Opinion ID: 1268876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 1. The Boys' Club is a business establishment covered by the Unruh Act.

Text: The Club first contends that it is not a business establishment covered by the Act. We disagree. Adopted in 1959, the Unruh Act, [e]manat[es] from and [is] modeled upon California's earlier statute forbidding arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations. ( Marina Point, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 731.) The prior law, first adopted in 1897, derived from the common law doctrine that certain public enterprises are obliged to serve all without arbitrary discrimination. ( In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 212 [90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992]; see Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State (1967) 55 Cal.L.Rev. 1247, 1250 [fns. omitted].) The Unruh Act  expanded the reach of [the prior public accommodations statute] from common carriers and places of public accommodation and recreation, e.g., railroads, hotels, restaurants, theaters, and the like, to include `all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.' ( Marina Point, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 731 (italics added), citing Horowitz, The 1959 California Equal Rights in Business Establishments Statute  A Problem in Statutory Application (1960) 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. 260, 272-294 (hereafter Horowitz).) By its use of the emphatic words all and of every kind whatsoever, the Legislature intended that the phrase business establishments be interpreted in the broadest sense reasonably possible. ( Burks, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 468.) Indeed, the Unruh Act was adopted out of concern that the courts were construing the 1897 public accommodations statute too strictly. That prior law, a model for subsequent civil rights legislation in other jurisdictions both state and federal, prohibited arbitrary discrimination by enumerated lodging, eating, transportation, recreational, and entertainment facilities as well as all other places of public accommodation or amusement, ... (See Stats. 1897, ch. 108, § 1, p. 137, as amended.) However, despite periodic additions to the list of covered facilities (see Stats. 1919, ch. 210, § 1, p. 309 [public conveyances]; Stats. 1923, ch. 235, § 1, p. 485 [soda fountains]), lower appellate courts used the principle ejusdem generis to limit the law's reach. (See, e.g., Reed v. Hollywood Professional School (1959) 169 Cal. App.2d Supp. 887, 890 [338 P.2d 633] [private school not covered]; Coleman v. Middlestaff (1957) 147 Cal. App.2d Supp. 833, 834-836 [305 P.2d 1020] [dentist's office not covered]; Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Assn. (1955) 130 Cal. App.2d 328, 329 [278 P.2d 945] [private cemetery not covered].) Accordingly, the Legislature, enacting the Unruh Act, modified the [prior] mandate ... and broadened its scope [to include] all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. ( Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 214.) The original version of the bill which became the Unruh Act extended its antidiscriminatory provisions to all public or private groups, organizations, associations, business establishments, schools, and public facilities; ... (See Assem. Bill No. 594, as introduced Jan. 21, 1959.) Later versions dropped all the specific enumerations except business establishments but added to the latter phrase the modifying words of every kind whatsoever. The broadened scope of business establishments in the final version of the bill, in our view, is indicative of an intent by the Legislature to include therein all private and public groups or organizations [specified in the original bill] that may reasonably be found to constitute `business establishments of every type [ sic ] whatsoever.' ( O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 795-796 [191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427], italics added. [3] ) Considering the Act's ancestry, its phrase business establishments clearly includes at least those facilities subject to the predecessor statute  i.e., places of public accommodation or amusement. (See 34 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 230, 232 (1959); Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. 260, 289; cf., Burks, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 471.) Courts in other jurisdictions have consistently held that broad-based nonprofit community service organizations like the Boys' Club are public accommodations covered by statutes analogous to California's pre-1959 civil rights law. For example, in language similar to our prior law, title II of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a et seq.) grants all persons the right to full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. [4] A place of public accommodation includes, among other specified facilities, any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment.  ( Id., § 2000a(b)(3), italics added.) Title II has been applied to private, nonprofit recreational organizations which offer memberships to the public at large and exclude only a particular class of persons protected by the statute. (E.g., Smith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Montgomery (5th Cir.1972) 462 F.2d 634, 649; Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Raleigh, N.C. (4th Cir.1968) 397 F.2d 96, 100; United States v. Slidell Youth Football Ass'n (E.D.La. 1974) 387 F. Supp. 474, 482-484; cf., Daniel v. Paul (1969) 395 U.S. 298, 306-308 [23 L.Ed.2d 318, 325-327, 89 S.Ct. 1697].) [5] The same rule has obtained under public accommodations legislation in other states. New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination bars sexual bias, among other things, in places of public accommodation. These are defined to include, without limitation, a long list of facilities and services, as well as other place[s] of amusement. (N.J. Stat. Ann., § 10:5-5, subd. l. ) There is an express exception for accommodations which are distinctly private ( ibid. ) or in [their] nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex. (N.J. Stat. Ann., § 10:5-12, subd. f.) The New Jersey courts have ruled that a local Little League was a covered place of amusement, too unselective in membership to be distinctly private, and suited in its goals and facilities to participation by girls. ( National Org. for W., Essex Ch. v. Little L. Base., Inc. (1974) 127 N.J. Super. 