Opinion ID: 2196603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: voluntary exposure to the risk

Text: The record in this case shows that Mr. Crews responded to the scene and began to confront the gas leak, but this alone is not enough to conclude that he acted voluntarily. Our cases illustrate that if a person was compelled to act and had no freedom of choice regarding whether to act, we will not say, as a matter of law, that he or she acted voluntarily. See ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 92, 702 A.2d at 734 (quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 68 at 490-91 (5 th ed.1984)); see also Burke v. Williams , 244 Md. 154, 157-58, 223 A.2d 187, 189 (1966). In the past, we have examined the voluntariness element of assumption of the risk in factual settings where the risks at issue arose during the course of the plaintiffs' discharge of employment duties. Thus, we have considered aspects of a plaintiff's employment as a factor in an assumption of the risk analysis. Because Mr. Crews was acting in his employment capacity when he confronted the gas leak, these cases are instructive. In ADM Partnership, the plaintiff, a delivery driver, sued the owners of a building for injuries she sustained by falling on ice while attempting to deliver copies of blueprints in the defendants' building. The Circuit Court, at trial, granted the defendants' motion for judgment at the end of the plaintiff's case based on its finding that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk by choosing to walk across an icy parking lot. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the question of whether the plaintiff acted voluntarily should have been submitted to the jury because the plaintiff testified that she feared her employer would fire her if she failed to make the delivery. We granted the defendants' petition for writ of certiorari to resolve the issue of whether the plaintiff's assumption of the risk was voluntarily when her actions were motivated by the responsibilities of her employment. At the outset of our analysis, we explained that an employee's act becomes voluntary when the employee is given a clear and reasonable choice either to act or not to act, and then chooses willingly to act. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 93, 702 A.2d at 735. (citations omitted). The plaintiff argued that she did not act voluntarily because her only options were to attempt delivery or return in failure to her employer. She testified at trial that she believed if she did not make the delivery her employer would lose the delivery contract and her employment would be terminated. After examination of the record, we rejected the plaintiff's argument. The only evidence in the record that supported the plaintiff's argument was her own testimony regarding her belief that her employment was at risk. We determined that her subjective testimony, without more, was not enough to create an issue for the jury. We stated that: [d]etermining whether [the plaintiff] acted voluntarily when she encountered the ice covered walkway or was responding to economic necessity requires proof of her state of mind. Ordinarily, that proof is supplied by direct evidence, i.e., testimony by the person whose state of mind is at issue, or by circumstantial evidence, i.e., testimony concerning facts and circumstances from which the state of mind may be inferred. While the testimony of the affected person ordinarily is sufficient, without more, to support a verdict and thus to generate a jury question ... where the proof of the state of mind itself depends upon the proof of another fact, the witness's testimony alone will not suffice. There must, in addition, be some evidence of that critical fact [and] there is not a shred of evidence from which [the plaintiff's] concern for her job if the delivery were not made can be inferred. Id. at 100-01, 702 A.2d at 739. (citations omitted). Because there was no evidence in the record to support her belief that her employment was in jeopardy by a compulsion to make the delivery, or any evidence from which such an inference could be drawn, we reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and affirmed the Circuit Court's grant of judgment to the defendants. See id. at 104, 702 A.2d at 740. In our analysis of ADM Partnership, we relied upon Burke v. Williams, 244 Md. 154, 223 A.2d 187 (1966). Burke, similar to ADM Partnership, involved a delivery person's suit against a property owner for injuries sustained from a slip and fall accident. The plaintiff in Burke delivered sinks to a house under construction in Prince George's County. When the plaintiff arrived at the house, the property owner directed him to bring the sinks through the house into the kitchen. Because the house was under construction, the plaintiff had to carry the sinks through the house over a walkway made of wooden planks. After two successful trips, the plaintiff slipped on a damp plank and fell into a ditch on his third journey. He sued the homeowner in a negligence action. The homeowner defended by asserting, among other things, that the plaintiff assumed the risk by undertaking to deliver the sinks into the house. