Opinion ID: 1938597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nature of Grand Jury Proceedings

Text: The grand jury serves a dual function in our criminal justice system, United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423, 103 S.Ct. 3133, 3137, 77 L.Ed.2d 743 (1983), operating as both a sword and a shield. 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 101 (2d ed. 1982) (quoting In re Grand Jury January, 1969, 315 F.Supp. 662, 671 (D.Md.1970)). While the grand jury is granted very broad investigatory powers to determine whether there is probable cause for criminal indictment, see, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344, 94 S.Ct. 613, 618, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), it also serves as a protective bulwark ... between the ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor.... United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.Ct. 764, 773, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973). A policy of secrecy has been deemed necessary to enable the grand jury to fulfill its dual purposes. Sells Eng'g, supra, 463 U.S. at 424, 103 S.Ct. at 3138 (citing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681, 78 S.Ct. 983, 986, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958)). This policy of secrecy is older than our Nation itself, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399, 79 S.Ct. 1237, 1241, 3 L.Ed.2d 1323 (1959); see also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 1673 n. 9, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979), and is codified in the criminal procedure rules of both the federal and District of Columbia courts. See FED.R.CRIM.P. 6; Super.Ct.Crim.R. 6. Secrecy has been found to protect several identified interests: (1) [t]o prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt. Procter & Gamble, supra, 356 U.S. at 681-82 n. 6, 78 S.Ct. at 986 n. 6 (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3rd Cir.1954)). Whether the policy of secrecy continues to serve a legitimate purpose is the subject of ongoing debate, see 1 WRIGHT, supra, § 106 n. 2, particularly where a breach of secrecy after the completion of a grand jury proceeding is contemplated. Id. at 244-45; see, e.g., United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 662-63 (2d Cir.1978). The Supreme Court has stated that the interest in secrecy is reduced [but] not eliminated merely because the grand jury has ended its activities. Douglas Oil, supra, 441 U.S. at 221-24, 99 S.Ct. at 1674-76. We think it necessary for a court to carefully evaluate the impact of disclosure on the interests promoted by grand jury secrecy, even when the request for disclosure arises after the proceedings have concluded, in order to strike an appropriate balance between the investigatory powers of the state and the rights of individual citizens. Further, some argue (including appellant here) that the policy of grand jury secrecy gives the government an unfair advantage when considered in light of the government's on-going custody of grand jury transcripts. See Super.Ct.Crim.R. 6(e)(1). [12] Because the transcripts are within its control, the government has use of them in preparing for trial, [13] while the defendant's access to transcripts is very limited. See discussion of Discovery Rules and Jencks Act, infra. While it is obvious that in comparison with the right of the defendant and third parties, the right of the government to see and use the grand jury minutes is incomparably the greatest, 1 M. RHODES, ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 6:123 (2d ed. 1985), and that the record of a grand jury proceeding constitutes a huge storehouse of relevant data which [is] in the exclusive possession of the government, United States v. Ball, 49 F.R.D. 153, 159 (E.D.Wis.1969), defendants are not entitled to production of grand jury minutes solely for the reason that the government had the use of them in preparing its case. 1 RHODES, supra, § 6:123. This asymmetry in access to information is built into our criminal justice system and represents a justifiable balance between the competing interests of the accused and the public. We note that legislatures and courts have balanced similarly competing interests in determining the appropriate scope of discovery in criminal prosecutions. While broad discovery rules promote the fullest presentation of the facts, minimize opportunities for falsification of evidence and eliminate the vestiges of trial by combat, State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953) (quotation omitted), a defendant need not be afforded access to the whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully.... United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y.1923) (Learned Hand, J.). Under Super.Ct.Crim.R. 16, which governs pretrial discovery in this jurisdiction, an accused has the right to discover specific types of information within the government's control, including any written record of the defendant's relevant statements. [14] However, internal documents made by the government in connection with an investigation or prosecution are excluded from the scope of discovery. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 16(a)(2). Thus, Rule 16 represents a considered balance between the interests of the accused and the state. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988), is another method by which an accused may secure information in the possession of the prosecutor. After a government witness has testified at trial an accused has the right, pursuant to the Jencks Act, to review any prior statements by that witness that are within the government's control and are relevant to the witness' direct testimony, including the witness' testimony before a grand jury. The advantages provided in the Jencks Act were never intended to be transposed to the pretrial context; rather, the heavy burden incumbent upon the prosecution pursuant to that act was intended to safeguard the fairness of criminal trials by providing defendants with appropriate tools for cross-examination. United States v. Wolfson, 289 F.Supp. 903, 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Thus, a defendant is prevented from tailoring his defense in response to a pretrial review of the grand jury testimony of witnesses who will eventually testify at trial. The Jencks Act represents a balancing of the interests of the accused and the state similar to that underlying the policy of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings and the limits on the otherwise broad discovery rules.