Opinion ID: 162328
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Victim Protective Order Statement

Text: 11 Mr. Hooker argues his trial was fundamentally unfair and he was denied due process of law when the trial court admitted a statement made by Ms. Stokes in a Victim Protective Order. Five months before the murders, Ms. Stokes obtained a Victim Protective Order against Mr. Hooker. Despite defense objections, the district court allowed the jury to consider Ms. Stokes' statement in the protective order: [I] feel he will harm me and please help me ... I don't want to be like the others dead. 12 Mr. Hooker raised this claim in his direct appeal. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded the trial court erred in admitting the statement, I don't want to be like the others dead, because it implied Mr. Hooker committed past acts of violence in which he killed other people. Hooker, 887 P.2d at 1360. Nonetheless, the Oklahoma appellate court found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the error did not contribute to the verdict and the evidence supporting Mr. Hooker's two death sentences was overwhelming. Id. at 1360 & n. 19. Mr. Hooker presented similar arguments in both his state and federal petitions for post-conviction relief. Those courts rejected his claims for substantially the same reasons. 13 In the habeas petition before us, Mr. Hooker claims the others dead statement was inflammatory and extremely prejudicial. Mr. Hooker also argues the statement was uncorroborated hearsay, 3 remote, misleading, false, of slight probative value, and the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the limited purpose of its admission. For these reasons, Mr. Hooker believes admission of the statement deprived him of due process and resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. 14 We limit our review 4 to consideration of alleged violations of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Mr. Hooker, therefore, can receive habeas relief only if the erroneous admission of evidence rendered his trial as a whole fundamentally unfair. Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1053 (10th Cir.2001). In federal habeas, we review state court evidentiary rulings to determine whether the error was so grossly prejudicial that it fatally infected the trial and denied the fundamental fairness that is the essence of due process. Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1522 (10th Cir.1997). 15 Considering the overwhelming evidence produced at trial illustrating the very turbulent, and sometimes violent, nature of Mr. Hooker's relationship with Ms. Stokes, this singular statement was not so grossly prejudicial that it infected the trial. Several witnesses testified Mr. Hooker threatened to kill Ms. Stokes when he was angry with her. Mr. Hooker's conviction and death sentence were supported by overwhelming evidence. In light of this evidence, we conclude Mr. Hooker received a fair trial. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying habeas relief on this ground. 16