Opinion ID: 1481173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: When he denied defendant's Rule 29 motion to dismiss, the trial justice rejected his argument that he was prejudiced by the variance between the proof at trial and the bill of particulars. He ruled that defendant was not deprived of due process because the proof of conspiracy at trial between March 4 and March 9 was reasonably close to the facts and allegations contained in the bill of particulars and information that the conspiracy occurred on or about March 9. We agree with the trial justice that defendant suffered no prejudice. General Laws 1956 § 12-12-10 provides that [a] defendant shall not be acquitted or discharged on the ground of variance between the allegation and proof if the essential elements of the crime are correctly stated in the indictment, information, or complaint, unless the defendant is prejudiced in his or her defense by the variance. Section 12-12-10 further provides that a defendant shall not be acquitted or discharged by reason of    failure to prove unnecessary allegations in the description of the crime or by reason of any other immaterial mistake in the indictment, information, or complaint. This Court also has held that [t]he rules governing variance between proof and pleading apply to a bill of particulars just as they do to an indictment or information. State v. Collins, 543 A.2d 641, 655 (R.I. 1988) (citing State v. Lanigan, 528 A.2d 310, 319 (R.I.1987)). The central inquiry under § 12-12-10 is to determine whether defendant suffered actual prejudice. See State v. McParlin, 422 A.2d 742, 743 (R.I.1980). We will not reverse a conviction if the information properly sets forth the essential elements of the crimes charged, unless there is a variance that prejudices the defendant's defense. See State v. Markarian, 551 A.2d 1178, 1182 (R.I.1988) (citing State v. McKenna, 512 A.2d 113, 114-15 (R.I.1986) and McParlin, 422 A.2d at 744). Here, the on or about March 9, 2005 language contained in the information and bill of particulars reasonably gave defendant notice of an alleged conspiracy between him and John in the days surrounding March 9, 2005. The words on or about cannot be read to confine the allegations in the information to a single day. The defendant has not advanced any specific argument that he was prejudiced by any difference in wording between the bill of particulars and the evidence offered at trial. After a review of the record, we conclude that defendant was aware that the state intended to offer evidence of his involvement with Murray between March 4, 2005, and March 9, 2005, as well as his knowledge of and participation in John's cocaine business and his scheduled arrival at the Block Island airport. We conclude that defendant was not subjected to any surprise or prejudice from the introduction of this evidence at trial. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 626 A.2d 228, 232 (R.I.1993) (holding defendant did not suffer surprise or prejudice from variance between bill of particulars and proof at trial because defendant was made aware of the admitted evidence through discovery); McKenna, 512 A.2d at 115 (determining lack of a specific date of offense in a sexual assault indictment did not prejudice defendant because defendant denied having any sexual relations with the complaining witness and did not offer any alibi witnesses in his defense).