Opinion ID: 6354474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sherman's Closing Argument

Text: The petitioner next argues that Sherman's closing argument was constitutionally deficient and prejudiced his defense. The habeas court agreed that Sherman's closing argument was deficient, concluding that it was disjointed, unfocused, that Sherman did not respond to certain aspects of the state's case, and that Sherman unreasonably made arguments that drew objections from the state. The habeas court nevertheless concluded that any deficiency in the closing argument did not prejudice the petitioner because the trial court had instructed the jury that it was obligated to focus on the evidence when deciding guilt, and the habeas court  presumed that the jury followed the trial court's instructions. We disagree that Sherman's closing argument was constitutionally deficient. Courts must be highly deferential when reviewing a claim that a closing argument was constitutionally ineffective. [C]ounsel has wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a client, and deference to counsel's tactical decisions in his closing presentation is particularly important because of the broad range of legitimate defense strategy at that stage. Closing arguments should sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact ... but which issues to sharpen and how best to clarify them are questions with many reasonable answers. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Yarborough v. Gentry , supra, 540 U.S. at 5-6 , 124 S.Ct. 1 . Even if some arguments would unquestionably have supported the defense, it does not follow that counsel was incompetent for failing to include them. Focusing on a small number of key points may be more persuasive than a shotgun approach. Id., at 7 , 124 S.Ct. 1 . We believe that the habeas court acknowledged but ultimately failed to apply this deference in its analysis. Our review of Sherman's closing argument convinces us that it did not fall outside of the broad range of permissible arguments that counsel might make. Sherman was allotted ninety minutes of argument to cover fifteen days of testimony and evidence. In addition, because the state had given its closing statement immediately before Sherman, he could not simply give a scripted argument but needed to work in a rebuttal to the state's argument with no additional time to prepare it. Despite these constraints, Sherman's closing argument amply covered the evidence concerning the key issues in the case. Sherman began his argument by summarizing the essence of the defense, emphasizing that the petitioner  did not commit the crime and had never confessed. He attacked the state's case as a desire for a conviction in search of evidence rather than a search for the truth, noting that the state had gone through a number of prior suspects before settling on the petitioner. Sherman also noted that the defense, in response to the state's case, had not tried to present a boutique defense using high tech delivery or fancy theories. He emphasized that the state had not presented evidence to prove its claim that that the petitioner was disturbed or to demonstrate that he had become a demonic killer one night on Halloween. He also  contended that much of the testimony presented by the state's witnesses raised more questions than answers. Sherman then turned to a critique of the physical and forensic evidence presented. He began by noting that the state had not presented any forensic or physical evidence to tie the petitioner to the murder. He reminded the jury that Lee acknowledged that there was no direct evidence to connect the petitioner to the crime, even though the killer would have been in close contact with the victim and likely would have been covered in blood after the assault. Sherman also recounted testimony demonstrating that the state was still testing forensic evidence just days before the trial began, and he argued that the state was apparently still trying to determine who was responsible for the crime, even though it already had put the petitioner on trial. Sherman candidly added that, although he did not know who committed the murder, the state's continued last minute forensic testing demonstrated that the state still did not know either. He noted that, although there was no physical evidence connecting the petitioner to the crime, Lee had explained that two hairs were found that potentially connected Littleton to the crime scene. With respect to the golf club used in the attack, which came from a set of golf clubs in the Skakel home, Sherman  reminded the jury of testimony from one of the investigators that it was reported that golf clubs were often left outside all about the Skakel property. He reminded the jury that one of the police investigators admitted that the state's physical evidence against the petitioner was zilch. As an aside, he added that that same investigator had once tried to obtain an arrest warrant for Thomas Skakel for the murder. Sherman next addressed the state's argument that the petitioner had a motive to murder the victim. He attacked the state's theory that the petitioner murdered the victim after she rebuffed his romantic advances, pointing out that entries in the victim's diary and witnesses who knew the petitioner and the victim at the time established that the petitioner's feelings for the victim were that of an ordinary teenager, not a jealous murderer. Sherman also criticized the state for pulling its motive argument from theories pushed by a celebrity book written about the case for money and by tabloid magazines. Sherman next pivoted to Littleton. Sherman acknowledged he did not know whether Littleton had committed the crime but used uncertain evidence about whether Littleton had ever confessed to show that a confession ain't always a confession and that the evidence against the petitioner was no better than that against Littleton. He recounted evidence that the state had spent significant time trying to pin the crime on Littleton and argued that the state's attempts to secure a confession from Littleton laid bare the lengths to which the state would go to get somebody to say, 'I did it.'  He also compared Littleton's uncertain confession to those that the petitioner supposedly made, arguing that Littleton's alleged confessions were no less compelling and no less persuasive than the garbage presented against the petitioner from Coleman and other witnesses who claimed the petitioner had made incriminating statements.  