Opinion ID: 3131353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sufficiency of the Plea

Text: To show plain error, a defendant must demonstrate (1) 'error,' (2) that is 'plain,' and (3) that 'affect[s] substantial rights.' If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d at 15 (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)); accord United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 218 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)). In applying plain error analysis in guilty plea cases, a defendant must, in order to demonstrate that his substantial rights were affected, 'show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the [guilty] plea.' United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)); see also United States v. Delgado-Hernandez, 420 F.3d 16, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that deficiencies in the Government's factual proffer do not create plain error if defendant is otherwise aware of Government's evidence against him). A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment - 16 - of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. CaraballoRodriguez, 480 F.3d at 69-70 (quoting Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83); see also Ramirez-Burgos v. United States, 313 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2002) (An error affects substantial rights if it was 'prejudicial,' meaning that the error 'must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.' (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993))).
Figueroa's plea was knowing and voluntary Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires that the district court make the defendant aware of the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). Indeed, ensuring that the defendant understands the elements of the charges that the prosecution would have to prove at trial is a 'core concern' of Rule 11. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d at 3 (citations omitted). And reviewing courts have been willing to intervene when, as here, an error in the plea process implicates that core concern. Id. In United States v. GandiaMaysonet, for example, we vacated a plea as not knowing and voluntary when the district court and the plea agreement both misstated the scienter requirement for carjacking. Id. at 4–6. - 17 - We found the misstatement in Gandia to be obviously erroneous. See id. The same is true in this case. Here, the court did not ensure that Figueroa understood what the Government needed to prove against him to support a conviction. There was no plea agreement to evidence that Figueroa had reviewed and acknowledged prior to the hearing the nature of the charges and the significance of pleading guilty. At the hearing, the court did not ask Figueroa whether he had read the indictment, nor whether he had reviewed it with his attorney and understood it.11 The court muddied what thin record there was by repeatedly asking confusing, compound, and/or internally contradictory questions and by failing to follow up sufficiently on Figueroa's denials or ambiguous statements regarding the elements of the charged offenses. Given all the attendant circumstances, we believe the record leaves significant doubts about Figueroa's understanding of the nature of all the charges. Moreover, the plea colloquy itself did not provide illumination. The court did not adequately explain, and misstated the Government's burden in proving, the requisite mens rea. While the court explained in general terms, and Figueroa acknowledged he understood, that the Government had the burden to prove that the 11The district court asked only, You have seen the indictment, correct? - 18 - acts alleged in the indictment were entered into by [Figueroa] knowingly, willfully and unlawfully . . . with a bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, and not because of mistake, accident, or other innocent reason, the court's subsequent particularized explanations of the charges repeatedly stated a lesser burden. For instance, count 2, the stolen firearms charge, required proof that Figueroa knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the firearm[] [was] stolen. See United States v. Ridolfi, 768 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(j)). Figueroa, reacting to the court's explanation of count 2, actually denied knowledge that the subject firearm was stolen. In response, the court posed an alternative notion of mens rea not found in the applicable statute, asking whether there was a possibility when you bought it or wherever you bought it or found it or took it, God knows how it got there, it could have been stolen? Figueroa answered in the affirmative, and the court then moved on as if the answer were sufficient. We are thus left with a record on which it appears that Figueroa denied knowing that the gun was stolen, yet was coaxed into thinking it sufficient that there was a mere possibility that it had been stolen.12 12 It also is not clear from this exchange whether Figueroa was admitting he bought, took, or found the firearm, or that it was in the vehicle God knows how[.] - 19 - The district court also misstated the requisite mens rea with respect to count 4, the school zone count. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A), [i]t shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.13 See United States v. Guzmán-Montañez, 756 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2014) (defendant charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) must have known or reasonably should have known he was in a school zone). Figueroa did not admit, nor was there any proffer stating, that he possessed a firearm knowing or having reasonable cause to believe he was in a school zone. At most, Figueroa indicated only that his presence in what turned out to be a school zone was a coincidence. In response, the court again suggested that a standard less than personal knowledge or reasonable cause to believe was enough: But he knew there was a school there? Everybody knows there's a school, Sagrado Corazon, in Santurce. Well, it's common knowledge. You can see the school from the street. Do you understand that, sir? Given the misdirected 13A school zone is an area within school grounds or within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25); see also United States v. Nieves–Castaño, 480 F.3d 597, 603–04 (1st Cir. 2007). - 20 - nature of the court's question, it is not clear what Figueroa was admitting or thought was required.14 Next, in summarizing all the charged offenses, the district court again affirmatively suggested a lesser mens rea than the law requires. First, it misstated the required proof for counts 2, 3, and 4, suggesting that proof that Figueroa was in possession of one of those firearms that happened to be stolen . . . [or] that happened to be an automatic firearm converted or otherwise, and [that] it so happened all these firearms were possessed in a school zone was sufficient to prove the offenses. Of course, the fact that a firearm happened to be anything is not enough to establish criminal liability under the charged offenses. The court created further confusion by asking Figueroa whether he had any doubt about what he was pleading to. The court asked, No doubt? Do you have a doubt or no doubt? No doubt? From Figueroa's No, we do not know whether he meant he had doubt or he had no doubt. The district court also failed to offer any explanation of the Government's burden in proving the aiding and abetting 14 As we have held, evidence of the location of a school or even of the fact that it is visible from the location of a defendant's unlawful possession of a firearm is insufficient, in itself, to prove knowing possession of a firearm in a school zone. See Guzmán-Montañez, 756 F.3d at 11-12. - 21 - counts. See Encarnación-Ruiz, 787 F.3d at 584 ([T]he government must prove that an aider and abettor of criminal conduct participated with advance knowledge of the elements that constitute the charged offense.) (citing Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248-49 (2014)). In this respect, neither the Government nor the district court made any effort to distinguish between the proof necessary to convict Figueroa as a principal and that required to convict him as an aider and abettor. Thus, the record does not establish that Figueroa understood the difference between possessing firearms and aiding and abetting others in possessing firearms.15 The district court further compounded this error through its confusing question, So you, aided and abetted by others, or others aiding and abetting you, whatever way you want to call it, were in possession of these firearms in that car? We do not know whether Figueroa's response of Yes to this disjointed compound question meant that he was in possession of these firearms in that car or others . . . were in possession of these firearms in that car. We do not know which theory of liability the Government 15 In order to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting the government must prove, in addition to the commission of the offense by the principal, that the defendant consciously shared the principal's knowledge of the underlying criminal act, and intended to help the principal. United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 109 (1st Cir. 2003). - 22 - intended to pursue, as, indeed, neither the Government nor the district court offered any explanation of the distinction between principal and aider and abettor liability. Last but not least, Figueroa's final, formal entry of a plea was itself ambiguous and less than explicit. According to common practice, the colloquy resulting in a guilty plea concludes with the question, How do you now plead to the charge, guilty or not guilty? West's Federal Forms, § 84:42 (May 2014). So that an explicit, non-ambiguous record is created, the defendant should be prompted to state either guilty or not guilty. Here, the court did not follow this sensible practice. Rather, it asked, Do you still want to plead, sir? Figueroa then gave no verbal or oral answer at all, but instead only nodded his head up and down. Again, we are left without an unambiguous, explicit admission of guilt.
