Opinion ID: 782629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualified immunity for Shaw

Text: 14 We now turn to the question of whether Shaw is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Vakilian's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Qualified immunity shields government officials acting within the scope of their official duties from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The purpose of the qualified immunity defense is to protect public officials from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d 1003, 1007 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806, 102 S.Ct. 2727). Thus, whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity is a threshold question to be resolved at the earliest possible point in the proceedings. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727. 15 In determining an officer's entitlement to qualified immunity we follow a two-step inquiry. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). First, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we decide whether the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If no constitutional right would have been violated were the plaintiff's allegations established, there is no need for further inquiry into immunity. If a violation can be made out on a favorable view of the plaintiff's submissions, we next ask whether the right was clearly established. Id.
16 Shaw argues that the district court erred in denying him qualified immunity on the claim that he procured the arrest warrant through false testimony. He contends that there was probable cause to arrest Vakilian despite the allegedly false statements, and, therefore, the estate cannot demonstrate that Vakilian's Fourth Amendment rights were violated. 17 The Fourth Amendment requires that arrest warrants be issued only upon a showing of probable cause. Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir.1996). In a civil rights case, investigators are entitled to rely on a judicially-secured arrest warrant as satisfactory evidence of probable cause. Yancey v. Carroll County, 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). However, an officer [or investigator] cannot rely on a judicial determination of probable cause if that officer knowingly makes false statements and omissions to the judge such that but for these falsities the judge would not have issued the warrant. Id; see also Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 373 (6th Cir.1999); Hill v. McIntyre, 884 F.2d 271, 275 (6th Cir.1989). 18 An investigator may be held liable under § 1983 for making material false statements either knowingly or in reckless disregard for the truth to establish probable cause for an arrest. Ahlers, 188 F.3d at 373. To overcome an officer's entitlement to qualified immunity, however, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a substantial showing that the defendant stated a deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for the truth and (2) that the allegedly false or omitted information was material to the finding of probable cause. See Hill, 884 F.2d at 275 (applying test set forth in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1973), to evaluate a § 1983 claim); see also Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir.2000); Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 789 (9th Cir.1995); Packer v. City of Toledo, 1 Fed.Appx. 430, 433-342 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion) (noting that the materiality of the false information used to procure a search warrant was a key issue in deciding whether to grant qualified immunity). In other words, Vakilian must show that the judge would not have issued the warrant without the allegedly false material. 19 Relying on our decision in Hill, 884 F.2d 271, Vakilian first argues that the issue of probable cause is for the jury where there is an allegation of a false swearing to obtain a warrant. This is incorrect. Although in Hill we vacated a directed verdict in favor of the defendant officer and held that the question of whether the judicial officer issuing the warrant would have done so even without the knowingly or recklessly false statement is one for the jury, qualified immunity was not at issue. Id. at 276. Where qualified immunity is asserted, the issue of probable cause is one for the court since the entitlement is immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227-28, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806); see also Burda Bros., Inc. v. Walsh, 22 Fed.Appx. 423, 432 n. 8 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion) (It is clear that in Hill, as in Yancey (which is cited in Hill ), the issue is one for the jury only when the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for trial.). Only where the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact should the matter proceed to trial. Here, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find there is no dispute of material fact as to the events leading up to Vakilian's arrest. 20 For qualified immunity purposes, we assume that Vakilian has made the required showing that Shaw recklessly disregarded the truth when he testified before the judge. Shaw told the judge that Vakilian ordered excessive tests pursuant to an agreement with the owner of the clinic when, in fact, there was no evidence to suggest that Vakilian ordered any unnecessary test or knew how his bonus was computed. Thus, Shaw's testimony is false inasmuch as it implies that Vakilian ordered tests that were not medically necessary and knew that his bonus money was based on the number of tests he ordered. The conclusion that Shaw misrepresented the evidence to the judge does not end our inquiry, however, because we must also determine whether the false statements were material to the finding of probable cause. 