Opinion ID: 777468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of the Exhaustion Requirement

Text: 29 We now consider whether the exhaustion requirement of the IDEA should apply to Polera's claims despite the fact that some of the relief sought — damages — is not available under the IDEA. 30 The IDEA's exhaustion requirement was intended to channel disputes related to the education of disabled children into an administrative process that could apply administrators' expertise in the area and promptly resolve grievances. The exhaustion requirement prevents courts from undermining the administrative process and permits an agency to bring its expertise to bear on a problem as well as to correct its own mistakes. Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 159 (2d Cir.1992). Exhaustion of the administrative process allows for the exercise of discretion and educational expertise by state and local agencies, affords full exploration of technical educational issues, furthers development of a complete factual record, and promotes judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled children. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir.1992); see also Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir.1989) (States are given the power to place themselves in compliance with the law.... Federal Courts—generalists with no experience in the educational needs of handicapped students — are given the benefit of expert factfinding by a state agency devoted to this very purpose.). In other words, the administrative system is uniquely well suited to review the content and implementation of IEPs such as Polera's, and to determine what changes, if any, are needed. The administrative process would have been particularly valuable here because, as the record reveals, the IEPs prepared for Polera were vague and generalized at best, in some cases offering little detail beyond a requirement that the school district provide a curriculum to Polera. 31 Courts in the Second Circuit have required exhaustion of administrative remedies even where damages were held to be unavailable through the administrative process. In such cases, plaintiffs were not permitted to evade the IDEA's exhaustion requirement merely by tacking on a request for money damages. In Buffolino v. Board of Education of Sachem Central School District at Holbrook, 729 F.Supp. 240 (E.D.N.Y.1990), the court rejected just such an argument by the plaintiffs, stating, [i]f the Court were to hold that plaintiffs in this case are excused from exhausting their remedies because adequate relief could not be obtained, plaintiffs could avoid administrative procedures merely by asking for relief that administrative authorities could not grant. Id. at 247; see also BD v. DeBuono, 130 F.Supp.2d 401, 428 (S.D.N.Y.2000) ([P]laintiffs should not be allowed to avoid the administrative requirements of IDEA by claiming only monetary damages or other relief not available under IDEA.); Hope v. Cortines, 872 F.Supp. 14, 17 (E.D.N.Y.) (a plaintiff cannot escape IDEA's exhaustion requirement by drafting a complaint artfully avoiding an IDEA claim where IDEA offers plaintiffs the very relief they seek), aff'd, 69 F.3d 687 (2d Cir.1995). 32 The opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Charlie F. v. Board of Education of Skokie School District, 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir.1996) is particularly instructive. In Charlie F., the plaintiff, like Polera, sued for damages under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, Section 1983, and state tort law, but did not bring an IDEA claim. The Seventh Circuit held that damages are not available under the IDEA, but nevertheless applied the IDEA's exhaustion requirement to the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 991-93. The court noted that [t]he statute speaks of available relief, and what relief is `available' does not necessarily depend on what the aggrieved party wants. Id. at 991. Giving a practical interpretation to the meaning of available relief, the court stated: [T]he theory behind the grievance may activate the IDEA's process, even if the plaintiff wants a form of relief that the IDEA does not supply.... We read `relief available' to mean relief for the events, condition, or consequences of which the person complains, not necessarily relief of the kind the person prefers. Id. at 991-92. The court then considered a hypothetical that parallels the facts of Polera's case: 33 Suppose a school fails to provide a reader for a blind pupil, who as a result falls behind. The IDEA provides relief: the school can assign a reader to the pupil for the future and can provide tutors and other special instruction until the pupil catches up. If disgruntled parents spurn this solution and demand compensation, the response should be that they cannot ignore remedies available under the IDEA and insist on those of their own devising; under the IDEA, educational professionals are supposed to have at least the first crack at formulating a plan to overcome the consequences of educational shortfalls. That the educational problem has consequences outside school ... can't be enough to avoid the statutory system.... By making an unreasonable or unattainable demand parents cannot opt out of the IDEA. 34 Id. at 992. The court held that the plaintiff's demand for damages did not excuse him from the IDEA's exhaustion requirement, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for failure to pursue administrative remedies. Id. at 993. 35 We find Polera's situation materially indistinguishable from that of the plaintiff in Charlie F., and we apply the same reasoning. The IDEA is intended to remedy precisely the sort of claim made by Polera: that a school district failed to provide her with appropriate educational services. The fact that Polera seeks damages, in addition to relief that is available under the IDEA, does not enable her to sidestep the exhaustion requirements of the IDEA. Where, as here, a full remedy is available at the time of injury, a disabled student claiming deficiencies in his or her education may not ignore the administrative process, then later sue for damages. Therefore, we hold that, absent an applicable exception, Polera was required to exhaust her administrative remedies. 36