Opinion ID: 792429
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Investigate Mental Health Defenses or Mitigation Evidence

Text: 76 More troubling is counsel's failure to conduct a thorough investigation into Daniels's mental illness and possible brain damage. Even though Daniels refused to speak to his counsel, Jordon still had an independent duty to investigate the facts of his case and possible mitigation evidence. See Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.1994) ([C]ounsel must, at a minimum, conduct a reasonable investigation enabling him to make informed decisions about how best to represent his client.); see also Birt v. Montgomery, 709 F.2d 690, 701 (11th Cir.1983) (Essential to effective representation. . . is the independent duty to investigate and prepare.); Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 (11th Cir.1982) (At the heart of effective representation is the independent duty to investigate and prepare.); 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.) (It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction. . . . The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty.). 77 We have found counsel ineffective where he neither conducted a reasonable investigation nor made a showing of strategic reasons for failing to do so. See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir.1992) (vacating judgment of district court where it was not possible to determine if counsel's decision was a strategic one, and if so, whether the decision was a sufficiently informed one.). As we have explained, [p]retrial investigation and preparation are the keys to effective representation of counsel. Courts have repeatedly stressed the importance of adequate consultation between attorney and client, the interviewing of important witnesses, and adequate investigation of potential defenses. United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir.1983) (internal citations omitted). 78 In Wiggins v. Smith, the Supreme Court concluded that Wiggins was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to conduct an investigation that would have revealed a background of sexual and physical abuse, borderline mental retardation, and troubling experiences in the foster care system. 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Wiggins's trial counsel had made a minimal investigation: they had obtained reports from the Department of Social Services, had consulted a pre-sentence investigation report, and had hired a psychologist to perform some preliminary tests. Despite preliminary findings suggesting that Wiggins had been significantly victimized as a child, his trial counsel did not conduct any additional investigation or pursue any of these leads. 79 In reversing the Fourth Circuit's denial of the petition, the Court explained the focus of its inquiry this way: 80 [O]ur principal concern in deciding whether[Wiggins' trial counsel] exercised `reasonable professional judgment,' is not whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case. Rather, we focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins' background was itself reasonable. 81 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522-23, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (internal citation omitted). Counsel's decision not to expand their investigation beyond the preliminary reports they had access to fell below professional standards. Id. at 524-25, 123 S.Ct. 2527. The Court found it particularly unreasonable for counsel to limit the scope of their investigation given the preliminary reports, noting that any reasonably competent attorney would have pursued such leads in order to make an informed choice among possible defenses. Id. at 525, 123 S.Ct. 2527. In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's investigation. . . a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further. Id. at 527, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Using this standard, the Wiggins Court found that Wiggins's counsel had chosen to abandon their investigation at an unreasonable juncture, and thus had made a fully informed decision with respect to sentencing strategy impossible. Id. 82 Here, the record reveals that although Jordon believed Daniels may have suffered from a mental illness, he did little to investigate Daniels's mental health. Even after Dr. Banks's preliminary examination indicated a strong probability that Daniels was schizophrenic and suffered from paranoia, trial counsel did not follow up on these important leads by seeking a comprehensive evaluation by more qualified and experienced practitioners. Given these preliminary results, counsel was expected to investigate further, rather than abandon their investigation at an unreasonable juncture. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527-28, 123 S.Ct. 2527; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052([C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.). 83 Nor did counsel follow up on the evidence of Daniels's impaired mental state that was available in reports at the time he was preparing for trial. For instance, Jordon failed to review Daniels's family and social history, which described a family history of mental illness. Although many of the documents related to Daniels's social history were not collected until after he was convicted, they were all available at the time of Daniels's trial. Similarly, much of Daniels's medical history was available even without Daniels's cooperation as it was held by prison hospitals. Had counsel reviewed these records, they would have found that, even before 1982, prison psychiatrists and psychologists considered Daniels mentally ill, at risk of experiencing a psychotic episode, and in need of psychotherapy. Daniels's medical records also contained information about prescription medications he was taking at the time of the offense. Nevertheless, counsel never investigated what, if any, potential effect these medications may have had on Daniels's mental state. Counsel's failure to review readily available records held by prison officials fell below a reasonable level of performance. See Rompilla v. Beard, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2464-67, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (With every effort to view the facts as a defense lawyer would have done at the time, it is difficult to see how counsel could have failed to realize that without examining the readily available file they were seriously compromising their opportunity to respond to a case for aggravation.). 