Opinion ID: 2018359
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Review Under Article 105

Text: Section 6 of Article 105, Constitution of North Dakota, provides in part: All decisions of the secretary of state in regard to any such petition shall be subject to review by the supreme court.. . . If proceedings are brought against any petition upon any ground, the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking it. Section 7 of Article 105 states in part that: All decisions of the secretary of state in the petition process are subject to review by the supreme court in the exercise of original jurisdiction. Meier submits that in reviewing the secretary of state's determination this court is governed by the abuse of discretion standard enunciated in Hernett v. Meier, 173 N.W.2d 907 (N.D.1970). In Hernett, the issue was whether or not signatures on a referendum petition complied with a statute, § 16-01-11, NDCC. It appears that the proper standard of review was not raised as an issue. Under the principle of separation of powers, courts do not substitute their judgment for that of an executive officer who has exercised a discretionary function. See Appeal of Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 475 (N.D. 1970). That has no application, however, to ministerial acts. In State v. Hanna, 31 N.D. 570, 154 N.W. 704 (1915), the issue raised was whether or not the secretary of state's action in filing and canvassing referendum petitions pursuant to § 25 of the Constitution [2] was discretionary, and whether or not his decision was conclusive on this court. This court found that his decision was not conclusive and, in holding that the duties fixed by § 25 are ministerial, said: That a question of law may arise, as here, upon the sufficiency of the petition vests no discretion in said official in acting under it. 154 N.W. at 705. There is authority for the proposition that the placing of a proposal on the ballot by the secretary of state is a ministerial, not a quasi-judicial, act. State ex rel. Williams v. Brown, 52 Ohio St.2d 13, 6 Ohio Cas.3d 79, 368 N.E.2d 838 (1977). See also, 42 Am.Jur.2d, Initiative and Referendum, § 47. We are not bound by the secretary of state's interpretation of the Constitution, and the abuse of discretion standard has no application here. It has been suggested that, in effect, Meier's determination is a proceeding against the petition and thus the burden of proof is upon him pursuant to the provision in Section 6 of Article 105, which states: If proceedings are brought against any petition upon any ground, the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking it. We do not agree that there is a burden of proof upon anyone in this case where the principal question is entirely one of law, and to the extent that there are disputes as to the facts, they are not material to our determination.