Opinion ID: 584150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Constitutionality of the Backyard Presence

Text: 30 Given our conclusion that the officers were lawfully in the hallway and lawfully announced their presence at the first floor apartment door, we must next confront defendants' contention that the forced entry into defendants' apartment was unconstitutional. Since the government concedes that the officers did not have any reason to believe that Santiago was in the first floor apartment at 522 West Venango Street as opposed to one of the other apartments, their break-in cannot be justified by their possession of the arrest warrant. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). Thus, as the government agrees, the officers' entry could only be justified under an exception to the search warrant requirement, such as the exigent circumstances doctrine. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1645-46, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.1973) (reasonable conclusion that the evidence is being destroyed constitutes exigent circumstances), cert. denied sub nom. Agran v. United States, 414 U.S. 833, 94 S.Ct. 173, 38 L.Ed.2d 68 (1973). 31 The district court concluded that the scuffling noise and the sound of a toilet flushing in the apartment, standing alone, did not create exigent circumstances which would warrant the intrusion. It found, however, that exigent circumstances arose when Agent DeProsperis, in the backyard, alerted the officers at the apartment door of the occupants' attempt to clear the apartment of contraband by throwing it out the window. Defendants do not dispute this finding. Notwithstanding the existence of exigent circumstances, however, defendants argue that the forced entry was unconstitutional because of the officers' illegal presence in the backyard. 32 In addressing this argument, the district court first held that the backyard is part of the curtilage of the defendants' first floor apartment. Thus, it determined that defendants had an expectation of privacy in the backyard that was protected by the Fourth Amendment and was violated by the officers' entry into the yard. The court reasoned that, but for the unlawful entry into the curtilage of their apartment, the agent would not have observed the evidence being thrown from the window. 6 Thus, it held that the officer, having impermissibly placed himself in a position to observe the drugs caused the exigency to be created. The court thereupon held that the government could not rely on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. On that basis, the district court ordered the evidence suppressed. 33 We begin our analysis by noting that the concept of curtilage originated at common law to extend to the area immediately surrounding a dwelling house the same protection under the law of burglary as was afforded the house itself. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1139, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987). In Dunn, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a house and that the extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the central component of the inquiry [i]s whether the area harbors 'intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.'  Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), abrogated on other grounds, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1812, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986). 34 Dunn referred to four factors relevant to the curtilage inquiry: 35 the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. 36 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S.Ct. at 1139. Defendants claim that the district court correctly analyzed these factors to reach its conclusion that the defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the backyard. 37 We assume that the curtilage determination was one of fact and that we therefore review it by the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Hatch, 931 F.2d 1478, 1480 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 235, 116 L.Ed.2d 191 (1991); Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir.1957). We may overturn a finding of fact under this standard only when after reviewing the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). 38 The district court concluded, applying the four [Dunn ] factors that the backyard was part of the first floor apartment's curtilage. We believe that, very broadly viewed, the district court complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e). 7 The court appears to have applied the Dunn factors as though they constituted the exclusive test. However, the Court said in Dunn: 39 We do not suggest that combining these [four] factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a correct answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration--whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's umbrella of Fourth Amendment protection. 40 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S.Ct. at 1139-40. Thus, even assuming each of the four factors was supported by the evidence, we think mechanical application of them in isolation is inappropriate to determine curtilage. 8 41 In the first place, the question before the Court in Dunn was whether the barn, located on defendant's property fifty feet from his ranch house, was within the curtilage of the house. In that context, questions about the defendant's use of portions of the land, fencing configurations and efforts to shield it from public observation were relevant to demonstrate the extent of the curtilage of the home. The more fundamental question here is whether the backyard constitutes curtilage of the first floor apartment at all. 42 In addition, although the Dunn factors also apply to determine extent-of-curtilage questions in urban areas, certain factors may be less determinative in a city setting because of the physical differences in the properties. See Horton v. United States, 541 A.2d 604 (D.C.App.1988) (determination will necessarily center on use made of area since fencing will be less significant than in rural area and it may be impossible to shield the area from observation). We believe that the weight of the factors is diminished further as applied to apartment dwellings. See United States v. Romano, 388 F.Supp. 101, 104 & n. 5 (E.D.Pa.1975) (The concept of curtilage has been significantly modified when applied to a multiple dwelling.). It seems clear, for example, that the configuration of the streets and houses in many parts of the city may make it impossible, or at least highly impracticable to screen one's home and yard from view. Horton, 541 A.2d at 608. This seems to be true here. In addition to the foregoing, tenants generally have neither the authority nor the investment incentive to take steps to protect a yard from view by doing such things as erecting a solid fence or planting trees and shrubbery. Instead, the tenant generally takes the property as he finds it, with or without fencing or other types of obstructions in place. In this context, the Dunn factors are not as useful analytically as in other settings. Thus, we believe the above quoted language in Dunn permits us to examine the record to determine whether other undisputed facts are important to the curtilage issue and thus to the tenants' expectations of privacy in the backyard. 43 Whether these defendants can demonstrate an invasion of their own Fourth Amendment privacy interests 9 depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, as this case demonstrates, property law is not irrelevant to the inquiry. As the Supreme Court stated in Rakas, by focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of privacy interests protected by that Amendment. Id., 439 U.S. at 144 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 430-31 n. 12. Although emphasis on arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control, id. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430, as Justice Blackmun said, [n]ot every concept of ownership or possession is 'arcane.'  Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 112, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2565, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Recent cases, therefore, reflect the Supreme Court's continued consideration of property interests in determining Fourth Amendment privacy interests. See e.g. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 109 S.Ct. 693, 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989). With these considerations in mind, we turn to the record. 44 The district court made no findings as to whether defendants' lease gave them any legal interest in the backyard. The record reveals no written lease. The landlord gave the only testimony as to a lease as follows: 45 Q. [Government] Did you ever have an agreement with Jose Diez, [sic] 10 either in the lease or any other kinds of agreement, as to who was allowed to go in the backyard? 46 A. [Torres] No, we don't put--we don't state nothing on the lease or nothing. 47