Opinion ID: 2630573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Unanswered Question

Text: Most glaringly, the lead opinion leaves unanswered the threshold question of which particular Pitchess records disclosed or discovered are subject to a section 1045(e) protective order. Specifically, the information provided to the defense by the trial court after a Pitchess hearing, in daily trial practice, is limited to a complainant's or witness's name, address, telephone number, and the date of the incident. As we stated in City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at page 84, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222: [C]ourts have generally refused to disclose verbatim reports or records of any kind from peace officer personnel files, ordering instead (as the municipal court directed here) that the agency reveal only the name, address and phone number of any prior complainants and witnesses and the dates of the incidents in question. Thus, a trial court's Pitchess disclosure necessarily presupposes an independent investigation by defense counsel. Accordingly, the threshold question we should endeavor to answer is whether a section 1045(e) protective order (a) may only restrict the use of the actual information disclosed by the trial courti.e., the complainant's and witness's name, address, telephone number and the date of the incident; or (b) may also encompass the direct fruits of the information developed during this independent investigatione.g., a complainant's or disclosed witness's statement; or (c) may encompass other information obtained during this independent investigatione.g., physical evidence (such as a photograph of injuries), or a statement obtained from a newly discovered witness. Until the threshold question of what constitutes Pitchess information is answered, the majority's decision leaves trial courts, city attorneys, and defense attorneys, with little guidance.