Opinion ID: 783924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Remaining Adverse Employment Action Claims

Text: 31 After correctly determining that most of Appellants' claims were time-barred and not saved by the continuing violation doctrine, the district court then dismissed their remaining claims for failure to satisfy their burden of proof in establishing discrimination. We reverse the district court on this issue. 32 In addressing the remaining claims, the district court applied the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). McDonnell Douglas instructs that the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. Once the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the defendant must then articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the questioned employment action. Id. If the defendant is able to do so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the defendant's articulated reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. 33 To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) that she was a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the position; (3) that she was discharged; and (4) after she was discharged, she was replaced with a person who is not a member of the protected class. Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1999). Of course, the plaintiff may always present a prima facie case by providing direct evidence of discrimination. Fierros v. Tex. Dep't of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir.2001). We understand that when there is sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory motive, the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). And so, our court has earlier held that when a plaintiff presents credible direct evidence that discriminatory animus in part motivated or was a substantial factor in the contested employment action, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have been made regardless of the forbidden factor. Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861(5th Cir.1993). 34 We find that the existence of the BWF program is sufficient to constitute direct evidence of a form or practice of discrimination. See Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1110 (11th Cir.2001). [T]he existence of an affirmative action plan, the Eleventh Circuit has written, when combined with evidence that the plan was followed in an employment decision is sufficient to constitute direct evidence of the unlawful discrimination unless the plan is valid. Id. at 1111; see Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas, Tex., 150 F.3d 438, 440-42 (5th Cir.1998)(discussing factors that weign on the validity of affirmative action plans). See also Messer, 130 F.3d at 135-36. Here, in the BWF summary reports, Xerox candidly identified explicit racial goals for each job and grade level. The reports also stated that blacks were over-represented and whites were under-represented in almost every job and grade level at the Houston office. Senior staff notes and evaluations also indicate that managers were evaluated on how well they complied with the BWF objectives. A jury looking at these facts could find that Xerox considered race in fashioning its employment policies and that because Plaintiffs were black, their employment opportunities had been limited. Because the district court ignored the existence of the BWF program and applied the McDonnell Douglas standard when it analyzed Plaintiffs' non-time-barred claims, 1 we reverse the district court's dismissal of these claims.