Opinion ID: 3183072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: After trial, Contreras renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to find him guilty of Counts 1 and 3 beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court found that conflicting lay and expert testimony were presented at trial. It determined that, [t]aken as a whole, . . . the weight of the evidence supported conviction beyond a reasonable doubt on each count of conviction and accordingly denied the motion. In support of its ruling, the court noted that [t]he location of the injuries to the skull, the number of the separate injuries to the skull, and the severity of the injuries to the victim all strongly supported the conclusion that the Defendant hit the head of the victim several times with his closed fist. According to the court, [t]he evidence established that this was not a shaken baby case, but rather a baby that got beaten as opposed to a single fall from a chair or even the table. The court emphasized that [n]o one else had access to the victim that could have caused such injuries during the time period in which they were sustained. On appeal, Contreras argues that the [g]overnment's evidence supported Mr. Contreras's innocence of the crimes charged at least as strongly as it supported his guilt. Contreras claims that the government's case required the jury to infer when the injuries occurred and that the evidence did not allow a reasonable juror to make that inference beyond a reasonable doubt. First, he cites Dr. Froloff's testimony that the injuries in the head, in the subgaleal tissue, and contusions in the head, it's [sic] at least three days old. Second, Contreras points to Dr. Snell's testimony that some of A.C.'s injuries were acute, which he defined as less than five days old. Third, Contreras notes that Dr. Graff testified that [i]t's impossible to date a retinal hemorrhage. In summary, Contreras asserts that while all the experts testified that it was possible for A.C. to have sustained the injuries when the government alleged, the -8- witnesses also stated that it was possible for the injuries to have been caused earlier and possibly even before the child was in Contreras's care. He cites evidence that A.C. had symptoms of a concussion when she came to his home on January 4, 2012, and that she had fallen and was injured on at least three occasions during the weekend prior to her death. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence de novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Gentry, 555 F.3d 659, 664 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Second-degree murder requires proof of the unlawful taking of a human life. United States v. Good Bird, 197 F.3d 1203, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Lame, 716 F.2d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 1983)); see also United States v. Downs, 56 F.3d 973, 974 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that the elements of second-degree murder require proof that the defendant unlawfully killed [the victim] with malice aforethought). [A]ssault resulting in serious bodily injury is not a lesser included offense of murder. United States v. Cavanaugh, 948 F.2d 405, 410 (8th Cir. 1991). [A]ssault resulting in serious bodily injury contains different elements than murder . . . . Id. The elements of the 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6) offense of assault resulting in serious bodily injury are (1) an intentional assault that (2) results in serious bodily injury, committed (3) by an Indian and (4) within Indian Country. United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 766 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Contreras contends that the government failed to prove when the injury occurred. The indictment alleged a nine-day window in which A.C. may have been injured—[o]n or about between January 1, 2012, and January 9, 2012. The evidence shows that Contreras was the sole adult who had physical custody of the victim between January 4 and January 9, 2012, and was the only adult with A.C. when she became unconscious. While Contreras told the FBI that the child became unconscious after falling from a chair, three physicians testified that a fall from such a chair is -9- inconsistent with the 18 contusions observed on four different parts of the child's head; in fact, Dr. Froloff testified, contrary to Contreras's claim, that A.C.'s injuries were consistent with a beating. As to the timing of the injury, Dr. Froloff testified that the hemorrhages probably were inflicted within the 72 hours preceding death. A.C. arrived at the hospital at 8:39 a.m. on Monday, January 9, 2012, and died on Wednesday afternoon, January 11, 2012, at 5:00 p.m. Dr. Snell testified that A.C.'s injury was acute and that this acute injury was less than five days old. Could be a few days of that. But if we start at the time of death, we know she's in the hospital for three days, so we back up from there, which would tell us the injury occurred approximately right about the time or right before she was admitted to the hospital. (Emphasis added.) Both Dr. Froloff's and Dr. Snell's estimates of when A.C. sustained the fatal injuries place her in Contreras's care. Furthermore, A.C. underwent a physical exam with no reported issues at the end of December 2011, and A.C.'s mother testified that A.C. sounded fine on the telephone while in Contreras's care on the Sunday night prior to A.C. being taken to the hospital the next day. Based on the evidence in this record, we hold that the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that A.C.'s injuries fell within the time period specified in the indictment and that sufficient evidence exists to support Contreras's convictions on Counts 1 and 3.