Opinion ID: 527780
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: soto's fifth amendment claim

Text: 168 Soto claims that the district court abused its discretion by not permitting him to testify concerning the shooting of Gutierrez, and that due to this error, he was denied due process of law. We disagree. 169 The pertinent facts are as follows. Soto appeared at his August 24, 1987 deposition without counsel and refused to answer any questions concerning the shooting incident. Plaintiff filed a motion in limine on October 15, 1987 to prohibit Soto from testifying at trial if he was going to assert the fifth amendment during discovery. Plaintiff's motion was granted on January 12, 1988. On January 25, 1988, Soto filed a motion for reconsideration of that order. On February 25, 1988, the court heard arguments on Soto's motion and denied it. Four days later, the trial began. 170 In his motion for reconsideration of the order granting plaintiff's motion in limine, and on appeal, Soto takes the position that he should not have to choose between asserting his fifth amendment privilege during discovery and testifying at trial. 171 Plaintiff contends, and the district court apparently agreed, that it would be an abuse of the fifth amendment to allow Soto to claim the privilege against self-incrimination during discovery and concurrently subject plaintiff to the possibility that at the eleventh hour he might waive the privilege and testify at trial. This, plaintiff asserts, would unduly hamper his preparation for trial. 172 Trial courts have broad discretion in fashioning remedies during discovery. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976). Discovery sanctions are appropriate not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent. Id. The viewpoint of National Hockey League was echoed in the advisory committee note to the 1983 amendment of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26: Rule 26(g) is designed to curb discovery abuse by explicitly encouraging the imposition of sanctions. Courts have not been afraid to bar a party from testifying where doing so was necessary to prevent the thwarting [of] the purposes and policies of the discovery rules. Meyer v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, etc., 95 Nev. 176, 591 P.2d 259 (1979); see Lyons v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 540, 541-42 (9th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1027, 90 S.Ct. 1273, 25 L.Ed.2d 538 (1970). 173 The district court's decision to bar Soto from testifying at trial due to his previous refusal to testify during discovery is supported by ample precedent. 174 The Federal Rules contemplate that there be full and equal mutual discovery in advance of trial so as to prevent surprise, prejudice and perjury. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses. 4 Moore, Federal Practice p 26.02 at 1034-35. The court would not tolerate nor indulge a practice whereby a defendant by asserting the privilege against self-incrimination during pre-trial examination and then voluntarily waiving the privilege at the main trial surprised or prejudiced the opposing party. 175 Duffy v. Currier, 291 F.Supp. 810, 815 (D.Minn.1968); accord Rubenstein v. Kleven, 150 F.Supp. 47, 48 (D.Mass.1957), aff'd on other grounds, 261 F.2d 921 (1st Cir.1958) (defendant's claim of privilege during deposition precluded his testimony as to certain evidence at trial); Costanza v. Costanza, 66 N.J. 63, 328 A.2d 230, 232 (1974); see also Bramble v. Kleindienst, 357 F.Supp. 1028, 1035 (D.Colo.1973) (applying same sanction to a plaintiff), aff'd, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069, 95 S.Ct. 656, 42 L.Ed.2d 665 (1974); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2018, at 149 (1970) ([I]f a party is free to shield himself with the privilege during discovery, while having the full benefit of his testimony at trial, the whole process of discovery could be seriously hampered.). We find these cases persuasive. 176 The Supreme Court's reasoning in an analogous situation supports the constitutionality of the holdings cited above. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1895, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970), the Court upheld a Florida notice-of-alibi rule requiring that a criminal defendant submit to a limited form of pretrial discovery by the State whenever he intends to rely at trial on the defense of alibi. The Court stated: 177 The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played. We find ample room in that system, at least as far as due process is concerned, for the instant Florida rule, which is designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence. 178 Id. at 82, 90 S.Ct. at 1896 (footnote omitted). The Court did not find that the Florida rule violated defendant's fifth amendment privilege. 179 At most, the rule only compelled petitioner to accelerate the timing of his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier date information that the petitioner from the beginning planned to divulge at trial. 180