Opinion ID: 2800623
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sealing Of The Wiretap Recordings

Text: We now turn to Burgos' argument that the wiretap application failed to comply with certain procedural requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a). That subsection provides that [i]mmediately upon the expiration of the period of the order authorizing a wiretap, such recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions. Id. It further provides that [t]he presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof is a prerequisite for any use of the evidence. Id. Burgos makes two arguments: (1) that the records were not sealed immediately, because the government ended the wiretap on September 30 but the recordings were not sealed until October 7, and (2) that they were not sealed by the same judge who had issued the order. The government does not dispute these deviations from the statutory requirements. It argues, however, that because it has offered a satisfactory explanation for the late sealing, and -13- because the use of a different judge is immaterial, the recordings need not be suppressed. After an evidentiary hearing to consider the issue of sealing, the district court denied Burgos' motion to suppress the wiretap evidence on these grounds. Burgos Montes, 2010 WL 5184844, at -8. Before turning to the substance, we must first address the threshold issue of the proper standard of review. Neither party points us to a standard of review for the question of whether the government's explanation for the absence of a seal that complies with the requirements of section 2518(8)(a) is satisfactory. It appears that this circuit has never expressly articulated one. Other circuits are split, with some employing a clearly erroneous standard, see, e.g., United States v. Coney, 407 F.3d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 2005), and others applying plenary review to the question of whether the explanation is satisfactory, even though subsidiary factual questions are reviewed for clear error, see, e.g., United States v. Sawyers, 963 F.2d 157, 159 (8th Cir. 1992). In United States v. Mora, 821 F.2d 860, 869-70 (1st Cir. 1987), which articulated the factors that define a satisfactory explanation in this circuit, we accepted the district court's supported subsidiary factual findings, but applied de novo review to whether those facts were satisfactory under the newly announced test. We will follow in those footsteps. -14- In assessing the ramifications of an untimely sealing, Mora established that the key inquiry was whether the government had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the integrity of the tapes ha[d] not been compromised. Id. at 867. Sealing helps ensure and demonstrate a lack of tampering. To the extent that there is any delay in sealing, the field may open more widely for the defendant to question and explore what happened to the records pre-sealing. Here, the district court concluded that Iglesias was credible in his testimony that the recordings were kept in a manner that sufficiently excludes the possibility of tampering, and noted that Burgos had not even argued that they had been tampered with. Burgos Montes, 2010 WL 5184844, at . On appeal, Burgos again offers no allegations of tampering. While the burden of proof is on the government, this does not mean the government must prove a negative when the defendant does not even allege that tampering has taken place. Burgos also does not offer any facts speaking to the other factors in Mora, particularly indications of bad faith by law enforcement personnel or prejudice to him--his argument simply turns on the bare fact that seven days is not immediately. However, in Mora itself, the court found that delays of twenty and forty-one days, while concerning, did not automatically require suppression in light of the other factors. Id. at 869. We conclude the same here regarding the seven-day -15- delay, given the lack of any evidence of tampering or other possible prejudice, and the lack of evidence of bad faith. We can also quickly dispense with Burgos' objection to the sealing of the recordings by a judge other than the one who approved the wiretap. When Iglesias took the recordings to the issuing judge, he was told that the judge was unavailable and was sent to a different judge, who sealed them. Burgos cites no case where recordings have been suppressed under such circumstances. Few cases have addressed the issue at all, although the Second Circuit has suggested in dictum that when the issuing judge's unavailability would result in a delay, sealing by a non-issuing judge is permissible. United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1972). As a purely textual matter, the agents appear to have complied with the statute in that they made [the recordings] available to the [issuing] judge and followed her direction[] to take them to a different judge for sealing. Thus, this argument also fails.