Opinion ID: 744057
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Fear of Foreign Prosecution

Text: The Fifth Amendment provides in part: No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.... U.S. Const. amend V. Resident aliens, like Balsys, have the same rights under the Fifth Amendment as citizens, see Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 & n. 5, 73 S.Ct. 472, 478 & n. 5, 97 L.Ed. 576 (1953), and thus may invoke the privilege to the same extent as citizens. The privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, in which the witness reasonably believes that the information sought, or the evidence discovered as a result of that information, could be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1655-56, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 817, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). The deposition at which Balsys asserted the privilege was part of an investigation into whether Balsys is deportable. Since a deportation proceeding is a civil action and not a criminal prosecution, see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 3482-83, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984), Balsys does not have a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer questions posed to him for fear that such information might be used to deport him. He would, nevertheless, clearly have a right to refuse to answer the questions if the information could be used against him in a criminal case in the United States. Balsys does not claim to be at risk of such domestic criminal prosecution. Instead, he asserts (and the government does not deny on appeal) that he has a real and substantial fear of prosecution by Lithuania and Israel. The language of the Fifth Amendment makes no distinction between self-incrimination in domestic and in foreign prosecutions. The privilege would therefore seem to apply to Balsys. The government nevertheless argues that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not protect against self-incrimination in foreign criminal trials. And so the question facing this court is whether fear of foreign prosecution gives Balsys the right to refuse to answer questions in a domestic deportation proceeding.
In answering this question, we have no explicit guidance from either the Supreme Court or from this court. Although the issue was before the Supreme Court in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 92 S.Ct. 1670, 32 L.Ed.2d 234 (1972), 1 the Court held that since no real and substantial risk of foreign prosecution existed in that case, it was unnecessary to decide the question. See id. at 478-81, 92 S.Ct. at 1674-76. 2 Since Zicarelli, and until this case, this court has never had to reach the issue, because each of the claimants advancing the argument lacked the real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution required by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Chevrier (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 748 F.2d 100, 104-05 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Gilboe, (In re Gilboe), 699 F.2d 71, 74-75 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Flanagan (In re Flanagan), 691 F.2d 116, 121-22 (2d Cir.1982). Three other circuits have considered whether the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to fear of incrimination in foreign countries, and they have come to divergent conclusions. In United States v. (Under Seal) (Araneta), 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.1986), the Fourth Circuit held that the Fifth Amendment does not protect a witness facing a substantial risk of foreign prosecution from compelled self-incrimination. It reasoned that when the Fifth Amendment applied only to the federal government, and not to the states, the Supreme Court had held that the amendment did not forbid the federal government from compelling testimony that would incriminate a witness under state law or forbid a state government from compelling testimony that would incriminate the witness under federal law. Since [o]nly when the Fifth Amendment was held applicable to the states was the privilege held to protect a witness in state or federal court from incriminating himself under either federal or state law, the court concluded that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies only where the sovereign compelling the testimony and the sovereign using the testimony are both restrained by the Fifth Amendment from compelling self-incrimination. Araneta, 794 F.2d at 926 (citation omitted). The Fourth Circuit has since reaffirmed this holding in United States v. (Under Seal), 807 F.2d 374, 375-76 (4th Cir.1986) (per curiam). The Tenth Circuit also held in a brief opinion that the Fifth Amendment does not protect against self-incrimination for acts made criminal by the laws of a foreign nation. See In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir.1969), vacated as moot sub nom., Parker v. United States, 397 U.S. 96, 90 S.Ct. 819, 25 L.Ed.2d 81 (1970). 