Opinion ID: 2516682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Elements of Felonious Restraint

Text: [¶ 6] Wyoming's felonious restraint statute provides: (a) A person is guilty of felonious restraint if he knowingly: (i) Restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury; or (ii) Holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude. (b) Felonious restraint is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-202 (LexisNexis 2001). [¶ 7] The jury was instructed as follows: The elements of the crime of Felonious Restraint, as charged in Count I of this case, are: 1. On or about January 18, 2000. 2. In Campbell County, Wyoming. 3. The Defendant, Dennis Williams. 4. Knowingly restrained Joshua Wenger. 5. Under circumstances exposing Joshua Wenger to a risk of serious bodily injury. [¶ 8] In his first issue, Williams contends that plain error occurred when the trial court permitted the State to argue that knowingly as used in the felonious restraint statute referred only to the restraint portion of the statute. Williams argues this is an incorrect statement of the law. Williams contends that the term knowingly refers also to the exposure to risk of serious bodily injury, and further contends that the prejudice caused by the State's misstatement of the law was compounded by the failure of the trial court to provide guidance to the jury. The State contends that, based on the plain language of the statute, this Court can conclude that no misstatement of the law occurred. [¶ 9] Although the felonious restraint statute was first enacted in 1982, we have not previously interpreted it. In 1982, Wyoming enacted a comprehensive criminal code based upon the Model Penal Code, and the felonious restraint statute was enacted along with significant changes to the kidnapping statute. Theodore E. Lauer, Goodbye 3-Card Monte: The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, 19 Land & Water L.Rev. 107, 124-25 (1984). The statutory language adopts that of the Model Penal Code. Id. at 125. Commentary to the Model Penal Code distinguishes felonious restraint from misdemeanor false imprisonment by using the risk of physical injury as the decisive factor for imposing felony punishment. In contrast, its maximum penalty of five years is considerably less than that imposed by the kidnapping statute. Model Penal Code § 212.2 cmt. 1, at 239 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The felonious restraint statute is violated when a risk of serious bodily injury occurs and the action causing that risk is an unlawful restraint. The term serious bodily injury is defined by Wyoming statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(x) (LexisNexis 2001), and the word unlawfully is said to carry its usual meaning of conduct violative of any legal duty, whether penal or civil in origin. Model Penal Code, supra, cmt. 2, at 241. [¶ 10] The Commentary explains that the language requires proof that the accused acted knowingly, meaning he must have been aware that he was restraining his victim, that the restraint was unlawful, and that it exposed the victim to physical danger. Id. at 242. It articulates this reasoning: The tentative-draft version of the offense failed to make the knowledge requirement explicit. Under the general culpability provisions of the Code, silence would have been construed to authorize conviction upon proof of recklessness as well as of knowledge. Upon reconsideration, however, it became apparent that recklessness would be an inappropriate standard for this offense. The conduct involved here would virtually always be purposeful or knowing with respect to the fact of restraint. Moreover, the element of serious bodily injury is stated expressly in terms of risk. This formulation reaches the actor who is reckless with respect to physical harm by punishing one who is aware of the risk thereof. Finally, with respect to the unlawful character of the restraint, a knowledge requirement seems proper if only to guard against convicting peace officers of felonious restraint because of defects in their arresting authority. For these reasons, Section 212.2 expressly requires a minimum culpability of knowledge with respect to each element of the offense. Id. at 242-43. As the commentaries demonstrate, the legislature intended that the State prove that the accused acted knowingly on each element of the offense. See Ellison v. State, 3 P.3d 845, 849 (Wyo.2000). Applying that interpretation to the instruction submitted, the jury was not properly instructed on the knowingly element. Additionally, the term unlawfully was omitted. The State acknowledges the omission but claims that the error was waived because no objection was made at trial and the error has not been raised on appeal. [¶ 11] [I]nstructions to the jury are designed to inform the jury about the applicable law so that the jury may apply that law to its own findings with respect to the material facts. Brown v. State, 817 P.2d 429, 439 (Wyo.1991). State and federal courts alike have long recognized that the failure to give any instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction. Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 662 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 423 (7th Cir.1987)). An instruction that neglects to include an essential element of the crime for which the defendant was convicted may be reviewed to determine whether the trial court committed plain error. Vigil, 859 P.2d at 662. The test whether the jury has been instructed on the necessary elements of the crime charged is whether the instruction leaves no doubt as to under what circumstances the crime can be found to have been committed. Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo.1995). The accuracy of an instruction to the jury is purely a question of law which we review de novo. If the instruction fails to correctly state the law, reversible error exists. Paugh v. State, 9 P.3d 973, 975-76 (Wyo.2000). [¶ 12] Plain errors or defects that affect substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. Under our cases, in order to invoke the plain error doctrine, the following elements must be present: (1) the record must demonstrate clearly what occurred at trial without resort to speculation; (2) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been violated in an obvious way; and (3) this violation must have adversely affected some substantial right of the accused. Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 707 (Wyo. 1992). The inaccurate jury instruction in the record violates the clear and unequivocal rule of law that a defendant must be convicted upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all essential elements of the crime, and is necessarily prejudicial. See Vigil, 859 P.2d at 663-64. [¶ 13] An additional ground for reversal exists because the law was misstated to the jury by the prosecutor during closing argument and by the trial court's rulings on objections to the defense's closing argument. Reversible error exists when the misstatement adversely affected a substantial right of the defendant. The right with which we are concerned is the fundamental right to a fair trial, free from tainted argument. A reversal and remand for a new trialbecause of prosecutorial misconductwill not be ordered as punishment for a prosecutor's misdeeds, but only because such misdeeds denied the accused a fair trial. Where a prosecutor repeatedly misstates the law to a jury, and thereby plants an erroneous conception which prejudices the defendant, a fair trial may, under certain circumstances, have been denied. Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Wyo. 1978) (citations omitted). Although Jones determined that the misstatement at issue in that case was isolated and could not have materially prejudiced the defendant, in this case the essence of the prosecutor's argument on this count was an incorrect interpretation of the term knowingly, and the misstatement did materially prejudice Williams. Thus, the elements of plain error are established and require that we reverse Williams' conviction for felonious restraint.