Opinion ID: 48756
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Basis for Recovery on State Law Claims

Text: Ameen challenges the district court’s conclusion that she had no basis for recovery against the individual defendants under state law. Ameen alleged eight Texas law causes of action against the individual defendants: (1) defamation; (2) civil conspiracy; (3) tortious interference; (4) intentional infliction of emotional 22 McDonal, 408 F.3d at 184 (quoting Rainwater v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 636, 638-39 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)). 23 See Rainwater, 391 F.3d at 638. 11 distress; (5) negligence; (6) negligent misrepresentation/ promissory estoppel; (7) false imprisonment; and (8) retaliation.24
To state a claim for defamation of a non-public figure under Texas law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant published a defamatory statement about him while acting with negligence regarding the truth of the statement.25 To recover on such a claim, the plaintiff must identify the alleged defamatory statement and the speaker.26 Texas defamation claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations,27 which period begins to run when a plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, that the defamatory statement was made.28 Ameen points to numerous allegedly defamatory statements made by the individual defendants and known to Ameen in or around August 2001. Ameen did not file her complaint until November 2002, more than a year after she discovered these statements had been made. 24 Ameen concedes that she has no cause of action against the individual defendants on her retaliation claim. 25 WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998). 26 See Abbott v. Pollock, 946 S.W.2d 513, 520 (Tex. App.——Austin 1997, pet. denied) (holding that appellants failed to raise material issue of fact when they relied on their belief that appellee or his employees had spoken disparagingly about them). 27 TEXAS CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.002. 28 Newsom v. Brod, 89 S.W.3d 732, 736 (Tex. App.——Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). 12 Her claim is therefore time-barred to the extent that it is based on the August 2001 statements. Ameen nevertheless relies on a conversation she had during an appointment with her personal physician early in 2002, when he told her that Merck representatives had made disparaging statements about her. Ameen asserts that her defamation claim survives, because she filed suit within one year following her discovery of these statements. The 2002 conversation with her doctor, however, does not save Ameen’s defamation claim. First, the statement by the doctor is inadmissible as hearsay.29 Second, even if it were admissible, the doctor did not identify the speaker or the specific nature of what was said, so his comments are too vague to support Ameen’s defamation claim.30 Ameen further relies on a self-publication theory of defamation based on the disclosures she made to potential employers about statements made by Merck employees. Assuming arguendo that Texas law recognizes such a theory, the statements made by Ameen to potential employers cannot be considered defamatory. Ameen reported to each of these potential employers that, although Merck ascribed her termination to her violation of company policy, she 29 See Patton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1250, 1274 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (citing Wells v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 474 F.2d 838, 839 (5th Cir. 1973)). 30 See Abbott, 946 S.W.2d at 520 (granting summary judgment when plaintiff failed to specify facts of alleged defamation). 13 believed that the true reason for her termination was retaliation for her reporting employment discrimination. To make out a defamation claim based on self-publication, however, a plaintiff must believe the statement was in fact true at the time she disclosed it.31 As the gist of her revelations to her potential new employers was that she believed the allegedly defamatory statements were false, Ameen cannot make out a defamation claim against the individual defendants based on a theory of self-publication.
Civil conspiracy occurs when (1) two or more persons (2) with an objective to be accomplished (3) have a meeting of the minds on the objective of the conspiracy or course of action and (4) commit one or more unlawful, overt acts (5) that proximately results in damages.32 To state a claim of civil conspiracy against an employee or agent of a principal, the employee or agent must have been acting outside the scope of his employment or agency.33 Appellees have met their burden of demonstrating that Ameen cannot make out her claim of civil conspiracy. First, her theory that the individual defendants conspired to mislead Merck about the 31 Martineau v. ARCO Chem. Co., 203 F.3d 904, 914 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing Texas law). 32 Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983). 33 Vosko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 909 S.W.2d 95, 100 n.7 (Tex. App.——Houston [14th District] 1995, pet. denied) (“Nor can a parent and subsidiary corporation, or their employees or agents acting within the scope of their employment, conspire.”). 14 facts relevant to her termination is belied by her admissions that she violated Merck policy. Second, to the extent that this claim rests on the apparently rampant violations of HEL policy by Merck employees,34 this did not proximately cause Ameen’s damages. Third, Ameen has not alleged any facts suggesting that the individual defendants acted outside the scope of their employment in reporting the facts of Ameen’s misconduct to Merck. (iii) Tortious Interference with Ameen’s At-Will Employment Contract To state a tortious interference claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a business relationship subject to interference, (2) the occurrence of a willful and intentional act of interference, (3) that was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) actual damages or loss occurred.35 A business’s agent can be held liable for interference with an employment contract when he acts willfully and intentionally to serve his own personal interest at the company’s expense.36 Nevertheless, [b]ecause a corporate officer's acts on the corporation's behalf usually are deemed corporate acts, a plaintiff 34 Despite the existence of the HEL policy, several sales representatives testified that Merck policies were routinely broken, as Merck representatives competed with other pharmaceutical companies to attract physicians as customers. 