3 The court stated: The ideology of some nations considers failure itself to be a crime and could provide punishment for the failure, apprehension, or admission of a traitorous saboteur acting for such a nation within the United States. In such a case the words privilege against self-incrimination, engraved in our history and law as they are, may turn sour when triggered by the law of a foreign nation. Id. at 1070 (footnote omitted). The Eleventh Circuit considered the issue in a case with facts very similar to those in the case before us. See United States v. Gecas, 50 F.3d 1549 (11th Cir.1995), reh'g en banc granted, op. vacated, 81 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir.1996). Vytautas Gecas invoked the privilege during a deposition by OSI that was part of a investigation into whether Gecas, a resident alien, lied on his visa application in 1962 about his activities in Lithuania during World War II. Reasoning that the Fifth Amendment has multiple purposes, which include protecting individual dignity as well as preventing overzealous prosecution, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit permitted Gecas to invoke the privilege. Allowing the privilege where the fear of foreign prosecution is real and substantial promotes, the court concluded, an appropriate balance between these purposes and the important government interest in domestic law enforcement. See id. at 1564-65. A number of district courts, in this circuit and elsewhere, have also considered the question that the court faces today. In 1972, after the Supreme Court in Zicarelli had indicated that the issue remained open, Chief Judge Newman of this court, then a district court judge for the District of Connecticut, held that, when a witness has a reasonable fear of foreign prosecution, he can invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, despite a grant of use immunity. See In re Cardassi, 351 F.Supp. 1080, 1086 (D.Conn.1972). In reaching that conclusion, Judge Newman relied heavily on the earlier Supreme Court opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964). See Cardassi, 351 F.Supp. at 1084-86. His ruling was not appealed. Another member of this court also addressed this issue as a district court judge. In In re Flanagan, 533 F.Supp. 957 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.1982), Judge McLaughlin, then of the Eastern District of New York, found that Martin Flanagan had a real and substantial fear of being prosecuted in the Republic of Ireland or in Northern Ireland for being a member of the Irish Republican Army, and went on to hold that the privilege could be invoked in the face of such a fear. See id. at 962-66. This court, however, held that the district court had erred in finding a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution. We therefore reversed the district court without reaching the issue of the applicability of the privilege. See Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 121-22. District courts in other circuits have also found the privilege to extend to fear of foreign prosecution. See, e.g., Moses v. Allard (In re Moses), 779 F.Supp. 857, 870-83 (E.D.Mich.1991) (refusing in a domestic bankruptcy proceeding to compel the testimony of a debtor who feared prosecution in Switzerland); Yves Farms, Inc. v. Rickett, 659 F.Supp. 932, 939-41 (M.D.Ga.1987) (holding that a foreign citizen was entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against private-party defendants seeking testimony on a collateral issue); Mishima v. United States, 507 F.Supp. 131, 135 (D.Alaska 1981) (relying on the analysis of English common law in Murphy to conclude that the privilege could be invoked where a real fear of foreign prosecution exists). And a number of district courts have found the privilege applicable in the particular context of OSI investigations. See, e.g., United States v. Kirsteins, No. 87-CV-964, 1989 WL 49796, at  10 (N.D.N.Y. May 10, 1989) (noting an earlier decision to allow the witness to invoke the privilege); United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671, 673 (E.D.Pa.1981) (Pollak, J.) (relying on Judge Newman's discussion in Cardassi). But other district courts have refused to allow the privilege to be invoked against questioning by OSI. See, e.g., Lileikis, 899 F.Supp. at 809 (holding that the privilege cannot be asserted if there is a governmental interest in enforcing domestic law and the witness's testimony furthers that interest). Although the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue faced by this court today, the Court has considered an analogous and related issue: whether one jurisdiction in our federal structure may compel a witness to give testimony which might incriminate him under the laws of another jurisdiction. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 54, 84 S.Ct. at 1596. The Court's answer to this question guides us in two ways. First, like the Supreme Court in Murphy, we will begin by considering the question in the light of the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, and then in the light of Supreme Court cases and of English common law. Second, the Murphy decision, in and of itself, provides considerable support for the holding that the Fifth Amendment protects Balsys from being compelled to testify.
