Opinion ID: 2326714
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Confidential Commercial Information

Text: Alternatively, the University relies on another privilege generally recognized under the civil discovery rules that has been incorporated by decisional law within the ambit of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) and that it urges should be incorporated within the ambit of SG § 10-618(b)  that of confidential commercial information. Because there is no definitive Maryland law on this point, the University relies on Federal cases interpreting FOIA, mostly Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill, supra, 443 U.S. 340, 99 S.Ct. 2800, 61 L.Ed.2d 587. At issue there, among other things, was whether Domestic Policy Directives issued on a monthly basis by the Federal Reserve Board's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) were subject to immediate public inspection under § 552. Those Directives, issued immediately following the FOMC monthly meeting, summarized the economic and monetary background of the FOMC's deliberations and indicated whether the Committee intended to follow an inflationary, deflationary, or unchanged monetary policy in the month ahead. The Directives also included specific tolerance ranges for growth in the money supply and for the Federal Funds rate. FOMC withheld disclosure of the Directive for 45 days in accordance with FOMC regulations, at which point a new Directive was in place. After rejecting most of FOMC's arguments against immediate disclosure, the Court concluded, from some of the legislative history of FOIA, that § 552(b)(5) incorporated a qualified privilege for confidential commercial information, at least to the extent that this information is generated by the Government itself in the process leading up to awarding a contract. Id. at 360, 99 S.Ct. at 2812, 61 L.Ed.2d at 603. (Emphasis added). [3] The Court held that the Directives were confidential and commercial in nature and that, in a broad way, they were relevant to the process for awarding contracts  the purchase of Government securities in the open market. Still, the Court noted that the privilege for such information was not complete, even under the civil discovery rules, and it approved an exemption under § 552(b)(5), for the limited period of 45 days, only to the extent that the Directives contain sensitive information not otherwise available, and if immediate release of these Directives would significantly harm the Government's monetary functions or commercial interests. Id. at 363, 99 S.Ct. at 2813, 61 L.Ed.2d at 605. The case was remanded for the trial court to make those determinations. In conformance with Merrill, the lower Federal courts have shielded, on a temporary basis, such information as a real estate appraisal obtained by a Federal agency to assist in determining the price to be asked for surplus property ( Government Land Bank v. General Services Admin., 671 F.2d 663 (1st Cir.1982)), data used by the Army in preparing an in-house bid in competition with bids from private contractors and that, if released prior to the opening of all bids, would allow other bidders to anticipate the Army's bid ( Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Dept. of the Army of U.S., 595 F.Supp. 352 (D.D.C.1984), aff'd., 762 F.2d 138 (D.C.Cir.1985)), and conceptual design reports prepared in order to fix the scope and estimate the cost of projects which, if released prematurely, could be detrimental to the process for selecting architects and engineers for the project ( Hack v. Department of Energy, 538 F.Supp. 1098 (D.D.C.1982)). We agree with the University that the limited and time-sensitive exemption for confidential commercial or financial information that has been read into FOIA, § 552(b)(5), is part of SG § 10-618(b) as well. That kind of information may be shielded from discovery by a protective order under Maryland Rule 2-403, as it is under F.R. Civ. Proc. 26(c). That does not avail the University in this case, however, for two reasons. For one thing, the University does not assert a time-limited privilege, as was recognized in the Federal cases, but seems to assert that the number in question may never be revealed. That extends well beyond what the Federal courts have allowed under § 552(b)(5). More important, for the reasons discussed with respect to the deliberative process privilege, we fail to see how the number would disclose any time-sensitive confidential commercial information. As we have indicated, it is an aggregate number that does not reveal Mr. Mitchell's, or anyone else's, views as to the validity or value of claims or the future status of the project.