Opinion ID: 4526737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: applicability of neese

Text: ¶25 Applying the paradigm of Neese v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 2017 UT 89, 416 P.3d 663, and its ancestry, we determine that the Parole Board did not violate Blanke’s right to due process by considering him a sex offender for the purposes of sex offender treatment. Two facts here strip away the need for additional procedure. First, Blanke was convicted of attempted child kidnapping—a crime that, at the time of his conviction, required him to register as a sex offender. Second, he admitted in his presentence report, while benefiting from the extensive procedures of a sentencing hearing, to having sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old. If he were convicted of it, that admitted conduct would constitute a crime that would also require Blanke to register as a sex offender. 10 Cite as: 2020 UT 16 Opinion of the Court ¶26 Given the procedural protections that Blanke enjoyed in pleading guilty to attempted child kidnapping and in admitting to having sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old, more procedural protections were unnecessary to satisfy due process before the Parole Board could consider Blanke’s unconvicted sex offenses for purposes of sex offender treatment. 9 Additional procedures would neither substantially reduce the risk of error nor protect the appearance of fairness in the Parole Board’s decision that Blanke was a sex offender. Thus under our precedents, the Parole Board owed Blanke no more procedural protections before it decided that he is a sex offender.
¶27 Neese’s “unique procedural protections,” 2017 UT 89, ¶ 30, are not required by due process because Blanke was convicted of attempted child kidnapping. 10 As a result of that conviction, he is required under the Utah sex offender registration statute to register as a sex offender. Thus he has been adjudicated __________________________________________________________ 9 The concurrence says that “there is nothing in Neese that dictates this result” and that this “is a policy decision that we are making based on the facts of this particular case.” Infra ¶ 61. We disagree. We are not making a policy decision; rather, we are fulfilling our judicial role, which is to determine what procedural protections due process requires in this case. Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 911 (Utah 1993) (“Due process is flexible and calls for the procedural protections that the given situation demands.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) (“Precisely what due process requires of the board of pardons cannot be determined in the abstract, but must be determined only after the facts concerning the procedures followed by the board are [fleshed] out.”). And the principles of due process voiced in Neese and its ancestry require the result we reach today. 10 The crime of child kidnapping is committed when a person “intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law, and by any means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports a child under the age of 14 without the consent of the victim’s parent or guardian, or the consent of a person acting in loco parentis.” UTAH CODE § 76-5-301.1(1). 11 BLANKE v. BOARD OF PARDONS Opinion of the Court a sex offender, 11 and the Parole Board did not violate due process by refusing to afford him additional procedures before considering him to be a sex offender for parole purposes. ¶28 Blanke contends that he deserves the procedures in Neese. But the situation in Neese was very different from Blanke’s situation. Unlike the Neese inmate, Blanke has been adjudicated a sex offender. He was convicted of attempted child kidnapping.12 At the time of his conviction, attempted child kidnapping was a registerable offense under Utah’s sex offender registration statute. 13 So as a result of that conviction, Blanke had to register as a sex offender. And thus he has been adjudicated a sex offender. __________________________________________________________ 11 The concurrence argues that Neese “gave little guidance on what it means to have ‘been adjudicated a sex offender.’” Infra ¶ 56. Consequently, the concurrence believes that “[i]t is not at all clear that Neese provides that Blanke ‘has been adjudicated a sex offender.’” Infra ¶ 54. Although the concurrence may be correct in that the Neese opinion left open what we meant by that phrase (we did not need to define it there), this court may define terms that it has used in past cases. And it is patently reasonable to conclude that a sex offender, as used in Neese, means someone who fits the definition of a sex offender under the Utah Code. 12 Blanke argues that the Parole Board cannot classify him as a sex offender because attempted child kidnapping is not one of the crimes listed under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4 of the Utah Code, the part named “Sexual Offenses.” But regardless of whether a crime is housed in that part of the Utah Code, we hold that the Parole Board may classify an inmate as a sex offender when the inmate is required to register as a sex offender. See infra ¶ 32. He also points out that attempted child kidnapping requires no sexual element or motive. Although true, there is a correlation between attempted child kidnapping and sex offenses. See infra ¶ 31. 