Opinion ID: 1643636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Estate Action

Text: Thus, the question becomes whether a decedent's estate may recover for the mental anguish a decedent consciously suffers by the apprehension and fear of impending death prior to sustaining fatal injury. While we have not heretofore considered this question, we have long permitted a decedent's estate to recover for the conscious physical pain and suffering the decedent endured after a negligently inflicted injury resulting in death. Wilfong v. Omaha & C.B. Street R. Co., supra . We have also long recognized postinjury mental anguish as an element of damages recoverable in personal injury actions. Baylor v. Tyrrell, 177 Neb. 812, 131 N.W.2d 393 (1964); Omaha Street R. Co. v. Emminger, 57 Neb. 240, 77 N.W. 675 (1898). Some courts have allowed recovery for conscious preimpact mental anguish suffered by decedents aware of impending death. Most of these cases are federal diversity actions and arise out of airplane crashes. In one such action, Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.1984), the decedent was killed when a jet crashed shortly after takeoff. The reviewing court referred with approval to the language of the trial court, 574 F.Supp. 1407, 1416 (S.D.N.Y.1983), which observed: New York provides a cause of action for the pain and suffering of a decedent before his death. In several cases it has been held that a decedent's estate may recover for the decedent's pain and suffering endured after the injury that led to his death. [Citations omitted.] From this proposition, it is only a short step to the allowing of damages for a decedent's pain and suffering before the mortal blow and resulting from the apprehension of impending death. (Emphasis in original.) The reviewing court then itself reasoned: A decedent's representative unquestionably may recover for pain and suffering experienced in a brief interval between injury and death.... We see no intrinsic or logical barrier to recovery for the fear experienced during a period in which the decedent is uninjured but aware of an impending death. 742 F.2d at 53. In Haley v. Pan American World Airways, 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.1984), reh'g denied 751 F.2d 1258, the court interpreting state law concluded that Louisiana would recognize a surviving cause of action for preimpact fear and apprehension of impending death experienced by an airline passenger killed in an airplane crash. In Haley, as in our present case, the decedent was killed immediately upon impact. The court based its decision on Louisiana law which permitted recovery for fear suffered during a negligently produced ordeal. While many of the Louisiana cases cited by Haley dealt with recovery for postimpact mental anguish associated with physical injury, the Haley court concluded that Louisiana would permit damages for conscious mental anguish suffered by the decedent before his death or impact, and quoted with approval the analysis from its earlier decision in Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied 434 U.S. 801, 98 S.Ct. 28, 54 L.Ed.2d 59 (1977) (interpreting Florida law): While in the garden variety of claims under survival statutes, including the Florida Statutefatal injuries sustained in automobile accidents and the likethe usual sequence is impact followed by pain and suffering, we are unable to discern any reason based on either law or logic for rejecting a claim because in this case as to at least part of the suffering, this sequence was reversed. We will not disallow the claims for this item of damages on that ground. Haley at 314-15. In Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ.App.1979), decedent was killed when he descended from the back of a truck and the defendant driver of the truck negligently backed over him. The court, in affirming a jury award of $5,000, implicitly held that recovery was appropriate for conscious preimpact mental anguish suffered by the decedent in anticipation of impending death, regardless of how brief in duration. Similarly, in Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Lane, 720 S.W.2d 830 (Tex.App.1986), the court affirmed an award for mental anguish suffered by the decedent before a train hit his stalled truck. As to the claim that such damages were not recoverable because decedent died instantly, the court reasoned: Such an argument fails to consider the terror and consequent mental anguish Lane suffered for the six to eight seconds while he faced imminent death. Id. at 833. Similar results were obtained in Pregeant v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 762 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.1985) (following Haley ); Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir.1988) (plaintiff must prove conscious mental anguish by preponderance of the evidence); Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Intern., Inc., 828 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.1987) (allowing such recoveries generally but holding that lower court's denial of damages for airplane passengers' precrash conscious pain and suffering not clearly erroneous where no evidence to support); Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F.Supp. 1271 (D.Conn. 1974), aff'd in relevant part 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir.1975); Platt v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 554 F.Supp. 360 (E.D.Mich.1983); D'Angelo v. United States, 456 F.Supp. 127 (D.Del.1978), aff'd 605 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir.1979) (interpreting Maryland law); Mitchell v. Akers, 401 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Civ. App.1966) (holding that action instituted or which could have been instituted by person who sustains injuries later resulting in death survives the deceased and may be asserted by his heirs or the administrator of his estate and that in such action damages were recoverable for the mental anguish suffered by the 3-year-old decedent for the 2 or 3 minutes before he drowned). Some courts, however, have denied recovery for preimpact mental anguish. E.g., Nye v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 331 Pa.Super. 209, 480 A.2d 318 (1984) (no damages available under Pennsylvania statute for conscious preimpact fright); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. etc., 507 F.Supp. 21 (N.D.Ill.1980) (no recovery under Illinois law for fright and terror decedent may have suffered in anticipation of physical injury prior to death in an airplane crash); Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Exp., Inc., 640 F.Supp. 953 (D.Kan.1986) (no recovery is permitted under Kansas law for negligently induced preimpact mental anguish, not itself resulting in physical injury, notwithstanding that the collision caused physical injury). Nonetheless, we are persuaded that there exists no sound legal or logical distinction between permitting a decedent's estate to recover as an element of damages for a decedent's conscious postinjury pain and suffering and mental anguish and permitting such an estate to recover for the conscious prefatal-injury mental anguish resulting from the apprehension and fear of impending death. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1401 (Reissue 1985) provides that, among other things, a cause of action for an injury to a personal estate survives the death of the person entitled to the same. Thus, we hold that as an element of a decedent's personal injury action, conscious prefatal-injury fear and apprehension of impending death survives a decedent's death and inures to the benefit of such decedent's estate. See Wilfong v. Omaha & C.B. Street R. Co., 129 Neb. 600, 262 N.W. 537 (1935). Dolan argues that the personal representative's offer of proof fails in any event to establish that the decedent Nelson knew how closely his motorcycle was being followed or otherwise establishes that the decedent Nelson was consciously aware of and feared his impending death. It is true that courts have denied recovery for preimpact mental anguish for lack of evidence that the decedent was aware of his impending death. E.g., Anderson v. Rowe, 73 A.D.2d 1030, 425 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980); Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202 (2d Cir.1984); Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 529 F.Supp. 634 (W.D. La.1982); Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Intern., Inc., supra ; Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., supra . In Shatkin, the reviewing court reversed a jury award for preimpact pain and suffering, finding no evidence that the decedent passenger was awake or was aware that anything was wrong; that the pilot or anyone alerted the passengers as to the danger; nor that the airplane tilted and rolled in an unusual manner. However, in Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.1984), which arose out of the same accident, the same reviewing court distinguished Shatkin and concluded that the jury could reasonably find that a passenger seated over the left wing of the airplane (Shatkin's assigned seat was over the right wing) could have seen the left engine and a portion of the wing break off at the beginning of the flight and suffered preimpact mental anguish during the 30 seconds before the crash. Accord Green v. Hale, 590 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.Civ.App.1979). Finally, in Mitchell v. Akers, 401 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Civ.App.1966), the court found that proof of mental anguish was sufficient where a doctor testified that a 3-year-old child who had drowned had struggled for 2 or 3 minutes before losing consciousness. It is fundamental that the nature and amount of damages cannot be sustained by evidence which is speculative and conjectural. Nebraska Truck Serv. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 213 Neb. 755, 331 N.W.2d 266 (1983); Suhr v. City of Scribner, 202 Neb. 364, 275 N.W.2d 596 (1979). The record must provide some basis for the jury to make a reasonable inference that the decedent suffered conscious mental anguish. See, Haley v. Pan American World Airways, 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.1984), reh'g denied 751 F.2d 1258; Green v. Hale, supra ; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Lane, 720 S.W.2d 830 (Tex.App.1986). While it is true that in the present case there is no evidence that decedent Nelson said anything prior to his death revealing an awareness of his impending death, the personal representative's offers of proof nonetheless provide a basis upon which the jury certainly need not, but could, if it wished, find that decedent Nelson apprehended and feared his impending death during the 5 seconds his motorcycle traveled 268 feet locked with Dolan's automobile before he was crushed and thus killed. We must therefore conclude that the record sustains the personal representative's second assignment of error.