Opinion ID: 3135033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the State violated his statutory right to a speedy trial; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to impeach the defendant with facts not in evidence; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present evidence that its key witnesses received threats before testifying at trial. 1. Compulsory Joinder and the Speedy-Trial Act First, the defendant contends that the State violated the speedy-trial act when it charged him with first degree murder in connection with Patterson’s death 168 days after it charged him with contributing to the criminal delinquency of a juvenile in connection with Patterson’s death. The defendant claims that, because these charges were subject to compulsory joinder, pretrial continuances attributable to him on the contributing charge were not attributable to him on the murder charge. The speedy-trial act provides, “Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant .” 725 ILCS 5/103–5(a) (West 1996). Application of the speedy-trial act is a straightforward counting exercise when the defendant is charged with a single offense. Its application, however, becomes more complicated when the defendant is charged with multiple, but factually related, offenses at different times. In such cases the speedy-trial guarantee is tempered by compulsory joinder principles. The compulsory-joinder provision of the Criminal Code of 1961 states: “(a) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. (b) If the several offenses are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution, except as provided in Subsection (c), if they are based on the same act . (c) When 2 or more offenses are charged as required by Subsection (b), the court in the interest of justice may order that one or more of such charges shall be tried separately.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/3–3 (West 1996). The committee comments shed some light upon what the phrase “based on the same act” means: “Section 3–3 requires in substance that several offenses must be prosecuted in a single prosecution if they are based on the same act . (The Joint Committee originally used the word ‘conduct’ instead of ‘act,’ but after much discussion it was changed to ‘act’ before submission to the legislature.) This requirement is expressly subject, however, to several qualifications. First, the several charges must be known to the prosecuting officer [citation] at the commencement of the prosecution.  Second, the several charges must be within the jurisdiction of the same court–a necessary recognition of the statutory venue provisions. Third, as provided in subsection (c), after the prosecution has been initiated, the court may permit the separate trial of one or more of the offenses if the interests of justice so require.     Section 3–3 is not intended to cover the situation in which several offenses–either repeated violations of the same statutory provision or violations of different provisions–arise from a series of acts which are closely related with respect to the offender’s single purpose or plan.” (Emphasis in original.) Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 3–3, Committee Comments–1961, at 101-02 (Smith-Hurd 1989). That is, “same act” does not include independent acts constituting different offenses: “There is no requirement of joinder where multiple offenses arise from a series of related acts.” People v. Mueller , 109 Ill. 2d 378, 385 (1985). In People v. Quigley , 183 Ill. 2d 1 (1998), we discussed section 3–3 and its relation to the speedy-trial act. In Quigley , the defendant was charged by indictment with felony DUI and by information with misdemeanor DUI. Both charges arose from the same multiple-vehicle collision. The court dismissed the felony charge, and the defendant filed a speedy-trial demand on that charge. After he was reindicted for felony DUI, he filed a motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charge on speedy-trial grounds. The trial court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the misdemeanor charge. The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the felony charge on compulsory-joinder and double-jeopardy grounds. The trial court disagreed with the defendant, and the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal. The appellate court affirmed. We examined section 3–3 and noted that the parties’ dispute centered upon whether the two DUI charges were based on the “same act.” Quigley , 183 Ill. 2d at 7. We held that they were and that the DUI charges were subject to compulsory joinder: “Driving while under the influence may lead to some other act that, in turn, leads to the accident. The underlying cause of both misdemeanor and [felony] DUI, however, is driving while under the influence. The misdemeanor DUI and the [felony] DUI charges are based on the same act.   The ‘same act’ requirement applies primarily to two situations: (1) where several persons are affected by one act, and (2) where several different statutes are violated by one act.   