Opinion ID: 671235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: 2 In 1970, plaintiff (who was then 16 years old) was convicted of a double murder. He was released on parole in 1983, and arrested for armed robbery in 1989. The armed robbery charges were later dismissed, but the Illinois Prisoner Review Board chose to revoke plaintiff's parole. Plaintiff subsequently filed this 19-count civil rights complaint. 3 The complaint asks for damages and for an injunction reinstating plaintiff to parole. Counts 2 through 10, 13 through 16, and 19 challenge the constitutionality of parole revocation proceedings. Counts 11, 12, and 18 challenge the reparole proceedings. The crux of the complaint is that the defendants failed to use constitutionally adequate procedures in revoking parole and denying reparole. 4 The district court held that the allegations of the complaint concerned the fact or duration of plaintiff's confinement, and thus he must first exhaust state court remedies. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55 (1974). 5 On April 18, 1994, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355 (7th Cir.1993), cert. granted, 114 S.Ct. 751 (U.S.1994), No. 93-6188, on the question of whether a federal court may recharacterize a state prisoner's Sec. 1983 action for damages as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The decision in Heck may provide much needed guidance on the distinction between civil rights and habeas actions in this context, and whether we should stay (rather than dismiss) the Sec. 1983 action pending exhaustion. 6 The case before us will benefit greatly from this guidance, and for this reason, we remand the case to the district court with directions that it grant plaintiff's petition to proceed in forma pauperis. 2 7 Finally, if after granting IFP and proceeding on the basis of the Supreme Court's opinion in Heck, the district court determines that this is a Sec. 1983 action, we point out that Counts 1 and 17, 3 dismissed with prejudice on the basis of the running of the two-year statute of limitations, may be subject to the Illinois non-discovery rule, which would toll the running of the statute of limitations. 8 Accordingly, the district court decision is REVERSED and the cause is REMANDED for further proceedings.