Opinion ID: 821522
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Helen Copitka’s Testimony

Text: Robert Homick called his and defendant‟s sister, Helen Copitka, to testify about the childhood dynamics within their family and specifically defendant‟s domineering relationship with his younger brother. Defendant objected that the testimony was inadmissible character evidence and, because Copitka had had few interactions with her brothers in adulthood, her testimony would be stale. The 62 court overruled the objections, finding, as to the latter contention, that Copitka‟s lack of adult interactions with her brothers went to the weight, not the admissibility, of her testimony. The trial court also rejected defendant‟s request to impeach Copitka‟s testimony with evidence of the Missouri incident. Defendant contends that Copitka‟s testimony was of little relevance because of her limited interactions with her adult brothers; that it was more prejudicial to defendant than probative; that Robert Homick‟s defense—that he simply followed defendant‟s orders, unaware of defendant‟s purpose—was without support in the evidence; and that, if testimony about the brothers‟ leader/follower relationship was relevant, the trial court should have allowed defendant to present the Missouri incident evidence. His contentions are meritless. Copitka‟s testimony about defendant‟s dominance in his relationship with his brother, established when both were children, was clearly relevant to Robert Homick‟s defense that he carried out defendant‟s instructions in the instant case without necessarily understanding their purpose. Her limited interaction with her brothers as adults and, thus, her opportunity to observe their adult relationship, went to the weight, not the admissibility, of her testimony. “Relevant evidence is evidence „having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.‟ (Evid. Code, § 210, italics added.) The evidence need not be dispositive of the disputed fact.” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1002.) Defendant‟s assertion that there was no evidence to support Robert Homick‟s defense, and thus no basis for Copitka‟s testimony, is puzzling, to say the least, given defendant‟s objections to some of the evidence presented in support of that defense. That defendant found his brother‟s defense implausible—as apparently did the jury—does not mean there was no evidentiary basis for it. Finally, we have already concluded that the trial court 63 properly excluded the Missouri incident evidence under Evidence Code section 352. 5. References to Las Vegas triple murder investigation During the presentation of Robert Homick‟s defense, Detective Holder, one of the investigating officers in this case, testified that no deal had been made with Michael Dominguez when he was interviewed in March 1986, first by Holder and his partner Detective Crotsley and then by members of the Las Vegas police department. Counsel for Robert Homick was then permitted to play the tape of the Las Vegas police department interview, at which Holder was also present. A comment was made at the beginning of the tape that the Las Vegas police were investigating a triple murder. Dominguez‟s attorney then spoke of a tentative plea agreement with the Los Angeles police department. Confronted with the tape, Holder acknowledged his recollection about whether a deal had been reached was incorrect. Subsequently, when the prosecutor cross-examined Holder, further reference was made to a “triple homicide” the Las Vegas police had been investigating at the time of the interviews.32 Defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that the jury would have inferred defendant had something to do with the triple murders. The court denied the motion, remarking, “I see nothing in that that would even, under rank speculation, tie that in to any defendant in this case.” Defendant argues the jury must 32 The triple murders at issue were the Tipton murders of which defendant was convicted in Nevada. Before Robert Homick was allowed to question Holder about the Dominguez interviews, the trial court explicitly directed the prosecution not to refer to the homicides as the “Tipton murders” or to mention defendant in connection with them. 64 inevitably have connected him to the triple murder investigation mentioned during Holder‟s testimony. We agree with the trial court that the argument is speculative. Finally, having rejected defendant‟s various individual claims of error, we necessarily reject his claim that the cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors requires reversal. (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 479-480.) F. Coconspirator Statements Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously admitted statements by his confederates under the coconspirator exception to the rule against hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1223 [“Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: [¶] (a) The statement was made by the declarant while participating in a conspiracy to commit a crime . . . and in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy; [and] [¶] (b) The statement was made prior to or during the time that the party was participating in that conspiracy . . .”].) 