Opinion ID: 2999319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimonial Inconsistencies

Text: The first (and according to the IJ, most important) reason for his determination was Yueng’s vacillation as to whether No. 05-3245 7 the events in question happened in February 1999 or February 2000. But “adverse credibility determinations may not be based on minor discrepancies that are easily explained,” Shtaro v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006), which precisely describes this discrepancy. Yueng, who communicates poorly, confused the dates but consistently identified the underlying events as occurring subsequent to and being the result of her pregnancy in 1999. See Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2003) (chronological inconsistency insufficient to support adverse credibility finding where petitioner “tried to place the event in question in its proper chronology even if she could not calculate the correct date in our calendar system”). Yueng unambiguously testified that she went into hiding after learning in October 1999 that she was pregnant, making it impossible that she could have been referring to events in February 1999. Her testimony that she fled in October 1999 is consistent with the written statement she submitted with her asylum application, which also dates her encounters with the family planning authorities to February 2000. On appeal, Yueng attributes her confusion to her illiteracy, poor education, and general difficulty communicating. The IJ dismissed her education as an explanation for the error, but did not address her communicative difficulties or the obvious fact that February 1999 was a nonsensical date. The IJ’s analysis was therefore insufficient because he did not “attempt to ascertain whether [the inconsistencies] could be accounted for.” Shtaro, 435 F.3d at 716. The petitioners also argue that the IJ improperly discredited them by relying on an apparent putative discrepancy as to whether Yueng’s husband hid from the authorities with her. The IJ wrote that, contrary to Yueng’s testimony her husband joined her in hiding at her cousin’s home, her husband “did not accompany her.” But the record 8 No. 05-3245 contains no basis for this conclusion. Although Ho Kwok’s written statement is silent as to whether he joined her in hiding, nothing in it (or elsewhere in the record) contradicts Yueng’s testimony that “he went into hiding with me, in my place later.” The IJ’s assertion that Ho Kwok did not hide with his wife is “unmoored from the record, based on nothing but the IJ’s personal speculation or conjecture.” Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 755-56 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The IJ’s skepticism—utterly unsupported by any facts in the record—with respect to [an element of petitioner’s testimony] does not form a valid basis for a negative credibility determination.”). The IJ’s problematic findings on these issues are sufficiently serious to call into question his adverse credibility determination. Other inconsistencies that the IJ identified are more substantial, but not significant enough to support the adverse credibility determination. The IJ wrote that Yueng testified that she “was found in Fuzhou City,” but he noted that the written statement in her asylum application “indicated that she surrendered herself to the township office1.” And as the government points out, Yueng testified inconsistently as to the manner in which she was taken into custody. At one point in the hearing, she clearly and unambiguously testified that she did not turn herself in; not long afterwards, however, she admitted that she did turn herself in to the authorities in order to secure her son’s release. Similarly, as the IJ also noted, San Kai testified 1 Although the IJ characterizes this as an inconsistency between Yueng’s testimony and her written statement, he apparently meant to refer to Ho Kwok’s written statement, in which Ho Kwok writes that his wife turned herself in to the township office. No. 05-3245 9 inconsistently about whether he knew where Yueng was while he was detained. He testified that he knew where his mother was while he was imprisoned, but during his crossexamination stated that he “didn’t know where she was.” The IJ was entitled to question the petitioners’ credibility based on these inconsistencies, but the other grounds for the adverse credibility finding were too seriously flawed for us to affirm it on this basis. See Tabaku, 425 F.3d at 423 (granting petition for review despite inconsistency that made petitioner “less believable”); Georgis, 328 F.3d at 970 (in light of five flawed bases for the challenged credibility finding, “we are not inclined to defer to [that finding] on this remaining sixth ground alone”).