Opinion ID: 2358793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Was the sealing order of June 9 proper?

Text: ¶ 31 Unlike the May 20 order, which concluded that documents requested from the Sheriff were exempt from production under the PRA, the June 9 order (as modified by the June 25 order) sealed records that had previously been marked or entered as exhibits in a public trial. We review a trial court's sealing order for abuse of discretion. Rufer v. Abbott Labs., 154 Wash.2d 530, 540, 114 P.3d 1182 (2005). We start with the presumption of openness based on our state constitution's mandate that `[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay.' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10). ¶ 32 In keeping with our state constitution's mandate for open justice, court rules require a hearing before court records are sealed or redacted, and this procedure was not followed before entering the ex parte sealing order. GR 15(c)(1). We recognize that a hearing on the merits was contemplated in the ex parte order, but it does not appear from the record that the necessary hearing ever occurred. Even assuming that the July 14 hearing, at which respondent Darcus Allen was not represented, was the anticipated GR 15 hearing, the order entered after this hearing was constitutionally inadequate to justify the sealing of court records. The sealing of court records in this instance constituted a court closure to the extent it removed from public access documents marked as exhibits or admitted into open court. Rufer, 154 Wash.2d at 549, 114 P.3d 1182. In order to make such a closure, the trial court was required to engage in an on-the-record analysis of the factors outlined in Ishikawa and to set forth findings supporting a determination that there is a compelling interest which overrides the public's right to the open administration of justice. Id. [6] The June 9 order lacks any discussion of Ishikawa. Accordingly, it must be vacated.