Opinion ID: 2614927
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statutory Construction Standards

Text: [1] Certain rules of construction guide the court in its interpretation of statutes. A general rule, and one argued by the Petitioners in this case, states that statutes providing for constructive or substituted service must be strictly construed as in derogation of the common law. [27] More specifically, [w]hen RCW 46.64.040 applies ... its procedures must be strictly adhered to, otherwise jurisdiction is not obtained under the statute. [28] This court, however, in the 1991 case of Wichert v. Cardwell , called into question application of the rule of strict construction, and suggested the matter might be more fully addressed in a future case. [29] [2] Meier addressed the question whether a defendant must actually depart from the state before a plaintiff may resort to substituted service. RCW 46.64.040 applies to each resident of this state who, while operating a motor vehicle ... is involved in any accident ... and thereafter ... departs from this state ... (italics ours), and makes no reference to residents who are not absent from the state, but who cannot be located. Nevertheless, this court did not strictly construe the term depart, acknowledging instead that in construing statutes our objective is to ascertain legislative intent as expressed in the statute. [30] Under such a construction, the court approved use of the procedures under RCW 46.64.040 to serve the defendant, finding that plaintiff had a good faith belief that defendant was absent from the state and had exercised due diligence in attempting to find and serve the defendant. In construing statutes, the spirit and intent of the statute should prevail over the literal letter of the law and there should be made that interpretation which best advances the perceived legislative purpose. [31] Petitioners argue incorrectly that the court need not construe the substituted service statute in order to resolve this case. [32] The issues in this case require a ruling on the meaning of words within the statute, as well as the effect of one procedural statute on another. One interpretive distinction this court makes in construing service of process statutes and rules is between strict compliance and substantial compliance. Constructive or substituted service statutes require strict procedural compliance, [33] while personal service statutes require only substantial compliance. [34] It is appropriate to require strict compliance with the detailed procedures for service of process set forth in RCW 46.64.040. [35] Rules of construction are not helpful, however, in determining the operation of the tolling statute on the 3-year limit under the substituted service statute. As this court stated in Wichert, [W]e assume that the common law required personal service of process and that only personal service would suffice. We need not strictly construe the statute to conclude that the Legislature, if that were the common law, intended to change it by permitting substitute service. Having identified that change, we do not apply a strict construction in interpreting the statute. Rather, we so construe the statute as to give meaning to its spirit and purpose, guided by the principles of due process stated above.[ [36] ] In order to resolve this issue, we must look to the legislative purpose underlying each of the statutes in question.