Opinion ID: 774603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due process and fair and impartial jury challenges

Text: 69 A COA was granted on the issues of whether an alleged misstatement by the prosecution during voir dire denied Styron a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Eight of twelve jurors were told during voir dire that the second question submitted in the punishment phase of the trial should only be answered affirmatively if the mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravating evidence. Texas Criminal Procedure Article 37.071 actually instructs the court to answer the following issue: 70 Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficientmitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed. 71 Styron contends that a mitigating circumstance might be sufficient to warrant life imprisonment without outweighing the aggravating circumstances. 72 However, Styron, as he readily admits, failed to object to the voir dire questioning. The 'Texas contemporaneous objection rule constitutes an adequate and independent state ground that procedurally bars federal habeas review of a petitioner's claims.'Jackson v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 641, 652 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). If Styron overcomes the procedural bar, he still must demonstrate that the prosecutors' comments 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction [or sentence] a denial of due process. Rogers v. Lynaugh, 848 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted). This Circuit has developed the following test of constitutional error when a generic due process violation is asserted: 'The test applied to determine whether a trial error makes a trial fundamentally unfair is whether there is a reasonable probability that the verdict might have been different had the trial been properly conducted.' Id. at 609 (quotingKirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1985)). 73 Although he never clearly addresses cause or prejudice, Styron does assert that his attorney failed to object to the voir dire questioning because he misunderstood the question and thought that the state was presenting accurate law. This reason, however, is not sufficient cause. The Fifth Circuit found that if an attorney had 'no reasonable basis upon which to formulate a constitutional question,' the default is excusable. Landry v. Lynaugh, 844 F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th Cir. 1988). An attorney's personal alleged misconceptions about the law do not rise to the level of a change in federal law. Id. Furthermore, Styron fails to demonstrate prejudice. The state never referred back to voir dire in its closing arguments, and the court submitted the special issue as dictated by Texas Criminal Procedure Article 37.071. In interpreting the mitigation issue, a Texas court has described it as the weighing of mitigating evidence[,] . . . a subjective determination undertaken by each juror. Morris v. State, 940 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 74 Styron also fails to show a risk of fundamental miscarriage of justice. Although he argues that the evidence presented during the punishment phase concerning his dysfunctional childhood and history of abuse was considerable, nevertheless the jury still received the proper instruction immediately before punishment deliberations. 3 See Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054, 1061 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding, despite prosecutor's misstatement of the law during voir dire, there was no constitutional error because the court properly instructed the jury in accordance with law). Because Styron has failed to overcome the procedural bar, we decline to address the merits of his claim of violation of his right to a fair and impartial jury and right to due process.