Opinion ID: 1571905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Jimmy Ryce Act

Text: The Florida Legislature first passed the Act in 1998, and it went into effect on January 1, 1999. See ch. 98-64, § 24, at 455, Laws of Fla. As originally enacted, the Act appeared in chapter 916, which pertains to mentally ill defendants in criminal cases. See §§ 916.31-.49, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998); ch. 98-64, §§ 1-24, at 445-55, Laws of Fla. The Act was later transferred to chapter 394, Florida Statutes, which pertains to civil mental health commitments. See ch. 99-222, §§ 1-29, at 1372-89, Laws of Fla. Although based on a criminal conviction for a sexually violent offense, Jimmy Ryce commitment proceedings have been held to be civil in nature. See Mitchell v. State, 911 So.2d 1211, 1213 (Fla.2005). Even so, we have repeatedly emphasized the procedural safeguards provided by the Act that ensure an individual's constitutional rights are protected. In holding the Act constitutional in the plurality opinion in Westerheide v. State, 831 So.2d 93 (Fla.2002), we specifically relied on the range of procedural safeguards to the individuals provided by the Act: The parties being subjected to this state action are limited to those who have exhibited past sexually violent behavior and [have] a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated. Although the individual's liberty interest is at stake, that interest is not absolute and the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden even in the civil context provided that the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards. Confinement under the Ryce Act is limited to those individuals who are likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment. Further, the act provides a range of procedural safeguards to the individuals, including the assistance of counsel and mental health professionals at commitment proceedings, the right to a jury trial, the right to appeal a sexually violent predator determination, at least a yearly mental health examination to determine whether the person's condition has so changed that it is safe for the person to be discharged, the right to petition for release, and in court hearings for the release of a committed person, the state bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the person's mental condition requires continued confinement. Id. at 104-05 (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-57, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997)). Although Larimore has not raised a constitutional challenge to the Act, because the Act can impose on an individual a substantial deprivation of libertyone that is of indeterminate durationour construction of the Act must be conducted with due regard to the basic tenets of fairness and due process. State v. Atkinson, 831 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla.2002). In this light, we first examine the provisions of the Act to determine if the Legislature intended that persons against whom civil commitment proceedings are brought must be in lawful custody when those proceedings are initiated.