Opinion ID: 728966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Because of in

Text: Title VII Cases 48 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994) (emphasis added). The relevant causal language of Title VII's liability provision is substantially identical to the causal language at issue in this case. Compare id. (Title VII) (because of) with 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1) (ADA Title I) (because of) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 12203 (ADA Title IV anti-retaliation provision) (because). 49 When Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, the Supreme Court had already authoritatively determined that, for Title VII cases, because of does not mean solely because of. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), the Supreme Court focused on the nature of the causal connection required by the phrase because of in Title VII cases. No opinion of the Court garnered a majority of the votes in Price Waterhouse, in part because the justices held differing views about whether the because of requirement meant that the impermissible consideration was a but-for cause, or meant only that it had been taken into account in the decisionmaking process. Compare id. at 244, 109 S.Ct. at 1787 (plurality opinion) with id. at 262-63, 109 S.Ct. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). However, all of the justices agreed that because of, as used in Title VII, does not mean solely because of. See id. at 241, 109 S.Ct. at 1785 (plurality opinion); id. at 258-59, 109 S.Ct. at 1795 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 262-63, 109 S.Ct. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 284, 109 S.Ct. at 1808 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 592-94 (3d Cir.1995) (analyzing and summarizing the because of analysis contained in the various Price Waterhouse opinions). 50 A familiar canon of statutory construction is that evaluation of congressional action must take into account its contemporary legal context. Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1186, 1190, 134 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (plurality opinion) (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1958-59, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); see also Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank N.A., 83 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir.1996) (en banc) (recognizing principle that Congress legislates against the background of the existing common law ). That presumption is particularly compelling where, as here, Congress adopts operative language to which the Supreme Court has recently given an authoritative interpretation in a similar context. When Congress enacted the ADA, it did so against the backdrop of recent Supreme Court employment discrimination case law that interpreted the phrase because of not to mean solely because of. We think Congress knew what it was doing, and we hold that the ADA imposes liability whenever the prohibited motivation makes the difference in the employer's decision, i.e., when it is a but-for cause.