Opinion ID: 772290
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Designated Public Forum Versus Limited Public Forum

Text: 39 Here, then, our initial task is to determine whether the Pasco City Hall Gallery constituted a designated public forum or a limited public forum. If we classify the Gallery as a designated public forum, we must decide whether the city's decision to exclude plaintiffs' works was justified by a compelling interest. If, on the other hand, we determine that the Gallery is a limited public forum, we need only decide whether the exclusion was reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. 40 As the Supreme Court observed in Cornelius, government intent is the essential question in determining whether a designated public forum has been established: 41 The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for public discourse. Accordingly, the Court has looked to the policy and practice of the govern ment to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum. The Court has also examined the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity to discern the government's intent. 42 473 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added) (citing Perry , 460 U.S. at 46). 43 The policy and practice inquiries are intimately linked in the sense that an abstract policy statement purporting to restrict access to a forum is not enough. What matters is what the government actually does -specifically, whether it consistently enforces the restrictions on use of the forum that it adopted. Thus in Cornelius, where the Court held that a federal fundraising drive was not a designated public forum, the Court emphasized both the existence of a policy and its consistent application: 44 The Government's consistent policy has been to limit participation in the [fundraising drive ] to appropriate voluntary agencies and to require agencies seeking admission to obtain permission from federal and local Campaign officials. Although the record does not show how many organizations have been denied permission throughout the 24-year history of the [fundraising drive], there is no evidence suggesting that the granting of the requisite permission is merely ministerial. The Civil Service Commission . . . developed extensive admission criteria to limit access to the Campaign to those organizations considered appropriate. Such selective access, unsupported by evidence of a purposeful designation for public use, does not create a public forum. 45 473 U.S. at 804-05 (citations omitted); see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 47 (no designated public forum in a public school's internal mail system where the regular practice was to require permission from the individual school principal before access to the system was granted, and where permission had not been granted as a matter of course to all who [sought] to distribute material); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights , 418 U.S. 298, 302-304 (1974) (no designated public forum in advertising space on city buses where a city management contract required control over subject matter of displays, and such control was consistently exercised for more than twenty-five years); Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 1998) ([A] review of the city's standards and practices indicates that the city has not opened a public forum [for ads on its bus panels]. The city has consistently restricted political and religious advertising; upholding the exclusion of a religious anti-abortion ad), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1131 (1999). 9 46 Thus, consistency in application is the hallmark of any policy designed to preserve the non-public status of a forum. A policy purporting to keep a forum closed (or open to expression only on certain subjects) is no policy at all for purposes of public forum analysis if, in practice, it is not enforced or if exceptions are haphazardly permitted. See Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 5, 941 F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 1991) (in public forum analysis, actual practice speaks louder than words). 47 Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. SEPTA, 148 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068 (1999), is especially instructive in this regard. There, the Third Circuit considered a regional transit authority's decision to remove a poster adstating that Women Who Choose Abortion Suffer More & Deadlier Breast Cancer. Id., 148 F.3d at 244. The ad was removed when the transit authority received a letter in which the Assistant Secretary of Health in the United States Department of Health and Human Services stated that the ad was misleading and did not accurately reflect the weight of scientific evidence. See id. at 245. The contract for the ad provided that the transit authority reserved the right to remove any ads it deemed objectionable. Id. at 250-51. The court nevertheless rejected the transit authority's argument that,because it retained the sole discretion to reject or to remove any advertisement that it deems objectionable, it did not create a public forum of any sort in transit system advertising space. Id. at 251. 48 The court reached this conclusion after a careful review of the transit authority's past practice with respect to advertising, noting that it had accepted a broad range of advertisements for display, ranging from religious and political messages to explicit ads regarding safe sex, abstinence, and AIDS. Id. The transit authority had even allowed two ads favoring abortion rights. Id. at 251-52. On only three prior occasions had the transit authority requested advertisers to modify their ads. Id. at 252. At least in part because of the transit authority's practice of permitting virtually unlimited access to the forum, the court held that the ad space qualified as a designated public forum. Id. Indeed, the court held that the transit authority's long practice of allowing ads on controversial subjects as a `matter of course,'  id. at 254, trumped the general rule that no public forum is created when the government requires speakers to obtain permission before engaging in expressive activity in the forum. Id. at 252-55. 