Opinion ID: 1801779
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The trial court was in error in refusing to grant jury instructions D4, D6, D10, & D11.

Text: There is no merit to the argument of Givens that the trial court was in error in refusing to grant jury instructions D-4, D-6, D-10 and D-11. Only instruction D-10 warrants discussion. As to the refusal of the trial court to grant circumstantial evidence instruction D-10, often referred to as the two-theory instruction, we hold that no error resulted. The resolution of this assignment of error turns on whether there was any direct evidence supporting the State's case  if so, then the instructions were properly refused. Keys v. State, 478 So.2d 266 (Miss. 1985) provides a detailed discussion by this Court on the giving of circumstantial evidence instructions. This Court stated: A correct statement is that the instruction must be given only where the prosecution is without a confession and wholly without eye witnesses to the gravamen of the offense charged. The least inadequate definition we can provide is that circumstantial evidence is evidence which, without going directly to prove the existence of a fact, gives rise to logical inference that such fact does exist. Conversely, eye witness testimony is thought of as direct evidence. 478 So.2d at 267-68. (emphasis added). Givens claims that the State's case was purely circumstantial and thus the trial court erred in refusing an instruction on circumstantial evidence. In support, Givens cites the following passage from Henderson v. State, 453 So.2d 708, 710 (Miss. 1984): In this case the trial court erred in refusing to give these two instructions on circumstantial evidence. Where all the evidence tending to prove the guilt of the defendant is circumstantial, the trial court must grant a jury instruction that every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt must be excluded in order to convict. Sanders v. State, 286 So.2d 825, 828 (Miss. 1973); Matula v. State, 220 So.2d 833, 836 (Miss. 1969). Also where the evidence is purely circumstantial, the trial court must grant a two-theory instruction such as D-6. Johnson v. State, 347 So.2d 358, 360 (Miss. 1977); Nester v. State, 254 Miss. 25, 29, 179 So.2d 565, 566 (1965). The two-theory instruction spoken of in Henderson is an almost verbatim reproduction of jury instruction D-10, refused in the case at bar. Herein, if there was any direct evidence supporting the State's case, then the instruction was properly refused; if not, such refusal constitutes reversible error. The record reveals testimony by Officer Leonard that he observed Mr. Givens throw a bag down to the surface, to the ground. He identified the bag containing the cocaine as the item that I saw Mr. Givens throw to the ground, that I transported to the station, and Officer Coon and I sealed it in the evidence bag. Officer Leonard admitted on cross-examination that he could not see the contents of the bag that Givens threw down, that he momentarily lost sight of the bag, and that he had not searched the ground around Givens at any point previously. No fingerprints were found on the bag. As a result, Givens contends that this was purely a circumstantial evidence case. However, unlike the situations in Burnham v. State, 467 So.2d 946 (Miss. 1985), and Henderson v. State, 453 So.2d 708 (Miss. 1984), there remains direct evidence placing the controlled substance within the physical possession of Givens  the testimony of Officer Leonard. A case factually similar to the case at bar is Hicks v. State, 580 So.2d 1302 (Miss. 1991). As in this case, Hicks threw down a film canister containing narcotics and a police officer witnessed the act. Hicks' request for a constructive possession instruction was refused by the trial court which stated, [T]here is clear evidence establishing actual possession by Hicks from the testimony of the detective, who actually saw Hicks with the canister ... Id. at 1306. Similarly, there is direct evidence of actual possession in the present case. Officer Leonard testified that he saw, at a distance of about 25 feet, a plastic bag leave Givens' hand and travel to the ground, where it was immediately seized in an area close to Givens. Although the general area was littered and crowded, Leonard stated that no other plastic bags were found in the immediate area, nor were there any plastic cups. The defendant emphasizes that Officer Leonard stated he was unable to see the contents of the bag that Givens threw down, that he momentarily lost sight of the bag, and he had not searched the ground around Givens at any point previously. In particular, the defendant is concerned with