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment based, in part, on its finding of the plaintiff's voluntary assumption of a known risk. On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that once he arrived at the delivery site his actions were involuntary because the defendant provided him with only one means of ingress and egress to the house via the wooden plank path and, if he did not complete the delivery, he would have been discharged from his job. His argument, in essence, was that he was constrained by the economic necessity of keeping his job. We affirmed the trial court's judgment because the plaintiff offered no evidence that the defendant or his employer ever demanded that he make the delivery across the pathway into the house and, on the record of the case, the defendant was free to leave the sinks at the entrance of the house. See id. at 158, 223 A.2d at 189. In reaching our conclusion, we explained that: [t]he rule is that when a plaintiff in a personal injury action becomes aware of a previously created risk and voluntarily chooses to put up with the situation-where as here a workman confronted with a slippery walkway nevertheless chose to use it-then his willingness to take a chance is implied and he would be barred from recovering for a risk he chose to assume. Id. 244 Md. at 157-58, 223 A.2d at 189. To similar effect, in Brady v. Parsons, 327 Md. 275, 609 A.2d 297 (1992), we affirmed a jury verdict against a deceased construction worker's estate based, in part, on a jury finding that the deceased voluntarily assumed the risk that caused his death. In that case, the deceased's estate sued the construction-safety manager of a construction site owned by the Mass Transit Administration. The construction worker fell to his death while attempting to attach an aluminum sheet over the top of a train station platform. The estate charged that the defendant was negligent in not providing the deceased with a safe means of performing the tasks of his job. The estate introduced evidence at trial that guardrails, which may have prevented the accident, were not attached to the scaffolding that was used by the deceased construction worker. See id. at 287, 609 A.2d at 303. On appeal, the estate asserted that the deceased's assumption of the risk was not voluntary because he was faced with a choice between encountering the risk of using the incomplete scaffolding or losing his job. We held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict because there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the deceased opted for a faster, yet more dangerous, method of completing his task. Thus, the jury verdict on the assumption of the risk ground was proper because the estate provided no evidence that the deceased could not have insisted on the use of a safe platform to use while attaching the aluminum sheet. See id. at 327 Md. at 289, 609 A.2d at 304. See also Imbraguglio v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 358 Md. 194, 211-13, 747 A.2d 662, 672-73 (2000)(an employee's decision to use an elevated platform without guardrails as a means of repositioning stacked cartons was a voluntary act for assumption of the risk purposes). Bull S.S. Line v. Fisher, 196 Md. 519, 77 A.2d 142 (1950), involved a ship's carpenter's suit against a shipping line company. Fisher, the plaintiff, was injured when he was struck by a load of lumber as he was assisting the defendant ship owner's employees in hoisting lumber onto the defendant's ship. At the time of the incident, Fisher's employer had a contract with the ship owner to supply waterfront workers, including carpenters. Fisher, after assisting in loading the lumber on a dolly, strapping it down and attaching a boom hook at the end of a cable leading to a winch hoist operated by the defendant's employees, stepped back four or five steps, or feet from the load so that it could be hoisted in the air and moved to the ship. Bull S.S. Line, 196 Md. at 522, 77 A.2d at 145. Fisher said he figured the load would swing some [as it was hoisted], but not exactly the way it did. Id. at 522-23, 77 A.2d at 145. He brought suit to recover damages for his injuries and prevailed at trial. One issue advanced by the defense on appeal was whether the evidence showed that the [plaintiff] had voluntarily assumed the risk which caused his injuries, as a matter of law. Bull S.S. Line, 196 Md. at 521, 77 A.2d at 144. The defendant contended that, due to the plaintiff's vast experience as a ship's carpenter, he took the chance of risks incident to his employment, thereby relieving the shipping company of the duty to protect him. See Bull S.S. Line, 196 Md. at 526, 77 A.2d at 146. We determined that resolution of the company's argument was dependent on what risks the plaintiff assumed in his capacity as a ship's carpenter. We then offered a test to resolve the question, stating that every risk is not necessarily assumed by one who works in a dangerous place or at a dangerous occupation. He assumes only those risks which might reasonably be expected to exist, and, if by some action of the defendant, an unusual danger arises, that is not so assumed. Id. We ultimately concluded that we could not say, as a matter of law, that plaintiff's injuries resulted from a risk reasonably expected to exist