Opinion ID: 849010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: scope of title

Text: The majority's treatment of the Title-Object Clause7 in the state constitution omits the significance of the title of the GTLA as a key indicator of the Legislature's intent. Since Justice COOLEY 's time, the clause has been applied to insure that adequate notice of new legislation be given to the general public and to those affected by it. Maki v East Tawas, 385 Mich 151, 156-158; 188 NW2d 593 (1971). To accomplish that end and to avoid deception and subterfuge, the clause requires that the scope of all legislation must fall within the scope of its title. Id., Kurtz v People, 33 Mich 279, 281 (1876). In addition, the clause requires that no law 7 Const 1963, art 4, § 24. 9 embrace more than one object, which must be expressed in the title. The title of the GTLA indicates a desire for a uniform system of liability. However, the majority's construction of § 7 of the act accomplishes the opposite. The majority examines the differences between sovereign and governmental function immunity. It then concludes that, under its reading of the act, the system will be uniform as regards governmental function immunity. It finds that reaffirmation of sovereign immunity was incidental to the purpose of the act. I disagree. If the first sentence of § 7 codifies a consistent governmental function immunity and the second reaffirms the state's sovereign immunity, the second sentence falls outside the requirements of the Title-Object Clause. It is beyond the scope of the act's title to affirm and codify the state's common-law sovereign immunity, because the title refers only to an immunity enjoyed when engaged in the discharge of governmental function. MCL 691.1401 et seq. It is also beyond the act's scope to allow different governmental immunity at different levels of government, as the majority finds it does. The Ross and Hadfield decisions construed the act in a way that does not violate the Title-Object Clause. The Ross Court held that § 7 uses the expression sovereign immunity to include governmental functions. The expression was the tool by which the Legislature made all immunity uniform when 10 a unit of government was performing a governmental function. Under this interpretation, the affirmation of sovereign immunity is germane to the creation of a uniform system of liability and immunity. II . THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE TRESPASS -NUISANCE EXCEPTION Overlooked in the majority's analysis of the Legislature's intent is whether the trespass-nuisance exception enjoys a constitutional basis that defeats a statutory grant of governmental immunity. The majority treats the question as part of the plaintiffs' taking claim that has yet to be adjudicated below. I believe that it is preferable to address the question here, than wait for the matter to return to us. I believe that the common-law cause of action of trespass-nuisance is based on the Taking Clause of the Michigan Constitution8 and, as a consequence, statutory governmental immunity is not a defense. Li v Feldt (After Remand), 434 Mich 584, 594, n 10; 456 NW2d 55 (1990). This Court in Buckeye Union Fire Ins Co v Michigan9 acknowledged that the trespass-nuisance exception has a constitutional basis. Governmental immunity is not a defense to a constitutional tort claim, hence not to a claim based on 8 Const 1963, art 10, § 2. 9 383 Mich 630; 178 NW2d 476 (1970). 11 trespass-nuisance. Thom v State Hwy Comm'r, 376 Mich 608, 628; 138 NW2d 322 (1965). The claim survives despite the fact that a statutory exception is not present because the law views the trespass or nuisance as an appropriation of property rights. Taylor, Googasian & Falk, Torts, § 7:252, p 7-86. Not even the state can intrude on a citizen's lawful possession of his property. Ashley v Port Huron, 35 Mich 296, 300 (1877); Herro v Chippewa Co Rd Comm'rs, 368 Mich 263, 272; 118 NW2d 271 (1962). And the protection of one's property rights is not accomplished solely through actions for eminent domain. One may sue under the Taking Clause. Also, actions under the clause are not limited to claims alleging an absolute conversion of property. Pearsall v Supervisors, 74 Mich 558; 42 NW 77 (1889). The action of a governmental agency may constitute a taking when it interferes with, damages, or destroys the property of an individual. Buckeye, supra at 642. Since 1860, this Court has relied on the Taking Clause to support actions for trespass-nuisance. This Court has held many times that an invasion by government-controlled waters or sewage creates a cause of action against which governmental immunity is not a bar.10 10 See Pennoyer v Saginaw, 8 Mich 534 (1860); Sheldon v Kalamazoo, 24 Mich 383 (1872); Ashley, supra at 296; Defer v Detroit, 67 Mich 346, 349; 34 NW 680 (1887); Rice v Flint, 67 Mich 401, 403; 34 NW 719 (1887); Vanderlip v Grand Rapids, 73 (continued...) 