Opinion ID: 2520047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: penalty phase arguments

Text: Defendant, relying solely on his guilt phase argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the felony-murder conviction and the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding, contends without further argument that his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable penalty determination was violated. Because we have concluded above that sufficient evidence supported both the conviction and the special circumstance finding, we reject this argument as well.
Defendant contends the trial court's exclusion at the guilt phase of third party culpability evidence relating to Liberato Gutierrez prejudicially affected the penalty verdict depriving him of his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial and nonarbitrary penalty determination. As with defendant's guilt phase argument, we reject this claim because defendant did not rely on a theory of third party culpability in his offer of proof. Defense counsel was very clear that it was not his intention to point [ ] the finger at Liberato Gutierrez. (See ante, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 302-304, 82 P.3d at pp. 322-324.) Even so, as defendant concedes, the trial court instructed the jury on lingering doubt. [27] Defendant's assertion that the lingering doubt instruction was ineffective is undermined by Detective Guenther's testimony and defense counsel's argument, which alerted the jury to the possibility that other individuals were in the vicinity before, during, or after the murder and robbery. Defense counsel, for example, argued to the jury during his guilt phase closing argument that other individuals could have killed or robbed the victim, arguing at one point: In the back alley ... are other people that are found, that are detained, that are talked to. Guenther knows they're back there. He talked to them. [¶] Were those people's shoes gathered up? Were those people's shoes taken? Were those people's shoes analyzed? Were those people's shoes looked at for blood? Defendant's reliance on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 is misplaced. Lockett struck down Ohio's death sentence statute because it prevented the sentencer from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation.  ( Id. at p. 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, italics added.) Defendant here, however, did not seek to introduce third party culpability evidence at the penalty phase as mitigating evidence. (See e.g., People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 967, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574, abrogated on another ground in People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 999 P.2d 666 [finding that since defendant did not seek to introduce lingering doubt at the second penalty phase trial he could not complain of any state law violation].) [28]
Defendant contends the joinder of the escape charge with the robbery-murder charge deprived him of a fair trial and nonarbitrary penalty determination. He maintains that the escape evidence may have been the most important factor in the jury's decision to sentence him to death. This claim lacks merit. As we explained above, the joinder of the escape charge and the murder charge was not prejudicial because evidence of the escape would have been admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt had the charges been tried separately. And contrary to defendant's assertion, evidence of the scuffle between defendant and Deputy Guise was admissible and relevant at the penalty phase as evidence of criminal activity involving force or violence under section 190.3, factor (b).
Several defense witnesses, including defendant's sister Victoria Valdez (Victoria), testified that defendant was a nonviolent person and that it was difficult for them to believe that he was capable of killing another person. On cross-examination of Victoria, the following colloquy occurred: [Prosecutor]: And you tell us that your brother is not a violent man; is that correct? [Victoria]: Not in front of us he's not. [Prosecutor]: Have you ever seen your brother with a weapon, like a gun? [Victoria]: No, never. [Prosecutor]: And it would be your opinion that your brother never had guns, never touched guns. Is that pretty good? [Victoria]: I guess that's pretty good. I have never seen him with a gun. [Prosecutor]: Would you be really surprised if your brother hung around and had  somewhere and had guns? [Victoria]: Yes, I would be surprised. At this point, the prosecutor showed Victoria two photographs, one of defendant posing with a long gun and making hand gestures and the other of defendant and another person holding the gun. The prosecutor then asked Victoria: So this is a picture of your yard area with him doing something with his hands? Do you see what's he doing with his hand there? Can you tell? Victoria responded, He's going like this (motioning). The prosecutor elaborated: Doing something with his hands, okay. Defense counsel did not object to this questioning. When the prosecution later sought to introduce the photographs