Opinion ID: 3009938
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Those are one of the reasons, sir. My other two

Text: reasons are that my imprisonment has been very, very harsh. You must understand, sir, that I've only been in general population for 14 months out of 15 years imprisonment. I have done the hardest time of any convict in prison. I see my execution as an end of suffering to my imprisonment, a blessed, merciful release from all of these health symptoms that I'm constantly suffering with. And ten and-a-half years ago I became a Christian. And as a Christian, I have many questions and desires that I wish to know, and only God can answer those questions. So I'm very anxious to get to Heaven, so to speak, so that I can finally learn the answers to all of these deep religious and philosophical questions that have come across my mind for all of these years, sir. Transcript of April 29, 1995 at 182. There is adequate evidence to support the district court's findings and conclusions that petitioners failed to prove that Zettlemoyer was incompetent and that Zettlemoyer has knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to proceed.5 Schmidt and DeVetsco therefore are not entitled to next friend standing. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 149. In the absence of next friend standing for Schmidt or DeVetsco or the appointment of a guardian, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the petition, as no adequate basis exists for the exercise of federal power in this case. See Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 737.6 5 . Petitioners argue on appeal that they did not receive a full and fair hearing in the district court. They complain that the district court gave them no notice that an evidentiary hearing would be held on Friday, April 28, 1995, that the district court made numerous comments evidencing its disdain for petitioners' counsel, that they had an inadequate opportunity to examine the background of the court-appointed psychiatrist, and that the district court improperly barred petitioners' counsel from conducting a full examination of Zettlemoyer. After a careful review of the record, we find all of these contentions meritless. The petition in this case was filed a mere five days before the execution was scheduled, and the district court made every effort to ensure that the petitioners received a full and fair opportunity to present evidence in support of their case. Indeed, in light of the emergency nature of the petition, we commend the district court for its extensive and thorough approach to the issues raised by the petition. 6 . Because we affirm the district court's conclusion that it is powerless to address the issues raised in the petition due to petitioners' clear lack of standing, we need not address petitioners' suggestion that the district court erred by failing to await the outcome of petitioners' state court proceedings. Nor need we address petitioners' argument that the district court's grant of the certificate of probable cause to appeal requires this court to reach the merits of the petition under Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1985). We note, however, that Barefoot requires only that we reach the merits of the appeal, not the merits of the issues raised in the underlying habeas petition. Id. at 888-89. By affirming the district court's order dismissing the petition, we have reached the merits of this In reaching our result we have considered petitioners' contention at oral argument, predicated on Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990), and State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746 (La. 1992), that the district court's finding that Zettlemoyer was competent to waive further appeals should be reversed because Zettlemoyer was taking an anti-depressant/anti-psychotic drug when he testified before the district court and when he wrote a letter on March 28, 1995, indicating that he wanted no further appeals. In Perry v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court vacated a decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court denying review of a trial court's decision order[ing] the state to administer antypsychotic drugs to [a] prisoner in order to make him able to understand the link between his crime and punishment. State v. Perry, 610 So.2d at 747. The Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). Those cases are inapposite. Harper only held that an inmate has a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added). Of course, as the Supreme Court of Louisiana held upon Perry's remand, the involuntary (..continued) appeal, and have therefore satisfied our obligation under Barefoot. administration of antypsychotic medications for no legitimate penological purpose other than making the defendant competent for execution is a clear violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. State v. Perry, 610 So.2d at 754 (trial court's order cannot be justified under Harper because forcible administration of drugs to implement execution is not medically appropriate.) In this case, however, the record is clear that Zettlemoyer voluntarily took the medication as part of a course of treatment for his medical problems. He testified before the district court that I have a number of health problems, and the psychiatrist and the psychologist at the SCI Pittsburgh Institution have recommended a variety of medications for me to take. And it benefits me tremendously so I always take it. Transcript of April 29, 1995 at 140. Thus, Zettlemoyer's situation is markedly different from Harper's and Perry's, and the policies underlying those cases do not cast doubt on the district court's finding. To order the trial court to force Zettlemoyer to stop taking medications that were prescribed for him in the course of legitimate medical treatment, and that he desires to take -- simply to see what he would say if he went untreated -- would be a bizarre way to vindicate the Due Process Clause. We decline to extend Harper and Perry in that manner.