Opinion ID: 1163998
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Error is assigned to the trial court's having permitted Dr. Richard Jarvis to testify about contemporary community standards regarding sexual matters.

Text: Defendant concedes Dr. Jarvis is a licensed medical doctor and a qualified specialist in psychiatry. Nevertheless, it is argued that he was not qualified to express an expert opinion that the materials in issue go beyond contemporary community standards. It is suggested that the doctor's survey of public opinion in the Everett-Seattle-Tacoma area, in which he interviewed over 100 people of various ages and backgrounds, was insufficient even though it was related to the attitude people maintained toward the display of sexual material and each interviewee's belief as to the public's attitude. It is also suggested that Dr. Jarvis is no more qualified than a layman. We do not agree. Dr. Jarvis is experienced in the field of psychiatry and has held various teaching positions in that speciality. His experience includes the area of pornography. He has conducted a 5-year study of people's attitudes toward pornography. Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that the survey was recently concocted merely for trial presentation. [6] Generally speaking, an expert is required to possess some special skill or knowledge going beyond that of the average person. Whether a witness has such special skill or knowledge and is properly qualified to express an opinion as an expert is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Nelson, 72 Wn.2d 269, 432 P.2d 857 (1967); State v. Tatum, 58 Wn.2d 73, 360 P.2d 754 (1961). Clearly the trial court did not abuse its discretion. [7] Finally, as pointed out in Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 37 L.Ed.2d 492, 93 S.Ct. 2680 (1973), citing Miller v. California, supra , and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 37 L.Ed.2d 446, 93 S.Ct. 2628 (1973), the United State Supreme Court has rejected any constitutional need for expert testimony on behalf of the prosecution, or for any other ancillary evidence of obscenity, where, as here, the allegedly obscene materials have been placed in evidence. The materials are regarded as sufficient in themselves for the determination of the question. 2. Error is assigned to the trial court's denial of defendant's motions to dismiss at the end of the state's case and at the end of all evidence. Similar error is assigned to its denial of defendant's motion in arrest of judgment or for new trial. All three assignments of error raise the same legal points, which shall now be discussed as a unit. a. First, it is asserted that neither RCW 9.68.010(1) nor (2) prohibit a sale or exhibition of allegedly obscene material in any particular context or location. Rather, the statute prohibits the sale or exhibition of obscene material irrespective of to whom, the manner, where, or under what circumstances. Thus it is urged, guilt based upon a consideration of the context or location of the sale or exhibition of allegedly obscene materials is unconstitutional under Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 31 L.Ed.2d 258, 92 S.Ct. 993 (1972). Defendant has incorrectly applied Rabe to the facts before us. [8] Rabe does not hold that a defendant's conduct or the manner of sale or exhibition may not be considered on the question of redeeming social value. Rather, it holds that when the context or manner in which a film is exhibited is made an essential element of the crime of exhibiting an obscene film, a defendant may not be convicted unless the statute gives him fair notice that the manner or location of display is a vital element of the offense. It must be noted that the holding was made in light of an earlier decision of this court in State v. Rabe, 79 Wn.2d 254, 484 P.2d 917 (1971) (reversed in Rabe v. Washington, supra ), wherein we held that although a film was obscene only under certain limited circumstances, the statute proscribed the obtrusive exhibition thereof at an improper place and time. [9, 10] Evidence of the setting in which allegedly obscene materials are purveyed, however, is relevant to the question of redeeming social value. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 16 L.Ed.2d 1, 86 S.Ct. 975 (1966); see also Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 16 L.Ed.2d 31, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966). Although the Memoirs test of utterly without redeeming social value has been rejected, this is not to say that evidence of the setting in which allegedly obscene materials are purveyed is no longer relevant either to the question of redeeming social value or the now accepted standard of whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Under either the rejected test or the one now adopted in Miller, an evidentiary inquiry into the manner of sale, exhibition or pandering is permitted to determine whether an asserted value is real or spurious. Fair warning does not require that a prospective defendant be informed in advance of every type of evidence which might be found probative in relation to a statutory crime. Further, the United States Supreme Court has commented favorably upon an evidentiary inquiry into circumstances surrounding the location of the sale or exhibition of allegedly obscene material. In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 4 L.Ed.2d 205, 80 S.Ct. 215 (1959), the court struck down an obscenity ordinance that failed to make knowledge of