Opinion ID: 2037020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Heck v. Humphrey

Text: ¶ 49. The defendants additionally argue that Robinson's excessive use of force claim is in part barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck, when a plaintiff seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. Id. at 487. If the action would imply the invalidity of the prior conviction or sentence, it must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Id. ¶ 50. Similar to their issue preclusion argument, the defendants contend that Heck supports dismissal of petitioner's claims [of excessive force] prior to being in custody, because these pre-custody claims imply the invalidity of Robinson's convictions and the read-in charges. We need not decipher which of Robinson's allegations the defendants believe arose prior to custody, because we conclude that none of Robinson's allegations implicates the prior criminal action in a manner requiring dismissal under Heck. ¶ 51. The defendants present us with no authority to support the proposition that the Heck doctrine is meant to protect the integrity of read-in charges. Indeed, the Supreme Court explained that the doctrine prevents a § 1983 claim only if it will imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). Because read-in charges are not criminal judgments, we conclude they do not implicate the rule of Heck v. Humphrey . ¶ 52. Turning our attention to Robinson's two convictions, which clearly are criminal judgments, we must determine whether his excessive force claim necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of these convictions. Id. In determining whether a § 1983 claim so invalidates a prior conviction, the Supreme Court suggested that the proper inquiry is whether the § 1983 claim requires negation of an element of the offense for which the plaintiff was convicted. Id. at 486 n.6. [15] ¶ 53. Robinson was convicted of the offense of battery to a law enforcement officer, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.20(2). [10] We find no element of that offense that will necessarily be negated through proof of Robinson's excessive use of force claim. Similarly, as we explained in regard to defendant's issue preclusion argument, Robinson's § 1983 claim does not implicate his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.23. We therefore find no reason under Heck to grant summary judgment dismissing Robinson's claim or any portion of that claim.