1. Soft Lite incident The prosecution introduced evidence that, at Stewart Woodman‟s behest, Robert Homick went to Soft Lite, a business owned by Jack Swartz, and threatened him over money Soft Lite owed to Manchester Products. The evidence came in through the testimony of Swartz‟s daughter, Tracy Swartz Hebard. Just before she testified, defendant‟s counsel objected to her testimony because “there‟s no showing that [the Soft Lite incident] is part of any conspiracy dealing with the death[s] of Gerald and Vera Woodman.” The court rejected the argument, ruling that the evidence was relevant to demonstrate the relationship between the defendants “during the years leading up to the 1985 murder[s].” Defendant‟s counsel asked for an instruction to limit the evidence to Robert 65 Homick. The court agreed to listen to the evidence and “if it is apparent that it bears no relationship to [defendant] I will so instruct the jury.” Defendant contends the evidence should have been excluded as irrelevant and prejudicial. While he concedes the evidence was more harmful to his brother, he argues he suffered “some prejudice” because there was “an inevitable tendency” for evidence harmful to one of them to be “considered by the jury as harmful to both.” He also complains that the court failed to give the limiting instruction he had earlier requested, thus compounding any prejudice, although he acknowledges such prejudice alone “may not have been sufficient to require reversal of the judgment against” him. Defendant has lumped this claim into his general claim that the trial court misapplied the coconspirator hearsay exception, even though no party made a hearsay objection to this particular evidence. Accordingly, any hearsay claim is forfeited. We reject on its merits defendant‟s claim that the evidence was irrelevant. “Conspiracy requires two or more persons agreeing to commit a crime, along with the commission of an overt act, by at least one of these parties, in furtherance of the conspiracy. (People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 600 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994; see §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 184.) A conspiracy requires (1) the intent to agree, and (2) the intent to commit the underlying substantive offense.” (People v. Bogan (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1074.) “ „The punishable act, or the very crux, of a criminal conspiracy is the evil or corrupt agreement.‟ ” (People v. Alleyne (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1262.) If the agreement between the conspirators is the crux of criminal conspiracy, then the existence and nature of the relationship among the conspirators is undoubtedly relevant to whether such agreement was formed, particularly since such agreement must often be proved circumstantially. “ „The 66 existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct, relationship, interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators before and during the alleged conspiracy.‟ ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1135, italics added.) Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Hebard‟s testimony as relevant to establish the relationship between Robert Homick and Stewart Woodman. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion when it found that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. The court characterized Robert Homick‟s threat as “a lot like puffing” and unlikely to have been taken at face value by the jury. If, for this reason, the testimony was minimally prejudicial to Robert Homick, then, necessarily, it was not prejudicial at all to defendant who was not involved in the incident and whose name did not surface during Hebard‟s testimony. Regarding defendant‟s complaint about the court‟s failure to give a limiting instruction, defendant‟s failure to press the court for a ruling once Hebard gave her testimony forfeits any claim of error. (People v. Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 541, 554.) In any event, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court‟s failure to give such an instruction. The incident, on its face, simply had nothing to do with him, which the jury would have understood even without an instruction to that effect. 2. Statements made by Stewart and Neil about defendant Over defendant‟s objection, the trial court permitted two former employees of Manchester Products to testify to statements made by Stewart and Neil about defendant on grounds they were made during a time the conspiracy was in existence. Cathy Clemente testified that, sometime in March or April of 1983, the brothers had a meeting with defendant after which Stewart described defendant as “his man in Vegas” and added that, if anything needed doing, defendant “was the 67 man to do it.” Neil told her that defendant was “tougher” than the Mafia. Richard Wilson testified that on many occasions Neil had told him defendant “could get anything done of an illegal nature upon request.” In his in limine testimony, though not in his trial testimony, Wilson identified the timeframe of these statements as 1984 and 1985. “Hearsay evidence is of course generally inadmissible. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Hearsay statements by coconspirators, however, may nonetheless be admitted against a party if, at the threshold, the offering party presents „independent evidence to establish prima facie the existence of . . . [a] conspiracy.‟ [Citations.] Once independent proof of a conspiracy has been shown, three preliminary facts must be established: „(1) that the declarant was participating in a conspiracy at the time of the declaration; (2) that the declaration was in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy; and (3) that at the time of the declaration the party against whom the evidence is offered was participating or would later participate in the conspiracy.‟ [Citation.]” (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 139.) Defendant contends, correctly, that Stewart‟s and Neil‟s statements to Clemente took place before the conspiracy to kill Gerald and Vera was formed and were therefore inadmissible under the coconspirator exception. The trial court concluded the conspiracy was formed no earlier than the fall of 1983 when, as Stewart testified at the federal trial, Joey Gambino suggested he speak to defendant about Stewart‟s problem with his father, whereas Clemente testified the statements to her were made in March or April 1983. Thus, the trial court erred when it admitted Clemente‟s testimony under the coconspirator statement exception because the foundational requirements—“[t]he statement was made by the declarant while participating in a conspiracy to commit a crime . . . and in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy” (Evid. Code, § 1223, subd. (a))— 68 were not met. Nevertheless we conclude any error in the admission of Clemente‟s brief testimony was harmless in light of the strong evidence of defendant‟s guilt. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.) Defendant concedes Neil Woodman‟s comment to Richard Wilson was made after the conspiracy came into existence, but argues it was not in furtherance of that conspiracy. As the Attorney General asserts, the trial court found otherwise; that finding binds us only if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 303-304.) The court cited no such evidence, and we find none. There is no apparent connection between Neil‟s statement to Wilson about defendant‟s ability to commit illegal acts and the specific objective of the conspiracy to kill Gerald and Vera. Neil was not enlisting Wilson‟s assistance nor attempting to procure his silence; he seems simply to have been bragging about his connection to a dangerous man. (See id. at p. 304 [coconspirator‟s remark to third parties that he was going with defendant to the prison yard the next morning to resolve a dispute with the victim was not in furtherance of the conspiracy to assault the victim where “Menefield was not asking Rooks or Long for help”].) Again, however, we find this fleeting comment nonprejudicial in light of the strong evidence of defendant‟s guilt. 3. Neil Woodman’s comments on a magazine article about hiring a hit man Gloria Karns, Stewart and Neil‟s aunt, testified that while waiting for a deposition at her attorney‟s office in connection with her lawsuit against the brothers, Neil flipped through a magazine and came across an article entitled “This Gun for Hire.” He remarked to his attorney, loudly enough for Karns to hear, “When somebody annoys you, you can look in a magazine [and] find someone to stop them annoying you.” At an in limine hearing, defendant argued that even if the testimony was admissible against Neil, it was inadmissible against defendant 69 and should be excluded. Alternatively, he argued the court should give an instruction limiting the jury‟s consideration of the testimony to Neil. The prosecutor opposed any limiting instruction on the ground that the statement, made in 1984, constituted proof of the existence of the conspiracy to murder Gerald and Vera. The trial court agreed and declined to give a limiting instruction. Defendant maintains the trial court erred because the statement was not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Assuming the testimony should have been excluded or a limiting instruction given, defendant was not prejudiced. Neil‟s comment, made in the midst of an acrimonious legal dispute with his aunt, was clearly directed at her, was unrelated to the conspiracy to murder his parents, and did not name defendant, expressly or by implication. 4. Stewart’s and Neil’s comments to Jack Ridout Jack Ridout, a business associate of Stewart and Neil‟s, testified about two conversations with the brothers. In one, Stewart told Ridout he used defendant for collections. He said he had sent defendant to take care of someone in Florida with whom the company was having problems getting paid and “they got paid right away.” In the other, when Ridout complained about a custody dispute with his exwife, Neil suggested that “he could have her hit, and all problems would be over with.” We need not resolve whether admission of Stewart‟s comment was error, because any error was harmless. Other testimony established that Stewart and Neil employed defendant for various jobs, including providing security and installing listening devices. The additional testimony that defendant was also employed to do collections was cumulative and insignificant in light of the strong evidence of his guilt. 70 As to Neil‟s statement, the trial court gave a limiting instruction expressly informing the jury it was not to consider the statement against defendant. We presume the jury understood and followed the instruction. (People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 575.) Defendant complains that the limiting instruction was given long after the testimony and this diluted its effect. “[T]he trial court is not obliged to give limiting instructions the moment they are requested or when the limited evidence is presented; subsequent instruction can be sufficient in a proper case.” (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 534.) We perceive no abuse of discretion here. Defendant also suggests the instruction was inadequate.33 We disagree and, in any event, defendant failed to suggest a different instruction be given. 5. Neil Woodman’s postarrest call to Steven Strawn Steven Strawn, Manchester Products‟s former controller, testified that after his arrest Neil Woodman called him from jail and asked him to destroy business cards located beneath Neil‟s desk; two of the cards belonged to defendant. Defendant objected that Neil‟s statement inculpated him in violation of the Aranda-Bruton rule. (People v. Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d 518; Bruton v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. 123 [a nontestifying codefendant‟s extrajudicial statement that incriminates himself or herself and the other defendant is inadmissible].) The trial court concluded that any potential prejudice to defendant could be cured by a 33 The jury was instructed in pertinent part: “With respect to the 2 statements that were testified to by Mr. Ridout, one statement that Neil Woodman could have Mr. Ridout‟s ex-wife hit . . . these statements were admitted in evidence against Neil Woodman only, and they are not admitted against Robert Homick, or Steven Homick. [¶] Whether the statements were in fact made by Neil Woodman, and the weight, if any, to be given them, are matters for the jury to decide. However, they are not to be considered by you as evidence against Steven or Robert Homick.” 