13 At the time of Blanke’s conviction of attempted child kidnapping, Utah Code section 77-27-21.5 governed sex offender registration. That section required sex offenders to register, defining a “sex offender” to include any person convicted of “Section 76-5-301.1, kidnapping of a child” or “attempting” that crime. UTAH CODE § 77-27-21.5(1)(e) (2002) (repealed 2012). 12 Cite as: 2020 UT 16 Opinion of the Court ¶29 In contrast to Neese, more procedural protections here would not serve the “critical functions” of due process. See Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 909 (Utah 1993). Specifically, they would not substantially increase the accuracy of the Parole Board’s decision that Blanke is a sex offender since Blanke already had the opportunity to meaningfully present evidence about the events leading to the attempted child kidnapping conviction. 14 Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 44. That is, in part, __________________________________________________________ 14 The concurrence contends that additional procedure is arguably warranted because it “would aid the Parole Board’s decision-making to some degree.” Infra ¶ 71. But our precedents require more than that: an inmate must show that “a particular procedural requirement will substantially further the [Parole] Board’s fact-finding process.” Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 63 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1030 (Utah 1996) (“[O]ur decision to extend particular procedural due process requirements under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution to certain parole hearings is grounded in the rationale that such requirements will substantially further the accuracy and reliability of the Board’s fact-finding process.”); Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1103 (Utah 1994) (“[T]he touchstone of due process in the context of parole hearings is whether the proposed procedural due process requirement substantially furthers the accuracy and reliability of the Board’s fact-finding process.”). Undoubtedly, the robust procedure required in Neese—notice, an opportunity to call witnesses, and a written decision—substantially furthers the accuracy of the Parole Board’s decision-making, even if we have not explicitly said so. See also Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 909 (Utah 1993) (holding that due process “requires that the inmate know what information the Board will be considering at the hearing and that the inmate know soon enough in advance to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare responses and rebuttal of inaccuracies,” in part, because “researchers and courts have discovered many substantial inaccuracies in inmate files” (citation omitted)). And although this court does not always say out loud that the procedural requirement must substantially further the fact-finding process, this court has never held that due process requires additional procedure whenever it aids the Parole Board’s decision-making to some degree. Such a standard would render the required procedure virtually limitless. 13 BLANKE v. BOARD OF PARDONS Opinion of the Court the function of plea and sentencing proceedings. Nor would more procedures substantially further the appearance of fairness in the Parole Board’s decision-making: an inmate who pleads guilty to a crime that requires him to register under the sex offender registration statute cannot reasonably think it unfair that the Parole Board would then consider him a sex offender and condition his parole on sex offender treatment. ¶30 We note that under the current statutory scheme, an individual convicted of attempted child kidnapping is considered a kidnap offender—not a sex offender. UTAH CODE § 77-41-102(9), (17). But even if the new Sex and Kidnap Offender Registry were to apply to Blanke, we would still conclude that more procedural protections are unnecessary before the Parole Board determines that he is a sex offender. We hold this for two reasons. ¶31 First, the Utah Legislature added attempted child kidnapping as a registerable sex offense in 1997, noting that it was “expanding the definition of sex offender to include other offenses against minors.” 1997 Utah Laws 763. Before then, the Legislature had defined sex offender only as someone with a felony conviction under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4. UTAH CODE § 77-27-21.5 (1983). The Utah Legislature, then, apparently saw a link between sex offenses and attempted child kidnapping. That view does not lack support, given the apparent significant correlation between child kidnapping and child sex offenses. 