Opinion ID: 68289
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: m iriam g il

Text: Miriam argues that the district court made erroneous Brady or Jencks Act rulings in three instances. In the first instance, Miriam moved to preclude Wilfredo Cabrera del Sol and Roberto Valle from testifying and to strike Juan Carlos Castellanos’s testimony because the government had not provided required 1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). 2 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). 4 disclosures. The district court denied Miriam’s motion. It concluded that the Supreme Court decisions requiring such disclosures were inapplicable because the government called these witnesses to rebut the defendant’s safety-valve statement. The district court’s ruling appears to be erroneous, at least insofar as it ruled that Brady is inapplicable to sentencing hearings. See Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 915–16 (11th Cir. 2001) (considering the merits of defendant’s claim of a Brady violation during his resentencing hearing). However, we need not address the propriety of the court’s ruling because Miriam does not show, or even argue, that the material she sought met the criteria for a Brady disclosure. See United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (setting forth criteria for a Brady claim).3 In the second instance, Miriam moved, under the Jencks Act, for production of the safety-valve statement that Valle had submitted in another case and for a portion of the PSI from that case. The district court denied the motion. It found 3 [T]o state . . . a [Brady] claim, a defendant must show (1) that the government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment evidence) . . . ; (2) that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence . . . ; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence . . . ; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Hansen, 262 F.3d at 1234 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 5 that disclosure was not required because Miriam had already pled guilty, and Valle was called only to rebut assertions that Miriam made in her safety-valve statement. This ruling also appears to be erroneous. The Jencks Act applies at sentencing hearings, and Valle was called by, and testified on direct examination for, the government. F ED. R. C RIM. P. 32. Again, however, the propriety of the court’s ruling is irrelevant because Miriam does not show, or even argue, that the documents she sought were “statements” under the meaning of the Jencks Act, or that they were related to the subject matter of Valle’s testimony. In the third instance, Miriam moved, under both Brady and the Jencks Act, for production of debriefing notes taken by law enforcement agents who interviewed Valle about his case. But these notes, as Miriam’s attorney confirmed, had been turned over to the defense. Therefore, the record does not support Miriam’s contention that the district court erroneously denied her motion for production of these notes. Because Miriam has not shown that she was denied access to any material that she was entitled to receive, we find no reversible error in the district court’s Brady and Jencks Act rulings. Although the record contains other references to required disclosures, the Jencks Act, and Brady, Miriam has abandoned any challenge to those by not addressing them plainly and prominently in her appellate 6 brief. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1284 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that a claim that is not “plainly and prominently” indicated is abandoned on appeal, even if properly preserved).
Miriam further argues that the district court clearly erred by determining that her safety-valve statement did not truthfully reveal her involvement in the offense. “When reviewing the denial of safety-valve relief, we review for clear error a district court's factual determinations. We review de novo the court's legal interpretation of the statutes and sentencing guidelines.” United States v. Johnson, 375 F.3d 1300, 1301 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citations omitted). The defendant has the burden of proving her eligibility for safety-valve relief. Id. at 1302. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for sentencing without regard to any statutory minimum (safety valve) when specific requirements are met. U.S. S ENTENCING G UIDELINES M ANUAL § 5C1.2(a) (2008). To qualify for safety-valve relief, the defendant must “truthfully disclose to the Government all information and evidence that [s]he has about the offense and all relevant conduct.” Johnson, 375 F.3d at 1302 (citation and quotation marks omitted). [I]t is the offense for which the defendant is convicted that determines the scope of information which 7 the defendant must disclose. Id. (citation omitted). In a conspiracy case, the defendant is required to provide all the information that [s]he possesses about [her] involvement in the offense, including information relating to the involvement of others and to the chain of the narcotics distribution. United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). We reject Miriam’s challenges to the district court’s finding that her safetyvalve statement failed to comply with §5C1.2(5)’s “tell-all” requirement. Although the government did not prove that Miriam possessed a gun in furtherance of her drug activities, details surrounding the recovery of her firearms were an important part of this case. The record supports the district court’s finding that Miriam was misleading about this. She stated that she did not know where the gun was and that she did not help the agents find it. However, a Drug Enforcement Administration agent rebutted her statements by testifying that Miriam told him exactly where the gun was. Thus, the record supports the district court’s finding that Miriam failed to comply with the “tell-all” requirement. We affirm the court’s denial of safety-valve relief.