Opinion ID: 1662508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Concealed Firearms

Text: The second question which confronts us is: Under what circumstances is a firearm in fact concealed? Section 790.01, Florida Statutes (1977), reads in pertinent part: (2) Whoever shall carry a concealed firearm on or about his person shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree... . Concealed firearm is defined by section 790.001(2), Florida Statutes (1977): Concealed firearm means any firearm ... when the same is carried on or about a person in such a manner as to conceal said firearm from the ordinary sight of another person. This Court has not previously addressed what constitutes a concealed weapon under these sections. The district court decisions are conflicting and irreconcilable. The Third District Court of Appeal has held that a pistol in an automobile glove compartment comprises a concealed firearm. State v. Butler, 325 So.2d 55 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The First District, one day later, in Sutton v. State, 327 So.2d 234 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 334 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1976), said a firearm in a closed automobile glove compartment was not concealed within the meaning of chapter 790. The Third District has held that a firearm underneath a defendant's automobile seat and totally obscure from view was concealed. Lawson v. State, 251 So.2d 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). The Second District, on the other hand, held that a revolver out of view under the defendant's front seat but holstered with a leather strap snapped over the hammer, was concealed under section 790.01(2) but was excepted by section 790.25. State v. Hanigan, 312 So.2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). The First and Third District Courts have stated that any time a weapon is open to an officer's observation, it is not concealed. Specifically, the courts determined that a handgun was not concealed when it was protruding from under defendant's automobile seat and partially visible from peering through the vehicle window. Christian v. State, 303 So.2d 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 314 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1975); State v. Day, 301 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1975). Yet, the Fourth District Court in the instant case held that a pistol under the front seat and partially visible from the front windshield could qualify as a concealed weapon. Other jurisdictions with concealed weapon statutes similar to Florida's have considered the instant question. The majority of those jurisdictions have concluded that a weapon need not be totally hidden from view to constitute a concealed weapon for purposes of prosecution under the respective statutes. [3] For example, in Mularkey v. State, 201 Wis. 429, 230 N.W. 76 (1930), the defendant reached into his automobile during an altercation and withdrew a .32 Colt automatic revolver from a small shelf behind the driver's seat. In affirming defendant's conviction for possessing a concealed firearm, the court said, [i]f the weapon is hidden from ordinary observation, it is concealed. Absolute invisibility to other persons is not indispensable to concealment. Id. at 432, 230 N.W. at 77. Similarly, in People v. Williams, 39 Ill. App.3d 129, 350 N.E.2d 81 (1976), a police officer viewed a .38 caliber pistol lying on the rear floorboard of defendant's automobile. The weapon could not be seen except from the side window view and was easily accessible to defendant. The Illinois appellate court affirmed defendant's concealed weapon conviction and pointed out: It is well settled in Illinois that a weapon is `concealed' ... even though there is some notice of its presence to an alert police officer who can see part of the gun when he approached [sic] the vehicle. Id. at 131, 350 N.E.2d at 83. The Alabama Supreme Court set forth its standard in the early case of Driggers v. State, 123 Ala. 46, 49, 26 So. 512, 514 (1899): [I]f the pistol is carried on the person under such conditions that it is hidden from view from the observation of persons coming in contact with the person carrying it, casually observing his person, this is a concealment, and in violation of the statute. We agree with the majority view and find that absolute invisibility is not a necessary element to a finding of concealment under section 790.001. The operative language of that section establishes a twofold test. For a firearm to be concealed, it must be (1) on or about the person and (2) hidden from the ordinary sight of another person. The term on or about the person means physically on the person or readily accessible to him. This generally includes the interior of an automobile and the vehicle's glove compartment, whether or not locked. The term ordinary sight of another person means the casual and ordinary observation of another in the normal associations of life. Ordinary observation by a person other than a police officer does not generally include the floorboard of a vehicle, whether or not the weapon is wholly or partially visible. These statements are not intended as absolute standards. Their purpose is to make it clear that a weapon's possible visibility from a point outside the vehicle may not, as a matter of law, preclude the weapon from being a concealed weapon under section 790.001. Similarly, a weapon's location in some extreme part of the vehicle's interior may be such that the trier of fact finds the weapon to be not about the person, and thus not concealed. In all instances, common sense must prevail. The critical question turns on whether an individual, standing near a person with a firearm or beside a vehicle in which a person with a firearm is seated, may by ordinary observation know the questioned object to be a firearm. The ultimate decision must rest upon the trier of fact under the circumstances of each case. In carrying out normal procedures in making an arrest, the officer in the instant case discovered the derringer pistol on the vehicle's floorboard through a legally permissive open view. The undisputed facts reflect, however, that the officer could not identify the object until he looked through the open vehicle door and under the vehicle seat. The gun was on the floor, partially under the mat. We find that this weapon could qualify as hidden from the ordinary sight of the average person. It should be emphasized that the permissible and legal observations of a police officer in making an arrest and the observation of an average person making normal contact with an individual are clearly not the same. We hold that appellant's prosecution for possession of a concealed firearm was permissible and that the firearm was wrongfully suppressed. The jury should determine whether this weapon was concealed under these facts. In our decision, we have not considered the effect of Florida's weapon licensing provisions or the effect of the exceptions thereto. See §§ 790.05, .06, .25, Fla. Stat. (1979). The result of the instant decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal is affirmed. The decisions in Sutton v. State , Porchay v. State , Christian v. State , and State v. Day are hereby disapproved to the extent that they conflict with the views expressed in this opinion. It is so ordered. ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur. SUNDBERG, C.J., concurs in the result only. BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion. ADKINS, J., dissents.