Opinion ID: 276221
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Washington Statute of Limitations

Text: 37 The union advances the contention that this action is in part barred by the Washington statute of limitations, Rev.Code of Wash. § 4.16.130: An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for, shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued. As to the 1962 records, the union contends that the cause of action arose on the April 1, 1963 filing date. 38 Judge Ely, speaking for this court in International Union of Operating Engineers, etc. v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 350 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. C. D. Draucker, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, etc., 384 U.S. 904, 86 S.Ct. 1336, 16 L.Ed.2d 358 (1966), held that actions for damages under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, particularly § 303 thereof (29 U.S. C. § 187), are controlled by the state statute of limitations. The rationale of that decision was that since Congress had indicated no time limit, the Rules of Decision Act (28 U.S.C. § 1652) required reference to the state law. Appellants argue that Fischbach and Moore is controlling here; Congress imposed no time limit, so the law of Washington applies. Appellees contend that Congress, in requiring that supporting records be kept for five years (29 U.S.C. § 436), in effect established a five-year statute of limitations for actions under § 431 (c). 39 The bar of a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, as appellants noted in their answer (C.T. pp. 8-9). They were thus required to prove every element of the defense. Bellingham Securities Syndicate, Inc. v. Bellingham Coal Mines, Inc., 13 Wash.2d 370, 125 P.2d 668 (1942). The only statute which they allege as a bar is the Washington statute quoted above. We find that under Washington law the cause of action accrues when all of the conditions precedent have been met. Washington Security Co. v. State, 9 Wash.2d 197, 114 P.2d 965, 135 A.L.R. 1330 (1941). Where the condition precedent to bringing an action is the making of a demand, the period runs from the time when it could first have been made. Jones v. Jacobson, 45 Wash.2d 265, 273 P.2d 979 (1954); Edison Oyster Co. v. Pioneer Oyster Co., 22 Wash.2d 616, 157 P.2d 302 (1945). In this case, under the statutory requirement of just cause, demand could not have been made until the appellees had just cause. It was incumbent upon the appellants to prove this element, which they did not. They seem to suggest that the right of action could not have accrued later than the last day for filing the reports in question. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 28-29.) But it was their burden to prove the time when the appellees actually had just cause, not when they might have. 5 Having failed to prove this element, the action is not barred by the Washington statute. 40 We deem it advisable to point out that our resolution of the question of the effect of the Washington statute is not a decision that state statutes of limitations control actions based on 29 U.S.C. § 431(c), nor does it foreclose the possibility that 29 U.S.C. § 436 established a five-year statute of limitations for such actions. Our decision goes only as far as it must, that appellants' affirmative defense is not valid for failure to prove a necessary element of that defense. 41