Opinion ID: 2060361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Failure by Legislature to Independently and Objectively Consider Compensation Increases ( Maron, Larabee and Chief Judge )

Text: The Maron petitioners and the Larabee and Chief Judge plaintiffs all make the same separation of powers argument: By tying judicial compensation to unrelated legislative objectives and policy initiatives, as opposed to conducting an independent assessment of judicial compensation, the Legislature has disregarded the Separation of Powers Doctrine and threatened the independence of the Judiciary. The State defendants counter that there is nothing in the constitutional text or framework prohibiting the Legislature from considering judicial compensation along with other prerogatives. Furthermore, any declaration condemning that practice as unconstitutional would itself constitute a separation of powers violation by the Judiciary through intrusion into budgetary and appropriations processes. In Maron, the Appellate Division dismissed petitioners' claim on the ground that their failure to allege a discriminatory attack on the judicial branch that has impaired or imminently threatened the Judiciary's independence and ability to function was fatal to the claim ( Maron, 58 AD3d at 123). This claim met with greater success in Larabee and Chief Judge, where the Appellate Divisions in each of those cases upheld the Supreme Court's award of summary judgment to those plaintiffs ( see Chief Judge, 65 AD3d 898, 899 [2009]; Larabee, 65 AD3d at 74). The concept of the separation of powers is the bedrock of the system of government adopted by this State in establishing three coordinate and coequal branches of government, each charged with performing particular functions ( see generally Under 21, Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344, 355-356 [1985]; Matter of County of Oneida v Berle, 49 NY2d 515, 522 [1980]). The Constitution's aim is to regulate, define and limit the powers of government by assigning to the executive, legislative and judicial branches distinct and independent powers, thereby ensuring an even balance of power [among] the three ( People ex rel. Burby v Howland, 155 NY 270, 282 [1898]). The separation of the three branches is necessary `for the preservation of liberty itself,' and `[i]t is a fundamental principle of the organic law that each department should be free from interference, in the discharge of its peculiar duties, by either of the others' ( Berle, 49 NY2d at 522, quoting Burby, 155 NY at 282). To accomplish this important goal, articles III, IV and VI of the State Constitution address the respective powers conferred upon, and respective compensation of, the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. Article III states that [t]he legislative power of this state shall be vested in the senate and the assembly (NY Const, art III, § 1), and that [e]ach member of the legislature shall receive for his or her services a like annual salary, to be fixed by law. . . [but] the salary of any member . . . may [not] be increased or diminished during, and with respect to, the term for which he or she shall have been elected (NY Const, art III, § 6). Article IV states that [t]he executive power shall be vested in the governor, who shall hold office for four years (NY Const, art IV, § 1), and who shall receive for his or her services an annual salary to be fixed by joint resolution of the senate and assembly (NY Const, art IV, § 3). Article VI states that [t]here shall be a unified court system for the state (NY Const, art VI, § 1 [a]) and that the compensation of judges and justices within that system shall be established by law and shall not be diminished during the term of office for which he or she was elected or appointed (NY Const, art VI, § 25 [a]). We find it significant that the compensation provisions for each branch of government are not contained in article III where the powers of the legislative branch are articulated, but rather are separately addressed in the article for each respective branch. Although a function of the Legislature is to approve the compensation of each of the three branches, this fact underscores only the checks and balances of the system; it does not rebut the fact that the compensation to be paid to members of each particular branch must be determined separately and distinctly from the others. Indeed, whether the Judiciary is entitled to a compensation increase must be based upon an objective assessment of the Judiciary's needs if it is to retain its functional and structural independence. Simply put, by failing to consider judicial compensation increases on the merits, and instead holding them hostage to other legislative objectives, the Legislature [w]eaken[s the Judiciary] by making it unduly dependent on the Legislature ( Burby, 155 NY at 282). Separate budgets, separate articles in the Constitution, and separate provisions concerning compensation are all testament to the fact that each branch is independent of the other. This, of course, does not mean that the branches operate without concern for the other. Both the Legislature and the Governor rely on the good faith of the other and of the Judiciary for the good of the State. As members of the two political branches, the Governor and Legislature understandably have the power to bargain with each other over all sorts of matters including their own compensation. Judges and justices, on the other hand, are not afforded that opportunity. They have no seat at the bargaining table and, in fact, are precluded from participating in politics. The judicial branch therefore depends on the good faith of the other two branches to provide sufficient funding to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities. Given its unique place in the constitutional scheme, it is imperative that the legitimate needs of the judicial branch receive the appropriate respect and attention. This cannot occur if the Judiciary is used as a pawn or bargaining chip in order to achieve ends that are entirely unrelated to the judicial mission. For instance, the Constitution prohibits legislators from increasing or decreasing their own salaries during their two-year term of office, but there is no such prohibition against the Legislature addressing judicial compensation at any time. Moreover, state legislators are part time and may supplement their income through committee assignments, leadership positions and other outside employment. Judges are constitutionally forbidden from engaging in any employment that would interfere with their judicial responsibilities ( see NY Const, art VI, § 20 [b] [4]). But by failing to consider judicial compensation independently of legislative compensation, the State defendants have imposed upon the Judiciary the same restrictions that have been imposed on the Legislature, and have blurred the line between the compensation of the two branches, thereby threatening the structural independence of the Judiciary. The State defendants assert that it is within their legislative rights to consider judicial compensation not on the merits but relative to unrelated policy initiatives. But they overlook the fact that they are treating judicial compensationwhich falls within the scope of their constitutional dutiesas if it were merely another government program appropriation as opposed to compensation for members of a coequal branch. We do not attribute the State defendants' failure to increase judicial compensation to any nefarious purpose. Indeed, it is not necessary to consider, or find, the existence of any improper motive. All parties agree that a salary increase is justified and, yet, those who have the constitutional duty to act have done nothing to further that objective due to disputes unrelated to the merits of any proposed increase. This inaction not only impairs the structural independence of the Judiciary, but also deleteriously affects the public at large, which is entitled to a well-qualified, functioning Judiciary ( see O'Donoghue v United States, 289 US 516, 533 [1933] [prohibition against diminution is to attract competent people to the bench, promote independence of the Judiciary, and for the public interest]). It must be remembered that the Separation of Powers Doctrine is a structural safeguard rather than a remedy to be applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be identified. In its major features. . . it is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict ( Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 US 211, 239 [1995]). Here, the allegations by the Maron petitioners are sufficient to state a separation of powers claim. As that case is here before us on a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, our corrective action is limited to a reinstatement of that cause of action. In Larabee and Chief Judge, the procedural posture of the cases is not so limiting and we may now issue a declaration. We hold that under these circumstances, as a matter of law, the State defendants' failure to consider judicial compensation on the merits violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine. However, when fashioning specific remedies for constitutional violations, we must avoid intrusion on the primary domain of another branch of government ( Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14, 28 [2006]). Indeed, deference to the Legislaturewhich possesses the constitutional authority to budget and appropriateis necessary because it is in a far better position than the Judiciary to determine funding needs throughout the state and priorities for the allocation of the State's resources ( id. at 29). The Judiciary may intervene in the state budget only in the narrowest of instances ( Wein v Carey, 41 NY2d 498, 505 [1977]), and we do not believe that it is necessary here to order specific injunctive relief. When this Court articulates the constitutional standards governing state action, we presume that the State will act accordingly.