Opinion ID: 2424378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Abrams

Text: In Abrams v. State, 176 Md.App. 600, 604, 933 A.2d 887, 889 (2007), Abrams, in June 1994, pleaded guilty to three counts of uttering. During the plea colloquy, the trial judge informed Abrams that uttering entailed offering a forged instrument to obtain some benefit you are not entitled to. . . . Id.; see Maryland Code (2002), Criminal Law Article, § 8-103. Further, the record reflected that Abrams received a copy of the statement of charges, read it and understood it, and had reviewed possible defenses with his attorney. Abrams, 176 Md.App. at 604, 933 A.2d at 889-90. The trial court accepted Abrams's guilty plea and sentenced him to one-year imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. Abrams, 176 Md.App. at 605, 933 A.2d at 890. In 2005, Abrams was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base. Abrams, 176 Md.App. at 606, 933 A.2d at 890. Because of the previous uttering convictions Abrams was ineligible for a safety valve under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which could have yielded a reduced sentence. Id. Accordingly, in September 2006, Abrams filed in state court a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, arguing the 1994 guilty plea should be vacated because he was entitled to be advised of `the elements of the crime of uttering  among which is the specific intent to defraud. . . .' [and] because [he] was not adequately informed of this `critical element,' his guilty plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily. Abrams, 176 Md.App. at 619, 933 A.2d at 898. First, in Abrams, the Court of Special Appeals quoted, from Priet, the notion that [t]he Rule [731(c) then, 4-242(c) now] does not require that the precise legal elements comprising the offense be communicated to the defendant as a prerequisite to the valid acceptance of his guilty plea. Abrams, 176 Md.App. at 620-21, 933 A.2d at 899 (quoting Priet, 289 Md. at 288, 424 A.2d at 359). Next, after mentioning the presumption language in Priet (quoting Henderson ), the Court detailed the facts, holding, and rationale of Bradshaw. The intermediate appellate court, on this point, concluded: It appears . . . that the Bradshaw opinion has effected a significant restriction to the principles enunciated by the Court of Appeals in Priet. No longer can a trial judge rely on the presumption that defense counsel has sufficiently explained to the defendant the nature of the offense to which he or she is entering a guilty plea. Instead, the trial judge must either (1) explain to the defendant on the record the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime, or (2) obtain on the record a representation by defense counsel that the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he [or she] is pleading guilty. Abrams, 176 Md.App. at 622-23, 933 A.2d at 900. Notwithstanding its refusal to apply the Henderson/Priet presumption, the Court of Special Appeals found nevertheless that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, reasoning that the court's definition of uttering [`offering a forged instrument to obtain some benefit you are not entitled to'] included all of the elements of uttering, and, as such, Abrams understood the nature and elements of the charges to which he was pleading guilty. Abrams, 176 Md.App. at 624, 933 A.2d at 901-02.