Opinion ID: 1048495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Enhancement

Text: Alcantar further argues that the district court procedurally erred by assessing the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Because Alcantar preserved this argument in the district court, we review the application of the Guidelines de novo and the district court’s factual findings—along with the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts—for clear error. See United States v. Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1845 (2013); United States v. Coleman, 609 F.3d 699, 708 (5th Cir. 2010). “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Coleman, 609 F.3d at 708. 3 For this reason, we do not reach the Government’s argument that the Commerce Clause discussion in National Federation was dicta. 4 We note that while Alcantar seeks de novo review of the district court’s decision, the Government suggests that plain error review should apply because Alcantar may not have preserved this issue for our review. Regardless of whether we review the district court’s denial of Alcantar’s motion de novo or for plain error, we affirm the court’s decision because this issue is foreclosed by our prior precedent. 5 Case: 12-10909 Document: 00512399416 Page: 6 Date Filed: 10/07/2013 No. 12-10909 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a four-level increase in the offense level “[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm . . . in connection with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm . . . with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.” (emphasis added). The application notes provide that, in examining the “in connection with” element, the enhancement applies, in general, “if the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential for facilitating, another felony offense or another offense, respectively.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), cmt. n.14(A). The application notes further explain that U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) “appl[ies] . . . in the case of a drug trafficking offense in which a firearm is found in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia. In these cases, application of [U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)] is warranted because the presence of the firearm has the potential of facilitating another felony offense or another offense, respectively.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), cmt. n.14(B)(ii) (emphasis added). The Guidelines’s “application notes [are] authoritative unless [they] violate[] the Constitution or a federal statute, or [are] inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that [G]uideline.” See United States v. Miller, 607 F.3d 144, 148 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993). Here, because the other felony—possession of cocaine with intent to deliver—is a drug trafficking offense, application note 14(B)(ii) applies. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iv) (“‘Drug trafficking offense’ means an offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits . . . the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to . . . distribute . . . .”)5; see also United States v. Marban-Calderon, 631 5 This definition of “drug trafficking offense” explicitly includes “possession . . . with intent to . . . distribute” and, therefore, is unlike the definition construed in United States v. 6 Case: 12-10909 Document: 00512399416 Page: 7 Date Filed: 10/07/2013 No. 12-10909 F.3d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the district court could assess the enhancement after finding that the firearm was discovered in close proximity to Alcantar’s drug-manufacturing materials or drug paraphernalia.6 See United States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 692 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that with respect to drug trafficking offenses, application note 14(B)(ii) provides that the “the enhancement automatically applies” when “a firearm is found in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia”). Here, according to the PSR, APD officers discovered drug paraphernalia, drug-manufacturing materials, and a dismantled firearm in Alcantar’s bedroom. The district court could adopt these facts as described by the PSR unless Alcantar presented “rebuttal evidence or otherwise demonstrate[d] that the information in the PSR is unreliable.” See United States v. Trujillo, 502 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Harris, 702 F.3d at 230. Alcantar did not present evidence rebutting the proximity of the firearm to the drug paraphernalia and drug-manufacturing equipment. Instead, based on the testimony of the Federal Public Defender’s staff investigator, he asserted that because the unloaded firearm was in three pieces and he did not know how to assemble it, the firearm was “decidedly unhelpful” to the distribution of drugs. He also argued that the Government’s contention that the firearm could be assembled in as little as ten to thirty seconds did not account for the Silva-De Hoyos, 702 F.3d 843, 847-48 (5th Cir. 2012), which required actual distribution (not mere possession with intent to distribute) to qualify as a “drug trafficking offense.” 6 Alcantar urges that the district court should have applied the three-part analysis of United States v. Juarez, 626 F.3d 246, 253 (5th Cir. 2010), to determine whether the firearm had the potential to facilitate another felony offense. However, Juarez is inapplicable here because it applies the general rule set forth in application note 14(A) to another felony offense not involving drug trafficking, rather than the more specific analysis of application note 14(B)(ii), which applies here because the other felony involves a drug trafficking offense. See id. at 255. 7 Case: 12-10909 Document: 00512399416 Page: 8 Date Filed: 10/07/2013 No. 12-10909 “uncontroverted evidence” showing that he did not have the capacity to assemble the shotgun.7 Despite Alcantar’s arguments, the proximity of the firearm to the drug paraphernalia and drug-manufacturing materials makes it plausible for the district court to have concluded that Alcantar possessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense.8 See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), cmt. n.14(B)(ii); see also Jeffries, 587 F.3d at 692-93. Thus, regardless of whether we would have decided this issue the same way, it was not clear error to find as the district court did. Therefore, the court did not err in assessing the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).9 AFFIRMED. 7 Although we have observed that the “inoperable character” of a firearm does not prevent it from being used or possessed in connection with another felony because “an unloaded or broken gun may be of use in a criminal act,” United States v. Paulk, 917 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 1990), we need not reach that issue here because Alcantar does not contend that the firearm was broken or in need or repair. Instead, he merely asserts that it was “inoperable” because it was disassembled. The Government presented evidence that the firearm could be assembled in as little as ten to thirty seconds and, therefore, the district court plausibly concluded that this firearm was capable of being used or possessed in connection with Alcantar’s felony drug offense. 8 Because U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies to possession of either a firearm or ammunition, the district court did not err in concluding that the absence of ammunition was not dispositive. See U.S.S.G § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). 9 Alcantar also argues that the Government failed to show that he possessed the firearm with knowledge or intent that it would be used in connection with another felony offense. Importantly, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) requires that the defendant either (1) “[u]sed or possessed any firearm in connection with another felony offense”; or (2) “possessed or transferred any firearm . . . with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Because the district court did not err in concluding that Alcantar “used or possessed any firearm in connection with another felony offense,” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), we need not consider whether U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)’s enhancement could be assessed based on the possession of the firearm with knowledge or intent that it would be used in connection with another felony offense. 8