49 The Christ's Bride court followed a Seventh Circuit decision reaching a similar conclusion with respect to advertising space managed by Chicago's transit authority. In Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985), the transit authority refused to lease ad space to Planned Parenthood for abortion-related displays. Otherthan a general contractual directive . . . to refuse vulgar, immoral, or disreputable advertising, the court found that the transit authority maintained no policy or system of control over the ads it accepted and that it ha[d ] allowed its advertising space to be used for a wide variety of commercial, public service, public-issue, and political ads. 767 F.2d at 1232-33. Under these circumstances, the court held that the advertising space was a designated public forum. Other courts have held likewise. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 353 (6th Cir. 1998) (following Christ's Bride and noting that [w]e . . . must closely examine whether in practice [the transit authority] has consistently enforced its written policy in order to satisfy ourselves that [its ] stated policy represents its actual policy); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Dept. of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1153 (7th Cir. 1995) (The government may not `create' a policy to implement its newly discovered desire to suppress a particular message. Neither may the government invoke an otherwise unenforced policy to justify that suppression. Therefore, the government's stated policy, without more, is not dispositive with respect to the government's intent in a given forum.) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 50 Courts have also been reluctant to accept policies based on subjective or overly general criteria.  `[S]tandards for inclusion and exclusion' in a limited public forum `must be unambiguous and definite' if the `concept of a designated public forum is to retain any vitality whatever.'  Christ's Bride, 148 F.3d at 251 (quoting Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Distr., 907 F.2d 1366, 1375 (3d Cir. 1990). Absent objective standards, government officials may use their discretion to interpret the policy as a pretext for censorship. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 244-45 (1990) (generalized definition of permissible content poses risk of arbitrary application); Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F. 3d 834, 845-46 (6th Cir. 2000) (broad discretion [given] to city officials [raises] possibility of discriminatory application of the policy based on viewpoint); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d at 560 (9th Cir. 1984) (vague standard has potential for abuse); Gregoire, 907 F.2d at 1374-75 (virtually unlimited discretion granted to city officials raises danger of arbitrary application); see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758-59 (1988) (absence of express standards in licensing context raises dual threat of biased administration of policy and self-censorship by licensees). Therefore, the more subjective the standard used, the more likely that the category will not meet the requirements of the first amendment. Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 575; see also Christ's Bride, 148 F.3d at 251 (suppression of speech under defective standard requires closer scrutiny). 51 In addition to these factors, courts examine the selectivity with which the forum was open to particular forms of expression. In general, the more restrictive the criteria for admission and the more administrative control over access, the less likely a forum will be deemed public. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998) (distinguishing the government's decision to make[ ] its property generally available to a certain class of speakers[from a situa-tion] when it does no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must then, as individuals, `obtain permission' to use it) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 570 (9th Cir. 1984) ([B]y granting [a private promoter] access to the[municipal amphitheater] for the presentation of music by a variety of performers, the City transformed publicly owned property into a public forum for expressive activity, even if the expressive activity is promoted by a single entity.). 52 Finally, courts consider whether the expressive activity is consistent with the principal function of the forum. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804. This inquiry focuses on the specific space to which the would-be speaker seeks access, but should also take into account the context of the property as a whole. DiLoreto, 196 F.3d at 968. 53 It is undisputed that Pasco opened its display space to expressive activity by retaining the Arts Council to manage a gallery with exhibitions by local artists. This evinces an intent to create a designated public forum. Pasco argues, however, that its stated policy--memorialized in the agreement with the Arts Council--demonstrates that it did not intend to establish a public forum, but only to display noncontroversial art. Put otherwise, the city contends that it opened only a limited (rather than a designated) public forum. This argument is unpersuasive. 54 The city's so-called policy of non-controversy became no policy at all because it was not consistently enforced and because it lacked any definite standards. Prior to the exclusion of the works at issue here, the city neither pre-screened submitted works, nor exercised its asserted right to exclude works. Indeed, controversial artwork was exhibited despite complaints from citizens and employees. Given the undisputed facts in the record concerning the selection and screening process for art to be displayed at City Hall (or, rather, the lack thereof), we conclude that the city retained no substantive control over the content of the arts program. Both Luhrs and Crutchfield testified that they left content screening to the Arts Council, and Luhrs' letter to Gurth confirms that he expected her to ensure the propriety of the exhibits. The record is clear that the Arts Council itself undertook no screening and, that it affirmatively solicited the purportedly controversial works at issue here. Combined with the fact that the city established no specific criteria for exclusion of art from the program, we are bound to conclude that the city opened its halls to expressive activity and thereby created a designated public forum in the art gallery. Because the city's decision to exclude the works by Hooper and Rupp was unjustified by any compelling state interest (a subject discussed more fully at section III(a)(3) infra), we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Pasco. 