Opinion ID: 1841753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the jury verdict form requirement

Text: The verdict form requirement is contained in § 13-11-2(a), which provides that: If the jury finds the defendant guilty, it shall fix the punishment at death.... Section 13-11-2(c) recognizes the possibility that the jury may fail to agree on the fixing of the penalty of death, and provides that the court may declare a mistrial if such a contingency occurs. Section 13-11-3 provides for a sentence hearing if the jury finds the defendant guilty of a capital offense and fixes the punishment at death. The requirement that the jury fix the punishment at death if it finds the defendant guilty of a capital offense is in no way binding on the trial court as the final sentencing authority. This is made clear by the first sentence of § 13-11-4, wherein it is provided that, notwithstanding the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury..., the court, following the sentence hearing and after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, may sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole instead of death. As this Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, and the federal courts have all held, under Alabama's statute the trial court judge and not the jury is the sentencing authority. Jacobs (Jerry Wayne) v. State, 361 So.2d 640, 644 (Ala.1978) (In Alabama, the jury is not the body which finally determines which murderers must die and which must not.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S.Ct. 1034, 59 L.Ed.2d 83 (1979); Beck v. State, 365 So.2d 985, 1001 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd, 365 So.2d 1006 (Ala.1978), rev'd, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980); Evans v. Britton, 472 F.Supp. 707, 718 (S.D.Ala.1979), rev'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 400 [5th Cir. 1980]. While the jury is not the final sentencing authority under the capital sentencing scheme set out in the statute, the requirement that the jury fix the punishment was deliberately included in the statute by the legislature. Applying the same principles of severability which we applied to the preclusion clause, we arrive at a different conclusion with regard to the jury verdict requirement. We cannot sever that clause, because we believe that the legislature intended to have jury input in the sentencing process. Throughout Alabama's history, juries have always played a major role in capital cases and we are not convinced that a state could constitutionally eliminate jury participation in the sentencing process, although the State argues otherwise as follows: Capital defendants are still arguing that Alabama's statute is unconstitutional because it does not provide for jury input into the sentencing decision, but all the precedents establish that jury participation in the sentencing process is not required. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 633 [98 S.Ct. 2954, 2975, 57 L.Ed.2d 973] (1978) (dissenting opinion of Rehnquist, J.); Richmond v. Arizona, 434 U.S. 1323 [98 S.Ct. 8, 54 L.Ed.2d 34] (1977) (opinion of Rehnquist, J., as Circuit Justice); Jacobs (Jerry Wayne) v. State, 361 So.2d 640, 646 (1978) (opinion of Torbert, C. J.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1122 [99 S.Ct. 1034, 59 L.Ed.2d 83] (1979); Beck v. State, 365 So.2d 985, 1001 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd. 365 So.2d 1006 (Ala.1978), rev'd on other grounds [447 U.S. 625], 100 S.Ct. 2382 [65 L.Ed.2d 392] (1980); State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 559, 250 N.W.2d 881, 888, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 [98 S.Ct. 231, 54 L.Ed.2d 158] (1977); State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 560 P.2d 41 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 [97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101] (1977); see, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 [96 S.Ct. 2960, 2966, 49 L.Ed.2d 913] (1976) (joint opinion) (`it has never been suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required'); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 [96 S.Ct. 2909, 2934, 49 L.Ed.2d 859] (1976) (joint opinion) (flaws in jury sentencing). The legislature has included jury participation in the sentencing scheme; therefore, we cannot judicially sever it even if it might not be required constitutionally. The next question is whether severance of the preclusion clause would make the verdict form requirement unconstitutional. The State thinks so. The Attorney General states: Without the preclusion clause, the verdict form requirement is unconstitutional. Absent preclusion, the apparently mandatory nature of the death penalty would lead at least some juries to exercise de facto sentencing discretion and cause them to improperly convict defendants who were actually guilty of capital offenses of nothing more than a lesser included offense. We agree with the Attorney General that if the jury is permitted to determine guilt at the same time it also is required to make its punishment decision, that the jury could use its power to decide guilt to make a de facto punishment decision. The solution to this problem cannot be effected by the elimination of the jury's participation in the sentencing process, but it can be effected by a bifurcation of the proceedings. As the Supreme Court noted in this case: ... [W]here guilt is determined separately from punishment, there is little risk that the jury will use its power to decide guilt to make a de facto punishment decision. Beck v. Ala., 447 U.S. at 641 n. 17, 100 S.Ct. at 2391 n. 17 (1980), quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2937, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.). Because the legislature has provided for jury participation in the sentencing scheme, before this jury participation can comport with constitutional requirements, certain procedures must be followed by the trial court. The statutory requirement that the jury shall fix the punishment at death if the jury finds the defendant guilty of a capital offense is mandatory in nature even though the jury is not the sentencing authority under Alabama's death penalty law, as we have already pointed out; however, the requirement that the jury mandatorily fix the punishment at death, even at a bifurcated proceeding, would be open to a constitutional challenge. The Attorney General recognizes this and wants the jury verdict requirement severed. To sever the jury verdict requirement, in our opinion, would not carry out legislative intent; however, since we conclude that the dominant intent of the legislature was to pass a constitutional death penalty law, we may now construe the requirement that the jury fix the penalty at death to be permissive instead of mandatory. By doing this we carry out legislative intent to pass a constitutional death penalty statute. Cf. Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242 (Miss.1976), cited in Beck v. Alabama, supra . We, therefore, construe the requirement in § 13-11-2(a), that the jury shall fix the punishment at death to be permissive and to mean that the jury cannot fix punishment at death until it takes into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensity of the offender, under sentencing procedures which will minimize the risk of an arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. The procedures we establish in this case are substantially those set out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Gregg v. Georgia, supra , wherein the Court noted that [j]ury sentencing has been considered desirable in capital cases ... and that ... a bifurcated system is more likely to insure elimination of the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman. In Gregg, the court said: While Furman did not hold that the infliction of the death penalty per se violates the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishments, it did recognize that the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice. Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. ... Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. It is certainly not a novel proposition that discretion in the area of sentencing be exercised in an informed manner. We have long recognized that [ f ] or the determination of sentences, justice generally requires ... that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender. Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 [58 S.Ct. 59, 60, 82 L.Ed. 43] (1937). See also Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 [79 S.Ct. 421, 426, 3 L.Ed.2d 516] (1959); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 [69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L.Ed. 1337] (1949). Otherwise, the system cannot function in a consistent and rational manner. ... If an experienced trial judge, who daily faces the difficult task of imposing sentences, has a vital need for accurate information about a defendant and the crime he committed in order to be able to impose a rational sentence in the typical criminal case, then accurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury of people who may never before have made a sentencing decision.