Opinion ID: 808641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Manuel

Text: Like Gerson, Manuel challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 1 and 3. Manuel also challenges three aspects of his sentence. We begin by addressing the district court’s denial of his acquittal motion.
As to Manuel’s conviction on Count 1, government witnesses testified that Manuel was found within the main residence during the execution of the search warrant and that he was spotted at the organization’s other residence on two occasions. On one such occasion, Manuel was seen interacting with three of the other co-defendants. On the other occasion, Manuel was seen with a group of others entering that residence carrying pillows and blankets shortly after the van unloaded marijuana at the main residence. From this latter evidence, the jury could infer, as the government suggests, that the other residence was used as a safe house where members of the 8 organization could rest after transporting marijuana. Finally, the government presented evidence from which the jury could infer that Manuel traveled in the van to the main residence with marijuana on one occasion. Given this collective evidence, a reasonable fact finder could convict Manuel on Count 1. See United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 408 (4th Cir. 2012) (“In reviewing [this claim], we must affirm a guilty verdict that . . . is supported by substantial evidence,” which “is defined as evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). With regard to Count 3, the same evidence supporting Manuel’s conviction for Count 1 supports his conviction for Count 3. Under a constructive possession theory, a reasonable fact finder could convict Manuel on Count 3. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Manuel’s acquittal motion as to Counts 1 and 3.
Turning to Manuel’s sentencing challenges, we first address his claim that the district court erred in attributing at least 400 kilograms but less than 700 kilograms of marijuana to him for sentencing purposes. We review this claim for clear 9 error. See United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 2011). At sentencing, the government presented evidence that the organization delivered approximately 100 pounds of marijuana to its customers every three days, that Manuel participated in the conspiracy for 42 days, and that approximately 14 deliveries were, therefore, made during his involvement in the conspiracy. From this evidence, the district court attributed 1,400 pounds of marijuana to Manuel, which equates to approximately 635 kilograms of marijuana. Thus, the district court did not commit clear error in calculating the drug quantity attributable to Manuel at sentencing. See United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 210 (4th Cir. 1999) (“A district court’s approximation of the amount of drugs is not clearly erroneous if supported by competent evidence in the record.”).
Manuel also challenges the district court’s application of a firearm enhancement, which we review for clear error. See Slade, 631 F.3d at 188. Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines permits a district court to increase a sentence by two levels “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” In this case, two handguns were found in the main residence in a bedroom that was adjacent to a study, where over 120 pounds of marijuana were found. Thus, the 10 district court’s application of the firearm enhancement was not clear error. See United States v. Harris, 128 F.3d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he proximity of guns to illicit narcotics can support a district court's enhancement of a defendant's sentence under Section 2D1.1(b)(1).”); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.3 (“The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.”).
Finally, Manuel challenges the district court’s refusal to apply a mitigating role adjustment, which we review for clear error. See United States v. Powell, 680 F.3d 350, 359 (4th Cir. 2012). Pursuant to § 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, a district court may decrease a defendant’s offense level upon finding that the defendant played a minor or minimal role in the offense. In light of the evidence previously discussed, we find Manuel’s role to be “material or essential to committing the offense[s],” United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), and conclude that the district court did not clearly err in refusing to apply the adjustment. 11