Opinion ID: 6330968
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether substantially the same evidence

Text: is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts. Adams, 487 F.3d at 689 (quoting Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 1982)). Each of these factors confirms that Mendoza I and Mendoza II involve the same causes of action. The “most important” factor is “whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Adams, 487 F.3d at 689 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). That is obviously true here: the gravamen of both suits is that, based on its findings concerning Mendoza’s extensive malfeasance, ATU was able to place Local 1637 into receivership and to oust its then-existing board. And given that core overlap, it is equally obvious that the two suits involve “infringement of the same right”; that litigation of the suits would involve “substantially the same evidence”; 14 MENDOZA V. ATU and that continued litigation of a second suit could impair any “rights or interests” that might be established in a judgment in the first. Id. The fact that Mendoza II involves somewhat different legal theories and a somewhat broader range of related conduct and damages does not alter the underlying fundamental identity of the suits under the Restatement’s same-transaction test. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982) (“Res judicata has recently been taken to bar claims arising from the same transaction even if brought under different statutes.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61(1) (Tentative Draft No. 5, Mar. 10, 1978) (additional citations omitted)).