Opinion ID: 1842387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Wrongful Death Act and Survival Statute

Text: Next, petitioner argues that the court below ignored the legislative intent of section 400.023(1) as evidenced by (1) existing law and (2) the legislative history of the statute. First, petitioner argues that the lower court failed to consider the different purposes of two related statutes. See § 46.021, Fla. Stat. (1997) (Survival Statute); §§ 768.16-768.27, Fla. Stat. (1997) (Wrongful Death Act). The Survival Statute states: No cause of action dies with the person. All causes of action survive and may be commenced, prosecuted, and defended in the name of the person prescribed by law. § 46.021, Fla. Stat. (1997). The Wrongful Death Act, on the other hand, permits a cause of action [w]hen the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, default, or breach of contract or warranty of any person. § 768.19, Fla. Stat. (1997). Under the Wrongful Death Act, however, a personal injury claim abates where personal injuries suffered from the negligent or wrongful act result in death. See Martin v. United Sec. Servs., Inc., 314 So.2d 765, 770 (Fla.1975) (holding that no separate statutory action for personal injuries resulting in death can survive the decedent's demise). Damages are limited to the survivor's loss of support and services, companionship, and his or her own pain and suffering. The estate may also recover loss of earnings of the deceased and medical and funeral expenses. See § 768.21, Fla. Stat. (1997). Petitioner argues that the court below erroneously applied the canon of statutory construction that the specific statute controls over a general statute, when it should have read section 400.023(1) in harmony with section 46.021. It is true that courts must presume that the Legislature passes statutes with the knowledge of prior existing statutes and that the legislature does not intend to keep contradictory enactments on the books or to effect so important a measure as the repeal of a law without expressing an intention to do so. Woodgate Dev. Corp. v. Hamilton Inv. Trust, 351 So.2d 14, 16 (Fla.1977). We have also noted that [w]here possible, it is the duty of the courts to adopt that construction of a statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions of the same act.  Id. (emphasis added). However, as noted by the Third District, [t]here must be a hopeless inconsistency before rules of construction are applied to defeat the plain language of one of the statutes. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Estate of Johnson, 743 So.2d 83, 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). On the one hand, section 400.023, as written by the Legislature and construed by the court below, might appear to extinguish a statutory cause of action for those claimants in petitioner's position; the district court's interpretation of section 400.023 precludes a personal representative's ability to bring a survival action based on the statutory cause of action where death was not the result of a violation of the act. The effect of this interpretation could be viewed as extinguishing or abating a cause of action the decedent clearly would have had under the statute, had he not died. Such a result appears to conflict with the purpose of section 46.021, which clearly provides that all causes of action survive the death of a person. However, because this is a legislatively created cause of action to be brought by personal representatives only under certain circumstances, we conclude the Legislature had the authority both to determine the extent of the statutory right and to prescribe or limit the remedies available for a violation of the right. More importantly, section 400.023(1) does not cut off a deceased resident's right to bring a cause of action. Section 400.023(1) states that [t]he remedies provided in this section are in addition to and cumulative with other legal and administrative remedies available to a resident and to the agency. § 400.023(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). Thus, in actuality, section 400.023(1) does not negate or extinguish a cause of action that would otherwise exist as among other legal and administrative remedies. Rather, such resident (or estate) can bring a common law negligence action as was done in this case. Furthermore, in addition to common law negligence, the facility may be liable depending on the particular facts, under the theories of common law intentional torts, like battery, or abuse of a vulnerable adult under section 415.1111, Florida Statutes (1997). Thus, section 400.023(1) does not necessarily conflict with section 46.021. Furthermore, we note petitioner was not deprived of or prevented from relying on the violation of Mr. Knowles' chapter 400 rights, because although petitioner proceeded on a common law negligence theory she was permitted to refer to the rights listed in section 400.022 to establish her claim. More importantly, the trial court instructed the jury that residents in nursing homes have rights under section 400.022 and that a violation of those rights constitutes negligence. [3] Thus, while petitioner's statutory claim under section 400.023(1) may have been dismissed, the trial court permitted petitioner to proceed in a manner substantially similar to the statutory cause of action. [4]