Opinion ID: 1392599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Professional Standard of Care

Text: Although this court has not explicitly announced a rule setting forth a separate standard of care for professionals, we have implicitly considered and accepted such a standard in several cases. For instance, in 1979, in Kemmerlin v. Wingate , 274 S.C. 62, 261 S.E. (2d) 50 (1981), Justice Ness, writing for the majority, noted that as a professional, an accountant was held to the standard of care of other accountants. 261 S.E. (2d) at 51. There, we affirmed the involuntary nonsuit rendered against the plaintiff because he failed to present any evidence tending to show the standard of care applicable to professional accountants or any damages proximately caused by the accountants' acts or omissions. In King v. Williams , 276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E. (2d) 618, 620 (1981), this court abolished the locality rule which adjudged a physician's skills against those of other physicians in his community, and adopted a professional standard of care not bound by any geographical restrictions. We articulated the standard of care which must be observed by a physician as that of an average, competent practitioner acting in the same or similar circumstances. 279 S.E. (2d) at 620. We approved a judge's instruction to a jury in a medical malpractice case concerning the standard of care for a physician in Cox v. Lund , 286 S.C. 410, 334 S.E. (2d) 116 (1985). There, the trial judge instructed that to reach a verdict against the doctor for malpractice, the jury would have to find by the greater weight of the evidence that the physician did not possess the degree of skill common to other doctors, or that he failed or was negligent in so exercising such skills in the treatment of a patient. 334 S.E. (2d) at 119. The trial judge further charged that in a malpractice case, the negligence was the failure to do that which an ordinary, careful and prudent physician or surgeon would do under the circumstances shown by the evidence to have existed at the time of the transaction in question, or, it [was] the doing of that which an ordinary, careful and prudent physician or surgeon would not have done under the same circumstances. 334 S.E. (2d) at 119. Thus, we again impliedly recognized a separate standard of care for physicians. Our court of appeals also had occasion to address the issue of a professional standard of care in Welch v. Whitaker , 282 S.C. 251, 317 S.E. (2d) 758 (Ct. App. 1984). In Welch , the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the ophthalmologist because the plaintiff presented no expert medical testimony that the ophthalmologist deviated from the recognized standard among ophthalmologists. 317 S.E. (2d) at 762. The court applied the professional standard in Welch specifically to the scope of a physician's duty to disclose information, but generally to the negligence cause of action. Again, in Folkens v. Hunt , 290 S.C. 194, 348 S.E. (2d) 839, 843 (Ct. App. 1986), the court of appeals analyzed the standard of care for a professional in a malpractice action. The court stated that a public accountant who fails to perform in accordance with accepted professional standards may be liable in tort to his client for his negligence. 348 S.E. (2d) at 842. The court further expounded on the standard of care and competence of public accountants by explaining that accountants must render their services with that degree of skill, care, knowledge and judgment usually possessed and exercised by members of that profession ... in accordance with accepted professional standards and in good faith without fraud or collusion. 348 S.E. (2d) at 843. See also, Bonaparte v. Floyd , 291 S.C. 427, 354 S.E. (2d) 40, 45 (Ct. App. 1987). (To recover for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must show failure by a physician to exercise that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession under similar conditions and in like circumstances.) Although our courts have previously recognized the professional standard of care, this court has not heretofore set forth with precision the standard of care to be used to measure the conduct of professionals. We now hold that in a professional negligence cause of action, the standard of care that the plaintiff must prove is that the professional failed to conform to the generally recognized and accepted practices in his profession. If the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that the professional failed to conform to the generally recognized and accepted practices in his profession, then the professional cannot be found liable as a matter of law. In setting forth such a standard, we defer to the collective wisdom of a profession, such as physicians, dentists, ophthalmologists, accountants and any other profession which furnishes skilled services for compensation. See, Kemmerlin v. Wingate , 274 S.C. 62, 261 S.E. (2d) 50 (1981). Establishing such a standard which measures conduct of a professional against other professionals is rooted, as Professor Prosser commented, in this court's healthy respect ... for the learning of a fellow profession, and [our] reluctance to overburden it with liability based on uneducated judgment. Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts , § 32, p. 189 (5th ed. 1984).