Opinion ID: 1670877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court abused its discretion in entering summary judgment against reeder.

Text: ¶ 19. Since we have determined that the trial court followed the proper procedure in entering summary judgment against Reeder, we must now examine the merits of Reeder's petition. Where the petitioner's version is belied by previous sworn testimony, for example, as to render his affidavit a sham we will allow summary judgment to stand. Kirksey v. State, 728 So.2d 565, 567 (Miss.1999). ¶ 20. URCCC 8.04(A)(4) provides that at the hearing on entry of a guilty plea, the court has the duty to address the defendant personally and inquire about the following: a. That the accused is competent to understand the nature of the charge; b. That the accused understands the nature and consequences of the plea, and the maximum and minimum penalties provided by law; c. That the accused understands that by pleading guilty (s)he waives his/ her constitutional rights of trial by jury, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right against self-incrimination.... The constitutional standard for voluntariness of a guilty plea is as follows: It is essential that an accused have knowledge of the critical elements of the charge against him, that he fully understand the charge, how it involves him, the effects of a guilty plea to the charge, and what might happen to him in the sentencing phase as a result of having entered the plea of guilty. Smith v. State, 636 So.2d 1220, 1225 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 653, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976)). Reeder proffers a litany of examples which he claims illustrate the involuntariness of his guilty plea.
¶ 21. During the plea colloquy, the trial court asked Reeder [h]ave you ever been in trouble in youth court? to which Reeder responded affirmatively. The trial court next asked Reeder [w]ere you adjudicated a delinquent and sent to the training school here or put on probation? Reeder answered that he had been put on probation and that the incident had occurred in Jackson County. ¶ 22. Reeder contends that this exchange rendered his guilty plea involuntary, because the trial court intimidated him with its demand that he recite to the court his youth court record. He further notes that under Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-261, his youth court records must remain confidential. However, the claim is without merit, as a circuit judge may consider a party's youth court record in sentencing him. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-261 provides in part: [t]he judges of the circuit and county courts, and presentence investigators for the circuit courts, as provided in Section 47-7-9, shall have the right to inspect any youth court records of a person convicted of a crime for sentencing purposes only.
¶ 23. Reeder also claims he was not advised of the maximum sentence he could receive upon pleading guilty to the crimes of burglary and kidnapping. Statements made during the plea colloquy belie his contentions. The trial judge asked Reeder, [w]hat do you understand is the maximum punishment you could receive for these crimes? Reeder responded Life.
¶ 24. Reeder next complains that he was not informed prior to court that his sentence for armed robbery would be ten years without benefit of probation or parole. He notes that the petition to enter a guilty plea does not mention parole or probation, nor does it differentiate between the sentences for armed robbery and kidnapping. Rather, it merely provides that the State would recommend a sentence of ten years ¶ 25. The trial judge asked Reeder, [d]o you understand that the State will make a recommendation as to a sentence in your case? to which he responded affirmatively. She then asked Reeder, [w]hat do you understand they will recommend? Reeder answered, Ten years. The following exchange then occurred between the trial judge and the district attorney: BY THE COURT: Is that on each charge? BY MR. MILLER: Yes, ma'am. BY THE COURT: To run concurrently? BY MR. MILLER: Yes, ma'am. BY THE COURT: And the armed robbery, the ten years would be without parole. BY MR. MILLER: That's right.... ¶ 26. The trial judge clearly advised Reeder he would not be eligible for parole. She asked him [s]o it's been explained to you that only a jury can give you life on cases like this? Reeder answered affirmatively. The trial judge advised Reeder that if the jury were unable to agree on a sentence in the matter, the court would sentence him. She then told Reeder, It would have to be something less than your life expectancy; but, because it is an armed robbery, whatever sentence you got, you would have to serve it without parole. You have to serve each and every day of it. Do you understand that? (emphasis added). Reeder indicated he understood.
¶ 27. Reeder next complains that the trial court failed to advise him that he had a right to stop or request postponement of the proceedings so he could ask questions about the change in sentencing offered by State. Neither URCCC 8.04 nor the constitutional standard provide for such a right. Moreover, the State made no change in sentencing other than proposing a fine which it immediately withdrew upon objection by Reeder's attorney.
