Opinion ID: 1995845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Revocation and Revival

Text: In the District of Columbia, a testator may revoke a will or codicil in two ways. [2] He may expressly revoke the instrument (or a part thereof) by executing a later will, codicil, or other writing declaring the revocation. D.C.Code § 18-109(a)(1) (2001). Alternatively, revocation may be accomplished by burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will or codicil, or the part thereof, with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by a person in his presence and by his express direction and consent. D.C.Code § 18-109(a)(2). Both of these forms of revocation are at issue in this case. There is no dispute that in her 1995 codicil, Ms. Creech explicitly revoke[d] critical items from the 1992 will. [I]n place of said Item[s], she, among other changes, appointed a new alternate personal representative and disposed of her home differently. These revocations became effective upon execution of the 1995 codicil. D.C.Code § 18-109(a) (a will may be revoked in part); In re Burleson, 738 A.2d 1199, 1205 (D.C.1999) ([W]e now hold that under D.C.Code § 18-109, a prior will may be revoked upon the execution of a subsequent will. ...) (emphasis in original). Even if it were true, as the trial court seems to have concluded, that Ms. Creech revoked the 1995 codicil by destroying it (more on that later), the court erred by admitting the 1992 will to probate in its entirety. D.C.Code § 18-109(b) provides that: A will or codicil, or a part thereof, after it is revoked, may not be revived otherwise than by its re-execution, or by a codicil executed as provided in the case of wills, and then only to the extent to which an intention to revive is shown. As we explained in Burleson, under D.C.Code § 18-109, a prior will [once revoked]... may not be revived unless [it] has been re-executed or a codicil [is] executed in accordance with other statutory provisions. In re Burleson, 738 A.2d at 1205. In other words, revocation of the codicil would not reinstate Items VI, XIII, and XIV of the earlier will. Id. at 1205-06 ([E]ven if we were to assume, from the fact that the original 1994 will was not found at the time of his death, that Burleson intended to revoke his 1994 will, ... this would not change the fact that the 1993 will was rendered void upon execution of the 1994 will containing a revocation clause.); In re Smith, 77 F.Supp. 217, 219 (D.D.C.1948) (The revocation of the second will does not reinstate the earlier will.). Here, as in Burleson, it is undisputed that the codicil had been properly executed, and no evidence was presented suggesting that the deceased had revived the [earlier] will by re-executing [it] or executing a[new] codicil. In re Burleson, 738 A.2d at 1206. Thus, Items VI, XIII, and XIV of Ms. Creech's 1992 will have not been revived and may not be admitted to probate.