Opinion ID: 3179997
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The issue is one of great public importance;

Text: 2. It is necessary to answer the issue to provide guidance to state agencies and lower courts; or 7 3. The controversy is capable of repetition yet evading review. Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Dist. v. Lee Newspapers, 2014 WY 101, ¶ 12, 332 P.3d 523, 528 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Operation Save America, 275 P.3d at 448-49). [¶29] In determining whether any of these exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply to this case, it is important to review the progress of this case. The juvenile court originally placed CRA in shelter care with her maternal grandmother after a hearing. DB did not challenge that placement. Not long after that placement, the case was resolved by a consent decree. When DB entered into the consent decree, he agreed that CRA could remain in DFS custody for placement with her maternal grandmother. He agreed with the consent decree goal of involving both EA and CRA in a plan to reunite them. On four separate occasions while the consent decree was pending, DB represented, through multidisciplinary team reports and the consent decree, that CRA should remain with her grandmother. This is the setting DB created and in which he attempts to raise his constitutional claim to temporary custody of CRA. [¶30] The first exception to the mootness doctrine permits the Court to consider issues of great public importance. Ordinarily, protection of the parent-child relationship is of great public importance. In many circumstances the parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected. DB argues that temporary placement of his daughter interfered with his constitutional rights as a parent. The State, on the other hand, asserts that juvenile neglect cases do not interfere with constitutional rights of parents because they are temporary, remedial, and intended to support parent-child relationships. We decline to consider whether temporary placement of a juvenile in a neglect case qualifies for this mootness exception because DB’s claim about his constitutional right to parent his child is in direct opposition to the position he agreed to in the consent decree. In context, he is simply complaining that he does not like the deal he made in the consent decree, and he asks this Court to re-write it. The issue here does not truly involve DB’s constitutional rights as a parent, but rather involves his dissatisfaction with the consent decree. That issue is not a matter of such great public importance that it justifies this Court making an advisory ruling. [¶31] The second exception to the mootness doctrine recognizes that the Court, at times, should give guidance to lower courts and state agencies. This is not such a time. We see no need to give any guidance to either the juvenile court or to DFS in the context of this case because it was entirely controlled by a consent decree. In the consent decree all the parties, including DB, agreed to work toward reuniting CRA with EA by temporarily placing CRA with her grandmother and DFS providing services to EA and CRA. The 8 parties themselves developed that plan. The situation does not call for guidance to the juvenile court nor to DFS.8 [¶32] We recognize the third exception to the mootness doctrine when a controversy is capable of repetition yet evading review. Two requirements must be met for this exception to apply. “First, the duration of the challenged action must be too short for completion of litigation prior to its cessation or expiration. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.” KO, ¶ 28, 138 P.3d at 1154. [¶33] Wyoming’s Child Protection statutes intend for the case to be relatively short, and any placement of a child outside his or her home to be temporary. It is possible that a temporary placement in a neglect case could end before appellate review is complete. However, there is no reasonable expectation that DB will again be in the same position as he was during the consent decree. If the district court continues custody of CRA with EA, there is no reasonable expectation that temporary custody would again be required under a neglect case, or that DB would enter into a consent decree. Consequently, we find that the third exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply. [¶34] The issue DB raises about custody of CRA during the pendency of the juvenile neglect case is moot. We decline to address that issue because any determination we make would be wholly advisory, having no impact on any party.