Opinion ID: 4510976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seventeenth Amendment Challenge to Vacancy

Text: Election Date and Duration of Appointment We begin with Plaintiffs’ as-applied Seventeenth Amendment challenges to the November 2020 vacancy election date and the 27-month duration of appointed representation. We consider these two challenges together because both require an analysis of what, if any, implicit time constraints exist within the Seventeenth Amendment. The meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment has seldom been litigated, and no body of doctrine provides us with robust guidance as to its proper interpretation. We therefore undertake here to decipher the Amendment’s meaning using multiple modes of analysis and sources of authority. After reaching a conclusion regarding that meaning, we turn to the law challenged in this case.
The parties hold very different views of the extent to which the Seventeenth Amendment restricts state discretion regarding the timing of a vacancy election and the duration of an interim appointment. Plaintiffs argue that the TEDARDS V. DUCEY 17 Seventeenth Amendment gives States very little discretion—that it requires a State to hold a vacancy election as quickly after the occurrence of a vacancy as the State holds a general election after petition filing. Plaintiffs argue that in most cases this means that a vacancy election will be held within, and an interim appointment will last no longer than, one year. Defendants argue that the Seventeenth Amendment gives States very broad discretion—that it does not carry any time constraint on vacancy elections or interim appointments at all beyond the deadline imposed by the end of the vacant term. The Supreme Court has spoken to the meaning of the relevant Seventeenth Amendment provisions in two cases. First, in Valenti v. Rockefeller, a three-judge district court conducted a detailed analysis of the relevant provisions in both a majority and a dissenting opinion, and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the majority. 292 F. Supp. 851 (W.D.N.Y. 1968), summarily aff’d, 393 U.S. 405 (1969). Second, in Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, the Supreme Court opined on a related constitutional question in part based on a particular interpretation of the result it had summarily affirmed in Valenti, and also endorsed some of the reasoning of the Valenti three-judge district court majority. 457 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1982). Normally, a summary affirmance binds us to the precise result affirmed, yet it remains incumbent upon us to give full consideration to the issues and articulate our own independent analysis. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784–85 & n.5 (1983); Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 476 n.20 (1979). In this instance, the Supreme Court has provided some additional analysis of its own, see Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 10–12, but in an opinion that “did not 18 TEDARDS V. DUCEY . . . purport to be a thorough examination” of the Seventeenth Amendment. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 623 (2008). We therefore undertake a full analysis here, but we do not reach any dispositive interpretive conclusions until we come to Rodriguez and consider our analysis in light of the reasoning therein. Our analysis proceeds as follows, taking inspiration from the method by which the Supreme Court analyzed the meaning of the then little-litigated Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller 14: We begin with a close 14 In Heller, the Supreme Court announced its first “thorough examination of the Second Amendment.” 554 U.S. at 623. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began with a textual analysis aiming to identify the meaning of the Second Amendment as it “would . . . have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.” Id. at 576– 77. In the process of analyzing the text, he considered the natural and logical reading of the text on close examination; other uses of identical language elsewhere in the Constitution; founding-era dictionary definitions; other uses of similar language in such founding-era sources as The Federalist Papers and State constitutions; and the historical circumstances motivating the founders to codify the Second Amendment in the Constitution. Id. at 576–600. Justice Scalia devoted a second section to greater analysis of the contemporary State constitutions codifying a similar right. Id. at 600– 03. He next considered the Amendment’s drafting history, though he expressed doubt about relying on analysis of prior rejected proposals. Id. at 603–05. He then considered postratification interpretation, as evidenced by commentary, case law, and legislation, both close in time to ratification and specifically in the post-Civil War context. Id. at 605– 19. Finally, he considered “whether any of [the Court’s] precedents foreclose[d]” the majority’s interpretation. Id. at 619. In that discussion, he specifically rejected reliance on United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), which “did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment,” and in which only one party had (only minimally) briefed the Amendment’s history. Id. at 623–24 (discussing). TEDARDS V. DUCEY 19 examination of the Seventeenth Amendment’s text. In subsection 1, we attempt to discern the most natural reading of the text standing alone. In subsection 2, we consider the text in the context of related constitutional provisions. Subsection 3 then considers the text in the context of the historical circumstances motivating Congress and the ratifying States to amend the Constitution. In subsection 4, we consider the interpretations of the Seventeenth Amendment provided by the sponsor of the final version in the Senate and the author of a materially similar version in the House. In subsection 5, we consider the interpretations evidenced by state legislative enactments in the immediate aftermath of the Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification. Finally, in subsection 6, we analyze prior cases interpreting the relevant portion of the Seventeenth Amendment, including and especially Valenti and Rodriguez, and come to our ultimate conclusion.
