Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony of the Government's Fingerprint Expert

Text: 167 Ajaj argues that the trial judge erred by admitting the testimony of a fingerprint expert who opined that Ajaj held a notebook in a manner consistent with his having written in the notebook. 168 At trial, the government called Carol Edelen, an FBI fingerprint expert. The defendants did not contest Edelen's expertise in analyzing fingerprint evidence. Edelen testified that she identified hundreds of Ajaj's fingerprints on the terrorist materials that were taken from him when he entered the United States. For one particular object, a hand-written notebook which contained instructions on how to build explosives, Edelen explained to the jury how Ajaj's fingers were positioned in order to leave the prints that she identified. There was no objection to this testimony. 169 The government then asked Edelen whether she reached any additional conclusions beyond the mere identification of those prints. Ajaj's counsel objected, arguing that although Edelen was an expert on fingerprint identification, I don't know that she's been established as an expert on holding things. The court sensibly allowed Ajaj's counsel to voir dire Edelen on her ability to tell how a person was holding an object by analyzing fingerprint evidence. After listening to the voir dire, Judge Duffy permitted the government to ask Edelen whether she was able to come to any conclusions based upon the location of Ajaj's prints on the notebook. 170 Edelen explained that the position of the fingerprints suggested that Ajaj was holding the left side of the notebook in his left hand. She expressed no further opinion about the significance of the fingerprints or their positioning on the notebook. In summation, the government claimed that Ajaj, who is right-handed, was the author of the notebook because the author held the notebook in a manner consistent with how a right-handed person would hold a notebook while writing. 171 Ajaj argues that this testimony should not have been admitted. He argues that: (1) the subject of Edelen's testimony was not scientific knowledge and thus was not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702; and (2) even if the testimony was scientific knowledge, Edelen was not qualified to give such testimony. Neither of Ajaj's arguments has merit. 172 Generally, the admission of expert testimony is appropriate if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact. Fed.R.Evid. 702. We have held that expert testimony is proper under Rule 702 if it illuminates matters not within the common knowledge of the average juror. United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 102 n. 3 (2d Cir.1994). 173 When scientific evidence is proffered, the district court must ensure that it rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand, before allowing it to be presented to the jury. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). A district court's decision to admit scientific evidence, like its decision to admit any other type of evidence, is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, ----, 118 S.Ct. 512, 517, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). A decision to admit scientific evidence is not an abuse of discretion unless it is manifestly erroneous. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1042 (2d Cir.1995). 174 Ajaj argues that identification of the placement of fingerprints is not based on any accepted scientific theory or principle. Thus, Ajaj maintains that although the identification of fingerprints rests on a reliable scientific foundation, an opinion on how particular fingerprints were made does not. His argument is wide of the mark. 175 Edelen explained that, given her expertise in identifying fingerprints, she could determine in what position your hand was placed because [she] can determine what the top of the fingerprint is, or the side of the fingerprint is, so [she] can tell the position that you would be holding [for example, a pad of paper]. Indeed, Ajaj did not object to Edelen's lengthy exposition on the way his fingers were positioned on the notebook when they left the prints Edelen identified. 176 The voir dire made clear that Edelen's testimony regarding the placement of Ajaj's hand on the notebook was based on the same well-accepted scientific foundation as her identification of his fingerprints. Edelen explained that when a finger touches an object, the ridges of that finger leave an identifiable mark upon the object, which is referred to as a latent print. By comparing the ridges of a latent print to a sample print, a fingerprint expert can tell which finger left the latent print. A fingerprint expert can also tell whether a particular part of a finger left a latent print by comparing the ridges on that part of the finger with those on the object. By determining what part of a finger left a given print, a fingerprint expert can then determine the position of the finger when it left that print. Finally, by putting together the position of all the fingers, an expert can tell how a person was holding an object. 177 Judge Duffy correctly concluded that Edelen's opinion on the way that Ajaj held the notebook was based on a reliable scientific foundation. 178 Ajaj's claim that Edelen was unqualified to give the testimony regarding the way he was holding the notebook is also frivolous. Edelen was qualified to give expert testimony on how fingerprints are made, and how a person was holding an object when a print was made. See McCullock, 61 F.3d at 1044; Locascio, 6 F.3d at 937.