Opinion ID: 347528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the by other means allegation

Text: 657 That appellants did not move to strike by other means from the indictment proves nothing. There was nothing improper or illegal about the use of the phrase. The defendants had a perfect right to assume it would be given its normal meaning and construed to refer to other similar means and as such it was unobjectionable. As above stated, the abuse of the phrase was not by its inclusion in the count but by the court's interpretation of it in its closing instruction. 658 United States v. Caine, 441 F.2d 454, 456 (2d Cir. 1971) and United States v. Mayo, 230 F.Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y.1964) are not to the contrary. In Caine the indictment charged that a particular specified advertisement was fraudulent that included 12 specific false advertising claims among others. Obviously the others referred to other false claims in the advertisement specified in the indictment. No further factual allegation was necessary and the indictment was upheld, partially on the ground that such evidence was legally admissible for at least some purposes. 441 F.2d at 456-57. The lack of relevance of Caine to this case is obvious. 659 As for Mayo, the decision held that an allegation among others to be proper because in the context of that indictment it did not constitute 660 an impermissible delegation of authority to the prosecutor which enabled him to enlarge the grand jury accusation. 661 230 F.Supp. at 86. The phrase there was included in a paragraph which went to the matter of proof to sustain the charges; i.e., to evidence. Here, the majority seeks to use the phrase by other means, not to support the introduction of matter of proof to sustain the charges, as in Mayo, but as a wedge to enlarge the Grand Jury charges to include a different factual offense than the ones alleged in the indictment. 662 In any event, no person contends that the phrase is invalid, but only that it should be given the meaning the Grand Jury obviously intended. The Grand Jury never intended to include defrauding the government by delaying the investigation in Count 2. Had it so intended the very competent prosecutors were more than sufficiently knowledgeable to accomplish that result.