Opinion ID: 2973286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Interpretation of

Text: § 1415(b)(6)(B) The Supreme Court has instructed that “[t]he meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.” F.D.A. v. 14 In Lawrence, we addressed whether a school district had standing to bring a private right of action under § 1415(b)(6) and concluded the provision was intended to provide a private right of action only to disabled children and their parents. 417 F.3d at 371-72. While the question was wholly unrelated and we were addressing a pre-amendment version of the IDEA, our observation about the opacity of § 1415(b)(6) pertains even more so to the amended version. 29 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). That is, “[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); accord Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1987) (analyzing statutory language in a way that is in accord with the “language and structure” of the section of law at issue). Such is the case here, where examining § 1415(b)(6)(B) in the context of § 1415 and the IDEA as a whole points unequivocally in one direction: that § 1415(b)(6)(B) indeed restates § 1415(f)(3)(C)’s two-year statute of limitations and that this limitations period functions in a traditional way, that is, as a filing deadline that runs from the date of reasonable discovery and not as a cap on a child’s remedy for timely-filed claims that happen to date back more than two years before the complaint is filed.
Context of the Act We begin with the overarching structure of § 1415. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59-60; Evankavitch v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 793 F.3d 355, 363 (3d Cir. 2015) (examining the “structure and . . . parallels” of a statute to determine the meaning of its terms). As previously noted, after opening with a preamble that reiterates that a state must “establish and maintain procedures . . . to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a), the section next proceeds to list and briefly describe the “[t]ypes of procedures” mandated by the IDEA, id. § 1415(b). That listing, in § 1415(b), serves 30 in effect as a table of contents for the expanded descriptions of these same procedures that then appear in roughly the same order in § 1415(c)-(f). Thus, for example, § 1415(b)(3) requires written prior notice of changes to a child’s educational program, the details of which are described in § 1415(c)(1); § 1415(b)(4) ensures notice is available in a parent’s native language, as described in § 1415(d)(2); § 1415(b)(5) provides “[a]n opportunity for mediation,” as described in § 1415(e); and, as relevant here, § 1415(b)(6) provides an “[a]n opportunity for any party to present a complaint,” which is more fully described in § 1415(f). Id. § 1415(b)-(f). This structure makes clear that § 1415(b) was intended to preview and convey the same essential meaning as § 1415(f). Given that § 1415(b), in context, appears to be nothing more than a summary listing of the procedural safeguards more fully described in later subsections, we cannot conceive that Congress intended to bury within § 1415(b)(6) a sea change in the IDEA. That, however, would be the effect of cutting off at twenty four months in virtually all cases the courts’ power to award compensatory education, and “le[aving] parents without an adequate remedy when a school district unreasonably fail[s] to identify a child with disabilities.” Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 245 (2009) (noting “Congress’ acknowledgment of the paramount importance of properly identifying each child eligible for services”). This proposition appears particularly fanciful considering that Congress failed to even hint at such an intention either in § 1415(f), the full version of the due process hearing procedure of which § 1415(b)(6) is merely a précis, or in § 1415(i), which was reenacted in 2004 without any alteration to the “broad discretion” it grants federal courts 31 to remedy violations of the IDEA, Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 238. As the Supreme Court “ha[s] repeatedly said[,] . . . Congress ‘does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.’” E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1612 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). Moreover, it is “[a] standard principle of statutory construction . . . that identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007). Here, the words and phrases describing the IDEA’s statute of limitations and its exceptions indicate that § 1415(b) was intended to have the same meaning as the other references to a limitations period in § 1415, and, like them, to function as a filing deadline and not a remedy cap. Specifically, in three separate subsections of § 1415, the statute provides a federal time limit, but—using identical language—provides as an alternative: “or, if the State has an explicit time limitation . . . , in such time as the State law allows.” 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f)(3)(C), (i)(2)(B). Given that state limitations periods generally function as filing deadlines on claims that are known or should have been known, not remedy caps on claims not yet reasonably knowable, the only way those words can be read sensibly is if they provide an alternative to a federal filing deadline, i.e., a traditional statute of limitations. “Textual cross-reference confirms this conclusion,” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994), for § 1415(b)(6)(B) not only mirrors § 1415(f)(3)(C)’s state statute of limitations provision but also its two equitable 32 tolling exceptions, and does so simply by cross-referencing the “the exceptions to the timeline described in [§ 1415(f)(3)(D)],” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)(3)(C). This shorthand reference to these important tolling provisions, which are then set forth in full in § 1415(f), fortifies our conclusion that § 1415(b)(6) was merely intended as an abstract of § 1415(f), that it reflects the same limitations period as § 1415(f)(3)(C), and that this limitations period, pursuant to the “cooperative federalism” inherent in