Opinion ID: 65337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reimbursement for Pendency Placement

Text: Our previous discussion leads to our affirming the award of $16,125.30 to reimburse V.P. for the payments to the Parish School for the 2004-2005 school year. Our last issue is whether HISD must make the same payment for the 2005-2006 school year. In ruling on the cross motions for summary judgment on the 2005-2006 reimbursement issue, the court again fully adopted the magistrate judge's findings. We will refer to the findings as those of the district court. The components of this last issue and the order in which we will discuss them are these: (1) what relevance to the second year's reimbursement is the Texas Education Agency's decision that the Parish School was the appropriate placement, (2) how was the issue of the second year's reimbursement raised, opposed, and resolved, and (3) was the issue properly resolved?
The IDEA provides that during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child.... 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). The Supreme Court held that an administrative decision in favor of parents who had placed their child in a private school after they rejected a proposed IEP constitutes an agreement by the state to the change of the child's placement, making the new, private school placement the current educational placement of the child. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 371-72, 105 S.Ct. 1996. Accordingly, by force of Supreme Court opinion and federal regulation, the decision by the Texas Education Agency hearing officer on February 10, 2005, was an agreement between HISD and V.P.'s parents that the Parish School was the appropriate placement. The agreement lasts for the pendency of the review of the administrative decision. The regulation does not state that a parent needs to file for a court order declaring the alternative placement to be the correct one. Instead, unless the parents and school district agree otherwise, the Parish School by operation of law is the proper placement. Id. Our case law is consistent with this interpretation. We have addressed related issues that arise when parents seek to have the public school district pay the costs of the private school pending the final review of the merits. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana, 142 F.3d 776, 785 (5th Cir.1998). In that case, as here, the state administrative process resulted in an order that a private placement was appropriate because the public school education was inadequate. Id. at 780. The administrative process ended in April of a school year, and the administrative ruling was that the entire school year should be paid for by the public school. Id. Also as here, the school district filed an appeal in district court. That appeal was filed also in April. Unlike here, the parents in June counterclaimed for compensation for the next school year. Id. at 781. Such a counterclaim is what HISD argued and the district judge accepted had to be made here, but it never was. The St. Tammany parents sought an order declaring the private school placement to be the correct one, and requiring payments for the next school year to be made by the public school district. In August, as the new school year was beginning, the district court granted the parents their requested relief. Id. The district court's ruling was immediately appealed. Id. We concluded that a stay-put order qualifies as a collateral order for purposes of interlocutory appeal because it conclusively determines a student's pendency placement and the tuition reimbursement rights associated with such placement. Id. at 781-82. In support of this holding, we cited a case from another circuit that found resolution of pendency-placement issues to be completely separate from the merits issues which focus on adequacy of the proposed IEP; and the propriety of the pendent placement and the concomitant financial responsibility are not effectively reviewable on appeal of a decision on the merits. Id. at 782 (citing Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 81 n. 4 (3d Cir.1996)); see also Mackey ex rel. Thomas M. v. Bd. of Educ. for the Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 158, 160 (2d Cir.2004) (A claim for tuition reimbursement pursuant to the stay-put provision is evaluated independently from the evaluation of a claim for tuition reimbursement pursuant to the inadequacy of an IEP.). In St. Tammany, the district court ordered payment for tuition and other costs for the school year just starting. We affirmed. The Third Circuit case on which we relied also reviewed such a district court order. Susquenita Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d at 85. In that case, the school district appealed the administrative decision to the district court and filed for a stay of the requirement that it reimburse the parents for the private school placement. The district court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that the school district was required to pay for the child's private school placement from the point of the administrative decision forward; it also held that the school district may be required to pay for tuition and expenses associated with a pendent placement prior to the conclusion of the litigation. Id. at 84. The court explained that [t]he purpose of the Act ... is not advanced by requiring parents, who have succeeded in obtaining a ruling that a proposed IEP is inadequate, to front the funds for continued