Opinion ID: 610908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Maynard Subpoena

Text: 31 Harwood asserts that the district court erred in quashing the subpoena served on reporter Maynard, contending that the proffered testimony was neither inadmissible hearsay nor protected by the reporter's First Amendment privilege. Because we agree with the district court that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay, we do not reach Harwood's First Amendment argument. 32 Maynard would have testified that McKee, approximately three weeks before trial, stated that Harwood was in the wrong place at the wrong time, and the same would have happened to any person driving a vehicle in which he [McKee] was a passenger. Harwood claims that these statements were nonhearsay because they were offered: (1) solely for the fact that they were made and not for their truth; and (2) as evidence of the declarant's state of mind and pattern of verbal behavior. He also maintains that the statements were admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), which excludes from hearsay admission[s] by [a] party-opponent in the form of the party's own statement[s]. None of these contentions is defensible. 33 Statements may occasionally be offered, not to prove their truth, but solely for the limited purpose of proving that they were made. They may be admitted, however, only if the mere fact that they were made is relevant to some issue in the case. United States v. Cardascia, 951 F.2d 474, 486-87 (2d Cir.1991). Here the fact that McKee made the statement to Maynard is irrelevant. What would be relevant is that Harwood was in truth in the wrong place at the wrong time--not that McKee thought so. Hence the statement is irrelevant unless it was true, in which case it would be hearsay, and inadmissible under any of the exceptions in Fed.R.Evid. 803 and 804. Similarly, the declarant's state of mind and pattern of verbal behavior were irrelevant to any issue in the case and cannot be invoked like a mantra to circumvent a hearsay objection. 34 We reject Harwood's argument that McKee's statements were admissions by a party opponent because the admission sought to be introduced was made by a co-defendant who is not a party opponent. The Government is the party opponent of both defendants. United States v. Gossett, 877 F.2d 901, 906 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082, 110 S.Ct. 1141, 107 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1990). 35 Harwood's attempt to invoke Fed.R.Evid. 803(3) is also unavailing. That rule admits 36 [a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition ... but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.... 37 Fed.R.Evid. 803(3). Thus, the statement must face forward, rather than backward. See United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 271 (2d Cir.1984) (quoting Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104, 54 S.Ct. 22, 25, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933) (Cardozo, J.)). In addition, the reasons for the state of mind exception focus on the contemporaneity of the statement and the unlikelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation. Cardascia, 951 F.2d at 487. McKee's statements were not offered to prove his state of mind, but were intended to be used by the jury to support an inference about conduct that had occurred five months earlier. To admit such statements would significantly erode the intended breadth of this hearsay exception. Cardascia, 951 F.2d at 488. 38 Harwood's next argument that McKee's statements were admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) as a declaration against penal interest is likewise without merit. See United States v. DeVillio, 983 F.2d 1185, 1189 (2d Cir.1993) (Appellate review of this issue is limited to an 'abuse of discretion' standard.) Rule 804(b)(3) has three requirements: (1) an unavailable declarant; (2) the statement, at the time it was made, was against the declarant's penal interest; and, (3) when offered to exculpate Harwood, corroborating circumstances clearly indicating trustworthiness. United States v. Rodriguez, 706 F.2d 31, 40 (2d Cir.1983). Here, the government conceded that McKee would have been unavailable, under Fed.R.Evid. 804(a)(1), but Harwood fails to satisfy the other two requirements. 39 The proffered statements, on their face, do not expose McKee to criminal liability. They seem only to suggest that Harwood was arrested at an inopportune time. In any event, we have rejected similar efforts by one defendant to shift blame away from another with purported declarations against the former's penal interest. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1436 (2d Cir.) (affirming district court refusal to allow a private investigator to testify about a statement made by defendant-1 that defendant-2 did not know that defendant-1 was selling drugs out of defendant-2's store), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3482, 87 L.Ed.2d 617 (1985). 40 Even if McKee's statements had unequivocally placed blame on himself alone, these statements still failed to meet the trustworthiness requirement. The inference of trustworthiness from the proffered 'corroborating circumstances' must be strong, not merely allowable. United States v. Salvador, 820 F.2d 558, 561 (2d Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 966, 108 S.Ct. 458, 98 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). Here, there is no corroborating evidence that McKee's statements about Harwood's innocence were trustworthy. 