Opinion ID: 725554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Do the Advance Parole Regulations Conflict with the Statute?

Text: 44 We must next determine whether the INS's regulations requiring legalization applicants to receive advance parole conflict with its own construction of § 1255a(a)(3)(B) as a border control mechanism. We conclude that the regulations requiring advance parole are invalid. See CSS I, 685 F.Supp. at 1159 (invalidating the regulations); De Oliveira, 873 F.Supp. at 343 (same); Fernandes v. McElroy, 920 F.Supp. 428 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (same). 45 Since the Supreme Court decided Fleuti in 1963, courts have found that a trip was brief, casual, and innocent if it was not intended to disrupt meaningfully an alien's permanent residency in the United States. CSS I, 685 F.Supp. at 1158 (citing Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462, 83 S.Ct. at 1812). The focal point of the Fleuti doctrine is the alien's intentions. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462, 83 S.Ct. at 1812. [W]e declare today simply that an innocent, casual, and brief excursion by a resident alien ... may not have been 'intended' as a departure disruptive of his resident alien status and therefore may not subject him to the consequences of an 'entry' into the country on his return. Id. 46 The INS's advance parole regulations totally lose sight of the Fleuti doctrine's purpose to circumvent entry procedures when aliens have not intended to disrupt their United States residency. Instead, the advance parole regulations require aliens to jump through several administrative hoops in order to receive advance parole. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(l)(2), (m)(1) & (n)(2). Aliens who fail to jump through the requisite administrative hoops are thereafter barred from reentering the country, regardless of the fact that a departure may not have been intended to disrupt United States residency. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(m)(1). 47 For example, in De Oliveira, the legalization applicant flew to Brazil after learning her mother was ill and needed surgery. 873 F.Supp. at 339-40. The petitioner waited in line for two days to obtain advance parole prior to her departure, but did not get in to see an INS agent. Id. The petitioner had to leave to be with her mother, and so left without permission from the INS. Id. The INS thereafter put her into exclusion proceedings upon her return. Id. In these circumstances, it is irrefutable that the petitioner did not intend to disrupt meaningfully her United States residency. Nonetheless, the INS sought to exclude the petitioner by application of its advance parole regulations. Such a result cannot be reconciled with the intent and spirit of the Fleuti doctrine. 48 By construing the brief, casual, and innocent language of subsection (B) so narrowly, not only has the INS eviscerated the historical meaning and purpose of the words; it has also contravened Congress's intent that IRCA be liberally construed. 49 The Committee intends that the legalization program should be implemented in a liberal and generous fashion, as has been the historical pattern with other forms of administrative relief granted by Congress. 50 H.R.Rep. No. 682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1986), reprinted in, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5676. The advance parole regulations subjecting legalization applicants to administrative requirements not contemplated by the Fleuti doctrine are a far cry from a liberal and generous application of IRCA as intended by Congress. 51 Given the historical meaning of the phrase brief, casual, and innocent, and given Congress's desire for IRCA to be liberally and generously construed, we conclude that subsection (B) is not limited to those absences authorized in advance by the INS. To the contrary, the language of the statute, as confirmed by the INS's own interpretation, mandates the application of the Fleuti doctrine as it has been historically understood and applied. We therefore hold those regulations requiring advance parole for legalization applicants to be invalid: 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(l)(2), providing that a brief, casual, and innocent absence means a departure authorized by the INS; and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(m)(1) providing that readmission is authorized only if the alien received advance parole. 4 We therefore remand to the INS for a determination under Fleuti whether Espinoza's absence was brief, casual, and innocent. See Castrejon-Garcia v. INS, 60 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (9th Cir.1995) (construing brief, casual, and innocent).V. Jurisdiction to Review Denial of Legalization Appeal 52 Espinoza appeals the district court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of the LAU's denial of his legalization application appeal. Review of IRCA and its legislative history shows that Congress did not intend judicial review of legalization denials in exclusion proceedings. 53 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(1) provides there shall be no administrative or judicial review of an IRCA application, except as expressly accorded by the statute. Section 1255a(f)(4) provides for judicial review of a denial of a legalization application only in an order of deportation under section 1105a of this title. Id. (emphasis added); see also Reno v. Catholic Social Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 53-54, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 2493-94, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993); Noriega-Sandoval v. INS, 911 F.2d 258, 260-61 (9th Cir.1990). Thus, the plain meaning of the statute precludes review of a legalization application in an exclusion proceeding, such as the one at bench. 54 The plain meaning of a statute is controlling, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary. Id. at 260 (quoting United States v. Hoffman, 794 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir.1986)). The legislative history of § 1255a(f) indicates that Congress's failure to provide for judicial review of a legalization application in an exclusion hearing was intentional. 55 When the administrative review is exhausted and also yields a negative decision, and when the applicant is in a deportation proceeding (but not an exclusion proceeding), the applicant can appeal a negative decision within the context of judicial review of a deportation order. 56 H.R.Rep. No. 682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5678 (emphasis added). 57 Moreover, in SAW, passed simultaneously with IRCA, Congress did provide for judicial review of LAU denials in exclusion proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(3)(A). Section 1160(e)(3)(A), providing the exclusive means of judicial review of SAW legalization denials, is identical to § 1255a(f)(3)(A), with one major exception. Section 1160(e) expressly provides that orders of deportation and exclusion can be judicially reviewed, while § 1255a(f) provides for judicial review only of deportation orders. 58 The fact that Congress did not include judicial review in § 1255a(f) indicates that Congress did not want to give IRCA applicants this benefit. See Russello, 464 U.S. at 23, 104 S.Ct. at 300-01; see also Navarro-Aispura v. INS, 53 F.3d 233, 235 (9th Cir.1995) (recognizing in the context of another amnesty statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1259, that there is no administrative review in exclusion proceedings). 59 In summary, the plain meaning of the statute, its legislative history, and its construction, all suggest that Congress purposely foreclosed the possibility of judicial review of an LAU denial in an exclusion proceeding. 60 Espinoza also argues that the district court had jurisdiction to review the LAU denial because the IJ ordered that Espinoza be excluded and deported from the United States. Section 1255a(f)(4)(A) provides: There shall be judicial review of such a denial only in the judicial review of an order of deportation under section 1105a of this title. Thus, because he has been ordered to be deported, Espinoza claims that the plain language of § 1255a(f)(4)(A) gives the district court jurisdiction to review the denial. Espinoza's argument is without merit. 61 Although Espinoza relies on use of the word deport in the IJ's order, he was not subject to a deportation hearing, nor is he subject to an order of deportation. He was the subject of an exclusion proceeding. Consequently, he is subject to an order of exclusion, which can only be effectuated by deporting him. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 1073-74, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (use of the word deportation in an exclusion proceeding is merely the method of removing the alien from this country, and is not intended as a word of art). Accordingly, we reject Espinoza's attempt to recharacterize his exclusion hearing as a deportation hearing within the meaning of § 1255a(f) and affirm the district court's holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the LAU's denial of his legalization appeal.VI. Attorney's Fees 62 Espinoza requests attorney's fees on appeal under subsection (b) of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). This subsection makes the United States liable to the prevailing party 5 for attorney's fees to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). 63 Espinoza identifies no statute providing for an award of fees. Under the common law, attorney's fees may be assessed against a losing party that has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons[.] Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2133-34, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1622, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975)). The bad faith doctrine is an exception to the American rule that litigants bear their own expenses. Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1334 (9th Cir.1987). As the bad faith exception predates the EAJA, it is applicable in suits against the United States. Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4953, 4984, 4987). 64 Awarding attorney's fees under this common law doctrine is punitive, and should be imposed only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice. Brown v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 492, 495 (9th Cir.1990) (internal quotations omitted). To be liable, the government's conduct must have been more than merely unreasonable. Barry, 825 F.2d at 1334. The burden of showing the government's bad faith is on the prevailing party. Id. at 1333. (citing United States v. Ford, 737 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (9th Cir.1984)). 65 In sum, Espinoza has not offered any argument whatsoever to support his request for fees under § 2412(b). Thus, he has failed to meet his burden of showing the government's bad faith. Moreover, we have held that the government does not act in bad faith where it seeks judicial resolution of an important, doubtful question of law that is not subject to resolution by clear, controlling precedent. Minor v. United States, 797 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir.1986) (internal quotation omitted). As the preceding analysis indicates, the issues presented in this appeal were difficult and the law unsettled. Accordingly, we conclude that the government did not act in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons[.] Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133-34 (quoting Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-59, 95 S.Ct. at 1622). The request for attorney's fees is therefore denied. 6