84 Instead of seeking further mental evaluations, Daniels's counsel relied on the expert witness testimony of psychologist Banks, who was not qualified to testify in a capital case and whose testimony toyed with the idea that Daniels could be a sociopath. 27 See Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 874-75 (9th Cir.2001) ([C]ounsel's ill-preparation resulted in the testimony of one defense witness . . . [whose testimony] contribut[ed] to the evidence in aggravation[,] not mitigation) (hereinafter Ainsworth II ). This alone constituted a significant error. See Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1257(9th Cir.2002) (It is significant in considering the impact of the omitted evidence on the reliability of [the defendant's] sentence, that the evidence presented by the defense as mitigation consisted primarily of lay background and character evidence. The only expert testimony presented relating to[the defendant's] mental health did not shed light on his brain damage, [but] tended, rather, to paint him as a violent psychopath.). Consequently, Daniels never received a thorough mental health examination or diagnosis, and the jury never heard any mitigating psychological explanation for Daniels's behavior. 85 In addition, Jordon failed to investigate or present evidence explaining Daniels's fear of returning to custody, which may have offered some explanation for his actions. Much of this fear could be based on Daniels's erroneous arrest in 1981, during which he received such inadequate medical care that he contracted urine poisoning. Evidence of this arrest and mistreatment was easily accessible in police records and in the public records of Daniels's suit filed against the County of Riverside. Counsel could have uncovered these records regardless of Daniels's cooperation. 86 The evidence presented at the district court's evidentiary hearing suggests that if Jordon had undertaken a thorough investigation of Daniels's mental state, the jury would have heard evidence that Daniels suffered from a mental disorder at the time he committed the murders. After conducting a comprehensive review of Daniels, psychiatrist Dudley concluded that Daniels suffered a paranoid disorder at significant times prior to the shootings as well as during the shooting and later during the trial. In Dudley's opinion, a competent psychiatrist would have reached the same conclusion in 1982. Equally compelling would have been Rosenthal's testimony that Daniels suffered from brain damage, at least since the 1980 shooting. Because his counsel did not thoroughly investigate Daniels's mental history, none of this evidence was put before the jury and could not be considered in the jury's deliberations. 87 Nothing in the record suggests that the failure to investigate was the result of a strategic decision. According to the district court, Jordon's decision to delay his investigation and preparation for the penalty phase until it was essentially too late to permit the development and therefore introduction of meaningful mitigation is without explanation or justification. 28 Jordon did request additional funds for mental health expert testimony, but not until one week before the penalty phase was to begin. Thus, when preliminary screening suggested that Daniels was both schizophrenic and brain damaged, insufficient time and funding prevented further evaluations by neuropsychology experts. Indeed, at the evidentiary hearing, Jordon testified that he was unable to pursue further mental health evidence because of funding and time limitations. It was this lack of time and funding—and not a strategic choice—that hampered Jordon's representation and ability to present mitigation evidence. 88 In summary, counsel (1) primarily relied on one inexperienced psychologist, who had conducted only a cursory screening of Daniels, as the principal witness in mitigation; (2) failed to follow up when this preliminary screening suggested that Daniels suffered from a mental disorder; (3) failed to follow up on evidence of paranoia; (4) failed to review Daniels's family and social history which described a family history of mental illness; (5) failed to investigate whether the medication prescribed for Daniels impacted his state of mind at the time of the shootings; and (6) failed to investigate Daniels's use of illegal substances, in particular, the combined impact of these with the prescription medications on his state of mind. 89 More importantly, counsel's failures were not the result of strategic decision-making, but of a communication breakdown with their client, the court's refusal to grant a continuance, a shortage of time, and repeated problems with securing state funding. As Wiggins makes clear, without a reasonable investigation, a fully-informed decision with respect to trial strategy is impossible. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527-28, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Because the failure to conduct a reasonable investigation lacked a strategic rationale, Daniels's representation was ineffective. See Hendricks, 974 F.2d at 1109; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (finding that counsel had an obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (finding that counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary).