Opinion ID: 2673196
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Any decrease in the fair market val[u]e of the

Text: remaining property, to the extent that the decrease was proximately caused by the taking. 3. Reasonable value for the use of [the Hikes’] property for a temporary easement. 4. Reasonable abstracting expenses. This instruction was a correct statement of the law and afforded a basis on which the Hikes could and did argue that they should be compensated for the loss of access to Highway 75. The Hikes contend on appeal that the court erred in not giving NJI2d Civ. 13.06 or NJI2d Civ. 13.07. But there is no indication in the record that the Hikes ever requested that these instructions be given. And in any event, they are inapposite to 29 See, Shipler v. General Motors Corp., 271 Neb. 194, 710 N.W.2d 807 (2006); Borley Storage & Transfer Co. v. Whitted, 271 Neb. 84, 710 N.W.2d 71 (2006). Nebraska Advance Sheets HIKE v. STATE 79 Cite as 288 Neb. 60 this case because they involve the taking of a new permanent easement over a condemnee’s property. In this case, the existing easement in question was extinguished. [12] The Hikes did request four jury instructions which consisted of legal principles generally stating the nature of a permanent easement and its compensability in a condemnation action. The district court declined to give these instructions. In reviewing a claim of prejudice from instructions given or refused, an appellate court must read the instructions together, and if, taken as a whole, they correctly state the law, are not misleading, and adequately cover the issues supported by the pleadings and evidence, there is no prejudicial error.30 The requested instructions are correct statements of the law. But we conclude that the Hikes were not prejudiced by the district court’s refusal to give them. The issue in this case was not the fair market value of the Highway 75 access easement standing alone, but, rather, the value of the entire condemned tract, which included the easement, and any decrease in the fair market value of the Hikes’ remaining property to the extent that the decrease was proximately caused by the taking. That, in turn, depended upon whether the easement would have been sufficient to permit future commercial development of the Hikes’ property had it not been taken, which was the subject of conflicting evidence at trial. The instructions given by the court adequately instructed the jury on the measure of damages.