Opinion ID: 2301483
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Apprendi Questions

Text: Three of the questions submitted by Baker to this Court directly rely on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Following our decision in Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 786 A.2d 631 (2001), [15] which had not been filed at the time that Baker submitted his briefs or made his oral arguments before this Court, we hold that the questions submitted by Baker that rely on Apprendi are without merit. Apprendi was not a death penalty case. It involved a New Jersey separate hate crime statute that permitted a trial court to add to or enhance a maximum statutory prison sentence for a specific offense if the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that [t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e)(2000). Mr. Apprendi fired several bullets into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into his previously all-white neighborhood. Mr. Apprendi was arrested the same night and he admitted that he was the shooter. A plea agreement was reached between Mr. Apprendi and the State in which Apprendi pled guilty to two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one count of the third-degree offense of unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb. As part of the plea agreement, the State reserved the right to request that the trial court impose an enhanced sentence on one of the second-degree offenses (count 18) on the ground that the offense was committed to intimidate because of racial bias. At the plea hearing, the trial court found enough evidence to find Apprendi guilty of the three offenses for which pled. The trial court then held an evidentiary hearing to determine why Apprendi fired the gun at the house in count 18. After hearing evidence from the State and Apprendi, the trial court determined that by a preponderance of the evidence Apprendi had shot into the house for the purpose to intimidate because of racial bias and therefore qualified for an enhanced sentence under the separate hate crime statute. The trial court then sentenced Apprendi to a twelve-year term of imprisonment on count 18 [16] and to shorter concurrent sentences on the other two counts. Apprendi appealed, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471, 120 S.Ct. at 2352, 147 L.Ed.2d at 443. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied Apprendi's due process claim and upheld the enhanced sentence imposed under the separate hate crime statute by the trial court. The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the New Jersey appellate courts. The Supreme Court noted that the previous year in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), the Supreme Court had expressed doubts concerning the constitutionality of allowing penalty-enhancing findings to be determined by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence. Apprendi at 472, 120 S.Ct. at 2353, 147 L.Ed.2d at 444. The Supreme Court then stated that the answer to the question of whether Apprendi was entitled to have a jury find racial bias on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was foreshadowed when the Court was interpreting a federal statute in Jones. The Court stated that: We there noted that `under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' The Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case involving a state statute. Id. at 476, 120 S.Ct. at 2355, 147 L.Ed.2d at 446, quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 1224 n. 6, 143 L.Ed.2d 311, 326 n. 6 (1999) (citation omitted). The Court stated that it wanted to be clear that it is not impermissible for judges to exercise discretion, when the judges are imposing a sentence that is within the statutory limits. Id. at 481, 120 S.Ct. at 2358, 147 L.Ed.2d at 449. The Court then looked at how a statute that removes the jury from a factual determination that would decide if the defendant could be sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding the statutory maximum is a novelty when compared to historical trial practices. The Court stated: We do not suggest that trial practices cannot change in the course of centuries and still remain true to the principles that emerged from the Framers' fears `that the jury right could be lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion.' Jones, 526 U.S. at 247-248, 119 S.Ct. 1215. But practice must at least adhere to the basic principles undergirding the requirements of trying to a jury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense, and proving those facts beyond reasonable doubt. As we made clear in Winship, [ [17] ] the `reasonable doubt' requirement `has a vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons.' 397 U.S. at 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Prosecution subjects the criminal defendant both to `the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and ... the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.' Ibid. We thus require this, among other, procedural protections in order to `provide concrete substance for the presumption of innocence,' and to reduce the risk of imposing such deprivations erroneously. Ibid. If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should notat the moment the State is put to proof of those circumstancesbe deprived of protections that have, until that point, unquestionably attached. Id. at 483-484, 120 S.Ct. at 2359, 147 L.Ed.2d at 450-451 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Court then went on to hold that: In sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the history upon which they rely, confirms the opinion that we expressed in Jones. Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. With that exception, we endorse the statement of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions in that case: `It is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' 526 U.S. at 252-253, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); see also 526 U.S. at 253, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-2363, 147 L.Ed.2d at 455 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). At the end of its opinion, the Supreme Court addressed whether its holding in Apprendi would have an effect on state capital sentencing schemes. The Court stated: Finally, this Court has previously considered and rejected the argument that the principles guiding our decision today render invalid state capital sentencing schemes requiring judges, after a jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-649, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); 497 U.S. at 709-714, 110 S.Ct. 3047 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). For reasons we have explained, the capital cases are not controlling: `Neither the cased cited, nor any other case, permits a judge to determine the existence of a factor which makes a crime a capital offense. What the cited cases hold is that, once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed.... The person who is charged with actions that expose him to the death penalty has an absolute entitlement to jury trial on all the elements of the charge.' Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 257, n. 2, 118 S.Ct. 1219 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted). Id. at 496-497, 120 S.Ct. at 2366, 147 L.Ed.2d at 459. Baker proffers arguments on the three questions he presented that rely directly on the Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi. The first argument Baker makes is that Maryland's death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it provides that a sentence of death may be imposed if the State proves only that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. Baker's second argument is that the rights identified in Apprendi should be applied retroactively to his sentence. Baker's third argument is that as a matter of fundamental fairness, and pursuant to Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, this Court should hold that no sentence of death in Maryland is permissible unless the finder of fact unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. We hold that all three of Baker's arguments are without merit because the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi does not apply to the Maryland capital sentencing scheme. We have held on numerous occasions that the Maryland death penalty statute is constitutional and more specifically we have held that section 413(h), which requires the aggravating circumstances to outweigh the mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence, is constitutional. In Collins v. State, 318 Md. 269, 296, 568 A.2d 1, 14 (1990), we answered Baker's third argument when we stated: Collins claims the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in the Maryland death penalty statute is violative of the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause and of the due process clause. Collins apparently refers to the final stage of the capital sentencing special verdict form where the jury is asked to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Art. 27, § 413(h). We have previously reconsidered and reaffirmed the rule that a preponderance of the evidence test is proper in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 739-40, 511 A.2d 461, 485 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910, 107 S.Ct. 1339, 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987); Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 477, 499 A.2d 1236, 1255-56 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 729-734, 415 A.2d 830, 848-50 (1980), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 2374, 80 L.Ed.2d 846 (1984). Under Maryland's capital sentencing scheme, the sentencing authority may not even consider the appropriateness of a death sentence unless the State has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more statutory aggravating circumstances exist. Art. 27, § 413(d). Moreover, the state has the burden of showing that aggravating outweigh mitigating circumstances. Scott v. State, 310 Md. 277, 284, 529 A.2d 340, 343 (1987) (This Court has consistently held that the state bears the burden of persuasion under Art. 27, § 413(h)); Md. Rule 4-343(e) (Section IV). Under the circumstances of this case, we find no basis for reevaluating the rule set forth in Calhoun, Foster and Tichnell. Again, we hold the preponderance of the evidence standard is constitutionally proper in the context of Art. 27, § 413(h). See Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 712-713, 759 A.2d 764, 797 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1115, 121 S.Ct. 864, 148 L.Ed.2d 776 (2001); Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 198 199, 729 A.2d 910, 945-946, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 910, 120 S.Ct. 258, 145 L.Ed.2d 216 (1999); Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 582-583, 597 A.2d 1359, 1374 (1991). Therefore, as we stated in Borchardt, 367 Md. 91, 121, 786 A.2d 631, 649 (2001), [t]he only question is whether Apprendi sub silentio overturns all of those rulings and requires a different result. The easiest explanation as to why Apprendi would not apply to the Maryland death penalty statute is the straightforward language used by the Supreme Court in Apprendi. Judge Wilner, writing for the majority in Borchardt, [18] stated: Perhaps the easiest answer lies in the unequivocal statement by the Apprendi majority that its decision did not render invalid State capital sentencing schemes, such as approved in Walton, [19] that allowed the judge, not sitting as the trier of fact, to find and weigh specific aggravating factors. If it is permissible under Apprendi for the law to remove that fact-finding and fact-weighing process entirely from the jury and leave it to the judge as a legitimate sentencing factor, without specifying a reasonable doubt standard, it can hardly be impermissible for a jury that has found the prerequisite aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt to apply a preponderance standard in weighing them against any mitigating circumstances. The Walton scheme, in other words, is in far greater direct conflict with the underpinning of Apprendi than the Maryland approach. Thus, if the aggravating circumstances do not constitute elements of the offense or serve to increase the maximum punishment for the offense in the Walton context, they cannot reasonably be found to have that status under the Maryland law. If Apprendi renders the Maryland law unconstitutional, then, perforce, it likely renders most of the capital punishment laws in the country unconstitutional. We cannot conceive that the Supreme Court, especially in light of its