Opinion ID: 1333278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the lewis appeal

Text: Ms. Lewis also appeals from the December 5, 1996, order of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County. Essentially, Lewis contends that family law master Gallagher and the circuit court did not accurately classify the parties' property as marital or separate property because the family law master and the circuit court failed to allow a proper adjudication of the parties' separation date. As stated above, Chafin contends that the parties separated on March 31, 1993, and Lewis contends that the parties separated on August 29, 1993. Specifically, Lewis asserts that if it is, in fact, determined that the parties did not separate until August 29, 1993, the portion of the attorney fees from the parties' law practice subject to declaration as marital property would substantially increase. Thus, the sole issue in the Lewis appeal is whether family law master Gallagher and the circuit court committed error in refusing to permit Lewis to present evidence that the parties separated on August 29, 1993. According to the proffer submitted by Lewis, the parties lived together, traveled together, vacationed together and worked together through August 1993. As indicated above, family law master Gallagher relied upon the bifurcation order of December 28, 1994, which indicated that March 31, 1993, was the parties' separation date. The $232,233 in equitable distribution payable to Lewis recommended by family law master Gallagher included her marital share of the attorney fees in question, based upon the March 1993 date. Specifically, as stated above, the portion of a particular fee declared to be marital property was determined by calculating the percentage of the work done in the case prior to March 31, 1993. For example, one of the parties' cases was King v. Mobile Drilling, and the attorney fee therein was $25,625. Inasmuch as 80% of the legal work in the case was found to have resulted from the efforts of the parties prior to the March 1993 separation date, $20,500 (80% of $25,625) was determined to be marital property. In another case, only 5% of the work resulted prior to the March 1993 separation date. According to Lewis, the percentages to be classified as marital property would substantially increase, based upon an August 29, 1993, separation date. [20] Chafin asserts, however, that March 31, 1993, was the true separation date of the parties and that, accordingly, the marital property division ordered by family law master Gallagher and the circuit court was proper with regard to the attorney fee issue. According to Chafin, although Lewis may be entitled to recover for her post-March 1993 legal work on a quantum meruit basis, she is not entitled to recover for post-March 1993 legal work upon a marital property basis. See, n. 5, supra. See also, Statler v. Dodson, 195 W.Va. 646, 654, 466 S.E.2d 497, 505 (1995), and syl., Clayton v. Martin, 108 W.Va. 571, 151 S.E. 855 (1930), indicating that a departing attorney is entitled to the value of his or her services, rather than to the whole contingent fee. Primarily, however, Chafin contends that Lewis waived the separation date issue by not contesting his testimony upon that point during the bifurcation hearing before family law master Diana L. Johnson and by not pursuing that issue until the matter was before family law master Gallagher. As indicated above, Chafin was not cross-examined after testifying before family law master Johnson that the parties separated in March 1993. The resulting bifurcation order of December 28, 1994, stated that the parties separated on or about March, 1993. In Metzner v. Metzner, 191 W.Va. 378, 446 S.E.2d 165 (1994), a husband and wife separated in March 1989 and were later divorced. During the marriage, the husband practiced law, and the wife worked as a secretary. With regard to the distribution of the parties' property, the wife asserted that she had a marital property interest in any contingent fees that her husband may ultimately receive from his pending cases. Concluding that the wife's assertion had merit, this Court, in Metzner, indicated that the portion of the husband's fees attributable to work performed prior to the separation of the parties constituted marital property. Specifically, syllabus point 5 of Metzner holds: Contingent and other future earned fees which an attorney might receive as compensation for cases pending at the time of a divorce should be treated as marital property for purposes of equitable distribution. However, only that portion of the fee that represents compensation for work done during the marriage is actually marital property as defined by our statute. Because the ultimate value of a contingent fee case remains uncertain until the case is resolved, a court must retain continuing jurisdiction over the matter in order to determine how to effectuate an equitable distribution of this property. Syl. pt. 2, White v. Williamson, 192 W.Va. 683, 453 S.E.2d 666 (1994). See, C.W. Davis, Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Attorney's Contingent Fee Contracts as Marital Property Subject to Distribution, 44 A.L.R.5th 671 (1996), citing