Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's Jailhouse Statement Showing Lack of Remorse

Text: The district attorney's office notified defendant that it would use against him his statement to Alameda County Sheriff's Deputies that he felt no remorse for killing Lees and would repeat the crime if given the opportunity. Defendant opposed the statement's prospective admission, arguing that doing so would violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the federal Constitution and Evidence Code section 352. The trial ruled that the statements could be admitted. Defendant argues that his extrajudicial statement should have been excluded because it was procured in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and to counsel while under custodial interrogation ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) and his Sixth Amendment right not to be interrogated outside counsel's presence (see Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 205-207, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246). We do not agree. In an in limine hearing on the admissibility of defendant's statement, Alameda County Deputy Sheriff Allen Boyd testified that on May 16, 1991, he and Deputy Lavada Spence were escorting Huggins to court. According to Boyd, defendant asked Spence if she would applaud if he were given the death penalty, and she said she would. Defendant and Spence briefly engaged in a mild squabble, and Boyd commented, I see you're still making friends. Defendant replied, according to Boyd, Don't nobody like me anyway, and if I had it to do again I'd do it the same way. I don't have any remorse. If I did have remorse, I wouldn't have done it in the first place. Spence testified to the same effect, and explained that the conversation in question had been precipitated because she had clapped in defendant's presence when another jailer pointed out to defendant that he was a convicted criminal. Spence clapped because she was happy defendant had been convicted. No Miranda warnings preceded the conversation among her, Boyd, and defendant. The jailer to whom Spence was referring, Alameda County Sergeant Gary Schellenberg, testified that defendant's behavior had irritated him and he told defendant he was glad defendant was facing the death penalty and hoped defendant would receive a death sentence. Schellenberg, who had discovered Lees's body at the crime scene ( ante, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 611, 131 P.3d at p. 1010), denied making his comments in an effort to provoke defendant into an admission; he was merely taking out his frustration on him. Defendant denied that the conversation with Spence and Boyd ever occurred. After the court ruled that the testimony was admissible, Boyd and Spence testified before the jury to the same effect as their in limine testimony. As we stated in our prior discussion of a Miranda claim, `Clearly, not all conversation between an officer and a suspect constitutes interrogation. The police may speak to a suspect in custody as long as the speech would not reasonably be construed as calling for an incriminating response.' ( People v. Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th 283, 301, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170; see People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th 926, 993, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) Defendant initiated the conversation by asking Spence if she would applaud if he received the death penalty. Focus[ing] primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect ( Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682), we conclude that nothing in the exchanges that followed suggests that the sheriff's deputies made any statement that might reasonably be construed as calling for a response that might reflect unfavorably on defendant in later trial proceedings. Defendant's Massiah claim also lacks merit. The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides in pertinent part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. This right attaches `at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings Б─■ whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' [Citation.] After it both attaches and is invoked, any incriminating statement the government deliberately elicits from a defendant in counsel's absence is inadmissible at that defendant's trial. [Citations.] ( People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1079, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 32 P.3d 1073.) `The question here is whether under the facts of this case a Government agent deliberately elicited incriminating statements ... within the meaning of Massiah '.... ( Fellers v. United States (2004) 540 U.S. 519, 524, 124 S.Ct. 1019, 157 L.Ed.2d 1016.) This inquiry is objective and does not focus on the subjective intentions of the state officer. ( Beaty v. Stewart (9th Cir.2002) 303 F.3d 975, 991.) We conclude that the officers did not deliberately elicit incriminating statements from defendant. The Sixth Amendment is violated only by deliberate action, not `whenever Б─■ by luck or happenstance Б─■ the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached.' ( Beaty v. Stewart, supra, 303 F.3d 975, 991.) At most, Spence needled defendant by clapping in his presence when Schellenberg commented on his conviction and the possible punishment. This may have been provocative, but it was not calculated to elicit incriminating statements, and defendant made none. Later, defendant began a conversation, outside Schellenberg's presence, by asking if Spence would applaud again if he received the death penalty, and she said she would. It was only at that point that he volunteered a statement that could be used in aggravation. Spence merely replied to defendant's question and did not, in our view, solicit any response. In sum, at no point did defendant's jailers intentionally create[ ] a situation likely to induce [him] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 993, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.)