Opinion ID: 688699
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The nature of the February 4, 1975 Consent Judgment

Text: 81 Initially, we must establish the character of the February 4, 1975 order. The County argues that the consent judgment was not really a consent decree. This contention is without merit. The Supreme Court has described a consent decree as an agreement between the parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on [its] precise terms. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3075, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, we have noted that [o]nce the district court enters the settlement as a judicial consent decree ending the lawsuit, the settlement takes on the nature of a judgment. Ho v. Martin Marietta Corp., 845 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir.1988); see also 1B James WM. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice p 0.409, at III-151 (2d ed. 1993) (The judgment is not, like the settlement agreement out of which it arose, a mere contract inter partes. The court is not properly a recorder of contracts; it is an organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions, and when it has rendered a consent judgment it has made an adjudication. (emphasis added)). 82 In the instant case, the parties intended to settle the case. The consent judgment specifically states that it was entered only when the parties being desirous of effecting a just settlement of this action, and a compromise of the claims therein ... ha[d] agreed to the terms of such a settlement. See Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, Texas, No. 72-H-1094, slip op. at 1 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 4, 1975). Thus, the entire settlement clearly was entered into with the consent of the parties, notwithstanding the fact that the court required the parties to agree to certain provisions before the court accepted the settlement. Moreover, the settlement, which was signed by the attorneys for the commissioners court, the attorney for the sheriff of Harris County, and the attorneys for the plaintiff-prisoners, was plainly labeled as CONSENT JUDGMENT. See Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, No. 72-H-1094, slip op. at 1 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 4, 1975). 83 The nature of the February 4, 1975 order is also indicated by the court's and the parties' treatment of it. The courts and the parties (until the County's recent position) treated the February 4, 1975 consent judgment as a final judgment in which the district court retained jurisdiction to issue any and all interim orders necessary for immediate relief in this action until such time and as the terms are complied with by the Defendants Commissioners Court and the Sheriff. Id. (emphasis added); see, e.g., Alberti I, 937 F.2d at 987 ([T]he district court retained jurisdiction to issue further interim orders.); Alberti v. Heard, 600 F.Supp. 443, 446 (S.D.Tex.1984) (noting that after the consent judgment the district court retained jurisdiction); Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F.Supp. 649, 654 (S.D.Tex.1975) (On February 4, 1975, counsel signed and this Court approved, a Consent Judgment by which defendants generally agreed to bring presently existing facilities and operations into compliance with federal and state standards.). Simply, we are unconvinced that over the past two decades the parties and the courts have misapprehended the nature of the decree. 84 The fact that the Consent Judgment was a final judgment on the merits is not undermined by the court's issuance of numerous orders after February 4, 1975. These orders were not interlocutory orders, as the County asserts; rather, those orders were the very interim orders that the court described as necessary for immediate relief, and they were fully consistent with the nature of the February 4 order as a consent judgment. As the First Circuit noted, The entry of a consent decree does not 'kill' a case or terminate the district court's jurisdiction. Rather, when ... an injunction entered pursuant to a consent decree has ongoing effects, the issuing court retains authority to enforce it. In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653, 657 (1st Cir.1993); see also Ho, 845 F.2d at 548 (noting that a court has continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree); cf. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 370-79, 112 S.Ct. 748, 754-57, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (discussing the district court's orders that were issued subsequent to a consent decree). Clearly, the February 4, 1975 order was--just as it was labeled--a consent judgment.