Opinion ID: 1342412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Suppression of the Appellant's Statement

Text: The Appellant also contends that his statement should have been suppressed based upon what he characterizes as insufficient explanation, prior to the waiver of his Miranda [12] rights, regarding the magnitude of the crime with which he was subsequently charged. The Appellant maintains that although he waived his Miranda rights and executed the Miranda rights form, he was not clearly advised of the reason for his questioning. He also asserts that the Miranda rights form was devoid of any explanation of the possible criminal charges and penalties. The Appellant directs this Court's attention to language included in a footnote in State v. Goff 169 W.Va. 778, 289 S.E.2d 473 (1982), a case in which this Court addressed the assertion that an intellectually challenged defendant was not properly informed of the charges against him. In Goff, the defendant's prior activity as a police informant created the concern that he may have misinterpreted his role, believing that he was being asked to assist in solving a crime, rather than realizing that he was actually a suspect under investigation. The Court ultimately ruled that the confession was involuntary, under the totality of the circumstances. In discussing the quantum of information to be provided to a defendant prior to a waiver of Miranda rights, the Goff Court opined as follows in footnote eight: We believe that some information should be given to the defendant as to the nature of the charge in order that he can determine whether to intelligently and voluntarily exercise or waive his Miranda rights. 169 W.Va. at 785, 289 S.E.2d at 477. The State responds to the Appellant's assertions by emphasizing that the record clearly demonstrates that the Appellant was provided with his Miranda rights and that he waived those rights by reviewing, initialing, and signing an Interview and Miranda Rights Form. The Appellant does not assert that he suffered from any disability which would have affected his understanding of those rights. [13] Further, the present case is distinguishable from Goff in several respects. The Appellant herein does not assert any intellectual incapacity. Trooper First Class Scarbro testified that the Appellant was clearly advised of his Miranda rights before he was questioned. Because he was not yet under arrest, he could obviously not be advised that any particular charges were pending against him. Moreover, Trooper Scarbro testified that the Appellant was free to leave at any time. With regard to the Appellant's assertion that he was not fully aware of the reason for his questioning, this case is analogous to State v. Moore, 193 W.Va. 642, 457 S.E.2d 801 (1995). In that case, Moore also asserted that his confession was not voluntary because he had not been informed of the charges against him. This Court found such argument disingenuous, explaining that [a]lthough it appears that the police did not expressly tell Mr. Moore the nature of the charges against him, under the circumstances there could be no confusion about what Mr. Moore was being charged with. 193 W.Va. at 648, 457 S.E.2d at 807. The same could be deduced in the present case. The Appellant was involved in an incident in which two people were fatally wounded. The gravity of the situation would not have been difficult to comprehend. When the Appellant presented this issue of suppression of the statement to the trial court, it denied the motion to suppress, reasoning [14] that the Appellant's statement should not be suppressed based upon the interviewing officer's failure to inform the Appellant that he could become a suspect in the murder investigation or that he would be subject to a certain penalty if convicted. This Court has consistently held that considerable deference is to be provided to the trial court's decision regarding the voluntariness of a confession. In syllabus point four of Moore, this Court explained that `[a] trial court's decision regarding the voluntariness of a confession will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or clearly against the weight of the evidence.' Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Vance, 162 W.Va. 467, 250 S.E.2d 146 (1978). Further, the totality of the circumstances must be assessed in a determination of the voluntariness of a confession. State v. Farley, 192 W.Va. 247, 253, 452 S.E.2d 50, 57 (1994). Based upon our review of this issue, we find no merit to the Appellant's claims that his statement should have been suppressed based upon the lack of information regarding the magnitude of the crime ultimately charged. We determine that the evidence in the record amply supports the trial court's ruling on this issue.