Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Presumption-of-sanity instruction.

Text: The court instructed prospective jurors that during the guilt phase of the trial the defendant was to be conclusively presumed to be sane at the time of the crime. Although that instruction correctly states the law (see § 1026; People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 232, 276 Cal. Rptr. 80, 801 P.2d 323), appellant contends that this was error which prejudicially undermined his guilt phase defense of lack of premeditation of the murders. He concedes that the jury was instructed that if the defendant did not premeditate because of mental illness or defect, he was not guilty of first degree murder, but claims, nonetheless, that the jury would conclude that the presumption-of-sanity instruction meant that the evidence of his odd behavior prior to the killings could not be considered. A defendant who believes that an instruction requires clarification must request it. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1140, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) Appellant neither objected to the instruction nor sought modification. We are satisfied that appellant suffered no prejudice here in any case. As defendant observes, we noted in People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 390, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793 that the instruction given there [23] could mislead the jury when evidence of mental illness was offered at the guilt phase. The Burton instruction was very different from that of which appellant complains here. Moreover, the prosecutor and defense counsel argued the presence or absence of mental disease during guilt phase closing argument, with defendant reminding the jury that whether appellant was mentally was for the jury to decide. The guilt phase instructions given shortly thereafter expressly advised the jury that premeditation and deliberation were elements of first degree murder and that evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental illness or defect could be considered in determining if those mental states were present. [24] There was no possibility of confusion arising from the instruction of which appellant complains here.