Opinion ID: 2639459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Date of Valuation/Evidentiary Issues

Text: [¶ 9] Citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-103, appellant contends that only after the Board has determined that the viewers' and appraisers' reportwhich addresses the location of the road and the amount of damagesis just and payment of the assessed damages by the applicant of all costs of locating the road, can the road then be declared to be a private road. Thus, appellant argues that until such time, no taking has occurred and, therefore, a date of valuation has yet to occur. Continuing this line of reasoning, appellant asserts that both the district court and the Board erred by precluding it from presenting additional evidence of the value of appellant's property affected by the proposed road for the time period of September 28, 1999, to June 20, 2001. [2] [¶ 10] Appellant's argument requires us to interpret certain statutes that are applicable to the establishment of private roads. In State by and through Dep't of Rev. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2003 WY 54, ¶ 12, 67 P.3d 1176, ¶ 12 (Wyo.2003) (quoting McClean v. State, 2003 WY 17, ¶ 6, 62 P.3d 595, ¶ 6 (Wyo.2003)), we explained: We have long recognized that conclusions of law, such as questions regarding statutory interpretation, are to be reviewed by this court de novo. Hutchings v. Krachun, 2002 WY 98, ¶ 10, 49 P.3d 176, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2002). In Pagel v. Franscell, 2002 WY 169, ¶ 9, 57 P.3d 1226, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2002) (citing Wyoming Cmty. College Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. College Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶¶ 16-18, 31 P.3d 1242, ¶¶ 16-18 (Wyo.2001)), we stated: In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the legislature's intent. Fontaine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 P.3d 890, 894 (Wyo.2000); State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo.1983). Legislative intent must be ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo.1991); Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 837 (Wyo.1991). When the words are clear and unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible substitution of its own views, or those of others, for the intent of the legislature if any effort is made to interpret or construe statutes on any basis other than the language invoked by the legislature. Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d at 219. Moreover, [a]ll statutes must be construed in pari materia; and in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or hav[ing] the same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony. Fontaine, 4 P.3d at 894 (citing State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d at 735). Therefore, in performing our review, we look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the statute is ambiguous. Olheiser v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo.1994) (citing Parker Land & Cattle Company v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo.1993)). A statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability. Parker Land & Cattle, at 1043. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. Id. We have said that divergent opinions among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence of ambiguity. Basin Electric Power Co-op. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 561 (Wyo.1978). However, the fact that opinions may differ as to a statute's meaning is not conclusive of ambiguity. Ultimately, whether a statute is ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court. Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d at 219. [¶ 11] Wyo. Stat. § 24-9-101, states, in pertinent part: Any person whose land has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road, may apply in writing to the board of county commissioners of his county for a private road leading from his premises to some convenient public road.... At the hearing, all parties interested may appear and be heard by the board as to the necessity of the road and all matters pertaining thereto. Upon the hearing of the application, whether the owner or others interested appear or not, if the board finds that the applicant has complied with the law and that the private road is necessary, the board shall appoint three (3) disinterested freeholders and electors of the county, as viewers and appraisers, and shall cause an order to be issued directing them to meet... on the proposed road, and view and locate a private road according to the application therefor, and to assess damages to be sustained thereby .... The viewers shall then proceed to locate and mark out a private road in accordance with the application or in such other manner and location they deem appropriate.... The viewers shall also at the same time assess the damages sustained by the owner over which the road is to be established and make full and true returns, with a plat of the road to the board of county commissioners. (Emphasis added.) Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-103, goes on further to state: The viewers and appraisers so appointed, or a majority of them, shall make a report to the county commissioners at the next regular session, of the private road so located by them, and also the amount of damages, if any, assessed by them, and the person or persons entitled to such damages, and if the commissioners are satisfied that such report is just, and after payment by the applicant of all cost of locating such road, and the damages assessed by the viewers, the commissioners shall order such report to be confirmed and declare such road to be a private road, and the same shall be recorded as such. (Emphasis added.) [¶ 12] Applying the plain and ordinary meaning to the language used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101 and 24-9-103, we find no ambiguity. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 clearly mandates that the viewers and appraisers assess damages at the same time they meet for the purpose of viewing the affected real property and locating the proposed road. Similarly, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-103 squarely expresses the legislature's intent that the county commissioners involved would soon thereafter, at the county commissioner's next scheduled session, receive a report of the viewers and appraisers which included, in part, their assessment of damages made at the time of their viewing of the affected property so the county commissioners could determine if that report should be confirmed. No significant delay or later date for the assessment of damages as argued by appellant can be inferred from this language. [¶ 13] As we recognized in Wagstaff, at ¶ 12, and many other previous cases dealing with the establishment of private roads, the language used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101, discloses the legislature's intent that the procedure under the statute provide, in a local forum, a readily available, economically affordable, and time efficient method to obtain a means of access to property. See also Martens v. Johnson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 954 P.2d 375, 380 (Wyo.1998) and McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1288 (Wyo.1980). Appellant's reading of the statute frustrates this intent. [¶ 14] Furthermore, under appellant's theory, the amount of damages would be an ever-moving target subject to potential manipulation and continual review. Given appellant's expressed scenario, unless the county commissioners entered a final order on the same day as the damages hearing, the assessment of damages would continue to remain