Opinion ID: 498404
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exhaustion of Available State Remedies

Text: 10 Respondent argues that Stamps has failed to exhaust available state remedies on both his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the insufficiency of evidence on the PFO claim. Thus, respondent argues that Stamps' petition should be dismissed without any adjudication of the merits of his claim. After examining the extensive procedural history preceding this appeal, we find that Stamps has adequately exhausted his available state court remedies. 11 After his conviction in 1980, Stamps brought a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during both phases of his bifurcated trial, and that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an on-the-record inquiry into whether the admission of petitioner's guilt made by his counsel during the PFO phase of the trial was with Stamps' intelligent and voluntary consent. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that Stamps' ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defective, relying upon the rule of Wilson v. Commonwealth, 601 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Ky.1980), that such a claim will not be heard for the first time in an appellate court. 12 On the second issue, the court rejected the claim, holding that the stipulation of the two prior convictions was not a de facto guilty plea and noting that it was quite obvious that the trial strategy of Stamps' attorney was aimed at obtaining the lightest sentence possible in face of overwhelming evidence. The Kentucky Supreme Court noted that Stamps received the minimum sentence possible on the PFO charge, and that his attorney's tactics, be they planned or mistaken, worked no prejudice on Stamps' right to a fair trial. The court made it quite clear that Stamps did not seek review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. 13 Stamps then filed a RCr 11.42 motion in the Christian County, Kentucky, Circuit Court to collaterally attack his conviction. Stamps argued in support of his motion that there was insufficient evidence for a first-degree burglary conviction, that the trial court erred in failing to give instructions on lesser included offenses, and that the state failed to prove an essential element of a PFO conviction, none of which allegations had been previously raised on appeal. Stamps did not allege ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, 1 and the Kentucky Supreme Court refused to exercise discretionary review. 14 Stamps then filed his first habeas corpus petition in district court. The petition was referred to a magistrate who determined that state remedies had been exhausted, but that Stamps failed to state any cognizable claim which would support the issuance of the requested writ. The district court subsequently adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation and dismissed the petition. 15 Stamps timely appealed to this court, raising the same claims presented to the district court. Upon our finding that the petition contained unexhausted claims, the petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction pursuant to our holding in Bowen v. Tennessee, 698 F.2d 241 (6th Cir.1983) (en banc ). Specifically, we found that Stamps had not exhausted his state remedies as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the sufficiency of evidence on the burglary conviction claim, and the insufficiency of evidence for a PFO conviction claim. Stamps petitioned this court for a rehearing and presented an opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals regarding the sufficiency of evidence for a persistent felony offender conviction wherein his conviction was affirmed. We denied the request for a rehearing, concluding that the petition must still be denied for lack of exhaustion of all claims. However, we did find that Stamps had exhausted his state court remedies insofar as the insufficiency of evidence for a persistent felony offender claim was concerned. 16 After we dismissed Stamps' first petition, he began an all-out collateral attack on his PFO conviction by attacking the two underlying convictions which supported his PFO conviction. In his second federal habeas petition, he claimed that the theft by unlawful taking conviction in 1979 was unconstitutional because he was denied effective assistance of counsel, and that his plea of guilty was not voluntary or knowing. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed the petition, finding that Stamps suffered no constitutional deprivation as his guilty plea was voluntary and knowing, and his counsel's advice was competent. Stamps again appealed to this court. We affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Stamps received effective assistance of counsel at the guilty plea proceedings, and that he had a complete understanding of the charge to which he pleaded and the consequences of making the plea. 17 Stamps also challenged the underlying receiving stolen property of a value over $100 conviction pursuant to a RCr 11.42 proceeding in the state trial court. The trial court overruled his motion, and Stamps appealed again to the Kentucky Court of Appeals which affirmed the action of the trial court in denying an evidentiary hearing and overruling the Rule 11.42 motion. However, the court sustained Stamps' argument that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel, stating that it was appropriate and necessary that the trial court appoint counsel and permit Stamps to present for adjudication any supplementary grounds that might originally appear for RCr 11.42 relief. The Kentucky Supreme Court granted discretionary review, reversed the Court of Appeals, and affirmed the trial court. Commonwealth v. Stamps, 672 S.W.2d 336 (Ky.1984). 