Opinion ID: 2345631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Given the Magistrate Judge's factual findings, reflecting considerable time spent on this case, and the Reviewing Judge's extensive analysis of the record, we center our attention on only one of I.B.'s contentionsher central claim that there was insufficient record evidence to show that the statutory factors contained in D.C.Code § 16-2383(d) were met and that the guardianship was in C.B.'s best interest. Our review prompts no concern except with respect to one aspect of one factorD.C.Code § 16-2383(d)(3), the quality of the interaction between C.B. and the guardians. While the Reviewing Judge discusses the interaction of C.B. and her uncle, A.B., she does not focus on the negative testimony which C.B. gave about her aunt on June 17, 2005. That testimony was taken by the Magistrate Judge out of the presence of the parties and their counsel. The judge apparently informed A.B. of this testimony shortly after it was given, but not until September 2005 did the Magistrate Judge tell the others, including I.B. and her counsel, that C.B. was unhappy, doesn't feel that E.B. is the nicest person in the world, doesn't like being with [E.B.], and feels that [E.B.] is mean to her and treats her differently when [A.B.] is not at home. We turn now to the statute which guides our review of this case. The District of Columbia Foster Children's Guardianship Act (the Guardianship Act), D.C.Code §§ 16-2381 (2009 Supp.), is designed to [e]ncourage stability in the lives of certain children who have been adjudicated to be neglected and have been removed from the custody of their parent by providing judicial procedures for the creation of a permanent guardianship.... D.C.Code § 16-2381(1); see also W.D. v. C.S.M., 906 A.2d 317, 326 (D.C.2006) (quoting § 16-2381). The Guardianship Act attempts to ensure that the constitutional rights of all parties are safeguarded and the fundamental needs of children are addressed. D.C.Code § 16-2381(2). As we explained in In re A.G., 900 A.2d 677 (D.C.2006): The statute strikes this balance by encompass[ing] a number of procedures aimed at protecting children from emotional and physical harm while at the same time seeking to repair and maintain family ties. It provides for a measure of flexibility ... to allow the [District] to provide permanence for a child without terminating the parent's rights. The statute provides for secure placement of the child while authorizing both visitation between parent and child and continuing involvement by [District] agencies. Id. at 681 n. 6 (citations omitted). Moreover, the Guardianship Act explicitly states the standards for the issuance of a guardianship order by the Family Court; D.C.Code § 16-2383(c) provides: (c) The court may issue a guardianship order only if the court finds that: (1) The permanent guardianship is in the child's best interests; (2) Adoption, termination of parental rights, or return to parent is not appropriate for the child; and (3) The proposed permanent guardian is suitable and able to provide a safe and permanent home for the child. Undoubtedly, to assist in striking the balance between the constitutional rights of all parties and the fundamental needs of the child, the Guardianship Act requires the Family Court to schedule an adjudicatory hearing in accordance with D.C.Code § 16-2386. Section 16-2388 grants to [e]very party ... the right to present evidence, to be heard in his or her own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses called by another party. D.C.Code § 16-2388(c). In addition, § 16-2388(d) mandates that [a]ll evidence which is relevant, material, and competent to the issues before the court shall be admitted. The adjudicatory hearing and the procedures and standards outlined in § 16-2388(c) and (d) will enable the Family Court to perform its ultimate task under § 16-2388(f), determining the best interests of the child: The court may enter, modify, or terminate a guardianship order after considering all of the evidence presented, ... and after making a determination based upon a preponderance of the evidence that creation, modification, or termination of the guardianship order is in the child's best interests. Despite the extensive and sensitive work of the Magistrate Judge and the Reviewing Judge in this case, what gives us pause in examining the statutory provisions and the record before us is (1) the mandate in § 16-2388(c) that a party shall have the right to ... cross-examine witnesses called by another party during an adjudicatory hearing; and (2) the explicit language in § 16-2388(d) that [a]ll evidence which is relevant, material, and competent to the issues before the court shall be admitted. C.B.'s comments to the Magistrate Judge on June 17, 2005, about E.B. clearly were relevant to part of the third factor in § 16-2383(d), the quality of the interaction and interrelationship of [C.B.] with ... the proposed permanent guardian, but all of the parties were not informed about C.B.'s negative comments about her aunt until September 2005, and neither I.B. nor the guardian ad litem were given an opportunity to examine A.B. and E.B. on the record about C.B.'s comments and their impact on the suitability of A.B. and E.B. as permanent guardians of C.B. The Magistrate Judge apparently realized that C.B.'s negative comments about E.B. and her unhappiness based on her perception that her uncle's wife treated her differently from the other children in the household would affect the guardianship decision. Therefore, the judge appeared to adopt a twofold strategy: determine whether reunification still might be a viable option and work to resolve the difficulties between C.B. and E.B. While the Magistrate Judge's approach is understandable, it conflicted with the statute's concept of an adjudicatory hearing and the right of every party to cross-examine witnesses called by another party. Technically, the court called E.B. and A.B. and questioned them about C.B.'s relationship with E.B. Nevertheless, on September 15, 2005, when A.B. responded to the questions of the judge, he was testifying, in essence, in behalf of the petitioners, A.B. and E.B. Moreover, when the judge spoke with A.B. and E.B. on June 15, 2006, they also were testifying, in essence, as witnesses for the petitioners. In addition, the therapist who authored the report stating that C.B. has adjusted and adapted to [A.B. and E.B.'s] home, which the Magistrate Judge reviewed on June 15, 2006, was testifying for the petitioners. Yet, I.B. and the guardian ad litem did not have an opportunity to examine A.B., E.B. or the therapist in June 2006. `Where a witness cannot be examined, the search for the truth is severely impaired.' Tyree v. Evans, 728 A.2d 101, 103 (D.C.1999) (quoting Curry v. United States, 658 A.2d 193, 199 (D.C.1995)). While [t]he extent of cross-examination [of a witness] with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court, ... [a] complete denial of the opportunity to cross-examine... is impermissible. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; second alteration in original); accord, In re L.D.H., 776 A.2d 570, 573 (D.C.2001). Furthermore, interrogation by the judge is not a sufficient substitute for cross-examination by counsel. Tyree, supra, 728 A.2d at 105. Despite the obvious passage of time since the issuance of the guardianship order in October 2006, in light of D.C.Code §§ 16-2388(c), (d), and (f) and the legal principles pertaining to a party's right to examine or cross-examine witnesses, our review of the record in this matter constrains us to remand this case to the trial court with instructions to promptly reopen the adjudicatory guardianship hearing to permit the parties to examine A.B., E.B., and the therapist on the record concerning C.B.'s relationship with E.B. Following that testimony, the Magistrate Judge should modify her findings and conclusions under D.C.Code § 16-2383(d)(3) and issue a revised order; the Reviewing Judge should review the revised findings, conclusions, and the revised order. So ordered.