Metzner; L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Division of Fees or Compensation Between Cooperating Attorneys, 73 A.L.R.2d 991 (1960). See also, syl. pt. 3, Shaffer v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 199 W.Va. 428, 485 S.E.2d 12 (1997), stating that [w]hen attorneys jointly undertake to represent a client there is a rebuttable presumption that the attorneys are to equally share any recovery of attorney's fees. Accordingly, as Metzner demonstrates, the separation date of the parties is critical to Lewis' attorney fee claims, in terms of marital property. Thus, Lewis seeks an opportunity to present evidence to the effect that the parties did not separate until August 29, 1993. [21] As indicated above, however, Chafin asserts that Lewis waived that opportunity. In resolving this controversy, an analysis of the bifurcation of this action is required. The motion to bifurcate the divorce relief from the issues concerning the distribution of property was filed by Mr. Chafin in November 1994 pursuant to Rule 30 of this Court's Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Law. That Rule states in part: The family law master and the circuit judge shall not order bifurcation in a divorce proceeding unless (a) there is a compelling reason to grant the divorce prior to resolving issues related to alimony, child support and distribution of property, (b) neither party will be prejudiced by the bifurcation, and (c) a temporary order has been entered granting alimony, child support, and any other relief. (emphasis added) See, syl. pt. 1, Holst v. MacQueen, 184 W.Va. 620, 403 S.E.2d 22 (1991), stating that [i]n a divorce proceeding bifurcation is proper when there is a compelling reason to separate the divorce issue from the related property issues, and neither party will be prejudiced by the bifurcation. In this action, the ostensible clarity of the March 1993 separation date expressed in the December 28, 1994, bifurcation order is surrounded by equivocation. First, the testimony of Chafin notwithstanding, his motion to bifurcate stated that, [a]lthough the parties disagree as to the date of separation, for purposes of this motion the date of separation will be considered as August 29, 1993, when [Lewis] abandoned the marital home in Williamson, West Virginia, and moved to Charleston. Second, a review of the transcript of the hearing upon the motion reveals that family law master Johnson acknowledged that the separation date was in dispute. Third, and most important, the December 28, 1994, order granting bifurcation, although stating that the parties separated on or about March, 1993, also stated, however: (1) that [s]ubstantial property issues have arisen between the parties with regard to equitable distribution of property, (2) that bifurcation would not prejudice either party and (3) that all other unresolved issues, including but not limited to equitable distribution, were to be held in abeyance. Finally, even the final order of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County, entered on December 5, 1996, indicated that the December 28, 1994, bifurcation order remanded certain issues, including issues of equitable distribution, for further proceedings. Clearly, therefore, the establishment of March 1993 as the true separation date of the parties, by way of the December 28, 1994, bifurcation order, is in doubt. Nor do the circumstances herein indicate that Lewis waived her objection to the March 1993 date. As explained above, prior to the entry of the December 28, 1994, order, Lewis filed exceptions to family law master Johnson's conclusions that bifurcation should be granted and that an order divorcing the parties should be entered. Although Lewis did not discuss therein the dispute concerning the date of separation, the exceptions alleged that there were no compelling reasons to grant the divorce prior to resolving issues relating to distribution of property. After the action was transferred to Monongalia County, Lewis, in September 1996, specifically challenged family law master Gallagher's acceptance of March 31, 1993, as the parties' separation date. Here, the August 9, 1996, recommended order of the family law master contained no findings of fact with regard to the parties' separation date. Rather, the family law master relied upon the bifurcation order of December 28, 1994, which indicated that March 1993 was the separation date. However, as explained above, the December 28, 1994, order was clearly prejudicial to Lewis' attorney fee claims concerning the parties' practice of law, in spite of the admonition of Rule 30 that bifurcation shall not be allowed if it would prejudice the parties. Moreover, the bifurcation order indicated that the equitable distribution issues would be resolved at a later date. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the family law master and the circuit court committed error in refusing to permit Lewis to present evidence that the parties separated on August 29, 1993. Consequently, we remand this action to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing limited to that determination and to its effect upon the attorney fee claims of Lewis under Metzner.