Opinion ID: 1943879
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Proffer

Text: Nearly identical to his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his obstruction conviction, is appellant's argument that the proffer failed to show that Wiseman was a witness within the meaning of Devonshire because she denied relevant knowledge of the triple murder and had not cooperated with the authorities investigating that case. In order to overcome the defendant's right to object to the slain declarant's statements, the government need only establish the predicate facts [that appellant procured the declarant's unavailability and that the declarant qualifies as a witness] by a preponderance of the evidence. 691 A.2d at 169. We hold that the proffer was sufficient to meet the preponderance standard because we conclude that Wiseman qualifies as a witness for the purposes of waiver under Devonshire. Although neither Devonshire nor the sole District of Columbia case relying on it thus far, see Sweet, supra, 756 A.2d at 379, defined potential witness, the First Circuit case which was relied upon by Devonshire discussed the issue in some detail. See United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271 (1st Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1118, 117 S.Ct. 963, 136 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997). In Houlihan, the appellants argued that the decedent was not an actual witness because no charges had been lodged against them at the time of his slaying. See id. at 1279. The Houlihan court held: When a defendant murders an individual who is a percipient witness ... to prevent him from appearing at an upcoming trial, he denies the government the benefit of the witness's live testimony. In much the same way, when a defendant murders such a witness ... to prevent him from assisting an ongoing criminal investigation, he is denying the government the benefit of the witness's live testimony at a future trial. In short, the two situations are fair congeners: as long as it is reasonably foreseeable that the investigation will culminate in the bringing of charges, the mere fact that the homicide occurs at an earlier step in the pavane should not affect the operation of the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine. Indeed, adopting the contrary position urged by the appellants would serve as a prod to the unscrupulous to accelerate the timetable and murder suspected snitches sooner rather than later. We see no justification for creating such a perverse incentive, or for distinguishing between a defendant who assassinates a witness on the eve of trial and a potential defendant who assassinates a potential witness before charges officially have been brought. In either case, it is the intent to silence that provides notice. Id. at 1279-80. The rationale of Houlihan fully complements the stated purpose behind Devonshire to prevent a mockery of the system of justice that would arise from a defendant deriving benefits from murdering [witnesses] against him. See Devonshire, supra, 691 A.2d at 168 (quoting United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir.1982)). We may also look to our definition of the term witness under the obstruction statute and Smith, discussed supra Part D., which is, at a minimum, instructive since both the obstruction statute and Devonshire are aimed at deterring the elimination of witnesses by defendants. Devonshire stated that the term potential witness includes those individuals expected to give damaging testimony in some future proceeding. See Devonshire, supra, 691 A.2d at 166. This language tracks roughly the language in Smith that defines a witness for obstruction purposes, in part, as one supposed to know material facts. Smith, supra, 591 A.2d at 231. Further, the use of the adjective potential, modifying witness in Devonshire, was also used in Smith to describe a witness for obstruction purposes as being one who  may be called to testify. Smith, supra, 591 A.2d at 231 n. 3 (emphasis added). Moreover, the objective of the waiver rule under Devonshire is to prevent impediments to justice in the form of witness elimination, see Devonshire, supra, 691 A.2d at 168, the same purpose as § 22-722. See Council of the District of Columbia, Committee on the Judiciary, Report on Bill 9-385, Law Enforcement Witness Protection Act of 1992, at 2 (discussing the bill passed and codified at D.C.Code § 22-722 (1996)). The close similarities between these two provisions dictate that those who qualify as witnesses under the obstruction statute likewise qualify as potential witnesses under the waiver rule of Devonshire. Our review of the record confirms that the pretrial evidence proffered by the government to show that appellant killed Wiseman, and that she therefore qualified as a witness under Devonshire, was essentially the same as that presented at trial to prove the obstruction charge. Rather than restating that evidence, therefore, we refer to our discussions of the evidence within both our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence of the obstruction count, see supra Part D., and our analysis of the admissibility of the obstruction evidence in a trial for the triple murder, see supra Part C. We conclude that the proffered evidence was more than sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant knew Wiseman had damaging knowledge to which she potentially would testify at some future proceeding. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that appellant had waived his right to object to admission of Wiseman's statements under Devonshire.