Opinion ID: 1781968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: the prosecutor's plea bargain with vincent harris which was conditional upon his testifying violated defendant's rights under mississippi law and the united states constitution.

Text: Vincent Harris was indicted as a codefendant with Foster for capital murder, but was allowed to plead guilty to being an accessory after the fact in exchange for his testimony at Foster's trial. Foster contends that while plea bargains in general are allowed, the State may not condition acceptance of a plea until an accomplice performs correctly at the trial of his codefendant. In this case, Foster notes the reduction in Vincent Harris' sentence was not scheduled to occur until after the trial of Foster, and Harris' testimony therein, had concluded. It is well established in our jurisprudence that an accused may be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Culberson v. State, 379 So.2d 499 (Miss. 1979); Rich v. State, 322 So.2d 468 (Miss. 1975); Moore v. State, 291 So.2d 187 (Miss. 1974); Young v. State, 212 Miss. 460, 54 So.2d 671 (1951). However, citing Burns v. State, 96 Nev. 802, 618 P.2d 881, 884 (1980), Foster contends Harris' testimony in the present case was irreparably tainted. In Burns, the Nevada Supreme Court determined that the State, in dismissing charges of attempted murder only after the completion of a codefendant's testimony, violated the rule against such a practice as stated in Franklin v. State, 94 Nev. 220, 577 P.2d 860 (1978). The Court in Franklin held that by bargaining for specific testimony to implicate a defendant, and withholding the benefits of the bargain until after the witness has performed, the prosecution becomes committed to a theory quite possibly inconsistent with the truth and the search for the truth. Id. 577 P.2d at 863. In a concurring opinion in Burns, Justice Manoukian stated: Although I concur in the result of the opinion of the court, I disagree that the prosecutorial tactics involving the plea bargaining with the defendant, Chism, violated his codefendant's right to due process. I would not assign error to that issue. First, I believe that Franklin, a near carbon copy of People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App.3d 438, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1974), represents bad precedent as well as an unreasonable intrusion into legitimate prosecutorial prerogatives. I am no more disposed today than I was in Franklin, to establish yet another technicality in criminal procedure hitherto unknown to Nevada Criminal jurisprudence.... Franklin v. State, 94 Nev. at 228, 577 P.2d at 865 (Manoukian, J., dissenting). Indeed, not only is Medina a product of California district appeals court, but there were no other reported judicial opinions in the United States or Canada, that went to the liberal extreme of Medina, fact for fact. (cite omitted). As the above-cited concurring opinion noted, Medina and its offspring, including Franklin and Burns are in the definite minority in deciding that a due process violation has occurred where the State withholds its performance in a plea bargain until after an accomplice has testified. In State v. DeWitt, 286 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Iowa 1979), the Iowa Supreme Court expressly rejected the Nevada court's approach and in doing so noted the various jurisdictions which have accepted accomplice testimony given before the prosecution fulfills promises made to the accomplice through a plea agreement: A promise of immunity, lenient treatment, prosecutorial abstinence, or favor ordinarily is viewed merely as removing a possible barrier to a willing response to the testimonial call of a witness. The promise goes only to the credibility of the promisee, not to the admissibility or competency of the testimony. State v. Houston, 206 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Iowa 1973); see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 109 (1972); McDonald v. State, 249 Ark. 506, 507, 459 S.W.2d 806, 807 (1970); Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 403, 150 S.E.2d 240, 248, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 953, 87 S.Ct. 336, 17 L.Ed.2d 231 (1966); People v. West, 54 Ill. App.3d 903, 906, 370 N.E.2d 265, 269, 12 Ill.Dec. 642, 646 (1977); Coleman v. State, 264 Ind. 64, 67, 339 N.E.2d 51, 54 (1975); State v. McGlynn, 292 Minn. 405, 409, 195 N.W.2d 583, 585 (1972); State v. Woods, 346 Mo. 538, 546, 142 S.W.2d 87, 90 (1940); State v. Crepeault, 126 Vt. 338, 340, 229 A.2d 245, 246 (1967); cert. denied, 389 U.S. 915, 88 S.Ct. 249, 19 L.Ed.2d 267, appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 38, 88 S.Ct. 833, 19 L.Ed.2d 813 (1968); (other cites omitted). Id. The jury was first informed of Vincent Harris' plea bargain by the State during voir dire proceedings. Thereafter, Vincent Harris testified to his agreement to testify for the State in exchange for which he would be allowed to plead guilty as an accessory after the fact with no recommendation of sentence by the State. We decline to find any violation of Foster's due process rights under these circumstances. There is no indication that Harris' plea reduction was made conditional upon false or specific testimony or a specific result, such as to render it inadmissable. State v. DeWitt, 286 N.W.2d at 384, citing People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App.3d at 455-56, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 141-43. To the contrary, Harris himself testified the agreement was for him to tell the truth. Further, counsel for Foster cross-examined Harris extensively on the plea bargain. We decide to align ourselves with those jurisdictions which have declined to find that the practice of the prosecution's withholding its end of a plea bargain until a codefendant has testified results in tainted and inadmissible testimony. Rather, we would agree with the assessment of the court in People v. Green, 102 Cal. App.2d 831, 838, 228 P.2d 867, 871 (1951), that such promises by the prosecution are conditional in nature, and we might add, permissibly so: It is a practice which seems to be approved in all jurisdictions, if the ends of justice will be thereby served, to extend immunity to one jointly charged with crime, upon condition that he testify fully and fairly as to his knowledge of the facts out of which the charge arose. (emphasis in original). Id. We place our trust in the trier of fact to determine the effect of such an agreement upon the credibility of a particular codefendant turned State's witness, and hold that the existence of the witness' plea bargain is a consideration in the credibility, not the admissibility of the witness' testimony.