41 Harwood's final argument based on the residual hearsay exception, Fed.R.Evid. 803(24), is also rejected. To be admissible under this exception, the evidence must fulfill five requirements: trustworthiness, materiality, probative importance, the interests of justice and notice. Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc., 929 F.2d 901, 907 (2d Cir.1991) (citations omitted). Rule 803(24) is applied in the rarest of cases, and the denial of admission under the exception[ ] can only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. DeVillio, 983 F.2d at 1190. Here, the district court found McKee's statements to be untrustworthy and highly prejudicial. In light of the availability of other evidence, especially other inculpatory statements made by McKee, we cannot say that the court committed error in refusing to admit McKee's statement under Rule 803(24). See Cardascia, 951 F.2d at 489. 42 In sum, the district court properly quashed the subpoena served on Maynard. His proffered testimony was hearsay, and inadmissible under any exception.IV. Admissibility of Intelligence Evidence 43 McKee argues that the district court erroneously admitted hearsay when it permitted government agents Labier and Brouwer to testify, over objection, that through their intelligence they knew that McKee was the main supplier of LSD at the Rainbow Family gathering. Because he distributed only $20 worth of LSD and the issue at trial was whether he was involved with the large stash of LSD discovered in the van, McKee contends that admission of this testimony was reversible error. See, e.g., United States v. Tussa, 816 F.2d 58, 66-67 (2d Cir.1987) (erroneous admission of hearsay information from uncalled informants requires reversal if it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict). 44 The government's argument that this intelligence testimony was not hearsay and was properly admitted as background is familiar but unpersuasive in this case. When statements by an out-of-court declarant are admitted as background, they are properly so admitted not as proof of the truth of the matters asserted but rather to show circumstances surrounding the events, providing explanation for such matters as the understanding or intent with which certain acts were performed. United States v. Pedroza, 750 F.2d 187, 200 (2d Cir.1984) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1561 (2d Cir.1991) ( '[T]he trial court may admit evidence that does not directly establish an element of the offense charged, in order to provide background for the events alleged in the indictment.' ) (quoting United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1388 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821, 109 S.Ct. 66, 102 L.Ed.2d 43 (1988)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1486, 117 L.Ed.2d 628 (1992). 45 The government maintains that the evidence was not elicited to prove McKee was the main supplier, but merely to explain why Deputy Marshal Labier originally approached McKee at the gathering. Here, however, McKee conceded (in his opening statement) that he had sold $20 worth of LSD to Labier. Why Labier approached McKee, therefore, was irrelevant. Even if there were some need to explain Labier's reason for approaching McKee, the government had already established that Aaron Cantor, a Rainbow Family member whom agents had arrested for drug possession, had informed on McKee. What the so-called intelligence testimony really added to the government's case was proof that McKee was the main supplier of LSD. It was clearly inadmissible hearsay. 46 While it was error to admit the intelligence testimony, we conclude that the error was harmless in light of the record as a whole. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) (error harmless if it does not affect substantial rights); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1247-48, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) (in nonconstitutional cases, inquiry is whether, viewing the record as a whole, error had substantial and injurious effect in determining jury's verdict); cf. United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668, 685 (2d Cir.1978) (court reviewed erroneous introduction of undercover agent's testimony about confidential informant's out-of-court statements under Kotteakos test). Compare Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (higher standard for federal constitutional error). 47 The mass of admissible evidence connecting McKee to the LSD in Harwood's van was overwhelming. See 3A Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 854, at 311 (2d ed. 1982) (Error in the admission of evidence is harmless if the facts shown by that evidence are already before the jury through other properly-admitted evidence.). All the LSD seized in this case was identical in every respect except weight, thus supporting the inference that the LSD originated from the same source. While negotiating a drug sale with Labier, McKee boasted that he had as much LSD as Labier wanted and, significantly, that he had to return to a friend's vehicle to retrieve it. Later conversations between the defendants and Brouwer further demonstrated a close relationship between McKee and Harwood. Fingerprint analysis also established that both defendants had handled express mail envelopes found inside the van, discrediting any argument that they had gotten together only on that day for the sole purpose of making the trip to the West Coast. Where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, as there was here, it is  'highly probable' that the error did not contribute to the verdict. United States v. Corey, 566 F.2d 429, 432 (2d Cir.1977) (citations omitted).