Opinion ID: 714140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Teixeira's Perjured Testimony.

Text: 33 Figueroa next argues that the government knowingly permitted Teixeira to commit perjury when he testified on cross-examination that he always did [his] taxes and that he filed a 1988 tax return. Figueroa contends that the government knew, or should have known, that Teixeira's testimony with respect to his income tax filings was perjurious when made because Teixeira had previously testified, in both the Restrepo and Salcedo trials, that he had not paid any income tax in 1987. In Restrepo, Teixeira further conceded that his failure to pay income tax was a criminal act. 34 If newly discovered evidence indicates that testimony given at trial was perjured, the grant of a new trial depends on the materiality of the perjury to the jury's verdict and the extent to which the prosecution was aware of the perjury. United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 939, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993). Where the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury, a new trial is warranted if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Id. (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)); see also Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218, 225 (2d Cir.1988) (question is whether the jury's verdict might be altered). But see United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir.1975) (where government knowingly offers perjured testimony, new trial is virtual[ly] automatic). However, where the government was unaware of the perjury at the time of trial, a new trial is warranted only if the testimony was material and 'the court [is left] with a firm belief that but for the perjured testimony, the defendant would most likely not have been convicted.'  Wallach, 935 F.2d at 456 (quoting Sanders, 863 F.2d at 226). 35 For purposes of analysis, the district court proceeded on the assumption that the government knew that Teixeira's testimony was perjurious when made. That assumption was supported by some of the evidence presented to the district court. Prior to the Figueroa trial, Teixeira had testified in both the Restrepo and Salcedo trials that he had not paid any income taxes for 1987. In all of his assignments, Teixeira had worked with the same DEA agent, who was present throughout the Restrepo, Salcedo and Figueroa trials. All three of these cases were prosecuted by the office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. It can be argued, therefore, that the government knew or should have known that Teixeira's statements at the Figueroa trial that I always did my taxes, and that he filed his 1987 and 1988 tax returns, were false when made. See Wallach, 935 F.2d at 457 ([G]iven the inconsistencies in [government witness's] statements the government should have been on notice that [the witness] was perjuring himself.). 36 On the other hand, Teixeira's false testimony in the Figueroa trial was first elicited not by the government, but by defense counsel on cross-examination. That testimony was partially impeached on cross-examination, and then was further discredited, and recanted, on re-cross. In addition, throughout Teixeira's testimony, there was ambiguity as to whether his reference to a particular year was intended to signify the tax year (i.e., the year in which he earned income on which taxes were due), or the year in which he filed a return in respect of that tax year. These circumstances, in our view, may support a finding that the government should not be charged with knowledge of Teixeira's perjury. The district court, however, did not decide whether Teixeira's testimony in the Figueroa trial was perjurious, or whether the government knew that Teixeira's testimony was perjurious. 37 Even assuming, as the district court did, that the government knowingly introduced the perjured testimony, Figueroa is not entitled to a new trial. Where the government knowingly allows perjured testimony to be introduced, a new trial is warranted if there is a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony affected the judgment of the jury. Wallach, 935 F.2d at 456 (citation omitted). No doubt, new impeachment evidence may satisfy the reasonable likelihood standard where a conviction depends on the testimony of a single government witness, or on a witness whose credibility was not attacked on cross-examination. See, e.g., id. at 457-58; Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 246 (recognizing possibility that new evidence regarding credibility of witness may warrant new trial). But where independent evidence supports a defendant's conviction, the subsequent discovery that a witness's testimony at trial was perjured will not warrant a new trial. See, e.g. United States v. Reyes, 49 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir.1995) (where government agent subsequently discovered to have perjured himself, new trial not warranted where core of the evidence came from a different witness). 38 The circumstances do not suggest that the undisclosed evidence of Teixeira's perjury would have affected the result. Ample evidence supports Figueroa's conviction. See supra note 4. The additional evidence concerns a collateral issue (Teixeira's taxes), and d[oes] not refute any of [the witness's] testimony against Figueroa. Reyes, 49 F.3d at 68. And Teixeira's testimony regarding his taxes was impeached--actually recanted--on further cross-examination, so that further impeachment evidence on that issue would have been cumulative. For these reasons, the new evidence of Figueroa's perjury is the sort of cumulative impeachment material that is routinely held insufficient to warrant a new trial, United States v. White, 972 F.2d 16, 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1026, 113 S.Ct. 669, 121 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992), because it does not undermine the confidence in the verdict. Whitley, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1566. Since the jury would probably not have altered its verdict had it known of [Teixeira's] false testimony, Wallach, 935 F.2d at 458, a new trial is not required. 39