Opinion ID: 170505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The officers' stop of the vehicle Mr. Worthon drove was justified.

Text: Whether a traffic stop is valid . . . turns on whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist violated any . . . traffic . . . regulation[]. United States v. Vercher, 358 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Traffic stops are seizures for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and as such, must be reasonable under the circumstances. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1523(a) provides: The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. In challenging his detention, Mr. Worthon argued to the district court that he did not commit the alleged offense, and that the statute sets out a very subjective standard, which lacks any objective justification. This court applying the same Kansas statute has held a stop reasonable when [n]othing is advanced in the record that demonstrates that [the defendant] was prevented from applying his brakes to maintain a safe interval, or that he was in imminent danger of being rear-ended. . . . Vercher, 358 F.3d at 1262. The Vercher court also held that in some cases, an officer's observation of a vehicle traveling at a high speed and close distance from the preceding vehicle, while not necessarily sufficient to convict, is sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop. 358 F.3d at 1263. Here, the district court found that, based on the testimony presented at trial, even if Trooper Racy had a subjective motive for wanting to stop Mr. Worthon (and none of the other cars in the line that may have been guilty of the same violation), there was still probable cause for the stop. Rec. vol. I, doc. 53, at 4-5. On appeal, Mr. Worthon seeks to analogize his case to United States v. Ochoa, 4 F.Supp.2d 1007, 1012 n. 4 (D.Kan.1998), which determined that Ms. Ochoa did not commit a traffic violation because the court [found] the troopers caused or contributed to causing the defendant to drift momentarily, for the first and only time, out of her traffic lane. See also Worthon's Br. at 14 (Because the troopers had caused or contributed to the defendant drifting outside her lane of traffic, the district court found there was no violation. . . .). Mr. Worthon argues that, even though he was following too closely, because Deputy Shultz's slowing down caused the traffic violation, the stop is invalid. Mr. Worthon also suggests that Deputy Shultz's actions amounted to outrageous government conduct. We will address each argument in turn. (i) The stop was reasonable. We hold that Ochoa is inapposite to this case for four reasons. First, district court opinions have persuasive value only and are not binding as a matter of law. As such, we are unwilling to extend it beyond its unique set of facts. Second, those facts are quite different than those present here. As the Ochoa, court stated: When Ochoa briefly drifted onto the shoulder, another vehicle was following her too closely with a patrol car maintaining a position directly beside it. A reasonable driver might have been distracted by the commotion and looked to see what was going on, briefly drifting partially onto the shoulder. In fact, in view of Trooper Rule's testimony which reflects a clear intent to find some reason to pull over both cars, the court must consider the impact of the officers positioning their vehicle beside the Toyota, which may have startled Ochoa into crossing onto the shoulder or committing some other minor traffic violation. The court finds under the facts of this case that Ochoa's single crossing onto the shoulder was not a violation of Kansas law. 4 F.Supp.2d at 1012. The court continued in a footnote: This is not a matter of a pretextual stop, which is no longer an issue in these types of cases. It is a question of whether there was, in fact, a violation. Here the court finds the troopers caused or contributed to causing the drift, which, under the circumstances, does not constitute a violation. Id. n. 4 (internal citations omitted). Here, in contrast, the record does not show that the officer was the cause, in the way that the officer was a significant factor in the violation in Ochoa. Id. at 1011. While Deputy Shultz's slowing down is, perhaps, a but-for cause (but for his slowing down, the offense might not have been committed), the district court here found there was no reason why Mr. Worthon could not have slowed down accordingly. When the officer in Ochoa moved over into the passing lane alongside the car behind Ms. Ochoa's vehicle, the patrol car likely was a significant factor in causing [Ms. Ochoa's car's] momentary drift because the driver might have been distracted by the commotion and looked to see what was going on. Id. at 1011-12. Significantly, in the present case, instead of slowing down to maintain a safe distance as he could and should have done, with respect to a vehicle in front of him, Mr. Worthon maintained a half-a-second difference between his van and Deputy's Shultz's vehicle, in what appeared to be an attempt to pass. Third, as the district court in Ochoa explained, prior cases from this circuit have held that a single instance of traveling outside one's lane is not a violation of law when attributable to such factors as the weather, traffic, and road conditions. 4 F.Supp.2d at 1011 (citing United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 978 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Dunn, 133 F.3d 933, 1998 WL 8227 (10th Cir.1998) (Table)). In Ochoa, the court analogized the presence of the patrol car, which distracted the driver, to such a condition, and held that the driver's resulting lone instance of traveling outside of the lane was not a violation of the Kansas statute in question. 4 F.Supp.2d. at 1011-12 & n. 4. Because no violation of law occurred, the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1012-13. In the present case, Mr. Worthon concedes that a violation of law occurred under the language of the statute in question, and that [t]here is no similar body of case law holding that a single instance of following too closely does not constitute a traffic violation. Worthon's Br. at 16. [2] Fourth and finally, the district court here also found the testimony of Trooper Racy and Deputy Shultz to be credible. Deputy Shultz testified that (1) he had no choice but to slow down when a semitrailer and the line of traffic in front of him did so; and (2) he did not slam on his brakes or do anything to cause Mr. Worthon's van to follow more closely. The district court found that Trooper Racy had probable cause to stop Mr. Worthon for a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1523. It determined that the officer's decision not to stop any of the other cars in the same line of traffic was irrelevant as this observation