Opinion ID: 774529
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cronic and Presumed Ineffectiveness

Text: 30 As in Mitchell, the state appeals court in Hunt's case properly acknowledged that the Supreme Court's decision in Cronicprovided the legal standards by which Hunt's ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be judged. 3 See Hunt, 1996 WL 502151, at . The Ohio court unreasonably applied the holding of Cronic to the facts of Hunt's case, however, and, as a result, erred in concluding that Hunt was not entitled to a presumption of ineffectiveness.
31 As previously discussed, the Court in Cronic identified certain situations in which the circumstances of trial are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. In such situations, prejudice to the defendant will be presumed. One such situation is where the defendant is denied the presence of counsel at a critical stage of the prosecution. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. Another is where the circumstances surrounding the appointment of counsel are so egregious that even a fully competent lawyer is presumed to have rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. Id. at 659-61, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (discussing the last-minute appointment of defense counsel in Powellas an example of such a case). 32 In attempting to apply Cronic to the case at bar, the Ohio Court of Appeals failed to consider whether Hunt had been denied the presence of counsel during a critical stage of the prosecution. Nor did the court of appeals look to the circumstances surrounding the appointment of Hunt's counsel to determine whether it was unlikely that even a fully competent lawyer could have provided effective assistance. Rather, in applying Cronic, the court of appeals focused on the fact that Hunt had failed to preserve his objection to the trial court's last-minute appointment of counsel. The Ohio court stated that neither Hunt nor his attorney objected to the alacrity with which the trial commenced,and further stated that there were no statements either that counsel was unprepared to represent appellant or that appellant was being denied his right to effective assistance of counsel by the proceedings. Hunt, 1996 WL 502151, at . The Ohio court's presumed-prejudice analysis under Cronic appears to have turned, therefore, on Hunt's alleged waiver of his objections in the court below. By definition, however, a per se violation of a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel does not require the defendant to preserve the error below. See, e.g., Powell, 287 U.S. at 57-58 (holding that under the circumstances, defendants were not accorded right to counsel in any substantial sense, even though defendants did not formally object to last-minute appointment of counsel by state trial judge). Moreover, the record reflects that defense counsel did inform the court that he needed more time consult with his client. Thus, the reason relied upon by the Ohio court in rejecting Hunt's presumed-prejudice argument under Cronic is both factually inaccurate and legally irrelevant. 33
34 Had the Ohio Court of Appeals properly applied Cronic to the facts of this case, it could not reasonably have arrived at the decision it reached. 35
36 First, the undisputed facts of this case reveal that Hunt was denied the presence of counsel during a critical stage of the prosecution. As we recently explained: 37 The Supreme Court has decided several cases that make clear that the period between appointment of counsel and the start of trial is indeed a critical stage for Sixth Amendment purposes. . . . The pre-trial period constitutes a critical period because it encompasses counsel's constitutionally imposed duty to investigate the case. . . . [W]ithout pre-trial consultation with the defendant, trial counsel cannot fulfill his or her duty to investigate. 38 Mitchell, 257 F.3d at 567. In Mitchell, we found that the defendant's lawyer had consulted with his client for a total of six minutes during the seven-month period prior to the start of trial and had been suspended from practicing law during the one-month period immediately preceding trial. See id. at 564-65. On these facts, we found that defendant's counsel had been totally absent during a critical stage of the proceedings and concluded that the state court's decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See id. 39 The facts of this case are even more egregious than the facts of Mitchell. Indeed, here, there is no indication that Hunt consulted with his lawyer even once before the start of voir dire. Hunt's counsel was not even afforded ten minutes to confer with his client to discuss the possibility of entering into a plea agreement. As a consequence of the trial court's haste to begin trial, counsel was required to proceed to voir dire without ever discussing the case with his client and without conducting any discovery or independent investigation of the facts. While we recognize that broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances, such an unreasonable and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for a delay violates the right to the assistance of counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (internal citations omitted). 4 40 In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of pre-trial consultation between attorney and client. For example, the Court has stated that [t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984); see also Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88-89 (1976) (holding that the right to counsel encompasses the right to confer with one's lawyer). Because Hunt was denied the opportunity to confer with counsel during the critical pre-trial stage of the State's proceedings against him, he was entitled to a presumption of ineffective assistance under Cronic. The decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals to the contrary was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. See28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). 41
