Opinion ID: 1093868
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court err in denying walker's motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence?

Text: Walker asserts that the search warrant was invalid as the affidavit did not set forth facts and circumstances from which a neutral and detached magistrate could find probable cause to issue the search warrant. He cites three deficiencies: (1) The reliability of Shirley Jones, an eyewitness to the shooting, was not shown; (2) the affidavit failed to clearly indicate which of the facts alleged were hearsay or which were within affiant's personal knowledge; and (3) the confidential source mentioned in paragraph 3 of the underlying facts in the affidavit was not shown. Walker bases his argument upon the two-prong test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). After the briefs were filed in this case, the United States Supreme Court decided Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), which abandoned the two-prong test and replaced it with the totality of the circumstances analysis to determine whether probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant. We too have adopted the new totality of the circumstances analysis. In Lee v. State, 435 So.2d 674 (Miss. 1983), quoting from Gates, we said: The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for ... concluding that probable cause existed. .... 435 So.2d at 676. In Lee, we applied the new Gates test and determined that probable cause existed for the warrant. Furthermore, in Hall v. State, 455 So.2d 1303 (Miss. 1984), while not relying expressly upon Gates, we stated a totality of the circumstances test and upheld the facial validity of a warrant-affidavit. 455 So.2d at 1308-09. We reaffirmed our adoption of this test in Stringer v. State, No. 54,805, February 27, 1985, not yet reported. In accordance with these cases, we now examine the affidavit in this record to determine if the facts and circumstances set forth therein were sufficient for the issuing magistrate to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances in the affidavit before time, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there was a fair probability that evidence of the crime would be found at the residence of Walker. In the first two paragraphs of the underlying facts and circumstances sheet, the affiant related the substance of an interview with an eyewitness who observed the crime, gave a description of the automobile in which the persons who fired the shots were riding, gave a description which fit that of appellant and Kenneth Painter, and identified the automobile in the presence of the officer. These facts, standing alone, were sufficient to enable the issuing magistrate to make a practical decision that there was a fair probability that evidence of the crime would be found at appellant's residence. With reference to this part of the affidavit, appellant contends that the reliability of the eyewitness to the shooting was not shown and that this was necessary. We have considered this argument in at least three cases and have held that, when information is furnished by an eyewitness rather than from an informant, there is no need to show the party supplying the information was a credible person. Foley v. State, 348 So.2d 1034 (Miss. 1977); Holt v. State, 348 So.2d 434 (Miss. 1977); and Wolf v. State, 281 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1973). The rationale for the victim or eyewitness exception is that the statements of such eyewitnesses are based on their own observation and thus are not likely to reflect mere idle rumor or irresponsible conjecture. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have likewise considered the same question and reached a similar conclusion. United States v. Flynn, 664 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231, 1238-39 (5th Cir.), appeal after remand 470 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir.1972); McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264, 1269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 984, 89 S.Ct. 2149, 23 L.Ed.2d 773 (1969). In the third reason advanced by appellant for the insufficiency of the affidavit, he argues that the affidavit failed to clearly indicate which of the facts alleged were hearsay and which were within the affiant's own knowledge. He cites United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965), but he can take little comfort from this case. In Vantresca, the United States Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit and disagreed with its conclusion that the affidavit might have been based wholly upon hearsay. The Court then set forth in detail the reasons for its conclusion. The affidavit in the case before us shows clearly the facts relied upon by affiant which were hearsay and the facts which were within his personal knowledge. Accordingly, we find no merit in this contention. In the third paragraph of the affidavit, the officer averred that a confidential source had advised him that appellant owned a.30 caliber carbine. The reliability of the informant was not stated, but this omission is not fatal because this information may be purged from the affidavit and the other remainder of the affidavit may be considered to determine if probable cause existed for issuance of a search warrant. United States v. Napoli, 530 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir.1976), and United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.1973). The affidavit, omitting paragraph three, is sufficient to support issuance of a search warrant.