Opinion ID: 478970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amendment or Variance

Text: 25 It is clear that after an indictment has been returned its charges may not be broadened except by the grand jury itself. Watson v. Jago, 558 F.2d 330, 333 (6th Cir.1977). See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216, 80 S.Ct. 270, 272, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960). In the instant case, defendant Atisha notes that the grand jury never reviewed evidence relating to the stolen beef and that the admission of this evidence therefore constituted an impermissible constructive amendment to or prejudicial variance of the indictment. See United States v. Jones, 647 F.2d 696, 700 (6th Cir.) (material alteration of the theory of criminal liability by the court constituted an impermissible amendment to the indictment), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898, 102 S.Ct. 399, 70 L.Ed.2d 214 (1981). 26 An amendment of the indictment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are altered, either literally or in effect, by prosecutor or court after the grand jury has last passed upon them. A variance occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment. 27 Watson v. Jago, 558 F.2d at 334 (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C.Cir.1969)) (emphasis in the original). 12 28 To determine whether there has been a constructive amendment, the court must decide whether there has been a modification at trial in the elements of the crime charged. Id. at 334 (explaining Stirone v. United States ) (emphasis added). 29 We agree with the district court that introducing the evidence of the stolen beef did not constitute a constructive amendment to, or variance of, the indictment. The indictment alleged a conspiracy which clearly encompassed the theft of this truckload of beef; the time-frame, modus operandi, and characters were identical to those alleged in the indictment. In support, we note that there is no requirement in conspiracy cases that the government disclose even all the overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979). Further, by admitting evidence of another overt act, the theory of the case was not changed, the defendant was not charged with a different substantive crime, and the elements of the crime charged were not altered. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial or to exclude the evidence on this basis.