Opinion ID: 657339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of the Extended Border Search Doctrine

Text: 30
31 Cardenas first contends that the district court erred in applying the extended border search doctrine in her case. She argues that the justification for relaxing the warrant requirement under the extended border search doctrine is the mobility, speed, and capability for smuggling associated with vehicles. She thus concludes that the border search doctrine was formulated to apply only to vehicles, not pedestrians, crossing the border. We disagree. 32 Although reported cases concerning the extended border search doctrine involve the search of a vehicle, the doctrine was not formulated to apply only to vehicles that have crossed the border. The major impetus behind the extended border search doctrine is the government interest in stopping drug traffic. WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS Sec. 15.3, at 15-20 (Supp.1993); cf. United States v. Kenney, 601 F.2d 211, 212-13 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979) (noting that subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, 19 U.S.C. Sec. 482 authorizes customs inspectors to stop and search at the border any vehicle or person suspected of bringing contraband into the country). We explained the basic rationale for an extended border search in United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097, 102 S.Ct. 669, 70 L.Ed.2d 638 (1981): 33 While the mere fact that a person or thing has once crossed the border does not sanction a search of it forever after, we have also recognized that the need to protect personality and property against warrantless invasion must be balanced against the myriad difficulties facing customs and immigration officials who are charged with the enforcement of smuggling and immigration laws. We have, therefore, recognized in the doctrine of extended border search, the government's power, under certain circumstances, to search without a warrant persons and things after they have entered the country. 34 Id. at 771 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Flynn, 664 F.2d 1296, 1306 n. 17 (5th Cir.) (explaining that an extended border search enables government officials to search persons or goods at some point after they have crossed the border where there is a reasonable suspicion of secreted contraband that can be shown to have been present at the time the border was crossed) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S.Ct. 1979, 72 L.Ed.2d 446 (1982); United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1070 n. 16 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 1617, 71 L.Ed.2d 852 (1982) (same). Thus, because both vehicles and persons crossing the border may harbor contraband, it follows that the extended border search doctrine should permit the search of not only vehicles but also persons--the caveat being, however, that the requirements enunciated in Espinoza-Seanez must be met so that an entrant's legitimate expectations of privacy are not unconstitutionally intruded upon. 4 To view the extended border search doctrine in the limited manner which Cardenas prescribes would be to frustrate the purpose of the extended border search doctrine--as well as the border search doctrine itself on which the extended doctrine is based--so as to limit illogically the right of a sovereign state to control what persons or property crosses its international borders. We therefore find Cardenas' argument to be without merit. 35
36 Cardenas contends generally that the district court based its determination that the Espinoza-Seanez factors had been demonstrated on clearly erroneous factfindings, i.e., that the taxi driver gave a description of Cardenas' clothing to Inspector Soledad before Soledad set out to look for Cardenas, that Cardenas volunteered to walk with Soledad to the Head House, and that Cardenas told Soledad that she had just crossed the border. We find no support in the record for these particular findings. However, we consider the other findings made by the district court, which are supported by record evidence, in reviewing the district court's conclusion that the Espinoza-Seanez factors have been demonstrated.(i). Reasonable certainty of a border crossing 37 Cardenas first contends that the government failed to show by a reasonable certainty or a high degree of probability that she had just crossed the border. She argues that she was not viewed with suspicion as she crossed the border, that she was not kept under surveillance after she crossed, and that nothing about her appearance or her being located within a block of the border when found supports a high degree of probability that she had just entered the United States. She thus concludes that the first Espinoza-Seanez requirement was not satisfied and that her search and seizure cannot be qualified as having been made under the extended border search doctrine. Again, we disagree. 38 Despite Cardenas' argument otherwise, continuous surveillance is not a requirement of an extended border search. Niver, 689 F.2d at 527; United States v. Ingham, 502 F.2d 1287, 1291 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911, 95 S.Ct. 1566, 43 L.Ed.2d 777 (1975); see also United States v. Driscoll, 632 F.2d 737, 739 (9th Cir.1980). 