Although the district court noted that the Fifth Amendment has a role in preserving an individual's privacy and dignity, it determined that the fundamental purpose of the privilege [against self-incrimination] is to protect individuals against governmental overreaching. Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 598-99. The court went on to conclude that, since Balsys asserted the privilege in order to thwart the enforcement of domestic law, and since the government has a valid purpose, and there is no evidence of malicious or  'overzealous prosecution,'  allowing Balsys to assert the privilege would undermine the values the Fifth Amendment was intended to protect. Id. at 599. We disagree. The origins and history of the Fifth Amendment are complex and controversial. See, e.g., Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment: The Right Against Self-Incrimination (1968); R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-incrimination: The Role of the European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 962 (1990); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 Mich. L.Rev. 1047 (1994); John H. Wigmore, The Privilege Against Self-Crimination; Its History, 15 Harv. L.Rev. 610 (1902). And its purposes are myriad and difficult to divine. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 56-57 n. 5, 84 S.Ct. at 1597 n. 5; Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L.Rev. 857, 857-58 (The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an unsolved riddle of vast proportions, a Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights. From the beginning it lacked an easily identifiable rationale.... Today, things are no better: the clause continues to confound and confuse.). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated that its purposes include: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the load; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a protection to the innocent. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55, 84 S.Ct. at 1596 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We are told, therefore, that the Fifth Amendment serves three categories of purposes: it advances individual integrity and privacy, it protects against the state's pursuit of its goals by excessive means, and it promotes the systemic values of our method of criminal justice. Rather than attempt to determine a single cardinal purpose of the Fifth Amendment and consider the question before us only in relation to that purpose, as the district court essentially did, we are bound to recognize the multiple values that the Supreme Court has found the privilege against self-incrimination to serve, and to consider whether allowing those who have reasonable fear of foreign prosecution to invoke the privilege promotes or defeats [these] policies and purposes. Id. 4 1. Individual Dignity and Privacy Values Permitting a witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment to avoid incriminating himself in a foreign criminal case works to protect the dignity and privacy of the individual every bit as much as allowing the privilege in cases where the fear is of domestic prosecution. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to avoid imposing the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt, see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595-97, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2646-47, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 561-64, 103 S.Ct. 916, 921-22, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), and this trilemma is no less cruel nor any less imposed by a government within the United States merely because the testimony is ultimately used by a foreign nation. Nor is the threat to the the human personality and privacy any less serious simply because the compulsion serves the purposes of a foreign government. Finally, the privilege protects the innocent and better ensures the reliability of the testimony the United States seeks to compel regardless of whether the witness from whom the information is sought fears foreign or domestic prosecution, since self-incriminating statements are no more reliable in either case. 2. Values of the American Criminal Justice System 1 The systemic policies of American criminal justice that underly the Fifth Amendment are neither promoted nor inhibited by allowing the privilege to be invoked in cases of fear of foreign prosecution. Although we value an accusatorial system, a fair state-individual balance in criminal trials, and trial evidence of the highest reliability, our practice of these values is unaffected one way or the other when a witness fears foreign prosecution. This factor is, therefore, of no real significance in cases of this sort. 2 3. Values of Preventing Governmental Overreaching 3 The question of how applying the privilege in cases of fear of foreign prosecution affects the Fifth Amendment's purpose of avoiding governmental overreaching is more complicated. The district court reasoned that since Balsys faces no domestic prosecution, there is no incentive for the government to elicit self-incriminating statements from Balsys by 'inhumane treatment and abuses.'  Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 599 (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55, 84 S.Ct. at 1596). Admittedly, there is less of a motive for a government to treat a witness inhumanely in order to extract admissions when that same government is not seeking to prosecute the witness. Conviction hunger 5 seems unlikely when the prosecution does not intend to eat. We believe, however, that the district court underestimated the danger that exists where the fear is of prosecution in foreign lands. 