Opinion ID: 2049393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the insurance company defendants' cross appeal

Text: As we have indicated previously herein, the trial court effectively treated each count of the plaintiff's complaint alleging violations of the state constitution as two separate counts alleging separate theories of recovery and concluded that his claims under the individual theory of entitlement must be dismissed. In their cross appeal, the insurance company defendants claim that the trial court improperly dismissed those claims. They contend that, regardless of whether the state acted as an agent for the plaintiff and others similarly situated, the plaintiff raised a valid claim of an unconstitutional taking under both his individual theory of entitlement and his group as a whole theory of entitlement because, if a trier of fact ultimately were to determine that the plaintiff and other similarly situated state employees are the true owners of the stock, the state's retention of the stock or the proceeds from its sale would unconstitutionally exclude the true owners from its use and possession. Thus, the insurance company defendants challenge the trial court's conclusion that, in the absence of an agency relationship, the state could not have interfered unconstitutionally with the plaintiff's property rights. The insurance company defendants also claim that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff's constructive trust and resulting trust claims on the ground that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar claims for declaratory or injunctive relief. The state counters that the insurance company defendants lack standing to bring this cross appeal because the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the state did not affect any specific personal or legal interest of the insurance company defendants. We agree with the state. Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action.... Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved.... The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all the members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that the specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.... Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest ... has been adversely affected. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Briggs v. McWeeny, 260 Conn. 296, 308-309, 796 A.2d 516 (2002). If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.... A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 286 Conn. 264, 271, 943 A.2d 420 (2008). The state claims that the insurance company defendants lack standing to cross appeal from the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the state because the insurance company defendants have raised no claims against the state. Because the plaintiff's claims against the insurance company defendants are entirely distinct from his claims against the state, the state argues, the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the state does not affect the insurance company defendants. In response, the insurance company defendants contend that, because the practical effect of the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the state is to expose the insurance company defendants to the risk of a double recovery of the value of the stock, they have a specific interest in keeping the state as a party in the case. We recognize that, as a practical matter, permitting the plaintiff to pursue his claims against the state could reduce the insurance company defendants' risk of exposure to multiple recoveries. We also recognize that their interest in avoiding multiple recoveries against them probably would be sufficient to confer standing on them to bring a claim against the state, which are the claims at issue in the insurance company defendants' cross appeal. [19] We conclude, however, that the insurance company defendants have no legally protectible interest in the plaintiff's claims against the state. As the state points out, the plaintiff could have brought a claim for the stock solely against the insurance company defendants and he could withdraw his claims against the state at will. [20] We conclude, therefore, that the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the state did not deprive the insurance company defendants of anything in which they had a specific personal and legal interest.... Briggs v. McWeeny, supra, 260 Conn. at 308, 796 A.2d 516. Accordingly, we conclude that the insurance company defendants lack standing to bring their cross appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's constitutional claims against the state. [21]