Opinion ID: 1594360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Pennington County Jury Pool.

Text: Lohnes claims that the Pennington County jury pool selection process violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. He claims that the selection process results in an under-representation of and discrimination against native Americans. The defendant has the burden of establishing a prima facie showing that the cross-sectional requirement has been violated. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). To establish a prima facie challenge the defendant must show that: (1) the group excluded is a distinct group in the community; (2) the representation of this group in jury pools is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; (3) this under-representation is due to the systematic exclusion of the group from the jury-selection process. Duren, supra, 439 U.S. at 364, 99 S.Ct. at 668; Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970). Lohnes claims that the voter registration list used for the Pennington County jury pool creates a disparate and systematic exclusion of Indians in the jury pool. Based on 1984 Pennington County census figures, he initially showed an Indian population of 5.2% and indicated that only .52% to 1.52% of the county Indian population was registered to vote. [1] Later, based on a search of the 1987 county voter registration list for surnames of Indian and French decent, Lohnes submitted that 1,322 (3%) of the 41,514 names on the list were Indian. Voir dire established that only 2 members (2%) of the entire panel of 99 were Indian. However, 1 (or 8.3%) of the 12 jurors selected was Indian. These statistics fail to establish the second prong for a prima facie case under Duren. Lohnes attempted to determine the percentage of Indians registered to vote by searching the voter list for Indian surnames. This method is unreliable, as many people of Indian decent may not have Indian surnames. State v. Fallis, 205 Neb. 465, 288 N.W.2d 281 (1980); State v. Addison, 198 Neb. 442, 253 N.W.2d 165 (1977). Though Lohnes also counted French names, and checked addresses against areas of the community generally occupied by Indians, this data is unreliable and incomplete for establishing his claim. [2] In State v. Plenty Horse, 85 S.D. 401, 184 N.W.2d 654 (1971), we held that a defendant's right to equal protection was violated by the jury selection process. The statistics in that case showed that 29.9% of the county's population was Indian, while only 8% were represented on county jury lists over three years. Further, there was testimony that the county jury selectors would not certify Indians for the jury lists because they generally believed Indians to be unfit for jury service. In contrast to Plenty Horse, Lohnes' evidence was insufficient to meet his burden. Therefore, we cannot determine whether the representation of Indians on the voter registration list is fair and reasonable in comparison with others. We will not presume that the source for jury selection fails to provide a fair cross-section of the community, absent adequate proof. State v. Hall, 272 N.W.2d 308 (S.D. 1978). Lohnes has also failed to show a systematic exclusion of Indians under the third prong of Duren. Duren concluded that a systematic exclusion requires that it be inherent in the jury-selection process. Courts have found a systematic exclusion or discrimination upon a showing that the jury-selection process was not random in excluding a certain group. See Duren, supra ; Taylor, supra ; Plenty Horse, supra . SDCL chapter 16-13 requires that the jury-selection process be random in selecting names from voter registration lists, but Lohnes failed to show that the process was not random. An inherent exclusion of Indians from the jury selection process may also be found with statistical evidence showing that the voting list results in an under-representation of Indians. People v. Harris, 36 Cal.3d 36, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433 (1984). If under-representation is shown, fairness requires supplementation of the jury panel. [3] Hall, supra ( citing United States v. Armsbury, 408 F.Supp. 1130 (D.C.Or.1976)). However, Lohnes failed to meet this burden.