Opinion ID: 546132
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Pattern Conspiracy Instruction

Text: 11 Over the objections of defense counsel, the district court adopted the rationale of the ninth circuit as set out in United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979), and incorporated the following as part of its jury charge on the conspiracy count: 12 In determining whether or not a particular defendant was a member of the conspiracy, you may consider the evidence of his or her conduct and actions, together with his or her own statements and declarations. You may also consider and weigh the acts and declarations of other co-conspirators which were made during the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of it, as bearing on the question of a defendant's membership in the conspiracy. 13 This instruction was erroneous, appellants claim, in that it permitted the jury to consider co-conspirators' statements and actions in determining each defendant's membership in the conspiracy. Appellants argue that the district court should have adhered to Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit Sec. 5.11 (1980), which reads: 14 In determining whether the defendant became a member of the conspiracy you may consider only the actions and statements of that particular defendant. 15 The arguments which appellants have raised on this issue have recently been addressed and rejected by this court in United States v. Martinez de Ortiz, 907 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc ). In Martinez de Ortiz, we held that the particular language which appellants urged upon the district court--i.e., the portion of Sec. 5.11 reprinted above--is inconsistent with Fed.R.Evid. 104 and Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). In light of the thorough discussion of this issue in Martinez de Ortiz, we reject appellants' challenge to this instruction without further discussion.