Opinion ID: 1200002
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prejudice to Armstrong's Defense

Text: Having concluded Armstrong has satisfied the first prong of Strickland, we now consider whether trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Armstrong's defense. To demonstrate Strickland prejudice, Armstrong must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To conduct this analysis, we are required to add the expected testimony of the three out-of-state witnesses to the totality of evidence that was actually presented at trial. See McCauley-Bey v. Delo, 97 F.3d 1104, 1105-06 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1178, 117 S.Ct. 1453, 137 L.Ed.2d 558 (1997). In our previous opinion, we remanded to the district court for reconsideration of Armstrong's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In doing so, we directed the district court to address both prongs of the Strickland analysis, providing the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Armstrong I, 365 F.3d at 628 (emphasis added). Despite our clear instruction, the district court concluded Armstrong's trial counsel was not ineffective under the first prong of Strickland and failed to address the Strickland prejudice prong. The district court cursorily concluded Armstrong demonstrated no prejudice on account of his trial counsel's failure to secure a continuance, but the court engaged in no analysis of whether there is a reasonable probability the result of Armstrong's trial would have been different had his trial counsel properly secured the testimony of the out-of-state witnesses. Because the district court failed to follow our instruction to address both prongs of the Strickland analysis, we are now faced with addressing the prejudice inquiry for the first time in these proceedings. For the reasons described below, we conclude the existing record is inadequate for this purpose, in part, because Armstrong has not been given an adequate opportunity to present competent evidence of the out-of-state witnesses' expected testimony. We reverse and remand for further development of the record and so that the district court may conduct the Strickland prejudice analysis in the first instance. See, e.g., Briggs v. Pa. R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306, 68 S.Ct. 1039, 92 L.Ed. 1403 (1948) (observing that the Supreme Court has consistently held that an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court (citations omitted)); United States v. Montgomery, 462 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir.2006) (Failure to follow this court's instructions on remand is grounds for the case to be re-remanded for compliance with our instructions. (citations omitted)); see also Burns v. Gammon, 173 F.3d 1089, 1094 (8th Cir.1999) (remanding and declining to address in the first instance whether the § 2254 petitioner demonstrated deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland ). As it stands, the record fails to disclose, with any degree of reliability, just what testimony the absent witnesses would have given at Armstrong's trial, a deficiency that has plagued this case from the start. See Armstrong I, 365 F.3d at 625, 628 n. 3 (noting the state trial court was not provided the absent witnesses' expected testimony when it denied Armstrong's midtrial request for a continuance to secure their attendance). Because Armstrong's motion for state postconviction relief was untimely, no motion hearing was held. And none of the absent witnesses testified at the § 2254 hearing. Instead, the existing record's limited disclosure of the expected content of the three absent witnesses' testimony is derived from two sources: Armstrong's representations in his § 2254 application and his trial counsel's testimony at the district court's habeas hearing held six years after the shooting. As our prior opinion notes, Armstrong alleged the following in his federal habeas application: [W]itnesses would have testified that I did not have a weapon, nor was I arguing with anybody, and that someone else from the McGee family were [sic] shooting at us. Someone who they were arguing with in the club. Id. at 625. No bases for those allegations (except that they match Armstrong's own trial testimony) are set out in the application. At the initial federal habeas hearing, Armstrong's trial counsel testified the only witness she was certain she spoke with before the trial was Solomon. She also testified her investigator had talked to all three of the witnesses by telephone on at least one, and maybe two, occasions. According to counsel, Brown told the investigator (1) he observed an argument in the bar between a male and a female, (2) someone from his group interceded, (3) he heard the shots as he exited the club, and (4) he never saw Armstrong with a gun. Counsel also testified that, based on conversations she had with her investigator, she believed Hamilton and Solomon would have given similar testimony, including testimony Armstrong did not have a gun... [and] did not shoot [the victims]. Counsel specifically testified she did not know and did not remember whether either witness would have testified to having seen the shooting take place. Absent from this record is so much as a signed statement, let alone an affidavit or a sworn evidentiary deposition, from any of the three absent witnesses (one of whom is Armstrong's brother) indicating what their actual testimony would have been at the original trial. Instead, we have only raw, untested hearsay, most of which is twice removed (the declarant witnesses told the investigator who told trial counsel who testified at the § 2254 hearing to the content of the secondhand, out-of-court statements). Even though this hearsay testimony drew no objections during the hearingin fact, the State or the district court elicited the majority of the hearsay testimonywe do not think that fact gives us license to disregard wholly the diminished probative value of this evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence do apply to § 2254 proceedings. See Fed.R.Evid. 1101(e). Ordinarily, a defendant's failure to present some evidence from the uncalled witness regarding that witness's potential testimony ... would be fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Harrison v. Quarterman, 496 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir.2007) (citations omitted). Because of the inherently abstract nature of our Strickland prejudice inquiry in the uncalled-witness context, see Evans v. Cockrell, 285 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir.2002) ([C]omplaints of uncalled witnesses are not favored ... because allegations of what the witness would have testified are largely speculative. (citation omitted)), federal appellate courts generally insist on a more precise and more reliable showing of the uncalled witnesses' expected testimony than the showing made in the existing record. See Lawrence v. Armontrout, 900 F.2d 127, 130 (8th Cir.1990) ([I]f potential trial witnesses are not called to testify at a postconviction review hearing, the petitioner ordinarily should explain their absence and demonstrate, with some precision, the content of the testimony they would have given at trial. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 682 (3d Cir.2006) (observing that, in this context, a showing of Strickland prejudice must be made based on the potential witness's testimony to the habeas court. (citation omitted)); United States ex rel. Partee v. Lane, 926 F.2d 694, 701 (7th Cir.1991) ([A] habeas court cannot even begin to apply Strickland 's standards to... a [missing witness] claim unless and until the petitioner makes a specific, affirmative showing as to what the missing evidence or testimony would have been. Without such a showing, it is ... nearly impossible to determine whether the petitioner was prejudiced by any deficiencies in counsel's performance. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). But we conclude Armstrong should not be required to rest his appeal on the basis of the existing record because Armstrong, who was without counsel at the § 2254 hearing, [5] was not given an adequate opportunity to develop the record with respect to the out-of-state witnesses' expected testimony. At the first evidentiary hearing, the district court focused primarily on the first Strickland prong and dismissed Armstrong's argument that if he had legal counsel he could have been prepared by having [his] brothers ... personally testif[y] ... before the Court. The district court replied, the issue here is not having them testify in front of me... it would not have helped at all to have... your friends, brother, and your mother here. On remand, the district court declined to hold a second evidentiary hearing and, contrary to our express instructions, again primarily confined its analysis to the first prong of Strickland. Thus, Armstrong had little opportunity to improve the state of the record following our remand. In the proceedings following this second remand, Armstrong should have an adequate opportunity to present further evidence of what the three out-of-state witnesses would have testified to had they been properly secured to testify at Armstrong's trial.