Opinion ID: 402449
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Omnibus Crime Control Act

Text: 17 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-20 (the Act) prohibits the electronic interception of oral communications except under certain circumstances and provides that the contents of conversations intercepted in violation of the Act may not be received in evidence in any court proceeding. See §§ 2511 amd 2515. The legality of the interceptions involved here turns on the construction and application of § 2511(2)(c), a consensual exception to the Act's broad proscriptions. 1 That subsection states: 18 It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. 19 Whether the requirements of § 2511(2)(c) were met thus depends upon (1) what acts constituted interceptions of the conversations between Quick and Shields, (2) who was responsible for each interception, (3) whether that person was acting under color of law, and (4) whether that person was a party to the communication or whether there was consent to the interception by a party. 20 The Act defines intercept as the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). Under this definition, each communication in question was intercepted twice. One aural acquisition occurred when the agents heard the conversation being transmitted by radio. The other involved the tape recording and occurred at the time the recording was made, not when persons listened to the tape. United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823, 97 S.Ct. 74, 50 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976). 21 In ruling on the motion to suppress, the district court determined that the tape recording was an interception by Andrews. That finding was based upon the district court's conclusion that the recording ... equipment came to be on defendant Quick's person as a result of Quick's explicit request that Mr. Andrews assist him with acquiring such electronic paraphernalia as was necessary for Andrews to record said conversations. Appellant Shields argues, however, that Quick intercepted the conversations by making the tapes and that the evidence is inadmissible under § 2511(2)(c) because Quick was not acting under color of law. 22 The district court's determination of who intercepted the conversations was a finding of fact. As such, it must be upheld unless we find it clearly erroneous. See generally McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 53 (2d ed. 1972). 23 We find that the record sufficiently supports the district court's view of the events. Andrews' testimony at the suppression hearing indicates that he, not Quick, controlled the recording equipment. Andrews installed the recorder, turned it on, and taped the switch in the on position. After the conversation, he removed the equipment and turned off the recorder. Though the recording was apparently done at Quick's request, and though Quick wore the recorder, Andrews did the recording. He used Quick's body as the means of inserting the equipment into the presence of the conversationalists; Quick's request would have been granted had Andrews arranged for the recorder's and the transmitter's presence in any other acceptable way. 24 Courts have repeatedly held that informants who tape-record private conversations at the direction of government investigators are acting under color of law within the meaning of subsection (c). See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1377 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988, 99 S.Ct. 584, 58 L.Ed.2d 661 (1978); United States v. Ransom, 515 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 1412, 47 L.Ed.2d 349 (1976); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 476 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rich, 518 F.2d 980, 985 (8th Cir. 1975). Consequently, it seems clear-and Shields apparently admits-that Andrews was acting under color of law when he recorded the conversations here. 25 The remaining inquiry is whether Quick consented to the interception within the meaning of § 2511(2)(c). The legislative history explains the consensual exception as follows: It shall not be unlawful for a party to any wire or oral communication or a person given prior authority by a party to a communication to intercept such communication. S.R.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1968) U.S.Code Cong. and Ad.News 2112, 2182. Since Andrews' activities were invited, he did have prior authority to make the interception. 2 Also, the requirement that the consent be voluntary is satisfied in this case. See United States v. Juarez, 573 F.2d 267, 278 (5th Cir. 1978). 26 We find, then, that the recordings were legal interceptions and that the taped evidence of the conversations was admissible. We need not decide whether the interceptions through the reception of radio transmissions were legal. 3