Opinion ID: 179980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Puiatti's Claims on Appeal

Text: As noted earlier, Puiatti claims that the trial court's denial of his severance motion (and resulting joint trial) violated his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing determination. For numerous reasons, Puiatti's claim wholly fails. First, Puiatti was not prevented from presenting any mitigating evidence. Puiatti has not proffered a single piece of evidence he was unable to put before the jury or judge for consideration by virtue of the joint penalty phase. Second, no state statute nor judicial interpretation nor jury instruction restricted the jury or judge from considering, or acting upon, Puiatti's mitigation evidence. Rather, the Florida trial court appropriately instructed the jury during the penalty phase to carefully weigh and consider all of the evidence presented, stating, Before you ballot you should carefully weigh, sift and consider the evidence, and all of it, realizing that human life is at stake, and you should bring to bear your best judgment in reaching your advisory sentence. The state trial court also instructed the jury about the potential sentences for Glock and Puiatti separately and individually. [29] Jurors routinely serve as impartial factfinders in cases that involve sensitive, even life-and-death matters and [i]n those cases, as in all cases, juries are presumed to follow the court's instructions. Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289, 1334 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Hensley, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2139, 2141, 173 L.Ed.2d 1184 (2009)). Courts presume that the jury heard, understood, and followed the court's instructions. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208-11, 107 S.Ct. at 1708-09. Third, although Puiatti attempts to connect and intertwine severance with his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing determination, we can locate, and Puiatti has cited, no Supreme Court decision doing so. Lockett and its progeny do not address joint penalty phases or say that the presence of a co-defendant at a capital defendant's penalty phase trial has any Eighth Amendment implications whatsoever. None of the Lockett line of cases relates to severance or helps Puiatti's claim at all. Puiatti, like the district court, cites no precedent that suggests a joint penalty trial is improper for co-defendants who were properly joined in the guilt phase. The Supreme Court has never intimated, much less held, that the special concerns in capital cases require, or even suggest, that severance is necessary. Fourth, while we consider Puiatti's § 2254 appeal separately from Glock's, this Court already has rejected Glock's claim that a joint trial deprived him of an individualized sentencing determination. See Glock V, 84 F.3d at 385-86 (rejecting as non-meritorious Glock's claim that his sentence should be set aside because ... the trial court refused to sever his sentencing proceeding from his co-defendant's, thereby depriving him of individualized sentencing). For all four reasons, Puiatti has not shown the state trial court's severance denial deprived Puiatti of his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing determination. We could stop here but for the fact that Puiatti, as a pre-AEDPA petitioner, also tries to advance a new constitutional theory. [30] Even though a separate penalty trial is not part of his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing determination, Puiatti argues that the severance denial and joint penalty phase, under the facts of his case, prejudiced him to the point of effectively denying his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing decision or at least a fair hearing. A threshold problem for Puiatti is that he has not shown any severance error at all, much less severance error rising to the level of a constitutional violation. For example, Puiatti has not satisfied the prejudice requirement at Zafiro 's first step for analyzing severance claims. Puiatti claims he was prejudiced because his mitigation theorysubstantial domination by Glockwas undermined by Glock's mitigation defense that Glock was a follower, too. However, Glock's expert Dr. Mussenden, although testifying Glock was a follower, also testified that Glock's role in Ritchie's murder was an expression of [Glock]'s anger and resentment towards women and all of the failure and rejection he had experienced all his life. [31] In closing, Glock's counsel never argued that Glock was under the substantial domination of Puiatti at the time of the crime and expressly disclaimed any argument to that effect. If anything, Glock and Puiatti presented similar mitigation theoriescounsel for Puiatti and Glock both argued their clients were insecure, easily led men who were under stress because of personality problems, unfortunate circumstances, and poor relationships with their families, but who nevertheless would not have committed the murder but for the presence and association of the other. Simply put, the defendants did not present antagonistic mitigation defenses. In any event, the Supreme Court has held expressly that [m]utually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S.Ct. at 938. The