Opinion ID: 2341817
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Gansler's Extrajudicial Statements Applied to MRPC 3.6

Text: In the case before us, Bar Counsel argues that Gansler violated MRPC 3.6 by making extrajudicial statements related to the Cook, Lucas, and Perry cases. Gansler asserts, however, that his statements in these cases fall under the public record exception under the safe harbor provisions of MRPC 3.6(c). In addition, Gansler claims that the safe harbor provisions do not provide sufficient guidance as to what information is contained in the public record, so he was incapable of determining which statements actually would constitute violations. The issues in this case are similar to those discussed by the Supreme Court in Gentile. In a fractured opinion, the Court held that Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, a rule substantively identical to MRPC 3.6, had been unconstitutionally applied to discipline a defense lawyer for making extrajudicial statements that professed his client's innocence in a criminal case. Id. at 1033, 111 S.Ct. at 2723, 115 L.Ed.2d at 897. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the portion of the majority opinion analyzing the substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard of Rule 177, and Justice Kennedy represented the majority of the Court in striking down Nevada's application of Rule 177 as unconstitutionally vague. Nevada's rule, like Maryland's, prohibited an attorney from making extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Gentile, the Nevada attorney challenging the rule, argued that this standard infringed upon an attorney's right to free speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State Bar of Nevada, arguing in favor of the standard, emphasized the State's interest in maintaining fair trials that are decided in the courtroom and not through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper. Id. at 1070, 111 S.Ct. at 2742, 115 L.Ed.2d at 920 (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271, 62 S.Ct. 190, 197, 86 L.Ed. 192, 208 (1941)). In analyzing the parties' arguments, the Court acknowledged that the First Amendment permitted States to regulate attorney speech more stringently than the speech of an ordinary citizen. Id. at 1071, 111 S.Ct. at 2743, 115 L.Ed.2d at 921. The Chief Justice explained the State's particular interest in restricting speech of a lawyer involved in a pending case: Lawyers representing clients in pending cases are key participants in the criminal justice system, and the State may demand some adherence to the precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct. As noted by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Nebraska Press, which was joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, as officers of the court, court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate that will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will obstruct the fair administration of justice. Because lawyers have special access to information through discovery and client communications, their extrajudicial statements pose a threat to the fairness of a pending proceeding since lawyers' statements are likely to be received as especially authoritative. Id. at 1074, 111 S.Ct. at 2744-45, 115 L.Ed.2d at 923 (citation omitted). The Court concluded that the substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State's interest in fair trials. Id. at 1075, 111 S.Ct. at 2745, 115 L.Ed.2d at 923 (internal quotations omitted). The Court also subjected the substantial likelihood standard under Rule 177 to traditional First Amendment scrutiny, requiring that content-based speech regulation be necessary to achieve a legitimate state interest. Id. The Court stated: The substantial likelihood test embodied in Rule 177 is constitutional under this analysis, for it is designed to protect the integrity and fairness of a State's judicial system, and it imposes only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers' speech. The limitations are aimed at two principal evils: (1) comments that are likely to influence the actual outcome of the trial, and (2) comments that are likely to prejudice the jury venire, even if an untainted panel can ultimately be found. Few, if any, interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by impartial jurors, and an outcome affected by extrajudicial statements would violate that fundamental right. Even if a fair trial can ultimately be ensured through voir dire, change of venue, or some other device, these measures entail serious costs to the system. Extensive voir dire may not be able to filter out all of the effects of pretrial publicity, and with increasingly widespread coverage of criminal trials, a change of venue may not suffice to undo the effects of statements such as those made by [Gentile]. The State has a substantial interest in preventing officers of the court, such as lawyers, form imposing such costs on the judicial system and on the litigants. Id. at 1075, 111 S.Ct. at 2745, 115 L.Ed.2d at 923-24 (citations omitted). The Court concluded that the substantial likelihood standard was narrowly tailored to protect these State interests. Id. at 1076, 111 S.Ct. at 2745, 115 L.Ed.2d at 924. This was so because the restraint on attorney speech was limitedit applies only to speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it is neutral as to points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating in a pending case; and it merely postpones the attorneys' comments until after trial. Id. In addition to upholding the substantial likelihood standard on its face, the Gentile Court also considered the constitutionality of Nevada's application of Rule 177. The Nevada Supreme Court had imposed a sanction against Gentile for making extrajudicial statements labeling the alleged victims in the criminal case as drug dealers and money launderers, blaming the alleged crime on the police, calling into question the police's motives for levying the criminal charges