Opinion ID: 2160904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Public Policy Regarding Terms Affecting Marriage or Divorce

Text: The contrary law relied upon by the appellate court to invalidate Max's beneficiary restriction clause is found in three decisions of this court: Ransdell, 172 Ill. 439, 50 N.E. 111, Winterland v. Winterland, 389 Ill. 384, 59 N.E.2d 661 (1945), and Estate of Gerbing, 61 Ill.2d 503, 337 N.E.2d 29 (1975) (which overruled Winterland in part). The appellate court concluded that the language and circumstances of the testamentary provisions in these cases, which Illinois courts have found to be against public policy, are strikingly similar to the instant case. 383 Ill.App.3d at 996, 322 Ill.Dec. 534, 891 N.E.2d 549. Specifically, the appellate court invoked the principle that testamentary provisions are invalid if they discourage marriage or encourage divorce. 383 Ill.App.3d at 995, 322 Ill.Dec. 534, 891 N.E.2d 549. In Ransdell, the testator's will included provisions for his wife, his son, and his daughter. At the time the will was executed, the son and his wife were separated and cross-suits for divorce were pending. The father's bequest to the son provided that the property be held in trust, giving him use and income of the land for life, or until such time as he    shall become sole and unmarried, at which time the trustee was to convey title to the land to him in fee simple. Ransdell, 172 Ill. at 440, 50 N.E. 111. If the son died childless while still married to the wife, the land was to go to other devisees. Several years after the father's death, the son, who was still married but living apart from his wife, challenged the provision on public policy grounds. The circuit court granted judgment for the defendants and this court affirmed. This court acknowledged the long-standing rule that conditions annexed to a gift that have the tendency to induce spouses to divorce or to live separately are void on grounds of public policy. Ransdell, 172 Ill. at 445, 50 N.E. 111. However, the testator's purpose in this case was simply to secure the gift to his son in the manner which, in his judgment, would render it of the greatest benefit to him in view of the relations then existing between him and his wife ( Ransdell, 172 Ill. at 445, 50 N.E. 111), which were strained, to say the least. Certainly, this court noted, it cannot be said that the condition tended to encourage either the separation or the bringing of a divorce suit, both having taken place long prior to the execution of the will. Ransdell, 172 Ill. at 446, 50 N.E. 111. This court weighed two potentially competing public policies, stating that it was of the first importance to society that contract and testamentary gifts which are calculated to prevent lawful marriages or to bring about the separation or divorcement of husbands and wives should not be upheld. Ransdell, 172 Ill. at 446, 50 N.E. 111. On the other hand, it is no less important that persons of sound mind and memory, free from restraint and undue influence, should be allowed to dispose of their property by will, with such limitations and conditions as they believe for the best interest of their donees. Ransdell, 172 Ill. at 446, 50 N.E. 111. Because the testator had not disinherited his son if he remained married, but made one provision for him in case he remained married (a life estate) and a different provision if he divorced (taking title in fee simple), the condition was not contrary to public policy. Finally, this court distinguished between a condition subsequent (for example, if the will devised property to the beneficiary in trust for life, subject to divestment if he married), and a condition precedent, which directs that upon the fulfillment of the condition, ownership of the property is to vest in the beneficiary. Ransdell, 172 Ill. at 447, 50 N.E. 111. The condition subsequent, such as one that would prohibit marriage generally, would be void and the donee would retain the property, unaffected by the violation of the condition. A condition precedent would be given effect, because until the condition was met, the beneficiary's interest was a mere expectancy. Ransdell, 172 Ill. at 447-48, 50 N.E. 111. The appellate court cited Ransdell for the general rule that testamentary provisions which act as a restraint upon marriage or which encourage divorce are void as against public policy and distinguished Ransdell from the present case on the basis that the Ransdells' marriage was already in disrepair at the time the will was executed. 383 Ill.App.3d at 994, 322 Ill. Dec. 534, 891 N.E.2d 549. The appellate court noted that subsequent Illinois cases, however, have reaffirmed the underlying principle. 