Opinion ID: 39986
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy and Fake Drugs

Text: A defendant may not be convicted of the possession or sale 4 of drugs unless the defendant possesses or sells actual drugs. See United States v. Bobo, 586 F.2d 355, 371 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 1546 (1979). However, factual impossibility does not preclude a conviction for conspiracy or attempt. See United States v. Pietri, 683 F.2d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1982). Because the act of conspiracy is complete upon the formation of an illegal agreement, a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy to aid in the distribution of drugs even if those drugs are fake. Id. (“The fact that the cocaine which they thought they were receiving was a fake substance does not affect their intent to obtain the genuine article.”). See also United States v. Murray, 527 F.2d 401, 411–12 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding a conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin even though it turned out to be lactose). The question raised in Burke’s objection is whether it follows that because a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy to distribute fake drugs, then a defendant’s sentence for a drug conspiracy may be based on a quantity of fake drugs. We hold that a sentence for drug conspiracy may be based on fake drugs. We are guided in this respect by the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. That commentary explains that where the drug offense involves an agreement to buy or sell, “the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance shall be used to determine the 5 offense level.”2 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Commentary, Application Note 12. Thus, for inchoate offenses, the quantity of drugs is based, not on the amount actually delivered, but on the amount agreed upon. United States v. Lombardi, 138 F.3d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1998). See also United States v. Dallas, 229 F.3d 105, 108–10 (2d Cir. 2000). Indeed, in convictions based on reverse-sting operations such as this one, where the actual quantity of drugs is controlled by the government instead of by the defendant, the quantity of drugs agreed upon more accurately reflects the scale of the offense than the quantity actually delivered. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 Commentary, Application Note 12. Accordingly, Burke’s sentence for drug conspiracy is properly based upon the amount he agreed to escort. His crime was complete when he agreed to aid in the distribution of 350 kilograms of cocaine with the intent to achieve that objective. II. Quantities That Were Part of the Dismissed Counts Even if fake cocaine is properly included in the drug quantity calculation, Burke argues that the sentencing court erred in considering the entire 350 kilograms of cocaine, real and fake, admitted to during the plea colloquy. Instead, Burke argues, the district court should have considered only the 50 kilograms involved in count two, the count to which Burke pleaded guilty. 2 There are exceptions that do not apply here. 6 A. Standard of Review The question of whether the sentencing court is limited to the quantity of drugs that provided the factual basis for conviction is a legal question concerning the interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines that we review de novo. Villegas, 404 F.3d at 359. Because Burke objected to the PSR’s consideration of the entire 350 kilograms of cocaine, our de novo review of the record is for harmless error. United States v. Ahmed, 324 F.3d 368, 374 (5th Cir. 2003).3 B. Harmless Error Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[a]ny error . . . that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). Thus, an error in the application of the sentencing guidelines can be disregarded as harmless if it “did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.” Ahmed, 324 F.3d at 374. It is the proponent of the sentence, here the government, that bears the burden to “persuade[] the court of appeals that the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent 3 There is no preserved constitutional error. Burke did not object to his sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds, although, as we address later, he now argues Booker on appeal. Moreover, in his brief on appeal, Burke does not challenge either his conviction or sentence on Fifth Amendment grounds; he argues only that the guidelines were misapplied. 7 the erroneous factor.” United States v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119, 1129 (5th Cir. 1993)(quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)).4 We conclude that the government has met that burden. At the Rule 11 hearing, Burke did not dispute that “[o]n July 6, 2001, as described in count two, Mr. Burke and others provided protection by providing an escort for a shipment of what was purported to be 50 kilograms of cocaine.” Thus, Burke has conceded that at least 50 kilograms of cocaine are relevant to his guilty plea. A reduction in the quantity of cocaine from 350 kg to 50 kg would not have affected Burke’s sentence, because either quantity yields a sentence much longer than the ten-year cap. That is, 350 kilograms of cocaine results in an offense level of 35, yielding a range of 168–210 months; 50 kilograms results in an offense level of 33, yielding a range of 135–168 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). The bottom of either range substantially exceeds both the 120 month agreed sentence cap and Burke’s ultimate sentence of 96 months. This is not simply a case where the same sentence is 4 We understand this to be the proper standard for review of non-constitutional sentencing errors. However, we recognize that in what may be a similar circumstance a prior panel of this court did apply, without citation, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. United States v. Lopez-Urbina, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. 2005) (2005 WL 1940118 at ). 8 included in both the incorrect and the correct sentencing ranges. See e.g., United States v. Lopez-Urbina, __F.3d__ (5th Cir. 2005). In such cases, it is more difficult for the government to bear its burden of proving that “the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the erroneous factor.” United States v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119, 1131 (5th Cir. 1993). Instead, in this case any alleged errors are moot because the defendant’s sentence was determined entirely by only two independent factors: (1) The ten-year sentencing cap and (2) the downward departure for substantial assistance to authorities under section 5K1.1. Neither of these two factors is influenced by the quantity of drugs (50 or 350 kg). The ten-year cap, if accepted by the court, functions without regard to drug quantity or to the severity of the sentence previously calculated. Furthermore, with respect to section 5K1.1, neither the considerations listed, nor the policy statement provided, suggest that the severity of the crime——here determined by the quantity of drugs——should influence the amount of the substantial-assistance reduction.5