Opinion ID: 1470157
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pretrial Continuance

Text: Relying on the declarations of his attorneys and investigator, Appellant argues that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial were violated by the trial court's failure to grant a continuance due to Appellant's retention of substitute counsel shortly before trial commenced. See generally United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047-48, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Appellant observes that, since voir dire began only two days after counsel requested a continuance, see N.T. September 26, 1991, at 4, the trial court erred in stating that nine days had elapsed between Appellant's retention of new representation and trial. In addition, Appellant contends that, if a continuance was not requested on the record, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to so request, and he was prejudiced by that failure, as trial counsel could not conduct adequate investigation into potential trial strategies or mitigating evidence in such a brief period of time. Further, Appellant asserts that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not challenging trial counsel's failure in this regard on direct appeal. The only suggestion of prejudice associated with the derivative claims contained within the declarations upon which Appellant relies derives from assertions by Appellant's former attorneys that, had they obtained Green's statement, they would have altered their strategy, since the statement contained exculpatory information in the form of Tancemore's admission to having shot bar patrons and Appellant's intoxication. [15] Neither declaration, however, addresses the context of the relied-upon passages, or their occurrence among highly inculpatory passages of Green's statement, reflecting a belief by Appellant that he had shot someone, Appellant's ownership of the .45 caliber handgun which killed Officer Dukes, and his concealment of the weapon at the location at which it was found by police. Further, and again, trial counsel did not need Green's statement to apprehend that Appellant had been drinking on the night of his offenses. We conclude that Appellant's proffer failed to advance a sufficient claim of prejudice associated with the alleged failure of counsel to preserve a claim deriving from the denial of a continuance. Therefore, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing this claim without a hearing.