Opinion ID: 2600313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Derivative Information

Text: We consider a situation in which defense counsel has obtained complainant information through the Pitchess process, and defense investigators have interviewed that complainant. If that counsel later represents another defendant and, pursuant to Pitchess, discovers the same complainant information, may the lawyer refer to the derivative information obtained during the earlier follow-up investigation without violating the section 1045(e) protective order? As noted, section 1045(e) provides that when a court permits disclosure pursuant to section 1043, it must also order that the records disclosed or discovered may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law. (§ 1045(e).) In Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1033, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228, we held the language `a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law' refers to the statutory Pitchess scheme, and restricts use of the disclosed information to the proceeding in which it was sought. ( Id. at pp. 1040, 1042, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228, italics added.) This interpretation of section 1045(e) harmonizes the entire statutory scheme and retains its effectiveness by furthering the legitimate interests of both the defendant and the peace officer. ( Id. at pp. 1042-1043, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228) In reaching our conclusion, we rejected Alford's argument that an order limiting use of Pitchess material to the case in which it is sought undermines fair representation and encourages inefficiency and duplication of effort, in that members of the public defender's office must feign ignorance of Pitchess information personally known to them and instead file repeated Pitchess motions in subsequent cases, not `using' previously disclosed information in making showings of good cause for disclosure. ( Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1043, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228.) Alford identified no impediment to the public defender's ability to represent him, and the specific Pitchess judicial obligation arguably superseded a public defender's office rules concerning attribution to all deputies of knowledge gained by any one of them. ( Ibid., italics omitted) Alford involved the information disclosed pursuant to a Pitchess motion. ( Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1037, fn. 2, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228.) We noted that the parties have not briefed, and we express no views concerning, the treatment of information developed as a result of the receipt of information disclosed pursuant to a Pitchess motion. ( Ibid.; see also id. at p. 1063, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228 (cone. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J.).) That issue is presented here. Section 1045(e) refers to records disclosed or discovered. We conclude that this language means the personnel file information that is ordered disclosed by the trial court. As noted, this information is generally limited to the name, address and telephone number of a prior complainant, other witnesses, and the date of the incident. In that general situation, the statutory description of records disclosed or discovered does not extend to information subsequently developed. However, derivative information could reveal that a complaint had been made against a particular officer and the name of the complainant. As a result, it could relate back to information that was disclosed and fall under the protective order. In this situation, however, there is no danger of an unjustified disclosure, as Chambers will receive the name of the officer through his own Pitchess motion. We adopt the rule formulated by the Court of Appeal for this narrow factual situation. When complainant information has been ordered disclosed to counsel who, when later representing a different defendant, succeeds under Pitchess in discovering the same complainant information relating to the same officer, counsel may then refer to the derivative information uncovered as part of the earlier followup investigation. Application of the rule is illustrated by the following scenario: Counsel for Defendant A files a Pitchess motion and receives complainant information. An investigator then interviews that complainant, and perhaps other witnesses, thus developing derivative information. The same attorney later represents Defendant B. Even though the same law enforcement officer may be involved in Defendant B's case, counsel cannot simply use the derivative information developed in Defendant A's case. Doing so' would reveal complainant information from the officer's record that is subject to the section 1045(e) protective order under which the disclosure was made in Defendant A's case. However, if counsel files a new Pitchess motion in Defendant B's case, seeking information about the officer and then receives the same complainant's name as he or she did in Defendant A's case, the attorney is free to use derivative information previously garnered during the followup investigation. The section 1045(e) protective order is designed to ensure that disclosure of confidential information is limited to the proceeding in which the disclosure is ordered. Once a subsequent defendant obtains that same information under a valid Pitchess order, there is little justification for precluding review of derivative information. As the Court of Appeal observed, the second litigant obtains nothing beyond that which the Pitchess statutory scheme contemplates he is able to obtain, and counsel for the first Pitchess litigant has not permitted the information to be used for any court proceeding in which a Pitchess relevance determination has not been made. This approach is consistent with the purpose of the Pitchess scheme to balance the police officer's privacy interest in his or her personnel records with the criminal defendant's interest in obtaining all pertinent information. As the Court of Appeal observed, the defendant remains able to prepare a defense, and the officer's privacy interest in the data contained in his personnel file is not affected beyond that which occurred when Pitchess disclosure was ordered. The San Diego Police Department relies on a line of cases holding that other discovery methods cannot substitute for compliance with the Pitchess statutory scheme. Here, however, Chambers followed the Pitchess process, and will receive the complainant information that was also released in the Washington case. Our resolution requires both defendants to bring Pitchess motions, and for a trial court to find good cause and relevance in each case.