383 Ill.App.3d at 995, 322 Ill. Dec. 534, 891 N.E.2d 549. One such case was Winterland, in which the testator created a trust for his wife that, upon her death, was to be distributed equally to their 11 children. However, in a later codicil, the testator directed that the share intended for their son, George, was to be held in trust for him `so long as he may live or until his present wife shall have died or been separated from him by absolute divorce.' Winterland, 389 Ill. at 385, 59 N.E.2d 661. George predeceased his wife and she and their son challenged the codicil as promoting divorce, contrary to good morals, and against public policy. Winterland, 389 Ill. at 386, 59 N.E.2d 661. This court distinguished Ransdell on the basis that the couple's separation was already an accomplished fact and a divorce suit was then pending at the time the testator made his will. Winterland, 389 Ill. at 387, 59 N.E.2d 661. But where no separation was contemplated, the natural tendency of the provision was to encourage divorce. For that reason, the provision was void. Winterland, 389 Ill. at 387-88, 59 N.E.2d 661. This court announced that it is the public policy of this state to safeguard and protect the marriage relation, and this court will hold as contrary to that policy and void any testamentary provision tending to disturb or destroy an existing marriage. Winterland, 389 Ill. at 387, 59 N.E.2d 661. This court further found that the codicil established two separate and divisible conditions upon which the trust would be distributed to George. First, George's life estate was to continue until the death of his wife; second, his life estate would terminate upon their absolute divorce. This court rejected the argument that the life estate itself failed and that title to the property vested in George upon his father's death. Rather, while the second condition was void, the first condition was not and, thus, could be given effect. Winterland, 389 Ill. at 388, 59 N.E.2d 661. In Gerbing, this court considered the validity of a provision in a testamentary trust that would have terminated the trust and distributed the corpus to the testator's son in the event that his wife predeceased him or the couple divorced and remained divorced for two years. Gerbing, 61 Ill.2d at 505, 337 N.E.2d 29. This court restated the general principle that a devise or bequest, the tendency of which is to encourage divorce or bring about a separation of husband and wife is against public policy. Gerbing, 61 Ill.2d at 507, 337 N.E.2d 29. However, if the dominant motive of the testator is to provide support in the event of such separation or divorce the condition is valid. Gerbing, 61 Ill.2d at 507, 337 N.E.2d 29. Further, unless the couple was separated or a divorce was pending at the time the will was executed, the exception to the general rule announced in Ransdell  was not applicable. Gerbing, 61 Ill.2d at 508, 337 N.E.2d 29. This court found the provision void, but declined to sever the two conditions, as it had done in Winterland. Finding that it was the testator's general intent to benefit her son and that she would have preferred that he take the corpus of the trust, even if he remained married, rather than have him take nothing, this court found the entire provision void, overruling Winterland to the extent it held otherwise. Gerbing, 61 Ill.2d at 512, 337 N.E.2d 29. In the present case, the appellate court found the language and circumstances of these three cases strikingly similar to the present case and saw no reason to depart from this well-established principle of these cases. 383 Ill.App.3d at 996, 322 Ill.Dec. 534, 891 N.E.2d 549. We disagree with the appellate court's conclusion regarding the similarity of the present case to the cited cases. The beneficiary restriction clause as given effect by Erla's distribution scheme does not implicate the principle that trust provisions that encourage divorce violate public policy. That is, the present case does not involve a testamentary or trust provision that is capable of exerting    a disruptive influence upon an otherwise normally harmonious marriage by causing the beneficiary to choose between his or her spouse and the distribution. Gerbing, 61 Ill.2d at 508, 337 N.E.2d 29. The challenged provision in the present case involves the decision to marry, not an incentive to divorce. This court has considered the validity of restrictions affecting marriage in cases going back as far as 1857. In Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ill. 212 (1857), the testator, Hall, left his estate to his wife for life or until she remarried, with the remainder to his four children, subject to the condition that they not marry before the age of 21. Any child who married before his or her twenty-first birthday was to receive one dollar only. The only daughter, Eliza, married four months before her twenty-first birthday, with the approval of her eldest brother, the executor of their father's estate. This court described the provision as a devise with a condition subsequent, because the remainder interest vested in the four children immediately upon the death of the testator, subject to be defeated by their marriage before they should attain that age. Shackelford, 19 Ill. at 213. This court noted that: whoever will take the trouble to examine this branch of the