Opinion ID: 1854339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of the Legislative Presumption of Intent Contained in Sec. 100.30 (4), Stats.

Text: Defendant attacks the constitutionality of the last sentence of sub. (4) of sec. 100.30, Stats., which provides: (4) . . . Evidence of any advertisement, offer to sell, or sale of any item of merchandise by any retailer or wholesaler at less than cost as defined in this section shall be prima facie evidence of intent to induce the purchase of other merchandise, or to unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or to otherwise injure a competitor. Originally this sentence of the act read: Proof of any such advertising, offer to sell or sale by any retailer . . . in contravention of the policy of this section shall be prima facie evidence of a violation hereof. In referring to the original wording the court in State v. Twentieth Century Market [17] declared it is not within the province of the legislature to declare an individual guilty of a crime. Thereafter the legislature amended the sentence to read as it now reads. The last sentence of sub. (4), sec. 100.30, Stats., as it now reads, was before this court in State v. Ross [18] wherein its constitutionality was upheld, the court stating: The statute was amended and it is now clear that the plaintiff may establish prima facie evidence of intent by proof of advertising or sale of items below cost. The burden of going forward with the evidence then shifts to the defendant. We cannot agree with appellant that this presumption in favor of the plaintiff is unreasonable or that it amounts to a conclusion of guilt. [19] The United States supreme court in United States v. Gainey [20] recently held that a statutory presumption grounded on evidentiary facts in a criminal statute is constitutionally permissible if there is a rational connection between such evidentiary facts and the fact presumed. There the court upheld a statutory provision making defendant's unexplained presence at a still sufficient evidence of his possession, custody or control of an unregistered still. In McIntire v. Borofsky [21] a section of the New Hampshire Unfair Sales Act, which section provided that advertisements or sales at less than cost are prima facie evidence of a violation of the act, was attacked as being unconstitutional. The court held the section valid, stating: . . . there is a rational connection between the fact to be proved and the fact presumed. . . . [22] We hold there is a rational connection between the facts presumed in the last sentence of sub. (4) of sec. 100.30, Stats., viz., intent to induce the purchase of other merchandise, or to unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or to otherwise injure a competitor and the evidence of the selling by defendant of the mixed nuts, toilet tissue, and work gloves below cost. Therefore, it necessarily follows that the statutory presumption is constitutional as so applied.