We begin with the text of the Seventeenth Amendment standing alone. The second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment (hereinafter the Vacancy Clause) comprises two subclauses. We refer to the first as the principal clause: When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive Writing for four dissenting Justices, Justice Stevens likewise focused on “the most natural reading of the Amendment’s text and the interpretation most faithful to the history of its adoption.” Id. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He nevertheless reached a different conclusion from the majority, which he argued was required by Miller. Id. at 637– 40. 20 TEDARDS V. DUCEY authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: . . . U.S. Const. amend. XVII para 2. We refer to the second as the proviso: . . . Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. Id. The principal clause begins with a trigger: “When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, . . . .” This trigger does not expressly invoke the discretion of the state legislature or any other decisionmaker. We read the word “when” to denote both “immediately after” and “every time that.” Thus, every vacancy immediately triggers the Vacancy Clause when it happens. The trigger gives no express guidance as to the types of events that cause a vacancy to “happen,” but no ambiguity on that point is before us. We have no doubt that the death of a Senator causes a vacancy to happen. The principal clause then directs that “. . . the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: . . . .” We assume “executive authority” refers to a state’s Governor, but we need not consider whether a Governor could delegate the relevant authority to an executive agency or other executive officer. We interpret the word “shall” as imposing a mandatory obligation on the Governor. See Zachary D. Clopton & Steven E. Art, The Meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment and a Century of State Defiance, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1181, 1202 n.79 (2013) TEDARDS V. DUCEY 21 (canvassing uses of the word “shall” in the Constitution, all of which are obligatory); accord Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 547 (7th Cir. 2010) (Judge I), amended by 387 F. App’x 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (Judge II), cert. denied sub nom. Quinn v. Judge, 563 U.S. 1032 (2011). A writ of election is the traditional device for initiating a popular election. Id. at 552 (collecting evidence regarding writs of election from the Glorious Revolution, the Founding period, the Seventeenth Amendment era, and the present day). A writ of election “plays the important administrative role of authorizing state officials to provide for the myriad details necessary for holding an election (printing ballots, locating voting places, securing election personnel, and so on).” Id. At the time the Seventeenth Amendment was drafted, “it was settled that the state executive’s power to issue a writ of election carried with it the power to establish the time for holding an election, but only if the time had not already been fixed by law.” Id. (citing, inter alia, George W. McCrary, A Treatise on the American Law of Elections 166 (2d ed. 1880)). The “writ of election” reference thus appears to allow some discretion on the part of the State Governor or legislature to choose the date on which the election will be held. We interpret the phrase “writs of election to fill such vacancies” also as a cross-reference to the Seventeenth Amendment’s first paragraph, which states that Senators shall be “elected by the people” of each state, and which provides the qualifications for electors. U.S. Const. amend. XVII para 1. We thus understand the Vacancy Clause to require a writ of election that orders an election by the people, where “the people” is composed of those individuals having the requisite qualifications to vote in a Senate election. 22 TEDARDS V. DUCEY We read “to fill such vacancies” to refer to the election of a Senator who will represent the state for the remainder of the term in which the vacancy occurred. This language appears to assume that a non-de minimis period of time remains in the term, and that an orderly election is capable of filling it. That is, the duty to call an election might not apply if the vacancy happens so late in the term that it is not feasible to hold an orderly election quickly enough that the elected Senator will serve for more than a de minimis period of time. Cf. ACLU v. Taft, 385 F.3d 641, 648 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Jackson v. Ogilvie, 426 F.2d 1333, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1970)). This language may also suggest that the State should leave some non-de minimis period of the vacancy for the people to fill by election to the extent it is within the State’s discretion to do so. The proviso begins with the authorization, “Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive authority thereof to make temporary appointments . . . .” This language appears to give the legislature discretion as to whether the State will utilize the mechanism of temporary appointments. 15 We interpret the phrase “make temporary appointments,” by reference to the Senate vacancy invoked by the principal clause, to mean appoint a person to serve, temporarily, as Senator in the vacant seat. The key issue here is the word “temporary.” On its face, the term “temporary” is vague. In context, however, we are 15 We decline to address here whether the state legislature’s discretion extends so far as to encompass mandating that the executive make appointments, or defining the qualifications of appointees. We therefore also do not address how much, if any, discretion regarding appointments the proviso preserves for the state executive. As we explain in section 0, infra, we find that Plaintiffs lack standing to raise these arguments. TEDARDS V. DUCEY 23 able to discern some meaning. First, we think the term must be read in relation to the six-year term of a Senator stated in the preceding paragraph. We would have difficulty reading it to approach anything nearing that full six-year term. Second, the proviso concludes with language placing a specific limit on the duration of “temporary”: “. . . until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.” The tenure of a Governor’s appointee is thus limited by the timing of a popular election to fill the vacancy. Without more context, however, this language does not establish the precise amount of time that may elapse before the Seventeenth Amendment compels an election by the people to fill the vacancy. Indeed, this language expressly grants the state legislature some degree of discretion regarding that timing. Contrary to the Third Circuit in Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1014 (1991), we do not read the proviso’s two express references to state legislative discretion—“the legislature of any State may empower” and “as the legislature may direct”—as creating state legislative discretion over the whole of the Vacancy Clause. See id. at 234. Rather, we read these grants of discretion as modifying the specific terms they immediately relate to within the proviso. Cf. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (explaining the “‘rule of the last antecedent,’ according to which a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows”). Thus, the first grant confers discretion as to whether a state legislature “empower[s]” the Governor “to make temporary appointments.” The second grant confers discretion as to the “direct[ing]” of a vacancy “election.” To read either grant 24 TEDARDS V. DUCEY of discretion more broadly would render the other grant superfluous. Instead, we agree with the Seventh Circuit in Judge I that “as the legislature may direct” does not modify the principal clause’s mandate that a Governor issue a writ of election when a vacancy happens. See 612 F.3d at 549. We further agree with the Seventh Circuit that the proviso acts as a qualifier on the principal clause, rather than as an alternative option for responding to Senate vacancies. See id. at 551. In sum, the text of the Seventeenth Amendment confers some discretion upon the States as to both the timing of an election to fill a vacancy and the duration of an interim appointment. The text is ambiguous as to the outer bounds of this discretion.