71 limiting instruction. It instructed the jury: “[E]vidence concerning Neil Woodman‟s telephone instructions to Steven Strawn, if believed by you, is to be considered only as it applies to Neil Woodman. It may not be considered in any fashion with respect to Steve Homick.” Defendant contends the limiting instruction was inadequate. “Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a „nontestifying codefendant‟s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant‟s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.‟ [Citation].” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 652.)34 The United States Supreme Court “limited the scope of the Bruton rule in Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 [95 L.Ed.2d 176, 107 S.Ct. 1702] . . . . The court explained that Bruton recognized a narrow exception to the general rule that juries are presumed to follow limiting instructions, and this narrow exception should not apply to confessions that are not incriminating on their face, but become so only when linked with other evidence introduced at trial. (Richardson, supra, at pp. 206-207.) That is because, „[w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence.‟ (Id. at p. 208.)” (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 454; see People v. Fletcher, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 463-464 [Richardson limits application of Bruton exception to facially incriminating confessions of codefendant at a joint trial].) 34 To the extent Aranda “require[d] the exclusion of relevant evidence that need not be excluded under federal constitutional law, it was abrogated in 1982 by the „truth-in-evidence‟ provision of Proposition 8 (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d)).” (People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 465.) 72 Neil‟s statement to Strawn was not a confession, much less one that facially incriminated defendant. Its incriminatory effect on defendant depended entirely on its linkage to other evidence. As the trial court aptly noted, this was not a Bruton/Aranda issue “in a true sense,” and any possible prejudice to defendant could be dispelled by a limiting instruction. (Richardson v. Marsh, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 206 [“Ordinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be a witness „against‟ a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant.”].) 6. The “heavy guy” comment During defense counsel‟s cross-examination of Steven Strawn, Strawn testified that Stewart had ridiculed Neil‟s friendship with defendant. On redirect examination, Strawn explained that Stewart thought “Neil seeing [defendant] as a, quote, heavy guy went beyond the limits when Neil would use this in conversations with other people . . . .” Defense counsel objected that the “heavy guy” characterization violated the court‟s earlier ruling prohibiting the prosecutor from eliciting such testimony from Strawn. The court observed the comment “just sort of came out of left field.” Neil‟s counsel observed, “It came in as innocuously as possible and it was gone.” Although he concedes the error was “relatively minor,” defendant renews his objection to bolster his claim that the cumulative prejudice from all the evidentiary errors raised in this part requires reversal. There was no error here. The prosecutor did not solicit this testimony, nor did the court permit it. It slipped out of the witness in passing. Defendant could have, but did 73 not, request an admonition to the jury to disregard the phrase, probably because an admonition would simply have called attention to the innocuous remark.35 G. Other Claims of Evidentiary Error 1. Art Taylor’s testimony that defendant habitually carried a revolver The defense sought to preclude testimony by Art Taylor that he had seen defendant carrying a revolver. The prosecutor argued Taylor‟s testimony would be relevant to anticipated testimony by another witness, Robert Kelly. Kelly, who heard the shooting, believed the weapon used was a revolver, based, apparently, on his knowledge of firearms. The trial court overruled the objection. Taylor testified briefly that defendant usually carried a briefcase and among its contents was a silver revolver. Robert Kelly did not testify about the type of weapon he thought was used in the shooting. Later, however, evidence was presented that Michael Dominguez saw a silver revolver in the gun case defendant had obtained from Max Herman. In closing argument, the prosecutor suggested this revolver might have been the 35 Here, as elsewhere, defendant asserts the cumulative effect of prejudice from the erroneous admission of the evidence requires reversal. Where we have identified an error, we have concluded there was no prejudice. We conclude this is true whether the claims of prejudice are viewed individually or in the aggregate. This was not a close case. There was direct testimony from Stewart Woodman that he and his brother hired defendant to kill their parents. This testimony was corroborated by ample evidence that defendant personally stalked the victims and gathered confederates to help him accomplish the crime. Against this overwhelming evidence, defendant offered a weak alibi defense and attempted to point the finger of blame at his brother, who the evidence strongly indicated was defendant‟s pawn. The occasional evidentiary error defendant points to could not have had a prejudicial impact sufficient to require reversal. (See Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b) [no reversal for erroneous admission of evidence unless “[t]he court which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is of the opinion . . . that the error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”].) 