Opinion ID: 2069162
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instructions on the Slander-of-Title Counterclaims

Text: The plaintiff argues that the trial justice's instructions regarding the slander-of-title counterclaims improperly permitted the jury to find that plaintiff had slandered the Mandarellis' title to the Atwood Avenue property without requiring plaintiff to have maliciously uttered false statements about their ownership interest in that property. In support of this argument, plaintiff cites the following passage from the trial justice's instructions to the jury: If there is evidence by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the Atwood Avenue property has been slandered, then Joyce Mandarelli is entitled to your verdict against Claire Montecalvo. Whether you return a verdict in favor of    Roger, depends. What does it depend on? It depends on what you decided about the partnership. And it simply is this: If you find that Claire failed to prove her partnership by a fair preponderance of the evidence, then in addition to giving Joyce your verdict, you must give Roger your verdict. The plaintiff asserts that these instructions allowed the jury to find slander of title for defendant after finding slander of title for Joyce Mandarelli simply by concluding that plaintiff had failed to establish her partnership agreement with defendant. However, a review of all of the court's jury instructions belies this contention. In evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, we view the charge as a whole in light of the meaning and interpretation that a jury composed of ordinary, intelligent lay persons would give them. Hueston v. Narragansett Tennis Club, Inc., 502 A.2d 827, 829 (R.I.1986). An erroneous charge warrants reversal only if it can be shown that the jury `could have been misled' to the resultant prejudice of the complaining party. Brodeur v. Desrosiers, 505 A.2d 418, 422 (R.I.1986) (quoting Anter v. Ambeault, 104 R.I. 496, 501, 245 A.2d 137, 139 (1968)). Upon review of the record before us, and notwithstanding plaintiff's claim to the contrary, we believe the trial justice properly instructed the jury on each of the elements the Mandarellis had to prove for the jury to find for them on their respective claims of slander of title. To recover for slander of title, the Mandarellis had to establish that the [plaintiff] maliciously uttered false statements about [their] ownership of real estate which resulted in [their] sustaining an actual pecuniary loss. Peckham v. Hirschfeld, 570 A.2d 663, 666-67 (R.I.1990) (quoting DeLeo v. Anthony A. Nunes, Inc., 546 A.2d 1344, 1346 (R.I.1988)). Malice in the context of a slander-of-title claim is an intent to deceive or injure. Hopkins v. Drowne, 21 R.I. 20, 23, 41 A. 567, 568 (1898). It is established by showing that a party made a false statement, with full knowledge of its falsity, for the purpose of injuring the complainant(s). Id. at 23, 41 A. at 568; see also Peckham, 570 A.2d at 667. Here, the trial justice's instructions specifically charged the jury on each of these elements. Specifically, the trial justice stated in pertinent part: What is it that Roger Mandarelli and Joyce Mandarelli must prove to establish a slander of title? Each one of the following four elements which make up the wrong called slander of title or slander of property, must be proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence. First, the uttering and publishing of a statement, that's the first thing.    Second, that the statement was false. Third, that the statement was malicious. Fourth, that the Mandarellis suffered pecuniary loss.     If you are persuaded that the Mandarellis have proved that statement to be false, you must proceed to consider whether Mrs. Montecalvo made the statement maliciously. You must proceed to consider the question of malice, and insofar as malice is concerned, I say to you that it consists of an intent to deceive or to injure. So that if falsity is not proved, you will find for Claire Montecalvo. If falsity is proved, you will consider malice. As to this element, the Mandarellis must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that Claire Montecalvo has claimed an interest in the Atwood Avenue property with full knowledge of the falsity of her claim and for the specific purpose of injuring the Mandarellis. If the Mandarellis failed in this proof, return a verdict for Claire Montecalvo. If they prove the statement was maliciously made, it is at that time you will consider damages. (Emphases added.) When viewed in its entirety, therefore, the trial justice's charge to the jury on the Mandarellis' claims for slander of title was neither erroneous nor misleading.