Opinion ID: 487734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Crossclaims

Text: 62 Niagara's final contention is that the district court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury regarding its crossclaims against Jo-Ja for tort and contract indemnity. Under a theory of tort indemnity, between joint tortfeasors the whole loss may be shifted to the more guilty of the tortfeasors. Araujo v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard, Nantucket Steamship Authority, 693 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1982). A contractual right to indemnity may arise if there are unique special factors demonstrating that the would-be indemnitor bear the ultimate responsibility for the plaintiff's safety ... or where there is a generally recognized special relationship between the parties. Araujo, 693 F.2d at 2-3 (citations omitted). 63 The record shows that Niagara failed to make a timely objection to the court's failure to give the instructions. Rule 51 states in pertinent part: 64 No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury. 65 Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. This court has previously stated the rationale behind the rule: 66 The object of the rule is to afford the trial judge an opportunity upon second thought, and before it is too late, to correct any inadvertent or erroneous failure to charge. The rule also serves to lessen the potential burden of appellate courts by diminishing the number of rulings at the trial which they may be called upon the review. 67 Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 615 (1st Cir.1955). 68 The record below reveals that after the second day of trial, the trial court stated to counsel that I think everything has to go to the jury, which includes your two crossclaims. In response, Niagara submitted four questions regarding tort and contract indemnity in the verdict forms. During jury instructions, the trial court explained that Niagara had its claims against Jo-Ja, but did not specifically instruct the jury regarding the crossclaims for tort and contract indemnity. After the trial court finished reading the special verdict questions, it stated in open court: Now, let me ask counsel, before I excuse the alternates, if they have anything to add? Thereafter, at the bench and out of the presence of the jury, counsel for Niagara made one objection regarding the court's refusal to read its proposed instructions 9 through 16, which dealt with the Peymann issue. Niagara made no objection regarding the omission of the crossclaims from the special verdict forms. The jury then retired to deliberate. 69 Niagara objected to this omission three months after the jury verdict, at the limitation of liability hearing on August 7, 1985. Manifestly, Niagara's objection was not timely under Rule 51. These are precisely the circumstances that Rule 51 addresses. Marshall v. Nugent, supra. The trial court gave counsel ample opportunity to object to omissions in the special verdict form, and counsel for Niagara made none regarding this issue. Moreover, it may not rely on statements by the trial court prior to its conclusion of jury instructions as an excuse for its neglect. See, e.g., DeHues v. Western Electric Co., 710 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir.1983). 70 As to tort indemnity, along with its procedural problem under Rule 51, Niagara's active negligence precluded it from recovering against Jo-Ja under that theory beyond its percentage of negligence as found by the jury. Where the party seeking indemnification was itself guilty of acts or omissions proximately causing the plaintiff's injury, tort indemnification is inappropriate. Arauso, 693 F.2d at 3. Niagara could not have recovered under a theory of tort indemnity. 71 Affirmed in part, reversed in part.