law attentively, will find that the testator may impose reasonable and prudent restraints upon the marriage of the objects of his bounty, by means of conditions precedent, or subsequent, or by limitations, while he may not, with one single exception, impose perpetual celibacy upon the objects of his bounty, by means of conditions subsequent or limitations. That exception is in the case of a husband in making bequests or legacies to his own wife. He may rightfully impose the condition of forfeiture upon her subsequent marriage. Shackelford, 19 Ill. at 214-15. As for other conditions affecting marriage that might be imposed by a testator, this court said that: [a]n examination of the subject, will show that the courts have very rarely held such condition void, although it might appear harsh, arbitrary and unreasonable, so as it did not absolutely prohibit the marriage of the party, within the period wherein issue of the marriage might be expected. It is enough for our present purpose, and we will go no further now, for it is not necessary, that it has been nowhere held, or pretended, that an absolute prohibition of marriage till twenty-one years of age is not reasonable and lawful, and must not be upheld, as a good condition, the violation of which may defeat a vested estate. The condition, then, annexed to this devise, was proper, reasonable and lawful, and its violation must be held to have forfeited the estate devised, unless it can be saved by some other equally well settled principle of law. Shackelford, 19 Ill. at 215. Further: The facts of the case show, that all of the devisees of the estate in remainder, now in controversy, were the children and heirs at law of the testator, and as such heirs at law, had expectations of this estate. In the absence of the will, each would have been entitled to his or her respective proportions of it, according to our statute of descent. When such is the case, the condition subsequent, the breach of which shall divest the estate which has become vested in the devisee by the will, must be shown to have been brought home to the knowledge of the devisee, before the breach, in order to mark the forfeiture. (Emphases added.) Shackelford, 19 Ill. at 215-16. In the end, this court found that the marriage of Hall's daughter prior to her twenty-first birthday did not divest her of the remainder interest conveyed to her upon her father's death. The basis for this decision was not that her father's partial restraint upon marriage was invalid, but that her remainder interest vested upon his death and could not be divested by a subsequent act on her part, absent a showing that she had notice of the condition subsequent. Other factors supporting this result were that she would have been one of her father's heirs at law should he have died intestate and that her brother, the executor, had unclean hands: And this rule is in harmony with the general principles of law, which always lean hard against a forfeiture of estates once vested, and that it will not allow such forfeiture, where there has been no laches or misconduct. In the case before us, we must assume that the defendant did not know of the existence of the will, and much less of the condition which it contained, that she should not marry till she was twenty-one years of age, under the penalty of forfeiting her interest in her father's estate. In ignorance of the will, she supposed she was entitled to take as heir without any condition. When we look at this case as it is presented by the record, we see it would be a monstrous piece of injustice to enforce this forfeiture against her. Here was her elder brother, who was an executor named in the will, knowing of the condition of forfeiture, had an interest in keeping it from her, that she might, by doing the prohibited act, incur the forfeiture, that her portion might go to himself and the other heirs of the testator. Under the influence of this direct interest, he suffers her to go on in ignorance of the will, and marry only four months before she attained the age of twenty-one years, and now he comes forward and claims the benefit of the forfeiture, and insists upon depriving her of the portion devised to her by the will. To sustain this claim, would be to offer a premium for the commission of the most heartless frauds.    