Opinion ID: 1983886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the statute and applicable principles of statutory construction

Text: Section 2825 prohibits any person or organization not authorized to practice engineering under the Act from using: ... any name, title, description or designation, either orally or in writing, that will lead to the belief that such person is entitled to practice engineering as defined in this chapter, including without limitation the words engineer or engineering or any modification or derivative of those words; ... (emphasis added). The Court of Chancery interpreted Section 2825 as a per se ban of all uses of the term engineer and its derivatives by anyone not certified to practice the profession of engineering. The court then proceeded on this assumption when it analyzed Section 2825 under commercial free speech jurisprudence. Snell v. Engineered Systems & Designs, Del.Ch., C.A. No. 12865, slip op. at 3-4, 6-10, 1994 WL 672680 (Nov. 18, 1994). Despite the fact that ESD admits this purported breadth of the statutory ban, [6] we view the statute differently. Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Chancery erroneously interpreted the statute and that its constitutional analysis flowing therefrom was flawed. This Court has spoken on the proper approach to the construction of statutes in various contexts, noting the strong judicial tradition in Delaware in support of a presumption of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. Opinion of the Justices, Del.Supr., 425 A.2d 604, 605 (1981). [W]e become mindful of the traditional self-restraint of this Court whenever it becomes engaged in testing the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly.... Legislative acts should not be disturbed except in clear cases, and then only upon weighty considerations; a legislative enactment is cloaked with a presumption of constitutionality and should not be declared invalid unless its invalidity is beyond doubt. Klein v. National Pressure Cooker Co., Del.Supr., 31 Del.Ch. 459, 64 A.2d 529 (1949). Justice v. Gatchell, Del.Supr., 325 A.2d 97, 102 (1974); see also Richardson v. Wile, Del.Supr., 535 A.2d 1346, 1350 (1988) ([W]here a possible infringement of a constitutional guarantee exists, the interpreting court should strive to construe the legislative intent so as to avoid unnecessary constitutional infirmities.). See also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 464, 467, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994) ([A] statute is to be construed where fairly possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional problems.). Based on this judicial tradition, we hold that the Court of Chancery erred in finding that Section 2825 bans all uses of the term engineer and hence is unconstitutional as applied to ESD. The Court of Chancery failed to consider the significance of the phrase in the statute that provides that usage of the derivatives of the term engineer is banned only if it will lead to the belief that [ESD] ... is entitled to practice engineering.... That phrase, when read in conjunction with the remainder of Section 2825, serves to limit the applicability of that Section to only those uses of the term engineer that are misleading. As long as a derivative of the word engineer does not lead to the belief that the user of the term provides licensed engineering services, as defined by the Act, the use is permissible. See Arbern-Wilmington, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, Del.Supr., 596 A.2d 1385, 1390 (1991) (statute should not be read so that part becomes surplusage). Accordingly, the First Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court is implicated merely as a backdrop to the interpretation of the statute. The interpretation of the statute is aided by the synopsis to a recent amendment to Section 2825. This synopsis states that the amendment clarifies the limitations on the public use of the word engineering by those not authorized to practice engineering for the general public. 68 Del.Laws, c. 24 (emphasis added). Had the General Assembly intended to ban all uses of the word engineer by those not certified, it would have been more logical for it to have used the word prohibition (or the equivalent) rather than the word limitations in the synopsis. [7] Section 2825 must be analyzed, therefore, with the understanding that it bans only uses of the term engineer which would lead to the belief that such person is entitled to practice engineering  i.e., a misleading use of any derivative of the word engineer.