Opinion ID: 429180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Defendant's Membership in the Black Hebrew Sect

Text: 97 The defendant not only denies the government's allegation that he is a member of the Black Hebrews; he also claims that the first amendment bars the consideration of evidence of his alleged affiliation with the Black Hebrews in the absence of a finding that he intended to further the group's illegal aims. We consider first the operation of the first amendment generally in the context of sentencing. Because we conclude that the first amendment makes the consideration in sentencing of certain factors improper, we must decide, second, whether the Black Hebrew sect is an organization protected by the first amendment. Concluding that it is, we discuss finally the first amendment principles that govern the consideration of membership or affiliation with such a group for the purpose of sentencing. We agree with the defense that such affiliation ordinarily may be considered only if the defendant specifically intended to further the illegal aims of the organization. In this case, however, the defendant's association with Black Hebrews may be used for the narrow purpose of determining whether he had knowledge of the illegal activities of the group and could therefore be held responsible for his failure to cooperate with the government in its investigation of those illegal activities. 98 (1) The First Amendment in Sentencing 99 There can be no doubt that the constitution continues to operate, even after a valid conviction, in the sentencing process. Thus, a defendant may not be given a higher sentence in retaliation for invoking the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681, 685 (3d Cir.1976); 44 or for successfully appealing his conviction, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). As the Supreme Court stated in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 667-668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604, [t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort. Accordingly, a court may not punish an individual by imposing a heavier sentence for the exercise of first amendment rights. 100 Although the extent to which the first amendment limits the discretion of a sentencing court has received surprisingly little attention, the Eighth Circuit seems justified in its confident pronouncement that [c]onsideration of political beliefs, as distinguished from criminal activity, would clearly be impermissible in determining defendants' sentences, because it would impair the rights of the defendants under the First Amendment, protecting public expression of their political beliefs, by word and symbols. United States v. Bangert, 645 F.2d 1297, 1308 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860, 102 S.Ct. 314, 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981). 45 The First Circuit also took as self-evident the applicability of the first amendment in sentencing in United States v. Sachs, 679 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir.1982). Although the court rejected the defendant's argument that his sentence for obstructing the use of an elevator was based on the political context of his actions, it assumed that it would be constitutionally impermissible to consider political beliefs in sentencing. This principle had been made explicit in O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir.1967), vacated on other grounds, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). 46 Recognizing the possibility that the defendant may have received a higher sentence because, in burning his draft card, he was expressing his opposition to the war, the court remanded for resentencing. For the court to conclude ... that the impact of such conduct would impede the war effort, and measure the sentence by the nature of his communication, would be to punish defendant, pro tanto, for exactly what the First Amendment protects. Id. at 542. The court held that fairness to the defendant requires that he be resentenced upon considerations affirmatively divorced from impermissible factors. Id. Similarly, the Second Circuit in United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir.1973), left no doubt that it would be improper for the judge to base his sentence for refusal to report for induction on the defendant's unpopular political beliefs, although it was satisfied that the judge did not do so. Id. at 1174. 101 These decisions declare what we believe the constitution compels: A sentence based to any degree on activity or beliefs protected by the first amendment is constitutionally invalid. 47 We must therefore determine whether the Black Hebrew sect is an organization protected by the first amendment, and what the contours of first amendment protection are for such an organization in the context of this case. 102 (2) The Black Hebrews and Freedom of Association 103 The government does not contest the defendant's claim that the Black Hebrew sect is a religious organization. According to our perusal of the articles submitted by the government, the Black Hebrews have a set of beliefs based in part on the Torah; they observe a Sabbath by fasting and by religious services; they adhere to a vegetarian diet as part of their beliefs. It is not necessary for us to make a factual determination whether the Black Hebrew sect is a religion, however, because the defendant does not claim any special protection or privilege under the free exercise clause; 48 he claims only the first amendment freedom of association that protects membership or participation in groups based on a broad range of political, economic, social, moral, religious and other beliefs. Association with the Black Hebrews, whether or not their beliefs were ultimately determined to be religious, is protected by the broad guarantee of freedom of association unless the group were found to be a sham whose members did not sincerely share the beliefs they asserted, 49 but only used them cynically to conceal a criminal conspiracy. Given the government's apparent acquiescence in the defendant's claim that the Black Hebrew sect is a religious organization, we can comfortably conclude for the purposes of this appeal that the group is protected by the first amendment. 