private education. Id. at 86-87. What is of particular importance for our issue is that the court considered the right to continuing payments to be automatic from the district court's decision that the private school would be the current educational placement: This holding also effectively decided the reimbursement question in favor of Raelee's parents. Id. at 80. That sentence was followed by a footnote, which concluded that once reimbursement for the first year was found to be appropriate, payments for continuing the private school placement were proper while proceedings under the statute were pending: The order encompassed reimbursement for expenses incurred in the 1994-1995 academic year. By adopting the appeals panel holding that the private school was the appropriate placement pending a contrary judicial order, Order # 1 also effectively made Susquenita financially responsible for continuing the private school placement. Order # 1 thus decided both reimbursement for and prospective payment of private school tuition. Id. at 81 n. 3. As the Supreme Court held, public payment of expenses of the current education placement flows from the child's right to a free appropriate public education under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370, 105 S.Ct. 1996 (emphasis in original). Reimbursement forces a school district to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP. Id. at 370-71, 105 S.Ct. 1996. Burlington did not involve paying for costs during the pendency of the litigation. Neither were we in St. Tammany faced with deciding the propriety of such payments because the state did not contest that legal issue. St. Tammany, 142 F.3d at 783. Our issue today is almost the opposite: do parents forfeit the right to receive reimbursements for the costs of the private placement, which by operation of law is the current educational placement during the pendency of the litigation, if they do not ask for funding at the beginning of a school year? In answering that question, we examine the arguments as to why the right to reimbursement for the education that is supposed to be free has been forfeited here. The district court denied reimbursement for V.P.'s second school year almost exclusively because of the lack of notice to HISD that anyone was contemplating asking for payment. It is true that V.P. did not amend her pleadings specifically to request reimbursement. Soon after the second school year ended, she did seek to supplement the record with the new bills. Even without any filings by V.P., notice existed as a matter of law that the Parish School was the current educational placement until an agreement to the contrary or an end to the litigation was reached. Relevant here is an issue still unresolved in this circuit, namely, if an order is entered that requires the public school district to pay for the private school during the pendency of the proceedings, will the parents have to refund the money if the private placement is later found to have been improper? See St. Tammany, 142 F.3d at 788 (stating, we do not reach, nor do we express an opinion on, whether the State defendants are entitled under IDEA to reimbursement if the private placement is held to have been unnecessary). We still do not need to resolve that point, but the issue highlights a choice for a child's parents. They can request payment-as-they-go, but they may have to refund that money if they lose on the merits. Or, they can continue to pay for the private placement until such time as there is a final decision on the merits. Many parents will not have a choice, as the private school will be beyond their financial means. When there is a choice, the parents do not need to seek prospective relief, which under St. Tammany is an appealable order. They may instead ask for costs of the pendency placement to be made an award at the end of the litigation. That does not mean, though, that the parents can wait until the end of the litigation to make the request. We address that issue below. HISD counters that had it known V.P. would seek reimbursement for the 2005-2006 school year, it could have proposed an alternative placement. For example, in an effort to avoid paying for a second year of V.P.'s Parish School costs, HISD could have attempted to develop a new IEP that corrected the deficiencies found by the due process hearing officer. Furthermore, HISD alleges it could have suggested an alternative placement at one of its schools, such as at the Sutton Elementary oral deaf program. HISD alleges V.P.'s delay kept it from appealing any intermediate order regarding the child's proper placement during the pendency of the district court proceedings. HISD's position does not take into consideration that the Parish School was the proper placement for 2005-2006. We find useful guidance for HISD in St. Tammany. There, soon after the order was entered that the private school was the current education placement, the school district moved to require a new IEP conference to determine how the public school could meet the child's needs. Id. The district court denied the motion. A similar motion by HISD is at least one way the issue of changing V.P.'s placement could have proceeded. Perhaps HISD did not know until the 2005-2006 school year was over that V.P. would actually request reimbursement, but it constructively knew that by operation of law, the Parish School was the continuing proper placement for the child and that HISD might be requested to pay for it. The moving party for ending the current