Opinion ID: 6342637
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Excited Utterance

Text: ¶ 26. Defendant next argues that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding a statement made by defendant after the shooting that tended to show that he did not intend to kill the victim. We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. State v. Kelley, 2016 VT 58, ¶ 19, 202 Vt. 174, 148 A.3d 191. We agree that the court applied the wrong legal standard in deciding whether to admit the evidence but conclude that the error was harmless. ¶ 27. Defendant and his cousin were close friends and lived together with their girlfriends. Defendant’s cousin’s girlfriend told police that defendant and his cousin had a phone conversation around 8:00 a.m. the morning of the shooting, during which defendant was crying. The cousin’s girlfriend overheard defendant tell his cousin that he felt horrible and did not know what really happened in the parking lot. The State objected to introduction of this statement, arguing that it was hearsay. The court sustained the objection, concluding that the statement did not meet the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule because it was made too long after the shooting. ¶ 28. The hearsay rule “prohibits the admission of out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Id. ¶ 25; see V.R.E. 801(c), 802. There is an exception to the hearsay rule for statements “relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” V.R.E. 803(2). Such 10 statements are referred to as excited utterances. Id. “The underlying rationale for the exception lies in the assumption that a person’s powers of reflection and fabrication will be suspended when [the person] is subject to the excitement of a startling event, and any utterances [the person] makes will be spontaneous and trustworthy.” In re Est. of Peters, 171 Vt. 381, 391, 765 A.2d 468, 476 (2000). ¶ 29. As our case law and the Reporter’s Notes to Rule 803(2) make clear, an excited utterance need not be contemporaneous with the startling event. See State v. Jackson, 2008 VT 71, ¶ 9, 184 Vt. 173, 956 A.2d 1126 (“A statement need not be made immediately after the startling event in order to qualify.”); State v. Shaw, 149 Vt. 275, 281, 542 A.2d 1106, 1109 (1987) (“[C]ontemporaneousness with the exciting event is not required for statements to be admissible as excited utterances.”); see also Reporter’s Notes, V.R.E. 803 (explaining that unlike presentsense-impression exception, excited-utterance exception “relies on the exciting quality of the event”). Instead, the “key inquiry” governing admissibility is the declarant’s excited condition, which must be caused by the startling event. Kelley, 2016 VT 58, ¶ 25. For example, in State v. Shaw we affirmed the application of the excited-utterance exception to statements made by the complainant in a sexual-assault case to her neighbors two or three hours after the event where the neighbors testified that the complainant was “shaking, pale, and hysterical,” and cried and trembled as she told them about the attack, because this evidence showed that the complainant was still under the stress of the exciting event. 149 Vt. at 279-80, 542 A.2d at 1108-09. ¶ 30. The trial court in this case concluded that defendant’s statement to his cousin did not qualify as an excited utterance because the statement was made hours after the shooting, reasoning that “the whole idea of excited utterances is there’s no time to reflect.” This was error because the court focused solely on the timing of the statement. The court instead should have considered whether defendant “provide[d] sufficient evidence for a preliminary determination that the declarant was still gripped by the exciting event.” State v. Verrinder, 161 Vt. 250, 257, 637 11 A.2d 1382, 1387 (1993). While timing was relevant to this inquiry, it was not necessarily determinative. See id. at 258, 637 A.2d at 1387 (affirming exclusion of defendant’s statement of remorse because exclusion was based on lapse of time between event and utterance, lack of foundation showing that defendant was under stress of excitement, and finding that content of statement showed contemplation). The court applied the wrong legal standard and therefore abused its discretion. See In re Essex Search Warrants, 2012 VT 92, ¶ 14, 192 Vt. 559, 60 A.3d 707 (“When a trial court commits an error of law, it is an abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted)); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (noting that trial court “would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law”). ¶ 31. Defendant argues that the error requires reversal of the verdict because the excluded statement would have provided crucial support for his version of events, which was that he fired a warning shot and was genuinely shocked and