Opinion ID: 268983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The findings are clearly erroneous because without support.

Text: 52 II. The findings are clearly erroneous because they fail to refer to a host of clearly relevant facts. 53 III. The findings are clearly erroneous because they disregard all the credible technical testimony in the case. 54 IV. Procedural errors or abnormalties make the findings suspect, and this court must review them with particular care. 55 We think we have said enough above to conclude that appellant's first and third alleged errors are without merit. We hold there was substantial evidentiary support for the trial court's findings, and that he did not disregard all the credible technical testimony. 10 56 As to appellant's fourth point, we have reviewed the findings 'with particular care.' We are satisfied with them, and as we said above, we find no prejudicial procedural errors. 57 We do not think the court's desire (a) to shorten the trial; (b) to hasten the trial so that he could turn to other pressing business; or his action (c) to interrupt the trial for six weeks; (d) to require briefs before all the rebuttal testimony was in-- constitutes, either singly or collectively, error in this case. (We cannot fail to speculate whether, under the same circumstances, counsel for appellant would have conceded error had the trial judge ruled in his favor.) Nor do we find (e) that the court substituted his own lay opinion for, and to the disregard of, expert testimony; nor (f) that there is any proof the court 'may' have based its opinion upon facts not in the record, 'but known to him alone.' 11 58 Appellant concedes the trial was not 'unfair' in any invidious sense-- merely that this court should carefully examine the record. Within the limits of our capabilities (not having the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor, etc.) and of our responsibilities (to look at the evidence most favorable to appellee), we must ask whether there was sufficient and substantial evidence, which, though disputed, if believed, was sufficient to support the findings. We have conducted this inquiry, and have determined that such sufficient and substantial evidence does exist. 59 Turning to specification of error two, that the findings make no specific reference to a host of clearly relevant facts, no recital of such facts is attempted in the opening brief, nor is any rebuttal attempted in appellee's brief. In appellant's reply brief this issue is first watered down and then evaded. Appellant says (R.B. p. 7): 60 'The fault we find with the Findings of Fact is not merely that they were adopted by the court below and that they are in large part unsupported by the proof, but also that they represent a one sided statement (etc.)    and in the absence of any opinion by the court we have no way of knowing whether or to what extent they accurately reflect his thinking.' 61 We can assume, we believe, that any findings signed by a trial judge do reflect his thinking. We can not only assume, but must also presume they accurately reflect his thinking. But appellant goes on: 62 'Here we are confident the court will discover that many of the findings have no support in the Record. But apart from that conventional ground for reversal, we submit that unless this court looks beyond the findings in this case, a situation is presented where a District Court ruling is, for all practical purposes rendered appeal-proof.' 63 The court is not required to discover or attempt to discover errors that appellant's counsel cannot or will not point out. Appellee has made specific reference to the evidence in the record supporting Findings 8 to 10, inclusive, 13 to 14, inclusive, and 16 to 43, inclusive. In not one instance has appellant pointed out in its reply brief where such references are inaccurate or untrue. It is true that in its opening brief, appellant attacked all the above findings for inaccuracy or incompleteness, but only ten findings of the 32 (Nos. 24, 32-39, 41) refer to a total lack of proof. We consider each in turn: 64 (a) Findings 32 to 39, inclusive, refer to the difference between the patent and the prior art as 'merely a matter of degree.' Appellee, to support this, cites the tests made in court by the judge; and cites record references to prove both types are used interchangeably in devices for government use, and that the earlier art, like the patent in suit, meets military specifications (Ex. Y). Exhibits 52 and 57 also establish what each connector must do to qualify for governmental specifications. 65 In rebuttal (R. p. 151), appellant admits that certain supporting testimony exists in the record (an expert's answer, for example), but that such answer is 'meaningless' (R.B. p. 4); and that the appellee's reference to Exhibit Y (which contained proof that a certain type of construction was being sold) although introduced in evidence constituted 'pure hearsay' in stating that the earlier product or art 'meets military specifications' (R. p. 5). This is not the stuff from which reversals are earned. 