42 The egregious circumstances surrounding the trial court's appointment of counsel also justified a presumption of ineffective assistance under Cronic. As Judge Patton pointed out in dissent in the Ohio Court of Appeals, Hunt's case apparently fell through the cracks of the system, forgotten until just before [Hunt's] speedy trial rights might be violated. Hunt, 1996 WL 502151, at  (Patton, J., dissenting). Indeed, following his arrest, Hunt languished in jail for eighty-seven days before the grand jury returned an indictment charging him with felonious assault and domestic violence. On his eighty-ninth day in jail, the prosecutor's office apparently realized that it needed to take quick action to bring Hunt to trial, else his indictment be dismissed under Ohio's speedy trial statute. See Ohio Rev. Code §2945.71(C)(2), (E) (requiring person charged with a felony and held in jail in lieu of bail be brought to trial within ninety days after his arrest). The trial court hastily arraigned Hunt and appointed counsel. Unfortunately, the judge believed that Hunt had reached his ninetieth day of confinement without bail (where, in fact, it was his eighty-ninth day), and thus mistakenly concluded that trial must commence at once. The court therefore gave Hunt a choice: he could either waive his right to a speedy trial and receive more time for his counsel to prepare, or he could proceed immediately to trial that same afternoon. As previously discussed, the court refused to give Hunt's counsel ten minutes to consult with Hunt regarding his options, but instead asked Hunt point-blank whether he wished to start trial, to which Hunt responded, Sure. Immediately thereafter, Hunt changed out of his prison clothes and the court began to impanel a jury. 43 The Supreme Court has stated that it is intolerable to force a criminal defendant to surrender one constitutional right in order to assert another. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). While Hunt's statutory right to a speedy trial under Ohio law may not equate precisely to his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, cf. United States v. O'Dell, 237 F.3d 655, 666-67 (6th Cir. 2001) (refusing to equate federal statutory right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act with Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial), the element of coerced choice decried by the Court in Simmons is nevertheless present here. When Hunt refused to waive his right to a speedy trial, the trial court effectively forced him to go to trial with an unprepared attorney. 44 Hunt's lawyer's lack of time to prepare was particularly prejudicial to Hunt in light of the fact-intensive nature of the government's case. In Cronic, the Supreme Court found that defense counsel's limited preparation time was of minimal significance in light of the charges at issue in that case. The Court stated: 45 Most of the Government's case consisted merely of establishing transactions between the two banks. A competent attorney would have no reason to question the authenticity, accuracy, or relevance of this evidence - there could be no dispute that these transactions actually occurred. As respondent appears to recognize, the only bona fide jury issue open to competent defense counsel on these facts was whether respondent acted with intent to defraud. When there is no reason to dispute the underlying historical facts, the period of 25 days to consider the question whether those facts justify an inference of criminal intent is not so short that it even arguably justifies a presumption that no lawyer could provide the respondent with the effective assistance of counsel required by the Constitution. 46 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 664-665 (emphasis added). Here, by comparison, Hunt's counsel had every reason to dispute the underlying historical facts of the case. Indeed, Hunt's sole line of defense was to challenge the prosecution's version of events, as was illustrated by his lawyer's cross-examination of the police witnesses regarding whether they saw Hunt holding a knife or assaulting his wife. No one can say what additional factual issues Hunt's counsel would have raised had he had an opportunity to consult with his client prior to trial. 47 While it is true that Hunt's trial did not involve a menacing mob or the threat of execution looming over the Scottsboro Boys in Powell, this is one of those rare cases in which the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60. The circumstances surrounding the appointment of Hunt's counsel were sufficiently egregious as to warrant a presumption of ineffectiveness under Cronic. In holding otherwise, the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. See28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).