Opinion ID: 11549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the order was final and appealable

Text: 9 Although the parties do not challenge the appellate jurisdiction of either the district court or this Court, we are obligated to examine the basis for our jurisdiction, sua sponte, if necessary. Williams v. Chater, 87 F.3d 702, 704 (5th Cir.1996). We apparently have never squarely addressed the question whether a bankruptcy court's lifting of an automatic stay is a final and appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 158. 4 10 In pertinent part, section 158(a) provides that [t]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments, orders, and decrees of bankruptcy judges. Section 158(d) provides that [t]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b) of this section. 5 11 In the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the Supreme Court has defined a final judgment as a decision that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do except execute the judgment. Coopers and Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2456, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). In the context of bankruptcy cases, however, it is well established that finality is contingent upon the conclusion of an adversarial proceeding within the bankruptcy case, rather than the conclusion of the entire litigation. Matter of England, 975 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir.1992). This Court has explained that an order that ends a discrete judicial unit in the larger case concludes a bankruptcy proceeding and is a final judgment for the purposes of section 158(d). Id. 12 Although we apparently have never held that a bankruptcy court's order granting relief from an automatic stay is final and appealable, we have stated, in dicta, that [o]rders granting or denying relief from the automatic stay [pursuant to § 362] are final and appealable. In the Matter of Lieb, 915 F.2d 180, 185 n. 3 (5th Cir.1990) (citing In re Sun Valley Foods Co., 801 F.2d 186, 190 (6th Cir.1986)). Indeed, our research reveals that our sister circuits have invariably held that orders granting relief from a § 362 automatic stay are final and appealable. In re Pegasus Agency, Inc., 101 F.3d 882, 885 (2d Cir.1996); Eddleman v. United States Dep't of Labor, 923 F.2d 782, 784 (10th Cir.1991), overruled in part on other grounds, Temex Energy, Inc. v. Underwood, Wilson, Berry, Stein & Johnson, 968 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir.1992); In re Dixie Broadcasting, Inc., 871 F.2d 1023, 1026 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853, 110 S.Ct. 154, 107 L.Ed.2d 112 (1989); In re Sun Valley Foods Company, 801 F.2d 186, 189 (6th Cir.1986); In re American Mariner Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir.1984); In re Comer, 716 F.2d 168, 172 (3d Cir.1983). 13 In making this determination, several of the circuits have relied on the legislative history of the automatic stay in the Bankruptcy Code, which reveals that Congress perceived the automatic stay to be similar to a permanent injunction. E.g., Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 785 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 344, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787, 5963, 6300). Reasoning that a permanent injunction is appealable as a final order, the courts have concluded that Congress likewise intended the lifting of a stay to be appealable. Id. (citing Vicksburg v. Henson, 231 U.S. 259, 34 S.Ct. 95, 58 L.Ed. 209 (1913)). 14 Moreover, the courts have recognized that if such orders are not considered final and appealable, they would be, for the most part, unreviewable by the circuit courts. E.g., Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 785. We are persuaded by the above reasoning and conclude that an order granting relief from an automatic stay is a final and appealable order.B. WHETHER BANKRUPTCY COURT ERRED IN LIFTING THE STAY 15 After reviewing the record, briefs, and arguments of counsel, it is clear that the state court's order that Mr. Chunn pay the mortgage payments pending appeal of the divorce judgment was actually in the nature of support. It was designated as such and can hardly be construed as anything but a support order. It is without dispute that Texas courts, like the courts of other states, routinely make temporary support orders regarding the payment of expenses, including mortgage payments. This is especially so in cases such as the instant case where the party receiving support is the primary custodian of the minor children of the marriage sought to be dissolved. Pursuant to § 362(b)(2), which specifically exempts actions for the collection of maintenance, the automatic stay did not apply to the support order. 6 Therefore, the bankruptcy court could not have abused its discretion in lifting the stay to allow enforcement of the order. See Gibraltar Sav. v. LDBrinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275, 1285 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091, 109 S.Ct. 2432, 104 L.Ed.2d 988 (1989). We likewise find Mr. Chunn's remaining arguments to be without merit. 16 AFFIRMED.