educational placement at the Parish School and the concomitant, but as yet unasserted, financial reimbursement potential needed to be HISD. It is also important that after the date of Burlington, St. Tammany, and the Third Circuit Susquenita opinion, the U.S. Department of Education adopted the regulation that expresses the effect of the final order in the administrative proceedings that a private placement is proper. Effective on March 12, 1999, a slightly different phrasing of what is now 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(d) was promulgated. It stated that when the decision of a State review official in an administrative appeal agrees with the child's parents that a change of placement is appropriate, that placement must be treated as an agreement between the State or local agency and the parents for purposes of paragraph (a) of this section. 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(c) (as adopted by 64 Fed.Reg. 12418 (Mar. 12, 1999)). The referenced paragraph (a) is similar to Section 300.518(a), the earlier version stating that the child during the pendency of any administrative or judicial proceeding ... must remain in his or her current education placement. Id. § 300.514(a). It is true that in St. Tammany, the district court had ordered that the private school be considered the current educational placement. 142 F.3d at 781. There was no holding in St. Tammany that such an order was needed. We conclude that Section 300.518 makes that kind of order superfluous. A correlation between a private school's being the current educational placement and the public school's responsibility to fund it, is found in the IDEA: (B) Children placed in, or referred to, private schools by public agencies (i) In general. Children with disabilities in private schools and facilities are provided special education and related services, in accordance with an individualized education program, at no cost to their parents, if such children are placed in, or referred to, such schools or facilities by the State or appropriate local educational agency as the means of carrying out the requirements of this subchapter.... ... (C) Payment for education of children enrolled in private schools without consent of or referral by the public agency ... (ii) Reimbursement for private school placement. If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(b). These provisions allow a hearing officer to require reimbursement of private school costs when a free appropriate public education has not been made available. Burlington and Section 300.518 transform a hearing officer's order adopting a private placement into an agreement that the private school is necessary to carry out the requirements of the IDEA. That placement is at no cost to the parents of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i). Pendency-placement issues are separate from the merits to the extent they can be decided prior to and without regard to the merits issues. We have noted that V.P.'s parents had a choice to request payments during the pendency of the litigation, or to forgo payment-as-they-go and await the conclusion of the merits case. Intentionally or otherwise, the request was not made until the end of the second school year. V.P. did not seek payments pending the litigation. Not raising this separate issue at the earliest opportunity does not by itself prevent receiving reimbursement for relevant school years at the end of the litigation. We have examined with some care the case law and regulations. Two events are crucial in our analysis. The first is the decision by a hearing officer for the Texas Education Agency that the Parish School was an appropriate placement for V.P. The second was the affirmance of that decision on appeal. Those two events having occurred, V.P.'s parents were entitled to have their costs at the Parish School reimbursedabsent any default in requesting them, an issue we discuss below. Valid costs for a private school placement may be reimbursed at the end of litigation in which the parents prevail without regard to whether an order for payment during the pendency of the proceedings is sought. The costs will be the relevant ones during the time period that begins with the school year for which the district is ultimately found not to have proposed a placement reasonably calculated to provide a free appropriate public education. The period ends with the conclusion of the litigation. A school district may be able to seek, as occurred in St. Tammany, to change the educational placement during the pendency of the litigation. Whatever steps that involves certainly need not be addressed now. Without such a change, the obligation for the proper public entities to pay for the private school exists. Our holding does not resolve the issue of whether parents do not even need to ask for reimbursement. We now turn to just how the issue of reimbursement for a second year was injected in the appeal to the district court.
