Opinion ID: 776162
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Court's Inherent Power

Text: 45 We also affirm the district court's decision with respect to the sanctions awarded to Plaintiff under the court's inherent powers. In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., the Supreme Court reinforced the longstanding principle that [c]courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates. 501 U.S. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted). Significantly, under our controlling cases, conduct that is tantamount to bad faith is sanctionable. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980). As we recently stated in Fink, [f]or purposes of imposing sanctions under the inherent power of the court, a finding of bad faith does not require that the legal and factual basis for the action prove totally frivolous; where a litigant is substantially motivated by vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala fides, the assertion of a colorable claim will not bar the assessment of attorney's fees. 239 F.3d at 992 (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum,sanctions are available if the court specifically finds bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith. Sanctions are available for a variety of types of willful actions, including recklessness when combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose. Therefore . . . an attorney's reckless misstatements of law and fact, when coupled with an improper purpose, . . . are sanctionable under a court's inherent power. Id. at 994. 46 Here, regardless of whether defense counsel's behavior constituted bad faith per se, we readily find that counsel's reckless and knowing conduct in this case was tantamount to bad faith and therefore sanctionable under the court's inherent power. If left unsanctioned, defense counsel's behavior in this case would undermine the very purpose and force of Rule 412's strictures. Thus, we believe the district court's resort to its inherent powers to sanction the County was eminently reasonable and justified. 47 To be sure, [b]ecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.  Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. However, [a] primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process. Id. at 44-45. In disingenuously circumventing both the spirit and the letter of Rule 412, we believe that defense counsel abused the judicial process, making the imposition of sanctions appropriate. 48 The County argues that sanctions for compensatory damages to Plaintiff are unprecedented and beyond the scope of the court's inherent power. And yet, in Chambers , the Court delineated a broad range of situations for which a variety of sanctions were deemed appropriate, and noted that even outright dismissal of a lawsuit lies within the court's inherent power. The Court therefore reasoned that the less severe sanction of an assessment of attorneys fees was well within the court's authority as well. Id. at 43-45. Similar logic applies here, particularly given that none of the other federal rules or statutes govern the situation. See id. at 50 ([I]f in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.). 49 The imposition of sanctions . . . transcends a court's equitable power concerning relations between the parties and reaches a court's inherent power to police itself, thus serving the dual purpose of vindicating judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court and making the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent's [misbehavior]. Id. at 46 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). The award of compensatory damages to Plaintiff for the County's misconduct therefore does not appear unreasonable in this regard. Contrary to the County's position, by imposing sanctions for the embarrassment and pain suffered by Plaintiff as a result of the improper testimony, the district court was not invading the province of the jury or providing a substantive remedy to an aggrieved party. Instead, the amount the court imposed reflected its assessment of the actual harm incurred by Plaintiff, both in terms of additional attorneys' fees and emotional and reputational damage. This was well within the bounds of the court's discretionary power.