Opinion ID: 2736929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Logic and Experience Test Is Flawed

Text: The logic and experience test is flawed because it fails to account for article I, section 1O's uniquely strong mandate for openness at every stage of a judicial proceeding. Moreover, it categorically permits closures in certain types of proceedings without considering the effect that such closures have on the open administration of justice in that particular case. A. Fails to account for our constitution's unique emphasis on open proceedings Washington is one of a number of states whose constitutions (unlike the United States Constitution) explicitly guarantee the open administration of justice. 3 Article I, section 10 of our constitution commands, Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay. The special emphasis on open court proceedings renders the Washington Constitution arguably more stringent than its federal counterpart, and our court's decisions have consistently emphasized the value of open administration of justice. See, e.g., Wise, 176 Wn.2d at 5; State v. Lormor, 172 Wn.2d 85, 90-91, 257 P.3d 624 (2011 ). The logic and experience test fails to account for the text and fu_nctign_ of article I, section 10. It is a test developed by federal courts with the United States Constitution in mind. It has little applicability to our constitution, which mandates that justice in all cases be administered openly. Moreover, we have recognized that the purpose of article I, section 10 is to 'ensure a fair trial, to remind the officers of the court of the importance of their functions, to encourage witnesses to come forward, 3 The United States Constitution never mentions open courts. Instead, the right to a public trial is implied in the First Amendment and made explicit in the Sixth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amends. I, VI (the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial). 5 No. 85809-8 (Wiggins, J., concurring in result) and to discourage perjury.' State v. Strode, 167 Wn.2d 222, 226, 217 P.3d 310 (2009) (quoting State v. Brightman, 155 Wn.2d 506,514, 122 P.3d 150 (2005)). But, applying the logic and experience test, we have drawn increasingly arbitrary lines delineating the universe of proceedings to which the public trial right attaches without considering whether our decisions further these goals. Indeed, public trial values are implicated when counsel and the court meet privately to discuss jury instructions, to answer a question from the jury, and to argue and rule on evidentiary issues. And yet, a majority of this court holds that the right to public trial did not extend to an in-chambers conference to discuss a question from a deliberating jury regarding jury instructions (Sublett, 176 Wn.2d at 147), nor to an in-chambers discussion of jury instructions prior to deliberations (State v. Koss, No. 85306-1 (Wash. Sept. 25, 2014)), nor to the 12 sidebar conferences here that involved the exclusion of testimony and evidence