Opinion ID: 1896603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: procedural and historical background

Text: [¶ 2] The parties' 1993 divorce judgment included the following provision dividing David's military retirement pay: 15. The parties [ sic ] marital property consisting of the plaintiff's United States Air Force Retirement Pay shall be divided as follows: plaintiff and the defendant shall each receive $667.00 per month before taxes, which equals fifty per cent [50%] of the plaintiff's disposable retirement pay according to said SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. The parties shall complete all necessary documentation to facilitate direct payment to each party from the United States Government. The settlement agreement was incorporated into the divorce judgment and provided, in relevant part: (1) each party would receive his or her share directly from the U.S. Air Force and each party will execute any and all documents necessary to facilitate this arrangement; (2) Lorraine would not be entitled to any share of David's military disability benefits in the amount of $277 each month; (3) each party would execute and deliver all documents required to give full force and effect to the settlement agreement; and (4) each party waived the right to seek alimony or separate support and maintenance, regardless of any change in their needs or any other circumstances. [¶ 3] Following the entry of the divorce judgment, David and Lorraine each received their respective shares of the military retirement pay. In October 2000, the Department of Veterans Affairs determined that David suffered from major depression, which entitled him to increase his disability pay to the 100% rate. David elected to receive 100% disability compensation, and he waived his retirement pay in its entirety as a condition of this election. As a result, Lorraine's receipt of her share of David's retirement pay ended in November 2000. [¶ 4] In response to David's postdivorce conversion of his retirement pay to disability pay, Lorraine filed a motion to enforce the divorce judgment and a motion for relief from the divorce judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b). [1] Following a non-testimonial hearing, the court denied the motion to enforce, concluding that the strong public policy favoring finality of judgments, particularly in the area of family law, precluded relief. The court noted that neither property distributions nor the permanent denial of spousal support in divorce judgments are subject to modification, and that If these rules did not exist, the court would be overwhelmed by relitigation of contentious family law cases on these issues, in addition to the flood of post-judgment motions already allowed on issues of parental rights and responsibilities and child support. [¶ 5] With respect to the motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b), the court concluded that although David's decision to convert his retirement pension to disability benefits works a great injustice on [Lorraine], and unjustly enriches him, it could not grant the motion because the division of veterans' disability pay was precluded by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA) in Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989). In Mansell, the Court held that, under the USFSPA, a state divorce court may treat military retirement benefits, but not military disability benefits, as divisible marital property upon divorce. Id. at 589, 594-95, 109 S.Ct. 2023. The District Court concluded that but for federal law, the court would exercise its discretion and reopen the judgment. This appeal followed.