Opinion ID: 844204
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Imposition of upper-term firearm enhancement

Text: In connection with each of the murder and robbery counts the jury found true the allegation that defendant personally used a handgun, within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a)(1). That provision allows for an additional sentence of 3, 4, or 10 years. The court imposed the upper term of 10 years for each murder conviction and for one of the two robbery convictions. Defendant asserts that sentencing him with these upper term enhancements violated his Sixth Amendment jury trial right because none of the aggravating factors on which the court relied to impose them had been found true by the jury or admitted by him. (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270; People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825.) We agree with defendant that the court erred when it selected the upper term enhancement on the Ricky Byrd murder count, relying on facts not found by the jury. However, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 holds that, under the Sixth Amendment, “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Apprendi, supra, at p. 490.) In Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, the high court extended the scope of Apprendi by defining “statutory maximum” as the “maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” (Blakely, supra, at p. 303, italics omitted; see In re Gomez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 650, 656.) Applying Blakely, the court later held in Cunningham v. California, supra, 549 (footnote continued from previous page) of the crime.” Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, the trial court properly concluded that the proposed instruction was an incorrect statement of law. 50 U.S. 270, that California‟s determinate sentencing law did not comport with a defendant‟s Sixth Amendment jury trial right. As Cunningham explained, “If the jury‟s verdict alone does not authorize the sentence, if, instead, the judge must find an additional fact to impose the longer term, the Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied.” (Id. at p. 290.) Because the aggravating circumstances necessary for imposition of an upper term “depend on facts found discretely and solely by the judge” (id. at p. 288), the “statutory maximum” prescribed in California‟s sentencing scheme is not the upper term but rather the middle term. (Ibid.) Decisions by this court have further clarified the interplay between Sixth Amendment requirements and our determinate sentencing scheme. People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799 held in relevant part that imposition of the upper term does not violate a defendant‟s jury trial right “so long as one legally sufficient aggravating circumstance has been found to exist by the jury,” or “has been admitted by the defendant.” (Id. at p. 816.) A companion case, People v. Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th 825 (Sandoval), established that the erroneous imposition of an upper term is subject to federal harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. (Sandoval, supra, at p. 838.) In adding the firearm use enhancement to the sentence for the murder of Ricky Byrd, the court chose the aggravated term “because of the use of two firearms and multiple shots and lack of any provocation.” All of the identified aggravating factors were based on the evidence of the underlying crime, and none were established by the jury‟s verdict or admitted by defendant. (Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 837-838, 839.) We therefore agree with defendant that the court violated his federal constitutional right to jury trial when it imposed the upper term for this enhancement. Defendant argues that the Cunningham/Black error was not harmless. Under Sandoval, the pertinent inquiry is “whether, if the question of the existence of an 51 aggravating circumstance or circumstances had been submitted to the jury, the jury‟s verdict would have authorized the upper term sentence.” (Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 838.) “[I]f a reviewing court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, unquestionably would have found true at least a single aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the jury, the Sixth Amendment error properly may be found harmless.” (Id. at p. 839.) Contrary to defendant‟s assertion, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found true all of the aggravating circumstances stated by the court had they been charged and submitted to the jury for its consideration. Eyewitnesses to the Ricky Byrd murder testified consistently with one another that when defendant yelled to their group from the backseat window of the car, asking whether they would “give Smoke a message for him,” Ricky approached the car and said, “Okay. What‟s the message?” They further testified that defendant then pointed two guns out the window and fired twice. Defendant did not dispute this evidence. Notably, he presented no defense case at the Byrd trial. Nor did counsel challenge the evidence during closing remarks. Indeed, in the course of arguing that defendant did not act with premeditation and deliberation, counsel asserted that defendant asked the group “quickly, just, „Give Smoke a message,‟ and boom boom.” Counsel also argued that defendant had no intent to kill but rather was firing madly at a parked car and happened to hit the victim as he was ducking down behind it for protection after seeing the two guns. Given the undisputed evidence regarding defendant‟s gun use, counsel‟s concessions, and that the jury convicted defendant of first degree murder rather than a lesser offense, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, under the same standard, the 52 jury also would have found the aggravating circumstances that defendant used two firearms, fired multiple shots, and had not been provoked.14 D. Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty Scheme Defendant presents numerous challenges to the constitutionality of California‟s death penalty law that, as he acknowledges, are identical to those that previously have been considered and rejected by this court. We decline his request to reconsider our prior conclusions here. (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 303.) 14 The heading of defendant‟s claim of Cunningham/Black error in his opening brief refers to the court‟s imposition of upper term gun use enhancements relating to two counts, the Ricky Byrd murder and the robbery of Krystal Anderson. However, neither his opening brief nor the reply provides citation to the record or legal argument concerning the Anderson robbery. For this reason, we do not consider whether the court permissibly imposed the upper term enhancement in connection with that count. (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1029 [if the appellate brief presents no legal argument on a point, the reviewing court may treat it as waived and decline to consider it]; People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 846, fn. 9; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) We agree with defendant, however, that the abstract of judgment should be corrected with regard to these two convictions and their gun enhancements, and respondent does not argue otherwise. The reporter‟s transcript indicates that, pursuant to section 654, the court stayed sentence on the Anderson robbery count and its associated enhancements. With regard to the Ricky Byrd murder count, it ordered that imposition of the gun use enhancement not be stayed. However, the abstract of judgment reflects a stayed sentence, rather than 10 years, for the enhancement on the Ricky Byrd murder count, and a term of 10 years, rather than a stayed sentence, for the enhancement on the Anderson robbery. When an abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the trial judge‟s oral pronouncement of sentence, this court has the inherent power to correct such an error, either on our own motion or at the parties‟ behest. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) Accordingly, we order that the abstract of judgment be corrected to conform to the sentences actually imposed by the court. 