Opinion ID: 430956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Mandatory Sentencing Clause: The Sentencing Phase of Petitioner's Trial

Text: 17 Petitioner claims that the 1975 Alabama death penalty statute's sentencing procedures, requiring consideration by the sentencing judge of the jury's mandatory death sentence, in effect at the time of his conviction and sentence are unconstitutional and that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. The State does not address the merits of petitioner's constitutional challenge to the sentencing procedures except by citation to the opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court in Ritter v. State, 429 So.2d 928, 934-37 (1983). Instead, the State contends that all of the sentencing procedure claims here asserted by the petitioner were raised by his co-defendant, John Lewis Evans, III, and rejected on their merits by the United States Supreme Court in its decisions denying Evans a stay of execution pending the disposition of his petition for writ of certiorari, Evans v. Alabama, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1735, 75 L.Ed.2d 921 (1983) (Powell, J. in chambers), and vacating a stay of execution entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, Alabama v. Evans, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1736, 75 L.Ed.2d 806 (1983) (per curiam). Alternately, the State contends that any constitutional error in petitioner's sentencing proceeding was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 For the following reasons, we hold that the 1975 Alabama death penalty statute's sentencing procedures, under which petitioner was sentenced to death, are unconstitutional and that petitioner is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. 19
20 The procedural history of Evans' challenges to the constitutionality of Alabama's capital sentencing procedures, necessary to provide the context for the decisions on which the State relies, is as follows. 21 Evans and petitioner were both sentenced to death under the 1975 Alabama death penalty statute. 13 In a joint appeal, pursuant to the automatic appeal provision of the death penalty statute, 14 Evans and petitioner challenged the constitutionality of their sentencing proceedings. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed their convictions and sentences, Evans v. State, 361 So.2d 654 (1977), and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed Evans' conviction and sentence, 361 So.2d 666 (1978). 15 Evans' petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court was denied. Evans v. Alabama, 440 U.S. 930, 99 S.Ct. 1267, 59 L.Ed.2d 486 (1979). 22 Evans then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama claiming, inter alia, that the death penalty statute's preclusion clause and sentencing procedures were unconstitutional. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court rejected Evans' claims on their merits and denied the petition. Evans v. Britton, 472 F.Supp. 707 (S.D.Ala.1979). Evans appealed, and the former Fifth Circuit reversed the district court on the grounds that the statute's preclusion clause was unconstitutional and that the harmless error rule did not apply. Evans v. Britton, 628 F.2d 400 (1980) (per curiam), modified on rehearing, 639 F.2d 221 (1981) (per curiam). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the preclusion clause issue. Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982). 23 The judgment of the United States Supreme Court reinstated Evans' conviction, but his challenges to the statute's sentencing procedures remained to be decided by the Court of Appeals on remand. In July of 1982, however, after briefing and before a decision, Evans dismissed his attorneys and filed a motion with the Court of Appeals seeking leave to dismiss his appeal. This Court dismissed the appeal on October 19, 1982. 24 On October 22, 1982, the State filed a motion requesting that the Alabama Supreme Court set an execution date for Evans. Evans filed a petition in response attacking the constitutionality of the statute's sentencing procedures and requesting a new sentencing hearing. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Evans' petition, Evans v. State, 432 So.2d 463 (1983), and set Evans' execution for April 22, 1983. 25 On April 19, 1983, Evans filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Later the same day, Evans filed an application for a stay of execution pending the disposition of his petition for certiorari. On April 21, 1983, Justice Powell, acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice and with the concurrence of six other members of the Court, denied Evans' application for a stay, Evans v. Alabama, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1735, 75 L.Ed.2d 921, stating that [Evans'] constitutional challenges to Alabama's capital-sentencing procedures have been reviewed exhaustively and repetitively by several courts in both the state and federal systems, --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 1736, 75 L.Ed.2d at 923, and concluding that [t]here is not 'a reasonable probability that four members of this Court would find that this case merits review.'  Id. (quoting White v. Florida, 458 U.S. 1301, 103 S.Ct. 1, 73 L.Ed.2d 1385 (1982) (Powell, J. in chambers)). 