Opinion ID: 2570068
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Order in this Case is an Appealable Final Order

Text: {14} On its face, it is hard to imagine a more confusing order than the Notice of Dismissal of Criminal Complaint entered in this case. The order purports to capture the court's determination that there was no probable cause and then goes on to dismiss the underlying complaint both with and without prejudice. The State claims this brought about a final disposition of the matter. Defendant claims that the clear language finding no probable cause on this Notice of Dismissal makes the order operate as a  de facto suppression order. We are compelled by the reasoning behind each argument: we understand on one hand the State's concern that it is entitled to prosecute this case with evidence which is not subject to the no probable cause determination, and we also recognize that Defendant is correct that the suppression of particular evidence pursuant to the finding of no probable cause is not subject to appellate review. See State v. Armijo, 118 N.M. 802, 805, 887 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Ct.App.1994) (concluding that the State is entitled to appeal any order dismissing one or more counts of a complaint, indictment, or information, regardless of whether the dismissal is with prejudice); Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 1, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040 ([T]here is no constitutional or statutory basis for an appeal by the State from a suppression order of a magistrate court.). {15} To resolve this conundrum, we turn to the structure and purpose of judicial orders. We recently explained the significance of requiring a clearly recognizable final order that will serve its intended function as an avenue for appellate review of the issues in a case because an ambiguous order can be a focus for additional litigation that serves no beneficial purpose. Lohberger, 2008-NMSC-033, ¶ 30, 187 P.3d 162. We have long expressed a preference for orders that are individuated to their subject matter; that is, specific. See generally Criminal Forms, Rules 9-101 to 9-902 NMRA (comprehensive form directory). Further, the orders are designed to be simple and expedient even to the extent of providing order forms containing boxes that can be checked off over a space reserved for a judge's signature. Lohberger, 2008-NMSC 033, ¶ 35, 187 P.3d 162. Within this directory are three examples of dismissal orders, none of which contain any provision for suppression of evidence. See Rules 9-414 to 415A. Separating these two subjects in our rules makes sense because a suppression order is not a final order and an order of dismissal is an appealable final order. Compare Armijo, 118 N.M. at 805, 887 P.2d at 1272 (holding that the State is entitled to appeal any order of full or partial dismissal), with Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 1, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040 (holding that the State is not entitled to appeal a non-final order of suppression). {16} The record in this case, inclusive of the Order of Dismissal, does not fully reveal what happened in the proceedings below other than discovery proceeded, the matter was set for two pre-trial conferences, and then for a probable cause/bench trial. The probable cause/bench trial was reset once on Defendant's motion to continue the trial setting, and then heard at the second setting where the Order of Dismissal was entered on that same day. The parties disagree on what happened at the probable cause/bench trial. The State claims that the matter did not go to trial. Defendant claims that the State presented its case, the magistrate court found there was no probable cause for the arrest and the court then suppressed the evidence flowing from the illegal arrest. {17} From this record, we discern three actions the magistrate court could have taken that resulted in this Order of Dismissal. First, the magistrate court could have heard the State's evidence, determined that the evidence did not support probable cause to arrest and entered the Order of Dismissal intending that it be a suppression order. This would be a mistaken act. The parties initially agreed that the magistrate court's order was supposed to be a suppression order. If this is accurate, then: [t]he trial court's ruling was in no sense a decision on the quantum of proof offered by the [State], on its probative value, on the credibility of the evidence, or on any other question relating to the sufficiency of the [State's] case; it was purely and simply a ruling on the legality of defendant's arrest and the consequent admissibility vel non of the prosecution's evidence. County of Los Alamos v. Tapia, 109 N.M. 736, 739, 790 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1990). If the magistrate court intended to suppress evidence in the State's case, the order should have ruled only on the legality of Defendant's arrest and the suppression or admissibility of the particular evidence relevant to that arrest. Id. Then the State could invoke judicial review of the magistrate court suppression order by filing a nolle prosequi to dismiss some or all of the charges in the magistrate court after the suppression order is entered and refiling in the district court for a trial de novo. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 1, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040. {18} Second, the magistrate court heard evidence and anticipated that the State could not prove its case and intended to enter an order dismissing the State's case. This, of course, would be an improper act because once some evidence is suppressed, the State is entitled to determine, for example, whether to pursue its case with its remaining evidence, dismiss its case with prejudice or dismiss its case and refile it in district court. Id. ¶ 25. {19} Third, the magistrate court could have heard the State's evidence, asked the State about any additional evidence and, if it determined that the State's evidence was insufficient to convict Defendant, acquit Defendant on the merits of the State's case. This would be the equivalent of a dismissal under State v. Lizzol, 2007-NMSC-024, 141 N.M. 705, 160 P.3d 886. See id. ¶ 7 ([W]hether a defendant was acquitted depends on whether the trial court's ruling, however labeled, correctly or incorrectly resolved some or all of the factual elements of the crime.). Of course, such a ruling would be unappealable by the State because a verdict of acquittal [is] final, and could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the constitution. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300(1896). {20} Without speculating on which of the above three possibilities, or a hybrid thereof, occurred, we cannot dispute that the Order of Dismissal is indeed, on its face an order dismissing the State's case. Although the State does not have a right to appeal an order of suppression, Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040, it does have the constitutional right to appeal from a dismissal, Armijo, 118 N.M. at 802, 887 P.2d at 1272, unless that order was predicated on a finding of acquittal. Ball, 163 U.S. at 671, 16 S.Ct. 1192; see Lizzol, 2007-NMSC-024, ¶ 29, 141 N.M. 705, 160 P.3d 886 (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution bars the State's appeal if substantive act of court was to acquit a defendant). Therefore, the State is entitled to a de novo trial in the district court.