Opinion ID: 2584137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: our holding applies prospectively

Text: {34} Having concluded that Section 31-18-15.1 is facially unconstitutional after Cunningham, the question remains whether our holding applies prospectively or retroactively. The answer to this question turns on whether the rule we announce is old or new under the analysis set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Whorton v. Bockting, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1180, 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (2007). If it is an old rule, it applies both on direct and collateral review. Id. If it is a new rule, it generally applies only to cases that are still on direct review. Id. A new rule, however, may apply retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). {35} A new rule is defined as a rule that . . . was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. Id. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 1181 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Using this definition of a new rule, the Supreme Court has determined that a court establishes a new rule when its decision is flatly inconsistent with the prior governing precedent and is an explicit overruling of an earlier holding. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). {36} After Apprendi, a number of New Mexico cases upheld enhanced sentences based on a finding of aggravating circumstances by the trial judge. The first of these cases was State v. Wilson , which held that Section 31-18-15.1 is constitutional under Apprendi. 2001-NMCA-032, ¶ 4, 130 N.M. 319, 24 P.3d 351. The Court of Appeals followed Wilson when faced with other Apprendi challenges to enhanced sentences. State v. Morales, 2002-NMCA-016, ¶ 4, 131 N.M. 530, 39 P.3d 747; State v. Fike, 2002-NMCA-027, ¶ 22, 131 N.M. 676, 41 P.3d 944. Our holding today, requiring that a jury and not a trial judge must find aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, goes against our own line of cases in Wilson, and thus announces a new rule. {37} Our conclusion is consistent with Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004). In that case, the Supreme Court determined that a change in sentencing law created a new rule. The defendant in Schriro had been sentenced to death under Arizona law, and his sentence had been affirmed on direct review. Id. at 350, 124 S.Ct. 2519. The defendant filed a federal habeas petition. Id. While that appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided in Ring v. Arizona that Arizona's death penalty was unconstitutional under Apprendi because the judge, not the jury, determined whether there were sufficient aggravating circumstances to impose a death sentence. Id. at 350-51, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002)). The Supreme Court implicitly concluded that Ring had announced a new rule when it began its Schriro analysis by considering whether any of the Teague new rule exceptions applied. See id. at 351-52, 124 S.Ct. 2519; see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (holding that Apprendi was irreconcilable with Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), and explicitly overruling Walton ). {38} Our opinion today meets the Whorton test for establishment of a new rule. Like Ring, we overrule an earlier case, Lopez, 2005-NMSC-036, 138 N.M. 521, 123 P.3d 754, that allowed a judge to find aggravating facts to enhance a sentence. As Schriro held, this creates a new rule. Because we announce a new rule, it can only be applied retroactively if it meets one of the two Teague exceptions: namely, it must be either a substantive rule or a watershed rule of criminal procedure. The new rule we announce today does not satisfy either exception.
{39} A rule is substantive rather than procedural if it alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519. In contrast, [a] decision that modifies the elements of an offense is normally substantive rather than procedural. Id. at 354, 124 S.Ct. 2519. Rules that require a jury, not a judge, to find the essential facts bearing on punishment are prototypical procedural rules. Id. at 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519. {40} In Ring, the Supreme Court required that a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, [may not] find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. This holding had no effect on what factors would subject a defendant to Arizona's death penalty, but rather it merely required that the jury, not the judge, determine whether conduct punishable by death had occurred. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519. The Court explained that the range of conduct punished by death in Arizona was the same before Ring as after. Id. at 354, 124 S.Ct. 2519. Had the Supreme Court changed the required conduct warranting punishment, the holding would have been substantive, not procedural. Id. at 354, 124 S.Ct. 2519. {41} Our holding today likewise announces a procedural rule because, as in Ring, it affects only Frawley's sentence, not his conviction. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 595, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The requirements for conviction of felony child abuse, and for any other crime, remain the same after this case as before. All that has changed is that the jury, not the judge, must find the facts necessary to aggravate a sentence.
{42} A watershed rule must meet two requirements: (1) it must be necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction; and (2) it must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. Whorton, ___ U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 1182 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The watershed exception is extremely narrow; since Teague, the Supreme Court has rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status. Id. at 1181-82. In fact, only one case has ever met the test: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), decided 26 years before Teague. Whorton, ___ U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 1182. {43} In the context of factors for sentencing, the Supreme Court rephrased the watershed test as whether judicial factfinding so seriously diminishe[s] accuracy that there is an impermissibly large risk of punishing conduct the law does not reach. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 355-56, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). The Supreme Court noted that for every argument why juries are more accurate factfinders, there is another why they are less accurate. Id. at 356, 124 S.Ct. 2519. Because of this disagreement, it was impossible for the Supreme Court to determine whether judicial factfinding seriously diminishes accuracy in sentencing. Id. We conclude that our ruling today does not stand out as a watershed case because, like Schriro, it merely shifts factfinding from the judge to the jury. See id. at 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519. The Supreme Court has held that such a shift in factfinding is insufficient to meet the narrow watershed exception. See id. at 355-57, 124 S.Ct. 2519. {44} Other courts have determined that changes in sentencing laws do not meet the Teague test for retroactive application. Our holding today is based on Cunningham, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 856, which in turn is based on the Apprendi-Booker-Blakely line of cases. Our research has not disclosed a case where a court has given the Apprendi-Booker-Blakely line of cases retroactive effect in federal habeas proceedings. Lopez v. Campbell, No. 1:05-cv-00481-LJO-TAG HC, 2007 WL 2500424,  (E.D.Cal. Aug.30, 2007); see also United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 846, 849 (10th Cir.2005) (finding that Blakely is a new procedural rule that does not qualify for Teague exceptions); Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 861-63 (6th Cir.2005) (reaching same conclusion for Booker ); United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1218-19 (10th Cir.2002) (reaching same conclusion for Apprendi ). Accordingly, our holding today is only to be given prospective application.