Opinion ID: 754070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Fourth Amendment and Roving Border Patrol Stops

Text: 5 The Supreme Court addressed the Border Patrol's authority to stop automobiles near the Mexican border in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), finding that such authority exists only where Border Patrol agents are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country. Id. at 884, 95 S.Ct. at 2582. Specifically, Brignoni-Ponce required the Court to address whether roving Border Patrol agents may stop a vehicle near the Mexican border where the only ground for suspicion is that the vehicle's occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry. Id. at 876, 95 S.Ct. at 2577-78. The Court held that the mere appearance of Mexican ancestry did not alone amount to the reasonable suspicion necessary for a roving Border Patrol stop near the border. Id. at 886-87, 95 S.Ct. at 2582-83. 6 The Court began by noting that the Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures involving only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Id. at 878, 95 S.Ct. at 2578-79 (citing, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Quoting from the seminal Terry decision, the Court explained that a police officer's restraint of an individual's freedom to walk away constitutes a seizure, for which the Fourth Amendment imposes a reasonableness requirement. Id. The reasonableness of such a seizure, as the Court pointed out, depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. Id. 7 The Court then examined the interests at stake, finding that [b]ecause of the limited nature of the intrusion, stops of this sort may be justified on facts that do not amount to the probable cause required for an arrest. Id. at 880, 95 S.Ct. at 2580. In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined the public interest in effective prevention of illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican border, which creates significant economic and social problems. Id. at 878-79, 95 S.Ct. at 2579. Against this valid public interest, the Court weighed the interference with individual liberty that results when an officer stops an automobile and questions its occupants, finding this intrusion to be modest. Id. at 879, 95 S.Ct. at 2579. The Court concluded: 8 [B]ecause of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, we hold that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation. 9 Id. at 881, 95 S.Ct. at 2580. 10 The Court elaborated by noting that the reasonableness requirement allows the government adequate means of guarding the public interest and also protects residents of the border areas from indiscriminate official interference. Id. at 883, 95 S.Ct. at 2581. As such, the Court found that, even though the intrusion on personal liberty by roving Border Patrol agents is modest, it is not 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment to make such stops on a random basis. Id. Finally, although holding that the apparent Mexican ancestry of the vehicle's occupants was one of several factors that legitimately inform the reasonable suspicion analysis, the Court nonetheless found that standing alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens. Id. at 887, 95 S.Ct. at 2583. 11