Opinion ID: 2175047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Findings of fact and the evidence

Text: The gravamen of petitioners' appeal attacks the Wage Board's findings of fact and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting those findings. They urge that because there is no administrative review of Wage Board action this court, being the only check on the propriety of the Order, should closely examine the record to determine if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. We agree that a close examination is proper. The statute does not explicitly provide that the Wage Board shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the order. Section 36-409(a), supra, states that [t]he review by the court shall be limited to questions of law, and findings of fact by the Commissioners [Board] when supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive. [21] This reference to agency findings reflects that they must be made. Findings are required to aid the reviewing court in properly exercising its prescribed function. SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); Braniff Airways v. CAB, 113 U.S. App.D.C. 132, 135, 306 F.2d 739, 742 (1962). See also footnote 24, infra. For rule-making proceedings, both the Administrative Procedure Act [22] and the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, effective October 21, 1969, [23] require that findings of fact and conclusions of law adhere to the standards applicable to the agency adjudicatory process. We apply these standards to the Wage Board's findings and conclusions in these cases. We think all interested parties are entitled to know, and this court on review must know, the basis and reasons for the Wage Board's action. Section 36-406(e) states that the ad hoc committee in making recommendations shall take into consideration (1) the amount of wages sufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health, (2) the fair and reasonable value of the work performed, and (3) the wages paid in the District of Columbia by fair employers for work of like or comparable character. The Corporation Counsel agree in their brief on behalf of the Board that these standards apply to ultimate Wage Board action. The Wage Board also considered that these basic standards were applicable to their final action. We agree. [24] See also § 36-406(a). The Wage Board made only two findings of fact. The first, relating to a general minimum weekly wage [25] of $81.28, was expressly based on a cost-of-living study (R. 376-380) reflecting that $64.93 was required for goods and services, and $16.35 for taxes. This finding was specifically related to the statutory requirement that wages be sufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health. The second finding, unlike the first, related specifically to the retail trade occupations, and was that the minimum wage should be not less than $2.00 an hour. [26] It was stated that this second finding was based on the three statutory considerations. Accordingly, we have only one finding by the Wage Board which is subject to review on the petitions filed with the court. We think this is not sufficient for meaningful review of the Wage Board's action as set out in the Wage Order. We note that after making this single hourly wage rate finding the Wage Board then directed preparation of a wage order to include among other things eleven specified items, one of which was an hourly minimum wage for the occupation. [27] We also note that the gross weekly wage rate, based on a prescribed forty-hour work week ( see D.C.Code 1967, § 36-403(b)) for this occupation at the $2.00 hourly rate, would be $80.00 whereas in the first finding the minimum weekly wage was determined to be $81.28. While we intimate no view as to the significance of this discrepancy, the minor difference is unexplained by the Wage Board. According to the Wage Board, it considered many volumes of transcript, written statements, statistical documents, and the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee. Yet it mentioned only one item, a report dated August 1968, on hourly earnings in the retail trade occupations in the District of Columbia. We think that meaningful review of Wage Board action requires sufficiently detailed findings of fact to enable the court to know what testimony, statements, and documents were considered relevant and persuasive to the various provisions of the wage order as each relates to the applicable statutory standards for Wage Board action. Such basic findings may then be support for the ultimate facts found. Also, to the extent that agency policy or other relevant considerations are involved, findings must be made to support those determinations. To put it in slightly different terms, the decision must include what have been    described as the basic facts, from which the ultimate facts in the terms of the statutory criterion are inferred. Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 68 App.D.C. 282, 288, 96 F.2d 554, 560 (1938). The court in Saginaw, supra, at 287, 96 F.2d at 559, also counseled that: The process necessarily includes at least four parts: (1) evidence must be taken and weighed, both as to its accuracy and credibility; (2) from attentive consideration of this evidence a [finding] of [the] facts of a basic or underlying nature must be reached; (3) from these basic facts the ultimate facts, usually in the language of the statute, are to be inferred, or not, as the case may be; (4) from this [basic] finding the decision will follow by the application of the statutory criterion. Due to the lack of sufficient basic findings and a reasoned application of these findings to agency policy and the law, [28] we defer review of the Wage Board findings and, retaining jurisdiction of the case, remand the record to the Wage Board [29] with instructions promptly to make appropriate findings of fact. Remanded for further consideration consistent with this opinion.