Opinion ID: 734150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effective Date and Retroactivity

Text: 13 As a preliminary matter, we hold that the Act took effect on April 24, 1996. It is well established that, absent a clear direction by Congress to the contrary, a law takes effect on the date of its enactment. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404, 111 S.Ct. 840, 846, 112 L.Ed.2d 919 (1991). There is nothing in AEDPA which can be construed as a clear direction that this should not be the case. See Qasguargis v. INS, 91 F.3d 788, 789 (6th Cir.1996) (order) (No specific effective date was provided for [the relevant AEDPA provision,] § 440(a), and it accordingly took effect upon the date of enactment.); Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 679 (2d Cir.1996) (applying AEDPA certificate of appealability provision to pending non-capital state-habeas case); Hatch v. Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012, 1014 n. 2 (10th Cir.1996) (assuming, in absence of explicit effective date, that AEDPA was effective when enacted). 14 The next question--whether Congress expressed any clear intent that the relevant parts of the new law be applied to pending cases--is only slightly more difficult. Section 107(c) of the Act states that § 107(a) applies to pending capital cases; Lyons asks us to infer from this that the Act does not apply to pending non-capital cases. We reject this line of reasoning for several reasons. First, this type of negative inference argument presupposes a well-crafted piece of legislation, which the AEDPA is not. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 343-44, 92 S.Ct. 515, 520-21, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971) (rejecting argument based on structure of other legislation where amendment in question was hastily passed and thus could not be expected to dovetail neatly with other provisions of law); Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Buff.L.Rev. 381, 381 (1996) (hereinafter New Habeas Corpus ) (The new law is not well drafted.). 5 Second, it is likely that the specification of applicability to pending cases in section 107 reflects only Congress's explicit concern as to death penalty cases, and carries no negative implication as to other habeas cases. Reyes, 90 F.3d at 679. 6 Finally, Lyons's argument here is similar to, but weaker than, the one which the Supreme Court rejected in Landgraf. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 259, 114 S.Ct. at 1494 (rejecting argument that because Congress provided specifically for prospectivity in two places .... we should infer that it intended the opposite for the remainder of the statute). No other provision in the AEDPA intimates whether the Act should apply to pending cases. Thus, there is no clear statement from Congress regarding the Act's proper reach. 15