Opinion ID: 2629208
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion/Admission of Evidence

Text: Whether excluding or admitting evidence at trial, this court reviews such decisions under the same standard of review: abuse of discretion. State v. Swan, 114 Wash.2d 613, 658, 790 P.2d 610 (1990); Reese v. Stroh, 128 Wash.2d 300, 310, 907 P.2d 282 (1995). Thus, the trial court's decision will be reversed only if no reasonable person would have decided the matter as the trial court did. State v. Castellanos, 132 Wash.2d 94, 97, 935 P.2d 1353 (1997). Proper objection must be made at trial to perceived errors in admitting or excluding evidence and failure to do so precludes raising the issue on appeal. State v. Guloy, 104 Wash.2d 412, 421, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985).
Thomas claims that he should have been able to cross-examine the police witnesses on other suspect evidence and been able to present certain results from Daryl Lynch's polygraph test. He contends that his rights to compulsory process and due process have been impinged. The State argues that it was sufficient for the court to have granted Thomas the opportunity to question officers about who they arrested in their investigation. The Sixth Amendment provides, in part: [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.... U.S. Const. amend. VI. The federal right to compulsory process is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920; State v. Smith, 101 Wash.2d 36, 41, 677 P.2d 100 (1984). But both the Supreme Court and this court have noted that [a]lthough guarded jealously, the right [to compulsory process] is not absolute. Smith, 101 Wash.2d at 41, 677 P.2d 100 (noting that Washington limited the right to compel witnesses to those witnesses who are material to the defense). In keeping with the right to establish a defense and its attendant limits, a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to have irrelevant evidence admitted in his or her defense. State v. Hudlow, 99 Wash.2d 1, 15, 659 P.2d 514 (1983). When there is no other evidence tending to connect another person with the crime, such as his bad character, his means or opportunity to commit the crime, or even his conviction of the crime, such other evidence is irrelevant to exculpate the accused. See State v. Downs, 168 Wash. 664, 667, 13 P.2d 1 (1932); State v. Maupin, 128 Wash.2d 918, 925, 913 P.2d 808 (1996). Mere opportunity to commit the crime is not enough as such evidence is the most remote kind of speculation. Downs, 168 Wash. at 668, 13 P.2d 1. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make any fact that is of consequence to the case more or less likely than without the evidence. ER 401. Relevant evidence is admissible unless its probative value is outweighed by prejudice or has a tendency to confuse the issues, mislead the jury, cause undue delay, or is an unnecessary presentation of cumulative evidence. ER 403.
Thomas implies that the State was allowed to present evidence that the police initially suspected Lynch because Walker had identified Lynch in a photomontage, while Thomas was disallowed from cross examining the investigating officers who testified on this matter. Here, Lynch had an alibi for the night of the murder. Walker was certain the man driving the van was not Geist as he testified he saw a light-skinned African American male driving the van as he chased it from Geist's house (Geist was Caucasian). Walker also estimated that the man driving the van was large and taller than Geist. This may have had a bearing on why Walker chose Lynch out of the montage since Lynch was a light-skinned African American, about six feet tall and weighed 190-200 pounds. Thomas has these same characteristics. While he identified Lynch in a photomontage, Walker was uncertain whether Lynch was the man he saw. Walker testified that Lynch looked most like the person driving the van out of any of the other people pictured in the photomontage, however, no photo of Thomas was included. Thomas also neglects to point out that he cross-examined Walker at length on his identification of Lynch in the montage as well as Geist's mention that he may be meeting up with a man named Zaheed (Lynch) sometime in the evening of March 27, 1998. Thus, the record shows that Thomas was able to present evidence of Walker's identification of Lynch by Walker's own testimony. We therefore cannot agree that Thomas's right to present evidence was violated in regard to this issue.
The trial court granted the State's motion in limine to exclude Coleman's out of court identification of Lynch unless she were to testify at trial. The court clarified that Thomas could question officers as to who was arrested but not as to what the officer heard from Coleman. The trial court believed such testimony to be hearsay if not obtained directly from Coleman. On appeal, Thomas argues that he should have been permitted to cross-examine the police witnesses as to Coleman's identification of Lynch as the driver of a van she saw the night of the murder, without having to call Coleman as a witness. Thomas's argument is not persuasive. First, Thomas did not object to the court's hearsay ruling. Second, he could have called Coleman herself, as he did with Walker, to testify as to what she saw the night of the murder, but he declined to do so. Therefore, Thomas has waived his hearsay objection and there was no infringement on his right to present evidence.