5 Furthermore, although the reasonable certainty standard, which governs our inquiry into whether a border crossing has occurred, requires more than probable cause, it does not require knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Espinoza-Seanez, 862 F.2d at 531. The reasonable certainty standard requires that 39 the totality of facts and circumstances within the [government] officers' knowledge of which they have reasonably trustworthy information be sufficient in the light of their experience to warrant a firm belief that a border crossing has occurred. 40 United States v. Corral-Villavicencio, 753 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1366-67 (9th Cir.1976)). Moreover, that a border crossing has occurred may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. See Delgado, 810 F.2d at 484 n. 2 (explaining that government officials need not actually observe a border crossing in order for their search to be considered reasonable). For example, in United States v. Barbin, 743 F.2d 256, 261 (5th Cir.1984), this court concluded that it was reasonably certain that a sailboat and trailer had crossed the United States border from Mexico because (1) an informant had reported to customs inspectors that the boat and trailer were approaching the border on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande River; (2) the boat and trailer were later sighted within 25 miles of the border on the United States side; (3) the boat and trailer were found with sand and river mud on them; and (4) trailer tracks, which matched the trailer, were found at the border river crossing. 41 Additionally, in United States v. Delgado, we upheld the district court's determination that the search of a truck qualified as an extended border search because there was a reasonable certainty that the contraband found in the truck had crossed the border. 810 F.2d at 484. In Delgado, James Marchant, a customs investigator, received information that a drug smuggling operation was using a specific crossing on a farm on the Rio Grande River to smuggle marijuana into the United States from Mexico. Id. at 481. Marchant was informed that a convoy of vehicles had left Juarez, Mexico, headed downriver on the Mexican highway to the crossing at the farm and that before 9 p.m. the marijuana was to be offloaded from one of the vehicles--a large truck capable of carrying tonnage--and smuggled across the border into the United States. Id. at 482. Relying on the past credibility of his informant, Marchant established surveillance at the farm with another customs official, both of whom were positioned so that traffic not coming from the border area had to pass one of the two inspectors. Id. 42 When Marchant saw a truck driving away from the border on the road out of the farm at 7:30 p.m. Marchant concluded that it had come from the border area because it had not passed either him or his partner. Id. Marchant then followed the truck on the highway, and when a car passed him to travel with the truck, he concluded--from his experience--that the car was a heat vehicle, traveling in tandem with the truck to ensure that the truck reached its destination. Id. This court upheld Marchant's subsequent stop and search of the truck under the extended border search doctrine, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable certainty that the contraband had crossed the border. Id. at 484. 43 Evidence in the instant case is also circumstantial. Testimony indicates that Cardenas' co-defendant Lawal appeared nervous and was very evasive in answering routine questions posed to him by Inspector Valdez as he attempted to cross the border, that a patdown search of Lawal rendered razor blades (for which Lawal attempted to fight), a roll of transparent tape, and a picture of Cardenas, and that a strip search of Lawal brought forth a United States passport issued to Cardenas that contained visa stamps for the Philippines, which Lawal attempted to hide. Specifically, Valdez testified that based on his past experience, the presence of the razor blades, as instruments commonly used in the cutting of heroin and cocaine, raised his suspicion that Lawal was involved in narcotics trafficking. He further testified that because his experience had shown that drug smugglers often travel in pairs and split up as they go through customs to avoid detection, he discontinued the search of Lawal to brief Inspector Soledad, his supervisor, of his suspicions--i.e., that Lawal and Cardenas were partners in a smuggling scheme and that Cardenas had recently crossed the border and was somewhere nearby. He also attested that Cardenas' passport with visa stamps from the Philippines, which was recognized by inspectors as a high source country for narcotics, made him very suspicious of her involvement in a smuggling scheme. Moreover, Soledad testified that Cardenas was found not more than a block away from the border crossing, standing next to a wall near a store, within minutes of his proceeding to look for her. 44 The evidence provided by the searches of Lawal, Valdez's familiarity with the modus operandi of drug smugglers in crossing the border in pairs, Valdez's briefing of Inspector Soledad on his suspicions about Cardenas and Lawal, the location at which Cardenas was found, and the short time frame during which the inspectors discovered Cardenas' picture and passport with Lawal and then found Cardenas herself near the border indicate a high degree of probability or a reasonable certainty that Cardenas had crossed the border. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that the government had sufficiently demonstrated the first factor enunciated in Espinoza-Seanez. 45 (ii). Reasonable certainty of unchanged condition 46 Cardenas also argues that the district court erroneously concluded that the government had established the second Espinoza-Seanez factor, i.e., a reasonable certainty that there had been no change in Cardenas' condition from the time of the border crossing until the time of the search and that the heroin found on Cardenas' person had been present when she crossed the border. She asserts that Inspector Alvarado, who allowed her to pass through the pedestrian lane without inspection, did not notice her looking bulky around the waist and that no one testified whether she looked the same when she crossed the border as when she was confronted in El Paso. We are, however, unpersuaded by Cardenas' argument. 47 Testimony supports the district court's finding that between fifteen and thirty-five minutes elapsed between the time Inspector Alvarado passed Cardenas through the pedestrian lane and the time Inspector Soledad encountered her in El Paso--not more than a block from the border. Furthermore, the district court found Inspector Hasan's testimony to be convincing. Hasan testified not only to the difficulty of removing the girdle from Cardenas' body but also to the difficulty of placing the girdle around Cardenas' waist with the bulky, plastic packages underneath. Hasan also testified that it would have been difficult for Cardenas to put on the girdle and the plastic packages quickly and extremely difficult for her to have done so with no help. Specifically, Hasan testified that Cardenas required assistance to position one of the packages of heroin underneath the girdle she was wearing as it was positioned, i.e., on her back. 48 Cardenas argues, however, that it is ludicrous to believe that she could not have put on the girdle in a restroom or dressing room in one of the nearby El Paso shops. She also asserts that because Hasan testified that it took approximately five minutes to help Cardenas put the girdle on, Cardenas had plenty of time to do so during the fifteen to thirty-five minutes when she was unobserved in downtown El Paso. 49 We again emphasize that continuous surveillance is not a requirement of an extended border search. Niver, 689 F.2d at 739; Driscoll, 632 F.2d at 739; Ingham, 502 F.2d at 1291. This court has also upheld border searches in which defendants have remained unobserved for periods of thirty minutes, United States v. Ramos, 645 F.2d 318, 321 (5th Cir.1981), and fifty-five minutes, United States v. Walters, 591 F.2d 1195, 1198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 945, 99 S.Ct. 2892, 61 L.Ed.2d 317 (1979). Although the searches conducted in Ramos and Walters were each deemed a functional equivalent of the border search, and not an extended border search as the district court decided in the instant case, our discussion in those cases aids our analysis of Cardenas' situation. 50 In Walters, for example, fifty-five minutes had elapsed between the time the defendant passed through the airport customs enclosure to the time a customs agent requested that she return to the customs enclosure. 591 F.2d at 1198. During that fifty-five minute period, the defendant testified that she had gone upstairs to the end of the airport terminal building, into a drugstore where she bought a soda and looked at magazines, and returned to the airport lobby. Id. We took into account the defendant's limited activities during the fifty-five minute period, that her clothing was unchanged when she returned to customs, and that cocaine had been taped to her body under heavy clothes and a girdle to determine that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the cocaine was in the same position on the defendant's person as it had been when the defendant entered the country. Id. 51 In Ramos, we reviewed the district court's determination that the government demonstrated with reasonable certainty that the contraband found on the defendant had recently crossed the border. The defendant had been approached by customs officials within thirty minutes of leaving the airport customs enclosure. 