Opinion ID: 4550285
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: In re J.S.

Text: ¶179 The majority also claims support for its substantive due process analysis in our decision in In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51. 79 IN RE K.T.B. Lee, A.C.J., dissenting Citing J.S., the majority says that “a substantive due process claim may be brought where otherwise fair procedures are alleged to be unfair in light of the ‘fundamental or important’ right they foreclose.” Supra ¶ 85 (citation omitted). Because the mother’s right to parent her child is concededly fundamental, the majority says that J.S. establishes a basis for substantive scrutiny of the fairness of the procedures set forth in the Adoption Act—and thus a basis for concluding that the mother in this case has a right to retain her parental rights despite her failure to comply with required procedures. ¶180 J.S. does not support the majority’s approach, however. In fact, the standard set forth in J.S. reiterates and extends the warnings stated in J.P. J.S. nowhere endorses the idea of a substantive due process right to retain parental rights despite failure to comply with required procedure. Certainly it doesn’t say that such a right can be premised purely on the general notion that a mother’s parental rights are “fundamental.” Instead it asks for proof at a highly specific level of generality. ¶181 In J.S. the father asserted a “substantive right” to establish his parentage without complying with the procedural elements of the statute. 2014 UT 51, ¶ 24. The governing procedure under the Adoption Act in J.S. was the requirement that a putative father file a detailed affidavit to preserve his parental rights. UTAH CODE § 78B-6-121(3). And the father sought to assert a “due process challenge . . . to the ‘substantive constitutionality of the affidavit requirement at issue,’ while emphasizing that that claim subsisted regardless of whether the statutory limitations in question were ‘applied in a procedurally fair manner.’” In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 27. Thus, the father “repeatedly characterize[d] his claim as one challenging the statutory affidavit requirement as ‘substantively unconstitutional,’” or in other words as “aimed at establishing a ‘fundamental,’ ‘substantive right’ of an unwed father as a parent” without complying with the statutory affidavit requirement. Id. ¶ 24. ¶182 In this sense J.S. is directly applicable to this case. As in this case, the question in J.S. came down to whether there was a substantive due process right to preserve parentage without complying with the procedural requirements of the law. But the standard set forth by the J.S. opinion is not at all compatible with the approach taken by the majority today. J.S. acknowledges the possibility of a limited form of substantive scrutiny of procedure— in a case in which a party can show not only that a general right or 80 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Lee, A.C.J., dissenting interest is “fundamental,” but also that there is an established, longstanding tradition entitling a party to the protection of such right without compliance with procedures prescribed by the government. See id. ¶ 57 (plurality opinion) (explaining that a party would need to “establish a specific showing that the precise interest asserted by the parent is one that is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition and in the history and culture of Western civilization” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, J.S. speaks to the appropriate level of generality at which to frame an inquiry into the existence of a substantive due process right. It suggests a specific and narrow framing—not the broad, sweeping level of generality that the majority today espouses.217 ¶183 In articulating this standard, the J.S. opinion went out of its way to warn of the “slippery slope problems” associated with any decision to endorse a new substantive due process right in this field. Id. ¶ 59 (plurality opinion). It noted that the father asserted a broad historical basis for recognizing the rights of unwed fathers. But it concluded that that was insufficient. The putative father had failed “to identify any longstanding, widespread basis in our history and culture for recognizing a perfected right in unmarried biological fathers arising upon their mere filing of a paternity suit (and without following other requirements set forth by law).” Id. (emphasis added). And it noted that “[e]ndorsement of a substantive right in this case would inevitably lead to a series of line-drawing problems going forward, requiring courts to make policy judgments about __________________________________________________________ 217 The majority concedes the narrow framing in J.S. but attempts to cabin that framing by arguing that J.S. “did nothing to limit the scope of relevant parental conduct” but instead “more narrowly construed the parental status—to exclude unmarried fathers who had not perfected their parental rights—deserving full due process protection.” Supra ¶ 77 n.145. The majority’s point seems to be that a holding dealing only with “status” would not be binding when it comes to “conduct.” I disagree with the court’s premise and with its conclusion. First, I don’t think the narrow framing in J.S. dealt with status as opposed to conduct. Second, even accepting the majority’s premise for the sake of argument, I see no reason why the level of generality would be different for “conduct” as opposed to “status”; the majority itself posits that the nature of the right at issue is defined by both the conduct and status of the parent. See supra ¶¶ 59, 62, 78. 81 IN RE K.T.B. Lee, A.C.J., dissenting whether the biological father before the court had done enough to properly justify the recognition of his parental rights.” Id. ¶ 60. J.S. explained that such “policy judgments are matters for legislative action.” Id. ¶ 61. ¶184 J.S. also noted that “[o]ur legislature has spoken to th[e] question” of where to draw the line on the procedure for a putative father to preserve the assertion of his parental rights—“prescribing a series of prerequisites” to the assertion of his rights. Id. It rejected the putative father’s attempt to “second-guess those requirements” by “establish[ing] a substantive due process right to perfect his parental rights on something less than the grounds prescribed by the legislature—by filing a paternity action but not the affidavit called for by statute.” Id. “Doing so,” the plurality explained, “would put us in the problematic realm of making ‘due process innovations’ dictated by ‘abstract formulae’ and without any effective limiting principle.” Id. And with this in mind it held the putative father to the substantive due process standard quoted above—a standard framed at a specific level of generality. ¶185 The opinion also connected this standard to the law of procedural default or forfeiture. It noted that the putative father in that case was merely “claim[ing] that he ignored” the procedural requirements of our law “on the (bad) advice of counsel.” Id. ¶ 63. And while acknowledging that this was “unfortunate,” it emphasized that “bad legal advice is no excuse for failure to follow” procedural prerequisites to the assertion of a party’s legal rights, noted that “our legal system treats attorneys as agents for their clients,” and explained that we “deem clients responsible for the decisions they make on advice of counsel.” Id. ¶186 J.S. thus emphasizes the narrowness of the operative notion of substantive due process. In rejecting the father’s substantive due process claim in that case, the lead opinion explained that the father had failed to “make the kind of showing,” id. ¶ 58,” needed to establish such a right—proof of a “longstanding, widespread basis in our history and culture for recognizing a perfected right in unmarried biological fathers arising upon their mere filing of a paternity suit (and without following other requirements set forth by law),” id. ¶ 59. And it also connected this strict standard of substantive due process to the law of procedural default or forfeiture. ¶187 The above bears no resemblance to the standard applied by the majority in this case. The majority invokes J.S. in support of a substantive standard of scrutiny of the statutory procedure under 82 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Lee, A.C.J., dissenting review—here, the requirement of a motion to intervene. See supra ¶¶ 84–86. And it roots its holding in the bare notion that a mother’s rights in a child are “fundamental”—presupposing that the inquiry should be framed at a broad, sweeping level of generality. See supra ¶¶84–86. But that is not the approach taken in J.S. J.S. took the substantive due process claim at issue on its own terms—framing it at a highly specific level of generality. And the plurality in J.S. rejected that claim on the ground that the father had not established a basis in history and tradition for the notion of a substantive right—narrowly framed—to preserve parental rights without complying with the established statutory procedure. ¶188 J.S. thus charts a narrow, limited domain for a claimed substantive right to preserve parental rights despite a party’s default under established procedure. And it highlights the novelty—and error—in the majority’s decision to endorse a substantive right to preserve parental rights despite a procedural default under the law.218