Opinion ID: 1354990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General standing principles

Text: Standing implicates both constitutional requirements and prudential concerns. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128, 125 S.Ct. 564, 160 L.Ed.2d 519 (2004). In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. The standing requirement is born partly of an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004) (quotations, citations omitted). A federal court [a]lways ... must balance the heavy obligation to exercise jurisdiction against the deeply rooted commitment not to pass on questions of constitutionality unless adjudication of the constitutional issue is necessary. Id. (quotations, citations omitted). Thus, Article III's standing requirement is every bit as important in its circumscription of the judicial power of the United States as in its granting of that power. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Invoking the power of the federal judiciary requires more than important issues and able litigants. See id. at 489-90, 102 S.Ct. 752.
Article III, § 2, of the Constitution restricts the federal `judicial Power' to the resolution of `Cases' and `Controversies.' That case-or controversy requirement is satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing. Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 2535, 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 471, 102 S.Ct. 752. [I]n order to have Article III standing, a plaintiff must adequately establish: (1) an injury in fact ( i.e., a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest); (2) causation ( i.e., a fairly traceable connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and (3) redressability ( i.e., it is likely and not merely speculative that the plaintiff's injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit). Sprint Commc'ns Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2535 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130) (further quotation, alterations omitted); see also Cortes, 508 F.3d at 161. In this manner does Art. III limit the federal judicial power `to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.' Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 472, 102 S.Ct. 752 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)). Determining that a matter before the federal courts is a proper case or controversy under Article III therefore assumes particular importance in ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects the properand properly limitedrole of the courts in a democratic society. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 341, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (quotation omitted). [N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies. Id. (quotations omitted). If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it.... Id. Of particular relevance to this case, a plaintiff must allege an actual, concrete injury. See Sprint Commc'ns Co., 128 S.Ct. at 2535; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. It is not enough to assert a generalized, abstract grievance shared by a large number of similarly situated people. See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 482-83, 102 S.Ct. 752 (citing cases). We go on to discuss prudential standing.
In contrast to constitutional standing, prudential standing embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 11, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (quotation omitted). Although the Supreme Court has not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the standing doctrine, [the Court has] explained that prudential standing encompasses the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. Id. at 12, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (quotation omitted); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 474-75, 102 S.Ct. 752; Twp. of Piscataway v. Duke Energy, 488 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir.2007). Without such limitations-closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance-the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (quotation omitted). Of import in this case, then, even when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III, the [Supreme] Court has refrained from adjudicating `abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to `generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 474-75, 102 S.Ct. 752 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)).
Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the [Supreme] Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998) (citing cases). Based upon this reasoning, the Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected claims of standing predicated on the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 482-83, 102 S.Ct. 752 (quotation, alteration omitted; citing cases); see also Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 516-17, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007) (We will not ... entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public's nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442, 127 S.Ct. 1194, 167 L.Ed.2d 29 (2007) (per curiam) (noting that the [t]he only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law... has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about governmentclaiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at largedoes not state an Article III case or controversy.); id. at 573-77, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citing cases); Goode, 539 F.3d at 322 (holding taxpayers lacked standing to assert claims based upon generalized injury that all persons in Philadelphia suffered); Cortes, 508 F.3d at 164 (holding voters and taxpayers lacked standing to assert a generalized grievance[] of concerned citizens); Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 185, 190 (holding homeowners lacked standing to assert generalized challenge to local zoning ordinance); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 120-21 (3d Cir.1997) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing to assert generalized claim that they were injured by knowing that creek was being polluted). Such claims amount to little more than attempts to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air ... generalized grievances about the conduct of government. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 479, 102 S.Ct. 752 (quotation, alteration omitted). Therefore, assertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning. Id. at 483, 102 S.Ct. 752. This reasoning invariably appears in cases where the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite naturefor example, harm to the common concern for obedience to law. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (quotation omitted). The abstract nature of the harmfor example, injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyeddeprives the case of the concrete specificity ... which ... prevents a plaintiff from obtaining what would, in effect, amount to an advisory opinion. Id. at 24, 118 S.Ct. 1777. Often the fact that an interest is abstract and the fact that it is widely shared go hand in hand. But their association is not invariable, and where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the [Supreme] Court has found `injury in fact.' Id.; see also Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 517, 127 S.Ct. 1438; Goode, 539 F.3d at 322 (noting in that case that [a]ppellants lack standing, ... not because the alleged injuries they suffer are widely felt, but because their injuries are no different in nature from the general interest in enforcing compliance with the law which the public shares). In this appeal, Plaintiffs argue they are not asserting generalized grievances, but are instead alleging the deprivation of personal rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Even so, Plaintiffs must allege that they directly suffered an actual injury to those rights. See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 482-87, 102 S.Ct. 752; see also Goode, 539 F.3d at 315, 320-22 & 322 n. 7 (applying same standing analysis to a citizen taxpayer's claims alleging the deprivation of rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to access the courts and to petition the legislature, and thus requiring plaintiff to establish an actual and direct injury to her rights in order to have standing).
