Opinion ID: 2234742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discriminatory Discharge Claim

Text: Under the MHRA, it is an unfair employment practice for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because of the employee's disability. Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(b)-(c). Discrimination plaintiffs may prove discriminatory intent by direct evidence or by using circumstantial evidence in accordance with the three-part burden-shifting test set out by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 710-11 (Minn.1992); see also Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn.1988) (As the result of the substantial similarities existing between Title VII and [the MHRA], we have frequently applied principles which have evolved in the adjudication of claims under the federal act, and, specifically we have adopted the McDonnell Douglas analysis as an aid to resolving cases claiming disparate treatment.). Under that test, the plaintiff alleging a discriminatory employment practice must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. As applied to the discriminatory discharge setting, the plaintiff must show that she: (1) is a member of [a] protected class; (2) was qualified for the position from which she was discharged; and (3) was replaced by a non-member of the protected class. Feges, 483 N.W.2d at 711. If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant who, in order to avoid summary judgment, must produce admissible evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. Id. If the defendant provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the presumption of discrimination disappears and the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. See Hasnudeen v. Onan Corp., 552 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn.1996); Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 623-24. Norwest contends that Hoover has failed to establish that she is disabled within the meaning of the MHRA (and therefore not a member of a protected class), arguing that Hoover's symptoms from the fibromyalgia between May 1995 and February 1996 were not severe enough to make her disabled under the law. Norwest cites several federal court cases for the proposition that fibromyalgia, with symptoms comparable to Hoover's, does not qualify as a disability. Norwest cautions us that to consider Hoover disabled under the law leads to an absurd result that broadens `disability' to include anyone with any medical condition, who merely claims some unspecified and essentially unverifiable amount of pain and fatigue and resultant increased time to do the job. A disabled person is one who: (1) has a physical, sensory, or mental impairment which materially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. [5] Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 13 (2000); Sigurdson, 532 N.W.2d at 228. The degree to which a condition limits one or more major life activities is evaluated based on the plaintiff's specific circumstances. See State by Cooper v. Hennepin County, 441 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Minn.1989). When, as here, the plaintiff alleges that work is the major life activity in which she is materially impaired, we consider (a) the number and type of jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified, (b) the geographic area to which the applicant has reasonable access, (c) the applicant's own job expectations and training, (d) the criteria or qualifications in use generally, and (e) the types of jobs to which the rejection would apply. [6] Id. Hoover argues that she was disabled at the time of her termination, stating that her fibromyalgia caused her to suffer headaches, muscle and joint pain, sleeplessness, and depression. According to Hoover, these symptoms caused her to have difficulty concentrating, learning, and retaining information. As a result, it not only took her longer to do her job than it did before the onset of her fibromyalgia, but it limited her ability to perform her job. Hoover points out that some time after being told that Hoover had been diagnosed with fibromyalgia, McCullough gave Hoover a brochure that described a medical program for those with fibromyalgia. According to evidence submitted by Hoover, McCullough also discussed with a coworker the limiting effect fibromyalgia was having on Hoover's ability to work. Viewed in the light most favorable to Hoover, as it must be at this stage of the litigation, the competent evidence [7] in the record establishes that she suffered from severe headaches, sleeplessness, fatigue, chronic pain, and a depression-like state, and that these symptoms caused her to experience difficulty concentrating and remembering, which caused her to expend extra time and effort in an ultimately failed attempt to keep up with her work. Applying the five factors set forth in State by Cooper, we note that Hoover had experience in the loan origination field and no experience in any nonbanking field. Any job similar to that of a loan originator, utilizing skills and experience consistent with her background, would seemingly require Hoover to meet deadlines. However, her impairment limited her ability to handle heavy workloads and deadlines. Thus, Hoover has raised a fact question as to whether she is impaired in the major life activity of work. Norwest argues that the symptoms Hoover alleges lack the specificity and severity necessary for a disability. While in another case a combination of severe headaches, sleeplessness, and fatigue may not constitute a disability under the MHRA, in this case Hoover has substantiated her allegations with concrete evidence suggesting that the fibromyalgia materially limited her ability to work. We conclude that Hoover has established a genuine issue of fact as to whether she was disabled. Norwest also argues that the alleged errors found in Hoover's files during the special audit establish that she was not qualified for the loan originator position. For the purposes of establishing that she was qualified for the position from which she was dismissed, a plaintiff need only establish that she met the minimum objective qualifications for the job. Legrand v. Trustees of Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff, 821 F.2d 478, 481 (8th Cir.1987); State by Khalifa v. Hennepin County, 420 N.W.2d 634, 640 (Minn.App.1988) (applying Legrand to MHRA disability discrimination claim), rev. denied (Minn. May 4, 1988); see also Miller v. Centennial State Bank, 472 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn.App.1991) (applying