Opinion ID: 2130351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: osha preemption

Text: Generally, the existence of federal laws or regulations in a particular area can preempt state action in the same field where preemption is either express, implied, or the result of a conflict between state and federal law. [10] In each of these situations, the extent to which federal law actually preempts state authority is a question of congressional intent. `[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.' Fort Halifax Packing Co v Coyne, 482 US 1, 8; 107 S Ct 2211; 96 L Ed 2d 1 (1987) (quoting Malone v White Motor Corp, 435 US 497, 504; 98 S Ct 1185; 55 L Ed 2d 443 (1978). In addition, [w]here, as here, the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally occupied by the States ... `we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 US 218, 230 [67 S Ct 1146; 91 L Ed 1447] (1947). Jones v Rath Packing Co, 430 US 519, 525; 97 S Ct 1305; 51 L Ed 2d 604 (1977).
The defendant does not argue that OSHA expressly preempts the application of state criminal laws to conduct in the workplace. [11] The Court of Appeals, however, apparently found such express preemption by virtue of § 18 of the act. Section 18 provides in relevant part: (a) Assertion of State standards in absence of applicable Federal standards Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no standard is in effect under section 655 of this title. (b) Submission of State plan for development and enforcement of State standards to preempt applicable Federal standards Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for development and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relating to any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard has been promulgated under section 655 of this title shall submit a State plan for the development of such standards and their enforcement. The Court of Appeals properly interpreted this language to mean that a state may assert jurisdiction over an occupational safety and health issue  only if there is no federal standard in effect ... or the state has submitted its own enforcement plan to the United States Secretary of Labor for approval pursuant to [§ 18(b)]. People v Hegedus, supra, p 67 (emphasis added). However, the Court of Appeals then improperly concluded that the prosecution of the defendant in this case in fact amounted to an assertion of jurisdiction over just such an issue. The Court of Appeals reasoned that since OSHA does contain standards regulating the existence and allowable proportions of carbon monoxide in the workplace, the state may not exert jurisdiction over this issue except through an approved state plan. Id., p 68. Observing that this case was not prosecuted under the state's approved plan (MIOSHA), but rather on general criminal charges, the Court concluded that such prosecution was an improper attempt not only to circumvent the penalties prescribed in MIOSHA, but also to assert jurisdiction over a federally covered occupational safety and health issue through means other than an approved plan. The Court of Appeals misreads § 18. Section 18(a) has the clear effect of actually preserving state jurisdiction over safety and health issues with respect to which no federal standard exists, while the language of § 18(b) is expressly limited to the development and enforcement of state standards relating to such issues, and thus does not affect the enforcement of a state's general criminal laws. The term occupational safety and health standard is defined as a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment. 29 USC 652(8). The manslaughter statute under which the defendant was charged in this case is not a standard in the sense intended by the act. It does not require particular conditions, or mandate the use of prescribed practices or means, etc., in order to ensure the existence of a safe and healthful work environment. As one commentator explained, [s]tandards are ... ex ante, prophylactic measures prescribing or proscribing specific practices. In contrast, general state criminal laws ... are ex post, reactive measures, focusing on conduct after an injury has occurred. [12] For the same reasons, § 17(e) itself cannot be called a standard. It is a penalty provision. It does not literally prescribe or proscribe conduct. [13] The Court of Appeals characterized the prosecution of the defendant under the state's general criminal laws as an attempt to assert jurisdiction over a federally covered occupational safety and health issue other than through an approved state plan. Hegedus, supra, p 68. To allow such action, it concluded, would emasculate the requirement of § 18 that the state act through an approved plan. It thus appears that what the Court really was concerned with is the state's apparent ability to accomplish the same purpose or end to which safety and health standards are created  regulation of workplace conduct  without having to go through the process of approval the act requires. It therefore in effect concluded that Congress intended § 18(b) to preempt all state laws to the extent that they regulate workplace safety and health. We disagree. In People v Chicago Magnet Wire Corp, 157 Ill App 3d 797, 801; 510 NE2d 1173 (1987), the Illinois Court of Appeals similarly concluded that the state was precluded from enforcing its criminal laws as to conduct related to working conditions now regulated by OSHA. [14] On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected this implicit regulation analysis and in reversing the intermediate court stated: We cannot accept the defendants' contention that it must be concluded that Congress intended to preempt the enforcement of State criminal laws in regard to conduct of employers in the workplace because the State criminal laws implicitly enforce occupational health and safety standards. [ People v Chicago Magnet Wire Corp, 126 Ill 2d 356, ___; 534 NE2d 962, 966 (1989). Emphasis added.] It is true that the knowledge that general criminal sanctions, such as prosecution for manslaughter, are available in sufficiently egregious situations is likely to affect an employer's actions in the workplace. It is also likely that the fear of a criminal conviction would cause an employer to adhere more closely to promulgated OSHA standards to ensure that no such situation results. However, as myriad overlapping areas of state and federal law demonstrate, it can only rarely be said that the enforcement of state laws is precluded simply because it tends of necessity to affect the regulated conduct. [15] We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that in this context the preemption question cannot be resolved with reference to the possible incidental effects of state action. Rather, it is the purpose of the state action that governs the express preemption inquiry. In Environmental Encapsulating Corp v New York City, 855 F2d 48 (CA 2, 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the claim that the city's program for training and certification of workers who handle asbestos, administered through its Department of Environmental Protection, was preempted by OSHA. [16] In rejecting the claim that § 18 expressly preempted the city's program, the court in Environmental Encapsulating first observed that the program had a dual purpose, both to protect public health and to safeguard employee health and safety. Id., p 56. It then went on to consider the effect of § 18 on state or local regulations which have a legitimate purpose apart from one promoting occupational health and safety, but which also  even if incidentally  in fact promote occupational health and safety. Id., pp 56-57. The court ultimately concluded that OSHA does not preempt such regulations: Thus, we hold that in order to avoid preemption the City must demonstrate only that for each of the DEP requirements there is a legitimate and substantial purpose apart from protecting asbestos workers. If this is demonstrated, the particular requirement is not a state occupational safety and health standard preempted by § 18. [ Id., p 57.] The legitimate and substantial purpose test of Environmental Encapsulating recognizes both the intention of Congress to establish a federal floor for safety in the workplace, United Steelworkers of America v Auchter, 763 F2d 728, 734 (CA 3, 1985), and the interest of the states in retaining their historic police powers. [17] We similarly conclude that there is a legitimate and substantial purpose on the part of this state, apart from regulating occupational health and safety, in enforcing its criminal laws even though the conduct occurred in the workplace. While deterrence, and thus to some extent regulation, is one aim of general criminal laws, so too is punishment  clearly not one of OSHA's primary goals. A more important purpose, however, is the protection of employees as members of the general public. While OSHA is concerned with protecting employees as workers from specific safety and health hazards connected with their occupations, the state is concerned with protecting the employees as citizens from criminal conduct. Whether that conduct occurs in public or in private, in the home or in the workplace, the state's interest in preventing it, and punishing it, is indeed both legitimate and substantial. [18] We thus cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that § 18 of the act, the focus of which is the administrative regulation of workplace health and safety through specific, promulgated standards, was clearly intended to deprive citizens, merely by virtue of their status as employees, of the historic protection of this state's criminal laws. In addition to the limited relevance of § 18 to the question before us, we note the inclusion of a saving clause within the act to guard against undue restrictions upon state action in this area. Section 4(b)(4) of the act states: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment. The Court of Appeals interpreted this provision as reflecting a congressional intent to leave undisturbed private rights and liabilities of employers and employees such as those found in the Workers' Disability Compensation Act or the Civil Rights Act. Hegedus, supra, p 68. It should be strictly construed, the Court argued, to preserve only other laws regulating relations between employers and employees, which criminal laws are not primarily designed to do. [19] There is some merit to the argument that § 4(b)(4) was never intended by Congress specifically to save criminal law from preemption. As one author points out, there is no indication in either the act itself or its legislative history that Congress ever contemplated the effect that criminal laws might have on OSHA enforcement. Note, Getting away with murder: Federal OSHA preemption of state criminal prosecutions for industrial accidents, 101 Harv L R 535, 543 (1987). However, it is also true that § 4(b)(4) arguably includes criminal laws among those specifically not superseded. It states that the act should not be read to supersede or affect either any workers' compensation law or the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers ... under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment. (Emphasis added.) The manslaughter law under which the state seeks to impose statutory liability upon the defendant for the death of an employee arguably qualifies as any law under the above language. As written, the section does not appear to be in any way qualified, other than by the arising out of, or in the course of, employment language, which also apparently is met here. When the broad language of § 4(b)(4), evidencing a general congressional intent to leave existing state common-law rules and statutes intact so far as possible, is considered along with the general presumption against preemption discussed above, the conclusion that the § 18 jurisdictional requirements are to be read narrowly to preempt only unauthorized workplace standards, not the state's criminal laws, is inescapable.