The named plaintiffs include four individualsTim Potts, Carl H. Silverman, William R. Koch and H. William McIntyrewho are Pennsylvania residents, citizens and taxpayers. Plaintiff Greg Vitali is a citizen and taxpayer in Pennsylvania. He is also a member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives who voted against Act 44. [4] Two of the plaintiffsCommon Cause of Pennsylvania and the League of Women Votersare associations. Common Cause is a national non-partisan citizen advocacy organization concerned with advancing integrity in government. Common Cause's primary goal is governmental accountability and responsiveness, which it promotes through lobbying, oversight, education, outreach and litigation programs. App. at 33. Common Cause of Pennsylvania has over 10,000 members in Pennsylvania. Id. Plaintiff League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania is a membership based, non-partisan, non-profit corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania. The League's purpose is to promote the informed and active participation of citizens in their government. Id. at 34. Its membership consists of [Pennsylvania] citizens, taxpayers, and voters. Id. An association's or organization's standing presents special considerations. [A]n organization or association may have standing to bring suit under two circumstances. First, an organization may be granted standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the organization or association itself may enjoy. Alternatively, an association may assert claims on behalf of its members, but only where the record shows that the organization's individual members themselves have standing to bring those claims. Cortes, 508 F.3d at 162-63 (citations, alterations omitted); see also Pa. Psychiatric Soc'y v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir.2002). Thus, an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries, even without a showing of injury to the association itself. United Food & Comm'l Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 552, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996). `[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.' Id. at 553, 116 S.Ct. 1529 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)); see also Pa. Psychiatric Soc'y, 280 F.3d at 283. The first requirement, that at least one of the organization's members would have standing to sue on his own, is grounded on Article III as an element of the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy. United Food & Comm'l Workers Union Local 751, 517 U.S. at 554-55, 116 S.Ct. 1529 (quotation omitted). The second prong is, at the least, complementary to the first, for its demand that an association plaintiff be organized for a purpose germane to the subject of its member's claim raises an assurance that the association's litigators will themselves have a stake in the resolution of the dispute, and thus be in a position to serve as the defendant's natural adversary. Id. at 555-56, 116 S.Ct. 1529. The third prong, on the other hand, is prudential in nature, rather than a constitutional requirement. See id. at 556-57, 116 S.Ct. 1529. In this case, the two Plaintiff associations base their standing solely on injuries suffered by their members. Therefore, because Plaintiffs Common Cause and the League of Women Voters have alleged no injury to [themselves] as an organization, distinct from injury to [their] taxpayer members, their claim to standing can be no different from those of the members [they] seek[] to represent. The question [presented, then,] is whether [their] members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 476 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 752 (quotation omitted). Because the standing of the two Plaintiff associations thus rests on the standing of their members, and because Plaintiffs allege that the associations' members suffered the same injury as the individual plaintiffs, save perhaps Representative Vitali, we will address the associations' standing together with that of the individual plaintiffs.