Opinion ID: 788340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Denial of motions to suppress evidence obtained from residential search

Text: 187 We review the issuance of a search warrant by a magistrate judge for clear error, in order to determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that the warrant was supported by probable cause. United States v. Celestine, 324 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir.2003) (citation omitted). This standard of review is less probing than de novo review and shows deference to the issuing magistrate's determination. United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.1986)). Probable cause exists when, considering the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit shows that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). 188 In January 1999, FBI Special Agent Samuel Spencer submitted an affidavit (the Spencer affidavit) to the District Court for the Central District of California, requesting the issuance of a search warrant for a residence located on Rambler Avenue in Palmdale, California (the Rambler residence). In addition to identifying the place to be searched and the items to be seized, Agent Spencer recounted his experience in investigating organized criminal enterprises, and his participation in a previous investigation of the Mexican Mafia. The affidavit stated that his conclusions were based on [his own] training and experience, communications with other law enforcement officers, [his] review of reports prepared by law enforcement personnel, and [his] review of recordings, and summaries of recordings prepared by law enforcement personnel, of intercepted communications. 189 Much of the Spencer affidavit, which was based on a two-year multi-agency task force investigation, contained general information on the Mexican Mafia, including its structure, members, illegal activities, and methods of operation. Agent Spencer attached the initial indictment to the affidavit, and asserted that it provided probable cause for each defendant's association with the Mexican Mafia, and participation in the Mexican Mafia's criminal activities. At several places in the affidavit, he discussed his knowledge of the practices of Mexican Mafia members, using it (along with his training and experience) to explain the relevance of the items he expected to find in the residence to the charges in the indictment. He stated the reasons he believed that Fernandez and Gonzales both lived in the house. Last, he recited information, culled from the wiretaps, which he believed established probable cause that firearms and narcotics would be found at the Rambler residence, including Gonzales' statements that he had firearms, and particularly that he has enough guns at his house; Fernandez's statement that he possessed a gun; and repeated references to Fernandez's trafficking in narcotics. The Spencer affidavit did not mention Turscak or any other confidential informant. The warrant issued and was executed. The district court denied both Fernandez's motion to suppress the evidence recovered at the Rambler residence, and his motion for a Franks evidentiary hearing. 36 190 Gonzales and Fernandez raise two arguments in their challenge to the Spencer affidavit. First, they claim that the general descriptions of the Mexican Mafia and its activities are insufficient to establish probable cause, because they provide no basis for a magistrate to find probable cause that contraband, firearms, or evidence would be found at the Rambler residence. Second, they argue that the intercepted calls are also insufficient to provide probable cause because the wiretaps were invalid. Even if the intercepts were valid, however, Gonzales and Fernandez contend that those communications are stale and do not support the inferences the government attempted to draw from them, because they did not establish that the guns, narcotics, and other potentially relevant items were at the house, or still on the premises, even if they had been there at some time in the past. 37 These arguments are unavailing, because the information in the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause under well-settled circuit law. 191 We have repeatedly held that an issuing magistrate may draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense alleged. See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 980 F.2d 546, 551 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1990) (citing Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d at 1399). In Terry, the panel noted that a magistrate may rely on the conclusions of experienced law enforcement officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found, 911 F.2d at 275 (citing United States v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.1987)), and concluded that the requesting agent's statement that he knew from past experience that methamphetamine drug traffickers keep drugs, paraphernalia, records, and money in their homes or adjoining structures, combined with personal knowledge of the defendant's earlier possession of methamphetamine, was sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrant to search the residence. Id. at 275-76. See also United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1419 (9th Cir.1995) (concluding that affidavit in which surveillance observations ... provided a sufficient basis for the judge to infer that the defendants lived at the residences ... and that they were involved in the drug trade established probable cause). 