Opinion ID: 6500514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scarfo’s Joint Trial with Former Counsel

Text: Donald Manno41 Scarfo argues that he deserves a new trial because he 41 We address this issue here, as arising out of trial, because Scarfo did not move before the trial to have his case severed from Manno’s. Manno did seek severance, but, as 65 was tried jointly with his codefendant and former attorney, Donald Manno, who proceeded pro se. In particular, he contends – for the first time on appeal42 – that Manno’s selfrepresentation “stripped” him (Scarfo) “of a fair and unbiased trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” (NS Opening Br. at 43.) As the government puts it, Scarfo “claims Manno had a conflict of interest that Scarfo refused to waive, so Manno couldn’t represent himself without violating Scarfo’s Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel.” (Answering Br. at 49.) discussed herein, the argument he made in the District Court was different from the Sixth Amendment theory Scarfo now advances. We need not decide whether Scarfo would need to establish plain error to succeed on his unpreserved Sixth Amendment claim or whether any violation of his rights was a per se reversible error, since his claim lacks merit under either standard. 42 Although, as just noted, Scarfo did not raise this issue before the District Court, Manno did seek to sever his trial from Scarfo’s. But even though there was a presumption that all defendants joined each other’s motions, Manno’s request – which articulated a need for severance to protect his own interests – was insufficient to preserve an objection from Scarfo. Indeed, the District Court pointed out as much, denying one of Manno’s severance motions partly because “Scarfo has not objected at this point to the proposed testimony, and he would be the one prejudiced by it.” (JAB at 842.) 66 Because Scarfo was represented by independent, conflict-free counsel throughout his trial, he was not deprived of a Sixth Amendment right. If anything, Scarfo’s challenge to the fairness of his trial sounds in due process more than in the Sixth Amendment. But Scarfo waived any due process claim he may have had and is not entitled to relief on that basis.
Among those indicted alongside Scarfo was Manno, who appears to have been one of Scarfo’s go-to criminal defense attorneys. According to Manno, he represented Scarfo in several matters, including when Scarfo was seeking habeas relief while imprisoned on state RICO charges related to gambling, when he was charged with possessing a deadly weapon in connection with an altercation at an Atlantic City bar, and when he faced charges of illegal gambling and loansharking. As his codefendant in this case, however, Manno did not represent Scarfo. For that task, the District Court appointed counsel. The Court allowed Manno to represent himself but denied his initial request for severance. Prior to trial, Manno moved once more for severance and moved for permission to introduce evidence of “certain legal services” he had provided to Scarfo. (D.I. 664 at 1-2.) He said he needed the evidence to illustrate his “professional and personal relationship” with Scarfo and Pelullo and to emphasize his role as a criminal defense attorney “as a partial explanation” for some of his conduct. (D.I. 664-1 at 3.) He also argued that the evidence was relevant to show that the approximately $20,000 in fees he received from LANA was compensation for legal services and “totally legitimate and unrelated to [FirstPlus].” (D.I. 664-1 at 67 4.) Because Manno’s defense would depend on addressing his relationship with Scarfo, which centered around Scarfo’s criminal activities, Manno said that severance was necessary. He warned that “one of two results” would occur if he and Scarfo were tried together: “Either Scarfo or other defendants or all will be prejudiced by the admission of other convictions and allegations of bad acts[,] or Manno will be denied the ability to fully develop his relationship with Scarfo and others.” (D.I. 664-1 at 9.) Scarfo did not object to those requests, and the District Court granted Manno’s motion in part, authorizing him to introduce evidence of his attorney-client relationship, but it refused to sever the trials. Accordingly, at trial, Manno questioned witnesses about and introduced evidence of his prior representations of Scarfo. Although the jury found Scarfo guilty, Manno was ultimately acquitted of all charges.