The Court in Hillsborough Co v Automated Medical Labs, Inc, 471 US 707; 105 S Ct 2371; 85 L Ed 2d 714 (1985), narrowed the application of implied preemption theory to two distinct situations. First, Congress' intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress `left no room' for supplementary state regulation. Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 US 218, 230 [67 S Ct 1146; 91 L Ed 1447] (1947). Hillsborough, p 713. Preemption also may be inferred if the field sought to be preempted is one in which `the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.' Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 [61 S Ct 399; 85 L Ed 581] (1941). Id., p 713. [20] It cannot seriously be contended, with respect to this second theory of implied preemption, that the federal interest in workplace health and safety outweighs the state's interests in this situation. Against that federal interest must be balanced not only the state's own  and in fact predominant  historical interest in the regulation of health and safety matters, Hillsborough, p 719 (citing Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp, supra ), but also its traditional police powers interest in prosecuting criminal conduct. See Knapp v Schweitzer, 357 US 371; 78 S Ct 1302; 2 L Ed 2d 1393 (1958); Patterson v New York, 432 US 197; 97 S Ct 2319; 53 L Ed 2d 281 (1977). [21] The defendant, however, does not argue the dominancy of the federal interest in this case. He argues instead that the comprehensiveness of the federal act evidences an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field of workplace safety and health that would be undermined by allowing the application of state criminal laws in cases such as this. He contends that Congress has created a comprehensive regulatory scheme that is unquestionably a clear, thorough set of guideposts for employers and employees that leaves no room for state involvement, and that, in any event, the act's statutory scheme sets specific standards for criminal liability in this area, thus evidencing Congress' intent to occupy entirely at least that portion of the safety and health field. There is no merit to the argument that we may infer from OSHA's broad scope a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of safety and health regulation or to exclude the states therefrom. The act itself clearly belies that conclusion, since, as discussed above, it preserves in § 18(a) the states' jurisdiction over issues for which there is no existing federal standard, and allows states in § 18(b), albeit with OSHA approval, to formulate their own standards for workplace safety and health. The act thus contemplates an active role by the states in all areas of regulation. Indeed, it actually encourages states to assume the fullest responsibility for the administration and enforcement of their occupational safety and health laws.... 29 USC 651(b)(11). The sheer length of the act, in our view, merely reflects the complexity of the subject matter. When considered in the context of that subject matter, the act's apparent comprehensiveness is not surprising. As the United States Supreme Court stated in New York Dep't of Social Services v Dublino, 413 US 405, 415; 93 S Ct 2507; 37 L Ed 2d 688 (1973), The subjects of modern social and regulatory legislation often by their very nature require intricate and complex responses from Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending its enactment as the exclusive means of meeting the problem.... [22] Despite its length and thoroughness, OSHA is far from complete. The incompleteness of OSHA's provisions for criminal penalties is but one example of the incompleteness of the act as a whole, and serves to answer the defendant's second argument, that the inclusion of such sanctions within the act evidences Congress' intent to preempt at least that portion of the occupational safety and health field. The act itself contains only a few very minor criminal sanctions that can hardly be said to compose a comprehensive and exclusive scheme. Under § 17(e), a wilful violation of a specific OSHA standard that results in an employee's death is punishable by only up to six months' imprisonment. A similar violation that only seriously injures an employee carries no criminal penalties at all. A violation of the general-duty clause of § 5(a), even if it results in death, also carries no criminal penalty. Thus, as the Illinois Supreme Court concluded in Chicago Magnet Wire, supra: [I]t seems clear that providing for appropriate criminal sanctions in cases of egregious conduct causing serious or fatal injuries to employees was not considered. Under these circumstances, it is totally unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended that OSHA's penalties would be the only sanctions available for wrongful conduct which threatens or results in serious physical injury or death to workers. [ Id., 534 NE2d 967.] Rather, as one author has concluded, [t]he interpretation most consistent with the Act's goals is that Congress did not intend to preclude state penalties but rather [intended] to allow states to supplement OSHA penalties with their own sanctions. Note, Federal OSHA preemption, supra, p 548.
