Opinion ID: 2590211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instructional and Related Issues

Text: Defendant contends the trial court committed several errors in instructing the jury concerning modus operandi. First, as he did in his claim of error in the denial of his motion for severance, he urges there were insufficient distinctive marks common to the various homicides. Hence, he argues, the giving of any modus operandi instruction was unjustified. Second, he contends the special instruction on modus operandi given his jury was legally flawed and compels reversal of eight specified murder counts (with ramifications that extend to the remainder of the charges). Third, he claims reversible error in the trial court's refusal of his requested special instructions concerning the Hall and Loggins homicides. Finally, he contends the prosecutor in this case acted in bad faith and presented a false picture to the jury by relying on a modus operandi theory despite his alleged awareness that the modus operandi of some of the homicides resembled that of William Bonin and his confederates. (See People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217; People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.) Defendant's contentions lack merit. Defendant criticizes the special instruction given the jury as not setting up a single standard against which to assess all of the charged offenses. No specific group of homicides, he argues, was offered as determining the pattern of characteristics making up [defendant's] modus operandi. Defendant's premise, that modus operandi requires one single set of distinctive marks common to all charged counts, is unsupported by authority. Indeed, one of the cases on which he relies, People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267, analyzes the admissibility, on the question of identity, of evidence of several different sexual assaults charged to the defendant in that case in precisely the manner defendant insists is error in this case. That is, in People v. Thornton this court enumerated various unusual characteristics of the crimes and noted those shared by the charged offenses, but we did not, as defendant apparently would have us do, look for characteristics not so shared by a particular offense and thereby disqualify that offense from consideration on modus operandi. Indeed, we noted that the probative value of the evidence of one uncharged offense [wa]s not significantly diminished by the presence of certain marks of dissimilarity between the uncharged and charged offenses. ( People v. Thornton, supra, at p. 758, 114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267, italics in original; see also id. at p. 759, 114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267.) As the Attorney General points out, even though various victims in this case were killed under different circumstances, certain unique circumstances nevertheless were common to two or more murders. We conclude that, given the commonality of certain features of the various offenses present in the record of this case, the task of determining the degree of distinctiveness and the number of such circumstances necessary to establish defendant's identity as the perpetrator of these offenses was a matter for the jury. Finding no error, therefore, in submission to the jury of the modus operandi theory, we likewise find no merit in defendant's related claim that the resulting judgment lacks the reliability required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Defendant further contends the trial court erred in refusing his special instruction relating to the modus operandi of the Hall count. There was no error: The requested instruction was plainly argumentative, singling out particular pieces of evidence for the jury's consideration without attempting to explain any principle of law. (See People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1137, 248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049.) The same infirmity afflicted the requested special instruction pertaining to the Loggins count, which for the same reason was properly refused. Defendant contends the prosecutor acted in bad faith in trying the present case largely on a modus operandi theory despite his asserted awareness that the method ascribed to defendant matched that employed by Bonin in the latter's numerous killings. [10] As the Attorney General correctly argues, however, the record in this case does not reveal the prosecutor's reasoning as to why the 16 charged murders were committed not by Bonin but by defendant. Defendant invites us to take judicial notice of the records in the Bonin cases, but he fails to explain how doing so would illuminate the prosecutor's thought processes in this case. In any event, for us effectively to augment this record with the records of the Bonin cases would be improper. (See People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 635-636, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152.) We therefore decline to consider the claim of prosecutorial bad faith in this proceeding. Defendant's citation to Napue v. Illinois (1959) 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, in which the high court overturned a conviction obtained by the prosecution's knowing use of false evidence, is inapposite given the absence of any suggestion the prosecutor in this case engaged in such a practice. Likewise not on point are Pyle v. Kansas (1942) 317 U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214, involving prosecutorial coercion of witnesses, and Alcorta v. Texas (1957) 355 U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9, involving the prosecutor's failure to correct a witness's false testimony.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing his requested instructions on the identity of the killer with respect to the counts involving Keith, Loggins, Crotwell, John Doe Huntington Beach, Klingbeil, Inderbieten, Wiebe, Moore, Crisel, Young, Nelson, DeVaul, and Gambrel, and with respect to the possibility of multiple killers with respect to the Hall and Loggins counts. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing as argumentative the requested instructions. A defendant has the right, on request, to instructions that pinpoint the theory of the defense, not specific evidence as such. { People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1137, 248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049.) The trial court properly refused the requested instructions, which merely invited the jury to draw inferences favorable to him from selected items of evidence. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Contrary to defendant's argument, the jury was adequately instructed, by means of CALJIC Nos. 2.90 and 2.91, that it must determine the identity of the perpetrator of each charged offense. The trial court's refusal of defendant's requested pinpoint instructions, therefore, did not deprive him of due process.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing his request for jury instructions on principles of aiding and abetting, as pertinent to the Hall and Loggins murders. He contends further the trial court should have instructed the jury on aiding and abetting with respect to the Hughes, Young, Keith and Klingbeil murders despite the lack of a request below, suggesting his trial counsel's failure to request such instructions constituted ineffective assistance requiring reversal of those convictions. He also asserts the trial court erred in refusing his request for instructions on accessory liability. Finally, he contends that, had the jury been properly instructed as to aiding and abetting principles and the law of accessories, it should, additionally, have been instructed on intent to kill. Defendant's contentions lack merit. The trial court must instruct on lesser offenses necessarily included in the charged offense if there is substantial evidence the defendant is guilty only of the lesser. ( People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 118, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073.) On the other hand, if there is no proof, other than an unexplainable rejection of the prosecution's evidence, that the offense was less than that charged, such instructions shall not be given. ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323-324, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311.) Citing People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 731-732, 44 Cal.Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665, People v. Burnham (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1134, 1141-1143, 1151, 222 Cal.Rptr. 630, and People v. Lemus (1988) 203 Cal. App.3d 470, 477, 249 Cal.Rptr. 897, defendant contends that, to trigger the necessity of an instruction on aiding and abetting, this substantial evidence may be incredible and not of a character to inspire belief because the jury, not the trial court, is to determine the credibility of witnesses. Unlike in the cited cases, however, the record before us contains no evidence, as distinct from mere speculation, that any other person was involved in the killings charged to defendant. (See People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 942, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212 [Speculation is an insufficient basis upon which to require the trial court to give an instruction on a lesser included offense.].) Defendant asserts his small size, relative to Hall and Loggins, made it unlikely he, acting alone, could have placed the bodies in the locations where they were found. He also notes that the prosecution relied, to prove guilt, on the list, which was prepared after the crimes it purportedly memorialized. These circumstances, however, simply do not amount to evidence of another's participation warranting aiding and abetting instructions, nor do they suggest defendant's participation was limited to rendering after-the-fact assistance. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing the requested instructions. For this reason, too, we reject defendant's contention that his convictions on the charges tried under the 1977 death penalty law (the Hughes, Young, Keith and Klingbeil offenses) are invalid for want of an instruction on aiding and abetting. Although it is true that death eligibility under the 1977 law required a defendant to have been personally present and to have personally participated in the killing, the record in this case lacks any evidence suggesting defendant merely aided or abetted another principal in the offenses or assisted after the fact. Likewise, the lack of such evidence means the absence of aider-abettor instructions cannot invalidate special circumstance findings requiring intent to kill for persons who did not commit the actual killing. (See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1138-1148, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on accessory after the fact (ї 32) as a lesser related offense to murder in connection with those counts where the evidence showed some connection between defendant and the victim, but no evidence showed the degree of his involvement in the killing. We disagree: Even were there evidence supporting a theory of accessory liability, which the trial court properly found lacking, defendant was not entitled to instructions on lesser related offenses. ( People v. Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 136, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073, retrospectively overruling People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510,199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303.) Finally, it should be clear from the foregoing discussion that, given the correctness, on this record, of the trial court's declining to instruct on principles of aider-abettor and accessory liability, defendant's related claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and constitutional error under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and the rule of Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 also must fail.
Defendant contends, and the Attorney General agrees, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, with respect to the Hughes, Young, Keith and Klingbeil murder charges, regarding the requirements of the multiple-murder special circumstance under 1977 death penalty law. Instead, the jury was instructed on the corresponding requirements of the 1978 death penalty law with CALJIC No. 8.81.3 (5th ed.1988), as follows: To find the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions as multiple murder convictions, is true, it must be proved: [f] The defendant has in this case been convicted of at least one crime of murder of the first degree as to counts 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18 or 19 and one or more crimes of murder of the first or second degree. The trial court should have instructed the jury on the 1977 law's requirement that the defendant have been personally present during the commission of the act or acts causing death and, with the intent to cause death, physically aided or committed such acts. The omission, nevertheless, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; see People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 45-6, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.) The jury effectively, albeit impliedly, determined each issue adversely to him by returning the verdicts and making the findings that it did under other, proper instructions.
In another argument asserting reversible error as a consequence of the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on principles of aiding and abetting, defendant contends that, with respect to the Moore, John Doe Huntington Beach, Wiebe, Hall, Hughes, Young, Keith, Klingbeil, Inderbieten and Loggins murders, the evidence suggested multiple perpetrators; the trial court, he argues, therefore was required to instruct the jury on the need to find intent to kill or to aid another person to kill for special circumstances to apply to an aider-abettor of those murders. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1138-1147, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Again, as explained above, the trial court did not err in concluding the record lacked evidence supporting an aiding and abetting theory. Consequently, the error claimed by defendant did not occur.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing his request for a special instruction specifically advising the jury that, before it could rely on the so-called death list, exhibit No. 165, as evidence of any of the charged offenses, it must first find a corpus delicti for that offense. The trial court concluded the requested instruction improperly focused the jury's attention on a particular piece of evidence. The trial court did, however, give a different instruction the defense requested, one that told the jury [i]n the present case, [the corpus delicti rule] applies to every statement of the defendant. [І] If you find that any tape recorded, written, or oral statement made by the defendant is either an admission or a confession, you may not consider that statement at all to prove the elements of any of the crimes charged, unless you have first determined that there is a corpus delicti for that crime. [І] In other words, you may not rely at all on any statement of the defendant's to establish the corpus delicti of any crime charged. The court also instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.72, setting forth the corpus delicti rule. We conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction specifically referring to the list. The instruction was, as the trial court reasoned, argumentative, in that it focused the jury's attention on a particular piece of evidence. ( People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1137, 248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049.) Further, even if the ruling could be said to be erroneous, defendant suffered no prejudice, as the substance of the refused instruction was conveyed through the special instruction the trial court did give. The jury could have been under no misunderstanding regarding the use it could properly make of the list, and it is not reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had the requested instruction been given. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836, 299 P.2d 243.)