Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ayyad's Motion

Text: 42 Ayyad argues that admission of Ajaj's terrorist materials violated Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). This claim is meritless because the materials were admissible for a non-hearsay purpose. 43 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that, notwithstanding the definition in Rule 801(c), a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, is equally not hearsay. Obviously, if the proffered evidence is not hearsay in the first place, under Rule 801(c), the various requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) need not be met. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974). 44 The terrorist materials seized from Ajaj discussed two issues: (1) the desirability of attacking enemies of Islam; and (2) how to produce and use explosives. However, the government introduced this evidence to prove the state of mind of those who harbored these materials, relevant to prove: (1) the existence of the bombing conspiracy; and (2) the conspirator's intent and motives. See Tr. 7320-21. 45 Where, as here, the statement is offered as circumstantial evidence of [a defendant's] state of mind, it does not fall within the definition given by Rule 801(c); because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. United States v. Detrich, 865 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir.1988); see United States v. Pedroza, 750 F.2d 187, 200 (2d Cir.1984). As proof of defendants' state of mind, Ajaj's terrorist materials were not hearsay under Rule 801(c), and their failure to come within Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is of no consequence. See Anderson, 417 U.S. at 219, 94 S.Ct. 2253. 46