Opinion ID: 152718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We turn now to the heart of Sanchez's appeal-whether sufficient evidence supports each of his three convictions. We review the evidence `in the light most favorable to the government and ask whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1334 (7th Cir.1996)). A conviction will be overturned only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, upon which a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir.2002).
To obtain a conviction for conspiracy, the government was required to prove that Sanchez: (1) agreed to commit an illegal act; (2) committed an overt act in furtherance of that agreement; and (3) had an intent to commit the substantive offense, in this case kidnapping. United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 635 (7th Cir.1998). As applicable here, the kidnapping statute punishes [w]hoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, and the person so kidnapped is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). Sanchez argues that the evidence was not sufficient for a jury to find that he intended to kidnap Vega and Maria Jimenez. We disagree. The government presented ample evidence of Sanchez's intent. Francisco Jimenez testified that at a face-to-face meeting with Sanchez on October 10, 2006, Sanchez explained that he planned to kidnap two people who owed Vasquez money. Francisco told the jury that Sanchez said he was going to take the kidnapping victims to Mexico and claimed to be acting with Vasquez's consent. Sanchez said he would need money, a safehouse, and an automobile to accomplish the kidnapping, and asked for Francisco's help. He identified the intended kidnapping targets as Yolanda, who owned a restaurant at 31st and Lawndale, and someone with the last name Jimenez. After this initial meeting, Francisco Jimenez spoke with Sanchez on several occasions about the kidnapping, and recordings of these conversations were played for the jury at trial. The two spoke on the telephone a day after the initial meeting, at which time Sanchez again discussed his plans for the kidnapping and told Francisco that he needed a van that will allow me to head down there with the person. Sanchez called Francisco again about a week later. Although Sanchez used coded language, Francisco testified that Sanchez was discussing the arrangements for the kidnapping that he had just made on a trip to Mexico. More specifically, Sanchez said the Mexican drug cartel had agreed to assist once Sanchez brought the victims to the intended drop-off point at the border. Sanchez repeated his initial request that Francisco help him find a safehouse and a van to use in the kidnapping. A few days later Sanchez said he no longer needed help in securing a safehouse because he had located a ranch in Joliet for that purpose. The two further discussed the specifications for the van, agreeing that it should have tinted windows and new license plates. The recording of the last meeting between Sanchez and Francisco Jimenez completed the picture for the jury. Sanchez inspected the van and said it was more or less what he needed but that it would take about a week to secure license plates. Asked about how many people would be traveling in the van, Sanchez initially said two and then clarified, [t]wo and two of us that might be going. He then explained that he might need more people to help with the pick up ... who will get into the car with the guys. Sanchez also described in some detail the ranch in Joliet that he had secured as a temporary safehouse for the victims. He then explained how he would take them to the Mexican border where members of the drug cartel would be waiting to take them to Sinaloa, Mexico. That Sanchez referred to the victims as Jimenez and Yolanda does not undermine the government's case, as Sanchez contends. First, one of the kidnapping targets was in fact named Jimenez, and although neither went by the name Yolanda, they were a married couple who owned two restaurants called Yolanda's. Second, although neither of the Yolanda's restaurants was located at 31st and Lawndale, one was located approximately two blocks from that address. Finally, the background evidence regarding the underlying drug-trafficking conspiracy and the payment of Jose Jimenez's drug debt to Vasquez convincingly tied Vasquez to Maria Jimenez (Jose's cousin) and her husband Ignacio Vega; their ownership of restaurants named Yolanda's made it clear that Sanchez understood who the targets of the kidnapping were. Sanchez argues in the alternative that most of the taped conversations introduced at trial related to the drug-trafficking activity of the Vasquez organization and that the evidence is really more consistent with a drug-smuggling conspiracy, not a conspiracy to kidnap. This is an attempt to invoke the principle that reversal is required whenever evidence `gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence,' and as such `a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.' United States v. Ramos-Garcia, 184 F.3d 463, 465 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 74 F.3d 575, 577 (5th Cir.1996)). This is not remotely a case in which the evidence is in equipoise. Although there was significant background evidence of drug trafficking, Sanchez's recorded conversations during October 2006 are sufficient to establish the kidnapping conspiracy. Though he often used coded language, Sanchez's intent to kidnap is clear from the detailed descriptions of the minivan he needed, the safehouse he secured, and the plans that were in place to deliver the victims to the waiting members of the Mexican drug cartel on the border.
