Opinion ID: 1253069
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Paragraph Seven is an unenforceable agreement to grant Camille survivorship benefits.

Text: Camille argues that the parties agreed to provide her with a guaranteed annuity and to leave William free to choose the means of providing that annuity. She insists that the court can enforce that agreement by ordering the estate to pay her a lump sum equal to the present value of the payments she should have received upon William's death. The estate disagrees; it alleges that Paragraph Seven simply granted Camille survivorship benefits as a means of dividing William's civil service pension. When interpreting contracts, we give effect to the parties' reasonable expectations. [5] Those expectations are discerned from the language of the disputed provisions, other provisions, and relevant extrinsic evidence, with guidance from case law interpreting similar provisions. [6] We depart from the plain language of the contract only if the contract language is ambiguous. [7] A contract is ambiguous only if, taken as a whole, it is reasonably subject to differing interpretations. [8] For instance, in Wahl v. Wahl, [9] we departed from the plain language of the property settlement agreement because the parties' use of the term retirement did not clarify whether the ex-wife was entitled to retirement benefits earned by her ex-husband after the marriage. [10] But unlike the provision in Wahl, Paragraph Seven does not require interpretation to give it meaning. The term survivorship benefits is a term of art that has specific meaning in the context of a civil service pension. It is not a term subject to a variety of meanings, nor is it generally employed to imply a guaranteed annuity. Although the parties included specific dollar amounts in Paragraph Seven, the amounts only describe the grant of survivorship benefits; they are not what was granted. It appears that the parties added the specific dollar amounts because the civil service pension program offers pensioners several different options which result in varying levels of survivorship benefits. A letter and testimony by Camille's attorney cited by Camille support this conclusion. In addition, Camille's interpretation is inconsistent with the divorce proceeding. Pensions earned during marriage are marital property subject to division upon divorce. [11] Thus, it is logical to conclude that Paragraph Seven was only an attempt to divide William's civil service pension, a marital asset. Furthermore, Camille has not provided any explanation as to why she would have received a guaranteed annuity. When she entered into the property settlement agreement she was not dependent upon William for support such that she might need financial protection if he should predecease her. She had already remarried and had her own business. We conclude that Paragraph Seven is an agreement to elect survivorship benefits for Camille as a means of dividing William's civil service pension. Because Camille remarried before age fifty-five, federal regulations render enforcement of the agreement impossible. Therefore, we affirm the superior court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to award Camille the relief she requested. Because the agreement as it stands cannot be interpreted in Camille's favor, the agreement must be modified if Camille is to be granted relief.