Opinion ID: 3009545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admiralty law and displacement of state law:

Text: GENERAL PRINCIPLES As we have noted, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged federal jurisdiction on the basis of both diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1993), and admiralty, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (1993).5 The Supreme Court has instructed us that [w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 864, 106 S. Ct. 2295, 2298-99 (1986). But knowing that substantive admiralty law applies does not really resolve the question whether federal or state law provides the relevant rule of decision. Although the corpus of admiralty law is federal in the sense that it derives from the 5 Since this accident involved the allision of a pleasure craft (the Wavejammer) with another vessel on navigable waters, admiralty jurisdiction appears to have been appropriate. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2898 (1990); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677, 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2659 (1982) (collision of two boats, neither of which had ever been engaged in commercial maritime activity, and where site of accident was on waters seldom, if ever, used for commercial activity, was within admiralty jurisdiction). The Calhouns now argue that admiralty jurisdiction is inappropriate. Although they are entitled to so argue and have reserved their right to appeal that question from a final order, we doubt that the existence or non-existence of admiralty jurisdiction matters to the question of remedies. Even if this were solely a diversity case (in which event we would still have subject matter jurisdiction over these cross-appeals) or the parties were in state court, a federal maritime rule of decision applicable to the controversy would still displace a state rule that was in conflict. Although Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938), states that there is no general federal common law, it is well settled that there are areas in which specific bodies of federal common law operate, particularly admiralty. And where a federal rule (either statutory or common law) supplies a rule of decision in a particular case, it applies regardless of the basis of jurisdiction. That is in part what the reverse-Erie doctrine tells us. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (1986). implications of Article III evolved by the courts, to claim that all enforced rights pertaining to matters maritime are rooted in federal law is a destructive oversimplification of the highly intricate interplay of the States and the National Government. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373-75, 79 S. Ct. 468, 480 (1959). See also American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 987 (1994) (recognizing the continued vitality of this principle from Romero). State and federal authorities jointly exercise regulatory authority over maritime matters. Romero, 358 U.S. at 375, 79 S. Ct. at 481. As a result, state law can, and often does, provide the relevant rule of decision in admiralty cases. See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 321, 75 S. Ct. 368, 374 (1955) (state law determines the effect of breach of warranty in a marine insurance policy). Indeed, [i]n the field of . . . maritime torts, the National Government has left much regulatory power in the States. Id. at 313, 75 S. Ct. at 370. Whether a state law may provide a rule of decision in an admiralty case depends on whether the state rule conflicts with the substantive principles of federal admiralty law. As Judge Aldisert explained in Floyd v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 844 F.2d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1988), state law may supplement maritime law when maritime law is silent or where a local matter is at issue, but state law may not be applied where it would conflict with [federal] maritime law. See also Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 341, 93 S. Ct. 1590, 1600 (1973) (courts in admiralty cases may reach beyond maritime precedents and apply state law absent a clear conflict with the federal law); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-10, 74 S. Ct. 202, 205 (1953) ([S]tates may sometimes supplement federal maritime policies . . . .); Sosebee v. Rath, 893 F.2d 54, 56-57 (3rd Cir. 1990) (maritime law preempts territorial attorney fees provision that directly conflicts with federal law). Thus, in the context of this case, the Pennsylvania wrongful death and survival statutes (or the Puerto Rico death and survival actions) may apply unless they conflict with a substantive rule of federal admiralty law. We view this question as being quite similar, if not identical, to the preemption analysis articulated in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S. Ct. 573 (1943), and its progeny, see, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594, 93 S. Ct. 2389, 2398 (1973); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29, 99 S. Ct. 1448, 1458-59 (1979); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 n.3, 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2516 n.3 (1988); O'Melveny & Myers v. F.D.I.C., 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2053 (1994). These cases recognize that there are areas of unique federal interest which are entirely governed by federal law, but where federal law nevertheless borrows, see Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 594, 93 S. Ct. at 2398, or incorporates or adopts, see Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-30, 99 S. Ct. at 1458-59, state law except where a significant conflict with federal policy exists. While it is clear that under certain circumstances the general maritime law -- including the wrongful death rule of Moragne -- may incorporate state law as its rule of decision, the Supreme Court has begun to view the distinction between federal law incorporating state law as a rule of decision and state law operating of its own force as of theoretical importance only. See O'Melveny & Myers, 114 S. Ct. at 2048 (In any event, knowing whether `federal law governs' in the Kimbell Foods sense -- a sense which includes federal adoption of state-law rules -- does not much advance the ball. The issue in the present case is whether the [state] rule of decision is to be applied . . . or displaced, and if it is applied it is of only theoretical interest whether the basis for that application is [the state's] sovereign