Opinion ID: 164713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of Past Convictions

Text: 31 Groves also challenges the district court's conclusion that his prior convictions for child molestation could be used both to enhance his offense level under § 2G2.2(b)(4) and to determine his criminal history category. The pre-amendment commentary to § 2G2.2 did not mention whether convictions could be properly counted under both the pattern of abuse offense enhancement and in determining a defendant's criminal history. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G2.2 (1993). The amended commentary to § 2G2.2, in contrast, expressly provides that [p]rior convictions taken into account under subsection (b)(4) are also counted for purposes of determining criminal history points. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G2.2 cmt. n. 2 (1997). The Commission stated that this amendment clarifies that prior convictions counted as part of the `pattern of activity' also may be counted as part of the defendant's criminal history. Id. at app. C, amend. 537 (1997). 32 Again, the Commission expressly declared the change to be clarifying, and the amendment altered only the commentary accompanying § 2G2.2, not the text of the guideline itself. Accordingly, whether this aspect of the 1996 amendment was clarifying or substantive depends wholly on whether it was contrary to prior controlling law. As noted above, this analysis requires consideration of both the plain meaning of the pre-amendment Sentencing Guidelines and any prior controlling Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court case law. 33 We are mindful of the general rule that the Sentencing Commission plainly understands the concept of double counting, and expressly forbids it where it is not intended. See United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911, 918 (10th Cir.1997). Yet with respect to calculating a defendant's criminal history points, the Sentencing Commission has expressly taken action to limit double counting. 34 To understand what properly could have been considered as criminal history, we must navigate our way through a number of interconnected provisions of the guidelines and commentary. We begin with the various sections of the guidelines that provide that criminal history points are to be assessed for the defendant's prior sentences. Next, we note that USSG § 4A1.2(a)(1) defines the term prior sentence to mean only a sentence previously imposed for conduct not part of the instant offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(a)(1) (1993). As of 1993, the commentary to § 4A1.2 further has defined conduct that is part of the instant offense as conduct that is relevant conduct to the instant offense under the provisions of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). See id. at § 4A1.2 cmt. n. 1; United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1526 (10th Cir.1995) (recounting the history of the 1993 amendment to the commentary to USSG § 4A1.2). Taken together, these provisions of the guidelines and commentary provide that, prior to the 1996 amendment to the commentary, a conviction for conduct that is characterized as relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 for the instant offense would not also be counted as criminal history. 35 We next turn to what counts as relevant conduct under § 1B1.3. Among the examples of relevant conduct in that section, as pertinent to this case, is any ... information specified in the applicable guideline. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(4) (1993). This provision steers us to the guideline that the district court must apply in computing the defendant's offense level — in our case the pre-amendment interpretation of § 2G2.2. Section 2G2.2 specified various information that the district court was to consider in calculating the offense level, including whether the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. Id. at § 2G2.2(b)(4). The pre-amendment version of the guidelines did not contain any specific provision in either the text or the commentary that expressly permitted or prohibited double counting under these particular circumstances. 36 The guidelines are admittedly not a model of organizational clarity with respect to double counting. Yet this odyssey ultimately leads us to the conclusion that, prior to the 1996 amendment, a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor was relevant conduct with regard to the offense at issue, and that such conduct therefore could not also have been used as criminal history. 37 This interpretation of the guidelines and commentary is supported by the purpose of the 1993 commentary amendment excluding all relevant conduct from the definition of a prior sentence. According to the Sentencing Commission, this change was designed to avoid double counting and ensure consistency with other guideline provisions. Williamson, 53 F.3d at 1526 (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual App. C ¶ 493 (1993)). 38 This analysis is also reflected in our case law. As we held in United States v. Torres, [i]f the district court did take the prior sentence into account in calculating the offense level, then it is clear that to prevent double counting the court cannot use that same sentence in its criminal history calculation. 182 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir.1999). Moreover, even when the district court did not actually consider the defendant's prior sentences in calculating the offense level, we will review the district court's underlying finding that the criminal activity was not relevant conduct. Id. A correct determination of whether the prior sentence constituted relevant conduct is an essential predicate to the criminal history assessment. Id. In short, a prior sentence counts as criminal history if it does not involve relevant conduct under § 1B1.3. Id. at 1159; see also United States v. Rice, 358 F.3d 1268, 1276-77 (10th Cir.2004) (it is improper to double count uncharged criminal activity that was used as relevant conduct in calculating the offense level to justify a criminal history category departure). 39 Furthermore, by the time the 1996 commentary amendment came into effect, we had already explained that under the preexisting version of the guidelines, at a minimum, [i]f the prior sentence was actually considered by the court in calculating the defendant's offense level, then the [1993] amendment to note 1 of § 4A1.2 clarifies that the prior sentence may not be used to enhance the defendant's criminal history score. Williamson, 53 F.3d at 1526 (discussing double counting in the context of plain error review). 3 40 Thus, prior to the 1996 amendment, it was clear that convictions that had already been considered as relevant conduct under USSG § 2G2.2(b)(4) could not have been used to calculate the defendant's criminal history. First, the text of USSG §§ 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History) and 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) and their accompanying commentary compelled that result, and there is no fair interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines and accompanying commentary to the contrary. 4 Additionally, a prior Tenth Circuit case had already explained that, under this framework, convictions taken into account as relevant conduct to determine the defendant's offense level could not also be used in computing criminal history points. See Williamson, 53 F.3d at 1526 (ultimately finding no plain error when the prior conviction was not actually considered as relevant conduct in determining the defendant's offense level). 41 Because the 1996 amendment to the commentary to § 2G2.2(b)(4) modified this controlling framework by expressly allowing this kind of double counting, we must consider this aspect of the amendment to be substantive, not merely clarifying. 5 Therefore, the district court's application of the 1996 amendment's double counting rule to criminal conduct that occurred before that amendment went into effect, to the defendant's detriment, ran afoul of the limits imposed by the Ex Post Facto Clause. 42 Under the 1993 version of the Sentencing Guidelines, once the court considered Groves' prior child molestation convictions as relevant conduct for the instant offense, it then should have excluded those convictions from its criminal history analysis. This approach would have given Groves a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of II. His guideline range would have been 41 to 51 months. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5A (1993).