Opinion ID: 1264167
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Terms of Expungement under State Law

Text: In the alternative, the IJ found that Ramirez-Altamirano's conviction was not expunged for immigration purposes because [t]he [state court] order itself, by its plain language, shows that even for the State of California, the respondent has a conviction, at least for disclosing it for public office, for seeking a license by any State or local agency, and for even contracting with the California State lottery. Because the critical question is not the nature of the state's expungement statute but rather what [the petitioner] did, Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738 n. 18 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), we conclude that this was also an improper ground upon which to deny Ramirez-Altamirano relief. We note that the title of the expungement order does not reflect the nature of the order itself. The state court order is entitled ORDER DISMISSING ACCUSATION AGAINST PROBATIONER [PENAL CODE § 1203.4a]. This description is oxymoronic, because California Penal Code section 1203.4a applies only to defendants not granted probation. Cal.Penal Code § 1203.4a(a). The similar expungement relief accorded to probationers is set forth in California Penal Code section 1203.4. Moreover, section 1203.4, unlike section 1203.4a, requires that the order state that it does not relieve [the probationer] of the obligation to disclose the conviction in response to any direct question contained in any questionnaire or application for public office, for licensure by any state or local agency, or for contracting with the California State Lottery. Id. § 1203.4(a). The state court's order recited this text nearly verbatim, suggesting that Ramirez-Altamirano actually was granted relief under section 1203.4 and the caption's description of the order misstates the applicable statute. Under either statute, the set-aside conviction retains certain residual consequences under state law. Under California Vehicle Code section 13555, relief granted under either section 1203.4 or section 1203.4a will not reinstate a defendant's driving privileges if they were revoked or suspended as a result of the original conviction. For certain violent offenses, a defendant still may be prohibited from possessing or controlling a firearm after his conviction is dismissed under section 1203.4a. Cal.Penal Code § 12021.1(a). As described above, convictions set aside under section 1203.4 must be disclosed on certain questionnaires. Finally, under either statute, a prior set-aside conviction may be pleaded and proved if the defendant is prosecuted for another offense in the future. Cal.Penal Code §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a. Other than these narrow exceptions, however, both statutes dictate that the defendant be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has been convicted. Id. §§ 1203.4(a), 1203.4a(a). Although we have never addressed explicitly the extent to which a conviction must be expunged under state law before invoking the equal protection concerns articulated in Lujan-Armendariz, our analysis consistently has focused on whether aliens would have been eligible for relief under the [FFOA] had their offenses been prosecuted as federal crimes, 222 F.3d at 749, rather than on the intricacies of the state rehabilitative statutes in question, id. at 738 n. 18. We first addressed the equal protection ramifications of the FFOA in Garberding, 30 F.3d 1187. At that time, the BIA had long acknowledged that an alien granted relief under the FFOA did not have a conviction for immigration purposes, and it similarly held that defendants granted relief under a state counterpart to the FFOA should be given the same treatment. See Matter of Deris, 20 I. & N. Dec. 5, 11 (BIA 1989); Matter of Werk, 16 I. & N. Dec. 234, 236-37 (BIA 1977) (concerning the predecessor statute to the current FFOA). However, in determining whether a state defendant was covered under this rule, the BIA generally focused on the procedural details of the state rehabilitative statute in question. In Garberding, for example, the BIA had concluded that Montana's rehabilitative statute was not a state counterpart to the FFOA because it applied to a broad range of offenses more serious than simple drug possession. 30 F.3d at 1189-90. We held that even if the statute in question was broader than the FFOA, there was no rational basis for denying Garberding relief because her state conviction for possession of marijuana would have qualified her for relief under the FFOA had it been brought federally. Id. at 1190-91. The immigration consequences of a set-aside conviction could not turn on whether it happened to occur in a state whose rehabilitation statute was an exact counterpart to the FFOA. Id. at 1191. In our subsequent cases, we reiterated that the relevant question is whether the person involved could have received relief under the [FFOA] and does receive relief under a state rehabilitative statute. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738 n. 18; see also Cardenas-Uriarte, 227 F.3d at 1136 (If [the petitioner] would have been eligible for first offender treatment under federal law, he would not stand `convicted' for purposes of the immigration laws.); Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir.2001) ([T]he INS may not discriminate against aliens convicted of simple possession offenses whose subsequent conduct would have qualified them for FFOA rehabilitation, but for the fact that they were convicted and rehabilitated under the laws of another sovereign.). Similarly, when we have denied FFOA treatment to an alien convicted under state law, it has consistently been because the alien would not have been eligible for relief under the FFOA. In some cases, this was because the conviction itself fell outside the scope of the FFOA. See, e.g., de Jesus Melendez, 503 F.3d at 1025-26 (concerning a second controlled substance conviction); Aguiluz-Arellano, 446 F.3d at 983-84 (same); Ramirez-Castro, 287 F.3d at 1175 (concerning a concealed weapon conviction). [7] In another case, it was because the alien was not yet eligible for rehabilitative relief. See Chavez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1284, 1290-93 (9th Cir.2004); see also id. at 1292-93 (It would defy common sense to require the INS to sit on its hands for three years, waiting to see whether Chavez-Perez will comply with the terms of his probation and perhaps qualify for future expungement.). Moreover, we frequently have found that equal protection principles required treating state drug possession convictions as expunged for immigration purposes even when the convictions retained certain consequences under state law. The Montana statute under which Garberding was granted relief specifically allows for public access to the[records related to the dismissed charge] . . . by district court order upon good cause shown. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-204; Garberding, 30 F.3d at 1189. Similarly, both Lujan-Armendariz and Cardenas-Uriarte involved Arizona's rehabilitative statute, which contains exceptions similar to those in the California statute at issue here. The Arizona statute specifically exempts certain penalties and disabilities from release, including several imposed by the state's department of transportation and the state's game and fish commission. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-907(C)(1)-(2) (2006). The statute also allows dismissed convictions to be pleaded and proved in any subsequent prosecution . . . for any offense. Id. § 13-907(C)(1). Cardenas-Uriarte explicitly mentioned these exceptions, 227 F.3d at 1138, and Lujan-Armendariz similarly noted that the statute was subject to some exceptions not relevant here,  222 F.3d at 733 n. 6 (emphasis added). The dissent argues that Garberding, Lujan-Armendariz, and Cardenas-Uriarte are inapposite[ ] because in none of them did we consider or even mention the extent to which the state expungement scheme removed the consequences of a conviction. Dissent at 4285. The dissent's cramped reading of these cases is unpersuasive. We have repeatedly found that an individual can be considered to have receive[d] relief under a state rehabilitative statute even when the statute in question does not expunge a conviction for all purposes. [8] Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738 n. 18. That we did not explicitly discuss the scope of the expungement statutes in these cases does not change the fact that we concluded Lujan-Armendariz applied notwithstanding the statutory exceptions. The dissent mischaracterizes our opinion in stating that the majority[ ] suggest[s] that the scope of the relief provided by the state statute is irrelevant. Dissent at 821. In finding that Ramirez-Altamirano's conviction was sufficiently expunged, we do not conclude that the exceptions contained in an expungement statute will never be relevant. Rather, we limit our analysis, as we must, to the statute before us, and hold that the few residual consequences contained in this statute do not alter Ramirez-Altamirano's eligibility for relief. We are thus bound to apply Lujan-Armendariz 's holding that the relevant question is whether the person involved could have received relief under the [FFOA] and does receive relief under a state rehabilitative statute. 222 F.3d at 738 n. 18. Accordingly, an alien cannot be deemed convicted for immigration purposes if he can demonstrate that (1) the conviction was his first offense; (2) he had not previously been accorded first offender treatment; (3) his conviction was for possession of drugs, or an equivalent or lesser charge such as possession of drug paraphernalia, Cardenas-Uriarte, 227 F.3d at 1137-38; and (4) he received relief under a state rehabilitative statute. Ramirez-Altamirano meets each of the first three requirements, placing him in exactly the position of federal defendants eligible for relief under the FFOA. [9] He also has been granted relief under a state rehabilitative statute. Ramirez-Altamirano was released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he . . . [was] convicted. Cal.Penal Code §§ 1203.4(a), 1203.4a(a). Because the minimal, residual consequences of his conviction under state law are not relevant here, the IJ erred in denying Ramirez-Altamirano's application on that ground. Ramirez-Altamirano is thus entitled to relief under Lujan-Armendariz, unless his five-day jail sentence would have precluded him from qualifying for expungement under the FFOA. Because the BIA has not yet considered this issue, we do not decide it here.