Opinion ID: 77222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court Correctly Entered Summary Judgment Against Brown.

Text: 32 Because we conclude that the district court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction, we address Brown's complaint of discrimination and retaliation on the merits. Brown argues that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment against his claims of discrimination and retaliation because the district court concluded that Brown did not suffer an adverse or tangible employment action. Brown also argues that the district court erred in concluding that his claim of retaliation by termination was not before the court. We address each argument in turn. 33
34 To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment, Brown must make four showings: (1) [he] belongs to a protected group; (2) [he] was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; and (4) [his] reaction to the unwelcome behavior affected tangible aspects of his compensation, or terms, conditions or privileges of employment. Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1361 (11th Cir. 1994). Because Snow does not contest that Brown satisfied each of the first three requirements, we consider only the fourth. To satisfy the fourth requirement, Brown must show that he suffered a tangible employment action, which is a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits. Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 512 (11th Cir.2000) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2268, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)). 35 Brown argues that the IRS failed to promote him because of his downgraded performance evaluation. A lower score on Brown's performance evaluation, by itself, is not actionable under Title VII unless Brown can establish that the lower score led to a more tangible form of adverse action, such as ineligibility for promotional opportunities. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir.2001). We agree with the district court that Brown failed to establish any connection between the lower score on the performance evaluation and his lack of promotion. 36 Brown argues that he was denied several promotions for which he had applied, but Brown failed to produce any evidence that the denials of the promotions were based on discrimination or the lower score. The downgraded evaluation still described Brown's performance as fully successful. When questioned, in his deposition, whether he ever was informed by the IRS that the reason he did not receive the promotion was because his evaluation rated him at a 3.33 rather than a 3.67, Brown speculated that it was his understanding that it's common knowledge that the requirements for promotion relied on the performance evaluations. Brown did not provide any evidence either that he was qualified for the promotions or that his lowered evaluation score was the reason he did not receive the promotions. 37 Although we must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of Brown, it is unreasonable to infer from Brown's speculative testimony alone that he was denied promotion on the basis of his lowered evaluation score. Brown failed to establish that he suffered a tangible employment action. The district court correctly entered summary judgment against his claim of sex discrimination. 38
39 Brown alleges that the IRS retaliated against him for his complaints of sexual harassment in two ways: (1) the IRS lowered the scored on Brown's performance evaluation, which allegedly led to the denial of Brown's requests for promotions; and (2) the IRS fired Brown. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Brown had to present evidence that (1) [he] engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected expression. Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1454 (11th Cir.1998). Under our case law, the definitions of tangible employment actions and adverse employment actions are essentially the same. See Johnson, 234 F.3d at 512. An inability to establish one is an inability to establish the other. 40 As we explained in reference to his claim of discrimination, Brown failed to produce any evidence that the lower score on his evaluation led to the denial of any promotions. Brown's failure to present evidence of a tangible employment action regarding his claim of discrimination is also a failure to establish an adverse employment action regarding his claim of retaliation. Because Brown did not suffer an adverse employment action when the score on his performance evaluation was lowered, the district court correctly concluded that Brown's first allegation of retaliation failed. 41 Brown's second claim of retaliation by termination was not properly before the district court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Brown's complaint did not allege that Brown was terminated in retaliation for his sexual harassment charges filed with the EEOC. Although Brown had not been fired when he filed his complaint, Brown never amended his complaint to include a claim of retaliation based on his termination. Brown argues that he discussed his claim of retaliation based on his termination extensively in his deposition testimony, but the discussion of a potential claim in a deposition does not satisfy the requirement of Rule 8(a). Coon v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 829 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1987). The district court correctly refused to address this allegation of retaliation.