Opinion ID: 203237
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Marshal Cooper's Search of the Kitchen Cabinet

Text: Jones argues that Marshal Cooper's search of the kitchen cabinet, and consequent discovery of drugs therein, was not justified as a protective sweep or under any other exception to the warrant requirement. The district court examined the timeline as established through the testimony of the various officers at the suppression hearing, and found that the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Marshal Cooper actually discovered the drugs in the kitchen cabinet after Jones had given his consent to Agent Boucher. We have reviewed the officers' testimony and conclude that this finding was not clearly erroneous.5 We briefly explain. Agent Welsh and Marshal Cooper each testified that when they entered Room 318, they saw marijuana in plain view on the living room table. Agent Welsh testified that he immediately detained and handcuffed Jones, who was sitting on the living room couch. Jones was promptly taken into the bedroom, where Agent Boucher began the process of questioning him; according to Agent Boucher, the point at which Jones gave his consent was some ten to fifteen minutes after the officers' initial entry into Room 318. Agent Boucher then left the room and advised a couple of the 5 With respect to the district court's analysis of the timing of the consent, we apply the usual standard of review for factual findings in a decision denying a motion to suppress -- that is, clear error review. See Marshall, 348 F.3d at 284. -17- agents that we in fact had consent from Mr. Jones to search the motel room. Agent Wolf testified that he was one of those whom Agent Boucher informed. According to Marshal Cooper, during this period the other officers detained Jones's associates and performed a quick scan of the suite to make sure there were no hidden persons. Marshal Cooper took responsibility for one of the detainees and initially had him handcuffed and lying on the bathroom floor. Marshal Cooper testified that, at this point, it occurred to him to announce to the other officers that he had seen marijuana on the living room table, in case they wanted to seek a search warrant. Marshal Cooper continued: One of the officers told me at that point that it's okay, they already had consent. Sometime soon thereafter, when Marshal Cooper was satisfied that the suite had been secured, he attempted to relocate the detainee to the kitchenette, where he searched the cabinet and found what he believed to be drugs. The district court credited Marshal Cooper's testimony and found that the search occurred after Jones gave his consent.6 We see nothing in the record that would lead us to quarrel with this finding, much less to reach a strong, unyielding 6 At a later point in Marshal Cooper's testimony, the Government asked again whether Marshal Cooper had learned of Jones's consent before attempting to relocate the detainee to the kitchenette. Marshal Cooper responded, I'm not sure, but immediately clarified that I would think it was after. The district court obviously credited this clarification. It did not clearly err in doing so. -18- belief that a mistake has been made, as is required under the applicable standard of review. C.G. ex rel. A.S., 513 F.3d at 284 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because Marshal Cooper's search of the kitchen cabinet occurred after Jones gave consent and -- as affirmed above -- the scope of the consent extended to the kitchen cabinet, it was constitutionally valid. Given this conclusion, we need not state a view on the district court's alternative ruling that the search was lawful in any event by virtue of the independent source doctrine. Finding no infirmity in the denial of Jones's suppression motion, we proceed to examine the challenges relating to his sentence.