Opinion ID: 15663
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Complete Preemption Analysis

Text: Although ordinary and complete preemption are conceptually and functionally distinct, they are analytically related insofar as ordinary preemption is a necessary——but obviously not a sufficient——precondition to complete preemption in the context of ERISA. In Hartle v. Packard Electric, we held that ordinary preemption was a prerequisite to [the] exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to complete preemption.30 Accordingly, the first step 29 See, e.g., Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 943 n.1 (7th Cir. 1989) (commenting that [t]he use of the term ‘complete preemption’ is unfortunate, since the complete preemption doctrine is not a preemption doctrine but rather a federal jurisdiction doctrine). 30 877 F.2d 354, 355 (5th Cir. 1989) (A prerequisite to this exercise of [complete preemption] jurisdiction, however, is that the state law claims actually be preempted by ERISA.). 22 in the complete preemption analysis is to determine whether the claim is subject to ordinary preemption under section 514(a).31 This leaves the obvious question of what more is required to bring a claim subject to ordinary preemption within the scope of complete preemption. This question has been answered, at least in substantial part, by the Supreme Court in Franchise Tax Board and Taylor. In Franchise Tax Board, the Court suggested, but did not have occasion to hold, that the civil remedies provided by ERISA might give rise to complete preemption, stating that “[i]t may be that, as with § 301 as interpreted in Avco, any state action coming within the scope of § 502(a) of ERISA would be removable to federal district court, even if an otherwise adequate state cause of action were pleaded without reference to federal law. 103 S.Ct at 2854. Subsequently, in Taylor, the Court reached and decided this issue, holding that section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA completely preempted state law claims falling within its scope.32 In Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems, Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 31 Our subsequent cases have followed this two-step approach. See, e.g., Kramer v. Barney, 80 F.3d 1080, 1083 (Having concluded that [Plaintiff’s] state law claims are preempted, we must next consider whether ERISA displaces those claims under the complete preemption doctrine.); and Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1313 (applying two-prong analysis). 32 107 S.Ct. at 1547-48. The Court also noted that Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action within the scope of § 502(a) removable to federal court. Id. at 1548. 23 1315 (5th Cir. 1994), we construed the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor as holding that complete preemption in the context of ERISA applies to those claims that fall within the scope of section 502(a).33 In Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080 (5th Cir. 1996), we construed Taylor a bit more narrowly, interpreting its specific holding as being limited to claims falling within the scope of section 502(a)(1). Id. at 1083. We reasoned, however, that the Court’s analysis supported extending the scope of complete preemption to claims falling under section 502(a)(2), and held that because [plaintiff’s] state law claims fall within the enforcement provisions of section 502, they are completely preempted and the action was properly removed to the district court. Id. at 1084. Thus, this Court has held, in essence, that state law claims falling within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions contained in section 502(a) are completely preempted.34 33 Id. at 1315 (holding that plaintiff’s claim falls within the scope of the civil enforcement provision, and hence created removal jurisdiction.). 34 In describing the scope of complete preemption as generally including those claims falling within section 502(a), we note that there exists some ambiguity in the caselaw as to whether the scope of complete preemption is limited to only those claims falling within section 502(a)(1)(B), or whether complete preemption encompasses all claims falling within the scope of section 502(a). The Supreme Court’s opinion in Taylor dealt with a claim that was preempted by section 502(a)(1)(B), and consequently it could be argued that the Court’s holding was limited to that subsection. However, the Court appeared to base its conclusion regarding the scope of complete preemption under ERISA on the explicit direction from Congress that it found in the legislative history of the statute. Taylor, 107 S.Ct. at 1547. The Court summarized this 24 Applying this two-prong analysis to the facts of the case sub judice, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief did not trigger complete preemption. We begin by assuming, arguendo only, that the district court was correct in its holding that the motion sufficiently related to an ERISA plan to implicate ordinary preemption under section 514(a), thus disposing of the first prong of our analysis. Proceeding to the second explicit direction as indicating that Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) removable to federal court. Id. at 1548. Thus, it is potentially unclear whether the Court intended its holding to apply to section 502(a)(1)(B) or to all of section 502(a). In Kramer, we held that the Supreme Court’s reasoning, if not its specific holding, in Taylor supported complete preemption based on section 502(a)(2). 80 F.3d at 1083. Some courts, however, appear to have limited complete preemption to section 502(a)(1)(B), while others seem to anticipate that complete preemption potentially encompasses the full range of causes of action provided by 502(a). Compare, e.g., Lupo v. Human Affairs International, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the § 1109 fiduciary claims discussed by [defendant-appellee] are not the § 1132(a)(1)(B) claims that provide the complete preemption necessary to satisfy the well-pleaded-complaint rule in accordance with [Taylor]), with Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 654-57 (9th Cir. 1998) (considering the possibility of complete preemption removal based on causes of action authorized by each subsection of section 502(a)). For other examples of the application of complete preemption in the ERISA context, see, e.g., Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 1995); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1995), and Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 1995). We do not intend our brief discussion of complete preemption to be interpreted as expanding its scope under ERISA. Because it is not essential to the determination of the case sub judice, and because it is not clear that there is any persisting conflict between our position and those of our sister circuits, we leave the tasks of further exposition and more precise definition of the scope of complete preemption under ERISA to future cases. 25 prong, we have little difficulty in determining that the plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction does not fall within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of section 502(a). Initially we note that the plaintiffs were not acting as participants or beneficiaries in seeking injunctive relief;35 and the motion clearly does not seek to recover benefits or enforce rights under an ERISA plan pursuant to section 502(a)(1)(B).36 Nor does the motion seek relief for a breach of fiduciary duty,37 or for violations of the reporting requirements.38 In sum, the plaintiffs’ motion does not appear to assert a claim that falls within any of 35 As discussed above, the underlying class action asserts various state claims involving Mobil’s alleged violation of workers’ compensation law. As such, this suit implicates the employer-employee relationship and not a relationship dependent upon the existence of an ERISA plan. Or, in other words, this suit is not between traditional ERISA entities. 36 It might be argued that because in ruling on the motion a court would necessarily construe the waiver provision, the motion implicitly sought a clarification of rights to future benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B). This argument, however, necessarily fails because the plaintiffs were not acting as participants or beneficiaries in seeking the injunctive relief that might result in a clarification of future rights. Thus, the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief does involve the parties as traditional ERISA entities. Furthermore, we note that our decision in Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 1994), would appear to foreclose the general argument that the construal of a waiver provision contained in an ERISA plan, or executed in partial consideration for benefits under an ERISA plan, gives rise to complete preemption. 37 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). 38 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4). 26 the causes of action provided by section 502(a).39 Thus, although the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief may relate to an ERISA plan, thereby triggering ordinary preemption, we can find no basis for holding that the motion asserted a claim falling within the scope of section 502(a). We therefore hold that the district court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs’ motion asserted a claim arising under federal law, so as to provide the basis for original jurisdiction necessary to support removal.