Opinion ID: 773857
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence Obtained from Traffic Stop

Text: 23 Appellant also argues that the district court erred in refusing to suppress identification information obtained by Officer Kelley after a traffic stop of appellant's car on July 30, 1999. Appellant argues that the traffic stop was unlawful because it was pretextual and not based upon reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 24 While a pretexual traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment, see United States v. Eldrige, 984 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 1993), this Court has held on numerous occasions that any traffic violation, regardless of its perceived severity, provides an officer with probable cause to stop the driver. United States v. Periera-Munoz, 59 F.3d 788, 791 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir. 1993). To determine whether a traffic stop was based on probable cause or was merely pretextual, an objective reasonableness standard is applied. United States v. Miller, 20 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 1994). Once a car is lawfully stopped, the police may request the driver's license and registration. United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 1994) (a reasonable traffic stop includes asking for a license and registration). 25 In this case, Officer Kelley ran defendant's license plate information through his on-board computer and discovered that the plates were registered to a four-door car, rather than a two-door car. Officer Kelley concluded that defendant was operating an improperly registered vehicle and then stopped the vehicle. Officer Kelly next asked Jones for identification and was given a Missouri driver's license that identified defendant as Marcus D. Jones.After writing down the identification information, Officer Kelly issued Jones a warning for improper registration and for not producing proof of insurance. 26 Officer Kelley had evidence of a traffic violation and his decision to stop Jones and ask for identification was therefore objectively reasonable. The fact that Officer Kelley had previously been told by Sgt. Piester that an undercover detective was going to meet with an individual near Officer Kelly's patrol area, and that after the meeting Kelly should follow the vehicle and attempt to find probable cause to stop the vehicle and identify the driver is irrelevant. Courts are not to consider the motive for a stop as long as the reason for the stop is valid. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996); Periera-Munoz, 59 F.3d at 791 (if the officer is doing that which he is legally permitted to do and objectively authorized to do, his state of mind is irrelevant for purposes of determining the lawfulness of the stop). Here, because the reason for the stop was valid, the district court decision to deny Jones' motion to suppress the identification information obtained by Officer Kelley was not clearly erroneous.