Opinion ID: 1277356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Other Crimes Instruction

Text: The trial court gave the standard instruction prohibiting the jury from considering other violent crimes admitted in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b), unless these crimes had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction did not describe or otherwise identify any of the acts to which it might apply. The prosecutor and defense counsel approved the instruction as given; defense counsel in fact requested that the trial court not delineate the specific criminal acts that the jury would be permitted to consider. [38] Defendant contends that the trial court's failure to instruct, sua sponte, on the elements of the crimes proved under section 190.3, factor (b), rendered unreliable the jury's penalty determination. We repeatedly have rejected the identical contention in other cases, observing that there is no duty, absent a request, to so instruct. (See, e.g., People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1175, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 704, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640.) The rule is based in part on a recognition that, as [a] tactical matter, the defendant `may not want the penalty phase instructions overloaded with a series of lengthy instructions on the elements of alleged other crimes because he may fear that such instructions could lead the jury to place undue emphasis on the crimes rather than on the central question of whether he should live or die.' [Citations.] We have also noted a trial court is not prohibited from giving such instructions on its own motion when they are `vital to a proper consideration of the evidence.' [Citation.] ( People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1, 72, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224, original italics].) Defendant does not provide us with a principled basis for reconsidering these decisions, and we decline to do so. Defense counsel's explicit approval of the instruction indicated a clear preference for the standard, general language, rather than a recitation of the litany of defendant's uncharged criminal activity. Defendant now contends that trial counsel's failure to request a more detailed instruction amounted to ineffective assistance. In view of the nature of defendant's prior criminal conduct, however, counsel's decision obviously was a reasoned, tactical one. (See, e.g., People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 592, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142; see also People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, fn. 16, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859.) The trial court was under no duty to override defense counsel on this point and instruct the jury as to the individual elements of the crimes proved. No error or constitutionally deficient assistance appears. In any event, we reject defendant's contention that the absence of such an instruction tainted his trial. Our review of the record discloses convincing evidence of criminal activity properly admitted under section 190.3, factor (b). There is no indication that an instruction on the specific crimes and elements would have changed the jury's assessment of the evidence or would have affected the outcome of the trial.