Opinion ID: 587250
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is the present class distinct from the HRC v. Baker class?

Text: 140 To begin with, the majority concludes that the two classes are different: We do not believe that any of the sub-groups of plaintiffs could fairly be characterized as a party to the Florida action; thus, the issues they present to us are not barred by collateral estoppel. Majority Op. at 1355. I do not agree. 141 The HRC v. Baker class, as certified, consisted of: 142 all Haitian aliens who are currently detained or who in the future will be detained on U.S. Coast Guard Cutters or at Guantanamo Naval base who were interdicted on the high seas pursuant to the United States Interdiction Program and who are being denied First Amendment and procedural rights. 143 In the present case, the district court certified a class of all Haitian citizens who have been or will be screened in. Since, under the interdiction policy, a plaintiff must be detained before he or she is screened in, it follows that the class of all those who have been or will be screened in is wholly contained within the class of all those who are currently detained or will in the future be detained. The present class thus fits neatly within the HRC v. Baker class. 144 The majority, however, focuses on the terms United States Interdiction Program. The panel states that the present plaintiffs have been or will be interdicted pursuant to a different interdiction program. The one at issue in HRC v. Baker was a program of preliminary screening before return; the program put in place by the Kennebunkport Order is one of summary return without screening. The majority summarily concludes that [t]his is a change sufficient to avoid the class definition in HRC v. Baker. Majority Op. at 1355. 145 I cannot accept this artificial distinction. To begin with the obvious, it seems to me that the terms United States Interdiction Program refer to the policy under which plaintiffs were interdicted and not the screening policy to which they were later subject. The term interdiction program, as it is used elsewhere in the HRC v. Baker plaintiffs' complaint, is consistent with this reading. See Second Amended Complaint, HRC v. Baker, 789 F.Supp. 1552 (No. 91-2653-Civ), p 2 (Under an 'interdiction program,' the Coast Guard and the Immigration and Naturalization Service ('INS') intercept vessels on the high seas believed to be carrying Haitian aliens, many of whom meet the standard for political asylum and who seek refuge in our country.). Moreover, the majority neglects to mention that the two Executive Orders, which purportedly create two entirely separate programs, were issued pursuant to a single Proclamation dated September 29, 1981 and entitled High Seas Interdiction of Illegal Aliens. Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed.Reg. 48,107 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (West Supp.1992). I read United States Interdiction Program to refer to the unitary program undertaken pursuant to Proclamation 4865. The HRC v. Baker complaint bears out this reading. See Second Amended Complaint, HRC v. Baker, 789 F.Supp. 1552 (No. 91-2653-Civ), p 32 (On September 29, 1981 the President issued Proclamation 4865 ... which announced a program of 'interdiction: on the high seas of vessels transporting aliens.' ). The government's interdiction policy, which has continued unabated both before and after the May 23, 1992 Order, thus constitutes one program, not two. 146 Even if I could distinguish between a pre- and a post-May 23, 1992 United States Interdiction Program, I would not find this distinction sufficient to avoid the class definition in HRC v. Baker. Majority Op. at 1355. Where the parties are in all material respects the same and stand in an identical position vis-a-vis the issues, a purely formal distinction in the naming of the class will not enable a party to avoid issue preclusion. Where the issues in separate suits are the same, the fact that the parties are not precisely identical is not necessarily fatal. As stated in Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Shendel, 270 U.S. 611, 620, 46 S.Ct. 420, 423, 70 L.Ed. 757 (1926), 'Identity of parties is not a mere matter of form, but of substance. Parties nominally the same may be, in legal effect, different ... and parties nominally different may be, in legal effect, the same.'  Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402, 60 S.Ct. 907, 916, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940); see also St. Louis Typographical Union v. Herald Company, 402 F.2d 553, 556 (8th Cir.1968). In another formulation of this principle, it has been stated that a party is privy to another, and hence bound by issue preclusion, if he or she is so identified in interest with a party to former litigation that he represents precisely the same legal right in respect to the subject matter involved. Jefferson School of Social Science v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 331 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C.Cir.1963) (citing cases); see also Donovan v. Estate of Fitzsimmons, 778 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir.1985); Gill and Duffus Serv., Inc. v. A.M. Nural Islam, 675 F.2d 404, 405 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1982); United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286, 1303 (9th Cir.1981); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 546 F.2d 84, 95 & n. 38 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832, 98 S.Ct. 117, 54 L.Ed.2d 93 (1977). 147 These principles require issue preclusion in the present case. The issues before us--the scope of INA § 243(h); the self-executing nature of Article 33; and judicial review under the APA--are identical to those before the HRC v. Baker court. Moreover, as a practical matter, the only asserted difference between the classes is that the HRC v. Baker class received some minimal screening rights prior to return, whereas the current plaintiffs receive none. The issues with which we are concerned, however, do not in any way turn on the existence or non-existence of a minimal screening. Nor does the minimal screening granted the HRC v. Baker plaintiffs have any bearing on the parties' incentive to litigate the issues. Thus, both classes stand in precisely the same legal position and assert the same legal interests with respect to the issues involved. Whether or not the identity of the parties varies slightly in form, it is the same in substance. Sunshine Anthracite Coal, 310 U.S. at 402, 60 S.Ct. at 916. I therefore conclude that collateral estoppel applies. Cf. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 159-61, 99 S.Ct. 970, 976-77, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (issue preclusion applies even where facts have changed if prior judgment not premised on those facts). 148