We now consider other constitutional provisions closely related to the Seventeenth Amendment. Portions of the Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause appear in, or cross-reference, sections 2, 3, and 4 of Article I of the unamended Constitution. The meaning of identical, similar, or explanatory language in these provisions has the potential to bring the meaning of the Vacancy Clause into sharper focus. The Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause specifically replaced the following language from Article I, section 3, of the unamended Constitution: . . . and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments TEDARDS V. DUCEY 25 until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 2, amended by U.S. Const. amend. XVII (hereinafter the Unamended Vacancy Clause). The Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause nevertheless retains much of this language. 16 Most notably for our purposes, both Vacancy Clauses contain temporal limitations, including specifically that appointments be “temporary.” The Unamended Vacancy Clause provided two other express limitations: the trigger is limited to vacancies that happen “during the Recess of the Legislature of any State,” and the appointment lasts only “until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.” The Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause, however, provides just one other express limitation: the appointment lasts only “until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.” The Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause thus has a broader reach than 16 We provide a blackline for easy comparison: . . . and if When Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise in the representation of any State in the Senate, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the Executive thereof may to make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then people fill such the Vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. See U.S. Const. amend. XVII para. 2; id. art. I § 3, cl. 2 (additions in underline, omissions in strikethrough) (capitalization differences omitted). 26 TEDARDS V. DUCEY the Unamended Vacancy Clause, in that it applies throughout a Senate term. It is also more ambiguous than the Unamended Vacancy Clause, in that meetings of the state legislature occurred on regular schedules, whereas a popular vacancy election would not necessarily coincide with a regularly scheduled event. Plaintiffs argue that the Seventeenth Amendment’s reference to “temporary appointments” invokes a precise temporal meaning that this phrase had in the Unamended Vacancy Clause. Under the Unamended Vacancy Clause, a “temporary” appointment lasted no longer than the maximum interval between state legislative sessions. At the time that the Unamended Vacancy Clause was drafted, it appears that States held legislative sessions at least once a year. See Clopton & Art, supra, at 1211 n.119 (collecting state constitutions). As the Framers understood the provision, the maximum duration of a “temporary” appointment was thus one year. 17 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 33385, at 1–2 (1854) (concluding that an appointed Senator’s right of representation had expired upon the closing of the next legislative session following appointment). However, at the time that the Seventeenth Amendment was drafted, 17 Indeed, delegates to the Philadelphia Convention doubted whether it was wise to entrust a Senate appointment power to State Governors at all, but their concerns were assuaged by assurances of this time constraint. See James Madison, Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, Aug. 9, 1787 (“Mr. WILSON objected to vacancies in the Senate being supplied by the Executives of the States. It was unnecessary as the Legislatures will meet so frequently. It removes the appointment too far from the people . . . . Mr. RANDOLPH thought it necessary in order to prevent inconvenient chasms in the Senate. In some States the Legislatures meet but once a year. As the Senate will have more power & consist of a smaller number than the other House, vacancies there will be of more consequence. The Executives might be safely trusted he thought with the appointment for so short a time.”) (emphasis added). TEDARDS V. DUCEY 27 many States held legislative sessions only every other year. Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 864 (W.D.N.Y. 1968), summarily aff’d, 393 U.S. 405 (1969). The maximum duration of a “temporary” appointment then, assuming the permissible duration evolved with changing practice, 18 was therefore two years. These discrete time limits (one year or two years) are potential interpretations of the term “temporary” in the Seventeenth Amendment. 19 However, the Seventeenth Amendment’s omission of the very language from the Unamended Vacancy Clause that 18 The duration of actual interim appointments did grow longer. See Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 864 (finding that 32 of 179 appointees between 1789 and 1913 served for more than one year); Clopton & Art, supra, at 1211 n.120 (reporting based on “the aid of modern technology and more accurate sources” that only 21 pre-Seventeenth Amendment appointees served longer than one year, only one of whose tenure occurred during the first fifty years after the unamended Constitution was ratified). 19 Plaintiffs also invite us to also interpret the term “temporary” to invoke a functional analogy between the Unamended Vacancy Clause’s reference to the “next Meeting of the Legislature,” and the Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause’s reference to “the people fill[ing] the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.” That is, the term “temporary” could carry over an implication that the election by the people to fill the vacancy must take place at the popular-election equivalent of the “next Meeting of the Legislature.” Plaintiffs argue that the people are always in session. Thus, the State must hold the vacancy election as quickly as it is able to hold an orderly special election. Other functional interpretations are also possible, however, such as that the people meet when they vote in elections. Thus, the State must hold the vacancy election no later than the next election at which the people of the state are voting, which is to say any statewide election, including a special election or odd-year election. Or, the people meet in their federal political capacity when they vote for congressional representatives. Thus, the State must hold the vacancy election no later than the next congressional election, which is to say the next even-year November election. 