Opinion ID: 1247657
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Asian Prospective Jurors

Text: The first Asian prospective juror discussed by the prosecutor was Sharon Fukada. As an objective reason for striking her, he said she did not approve of the death penalty, was strong about that.... As a summary of Ms. Fukada's view the statement is both exaggerated and incomplete. Although she did not approve of the death penalty, she was certainly not strong in that belief: she repeatedly assured the court that she would not be reluctant to vote for death if it was the appropriate penalty under the evidence and instructions in this case. She reiterated that position several more times in close questioning by the prosecutor. Indeed, when asked by him for an example in which she could vote for death, she suggested felony-murder rape; and she expressly stated she would not automatically vote for life in a felony-murder robbery, which was the People's theory in the case at bar. Next the prosecutor complained that she said she couldn't pass judgment. The record is otherwise: Ms. Fukada did not say she was unable to pass judgment under any circumstances; she explained rather that It is hard for me to say I could [judge the defendants] right now, because she had not heard the evidence and the law. But when the prosecutor made clear that she could answer in the abstract, she stated she would be able to vote to convict if the facts warranted it. The prosecutor asked if she was sure about that and she replied, I would say that I am sure. The prosecutor was not similarly troubled, moreover, by other jurors who were initially uncertain whether they could pass judgment in this case. For example, Juror Mary Heinrich repeatedly voiced grave doubts whether she would be able to vote at all on the issue of penalty: she had previously served on a jury in a murder case in Alaska, and even though that state does not have a death penalty she found it a hard and traumatic experience that left her very loath to play God. During a long and arduous voir dire on this single issue by the court, by defense counsel and by the prosecutor, Mrs. Heinrich answered time after time that she simply did not know if she could sit in judgment on this case. Under continued questioning she eventually said she probably could do so; and it was only when the court insisted on an unqualified answer that she affirmatively stated  with obvious reluctance  that she could pass judgment. Despite this performance the prosecutor allowed Mrs. Heinrich to serve as a juror. As his final reason for striking Ms. Fukada the prosecutor charged that she had some trouble understanding the questions on voir dire, and either had a language difficulty or there might have been an intelligence problem. This harsh criticism finds little or no support in the record. It is true Ms. Fukada candidly admitted that when the questions are lengthy I get lost along the way. But this is not unusual, as shown by the fact that the prosecutor immediately acknowledged to her, I have a tendency to do that myself. A number of the questions asked of Ms. Fukada were indeed long and complicated, involving legal procedures unfamiliar to laypersons [30] still other questions were, to put it charitably, awkwardly phrased. [31] In the circumstances Ms. Fukada's answers were as prompt and direct as could reasonably be expected of a layperson called to serve on her first jury  in a trial, moreover, in which two defendants were charged with capital crime. The court and counsel also found it necessary to rephrase or explain many of the questions they asked of other prospective jurors, including most of those selected to serve. There is nothing to distinguish Ms. Fukada in this respect. Nor are the prosecutor's speculations about a language difficulty or an intelligence problem plausible on this record. Although of Japanese descent, Ms. Fukada was born and raised in Mountain View and Watsonville, attended two years of community college in Southern California studying animal health technology, at the time of trial was attending Foothill Community College studying accounting, and had worked for four years in the accounting department of Fairchild. The only subjective reasons offered by the prosecutor for striking Ms. Fukada were that she seemed very shy and perhaps even younger than her age (26), and I noticed [her] staring off when being questioned by the court. The prosecutor did not further explain these reasons, and none is verifiable. The second Asian prospective juror discussed by the prosecutor was Miranda Wong. As an objective reason for the challenge [32] the prosecutor said she preferred ... life without possibility of parole. The facts are not so simple. Ms. Wong explained that largely because of her religious education she used to believe that all murderers deserved to die, but that she now leaned more towards life imprisonment because of problems of proof. Nevertheless she assured the court several times that she would not be reluctant to vote for death if it was the appropriate penalty under the facts and the law. She reiterated this assurance to the prosecutor, and also agreed that she could vote for death for one defendant even if that penalty was not