Opinion ID: 1970693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ANALYSIS UNDER D.R.E. 804(b)(3)

Text: Though conceding that he failed to object to the introduction of this evidence in the Superior Court, Smith argues that the court committed plain error in admitting portions of the October 10 conversation between Weedon and Mrs. Weedon that implicated him. He asserts that Williamson provides the more analytically sound approach to D.R.E. 804(b)(3) issues. The State initially notes that Williamson is only marginally involved because only those portions of Weedon's statement that used a plural, first-person pronoun and the component that directly inculpated Smith are at issue. The State contends that because Williamson was based on federal statutory analysis, this Court is not bound by that decision and, further, that policy considerations favor rejection of Williamson. Premised on such rejection, the State concludes that Weedon's October 10 statement was admissible against Smith under D.R.E. 804(b)(3). [8] D.R.E. 804(b)(3) only allows admission of truly self-inculpatory statements. That provision, which codifies the declaration-against-interest exception to the hearsay rule, allows admission of the following: A statement which was, at the time of its making, so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. D.R.E. 804(b)(3). In Williamson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994) (O'Connor, J., majority), the United States Supreme Court clarified the scope of statements admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) (F.R.E. 804(b)(3)), ___ U.S. at ___-___, 114 S.Ct. at 2433-37, the federal counterpart to D.R.E. 804(b)(3). In that case, a declarant (Harris) during a custodial interrogation made a confession that incriminated himself as well as the defendant (Williamson). Subsequently, Harris recanted parts of his confession as fabricated but made a second confession. The second confession still incriminated himself and Williamson, though under a different set of circumstances. At Williamson's trial, because Harris (who was called as a witness under use immunity) refused to testify, the court allowed the interrogating officer to recount Harris' second confession which inculpated both Harris (the declarant) and Williamson (the defendant). Id. at ___-___, 114 S.Ct. at 2433-34. The issue before the Court was whether the confession should be dissected to its self-inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory components. Relying on the denotative meaning of statement in F.R.E. 804(b)(3) and the underlying basis for admissibility of such statements  trustworthiness attributable to declarations against interest  the Court explicated that F.R.E. 804(b)(3) renders admissible only those components of a declarant's confession that are truly self-inculpatory as to the declarant in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Id. at ___-___, 114 S.Ct. at 2436-37. [9] The policy behind the declaration-against-interest exception is that self-inculpatory statements are inherently reliable and trustworthy. Williamson, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2435 (reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-incriminatory statements unless they believe them to be true); United States v. Matthews, 2d Cir., 20 F.3d 538, 545 (1994) (people do not ordinarily make statements damaging to themselves unless they are true) (quotation omitted). There is no clear policy basis, however, for attributing equal guarantees of trustworthiness to declarations appurtenant to the self-incriminatory ones, particularly those that are self-serving. Williamson, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2435; Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2062, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986); Matthews, 20 F.3d at 545. Justice O'Connor, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in Williamson, analyzed the rule as follows: Rule 804(b)(3) is founded on the commonsense notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be true. This notion simply does not extend to the broader definition of statement. The fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the confession's non-self-inculpatory parts. One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature.       Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones which people are most likely to make even when they are false; and mere proximity to other, self-inculpatory, statements does not increase the plausibility of the self-exculpatory statements.       Nothing in the text of Rule 804(b)(3) or the general theory of the hearsay Rules suggests that admissibility should turn on whether a statement is collateral to a self-inculpatory statement. The fact that a statement is self-inculpatory does make it more reliable; but the fact that a statement is collateral to a self-inculpatory statement says nothing at all about the collateral statement's reliability. We see no reason why collateral statements, even ones that are neutral as to interest ... should be treated any differently from other hearsay statements that are generally excluded.       In our view, the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory. The district court may not just assume for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3) that a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller confession, and this is especially true when the statement implicates someone else. Williamson, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2435. Although not bound by the Supreme Court's interpretation of F.R.E. 804(b)(3) in construing our identical D.R.E. 804(b)(3), we have repeatedly noted that construction of identical rules by the federal judiciary is accorded great persuasive weight in our interpretation of the Delaware counterparts. See Hoffman v. Cohen, Del.Supr., 538 A.2d 1096, 1098 (1988) (quoting Canaday v. Superior Court, Supr., 49 Del. 456, 119 A.2d 347, 352 (1956)). [10] We find Justice O'Connor's reasoning to be persuasive and we therefore adopt it in construing the Delaware rule. [11] As the Court in Williamson held, there is no theoretical basis for the admission of neutral, collateral statements. Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible. D.R.E. 802. [12] A hearsay declaration is admissible, usually under a specific exception, only where the declaration has some theoretical basis making it inherently trustworthy. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); D.R.E. 803 (listing hearsay exceptions where availability of declarant is immaterial); D.R.E. 804 (listing hearsay exceptions requiring unavailability of declarant). Thus, absent some special indicia of reliability and trustworthiness, hearsay statements are inadmissible. Neutral, collateral statements enjoy no such guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness. Williamson, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2435. Non-self-incriminatory components of a declaration purportedly falling within D.R.E. 804(b)(3) are presumptively inadmissible hearsay because they cannot claim any special guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness. [13] This result is consistent with Delaware's traditional approach of viewing constitutional protection of confrontation accorded the accused by the United States Constitution as a floor rather than a ceiling. See, e.g., Bryan v. State, Del.Supr., 571 A.2d 170, 176-77 (1990); Hammond v. State, Del.Supr., 569 A.2d 81, 86-87 (1989). In the instant case, the Superior Court allowed Mrs. Weedon to testify to the entire conversation she had with Weedon on October 10, 1992. In that conversation, Weedon described his assault on Ward, inculpated himself and also inculpated Smith. Under the D.R.E. 804(b)(3) analysis set forth above, only those portions of Weedon's October 10 communication to Mrs. Weedon that were truly self-inculpatory as to Weedon under all the circumstances were admissible. The Superior Court committed plain error in not analyzing the October 10 communication to distill those portions that were truly self-inculpatory and admissible from those that were not.