Opinion ID: 2324370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Brown v. Texas Factors

Text: [¶ 10] The requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable reflects the Framers' recognition `that searches and seizures were too valuable to law enforcement to prohibit them entirely' but that `they should be slowed down.' Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment: Its History and Interpretation § 11.1 at 466 (2008) (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 75, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)). Accordingly, when the State points to a public concern to justify the reasonableness of a search or seizure, courts must consider the gravity of that public concern in the context of the constitutionally-protected right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637. [¶ 11] As noted above, the investigation of serious crimes has been deemed sufficiently important to outweigh certain interferences with the liberty interests of stopped motorists. For example, we concluded that the public concern in the investigation of a recently-committed burglary was sufficiently grave to outweigh the interference with a motorist's liberty interest when the motorist was stopped briefly at a roadblock for questioning about the burglary. State v. Gorneault, 2007 ME 49, ¶¶ 2, 9, 918 A.2d 1207, 1208, 1209. Our reasoning in Gorneault mirrored the Supreme Court's approach in Lidster, in which the public concern related to the investigation of a fatal hit-and-run accident was sufficiently grave to outweigh the interference with a motorist's liberty interest when he was stopped at a roadblock for questioning about the accident. 540 U.S. at 422, 427, 124 S.Ct. 885. Similarly, other courts have concluded that the investigation of serious crimes can be deemed sufficiently urgent and important to justify warrantless seizures of motorists in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion, including investigations of a robbery, see Gipson v. State, 268 S.W.3d 185, 188-89 (Tex.App.2008), an armed robbery, see Baxter v. State, 274 Ark. 539, 626 S.W.2d 935, 936, 937 (1982), and the repeated discharge of a firearm, threatening personal injury, see Williamson v. United States, 607 A.2d 471, 477 (D.C.1992). [¶ 12] In contrast, the investigation of noncriminal offenses is generally not a sufficiently grave public concern to outweigh the interference with a motorist's liberty interest that occurs when the motorist is stopped without any reasonable articulable suspicion. [3] See, e.g., State v. Ryland, 241 Neb. 74, 486 N.W.2d 210, 213-14 (1992). [¶ 13] In this case, the trooper was investigating a noncriminal speeding offense. [4] In contrast with the burglary investigation considered in Gorneault or the serious crimes considered in Gipson, Baxter, and Williamson, the civil speeding infraction that led the trooper to stop La-Plante did not present a matter of grave public concern.
[¶ 14] Courts have recognized that motorist stops may significantly advance the investigation of serious crimes in cases where motorists are stopped soon after the crime and in the vicinity where the crime occurred because the stopped motorists might well have been in the vicinity of the crime at the time it occurred. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427, 124 S.Ct. 885; see also Gorneault, 2007 ME 49, ¶¶ 2, 9, 918 A.2d at 1208, 1209 (concluding that a roadblock significantly advanced a burglary investigation because it was set up within two hours of the burglary, in the same area in which it was committed); Gipson, 268 S.W.3d at 189 (concluding that a motorist stop significantly advanced a robbery investigation when the motorists were stopped in the same parking lot where the suspects were last seen); Baxter, 626 S.W.2d at 937 (concluding that a motorist stop significantly advanced a robbery investigation when the motorist was the sole person in the park one-quarter mile from the robbery, where the robber likely fled); Williamson, 607 A.2d at 475, 478 (concluding that an investigatory motorist stop was reasonable, when the motorist was in one of two cars from which gun shots were heard, and the other car sped off). [¶ 15] Unlike a motorist who witnesses a hit-and-run accident or a robbery, the average motorist who witnesses noncriminal speeding is unlikely to take much notice of it because it is a common occurrence. In a national survey, about eighty percent of all drivers reported speeding within the past month, and about one-third reported speeding on the day of the interview. See National Forum on Speeding, Strategies for Reducing Speeding-Related Fatalities & Injuries, Summary Report 2 (2005), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/ people/injury/enforce/NatForumSpeeding/ images/SpeedingForum.pdf. Because speeding is common, the likelihood that the average motorist will be able to assist law enforcement with a speeding investigation is not great. Therefore, although in this case LaPlante did in fact observe and remember the red Pontiac, as a general matter, stopping motorists who are potential witnesses to other motorists' civil speeding infractions will not significantly advance the investigation by law enforcement officials of speeding violations.
