Opinion ID: 783483
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Conspiracy to Extort Instruction

Text: 187 We review de novo whether a district court's jury instructions constructively amend the indictment. United States v. Pisello, 877 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir.1989). 188 Racketeering Act 22, alleged in the substantive RICO count, charged that R. Hernandez and others conspired to obtain money and firearms from members of various street gangs.... The district court gave the following instruction on this crime: 189 Racketeering Act 22 charges [R. Hernandez] with conspiring to extort money and firearms from others. In order for a particular defendant to be found guilty of conspiring to extort money or property from another as charged in Racketeering Act 22, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 190 1. On or about the date charged, there was an agreement between two or more persons to extort money or other property from another as charged in the indictment. 191 ... 192 (Emphasis added). R. Hernandez argues that the instruction's use of money or other property when the indictment uses money or firearms amounts to a constructive amendment to the indictment. 193 A constructive amendment requires reversal, and has been found where (1) there is a complex of facts[presented a trial] distinctly different from those set forth in the charging instrument, or (2) the crime charged [in the indictment] was substantially altered at trial, so that it was impossible to know whether the grand jury would have indicted for the crime actually proved. Adamson, 291 F.3d at 615. Here, the district court's instruction did not constructively amend the indictment by replacing firearms with property because all the evidence at trial proved the crime alleged in the indictment. VII Sufficiency Arguments 194 We review de novo claims of insufficient evidence. Carranza, 289 F.3d at 641. There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find facts fulfilling the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 641-42. We also review de novo sufficiency of the indictment claims. United States v. Pernillo-Fuentes, 252 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir.2001). 195 Appellants argue that there was insufficient evidence (1) that Appellants participated in a RICO enterprise, and (2) that Appellants aided and abetted the distribution of narcotics. Gallardo argues that there was insufficient evidence (1) that he murdered Ricardo Gonzales, and (2) that he conspired and attempted to murder Eduardo Soriano. Mendez argues that there was insufficient evidence (1) that he conspired to violate RICO, (2) that he aided and abetted the distribution of narcotics, (3) that he conspired to murder Donald Ortiz, and (4) that the RICO pattern element was satisfied because the racketeering acts proven against Mendez were unrelated. Mendez also argues that the indictment insufficiently alleged that he conspired to distribute narcotics. Aguirre argues that insufficient evidence supported the jury's conclusion that his interest in a 1992 Honda Accord was forfeitable because he obtained the car as a result of the narcotics distribution conspiracy. 196 In light of the powerful corroborated evidence viewed most favorably to the government, these sufficiency claims are patently meritless and border on frivolous. Accordingly, we need not address these claims in detail. We hold that sufficient evidence exists to support the convictions of each Appellant and Aguirre's forfeiture. We also hold that the indictment sufficiently alleged that Mendez conspired to distribute narcotics. VIII Sentencing Issues 197 Appellants raise numerous issues regarding their sentencing. We review de novo the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, and review for an abuse of discretion the district court's application of the guidelines to the specific facts of a case. United States v. Alexander, 287 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2002). We review for clear error the district court's factual findings in the sentencing phase. United States v. Williams, 291 F.3d 1180, 1196 (9th Cir.2002). A preponderance of the evidence must support these factual findings. United States v. Montano, 250 F.3d 709, 713 (9th Cir.2001). A. Sentences Based on Murder Predicate Acts 198 The district court imposed life sentences on the following Appellants for first-degree murder: (1) Aguirre; (2) Gallardo; (3) Shryock; and (4) Therrien.
