Opinion ID: 883813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the definition of purposely

Text: When the District Court defined the term purposely, it gave the following jury instruction: INSTRUCTION NO. 6 A person acts purposely when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. On appeal, Patton contends that the District Court erred when it defined the term purposely. He asserts that Instruction No. 6 impermissibly broadened the mens rea element of the crime charged, and thereby reduced the State's burden of proof as to that element. He maintains that he could only have acted purposely, for purposes of a deliberate homicide conviction, if it was his conscious object to cause the death of Bradley, and that the jury was improperly instructed that he could be convicted if the State proved that he had the purpose to engage in conduct, even though it did not prove that he engaged in that conduct for the purpose of causing another's death. In State v. Rothacher (1995), 272 Mont. 303, 901 P.2d 82, the district court instructed the jury that in order to convict the defendant of deliberate homicide it was not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant intended to cause the death of the victim, so long as the act which caused the death was done purposely, and no circumstances of mitigation, excuse, or justification were present. After an extensive analysis of the plain language of the pertinent statutes, we concluded that: [W]hile our statutory law does not require proof that [the defendant] intended the specific result of his act, it does at least require that he intended a similar kind of harm. It is not sufficient, as indicated in [the District Court's jury instruction], that the act which caused the harm be done purposely without regard to whether any harm was intended. Rothacher, 272 Mont. at 307, 901 P.2d at 85. In this case, we conclude that, pursuant to Rothacher, the District Court erred when it instructed the jury that [a] person acts purposely when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. (Emphasis added.) Instruction No. 6 defined purposely in an either-or-fashion, and allowed the jury to convict Patton solely on the basis that he consciously engaged in conduct without regard to whether harm was intended. However, our conclusion that Instruction No. 6 was erroneous is simply the first part of our analysis. Pursuant to § 46-20-701, MCA, a district court's judgment will not be reversed for error unless the defendant's substantial rights are affected. The potential prejudice from Instruction No. 6 could occur where a defendant acted purposely, but did not intend to cause any harm. However, in this case, as in Rothacher, no facts were presented from which a credible argument could be made that when Bradley was stabbed eight times his assailant did not intend to cause any harm. Patton's only asserted defense was that the crime was committed by another person. Therefore, we hold that, although the District Court erred when it instructed the jury on the definition of purposely (Instruction No. 6), the error was harmless and does not require a reversal of the judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. GRAY, NELSON, HUNT and LEAPHART, JJ., concur.