Opinion ID: 448869
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Errors Of Law

Text: 18 The appellant alleges that the trial court committed two errors of law. Argo first asserts that the district court did not properly apply the law of contract formation to the proposed Distributor Agreement. The appellant further argues that the trial judge incorrectly applied New York agency law to this case.
19 The district court determined that the Distributor Agreement, as modified and signed by Camar, constituted a counteroffer which was never accepted by Argo. The appellant insists that the trial judge erred in dismissing the significance of the Distributor Agreement, which it contends demonstrated Camar's intention to grant Argo an exclusive agency. In this appeal, and throughout the trial, Argo has maintained that it had an oral agreement with Camar, pursuant to which Argo had been granted an exclusive sales agency which entitled it to a ten per cent commission on all sales made in its territory regardless of whether or not Argo had procured those sales. Argo claims that the Distributor Agreement reflected this oral agreement and that its case was prejudiced by the trial court's erroneous legal conclusion that the agreement had no significance. 20 The appellant argues that its failure to sign the agreement does not prevent it from recovering under its terms, that courts have allowed parties to sue to enforce contracts although they have not set their hand to the actual document. However, those cases in which courts have enforced contracts against a signatory, in favor of a non-signing party, have involved instances where the non-signing party has accepted [the] written agreement and has acted upon it. Dreyfus & Co. v. Maresca, 224 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (Sup.Ct., N.Y.Co.1961). Here, admittedly, major differences existed between Argo and Camar concerning the Distributor Agreement. First and foremost of these was the disagreement between the parties as to whether the relationship to be created was to be a sales agency, which Argo came to desire, or a distributor relationship, as was Camar's expectation. Additional elements of the agreement which presented bones of contention concerned the territory covered by the agreement and terms of payment. It is clear that the plaintiff-appellant did not accept the terms of the written agreement, nor did it act on those terms so as to entitle it to enforce the contract against the defendant-appellee. 21 Accordingly, we find that the trial judge did not err in holding that there was no agreement between the parties manifested in the Distributor Agreement and that the signed Distributor Agreement was merely a counteroffer by the defendant which was never accepted by the plaintiff.
22 After carefully weighing all of the evidence in the case, the trial judge concluded that Camar, and not Argo, was the producing cause of the IGS sales at issue in this case and, therefore, Argo was not entitled to any sales commissions under New York agency law. The appellant claims that this conclusion by the trial judge was founded upon a misapprehension of the general rule governing the earning of commissions. Argo insists that the test of whether it earned any commissions is whether Argo brought Camar and its customers together in an amicable frame of mind and otherwise facilitated the sales in issue. Argo also alleges that the district court erred in not finding that it was entitled to commissions under the theories of quasi-contract or quantum meruit. 23 Under New York law, an agent is entitled to a commission when he brings the minds of the parties together, in that he has procured a buyer ready, willing and able, to purchase on the seller's terms and conditions, Trihy v. Belsha, 52 Misc.2d 590, 276 N.Y.S.2d 313, (D.C.Suf.Cty.1966). In order for an agent to be considered the procuring cause, the New York Court of Appeals has required that there must be a direct and proximate link, as distinguished from one that is indirect and remote, between the bare introduction and the consummation. Greene v. Hellman, 51 N.Y.2d 197, 206, 433 N.Y.S.2d 75, 412 N.E.2d 1301 (1980). 24 It is evident from his opinion that the trial judge understood and correctly applied New York law with respect to commissions. The district judge found that Argo did not initiate, nor was it the procuring cause, wholly or even partly, of any of the ... sale transactions in issue. His denial of commissions on that basis was proper under New York agency law. 25 As regards the appellant's contention that the court below erred in not finding that Argo was entitled to commissions under either a quantum meruit or a quasi-contract analysis, the trial court found that Argo did not have expressly or by implication, any reasonable expectancy flowing from any act or agreement of Camar, to receive compensation or commissions on the [IGS sales] transactions. In order to establish a right to compensation under a theory of quantum meruit or quasi-contract, one must establish that he had a reasonable expectancy of receiving such compensation. Here, the trial judge found that the appellant lacked such a reasonable expectancy and, hence, under New York law is not entitled to an award of commissions based upon a quasi-contract or quantum meruit theory. 