Opinion ID: 1194845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of Constitutional Writ of Certiorari

Text: The majority opinion perpetuates unfortunate confusion that has arisen in this Court's decisions concerning the common law writ of certiorari found in art. IV, §§ 4 and 6 of our State Constitution. The majority begins by saying, The superior court has inherent power provided in art. IV, § 6 of the Washington State Constitution to review administrative decisions for illegal or manifestly arbitrary acts. (Emphasis added.) Majority op. at 372. Article IV, § 6 does not provide for a superior court's inherent power. Inherent power is just that, inherent: The inherent power of the court is the power to protect itself; the power to administer justice whether any previous form of remedy had been granted or not; the power to promulgate rules for its practice; and the power to provide process where none exists. It is true that the judicial power of this court was created by the constitution, but upon coming into being under the constitution, this court came into being with inherent powers. Among the inherent powers is the power to admit to practice, and necessarily therefrom the power to disbar from practice, attorneys at law. In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 476, 172 P. 1152 (1918). Article IV, § 6 sets out and enumerates the powers of the superior courts. The court's inherent powers developed during the long history of common law courts, not from constitutional mandate. As the Tennessee Supreme Court said, The writ of certiorari does not owe its existence to constitutional provision or statutory enactment. It is a common law writ, of ancient origin. Tennessee Central R. v. Campbell, 109 Tenn. 640, 645, 75 S.W. 1012 (1903). Thus, our state constitution merely encompassed the common law writ of certiorari; it did not create it. Even in the absence of the constitutional provision, our courts would have the inherent power to issue writs of certiorari. [2] Historically, the constitutional writ of certiorari developed long before the dawning of administrative law and the development of statutory avenues for judicial review of administrative decisions. The writ of certiorari is of ancient lineage. It has existed in both the common law courts (King's Bench) and the equity courts (courts of chancery) since the 13th century. Its original office was to provide a method for superior courts to correct the illegal activities of inferior tribunals, both judicial and administrative. The two inquiries the superior court made upon the issuance of a writ of certiorari were, (1) did the lower tribunal exceed its subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) did the lower tribunal act outside the law. See generally CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES (1987); FORREST G. FERRIS & FORREST G. FERRIS, JR., THE LAW OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES (1926); 2 THOMAS CARL SPELLING, INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES (2d ed.1901). In Wilson v. City of Seattle, 2 Wash. 543, 544, 27 P. 474 (1891), we said: The common law writ of certiorari is the proper remedy upon which to correct the errors of all inferior tribunals where they have exceeded their jurisdiction or proceeded illegally and there is no appeal or other mode of reviewing or correcting their proceedings. The majority offers no real guidance as to when the constitutional writ of certiorari may be invoked because it undertakes no analysis of the tenets supporting issuance of the constitutional writ. The majority suggests the writ is available to review any arbitrary and capricious act, or any act contrary to law if no other avenue of appeal is available, but the writ may even be available where a statutory writ or direct appeal is available if the party can show good cause for circumventing those procedures. [3] Majority op. at 373, 374. The majority's analysis cuts the writ loose from its historical moorings, and offers no real analytical limit on the courts' exercise of the power of review.