a statement made by Officer Leonard that he lost sight of the plastic bag for an instant after it left Givens' hand and traveled to the ground. A detailed examination reveals the statement of the facts given in Hicks is essential for comparison purposes with the case at bar. When the investigation did not materialize in this area, the detectives moved the investigation to the corner of Booker and Harrison Streets. Detective Isles noticed that Hicks was clutching a small black item which he suddenly pitched across the ditch toward a telephone pole. The item land [sic] between the telephone pole and a guide wire. Detective Isles was about 100 feet from where Hicks threw the black item. Detective Isles approached Hicks and asked him to place his hands on the patrol car. Detective Isles then asked the other detectives... to watch Hicks while he returned to the spot where he saw Hicks pitch the black item. Detective Hicks retrieved a small black film canister; it was the only item there except for a soft drink can. The grass in the area was not overgrown. Detective Isles further testified that during drug raids through the area, it was routine to find stashes of drugs in weeds, under bricks, in tree limbs, under car tires, and other locations without knowledge to whom the drugs belonged. 580 So.2d at 1303. We would submit that the arresting officer in Hicks could not have kept his eyes directly trained on the canister thrown 100 feet away from him, while also approaching and detaining Hicks at the patrol car and then walking across the street to retrieve the item. Note also that in the case at bar, Officer Leonard was only 25-45 feet away when he first saw Givens toss the plastic bag. Further, it is even less likely that the officer in Hicks could have seen through a black film canister to know drugs were inside, or that he had searched the area previously since the surveillance was not originally scheduled to take place in the area where the drugs were found. The facts as stated in Hicks and in the present case are nearly identical, as should be the result; the trial court correctly refused to grant Givens' requested instructions, as did the lower court in Hicks. This Court has emphasized the general rule is that all instructions must be supported by the evidence. Where an instruction is not supported by the evidence then it should not be given. Hicks, 580 So.2d at 1306, citing Dennis v. State, 555 So.2d 679, 683 (Miss. 1989); Moffett v. State, 540 So.2d 1313 (Miss. 1988); Nicolaou v. State, 534 So.2d 168 (Miss. 1988). Further, [g]ranting instructions not supported by evidence is error. Hicks, 580 So.2d at 1306; Lancaster v. State, 472 So.2d 363, 365 (Miss. 1985). Further, in King v. State, 315 So.2d 925 (Miss. 1975), this Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant the two-theory instruction and another circumstantial evidence instruction where an eyewitness testified to the shooting in a manslaughter case. This Court noted the importance of eyewitness testimony: The appellant's conviction did not rest upon circumstantial evidence. There was an eyewitness to the shooting who testified in great detail as to what happened. The credibility of the witness and the weight and worth to be given his testimony was for the jury to decide. The verdict is evidence that the jury believed the eyewitness and not the appellant, which they had a right to do. Id. at 926. Givens admitted that he had been drinking beer practically all night. Givens further stated that Officer Leonard pulled a gun on the crowd, telling everyone to get back. Yet the officers and Givens' own eyewitnesses stated simply that Officer Leonard unsnapped his holster. The jury may have considered all these facts during its deliberations and weighed them (taking credibility issues into account) against Givens. This Court has held a trial court is not required to give, nor is a defendant entitled to receive, circumstantial evidence instructions where direct evidence of a crime is presented. See Deal v. State, 589 So.2d 1257 (Miss. 1991); Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1991); King v. State, 580 So.2d 1182 (Miss. 1991); Sudduth v. State, 562 So.2d 67 (Miss. 1990); Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418 (Miss. 1988), certiorari denied 490 U.S. 1028, 109 S.Ct. 1767, 104 L.Ed.2d 202, rehearing denied 490 U.S. 1117, 109 S.Ct. 3179, 104 L.Ed.2d 1041; Boches v. State, 506 So.2d 254 (Miss. 1987). We find that the trial court's refusal to grant the circumstantial evidence instruction requested by Givens was clearly correct in view of the eyewitness testimony of Officer Leonard and substantial supporting testimony of Officer Jones.