into evidence, defense counsel objected, but objected only to the one photograph depicting signing[, the] gang signing. The following exchange then took place outside the presence of the jury: [Prosecutor]: There was no testimony about the gang signs. [Defense counsel]: I know, but that doesn't mean that you're not going to argue  [Prosecutor]: I'm not going to argue gang signs. I can't. There's no evidence.... [¶] Also, I have a good faith belief that that's not a recognized gang sign. Every gang sign expert I talk to says he made this up. [Defense counsel]: If that's the case  [Prosecutor]: I'm not going to argue that. As a result of the prosecutor's assurance that she did not intend to make an argument regarding gang signs, the court admitted the photographs, stating that they would be received into evidence because the people will not argue that issue of whether or not they're flashing a gang sign. Defendant argues on appeal that his constitutional rights to a fair trial and reliable penalty determination were violated by the admission of the photographs and the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant's sister relating to the gun and the hand gestures. Because defendant did not object at trial, he may not now complain on appeal about the prosecutor's cross-examination. ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 453, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442 [Defendant was required to object to the improper question so that the court could admonish the jury to disregard it and the answer. He did not, and has waived his claim.].) Even if this claim was not forfeited, the questioning was within proper bounds. The prosecution was permitted to counter the defense witnesses' portrayal of defendant. Testimony regarding the gun countered testimony that defendant could not have committed the crime he was found guilty of, and that Victoria, who lived with her brother when the photograph was taken, had never before seen him with a gun. It also pointed out that Victoria may have been unaware of her brother's activities. The prosecutor's inquiry into the hand gestures, although questionable as to its relevance, was not prejudicial. While the prosecutor subsequently informed the court and defense counsel that she did not think the gestures were authentic gang signs, she may have believed that defendant's sister may have had another insight. Whether or not this was the case is not important since the reference to the hand gestures was too fleeting to be prejudicial. The admission of the photographs into evidence was also permissible because defense counsel implicitly withdrew his objection. As noted above, defense counsel objected when the prosecutor first sought their admission, but only to the one photograph showing the hand gestures. However, defense counsel, was concerned not with the admission of the photograph per se, but only with its admission in conjunction with a prosecution argument to the jury regarding gang signs. After the prosecutor assured defense counsel that she was not going to so argue, he stated, If that's the case  at which time he was cut off by the prosecutor who reassured him that she was not going to make an argument respecting gang signs. A reading of this testimony reveals that defense counsel was only concerned about a subsequent argument by the prosecutor regarding gang signs. Because he was assured that no such argument would take place, he did not object to the admission of the photograph. Finally, we note there was never any testimony relating to gang membership or any mention of the word gang. We conclude defendant's constitutional rights were not violated by this testimony and the admission of the photographs into evidence.
Defendant contends that his federal constitutional rights to due process, fair trial, and reliable penalty determination were violated by prosecutorial misconduct at both the guilt and penalty phases. Such misconduct, he urges, requires reversal of the death sentence. We disagree. The same standard applicable to prosecutorial misconduct at the guilt phase is applicable at the penalty phase. (See Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1019, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) A defendant must timely object and request a curative instruction or admonishment. Failure to do so forfeits the claim on appeal unless the admonition would have been ineffective. ( Ibid. ) Moreover, when misconduct has been established, it must bear a reasonable possibility of influencing the penalty verdict. [Citations.] In evaluating a claim of prejudicial misconduct based upon a prosecutor's comments to the jury, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the jury construed or applied the prosecutor's comments in an objectionable manner. [Citations.] ( Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1019, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) Because defendant did not object to any of the complained-of instances of misconduct, and a curative instruction or admonition could have mitigated any prejudice, his claims are forfeited. But even if not forfeited, defendant's contentions are without merit.