53 1. Aggravating and mitigating factors Defendant asserts that California‟s capital sentencing statute, with its unitary list of aggravating and mitigating factors, fails to guide the sentencer‟s discretion in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and their state constitutional counterparts. We have concluded otherwise: Section 190.3 is not constitutionally infirm for not specifying which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating, for not limiting aggravation to the specified aggravating factors, or for not defining the terms “aggravation” and “mitigation.” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 652; People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 913; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1026.) Nor do these asserted deficiencies impermissibly allow the jury to consider mitigating evidence, or its absence, in aggravation. (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690; People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 61.)15 Defendant further contends that section 190.3‟s aggravating and mitigating factors violate the Eighth Amendment‟s proscription against the use of vague factors in the penalty phase weighing process. (See Stringer v. Black (1992) 503 U.S. 222, 235.) We previously have rejected the same arguments defendant 15 Defendant complains that section 190.3‟s deficiencies also improperly allowed the prosecutor to characterize his age as an aggravating factor and to argue nonstatutory matters as evidence in aggravation. He has forfeited this portion of his claim because he failed to object to the prosecutor‟s remarks. (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 794.) In any event, there is no merit to defendant‟s assertions. Age can be a factor in aggravation. (See People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1349, fn. 25.) Furthermore, according to the record, the prosecutor told the jury that evidence of defendant‟s age is “not really an aggravating or mitigating factor.” And although defendant complains that the prosecutor relied on a nonstatutory factor when urging the jury to choose death because defendant “is still part of society,” the quoted remark does not appear in the reporter‟s transcript at the page number he cites, and our own review of the record discloses no such argument. 54 presents here: Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits consideration of the circumstances of the crime as an aggravating factor, is not impermissibly vague. (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 213-214; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 810; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976.) Moreover, neither the use of the adjective “extreme” in “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” under factor (d), nor the absence of language explaining that these identified circumstances are mitigating rather than aggravating, renders that factor unconstitutionally vague. Nor does the same asserted deficiency invalidate factor (h), regarding impairment due to mental disease, defect, or intoxication. (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 598-599; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1138; People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 968-969.) Finally, factor (i), the age of the defendant at the time of the crimes, is not unconstitutionally vague merely because it may be considered as a factor in aggravation or mitigation.16 (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 201202; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 302.) Defendant acknowledges that the high court upheld the constitutionality of factors (a), (b), and (i) in Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. 967. He asserts, however, that although discrete factors may appear constitutional, the combined effect of all factors renders the entire scheme unconstitutional. We have concluded to the contrary that section 190.3 as a whole is not impermissibly vague. (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 16 Defendant presents a catch-all argument, contending without any legal argument or explanation that all of the aggravating and mitigating factors are unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary, and that the jury‟s consideration of them results in unreliable sentences. We do not address the remaining factors. (People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1129; see also People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 51, fn. 14 [a matter asserted in a perfunctory manner is not properly raised].) 55 598, 688; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217; People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 267-268.) 2. Procedural safeguards “The jury need not make written findings unanimously agreeing on the existence of aggravating factors and concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors exist, that they outweigh the factors in mitigation, and that death is the appropriate penalty.” (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1007.) Nor is there a constitutional requirement that the jury be instructed on any burden of persuasion with regard to the penalty determination. (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 328.) California‟s automatic appeals procedure is not unconstitutional on the ground that it fails to provide for intercase proportionality review. (People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 764.) Prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty does not create a constitutionally impermissible risk of arbitrary outcomes that differ from county to county. (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 629; People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 505.) 3. Narrowing function The various special circumstances listed in section 190.2 that render a murderer eligible for the death penalty are not so numerous or broad that they fail to genuinely narrow the class of persons subject to capital punishment. (People v. Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 891.) More specifically, the felony-murder and multiple-murder special circumstances adequately narrow the class of death eligible murderers. (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 496, People v. Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 843; see also People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th 56 at p. 483 [to categorize multiple murderers as especially deserving of the deathpenalty is neither arbitrary nor irrational].) That the jury may consider the special circumstance finding as an aggravating factor under section 190.3, factor (a), does not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment‟s narrowing requirement. “[T]he aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in section 190.3 do not and need not perform a narrowing function.” (People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 102; see People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 192.) Nor does consideration of a special circumstance finding in aggravation permit the sentencer unbridled discretion that is weighted in favor of death. (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 40-41; People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1137.) Nor does the use of a felony-murder special-circumstance finding as an aggravating factor subject the defendant to a greater likelihood of being sentenced to death than a defendant against whom some other special circumstance allegation has been found true. (People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1188-1189.) E. International Law Defendant contends that the denial of his state and federal rights to due process and a fair and impartial trial in this case amounted to a violation of customary international law as informed by instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which requires that his convictions and sentence be set aside. We reject the assertion. “Because defendant has failed to establish prejudicial violations of state or federal constitutional law, we need not consider whether such violations would also violate international law.” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 567; accord, People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1098.) 57 F. Cumulative Effect of Asserted Errors Defendant argues that the cumulative impact of the asserted errors at the guilt and penalty phases rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him of other constitutional rights. Because we have concluded there was no error related to the capital offenses or their punishment, there is nothing to cumulate and, in any event, we reject his claim that any asserted cumulative effect warrants reversal.