Opinion ID: 1689270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the send a message argument used by the prosecution in its closing statement constitutes reversible error?

Text: ¶ 11. Ishee contends that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct in his closing argument. In closing, the prosecutor, stated: The defense asked you to think about what kind of message you would be sending if you findwhat kind of terrible message you would be sending if you find the Defendant guilty. Think about this: What if you find him not guilty? What message are you sending then? You are saying these sexual predators can go to Wal-Mart and cruise for nine year olds all day long and ask them to perform perverted sexual acts until one of them finally says yes, and then it's a crime. And later, while continuing with his closing argument, the prosecutor said: The way to stop it is to tell the Glenn Ishees of the world you can't go to a public place like that and wait for a young child to be by himself and then swoop down on him and try to commit perverse sexual acts, because if you do, you are going to have to answer to that. One way or the other, we are going to send a message with this verdict. I hope it's a message that we all can live with in Philadelphia and feel like our kids are safe to go to stores in Philadelphia. ¶ 12. It is true that this Court has repeatedly cautioned prosecutors against using the send a message argument. Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613, 675 (Miss. 1997); Chase v. State, 699 So.2d 521, 537 (Miss.1997); Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625, 637 (Miss.1996); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 209 (Miss.1988). In fact, in Williams we stated: The jurors are representatives of the community in one sense, but they are not to vote in a representative capacity. Each juror is to apply the law to the evidence and vote accordingly. The issue which each juror must resolve is not whether or not he or she wishes to send a message but whether or not he or she believes that the evidence showed the defendant to be guilty of the crime charged. The jury is an arm of the State but it is not an arm of the prosecution. The State includes both the prosecution and the accused. The function of the jury is to weigh the evidence and determine the facts. When the prosecution wishes to send a message they should employ Western Union. Mississippi jurors are not messenger boys. Id. at 209. ¶ 13. However, despite these admonitions we have specifically held that we would not adopt a per se reversible error rule on this issue. Payton v. State, 785 So.2d 267, 271 (Miss.1999). Here, again we find the argument to be improper, but it does not constitute reversible error for two reasons. First, Ishee did not object to the argument in the trial below. This Court has no original jurisdiction, and it can only try questions that have been tried and passed upon by the court from which the appeal is taken. Patrick v. State, 754 So.2d 1194, 1196 (Miss.2000) (citing Leverett v. State, 197 So.2d 889, 890 (Miss. 1967)). Further, we do not find that the prosecutor's arguments rise to the level of impropriety that would warrant reversal as plain error. ¶ 14. Second, we believe that Ishee's argument is without merit. It is important when considering this type of issue that we not only weigh the impact of the prosecutor's remark, but also take into account defense counsel's opening salvo. Edwards v. State, 737 So.2d 275, 299 (Miss. 1999) (citing Williams, 522 So.2d at 209). In his own closing argument, Ishee's attorney stated: That's the same thing we have got here. We have got Instruction S-3, which says, the last sentence from the bottom, Whether an act has been passedhas passed beyond the state of preparation and constitutes an attempt, is a question of degree, and if you say that Glenn Ishee is guilty of attempted sexual battery, you might as well be saying he should have went [sic] ahead and put one hand on the boy's mouth, grabbed him by the arm, and took [sic] him off to the bathroom, and committed whatever act he wanted to commit. He might as well have gone ahead and done it. And, the next fellow, the next perverted fellow that has the same thought knows what the jury says the law is, well, then, he will know he has done reached [sic] the point of no return, and he might as well commit the act....You think about what message this is going to be sending to other Defendants and other people. ¶ 15. Thus, Ishee made his own send a message argument. Considering Ishee's own argument and the fact that the prosecutor's send a message argument was made following it, there is a rational link between the two. We have noted that prosecutorial comments which under normal circumstances would constitute error do not when the statements merely reiterate statements of defense counsel. Booker v. State, 511 So.2d 1329, 1332 (Miss. 1987) (citations omitted). This is the case here. The prosecutor was merely `right[ing] the scale' tipped by defense counsel's comments. Id.; see also Gilliard v. State, 428 So.2d 576, 583-84 (Miss. 1983), overruled on other grounds, Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 681 (Miss.1991). ¶ 16. We find that Ishee's argument that the prosecutor's remarks were reversible error fails because it is procedurally barred, but alternatively that it is without merit.