Opinion ID: 202976
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defamation Under Maine Law

Text: To prove defamation under Maine law, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant made a false statement that lower[ed][her] in the estimation of the community. Ballard v. Wagner, 877 A.2d 1083, 1087 (Me.2005) (quoting Schoff v. York County, 761 A.2d 869, 871 (Me.2000)). Accordingly, truth is an absolute defense to a charge of defamation. Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94, 106 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying Maine law). False statements are defamatory per se if they relate to a profession, occupation, or official station in which the plaintiff was employed. See Saunders v. VanPelt, 497 A.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Me. 1985). In such cases, malice is implied as a matter of law, and a plaintiff may recover a compensatory award without proving special damages. Farrell v. Kramer, 159 Me. 387, 193 A.2d 560, 562 (1963). Per se defamation may not be actionable, however, if it is privileged. See Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 A. 411, 413 (1896). A conditional privilege against liability for defamation arises in settings where society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered speech. Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 69 (Me.1991). The parties agree that Merrill Lynch's statement in the U-5 is conditionally privileged under Maine law. While a conditional (or qualified) privilege does not change the actionable quality of words published, it rebuts the inference of malice that is imputed in the absence of the privilege. See Saunders, 497 A.2d at 1124. Where a conditional privilege exists, liability for defamation attaches only if the person who made the defamatory statements loses the privilege [by] abusing it. Lester, 596 A.2d at 69. A conditional privilege may be abused if the defamatory statement is made with reckless disregard as to its falsity. See Cole v. Chandler, 752 A.2d 1189, 1194 (Me.2000).