Opinion ID: 2647906
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Idaho’s Revenue Bond Act

Text: Next, the City argues that Idaho’s Revenue Bond Act (“RBA”) grants it extraterritorial eminent domain power for 10 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS the purpose of constructing electric transmission lines.3 According to the City, because § 50-1030(a) (“paragraph (a)”) authorizes it to acquire land to construct transmission lines outside the City,4 and § 50-1030(c) (“paragraph (c)”) authorizes it to employ eminent domain “for any of the works, purposes or uses provided by this act,” it may use eminent domain to acquire the property rights it seeks in this case. The text of the statute forecloses this argument. Paragraph (c) only permits cities to exercise the power of eminent domain “in like manner and to the same extent as provided in section 7-720.” (emphasis added). These words of limitation indicate that the legislature did not intend paragraph (c) to augment the scope of the eminent domain power beyond what § 7-720 already permitted. As discussed, § 7-720 does not grant cities extraterritorial eminent domain power, so the language in paragraph (c) precludes the RBA from granting the City that power. Additional statutory text also forecloses the argument. Paragraph (a) lists specific means of acquiring property rights 3 The RBA includes §§ 50-1027 to -1042. See § 50-1027. The City may exercise the powers granted in the RBA, even if the City is not issuing bonds. See Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 233 P.3d 118, 123 (Idaho 2010) (concluding, based on similar language, that analogous revenue bond act is “not limited to a district issuing bonds”), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 265 P.3d 502, 508–09 (Idaho 2011). 4 Paragraph (a) grants cities the power to “acquire by gift or purchase . . . rights in lands . . . in connection [with]” the construction of “works within or without the city.” These “works” include electric transmission lines. See § 50-1029(a) (defining “works” as including “electric systems”); § 50-1029(h) (defining “electric system” to include “transmission lines”). ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 11 related to the works it describes. Namely, it authorizes cities to “acquire by gift or purchase lands or rights in lands.” (emphasis added). However, acquisition by “condemnation” is not listed in paragraph (a). Therefore, Idaho precedent suggests that we must assume that the legislature excluded “condemnation” from this list deliberately. Idaho Press Club, Inc. v. State Legislature of Idaho, 132 P.3d 397, 399 (Idaho 2006) (“[W]here a constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others.”) (quoting Local 1494 of Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (Idaho 1978)). Supporting this determination, in previous versions of the RBA, paragraph (a) did expressly list “eminent domain” as a means by which municipalities could acquire property outside of its boundaries. See 1965 Idaho Sess. Laws 795. The legislature’s subsequent deletion of the term from the list forecloses the conclusion that § 50-1030 expands the scope of cities’ eminent domain power. Lastly, finding a grant of extraterritorial eminent domain power in the RBA would render redundant the (clearer) grant of such power in at least one other statutory section. Section 21-401 expressly grants Idaho municipalities the power to acquire “lands either wholly or partly within or without [their] boundaries” by “condemnation” “for the purpose of constructing and maintaining aviation fields, airports, hangars and other air navigation facilities.” Similarly, the RBA identifies “airport facilities and air navigation facilities” as “works” for which paragraph (c) authorizes the use of eminent domain. See § 50-1029(a). If paragraph (c) grants extraterritorial eminent domain power to acquire air navigation facilities, then § 21-401 becomes a redundant grant of the same power. Idaho courts avoid such constructions. See Verska, 265 P.3d at 510 (“When 12 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS determining the plain meaning of a statute, effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Appellants argue that paragraph (c) itself is superfluous if it does not add to the eminent domain powers that § 7-720 already grants. However, this argument incorrectly assumes that paragraph (c) could serve no purpose except for expanding the scope of the eminent domain power. Instead, paragraph (c) makes clear that eminent domain is one means of acquiring “works,” and that cities may finance such acquisitions by issuing revenue bonds. See § 50-1030(c), (e). Without that specific authorization and with the explicit grants of power to acquire by other means in paragraph (a) (namely, by gift or purchase), there would be ambiguity as to whether the RBA authorized cities to finance eminent domain acquisitions by issuing revenue bonds. Thus, paragraph (c) is not superfluous.5