Opinion ID: 2792043
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: verdell mays

Text: Verdell complains that his offense level was improperly enhanced on three grounds: maintaining a premises for drug manufacture or distribution, possession of a firearm in connection with a drug offense, and being responsible for a sufficient quantity of drugs to require a base offense level of 32. To put his arguments in context, we summarize the relevant evidence. On November 10, 2009, police officers executed a search warrant at 2269 Russell, Kansas City, Kansas. They found the following: In the kitchen were seven electronic scales with residue, four razor blades with residue, five boxes of baking soda, 15 empty medicine bottles, five mason jars with residue, a metal pot with residue, a Pyrex measuring cup, nine boxes of sandwich bags, a metal spoon with residue, and a melted plastic bag with an unknown substance. A letter addressed to Verdell was in a kitchen drawer. A firearm, a pistol magazine, and a bullet were on a table in the living room. In the southwest bedroom were two baggies of crack cocaine and $942 in a jacket pocket. And in the closet of the northwest bedroom were $976 in a shoebox, a rifle magazine, and a pouch containing a motor vehicle registration for Verdell, a traffic ticket issued to him, and a letter addressed to him. At Verdell’s sentencing hearing, Officer Dillon Passinese explained the use of Pyrex cups, baggies, digital scales, and baking soda in the manufacture and sale of crack 3 cocaine. He testified that although the residence contained a couch, a dining room table, and clothing, there was no bedroom furniture. He said that “it appear[ed]. . . that [the] residence was used for the purposes of making or manufacturing cocaine” because “it didn’t appear to be lived in for any other reason.” R. (Verdell 14-3106), Vol. 2 at 123. Detective Joseph Daneff testified about what he had learned during his investigation, which included wiretaps. Coconspirator Gregory Moore told him that he and Verdell began engaging in drug transactions in 2006 or 2007. Verdell acted as “a middleman.” Id. at 70. He would purchase cocaine from Anthony Smith and then sell that cocaine to Moore. Many of these transactions occurred “at an address believed to be owned by Verdell Mays at 2269 Russell.” Id. at 71. Daneff also interviewed Smith, who said that his drug transactions with Verdell began in 2004 or 2005 and that he supplied Verdell with various quantities of cocaine. Smith estimated that he had provided Verdell with at least 10 kilograms altogether. Daneff also testified that he knew “during the course of the investigation [that Smith and Verdell] were closely associated,” id. at 100, and that he had no “reason to doubt [Smith’s] veracity as to the calculation of 10,000 grams of powder cocaine” because “his information [was] consistent with the information that other individuals told [him],” id. at 100. Djuane Sykes testified that Verdell purchased the residence at 2269 Russell in 2007 and that he “moved in with [Verdell] and [they] proceeded to work out of it.” Id. at 183. He said that he and Verdell would “hang out” and manufacture drugs there, id. at 185, and that people frequently came to the house to purchase crack cocaine. In addition, 4 he sold Verdell firearms while they lived at the house and Verdell carried firearms on his person, including a .40 caliber Glock that he carried for protection. Sykes also said that Smith, known to him only as Anthony, sold Verdell cocaine in amounts of half a kilogram and a kilogram. Moore, who the investigation identified as the head of the drug-trafficking organization, testified that he began a drug-trafficking association with Verdell in 2007 or 2008 and that Verdell obtained cocaine for him, although sometimes Moore sold cocaine to Verdell. Moore said that Smith and Verdell were “drug partners” for “a little while.” Id. at 139–140. He identified a picture of 2269 Russell as Verdell’s house and said that on one occasion he had seen an assault rifle lying by the front door and that sometimes Verdell would have a gun on him at his house. He acknowledged that he saw Verdell manufacture crack cocaine there on one occasion and that sometimes drugs were sold there. 1. Maintaining a Premises for Purpose of Drug Manufacture or Distribution The guidelines direct a sentencing court to increase the offense level by two levels “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12) (2013).2 “Manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance need not be the sole purpose for which the premises was maintained, but must be one of the defendant’s primary or principal uses for the premises, rather than 2 All citations to the guidelines are to those in effect when the defendants were sentenced in July 2014. 5 one of the defendant’s incidental or collateral uses for the premises.” Id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.17. The district court found that Verdell maintained 2269 Russell for the “purposes of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” R. (Verdell 14-3106), Vol. 2 at 224. Verdell argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding because “[t]he testimony of the cooperating co-defendants was so unreliable as to justify a finding that a sentence based upon it must be set aside.” Aplt. (Verdell 14-3106) Br. at 27. He also contends that even if “there is sufficient evidence that [he] maintained the premise [at 2269 Russell,] . . . the testimony of the cooperating co-defendants did not support a finding that manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance was one of [his] primary or principal uses for the premises.” Id. at 28. We reject Verdell’s challenge to the veracity of his codefendants’ testimony. Credibility determinations are left to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and “we will not hold that testimony is, as a matter of law, incredible unless it is unbelievable on its face, i.e., testimony as to facts that the witness physically could not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature.” United States v. Hoyle, 751 F.3d 1167, 1175 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Verdell ignores the evidence found in the house. The enhancement was appropriate in light of the evidence of drug manufacture found there and the supporting testimony of Sykes, Moore, and Officer Passinese. See United States v. Cortez-Diaz, 565 6 F. App’x 741, 748 (10th Cir. 2014) (no furniture and “only noted contents [in house] were seven pounds of methamphetamine, drug packaging materials, a digital scale, and [subordinate’s] luggage”); see also United States v. Bell, 766 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 2014) (“house contained the ‘tools of the trade’”). Verdell points out that he slept there and his friends used the house as a “hangout.” Aplt. (Verdell 14-3106) Br. at 28. That evidence, however, does not compel the conclusion that drug manufacture and distribution were merely incidental. The house had no bedroom furniture, but it did contain a number of items necessary for the drug trade: seven digital scales, five boxes of baking soda, nine boxes of sandwich bags, and two baggies of crack cocaine, among other evidence of drug manufacture. We affirm the application of the enhancement. 