Opinion ID: 1547174
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Videotape Identification Issue

Text: Both Mr. Brooks and Mr. Sanders contend that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the government to introduce lay, non-eyewitness videotape identification testimony. They maintain that such testimony lacked a sufficient foundation, was unreliable and suggestive, and that the jury was just as able as the witnesses ... to view the videotape and determine if Mr. Sanders (or Mr. Brooks) appeared on the tape. In claiming that the identification testimony lacked a sufficient foundation, Mr. Brooks contends that it was not rationally based on witnesses' perceptions, and that the government's proffer was inadequate. [9] The government argues that a proper foundation was laid for the lay witness identifications from the videotape or videotape photographs, and that because of the lack of clarity of the videotape it was helpful for the jury to hear the opinions of lay persons who were familiar with Mr. Brooks and Mr. Sanders. We first set the factual context for the videotape identification issue. Prior to trial, the government proffered that lay witnesses who had known one or more of the defendants for an extended period of time and who were well acquainted with the appearance and the voice of a given defendant, would testify. The government presented a number of witnesses who identified Mr. Brooks and Mr. Sanders from the jewelry store surveillance videotape that had recorded the incident on September 27, 1993, or by examining photographs from still frames of the videotape. The lay witnesses each testified that they knew the defendants personally and provided the nature and length of their relationship. [10] The identification testimony was based upon the witnesses' own observation of the videotape and their knowledge of the appellants. The witnesses noted appellants' physical characteristics and other factors upon which they relied for identification. For example, Mr. Brooks' ex-girlfriend testified that she recognized Mr. Brooks from his sway and from his distinctive mustache. Messrs. Brown, Proctor and Rowley all recognized Mr. Brooks from his jacket and voice. Mr. Sanders' sister identified him as the person in the videotape who was wearing [t]he blue sweat shirt and sweat pants with the white lines. The trial court applied Federal Rule of Evidence (F.R.E.) 701 in admitting the testimony. [11] It found that: The videotape certainly in substantial part in this Court's view, is not all that clear and that the individuals are all wearing hats and none of the photographs depicted the frontal portion of the individuals' faces. Based upon this finding, the court ruled that: [I]t would be particularly helpful in this case to have the testimony of individuals who are very familiar with the faces, the side angles, the body, the posture of the individuals who are depicted in the videotape and the still photos made from that videotape. [T]hus, the Court concludes that the two tests set forth in 701 are satisfied. We have held previously that: Modern rules of evidence permit non-expert witnesses to express opinions as long as those opinions are based on the witness' own observation of events and are helpful to the jury. Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913, 919 (D.C.1992) (quoting Fateh v. Rich, 481 A.2d 464, 470 (D.C.1984)). We have never explicitly held, however, that a lay witness may identify a person from a videotape, or a photograph derived from a videotape. The majority of jurisdictions that have decided cases involving lay witness testimony identifying a person depicted in a videotape, or in a still picture derived from the videotape, have affirmed the admission of such testimony under F.R.E. 701, or an identical state evidentiary rule, provided the witness has at least some degree of familiarity with the person identified. [12] For instance, in United States v. Jackman, 48 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1995), the ex-wife of a defendant identified him after examining a photograph taken by a bank surveillance camera. The First Circuit held that: [S]uch testimony is admissible, at least when the witness possesses sufficient relevant familiarity with the defendant that the jury cannot also possess, and when the photographs are not either so unmistakably clear or so hopelessly obscure that the witness is no better-suited than the jury to make the identification. Id. at 4-5. (citations omitted). A cousin and a parole officer provided lay testimony in Langford, supra at note 12, identifying the defendant as the person appearing in bank surveillance photographs taken during a robbery. The Ninth Circuit declared that: Such opinion testimony by lay witnesses is admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 701 if it is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of [the] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Such testimony is particularly valuable where, as in the present case, the lay witnesses are able to make the challenged identifications based on their familiarity with characteristics of the defendant not immediately observable by the jury at trial. We conclude that, because [the lay witness] had met with [the appellant] approximately 50 times and [another lay witness] had known [the appellant] most of his life, the opinions testified to by [the lay witnesses] were rationally based and helpful to the jury in determining a fact in issue. 