Opinion ID: 1186335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Witness Preclusion

Text: Sykes next claims that the superior court erred in precluding him from calling witnesses to support his defense at trial. The challenged preclusion order resulted from Sykes's failure to file timely witness and expert witness lists. In a pretrial order issued April 9, 1993, the superior court directed the parties to submit expert witness lists by December 27, 1993, and non-expert witness lists by January 18, 1994. The pretrial order also called for the parties to file case management memoranda by October 25, 1993. Sykes failed to file a case management memorandum by the October 25 deadline. On November 2, 1993, the court issued a sua sponte order directing Sykes to file the memorandum within fifteen days; in the same order, the court directed Sykes to comply with all dates and required acts set forth in the Pretrial Order filed April 9, 1993, without further intervention of this court. Sykes thereafter missed the December 27, 1993, and January 18, 1994, deadlines for filing expert and non-expert witness lists. On February 28, 1994, Sykes submitted untimely lists, together with a Motion to Accept Late Filings in which he claimed that his deteriorated mental state had prevented him from submitting the lists earlier. Specifically, Sykes asserted that his depressed condition had prevented him even from opening his mail when the filings were due. Sykes submitted information purporting to document his assertions. [5] The superior court denied Sykes's motion to accept the late witness lists, finding that Sykes had failed to establish good cause and manifest injustice for this court to grant him relief from the Pretrial Order. Although the court indicated that Sykes could call any witness listed on the plaintiffs' witness list, it declared that he shall not be allowed to call any lay or expert witnesses who had not been so listed. The court went on to note that it repeatedly ... has advised Mr. Sykes throughout these proceedings that the Pretrial Order deadlines provide him with plenty of notice and that the order would not be varied. The case proceeded to trial; as a result of the preclusion order, Sykes was unable to call any of the persons named in his expert witness list, because none of them had been listed as MCM witnesses. All had been designated by Sykes to testify about his claim of mental incapacity. [6] Sykes attempted to prove this claim through his own testimony and the testimony of his wife. In rendering judgment against Sykes, the trial court rejected his mental incapacity defense as wholly incredible. Sykes now challenges the preclusion order as erroneous. According to Alaska Civil Rule 16(e), pretrial orders setting filing dates and other deadlines shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified by a subsequent order. Id. The order may be modified to prevent manifest injustice. Id. The discretion to modify a pretrial order rests in the trial court. City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1316 (Alaska 1985). The burden is on the party seeking modification to show manifest injustice. Johnson v. State, 636 P.2d 47, 58 (Alaska 1981). For present purposes, we may assume that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Sykes had failed to show manifest injustice warranting modification of the pretrial order. This assumption, however, does not resolve the controversy. For although the trial court did not expressly say so, its order rejecting the untimely lists in their entirety and precluding Sykes from calling witnesses at trial amounted to a sanction for Sykes's violation of the pretrial order. The appropriateness of the preclusion order must be considered under the ground rules governing sanctions. Under Civil Rule 16(f), a party's violation of a pretrial order empowers the court to make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B),(C),(D). Wasserman v. Bartholomew, 923 P.2d 806, 811 (Alaska 1996). [7] One sanction enumerated in Rule 37(b)(2) for violation of a pretrial order is [a]n order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing designated matters in evidence. Alaska R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B). The trial court's order precluding Sykes from calling expert witnesses falls squarely within this language. Ordinarily, the choice of a particular sanction for a discovery violation is a matter committed to the broad discretion of the trial court, subject only to review for abuse of discretion. Hughes v. Bobich, 875 P.2d 749, 752 (Alaska 1994). However, we have repeatedly held that the trial court's discretion is limited when the effect of the sanction it selects is to impose liability on the offending party, establish the outcome of or preclude evidence on a central issue, or end the litigation entirely. [8] Before extreme sanctions of this kind may properly be imposed, [t]here must be `willful noncompliance' with court orders, or `extreme circumstances,' or `gross violations' of the Rules. The record must also `clearly indicate a reasonable exploration of possible and meaningful alternatives to dismissal.' ... If meaningful alternative sanctions are available, the trial court must ordinarily impose these lesser sanctions.... Arbelovsky, 922 P.2d at 227 (citation and footnotes omitted). [9] This court has recently amended Civil Rule 37(b) to include an express statement of these principles. In its present form, the rule specifically provides that a court shall not make an order that has the effect of establishing or dismissing a claim or defense or determining a central issue in the litigation unless the court finds that the party acted willfully. [10] Although this provision was not in effect when the trial court entered the disputed order precluding Sykes from calling expert witnesses, its language summarizes the requirements then applicable under existing case law. For the present case, there seems to be little question that the preclusion order issued against Sykes ha[d] the effect of .. . determining a central issue in the litigation[.] Civil Rule 37(b)(3). Apart from questions relating to damages, the primary issues surviving the superior court's summary judgment order were Sykes's claims of mental incapacity and misrepresentation. While the order precluding Sykes from calling witnesses seemingly had little direct effect on his claim of misrepresentation, [11] it had extreme consequence for his mental incapacity defense: all of the witnesses named by Sykes as experts were slated to testify about Sykes's condition at the time the contract was formed. None of these experts appeared on MCM's witness lists. Hence, to establish his mental incapacity defense at trial, Sykes was left with little but his own testimony  readily impeachable as self-serving [12]  and the testimony of his wife equally vulnerable to attack as biased. Given the absence of ostensibly neutral expert testimony, the trial court's rejection of Sykes's incapacity defense as incredible hardly seems surprising. Even though the witness preclusion order appears to have had the effect of determining the central issue of mental incapacity, the superior court did not make any finding as to whether Sykes had wilfully violated the pretrial order; [13] indeed, the court did not expressly reject Sykes's explanation for his failure to file timely witness lists  his depressed emotional condition. Nor did the court specifically address the discovery violation's impact on MCM's case. The record provides little indication that accepting Sykes's untimely lists would have caused MCM serious prejudice: Sykes's claim of mental incapacity and the basic nature of that claim were known to MCM from the outset of the case. The witnesses named by Sykes to support this claim were health care professionals who had provided ongoing treatment to Sykes; their identities, and a number of their reports, were available to MCM in other pleadings. Although the untimely lists were filed after discovery had closed, the tardiness posed no obvious obstacle to MCM's ability to prepare for trial; to the contrary, the record reveals that the originally scheduled trial date was eventually postponed to accommodate the parties' mutual request for a supplemental deposition of another witness. Moreover, before entering its witness preclusion order, the trial court evidently failed to consider any less drastic sanctions. At the time Sykes missed the deadlines for filing his witness lists, no discovery sanctions had been imposed or threatened. [14] The record discloses no basis for concluding that a sanction less extreme than wholesale preclusion would not have been effective. Given the totality of these circumstances, we [are] left with the definite and firm conviction on the record that the judge . .. made a mistake [15] in striking all of the expert witnesses named in Sykes's untimely expert witness list. The preclusion order's harsh effect on Sykes's defense of mental incapacity rendered this sanction disproportionate to the severity of the violation for which it was imposed. The trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sanction. This error requires that the judgment entered below be vacated and that this case be remanded for further proceedings. Because the case was tried to the court without a jury, however, a new trial will not be necessary. Instead, the trial court may reconsider its original decision after receiving supplemental testimony from Sykes's designated experts and from any additional witnesses MCM chooses to present in response to the new evidence. [16]