Opinion ID: 173190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “In custody” requirement

Text: 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides: The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. (Emphasis added.) “The ‘in custody’ language of § 2254 is jurisdictional and requires habeas petitioners to be ‘in custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack when they file the petition.” Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004). Triplet filed his § 2254 petition attacking his attempted escape conviction on April 6, 2006. At that time, he had already completed his two year sentence.8 However, he 8 In his pro se appellant brief, Triplet stated he was “no longer in custody on the challenged offense because [he] has already discharged that prison sentence” and referred to “Doc. 4.” (Appellant’s Br. at 2.) Because that document appeared to indicate he had completed his attempted escape sentence on December 22, 2004, we requested supplemental briefing from the parties as to whether Triplet was “in custody” on the attempted escape charge at the time he filed his § 2254 petition. In the supplemental briefs, neither Triplet (who was represented by appointed counsel) nor the State contested the December 22, 2004 date as the date of discharge. However, in his supplemental - 12 - was still serving the eight years remaining on the sentences that were ordered to run concurrent with his attempted escape sentence (the concurrent series). Additionally, he had yet to serve the two concurrent ten-year sentences (eight years suspended) which were ordered to run consecutive to the concurrent series. See hyperlink, n.8. The fact the attempted escape sentence was part of a consecutive series, with sentences remaining to be served within the consecutive series at the time he filed his § 2254 petition, is critical. In Peyton v. Rowe, two state prisoners serving consecutive sentences filed federal habeas petitions attacking convictions whose sentences were set to run second in the consecutive series, i.e., convictions whose sentences they were not yet serving. 391 U.S. 54, 55-57 (1968). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court determined they were “in custody” on the second convictions for purposes of federal habeas relief. It held that when a habeas petitioner is in custody under consecutive state sentences, those sentences should be considered in the aggregate or as a continuous series. Id. at 64-65. It reasoned that one of the purposes of the habeas corpus writ is to provide “swift judicial review of alleged unlawful restraints on liberty” and it is in both the government and defendant’s interests to have the claims determined before the lapse of time prejudices the truth- filings, Triplet referred to a document indicating Triplet’s reception date into the ODOC was December 22, 2004. Therefore, it is impossible for him to have completed his sentence on that date. Moreover, performing an offender search on the ODOC’s website, of which we take judicial notice, see Fed. R. Evid. 201, has revealed Triplet began his attempted escape sentence on December 22, 2004, and completed it on May 7, 2005. See http://docapp065p.doc.state.ok.us/servlet/page?_pageid=394&_dad=portal30&_schema=PORTA L30&doc_num=489669&offender_book_id=286523. These dates are more logical, given that Triplet did not enter his guilty plea until May 19, 2004. In any event, Triplet had already served his attempted escape sentence at the time he filed his § 2254 petition. - 13 - finding process. Id. at 59-64. Therefore, a prisoner serving consecutive sentences should not have to wait to challenge a sentence until he is actually serving it. Consequently, the Court determined the prisoners were considered “in custody” on the second sentence while they were serving the first sentence in the consecutive series. Id. at 67. Peyton’s holding was extended in Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39 (1995). There, a state prisoner serving consecutive sentences filed a § 2254 petition challenging the conviction whose sentence had already run. Relying on Peyton, specifically the fact that consecutive sentences are considered a continuous series, the Supreme Court held the prisoner was “in custody” for purposes of federal habeas relief. Id. at 41. A petitioner incarcerated under consecutive sentences “remains ‘in custody’ under all of his sentences until all are served.”9 Id.; see also Foster v. Booher, 296 F.3d 947, 949-50 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding petitioner was “in custody” under § 2254 even though he had served the sentence on the challenged conviction because that sentence ran consecutive to sentences which had not yet been served). The continuing series rationale of Garlotte and Foster controls here. Because Triplet’s attempted escape sentence was part of a consecutive series, he remained “in custody” on that sentence for purposes of federal habeas relief until all of the sentences in the consecutive series were served. At the time he filed his habeas petition, he had yet to serve the two concurrent ten-year (eight years suspended) sentences ordered to run 9 There was no need for the Court to carve out a similar rule for concurrent sentences. Because they run simultaneously, a defendant sentenced to concurrent sentences naturally remains “in custody” until all are served. - 14 - consecutive to the concurrent series containing the attempted escape sentence. Consequently, Triplet was “in custody” on the attempted escape conviction when he filed his petition even though he had already served the sentence. The State does not contend otherwise.