4 First, a domestic government's interest in extracting admissions in aid of foreign prosecutions is more analogous to a domestic jurisdiction's interest in the criminal prosecution of a witness by another domestic jurisdiction than it is to the situation in which the extracting government has no interest in prosecution at all. In Murphy, the Court suggested that the purpose of avoiding governmental abuse was best served by preventing states and the federal government from compelling testimony that might incriminate the witness in a court of another jurisdiction. This is because there is frequently a cooperative federalism between the several states and the nation, as a result of which the federal and state governments wage a united front against many types of criminal activity. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 56, 84 S.Ct. at 1597. 5 International collaboration in criminal prosecutions has intensified admirably in recent years. See New MLAT Treaties Increase DOJ's Reach, 4 No. 7 DOJ Alert 7, April 18, 1994, (discussing rise in United States cooperation with foreign nations to produce criminal evidence); Ethan A. Nadelman, Cops Across Borders: the Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement (1993); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Policy Considerations on Inter-State Cooperation in Criminal Matters, 4 Pace Y.B. Int'l L. 123, 130 (1992) (discussing the increase in cooperation among national and international police agencies since 1960's); Dominic Bencivenga, International Antitrust Bilateral Pacts Seen As Crucial to Enforcement, N.Y.L.J, December 12, 1996 at 5; U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties Continue Proliferating, Money Laundering Alert, 1996 WL 8687221 (May 1, 1996); Bruce Zagaris, International Criminal and Enforcement Cooperation in the Americas in the Wake of Integration, 3 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 1 (1996) (reviewing criminal enforcement cooperation mechanisms in the Americas). And what might be called cooperative internationalism has now begun to parallel the cooperative federalism described in Murphy. This eminently desirable development leads to the conclusion that, since the United States does have a significant stake in many foreign criminal cases, we can best avoid governmental abuse by allowing witnesses to avoid being compelled to answer questions posed by the government at home for fear of incriminating themselves abroad. 6 Second, as this case demonstrates, there is considerable correlation between the cases in which a witness is most likely to be able to demonstrate a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution and the cases in which the purpose of preventing government overreaching would best be served by permitting the privilege. The United States government has manifested a substantial interest in the success of Balsys's foreign prosecution, an interest that makes that foreign prosecution significantly more likely. For example, according to the district court--and neither party has challenged its analysis in this regard--Balsys has a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution in large part precisely because (1) OSI was created for the sole purpose of investigating and gathering evidence of alleged Nazi collaborators residing in the United States illegally, and taking legal action to denaturalize, deport or prosecute them, (2) OSI has entered into an agreement to provide evidence that it has gathered on suspected Nazi collaborators to Lithuania, and (3) OSI has exchanged incriminating evidence on suspected Nazi collaborators with Israel on past occasions. See Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 595-97 (citing the order of the Attorney General establishing OSI, Order of Att'y Gen. No. 851-79 (Sept. 4, 1979), and a Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Department of Justice and the Office of the Procurator General of the Republic of Lithuania Concerning Cooperation in the Pursuit of War Criminals, August 3, 1992, U.S.--Lithuania); see also Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1557-61 (concluding that Gecas had a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution for substantially the same reasons). 7 In the presence of such facts, it would be odd indeed to suggest that the United States government does not care about foreign prosecutions and hence that allowing witnesses to invoke the privilege does not discourage governmental overreaching. Indeed, it is precisely in cases in which the United States' interest is strongest that the evidence will most probably be shared. In the same cases, in part because of the sharing of evidence, the witness will most likely be able to show a real fear of foreign prosecution. There is thus a strong correlation between the cases in which the government has an interest and the cases in which the witness will be able to use the privilege. It follows that permitting the privilege in such cases will help curb any tendency by the United States to take abusive measures just as it does in cases in which domestic prosecution is feared. For these reasons, we reject the district court's argument that allowing Balsys the privilege would not further the Fifth Amendment purpose of avoiding governmental overreaching. 8 The district court also erred when, following Lileikis it suggested that it is relevant to the application of the privilege that [t]here is no indication that the government's motive is malicious, or that the government is engaging in overzealous prosecution. Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 599. The Lileikis court held that as long as the United States has a legitimate need for a witness's testimony to further a governmental interest in enforcing domestic law, and there is no evidence of improper motivation, the privilege must yield. Lileikis, 899 F.Supp. at 808-09. This holding, however, is contrary to both the purposes and the structure of the protection provided by the Fifth Amendment. 9 The exact same argument--if it were valid--would apply to invocations of the privilege in cases of fear of domestic prosecution. In almost all situations in which a witness in a civil proceeding claims the privilege, there exists a significant domestic law interest in obtaining the information. And yet the privilege perdures. Similarly, it is rare in such cases that one can show either overzealous prosecution or improper motivation. But no such showing is required. The privilege applies in such instances because the Fifth Amendment is fundamentally preventative. It prevents the government from using compelled testimony in the class of the cases--criminal prosecutions--in which the government's interest in the information might most tempt it to abuse witnesses. It does this at the cost of possibly limiting information gathering in other contexts, including civil cases. The point of the privilege is to preempt government abuse, rather than to seek to deter abuse by punishing it after it has occurred. 10 The question is not, therefore, as Lileikis suggests, whether the government can state some legitimate interest in the testimony it seeks, or whether governmental overreaching can be shown. It is rather whether cases involving fear of foreign prosecution--as a class--involve circumstances in which the application of the Fifth Amendment would preempt abuse and thereby promote constitutional goals. More directly, the question is whether, in this respect, cases involving fear of foreign prosecution differ significantly from cases involving domestic prosecutions. As we have noted, the United States will frequently have the same opportunity and the same temptations when a witness faces prosecution abroad as in cases involving fear of prosecution by another domestic jurisdiction. It follows that applying the privilege in both sets of cases achieves the same functions at the same costs. In both contexts, the Fifth Amendment inhibits the pursuit of government goals--in spite of their legitimacy and importance--in order to deny the government an inducement to use inappropriate methods to achieve those ends. 11
12 In United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 52 S.Ct. 63, 76 L.Ed. 210 (1931), the Supreme Court held that the federal government could compel a witness to give testimony that might incriminate him under state law. In support of this holding the Court cited English common law, stating [t]he English rule of evidence against compulsory self-incrimination, on which historically, that contained in the Fifth Amendment rests, does not protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of another country. Id. at 149, 52 S.Ct. at 64. Thirty-three years later (on the very same day that the Court held in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1490, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment), the Court in Murphy rejected the basis, the reasoning, and the holding of Murdock. 13 In Murphy, the Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination protects a witness in one domestic jurisdiction against being compelled to give testimony that could be used to convict him in another domestic jurisdiction. Part of the Court's justification for this rejection of the Murdock rule was that the Murdock Court had incorrectly stated the relevant English common law rule. The Murdock Court had asserted that the English common law rule could be found in King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 1 Sim. (N.S.) 301, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851). The Murphy Court concluded instead that United States of America v. McRae, L.R., 3 Ch.App. 79 (Ch.App.1867), which held that where a witness is under threat of foreign prosecution the privilege applies as much as where the witness is exposed to that threat under English law, reflected the settled 'English rule' regarding self-incrimination under foreign law. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 63, 84 S.Ct. at 1600. Thus, the Murphy Court rejected the conclusion that the only danger to be considered is one arising within the same jurisdiction and under the same sovereignty. and ultimately accept[ed] as correct the construction given the privilege by the English courts namely, that the privilege may be invoked by witnesses attempting to avoid incriminating themselves abroad. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 68, 77-78, 84 S.Ct. at 1603, 1608-1609 (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 14 The Supreme Court's statement and acceptance of the English common law rule suggests that the Court has endorsed the proposition we accept today, that a witness may invoke the Fifth Amendment out of fear of a foreign prosecution. See Trucis, 89 F.R.D. at 673; Mishima, 507 F.Supp. at 134-35; Cardassi, 351 F.Supp. at 1085. But see Parker, 411 F.2d at 1070 (stating that the Supreme Court relied on English common law regarding foreign prosecutions only as an argumentative analogy to the relationship between the federal government and the states). Although the discussion of English common law in Murphy does not decide the case before us, as demonstrated by the fact that the Court considered the question an open one in Zicarelli, it does provide significant support for our conclusion. See Araneta v. United States, 478 U.S. 1301, 1303-04, 107 S.Ct. 1, 2, 92 L.Ed.2d 751 (1986) (Chief Justice Burger acting as Circuit Justice in granting stay of contempt order) (Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor contains dictum which, carried to its logical conclusion, would support a ruling that the privilege against self-incrimination protects a witness from being compelled to give testimony that may later be used against him in a foreign prosecution.) (citation omitted). 7 15
16 The district court viewed the potential effect of the privilege on domestic law enforcement as the primary obstacle to granting the privilege to those in Balsys's position. See Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 599 ([T]o allow Balsys to invoke the privilege would unreasonably impinge on the government's ability to monitor and verify immigration and visa applications.). Other courts and commentators that have denied such witnesses the privilege have been similarly concerned that granting the privilege would allow the priorities of foreign prosecutions to inhibit domestic law enforcement. See, e.g., Araneta, 794 F.2d at 926 (It would be intolerable to require the United States to forego evidence legitimately within its reach solely because a foreign power could deploy this evidence in a fashion not permitted within this country.); Lileikis, 899 F.Supp. at 809 (stating that if the United States has a legitimate need for a witness's testimony, [i]t would be an unacceptable affront to the sovereignty of the United States if the operation of its laws could be stymied by the desire of a foreign government to prosecute the same witness); Parker, 411 F.2d at 1070; Diego A. Rotztain, Note, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Fear of Foreign Prosecution, 96 Colum. L.Rev.1940, 1964 (1996). 17 This objection is significant because it contrasts the effects on domestic law enforcement of granting the privilege to those who fear criminal charges abroad with the effects of granting it to witnesses who fear prosecution at home. When a witness refuses to answer questions because he is afraid of domestic prosecution, the government is able to compel the testimony by offering the witness immunity from the use either of the testimony or of its fruits in a subsequent domestic criminal prosecution. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 449, 459, 92 S.Ct. at 1658, 1664. This immunity is enforced by the courts. Once a defendant establishes that he has testified under a grant of immunity, the court will exclude evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings unless the government proves that the evidence it proposes to use comes from a legitimate source independent of the compelled testimony. See id. at 460, 92 S.Ct. at 1664. Where a witness fears foreign criminal proceedings, under current law, the United States cannot grant effective immunity since our courts cannot ensure the exclusion of evidence from prosecutions abroad. Because allowing the privilege in the latter case allegedly deprives the government of the means of compelling testimony, the result is said to be an unacceptable encroachment on the government's law enforcement efforts. 18 We find the strength of this objection to be exaggerated, and we conclude that it does not justify denying those who fear foreign prosecution the right to use the privilege. 19 The fact that allowing the privilege has costs for domestic law enforcement is not by itself a constitutional argument for disallowing the privilege. See Cardassi, 351 F.Supp. at 1086 (Of course, a constitutional privilege does not disappear, nor even lose its normal vitality, simply because its use may hinder law enforcement activities. That is a consequence of nearly all the protections of the Bill of Rights, and a consequence that was originally and ever since deemed justified by the need to protect individual rights.). 20 The effective enforcement of a well-designed penal code is of course indispensable for social security. But the Bill of Rights was added to the original Constitution in the conviction that too high a price may be paid even for the unhampered enforcement of the criminal law and that, in its attainment, other social objects of a free society should not be sacrificed. 21 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489, 64 S.Ct. 1082, 1083, 88 L.Ed. 1408 (1944). It is the duty of the courts to enforce constitutional protections despite their costs. 22 It might nevertheless be argued that in deciding whether a constitutional right exists, a court may consider the effect that such a finding will have on legitimate government needs. For example, it could be said that, if the application of the privilege against self-incrimination that we consider today has a much greater negative effect on domestic law enforcement than does the traditional application of the privilege, this disparity might itself be relevant to what the words of the Framers should be taken to mean. The premise of this argument, however--that the interpretation of the privilege that we accept today would have a significantly greater adverse effect on the United States's ability to pursue domestic law enforcement goals than does its traditional application--is dubious.1. The Conflict Rarely Arises 8 23 In the first place, the circumstances giving rise to application of the privilege in cases involving foreign prosecutions rarely occur. Since the Supreme Court refused to consider the constitutional question twenty-five years ago in Zicarelli--finding that the witness had not established a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution--only a handful of witnesses have managed to demonstrate such a fear. See Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1556-62; Araneta, 794 F.2d at 923-25; United States v. Ragauskas, No. 94 C. 2325, 1995 WL 86640, at  3-4 (N.D.Ill.1995); Moses, 779 F.Supp. at 861-870; Trucis, 89 F.R.D. at 673; Mishima, 507 F.Supp. at 