Sanchez also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempted kidnapping. To obtain a conviction for an attempt crime, the government must prove that the defendant intend[ed] the completed crime and t[ook] a `substantial step' toward its completion. United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 114 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991)). Sanchez claims the evidence is insufficient on both elements, but we have already explained why the evidence was sufficient to establish that Sanchez intended to kidnap Vega and Jimenez. The remaining question is whether the government proved that Sanchez took a substantial step toward completing this crime. A substantial step is `some overt act adapted to, approximating, and which in the ordinary and likely course of things will result in, the commission of the particular crime.' Id. (quoting United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 988 (2d Cir. 1980)); see also United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir.1985) (noting that a substantial step is an overt act strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant's criminal intent (quotation marks omitted)). It is something more than mere preparation, but less than the last act necessary before the actual commission of the substantive crime. United States v. Barnes, 230 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir.2000). The line between mere preparation and a substantial step is inherently fact specific; conduct that would appear to be mere preparation in one case might qualify as a substantial step in another. See United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d 1173, 1199 (7th Cir.1997). Although there is no easy way to separate mere preparation from a substantial step, we are guided by two general principles. First, a substantial step must be something that makes it reasonably clear that had [the defendant] not been interrupted or made a mistake ... [he] would have completed the crime. Gladish, 536 F.3d at 648; see also United States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir.2003) (To determine whether conduct is preparation or an attempt, a court must assess how probable it would have been that the crime would have been committedat least as perceived by the defendanthad intervening circumstances not occurred.); Barnes, 230 F.3d at 315 (noting that a substantial step occurs where events ha[ve] moved beyond the preparation stage and would have resulted in the completed crime but for the government's intervention). Second, we have said that the focus is on the actions already taken to complete the underlying crime, not on the acts that remain uncompleted at the time of the arrest. See Barnes, 230 F.3d at 315. The evidence of Sanchez's conspiratorial conduct in this case was strongly corroborative of his firmness to carry out the kidnapping plot. He explained in recorded conversations that he had secured a safehouse in Joliet and arranged for the cooperation of the Mexican drug cartel indeed, he had traveled to Mexico and back in furtherance of this aspect of the plot. In Sanchez's final meeting with Francisco Jimenez, he approved the van as meeting his specifications for use in the kidnapping and offered a detailed description of additional logistics of the scheme. This is sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the kidnapping plot had progressed well beyond the planning stage. To be sure, the kidnapping was not imminent at the moment Sanchez was arrested; he said he would need a week to secure license plates for the van. But it is clear that Sanchez was fully committed and well along the way to putting the kidnapping in motion. Sanchez insists nonetheless that he has been convicted of a thought crimethat the taped conversations reveal only mental preparations from which the jury could infer at most that he was all talk and no more. We have said that [t]reating speech ... as the `substantial step' would abolish any requirement of a substantial step. Gladish, 536 F.3d at 650. The Fourth Circuit has also expressed a similar view: [W]ords and discussions would usually be considered preparations for most crimes. Pratt, 351 F.3d at 136. But the government's case here went well beyond words and discussions and included evidence of concrete actions Sanchez took toward the completion of the kidnappingincluding securing the safehouse and traveling to Mexico to enlist the assistance of the drug cartel. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, this evidence was sufficient to sustain Sanchez's conviction for attempted kidnapping.
Sanchez also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to retaliate against a witness. The retaliation statute makes it a crime to knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, take[ ] any action harmful to any person ... for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e). Sanchez argues that there was no evidence to permit the jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that he plotted to kidnap Ignacio Vega and Maria Jimenez in retaliation for their testimony against Vasquez at his trial. We agree. There is no record evidence from which the jury could infer that Sanchez even knew that Vega and Maria Jimenez had testified against Vasquez, let alone that the motive for the kidnapping was to retaliate against them for that testimony. Rather, the evidence strongly supports the inference that Sanchez targeted the kidnapping victims because he believed they owed Vasquez money. The government responds that the jury could have inferred that Sanchez learned about Vega's and Maria Jimenez's testimony from Vasquez himself or from someone associated with the Mexican drug cartel. But no evidence supports either inference; this argument relies entirely on speculation. See United States v. Robinson, 161 F.3d 463, 472 (7th Cir.1998) (`[W]e recognize that in reviewing a guilty verdict based on circumstantial evidence, we must insure that the verdict does not rest solely on the piling of inference upon inference....' (quoting United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1364 (7th Cir.1997))). The inference might be sustainable had the government offered evidence to show that the victims' testimony at Vasquez's trial was widely publicized and that Sanchez was so closely tied to the underlying conspiracy that he might reasonably be presumed to have knowledge of that trial. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 903 F.2d 1084, 1087-89 (7th Cir.1990). But there was no such evidence in this case. The evidence established instead that Sanchez thought his targets owed Vasquez money and that that was the reason for the kidnapping. Accordingly, we vacate Sanchez's conviction for conspiracy to retaliate against a witness.