Opinion ID: 6327334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Bolles 2.0?

Text: ¶28 Our holding today might be summarized simply as “Bolles goes digital.” Bolles dealt with the 1973 version of section 18‑9‑111(1)(e), which stated in relevant part: “A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he . . . [c]ommunicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, telegraph, mail, or any other form of communication, in a manner likely to harass or cause alarm.” Bolles, 541 P.2d at 81 n.1 (quoting § 18-9-111(1)(e), C.R.S. (1973)). Bolles was charged with harassment under subsection (1)(e) for mailing anti-abortion material to approximately 2,400 Boulder County residents. Bolles, 541 P.2d at 81. He challenged the statute as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, and this court concluded that subsection (1)(e) was facially overbroad and thus unconstitutional. Bolles, 541 P.2d at 81. ¶29 The Bolles court began its analysis by recognizing the “delicate and vulnerable nature” of free-speech protections and the responsibility of courts to closely inspect “state action which has the effect of curtailing or ‘chilling’ free expression.” Id. at 82 (quoting People v. Vaughan, 514 P.2d 1318, 1323 (Colo. 1973)). Recognizing that in the area of free speech, statutes must be carefully crafted and telephone, computer, computer network, computer system, or other interactive electronic medium that is obscene. 17 narrowly drawn, we concluded that, while the statute at issue could “be relied upon to punish for obscene, libelous, [or] riotous communication[,] which is probably constitutionally permissible[,] . . . [it] could also be used to prosecute for communications that cannot be constitutionally proscribed.” Id. ¶30 Indeed, a fundamental purpose of free speech in our system of government is to debate ideas. Id. at 83. These debates may be vigorous and high-minded but may at times devolve into vituperative attacks. “Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects.” Id. (quoting Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). But as the Bolles court aptly observed, if such speech could be restricted, “the protection of the First Amendment would be a mere shadow.” Id. ¶31 The 1973 version of subsection (1)(e) and the current iteration are similarly expansive. While in 1973 the statute applied to “any other form of communication,” now it applies to almost any form of electronic communication. Cf. People v. McBurney, 750 P.2d 916, 919 (Colo. 1988) (upholding yet another version of subsection (1)(e), containing the term “in a manner intended to harass,” because it was limited to land-line telephones; and distinguishing Bolles, explaining that because the statute in Bolles applied to any form of communication it “contained no particularized standards to limit the scope of the offense”). 18 ¶32 While we sympathize with those who become the target of gratuitous and unfounded insults, we are not persuaded by the prosecution’s privacy argument. “The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). Even in Bolles, where the defendant mailed highly disturbing materials to people’s homes, we concluded that “the intrusion into the recipient’s privacy is only minimal since he is not only free to discard at once any mail that he does not wish to receive, but can also ensure that he will not receive any more like it from the sender.” 541 P.2d at 84. Likewise, today, the swipe of a finger can often block, or at least delete, unwanted electronic communication. This is a small price to pay for freedom of speech. 6