Opinion ID: 1233143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Injury Direct & Proximate Result

Text: The final requirement in the statute is that the employee's injury must have occurred as a direct and proximate result of the unsafe working condition. Id. § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(E). Clearly there was sufficient evidence presented from which the jury could conclude that the employee was following the procedure utilized in the restaurant to dispose of the grease, that his injuries were serious and that they were the direct and proximate result of the unsafe working condition. The statute requires that the trier of fact, in this case the jury, determine whether the above-mentioned requirements are proven through special interrogatories. Id. § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii). In this case, the jury, utilizing the special interrogatories, found for the appellee. We have previously stated that when presented with the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict [w]e recognize that in view of a favorable jury verdict, the facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cline v. Joy Mfg. Co., ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 310 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1983) (citing Wager v. Sine, 157 W.Va. 391, 201 S.E.2d 260 (1973); Lambert v. Goodman, 147 W.Va. 513, 129 S.E.2d 138 (1963)). We find that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdict in this case. Thus we conclude that a plaintiff employee may establish deliberate intention in a civil action against an employee for a work-related injury by offering evidence to prove the five specific requirements provided in W.Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii). Ironically, this is not the sort of case wherein, under all the facts and circumstances, the appellee could probably have prevailed under the extremely narrow concept of deliberate intent enunciated in Mandolidis. See 246 S.E.2d at 907. The reason the appellee would likely have been unsuccessful under Mandolidis is because we do not perceive this as the type of injury result[ing] from wilful, wanton or reckless misconduct [where] such ... injury [wa]s no longer accidental in any meaningful sense of the word, and [therefore] must be taken as having been inflicted with deliberate intention ... Id. at 914. However, the legislature, in an apparent effort to narrow the parameters of civil liability for employers, has indeed broadened the concept by enactment of the five-part test of W.Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii).