Opinion ID: 1480748
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sidebar Conference

Text: The United States Supreme Court has held that the right of self-representation in criminal proceedings is implicit in the Sixth Amendment. [2] That right is also made explicit in the Delaware Constitution. [3] The defendant's right to self-representation is either respected or denied. The denial of this right is not subject to a harmless error analysis. [4] In Snowden v. State, [5] this Court addressed the issue of whether excluding a pro se defendant from participating in sidebar conferences violates the right of self-representation. Snowden, like Robinson, was ordered to remain at counsel table and was excluded from all sidebar conferences held during his trial, although his standby counsel participated. [6] We held that Snowden's right of self-representation included the right to participate in sidebar conferences, for two reasons. First, the right of self-representation encompasses a pro se defendant's right to address `the court' at `appropriate points in the trial' on `any matter of importance,' including sidebar conferences. [7] Standby counsel's participation, over defendant's objection, erodes the defendant's actual control over the case he chooses to present to the jury. [8] Second, participation by standby counsel without the defendant's consent might undermine the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself, thereby harming the defendant's dignity and autonomy. [9] In determining whether the defendant's right of self-representation has been respected, the primary focus is upon `whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case [to the jury] in his own way.' [10] We concluded that because Snowden did not waive his right to represent himself at bench conferences (as reflected by the trial record), this right was violated. Snowden was granted a new trial. [11] Robinson's reliance on Snowden is misguided. In this case, unlike in Snowden, Robinson's right of self-representation was not violated when he did not participate in the sidebar conference. [12] The record reflects that Robinson opposed any involvement of standby counsel during his trial, and refused any assistance from standby counsel. Nevertheless, Robinson did not object to standby counsel's participation in the sidebar conference. Robinson's silence in the face of his standby counsel's participation in the sidebar conference, which took place in the middle of his cross-examination of a witness, can only be deemed a consent. [13] Robinson did not ask to participate in the sidebar conference, and accordingly, the trial judge did not rule that Robinson was excluded. It is also unlikely that the jury's perception that Robinson was representing himself was harmed by his failure to participate in the sidebar conference. The record reflects that Robinson actively managed his own defense at trial, and that the sidebar conference was the only event in the jury's presence in which standby counsel was actively involved. At the conclusion of the sidebar conference, the prosecutrix withdrew her objection and Robinson continued his cross-examination of the witness. Further, this single occurrence could not have had any effect on Robinson's presentation of his defense to the jury, because Robinson did not present any defense witnesses. Instead, speaking in his own defense, Robinson conceded that he was carrying the steak knife, but argued that his action was defensible because he was using the knife as a work tool, not as a deadly weapon. [14] As discussed below, Robinson's purpose in carrying the knife is irrelevant and is not a defense to PDWPP. Accordingly, the Superior Court did not violate Robinson's right to represent himself, and Robinson's failure to participate in the sidebar conference does not entitle him to a new trial.