28 TEDARDS V. DUCEY gave the term “temporary” a precise temporal meaning suggests to us that such meaning was not retained. We think it more likely that the meaning retained by “temporary” was simply that an appointment does not definitively resolve a vacancy, but rather lasts only until the event that actually “fill[s]” the vacancy. Plaintiffs invite us to find further meaning in the language of the Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause that duplicates language in the vacancy clause governing the House of Representatives (the House Vacancy Clause). The House Vacancy Clause states: When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 4. The Seventeenth Amendment materially replicates this language in the principal clause. 20 The House Vacancy Clause does not specify the amount of time that may permissibly elapse between the happening of a vacancy and the vacancy election. Given the two-year term of a Representative, however, we can deduce that any 20 We provide a blackline for easy comparison: When vacancies happen in the Representation from of any State in the Senate, the Executive Authority thereof of such State shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.: Provided . . . See U.S. Const. amend. XVII para. 2; id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (additions in underline, omissions in strikethrough) (capitalization differences omitted). TEDARDS V. DUCEY 29 vacancy election must occur within a timeframe shorter than two years, and generally earlier than the next congressional election. 21 We note the judgment implicit in this requirement, that a special election is practicable on this shorter timeframe, and that a special election is worthwhile notwithstanding the limited duration of the remaining vacancy. Accord Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 878 (Frankel, J., dissenting). However, we do not think the Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause should be interpreted as referencing the precise time constraints that apply in the House context, for two reasons. First, the effect of a House vacancy is different from that of a Senate vacancy. When a vacancy occurs in the House, the affected district has no representation in the House until the State certifies a winner of the special election. The House Vacancy Clause contains no provision for an interim appointee. By contrast, when a vacancy happens in the Senate, the affected state is normally still represented by a second elected Senator, as well as potentially by an interim appointee. The election of a replacement Representative is thus in some sense more urgent than the election of a replacement Senator. Accord 21 Plaintiffs’ reliance on Jackson v. Ogilvie, 426 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1970), and ACLU v. Taft, 385 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 2004), for the proposition that the House Vacancy Clause requires a special election as soon as practicable is misplaced. Both of those cases were concerned with whether the House Vacancy Clause mandates a special election at all, even with little time left in the vacant term. See Jackson, 426 F.2d at 1334; ACLU, 385 F.3d at 644. Both held that it does, so long as the remaining time is not truly de minimis. See Jackson, 426 F.2d at 1337; ACLU, 385 F.3d at 650. Both held further that the lame-duck session is not de minimis. See Jackson, 426 F.2d at 1337; ACLU, 385 F.3d at 649 n.5. But neither pronounced a time constraint that would require a special election earlier than the next general election. 30 TEDARDS V. DUCEY ACLU, 385 F.3d at 649 n.3; Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 862–63 (majority opinion). Conversely, however, the election of a replacement Senator is uniquely urgent in the sense that the Constitution prizes the equal representation of the States. See U.S. Const. art. V (“[N]o state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”). Second, as a practical matter, most States can likely conduct a special election more easily for a single congressional district than for an entire state. Most congressional districts are smaller than their entire states in terms of both geography and population. 22 Thus, House special elections generally require fewer polling places, fewer ballot materials, and a smaller elections staff. There may also be a smaller field of candidates, and candidates may be able to campaign more quickly. Accordingly, there is reason to think the Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause may allow a longer interval before the people fill the vacancy by election than does the House Vacancy Clause. Accord Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 862–63. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the final words of the Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause (“as the 22 Currently, seven states have only one congressional district: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. U.S. Census Bureau, Apportionment Population and Number of Representatives, by State: 2010 Census, https://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/files/Apportionment %20Population%202010.pdf. When the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified, five states had only one congressional district: Arizona, Delaware, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wyoming. Apportionment Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 62-5, 37 Stat. 13 (1911). When the original Constitution was ratified, two of the thirteen original states were apportioned only one congressional district pending the first census: Delaware and Rhode Island. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. TEDARDS V. DUCEY 31 legislature may direct”) are a cross-reference to the Elections Clause, which states: The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. We need not resolve this question, as we would disagree in any event with Plaintiffs’ argument that such a cross-reference independently imposes a time constraint on the vacancy election. Cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 311 (1941) (“Pursuant to . . . [the Elections Clause] . . . , the states are given, and in fact exercise a wide discretion in the formulation of a system for the choice by the people of representatives in Congress.”). In sum, we do not find that related constitutional provisions place any precise temporal limitations upon vacancy elections or appointments under the Seventeenth Amendment.