Thomas argues that Lynch owed money to Geist's mother, Hall, and that he had previously threatened her. He believes the court erred in denying him the opportunity to cross-examine police officers about Lynch's initial suspected motive for the crime and that the State opened the door to this evidence by discussing the investigation of Lynch. The State moved in limine to exclude any reference to a phone conversation between Lynch and Hall. The State proffered that in January or February 1998, Hall contacted Lynch by phone regarding the final payment he owed her. Over the phone, Lynch allegedly responded with something to the effect of, [d]on't fucking hassle me. I know where you live, and you will get your fucking money when I tell you. RP at 220. The State then stated that, after this phone call, Geist spoke with Lynch who agreed to pay Hall what was owed, less a transfer fee. This apparently resolved the dispute between Hall and Lynch. The trial court excluded testimony as to the phone call between Hall and Lynch. The State's argument to the trial court and on this appeal is persuasive. Any exchange as between Lynch and Hall bears no relevance as to the existence or nonexistence of a disagreement between Lynch and Geist. Thomas has not shown that conversations between Hall and Lynch are relevant to showing Lynch had a motive to murder Geist, especially when any disagreement between Lynch and Hall had been resolved two to three months before the murder. On the day of the murder, Lynch only owed Hall $144. The investigating officers' mere mention of Lynch as an initial suspect at the beginning of the murder investigation does not suffice to open the door to cross-examination as to Lynch's possible motive to kill Geist.
Thomas's argument that he should have been allowed to present evidence that Lynch showed deception in his polygraph is not well taken. Results of polygraph tests are not recognized in Washington as reliable evidence and are, in fact, inadmissible without stipulation from both parties. State v. Renfro, 96 Wash.2d 902, 905, 639 P.2d 737 (1982). Thus, the fact that Lynch showed deception in questions during the test does not, by itself, make the results admissible. Given the dearth of additional evidence inculpating Lynch in the murder, and given the inadmissibility of polygraph results, there is no basis for an exception here. Thus, in regard to whether Thomas's right to present evidence was violated, Thomas only speculates that the testimony from the police officers who initially investigated Lynch would inculpate Lynch as a potential suspect. In reality, there is no evidence suggesting that the dismissal of Lynch as a suspect was anything but rational and supported by the weight of the evidence. Recall the testimony of Ducharme and Azevedo that chronicled Thomas's and Rembert's presence with Geist prior to the murder and their presence after the estimated time of the murder at Geist's house and in his van. There was also Thomas's acquaintance, Horyst, who testified that Thomas solicited him to help Thomas rob his boss two weeks before the murder. During that conversation, as well as others, Thomas expressed that his boss may have to be killed. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the evidence to that which was relevant to the consideration at issue by excluding other suspect evidence and polygraph evidence pertaining to Lynch when each was at once irrelevant and unreliable.
