Opinion ID: 1925281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression Challenge

Text: Owens invokes the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as applicable to the states by incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment [48] and construed by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), for the proposition that his questioning by the Howard County police detectives at the Hospital was illegal because it was custodial in nature and not preceded by the proper warnings prescribed by Miranda. Perhaps nothing is more recognized in the realm of constitutional criminal procedure than the notion that once a suspect is in custody, agents of law enforcement must advise the suspect of his Miranda rights before engaging in interrogation, should the state wish to admit the resulting statements against the suspect at trial. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612; accord Fenner v. State, 381 Md. 1, 9, 846 A.2d 1020, 1024-25. It is clear that the strictures of Miranda apply only in a custodial setting. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441, 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1610-11, 1612; Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1528, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1293, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); accord Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 333, 893 A.2d 1018, 1043 (2006); Fenner, 381 Md. at 9, 846 A.2d at 1025 (2004). Thus, if Owens was not in custody at the time he was questioned by the detectives, the absence of Miranda warnings is immaterial and the Fifth Amendment presents no impediment to the admission of his inculpatory statements. A significant body of law has developed around the questions of what constitutes custody and interrogation for Fifth Amendment purposes. The Miranda Court defined custodial interrogation as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Custody, though typically associated with formal arrest or incarceration, Allen v. State, 158 Md.App. 194, 229, 857 A.2d 101, 122 (2004), aff'd, 387 Md. 389, 875 A.2d 724 (2005), is not always so clearly delineated a concept. The Supreme Court declared in California v. Beheler that the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest.  463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714) (emphasis added). In fact, a person is considered in custody when a reason able person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 465, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995); see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 2149, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004); accord Rucker, 374 Md. at 209, 821 A.2d at 445; Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141, 411 A.2d 415, 425 (1980). Interrogation is no longer considered solely as direct questioning by the police, a concept that prevailed when Miranda was newly-minted. That concept now refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (footnotes omitted); accord Drury v. State, 368 Md. 331, 335-36, 793 A.2d 567, 570 (2002). The question of whether a suspect is in custody is determined objectively, to the exclusion of the subjective intent of law enforcement, in light of the totality of circumstances of the situation. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 667, 124 S.Ct. at 2151; Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323, 322, 114 S.Ct. at 1529; accord Whitfield, 287 Md. at 140, 411 A.2d at 425. Among the circumstances which should be considered in determining whether a custodial interrogation took place are: when and where it occurred, how long it lasted, how many police were present, what the officers and the defendant said and did, the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door, and whether the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or as a witness. Facts pertaining to events before the interrogation are also relevant, especially how the defendant got to the place of questioning whether he came completely on his own, in response to a police request or escorted by police officers. Finally, what happened after the interrogation whether the defendant left freely, was detained or arrested may assist the court in determining whether the defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the questioning. Whitfield, 287 Md. at 141, 411 A.2d at 425 (quoting Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)). The record here establishes that the first interrogation of Owens by the detectives took place in the pediatric ward's playroom where Detectives Kruhm and Shaffer encountered Owens. The playroom was a public space, apparently enclosed mostly in glass, and Owens was not detained in the room in any way. The two non-uniformed detectives were wearing side-arms, but did not draw or display threateningly their weapons. The questioning was brief, lasting only 10 to 15 minutes, and involved subjects relating to their investigation, but did not tend to imply that Owens was responsible for Kevonte's death. The encounter ended when Owens left the room. Under these circumstances, it is beyond cavil that the first interrogation was not custodial in nature. No force or compulsion kept Owens in the playroom: there were only two officers; and, there is no evidence that either of them advised Owens not to leave or positioned themselves to prevent or discourage such an attempt. In fact, the interview was terminated after less than a quarter of an hour because Owens left. Clearly, Owens was not placed under formal arrest, restrained in his freedom of movement, or made to feel that he was not at liberty to leave. Though the second interrogation bears more characteristics of a custodial interrogation, those qualities are sufficiently outweighed by those indicative of a non-custodial encounter. The detectives initiated the second contact by seeking out Owens, who was now a suspect, in the Hospital parking lot and requested his car keys (whether to effect a search or restrain his movement was likely not clear to Owens). This request to talk was, however, from all indications, not a compulsory order and Owens agreed to accompany the detectives back inside. Owens also agreed to the audiotaping of the interview. Owens argues that the unoccupied patient room, with the door closed, was so unfamiliar and the questioning so accusatory that he must have been in custody. This argument is significantly compromised by the fact that the hospital room was still a public place [49] from which he was more than capable of extricating himself in the face of hard questioning, a feat he accomplished after approximately 30 minutes when he evidently felt that the detectives were being too confrontational. Owens was not arrested that night. Owens's reliance on Bond v. State, 142 Md.App. 219, 788 A.2d 705 (2002), is inapposite. Bond involved a situation where three police officers confronted a half-undressed suspect in his bedroom around midnight and, while blocking the only exit, accused him of being involved in a hit-and-run accident. 142 Md.App. at 223-24, 788 A.2d at 707-08. The Court of Special Appeals held that the unexpected nature of the sudden bedroom confrontation at such a late hour would have curtailed a reasonable person's ability to ask the officers to leave. Bond, 142 Md.App. at 233-34, 788 A.2d at 713. There was no unexpected late-night home invasion in the present case. Rather, the two detectives approached Owens in the Hospital parking lot and acquired his consent for more questioning. We are persuaded that Owens must not have felt unable to end the encounter because, unlike in Bond, he did just that. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE. Dissenting Opinion by BELL, C.J. The majority holds that the empaneling, in a criminal case, of a jury, which includes a non-citizen, does not compromise the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial under either the United States or the Maryland Constitution, and, in any event, because the right is only statutory, not constitutional, by failing to inquire as to the citizenship status of the venire, the defendant waived the right to complain about the service of a non-citizen on the jury. I do not agree with either premise. On the contrary, I believe that Marcus Dannon Owens (Owens), the petitioner, did, and does now, have the constitutional right, federal and State, to a trial by jury composed only of citizens of the United States. [1] I am also of the view that, even if the right to an all citizen jury is only statutory, Owens did not waive the right. To save this conviction, the majority holding, in that regard, imposes on criminal defendants a burden that is both unnecessary and unreasonable and, for good measure, misapplies our precedents. Therefore, I dissent.