Opinion ID: 1384870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the controlling statutes.

Text: Although we have rejected an approach to statutory construction which is limited to the words of the statute, it is still fundamental that the statutory language is the starting point for any interpretation. State v. Moniz, 69 Haw. ___, 742 P.2d 373 (1987). Any interpretation, though, must be consistent with the legislative purpose, State v. Kala, 6 Haw. App. ___, 718 P.2d 1117 (1986), and cannot contradict the plain and obvious meaning of the law. State v. Rodrigues, 68 Haw. ___, 706 P.2d 1293 (1985). The statutes indicating the scope of DAG pleas and DANC pleas read in relevant part (emphasis added): § 853-1 Deferred acceptance of guilty plea or nolo contendere plea; discharge and dismissal, expungement of records. (a) Upon proper motion as provided by this chapter: (1) When a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty or nolo contendere, prior to commencement of trial, to a felony, misdemeanor, or petty misdemeanor; (2) It appears to the court that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct; and (3) The ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant shall presently suffer the penalty imposed by law, the court, without accepting the plea of nolo contendere or entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the defendant and after considering the recommendations, if any, of the prosecutor, may defer further proceedings. (b) The proceedings may be deferred upon any of the conditions specified by section 706-624. The court may defer the proceedings for such period of time as the court shall direct but in no case to exceed the maximum sentence allowable. The defendant may be subject to bail or recognizance at the court's discretion during the period during which the proceedings are deferred. (c) Upon the defendant's completion of the period designated by the court and in compliance with the terms and conditions established, the court shall discharge the defendant and dismiss the charge against the defendant. (d) Discharge of the defendant and dismissal of the charge against the defendant under this section shall be without adjudication of guilt, shall eliminate any civil admission of guilt, and is not a conviction. (e) Upon discharge of the defendant and dismissal of the charge against the defendant under this section, the defendant may apply for expungement not less than one year following discharge, pursuant to section 831-3.2. § 853-4 Chapter not applicable; when. This chapter shall not apply when: (1) The offense charged involves the intentional, knowing, reckless, or negligent killing of another person; (2) The offense charged involves the intentional, knowing, or reckless bodily injury or serious bodily injury of another person... . Negligently is defined by HRS § 702-206(4) (1985) as: (a) A person acts negligently with respect to his conduct when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk taken by engaging in such conduct. (b) A person acts negligently with respect to attendant circumstances when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances exist. (c) A person acts negligently with respect to a result of his conduct when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause such a result. (d) A risk is substantial and unjustifiable within the meaning of this subsection if the person's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation. [2] By contrast, HRS § 707-704 (1985) provides (emphasis added): Negligent homicide in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of the offense of negligent homicide in the second degree if he causes the death of another person by the operation of a vehicle in a manner which is simple negligence. (2) Simple negligence as used in this section: (a) A person acts with simple negligence with respect to his conduct when he should be aware of a risk that he engages in such conduct. (b) A person acts with simple negligence with respect to attendant circumstances when he should be aware of a risk that such circumstances exist. (c) A person acts with simple negligence with respect to a result of his conduct when he should be aware of a risk that his conduct will cause such a result. (d) A risk is within the meaning of this subsection if the person's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a deviation from the standard of care that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation. (3) Negligent homicide in the second degree is a misdemeanor. Clearly, then, an important distinction exists between negligence and simple negligence for the purposes of criminal mens rea. We go on to describe the reasons for this distinction based on an examination of the germane legislative history.