Opinion ID: 3015764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Conduct.

Text: The government also moved in limine to admit various pieces of evidence as either outside the scope of the prohibition of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) or admissible under that rule. Specifically, the government moved to admit testimony regarding the February 2001 loan from Lin to Feng, a series of IOUs found in Lin’s wallet, and evidence of a stabbing incident unrelated to the instant charges. On appeal, Lin only challenges the district court’s decision to admit the three IOUs documenting loans unrelated to the charged extortionate conduct. The district court ruled the evidence admissible under Rule 404(b). The court concluded that it demonstrated that Lin was actually in the business of loaning money, and that its probative value 6 outweighed any prejudicial impact under Rule 403 because the transactions were not identified as evidence of extortion. Lin claims this was an abuse of discretion that was amplified by the district court’s failure to give a limiting instruction as promised. This claim is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lopez, 340 F. 3d 169, 171-72 (3d. Cir. 2003). Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) states in relevant part: Evidence of other crimes, . . . or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, . . . intent, . . . plan, [or] knowledge . . . . Evidence that is properly admitted under Rule 404(b) must therefore be relevant to a proper purpose, and its probative value must outweigh the prejudice that is inherent in this kind of evidence. United States v. Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d 288, 294 (3d. Cir. 1999). Although there are obvious dangers inherent in “bad acts” evidence admitted under Rule 404(b),6 we do not believe the district court abused its discretion in admitting that evidence here. The government was attempting to prove that Lin did not lend money to Feng, his victim, out of a sense of personal friendship, but that Lin had a practice of lending money. The district court concluded that the IOUs were probative of the relationship between Feng and Lin, and that they buttressed Feng’s testimony. App. 36. 6 See United States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 139 (3rd Cir. 1999) (noting “the adversarial tendency of the proponents of such evidence to be less than candid about their motives for offering evidence that suggests that a defendant's character is suspect ”) 7 In addition, since the IOUs did not suggest that Lin was violent, the court reasoned that they were not unduly prejudicial given the significance of their probative value. Lin quite correctly emphasizes the district court’s failure to give a limiting instruction as promised when ruling the evidence admissible. Such an instruction should be given when requested. However, although the court stated that it would give the instruction, the defendant never requested that a limiting instruction be included in the court’s charge. Before the charge was given, defense counsel told the court, “I read [the charge] last night and I’m satisfied with the Charge, Judge.” Sup. App. 734. At the conclusion of the charge, defense counsel told the judge that he had no objection to the charge as given. Sup. App. 887. Accordingly, we must analyze the court’s omission for plain error. At trial, Detective Bennett merely confirmed that he recognized the IOUs, and the prosecutor then read the translation of each one. That translation included only the names of the people who owed Lin money, the dates of the transactions, and the amounts involved. Moreover, in his closing, the prosecutor did not refer to the IOUs or allude to them in a way that would suggest an inference about Lin’s character. We therefore hold that the court neither abused its discretion, nor committed plain error, in admitting that evidence under Rule 404(b) without a limiting instruction.