35 Hill v. Heritage Res., Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89, 109 (Tex. App.——El Paso 1997, pet. denied). 36 Powell Indus., Inc. v. Allen, 985 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex. 1998). 15 must show that the agent acted solely in his own interests. . . . A corporate officer's mixed motives-to benefit both himself and the corporation-are insufficient to establish liability. . . . [I]f a corporation does not complain about its agent's actions, then the agent cannot be held to have acted contrary to the corporation's interests.37 Merck does not object to the conduct of the individual defendants. As the individual defendants’ actions cannot therefore be considered contrary to Merck’s interest, Ameen’s tortious interference claim likewise fails. (iv) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress “To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe.”38 The courts of Texas have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition of extreme and outrageous conduct as “conduct that is ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’”39 The alleged “extreme and outrageous” 37 Id. (emphasis added and citations omitted). 38 Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). 39 Id. (quoting Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993)). 16 conduct proffered by Ameen is her treatment by the individual defendants during the investigation process and their role in “persuad[ing] Merck to fire Plaintiff under false pretenses.” To the extent that this claim is based on Ameen’s allegedly retaliatory termination, it fails. The Texas Supreme Court has instructed that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a “judicially created [cause of action] for the limited purpose of allowing recovery in those rare instances in which a defendant intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in a manner so unusual that the victim has no other recognized theory of redress.”40 The conduct Ameen relies on —— the allegedly pretextual explanations for her termination in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination —— is the same as the conduct underlying her retaliation claim. As Ameen had the ability to bring a retaliation claim for this conduct, her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on the same action cannot stand.41 Ameen also impugns the treatment she received during the interview by Petrovich as inflicting distress. She claims that Petrovich and Young persisted in questioning her in a hotel room about her violations of company policy until she broke into 40 Hoffmann-LaRoche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004). 41 Id. at 448 (“If the gravamen of a plaintiff's complaint is the type of wrong that the statutory remedy was meant to cover, a plaintiff cannot maintain an intentional infliction claim regardless of whether he or she succeeds on, or even makes, a statutory claim.”). 17 “hysterical tears.” She says that they then put her in another room and told her not to leave, forbidding her from using the phone or talking to anyone; that she remained in the room for approximately thirty to forty minutes; and that although the door to the room remained open at all times, a guard was stationed there. To the extent that Ameen’s claim relies on the individual defendants’ investigation of the complaint, including their instruction that she not leave the room or use the telephone, Appellees have demonstrated that there is no reasonable basis to predict Ameen’s claim might succeed, as such conduct falls far short of that considered “extreme or outrageous” under Texas Law. Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson is instructive. There, the plaintiff brought a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against her former employer and supervisors based on their conduct during an investigation of her theft of an item from the store where she worked. She alleged that her supervisors’ tone and manner of inquiry was “severe and curt,” which resulted in her crying, and that she believed that she was unable to leave because her supervisor instructed her to stay put.42 The Texas Supreme Court found that she had failed to demonstrate intentional infliction of emotional distress. In so holding, the court noted, “[e]mployers act within their legal rights in investigating 42 Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc., 891 S.W.2d at 644. 18 reasonably credible allegations of dishonesty of their employees.”43 The Randall’s court found that the supervisors’ conduct was “not ‘beyond all possible bounds of decency,’ ‘atrocious,’ and ‘utterly intolerable in a civilized community’; rather, it [was] a managerial function that is necessary to the ordinary operation of a business organization.”44 Although there are discrete factual differences between the treatment received by the plaintiff in Randall’s Food Markets and that received by Ameen,45 the cases are remarkably similar. As in Randall’s Food Markets, the supervisors’ conduct here is not “beyond all possible bounds of decency.” (v) Negligence To establish actionable negligence, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant owed him a duty; (2) that duty was breached; and (3) he suffered damages as a proximate result of the breach.46 Individual employees and managers may be held personally liable for on-the-job negligence only if the alleged duty is one that is owed to the employee distinct from that owed by the 43 Id. 44 Id. (citing Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. 