Opinion ID: 303946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: He said this six or seven times, perhaps.

Text: 65 Moreover, Sutherland acknowledges that Dopp was continuing to make payments right up to the date of the option in order to avoid foreclosure. Surely, one can conclude from this that Sutherland was aware that Dopp believed the June 15 notice had been abandoned, as deadlines had always been in the past. In addition, Dopp was, of course, relying on the Sutherland promise to give him a first refusal before selling his stock. 66 The majority suggests that, as an experienced businessman, Dopp did not, would not, and should not rely on oral promises in these matters, insisting instead that the arrangement be reduced to writing. The whole history of negotiations between Dopp and the bank belies this notion. Since 1970 Dopp had paid over $700,000 on his debts in an occasional and erratic manner, frequently orally proposing and accepting new schemes to gain more time for payment, add additional security for his debts, etc. During all this time, the bank had refrained from foreclosing on any of his loans. Although neither party seemed wholly comfortable with its trading partner, each had accepted these frequent renegotiations of the terms, almost always on an oral basis. Even after the bank had obtained a judgment against Dopp, it did not foreclose on the property it held, but instead entered into another oral arrangement by which Dopp promised more collateral and the bank promised not to foreclose and to extend the time for payment. 67 The willingness to modify the arrangement orally is most clearly indicated in the period from June 1971 to October 1, 1971, when Dopp learned of the option for the Galesis. On June 15 the bank informed Dopp in writing that it intended to sell the stock. Within ten days, however, bank officials and Dopp's attorney orally negotiated new arrangements, by which the bank would not sell the stock and Dopp would make additional payments and post additional security. during these months, according to Sutherland's testimony, Dopp asked seven or eight times for assurances that the stock would not be sold without notice to him, Dopp continued to make payments, and, apparently, nothing was said about the June 15 notice. From an actual count the Franklin Bank agreed orally during the period September 1970 through September 1971 14 times to delay the due date on the indebtedness here. Only one time was such an agreement put in writing. In view of this rather casual approach to Dopp's obligations, his insistence on a written agreement would be unusual and unnecessary. 68 The majority also suggests that Sutherland's meticulous note-making did not indicate that the alleged promises were made. I find this absence, under the circumstances of this case, almost wholly immaterial and certainly not, as the majority suggests, conclusive of the issue. Sutherland's ledger is filled with his personal notes on Dopp's promises. It is but a one-sided account of Sutherland's recollections and was clearly not intended by the parties to embody the ever-changing due date on Dopp's indebtedness that would be binding on the bank and Dopp. Indeed the notations were never seen by Dopp. Moreover, Sutherland admitted that he did not record every conversation with Dopp in his file; we know, for example, that he did not record the seven or eight times Dopp asked for a first call on the stock. The notes are therefore of little value as to the basic obligation though they do shed some side light on the development and implementation of the conspiracy against Dopp. Dopp Would Suffer Irreparable Injury: 69 The majority says that Dopp's inability to prove irreparable injury is in itself sufficient grounds for reversing . . . It cites an observation by the trial court that it is difficult to conceive how Dopp may successfully conduct a proxy contest in light of his financial situation. This was not a finding although the majority tries to elevate it to that level. The finding, despite this observation of the district judge, is that irreparable injury would be suffered by Dopp. Moreover, Widmark and the Galesis were clearly disturbed over the possibility of Dopp securing control: 70 (1) Dopp was the largest single shareholder with 18 percent of the stock; (2) he was former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer who certainly had connections among the stockholders; (3) he had acquired 55,000 shares between April and June, 1971, despite the hostile action of Widmark, the Galesis and the Bank toward him; (4) Michael Galesi was inquiring of Sutherland about the Bank's voting of the Dopp stock in the coming election on the date of Sutherland's deposition, October 21; (5) Dopp's ability to stave off creditors while waging the battle for control; and (6) the testimony in the depositions indicating that the disposition of the case was important in the election and that both Widmark and the Galesis were disturbed about it. 2 71 The majority cites the outcome of the election-an event occurring after the trial court's action-as conclusive of the point as to irreparable injury. It notes that Dopp lost by 300,000 votes. This methodology is insupportable. It faults the district court for not being clairvoyant. It fails to mention, however, that 250,000 votes were challenged. The Franklin Bank voted Dopp's stock for Widmark. If it had been switched to Dopp and the challenges sustained, Dopp would have been successful. There was clear evidence that Dopp might be successful. Indeed he was remarkably close under the circumstances. The equities being with him on the whole record the injunction was properly granted. 72 The finding of irreparable injury was also supported by the trial court on another adequate ground i. e. the impossibility of compensating Dopp fully if such a large block of stock had to be purchased on the market in case Dopp was successful on the merits. Dopp claimed that the shares were worth $12 to $15 each; the stock exchange listed them at around $5. The trial court concluded on the concession of the parties that a block of stock of this size could not be sold by the bank through traditional channels: 73 If the market is so thin that a block of this size cannot be sold without unduly depressing the market, then it follows logically that a block of the size involved cannot be purchased on the market without having converse undue effect on the price. Under these circumstances, plaintiff correctly argues that the block of Butler shares herein involved is unique, and because of its size has no ascertainable market value. 74 This conclusion is but hornbook law as to the inadequacy of money damages: Of course, (equitable) remedy should be granted in case the shares cannot be obtained in the market and the plaintiff's damages cannot be ascertained. 5 A Corbin on Contracts Sec. 1148 (1964). The majority seems to say that since the shares are traded on the American Stock Exchange that Dopp's damages are equal to that Exchange's price. This position is incredibly unrealistic and would be entirely unfair. Dopp, if he loses this stock, cannot move back to his 18 percent position without inflating the price to some unascertainable value. It may be true that he acquired 55,000 shares in April and June. This is not in the record here and is taken from the litigation referred to by the majority. 3 It does not show how he acquired the stock i. e. by purchase, loan for use in the proxy battle or otherwise. We do know that there was no transfer of this volume made on the Exchange during this period and that Dopp had no money or credit to acquire such a block by purchase. Neither of the parties mentioned it in their briefs or arguments and in the light of these facts is entitled to no weight whatever. 4 Moreover, this false support for the majority's decision that money damages will be adequate produces a harsh effect on Dopp. As I have indicated Dopp has insisted throughout the trial that the stock was undervalued on the Exchange. This conclusion, presumably, was reached on solid information obtained by Dopp in his former position with the Company. 5 Under traditional damage rules the measure of damages would be the difference between the contract price and the market or current price at the time or times when they ought to have been delivered. 5 Corbin on Contracts, supra, at Sec. 1101. Applying this standard, Dopp would only receive the market value of the shares on October 1, 1971, the date he learned of the option less the sum he would pay to meet the terms of the option price. This would be an unconscionable nothing in this case. Today the price on the American Stock Exchange is $12 per share. 6 Thus even if he wins his damage suit, Dopp eventually loses $300,000. This hardly affords Dopp an adequate remedy while it gives the Galesis a windfall. 75 For these reasons, I dissent.