Opinion ID: 2807529
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prosecutor’s Cross-Examination

Text: Because Alcantara did not object to the cross-examination during trial, we review for plain error. See Doss, 630 F.3d at 1193. To be plain, an error must be so obvious that the judge should be able to detect the error even in the absence of an objection. See United States v. Matus-Zayas, 655 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011). “Improper questioning was [not] an organizational theme for the prosecutor’s entire crossexamination.” United States v. Harrison, 585 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended. Rather, Alcantara spontaneously challenged Agent Hunter’s testimony when the 32 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO prosecutor merely inquired whether Alcantara remembered that testimony. The prosecutor followed up by inquiring if it was Alcantara’s “testimony . . . that Agent Hunter [was] inventing stories about [him].” The prosecutor did not otherwise compel Alcantara to comment on Agent Hunter’s veracity. Cf. United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (asking five times whether the government witness “would be lying” if his testimony contradicted that of the witness). The crucial distinction between this case and the cases cited in the majority opinion is the absence of the word “lying” in the questions posed by the prosecutor in this case. Use of that word appears to be the common denominator in those cases holding that plain error occurred. See, e.g., Geston, 299 F.3d at 1134 (asking if the government witness “would be lying”); United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 572 (9th Cir. 2004) (questioning whether agent “was lying” in his earlier testimony); Harrison, 585 F.3d at 1158 (inquiring if witnesses were “swearing on oath to testify to the truth and then lying”); United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1999) (asking if the witness “would say [another witness] was lying” when he testified); United States v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1159 (9th Cir. 2010) (“You heard his testimony. . . . He’s lying?”) (emphases added). The majority seeks to lessen the precedential effect of these cases by resorting to dictionary definitions. See Majority Opinion, p. 12–13. Yet, we resort to dictionary definitions only when the meaning of language in a statute is unclear, not to reword our precedent. See, e.g., San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (“To determine the plain meaning of a term undefined by a statute, resort to a dictionary is UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 33 permissible . . .”) (citation omitted). The fact remains that the majority has cited no case where prosecutorial misconduct was found based on an inquiry regarding “invention” of testimony, particularly when that characterization was first used by the testifying defendant. Without clear precedent on this issue, it cannot be fairly said that the district court plainly erred. Indeed, the majority has not cited one case where there was a determination of plain error in the absence of use of the word “lying” or some variant of “lie.” Yet, there are cases in our precedent concluding that there was no plain error when the prosecutor was accused of forcing the witness to comment on veracity, but stopped short of using the L- word. See, e.g., United States v. Greer, 640 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2011) (observing that “[a]lthough we have repeatedly stated that a prosecutor may not ask the defendant to comment on the veracity of another witness, we have found improper prosecutorial questioning in only one particular context: when the prosecutor specifically asked the defendant whether another witness was lying”) (citing Harrison, Combs, Geston and Sanchez). The majority argues that my reliance on Greer is misplaced. See Majority Opinion, p. 13. I beg to differ. Greer states definitively the point that makes plain error inapplicable to this case—“we have found improper prosecutorial questioning in only one particular context: when the prosecutor specifically asked the defendant whether another witness was lying.” 640 F.3d at 1023 (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). We declined to conclude that there was plain error when the prosecutor asked whether another witness testified “inaccurately” because neither the Supreme Court nor our court had yet ruled on whether asking 34 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO about “inaccurate” testimony was improper. Id. Similarly, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ruled that asking about “invented” testimony is improper, particularly when the term is first used by the testifying defendant. Notably, this case cites the exact cases cited by the majority, but acknowledges that these cases concluding that questioning was improper are limited to “one particular context: when the prosecutor specifically asked the defendant whether another witness was lying. . . .” Id. (emphasis in the original); see also United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 612 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that there was no plain error when the prosecutor asked the defendant questions concerning a “rogue agent” during “a fairly argumentative cross-examination in order to poke holes in [the defendant’s] version of the facts”). The facts of this case diverge substantially from those relied upon by the majority. An initial and important difference is that the first comment on the veracity of Agent Hunter’s testimony came unprompted from Alcantara when he stated that Agent Hunter had “invented things” about Alcantara. Unlike in the cases where plain error occurred, the prosecutor did not follow up by asking Alcantara if Agent Hunter was lying when he testified. Rather, he used the same word utilized by Alcantara to ask Alcantara: “Your testimony is that Agent Hunter is inventing stories about you; is that correct?” There was nothing inappropriate about the prosecutor asking Alcantara if he heard Agent Hunter’s testimony, and the majority has cited no authority otherwise. Cf. Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a claim of prosecutor misconduct where the attorney asked the defendant if he had heard the testimony); see also Wright, 625 F.3d at 612 (“There was nothing improper about the UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 35 prosecutor’s” questions forcing the defendant to call the investigating agent a “rogue agent”). The majority intimates that its holding of plain error is valid because the prosecutor “forced” Alcantara to comment on Agent Hunter’s truthfulness. Majority Opinion, pp. 14–15. However, this contention lacks persuasive force because we have expressly held that no plain error occurred during a “fairly argumentative cross-examination” that forced a defendant to call an agent a “rogue agent.” See Wright, 625 F.3d at 612. Finally, even if it was error for the district court to allow the prosecutor to follow-up on Alcantara’s comment that Agent Hunter “made up things,” “the error was not so clearcut, so obvious, a competent district judge should have been able to avoid it without benefit of objection. . . .” Greer, 640 F.3d at 1023 (citation, alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). In Greer, we concluded that “[b]ecause neither the Supreme Court nor this court has yet ruled on the propriety of the prosecutor’s questions in this case [whether witnesses testified inaccurately], the district court did not err.” Id. The same is true in this case. As mentioned, we have limited our cases involving plain error to those where a witness is asked if another witness is lying. See id. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has gone further to impute plain error when the prosecutor asks if another witness “made up things,” especially when the defendant used the phrase first and the prosecutor merely repeated the phrase in the form of a question. Because the facts in this case differ so dramatically from those where plain error occurred, I would hold that the trial judge was not obligated to sua sponte object to the prosecutor’s questions to Alcantara. See Matus-Zayas, 655 F.3d at 1098. 36 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO