Opinion ID: 787387
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sira's Due Process Claim

Text: 40 Sira's due process claim points to three procedural deprivations: (1) inadequate notice, (2) non-disclosure of confidential evidence relied on to support the disciplinary ruling, and (3) insufficient evidence of misconduct. We address defendants' qualified immunity defense as it pertains to each of these issues.
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42 Due process requires that prison officials give an accused inmate written notice of the charges against him twenty-four hours prior to conducting a disciplinary hearing. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F.3d at 108. Sira acknowledges that he received the challenged misbehavior report within the prescribed time; his complaint is that the report charge was too general to provide meaningful notice of the misconduct at issue and in fact misleading as to the incident date. 43 The notice required by due process is no empty formality. See Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d at 192; Benitez v. Wolff, 985 F.2d 662, 665 (2d Cir.1993). Rather, notice serves to compel `the charging officer to be [sufficiently] specific as to the misconduct with which the inmate is charged' to inform the inmate of what he is accused of doing so that he can prepare a defense to those charges and not be made to explain away vague charges set out in a misbehavior report. Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d at 192-93 (quoting McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 940 n. 11 (2d Cir.1977)); see Benitez v. Wolff, 985 F.2d at 665. Toward this end, due process requires more than a conclusory charge; an inmate must receive notice of at least some specific facts underlying the accusation. Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d at 193. Such notice is especially important where, as in this case, large parts of the disciplinary hearing are conducted outside the inmate's presence. The law recognizes that legitimate concerns for inmate safety may sometimes require confidential proceedings, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 566-67, 94 S.Ct. 2963, but, in such circumstances, there is a particular due process interest in requiring some factual specificity in the misconduct notice. See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975) (the more forthcoming the notice, the stronger should be [an agency's] position in asking curtailment of other procedures associated with due process). 44 In Taylor v. Rodriguez, this court rejected as vague or conclusory a notice that informed an inmate that he was being considered for special confinement based on past acknowledged membership in the Latin Kings gang, recent tension in B-Unit involving gang activity, and unspecified statements by independent confidential informants. 238 F.3d at 193; see also Powell v. Ward, 643 F.2d 924, 933 (2d Cir.1981) (affirming district court conclusion that charging inmate without disclosing what rule was broken violated due process). Sira's notice is similarly devoid of specific facts to support the otherwise conclusory allegation that he had urged ..., organized ..., and threatened inmates to participate in the Y2K strike. Sira's Misbehavior Report at 1. Certainly, the report identifies no inmates toward whom Sira's alleged misconduct was directed. It describes no words, actions, or means employed by Sira to further the strike. It mentions no sites within the prison where Sira allegedly engaged in the charged conduct. Instead, by identifying the incident site as the whole of Green Haven, the report essentially provided Sira with no notice of where within his then-limited universe his misconduct was alleged to have occurred. Moreover, to the extent the report identifies the date and time of the incident as January 19, 2000, at 10:15 a.m., the document is affirmatively misleading. As Lt. Schneider testified, that date and time correspond to her filing of the disciplinary charges, not to any particular misconduct by Sira. 45 Defendants assert that the latter error is of no import because Sira was served with the misbehavior report approximately ten minutes after its January 19 filing and could not reasonably have thought he was being charged with misconduct at that date and time. A review of the evidence in the light most favorable to Sira does not compel such a conclusion. A reasonable person might well have interpreted the report to charge Sira with misconduct on January 19 in attempting to rekindle the Y2K strike. So far as the record reveals, Sira thought it was conduct on January 19 that he had to defend: on the first day of the disciplinary hearing, he sought to document his whereabouts on the morning of that date. 46 Alternatively, defendants insist that the report's reference to January 1, 2000, provided Sira with adequate notice that his misconduct was alleged to have occurred on or about that date. In fact, the report states only that the strike was to occur on January 1 (which it apparently did not because of the lockdown). Nowhere does the report give notice as to whether his charged conduct allegedly occurred before or after January 1, or whether his actions spanned a day, week, month, or longer. 