Opinion ID: 852392
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Petition for Special Prosecutor

Text: Pelley was charged on August 7, 2002 while Christopher Toth was serving as St. Joseph County Prosecutor. In November 2002, Michael Dvorak was elected to that position. Dvorak was sworn in on January 1, 2003 and inherited the Pelley prosecution. On January 3, Dvorak advised the trial court that he had met with Pelley while in private practice. Dvorak disclosed that after the murders, he was visited by Pelley and Pelley's grandfather. Dvorak believed that Pelley was interviewing several attorneys before choosing counsel, and Pelley did not retain Dvorak. Dvorak stated that he had no independent recollection of what was said in the meeting, but believed he received no confidential information from Pelley. Dvorak had no further contact with Pelley. On January 7, Pelley petitioned for appointment of a special prosecutor. Pelley's verified petition states that in May, 1989, at which time he was a practicing attorney in South Bend, Indiana, Michael A. Dvorak interviewed [Pelley] regarding the events surrounding the murder of his family, murders which [Pelley] was then and there suspected of having committed. By reason thereof, Michael A. Dvorak obtained knowledge of facts that directly relate to the charges now pending against [Pelley]. Pelley asserted that a special prosecutor was necessary to avoid a conflict of interest and the appearance of impropriety. The parties stipulated to the statements made in Dvorak's disclosure and Pelley's verified petition. The trial court denied Pelley's motion, finding that Pelley failed to establish that Dvorak obtained confidential information creating an actual conflict of interest, and that the applicable Indiana statute does not require appointment of a special prosecutor to avoid the appearance of impropriety, if there is no showing that confidential information was shared. Pelley argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition for a special prosecutor. Appointment of a special prosecutor is prescribed by statute. [6] Indiana Code section 33-39-1-6(b)(2) provides that the trial court may appoint a special prosecutor if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that appointment is necessary to avoid an actual conflict of interest. Pelley contends that this section is to be read in conjunction with Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 1.18, which addresses communications by prospective clients. In effect, Pelley argues for application of a rigid rule that the appearance of impropriety is offended without any showing as to the nature or substance of the communication between the prospective client and the attorney. Pelley contends that a requirement of actual harm would force him to choose between a conflict-free prosecutor and his right to attorney-client confidentiality. In a similar vein, Pelley urges that permitting former defense attorneys to pursue cases against former prospective clients compromises the integrity of the judicial process. A rigid standard has been used by some courts as the test of an impermissible conflict. Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 121 cmt. c(iv) (1998). But even the more restrictive standard permits a lawyer to represent a client with interests adverse to those of the prospective client if the lawyer has not received from the prospective client information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter. Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 1.18 cmt. 6. Moreover, more recent authority relaxes the appearance of impropriety standard, noting that avoiding conflicts of interest can impose significant costs on lawyers and clients. Prohibition of conflicts of interest should therefore be no broader than necessary. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 121 cmt. b. In the context of prospective clients, a conflict occurs not because of the fact of consultation, but because of the passing of confidential information from the prospective client to the lawyer. Id. § 15 cmt. c ([P]ersonal disqualification of a lawyer who deals with a prospective client occurs only when the subsequent matter presents the opportunity to use information obtained from the former prospective client that would be `significantly harmful.'). These general principles are further modified by the specific provision of Indiana law governing the need for a special prosecutor. We have long held that appointment of a special prosecutor is governed by a standard that differs from that used in the civil context. Kubsch v. State, 866 N.E.2d 726, 732 (Ind.2007) (citing Johnson v. State, 675 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind.1996)). Specifically, for a prosecutor's previous involvement with the defendant to merit disqualification, there must be some showing that the prosecutor received confidential information that could assist the prosecution. Id. A more demanding showing is required because our elected prosecutors often possess criminal defense experience. Particularly in smaller communities, the limited pool of lawyers available to represent defendants faced with serious criminal charges overlaps with the pool of candidates for county prosecutor. Here, we have a prosecutor with no memory of the consultation who believes that he received no confidential information. Pelley states that he discussed some of the facts with Dvorak but provides no further explanation, and does not claim that he communicated any confidential information. The trial court was within its discretion to deny Pelley's petition for a special prosecutor.