Opinion ID: 2508417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Civil Stalking Statute and Act

Text: In 2002, the civil Act was first proposed in Senate Bill 474, and it defined stalking as intentional harassment of another person. The original bill was supported by the Attorney General's Office, the Kansas Coalition Against Sexual and Domestic Violence, the Battered Women's Task Force, the Kansas Women Attorneys Association (WAA), and others. The WAA opined by letter that the definition of `stalking' is drafted in such a way as to avoid the constitutional problems of vagueness that plagued the 1994 criminal stalking statute by creating an objective standard by which stalking is measured. See State v. Bryan, 259 Kan. 143 (1996). See Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm., February 8, 2002, attach. 7 (February 6, 2002, letter from WAA President Mary Feighny to Senator David Adkins). At the February 8, 2002, Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Ronald Nelson testified on behalf of the Kansas Bar Association (KBA) in opposition to the first draft of the Act: Section 2 provides that `stalking means intentional harassment of another person.' There is no requirement that any threat be explicit or implicit. There is no provision that there be any concern or fear of harm by the supposed victim. Read in its most literal terms, the proposed statute simply reads that a petition can be filed to stop one person from intentionally annoying another person. This type of statute cheapens the very real fear and threat of legitimate abuse victims. This constitutes the worst kind of legislative drafting. Instead of identification of a problem and preparation of a narrowly crafted statute meant to address those concerns, while protecting constitutional rights of the citizenry. It is often said that you can't legislate good manners. However, that is what this bill, in its current form, attempts. Instead of legislating good manners though, this bill seeks to criminalize and punish bad manners. Not only does the bill punish de minimus conduct, but also there is no requirement of any continuing or future threat of harm. No `harm' need to be alleged or shown. Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm., February 8, 2002, attach. 4. The KBA submitted amendments to the bill, which included adding an objective standard to the stalking definition that places the other person in reasonable fear for that person's own personal safety and also to the definition of harassment under subsection (b) as a course of conduct which is directed at a specific person that (I) causes that other person to have a reasonable fear for personal safety, or (ii) serves no legitimate purpose, and is intended either to seriously alarm, threaten, or torment another person. Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm., February 25, 2002, attach. 2. Although this language was initially approved by the Senate, a joint House and Senate conference committee considering the amendments to S.B. 474 subsequently removed the amended language from the definition of harassment in subsection (b) in favor of the original language directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments or terrorizes the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. Sen. J. 2002, p. 2110. The specific civil stalking statute at issue in this case, K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-31a02, provides: (a) `Stalking' means an intentional harassment of another person that places the other person in reasonable fear for that person's safety. (b) `Harassment' means a knowing and intentional course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments or terrorizes the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. (c) `Course of conduct' means conduct consisting of two or more separate acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of `course of conduct.'