Opinion ID: 2508301
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bias Or Prejudgment Exempts Litigants From Exhaustion Requirements

Text: One such exception to the exhaustion requirement applies where bias or prejudgment by the decisionmaker can be demonstrated. Peterson v. City of Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234, 236, 786 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Ct.App.1990); 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 13.22(9) (2d ed.1997); see Johnson v. Bonner Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 493, 887 P.2d 35, 38 (1994). This is because [t]he due process clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal. Eacret v. Bonner Cty., 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494, 498 (2004). Actual bias on the part of a decisionmaker is constitutionally unacceptable. Johnson, 126 Idaho at 493, 887 P.2d at 38. The constitutional requirement that an adjudicator be free from bias applies equally to the courts and to state administrative agencies. Eacret, 139 Idaho at 784, 86 P.3d at 498. To require a litigant to exhaust his administrative remedies before a biased decisionmaker would also be futile. See Peterson, 117 Idaho at 236, 786 P.2d at 1138. This Court's decision in Johnson v. Bonner Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 82 provides a trial court the authority to halt administrative proceedings upon a showing that there is a probability that the decisionmaker will decide unfairly any issue before it. 126 Idaho at 493, 887 P.2d at 38. In Johnson, a school principal (Johnson) had engaged in a public dispute with members of the school board. 126 Idaho at 491, 887 P.2d at 36. Both Johnson and members of the board traded barbed comments that were published in the local newspaper. Id. When the board acted to fire him, Johnson, alleging bias, sought a restraining order in district court to prevent the board from acting as the adjudicator at his termination hearing. Id. at 491-92, 887 P.2d at 36-37. Reasoning that it was not empowered to enjoin the board under those circumstances, the district court dismissed Johnson's action. Id. at 492, 887 P.2d at 37. On review, this Court reversed the district court's dismissal. Id. at 494, 887 P.2d at 39. The Court found requiring a litigant to submit to a biased decisionmaker to be a constitutionally unacceptable violation of due process. Id. at 493, 887 P.2d at 38. Therefore, according to this Court in Johnson, upon a showing that there is a probability that a decisionmaker in a due process hearing will decide unfairly any issue presented in the hearing, a trial court may grant an injunction to prevent the decisionmaker from participating in the proceeding. Id. at 494, 887 P.2d at 39. Here, under the standard of review applicable to I.R.C.P. 12(b) dismissals, if the Claimants' amended complaint alleged facts sufficient to infer bias or prejudgment, this Court would assume the allegations to be true. See Young, 137 Idaho at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159. Because actual prejudgment or bias trumps the normal exhaustion requirements, see Johnson, 126 Idaho at 493, 887 P.2d at 38, the district court's dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies would be in error. Therefore, we must determine whether the Claimants' complaint alleged facts sufficient to infer bias or prejudgment.