Opinion ID: 1238139
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Shackling of Defendant at the Preliminary Hearing

Text: At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel noted that defendant was dressed in jail garb, that he was handcuffed and that his feet were shackled. Counsel's request that the handcuffs and shackles be removed was summarily denied. Defendant raised the shackling issue in a subsequent section 995 motion to dismiss, which was also denied. (23a) Defendant now asserts that the court erred in refusing to have the shackles removed, and that the error prejudicially tainted the witnesses' identification of defendant as the perpetrator. (24) It is, of course, well settled that during a trial a defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury's presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints. ( People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-291, fn. omitted [127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, 90 A.L.R.3d 1]; accord People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 651 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351]; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 94-95 [270 Cal. Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].) We have not previously addressed the question whether the restrictions on the use of physical restraints at trial should apply at a preliminary hearing. One decision of the Court of Appeal has reasoned that the policies which underlie such restrictions have application to other proceedings as well. ( Solomon v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal. App.3d 532, 536 [177 Cal. Rptr. 1].) We agree. As early as 1871, we noted in People v. Harrington (1871) 42 Cal. 165, the common law rule that a prisoner brought into the presence of a Court for trial ... was entitled to appear free of all manner of shackles or bonds.... ( Id. at p. 167.) As we explained: [A]ny order or action of the Court which, without evident necessity, imposes physical burdens, pains and restraints upon a prisoner during the progress of his trial, inevitably tends to confuse and embarrass his mental faculties, and thereby materially to abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional rights of defense.... ( Id. at p. 168.) The common law rule was also recognized by the California Legislature with the enactment in 1872 of section 688. That section, as amended, provides: No person charged with a public offense may be subjected, before conviction, to any more restraint than is necessary for his detention to answer the charge. Thus, it was recognized early on that the use of shackles in court could prejudically affect the rights of the defendant, not just because of the impact they might have on the jury, but because of their unsettling effect on the defendant and consequently his constitutional rights of defense. ( Harrington, supra, 42 Cal. at p. 168.) More reccently, the United States Supreme Court has observed that use of this [shackling] technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings.... ( Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 344 [25 L.Ed.2d 353, 359, 90 S.Ct. 1057].) We reaffirmed our adherence to the Harrington rule, ( supra, 42 Cal. 165) in the seminal case of People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, where we stated: We believe that possible prejudice in the minds of the jurors, the affront to human dignity, the disrespect for the entire judicial system which is incident to unjustifiable use of physical restraints, as well as the effect such restraints have upon a defendant's decision to take the stand, all support our continued adherence to the Harrington rule. ( Id. at p. 290.) (25) Although we have not previously considered the use of restraints in a preliminary hearing, the reasoning of Harrington and Duran leave no doubt that the same principles would apply in that setting. As we have noted, the Harrington rule of evident necessity serves not merely to insulate the jury from prejudice, but to maintain the composure and dignity of the individual accused, and to preserve respect for the judicial system as a whole; these are paramount values to be preserved irrespective of whether a jury is present during the proceeding. Moreover, the unjustified use of restraints could, in a real sense, impair the ability of the defendant to communicate effectively with counsel ( People v. Harrington, supra, 42 Cal. at p. 168), or influence witnesses at the preliminary hearing. Accordingly, we hold that, as at trial, shackling should not be employed at a preliminary hearing absent some showing of necessity for their use. Nevertheless, while the dangers of unwarranted shackling at the preliminary hearing are real, they are not as substantial as those presented during trial. Therefore, a lesser showing than that required at trial is appropriate. (23b) No reasons for the shackling of defendant appear in the instant record. The trial court, as noted earlier, simply denied counsel's objection to the handcuffs and leg restraints without further inquiry. Therefore, we must conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to shackle defendant. ( People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 293.) The error does not, however, compel reversal. (26) [I]rregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary examination. ( People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [165 Cal. Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941].) (23c) As noted earlier, defendant claims that the physical restraints may have tainted the eyewitness identifications of defendant at the preliminary hearing. Only one witness, Trudy Allessie, positively identified defendant as the assailant. The record of the preliminary hearing, however, does not reveal whether she actually observed the restraints. Her testimony at trial suggests that she did not. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Mrs. Allessie whether she recalled how defendant was dressed at the preliminary hearing. She responded, I think he had orange overalls on. Counsel continued: And he was handcuffed and shackled at the preliminary hearing, wasn't he? She responded: I don't know. Furthermore, even assuming that Mrs. Allessie was aware of the shackles, she had previously identified defendant at both a photographic and a live line-up. There is no claim that either of these identifications was suggestive. Thus, the record refutes defendant's claim that the identification at the preliminary hearing was suggested by defendant's prison garb and shackles. Accordingly, we conclude that the error was not prejudicial to defendant.