Opinion ID: 2570544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Precluding Cross-examination on Witness's Drug Use

Text: Defendant contends the trial court's exclusion of evidence of Michael Durbin's alleged long-term methamphetamine abuse, and its resultant effect on his ability to process and recall details of the crimes, violated defendant's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to a fair trial and a reliable penalty determination in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We reject the claim for two reasons: first, defendant failed to preserve this claim for appeal; and second, the trial court's ruling did not violate defendant's constitutional rights. [6]
The trial court considered at an in limine hearing whether any of Michael Durbin's several prior convictions could be introduced against him as impeachment. The court ruled Durbin's 1992 burglary conviction was admissible, as was his 1997 conviction for spousal abuse, but excluded two other spousal abuse incidents as both too trivial and cumulative to the felony conviction. The court then considered the admissibility of Durbin's 1996 convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia and being under the influence of a controlled substance, offenses for which he was diverted from the criminal justice system. The court expressed its view that these crimes did not involve moral turpitude (see People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301 [211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111]) and that it intended to exclude them for that reason. When counsel for codefendant Phillips asserted that he intended to impeach Durbin with his drug use, the court repeated that the crimes did not involve moral turpitude but opined that it might change its mind if there was evidence Durbin was actually under the influence at the time of the crimes. The court then asked the parties whether Durbin was in fact under the influence of drugs when the crimes were committed. Mr. Wyatt, counsel for Phillips, said he did not know, but the prosecutor, Ms. Danville, spoke up, revealing that she had spoken to Durbin and L.R. the previous week and had learned, apparently for the first time, that they had each smoked some methamphetamine the day before the crimes. The prosecutor opined that she intended to question both witnesses on the topic before the jury. The following colloquy then occurred: THE COURT: All right. I think prior drug use is not relevant unless there's a denial that they had taken methamphetamine on or near the date of the events at issue. MR. WYATT: Well THE COURT: If they deny it, then, of course, we have direct impeachment potential there. But for the moment, simply credibility on other testimony, I'm excluding it, all right? MR. WYATT: Mythe reason I would want to go into [it] is, for instance, I didn't know about the methamphetamine until you just solicited it from the district attorney just a few seconds ago. But we know that people that are using drugs, particularly like methamphetamine or crack or PCP, the effect and the consequences are not just for the moment, that they may have delayed reactions, and that would affect their perceptions. THE COURT: That's a whole different issue than straight credibility. MR. WYATT: Oh, correct. THE COURT: Do you intend to call an expert? MR. WYATT: No, II think I can get it from either of them. I think they're probably users and probably are experts on drugs, and I think we can elicit that from their testimony. THE COURT: Miss Danville. Ms. DANVILLE: I would highly object. The fact that they had used some [drugs] the day before [the murder] and may have still been somewhat a little bit under the influence is relevant to their ability to perceive the events about which they're testifying, but beyond that it's extremely inflammatory, and it has no relevance to this case. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wyatt, you can ask them what they took on or around the date in question. MR. WYATT: Thank you. THE COURT: You can ask them the effects it had on them. MR. WYATT: Thank you. THE COURT: Beyond that I don't want you to go without a further [Evidence Code section] 402 [hearing] on the issue. MR. WYATT: Thank you. No, that's fine. I understand. Mr. Belter, defense counsel for defendant, uttered no comment and made no objection throughout this entire exchange. On direct examination, Michael Durbin testified he had smoked some methamphetamine the day before the crimes, that as a result he felt a bit tired the next day, but that the drug use did not otherwise affect him. When asked on cross-examination how much he had ingested, he testified he had smoked a quarter of a gram with his girlfriend, L.R. When Mr. Wyatt asked him when he next used drugs, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection. During Mr. Belter's cross-examination, Durbin affirmed his earlier testimony that his use of methamphetamine the day before the crimes had left him tired. He also stated that a quarter of a gram of methamphetamine was not a lot to smoke in one sitting for him. In her testimony, L.R. corroborated Durbin's testimony in every respect; that is, she testified she smoked a quarter of a gram of methamphetamine with Durbin the day before the crimes and felt tired the next day as a result. Neither defendant called an expert witness to describe the impact of long-term drug use on one's perception or memory.