Defendant was allegedly engaged in only one continuous and uninterrupted act of driving while under the influence. In this instance, the phrase ‘based on the same act’ cannot be given a hypertechnical interpretation to create multiple acts based on discrete moments in time.” (Emphasis in original.) Quigley , 183 Ill. 2d at 10-11. We then addressed the interaction between compulsory-joinder principles and the speedy-trial guarantee: “Compulsory joinder requires the State to bring multiple charges in a single prosecution. The charges are tried together unless the circuit court determines that a separate trial is required in the interest of justice. [Citation.] Once a speedy-trial demand is filed, the multiple charges are subject to the same speedy-trial period. If the charges are required to be brought in a single prosecution, the speedy-trial period begins to run when the speedy-trial demand is filed, even if the State brings some of the charges at a later date.” Quigley , 183 Ill. 2d at 13. We concluded that the felony and misdemeanor charges were required to be tried together. Quigley , 183 Ill. 2d at 13-14. Once the speedy-trial period expired on the misdemeanor charge, it also ran on the felony charge. Quigley , 183 Ill. 2d at 16. In this case, the defendant claims, and the State concedes, that the murder and contributing charges related to Patterson were subject to compulsory joinder. In fact, responding to the defendant’s second speedy-trial motion to dismiss, the prosecutor stated that the new charges were based upon “the same fact pattern that the Grand Jury heard and in fact the Grand Jury considered the facts. This is an alternative theory to the same facts. There is no change in discovery. There is no change in witnesses. There is no change in any evidence that would be presented. It’s preliminarily an alternative theory which may–which a jury could find based upon the same facts which were presented .” The parties disagree, however, on whether continuances attributable to the defendant on the contributing charge were attributable to him on the murder charge. In People v. Williams , 94 Ill. App. 3d 241 (1981), the appellate court addressed this issue. Though the court did not mention compulsory joinder or section 3–3, it held: “Where new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charges and the State had knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory limitation that is applied to the original charges. Continuances obtained in connection with the trial of the original charges cannot be attributed to defendants with respect to the new and additional charges because these new and additional charges were not before the court when those continuances were obtained .” (Emphasis added.) Williams , 94 Ill. App. 3d at 248-49. Until 1998, the appellate court uniformly followed the rule announced in Williams . See People v. Stanley , 266 Ill. App. 3d 307, 311 (1994); People v. Hinkle , 234 Ill. App. 3d 663, 666 (1992); People v. Hawkins , 212 Ill. App. 3d 973, 981 (1991); People v. Howard , 205 Ill. App. 3d 702, 710 (1990); see also People v. Parker , 59 Ill. App. 3d 302, 304-05 (1978); People v. King , 8 Ill. App. 3d 2, 5 (1972); People v. Williams , 2 Ill. App. 3d 993, 994-95 (1971); People v. Alcazar , 173 Ill. App. 3d 344, 354 (1988). People v. Gooden , 296 Ill. App. 3d 205 (1998), aff’d in part & rev’d in part , 189 Ill. 2d 209 (2000), changed that. In Gooden , the State charged the defendant with home invasion. The State alleged that he entered his ex-wife’s house without authority and struck her in the head with a shotgun. One hundred five days after his arrest, the defendant requested a 3½-month continuance to obtain a mental health expert. Two hundred eighteen days after his arrest, the State filed an amended information against the defendant, recharging him with home invasion and adding five counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. In the new charges, the State alleged that the defendant sexually assaulted his ex-wife after he struck her in the head. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the sexual assault charges under the speedy-trial act. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion. Two hundred forty-three days after his arrest, but only 26 days after the State filed the new charges, the defendant was tried and convicted of home invasion and one count of sexual assault. The defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed, but its holding on the speedy-trial issue is difficult to discern. The court initially announced it had “no problem” with the proposition that, under section 3–3, “[i]f the newly charged offenses are known to the State at the time of the original prosecution and they arise from the same set of facts, then they are subject to the speedy-trial limits that apply to the original charge, regardless of when the new charges are filed.” Gooden , 296 Ill. App. 3d at 210. The appellate court, however, did not explicitly apply this rule to the defendant. That is, the court did not conclude that the home invasion and sexual assault charges were not subject to compulsory joinder. Instead, the court considered whether the lengthy continuance requested by the defendant on the home invasion charge also applied to the sexual assault charges. The appellate court stated: “[I]t is illogical to hold that continuances which are attributable to the original charges are not attributable to the later filed charges on the basis that those charges are not before the court. The defendant cannot have it both ways. He cannot seek continuances that benefit him and enable him to better prepare for trial on the charges and then seek the dismissal of a later-filed charge on the basis that 120 days had