Opinion ID: 2759713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable particularity

Text: Under RCW 4.16.170, service of process on one defendant tolls the statute of limitations as to unserved defendants. Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 1J 7 Wn.2d 325, 329, 815 P.2d 781 (1991). In Sidis, this court observed that in some cases, if identified with reasonable particularity, 'John Doe' defendants may be appropriately 'named' for purposes of RCW 4.16.170. !d. at 331. This case gives us an opportunity to explore our observation in Sidis, and we find it sound and authoritative in the case at bar. While we have not had occasion to discuss our observation in Sidis previously, our Courts of Appeals have, and we build on the holdings of the Courts of Appeals. See, e.g. Bresina v. Ace Paving Co., 89 Wn. App. 277,282,948 P.2d 870 (1997). In 3 5 ' . Powers v. WB. Mobile Services, Inc.', No. ·90133-3 order for a plaintiff to show that an um1amed defendant is identified with reasonable particularity, the plaintiff must establish ( 1) (a) from the commencement of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff made a diligent effort to identify the actual defendant given the information reasonably available to the plaintiff and (b) the plaintiff provided information about the unnamed defendant in the complaint to the greatest extent possible, including describing the unnamed defendant's acts and appearance and (2) the defendant had or should have received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits at the time when the placeholder for the defendant, such as John Doe or ABC Corporation, is replaced with the defendant's actual name. The first prong of the reasonable particularity standard is satisfied only when the plaintiff shows that it made a reasonable effort to identify an unnamed defendant and that actua]ly naming the defendant was unreasonably difficult given the information available. If a plaintiff is able to show that the plaintiff identified an unnamed defendant with reasonable particularity and tolled the statute of limitations by timely serving at least one named defendant, the statute of limitations will be tolled as to claims against such unnamed defendant. In that case, the plaintiff may amend its pleading under CR - 10(a)(2) to substitute the actual name of the defendant in place of the placeholder for such defendant, such as John Doe or ABC Corporation, even after the expiration 6 . . Powers v. W.B. Mobile Services, Inc.; No. ·90133-3 of the statute of limitations, without needing to show that such amendment relates back to the date of the plaintiffs .original pleading under CR 15(c). 3 We find that Powers identified W.B. ]\1obil~ with reasonable particularity and, therefore, tolled the statute of limitations by serving Pacific on June 5, 2009, and properly substituted W.B; Mobile's name for John Doe One ... builder of the handicap access ramp where the incident occurred in February 2011. 4 Viewing facts and inferences in a light most favorable to Powers, as we must, we find that Powers satisfied the first prong of the reasonable particularity standard. Powers made a diligent effort to identify and name W.B. Mobile from the commencement of the statute of limitations given the information reasonably available because from when Powers fell, Powers tried to find out exactly who put 3 We recognize that our holding today is contrary to Kiehn v. Nelsen's Tire Co., 45 Wn. App. 291, 294-96, 724 P.2d 434 (1986). Kiehn was decided before Sidis and found that a plaintiff must satisfy CR 15(c) to amend a pleading to replace a placeholder for an unnamed defendant with the defendant's actual name after the expiration of the statute of limitations. I d. Following Sidis, as we hold today, if a plaintiff satisfies the reasonable particularity standard and timely served at least one named·defendant, the statute of limitations has been tolled as to the unnamed defendant and the plaintiff may amend its pleading to replace a placeholder for the unnamed defendant with the defendant's actual name without consideration of CR 15(c). Given that CR 15(c)(2) requires that the defendant knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him (emphasis added) and in cases such as this one the plaintiff was ignorant of the name of the defendant under CR 10( a)(2) (emphasis added), not mistaken, CR 15(c) does not apply to a plaintiff's amending a pleading to replace a placeholder for an mmamed defendant with the defendant's actual name after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Whether the plaintiff has satisfied the reasonable particularity standard is the exclusive inquiry in such cases. 4 Powers also argues that he may amend his pleading to name W.B. Mobile in place of John Doe One under CR 15(c) and asks us to abandon the inexcusable neglect prong of the CR 15(c) analysis. W.B. Mobile filed a motion to strike a portion of Powers's brief devoted to that argument. Given our holding today, we deny the motion as moot. 7 Powers v. WB. Mobile Services, Inc.; No. 90133-3 the ramp the together and Powers filed a complaint and initiated discovery to ascertain more information about the installer of the ramp. CP at 256; RCW 4.16.080. Powers provided information about W.B. Mobile in his complaint to the greatest extent possible by describing W.B. Mobile as John Doe One ... builder of the handicap access ramp where the incident occurred. CP at 186. Powers's actually naming W.B. Mobile in his complaint was unreasonably difficult given the information available because Powers's attempts to ascertain the identity ofW.B. Mobile were stymied by inaccurate information from his employer and the lack of an available record showing who installed the ramp. Given the record available and viewing facts and inferences in a light most favorable to Powers, Powers satisfied the first prong of the reasonable particularity standard, but this is a close call, and such finding is the outer extreme of what may satisfY the first prong of the reasonable particularity standard. W.B. Mobile received sufficient notice to ensure that it is not prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the merits, satisfying the second prong of the reasonable particularity standard. The owner and sole employee ofW.B. Mobile received a copy of Powers's complaint andPacific's invoices reflecting that W.B. Mobile installed the ramp at issue a few days after July 28, 2009, well within the ninety days required for service after Powers filed his complaint on May 28, 2009. See RCW 4.16.170. W.B. Mobile received actual notice of Powers's claim in a timely manner, which satisfies the second prong of the reasonable particularity standard. 8 . . Powers v. W.B. Mobile Services, Inc.; No.'90133~3