Opinion ID: 1709776
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Move for Change of Venue

Text: Next, Dillbeck argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move for a change of venue due to extensive and inflammatory pretrial publicity. On remand, the postconviction trial court found that Dillbeck established neither deficient performance nor prejudice regarding this claim and that [t]rial counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to file a motion for change of venue. The postconviction trial court summarized the evidence presented as follows: Trial counsel testified that he did not move for a change of venue. He thought about filing a motion but decided against it. He did not think the law supported a change of venue motion and that there was no merit to one, so he did not raise it. He did not move for change of venue after jury selection. Trial counsel testified that the newspapers' reports that he saw were accurate and did not distort the facts. Trial counsel again explained that he was not concerned about the facts of the case because all the facts that were in the paper were facts that were going to come out during the trial and noted that this was not a case where the confession had been suppressed but published in the newspapers. He was not concerned about prospective jurors who knew the facts of the crime because that was all going to come out during the trial. He further testified that he was concerned because the crime occurred at a popular shopping area where anybody who lives in Tallahassee has been, which could cause the jurors to identify with the victim, but at the same time, Tallahassee is a good place to try a case from the defense standpoint. He was concerned about the murder occurring at Gayfers, a common shopping spot, but he felt he could deal with that. Trial counsel was also concerned about the place that the case would be transferred to because any other place, other than Gadsden County, in the panhandle you are going to have a much more conservative jury, a jury much more likely to vote for death. Trial counsel testified that the odds are you are not going to wind up in a place that is better than Tallahassee. Trial counsel testified that he did not think he had legally adequate grounds to request a change of venue. He was aware that if he had a lot of trouble selecting a jury, he could then request a change of venue after unsuccessfully attempting to empanel a jury. Dillbeck testified that he made only one suggestion to trial counsel and that was asking about a change of venue. Dillbeck testified that he wanted a change of venue due to the publicity. The publicity portrayed him as a serial killer. They discussed the pros and cons of a change of venue. Dillbeck testified that trial counsel preferred to keep the trial in Tallahassee. Trial counsel told Dillbeck that Tallahassee was a better place for lenient jurors. Trial counsel told Dillbeck that they were more likely to get a more liberal jury pool in Leon County. Dillbeck testified that they talked about other places where the case could be tried if they filed for a change of venue and it was granted. There is no record evidence that there was extensive and inflammatory pre-trial publicity. Dillbeck, although granted an evidentiary hearing on this claim, did not introduce any newspaper articles reporting the prior murder. Collateral counsel did not attach the newspaper articles that referred to Dillbeck's prior conviction to his initial post-conviction motion nor his amended motion. Nor did he introduce any such articles at the evidentiary hearing. State v. Knight, 866 So.2d 1195, 1209 (Fla.2003) (explaining test for determining whether a change of venue should be granted based on pretrial publicity examines a number of circumstances including whether the publicity was made up of factual or inflammatory stories or favored the prosecution's side of the story). Dillbeck did not supply the trial court with any of this information and thus did not sufficiently factually develop this claim at the evidentiary hearing. Meeks v. Moore, 216 F.3d 951, 964 (11th Cir.2000) (finding no evidentiary support for ineffectiveness for failing to file a change of venue claim where collateral counsel introduced four newspaper articles which were meager and mundane). . . . This Court finds Mr. Murrell's testimony regarding change of venue to be credible. The Court also finds that Dillbeck's jury was selected without undue difficulties and therefore, this Court would not have granted any motion for change of venue had one been made. Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a change of venue. (Record citations omitted.) Based on these findings, which are supported by competent, substantial evidence, the postconviction trial court concluded that Dillbeck failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland. We agree. Although Dillbeck's trial counsel was concerned about the pretrial publicity, on balance he believed it would be best to try the case in Tallahassee in order to obtain the most favorable jury. This was a reasonable tactical decision and, therefore, not deficient performance. Moreover, no prejudice resulted. When applying the prejudice prong to a claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a change of venue, the defendant must, at a minimum, `bring forth evidence demonstrating that the trial court would have, or at least should have, granted a motion for change of venue if [defense] counsel had presented such a motion to the court.' Wike, 813 So.2d at 18 (alteration in original) (quoting Meeks v. Moore, 216 F.3d 951, 961 (11th Cir.2000); citing Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So.2d 541, 545 (Fla.1990)). Dillbeck failed to demonstrate a legal basis for filing a motion for change of venue. Dillbeck produced no evidence of extensive pretrial publicity (newspaper articles, etc.) in support of this claim. Also, there were no undue difficulties in selecting an impartial jury because the jurors assured the court during voir dire that they could be impartial despite their extrinsic knowledge about the case. See Provenzano, 561 So.2d at 545. Therefore, any motion for change of venue would have been denied. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Dillbeck's claim.