We next reflect upon the broader historical context and the public spirit of the moment that motivated the drafting and ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. As drafted in 1787, the original U.S. Constitution provided for two chambers of the national legislature elected in two different ways. While members of the House of Representatives were to be elected “by the People,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, Senators were to be “chosen by the [State] Legislature,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. The Framers had at least two 32 TEDARDS V. DUCEY motivations for designing the Senate in this way: (a) to secure the role of state governments in the new federal government, and (b) to balance the directly elected House with a legislative chamber comprising a more “select appointment.” The Federalist No. 62 (James Madison). 23 Congressional proposals to amend the Constitution in favor of the direct election of Senators began within Madison’s lifetime. See Clopton & Art, supra, at 1189 n.17 (collecting proposals as early as 1826). At least four motivations drove the reformers: (1) curbing corrupt practices in the choosing of Senators, such as bribery and control by party bosses; 24 (2) freeing state legislatures from the distraction and distorting effects of being responsible for choosing national representatives; 25 (3) avoiding deadlocks 23 See also James Madison, Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, June 6, 1787 (“Mr. SHERMAN: If it were in view to abolish the State Govts. the elections ought to be by the people. If the State Govts. are to be continued, it is necessary in order to preserve harmony between the National & State Govts. that the elections to the former shd. be made by the latter.”); George H. Haynes, The Election of Senators 1–18 (1906) (canvassing the debates that took place at the 1787 Philadelphia convention regarding the composition of the Senate, noting that the device of election by state legislatures was widely popular and was the device by which the delegates had themselves been selected). 24 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 55-125, at 3 (1898) (“The public press for years . . . has been teeming with legislative scandals in the election of Senators, until bribery and corruption are, we fear, in some localities, fast becoming recognized as a part of the legislative function . . . .”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 52-368, at 3 (1892)); Haynes, supra note 23, at 169–79; Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500, 536–41 (1997). 25 See Haynes, supra note 23, at 180–95. TEDARDS V. DUCEY 33 that left states unrepresented; 26 and (4) giving the people a greater voice in their own government. 27 This last motivation was primary. In the words of then-Professor, now Judge Jay S. Bybee: [W]hile corruption and legislative deadlock might have demanded reform, neither justified amending the Constitution. . . . In the end analysis, . . . the real justification for the Seventeenth Amendment was its populist appeal, a need to “awaken[] in the Senators . . . a more acute sense of responsibility to the people.” The people simply wished to elect senators themselves, without the mediation of their state representatives. William Jennings Bryan argued that “[i]f the people of a State have enough intelligence to choose their representatives in the State legislature . . . , they have enough intelligence to choose the men who shall represent them in the United States Senate.” Whatever the reasons for the original mode of selection, the voters were “a new people living and acting under an old system.” In the proponents’ view, the Senate had been “a sort of aristocratic body— too far removed from the people, beyond their reach, and with no especial interest in their welfare.” For populists and 26 See id. at 158–60, 195–96; Bybee, supra note 24, at 541–44. 27 See Haynes, supra note 23, at 131–32, 153–58, 166–69, 200–03; Bybee, supra note 24, at 544–47. 34 TEDARDS V. DUCEY progressives, election by the legislature was an anachronism[.] Bybee, supra note 24, at 544 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting H.R. Rep. No. 50-1456, at 2 (1888); second quoting 26 Cong. Rec. 7775 (1893); third quoting 28 Cong. Rec. 1519 (1896) (statement of Sen. Turpie); fourth quoting S. Rep. No. 54-530, at 10 (1896)). By the first decade of the twentieth century, a majority of state legislatures supported and had to some extent already implemented the popular election of Senators. See Richard Albert, The Progressive Era of Constitutional Amendment, 2 Revista de Investigações Constitucionais 35, 46–48 (2015). Having received House approval numerous times in various versions, the soon-to-be Seventeenth Amendment finally received Senate approval in 1911. H.J. Res. 39, 62d Cong., 47 Cong. Rec. 1879–1925 (1911). The House accepted the Senate’s version in 1912, 37 Stat. 646 (1912), and three quarters of the States had ratified the Amendment by mid-1913, 38 Stat. 2049 (1913). Reading the Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause in the context of its primary historical purpose, we think that the people are generally more empowered the more of a Senate term they are permitted to fill by election. Representation by a temporary appointee is some representation, but it is indirect representation only, of precisely the type the Seventeenth Amendment meant to substantially replace. However, the people may also suffer a loss of empowerment to the extent the vacancy election occurs too close in time to when the vacancy happened, if a too-quick schedule means the people are deprived of a meaningful choice among candidates. But beyond the amount of time that it takes to hold an orderly election, we TEDARDS V. DUCEY 35 think that the popular purpose of the Seventeenth Amendment counsels interpreting it to minimize the interval preceding the vacancy election and likewise the duration of appointed representation. As to the secondary concerns that motivated reformers, we note that corrupt practices are a heightened risk where