Opinion ID: 3194677
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alex’s Right to Familial Integrity

Text: Alex implores this court to follow Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999), which allowed children of a parent killed by the police to pursue claims for losses of familial companionship and society. Because the defendants violated his personally held right to familial integrity, Alex argues, the district court erred by finding his claim derivative of his mother’s and dismissing it. But Smith is at odds with our precedents. Claims under § 1983 are personal to the party injured by a constitutional violation. See Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 241 (6th Cir. 1984). Indeed, we have repeatedly found that § 1983 provides no relief for injuries collateral to the violation of another person’s constitutional right. Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[O]nly the purported victim, or his estate’s representative(s), may prosecute a section 1983 claim; conversely, no cause of action may lie under section 1983 for emotional distress, loss of a loved one, or any other consequent collateral injuries allegedly suffered personally by the victim’s family members.”); see also Foos v. City of Delaware, 492 F. App’x 582, 592–93 (6th Cir. 2012). In fact, we juxtaposed the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Smith that § 1983 allows children to assert claims for deprivation of the parent-child relationship with our - 16 - Case Nos. 14-3905/3906, LeFever v. Ferguson conclusion that “section 1983 provides a cause of action which is personal to the injured party.” Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 948 n.6 (6th Cir. 1991). Because Alex alleges that the defendants violated his right to familial integrity by trampling his mother’s constitutional rights leading to her wrongful conviction, he raises a noncognizable claim for a collateral injury.