Opinion ID: 1212676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The IJ Abused Her Discretion in Denying the Continuance

Text: The IJ abused her discretion in denying Karapetyan's request for a continuance so that he could submit fingerprints. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29, an IJ may grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown. In the context of immigration proceedings, the decision to grant or deny continuances is in the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Nakamoto, 363 F.3d at 883 n. 6 (9th Cir.2004); see also Baires, 856 F.2d at 91. But the IJ's discretion is limited. Baires, 856 F.2d at 91 (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)). We will reverse an IJ's decision should we conclude that her ruling results from an abuse of discretion. Id. When evaluating an IJ's denial of a motion for continuance we consider a number of factorsincluding, for example, (1) the importance of the evidence; (2) the reasonableness of the immigrant's conduct; (3) the inconvenience to the court; and (4) the number of continuances previously granted in the case. See Baires, 856 F.2d at 92-93; cf. United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir.1985) (listing factors appellate court considers when reviewing district court's denial of request for continuance), amended, 764 F.2d 675 (9th Cir.1985). We recently evaluated these factors in a similar case, Cui v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir.2008), in which we held that the IJ abused his discretion in denying the immigrant's request for a short continuance to submit fingerprints. Although a decision whether a denial of a continuance constitutes an abuse of discretion must be resolved on a case by case basis, Baires, 856 F.2d at 91, Cui established that it is clearly an abuse of discretion for an IJ to deny a request from an otherwise diligent applicant for a short continuance to submit fingerprints, particularly where the applicant was faced with an unclear fingerprint requirement and where the applicant was disserved by an IJ's inadequate guidance on the requirement. Cui, 538 F.3d at 1296. 1. Nature of the Excluded Evidence We first consider the evidence that was excluded as a result of the IJ's denial of Karapetyan's motion for a continuance. The denial of the continuance meant that Karapetyan was unable to submit fingerprints for the required security check. Without a security check, Karapetyan could not be granted relief under the law. Thus, when the IJ denied his request for a continuance to submit fingerprints, the IJ effectively pretermitted any hope Karapetyan had of obtaining relief. The vital importance of the excluded fingerprint evidence counsels in favor of granting a continuance. See Cui, 538 F.3d at 1292-93. 2. Petitioner's Conduct Another factor we consider is whether the need for a continuance arose because the petitioner behaved unreasonably. We find that Karapetyan's conduct was not unreasonable, given the circumstances. First, Karapetyan showed that exceptional circumstances prevented him from complying with the fingerprint requirement. See Baires, 856 F.2d at 92-93; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.10 (requiring the applicant to show good cause for a continuance). When Karapetyan was asked by the IJ why he did not submit fingerprints, he explained that he suffered a debilitating injury from a car accident on April 4, 2004about two months prior to the merits hearing, which was held on June 10, 2004. Karapetyan explained that he had injured his back and neck as a result of the car accident. He had regular doctor appointments twice per week and experienced difficulty sitting upright for the first two months. As of June 10, 2004, the date of the merits hearing, Karapetyan was still taking antibiotics and painkillers for his injuries. Second, as we have previously recognized, the ability of otherwise diligent applicants, like Karapetyan, to comply with the fingerprint requirement was frustrated by the legal uncertainties surrounding the fingerprint laws. See Cui, 538 F.3d at 1292-93. The IJ denied Karapetyan's motion for a continuance in June 2004, when the laws addressing fingerprinting were still unclear. [14] Third, Karapetyan did not receive adequate notice regarding the fingerprint requirement. On May 8, 2003, the government informed the IJ that Karapetyan had not been fingerprinted. The IJ told Karapetyan's attorney, Rita Mahdessian, before we conclude this case, you need to have your client fingerprinted. (emphasis added). Attorney Mahdessian replied, I will. The IJ never said that the fingerprints had to be submitted before the beginning of the merits hearing. The vague statement made by the IJ certainly would not meet the notice standards under existing law. As a result of the confusion over the fingerprint requirement, the EOIR proposed a new rule, effective April 1, 2005, that required IJs to ensure that applicants understand the fingerprint requirements and the consequences of noncompliance by specifying for the record (1) when the applicant received the fingerprint notice and instructions from DHS, and (2) the consequences for failing to submit the required fingerprints. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d). Neither was done in this case. [15] Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Karapetyan's failure to submit fingerprints prior to his merits hearing was reasonable. 3. Inconvenience to the Court We also consider whether the requested continuance would inconvenience the immigration court. Here, it is quite clear that neither the IJ nor the government would have been inconvenienced by a short continuance. The IJ had already heard the merits of Karapetyan's claims. If she had found Karapetyan worthy of relief, she could have simply held the decision in abeyance pending submission of Karapetyan's fingerprints and then scheduled a brief hearing to hear the results of the security check. Thus, this factor also supports granting Karapetyan's request for a continuance. 4. Previous Continuances When evaluating the denial of a continuance, we also consider the length and number of continuances that have previously been granted in the case. Here, the proceedings had been ongoing for about two years. On March 19, 2002, Karapetyan requested a ninety-day continuance to supplement his asylum application. On June 13, 2002, Karapetyan requested another continuance to submit additional documents. On February 13, 2003, Karapetyan requested a continuance to submit additional documentation explaining that country conditions had recently changed. On May 8, 2003, the merits hearing was continued, by mutual agreement, to September 2, 2003. The record does not indicate why the merits hearing did not take place on September 2, 2003 as scheduled. On March 24, 2004, Karapetyan's counsel withdrew. On April 16, 2004, Karapetyan did not appear for the merits hearing because he had suffered debilitating injuries from a car accident two weeks earlier, and the matter was reset for June 10, 2004. The merits hearing was eventually held on June 10, 2004, and the IJ denied Karapetyan's motion for a short continuance to submit fingerprints after the hearing concluded. Although Karapetyan's case had been continued previously, the interest in administrative efficiency cannot justify the pretermission of Karapetyan's claims where the other factors we have addressedthe importance of the evidence excluded, the reasonableness of the petitioner's conduct, and the inconvenience to the immigration courtall militate strongly in Karapetyan's favor. Accordingly, we conclude that the IJ abused her discretion when she denied Karapetyan's motion for a continuance.