26 III. The Trial Court's Factual Findings Regarding The Agreement Between The Parties And the Sales Efforts Expended By Argo 27 The appellant first argues that the trial court erred in its findings concerning the agreement between the parties. Argo claims that the court below erred in not finding that Argo was retained by Camar as an exclusive sales agent entitled to a ten per cent commission on all sales of Camar IGS in the United States. The appellant asserts that this error was the result of the trial court's rejection of Eric Nietsch's testimony. However, for the reasons set forth above, we have concluded that the district court did not err in finding that Nietsch's testimony was unworthy of belief. Accordingly, the trial judge was entitled to exercise his discretion and accept as true Mercanti's testimony concerning the nature of the agreement between the parties. It is significant to note that by a letter dated as late in the negotiation process as October 6, 1980, Argo solicited Camar's permission to allow its own independent engineering consultant to review the design and engineering of Camar's IGS. 4 Such a request would be more likely to have come from a distributor, worried about its potential products liability, than from an agent. 28 The appellant also alleges that the trial court was mistaken in its findings regarding the sales efforts expended by Argo and argues that the district court erred in failing to find that Argo was the procurring cause of the sales in issue. To determine the merit of this assertion, we shall examine each sale separately. 29 In the fourth claim of its complaint, the plaintiff asserted that it obtained orders for defendant's IGS from Trinidad Corporation. The trial court determined that Argo did not produce or motivate or generate a chain of circumstances leading to a sale by Camar to Trinidad. In making this finding, the trial court appears to have relied extensively on the deposition testimony of Vidor Kumar, the manager of engineering for Trinidad. Kumar's statements, which conflict with those of Nietsch, indicate that Argo had not communicated with Trinidad until very late in the sales process and that the actual selling of Camar's IGS to Trinidad was effectuated by Mercanti himself, an officer of Camar. In light of the credibility of this neutral deponent's (i.e. Kumar's) testimony and the demonstrated untrustworthiness of Nietsch's contrary version of the facts, the trial judge's finding is certainly not clearly erroneous. 30 The plaintiff's sixth cause of action concerned Argo's claim for a commission for the sale of an IGS to the LACONIAN. Argo insists that the fact that it was responsible for informing Camar of the LACONIAN'S need for an IGS and the fact that it arranged for the vessel's vice president and one of its principals to visit Camar's plant, make clear its entitlement to a commission for the IGS sold to the LACONIAN. However, the trial court found that as the buyer was from London, England and the sale was made overseas, and not in the United States, there was no applicable agreement which could have remotely covered this sale. 31 Even if we were to decide not to go along with the trial court's conclusion that the sale overseas prevented the plaintiff from asserting a right to a commission (and we do so merely for the sake of argument), the evidence established that the sale of the IGS to Peninsular Maritime (owners of the LACONIAN) was the result of Mercanti's endeavors in London to persuade Peninsular to purchase Camar's IGS, instead of that of a competitor whose IGS Peninsular had, tentatively, already committed itself to purchase. While Nietsch of Argo, at one point, had contacted the captain of the LACONIAN and, on another occasion, met with one of its directors, the credible evidence showed that Peninsular Maritime first approached Camar regarding its IGS. Hence, the trial court was justified in concluding that Argo was neither the originating nor a motivating cause of the IGS sale to the LACONIAN. 32 The plaintiff's fifth cause of action stated a claim for a commission due on the sale of a Camar IGS for the MANHATTAN. On appeal, Argo asserts that Nietsch's testimony that he arranged meetings with Nealis of the MANHATTAN and Mercanti of Camar, as well as Camar's admission that Argo was its representative in its quotation on the MANHATTAN, demonstrate that Argo procured the MANHATTAN sale. However, the appellant concedes that this conclusion hinges on a finding that Nietsch's testimony was credible. As has already been discussed, we conclude that the trial judge did not err in finding that Nietsch's testimony was not credible. Even more persuasive on this point is the fact that the unbiased testimony of Nealis himself indicated that his decision to purchase Camar's IGS was based upon the fact that he had previously purchased a Camar IGS for another tanker and that he had been satisfied with the product's performance and operation. He further testified that he first contacted Mercanti about obtaining an IGS for the MANHATTAN and that his only contact with Nietsch, or any other employee of Argo, was at a meeting to which Mercanti had brought Nietsch along. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's determination that Argo was not entitled to a commission on the MANHATTAN IGS sale. 33 In its seventh cause of action, Argo claimed a commission was due it on the sale of two Camar IGS exhaust fans to Texaco Overseas Tankships (hereinafter TOT). The trial judge found that Argo had not obtained the orders for the equipment and held that Argo was not a motivating or producing cause of such sales. Again, the appellant asserts that the district court made an erroneous finding because it improperly disregarded Nietsch's testimony. And, once again, we affirm that the trial judge had properly exercised his discretion when he chose not to believe Nietsch's self-serving version of the facts. The testimony of Mercanti on this issue was in direct conflict with that of Nietsch. Mercanti testified at trial that TOT initiated contact with Camar and that Camar convinced TOT to purchase the IGS fans from them. Given the questionable veracity of plaintiff's principal witness, there is no clear error in the district court's decision not to believe Nietsch's account of the sale to TOT. 34