Opinion ID: 2334960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The State's Scope-Of-Employment Certification Is Subject To Judicial Review.

Text: When a lawsuit is filed against state employees, AS 09.50.253(c) allows the Attorney General to determine whether the individually named defendants were acting within the scope of their employment during the conduct giving rise to the lawsuit. If they were, the Attorney General certifies to the superior court that the defendants were acting within the scope of their employment, and substitutes the State for the individually named defendants. The lawsuit proceeds against the State as the remaining defendant. Alaska Statute 09.50.253 is derived from the Westfall Act, [5] a nearly identical federal statute that grants immunity to federal employees from tort lawsuits. [6] While the United States Supreme Court has held that the federal certification is reviewable, [7] Alaska has never addressed whether state certification is subject to judicial review. The State argues that the certification is not reviewable. Heisey maintains that it is, relying largely on United States Supreme Court case law and policy grounds. After reviewing the statute's plain language, its legislative history, and Supreme Court case law, we conclude that certification is reviewable. Our analysis proceeds from a presumption of judicial review in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary. [8]
When interpreting a statute, we look first at the statute's language, legislative history, and legislative purpose. [9] Here, we conclude that all three are silent on the judicial review of affirmative certifications. Alaska Statute 09.50.253(c) provides, in relevant part: Upon certification by the attorney general that the state employee was acting within the scope of the employee's office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon the claim in a state court is considered an action or proceeding against the state under the provisions of this title, and the state is substituted as the party defendant. The State, arguing against review, claims that the plain meaning of the word is, in the verbs is considered and is substituted, indicates that the substitution is automatic and unreviewable. We disagree. The plain language does establish that the substitution occurs immediately once a defendant has been certified. However, the language says nothing about the reviewability of the certification. The legislative history of AS 09.50.253 is similarly silent. The statute originated in the Alaska Senate as S.B. 338 during Alaska's 23rd legislature. At a Senate Committee meeting conducted in 2004, Assistant Attorney General Gail Voigtlander testified that the bill would benefit both employees and the public. By removing employees from the lawsuit as quickly as possible, S.B. 338 would minimize the disruption to their lives that would result from being part of protracted litigation, and protect their reputations by precluding the need to disclose their involvement in a lawsuit. In addition, because employees would no longer be involved in and distracted by the lawsuit, they would serve the public more effectively than they would without a substitution. Overall, the bill was designed to increase efficient use of the State's resources, and of employees' and attorneys' time. [10] The State interprets the Senate committee proceedings as dismissing the possibility of judicial review. In the State's view, the bill's purpose was to substitute the State for state employees to the extent possible. Allowing judicial review would strip the employee of the immunity and relief from litigation that the legislature sought to provide. The superior court agreed, holding that it is clear that the statute was to preclude some claims against the State, and to shield the [Attorney General]'s decision to certify from judicial review. We disagree that the Senate minutes prove legislative intent to close off judicial review. Though it is clear that the legislature was trying to provide an avenue for state employees to be dismissed from litigation, the Senate minutes simply do not mention judicial review of a decision to certify. The House committee minutes from H.B. 488, the companion House bill to S.B. 388, are equally silent on whether an affirmative certification is reviewable. [11] Overall, the legislative history and legislative intent of AS 09.50.253 are inconclusive.
Though AS 09.50.253 contains no language pertaining to the judicial review of affirmative certifications, AS 09.50.253(d) provides judicial review for employees who are denied certification. [12] The State claims that the absence of a similar provision for affirmative certifications must have been intentional, and leads to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend that affirmative certifications be reviewable. But we find another interpretation equally possible. The presence of the provision may simply reflect the legislature's desire to provide an additional layer of protection for state employees. After all, protecting state employees was the basis on which the Attorney General's office argued for the legislation in the first place. In sum, the legislature's silence on judicial review of affirmative certifications is inconclusive.