Before we determine whether defendant's rights were violated, we must decide whether he preserved this claim for appellate review. Although Mr. Wyatt, counsel for codefendant Phillips, objected to the exclusion of evidence of Michael Durbin's drug use, defendant did not join in the objection or interpose his own. Generally, failure to join in the objection or motion of a codefendant constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal. ( People v. Santos (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 169, 180, fn. 8 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 719]; see People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1048 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277].) A litigant need not object, however, if doing so would be futile. ( People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 553 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137].) Defendant contends that having seen how the trial court treated his codefendant's motion, he reasonably believed making his own motion would have been futile. We disagree. The trial court permitted Phillips's counsel to ask Durbin what drugs he took around the time of the crime and their effect on him, but left the door open to eliciting additional information provided counsel would call an expert witness and undergo an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, presumably to determine the effect such drug use would have on a person's perception and recall ability. Defendant was thus on notice that an objection would not have been futile provided he satisfied the court's reasonable prerequisites. The court also stated it would reconsider its ruling if a party could present evidence that Durbin was under the influence at the time of the crimes. Because an objection would not necessarily have been futile, defendant's failure to object or affirmatively join codefendant Phillips's motion forfeited the issue for appeal. (6) Even had the issue been preserved, we would find no error. The Sixth Amendment provides that `[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.' This federal constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses in a criminal prosecution applies to the states ( Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400 [13 L.Ed.2d 923, 85 S.Ct. 1065]) and is also guaranteed independently by the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15) and by statute (§ 686). The primary reason an accused is entitled to confront adverse witnesses is to permit cross-examination. ( Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 106 S.Ct. 1431]; Alvarado v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1121 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 149, 5 P.3d 203].) `[T]he right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal. Indeed, ... to deprive an accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law.' ( Pointer v. Texas, supra, at p. 405.) ( People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 537-538.) `It does not follow, [however], that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness.' ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 207 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710].) Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. ( Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 20 [88 L.Ed.2d 15, 106 S.Ct. 292] ( per curiam ).) (7) The trial court's treatment of this issue was correct and did not violate defendant's constitutional rights. There was no evidence Michael Durbin had ingested any drugs on the day of the crimes, and neither counsel suggested they had evidence he was an habitual user. Moreover, even if he was, neither defense counsel accepted the trial court's suggestion to call an expert to lay a foundation regarding the effect of habitual methamphetamine use on one's ability to perceive and recall events. Evidence of habitual narcotics ... use is not admissible to impeach perception or memory unless there is expert testimony on the probable effect of such use on those faculties. ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 191 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]; see also People v. Pargo (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 594, 600 [50 Cal.Rptr. 719]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Presentation At Trial, § 266, pp. 337-338.) Defendant does not persuasively explain how this long-standing evidentiary rule undermined his ability to effectively cross-examine Michael Durbin or L.R. Even if the court had erred, we would find any error was harmless. Defendant was able to impeach Durbin with his two prior felony convictions and was also able to place before the jury evidence that both Durbin and L.R. had smoked methamphetamine the day before the crimes. There is no suggestion in the record, however, that either Durbin or L.R., as a result of their drug use, misperceived or misrecollected the details of the crimes. They were well acquainted with defendant, and their account, including details about seeing defendant choke the victim with a dog chain and beat him with D-cell batteries placed inside a gardener's glove, was amply corroborated by independent evidence. Moreover, the testimony of both witnesses was clear and direct and betrayed no suggestion their recall of the night in question was at all impaired by their previous drug use. In sum, defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal, and the trial court did not commit constitutional error, prejudicial or otherwise, in excluding the evidence of Michael Durbin's habitual drug use.