Opinion ID: 168846
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possession of Drugs

Text: 15 To sustain Ms. Triana's conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the evidence must prove that she (1) knowingly possessed the illegal drug, and (2) did so with the intent to distribute it. See United States v. Reece, 86 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir.1996). Possession may be either actual or constructive; constructive possession may be found if a person knowingly has ownership, dominion, or control over the narcotics and the premises where [they] are found. . . . [W]hen the contraband may be attributed to more than one individual, constructive possession requires some nexus, link, or other connection between the defendant and the contraband. The jury may draw reasonable inferences from direct or circumstantial evidence, yet an inference must amount to more than speculation. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [A] jury may infer intent to distribute from the possession of large quantities of drugs. United States v. Pulido-Jacobo, 377 F.3d 1124, 1131 (10th Cir.2004). 16 Ms. Triana argues that she could not be convicted of the drug offense because (1) Mr. Callirgos-Navetta, not she, exercised dominion and control over the drugs found in the trunk and he was the one who was going to distribute them; and (2) the drugs in the pouch found on her person belonged to him and were for his personal use, not distribution. We are not persuaded. 17 Ms. Triana relies on Reece, in which we reversed the defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute because the evidence fail[ed] to link [him] to the narcotics in any way other than presence and proximity, let alone show his intent to sell. 86 F.3d at 996. Mr. Reece was driving the car in which his codefendant was riding when they were stopped by a police officer. Drugs were found on the codefendant, but not on Mr. Reece, nor elsewhere in the car. See id. We stated that the only evidence that could possibly link Mr. Reece to the drugs was a statement recorded while he and his codefendant waited in a patrol car. See id. The statement indicated his knowledge of the drugs, but by the time it was made, the codefendant had told Mr. Reece about the drugs. See id. It was therefore insufficient to establish the required nexus between Mr. Reece and the drugs. See id. 18 We find Reece readily distinguishable. Unlike the defendant in Reece, who had no drugs on his person, Ms. Triana was carrying the drugs in the black pouch at the time of the stop. Her knowledge of their presence was demonstrated by her statement I have that shit in my pants, R. Add. 19:48:48, and her later voluntary surrender of the pouch to the trooper. The jury was not required to credit her argument that the drugs in the pouch belonged to Mr. Callirgos-Navetta and that she did not have dominion or control over them. 19 More important is the evidence of her connection to the drugs in the trunk: After Mr. Callirgos-Navetta apologized to her while they sat in the patrol car, she asked him, Sorry what, that I'm going to go to jail? Id. at 19:48:16. While waiting for the dog, she feared that it was going to smell that in the bag. Id. at 19:51:48. When the dog approached the trunk, she said, If he gets near that corner, that's where it is, id. at 19:53:38, and Keep going doggy, keep going, id. at 19:53:41. As the officer opened the trunk, she said, We're dead, id. at 20:03:56; and as he removed the backpack containing the drugs, she said, Oh, please no, there it is Rick, id. at 20:04:08, and Who's gonna help me Rick? Id. at 20:04:09. Although Mr. Callirgos-Navetta testified that the drugs were his and that she did not know about them, the jury was not required to believe him. We note that the jury could reasonably have determined from the tone and substance of the audio recording that Ms. Triana, not Mr. Callirgos-Navetta, was the dominant person in their relationship. We accept the jury's resolution of the evidence as long as it is within the bounds of reason. See United States v. Cui Qin Zhang, 458 F.3d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir.2006) (emphasis and internal quotation mark omitted). It was eminently reasonable to find that Ms. Triana knowingly possessed all the drugs found in the convertible. 20 Having determined that the evidence was sufficient to show that she possessed the drugs, we have little difficulty in further determining that the evidence was sufficient to show that Ms. Triana intended to distribute them. Not only was the quantity of drugs found in the backpack large enough for the jury to infer intent to distribute, see Pulido-Jacobo, 377 F.3d at 1131, but the scales, glass pipes, and ziplock baggies—so called tools of the drug trade—were further evidence from which the jury could infer an intent to distribute. United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1255 (10th Cir.1996), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Holland, 116 F.3d 1353 (10th Cir.1997). Whoever possessed the drugs had more in mind than just personal use.