contents a prerequisite to a determination of guilt. Nevertheless, it had this to say at page 154: Eyewitness testimony of a bookseller's perusal of a book hardly need be a necessary element in proving his awareness of its contents. The circumstances may warrant the inference that he was aware of what a book contained, despite his denial. (Italics ours.) We also note that in the instant case the trial court did not give an instruction, excepted to by defendant, in which the jury was informed that the manner of sale or exhibition was significant or vital to the issue of obscenity vel non. b. Next it is asserted that RCW 9.68.010 is unconstitutional because the word obscene is not defined and thus is vague and overbroad. It is said that a man of ordinary understanding and intelligence could not divine the meaning of obscene because it is not self-defining. The argument is based principally upon a mistaken premise that Roth and its standard of obscenity are passe. To the contrary, the import of Roth is not a thing of the past. Rather, it remains viable and basic to the recent holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, supra , Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra and Kaplan v. California, supra . Further, it is important to note historically that United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 28 L.Ed.2d 813, 91 S.Ct. 1410 (1971), reaffirmed the vitality of Roth as follows, at page 354: Roth has not been overruled. It remains the law in this Court and governs this case.... Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), compels no different result.... The Court [in Stanley ] made its point expressly: Roth and the cases following that decision are not impaired by today's holding. As we have said, the States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home. ... Nothing in Stanley questioned the validity of Roth insofar as the distribution of obscene material was concerned. (Italics ours.) [11, 12] In Roth the United States Supreme Court considered carefully whether the word obscene is unconstitutionally vague and found that it was not. Accord, Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 16 L.Ed.2d 56, 86 S.Ct. 958 (1966). According to Roth the only requirement is that the language convey a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (1957). See also State v. Oyen, 78 Wn.2d 909, 480 P.2d 766 (1971) (judgment vacated and case remanded on other grounds, 408 U.S. 933 (1972)). We hold that the word obscene, as used in RCW 9.68.010, is not unconstitutionally vague when considered within the light of the Roth-Miller test. According to the Roth-Miller test the scope of regulation is confined to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. [1] A state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, portraying sexual conduct in a way that is patently offensive, and which taken as a whole does not have a serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. [2] As thus authoritatively construed by this court, RCW 9.68.010 is sufficiently definite, when measured by common understanding and practice. [3] Photographs, pictures and drawings which portray in a patently offensive way sexual conduct such as ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, or which depict acts of masturbation, fellatio, cunnilingus, lewd exhibition of the genitals and sexual relations between humans and animals are obscene if, taken as a whole, the subject matter does not have a serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. No such value has been demonstrated here. c. Next, defendant contends that RCW 9.68.010 is unconstitutionally overbroad when considered with the exemptions contained in RCW 9.68.015. It is said that since RCW 9.68.015 authorizes certain specified institutions to circulate materials otherwise proscribed as obscene by RCW 9.68.010, the material must have some modicum of social value. Thus, it is argued, if it has such value it may not be proscribed under Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra . We do not agree. [13] First, the test of utterly without redeeming social value and its counterpart, the modicum of social value test, have been rejected by Miller and are no longer viable. Second, defendant's argument is a bootstrapping non sequitur. The fact that the legislature has authorized certain educationally oriented and supervised depositories, enumerated in RCW 9.68.015, to circulate materials proscribed by RCW 9.68.010 does not clothe otherwise obscene material with the status of serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Material shelved in one of the enumerated educationally oriented depositories, as an example of obscenity, is no less obscene by reason of the fact that it provides an example of that which is proscribed by law. Its value is not somehow vaguely elevated beyond obscenity merely because it may provide police officers or students with an example of material declared illegal by RCW 9.68.010. It is clear that the legislature intended that RCW 9.68.015 does no more than exempt certain logical institutions from prosecution for the possession and circulation of material otherwise declared obscene. d. RCW 9.68.010 exempts from prosecution motion picture operators or projectionists employed to show obscene moving pictures, unless they have a financial interest in the place of employment or unless they exhibit the picture without the owner's permission. Not included within the exempted class are theater cashiers and employees of bookstores or newsstands. This, argues defendant, violates equal protection of the laws under the federal constitution and provides a class of citizens with immunities not authorized equally for all, and thus also violates article 1, section 12 of the state constitution. [14, 15] Defendant has presented an engaging argument, but we do not agree with it. We have held consistently that when a statutory classification is challenged, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that will sustain it, there is a presumption that such facts exist. Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wn.2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1968); State v. Persinger, 62 Wn.2d 362, 382 P.2d 497 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 187 (1963). We have held with equal consistency that the burden is upon one who challenges the classification of showing that it fails to rest upon any reasonable basis and is essentially arbitrary. Markham Advertising Co. v. State, supra ; State v. Persinger, supra . There are valid reasons for the classification. The following are by no means exclusive: (1) Book and magazine stores offer a wide range of materials from which both the customer and clerk may select at the time of sale. Each has an opportunity to choose that which will be sold or purchased. On the other hand, motion pictures are shown one reel at a time and the projectionist must exhibit those selected by the manager. (2) Projectionists do not decide which films to exhibit and thus should not be obliged to make a judgment as to their obscenity. Furthermore, to require a projectionist to decide whether the showing of a particular film would be a crime might tend to chill the dissemination of borderline, but constitutionally protected motion pictures. As just illustrated, valid reasons for the legislative classification are evident. On the other hand, defendant has failed to establish that the classification lacks a reasonable basis and thus is essentially arbitrary. We hold that the classification is both reasonable and constitutional. e. Defendant argues that RCW 9.68.010 has been superseded and impliedly repealed by RCW 9.68.050-.120. He points out that RCW 9.68.010 was last amended in Laws of 1969, ch. 92, § 1, p. 261, whereas RCW 9.68.120 was adopted subsequently in Laws of 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 256, §§ 13-20, p. 2393. This is said to indicate a legislative intent to repeal the earlier enactment by the more recent one, although both were enacted in 1969. Thus, defendant contends, RCW 9.68.050-.120 is the exclusive method of dealing with the exhibition of materials falling within its purview, including obscene material. We disagree. [16, 17] First, there is nothing in the legislation itself to indicate that RCW 9.68.050-.120 amends or repeals RCW 9.68.010. Second, repeal by implication is not favored. Before a legislative enactment will be found to have been impliedly repealed by a subsequent act, the later legislation must clearly be intended to supersede the prior act. Copeland Lumber Co. v. Wilkins, 75 Wn.2d 940, 454 P.2d 821 (1969). Third, if there is to be an implied repeal, the implication must be clear and necessary and the two acts must be so inconsistent with and repugnant to each other that they are irreconcilable and cannot both be given effect. State v. Cross, 22 Wn.2d 402, 156 P.2d 416 (1945); Copeland Lumber Co. v. Wilkins, supra . Such is not the case here. Clearly, RCW 9.68.050-.120 evidences no legislative intent to impliedly repeal RCW 9.68.010. Different conduct, persons and categories of materials are covered in the two legislative enactments. RCW 9.68.050-.120 specifically applies only to minors whereas RCW 9.68.010 has general application. RCW 9.68.050-.120 recognizes that there is a difference between materials which will appeal to a minor's prurient interest in sex and those which will have a similar appeal to adults (covered by RCW 9.68.010). Application of the later enactment is not broadened by use of the language the provisions of RCW 9.68.050 through 9.68.120 shall be exclusive. RCW 9.68.120. Such language means only that the definitions and procedures set forth in RCW 9.68.050-.120 are exclusive insofar as minors are concerned, and, that the state has preempted the field in the area of material defined as erotic to minors. Thus, there is no repeal by implication here. f. Defendant points out that the purveyor of material proscribed by RCW 9.68.010(1) and (2) must have knowledge of the contents thereof. Based thereon he argues that the purveyor must not only have knowledge of the contents purveyed, but, in addition thereto, must also have a personal knowledge or belief that the subject matter of the contents is obscene. Defendant asserts that it would be possible for one to know the contents of a magazine or film without knowing that it was obscene and hence illegal. We agree a defendant must have knowledge of the contents of that which he sells or exhibits before he can be found guilty of violating RCW 9.68.010(1), (2). It does not follow, however, that after having acquired that knowledge he must also form a subjective belief that the contents are obscene, before he can be found guilty of selling or exhibiting obscene materials. [18] The statute requires only that he have knowledge of the contents of that which he purveys. Whether the contents are obscene, and thus proscribed by RCW 9.68.010, must be resolved by resort to the Roth-Miller test. It may not, however, be resolved by