Opinion ID: 2756139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Marital Status Discrimination

Text: Skalsky next contends the district discriminated against him because of his marriage to Kirsten Skalsky in violation of Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2. In Minnesota, married persons are members of a protected group for marital status discrimination claims. Cf. Taylor v. LSI Corp. of Am., 796 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Minn. 2011). The MHRA prohibits discrimination based on the “identity, situation, actions, or beliefs of a spouse.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 24; see also id. § 363A.08, subd. 2. MHRA claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting test of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973). See Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 542 (Minn. 2001) (en banc). This requires the plaintiff first establish a “prima facie case of . . . discrimination.” McDonnell Douglas, at 802. If the plaintiff meets that burden, “[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for taking the adverse employment action. Id. If the employer does so, the plaintiff must then show the proffered reason was mere pretext for discrimination. See id. at 804. Assuming Skalsky met his initial burden, appellees have articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their decision to reassign him: reassignment was necessary after the district eliminated the primarily outdoor custodial position. Skalsky thus must “offer proof that would allow a rational fact-finder to conclude that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment action.” Yates v. Rexton, Inc., 267 F.3d 793, 800 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993)). He can do so “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). “It is not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the fact finder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.” McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140 F.3d 1123, 1128 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519). -7- Skalsky attempts to show pretext by pointing to the fact his job duties were changed shortly after his wife spoke at the school board meeting. Again, temporal proximity alone is not sufficient. See Morris v. City of Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1019-20 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he fact that a plaintiff is terminated after engaging in protected activity is not sufficient to support an inference of pretext, even though temporal proximity may sometimes be enough to get a plaintiff past the prima facie stage.”). In Morris, in addition to providing evidence of temporal proximity, the plaintiff presented evidence of his employer’s departure from its disciplinary policy and its similar treatment of his co-officer. See id. at 1020. We still found Morris had not provided sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment. See id. Skalsky adduces less evidence than we decided was insufficient in Morris. Skalsky questions appellees’ decision to assign him the outdoor duties, but simply questioning Messer’s opinion that Skalsky was the best fit for the position does not establish that appellees’ reasons for selecting him were pretext for discrimination. See Moody v. St. Charles Cnty., 23 F.3d 1410, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994) (“A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to avoid summary judgment.”). When viewed in the light most favorable to Skalsky, the evidence does not create a genuine dispute of material fact for a jury to decide.