Thomas asserts that his right to confront witnesses was violated by the trial court's exclusion of cross-examination of Adams, who tape recorded Horyst and elicited his recount of Geist's murder and Thomas's involvement in it. Thomas argues he should have been allowed to present evidence (1) that Adams initially contacted police to offer a trade of information about an unsolved murder for leniency in drug charges pending against him, and (2) that Adams wore a body wire to record the conversation with Horyst as part of a plea agreement with the State. The State moved in limine to exclude evidence of Adams's plea agreement as irrelevant. The State clarified that it would not be calling Adams to testify; rather, Horyst would be testifying. Thomas agreed that Horyst would not be allowed to testify as to any hearsay statements made by Adams and that Adams's plea agreement was irrelevant unless Thomas called him as a witness. Thus, the court ruled that no reference would be made to Adams's plea agreement unless he was later called as a witness, [6] which neither side did. Thomas was the only one who referenced Adams's plea agreement when he objected to the State's question to Detective Webb: [w]hat, if anything, did Mr. Adams want in exchange for his help in this case? RP at 4762. In the objection, defense counsel stated, [o]bjection, Your Honor, irrelevant. The Court has ruled pretrial that we can't even go into any agreements of Mr. Adams unless he's called as a witness. He's not been ... and won't be. RP at 4762. The State withdrew the question. Thomas's argument on appeal, then, is disingenuous. The State is correct that the jury did not hear evidence about Adams's plea agreement because Thomas objected to its admission in the first place and objected to it at trial. Thomas maintains, however, that Detective Webb's testimony on direct revealed hearsay statements made to him from Adams to the effect that Adams knew who killed Geist. Thomas argues that admission of these hearsay statements as preliminary, to which Thomas objected, made Adams a witness against Thomas, thereby allowing him to subject Adams's statements to impeachment for motive and bias, just as they would be had Adams testified as a witness at trial. Had he been given the opportunity, Thomas argues he would have pointed out that he never told Horyst that he had killed Geist or that Horyst had ever told Adams that Thomas had killed Geist. Thus, he argues that the trial court erred in disallowing him to put on evidence of Adams's motive to lie or his bias, i.e., his plea agreement. Detective Webb mentioned Adams in the context of explaining how suspicion shifted to Thomas during the investigation. Thus, it is arguable whether this statement by Adams was hearsay at alli.e., that it was being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Also, since the record does not reflect that Thomas ever sought to introduce evidence of Adams's bias pursuant to ER 806, either through Detective Webb or otherwise, this claim was not preserved for appeal. See State v. Pam, 101 Wash.2d 507, 511, 680 P.2d 762 (1984), overruled on grounds by State v. Olson, 126 Wash.2d 315, 893 P.2d 629 (1995).
Thomas argues that Detective Webb was permitted to testify about Lynch's mother's and roommate's statements as to Lynch's whereabouts on the night of the murder and that someone using Lynch's personal identification number (PIN) entered West Top Credit Union, an establishment with which Lynch had a cleaning contract to clean it every Friday night. Detective Webb testified that he contacted these people in order to verify Lynch's alibi. Webb also testified to the use of Lynch's PIN at the credit union. Thomas's hearsay objection to this latter testimony was overruled. At no time, however, did Webb testify as to statements made by these parties, as such, the hearsay rules are not applicable. We find there was no abuse of discretion in allowing Webb to testify as to the course of his investigation because he elicited no hearsay testimony.
Thomas argues that evidence showing Horyst was using drugs regularly at the time of the intercepted conversation he had with Adams was relevant and should not have been excluded. It is well settled in Washington that evidence of drug use is admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness if there is a showing that the witness was using or was influenced by the drugs at the time of the occurrence which is the subject of the testimony. State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 83, 882 P.2d 747 (1994). When asked by the court, Thomas admitted to having [n]othing concrete in the way of evidence showing Horyst was under the influence of drugs the day he had the conversation with Adams. RP at 399. The trial court ruled that Thomas would not be allowed to question Horyst about his drug usage during the deposition but that it would reconsider the issue at trial if Thomas had more evidence then. Horyst did testify at trial and the record does not show, nor does Thomas allege, that he sought to introduce better evidence of Horyst's drug usage than he had during pretrial. Thomas has not pointed to any new evidence discovered since trial that indicates Horyst was using drugs on the day of or even during his conversation with Adams. Again, Thomas is raising a disingenuous argument on appeal. We find no abuse of discretion.
