Opinion ID: 209477
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: JVT Participants' Understanding of the JVT IPR Policies

Text: Even if we were to read the written IPR policies as not unambiguously requiring by themselves the aforementioned disclosure obligations, our conclusion as to the disclosure obligations of JVT participants would nonetheless be the same. That is because the language of the JVT IPR policies coupled with the district court's unassailable findings and conclusions as to the JVT participants' understanding of the policies further establishes that the policies imposed disclosure duties on participants (apart from the submission of technical proposals). As previously discussed, even though the Rambus court determined that there was not an express disclosure duty in the JEDEC patent policy in that case, it treated the policy as imposing a disclosure duty because the members treated it as imposing a disclosure duty. Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1098. In the present case, while the district court concluded that there was no express disclosure requirement in the written policies apart from the submission of technical proposals, it found clear and convincing evidence that JVT participants treated the JVT IPR Policies as imposing a duty to disclose, Waiver Order at , and that Qualcomm was aware of this treatment as early as August 2002, prior to the release of the H.264 standard in May 2003, Remedy Order at 1224. Specifically, the district court noted that, like Rambus, in addition to the written guidelines, JVT participants also learned of the patent disclosure policy from attendance of JVT meetings. Waiver Order at . The district court considered witness testimony, including testimony from Qualcomm employees, indicating that it was the practice of the chairman of the JVT, Gary Sullivan, to discuss the JVT IPR policies at every meeting. The district court also considered testimony indicating that JVT participants sometimes submitted disclosures without an accompanying technical proposal. Qualcomm attempts to distinguish Rambus by arguing that the JEDEC patent policy in Rambus was silent as to whether members had a disclosure duty, while the written JVT IPR policies are unambiguous, Appellant's Reply Br. 15, and expressly specify disclosure duties only in conjunction with a submission, Appellant's Br. 28. Thus, Qualcomm argues that the district court erred by inferring a disclosure duty that is directly contrary to the written JVT policy. Appellant's Br. 26. As previously discussed, however, we disagree with Qualcomm's interpretation of the written JVT IPR policies in the present case. Moreover, even if we were to read the written IPR policies as not unambiguously requiring by themselves the aforementioned disclosure obligations, the disclosure duty found by the district court based on the understanding of the JVT participants is certainly not directly contrary to the written JVT policy. Id. Having rejected Qualcomm's argument that the understanding of JVT participants is contrary to the written JVT IPR policies, we are left with reviewing the sufficiency of the district court's factual finding that JVT participants understood the JVT IPR policies as imposing a disclosure duty. Qualcomm argues that the evidence relied upon by the district court does not support its finding that the JVT participants understood the JVT IPR policies as imposing a disclosure duty. It asserts that Broadcom offered no testimony of the other JVT participants as to their understanding of the policy. Broadcom responds that it offered, inter alia, the testimony of Gary Sullivan (the JVT chair) and Stephen Gordon (a JVT participant) indicating that they understood the patent disclosure duty to be mandatory. Qualcomm offers a different interpretation of this testimony, as well as the testimony expressly relied upon by the district court regarding the discussion of the JVT IPR policies at every meeting and the submission of disclosures without accompanying technical proposals. We are not persuaded, however, by Qualcomm's arguments that the district court's findings lacked sufficient evidentiary support, or that the evidence should be interpreted differently. The district court was in the best position to determine the significance and implications of the record testimony in the first instance, and the cited testimony provides sufficient evidentiary support for its findings. [5]