Opinion ID: 76033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Type of Risk

Text: 36 We also reject plaintiff Ellis's claims that Georgia's learned intermediary rule applies only when the risk at issue is unavoidable. According to Ellis, the PCA pump is safe when a third party does not activate it and thus this is a preventable risk case to which the learned intermediary rule does not apply. More specifically, Ellis argues that the rule applies only to unavoidable risk warnings associated with prescription drugs or devices requiring a medical provider (learned intermediary) actually to weigh the potential benefit of the drug or device against an unavoidable side effect. As to preventable risk warnings, Ellis contends that a learned intermediary need not do any weighing with regard to these preventable risks and thus the duty to warn extends to persons beyond the learned intermediary. 37 For this distinction, plaintiff Ellis relies primarily on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir.1992), applying Mississippi law to a failure-to-warn claim asserted against the manufacturer of a prescription drug. In Thomas, the Fifth Circuit did recognize that there are two very different types of warnings that might be associated with a particular product: (1) an unavoidable risk warning; and (2) a preventable risk warning. Id. However, that recognition was not made in connection with the question regarding to whom a manufacturer's duty to warn extends or whether the learned intermediary rule should apply to a given prescription drug or device. Instead, that recognition was made in discussing causation and in response to plaintiff's argument that, for certain types of risks, the independent element of causation should be presumed given an inadequate warning by a manufacturer to an intermediary. Id. at 812-14. Simply put, Thomas does not suggest, much less hold, that the learned intermediary rule applies only when the risk in question is unavoidable as opposed to preventable. 38 In any event, plaintiff Ellis cites to no Georgia decision (1) limiting the application of the learned intermediary rule to situations in which the risk is unavoidable or (2) otherwise indicating that the applicability of that rule should depend on the type of risk at issue. Ellis does point out correctly that the learned intermediary rule presupposes that the learned intermediary will weigh the benefits of any prescription against its potential dangers. See, e.g., Hawkins, 147 Ga.App. at 483, 249 S.E.2d 286 (As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into account the propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient. His is the task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its potential dangers.). But we disagree with Ellis's suggestion that no weighing need be done when the risk at issue is a preventable risk and thus the doctrine should not apply. A learned intermediary does weigh both so-called preventable and unavoidable risks in deciding whether to prescribe a certain medical device or drug. In fact, in making his decision to prescribe the PCA pump to Brown, Dr. Sherbert testified that he knew of the risks associated with third-party activation, but nonetheless chose to prescribe the PCA pump to Brown instead of some other method of drug administration. That testimony reflects a weighing process on behalf of Dr. Sherbert, the learned intermediary. 39 In short, we conclude that the Georgia courts have not adopted an approach whereby the applicability of the learned intermediary rule depends on the nature of the risk involved. Indeed, that approach is not hinted at in, much less supported by, the several Georgia decisions that have applied the learned intermediary rule. Nor is it hinted at in any other decision cited by Ellis.