Opinion ID: 1174938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: theoretical background

Text: Although the cases come to uniform results, that is, they consistently disallow government advocacy in support of one side of issues before the voters, the legal premises upon which they stand are inconclusive. This lack of precision has led commentators to examine the larger issues underlying the problem of government speech. See Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 565 (1980). The literature attempts to explain the often expressed but infrequently probed uniform judicial reluctance to uphold government advocacy. The commentators draw attention to the larger universe of government advocacy as it implicates constitutional principles. Although we find it unnecessary to decide this case on constitutional grounds, it is helpful to understand the concerns that stretch out to many forms of so called government speech, and the developing and as yet undefined constitutional boundaries within which laws concerning government publicity must operate. In a democracy, efforts by government to publicize and promote its policy views pose an obvious problem. On the one hand, democratic accountability requires that public officials explain their past, present and intended actions. This means explaining policy goals and reasons for choosing or rejecting particular ways of pursuing those goals. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the chosen policy rests on the consent, if not consensus, of the governed; excessive or questionable efforts by government to manufacture the consent of the governed calls the legitimacy of its action into question. The concerns with government publicity for its chosen policies extend to government managed and commonly accepted functions such as public education, public libraries, museums, theatres, and public broadcasting, all of which involve inescapable cultural choices and incidentally or designedly shape society's view of itself and its values. Yudof, When Government Speaks (1983). Scholars have sought restraints on such government intervention in the First Amendment of the federal constitution. See, e.g., Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 Calif.L.Rev. 1104 (1979); Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 Tex.L. Rev. 863 (1979). It hardly seems necessary to rely on the First Amendment, at least when government resources are devoted to promoting one side in an election on which the legitimacy of the government itself rests. The principles of representative government enshrined in our constitutions would limit government intervention on behalf of its own candidates or against their opponents even if the First Amendment and its state equivalents had never been adopted. Federal limits against abuse even in the states already were implied in the guarantee of a Republican Form of Government, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. Related assumptions about representative government may be found in Oregon Constitution Article II, section 1: All elections shall be free and equal, and in Article I, section 26, respecting the right of the inhabitants of the State to consult for the common good, and to [instruct] their representatives. Commentators examining the potential constitutional issues which arise when government promotes its own views come to a few uniform conclusions: Neither the free speech clauses, nor principles of representational democracy require that governments, as such, refrain from speech entirely. However, assuming governments may engage in some forms of speech, they are still prohibited from advocacy intended to perpetuate themselves in power. Drawing lines between these two extremes is the task required in this case. A view of where the line lies for appropriate government speech will be tempered by a perception both of the purpose of constitutional free speech guarantees and the function of government. If the free speech guarantees are viewed as intending to ensure a marketplace of ideas [5] as a means towardintelligent self-government one could conclude that government may facilitate the market but not itself enter the bidding. If one purpose of government in our society is not only to moderate among competing private interests and voices but also to promote its view of the public interest, or, in Shiffrin's words, the good life, Shiffrin, supra, at 566, the permissible limits of government speech must be expanded accordingly. On the other hand, if one perceives government's purpose to be an arbiter of competing private interests, a synthesizer or umpire, the need for and propriety of a government voice in the marketplace diminishes. Under either view, however, government propaganda for its chosen policies can be criticized for denying equal chances to proponents of competing policies, a concern expressed in Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Board of Education, supra , and Stanson v. Mott, supra , or for drowning out the free speech of opposing voices, a problem acknowledged in Miller v. California Com'n on Status of Women, supra . Suggested analyses of the limits of government speech range from an interpretation of the First Amendment as containing an implied prohibition against political establishment, similar to the express prohibition against establishment of a religion by the government, [6] Kamenshine, supra, to the position that government can add its own voice to many it must tolerate, provided it does not drown out private communication. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-4, at 590 (1978). Certainly, at a minimum, governments must refrain from supporting a particular candidate for office. It is not the function of the government to get itself reelected. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 699 (1970); see also State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Sup'r Ct, supra . When considering government speech, it becomes necessary to recognize the difference between advocacy by governments as institutions, an activity which may call into question the constitutional principles explained here, and advocacy by individual policy makers who not only enjoy constitutional protection to speak but whose position requires them to develop, implement and garner support for their policy choices. There is no easy way to define what is electoral or political advocacy by an individual policy maker and when the advocacy is an official action of government. Nonetheless, the distinction is significant. One would not expect to muzzle the official who is personally responsible for a program or policy, yet in local government, that official alone may be the relevant government; no bureaucratic staff may be involved. Equally difficult are attempts to distinguish partisan from non-partisan speech or information from advocacy. See Stanson v. Mott, supra . This is because [n]on-partisan aspects such as informing the populace of government policy and explaining that policy are also necessarily partisan because incumbent candidates almost invariably claim that their reelection is justified by their link to the government policy they explain and defend. Shiffrin, supra, at 603. A government's controversial advocacy may aim at winning support or opposition, not for any action of its own electorate, but for action by another government; for instance, local officials may spend public resources to persuade Congress, the state legislature or another level of government of a policy which many of the officials' own constituents oppose. This lobbying of the government's own legislature or of policymakers at another level of government differs from government propaganda directed to its own constituency in at least one respect. No matter how aggressive and effective such lobbying may be as a matter of political reality, in principle those to whom it is addressed are themselves public officials with an independent responsibility to decide on the public interest as they perceive it. Moreover, if they have legislative power over the importuning officials, they may restrict their use of resources for lobbying or other publicity; besides, they need not make themselves available to the uninvited advocate. Other courts have examined the difference between lobbying and soliciting votes from the electorate. Stanson v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d at 218, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1; Anderson v. Boston, supra, 376 Mass. at 188 n. 11, 380 N.E.2d 628; Miller v. Miller, supra, 87 Cal. App.3d at 768-69, 151 Cal. Rptr. 197. [7] Dean Yudof cautions against turning prematurely to the constitutional premises underlying government speech if some other avenue is available. As we have seen, state courts have, for the most part, chosen to examine the issue as one of authority for the challenged expenditure. In this way the question becomes one of statutory construction, that is, whether a particular expenditure is within or without legislative authorization. Yudof, supra, at 912-13 (1979). The need to face a constitutional issue arises, if at all, only after the court determines what ordinary laws authorize, require or forbid. Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or. 562, 687 P.2d 785 (1984). We turn to an examination of our statutes.