199 Gallardo and Therrien argue that the district court erred by applying U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 (2A1.1) for first-degree murder, rather than U.S.S.G. § 2A1.2 (2A1.2) for second-degree murder, because the jury did not return any findings that the murder predicate acts were in the first degree. We disagree. First, the district court has authority to find by a preponderance of the evidence that 2A1.1 rather than 2A1.2 applies. See United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 426-27 (4th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (holding that the district court can sentence a defendant convicted for distributing narcotics under 2A1.1 for a drug-related murder even if the jury did not find the defendant guilty of such murder, provided that the district court found the murder to have occurred by a preponderance of the evidence). Second, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) does not prevent the district court from applying 2A1.1 on these facts. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The jury convicted Appellants of murder under California state law, which provided a maximum term of life imprisonment whether the murder was in the first or second degree. Accordingly, the district court's decision to apply 2A1.1 rather than 2A1.2 did not change the statutory maximum sentence. 200
201 Shryock argues that the district court mistakenly applied 2A1.1 based on its clearly erroneous finding that the murder of Albert Orosco was in the first degree. We disagree because sufficient evidence in the record supported the district court's conclusion of premeditation where the evidence at trial showed that Shryock directed the killing of Orosco. B. Sentences Based on Drug Trafficking 202 In sentencing Arias, Barela, R. Castro, J. Hernandez, R. Hernandez, and Mendez, the district court relied on their convictions for aiding and abetting the distribution of narcotics. The district court applied U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 to the offenses, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount of drugs involved was sufficient to meet the requirements for offense level 38, the highest level. The jury did not make findings as to the amount of drugs involved. Instead, the district court made the drug quantity determinations that increased Appellants' statutory maximum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 841(b). 203 Arias, Barela, R. Castro, J. Hernandez, R. Hernandez, and Mendez make several arguments that the district court erred in sentencing them based on its drug quantity finding, including that (1) their sentences violate Apprendi, (2) the district court used the wrong standard in determining drug quantity, (3) the amount of drugs sold was not foreseeable, and (4) the district court did not individualize its determination as to responsibility. We need not address these issues because, assuming any error, Arias, Barela, R. Castro, J. Hernandez, and Mendez's sentences were justified by the doctrine of stacking. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d); Buckland, 289 F.3d at 570-71. Stacking applies when a defendant is convicted of multiple counts, one of which is a drug count. In such a case, the district court may determine the quantity of drugs by a pre-ponderance of the evidence and sentence the defendant based on that quantity determination. The sentence imposed may go as high as the sum of the maximum sentence for each count of conviction as if those sentences were imposed consecutively. Buckland, 289 F.3d at 570-71. Such a sentence does not violate Apprendi. 204 Here, stacking allowed the district court to impose sentences up to life imprisonment on Arias, Barela, R. Castro, J. Hernandez, and Mendez. The jury convicted these Appellants of — among other counts — a substantive RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) based on predicate acts that included murder. The maximum sentence for a RICO conviction is twenty years, or life if the underlying violation has a maximum sentence of life. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). Murder is punishable by up to life imprisonment (regardless of whether it is first-or second-degree murder). 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b). Because the jury convicted these Appellants of RICO violations based on predicate acts of murder, and the district court did not sentence them to more than life imprisonment, we affirm their sentences. 205 As the government concedes, however, the district court erred by sentencing R. Hernandez to life imprisonment. The jury convicted R. Hernandez of (1) a substantive RICO violation, based on predicate acts of conspiracy to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to extort, in violation of Cal.Penal Code §§ 182, 518; (2) a conspiracy RICO violation for the same predicate acts in the substantive RICO violation; and (3) conspiracy to distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The statutory maximum sentence supported by the jury verdicts against R. Hernandez was twenty years for each count. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Under the stacking rule, the district court may only sentence R. Hernandez to a maximum of sixty years. Accordingly, we vacate R. Hernandez's sentence and remand for re-sentencing. IX Forfeiture 206 On June 20, 1997, the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that Aguirre's interest in a 1992 Honda Accord was forfeitable under 21 U.S.C. § 853 because he obtained it as a result of the conspiracy to aid and abet the distribution of narcotics. Aguirre argues that we should reconsider our cases holding that the standard of proof in criminal forfeiture cases is the preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1576-77 (9th Cir.1989). Aguirre asserts that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the appropriate standard is beyond a reasonable doubt. 207 Forfeiture of all property connected with the charged offenses in this case is prescribed in the statutes proscribing the offenses themselves. See Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d at 1577 (noting that criminal forfeiture is an additional penalty for an offense). Apprendi only holds that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. We therefore join all other circuit courts of appeals that have considered the question, and conclude that Apprendi does not disturb the rule that statutorily-prescribed forfeiture is constitutional when supported by the preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 485-86 (4th Cir.2002); United States v. Gasanova, 332 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543, 550-51 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Vera, 278 F.3d 672, 672 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Cabeza, 258 F.3d 1256, 1257 (11th Cir.2001).