Opinion ID: 780331
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propensity

Text: 21 The government argues that evidence of all prior bad acts is relevant in the face of an entrapment defense. Our cases do not reach that far. 22 Generally, evidence of character, or of prior bad acts, is inadmissible when used to prove a defendant's propensity to commit the crime in question. Fed. R.Evid. 404. When the defendant raises an entrapment defense, however, such evidence becomes relevant. If the government has induced the defendant to break the law, `the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents.' Thomas, 134 F.3d at 978 (quoting Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992)). The character of the defendant is one of the elements — indeed, it is an essential element — to be considered in determining predisposition. Id. at 978, 980. As Federal Rule of Evidence 405(b) provides: In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may ... be made of specific instances of that person's conduct. 23 Nevertheless, we have held that evidence of prior bad acts is not relevant to prove predisposition unless the prior bad acts are similar to the charged crime. United States v. Bramble, 641 F.2d 681, 682 (9th Cir.1981). That is so because no probative purpose is served unless a rational inference can be drawn from the prior act ... that one induced to perform [the charged crime] was predisposed to do so. Id. at 683 n. 2. In Bramble, we held that an earlier conviction for possession of marijuana was not probative of[the defendant's] predisposition to sell cocaine and that the admission of evidence concerning the prior conviction was reversible error. Id. at 683; see also United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 807 (9th Cir.1990) (setting standards for admission of prior-bad-acts evidence to prove predisposition). 24 The government argues that the logic of our later opinion in Thomas undercuts those cases that require propensity evidence to be about acts that are reasonably similar to the charged crime. In Thomas, a prosecution for trafficking in a substantial quantity of methamphetamine, the defendant offered an entrapment defense. The government introduced evidence that Thomas was an occasional methamphetamine user and that he had sold two single doses of methamphetamine. In response, Thomas sought to testify that he had never been arrested or convicted of any crime. Thomas, 134 F.3d at 979. The district court disallowed the testimony, and we reversed. We explained that, 25 [f]or the jury to find predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt, it must consider the defendant's character. Although we have not labelled it as such, the well-settled rule that character must be considered is tantamount to a holding that it is an essential element of the defense, and we explicitly recognize it as such here.... [B]ecause Thomas' character was an essential element relevant to the determination of whether he was predisposed to engage in large-scale drug trafficking, the proffered evidence, which was far more probative than prejudicial as to the question whether he had the requisite state-of-mind prior to [the government informant's] repeated solicitation of him, was admissible under Rule 405(b). 26 Id. at 980 (citations omitted). 27 If Thomas could introduce evidence about his arrest-free and conviction-free past life in all respects, the government argues, then the government should be able to introduce evidence having a similar scope. Even if we were free to overrule Bramble and similar cases — which of course we are not — we are not persuaded. The two situations are different, so the two lines of cases coexist peacefully. 28 When a defendant argues that he was not predisposed to commit a particular crime, the only relevant response from the government is one that bears on his propensity to engage in that kind of criminal activity. For example, a person who has been convicted of reckless driving does not necessarily have a propensity to cheat on his taxes. 29 But when, in a hypothetical tax-evasion case, the government introduces evidence that the defendant has previously cheated private parties, the defendant may respond by rehabilitating his character generally. If the defendant has never been arrested or convicted of any crime, the jury can infer that the person did not commit any prior bad acts, including the ones to which the government's evidence alludes. By contrast, a rule that permitted the defendant only to deny specific bad acts would create the risk of a negative pregnant: If he could testify only that he has never been convicted of tax evasion, a jury reasonably may wonder whether he has committed other crimes, from assault to possession of heroin. 30 Because the inferences that can be drawn in the two situations are not parallel, there is no reason why the rules governing a defendant's good-character evidence and the government's bad-character evidence must be parallel. 31 Here, evidence of the prior bad acts was not admissible to prove propensity. Theft, extortion, and aiding a prison escape, although obviously serious crimes, bear little relationship to the drug-trafficking crimes with which Defendant was charged.