On February 10, 2005, the Texas Education Agency hearing officer declared the IEP to be inadequate. The Parish School was found to be an appropriate placement. V.P.'s parents were awarded payment for all of their daughter's 2004-2005 relevant expenses at the Parish School. On May 10, 2005, HISD filed an appeal in district court. On June 9, 2005, V.P. filed her answer and counterclaim, appealing the Hearing Officer's decisions on the issues for which she did not prevail at the due process hearing. This pleading did not include a claim for reimbursement for V.P.'s 2005-2006 placement at the Parish School. During a September 8, 2005 Rule 16 scheduling hearing, V.P. first informed the court that she intended to introduce evidence in addition to the administrative record for the district court's consideration on appeal. V.P. did not explain what additional evidence she intended to introduce and did not explain that the additional evidence pertained to V.P.'s 2005-2006 Parish School placement. HISD stated that it opposed the entry of additional evidence and that the case should be decided solely on the administrative record. On June 9, 2006, exactly a year after V.P. filed her answer, V.P. filed a motion to submit additional evidence in which she indicated that she intended to introduce reimbursement evidence regarding the costs of V.P.'s placement at the Parish School for the 2005-2006 school year. In a June 20, 2006 response, HISD objected to the motion, arguing that the only issue before the court was the correctness of the Hearing Officer's decision regarding the 2004-2005 school year, and the 2005-2006 private school bills were irrelevant to that issue. The case was eventually reassigned to a new district judge who requested a status report from the parties. In that report, V.P. again indicated that she needed to submit additional evidence regarding reimbursement for the 2005-2006 school year. On July 6, 2006, V.P. filed a supplemental motion to submit additional evidence. In this motion, V.P. alleged that the Parish School was the proper placement for V.P. during the pendency of HISD's appeal, and accordingly, V.P. [was] entitled to an automatic injunction providing her with reimbursement for the placement during the appeal, and until such time as HISD offers her an appropriate placement. HISD responded that V.P. was belatedly attempting to amend her complaint to assert a new claim for relief under the guise of a request to introduce additional evidence and that pendency placement had not been made an issue in the case. In a reply brief, V.P. contended that the right to reimbursement for ongoing tuition at the Parish School is automatic and is merely a continuation of the issues decided by the administrative hearing officer. V.P. further stated that reimbursement of the pendency placement is actually a cost which [she] is entitled to if she prevails in this matter and that HISD has not demonstrated that it was surprised or prejudiced by the pendency reimbursement claim. On August 9, 2006, the magistrate judge conducted a hearing regarding, among other things, V.P.'s motion to submit additional evidence. There were two items of evidence. One was a new affidavit from an expert, and the other were bills for the second school year. At the hearing, V.P. argued that the 2005-2006 Parish School bills were just an extension of the hearing officer's order and should be considered as a cost issue if the court decides to uphold that decision. The magistrate judge initially indicated she would deny V.P.'s request to submit the bills. Later in the hearing, in response to argument, the magistrate judge delayed decision until a future date, saying yes, if this goes your way, yeah, we'll consider that, but right now to keep amending to put the school bills in, you know, you haven't won yet. And we'll cross that bridge when it comes to it. The magistrate judge and counsel for HISD then engaged in the following exchange: THE COURT: I mean it seems to me that if you lose and the hearing officer's decision is implemented, HISD is going to have to pay those bills, right? And we will have to know what they are. HISD COUNSEL: Well, irrespective I don't necessarily agree to that, but irrespective of that, in terms of the [c]ourt's time... it makes more sense for you to rule on the motion for summary judgment because if you rule for me, those issues will be moot ... and we won't have to touch on them. If you rule on all that stuff now, you may be making rulings that you won't have to make. THE COURT: Right. On March 2, 2007, the magistrate judge recommended granting in part and denying in part HISD's motion for summary judgment. With respect to the 2005-2006 Parish School costs, the memorandum explained that [a]lthough [V.P.] requests reimbursement for the costs of the Parish School during the pendency of this review, she did not move for summary judgment on that issue. The court refrains from addressing that matter at this time. On March 22, 2007, the district judge entered an order adopting the recommendation. The magistrate judge then ordered HISD and V.P. to file cross motions for summary judgment on the 2005-2006 reimbursement issue. On September 11, 2007, the magistrate judge recommended the denial of reimbursement for the 2005-2006 Parish School placement. The judge concluded that V.P.'s late mention of additional and ongoing education costs at the Parish School does not properly meet the requisite timing and form necessary to put [HISD] on notice of the 2005-2006 reimbursement claim. The judge also held that the failure to add this claim to the pleadings meant it could not be awarded as appropriate relief under the IDEA without ignoring the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, the magistrate judge concluded that reimbursement for the 2005-2006 school year under the IDEA's stay put provision would be collateral to the court's review of the hearing officer's decision on the merits. [5] The district judge adopted the magistrate judge's memorandum and recommendation on October 4, 2007, over V.P.'s objections.
