Opinion ID: 4266372
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Next-friend standing for animals is barred by

Text: Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has clearly delineated the limits of next-friend standing: “[T]he scope of any federal doctrine of ‘next friend’ standing is no broader than what is permitted by . . . the historical practice.” Id. at 164–65; cf. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1818–19 (2014) (recognizing legislative prayer as a “historical” exception to the Establishment Clause); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 627 n.26, 626 (2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on the longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill[.]” (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court noted 26 NARUTO V. SLATER the two illustrations allowed by such “historical practice”: imprisoned individuals using habeas corpus and mental incompetents or minors. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 161–63, 163 n.4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (codifying next-friend standing for habeas corpus actions; Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2) (permitting next-friend standing for a “minor or an incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative” (emphasis added)). However, there is no historical evidence that animals have ever been granted authority to sue by next friend and, absent an act of Congress,4 it would be improper to expand this narrow exception to the actual injury requirement of Article III.