Opinion ID: 3065761
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Intervene

Text: [6] An applicant has a right to intervene if he “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit has provided that in order for an applicant to intervene, as a right: (1) [T]he application for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must have a significantly protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must not be adequately represented by the existing parties in the lawsuit. DBSI/TRI IV Ltd. v. United States, 465 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).10 9 The district court concluded that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 statutory requirement. Lucent I, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77360, at . Neither party contests this determination. 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1) recognizes the unconditional right to intervene when such is provided by federal statute. This subsection does not apply here. 5366 DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES Both parties agree that the first three prongs of this test were satisfied in this case. Carauddo claims that he also satisfied the fourth prong because he was inadequately represented. He asserts that DFEH “litigate[s] in order to further the societal goal of ending discrimination, without regard to whether the result is the most advantageous that could be achieved on behalf of the individual victim.” This claim lacks merit. [7] “In the absence of a very compelling showing to the contrary, it will be presumed that a state adequately represents its citizens when the applicant shares the same interest.” Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[M]ere [ ] differences in [litigation] strategy . . . are not enough to justify intervention as a matter of right.” Perry, 587 F.3d at 954 (internal quotation marks omitted). Carauddo’s vague speculation falls far short of a “very compelling showing.”11 California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 443-44 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that an applicant “must demonstrate a likelihood that the government will abandon or concede a potentially meritorious” position). [8] Nor does public policy support Carauddo’s unconditional right to intervene. Although the FEHA provides that in employment discrimination cases brought by DFEH, “the person claiming to be aggrieved shall be the real party in interest and shall have the right to participate as a party and be represented by his or her own counsel,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12965(c)(2), state law cannot negate the requirement of the federal rule that Carauddo demonstrate that he is not ade11 This finding is further supported by the discussion in the previous section. See, supra Sect. (I)(B)(i). Arguably, if these parties sought drastically different remedies, there would be a greater risk of inadequate representation. See Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 209 (1st Cir. 1998) (petitioner lacks right to intervene where “no divergence of interest between the two bodies in respect to the causes of action pleaded”). This, however, is not the case. DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES 5367 quately represented by California, see Patch, 136 F.3d at 208 (providing that “[a] state statute can inform the Rule 24(a)(2) calculus, but it cannot displace the requirement that a wouldbe intervenor satisfy each of the rule’s prerequisites”).12 As Carauddo has failed to make such a showing, the district court’s denial of his motion to intervene as a right was not in error.