Opinion ID: 2543636
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Expert's Testimony On The Factors Affecting The Reliability Of Eyewitness Identifications, Together With The Cautionary Jury Instruction, Enabled The Jury To Form This Opinion Themselves

Text: ¶ 67 The trial court's decision to exclude the expert's opinion did not exceed the limits of reasonability. In reaching this conclusion, we first place the trial court's decision in its proper context. Before Hollen's attorney tried to solicit the expert's opinion as to the overall reliability of the process of identification, the expert not only gave extensive testimony on factors that affect the reliability of identifications, he also applied the factors to this case, as Hollen himself points out in his brief: Dr. Dodd noted several factors that limited the witnesses' capacity to accurately identify the assailants, including the fact that they had only seen the robbers on one occasion. He also concluded that the elaborate disguise had an enormous influence on the witnesses' ability to acquire memory of the disguised man's ... face because they could not see the entire facial pattern together. Dr. Dodd continued that whenever a gun is displayed people tend to spend a significant amount of time focusing on the weapon [and that] [f]ear also impairs witnesses' ability to acquire memory. Dr. Dodd expressed particular concern that Oscar [Contreras] showed a high degree of fear. Dr. Dodd explained that research has established that to accurately commit a person to memory, a witness must spend time actually examining the other person's face rather than simply spending time in a person's presence .... He added that studies of actual crimes show that victims have a very difficult time remembering and identifying the face of the person they saw commit the crime. Appellant Brief at 19 (record citations omitted). Dr. Dodd also testified, inter alia, (1) on the negative impact of the passage of time and composite sketches on identifications; and (2) that, in his opinion, the photo array in this case was suggestive. ¶ 68 Only after this extensive testimony did the trial court prevent the expert from opining as to the overall reliability of the process of identification. In addition, following this limited exclusion, the trial court permitted defense counsel to solicit Dr. Dodd's opinion as to which factors caused him particular concern in terms of reliability, such as the use of a disguise. Then, at the close of evidence, the trial court read a lengthy jury instruction concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications as set forth in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 494 n. 8 (Utah 1986). ¶ 69 Placed in its proper context, the trial court's exclusion of the expert's opinion clearly fell within the court's wide discretion under the rules of evidence. Indeed, Utah Rule of Evidence 702 conditions the admissibility of an expert's testimony or opinion on it assisting the trier of fact: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Utah R. Evid. 702 (emphasis added); Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361 (interpreting rule 702 as requiring that the expert's testimony be `helpful to the finder of fact.' (quoting State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n. 8 (Utah 1989))). ¶ 70 The expert's opinion did not meet this condition, however. [3] When Hollen's attorney tried to solicit the expert's opinion, the expert had already educated the jury on factors that impact the reliability of eyewitness identifications. Armed with this knowledge, the jury could form a conclusion regarding the overall reliability of the identifications without further assistance. The trial court's cautionary jury instruction further prepared the jury to draw its own informed conclusion. In addition, in addressing the individual factors affecting eyewitness testimony, the expert had on direct examination focused on the defects in the identification process, so the jury could readily anticipate the expert's overall conclusion. ¶ 71 Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not exceed its discretion when it excluded the expert's opinion on the overall reliability of the process of identification.