power or federal adoption of [the state's] disposition.) (citation omitted). More precisely, although drawing such a distinction identifies the sovereign power being exercised, it does not have any real bearing on the practical question whether the state law rule of decision will apply or be displaced. See id.6 Thus, because it makes little practical 6 See also Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 n.3, 108 S. Ct. at 2516 n.3 (We refer here to the displacement of state law, although it is possible to analyze it as the displacement of federal-law reference to state law for the rule of decision. [Citing Little Lake Misere and Kimbell Foods]. We see nothing to be gained by expanding the theoretical scope of the federal pre-emption beyond its practical effect, and so adopt the more modest terminology. If the distinction between displacement of state law and displacement of federal law's incorporation of state law ever makes a practical difference, it at least does not do so in the present case.); Martha Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 977 & n.408 (1986) ([The] distinction between state law applying directly and state difference as to whether the general maritime law has incorporated state law or whether state law provides a rule of decision of its own force, we simply refer to the problem as displacement of state law.7 In admiralty law, determining whether federal maritime law conflicts with and thus displaces state law has proven to be extremely tricky. Although we are told time and again under maritime preemption doctrine that a conflict exists where state law prejudices the characteristic features of federal maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law, Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216, 37 S. Ct. 524, 529 (1917), the Jensen language is little more than a convenient slogan, providing little guidance on the question whether there is a conflict. See American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 991 (Stevens, J., concurring) (The unhelpful abstractness of [the Jensen language] leaves us without a reliable compass for navigating maritime pre-emption problems.). Indeed, the lack of a clearly delineated conflicts inquiry in this area has been law applying through federal reference is of dubious relevance.). 7 The correct analytic conclusion, we believe, is that admiralty law simply has not spoken to the factual situation of this case, see infra at typescript Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! Bookmark not defined., 45-Error! Bookmark not defined., and that state laws accordingly apply of their own force. Were we to find federal admiralty law governing wrongful death and survival actions applicable to the death of a recreational boater occurring within state territorial waters, however, our analysis would likely lead us to hold that admiralty law either does not displace or adopts (or incorporates) state (or territorial) tort law. See infra at n.Error! Bookmark not defined.. problematic. The Supreme Court has consistently struggled with setting the boundary between conflicting and non-conflicting state regulation in the area of maritime affairs, and has recently admitted, [i]t would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible from impermissible state regulation is readily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence, or indeed is even entirely consistent within our admiralty jurisprudence. Compare [Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 81 S. Ct. 886 (1961)] (state law cannot require provision of maritime contract to be in writing), with Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 75 S. Ct. 368 [(1955)] (state law can determine effect of breach of warranty in marine insurance policy). American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 987-88 (parallel citation omitted). See also GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-17, at 49 (2d ed. 1975) (The concepts that have been fashioned for drawing [the line between state and federal law] are too vague, as we have seen, to ensure either predictability or wisdom in the line's actual drawing.). In our view, however, the maritime preemption doctrine is not significantly different from the preemption doctrine applicable to non-maritime contexts. See American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 992 (Stevens, J., concurring); Wilburn Boat Co., 348 U.S. at 324, 75 S. Ct. at 376 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (maritime preemption analysis factors are not unlike those involved when the question is whether a State, in the absence of congressional action, may regulate some matters even though aspects of interstate commerce are affected); id. at 333, 75 S. Ct. at 381 (Reed, J., dissenting) (Since Congress has power to make federal jurisdiction and legislation exclusive, the [preemption] situation in admiralty is somewhat analogous to that governing state action interfering with interstate commerce.). Therefore, resort to non-maritime preemption doctrine by way of analogy may help sharpen the focus of the inquiry.8 Stated succinctly, in the absence of an express statement by Congress (express preemption), (implied) preemption could occur either where Congress intended that federal law occupy the field (field preemption) or where there is an actual conflict between state and federal law such that: (1) compliance with both federal and state law is impossible; or (2) state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 8 The analogy is not perfect. In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S. Ct. 438 (1920), and Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 44 S. Ct. 302 (1924), the Supreme Court held that some state regulation of maritime matters, even where authorized by Congress, was precluded directly by the Constitution and the uniformity implications of its grant of federal maritime jurisdiction. See Knickerbocker, 253 U.S. at 163-64, 40 S. Ct. at 441; W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. at 227-28, 44 S. Ct. at 302. In Knickerbocker, however, a congressional enactment authorizing state workers' compensation laws to govern maritime workers was held unconstitutional because their provisions were held to modify or displace essential features of the substantive maritime law. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124, 44 S. Ct. 274, 277 (1924). And in W.C. Dawson & Co., a similar congressional act was invalidated because it permit[ted] any state to alter the maritime law and thereby introduce conflicting requirements. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. at 228, 40 S. Ct. at 305. Although these cases have not been explicitly overruled by the Court, they rest on a strong nondelegation doctrine the likes of which has not been seen since the 1930s. At all events, by contrast to the situations in Knickerbocker and W.C. Dawson, as we detail below, here we discern no maritime law governing the plaintiffs' wrongful death and survival actions and no federal interest whose uniformity would be unconstitutionally impaired by application of state law. full purposes and objectives of Congress. See California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01, 109 S. Ct. 1661, 1665 (1989) (antitrust).9 In non-maritime cases, the determination whether there is a conflict between state and federal law in large part turns on the interpretation of federal statutes. See Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68, 86 S. Ct. 1301, 1304 (1966) (Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress.).10 In 9 The full Jensen preemption analysis is contained in the now famous passage stating that state legislation affecting maritime commerce is invalid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216, 37 S. Ct. at 529. This language seems to include the express preemption and implied preemption concepts of the nonmaritime preemption doctrines. The language also seems to leave room for field preemption, although it does not appear to reference it as clearly. But as the First Circuit has recently recognized in Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 626-27 (1st Cir. 1994), in American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 987, the Supreme Court gave the Jensen characteristic features language a limited meaning. [I]t rea[d] the phrase to apply -- and apparently only to apply -- to a federal rule that either `originated in admiralty' or has `exclusive application there.' Ballard Shipping, 32 F.3d at 627. Under this restrictive reading, wrongful death and survival statutes would materially prejudice no characteristic feature of admiralty because the wrongful death and survival remedies did not originate in or have exclusive application in admiralty. Because applying these state remedies would not conflict with any congressional legislation, see infra at typescript Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! Bookmark not defined., 45-Error! Bookmark not defined., the focus of the inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether the application of state rules of decision will unduly interfere with the uniformity of federal maritime principles. 10 Maritime law is not simply a creature of statute but is more an amalgam of common law and statutory principles. But as we addition, non-maritime cases employ a presumption against preemption. That is, a court should construe a federal substantive rule in such a way that it does not conflict with a state rule in an area traditionally regulated by the states. See ARC America, 490 U.S. at 102, 109 S. Ct. at 1665. In admiralty law a similar presumption is incorporated in the case law by the requirement that there be a clear conflict before state laws are preempted. See Askew, 411 U.S. at 341, 93 S. Ct. at 1600; cf. Ballard Shipping v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 630 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that where a state remedy is aimed at a great and legitimate state concern, a federal court must act with caution before finding displacement of state law). In light of these general principles, the question in this case -- whether state statutory remedies can provide the rule of decision when a recreational boater is killed in territorial waters -- largely reduces to an inquiry into whether the different substantive admiralty rules articulated in federal statutes and at common law would be frustrated by the application of state law. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 346 U.S. at 410, 74 S. Ct. at 205 ([A] state may not deprive a person of any substantial discuss in the next section, the development of the federal law of maritime deaths has become increasingly defined by statute, and the federal statutory schemes have taken a preeminent role in shaping the federal maritime death remedies, including those provided by federal common law. This development, in our view, brings the federal admiralty preemption doctrine more into line with the run-of-the-mill preemption case law, where the focus of the inquiry is in large part on statutory interpretation. Cf. Ballard Shipping, 32 F.3d at 630-31 (looking to a recently enacted statute to determine whether a federal common law rule displaced a state statute). admiralty right as defined in controlling acts of Congress or by interpretative decisions of this Court.); Wilburn Boat Co., 348 U.S. at 332, 75 S. Ct. at 381 (Reed, J., dissenting) (State power may be exercised where it is complementary to the general admiralty law. It may not be exercised where it would have the effect of harming any necessary or desirable uniformity.); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 228, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2497 (1986) ([W]here Congress had spoken, or where general federal maritime law controlled, the States exercising concurrent jurisdiction over maritime matters could not apply conflicting state substantive law.). But before determining whether the substantive federal policies concerning maritime deaths would be frustrated, it is important to know what policies have, and have not, been articulated. This requires some understanding of the history behind the development of federal remedies for maritime deaths. Although the tortuous development11 of the federal remedies for maritime deaths is familiar to many, and has been amply described elsewhere in the case law,12 it is essential background, and so we will describe at least the major developments. 11 Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 212, 106 S. Ct. at 2488 (The tortuous development of the law of wrongful death in the maritime context illustrates the truth of Justice Cardozo's observation that `[death] is a composer of strife by the general law of the sea as it was for many centuries by the common law of the land.') (quoting Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371, 53 S. Ct. 173, 174 (1932)). 12 See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 23-27, 111 S. Ct. 317, 320-23 (1990); Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 212-17, 106 S. Ct. at 2488-91.