645 F.2d at 320-21. The defendant testified that during that thirty-minute period he had checked into the airport hotel which was part of the terminal complex. Id. at 321. However, there was no indication that the defendant had gone to his room because he had not changed clothes since his departure from the customs enclosure and was carrying the same briefcase. Id. A patdown search of the defendant eventually revealed a package of cocaine taped to the defendant's leg and covered by an ace bandage. Id. at 320. In agreeing with the district court that it was reasonably certain that the cocaine found on the defendant had crossed the border, we explained: 52 The government is not required to negate every hypothetical possibility as to how the contraband may have been obtained subsequent to the border crossing. In this case, the mere assertion by the defendant that there was the opportunity to obtain the contraband after the border crossing is insufficient to controvert the facts established by the government. Although opportunity is, of course, one factor, and might be the controlling factor if the contraband were found loose in a pocket or purse, the court finds that it is highly unlikely that cocaine obtained after a long international flight, late at night almost contemporaneously with registration in a hotel, would be carried in the manner of the cocaine found in this case. 53 Id. at 321 (emphasis added). 54 In light of our discussion in Walters and Ramos, and after reviewing the evidence in the instant case on which the district court made its factual findings, we cannot say that the district court erred in determining that the government demonstrated a reasonable certainty that Cardenas, and thus the heroin secured to her person, had not changed in condition between the time she crossed the border and the time she was found in El Paso. We therefore find Cardenas' contention to be without merit. 55 (iii). Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 56 Finally, Cardenas contends that the inspectors who found her in El Paso had at best a generalized suspicion that she was involved in criminal activity but no particularized suspicion. She asserts that the inspectors who encountered her in El Paso noticed nothing suspicious about her when they approached and that the inspectors who suspected Lawal of drug trafficking could not transfer that suspicion to Cardenas simply because Lawal possessed Cardenas' passport. She thus concluded that the district court erred in determining that the third factor enunciated in Espinoza-Seanez, a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring, had been demonstrated. Again, we disagree. 57 Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity must be based on specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant an intrusion. See United States v. Lopez-Gonzalez, 916 F.2d 1011, 1013 & n. 3 (5th Cir.1990) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and explaining that factors relevant to the reasonable suspicion inquiry for a Terry stop might also be relevant to the reasonable suspicion inquiry in an extended border search, particularly for those stops in which the transportation of contraband is suspected); United States v. Miranda-Perez, 764 F.2d 285, 288 (noting that the reasonable suspicion standard reaches to stops for the purpose of investigating not only suspected smuggling of contraband or transportation of illegal aliens but also, in a broader sense, for investigating suspected criminal activity). We have also made it clear that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is not limited to any particular set of factors. Espinoza-Seanez, 862 F.2d at 531. Instead,  'each case must turn on the totality of the particular circumstances.'  Id. (quoting Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d at 410-11). 58 Testimony supports the district court's finding that Lawal was concealing Cardenas' passport, a passport marked with visa stamps from the Philippines, which Inspector Valdez recognized as a high source country for narcotics. We have found such evidence to be supportive of a government official's reasonable suspicion of the person to whom the passport had been issued. See United States v. Adekunle, 980 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir.1992) (evidence that a person carried a passport from Nigeria, a known narcotics source country, supported the custom agent's reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2380, 124 L.Ed.2d 284 and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2455, 124 L.Ed.2d 670 vacated in part on reh'g on other grounds, 2 F.3d 559 (5th Cir.1993). Testimony further supports the finding that Lawal tried to hide Cardenas' passport from the inspectors and that Lawal was also carrying a photograph of Cardenas in his wallet. The district court also found that the inspectors possessed an abundance of information supporting a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, i.e., evidence obtained from the search of Lawal--especially the razor blades which Lawal struggled to keep from the inspectors--and Inspector Valdez's testimony that his experience indicated that drug smugglers often traveled in pairs and crossed the border separately but at approximately the same time. When viewed as a whole, the evidence supports the district court's determination that Lawal and Cardenas were each reasonably suspected of criminal activity. We thus cannot say that the district court erred in determining that the third factor enunciated in Espinoza-Seanez, a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on Cardenas' part, had been demonstrated.