132-33; Cardassi, 351 F.Supp. at 1083-84. In most cases, courts have found that the danger is remote and speculative and, hence, insufficient to justify the application of the privilege. See, e.g., Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1064-65 (3d Cir.1988), aff'd on other grounds, 493 U.S. 400, 110 S.Ct. 701, 107 L.Ed.2d 816 (1990); United States v. Joudis, 800 F.2d 159, 163-64 (7th Cir.1986); In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191, 1198-99 (11th Cir.1985); Chevrier, 748 F.2d at 104-05 (2d Cir.1984); Gilboe, 699 F.2d at 75-78; Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 121-24; Nigro, 705 F.2d at 1226-28; In re Baird, 668 F.2d 432, 434 (8th Cir.1982); United States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940, 946-47 (2d Cir.1977); In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 811-12 (5th Cir.1972). 24 This is likely to continue to be the case, as it is difficult to establish a real and substantial fear of criminal prosecution abroad. For example, one important factor in determining whether a witness has a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution is whether, by extradition or deportation, he would likely be forced to enter a country disposed to prosecute him. Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1560; see also Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 596; Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 121. And few witnesses are, in fact, subject to either deportation or extradition. 25 Only aliens may be deported. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 9 And extradition generally requires the existence of an authorizing treaty. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 2193, 119 L.Ed.2d 441 (1992); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8-9, 57 S.Ct. 100, 102-03, 81 L.Ed. 5 (1936). Moreover, even if an extradition treaty exists linking the United States and the country in which a witness fears prosecution, the witness can be extradited to that country only for acts that would also be criminal in the United States. 10 For these reasons, and because of other barriers to showing a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution, the class of witnesses who are likely to be eligible for the privilege under the interpretation Balsys advocates is very limited. 26 In the second place, even where a real and substantial fear of prosecution is established, allowing the witness to invoke the privilege would often have little effect on domestic law enforcement. A witness may only use the privilege in response to questions the answers to which might in themselves support a conviction or furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a ... crime. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 817, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). He may not maintain a general silence. Since the United States's interests in domestic law enforcement concern primarily domestic activities and foreign prosecutions concern primarily foreign activities, when what a witness fears is foreign prosecution, the information sought by the United States will usually not fall within the scope of the silence that the Fifth Amendment allows to that witness. See Cardassi, 351 F.Supp. at 1086. 27 In the third place, since an adverse inference may be drawn in civil cases when a witness invokes the privilege, that very invocation often aids the government's case at the same time that it deprives the government of the testimony it sought. In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976), the Supreme Court made clear that while the Fifth Amendment precludes the drawing of adverse inferences against defendants in criminal cases, it does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them. Id. at 318, 96 S.Ct. at 1557. This is so even though, as in Baxter, the government is a party to the action and would benefit from the drawing of the inference. LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Ianniello, 824 F.2d 203, 208 (2d Cir.1987)). 28 It follows, for example, that since a deportation hearing is a civil proceeding, see Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038-39, 104 S.Ct. at 3482-83 a resident alien, like Balsys, who refuses to answer questions that might incriminate him abroad takes a chance that he will create a negative inference that may be used in conjunction with other evidence to deport him. Invoking the privilege in the face of incriminating questions is probably not, by itself, sufficient to justify depriving a person of an important liberty interest. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). And freedom from deportation is such an interest. See United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106, 47 S.Ct. 302, 303, 71 L.Ed. 560 (1927). But if there is other evidence, the witness's silence may contribute to a decision to deport the alien. See United States v. Stelmokas, 100 F.3d 302, 311 (3d Cir.1996) (stating that adverse inferences could be drawn in a denaturalization proceeding against an alleged Nazi collaborator from fact that he invoked his privilege against self-incrimination as long as there was independent evidence to support the negative inferences beyond the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1847, 137 L.Ed.2d 1050, (1997). The possibility of drawing adverse inferences, thus substantially reduces the effects on government law enforcement efforts of applying the privilege to those who fear incriminating themselves in foreign prosecutions. 29 Finally, the witness's testimony may not be the only source of the information the government seeks. And although the government might prefer to obtain the information directly from the witness, it may often be able to achieve its law enforcement goals by relying entirely on other sources of evidence. 