Had Manno represented Scarfo at trial, there would be weight to Scarfo’s Sixth Amendment arguments. But Manno did not. Instead (and to repeat), Scarfo was represented by independent, conflict-free counsel. The absence of any issues with Scarfo’s own representation is dispositive and means that Scarfo has no Sixth Amendment claim. Cf. United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding Sixth Amendment caselaw inapplicable to evaluating “the possibility that [a potential trial witness’s] prior representation of [certain defendants] during the grand jury investigation might affect [their] ability to receive a fair trial”). 68 The Sixth Amendment “commands, not that a trial be fair, but that … particular guarantee[s] of fairness be provided[.]” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006). It does so by defining “the basic elements of a fair trial[,]” “including [through] the Counsel Clause.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). That provision entitles a criminal defendant “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Scarfo does not argue that the District Court failed to appoint him counsel, or that he was denied “the right to adequate representation by an attorney of reasonable competence [or] the right to the attorney’s undivided loyalty free of conflict of interest.” United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 748 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Therefore, he suffered no deprivation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Scarfo musters an extensive array of cases in supposed aid of his argument, but none are on point. In all those cases, the defendant’s challenge related to the assistance provided by his then-current defense counsel or his inability to select counsel of his choice. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 155-57, 164 (1988) (approving district court’s “refusal to permit the substitution of counsel” due to defendant’s desired counsel’s conflicts of interest); Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1071-80 (summarizing caselaw governing “denials of the right to counsel” of choice); Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1984) (reversing conviction “because trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest”). None stand for the proposition that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated if his former counsel is involved in the proceedings in another capacity. See United States v. Ramon-Rodriguez, 492 F.3d 930, 945 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[Defendant] cites no authority, and we have found none, in 69 which [a Sixth Amendment conflicted-counsel issue arises in] a situation involving a defendant’s prior attorney in the absence of any alleged conflict involving actual trial counsel.”); English v. United States, 620 F.2d 150, 151-52 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that defendant could not raise an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim against former attorney who had switched to representing codefendant). In the absence of any conflicts between Scarfo and the trial counsel he actually had, the effort to use the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel to condemn Manno’s presence in the case “entails the pounding of a square peg into a round hole.”43 United States v. Poe, 428 F.3d 1119, 1122-24 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding no conflict of interest from fact that codefendant’s counsel previously represented defendant in separate state-court prosecution). Scarfo nevertheless tries to support his claim by pointing to a conversation the District Court had with government counsel and Manno. In that discussion, the Court “urge[d] [Manno] to seek independent counsel … and not represent [him]self[,]” explaining that he could be “subject … to [an] ethics investigation or prosecution.” (Nicodemo Scarfo Appendix (“NSA”) at 6.) The Court explained to Manno that 43 Scarfo insists that, at a minimum, the District Court should have conducted an inquiry into the potential conflict, and he claims that its failure to do so was reversible error. Again, though, he relies on caselaw focused on protecting a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have his current counsel be conflict-free. That concern was not in play here, making those cases inapposite. 70 he was in a “very difficult position” due to the “potential risk of revealing client confidences without the permission of [his] client which would … potentially expose[] [him] to ethics problems.”44 (NSA at 5.) That conversation avails Scarfo nothing. The District Court’s warnings to Manno confirm that the Court was aware that Manno might be opening himself up to potential ethical and professional conflicts by choosing to represent himself. But any issues Manno faced would not, and did not, affect Scarfo’s ability to receive conflict-free assistance of counsel from his trial attorney.45 44 In passing, Scarfo also attempts to frame that conversation as infringing on his Sixth Amendment right to be present at all critical stages of trial. The government explains that it asked for the chambers conference because Manno made certain statements in his severance motion that were inconsistent with the government’s evidence, and it wanted to give Manno a chance to retract his false statements before they were revealed in open court. Scarfo makes no showing that his absence from that discussion undermined his rights or harmed his defense at trial, so the conference does not provide a basis for disturbing his convictions. Cf. infra Section V.F.2. 45 Similarly misplaced is Scarfo’s reliance on the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct to argue that Manno violated his ethical obligations, an issue that he forfeited in any event by failing to raise it in his opening brief. See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005). That argument is simply beside the point in this Sixth Amendment 71 Ultimately, any potential legal or ethical issues arising from Scarfo being tried alongside Manno are not cognizable as a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Setting aside Scarfo’s Sixth Amendment argument, the facts he alleges do implicate interesting questions as to his Fifth Amendment due process rights. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85 (noting that “[t]he Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses,” while the Sixth Amendment only protects particular “elements of a fair trial”); cf. Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1071-77 (affirming district court’s decision to disqualify defendant’s counsel who had conflict of interest with codefendants, in the “interest[] of the proper and fair administration of justice”). Scarfo asserts that, due to the conflict of interest caused by Manno’s presence as a codefendant, he could not take the stand – since that would open himself up to cross-examination by Manno – and he was prevented from asserting an advice-of-counsel defense. Those claims raise non-frivolous issues about trial severance, but Scarfo has expressly disclaimed any “challenge [to] the district court’s decision to deny Manno’s motions seeking to sever his trial from that of his clients.” (NS Opening Br. at 19.) Scarfo’s disclaimer is an unequivocal waiver as to severance – the only plausible step the District Court could have taken to eliminate any potential due process issues with challenge, which requires a showing that Scarfo’s actual trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. 72 the joint trial. 46 In the face of that waiver, we decline to consider an argument Scarfo has not himself articulated. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (“[O]ur [adversarial] system is designed around the premise that parties represented by competent counsel know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief.” (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted)). The District Court’s denial of severance may well be entirely justifiable, but even if it were not, Scarfo does not advance a due process theory for severance, so we will not “sally forth … looking for wrongs to right.” Id. (citations omitted). 46 Scarfo also offers several alternative solutions in lieu of severance, but there is a disconnect between those proposed remedies and Scarfo’s complaints. As mentioned above, Scarfo’s theory of unfairness and prejudice is that Manno’s mere presence as a codefendant at the trial prevented Scarfo from taking the stand and raising an advice-of-counsel defense. He now suggests that the District Court should have disqualified Manno from representing himself or, at a minimum, appointed standby counsel for Manno. Scarfo does not explain how those strategies – which would have entailed abridging Manno’s Sixth Amendment right to self- representation – would have prevented the harm he says he suffered. Scarfo also assigns error to the District Court’s failure to obtain a conflict waiver from him. But he undercuts that by saying that even if the Court had done so, “such a waiver would be invalidated” – thus taking his own proposed remedy off the table. (NS Opening Br. at 99 n.27.) 73