This review of the procedural history reveals that V.P. raised the issue of reimbursement for the second school year by a motion to introduce additional evidence. The motion was filed one year after her answer and counterclaim, a month or so after the second school year ended, and one year before final judgment. She never moved to amend the answer and counterclaim. Despite the intricacies of the federal statutes we are applying, the usual pleading rules remain relevant. The appeal by HISD to the district court started a lawsuit. An answer and counterclaim were filed, seeking certain relief. The request for prospective payments for the second school year could easily have been made in the initial pleadings by V.P. in district court. Or, a motion for leave to amend could later have been made when the school year was over, seeking reimbursement. Amendments to pleadings are to be allowed when justice so requires.... Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Because no amendment was ever requested, the justice of such a motion is not before us. V.P. maintains that her request in her counterclaim that the district court uphold the hearing officer's decision was sufficient to raise her right to reimbursement for the 2005-2006 Parish School placement. Under the stay-put or pendency-placement provision of the IDEA, V.P. argues that she became eligible for reimbursement for the 2005-2006 Parish School tuition once the placement for 2004-2005 was upheld. Under her theory, she did not need to file a specific pleading or bring a separate action asserting a claim for pendency-placement reimbursement to obtain such relief. HISD argues that it would be prejudicial to require pendency-placement reimbursement without a timely and explicit claim for such relief. If V.P. had sought an order from the hearing officer or the district court regarding the 2005-2006 pendency placement, HISD alleges it would have had an opportunity to propose an alternative placement or appeal the pendency-placement order. We have already addressed the latter points, and have found no merit to them. As to what was required in V.P.'s pleading, we note that the remedies a federal court may bring to bear are not constrained by a litigant's prayer for relief; rather, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure command the federal courts to grant relief that complainants do not demand when such relief is appropriate. Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 448 (5th Cir.2002); see also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 708 F.2d 991, 1000 (5th Cir.1983) (Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a judgement shall grant the relief to which a party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded this relief in his pleadings.  (emphasis in original)). The district court apparently determined that a request for a second year's reimbursement did not concern the nature of relief, but was a claim of a separate injury. Some decisions under the IDEA have held that general prayers for relief are insufficient to raise claims for reimbursement of school expenses that were not explicitly made. The magistrate judge cited some of these in denying recovery of the second school year's expenses. E.g., Lillbask v. Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2005). We do not decide whether reimbursement for a second year is a new claim or whether it is additional relief on the existing claim. We turn instead to the effect of the magistrate judge's statements at one hearing, and HISD's responses. Regardless of whether a claim for a second year should have been the subject of amended pleadings, V.P. argues that the magistrate judge's ruling on the motion to supplement the record indicated the question of reimbursement for a second year was tied to the not-yet-made decision on whether to affirm the Texas Education Agency's decision that the Parish School was the proper placement. As we have discussed, the magistrate judge on August 9, 2006, stated that if the decision as to the Parish School placement goes your way,... we'll consider the bills for the second year. The judge did not see a reason for the parents to keep amending to put the school bills into the record as they were received. Instead, we'll cross that bridge when it comes to it. Even more pointedly, the judge then stated that if the hearing officer's decision is implemented, HISD is going to have to pay those bills, right? HISD's attorney immediately indicated that he did not necessarily agree to that, but that in terms of the court's time, it makes more sense for you to rule on the motion for summary judgment [and hold that HISD provided an appropriate education,] because if you rule for me, those issues will be moot. The magistrate judge agreed. At that point, the magistrate judge was finding that the only predicate for reimbursement of appropriate expenses from the second year was that the administrative decision be affirmed. This ruling in no manner suggested that another predicate was an amendment to the answer and counterclaim. An order was entered on August 9, 2006, reflecting the rulings made at the hearing. It stated only this: Arguments heard on the record. Docket Entries Nos. 16, 21, and 28 are granted. Docket Entry No. 20, 26, and 34 are granted in part and denied in part as stated on the record. Docket Entry 20 was V.P.'s request to submit an affidavit from a new expert and cost bills for attending the Parish School during the pendency of the appeal. To grant and deny that motion as stated on the record, was a decision that the expert's affidavit would be admitted, and that the bills for the second year would not be at that time. We also interpret the order, though, to mean that the bills would likely be admissible if the hearing officer's decision was upheld. So as of August 9, 2006, V.P. had reason to proceed on the basis that appropriate expenses for the 2005-2006 school year would be reimbursed if the hearing officer's decision was affirmed. There was no suggestion from the magistrate judge that any amendment to the pleadings was needed. Subsequent steps were taken that were consistent with this understanding. On March 22, 2007, the district court approved the magistrate judge's recommendation that the Parish School was the appropriate placement. In the same set of findings, the magistrate judge decided that there was not enough evidence in the record