Opinion ID: 1760837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence of Drug Abuse

Text: ¶ 10. Snelson asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to elicit from Goode claims that Snelson had purchased and smoked crack cocaine after the crime and that he had claimed that he had committed three or four other murders. During the trial, Goode testified that he paid five dollars for Snelson to take a cab from the Redwood Inn, where Goode and Snelson were staying, to the house of Timothy Myles, the individual who was supposed to sell a camcorder and some bows which Goode and Snelson had stolen. Goode was allowed to further testify that he had to pay for Snelson's cab because Snelson had spent his money on cocaine. ¶ 11. Before this testimony was allowed in the presence of the jury, the defense argued that evidence that Snelson had spent his money on cocaine was irrelevant and prejudicial. The state argued that this evidence was part of the res gestae and went to the mood of the defendant at the time. In overruling the defendant's objection, the court stated that the court is ... not required to leave gaps in the ... testimony of the witnesses to require the jury to speculate as to what has occurred in the case... . I have to let the facts be presented as they exist and the court is not going to alter the course of the ... activities ... of the defendant or ... of this witness. ¶ 12. After the court made its ruling, the prosecutor asked Goode where he and Snelson went after selling the guns they had stolen. Goode testified that while traveling back to Jackson, they stopped at a truck stop because Snelson wanted to buy some cocaine. The prosecutor went on to ask the witness how Snelson ingested the cocaine. Goode explained that Snelson took a can, bent it in the middle, poked a hole in it, put the rock on it, took his lighter and smoked it. Although this testimony would appear to be outside of the ruling of the trial court, the defendant failed to object to such inflammatory testimony, and is therefore procedurally barred from raising it as an assignment of error. See Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1270 (Miss. 1994); Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 844 (Miss. 1994); Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365, 369 (Miss. 1987). Thus, the first issue is whether the trial court erred in allowing the witness to testify to Snelson's use of cocaine long after the crime had taken place. ¶ 13. Rule 401 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence states: Relevant Evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Rule 402 states that all relevant evidence is admissible. Thus, the question before this Court is whether evidence showing that Snelson bought and smoked cocaine with the proceeds of the stolen guns has a tendency to make any fact that was of consequence to the determination of whether Snelson killed Stephen Goode more or less probable than it would be without the introduction of such evidence. ¶ 14. In Wilson v. State, 661 So.2d 1109 (Miss. 1993), this Court held that evidence showing that the defendant's boyfriend had been charged with a drug offense had absolutely no `tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action' [whether the defendant had sold cocaine to a government informant] more or less probable. Id. at 1111. The evidence was therefore held to be irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule 401. ¶ 15. In Collins v. State, 513 So.2d 877 (Miss. 1987), this Court held that the introduction of five pornographic magazines hidden in a desk drawer inside of the defendant's shed, which were not used during the commission of a sexual battery, was improper. This Court stated that the magazines, other than the one which was shown to the victim and used during the commission of the crime, were neither relevant to any issues in the case nor a part of the res gestae of the crime... . They were simply found in a desk drawer in a shed owned by the defendant. Id. at 879. The court held that there was no evidence in the record linking the five additional magazines with the alleged sexual battery of Tammy T... . They were neither shown to Tammy T. nor viewed by Billy Wayne Collins during the commission of the crime. Id. at 879. Thus, they were irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule 401. ¶ 16. As we noted in Jenkins v. State, 507 So.2d 89 (Miss. 1987), whatever the concept of res gestae may have included in its historical use, it most assuredly has never properly applied to wholly independent bad acts which are obviously unnecessary to the proof of the primary charge. Id. at 92-93 n. 2. ¶ 17. We hold that the evidence which showed that Snelson bought and used cocaine after he had sold the stolen guns did not have the tendency to make any fact that was of consequence to the determination of whether Snelson killed Stephen Goode more probable or less probable than it would without the introduction of such evidence. The fact that Snelson purchased and used cocaine with the proceeds of the stolen guns does not make it any more likely that he committed the murder of Stephen Goode. It is certainly separable from the main offense and cannot be made a part of whatever is referred to as the res gestae of the entire transaction. The evidence was clearly inflammatory and offered for the sole purpose of improperly influencing the jury. ¶ 18. Although the state argues that the evidence is admissible as proof of Snelson's motive under Rule 404(b), this Court warned in Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289 (Miss. 1994), that prosecutors and trial courts alike should approach with caution any evidence of other crimes offered for the purpose of proving motive for a robbery. Robbery has its own motive  the attainment of something of value. Id. at 1313. In Mack, this Court acknowledged the danger of prejudice in presenting evidence to the jury that the defendant purchased crack cocaine after robbing and killing his victim. Id. ¶ 19. However, the court recognized that it was clear that Mack robbed Henry Fulton because he needed money for cocaine. Id. Therefore, this Court stated that because of the close connection of a specific monetary objective and because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we conclude that the error in admitting ... evidence [showing that the defendant purchased crack cocaine after robbing and killing Fulton], if any, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. ¶ 20. Unlike Mack, there is no evidence showing that the primary objective of Snelson's actions was to obtain money to buy cocaine. Snelson's purchase of cocaine was a separate incident from the robbery and murder of Stephen Goode. The introduction of this evidence, therefore, constitutes reversible error.