Opinion ID: 2192826
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Death Penalty as Sentencing Option

Text: The second argument made by the Commonwealth asks us to examine the trial court's decision to exclude the death penalty as a sentencing option. The Commonwealth asks this Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the matter from proceeding to sentencing and final judgment. We find clear error in the trial court's pretrial rulings regarding the propriety of the death penalty and the manner in which sentence would be determined. Accordingly, the writ of prohibition shall be issued. RCr 9.26 provides, Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the Commonwealth. We held this language allows the Commonwealth to insist upon a sentencing hearing before a jury to determine the sentence in a criminal matter and requires the Commonwealth's consent to sentencing by the court without a jury's recommendation. Commonwealth v. Johnson, Ky., 910 S.W.2d 229 (1995); Commonwealth v. Collins, Ky., 933 S.W.2d 811 (1996). In Commonwealth v. Johnson , this Court held the Commonwealth is entitled to present its case for punishment to a jury prior to imposition of final judgment and reversed a sentence imposed by a judge who refused to empanel a jury for a sentencing hearing in a capital case. Johnson, supra . The Court outlined some of the rationale behind its construction of RCr 9.26, especially in situations involving the possibility of capital punishment: In death penalty cases, jury sentencing is deeply ingrained in Kentucky law. By virtue of statutes, rules of Court, and decisions, participation by a jury in this momentous governmental event has been regarded as indispensable except upon concurrence of all involved. While the importance of a defendant's right to insist upon jury sentencing is obvious, the significance of the public's right of participation in the process should not be taken lightly. As the death penalty is a possible punishment for only the most heinous of crimes, and with due regard for the legitimate public interest in law enforcement, the verdict of a jury should be heard by the court prior to final sentencing except upon agreement of all parties. Id . at 231 (citations deleted). In addition to denying the Commonwealth a right to present its case for sentencing to a jury, the trial court in the matter before this Court also ruled pretrial that the death penalty was inappropriate and removed it from consideration as a sentencing option prior to the defendant's plea of guilty but mentally ill. The defendant directs us to our opinion in Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky ., 634 S.W.2d 411 (1982), where we affirmed a trial court's decision not to instruct a jury on the death penalty as a possible punishment following a jury verdict of guilty to murder. Id. We feel that the limited holding in Smith does not govern the case before us. We hold a trial court may not rule out the possibility of the death penalty on the basis of a pretrial factual determination regarding the defendant's mental health. The defendant in Smith was found guilty of murder, but as the opinion refers to someone else as the triggerman, he was liable only as an accomplice. The triggerman entered a guilty plea and received the minimum sentence of twenty years. Id. at 413. The trial judge's ruling excluding the death penalty was premised on his belief it would constitute a disproportionate imposition of the death penalty if an accomplice were sentenced to death while the triggerman received the minimum sentence. Id. While Smith holds the trial judge has some power to relieve the jury of consideration of the death penalty, our other opinions on this issue suggest that the trial court's authority in this area is not broad enough to embrace the actions of the judge in the case before us. In Commonwealth v. Corey, Ky., 826 S.W.2d 319 (1992), we addressed a situation where the trial court entered an order allowing two defendants to plead guilty and reserve the authority to withdraw their pleas if the court chose to impose a sentence of death or life without parole for twenty-five (25) years. Id. at 320. We held the trial court's stated purpose of avoiding a protracted trial by jury was not a legally permissible reason to withdraw the death penalty from consideration, in part because: [h]ere, the decision of the trial court as to the appropriate punishment will require a broad factual analysis, where in Smith , the conclusion was mandated by the Court's view of the law. Id. We also emphasized in Corey that a pretrial determination of a matter as significant as sentencing phase instructions in a capital case was suspect: ... only after the evidence is presented does the court have a right to determine whether the evidence is sufficient under the law to sustain a conviction and what instructions should be given to the jury.... Id. Certainly, a judge who makes pretrial, binding decisions regarding sentencing does so with less information available to him than those who make sentencing decisions after trial by jury, plea bargaining, or an unconditional guilty plea: When sentence is imposed after trial and receipt of the verdict, the court has benefit of having heard the evidence and the recommended punishment from the jury. Upon sentence pursuant to a plea agreement, the court may rely in part upon the agreed disposition as fairly serving the interests of both the Commonwealth and the defendant. When the defendant enters an unconditional guilty plea, the trial court may consider all relevant information and the full range of punishment without regard to any tentative determination it may have made as to the appropriate punishment and the possibility that the plea will be withdrawn. Id. Corey explains