Khalifa to claim of discriminatory termination on the basis of disability). The competent evidence in the record establishes that Hoover had a long career in the banking industry and, before her diagnosis with fibromyalgia, had been a highly rated loan originator for Norwest. The extent to which she continued to meet the requirements of her job in the winter of 1995-96 and the extent to which her files were not in compliance with internal Norwest standards and federal law at the time of her termination are disputed questions of fact. Hoover has at least created a genuine issue of fact as to whether she met the minimum objective qualifications of her job. Finally, it is not disputed that Hoover was replaced by a nondisabled person. Thus, the record leads us to conclude that Hoover has met her burden of establishing, sufficient to survive summary judgment, the requirements of a prima facie case for discrimination: that she is a disabled person, was qualified for the position from which she was discharged, and was replaced by a nondisabled person. Having made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Norwest to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Hoover's discharge. Norwest contends that Hoover was terminated because her files failed to comply with internal policy and federal regulations. Because this reason, on its face, is legitimate and nondiscriminatory, we conclude that Norwest has rebutted Hoover's prima facie case. This brings us to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Under this third step, Hoover must establish that Norwest's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Hasnudeen, 552 N.W.2d at 556-57. What must Hoover show at the summary judgment stage to establish that Norwest's proffered reason is pretext for discrimination? The United States Supreme Court recently declared that [p]roof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence    may be quite persuasive. In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is    cover[ing] up a discriminatory purpose. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citation omitted). [8] , [9] This is consistent with the Court's statement in Hicks: The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, [n]o additional proof of discrimination is required.  Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). The Reeves Court clarified, however, that: This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability. Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred. See Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d [1284,] 1291-92 [(D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc)]; see also Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d [1332,] 1338 [(2d Cir.1997) (en banc)] ([I]f the circumstances show that the defendant gave the false explanation to conceal something other than discrimination, the inference of discrimination will be weak or nonexistent). Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Thus, as we read Reeves, in order to avoid summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas third step, the employment discrimination plaintiff must put forth sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to infer that the employer's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is not only pretext but that it is pretext for discrimination. In some cases, sufficient evidence may consist of only the plaintiff's prima facie case plus evidence that the employer's proffered reason for its action is untrue. In other cases, more may be required. However, at all times the employment discrimination plaintiff retains the burden of establishing that the defendant's conduct was based on unlawful discrimination. The Court's analysis in Reeves is not only persuasive, it is also consistent with our earlier cases in this area. See, e.g., Hasnudeen, 552 N.W.2d at 557 (noting that our cases are in line with the Hicks requirement that the plaintiff ultimately persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff). A rule that would preclude summary judgment for defendants in all cases in which the employment discrimination plaintiff was able to show that the employer's articulated reasons were pretextual, without a requirement that the reasons be pretext for discrimination, would prevent summary judgment even in cases when no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Such a rule would put employment discrimination plaintiffs at a distinct advantage, one that no other plaintiffs enjoy. Applying the standard from Reeves to the competent evidence before us in this case, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could infer that Norwest engaged in intentional discrimination. The record establishes that Hoover had been a strong employee at Norwest for three years, steadily receiving good evaluations and increased responsibilities. In a review of a sampling of files from all loan originators at her branch of Norwest Private Mortgage two months before her fibromyalgia diagnosis, Hoover tied for the highest compliance rating, but approximately eight months later, after hearing complaints that Hoover's loan files were out of compliance, McCullough requested that an auditor perform an unprecedented review of all of Hoover's loan files. The audit found Hoover's files to be out of compliance with Norwest standards and possibly with federal law. This period of noncompliance followed Hoover's diagnosis and coincided with the difficulties she had keeping up with her workdifficulties due, she claims, to the symptoms caused by her medical condition. The auditor recommended that Hoover be warned, trained, and monitored, but instead Hoover was fired. Hoover was the only loan originator fired for having files that were out of compliance despite the fact that, both before and after her diagnosis and termination, routine audits of samples of files from other loan originators showed that some of them had similar numbers and types of noncompliant files. This collection of evidence casts sufficient doubt on the truthfulness of Norwest's proffered reason for dismissing Hoover, her alleged legal and regulatory compliance violations, to allow a rational finder of fact to conclude that the reason offered was pretext for a discriminatory discharge. Hoover has met her burden of creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was discharged in violation of Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(b)-(c). Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals with respect to Hoover's disability discrimination claim.