Opinion ID: 153666
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Issues Raised in Mr. Veatch's Pro Se Brief

Text: 117 In addition to the counseled brief filed on behalf of Mr. Veatch, he filed an independent pro se brief that raises an additional fifty issues for us to consider. We have reviewed Mr. Veatch's pro se brief, liberally construing the issues he raises because he is representing himself. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Most of the issues that he raises are either duplicative of issues that we have already addressed or they are facially meritless. For example, some of his issues read: 118 SPR # 1 The district court was erroneous in ordering exclusion of CIA/AK4 spy operations that would have proven Dion Enterprises as a CIA asset at the start of the trial and without advance notice to Veatch was clearly erroneous, as it denied Veatch of his defense in chief, and without any trial strategy and defense. 119 .... 120 SPR # 26 Judges Cauthron and Alley were both clearly erroneous in accepting between $1 million to $5 million in money (bribes) from Sir Run Run Shaw, who is the CIA asset front for Asia. Veatch had been general counsel to Shaw and his $60 billion worldwide CIA/AK4 operations that dealt directly in worldwide crime, i.e. murder, drugs, treason, and much more. The multi-billionaire Shaw family is the richest family in Asia and basically controls Singapore and Hong Kong and S.E. Asia, to blow the whistle on the Shaw/cia/AK4 criminal operation, in which Veatch's CIA/M16 partner, wife, and 3 children were murdered by the CIA/Mossad in November, 1992. 121 .... 122 SPR # 31 The government was vendictive [sic] and outrageous in forcing Veatch to sleep next to a steel door that slammed at least 500 times a day, 24 hours a day, thereby, denying Veatch sleep and causing Veatch to be competent [sic] and or totally mentally and physcially [sic] ill prior to trial and at sentencing. 123 .... 124 SPR # 43 Double jeopardy as an issue to vacate. 125 Appellant Veatch's Pro Se Br. at A, H, M. Many of the issues raised by Mr. Veatch are unsupported, conclusionary, argumentative statements, and they are incomprehensible even when liberally construed. We will address the following issues, however, which appear to have some merit when liberally construed. 126 In issues nine and nineteen Mr. Veatch argues the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself by forcing him to have stand-by counsel. The court appointed Mr. McCormick to serve as stand-by counsel at Mr. Veatch's trial, and it granted Mr. Veatch's request to have Mr. Coyle appointed to serve as Mr. Veatch's counsel for his sentencing. As explained above, Faretta recognized a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of self-representation. A defendant's right to appear pro se, however, does not prohibit a court from appointing stand-by counsel or the unsolicited participation of stand-by counsel. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984). Like Wiggins, Mr. Veatch's complaint is directed at the presence of and unsolicited participation of counsel. Id. at 176. In determining whether a defendant's Faretta rights have been respected, the primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way. Id. at 177. 127 Mr. Veatch specifically complains that Bozo McCormick constantly interfered with Veatch at his trial by sitting next to Veatch so the jury could clearly see the hostility between Bozo McCormick and Veatch. Pro Se Veatch's Br. at C. In Wiggins, the Court refused to categorically bar the participation of stand-by counsel before the jury. 465 U.S. at 182. The assistance provided by Mr. McCormick to Mr. Veatch is very similar to that provided by stand-by counsel to the defendant in Wiggins. Mr. McCormick sat at the defense table with Mr. Veatch; he appears to have stayed in the background because his name rarely appears in the trial transcript; and he informed the court that although Mr. Veatch would not communicate with him, he would continue to make himself available to Mr. Veatch for legal advice and research. It appears from the record that any disputes between Mr. Veatch and his stand-by counsel were kept outside the presence of the jury. For example, Mr. Veatch filed numerous unfounded complaints with the bar against Mr. McCormick. Mr. Veatch alleged that Mr. McCormick was assisting the prosecution. Near the end of the trial, Mr. Veatch requested to put Mr. McCormick on the stand as a witness to question him about the fairness of the trial and about whether he was assisting the prosecution. The court denied Mr. Veatch's request, stating that Mr. McCormick's presence in the hall outside the courtroom was to smoke, not to engage in secret communications with the prosecution. As in Wiggins, Mr. McCormick's involvement was irreproachable under the circumstances; it did not interfere with Mr. Veatch's actual control over his defense; and it cannot reasonably be viewed as undermining Mr. Veatch's appearance before the jury in the status of a pro se defendant. 