Opinion ID: 1720016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial Of Motion To Escrow.

Text: [13] The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by refusing to escrow all fair-share funds pending resolution of the remaining issues in this case. The plaintiffs argue that the motion to escrow was in effect a motion for temporary injunctive relief. The motion was not denominated as such, but it did refer to irreparable injury as a basis for the remedy. The escrow remedy requested is similar to an injunction because it would have the effect of enjoining the unions from using all fair-share funds pending the outcome of the litigation. The motion to escrow will be judged by the same standards as a temporary injunction because the reasons used to support the remedy and the remedy itself are equivalent to a temporary injunction. [10] [14-16] The power to grant a temporary injunction lies within the discretion of the trial court. The trial court's decision concerning an injunction will not be reversed unless the discretion has been abused. Culligan v. Rheaume, 269 Wis. 242, 247, 248, 68 N.W.2d 810 (1955). An abuse of discretion in granting or refusing to grant a temporary injunction may occur if the trial court: (1) has failed to make a record of factors relevant to the discretionary determination in a particular case; (2) considered clearly irrelevant or improper factors; or (3) clearly given too much weight to one factor. Joint School v. Wisconsin Rapids Ed. Asso., 70 Wis.2d 292, 309, 234 N.W.2d 289 (1975). [17] Pertinent factors to consider in deciding whether to grant a temporary injunction appear at sec. 813.02 (1), Stats. (1975),  Temporary Injunction; When Granted. (1) When it appears from his pleading that a party is entitled to judgment and any part thereof consists in restraining some act, the commission or continuance of which during the litigation would injure him, or when during the litigation it shall appear that a party is doing or threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering some act to be done in violation of the rights of another party and tending to render the judgment ineffectual, a temporary injunction may be granted to restrain such act. [18-21] Other relevant considerations concerning temporary injunctions were collected in Fromm & Sichel, Inc. v. Ray's Brookfield, Inc., 33 Wis.2d 98, 103, 146 N.W.2d 447 (1966), `Injunctions are not to be issued lightly.' Bartell Broadcasters, Inc. v. Milwaukee Broadcasting Co. (1961), 13 Wis. (2d) 165, 171, 108 N.W. (2d) 129, The `remedy usually is made available only when necessary to preserve the status quo of the parties or to prevent a multiplicity of suits.' Rust v. State Board of Dental Examiners (1934), 216 Wis. 127, 132, 256 N.W. 919. The general rule is that, `Injunctions do not issue for inconsequential or trivial causes.' Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co. v. Pallange (1931), 205 Wis. 126, 134, 236 N.W. 549. They `should only be granted where there is an irreparable injury.' Kuntz v. Werner Flying Service, Inc. (1950), 257 Wis. 405, 410, 43 N.W. (2d) 476, quoting from Maitland v. Twin City Aviation Corp. (1949), 254 Wis. 541, 37 N.W. (2d) 74. In addition, `Past injuries are in themselves no ground for an injunction, and it is only granted when necessary to restrain irreparable mischief, suppress oppressive and interminable litigation, or prevent a multiplicity of suits.' Cobb v. Smith, (1863), 16 Wis. 692, 697. Sec. 813.02 (1), Stats., supra, shows that a party may not obtain injunctive relief that he would not be permanently entitled to if he prevailed on the merits of the claim. In Street, supra n. 7, union shop employees objected to compulsory union dues being spent for political purposes. The court considered what type of a final remedy would be appropriate and stated, The appellees therefore remain obliged, as a condition of continued employment, to make the payments to their respective unions called for by the agreement. Their right of action stems not from constitutional limitations on Congress' power to authorize the union shop, but from § 2, Eleventh itself. In other words, appellees' grievance stems from the spending of their funds for purposes not authorized by the Act in the face of their objection, not from the enforcement of the union-shop agreement by the mere collection of funds. If their money were used for purposes contemplated by §2, Eleventh, the appellees would have no grievance at all. We think that an injunction restraining enforcement of the union-shop agreement is therefore plainly not a remedy appropriate to the violation of the Act's restriction on expenditures. Restraining the collection of all funds from the appellees sweeps too broadly, since their objection is only to the uses to which some of their money is put. Moreover, restraining collection of the funds as the Georgia courts have done might well interfere with the appellant unions' performance of those functions and duties which the Railway Labor Act places upon them to attain its goal of stability in the industry. Even though the lower court decree is subject to modification upon proof by the appellants of cessation of improper expenditures, in the interim the prohibition is absolute against the collection of all funds from anyone who can show that he is opposed to the expenditure of any of his money for political purposes which he disapproves. The complete shutoff of this source of income defeats the congressional plan to have all employees benefited share costs `in the realm