Opinion ID: 1180042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial Impairment of a Meritorious Defense

Text: Our review of the record leads us to believe that if Aplaca's trial counsel had investigated the potential defense witnesses and reviewed the materials he received during discovery, he would have realized the value of such witnesses to Aplaca's defense. With Aplaca having admitted that she and Viernes collided, the focal point was whether such collision was intentional or reckless by Aplaca. Moreover, because there were no other witnesses to the incident, the outcome of the case depended on the credibility of Aplaca and Viernes. We have stated that [a]n accused has the right to give evidence of personal character traits associated with the basic nature of the offense with which he [or she] is charged as circumstantial evidence of his [or her] innocence. State v. Rivera, 62 Haw. 120, 126, 612 P.2d 526, 531 (1980) (citing State v. Faafiti, 54 Haw. 637, 642, 513 P.2d 697, 701 (1973)); accord State v. Rabe, 5 Haw.App. 251, 263, 687 P.2d 554, 562 (1984). Character evidence demonstrating that Aplaca was a peaceful and nonviolent person at the time or prior to the incident would have bolstered her credibility and related directly to whether she would have intentionally or recklessly hit another person. See Hawaii Rule of Evidence 404 (commentary) ([t]he accused in a criminal case may offer evidence of a trait of good character pertinent to the issues in the case.... Examples would be character for peacefulness and non-violence in an assault case.... (citation omitted)). Moreover, if trial counsel had reviewed the subpoenaed materials and interviewed witnesses such as ACO Ueda, he could have produced testimony that would have indicated that Viernes was not a truthful person. See Hawaii Rule of Evidence 608. Although we, as an appellate court, cannot predict the exact effect these prospective witnesses would have had on the trial court's assessment of Viernes and Aplaca's credibility, we firmly believe that such testimony could have had a direct bearing on the ultimate outcome of the case. We therefore disagree with the ICA's conclusion that the unproferred testimony would not have cast any light on the sole defense in this case, that is, the lack of criminal intent. The materials and affidavits are manifestly adverse to the ICA's finding. Having met the second prong of the Antone test, we conclude that Aplaca was denied her right to effective assistance of counsel, and we therefore remand for a new trial. See Antone, 62 Haw. at 349, 615 P.2d at 105 (finding of ineffective assistance of counsel mandates reversal of defendant's conviction).