26 Approximately seven hours before his scheduled execution, Evans filed a second habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama again claiming, inter alia, that the statute's sentencing procedures were unconstitutional. The district court ordered a temporary stay of execution. The State sought an order from this Court vacating the stay, which was denied. The United States Supreme Court granted the State's application to vacate the district court's stay of execution. Alabama v. Evans, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1736, 75 L.Ed.2d 806 (1983) (per curiam). Evans was executed on April 22, 1983. 27 The State concedes that the decision in Evans v. Alabama, denying Evans' application for a stay pending the disposition of his petition for certiorari, is not a binding decision on the merits of Evans' constitutional challenges to Alabama's sentencing procedures. We agree, 16 and hold that this decision does not decide the merits of petitioner's claims before this Court. 28 The State claims, however, that the decision in Alabama v. Evans, granting the State's application to vacate the stay of execution, is such a determination on the merits of Evans' sentencing procedure claims and controls petitioner's present challenge to Alabama's capital sentencing procedures. We disagree. 29 The decision in Alabama v. Evans does not support the State's argument that it was intended as a binding decision on the merits of Evans' sentencing procedure claims. First, we note that the opinion in Alabama v. Evans was rendered as a ruling on an application to vacate a stay. 17 Second, we find no textual support in the opinion itself for the State's argument. The merits of Evans' sentencing proceeding claims were not discussed by the Court in Alabama v. Evans. Instead, the Court quoted Justice Powell's statement in Evans v. Alabama, that Evans' constitutional challenges to Alabama's capital-sentencing proceedings have been reviewed exhaustively and repetitively by several courts in both the state and federal systems, --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 1738, 75 L.Ed.2d at 808, and noted that: 30 [T]he District Court found that counsel for petitioner conceded that all issues raised in the petition were raised in the petition previously filed before [the United States District Court] except for the issue asserted in section 12 of the petition. Thus, in the latest petition for habeas corpus, all but one of the grounds presented have been presented before and rejected. --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 1738, 75 L.Ed.2d at 808-809 (emphasis supplied). 31 The Court granted the State's application to vacate the stay on the grounds that: 32 [Evans'] petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on April 21, 1983, thus seeks to litigate several issues conclusively resolved in prior proceedings and a claim never before raised. This new claim, challenging the validity of one of the aggravating circumstances found to exist in this case, is a question of law as to which no further hearing is required. --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 1739, 75 L.Ed.2d at 809 (emphasis supplied). 33 The similarity between the Court's analysis of Evans' sentencing proceeding claims in Alabama v. Evans and Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963), is apparent. 18 Under Sanders, an issue may be conclusively resolved for purposes of a successor habeas petition if it has been presented before and rejected on its merits, and the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the successor petition. Id. at 15, 83 S.Ct. at 1077. The petitioner's failure to appeal an adverse ruling on his prior habeas petition is a factor considered in the ends of justice calculus of the Sanders test. Johnson v. Wainwright, 702 F.2d 909 (11th Cir.1983); Bass v. Wainwright, 675 F.2d 1204 (11th Cir.1982). A court's refusal to entertain an issue raised in a state prisoner's successor habeas petition on the ground that the issue has been conclusively resolved because it has previously been presented, decided on its merits, rejected, and on appeal from that rejection voluntarily dismissed, is clearly not a decision on the merits. 19 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 18, 83 S.Ct. at 1078. 34 In addition to the procedural posture of Alabama v. Evans as a decision on an application to vacate a stay, the lack of discussion of Evans' sentencing procedure claims, and the similarity between the Court's analysis of Evans' sentencing procedure claims and principles governing successor habeas petitions, we find further evidence that the decision was not intended as one on the merits of Evans' sentencing procedure claims in Justice Marshall's dissent: The execution of Evans prior to a decision of his claims on the merits will ensure that such certainty [of the legality of Evans' execution] is never achieved. --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 1740, 75 L.Ed.2d at 812 (emphasis supplied). 35 In sum, we find no evidence in Alabama v. Evans to support the State's claim that the United States Supreme Court reached the merits of Evans' sentencing procedure claims and determined that the Alabama capital sentencing procedures were constitutional. Therefore, since petitioner, unlike Evans, 20 appeals from the denial of his first habeas corpus petition, we hold that the decision in Alabama v. Evans does not preclude our consideration of the merits of his challenge to the 1975 Alabama death penalty statute's sentencing procedures. 36
37 The Alabama death penalty statute provides that if the jury finds the defendant guilty of a capital offense [i]t shall fix the punishment at death. Ala.Code Sec. 13-11-2(a) (1975) (repealed 1981). The jury has no discretion to fix any other penalty. The jury is not informed that the judge is the final sentencing authority and is thus led to believe, by implication, that its sentence will be final. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 639 n. 15, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2390 n. 15, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). 38 If the defendant is convicted of a capital offense, and the death sentence thus automatically imposed by the jury, the statute provides that the trial judge must then hold a separate sentencing hearing at which evidence [m]ay be presented as to any matters that the court deems relevant to sentence and shall include any matters relating to any of the [statutory] aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Sec. 13-11-3. The judge then determines whether to sentence the defendant to death or to life imprisonment without parole. Sec. 13-11-4. [A]fter weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, [the court] may refuse to accept the death penalty as fixed by the jury and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole. Id. Or [t]he court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury, may accordingly sentence the defendant to death. Id. If the court imposes the death sentence, it must set forth in writing the factual findings from the trial and the sentencing hearing, including aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that form the basis for its sentence. Id. The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are subject to automatic appeal. Sec. 13-11-5. 39 For clarity of analysis, we repeat that under this statutory scheme the trial judge is the final sentencing authority and that the jury's mandatory death sentence is not statutorily binding on the judge. For this reason, the district court termed the jury's mandatory sentence the phantom sentence. Petitioner contends, however, that the statute's express requirement that the judge weigh the factor of the phantom sentence--a factor petitioner claims is facially unconstitutional because it is unguided and standardless, reflects a blurred consideration of guilt and sentencing concerns, and does not reflect an individualized consideration of the particular defendant--in determining whether or not to impose the death sentence renders the sentencing procedure constitutionally infirm. 21 Accordingly, petitioner claims that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. 22 We agree. 40 In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the Court concluded that capital punishment, as then administered under capital sentencing procedures vesting unguided sentencing discretion in the ultimate sentencing authority, had become constitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. [W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Zant v. Stephens, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2741, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). 41 This means that if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.... It must channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764-1765, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (citations and footnotes omitted). 42 And because there is [a] qualitative difference between death and any other permissible form of punishment, 'there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.'  Zant v. Stephens, --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 2747 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)). Thus, the Court's decisions since Furman have [m]ade clear that the States may impose this ultimate sentence only if they follow procedures designed to assure reliability in sentencing determinations. Barclay v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3429, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134, 1139 (1983) (Stevens, Powell, JJ. concurring). In assessing capital sentencing procedures the Court has [a]ttempted to provide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would serve both goals of a measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111, 102 S.Ct. 869, 874, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). 43 Due to this heightened standard of reliability in capital sentencing procedures, involving considerations of both consistency and fairness to the accused, capital sentencing procedures must be tailored to provide for [a]n individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. Zant v. Stephens, --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 2744 (emphasis in original). Thus, sentencing schemes that exclude from the sentencer's consideration the critically relevant factors of the character of the individual defendant and the circumstances of the crime as mitigating factors are constitutionally inadequate. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). 