Opinion ID: 2403537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ireland's Easement Remedy

Text: [¶ 16] Carpenter and Loyen next argue that the court erred in granting Ireland's request for an easement over the subject property for at least three reasons: (1) the remedy granted by the court, an easement over Carpenter and Loyen's property, was not the remedy actually sought by Ireland; (2) the evidence on which Ireland relies does not support his entitlement to an easement, both because the agreement between the parties makes no provision for such an easement, and because Carpenter and Loyen claim they do not own the subject property over which the easement is sought; and (3) pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), the court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing before entering a judgment granting the remedy sought. Except as to the necessity of a hearing on the wording of the court's declaration, we disagree. [¶ 17] Ireland's complaint explicitly requested relief in the form of a declaration that pursuant to the terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Messrs. Carpenter and Loyen are required to grant George Ireland an easement onto their property so that Mr. Ireland can have reasonable access to move aircraft from his property to the runway on the Defendants' property via a paved taxi-way. Thus, contrary to Carpenter and Loyen's contention, Ireland did request that the court declare that he had an easement over the subject property. [¶ 18] Moreover, because Carpenter and Loyen were defaulted, their right to present evidence and arguments on the merits is very limited. Upon the entry of a default, all of Ireland's allegations are deemed to be true. See McAlister v. Slosberg, 658 A.2d 658, 660 (Me.1995) (When a default is entered against a defendant, the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint are deemed to be true and become findings of fact.). If true, all the allegations in Ireland's complaint would entitle him to the access rights he sought over the property owned by Carpenter and Loyen as granted to Ireland in the purchase and sale agreement. [¶ 19] In addition, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), conducting an evidentiary hearing prior to the entry of a default judgment is discretionary with the trial court: If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper .... (Emphasis added.) Carpenter and Loyen did not move the court to conduct such an evidentiary hearing, and the court determined that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary to its decision. [¶ 20] In this case, however, the nature and scope of the access granted to Ireland by the courtaccess rights and use of the runway at the south end of the runwayis ambiguous and requires clarification. We therefore remand the matter to the Superior Court for a hearing on the limited issue of the nature, scope, and location of the access rights to which Ireland is entitled. The entry is: Denial of motion to set aside the entry of a default is affirmed. Default judgment is vacated, and remanded to the Superior Court for a hearing on the nature, scope, and location of the easement to which Ireland is entitled.