the IDEA, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005) (quoting Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 830 (8th Cir. 1999)), defers to state limitations periods when appropriate and otherwise functions as a traditional statute of limitations—not a remedy cap. Indeed, while it would make no sense for a state filing deadline to displace a federal remedy cap or elements of a prima facie case, it makes perfect sense that Congress, according due weight to principles of federalism, would allow a state filing deadline to displace a federal one. Likewise, it would be odd indeed for § 1415(b)(6)(B), if it actually described a remedy cap or a prima facie case, to apply equitable tolling provisions from § 1415(f)(3)(D), but quite logical if § 1415(b)(6)(B) merely restates the statute of limitations to which those equitable exceptions apply. That is, when we “look to the [section’s] surrounding words and provisions and their context,” Tavarez v. Klingensmith, 372 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2004), and apply “the cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole,” King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991), it is clear that § 1415(b)(6)(B), 33 though poorly penned, was intended merely as a synopsis of § 1415(f)(3)(D)’s statute of limitations.15
against Sub Silentio Repeal Even if the structure, language, and context of the IDEA left room for doubt, we would be loath to interpret § 1415(b)(6)(B) as constricting the remedies available under the IDEA in view of the statute’s broad remedial purpose, see A.W., 486 F.3d at 803, codified, among other places, in § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). That subsection provides that a court “shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), and, in a long line of cases, the Supreme Court and this Circuit have held that it should be interpreted expansively to provide a comprehensive remedy for children deprived of a FAPE. See, e.g., Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 237-38 (“In determining the 15 Given the structure of this statute, which includes at the outset a digest of the multiple procedural safeguards that are each expounded upon in later subsections, we also discern no tension between our interpretation of § 1415(b)(6)(B) and the canon against superfluity. Moreover, that canon “assists only where a competing interpretation gives effect ‘to every clause and word of a statute.’” Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2248 (2011) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). We can identify no competing interpretation that could give logical meaning to all the words of § 1415(b)(6)(B), and thus conclude this is a quintessential case where “rigorous application of the canon does not seem a particularly useful guide to a fair construction of the statute.” King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492. 34 scope of the relief authorized, . . . the ordinary meaning of these words confers broad discretion on the court and . . . absent any indication to the contrary, what relief is appropriate must be determined in light of the Act’s broad purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bucks Cnty. Dep’t of Mental Health, 379 F.3d at 67 (“We . . . have broadly interpreted the term ‘appropriate’” and “discerned nothing in the text or history suggesting that relief under IDEA is limited in any way. . . .” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); see also D.E., 765 F.3d at 273 (examining the IDEA’s purpose and rejecting a statutory interpretation which “would ‘create an enormous loophole’ in a school district’s obligations under the IDEA, while ‘substantially weaken[ing] the IDEA’s protections’ for students” (alteration in original) (quoting D.F., 694 F.3d at 497)). Given the broad remedial scheme of the IDEA, neither in the period before the 2004 amendments—when we borrowed a state’s most analogous statutory cause of action to determine how long after an adverse decision by a hearing officer a parent could wait before filing an IDEA complaint in state or federal court16—nor in the period since, have we imposed a cap on the remedy a child could seek for timelyfiled claims. Instead, we have consistently repeated that a 16 See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 270 (3d Cir. 2014) (observing that “[p]rior to the [2004] amendment of the IDEA . . . , the time for bringing suit . . . after receiving an adverse administrative determination had been two years”). 35 child’s right to compensatory education “accrue[s] from the point that the school district knows or should know” of the injury to the child, and the child “is entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to the period of deprivation, but excluding the time reasonably required for the school district to rectify the problem.” M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396-97 (3d Cir. 1996); see also D.F., 694 F.3d at 499 (repeating standard); Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2009) (same); Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007) (same). That standard is grounded in our understanding, then and now, that “a child’s entitlement to special education should not depend upon the vigilance of the parents (who may not be sufficiently sophisticated to comprehend the problem) nor be abridged because the district’s behavior did not rise to the level of slothfulness or bad faith.” M.C., 81 F.3d at 397. Against the backdrop of these cases and the broad interpretation the Supreme Court has given to a court’s remedial power under § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), it bears particular significance that Congress reenacted that subsection without change as part of the 2004 reenactment. Thus, interpreting the IDEA’s statute of limitations as a remedy cap would also disregard the well-settled canon of statutory interpretation that “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2015). On this point, we find clear guidance in the Supreme Court’s decision in Forest Grove, which examined the 1997 36 amendments to the IDEA. Those amendments added, among other things, § 1412(a)(10)(C), which provided that if the parents of a special-needs child “who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency” enrolled their child in private school without the consent or referral of that public agency, a school district could still be ordered to provide tuition reimbursement if a fact-finder determined that the school district failed to provide a student with a FAPE in the first instance. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). In an attempt to limit liability, a school district argued that because the IDEA “only discusses reimbursement for children who have previously received special-education services through the public school, [the] IDEA only authorizes reimbursement in that circumstance.” 557 U.S. at 241. The Supreme Court disagreed. It observed that the 1997 amendments preserved the IDEA’s comprehensive remedial goal of providing every child with a FAPE and did not alter 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). See id. at 243 n.10 (stating that the holdings in School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 (1985), and Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), “rested . . . on the breadth of the authority conferred by § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), the interest in providing relief consistent with the Act’s purpose, and the injustice that a contrary reading would produce—considerations that were not altered by the 1997 Amendments” (internal citations omitted)). The Court thus rejected the notion that Congress repealed sub silentio those previous Supreme Court holdings describing the “broad discretion” afforded by § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). Id. at 243. Any other reading, the Court reasoned, would be contrary to the IDEA’s broad remedial 37 purpose and a “child’s right to a free appropriate education . . . would be less than complete.” Id. at 244-45 (alteration in original) (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370). So too here, for the 2004 reauthorization reaffirmed the IDEA’s first purpose as “ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education . . . designed to meet their unique needs,” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), and once more left unchanged § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), which grants courts the broad discretion to fashion remedies that accomplish that objective. Congress’s purpose in that mandate is clear: In order to effectuate the law’s broad remedial goals, a court finding a deprivation of a free appropriate public education should return a child to the educational path he or she would have traveled had the educational agency provided that child with an appropriate education in the first place. See D.F., 694 F.3d at 498-99; Reid, 401 F.3d at 518; see also Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 251 (remanding to district court to consider eight years of claims for compensatory education); Lester H. by Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming grant of thirty months of compensatory education). Consistent with that purpose and the traditional way in which a discovery-based statute of limitations functions, courts since the passage of the 2004 reenactment have routinely affirmed awards of compensatory education that remedy deprivations of greater than two years, or at minimum, remanded for an administrative agency to consider those claims. See Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming award of three years of compensatory education); M.S. ex rel. Simchick v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 553 F.3d 315, 324 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that the broad discretion afforded under the IDEA allowed a 38 district court to consider reimbursement for three years of a child’s allegedly inappropriate placement); Draper v. Atl. Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275, 1286-90 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a school district’s argument that a child’s longundiscovered injury was time barred and upholding an award of approximately five years of compensatory education); Reid, 401 F.3d at 526 (remanding to consider claims over a four and half year period of time); K.H. v N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 12-1680, 2014 WL 3866430, at  (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2014) (finding that “the IDEA’s clear statutory language mandates” that a remedy is not limited by the statute of limitations when a claim is timely filed); Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Lolita S., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1123 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (holding that a right to redress for a complaint filed in October 2011 would be limited to the most recent two years “unless . . . the statute did not begin to run on the claim because the parent did not know/should not have known about that action until a time within two years of the due process request”). But see Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413, Marshall v. H.M.J., No. 14-2114, 2015 WL 4744505, at  (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2015) (“No party may recover for a violation occurring outside the two-year statute of limitations.”). Of course, the IDEA’s statute of limitations does still practically curtail remedy, for it “specif[ies] when a [complaint] is timely filed” and thus “has the consequence of limiting liability because filing a timely [complaint] is a prerequisite to having an actionable claim.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 120 (2002). In context, however, that means simply that once a violation is reasonably discovered by the parent, any claim for that violation, however far back it dates, must be filed within two 39 years of the “knew or should have known” date. If it is not, all but the most recent two years before the filing of the complaint will be time-barred; but if it is timely filed, then, upon a finding of liability, the entire period of the violation should be remedied. In other words, § 1415(f)(3)(C), like its synopsis in § 1415(b)(6)(B), reflects a traditional statute of limitations.
