Opinion ID: 3065419
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The charges determined by the State

Text: Bar to be “reasonable costs” of investiga- tion, hearing, and review. These amounts shall serve to defray the costs, other than fees for the services of attorneys or experts, of the State Bar in the preparation or hear- ing of disciplinary proceedings, and costs incurred in the administrative processing of the disciplinary proceeding and in the administration of the Client Security Fund. (c) A member may be granted relief, in whole or in part, from an order assessing costs under this section, or may be granted an extension of time to pay these costs, in the discretion of the State Bar, upon 1864 IN RE FINDLEY grounds of hardship, special circumstances, or other good cause. (d) In the event an attorney is exonerated of all charges following a formal hearing, he or she is entitled to reimbursement from the State Bar in an amount determined by the State Bar to be the reasonable expenses, other than fees for attorneys or experts, of preparation for the hearing. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6086.10 (2001). In Taggart, we identified three reasons for our conclusion that the § 6086.10 attorney disciplinary costs served as “compensation for actual pecuniary loss.” First, we analyzed the § 6086.10 costs in light of § 6086.13 of the California Business and Professions Code, a separate statute authorizing discretionary “monetary sanctions” for attorney misconduct. 249 F.3d at 991. We concluded that the statutory language of § 6086.10 — which imposed “costs” for “actual expenses” and “reasonable costs” — as well as the existence of a hardship exemption under § 6086.10, but not § 6086.13, “support[ed] the impression that the California legislature intended monetary sanctions under § 6086.13, but not costs awards under § 6086.10, as punishment.” 249 F.3d at 993 (footnote omitted). Next, we considered the legislative history of § 6086.13, and determined that “the section was enacted in order to create the possibility of fines in the context of attorney disciplinary proceedings, which did not exist under § 6086.10.” 249 F.3d at 993 (citations omitted); see also id. at 993 n.7 (“not[ing] that the drafter of § 6086.10 . . . understood that section as not imposing a fine or penalty”) (citations omitted). Finally, we observed similarities between attorney disciplinary costs imposed under § 6086.10 and the costs awarded to prevailing parties in civil litigation. Id. at 992-93.2 Reasoning by analogy that it was “highly unlikely” 2 We found the analogy apt because “[w]hile § 6086.10 requires disciplined attorneys to pay the costs associated with their disciplinary hearIN RE FINDLEY 1865 that California “imposed mandatory costs in civil proceedings in order to punish losing parties or to deter them from bringing litigation,” we concluded that the legislature intended for the § 6086.10 costs to serve compensatory ends. Id. at 993 n.6. We acknowledged in Taggart that all of the reported cases to consider the issue had held attorney disciplinary costs nondischargeable. See 249 F.3d at 993-94 & n.8 (listing cases). These cases, as we explained, “by and large, analogized the costs of attorney disciplinary proceedings to the costs of criminal litigation imposed on convicted defendants,” 249 F.3d at 994, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986), which held a criminal restitution award nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7). We distinguished these opposing precedents, however, concluding that “analogy to the criminal context is inapt” where: the structure of the statutes imposing fees on disciplined attorneys, the existence of mandatory fees in the civil context, and the legislative history of the statute imposing monetary sanctions on disciplined attorneys all indicate that California does not view the assessment of costs on disciplined attorneys as penal in nature. 249 F.3d at 994.