Opinion ID: 3061630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Access to School Premises

Text: Porter argues that her claim that school officials violated her constitutional rights by denying her access to school property is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prove a violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that an entity, acting under the color of state law, deprived her of a right under the United States Constitution or federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Porter’s claim as to the school’s restrictions on her access to school property was not cognizable under § 1983. While parents have a general due process right to direct their children’s education without unreasonable interference by the states, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400, 43 S. Ct. 625, 627 (1923), Porter has provided no legal support for the proposition that this right includes the right to access school premises. See, e.g., Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655–56 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of non-custodial parent’s claim that prohibiting him from entering school property violated his due process rights as frivolous). Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed this claim. B. Failure to Respond to Porter’s Report of Inappropriate Touching We also reject Porter’s argument that she stated a cognizable claim against the individual school officials for failing to address her report that a male student 6 inappropriately touched her daughter. First, the school officials responded to Porter’s report. Porter acknowledges that Vice Principal Stanfield met with the male student who allegedly touched Porter’s daughter after she reported the incident. Porter also acknowledges that, after her report, the Principal prohibited all male students from sitting with female students on the bus. A report that the Department of Child and Families prepared, and which Porter attached to her amended complaint, reflects that: (1) the male student denied touching Porter’s daughter inappropriately, (2) “school personnel have addressed the concern and now keep the children apart at the bus stop,” and (3) there was “no need for [counseling] services.” Second, public schools generally do not have the requisite level of control over children to give rise to a constitutional duty to protect them from third-party actors. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995). Moreover, Porter’s amended complaint did not expressly allege a violation of her child’s due process rights. The district court did not err in dismissing Porter’s claim against the school officials. C. Claims Against the School Board Porter next argues that she stated a colorable claim against the Duval 7 County School Board for failing to respond adequately to her complaint that school officials did not discipline the student who touched her daughter inappropriately. To impose liability on a municipal government entity, such as a school board, under § 1983, “the plaintiff must identify a municipal policy or custom causing the deprivation of federal rights.” Sauls v. Pierce Cnty. Sch. Dist., 399 F.3d 1279, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). Municipal entities, cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior. Id. Further, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with “deliberate indifference to its known or obvious consequences.” Davis v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1367, 1375–76 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted); see also Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1673 (1999) (holding that a school district’s failure to respond to student-on-student harassment in its schools can support a private suit for money damages under Title IX only if district was deliberately indifferent to known acts of sexual harassment). Porter failed to state a cognizable claim against the Duval County School Board. Porter failed to identify a custom or policy that caused the deprivation of her or her daughter’s federal rights. See Sauls, 399 F.3d at 1287. Nor did Porter 8 allege in her amended complaint that the Board acted with deliberate indifference. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed Porter’s claims against the Board. AFFIRMED. 9