Opinion ID: 4301602
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Numerous Special Factors Counsel Against

Text: Authorizing a Bivens Remedy in This Case. Lest any doubt remain regarding our lack of authority to extend Bivens to the new context found in this case, I next consider the multiple special factors that also bar our conjuring a Bivens remedy in this case. “A Bivens remedy is not available . . . where there are ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’” Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2006 (quoting Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18). While the Supreme Court “has not defined the phrase ‘special factors counselling hesitation,’” it has explained that “the inquiry must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857–58. “[T]o be a ‘special factor counselling hesitation,’ a factor must cause a court to hesitate before answering that question in the affirmative.” Id. at 1858. “In sum, if there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy as part of the system for enforcing the law and correcting a wrong,” we “must refrain from creating the remedy in order to respect the role of Congress in determining the nature and extent of federal-court jurisdiction under Article III.” Id. (emphases added). Relatedly, “if there is an alternative remedial structure present in a certain case, that alone may limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action.” Id. This case is brimming with “sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy.” Id. First, cross-border violence implicates foreign RODRIGUEZ V. SWARTZ 63 relations, an area uniquely unsuitable for judicial interference. “Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981). Rather, “[t]he political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns.” Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018). The majority suggests that failure to imply a Bivens remedy in this case would “threaten international relations” and impair our relationship with Mexico, but the reality is that the judiciary is wholly ill-equipped to broker relations between two sovereign nations. Indeed, the political branches have already undertaken several initiatives to resolve cross-border concerns. For example, the governments of the United States and Mexico established the joint Border Violence Prevention Council, a standing forum to address border violence issues. See Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 820 (citing DHS, Written Testimony for a H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Hearing (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/09/09/writtentestimony-dhs-southern-border-and-approaches-campaignjoint-task-force-west). Moreover, the fatal cross-border shooting incident in Hernandez led to a “serious dialogue between the two sovereigns, with the United States refusing Mexico’s request to extradite [Agent] Mesa but resolving to ‘work with the Mexican government within existing mechanisms and agreements to prevent future incidents.’” Id. (quoting DOJ, Federal Officials Close Investigation into the Death of Sergio Hernandez-Guereca (Apr. 27, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-closeinvestigationdeath-sergio-hernandez-guereca). That the two sovereigns are working to address cross-border violence counsels hesitation against judicial interference in this area. 64 RODRIGUEZ V. SWARTZ After all, “matters relating ‘to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.’” Haig, 453 U.S. at 292 (alteration in original) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)). Second, border security is not the prerogative of the judiciary, but of the political branches. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861; see also United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[T]his country’s border-control policies are of crucial importance to the national security and foreign policy of the United States . . . .”). “The Supreme Court has never implied a Bivens remedy in a case involving the military, national security, or intelligence,” Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2012), and it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would entertain such an expansion of Bivens after Abbasi. Following suit, our sister circuits have rejected Bivens claims in the border-security context. See Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 818–19; Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 207–09 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding that special factors weighed against implying a Bivens action for damages against a TSA agent, because the TSA is “tasked with assisting in a critical aspect of national security—securing our nation’s airports and air traffic,” and because “[t]he threat of damages liability could . . . increase the probability that a TSA agent would hesitate in making split-second decisions about suspicious passengers”). The majority’s effort to analogize this case to “standard law enforcement operations” does not withstand scrutiny. Although Border Patrol agents may perform some actions that are “analogous to domestic law enforcement” activities, Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 819, Border Patrol agents are tasked RODRIGUEZ V. SWARTZ 65 with carrying out fundamentally different policies than domestic law enforcement officers. “Congress has expressly charged the Border Patrol with ‘deter[ring] and prevent[ing] the illegal entry of terrorists, terrorist weapons, persons, and contraband.