Opinion ID: 1057924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bailey v. County of Shelby

Text: Before the application for permission to appeal with this Court was filed, the Court of Appeals, relying upon a pre-1977 case, made the following observations in Bailey v. County of Shelby: The proposition that county governments operating under a form of government other than the traditional form may eliminate the constitutional officers . . . is unsupported by the case law. In Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Poe, 215 Tenn. 53, 383 S.W.2d 265 (Tenn.1964), the Tennessee Supreme Court considered this proposition in the context of the consolidated government of Nashville and Davidson County, which operates as a consolidated home-rule government under a metropolitan charter pursuant to Article XI, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. . . . The supreme court expressly rejected, however, the proposition that a charter government organized pursuant to Article XI, Section 9, could eliminate the constitutional office of sheriff. The court stated: Article 7, Section 1 of the Constitution of Tennessee provides that `There shall be elected in each County, by the qualified voters therein, one Sheriff, one Trustee, one Register;' etc. In the Constitution of 1796, Article 6, Section 1, it was provided that `There shall be appointed in each county, by the county Court, one sheriff, one coroner, one trustee,' etc. In the Constitution of 1834, by Article VII, Section 1, it was provided that `There shall be elected in each County, by the qualified voters therein, one Sheriff, one Trustee, one Register,' etc. It is obvious that express provisions have been made in all three Constitutions adopted by the voters of Tennessee for the office of Sheriff, and any language that may have been employed in any prior decisions of this Court, and particularly in Robinson v. Briley, supra, [213 Tenn. 418, 374 S.W.2d 382 (Tenn.1963)] from which it might be remotely concluded that we held the office of Sheriff or any other constitutional office could be or was abolished by the Charter was a mere inadvertence and not meant to be a holding of this Court. . . . . Bailey v. County of Shelby, No. W2005-01508-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3115915 at -10 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005) (quoting Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County v. Poe, 215 Tenn. 53, 383 S.W.2d 265, 268 (1964)). The Court of Appeals found that the alternate form of government, just like the metropolitan form, did not authorize the elimination of the constitutional officers of the county and decided that the third paragraph of article VII could not be interpreted as a stand-alone provision. It ruled that the offices of sheriff, trustee, register of deeds, county clerk, and property assessor were firmly embodied in our state constitution: A plain reading of this subsection compels a conclusion that county governments must include the constitutional officers whose statutorily defined duties may not be diminished by the charter. . . . . . . . . . . In the absence of an express exemption like that provided in paragraph two of Article VII for Article XI, Section 9 consolidated governments, this court is loathe to disturb a historical Tennessee constitutional mandate. Bailey, 2005 WL 3115915 at . After a careful analysis of the charter county government under article VII, section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and the enabling legislation found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-201 to -215, this Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in Bailey v. County of Shelby, 188 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn.2006). A unanimous Court observed that Article VII [of the Tennessee Constitution] grant[ed] broad authority to a county to go so far as to replace its existing government in favor of an alternate government, provided the people approve. 188 S.W.3d at 546. This Court reject[ed] the notion that an alternative government formed under the third paragraph of Article VII must conform to the language in the first paragraph of Article VII, i.e., qualifications and duties [of elected county officials] shall be prescribed by the General Assembly only. To hold otherwise would mean that a county could adopt a new form of government that is controlled by the old form of government that the new one replaced. Id. Our decision in Bailey did not address whether the Shelby County Charter [7] complied with the requirement of the enabling legislation that the charter must provide for an alternate form of county government to perform all of the governmental and corporate functions previously performed by the county. Tenn.Code Ann. § 5-1-203(b). The validity of that charter was not an issue. Moreover, while the plaintiffs in Bailey argued that the constitutional county officers mentioned in paragraph one of article VII could not be abolished by a government formed under paragraph three of Article VII, 188 S.W.3d at 546, this Court properly refrained from an advisory ruling. We explained that the case was not about Shelby County having abolished the officials identified in the first paragraph of Article VII, nor did it involve an attempt to diminish the duties of [those] elected county officials. Id.; see also Tenn.Code Ann. 5-1-210(12) (The