Opinion ID: 6318496
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maine's Burglary Statute

Text: Bowers first argues that the district court erred in applying the ACCA to him based on his prior burglary convictions in the State of Maine. Bowers argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), effectively overruled our earlier, directly on-point decision in United States v. Duquette, 778 F.3d 314 (1st Cir. 2015). In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), the Supreme Court held that a person has been convicted of burglary for purposes of [ACCA] enhancement if he is convicted of any crime, 5 The applicable Sentencing Guidelines provided a range of 180-210 months of imprisonment. - 4 - regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime. Id. at 599. Subsequently, in Duquette, we determined that the Maine burglary statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17–A, § 401(1), qualifies as generic burglary under the definition set forth in Taylor. Duquette, 778 F.3d at 318. Therefore, under Duquette, a conviction under the Maine burglary statute qualifies as a 'violent felony' under the ACCA. Id. In Mathis, decided the year after Duquette, the Supreme Court held that Iowa's burglary statute was broader than the definition of generic burglary under the ACCA and therefore convictions under it could not qualify as predicate offenses. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257. The Court did not redefine generic burglary. See id. at 2250 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598 for definition of the generic offense). Generic burglary still consists of an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. Iowa's statute, by contrast, reaches a broader range of places: 'any building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle.' Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250 (alterations in original) (quoting Iowa Code § 702.12). The parties, in fact, there agreed that Iowa's burglary statute . . . covers more conduct than generic burglary does. Id. - 5 - Bowers argues that the Maine statute is similarly structured to Iowa's statute and therefore, under Mathis, Bowers's convictions for burglary under Maine law should similarly preclude the application of the ACCA to him. Specifically, Bowers argues that the Maine burglary statute defines structure, as does the Iowa statute, to include certain vehicles. Bowers posits that the definition encompasses vehicles used to store property rather than transport persons, and therefore, as in Mathis, is broader than generic burglary as defined in Taylor. The relevant statutory language that Bowers relies on, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 2(24), defines a structure as a building or other place designed to provide protection for persons or property against weather or intrusion, but does not include vehicles . . . whose primary purpose is transportation of persons or property unless such vehicle . . . is also a dwelling place. The Maine statute defines a dwelling place in pertinent part as a structure that is adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, or sections of any structure similarly adapted. Id. § 2(10). Bowers argues that the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Mathis requires us to reconsider our decision in Duquette that the Maine burglary statute qualifies as generic burglary under the ACCA. Under the law of the circuit doctrine, our panel is bound by a prior panel decision, absent any intervening authority. Mouscardy, 722 F.3d at 77 (quoting United - 6 - States v. Grupee, 682 F.3d 143, 149 (1st Cir. 2012)). An exception to this rule arises when [a]n existing panel decision [is] undermined by controlling authority, subsequently announced, such as an opinion of the Supreme Court. United States v. Holloway, 630 F.3d 252, 258 (1st Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Igartua v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 603 (1st Cir. 2010)). We must also be mindful that a case's holding . . . can extend through its logic beyond the specific facts of its case. Id. at 258 (alteration in original) (quoting Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 38 (2010)). We disagree with Bowers's interpretation of Mathis to the effect it overrules our decision in Duquette. The Supreme Court's decision in Mathis did not alter the definition of generic burglary. Because our decision in Duquette was that the Maine burglary statute qualified as generic burglary, and the Supreme Court's decision in Mathis involved a statute which all parties agreed swept more broadly than that, Mathis does not affect our holding in Duquette. Our conclusion is supported by United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018). There, the Court decided whether two state burglary statutes fell within the ACCA's definition of generic burglary. Id. at 403-04. The statutes at issue included vehicles used for overnight accommodation as structures for the purposes of burglary. See id. at 404 (discussing Ark. Code. Ann. § 5-39- - 7 - 101(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-401(1)(A)-(B)). The Court held that the pertinent statutory language relating to such vehicles falls within the scope of generic burglary's definition as set forth in Taylor. Id. at 406. The Court reasoned that Congress intended the ACCA's definition of burglary to reflect 'the generic sense in which the term [was] used in the criminal codes of most States' at the time the Act was passed. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598). At that time, a majority of state burglary statutes covered vehicles adapted or customarily used for lodging. Id. The Supreme Court in Stitt also addressed the argument that in Taylor, Mathis, and other cases, [the Court] said that burglary of certain nontypical structures and vehicles fell outside the scope of the [ACCA's] statutory word 'burglary.' Id. at 407. Using that language, the respondents in Stitt argued that the vehicles used for overnight accommodation at issue in their case were analogous to the nontypical structures and vehicles to which the Court referred in those cases. Id. The Court disagreed and clarified that it did not decide in either [Taylor or Mathis] the question [then] before [it]. Id. For example, Mathis was concerned with whether Iowa's burglary statute qualified as generic burglary under the ACCA although some means of satisfying the structure element fall within Taylor's generic definition and some . . . fall outside it. Id. - 8 - The reasoning in Mathis and the Supreme Court's later explication of the same in Stitt confirms that Mathis does not provide a basis for questioning Duquette's precedential effect. Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision and uphold Bowers's fifteen-year sentence.