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 6 U.S.C. § 211(e)(3)(B)). Third, “Congress’ failure to provide a damages remedy” in the context of cross-border violence cannot be ascribed to “mere oversight” or “inadverten[ce].” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862 (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988)). “[I]n any inquiry respecting the likely or probable intent of Congress, the silence of Congress is relevant.” Id. Here, as in Abbasi, “that silence is telling.” Id. The majority’s decision to authorize an implied damages remedy in this case is precisely the sort of “‘congressionally uninvited intrusion’ [that] is ‘inappropriate’ action for the Judiciary to take.” Id. (quoting United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987)). What Congress has done in other instances is instructive. In Abbasi, the Supreme Court observed that “[i]n an analogous context,” Congress assumedly weighed “a number of economic and governmental concerns” when it enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and “decid[ed] not to substitute the Government as defendant in suits seeking damages for constitutional violations.” Id. at 1856 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A)).3 Congress did not stop there. It 3 The majority cites 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) for the proposition that the FTCA allows an exception for Bivens claims. I acknowledge that in a proper context, as delineated by the Supreme Court in Abbasi, the Bivens remedy may well be available. Where the majority goes astray, however, is ignoring the import of § 2679(b)(2) with respect to the special-factors 66 RODRIGUEZ V. SWARTZ also expressly excluded “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k). In fact, “the FTCA’s foreign country exception bars all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 (emphasis added). Thus, the majority’s decision produces an incongruous result. On one hand, an alien injured on Mexican soil by crossborder tortious conduct may not bring a claim for damages under the FTCA. On the other hand, an alien injured on Mexican soil by cross-border unconstitutional conduct may bring an implied claim for damages under Bivens. In a similar vein, “[t]he Torture Victim Protection Act provides a cause of action only against foreign officials, not U.S. officials.” Meshal, 804 F.3d at 420; see 28 U.S.C. § 1350. And where Congress has enacted a remedial scheme for aliens injured abroad by certain United States employees, Congress has authorized administrative—but not judicial—remedies. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 2734(a), 2734a(a) (property loss, personal injury, or death incident to noncombat activities of armed forces); 21 U.S.C. § 904 (tort claims arising in foreign countries in connection with Drug Enforcement Administration operations abroad); 22 U.S.C. § 2669-1 (tort claims arising in connection with overseas State Department operations)). Congress has not authorized a comparable remedy for aliens injured abroad by Border Patrol agents. inquiry. As the Court observed in Abbasi, the fact that Congress enacted § 2679(b)(2) signals that Congress, rather than the judiciary, is in the best position to “weigh[]” various “economic and governmental concerns,” and to carry out the “substantial responsibility to determine whether, and the extent to which, monetary and other liabilities should be imposed upon individual officers and employees of the Federal Government.” 137 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing § 2679(b)(2)(A)). RODRIGUEZ V. SWARTZ 67 I note also that the right to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is available only to “any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This express limitation strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to create a damages remedy for aliens injured abroad as the result of federal officials’ unconstitutional conduct—assuming arguendo that the relevant constitutional provisions apply extraterritorially.4 To infer otherwise, as the majority does, produces a bizarre result. A federal official who commits a cross-border violation of an alien’s constitutional rights must stand suit for damages—without any congressional authorization, no less. However, a state official who commits the same cross-border violation is statutorily exempt from a suit for damages. Congress has not only hesitated, but has declined, to allow aliens injured abroad to sue federal officials for damages. Congress, not the judiciary, is best positioned “to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857–58. Congress’s silence in the area of cross-border violence is telling, and is yet another special factor counselling hesitation in this case. Fourth, the cross-border nature of this case raises a “critical” special factor—extraterritoriality. Meshal, 804 F.3d at 425–26. It is unprecedented for Bivens to apply to aliens 4 The majority thinks it “inconceivable” that Congress contemplated cross-border incidents involving federal officials when it enacted § 1983. The majority misses the point. The fact that Congress limited the pool of § 1983 plaintiffs to “any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof,” shows that it is the role of Congress, not the judiciary, to determine, in the first instance, who may sue for damages. 