Opinion ID: 426287
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ill App.3d 596, 65 Ill.Dec. 143, 151, 440 N.E.2d 998, 1006

Text: 21 Counsel for CCOM argued as follows: MR. MOORE: Your Honor, again, if I may, earlier I brought up the question of this type of instruction with a long laundry list of argumentative assertions and issues and really taken from the pleadings. I think that we should have a fairly simple issue instruction for all contract claims, ... because as soon as we get away from this format I think we start arguing about the evidence and that sort of thing. (Emphasis added.) 22 The four duties which CCOM claims the district court wrongfully included were: (1) supply plans and specifications free of any defects that would interfere with the performance of the work, (2) refrain from interfering with the relationships between Fuller and its subcontractors, (3) promptly decide questions arising during the work, and (4) grant an extension of time and allowance for delay damages in an appropriate amount. With respect to the merits of including such obligations, see generally Williston on Contracts, Sec. 887 (3d ed. 1962) 23 The district court instructed the jurors: [I]t is the law under the contract between these parties that [CCOM] had the following obligations: 1) Supply plans and specifications which were free of defects that would interfer [sic] with and impede the performance of the work, 2) make timely and appropriate payments, 3) provide surveys and other necessary information about the job site, 4) refrain from interfering with Fuller's relations with its subcontractors, 5) make timely decisions on questions that arose during the progress of the work, 6) grant an extension of time and allowance for delay damages in an appropriate amount. Fuller claims that [CCOM] failed to meet one or more of the foregoing obligations and that such failure was the cause of losses to Fuller which were foreseeable and within the contemplation of the parties. R. 576 at 35. 24 A party need not move for a new trial challenging the alleged errors as a prerequisite to appeal. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2818 (1973) 25 The court gave the jury a different agency instruction: The various parties to this lawsuit conduct their business affairs through the actions of their employees, agents or other representatives. Whenever in these instructions I refer to a party as doing something, saying something or otherwise taking action, I mean through the actions of its employees, agents or other representatives. In particular, the Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine retained Schmidt, Garden and Erickson to serve as its architect and representative. [SGE] had the authority to act on behalf of CCOM during construction of the clinic to the extent provided in the Contract documents. 26 The contract between Fuller and CCOM provided: The Architect will be the Owner's representative during construction and until final payment. The Architect will have authority to act on behalf of the Owner to the extent provided in the Contract Documents, unless otherwise modified by written instrument which will be shown to the Contractor. The Architect will advise and consult with the Owner, and all of the Owner's instructions to the Contractor shall be issued through the Architect. CCOM Ex. 2 p 2.2.2, App. 263. Fuller interpreted this language to mean that SGE was CCOM's agent, even in the preparation of the plans and specifications. In contrast, CCOM asserted that SGE acted as an independent contractor in preparing the plans and specifications. 27 You will search [Fuller Ex. 68] ... in vain for any reference to any problems on this job.... There's no reference to delays by Fuller. There's no reference to foulups by Fuller. There's no reference to the fact that Fuller didn't get permits Here again you can dip into the reservoir of your common experience, and you can apply and attempt to understand why ... there are no references.... Was it because Fuller was at fault? I think they would have felt rather free to tell the public that Fuller was at fault. Was it because the college and Schmidt, Garden & Erickson had between them coupled with the concrete strike caused at least 10 or 11 months' delay by this time? ... Then there is reason for them to leave it out of what they say.... 28 What I am rebutting is the argument of Mr. Harrold and Mr. Kehoe about what they had to say about our charges against Fuller Mr.--It was a strange argument. Mr. Harrold brought up a bond prospectus that, by the way, is dated--I suggest that you look at it. I really do suggest you look at it. It was dated June 10, 1975, and it was a printed thing, so Lord knows when it was prepared, but it is dated June 10, 1975, sometime before that, almost three weeks before this whole thing blew up, and his arguments that it doesn't say in it that Fuller is trying to cheat us. We didn't know that until three weeks later, so I don't know how we could print it in a bond prospectus, and yet that was the whole kickoff of his case. If it meant anything, why wasn't there a witness in here to testify about it, a witness to subject himself to what we call the great legal engine to find the truth, cross examination. 29 As CCOM's closing argument did not affirmatively rely on exhibit 68 but only assumed the existence of such evidence, CCOM did not waive its right to object by merely meeting Fuller's argument. M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence Sec. 103.4 at 17 (1981) 30 The district court considered it unfair for a plaintiff to list a witness he plans to call, then decide not to call the witness, electing instead to argue to the jurors that the defendant's failure to call the witness indicates that the witness would have given testimony detrimental to the defendant's position. The court also observed that Hessmer is no longer working for Fuller 31 Annot., In Argument of Civil Case, on Adversary's Failure to Call Employee as Witness, 68 A.L.R.2d 1072 at Sec. 7 (1959) 32 See also Annot., In Argument of Civil Case, on Adversary's Failure to Call Employee as Witness, 68 A.L.R.2d Sec. 4 at 1078 (collecting cases recognizing this qualification and cases to the contrary). Cf. Tuthill v. Belt Railway Co., 145 Ill.App. 50 (1st Dist.1908) (a defendant is not obliged to produce a former employee at trial and defendant's failure to do so does not give rise to any unfavorable inference). But cf. Santiemmo v. Days Transfer, Inc., 9 Ill.App.2d 487, 133 N.E.2d 539, 549 (1st Dist.1956) (although the missing witness was defendant's former employee, the court seemed to rely not on this fact, but upon the fact that defendant had attempted to explain the former employee's absence, thereby invoking the rule that where a party attempts an explanation of why a witness was absent the other party has a right to comment on what he considers the inadequacy of the explanation.) 33 With respect to the ambiguity of the missing witness inference, see generally United States v. Busic, 3 Cir., 587 F.2d 577, cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 964, 98 S.Ct. 1631, 56 L.Ed.2d 72 (1978) (can only infer evidence not sufficiently helpful to present whether because of jury fatigue, burden of proof already met, unsavory demeanor of witness, etc.); McCormick, Evidence Sec. 272 at 657 (2d ed. 1972)