47 In urging us to ignore any incongruity in the dates cited in the misbehavior report, defendants point to Kalwasinski v. Morse, a case in which an inmate was charged with threatening to kill three corrections officers but where hearing evidence revealed only non-homicidal threats. 201 F.3d at 108. In rejecting a due process challenge, the court explained that [t]he discrepancy as to the precise nature of the threatened harm did not represent a failure of specificity that would impair Kalwasinski's ability to prepare his defense. Id. But Kalwasinski 's conclusion cannot be divorced from the facts of that case. The noted variance between charge and proof arose in the context of an otherwise detailed misbehavior report. Kalwasinski was given written notice that his charged conduct occurred on a specific (and correct) date: October 5, 1995; at a specific site: his jail cell; under specific circumstances: Kalwasinski disobeyed an order to remove a blanket obstructing the view of his cell. Further, the report advised Kalwasinski that, in defying the order, he engaged in two specific acts: he lewdly exposed himself to three corrections officers, while simultaneously directing threatening words and gestures toward them. The three officers were, moreover, identified by name and rank. See id. at 105. 48 Sira's situation is not at all comparable. His misbehavior report does not simply misidentify the incident date and time. It provides no notice as to the specific site or sites of his misconduct; it does not indicate the words or actions he employed in purportedly urging, organizing, or threatening inmates to participate in the Y2K strike; and it identifies no inmates toward whom his actions were directed. Thus, unlike Kalwasinski, this is not a case where one discrepancy in a misbehavior report can be excused because other details provided adequate notice of the conduct at issue. See generally Quinones v. Ricks, 288 A.D.2d 568, 568-69, 732 N.Y.S.2d 275, 276 (2d Dep't 2001) (noting that failure to include specific date in misbehavior report may be excused if the report otherwise provides sufficient details to permit the inmate to fashion a defense). From the notice he was given, Sira could only guess whether he was being charged with making a single objectionable statement to one inmate or a host of statements to groups of inmates; whether his conduct allegedly occurred on a specific day in January or over the course of several weeks; and whether he had to defend against misconduct in the mess, the prison yard, his cell block, or some other location. 49 This is not to suggest that the Constitution demands notice that painstakingly details all facts relevant to the date, place, and manner of charged inmate misconduct; but there must be sufficient factual specificity to permit a reasonable person to understand what conduct is at issue so that he may identify relevant evidence and present a defense. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d at 192-93. We recognize that, in some cases, prison officials may lack precise information about the date, place, and manner of an inmate's misconduct. In such circumstances, due process cannot demand that authorities provide notice of specific facts that are beyond their knowledge. But an inmate can at least be given any general information regarding the relevant time and place that is known to the authorities, accompanied by an explanation that the exact date or site of the alleged misconduct is unknown, or that the precise identities of persons toward whom the alleged act was directed are unknown. Such notice informs an inmate that he will not have to defend with respect to any particular date, place, or person, and permits him to focus his defense on challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. But where, as in this case, a defendant is provided with no specific facts relating to conclusory charges that he violated prison rules prohibiting inmates from urging or threatening others to cause prison disruptions, he has no more ability to identify the conduct at issue and to muster a defense than if he had been given no notice at all. 50 Defendants submit that any notice defects in the misbehavior report were rendered harmless by Lt. Schneider's January 31, 2000 testimony, which alerted Sira to statements made by confidential informants in the period from shortly before the December 24, 1999, lockdown through January 2000, identifying him as the leader of a group of Dominican inmates and the Captain of C-Block and reporting that Sira had used threats to enforce participation in the Y2K strike. Preliminarily, we are doubtful that inadequate written notice can be cured merely through oral disclosures at the disciplinary hearing. Certainly such curative disclosures would be insufficient unless the inmate was also afforded the meaningful opportunity to prepare a response to the new information. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (rejecting practice of giving inmates notice of charges at the time of disciplinary hearing and requiring 24-hour advance written notice). In any event, Lt. Schneider's testimony alerted Sira only to the role confidential informants ascribed to him within the inmate culture, not to the particular actions he allegedly took to encourage participation in the Y2K strike. The dates she mentioned referred to when confidential sources disclosed information to prison officials. Nothing in her testimony indicated whether Sira's actions were contemporaneous with those disclosures or whether they occurred weeks earlier. In sum, she provided no more specific facts than the initial misbehavior report with respect to when, where, or how Sira urged, organized, or threatened participation in the Y2K strike. 51 Accordingly, we conclude that when the record is viewed in the light most favorable to Sira, he has presented a viable due process claim of inadequate notice. 52