1993)). 45 In Randall’s Food Markets, no guard stood outside of the room, but the plaintiff remained in the room for several hours. Id. at 644-45. 46 Van Horn v. Chambers, 970 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. 1998). 19 employer.47 Ameen conceded that the only duty the individual defendants owed to her arose from their employment at Merck. She cites no duty separate and apart from the duty they owed as employees of Merck. Her negligence claim against the individual defendants therefore fails. (vi) Negligent Misrepresentation and Promissory Estoppel The elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim are: (1) the representation is made by a defendant in the course of his business, or in a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest; (2) the defendant supplies ”false information” for the guidance of others in their business; (3) the defendant did not exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information; and (4) the plaintiff suffers pecuniary loss by justifiably relying on the representation.48 The elements of promissory estoppel are (1) a promise, (2) foreseeability by promissor of reliance on that promise, and (3) substantial detrimental reliance by the promisee.49 The alleged promise/false information pointed to by Ameen is that Winn allegedly promised her that if she refrained from disclosing that she had violated Merck policy, Winn would protect her job. Negligent misrepresentation claims, however, cannot rest 47 Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996). 48 Federal Land Bank Ass’n v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1991). 49 Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying Texas law). 20 on future events.50 Similarly, with respect to promissory estoppel claims, vague oral assurances of future job security, such as that alleged here, are insufficient to modify an employee’s at-will employment status.51 Further, Ameen’s reliance on such a statement —— one that directly contradicted Merck’s written policies —— that she would not be terminated if she did not disclose the violations of the HEL policy is simply not reasonable.52 (vii) False Imprisonment “The essential elements of false imprisonment are: (1) willful detention; (2) without consent; and (3) without authority of law. A detention may be accomplished by violence, by threats, or by any other means that restrains a person from moving from one place to another.”53 When a plaintiff alleges that the detention was accomplished by a threat, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the threat was such as would inspire in the threatened person a just 50 Allied Vista, Inc. V. Holt, 987 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. App.——Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). 51 See Gilmartin v. KVTV-Channel 13, 985 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tex. App.——San Antonio 1998, no writ). Ameen concedes that she was an at-will employee. 52 Cf. DRC Parts & Accessories, L.L.C v. VM Motori, S.P.A., 112 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex. App.——Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (relying on oral promise that directly contradicts written contract cannot be justifiable). 53 Randall's Food Mkts., Inc., 891 S.W.2d at 644-45 (internal citations omitted). 21 fear of injury to her person, reputation, or property.”54 Ameen’s false imprisonment claim stems from the manner in which she was interviewed about the violations of HEL policy. Petrovich and Griffin allegedly questioned her about violations of company policy for about 45 minutes, in a hotel room, during which she cried “pretty hysterically.” After the initial interview, Ameen was moved to another hotel room, where she was instructed that she should not leave, use her cell phone, or talk to anyone. She was under the watch of a security guard, whom she believed would prevent her from leaving even though the door to the hotel room was open. She remained in this room for approximately 30-45 minutes before she was formally discharged. Despite these facts, Ameen acknowledged that she did not feel threatened, and that no one told her she would be restrained to prevent her leaving. And, she was compensated for the time she spent in the hotel room. Although there was a security guard standing outside of the room, the door remained open the entire time that Ameen was in the room. She was not locked in the room, and at no time did she attempt to exit. Indeed, Ameen admitted that the thought of leaving “didn’t even cross [her] mind.” She wanted to leave, but she had been asked to stay and she knew that her future at the company was being determined. In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Amburn, an intermediate Texas 54 Id. at 645. 22 appellate court was presented with similar facts. In dismissing the case, the court noted that [w]hile employers should be admonished that their dealing with employees should always be reasonable and humane, we cannot adopt a rule which would constantly place an employee in jeopardy of a charge of false imprisonment. The interview with Amburn had a direct bearing upon his duties as an employee. He was compensated during the time that he was in the area. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that his requested presence for purposes of interrogation constituted false imprisonment unless he was unlawfully detained. We accept at face value Amburn's testimony that he was scared. It is not unlikely that any person being confronted with questions concerning his personal integrity would relish such an interview. This, however, is not the same as false imprisonment.55 In the framework established by the Texas courts’ rejections of similar claims in Amburn and Randalls Food Markets,56 Ameen’s false imprisonment claim cannot succeed against the individual defendants. ----- Defendants-Appellees met their burden of demonstrating that Ameen has no basis for recovery against the individual defendants under any of the state law causes of action that she advanced. Thus, the district court did not err in denying her motion to remand.