Opinion ID: 2074042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of defense counsel as a witness at trial

Text: The defendant argues that the trial justice erred when he excluded defense counsel's testimony about the Frazer phone call on the grounds that counsel was unable to lay a proper foundation for that testimony. We agree. At both the motion in limine and during trial, defense counsel argued to the trial justice that, if allowed, he would testify that he had a telephone conversation with Frazer shortly after Frazer was injured and that he recognized Frazer's voice from the numerous contacts that he had had with her in the past. [6] In our opinion, according to Rule 901 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence [7] and this Court's previous rulings regarding the necessary foundation for voice identification, nothing more was required. See State v. Marrapese, 122 R.I. 494, 501-02, 409 A.2d 544, 549 (1979) (holding that prior to the admission of a witness' opinion as to the identity of a speaker, it need only be established that the witness is familiar with the voice of the alleged speaker, and that once a prima facie case of authenticity is made out, the testimony is admissible and the reliability of the identification becomes an issue for the trier of fact). It is well settled, however, that this Court may uphold a trial justice's decision even though the specific grounds relied upon by the justice were erroneous.  State v. Froais, 653 A.2d 735, 738 (R.I. 1995); see also State v. Ellis, 619 A.2d 418, 426 (R.I.1993) (trial justice's decision to allow the defendant's statement into evidence upheld on different facts than those relied upon by the trial justice); State v. Nordstrom, 529 A.2d 107, 111 (R.I.1987) (This [C]ourt on appeal is free to affirm a ruling on grounds other than those stated by the lower-court judge.). This is so even when the trial justice's ruling was, as it was in this case, evidentiary in nature. See State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1054 (R.I.2004) ([W]e can affirm the trial justice's evidentiary ruling on grounds other than the ones actually relied upon to admit this testimony.). Also, we note that prior to rendering his final ruling excluding defense counsel's testimony on foundational grounds, the trial justice also heard extensive argument from the parties about the effect of Rule 3.7 on the admissibility of the testimony. [8] It is on the requirements of that rule that we now focus our attention. On appeal, defendant argues that the admissibility of defense counsel's testimony should be analyzed solely through the prism of the rules of evidence, that Rule 3.7 is merely a disciplinary rule that does not affect an attorney's competence as a witness, and that the rule therefore was not a proper basis for his exclusion. We do not agree. Although it is true that the issue of whether an attorney may testify at trial generally is governed by the rules of evidence, see State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931, 937 (R.I.1992) (A court may only scrutinize the competency of a witness testifying at trial and not his or her professional status.    [W]e presume that a prosecuting attorney is competent to testify at a trial.); [9] State v. Caldwell, 117 Ariz. 464, 573 P.2d 864, 871 (1977) (As a matter of evidence law, the general rule is that a defense attorney is competent to testify on behalf of his client.), Rule 3.7(a) could not be more specific in its mandate: [a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness   . (Emphases added.) Thus, the rule (subject to certain enumerated exceptions that are inapplicable in this case) puts the burden on the attorney to decide whether to continue as advocate and forgo testifying, or withdraw as advocate because of the necessary nature of his testimony. When the attorney resolves to remain as an advocate, his testimony, although perhaps admissible under the rules of evidence, nevertheless is precluded by that determination unless and until withdrawal or disqualification is requested and that request is granted by the trial court. In this case, as his discovery responses naming himself as a witness illustrate, defendant's counsel was aware long before trial of the potential need to present himself as a witness. In essence, he created the dilemma and then impaled himself on its horns. Assuming he believed that his testimony was critical to his client's case, the onus to withdraw from the case early on  when that withdrawal would have caused minimal, if any, prejudice to his client  rested squarely on his shoulders. Significantly, however, defendant's counsel never requested permission from the trial court to withdraw from the case, and he vigorously objected to the state's efforts to keep him from testifying. In our view, the trial justice was under no obligation to require his withdrawal or to disqualify him absent such a request. See Caldwell, 573 P.2d at 871 (When defense counsel has reason to believe that he will be called as a witness, the burden is upon him to propose the solution of his withdrawing from the case.). In our opinion, therefore, it would have been improper to allow counsel to testify in the same case in which he had chosen to remain an advocate. See id. (holding that because the attorney did not offer to withdraw, the trial court was correct in ruling that his testifying would be improper).