Opinion ID: 2559108
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: mr. grayson's complaint and the standing issue

Text: We now review the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Grayson lacks standing because he cannot show that he or any other customer was injured. This task requires us to determine whether Mr. Grayson alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate standing in the context of a motion to dismiss. We consider Mr. Grayson's standing to present his CPPA claim as a threshold inquiry, independent of the merits of his interpretation of the CPPA. See Public Citizen, supra , [86] Warth, supra , [87] Parker, supra . [88] The majority of Mr. Grayson's CPPA allegations, which partially share a factual base with his FCA claim, see Grayson I, consist of intricate elaborations concerning appellees' practices, and how such practices constitute unlawful conduct in violation of the CPPA. Mr. Grayson describes appellees' withholding of breakage with great detail, including millions of dollars since 1992, and the retention, as of June 30, 2003, of sums exceeding $500,000 in dormant communications prepayments made by persons with District of Columbia addresses; these sums are alleged to have been recorded as revenues or profits. Significantly, Mr. Grayson states that he [Plaintiff] obtained and used prepaid calling cards in the District, the unused value of which [appellees] have failed to report and pay to the Mayor, Paragraph 32, and that at least one defendant pocketed, i.e., recognized [prepaid calling card balances] as revenue without an offsetting liability, whenever a card has been `dormant' for more than twelve months (whether or not the card has an `expiration date' or is rechargeable). Paragraph 64. He alleges that despite advertising and offering communications services whose price is equal to the amount of the prepayment, defendants have not provided these services in the District. Paragraph 166, 167. Furthermore, Mr. Grayson asserts that defendants have failed to inform their customers in the District that they have provided services whose price is less than the amount of the prepayment; and that they have failed to turn over breakage to the District for the benefit of those who obtained defendants' calling cards in the District, including the elderly and the disabled. Paragraphs 164, 168, 169-173, 177. Thus, Mr. Grayson claims, in part: (1) appellees' representation that prepayment equaled the purchase price of the card is a misrepresentation of material fact in violation of D.C.Code § 28-3904(a) and § 28-3904(e); (2) appellees' advertisements that customers would receive services equal to the amount of prepayment when appellees had no intention of providing the full value of services violates D.C.Code § 28-3904(h); (3) appellees' retention of breakage knowing that customers would be unable to receive substantial benefits from such breakage demonstrates that appellees knowingly [took] advantage of the inability of the customer to reasonably protect his interests due to age, infirmity, ignorance, or illiteracy, in violation of D.C.Code § 28-3904(r); and (4) appellees' failure to inform or to disclose to consumers who obtained their calling cards in the District the fact that they have retained breakage as profit, rather than reporting and turning it over to the District, as required by law, constitutes a material fact that tends to mislead, in violation of D.C.Code § 28-3904(f). In part, Mr. Grayson seeks injunctive relief for appellees' alleged violations of D.C.Code § 28-3904(a), (e), (f), (h) and (r): [o]rders and judgments necessary to prevent the Defendants' use or employment of the trade practice of failing to report and pay or deliver escheated prepaid communications breakage to the Mayor. As one court has said with respect to injunctive relief in the ERISA setting, it is well established that `[t]he actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.' [89] Mr. Grayson brings his cause of action for the interests of himself and the general public. Paragraph 157. In terms of standing in this case, Mr. Grayson's injury is derived solely from a violation or an invasion of his statutory legal rights created by the CPPA. [90] Our analysis of injury under the CPPA aligns with the opinion of the D.C. Circuit in Shaw v. Marriott Int'l Inc., [91] where the court observed that [t]he deprivation of . . . a statutory right [to be `free from improper trade practices'] may constitute an injury-in-fact sufficient to establish standing, even though the plaintiff `would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of [the] statute.' [92] See also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP). [93] The basis for Mr. Grayson's standing and the manifestation of his alleged injury in fact is similar to that in Havens, supra . There, the Court determined that § 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act [94] established an enforceable right to truthful information concerning the availability of housing, id. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114, and thus, plaintiffs were injured in fact and had standing to sue because of deprivation of information about housing availability, FEC v. Akins. [95] Akins also declared that [t]he `injury in fact' that respondents have suffered [in Akins ] consists of their inability to obtain information, based on a statutory provision conferring rights on respondents. Moreover, in Shays v. FEC the court concluded that appellee/cross-appellant's injury in fact is the denial of information he believes the law entitles him to. [96] Mr. Grayson alleges personal injury to himself, or injury in fact, based on the defendants' violation of his statutory right (derived from D.C.Code § 28-3904) to the disclosure of information about their failure to report and turn over to the District government breakage for the benefit of those who obtain calling cards in the District. [97] See Havens, Akins, Shays, supra. Among other relief authorized by the CPPA, he seeks to enjoin this alleged unlawful practice. As for the two remaining prongs of standing, Mr. Grayson's pleading meets these requirements. In describing appellees' conduct with great detail, Mr. Grayson amply draws a causal connection between the injury he suffered as defined by the CPPA and how appellees' allegedly unlawful conduct led to or threatened such an injury. With respect to the third Lujan prong, redressability by a favorable decision, the very design of the CPPA's injunctive remedy serves to sufficiently redress the alleged threatened statutory injury, and he also seeks a remedy for treble damages or $1500 for each violation, whichever is greater. Since Mr. Grayson satisfies the three prongs of standing as enumerated in Lujan, we conclude that, with the exception of defendant Verizon Communications Corp. and its affiliates, [98] the trial court erred in dismissing his individual CPPA claim on the ground that he personally lacked standing. [99]