Opinion ID: 1160457
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: In Limine Motion to Bar Evidence About Sandra S.

Text: Immediately prior to trial, the People moved the superior court, in limine, to preclude defendant and Ross from inquiring into certain areas in their questioning of Sandra S. in the presence of the jury, on grounds including that any testimony in response would not be relevant, i.e., would not have any tendency in reason to prove or disprove a disputed fact bearing on a material issue (Evid. Code, § 210). The areas were these: (1) her general sexual habits, including prior misdemeanor convictions she had suffered for prostitution; (2) her general drug use, other than on the date of the charged rape and the date of her testimony; and (3) a rape complaint she had made against an unidentified man only after she had been approached by the police about an unrelated matter  she subsequently made a rape complaint against defendant only after she had been approached by the police about the theft of Glidewell's Camaro. The prosecutor represented that, on direct examination, he would have her admit that, as of the date of the charged rape, she was working as a prostitute. Defendant opposed the motion insofar as it sought to bar, as irrelevant, evidence of Sandra S.'s general drug use. He argued that such evidence might be relevant for impeachment if she should deny such use. He also opposed the motion insofar as it sought to bar, as irrelevant, evidence of her prior belated rape complaint. He argued that such evidence would be relevant for impeachment because it assertedly revealed a propensity to fabricate. But on the prosecutor's representation that she would admit working as a prostitute, he did not oppose the motion insofar as it sought to bar, as irrelevant, evidence of her general sexual habits. Indeed, when the superior court observed, I don't see any reason why evidence of her prior misdemeanor prostitution convictions would be admissible, defense counsel agreed, I'm not even going to argue that. The statement and response were both apparently predicated on Evidence Code section 787, which expressly renders evidence of misconduct generally inadmissible for impeachment, and impliedly does the same for evidence of prior misdemeanor convictions, or more precisely, evidence of the misconduct underlying such convictions. Ross did not oppose the motion in any respect, since she was not charged with the rape of Sandra S. The superior court proceeded to grant the motion. It found unpersuasive defendant's argument that evidence of Sandra S.'s general drug use might be relevant for impeachment: It was speculative. It also found unpersuasive his argument that evidence of her prior belated rape complaint would be relevant for impeachment: its premise was that the prior complaint was false; the support proffered therefor  viz., defense counsel's speculation that the police might not have really fe[lt] it was a crime because they apparently did not even write a formal report of the incident, but told her if she ever sees the guy again to let them know  was insufficient. At the guilt phase, Sandra S. testified on the People's behalf. On direct examination, she admitted that, as of the date of the charged rape, she was working as a prostitute. On cross-examination, defendant inquired into her work as a prostitute, and did so openly and repeatedly. But he did not inquire into her general sexual habits, including her prior misdemeanor prostitution convictions; her general drug use, other than on the date of the charged rape and the date of her testimony; or her prior belated rape complaint. Forgoing any cross-examination at all, Ross made no inquiry whatsoever. (13a) Defendant now contends that the superior court erred by granting the People's motion to bar, as irrelevant, the introduction of evidence of Sandra S.'s prior misdemeanor prostitution convictions and her prior belated rape complaint. He argues that evidence on each of these matters would have been relevant for impeachment. In its first part, as to evidence of Sandra S.'s prior misdemeanor prostitution convictions, we reject the claim at the threshold. Defendant has not preserved the point for review in this respect. He may not offer an argument here that such evidence would have been relevant for impeachment because he did not offer any to that effect below. ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 262, fn. 2 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897]; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1251-1252 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) We recognize that, at the time of the motion, we had yet to decide People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938], in which we held that article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution supersedes Evidence Code section 787 insofar as it impliedly renders evidence of prior misdemeanor convictions, or more precisely, evidence of the misconduct underlying such convictions, generally inadmissible for impeachment. But that is of no consequence. Defendant could surely have argued that it did. Indeed, on another point, he relied on People v. Adams (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 10 [243 Cal. Rptr. 580], in which the court held that article I, section 28, subdivision (d), of the California Constitution supersedes Evidence Code section 787 insofar as it expressly renders evidence of misconduct generally inadmissible for impeachment. If he had so argued, the superior court might well have been persuaded. To the extent that he attempts to excuse his omission by asserting that any act would have been futile, he fails: his assertion is mere conjecture. [11] In its second part, as to evidence of Sandra S.'s prior belated rape complaint, we reject the claim on the merits. (14) Broadly speaking, an appellate court reviews any ruling by a trial court as to the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 264.) Specifically, it scrutinizes a decision on a motion to bar the introduction of evidence as irrelevant for such abuse: it does so because it so examines the underlying determination whether the evidence is indeed irrelevant. (E.g., People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1239.) (13b) After review, we find no abuse of discretion. The superior court impliedly determined that any relevance that evidence of Sandra S.'s prior belated rape complaint might have for impeachment was premised on the falseness of the prior complaint. It was not unreasonable in this regard. Indeed, under the reasoning of People v. Neely (1964) 228 Cal. App.2d 16, 18 [39 Cal. Rptr. 251, 20 A.L.R.3d 679], if her prior complaint was in fact true, it would have no relevance for impeachment whatsoever. The superior court also impliedly determined that the premise that the prior complaint was false was without sufficient support. In this regard too, it was not unreasonable. Defense counsel's speculation that the police might not have really fe[lt] it was a crime could obviously have been deemed inadequate. Defendant here asserts that Neely entitled him to inquire of Sandra S. in the presence of the jury in the hope of establishing the falseness of her prior complaint. It did not. The Neely court held only that the defendant therein should have been allowed to so inquire of a woman who was a mentally ill person who had been institutionalized for several years, and had indicate[d] some uncertainty and confusion concerning the exact nature of her charges.... ( People v. Neely, supra, 228 Cal. App.2d at p. 19.) From all that appears, Sandra S. was not such a woman. [12]