Opinion ID: 1781968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the trial court erred in allowing the statement of the defendant to be admitted into evidence in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution of the united states as well as article three, sections 14 and 26 of the mississippi constitution.

Text: Foster here contends allowing his statement to the police into evidence constitutes reversible error in view of the fact that there was no inquiry first into such relevant factors as his education, intelligence, background, experience with the criminal justice system, and, particularly, his age. Without such an inquiry, Foster asserts, there was no showing that his statement was given freely and voluntarily. The United States Supreme Court in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725-26, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571-72, 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212-13 (1979) held that whether a statement made by a juvenile during custodial interrogation is admissible necessitates an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances. The Court stated: This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved. We discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so. The totality approach permits  indeed, it mandates  inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. (cite omitted). Id. A suppression hearing was held to determine the admissibility of statements given by Foster to the police during his interrogation. The trial court heard evidence from Foster that he was seventeen years old at the time of his arrest and interrogation, that he had an eighth grade education, that his parents were uneducated and that he had suffered head injuries as a young child which allegedly caused some impairment of his mental faculties at times. Foster testified at the suppression hearing that he did not understand the warnings he was given prior to being interrogated. The trial court also heard from the two arresting officers that Foster was read his Miranda rights at least twice before any interrogation. Foster was asked whether he understood those rights and responded that he did. He was also asked whether he had any trouble reading or writing and he stated he did not. Before Foster gave his taped statement, an officer read him the form declaring the waiver of his rights and asked Foster if he understood the waiver. Foster responded he understood the waiver. The two officers who questioned Foster testified that they made no promises or threats nor did they coerce, intimidate or beat Foster. One officer testified that Foster was cooperative and did not appear to be afraid. The State offered into evidence Foster's tape recorded confession, a transcript of the taped confession and a handwritten version of the confession with Foster's signature. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial judge stated: BY THE COURT: I have read all of the exhibits tendered into evidence. When a motion to suppress statements or a statement is filed alleging violation of a defendant's constitutional, both state and federal rights, the burden of proof devolved upon the State to prove to the Court's satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements [sic] that is given were freely and voluntarily given after a knowing and intelligent waiver of those federal and state constitutional rights. The Court sits as both the finder of fact and law in motions to suppress. In this particular case, after hearing all of the evidence and testimony elicited and after observing the witnesses testify and observing their conduct in the courtroom during the course of this hearing, finds that the State has met its burden of proof, that is, the Court finds affirmatively from the evidence that the statements were freely and voluntarily given to the officers after a knowing and intelligent waiver of the constitutional rights afforded this defendant as is afforded any defendant. The motion to suppress these statements will be overruled. It is clear from the findings by the trial judge that he applied the correct standard in determining, after hearing all of the evidence and testimony elicited, that Foster's confession was given voluntarily and with a knowing and intelligent waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination. Jones v. State, 461 So.2d 686 (Miss. 1984); Frost v. State, 483 So.2d 1345 (Miss. 1986). Such findings are treated as findings of fact made by a trial judge sitting without a jury as in any other context. As long as the trial judge applied the correct legal standards, his decision will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly in error, or is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 169 (Miss. 1989), citing Frost v. State, 483 So.2d at 1350; White v. State, 495 So.2d 1346, 1347 (Miss. 1986). We find that the trial court's determination of the admissibility of Foster's statement was neither manifestly in error or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. This assignment is without merit and is rejected.