Opinion ID: 204284
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lack of an Independent Investigation

Text: Under any formulation of the cat's paw standard, the chain of causation can be broken if the unbiased decisionmaker conducts a meaningful and independent investigation of the information being supplied by the biased employee. See, e.g., Martino, 574 F.3d at 453 (decisionmaker's independent investigation defeated effort to rely on cat's paw theory); Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547-48 (7th Cir.1997) (same). Here, however, Schandelmeier presented ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded that, whether the decisionmaker was McDonald or Rowland, the Park District's investigation into Schandelmeier's job performance was not independent of Adams's input. The jury could find that, in fact, the supposed investigation was based almost entirely on Adams's input. McDonald testified that she did not personally observe Schandelmeier's performance and that she relied entirely on information she got from other people. She never saw the food service write-ups. [5] Prior to drafting her July 24th CAM request e-mail, she discussed Schandelmeier's performance with Adams, Williams, and Rowland, and her e-mail referred to Adams's memo. This was the full extent of McDonald's investigation. Williams testified that he observed some issues with Schandelmeier's employment, but neither he nor McDonald testified as to what Williams may or may not have conveyed about Schandelmeier's performance to McDonald. His testimony was specific, however, that he never recommended that Schandelmeier be fired. Adams, on the other hand, papered Schandelmeier's file with performance-related memos, in particular the August 1st last straw memo. McDonald did not attempt to observe Schandelmeier's work performance herself, nor did she attempt to speak to Schandelmeier about her performance issues. The jury could easily conclude from this evidence that the only meaningful information McDonald acquired in her investigation came from Adams, the racially biased source. Even if the jury concluded that Rowland was the decisionmaker instead of McDonald, that additional layer of supervision did not improve the quality of the investigation into Schandelmeier's job performance. Rowland's investigation was even less thorough and independent than McDonald's. She testified at trial that her termination decision was based on input she received from McDonaldwhose own opinion, as noted, was based almost entirely on information garnered from Adams. Rowland testified, too, that two or three weeks before Schandelmeier's termination, she had witnessed Schandelmeier not interacting with day-campers, and that parents were complaining because Schandelmeier had not prepared a schedule for camp. Rowland was the human resources manager, however, and the jury was entitled to find that her statements regarding Schandelmeier's performance were not entirely credible, particularly after she admitted that no parents actually complained to her about the missing camp schedules. Rowland did not testify that she sought additional input from Williams, Schandelmeier herself, or even Adams. This evidence, again, does not diminish the pervasive influence of Adams and her bias. Keeping in mind the Rule 50 standard, we find sufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the decisive influence on the decision was Adams's bias, regardless of whether McDonald or Rowland was the formal decisionmaker. By way of illustration, compare this evidence to the lack of similar evidence in Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office , in which judgment as a matter of law in favor of an employer was affirmed. Willis was a retaliatory discharge case. No evidence was presented from which the jury could have concluded that the decisionmaker harbored an impermissible racial or retaliatory bias against the plaintiff. Willis, 118 F.3d at 546. But evidence was presented to suggest that two non-decisionmakers did. Despite a jury verdict for the plaintiff, judgment as a matter of law for the defense was upheld because it was shown that, rather than accepting the biased supervisors' word regarding the plaintiff's performance problems, the actual decisionmaker permitted the plaintiff to explain her deficiencies, which she was unable to do. The decisionmaker also aired the plaintiff's suspicions that she was being targeted for impermissible reasons and permitted the plaintiff to try (unsuccessfully) to substantiate her claim. Also, the decisionmaker's termination decision was based ultimately on the plaintiff's undisputed violations of objective performance standards. See id. at 547-48. Because of these factors, we agreed with the district court that the causal chain had been broken in Willis as a matter of law. Similar factors are not present here, at least beyond reasonable factual dispute, so the jury could find that the causal chain remained intact. Schandelmeier's race discrimination case survived summary judgment because the district court found that disputed issues of material fact existed as to whether the decision to terminate Schandelmeier was made before or after Adams sent the August 1st last straw memo, among other things. The court found that if that fact were resolved in Schandelmeier's favor at trial, a jury could believe that Adams objected to Plaintiff in her employment capacity because of her race and perceived inability to understand allegedly African-American social mores, leading her to write the August 1 memorandum that may have caused Plaintiff to be fired later that same day, and that even if McDonald were the sole decisionmaker, Adams's prejudices could be imputed to McDonald if it can be shown that Adams concealed relevant information from McDonald or fed false information to her in order to influence her decision. See Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chicago Park Dist., 2008 WL 4855649, at , n. 3 (N.D.Ill. Nov.7, 2008), citing Lust, 383 F.3d at 585. We agree with that analysis. If that evidence had not materialized at trial, and if Schandelmeier had not introduced other evidence in its place, this court would be obligated to affirm the grant of the Park District's Rule 50 motion. See Filipovich v. K & R Express Systems, Inc., 391 F.3d 859, 863 (7th Cir.2004). However, Schandelmeier offered sufficient evidence at trial to connect Adams's racial bias to the Park District's decision to terminate her employment. The district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Park District is reversed, and the jury's finding of liability is reinstated.