the purveyor's subjective opinion on the issue of obscenity. Defendant argues that since RCW 9.68.010 does not exclude guilty knowledge or evil intent, it must be read into the statute. He urges that the state not only must establish that defendant had knowledge of the contents, but that he personally believed the contents to be obscene. In support he quotes from State v. Turner, 78 Wn.2d 276, 283, 474 P.2d 91, 41 A.L.R.3d 493 (1970): Accordingly, unless the statute expressly eliminates the element of intent or design or defines the kinds of offenses which, by their very nature, are classified judicially as mala prohibita, the ingredients of intent, design and purpose should be deemed indispensible to a proof of guilt. State v. Turner, supra , is inapposite. Turner dealt with a former statute which prohibited public mutilation and contempt of the flag. Laws of 1919, ch. 107, p. 259. As then written the enactment contained no language describing the mens rea required. [4] However, RCW 9.68.010 provides that knowledge is a necessary element, thus escaping the defect at which Turner was aimed. Further, Turner does not stand for the proposition that beyond knowledge one must also possess some studied subjective belief in his wrongdoing. Defendant states that a statute which is a mala prohibita regulation of obscenity is unconstitutional, citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 4 L.Ed.2d 205, 80 S.Ct. 215 (1959). Thus, he argues, to be constitutional RCW 9.68.010 must define a crime malum in se. We do not agree with defendant's interpretation of Smith. Smith struck down a city ordinance which, unlike RCW 9.68.010, dispensed with any requirement of knowledge of the contents of the book. The Smith court was concerned that absent the required knowledge of contents a bookseller could be intimidated by his possible absolute criminal liability. This, it was said, would unconstitutionally impede the distribution of literature, both obscene and nonobscene. However, Smith did not pass upon the kind of mental element requisite to a constitutionally permissible prosecution or whether an honest mistake about the obscenity of the contents would be a defense. Smith v. California, supra at 154. In fact, contrary to defendant's assertion, Smith did not hold or suggest that a statute which is a mala prohibita regulation of obscenity is unconstitutional. In the case at hand it is not necessary for us to make the distinction and we do not do so. Defendant's argument on this portion of his broad assignment of error is not well taken. g. Next defendant contends that under RCW 9.68.010 proof of knowledge of the contents of allegedly obscene materials requires proof that a defendant had actual knowledge of the contents, as a whole. He contends that the state must at least prove that a defendant perused the contents of the questioned material or saw a significant portion of the challenged film. It is urged that proof a defendant was generally aware that the contents probably contained sexually explicit photographs is insufficient. [19] Defendant's position is without merit. Proof that a defendant had specific knowledge of the contents' obscenity, acquired by an actual perusal or viewing thereof, is not necessary to support a constitutional prosecution. General awareness that the contents are obscene is sufficient. It is for the trier of fact to determine, under all of the surrounding facts and circumstances, whether a defendant had knowledge that the materials were obscene. Smith v. California, supra at 154 carefully points out: Eyewitness testimony of a bookseller's perusal of a book hardly need be a necessary element in proving his awareness of its contents. The circumstances may warrant the inference that he was aware of what a book contained, despite his denial. (Italics ours.) Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 510-12, 16 L.Ed.2d 56, 86 S.Ct. 958 (1966), also discusses the knowledge required to support a constitutional prosecution under a state obscenity statute: The evidence of scienter in this record consists, in part, of appellant's instructions to his artists and writers; his efforts to disguise his role in the enterprise ... the transparency of the character of the material in question, highlighted by the titles, covers, and illustrations; the massive number of obscene books appellant published ... and possessed for sale; the repetitive quality of the sequences and formats of the books ... This evidence amply shows that appellant was  aware of the character of the material  and that his activity was not innocent but calculated purveyance of filth. (Italics ours.) Consistent with the above is People v. Finkelstein, 9 N.Y.2d 342, 174 N.E.2d 470 (1961) quoted in Mishkin at page 510: A reading of the statute [§ 1141] as a whole clearly indicates that only those who are in some manner aware of the character of the material they attempt to distribute should be punished. It is not innocent but calculated purveyance of filth which is exorcised ... (First italics ours.) In other words, proof of awareness of the contents of allegedly obscene books, magazines and films is legally sufficient to furnish proof of knowledge of the contents required under RCW 9.68.010. Thought, knowledge or awareness cannot be ascertained absent some outward manifestation. The state of a man's mind must be inferred from what he says or does. In this way courts and juries pass upon knowledge and awareness every day having before them no more than the evidence of words and conduct from which, in ordinary human experience, mental condition, knowledge or awareness may be inferred. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 244, 265-67 (3d ed. 1940). RCW 9.01.010 (4) is a statutory manifestation of the foregoing. It permits an inference of knowledge of a fact to be derived from knowledge of such other facts as should put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry. It does not require actual or specific knowledge that an act is unlawful. It is sufficient if one knows of facts that exist which constitute a crime. h. It is defendant's contention that the contemporary community standard referred to in the Roth-Memoirs test means a community composed of the entire United States. In essence he argues, in the discussion of this legal point, that a contemporary community standard based upon anything less than the nation as a whole is error. He leaves no room for consideration of any standard less than national, despite the size or area. We disagree with his position. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 L.Ed.2d 419, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973), holds specifically that there is nothing in the First Amendment which requires the trier of fact to consider hypothetical and unascertainable national standards when attempting to determine whether certain materials are obscene. Miller quite logically recognizes that: It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City. Miller v. California, supra at 32. We agree with the dissent of former Chief Justice Warren in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200, 12 L.Ed.2d 793, 84 S.Ct. 1676 (1964), quoted with approval in Miller v. California, supra at 32. It is my belief that when the Court said in Roth that obscenity is to be defined by reference to `community standards,' it meant community standards  not a national standard, as is sometimes argued. I believe that there is no provable `national standard'... (Italics ours.) [20, 21] The position taken by Miller is both reasonable and rational. It provides the community with adequate latitude in which to function on the subject of obscenity. It recognizes that people in different states may vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity should not be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity. Standards of obscenity are not static. Rather, they change with the character of the community involved as well as with the time at which they are tested. There is nothing disturbing or unusual about applying a different standard based upon the state in which the standard is considered. The primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the standard of `the average person, applying contemporary community standards' is to be certain that it will be judged by its impact on an average person, rather than on a particularly susceptible or sensitive person  or a totally insensitive one. Miller v. California, supra at 33; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (1957). Thus, we hold that as used in Roth and Miller the contemporary community standard to be applied by the average person is the contemporary community standard of the state in which the question of obscenity is to be tested by the trier of fact. [22] In the instant case, as in all of the others consolidated with it on appeal, the allegedly obscene materials were admitted in evidence and available for consideration by the trier of fact. It is important to note that in each case the same exhibits were available to the members of this court on appeal and were, in fact, reviewed. Inasmuch as the exhibits were before the court it was unnecessary to have expert testimony on the subject of obscenity. Hard-core pornography can and does speak for itself. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 37 L.Ed.2d 446, 93 S.Ct. 2628 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 37 L.Ed.2d 492, 93 S.Ct. 2680 (1973); accord, Roth v. United States, supra . As we said in one of the consolidated cases in Division II-C-State v. Cox and State v. Rogoway, § 2: No amount of testimony by anthropologists, sociologists, psychiatrists, or psychologists could have added anything to the trial court's [or to this court's] ability to determine that the materials failed to comply with any contemporary community standards related to sexual matters. The materials viewed by the triers of fact and by the members of this court are, in each of the consolidated cases hard-core pornography in every sense of the term and as that expression is more fully discussed in Division II-C-State v. Cox and State v. Rogoway, § 2. The materials go far beyond the contemporary community standards of this state relating to sex whether one considers the view of the average man under the former Memoirs test or the current Roth-Miller test. Our own independent review of the materials leaves us with no question that they are an affront to the contemporary community standards of this state, in the area of sexual matters; that they appeal to the prurient interest of the average man; and that they go far beyond any customary limit of that which is deemed to be patently offensive in a sexual way. i. Defendant's next argument is based upon the now rejected Memoirs test that material was obscene only if it was utterly without redeeming social value, if put to any conceivable use whatsoever. Using the test, rejected since his brief was written, defendant attempts to employ it as a springboard to establish that the questioned