Opinion ID: 174346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner Jermaine Archer

Text: On July 20 and 21, 1997, Petitioner Jermaine Archer had several brief street confrontations with Carlos Bethune and Reynaldo Niles. On the night of July 21, 1997, Bethune was driving his car with Reynaldo's brother, Patrick Niles, in the passenger seat. At one point, Bethune slowed down and noticed a van to the right of his car. According to Bethune, Archer then emerged from around the van, pulled a gun from his waist, and fired three or four shots, in quick succession, into Bethune's car before Bethune could drive away. One of these shots struck Patrick Niles in the back of the neck and killed him. Archer v. Fischer, No. 05 Civ. 4990(JFB), 2009 WL 1011591, at -2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.13, 2009). Archer was charged with intentional murder, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1), depraved indifference murder, id. § 125.25(2), manslaughter in the first degree, id. § 125.20(1), and manslaughter in the second degree, also known as reckless manslaughter, id. § 125.15(1). Archer was tried before a jury. At the close of the trial, the judge instructed the jury that it should consider the intentional murder charge first, and consider the offense of depraved indifference murder only if it found petitioner Archer not guilty of intentional murder. Similarly, the judge instructed that the jury should consider the charge of manslaughter in the first degree only if it concluded Archer was not guilty of depraved indifference murder, and it should consider the reckless manslaughter charge last and only if it found Archer not guilty of all previously considered charges. With respect to the depraved indifference murder charge, the court explained: A person is guilty of depraved indifference murder in the second degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly creates a grave and unjustifiable risk of death to another person and thereby causes that person's death. A grave risk of death means a very substantial, very great risk of death. A person acts recklessly regarding a grave and unjustifiable risk of death when he is aware of and consciously disregards a very substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from his actions. The risk must be of such [a] nature and degree that the defendant's disregard of it was a gross deviation, meaning a very great, flagrant, obvious departure from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would have followed in the same situation. Although this charge is called murder, it does not require proof of the defendant's intent to kill or even intent to murder anyone. In depraved indifference murder, taking the place of an intent to kill are the defendant's creation of a very great and unjustifiable risk of death, plus his reckless state of mind regarding that risk, plus circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life. Trial Tr. 516:2-25, 517:1. In further explicating the meaning of depraved indifference, the court stated that it relates to the dangerous circumstances alleged to have been created by the defendant. Trial Tr. 518:24-25, 519:1. The court noted that [a] depraved indifference to human life is much more serious and blameworthy than conduct that is merely reckless, because the conduct is much more dangerous. Trial Tr. 519:2-5. The court instructed: Circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life exist[ ] when, in the judgment of the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's conduct, beyond being reckless, was so highly and immediately dangerous to life and so wanton, without regard for or caring about the results to human life, and deficient in moral sense or concern, that it warrants the same level of criminal blame as the law imposes on someone who intentionally causes a person's death even though there is no intent to kill. Trial Tr. 519:5-14. Later in the instructions provided to the jury, the court explained the charge of reckless manslaughter. The judge stated: A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when he recklessly causes another person's death. A person acts recklessly regarding someone's death in manslaughter in the second degree when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death from his actions, and the risk is of such nature and degree that disregarding it is a gross deviation from the standard of conduct of a reasonable person. Trial Tr. 521:24-25, 522:1-7. The court then explicitly contrasted reckless manslaughter with depraved indifference murder. The court acknowledged that the crimes might be viewed as similar in that they both required proof that the defendant recklessly caused someone's death. Trial Tr. 522:14. However, the court made it clear to the jury that the crimes are distinct because manslaughter in the second degree does not require proof of circumstances evincing a depraved indifference... to human life. Trial Tr. 522:17-19. Archer was convicted of depraved indifference murder. [5] N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(2). Archer appealed his conviction to the appellate division. [6] While his appeal to the appellate division was pending, Archer made a motion in state supreme court, pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10, to vacate the judgment of conviction. [7] One of the grounds for this motion was Archer's contention that the depraved indifference murder statute was unconstitutionally vague. The state trial court denied his § 440.10 motion, holding that the depraved indifference murder statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Petitioner applied for leave to appeal the denial of his § 440.10 motion; this motion was denied by the appellate division. On October 25, 2004, the appellate division affirmed Archer's conviction. People v. Archer, 11 A.D.3d 704, 784 N.Y.S.2d 567, 567 (2d Dep't 2004). [8] Archer sought leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, which was denied. People v. Archer, 4 N.Y.3d 741, 790 N.Y.S.2d 653, 824 N.E.2d 54 (2004). Archer then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of New York. Archer, 2009 WL 1011591, at . The court held that Archer's vagueness challenge to New York's depraved indifference murder statute was without merit. Id. at -26. The court concluded that the statute gives the accused fair warning that his conduct was criminal and proscribed since ordinary people would understand that shooting at someone at short range in the vicinity of others would be criminal and put them at risk of a homicide conviction. Id. at  (internal quotation marks omitted). The court further reasoned that the language of the statute was adequate to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id. at . The district judge determined that the jury instructions administered in this case gave the jury sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory application of the statute. Id. On October 13, 2009, this Court granted, in part, Archer's motion for a certificate of appealability. The certificate issued by this Court was limited to the issue of whether New York's depraved indifference murder statute was unconstitutionally vague as compared to New York's reckless manslaughter statute at the time Archer's conviction became final. [9]