Opinion ID: 859136
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The NYCHRL

Text: For many years, we construed the NYCHRL to be coextensive with its federal and state counterparts. See, e.g., Estate of Hamilton v. City of New York, 627 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 2010); Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 498 n.1 (2d Cir. 2009); Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 565 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000). In 2005, however, the New York City Council amended the NYCHRL by passing the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005 (the Restoration Act), N.Y.C. Local L. No. 85. See, e.g., Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2009); Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 36 (1st Dep't 2009) (Acosta, J.); see generally Craig Gurian, A Return to Eyes on the Prize: Litigating Under the Restored New York City Human Rights Law, 33 F ORDHAM U RB . L.J. 255 (2006). As amended, the NYCHRL - 14 - requires an independent analysis. See Restoration Act § 1; Loeffler, 582 F.3d at 278. Nonetheless, district courts continued -- erroneously -- to apply federal standards to NYCHRL claims. See, e.g., St. Jean v. United Parcel Serv. Gen. Serv. Co., No. 12-544-cv, 2013 WL 336006, at  (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 2013) (summary order) ([T]he district court erred to the extent it found that federal standards for recovery are applied in determining employment discrimination claims under the City HRL . . . .); Simmons v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP , No. 11-4480-cv, 2013 WL 261537, at  (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 2013) (summary order) ([T]he district court erred to the extent that it . . . analyzed [the NYCHRL claim] under the same standard as her claims under federal and state law.). In amending the NYCHRL, the City Council expressed the view that the NYCHRL had been construed too narrowly and therefore underscore[d] that the provisions of New York City's Human Rights Law are to be construed independently from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes. Restoration Act § 1. To bring about this change in the law, the Act established two - 15 - new rules of construction. First, it created a one-way ratchet, by which interpretations of state and federal civil rights statutes can serve only 'as a floor below which the City's Human Rights law cannot fall .' Loeffler, 582 F.3d at 278 (quoting Restoration Act § 1) . Second, it amended the NYCHRL to require that its provisions be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human rights law s, including those laws with provisions comparably-worded to provisions of this title[,] have been so construed. Restoration Act § 7 (amending N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-130). Pursuant to these revisions, courts must analyze NYCHRL claims separately and independently from any federal and state law claims, see Restoration Act § 1; Hernandez v. Kaisman, 957 N.Y.S.2d 53, 58 (1st Dep't 2012) ; Gurian, supra, at 275-77, construing the NYCHRL's provisions broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible, Albunio v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472, 477-78 (2011). Thus, even if the challenged conduct is not actionable - 16 - under federal and state law, federal courts must consider separately whether it is actionable under the broader New York City standards. See Hernandez, 957 N.Y.S.2d at 58 (While we find that the complained-of incidents do not rise to the level of 'severe and pervasive' for purposes of a claim pursuant to the State HRL, this does not dispose of the question whether plaintiffs' City HRL claim is still viable.).
Section 8-107(1)(a) of the NYCHRL makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or an employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of the . . . gender . . . of any person, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such person or to discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment . N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a). Applying the Restoration Act's new rules of construction, the First Department has established a new standard of liability for gender discrimination under the NYCHRL. - 17 - Construing the phrase discriminate against . . . in terms, conditions or privileges of employment broadly, the First Department reasoned that forcing a targeted employee to suffer unwanted gender-based conduct imposes a different term or condition of employment on her, even if the harassing conduct does not rise to the level of being severe and pervasive. Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 38. Therefore, the First Department declined to use the federal severe and pervasive standard for NYCHRL claims and instead adopted a rule by which liability is normally determined simply by the existence of differential treatment. Id. To establish a gender discrimination claim under the NYCHRL, the plaintiff need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she has been treated less well than other employees because of her gender. Id. at 39; accord Nelson v. HSBC Bank USA, 929 N.Y.S.2d 259, 264 (2d Dep't 2011) (adopting the same standard of liability). Under this standard, the conduct's severity and pervasiveness are relevant only to the issue of damages. See Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 38. To prevail on liability, - 18 - the plaintiff need only show differential treatment -- that she is treated less well -- because of a discriminatory intent. 7 See id. at 39. Indeed, the challenged conduct need not even be 'tangible' (like hiring or firing). Id. at 40. When applying this standard, however, district courts must be mindful that the NYCHRL is not a general civility code. Id. at 40-41 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The plaintiff still bears the burden of showing that the conduct is caused by a discriminatory motive. It is not enough that a plaintiff has an overbearing or obnoxious boss. She must show that she has been treated less well at least in part because of her gender. Id. at 39, 40 n.27 (emphasis added). 8 7 We note that our discussion applies only to disparate treatment claims and that a separate provision of the NYCHRL applies to disparate impact claims. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(17); Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 96 N.Y.2d 484, 491 (2001); cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577-78 (2009) (explaining that, under Title VII, liability for disparate treatment requires intentional discrimination, but liability for disparate impact does not). 8 It is unclear whether, and to what extent, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis has been modified for NYCHRL claims. Compare Bennett v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 936 N.Y.S.2d 112, 116 (1st Dep't 2011) (beginning to consider how - 19 - Even if the plaintiff establishes that she was treated less well because of her gender, defendants may assert an affirmative defense whereby [they] can still avoid liability if they prove that the conduct complained of consists of nothing more than what a reasonable victim McDonnell Douglas framework should be modified), with Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 946 N.Y.S.2d 27, 30 (1st Dep't 2012) ([N]either the [Restoration Act] nor the City Council report thereon . . . indicates that the McDonnell Douglas framework is to be discarded.). Although Bennett seemed to suggest the analysis has changed, the First Department later narrowly construed Bennett as only requiring trial courts to consider whether plaintiff's claim could survive under either the McDonnell Douglas analysis or a mixed motives theory of liability. See Melman, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 30. It is unclear how this differs from the federal standard. See, e.g., Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep't, 706 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2013) ([T]o defeat summary judgment . . . the plaintiff is not required to show that the employer's proffered reasons were false or played no role in the employment decision, but only that they were not the only reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of the motivating factors. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). It is not necessary to resolve this issue. While it is unclear whether McDonnell Douglas continues to apply to NYCHRL claims and, if so, to what extent it applies, the question is also less important because the NYCHRL simplified the discrimination inquiry: the plaintiff need only show that her employer treated her less well, at least in part for a discriminatory reason. The employer may present evidence of its legitimate, non-discriminatory motives to show the conduct was not caused by discrimination, but it is entitled to summary judgment on this basis only if the record establishes as a matter of law that discrimination play[ed] no role in its actions. Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 38, 40 n.27 (1st Dep't 2009); see also Furfero v. St. John's Univ., 941 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (2d Dep't 2012) (citing Bennett, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 124). - 20 - of discrimination would consider 'petty slights and trivial inconveniences.' Id. at 41 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)). As with most affirmative defenses, the employer has the burden of proving the conduct's triviality under the NYCHRL. See Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp. Inc. v. Galadari, 777 F.2d 877, 880 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Blunt v. Barrett, 124 N.Y. 117, 119 (1891)) (The party asserting an affirmative defense usually has the burden of proving it.). The employer may prevail on summary judgment if it shows that a reasonable jury could conclude only that the conduct amounted to no more than a petty slight. Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 41. Thus, courts may still dismiss truly insubstantial cases, where the defense is clear as a matter of law. Id. In evaluating both the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's affirmative defense, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances. Hernandez, 957 N.Y.S.2d at 59. [T]he overall context in which [the challenged conduct occurs] cannot be ignored. Id. Even a single comment that objectifies women . . . made in circumstances where that comment would, for example, signal views about - 21 - the role of women in the workplace [may] be actionable. Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 41 n.30. Although the First Department has observed that a jury is often best suited to make this determination, id. at 41, we note that summary judgment still can be an appropriate mechanism for resolving NYCHRL claims. Even in this context, summary judgment remains an integral part of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). The Restoration Act cannot, as a procedural matter, limit our interpretation of Rule 56. See Com/Tech Commc'n Techs., Inc. v. Wireless Data Sys., Inc., 163 F.3d 149, 150-51 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) ([W]here the matter in question is one covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 'it is settled that . . . the Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary state law.' (omission in original) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996))). While the New York City Council may provide a different substantive standard to be applied to - 22 - particular claims in federal court, the same federal procedural rules apply. See, e.g., id. at 150 (Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.  (internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, even New York courts continue to grant and affirm the granting of summary judgment dismissing NYCHRL claims. See, e.g., Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 946 N.Y.S.2d 27, 44 (1st Dep't 2012) ([E]ven after the passage of the [Restoration Act], not every plaintiff asserting a discrimination claim will be entitled to reach a jury . . . .); Bennett, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 123-25 (affirming grant of summary judgment); Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 42 (same). Accordingly, district courts may still grant summary judgment with respect to NYCHRL claims if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding plaintiff's claim and the employer's affirmative defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
Section 8-107(7) of the NYCHRL prohibits employers from retaliat[ing] or discriminat[ing] in any manner - 23 - against any person because such person has . . . opposed any practice forbidden under this chapter. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7). The Restoration Act amended this section to further provide: The retaliation or discrimination complained of under this subdivision need not result in an ultimate action with respect to employment, . . . or in a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment, . . . provided, however, that the retaliatory or discriminatory act or acts complained of must be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity. Restoration Act § 3 (amending N.Y.C. Admi n. Code § 8-107(7)). Thus, to prevail on a retaliation claim under the NYCHRL, the plaintiff must show that she took an action opposing her employer's discrimination , see Albunio, 16 N.Y.3d at 479, and that, as a result, the employer engaged in conduct that was reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in such action, see Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 33-34. In accordance with the Restoration Act's rules of construction, New York courts have broadly interpreted the - 24 - NYCHRL's retaliation provisions. See, e.g., Albunio, 16 N.Y.3d at 477-78. The New York Court of Appeals has held that oppos[ing] any practice can include situations where a person, before the retaliatory conduct occurred, merely made clear her disapproval of [the defendant's] discrimination by communicating to [him], in substance, that she thought [his] treatment of [the victim] was wrong. Id. at 479. Similarly, the First Department has held that no challenged conduct may be deemed nonretaliatory unless a jury could not reasonably conclude from the evidence that such conduct was . . . 'reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity.' Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 34. This assessment [should] be made with a keen sense of workplace realities, of the fact that the 'chilling effect' of particular conduct is context - dependent, and of the fact that a jury is generally best suited to evaluate the impact of retaliatory conduct. Id.