Opinion ID: 1571247
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Appointment of Special Mitigation Counsel

Text: Barnes contends that the trial court violated his Faretta right to self-representation by appointing special court counsel to investigate and present mitigation over his objection. He argues that as both the client and the attorney, he had the absolute right to limit the court's consideration of mitigation only to the fact that he came forward to confess to an unsolved crime and took full responsibility for his actions. He also argues that even if he did waive mitigation, the trial court violated the procedure set forth in Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343 (Fla. 2001), by appointing mitigation counsel before ordering and reviewing a presentence investigation report (PSI), and before determining, based on the PSI, that additional mitigation existed and should be investigated. We disagree with these contentions. In Muhammad, we held that where a defendant waives presentation of mitigation, the trial court must order a PSI. We stated that in addition to ordering the PSI: [T]he trial court could require the State to place in the record all evidence in its possession of a mitigating nature such as school records, military records, and medical records. Further, if the PSI and the accompanying records alert the trial court to the probability of significant mitigation, the trial court has the discretion to call persons with mitigating evidence as its own witnesses.... If the trial court prefers that counsel present mitigation rather than calling its own witnesses, the trial court possesses the discretion to appoint counsel to present the mitigation as was done in Klokoc v. State, 589 So.2d 219 (Fla.1991), or to utilize standby counsel for this limited purpose. Id. at 363-64 (footnotes omitted). Muhammad does not set forth a hard and fast rule that a trial court has no discretion to order investigation and presentation of mitigation without first reviewing a PSI and without first making an express determination that the PSI suggests the existence of mitigation. Moreover, in this case, just as we held to be proper in Muhammad, the trial judge did have a PSI and had ordered medical and school records before appointing mitigation counsel. Prior to the February 7, 2007, appointment of Sam Bardwell as special mitigation counsel, the court had been provided with a PSI and was aware of an August 22, 2006, report prepared by Dr. Riebsame, which indicated that Barnes had behavioral problems during childhood and was under an extreme mental disturbance at the time of the murder. Just as we held in Muhammad, the trial court had discretion to provide a method whereby the possible mitigation was investigated and presented after Barnes refused to present any witnesses or evidence of mitigation. Accordingly, we find the trial court acted properly in this regard in appointing independent court counsel, who did not represent Barnes but was directed to assist the court by investigating and presenting mitigation. We are aware that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that appointment of special mitigation counsel under certain circumstances can violate a defendant's right to represent himself in United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1066, 123 S.Ct. 618, 154 L.Ed.2d 555 (2002). In Davis, the pro se defendant contended that he wanted to continue to assert his innocence as mitigation in the penalty phase, but the trial court appointed special counsel to develop other mitigation for consideration by the court. The court found this appointment to be error under the circumstances, where the mitigation presented by special counsel directly contradicted the defendant's mitigation. The Court in Davis stated: We find that the district court's decision to appoint an independent counsel violates Davis's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. An individual's constitutional right to represent himself is one of great weight and considerable importance in our criminal justice system. This right certainly outweighs an individual judge's limited discretion to appoint amicus counsel when that appointment will yield a presentation to the jury that directly contradicts the approach undertaken by the defendant. 285 F.3d at 381 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals further explained: As such, Davis's strategy is in direct conflict with the independent counsel's approach. Because Davis's right to self-representation encompasses the right to direct trial strategy, the district court's decision to impose an independent counsel into these proceedings is overturned. 285 F.3d at 385 (emphasis added). Davis is distinguished from the instant case because, contrary to what occurred in Davis, Barnes presented no mitigating testimony or evidence. Although he contends that he had a mitigation strategythe fact that he took responsibility for the murderwe conclude that this amounted to nothing more than the fact of his guilty plea. While presentation of evidence of remorse could constitute mitigation evidence, Barnes never offered remorse as an element of his mitigation strategy. He explained that his confession and guilty plea were prompted by his conversion to the Muslim religion and his desire to have the benefit of doing a good deed during Ramadan. Thus, we conclude that, contrary to what occurred in Davis, the mitigation evidence presented by independent counsel in this case did not conflict with anything presented by Barnes and did not violate his right to self-representation. Davis is further distinguished from the instant case by the fact that in Davis, a sentencing jury was present and the court expressed concern that presentation of mitigation by an independent counsel in front of a jury might give[ ] the independent counsel's presentation an aura of superiority over whatever is presented by the prosecution and the defense. Id. at 381 n. 1. This concern is not present in the instant case because Barnes waived an advisory jury. Moreover, we agree with the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 859 A.2d 1173 (2004), which refused to adopt the reasoning in Davis, stating: The Fifth Circuit concluded [in Davis ] that because the core of a defendant's Faretta right is his ability to preserve control over the case he chooses to present to the jury, this right must be honored during the penalty phase regardless of whether society would benefit from having a different presentation of the evidence. Ibid. We respectfully disagree. In our view, it is difficult to square that conclusion with the Supreme Court's mandate in Gregg, supra, and Eddings, supra, that to constitutionally impose a death sentence, the sentencing jury cannot be deprived of an opportunity to make an individualized judgment based on a fair presentation of mitigating evidence. Id. at 1204. As the New Jersey court notes, American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, section 6-3.7 (2d ed.1980), states that standby counsel may call the judge's attention to matters favorable to the accused. Id. at 604. In this case, special mitigation counsel filled that same role and assisted the court by bringing to the trial court's attention matters favorable to Barnes. A plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), instructs us that [t]here is no question that death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability. Id. at 187, 96 S.Ct. 2909. Further, as that Court noted, [T]he concerns expressed in Furman [13] that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195, 96 S.Ct. 2909. We also recognize that the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other punishment, and hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it is a justified response to a given offense. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Appointment of mitigation counsel in this case, where Barnes essentially refused to provide any mitigation evidence, was intended to provide such a safeguard and thereby ensure that the sentencing judge was apprised of adequate and relevant information upon which she could make a reasoned decision concerning the applicability of the death penalty. This was proper in order to ensure that the severe and irrevocable penalty of death, if imposed, would be justified and not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The Supreme Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), reiterated the requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases that is required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See id. at 105, 102 S.Ct. 869. The use of mitigation evidence is a product of the requirement of individualized sentencing. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 174, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006). Thus, in order for a trial court to carry out its duty to give each capital defendant the individualized sentencing that the Constitution requires, the court may appropriately require presentation of mitigation where a pro se defendant such as Barnes essentially refuses to present any evidence of mitigation. Presentation of mitigation in such a case also allows this Court to carry out its obligation to determine if the death sentence is proportionate. We explained in Muhammad: In all capital cases, this Court is constitutionally required to engage in a thoughtful, deliberate proportionality review to consider the totality of circumstances in a case, and to compare it with other capital cases. This case provides a perfect example of why the defendant's failure to present mitigating evidence makes it difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to adequately compare the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case to those present in other death penalty cases. 782 So.2d at 364-65 (citations omitted) (quoting Porter v. State, 564 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.1990)). The Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), in holding that states can require otherwise competent but severely mentally ill defendants to be represented by counsel, noted that  Faretta ... and later cases have made clear that the right of self-representation is not absolute. Id. at 2384. The Edwards Court also cited Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, 528 U.S. 152, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000), for the proposition that [e]ven at the trial level ... the government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. at 2387 (quoting Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162, 120 S.Ct. 684). In Martinez, a case involving the participation of standby counsel rather than court counsel, the Supreme Court also noted that standby counsel may participate in the trial proceedings, even without the express consent of the defendant, as long as that participation does not `seriously undermin[e]' the `appearance before the jury' that the defendant is representing himself. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162, 120 S.Ct. 684 (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 187, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984)). Because the trial court and this Court each has a constitutional obligation to ensure that Barnes received individualized sentencing and that the death penalty is fairly and constitutionally imposed, Barnes' right to self-representation was not violated by the appointment of independent counsel under the facts and circumstances present in this case. Mitigation counsel was appointed, not to supplant Barnes as his own counsel, but to assist the court by presenting mitigation evidence where Barnes refused to do so. The mitigation was not in conflict with any evidence presented by Barnes and was not in conflict with his mitigation theory that he confessed and took responsibility. In fact, the trial court did find his confession and acceptance of responsibility to be nonstatutory mitigation. Based on the mitigation presented by special counsel, the trial court also found the statutory mitigator that Barnes was under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense, as well as nonstatutory mitigation that he had an abusive childhood, lacked a loving relationship with his parents, and was a functional and capable person with a capacity to contribute to society. Even so, after engaging in its constitutionally required weighing process, the trial court concluded that each one of the six aggravators outweighed all the mitigation found by the court. We decline to hold, as Barnes requests, that a trial court may never consider other mitigation contained in the record or appoint special mitigation counsel to assist the court, where a pro se defendant's refusal to present mitigating evidence impedes or prevents the trial court's exercise of its constitutional duty to provide individualized sentencing. Thus, relief is denied on this claim. We turn next to Barnes' claim that consideration of the presentence investigation report in this case violated his confrontation rights.