contrary statement, intended such a dramatic result to flow from a case that did not even involve a capital punishment law. Id. at 121, 786 A.2d at 649 (footnote omitted). Aside from the straightforward language used by the Supreme Court, the holding in Apprendi does not implicate Maryland's death penalty statute. As stated, supra, section 412(b) states that a person found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. The statutory maximum penalty upon a conviction of the specific offense of first degree murder is a sentence of death, the sentence of death, thus, is not an enhanced penalty. The holding in Apprendi is that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d at 455. Upon the State proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of first degree murder, including any aggravating circumstances that make the defendant eligible for the death penalty, the statutory maximum penalty is death; this maximum statutory sentence of the death penalty cannot logically and possibly be enhanced, whether by a judge or jury. Death simply is not an enhancement of death. In order for the holding in Apprendi to control, there would need to be a penalty enhancement at the sentencing proceeding beyond the maximum sentence provided for by statute. For example, if Baker had been convicted of second degree murder, which allows for a person to be imprisoned for not more than the statutory maximum of thirty years, [20] and at a sentencing proceeding a judge or jury, by reason of a separate statute, was able to make a finding of aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence that increased the sentence for second degree murder to any of the sentences available for first degree murder, then the holding in Apprendi might apply. As the Supreme Court stated in Apprendi: The New Jersey statutory scheme that Apprendi asks us to invalidate allows a jury to convict a defendant of a second-degree offense based on its finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he unlawfully possessed a prohibited weapon; after a subsequent and separate proceeding, it then allows a judge to impose punishment identical to that New Jersey provides for crimes of the first degree, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 1999), based upon the judge's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's `purpose' for unlawfully possessing the weapon was `to intimidate' his victim on the basis of a particular characteristic the victim possessed. In light of the constitutional rule explained above, and all of the cases supporting it, this practice cannot stand. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-492, 120 S.Ct. at 2363, 147 L.Ed.2d at 455-456 (emphasis added). The Court went on to state that: Indeed, the effect of New Jersey's sentencing `enhancement' here is unquestionably to turn a second-degree offense into a first-degree offense, under the State's own criminal code. Id. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365, 147 L.Ed.2d at 457. The Court also stated that, [w]hen a judge's finding based on a mere preponderance of the evidence authorizes an increase in the maximum punishment, it is appropriately characterized as `a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.' Id. at 495, 120 S.Ct. at 2365, 147 L.Ed.2d at 458, quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2417, 91 L.Ed.2d 67, 77 (1986). Under Maryland's death penalty statute, once a defendant is convicted of a qualifing first degree murder, the maximum penalty is death. This penalty is not enhanced at a sentencing proceeding, the defendant is already eligible for this penalty upon conviction. The holding of Apprendi simply does not apply to Maryland's death penalty statute. As stated, supra, the Supreme Court in Apprendi specifically rejected the argument that the principles guiding our decision today render invalid state capital sentencing schemes requiring judges, after a jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death. Id. at 496, 120 S.Ct. at 2366, 147 L.Ed.2d at 459. In responding to the principal dissent in Apprendi, the majority pointed out the difference between aggravating factors and mitigating factors. The Court stated: Finally, the principal dissent ignores the distinction the Court has often recognized between facts in aggravation of punishment and facts in mitigation. If facts found by a jury support a guilty verdict of murder, the judge is authorized by that jury verdict to sentence the defendant to the maximum sentence provided by the murder statute. If the defendant can escape the statutory maximum by showing, for example, that he is a war veteran, then a judge that finds the fact of veteran status is neither exposing the defendant to a deprivation of liberty greater than that authorized by the verdict according to statute, nor is the Judge imposing upon the defendant a greater stigma than that accompanying the jury verdict alone. Core concerns animating the jury and burden-of-proof requirements are thus absent from such a scheme. Id. at 491 n. 16, 120 S.Ct. at 2363 n. 16, 147 L.Ed.2d at 455 n. 16 (citations omitted). The jury in this case found beyond a reasonable doubt that Baker was guilty of first degree murder and, upon Baker's specific request that it address the issue of principalship, found that there was an aggravating circumstance that made Baker eligible for the death penalty. Baker was not able to show any mitigating circumstances that outweighed the aggravating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence; therefore, the Circuit Court was authorized to sentence Baker to death the maximum penalty provided for by the statute governing first degree murder. As Judge Wilner examined in Borchardt, the courts of our sister states have not found the holding in Apprendi to be applicable to their capital sentencing schemes. [21] See State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 14 P.3d 997 (2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 386, 151 L.Ed.2d 294 (2001) (the Arizona Supreme Court followed the United States Supreme Court's holding in Walton in denying a claim that the Arizona death penalty law was unconstitutional because it eliminated jury consideration in the sentencing process); People v. Anderson, 25 Cal.4th 543, 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347, 386 (2001) (the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that