Opinion ID: 77333
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficient Evidence Supported Nunez's Conviction for Conspiracy.

Text: 44 Nunez argues the government failed to prove that he was the person recorded on the phone calls, the phone calls involved illegal activity, the phone calls referred to cocaine, or the phone calls were part of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Each argument fails. 45 First, a jury reasonably could have concluded that Nunez was the speaker in the five phone calls. Self-identification and telephone subscriber information are recognized means to establish the identity of persons speaking in recorded conversations. See United States v. Green, 40 F.3d 1167, 1173 (11th Cir.1994). Three of the calls were to or from Nunez's cell phone. In the fourth call, Cuevas asked for Hector and an unidentified female said that Hector had just returned from Houston. Nunez's first name is Hector and he is from Houston. In that same call, Hector and Cuevas call each other cuz. Nunez and Cuevas are cousins. 46 The fifth call was subject to comparison by the jury with the first four calls because the government played all the calls at trial. The jury had the opportunity to compare the voice, matter of discussion, manner of speech, and use of language in the fifth call with these qualities and characteristics in the first four calls. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see Miranda, 425 F.3d at 959, and a jury reasonably could have concluded that Nunez was the speaker on these five phone calls. 47 Second, a jury reasonably could have concluded that the recorded conversations involved illegal activity. Nunez and Cuevas discuss shirts, a lady, a truck driver, McAllen, and Ruthie. Special Agent Cromer testified that shirts means cocaine and sometimes methamphetamine, lady means cocaine, and he believed Ruthie referred to drugs. Cromer explained that McAllen is a city in Texas that is an entry point for drugs smuggled into the United States from Mexico and the word trailer refers to a tractor trailer[,] which is one of the common forms of how to transport drugs from McAllen, Texas, to Atlanta. A cooperating co-conspirator also testified that, in his conversations with Cuevas, one shirt meant an ounce of cocaine. The combination of testimony about the meaning of coded language and conversations that make little facial sense at all but gain a great deal of meaning when viewed as coded references to dealings in [drugs], United States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366, 370 n. 4 (5th Cir.1980), was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Cuevas and Nunez's conversations were about drugs. 48 Third, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the conversations were about cocaine or methamphetamine. Mojica testified that an ounce of cocaine is one shirt. Cromer testified that shirts meant cocaine, and sometimes methamphetamine. Cromer also testified that lady meant cocaine. The phone calls support the inference that Nunez was transporting something and it was reasonable to conclude that that something was cocaine. 49 Fourth, it was reasonable for a jury to conclude that the phone calls were related to the charged conspiracy. Nunez contends that a buyer-seller relationship is not sufficient to prove a conspiracy. We recognize that two parties . . . charged with agreeing to distribute drugs might not be guilty of conspiracy when the evidence [demonstrates] that the parties understood their transactions to do no more than support the buyer's personal drug habit, United States v. Dekle, 165 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir.1999), but there was ample evidence that Nunez was involved in much more than supplying whatever personal drug habit Cuevas might have had. Nunez participated in the transportation of drugs in cooperation with the ringleader of the charged conspiracy and used at least some of the same coded language to discuss that conspiracy as had at least one other conspirator. The jury reasonably could have concluded that Nunez was involved in the conspiracy charged in the indictment. D. Sufficient Evidence Supported Garcia's Conviction for Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime. 50 Garcia argues that the district court erroneously concluded that sufficient evidence supported his conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. A person violates federal law when during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . [he] uses or carries a firearm, or. . . , in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). To be in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, there must be some nexus between the firearm and the drug selling operation. United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). This argument fails. 51 Because Garcia testified that the firearm belonged to him, the only question is whether he possessed it in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Garcia testified that he did not possess the firearm to protect the money, but when a defendant chooses to testify, he runs the risk that if disbelieved `the jury might conclude the opposite of his testimony is true.' Brown, 53 F.3d at 314 (quoting Atkins, 965 F.2d at 961 n. 7). Because a statement by a defendant, if disbelieved by the jury, may be considered as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt, id., the jury was free not only to conclude that Garcia possessed the firearm to protect the money, but also to rely upon that conclusion to convict Garcia. A conclusion of guilt based on Garcia's testimony would have been supported by evidence that Garcia's firearm was in the open drawer of the nightstand in the bedroom, the bedroom and adjoining bathroom contained drugs, a bedroom closet contained a large amount of money that Garcia openly admitted he suspected to be drug proceeds, and Garcia was concerned someone might try to take the money. Sufficient evidence supported Garcia's conviction under section 924.