Opinion ID: 778459
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pretrial Order

Text: 18 Maytag also argues that the district court's rulings in Pretrial Order No. 2 were erroneous. The pretrial ruling states that: (1) adequate warnings cannot render a product with a manufacturing defect non-defective under Indiana law, even if compliance with the warnings would have rendered the product safe; (2) misuse is not a complete defense to a strict liability claim, but rather a factor going to the issue of comparative fault under section 34-20-8-1 of the Indiana Code; and (3) even if misuse is a complete defense, the failure to follow the manufacturer's instructions does not constitute misuse as a matter of law. Maytag argues that these rulings do not correctly apply Indiana law on these issues and as a result, the district court improperly refused to allow Maytag to assert, prove or argue that its warnings or Mr. Chapman's failure to comply therewith rendered the stove non-defective or constituted misuse. Generally, we review a decision in a pretrial order to admit or bar certain evidence for an abuse of discretion. Hotaling v. Chubb Sovereign Life Ins. Co., 241 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 2001). In this case, however, the district court first made determinations regarding Indiana law; such determinations of law are reviewed de novo. Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1178 (7th Cir.1985) (Even when the standard is abuse of discretion, review for errors of law is plenary). 19 We find that the district court's pretrial order is not contrary to Indiana law. First, Maytag's warnings have no bearing on the defective condition of the range. It is undisputed that Maytag's range was manufactured with a defect. We believe that the district court correctly determined that adequate warnings will not render a product with a manufacturing defect non-defective, regardless of whether compliance with the warnings would have rendered the product safe. Although Maytag provided numerous warnings with which Mr. Chapman failed to comply, warnings cannot make a dangerous product safe. Marshall v. Clark Equip. Co., 680 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Ind. App.1997). Accordingly, it was well within the discretion of the district court to hold that warnings will save a product from being defective only when a product is without manufacturing defects. See, e.g., Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that [a]lthough an adequate warning will prevent the reliance on a theory of strict liability in a failure to warn defect case, such a warning will not make safe a product with a manufacturing defect). 20 Second, the district court did not err when it determined that the defense of misuse is not a complete defense, but instead is an element of comparative fault. The court's order cites the amendment to the Indiana products liability statute, which states: The fault of the person suffering the physical harm ... shall be compared by the trier of fact in accordance with [sections of the comparative fault act]. The Indiana General Assembly defined fault as an act of omission that is negligent, willful, wanton, reckless or intentional toward the person or property of others. I.C. § 34-20-8-1. The district court determined that any misuse falls within the scope of the definition of fault. Accordingly, the court concluded that since a jury is directed to compare all fault in a case, it was the intent of the legislature that misuse be a part of the comparative fault analysis, rather than providing a defendant with a complete defense. We find that this interpretation of Indiana law is not an abuse of discretion. 21 Finally, Maytag challenges the district court's determination that Mr. Chapman's failure to heed the warnings is not misuse under Indiana law. In support of its position, Maytag cites only Indiana cases in which the defendant was injured by a defect-free product. We agree with the district court that the Chapmans' case is extraordinary and, therefore, distinguishable, based on the undisputed fact that the Maytag range was defective. The court reasoned that an Indiana court would interpret the statute and make the policy decision to not allow Maytag to assert the defense of misuse on the basis of Mr. Chapman's failure to comply with its warnings. Again, we find that this conclusion was within the sound discretion of the district court.