Opinion ID: 2289766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Riparian Rights Under the Act of 1862

Text: A reading of the statutory language makes it apparent that the Act of 1862 enlarged the rights enjoyed by the riparian owner at common law and at the same time by Section 48 (Sec. 39 in the original Act) gave added protection to his shoreline interests by prohibiting the issuance of patents to submerged lands covered by navigable waters. Owen v. Hubbard, 260 Md. 146, 161, 271 A.2d 672 (1970); Melvin v. Schlessinger, 138 Md. 337, 343, 113 A. 875 (1921). Cf. Baltimore v. Canton Co., 186 Md. 618, 625, 47 A.2d 775 (1946). [3] However, the extent to which this Act enlarged the riparian owners' common law rights is the central question in this case. There have been a plethora of cases defining various aspects of these rights but not without some attending confusion. The difficulties encountered by Section 45 (Sec. 37 in the original Act) of the Act of 1862 are well summarized by the following quotation from the excellent comment titled, Maryland's Wetlands: The Legal Quagmire, S.M. Salsbury, found in the Maryland Law Review: The language and legislative intent of section 45 is as confusing as the conflicting interpretations that have been given it. The section entitles riparian landowners `to all accretions to said land by the recession of said waters,' a phrase which is technically inaccurate since it confuses accretion, which is a gradual and imperceptible build-up of soil deposits on the shore, with reliction, which is an exposure of submerged land by the retrocession of the water. Further ambiguities arise from the wording `accretion    made by natural causes or otherwise.' Since at common law accretions could only be formed by natural causes, [ Linthicum v. Coan, 64 Md. 439, 450-452 (1886)] it is unclear what accretions `made    otherwise are. Particularly troublesome is the question of whether land reclaimed by filling comes within the purview of accretions `made    otherwise.' 30 Md.L.Rev. 240 at 247. It would appear that artificial fill, in the sense that the fill material is brought over riparian land by mechanical means and dumped into the water or dredged up from the bottom of the sea and placed in front of riparian properties so as to create new fast land, was not within the established meaning of accretion, as it was known at common law. See U.S. v. 222.0 Acres of Land, 306 F. Supp. 138, 151 (D. Md. 1969); See Tome Institute v. Crothers, supra, at 584; 56 Am. Jur., Waters, § 486. All parties to this appeal devoted much of their briefs to the question of whether the term or otherwise contained in the language of Section 45 of the Act of 1862, providing for `accretion    made by natural causes or otherwise,' meant a build-up of the land exclusively by natural causes or whether it included artificial land fill. Larmar and Adkins contend that it includes the right to make and hold new fast land offshore by artificial landfill relying upon Goodsell v. Lawson, 42 Md. 348 (1875) as their most solid authority and also citing Causey v. Gray, 250 Md. 380, 243 A.2d 575 (1968); Baltimore v. Canton Co., supra at 625; Hodson v. Nelson, 122 Md. 330, 337-341, 89 A. 934 (1914) and West. Md. T.R. Co. v. Baltimore, 106 Md. 561, 565, 566, 68 A. 6 (1907). They further contend that the Act of 1862 was a state-wide act expanding the purposes of the Act of 1745, which latter act pertained only to the Town of Baltimore. The thrust of the Larmar-Adkins' argument is that the practical and administrative interpretation of the Act of 1862 for over 100 years permitted the riparian owner to make artificial landfill into navigable waters and construct improvements thereon, according to his own purpose and desire, subject only to the right of navigation and valid regulation (such as permission from the United States Army Corps of Engineers). The State agencies on the other hand contend that the Act of 1745 was passed to fulfill a need peculiar at that time to the Town of Baltimore, and that the recognized need of a thriving port and the necessity to fill in insect-infested marshes prompted the Legislature to encourage land fill and wharfing out by the riparian owner. The State agencies further contend that the Act of 1766 not only permitted an owner to fill the land, but actually required him to do so by providing that the riparian owner should, within one month after the end of the session of the General Assembly in which the law was passed, give bond with approved surety, that within two years he would abate the nuisance by wharfing in all marshy ground next to the water, and should also cover all such marshy ground with stones, gravel, sand, or dirt, so as to raise the same not less than two feet above the level of common flood tides. It was further directed that the reclaimed land be laid out into streets and lots. Chapter 22, Acts of 1766; The Wharf Case, 3 Bland 361 (1831). See also Wilson v. Inloes, 11 G. & J. 351 (1840). In short, the State agencies do not view the Act of 1745 as the progenitor of the Act of 1862. With regard to the Act of 1862, the State relies primarily on Hess v. Muir, 65 Md. 586, 5 A. 540 (1886) wherein the Court stated: Farming and commercial interests are promoted by the privilege [of constructing improvements into the water] and to encourage the development of these was the main object of conferring it. 65 Md. at 598. (Chief Judge Alvey would appear to give a broader interpretation of the Act of 1862 in his concurring opinion.) Hence, the State argues that even if it were conceded that under the Act of 1862, the riparian owner could, at will, fill in the waters offshore, subject only to the requirement that he not obstruct navigation, such reclamation was restricted to that which was necessary for farming or commerce for the enjoyment of the particular land in question, i.e., to the extent that filling the land was necessary to enable the [BAD TEXT] owner to till the soil, fish, and to ship products of the land and water. The State agencies hotly contend that the Legislature, in passing the Act of 1862, never intended that the riparian owner should have the right to make extensive land reclamation into navigable waters for the sole purpose of development of real estate lots for sale. In point of fact the State relies heavily on 50 Opinions Attorney General, 452 (1965), wherein the conclusion was reached that: The picture we draw of reclamation which a Maryland tidewater riparian owner has the unfettered right to accomplish as a statutory improvement shows small areas filled up in connection with wharfing out for the purpose of improving the riparian's own commercial access to deep water. A made-land housing development has nothing in common with this picture. 50 Op. Atty. Gen. at 468. Professor Power in his able work, Chesapeake Bay In Legal Perspective, supra, at 101, while acknowledging 50 Opinions Attorney General, 452 (1965) to be persuasive, opines that it is in error and puts it down as a conservationist's brief. A fair summary of his conclusion as to the rights of a riparian owner is found on pages 100-101 of the aforementioned work: The language used in Section 45 and 46 [Act of 1862] would seem to be broad enough to embrace artificial landfill projects. Section 45 provides that owners of land bounding on navigable waters shall have the same rights to accretions by virtue of recession of waters from either natural causes or `otherwise,' as do owners of land bounding on non-navigable streams. Since it had been resolved prior to 1862 that owners of land bounding on non-navigable waters were entitled to accretions, the apparent intent of the statute was to give navigable riparian owners on navigable waters the same rights. Although the syntax of Section 45 leaves something to be desired, that natural increases in the shoreline (accretions) be treated interchangeably with man-made increases appears to have been intended. This construction is buttressed by the language of Section 46, which lumps together `improvements' with `other accretions' and provides that they shall all belong to the abutting riparian land owners. Historical considerations seem also to support the right of the riparian owner to fill lands adjacent to his property. The earliest progenitor of Section 46 gave riparians in Baltimore City the right to make `improvements,' `as an encouragement to such improver.' [Laws, Ch. 9, Acts of 1745] The response to this authorization, which was not repealed until 1860, was so enthusiastic that the shape of the harbor was changed from a concave figure to a rectangular figure. [ Baltimore v. Canton Co., 168 Md. 618, 47 A.2d 775 (1946)] Against this backdrop it appears likely that when the General Assembly in 1862 (over two years after repeal of the Act of 1745 statute) used the identical word, `improvements,' it intended that riparians throughout the state have similar privileges. Cases decided under the 1745 statute uniformly recognized that riparian owners had the power to fill [ B. & O.R.R. Co. v. Chase, 43 Md. 23, 33-34 (1875)] subject only to the regulatory power vested in Baltimore City to protect navigation. Dicta in various cases decided under the 1862 statutes recognize the right of riparians to fill and acquire title to the land created, and the one case dealing with artificial landfill under the 1862 statutes acknowledges the rights of the abutting riparian. [ Goodsell v. Lawson, 42 Md. 348 (1875)]. Chesapeake Bay In Legal Perspective, U.S. Dept. of Interior (1970) at 100-101. After a thorough review of the many cases and authorities cited in the ably prepared briefs submitted by all parties we have come to the conclusion that the riparian owner under the Act of 1862 had the right to make artificial landfill in navigable waters in front of his shore, limited only to the extent that he could not obstruct navigation. This is a decision hard to come by, particularly in view of the circumstance that the writer of this opinion for the Court was Attorney General of the State at the time of the publication of the opinion espousing a contrary conclusion, 50 Opinions Attorney General, 452 (1965). Realizing the inconsistency of the position now taken six years later, the words of Lord Eldon come to mind. He, finding himself in a similar situation, stated: I feel myself bound to state that I must, when I decided that case, have seen it in a point of view, in which, after most laborious consideration, I cannot see it now. Ex parte Nolte, 2 Glynn & Jam. 295, 307-308 (1826).