Opinion ID: 1934936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Grounds for jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA and the PKPA

Text: The next question is whether the District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA and the PKPA on May 21, 1990, when it heard Darla's divorce complaint. The grounds for jurisdiction provided by the UCCJA and the PKPA are similar but not identical. In order for a court to assume jurisdiction pursuant to the PKPA, the relevant state law requirements must be met. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c)(1). In addition, one of the five statutory conditions must be satisfied. Id. at § 1738A(c)(2). The first of these conditions is a home state provision almost identical to that in the UCCJA. Compare 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) with 19 M.R.S.A. § 804(1)(A). Home state is defined in section 1738A(b)(4) of the PKPA, in pertinent part, as the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months.... Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period.... 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a)(4). The PKPA provision allows a court to assume jurisdiction if such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State within six months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) (1994). Darla left Washington with the children in February, 1990. She entered her divorce complaint in Maine on March 30. Matthew filed for dissolution in Washington on March 20, 1990. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(i) and (ii), Washington, not Maine, was the children's home state. Both the PKPA and the UCCJA contain a best interest/significant connection provision that allows a court to assume jurisdiction even if it does not meet the home state test. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c)(2)(B) and 19 M.R.S.A. § 804(1)(B). The PKPA best interest provision requires a finding that no other state would have jurisdiction. The UCCJA best interest provision is more liberal, allowing the court to assume jurisdiction as long as the court determines that it is in the best interest of the child, and there is evidence available pertaining to the child's welfare. While the District Court could assume jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA best interest provision, such an assumption would ignore the fact that a decree thus entered may be denied full faith and credit by the provisions of the PKPA. The PKPA obligates courts to grant full faith and credit only to decrees entered in accordance with the terms of the PKPA. In order for a court to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the best interest provision of the PKPA, the court must first find that no other state would have home state status. In the instant case, the children had a home stateWashington. While Maine may have been able to assume jurisdiction according to the terms of the UCCJA, it could not issue a decree that would be honored in accordance with the terms of the PKPA, at least not without some inquiry as to the Washington proceeding. A decree so entered runs the risk of being denied full faith and credit. [3] Additionally, pursuant to the same PKPA, a Maine court might be required to give full faith and credit to an inconsistent decree from another jurisdiction. It is unclear whether the District Court had sufficient information at the time of the hearing to question the home state status of the children or to inquire about the Washington proceeding. On the child custody affidavit, required by § 810 of the UCCJA and intended to inform the court about the children's residences, Darla left blank the column requesting the dates each child lived in each location. The record does not disclose whether the court had a copy of the letter faxed from Matthew's attorney to Darla's attorney providing information about the Washington petition, or whether Darla informed the court specifically that Matthew had commenced a divorce proceeding in Washington. Whether the court had a clear picture that something was happening in Washington, the assumption of jurisdiction was problematic. In Peterson v. Peterson , we held that the mere filing of an action in one court does not make that action pending for the purposes of 19 M.R.S.A. § 807(1) [4] or 28 U.S.C.A. 1738A(g) [5] . Peterson v. Peterson, 464 A.2d at 205. While an inquiry by the Maine District Court as to the Washington proceeding probably would have determined that the action in Washington was not yet pending, the Peterson definition of pending was not meant to preclude the inquiry. Even if the mere filing of another action, and the timing of the respective filings, would not have precluded the District Court from exercising jurisdiction, the information should have prompted an inquiry pursuant to § 807(2). Hepner v. Hepner, 469 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Ind.App. 3 Dist.1984) (Under the UCCJ[A], when a court becomes aware that a custody dispute has an interstate dimension ... that court has an affirmative duty to question its jurisdiction.); Renno v. Evans, 580 So.2d 945, 947 (La.App. 2 Cir.1991) (It is the duty of a court to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the issue is not raised by the litigants.). Darla's contention that the District Court did not have this information is of no avail. She is under a continuing duty to provide such information. 19 M.R.S.A. § 810(3) (Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any custody proceeding concerning the child in this or any other state of which he obtained information during this proceeding.). Darla may be correct that, technically, she was not required to list the dates the children lived in each location. The omission, however, may have contributed to a misleading picture, as the child custody affidavit provided no information as to the length of time the children had lived in Maine. This information, had it been provided, may have prompted the court to question its jurisdiction. It is entirely possible that full compliance and investigation would have brought all parties to the same conclusionthat Maine is the more appropriate forum for this action. This may have happened in compliance with all three statutes if, for example, Washington had declined jurisdiction. 19 M.R.S.A. § 804(1)(D), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c)(2)(D) and Wash.Rev.Code 26.27.030 (1994). The problem in the instant case is that the parties bypassed almost every relevant protective procedure available, and did not allow the District Court to make such a determination on an informed basis. As a result, the judgment of the District Court was not entered consistent with the provisions of the PKPA and is not guaranteed full faith and credit. Consequently, we vacate that portion of the judgment.