The federal counterpart to AS 09.50.253, the Westfall Act, substitutes the United States as the defendant for torts performed within the scope of employment. The Westfall Act provides: Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an action against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.[ [13] ] The primary difference in wording between the federal statute and the Alaska statute is in the verbs used: The former uses shall be (shall be deemed an action against the United States) and the latter uses is (is considered an action ... against the state). Because the Westfall Act and AS 09.50.253 contain nearly identical language, and because AS 09.50.253 was based on the Westfall Act, federal decisions construing the Westfall Act are persuasive authority in construing AS 09.50.253. [14] In Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, [15] the Supreme Court held that the Attorney General's certification is reviewable. [16] There, three Colombian citizens filed suit against a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration following a car accident in Colombia. [17] Acting on behalf of the Attorney General, the U.S. Attorney certified that the agent had been acting within the scope of his employment, resulting in the substitution of the United States as the defendant. [18] After considering the language of the statute and policy considerations, the Supreme Court determined that the Attorney General's certification was reviewable. [19] The State attempts to distinguish Gutierrez, but its argument is not persuasive. The State argues that Gutierrez turned on two aspects of the Westfall Act that are not found in the Alaska statute. First, the Westfall Act states that the Attorney General's certification shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal, [20] and the State argues this language necessarily implies that certification is reviewable for other purposes. Because AS 09.50.253 does not contain a similar provision, the State argues that the same analysis does not apply. Second, the federal statute provides that the United States  shall be substituted as the defendant, rather than  is substituted as in the Alaska statute. The State argues that the use of shall explains the Supreme Court's conclusion in Gutierrez, as it meant that the statute could be interpreted as authorizing, but not requiring substitution. In the State's view, the Alaska statute's use of is rather than shall precludes ambiguity. The State's argument is unconvincing. It misinterprets the Supreme Court's analysis and, as Heisey suggests, ignores the policy considerations that were central to the case. In Gutierrez, the Court began from the presumption that when a Government official's determination of a fact or circumstancefor example, `scope of employment'is dispositive of a court controversy, federal courts generally do not hold the determination unreviewable. Instead, federal judges traditionally proceed from the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review. [21] The Court then examined the language of the statute to determine whether it overcomes the presumption favoring judicial review, the tradition of court review of scope certifications, and the anomalies attending foreclosure of review. [22] Finding both interpretations plausible, the Court did not initially endorse one side's interpretation over the other. [23] For instance, the defendant in Gutierrez interpreted the word shall in the Westfall Actin shall be deemed an action against the United States and shall be substitutedto mean that the substitution is not reviewable, apparently taking shall to mean must. [24] The Court observed that shall generally means must, but can also be used in place of should, will, or even may. [25] Ultimately concluding that the Westfall Act's language is reasonably susceptible to divergent interpretation, the Court decided instead to adopt the reading that accords with ... [the] basic principle[ ] that executive determinations generally are subject to judicial review. [26] Along similar lines, the Court noted that section 2679(d)(2) states that certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal, while no such language appeared with regard to substitution. [27] However, while the Court conceded that this may support the conclusion that the substitution is reviewable, the Court declined to commit to this interpretation. [28] Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that [t]he Westfall Act's language is far from clear, prompting it to decide the case on policy grounds. [29] Given the similarity between AS 09.50.253(c) and the Westfall Act, we are persuaded by the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gutierrez: We conclude that the plain language and legislative history of AS 09.50.253(c) do not clearly favor or disfavor judicial review, and we therefore look to analogous cases and policy considerations to guide our determination. In several cases in the past we have reserved the right to judicial review within the context of administrative agency determinations. [30] Here, the Attorney General's decision to certify is analogous to an administrative adjudication. In an administrative adjudication, the legislature has delegated decision-making authority to a body other than the courts. Similarly, AS 09.50.253(c) delegates authority to the Attorney General to make a legal determination: whether an employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment. In Alyeska Ski Corp. v. Holdsworth, [31] we considered the reviewability of leasing decisions by the Director of the Division of Lands and the Commissioner of Natural Resources. We concluded that it was not intended that Alaska's courts be divested of their constitutionally vested duty to insure compliance with the laws of Alaska. [32] In K & L Distributors, Inc. v. Murkowski, [33] in spite of a statute denying review of an administrative action, we noted our constitutional duty to ensure administrative compliance with Alaska's laws and concluded: It is the constitutionally vested duty of this court to assure that administrative action complies with the laws of Alaska. We would not be able to carry out this duty to protect the citizens of this state in the exercise of their rights if we were unable to review the actions of administrative agencies simply because the legislature chose to exempt their decisions from judicial review. The legislative statement of finality is one which we will honor to the extent that it accords with constitutional guarantees. But if the administrative action is questioned as violating, for example, the due process clause, we will not hesitate to review the propriety of the action to the extent that constitutional standards may require.[ [34] ] Turning to policy considerations, we agree with the United States Supreme Court that not permitting judicial review would lead to ominous consequences more severe than the alternative: The local United States Attorney, whose conflict of interest is apparent, would be authorized to make final and binding decisions insulating both the United States and federal employees . . . from liability while depriving plaintiffs of potentially meritorious tort claims.... Nor should we assume that Congress meant federal courts to accept cases only to stamp them Dismissed on an interested executive official's unchallengeable representation. The statute is fairly construed to allow petitioners to present to the District Court their objections to the Attorney General's scope-of-employment certification, and we hold that construction the more persuasive one.[ [35] ] We follow the same rationale here. These policy considerations are all the more important in Alaska, where our underlying law guarantees plaintiffs greater rights against the government than plaintiffs have under federal law. In cases against the U.S. government, immunity is the rule and liability the exception. [36] But government liability is the rule in Alaska, while immunity is the exception. [37] Precluding judicial review would stand contrary to this principle. It would allow the Attorney General to be the final arbiter of a case-dispositive issue, contrary to the presumption of judicial review. Finally, judicial review helps preserve the integrity of the certification process. In Gutierrez, the Attorney General herself urge[d] review, mindful that ... the incentive of her delegate to certify is marked. [38] In the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, and to avoid any due process concerns, we hold that the Attorney General's certification is reviewable.
The superior court has done no fact-finding in this case; the proceedings were stayed pending resolution of the legal issues before this court. In light of our conclusion that the Attorney General's certification is judicially reviewable, we remand to the superior court the question of whether the correctional officers were acting within the statutorily defined scope of their employment at the time of the incident. Looking to the methodology adopted by the federal courts, [39] we establish these principles: (1) the standard of review for the certification decision should be de novo; (2) the burden of proof lies upon the plaintiff challenging certification to prove that the defendants were not acting within the scope of their employment; (3) the court should apply the factors in AS 09.50.253(h)(1) [40] for the scope-of-employment determination; (4) the outcome should be decided by the court, not a jury; and (5) the determination should be made prior to trial. If there are disputed issues of fact, we direct the court to hold an evidentiary hearing and make factual findings, then decide the certification question prior to trial. If no disputed issues of material fact exist, the court may resolve the issue on summary judgment.