Opinion ID: 220995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Minnesota Bank Robbery Evidence

Text: Young asserts that the district court committed reversible error when it permitted the government to present evidence of the Minnesota bank robberies. [2] We review the district court's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hill, 638 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir.2011). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Such evidence is admissible for other limited purposes, however, such as proof of identity. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Preliminary questions concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court and [w]hen the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition. Fed.R.Evid. 104; United States v. Almendares, 397 F.3d 653, 662 (8th Cir.2005). When the district court admits evidence that is admissible for one purpose but not admissible for another purpose, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. Fed. R.Evid. 105. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403. Young's defense was that he was not the South Dakota bank robber, placing the identity of the robber at issue. The Minnesota bank robbery evidence was thus admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove Young's identity as the South Dakota bank robber. The Minnesota bank robbery evidence was conditionally relevant for that purpose if it was sufficient for a jury to find (1) that Young robbed the Minnesota banks, and (2) that the same person robbed the Minnesota and South Dakota banks. The district court found that the Minnesota bank robbery evidence was sufficient to support such a finding. If the conduct underlying the prior act and the current charged offense involved a unique set of `signature facts,' then evidence of the prior act is admissible to show that the same person committed both crimes. Almendares, 397 F.3d at 662. Two factors relevant to this determination are the distinctiveness of the facts that make the crimes unique and the distance between the crimes in space and time. Id. The district court found that there certainly [was] a signature feature or signature element given that the [robber's] shirt [was] the same and at least in some of these bank robberies the hat [was] the same. Additionally, the Minnesota robberies occurred after the second South Dakota robbery and preceded the third South Dakota robbery. The district court stated that it almost approache[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the person who robbed the two Minnesota banks appear[ed] to be the same person who robbed the three South Dakota banks. In overruling Young's objection to the admission of evidence regarding the Minnesota bank robberies, the district court noted that the words spoken are similar among all five bank robberies. Young contends that the government's failure to introduce evidence at trial regarding the words used during the Minnesota bank robberies undercut part of the rationale relied upon by the district court to admit the Minnesota robberies evidence. Thus, Young argues, because the evidence that was admitted did not support the government's own theory of admissibility, the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. We do not agree, for although evidence regarding the words used during the Minnesota robberies would no doubt have enhanced the probative value of the Minnesota evidence, as well as the grounds for its admission, the evidence that was admitted was by itself sufficient for both purposes. Young contends that because the identity of the bank robber in the Minnesota evidence was unknown, the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. The district court determined that the potential prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value and that any prejudice could be cured through a limiting instruction, which it gave both before the evidence was presented and again with the final jury instructions. See Fed.R.Evid. 105; United States v. Littlewind, 595 F.3d 876, 881 (8th Cir.2010) ([T]he risk [of unfair prejudice] was adequately reduced by two cautionary instructions from the district courtone when the prior crimes evidence was first admitted and another within the final jury instructions. Such limiting instructions minimize the danger of unfair prejudice.). The instruction provided that the evidence was being presented for the limited purpose to help [the jury] decide identity. It went on: To use this evidence on identity, you must find by the greater weight of the evidence that [Young] committed one or both of the Minnesota robberies. If you do not so find by the greater weight of the evidence, then you must disregard such evidence in its entirety. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence for the limited purpose set forth in its instruction.