53 Defendants submit that even if Sira did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the disciplinary charges against him, they are, nevertheless, entitled to qualified immunity because under then-established law, reasonable corrections officials could have believed that the notice given comported with due process. We disagree. 54 As the preceding discussion makes plain, for more than two decades before the filing of Sira's misbehavior report, the law has recognized an inmate's due process right to receive advance written notice of the disciplinary charges against him sufficient to permit him to marshal the facts in his defense. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Opinions of this court, in reiterating the importance of adequate notice, have emphasized that vague, conclusory allegations are inadequate to this purpose; due process requires a modicum of factual specificity. See Benitez v. Wolff, 985 F.2d at 665 (observing that notice must `inform[ ] the inmate of what he allegedly has done so that he can prepare a defense, if he chooses, to the specific charges set forth' (quoting McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d at 940 n. 11)). 55 Defendants acknowledge these precedents but argue that a reasonable corrections officer could have believed that a misbehavior report, like a criminal indictment, satisfies due process if it simply tracks the language of the law or rule violated. This argument misstates the law with respect to indictments. We have frequently upheld indictments that do little more than ... track the language of the statute charged, but only when they also state, at least approximately, the time and place of the alleged crime. United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1113 (2d Cir.1975), quoted in United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 44 (2d Cir.1999). 5 Crimes involving threats, moreover, are rarely charged in so bare-boned a manner. See, e.g., United States v. Palmiotti, 254 F.2d 491, 495 (2d Cir.1958) (rejecting generality challenge to extortion charge where indictment specified dates of threats, corporate victim, and specific amounts sought). 6 Indeed, we have not upheld indictments that merely tracked statutory language prohibiting threats when more specific pleading was necessary to permit the accused to prepare his defense and defend against double jeopardy. See United States v. Davidoff, 845 F.2d 1151, 1154 (2d Cir.1988) (reversing racketeering conviction where a defendant was not given notice of discrete extortion schemes that the prosecution intended to prove); see also United States v. Tomasetta, 429 F.2d 978, 980-81 (1st Cir.1970) (finding indictment insufficient for failing to name the victim of an extortion count, the location of the alleged threat, and the means by which the threat was made); cf. United States v. Kalevas, 622 F.Supp. 1523, 1532 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Weinfeld, J.) (rejecting request for particulars because government letter had already disclosed the names of the persons allegedly threatened by defendant and the approximate dates of those threats). Similarly, courts have not hesitated to order the government to give a defendant notice of the specific parts of a lengthy conversation on which it would rely to prove a threat charge. See United States v. Sabri, 973 F.Supp. 134, 138 (W.D.N.Y.1996). 56 In Sira's case, the misbehavior report provided no notice as to the purported victims of the charged misconduct, not even notice that the specific victims were unknown. 7 The report similarly failed to describe the words or actions by which defendant purportedly urged, organized, or threatened any person. As already noted, it did not provide even minimal notice of the time or place of the charged conduct. No reasonable officer could have thought that such a misbehavior report, devoid of any factual detail and containing an inaccurate incident date, was adequate to permit Sira to identify and marshal the facts pertinent to a defense. Indeed, such a conclusion is particularly warranted in this case because Sira persistently challenged the adequacy of the notice he received with respect to place, date, and victims. Capt. Morton acknowledged the report's vagueness as to place and error as to date; Nevertheless, he refused to dismiss the report or to order that it be supplemented with some specific facts. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court correctly denied qualified immunity. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). 57
