Opinion ID: 693930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Velasquez Appeal

Text: 17 We now turn to the sole issue raised by Velasquez on appeal, which involves the proper computation of his sentence. Velasquez entered a guilty plea pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement, which had as an attachment sentencing guideline worksheets representing the agreed upon position of the government and the defendant as to the appropriate sentencing range. These worksheets indicated that a statutorily mandated minimum term of 60 months was implicated, and therefore the guideline range was 60-71 months. The agreement further provided that, subject to the agreement of the court, no sentence of incarceration would exceed 60 months. Further, the government agreed that the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed either to run concurrently with the remainder of the defendant's undischarged sentence imposed on August 10, 1992, or pursuant to Guideline 5G1.3(c), whichever is more beneficial to the defendant. (App. 30.) 18 At sentencing, the only discussion between the parties and the court concerned how the new sentence was to be made concurrent with the sentence the defendant was presently serving. There appeared to be general agreement that defendant's prior sentence involved conduct that also was considered as part of the relevant conduct factored into the sentence computation in this case. At sentencing, the government argued that the date to be used to start the concurrent running of the two sentences was August 10, 1992, the date that the defendant formally commenced serving his earlier Indiana sentence. Defense counsel argued that the date should be backed up even further, wanting the defendant to be credited for the time he spent in pretrial detention, prior to formally commencing the service of his sentence in Indiana. 19 The trial judge resolved the issue in the following language: 20 It is going to be the sentence of the Court that the defendant be turned over to the Bureau of Prisons and confined for a period of 60 months. 21 That is to run concurrent to the sentence imposed by the United States District Court in Indiana. And I am recommending that this concurrent sentence commence on August 2nd, 1992 [sic]. 22 (App. 104-05.) 23 The August 10, 1992, date was the date the formal service of the Indiana sentence began and was not the date when Velasquez entered pretrial detention. The court memorialized its oral pronouncement in its judgment and commitment order, which contained the following language: 24 The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 60 months; said term shall run concurrent with the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Dkt. # HCR-92-00112-001 which began on 8/10/92. 25 (App. 69.) This judgment was entered on February 11, 1994. 26 On February 16, 1994, the defendant filed a notice of appeal indicating he was appealing from his conviction. No mention was made in the notice of appeal concerning the sentence imposed. Velasquez' notice of appeal went on to state that he was raising the issues of insufficiency of the evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. It is interesting to note in this regard that these were not issues discussed at Velasquez' sentencing, although these issues were implicated by the arguments made by Washpun's counsel on behalf of his client. One is left with the distinct impression that Velasquez had no intention of appealing at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, but upon becoming aware that Washpun was appealing after pleading guilty, Velasquez decided to appeal and track the issues raised by Washpun. 27 Several months later, on August 15, 1994, newly appointed appellate counsel for Velasquez filed his brief with this court. The brief is completely silent as to any claims or contentions involving insufficiency of the evidence or ineffective assistance of counsel. The only issue raised on appeal concerns the manner in which Velasquez' concurrent sentence was being interpreted by the Bureau of Prisons. The only indication of what triggered this argument is to be found in a sentence monitoring computation data sheet issued by the Bureau of Prisons on June 16, 1994, well after the notice of appeal was filed. The document is somewhat difficult to understand, and neither defense counsel nor the government offer any explanation of the contents of the document. It would appear, however, that the Bureau of Prisons has determined that Velasquez' sentence of 60 months is not to be computed using August 10, 1992, as the starting date for the running of the 60 months. 28 It is not clear to us whether an error has been committed but, in any event, we are unable to address this issue for a number of reasons. First of all, it was not raised in the district court. Second, the notice of appeal filed by the defendant does not indicate any appeal being taken from the sentencing order and further specifically sets forth the claims of error being raised which do not include any claim relative to the manner in which the concurrent sentence is being interpreted by the Bureau of Prisons. This is understandable because on the date that the defendant filed his notice of appeal, he would have had no idea how the Bureau of Prisons was going to compute his sentence. 29 Although defense counsel attempts, by the way in which he formulates the issue he raises on appeal, to bring this issue before the court in Velasquez' direct appeal, we are unable to consider this issue. Defendant has made no effort to exhaust his administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons. This is a prerequisite to his being able to address the substantive merits of his claim before this court. See United States v. Westmoreland, 974 F.2d 736, 737 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1818 (1993). 30 Accordingly, the appeal of Nicolas Velasquez is DISMISSED without prejudice to his right to raise the issue of the proper interpretation of his sentence in an appropriate proceeding.