At trial, the court permitted Ducharme to testify as to what she had told her friends about the murder and burglary and how Thomas was involved. The court also permitted Ducharme's friends, Alexandra Wright and Marcy Robinson, to testify as to what she had told them about the night of the murder. The court's rationale for allowing the friends to testify as to what Ducharme said was that it was evidence of a prior consistent statement offered to rebut a claim of recent fabrication pursuant to ER 801(d)(1)(ii). First, Thomas argues that his cross of Ducharme did not rise to the level of an expressed or implied claim that Ducharme had recently fabricated her story; therefore, ER 801(d)(1)(ii) was not triggered. Second, he argues that Ducharme had a motive to fabricate her story in order to shift blame to Thomas. Third, if the testimony of Ducharme's friends was admissible, Thomas argues that it was unnecessary as Ducharme's testimony would have been sufficient. ER 801(d)(1)(ii) provides that a statement is not hearsay if: The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross examination concerning the statement and the statement is ... (ii) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.... If there is an inference raised in cross examination that the witness changed her story in response to an external pressure, then whether that witness gave the same account of the story prior to the onset of the external pressure becomes highly probative of the veracity of the witness's story given while testifying. State v. McDaniel, 37 Wash.App. 768, 771, 683 P.2d 231 (1984) (same rule cited with approval in State v. Purdom, 106 Wash.2d 745, 750, 725 P.2d 622 (1986)). Accordingly, the proponent of the testimony must show that the witness's prior consistent statement was made before the witness's motive to fabricate arose in order to show the testimony's veracity and for ER 801(d)(1)(ii) to apply. McDaniel, 37 Wash. App. at 771, 683 P.2d 231. During cross examination of Ducharme, defense counsel began questioning with: Q (By [Defense Counsel]) The agreement you worked out if you testified in this case, it was that you would be charged with robbery in the first degree. The State would recommend 48 months in prison. You would also be charged with rendering criminal assistance in the first degree. They would recommend 14 months to run concurrent, meaning that it wouldn't be added to the 48. It gets run together. Is that how you understood it? A Yes. Q It also says that the State has no objection to a defense plea to the sentencing judge for the low end of the range, which is 36 months. So your attorney can argue to the judge that you receive a sentence of 36 months? A Yes. Q Which is also a possibility in this case? A Yes. . . . . Q So you would have what, about four more months to go? A Right. Q Given what you were charged with, aggravated murder in the first degree, the penalties for that are life without the possibility of parole? A Yes. Q And the death penalty? A Right. Q So getting out in possibly as little as four months is certainly better than never getting out? A Right. Q Better than being hanged, isn't it? A Yes. RP at 3862-64. The next set of questions regarded Ducharme's divorce from Thomas that enabled her to testify against him. Thomas then asked about Ducharme's first interview with police on March 30, 1998, and pointed out both consistencies and inconsistencies in her statements between this initial interview and the one on January 26, 1999. Thomas alleges that he was merely trying to establish that Ducharme's statements to police were inconsistent with each other and with her testimony on direct at trial. Thomas rebuts his own argument with his explanation of the cross-examinationhe was, by his own admission, trying to show her testimony was changed. The portion from the cross examination above strongly suggests that Thomas was trying to show Ducharme may have motive to change her story in order to receive a plea agreement for testifying against Thomas. [7] If not an express claim of recent fabrication it was certainly implied. Thus, ER 801(d)(1)(ii) was triggered. Apparently anticipating that result, Thomas's next argument is that Ducharme had motive to change her story in order to shift the blame to Thomas and minimize her involvement. Whether she had motive to do so and how much weight was to be given that determination was properly left within the auspices of the jury. The tool for doing so, once the claim was made by Thomas, was to allow hearsay testimony by her friends indicating that the story Ducharme told police in January 1999 was the same as the story she told her friends in August 1998, long before striking any plea agreement with the State. Finally, Thomas contends that if the testimony of Ducharme's friends was admissible, it was unnecessary as Ducharme's testimony would have been sufficient. Evidence that a witness repeatedly told the same story is not admissible to corroborate her testimony, unless the defense attack's her credibility by suggesting her fabrication of the story or motive to lie. State v. Alexander, 64 Wash. App. 147, 152, 822 P.2d 1250 (1992) (citing Thomas v. French, 99 Wash.2d 95, 659 P.2d 1097 (1983)). This is because `repetition is not generally a valid test for veracity.' Id. (quoting State v. Harper, 35 Wash.App. 855, 857, 670 P.2d 296 (1983)). Here, though, Thomas did challenge Ducharme's credibility. Allowing only Ducharme's testimony would not have been sufficient since her story at trial is precisely what Thomas was attempting to undermine. The allegation of motive and fabrication having been made, the State was then allowed, pursuant to ER 801(d)(1)(ii), to rebut that allegation. And, in essence, Thomas set himself up for it by alleging motive and fabrication in the first place. Nothing in the rules prohibits the prior consistent statements that the trial court allowed.