58 Compounding the problem of inadequate notice, defendants also failed to disclose to Sira much of the evidence supporting his disciplinary ruling, specifically, the identities of the confidential informants who inculpated him in the Y2K strike and the substance of their statements. 8 An inmate's due process right to know the evidence upon which a discipline ruling is based is well established. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 564-65, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir.1989). Such disclosure affords the inmate a reasonable opportunity to explain his actions and to alert officials to possible defects in the evidence. 59 Courts have long recognized, however, that the right to know evidence supporting prison disciplinary rulings is not absolute. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 564-65, 94 S.Ct. 2963. As the Supreme Court has observed, prison disciplinary proceedings take place in tightly controlled environments peopled by those who have been unable to conduct themselves properly in a free society. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497, 105 S.Ct. 2192, 85 L.Ed.2d 553 (1985). The risks of violence or intimidation directed at either other inmates or staff are real. Id. at 495, 105 S.Ct. 2192. Thus, when the disclosure of evidence presents such risks, hearing officers may properly decline to inform an inmate of the adverse evidence. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 565, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d at 48. 60 Courts will not readily second guess the judgment of prison officials with respect to such matters, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963; nevertheless, the discretion to withhold evidence is not unreviewable, see Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. at 498, 105 S.Ct. 2192. The touchstone of due process, after all, is freedom from arbitrary governmental action. Id. at 495, 105 S.Ct. 2192. Thus, prison officials who decide to circumscribe inmates' procedural rights at disciplinary proceedings must offer a reasonable justification for their actions, if not contemporaneously, then when challenged in a court action. See id. at 498-99, 105 S.Ct. 2192. 61 In this case, the sole contemporaneous reason stated by Capt. Morton to justify non-disclosure of the confidential evidence was as follows: Inmate Sira was not present during the confidential testimony because it was confidential, and would have put another inmate's life in danger. Hearing Disposition Form at 2. Certainly, testimony adduced at the confidential hearing indicates that the informants' lives might have been placed at risk if they had appeared before Morton or if their identities had been disclosed to Sira. But neither Morton's statement nor any evidence in the present record suggests that disclosure of the substance of the informants' statements to Sira would have presented safety risks. 62 For example, Informant 5's attribution of threatening conduct to Sira was conclusory, without any indication of the time, place or circumstances at issue; thus, it is not obvious from the record that its disclosure would have identified and, therefore, jeopardized the source. Similarly, although Informant 4's letter provided specific information as to strike leaders and a strike meeting site, it provided no context that identified the author. Informant 3 likewise reported only the overheard conversation of two other inmates, while Informant 2 disclosed information obtained simply from asking around. The record provides us with no basis to conclude that Sira could have divined the informants' identities from disclosure of the substance of these hearsay reports. 63 Most significantly, nothing in the record explains why Sira could not have been informed of the substance of Informant 1's disclosure that at a strike meeting held in Building 12 sometime after the lockdown ended, inmate Codorel had identified Sira to a whole group of persons as the individual who would enforce the work action in C Block. Codorel's statement is significant because it is akin to a co-conspirator declaration and, if deemed credible, might, by itself, have supported Sira's discipline. See infra at [35] (discussing minimal requirement of some reliable evidence to support prison discipline). Withholding this information from Sira, however, deprived him of any opportunity to explain or challenge this inculpatory evidence, whether by demonstrating some motive for Codorel falsely to inculpate him in the strike, or by proffering a statement from Codorel himself denying the informant's report, or by adducing any other facts or circumstances relevant to reliability. 64 It is possible that on further development of the record defendants will be able to justify withholding the substance of the informants' disclosures from Sira. See Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. at 498-99, 105 S.Ct. 2192. But because no reasons are now before the court and because we review the record in the light most favorable to Sira, we must conclude that he presents a viable due process claim based on non-disclosure of evidence and that there is no basis to hold that any reasonable officer could have thought otherwise. Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this part of Sira's due process claim.
