Opinion ID: 1217672
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Precedent Regarding Protection of Right Against Self-incrimination

Text: The Appellant contends that the prosecutor's comments violate the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution of West Virginia. [2] West Virginia Code § 57-3-6 (1923) (Repl.Vol.2005) [3] serves as further protection of the right against self-incrimination, providing that the failure of the defendant to testify cannot be the subject of comment before the court or jury. This Court has scrupulously protected a defendant's right to remain silent. State v. Murray, 220 W.Va. 735, 739, 649 S.E.2d 509, 513 (2007). We have also consistently held that [f]ailure to observe a constitutional right constitutes reversible error unless it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Syl. Pt. 5, State ex rel. Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647, 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975). [4] The sanctity of the right against self-incrimination has been extensively addressed by this Court. In State v. Taylor, 57 W.Va. 228, 50 S.E. 247 (1905), for instance, this Court explained that the rule has its origin in the principle that the law, having brought the prisoner into court against his will, did not permit his silence to be treated or used as evidence against him. 57 W.Va. at 235, 50 S.E. at 249. In State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234, 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977), this Court examined the rule and explained its premise as follows: The basis for the rule prohibiting the use of the defendant's silence against him is that it runs counter to the presumption of innocence that follows the defendant throughout the trial. It is this presumption of innocence which blocks any attempt of the State to infer from the silence of the defendant that such silence is motivated by guilt rather than the innocence which the law presumes. 160 W.Va. at 240, 233 S.E.2d at 716. The analysis of alleged impermissible prosecutorial comments on a defendant's failure to testify proceeds according to the precepts announced in syllabus point six of State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388, 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995), as follows: Four factors are taken into account in determining whether improper prosecutorial comment is so damaging as to require reversal: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters. This Court has been presented with numerous factual situations in which the remarks of a prosecutor were alleged to be impermissible. For example, in State v. Noe, 160 W.Va. 10, 230 S.E.2d 826 (1976), overruled on other grounds by State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995), the prosecutor observed as follows during closing: Now, Freddie Joe Noe can't have his cake and eat it too. Now, you've either got an alibi or you don't. 160 W.Va. at 18, 230 S.E.2d at 831. This Court evaluated the prosecutor's comments on appeal, reasoning that by inference, it comments on his failure to explain how his fingerprints got on the pane of glass. Id. This Court reversed the conviction and held as follows in syllabus point three of Noe: It is prejudicial error in a criminal case for the prosecutor to make statements in final argument amounting to a comment on the failure of the defendant to testify. The Noe Court further explained its determination, as follows: We recognize that a certain latitude must be given to an attorney either for the defense or for the prosecution in final argument. We are aware that the intensity of the moment may be productive of language which is intemperate or overdrawn. However, this can never justify disregard for constitutional and statutory guarantees either directly or by inference or innuendo. Id. In State v. Green, 163 W.Va. 681, 260 S.E.2d 257 (1979), the prosecutor stated as follows in closing argument: None of those facts are in dispute. No one said those things didn't take place. . . . 163 W.Va. at 695, 260 S.E.2d at 265. The prosecutor continued: You know, there is one thing I know which has been hidden in this case. . . . If Fred Muth [defense counsel] can think of one reason, one lousy little reason at all why this girl would turn a finger at his client sitting over there, other than the fact that he committed this crime, he would tell you what it was. . . . There is a motive, you know what it is, I know what it is, everybody knows what it is. It is because he did it. Whether he hangs his head there and won't look at you or not, he did it, and there is no one in this Court Room that ever said he didn't do it. . . . Id. Reversing the conviction on appeal, this Court explained that the remarks by the prosecution amounted to specific reference to Green's failure to testify. Id. In syllabus point five of Green, this Court reiterated: Remarks made by the State's attorney in closing argument which make specific reference to the defendant's failure to testify, constitute reversible error and defendant is entitled to a new trial. This Court again evaluated a remark which allegedly referenced the defendant's failure to testify in State v. Nuckolls, 166 W.Va. 259, 273 S.E.2d 87 (1980). This Court reversed the Appellant's conviction based upon the following comments made by the prosecuting attorney in closing: If Lucille Nuckolls hadn't killed her husband that night we wouldn't be here. I haven't seen her, you haven't seen her, nobody in the Court Room has seen her. She is a person of mystery. No one has seen her. Did any one of the psychiatrists tell you this was catatonic schizophrenia? Catatonic is when you sit and stare with no expression at all. Don't say anything, you don't do anything, and it is also a way to snow people. It is a way to get in here and act and behave so that you say, Why look at her. She is not paying any attention. She didn't do this, she didn't do that. It is what the psychiatrists told you when she took her examination didn't they? I want to know what was in Lucille Nuckolls' mind when she killed her husband. 