66 ( b) Finding 24 is alleged by appellee to be supported by the transcript, pages 594-96, i.e., 'the cooperative relations therebetween are old and well known in the art.' In rebuttal, appellant urges that this was based on the testimony of experts-- that 'the true and accurate' explanation 'was that given by its expert'-- that 'this court is urged to compare the cross-examination of Professor Siegel with the cross-examination of Mr. Ross and to draw its own conclusion.' (Reply Br., p. 9.) This is not the function of an appellate court. We are not to re-evaluate conflicting expert testimony. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., supra; Carolina Lee Knitting Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 275 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1960). 67 ( c) Number 41 is the final finding alleged to be totally without evidence to support it. It concerns the comparison of contact resistance between the patented contact and prior art contacts. Tests in this area were conducted in open court, answers appellee, citing transcript pages 540-50. But says appellant in his reply brief (a) 'our expert later testified these tests were meaningless,' and (b) the finding refers to 'prior art' tests, and no 'prior art' was tested in open court. 68 If we concede the reference to 'prior art' connectors in Finding 41 is improper, we can only conclude it should be stricken entirely or modified to read 'other connectors.' We consider it at most harmless error. Rule 61. United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 74 S.Ct. 703, 98 L.Ed. 903 (1953). 28 U.S.C. 2111. 69 In summary we conclude the fourth and last error considered (listed second in appellant's brief), is without substantial merit. 70 This court might or might not have agreed with the trial court that on the record before it, the 'surprising and unexpected results' test was not fulfilled. There is testimony that the results produced are what would be expected to be produced by one skilled and experienced in this art, young though it may be. Perhaps it is true there had never been the simultaneous grouping of all the results claimed before this particular attacked patent was created. (Siegel's testimony, Tr. pp. 751-52.) But as appellee points out, the court below put the answer to this question in proper perspective by asking (Tr. p. 752): 71 'The Court: Now, that answer 'No,' what am I to imply from that? That 'No' means that none of those elements exist in any of the prior art, or that they do not all exist in one piece of the prior art? 72 'The Witness: They don't all exist simultaneously. 73 'The Court: But in one form, in one way or another some of them exist in the prior art, is that right? 74 'The Witness: Yes, sir.' 75 Cf: Farr Company v. American Air Filter, 318 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1963); Griffith Rubber Mills v. Hoffar, 313 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963). 76 'S'-springs are nothing new. They were known to prior connector art, as were the various placings of the attachments of the spring to the spring holder, or housing. Whether the 'S'-spring is a refinement of the leaf-spring, or a different spring, is of little importance. Use of either is not new. Nor do we think we should disturb the conclusion of law made by the court below that the patent in suit was not invention, and that any 'invention' was obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. 77 The result we reach is not one based on any belief we hold that we are bound by the conclusion of the trier of fact below as to the validity of a claim in a patent. Validity of a combination patent is determined as a matter of law: 78 'The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, perform or produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them, is not patentable invention.' 79 Lincoln Eng. Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549, 58 S.Ct. 662, 664, 82 L.Ed. 1008 (1938). 80 Here the spring gripped the male insert. Springs had thus functioned before. S-springs functioned to produce a greater area of contact with the insert. They had so functioned, to a greater or lesser degree, in the prior art. (German, 471,033; Sweden 137,196; German 508,604; Soreney, 1,880,511.) The housing itself was old in the art. Here the shape or design of the S-spring, and its method and place of attachment, produced a variance in the point at which the greatest area of contact between spring and insert took place. This was also affected by the material used in the spring, by its thickness or thinness, and by the thickness of the insert. This was true, though to a lesser degree, in much of the prior art. (Appellee's Brief, opposite p. 5 including the Jackson and Kennedy patents.) This was, at best, an improvement in efficiency of function, but not the creation of a new, different or additional function, or a new or different result. It was not unexpected. It was at best the 'mincing step forward' described in 69 C.J.S. Patents 204, 213, pp. 686-687, 726-727. 81 A strict construction of a combination of old elements is required of our courts. 82 The court below came to its conclusion of invalidity as a matter of law. As a matter of law, we cannot say he was in error in his conclusion that the standard of invention had not been met. See Bergman v. Aluminum Lock Shingle Corp., 251 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1957); Kwikset Locks, Inc. v. Hillgren, 210 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1954). 83 We affirm.