Opinion ID: 883657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony used to bolster victim's credibility.

Text: Relying on Dannels, Stuart argues that a person may not bolster his or her credibility and explain inconsistent statements were made because he or she suffered from the battered woman syndrome. In Dannels, the defendant was charged with deliberate homicide in connection with the death of her husband. When the police questioned her about the incident, Dannels told the police that she received the bruises during the course of an attack by robbers who broke into their motel room, assaulted her, and killed her husband. However, later examination by a physician revealed that the bruises were old injuries and could not have been sustained on the night in question. Dannels, 734 P.2d at 191. At trial, Dannels sought to introduce evidence concerning the battered woman syndrome to explain why she lied to the police about the origin of her bruises. This Court acknowledged that such evidence could be used to prove that the defendant did not have the requisite state of mind to commit the offense in accordance with § 46-14-102, MCA. However, we held that the evidence was inadmissible because it was being offered for the purpose of bolstering the defendant's credibility. Dannels, 734 P.2d at 192-93. However, the purpose for which evidence of the syndrome was sought to be introduced in Dannels is distinguishable. In Dannels, the criminal defendant sought to introduce evidence of the battered woman's syndrome to bolster her credibility. She did not offer the evidence in support of her own self defense theory. In the instant case, the evidence was offered by the prosecution, to provide an understanding as to why the complaining witness might recant her earlier statement that she suffered abuse at the hands of her spouse. The overwhelming trend of other jurisdictions is to allow evidence regarding the battered woman syndrome. Expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome is accepted in at least thirty-one states. Bechtel v. State (Okl.Cr. 1992), 840 P.2d 1, 7. The battered woman syndrome is the term used to define the common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371. Because the average juror might not have experience or knowledge about the battered woman syndrome, expert testimony is used to explain recantation by the complaining witness. The relevance of battered woman syndrome evidence has been aptly described as follows: A battered woman may act in ways that are incomprehensible to the average person. She may tolerate physical abuse for years, hide her abuse, delay reporting even severe abuse to authorities or friends, or recant and attempt to have charges against her abuser dropped. Consequently, when the state's key witness, the battered woman, testifies against her batterer, she may appear to be fabricating her story. If the jury does not understand why the woman behaved in this manner, it will be unable to assess the evidence correctly. Thus, when a batterer is prosecuted, the state needs expert testimony to educate the jury about battered women in order to enable the jury to determine the facts in issue. (Footnotes omitted.) Schroeder, Using Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Prosecution of a Batterer, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 553 (1991). Jurisdictions which have approved battered woman syndrome evidence to explain a victim's recantations do so on the basis that the expert's testimony would provide a reasonable explanation for the victim's recantation. State v. Bednarz (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), 507 N.W.2d 168; State v. Borrelli (Conn. 1993), 629 A.2d 1105; Arcoren v. U.S. (8th Cir.1991), 929 F.2d 1235. In Bednarz, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained: The battered woman's syndrome is recognized as a subcategory of posttraumatic stress disorder. While there are various possible explanations for [the victim's] recantation, one explanation could be that the recantation is consistent with this form of posttraumatic stress disorder. An untrained lay person does not know that recantation can be suggestive of posttraumatic stress in the form of the battered woman's syndrome. The expert opinion was thus permissible to enlighten the jury and allow it to intelligently consider the syndrome as one possible explanation for [the victim's] behavior. Bednarz, 507 N.W.2d at 172; see also, State v. Riker (Wash. 1994), 869 P.2d 43, 47 [the battered woman syndrome] is considered a subset of post-traumatic stress disorder... . Expert testimony in Montana is governed by Rule 702, M.R.Evid., which provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Here, Stuart is not contesting the general admissibility of evidence regarding the battered woman syndrome, rather, he asserts that it cannot be used to bolster a witness' credibility. It is well established that an expert cannot be allowed to comment on the credibility of an alleged victim. State