against his client, and proclaiming the innocence of his client. Id. at 1078-79, 111 S.Ct. at 2747, 115 L.Ed.2d at 925-26. Gentile had testified at his disciplinary hearing that he believed his statements were protected by Rule 177(3)(a), one of Rule 177's safe harbors, which allowed an attorney to comment outside of the courtroom and without elaboration on the general nature of the ... defense, even if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that [the statement] will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Id. at 1048-49, 111 S.Ct. at 2731, 115 L.Ed.2d at 907. A majority of the Justices, led by Justice Kennedy, decided that, [a]s interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court, [Rule 177] is void for vagueness ... for its safe harbor provision, Rule 177(3), misled [Gentile] into thinking that he could give his press conference without fear of discipline. The Court described its reasoning: Given [the Rule's] grammatical structure, and absent any clarifying interpretation by the state court, the Rule fails to provide fair notice to those to whom [it] is directed. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2301, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 230 (1972). A lawyer seeking to avail himself of Rule 177(3)'s protection must guess at its contours. The right to explain the general nature of the defense without elaboration provides insufficient guidance because general and elaboration are both classic terms of degree. In the context before us, these terms have no settled usage or tradition of interpretation in law. The lawyer has no principle for determining when his remarks pass from the safe harbor of the general into the forbidden sea of the elaborated. Id. at 1048-49, 111 S.Ct. at 2731, 115 L.Ed.2d at 906-07. The Court further declared that, without providing sufficiently precise guidance, Rule 177 creates a trap even for the lawyers who study the rule and make a conscious effort to comply with it. Id. at 1051, 111 S.Ct. at 2732, 115 L.Ed.2d at 908. Finally, Rule 177(3)(a) was so imprecise that, in the Court's view, it created an impermissible risk of discriminatory enforcement. The case before us involves the application of a different safe harbor, MRPC 3.6(c)(2), which refers to information contained in a public record. This provision suffers from constitutional infirmities similar to those of Nevada's Rule 177(3)(a). [18] The text of MRPC 3.6(c)(2) provides that an attorney may make extrajudicial statements without elaboration concerning information contained in a public record. These protections lack a clarifying interpretation by this Court, and the term elaboration, a classic term of degree, has no settled usage or tradition of interpretation in law. The phrase information contained in a public record also does not provide sufficient guidance for determining which statements were protected under MRPC 3.6(c)(2). As evidenced by the widely disparate meanings for public record that the parties' experts in this case have advanced, the term, standing alone, can be subject to multiple interpretations even by lawyers well educated on this specific principle of professional responsibility. Gansler and Professor Lerman define information in a public record broadly as anything that has been filed in court ... and anything that has been otherwise made public. Bar Counsel and Professor Dash offer a narrower interpretation, suggesting that the public record exception applies to that formal information in the public domain that exists prior to, or separate from, the investigation and prosecution of the subject criminal matter. (emphasis added). Bar Counsel, however, has provided no authority to support its interpretation and, in fact, concedes that the term does not appear to have been the subject of judicial scrutiny and little guidance is afforded.... Public record has been defined in other contexts, as the hearing judge recognized in her report, but those definitions also fail to provide uniform guidance. Maryland Code, § 10-611(g)(1) of the State Government Article (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), sets forth one definition for purposes of the Public Information Act: (g) Public Record. (1) Public record means the original or any copy of any documentary material that: (i) is made by a unit or instrumentality of the State government or of a political subdivision or received by the unit or instrumentality in connection with the transaction of public business; and (ii) is in any form, including: 1. a card; 2. a computerized record; 3. correspondence; 4. a drawing; 5. film or microfilm; 6. a form; 7. a map; 8. a photograph or photostat; 9. a recording; or 10. a tape. The Maryland Code provides a different definition of public record in Section 8-606(a)(3) of the Criminal Law Article. That section states: (3) Public Record includes an official book, paper, or record, kept on a manual or automated basis, that is created, received, or used by a unit of:

or
The Maryland Rules describe public record in still a different way. Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A) defines public records and reports for purposes of the public records exception to the hearsay rule, as including: a memorandum, report, record, statement, or data compilation made by a public agency setting forth (i) the activities of the agency; (ii) masters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by law, as to which matters there was a duty to report; or (iii) in civil actions and when offered against the State in criminal actions, factual finding resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. Another source, Black's Law Dictionary, defines public record as [a] record that a governmental unit is required by law to keep, such as land deeds kept at a county courthouse. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (7th ed.1999). These characterizations of public record contemplate only information that has been created or distributed by a government entity. Not all sources, however, consider public record to be a reference to materials produced by any government entity. Although Canon 20 of the 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics did not use the phrase information contained in a public record, its terms do furnish some instruction as to the meaning of the phrase. Canon 20 prohibited  ex parte reference to the facts of a case beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the court.  (emphasis added). Similarly, Local Rule 204 of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland prohibits an attorney from making certain extrajudicial statements after the arrest of an accused, except that the lawyer may quote from or refer to without comment to public Court records in the case. Thus, according to some sources, public records are limited to the exact information contained in documents on file with the court. Because there is no settled definition of information contained in a public record we agree with Gansler that MRPC 3.6(c)(2) does not provide adequate guidance for determining which extrajudicial statements would qualify under the safe harbor. For this reason, we construe the phrase in its broadest form as applied to Gansler in this case and to any other extrajudicial statements made prior to the filing of this Opinion. In this case, we consider information in a public record to include anything in the public domain, including public court documents, media reports, and comments made by police officers. Under this broad interpretation, it is clear that a number of Gansler's extrajudicial statements do not warrant discipline, as the hearing judge determined. Gansler did not violate MRPC 3.6 by commenting on the sneaker print matches in Cook's case because, shortly before Gansler's extrajudicial comments, a television reporter had broadcast an account of that evidence nearly mirroring Gansler's version. Additionally, in the Lucas case, Gansler made statements to the media about a shoe print at the crime scene that matched shoes Lucas had been observed wearing. This information was already public as recorded in the statement of charges filed by the police the day before. Also contained in the statement of charges was an account of Lucas's admission to police that he broke into the church rectory and murdered Monsignor Wells. Therefore, the next day, when Gansler relayed information about the admission to the media, he revealed information contained in a public record. We overrule Bar Counsel exceptions as they relate to Gansler's extrajudicial statements about physical evidence in the Cook and Lucas cases as well as the confession in the Lucas case. Gansler argues that the public record safe harbor also should protect his reference to Lucas's history of convictions. MRPC 3.6(b)(1) informs lawyers that extrajudicial statements relating to the criminal record of a party are ordinarily likely to be intolerably prejudicial. Nevertheless, during the June 18, 2003 press conference announcing the arrest of Lucas, Gansler mentioned that Lucas has a criminal record which includes residential burglaries. To support his assertion that this statement should be protected by the public record safe harbor, Gansler points to Deputy State's Attorney Winfree's testimony, characterizing Lucas's prior arrest and conviction record as part of the public record. Based on this testimony, we hold that Gansler's reference to Lucas's criminal record falls under our broad definition of information in a public record. We reach this result because we have inferred from Deputy State's Attorney Winfree's testimony that she was referring to publicly accessible court records in Maryland, either case files or docket sheets, which indicate that an individual has been convicted of a crime. Maryland law does not bar an ordinary citizen from combing these court documents to learn information about someone's criminal history. For this reason, Lucas's history of convictions could have existed in the public domain before Gansler spoke of it. Under the circumstances of this case, the extrajudicial reference to Lucas's convictions qualifies for the protection of the public record safe harbor, as we have broadly defined it for this Opinion. Because of the strong prejudicial impact of the public disclosure of criminal record information, future respondents will have the burden of establishing that such information was contained in a bona fide public court record accessible to the general public. [19] Additionally, lawyers who make extrajudicial statements in the future will not find shelter in the broad definition of MRPC (c)(2) that we apply here. Public policy mandates a more limited definition of information in a public record. We believe that, to best protect[ ] the right to a fair trial and safeguard[] the right of free expression, the phrase information in a public record should refer only to public government recordsthe records and papers on file with a government entity to which an ordinary citizen would have lawful access. To receive the protection of the public record safe harbor, the lawyer must not provide information beyond quotations from or references to public government records. The definition we establish in this case prevents attorneys from side-stepping the rule by directing or encouraging individuals not bound by the MRPC to publicize information so that attorneys can speak freely about it. Furthermore, by strictly limiting what is considered a public record, this definition enables all of the components of MRPC 3.6 to filter objectionable publicity, preventing the public record exception from swallowing the general rule of restricting prejudicial speech. In any event, no matter whether one defines information in a public record broadly to include everything in the public domain or narrowly, Gansler violated the MRPC 3.6 by making several extrajudicial statements at issue in this case. Initially, we must point out that Gansler has not challenged that his comments qualify, under MRPC 3.6(a), as statements that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication. The only