Opinion ID: 2997098
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Litigation—Round Two

Text: Following the Supreme Court’s decision, this court remanded the case to the district court. Southworth, 2000 WL 831585, at . This court, while expressing doubt as to its 8 No. 03-2314 constitutionality, instructed the district court on remand to consider the constitutionality of the referendum method after the development of a more complete record. Id. at . This court also remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the Students’ request for leave to amend their complaint and for leave to withdraw their stipulation that the University administered SGAF and GSSF funds in a viewpoint-neutral manner. Id. While finding that the Students’ request, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision, “seems reasonable,” this court left the request to the district court to consider on remand. Id. at . On remand, the district court voided the Students’ stipulation and granted the Students’ motion to amend their 5 complaint. The Students’ amended complaint alleged that the University’s system failed the requirement of viewpoint neutrality by vesting the student government with unbri- 6 dled discretion in making allocation decisions. In December 2000, the district court conducted a bench trial on the Students’ amended complaint. At the conclusion 5 The district court did not ultimately consider the constitutionality of the referendum method of funding. On May 3, 2000, the University’s president, citing the Supreme Court’s opinion, abolished the referendum method of funding. This action was taken prior to the order of this court remanding the constitutionality of the referendum method to the district court. It appears, however, that this court was not made aware of this when we ordered the remand. The parties later stipulated to the dismissal of the Students’ claims concerning the referendum method of funding. 6 The Students’ amended complaint also alleged that the funding system failed to ensure viewpoint neutrality because the University barred the funding of partisan political and religious organizations. Before trial, the University eliminated this prohibition. No. 03-2314 9 of the trial, the district court issued an oral ruling that the University’s mandatory fee system violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by granting the student government too much discretion for determining which student organizations to fund. Four days later, the district court issued a written Supplemental Decision and Order further explaining its oral ruling. Specifically, the district court explained that after reviewing the guidelines for funding set forth above, “no objective standards exist to determine which eligible student groups receive the funds compelled from the student body.” Fry, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 749. The court found that “[d]ecisions as to who receives funding and in what amounts are left to the complete discretion of the student officials on student government committees.” The court recognized that there was an appeals process but held that “those hearing the appeals are no more bound by objective standards than the original decision-makers.” Id. The court also found that the absence of objective standards for SGAF and GSSF funding decisions meant that these funding decisions suffered from the same defect of the referendum method criticized by this court and the Supreme Court, namely, that the decisions were an exercise of majoritarian rule that was inconsistent with the principle of viewpoint neutrality. Id. at 750. Importantly, however, the district court deferred entry of its judgment for two months to permit the University “to establish a system which operates in a viewpoint neutral manner.” Id. In response to this order, the University instituted a series of extensive changes to its funding system and submitted these changes to the district court for its consideration. These new policies are set forth in great detail in this court’s October 2002 decision. See Southworth II , 307 F.3d at 581-88. The district court reviewed the University’s new policies but found that even these policies did not “address the 10 No. 03-2314 central constitutional defect,” namely, that the discretion afforded the student government committees remained unchecked. Fry v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., No. 96- C-0292-S, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Wis. March 15, 2001). The district court found that many of the criteria for determining funding were “inherently subjective and malleable and provide for the use of expansive discretion.” Id. Finally, the court noted that the new system did not balance the University’s announced goals of funding diverse speech and, at the same time, “empower[ing] student government to be the arbiter of that funding,” and questioned whether such a balance could be found that was “viewpoint neutral and protects the First Amendment rights of objecting students.” Id. at 4. This court affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the district court’s decision concerning the new policies. This court held “that the University’s Funding Standards, as a whole, substantially limit the discretion of the SSFC and the ASM Finance Committee as to the GSSF grants and SGAF operation and events grants.” Southworth II, 307 F.3d at 592-93. We did, however, find that “a few of the criteria relied upon by the University are related to the RSO’s speech or viewpoint, and thus are improperly considered by the student government.” Id. at 593. Specifically, this court found that because the funding of travel grants was not guided by the same criteria as funding for operation and events grants, “the University cannot use the mandatory student activity fees of objecting students to fund the travel of groups engaged in political, religious or ideological activities or speech.” Id. at 595. In addition, we rejected as improper criteria for funding that considered “the length of time an RSO has existed and the amount of past funding it has received.” Id. That decision was the last decision on the merits in this litigation. We issued our opinion on October 1, 2002 and set No. 03-2314 11 forth an amended opinion the next day. On October 24, 2002, we issued our mandate to the district court.