Opinion ID: 1684920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: remedy for government

Text: While I have no doubt as to the soundness of the trial court's judgment and today's decision approving that judgment, I, nevertheless, recognize that the government has a distinct interest in the health and welfare of its children that is different in kind than the government's similar interest in the health and well being of adults. As noted above, this Court's decision in In re T.W. relied on the government's failure to consistently recognize that interest, and, in fact, to selectively target only the health care decision to terminate a pregnancy, as the reason for concluding the government had failed to make a case that its interest was compelling. However, under this Court's holding in In re T.W., and our holding today, the government still has the option available to remedy the problem this Court found fatal to the legislative scheme identified in In re T.W. [70] It is important to note, as legislative staff once did, that this Court's opinion in In re T.W. also put the government on explicit notice of how the inconsistency that was fatal to a claim of a compelling interest could be remedied. In In re T.W. this Court explicitly identified legislative inconsistency as an obstacle to the enactment of the legislation at issue. However, in this instance, and without removing the obvious legal obstacle expressly pointed out by Justice Shaw in In re T.W., the government went ahead over staff warnings and enacted the legislation under review. The obstacle of inconsistency was clearly within the power of the government to remedy before enacting the current legislation. To be sure, the government can avoid these problems by bringing more consistency to the legislative provisions concerning a minor's health choices, and by making parental involvement the norm rather than the exception to a minor's important health care choices. [71] In short, under this Court's controlling precedent in In re T.W, the government is still left with the ability to both demonstrate its valid and consistent interests in a minor's health and well being, and to do so in a manner less intrusive than the present selective and directly intrusive scheme on the minor's right of privacy. In the meantime, however, this Court is bound to honor its own precedent, and Justice Shaw's opinion does so today. PARIENTE, J., specially concurring. I fully concur with the majority opinion, and agree that this case is controlled by the majority opinion in In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla.1989). I write separately to emphasize that it is not T.W. alone that renders the parental notification law unconstitutional, but also the well-established precedent governing review of legislation that infringes on fundamental rights in general and Florida's constitutional right of privacy in particular. I also write separately to specifically respond to the arguments advanced by the dissent and the concerns expressed by Justice Lewis in his concurring in result only opinion. Simply put, the State has not met its heavy burden of establishing that mandating parental notification of the minor's abortion decision furthers any compelling state interest. Specifically, the State has failed to establish that parental notification makes abortion a safer procedure for minors. Rather, parental notification, like the parental consent law held unconstitutional in T.W., impermissibly infringes on a minor's constitutional right of privacy guaranteed by the Florida Constitution. Our decision today rests on the firm foundation of this Court's precedent that guides the adjudication of challenges to statutes infringing on fundamental rights, including the right of privacy contained in article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution. In every case since Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 548 (Fla.1985), we have held that legislation that infringes on the right of privacyas this statute doesis unconstitutional unless the State has proved that the legislation serves a compelling state interest; that the legislation substantially furthers that interest; and that the legislation does so through the least restrictive means. Known as strict scrutiny analysis, this standard is the most stringent this Court applies, and imposes the heaviest burden of proof for the State to sustain. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated when it declared that state's parental notification statute unconstitutional: We acknowledge that the State has a substantial interest in preserving the family and protecting the rights of parents. When weighed against the right of a young woman to make the most personal and intimate decision whether to carry a child to term, however, the insubstantial connection between the notification requirement and the interests expressed by the State is not sufficient to sustain the statute. We emphasize that our decision in no way interferes with parents' protected interests, nor does it prevent pregnant minors or their physicians from notifying parents about a young woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy. Simply, the effect of declaring the notification statute unconstitutional is to maintain the State's neutrality in respect of a minor's childbearing decisions and a parent's interest in those decisions. In effect, the State may not affirmatively tip the scale against the right to choose an abortion absent compelling reasons to do so. Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609, 762 A.2d 620, 622 (2000) (emphasis supplied). I agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning and find its analysis to be applicable to our evaluation of the constitutionality of Florida's similar parental notification statute. In my view, in light of our precedent in this area of law and the extensive factual record and findings developed in the trial court below, the State has not met its heavy burden in this case.