Opinion ID: 417704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenge to the Entrapment Instructions

Text: 111 Appellants contend that the entrapment instructions were erroneous in two respects. They first claim that Judge Pratt removed the issue of entrapment from the jury's consideration. The basis for this claim is the following portion of the charge: 112 You are not to be concerned with whether the prosecution or the F.B.I. agents or Mr. Weinberg acted legally or illegally, properly or improperly or whether the Abscam investigation itself was conducted properly. Those are questions which must be decided by me at an appropriate time. 113 The challenged sentences were not error. It was not any part of the jury's function to decide whether the Abscam tactics were illegal or improper. Their function, as Judge Pratt told them, was to decide whether they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that each defendant was predisposed to commit the crimes charged. And with respect to that question Judge Pratt instructed as follows: 114 In determining whether either defendant, if afforded a favorable opportunity, was predisposed to engage in the kind of criminal activity for which he is charged, you should look to the totality of the circumstances shown by the evidence, including the nature and extent of the inducement offered. In weighing the circumstances to determine this issue of predisposition, you may consider, among other things, the impact that the conduct of the government agents had on the defendant, both directly and indirectly through its effects on the alleged co-conspirator Sandy Williams, George Katz, and Angelo Errichetti. 115 In the same vein, the sentence immediately preceding the passage complained of by the appellants instructed the jury as follows: 116 What the F.B.I. agents and Mr. Weinberg did should concern you only to the extent that you find that it affected the conduct and state of mind of a defendant or other participants in the conspiracy or only insofar as it may affect the credibility of any witness with respect to the matters before you. 117 The charge, taken as a whole, fully and fairly permitted the jury to consider the Abscam tactics as they related to the defense of entrapment. 118 The second claim arises from Judge Pratt's response to a question asked by the jury during deliberations. The jury's note read as follows: 119 Would you kindly explain the legal guidelines of a scam operation? 120 At what point do the practices or methods used in a scam become entrapment in regards to the law? 121 Does entrapment have to be established from day one of the indictment or can it be established further along in the operation? 122 This note precipitated an extended colloquy between Judge Pratt and counsel for both defendants. Attorney Koelzer, representing Williams, began by noting that part of the inquiry had misstated the burden of proof with respect to entrapment. Whereas the note had asked, Does entrapment have to be established from day one of the indictment, Koelzer correctly pointed out that, once inducement is shown, the Government has to prove predisposition. Taking the jury's phrase, he maintained that predisposition had to be proved  'from day one.' In other words, from on or about the first day of January, 1979, these two men were predisposed beyond a reasonable doubt--. Judge Pratt promptly interjected, That is an overstatement. Attorney Batchelder, representing Feinberg, pointed out that the question related to entrapment, not predisposition, and that entrapment can occur anytime during the scheme. Disputing Attorney Koelzer, he added, So when he says that you have to have entrapment from square one, the answer is no, no, no, no. He then suggested that the entrapment portion of the original charge be reread in full. Judge Pratt then ascertained that both counsel agreed to that suggestion. 123 When the jury was recalled, Judge Pratt began by making sure the jury understood that, since inducement was not disputed, the defendants had no burden to establish anything with respect to entrapment, that the burden was upon the Government to disprove the defense by showing that the defendants were predisposed to commit the crimes. At that point, he made the statements that appellants now contend created reversible error: 124 You said from day one, or at some other time. You have to decide when the crime was committed, if you get to that element, and then determine as of that time when he committed the crime was he predisposed to do it or wasn't he. 125 This was followed by a rereading of the entrapment portion of the original charge. At the conclusion of the supplemental charge, Judge Pratt asked if there were exceptions and counsel took none, other than to preserve their prior objections to the original charge. 126 As a general proposition of law the fragment of the supplemental response now challenged by appellants was erroneous. A defendant's predisposition is not to be assessed as of that time when he committed the crime. Normally, predisposition refers to the state of mind of a defendant before government agents make any suggestion that he should commit a crime. By state of mind we do not mean to require specific prior contemplation of criminal conduct. It is sufficient if the defendant is of a frame of mind such that once his attention is called to the criminal opportunity, his decision to commit the crime is the product of his own preference and not the product of government persuasion. The phrase ready and willing adequately captures that concept and does so in a manner likely to be comprehensible to juries. 127 In the circumstances of this case, however, the erroneous statement in the supplemental charge does not warrant reversal for several reasons. First, neither counsel, after hearing the statement, objected to it or asked for a clarifying instruction. Second, neither counsel had suggested to Judge Pratt a correct statement of the law that would have answered the jury's questions. Attorney Koelzer's initial suggestion that predisposition had to be proved from day one ... on or about the first day of January, 1979 was, as Judge Pratt noted, an overstatement. The earliest that predisposition had to be established was as of the time when the agents first presented the criminal opportunity to the defendants, which was May 30 with Feinberg and May 31 with the Senator. There was no reason to focus the jury's attention on the Senator's state of mind at the start of the indictment period, which was five months before any criminal opportunity was broached by the undercover agents. 9 Third, the isolated remark complained of was followed by a rereading of the full charge on entrapment, 10 which correctly set forth the applicable principles, see United States v. Parisi, 674 F.2d 126, 128 (1st Cir.1982), and, following United States v. Viviano, 437 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983, 91 S.Ct. 1659, 29 L.Ed.2d 149 (1971), focused the jury's attention on the three possible bases of proving predisposition--a design to commit the offense formed prior to any inducement, a prompt and unhesitating agreement to the corrupt proposal, or an existing course of similar conduct. Fourth, and most important, on the facts of this case, the statement as to time of predisposition was not prejudicial because the criminal opportunity was accepted when it was first presented. The time when the crime was first committed virtually coincided with the pertinent time for assessing predisposition. Thereafter the Senator simply repeated and emphasized his willingness to commit the crimes. On the facts of this case, the supplemental charge, taken as a whole, contained no prejudicial error.