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66 In considering whether Sira presents a viable due process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we address the following issues: (1) the evidence required by law to support prison discipline, (2) a hearing officer's obligation independently to assess the reliability of evidence supplied by confidential informants, and (3) the need to evaluate reliability by reference to the totality of circumstances. With respect to totality review, we further discuss how this applies to (a) hearsay evidence supplied by confidential informants and (b) conclusory assertions by informants. 67
68 In Superintendent v. Hill, the Supreme Court ruled that prison discipline decisions affecting an inmate's liberty interest cannot be imposed arbitrarily but must be supported by some evidence in the record. 472 U.S. at 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768. Judicial review of this some evidence standard is narrowly focused. As the Supreme Court has explained, it does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. Id. at 455-56, 105 S.Ct. 2768. However narrow this sufficiency question, it presents an issue of law subject to our plenary review. Cf. United States v. Henry, 325 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction is reviewed de novo ); Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir.2002) (reviewing sufficiency of substantial evidence determinations de novo ); Heard v. United States, 348 F.2d 43, 44 (D.C.Cir.1964) (per curiam) (observing that the question whether the evidence in a particular case constitutes `some evidence' of insanity ... is a question of law for the court). 9 69 In a recent discussion of the some evidence standard, this court observed that only reliable evidence can constitute some evidence. Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d at 488. The principle is not new. A reliability inquiry has long been required when confidential source information is relied on to satisfy the some evidence standard. As we explained in Giakoumelos v. Coughlin, an informant's testimony implicating an accused inmate in charged misconduct can support a some-evidence finding as long as there has been `some examination of indicia relevant to [an informant's] credibility.' 88 F.3d at 61 (quoting Russell v. Scully, 15 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir.1993)); accord Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d at 194. 70
71 In this case, all the evidence supporting the misconduct charge against Sira derived from confidential informants. There has been some ambiguity in our case law whether a hearing officer must make an independent assessment of informant credibility to ensure that disclosures qualify as some reliable evidence, or whether he can simply rely on the opinions of prison officials who have dealt with the informants. See Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir.2001) (describing question as not yet resolved in this circuit). 10 In Gaston, it was unnecessary to choose between the two standards because the record clearly demonstrated that the hearing officer had conducted a satisfactory independent assessment of informant credibility. Id. at 164. 72 We note, however, that in Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d at 194, this court endorsed an independent credibility assessment when confidential information is used to establish the some evidence necessary to afford due process in prison disciplinary proceedings. The record in Taylor failed to evidence any credibility assessment, independent or otherwise, by the hearing officer; nevertheless, the court expressly discussed only the former standard in reversing an award of summary judgment in favor of prison authorities: Requiring an independent credibility assessment ensures not only a fair hearing and discipline based on reliable evidence, but also places a minimal burden on prison officials conducting such hearings, with the assurance that judicial review is available. Id. Because this conclusion was instrumental to Taylor 's ruling, it binds us notwithstanding Gaston 's dicta. See generally Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-401, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821); United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 205-06 (2d Cir.1975); 1 C. Wright & M. Kane, The Law of Federal Courts § 56, at 386 (6th ed. 2002) (If the Court believes it is deliberately deciding a constitutional question, it is wise to suppose that the constitutional question has been decided, unless and until some later Court suggests a different answer.). 73 In any event, we think Taylor 's holding is constitutionally sound. Due process requires not simply that an inmate facing a loss of liberty receive a hearing, but that he receive a fair hearing. See, e.g., Grillo v. Coughlin, 31 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir.1994). See generally Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Fairness of procedure is due process in the primary sense. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Fairness cannot be achieved without some assessment of the reliability of the evidence offered against the accused. In our adversarial system, confrontation and cross-examination are the usual tools used to test credibility. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 248-49 (2d Cir.2003); see also Crawford v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, ___, ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1359, 1370, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); cf. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (No. 14,694) (C.C.Va.1807) (Marshall, C.J.) (noting that nothing endanger [s] the right to life, liberty and property more than precluding confrontation). But in light of the substantial risks for violence and retaliation in connection with prison disciplinary actions, due process does not mandate these procedures in that context — although prison officials retain discretion to afford them. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 568, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Nevertheless, when sound discretion forecloses confrontation and cross-examination, the need for the hearing officer to conduct an independent assessment of informant credibility to ensure fairness to the accused inmate is heightened. 74 The record in this case demonstrates, and Sira does not dispute, that Capt. Morton independently assessed the credibility of these informants by inquiring as to their record for reliability. See Russell v. Scully, 15 F.3d at 223. In the case of Informants 1-3, however, the evidence supplied was not based on the informants' personal knowledge but on communications from third parties. Sira asserts that such information could not be deemed reliable without further inquiry into the credibility of the underlying sources. As to evidence supplied by Informant 4, because the record is unclear as to whether it was based on direct knowledge or hearsay, Sira submits that it could not be considered reliable without further similar inquiry. Finally, as to Informant 5, the only source who purported to provide direct evidence, Sira asserts that his information was too conclusory to be deemed reliable without some inquiry into its basis. 75

76 We agree that when confidential information presented at a prison disciplinary proceeding involves multiple levels of hearsay, a hearing officer cannot determine the reliability of that information simply by reference to the informant's past record for credibility. Credible informants may, after all, unwittingly pass along suspect information from unreliable sources. For this reason, the officer must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if the hearsay information is, in fact, reliable. 77 Any number of factors may inform a totality assessment of reliability. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (holding that reliability assessments generally depend on the totality of circumstances). For example, a hearing officer may consider the identity and reputation of the original declarant, his motive for making the statements at issue, whether he is willing to testify and, if not, the reasons informing that decision, and the consequences he faces if his disclosures prove false. Where the original declarant's identity is unknown or not disclosed, the hearing officer may nevertheless consider such factors as the specificity of the information, the circumstances under which it was disclosed, and the degree to which it is corroborated by other evidence. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-31, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 72-73 (2d Cir.1993). See generally Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (finding hearsay statements reliable because they were made spontaneously, were corroborated by some other evidence in the case, and were against the declarant's interest); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970) (further discussing factors relevant to reliability). The officer may also consider any challenges to reliability raised by the accused inmate. Where good reasons justify withholding confidential evidence from the inmate, the hearing officer, of course, has the singular responsibility for ensuring that he has been provided with all the facts and circumstances necessary to make an informed assessment of reliability. 78 In this case, where Sira appears to have been unjustifiably deprived of adequate notice and the substance of the evidence against him, Capt. Morton's failure to probe and assess the totality of the circumstances in assessing the reliability of third-party hearsay information disclosed by confidential informants makes it impossible for us to conclude as a matter of law at this stage of the case that Sira can present no viable sufficiency claim. While this is obviously the case with respect to the general accusations reported by Informants 2 and 4, the conclusion pertains even as to Informant 1. As we have already noted, his report that Codorel had announced to a group of striking inmates that Sira would enforce discipline in C-Block might have sufficed, by itself, to support Sira's discipline if the statement's reliability had been assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances. But Codorel's reliability could not be determined by reference only to the credibility record of Informant 1. It may be that on further development of the record, Morton might satisfactorily demonstrate that he did base his reliability finding with respect to all the hearsay declarants on more than a credibility assessment of the informants, but on this appeal, we must assume otherwise and, therefore, conclude that plaintiff has stated a viable constitutional claim. 