Opinion ID: 655057
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attorney's Conduct

Text: 81 Ball asserts further that his actions were the result of mistaken trust in his attorney, Morton Taubman. The court held that Ball's excuse that Taubman was apparently incompetent is insufficient to persuade the Court that it should set aside its default judgment and we agree. 82 The Supreme Court has held that a client is bound by his lawyer's acts even if those acts cause dismissal of the case or entry of default judgment. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386 (1962). Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Id. at 633-34, 82 S.Ct. at 1390. 83 Despite this unequivocal language, this court has been extremely reluctant to uphold the dismissal of a case or the entering of a default judgment merely to discipline an errant attorney.... Shepard Claims Service, Inc. v. William Darrah & Associates, 796 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir.1986). 84 However, here there are no factors which favor reversing the district court. This is not a case where the district court immediately dismissed a case for failure to comply with a single court order. Buck v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, F.H.A., 960 F.2d 603, 608 (6th Cir.1992.) 85 The record indicates that Ball had notice as early as May, 1991, that Taubman's actions on his behalf commanded attention. Dunnells, Duvall filed a motion to withdraw for non-payment of its retainer and costs, even though Ball had written Taubman two checks, each in the amount of $20,000, one payable to Taubman and one to Dunnells, Duvall. This should have put Ball on notice to ask Taubman about the money, and to be concerned about legal representation. Further, Ball was told by Dunnells, Duvall that his files were never picked up. 86 If this were not enough, there was further inaction on the part of Ball. Ball had received 1.) a notice that his motion to dismiss had been denied for inaction, 2.) letters from the court and from Dunnells, Duvall that hearings were scheduled, 3.) notices that no one had entered an appearance on his behalf at those hearings, 4.) a notice that a motion for default was filed and granted, and 5.) notices that a motion for default judgment had also been filed, a hearing set and the motion granted. Ball indicated to the court that he was in touch with Taubman almost daily throughout the relevant period at issue. 87 Ball had retained Taubman over the past ten years, had participated in multiple litigations, and had knowledge of the necessity to comply with the procedures of the court. 88 This is not a case of mere inadvertence on the part of counsel in missing a deadline for which the client is prejudiced. Taubman was derelict in his duty to Ball but Ball cannot hide his own misconduct, inaction and negligence by attributing it solely to his attorney. 89 [W]hen either derelict counsel or new counsel moves quickly to cure the delinquency this court is more likely to give the non-complying party another chance, even when no excusable neglect is found. Buck at 609. However, no such mitigating factor exists in this case. New counsel, Corbett, was retained by Ball for the Dunnells, Duvall litigation on December 28, 1990, a month before the default judgment hearing in this case. The Dunnells, Duvall litigation grew out of the Clarendon litigation, and Ball would have had to explain this case to Corbett before he could mount an adequate defense. 90 In addition, Corbett received a copy of the January 22, 1992, letter from Dunnells, Duvall to Ball stating that a request for entry of default had been filed. He did not act until the morning of the scheduled hearing, and then did not appear himself, or send anyone else to appear on Ball's behalf. 91 Under these circumstances, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion.