Opinion ID: 163067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dismissal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim

Text: 15 Similarly, Mr. Ledbetter's cruel and unusual punishment allegations lack the necessary specificity. Mr. Ledbetter's complaint states that he was falsely imprisoned in [h]einous conditions, but provides no further detail. Rec. vol. I, doc. 1, at 4 (Complaint filed April 20, 2000). 16 We note that in an affidavit submitted in response to the City's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Ledbetter states that he was kept in a filthy cell with no toilet in [his] bare feet. Rec. vol. I, doc. 70, Ex. A (affidavit of Joseph Ledbetter, dated Sept. 14, 2001). Even if Mr. Ledbetter had alleged these facts in his complaint, they are insufficient to establish that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution. 17 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the City was required to provide to a pretrial detainee such as Mr. Ledbetter humane conditions of confinement by ensuring ... the basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and by taking reasonable measures to guarantee [his] safety. Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir.1998); see also Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir.1998) (Although the Due Process Clause governs a pretrial detainee's claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the Eighth Amendment standard provides the benchmark for such claims.) (citation omitted). In order to establish city officials' liability for violating his right to humane conditions of confinement, Mr. Ledbetter was required to establish that: (1) the officials kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [his] health and safety, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) and (2) the alleged deprivation was sufficiently serious. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271, (1991). As to the second component, jail conditions may be restrictive and even harsh without violating constitutional rights. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). [O]nly those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities ... are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321. (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Here, Mr. Ledbetter's contention that he was placed in his bare feet in a cell without a toilet for five hours does not allege a sufficiently serious deprivation to constitute a constitutional violation. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1311 (noting that [a]n important factor in determining whether the conditions of confinement meet constitutional standards is the length of the incarceration). E. Claim against Judge Roach 19 The dismissal of Mr. Ledbetter's claim against Judge Roach on immunity grounds was also proper. We acknowledge that the district court concluded that by allowing the clerk to sign [Mr. Ledbetter's arrest warrant] for the court, Judge Roach issued [the] warrant in violation of Kansas law. Ledbetter, 2001 WL 80060 at . 3 However, a judicial officer is entitled to absolute immunity from a claim for damages under § 1983 unless he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Rosenthal v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Cal., 910 F.2d 561, 565-66 (9th Cir.1990) (A judge is immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts in excess of his jurisdiction, so long as the acts themselves were judicial.). 20 Here, even assuming that his acts violated Kansas law, Judge Roach did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099. Accordingly, he is entitled to absolute immunity from Mr. Ledbetter's claim for damages against him. F. Claim Against the City 21 The district court granted summary judgment to the City on Mr. Ledbetter's remaining claim — that he was arrested on an invalid warrant. The court reasoned that in allowing the use of his signature, Judge Roach was not acting as a municipal policymaker. 22 Under § 1983, a municipality may not be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior. Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1029 (10th Cir.2000) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 698, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Instead, the plaintiff must show that the unconstitutional actions of an employee were representative of an official policy or custom of the municipal institution, or were carried out by an official with final policy making authority with respect to the challenged action. Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1229 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the plaintiff proceeds on a theory that the alleged constitutional violation was caused by an official with policymaking authority: 23 The touchstone for determining official policy is distinguish[ing] acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby mak[ing] clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.... [M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question. 24 Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 723 (10th Cir.1989) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. at 478-79, 483-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)), overruled on other grounds, 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.1991) (en banc). Additionally, in identifying final municipal policymakers, the courts must examine state laws and local ordinances or regulations to determine where the statutory law places the responsibility for making law or setting policy in a particular area. Melton, 879 F.2d at 724. 25 Here, as the district court observed, the authority of the municipal official whom Mr. Ledbetter named as a defendant and sought to hold responsible for the issuance of the arrest warrant — Judge Roach — is established by state law. See Rec., vol I, doc. 82 at 10 (noting that the judicial authority wielded by Kansas municipal judges is governed by the Kansas Code of Procedure for Municipal Courts, and that [a] municipal judge's duty to sign all municipal arrest warrants is directly mandated by statute (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-41-1 et. seq and § 12-4208)). 4 Thus, Judge Roach's authority to issue arrest warrants was circumscribed by his judicial duty to follow state law, and [a]ny procedural `trailblazing' on his part, [i.e. allowing a signature stamp to be used without personally reviewing the warrant] was not done under the auspices of the City and could not be interpreted as promulgating municipal policy. Id. 26 Mr. Ledbetter has failed to present any evidence indicating that Judge Roach or the clerk who affixed his signature stamp acted as municipal policymakers. Moreover, although our circuit does not appear to have specifically addressed the question of the policymaking authority of a municipal judge, we note that several other circuits have concluded that municipal judges did not act as policymakers and thus could not render a city liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983. See Eggar v. City of Livingston, 40 F.3d 312, 314-15 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a municipal judge was performing a state judicial function and not acting as a final decision maker for the City when deciding how or whether to advise the plaintiffs of their rights, and whether to appoint counsel and stating that [t]he [j]udge's failure to follow state law or federal constitutional law does not transform his [conduct] into municipal policymaking); Woods v. City of Michigan City, 940 F.2d 275, 279 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that the city and county were not liable for a municipal judge's bond directive because the judge was acting as an officer of the state judicial system); Carbalan v. Vaughn, 760 F.2d 662, 665 (5th Cir.1985) (noting that a municipality had no policy regarding the municipal judge's duties, and that, if the judge erred the city is not liable simply because the judge held the office of municipal judge); cf. Williams v. Butler, 863 F.2d 1398, 1402 (8th Cir.1988) (holding that a municipal judge constituted a policymaker because, [r]egarding employment matters in his court, [the municipal judge] had been delegated carte blanche authority ... and was exercising that authority when he hired and when he fired [the plaintiff]). We are persuaded by the reasoning of these cases. 27 We therefore conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the City on Mr. Ledbetter's wrongful arrest claim.