appropriate for the other. Her assurances were identical to those given by other jurors preferring life imprisonment, which were accepted by the prosecutor. Next the prosecutor complained that she mentioned that she was concerned that the case be proven without any doubt. The record is to the contrary. The prosecutor went into the matter at length in his voir dire, reviewing with Mrs. Wong the difference between the law's standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the higher standard of scientific proof. He illustrated the point by reference to Mrs. Wong's job as a laboratory technician analyzing blood samples: if she was uncertain of a result in her work she could draw another sample and run the test again or run it differently, whereas as a juror she would have to reach her decision on the fixed quantity of evidence presented to her; for this reason her standard of proof as a juror could not be scientific certainty but proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Mrs. Wong immediately understood, and agreed that I think my work and this case are two different things. She restated the difference in her own words, and the prosecutor commended her for giving an accurate summation of the matter. She then assured him she would have no problem with applying the law's standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in this case, and he appeared to accept that assurance. The prosecutor next gave as a reason for challenging Mrs. Wong that she felt it was hard to judge someone. The record shows that although she first said it would be hard to do so, she immediately told the court she would be able to judge when it was needed. [33] In his voir dire the prosecutor returned briefly to the topic and asked, Would it make you feel bad to have to decide who's telling the truth and who isn't? Mrs. Wong squarely replied, No. The prosecutor then dropped the subject, agreeing with her that You mentioned that it was hard to judge someone, which, of course, is true, it is. Mrs. Wong's actual position on this point was thus entirely unremarkable, and was shared by many of the jurors subsequently selected to serve. Finally the prosecutor complained, She contested a speeding ticket against a police officer and apparently lost that ticket and she had some feeling about that. Again the prosecutor grossly exaggerated the significance of the incident. The record shows that about two years before this trial Mrs. Wong received a ticket for speeding, and went to traffic court to tell her side of the story. The arresting officer did not appear. She admitted she had been speeding, and disagreed only on how much faster than the limit she had been driving. [34] Because it was a first offense, the court was lenient; and contrary to the prosecutor's claim that she had some feeling about the outcome of the incident, the record shows that Mrs. Wong harbored no resentment whatever that could have biased her against the prosecution in this case. [35] More important, the fact that the prosecutor mentioned the incident at all as a reason for striking Mrs. Wong is further proof of the disparate treatment he accorded these minority prospective jurors. As we have seen, he also singled out prior traffic tickets as reasons for striking Jewish prospective juror Sobel and Black prospective jurors Storey and Tamboura. Yet the record reveals that of the 14 empaneled jurors and alternates who were asked the same question, no less than 11 admitted they had also received traffic tickets, and in each case the prosecutor was unconcerned by the incident and accepted the juror's assurance that it would not bias him or her in the present trial. Perhaps the most dramatic example was that of Juror Reguero, who admitted on voir dire that (1) in 1970 or 1971, while driving under the influence of alcohol, he struck and injured a person; (2) he was arrested by a policeman who handcuffed him behind his back while taking him into custody; (3) although the offense was a felony, his attorney obtained a reduction of the charge to a misdemeanor; (4) he was again arrested for drunk driving only six months before the present trial; (5) he felt the second arrest was a bum rap because although he had had probably three drinks he did not think he was legally drunk; [36] (6) his attorney obtained a reduction of the charge to reckless driving; and (7) the incident cost him $200 for the fine, $60 to release his car from impound, plus, as he put it, six hundred bucks for the attorney. I thought that was a bummer. Despite these repeated expressions of resentment by the juror, the prosecutor accepted at face value his assertion that the experiences would not bias him against the People. [37] Indeed, the prosecutor brushed the whole matter aside with the remark, We all get a traffic ticket once in awhile. Yet his tolerance in this respect was highly selective: when Jewish prospective juror Sobel and Black prospective jurors Storey and Tamboura and Asian prospective juror Wong admitted to receiving traffic tickets for much less serious offenses and likewise said the incidents would not bias them against the People, the prosecutor refused to accept their assurances and cited their tickets as a reason for striking them from the jury.