[¶ 16] The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's reasonable desire for privacy, which arises from the right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Every traffic stop involves some degree of interference with that liberty interest because the motorist, whether law-abiding or not, loses the freedom to travel without interruption. The resulting intrusion on a person's individual autonomy is not insubstantial. In his testimony, the trooper agreed that once he initiated his stop of LaPlante's motorcycle by activating the blue lights of his cruiser, LaPlante was obligated to pull over, was not free to leave, and was seized for [all] effective purposes. See Brewer, 1999 ME 58, ¶ 12, 727 A.2d at 355 (discussing when an officer's interaction with a citizen constitutes a seizure). Furthermore, if law enforcement officers routinely stopped motorists to inquire about third-party speeding offenses, the aggregate damage to individual liberty would be great. [¶ 17] In addition, none of the elements that have been found to lessen the severity of the interference with the liberty interest when a motorist is stopped in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion are present here. The decisions upholding information-seeking roadblock stops have noted that the severity of the intrusion is minimized when the stop is brief, unlikely to cause anxiety, and planned ahead so as to minimize officer discretion in the field. For example, in Gorneault, the interference with a motorist's liberty interest was characterized as slight when the stop was brief and the officer stopped every vehicle that passed. 2007 ME 49, ¶¶ 2, 3, 9, 918 A.2d at 1208, 1209; see also State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143, 146 (Me.1985) (listing the factors we use to evaluate the reasonableness of a roadblock stop, including the length of the stop, the degree of discretion left to the officer, and the degree of fear or anxiety likely instilled in the motorist generated by the mode of operation). [¶ 18] Similarly, in Lidster, a roadblock stop interfered only minimally with a motorist's constitutionally-protected liberty interest because each stop lasted about ten to fifteen seconds, motorists could see the roadblock in advance because police cars with flashing lights partially blocked the highway, and the police stopped all vehicles systematically. 540 U.S. at 422, 427, 428, 124 S.Ct. 885; see also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (stating that checkpoint stops are less, intrusive than roving-patrol stops because roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists) (quotation marks omitted); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 547, 567, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of checkpoint stops of three to five minutes). [¶ 19] In contrast with Gorneault and Lidster, in State v. Kent, we recently concluded that a stop and seizure resulting from a sobriety checkpoint was constitutionally unreasonable, noting that the detention of motorists for an average of three to five minutes, in the absence of accountability, oversight, or adherence to protocol, suggest[ed] more than a minimal intrusion of a motorist's liberty interest. 2011 ME 42, ¶¶ 13, 14, 15, 20, 15 A.3d 1286, 1289, 1290, 1291. We noted in that case that the crucial underlying criterion of reasonableness is the amount of discretion that a police officer is allowed to exercise in conducting a stop. Id. ¶ 16, 15 A.3d at 1290 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 20] Here, none of the elements that might have minimized the interference with LaPlante's liberty interest were present. The trooper's stop of LaPlante was not part of a pre-planned roadblock and was, in all salient respects, a function of the trooper's individual discretion. La-Plante's stop was more likely to cause alarm and anxiety than a roadblock stop because upcoming roadblocks are clearly visible, whereas LaPlante had no indication that he would be stopped. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453, 110 S.Ct. 2481. Viewed objectively, once a motorist, such as La-Plante, submits to the authority of a law enforcement officer by pulling over and stopping, the motorist is not free to leave until given permission by the officer. [5] An individual who is pulled over under these circumstances, while operating in a manner consistent with the posted speed limit and all other laws, has no basis to know the reason for, or the likely length of, the stop that will ensue. [¶ 21] Because there were no formal restrictions on the trooper's exercise of discretion, and, under the circumstances of the stop, there was a significant potential to cause alarm and anxiety, the interference with LaPlante's liberty interest was significant.