Opinion ID: 202730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to proceed as a class action

Text: 16 Fryar argues that the district court erred by failing to allow the case to proceed against various supervisory officials. As clarified at oral argument, however, Fryar concedes that the case proceeded only against defendant Curtis, rather than against all of the original defendants, by agreement of the parties. This affirmative agreement to proceed against Curtis alone waived Fryar's right to review on this issue. An issue is waived when a defendant intentionally relinquishes or abandons a legal right. United States v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 92, 101 (1st Cir.2006) (finding jury instruction issue waived when the defendant indicated, I am content, after the district court omitted the requested instruction); see also United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (`[A] litigant has an obligation to spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever hold its peace.') (quoting Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir.1988)). 17 Even if one assumes that an objection to the decision to proceed against a single defendant was not waived, the decision is harmless in light of the jury verdict in favor of Curtis. See Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 429 (1st Cir.2006) (It follows that the inadequate training of a police officer cannot be a basis for municipal liability . . . unless a constitutional injury has been inflicted by the officer or officers whose training was allegedly inferior.); Jordan v. Fournier, 324 F.Supp.2d 242, 250 (D.Me.2004) (If there is no underlying constitutional violation by the three arresting officers, Jordan cannot hold the other defendants liable on theories of failure to supervise or policy and custom.) (citing Gero v. Henault, 740 F.2d 78, 84-85 (1st Cir.1984)). 18 Alternatively, Fryar argues that the jury should nonetheless have been informed, through instruction or argument of counsel, that his case arose from and was pled as part of a class action. Despite counsel's contention that the jury should have known about this case history and that this history was central to what the case was about, Fryar fails to establish how this testimony was relevant to whether Curtis assaulted Fryar, which is the specific issue the trial was intended to assess. See De Araujo v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 146, 153 (1st Cir.2006) ([C]onclusory statements, without further development, do not rise to the level of a cognizable appellate argument.). We conclude that because, by agreement of the parties, the sole issue before the jury was whether Curtis committed the acts alleged by Fryar, the district court did not abuse its discretion by foregoing potentially confusing jury instructions and information regarding the procedural history of the case that was not probative of the underlying factual dispute. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(b) (The court . . . may order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.); Buchanan v. Demong, 654 F.Supp. 139, 140 (D.Mass.1987) (action originally pled as class action proceeded individually).