55 Turning to the artists' cross-motion for partial summary judgment, we are obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the city. We must therefore assume that, as a matter of policy, Pasco expressly retained a final say, or discretion to exclude controversial works, and that, at least at the outset, Crutchfield and Luhrs intended the exhibit to be limited to uncontroversial works (whatever that may mean). Pasco argues that this proves that it did not intend to create a public forum, or alternatively, that any forum created was expressly limited to uncontroversial art. 10 Under the authorities discussed above, however, Pasco cannot hide behind its policy if that policy is inconsistent with the city's actual practice. Under the facts presented, we find inconsistency as a matter of law. 56 Certain facts are undisputed. First, the city concedes that it exerted little or no substantive control over the selection and content of the art work displayed at City Hall. The arts program was open to art work of any form, and there was no prescreening of exhibits prior to Hopper's submission. Therefore, the basic structure of Pasco's arts program suggests an intent to permit unrestricted expression. Second, despite its stated policy of avoiding controversial art, Pasco never established criteria by which to assess whether or not a work would fall within the policy. Instead, application of the policy was left entirely to the discretion of city administrators. 57 The potential for abuse of such unbounded discretion is heightened by the inherently subjective nature of the standard itself. 11 A ban on controversial art may all too easily lend itself to viewpoint discrimination, a practice forbidden even in limited public fora. 12 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (describing the inability of government officials to make principled distinctions on matters of taste and warning that censorship on this basis offers a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (permitting civil liability for outrageous social commentary invites viewpoint discrimination); see also Federal Communications Corp. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) ([T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it . . . . government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.). Not only was Pasco's policy intrinsically flawed, its enforcement of the policy was, in practice, contingent upon the subjective reaction of viewers of the artwork, as perceived by the city management. 13 Such censorship by public opinion only adds to the risk of constitutional impropriety. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-409 (1989) (invalidating ban on flag-burning where offense hinges on audience reaction). 58 This is not to say that community standards of decency have no place in the regulation of government property; our cases merely insist that such standards be reduced to objective criteria set out in advance. In the absence of such guideposts, we must scrutinize Pasco's actual practice all the more closely for apparent inconsistency or abuse in enforcing the policy. 59 A review of the art work displayed during Pasco's short lived series of exhibits demonstrates that the concerns articulated in the preceding paragraphs are by no means hypothetical. It is undisputed that works involving nudity were displayed in earlier exhibitions without apparent negative comment. Pasco's post-hoc distinction between the abstracted depictions of nudity in these works and the perceived sexual nature of Hopper and Rupp's submissions does not erase the suspicion that a double-standard might have been applied. Cf. Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 758 (discussing the potential for administrators to concoct post-hoc rationalizations for inconsistent treatment in the absence of substantive standards). 60 Such suspicion is brought into sharp relief by the city's handling of the Starving Man sculpture. It is undisputed that this work actually did generate negative feedback and, thus, would appear to fall, at least prima facie, within the terms of the prohibition on controversial art work. 14 Both the city and dissent cite testimony that the controversy surrounding the Starving Man sculpture never rose to the level created by the work of Hopper and Rupp and thus cannot be taken as evidence of any genuine inconsistency in Pasco's enforcement of its policy. Given the posture of summary judgment, we must accept such testimony unchallenged. Even so, Pasco has failed to articulate any basis to validate its asserted distinction in the degree of controversialness separating the respective art work other than the entirely subjective and ad hoc reactions of the limited subset of viewers whose opinions came to the attention of city administrators. To remand for trial of this issue under such a standard would only yield a verdict as arbitrary as the standard itself. Moreover, to sanction the suppression of speech on this basis would be to abdicate meaningful judicial review. See id. (without express standards, the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are far too easy.). 61 Having effectively opened its doors to all comers, subject only a standardless standard, Pasco has failed to exercise the clear and consistent control over the exhibits in city hall that our cases require to maintain a limited public forum. Its stated policy is belied by objective indicia of a contrary intent. Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1991). 15 62 Other factors considered by courts in designated public forum analysis also favor the artists here. Unlike cases involving commercial speech, the purpose of the exhibitions here was purely aesthetic and expressive -the city hoped to promote and display the work of local artists as a means of beautifying the new city hall. Moreover, the nature of the property is consistent with the expressive activity at issue here. The city created the exhibition program and invited the participation of local artists because it hoped to increase the aesthetic appeal of the new city hall by adding art. Although there is some evidence that unrestricted artist expression could be deemed inappropriate for certain users of city hall, the dissent concedes that there is no evidence that the displays, even if controversial, would have directly affected the running of the city government. Nor is this a case involving advertising or commercial speech, where the government is engaged in commerce and where allowing certain expressive activity might harm advertising sales or tarnish business reputation. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-04; Children of the Rosary, 154 F.3d at 977-78. 63 For these reasons, with respect to the artists' motion for cross summary judgment, we hold that the city created a public forum, specifically a designated public forum, in the art displays.