Opinion ID: 2636938
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to order psychiatric examination of Baros.

Text: Defendant next contends that in view of Baros's delusional state, the trial court erred prejudicially by failing to require, sua sponte, that Baros undergo a psychiatric examination to assist the court's own evaluation of her testimonial competence. Defendant cites no authority, and we know of none, that imposes such a duty in the absence of request. As defendant notes, earlier cases indicated a trial court should grant a defense motion for a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a sex-crime case where psychiatric evidence appeared necessary to assist the trier of fact in assessing the witness's credibility. (E.g., People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187, 193, 70 Cal.Rptr. 210, 443 P.2d 794; Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 171-177, 49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838 ( Ballard ) [noting, however, the general rule against impeachment by psychiatric evidence]; People v. Duncan (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 418, 426-427, 171 Cal.Rptr. 406 [finding no abuse of discretion in denial of defense motion].) But the Legislature overruled this line of authority in 1980 by adopting Penal Code section 1112, which forbids courts from ordering psychiatric examinations of victims or complaining witnesses in sex-crime cases in order to assess their credibility. [10] We have recently reiterated that [t]he use of psychiatric testimony to impeach a witness is generally disfavored. ( People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 835, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280; see also Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th 225, 263, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 781, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192 ( Alcala ).) Defendant insists these principles do not preclude court-ordered psychiatric examinations to evaluate testimonial competency, a preliminary issue not determined by the trier of fact. (See, e.g., People v. Reber (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 534, 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 ( Reber ), disapproved on other grounds by People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1123, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986 ( Hammon ); People v. Armbruster (1985) 163 Cal. App.3d 660, 663 & fn. 1, 210 Cal.Rptr. 11.) But we see no convincing reason why a trial court must, on its own motion, order and consider the psychiatric evaluation of a potential witness whose testimonial competence is challenged on grounds of mental or emotional impairment. We recently intimated that trial courts have broad discretion to refuse requested examinations for this purpose ( Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th 225, 264-265, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3), and such a rule is well justified. At the outset, serious privacy interests, as well as the policy of encouraging witnesses to come forward and testify voluntarily, would be undermined if courts were compelled to order psychiatric evaluations of potential witnesses as a condition of their testimony. Moreover, Ballard itself noted the many dangers of using psychiatric evidence to impeach credibility; the psychiatrist's testimony may not be relevant; the techniques used and theories advanced may not be generally accepted; the psychiatrist may not be in any better position to evaluate credibility than the juror; difficulties may arise in communication between the psychiatrist and the jury; too much reliance may be placed upon the testimony of the psychiatrist; partisan psychiatrists may cloud rather than clarify issues; the testimony may be distracting, time-consuming and costly. ( Ballard, supra, 64 Cal.2d 159, 175, fn. 10, 49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838, citation omitted; see also Alcala, supra, 4 Cal.4th 742, 781, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192.) Many, if not all, of these concerns are also pertinent to a court determination of competence. (See Alcala, supra, at pp. 780-782, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192 [unavailability of witness on grounds of amnesia].) Finally, as noted above, the grounds upon which a trial court may disqualify a witness as incompetent, or exclude the witness's testimony for lack of personal knowledge, are exceptionally narrow. The witness must be allowed to testify unless he or she cannot communicate intelligibly or understand the duty to tell the truth, or unless no rational jury could believe the witness actually saw the events he or she claims to have seen. In many cases, psychiatric testimony, itself inherently [subject to] expert debate ( People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1247, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159), would be less useful on these issues than the court's own evaluation of the witness's demeanor and responses in light of all the evidence. (See, e.g., Alcala, supra, 4 Cal.4th 742, 781, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192.) Here, the extensive record of the competence hearing manifestly discloses that Baros was a coherent communicator, and her understanding of the specific duty to give truthful testimony was also not in serious dispute or doubt. Thus, there seems little basis on which a psychiatric evaluation could have affected a ruling on her qualifications as a competent court witness. (See Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th 225, 265, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3.) On the issue whether Baros's specific testimony would reflect her personal knowledge, the court was fully aware of Baros's delusions about Anthony and the triplets, and the relationship of these fantasies to the events about which she would testify. The court also knew Baros had undergone therapy and taken medications for emotional problems. Yet the court believed, with substantial reason, that Baros's account of the Mackey murder, corroborated in numerous details by independent evidence, could persuade a rational jury she must actually have perceived that event. Again, this was not a matter on which psychiatric evidence would be of particular help. The court committed no error by failing, sua sponte, to order a psychiatric evaluation of Baros's qualifications to testify. [11]