Opinion ID: 1184955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: defendant's intention to go to Ohio and kill a person there?

Text: No. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting Sergeant Goodman, of the St. Louis County Police Department, to testify that in defendant's unsolicited statement to the St. Louis police he admitted that he had been planning to leave St. Louis that night and go to Cleveland, Ohio, in order to kill a man there. Defendant contends that the evidence of his statement was improperly received as a declaration of intent to show the state of mind of a person under the so called `Hillmon' doctrine ( Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 [36 L.Ed. 706, 12 S.Ct. 909]), since he never left for Cleveland or killed a man in that city. [11] At the trial, defendant made no objection to this testimony, and he is therefore precluded from claiming error in this respect on appeal. ( People v. Jones, supra, 52 Cal.2d 636, 646 [3]; People v. Glatman, supra, 52 Cal.2d 283, 286 [1]; People v. Feldkamp, 51 Cal.2d 237, 241 [2, 3] [331 P.2d 632].) In addition, defendant has misconstrued the basis upon which the statement was received in evidence. The admission of the statement was obviously not intended to demonstrate that a Cleveland killing had taken place, defendant's stated intention to kill a man in Cleveland having been thwarted by his arrest. Hence, there did not occur in the present case the error condemned in People v. Hamilton, supra, 60 Cal.2d 105, cited by defendant, namely, the proof of a prior offense by the introduction of the defendant's extrajudicial statements uncorroborated by any other evidence. The basis for the admission of defendant's statement was the provision in section 190.1 of the Penal Code that on the issue of penalty the jury may consider evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background and history, and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. Defendant's intention to kill yet another person was relevant as to his state of mind regarding the three earlier killings. The statement showed that he apparently had no feelings of guilt or remorse. The jury was entitled to know that he was not revulsed by that killing but was willing to kill again. ( People v. Bentley, supra, 58 Cal.2d 458, 461.) In People v. Corwin, 52 Cal.2d 404 [340 P.2d 626], the sole witness presented by the People at the penalty phase of the trial was a deputy sheriff who, over the defendant's objection, testified to a conversation he had with the defendant when taking him from the jail to the courtroom during the guilt phase of the trial. He testified that he asked the defendant why did he kill the old lady, [1] and that the defendant replied that he didn't know why ... but if he had it to do all over again, he would do the same thing ... [and] he would also like to kill a couple of detectives ... [and] his brother-in-law. (P. 406.) This court, in affirming the judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty, held, at page 406 [1]: Unquestionably, the broad language of section 190.1 sustains the propriety of the court's ruling admitting the conversation as relevant evidence on the trial of the penalty issue.