Sherman then reminded the jury that Littleton himself admitted on the stand that he had told his former wife that he stabbed the victim in the neck. Sherman then attacked the state's evidence with respect to the time of death. He criticized the state's experts for being unable to pin down a more narrow time frame for the victim's death and reviewed testimony from a number of witnesses,  including the victim's mother, that there was a commotion and incessant barking by dogs sometime between 9:30 and 10 p.m. on October 30, 1975. He recalled testimony from the victim's mother that, around that time, she also thought she may have heard the victim's voice. To bolster the testimony from these witnesses, Sherman recounted the testimony of a medical examiner, who originally worked in connection with the state's investigation of the case and testified that the murder likely occurred about 10 p.m. Tying the defense theory of the time of death to the petitioner's alibi, Sherman next reviewed the testimony establishing that the petitioner had gone to the Terrien home at about 9:30 p.m. and did not return until around 11 p.m., placing him out of the neighborhood during the time period he claimed that the murder had occurred. Sherman gave the jury reasons to credit the petitioner's alibi witnesses and explained why witnesses who thought that the petitioner had not gone to the Terrien home were mistaken in their recollection. Sherman turned to attacking the state's theory that the Skakel family and possibly its attorneys had tried to cover up the petitioner's involvement in the murder and invent an alibi. The weekend following the murder, Littleton had taken many of the Skakel siblings to the family's vacation home in New York. The state argued that the purpose was to remove the petitioner from the investigation and insinuated that, during that trip, the  Skakel family developed the petitioner's alibi story. But Sherman reminded the jury that Littleton testified that he, rather than the Skakel family or its attorneys, had brought up the idea of taking the Skakel siblings out of town. He noted that police investigators initially had concluded that the petitioner was among those who went to the Terrien home. And Sherman also recounted how some of the Skakel siblings had candidly testified that they could not remember precisely who had gone to the Terrien home, indicating that, if there was a Skakel family conspiracy, it was the worst run conspiracy [he had] ever seen. Turning to the subject of the petitioner's confessions, Sherman went through each, detailing at length the reasons that each was not credible. For example, he noted that many of the witnesses had delayed decades in reporting the confessions, that some of the details they claimed the petitioner relayed to them were inconsistent with the evidence, that one witness recanted, that one admitted his recollection was questionable, and that many of them had questionable motives for coming forward, including the potential of receiving reward money. He recounted Coleman's history of drug use, including his drug use at the time he testified, as well as his criminal history. And he reminded the jury of the cruelty that the petitioner experienced at Elan to demonstrate why anything the petitioner said while he was there was wholly unreliable. Sherman also noted that, despite the harsh treatment of the petitioner at Elan, witnesses who were with the petitioner at Elan testified that he had continually denied any involvement in the murder. On the subject of the petitioner's statements about his activities later on the night of October 30, 1975, including his claim of masturbating in a tree, Sherman rebutted the state's argument that the petitioner had changed his story about the tree in which he was sitting  in order to potentially explain the presence of any DNA that might be found at the crime scene. He first explained why the petitioner did not initially tell the police about his activities during the initial investigation, indicating that the petitioner concealed his activities because he was afraid that his  father would hear about them. He also recounted testimony from witnesses demonstrating that, once the petitioner revealed his activities that night, he was consistent with his story about which tree he was sitting in. Sherman explained that the argument that the petitioner had changed his story about which tree he was sitting in was based entirely on an assumption made by a witness about which tree the petitioner was referring to when he told his story on one particular occasion. Sherman concluded by reminding the jury that the state had believed that other suspects committed the murder and spent years trying to build cases against them, and that the state finally settled on the petitioner, despite having no physical evidence to tie the petitioner to the crime. Sherman stressed that the state's case consisted solely of questionable claims that the petitioner had confessed. He characterized the state's evidence as not acceptable for supporting a conviction because there were simply too many questions still surrounding the case. He cautioned the jurors that there were few times they would ever make a decision as consequential as deciding the petitioner's guilt and that they should not find the petitioner guilty on the basis of such little reliable evidence. Sherman might not have had time to review all of the evidence presented in his closing argument, but he succeeded in addressing the critical evidence supporting his defense and responded to the key arguments raised by the state. The habeas court, in concluding that Sherman's argument was professionally incompetent, acknowledged that counsel is afforded substantial deference  in formulating a closing argument given the broad range of options counsel has for argument and the constraints under which it is made, but we conclude that the habeas court did not apply that deference in its review of the petitioner's claim. The habeas court characterized Sherman's closing argument as disjointed and unfocused, but we do not share that view. To the contrary, Sherman organized his discussion of the evidence around the central topics of the petitioner's defense, focusing on his alibi, the competing evidence against Littleton, and the lack of credibility of the confession witnesses. Sherman also addressed other aspects of the state's case, including its theory of a family cover-up and the petitioner's alleged motive. The habeas court faulted Sherman for his failure to provide the jury a road