Opinion ID: 1743523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: LAW I. Did the chancellor err in admitting parol evidence to determine the intent of the testators?

Text: It is the rule in Mississippi, as elsewhere, that if the terms of a will are ambiguous, parol evidence may be admitted to determine the intent of the testator. E.g., Tinnin v. First Bank of Mississippi, 502 So.2d 659, 670 (Miss. 1987); Maupin v. Estate of Perry, 396 So.2d 613, 615 (Miss. 1981); Strickland v. Delta Investment Co., 163 Miss. 772, 781, 137 So. 734, 736 (1931). However, if the will is unambiguous and the intent of the testator can be discerned from the face of the document, the admission of such evidence is improper. E.g., Stovall v. Stovall, 360 So.2d 679, 681 (Miss. 1978); Seal v. Seal, 312 So.2d 19, 21 (Miss. 1975); In re Estate of Granberry, 310 So.2d 708, 710-12 (Miss. 1975) The chancellor allowed the attorney Riser to testify in support of the appellee's contention that the Brasells meant to include the promissory notes executed to them in exchange for their stock in the bequest referring to promissory notes. Patricia, on appeal, takes the position that since both wills refer to promissory notes from them [i.e., from the joint executors] and the promissory notes in question were executed not by the brothers as individuals, but by the corporation, the wills are not ambiguous as to those promissory notes. Patricia contends that whatever promissory notes were intended by the wills did not encompass the promissory notes from the stock transaction since these notes were not from them. Brasell Farms, Inc. was a closely held corporation in which all stock was held by family members. Patricia further argues that even if the will were ambiguous, the chancellor did not make an explicit finding of ambiguity; she contends this is an absolute prerequisite for the admission of any parol evidence. Seal v. Seal, 312 So.2d 19, 21 (Miss. 1975). This is true, but it is also true that where a chancellor does not make explicit findings, this Court on appeal will assume that all disputed issues were resolved in favor of the appellees. This is so even in cases where the chancellor's findings left much to be desired. Bryant v. Cameron, 473 So.2d 174, 179 (Miss. 1985). This Court has recognized that a chancellor may make an implicit as well as explicit finding. Spain v. Holland, 483 So.2d 318, 320 (Miss. 1986); Dungan v. Dick Moore, Inc., 463 So.2d 1094, 1100 (Miss. 1985); In re Enlargement of Boundaries of Yazoo City, 452 So.2d 837, 842 (Miss. 1984). In the present case the chancellor's action in admitting the parol evidence makes no sense unless he had come to the conclusion that the will was in fact ambiguous. Where a will disposes of property, by a definite description, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary that description. Barner v. Lehr, 190 Miss. 77, 199 So. 273 (1941). On the other hand, where the language of the will could apply to more than one item of property, parol evidence is admissible to determine which property the testator intended to bequeath. Carlisle v. Carlisle's Estate, 252 So.2d 894 (Miss. 1971); Welch v. Welch, 147 Miss. 728, 113 So. 197 (1927). The question in the present case is whether or not the inclusion of the phrase from them makes the description of the promissory notes definite enough to exclude the notes executed by the corporation. In practice, Mississippi has tended to be liberal in the admission of such evidence, even where the document on its face appears unambiguous. An excellent example is the case of Maupin v. Est. of Perry, 396 So.2d 613 (Miss. 1981). This involved a will whose residuary clause specified that the testator's surviving nieces and nephews would be beneficiaries. At the time of his death, the testator was survived by one nephew. His last niece died eighteen years previously. The testator was fully aware of that fact. When the will was probated, a dispute arose as to whether or not greatnieces and great-nephews were intended to be included under the residuary clause. The chancellor pronounced the residuary clause ambiguous and employed rules of construction in determining the testator's true intent. This Court held that he had not erred in pronouncing the will ambiguous, but that he had erred in its resolution by giving literal construction to the word `nephew' thereby limiting the devise to that person. The ambiguity arises from the uncertainty of designating the intended recipients. 396 So.2d at 615. In effect, this Court held that the surrounding circumstances created ambiguity in the will, despite the apparent clarity of the word nephew. In this case, the chancellor had not admitted parol evidence to establish the testator's intent, so this Court ruled that the residuary clause was void and the property concerned must descend according to the intestacy statute. This Court has long recognized that parol evidence is admissible to show the surrounding circumstances where that is necessary to establish the testator's true intent. Keeley v. Adams, 149 Miss. 201, 115 So. 344 (1928). Of special interest is the case of Byrd v. Henderson, 139 Miss. 140, 104 So. 100 (1925). Byrd involved a will which devised all the testator's property to his wife and her heirs. A dispute arose as to whether or not the testator had intended to include heirs other than children. This Court held it was permissible to use parol evidence of surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether the testator used the word heirs in its technical sense or in the sense of children. 139 Miss. at 156-57, 115 So. at 102. In the present case, we think that the technical significance of the phrase from them should not serve to prevent the chancellor from considering parol evidence necessary to establish the true intent of the testator. This accords best with the necessity of establishing the testators' intent and to construe wills so as to avoid a clearly unintended consequence. Tinnin v. First Bank of Mississippi, 502 So.2d 659, 669 (Miss. 1987); Est. of Bunch v. Heirs of Bunch, 485 So.2d 284, (Miss. 1986). The chancellor's finding not being manifestly wrong, we will not disturb it on appeal.