Opinion ID: 6104768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Presence Claims

Text: Finally, Reyes argues pro se that his absence at pretrial proceedings on October 11, 2016, April 4, 2017, and August 7, 2017, violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a), the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause such that his conviction and sentence should be reversed and a new trial ordered. The Government maintains that Reyes's claims have no legal basis. Because Reyes did not object to his absence below, we review each of these claims for plain error; that is, Reyes must show, among other things, both that any error was clear or obvious and that it affected his substantial rights. United States v. Karmue, 841 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012)) (applying plain error review to claims under Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a) and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause raised for the first time on appeal); United States v. Acevedo-Maldonado, 696 F.3d 150, 155-56 (1st Cir. 2012) (same for unpreserved Confrontation Clause objections). We find no plain error. - 57 -
Reyes's statutory claim has no legal basis and fails. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 provides that a defendant must be present at: (1) the initial appearance, the initial arraignment, and the plea; (2) every trial stage, including jury impanelment and the return of the verdict; and (3) sentencing, Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)); the rule further states a defendant need not be present when '[t]he proceeding involves only a conference or hearing on a question of law,' United States v. Veloz, 948 F.3d 418, 434 n.4 (1st Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(3)); see also Karmue, 841 F.3d at 28 (holding no clear or obvious violation of Rule 43 where defendant was not present at pretrial Daubert hearing). In Reyes's case, a review of the relevant case filings reveals that the contested pre-trial proceedings from which Reyes was absent were status conferences to discuss discovery and scheduling. We, thus, find that Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 did not require Reyes to be present, and Reyes has not established that proceeding at these pre-trial hearings without him present constituted a clear or obvious error.
We, likewise, reject Reyes's presence claim lodged under the Fifth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that a defendant be allowed to be present 'to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence,' - 58 - Veloz, 948 F.3d at 435 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987)); whenever [a defendant's] presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge, he has a due process right to be present at the proceedings, United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1934)) (rejecting claim of due process violation where in camera discussion at trial did not include respondent). Here, [i]t is not clear or obvious . . . what the benefit of [Reyes]'s presence at the contested pre-trial status conferences would have been. Karmue, 841 F.3d at 27. Because Reyes has not demonstrated that his absence 'affected [his] substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings,' id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Fernández–Hernández, 652 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2011)), Reyes has not shown any error -- obvious or otherwise -- and his Fifth Amendment claim also fails.
Finally, Reyes's Sixth Amendment claim is inapposite. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause has historically applied to testimony elicited at, and evidence produced for, trial, United - 59 - States v. Mitchell-Hunter, 663 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2011), and we -- and the Supreme Court -- have thus far declined to extend the reach of the Confrontation Clause beyond trial, see, e.g., id. at 50-53 (noting that defendant d[id] not point to a single case extending the right to confrontation beyond the context of trial); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–56 (2004) (extending right to confrontation only to declarants whose statements are offered at trial). Reyes's presence claims concern only his absence at pre-trial proceedings and he offers no arguments as to why we should extend the reach of the Confrontation Clause beyond trial in this case. Moreover, even if we were to extend the right to confrontation here, such a right would be inapplicable as Reyes points to no evidence that was offered against him at these proceedings; indeed, such pre-trial status conferences would not present an opportunity to do so. Here too, Reyes has failed to show plain error. Accordingly, we decline to reverse Reyes's conviction and sentence and to order a new trial because he was not present at three of the pre-trial court dates.