Opinion ID: 1187510
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay Evidence Before the Grand Jury.

Text: Frink's brief initially alleged six instances of hearsay evidence before the grand jury. The state conceded one, namely, Karen Check's testimony that Phil Hillier, the deceased, told her that Frink threatened him. Frink's reply brief withdraws two instances, conceding their introduction was harmless error. [7] We now evaluate the other three alleged instances of hearsay before the grand jury: Karen Check's testimony about an anonymous phone call, Officer Rice's testimony about the results of an autopsy, and Rice's testimony about the results of a lab test. Karen Check testified before the grand jury about an anonymous phone call she received: Q. Did he [Frink] ever mention to you that he may have hired someone to kill you? A. Yes, he did. Q. And could you elaborate on that? A. One night he had somebody call me. I don't know who it was. I took it to be from a bar because there was noise in the background, and this man said that Glenn had wanted to talk to me and would I please talk to him, and I said no and I hung up. The next day Glenn came over and said that that had been a black man that he hired to kill me. Q. Okay. And did he then tell you he had  or he wasn't going to go through with that? A. He said that he didn't want to hurt me and so he had called it off after he thought about it. We find that this testimony is not inadmissible hearsay. The hearsay rule forbids evidence of out-of-court assertions introduced to prove the truth of those assertions. [8] To the extent that the testimony referred to Frink having someone call Check, it is based on admissions by Frink to Check, a well recognized exception to the hearsay rule. [9] The caller from the bar merely indicated that Frink wanted to speak with Check, a fact which was not incriminating or in dispute. The primary policy underlying the hearsay rule is to permit cross-examination of the person on whose credibility the jury is being asked to rely. [10] But when the fact that words were uttered has legal significance, independent of the truth of the words, the hearsay rule does not exclude evidence showing the words were said. [11] The credibility of the person who heard the words is at issue and that person was before the jury and was subject to cross-examination. The state wanted to prove that Karen Check heard certain words during an anonymous phone call. The grand jury could cross-examine Check, observe her demeanor, and evaluate whether she received the call and heard those words. The grand jury is never asked to rely on the credibility of the anonymous caller, but on the credibility of Karen Check, and thus evidence about the telephone call did not constitute inadmissible hearsay. Before the grand jury, Investigator Rice testified about the results of an autopsy performed by Dr. Rogers and gun residue tests performed by lab technician Archie Green. Frink argues that Investigator Rice's testimony concerning results of tests conducted by others constituted inadmissible hearsay. He contends that the state should have introduced the reports prepared by the experts, a practice we sanctioned in McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18, 27-28 (Alaska 1974). The state argues that Frink suffered no prejudice and that it was not necessary to introduce the reports because Investigator Rice accurately summarized the findings of the experts. In McKinnon, we permitted a district attorney to introduce the results of a lab analysis of cocaine, even though the evidence was hearsay: [W]e believe that the credibility of the author of the laboratory report and the report itself was adequately established by the fact that the author was a technician at Alaska Medical Laboratories. The author's professional and objective position, of which the grand jury was aware, warranted the use of the laboratory analysis at the grand jury hearing. A professional laboratory technician has no motive to prevaricate, and he is presumptively qualified to perform chemical analyses in a competent manner. We also note that there is little a technician's physical presence at a grand jury proceeding could add to a laboratory report; the technician could do no more than affirm that he did perform the test reported, and that those tests did indicate the presence of a narcotic substance. Vigorous cross-examination regarding the competence of the expert or the reliability of the test can hardly be expected in grand jury proceedings. 526 P.2d at 27-28 (footnote omitted). Criminal Rule 6(r) permits the introduction of hearsay evidence if there is compelling justification for its use. [12] In State v. Gieffels, 554 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1976), we elaborated on the meaning of compelling justification [13] and noted that McKinnon merely stands for the proposition that where a professional submits a technical report and his testimony would simply affirm that report, it is proper to introduce the evidence by hearsay testimony since the presumed inconvenience is a compelling reason for such evidence. 554 P.2d at 465 n. 22. Based on the purpose of Criminal Rule 6(r) and our past decisions, we find error in the grand jury proceeding. Reports from Dr. Rogers and technician Green should have been submitted to the grand jury, and Investigator Rice's testimony should have been confined to presenting the reports and answering questions about them. The rationale of McKinnon does not permit a police officer to offer far-ranging opinions about how he or she thinks an expert would answer hypothetical questions. The McKinnon exception does not permit an officer to draw conclusions in ballistics, lab analysis or any other field in which the officer is not expert. The state's position skirts too close to the dangers the hearsay rule seeks to avoid. A peace officer testifying without a report may not accurately convey the results of tests in fields where the officer is not expert, and the grand jury would have no way of questioning the officer's testimony. This situation undermines the goal of Criminal Rule 6(r) which is to make a reliable determination ... as to the probability of [the defendant's] guilt, State v. Gieffels, 554 P.2d at 465. The compelling justification in McKinnon was the inconvenience of requiring a technician or other expert to testify in person when the testimony would add little to the report submitted to the grand jury. The state offers no compelling justification to dispense with the preparation and presentation of a report. [14] In this case, however, we find that the introduction of Officer Rice's testimony was harmless error. When inadmissible hearsay is introduced before the grand jury, our duty is to determine whether there was sufficient nonhearsay testimony to justify the indictment. See Adams v. State, ___ P.2d ___, Opn. No. 1684 (Alaska, June 22, 1979); State v. Taylor, 566 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Alaska 1977). We now turn to that inquiry.