18 Upon Stamps' filing the present petition in the district court, the petition was referred to the United States Magistrate who recommended that the petition be dismissed as Stamps had failed to exhaust state court remedies as to one or more of the grounds raised in the petition, and that the petition was therefore mixed. The magistrate specifically found that collateral attack was inappropriate because Stamps had a full opportunity to raise and litigate the issues presented in the petition in state courts, but neglected to do so and neglected to comply with state court procedure. The magistrate noted this court's prior determination that the claim as to ineffective counsel was not exhausted at the state court level, and found that Stamps had done nothing to exhaust the claim previously found to be unexhausted by this court. 19 The district court rejected the magistrate's report and recommendation, finding that Stamps had adequately exhausted his claim before the Kentucky state courts. The district court then considered the merits of Stamps' petition and found that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel, as there was no reasonable probability that the few omissions made by Stamps' defense counsel prejudiced him or affected the outcome of the trial. On Stamps' second contention, the district court found that Stamps' attorney's stipulation concerning the prior convictions was a matter of strategy which worked in that Stamps received the minimum possible PFO sentence. Therefore, there was no prejudice to Stamps' rights to a fair trial. Finally, the district court found there was sufficient evidence to convict Stamps under Kentucky's PFO statute. 20 Lack of exhaustion is an issue on only one of Stamps' claims, as we have previously held that Stamps' claim of insufficiency of evidence on his PFO conviction was adequately exhausted in the state courts. Stamps' claim that the trial court erred in not conducting an on-the-record inquiry into the voluntariness of a de facto guilty plea was adjudicated and dismissed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Stamps' original direct appeal. Therefore, the only exhaustion issue before us concerns whether Stamps' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been adequately exhausted at the state court level. 21 Initially, it is noted that Stamps has done nothing to exhaust this claim since we previously held that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not properly exhausted. However, recent holdings of the Supreme Court and this court lead us to reverse ourselves and conclude that Stamps has adequately exhausted this claim. In Granberry v. Greer, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), the Court held that although there is a strong presumption in favor of requiring a prisoner to pursue his available state remedies, a failure to pursue those remedies is not an absolute bar to appellate consideration of his habeas corpus petition. Granberry, 107 S.Ct. at 1673-74. In a recent decision of this court applying the principles of Granberry, we concluded that, under special circumstances, failure to exhaust state remedies will not act as a complete bar to federal habeas review. Pillette v. Foltz, 824 F.2d 494 (6th Cir.1987) (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1201-02, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982)). For example, if the state fails to raise nonexhaustion as a defense until the case reaches the court of appeals, the court will examine the interest of comity and federalism in deciding whether or not to review the merits of a claim. Pillette, 824 F.2d at 496. Similarly, nonexhaustion will not act as a bar to appellate review where it is clear that requiring a petitioner to pursue further review before the state courts would be futile because state law precludes further review. Pillette, 824 F.2d at 498 (citing Rachel v. Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200, 204 n. 5 (6th Cir.1978)). 22 Under Kentucky law, when a party files a RCr 11.42 motion collaterally attacking a conviction, the party is required to state all grounds for holding the conviction or sentence invalid of which the party has knowledge. A failure to do so results in a bar to further collateral attack in state court. RCr 11.42 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983). See, e.g., Crick v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 534 (Ky.1977) (per curiam). Since Stamps failed to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his RCr 11.42 collateral attack on his burglary and PFO convictions, he is now precluded from that avenue of relief. As we have heretofore indicated, when a defendant has previously petitioned under this rule and where a subsequent motion will apparently be denied without a hearing, we do not require a further effort to exhaust the claim in state court since that requirement would be an exercise in futility. Matthews v. Wingo, 474 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 985, 93 S.Ct. 2283, 36 L.Ed.2d 963 (1973). The decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals denying Stamps' RCr 11.42 motion is final state action and, therefore, that claim has been adequately exhausted. See Tuggle v. Seabold, 806 F.2d 87 (6th Cir.1986). 23 Finally, judicial economy must be taken into consideration. This is the third habeas appeal of petitioner to reach this court. The district court has twice considered the merits of Stamps' allegations and has held on both occasions that Stamps has not experienced a constitutional violation. We are of the view that it would be an exercise in futility for this court to require the district court to review again the merits of Stamps' allegations. Moreover, each and every time any court has considered the merits of Stamps' allegations, it has determined them to be without merit. Thus, we will exercise our discretion and adjudicate Stamps' petition on its merits.