the California death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it did not require (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt); Weeks v. State, 761 A.2d 804 (Del.2000) (holding that Apprendi does not apply to state capital sentencing schemes where judges are required to find certain aggravating circumstances before imposing a death sentence); Mills v. Moore, 786 So.2d 532, 536-37 (Fla.2001), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1015, 121 S.Ct. 1752, 149 L.Ed.2d 673 (2001) (holding that Apprendi does not apply to capital sentencing schemes); State v. Storey, 40 S.W.3d 898, 915 (Mo.2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 272, 151 L.Ed.2d 199 (2001) ([T]he Apprendi Court specifically rejected the contention that its ruling had any effect on the finding of aggravating factors in capital cases.); State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 396-97, 533 S.E.2d 168, 193-94 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 121 S.Ct. 1379-80, 149 L.Ed.2d 305 (2001) ( Apprendi does not make the North Carolina capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional because the State does not have to notify a defendant prior to trial of the aggravating factors upon which the State intends to rely). [22] The Indictment Baker contends that the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, and Jones, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311, make clear that the indictment issued by the grand jury in Mr. Baker's case did not give the circuit court jurisdiction to sentence him to death. Specifically, Baker contends that the indictment fails because it did not allege the commission of a capital murder in that the indictment failed to list the aggravating circumstance the State sought to rely on in seeking to impose a sentence of death, and it failed to include any allegation that Baker was a principal in the first degree to murder. We do not agree with Baker that the rulings in Apprendi and Jones make it clear that the indictment was flawed. Baker's reliance on Apprendi fails for two reasons: (1) we have already held that the sentence in the Maryland capital sentencing scheme is not enhanced beyond what the statutory maximum allows so the indictment cannot reference a sentence enhancement as it could have in Apprendi; [23] and (2) the Fifth Amendment right to presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, in the first instance, has not been held to be applicable to the States through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We examined the application of the Fifth Amendment in Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 468 A.2d 101 (1983), when we stated: Bowers argues `that his conviction for murder in the first degree must be reversed because he was denied his common law and constitutional right to be tried on an indictment in a capital case'. He says that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States `expressly provides that no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.` He argues that this is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment under Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), pertaining to the double jeopardy clause, and Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S.Ct. 1913, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968), pertaining to the privilege against self-incrimination. This Court pointed out in Heath v. State, 198 Md. 455, 464, 85 A.2d 43 (1951), that there is no constitutional provision expressly guaranteeing a right to trial upon indictment in this State. The Supreme Court in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884), held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not necessarily require a grand jury indictment in prosecution by a state for murder. What Judge Scanlan said for the Court of Special Appeals in Kable v. State, 17 Md.App. 16, 299 A.2d 493, cert. denied, 268 Md. 750 (1973), is applicable here: The appellant, however, would have us anticipate the Supreme Court of the United States. He argues that authority of Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 [4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232] (1884) has been eroded by more recent Supreme Court decisions. In Hurtado, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require that State criminal prosecutions be initiated by grand jury indictment. The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to Hurtado. The last clear expression of its continuing agreement with the rule of that case came in Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 [, 82 S.Ct. 955, 957 958, 8 L.Ed.2d 98] (1962). `The appellant, nevertheless, claims that the Supreme Court by its recent decision in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 [89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707] (1969) has given a signal suggesting that the Court ultimately will overturn Hurtado and extend the Fifth Amendment grand jury right to the States through application of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Benton, the Court held that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represented a notion that was fundamental to the American scheme of justice, and that the prohibition was enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 796 [89 S.Ct. at 2063]. `We eschew speculation on our part as to whether a majority of the present members of the Supreme Court of the United States might hold, despite the precedent of Hurtado, that the Fifth Amendment grand jury indictment right is fundamental to the American scheme of justice and thus binding on the States through application of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We point out, however, that the grand jury was abolished in England in 1933 and that at the present time only half of the States use the grand jury as a regular adjunct of criminal prosecutions. We also observe that, unlike the prohibition against double jeopardy, the requirement of trial by jury and other procedural protections of the Bill of Rights which operate for the protection of a defendant in a criminal case, the grand jury often has been an instrument more for the benefit of the prosecution than of the defendant and, indeed, not infrequently has operated to a defendant's severe detriment.' 17 Md.App. at 26-27, 299 A.2d 493.