Therefore, we hold that the BIA is not plainly erroneous in its position, expressed in In re Armendarez-Mendez, that the departure bar limits its sua sponte jurisdiction. Accordingly, because the Board is entitled to deference with respect to that view, it did not err in concluding that § 1003.2(d) deprived it of authority to consider petitioner's motion to reopen after he was removed from the country.