Opinion ID: 2021607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The County Jail Act

Text: The State next challenges the appellate court's construction of the Act (730 ILCS 125/1 et seq. (West 2002)). The State argues the appellate court erroneously construed the Act to require a judicial order whenever a pretrial detainee is transferred from the sheriff's custody to police for purposes of investigating an unrelated crime pursuant to section 19.5. Defendant argues the appellate court properly construed the Act, concluding that to allow police departments or prosecutors to summon any incarcerated inmate they see fit by simply filling out a form does not comport with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant acknowledges, however, that [p]erhaps the appellate court went too far because, outside the jail context, a person may be arrested without a warrant so long as there is probable cause. Defendant suggests the proper balance to be struck is to require some sort of probable cause requirement as opposed to a `judicial writ or order' for prisoner releases to other law enforcement personnel under section 19.5 of the Act. This issue requires us to interpret a statute, presenting a question of law we review de novo. People v. Christopherson, 231 Ill.2d 449, 454, 326 Ill.Dec. 40, 899 N.E.2d 257 (2008). Our primary objective when construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent, best determined by giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. Christopherson, 231 Ill.2d at 454, 326 Ill.Dec. 40, 899 N.E.2d 257. The statute should be construed in its entirety, with each section evaluated with the other provisions. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill.2d 200, 216-17, 319 Ill.Dec. 887, 886 N.E.2d 1011 (2008). We will not use other construction aids when the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. Christopherson, 231 Ill.2d at 454-55, 326 Ill.Dec. 40, 899 N.E.2d 257. The Act requires each Illinois county to keep and maintain in good condition and repair one or more jail facilities. 730 ILCS 125/1 (West 2002). The Act designates the county sheriff as the warden of the local county jail and, as jail warden, the sheriff has custody of all prisoners in the jail. 730 ILCS 125/2 (West 2002). Section 4 of the Act is titled Receipt and Confinement of Prisoners and provides, in part, that the jail warden shall receive and confine in such jail, until discharged by due course of law, all persons committed to such jail by any competent authority. 730 ILCS 125/4 (West 2002). Section 4 also authorizes county prisoners to be taken to a jail in an adjoining county if no suitable jail exists in the county of arrest. 730 ILCS 125/4 (West 2002). Section 19.5 of the Act is titled Release of prisoners to law enforcement personnel or State's Attorney and provides: The sheriff may adopt and implement a written policy that provides for the release of a person who is in the custody of the sheriff for any criminal or supposed criminal matter to sworn law enforcement personnel or to the State's Attorney for the purpose of furthering investigations into criminal matters that are unrelated to the criminal matter for which the person is held in custody. The written policy must, at a minimum, require that there be a written request, signed by an authorized agent of the law enforcement agency or State's Attorney office, to take custody of the prisoner and that the written request shall include the name of the individual authorized to take custody of the prisoner, the purpose and scope of the criminal matter under investigation, and a statement of the fact that the individual taking custody and agency they are employed by understand the limitation of the sheriff's liability as described in this Act. 730 ILCS 125/19.5 (West 2002). Section 19.5 also limits the sheriff's liability for any injury or death resulting from the transfer. 730 ILCS 125/19.5 (West 2002). In this case, defendant was in the Cook County sheriff's custody as a pretrial detainee when he was transferred to the Chicago police department as part of an unrelated investigation. This exact scenario is not only contemplated by section 19.5 but is unequivocally and explicitly authorized by its plain language. Moreover, section 19.5 contains absolutely no reference to a judicial order, let alone any requirement that these transfers be authorized by judicial order. Instead, section 19.5 requires only the sheriff's adoption of a written policy. Defendant does not challenge the existence of such a policy in this case. Simply put, the plain and ordinary meaning of the unambiguous language of section 19.5 does not support the appellate court's conclusion that the legislature intended to require a judicial order for transfers pursuant to that section. Contrary to the legislative intent evident in the plain language of section 19.5, the appellate court mistakenly relied on this court's decision in Campa to reach a contrary conclusion. 381 Ill.App.3d at 803-04, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409. In Campa, the defendant argued he was entitled to a new trial under the speedy-trial provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 because, in relevant part, he was not tried within 120 days and remained in custody despite being transferred to the Day Reporting Center by the Cook County sheriff. Campa, 217 Ill.2d at 247-48, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157. The State maintained the 120-day limit did not apply because the defendant was not in custody during the day reporting program and asserted that the 160-day limit for persons on bail or recognizance applied. Campa, 217 Ill.2d at 248-49, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157. This court first recognized a distinction between physical custody and constructive custody. Campa, 217 Ill.2d at 253-54, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157. We concluded that the term `custody' [had] a broad meaning and encompass[ed] lesser forms of restraint than confinement, including day reporting programs. Campa, 217 Ill.2d at 254-55, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157. This court next considered the State's argument that the sheriff was permitted to release prisoners on their own recognizance, even after the trial court set bail, thus triggering the 160-day speedy-trial period. Rejecting the State's argument, we looked to the statutory provisions for bail and recognizance. We construed the plain language of those to require judicial action, stating a sheriff cannot substitute his or her authority for that of the trial court merely by holding a defendant to conditions similar to those a court may impose. Campa, 217 Ill.2d at 264-65, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157. The appellate court here read the statement as a limitation on the sheriff's authority to release any prisoner held on a bail order. 