44 Likewise, particular features included in a sentencing scheme may be [s]ufficiently inadequate, unreliable, or unfair that they violate the United States Constitution. Barclay v. Florida, --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 3429, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1150 (Stevens, Powell, JJ. concurring). Each aggravating factor included in a sentencing scheme [m]ust satisfy a constitutional standard derived from the principles of Furman itself. Zant v. Stephens, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 103 S.Ct. at 2742. Therefore, an aggravating factor, whether statutory or nonstatutory, considered by the sentencer in its determination of whether to impose the death sentence must not be [c]onstitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process. Id. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 2747. 45 In light of these principles, and mindful of the Court's admonition that [a]lthough not every imperfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case, to set aside a state court judgment, the severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of error, id., we turn to an examination of the factor of the jury's mandatory death sentence included in Alabama's capital sentencing determination. 46 First, the jury's mandatory death sentence is a factor in the sentencing process which must meet the constitutional standards established in Furman to be permissible. 23 This is a test the mandatory death sentence factor clearly does not meet. A mandatory death sentence requirement, withdrawing all sentencing discretion from the jury, results in a distortion of the guilt/innocence determination in order to allow for such discretion. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). The jury's decision to exercise this de facto sentencing discretion is both unguided and standardless, and necessarily reflects a blurred consideration of guilt/innocence and sentencing concerns. A mandatory death penalty statute therefore [d]oes not fulfill Furman 's basic requirement by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death. Id. at 303, 96 S.Ct. at 2990-2991. Further, the jury's mandatory death sentence by definition does not reflect any individualized focus on the circumstances of the particular offense and the character and propensities of the offender. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976). Fundamentally, the mandatory death sentence is a factor which is totally irrelevant to the sentencing process; it is simply a statutory consequence of the jury's finding of guilt of a capital offense, and reflects no considerations in favor of imposing the death penalty in any particular case. Cf. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2392, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (In the final analysis the difficulty with the Alabama statute is that it interjects irrelevant considerations into the factfinding process...). Because the mandatory death sentence as a statutorily required factor to be considered in the sentencing process is a factor which is unguided and standardless, reflects no individualized consideration of the particular defendant or crime, and is irrelevant to the sentencing process, we hold that it is a constitutionally impermissible factor in Alabama's capital sentencing scheme. 47 We further find that the constitutionally impermissible factor of the jury's mandatory death sentence infects the trial judge's sentencing determination. Although a separate sentencing hearing is held by the trial judge, at which evidence of aggravating and mitigating factors is introduced, the statute requires that in making the determination whether to impose the death sentence after reviewing this evidence the judge must decide whether he will [r]efuse to accept the death penalty as fixed by the jury. Ala.Code Sec. 13-11-4 (1975) (repealed 1981). Moreover, the statute requires the judge to weigh the mandatory death sentence factor in the balance with his consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deciding to impose the death penalty. Id. Thus, the constitutionally impermissible factor of the jury's mandatory death sentence must be given weight in the judge's own sentencing decision. In Beck the Supreme Court noted the influence of this factor on the judge's sentencing decision: 48 [I]t is manifest that the jury's verdict must have a tendency to motivate the judge to impose the same sentence that the jury did. Indeed, according to statistics submitted by the State's Attorney General, it is fair to infer that the jury verdict will ordinarily be followed by the judge even though he must hold a separate sentencing hearing in aggravation and mitigation before he imposes sentence. 49 447 U.S. at 645, 100 S.Ct. at 2393 (footnote omitted). 50 In order to arrive at a sentencing determination unaffected by the influence of the jury's mandatory death sentence, the judge must disobey the statute's express requirement that the mandatory death sentence be considered in his decision. 24 51 We hold that the inclusion of the constitutionally invalid factor of the jury's mandatory death sentence in the sentencing determination, and the statutorily required influence of that invalid factor on the judge's sentencing decision, renders the 1975 Alabama death penalty statute's sentencing procedures facially unconstitutional.
