Opinion ID: 2159669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence Of Prior Sexual Abuse

Text: [¶ 16] The father contends that the court committed prejudicial error in admitting testimony about the father's sexual behavior when he was a minor. He contends that if the evidence was relevant, its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. The father's brief does not cite any legal authority on this issue. DHS contends that the evidence is relevant to establish a pattern of conduct, and that the court's examination of evidence is not limited in temporal scope. [¶ 17] We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for clear error and an abuse of discretion. In re Kayla S., 2001 ME 79, ¶ 9, 772 A.2d 858, 862. Although the father's brief does not raise it, Rule 404(b) specifically governs the admission of evidence of prior bad acts: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. M.R. Evid. 404(b). Excepted from Rule 404(b) is evidence offered to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. State v. Huntley, 681 A.2d 10, 13 (Me.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). [¶ 18] We have discussed the temporal scope of a court's evidentiary examination in child protective cases: [W]hile the inquiry concerning parental unfitness pursuant to sections 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i) and (ii), concerning the parents' inability or unwillingness to protect the children from jeopardy and to take responsibility for the children, is prospective, the evidence to be considered is retrospective.... There is nothing in the statute, and nothing in our past decisions, that limits the temporal scope of the court's examination of evidence to any particular period. We decline to impose such a limit. In re Nathaniel B., 1998 ME 99, ¶ 6, 710 A.2d 921, 922 (holding that the court was permitted to consider the parents' actions over the entire course of the child protection proceedings). See also In re Alexander D., 1998 ME 207, ¶ 18, 716 A.2d 222, 228 (holding that the court properly weighed the mother's inability to protect her children and her prior poor participation in programs along with her recent improved participation). [¶ 19] The nature of the proof required in the child protective context is different than in the criminal context; the court is assessing a risk, not determining whether the father committed a criminal act. Unlike a criminal complaint for sexual abuse, the child protective petition alleges a threat of sexual abuse of the children, not actual sexual abuse of the children. See 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4002(6)(A), 4035(3) (1992) (directing courts to determine whether a child is in circumstances of jeopardy to health or welfare, which includes a threat of serious harm). DHS's attempt to establish a threat of abuse thus does not run afoul of the rule that prohibits the submission of evidence to show that a person acted in conformity therewith. M.R. Evid. 404(b) (emphasis added). Although this relevant evidence of prior abuse is adverse to the father, it is not unfairly prejudicial and, in any event, its probative value in this child protective proceeding outweighs any risk of unfair prejudice. See M.R. Evid. 403. [2]