Opinion ID: 4426324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Circuit Court’s Denial of the Stay

Text: Because Mrs. Heffington waived her Fifth Amendment privilege on the subject of her fraudulent transactions by testifying in her deposition to that subject, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the stay. The court found correctly that it should weigh Mrs. Heffington’s Fifth Amendment interest lightly in balancing the interests at stake. The court balanced the Heffingtons’ interest in Mrs. Heffington attempting to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege at trial against the Mosers’ discovery and trial preparation expenses as well as the Mosers’ interest in a timely resolution of the civil case. 4 At the hearing on the motion to stay, counsel for Mrs. Heffington stated only that after discovery, the Mosers had “a better chance of actually trapping her into saying something that could, quite frankly, impact her criminal case.” 22 ______________________________________________________________________________ We address briefly the Court of Special Appeals’s holding that the trial court failed to consider in its analysis Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Article 19 states as follows: “That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law of the land.” To be sure, the people have a right of access to courts.5 Article 19 ensures that rights belonging to citizens of Maryland are “not illegally or arbitrarily denied by the 5 In Jacome de Espina v. Jackson, 442 Md. 311, 335, 112 A.3d 442, 457 (2015), we noted that Article 19 essentially protects two interrelated rights, a right to a remedy for an injury to one’s person or property and a right of access to the courts. We set out the history of Article 19 in Piselli v. 75th St. Med., 371 Md. 188, 205, 808 A.2d 508, 518 (2002), explaining as follows: “Article 19 was part of the original Maryland Declaration of Rights adopted in 1776, although it was then designated as Article 17 of the Declaration of Rights. Except for one word, the wording today is identical to the 1776 wording. All of the original state constitutions adopted at the time of the Revolutionary War, except Virginia’s and North Carolina’s, contained provisions like Article 19. While the United States Constitution contains no comparable provision, today the constitutions of 39 states have clauses similar to Article 19. These provisions, often referred to as ‘Remedy Clauses’ or ‘Open Courts Clauses’ or ‘Access to Courts Clauses,’ are based on Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta or, more particularly, Lord Coke’s interpretation of Chapter 40 . . . Today’s language refers to ‘every man,’ whereas the 1776 language referred to ‘every freeman.’ In light of the Equal Rights Amendment [to the Maryland Constitution], which is Article 46 of the Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1972, the provision should be read as ‘every person.’” (Internal citations omitted.) 23 ______________________________________________________________________________ government.” State v. Board of Education, 346 Md. 633, 647, 697 A.2d 1334, 1341 (1997). Nonetheless, our cases emphasize that access to the courts is subject to reasonable regulation. Doe v. Doe, 358 Md. 113, 128, 747 A.2d 617, 624 (2000); Johnson v. Maryland State Police, 331 Md. 285, 297, 628 A.2d 162, 168 (noting that a “restriction upon access to the courts violates Article 19 only if the restriction is unreasonable”). The applicability of Article 19 was neither raised nor briefed in the trial court or before the Court of Special Appeals. To the extent that the Heffingtons raised Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and their right to access to the courts, the trial court balanced that interest in considering the stay although not explicitly referencing Article 19. The right of access to the courts was implicit in the trial judge’s analysis and reasoning. The trial court noted that the stay would be for an undefined or indefinite duration because there was no guarantee that the criminal trial would begin on the scheduled date or conclude as quickly as “the usual two- or three-day trial.” Postponing repeatedly the civil proceedings would be a burden on the Mosers as well as an inconvenience to the court and docket considerations, as the case was assigned specifically to a judge. Similarly, the court noted that the motion to stay was filed “somewhat late” in the proceedings, months after the Heffingtons knew of the indictment. A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on untenable grounds. Mrs. Heffington waived her Fifth Amendment privilege to the extent necessary to cross-examine her on the conduct at issue, and a stay would cause 24 ______________________________________________________________________________ substantial expense and uncertainty for the Mosers. The decision of the circuit court to deny the stay was not based upon an incorrect standard, was not manifestly unreasonable, and hence was not an abuse of discretion. A party is entitled to a motion for judgment “when the evidence at the close of the case, taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, does not legally support the nonmoving party’s claim or defense.” Giant Food, Inc. v. Booker, 152 Md. App. 166, 177, 831 A.2d 481, 487 (2003); Rule 2-519. In this case, the Heffingtons argued that they were unable to pursue their claims in the absence of a stay. When the court denied the stay, the Heffingtons presented no evidence, and the Mosers moved for judgment in their favor. The Heffingtons consented, stating “Plaintiffs cannot argue against that, Your Honor.” The trial court did not err in granting the Mosers’ motion for judgment.6 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY. COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS. 6 We need not address petitioners’ mootness argument because of our holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to stay. 25