Opinion ID: 2582855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Legality of the Search

Text: The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searchesit merely prohibits those that are unreasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360, 88 S.Ct. 507). Using reasonableness as the gauge, a search is reasonable when officers have obtained valid consent to conduct the search because the defendant has chosen to waive his Fourth Amendment protections. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)); Najjar, 984 P.2d at 596 ([C]onsensual searches have long been approved because `it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.' (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801)). Hence, we first address the authority of the defendant, who was the driver but not the owner of the vehicle, to consent to the search. Proper consent can come from any individual with common authority over the area or item searched, with the burden of proving such authority resting with the state. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793. The Supreme Court's analysis considers whether the person giving consent possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). Multiple circuits have applied this logic to vehicle cases in which the driver, who has common authority and a sufficient relationship with the vehicle, consents to a search. United States v. Morales, 861 F.2d 396, 399 (3d Cir.1988) ([A] driver of a vehicle has the authority to consent to a search of that vehicle.); United States v. Eldridge, 984 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Dunkley, 911 F.2d 522, 526 (11th Cir.1990). Here, we endorse this reasoning and hold that a driver with control over a vehicle possesses the authority to consent to a search of the vehicle even when the car owner is present as a passenger. We next review the scope of Minor's consent, objectively asking what a reasonable officer would conclude are the parameters of Minor's general consent. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801. In Jimeno, the Supreme Court addressed a similar question when it ruled that the search of a closed container in a vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment after the defendant had consented to a general search of the vehicle. Id. at 249, 111 S.Ct. 1801. In that case, a police officer pulled over the defendant on a traffic stop. Id. Based on an overheard conversation, the officer had reason to believe that the defendant was involved in illegal drug trafficking, a fact the officer relayed to the defendant before asking permission to search the vehicle. Id. The defendant declared that he had nothing to hide and consented to a search without voicing any limitations. Id. The Court interpreted this as a general consent to search the entire vehicle, including containers, despite drugs being the implicit object of the search. Id. Specifically, the Court employed the objective reasonableness standard to reach its decision, concluding that: We think that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container. Id. at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801. Upon executing the search in Jimeno, the officer found a folded, closed, brown paper bag on the floor, which contained a kilogram of cocaine. Id. Although the Court noted that further consent would probably have been necessary to open a locked container or briefcase, the Court explicitly refused to require a separate and distinct consent for every container found within the area of the search if the container could reasonably hold the object of the search. Id. at 252, 111 S.Ct. 1801. Indeed, we agree with the Jimeno Court's distinction between containers requiring force to open, such as locked briefcases, and items that are merely closed, like folded paper bags, because it would be unreasonable to interpret one's general consent as authorizing the forcible destruction of property. Id. Thus, Jimeno held that it is reasonable to include in the search anything that represents a likely container for the implied object of the search so long as no forcible destruction of property is necessary to access its contents. See id. at 251-52, 111 S.Ct. 1801. Moreover, in rejecting the notion that individual consent is required for every container in a vehicle, the Court stated we see no basis for adding this sort of superstructure to the Fourth Amendment's basic test of objective reasonableness. Id. at 252, 111 S.Ct. 1801. Similarly, in Olivas, we upheld a search that produced marihuana hidden behind the loose panel of the driver's side door after the defendant consented to a general search of the vehicle. Olivas, 859 P.2d at 212-13. We noted that after an officer obtains general consent, it is reasonable for a police officer to believe that he may search areas of the automobile that extend beyond the passenger compartment and trunk if the facts and circumstances surrounding the search and investigation provide the officer with a sufficient basis to believe that contraband was hidden in those areas and the suspect fails to affirmatively limit the search away from those areas. Id. at 215-16; see also United States v. Deases, 918 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir.1990) (Consent to search a car means to search the entire car and whatever is in it, unless such consent is otherwise restricted.). Hence, the scope of a general search extends to any area that an objective officer could reasonably assume might hold the object of the search, including the trunk of a vehicle and unlocked containers therein. Here, the defendant provided general, unlimited consent to search the entire vehicle, knowing that illegal drugs were the implicit object of the search. A zippered but unlocked backpack in the trunk of a car is objectively a place where illegal substances could be stored. As Jimeno concluded, we find it unnecessary to add any superstructure to our Fourth Amendment analysis that would require specific consent to search individual containers when no forcible destruction of property is necessary to access their contents. Thus, the search of the backpack was objectively reasonable given the defendant's general, unlimited consent to search.