Opinion ID: 2229929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Hold a Franks Hearing

Text: Beginning in April 1992, and continuing through March 1993, the Will County sheriff's department and the Wilmington police department received four anonymous tips indicating that defendant was involved in the murder of Jeff Stephens and the attempted murder and sexual assault of Heather Stephens. Gloria DeLeon, the head investigator for the Will County sheriff's department, learned that defendant was incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections in 1992 as a result of a conviction for sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, Michelle Adermann. Under section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 1994)), certain sex offenders and sexually dangerous persons are required to submit blood specimens to the State Police for the purpose of establishing a data bank composed of DNA profiles. Pursuant to this statute, a blood sample was taken from defendant, the DNA extracted, and an RFLP analysis performed. The resulting profile was stored in the sexual offenders DNA data bank. On April 6,1993, a search of the data bank indicated a preliminary match between defendant's DNA profile and the profile of the DNA extracted from the semen found on Heather's panties and on the vaginal swabs taken of her at the hospital on November 25, 1991. Subsequently, on April 14, 1993, De-Leon submitted a complaint for a search warrant to obtain samples of defendant's blood and saliva. Included with the complaint was a supporting affidavit authored and sworn to by DeLeon. On the strength of the affidavit, the search warrant was issued and a blood sample was collected from defendant. This blood sample was eventually forwarded to Metzger at the State Police laboratory and used in his DNA analysis. After defendant was charged with the instant offenses, he filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing, under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), to challenge the search warrant and to suppress the DNA evidence. According to defendant, DeLeon intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth omitted crucial information from the warrant affidavit, particularly with respect to the preliminary DNA results obtained from the search of the sexual offenders DNA data bank. The trial court heard arguments on defendant's motion and concluded that a Franks hearing was not warranted. Before this court, defendant maintains that the trial court erred in denying him a Franks hearing. Defendant requests this court to order the suppression of the DNA evidence and a grant him a new trial or, alternatively, to remand for a Franks hearing. In Franks, the United States Supreme Court held that in certain limited circumstances, a defendant may be allowed an evidentiary hearing to challenge the truthfulness of the affidavit used by the police to obtain a search warrant. In order to obtain a Franks hearing, the defendant must make a `substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,' and that `the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.' People v. Lucente, 116 Ill.2d 133, 147, 107 Ill.Dec. 214, 506 N.E.2d 1269 (1987), quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. at 2676, 57 L.Ed.2d at 672. The substantial preliminary showing necessary to warrant a Franks hearing requires the defendant to offer proof that is somewhere between mere denials on the one hand and proof by a preponderance on the other. Lucente, 116 Ill.2d at 152, 107 HLDec. 214, 506 N.E.2d 1269. In addition, if after setting the allegedly false material to one side there is sufficient information left in the affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, a hearing is not required. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S.Ct. at 2684, 57 L.Ed.2d at 682. The reasoning of Franks extends to those situations where information necessary for a determination of probable cause is intentionally or recklessly omitted from the warrant affidavit. People v. Stewart, 105 Ill.2d 22, 43, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840 (1984). In these situations, in order to be granted a hearing, a defendant must show that the information was omitted with the purpose of misleading the judge issuing the warrant, and that the omitted information was material to the determination of probable cause. Stewart, 105 Ill.2d at 44, 85 Ill. Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840. For omitted information to be material to the determination of probable cause, and thus, `to serve as the basis for a hearing under Franks, it must be such that its inclusion in the affidavit would defeat probable cause.' 2 W. LaFave, Search 4.4(c), at 498 (3d ed.1996), quoting United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 301 (4th Cir.1990); Stewart, 105 Ill.2d at 47, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840. The pertinent portions of DeLeon's affidavit state: An interview was conducted eventually of Heather Stephens when her condition improved and she described her attacker as a male/white, approximately 5'2 to approximately 5'5, approximately 140 lbs., light colored hair and on the younger side. It is important to state that Heather Stephens is extremely poor sighted and she did not have glasses on at the time of her sexual assault. Her sexual assault also occurred in a dark area and she stated she did not get a good look at the individual who assaulted her although she feels that is she saw him again, she could identify him.       Arthur Dale Hickey fits the general size description of the offender but Mr. Hickey is older than what was described by Heather Stephens in that Mr. Hickey was born in 1951. Throughout this investigation, on numerous occasions, Heather Stephens has observed mug books and groups of photographs of people, with each group being approximately 20 to 40 people. Heather Stephens has observed over 300 of these photographs and approximately 2 or 3 times the photo arrays shown to her included Arthur Dale Hickey and she has never picked out Mr. Hickey as being her attacker.    