devastated when the bullet deflected and fatally struck the victim. He argues that the statement demonstrated that he did not intend to hit the victim, and that its exclusion deprived him of his due process right to present a defense. The State contends that the error was harmless because the excluded statement was cumulative to other testimony that was admitted. ¶ 32. “For an error to be harmless, this Court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict regardless of the error.” State v. Larkin, 2018 VT 16, ¶ 22, 206 Vt. 535, 183 A.3d 589 (quotation omitted); see V.R.Cr.P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”). In assessing this question, we consider the strength of the State’s case without the excluded evidence and the strength of the excluded evidence. State v. Haskins, 2016 VT 79, ¶ 17, 202 Vt. 461, 150 A.3d 202. ¶ 33. As discussed above, the State presented ample evidence to demonstrate that, even if defendant did not intend to kill the victim, he acted in wanton disregard of the likelihood that 12 the victim could be killed or severely injured when he fired the gun into the car where the victim was seated. In contrast, the excluded statement—that, three hours after the shooting, defendant “felt horrible and didn’t really know what happened”—was not obviously exculpatory. It did not indicate that someone else was to blame or give defendant an alibi. Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (holding that application of hearsay rule to exclude statements made by third party to three other individuals confessing to murder with which defendant was charged deprived defendant of fair trial under Due Process Clause). While the statement is somewhat supportive of the defense’s claim that defendant did not specifically intend to kill the victim when he fired the gun, and therefore might have undercut the prosecution’s theory of premeditated murder, the jury acquitted defendant of that charge. See State v. Charbonneau, 2009 VT 86, ¶ 16, 186 Vt. 583, 980 A.2d 279 (holding any error with regard to admission of testimony regarding “cycle of violence” in domestic-assault cases was harmless because it was primarily relevant to domestic-assault charge of which defendant was ultimately acquitted). The statement was not probative of whether defendant knowingly disregarded a deadly risk to the victim, the minimum intent required for second-degree murder. ¶ 34. Furthermore, defendant was able to elicit similar evidence during crossexamination of his former girlfriend. See Haskins, 2016 VT 79, ¶ 28 (explaining that in considering strength of excluded evidence, court may consider “whether it was cumulative or duplicative of other evidence” (quotation omitted)). Defendant’s girlfriend testified that after the shooting, defendant was crying and kept saying, “I fucked up” and that “he wasn’t sure if he hit him” and “he didn’t aim for him.” She also testified that defendant told her that the victim got out of the car and started screaming at him, that he shot at the car just to scare the victim, and that he did not see the victim but thought that the victim had ran around the back of his car. She further testified that once she moved down to Florida with defendant, he looked “[i]ll, sick, malnourished,” “pale,” “skinny,” and “unkempt.” Given the minimally probative nature of the 13 excluded statement and the similar testimony presented by defendant’s girlfriend, we are unable to conclude that the jury would have returned a different verdict if the statement had been admitt ed. ¶ 35. Defendant argues that he had to impeach his girlfriend with her prior sworn statement to make her admit that she told the police these things. He also argues that on re-direct, his girlfriend explained that defendant told her a lot of “different scenarios of what had happened that night,” which left her with the impression that “he was trying to convince himself of it.” He claims that her reluctant testimony was no substitute for his cousin’s girlfriend’s “straightforward” testimony about what he said a few hours after the shooting. However, the record shows that the cousin’s girlfriend was also subpoenaed, and on direct examination, testified that she did not overhear anything when defendant’s cousin was on the phone with defendant. On crossexamination, defense counsel had to impeach the cousin’s girlfriend with her prior inconsistent statement to get her to agree that she had overheard defendant’s conversation with his cousin. Because the two witnesses were fairly similar in terms of their attitude towards the defense, we are not persuaded that the admission of the cousin’s girlfriend’s similar testimony would have made a significantly different impact on the jury. For the same reason, we conclude that the exclusion of the statement did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.