Opinion ID: 43721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reedy’s and Latoya’s EAJA claim

Text: Section 2412(d) authorizes a district court to award fees and expenses after making three findings: (1) the litigant opposing the United States must be a prevailing party; (2) the government's position must not have been substantially justified; and (3) there must be no circumstances that make an award against the government unjust. Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 765 (11th Cir. 1988), aff’d sub 8 nom. Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990). “The government’s position is substantially justified under EAJA when it has a “reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Id. at 767. “[T]his question is one which the district courts are better positioned to decide.” Id. (internal citation omitted). In making the determination, the district court may consider (1) the state at which the litigation was resolved; (2) views expressed by other courts on the merits; (3) the legal merits of the government's position; (4) the clarity of the governing law; (5) the foreseeable length and complexity of the litigation; and (6) the consistency of the government's position. Id. A party is deemed to have abandoned an issue that it includes in its statement of issues but does not address in its brief. See Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1519 n.1 (11th Cir. 1995). The only dispute Reedy and Latoya raise in this appeal is whether the Government’s position was substantially justified. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Reedy’s and Latoya’s motion because the Government’s position was substantially justified. At the time the Government moved the district court to modify the judgment to include the forfeiture order, it was not clear from the case law in this circuit whether Rule 36 was a proper vehicle for modifying a judgment to include an omitted forfeiture provision. Further, based on events that 9 unfolded in Pease’s criminal case, the Government had reason to believe that its position regarding the correction of the judgment was justified. Pease’s indictment included a forfeiture count, Pease’s plea agreement contained a forfeiture provision, and at the change of plea hearing the magistrate judge questioned Pease about his understanding of the forfeiture. At the sentencing hearing, the court and the Government again briefly addressed the forfeiture of Pease’s property, and defense counsel confirmed that he was not challenging the forfeiture. Because Pease never objected to the forfeiture of his property, the Government’s belief that Pease’s property had been forfeited was reasonable.