contested issues in this case concern whether Gansler knew or should have known that his statements would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding and whether the statements are protected under the safe harbor provisions of MRPC 3.6(c). As we discuss in detail below, Gansler did violate MRPC 3.6 by commenting on Cook's confession, by discussing the plea offer to Perry, and by providing his opinion as to the guilt of Cook and Lucas. First, Gansler violated MRPC 3.6 by discussing Cook's confession to the Stottsmeister murder. MRPC 3.6(b)(2) provides that a statement relating to the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant is ordinarily likely to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Notwithstanding the cautionary language of the rule and prior to the filing of murder charges, Gansler publicly stated that police were able to obtain a confession from Cook. Apparently seeking shelter again under the public record safe harbor, Gansler points out that his reference to incredible details mirrored the information and even the language of the charging document. This observation fails to acknowledge that officials did not file the statement of charges against Cook until after the press conference. The public record safe harbor, whether construed narrowly or broadly, could not apply possibly to any statement that introduced information to the public for the first time. Gansler should have known that these statements, by themselves, would prejudice Cook in the public's eye. Not only did Gansler announce the existence of Cook's confession, but he also furnished specific information of the surrounding circumstances, including that Cook provided incredible details that only the murderer would have known. Gansler magnified the prejudicial effect of his statements by bolstering the believability of the confession. He stated that, before Cook traveled to the crime scene and went over in detail by detail every step of the murder, the police had provided him with a restful night's sleep. If we found no fault with such public disclosures, we would be allowing attorneys, in effect, to evade the operation of the exclusionary rule by taking advantage of the probative value of the confession without regard to its constitutionality or admissibility as evidence. That is, Gansler made Cook's confession public even though its contents might never reach the jury as a result of a constitutional challenge. His actions, in this regard, run afoul of our principles of criminal justice, as Chief Justice Rehnquist illustrated: The outcome of a criminal trial is to be decided by impartial jurors, who know as little as possible of the case, based on material admitted into evidence before them in a court proceeding. Extrajudicial comments on, or discussion of, evidence which might never be admitted at trial and ex parte statements by counsel giving their version of the facts obviously threaten to undermine this basic tenet. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1070, 111 S.Ct. at 2742, 115 L.Ed.2d at 920. Accordingly, with respect to Gansler's remarks on the Cook confession, we sustain Bar Counsel's exception because Gansler knew or should have known that his announcement would have a substantial likelihood of causing material prejudice. [20] Gansler also committed a violation of MRPC 3.6, as Judge Stevenson concluded, by commenting extrajudicially on the matter of Perry's plea bargain. MRPC 3.6(b)(2) states that a statement is ordinarily likely to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding if the statement relates to the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense. Gansler's reported statement in April of 2000 disclosed, for the first time, his decision to offer [Perry] a plea bargain. Gansler argues, though, that his comments to the Gazette about the plea offer should be covered by the public record safe harbor because the public already knew of his conversations with the victims' family members, in which they were consulted about whether to retry Perry or plea bargain. The public's general knowledge about plea bargains and how they normally play a part in every prosecution does not equate, however, to the public having actual knowledge that a plea bargain would be offered in this particular case. The decision to offer a plea bargain does not qualify as information contained in a public record, even under the broadest meaning of that phrase. Besides announcing the plea offer, Gansler also discussed the impending deadline for Perry to accept that offer, all during a very public and controversial prosecution of a multiple murder suspect. Public comments such as these place greater pressure on the defendant to accept the plea offer. More importantly, the comments likely influenced potential jurors in Perry's case by communicating that the lead prosecutor believed the defendant was guilty. See JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER § 12.16 (2nd ed. 1996) (Any ... statement [regarding the possibility of a plea of guilty] is, of course, a direct reference to an opinion of the speaker as to guilt of the accused or as to the belief of the accused as to his own guilt. It is tantamount to publication of an opinion as to guilt.). We, therefore, overrule Gansler's exception to Judge Stevenson's conclusion that the comments related to Perry's plea offer violated MRPC 3.6. MRPC 3.6(b)(4) specifically addresses attorney comments discussing any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Although several of Gansler's extrajudicial statements fall under this category of restricted speech and were not covered by any safe harbor, the hearing judge determined that the evidence did not show that any material prejudicial effect stemmed from them. Gansler's statements, indicating that they had apprehended the person who committed the crimes in the Cook and Lucas cases, came soon after the defendants had been arrested and well before the eve of trial. This, coupled with the fact that neither Lucas's nor Cook's attorneys claimed that