Opinion ID: 728750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Departures

Text: 15 The Sentencing Reform Act provides that a sentencing court may impose a sentence higher or lower than the sentencing range established by the Guidelines if the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). In seeking to determine whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration by the Commission, the courts are to consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission. Id. See generally Koon v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). The Guidelines, in turn, state that the Commission has sought to set out a 16 heartland, a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted. 17 Guidelines ch. 1 pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(b). 18 A district court's decision to depart from the Guidelines ... will in most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court. Koon v. United States, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2046. Because the courts of appeals see but a small fraction of the sentencing issues that arise under the Guidelines, see id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2047 (In 1994, for example, 93.9% of Guidelines cases were not appealed.), the [d]istrict courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in determining whether or not a given case, considering all of its circumstances, is within the heartland of typical cases. See id. Accordingly, such determinations by the district courts are subject to review under an abuse-of-discretion standard on appeal. Id. 19
20 Delmarle challenges the court's offense-level departure on the ground that his use of a computer to transmit images in violation of § 2252(a) was not outside the heartland of cases contemplated by the Commission because § 2252(a)(1), referenced in Guidelines § 2G2.2, makes it unlawful knowingly to transport or ship in interstate commerce a photograph of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct if such transport or shipment is by any means including by computer. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (emphasis added). This argument is wide of the mark. 21 The district court made clear that its offense-level departure was not simply for use of a computer but rather was for the use of a computer in the sexual exploitation of children to commit sex crimes. (S. Tr. 45.) The district court found that [t]he use of Internet computers to transfer child pornography to minors to seduce a minor to engage in sexual activity is outside the heartland of cases covered by the sentencing guidelines.... (Id.) While Guidelines § 2G2.2 deals with pictorial transmissions, it does not deal with the sending of such pictures for the purpose of soliciting sexual activity with the sender for the sender's own gratification. Nor does any guideline that governs sexual offenses relating to a minor deal with solicitation of sexual activity through the sending of exploitative pictures. We see no abuse of discretion in the court's determination that Delmarle's conduct was not within the heartland of cases considered by the Sentencing Commission in framing the Guidelines. 22 Delmarle also contends that there was no factual basis for the finding that he sent the images in an attempt to seduce a minor to engage in sexual activity. The record squarely refutes this contention. The district court's finding that Delmarle was soliciting sexual activity is supported by, inter alia, his sending Aaron 12M a picture of a young boy engaged in anal intercourse, along with the message, I want to do this to you sometime if you'll let me. And though Delmarle also claimed that he knew Aaron 12M to be an adult because of the language patterns used, it was the province of the district court to assess Delmarle's credibility. The court did not credit his statement, concluding that Delmarle felt he was communicating with a twelve year old male child even though he denies this now. (S. Tr. 46.) The court's rejection of the claim that when Delmarle sent the pictures he knew Aaron 12M was an adult is supported by, inter alia, Delmarle's repeated contemporaneous references to Aaron 12M as his young friend and the suggestion that they try to meet in person, with Aaron 12M concealing his whereabouts from his parents. 23 Finally, though Delmarle contends that the court should not have rejected his factual claims without a hearing, the record reveals that the court considered his affidavit and allowed him to explain his claimed knowledge and motivations orally at the sentencing hearing. Delmarle had a full opportunity to be heard. Given the documentary record no more formal hearing was required. 24
25 The Guidelines require the sentencing court to calculate a defendant's criminal history principally with reference to his prior sentences as categorized in Guidelines §§ 4A1.1 and 4A1.2. Under § 4A1.2(e), a sentence ordering imprisonment for not more than one year and one month, and imposed more than 10 years prior to the commencement of the defendant's current offense, is not to be counted. Under Guidelines § 4A1.2(h), a sentence for a foreign conviction is not to be counted. 26 The Guidelines encourage the sentencing court, however, to consider departing from the criminal history category computed strictly pursuant to §§ 4A1.1 and 4A1.2 [i]f reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes. Guidelines § 4A1.3. Indeed, § 4A1.2(h) itself notes that a sentence resulting from a foreign conviction may be considered under § 4A1.3; and the commentary to § 4A1.2 states that information with regard to a superannuated conviction may be considered in determining whether an upward departure is warranted under § 4A1.3, if such a conviction is evidence of similar, or serious dissimilar, criminal conduct, Guidelines § 4A1.2 Application Note 8. While the Guidelines do not define similar criminal conduct, it is plain that the prior conduct need not have been of an identical type. United States v. Mayo, 14 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir.1994). 27 In the present case, Delmarle's criminal history category was calculated under §§ 4A1.1 and 4A1.2 without regard to either his 1970 misdemeanor conviction for unlawfully dealing with a minor or his conviction in Italy for sexual misconduct with three young boys. The resulting criminal history category was I, the lowest category. The district court departed upward by two criminal history category steps pursuant to § 4A1.3 on the ground that category I did not adequately reflect Delmarle's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that he would commit further crimes. Delmarle challenges the departure, contending that the conduct underlying the 1970 conviction was not similar and that the Italian conviction was not entered in accordance with due process. We see no abuse of discretion. 28 As to the 1970 conviction, the presentence report prepared on Delmarle revealed that the underlying conduct was Delmarle's subjecting a 15-year-old to sexual contact when that minor was incapable of consent by reason of a factor other than age. Though that conduct was not identical to the conduct at issue here, it was plainly within the district court's discretion to view the prior sexual contact with a 15-year-old minor who was incapable of consent--for whatever reason--as sufficiently similar to Delmarle's solicitation of sexual contact with Aaron 12M, whom he believed to be a 12-year-old minor. 29 Nor do we see error in the district court's treatment of the Italian conviction. When the sentencing judge has been apprised of possible constitutional infirmities surrounding a foreign conviction--or even is informed of a conviction that has been vacated for constitutional infirmity, see Guidelines § 4A1.2 Application Note 6--he may nonetheless consider any reliable information concerning the conduct that led to that conviction in order, in an exercise of informed discretion, to determine whether the conduct warrants a departure. See id. (criminal conduct underlying any conviction that is not counted in the criminal history score may be considered pursuant to § 4A1.3); United States v. Soliman, 889 F.2d 441, 444-45 (2d Cir.1989). 30 In the present case, Delmarle maintains that the Italian conviction was obtained without due process, having been entered in absentia after Delmarle was expelled from Italy by order of the Italian court, and should have been disregarded for that reason. The district court did not rely on the fact of the Italian conviction, however. The events, which occurred while Delmarle was working in Italy as a civilian employee with the United States military, had been investigated by both an Italian agency and the United States Military Police. The court considered the investigative report of the United States Military Police, which was accompanied by extensive documentation. The court found that the investigative records showed that on several occasions, Delmarle had used his own children as bait to encourage [neighbors'] children to be overnight guests at his home, and that [w]hile they slept in their sleeping bags he molested them. (S. Tr. 41.) The court found that the information in the report was reliable and relevant. (Id.) Delmarle did not point to any specific part of the report or the records that he contended was unreliable; he made only the most conclusory challenge to the reliability of the information on which the [Italian] conviction was based (Defendant's Statement with Respect to Sentencing Factors at 3), and argued without elaboration that the underlying evidence was insufficient (S. Tr. 9). His conclusory argument is insufficient to warrant questioning the district court's assessment that the information was reliable. 31 In sum, the district court's departure decisions were not an abuse of discretion. Given the factors considered by the court in departing, we also conclude that the overall extent of the departure was not unreasonable.