¶ 28. Reeder contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to advise him that his sentence would be ten years without the benefit of parole. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient, that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial proceedings would have been different. Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1129 (Miss. 1996) (applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). A defendant who pleads guilty to a crime is `prejudiced' by his counsel's erroneous advice if he would have insisted on going to trial if he had been correctly informed. Alexander v. State, 605 So.2d 1170, 1173 (Miss.1992). An allegation that a defendant has been incorrectly informed of sentence range is a question of fact that is to be resolved by the trial court. Ward v. State, 708 So.2d 11, 15 (Miss.1998). As discussed above, Reeder was aware of the sentence the State would recommend. Moreover, Reeder indicated he was satisfied with the services of his attorney. The defense counsel is presumed to have acted competently and the effectiveness of his or her efforts are determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. Foster v. State, 716 So.2d 538, 541 (Miss.1998).
¶ 29. Reeder next alleges that his attorney failed to advise him as to the nature of the charges against him, his possible defenses, and the consequences of entering a guilty plea. Reeder indicated at the hearing that he understood the charges against him. ¶ 30. If the defendant is advised regarding the nature of the charge against him and the consequences of the entry of the plea, it is considered voluntary and intelligent. Alexander v. State, 605 So.2d at 1172. In other words, the defendant must be instructed that a guilty plea waives his rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse witnesses, and protection against self-incrimination. Id. ¶ 31. The record reveals that the trial judge advised Reeder that if he pled guilty, he was waiving his right to a trial by jury. She further informed him that after the State calls and questions their witnesses, you have the opportunity to confront those witnesses by what we call cross-examination. Finally, the trial judge advised Reeder that he had the right to remain silent throughout the trial. She then asked Reeder, knowing all of the rights you're waiving this morning by pleading guilty, do you still want to plead guilty to these two charges? Reeder responded affirmatively. ¶ 32. Though there is no indication in the record that Reeder's attorney advised him of the aforementioned rights he waived by pleading guilty, the trial judge did provide him with that information. A strong but rebuttable presumption exists that counsel's conduct falls within a broad range of reasonable professional assistance. McQuarter v. State, 574 So.2d 685, 687 (Miss.1990). To overcome this presumption, Reeder must show that he would have insisted on going to trial had he been correctly informed. Alexander, 605 So.2d at 1173. Reeder was indicted for armed robbery, kidnapping, and burglary. Had he gone to trial, he faced the possibility of receiving two life sentences for the armed robbery and kidnapping and twenty-five years for burglary of an inhabited dwelling. Instead, Reeder received a ten-year sentence for armed robbery and a ten year sentence for kidnapping to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for armed robbery. Moreover, the State agreed to nol pros the burglary charge. Reeder has failed to establish that had his attorney advised him of the nature of the charges, his possible defenses, and the consequences of a guilty plea that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial.
¶ 33. Reeder maintains that once the State changed his proposed sentence by attempting to impose a fine, his attorney should have advised him of his right to postpone the proceedings or to ask questions about the proposed change. Reeder's claims are unfounded. The record reveals that once the State mentioned the proposed fine, Reeder's attorney objected and the State withdrew the fine.
¶ 34. Reeder's three co-indictees, Woods, Lewis, and Espinoza, received sentences of three, five, and ten years respectively. Reeder contends his attorney should have pointed out to the trial court the disparity between the sentence imposed in his case and the sentences received by his co-indictees. Reeder ignores the fact that the trial court sentenced him some time before it sentenced his co-indictees. It would have been difficult for Reeder's attorney to point to a disparity that did not exist at the time of entry of Reeder's guilty plea. ¶ 35. Reeder next complains his counsel should have ensured Reeder entered his guilty plea at the same date and time as his co-indictees rather than coerce him into pleading guilty earlier. Such a feat is likely not within counsel's control. Moreover, Reeder has failed to establish that had his attorney somehow managed to schedule entry of the guilty pleas on the same day, the result in his case would have been different. Notably, one of his coindictees received the same sentence as Reeder.