Opinion ID: 848685
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: determinations of policy

Text: The third Chadha/Blank factor requires that we consider whether the compacts involved determinations of policy. Blank, supra at 114, 611 N.W.2d 530. The compact negotiation process required the Governor to undertake and resolve multiple policy-making decisions of great consequence to this state, the most significant of which was the initial decision to make lawful what was otherwise unlawful  casino gambling on the subject Indian lands. The fact that casino gambling engenders considerable controversy and passion throughout our society at large, as evidenced by the very existence of this lawsuit, underscores the significance of the policy decision that these compacts represent. Moreover, the compacts represent a host of additional policy decisions that sprang from the initial decision to make gambling lawful on the subject Indian lands. These include, but certainly are not limited to, decisions regarding the number of compacts to sign and the number of casinos to allow, the minimum gambling age that would be enforced in the relevant casinos, the percentage of profits that the tribes would be required to submit to the state and the subsequent use of those funds by the state, the decision to incorporate into the compacts the protections of the Michigan Employment Security Act, MCL 421.1 et seq., and the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq., and the decision to leave enforcement of the compact rules and regulations to the tribes themselves rather than delegating that duty to the relevant state agencies as the state clearly could have done pursuant to 25 USC 2710(d)(3)(C). [44] In my judgment, these policy decisions are exactly the sorts of decisions that properly belong within the province of the Legislature. [45] This point was well made by the highest court for the state of New York, the Court of Appeals of New York, in a decision in which that Court held that IGRA tribal-state compacts represent legislation. In Saratoga Co. Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 822-823, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 766 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2003), the Court stated: IGRA itself contemplates that states will confront several policy choices when negotiating gaming compacts. Congress provided that potential conflicts may be resolved in the compact itself, explicitly noting the many policies affected by tribal gaming compacts. Indeed, gaming compacts are laden with policy choices, as Congress well recognized. Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under subparagraph (A) may include provisions relating to  (i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation of such activity; (ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations; (iii) the assessment by the State of such activities in such amounts as are necessary to defray the costs of regulating such activity; (iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts comparable to amounts assessed by the State for comparable activities; (v) remedies for breach of contract; (vi) standards for the operation of such activity and maintenance of the gaming facility, including licensing; and (vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming activities. [25 USC 2710(d)(3)(C).] Compacts addressing these issues necessarily make fundamental policy choices that epitomize legislative power. Decisions involving licensing, taxation and criminal and civil jurisdiction require a balancing of differing interests, a task the multi-member, representative Legislature is entrusted to perform under our constitutional structure. [Emphasis added.] I agree with the court's decision on this issue in Saratoga Co and with the other state supreme courts that have considered this issue and reached a similar conclusion. See State ex rel Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 904 P.2d 11 (1995) ; State ex rel Stephan v. Finney, 251 Kan. 559, 836 P.2d 1169 (1992) ; Panzer v. Doyle, 271 Wis.2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666 (2004); Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. Rhode Island, 667 A.2d 280 (RI, 1995). [46] It is evident that the compacts involved determinations of policy, Blank, supra at 114, 611 N.W.2d 530, such that they themselves constitute legislation.