Opinion ID: 1811748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in overruling dr. wright's and semmes-murphy's batson challenges.

Text: ¶ 26. Dr. Wright and Semmes-Murphy next argue the Phillipses violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminatorily using three of their four peremptory challenges against white members of the venire. [11] The Phillipses respond that the doctor and clinic failed to make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination and further failed to demonstrate that the race-neutral reasons offered by the Phillipses were pretexts for purposeful discrimination. We find the Phillipses are ultimately correct. ¶ 27. Dr. Wright and the clinic argued a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination to which the Phillipses volunteered their race-neutral reasons for peremptorily striking the three jurors. [12] The trial court then stated its ruling: All right. The Court finds the reasons given were race neutral. And it was a close call as to whether a systematic pattern had been established, but even if that were the case, race neutral reasons have been given. [13] The trial judge did not directly rule on whether Dr. Wright and the Semmes-Murphy Clinic made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, yet clearly ruled on the ultimate issue of the race-neutral reasons after they were offered. This Court historically has followed the rule that once a party has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. Pruitt v. State, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 346,  (Miss. July 23, 2008) ( quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)). However, to clarify any dispute, we will briefly discuss the issue on its merits. ¶ 28. Dr. Wright and the Semmes-Murphy Clinic argued that the percentage of strikes against a racial group of which Dr. Wright was a member was prima facie evidence of discrimination. [T]hough the sheer number of strikes exercised against a cognizable group of jurors is not itself dispositive of our analysis, `the relative strength of the prima facie case of purposeful discrimination will often influence this inquiry' into Batson challenges. Flowers v. State, 947 So.2d 910, 935 (Miss.2007) ( quoting Sewell v. State, 721 So.2d 129, 136 (Miss.1998)). A showing that the Phillipses used three out of four strikes or seventy-five percent of their strikes against members of the white race will strengthen a prima facie case for discrimination, but the complaining party must go further. [A] prima facie case requires ... [the complaining party] to produce sufficient evidence to permit the trial judge to infer purposeful discrimination. Strickland v. State, 980 So.2d 908, 917, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 132,  (Miss. 2008); see Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 216 (1981) ([t]he phrase `prima facie case' ... may be used by courts to describe the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue.) Unfortunately, the record does not support further evidence that would prove that the strike percentages alone satisfy a prima facie case of discrimination. The trial record does not reflect the racial makeup of the venire, the empaneled jury, the community at large or any other factor that might suggest these percentages alone suggest discrimination. [14] However, as the trial judge made a ruling on the Phillipses' race neutral reasons for the strikes, the Phillipses' argument that Dr. Wright failed to prove his prima facie case is moot. ¶ 29. Once a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination has been made, the proponent of the strike must offer race-neutral reasons for the strike, and the opponent must be given an opportunity to rebut the reasons offered by the proponent. Then, the trial court must make findings of fact regarding those reasons on the record and rule whether the opponent of the strike has proven purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712; Brawner v. State, 872 So.2d 1, 9-10 (Miss.2004); Johnson v. State, 754 So.2d 1178, 1180 (Miss.2000); Hatten v. State, 628 So.2d 294, 298 (Miss. 1993). See also Burnett v. Fulton, 854 So.2d 1010, 1013-14 (Miss.2003). The reasons for the strikes can be shown to be pretextual where there exists: (1) disparate treatment, that is, the presence of unchallenged jurors of the opposite race who share the characteristic given as the basis for the challenge; (2) the failure to voir dire as to the characteristic cited; (3) the characteristic cited is unrelated to the facts of the case; (4) lack of record support for the stated reason; and (5) group-based traits. Manning v. State, 765 So.2d 516, 519 (Miss.2000) (citations and quotations removed.) [15] On appeal, this Court reviews the decision of the trial court with great deference and will not overturn the trial court's ruling unless it is clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712; Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 630, 633 (Miss.1988); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1352 (Miss.1987). ¶ 30. Dr. Wright and the clinic particularly argue the reasons offered by the Phillipses for striking certain jurors were pretextual because they resulted in (1) disparate treatment of one white member of the venire, (2) the failure to voir dire a black juror regarding his connection to the medical industry, (3) the lack of a record supporting a reason offered by the Phillipses to strike a white member of the venire and (4) discrimination on the basis of a group-based trait. The Phillipses address each peremptory strike in their brief. ¶ 31. The record of the characteristics of the members of the venire who were peremptorily stricken and of comparative jurors who sat on the jury was developed through the arguments of counsel. [16] The voir dire was apparently done in stages. The first stage was general voir dire wherein the court and the attorneys asked questions of the entire venire in open court. The second stage was done in chambers, in which the attorneys briefly asked questions of particular members of the venire and were given an opportunity to seek their removal for cause or to rehabilitate them. [17] The entirety of the first stage is left out of the record as per request. ¶ 32. Dr. Wright argues Juror 16, whom the Phillipses peremptorily struck with their third strike, was treated differently from Juror 9, who served as the fourth juror. Counsel represented to the Court that both were involved in the medical field, yet Juror 9, a black male, was not stricken, and Juror 16, a white female, was peremptorily stricken. The trial judge made a finding that Juror 9 did not have other factors to be considered along with the fact that he is an ambulance driver. The Phillipses offered a second and third reason to strike Juror 16 peremptorily: the Juror knew Gloria Mitchell, a potential witness, and she said she felt there were too many lawsuits, especially against physicians. This Court finds that these are sufficient race-neutral reasons that precluded a finding of disparate impact. ¶ 33. Dr. Wright further argues the Phillipses failed to voir dire Juror 16 on why her indirect connections to the medical profession would result in bias against the Phillipses. Assuming the recorded arguments of counsel are true, Juror 16 expressed the opinion that there are too many lawsuits, especially against physicians. Considering this assertion, it seems unnecessary for the Phillipses to further question Juror 16 concerning the potential for any bias against the Phillipses. ¶ 34. Dr. Wright also argues the Phillipses failed to voir dire Jurors 16 and 24 concerning their relationships with a potential witness. Like Juror 16, there is no record of the voir dire of Juror 24, thus this Court cannot ascertain whether this argument is valid. ¶ 35. Finally, Dr. Wright argues the three white members of the venire peremptorily struck by the Phillipses were stricken because of a group-based trait, namely their race. The record itself refutes this premise, assuming the jury's makeup alleged in Dr. Wright's brief is accurate, because a white juror joined the unanimous verdict against Dr. Wright. ¶ 36. Based on the available record, we cannot say the trial judge clearly erred in finding the Phillipses' reasons for striking jurors were race-neutral.