Opinion ID: 210204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim Construction: Receiving Means

Text: The claimed CCTV system requires a receiving means for receiving said video signals and said first code signals. Because this limitation uses means for there is a presumption that the claim invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. See Biomedino L.L.C. v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950 (Fed.Cir.2007). Neither party contends that the presumption has been rebutted; we agree that it has not. Our case law provides the appropriate framework for construing a claim limitation expressed in means-plus-function format. First, the court must determine the claimed function. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2006). Once the function has been identified, we turn to the specification to determine which structures disclosed in the specification perform that function. Id. The function recited in the receiving means limitation is the reception of video signals and first code signals. As for the structure, the specification states that [t]he receiving device 16 includes a low-pass filter 54 [sic 52] which allows the video signals to pass and prevents the high frequency output signals of the controller device 14 from passing. The output signals of the filter 54 [sic 52] are supplied to a television receiver or monitor 58 [sic 56] via an interface 56 [sic 54] which superposes the display signals from the controller 46 on the output signals of the filter 54 [sic 52]. '085 patent, col.5 ll.55-61. The receiving device (16) is depicted in Figure 1 of the '085 patent, as reproduced below. '085 patent, Figure 1. The receiving means includes an input line, a low pass filter, an interface and a television receiver or monitor and any equivalents thereof under § 112, ¶ 6. Claim terms are entitled to a heavy presumption that they carry their ordinary and customary meaning to those skilled in the art in light of the claim term's usage in the patent specification. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters. Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 874 (Fed.Cir.2004); Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2003). However, when a patent applicant surrendered claim scope during prosecution before the PTO, the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term may not apply. This doctrine of prosecution disclaimer has been adopted . . . as a fundamental precept in our claim construction jurisprudence. Omega Eng'g, 334 F.3d at 1323 (citing cases). Prosecution disclaimer promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public's reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution. Id. at 1324. This doctrine does not apply where the alleged disavowal is ambiguous; the disavowal must be both clear and unmistakable to one of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 1326; Seachange Int'l, Inc. v. C-COR Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2005) (A disclaimer must be clear and unambiguous.); Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1089-91 (Fed.Cir.2003) (finding no clear disclaimer because the statement made was facially inaccurate in light of the remainder of the prosecution history); Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2001) (finding no clear disclaimer because a person of reasonable intelligence would not be misled into relying on the erroneous statement, for it is contrary not only to the plain language of the claims and the specification, but also to other statements in the same prosecution document); Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 956-57 (Fed.Cir.2000) (finding disavowal because reasonable competitor . . . would have no reason to believe that a mistake was made); Desper Prods., Inc. v. QSound Labs., Inc., 157 F.3d 1325, 1334-36 (Fed.Cir.1998) (concluding prosecution statements were clear and unmistakable disclaimer because they were entirely consistent with written description and knowledge of those skilled in the art). In the present case, the district court found that the inventor limited the receiving means that receives the first code signal to a monitor that receives the first code signal. Implicit in its determination is a finding that the inventor clearly and unmistakably surrendered any claim scope between the receiving means that receives first code signals as expressly recited in the claims, and a monitor that receives first code signals. We cannot agree. The statements to the effect that the code signal is received by the monitor did not amount to a clear and unmistakable surrender of claim scope. First, the statement in the prosecution history is unsupported by even a shred of evidence from the specification. The specification never suggests that the monitor of the receiving means receives first code signals and returns a corresponding code to the cameras. Figure 1 above shows that the first code signal would be received by the receiving means 16 on an input line from the transmitter and then would travel to the controlling means 14. After receiving the first code signal, the controlling means decodes and manipulates the first code signal and then generates the second code signal which is transmitted back to the camera along with the control signals via the receiving means. See, e.g., '085 patent, col.1 ll.62-67; col.2 ll.32-36; col.2 ll.39-42. As Figure 1 shows, the receiving means receives the first code signal, but the monitor does not. There is nothing in the specification to suggest that the first code signal ever reaches the monitor. Second, read in isolation, the statement in the prosecution history could be argued to be a disclaimer. When the prosecution history as a whole is considered, the inventor's response to the PTO is not as clear. Because of the potential for such ambiguities, we have recognized that because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant . . . it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed.Cir. 2005). In this case, two paragraphs after the alleged disclaimer, the inventor also included the following statement to distinguish a reference relied on by the PTO examiner: The Bellman reference fails to suggest that the code received by a display device is sent back to the camera along with the control signal and that the camera is operated by control signals only upon the coincidence of the original camera code with the code returned to the camera. Amendment & Remarks at 6. The specification equates the display device and the receiving device. See '085 patent, col.3 l.4 (. . . a displaying device or receiving device 16 . . .). This statement, unlike the alleged disclaimer, is fully supported by the written description and provides further indication that the earlier statement in the same document was not a clear and unmistakable surrender. Third, reading the specification and remainder of the intrinsic record as a whole would lead those skilled in the art to the conclusion that the inventor's statement that the monitor received the first code signals and, based upon that code, transmits a second code signal back to the camera was not a clear and unmistakable surrender of claim scope. Amendment & Remarks at 5-6. This prosecution statement if taken literally would result in an inoperable system. Even if the monitor contained the necessary hardware to receive and generate a second code signal corresponding to the first code signal to be sent back to the cameras (a technological concept not at all supported by the specification), the second code signals would not reach the cameras. The low pass filter is positioned between the monitor and the cameras. The sole purpose of that filter is to prevent the high frequency output signals [i.e., the `second code signals'] of the controller device 14 from passing. '085 patent, col.5 ll.55-58. Hence, the second code signal would be filtered out before it ever reached the camera. Even Sensormatic's own technical witness testified that he ha[d] trouble figuring out how [transmitting the code signals to and from the monitor] would work. For a prosecution statement to prevail over the plain language of the claim, the statement must be clear and unmistakable such that the public should be entitled to rely on any definitive statements made during prosecution. Omega, 334 F.3d at 1324. On this unique amalgamation of facts, including (1) the absence of support in the specification or drawings for a monitor that receives code signals from and returns code signals to the cameras; (2) the ambiguity created by other statements in the same prosecution document; (3) the fact that Sensormatic's own technical witness did not understand how the system would operate consistent with the erroneous statement; and (4) the inoperability of a device constructed in accordance with the incorrect statement, we conclude that this is not a case of prosecution disclaimer. One of skill in the art would understand the claim to cover a receiving means (not limited to a monitor) for receiving the video signals and the first code signals.