Opinion ID: 2079521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Suppression Motions

Text: On December 11, 1978, appellant's counsel filed a motion to suppress statements on the grounds that appellant's waiver of rights was neither knowing nor voluntary since he was in pain and had had neither adequate food nor sleep. At the conclusion of a hearing on February 16, 1979, the trial court held that appellant was properly advised of his rights as required under Miranda, that his confessions were freely and voluntarily given and that his physical condition did not affect the voluntariness of his statements. On July 16, 1979, appellant, represented by new counsel, filed a more extensive motion to suppress on the grounds that appellant had not voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and that his presentment was unnecessarily delayed. After hearing further evidence, on September 21, 1979, the court found that appellant had waived his right to remain silent during questioning. It also ruled that appellant's presentment was not unnecessarily delayed and that the delay did not render his confession inadmissible under Super.Ct.Cr.R. 5(a). On January 10, 1980, substituted counsel filed yet another motion to suppress. Before the felony-murder trial, appellant was allowed to submit two items of documentary evidence [5] and to make additional arguments in support of his motion. The court again ruled that appellant had been advised of his Miranda rights and understood his rights, and that his confessions were voluntarily made. Appellant's statements were admitted into evidence at his trials for the felony-murder of the cab driver, and separately, for the robbery of the Logan Inn. He was convicted of all charges in both trials, and this appeal followed.