enabling legislation precluded any diminution of the duties of the constitutional county officers as prescribed [by statute] . . . under a county charter form.). Our opinion did, however, reject the implication that paragraph one requirements were necessarily a part of the alternate county governments established under paragraph three: Regardless, the plaintiffs' arguments are premised upon their view that alternative governments formed under the third paragraph of Article VII are controlled by the first paragraph of Article VII. . . . Bailey, 188 S.W.3d at 546. The thrust of the Bailey holding in that regard is that if there is no requirement that the third paragraph of article VII conform to the language of the first paragraph as to qualifications and duties, the offices named in the first paragraph, including those of sheriff, trustee, property assessor, register of deeds, and county clerk, are not essential to an alternative form of government. The implication of Bailey is that because the constitutional officers of a county are not necessary in the charter form, then no duty, obligation, or function of these offices and officers is retained unless expressly provided for in the charter or required by the constitution or the enabling legislation. Our opinion in Bailey strongly suggests that the 1990 Knox County Charter is, in fact, incomplete and fails to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 5-1-203(b) and 5-1-210(5), (6), and (7). As observed by the chancellor, Knox County's position on the charter contradicts our pronouncement in Bailey that paragraphs one and three of article VII, section 1, are not to be read together. Indeed, if a chartered county cannot abolish the constitutional offices and is compelled to retain them (as opposed to the functions that these positions serve), the new form of government [would be] controlled by the old form, a result this Court specifically rejected in the Bailey opinion. 188 S.W.3d at 546. Knox County's claim that its charter is not required to provide for the constitutional county offices and that they somehow exist separate and apart from the charter by operation of law does not take into account the requirements of the enabling legislation. Our constitution authorizes the General Assembly to grant counties the right to establish governments under either the traditional or metropolitan forms or to create an alternate charter form of county government. Although the second sentence in the third paragraph of article VII, section 1 provides that the new form of government shall replace the existing form if approved by a majority of the voters, the new form must also comport with the enabling legislation. In order to meet the latter standard, the new form of government must satisfy the requirements found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-210, including the provision that the duties of the constitutional county officers as prescribed by the general assembly shall not be diminished under a county charter form of government; provided that such officers may be given additional duties under such charters. Tenn.Code Ann. § 5-1-210(12). In Bailey, this Court unequivocally concluded that the third paragraph of article VII is not controlled by its first paragraph. Therefore, the subsection requires that the duties, which are clearly essential for a complete county government, not be neglected in an alternate form of government; but, as this Court ruled over forty years ago in Winter , the duties may be transferred to another county official, so long as the duty is performed. 367 S.W.2d at 790. The decision in Bailey implied that Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-210(12) provides that it is only when the charter does retain the constitutional county offices in the alternate form of government that the duties, as already described by our constitution and statute, may not be diminished. The point, of course, is that the offices must first be created under the charter. A comparison of the constitutional terminology and the statutory language compels this interpretation, as does the holding in Bailey. Article VII, paragraph 3 of our constitution grants the power to the counties not to have these officers at all. As indicated by the opinion in Leech, the third paragraph is an alternate form created without regard to the general type established in [the first paragraph] in Article VII. 588 S.W.2d at 537. As observed by the chancellor, the Knox County Charter is not a valid (de jure) charter under the law. Because the charter does not provide for the constitutional county offices or otherwise assign their duties to any other office, agency, or official, it is indeed incomplete. Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-203 requires that the charter contain all necessary governmental functions. The services offered by the constitutional officers must be maintained in some fashion in order to meet the requirements of law. Absent specific provisions in the charter, no right, power, duty, obligation, or function of any constitutional county officer in the prior government exists in the new alternate form. Because the offices of sheriff, trustee, property assessor, register of deeds, and county clerk are not expressly provided for in the new charter, there is no basis in the law for those offices in the alternate form of Knox County government.