Opinion ID: 754758
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant Key's Motion to Suppress

Text: 13 In a timely pretrial motion, defendant Key sought to suppress the evidence that law enforcement agents gathered in their warrant-based search of the East Larned apartment and in their inventory search of defendant Key's GMC Jimmy. At the suppression hearing, Key challenged the portion of the affidavit supporting the search warrant that stated that he was a resident of the East Larned apartment. He then argued that the police lacked probable cause to search his automobile. 14 With respect to the apartment search, the District Court first ruled that defendant cannot establish standing to challenge the validity of the search warrant because he argued that he did not reside in the apartment that was searched. The court, however, also ruled on the merits of defendant Key's challenge, holding that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. 2 The District Court also denied Key's motion with respect to the car search, finding that the law enforcement agents had probable cause to conduct a preforfeiture inventory search of the vehicle, and that the search was also valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 15 In considering a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review its conclusions of law and application of the law to the facts, such as its finding of probable cause, de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Pasquarille, 20 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir.1994). We must affirm the lower court's denial of a motion to suppress if the district court's conclusion can be justified for any reason. Id. 16 We believe that defendant Key had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the East Larned apartment and, therefore, had standing to contest its search. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). Turning to the merits of Key's challenge, we affirm the District Court's conclusion that the warrant authorizing the search was supported by probable cause. A United States Magistrate Judge issued the search warrant for the apartment based on the eighteen-page affidavit of Special Agent Lintner. The Supreme Court explained in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. Because the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, reviewing courts should pay great deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that an issuing magistrate's determination should be upheld so long as the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)) (alteration and omission in the original). The affidavit in this case reported that intercepted telephone calls and surveillance indicated that defendants conducted a portion of their drug trafficking activities from the East Larned apartment. It provided the magistrate with a substantial basis for concluding that the search of that apartment would uncover evidence of narcotics trafficking. Therefore, we affirm the District Court's denial of Key's motion to suppress evidence seized from that apartment. 17 Defendant Key's argument that the District Court should have suppressed the evidence seized from his car is also without merit. It is well established that police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); accord Pasquarille, 20 F.3d at 690; United States v. Mans, 999 F.2d 966, 969 (6th Cir.1993). If police officers have probable cause, they may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police custody. Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261, 102 S.Ct. 3079, 73 L.Ed.2d 750 (1982). 18 Probable cause is determined under the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317. In the instant case, investigators knew that Key had been planning a trip in his vehicle around November 15, 1995 to New York, where he would exchange seven kilograms of defective cocaine for a new supply. After losing surveillance of Key and Gibbs on November 15, FBI agent Kuhl observed Key emerging from the East Larned apartment with Riley on November 17. Key moved the vehicle to a position in the parking lot where it could be viewed from the apartment and returned inside. The apartment was strewn with evidence of drug trafficking, but the seven kilograms of cocaine were missing. Agent Kuhl recognized a secret compartment in the undercarriage of Key's vehicle, and knew from experience that such compartments were used to transport drugs and money. These circumstances supplied the police with probable cause to believe that the GMC Jimmy contained either contraband or evidence. We therefore affirm the District Court's denial of Key's motion to suppress the seven kilograms of cocaine discovered in the vehicle's secret compartment.