68 RODRIGUEZ V. SWARTZ injured abroad. The very “novelty and uncertain scope of an extraterritorial Bivens remedy counsel[s] hesitation.” Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 822; see Alvarez v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 818 F.3d 1194, 1210 (11th Cir. 2016) (concluding that a claim that “would be doctrinally novel and difficult to administer” is a special factor), cert. denied sub nom. Alvarez v. Skinner, 137 S. Ct. 2321 (2017). “After all, the presumption against extraterritoriality is a settled principle that the Supreme Court applies even in considering statutory remedies.” Meshal, 804 F.3d at 425 (emphasis added) (first citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013); then citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). How much more should we hesitate before implying a damages remedy extraterritorially by judicial mandate, in the absence of congressional action? “It would be grossly anomalous . . . to apply Bivens extraterritorially when we would not apply an identical statutory cause of action for constitutional torts extraterritorially.” Id. at 430 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). The majority’s opinion creates exactly such a “grossly anomalous” result. Finally, the majority places undue weight on what is, in its view, an insufficient alternative remedial structure. The majority’s position finds no support in Supreme Court law. “[T]he absence of a remedy is only significant because the presence of one precludes a Bivens extension.” Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 821. The Bivens remedy is not a freewheeling one—the lack of an alternative remedial structure cannot, on its own, compel judicial creation of a damages remedy. The Supreme Court has “rejected the claim that a Bivens remedy should be implied simply for want of any other means for challenging a constitutional deprivation in federal court.” RODRIGUEZ V. SWARTZ 69 Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69. In fact, “[i]t d[oes] not matter . . . that ‘[t]he creation of a Bivens remedy would obviously offer the prospect of relief for injuries that must now go unredressed.’” Id. (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 425). We may not use Bivens as a stop-gap wherever Congress has not created a remedial scheme: Even if Rodriguez has no alternative remedy, that alone is not dispositive, “because, ‘even in the absence of an alternative, a Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment[.]’” Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 205 (alteration in original) (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)); see Meshal, 804 F.3d at 425 (holding that no Bivens remedy was available, even in the absence of an alternative remedy for the plaintiff). And, as previously discussed, Congress has declined to adopt a statutory remedial structure. As previously noted, separations-of-powers principles underlie this point. Even “if equitable remedies prove insufficient,” and if “a damages remedy might be necessary to redress past harm and deter future violations,” still, “the decision to recognize a damages remedy requires an assessment of its impact on governmental operations systemwide.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858. Such concerns are considerable and wide-ranging. They include “the burdens on Government employees who are sued personally, as well as the projected costs and consequences to the Government itself when the tort and monetary liability mechanisms of the legal system are used to bring about the proper formulation and implementation of public policies.” Id. “These and other considerations may make it less probable that Congress would want the Judiciary to entertain a damages suit in a given case.” Id. 70 RODRIGUEZ V. SWARTZ It is true, as the majority observes, that Bivens serves, in part, to deter individual officers. Id. at 1860. However, “the absence of a federal remedy does not mean the absence of deterrence” because “criminal investigations and prosecutions are already a deterrent.” Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 821. As is evident from the Department of Justice’s ongoing criminal prosecution of Agent Swartz, “[t]he threat of criminal prosecution for abusive conduct is not hollow.” Id. In any event, “Abbasi makes clear that, when there is ‘a balance to be struck’ between countervailing policy considerations like deterrence and national security, ‘[t]he proper balance is one for the Congress, not the Judiciary, to undertake.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1863). Applying that instruction to this case, how best to deter any future abusive conduct by Border Patrol agents is not our determination to make. Contrary to the majority, I conclude that several special factors prevent us from implying a damages remedy in this case. The special factors in this case are weighty, and counsel strongly against judicial interference “in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 (quoting Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18).