Opinion ID: 821083
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Protective Plan

Text: Mann contends that she was entitled to a hearing before the imposition of the protective plan and another after she entered into the plan in order to contest its terms. A protective plan is presented to the operator of a licensed day care facility when:
tion names the individual as an alleged perpetrator; (2) the licensing representative determines that contact between the children in care and the individual presents an ongoing risk to the children, but that No. 11-1971 13 the health, safety and best interests of the children do not require closure of the program or facility . . . ; or (3) after a monitoring visit, the licensing representative documents a violation that requires a protective plan to restrict contact between the children in care and the individual to assure the health, safety and best interests of the children while the licensee is provided an opportunity to correct the violation. 89 ILL. A DMIN. C ODE § 383.45(a)(1)-(3). It is similar to a safety plan, which is often offered in the context of parental child abuse or neglect. See Dupuy v. Samuels (Dupuy II), 465 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2006) (“But sometimes, in lieu of immediately removing the child from its parents, the state will offer parents the option of agreeing to a ‘safety plan,’ under which restrictions short of removal are imposed pending completion of the state’s investigation into abuse or neglect.”). We have described a safety plan as an optional form of relief akin to an “interim settlement agreement pending the outcome of [an] investigation;” “[i]t imposes no obligation on anybody.” Id. at 761. The same is true of a protective plan. The individual is not required to enter into the protective plan, and the individual can opt out of it at any point. Thus, Mann’s contention that she was entitled to a hearing before the issuance of the protective plan and a hearing after to challenge its terms cannot be sustained. We were clear in Dupuy II why a hearing before entering into a plan is not required: “There is no right to a hearing when no substantive right has been infringed 14 No. 11-1971 or is threatened with being infringed. The state does not force a safety plan on the parents; it merely offers it. Parents are entitled to a hearing if their parental rights are impaired, and the offer of settlement no more impairs those rights than a prosecutor’s offer to accept a guilty plea impairs the defendant’s right to trial by jury.” Id. If anything, the point is stronger in this case because a parent’s right to “familial relations” is more significant than the right to pursue employment in the field of one’s choice. See Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 520 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that courts apply “some form of heightened scrutiny” when analyzing claims alleging a violation of the fundamental right to familial relations). The safety of one’s children in the care of another is of the utmost importance, and the state must work quickly to avoid possible abuse or neglect. See Siliven v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 635 F.3d 921, 928 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a child may be removed from his home if the facts and circumstances known to the state demonstrate that the child is in immediate physical danger). Accordingly, Mann was not entitled to a hearing before agreeing to the protective plan. Furthermore, Mann was not entitled to a hearing to contest the protective plan’s terms. Mann voluntarily agreed to stop operating the Center, and her consent rendered a subsequent hearing to contest the plan’s terms unnecessary. See Dupuy II, 465 F.3d at 761-62 (“Because the safety plan is voluntary, no hearing of any kind is necessary; hearings are required for deprivations taken over objection, not for steps authorized by consent.”); see also Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596, 599-600 (6th Cir. No. 11-1971 15 2008) (adopting the reasoning described in Dupuy II). But in any event, Mann’s assertion that she had no opportunity to have the protective plan’s requirements reviewed is incorrect. See 89 ILL. A DMIN . C ODE § 383.45(c) (explaining that a protective plan “shall be reviewed by the licensing supervisory every [six] months”). Mann’s protective plan was reviewed within the time frame prescribed (on January 6, 2009, approximately four-and- a-half months after she entered into it), which we believe was more than reasonable given the basis for the complaint against her. To the extent Mann argues in her brief that the protective plan was not presented to her in a way that suggested it was voluntary, the Amended Complaint does not describe how she was coerced into the protective plan. That DCFS told her “it would be in the best interest to cooperate with DCFS’s actions” does not mean DCFS “coerced” her into a settlement. It was merely threatening to enforce the rights it was legally entitled to enforce, which we have found to be permissible. See Dupuy II, 465 F.3d at 762. We recognize that a threat may be coercive if the agency has no lawful authority to make the threat (especially if it involves one’s own children, see, e.g., Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 482-84 (7th Cir. 2011); Siliven, 635 F.3d at 926; Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 n.1 (3d Cir. 1997)), but DCFS was acting on a complaint regarding events that Mann acknowledges occurred. It was not acting “without a suspicion of neglect or abuse”—to be discussed further below. Cf. Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 482-84. The facts alleged 16 No. 11-1971 here do not support an inference that Mann did not voluntarily enter into the protective plan. Mann’s allegation that she was entitled to a hearing before agreeing to the protective plan and after to contest its terms cannot survive the motion to dismiss.