Opinion ID: 2158909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Request for a Continuance

Text: [¶ 6] Dorey contends that the court exceeded the bounds of its discretion in denying his request for a continuance. He contends that he presented sufficient grounds for the court to grant his motion and that the court's exercise of discretion was prejudicial. [¶ 7] The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to protection from harassment claims unless they are inconsistent with the statute. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4658(1) (2002). The Rules provide: A motion for continuance of an action shall be made not less than 4 days before the date set for commencement of trial in the action; but if the cause or ground of the motion is not then known, the motion may be made as soon as practicable after the cause or ground becomes known. M.R. Civ. P. 40(b). An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial or under Rule 26(g) [Discovery Motions], shall be made in writing .... M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). [¶ 8] A party seeking a continuance has the burden of showing sufficient grounds for granting the motion, and the ruling of the presiding justice is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Provenzano v. Deloge, 2000 ME 149, ¶ 11, 755 A.2d 549, 551 (internal quotation marks omitted). The party requesting the continuance must establish a substantial reason why granting the continuance would further justice. Id. Even in the absence of a formal motion for a continuance, the same discretionary principles should apply to a refusal to delay a proceeding. State v. Greenwald, 454 A.2d 827, 829 (Me.1982) (trial court refused to delay proceedings so defendant could locate a witness). [¶ 9] We recognize that a telephone call to the clerk's office is not effective to file a motion for a continuance pursuant to the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). Nonetheless, in the specific circumstances of the present case, the court exceeded the bounds of its discretion in denying Dorey's request that the hearing be continued because, having been served only fifty-five minutes before the hearing, Dorey did not receive notice of the petition, the temporary order, and the date of the full hearing in time to develop any defense, or even in time to file a proper motion for a continuance. Cf. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Labbe, 401 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Me.1979) (holding court abused its discretion in denying continuance when letter announcing hearing was ambiguous and failed to give notice of the true nature of the scheduled hearing). We do not reach Dorey's other contentions. The entry is: Judgment vacated and remanded for a new hearing.