Opinion ID: 883796
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: Our standard of review of a district court's denial of a motion to change venue is a legal conclusion which we review to determine whether the district court correctly applied the law. Carter v. Nye (1994), 266 Mont. 226, 228, 879 P.2d 729, 730; Barthule v. K a m a n (1994), 268 Mont. 477, 482, 886 P.2d 971, 974. Our standard of review in appeals from a district court's denial of a motion to set aside an entry of default is that no great abuse of discretion need be shown to warrant reversal. Lords v. Newman (1984), 212 Mont. 359, 364, 688 P.2d 290, 293. Our standard of review in appeals from summary judgment rulings is de novo. Motaire v. Northern Montana Joint Refuse Disposal Dist. (1995), 274 Mont. 239, 242, 907 P.2d 154, 156; Mead v. M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465, 470, 872 P.2d 782, 785. When we review a district court's grant of summary judgment, we apply the same evaluation as the district court based on Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264, 900 P.2d 901, 903. In Bruner, we set forth our inquiry: The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the legal determinations made by a district court as to whether the court erred. Bruner, 900 P.2d at 903 (citations omitted)