Opinion ID: 2058318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Division of Marital Property/Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Text: A man and woman who marry create complex legal and equitable property relations between themselves. When a marriage is ended by divorce, this complex of interests in marital property must be sorted out and the respective rights of the spouses finally settled. In re Wife, K., Del.Ch., 297 A.2d 424, 427 (1972). [2] At the present time, that authority is vested in the Family Court. [3] In this case, the Wife argues that the Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to divide the parties marital assets separate and apart from a Delaware divorce proceeding. In support of her position, the Wife relies upon Coleman v. Coleman, 361 Pa.Super. 446, 522 A.2d 1115 (1987). Coleman held that the jurisdictional breadth given to the Pennsylvania courts under its Divorce Code permitted the resolution of economic issues incident to a foreign divorce decree. Id. 522 A.2d at 1118-19. Similarly, Delaware courts may only act in divorce matters pursuant to a specific statutory provision. Beres v. Beres, Del. Super., 154 A.2d 384 (1959). Del. Const. art. II, § 18. Therefore, we are called upon to examine the Delaware divorce statutes. The parameters of the Family Court's subject matter jurisdiction in divorce actions are found in Chapter 15 of Title 13 of the Delaware Code. [4] Section 1505 sets forth the grounds upon which a divorce may be granted. Section 1513 provides for ancillary relief in the form of a division of the marital property [i]n a proceeding ... upon the request of either party. 13 Del.C. § 1513(a) (Supp.1988). Section 1518(c) further provides: In the decree granting or denying a petition for divorce or annulment, or by separate order or orders preceding or following such decree, the Court shall dispose of all other prayers for relief, where appropriate under the facts and law; but an application for such relief and a hearing thereon must be presented in the petition or response, or by motion after notice to the other party prior to the entry or denial of such decree. 13 Del.C. § 1518(c) (emphasis added). [5] In a recent case, this Court was also required to examine the subject matter jurisdiction of the Family Court to divide marital property. Sherway v. Sherway, Del. Supr., 560 A.2d 1028 (1989). In Sherway, as in this case, it was argued that ancillary claims for property distribution are separate causes of action. In addressing that argument, this Court concluded that the Family Court did not lose jurisdiction to decide pending ancillary matters after the granting of a final decree of divorce, in order to protect property interests which were created ancillary to the divorce. Id. at 1035. However, that conclusion was not based upon the independence of the cause of action. This Court specifically held that a division of marital property can take place only in the context of the granting of a divorce. Id. at 1036. (emphasis added). Although the Family Court has succeeded to certain of the equitable powers of the Court of Chancery, that authority may be exercised only in aid of, or to implement, its statutory authority. Child Support Enforcement v. Smallwood, Del.Supr., 526 A.2d 1353, 1356 (1987). Thus, the Family Court's equitable authority to allocate the parties' property interests, ... is limited to the grant of ancillary relief incident to a divorce proceeding. Id. at 1037. Under the Delaware statutory scheme, a condition precedent to the Family Court's jurisdiction to equitably divide the parties' marital property is the existence of a Delaware divorce proceeding. Consequently, the subject matter jurisdiction of the Family Court is not as broad as its Pennsylvania counterpart. Moreover, efforts to expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the Family Court in this area have been either unsuccessful [6] or carefully circumscribed. [7] Section 1513 does not confer jurisdiction upon the Family Court over separate and independent causes of action to divide marital property. See Gilbert v. Gilbert, Del. Supr., 185 A.2d 73, 75 (1962). Section 1513 specifically empowers the Family Court to equitably divide marital property only in a proceeding for a divorce. See Rickards v. Rickards, Del.Supr., 166 A.2d 425, 428 (1960). Therefore, the subject matter jurisdiction conferred upon the Family Court by virtue of Section 1513 can only be exercised within the context of the divorce proceeding to which it is an incident. In re Wife, K., Del.Ch., 297 A.2d 424, 427 (1972); See Sherway v. Sherway, 560 A.2d at 1036. In this case, the Family Court lacked the statutory predicate upon which to fashion further relief. Sherway v. Sherway, 560 A.2d at 1037. Section 1513 is a statutory grant of power to the Family Court in aid of its jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding commenced pursuant to 13 Del.C. § 1504. Cf. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 185 A.2d at 75. The right of a party to petition for a division of marital property, is not an assertion of an independent cause of action, but is a prayer that the [Family] [C]ourt, in its discretion, exercise one of its incidental powers possessed solely by reason of its jurisdiction over the matrimonial cause. Id. The Family Court properly denied the Wife's petition for ancillary relief in the form of a property division, when it was incident to a foreign divorce decree.