Opinion ID: 2221624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: age discrimination claim trial procedure

Text: Because the instant case demonstrates how cases brought pursuant to § 48-1009 can cause confusion and result in premature interlocutory appeals, we take this opportunity to clarify our interpretation of § 48-1009 and the procedure by which a case thereunder should proceed at trial. At the time Billingsley filed the instant lawsuit, § 48-1009. provided: In any action brought to enforce the provisions of sections 48-1001 to 48-1009, the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as the court may deem appropriate to effectuate the purposes of sections 48-1001 to 48-1009, including judgments compelling employment, reinstatement, or promotion, or enforcing liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation. (Emphasis supplied.) This court has previously stated that § 48-1009 allows a plaintiff to invoke either the legal or equitable powers of the court and that when confronted with an appeal involving Nebraska's Act Prohibiting Unjust Discrimination in Employment Because of Age (the act), we would look to the plaintiff's petition to determine whether an action is legal or equitable. See Synacek v. Omaha Cold Storage, 247 Neb. 244, 526 N.W.2d 91 (1995). Further, we have consistently conformed our reading of the act to the federal courts' reading of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), which the act closely parallels. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Nebraska Pubic Power Dist., 243 Neb. 872, 503 N.W.2d 211 (1993); Allen v. AT & T Technologies, 228 Neb. 503, 423 N.W.2d 424 (1988). Our interpretation of the act in Synacek v. Omaha Cold Storage, supra , however, does not conform to the interpretation given portions of the ADEA similar to § 48-1009, thereby causing some confusion when age discrimination cases are brought to trial in state court. The parties' confusion in the instant case may have originated from language in Synacek v. Omaha Cold Storage, supra , wherein we stated that when a plaintiff seeking relief under the act includes a prayer for equitable relief in his or her petition, the action is pled in equity and that the jury empaneled to consider some of the issues in [the] case serve[s] only an advisory role, and its findings [are] not binding on the trial court. 247 Neb. at 247, 526 N.W.2d at 94. This interpretation of the act, however, is inconsistent with our prior statements that we will conform our reading of the act to the federal reading of the ADEA and is also contrary to the plain language of the statute. Thus, we deem it appropriate to reconsider a portion of the rationale in Synacek v. Omaha Cold Storage at this time. The language of § 48-1009 does not suggest that a litigant who includes a prayer for equitable relief forgoes the opportunity to have a jury decide factual issues relating to the lawfulness of the employer's conduct and the damages related thereto. To the contrary, a litigant is entitled to have a jury determine the lawfulness of the employer's conduct and the amount of claimed past damages, in addition to having the court consider any request for equitable relief. The either or approach in Synacek v. Omaha Cold Storage, supra , whereby the lawsuit is classified as either a case at law or a case in equity, is inconsistent with both the language of the act and the way the federal courts have interpreted the ADEA. Compare Humphrey v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., supra (treating action under act as one at law when petition did not seek equitable relief), with Allen v. AT & T Technologies, supra (differentiating petitions of several plaintiffs and noting that those including prayers for equitable relief were to be tried in equity, while those with only monetary damages were to be tried at law). We, therefore, examine the federal approach and find the case of Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir.1982), to be instructive and typical of the well-established procedure utilized in the federal system. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co . involved an age discrimination claim filed by a supervisor at a rubber plant. The primary issue therein was whether the jury was properly instructed on how to consider damages, but crucial to the instant appeal was the Eighth Circuit's explanation of the proper procedure for trial in age discrimination cases: After the jury trial on the foregoing damages issues, the district court should reconsider [the plaintiff's] request for equitable relief. The equitable relief that the district court may grant includes, inter alia, additional pension benefits, reinstatement, and monetary damages in lieu of reinstatement.... In fashioning its equitable remedy, the district court is not free to reject the jury's findings on whether [the defendant company] would have retained [the plaintiff] when the ... plant closed, or on any other issues in this case.... Although the court below retains its discretion to consider all the circumstances in this case when it determines what equitable relief may be appropriate, it cannot base its decision on its own factual findings that conflict with those expressly made by the jury. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d at 1100-01. See, also, Newhouse v. McCormick & Co., Inc., 110 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1997); Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir.1991) (stating that where both legal and equitable remedies are demanded, appropriate method of proceeding requires submission of case first to jury to resolve liability and all legal damages, after which district court conducts trial in equity to resolve all issues of equitable relief); Farber v. Massillon Bd. of Educ., 917 F.2d 1391 (6th Cir.1990); Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir.1990); Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461 (5th Cir.1989); Ramsey v. Chrysler First, Inc., 861 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir.1988); Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 822 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.1987); Cassino v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir.1987); Maxfield v. Sinclair Intern., 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir.1985). Such a procedure is logical and has proved to be workable in the federal courts. We conclude that state court trials brought under the Nebraska act should be conducted in the same manner. Thus, we determine that Synacek v. Omaha Cold Storage, 247 Neb. 244, 526 N.W.2d 91 (1995), was correct insofar as it noted the propriety of a trial court's submission of the damages issues involved in an age discrimination case to the jury; however, to the extent that Synacek v. Omaha Cold Storage holds that such a jury serves in only an advisory capacity when a plaintiff seeks both legal and equitable relief, it is overruled. The proper procedure, as noted in Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir.1982), is for the trial court to submit the damages issue in an age discrimination case to the jury, if one is empaneled, and reserve ruling on a plaintiff's requested equitable relief until after the jury renders a verdict. A trial court should then enter an order on the jury verdict and reserve entering judgment until after the court has considered any requests for equitable relief. See id. In other words, the trial court should limit itself to entering but one final judgment based on all of the rights and remedies of the parties before it. In the instant case, the district court has not ruled upon Billingsley's motion for equitable relief and attorney fees. In the absence of a judgment or order finally disposing of a case, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to act and must dismiss the purported appeal. In re Interest of Dustin H. et al., 259 Neb. 166, 608 N.W.2d 580 (2000).