Opinion ID: 6340652
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Question to be Decided

Text: Defendants insist that we should not reach the constitutional question presented in this case. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs waived any informational privacy claims by not pursuing the theory below and not raising it in their opening brief. Yet, Defendants raised informational privacy to the district court, the district court’s opinion reached the issue, and the parties have squarely addressed informational privacy on appeal. We therefore take the opportunity to clarify the confusion caused by Gonzalez. B. Gonzalez Did Not Identify a Constitutional Right Gonzalez did not recognize a per se constitutional right in juvenile records that is always violated by third-party access. The decision contains a limited discussion of the constitutional question: 8 A.C. V. CORTEZ If Spencer violated Gonzalez’s constitutional rights, he is entitled to at least nominal damages, even if Spencer could have obtained the documents lawfully. Because Spencer improperly obtained access to Gonzalez’s juvenile court file, we need not reach the question whether Spencer’s use of Gonzalez’s file in depositions also violated his constitutional rights. . . . Spencer is not entitled to qualified immunity. 336 F.3d at 835 (citation omitted). Gonzalez has been characterized as “opaque.” Nunes, 983 F.3d at 1114. Most of the district courts to consider the issue have concluded that Gonzalez did not recognize a constitutional right to privacy in juvenile records per se. E.g., Rigsby v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV-11-02766, 2011 WL 13143544, at  (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2011), aff’d, 531 F. App’x 811 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Nunes, 983 F.3d at 1113 (discussing cases). Gonzalez mentioned neither the Constitution nor any federal law in the relevant part of the opinion. As we noted in Nunes, “[s]uch an opinion, which leaves fundamental questions unanswered about the origin, nature, and scope of the right at issue, cannot place the constitutional issue ‘beyond debate.’” 983 F.3d at 1114. We conclude that Gonzalez cannot be viewed as identifying a constitutional right for qualified immunity purposes or otherwise. The quoted passage in Gonzalez at most assumed that there was some existing constitutional right to privacy in A.C. V. CORTEZ 9 juvenile records. See 336 F.3d at 839 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (noting that the issue was only whether Gonzalez had a “federal constitutional right of privacy based on a settled expectation arising out of state law”). We need not try to excavate further the intent behind the “opaque” passage in Gonzalez. It is sufficient to resolve that Plaintiffs cannot rely on Gonzalez for the existence of a per se constitutional right. Because we hold that Gonzalez did not identify a specific constitutional right in the first place, en banc review is not necessary to ensure the uniformity of our decisions, as Plaintiffs request. Fed. R. App. P. 35. C. Applying Informational Privacy to Juvenile Records “[F]ederal constitutional law recognizes a ‘right to informational privacy’ stemming from ‘the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’” Endy v. County of Los Angeles, 975 F.3d 757, 768 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999)). That said, the right “is not absolute; rather, it is a conditional right which may be infringed upon a showing of proper governmental interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Our balancing test to determine whether the government’s right to infringe outweighs the individual’s privacy interest considers: “(1) the type of information requested, (2) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, (3) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, (4) the degree of need for access, and (5) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward access.” Seaton, 610 F.3d at 539 (quoting Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). California’s definition of juvenile records is broad, including “records, or reports relating to” those prepared by 10 A.C. V. CORTEZ child welfare workers, the contents of which vary dramatically. Cal. R. Ct. 5.552(a). In its early stages, a social worker’s child-abuse file might contain only relatively innocuous biographical data and academic records. Eventually, however, it would not be unusual for such a file to contain intimate details that families would not share with strangers, including medical diagnoses, reports of abuse, substance-abuse treatment records, and the like. Thus, although courts may assume that juvenile records contain personal matters, an individualized determination will be required at the threshold stage to determine whether a particular file contains such information. We apply the standard informational privacy balancing test to minors. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 785, 789–90 (9th Cir. 2002). D. No Informational Privacy Violation Here The district court applied the five-factor balancing test articulated in Seaton, 610 F.3d at 593, and found no violation of Plaintiffs’ right to informational privacy. The court’s conclusion is sound. As to the first factor, the type of information requested, Plaintiffs contend that the files contained their medical, psychological, and psychiatric records, and we presume that the files contain at least some highly sensitive information. The second factor, the potential for harm, is unclear but seems low, as it has been years since the information was accessed, and it has not been used in the underlying lawsuit (about social workers interviewing Plaintiffs without consent) or in any other proceeding. The third factor, safeguards against misuse, helps assuage any concerns about harm because Plaintiffs allege only that the County’s attorneys accessed the files. Attorneys have a duty to keep their clients’ files confidential, and a “statutory or regulatory A.C. V. CORTEZ 11 duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures generally allays privacy concerns.” NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 155 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The next factor, the need for access, is the most crucial in this case, because that need is high. The County’s attorneys have a duty to represent their client, and they concluded that adequate representation required their reviewing the files. This situation is analogous to the concept of litigation waiver in other areas of the law: where a Plaintiff puts a particular subject at issue, such that lawyers and courts will need to examine records to investigate the claim, Plaintiffs’ privacy rights and expectations may be diminished or extinguished. 2 See, e.g., Vinson v. Superior Ct., 740 P.2d 404, 410–11 (Cal. 1987). We emphasize that Plaintiffs’ 2017 suit pertained to how County employees conducted themselves with respect to the juveniles, thus giving rise to the attorneys’ need to access the juveniles’ files. Our decision should not be misunderstood as holding that, whenever someone sues the County on any topic, its attorneys necessarily may access the Plaintiff’s juvenile file. The last factor, policies pertaining to access, is somewhat unclear. Defendants argue that there is such a policy because a state regulation provides that, when someone sues the county, social services agencies shall give county attorneys all files related to the Plaintiff. Cal. Dept. of Soc. Servs. Manual of Policies & Procs. § 19-004.5. On the other hand, California Welfare & Institutions Code § 827 requires a court order to access juvenile files, and it seems that the 2 Indeed, this logic arguably could decide the case: Plaintiffs’ 2017 suit waived their privacy rights and expectations, at least with regard to the lawyers for the entity that they sued. 12 A.C. V. CORTEZ attorneys here do not fall under the “court personnel” exception. Ultimately, this state-law issue need not be decided definitively because the need for access is sufficiently high that it outweighs the lesser possibility of harm. Even assuming that the social workers’ records comprised sensitive medical and psychological records, there was no constitutional violation because the County’s need to access the records was high. Plaintiffs initiated that need, and the professional obligations that lawyers owe their clients minimize the risk of misuse, harassment, or embarrassment. Thus, the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ Monell claim. Because no amendment could save the complaint, the district court correctly denied leave to amend. Gompper, 298 F.3d at 898. AFFIRMED.