2. Possession of a Firearm The guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement for the possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug-trafficking offense. USSG § 2D.1.1(b)(1). “The enhancement should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” Id. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.11(A). “Possession of a weapon in connection with a drug trafficking offense is established if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a temporal and spacial relation existed between the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant.” United States v. Alexander, 292 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The necessary nexus . . . may be established by showing that the weapon was located nearby the general location where drugs or drug paraphernalia are 7 stored or where part of the transaction occurred.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[O]nce the government establishes that the gun was possessed in proximity to the drugs or transaction, the burden shifts to the defendant to show it is clearly improbable that the weapon was related to the offense.” Id. at 1232 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court found that Verdell possessed a weapon in connection with his offense, based on the credible testimony of Moore and Sykes and the evidence from the search of the house. Verdell argues that “[t]he only evidence of [his] possessing a weapon came from the cooperating co-defendants whose testimony . . . proved to be unreliable.” Aplt. (Verdell 14-3106) Br. at 25. But the district court could properly credit that testimony and, again, Verdell disregards the physical evidence against him. Officers found a gun and ammunition on a table in the living room and multiple items associated with drug manufacture in the kitchen. They also found a large amount of cash and a rifle magazine in the northwest bedroom. And in both the kitchen and the bedroom, they found documents addressed to Verdell. The government demonstrated the requisite connection between the gun, the drug offense, and the defendant. See United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2005) (gun and digital scale found in living room and crack cocaine found on kitchen table); United States v. Smith, 131 F.3d 1392, 1400 (10th Cir. 1997) (gun “found in the garage near the entrance to [defendant’s] drug lab”). Although Verdell contends that “[t]here was no evidence that any weapons were seized from [him] nor . . . that law enforcement ever observed [him] in possession of a weapon.” 8 Aplt. (Verdell 14-3106) Br. at 26, such evidence is unnecessary, see United States v. Pompey, 264 F.3d 1176, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001) (gun need not be seized from defendant directly). And Verdell made no showing that it is clearly improbable that the firearms were connected with the offense. The enhancement was appropriate. 3. Drug Quantity The base offense level for a drug offense ordinarily depends on the quantity of drugs attributable to the defendant. See USSG § 2D1.1(a)(5). “When the actual drugs underlying a drug quantity determination are not seized, the trial court may rely upon an estimate to establish the defendant's guideline offense level so long as the information relied upon has some basis of support in the facts of the particular case and bears sufficient indicia of reliability.” United States v. Dalton, 409 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). If more than one drug is attributable to the defendant, the quantity of each is converted to a marijuana equivalent, and those equivalents are added. The district court attributed to Verdell 10,397 grams of powder cocaine and 220 grams of cocaine base. The marijuana equivalent of the powder cocaine was 2,079.4 kilograms, and the equivalent of the cocaine base was 785.62 kilograms, for a total of 2,865.02 kilograms. See USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. n.8(D) (equivalency tables). The base offense level was 32 for a marijuana equivalent of at least 1,000 kilograms but less than 3,000 kilograms. See id. 2D1.1(c)(4). 9 Verdell argues that “there was insufficient evidence to support the drug amounts that were attributed to [him].” Aplt. (Verdell 14-3106) Br. at 23. He asserts that Moore’s testimony “was shown to be completely untrustworthy,” id. at 24, and that because “[n]either Anthony Smith nor Ralph Mayo testified,” their statements in the presentence report should not have been used to calculate the drug amounts, id. at 23–24. We are not persuaded. “In sentencing, a district court may rely on hearsay evidence as long as the evidence is sufficiently reliable.” United States v. Caiba-Antele, 705 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 2012). Detective Daneff testified that Smith had estimated that he sold Verdell 10 kilograms of cocaine. Daneff said that he had no reason to doubt Smith’s veracity and that his estimate was consistent with information he received from other people he interviewed. The court was entitled to credit that testimony. See United States v. Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073, 1077–78 (10th Cir. 1990) (accepting testimony of probation officer based on interviews of two individuals who had purchased drugs from defendant). Further, that testimony was supported by the testimony of both Sykes and Moore. Because five kilograms of powder cocaine was sufficient to support Verdell’s base offense level of 32, see USSG § 2D1.1(c)(4), we need not address the additional amounts the court attributed to him.