Opinion ID: 32666
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Properly Examine Cynthia

Text: Kelly argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to cross-examine Cynthia with respect to the existence of any agreement she had with the State for her testimony. During the state habeas proceedings, the state court found that “[t]here was no agreement between the State and Cynthia . . . that she would not be prosecuted for the murders to induce her to testify.” Kelly admits that because Cynthia denied any such agreement during her pre-trial deposition, counsel correctly would have expected her to continue to do so at trial. Kelly further acknowledges that the prosecutor personally represented to the court that no deal had been made with Cynthia in exchange for her testimony and that the State did not consider Cynthia a codefendant or a coconspirator. Instead, according to the State, Cynthia was a witness to the murders. Nonetheless, Kelly asserts that had counsel asked Cynthia whether she had received anything for her testimony, it would have (at least) raised a question of credibility for the jurors. The district court assumed arguendo that counsel’s failure to make this inquiry constituted deficient performance. With respect to the second prong, the district court “adopted” the state court’s finding that there was no agreement between the State and Cynthia that she would not be prosecuted in exchange for testifying against Kelly. Based on this factual finding, the district court found there was not a reasonable probability that, had counsel cross-examined Cynthia with respect 19 the existence of any such agreement, the outcome of the guilt or sentencing phase would have been different. Relying on the affidavits of Kelly’s sister Nancy Brown and her husband, Conley Brown, defense investigator Barry Higginbotham, Cynthia’s sister, Beverly Stemen, and state habeas counsel Mark Breding, Kelly contends that subsequent investigation has demonstrated that the authorities either: (1) coerced Cynthia into testifying by threatening her life and that of her son; or (2) promised, advised, or lead Cynthia to believe that she would not be prosecuted if she returned to Texas to testify. Contrary to Kelly’s contentions, the hearsay in the affidavits regarding some vague threat by the authorities does not rise to a substantial showing. None of the affidavits provide that Cynthia admitted that she had an agreement with the State. The closest allegation is that representatives of the district attorney’s office told Cynthia’s sister Beverly Stemen that although Cynthia would not be granted immunity, she would not be prosecuted. Kelly’s argument is that Cynthia was not prosecuted even though her sister informed Assistant District Attorney Rebecca Simpson that Cynthia had confessed to shooting Jerry Morgan. However, the state court found that Beverly never had a conversation with Simpson or the District Attorney’s Office investigator Russell Potts concerning Cynthia shooting Morgan. Moreover, as set forth previously, in a 2001 deposition, Cynthia’s sister Beverly contradicted her previous affidavit by testifying that “I remember [Cynthia] saying very clearly on that point, very clearly that in [Cynthia’s] dream she had shot the man.”19 Further, the state 19 As set forth previously, Beverly stated in her deposition that she was angry at Cynthia at the time she lied. Beverly also indicated that she was taking “medications” and went to see a psychiatrist because the medicine “was causing me to do things and say things that weren’t of my nature, that were inappropriate.” Specifically, the state court found that Beverly was taking the following medications when she had executed the affidavit: “Luvox, Wellbutrin, Cytomel, 20 court found that Cynthia never told her sisters that she shot Jerry Morgan and that Cynthia’s reference to shooting a man was only in the context of a nightmare. The State’s position has been that Cynthia did not participate in the murders and thus she would not be prosecuted. The state court found that District Attorney’s Office investigator Russell Potts and Sheriff’s investigator Chuck Willeford informed Cynthia that “if it was shown that she participated in the crime she would be prosecuted. She was informed that mere presence at the scene was not sufficient to charge her with the crime.” In any event, the question before us is whether Kelly has made a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome had defense counsel cross-examined Cynthia regarding any deal she allegedly had with the State. Although defense counsel did not inquire regarding a deal with the State, counsel did question Cynthia’s motives while on the stand. Counsel asked Cynthia whether the State had charged her with any offense, and she responded no. On crossexamination, Cynthia admitted that the State paid for her trips between Michigan and Texas and for her stay in Texas. Additionally, the state court found that defense counsel cross-examined Cynthia regarding her decision to speak to law enforcement after the dismissal of a child support lawsuit against Kelly. In view of the evidence against Kelly at trial and the questions regarding Cynthia’s motivation to testify, we are confident that Kelly has not shown that the district court’s conclusion (that there exists no reasonable probability of a different outcome had defense counsel cross-examined Cynthia regarding any deal she allegedly had with the State) is debatable among jurists of reason. Kelly also argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to cross-examine Trazodone, Methyphaidate, Conazepam, Methpheid, Cyclobenzaabr, Ultram, and Zepharine.” 