Opinion ID: 1199597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Concealment of bias; pretrial exposure

Text: Gholston was asked on voir dire to disclose everything she had read, seen, heard, or said about petitioner's case, and whether any such exposure caused her to form an opinion of petitioner's guilt or innocence. In response, Gholston recounted a number of crime details she had learned from the Porterville newspaper, but she did not mention any other pretrial exposure. Gholston insisted on voir dire that she was not biased and would decide the case on the evidence. Gholston's 1994 declaration stated for the first time that sometime before trial, a neighbor had told her about petitioner's claim of a Canadian killer. The 1994 declaration said that this ridiculous story convinced Gholston petitioner was guilty. However, in her 1996 declaration, Gholston insisted that her pretrial exposure did not cause her to prejudge the case. At the reference hearing, Gholston disclosed that before petitioner's trial, she read newspapers other than the Porterville Recorder and also saw pretrial television coverage about the homicide. She confirmed the pretrial conversation about petitioner's Canadian claim. However, Gholston insisted that her skepticism about a Canadian killer did not cause her to prejudge petitioner's guilt, and she said it had never occurred to [her] to mention this conversation during voir dire examination. CAP investigator Nerad, who helped draft the 1994 declaration, testified that it accurately conveyed Gholston's statements about the prejudicial effect of the Canadian conversation. On this issue, the referee found as follows: Prior to trial, Gholston was generally familiar with the case from newspaper and television accounts. The conversation with the neighbor occurred a year prior to her jury service and any superficial opinion arising from that conversation was probably forgotten. Gholston's failure to describe either the full extent of her exposure to pretrial publicity or her conversation with the neighbor made her voir dire answers incomplete, but the omissions were inadvertent, not willful. The failure to mention television reports was an obvious oversight, and the trial court did not give Gholston a full opportunity to recount the extent of her newspaper reading. Gholston's claim that it never occurred to her to mention the conversation with the neighbor [is] interpret[ed] [by the referee] to mean [that] at the time she was being examined, a year after the conversation, she simply did not recall it under the stress of the moment. Gholston's testimony that when sworn as a juror, she did not believe petitioner to be guilty, and that she set aside all pretrial feelings and decided the case on the evidence, is true. The referee's findings appear sound insofar as they inform our determination that relief on this issue is not warranted. Substantial evidence supports the referee's determination, and we independently agree, that even if Gholston's voir dire answers understated her pretrial awareness and impressions about the case, particularly with respect to petitioner's claim of a Canadian killer, her omissions did not lead to the seating of a biased juror. [19] Crucially, the referee found that Gholston's omissions on voir dire were inadvertent, not intentional. Ample evidence supports that finding, and we adopt it. No evidence was introduced to indicate that when questioned on voir dire, Gholston deliberately concealed aspects of her pretrial knowledge and views about the case, including, in particular, her conversation with her neighbor. Indeed, all inferences are to the contrary. In response to voir dire inquiries, Gholston did reveal substantial details about her pretrial exposure, including her recollection that petitioner pretended to have a flat tire and claimed somebody else killed Gwendolyn while he was away from their disabled truck. Gholston's voir dire answers thus suggest a good faith effort to remember and disclose such information. Gholston has since acknowledged at all stages that the conversation with the neighbor did take place, a further indication that she never intended to hide it. Gholston insisted at the reference hearing that it simply never occurred to [her] to mention this brief incident during voir dire. Having observed Gholston's demeanor as a witness, the referee interpreted this to mean that the conversation, which apparently occurred well before trial, simply slipped Gholston's memory under the stress of voir dire examination. [20] CAP investigator Nerad, who interviewed Gholston in 1994, testified at the reference hearing that while Gholston admitted her failure to disclose the matter during voir dire, she never suggested the omission was purposeful. Thus, the facts of this case contrast starkly with those of Hitchings, supra 6 Cal.4th 97, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466, where we adopted a referee's finding of intentional concealment. In Hitchings, the juror never conceded she had given incorrect voir dire answers about her pretrial knowledge. ( Id. at p. 116, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466.) Instead, after stating in her jury questionnaire that she had no prior knowledge of the case at issue, the Hitchings juror continued, at the habeas corpus reference hearing, to profess her complete pretrial ignorance, despite credible testimony from others that she had at least overheard several pretrial conversations about the case. ( Id. at pp. 115-116, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466.) Under the very different circumstances present here, we are satisfied that Gholston committed no intentional concealment. There is serious question whether honest voir dire mistakes can ever form the basis for impeachment of a verdict. (See McDonough, supra, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (opn. of Rehnquist, J.); Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th 97,115, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466; see also Weathers, supra, 5 Cal.3d 98, 110, fn. 5, 95 Cal.Rptr. 516, 485 P.2d 1132.) In McDonough, a plurality concluded that [t]o invalidate the result of a [lengthy] trial because of a juror's mistaken, though honest, response to a question, is to insist on something closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give. ( McDonough, supra, 464 U.S. at p. 555, 104 S.Ct. 845 (opn. of Rehnquist, J.).) What is clear is that an honest mistake on voir dire cannot disturb a judgment in the absence of proof that the juror's wrong or incomplete answer hid the juror's actual bias. Moreover, the juror's good faith when answering voir dire questions is the most significant indicator that there was no bias. ( McDonough, supra, 464 U.S. 548, 556-557, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (cone, opn. of Blackmun, J.); id. at pp. 557-558,104 S.Ct. 845 (cone. opn. of Brennan, J.).) Here the referee has found, on substantial evidence, that Gholston's voir dire answers were honest. Moreover, the other evidence is equally consistent with the referee's finding that when sworn as a juror, Gholston harbored no bias as a result of her pretrial exposure. We first note that an inference of trial bias does not necessarily arise even from Gholston's 1994 declaration itself. The declaration does state that Gholston and her neighbor agreed petitioner's ridiculous story about a Canadian showed petitioner was guilty, though Gholston has since insisted that her skepticism about the Canadian story never amounted to a prejudgment of guilt. But even if the 1994 declaration is accepted at face value, it does not say Gholston retained her opinion about guilt at the time she was selected to serve on petitioner's jury. At the reference hearing, CAP investigator Nerad insisted that the 1994 declaration accurately conveyed Gholston's disclosure she had prejudged petitioner's guilt as a result of the conversation with the neighbor. But even Nerad did not say Gholston had admitted she remained so persuaded, and was thus unable to consider the trial evidence fairly, when sworn as a juror. The evidence suggests, as the referee found, that any preliminary impression Gholston formed from this conversation was insignificant over time and had long since dissipated. As noted above, the conversation was brief, and it apparently occurred well before trial. The conversation constituted only one segment of the substantial amount of pretrial information Gholston had accumulated about the case, most of which she derived from media coverage. Gholston disclosed on voir dire the bulk of the pretrial news she had learned, including her understanding that petitioner blamed his wife's murder on somebody who approached their disabled truck in his absence. After observing Gholston on the stand, the referee found that her voir dire omissions, and her failure to mention the Canadian conversation in particular, stemmed from mere forgetfulness. Gholston stated on voir dire that she was impartial, and that regardless of any pretrial impressions, she could and would judge the case solely on the evidence. She has since insisted at all stages that her exposure to pretrial information did not affect her fairness at trial. After watching Gholston testify, the referee explicitly credited Gholston's claim of impartiality, and the circumstantial evidence does not rebut it. Accordingly, we find no basis to conclude that Gholston's failure to disclose fully her pretrial knowledge and opinions about petitioner's case resulted in the seating of a biased juror. It follows that petitioner has demonstrated no grounds for relief on habeas corpus. [21]