Opinion ID: 721091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guilt Issues

Text: 17
18 Defendants contend the evidence at trial was insufficient for the jury to convict them of mail fraud. 3 There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could find all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Vgeri, 51 F.3d 876, 879 (9th Cir.1995). 19 Defendants annually represented on ASCS payment limitation forms that B & M Farms was a partnership of equal interests. The evidence easily allowed the jury to infer that defendants made these representations with an intent to increase their eligibility for farm subsidies past the $50,000 limit. In fact, they succeeded in doing so for several years. A jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt from the testimony of John MacLeod, Michael McLeod, and Janice McLeod that B & M Farms has never been an equal partnership, or a partnership at all under Montana law. 4 20 More importantly, a jury could also find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants knew the reality of their business relationship failed the legal test for a partnership. Their representations that each partner's interest was equal was a blatant and knowing falsehood. This falsehood belies their argument to the jury that B & M Farms was a good-faith attempt to create a partnership, albeit of unequal interests. The falsehood instead implies that the entire B & M Farms venture was an exercise in fiction from the outset. 21 A jury could therefore conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants knowingly maintained a fictitious partnership to defraud the government of farm subsidies, and that in doing so defendants caused the mails to be used. 5 22
23 Defendants contend the evidence at trial was insufficient for a jury to convict them on two counts of federal program fraud. 6 24 The first count of federal program fraud relates to the payment limitation forms submitted by defendants. Defendants represented on forms submitted to the ASCS that B & M Farms was an equal partnership, and this representation was false. Defendants knew these statements were false. Defendants made the statements knowingly and willfully on a subsidies application form signed by all the partners. The statements were material to the ASCS's decision, because they related directly to B & M Farms' eligibility for subsidies exceeding the $50,000 limit. 25 The second count of federal program fraud arises from the doctored checks submitted to the local ASCS committee for the 1991 year-end review. As discussed, a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that B & M Farms was a fictitious partnership and defendants knew it. The modified checks would then be knowing misrepresentations of the nature of the employees' compensation. A jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants willfully submitted the falsified checks to achieve a favorable (but illegal) result if the ASCS audited B & M Farms again. 26 The evidence was therefore sufficient for a jury to convict defendants on both counts of federal program fraud. 27
28 Defendants contend that the district court's refusal to instruct the jury with an offered instruction was reversible error. Defendants' offered instruction had two parts: (1) that the government had the burden of proving that B & M Farms was a fictitious partnership beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) that good faith is a sufficient defense to conviction. 29 We review de novo whether the district court's instruction adequately presented the defendant's theory of the case. United States v. Duran, 59 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 525 (1995). If the district court's instructions fairly and adequately cover the elements of the offense, the panel reviews the instruction's precise formulation for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Woodley, 9 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir.1993). A good faith instruction is unnecessary where the court has already adequately instructed the jury as to specific intent. Duran, 59 F.3d at 941. 30 Here, the district court instructed that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of falsity of the defendants' representations. This instruction fairly and adequately conveyed that the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the partnership was fictitious. Moreover, the district court's instruction on specific intent obviated the need for further instruction on the good faith defense. 31 The district court properly instructed the jury in this case. 32
33 Defendants contend the district judge erred in denying their motion to communicate with a dismissed alternate juror about allegations of juror misconduct. 34 We are unable to find a case directly on point for a standard of review for this motion. However, we review a denial of a motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding allegations of jury misconduct for abuse of discretion. United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir.1991). Unless the court is able to determine without a hearing that the allegations are without credibility or that the allegations if true would not warrant a new trial, an evidentiary hearing must be held. Id. 35 Here, the misconduct alleged is that jurors had already determined defendants' guilt before the judge submitted the case to them for deliberations. 7 However, the allegation made to the district court was fifth-hand hearsay. Thus, the allegation was so attenuated and lacking in credibility that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.