in his employment. Based on the record in Bull S.S. Line, we resolved that the question of whether plaintiff's injuries were caused by a risk inherent in the work of a ship's carpenter was properly left to the jury. See id. at 527, 77 A.2d at 147. [10] In our more contemporary fireman's rule cases, a secondary rationale for existence of the rule is found which is particularly relevant to this case. It focuses not on the public policy considerations of a firefighter as a public servant, but on firefighting as an inherently dangerous occupation. The fireman's rule is based in part on the notion that when an occupation exists wholly or partially for the purpose of confronting dangers posed to the public, it is inappropriate to allow the worker to recover for injures resulting from the very purpose for which he or she is employed. See Flowers, 308 Md. at 447-48, 520 A.2d at 368. Stated differently, a firefighter who is injured by a risk inherent in the task of firefighting may be barred from asserting claims for those injuries because it is the firefighter's duty to deal with fires and he or she cannot recover damages caused by the reason that made his or her employment necessary. The assumption of the risk analysis intrinsic in the fireman's rule cases focuses on the reasonably identifiable and inherent risks assumed by firefighters when they accept employment in an ostensibly dangerous occupation. See Flowers, 308 Md. at 445, 520 A.2d at 367. Based on the above cases, the record before us here, and Petitioner's argument notwithstanding, we conclude that Mr. Crews voluntarily assumed the risk in the present case. Petitioners contend that Mr. Crews was compelled by the exigency of the facts in this case to repair the leak to prevent serious harm to the people and property of the surrounding neighborhood. They argue that Mr. Crews was faced with the choice of either abandoning the leak and staying in safety, or approaching the pipe and going into danger. Petitioners reason that opting not to act was not a reasonable alternative under the circumstances, therefore he was compelled to address the gas leak. [11] To be sure, there are ordinarily greater private and public imperatives in repairing a serious gas leak than in the delivery of blueprints ( ADM Partnership ) or sinks ( Burke ), the installation of a roof on a rail line stop ( Brady ), repositioning mis-aligned stacked cartons ( Imbraguglio ), or loading a ship ( Bull S.S. Line ). Although commending Mr. Crews's apparent initiative here, we cannot find in this record any evidence that he was forced to make those efforts or what the larger implications may have been had he not acted. In reviewing the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment we shall draw any reasonable inferences from the facts in Petitioners' favor. See Liscombe, 303 Md. at 621-22, 495 A.2d at 839. The record, however, is devoid of any facts that Mr. Crews was compelled to choose the course of conduct that he selected. The available facts before the trial judge at the summary judgment hearing came from the partial transcript of Mr. Crews's deposition. The only reference in the transcript that remotely suggests any compulsion on Mr. Crews to confront the gas leak, or risk his job, is his response to a question from Maryland Cable's counsel, wherein Mr. Crews stated: ... but as I said before, that it have to be worked, regardless. You know what I mean? It have to be repaired. It's a chance you have tothat we go through. This enigmatic statement, standing alone as it does, fails to explain adequately what actual factors may have forced Mr. Crews to take action. Without greater elaboration, we cannot conclude that his actions were involuntary for purposes of our assumption of the risk analysis. See ADM Partnership, 384 Md. at 100-01, 702 A.2d at 739; Brady, 327 Md. at 289, 609 A.2d at 304. The unsupported argument in Petitioners' brief that Mr. Crews acted to save the people and the property of the surrounding neighborhood is insufficient to demonstrate there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact. See Lowman v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 68 Md.App. 64, 70, 509 A.2d 1239, cert. denied, 307 Md. 406, 514 A.2d 24 (1986). Of greater influence on our conclusion, however, is the undisputed evidence that the danger Mr. Crews encountered on Trillium Lane in Bowie on 23 April 1996 is the very danger that he accepted the risk of confronting when he became an employee of Washington Gas some twenty years earlier. In his own words, he accepted that responsibility when he was hired. Thus, the aspect of his job duties that involved fixing gas leaks, a clearly dangerous endeavor, and which he continued to confront for more than twenty years, constitutes a voluntary assumption of those risks which might reasonably be expected to exist on 23 April 1996 in Bowie. It seems to us, on this record, that the risk that led to Mr. Crews's injuries was reasonably identifiable and inherent in his job both when he was first hired and on 23 April 1996. Accordingly, we find no error of law in the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment, on this record, in favor of Respondents. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS.