Opinion ID: 3009780
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Heading: The Language of the Amendments Act

Text: By now, [i]t is axiomatic that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself. Government of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 633 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Pennsylvania Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990)). Courts presume that Congress expressed its legislative intent through the ordinary meaning of the words it chose to use, and if the statutory language is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the words ordinarily is regarded as conclusive. Id. Plaintiffs argue that the plain meaning of the language in the Amendments Act counsels that punitive damages are available in these actions. We agree. It is not disputed that these suits are public liability actions. See TMI II, 940 F.2d at 857; 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n). Such actions include suits asserting any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w) (emphasis added). Section 2014(w) does exclude certain types of claims from those 8 that may be brought under that statute. See 42 U.S.C. §2014(w)(i-iii). Significantly, claims for punitive damages are not listed as an exception. Accordingly, the district court's conclusion is further supported by the doctrine of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius which informs a court to exclude from operation those items not included in a list of elements that are given effect expressly by the statutory language. Williams v. Wohlgemuth, 540 F.2d 163, 169 n.30 (3d Cir. 1976). Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w)(i-iii) `is as significant for what it omits as for what it says.' Id. (citation omitted). Our analysis therefore turns on a determination of whether punitive damages fall within the scope of any legal liability as that phrase is used in the Act. Obviously, as defendants concede, punitive damages are a type of legal liability. (Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5.) The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that punitive damages are normally included within the concept of tort liability: [O]ne of the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to compensate the plaintiff fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights. . . . [P]unitive or exemplary damages are generally available in those instances where the defendant's misconduct was intentional or reckless. 9 United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1871-72 (1992). See also TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718 (1993) (finding legal liability for punitive damages by affirming a judgment of $19,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages). The Amendments Act was not intended to alter the nature of the tort claims which constitute public liability actions. Indeed, the Act directs that the substantive rules for decision in such action shall be derived from the law of the State in which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is inconsistent with the provisions of . . . the Price-Anderson Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). Here, the applicable state law is that of Pennsylvania, as TMI is located in Pennsylvania. See id. Historically, Pennsylvania has recognized punitive damages as a form of liability. See Thompson v. Swank, 176 A.2d 211, 211 (Pa. 1934) (Where the injurious act is willful, malicious, or wanton, the jury, according to the malignity shown, without bias or feeling, may award a reasonable sum in vindication of the rights of the injured party as exemplary or punitive damages.); Cf. Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1096 (Pa. 1985) (plurality) (As a general guide in this area Pennsylvania recognizes the principles set forth in Section 908(2) of the Restatement of Torts (Second): `(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. . . .'); Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747-48 (Pa. 1984) (same). 10 Defendants assert that the Price-Anderson Act has three relevant objectives: (1) assure the availability of funds to compensate persons injured; (2) limit liability to the funds so provided, to encourage private industry to invest in the nuclear power alternative; (3) achieve resolution of nuclear accident claims as efficiently and expeditiously as possible. Brief of Appellants at 6. Defendants argue that Pennsylvania's punitive damages rules are premised upon retribution, deterrence and punishment, and that they therefore can not apply to operators of nuclear reactors after the Price-Anderson Act and the 1988 Amendments. See Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 803 (Pa. 1989) (the purpose of punitive damages is to punish a tortfeasor for outrageous conduct and to deter him or others from similar conduct). Accordingly, defendants argue that the inherently penal nature of punitive damages in Pennsylvania is inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the public liability action, and the Act therefore precludes plaintiffs from recovering punitive damages. We disagree. As noted above, defendants' position is undermined by the very language of the statue it is based upon. The Amendments Act does specifically prohibit punitive damages, but that prohibition is far more narrow than defendants' construction suggests. Section 2210(s) states: Limitation of punitive damages No court may award punitive damages in any action with respect to a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation against a person 11 on behalf of whom the United States is obligated to make payments under an agreement of indemnification covering such incident or evacuation. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s). However, even this prohibition is limited and applies only with respect to nuclear incidents occurring on or after Aug. 20. 1988. Because TMI occurred in 1979, well before the effective date of the 1988 Amendments, the qualified prohibition does not apply here. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (1988) (Effective Date of 1988 Amendment). Again, the language is as significant for what it omits as for what it says. Williams, supra. Moreover, we concluded in TMI II that imposition of state remedies in a public liability action would not frustrate the objectives of the Price-Anderson Act. TMI II, 940 F.2d at 859. It was there noted that [t]he ban on punitive damages applies only to nuclear incidents occurring after August 20, 1988, which does not include this case. . . . It should also be noted that punitive damages remain available when the government is not obligated to make payments under an indemnification agreement. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s) (1988). Id. at 874 n.6 (Scirica, J. concurring). In Silkwood, the Court held that the Atomic Energy Act3 had not preempted a state authorized award of punitive damages. 464 U.S. at 256. Although the Price-Anderson Act did not control the analysis in Silkwood, the Court concluded that the discussion preceding its enactment and subsequent amendment indicates that 3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). 12 Congress assumed that persons injured by nuclear accidents were free to utilize existing state tort law remedies. Id. at 25152. The defendants in Silkwood had argued that an award of punitive damages frustrates Congress' express desire `to encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes' as expressed in the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d), and that such an award conflicts with Congress' express intent to preclude dual regulation of radiation hazards. Id. at 257-58. The Court disagreed. [T]he award of punitive damages in this case does not hinder the accomplishment of the purpose stated in §2013(d). The Court further stated; Congress did not believe that it was inconsistent to vest the NRC with authority over the safety aspects of nuclear development while at the same time allowing plaintiffs . . . to recover for injuries caused by nuclear hazards. Id. at 257-58. Thus, although Congress clearly intended to preempt state regulation of nuclear safety standards when it enacted PriceAnderson, the award of punitive damages would not impede the congressional goal of promoting nuclear safety. TMI II, 940 F.2d at 859. All that has changed since TMI II is the enactment of the 1988 Amendments, and it is clear from the unambiguous language of those Amendments that Congress did not intend to change the result the Supreme Court had reached in Silkwood. In view of the sweeping changes effectuated in the Amendments Act, Congress could easily have completely precluded punitive damages in every case arising out of a nuclear incident 13 or precautionary evacuation. However, Congress declined to extend its punitive damages limitation that far. The district court correctly reasoned: In passing the [Amendments] Act, Congress clearly had an opportunity to overturn the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Silkwood. In transform[ing] . . . the entire Price- Anderson landscape . . . [w]ith the passage of the Amendments Act, TMI II, 940 F.2d at 857, Congress did not hesitate to overturn several prior decisions of the Third Circuit with which it disagreed. See 42 U.S.C. §2014(hh) (providing for federal jurisdiction over suits arising out of all nuclear incidents and reversing Stibbitz [sic] v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 746 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985); and Kiick v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 784 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1986). Yet, despite its substantial revision of the nuclear regulatory scheme, Congress only partially limited Silkwood's holding. . . . While a statement in the legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend any inference for or against the applicability of punitive damages in other cases be drawn from the provision, see S. Rep. No. 70, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, (1987), the failure of Congress to completely reverse Silkwood at the very least indicates that Congress did not believe an award of punitive damages in prior cases to be so inconsistent with the purposes of the Act that it must be changed. In re TMI Litig. Consol. Proceedings, Nos. 1:cv-88-1452, 1:cv-881551, 1:cv-88-1558, slip op. at 6-7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994).