21 Cynthia with respect to the role she played in the murder of John Ford. 20 Kelly argues that such cross-examination would have disclosed to the jury that Cynthia had far greater involvement in “criminal activities than she admitted at trial.” According to Kelly, this questioning “would have indicated that she was actually an accomplice in the Morgan killings, rather than simply being present and forced to assist at gunpoint, as she claimed at trial.” Of course, as found by the state court during habeas proceedings, had counsel conducted such a cross-examination during the guilt phase, the jury would have been informed that Kelly had committed another murder. Indeed, Kelly’s counsel had filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of extraneous offenses such as the Ford murder. The district court denied relief on this claim, concluding that Kelly had not met the first prong of Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. More specifically, the district court opined that “[c]onsidering that Kelly denied guilt in the Morgan murders, the Court cannot say that a strategy of not admitting to the Ford murder during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, in order to lessen the chance of jury prejudice, would have been objectively unreasonable.” On appeal, Kelly does not acknowledge, much less challenge, this conclusion. Accordingly, because cross-examination of Cynthia regarding another murder would have introduced very prejudicial evidence during the guilt phase, we conclude that Kelly has not shown that the district court’s resolution of this issue is debatable among jurists of reason. 2. Failure to File Prepared Motion to Transfer Venue Elizabeth Fulton, who was co-counsel for Kelly’s lead attorney Harry Heard, prepared a motion to transfer venue that was never filed. Under Texas law, to prevail on a motion to transfer 20 Kelly was serving a sentence for the murder of John Ford at the time the instant, unrelated offense was solved. 22 venue based on unfavorable pretrial publicity, a defendant must establish, among other things, that pretrial publicity was pervasive, prejudicial, and inflammatory. McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Demouchette v. State, 591 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). Relying on three affidavits and twenty-seven newspaper articles covering the instant offense, Kelly argues that trial counsel should have filed the motion, and it would have been granted.21 In support of this argument, Kelly points to two statements made by each of the affiants. The first statement in each of the affidavits reads as follows: “It is my belief that a conspiracy of influential people constituting a dangerous combination against Alvin Kelly that would preclude a fair trial in Gregg County, Texas, exists.” The second statement by the affiants reads as follows: “It is my belief that the newspaper accounts that attempt to tie the murder of the Morgan family to the Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) murders would also preclude a fair trial in Gregg County, Texas.” The apparently unrelated “KFC murders” in the region had received a good deal of media coverage and had not been solved (at least at the time of Kelly’s trial). With respect to the first statement made by the affiants, the district court found that the conspiracy allegations and prejudice against the defendant are vague and conclusory. With respect to the allegation that Kelly was prejudiced by the newspaper articles, the district court found that none of the summaries offered by Kelly indicate that the respective writers attempted to tie the instant murders to the KFC murders. Indeed, all the references found by the district court indicated that the instant murders and the KFC murders were not related.22 Thus, the district court concluded that the 21 The district court assumed arguendo that twenty-seven newspaper articles over a sixyear period constituted pervasive press coverage. 22 We also note that the references to the KFC murders were in four articles published in 1984 and one article in 1989. The instant trial was conducted in 1991. 23 state trial court would not have found credible the assertion in the affidavits that the newspaper coverage connecting the instant offense to the KFC murders would have precluded a fair trial. In his brief, Kelly does not attempt to demonstrate that the district court’s conclusions were incorrect. This Court is not persuaded that twenty-seven articles over a time period in excess of six years is pervasive. Moreover, in light of Kelly’s failure to show that the conspiracy allegations were more than conclusory or that the newspaper coverage attempted to connect the instant offense with the KFC murders, we are convinced that the district court’s resolution of Kelly’s claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to file the motion to transfer venue is not debatable among reasonable jurists. 3. Counsel was Intoxicated During Trial In the alternative to the above arguments, Kelly argues that no prejudice is necessary because his counsel was intoxicated during trial and a “drunk lawyer is no better than a sl eeping one.” In Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1120, 122 S.Ct. 2347 (2002), this Court held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated when that defendant's counsel is repeatedly asleep through not insubstantial portions of the defendant's capital murder trial. Under such circumstances, it must be presumed that the violation prejudiced the defendant. Contrary to Kelly’s reliance on Burdine, in that case, this Court distinguished intoxicated counsel from sleeping counsel, explaining that sleeping or unconscious counsel could not perform at all for his client. Id. at 349. We are bound by precedent to reject Kelly’s argument that he need not show prejudice based on defense counsel’s alleged intoxication. See also Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance simply because counsel abused alcohol). 24 Accordingly, because Kelly has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right with respect to each of his claims, we DENY a COA. DENIED. The suspension of briefing is lifted and the Clerk is directed to issue a new briefing schedule to allow Kelly to file a brief with respect to the claims that the district court granted a COA and to allow the Director to respond to those claims. 25