Opinion ID: 2569354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution to exercise peremptory challenges on the basis of gender and religious affiliation.

Text: Harlan claims that the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges against prospective jurors Linda Garcia, Jacqueline Flores, Sandra Liggett, and Dorothy Schwann were improperly based on their gender. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 142-43, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). We conclude that Harlan did not sustain his burden of showing purposeful discrimination under the third Batson step. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Harlan also alleges that the prosecution exercised improper peremptory challenges to Garcia, Flores, and George Fortin because they were Roman Catholics. The exercise of peremptory challenges based on a prospective juror's religion is prohibited by section 13-71-104(3)(a), 5 C.R.S. (1999). We conclude that Harlan did not satisfy his burden of proving that the prosecution's strikes were exercised in a discriminatory manner based on religion.