there is only one decisionmaker (e.g. the Governor) rather than a large body of them (e.g. the State legislature). This risk was illustrated recently by Governor Blagojevich’s attempt to sell President-elect Obama’s vacant Senate seat. See Judge I, 612 F.3d at 541; Monica Davey & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Ex-Governor Found Guilty of Corruption, N.Y. Times, June 28, 2011, at A1. Thus, the shorter the tenure of an appointee, the shorter may be the time that a corruptly appointed Senator serves, and perhaps the less attractive will be the appointment to corrupt actors. We think the Seventeenth Amendment satisfies the overburdened legislature and legislative deadlock concerns regardless of the length of a temporary appointment. Thus, our review of the historical context leads us to disfavor any interpretation that permits excessively long vacancies, but still does not reveal any precise constraints.
Plaintiffs cite remarks by the Senator who proposed the final version of the Seventeenth Amendment in the Senate, and by the Representative who authored the Vacancy Clause’s final text in the context of a previous version of the Seventeenth Amendment introduced in the House, as supporting their interpretation of the Amendment. We disagree. We conclude that the cited reports are ambiguous as to the relevant questions. 36 TEDARDS V. DUCEY Senator Joseph L. Bristow 28 proposed the final version of the Seventeenth Amendment in the Senate. In his remarks on the Senate floor, he briefly explained the drafting of the Vacancy Clause. Regarding the principal clause, he emphasized that he had “use[d] exactly the same language in directing the governor to call special elections for the election of Senators to fill vacancies that is used in the Constitution in directing him to issue writs of election to fill vacancies in the House of Representatives.” 47 Cong. Rec. 1482–83 (1911). Regarding the proviso, he noted “[t]hat it is practically the same provision which now exists in the case of such a vacancy. . . . [T]he legislature may empower the governor of the State to appoint a Senator to fill a vacancy until the election occurs, and he is directed by this amendment to ‘issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.’” Id. These statements align with our conclusions regarding the text and constitutional context discussed above. They do not, however, illuminate whether legislators understood the final language to require that the necessary “special election” must “occur[]” by a particular time. Id. Representative Henry St. George Tucker III 29 authored an 1892 proposed version of the Seventeenth Amendment, 28 Senator Bristow (R-Kan.) was a former newspaper editor who devoted his political career to progressive reform, particularly with respect to popular participation in government. See U.S. Senate, Joseph L. Bristow: A Featured Biography, https://www.senate.gov/senators/ FeaturedBios/Featured_Bio_Bristow.htm. 29 Representative Tucker (D-Va.) was a constitutional law scholar who would later serve as dean of the law schools of Washington and Lee University and George Washington University. See Biographical Directory of the U.S. Cong., Tucker, Henry St. George, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000399. TEDARDS V. DUCEY 37 from which the final version of the Amendment borrowed the language in the Vacancy Clause (omitting one comma). Representative Tucker’s authorship received express acknowledgement during the Senate debates on the final version. 46 Cong. Rec. 2940 (1911). We therefore find Representative Tucker’s explanation of his language to be relevant here. In explaining his proposed language, Representative Tucker justified the principal clause, under which “the governor must order an election to fill the vacancy,” as “preserv[ing] the principle of election by the people.” H.R. Rep. No. 52-368, at 5 (1892) (emphasis added). He justified the proviso as responding to the predicament of those States that have “annual elections,” where any vacancy would therefore “in most cases not be of long duration, and to add another State election would be imposing an unnecessary expense on the people.” Id. (emphasis added). He went on to suggest that: . . . in a State where there are biennial elections the legislature might direct that if a vacancy occurred within a year [or any other period it might fix] after the election, the vacancy should be filled by an election by the people; but if the vacancy occurred more than a year after the election the vacancy should be filled by executive appointment. Id. (brackets in original). In context, we read this explanation to suggest that a state legislature would have discretion to direct that any vacancy occurring within the “period it might fix” be filled by prompt special election, but that any vacancy occurring thereafter be filled at the next general election, with a temporary appointee serving in the interim. 38 TEDARDS V. DUCEY We conclude that Representative Tucker’s report evinces a strong assumption that States would fill most Senate vacancies by popular election within one year of their occurrence. However, we are less confident that Representative Tucker’s report evinces any assumption that the proposed Vacancy Clause would require observance of this one-year limit. Rather, his report suggests that although the principal clause would require a special election (even sooner than one year) standing alone, the proviso defeats this requirement by leaving some discretion to state legislatures. The report does not anticipate the possibility that States with biennial elections might direct that a prompt special election is never required, postponing the people’s ability to fill the vacancy until the next general election no matter how near the previous election the vacancy arose. But neither does the report offer an interpretation of the proviso that would clearly prohibit this. The legislative history thus does not provide us with a clear view of the textual interpretation possessed by the members of Congress who voted in favor of the Seventeenth Amendment.
