Opinion ID: 1909313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Default Judgment

Text: Oliver argues that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the second default judgment. [4] Specifically, she argues that the trial court erred by not granting her motion to continue the trial because of her illness. Oliver claims that the motion should have been granted because, she says: she was a party representing herself; she was, as well, a material, competent witness; and she had a meritorious defense. Oliver also argues, among other things, that the default judgment was not based on the evidence, but instead was intended to send a message to other lawyers. Towns argues, in response, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the second default judgment. The applicable standard of review in appeals arising from a trial court's order granting or denying a motion to set aside a default judgment is whether the trial court's decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Bailey Mortgage Co. v. Gobble-Fite Lumber Co., 565 So.2d 138, 139 (Ala.1990) (citing Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc., 524 So.2d 600 (Ala.1988)). In exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider whether the defendant has a meritorious defense[,]... whether the plaintiff will be unfairly prejudiced if the default judgment is set aside and whether the default judgment was a result of the defendant's own culpable conduct. Id. at 140 (internal quotation marks omitted). On the one hand, in Ex parte Robinson Roofing & Remodeling, Inc., 709 So.2d 444 (Ala.1997), this Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in entering a default judgment against a pro se defendant. The pro se defendant had acted in good faith by filing an answer with the plaintiff, but not with the trial court. Id. at 444. Because the pro se defendant had failed to comply with Rule 5(d), Ala. R. Civ. P. (by failing to file an answer with the clerk of the court), the trial court entered a default judgment against him. Id. at 445. It appeared that the defendant had a meritorious defense, that the plaintiff would not be unfairly prejudiced if the court set aside the default judgment, and that the defendant's conduct was not culpable. Id. at 445-46. See generally Kirtland, 524 So.2d 600. Thus, this Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment. Id. at 446. On the other hand, in Jones v. Hydro-Wave of Alabama, Inc., 524 So.2d 610 (Ala.1988), this Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment based on the trial court's finding of culpability on the part of the defendant. This Court determined that the defendant had satisfied the meritorious-defense requirement, and that the plaintiff would not be prejudiced if the default judgment were set aside; however, this Court agreed that the defendant's conduct was culpable. Id. at 614-15. The defendant had failed to appear for trial because of a business engagement; that failure prompted the trial court to threaten to enter a default judgment. The trial court gave the defendant a second chance, but the defendant missed the second trial date because of an illness. Although the defendant provided evidence establishing that he was actually ill, [t]here [was] no evidence suggesting that [the defendant's] illness was so debilitating as to prevent him from traveling to Alabama for the trial. Id. at 615. Thus, this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment. Id. at 616. Oliver's conduct is similar to that of the defendant in Jones and, in some respects, it is worse. Oliver missed her first trial date, and a default judgment was entered. The trial court then gave Oliver a second chance when it set aside the first default judgment. Despite the fact that the trial court had not ruled on Oliver's motion for a continuance of the pretrial conference and the second trial, Oliver missed both the conference and the second trial date because of an alleged illness. Oliver, however, had absolutely no documentation only her own assertionto indicate that she was in fact sick. The trial judge also received evidence indicating that Oliver had deliberately avoided service of process before the first trial date. Because of the evidence in the record indicating culpable conduct and because the trial judge held a hearing at which he observed Oliver and could judge the credibility of her reasons for the default, we defer to the trial court's discretion in denying Oliver's motion to set aside the default judgment: [D]ue to a trial judge's superior vantage point, the trial court is the more suitable arbiter for determining with accuracy the culpability of the defaulting party's conduct, and, for this reason, we will show great deference toward the trial court's decisions with respect to such culpability. The utility of the default judgment rule depends on its effectiveness in encouraging compliance with procedural rules so that actions may be decided expeditiously. To facilitate an orderly functioning of the judicial system and to preserve the integrity of the court, parties who affront the court by intentionally disregarding trial dates, court orders, or procedural rules, with resulting unnecessary delay, should justifiably incur the ultimate sanction of losing their opportunity to defend. Jones, 524 So.2d at 616. [5] Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Oliver's motion to set aside the second default judgment.