522 [318 A.2d 33, 35 et seq., 66 A.L.R.3d 1247], affd. summarily (1974) 67 N.J. 320 [338 A.2d 198].) [6] Recently the New York Court of Appeals said that state's similar Human Rights Law (Exec. Law, § 290 et seq.) prohibits gender-based membership restrictions by United States Power Squadrons, a national boating safety and educational organization. ( U.S. Power Squad. v. State Human R. App. Bd. (1983) 59 N.Y.2d 401 [465 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874-877, 452 N.E.2d 1199].) [7] These principles and authorities persuade us that the Boys' Club of Santa Cruz is a place of public accommodation or amusement, and thus a business establishment covered by the Act. The Club certainly qualifies as a place of amusement. Indeed, its primary function is to operate a permanent physical plant offering established recreational facilities which patrons may use at their convenience during the hours the Club is open. Moreover, the Club is classically public in its operation. It opens its recreational doors to the entire youthful population of Santa Cruz, with the sole condition that its users be male. (See National Org. for W., Essex Ch. supra, 318 A.2d at pp. 37-38.) There is no attempt to select or restrict membership or access on the basis of personal, cultural, or religious affinity, as a private club might do. [8] While there are some organized activities, the emphasis is on drop-in use of the Club's facilities, thus minimizing any sense of social cohesiveness, shared identity, or continuity. Boys who join the Club have no power in its affairs and no control over who else may be members. A fee, though not a large one, is charged for the annually renewable membership. Thus, the Club provides an atmosphere deemed characteristic of a public accommodation by the principal commentator on the Unruh Act; relations with and among its members are of a kind which take place more or less in public view, and are of a relatively nongratuitous, noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial sort. ( Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. 260, 287, 288.) [9] The Club, its amici, and Justice Mosk urge that the statutory phrase business establishments includes only commercial or profit-seeking ventures. They point to Chief Justice Gibson's statement in Burks, supra, that a business is generally defined as a `calling, occupation, or trade, engaged in for the purpose of making a livelihood or gain.' (57 Cal.2d at p. 468.) When that language is read in context, however, it provides no support for the Club's view. The principal issue in Burks was whether the sale of tract homes was a business establishment covered by the Act. In discussing the statutory words all, business, establishments, and of every kind whatsoever, Burks intended only to make clear that the Act applies without any exception and without specification of particular kinds of enterprises. ( Ibid. ) Burks implied, as O'Connor later confirmed, that the expansive phrase all business establishments of every kind whatsoever, as it appeared in the final version of the Act, was intended to encompass many of the private groups and organizations mentioned in the original bill but removed before passage. ( Id., 57 Cal.2d at pp. 468-469, and fn. 3.) [10] Burks did not consider whether a nonprofit enterprise might come within the Act. In O'Connor, however, this court subsequently found no reason to insist that profit-seeking be a sine qua non for coverage under the [A]ct. The opinion held that the Act's regulation of business establishment[s] included a nonprofit condominium owners' association whose businesslike functions, including its responsibility for enforcing an arbitrary adults-only rule, were intended to protect and enhance the condominium project's economic value. (33 Cal.3d at p. 796.) The Boys' Club insists it is further removed from the commercial world, since it collects no substantial fees from its users and has no economic function. Of course, it has some of the businesslike attributes noted in O'Connor; like the nonprofit hospital there cited as an example of a nonprofit business establishment, the Club employs a substantial paid staff and care[s] for an extensive physical plant used for public purposes. ( Ibid. ) However, we need not rely exclusively on the Club's functional similarity to a commercial business. [11] As we have seen, the Unruh Act replaced a statute governing all places of public accommodation or amusement and was intended at a minimum to continue the coverage of public accommodations. The Santa Cruz Boys' Club, as a public recreational facility, fits within that category. In these circumstances, the fact that its purposes and operations are not strictly commercial does not bar a conclusion that it is a business establishment to which the Act applies. [12] The Club and its amici note that parallel California statutes banning discrimination in housing and employment  also originally adopted in 1959  contain express exemptions which refer to association[s] or corporation[s] not organized for private profit. (See Gov. Code, §§ 12926, subd. (c), 12927, subd. (d).) [13] They urge that by excluding nonprofit groups from the housing and employment laws, the Legislature demonstrated its intent that the phrase business establishments, as used in the Unruh Act, should have a strictly commercial meaning. We cannot agree. The disparate grammar of three statutes attests to their different legislative histories and purposes. If the specific exemption in the housing and employment laws proves anything, it is that the Legislature knows how to draft such exceptions when it wishes to. The Unruh Act covers all business establishments of every kind whatsoever, and the Legislature has never added any exemption, exception, or restriction. We are not free to import one from another law. Indeed, as we noted in Marina Point, the FEHA specifically provides that nothing contained in this part shall be construed, in any manner or way, to limit or restrict the application of Section 51 of the Civil Code [i.e., the Unruh Act]. (Gov. Code, § 12993, subd. (c), italics added; see Marina Point, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 731, fn. 5.) We conclude that the fair employment and housing provisions imply no restrictions on the Unruh Act which would exempt the Club from its requirements. It is suggested that extension of the Unruh Act to the Boys' Club will threaten all private organizations which traditionally serve the special cultural or charitable needs of particular minority groups with common interests. But we have emphasized that the Club's status as a business establishment covered by the act arises from its public nature; it offers basic recreational facilities to a broad segment of the population, excluding only a particular group expressly recognized by the Act as a traditional target of discrimination. [14] (2) Finally, and belatedly, the Club contends that forcing female participation in its activities would interfere with its current members' rights of association guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions. The United States Supreme Court has recently rejected the identical argument in a similar context. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609 [82 L.Ed.2d 462, 104 S.Ct. 3244], the court ruled that First Amendment associational rights do not prevent application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act to prohibit sex-segregated membership policies by the Jaycees. (See fn. 8, ante. ) Roberts acknowledged that the Constitution protects both intimate and expressive associational rights. (468 U.S. at p. 618 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 471].) However, it found no unconstitutional infringement of either of these separate interests. The court quickly dismissed the claim that the Jaycees' membership rules involved rights of intimate association. It noted that the Jaycees' character as a large, socially unselective membership institution places it outside the category of relationships to which the individual right of personal choice applies. ( Id., at p. 621 [82 L.Ed.2d at pp. 473-474].) The same is true of the Boys' Club, as we have seen. The Jaycees also argued in Roberts that their rights of expressive association would be infringed by forced admission of women, since the organization's cohesive purpose and creed was to promote the special views and interests of young men. The court disagreed, though it conceded, as the court of appeals had noted, that a `not insubstantial part' of the Jaycees' activities constitutes protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs. ( Id., at p. 626 [82 L.Ed.2d at pp. 477-478].) The Minnesota law, the court observed, was not aimed at protected speech, and it imposed no direct restraint on the Jaycees' freedom to express their views. On the other hand, the statute's protection of equal access rights, said the court, was the least intrusive means of satisfying a compelling state interest  the redress of historical discrimination against full participation by women in political, economic, and cultural life. ( Id., at pp. 627-628 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 478].) The court refused to entertain unproven assumptions, based on stereotypes, that participation of women would substantially alter the expressive character of the Jaycees. ( Ibid. ) The Boys' Club, though it purports to focus on the particular needs of male youth, does not suggest that it is substantially engaged in protected expression of views. In any event, our construction of the Unruh Act intrudes no further, and for no less compelling purpose, than was the case in Roberts. No federal constitutional violation is shown. We reach a similar conclusion under California's Constitution, though we recognize it affords greater privacy, expressive, and associational rights in some cases than its federal counterpart. (Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 2; see City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 130, fn. 3 [164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436, 12 A.L.R.4th 219]; Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979) 23 Cal.3d 899, 908 [153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341] affd. (1980) 447 U.S. 74 [64 L.Ed.2d 741, 100 S.Ct. 2035].) Considering this state's special constitutional sensitivity to sexual discrimination (see Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 600 [150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916]; Sail'er Inn v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 17 [95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 46 A.L.R.3d 351]), we see no basis to hold that a statutory requirement of equal access to the recreational facilities of a public, nonselective, nonexpressive community service organization offends rights guaranteed by the California charter. We decline to do so.