Opinion ID: 197222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Double Jeopardy Issue

Text: 16 Emerson alternatively seeks to invalidate the fine under the Double Jeopardy Clause, claiming that it constituted double punishment in light of the earlier administrative sanction of decertification. There is no contention that the civil fine is not punitive; the issue is the nature of the FAA penalty that preceded it. If the certificate revocation is remedial, rather than punitive, the later fine is permissible. 17 We recently have established that, in determining whether an administrative action constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes, a court must consider 18 the totality of the circumstances, including the source of the authority under which the debarment is imposable, the goals underpinning the authorizing statute, the order itself, the purposes it serves, and the circumstances attendant to its promulgation. 19 United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 721 (1st Cir.1996) (administrative debarment by FDIC); see also Allen v. Attorney General of State of Maine, 80 F.3d 569, 573 (1st Cir.1996) (driver's license suspension). We have recognized that the force of a double jeopardy claim depends upon the particular circumstances of each individual case, id. at 576, and have identified [t]he pivotal question to be whether the sanction, as applied, exacts rough remedial justice, id. at 576-77 (footnote omitted). 20 The district court thoroughly explored the double jeopardy question within this framework. See Order of March 29, 1996. We see no need to revisit its conclusion that the FAA's authority and goals are anchored in a concern for air safety. See Order at 6-7; see also, e.g., 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701 (previously 49 U.S.C.App. § 1421). 10 21 The court further examined whether the FAA's specific enforcement action in this case was tailored to the remedial goals of federal aviation law, and determined that it was. The court noted that the FAA's investigation of Emerson revealed a number of unsafe and unlawful practices, and observed that the decision to limit the defendant's flying privileges was a logical[ ] response. It further noted that Emerson was not subject to a monetary fine, which, in some instances, would suggest a punitive goal. 22 Analogizing the FAA's action here to the administrative decision in Allen to suspend the driver's license of an individual arrested for drunk driving, see 80 F.3d at 574, the district court noted our holding that the license suspension  'represents a reasonable effort to protect the public from motorists who have demonstrated a dangerous propensity to drink before they drive.'  It then continued: 23 The safety concerns underlying federal aviation laws, no less than those which give rise to state motor vehicle laws, strongly suggest that [t]he sanction [of certificate or license revocation] therefore is principally in service to a remedial goal. 24 Order at 9. 25 We share the district court's perspective that the FAA's actions here were driven by its remedial responsibilities. Indeed, the specific language of the agency's order reflects this focus on considerations of air safety rather than on punishment: 26 By reason of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Administrator has determined that you are not qualified to hold an Airman Certification, in that you lack the required care, judgment, and responsibility. Therefore, the Administrator finds that the safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public interest require the revocation of your Airman Certificate No. 2130849, with all its ratings and privileges. Furthermore, the Administrator finds that an emergency exists and safety in air commerce or air transportation requires the immediate effectiveness of this Order. 27 FAA's Emergency Order of Revocation at 5. The facts and circumstances to which the order referred included both details of the current violations and a listing of prior violations. Although it unquestionably is true that a governing authority might view this record of unlawful conduct as warranting punishment, the emphasis here is not on slapping Emerson's wrist but on preventing him from continuing to present a safety risk. He is deprived of his Airman Certification not as punishment for bad conduct, but because he is not qualified. The immediate implementation of the order further buttresses the judgment that it originated out of a concern for safety, not retribution. 28 Emerson acknowledges that the language of the statute authorizing the license revocation, 49 U.S.C.A. § 44701, suggests that the FAA's only purposes are non-punitive: to ensure safety and competence in aviation. He contends, however, that the most severe of the available enforcement options--including decertification--are, in fact, punitive, and he cites in support a 1994 memorandum describing aspects of the FAA's Compliance and Enforcement Program. See App. at 311-314. The document notes that the FAA's program ranges from educational and remedial efforts to punitive legal enforcement remedies, including criminal sanctions. Id. at 312. He cites in particular a section of the memorandum that describes progressive discipline, starting with a letter of correction to a first-time violator and culminating in a punitive legal enforcement sanction, i.e., a civil penalty or certificate suspension, for offenders who fail to sustain compliance with the law. Id. at 313-14. 29 On the basis of this memorandum, Emerson points out that the FAA Administrator plainly views his enforcement power to include punitive and deterrent measures, and he maintains that it was this punitive power that was used against him in the revocation order. We addressed a somewhat similar argument in Allen, 80 F.3d at 574, where the petitioner contended that the increasing length of a driver's license suspension based on the number of offenses reflected a punitive aim. We acknowledged there that tying the severity of a penalty to the number of offenses may indicate a retributive intent, but pointed out that it also may reflect a protective intent. The escalating suspensions, we observed, reflected a desire to protect the public from those who, on average, present the greatest safety hazard--recidivist drunk drivers. 30 So, too, here. Following the reference to punitive legal enforcement sanction[s] in the FAA memorandum stressed by Emerson, see id. at 314, the document states that, Repetitive violations by a certificate holder may even demonstrate a lack of qualification warranting certificate revocation. (Emphasis added.) This is precisely the basis given for revocation of Emerson's certificate. See supra at 82 ([T]he Administrator has determined that you are not qualified to hold an Airman Certification, in that you lack the required care, judgment and responsibility.). Thus, making our conclusion even more compelling than in Allen, the remedial nature of the administrative sanction is explicit. 31 Characterizing the sanction as primarily remedial does not, of course, mean that we must conclude that it has had neither deterrent nor punitive effect. Unquestionably, the loss of his license has had a severe impact on Emerson and his aviation business. It is equally apparent that the FAA's more serious enforcement measures are designed with deterrence at least partially in mind. Yet, we previously have recognized that the fact that something akin to punishment occurs along with, and incidental to, a sanction's overriding remedial purpose will not transform a permissible civil penalty into a prohibited multiple punishment, Stoller, 78 F.3d at 724. Likewise, the fact that deterrence is among the objectives underlying a civil sanction is merely one factor to be taken into account in the decisional calculus, Allen, 80 F.3d at 576 (citing Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 494 (7th Cir.1995)). Indeed, deterrence should be an anticipated byproduct of aggressive safety enforcement. 32 We note, finally, Emerson's reliance on Pangburn v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 311 F.2d 349, 354-55 (1st Cir.1962), where we held that the Civil Aeronautics Board could order revocation as a sanction for disciplinary purposes, apart from the qualifications or competency of a pilot. Having such authority does not mean, however, that it is wielded in every case of revocation. Here, as we have explained, the evidence persuades us that the sanction displays colors more consistent with the remedial end of the spectrum, Stoller, 78 F.3d at 721. Consequently, the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the civil action on double jeopardy grounds. 33 Affirmed.