74 murder weapon. When counsel for Robert Homick directly argued that it was the murder weapon, the court interrupted his argument and instructed the jury that, while it could draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, “I don‟t think there‟s been evidence tying a particular weapon to being the murder weapon.” Defendant contends the trial court erred by permitting Taylor to testify to defendant‟s habitual possession of a weapon, citing People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566. In Riser, we held: “When the prosecution relies, . . . on a specific type of weapon, it is error to admit evidence that other weapons were found in [the defendant‟s] possession, for such evidence tends to show, not that he committed the crime, but only that he is the sort of person who carries deadly weapons.” (Id. at p. 577.) On the other hand, “[w]e have also held that when weapons are otherwise relevant to the crime‟s commission, but are not the actual murder weapons, they may still be admissible.” (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 956.) For example, in People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1052, we held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a witness to testify the defendant had told her he kept a gun in his van. “Although the witnesses did not establish the gun necessarily was the murder weapon, it might have been. . . . The evidence was thus relevant and admissible as circumstantial evidence that [the defendant] committed the charged offenses.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 877, 896 [counsel not ineffective for failing to object to admission of rifle and ammunition found in defendant‟s truck shortly after commission of crime where “there was no direct evidence as to the fatal shooting 75 that would render this evidence irrelevant to establish facts material to proof of the charged offenses”].)36 Here, the prosecutor‟s offer of proof in support of Taylor‟s testimony was that the weapon defendant habitually carried may have been the same type of weapon used in the shooting. As the trial court observed, such evidence was “circumstantial evidence the jury can use to determine whether the case is proven that this defendant is connected to the murder.” The court acknowledged the testimony was prejudicial but nonetheless, by overruling defendant‟s objection, implicitly found the testimony was more probative than prejudicial. We cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony. (People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 955.) Defendant maintains the prosecutor ultimately pointed to another revolver—that obtained by defendant from Max Herman—as the murder weapon. As noted, however, the prosecutor‟s argument was not so direct, and the trial court specifically instructed the jury that no particular weapon had been identified as the 36 Defendant argues that defendants are held to a higher standard of relevance when attempting to introduce reasonable doubt evidence than is the prosecution when it offers weapons evidence. He cites People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, which involves a defendant‟s tender of third party culpability evidence. In Hall, we overruled earlier authority that had held such evidence was inadmissible absent a threshold showing of substantial proof of probability because that standard was too onerous. (Id. at pp. 832-834.) While we acknowledged some outer limits to guide the trial court‟s exercise of discretion—“direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime” (id. at p. 833)—we also observed that whether such evidence was admissible “will always turn on the facts of the case” (id. at p. 834). The same is true of weapons evidence because (1) some degree of connection between the weapon and the crime must be shown before it is admissible, but (2) this determination turns on the facts of the individual case. Therefore, we reject defendant‟s suggestion that different rules apply to the defense as opposed to the prosecution regarding the admission of this evidence. 76 murder weapon, while leaving the jury free to draw reasonable inferences. Even had the prosecutor ultimately argued the gun obtained from Herman was the murder weapon, the effect would have been to render Taylor‟s testimony irrelevant; the trial court‟s ruling would still have been correct based on the offer of proof made at the time of its ruling. Moreover, defendant could have, but did not, request that Taylor‟s testimony be stricken or otherwise renew his objection. 2. Stewart Woodman’s testimony regarding Robert Homick’s presence outside Gerald and Vera’s apartment building Defendant sought to exclude testimony by Stewart Woodman that Robert Homick had told him it was a coincidence he was parked outside Gerald and Vera‟s apartment building for several hours on June 22, 1985, Gerald and Vera‟s anniversary. While defendant‟s counsel conceded the statement was admissible against Robert Homick, he argued it was harmful to defendant, who planned to argue, in essence, that Robert was engaged in a plot to kill the victims on June 22, when defendant was not in Los Angeles. The trial court declined to exclude the testimony. Defense counsel again sought to exclude the testimony after Stewart had taken the stand. In response, the prosecutor argued: “My position is this is incriminating against Bob Homick because it shows there was a pattern of surveilling the victims in this case.” Defense counsel offered to stipulate to Robert Homick‟s statement he was at the scene on June 22, as well as before and after that date. The trial court again overruled the objection to the testimony. Defendant contends admission of the testimony was error. Not so. The testimony was admissible against Robert Homick to show he had been surveilling the victims. Robert Homick‟s claim to Stewart Woodman that it was simply a coincidence he had been outside the building did not fatally undermine defendant‟s assertion that his brother, and not he, was the designated hit man. Defendant was free to attack Robert Homick‟s truthfulness on this point. Nor was 77 the prosecution obligated to accept defendant‟s tender of a stipulation. “ „[T]he general rule is that the prosecution in a criminal case cannot be compelled to accept a stipulation if the effect would be to deprive the state‟s case of its persuasiveness and forcefulness.