Smith 's holding must be limited because underinformed sentencing decisions upset the balance of authority inherent in the judicial system: It is the duty of the prosecuting authority and defense counsel to intimately know the case prior to trial, and ordinarily the trial judge does not gain such insight until all the evidence has been heard.... For the trial court to determine the maximum sentence which may be imposed without a right of plea withdrawal, absent the concurrence of the Commonwealth, prior to trial, and without the benefit of a presentence investigation, radically alters the substance of the process. Id. (citation deleted). This Court also dealt with the issue of a trial court which issued a pretrial order excluding the death penalty as a sentencing option in Perry County Fiscal Court v. Commonwealth, Ky., 674 S.W.2d 954 (1984). In Perry County Fiscal Court , the Commonwealth petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ to prohibit the trial judge from enforcing its order setting a date for a homicide trial but excluding the death penalty as a possible sentence because of the unwillingness of the fiscal court to pay the fees of two expert witnesses for the defense. Id. at 956. The Court of Appeals found the writ of prohibition appropriate and we affirmed and adopted its opinion. Id. at 955-56. The respondents/appellees in Perry County Fiscal Court also relied upon the language of Smith to justify the trial court's action, but we were unpersuaded that the stated basis approached as significant a reason as the proportionality rationale in Smith . Id. Here, of course, the basis for the pretrial exclusion of the death penalty as a sentencing option was not to avoid hassle or disputes over the payment for experts. The trial judge's Findings of Fact and Order indicates a lofty list of reasons: Based upon the record in its entirety, including the uncontroverted evidence before this Court that Kimberly Harris suffers from a significant mental illness, the Court finds under the principles of fundamental fairness, due process and proportionality it would be unconscionable to impose a death sentence upon this particular defendant. Kimberly Harris is an emotionally disturbed, mentally ill, 23-year-old female who has no prior criminal history. Pursuant to its authority and discretion, the Court declines to engage in an exercise of futility by submitting the option of the death penalty to the jury in this case. Despite the judge's assertion that he made his ruling on the basis of fundamental fairness, due process and proportionality, we find that his decision to exclude the death penalty as a potential sentence does not fall within his authority. This Court's Corey opinion guides our decision because we believe the trial court's pretrial conclusion regarding the defendant's mental illness is not the type of rationale we had in mind when we held the court should not be required to entertain an exercise in futility and preside over a hearing of any duration when it will ultimately decide, for as significant a reason as expressed in this record, [that the death penalty is inappropriate]. Smith, supra at 414. First, although the trial court explains itself in constitutional terms such as proportionality, this judge undertook a broad factual analysis of the type Corey distinguishes from the legal conclusion reached by the trial court in Smith, supra . In Smith , the court had personal knowledge of the co-defendant shooter's guilty plea and minimum sentence, and decided, as a matter of law, that it would be disproportionate to expose an accomplice to the death penalty in light of the shooter's sentence. Here, the trial court conducted a pretrial evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining whether the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense. Certainly, those findings of fact are appropriate and required when the trial court accepts a plea of guilty but mentally ill, but we believe that the judge's decision to exclude the death penalty on the basis of those findings of fact does not fall within his authority. Second, we note that the decision not to submit instructions on the death penalty to the Smith jury came after the trial judge had an opportunity to hear all of the evidence during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. In the matter before the Court, the trial judge entered an order excluding the death penalty on the basis of Harris' mental illness without hearing any of the Commonwealth's evidence, including evidence which could constitute aggravation pursuant to KRS 532.025. We believe that a decision of this magnitude cannot be made without the true test of the adversarial process and we are concerned incomplete decision making is inherent in pretrial determinations of the appropriate penalty range. Corey, supra at 320. We are unwilling to equate the decision in this case to exclude the death penalty on the basis of unrebutted evidence regarding one statutory mitigating factor, mental illness, without evaluation of the Commonwealth's evidence regarding aggravating circumstances, with the trial court's decision in Smith, supra. Smith simply does not embrace the full spectrum of possible pretrial factual rulings dressed up in constitutional language. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's decision to exclude the death penalty as an option and set the matter for sentencing was erroneous. For the reasons set forth above, we grant the relief requested by the petitioner and issue a writ prohibiting the trial court from sentencing the real party in interest without first affording the Commonwealth the opportunity for a jury sentencing hearing with the full range of penalties permitted by law and supported by the evidence. All concur.