Opinion ID: 1342412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Misstatements of Prosecuting Attorney

Text: The Appellant contends that his due process rights were violated by the prosecuting attorney's repeated references, during closing argument, to the Appellant's possession of a gun as he exited the bathroom. The State's theory of the case was that the Appellant had possession of the .45 hi-point pistol in the bathroom and immediately started shooting as he exited the bathroom, shooting Chapman in the left back and Gauze twice in the right upper torso. Chapman was shot again in the right ear lobe, and both Chapman and Gauze were pronounced dead at the scene. The medical examiner found no evidence of defense or confrontational wounds on the bodies of either Chapman or Gauze, and the State presented evidence indicating that neither decedent was armed at the time of the shootings. With regard to the .22 rifle, Banig admits that he had possession of it during the altercation and that it jammed. He claims to have hit Chapman and Gauze with the gun, but further alleges that it would not shoot. [5] The Appellant contends that the prosecuting attorney misstated facts by making certain comments during closing argument. For instance, the prosecutor explained to the jury that [t]his was an ambush, folks. Messer comes out, simply starts shooting. The prosecutor also stated that the Appellant said he went to the bathroom. Well, he said he didn't use the bathroom and he took a 45 high caliber black high point to.... [6] Now unless there was a wildcat back there, I typically don't take a high point black 45 back to the bathroom to do my business. The Appellant contends that because his statement, indicating that he did not have a gun in his possession in the bathroom, was uncontroverted, the prosecutor should not have been permitted to make such comments to the jury during closing argument. In response to the Appellant's claim that the prosecutor misstated evidence, the State maintains that the prosecutor was simply drawing all permissible inferences from the evidence. Indeed, the Appellant's statement was uncontroverted only to the extent that there was no direct testimony indicating that he had a pistol in his possession while in the bathroom. However, extensive testimony was presented indicating that shots [7] were fired within seconds of Chapman and Gauze entering the trailer; that they did not have weapons upon entering the trailer; that Banig had possession of a rifle that would not fire; and that there was no evidence of a physical altercation such as that described by the Appellant. [8] Syllabus point seven of State v. England, 180 W.Va. 342, 376 S.E.2d 548 (1988), provides that [a] prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw. This Court also explained in State v. Asbury, 187 W.Va. 87, 415 S.E.2d 891 (1992), that [a] prosecutor is allowed to argue all reasonable inferences from the facts. 187 W.Va. at 92, 415 S.E.2d at 896. In State v. Graham, 208 W.Va. 463, 541 S.E.2d 341 (2000), this Court addressed the principles utilized to evaluate prosecutorial comments and explained as follows: In reviewing allegedly improper comments made by a prosecutor during closing argument, we are mindful that [c]ounsel necessarily have great latitude in the argument of a case, State v. Clifford, 58 W.Va. 681, 687, 52 S.E. 864, 866 (1906) (citation omitted), and that [u]ndue restriction should not be placed on a prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury. State v. Davis, 139 W.Va. 645, 653, 81 S.E.2d 95, 101 (1954), overruled, in part, on other grounds, State v. Bragg, 140 W.Va. 585, 87 S.E.2d 689 (1955). Accordingly, [t]he discretion of the trial court in ruling on the propriety of argument by counsel before the jury will not be interfered with by the appellate court, unless it appears that the rights of the complaining party have been prejudiced, or that manifest injustice resulted therefrom. Syllabus Point 3, State v. Boggs, 103 W.Va. 641, 138 S.E. 321 (1927). 208 W.Va. at 468, 541 S.E.2d at 346; see also State ex rel. Edgell v. Painter, 206 W.Va. 168, 522 S.E.2d 636 (1999) (holding that prosecutor is allowed to argue all reasonable inferences from facts presented at trial); State v. Smith, 190 W.Va. 374, 438 S.E.2d 554 (1993) (holding that prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in record). In State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388, 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995), this Court reiterated the wide latitude to which prosecutorial arguments are entitled, explaining as follows: Clearly, a prosecuting attorney should refrain from referring to questionable evidence that may poison the jury's mind against the defendant. However, there is equally clear authority that a prosecuting attorney's suggestion of a plausible inference to be drawn from the evidence is proper. 193 W.Va. at 405, 456 S.E.2d at 486. In the case sub judice, the prosecutor's remarks to the jury were indicative of the theory of the case espoused by the State and supported by the circumstantial, if not direct, evidence presented at trial. The prosecutor's statements to the jury constituted a reasonable interpretation of the facts. [9] The testimony supported the prosecutor's inferences based upon the timing of the shots fired, the fact that the decedents were unarmed upon entering the trailer, and the absence of any confrontational wounds on the decedents' bodies. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to grant a new trial on the basis of the prosecutor's remarks to which the Appellant objected. [10]