50 104 Our conclusion that the Black Hebrew sect is an association protected by the first amendment does not, of course, wholly immunize its activities from state regulation. Indeed, the government has offered to prove that a substantial number of Black Hebrews are engaged in illegal activity clearly subject to criminal prosecution. As we have noted, the defendant does not claim for the Black Hebrews any special privileges or protections, such as those sometimes afforded religious organizations, from otherwise legitimate government regulation. 51 In the relatively uncomplicated context of a claim that one is being punished for association with a protected organization, general first amendment principles govern. We are thus required to determine the contours of first amendment protection from state imposed punishment for membership in or association with a protected group, some of whose activities are illegal and legitimately subject to criminal prosecution. 105 (3) The First Amendment and Protected Groups with Illegal Aims 106 Outside the sentencing context, it is axiomatic that the first amendment guarantees freedom of association with religious and political organizations, however unpopular. Thus, the government cannot punish an individual for mere membership in a religious or political organization that embraces both illegal and legal aims unless the individual specifically intends to further the group's illegal aims. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 88 S.Ct. 419, 19 L.Ed.2d 508 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 86 S.Ct. 1238, 16 L.Ed.2d 321 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 1486, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961). 52 This well-established constitutional principle limits not only the government's power to prescribe criminal penalties, as in the Scales case, 367 U.S. 203, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782, but its power to revoke a passport, Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964), to regulate admission to the bar, Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 702, 27 L.Ed.2d 639 (1971), and to deny public employment, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967). 107 These cases leave no doubt that the first amendment proscribes punishment of an individual for membership in a protected organization unless the organization has illegal aims and the individual intends to further those aims. We believe that this central tenet of the first amendment must be observed in the context of sentencing as well. Thus we reject the argument pressed by the government throughout the sentencing proceedings that the defendant's alleged membership in the Black Hebrews was a significant and a permissible consideration in sentencing. Whether or not the evidence of defendant's membership were sufficiently reliable, mere membership would be an impermissible factor in sentencing. 108 However, the sentencing judge appears to have relied not on the government's specific allegation of membership but on its representations in support of that allegation, which concerned the defendant's alleged associations with members of the Black Hebrews. Of course, the defendant's freedom of association is no less implicated when informal affiliation as opposed to formal membership is made the basis for a harsher sentence. Thus it is evident that the court's reliance on information about the defendant's alleged associations with the Black Hebrews cannot be upheld unless the defendant intended to further the organization's illegal activities. 109 This does not mean, as the defendant appears to argue, that the government must necessarily show that the proceeds of the offense for which the defendant was convicted were intended to benefit the Black Hebrews. 53 Such a showing would of course be the strongest evidence of the defendant's intent to further the illegal aims of the Black Hebrews, but it is not the only evidence that would establish the requisite intent and satisfy the first amendment. 110 On the other hand, the limitations of the first amendment would be easily evaded if the defendant's illegal intent could simply be inferred from evidence of his association with members of the group. Although direct evidence of the defendant's intent is probably unavailable and in any event not required, there must be sufficiently reliable evidence of the defendant's connection to illegal activity within the Black Hebrews to insure that he is not being given a harsher sentence for mere association with the group and its legitimate aims and activities. If the government introduces into the sentencing process allegations about the defendant's association with an organization, and the defendant objects, at least in part on the basis of a plausible claim that any association the defendant may have with the organization is constitutionally protected, the judge ordinarily may not consider the government's allegations in sentencing without ascertaining either that the group is not protected at all, or that, even if protected, it has illegal aims and the defendant intends to further those aims. 111 In this case, consideration of the defendant's alleged failure to cooperate with the government in its investigation of illegal activities within the Black Hebrews is only proper if he has knowledge of those illegal activities. The defendant's association with Black Hebrews may be evidence of that knowledge, and may be considered for that limited purpose. We emphasize, however, that even this limited use of representations about the defendant's associations with a constitutionally protected group, in the absence of a reliable showing that he had the intent to further its illegal purposes, must withstand the heightened degree of scrutiny that we deem necessary to insure that the defendant is not penalized for mere association with members of a religious group. 112 We are not requiring courts confronted with information of this sort necessarily to explain their sentencing decision, 54 although an explanation of the considerations on which a sentence is based would serve many valuable functions, 55 especially in a case such as this in which sensitive constitutional rights are at issue. We simply point out that an unexplained sentencing decision may be particularly vulnerable to the close scrutiny that the first amendment and due process demand when the judge has been urged to consider information about the defendant's religious or political views or affiliations.