We have not the least doubt that, upon the soundest principles of law and morality, she must take the estate devised, discharged of the condition. (Emphasis added.) Shackelford, 19 Ill. at 217-18. In the present case, Michael argues that the beneficiary restriction clause is a similar reasonable and prudent restraint that does not operate as a complete restraint upon marriage. Rather, the clause disqualifies from receipt of a share of the trust assets any grandchild who has chosen to marry outside the religious tradition their grandparents valued so highly. More importantly, we note that, unlike Eliza Hall, the grandchildren did not receive a vested interest in the trust upon Max's death. By creating a power of appointment in Erla, Max created a situation in which the interests of the grandchildren were contingent on whether and in what manner she would exercise her lifetime and testamentary powers of appointment. Thus, the grandchildren had a mere expectancy that they might receive some portion of the remainder at the conclusion of Erla's life estate. No one had a vested interest in the remainder of the trust assets until Erla's death resolved all contingencies. Further, unlike Hall's daughter, the grandchildren in the present case were not Max's or Erla's heirs at law. Finally, while the record is unclear whether any or all of the grandchildren were aware of the existence of the beneficiary restriction clause, because they had no vested interest to protect, they were not entitled to notice of the condition. More recently, the appellate court upheld the validity of a testamentary provision regarding the marriage of the intended legatee. In In re Estate of Gehrt, 134 Ill.App.3d 308, 89 Ill.Dec. 265, 480 N.E.2d 151 (1985), the testator, Forrest Gehrt, originally left a portion of his estate to six named individuals who were the children of Edna Bocock, apparently his deceased sister. Upon the death of one of these individuals, Harold Bocock, he executed a codicil leaving the portion originally intended for Harold to his widow, Betty, provided that at the time of Forrest's death, she remained unmarried. If, at the time of Forrest's death, it was determined that Betty had remarried, the share was to go to Harold's five siblings. Estate of Gehrt, 134 Ill.App.3d at 309, 89 Ill.Dec. 265, 480 N.E.2d 151. Betty remarried and, upon Forrest's death, sought Harold's share of the estate. The parties agreed that the condition operated as a condition precedent. Betty argued that it constituted an invalid restraint on marriage and asked that it be declared void as against public policy. The executor argued that the condition did not operate as a restraint because the interest either vests or not at the date of the death of the testator depending on [Betty's] marital status at the time, not at some later time. Estate of Gehrt, 134 Ill.App.3d at 310, 89 Ill.Dec. 265, 480 N.E.2d 151. The appellate court invoked a rule of reasonableness, quoting a case from the state of Louisiana in support of such a rule: `[C]onceding, without deciding, that a legacy conditioned upon the legatee remaining unmarried is against the public policy of this State, it is apt to observe here that the provision under consideration is not one forbidding the donee to marry during her lifetime or even for a fixed period of time, nor one that directs the legacy shall lapse in case the legatee should marry in the future, but rather one that is conditioned upon her status at the time of the testator's death. Certainly, such a provision is not against good morals, and we know of no law prohibiting the same.'  Estate of Gehrt, 134 Ill.App.3d at 311, 89 Ill.Dec. 265, 480 N.E.2d 151, quoting Succession of Ruxton, 226 La. 1088, 1091, 78 So.2d 183, 184(1955). Applying this principle to the Gehrt estate, the appellate court noted the well-established principle that a will speaks as of the date of death of the testator. Estate of Gehrt, 134 Ill.App.3d at 310, 89 Ill.Dec. 265, 480 N.E.2d 151. Thus, the court observed: [T]he testator, Forrest L. Gehrt, could have, for any reason, changed his codicil at any time prior to his death. He could have, at the time of plaintiff's remarriage, immediately executed another codicil cancelling the gift to the plaintiff, and could have given that portion of property to others. He can validly accomplish the same result by using the language that he did in the codicil in this case. Estate of Gehrt, 134 Ill.App.3d at 311, 89 Ill.Dec. 265, 480 N.E.2d 151. The appellate court then quoted this court's opinion in Ransdell: While it is of the first importance to society that contract and testamentary gifts which are calculated to prevent lawful marriages or to bring about the separation or divorcement of husbands and wives should not be upheld, it is no less important that persons of sound mind and memory, free from restraint and undue influence, should be allowed to dispose of their property by will, with such limitations and conditions as they believe for the best interest of their donees. Ransdell, 172 Ill. at 446, 50 N.E. 111. We conclude, reading Ransdell, Shackelford, Gerbing, and Gehrt together, that no interest vested in the Feinbergs' grandchildren at the time of Max's death because the terms of his testamentary trust were subject to change until Erla's death. Because they had no vested interest that could be divested by their noncompliance with the condition precedent, they were not entitled to notice of the existence of the beneficiary restriction clause. Further, because they were not the Feinbergs' heirs at law, the grandchildren had, at most, a mere expectancy that failed to materialize for four of them when, at the time of Erla's death, they did not meet the condition established by Max.