of collective bargaining,' Hanson, 351 U.S. at p. 235, and threatens the basic congressional policy of the Railway Labor Act for self-adjustments between effective carrier organizations and effective labor organizations. (footnote omitted). Street, supra at 367 U.S. 740, 771, 772. In suggesting specific remedies the court stated that, One remedy would be an injunction against expenditure for political causes opposed by each complaining employee of a sum, from those moneys to be spent by the union for political purposes, which is so much of the moneys exacted from him as is the proportion of the union's total expenditures made for such political activities to the union's total budget. . . . A second remedy would be restitution to each individual employee of that portion of his money which the union expended, despite his notification, for the political causes to which he had advised the union he was opposed. Street, supra at 367 U.S. 774, 775. In Brotherhood of Railway Workers v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 83 S. Ct. 1158, 10 L. Ed.2d 235 (1963), the issue of appropriate temporary relief was squarely before the court. In Allen the appeal was from a judgment providing for an injunction restraining the union from collecting dues from objecting union shop members until the union showed what portion of the exacted funds were being used for collective bargaining. [11] Relying on Street, supra, the court determined that this interim relief was too broad and stated, It also follows from Street that the Superior Court erred in granting respondents interim relief against compliance with the financial obligations imposed by the Agreement. As a result of this relief none of the respondents has taken any steps toward compliance since the suit was instituted. We think that lest the important functions of labor organizations under the Railway Labor Act be unduly impaired, dissenting employees (at least in the absence of special circumstances not shown here) can be entitled to no relief until final judgment in their favor is entered. Therefore, on remand respondents would be given a reasonable time within which they must pay to the bargaining representative of their class or craft all sums required under the Agreement, including arrears, that are owing; as to any respondent failing to do this, the action must be dismissed. Allen, supra at 373 U.S. 120. [22] Street, supra and Allen, supra stand for the proposition that employees who are compelled to pay union dues are still required to pay those dues pending a determination of what portion of those dues are being used for statutorily impermissible purposes. [12] In support of their request to escrow all funds the plaintiffs cite Robbinsdale Educ. Ass'n v. Teacher's Local 872, 239 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. 1976) (vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of intervening changes in state law sub. nom. Threlkeld v. Teacher's Local 872, 429 U.S. 880 (1976)). In that case the Minnesota Supreme Court construed a public employee fair-share statute as allowing any fair-share dues payer to bring an action for injunctive relief in a state district court. In such an action the court would determine the validity and amount of the fair-share fee and, at the request of the complaining party, enjoin the use of the disputed fee until the union showed that amount of the fee was proper under the statute. In reaching this result the Minnesota court cited the Street and Allen decisions and acknowledged the government interest (union stability) that militates against enjoining the collection of all fair-share dues. However, the court distinguished enjoining collection of dues from enjoining use, the latter having a less substantial effect. Regardless of the Minnesota court's rationale in allowing an injunction, Robbinsdale is not a persuasive precedent in this case because the use of injunctive relief was sanctioned by construction of a Minnesota statute not present here. Here, plaintiffs base their demand for injunctive remedy on constitutional claims that were not decided in Robbinsdale. [23] Returning, finally, to the initial question: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to escrow all fairshare dues? In denying the motion the trial court stated, . . . it would be pure speculation on the part of this Court to determine without any factual basis upon which to make such a conclusion what percentage of funds have in fact been spent by unions of objecting employes outside of the confines of the statute. I could only guess that it runs anywhere from 0 to 100%. The court's rationale is not entirely clear, but the statement at least demonstrates an exercise of discretion because if the court does not know what portion of the dues were spent for political purposes, it can not very well find the required danger of irreparable injury. Kuntz, supra . [24] The plaintiffs contend that they should not be required to show that any portion of the dues are spent for political purposes because the burden is on the unions to prove that the funds are being spent for purposes related to collective bargaining. In Allen, supra at 373 U.S. 122, the court stated that the burden of proof was on the unions, but the court also held that dues should continue to be paid until that determination was made. By the Court. Order affirmed and cause remanded to the Milwaukee Circuit Court to transfer the cause to W.E.R.C. for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The following opinion was filed June 30, 1978.