Opinion ID: 1155448
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Heading: Delay in Appearing Before a Magistrate

Text: Powell argues that he was not brought before a magistrate within seventy-two hours as required by NRS 171.178(3). NRS 171.178(3) provides: 3. If an arrested person is not brought before a magistrate within 72 hours after arrest, excluding nonjudicial days, the magistrate: (a) Shall give the prosecuting attorney an opportunity to explain the circumstances leading to the delay; and (b) May release the arrested person if he determines that the person was not brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. The purpose of NRS 171.178 is to prevent the police from resorting to secret interrogations and coercive tactics. Huebner v. State, 103 Nev. 29, 32, 731 P.2d 1330, 1333 (1987). This court has repeatedly held that the defendant must show prejudice which resulted from the delay. See e.g., Id. at 32, 731 P.2d at 1333; Morgan v. Sheriff, 92 Nev. 544, 546, 554 P.2d 733, 734 (1976). Powell was arrested on Friday, November 3, 1989. A magistrate found probable cause to hold Powell for a preliminary hearing on Tuesday, November 7, 1989. It is unclear from the record whether Powell was present before the magistrate on this day. Powell contends that he was not brought before a magistrate until November 13, 1989. On November 3, 1989, and November 7, 1989, prior to his initial appearance, Powell made statements to the police. He admitted to spanking Melea for wetting her pants and slapping her on other occasions. Powell told officials that he never intended to hurt the baby. These statements, which were presented to the jury, were clearly prejudicial to Powell. We initially note that the United States Supreme Court has provided additional guidance on the issue of what constitutes a timely initial appearance. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991). In McLaughlin, the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment allows for a reasonable delay of a probable cause determination while authorities are processing suspects through the criminal justice system. Id. ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1669. The Court then went on to state that a judicial determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours of arrest comports with the promptness requirement set forth in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). McLaughlin, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1670. Intervening weekends (and implicitly, holidays or other non-judicial days) are included in the calculation of forty-eight hours. Id. If the suspect does not receive a probable cause determination within forty-eight hours, the State must prove that the delay was due to a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstances. Id. The McLaughlin case renders NRS 171.178(3) unconstitutional insofar that it permits an initial appearance up to seventy-two hours after arrest and instructs that non-judicial days be excluded from the calculation of those hours. Based on McLaughlin, we hold that a suspect must come before a magistrate within forty-eight hours, including non-judicial days, for a probable cause determination. [1] However, the analysis of whether or not Powell's rights were violated does not end with the mere facts of a delay and incriminating statements. We have previously held that an accused waives his right to a seasonal arraignment when he voluntarily waives his right to remain silent. Deutscher v. State, 95 Nev. 669, 601 P.2d 407 (1979), vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1678, 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991). There, we stated: We subscribe to the rule of law which provides that when an accused voluntarily waives his right to silence and his right to counsel, he concurrently waives his right to be seasonably arraigned. The reason for this rule is that the primary purpose of an arraignment is to inform the defendant of his rights. But a delay in arraignment is not prejudicial when a defendant has already been advised of his rights, was promptly so advised, and voluntarily waived his rights. This is particularly so when the delay is not flagrant and the record is silent relative to any other irregularities which go to the issue of voluntariness. Id. at 680, 601 P.2d at 414 (citations omitted). Powell does not challenge the voluntariness of his statements, nor is there any indication in the record that the statements were involuntary. During the first interview on November 3, 1989, prior to being formally arrested, Powell left the interview twice in order to smoke a cigarette. Powell's conduct indicates that he felt free to leave the interview at any time and that he was not coerced or involuntarily detained in any way. On November 7, 1989, Powell was read his Miranda rights prior to the interview, and he waived those rights. There is no indication that the waiver was involuntary. Irrespective of when Powell was brought before a magistrate, he waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. By waiving those rights, he thereby waived his right to a timely arraignment. Deutscher, 95 Nev. at 680, 601 P.2d at 414. The same reasoning this court employed in Deutscher applies to the requirement of an initial appearance before a magistrate within the prescribed time limit. At the initial appearance, Powell would have been advised, inter alia, of the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. NRS 171.186. [2] One of the purposes of a speedy arraignment is to ensure that the suspect is informed of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Huebner v. State, 103 Nev. 29, 32, 731 P.2d 1330, 1333 (1987). The same is true of a timely first appearance. Powell was advised of his rights on November 7, 1989, when he gave a statement to the police, and he voluntarily waived those rights. We therefore conclude that by waiving his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, Powell waived his right to an appearance before a magistrate within seventy-two hours.