to determine whether all the submitted costs for the private school should be reimbursed. Because V.P. had not moved for summary judgment on reimbursement during the pendency of the review, the issue was explicitly left for another time. On the same date as the district court's sustaining of the earlier magistrate judge's recommendation, the magistrate judge entered a new order as to reimbursement. The fact that V.P. had requested additional compensation for the continued placement during the appeal was noted. No suggestion of any pleading defect was indicated, and instead this was stated: In order for the court to determine the proper amount of relief, the court must determine whether other, more suitable substitute placements existed, whether the parents expended sufficient effort in securing an alternative placement, whether the school district cooperated with the parents on the child's placement, and whether the parents are entitled to reimbursement for the period of appeal. Cf. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir.1986) (listing factors to consider in determining whether parents are entitled to full reimbursement for the cost of private school enrollment). The court has determined that the record must be developed further, as to both facts and law, before the court can exercise its discretion in determining the amount to be awarded. The Alamo Heights precedent concerned whether the costs of a program should be reimbursed, even if the program was not necessitated by the IDEA: Factors that the court may consider in determining whether full or partial reimbursement is in order would include the existence of other, perhaps more suitable, substitute placements, the effort expended by Mrs. G. in securing alternative placements, and the general cooperative or uncooperative position of the School District itself. Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d at 1161. Here, the appropriateness of the Parish School placement had been resolved, but specific items of costs could have been subject to disagreement. The parties were ordered to attempt reaching an agreement on the reimbursement amount. Absent agreement, an evidentiary hearing would be held. By July 20, 2007, the parties had agreed that $16,125.30 was the appropriate amount of reimbursement for 2004-2005, and if reimbursement were found appropriate, also for 2005-2006. HISD, in a motion filed on that date, argued that V.P.'s failure ever to amend her pleadings to request reimbursement for a second year barred its consideration. In a response, V.P. argued that HISD's position was inconsistent with what had been known at least since the June 20, 2006 motion to supplement the record, namely, that reimbursement for the second year was being sought. V.P. argued that HISD had introduced a new objection by alleging an absence of pleadings. The original objection to the motion to supplement back on June 20, 2006, was that V.P. needed to go through the administrative process again for the second year, and that the appeal of the validity of the hearing officer's decision in no way affected the payment of costs for another year. As we have discussed above, neither of those defenses was valid. Because of Burlington and the federal regulations, the hearing officer's decision made the Parish School the agreed proper placement during the pendency of the appeal. The appeal was very much the place in which these issues could be resolved, not a second administrative proceeding. The district court found that payment for the 2005-2006 Parish School costs could be awarded under authority to grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.... 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). The court declined to do so, even saying that it could not do so, because of V.P.'s failure adequately and timely to raise the pendency placement issue. We disagree with that ruling. Because HISD was on notice no later than the August 9, 2006 hearing that V.P.'s request for reimbursement of the second year might well rise or fall on whether the hearing officer's decision was upheld, a linkage made by the magistrate judge in the oral ruling, there was no fatal flaw in the pleadings. In effect, there was ruling as of August 2006 that ignored any issue of pleadings and made the subsequent viability of the claim dependent on other factors. We do not overlook that more clarity could have been given to this point by both the magistrate judge and by V.P.'s attorney. We have had to piece together statements from the hearing and in the brief written order. Yet those shortcomings are far less significant than the denial of the claim in the face of these facts: (1) clear indications by the magistrate judge in August 2006 when the issue was first addressed that the only question was whether the administrative decision was ultimately affirmed, (2) HISD's knowledge at least since August 2006 that reimbursement for a second year was being sought, and (3) under the regulations and Burlington, HISD could not avoid responsibility for the pendency placement if the hearing officer's decision was affirmed. By the time of the decision by the magistrate judge on September 11, 2007, that same judge no longer saw the issue as she had thirteen months earlier. Certainly, any interim order may be altered at any time before final judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). We find it to have been an abuse of discretion, though, to reverse the earlier course on the issue of pleadings. HISD had for that entire time been fully aware of V.P.'s pursuit of the second year's reimbursement, even if it would not relinquish its disagreement with the magistrate judge's earlier indications that costs of a second year depended strictly on affirming the propriety of the first year. There was no lack of notice to HISD. By operation of the precedents and federal regulations, HISD had notice of a legal obligation. By operation of the understandings arising from the August 9, 2006 hearing, there was notice that V.P. was seeking reimbursement for a second year and payment was dependent on the Texas Education Agency hearing officer's decision being affirmed. The parties stipulated that if reimbursement for a second year became due, the proper amount would be $16,125.30. We reverse the refusal to award reimbursement for the second year at the Parish School and render judgment for the amount agreed to by the parties.