166 W.Va. at 262, 273 S.E.2d at 89. In rendering its decision, the Nuckolls Court discussed whether or not the statement constituted a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. This Court noted that while the comments were ostensibly directed at the defendant's insanity defense, they clearly amounted to a comment upon the failure of the defendant to testify. Id.; see also State v. Starcher, 168 W.Va. 144, 145, 282 S.E.2d 877, 878 (1981) (finding prejudicial prosecutor's comment that defendant is the only man that knows what was in his mind at the time of drug transfer). In State v. Clark, 170 W.Va. 224, 292 S.E.2d 643 (1982), this Court examined a statement by the prosecutor which allegedly constituted an impermissible comment on the defendant's failure to testify. After providing a litany of the State's evidence, the prosecutor remarked: So, he [the officer] told you, ladies and gentlemen, that that is the way it was. There is no evidence to contradict that. There is no evidence to contradict what the defendant said there in the living room so we have to take that as what he said. 170 W.Va. at 226, 292 S.E.2d at 646. In this Court's evaluation of the impact of that comment, we observed the established rule that in order to find the comment impermissible, the reviewing court must find that the language used was manifestly intended to be, or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a reminder that the defendant did not testify. This Court reasoned as follows: A prosecutor's statement that the evidence is uncontradicted does not naturally and necessarily mean the jury will take it as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. In many instances someone other than the defendant could have contradicted the government's evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Lipton, 467 F.2d 1161 (2nd Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927, 93 S.Ct. 1358, 35 L.Ed.2d 587 (1973). It is only in those cases where the defendant alone could possibly contradict the government's testimony that remarks concerning lack of contradiction have been held forbidden. 170 W.Va. at 227, 292 S.E.2d at 647. The Clark Court ultimately concluded that no error had been committed by the comments, explaining that the remark, when read in context, was not manifestly intended to be, nor was it of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. Id. at 228, 292 S.E.2d at 648. Furthermore, the Clark Court noted that [t]his is not a case where the jury's attention was focused on defendant's failure to testify because he alone could contradict the government's evidence. Id. A similar method of analysis was utilized in State v. Bennett, 172 W.Va. 131, 304 S.E.2d 35 (1983), wherein this Court focused upon the pivotal fact that the defendant was the only person who could have denied the drug offense. Thus, in the prosecution for an alleged delivery of a controlled substance, the prosecutor's repeated reminders that the State's evidence had not been denied could only have been referring to the defendant's absence of denial. This Court reversed the conviction, finding that the prosecuting attorney's remarks constituted an impermissible comment upon the defendant's failure to testify, since the defendant was the only one who could have denied the drug offense. The Court explained as follows: This Court has permitted prosecutorial statements that did not specifically refer to the defendant's failure to testify. See State v. Clark, 170 W.Va. 224, 292 S.E.2d 643 (1982); State v. McClure, 163 W.Va. 33, 253 S.E.2d 555 (1979); State v. Simon, 132 W.Va. 322, 52 S.E.2d 725 (1949). However, those cases involved isolated remarks that certain evidence was uncontradicted, unlike the argument here which repeatedly emphasized the absence of refutation by the defense. Further, the prosecutor's statements that no one had denied that appellant sold the drugs amounted to an impermissible comment on the appellant's failure to testify, since appellant was the only one who could have denied it. 172 W.Va. at 134, 304 S.E.2d at 39; see also U.S. v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 1996), cert denied, Cotnam v. U.S., 519 U.S. 942, 117 S.Ct. 326, 136 L.Ed.2d 240 (holding that prosecutor's comment that regarding uncontradicted, undenied, unrebutted, or undisputed evidence is considered violative of Fifth Amendment rights if only person who could have contradicted, denied, rebutted or disputed the evidence was the defendant himself); Mannarino v. State, 869 So.2d 650 (Fla.App.2004) (holding that comment on absence of explanation, as well as insufficiency of girlfriend's explanation, for defendant's possession of stolen credit cards was not harmless error since defendant was only person other than his girlfriend who could have explained the possession of the credit cards); Dean v. State, 690 So.2d 720 (Fla.App.1997) (holding that comment on defendant's failure to explain why he had been traveling under assumed name was susceptible to interpretation as comment on right to remain silent and not harmless where defendant was only person who could have testified about issue). [5] This Court again addressed a comment allegedly violative of the Fifth Amendment right in State v. Swafford, 206 W.Va. 390, 524 S.E.2d 906 (1999). In that case, the prosecuting attorney stated as follows in closing argument: But for Walter Swafford and Mark Yoney, Joseph Hundley would be alive today. You didn't hear from Joseph Hundley from that witness stand. That's why the testimony of those girls was important. Where would the State have been in this case if those girls had a good lawyer like Mike Gallaher [defense counsel] and they had said, `We ain't telling you nothing. We don't'`We got our constitutional rights. We ain't telling you nothing.' Where would we be? Where would we be? All five of them would be walking the street, wouldn't they? 206 W.Va. at 393, 524 S.E.2d at 909. In reversing the conviction in Swafford, this Court explained: The general rule formulated for ascertaining whether a prosecutor's comment is an impermissible reference, direct or oblique, to the silence of the accused is whether the language used was manifestly intended to be, or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a reminder that the defendant did not testify. 206 W.Va. at 393-94, 524 S.E.2d at 909-10 (quoting Clark, 170 W.Va. at 227, 292 S.E.2d at 646-47.) In State v. Sprague, 214 W.Va. 471, 590 S.E.2d 664 (2003), the prosecuting attorney asserted as follows in closing argument: Now there's been a lot of talk and I do want to talk to you about venue. The Defendant, as you have noted, as you've seen from this trial, has not contradicted any of the State's evidence or any of the State's testimony basically about the events that occurred at Sta[ ]dard Hall. 214 W.Va. at 474, 590 S.E.2d at 667. In evaluating the comments and reversing the conviction, this Court stated that no matter what the intention of the prosecutor was, the prosecutor's comments necessarily served to accentuate and highlight the fact that the appellant sat silently without taking the stand, and no matter how harmless the intent, the remarks plainly amount to comment on the appellant's choice not to testify. Id.