Opinion ID: 4562197
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Heading: Remedial Purpose of Implied Consent Statute

Text: Being licensed to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state is not a property right, but is merely a privilege subject to reasonable regulations under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. Peake, 375 S.C. at 595, 654 S.E.2d at 288. The implied consent laws are driven by public policy considerations. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Nelson, 364 S.C. 514, 522, 613 S.E.2d 544, 548 (Ct. App. 2005). One immediate purpose of the implied consent statute is to obtain the best evidence of a driver's blood alcohol content at the time when the arresting officer reasonably believes him to be driving under the influence. Leviner v. S.C. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 313 S.C. 409, 411, 438 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1993); see Skinner v. Sillas, 130 Cal. Rptr. 91, 95 (Ct. App. 1976) (stating the purpose of the statute is to take the test soon after arrest because alcohol in the blood system dissipates quickly). It also promotes traffic safety by expeditiously removing dangerous drivers from the public roadways in a summary civil procedure. See Nelson, 364 S.C. at 522, 613 S.E.2d at 548 (The State has a strong interest in maintaining safe highways and roads.); see also Krueger v. Fulton, 169 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Iowa 1969) (It is obvious the purpose of the Implied Consent Law is to reduce the holocaust on our highways part of which is due to the driver who imbibes too freely of intoxicating liquor. The civil license revocation provided for under the Implied Consent Act was intended to protect the public from the irresponsible driver and not merely punish the licensee. (citation omitted)). An operator of a motor vehicle in South Carolina is not required to submit to alcohol or drug testing; however, our legislature has clearly mandated that should one choose not to consent to such testing, his or her license must and shall be suspended . . . . Nelson, 364 S.C. at 522, 613 S.E.2d at 548. Were drivers free to refuse alcohol and drug testing without suffering penalty, the current system of detecting, testing, and prosecuting drunk drivers would simply fail. Id. at 522, 613 S.E.2d at 548–49. The South Carolina General Assembly has imposed a greater length of suspension for refusing to consent to testing than for those who take a test and have an alcohol concentration below a certain threshold and have no prior convictions. Id. at 522, 613 S.E.2d at 549. The disparity in suspensions demonstrates the legislative concern over an individual[']s refusal to consent to testing. Id. at 523, 613 S.E.2d at 549; cf. Quintana v. Mun. Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 397, 401 (Ct. App. 1987) (The purpose of the implied consent statute is to fulfill the need for a fair, efficient and accurate system of detection and prevention of driving under the influence. That purpose is obviously thwarted by the inebriated driver who refuses the test. . . . He has thus proven to be more dangerous to the public than the inebriated driver who has consented to a test. (citations omitted)). A civil license suspension is distinguishable from the criminal prosecution on the DUI charge. The provisions for an administrative suspension are liberally construed to advance the statute's purpose of promoting the public interest, and decisions restricting the application of implied consent laws are narrowly construed. See State v. Price, 333 S.C. 267, 273 n.7, 510 S.E.2d 215, 218 n.7 (1998) (stating the fact that the State affords procedural due process to a motorist prior to suspending a driver's license does not transform the suspension from a remedial sanction into a punitive one); see also Illinois v. Johnson, 758 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ill. 2001) (stating the implied-consent statute is remedial in nature and, therefore, 'should be liberally construed' to preserve its overall purpose (citation omitted)); Minnesota v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. 1981) (observing decisions restricting the application of the implied consent law are to be narrowly construed (citation omitted)); Wisconsin v. Reitter, 595 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Wis. 1999) (Given the legislature's intentions in passing the statute, courts construe the implied consent law liberally.).