Opinion ID: 2607357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: introduction of evidence in aggravation by the state

Text: The sentencing judge correctly concluded that the fact that the state was barred from requesting the death penalty did not foreclose the court's own ability to consider imposition of a death sentence. [4] However, in allowing the state to put on evidence in aggravation, the district court effectively allowed the prosecution to advocate a position inconsistent with its promise to recommend an indeterminate life sentence, the most lenient sentence possible for a conviction of First Degree Murder. Cf. State v. Little, 138 N.H. 657, 645 A.2d 665, 669-70 (1994) (prosecutor did not breach plea agreement for sentence recommendation by making agreed recommendation and also presenting evidence in aggravation because the judge possibly could have imposed a more lenient sentence than that suggested by the prosecution). In addition to aggressively cross-examining the defense witnesses testifying in mitigation, the state presented the following evidence in aggravation: (1) testimony that Lankford had been a disruptive inmate while incarcerated on death row; (2) testimony by an expert witness that, based on psychological examinations of Lankford, he was a poor candidate for rehabilitation; and (3) testimony that one of the victims, Captain Bravence, was a combat-trained marine who could not have been subdued by Mark Lankford without Bryan Lankford's assistance due to Captain Bravence's knowledge of self-defense which would be contrary to Bryan Lankford's version of events. In addition to the evidence itself the state made the following arguments based on the evidence: (1) that Lankford willingly participated in the murders and was not dominated by his older brother; (2) that Lankford was highly culpable because he had forged the Bravences' names to travelers' checks and credit card slips; (3) that Lankford was highly culpable because he made the arrangements for the two brothers to stay with a friend in Los Angeles after the murders; (4) that Lankford was manipulative, dishonest, and dangerous; (5) that the witnesses who testified on Lankford's behalf in mitigation were not credible; and (6) that the defense's expert witness' testimony about Lankford's psychological condition was unreliable. The state specifically argued in rebuttal against giving Lankford the most lenient treatment, despite the fact that the court had earlier ruled the state was obligated to recommend an indeterminate life sentence, the most lenient sentence available for the crimes for which Lankford had been convicted. At the outset of the resentencing proceeding, the district court instructed the prosecution that it had to walk a fine line in presenting evidence in aggravation while at the same time still bound to the original recommendation for an indeterminate life sentence. A review of the evidence and arguments indicates that the fine line was crossed many times. Allowing the state to make the arguments and introduce the evidence in aggravation to the extent that was done was reversible error, because it was so fundamentally at odds with the position the state was obligated to recommend that it amounted to a violation of the agreement. In this case the state was bound to a plea agreement for the minimum sentence that could be imposed. The evidence and arguments submitted by the state clearly called for a greater sentence. Lankford's suggestion that no evidence in aggravation could be introduced is more of a remedy than he is entitled to receive. The district court could exercise its powers under I.C.R. 32(f) to order additional investigation on the question of evidence in aggravation. The court could have required the prosecution to issue subpoenas, or issued subpoenas of its own and then questioned the witnesses. See I.R.E. 614. This would have allowed the court to consider the evidence for purposes of analyzing the statutory aggravating circumstances without involving the prosecution in the presentation of evidence in contravention of the plea agreement and the prohibition against vindictive prosecution. The sentences imposed are vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing with orders that the district court employ a procedure that does not involve the prosecution in the presentation of evidence in aggravation. [5] The remaining question is whether the sentencing judge should remain the sentencing judge on remand. So there can be no suggestion that the sentence ultimately imposed on remand, whatever it may be, is in any way a product of the residual effects of the state's submission of aggravating evidence and arguments, resentencing shall be by a judge who has not heard the evidence or arguments.