Opinion ID: 2141149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Remaining Causes of Action

Text: Claimants have discontinued Claim 6 alleging a conspiracy and Claim 10 alleging a violation of Public Officers Law article 6-A. Additionally, we need not address the sufficiency of Claim 9, asserting a cause of action based on section 40-c of the Civil Rights Law, because claimants acknowledge in their brief that damages are not available to them from the State on that cause of action. [10] The claim under section 8 of the Civil Rights Law is duplicative of the constitutional claim based on section 12 of article I of the Constitution and should be dismissed for that reason. Finally, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over Claim 11, asserting a cause of action for negligent training and supervision. In sum, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of all the causes of action asserted in this claim. Claims 7 and 8 insofar as they allege claims based upon violations of article I, §§ 11 and 12 of the New York State Constitution and Claim 11 alleging a claim for negligent training and supervision are facially sufficient to state causes of action against defendants and should be reinstated. The remaining causes of action were properly dismissed. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, and the case remitted to the Court of Claims for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion and, as modified, affirmed. BELLACOSA, J. (dissenting). Because the dismissal of this entire case against the State by the Court of Claims and the Appellate Division is the justifiable result, I respectfully dissent. The synopsis for my vote to affirm is:  The New York Constitution grants the Legislature the responsibility to define the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court of Claims;  Duly considered and enacted statutes expressly prescribe and implement that power and forbid implied State liability;  The judicial inferential interpretive method is neither supportable nor suitable for the resolution of this preanswer dispute, in which the Court of Appeals promulgates new subject-matter jurisdiction for a court of limited powers and recognizes new remedies and causes of action against the State;  The constitutional tort theory and nomenclature should not be equated and subsumed within conventional tort doctrines, as a route to resolving fundamental subject-matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity issues, affecting New York's jurisprudence in and for the Court of Claims. The following reasoning and documentation of authorities is necessary because of the complex nature of this dispute and the extensive majority explication. The reinstatement of constitutional tort claims in the Court of Claims invests that court with inferred subject-matter jurisdiction, which the Legislature has not seen fit to confer expressly. The means used to find an implied legislative authorization to achieve the end result substitutes for a quintessentially legislative prerogative. This Court, [b]y recognizing what it tries to minimize as a narrow remedy for violations of sections 11 and 12 of article I of the State Constitution so as to provide appropriate protection under a distinct `species of tort liability' (majority opn, at 178, 192), requires the State itself to answer for alleged official wrongdoings. The exposure includes the stigma of societal fault and the payment of unknown sums of public funds, not only for this case but also for innumerable others certain to be improvised within its precedential repertoire. The significant and sharp controversy grows out of a race-based, communitywide police sweep, as part of an investigation stemming from a serious crime committed in an upstate college town. As Judge Hanifin stated, however, in his comprehensive and cogent trial court opinion: This Court [of Claims] cannot expand its jurisdiction based on the emotional content of the issues presented to it ( Brown v State of New York , Ct Cl, Mar. 17, 1994, claim No. 86979, affd 221 AD2d 681). The focus in this Court, too, should remain solely on the statutory construction question posed by this case: whether the State itself may be sued in the New York State Court of Claims for affronts classified as constitutional torts. I conclude that the analysis and result that ultimately tap the deep reservoir of State responsibility are fundamentally flawed as a matter of law and history. No sustainable root and nexus have been sufficiently identified to overcome the twin towers of State protection expressly reflected in the statutorily specified subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and limited surrender of sovereign immunity. Instead, a wide web of words within the statutory interpretation method has been used to discern a route to the desired result, while traditional respect for and proper distribution of power between legislative and judicial branches are deflected. On the other hand, though I express a dissenting viewpoint, I also recognize and respect the cogency and reasonableness that is reflected in the decision my colleagues reach in this complicated case.