Opinion ID: 767038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the Functus Officio Doctrine

Text: 10 VCW first argues that the functus officio doctrine is inapplicable because the arbitration panel's first order was not final. 4 Whether the award indicates that [it] is final and whether the arbitrator intended the award to be final are factors in determining if an arbitration award is final. Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc. v. Pevely Sheet Metal Co., 951 F.2d 947, 949 (8th Cir. 1992). 11 In this case, we have no doubt that the arbitration panel intended the award of premiums to be a final order. This intent is shown by language in the order itself that instructs the parties to seek further relief in federal district court. The arbitrators certainly would not have so instructed if they had planned to revisit, and possibly rescind, the award of premiums at a later date. Moreover, the parties must have felt that the arbitrators intended the award of premiums to be final because there is nothing in the record to indicate that either side argued to the district court that the court did not have jurisdiction to review the award for lack of finality. 12 VCW also argues that the order was not final because the panel still had to decide additional issues, such as the amount of adjustments to the award of premiums. An award cannot be final if significant issues still need to be determined. See id. However, we do not think that a minor adjustment to the award creates an important issue. Further, an order does not have to be final in all aspects for the functus officio doctrine to apply. See Domino Group, Inc. v. Charlie Parker Memorial Found., 985 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying functus officio doctrine when the arbitrator still had to clarify an award of damages). 13 Because we find the order was final, VCW is only entitled to relief if an exception to the doctrine applies. Neither of the two exceptions to the doctrine that have been recognized in this circuit is applicable. See Local P-9, United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. George A. Hormel & Co., 776 F.2d 1393, 1394 (8th Cir. 1985) (recognizing exceptions to the functus officio doctrine for mistakes evident on the face of the award and for changes when the parties consent). VCW urges that we create an additional exception that would allow arbitrators to clarify a final award that is incomplete because the award failed to address a post-award contingency. To bolster this argument, VCW relies principally on two cases from other circuits. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Silver State Disposal Serv., Inc., 109 F.3d 1409 (9th Cir. 1997); Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers Int'l Union v. Excelsior Foundry Co., 56 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 1995). 14 But, even if we were to adopt this broad exception, this case is completely different from the cases on which VCW relies. In both Glass and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the arbitrators clarified an award prior to district court review. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 109 F.3d at 1410; Glass, 56 F.3d at 845-46. In this case, the arbitration panel clarified the award after the district court acted on the award. VCW has not cited any case in which the functus officio doctrine was not applied after the district court vacated or confirmed the final award. VCW's failure to cite such a case is not surprising because such a result would effectively grant an arbitration panel power to conduct appellate review of a federal district court decision. This would be absurd. Thus, we reject VCW's argument that this case falls within an exception to the functus officio doctrine. 15