Opinion ID: 164730
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-Examination of Robert Robertson

Text: 6 Mr. Vaughn argues that the District Court improperly limited his examination of Mr. Robertson, who is Mr. Bellamy's uncle and a self-admitted courier for the alleged drug conspiracy. After failing to raise the issue on direct or cross-examination, a codefendant's attorney asked Mr. Robertson on re-cross examination if he had entered [into] any kind of agreement with the Government. Mr. Robertson answered no. Mr. Vaughn's counsel then sought to ask whether Mr. Robertson ha[d] an agreement, an understanding as to whether he will be charged. The District Court denied the request, finding the inquiry unnecessarily cumulative. 7 Mr. Vaughn contends that this ruling is erroneous because, even though [Mr.] Robertson had already been asked about an `agreement' with the Government, .... [a]n `agreement' and an `understanding' are not identical. Thus, he urges that his proffered inquiry as to whether there was understanding was not cumulative. He further claims that the issue of whether there was an understanding would bear on [Mr. Robertson's] motive to testify against Mr. Vaughn. 8 We doubt that there is a meaningful distinction between the terms agreement and understanding as used in this context. 1 Indeed, by himself using the terms agreement and understanding interchangeably, Mr. Vaughn's counsel's own statements indicate that the District Court could reasonably construe the requested question as cumulative. More importantly, we have long held that in the last analysis the trial court is the governor of the trial with the duty to assure its proper conduct and the limits of cross-examination necessarily lie within its discretion. United States v. Hinkle, 37 F.3d 576, 579 (10th Cir.1994) (quotations omitted); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (noting that district courts have wide latitude in limiting cross examination). Given this wide latitude, even if there is a slight difference between the agreement question and the proffered understanding question, we cannot say the District Court abused its discretion by denying the questioning as cumulative.