Opinion ID: 528529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The National Speed Limit and the Commerce Clause

Text: 19 The Commerce Clause 9 forms the broadest base of Congressional power. The power is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 196, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). Not only does Congress have authority over the instrumentalities of and products in interstate channels, it may regulate activities affecting commerce, even if, by themselves, the activity is purely intrastate in character. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1359, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971). See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 277, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2360, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28, 63 S.Ct. 82, 90-91, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). 10 20 In determining whether Congress has exceeded its plenary authority under the Commerce Clause, our inquiry is a narrow one. A congressional finding that an activity affects interstate commerce must be afforded controlling deference if there is a rational basis for that judgment. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04, 85 S.Ct. 377, 383-84, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258, 85 S.Ct. 348, 358, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964). 11 Here, where Congress has determined that there is a concrete link both between highways and interstate commerce and between the national speed limit and economic development, 12 we start with a strong presumption that the collective wisdom of the legislature is correct. 21 Applying the Commerce Clause test to this case, we can easily see the links between the national speed limit and interstate commerce. First, the interstate highways, 13 and the feeder roads that serve them, are the arteries of national commerce. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 79 S.Ct. 962, 3 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1959). It takes only a glance at our interstate highways to realize that a substantial portion of this country's trade passes over them. The mere fact that control of traffic on these roads may significantly affect our economy would justify the federal government's exercise of plenary authority in devising ways to preserve that commerce. Even when Congress has not preempted the field and the Commerce Clause lies dormant, state regulations that adversely infringe upon the movement of goods and services along these key paths may violate the Constitution. Id. In light of these facts, we can hardly say that when Congress acts to secure safe and efficient passage over the roads that it is acting outside the boundaries of its authority. 14 22 Even when Congress seeks to achieve a goal within the purview of the Commerce Clause, its methods of implementation must be rationally related to meeting that goal. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 262, 85 S.Ct. at 360. Nevada suggests that Congress could not have been acting rationally in aid of the Commerce Clause because the lower national speed limit would inhibit rather than promote rapid commercial intercourse. This argument is clearly without merit; Congress is entitled to determine that a lower speed limit--as well as a uniform one--facilitates the safe passage of commerce through the several states. Certainly, no one could quibble with the judgment that commerce that proceeds safely is more efficient than commerce slowed by accident or injuries. 23 Second, the principal motivating force behind the national speed limit was the fears generated by the Arab Oil Embargo of the early 1970s. The petroleum embargo sponsored by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) damaged the economies of the Western powers, leading to one of the worst recessions of this century. See generally Danielson, The Evolution of OPEC, 201-33 (1982) (discussing impact of energy crisis on economies of developed countries). See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 2136, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982). Part of the Congressional reaction was to impose a lower national speed limit in order to conserve fuel and, thereby, revitalize commerce and protect the national defense. See 1973 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3344. 15 In light of the dramatic influence the energy crisis has had on the shape of American and international commerce, the 55 mph speed limit was a reasoned response on the part of Congress to the many serious problems posed by the crisis. 16 24 Nevada virtually concedes that Congress had the authority to change the speed limit in response to international economic developments. However, appellant argues that the fact that Congress chose to raise the speed limit in 1987 to 65 mph on some roads signaled the end of the energy crisis and its impact on interstate commerce. Although the emphasis of the national speed limit has shifted somewhat over time, it is the function of Congress, and not the courts, to determine whether and when the national economic crisis provoked by the oil embargo and the resulting market dislocation has ended. Moreover, Congress may certainly conclude that, even if there is no present emergency, there exists a long-term relationship between energy conservation and commercial development. The mere fact that Congress has chosen to alter in limited respects the speed limit suggests only that shifts in energy policy, and advances in energy technology, now permit a different balance between conservation, safety, and quicker travel. Congress has made its legislative determinations, and we are in no position to second-guess them. 25 We conclude that the 55/65 mph limit is rationally related to the Congressional goals that underlie the Highway Act and that those goals fall within the purview of the Commerce Clause. Thus, absent a Tenth Amendment bar, Congress had the power, under that clause, to adopt the national speed limit. 26