Opinion ID: 2982329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Request to Represent Self

Text: The Supreme Court in Faretta v. California acknowledged that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to represent themselves, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975), but “[a]s the Faretta opinion recognized, the right to self-representation is not absolute. The defendant must voluntarily and intelligently elect to conduct his own defense, and most courts require him to do so in a timely manner.” Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 161-62 (2000) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This court is one of those courts that has qualified the right to self-representation. It requires a defendant to assert the right to self-representation in a timely manner. See, e.g., Robard v. Rees, 789 F.2d 379, 383-84 (6th Cir. 1986). Likewise, a defendant must invoke the right to represent oneself clearly and unequivocally. United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 293, 295 (6th Cir. 1994). The timeliness determination is multifaceted. Courts consider not only the actual timing of the defendant’s request, but also any threat posed to the orderly progression and integrity of the trial by a defendant’s dilatory intent or lack of experience with the rules and procedures of the court. See Robard, 789 F.2d at 383. No one factor is required to justify denial, and a court -4- Case No. 12-1956 United States v. Cunningham can grant the request even where all factors are present. See United States v. Washington, 596 F.3d 926, 940 (8th Cir. 2010) (“despite [defendant’s] admission that his self-representation request was both untimely and for an improper purpose, neither concession serves as a basis for reversing the district court’s decision to grant his request.”). Cases show that there is no clear bright line for determining when a request is timely, either in this Circuit or others.2 And a defendant’s lack of legal knowledge is not sufficient to justify denial absent other circumstances. See Robard, 789 F.2d at 383. Rather, the law requires a holistic assessment based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, placing the trial judge in a unique position to balance the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right against delay, defense gamesmanship, and other practical concerns. As such, we review a trial judge’s finding that a defendant’s request to represent himself is untimely for an unreasonable exercise of discretion. Id. Cunningham contends that the district court erred in denying his request to represent himself without engaging in a McDowell inquiry. In McDowell, this court found that a trial judge should engage in a line of specific questioning to ensure that a defendant’s choice to conduct his own defense (and thereby waive his right to counsel) is sufficiently voluntary and intelligent. United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 248-250 (6th Cir. 1987). Cunningham 2 For examples of this Circuit’s practice, see United States v. Conteh, 234 F. App’x 374, 381 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (untimely the day after trial began); Lewis v. Robinson, 67 F. App’x 914, 919-20 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (untimely before jury selected because request was “merely a tactic to secure a delay in the proceeding.”) (quoting Robards, 789 F.2d at 383); United States v. Pleasant, 12 F. App’x 262, 266-67 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (per curiam) (untimely both before jury was selected and after trial began). For examples in other circuits, compare United States v. Betancourt-Arretuche, 933 F.2d 89, 95-96 (1st Cir. 1991) (untimely after jury sworn in) with United States v. Majors, 328 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 2003) (each of three requests untimely, before trial, during trial, and before closing arguments), Hamilton v. Groose, 28 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 1994) (untimely because defendant “waited to file his motion until only three weeks remained before scheduled trial date,” which showed an “apparent motive to delay.”), Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 794-99 (3d Cir. 2000) (timely because original request made “several weeks before his trial was scheduled to begin.”), and Williams v. Bartlett, 44 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 1994) (always timely if invoked before trial). -5- Case No. 12-1956 United States v. Cunningham argues that a district judge must engage in the McDowell colloquy every time a defendant requests to represent herself, even when the request is untimely. We disagree. A defendant may only represent himself where the request is both timely and voluntary. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162. Where the request is not timely, the district court need not first determine whether the request was voluntary in order to deny the request. Robard, 789 F.2d at 385; Martin, 25 F.3d at 295 (“Even where the right to self-representation is clearly invoked, it must be done so in a timely manner . . . .”). As such, we find no need to determine whether Judge Quist engaged in a McDowell inquiry or its substantial equivalent. Cunningham also argues that the district court erred in finding his request untimely, specifically arguing that the district court relied on two incorrect assumptions: that all requests after a jury has been empaneled are per se untimely, and that a lack of legal expertise alone is sufficient to deny a defendant’s request. We disagree; Cunningham accurately states the law but misconstrues Judge Quist’s analysis. Judge Quist’s explicit ruling, in relevant part, was as follows: Mr. Cunningham has a constitutional right to represent himself, but that has to be said on a timely basis. Asserting it after the jury is impaneled and after we've already heard two important witnesses I think it is not asserted on a timely basis. . . . These motions have to be made on a timely basis. I think it would be very disruptive to this trial to switch from counsel's representation to Mr. Cunningham representing himself at this point in time. He doesn't know the Rule [sic] of Evidence. For example, the letter that he sent to me that I've already referenced doesn't show any basis for admissibility of the evidence. He has a competent counsel who is doing her best to defend the case under the circumstances. . . . We are going to proceed as we were. Although Judge Quist considered Cunningham’s inexperience with the Rules of Evidence, he also explicitly considered issues of timeliness and disruption of the trial. Likewise, the judge’s ruling does not suggest that he applied a bright-line rule, but instead found the request untimely -6- Case No. 12-1956 United States v. Cunningham given the specific circumstances and demands of his case. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Cunningham’s request to represent himself was untimely.