Opinion ID: 1436237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Meyers-Milias-Brown Act

Text: Appellants next claim unlawful employer interference with the exercise of their rights under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3502-3504), prior to the imposition of the five-day suspensions. They observe that under section 3502 government employees have a right to join and participate in the affairs of employee organizations; that under section 3503 employee organizations have a right to represent their members in connection with all matters within the scope of representation including disciplinary matters. Citing Social Workers' Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 382 [113 Cal. Rptr. 461, 521 P.2d 453], for the proposition that in all matters involving discipline, employees were entitled to be represented by their employee organization, they conclude that the representation in question must include the opportunity to discuss the employees' case and to represent the employee in advance of the imposition of discipline. (5) We have, in the prior section of this opinion explained the employees' rights to a short-term suspension procedure. Since the employees have thus been held to have no rights under Skelly v. State Personnel Board, supra, 15 Cal.3d 194, to a hearing prior to the imposition of the five-day suspension imposed, the appellant's claims to presuspension representation must to that extent fall. However, our treatment of the matter has not left the appellant employees (with the exception of appellant Robinson) [9] entirely without a right to be heard. We analyze such appellants' claims to representation in light of the limited procedures recognized hereinabove. Appellants refer us to Government Code section 3503. That section reads in part as follows:  Recognized employee organizations shall have the right to represent their members in their employment relations with public agencies.... Nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from appearing in his own behalf in his employment relations with the public agency. [10] (Italics in original.) Their sole case citation for the proposition they advanced is to Social Workers' Union, Local 535, which held that a public employee's right to union representation under section 3504 attaches to an employer-employee interview which an employee reasonably fears may investigate and sanction his union-related activities. (11 Cal.3d at p. 390.) We do not deem Social Workers' Union, Local 535 entirely dispositive of the matter at bench. Appellants herein make no claim of fear of adverse action by respondent city by reason of union activity. We did, however, in Social Workers' Union, Local 535 demonstrate our sensitivity to developments in the federal law in interpreting state legislation (11 Cal.3d 382, 391), noting that the phrase wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment as used in Government Code section 3504 seems to be taken from the federal Labor Management Relations Act (see also: Service Employees' Internat. Union, Local No. 22 v. Roseville Community Hosp. (1972) 24 Cal. App.3d 400, 408-409 [101 Cal. Rptr. 69]; see Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts (1972) 23 Hastings L.J. 719, 749). Under the provisions of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, [11] an employee is entitled to the presence of his union representative during an investigatory interview according to recent United States Supreme Court cases. ( NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc. (1975) 420 U.S. 251 [43 L.Ed.2d 171, 95 S.Ct. 959]; Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co. (1975) 420 U.S. 276 [43 L.Ed.2d 189, 95 S.Ct. 972].) We note that in Weingarten the United States Supreme Court speaking through Justice Brennan stated (420 U.S. 260-263 [43 L.Ed.2d 179-181]): The action of an employee in seeking to have the assistance of his union representative at a confrontation with his employer clearly falls within the literal wording of § 7 that `[e]mployees shall have the right ... to engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid or protection.' Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 847 (CA7 1973). This is true even though the employee alone may have an immediate stake in the outcome; he seeks `aid or protection' against a perceived threat to his employment security. The union representative whose participation he seeks is, however, safeguarding not only the particular employee's interest, but also the interests of the entire bargaining unit by exercising vigilance to make certain that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly. .... .... .... .... ... The Board's construction also gives recognition to the right when it is most useful to both employee and employer. A single employee confronted by an employer investigating whether certain conduct deserves discipline may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors. A knowledgeable union representative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts, and save the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview. Certainly his presence need not transform the interview into an adversary contest. Respondent suggests nonetheless that union representation at this stage is unnecessary because a decision as to employee culpability or disciplinary action can be corrected after the decision to impose discipline has become final.... Although the court's statement was made to justify representation at an investigational stage, because of the informal nature of the procedures recognized herein this statement has meaning and cogency in the circumstances here presented. We have long recognized the right of a public employee to have his counsel represent him at disciplinary hearings. ( Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 716, 727 [160 P.2d 816]; cf. Borror v. Department of Investment (1971) 15 Cal. App.3d 531, 540-544 [92 Cal. Rptr. 525].) While Steen may have dealt with representation by a licensed attorney, the right of representation by a labor organization in the informal process here involved seems to follow from the right to representation contained in the Meyer-Milias-Brown Act and the right to representation recognized in Steen. Thus, the labor organization may here participate if requested by the employee. However, we note that the labor organization entitled under the act must be recognized (Gov. Code, §§ 3501, subd. (b), 3503), a point highly disputed by respondent city. On remand this factual issue may be clarified by the proofs of the parties.