v. Harris (1991), 247 Mont. 405, 409-10, 808 P.2d 453, 455; State v. Brodniak (1986), 221 Mont. 212, 222, 718 P.2d 322, 329. The reason for this rule is that the question of credibility lies within the province of the jury, and expert testimony regarding credibility invades the jury's function by placing a stamp of scientific legitimacy on the victim's allegations. Harris, 808 P.2d at 455. However, in this case, the evidence was not offered to bolster Kathy's testimony, but to provide the jury with an explanation for the inconsistencies in her testimony. Furthermore, the expert did not comment as to which of Kathy's statements were more credible or offer an opinion on whether Kathy is a battered spouse. Rather, she merely provided the jury with information to aid the jury in evaluating the evidence. This type of limited testimony does not invade the jury's role in determining the credibility of witnesses. Arcoren, 929 F.2d at 1241. While we hold that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome should generally be admissible, in this case, the State failed to lay an appropriate foundation establishing that Kathy was a battered spouse. Therefore, testimony about how battered women act was irrelevant and should not have been admitted. Dr. Lenore Walker, a psychologist who was preeminent in developing the battered woman syndrome, explains in her book, The Battered Woman (1979) [1] , that the violence inherent in a battering relationship is not random, but follows an identifiable cycle. The battering cycle has three distinct phases: the tension building phase; the explosion or acute battering phase; and the calm, loving respite (often called the honeymoon phase). During the first phase, minor battering incidents may occur. The woman attempts to minimize the incidents and calm the batterer to prevent the violence from escalating. As tension increases, it becomes more difficult for the coping techniques to work, which escalates into the second stage, the battering incident. This stage is characterized by the uncontrollable nature of the abuse (injury, brutality and sometimes death). The battering incident is followed by the third phase where the couple makes up. During this phase, the batterer exhibits loving and caring behavior and typically begs for forgiveness and promises the battering will never happen again. Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman 56-70 (1979). Dr. Walker also explains that in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman xv (1979). Many jurisdictions considering the admissibility of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome require proof that the witness was the victim of two cycles of abuse. See for example State v. Koss (Ohio 1990), 551 N.E.2d 970; State v. Borrelli (Conn. 1993), 629 A.2d 1105; Bechtel v. State (1992), (Okl.Cr. 1992), 840 P.2d 1. It follows then that there first must be evidence of a battered victim before expert testimony on the syndrome may be admitted. Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 974, a defendant attempting to admit expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome must offer evidence which establishes herself as a `battered woman.' See also Borrelli, 629 A.2d at 1115 n. 15. While we decline to set hard and fast foundational requirements, preferring instead, to leave those to the sound discretion of the trial court on a case by case basis, the party seeking to introduce battered woman syndrome evidence must lay an appropriate foundation substantiating that the conduct and behavior of the witness is consistent with the generally recognized symptoms of the battered woman syndrome, and that the witness has behaved in such a manner that the jury would be aided by expert testimony which provides a possible explanation for the behavior. It also is important to re-emphasize that the expert may not testify to or comment upon the credibility of the witness. Since the evidentiary foundation will likely involve offering other acts evidence showing prior completed cycles of abuse, counsel seeking to introduce battered spouse syndrome evidence must file the appropriate notice according to State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957, as modified in State v. Matt (1991), 249 Mont. 136, 814 P.2d 52. If the court determines that the proffered other acts evidence is not admissible under the tests established in Just and Matt, the court may nevertheless, hear the foundation testimony outside the presence of the jury and appropriately limit the testimony presented to the jury. In the instant case, the State did not file a modified Just notice, and was therefore precluded from offering other acts testimony. Moreover, at trial, the State failed to demonstrate that Kathy was the victim of prior cycles of abuse. Accordingly, we hold that the expert's testimony should have been excluded because the State failed to lay an appropriate foundation for the expert's testimony by establishing or offering any evidence that Kathy was a battered spouse.