Opinion ID: 1355273
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Tennessee's Death Penalty Scheme is Unconstitutional

Text: The Defendant raises numerous challenges to the constitutionality of Tennessee's death penalty provisions. Included within his claim that the Tennessee death penalty statutes violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Sections 8, 9, 16, and 17, and Article II, Section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution, are the following: A. Tennessee's death penalty statutes fail to meaningfully narrow the class of death eligible defendants. Specifically, the statutory aggravating circumstance set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2-203(i)(2), (i)(5), (i)(6), and (i)(7) have been so broadly interpreted whether viewed singly or collectively, that they fail to provide a meaningful basis for narrowing the population of those convicted of first degree murder to those eligible for the sentence of death. We note that factors (i)(5), (i)(6) and (i)(7) do not pertain to this case as they were not found by the jury. Thus, any individual claim with respect to these factors is without merit. See, e.g., Hall, 958 S.W.2d app. at 715; State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 87 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1020, 115 S.Ct. 585, 130 L.Ed.2d 499 (1994). Also, this argument has been rejected by our supreme court. See Vann, 976 S.W.2d app. at 117-118; State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727, 742 (Tenn.1994). B. The death sentence is imposed capriciously and arbitrarily in that (1) Unlimited discretion is vested in the prosecutor as to whether or not to seek the death penalty. This argument has been rejected. See State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 847, 117 S.Ct. 133, 136 L.Ed.2d 82 (1996). (2) The death penalty is imposed in a discriminatory manner based upon race, geography, and gender. This argument has been rejected. See State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 268 (Tenn.1994), cert. den. 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 743, 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995). C. There are no uniform standards or procedures for jury selection to insure open inquiry concerning potentially prejudicial subject matter. This argument has been rejected. See Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 269. D. The death qualification process skews the make-up of the jury and results in a relatively prosecution-prone, guilt-prone jury. This argument has been rejected. See State v. Reid , 91 S.W.3d 247 app. at 313 (Tenn.2002), cert. den. 540 U.S. 828, 124 S.Ct. 56, 157 L.Ed.2d 52 (2003), and cases cited therein. E. Defendants are prohibited from addressing misconceptions about matters relevant to sentencing. This argument has been rejected. See id. F. Requiring the jury to agree unanimously to a life verdict violates McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990) and Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). This argument has been rejected. See Reid , 91 S.W.3d app. at 313. G. There is a reasonable likelihood that jurors believe they must unanimously agree as to the existence of mitigating circumstances because of the failure to instruct the jury on the meaning and function of mitigating circumstances. This argument has been rejected. See id. H. The jury is not required to make the ultimate determination that death is the appropriate penalty. This argument has been rejected. See id. I. The defendant is denied final closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial. This argument has been rejected. See id. J. Mandatory introduction of victim impact evidence and mandatory introduction of other crime evidence upon the prosecutor's request violates separation of powers and injects arbitrariness and capriciousness into capital sentencing. This argument has been rejected by a panel of this Court. See State v. Robert Faulkner, No. W2001-02614-CCA-R3-DD, 2003 WL 22220341, at -37 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, Sept. 26, 2003). K. The appellate review process in death penalty cases, including comparative proportionality review, is constitutionally inadequate. This argument has been rejected. See Reid , 91 S.W.3d app. at 313. Moreover, our supreme court has held that, while important as an additional safeguard against arbitrary or capricious sentencing, comparative proportionality review is not constitutionally required. See State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 663 (Tenn.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S.Ct. 1536, 140 L.Ed.2d 686 (1998).