Opinion ID: 2365258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether There is Coverage Under the Policy for a Claim for Emotional Distress Based on Discrimination or Humiliation

Text: The Policy language makes clear that only unintentional conduct falls within the coverage provision. Specifically, the policy covers: Discrimination or humiliation that results in injury to the feelings or reputation of a natural person, but only if such discrimination or humiliation is: (1) Not done intentionally by or at the direction of: (a) The insured; or (b) Any executive officer ... of the insured ... (Policy, Special Broad Form at 1 (emphasis added)). ALPA contends that despite the fact that Count III of the Complaint is entitled Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress, certain of the allegations contained therein, when read in conjunction with allegations from other paragraphs of the complaint, state a cause of action for negligent or unintentional infliction of emotional distress. ALPA contends that because the Twin Cities Insurance policy must be construed generously in favor of coverage for the policy holder and because negligent conduct that causes a personal injury is covered by the policy, Twin Cities had a duty to defend ALPA against the Zumbrun law suit. ALPA further contends that its request for damages for humiliation is consistent with such a legal theory. Based on a plain reading of the complaint filed in this case, however, we are confident that Virginia courts would reject such an argument. The complaint specifically pleads the following with respect to the claim for emotional distress. Count 3: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS. 26. The allegations of Paragraphs 1 through 25 inclusive are realleged and incorporated herein by reference. 27. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of care not to create or impose any undue physical or mental stress on plaintiff. 28. Within the time period complained of, defendants breached that duty when it engaged in an intentional and dishonest course of conduct which was calculated to cause, and it was foreseeable that it would cause, and which did cause Plaintiff extreme mental distress. 29. The acts complained of were extreme and outrageous, exceeded the bounds of those usually tolerated in a civilized community and were not reasonably part of the Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants. 30. Each of the acts complained of herein were done willfully, maliciously, and oppressively, and with the wrongful intention of injuring plaintiff, from an improper and evil motive amounting to malice and in conscious or reckless disregard of the Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff is thus entitled to recover punitive damages from defendants in an amount according to proof. In this case, Zumbrun complains that ALPA breached its duty of fair representation to him and that ALPA did so with the intent to cause him serious emotional distress. Both of these causes of action are grounded on allegations of intentional misconduct. Specifically, Zumbrun claims that ALPA breached its duty of fair representation to Zumbrun by: 1) conspiring with Delta to discharge him; 2) acting in bad faith and engaging in conduct deliberately designed to mislead Zumbrun and by acquiescing in Zumbrun's discharge as a concession to Delta. With respect to the count entitled  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (emphasis added), the complaint incorporates the allegations of intentional conduct from the previous paragraphs of the complaint and further alleges that ALPA engaged in an intentional and dishonest course of conduct which was calculated to cause and did cause Zumbrun mental distress. Further, Zumbrun charged that [e]ach of the acts complained [of] herein were done willfully, maliciously, and oppressively, and with the wrongful intention of causing injury [Zumbrun], from an evil motive amounting to malice and in conscious or reckless disregard of [Zumbrun's] rights. ALPA argues that despite the fact that Zumbrun's complaint clearly and unambiguously states a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the complaint also contains allegations that when read together could form the basis of a claim for unintentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, ALPA relies on Zumbrun's allegations that: 1) ALPA owed him a duty of care not to create or impose any undue physical or mental stress on him; and 2) that ALPA breached that duty in reckless disregard of his rights to support its contention that his complaint triggered a duty to defend. As we stated earlier, however, we do not read Virginia law as requiring courts to scour the complaint to see if there are causes of action not specifically pled by the plaintiff. Under Virginia law, the court in deciding whether there is a duty to defend under an insurance policy looks at the causes of action actually asserted in the underlying complaint and compares them with the terms of the insurance contract. See, e.g. Travelers Indem. Co., 245 S.E.2d at 249; Town Crier, 721 F.Supp. at 105. The court in Town Crier, applying Virginia law, specifically rejected the notion that mere alleged acts contained in a complaint, rather than claims actually set forth, can require an insurer to defend. Town Crier, 721 F.Supp. at 106. Here, the allegations in Zumbrun's complaint that comprise his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress accuse ALPA of engaging in an intentional and dishonest course of conduct that was calculated to cause [Zumbrun] mental distress; that ALPA's actions were willful, malicious and oppressive and done with the wrongful intention of injuring Zumbrun; and that at the time that ALPA was engaging in this conspiracy with Delta that cost him his job, ALPA was acting with an improper and evil motive amounting to malice. The sum of these allegations, when read in conjunction with the specific cause of action pled by Zumbrun make it abundantly clear that Zumbrun was charging ALPA with engaging in intentional and malicious conduct designed to injure him and not the unintentional or negligent conduct which ALPA now argues might be covered under the insurance policy. This interpretation of the complaint is also consistent with common sense and California law. [4] While California recognizes the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff bringing such a claim must allege facts which indicate that they suffered severe emotional distress. Bogard v. Employers Cas. Co., 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 210 Cal.Rptr. 578, 588 (1985). Zumbrun's complaint, however, does not allege any facts that could support a claim of severe emotional distress, a necessary element for a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Bogard, 210 Cal.Rptr. at 587-88. This provides further confirmation that the complaint filed by Zumbrun against ALPA and Delta never contemplated a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Town Crier, 721 F.Supp. at 104 (explaining that causes of action give rise to relief ... only if all the elements of a claim are proved). Accordingly, we hold that Zumbrun's complaint asserted no cause of action covered under the Twin City policy, and therefore, Twin City had no duty to defend ALPA in the Zumbrun litigation. Because we conclude that Twin City had no duty to defend ALPA in its suit against Zumbrun, we need not reach ALPA's second contention on appeal that it is entitled to the reasonable market value for the work of its in-house personnel. Affirmed.