Opinion ID: 150737
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pugh’s Statements

Text: Pugh argues that the district court erroneously failed to suppress his postarrest statements for four reasons: (1) the federal officers violated his Sixth Amendment rights by questioning him after he asked for a lawyer; (2) the federal officers did not present him in a timely fashion to a judicial officer; (3) the federal officers used appeals to religion to secure a confession; and (4) the totality of the circumstances justified suppression. 4 Whitmore makes much of the fact that one of the on-scene officers testified that he did not believe the police had probable cause to arrest her. Nonetheless, we have previously held that “the mere subjective sentiment of the arresting officer or person” is not dispositive in determining the legality of an arrest. United States v. Sealed Juvenile 1, 255 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 2001). 7 Case: 09-60400 Document: 00511174536 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/15/2010 No. 09-60400 First, Pugh claims that his oblique statements to officers suggesting he desired counsel were sufficient to trigger his Sixth Amendment rights. Specifically, Pugh argues that he invoked his right to counsel by asking “how he could go about getting a court appointed attorney . . . .” Pugh’s argument is unavailing. Under Miranda, a “suspect must unambiguously request counsel.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, No. 08-1470, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4379, at -20 (June 1, 2010) (reaffirming that a suspect must “unambiguously” invoke the Miranda right to counsel and extending that principle to the Miranda right to remain silent). Consequently, the district court did not err in refusing to suppress Pugh’s statements as he did not unequivocally invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Next, Pugh claims the district court was obliged to suppress his statements because he was not timely presented before a judicial officer. In total, Pugh was held in custody for six days before appearing before a federal magistrate judge. The Supreme Court has held that post-arrest statements obtained outside the six-hour safe harbor created by 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) should be suppressed where the delay was unreasonable or unnecessary. Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1571 (2009). However, this obligation does not arise until a defendant is subject to a federal arrest. “Until a person is arrested or detained for a federal crime, there is no duty, obligation, or reason to bring him before a judicial officer ‘empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States . . . .’” United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 358 (1994). Pugh was arrested by state officers for a state offense. Further, Pugh has not offered any evidence to suggest state officials acted in collusion with federal officials with an aim of depriving him of the right of timely presentment. As such, Pugh has not demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to timely presentment on the federal charges at issue. 8 Case: 09-60400 Document: 00511174536 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/15/2010 No. 09-60400 Third, Pugh claims that his statements should have been suppressed because the interrogating officers made appeals to his religious beliefs. But an interrogating officer’s mere reference to religious beliefs does not alone invalidate a confession. Pugh’s reliance on Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), to claim otherwise is misplaced. Brewer, as recognized by this court in United States v. Dougall, 919 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1990), concerned the use of religious beliefs to disregard a defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 400-01 (discussing the “Christian burial speech” as a surreptitious interrogation). Pugh never invoked his right to counsel and all available evidence suggests his statements were voluntarily given. As such, the officers’ appeals to religious beliefs do not render his statements inadmissible. Finally, Pugh claims the totality of the circumstances surrounding his interrogation require suppression of his statements. None of the evidence cited by Pugh suggests officers employed coercion so as to make Pugh’s statements involuntary. As such, the district court did not err in denying Pugh’s motion to suppress his post-arrest statements.