Opinion ID: 1238028
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Number of continuances previously granted

Text: Finally, we consider the number of continuances already afforded to the petitioner. Here, Ahmed had received one previous six-month continuance for the purpose of awaiting the DHS's decision on his I-140 petition. According to the estimate provided by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, the processing time for an I-140 appeal may be anywhere from nine to twenty-two months. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, How Do I Appeal the Denial of My Petition or Application (April 2, 2009), http://www.uscis.gov/ portal/site/uscis (follow FAQ hyperlink; then follow How Do I Appeal the Denial of My Petition or Application? hyperlink). While an IJ cannot be expected to continue a case indefinitely pending appeal, a second continuance would not have been unreasonable in light of this estimate. In sum, each of the foregoing factors favors the grant of a continuance in Ahmed's case. Yet there is no indication in the record that the IJ weighed any of them, or gave any consideration at all to whether good cause existed for the continuance. The regulations do not give IJs unfettered discretion to grant or deny a continuance. Rather, a continuance may be granted only for good cause shown. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. Both the language of the regulation itself and our precedent require an IJ to make some inquiry into whether good cause exists in a given individual case. Id. ; Diaz-Covarrubias v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir.2009), ([The grant of] a continuance is governed by a meaningful standard: an [immigration judge] may grant a motion for a continuance `for good cause shown.' (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29)); Baires, 856 F.2d at 92. We also have recognized that the BIA abuses its discretion when it fails to state its reasons and show proper consideration of all factors when weighing equities and denying relief. Arrozal v. INS, 159 F.3d 429, 432 (9th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Similarly, an IJ's failure to state a reasoned basis for her decision may constitute an abuse of discretion: [A] decision of the BIA or IJ under review in this court must contain a sufficient indication of the content of excluded evidence to allow us to review the exclusion for fundamental fairness. Any other conclusion would be nonsensical in the face of the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory regime allowing for an asylum applicant to offer evidence and the right of judicial review of final orders of deportation. Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 905 (9th Cir.2000) (remanding to the BIA with instructions to clarify the basis of the decision, where the IJ gave no reason for discretionary decision to exclude evidence), overruled in part on other grounds by Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir.2009). Here, the IJ abused her discretion by failing to provide any explanation for her decision, and failing to take into account any of the facts and circumstances of Ahmed's case that were relevant to the grant or denial of a continuance. Absent an explanation from the IJ, we have no choice but to conclude that the denial of the continuance was arbitrary and unreasonable. Administrative efficiency alone cannot justify the denial of a continuance where, as here, it has the effect of pretermitting a diligent petitioner's appeal of the denial of his I-140 petition. This does not end our discussion. We still must address the BIA's decision to affirm the IJ's ruling on the ground that Ahmed failed to establish prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status. In Garcia, the BIA held that continuances generally should be granted to applicants who can establish prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status. Matter of Garcia, 16 I. & N. Dec. 653, 654, 657 (BIA 1978), modified by Matter of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253 (BIA 2002). To establish such prima facie eligibility, a petitioner must show: (1) he is eligible to receive an immigrant visa, and (2) a visa is immediately available to the alien at the time the application is filed. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2)(A)-(B). Here, the BIA concluded that [w]ithout an approved Form I-140 ... a visa is not immediately available, and [Ahmed] cannot establish prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status. Yet there is significant conflict among the courts of appeal as to whether the denial of an I-140 petition in the first instance precludes an applicant from establishing that a visa is immediately available. Compare Varela v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 864, 866 (8th Cir.2004) and Hassan v. INS, 110 F.3d 490, 492-93 (7th Cir.1997) with Merchant v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 461 F.3d 1375, 1378 (11th Cir.2006). We need not decide, however, whether the denial of Ahmed's I-140 petition precluded him from establishing prima facie eligibility. Ahmed is not required to show prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status to demonstrate good cause for a continuance (though doing so would certainly help his case). Regardless of whether or not Ahmed was entitled to a continuance under Garcia, the IJ clearly abused her discretion by failing to provide a reason for denying the continuance. See, e.g., Ladha, 215 F.3d at 904-905; Arrozal, 159 F.3d at 432-33. Ahmed's prima facie eligibility or lack thereof does not excuse this abuse of discretion. To the extent the BIA concluded otherwise, it erred. Accordingly, we conclude that the IJ abused her discretion in denying the requested continuance. We need not reach Ahmed's constitutional due process claim. We GRANT the petition for relief, and REMAND to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.