Opinion ID: 1709662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: applicability of the spills law

Text: ถ 47. Chrysler's argument regarding the applicability of the Spills Law to its conduct in this case revolves around our decision in Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d 288. In Mauthe, the DNR discovered evidence of hazardous substance spills near a site that had been used by Wisconsin Chromium Corporation for chrome electroplating activities since 1960. See id. at 293. The defendant Mauthe, president of Wisconsin Chromium, had purchased the site in 1966, and leased it to the corporation. Wisconsin Chromium continued to conduct chrome electroplating activities at the location until 1976, at which time the corporation dissolved and all electroplating activities ceased. At approximately the same time, Mauthe formed his own company. See id. ถ 48. Tests at and adjacent to the site revealed extensive hexavalent chromium contamination of the soil and groundwaterโa hazardous substance within the meaning of Chapter 144. See id. at 292-93. The state sought injunctive relief as well as forfeitures from Mauthe under Wis. Stat. ง 144.99 (1981-82) [20] for the violations of the Spills Law caused by chromium leakage into the soil coupled with surface water runoff and groundwater flow. See id. at 294. ถ 49. We first rejected Mauthe's argument that the definition of discharge provided in Wis. Stat. ง 144.76(1)(a) (1981-82) required some kind of human activity which results in contaminant seepage. See id. at 298. Because [w]ords such as `leaking' or `emitting' have no apparent tie to human activity and often refer to phenomena which occur absent human conduct, id., we concluded that discharge encompasses inactive waste sites from which hazardous substances are flowing. ถ 50. We then concluded that although he did not cause the hazardous substance spill, Mauthe could be held responsible for remediation of the spill because he owned the property in which the contaminated soil was located. In doing so, we rejected Mauthe's assertion that holding him liable under the Spills Law would violate the ex post facto clause of the Wisconsin Constitution since the electroplating activities ceased in 1976, prior to the statute's effective date. See id. at 300-01. We stated: [t]he action brought by the state relates only to the discharge from the contaminated soil located on his property and. . .does not relate to the activities which took place on his property prior to the statute's enactment. It is the abatement of this current discharge that the state is seeking. Therefore, this is not an ex post facto application of law. Id. at 301-02. ถ 51. Chrysler contends that the rationale of Mauthe does not apply to the current situation since Mauthe had actual possession or control of the land. In this case, Chrysler has never owned, possessed or controlled the Bark River site. We agree with this assertion. Nevertheless, Wis. Stat. ง 144.76(3) (1977) imposes liability on [p]ersons having possession of or control over a hazardous substance being discharged, or who cause a hazardous discharge. . . . (Emphasis added.) The situation presented here is different from that in Mauthe only to the extent that a different clause of the Spills Law is being used to impose liability. The State does not seek remediation and penalties from Chrysler because it possessed or controlled the hazardous substance after 1978, but only upon the theory that Chrysler caused a hazardous discharge after the Spills Law took effect. ถ 52. Therefore, to determine whether Chrysler may be held liable in this case, we must examine both the remedial and punitive segments of the Spills Law in the context of a party who is charged for causing the spill. As to remediation, we conclude that the legislature intended to apply the Spills Law retroactively. As to penalties and forfeitures, we conclude that the imposition of penalties in this case does not constitute a retroactive application of the Spills Law.