Opinion ID: 303595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standards By Which the Statute Is Construed.

Text: 24 Aside from the specific language of Section 15, a contrary reading of its scope regarding agreements covered is likewise not warranted in view of the fundamental import of the nation's antitrust policies, expressed by Congress in a variety of legislative enactments, primarily the Sherman Act. 6 The Supreme Court has long recognized that the antitrust laws represent a fundamental national economic policy . . . 7 and stated that [r]epeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions. 8 Even where Congress has granted exemptions from the antitrust laws, the Court has held that it is bound to construe them strictly, since . . . [they are] restrictive of a free economy. 9 With specific reference to situations such as that presented by the case at bar, the Court has stated that it cannot lightly assume that the enactment of a special regulatory scheme for particular aspects of an industry was intended to render the more general provisions of the antitrust laws wholly inapplicable to that industry. 10 25 This court has recently applied this principle, and in so doing observed: 26 . . . [T]he basic philosophy of our antitrust policy has been so long established, is of such recognized economic importance, and has assumed in the statutory scheme of things such high dignity that a contrary congressional intent or immunity from the antitrust laws 'is not lightly implied.' 27 . . . [T]he proper inquiry [in cases such as this one] would seem to be to what extent Congress has knowingly adopted a policy contrary to or inconsistent with the previously established antitrust laws. . . . 28 Putting the problem in this light, relevant criteria would include the specific language of the congressional statute involved, any legislative history which would throw light on the congressional intent, the relative importance of the governmental action which is asserted to override antitrust policy, whether the governmental agency is required to take into consideration the possible anticompetitive effect of its actions, whether the agency is required to adhere to a clearly defined and restricted statutory directive, and to what extent the agency's actions are subject to judicial review. 11 29 In the same case, this court, in considering federal government regulation of business, stated with specific reference to the scope of the Federal Maritime Commission's authority to grant exemptions from the antitrust laws: 30 The maritime industry operates under the power of the Federal Maritime Commission specifically to grant exemptions from the antitrust laws. This power is not to be exercised loosely, hence in Federal Maritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien (Swedish American Line) [390 U.S. 238, 88 S.Ct. 1005, 19 L.Ed.2d 1071] the [Supreme] Court upheld the Commission regulation that shipping conference restraints which interfere with the policies of the antitrust laws will be approved only [emphasis in original] if the conferences can show that they are required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits or in furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act. 12 (Emphasis added.) 31