192 While probable cause that a resident of the location has committed a crime is in itself insufficient to satisfy the standard, Gil, 58 F.3d at 1418; Pitts, 6 F.3d at 1369, we have also held that a magistrate is allowed to draw the reasonable inference that [i]n the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d at 1399, quoted in Gil, 58 F.3d at 1419; Pitts, 6 F.3d at 1369; Terry, 911 F.2d at 275. Moreover, we require only a reasonable nexus between the activities supporting probable cause and the locations to be searched. Ocampo, 937 F.2d at 490 (citation omitted). In an oft-quoted explanation of Illinois v. Gates' fair probability standard, we held: 193 For probable cause to exist, a magistrate need not determine that the evidence sought is in fact on the premises to be searched, or that the evidence is more likely than not to be found where the search takes place. The magistrate need only conclude that it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the affidavit. 194 United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir.1985) (emphasis in original, citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989). 195 Last, this Court has concluded that in cases involving ongoing narcotics businesses, lapses of several months—and up to two years in certain circumstances— are not sufficient to render the information in an affidavit too stale to support probable cause. See Pitts, 6 F.3d at 1369-70 (holding that four-month lapse between crack sale involving defendant in different location and affidavit was not enough to render information stale where affidavit supported inference that defendant was more than a one-time drug seller); United States v. Greany, 929 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir.1991) (evaluating staleness in light of the particular facts of the case and the nature of the criminal activity and property sought and holding that [w]hen the evidence sought is of an ongoing criminal business, even a two-year lapse may not render information stale); United States v. Dozier, 844 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir.1988) (The mere lapse of substantial amounts of time is not controlling in a question of staleness.). In this case, the earliest wiretap intercept occurred less than five months before the affidavit was submitted, a period that is insufficient to render the information stale in light of the crimes involved. 196 Agent Spencer's statements about the likelihood that the Rambler residence contained contraband or evidence relevant to the crimes charged, which were based on his own professional experience of the Mexican Mafia, combined with the information from the wiretaps, were sufficient to give the magistrate judge a substantial basis to conclude that the items sought were at the residence. 38 The issuance of the search warrant was not clearly erroneous.
197 The same standards of review outlined above in connection with Appellants' motions for a Franks hearing on the wiretaps apply here. The two appellants argue that the district court erred when it denied Fernandez's motion for a Franks hearing, and allege two material omissions or misstatements: (1) contradictions between agent Spencer's claims that guns or drugs would be found inside the residence, and the intercepted telephone conversations which do not suggest that guns or drugs are anywhere in particular; and (2) the affidavit's failure to discuss Turscak's astounding number of criminal acts while working for the government, and the government's alleged acquiescence in it. 198 For all the reasons explored above with regard to the denial of the motion to suppress, the first argument fails. The alleged contradictions are not factual, but rather represent a difference of opinion between the Appellants and the issuing magistrate on whether an inference that the guns and drugs were in the house was reasonable. The magistrate judge's conclusion that the Spencer affidavit established probable cause to search the Rambler residence was not clearly erroneous. Given the legal insufficiency of the claim before it, and the paucity of supporting factual allegations, the district court did not err in denying the motion for a Franks hearing. 199 Gonzales' and Fernandez's second allegation, that the affidavit's failure to describe Turscak's criminal activity warranted an evidentiary hearing, is a claim that they did not raise before the district court when requesting the hearing. It is the general practice of our court not to entertain such challenges, unless failure to do so will result in manifest injustice. See, e.g., United States v. Ullah, 976 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir.1992); Bolker v. Comm'r, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1985) (referring to the `exceptional' case in which review is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and two other recognized exceptions to general rule). Refusing to consider this argument in the context of a challenge to the search warrant will not cause injustice in this case, because the parties have received a full hearing on the same underlying issues with regard to their claim of outrageous government conduct, and we concluded that it does not warrant relief. 200 Even if we entertained this claim, Appellants would lose, because they cannot show materiality. In determining materiality, `the pivotal question is whether an affidavit containing the omitted material would have provided a basis for a finding of probable cause.' United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Garcia-Cruz, 978 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir.1992)). The affidavit neither refers to nor relies on Turscak's knowledge of the Mexican Mafia's practices, but rather claims to be based on Agent Spencer's own knowledge and experience as well as the observations of other law enforcement personnel. Even if knowledge of what the government euphemistically terms Turscak's misconduct had been included in the affidavit, it would have been irrelevant because he was neither the affiant nor an apparent source of information for the affidavit. Given the other information in the affidavit, the shadow of suspicion cast upon [Fernandez and Gonzales] would remain. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d at 979. No evidentiary hearing was warranted. 201