30 2. Parallels to Immunity Statutes May Be Enacted 31 Nevertheless, we assume that there do exist a number of cases in which the testimony sought by the government will be (a) within the scope of the privilege possessed by a witness (b) who genuinely fears prosecution abroad, (c) in circumstances in which the witness's failure to testify would affect the government's interests adversely. There are domestic legal areas in which the United States has an important interest in a witness's testimony about events that occurred overseas. The present case provides the most common example. When a resident alien is alleged to have lied about criminal activities in which he engaged in a foreign country, the United States may have a strong interest in excluding him from the United States, and the other country may have a strong interest in prosecuting him. 11 See, e.g., Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 592-97; Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1553-62. And even with a negative inference against him, the government may not have sufficient evidence to deport the witness without his own testimony. 32 We do not doubt, therefore, that applying the privilege to those who fear foreign prosecution will have some constraining effect--albeit less than the government suggests--on the government's pursuit of testimony. Even in such cases, however, the government can do much to minimize the costs to its law enforcement efforts, enough, indeed, so that those costs become analogous to those that occur in domestic prosecutions. For methods may exist by which the United States can constitutionally bypass the privilege either by eliminating the likelihood that the witness will be sent to the jurisdiction that would prosecute him, or by granting some form of constructive immunity to the witness. 33 As we have indicated previously, in cases involving fear of domestic prosecution, immunity statutes have become, over time, not only a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify, but also  'part of our constitutional fabric.'  Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446-47, 92 S.Ct. at 1656-57 (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438, 76 S.Ct. 497, 506, 100 L.Ed. 511 (1956)). And while the government must provide protection as comprehensive as the protection afforded by the privilege, Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 449, 92 S.Ct. at 1658 the Supreme Court has not stated that the combination of use and derivative-use immunity and the exclusionary rule is necessarily the only method for achieving this. 12 The way may be open, therefore, for the adoption of analogies to immunity statutes that would grant equivalent protection to witnesses whose fear is of foreign prosecutions. 34 While we need not pass on the constitutional sufficiency of any particular measures today, we note that extradition and deportation are not fixed practices. Congress may regulate extradition. 13 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196. And the executive branch has substantial discretion over extradition both by statute and through its role in negotiating treaties. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2 (stating that the President shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur); 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (stating that it is within the Secretary of State's discretion to determine whether an accused person is actually extradited); United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir.), stay denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1491, 137 L.Ed.2d 816 (1997) (noting that procedures for extradition are governed by statute and that the Secretary may decline to extradite a witness on any number of discretionary grounds, including but not limited to, humanitarian and foreign policy considerations). Like extradition, deportation is also regulated by statutes, many of which give considerable discretion to the executive. See 8 U.S.C., Ch. 12. 35 It follows that Congress can pass laws regulating extradition and deportation in cases involving the privilege, just as it has enacted immunity statutes in the past to deal with fear of domestic prosecution. 14 For example, Congress could provide that no one who has been compelled to testify despite a well-founded fear of prosecution in a given country will be deported or extradited to that country (or to countries empowered to so extradite him). See Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 124 (suggesting that a law prohibiting the extradition of a witness who gives testimony pursuant to a grant of immunity would negate the real and substantial risk of prosecution). 15 Both Congress and the executive branch may thus be able to limit dramatically the domestic law enforcement costs of the interpretation of Fifth Amendment that we accept today by developing schemes that parallel domestic immunity statutes. 16 36 We conclude that the negative effect on domestic enforcement efforts of allowing the privilege is of the same order when the witness fears foreign prosecution as when he fears domestic prosecution, and is, in any event, not substantial enough to undermine the fact that granting the privilege to those who fear foreign prosecution is consistent with the language of the Fifth Amendment, with its aims, and with the reasoning of the most relevant Supreme Court cases. Like the panel in Gecas, we therefore believe that this application of the privilege reasonably serves the purposes of the privilege and preserves the goals of domestic law enforcement. Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1565.