Opinion ID: 4199486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stash-House Sting Operations

Text: Arguably, undercover sting operations, including ones involving fictitious stash houses, can be a valuable investigative tactic for ferreting out those individuals who would otherwise commit crimes in their communities. I also agree that “[c]ourts should go very slowly before staking out rules that will deter government agents from the proper performance of their investigative duties.”1 However, the potential for abuse and mischief that is endemic to fictitious stash-house stings should not be ignored. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has cautioned that stash-house stings “appear[] highly susceptible to abuse.”2 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is “wary of [stashhouse] operations” due to the “the ease with which the government can manipulate . . . factors [like drug quantities][.]”3 The Ninth Circuit specifically warned that one of the problems with such operations is that they ignore questions about whether a planned stash-house robbery is within a defendant’s actual “ambition and means.”4 Indeed, 1 United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 2 United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 103–04 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 224 (2016), reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 460 (2016). 3 United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2010). 4 Id. 1 my colleagues also express reservations about these operations here, even though they ultimately conclude that Washington is not entitled to relief. Moreover, federal courts have noted that such sting operations risk opening the door to the very kind of racial profiling Washington is alleging here.5 All of these problems with stash-house operations have led noted jurist Richard Posner of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to conclude, on the whole, that such operations are “a disreputable tactic.”6 The facts of this case illustrate that these cautions and misgivings are well-founded. This investigation began with a confidential informant (“Roc”) advising a supervising ATF agent that he knew of an individual (Dwight Berry) who wanted to rob a drug stash house. After Berry was identified, the ATF embarked upon inventing a scenario that would include weapons, a “crew,” and a mythical quantity of cocaine that would be the bait for those who would become ensnared in ATF’s trap. 5 In 2013, for example, Chief Judge Ruben Castillo of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ordered the disclosure of prosecutorial records after defense attorneys filed for discovery. The defense attorneys argued that since 2011, all of the stash-house targets charged in Chicago’s federal courts had been minorities—19 AfricanAmerican and seven Latino defendants. Chief Judge Castillo ordered discovery “on the sensitive issue of potential racial profiling” after concluding that “the defendants ha[d] made a strong showing of potential bias in the history of the prosecution of . . . ‘phony drug stash house rip off cases.’” Order, United States v. Brown, No. 12-cr-632, ECF No. 153, at 1 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2013). Other district courts also have ordered discovery into the basis for ATF and federal prosecutors identifying suspects for investigation. See Maj. Op. at 54 n.112. 6 See, e.g., United States v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401, 414 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (criticizing that “[l]aw enforcement uses [such stings] to increase the amount of drugs that can be attributed to the persons stung, so as to jack up their sentences”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Jan. 16, 2013), on reh’g en banc sub nom. United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2014). 2 It was the Government, not Berry, that selected cocaine—instead of, for example, marijuana—as the drug of choice for the stash house. Although no cocaine actually existed, the Government decided to entice targeted individuals with a predetermined quantity of cocaine—10 kilograms— which was double the amount needed to statutorily trigger the mandatory minimum provisions. We are told that this quantity was necessary in order to portray a “credible” stash house in the Philadelphia region. After initiating a plan to rob a stash house with Roc and an undercover Agent, Berry presumably enlisted Washington. Washington was a resident of the community whom the confidential informant had not initially targeted, and he was not of any initial interest to the Government based on past criminal activity. I realize, of course, that even though Washington was just a secondary target, his statements during the planning meetings and subsequent phone conversations show that he was neither a shrinking violet nor reluctant recruit. Rather, Washington was clearly interested in participating and even offered a number of disturbingly violent ideas that he thought would facilitate the planned robbery. Nevertheless, it comes as no surprise that, “having yielded to an extraordinary inducement [Washington] would do everything possible to earn the promised reward.”7 According to the Special Agent’s testimony at trial, a single kilogram of cocaine was worth upwards of $40,000, as Berry (the person who enlisted Washington) no doubt knew. Despite the Government’s claim that the 10-kilogram quantity was only selected to make the scheme credible, nothing suggests that Washington was motivated by any knowledge of a specific drug quantity, nor is there any evidence of him having any involvement with stash-house robberies.8 To the contrary, Washington initially told the 7 See, e.g., Kindle, 698 F.3d at 415 (Posner, J., dissenting). 8 The Agent had only told Berry that he saw over 10 kilograms of cocaine inside a cooler when the two men met. 3 group that he did not want to be involved with cocaine. He explained that he “don’t fuck with coke” and that he didn’t “really do this shit.” The Agent understood Washington’s claim that he didn’t “really do this . . .” to mean that Washington did not deal in home invasion robberies. Yet, the Agent and Roc forged ahead, greasing the skids to involve Washington in the criminal conspiracy. Washington was ultimately arrested and charged with conspiracy to possess, and attempt to possess, 5 kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to distribute after he carried out the Government-contrived crime. Despite Washington’s initial statements of disinterest in cocaine and stash-house robberies, I agree that Washington’s ultimate actions do establish his intent to carry out an armed theft of cocaine from a stash house. However, that should not obscure a more fundamental point. As another appellate court has explained, “[t]he risk [of targeting] . . . generalized populations [with stash-house investigations] is that the government . . . create[s] a criminal enterprise that would not have come into being but for the temptation of a big payday, a work of fiction spun out by government agents to persons vulnerable to such a ploy who would not otherwise have thought of doing such a robbery.”9 Here, the Government created a criminal scheme that would not have otherwise existed. Washington had no prior history of stash-house robberies (or violent crimes generally, for that matter), and he expressed reluctance to get involved with cocaine. Thus, here, as in similar cases, there is a strong possibility that had Washington not been “fooled into conspiring and attempting to steal fictitious drugs,”10 he may well not have been sucked back into the criminal justice system. This is particularly true because he was not even the intended target of this operation. Despite his criminal past, The District Court makes no finding that Berry then told Washington of the exact quantity of drugs to be obtained in a potential stash-house robbery before Washington joined the initial planning meeting. 9 United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 303 (9th Cir. 2013). 10 United States v. Yuman-Hernandez, 712 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2013). 4 Washington was not necessarily destined to commit future crimes. “Criminals do sometimes change and get their lives back on track,” and, as Judge Posner reminds us, “we don’t want the government pushing [criminals] back into a life of crime.” 11,12