Opinion ID: 160816
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Past Conviction

Text: At trial, the government introduced a journal entry of Defendant’s June, 1997, conviction for possession of crack as evidence of the alleged Seabury Conspiracy. Defendant argues that the evidence of this conviction should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and under Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), on the grounds that it was more prejudicial than probative and conveyed to the jury only Defendant’s propensity to commit crime. Rule 404(b) “does not apply to other act evidence that is intrinsic to the crime charged.” United States v. O’Brien, 131 F.3d 1428, 1432 (10th Cir. 1997). With respect to conspiracies, the Eighth Circuit has stated, and we agree, that “[a]ny drug activity by a conspirator during the conspiracy is relevant evidence of the existence of the conspiracy.” United States v. Roulette, 75 F.3d 418, 424 (8th Cir. 1996). In other words, drug activity that occurs during the period of an alleged drug conspiracy may be relevant evidence of that conspiracy and thus not Rule 404(b) evidence. Here, that was the case. Defendant was arrested and convicted for possession of crack cocaine during the period of the Seabury Conspiracy. That conviction is not unrelated to the instant case as Defendant claims. Rather, it provides direct evidence of the existence of the Seabury Conspiracy because it shows that Defendant, as one would expect of a person involved in a crack distribution conspiracy, had crack -15- cocaine in his possession. His conviction for possession is, therefore, direct evidence of the alleged conspiracy to distribute crack and not Rule 404(b) evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of that conviction.