Opinion ID: 1602674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendants williamson and miller.

Text: ¶ 11. In reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment, the well-established standard of review is de novo. One South, Inc. v. Hollowell, 963 So.2d 1156, 1160 (Miss.2007) ( citing Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 956 (Miss. 2007)). Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A summary judgment motion is only properly granted when no genuine issue of material fact exists. Jackson Clinic for Women, P.A. v. Henley, 965 So.2d 643, 649 (Miss.2007) ( citing PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowery, 909 So.2d 47, 49 (Miss.2005); Miller v. Meeks, 762 So.2d 302, 304 (Miss. 2000)). [T]he evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. One South, 963 So.2d at 1160; Green v. Allendale Planting Co., 954 So.2d 1032, 1037 (Miss.2007) ( quoting Price v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So.2d 479, 483 (Miss. 2006)). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact(s) exists, and the non-moving party must be given the benefit of the doubt concerning the existence of a material fact. Id. ( quoting Howard v. City of Biloxi, 943 So.2d 751, 754 (Miss.Ct.App. 2006)). Partial summary judgment is also permissible under our rules, utilizing the same criteria for a grant or denial of a summary judgment and the same standard of review on appeal. Id. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(d); Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 363 (Miss.1983). ¶ 12. The trial court found that the Waggoners knowingly agreed as a matter of law to the terms of their settlement agreement. The Waggoners argue, however, that, although they did sign a settlement agreement, they were not aware that it was a part of an aggregate settlement or that other attorneys were involved. They assert that if they had been adequately informed of the nature of the aggregate settlement, they would have demanded a larger portion of the aggregate settlement due to the fact that Barthel Waggoner suffered actual injuries, unlike other Williamson/Miller Annette Williams claimants. The trial court found that a question of fact existed only as to whether the Waggoners knowingly agreed to the generic and case-specific-expenses portion of the disbursement statement, but that the Waggoners did, as a matter of law, agree to the attorney's fees, the multi-district litigation fees, and a contribution to the Mississippi Trial Lawyers' Association. Therefore, the Waggoners could pursue their claims only with respect to the generic and case-specific expenses. In considering the provisions of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56, it is clear that the trial court inappropriately granted partial summary judgment when there existed genuine issues of material fact, including, inter alia, the issue of Waggoner's share of the aggregate settlement. ¶ 13. The trial court cannot try issues of fact on a Rule 56 motion; it may only determine whether there are issues to be tried. Pollard v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 955 So.2d 764, 769 (Miss.2007) ( quoting Daniels v. GNB, Inc., 629 So.2d 595, 599 (Miss.1993)). When material facts are in dispute, it is not the province of the trial court to grant summary judgment, thereby supplanting a full trial with its ruling. Id. ( quoting Daniels, 629 So.2d at 599). The trial court in this case decided genuinely disputed issues of material fact by deciding that the Waggoners knowingly agreed to the gross settlement amount, attorney's fees, multi-district litigation fees, and the contribution to the Mississippi Trial Lawyers' Association. The Waggoners contend that they could not have agreed to the terms of the disbursement statement because Williamson and Miller withheld information vital to the Waggoners' informed consent. They maintain that they were not even informed that the settlement was aggregate. The Waggoners further assert the disclosures specified under Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(g), which requires disclosures of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement, were withheld from them. ¶ 14. During the initial litigation between the Waggoners and American Home Products Corporation (AHP) in which Williamson represented the Waggoners, Williamson caused a representation agreement to be sent to Barthel Waggoner, and it was subsequently signed only by Mr. Waggoner. The agreement required Williamson to diligently represent Mr. Waggoner and stated that [t]he lawyer shall not compromise or settle said right of action without the knowledge and consent of said client(s). The other agreement at issue in the case sub judice is the aforementioned contract between AHP and Williamson and Miller settling the diet drug cases. Under the AHP agreement, Williamson and Miller had a contractual duty to comply with Rule 1.8 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the state counterpart. [8] The record reveals the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether this contract was breached, whether the Waggoners were negligently misrepresented, and whether Williamson and Miller breached their fiduciary duty. ¶ 15. In Owen v. Pringle , this Court held: Today a lawyer owes his client duties falling into three broad categories: (a) the duty of care, (b) a duty of loyalty, and (c) duties provided by contract ... Each lawyer owes each client a second duty, not wholly separable from the duty of care but sufficiently distinct that we afford it its own label, viz. the duty of loyalty, or, sometimes, fidelity. We speak here of the fiduciary nature of the lawyer's duties to his client, of confidentiality and of candor and disclosure. That an action may lie for the lawyer's breach of these duties is settled. Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So.2d 1242, 1244-45 (Miss.1991) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Owen v. Pringle, 621 So.2d 668, 671 (Miss. 1993). As such, summary judgment was improper in the case sub judice. The record establishes that there are genuine issues of material facts in support of the Waggoners' claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Without doubt, a lawyer has a duty to inform his client of all matters of reasonable importance related to the representation or arising therefrom. Tyson v. Moore, 613 So.2d 817, 827 (Miss.1992) (citation omitted). The Waggoners argue that Williamson's and Miller's secretive allocation of aggregate settlement funds themselves among the thirty-one (31) Mississippi clients and the fourteen (14) Washington, D.C. and Virginia clients and the inherent conflicts of interest associated therewith is the clearest example of the breach of common law duty of loyalty presented by the instant case. In Tyson, this Court stated: The duty of loyalty is fiduciary in nature. In the present context its breach may take one of two forms. The first involves situations in which the attorney obtains an unfair personal advantage, such as acquiring property from a client; the second involves situations in which the attorney or other clients have interests adverse to the client in question. We have recently defined the lawyer's duty of loyalty to include a duty to: safeguard the client's confidences and property, avoid conflicting interests that might impair the representation, and not employ adversely to the client powers conferred by the client-lawyer relationship. Id. at 823 ( quoting Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So.2d 1242, 1245 (Miss.1991)). ¶ 16. Furthermore, with respect to the Waggoners' claim of negligent misrepresentation, there are also genuinely disputed issues of material fact. In order to recover on the basis of negligent misrepresentation, the Waggoners must prove: (1) a misrepresentation or omission of a fact; (2) that the representation or omission is material or significant; (3) that the person charged with the negligence failed to exercise that degree of diligence and expertise the public is entitled to expect of such persons; (4) that they reasonably relied upon the [attorneys'] misrepresentation or omission; (5) that they suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of such reasonable reliance. Spragins v. Sunburst Bank, 605 So.2d 777, 780 (Miss.1992) (emphasis added). The record in the case sub judice reveals the existence of genuine issues of material fact concerning the Waggoners' claim of negligent misrepresentation, and summary judgment was inappropriate. The Waggoners assert that the nature of the settlement with AHP was misrepresented by Williamson and Miller, and they signed the disbursement statement only as a result of the misrepresentations made to them by counsel. ¶ 17. Genuinely disputed issues of material fact also exist with respect to damages. In order to mature into a tort, the negligent act must proximately produce recoverable damages. Caves v. Yarbrough, 991 So.2d 142, 147 (Miss.2008) (citing Methodist Hosp. of Miss. Annual Conference v. Gammel, 252 Miss. 229, 172 So.2d 762 (1965)). The Waggoners' expert, Donna Ingram (Ingram), a Certified Public Accountant, a Certified Fraud Examiner, and a Certified Forensic Accountant, accounts that the Waggoners sustained $1,165,228.10 in compensatory damages. The Waggoners contend that the injuries to Barthel Waggoner were equal to or greater than W89, [9] another Annette Williams claimant, who received $1,103,286 more than the Waggoners. As such, according to Ingram, the Waggoners are entitled to an increase of $551,642.99. Also, the Waggoners argue that claimants