Opinion ID: 2405298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Travel/College Escrow Account Arrearages

Text: Wife first argues that the trial court erred when it declined to order Husband to pay the arrearages to the travel/college escrow account, which she contends are equal to $9,360 until the date of the court's 2003 order and $9,760 from the date of the court's 2003 order to the date of the daughter's graduation from college, plus interest. The trial court declined to order these arrearages because it believed that although Husband paid child support for the parties' daughter until she graduated from college, he was not obligated to do so. Because the amount of child support Husband paid for the daughter exceeded the travel/college escrow account arrearages, the court ruled that they were no longer owed. Wife contends that the trial court's reasoning is flawed under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). See RSA ch. 546-B (2007). We agree.
UIFSA is a model act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at the behest of Congress in 1992 and revised in 1996. Marshak v. Weser, 390 N.J.Super. 387, 915 A.2d 613, 615 (App.Div.2007). It was intended to bring greater efficiency to the process of interstate child support enforcement. Comment, Making Sense of the Changes: The 2001 Amendments to UIFSA, 20 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Lawyers 323, 323 (2007). UIFSA governs the procedure for establishing, enforcing, and modifying child and spousal support orders and for determining parentage when more than one state is involved in these proceedings. Annotation, Construction and Application of Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 90 A.L.R.5th 1, 1 (2001). [B]y 1998, all 50 states and the District of Columbia had adopted [UIFSA] (1996) as a requirement for receipt of federal funds for child support enforcement. Morgan ed., The Date of Termination as a Nonmodifiable Aspect of a Child Support Order Under Section 611 of UIFSA, 16 No. 4 Divorce Litig. 60, 60 (April 2004). New Hampshire enacted UIFSA in 1997, effective January 1, 1998. See Laws 1997, 263:32. Since New Hampshire adopted UIFSA, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has amended the uniform act twice, once in 2001, and again in 2008. See Symposium, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act , 43 Fam. L.Q. 75, 83 (2008). To interpret UIFSA, we rely not only upon our ordinary rules of statutory construction, but also upon the official comments to UIFSA. See Wills v. Wills, 16 Neb.App. 559, 745 N.W.2d 924, 928 (2008); cf. Bendetson v. Killarney, Inc., 154 N.H. 637, 643, 913 A.2d 756 (2006) (holding that we will look to the official comments of the model act for guidance on the intended meaning of the election statute); Estate of Gordon-Couture v. Brown, 152 N.H. 265, 273, 876 A.2d 196 (2005) (because language of New Hampshire statute is nearly identical to that of model act, we will look to model act as well as to similar statutes from other states to interpret New Hampshire statute); State v. Donohue, 150 N.H. 180, 183, 834 A.2d 253 (2003) (reviewing official comments of Model Penal Code for guidance to interpret analogous New Hampshire statute). Under our ordinary rules of statutory construction, we are the final arbiters of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. In re Alexis O., 157 N.H. 781, 785, 959 A.2d 176 (2008). We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We will review legislative history, however, to aid our analysis if the statutory language is ambiguous or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Id. This enables us to better discern the legislature's intent and to interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. Id. UIFSA consists of nine articles that supply procedural and jurisdictional rules for three types of proceedings within the context of child support enforcement. Peters, International Child Support: The United States Striving Towards a Better Solution, 15 New Eng. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 91, 106 (2009). These proceedings are: (1) a proceeding to establish a child support order when there is no prior child support order; (2) a proceeding to enforce an existing child support order; and (3) a proceeding to modify an existing child support order. Id. at 106-07; see RSA 546-B:31-:38 (establishing order), :39-:46 (enforcing order), :47-:52 (modifying order). Under UIFSA, a New Hampshire court may modify a child support order issued in another state when the original child support order has been registered here and the court finds that: (1) the child, the obligee and the obligor no longer reside in the state that issued the original order; (2) the petitioner seeking modification is not a resident of this state; and (3) the respondent is subject to personal jurisdiction here. See RSA 546-B:49, I(a). A New Hampshire court, however, may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state. RSA 546-B:49, III (emphasis added). The issuing state is the state that issued the original support order. RSA 546-B:1, IX.
In this case, pursuant to UIFSA, New Hampshire had jurisdiction in 2003 to modify the parties' Massachusetts child support orders because the parents and their children no longer resided in Massachusetts and Wife, who sought modification, did not reside here, although Husband did. See RSA 546-B:49, I(a). New Hampshire modified the Massachusetts child support orders in 2003 when it increased the weekly amount of child support. Once this occurred, New Hampshire became the issuing state, assumed continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the child support order, and obtained the authority to apply its own substantive law to any provision of the child support order that could have been modified under Massachusetts law. Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb. 525, 600 N.W.2d 159, 168 (1999); see Unif. Interstate Family Support Act § 611 (amended 2008), 9-IB U.L.A. 255, 259 (2005); In re Marriage of Crosby & Grooms, 116 Cal.App.4th 201, 10 Cal. Rptr.3d 146, 151-52 (2004). Despite becoming the issuing state, New Hampshire could not modify those aspects of the Massachusetts orders that were not modifiable under Massachusetts law. In effect, Massachusetts law continues to govern any provision that could not be modified under Massachusetts law. See RSA 546-B:49, III; Symposium, supra at 136-37 (discussing 2001 amendments). In this case, Massachusetts law governs the duration of Husband's child support obligation because, under UIFSA, duration is a non-modifiable aspect of an issuing state's original child support order. See Unif. Interstate Family Support Act § 611 (amended 2008), 9-IB U.L.A. 446 (2005). For example, the official comments to the 1996 version of UIFSA explain that if the original child support order ordered child support through age twenty-one, and the law of the new state ends the support obligation at age eighteen, the new state may not modify the original order to terminate child support at age eighteen. See id. The 2001 amendments to UIFSA confirm that the duration of an obligor's child support obligation is non-modifiable. As the official comments to those amendments state, although the initial child support order may be modified and replaced by a new controlling order. . ., the duration of the child-support obligation remains constant, even though virtually every other aspect of the original order may be changed. Id. at 258-59 (emphasis added). As amended in 2001, this section of UIFSA now reads: (d) In a proceeding to modify a child-support order, the law of the State that is determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of the obligation of support. The obligor's fulfillment of the duty of support established by that order precludes imposition of a further obligation of support by a tribunal of this State. Id. at 255 (emphasis omitted). The official comment to this provision explains: From its original promulgation UIFSA determined that the duration of child-support obligation should be fixed by the controlling order. If the language was insufficiently specific before. . . 2001, the amendments should make this decision absolutely clear. The original time frame for support is not modifiable unless the law of the issuing State provides for modification of its duration. . . . In sum, absent tribunal error the first child support order issued under UIFSA will invariably be the initial controlling order. . . . Once a controlling order is identified . . ., the duration of the support obligation is fixed. Id. at 258. Although New Hampshire has not adopted the 2001 amendments, they provide insight into the intended meaning of New Hampshire's existing statute. See Spencer v. Spencer, 10 N.Y.3d 60, 853 N.Y.S.2d 274, 882 N.E.2d 886, 890 (2008). Because Massachusetts law governs the duration of Husband's child support obligation, and because under Massachusetts law, a divorced parent may be required to pay child support until the child graduates from college, the trial court erred by excusing Husband's failure to comply with its 2003 order regarding payment to the travel/college escrow account on the ground that Husband had paid child support he did not owe. Therefore, we vacate this portion of the trial court's decision and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.