Preemption of state action lastly may be found if a conflict exists between the state and federal laws. Such a conflict arises when `compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,' Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v Paul, 373 US 132, 142-143 [83 S Ct 1210; 10 L Ed 2d 248] (1963), or when state law `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,' Hines v Davidowitz, supra at 67. Hillsborough, supra, p 713. This case does not involve conflicting sets of regulations in the same area, making compliance with both a physical impossibility, as might happen, for example, when compliance with federal regulations necessarily violates state regulations. [23] The defendant argues only that criminal prosecutions other than under OSHA for conduct in the workplace stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of that act's purposes. Hines v Davidowitz, supra, p 67. The defendant argues in particular that allowing criminal prosecutions other than under OSHA would frustrate the goal of uniformity of sanctions for violations of the act. According to the defendant, the fact that states may already incorporate different criminal sanctions, with federal approval, into their own occupational safety and health legislation is burden enough on employers. To allow the states to also apply their own criminal laws, which obviously vary from state to state, to workplace conduct, would completely defeat the prospect of uniformity. We are unpersuaded by this argument, since we are not convinced that uniformity of sanctions  or even of regulations, for that matter  was a significant concern of Congress when it adopted OSHA. In our view, [t]he statute's purpose was to assure minimum  but not necessarily uniform  occupational health and safety standards. Environmental Encapsulating Corp v New York City, supra, p 59. [24] The fact that states are encouraged in the first section of the act to develop their own occupational safety and health standards, subject only to the condition in § 18(c)(2) that they be at least as effective as the federal standards, indicates that Congress was not primarily concerned with uniformity, but rather intended the federal act to provide a kind of floor of protection to employees. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in United Steelworkers of America v Auchter, supra, p 734, [r]eduction of burdens posed by multiple state laws does not appear to have been a significant congressional concern; rather, Congress favored a uniform federal law so that those states providing vigorous protection would not be disadvantaged by those that did not. The application of this state's criminal laws to conduct in the workplace does not in our view present an obstacle to the accomplishment of OSHA's stated goal of assuring employees safe and healthful working conditions.
The result we reach today is compelled by the Supremacy Clause preemption analysis that has been established by the United States Supreme Court. Common sense likewise dictates this result. Consider the hypothetical example [25] in which an explosion occurs in a factory as a result of hazardous conditions amounting not only to a violation of a specific OSHA standard but also to criminal negligence. It could not seriously be contended in this situation that the prosecution under state criminal laws (such as a manslaughter statute) of the employer for the resulting deaths of his employees is preempted by OSHA's provision in § 17(e) of six months imprisonment for such a violation, while as to the deaths of any visitors, passersby, or members of the surrounding community, the state's ability to prosecute the employer as it sees fit is unaffected. To take the hypothetical example one step further, suppose the employer actually intended to cause the deaths of his employees. Surely it could not be contended that, since the employer's act involved conduct related to working conditions, People v Chicago Magnet Wire, supra, p 801, the state is precluded from charging the employer with murder, having instead to settle for a six-month prison term for a wilful violation of an OSHA standard. The difference between this hypothetical example and the case at bar is at most one of degree or of levels of criminal intent. We do not believe that the inclusion by Congress of a few truly minor criminal sanctions within OSHA for willful violations of its standards, and only for those violations which actually result in death, evidences an intent to subordinate the traditional police powers of this state to the limited authority of the federal government to such an extent that the state is unable to enforce its laws against serious criminal conduct directed against its citizens. The mere fact that such conduct takes place in an employment setting, where there is a limited federal interest in protecting the safety and health of employees, is not sufficient to remove from the state its traditional authority and responsibility to protect the welfare of its citizens. [26]