Defendants draw our attention to the Senate vacancy statutes enacted by most state legislatures shortly after the Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification. Defendants argue that these statutes demonstrate that the correct interpretation of the Vacancy Clause is one that permits a vacancy election at the next even-year election, or the second even-year election if the vacancy happens within some months of the first one. See Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 858–59 (where there is ambiguity or doubt, contemporaneous and subsequent state practice is persuasive evidence of the best constitutional construction) (citing McPherson v. Blacker, TEDARDS V. DUCEY 39 146 U.S. 1 (1892); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932)). We agree that these statutes provide persuasive evidence in favor of this conclusion. However, we note several caveats. Forty States enacted Senate vacancy statutes between 1913 and 1915. See Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 857 tbl.1, 871– 75 (App’x B). Nineteen States specifically required— whether expressly by reference to biennial or congressional elections, or implicitly by reference to the state’s general elections—that vacancy elections take place at the next even-year election. 30 Four States required that vacancy elections take place at the next even-year election following some additional time for nominations. 31 Four States required that vacancy elections take place at the next annual election. 32 Eight States required a special election within less than one year of the start of the vacancy. 33 The 30 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2870 (1913) (but authorizing Governor to call special election if this would result in lapse of over six months); 1913 Cal. Stat. 237 (but requiring vacancy election during any statewide special election if sooner); 1913 Fla. Laws 277; 1913 Ga. Laws 135; 1913 Ill. Laws 307; 1915 Ind. Acts 13; 1914 Ky. Acts 98; 1915 Mich. Pub. Acts 261; 1913 Minn. Laws 756; 1915 Mont. Laws 281; 1915 Nev. Stat. 83; 1915 N.H. Laws 32; 1915 Okla. Sess. Laws 57; 1915 S.D. Sess. Laws 367; 1913 Tenn. Pub. Acts 396; 1915 Utah Laws 54; 1915 Vt. Acts & Resolves 70; 1913 Wis. Sess. Laws 825 (but authorizing Governor to call special election sooner); 1913 Wyo. Sess. Laws 100. 31 See 1915 N.M. Laws 39 (30 days); 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 206 (30 days); 1914 Ohio Laws 8 (180 days); 1913 Pa. Laws 995 (60 days in advance of the primary). 32 See 1913 Colo. Sess. Laws 267; 1914 Md. Laws 1337; 1913 N.Y. Laws 2419 (plus 30 days); 1914 Va. Acts 252. 33 See 1915 Ala. Laws 364 (60 days, or 4 months if upcoming general election); Del. Rev. Code § 1890 (1915) (one year); 1914 La. Acts 471 (100 days); 1915 Me. Laws 35 (“forthwith”); 1914 Miss. Laws 40 TEDARDS V. DUCEY remaining five States did not set a deadline but appear to have left the timing of vacancy elections entirely or primarily to the Governor’s discretion. 34 The number of state legislatures apparently interpreting the Seventeenth Amendment to afford them discretion to postpone a Senate vacancy election for up to two years or slightly more is persuasive evidence that this interpretation reflects the original public understanding. Even the statutes providing for special elections within thirteen months or less do not necessarily evince an interpretation that the state legislature lacked discretion to postpone the election longer. 35 Nor can we entirely dismiss the interpretations of contemporary state legislatures as coming from the political bodies that the Seventeenth Amendment had just divested of power. The majority of state legislatures supported some form of the Seventeenth Amendment, and many had already implemented state-level reforms to create de facto direct election of Senators. Albert, supra, at 46–48. But we also do not find the state statutes conclusive as to the proper interpretation of the Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause. The evidence we have examined in this portion of our analysis tells us no more than that twenty192 (90 days, or calendar year of general election); 1914 R.I. Pub. Laws 65 (“as early . . . as will admit of compliance with . . . law”); 1914 S.C. Acts 592 (90 days); 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 101 (90 days). 34 See 1913 Conn. Pub. Acts 1839; 1913 Mass. Acts 1059; 1915 Mo. Laws 280; 1915 Or. Laws 59; 1915 Wash. Sess. Laws 232 (not less than 25 days from issuance of writ). 35 Indeed, many States that originally provided for prompt special elections later amended their statutes to postpone vacancy elections until the next even-year election. See Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 857 tbl.1, 871– 75 (App’x B). TEDARDS V. DUCEY 41 three state legislatures enacted statutes in the wake of the Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification that postponed a vacancy election to the next (or next practicable) even-year election. We do not know the extent to which that choice represented the state legislatures’ debate or deliberation, as opposed to uncontested assumption, regarding the meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment. We do not know how state or federal courts might have interpreted the Seventeenth Amendment if those statutes had occasioned contemporary challenges. 36 Cf. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 823 (1995) (“One may properly question the extent to which the States’ own practice is a reliable indicator of the contours of restrictions that the Constitution imposed on States, especially when no court has ever upheld [the challenged state practice].”). And we do not know whether the state legislatures that enacted speedier special election laws may have specifically interpreted the Seventeenth Amendment to so require. We do note that we have no example within contemporary state practice—or any subsequent state practice—of a State attempting to extend a vacancy or interim appointment by significantly more than the two-year gap between even-year elections. In sum, postratification state statutes favor, but do not compel, an interpretation of the Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause that leaves States broad discretion to schedule a vacancy election up until the next general election preceded by some reasonable period of time in which to hold the election. 36 We do know that many state courts had interpreted similar vacancy provisions in their own state constitutions to require prompt special elections. See Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 883 (Frankel, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). 42 TEDARDS V. DUCEY
We now turn to the four prior cases that have interpreted the Seventeenth Amendment Vacancy Clause at any length. We begin with Valenti and Rodriguez, and proceed to two related decisions decided by our sister circuits in the interim.
On June 5, 1968, U.S. Senator and presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy was fatally shot in the kitchen of the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles. Pursuant to thenapplicable New York law, the vacancy created by Senator Kennedy’s assassination occurred too close to that year’s Senate primaries to let the people of New York fill the vacancy by election in November 1968. 292 F. Supp. at 853. Instead, the law permitted the vacant seat to go unfilled by popular election until November 1970—an interval of 29 months. See id. Multiple plaintiffs challenged New York’s Senate vacancy statute and moved for an injunction ordering New York to hold a vacancy election in November 1968— i.e., five months from when the vacancy occurred. Id. In Valenti, a divided three-judge district court 37 dismissed the complaints. Id. 37 At the time of Valenti, Congress required that any case seeking an injunction against a state officer to prevent enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute be heard by a special three-judge district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964) (repealed 1976). One member of the specially constituted court had to be a circuit judge. Id. § 2284(1). The decision of the three-judge court was directly appealable to the Supreme Court. Id. § 1253. See generally 17A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Vikram David Amar, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4234 (3d ed., Aug. 2019 update) (tracing history of the three-judge district court from Congress’s reaction to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), TEDARDS V. DUCEY 43 All three judges on the panel agreed that the final words of the proviso (“as the legislature may direct”) grants “some reasonable degree of discretion” to state legislatures to determine the timing of a Senate vacancy election. Id. at 856; id. at 884 (Frankel, J., dissenting). They also all agreed that the word “temporary” could not “faithfully be read to allow appointments for anything approaching the full six years in the case of a vacancy occurring early in the term.” Id. at 881. They nevertheless disagreed regarding the outer boundaries of the State’s discretion, as well as regarding what evidence is relevant to answer that question. Writing for the majority, Second Circuit Chief Judge Lumbard 38 divided the relevant inquiry into two parts: (1) whether the Seventeenth Amendment permitted New York to skip the upcoming election—i.e., November 1968—and (2) whether the Seventeenth Amendment permitted New York to skip the next odd-year election—i.e., November 1969. See id. at 855 (majority opinion). He answered both questions in the affirmative. As to the first, he emphasized the State’s interest in holding primary elections, which he implied outweighed the people’s interest in a prompt special election. Id.; see also id. at 861–62 (emphasizing the virtues of primary elections). As to the second, he focused on the probative value of state statutes enacted shortly after the Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification, as we discussed above. Id. at 856–59. He also posited three “substantial state interests” as justifying a generous interpretation of the discretion the Amendment grants to state legislatures: to the Supreme Court’s frustration with the practice peaking in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to the “virtual abolition” of the practice in 1976). 38 Chief Judge Lumbard was joined by Chief District Judge Henderson of the Western District of New York. 44 TEDARDS V. DUCEY (a) capitalizing on maximum voter interest and turnout during even-year elections; (b) making it easier for Senate candidates to finance their campaigns; and (c) avoiding the inconvenience and expense associated with Senate elections in back-to-back years. Id. at 859–60. 39 39