map to an understanding of the state's burden of proof and the concept of reasonable doubt, but we disagree that Sherman was incompetent in this regard. There is no requirement that defense counsel explain these concepts during closing argument. And counsel might reasonably conclude that doing so would be a poor use of limited argument time considering that the court provides its own detailed instructions about the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. See Yarborough v. Gentry , supra, 540 U.S. at 10 , 124 S.Ct. 1 ([t]o be sure, [counsel] did not insist that the existence of a reasonable doubt would require the jury to acquit-but he could count on the judge's charge to remind [the jury] of that requirement [emphasis omitted] ). Moreover, before Sherman gave his closing argument, the state had already acknowledged, in its initial closing argument, its burden to prove all allegations in the information beyond a reasonable doubt. The habeas court also determined that Sherman's representation was ineffective insofar as he fail[ed]  to explain the relevance of the third-party culpability evidence [against Littleton] to the issue of reasonable doubt, but that assessment is belied by the record. As we already explained,  Sherman used the evidence against Littleton to explain that the evidence against the petitioner was no better. He also used it to discredit the integrity of the state's investigation by pointing out the investigators' role in attempting to extract a confession from Littleton. See footnote 9 of this opinion. He argued that the state's conduct vis-à -vis Littleton demonstrated that even the state could not be sure who committed the crime, and he urged the jury that there were simply too many questions outstanding to permit a guilty verdict. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, urging the jury that no one, not even the state, could be sure about who killed the victim is the very essence of a [reasonable doubt] argument. Yarborough v. Gentry , supra, 540 U.S. at 10 , 124 S.Ct. 1 . The habeas court criticized Sherman for admitting that he did not know whether Littleton murdered the victim and for expressing some sympathy for Littleton, but such a tactic hardly bespeaks incompetence. Given the uncertainty surrounding Littleton's confession, counsel reasonably could have decided that blaming and degrading Littleton might have caused the jury to discredit the defense. Sherman did not act unreasonably in deciding that the better course was to candidly acknowledge the uncertainty surrounding Littleton's guilt and then to argue that the same uncertainty clouded the evidence against the petitioner. See id., at 10-11 , 124 S.Ct. 1 (counsel was not ineffective for acknowledging that he did not know truth about what occurred and arguing that no one else could be sure either). By doing so, he set up Littleton as a sympathetic victim of the state's desire to convict someone of the murder and then attempted to portray his client as another of the state's failed suspects.  The habeas court also determined that Sherman had failed to rebut the state's argument that the petitioner used his story about masturbating in a tree to possibly explain the presence of DNA if it were ever found, but, again, this is not supported by the record. As we explained, Sherman confronted this claim directly by arguing that the evidence on which the state relied to demonstrate that he altered his story was in fact nonexistent and based solely on unsupported assumptions. The habeas court next observed that Sherman did not directly address the state's argument that the petitioner's family sent him to Elan to remove him from the police investigation. Although this determination is supported by the record, we disagree that it amounts to incompetence. Sherman can hardly be faulted for not spending valuable argument time addressing an issue that even the habeas court separately had concluded was tangential to the main issues in the case. And Sherman indirectly addressed this throughout his closing argument when he argued that the state's theory of a Skakel family cover-up, which involved the purported invention of an alibi and concealment of evidence, simply was not supported by the testimony in the case. Finally, the habeas court faulted Sherman for making improper comments during closing argument that caused the trial court to caution the jury to disregard the comments. For example, during his closing argument, the trial court twice interposed that the jury should disregard certain remarks Sherman had made. In addition, the state filed a motion after closing arguments, asking for additional curative instructions, which the trial court granted. According to the trial court, Sherman had stated that he did not know who murdered the victim, and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard that remark because it represented  counsel's personal opinion. The trial court also instructed the jury to disregard Sherman's remark that the  petitioner did not know who committed the murder because the petitioner had not actually testified, but the court further instructed the jury that it could draw no adverse inference from the petitioner's decision not to testify. Finally, the state asserted that Sherman had implied during his closing argument that the state attempted to conceal evidence by raising objections and failing to produce certain witnesses. The court instructed the jury that it should rely on its own recollection about whether Sherman made those arguments, and, to the extent he did, those arguments should not be considered during deliberations. We disagree with the habeas court that these comments, which were made during a long and detailed closing argument, amount to professional incompetence. Although drawing objections of this type during a closing argument might not get counsel an A for trial advocacy, our task is not to grade counsel's performance but to determine whether counsel's actions fell below the acceptable range of professional performance. Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 697 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . Attorneys commonly ask questions and make comments during a trial that draw objections from the opposing party, and those objections are often sustained and can lead to curative instructions. In our view, Sherman's comments, while legally objectionable, demonstrated strong advocacy on Sherman's part and reflected mistakes that a reasonable attorney might make, not ineffective assistance.