W3 and W91 should not have been included in the gross settlement with AHP, and claimant W17 was improperly allocated additional funds ranging from $450,000 to $885,000. If this is accurate, Ingram states the Waggoners' settlement amount should be increased $309,653.67. Ingram also sets forth the damages the Waggoners allegedly incurred for excessive attorney's fees, multi-district litigation fees, Mississippi Trial Lawyers Association contributions, and other client specific and common benefit adjustments. When viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Waggoners, it is clear that genuine issues of material fact exist, and summary judgment is improper. See Jackson Clinic for Women, P.A., 965 So.2d at 649 ( citing PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc., 909 So.2d at 49; Miller, 762 So.2d at 304); One South, 963 So.2d at 1160; Green, 954 So.2d at 1037 ( quoting Price, 920 So.2d at 483). ¶ 18. The trial court did not cite legal authority to support its ruling dismissing the Waggoners' claims with respect to the gross settlement amount and certain fees or contributions. However, we discuss here the trial court's ruling by considering the theories of waiver and estoppel and accord and satisfaction. In a recent case, this Court stated that it does not accept the proposition that, simply because the plaintiffs accepted the settlement funds, that they waived any right to sue for malpractice. Channel v. Loyacono, 954 So.2d 415, 426 (Miss.2007). [10] Clients maintain their right to sue for malpractice even after accepting settlement funds. Id. As a result, waiver and estoppel do not support the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, given the circumstances of this case. With respect to accord and satisfaction, Mississippi law sets forth four elements: `(1) something of value offered in full satisfaction of a demand; (2) accompanied by acts and declarations as amount to a condition that if the thing is accepted, it is accepted in satisfaction; (3) the party offered the thing of value is bound to understand that if he takes it, he takes subject to such conditions; and (4) the party actually does accept the item.' Id. ( quoting Medlin v. Hazlehurst Emergency Physicians, 889 So.2d 496, 498 (Miss.2004) (citations omitted)). In the case sub judice, the Waggoners did not demand anything of Williamson and Miller except reasonable care in legal service. Id. at 427. For the same reason, this Court in Channel determined that the signing of settlement agreements releases the person or entity settling with one's client, not the attorney representing his or her client. Id. at 426-27. Thus, in this respect, the settlement agreement signed by the Waggoners released AHP from liability and future claims, not Williamson and Miller, and accord and satisfaction does not undergird the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment. ¶ 19. The inconsistency in the trial court's ruling must also be noted. Contradicting its earlier reasoning, the trial court held that the Waggoners could present the factual circumstances related to generic and case-specific expenses to the jury, since the Waggoners could not have known whether these expenses were proper at the time they signed the disbursement statement. The Waggoners maintain that Williamson and Miller never disclosed to them the existence of an aggregate settlement and that they represented to the Waggoners that their settlement with AHP was individually negotiated and effectuated. This has a bearing on the Waggoners' acceptance of the settlement amount, the fees, the expenses, and any other amounts stated on the disbursement statement. [11] ¶ 20. Given that the Waggoners contend that the existence of an aggregate settlement was not disclosed to them, and that the disclosures required by law and the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct were not made to them it is apparent that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the Waggoners knowingly agreed to any of the items on the disbursement sheet. Certainly one cannot knowingly agree to the terms of an aggregate settlement without even the mere knowledge that an aggregate settlement exists. We find that the trial court erred and exceeded its authority in finding that the Waggoners knowingly agreed to some but not all items on the disbursement statement; therefore, this issue has merit. ¶ 21. Because we have found that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Williamson and Miller on the crucial issue before us, the trial court's judgment must be reversed and this case must be remanded to the trial court for a jury trial on all claims asserted by the Waggoners in their amended complaint. Based on the disposition of this issue, the remaining issues presented in today's appeal need not be discussed.