‟ ” (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 131.) Defendant also complains that a limiting instruction was not given with respect to this evidence but, as he did not request such an instruction, his complaint fails. (See People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 883-884.) Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this fleeting testimony. 3. FBI Agent Joseph Gersky’s testimony that he believed Michael Dominguez and Gersky’s characterization of defendant as “notorious” Robert Homick called FBI Agent Joseph Gersky to testify that when he initially interviewed Michael Dominguez, Dominguez told him he did not know who else had participated in the Woodman murders.37 Gersky testified that, an hour or so later, he again interrogated Dominguez because he did not believe him. In the second interview, Dominguez told Gersky two other men had assisted defendant, Anthony Majoy and defendant‟s brother, William, also known as “Moke.” On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Gersky that what Dominguez had actually said during the second interview was that Majoy and “Steve‟s brother” had participated in the murders, without specifying which brother. Over defendant‟s objection, the prosecutor was also allowed to ask Gersky if he believed Dominguez. Gersky said he did. 37 Gersky was also a polygraph examiner who evidently gave Dominguez a polygraph test. 78 Defendant contends the trial court erred by permitting Gersky to testify that he believed Dominguez after the second interrogation. “Even assuming these opinions were improperly admitted (see People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 744 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741] [opinion testimony from a witness with no personal knowledge of the events regarding the veracity of another witness‟s statements regarding those events is inadmissible because such testimony is speculative]; but see People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 946-947 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388] [declining to decide whether this aspect of Melton survived Prop. 8]), we nonetheless conclude that any [error] . . . was not prejudicial.” (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 300.) Gersky‟s brief testimony involved a subject—defendant and his brother‟s participation in the murders—as to which there was ample evidence.38 Neither the court nor the prosecutor drew any further attention to Gersky‟s testimony, and the jury was instructed that it alone was to determine witness credibility. We presume the jury followed this instruction. (See Riggs, at pp. 300-301 [where the jury was instructed it was to determine the credibility of witnesses, any error in an officer‟s testimony about defendant‟s veracity was harmless].) 38 Defendant maintains that Gersky‟s opinion about Dominguez‟s credibility was based on the polygraph examination Gersky administered to him. He complains about not being able to question Gersky about the results of that examination. Such results are inadmissible. (Evid. Code, § 351.1.) Moreover, the basis for Gersky‟s opinion that Dominguez was being truthful when he said defendant and one of his brothers had participated in the offense is unimportant in light of the overwhelming evidence that otherwise established this point. Indeed, Gersky‟s opinion of Dominguez‟s credibility was itself insignificant given the jury‟s ability to observe Dominguez‟s demeanor. As the trial court aptly remarked, “the jury‟s determination about the credibility of Michael Dominguez is not going to depend on whether this witness believed him or not.” 79 During redirect examination by counsel for Robert Homick, Gersky was asked whether he was aware defendant was arrested on March 11, 1986. He replied: “Well, I knew Steven Homick had been arrested, because he was a notorious person.” Defendant‟s counsel quickly moved to strike that response. His motion was granted, and the court instructed the jury to disregard the remark. He also sought a mistrial, which the court denied. Defendant contends, in effect, that the court should have granted his mistrial motion because striking the remark was insufficient to dispel the prejudice to defendant. We do not agree. The comment was made in passing, the court‟s response was instantaneous, and we presume the jury followed its instruction to disregard the remark. 4. Michael Dominguez’s testimony that he believed defendant intended to kill Gerald and Vera Woodman To impeach Michael Dominguez‟s testimony that his statement to police had been coerced, the prosecution was allowed to play the videotape of the interrogation. On the tape, Dominguez said he believed defendant had planned to kill the victims, even though defendant had told him only a robbery was planned. Defense counsel objected to evidence of Dominguez‟s “belief that . . . these people were going to get shot based on being with [defendant] and what [defendant] had done,” and Dominguez‟s interpretation of defendant‟s use of the phrase “to catch up with them,” as meaning “[t]o kill [the victims].” The trial court overruled the objection, concluding the statement would impeach any claim by Dominguez that he did not know there would be a murder. The court also observed that Dominguez‟s belief that a murder was planned was an opinion not based on anything defendant had said to him. Defendant argues that Dominguez‟s statement did not impeach his trial testimony because Dominguez did not testify he believed defendant intended only a robbery and not a murder. Rather, Dominguez testified he was not in Los 80 Angeles at all, implying he had no knowledge of any crime.39 Defendant asserts further that Dominguez‟s opinion about what defendant intended was irrelevant to any issue in the case. The statements at issue tended generally to impeach Dominguez‟s denial that he was involved in any crime by demonstrating an awareness on his part that some crime against the victims was planned. Moreover, as the Attorney General points out, Dominguez‟s belief appears to have been based on his observations of defendant‟s planning activity—his attempt to acquire an apartment in a nearby building and his long-term surveillance of the victims—and not on any admission by defendant or on Dominguez‟s assessment of defendant‟s character. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. Defendant suggests the cumulative prejudice from the evidentiary rulings discussed above requires reversal. As we have found either no error or no prejudice, we also conclude he was not cumulatively prejudiced. H. Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Reopen and Present Evidence After All Sides Had Rested After all sides had rested, but before closing arguments began, defendant‟s lawyers met with the court in an ex parte session. They claimed that a gun recovered by police from Robert Homick‟s residence, which police had test-fired and determined was not the murder weapon, was, according to defendant, the same gun he had acquired from Max Herman.40 Herman‟s description of the gun 39 When asked why defendant wanted him to come to Los Angeles, Dominguez testified he did not recall being in Los Angeles. 40 Counsel acknowledged there was no evidence, other than defendant‟s claim, that the weapon retrieved from Robert Homick‟s apartment was the weapon defendant obtained from Herman. Herman died before trial. 81 to police, defendant‟s counsel asserted, fit the description of the gun seized from Robert Homick‟s apartment and the serial number of the two guns matched. The defense wanted to reopen to ask the detectives whether they had asked Herman if he still had the serial number of the weapon he gave defendant, so it could be compared with the number of the gun seized from Robert‟s apartment, or if they had shown Herman the seized weapon and asked him if it was the gun he had given to defendant. Alternatively, the defense proposed a stipulation that stated, in part: “Detectives Crotsley & Holder did not ask Mr. Herman for the serial number & never showed him the .357 magnum [recovered from Robert Homick‟s apartment] to see if he could identify it as the gun he had given [defendant].” After considerable discussion, the trial court concluded the proffered evidence was not “sufficiently significant to do anything more about it, other than to leave the evidence in the state it‟s in.” It denied defendant‟s requests to reopen for a stipulation or a mistrial. A “motion to reopen [is] one addressed to the [trial] court‟s sound discretion.” (People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1202.) In determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred, the reviewing court considers four factors: “ „(1) the stage the proceedings had reached when the motion was made; (2) the defendant‟s diligence (or lack thereof) in presenting the new evidence; (3) the prospect that the jury would accord the new evidence undue emphasis; and (4) the significance of the evidence.‟ ” (People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1110.) The court found the proffered evidence—that is, defendant‟s desire to question the investigating detectives about whether they had talked to Herman about the serial number of the gun he had given defendant and had shown him the test-fired gun for comparison—“[in]sufficiently significant” to warrant reopening. 82 This finding corresponds to the fourth factor of our abuse of discretion analysis. If the trial court was correct regarding the insignificance of the evidence, it could not have abused its discretion by denying defendant‟s motion to reopen and present it. Only defendant‟s unsworn statement to his lawyers that the gun seized from Robert Homick‟s apartment was the same gun Max Herman had given him directly connected the two weapons. Herman‟s statement to police did not establish the connection. Herman merely supplied a description of a gun similar to the gun seized from the apartment. There was no evidence the serial number of the gun he gave defendant matched the serial number of the gun seized from the apartment. At most, then, the only evidence potentially favorable to his case defendant could have presented on this point was that the investigating detectives (1) did not ask Herman whether he had kept the serial number of the gun he gave defendant and (2) did not show him a gun seized during a police search and ask him if he could identify it as the weapon he gave defendant. If, to the contrary, the detectives testified they did ask Herman about these matters, that response would have indicated Herman did not know the serial number and/or did not recognize the seized weapon because, had he done either, the police would certainly have included that information in their reports. In either scenario, the testimony would not have materially assisted the defense. We agree with the trial court that the proffered evidence was insufficiently significant to warrant reopening the evidence. Based on our analysis of the value of the proffered evidence, we also conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant‟s motion for a mistrial. (People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 573.) For the same reason, we reject defendant‟s claim that he was entitled to lesser relief, in the form of a stipulation. 