Opinion ID: 2800197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendant Is a Credit Restricted Felon.

Text: Pierce argues the trial court erred by determining he was a credit restricted felon. Our General Assembly has defined “credit restricted felon” in pertinent part as “a person who has been convicted of . . . child molesting involving . . . deviate sexual conduct . . . if: (A) the offense is committed by a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age; and (B) the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-72 (Supp. 2013). Pierce contends this statute cannot apply to him because the State failed to prove V.H. was under twelve years of age at the time of the offense. We disagree. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction against Pierce for Count 9, Class A felony child molesting involving sexual deviate conduct against V.H. The charging information for Count 9 does not provide V.H.’s age at the time of the charged conduct, but it does state that conduct occurred in “Fall 2009.” App. at 163. It also states Pierce was at least 21 years of age at that time. V.H. was born in November of 1999. The laws of mathematics, as we presently understand them, preclude her being more than ten years of age at the time of the charged conduct. 15 But Pierce contends we should disregard the date on the charging information in light of Final Instruction No. 7: “The State is not required to prove that the crime charged was committed during a particular time period alleged in the charging information.” App. at 320. Thus, he argues, “it cannot be determined when the jury believed the conduct actually occurred,” and there is a possibility the jury believed it occurred after V.H.’s twelfth birthday. Appellant’s Br. at 19. That may be true as far as it goes, but it is not relevant. “At the time of sentencing, a court shall determine whether a person is a credit restricted felon.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.8(a) (2012). The court must base that determination upon: “(1) evidence admitted at trial that is relevant to the credit restrict status; (2) evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing; or (3) a factual basis provided as part of a guilty plea.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.8(b). As the statute makes plain, it is the trial court, and not the jury, that determines whether a defendant is a credit restricted felon. Here, after hearing all the evidence presented at trial and at the sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that V.H. “was less than twelve (12) years of age at the time the Defendant committed the offenses against her.” App. at 363. Therefore, it concluded, “The Defendant is a ‘credit restricted felon’ as that term is defined in I.C. 35-31.5-2-72.” App. at 364. We believe there is substantial evidence of probative value to support that determination. V.H. testified Pierce molested her in his apartment, but before her twelfth birthday, Pierce and his wife moved from that apartment to a house. Thus, the molestation in the apartment must have occurred when V.H. was less than twelve years of age. The trial court did not err by finding Pierce was a credit restricted felon. IV. The Trial Court Erred by Suspending Part of the Defendant’s Sentence. Finally, on cross-appeal, the State argues the trial court violated a state statute when it suspended six years of Pierce’s thirty-year sentence for Count 9, Class A felony child molesting of V.H. 16 If a person is: (1) convicted of child molesting . . . as a Class A felony against a victim less than twelve (12) years of age; and (2) at least 21 years of age; the court may suspend only that part of the sentence that is in excess of thirty (30) years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2(i) (2008). As we discussed above, the trial court found V.H. was less than twelve years of age when Pierce committed the offenses against her, including Count 9, Class A felony child molesting, and Pierce was at least twenty-one years of age at that time. There is substantial evidence of probative value to support those findings. Therefore, Indiana Code section 35-50-2-2(i) applies, the suspension is incompatible with the plain language of that statute, and we must reverse Pierce’s sentence for Count 9 and remand to the trial court for resentencing on that count.