Gansler's statements caused prejudice, persuaded the hearing judge to conclude that Bar Counsel had not shown a substantial likelihood of material prejudice. We disagree with the hearing judge's conclusion that the evidence failed to show that Gansler knew or should have known that his statements of opinion would have a substantial likelihood of material prejudice. In considering the propriety of a statement under MRPC 3.6, we determine the likelihood that a particular statement will cause prejudice at the time the statement was made, not whether that statement, in hindsight, actually worked to the detriment of a defendant. Whether Cook or Lucas claimed at their trials to be prejudiced by Gansler's statements, therefore, does not weigh in our analysis. Rather, we concentrate on the point in time when Gansler offered his public comments to determine the probability of prejudice. According to the hearing judge, the point in time when Gansler made the extrajudicial statements minimized whatever prejudicial effect flowed from his remarks. As support for this conclusion, the hearing judge cited Part II of Justice Kennedy's minority opinion in Gentile. Justice Kennedy suggested that statements made well before a defendant's trial have less prejudicial impact than statements made closer to the empaneling of a jury. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1044, 111 S.Ct. at 2729, 115 L.Ed.2d at 904 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Gentile had made his controversial statements six months prior to voir dire, enough time, according to Justice Kennedy, for the content of the message to fade from the public's memory. Id. The timing of Gentile's statement, however, was not the only factor that Justice Kennedy considered in determining that no prejudice had occurred in that case. He also analyzed the contents of Gentile's message, which, Justice Kennedy stated, lack any of the more obvious bases for a finding of prejudice. Id. at 1046, 111 S.Ct. at 2730, 115 L.Ed.2d at 905. We agree with Gansler's theory that the timing of an extrajudicial statement may affect its prejudicial effect, but we do not believe that the timing element in this case neutralizes the obvious prejudicial content of Gansler's statements of opinion. Like in Gentile, the timing of Gansler's statements came well before the beginnings of Cook's and Lucas's trials; however, Gansler's proclamation that they had apprehended the persons who committed the crimes in the Cook and Lucas cases directly contravened the provisions of MRPC 3.6(b)(4) (opinion on guilt of innocence). The comments blatantly expressed Gansler's opinion of the guilt of the defendants. In contrast to the lawyer in Gentile, who refused to comment on confessions and evidence from searches, see Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1046, 111 S.Ct. at 2730, 115 L.Ed.2d at 905 (Kennedy J., dissenting), Gansler supported his opinions of guilt by pointing to specific circumstances, such as confessions and physical evidence, to make his views more reliable. Gentile differs from the case before us for yet another reason: Gansler is a prosecutor, not a defense lawyer. Prosecutors play a unique role in our system of criminal justice. We recognized this recently in Walker v. State, 373 Md. 360, 394-95, 818 A.2d 1078, 1098 (2003), where Judge Harrell for the Court stated: Prosecutors are held to even higher standards of conduct than other attorneys due to their unique role as both advocate and minister of justice. The special duty of the prosecutor to seek justice is said to exist because the State's Attorney has broad discretion in determining whether to initiate criminal proceedings. Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 90, 40 A.2d 319, 321 (1944). The office of prosecutor is therefore not purely ministerial, but involves the exercise of learning and discretion, and he or she must exercise a sound discretion to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent. Id. The responsibilities of the prosecutor encompass more than advocacy. The prosecutor's duty is not merely to convict, but to seek justice. His obligation is to protect not only the public interest but the innocent as well and to safeguard the rights guaranteed to all persons, including those who may be guilty. Sinclair v. State, 27 Md. App. 207, 222-23, 340 A.2d 359, 369 (1975). In addition to their special role as ministers of justice, prosecutors have limitations not experienced by criminal defense attorneys in that defense attorneys have the benefit of their client's presumption of innocence. In other words, a criminal defense attorney may announce an opinion that his or her client is innocent with a lesser risk of causing prejudice because the law, itself, presumes the defendant's innocence. On the other hand, a prosecutor's opinion of guilt is much more likely to create prejudice, given that his or her words carry the authority of the government and are especially persuasive in the public's eye. See Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, The Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L.REV. 865, 886 (1990) (When the prosecutor speaks publicly about a pending case, he cannot separate his representational role from his speech, and he thereby involves the state in the extrajudicial comment.). As lawyers, prosecutors are so distinct that some commentators have argued that the rules against extrajudicial statements should apply only to them. See, e.g., Freedman & Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys, 29 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1977). Although we do not embrace this position, it nonetheless reinforces the notion that prosecutors, in particular, should be even more cautious to avoid making potentially prejudicial extrajudicial statements. [21] Because we hold that Gansler knew or should have known that his public opinions of Cook's and Lucas's guilt would have a substantial likelihood of material prejudice, we sustain Bar Counsel's exception with respect to those statements. [22]