elapsed since he was brought into custody.” Gooden , 296 Ill. App. 3d at 210. The appellate court observed that the State waited to receive forensic test results to support the victim’s allegations before filing the sexual assault charges: “This seems preferable to the State filing charges initially and having the defendant defend against charges that may be unfounded or have little supporting evidence.” Gooden , 296 Ill. App. 3d at 210. According to the court, nothing in the record indicated that the State filed the new charges in an effort to deprive the defendant of his right to a speedy trial or to hinder his defense. Gooden , 296 Ill. App. 3d at 210. The defendant’s trial was postponed because he sought mental health evidence on the home invasion charge, not because the State delayed in filing the sexual assault charges. Gooden , 296 Ill. App. 3d at 210. The court declined to follow Williams and it progeny, in effect holding that the continuance attributable to the defendant on the home invasion charge was also attributable to him on the sexual assault charges. Gooden , 296 Ill. App. 3d at 211. We affirmed. Though we noted that compulsory-joinder principles are relevant to determining speedy-trial issues, we held that the so-called Williams rule should not extend to cases which do not involve compulsory joinder “because it would result in the State having to join charges not otherwise mandated by the statute to be joined.” Gooden , 189 Ill. 2d at 218; accord People v. Williams , 193 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2000) (“the Williams rule applies only when the new and original charges are subject to compulsory joinder”). We concluded that the home invasion and sexual assault charges were based on separate acts and not subject to compulsory joinder. Gooden , 189 Ill. 2d at 220. We then examined whether the State’s decision to permissively join these charges thwarted the purposes of the speedy-trial guarantee. The defendant contended that the continuance he requested on the home invasion charge could not be used to extend the speedy-trial period for the sexual assault charges because those charges did not exist when he requested the continuance. We agreed: “[I]t is precisely because those charges were not in existence at that time that we cannot say  that defendant’s speedy-trial rights with respect to those charges were violated.” Gooden , 189 Ill. 2d at 221. This conclusion was merely an extension of our earlier conclusion that the home invasion and sexual assault charges were not subject to compulsory joinder. Because we disposed of this case on compulsory-joinder grounds, we did not need to discuss the core of the appellate court’s holding–namely, its refusal to follow Williams on whether continuances attributable to the defendant on the initial charge also apply to subsequent charges. Nonetheless, we added that, consistent with Quigley : “[T]he concerns that attend to the right to a speedy trial come into play in those cases where the later-filed charges are based on the “same act” as the original charges, i.e. , in cases where the charges must be brought in a single prosecution. In other words, had the sexual assault charges been required under section 3–3(b) to have been joined, we would not allow the State to circumvent the original speedy-trial term. The later date could not be used by the State to ‘restart’ the speedy-trial period, and any delay occasioned by such a late filing would not be attributable to the defendant . The State would be required to bring defendant to trial on all of the charges within the original speedy-trial term or face dismissal of the new charges. In such cases, fairness dictates that those charges ‘relate back’ to the date the original charges were filed.” (Emphasis added.) Gooden , 189 Ill. 2d at 222. In short, we disapproved of the appellate court’s departure from Williams . Here, the appellate court disregarded this aspect of Gooden , reasoning: “Because the supreme court reversed this court’s decision in Gooden on the basis that the charges were not subject to compulsory joinder, any further statements by the supreme court regarding delay attributable to the defendant on the originally filed charges and the later-filed charges are mere dicta .     [W]e choose to adhere to our court’s approach in Gooden .  [W]e continue to believe that it is illogical to hold that continuances which are attributable to a defendant on an original charge are not attributable to a defendant on a latter-filed [ sic ] charge where that charge is subject to compulsory joinder. We acknowledge our supreme court’s dicta but note that it did not clearly advise that any delay attributable to the defendant on the original charge is not retroactively attributable to the defendant on the later-filed charge. Our supreme court’s statement merely indicated that any delay occasioned by such a late filing would not be attributable to the defendant. This reasonably could refer to any future delay on account of the late filing of the new and additional charges, and not necessarily to delay that had already occurred.” No. 5–99–0452 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Thus, the appellate court concluded that the charges were subject to compulsory joinder, but found that the delays attributable to the defendant on the contributing charge were similarly attributable to the defendant on the murder charge.