Regulation and Interpretation The DOE, the federal agency charged with promulgating regulations for the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1406, agrees that § 1415(b)(6)(B) and § 1415(f)(3)(C) state the same limitations period. In its regulations following the 2004 reenactment, the DOE simply reproduced both subsections verbatim. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B), and 1415(f)(3)(C), with 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507(a)(2), and 300.511(e). In its Analysis of Comments and Changes to those regulations, however, the DOE reported that commenters were confused and sought guidance, “because the statute of limitations is mentioned twice and implies that the timeline for filing a complaint and filing a request for a due process hearing are different.” Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities & Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006). It responded that “[t]he statute of limitations in section [1415(b)(6)(B)] of the Act is the same as the statute of limitations in section [1415(f)(3)(C)] of the Act.” Id. In this appeal, at our request, the DOE also submitted an amicus letter brief in which it reiterated its position that the 40 subsections are, in fact, referencing a single statute of limitations.17 We afford the DOE’s interpretation of its regulation and its position before us here “‘respect’ . . . to the extent it has the ‘power to persuade,’” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)); see id. at 256-57 (holding that an agency’s interpretation of regulations that merely parrot the statute are accorded Skidmore deference, rather than the higher deference generally accorded to interpretive guidance under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)). Here, we find the DOE’s position persuasive because it accords with the language, structure and purpose of the statute, and it is yet one more voice in a harmonious chorus that § 1415(b)(6)(B) was intended to reiterate § 1415(f)(3)(C)’s two-year statute of limitations. 17 The IDEA also tasks the DOE with promulgating a model notice of procedural safeguards. 20 U.S.C. § 1417(e). In that model notice, it again repeated the language of § 1415(b)(6), but cautioned states that if they “established a specific timeframe for requesting a hearing under the IDEA that is different than two years (either shorter or longer), revise the above statement to reflect that timeframe.” United States Department of Education, Part B Procedural Safeguards Notice, 17 (2009), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/modelformsafeguards.doc. Again, such a caution to revise the limitations notice shorter or longer based on a state’s statute of limitations only makes sense if § 1415(b)(6)(B) is, in fact, a statute of limitations. 41 To the extent there remains any doubt about this conclusion, it is put to rest by the legislative history, to which we next turn.
2004 IDEA Amendments “Supreme Court cases declaring that clear language cannot be overcome by contrary legislative history are legion.” First Merchs. Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 198 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). That said, legislative history can play a confirmatory role in resolving ambiguity when statutory language and structure support a given interpretation. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586-91 (2004); Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2010). This is such a case. A legislature designing a statute of limitations confronts certain choices. As we have discussed, it can set the date from which the limitations period begins to run by using the occurrence rule or the discovery rule. See supra at 23-26. It also can set the expiration date either by counting forward from that occurrence or discovery date to the filing of a complaint or by counting backward from the date a complaint is filed to the occurrence or discovery date. When the House of Representatives proposed the amendment that was eventually incorporated into § 1415(b)(6), it chose to use the occurrence rule and to count backward, providing that parents would have: (6) an opportunity to present complaints– 42 (A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and (B) which set forth a violation that occurred not more than one year before the complaint is filed; H.R. Rep. 108-77, at 254 (2003). The House committee’s report unambiguously described this language as a one-year statute of limitations. Id. at 115-16 (“Statute of limitations[:] The Act currently has no statute of limitations and leaves local educational agencies open to litigation for the entire length of time a child is in school, whether or not the child has been identified as a child with a disability. . . . The bill includes a statute of limitations of one year from the date of the violation . . . .). And as written, it would have unambiguously functioned like one, barring claims based on injuries that occurred more than twelve months before the complaint was filed. The Senate, meanwhile, chose to use the discovery rule and to count forward, providing in what became § 1415(f)(3)(C): Timeline for requesting hearing.–A parent or public agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a 43 hearing under this part, in such time as the State law allows. S. Rep. 108-185, at 222 (2003). Unlike the House’s proposal, the Senate’s also added the provision giving primacy to a state’s limitations period, along with the two statutory tolling exceptions. Those two bills—both statutes of limitations but pointing in different directions and using different starting dates for the limitations period—then went to conference where the conference committee sought to reconcile them. That committee reaffirmed that each body’s amendment functioned as a traditional statute of limitations on the filing of a complaint: The House bill and Senate amendment have similar language regarding the opportunity to present complaints, but the House bill, not the Senate amendment, includes language establishing a 1 year statute of limitations on the right to present complaints. Senate has a 2 year timeline for filing complaints at note 221. H.R. Rep. 108-779, at 213 n.193 (2004) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2480, 2527; see also id. at 218 n.221, 2532 (“The Senate amendment establishes a 2- year statute of limitations unless State law already has a statute of limitations. The House bill includes a 1-year statute of limitations (see note 193).”). Apparently concluding that the addition of a statute of limitations should involve both a new provision within § 1415(f)(3)(C) and an amendment to its prefatory subsection 44 at § 1415(b)(6), the conference committee opted not to choose one body’s addition over the other but to retain both. It did so by conforming each and every of the material terms of the House’s version to the Senate’s, i.e., by changing the House’s limitations period from one year to two, changing the occurrence rule to the discovery rule, adding that a state’s statute of limitations could override the IDEA’s, and adding the two equitable tolling provisions specified by the Senate. The conference committee then incorporated the Senate’s version at § 1415(f) and the House’s version in the summary listing at § 1415(b). When it did so, however, it omitted to change the backward-looking framework of the House’s version to the forward-looking framework of the Senate’s. Thus was created the problem we grapple with today. Section 1415(b)(6), in other words, started in the House as a functioning, one-year statute of limitations for the filing of complaints: (A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and (B) which set forth a violation that occurred not more than one year before the complaint is filed[.] H.R. Rep. 108-77, at 254 (emphasis added). It ended, however, as something different altogether: (A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational 45 placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child; and (B) which set forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than two years before the date the parent or public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for presenting such a complaint under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows, except that the exceptions to the timeline described in subsection (f)(3)(D) shall apply to the timeline described in this subparagraph. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (emphasis added). The Congressional Research Service described the amendments this way: The 2004 reauthorization includes statutes of limitations in various sections. As previously discussed [Section 1415(b)] provides for a two-year statute of limitations regarding the filing of a complaint. There is also a two-year statute of limitations regarding requests for a hearing. The two years is from the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action. Richard N. Appling and Nancy Lee Jones, Cong. Research Serv., RL32716, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Analysis of Changes Made by P.L. 108-446, CRS-27 (2005) (emphasis added). While this post-enactment 46 observation on its own carries little weight, nothing in the IDEA’s legislative history points to a contrary interpretation. In fact, quite the opposite. Far from Congress intending that the two limitations periods diverge or limit a court’s remedial power under § 1415(i), the legislative history reflects that the drafters intended the amendments to add a single statute of limitations and to leave untouched the IDEA’s broad remedies. For example, in its explanation of the addition of the statute of limitations, the Senate report stated: This new provision is not intended to alter the principle under IDEA that children may receive compensatory education services, as affirmed in School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 (1985) and Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993) and otherwise limited under section [1412(a)(10)(C)] . . . . In essence, where the issue giving rise to the claim is more than two years old and not ongoing, the claim is barred; where the conduct or services at issue are ongoing to the previous two years, the claim for compensatory education services may be made on the basis of the most recent conduct or services and the conduct or services that were more than two years old at the time of due process or the private placement . . . . S. Rep. 108-185, 40 (emphasis added). 47 After conference, but before final passage, Senator Harkin, a co-sponsor of the amendments, addressed the addition of a statute of limitations this way: In this reauthorization, we also include a 2-year statute of limitations on claims. However, it should be noted that this limitation is not designed to have any impact on the ability of a child to receive compensatory damages for the entire period in which he or she has been deprived of services. The statute of limitations goes only to the filing of the complaint, not the crafting of remedy. This is important because it is only fair that if a school district repeatedly failed to provide services to a child, they should be required to provide compensatory services to rectify this problem and help the child achieve despite the school’s failings. Therefore, compensatory education must cover the entire period and must belatedly provide all education and related services previously denied and needed to make the child whole. 150 Cong. Rec. S11851 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) (emphasis added); see also Robert R. v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., No. 05-1282, 2005 WL 3003033, at  (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2005) (examining the IDEA’s legislative history and concluding that “the limitations period placed on claims for compensatory education by the [2004] amendment to the IDEA was not meant to limit the period which the hearing officer could consider when a due process 48 hearing was timely brought”); Jennifer Rosen Valverde, A Poor IDEA: Statute of Limitations Decisions Cement SecondClass Remedial Scheme for Low-Income Children with Disabilities in the Third Circuit, 41 Fordham Urb. L.J. 599, 643-646 (2013). The legislative history is thus crystal clear that Congress intended to impose a single statute of limitations, but otherwise not to limit a court’s power to remedy the deprivation of a free appropriate education.