Opinion ID: 1421847
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Presumption Against Implied Repeal

Text: The people of this state have the power to repeal provisions of the Constitution by voting on an initiative or a legislative proposal. (Const., art. XVIII, §§ 1, 3.) Yet that power must be unambiguously exercised. Even where one of two inconsistent [enactments] is later than the other and ... does not purport to continue the other in operation, it is settled that there is a presumption against repeal by implication, that to overcome the presumption the two acts must be irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent as to prevent their concurrent operation, and that the courts are bound to maintain the integrity of both [enactments] if they may stand together. ( Warne v. Harkness, supra, 60 Cal.2d 579, 587-588; accord, In re Thierry S., supra, 19 Cal.3d 727, 744; County of Placer v. Aetna Casualty etc. Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 182, 188-189 [323 P.2d 753].) [3] The majority's reading of section 28(d) results in a substantial repeal of article I, section 24, and article I, section 13, of the Constitution. Section 24 reads in pertinent part: Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Section 13 protects the people of this state from unreasonable searches and seizures. In order to reconcile section 28(d) with section 24 and section 13, it is necessary to examine the history and meaning of the latter two provisions. It is a basic premise of constitutional law that the states may adopt search and seizure rules affording greater protection to their citizens than is required by the United States Constitution. ( Alderman v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 165, 175 [22 L.Ed.2d 176, 187-188, 89 S.Ct. 961]; Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 62 [17 L.Ed.2d 730, 734, 87 S.Ct. 788].) [T]he California Constitution is, and always has been, a document of independent force. Any other result would contradict not only the most fundamental principles of federalism but also the historic bases of state charters. ( People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 549-550 [119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099].) Thus article I, section 13, of the Constitution has a life of its own, separate from the jurisprudence surrounding the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As we stated in Brisendine ( id. at pp. 550-551), in determining that California citizens are entitled to greater protection under the California Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures than that required by the United States Constitution, we are embarking on no revolutionary course. Rather we are simply reaffirming a basic principle of federalism  that the nation as a whole is composed of distinct geographical and political entities bound together by a fundamental federal law but nonetheless independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of their citizens. It was to codify this fundamental principle that the people of California adopted section 24 at the November 1974 General Election. The ballot pamphlet distributed to all voters explained that section 24 clarifies existing law by providing, inter alia, that rights guaranteed by the State Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the federal Constitution. (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1974), analysis by Legislative Analyst, p. 26.) The measure was overwhelmingly approved by 70.5 percent of the voters. That the exclusionary rule and the principle of vicarious standing are fundamental aspects of California's constitutional law cannot be doubted. In People v. Reeves (1964) 61 Cal.2d 268 [38 Cal. Rptr. 1, 391 P.2d 393], the defendant was able to challenge the constitutionality of the arrest and search of a third party. ( Id. at p. 274.) We held that The rule that requires a reversal where incriminatory evidence has been secured by means of an illegal search is not a mere technical rule of evidence. It is based on the fundamental concept that such a rule is required in order to give substance to the rights conferred by the provisions of our federal and state Constitutions prohibiting such seizures. ( Id. at p. 275, italics added.) And in Kaplan v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.3d 150, 161, we observed that this court has repeatedly reaffirmed Martin and its raison d'etre as a necessary adjunct to Cahan. As in People v. Brisendine, supra, 13 Cal.3d 528, 551, The ultimate confirmation of our conclusion occurred, finally, when the people adopted article I, section 24, of the California Constitution at the November 1974 election.... [4] In light of this history I cannot accept the argument that such a firmly established and fundamental rule, incorporated in section 13 and section 24 as a basic provision of California constitutional law, was impliedly overruled by the broad, nonspecific language of Proposition 8. Nothing on the face of section 28(d) or the ballot materials assertedly explaining it explicitly mentions section 24, section 13, or the exclusionary rule. Yet it is evident that the drafters knew very well how to repeal specific portions of the Constitution if they wished to do so: e.g., section 2 of Proposition 8 expressly deletes article I, section 12, of the Constitution, which afforded most accused persons the right to be released on bail while awaiting trial. In stark contrast is the vague and general language of section 28(d) and the ballot information interpreting it. The majority direct us to the analysis by the Legislative Analyst contained in the voter pamphlet. The portion relating to section 28(d) declares in part, Under current law, certain evidence is not permitted to be presented in a criminal trial or hearing. For example, evidence obtained through ... unlawful searches of persons or property, cannot be used in court. This measure generally would allow most relevant evidence to be presented in criminal cases.... The measure could not affect federal restrictions on the use of evidence. (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) p. 32, italics in original (hereafter Ballot Pamp.).) But to say that most evidence generally would be allowed to be presented is hardly a clear mandate that all California exclusionary rules are to be abrogated. And the statement regarding the continued vitality of federal exclusionary rules does not necessarily imply the demise of all state rules. Nowhere does the Legislative Analyst state, as the majority claim, that unlawfully seized evidence would become admissible except to the extent that the federal Constitution forbids its use. ( Ante, at p. 886.) Indeed, that there is no such statement anywhere in the ballot materials indicates that the majority's interpretation of section 28(d) is not compelled. As the majority note, section 28(d) has been described as the most ambiguous and least understood section of Proposition 8. (Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of Prop. 8, Mar. 24, 1982, p. 10.) ( Ante, at p. 886, fn. 6.) [5] The vague, nonspecific language of section 28(d) simply does not repeal the clear mandate of section 24 or the exclusionary rules embodied therein. [6]