Opinion ID: 182421
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: District Court's Instructions

Text: Defendant argues that the district court's failure to give a cautionary instruction following Agent Lewis's testimony was plain error. This Court addressed a similar challenge to a district court's failure to give a cautionary instruction following Agent Lewis's testimony in Alford. 332 Fed.Appx. at 282. We found no plain error because, when the district court charged the jury the morning after the one-day trial, it gave a cautionary instruction on opinion testimony that was the same as the instruction in Swafford. Id. at 282-83. The district court here gave a cautionary jury instruction regarding opinion testimony that was very similar to the charge given in Swafford. 385 F.3d at 1030 n. 4. In addition, the district court gave a general instruction about weighing witness testimony. These instructions were given mere hours after Agent Lewis testified. Accordingly, we find no plain error in the district court's failure to also instruct the jury immediately following Agent Lewis's testimony.
Defendant takes issue with the district court's instruction to the jury during voire dire that the burden of proof is on the government until the very end of this case. R. 41 at 13. Defendant acknowledges that the district court gave an accurate instruction after the close of evidence, and that he did not object to the court's language during voir dire, but argues that the instruction constituted plain error because it implied the burden might shift to Defendant. This court reviews jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately inform the jury of relevant considerations and explain the applicable law to assist the jury in reaching its decision. United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 760-61 (6th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 574 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Harrod, 168 F.3d 887, 890 (6th Cir.1999)) (emphasis added). Reversal is warranted only if the instructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading, or prejudicial. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). The challenged instruction does not suggest a burden shift, and is not improper as stated. We believe that a jury would think of the very end of this case as that time when they have rendered a verdict and their service has ended. In addition, even if the instruction were seen, standing alone, as implying a burden shift, the court extensively instructed the jury that it was always the Government's burden to prove Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no risk of confusion or misconception to be found here.