15 Second, the crime of child kidnapping carves out an exception for __________________________________________________________ 15 See CHILD VICTIMS OF STEREOTYPICAL KIDNAPPINGS KNOWN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 2011, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1, 10 (2016), https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh176/files/pubs/24924 9.pdf (noting that in 2011, 63 percent of stereotypically kidnapped children “were sexually assaulted during detainment” and that “[h]alf of all stereotypical kidnappings in 2011 were sexually motivated crimes against adolescent girls”). Child kidnapping is also often charged with other crimes that require a sexual element. See, e.g., State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 1993) (recounting that the defendant had been charged with child kidnapping and aggravated sexual abuse of a child); State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, ¶ 6, 55 P.3d 1131 (noting the defendant had been charged with one count of aggravated kidnapping, or in the alternative, one count of child kidnapping, and one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child). 14 Cite as: 2020 UT 16 Opinion of the Court the typical family kidnapping—i.e., conduct that would constitute “custodial interference” 16—making the conduct underlying child kidnapping more likely to be sexually motivated. ¶32 For these reasons, we hold that the procedural protections in Neese do not apply when an inmate must register as a sex or kidnap offender. B. Blanke Admitted to Having Sexual Intercourse with a Fifteen-Year- Old in a Setting in Which He Had Enough Procedural Protections ¶33 In addition to Blanke having been adjudicated a sex offender, Neese’s procedural protections would not substantially further the “critical functions” of due process because Blanke admitted in his presentence report to sexual misconduct. And the conviction of that misconduct would have required his registration as a sex offender. For that reason alone the Parole Board did not violate due process by determining that Blanke was a sex offender and conditioning his release on sex offender treatment. ¶34 Blanke’s admitted conduct constituted a crime that would have required him to register as a sex offender had he been convicted of it. Specifically, he admitted in his presentence report to having sex in 1997 with a fifteen-year-old, when he was fortythree years old. At that time, that conduct constituted the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse, a crime that required registration as a sex offender. 17 By the time of Blanke’s kidnapping conviction in __________________________________________________________ 16 See UTAH CODE § 76-5-301.1(2) (“Violation of Section 76-5-303 is not a violation of this section.”); id. § 76-5-303 (2001) (repealed 2010) (criminalizing, among other things, (1) the taking of a child from its lawful custodian with knowledge that “the actor has no legal right to do so” and “with the intent to hold the child for a period substantially longer than the court-awarded parent-time or custody period” and (2) concealing or detaining a “child with intent to deprive” a person “of lawful parent-time, visitation, or custody rights”). 17 In 1997, a sex offender included any person convicted of a “felony, under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses.” UTAH CODE § 77-27-21.5(1)(e) (1997). And Utah Code section 76-5-401 (1983) made it a third-degree felony (unlawful sexual intercourse) for a person to have “sexual intercourse with a person . . . who is (continued . . .) 15 BLANKE v. BOARD OF PARDONS Opinion of the Court 2003, the name of that crime had changed to unlawful sexual activity with a minor, but it still required registration as a sex offender. 18 Regardless of which statute applies—unlawful sexual intercourse or unlawful sexual activity with a minor—Blanke’s admitted conduct constituted a crime that would have required him to register as a sex offender had he been convicted of it. ¶35 With that in mind, we turn to Blanke’s contention that Neese requires the Parole Board to give him more procedural protections at his parole hearing. It does not. Unlike the inmate in Neese, Blanke did not “steadfastly maintain[] that he was innocent of sexual misconduct.” Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 32. Instead, he admitted in the presentence report to conduct that would require him to register as a sex offender if he were convicted of it. What is more, Blanke had the chance to refute the presentence report at his sentencing hearing. But there he only denied having “raped and sodomized” Michelle. Crucially, he did not dispute having sexual intercourse with her, her identity, or her status as a minor. 19 Put differently, that Blanke had sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old was an “undisputed background fact[].” Id. ¶ 29. ¶36 Unlike in Neese, the critical functions of procedural due process have been tended to here. More specifically, they were under sixteen years of age,” if the actor was more than three years older than the victim. 18 In 2003, Utah Code section § 77-27-21.5(1)(e) (2002) defined “sex offender” in part as “any person . . . convicted by this state of . . . a felony violation of Section 76-5-401, unlawful sexual activity with a minor.” At that time, unlawful sexual activity with a minor included having “sexual intercourse with [a] minor.” UTAH CODE § 76-5-401 (1998). A minor was defined as person who was “14 years of age or older, but younger than 16 years of age, at the time the sexual activity . . . occurred.” Id. This crime was a third-degree felony “unless the defendant establishe[d] by a preponderance of the evidence the mitigating factor that the defendant [was] less than four years older than the minor at the time the sexual activity occurred.” Id. 19 “Section 76-5-401 makes sexual intercourse with a fourteen or fifteen-year-old a violation of the statute, irrespective of defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age . . . .” State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ¶ 12, 52 P.3d 1276. 16 Cite as: 2020 UT 16 Opinion of the Court fulfilled by virtue of the sentencing proceeding. Blanke’s sentencing proceeding greatly “reduce[d] the risk of error” in the Parole Board’s decision-making, id. ¶ 25, by giving him the opportunity (while being represented by counsel) to refute the presentence report—i.e., to “meaningfully present evidence” to contradict it, id. ¶ 44, and to “point out errors,” Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909 (citation omitted). Indeed, the prosecutor even asked the district court to “allow Mr. Blanke” to “provide anything for the record” and to “let the Court know about any objections he has to the pre-sentence report.” The sentencing proceeding also promoted the “appearance of fairness:” an inmate cannot reasonably think it unfair that the Parole Board classifies him as a sex offender when he has admitted to sexual misconduct in the presentence report and then left that admission unchallenged in the sentencing proceeding. ¶37 The bottom line is that the procedural protections of Neese do not apply when the Parole Board classifies an inmate as a sex offender and thus conditions the inmate’s parole on sex offender treatment when he has admitted, in a proceeding with procedural protections like those of a sentencing hearing, to conduct that would constitute a crime making him a sex or kidnap offender. Consequently, the Parole Board did not violate due process by categorizing Blanke as a sex offender and conditioning his parole on sex offender treatment. C. Neese Does Not Apply, and Blanke Has Not Asked Us to Expand Its Scope ¶38 Blanke last argues that he deserves the procedural protections of Neese because in making its decision the Parole Board was “fixated on alleged, unconvicted sexual misconduct”— the rape and sexual abuse allegations—rather than on his convicted offense (attempted child kidnapping). 20 But this argument misunderstands our decision in Neese. Neese held only that due process requires “unique procedural protections” when (1) an inmate has never been adjudicated a sex offender in any __________________________________________________________ 20 Blanke also contends his “false confession” to the rape at the 2006 parole hearing does not obviate his right to Neese procedures. This argument is irrelevant, however, because Blanke is not entitled to the Neese procedures for two other, independent reasons. See infra ¶ 39. We therefore decline to address his argument in further detail. 17 BLANKE v. BOARD OF PARDONS Lee, A.C.J., concurring in the judgment proceeding and (2) the Parole Board considers unconvicted sex offenses in its decision to condition parole on sex offender treatment. Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 40. We did not decide in Neese whether the Parole Board must afford an inmate additional procedural protections whenever it considers any unconvicted sexual misconduct, even when the inmate has been adjudicated a sex offender for some other sexual misconduct. ¶39 Neese does not apply here because Blanke was adjudicated a sex offender by virtue of his attempted child kidnapping conviction. Beyond that, he admitted in the presentence report to conduct constituting another registerable sex offense. Those two facts push Blanke outside of Neese’s protection. The Parole Board thus owed Blanke no additional process before it considered unconvicted sex offenses in its decision to require Blanke to undergo sex offender treatment. Blanke has not asked us to expand the scope of Neese, and so we leave that issue for another day.