79 Defendants, however, submit that further factual development is unnecessary to their motion. They argue that the reliability of the hearsay evidence is so plainly established by the internal consistency of the information disclosed that Sira cannot, as a matter of law, establish that he was disciplined without some reliable evidence. In appropriate cases, consistency among hearsay statements may support a finding of reliability. See United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 998 F.2d 120, 124 (2d Cir.1993); accord United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 F.3d 97, 100 n. 3 (2d Cir.2002). But such a finding is not compelled as a matter of law in every case, and certainly not in this one. 80 For example, defendants highlight that several declarants placed Sira in Building 12 at night and in the pre-release center in the morning. At oral argument, however, Sira's counsel explained that his client was assigned to these locations. Presumably, Sira himself could have made this point at the discipline hearing had he known the substance of the confidential evidence. Corroboration of facts generally known or easily obtained do not necessarily establish a source's reliability with respect to other incriminating matters. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412; see also United States v. Mendonsa, 989 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir.1993) (mere confirmation of innocent static details is insufficient to support an anonymous tip); United States v. Rasor, 599 F.2d 1330, 1332 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that corroboration of information that was readily available to many persons does not demonstrate reliability). The consistency among the declarants on this point therefore bears little, if any, weight on a motion for summary judgment. 81 The more significant consistency among certain of the hearsay statements is the description of Sira as a person responsible for enforcing strike participation. The statements, however, also bear certain inconsistencies — for example, some of the declarants reported that Sira enforced C-Block (where he was housed), while others said J-Block (where he apparently worked). Further, except in the case of declarant Codorel, the statements reveal almost nothing about the circumstances under which they were made. On this record, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that Capt. Morton necessarily found that the consistencies in the hearsay established their reliability. Nothing in the record indicates that he considered the issue, nor any other circumstances relevant to the reliability of the hearsay accounts other than the confidential informants' credibility records. As we have already stated, this last factor is insufficient, by itself, to establish the reliability of the hearsay information communicated by Informants 1-4.
82 One source, Informant 5, provided direct evidence, reporting that he saw Sira coerce inmates through strong arm tactics and threats of violence to participate in certain stages of the planned strike. Hearing Tr., Feb. 8, 2000, at 5. We agree with the district judge that this conclusory characterization of Sira's conduct — unsupported by any factual basis as to what the informant heard or saw that he considered threatening, when or where he made his observations, or the persons toward whom Sira directed his purported threats — cannot, by itself, qualify as some reliable evidence of inmate misconduct. As the Supreme Court has long cautioned, a conclusory statement of culpability provides virtually no basis at all for a reviewing officer to make a reasoned and independent judgment on the matter at issue. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Due process does not permit a hearing officer simply to ratify the bald conclusions of others; it requires some inquiry to determine whether the totality of facts and circumstances reasonably supports the proffered conclusion. Indeed, this obligation pertains even when the conclusion is that of an eyewitness or person of general reliability. See id. at 234 & n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 2317; see also Zavaro v. Coughlin, 970 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that testimony from prison officials that every inmate of the more than one hundred in the mess hall at a particular time participated in a riot was too conclusory and speculative to constitute reliable evidence). 83 The factual basis for a witness's conclusions is certainly a relevant factor among the totality of circumstances properly considered in assessing reliability. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317; Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 162-63 (2d Cir.2002). While a thorough articulation of the factual basis for particular information may not be necessary in every case, especially where other circumstances weigh heavily in favor of reliability, 11 in this case the record is devoid of any inquiry into the basis for Informant 5's conclusory disclosure. The officer who dealt directly with Informant 5 testified to no facts or circumstances supporting the source's conclusion, and the hearing officer did not request that the officer question the informant further to ascertain such underlying information. 84 The record suggests that Capt. Morton may have recognized a reliability problem with respect to Informant 5's conclusory statement and, rather than pursue any inquiry into the totality of the circumstances, chose simply to ignore the evidence. He did not, after all, find Sira guilty of the threat charge, which he presumably would have done had he concluded that Informant 5's statement was reliable. If, indeed, Morton rejected or ignored Informant 5's conclusory statement — as a view of the evidence most favorable to Sira would suggest — we cannot assume that it was used to corroborate the third-party hearsay declarations whose own reliability, on the record before us, appears not to have been adequately assessed. 85 In sum, if we view the record in the light most favorable to Sira, we must conclude that he has presented a viable due process claim that defendants ordered him disciplined without some reliable evidence of misconduct. 86
87 Defendants maintain that even if Sira's disciplinary ruling was based on insufficient reliable evidence to satisfy due process, they are entitled to qualified immunity. 88 As we have already noted, qualified immunity shields a government official from suit if his challenged conduct was objectively reasonable in light of legal rules that were clearly established at the time of his actions. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151; Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d at 490. To be clearly established, a right must have been recognized in a particularized rather than a general sense. In other words, it is not enough that a general right to due process is clearly established by the Constitution. The contours of that right, as they pertain to a particular issue — for example, the identification of what qualifies as some reliable evidence in prison disciplinary proceedings — must have been delineated with sufficient clarity that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). This is because [t]he qualified immunity standard `gives ample room for mistaken judgments,' protecting `all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.' Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (per curiam) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). 89 Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Sira's sufficiency challenge. As this court recently observed, neither this circuit nor the Supreme Court has clearly defined standards for determining what constitutes some evidence in the context of prison disciplinary hearings; rather, decisions have addressed the problem piecemeal, focusing on the discrete problems raised by the facts of particular cases. See, e.g., Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d at 491 (holding that due process requires a credibility assessment of victim's hearsay accusation, but granting qualified immunity dismissal). 90 At the time of Sira's disciplinary proceedings, the law of this circuit recognized a due process obligation to conduct some assessment of informant credibility to support prison discipline, see Giakoumelos v. Coughlin, 88 F.3d at 61; Russell v. Scully, 15 F.3d at 223, but there was an ambiguity — which persisted at least until this court's decision in Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d at 192-93, and possibly thereafter, see Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d at 163 — as to whether a hearing officer was required to conduct an independent assessment or whether he could rely on the opinion of another person. We have attempted to clarify that point today by reiterating Taylor 's recognition that due process requires an independent assessment of the confidential informant's credibility. 91 Further, no prior case appears to have addressed the issue whether an independent assessment of informant credibility is necessarily sufficient to establish the reliability of all confidential disclosures, including third-party hearsay. Indeed, in cases where confidential information was found to constitute some reliable evidence, our decisions did not specifically discuss whether the evidence was based on the informant's direct knowledge or on hearsay. See, e.g., Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d at 160-61, 163 (holding that confidential information that inmate had prepared directions for mess hall slowdown on a piece of paper and passed it out to other inmates constituted the some evidence required by due process). We today hold that the reliability of evidence is always properly assessed by reference to the totality of the circumstances and that an informant's record for reliability cannot, by itself, establish the reliability of bald conclusions or third-party hearsay. 92 Because this principle was not clearly established before today, it was objectively reasonable for defendants to think that an independent assessment of the credibility of the confidential informants who proffered evidence against Sira, consistent with Russell v. Scully, 15 F.3d at 223, satisfied due process, and that Capt. Morton could, without further inquiry, rely on the third-party hearsay disclosed by those informants as some reliable evidence of Sira's participation in the Y2K strike. Accordingly, although we agree with the district court that the present record supports Sira's sufficiency challenge, we reverse the denial of qualified immunity on this part of Sira's due process claim and direct that, on remand, summary judgment be entered in favor of defendants on this point.