Defendant first contends that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument relating to the motivation of his two sisters was improper because it mischaracterized the evidence and amounted to deliberate misrepresentation, thereby resulting in prejudicial misconduct. The prosecutor made the following argument: The most convincing testimony that this defendant should be sentenced to the death penalty came from both his sisters, Victoria and Graciela. They didn't shed a tear for him. They didn't beg for his life, for  for mercy for anyone, not even for themselves. They were somewhat lighthearted, noncommittal, and it didn't appear that they truly meant it when they said he was a good and nonviolent man. [¶] They're [ sic ] demeanor indicated, to the People at least, that they were supportive of their brother, but because they really, really know just how bad he, [ sic ] is because they lived with him and perhaps could not tell us the things that they really knew, that they testified out of family commitment. They testified for Mr. and Mrs. Valdez and not for him. [¶] They couldn't bring themselves to beg for his life because they know in their heart he doesn't deserve mercy. The two women said it all. They're not criminals. These are hard working people with children. [¶] ... [¶] But I'll tell you, these women know what Alfredo Valdez is, and they're not happy about it. To come to court and have to beg for somebody because their parents want them to, because he's your brother, you got to do it, Ladies and Gentlemen. I would expect nothing less from anybody else. [¶] You would want your brother to come. You would want your sister to come. But they're probably so sick, both of them, it probably doesn't cause either sister an inordinate amount of grief to think at all about one of their brothers, Alfredo, facing the death penalty. Their actions and demeanor tell us, and they tell you he deserves it. While counsel is accorded great latitude at argument to urge whatever conclusions counsel believes can properly be drawn from the evidence [citation], counsel may not assume or state facts not in evidence ( Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 732, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332) or mischaracterize the evidence ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673). `Whether the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide.' ( People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 169, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988, quoting Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 522, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) In this case, the prosecutor's comments did not mischaracterize or assume facts not in evidence, but merely commented on the evidence and made permissible inferences. ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 278, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897 [prosecutor's argument that the defendant's mother couldn't bring herself to tell [the jury] that he didn't deserve the death penalty ... [but only that] her religion says that there shouldn't be a death penalty amounted to fair comment on the evidence].) The prosecutor here did not misstate the witnesses' testimony or state that the witnesses did not ask the jury not to impose the death penalty. Rather, it is clear that the argument was based on the prosecutor's interpretation of the evidence  e.g., the witnesses' tepid testimony, their demeanor, and their relationship to defendant. (See, e.g., People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 964, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571 [no prosecutorial misconduct in prosecutor's comment that `[e]ven the most heinous person born, even Adolph [ sic ] Hitler, probably had a mother who loved him.' ... [Because a] reasonable juror would understand the comment as attempting to diminish the weight of defendant's evidence in mitigation, that is, the evidence of his mother's attachment to him. [Citation.]].) Moreover, there was no danger that the jurors believed the prosecutor was aware of facts to which they were not privy. (Cf. People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 829, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673 [improper argument because it raised the possibility the jury would assume [the prosecution] had some undisclosed knowledge].) Given this, there is no reasonable basis to conclude the prosecutor's argument skewed the jury's decision toward imposing the death sentence or diminished the jury's sense of responsibility. ( Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231.) In passing, defendant contends that counsel's failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we find that the argument was a permissible comment on the evidence, this claim also is without merit. Finally, we note that any possible prejudice was mitigated by the court's instruction to the jury that [s]tatements made by the attorneys during trial are not evidence. (See Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 734, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.)
Defendant contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when she questioned Victoria about defendant's hand gestures. Defendant argues that this invited the jury to speculate that defendant was a gang member, despite the fact that the prosecutor was aware that the hand gestures were not identifiable gang signs. Even if this claim were not forfeited for failure to object at trial, we would reject this claim on the merits because the prosecutor never asked Victoria whether defendant was making gang signs, but only asked what he was doing with his hands. The word gang was never uttered during defendant's trial. Again, as observed above, the prosecutor may have believed that Victoria had some insight into what the hand gestures meant.