accepting Figueroa's guilty plea prejudicially affected the fairness of the proceedings The foregoing demonstrates that the district court committed plain and obvious error in entering Figueroa's plea as knowing and voluntary. Remaining are the third and fourth prongs of the plain error standard. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1, is instructive on those points as well. In Gandia, we found the district court's error in describing the mens rea for carjacking - 23 - as knowingly and unlawfully, rather than as with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, sufficiently prejudicial to affect the defendant's substantial rights, thus satisfying the third prong of plain error review. Gandia, 227 F.3d at 4–5. We thought that the court's repeated misstatement, if accepted by [the defendant], could well have encouraged him to plead guilty. After all, a defendant who honestly did not think that he had intended to kill or maim might well bridle if told that he had to admit to this intent . . . . Id. at 5. The district court's misstatements about the scienter requirements at Figueroa's colloquy were at least as confusing and misleading as those in Gandia. Additionally, as in Gandia, there is little evidence that the defendant understood the element from some other source. See id. And so we conclude that this confusion could well have encouraged [the defendant] to plead guilty. Id. If there were any doubt, our conclusion is easily confirmed by the manner in which a weakness in the government's proffer aligns with the district court's most glaring errors in explaining the law. The government's proffer offered at best a sketchy basis for inferring that Figueroa possessed or constructively possessed the firearms, much less that he knew that any were stolen. The proffer showed only that Figueroa was in the back seat of a car that contained three firearms, one of which was somewhere on the floor of the car. Such presence, by itself, is - 24 - not enough to establish criminal liability. See, e.g., Ridolfi, 768 F.3d at 62 (noting that mere presence with or proximity to weapons, or association with another who possesses a weapon, is not enough to sustain a conviction for firearms possession); United States v. Davis, 773 F.3d 334, 342 (1st Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Rodríguez-Lozada, 558 F.3d 29, 40 (1st Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64, 79 (1st Cir. 2007) (same). Rather, the Government must show some action, some word, or some conduct that links the individual to the contraband and indicates that he had some stake in it, some power over it. United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 501 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d 1460, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). There was no such fact conceded or otherwise made a part of the record that provided a rational basis for concluding Figueroa had some stake in or some power over the weapons in the car.16 16 The closest the proffer comes to suggesting Figueroa was in constructive possession of a firearm is the allegation that a firearm was found in the floor of the car after Figueroa exited the vehicle. From this, one reasonably might infer that the firearm was found on the floor near where Figueroa was sitting, from which one reasonably might infer that it was within arm's reach of Figueroa, from which one reasonably might infer Figueroa knew the weapon was within arm's reach, from which one reasonably might infer that Figueroa was in possession of the firearm. Facts, however, may not be established by stacking inference upon inference. See United States v. López-Díaz, 794 F.3d 106, 113–14 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Burgos, 703 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012)). Again, there were no facts indicating Figueroa knew there was a firearm in the floor, or that he knowingly [had] the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over [a firearm] either directly or through others. - 25 - The district court therefore had before it a defendant claiming a lack of the precise knowledge for which the prosecution was offering no evidence at all. In short, a man was apparently and unwittingly telling the court that he was very likely not guilty of the charge, with no evidence to the contrary. We have no difficulty finding in such a case that, but for the court's error in wrongfully disregarding Figueroa's unwitting claims of innocence, there is a reasonable probability that this guilty plea would not have been entered. Nor, finally, is there any doubt that the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. We noted in Gandia that the plea's force . . . in evidencing arguable guilt was substantially undercut by the misstatement of the scienter standard. Id. at 6. Given that, in combination with the fact that the other evidence of scienter was thin (although not beyond reasonable inference), we held that the fourth prong of plain error review was satisfied, because [the error] seriously affected the guilty plea colloquy's fairness and integrity. Id. The same result is dictated by the errors in this case. United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 501 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Carlos Cruz, 352 F.3d 499, 510 (1st Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 399 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding constructive possession of firearm found hidden in vehicle's engine compartment shown by, inter alia, defendant's statement that, When they came from everywhere, I could have gone boom, boom). - 26 -