Opinion ID: 2612293
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver: Retroactive Rate Making

Text: We have held that the order in question is void and unenforceable. Appellants claim, however, that the large industrial consumers, notably Sierra, by failing to move for a stay pursuant to NRS 704.550 [6] waived their right to receive refunds. They cite Garson v. Steamboat Canal, 43 Nev. 298, 185 P. 801 (1919), in support of their contention that the courts are constitutionally precluded from ordering refunds on review. Our reading of the case reveals no support for such contention. Moreover, NRS 704.550 does not make application for injunction a condition for return to the status quo prior to the issuance of a void order. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that a petition for stay, coupled with a suspending bond, is not a condition precedent to seeking reimbursement. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 180 Colo. 74, 502 P.2d 945 (Colo. 1972). In that case, however, it was a citizens group, not the utility, which had sought the review in district court. On the other hand, it was the utility that was forced to make the refund because of an invalid rate order. There is broad language in the case stating that obtaining a stay was unnecessary. In City of Los Angeles v. Public Util. Comm'n, 7 Cal.3d 331, 102 Cal. Rptr. 313, 497 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1972), the California Public Utilities Service Commission granted Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company a substantial rate increase. The order was challenged in a judicial review, and it was concluded that pending determination of the claim the increased revenues would be collected by the company pursuant to a partial stay order and would be subject to refund. The Supreme Court of California held, upon a determination that the ordered rate increase was invalid, that the money collected pursuant to the stay should be refunded. Id. at 803. Hawaii has also assumed the validity of surcharges and refunds derived from reallocation of rate spreads following the annulment of a commission order. See Application of Hawaii Elec. Light Co., above. We hold that failure to apply for injunction to enjoin enforcement of a void order does not per se avoid a refund of monies improperly paid as a result of the void order. Appellants claim that refunds are improper because they constitute improper retroactive rate making. We disagree. The refund order of the district court is not a form of retrospective legislation; it is merely a recognition that charges cannot be validly grounded on a void order. The judgment of the district court in both appeals is affirmed in all respects. MANOUKIAN, C.J., and MOWBRAY, STEFFEN and GUNDERSON, JJ., concur.