Opinion ID: 805977
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Counsel in Atkins Proceedings

Text: The State asserts at the outset that we need not review the merits of Mr. Hooks’s ineffective-assistance claim because he has no right to counsel in an Atkins proceeding: [T]here is no clearly established federal law that guarantees Petitioner the right to counsel in a post-conviction mental retardation trial. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.” Post-conviction review “is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and is in fact considered to be civil in nature.” Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8 (1989). Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state postconviction proceedings[,]” and, “[c]onsequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). -50- Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim must fail. Aplee. Br. at 50 (alterations in original). As far as we can tell, this is a question of first impression in the federal courts. We reject the State’s argument. We have held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies as fully to an Atkins proceeding as to any other jury trial. See Ochoa, 669 F.3d at 1143. Included, or “implicit,” within the “liberty” secured by the Due Process Clause is the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–44 (1963). That right, “a bedrock principle in our justice system” and “the foundation for our adversary system,” Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012), is grounded in the “obvious truth” that a person “cannot be assured a fair trial” without the effective advocacy of his attorney, id. (quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344) (internal quotation marks omitted). On this basis alone, we think we are justified in holding that the right to effective assistance of counsel extends to jury-based Atkins proceedings of the kind employed in Oklahoma. The State seeks to deflect this conclusion by analogizing an Atkins proceeding to state postconviction proceedings where, it is true, “[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). Whatever the value of that analogy in other contexts, it is merely superficial here. Mr. Hooks’s Atkins trial was “postconviction” only in the strict chronological sense: Atkins was handed down in 2002, after Mr. Hooks had been convicted in 1989. Of far greater importance is that his 2004 Atkins trial was “the first designated proceeding” at which he could raise a claim of -51- mental retardation. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317. No court had yet addressed his claim, the Atkins jury was the first to consider its merit, and Mr. Hooks had no “brief from counsel or an opinion of the court” on the issue. Id. In that situation, with Mr. Hooks surely “ill equipped to represent [himself],” id. (quoting Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 617 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted), the usual rationale for denying a right to counsel in postconviction proceedings is inapposite, cf. id.18 In any event, we think the State’s analogy also fails for a different reason. It is beyond cavil that “the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009). Under this rubric, whether Mr. Hooks has a right to counsel at his Atkins trial depends on two things: Is such a trial part of the “criminal proceedings”? And is it a “critical stage” of them? On the first question, contrary to the State’s contention, we think an Atkins trial is “part of the criminal proceeding itself” and not “civil in nature.” Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 8 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556–57 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In one sense, it is analogous to a competency hearing. See United States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that a competency hearing is a “critical stage” of the criminal proceedings such that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, and citing other circuits that agree). 18 We wonder, too, whether the retroactive applicability of Atkins to cases on collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)—“the only such new rule” since AEDPA’s enactment in 1996, Ochoa, 669 F.3d at 1142 n.9—makes void, as a matter of law, any “postconviction” character that an Atkins proceeding might have. -52- More importantly, an Atkins trial is inextricably intertwined with sentencing. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (“[The Eighth Amendment] ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405)). And there is no doubt that sentencing is part of the criminal proceedings. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (holding that sentencing is a “critical stage” of the criminal proceedings such that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches). As to the second question, we harbor little doubt that an Atkins trial is a “critical stage,” that is, “a step of a criminal proceeding” that holds “significant consequences for the accused.” Cone, 535 U.S. at 696. We are hard-pressed to imagine a more “significant consequence[] for the accused” than a determination of whether the State has the power to take his life. We come, then, to the question of clearly established federal law. We have concluded that defendants in Atkins proceedings have the right to effective counsel secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. But that does not perforce answer the question of whether that right is clearly established. Based on our analysis below of the nature of the right and its nexus to the proceedings allowable under Atkins, however, we further conclude that the right to counsel flows directly from, and is a necessary corollary to, the clearly established law of Atkins. Cf. Ochoa, 669 F.3d at 1143. Consequently, we hold that the right to counsel in Atkins proceedings is “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). To be sure, as we must, we acknowledge that the Supreme Court has never said that defendants -53- have a right to counsel in Atkins proceedings, nor has it ever identified such a proceeding as one of the “critical stages” to which the right attaches. So it might be said that the Court’s “cases provide no categorical answer” to our question, Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 125, or that the Court “has never addressed [this] claim,” Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76. But we are deeply troubled by that prospect and find that reasoning to be ultimately untenable under the law. The idea that a mentally retarded defendant has a right not to be executed by the State, but not a right to counsel in proceedings where the question of mental retardation will be determined, smacks of the absurd. Can a person with “diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, . . . [and] to engage in logical reasoning,” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, be expected to argue his own condition to a court or jury? On the contrary, the more persuasively he argued his case, the more he would doom it, and if he could not help but perform poorly, he would be unable to carry his burden of proof. Having no right to counsel in a mental-retardation proceeding—at least where that proceeding is the first opportunity to raise a claim of mental retardation—could render Atkins a nullity. We “should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as” human beings. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949) (plurality opinion). Guideposts erected long ago mark out the proper path here. The right to counsel is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial”—a necessity, not a luxury. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342, 344 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted). [The defendant] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in -54- the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (emphasis added). We think these concerns are heightened still further when a defendant’s life, rather than liberty, is at stake. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country.”). Therefore, we hold that defendants in Atkins proceedings have the right to effective counsel secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments—a right that stems directly from, and is a necessary corollary to, Atkins. For that reason, we further hold that the right to counsel in Atkins proceedings is “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).