Opinion ID: 1179927
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Claims against Dunder

Text: As with claims against Smith, the material facts at issue are related to Dunder's knowledge of the degree of danger associated with appellant's handling of perc. We have said: A material fact is one which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 869 (Wyo.1990). In this instance, evidence supporting genuine issues of material fact would show Dunder knew both that perc was a dangerous substance and that appellant was handling perc in a manner that would increase her exposure to this chemical. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court must review the entire record in order to determine whether summary judgment was proper. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Wyo. 1985). Contradictory evidence between the parties exists concerning the extent of Dunder's knowledge. Dunder's affidavit filed in support of his motion for summary judgment conflicts with his deposition testimony and affidavits of employees of the Laundry. Dunder was the plant manager at Cheyenne Steam Laundry at the time of appellant's injury; he considered himself to be part of the management team. In his deposition, Dunder stated he knew perc could cause irritation to the nose, throat and skin, cause headaches, slurred speech, drowsiness, lightheadedness, incoordination, nausea, mental confusion, unconsciousness, stomach problems, lung damage and death. Dunder testified in his deposition: Q. Okay. Did you have any concern for your own safety while being around perc? A. Yes, but I handled the perc in what I felt was a manner that I was not going to cause myself a health problem. Q. What was your concern that caused you to so handle the perc? A. You take one breath of perc, you can feel it kind of burn your lungs. You don't want that again, you are very careful. One time is enough. Contradicting this earlier deposition testimony, Dunder's affidavit contains his statement that he did not know perc could cause lung damage. Employees claimed they specifically complained to Dunder about headaches and nose bleeds they believed to have been caused by their constant exposure to perc. Conflicting with the employees' testimony, Dunder's affidavit claims he never received complaints from employees regarding ailments from exposure to perc. Morris testified that she was informed through Linda Rivera that Dunder wanted her to learn the process of doing silks which she did, thereby increasing her exposure to perc through the altered method used to operate the Multimatic machine. Though Dunder denies giving Morris specific instructions to do anything other than tasks associated with marking, assembling and pressing, he admits seeing Morris working with perc or with loading and unloading the machine. In an apparent effort to bolster the evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, Dunder makes conflicting statements in his affidavit of facts material to the issue of culpable negligence. The result is to create genuine issues of material fact which preclude the grant of summary judgment. In the context of the existence vel non of a genuine issue of material fact, a number of courts have addressed the issue concerning the effect of a conflict between a party's affidavit and that party's earlier deposition testimony. The issue has ordinarily arisen when the non-movant, typically the plaintiff, submits his affidavit in an effort to oppose a summary judgment motion based, in whole or in part, on the nonmovant's earlier deposition testimony. Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir.1986); Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.1983); Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.1980); Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F.Supp. 1528 (D.Kan.1990). The main concern of the courts faced with such an issue has been that parties not thwart the purpose of Rule 56 by generating issues of fact through affidavits that contradict their own depositions. Camfield, 719 F.2d at 1364. In assessing the effect of a contradiction thus created, the courts have considered several factors to determine whether the submission of an affidavit constitutes an attempt to create a sham fact issue. These factors are whether the affiant was cross-examined during his earlier testimony, whether the affiant had access to the pertinent evidence at the time of his earlier testimony or whether the affidavit was based on newly discovered evidence, and whether the earlier testimony reflects confusion which the affidavit attempts to explain. Franks, 796 F.2d at 1237. If a court determines that the conflict between the affidavit and the earlier testimony raises only a sham issue of fact, the court is free to disregard the contrary affidavit for summary judgment purposes. Id. In the case at bar, we have a variation on a theme in which Dunder, as the movant, is attempting to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists through submission of a conflicting affidavit to negate his own prior sworn deposition testimony. [T]hese conflicts present questions of credibility which require jury resolution. Kennett-Murray, 622 F.2d at 895. Just as courts must be cautious not to permit a non-movant to create a sham fact issue through submission of conflicting testimony, so too must courts guard against a movant's attempt to negate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact through submission of conflicting testimony. In assessing the effect of the conflict thus created by a movant, we have considered the same factors which courts have considered in assessing the conflict created by a non-movant. Dunder was cross-examined during his earlier deposition testimony. Dunder does not claim that inconsistencies in his affidavit explain aspects of his deposition testimony or that the deposition testimony reflects confusion that requires explanation by the affidavit. Camfield, 719 F.2d at 1365; Maddy, 737 F.Supp. at 1532. In fact, Dunder filed an amendment to his deposition in which he listed twenty-nine corrections to his testimony, none of which contained the contradicting information found in his affidavit. The affidavit makes no reference to his deposition. Maddy, at 1532. We hold that Dunder's affidavit, void of explanation of any confusing deposition testimony, is nothing more than an attempt to nullify apparent issues of material fact. Summary judgment for Dunder is reversed.