Through the testimony of Deputy Sheriffs Whipple and Shive, the prosecution introduced evidence that defendant attacked inmate Robinson. Robinson did not testify, but he was brought into the courtroom for identification purposes. In her closing argument, the prosecutor stated: It goes without saying that, in a custodial setting like county jail, and perhaps even more so, state prison, no one wants to be labeled a rat. No one wants to inform on anyone because the next time something happens to you, it will probably involve a lot more pain and suffering to you, a rat. [¶ ] ... [¶] Now, you remember that [defense counsel] asked Deputy Whipple about  asked him if Mr. Robinson would testify, and he said no, he didn't want to. Even the prison guards testified, and I think it was Officer Valentine, but I'm not really sure, testified that it's very common to have intimidation. The prosecutor continued: Now, let's talk about the stabbing of William Robinson. You saw him. He didn't want to testify. You saw how big and buffed out he was. Alfredo Valdez is nowhere near his size, but he stabbed him twice and he was causing him to back up in an intimidating fashion in front of deputies. Defendant contends this argument implied the reason Robinson did not testify was because defendant intimidated him. This was misconduct, defendant argues, because there was no evidence that defendant intimidated Robinson. We find no misconduct. The prosecutor never said or implied that defendant himself intimidated Robinson. She merely highlighted that inmates can be intimidated in prison and that an inmate would not want to be labeled a rat. Any inmate could consider Robinson a rat if it was disclosed that he testified against another inmate. With respect to the prosecutor's argument regarding Robinson's size, there was no misconduct. A fair reading of the argument reveals that the prosecutor intended to show that regardless of defendant's size, he could still pose a threat to other inmates, even those who are buffed out. Defendant also argues that the prosecution committed similar misconduct with respect to another witness, William Copeland. But he fails to cite any argument by the prosecution implying that defendant intimidated Copeland.
Defendant next argues that misconduct at the guilt phase also prejudiced him at the penalty phase. We reject this claim for the same reasons we rejected his guilt phase prosecutorial misconduct claims. (See ante, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 315-326, 82 P.3d at 333-337.)
Without a single instance of prosecutorial misconduct, we cannot conclude there was cumulative prejudicial impact depriving defendant of a fair trial and due process. (Cf. People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 815, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673 [reversing verdict based on numerous instances of egregious prosecutorial misconduct].)
During discussion regarding jury instructions between counsel and the court, the following colloquy occurred regarding CALJIC No. 2.06: [29] [Prosecutor]: Let me look at 2.06, because there may be  the argument may be that [defendant] attempted to suppress evidence by concealing the knife in the prison yard. Court: Perhaps by the intimidation of a witness, too. [Prosecutor]: Right. And there is that one witness that didn't want to testify. Court: Robinson. [Prosecutor]: Yes. Court: Let's give that one anyway, 2.06. Defendant argues that it was prejudicial error to instruct the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.06 because there was no evidence that he intimidated Robinson into not testifying. Giving this instruction, he maintains, lessened the prosecution's burden of proof by allowing the jury to infer guilt regarding the attack on Robinson, which was introduced in aggravation as an uncharged criminal act under section 190.3, factor (b). This, he urges, violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial and reliable penalty determination. [30] As a threshold matter, we find that defendant forfeited this claim because he did not object at trial. ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 326, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374, citing People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1223, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) Defense counsel did not object to the court's ruling at the time it was made, or later when the court asked whether defense counsel had any requests or objections to the proposed instructions on behalf of defendant. Turning to the merits, we disagree with the Attorney General that sufficient evidence existed to support CALJIC No. 2.06. It is an elementary principle of law that before a jury can be instructed that it may draw a particular inference, evidence must appear in the record which, if believed by the jury, will support the suggested inference. ( People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 597, 138 Cal.Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203, citing People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 773, 228 P.2d 281.) Here, the evidence surrounding Robinson's refusal to testify was insufficient to allow the jury to infer that defendant intimidated Robinson. Prior to Deputy Whipple's scheduled testimony, the prosecutor informed the court: [S]ome unforeseen occurrences have taken place, and I have spoken with counsel. We'd like to take Deputy Whipple very briefly out of order to identify an individual. With the court's permission and without objection from defense counsel, the prosecutor called Deputy Whipple as a witness for the sole purpose of identifying Robinson, who was brought into the courtroom. Deputy Whipple was recalled the next day. He testified that he talked to Robinson the day he was stabbed and that Robinson was cooperative. After eliciting from Deputy Whipple that he had conversations with Robinson, the prosecutor asked: [A]t this point was he cooperative with you about testifying? Before Deputy Whipple answered, defense counsel's objection on vagueness grounds was sustained. The prosecutor then asked Deputy Whipple if he had gone to talk to Robinson in lock-up two days earlier; Deputy Whipple said yes. He also answered in the affirmative when the prosecutor asked if his purpose was to see if Robinson would testify. Deputy Whipple testified that he was unsuccessful in his attempt, but did not elaborate. This testimony would not have allowed a reasonable jury to find that defendant intimidated Robinson or that Robinson's refusal to testify was related to something defendant may have said or done. Deputy Whipple never said why Robinson did not wish to testify, only that he seemed cooperative prior to his scheduled testimony. Even if Robinson was intimidated, as we explained above in our review of defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim (see ante, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 315-326, 82 P.3d at pp. 341-342), the source of the intimidation could have been other inmates who may have taken exception to an inmate testifying against another inmate. Robinson may have decided that he did not want to be labeled a rat. (See, ante, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 326, 82 P.3d at p. 342.) The jury, therefore, should not have been permitted, based on witness intimidation, to find that defendant exhibited consciousness of guilt by suppressing evidence of his attack on Robinson. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in instructing the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 2.06, we discern no prejudice to defendant warranting reversal of the death judgment. Defendant argues that this error lessened the prosecutor's burden of proof relating to the uncharged Robinson attack. But as we have previously held, CALJIC No. 2.06 and other consciousness of guilt instructions do not impermissibly lessen the prosecution's burden of proof. ( People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1224, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) Before the jury could rely on defendant's attack on Robinson as a factor in aggravation at the penalty phase, the prosecutor was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did attack Robinson. ( People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 293, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433.) Through the testimony of Deputies Whipple and Shive, there is little doubt the prosecution was able to do so. Deputy Shive's eyewitness testimony was essentially uncontroverted. At most, the defense was able to elicit from Deputy Shive that he could not be certain that defendant was the one who actually manufactured the shank that Deputy Shive found when he searched defendant. Moreover, any possible prejudice was mitigated by the admonition contained in CALJIC No. 2.06 that such conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for your consideration. There is no reasonable possibility, given the extent of the aggravating evidence introduced at the penalty phase overall, and the testimony of Deputies Whipple and Shive regarding the attack on Robinson specifically, that the penalty determination would have been different had the jury not been instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.06. ( People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 966, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571.) Therefore, any error was harmless.
Defendant argues that the robbery-murder special circumstance, facially and as applied, violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it fails to adequately narrow the class of death-eligible defendants and vests prosecutors with unbridled discretion. We have repeatedly rejected such contentions ( See, e.g., People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 125-126, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749; People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 462, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78; Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1041, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1078, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 189-190, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980) and find no need to reconsider our precedent at this time. Defendant further contends that federal due process requires that before returning a verdict of death the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors and that death is the appropriate penalty. We have repeatedly rejected these contentions. (See People v. Jones, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1126, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359; People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1078, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) The United States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, do not require that we reconsider our precedent. ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, fn. 33, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.)
We reject defendant's contention that the cumulative effect of any errors requires that this court reverse the death judgment. We reject this claim because none of the errors, individually or cumulatively, `significantly influence[d] the fairness of defendant's trial or detrimentally affect[ed] the jury's determination of the appropriate penalty.' ( Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1038, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519, quoting People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 84, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.)