Opinion ID: 748781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on Bloom's ADA Claims

Text: 3 In this circuit, we review a district court's summary judgment de novo. Hanks v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir.1992). In this context, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Id. Summary judgment is proper if the evidence so viewed shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
4 Regardless of whether Bloom was disabled, the district court properly granted summary judgment because Bexar County was not Bloom's employer for ADA Title I purposes. ADA Title I makes it unlawful for a covered entity to discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A covered entity is an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). The statutory term employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person.... 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). 5 Bexar County is not a covered entity with regard to Bloom because Bexar County was not Bloom's employer. In Texas, court reporters are employees of the state, rather than the county. Gill-Massar v. Dallas County, 781 S.W.2d 612, 617 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989, no writ). Texas law gives the Texas Supreme Court power to make rules governing the certification and conduct of court reporters. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 52.002 (West 1997). Court reporters for the Texas district courts are subject solely to the control of the elected state district judges. See Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 301, 306 (5th Cir.1980) (noting that Texas district judges have absolute authority over appointment of official court reporters), cert. denied sub nom. Rheuark v. Dallas County, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 1392, 67 L.Ed.2d 365 (1981). The district judges appoint the court reporters, who hold office at the pleasure of the court. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 52.041. A majority of district judges in Bexar County must agree to the necessity and method of hiring additional court reporters, and the presiding judge determines the assignments of any additional reporters so hired. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 52.044; see also Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 301, 306 (noting district judges in Texas possess absolute discretionary power to hire as many substitute court reporters as they deem necessary .... and each district judge possesses absolute authority to appoint an unlimited number of substitute court reporters as need requires and to compel the county to pay their salaries and fees.) (footnotes omitted). The Texas legislature's decision to explicitly vest control of state district court reporters in state district judges rather than counties precludes a finding that Bexar County was Bloom's employer for ADA Title I purposes. 6 Bloom cites cases supporting the proposition that a defendant need not be the plaintiff's direct employer to be liable under ADA Title I, see Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir.1994) (acknowledging the possibility that particular circumstances may arise in which Title I would apply where plaintiff is not technically defendant's employee); United States v. State of Illinois, 3 A.D. Cases 1157, 1994 WL 562180,  2 (N.D.Ill.1994) (There is no express requirement that the covered entity be an employer of the qualified individual.); however, Fifth Circuit precedent counsels against such a finding in this case. Carparts and State of Illinois rest on an analogy between ADA Title I and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under which some courts have considered defendants to be employers despite the absence of a direct employment relationship with the plaintiff. 2 See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 18; State of Illinois, 1994 WL 562180 at  3. Fifth Circuit precedent as to Title VII, however, is to the contrary; therefore, Bloom's analogy, even if accepted, would be unavailing. See Fields v. Hallsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that Fifth Circuit test for employment relationship under Title VII focuses on control over employee's conduct), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026, 111 S.Ct. 676, 112 L.Ed.2d 668 (1991). Under our test for determining the existence of an employment relationship in the context of a Title VII case, the right to control an employee's conduct is the 'most important factor.'  Id.; accord., Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc. 847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 956, 109 S.Ct. 394, 102 L.Ed.2d 383 (1988). 7 Bexar County could not have discriminated against Bloom in the manner proscribed by Title I because Bexar County did not have control or authority over job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, [or] other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. As the federal district court noted below, state judges are elected officials of the State of Texas and are not agents, officials, or employees of the county. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7. No county official has the authority to overrule the district judges with regard to the hiring, firing, or assignment of official court reporters in the state judicial system. See Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 301-02 (noting that county commissioners lack authority to require district judges to obtain advance clearance before hiring additional court reporters). While Bexar County may perform the ministerial task of paying the salaries of court reporters, it does so under the direction of state law. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 52.041, 52.054-52.057; see also Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 306 n. 16 (The payment of court reporters' salaries is a ministerial function....). Additionally, the relevant district judge, and not the county, determines the amount of a court reporter's salary. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 52.041, 52.044, 52.051; see also Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 306 (noting that district judges have absolute authority to ... compel the county to pay [court reporters'] salaries and fees.). 8 These same factors would preclude finding an employment relationship in the context of a Title VII employment discrimination claim. In the Fifth Circuit, we determine the existence of an employment relationship for Title VII purposes using the hybrid economic realities/common law control test. Fields, 906 F.2d at 1019; Diggs, 847 F.2d at 272. Although other factors are relevant, 3 the most important factor is the extent of the employer's right to control the 'means and manner' of the worker's performance....'  Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir.1985) (quoting Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C.Cir.1979)). Bexar County had no right to control the means and manner of Bloom's performance because the Texas legislature vested that right exclusively in the state district court. Furthermore, none of the economic reality factors weigh strongly in Bloom's favor, therefore, no employment relationship existed. Accordingly, the federal district court correctly granted summary judgment as to Bloom's Title I claims.
9 Regardless of whether Bloom was disabled, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Bloom's ADA Title III claims because ADA Title III expressly does not apply to public entities, including local governments. ADA Title III makes it unlawful for public accommodations and private entities that provide public transportation to discriminate against individuals with disabilities in the provision of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Title III defines public accommodations as certain private entities, and includes a list of the types of private entities included within that definition, such as places of lodging, food and drink establishments, places of exhibition or entertainment, sales or rental establishments, service establishments, and others. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Section 12181(6) qualifies this definition by defining the term private entity as any entity other than a public entity (as defined in [ADA Title II] ). 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6). The definition of public entity in ADA Title II includes any State or local government. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A). Accordingly, the structure and language of ADA Title III expressly precludes Bloom's claims against Bexar County under that title. 10 Several recent holdings support the inapplicability of ADA Title III to public entities such as Bexar County. In Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir.1995), the Sixth Circuit held that [p]ublic school grounds and public parks are of course operated by public entities, and thus cannot constitute public accommodations under title III. 64 F.3d at 1036. In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit relied on the statutory exclusion of public entities from the definition of private entities, as well as Department of Justice regulations defining place of public accommodation as  'a facility, operated by a private entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of the following categories'.... Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104). More recently, in the context of a claim that a public school district's refusal to administer a prescription drug to a student, the Eighth Circuit held that [e]ntities subject to Title III include private schools, but not public ones. DeBord v. Board of Educ., 126 F.3d 1102, 1106 (8th Cir.1997). In so holding, the Eighth Circuit noted Title III of the ADA applies to private entities providing public accommodations[,] not to public entities. Id.; accord., e.g., Rhodes v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 939 F.Supp. 584, 591 (N.D.Ohio 1996) ([The] definitions [in 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(6)-(7) ] have been understood to mean that a place of public accommodation must be operated by a private entity.); Kessler Inst. for Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Essex Fells, 876 F.Supp. 641, 652 (D.N.J.1995) (Municipalities, as well as municipal departments, instrumentalities, and agencies, are specifically excluded from the definition of 'private entities' subject to [Title] III.); Crowder v. Kitagawa, 842 F.Supp. 1257, 1267 (D.Haw.1994) (The definition of 'private entity' in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6) specifically excludes any public entity such as the State of Hawaii. Accordingly, neither Title III of the ADA nor its regulations concerning service animals apply to the Hawaii quarantine system.), rev'd on other grounds, 81 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir.1996) (reversing based on analysis of ADA Title II, rather than ADA Title III).