Opinion ID: 2671312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: apple’s request for injunctive relief

Text: The district court granted summary judgment that Apple was not entitled to an injunction for infringement of the ’949, ’263, and ’647 patents. The majority vacates the grant of summary judgment—apparently for all three patents—because of its reversal of the claim construction for the ’949 patent. Majority Op. 69-70. I respectfully dissent, and would affirm the grant of summary judgment for all three patents. Apple argues that it presented ample evidence with respect to the eBay factors outlined above to survive summary judgment. I will only address the first injunction factor—irreparable harm—because I view it as dispositive. APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. 13 Apple argues that it is being irreparably harmed by Motorola’s infringement because sales of Motorola’s infringing products are causing Apple to lose market share and downstream sales. 4 But in order to rely on lost market share and downstream sales to show irreparable harm, Apple must provide more than evidence showing merely that Motorola is taking market share from Apple. Rather, Apple must be able to show a causal nexus between the inclusion of the allegedly infringing features in Motorola’s phones and the alleged harm to Apple. See Apple III, 735 F.3d at 1360-61; Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs., 678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Apple I) (“Sales lost to an infringing product cannot irreparably harm a patentee if consumers buy that product for reasons other than the patented feature. If the patented feature does not drive the demand for the product, sales would be lost even if the offending feature were absent from the accused product.”). The district court found that Apple had no evidence linking Apple’s lost market share and downstream sales to the inclusion of the allegedly infringing features in Motorola’s phones. See J.A. 152 (“Apple’s ‘feel good’ theory does not indicate that infringement of these claims (if they were infringed) reduced Apple’s sales or market 4 Apple also argues that a finding of irreparable harm is supported by evidence showing that Apple has a policy against licensing competitors to practice the three asserted patents. Apple’s willingness to license the asserted patents is, of course, relevant to the second injunction factor—the inadequacy of legal remedies to compensate for irreparable harm. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1369-71 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Apple III). However, I am not aware of any cases establishing that a policy against licensing patents can show irreparable harm in the first place. 14 APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. share, or impaired consumer goodwill toward Apple products.”). Rather, the district court found that “Apple is complaining that Motorola’s phones as a whole ripped off the iPhone as a whole,” which the court explained was insufficient because “Motorola’s desire to sell products that compete with the iPhone is a separate harm—and a perfectly legal one—from any harm caused by patent infringement.” Id. at 153. Apple contends that its evidence raises a genuine issue as to whether the allegedly infringing features are drivers of consumer demand for Motorola’s products. I disagree. First, with respect to the ’949 patent, Apple cites consumer survey evidence purporting to show that “having a superior touchscreen interface—as opposed to a physical keyboard—drives consumers demand for smartphones.” Apple Br. 65. This evidence, however, says nothing about the specific features claimed in the ’949 patent. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Apple II). The only evidence Apple cites that allegedly relates specifically to “the scrolling heuristics claimed by the ’949 patent” is testimony from Motorola executives about what they thought would be important to consumers. Apple Br. 66. However, we found similar evidence, standing alone, to be insufficient to establish a causal nexus in Apple I, explaining: While the evidence that Samsung’s employees be- lieved it to be important to incorporate the pa- tented feature into Samsung’s products is certainly relevant to the issue of nexus between the patent and market harm, it is not dispositive. That is because the relevant inquiry focuses on the objective reasons as to why the patentee lost sales, not on the infringer’s subjective beliefs as to why it gained them (or would be likely to gain them). APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. 15 678 F.3d at 1327-28. Accordingly, I agree with the district court that Apple’s evidence fails to raise a genuine issue as to whether the features accused of infringing the ’949 patent drive consumer demand for Motorola’s phones. As for the ’263 patent, Apple cites studies and surveys purporting to show that the claimed invention facilitated the development of popular apps for the iPhone and iPad, which in turn helped make Apple’s devices so popular. But Apple does not cite any similar studies for consumers of Motorola’s products. Even assuming the evidence shows that the ’263 patent is a driver of demand for Apple’s products, that does not mean the ’263 patent is a driver of demand for Motorola’s products. See Apple II, 695 F.3d at 1376. Apple’s only other evidence for the ’263 patent allegedly shows Motorola’s subjective beliefs that using “Apple’s simplification of streaming technology” would help it gain sales. Apple Br. 67. Again, however, this evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a causal nexus between Motorola’s incorporation of the allegedly infringing feature and the alleged harm suffered by Apple. See Apple I, 678 F.3d at 1327-28. Similarly, with respect to the ’647 patent, Apple cites evidence that “Motorola itself” identified the patent’s “structure-detection feature” as “a high priority and a ‘differentiating’ feature.” Apple Br. 68 (quoting J.A. 29,857). Apple also cites a newspaper article describing the feature as a “cool[] new feature[]” in Apple’s products. J.A. 29,893. As with the ’263 patent, this evidence is insufficient to establish the requisite nexus. For these reasons, I agree with the district court that Apple’s evidence fails to raise a genuine issue as to whether the allegedly infringing features are drivers of consumer demand for Motorola’s products. As a result, Apple cannot show that Motorola’s infringement has caused it irreparable harm. Apple therefore cannot meet 16 APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. the eBay standard for injunctive relief. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment of no injunctive relief.