Opinion ID: 1195144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Policies Impacting on the Remedies in HRS Chapter 431

Text: AIAC also argues that it was not required to remain in circuit court once Moss filed an action for a declaratory judgment. Moss disagrees, claiming that she bound AIAC to that forum. While we have decided, supra, that there was no arbitration agreement in this case, AIAC and Moss's arguments presents us with another issue: was AIAC bound to Moss's chosen forum once Moss filed an action in circuit court? As previously noted, the legislature has provided three arenas in which litigants may settle no-fault disputes. See HRS §§ 431:10C-212, -213, and -314. Nevertheless, we believe that the legislature did not intend parties to engage in multiple, concurrent proceedings arising from the same claim and dealing with identical issues, as such a result would fly in the face of several well-established public policies. We now examine these policy interests, which include considerations in favor of reducing no-fault premiums, encouraging the prompt resolution of claims, the efficient use of judicial resources, deterring forum-shopping, and encouraging arbitration. In 1973, for example, the legislature amended the existing motor vehicle insurance laws and restructured them into a nofault system. Some of the stated goals behind these revisions were to (1) Provide for a speedy, adequate and equitable reparation for those injured or otherwise victimized; (2) Provide for the stabilization and reduction of motor vehicle insurance premium rates; [and] (3) Provide for insurance coverage for all who require it, at a cost within the reach of every licensed driver[.] Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 13, in 1972 House Journal, at 1219, 1221. In 1987 and 1992, the legislature further revised the nofault code, explaining, inter alia, that reduction and stabilization of rates were of primary concern. See Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 53, in 1987 House Journal, at 1022; Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 150, in 1992 House Journal, at 878; see also Chun v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Haw.App. 290, 296, 687 P.2d 564, 567, cert. denied, 67 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1984). This court also has recognized the importance of the efficient use of judicial resources. See, e.g., Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai`i 494, 510, 880 P.2d 169, 185 (1994) (recognizing the need for prompt, efficient resolution of civil disputes before trial, in part because of the strain on judicial resources); State ex rel. Price v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 189, 858 P.2d 712, 724, reconsideration denied, 75 Haw. 580, 861 P.2d 735 (1993) (recognizing the need to conserve scarce judicial resources); Kauhane v. Acutron Co., 71 Haw. 458, 463, 795 P.2d 276, 278 (1990) (doctrine of res judicata serves to conserve judicial resources); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Lyman, 68 Haw. 55, 78, 704 P.2d 888, 902 (1985) (trial court has the discretion to weigh the potential for waste of judicial resources); Arakaki v. Arakaki, 54 Haw. 60, 64, 502 P.2d 380, 383 (1972) (one purpose of a bill concerning property settlements during divorce proceedings is to conserve judicial resources). In a similar vein, the practice of `Forum Shopping' should be discouraged as inimical to sound judicial administration. Jordan v. Hamada, 64 Haw. 446, 448, 643 P.2d 70, 72 (1982) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) (the twin aims of the Erie rule [are the] discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.) Finally, we have recognized time and again that the proclaimed public policy of our legislature is to encourage arbitration as a means of settling differences and thereby avoid litigation. Richardson, 76 Hawai`i at 510, 880 P.2d at 185 (quoting Leeward Bus Co. v. City & County of Honolulu, 58 Haw. 64, 71, 564 P.2d 445, 449 (1977) (citation omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Mathewson, 82 Hawai`i at 69, 919 P.2d at 981; Mars Constructors, Inc. v. Tropical Enters., Ltd., 51 Haw. 332, 336, 460 P.2d 317, 319 (1969). [W]e emphasize the importance of utilizing alternative methods of dispute resolution in an effort to reduce the growing number of cases that crowd our courts each year. This court has long recognized the strong public policy supporting Hawai`i's arbitration statutes as codified in HRS Chapter 658. We have stated that the proclaimed public policy is to encourage arbitration as a means of settling differences and thereby avoiding litigation. Lee v. Heftel, 81 Hawai`i 1, 4, 911 P.2d 721, 724 (1996) (citations, ellipsis points, and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, in order to effectuate the intent of the legislature, we hold that the first party to choose a forum for the resolution of a no-fault dispute binds the other party to that forum unless the circuit court finds that the parties have entered into a mandatory and binding arbitration agreement. [6] To hold otherwise would create a patently absurd result: claimants could file as many as three separate yet concurrent actions, including a motion for an order appointing an arbitrator, a request for an administrative hearing, and an action for judicial review. Such an outcome would waste time, monies, and lead to inconsistent and unpredictable application of the law, results which would hamper, not further, the aforementioned public policies. Consequently, we apply the general rule, enunciated supra, that the first party to choose a forum, in the absence of a mandatory arbitration agreement, binds the other party to that forum. Accordingly, when Moss filed an action for a declaratory judgment in circuit court, she bound AIAC to circuit court. Unless Moss and AIAC agree otherwise, that is where the disposition of this action must proceed to its conclusion.