Opinion ID: 202583
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discriminatory Motivation

Text: 19 The district judge held that Velázquez failed to produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to believe that Velázquez's military service was at least a motivating factor in Horizon's decision to fire him. That is, the judge ruled that Velázquez was unable to show that Horizon at least partially based its decision to fire him on his military service. The district judge gave three principal reasons for this ruling. First, he discounted Velázquez's testimony of anti-military remarks made by his co-workers, in part because he had not reported any harassment to Horizon. Second, he said that the evidence of the timing of his firing close to a return from training was of no probative value because he had returned from several other training sessions without being fired. Third, he noted that other Horizon employees in the military had not been demoted or fired. Although the district judge correctly cited the motivating factor test of Sheehan, we believe, after carefully reviewing the record, that the judge committed error on each of these three points. 20 First, the court discounted Velázquez's testimony of anti-military remarks because it was his own self-serving testimony and because he had not previously reported it or made a formal complaint. Here, the distinction in Rule 56 between specific facts and mere allegations is important. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Had Velázquez merely rested on allegations of military discrimination, this would be a different case. Instead, he provided deposition testimony presenting specific instances of anti-military remarks, as well as complaints and pressure from his superiors, and it is for the jury, not the judge, to determine his credibility. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ([c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge). 21 Moreover, whether a nonmovant's deposition testimony or affidavits might be self-serving is not dispositive. It is true that testimony and affidavits that merely reiterate allegations made in the complaint, without providing specific factual information made on the basis of personal knowledge are insufficient. Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 53 (citing Roslindale Coop. Bank v. Greenwald, 638 F.2d 258, 261 (1st Cir.1981)). However, a party's own affidavit, containing relevant information of which he has first-hand knowledge, may be self-serving, but it is nonetheless competent to support or defeat summary judgment. Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 961 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1997)). Therefore, provided that the nonmovant's deposition testimony sets forth specific facts, within his personal knowledge, that, if proven, would affect the outcome of the trial, the testimony must be accepted as true for purposes of summary judgment. See Napier v. F/V Deesie, Inc., 454 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir.2006); Simas v. First Citizens' Fed. Credit Union, 170 F.3d 37, 50-51 (1st Cir.1999). 22 On appeal, Horizon argues that the anti-military comments were just stray remarks, and as such cannot be sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus. If true, that would undermine Velázquez's argument that the issues raised are genuine. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. But Horizon's argument oversimplifies the analysis. 7 First, it is only true that `stray workplace remarks' ... normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish ... the requisite discriminatory animus. González v. El Día, Inc. 304 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.2002) (emphasis added); see Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 36 (1st Cir.2001). Here, Velázquez points not only to the remarks by co-workers, but also to complaints by Batista and others about the difficulty of adjusting Velázquez's work schedule, and to the timing of his firing (which we address below). See McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 300-01 (1st Cir.1998) (stray remarks may properly constitute evidence of discriminatory intent for the jury to consider in combination with other evidence); cf. Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 55 (decisionmaker's comments and timing of firing are material facts for a jury to consider). 23 Here, the remarks that Velázquez testified to were not made by those who participated in the decision to fire him, and this does limit their probativeness. See McMillan, 140 F.3d at 301. But at least one such speaker, Juan Carrero, was shift marine manager and appears to be superior to Velázquez. Carrero was also in part responsible for scheduling, which was the source of Horizon's problems with Velázquez. Thus, his remarks could carry some weight with a jury. Furthermore, stray remarks by nondecisionmakers, while insufficient standing alone to show discriminatory animus, may still be considered evidence of a company's general atmosphere of discrimination, and thus can be relevant. Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 55 (citing Sweeney v. Bd. of Trustees of Keene State Coll., 604 F.2d 106, 113 (1st Cir.1979)). [S]uch evidence ... does tend to add `color' to the employer's decisionmaking processes and to the influences behind the actions taken with respect to the individual plaintiff. Cummings v. Standard Register Co., 265 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir.1987)). 8 24 Finally, the fact that Velázquez failed to report the remarks earlier is not dispositive. Cf. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (holding that plaintiff's failure to report sexual harassment is not an affirmative defense to a Title VII claim where plaintiff was discharged). In an atmosphere such as a working seaport, it is reasonable for a person to avoid making a scene over such behavior, or even to believe that the behavior is only in jest, only to discover too late that it was a harbinger of worse discrimination to come. Velázquez's failure to report the behavior may be considered by a jury in judging his credibility, but it is evident to us that a jury could reasonably decide to place no weight on his prior silence. Thus, it is a jury that should ultimately decide. 25 The district judge next discounted the timing of Velázquez's firing, saying that the fact that he was fired after returning from his military service is of no probative value, given that he had returned from other periods of service without being fired. But the emphasis of Velázquez's argument is elsewhere. The important factor, he argues, is not the time of his return from service, but rather the time of his final recoupment of the salary differential that he owed to Horizon. Horizon, according to Velázquez, waited until Velázquez had paid back the money he owed Horizon for the periods when his civilian salary was supplemented by his military salary. Once he had repaid the overage, he claims, Horizon then found the pretext to fire him. 26 Such facts, if true, could be considered evidence of discriminatory animus. The other USERRA cases that address the timing of firing look at proximity in time between the employee's military activity and the adverse employment action. Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1014; see Maxfield v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 427 F.3d 544, 552 (8th Cir.2005). But that is not an exclusive test, and there is no reason to limit ourselves to looking only at the proximity of the adverse employment action to military activity. The proximity to other military-related events may also be probative. If what Velázquez alleges is true, Horizon should not escape liability for making the tactical decision to wait until it recouped the salary it was owed before using a pretext to fire Velázquez. 27 Finally, the district judge held that the fact that the company had not fired other employees who served in the military demonstrated that they did not fire Velázquez for discriminatory reasons. As an initial matter, the failure to treat all members of a class with similar discriminatory animus does not preclude a claim by a member of that class who is so treated. Cf. Conn. v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (1982) (Title VII does not permit the victim of a facially discriminatory policy to be told that he has not been wronged because other persons of his or her race or sex were hired); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (A racially balanced work force cannot immunize an employer from liability for specific acts of discrimination.). 28 Furthermore, the district court failed to address Velázquez's argument that the other employees were not shift employees, and that therefore their military service did not cause as much scheduling conflict as his did. A reasonable jury could conclude that the different situations of these employees could result in Horizon firing Velázquez for his military service, while tolerating the other employees serving in the military. 29 For these reasons, we find that Velázquez has presented sufficient facts to withstand summary judgment on the question of whether his military status was at least a motivating factor in his dismissal. The issue is one for a jury.