Opinion ID: 1744651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expert testimony on post-traumatic stress disorder.

Text: The trial court admitted the expert testimony of a psychologist who holds a master's degree in counseling and is a certified clinical associate of the American Board of Medical Psychotherapists. She was allowed to testify to the classic characteristics that are exhibited after people have experienced a trauma. Her testimony was framed in a general context, equally applicable to any major trauma such as natural disasters, combat/wartime encounters, muggings or sexual assault. While her testimony centered around a particular aspect of this syndrome, commonly described as rape trauma syndrome, see State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Iowa 1986), this term was not specifically referred to in the trial. She listed numerous symptoms such as fear of staying alone, sleep disturbances, social and sexual impairment and hyperalertness. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is recognized by the American Psychiatric Association in its Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed. 1980) (DSM III). There was independent evidence presented that the victim exhibited some of the listed symptoms. Defendant's objection to the introduction of this evidence is based on Iowa Rules of Evidence 702 and 403. He first asserts that this testimony is irrelevant because it will not assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Iowa R.Evid. 702. In the alternative, defendant urges that even if the evidence was relevant, its probative value is outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect. Iowa R.Evid. 403. We have not previously passed upon the admissibility of such testimony. In Myers, we disallowed expert evidence expressing the opinion that children generally tell the truth about sexual abuse. Id. at 98. In our general discussion, we briefly reviewed the conflicting rulings from other jurisdictions regarding testimony that the complaining witness was suffering from PTSD and discussed such testimony in child sexabuse cases. Id. at 96-97. We summarized, it seems that experts will be allowed to express opinions on matters that explain relevant mental and physiological symptoms present in sexually abused children. Id. at 97. There is a sharp disagreement among various jurisdictions on the admissibility of expert testimony describing rape trauma syndrome. Compare State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338 (1982) (child psychiatrist allowed to testify that child's conduct consistent with other rape victims); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) (rape trauma syndrome is result of a sexual assault and is both detectable and reliable; that an assault took place is relevant to issue of consent); State v. Liddell, 211 Mont. 180, 685 P.2d 918, 923 (1984) (on issue of consent, expert's testimony that rape caused PTSD admissible); People v. Taylor, 142 A.D.2d 410, 417-418, 536 N.Y.S.2d 825, 830 (1988) (admission of rape trauma syndrome evidence consistent with increased tendency of the court to accept testimony of behavior which may not be commonly understood by every juror); State v. Whitman, 16 Ohio App.3d 246-247, 475 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1984) (admissible to corroborate complainant) with People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236, 246-51, 681 P.2d 291, 298-301, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 457-60 (1984) (testimony inadmissible to prove rape occurred); People v. Pullins, 145 Mich.App. 414, 421, 378 N.W.2d 502, 505 (1985) (inadmissible to prove rape occurred); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Minn.1982) (testimony produces an extreme danger of unfair prejudice and its reliability does not surpass the quality of jury's common sense evaluation); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 237-42 (Mo.1984) (syndrome not sufficiently based on accepted or sound scientific techniques; term connotes rape and is unduly prejudicial); State v. Black, 109 Wash.2d 336, 342-50, 745 P.2d 12, 16-19 (1987) (rape trauma syndrome not accepted in scientific community and is prejudicial as essentially an opinion of guilt). Some jurisdictions have allowed rape trauma syndrome or similar testimony under special circumstances. People v. Server, 148 Ill.App.3d 888, 898-99, 102 Ill.Dec. 239, 246, 499 N.E.2d 1019, 1026 (1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 131, 98 L.Ed.2d 88 (1987) (admissible on rebuttal for limited purpose of showing how minor victims react); Simmons v. State, 504 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ind.1987) (when victim gave inconsistent statements, expert allowed to testify that victim's behavior was consistent with rape trauma syndrome); State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 282, 415 A.2d 320, 322 (1980) (where defense was memory loss and fabrication, testimony allowed that memory loss not unusual among rape victims); People v. Reid, 123 Misc.2d 1084, 1087-88, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (Sup. Ct.1984) (in response to defendant's evidence that complainant recanted, proper to use expert testimony that this is a common characteristic of rape trauma syndrome). Other jurisdictions have allowed testimony of expert witnesses on PTSD if the term rape trauma syndrome was not used. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (1986) (testimony that victim suffered from PTSD caused by rape admissible). Although the Bledsoe court excluded the evidence, it indicated that expert testimony would be admissible to explain some of the the victim's conduct after the incident, such as delay in reporting. 36 Cal.3d at 247, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457. The Missouri court similarly indicated that a properly qualified expert might testify to characteristics consistent with those resulting from a traumatic stress reaction such as rape. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 240. The Missouri Court of Appeals also allowed an expert to testify on the psychological effects and reactions of a rape victim while not actually stating that the victim suffered from rape trauma syndrome or that she had been raped. State v. Ogle, 668 S.W.2d 138, 143-44 (Mo.App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 154, 83 L.Ed.2d 91 (1984). The Washington court similarly allowed an expert to state a diagnosis of rape trauma syndrome consistent with violence in a case of delayed reporting. State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash.2d 263, 277-281, 751 P.2d 1165, 1173-74 (1988). Another jurisdiction allowed a treating psychiatrist to testify that the complainant's mental state was consistent with the experience she described to him, a sexual assault. State v. Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 62, 699 P.2d 1290, 1293 (1985). Although the Arizona court admitted that the doctor was describing rape trauma syndrome, it approvingly noticed that the doctor never used the term and that the evidence was admissible to show lack of consent. Our review of the case law indicates that the majority of jurisdictions find no abuse of discretion in the admission of expert testimony limited to an explanation of the effects of PTSD and the typical reaction of a rape victim. This is an almost unanimous uniform rule when the expert neither uses the term rape trauma syndrome nor offers an opinion on whether the victim had been raped. However, if the expert testifies on these two matters, the courts are approximately evenly split on the admissibility of such evidence. The testimony in the present case showed only the typical symptoms exhibited by a person after being traumatized. Independent evidence showed that the complainant had experienced some of the symptoms of PTSD. Consequently, the evidence was relevant as tending to show that she had been traumatized. We see little, if any, prejudicial effect in the admission of this testimony. The more prejudicial term rape trauma syndrome was not used. We do not believe the evidence misleads the jury. In fact, there is little, if any, in the testimony which is not within the jury's own common sense evaluation. We believe that the admissibility of the testimony was a matter within the trial court's discretion. AFFIRMED.