Supreme Court has held that co-defendants do not suffer prejudice simply because one co-defendant's defense directly inculpates another, or it is logically impossible for a jury to believe both co-defendants' defenses. Blankenship, 382 F.3d at 1125 (discussing Zafiro ). This also underscores the vital role of a joint trial in preventing inconsistent verdicts. Puiatti also complains that Glock's counsel (as well as the State) got to cross-examine Puiatti's mental health experts, Drs. DelBeato and Meadows. This also did not prejudice Puiatti. Glock's counsel's questioning of DelBeato and Meadows was brief, with only a few questions each. Glock's counsel had DelBeato and Meadows admit that neither expert had examined Glock and that whether Puiatti was influenced by Glock depended on Glock's psyche as well as Puiatti's. [32] Glock's counsel's cross-examination did not cause the introduction of irrelevant or incompetent evidence. [A] fair trial does not include the right to exclude relevant and competent evidence. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. at 938. Puiatti also argues that the fact that Glock testified, and Puiatti did not, prejudiced him. Puiatti points to no case in which the Supreme Court or this Court has held that a non-testifying defendant is prejudiced by the mere fact that one of his co-defendants chooses to testify. In fact, we have concluded that favorable observation of the willingness of one of several co-defendants to testify does not constitute an impermissible comment on the failure of the other co-defendants to testify. United States v. O'Neill, 767 F.2d 780, 786 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1363 (11th Cir.1983)). Moreover, Puiatti's argument ignores that Glock testified briefly and only about the remorse he felt for Ritchie's murder. Puiatti used multiple penalty-phase witnesses to testify that he too was remorseful. Puiatti was able to, and did, impart similar testimony to the jury without testifying. [33] If anything, the fact that Glock testified helped Puiatti because Glock did not deny the joint confession's statements that Glock suggested the idea of killing Ritchie and Glock fired the last two shots that killed her. Puiatti also argues the fact that Glock argued the mitigating factor of no significant prior criminal history applied to him highlighted Puiatti's lack of ability to argue this factor for himself. However, Puiatti's own penalty-phase witnesses testified that Puiatti was involved in a burglary and was on probation at the time of Ritchie's murder. Even in a separate penalty trial, the jury would know Puiatti already had a criminal history. [34] There was no vast disparity in either the quality or quantity of mitigation evidence presented by Puiatti and Glock. The bottom line is Puiatti's prejudice claim essentially rests upon an implicit contention that a separate penalty trial is required whenever a co-defendant's presence might reduce a defendant's chance to avoid a death sentence. We have found nothing in severance law or Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to support this position. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. at 938 (stating that it is well settled that defendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials). Puiatti has failed to show any specific way that he was prejudiced by being tried jointly with Glock at the penalty phase. Indeed, the specific facts of this case made a joint penalty phase particularly appropriate. Puiatti and Glock acted together in planning and effecting the abduction, robbery, and murder of Ritchie. Both Puiatti and Glock fired shots at Ritchie. It was Puiatti who was the first to fire shots at and strike the helpless victim from close range. Puiatti and Glock issued a joint interlocking confession that agreed on how many shots were fired, who fired each of them, and when. Puiatti and Glock kept driving by and shooting Ritchie until they were sure she would die. As the state trial court aptly noted, this case is a classic example of why joint defendants ought to be [tried] together in order to get justice. In fact, Puiatti's joint trial with Glock avoided the inequity of inconsistent verdicts and one capital defendant going second with the benefits of previewing the State's evidence and arguments. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 210, 107 S.Ct. at 1708-09 (stating, Joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts and by not randomly favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case beforehand). The Lockett-Eddings-Penry-Abdul-Kabir principle that the sentencer must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence, see Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117, 102 S.Ct. at 878, is quite compatible with a joint trial. To the extent any arguable tension may exist between joint trials and individualized sentencing, it did not occur here. See Bernard, 299 F.3d at 475 (noting potential tension between joinder and a defendant's right to an individualized capital sentencing decision, but affirming defendant's death sentence in a joint trial). If any two capital co-defendants could be properly joined in a penalty phase, it was Puiatti and Glock. Puiatti has not shown that his severance denial violated any constitutional right.