Opinion ID: 2320585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prong 1: Counsel's Performance

Text: In evaluating counsel's performance, the reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Trial tactical decisions generally do not result in a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Zanders v. United States, 678 A.2d 556, 569 (D.C.1996). This court does not second-guess trial counsel's strategic choices because many alternative tactics are available to defense attorneys and their actions are often the products of strategic choices made on the basis of their subjective assessment of the circumstances existing at trial. Id. (quoting Carter v. United States, 475 A.2d 1118, 1123 (D.C.1984)). [M]ere errors of judgment and tactics as disclosed by hindsight do not, by themselves, constitute ineffectiveness. Lane v. United States, 737 A.2d 541, 549 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Curry, 498 A.2d at 540). Appellant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of counsel's competence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In his affidavit prepared for the § 23-110 hearing, defense counsel explains that The defense strategy in this case was to isolate the cooperating codefendant as the only witness who could convict Mr. Chatmon and to show that his testimony was unreliable and therefore raised a reasonable doubt as to Mr. Chatmon's guilt. It was essential to show that there was no identification of Mr. Chatmon by anyone except McGill and that his testimony contradicted other witnesses. Counsel states that in order to isolate McGill as the only identifying witness, he asked Detective Wheeler whether anyone else had identified appellant believing that Choi's statement was not an identification. Instead, defense counsel's question elicited a response that Choi had, in fact, made such an identification from the photo array. Counsel relates that he then attempted to impeach Wheeler's testimony about Choi's identification with Choi's statement that he was unsure because of the robber's hair length, see supra note 11, but that this line of questioning unavoidably opened the door to appellant's statement that he had cut his hair after the robbery, before the picture was taken. The trial court, which recognized that its role was not to substitute tactical judgments for trial counsel, nevertheless said that this explanation makes no sense. The government makes several arguments in attempting to show that defense counsel's tactics do make sense. First, it surmises that defense counsel realized the trial was going so poorly for his client that he had to do something drastic to change its course. This desperate measures strategy, as the government calls it, was not mentioned by defense counsel in his affidavit. In another strategy, that elaborates on defense counsel's affidavit, the government suggests that defense counsel purposely questioned Detective Wheeler about the photo array to show that Choi could not identify appellant from even a suggestive photo array, and thus cast doubt on the government's case by questioning Detective Wheeler's truthfulness and investigative tactics. [21] A threshold question arises whether, on appeal, we consider the adequacy of counsel's performance in light of any possible strategies that would explain defense counsel's actions, or whether we consider only those trial strategies and tactics that counsel actually embraced as disclosed either in an affidavit, as in this case, of in testimony at a hearing. In Strickland, the Supreme Court explained that to satisfy the deficiency prong, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ` might be considered sound trial strategy.' Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)) (emphasis added). Strickland recognizes that there is a wide range of reasonable professional assistance and establishes a strong presumption that counsel has rendered adequate assistance. Id. From this language we could conclude that our evaluation is an objective one: if counsel's action could be justified by a sound trial strategy, it should not be considered deficient, even if it was not defense counsel's actual trial strategy. We are not persuaded that is the proper course here, however, because a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Moreover, just as we do not burden counsel's actual tactical choices with the benefit of tactics as disclosed by hindsight, Lane, 737 A.2d at 549 (quoting Curry, 498 A.2d at 540), neither do we salvage them on that basis. Analysis under Strickland is highly fact bound and the presumption created by Strickland is simply that, a presumption, that can be overcome by the facts in a particular case. Therefore, once the record establishes the actual tactical explanation for counsel's actions, the government is not free to invent a better-reasoned explanation of its own. [22] In this case we have no difficulty concluding that trial counsel's questioning of Detective Wheeler, which led to introduction of Choi's identification from the suggestive photo array and to the admission of appellant's damaging statement about the haircutall of which had been agreed pretrial were otherwise inadmissibleconstitutes performance so deficient as to satisfy the first prong of Strickland. Up to that point, trial counsel's strategy was to show that McGill, who participated in the robbery and received a plea bargain for his testimony, was the only witness who could identify appellant. This was the defense that counsel presented to the jury from the outset of the trial, during opening argument. We focus on this strategy because whatever the other elements of its case, the government must always prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the charged crime. See Brooks v. United States, 717 A.2d 323, 327 (D.C.1998) (citing United States v. Telfaire, 152 U.S.App. D.C. 146, 149, 469 F.2d 552, 555, 559 (1972)). The introduction of Choi's testimony eviscerated the defense strategy to isolate and create doubt about the government's key witness against appellant. The government argues that the most damaging part of opening the door to this subject could not have been anticipated by counsel because counsel did not know that Detective Wheeler would testify that Choi had immediately identified appellant. This argument violates a cardinal rule of examinationif defense counsel did not know what Wheeler would say, he should not have asked. Moreover, from pretrial discussions defense counsel knew that questioning Wheeler generally about identifications could elicit a response about Choi's identification, which would open the door to the government's introduction of appellant's statement to Wheeler about getting his hair cut between the date of the shooting and the photograph used in the array. [23] The sequence of questions that would precipitate introduction of this evidence was carefully previewed by the trial court, and precludes surprise as an explanation for counsel's flawed trial strategy. Ultimately, even if counsel believed that Choi's statement was somehow less than a positive identification, it does not mean that it was no identification. Evaluated against counsel's express strategy to isolate McGill as the only person who identified appellant, the introduction of any other identificationeven if tentativewas simply illogical and could only be counter productive.