Opinion ID: 614205
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Silva's right of access to the courts claim

Text: Silva first argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his right of access to the courts claim. Citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354, 116 S.Ct. 2174 and Cornett, 51 F.3d at 898, the district court concluded that the right of access to the courts ends once a prisoner has brought his petition or complaint to the court and does not include the right to discover such claims or even to litigate them effectively once filed with a court. Accordingly, the district court concluded that because Silva's allegations related to his ability to effectively litigate his cases beyond the pleading stage, Silva failed to state a claim. We disagree. Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Under the First Amendment, a prisoner has both a right to meaningful access to the courts and a broader right to petition the government for a redress of his grievances. See Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) ( overruled on other grounds by Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230 n. 2, 121 S.Ct. 1475, 149 L.Ed.2d 420 (2001)). In some instances, prison authorities must even take affirmative steps to help prisoners exercise their rights. Id. We have traditionally differentiated between two types of access to court claims: those involving prisoners' right to affirmative assistance and those involving prisoners' rights to litigate without active interference. For example, in Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir.1989), we explained that a court must first determine whether the right of access claimant alleges . . . a denial of adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. Second, if the claims do not involve such an allegation, the court must consider whether the plaintiff has alleged an `actual injury' to court access. [8] Two of our sister circuits have recognized this distinction as well. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 290 (7th Cir.2004); John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 235 (6th Cir.1992). With respect to the right to assistance, the Supreme Court has held that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491; see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355, 116 S.Ct. 2174; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579-80, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969). The right to litigation assistance, however, is limited to the tools prisoners need in order to attack their sentences, [either] directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355, 116 S.Ct. 2174. Critical to the issue here, the right to legal assistance is also limited to the pleading stage. [9] Id. at 384, 116 S.Ct. 2174. In the interference line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment right to petition the government includes the right to file other civil actions in court that have a reasonable basis in law or fact. Snyder, 380 F.3d at 290 (citing McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985); Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972); see also Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir.1997)). This right does not require prison officials to provide affirmative assistance in the preparation of legal papers, but rather forbids states from erect[ing] barriers that impede the right of access of incarcerated persons. John L., 969 F.2d at 235; Snyder, 380 F.3d at 291 (The right of access to the courts is the right of an individual, whether free or incarcerated, to obtain access to the courts without undue interference). Thus, aside from their affirmative right to the tools necessary to challenge their sentences or conditions of confinement, prisoners also have a right, protected by the First Amendment right to petition and the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process, to pursue legal redress for claims that have a reasonable basis in law or fact. Snyder, 380 F.3d at 291 (citing Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir.1993)). We have recognized that prisoners' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to access the courts without undue interference extend beyond the pleading stages. See, e.g., Vigliotto v. Terry, 873 F.2d 1201, 1202 (9th Cir.1989) (a defendant is deprived of due process if prison authorities confiscate the transcript of his state court conviction before appeal); De-Witt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 685 (9th Cir. 1966) (When the efforts of a state prisoner to obtain an available appellate review of his conviction are frustrated by the action of penal officials, there has been a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Indeed, before the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds, when the right of access to the courts was understood only to guarantee prisoners a right to be free from interference, we held that the right to access the courts included the opportunity to prepare, serve and file whatever pleadings or other documents are necessary or appropriate in order to commence or prosecute court proceedings affecting one's personal liberty, or to assert and sustain a defense therein, and to send and receive communications to and from judges, courts and lawyers concerning such matters. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 637 (9th Cir.1961) (emphasis added). In Lewis, the Supreme Court limited the right of access to the courts to the pleading stage in cases involving prisoners' affirmative right to assistance. See 518 U.S. at 354, 116 S.Ct. 2174. Lewis does not speak to a prisoner's right to litigate in the federal courts without unreasonable interference. Because the Supreme Court has not limited a prisoner's right of access to the courts to the pleading stage in this circumstance, we hold that prisoners have a right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to litigate claims challenging their sentences or the conditions of their confinement to conclusion without active interference by prison officials. We disagree with the Defendants that Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1995), controls this case. In Cornett, we held that the constitutional right of access requires a state to provide a law library or legal assistance only during the pleading stage of a habeas or civil rights action. 51 F.3d at 898. The Defendants rely on Cornett for the proposition that all access to courts claims expire after the pleading stage. This reliance is misplaced primarily because Cornett, by its own language, only refers to claims involving library access and legal assistance, rather than active interference. Along the same lines, Cornett relied on Supreme Court cases involving assistance claims, not interference claims. See generally id. at 898-99. In Cornett we did not acknowledgelet alone discussaccess claims grounded in allegations of active interference. Accordingly, Cornett does not limit our ability to determine whether the right to pursue litigation efforts without active interference extends past the pleading stage, and we see no reason why such a right would not exist throughout a prisoner's litigation efforts. Having so held, we turn to the facts alleged by Silva, bearing in mind that we are to construe his allegations generously. Weilburg, 488 F.3d at 1205. In his amended complaint, Silva alleged that the Defendants repeatedly transferred Silva between different prison facilities in order to hinder his ability to litigate his pending civil lawsuits. Silva also alleged that the Defendants seized and withheld all of his legal files. Finally, Silva alleged an actual injury: that as a result of the Defendants' actions, several of his pending suits were dismissed. We therefore reverse the district court's order dismissing Silva's access to courts claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.