52 The State contends that any constitutional defect in the sentencing procedures was, in petitioner's case, harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt because in the unique circumstances here presented, in which petitioner testified against himself at trial and threatened the jury with harm if they did not convict him and sentence him to death, a reasonable sentencer under any set of procedures would have imposed the death penalty. Petitioner counters by claiming that the harmless error rule does not apply to facial constitutional defects in a capital sentencing scheme; relying on Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845, 92 S.Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 744 (1972) (per curiam); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), in which the Supreme Court invalidated death sentences imposed under unconstitutional sentencing procedures without discussion or application of the harmless error rule. In response, the State cites Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982); Zant v. Stephens, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983); and Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), 25 as examples of the application of the harmless error rule in capital cases. We find that Hopper and Washington are distinguishable from the present case, 26 and that the analysis in Stephens governs our disposition of this issue. 53 In Stephens, the Supreme Court employed essentially a federal harmless error analysis, Barclay v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3425 n. 8, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134, 1144-45 n. 8 (1983), to a constitutional defect in a capital sentencing scheme. One of the three statutory aggravating factors found by Stephens' sentencing jury was subsequently held invalid by the Georgia Supreme Court as unconstitutionally vague because it failed to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder case in which the death penalty may be imposed from those cases in which such a penalty may not be imposed. The Court addressed the issue of whether, under these circumstances, a defendant's death sentence must be vacated, and found that [t]he answer depends on the function of the jury's finding of an aggravating circumstance under Georgia's capital sentencing statute, and on the reasons that the aggravating circumstance at issue in this particular case was found to be invalid. --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 2736. The Court first found that under Georgia's capital sentencing scheme the finding of an aggravating factor served the function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty, that the two valid statutory aggravating factors properly achieved this function, and that the discretion of the sentencer was thus suitably directed and limited in this case. The Court then considered whether the invalid factor injected a constitutionally impermissible consideration into the sentencer's exercise of that limited discretion: 54 Respondent contends that the death sentence was impaired because the judge instructed the jury with regard to an invalid statutory aggravating circumstance, a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions, for these instructions may have affected the jury's deliberations. In analyzing this contention it is essential to keep in mind the sense in which that aggravating circumstance is invalid. It is not invalid because it authorizes a jury to draw adverse inferences from conduct that is constitutionally protected. Georgia has not, for example, sought to characterize the display of a red flag, cf. Stromberg v. California [283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) ], the expression of unpopular political views, cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 [69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131] (1949), or the request for trial by jury, cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 [88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138] (1968), as an aggravating circumstance. Nor has Georgia attached the aggravating label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant, cf. Herndon v. Georgia, 301 U.S. 242 [57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066] (1937), or to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty, such as perhaps the defendant's mental illness. Cf. Miller v. Florida, 373 So.2d 882, 885-886 (Fla.1979). If the aggravating circumstance at issue in this case had been invalid for reasons such as these, due process would require that the jury's decision to impose death be set aside. 55 --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 2747 (emphasis supplied). 56 In Stephens, the Court held that the underlying evidence introduced by the invalid factor was properly admissible at the sentencing hearing under both Georgia law and the United States Constitution, that [n]othing in the United States Constitution prohibits a trial judge from instructing a jury that it would be appropriate to take account of a defendant's prior criminal record in making its sentencing determination, id. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 2749, and that any impact on the jury's deliberations from the fact that this evidence was improperly designated a statutory aggravating factor [c]annot fairly be regarded as a constitutional defect in the sentencing process. Id. Accordingly, Stephens' death sentence was upheld. 57 The import of Stephens is clear: a federal harmless error analysis 27 will be applied to a facial constitutional defect in a capital sentencing scheme if, and only if, two criteria are met. First, independent of the invalid factor, the sentencing scheme must limit and channel the sentencer's discretion. Second, the invalid factor must not inject constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant considerations into the sentencer's exercise of that discretion. In Stephens, both of these criteria were met, and the defendant's death sentence was therefore constitutionally imposed. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), Ohio's death penalty statute narrowly limited the sentencer's discretion to consider only statutory mitigating factors, which did not include a consideration of the circumstances of the crime and the record and character of the offender as mitigating factors. The first criterion of the Stephens test was thus met in Lockett, and the sentencer's discretion was limited and channelled. The second criterion, however, was not met by a scheme that excluded the constitutionally relevant and indispensable consideration by the sentencer of any aspect of the defendant's character and record as an independently mitigating factor. In Lockett, the defendant's death sentence was vacated without further inquiry. 58 In the present case, we assume without deciding that, absent the invalid factor of the jury's mandatory death sentence, the 1975 Alabama death penalty statute's statutory aggravating and mitigating factors suitably limit the sentencer's discretion. We hold, however, that this invalid factor injects a constitutionally impermissible and irrelevant consideration into the sentencer's exercise of that discretion in determining whether to impose a sentence of death. Therefore, as in Lockett, no further inquiry is required, and petitioner's death sentence is due to be vacated. 59