Opinion ID: 750633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ADA Allegations

Text: 12 We turn first to Count I of the amended complaint; it alleges a violation of the ADA.
13 The Americans with Disabilities Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213, provides a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). The federal legislation, which took effect in July 1992, prohibits an employer's discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to ... [the] terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. § 12112(a). To determine whether Mr. Duda is qualified to bring a claim under the ADA, we turn to the various pertinent statutory definitions. First, there must be a disability. The Act offers three definitions by which one could establish the existence of a disability: 14 (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 5 one or more of the major life activities 6 of such individual; 15 (B) a record of such impairment 7 ; or 16 (C) being regarded as having such impairment. 8 17 Id. at § 12102(2). The regulations explicating and interpreting the statute define a mental impairment as [a]ny mental or physiological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). 18 To fall under the protection of the ADA, an employee not only must be disabled but also must be a qualified individual with a disability. To be qualified, the ADA requires that he be an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment condition that such individual holds or desires. Id. at § 12111(8). The regulations present two prongs to the definition of qualified individual. First, the disabled individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position [he] holds or desires. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). Second, he can perform the essential functions of such position with or without accommodation. Id. 19 The purpose of this second step is to ensure that individuals with disabilities who can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired are not denied employment opportunities because they are not able to perforn [sic] marginal functions of the position. 20 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(m) (1997). When a plaintiff satisfies both steps in this definition, he is a qualified individual with a disability. That determination should be based on the qualified disabled individual's capabilities at the time of the employment decision. Id. It should not be based on speculation that the employee may become unable in the future or may cause increased health insurance premiums or workers compensation costs. Id.
21 To prevail in his ADA claim, therefore, Mr. Duda must satisfy the threshold requirement of demonstrating that he is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. In Count I of the amended complaint, Mr. Duda states quite plainly that he suffers from a psychiatric illness and has been diagnosed as a manic depressive. He alleges that the School District is aware of that diagnosis and that it regards him as disabled and substantially limited in major life activities. He further alleges that, because of that perception on the part of the District, it has determined that he is unable to work with others, to get along with coworkers and to communicate with other people. Consequently, it has segregated him in his transfer to the elementary school, where he is forced to work alone under orders not to communicate with any other individual. 22 Mr. Duda sufficiently alleged a disability in his amended complaint. Our cases have distinguished between claims of personal conflicts with others, or mere temperament and irritability, which do not amount to disabilities under the ADA, 9 and medically diagnosed mental conditions, like the ones from which Mr. Duda suffers, which are recognized disabilities under the ADA. 10 23 Mr. Duda also adequately alleges that he can perform the essential functions of his job. Moreover, his allegation that he was forced to transfer to a new location and to work alone, under orders not to speak to others, is a clear claim of forced reassignment or of an unreasonable accommodation by the School District based on its regard of his disability. The ADA statute includes segregating a job applicant among its definitions of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1). 11 The EEOC's interpretive guidance to the regulations states clearly that [r]eassignment may not be used to limit, segregate, or otherwise discriminate against employees with disabilities by forcing reassignments to undesirable positions or to designated offices or facilities. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(o) (emphasis added). 12 Therefore, we hold that Mr. Duda's claim of a forced transfer that segregated him is a viable allegation under the ADA. 13 24 The amended complaint goes on to allege that, because of misperceptions about his mental illness, the defendants required him to inform them of counseling and medication changes as a condition of continued employment. We have no doubt that there are situations in which a prudent employer, concerned with the safety of its employees, would be justified in requiring information of this type from an employee suffering from a psychiatric illness, as long as the inquiries were actually related to his job and were necessary to the business. See Yin v. State of California, 95 F.3d 864, 867-68 (9th Cir.1996) (concluding that, in light of the business necessity exception of the ADA, when health problems have had a substantial and injurious impact on an employee's job performance, the employer can require the employee to undergo a physical examination designed to determine his or her ability to work, even if the examination might disclose whether the employee is disabled or the extent of any disability), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 955, 136 L.Ed.2d 842 (1997). At a later stage in this litigation, the School District will have an opportunity to demonstrate that it was necessary to make such an inquiry in this situation. We cannot say, however, that Mr. Duda's allegations might not be supported by factual submissions that would support a judgment in his favor. The ADA does indeed prohibit employers from making disability related inquiries of its employees unless such information is job-related and consistent with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A); 14 See Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1230-31 (10th Cir.1997) (concluding that employer's policy of requiring employee to report all prescription drugs she used violated the ADA unless the information was job-related); Yin, 95 F.3d at 867-68. 25 The amended complaint also alleges that Mr. Duda was subjected to discrimination when he was told that he was not to apply for another position because of the incident involving his diary. On the face of the amended complaint--the full extent of the permissible inquiry at this stage of the proceedings--we cannot say that Mr. Duda would be unable to establish a factual predicate for relief. One of the ADA's basic tenets is that no employer shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures and other employment conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). In the next statutory subsection, discrimination is defined to include denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of [the employer] to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant. § 12112(b)(5)(B). Mr. Duda's claim that the School District discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by refusing to let him apply for the bus driver position survives the motion to dismiss. See Marshall v. Federal Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1098-1100 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing plaintiff's claim that defendant's refusal to let her apply for a position was discriminatory, concluding that she failed to prove defendant's reason was pretextual); cf. Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir.1997) (stating that an employer could not refuse to consider [plaintiff] for the promotion because of his dyslexia, but may give promotion, without discriminating, to the employee who can do the job better); Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1459-60 (7th Cir.1995) (finding that employer who refused to give plaintiff an application had nondiscriminatory reasons for refusal to allow plaintiff to apply). 26 In sum, we conclude that Mr. Duda's amended complaint sufficiently alleges facts to establish a disability claim under the ADA. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal of this count. See Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., Inc., 91 F.3d 959 (7th Cir.1996). 27