at issue. The legislature could not have intended the damages valuation to change for an undefined period of time or that the final determination of damages be extended depending on when the county commissioners entered their final order or, as is pointed out by this action, when subsequent appeals on the county commissioners' decision are determined by the courts. We have on a number of occasions recognized that the legislature intended that good faith and reason prevail in the establishment of private roads. Wagstaff, at ¶ 12; Martens, at 380; Dunning v. Ankney, 936 P.2d 61, 64-65 (Wyo.1997); Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 462 (Wyo.1995); McGuire, at 1288. We fail to see how an ever-changing damages assessment would promote good faith and reason. [¶ 15] The viewers and appraisers met with Mr. Jon R. Gray, president of R.C.R., Inc., on January 15, 1999, the date of their scheduled viewing of the real property affected by the proposed private road. Mr. Gray indicated appellant had some general intent in the future to subdivide its property. Further, Mr. Gray showed the viewers and appraisers the possible location of improvements for an anticipated subdivision and golf course. At that time, however, Mr. Gray indicated that no plans had been submitted to rezone and subdivide appellant's property. The viewers and appraisers also confirmed that a subdivision plat had not been appropriately approved and recorded concerning appellant's property. [¶ 16] Because appellant objected to the damages assessment made by the viewers and appraisers, the Board held a hearing on September 27, 1999, wherein appellant was given a full opportunity to present evidence and witnesses concerning damages, including appellant's desire to potentially subdivide its property. In fact, appellant presented the only witnesses at this hearing, calling three witnesses. [¶ 17] The first witness, Jonathan Schnal, Planning Economic Development Director for Carbon County, testified that in August of 1998 his office received an imprecise sketch of a proposed rezoning and subdivision plan including both appellant's property as well as a neighboring property. In June of 1999, another drawing was received from appellant, but Mr. Schnal's office did not understand what was being proposed by this second drawing. Mr. Schnal indicated that the rezoning and subdivision application of appellant was on hold and in suspense because the neighboring property had not been removed from the plan or authority for such rezoning and subdivision received from the owner of the neighboring property. Furthermore, appellant had failed to provide additional requested information and had not completed the numerous and substantial steps for rezoning and subdivision. Mr. Schnal also testified that before rezoning and subdivision could occur 1) reviews would have to be completed by the State of Wyoming, Department of Environmental Quality, and the Wyoming State Engineer, 2) appellant would need to prepare and submit covenants for the subdivision that would need to be approved, and 3) appellant would need to complete, after first being approved by the necessary agencies, numerous improvements to the property. Critically, Mr. Schnal also confirmed that appellant's property remained zoned as ranch, agricultural, and mining property. [¶ 18] The second witness, Mr. Gray, testified about appellant's plans to subdivide its property but admitted that any formal steps to complete this plan were, at minimum, still in their infancy. Mr. Gray's testimony included his opinion of the estimated value of appellant's property after rezoning and subdivision and his estimated damage calculations with respect to the proposed private road. However, Mr. Gray's opinions were based only on his own general personal experiences as a developer and general information he stated he had received from realtors in the area. As such, Mr. Gray's opinions are somewhat speculative and lacking in foundation. [¶ 19] Appellant's last witness, Thomas Grieve, was a real estate broker. Mr. Grieve confirmed that he had experience in the sale of recreational type properties in Carbon County. Nevertheless, he stated he could neither agree nor disagree with the valuations expressed by Mr. Gray concerning appellant's property because he did not have sufficient foundation to do so. [¶ 20] Reviewing the record, we conclude that all parties, including appellant, were allowed to fully develop their respective positions on damages at the September 27, 1999 hearing. As we explained above, following the clear and unambiguous language of the applicable statutes, the assessment of damages upon the establishment of a private road must be calculated on the date of the viewing of the affected real property by the appointed viewers and appraisers and the circumstances that exist at that time. Accordingly, we hold that the district court and the Board did not err when they precluded appellant from presenting any additional evidence concerning damages after the September 27, 1999 hearing. [¶ 21] We further note that the position of appellant points out the potential for manipulation by the owner of the affected property if assessment of damages is not limited to the date of viewing by the appointed viewers and appraisers and the circumstances that actually exist at that time. The evidence presented established that appellant did not submit its admittedly very rough sketch concerning rezoning and subdivision of its property and surrounding property until August 18, 1998, just one day before the initial hearing held in this case. Subsequently, appellant did little more to further this application. The fact that the same parties involved in this appeal were previously embroiled in contentious litigation regarding the attempted establishment of an easement across appellant's property also does not support Mr. Gray's statements regarding appellant's long-time desire to rezone and subdivide its property. Appellant took no formal actions at that time to establish its alleged desire to rezone and subdivide its property. Therefore, while Mr. Gray expressed that appellant always desired to rezone and subdivide its property, these statements must be viewed as at least somewhat suspect. [¶ 22] Finally, our holding recognizes the well-established principle that evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the administrative agency or trial court including determinations of the adequacy of foundation, relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence. This court will generally accede to such determinations unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. See Garnick v. Teton County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2002 WY 18, ¶ 13, 39 P.3d 1034, ¶ 13 (Wyo.2002); Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 19, 49 P.3d 975, ¶ 19 (Wyo.2002); McGhee v. Rork, 978 P.2d 577, 580 (Wyo.1999); Goddard v. Colonel Bozeman's Restaurant, 914 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Wyo.1996). Likewise, we have also stated on a number of occasions that determinations concerning credibility of the evidence and weight of the evidence will not be disturbed by this court unless clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Brierley v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2002 WY 121, ¶ 16, 52 P.3d 564, ¶ 16 (Wyo.2002); Newman v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 31, 49 P.3d 163, ¶ 31 (Wyo.2002). [¶ 23] In this case, the district court explicitly ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held by the Board for the sole and narrow issue of determining damages. This hearing afforded appellant due process by requiring the viewers and appraisers to explain their determination of damages and to be subject to cross-examination.