12 On the basis of that long-established precedent, I would hold that a trespass-nuisance cause of action is constitutionally based and cannot be abrogated by the Legislature. The actions of the defendants here in flooding the plaintiffs' basements constitute a taking, and damages, if proven, should be available. The basis for recovery is that the government deprived plaintiffs of the useful possession of property that they own. Gerzeski v Dep't of State Hwys, 403 Mich 149, 170; 268 NW2d 525 (1978). III . APPLICATION OF THE TRESPASS -NUISANCE EXCEPTION Trespass-nuisance refers to a trespass or interference with the use or enjoyment of land caused by a physical intrusion that is set in motion by the government or its agents and result[s] in personal or property damage. Continental Paper & Supply Co v Detroit, 451 Mich 162, 164; 545 NW2d 657 (1996). Its elements are (1) the existence of a condition, such as a nuisance or a trespass, (2) a cause, such as a physical intrusion, and (3) causation or control, as by government. Id. 10 (...continued) Mich 522, 535; 41 NW 677 (1889); Seaman v Marshall, 116 Mich 327, 329-330; 74 NW 484 (1898); Ferris v Detroit Bd of Ed, 122 Mich 315, 318; 81 NW 98 (1899); McAskill v Hancock Twp, 129 Mich 74, 78-79; 88 NW 78 (1901); Onen v Herkimer, 172 Mich 593, 598; 138 NW 198 (1912); Attorney General v Grand Rapids, 175 Mich 503, 534; 141 NW 890 (1913); Donaldson v City of Marshall, 247 Mich 357, 359; 225 NW 529 (1929); Robinson v Wyoming Twp, 312 Mich 14, 23; 19 NW2d 469 (1945); Defnet v Detroit, 327 Mich 254, 258; 41 NW2d 539 (1950). 13 In both cases before us, plaintiffs' basements have been flooded by discarded water11 that entered through drains hooked up to the municipal sewer system. The nature of this intrusion is similar to that found in CS&P, Inc v Midland, 229 Mich App 141, 145; 580 NW2d 468 (1998). There, water and sewage flowed into the plaintiff's commercial suite from its floor drains and toilets. The Court of Appeals found that a trespass-nuisance cause of action existed. A cause should be found to exist in the cases before us, given the similarity of facts. IV . CONCLUSION The majority finds that the trespass-nuisance exception to governmental immunity ended in 1965 with passage of the GTLA . I disagree with its conclusion because of subsequent judicial precedent upholding the exception and the lack of clear legislative intent to alter it. Moreover, any legislative attempt to remove the trespass-nuisance exception must be found invalid because a cause of action under the exception is constitutionally based in the Taking Clause. In making its ruling, the majority discards longstanding and well-reasoned precedent of this Court in order to make its own interpretation of a Michigan statute.12 It does so, 11 Defendant disputes whether all the homes in question were flooded by debris-carrying sewage. 12 See Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143; 615 NW2d 702 (2000) (KELLY , J., concurring in part and dissenting in (continued...) 14 stating an obligation to shoulder [its] constitutional duty to act within [its] grant of authority and honor the intent of the Legislature . . . and to rectify . . . [past] misconstruction of the statutory text. Slip op at 22-23. But what must be apparent to all, when the rhetoric is stripped of its gloss, is that this Court is again ignoring its own past rulings. And, if each successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable. The majority's decision to limit its interpretation of the statute to prospective use is little more than a furnishing of salve to stem a hemorrhage. For all the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.