Opinion ID: 1747791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Succession in the Same Office

Text: Fergus is running for the elective office of circuit judge, Division # 2 of the Second Judicial Circuit, presently completing an appointment to fill a vacancy in Division # 10 of the same circuit. Smith is running for the elective office of circuit judge, Division # 2 of the Third Judicial Circuit, presently completing an appointment to fill a vacancy in Division # 3 of the same circuit. The question is whether a change in division within a circuit constitutes a separate elective office under Amendment 29. Section 1 of Amendment 29 provides that vacancies in elective offices, excepting some offices not relevant to this discussion, are to be filled by appointment by the Governor. See, Glover, supra . At issue is Section 2 of Amendment 29, wherein it is provided: The Governor, Lieutenant Governor and Acting Governor shall be ineligible for appointment to fill any vacancies occurring or any office or position created, and resignation shall not remove such ineligibility. Husbands and wives of such officers, and relatives of such officers, or of their husbands and wives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, shall likewise be ineligible. No person appointed under Section 1 shall be eligible for appointment or election to succeed himself. Our analysis must focus on the sentence, No person appointed under Section 1 shall be eligible for appointment or election to succeed himself. We note first that typically the word shall is interpreted by this court to mean mandatory compliance. Ramirez v. White County Circuit Court, 343 Ark. 372, 38 S.W.3d 298 (2001). Appellants argue that the apparent purpose of Amendment 29, in the case of a circuit judge, is to deny the appointed judge the advantage of incumbency in a following election. Appellant argues further that a circuit judge who is appointed to fill a vacancy in one division, and who then runs for the office of circuit judge of another division in the same judicial circuit, is in effect running for the same elective office because he or she would enjoy the advantages of incumbency in that the voters would be the same as they would have been had he or she run for the exact same division to which he or she was appointed. Appellants' argument is understandable, but skips essential steps in constitutional analysis. We may not simply analyze the issue based upon rules of interpretation without first determining whether we may resort to those rules. The rules of statutory construction apply to interpretation of constitutional amendments. McDonald v. Bowen, 250 Ark. 1049, 468 S.W.2d 765 (1971); Bailey v. Abington, 201 Ark. 1072, 148 S.W.2d 176 (1941). The words of the constitution should ordinarily be given their obvious and natural meaning. Hodges, supra . See also, Knowlton, supra ; Kervin, supra . In Frank v. Barker, 341 Ark. 577, 582, 20 S.W.3d 293 (2000), this court stated: As we interpret a provision of the Arkansas Constitution, we have said that when the language of a provision is plain and unambiguous, each word must be given its obvious and common meaning, and neither rules of construction nor rules of interpretation may be used to defeat the clear and certain meaning of a constitutional provision. Hoyle v. Faucher, 334 Ark. 529, 975 S.W.2d 843 (1998). Constitutional and statutory provisions are considered in the same manner. Ragland v. Alpha Aviation, Inc., 285 Ark. 182, 686 S.W.2d 391 (1985). Where the meaning of the words is clear and unambiguous, we do not resort to the rules of statutory or, in this case, constitutional interpretation. R.N. v. J.M., 347 Ark. 203, 61 S.W.3d 149 (2001). No interpretation is needed and, therefore, no aids of interpretation are used. Ragland, supra . See also, Ellison v. Oliver, 147 Ark. 252, 227 S.W. 586 (1921). Appellants invite us to consider the intent in putting Amendment 29 before the voters. This court has stated that in interpreting constitutional provisions, it may be helpful to determine what changes the constitutional amendment was intended to make. Glover, supra . We have stated further that in interpreting a constitutional amendment, it may be helpful to consider the history of the times and conditions existing at the time of adoption. Bryant v. English, 311 Ark. 187, 843 S.W.2d 308 (1992). Legislative interpretation may even be considered, but that is only where there is doubt or ambiguity. Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978). The sentence at issue is clear and easily understood. No person appointed to fill a vacancy in an elective office may succeed himself into that same elective office when the election takes place to fill that office. Circuit Judge of Division # 2 of the Second Circuit is an elective office, as is Circuit Judge of Division # 2 of the Third Circuit. When the voters go to the polls they will cast votes for the specific judge they wish to occupy each division. They will not, for example, vote for two of some number of candidates for circuit judge of a given circuit. In other words, the office of a division judge within a circuit is an elected office, not a office assigned once a person is elected as circuit judge of the circuit. The position of Division # 2 of the Second Circuit, for example, is an elected office. Therefore, neither Fergus nor Smith is succeeding himself in the position to which he was appointed in 2001, because neither is running for the division in which they were appointed to serve. The office of circuit judge refers to a single elective office. This is implicit in State v. Green, 206 Ark. 361, 175 S.W.2d 575 (1943), where this court discusses that Section 1 of Amendment 29 to the constitution provides the manner of filling vacancies which may occur in certain offices, including the office of circuit judge. In Green , this court notes that in Section 1 of Amendment 29, it is provided that the Governor shall fill such vacancy by appointment. The reference is to a specific single vacancy of a circuit judge. [1] See also, State v. Martin, 60 Ark. 343, 30 S.W. 421 (1895) (wherein this court discussed that the constitution did not limit each judicial circuit to one judge). It is relatively obvious that if candidates Fergus and Smith prevail in the upcoming election, they will be succeeding the prior sitting judges in Division # 2 of their respective circuits, and will not be succeeding themselves, as others will occupy their former positions. We hold that a person who runs as a candidate for circuit judge in a division of a judicial circuit, who was appointed in the previous term to serve out a vacancy in another division of the same judicial circuit, is not succeeding himself or herself in violation of Amendment 29, § 2, if elected. The mandate in this case shall issue immediately. Affirmed.