Opinion ID: 2627591
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Assignment in this case

Text: In stating an alternative argument, Valladarez argues the district magistrate judge in this case was not assigned to conduct the felony arraignment. Because there was no discussion in the district court regarding the question of jurisdiction, the record on appeal contains no information regarding the assignment. This lack of support for an assignment in the record, according to Valladarez, means we must conclude there was not an assignment. These arguments raise a question regarding the appropriate standard of review to be applied when the question is whether a district magistrate judge was assigned to conduct felony arraignments. As previously stated, typically subject matter jurisdiction raises an issue of law because it depends on application of the statutes defining a court's or judge's jurisdiction. Valladarez' arguments suggest, although do not specifically state, that this standard of review is appropriate in this circumstance as well because the assignment should be an order of record in the case which could be reviewed de novo by an appellate court. He seems to suggest an alternative of allowing the assignment to be stated in a local rule or an administrative order of the chief judge. As Valladarez suggests, when the issue is whether a district magistrate judge has been assigned to conduct felony arraignments by an order of the chief judge of the judicial district or by a local rule, an appellate court can conduct a de novo review of the order or rule and determine if the district magistrate judge has been properly assigned to conduct a felony arraignment in a particular case. However, Valladarez does not point to any requirement that the assignment take one of these forms. K.S.A. 20-302b merely states that district magistrate judges may hear felony arraignments subject to assignment pursuant to K.S.A. 20-329. In turn, K.S.A. 20-329 provides: In every judicial district, the supreme court shall designate a district judge as chief judge who shall have general control over the assignment of cases within the district, subject to supervision by the supreme court. See also Supreme Court Rule 107 (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 186) (same). These provisions do not require a written assignment and, indeed, a written assignment in all cases would be impractical because often assignments occur through the actions of the chief judge in creating and setting dockets and in devising systems that allow for automatic, administrative assignment of cases. See Krogen v. Collins, 21 Kan.App.2d 723, Syl. ¶ 1, 907 P.2d 909 (1995) (Pursuant to K.S.A. 20-329, K.S.A. 20-330, and K.S.A. 20-302, with or without a formal written assignment by the administrative [now chief] judge, any district judge has authority to issue an order in any case in the judge's assigned district unless such action would contravene the administrative judge's supervisory authority.). Thus, a written order or court rule is not required in order for a district magistrate judge's assignment to conduct a felony arraignment to be valid. However, if there is no written order or rule for an appellate court to construe, the question of whether a district magistrate judge has been assigned to conduct a felony arraignment cannot be treated as a question of law; rather, it is a question of fact. See Kemp v. Kenny, 126 Fed.Appx. 504, 507 (2d Cir.2005) (unpublished opinion) (although federal courts generally recognize subject matter jurisdiction to be question of law, issue of parties' consent to federal magistrate judge's jurisdiction is considered question of fact). Hence, this limited circumstance creates an exception to the general rule that subject matter jurisdiction can be decided for the first time on appeal because appellate courts do not make factual findings. State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 161, 199 P.3d 1265 (2009). Rather, a district court must make factual determinations. See Kemp, 126 Fed.Appx. at 507 (remanding for factual determination of federal magistrate judge's jurisdiction based on consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636[c] [2006]). In this case, the local rules of the Sixteenth Judicial District filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, as required by Supreme Court Rule 105 (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 185), do not address the assignments of that district's magistrate judges. Nor are there any orders included in the record on appeal that address this question. The State attempts to fill this gap by attaching to its brief two memoranda. In one, the chief judge of the Sixteenth Judicial District outlined procedures to be followed to avoid potential speedy trial problems if a district magistrate judge accepts a felony plea. The second is a recommended colloquy and checklist for use when accepting a guilty or no contest plea. Neither document directly states that the district's magistrate judges are assigned to conduct felony arraignments, but they reflect an expectation that the district's magistrate judges will do so, at least occasionally. Regardless, these documents are not properly before this court because an appendix to a brief is limited to extracts from the record on appeal; it cannot serve as a substitute for the record itself. State v. Bryant, 285 Kan. 970, Syl. ¶ 8, 179 P.3d 1122 (2008) (An appellate court does not consider appended items which are not contained in the record.). Because the record is silent on the issue and the State has the burden of establishing jurisdiction in a criminal prosecution, see State v. Martin, 241 Kan. 732, 742-43, 740 P.2d 577 (1987), Valladarez argues we must resolve this issue in his favor. However, the burden of establishing jurisdiction has never been extended to require a party to establish that a district magistrate judge, or any other judge, has been assigned to hear a particular case or to conduct an arraignment, especially when no objection has been stated by the opposing party. In this regard, the State notes that an appellant has the burden to designate a record affirmatively showing error and, without such a record, an appellate court presumes the action of the district court was proper. See State v. Paul, 285 Kan. 658, 670, 175 P.3d 840 (2008); State v. Goodson, 281 Kan. 913, 919, 135 P.3d 1116 (2006). As we sort these various rules in this case of first impression, we determine that Valladarez should not be penalized for failing to raise the issue before the district court when our general rule has been that subject matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal. In addition, the State should not be penalized for having failed to establish the assignment when no objection had been stated. Consequently, the case is remanded to the district court for determination of whether the district magistrate judge in this case was assigned and had jurisdiction to conduct felony arraignments. On remand, if it is determined that the district magistrate judge had been assigned to conduct felony arraignments, then Valladarez' pleas are valid. If however, it is determined that the district magistrate judge had not been properly assigned to conduct felony arraignments, the felony pleas must be set aside. We note, however, that a general administrative order or local rule in each judicial district authorizing its district magistrate judges to conduct felony arraignments would answer the question that has arisen in this case and that may arise in similar cases. Hence, in order to alleviate the need to remand future cases in which this issue might be raised, chief judges may consider the adoption of administrative orders or local rules stating whether that judicial district's magistrate judges, either collectively or individually, have jurisdiction to conduct arraignments in felony cases.