802 F.2d at 1179 (citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the admission of lay testimony by two bank tellers who identified the defendant as the person in videotape surveillance photographs taken at the time of a bank robbery. See Stormer, supra, at note 12. Recognizing that the decision to admit testimony under [F.R.E.] 701 is `committed to the sound discretion of the [trial] court ...,' id. at 761 (quoting United States v. Towns, 913 F.2d 434 (7th Cir.1990)), the court in Stormer applied the circuit's general rule that: [A] lay witness may testify regarding the identity of a person depicted in a surveillance photograph `if there is some basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than is the jury.' Id. at 761 (quoting United States v. Farnsworth, 729 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir.1984)). The lay witnesses in Farnsworth were two parole officers and a used car salesman who sold the defendant a car on the afternoon of the bank robbery. The court noted that: A witness's opinion concerning the identity of a person depicted in a surveillance photograph is admissible if ... the witness is familiar with the defendant's appearance around the time the surveillance photograph was taken and the defendant's appearance has changed prior to trial. Farnsworth, supra, 729 F.2d. at 1160 (citations omitted). [13] See also United States v. Borrelli, 621 F.2d 1092, 1095 (10th Cir. 1980) (admitting identification testimony from stepfather where defendant had changed facial hair and hairstyle). In another case, an employer and a probation officer identified the defendant as the person caught in a bank surveillance camera still photograph. United States v. Pierce, 136 F.3d 770 (11th Cir.1998). There, in a matter of first impression, the court cited cases from other circuits determining that lay opinion testimony identifying a defendant in surveillance photographs is admissible under [F.R.E.] 701, id. at 774, and stated: Because we find that, . . . there is some basis for concluding that the witness[es][are] more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than is the jury, we hold that the district court acted within its discretion in admitting lay opinion identification testimony from [the lay witnesses] . . . . [B]ecause the surveillance photograph was admitted into evidence, the jury was certainly able to compare [the defendant's] appearance at trial with the appearance of the individual depicted in the photograph. In view of the disguise worn by the robber pictured in the photograph and the level of familiarity with [the defendant's] appearance both [lay witnesses] possessed . . ., we conclude that the lay opinion identification testimony admitted was helpful to the determination of a fact in issue within the meaning of [F.R.E.] 701. Id. at 775. In the case before us, we now hold that lay witness opinion testimony regarding the identity of a person in a surveillance photograph or a surveillance videotape is admissible into evidence, provided that such testimony is: (a) rationally based on the perception of a witness who is familiar with the defendant's appearance and has had substantial contact with the defendant; and (b) helpful to the factfinder in the determination of a fact in issue. In permitting such testimony in cases such as the one before us, the trial court at least should be reasonably satisfied that because of the either obscured or altered appearance of the defendant in the photograph or the videotape, or changed appearance of the defendant, the lay witness is more likely to accurately identify the defendant than is the factfinder. We further hold that the admissibility of such testimony is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court. Applying these principles to the case before us, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence the opinions of lay witnesses who identified Mr. Brooks and Mr. Robinson as the two men appearing in the Georgia Avenue jewelry store's surveillance videotape and the photographs derived from the videotape. The government properly laid the foundation showing that each of the lay witnesses' opinion was rationally related to the witness' own perceptions, and that the testimony would be helpful to the jury. Like the trial court, we have no reason to question the reliability of the identifications. The lay witnesses demonstrated particular familiarity with both men and had had substantial contact with them. The familiarity of the witnesses with the appellants was important in this case because: (1) the features of the men in the videotape and still photographs were obscured by their hats; (2) the videotape that was not all that clear; and (3) Mr. Sanders had removed his facial hair since the jewelry store incident. Indeed, the expert witness for Mr. Brooks testified that he was not able to obtain a quality photograph [from the videotape] good enough to make a positive identification scientifically. Nonetheless, he credited the usefulness of identification based upon personal recognition, such as that demonstrated by the lay witnesses in this case. Thus, the familiarity of the lay witnesses with the defendants, and their ability to identify them by physical characteristics and other factors undoubtedly was helpful to the jury. Consequently, we discern no reason to disturb the trial court's ruling admitting the identification testimony of the lay witnesses.