Opinion ID: 295846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Concerted Activities Issue

Text: 9 Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides that [e]mployees shall have the right    to engage in    concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection   . Section 8(a) (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. The primary question presented by this case is whether a single employee acting alone is engaged in protected concerted activity when he presses demands for holiday pay, to which he deems himself entitled under the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. 10 The trial examiner found that Davis was discharged because he pressed his claim for holiday pay with the employer. The Act protects only concerted activities. 11 The Board would have us hold that Davis' efforts to enforce the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement constituted concerted activity. The Board asks us to supply the necessary element of concert from the facts that Davis was presenting a grievance within the framework of the collective bargaining agreement and that such grievance affects the rights of all 6 employees in the unit. The Second Circuit has followed such an approach, creating a kind of constructive concerted activity, in NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967), where the court stated that activities involving attempts to enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement may be deemed to be for concerted purposes even in the absence of    interest (on the part of) fellow employees. That case represents a clear expansion of the Act's coverage, in the face of unambiguous words in the statute. The Act surely does not mention concerted purposes.  (Emphasis added.) This is clear from the language of the Act, and was emphatically recognized by this court in Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1964). Interboro Contractors appears to create a legal fiction, constructive concerted activity, in an effort to support a judicial conception of a sound interpretation of the Act. We are unwilling to adopt such a fiction. 12 The Seventh Circuit has held that, in order to prove concerted activity under Section 7, it is necessary to demonstrate [at least] that the activity was for the purpose of inducing or preparing for group action to correct a grievance or a complaint. Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1967). The court cited our circuit's decision in Mushroom, supra, which contains the most expansive view of concerted activity in this circuit. The court in Mushroom included within the meaning of the term not only group action, but also talk looking toward group action. Even this definition of concerted activity stretches somewhat the normal meaning of the term in order to facilitate the policies of the Act. Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1947) defines concert as agreement in a design or plan; union formed by mutual communication of opinions and views; accordance in a scheme; harmony; simultaneous action and concerted as mutually contrived or planned; agreed on. We do not believe the purpose of the Act would be served by expanding the limits of Mushroom to include activity which could be considered concerted only in a fictional sense. 13 We therefore hold that Davis was not engaged in concerted activities within the protection of Section 7 of the Act. 14 Even if we were to adopt Interboro as the rule of this circuit, however, we would still be unable to enforce the Board's Order on the record as it now stands. Since its decision in Interboro, the Second Circuit has had an opportunity to expand upon that case's rationale in NLRB v. John Langenbacher Co., 398 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1968). The court there noted that an attempt by employees to enforce their understanding of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is a protected activity    if the employees have a reasonable basis for believing that their understanding of the terms was the understanding that had been agreed upon   . 15 It is clear from the trial examiner's findings of fact that he did not consider whether there was a reasonable basis for Davis' belief that he was entitled to holiday pay under the contract. He found, simply, that Davis was discharged for pressing for the holiday pay to which he thought he was entitled under the collective-bargaining contract. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, even under Interboro, we would be required to remand this case to the Board for a finding as to whether Davis had a reasonable basis for his belief, particularly since we believe that, on the basis of the record before us, this is a close factual question. 7 Of course, our decision not to follow Interboro makes such a remand unnecessary.