Opinion ID: 166148
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disabled Individual

Text: 23 The statute defines disability as either (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); (2) a record of such an impairment, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B); or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). An analysis under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) requires a three-step process: (1) we consider whether MacKenzie's heart condition is a physical impairment, (2) we identify the life activity upon which she relies and determine whether it constitutes a major life activity under the ADA, and (3) we ask whether the impairment substantially limited the major life activity. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). [W]hether a claimed affliction constitutes an impairment under the ADA and whether the identified endeavor constitutes a major life activity are determinations of law for the court to decide. Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir.1999). 24 Turning to step one, we observe the City does not dispute MacKenzie has a heart condition. Therefore, jury could reasonably conclude, even without expert medical testimony, that MacKenzie had a condition affecting the cardiovascular system constituting a physical impairment under the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (Physical or mental impairment means: [ ] any physiological disorder, or condition ... affecting one or more of the following body systems: . . . cardiovascular. . ..). 25 As to the second element, MacKenzie must precisely identify a major life activity affected by her impairment. Poindexter, 168 F.3d at 1232. Close inspection of the record and the pleadings reveals MacKenzie claims her cardiovascular impairment limits the major life activities of (1) physical exertion (unable to lift over 50 pounds) and (2) stress-related work. Her contention that physical exertion constitutes a major life activity is wholly without merit. Mere physical exertion (except to the extent it affects one's ability to work) does not constitute a major life activity under the ADA. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (Physical exertion is not within the genus of those listed as a major life activity); see also Croy v. Cobe Lab., Inc., 345 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir.2003) (We declined to recognize multiple sclerosis as a substantial impairment of a life activity where the plaintiff, among other things, could not bear sustained exertion.). 26 We next consider MacKenzie's claim that the major life activity of working is limited because she must avoid some unknown level of stress. In accordance with EEOC regulations, this court has recognized working as a major life activity. Bristol v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 281 F.3d 1148, 1161 (10th Cir.2002), rev'd in part on other grounds, 312 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir.2002) (en banc). 14 However, to establish that one is disabled, one must show that one is significantly restricted in performing a major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). In addition, in any claim where working constitutes a major life activity, a plaintiff must demonstrate she is unable to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1134 (10th Cir.2003) (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491-492, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999)). No such showing has been made here. Indeed, the record reveals the opposite. 15 Moreover, MacKenzie's entire disability claim focuses on the actions of her supervisor Gourley. However, the major life activity of working cannot be substantially impaired if a plaintiff cannot work under a certain supervisor because of the stress and anxiety it causes. Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir.1997) (citing Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524-25 (7th Cir.1996)). 27 Based on the above, we conclude as a matter of law that MacKenzie has not demonstrated an impairment to a major life activity. Therefore, MacKenzie has failed to establish the first prong of her prima facie case, that she is a disabled person under the ADA. 28