merely reflects that a subjective motivation of the officers was their investigation of potential drug activity. Rec. doc. 44, at 4. Mr. Worthon could have slowed down to avoid committing the violation. Mr. Worthon has not shown any of these determinations to be in error. In light of the facts as found by the district court, which are certainly not clearly erroneous, we agree with the district court that the stop was reasonable. (ii) There was no outrageous government conduct in this case. Mr. Worthon attempts to assert the defense of outrageous government conduct on behalf of the officers in this case. The relevant inquiry when assessing claims of outrageous government conduct is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances the government's conduct is so shocking, outrageous and intolerable that it offends the universal sense of justice. This court has recognized the defense of outrageous government conduct, but has never rendered a decision upholding such a claim. The absence of any decision by this court upholding such a claim bears testament to its narrow scope. To succeed on an outrageous conduct defense, the defendant must show either (1) excessive government involvement in the creation of the crime, or (2) significant governmental coercion to induce the crime. United States v. Garcia, 411 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). In this case, Mr. Worthon can point only to Deputy Shultz's slowing down as the but-for cause of the offense, which does not approach excessive government involvement in the creation of the violation. See id. Thus, there is no connection between Deputy Shultz's slowing down and his colleagues' goal, and it cannot be the basis for an outrageous government conduct defense because he did not want to tailgate the semi in front of him. This is not shocking to the universal sense of justice. United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 910 (10th Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we reject Mr. Worthon's suggestion that the defense should certainly apply in this case. 2. The reasonableness of the duration and scope of Mr. Worthon's stop Next, Mr. Worthon and Mr. Romero challenge the duration of Mr. Worthon's stop, and whether or not the scope of the stop exceeded its investigatory purpose. As indicated above, Mr. Romero lacks standing to raise this challenge. Further, the government correctly urges that we not consider these arguments because defendants did not raise them before the district court. We have applied to Fourth Amendment issues the long held rule that when a party to the litigation fails to raise an issue below, we will not consider it for the first time on appeal unless the party demonstrates that an impediment existed which prevented the party from raising the argument at the trial level. United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1499 (10th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Rascon, 922 F.2d 584, 587 (10th Cir.1990) (defendant waived the issue of the validity of his detention by failing to raise it at the suppression hearing). Mr. Worthon and Mr. Romero make no argument as to why they could not have raised this argument before, and we hold that no miscarriage of justice will result if we do not consider it. 3. The reasonableness of the search of the duffle bags Next, the defendants challenge the physical manipulation and search of the duffle bags in the van. The government argues that the defendants lack standing to raise this challenge, and we agree. In Martinez, we held that neither a nonowner driver nor a non-owner passenger had standing to challenge the officers' search of the trunk of a car in which they were traveling. 983 F.2d at 973. We suggested that the defendants might have standing to challenge a search of the luggage stored in the trunk, however. See id. ([G]iven the uncertainty over the ownership of the vehicle, she may have possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy over the contents of the luggage, [but] not over the trunk where the luggage was located.); see also United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1154 (5th Cir.1993) (The owner of a suitcase located in another's car may have a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of his suitcase.). Similarly, in United States v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928 (10th Cir.2001), we reiterated that while such defendants lack standing to challenge a search of these vehicles, they do have standing to challenge a search of their personal belongings within those vehicles. The Edwards court held that in deciding whether a search infringed upon protected constitutional rights, we must examine two primary factors: (1) whether the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched, and (2) whether society would recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable. Id. at 936 (internal quotation marks omitted). Since the bags at issue in Edwards were closed, stored in the trunk, and contained personal items such as clothing and toiletries, we found that the defendants may have met the two-prong test above. Here, the defendants' subjective expectation of privacy is not as well-defined. The bags were not locked, but were in duffle bags in the open compartment of a van. Mr. Worthon maintained that all the contents of the vehicle, which he was unauthorized to drive, were his. There is no doubt that Mr. Romero lacks standing to challenge the search of the duffle bags. Before the district court, Mr. Romero argued he clearly had an expectation of privacy in [Mr.] Worthon's vehicle as the Government is alleging [Mr.] Romero had personal items that were found in the back of [the] van. Rec. vol. I, doc. 44, at 7 (emphasis added). However, throughout his district court pleadings, Mr. Romero refers to the contents of the van as Worthon's bags, Worthon's duffle bag and some items that the Government is alleging belonged to Romero. Id. at 7, 3, 2. Mr. Romero unquestionably maintained no subjective expectation of privacy over the bags in the van. Mr. Worthon also lacks standing to challenge the search because unlike in Edwards, there was no authorized driver present. Mr. Worthon `was driving a rented vehicle and was not named on the rental agreement or any other documents, either as the renter or as an authorized driver. [He] made no showing that any arrangement had been made with the rental car company that would have allowed him to drive the car legitimately.' United States v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 887 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir.1984)). Because he was not in lawful possession or custody of the vehicle, id. at 888, he can have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Therefore, the district court properly concluded that Mr. Worthon lacked standing to challenge the search.