Opinion ID: 2452036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lying-in Expenses and Statute of Limitations

Text: As his third point appellant argues the trial court erred in awarding damages to Henry Bell, who was not a party to the suit, and, alternatively, that the damages were barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant argues that any debt due Henry Bell for the 1983 lying-in expenses are debts not in writing and, therefore, barred after three years under Ark.Code Ann. § 16-56-105 (1987). In Winston v. Robinson & State, 270 Ark. 996, 606 S.W.2d 757 (1980), this statute was applied to limit support obligations of the putative father to three years. We noted in Winston , that the bastardy statutes of Arkansas contain no specific statute of limitations and, therefore, we relied on Davis v. Herrington, 53 Ark. 5, 13 S.W. 215 (1890), where, in a paternity case, the three year limit on contracts not in writing was imposed. See also Dozier v. Veasley, 272 Ark. 210, 613 S.W.2d 93 (1981). However, the Winston opinion was written before Ark.Code Ann. § 9-10-109 (1987) was enacted. Section 9-10-109 provides: (a) Subsequent to the finding by the chancery court that the defendant is the father of the child, the court shall follow the same guidelines, procedures, and requirements as set forth in the laws of this state applicable to child support orders and judgments entered by the chancery court as if it were a case involving a child born of a marriage in awarding custody, visitation, setting amounts of support costs and attorney's fees, and directing payments through the clerk of the court. That directive in § 9-10-109 brings up Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-236 (1987) (Act 1989 No. 525 § 1) affecting procedures and limitations on actions for the support of children born of a marriage: In all cases where the support of any child or children is involved, an action for the enforcement of child support or for judgment of arrearages shall be limited to ten years prior to the filing of the action. [1] However, there has always been a distinction between statutes of limitation in paternity proceedings for support and proceedings for the support of children in divorce suits. For the latter, the limitation was five years. See also, Sullivan v. Edens, 304 Ark. 133, 801 S.W.2d 32 (1990) (discussing the change in statutes of limitation from five to ten years via § 9-14-236, speaking only in terms of actions on divorce decree support awards.) This raises the question whether in paternity cases the period of limitation is three years, as held in Davis v. Herrington, supra , and Winston v. Robinson, supra , or, whether under § 9-10-109 and § 9-14-236, a different period of limitations applies. Under either the three-year common law rule or ten-year rule of § 9-14-236, the lying-in expenses are barred in this case. Recovery is obviously barred under the three-year rule, and as to the ten year rule, in Sullivan v. Edens, supra , we said the new ten-year limitation would only apply to payments accruing after the effective date of the statute (1989) and actions which accrued before the effective date would be governed by prior statutes of limitations. Thus, it is unnecessary that we choose between these two limitation periods, because the claim for lying-in expenses incurred in 1983 is barred in any event. We note as well this distinction between the two statute of limitations was not raised or discussed in the trial court. The other contention, i.e., it was error to award judgment to a non-party, is moot.