Opinion ID: 1832218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: state's liability for injuries in bodies of waters

Text: A governmental entity that operates a swimming facility assumes the common law duty to operate the facility safely, just as a private individual is obligated under like circumstances. Avallone v. Board of County Comm'rs, 493 So.2d 1002, 1005 (Fla.1986); see Butler v. Sarasota County, 501 So.2d 579 (Fla.1986). Thus, a government entity operating a public swimming area will have the same operational-level duty to invitees as a private landownerthe duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn the public of any dangerous conditions of which it knew or should have known. [2] See, e.g., Avallone, 493 So.2d at 1005; Brightwell v. Beem, 90 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla.1956); Hylazewski v. Wet `N Wild, Inc., 432 So.2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). The core question presented in this case is whether a formal designation as a swimming area by the State is a prerequisite to the State's liability for breach of duty to operate the swimming facility safely, and if not, what must be shown before a duty of care to operate the swimming area safely arises. This Court's decision in Avallone did not expressly require the government entity to designate a public swimming area as a precondition to assuming liability for failing to operate the swimming area safely. 493 So.2d at 1005. However, the Court in Butler found the government entity to be liable because it created a designated swimming area where the dangerous condition existed. 501 So.2d at 579. Thus, our prior cases do not squarely resolve this question. The appellate courts addressing this issue have focused on whether the government entity held the area out to the public as a suitable place to swim, rather than relying solely on whether the government had designated the area for swimming. See Andrews v. Department of Natural Resources, 557 So.2d 85, 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Warren, 528 So.2d at 415. The first decision passing on this question was Warren, where the plaintiff was injured when he dove into a lake at a public park owned by a county. The Fourth District concluded that [s]ince the county did not designate Lake Osborne as a swimming area and did not in any manner contribute to the condition of the water or the lake bottom alleged to have presented an illusion of depth, it cannot be held liable to appellant. Warren, 528 So.2d at 415. The Fourth District focused on evidence that the county had taken active steps to prohibit swimming at the park: an ordinance prohibited swimming at the park, the park rangers were instructed to discourage or prevent swimming, and there were no signs permitting swimming or diving that would lead a person to conclude that the lake had been designated as a swimming facility by the county. See id. This analysis focusing on the totality of the circumstances is consistent with the Second District's opinion in Andrews, where a person drowned while swimming at a state park. 557 So.2d at 86. The Second District framed the critical question as whether the State had designated the area where the drowning occurred as a swimming area. Id. at 88. In resolving this question, the Second District considered evidence that the State knew that the section of the beach was commonly used for swimming, signs in the area permitted swimming, and the park brochure stated that swimming was permitted without designating a specific area. See id. at 89. The Second District determined that an issue of material fact existed as to whether the state led the public to believe that Dog Beach was a designated swimming area. Id. Thus, the court in Andrews concluded that the government entity would be liable if it held an area out to the public as suitable for swimming, regardless of whether the area had been formally designated for swimming. Id. In this case, although the State itself had not formally designated South Beach to be a public swimming area, there is no dispute that South Beach was held out as a public swimming area by the City. Further, the State made a conscious decision to allow South Beach to be operated as a public swimming area when it signed the management agreement with the City. The management agreement unquestionably demonstrates that the State was aware that the City would operate South Beach as a public swimming area and the State does not contend otherwise. In fact, the State's management agreement demonstrates more than just an acquiescence by the State to allow the City to operate South Beach. The management agreement required the City to submit a management plan detailing the limitation and control of land and water related activities such as boating, bathing, surfing, rental of beach equipment, and sale of goods and services to the public. [3] (Emphasis supplied.) Additionally, the State required the City to submit twenty-five percent of all revenues collected from private concessionaires. Therefore, the State actually derived revenue from the City's operation of South Beach. We conclude that the fact that the State never formally designated the beach as a public swimming area is not dispositive of whether the government owes an operational-level duty to safely operate a public swimming area if sufficient facts exist to demonstrate that the area was held out to the public as a public swimming area. The focus of the inquiry is not whether a formal designation occurred. Rather, as in Warren and Andrews, the actions of the government entity must be examined to determine whether, based on all the circumstances, the government entity held the area out to the public as a swimming area or led the public to believe the area was a designated swimming area. The actual operation of South Beach by the City pursuant to the management agreement between the City and the State establishes that the basis for the State's liability in this case is the State's permission to grant the City the right to operate South Beach as a swimming area open to the public. Not only did the State agree to the operation of the public swimming area, but it put limitations on the terms of the operation and demanded twenty-five percent of the revenues. Thus, the language in Garcia suggesting that the State would be considered to be operating a public swimming area if people commonly use the area for swimming is dicta. To the extent that the assertion that people were commonly using the area may be relied on as the sole basis for imposing a common law duty of care, we disapprove of this isolated statement in Garcia. As Andrews indicates, the common use of an area for swimming may be one factor to consider in order to determine if a governmental entity held out the area as a public swimming area or, as in Andrews, led the public to believe that the area was designated as a swimming area. At one end of the spectrum is the circumstance where the government entity formally designates an area for public swimming. At the other end of the spectrum are circumstances where either the government entity actively attempts to prohibit swimming or has no knowledge that some part of an undesignated beach is being used by swimmers. [4] Certainly, we would agree with the State that it would be an intolerable and unnecessary burden to expect the State to post No Swimming signs up and down its expansive coastline on the chance that residents of the State may, on their own, select a particular area to enjoy the ocean or other waterways. On the other hand, where an area such as South Beach is a well-known public swimming area, from which the State is actively deriving profit, the State has no basis for claiming immunity from suit merely because a formal designation as a state park did not occur. Accordingly, we approve the holding of the Third District reversing the summary judgment in favor of the State, but disapprove of the broad dicta suggesting that mere common use as a swimming area by the public creates an operational-level duty requiring the State to maintain the swimming area with reasonable care.