Opinion ID: 1931644
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-Conviction Relief Analysis

Text: In analyzing a post-conviction relief application based on newly discovered evidence, we apply the standard used for awarding a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. See Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 173 (R.I.2001) (citing McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I.1992)). The standard consists of a two-part test. The first part is a four-prong inquiry that requires that the evidence be (1) newly discovered since trial, (2) not discoverable prior to trial with the exercise of due diligence, (3) not merely cumulative or impeaching but rather material to the issue upon which it is admissible, [and] (4) of the type which would probably change the verdict at trial. State v. Hazard, 797 A.2d 448, 463-64 (R.I.2002) (quoting State v. L'Heureux, 787 A.2d 1202, 1207-08 (R.I.2002)). For the second part of the inquiry, the hearing justice must exercise his or her discretion and determine whether the newly discovered evidence is credible enough to warrant relief. See Hazard, 797 A.2d at 464; Brennan, 764 A.2d at 173. At the proceeding in this case, the parties agreed that the evidence was both newly discovered and not discoverable before trial. However, the state and Bleau disagreed about the materiality of the evidence and whether it was likely to change the outcome of the trial. The hearing justice found that the newly discovered evidence was material toBleau's conviction and would have changed the verdict. On appeal, the state argues that the report was merely cumulative, impeaching and immaterial and it would not have changed the outcome of the trial. We agree. In determining materiality, this Court relies on Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), which provides that the: touchstone of materiality is a `reasonable probability' of a different result   . The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A `reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.' Powers, 734 A.2d at 514 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. at 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d at 506). A trial justice must not determine whether there was sufficient evidence to convict absent the discounted evidence but must instead determine whether the previously undisclosed [or newly discovered] favorable evidence puts the case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Broccoli v. Moran, 698 A.2d 720, 726 (R.I.1997). The newly discovered evidence in this case lacks materiality. Malone's testimony was not essential to Bleau's guilt; it merely confirmed his presence at the scene  a fact which never was in dispute. Malone offered no evidence about the sexual assault on Mary. He simply analyzed the similarity between the hair and fiber samples collected from the car and Mary and samples taken from Bleau. However, Bleau's presence at the scene was never at issue. Not only did other witnesses testify to Bleau's presence in Mary's car, but also Bleau's own attorney in closing arguments said, you don't really have to worry, I don't think, about whether the person in the car with [Mary] was Carlton Bleau. I think [that]    you can decide beyond a reasonable doubt that it was. He also said I think he's guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of getting out of the car, [and] slashing the tires, for whatever reason. Despite the fact that comments made in closing arguments are not evidence, see State v. Garcia, 649 A.2d 1025, 1026 (R.I.1994), those comments certainly indicate that Bleau never disputed his presence at the scene. The problem with the hearing justice's conclusion about materiality is the misconception that an FBI agent's inaccurate testimony always is material. Although improper testimony always is a serious matter, it is not always material. The hearing justice understandably was upset with Malone's behavior, and this Court is likewise offended by the actions of this rogue agent. The hearing justice found that the conduct shocked the conscience of the court and said that you could not find a person that is legally competent that would say that it's perfectly all right for the police scientists to fabricate and to act in an arbitrary fashion   . We agree with the hearing justice that Malone's conduct is unacceptable. However, the nature of the conduct is not always relevant to the materiality determination. Contrary to the hearing justice's holding, the materiality inquiry is not about whether Malone acted improperly or whether he was a renegade, rogue, forensic scientist. Instead, the focus should have been on whether a nexus existed between Malone's conduct and the outcome of the trial, creating the likelihood of a different outcome or undermining the confidence in the verdict. In addition to being immaterial to the conviction, the newly discovered evidence is cumulative. Malone's testimony about matching hairs and fibers was offered inaddition to the complaining witness's identification of Bleau as the assailant and defense counsel's admission of Bleau's presence. Cumulative evidence is defined as [a]dditional or corroborative evidence to the same point. That which goes to prove what has already been established by other evidence. Black's Law Dictionary 380 (6th ed. 1990). Consequently, Malone's testimony was cumulative to the extent that it was offered to prove Bleau's admitted presence at the scene. Not only is the evidence cumulative and immaterial, but it also is impeaching. New information that is not related to defendant's guilt or innocence and serves only to destroy the credibility of the evidence merely is impeaching. See Mastracchio, 698 A.2d at 713. The fact that Malone previously lied on the stand would serve only to destroy his credibility. Moreover, even the line of questioning that the hearing justice speculated would have occurred if the evidence was available at trial shows that its only value would have been for impeachment. The trial justice hypothesized that the questioning would proceed as follows: `Are you the same Mr. Malone that has been found to be a prevaricator and a falsifier by your own Inspector General and who says that machines used for scientific testing have more abilities and capacities than they, in fact, do?' `Are you the same Mr. Malone who was involved in another matter of considerable importance to the people involved in which you fabricated and falsified testimony?' And maybe even defense at that time, because the newly-discovered evidence is not just the report itself, but is the identity of a man named Stephen Robertson who worked for the Inspector General or the Inspector General Department of the FBI, maybe the defense flies him up, puts him on the stand    and indeed maybe Mr. Robertson could be asked, `What is the reputation ofMr. Malone for truthfulness and honesty within the community of forensic scholars at the FBI crime lab?' I dare say Mr. Robertson would answer, `It is not good. His reputation is that he will not behave in a professional and truthful manner.' Now, assuming that is placed in front of the jury, what do you think they'd do with the testimony? [4] Although it is apparent to this Court that the newly discovered evidence in this case did not justify the order granting post-conviction relief, we wish to make it perfectly clear that we do not condone Malone's conduct. We understand the hearing justice's frustration with the misconduct of a national law enforcement agent. However, it is imperative that we do not allow that justified aggravation to blur our focus on the task before us; the law requires that we disregard newly discovered evidence that is cumulative, impeaching or immaterial. The newly discovered evidence in this case is all of the above.