Opinion ID: 1229071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's presence at conference in chambers.

Text: The defendant contends that his rights under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and art. I, sec. 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution were violated in that he was not personally present during a pretrial conference in chambers between his counsel, the prosecutor and the trial judge. The defendant relies on French v. State (1893), 85 Wis. 400, 55 N. W. 566, wherein this court stated an accused has a right to be present during the whole trial and to meet the witnesses face to face and to be confronted with witnesses against him. An accused has the right under art. I, sec. 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution to be present during his trial, and his right to be present at the trial includes the right to be present at proceedings before trial at which important steps in a criminal prosecution are often taken. Beverly v. State (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 725, 177 N. W. 2d 870; Williams v. State (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 154, 161 N. W. 2d 218; Ramer v. State (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 79, 161 N. W. 2d 209, certiorari denied, 394 U. S. 989, 89 Sup. Ct. 1476, 22 L. Ed. 2d 764. The presence of accused at all conferences has been recommended by this court. In Ramer v. State, supra, pages 85 and 86, this court stated: We think, however, that conferences of the court and attorneys outside the presence of the accused should be rarely held during the trial and the trial judge should be solicitous in allowing the defendant to be present at a conference in chambers when he requests it. There is always a risk of the conference exceeding a nonconstitutional scope or causing misunderstanding. [17] However, the presence of defendant is constitutionally required only to the extent a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence. Ramer v. State, supra ; Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), 291 U. S. 97, 54 Sup. Ct. 330, 78 L. Ed. 674, 90 A. L. R. 575. In Stein v. United States (9th Cir. 1962), 313 Fed. 2d 518, 522, the court stated: The presence of a defendant must bear a reasonably substantial relationship to the opportunity to defend. The Constitution does not assure 'the privilege of presence when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.' Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts .... [18] In Ramer v. State, supra, page 84, this court stated, whether the defendant has a right to attend a conference in chambers ... admits of no categorical `yes' or `no' answer. Where the conference in chambers deals solely with questions of law or preliminary matters of procedure, it does not constitute a part of the trial in the constitutional sense. [19] In the instant case, a conference in chambers was held on the morning of trial between counsel and the trial judge. Although the defendant asked to be present, he was excluded. At the conference, it was determined that the state would not elicit hearsay statements of the defendant's parents concerning their relationship to the defendant; the state indicated that it did not intend to introduce defendant's juvenile record at the trial; the manner and procedure for drawing the jury was determined; and certain voir dire questions for the jury were discussed, but no final form was stipulated or approved. The manner of withdrawal of defendant's not guilty by reason of insanity plea was also arranged. The record reveals that the plea was later withdrawn in open court in the absence of the jury, with the defendant present, and that the trial judge explained to the defendant the effect of the change. The record also indicates that certain exhibits were marked and admitted into evidence, including the death certificates of Eugene and Mary Leroux. [20] There is nothing in the record to indicate that the exhibits were inadmissible. The admissibility of evidence is a question of law and any knowledge that the defendant may have had of the facts that his counsel did not have, would have been no aid to his counsel in the presentation of the questions of law. The defendant contends that the cause of death was stipulated in the conference to be by gunshot, and that such a stipulation violated his substantial right to have every element of the crime proven at trial. Whether such a stipulation in conference would require defendant's presence need not be determined, in that the record reflects no such stipulation. Early in the conference, counsel for the defendant indicated his defense would be that, although the victims died of gunshot, the defendant is not guilty. However, no stipulations as to the cause of death were made. At trial, with the defendant present, the coroner testified, without objection, that the cause of death was trauma by bullet wound in the brain, hemorrhage, and due to gunshot. Nothing was determined or discussed in the conference but matters preliminary in nature that dealt solely with questions of law. The conference did not constitute a part of the trial in the constitutional sense that required the defendant's presence. Furthermore, nothing that transpired in the conference was prejudicial or harmful to the defendant's cause. Alleged error occurring at trial. The defendant asserts the following alleged prejudicial errors, not involving constitutional matters, that occurred during the trial: 1. Jeannette testified that the defendant told her that he had been mistreated by their parents when he was in the Green Bay State Reformatory, thereby informing the jury of the defendant's juvenile record. 2. The defendant was required to answer a question which had to do with his release from parole, again introducing his juvenile record. 3. In describing the property taken from the house at the time of the fire, Jeannette identified an exhibit as the defendant's jewelry case, containing a Maltese Cross and Swastika. 4. Testimony was adduced at trial from the sheriff on direct-examination and the defendant on cross-examination to the effect that at the time of his arrest the defendant was standing next to a bed with a young lady and that both were unclothed. 5. Hearsay statements of Kathy Reinert, Mrs. Reinert and Mr. Olk were admitted into evidence. The record reflects that the defendant made no objection at trial to the first and third allegations of error; that objection was made to the second and fifth allegations of error and sustained; and that objection to the fourth alleged error was overruled. The circuit court, in its decision on defendant's motion for a new trial, held that the inquiry into defendant's state of undress did not appear to be relevant, but that it did not feel that this was prejudicial error. We agree. Errors occurring in the course of trial will not serve to overturn a conviction unless it clearly appears that had they not occurred, the result would probably have been more favorable to the defendant. Zebrowski v. State (1971), 50 Wis. 2d 715, 185 N. W. 2d 545. If there were errors committed in the course of trial, they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Competency of counsel. The defendant in his pro se brief contends that the representation afforded at trial by his court-appointed counsel was so inadequate as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. In support of this allegation, the defendant directs this court's attention to the fact that counsel failed to challenge the legality of defendant's arrest, or attempt to suppress the pistol obtained in the search incidental thereto. At the evidentiary hearing held on defendant's motion for a new trial, counsel testified that he took no such action because he was unaware of the exclusionary rule of evidence and not as a trial tactic. While this may raise an inference of incompetent representation, incompetency of counsel is not ipso facto shown, particularly when we have determined that the arrest was lawful and the seizure of the weapons entirely justified and proper. The record in the instant case dispels any inference that the defendant was denied a fair trial as the result of the incompetency of counsel. Defendant alleges other incidents of trial counsel's incompetence but examination of the entire record discloses that defendant's objections are fostered in his dissatisfaction in the verdict and an assumption that had trial counsel chosen different tactics the result would have been more favorable. As pointed out in State v. Harper (1973), 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N. W. 2d 1, effective and adequate counsel does not translate itself into a notguilty verdict. In his decision on defendant's motion for new trial, the circuit judge held that the testimony adduced at trial overwhelmingly proved defendant's guilt and that defendant's own testimony was, in part, incredible. We concur in the trial court's observations. While this court has previously held that a new trial will not be granted on the ground of inadequate representation unless counsel's performance is so inadequate and of such low competency as to amount to no representation, [21] this court in State v. Harper, supra , adopted a higher standard as the test for competency of counsel. The court stated, at page 557: We think it is time for this court to restate a higher test for competency of counsel for the future. This court has always been most solicitous of the right of one accused of crime to be properly and adequately represented by counsel. Effective representation is not to be equated, as some accused believe, with a not-guilty verdict. But the representation must be equal to that which the ordinarily prudent lawyer, skilled and versed in criminal law, would give to clients who had privately retained his services.... In the instant case, the record reflects that counsel conducted a vigorous and able defense throughout the trial proceedings demonstrating the quality of representation expected of a prudent and skilled lawyer, versed in criminal law. By the Court. Judgment and order affirmed. BEILFUSS, J., took no part.