Opinion ID: 1303172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Asylum Based on Past Persecution

Text: Because the case must be remanded in any event, the parties and the agency may well wish to consider another issue that the parties appear to have overlooked. Although withholding of removal hinges on a likelihood of future persecution, a well-founded fear of future persecution is not a necessary prerequisite to asylum eligibility. As is clear from the text of the statute, an applicant can obtain refugee status  and thus asylum eligibility  by demonstrating past persecution or a well-founded fear of [future] persecution. Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir.2002) (emphasis added). In the words of the governing statute, [t]o establish that the applicant is a refugee ... the applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added). See also Aliyev v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir.2008) ([P]ast persecution may be sufficient, on its own, to establish eligibility for asylum....). Accordingly, the regulations provide two avenues for such a grant of humanitarian asylum without regard to a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). First, an applicant may be eligible for asylum if, based on the severity of the past persecution, she has demonstrated compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A). A grant of asylum under this theory is reserved for atrocious forms of persecution, Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (B.I.A.1989), and requires an alien to establish both `the severe harm and the long-lasting effects of that harm,' Jalloh, 498 F.3d at 151, quoting In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 326 (B.I.A.1998). The BIA has recognized that humanitarian asylum may be appropriate in certain cases of female genital mutilation. In Matter of S-A-K- and H-A-H-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 464 (B.I.A.2008), the BIA granted asylum to a mother and daughter who had been subjected to genital mutilation in Somalia, and who testified to the aggravated nature of the procedure[s] performed on them. Id. at 465. Under such circumstances, the BIA held that [w]hether or not the respondents have established a fear of further harm based on their membership in a particular social group ... they have suffered an atrocious form of persecution that results in continuing physical pain and discomfort, and we conclude that they should not be expected to return to Somalia. Id. at 465-66. Without clearer guidance from the BIA as to what factors warrant a finding of aggravated genital mutilation, we express no view on whether Kone's case falls within that category. If Kone seeks asylum on this ground, the BIA may wish to clarify the standard in addressing her case. Second, even where the severity of the past persecution does not rise to the extreme level required for asylum eligibility on that basis alone, the Department of Justice recognizes that there may be cases where it is appropriate to offer protection to applicants who have suffered persecution in the past and who are at risk of future harm that is not related to a protected ground. 63 Fed.Reg. 31945-01, 31947 (proposed June 11, 1998) (explaining the decision to add second avenue for humanitarian asylum), now codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). Accordingly, the regulations make eligible for asylum an applicant who has suffered past persecution and who establishes a reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). [O]ther serious harm is defined as harm that is not inflicted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, but is so serious that it equals the severity of persecution. 65 Fed.Reg. 76121-01, 76127 (Dec. 6, 2000). Should Kone press the argument, the Board may consider on remand whether the mental anguish of a mother who was herself a victim of genital mutilation who faces the choice of seeing her daughter suffer the same fate, or avoiding that outcome by separation from her child, may qualify as such other serious harm. The argument is distinct from a claim of derivative asylum, which would appear to be foreclosed in this Circuit by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir.2007) (en banc), even if the other serious harm to support a humanitarian asylum claim is derived from harm directed, in the first instance, at another. [11] Unlike a derivative claim, the argument contemplated here is not based simply on the claim that someone else, such as one's child, may be harmed, but rather is guided by humanitarian asylum's foundational requirement that the applicant must herself establish past persecution and herself be a refugee. For that reason, the Fourth Circuit, even while rejecting the possibility of a derivative claim based on the risk that one's child may be subjected to genital mutilation, has recognized that a humanitarian grant of asylum may be warranted in circumstances where a mother, who has been subjected to [female genital mutilation], fears her daughter will be subjected to [such mutilation] if she accompanies her mother to the country of removal. Niang, 492 F.3d at 509 n. 4 (citing Osigwe v. Ashcroft, 77 Fed.Appx. 235, 235 (5th Cir.2003), which remanded to the BIA to consider both avenues of humanitarian asylum relief under similar circumstances); cf. Benyamin v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir.2009) (remanding for the BIA to consider in the first instance whether petitioner's daughter's genital mutilation qualifies petitioner for humanitarian asylum). We express no view on the merits of any claim Kone might make for humanitarian asylum. That is a decision for the agency to make in the first instance. We note only that the argument is available to Kone on remand.