Opinion ID: 2997523
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: credible evidence standard

Text: As discussed earlier, DCFS rules define credible evidence of child abuse or neglect to mean that “the available facts, when viewed in light of surrounding circumstances, would cause a reasonable person to believe that a child was abused or neglected.” 89 Ill. Admin. Code § 336.20. The district court found that DCFS investigators historically read this standard to permit them to indicate a finding on no more than “any” credible evidence. Many investigators therefore did not consider evidence that the child abuse or neglect did not occur. Dupuy, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1135. Consistent with the district court’s order, DCFS has drafted a new rule that, among other things, expressly instructs the factfinder to consider all available evidence that an incident of abuse or neglect did or did not occur and admonishes that “[i]t is of critical importance that all evidence suggesting that an incident of abuse or neglect did not occur be given the same consideration as evidence suggesting that an incident of abuse or neglect did occur.” R.323, Draft Procedure § 300.60l (emphasis in original). The plaintiffs nevertheless submit that, even though DCFS investigators now must consider exculpatory evidence, the standard of proof for indicating reports is not sufficiently high. In essence, they submit that the “credible evidence” standard will continue to enable DCFS to indicate a finding based on a scintilla of inculpatory evidence, even in the face of equal or more powerful exculpatory evidence. In their view, we ought to require either a clear and convincing standard or, at minimum, a preponderance of the evidence standard. The plaintiffs contend that, despite DCFS’ efforts, the standard has not changed substantively as a practical matter because DCFS investigators have long understood the credible evidence standard to impose no obNos. 03-3071 & 03-3191 21 ligation upon them to consider or weigh exculpatory evidence. Therefore, investigators will continue to indicate individuals if there is any evidence to support an abuse or neglect allegation, even in the face of significant evidence to the contrary. DCFS maintains that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the more rigorous credible evidence standard together with the pre-deprivation Administrator’s conference will ensure the accuracy of indicated reports. Moreover, DCFS notes that indicated persons also can seek to expunge an indicated report through a full evidentiary hearing after the indication is placed on the register. Both sides present strong cases on the need for an accurate evaluation of the facts even at this initial stage. The child care workers want to avoid being stigmatized by a false indicated report that will preclude them from working in the child care field until it is expunged. See, e.g., Doyle, 305 F.3d at 619 (noting that, based on “thin evidence, and prior to an adversarial hearing that may develop a more complete and balanced record, DCFS discloses this finding to current and prospective employers of the indicated individual”). On the other side of the balance, “[a]ssuring the safety and wellbeing of a child exposed to abuse or neglect often requires DCFS to act promptly on the basis of meager evidence.” Id. Given the importance of the interests of both parties, the decisive factor in this case is the high risk of erroneous deprivation, see Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1003; specifically, the unacceptable 74.6 percent reversal rate for challenged indicated reports under DCFS’ original method of evaluating these claims. The standard of proof that applies no doubt will influence directly the risk of erroneous judgments: a higher standard reduces the risk of indicating an 22 Nos. 03-3071 & 03-3191 innocent person but also increases the risk of not indicating a perpetrator of child abuse or neglect. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Moreover, a higher standard of proof often will impede quick action by the State, although this concern is somewhat balanced by the State’s shared interest in avoiding mistakes and identifying the true perpetrator. See Dupuy, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1139; Lyon v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 807 N.E.2d 423, 436 (Ill. 2004). We believe that the more rigorous interpretation of the “credible evidence” standard required by the district court’s order is an appropriate measure at the pre-indication stage. As understood by the district court, this standard requires that the investigator not simply identify some evidence that supports an indicated finding. It also requires that the investigator take into account all of the available evidence that tends to show that abuse or neglect did or did not occur. Only then may the investigator decide whether that totality of evidence would cause a reasonable individual to believe that a child was abused or neglected. The plaintiffs nevertheless submit that the requirement that the investigator identify and weigh all the available evidence on both sides of the issue likely will be ignored as a practical matter. They point out that the same formulation was employed prior to this litigation and, at that time, widely was understood to describe the investigator’s obligation as simply to identify any evidence of abuse or neglect—without the concomitant obligation to identify and weigh evidence pointing against such a finding. Our colleague in the district court indicated a certain unease with the continuation of a term of art that for so long was identified with a one-sided view of the evidence that no party defends today. Other than bureaucratic intransigence, Nos. 03-3071 & 03-3191 23 it is difficult to identify any reason for DCFS’ determination not to abandon this term. Several considerations convince us, however, that, at this preliminary stage of the litigation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to require the wholesale abandonment of the term. First of all, as the district court noted, the term now is employed in a regulatory context that contains clear instructions on proper investigative techniques and that explicitly requires that the investigating officer consider all evidence on both sides of the issue.10 We also believe that, absent more concrete evidence that the standard would be mis- 10 The district court found: New draft DCFS procedures provide explicit, comprehensive instructions for assessing the reliability of information uncovered in the investigation, including the significance of professional training; independent verification of nonprofessional sources of information; sensitivity to the interest a witness might have, and the consistency and plausibility of the witness’s statement; consideration of the witness’s opportunity to observe; and recognition of the age, developmental stage, and susceptibility to influence any child witness. (Draft Procedures, § 300.60K, Exhibit 3 to Plaintiff’s Statement.) Most important, the new procedures state clearly that a child abuse or neglect investigation requires consideration of “[a]ll evidence that indicates that an incident of abuse or neglect did or did not occur.” (Id. § 300.60L, emphasis in original.) The procedures underscore still further the requirement that exculpatory evidence be considered, directing the investigator to create a matrix having two columns, one for recording evidence suggesting that abuse or neglect did not occur and a second for recording evidence in support of a finding of abuse or neglect. R.443 at 6. 24 Nos. 03-3071 & 03-3191 applied in the future, the district court was correct in determining that it was appropriate for the federal district court to refrain from interfering with the State’s administration of a state program any more than was necessary to remedy the constitutional violation. Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 392 (1992). Moreover, although the fears of the plaintiffs at this point are speculative, if retention of the “credible evidence” standard later becomes problematic in practice, the plaintiffs are not without recourse. At that point, faced with direct evidence of an unconstitutional course of conduct, the district court would be on solid ground in requiring abolition of the term. In evaluating this standard for the pre-indication stage of the investigation, the articulation of this standard of proof by DCFS certainly ought not be assessed in isolation. Rather, it is important to take into consideration that, before a person can be indicated under this standard of proof, the investigator’s determination to that effect is subject to review by an examiner who did not take part in the investigation. This review must include a hearing at which the accused individual will have a right to present his side of the story. When viewed in this procedural context, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion when it permitted DCFS to retain the term “credible evidence” in its articulation of the governing standard of proof.11 11 At first glance, it may appear that our determination as to the “credible evidence” standard sets our circuit’s law at odds with the standard articulated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994). Our study of that case leads us to the conclusion that no such conflict is present. In that case, our colleagues on that bench simply did (continued...) Nos. 03-3071 & 03-3191 25