The State Police had occasion to receive a blood sample which was labeled as coming from Mr. Hickey and that blood sample was worked up in such a manner that comparable DNA testing was done on that blood sample. The genetic markers from Mr. Hickey's DNA testing matched the genetic markers of the semen obtained from the victim, Heather Stephens. This was done similar to the State Police's use of a computer to perform AFIS fingerprint comparisons. David Metzger of the Illinois State Police, Division of Forensic Services, who is the DNA research coordinator, contacted your complainant with a letter stating of this match through the use of the DNA index data base containing Mr. Hickey's known sample. Mr. Metzger requests that your complainant obtain additional blood and saliva standards from Mr. Hickey to insure the chain of evidence on Mr. Hickey's blood so that the DNA of Hickey's blood can be directly compared to the DNA from the semen sample retrieved from Heather Stephens. (Emphasis added.) DeLeon's affidavit also states that four anonymous tips were received which implicated defendant in the instant crimes. Defendant asserts that DeLeon made three major misrepresentations in her affidavit, the first two of which relate to the physical description of defendant. First, defendant maintains that DeLeon omitted several of the physical characteristics of defendant. Specifically, defendant states that DeLeon omitted the fact that she knew defendant had dark or brown hair in 1991; omitted the fact that defendant weighed at least 165 pounds in 1991; omitted the fact that defendant is 5 feet 6 inches tall; omitted the fact that defendant was 40 years old in November 1991; and omitted the fact that while Heather had stated that her attacker had no facial hair, defendant had a mustache in 1991. Second, defendant maintains that DeLeon made an affirmative misstatement when she noted that Arthur Dale Hickey fits the general size description of the offender. The third alleged misrepresentation, and the most significant in defendant's view, is that DeLeon omitted important contextual information with respect to the results obtained from the search of the sexual offenders DNA data bank. In support of this contention, defendant points to a letter which DeLeon received from Metzger's office three days before she submitted her affidavit. The letter states that the DNA from the evidence semen was searched against the sexual offenders data bank at three loci. It then states that defendant demonstrates a DNA profile that is consistent with the evidence profiles and could be the donor of the seminal material identified. This finding can be used for investigative purposes. However, it will be necessary to submit additional blood and saliva standard samples from Mr. Hickey for confirmatory forensic analysis. Defendant argues that DeLeon should have explained in her affidavit that the match which resulted from the search of the sexual offenders data bank was merely a preliminary result, obtained, as the letter from Metzger's offices states, from a three-probe, RFLP analysis. Defendant maintains that DeLeon should have noted that the State Police laboratory requires that a DNA sample be subjected to a minimum of four or five probes to obtain a meaningful RFLP profile. According to defendant, DeLeon also should have stated that a blood sample was needed from defendant not only to insure the chain of custody but, more importantly, to confirm the results of the preliminary, three-probe analysis. Without this contextual information, defendant asserts that the judge who issued the search warrant had no way to gauge the significance of the match which resulted from the search of the sexual offenders data bank. Defendant maintains that he has made a substantial preliminary showing that DeLeon intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, omitted this contextual information, as well as the information regarding defendant's physical characteristics. From this, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying him a Franks hearing. We disagree. The probable cause requirement necessary to support the issuance of a search warrant is rooted in principles of common sense. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a `substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983), quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 708 (1960); see also People v. Tisler, 103 Ill.2d 226, 82 Ill.Dec. 613, 469 N.E.2d 147 (1984). In the case at bar, the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant rested primarily on the DNA information contained in the warrant affidavit. This court has determined that RFLP profiling is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community and, thus, satisfies the Frye standard of admissibility. Miller, 173 Ill.2d at 188-89, 219 Ill.Dec. 43, 670 N.E.2d 721. The identification of defendant through the sexual offenders data bank was based upon RFLP analysis. In addition, while a match across three loci may in general be considered preliminary, such a match unquestionably establishes a fair probability that    evidence of a crime will be found ( Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d at 527) in the identified suspect's blood sample. Accordingly, even if DeLeon's affidavit had explained that the search of the sexual offenders DNA data bank indicated only a preliminary match between defendant's DNA and the evidence semen DNA, probable cause would exist to support the issuance of the search warrant for defendant's blood sample. We note, moreover, that a contrary result would seriously undermine, if not eliminate, the usefulness of the sexual offenders data bank as a means of identifying and locating perpetrators of offenses where DNA evidence is the only meaningful evidence recovered. Finally, if the statement that defendant fits the general size description given by Heather were set to one side, and if the omissions regarding defendant's physical characteristics were included in the affidavit, the finding of probable cause based upon the DNA information would not be altered. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant a Franks hearing.