Opinion ID: 1197794
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: is goodyear entitled to a new trial?

Text: The Court of Appeals relied on a longstanding practice of this court, dubbed the we can't tell rule in Whinston. Tualatin does not disagree with the rule but argues that, under ORCP 63 and 64, [8] the court may not grant a new trialthe remedy ordered by the Court of Appealsunless the party seeking a new trial also moves for that relief in the trial court. The record is clear that Goodyear did not move for a new trial after judgment was entered in the trial court; it moved only for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.). For reasons that follow, we agree with Tualatin. The pivotal rule relating to this issue is ORCP 63 C, which provides: A motion in the alternative for a new trial may be joined with a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and unless so joined shall, in the event that a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is filed, be deemed waived.  (Emphasis added.) A party that has lost a jury trial and believes that the trial court may have committed one or more reversible errors with respect to the conduct of that trial has a variety of remedies available. If the party believes that the trial court has made a legal error to which the party timely objected, without which the other side would not be entitled to prevail at all, then the party may move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If the trial court grants the motion, judgment will be entered for the party. If the trial court denies the motion, the moving party has the same clear issue for appeal. But it may be that a party either is uncertain of its entitlement to a clear win, or asserts legal errors that, even if well taken, would justify only a new trial, rather than a judgment in its favor. In such circumstances, it may be prudent to join a motion for a new trial with a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. But that choice does not follow automatically. A party may, for example, be unwilling to undergo the expense of a retrial, even if it would be entitled to one. Under such circumstances, it could well instruct its counsel to place all its eggs in the single basket of a motion for a j.n.o.v. The wording of ORCP 63 C is a recognition of the foregoing range of practical possibilities, and it would be difficult for a rule to be much clearer. The party that has lost the jury trial may join a motion for a j.n.o.v. with a motion for a new trial, but the rule imposes a price on the choice to file only the motion for a j.n.o.v.the alternate remedy of a new trial no longer is available. We would nullify the policy choice represented by ORCP 63 C were we to permit the court-made we can't tell rule to override it. The reason for the we can't tell rulejudicial necessityis inapplicable if the party that invokes that rule has waived the right to a new trial. Having chosen to hazard its fortune solely on its motion for a j.n.o.v., Goodyear waived any claim to a new trial. ORCP 63 C. The only other argument that might be made for the disposition made by the Court of Appeals would arise under ORS 19.130(1), which states that a reviewing court in a civil appeal may, if necessary and proper, order a new trial. However, such an order would not be proper, as the statute uses that term, where a party has waived its right to such a remedy under ORCP 63 C. The contrary conclusion of the Court of Appeals was error. [9] At first blush, it might appear that our disposition of this first issue also necessarily disposes of the case. As noted, Tualatin had a jury verdict in its favor on three different claims. Tualatin then was required after trial to elect the theory under which it would recover. It chose the common law theory, which gave it the largest recovery. Nonetheless, Goodyear's appeal to the Court of Appeals necessarily challenged the verdict on all three claims; to do less would have involved conceding Tualatin's right to recover the amount assessed by the jury as to any unchallenged claim. Because all the claims were based on the same factual allegations, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial on all three. And, because it had ordered a new trial as to all three, that court was required to rule whether the retrial of the OFA claim should be to the court or to a jury. As noted, it held that the issue should have been tried to the court. Our ruling on the we can't tell issue changes the posture of the entire case. Goodyear is not entitled to a new trial with respect to the common law claim. Because the Court of Appeals' bases for reversing the verdicts on the other two claims shared the same rationale as its reversal of the common law claim, its reversal of the other two claims also was erroneous. That fact would be of little more than academic interest by itself, in light of Tualatin's election of a remedy. But the Court of Appeals' disposition of this case permitted it to avoid answering assignments of error by both parties that it now will be required to address by our holding here. Among the questions not answered by the Court of Appeals was the issue of the amount of attorney fees, if any, to which Tualatin may be entitled under the OFA. Resolution of that question would be premature ifas the Court of Appeals ruledit was error to try that issue to a jury. Thus, the second issue raised on this petition for review, viz., the right to a jury trial under the OFA, remains alive. We turn to it now.