21 At the time Shaw testified before the judge, Michigan law did not require the government to prove that an individual charged with Medicaid fraud intended to receive or had knowledge of the kickback. The MFCA contained no element of scienter and had been interpreted to prohibit referral fees, or kickbacks, even for medically necessary tests. It was not until ten months after Vakilian's arrest that the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that a showing of general intent was required under the statute. See People v. Motor City Hosp. and Surgical Supply, 575 N.W.2d 95, 99-100 (Mich.App.1997). Thus, there was no requirement that Shaw offer proof of knowledge or unnecessary testing in order to establish probable cause. 22 The remaining question is whether the accurate portions of Shaw's testimony suffice to establish probable cause. In addition to the false statements, Shaw testified that Vakilian received additional money above what he is supposed to get and that records were kept each month on the amount of tests that they [the doctors] were performing and a separate check was written to these doctors for these services. Indeed, the evidence established that Vakilian received a bonus based on the number of tests he ordered and the task force discovered a wide-ranging scheme to cover up the illegal kickbacks. This testimony, while insufficient to bring charges under the current interpretation of the statute, was sufficient to establish probable cause at the time charges were filed against Vakilian. 23 In summary, the district court erred in holding that there were genuine issues of material fact on the § 1983. Because Shaw's remaining testimony was sufficient to establish probable cause, the judge would have issued the warrant whether or not there had been false testimony. Therefore, Shaw is entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims of unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution.
24 Vakilian also maintains that Shaw is liable under § 1985(3) for conspiring to deprive him of equal protection of the law. To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. United Bhd. of C & J v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983). The acts which are alleged to have deprived the plaintiff of equal protection must be the result of class-based discrimination. See Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 886 (6th Cir.1992). 25 On appeal, Shaw argues that Vakilian has failed to put forth sufficient evidence to support a factual finding that a conspiracy existed and that he was motivated by discriminatory animus. Because this is an interlocutory appeal based on qualified immunity, we cannot consider whether Vakilian's evidence is sufficient to present a genuine issue for trial as to the underlying factual elements of his claim. Our jurisdiction is limited to purely legal questions, and, therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review a district court's finding that Vakilian has presented sufficient evidence to proceed to discovery. 4 See Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 536-37 (6th Cir.2002) (citing Johnson, 515 U.S. at 317, 115 S.Ct. 2151). 26 For purposes of qualified immunity analysis, there is little doubt that three of the four elements are satisfied. Vakilian alleges that Shaw and Koenigsknecht, as members of the task force, acted in concert to violate his constitutional rights according to an agreed-upon plan. The complaint also sets forth several acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, including Shaw's and Koenigsknecht's failure to interview Vakilian during their investigation and their decision to execute a criminal complaint and warrant against Vakilian. These acts, according to Vakilian, deprived him of his rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution because the decision to charge him, a foreign-born and ethnic minority doctor, while failing to charge American-born Anglo doctors, deprived him of his right to equal protection of the laws. 27 The critical issue is whether Vakilian can establish that Shaw's action was motived by some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). Shaw contends that Vakilian has failed to make out a violation of clearly established law because the defendants in the criminal action do not share a common characteristic that creates a single class. The defendants in the criminal matter were not of the same ethnicity nor were all of them foreign-trained physicians. 28 Although [a] class protected by section 1985(3) must possess the characteristics of a discrete and insular minority, such as race, national origin, or gender, Haverstick Enters., Inc. v. Fin. Fed. Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir.1994), the law does not require a plaintiff to show that he or she is a member of the same protected class as others who may be in a position independently to allege a § 1985(3) violation. Thus, Vakilian need not allege that he and the other criminal defendants share a common heritage. It is sufficient that Vakilian establishes facts tending to show that Shaw possessed discriminatory intent and that he prosecuted Vakilian but not a similarly situated white physician. See, e.g., Farm Labor Org. Comm., 308 F.3d at 534 (A claimant can demonstrate discriminatory effect by naming a similarly situated individual who was not investigated or through the use of statistical or other evidence which `address[es]' the crucial question of whether one class is being treated differently from another class that is otherwise similarly situated.) (citation omitted). 29 Notwithstanding this conclusion, Shaw nevertheless asserts that summary judgment is appropriate in light of his affidavit in support of his motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. Both Shaw and Koenigsknecht submitted affidavits stating that Vakilian's ethnicity was not a consideration in the decision to investigate or bring charges against him. Shaw's affidavit also explains that he testified truthfully during the preliminary exam that he was unaware of the ethnic background of the criminal defendants. Vakilian did not submit additional evidence controverting Shaw's statements that he lacked discriminatory animus. 30 While an uncontroverted affidavit frequently establishes the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the mere fact that affidavits filed in support of a motion for summary judgment are not controverted does not necessarily require its being granted.... Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1077 (6th Cir.1972). Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), Advisory Committee Notes (1963 Amendment). Therefore, to satisfy his burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all of the material facts, Shaw must make a showing that is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. Fitzke, 468 F.2d at 1077 n. 8. 31 Section 1985 defendants cannot establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact simply by disavowing any knowledge of the discriminatory characteristic at issue. In Reese v. City of Southfield, No. 97-1670, 162 F.3d 1172, 1998 WL 552841 at  (6th Cir. Aug.13, 1998)(unpublished), we employed the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in the context of a § 1985 claim alleging discrimination. Noting that the Supreme Court applies this burden shifting analysis to employment discrimination lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, this court reasoned that the scheme should also apply to § 1985 suits for discrimination outside the employment context: 32 McDonnell Douglas and its progeny reflect the fact that direct evidence is often unavailable in discrimination cases.... [A] discrimination plaintiff cannot necessarily offer direct testimony that his rejection, demotion, termination, or denial was due to unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas thus serves a discovery-like function: as long as a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case..., the defendant is required to prove an explanation of its actions... 33 Id.; see also Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992) (explaining that the McDonnell Douglas formula articulates the evidentiary framework for discrimination claims brought under § 1981). As a consequence, Shaw must do more than deny any discriminatory animus on his part. 5 34 Having determined that the facts alleged in Vakilian's complaint would, if proven, establish an equal protection violation, we must now ask whether the right was clearly established at the time of Shaw's action. In deciding whether a right was clearly established, a court should consider the specific context of the case, not whether the right was clearly established as a broad general proposition. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. [T]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. citing ( Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). 35 At the time of Vakilian's arrest, this circuit recognized that the enforcement of an otherwise valid law can be a means of violating constitutional rights by invidious discrimination. Futernick v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1056 (6th Cir.1996); see also Stemler, 126 F.3d at 873; United States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 453 (6th Cir.1991). Moreover, an officer's reasonable belief that probable cause exists for arrest does not affect the availability of a separate selective enforcement claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Stemler, 126 F.3d at 873 (noting that in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the Supreme Court confirmed the availability of an equal protection claim despite the existence of probable cause). Thus, it seems clear to us that, at the time Shaw swore out the arrest warrants, selective enforcement because of race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion was grounds for relief. 36 Although investigators have considerable discretion as to how they conduct investigations and enforce the law, a reasonable officer in Shaw's position would have recognized that selective enforcement on the basis of a suspect's race or ethnicity is unconstitutional. According to Vakilian's complaint, Shaw had reason to suspect that all seventeen physicians who worked at Health Stop clinics might have been involved in the illegal scheme to some degree. If, as Vakilian alleged, Shaw had comparable evidence against four physicians — Vakilian, an Iranian-born physician, and three Anglo-American physicians — and decided to charge him and not to charge the Anglo-Americans because of their respective races or ethnicity, surely the circumstances were such that a reasonable officer in Shaw's position would recognize that this selective enforcement of the law was unconstitutional. Therefore, Shaw is not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Vakilian's § 1985(3) claim.