Opinion ID: 1669462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of the Guest Statute to a 14-year-old Child

Text: In Walker, this Court held that the applicability of the guest statute to a child under fourteen is a jury question. 368 So.2d at 279. Steven was born on November 22, 1985; he was 14 years and 8 months old at the time of the accident on July 25, 2000. In Fox v. Hollar Co., 576 So.2d 223 (Ala.1991), an action was filed on behalf of an 11-year-old boy against The Hollar Company and others stemming from personal injuries the boy received as the result of a traffic accident that occurred while the boy was riding as a passenger in a tanker truck owned by Hollar and being driven by the boy's father, an employee of Hollar. Following a verdict for the defense, the plaintiff appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court had erred in submitting to the jury the question whether the boy was a guest within the meaning of the guest statute. This Court noted that [t]he relationship between a host and a guest is consensual in nature and involves some acceptance by the guest of the relationship and its attendant hazards and stated that the question presented was whether the 11-year-old boy was legally capable of giving his consent to ride in the Hollar tanker truck driven by [his father] so as to bring him within the guest statute. 576 So.2d at 226. The Court noted that in Walker it had adopted the position that the question whether a child under 14 is subject to the guest statute is to be determined by the factfinder, based on the individual child's capacity to consent. 576 So.2d at 226. Darryl does not argue that Steven was not as intelligent or perceptible as any other boy his age or that he was otherwise mentally incapable of consenting to the status of automobile guest; rather, he argues only that whether a child that age could become a guest is always a jury question. In this case the facts are undisputed. Candis testified that Steven was smart and was able to appreciate any particular danger. Ms. Key had transported Chris simply because he was Steven's best friend and was going to help him with his homework. Whether one is a `guest' within the meaning of this [the guest] statute is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury; however, where reasonable minds can reach but one conclusion from the evidence, the question becomes one of law for the court. Harrison v. McCleary, 281 Ala. 87, 199 So.2d 165 (1967). Davis v. Davis, 622 So.2d 901, 902 (Ala.1993). If the only benefits received by a driver are those such as are incidental to goodwill, then the passenger is a `guest' within the meaning of the statute. Id. In Walker, we observed that [s]everal of our cases have properly applied the [guest] statute against minors over the age of 14. See e.g. Boggs v. Turner, 277 Ala. 157, 168 So.2d 1 (1964); Shirley v. Shirley, 261 Ala. 100, 73 So.2d 77 (1954). 368 So.2d at 279. In Boggs v. Turner, 277 Ala. 157, 168 So.2d 1 (1964), the age of the injured minor passenger is not specifically stated, but she is identified as one of the girl cheerleaders at Vigor High School in Mobile County, Alabama, and referred to as one of the kids and one of the children. As noted, this Court, having access to the record in Boggs, indicated in Walker that she was over the age of 14. In Boggs, the Court held that there was not, as a matter of law, enough benefit to the appellee [defendant motor-vehicle operator] to remove the appellant [student cheerleader] from the influence of the guest statute, and she was, therefore, a guest. 277 Ala. at 161, 168 So.2d at 5. Our caselaw relating to a minor's capacity for contributory negligence is instructive by analogy. In Aplin v. Tew, 839 So.2d 635, 639 (Ala.2002), we affirmed a judgment as a matter of law entered on the ground that the 14-year-old plaintiff had been contributorily negligent. The plaintiff argued that he should not be held to the same standard of contributory negligence to which we would hold an adult. The question of contributory negligence is normally one for a jury. However, where the facts are such that all reasonable persons must reach the same conclusion, contributory negligence may be found as a matter of law.... .... [The minor plaintiff] is correct that we apply a different standard to children below the age of 14. A child between the ages of 7 and 14 is prima facie incapable of contributory negligence. Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So.2d 231, 236 (Ala.1994); Savage Indus., Inc. v. Duke, 598 So.2d 856, 858 (Ala.1992). However, at the time of the accident, [the minor plaintiff] was already 14 years old and was about to enter the ninth grade. Thus, [the minor plaintiff] was capable of contributory negligence. 839 So.2d at 638-39. Because the facts of this case present no jury question with regard to the applicability of the guest statute to Steven, apart from the issue of his capacity to consent to being a passenger and because he was over the age of 14 and of at least ordinary intelligence and perception for that age, the guest statute was applicable to him as a matter of law.