83 I. The Trial Court’s Statement About the Federal Trial At the outset of the trial, the court directed counsel to instruct their witnesses not to mention whether they had testified in defendant‟s federal trial. During cross-examination of Art Taylor by counsel for Robert Homick, Taylor twice mentioned he had testified at that trial. After his testimony, defendant‟s counsel briefly moved for a mistrial. The motion was summarily denied. About two months after this brief exchange, before Stewart Woodman took the stand, the trial court distributed to counsel a “proposed statement” it wanted to give the jury providing background about Stewart Woodman, including information about the federal case. Defendant‟s counsel‟s sole input was to object to the statement that Anthony Majoy had been tried along with Stewart Woodman. Just before Stewart Woodman testified, the trial court reminded counsel about its intention to “give [the jury] an instruction” in advance of his testimony and asked counsel “to be prepared to tell me if you have any modifications to my proposed instruction to them.” When court reconvened, the trial court pressed for any additional modifications to “the statement that I am going to read to the jury.” Defendant‟s counsel offered none. When the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial court read the following statement: “The next witness who is going to be called to testify for the prosecution is Mr. Stewart Woodman. [¶] Mr. Woodman is presently in custody and he‟ll be brought to court accompanied by marshals. [¶] Before he testifies, I want to give you some information about some background on this case. [¶] After the defendants were arrested for the murders charged in this case, a severance was ordered by the court. The trial of Stewart Woodman was severed from the trial of the three defendants who are presently on trial here. He was tried before a jury and in 1989 and 1990 and was convicted of the murders. [¶] Before the commencement of the penalty phase of that trial, Stewart Woodman entered into 84 an agreement with the prosecution whereby he promised to testify against the remaining defendants in this trial and the prosecution agreed not to seek the death penalty against him but to accede to his being sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. [¶] Thereafter, federal authorities filed charges against all the defendants charging them with interstate transportation to commit these same murders which is a federal offense. [¶] Stewart Woodman entered into an agreement with the federal authorities in that case. He was allowed to plead guilty to the federal charges in exchange for his testimony against the remaining defendants in the federal court. [¶] All defendants were tried in federal court in 1991 and Stewart Woodman testified against them in those proceedings.” Defendant complains that the court erred in giving this statement because it implied he had been convicted of the federal charges. The Attorney General responds that defendant forfeited his claim regarding the statement because he failed to object on this ground. Defendant asserts no objection was necessary, citing language from section 1259: “The appellate court may also review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” We agree the claim is forfeited. Defendant‟s counsel not only failed to raise this concern when the trial court first proposed its statement, counsel remained silent even when the court itself raised the question of whether it should have included a specific directive to the jury not to concern itself with the results of the federal trial. Nor did counsel speak up when, just before Stewart Woodman testified, the trial court again solicited comments. Moreover, contrary to the position he takes now, defendant‟s trial counsel did not make a global objection to any statement regarding the federal trial when he sought a mistrial after Art Taylor inadvertently referred to his testimony at that trial. The two events were entirely unrelated, and counsel made no statement at the earlier proceedings, two months 85 before Stewart Woodman testified, that could in any way be construed as an objection to the court‟s later statement. Nor does section 1259 help defendant. That section applies to instructions, but the court‟s statement was not an instruction. (See Black‟s Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) p. 935 [a jury instruction is “[a] direction or guideline that a judge gives a jury concerning the law of the case”].) The court‟s statement did not direct the jury on any legal point, it merely provided background information about a witness. As such, it was more in the nature of a stipulation drafted by the court and accepted by counsel. Accordingly, defendant has forfeited any objection to the court‟s statement. Even had he not, we would reject his claim on the merits. Nothing in the statement suggested the outcome of the federal proceedings with respect to defendant. Defendant‟s claim that the instruction unmistakably implied to the jury he was convicted and thus “diminished [their] feelings of responsibility” is wholly speculative and without support in the record. J. Cumulative Prejudice from Guilt Phase Errors Defendant contends that the cumulative prejudice arising from guilt phase errors requires reversal. “Defendant has demonstrated few errors, and we have found each error or possible error to be harmless when considered separately. Considering them together, we likewise conclude that their cumulative effect does not warrant reversal of the judgment.” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 567-568.)