materials, in certain of the series of cases here involved, have a modicum of social value because defense witnesses have testified that certain of the materials have been used for therapeutic purposes by some undisclosed clinicians. Further it is said, on page 71 of defendant's brief, that Dr. Jarvis admitted that a few psychiatrists used sexually explicit items materially the same as this subject material for certain therapeutic purposes such as ... demythologizing sexual attitudes ... First, a review of the relevant statements of fact, with which we are concerned in this series of cases, reveals that defendant has attributed too much to the doctor's testimony. Dr. Jarvis did not admit that sexually explicit materials he discussed in general terms were the same as or materially the same as those involved in the several cases before us. In addition, defendant did not establish that any of the materials before us were used or are even usable in the manner defendant suggested. Thus, even under the rejected Memoirs test there is a fatal gap in defendant's logic. It does not follow that the specific exhibits herein have some modicum of redeeming social value merely because certain unidentified and unspecified sexually explicit materials in general may have some modicum of redeeming social value. It must be noted that contrary to the implication in defendant's brief, Dr. Jarvis testified generally that certain sexually explicit films are used for clinical purposes in some instances. He went on to explain, however, that he was not convinced of the technique and he was positive that the materials, about which he was testifying, could have no value in teaching medical students or in treating persons suffering from distortions of sexual impulse. In the other relevant statements of fact he testified similarly that in his opinion the materials had neither educational, therapeutic, scientific nor redeeming social value. While Dr. Jarvis did acknowledge that some psychiatrists might use sexually explicit materials (without naming or comparing the materials to those in this series of cases) he was careful to point out that he knew of none who used them and that he felt their use had no therapeutic value. Also, he classified the foregoing psychiatrists as those weighted heavily with the pornography type group. Dr. Jarvis' emphatic refusal to recognize the value of any treatment that would use sexually explicit materials for therapeutic purposes plus other evidence that the specific materials herein were commercially exploited for their prurient appeal, to the exclusion of other value, if any, is important. It is relevant and clearly supportive of the fact that these specific materials are without redeeming social value and are not entitled to First Amendment protection even under the former Memoirs test. The fact that the defendant presented some testimony that the materials had some value did not require the trier of fact to accept or give weight thereto. The trier of fact has both the right and the duty to determine which witnesses are believable and to what extent. Second, the same discussion of the relevant evidence affirmatively establishes that the materials herein, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, and lack the requisite serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value imposed by the less stringent Miller test. Finally, it will be recalled that the materials in question were admitted as exhibits in the case. Once the allegedly obscene materials have been placed in evidence there is no constitutional need for expert testimony on behalf of the prosecution, or for any ancillary evidence of obscenity. The materials are sufficient in themselves to permit the trier of fact to resolve the question of obscenity. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra ; Kaplan v. California, supra . Defendant's challenge is not well taken under either the former Memoirs test or the newly adopted test in Miller. j. Defendant argues that although the alleged obscene material was admitted in evidence it does not speak for itself on the question of obscenity. He argues that the state must present testimony in addition to the material to affirmatively establish the facts that would support a determination of obscenity. We do not agree. Nothing will be gained by a detailed restatement of testimony and evidence before the trier of fact. It is sufficient to say that considering the totality of the record in the relevant cases there was ample evidence to meet even the former Roth-Memoirs test of obscenity relied on by defendant. More important, however, is the fact that under Miller v. California, supra , Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra and Kaplan v. California, supra , there is no constitutional need for expert testimony on behalf of the prosecution, or for any other ancillary evidence of obscenity, once the allegedly obscene materials themselves are placed in evidence. The materials are sufficient in themselves for a determination of the question of obscenity. We also call attention to our discussion of hard core pornography in this opinion. Division II-C-State v. Rogoway and State v. Cox, § 5. Nothing will be gained by repeating it here. On the record in this case, the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. k. Next defendant contends the materials involved herein are not obscene in the constitutional sense. It is argued that since Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 18 L.Ed.2d 515, 87 S.Ct. 1414 (1967), there has been no verbal definition of obscene acceptable to the United States Supreme Court. Defendant seems to argue that in light of Redrup the Roth test has been abolished. There being no adequate definition of obscenity, defendant says, he can be guilty of no crime. We do not agree. Defendant has disregarded the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354, 28 L.Ed.2d 813, 91 S.Ct. 1410 (1971). Reidel makes it abundantly clear that Roth remains the law in this Court. Thus, even under the Roth-Memoirs test, applicable at the time defendant's brief was written, there was a viable definition of obscenity. Subsequent to the writing of defendant's brief the United States Supreme Court rejected the Memoirs test and in Miller v. California, supra at 24, adopted a specific definition of obscenity together with basic guidelines for the trier of fact. We shall not restate them here, having set them out at length earlier in this opinion. 3. Defendant assigns error to the court having instructed the jury that it was not necessary for the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew the magazines were obscene, as long as the state proved he had knowledge of the contents of the magazines. The assignment of error is not well taken. Defendant's argument and our rejection thereof have been fully covered in this opinion. See Division II-A-State v. Kelly, § 2-f. Nothing will be gained by repetition. 4. Error is assigned to the trial court having instructed the jury using an adaptation of the Roth-Memoirs test defining obscenity. Defendant argues that although RCW 9.68.010 uses the term obscene it does not define the term. It is urged that this renders the statute unconstitutional. We do not agree. Defendant's basic argument and our rejection thereof have been fully explored in this opinion, Division II-A-State v. Kelly, § 2-b. There is no need to repeat it. Next, defendant asserts that the Roth-Memoirs definition of obscenity is passe, having been relegated to obscurity by Redrup v. New York, supra . We have answered and rejected this argument previously. See Division II-A-State v. Kelly, §§ 2-b and 2-k. We will not repeat the subject matter. 5. Error is assigned to the trial court's failure to give defendant's requested instructions 1, 2, and 3 and for having adjudged defendant guilty of counts 1 and 2. Inasmuch as the same argument is made supporting all four assignments of error we shall deal with them as a unit. Basically, it is argued that a defendant's good faith belief that questioned material is not obscene is a defense and it is error not to instruct the jury accordingly. Defendant's argument is presented as a corollary to that raised previously in this opinion, Division II-A-State v. Kelly, § 2-f. It is based primarily upon the earlier assertion that to convict one of a crime under RCW 9.68.010 the trier of fact must find that defendant knew or believed the subject material was obscene. Defendant's argument in this regard was rejected in Division II-A-State v. Kelly, § 2-f. There is no need to restate the matter. It is sufficient to say that we also reject the argument stated in corollary form. 6. Finally, error is assigned because the trial court permitted Dr. Jarvis to opine that the material in question was utterly without redeeming social value. It is also contended that the evidence submitted on the subject of obscenity was insufficient. We do not agree. Defendant seems to assert that the state must furnish expert opinion in every field of endeavor, discipline, learning, calling or art to establish that questioned material utterly lacks redeeming social value. He has presented us with no cases so holding, and we are aware of none. Common sense, however, dictates that to so hold would have reduced the former Roth-Memoirs test to an absurdity. Further, such a limitation of expert opinion would have an adverse impact upon the present Roth-Miller test despite Miller's rejection of the utterly without redeeming social value test of Memoirs. Finally, the suggested limitation would run counter to the spirit of Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra ; Kaplan v. California, supra and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (1957), all of which hold generally that admitted materials speak for themselves on the subject of obscenity. Whether a witness possesses sufficient expertise to testify on a given subject is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Its determination will be disturbed only for manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Nelson, 72 Wn.2d 269, 432 P.2d 857 (1967); State v. Tatum, 58 Wn.2d 73, 360 P.2d 754 (1961). [23] Once a witness has been properly qualified in his field of expertise or experience and has been permitted to testify on the subject in question, it becomes the duty of the trier of fact to decide whether the opinion is worthy of belief and the weight to be given the opinion. We have reviewed the relevant statements of fact in this series of cases as well as the case of State v. Kelly specifically. The qualifications of Dr. Jarvis and other evidence supportive of the trial court's actions are to be found in this opinion. Division II-State v. Kelly, §§ 1 and 2-i. We shall not repeat it. It is sufficient to say our review has convinced us that (a) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Dr. Jarvis, and (b) testimony was sufficient to meet the former Roth-Memoirs test as well as the present, less stringent, Roth-Miller test. The trial court is affirmed.