Opinion ID: 1347857
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Must An Employee Take FMLA Leave To Prove A Retaliation Claim?

Text: Nationwide argues that if Erdman is eligible for FMLA leave, she cannot recover on a retaliation theory because she did not actually take leave. We begin by noting that it would be patently absurd if an employer who wished to punish an employee for taking FMLA leave could avoid liability simply by firing the employee before the leave begins. But the question is not whether an employer may escape liability altogether; the question is whether such action constitutes interference with the employee's FMLA rights, retaliation against the employee, or both. Three provisions collectively form the basis of liability under FMLA. Two subsections of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a), entitled Interference with [FMLA] rights, state: (1) Exercise of rights It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter. (2) Discrimination It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter. In addition, 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or prospective employees who have used FMLA leave. (emphasis added). The District Court noted that FMLA interference claims are derived from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), and that [t]o succeed on an interference claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she was entitled to and denied some benefit under the FMLA. Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 510 F.Supp.2d 363, 370 n. 4 (M.D.Pa.2007). Retaliation claims, the District Court stated, arise under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). Id. at 370 n. 5. To assert a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she is protected under the FMLA, (2) he or she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the plaintiff's exercise of his or her FMLA rights. Id. (citing Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 146 (3d Cir.2004)). Under the District Court's statement of the law, Erdman's retaliation claim is valid because commencing leave is not a prerequisite. Nevertheless, Nationwide astutely observes that the elements stated by the District Court differ slightly from our pronouncement in Conoshenti. In that case, we said that the first requirement of a retaliation claim is that [an employee] took an FMLA leave, Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 146, not that she be protected under the FMLA, Erdman, 510 F.Supp.2d at 370 n. 4. We noted that [t]he circuits have taken divergent paths in analyzing claims that an employee has been discharged in retaliation for having taken an FMLA leave, with some circuits finding that such claims arise under § 2615(a)(2) and others holding that §§ 2615(a)(1), 2615(a)(2), and 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) all give rise to retaliation claims. Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 147 n. 9 (emphasis added). We concluded that the Ninth Circuit appropriately predicated liability in such situations on § 825.220(c), instead of §§ 2615(a)(1) or (a)(2). Id. [3] Nationwide argues that because the regulation protects employees who have used FMLA leave, § 825.220(c), and because Conoshenti held that to be successful on this claim, [an employee] must show [] that he took an FMLA leave, 364 F.3d at 146, an employee cannot establish a retaliation claim unless she actually commenced leave. Although Conoshenti's language supports Nationwide's argument, it is not clear whether firing an employee for requesting FMLA leave should be classified as interference with the employee's FMLA rights, retaliation against the employee for exercising those rights, or both. [4] Significantly, Conoshenti did not involve an employee, like Erdman, who requested FMLA leave but was fired before the leave was scheduled to begin. Nationwide has cited only one case to support its broad reading of Conoshenti. See Reid-Falcone v. Luzerne County Cmty. Coll., No. 3:CV-02-1818, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12713, 2005 WL 1527792 (M.D.Pa. Jun.28, 2005). But contrary to Nationwide's interpretation, Reid-Falcone does not stand for the proposition that an employee must actually commence leave to state a retaliation claim. Rather, Reid-Falcone held that an employee fired after requesting maternity leave  as opposed to FMLA leave  could not state an FMLA claim based on retaliation because she had fail[ed] to invoke the protections of FMLA. Id. at . The fact that her leave had not commenced was irrelevant to the Court's decision. Indeed, Reid-Falcone indicates that the critical issue is invocation of FMLA rights, which contradicts Nationwide's reading of Conoshenti. Simply put, this Court has never held that an employee fired after requesting FMLA leave but before the leave begins cannot recover for retaliation, and Nationwide cites none of our precedents other than Conoshenti to support this proposition. Reading Conoshenti as Nationwide urges would perversely allow a employer to limit an FMLA plaintiff's theories of recovery by preemptively firing her. Accordingly, we interpret the requirement that an employee take FMLA leave to connote invocation of FMLA rights, not actual commencement of leave. We therefore hold that firing an employee for a valid request for FMLA leave may constitute interference with the employee's FMLA rights as well as retaliation against the employee. [5]