128 In issue ten, Mr. Veatch claims the court violated his right to have court-appointed expert witnesses and a private investigator. Prior to trial, Mr. Veatch filed several motions requesting court-appointed expert witnesses and investigators to investigate his claim of a government conspiracy. The district court denied the motions. We review the court's denial of a defendant's motion to appoint an investigator or an expert for abuse of discretion. Matthews v. Price, 83 F.3d 328, 335 (10th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). A defendant requesting appointment of an investigator or expert bears the burden of demonstrating with particularity that he is indigent and that  'such services are necessary to an adequate defense.'  Id. (citation omitted). Mr. Veatch repeatedly refused to provide financial information to show that he was indigent, and the reason for his request--to investigate and testify about his conclusory assertion that he was the subject of a CIA conspiracy--did not show that the services were necessary to an adequate defense. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Veatch's request for court-appointed expert services. 129 Mr. Veatch argues in issue seventeen that he was denied a fair trial because the jury contained a social security employee when one of the charges against him was for the fraudulent use of a social security number. During voir dire, the court asked whether the jurors or their family worked for the federal government, and one juror responded that she worked as a claims representative for the Social Security Administration. The court informed her that the case involved a charge that a social security number had been fraudulently used, and it asked whether given her employment she would be fair and impartial. The juror responded that she could serve impartially. Mr. Veatch did not object to the presence of the Social Security Administration employee on the jury. In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a trial court was not required to exclude a postal service employee from a jury in a mail fraud case, based on a claim that it could be presumed the employee would be biased. United States v. Plache, 913 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir.1990). The mere fraudulent use of a social security number does not make all employees of the Social Security Administration biased. After investigation by the court, there was no evidence that even a remote relationship existed between the juror's duties as a claims representative and the government's investigation of Mr. Veatch. We conclude that Mr. Veatch's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury was not violated under the circumstances of his case. 130 In issue twenty-four, Mr. Veatch claims the court erred by not permitting him to make objections to the Presentencing Report. A review of Mr. Veatch's sentencing hearing transcript during the period prior to when he requested to be removed shows that this claim is meritless. Mr. Veatch filed several motions challenging his sentencing and the presentencing report. Prior to sentencing Mr. Veatch had the opportunity to review the final presentencing report, and he was provided an opportunity during sentencing to object to the final report. 131 Mr. Veatch claims in issue twenty-seven that the court erred in not ordering a severance of trials. Generally, persons indicted together are tried jointly. United States v. Martinez, 76 F.3d 1145, 1152 (10th Cir.1996). A defendant must show actual or threatened deprivation of his right to a fair trial in seeking severance. Id. Neither Messrs. Veatch nor Sealander requested a severance of trial prior to trial. Thus, this claim has no merit. 132 In issue forty-six Mr. Veatch argues that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to inform the jury that they could nullify the law. The court did prohibit Mr. Veatch from arguing to the jury that it could nullify the law in the following exchange: 133 Mr. Veatch: There's little to add except to provide you that the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Bill of Rights and the U.S. Constitution I believe in with all my heart. I love what's left of our Constitution. You have the power to either go ahead and give me to these people. [sic] There's no doubt in your mind take [sic] they're my enemy. That's been testified to. You have the power as jurors to nullify any law-- 134 Mr. Borden: I object to the arguments, Your Honor. That is not the law and it's contrary to the instruction of this Court. 135 The Court: Sustained. 136 Mr. Veatch: You have the right to vote your conscience, to judge both facts and law. When you leave here today to go make your decision, I hope you'll look at me as a human being and not like one of them. 137 (R., Vol. V at 900). Although Mr. Veatch disregarded the court's order and continued with his improper argument, the court's order was correct. Neither a judge nor a party can encourage a jury to disregard the law. See United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844, 849 (10th Cir.1976) (holding that a criminal defendant is not entitled to have the jury instructed that they could disregard the law); United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 106 (11th Cir.1983)(holding that defense counsel may not argue jury nullification during closing argument). Thus, the court did not error in prohibiting Mr. Veatch's argument to the jury that it could disregard the law. 138 The convictions and sentences of Defendants Veatch and Sealander are AFFIRMED. The restitution orders against Defendants Veatch and Sealander are VACATED. The cases of Messrs. Veatch and Sealander are REMANDED for resentencing consistent with this opinion.