381 Ill.App.3d at 803-04, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409. The appellate court then read section 19.5, authorizing the sheriff to release prisoners to law enforcement personnel or the State's Attorney, along with section 4, requiring the sheriff to jail prisoners until they are discharged by due course of law. 730 ILCS 125/4, 19.5 (West 2002); 381 Ill.App.3d at 804, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409. In light of its understanding of Campa, the appellate court read the by due course of law portion of section 4 into section 19.5 and concluded that the sheriff acts with `due course of law' when he releases prisoners on bail pursuant to a court order. 381 Ill.App.3d at 804, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409. Thus, the appellate court grafted a requirement of a court order onto all prisoner transfers under section 19.5 of the Act. 381 Ill.App.3d at 805, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409. The appellate court's conclusion, however, relies on a flawed interpretation of Campa. Campa addressed only the sheriff's ability to release prisoners on bail or on their own recognizance in the absence of a court order. This court rejected the State's contention that, in the absence of an express statutory bar, sheriffs have implicit power under the speedy-trial statute to release those prisoners when the speedy-trial statute is read with the bail and recognizance provisions. Campa, 217 Ill.2d at 264, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157. We concluded the statutes gave courts the sole authority to set or modify bail or release prisoners on their own recognizance. Campa, 217 Ill.2d at 264, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157. Here, the circumstances are substantially different. Section 19.5 expressly grants sheriffs the authority to adopt and implement a written policy that provides for the release of a person who is in the custody of the sheriff for any criminal or supposed criminal matter to sworn law enforcement personnel or the State's Attorney for the purpose of furthering investigations into criminal matters that are unrelated to the criminal matter for which the person is held in custody. 730 ILCS 125/19.5 (West 2002). This express authority stands in sharp contrast to the implied-power argument rejected in Campa. In construing a statute, the plain meaning of the language is the best indicator of the legislature's intent. Christopherson, 231 Ill.2d at 454, 326 Ill.Dec. 40, 899 N.E.2d 257. Here, the plain and unambiguous language of section 19.5 provides that sheriffs may transfer prisoners to agents of other law enforcement divisions or State's Attorneys without a prior judicial order if the statutory requirements are met. In addition, Campa does not conflict with our plain-language construction of section 19.5 because defendants released on bail or on their own recognizance are no longer in the custody of law enforcement. Campa, 217 Ill.2d at 260-61, 298 Ill.Dec. 722, 840 N.E.2d 1157. Under section 19.5, however, the temporary release of a prisoner requires a written transfer request to take custody of the prisoner and limits the sheriff's liability for any injury suffered by a released prisoner that occurs during the time period that the person is in custody of other law enforcement personnel or the State's Attorney. 730 ILCS 125/19.5 (West 2002). Thus, prisoners transferred under section 19.5 remain in custody, a legal status significantly different from being free on bail or recognizance. See 730 ILCS 125/19.5 (West 2002). Moreover, the requirement in section 4 that the sheriff keep all jail prisoners in custody until discharged by `due course of law' (381 Ill.App.3d at 804, 319 Ill.Dec. 646, 886 N.E.2d 409) is inapplicable here. Section 19.5 only authorizes a transfer of custody from the sheriff to law enforcement officials or the State's Attorney, not a complete discharge. 730 ILCS 125/19.5 (West 2002). We are obligated to construe statutes to give effect to both enactments if reasonably possible. People v. Lucas, 231 Ill.2d 169, 182, 325 Ill.Dec. 239, 897 N.E.2d 778 (2008). Any alleged inconsistency between sections 4 and 19.5 may be easily reconciled by interpreting section 19.5 to authorize only a temporary transfer of physical custody from the sheriff to law enforcement officials or the State's Attorney for investigation of unrelated criminal matters, but not a final discharge from commitment at the jail, consistent with section 4. The facts here and common sense demonstrate the applicability of this construction. After the sheriff released defendant to the custody of law enforcement officials and the court-ordered overhears were completed on July 31 and August 6, defendant was returned to the sheriff's custody and commitment at the jail. Thus, the due course of law provision in section 4 does not conflict with our construction of the plain language of section 19.5. Accordingly, we hold that the plain and ordinary meaning of section 19.5 of the Act indicates the legislature did not intend to require a judicial order to release a prisoner to law enforcement officials or the State's Attorney for the purpose of investigating an unrelated criminal matter. Therefore, we reject the appellate court's sua sponte construction of the Act and Campa.