Opinion ID: 1860641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court allowed improper closing arguments

Text: ¶ 26. Duncan submits that the defendants' closing argument contained prejudicial statements designed to influence the jury. In his closing argument, RMC's attorney stated, In a case like this, where we've got the loss of a young person ... pulls at all of our hearts, and it should. The only thing to make that worse is to punish that man and this hospital in an unacceptable way. Duncan's objection to the reference to punishment was sustained, and counsel then rephrased his statement to omit any reference to punishment. Duncan's attorney did not ask the judge to give a limiting instruction to the jury, but took the opportunity in his closing argument to further negate the statement by saying, we're not here to punish Dr. Chouteau. ¶ 27. A trial judge has wide discretion in controlling the remarks and argument of attorneys. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Layton, 353 So.2d 749, 754 (Miss.1977). We have also said that the trial judge is in a better position to observe and decide if a remark is improper. James W. Sessums Timber Co. v. McDaniel, 635 So.2d 875, 882 (Miss.1994). Considering that an objection was made and sustained, the statement was rephrased, and counsel took the opportunity to further address the statement during his closing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and no prejudice was shown.
¶ 28. Duncan also argues that the jury did not deliberate and must have been influenced by emotional factors because it was out less than fifteen minutes before coming to a decision. However, she offered no authority in support of this argument. Consequently, this issue is not properly before us. See Gerrard, 619 So.2d at 216; R.C. Petroleum, 555 So.2d at 1023. Duncan has an affirmative duty to address the issues she raises and to give authoritative support for her position. Id. Failure to do so frees us from addressing the issue. ¶ 29. Notwithstanding this, our case law is well settled that short deliberations do not automatically evidence bias or prejudice. See Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36 (Miss.1998) (upholding a seven minute jury verdict); Smith v. State, 569 So.2d 1203 (Miss.1990) (upholding a three minute jury verdict); and Johnson v. State, 252 So.2d 221 (Miss.1971) (upholding ten minute jury verdict). We have held that [t]here is no yardstick of time which a jury should use before reaching a verdict. Johnson, 252 So.2d at 224. Also, we have developed no formula for calculating the length jury deliberations should last. Smith, 569 So.2d at 1204. For these reasons, we find no error.