Opinion ID: 771476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Separation of Powers and Jurisdiction

Text: 17 In addition to the primary subject matter jurisdiction contention set forth above, Tittjung presents a number of arguments which he believes negate any federal jurisdiction conferred by 8 U.S.C. sec. 1451(a). Tittjung's first such argument is that the district court's redetermination of visa eligibility and declaration that admission was unlawful is an unconstitutional judicial encroachment into an exclusive Executive function . . . and it violates the constitutional doctrine of Separation of Powers. For support to his argument, Tittjung looks to language in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101 et seq. (1952 Act). Under Section 1103(a)(1) The Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens. . . Additionally, Tittjung cites to Section 1103(c), which empowers the Commissioner of Immigration with any and all responsibilities of the Attorney General that the Attorney General delegates to her, and Section 1104(a), which charges the Secretary of State with the administration and enforcement of the Act and other laws except those powers, duties, and functions conferred upon the consular officers relating to the granting and refusal of visas. Thus, Tittjung puts forth that Article III courts are without jurisdiction to proceed in reviewing visas and cancelling certificates of naturalization based on their findings of visa ineligibility. 18 Tittjung's argument is without merit. While Tittjung is correct that our system does delegate specific powers to specific branches of government, he fails to acknowledge that ours is a system of checks and balances. Under Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, Congress is empowered to establish standards for immigration. The 1952 Act delegates to the Executive Branch, and specifically the Attorney General, the powers of administration and enforcement. In such a situation, [t]he courts, when a case or controversy arises, can always 'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed' and can enforce adherence to statutory standards. See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983) (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)). The Court in Fedorenko acknowledged this mandated interplay between the branches as well as the power of Article III courts to review lawful admissions. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court noted This judicial insistence on strict compliance with the statutory conditions precedent to naturalization is simply an acknowledgment of the fact that Congress alone has the constitutional authority to prescribe rules for naturalization, and the courts' task is to assure compliance with the particular prerequisites to the acquisition of United States citizenship by naturalization legislated to safeguard the integrity of this priceless treasure. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506- 07 (internal quotation omitted). 19 We stated above that Article III courts do have the power, in the course of determining whether the statutory prerequisites for naturalization have been met, to examine visa eligibility. Were we to hold that separation of powers bars examination of visa eligibility by Article III courts, we would be substantially limiting the impact of 8 U.S.C. sec. 1451. Contrary to Tittjung's assertion, the fact that Congress delegated authority to the Executive to oversee matters of immigration does not mean that the Attorney General was provided with exclusive control for the entire area. Section 1451(a) allows for the district courts to, among other things, revoke or set aside certificates of naturalization (which are based on compliance with statutory prerequisites such as a valid visa). Furthermore, Congress recognized that the Judiciary and the Executive would both make denaturalization decisions. It is for that reason that 8 U.S.C. sec. 1451(h) provides that Nothing contained in this section shall be regarded as limiting, denying, or restricting the power of the Attorney General to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate an order naturalizing the person. Given this limitation on the power of the Judiciary, the district court was correct to determine that the 1990 revocation of Tittjung's naturalization does not substantially or unconstitutionally infringe on the Attorney General's authority. 5 Thus we find no jurisdictional defect, egregious or otherwise in the 1990 district court's actions.