Opinion ID: 200178
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 28 Awon also argues that the district court erred when it refused to vacate his conviction for the second fire (Count V). According to Awon the government failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish that the building was used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce as required by the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). As a result, Awon contends, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and his conviction as to Count V should be vacated. 5 29 Before we can reach the merits of Awon's argument, we must first address the government's contention that Awon procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. Awon concedes that he did not appeal concerning the court's jurisdiction but claims that subject matter jurisdiction can be noticed at any time. 30 Contrary to Awon's assertion, this case does not involve subject matter jurisdiction and therefore had to be raised on direct appeal. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case by virtue of the fact that Awon was charged with an offense against the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 6 The interstate commerce aspect of this case arises as an element of the section 844(i) offense. The statute requires the government to prove, inter alia, that the property involved in the arson was used in interstate or foreign commerce or in an activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce. If that element is not satisfied then Awon is not guilty; but the court is not by the failure of proof on that element deprived of judicial jurisdiction. See United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1246 (1st Cir.1996) (upholding section 844(i) as constitutional after Lopez ); accord United States v. Tush, 287 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir.2002), petition for cert. filed (Aug. 12, 2002) (No. 02-5940) (The interstate commerce element of § 844(i) `is not jurisdictional in the sense that it affects a court's subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., a court's constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case.'); United States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1165 (8th Cir.2001) (same). 31 Awon, on appeal, attempts to argue that his procedural default should be excused because he is actually innocent because the evidence was insufficient to show that the interstate commerce element had been met under Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000). 7 We reject Awon's actual innocence argument, which suffers from a number of problems. First, his petition under § 2255 makes no claim at all of actual innocence; the government, with justification, says the claim is forfeit. Even if it had not been forfeit, it is doomed. The assertion of actual innocence to excuse a procedural default does not permit a reviewing court to simply dive into defaulted questions of the sufficiency of evidence. 32 The actual innocence exception is quite narrow and seldom used. Simpson v. Matesanz, 175 F.3d 200, 210 (1st Cir.1999). It is reserved for the extraordinary cases of fundamentally unjust incarceration. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 320-21, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). 33 Even if we hypothesized that this question was correctly characterized as one of factual innocence and not legal insufficiency, see Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992), this had none of the hallmarks of the usual actual innocence claim. There is no credible argument that the so-called new evidence affects the interstate commerce nexus, so this is not a situation of an actual innocence claim predicated on new evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851. Nor is this a death case in which there is a constitutional violation which has probably resulted in the imposition of a death sentence of one who is actually innocent. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 411 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989). And even if we were to consider the claim of insufficiency, it is frivolous under Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 105 S.Ct. 2455, 85 L.Ed.2d 829 (1985) and United States v. Medeiros, 897 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1990).