Opinion ID: 698657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is Keller Disadvantaged by Application of the 1993

Text: 31 Guidelines? 32 Applying this discussion to the instant case reveals that no ex post facto violation would have occurred had the district court followed the general rule and used those guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing. Under the 1989 Guidelines Keller's offense level of 24 and criminal history category of V resulted in a sentencing range of 92-115 months. According to the government's brief, had the 1993 Guidelines been applied after adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, Keller would have had an offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of VI, resulting in a sentencing range of 188-235 months. Because the statutory maximum for a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g) is ten years, his guideline sentence would have been 120 months. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 5G1.1(a) (Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.). 33 Thus, it appears at first as though there is an ex post facto issue were the 1993 Guidelines to be applied. Upon looking further, it becomes plain that applying the 1993 Guidelines as a whole ameliorates the problem. Under the 1993 Guidelines, Sec. 5G1.3(b) and application note 2 provide that a sentence should be adjusted for any term of imprisonment already served as a result of conduct taken into account in determining the sentence for the instant offense. Keller was sentenced in state court on December 5, 1990. While it is not precisely clear from the record when he began serving this sentence, presumably he was incarcerated shortly after his state sentence was imposed. Therefore, at the time he received his federal sentence appellant had already served about 42 months in state prison. Had the 1993 Guidelines been applied Keller's sentence would have been 120 months, less the 42 months served, for a total sentence of 78 months. This is less than the 92-115 month range under the 1989 Guidelines. It can be seen therefore that any ex post facto effect of Sec. 4B1.4 is more than offset by the relevant changes to Sec. 5G1.3. As a consequence, application of the 1993 Guidelines does not disadvantage Keller. 34 We pause to resolve the government's contention that had Keller been sentenced under the 1993 Guidelines the 42-month credit would have been applied against the sentencing range of 188-235 months to arrive at a range of 146-193. That guidelines range would then be reduced to 120 months, the statutory maximum, which is more severe than the sentence under the 1989 Guidelines. Under the government's view, then, an ex post facto problem arises by application of the 1993 Guidelines. However, the government's application of the guidelines is incorrect. Guideline Sec. 5G1.3, application note 2, illustrates that the credit for time already served is applied as the last step, that is, it is applied after a sentence within the guidelines range is determined. The sequence of steps used by the Sentencing Commission is not fortuitous; rather it comports with the rationale of the credit--to provide a total combined state and federal sentence that the sentencing judge finds appropriate for the conduct underlying both sentences. Again, the result is that Keller is not disadvantaged by being sentenced under the 1993 Guidelines. 35 Finally, that the sentencing court could have decided to downwardly depart from the 1989 Guidelines does not alter the ex post facto analysis. Because a sentencing court's decision to depart depends upon a variety of discretionary factors, determining which guidelines version provides the more severe penalty is not aided by adding a potential for departure into the calculus. Indeed, considering such an unknowable factor is analytically unfeasible. 36 There being no ex post facto problem, it was plain error to fail to apply the 1993 Guidelines. Because the wrong version of the guidelines was used to determine Keller's sentence, we must vacate it and remand for resentencing.II Credit for Time in Custody 37 Because we are remanding this case, we briefly discuss the other sentencing issues raised to guide the district court and to resolve them now while they are before us. Keller asserts he should have received credit for time spent in federal custody before sentence was imposed. He was placed in federal custody in the spring of 1993 and sentenced over a year later on June 30, 1994. His liberty was not restrained pending the outcome of his case; he was simply held in a federal jail instead of state prison where he otherwise would have been confined. Credit for prior custody, governed by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3585(b) (1988), is granted by the Attorney General through the Bureau of Prisons after a defendant is sentenced, not by a district court at the time of sentencing. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 1354-55, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992). To obtain sentencing credit under Sec. 3585 a federal prisoner must first exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. See id. at 334, 112 S.Ct. at 1354; Martinez v. United States, 19 F.3d 97, 99 (2d Cir.1994) (per curiam). Because appellant has not pursued his administrative remedies, he is not presently entitled to seek judicial relief. III Calculation of Criminal History 38 Keller's third challenge to his sentence alleges errors in the calculation of his criminal history category. His criminal history includes convictions for two attempted robberies, committed four days apart, for which he simultaneously received identical concurrent sentences, and a robbery committed when he was 17 years old, for which he received a two to six year sentence of which he served over two years. Appellant believes that the robbery committed when he was 17 years old should not be counted in computing his criminal history because he was not then an adult, and that the two attempted robbery convictions should be counted as one conviction for determining his criminal history category because they were related. 39 With respect to the robbery Keller committed when he was 17 years old, he does not argue that the two to six year sentence he received was not an adult sentence; he simply insists that because he was 17 years old this conviction should not be counted toward his criminal history. This argument fails in light of the plain language of the guidelines. The criminal history portion of the guidelines states, in relevant part, that offenses committed prior to age 18 are included if the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2(d)(1). Section 4A1.2(d) and the accompanying application note explicitly refer to an offense committed prior to a defendant's having reached age 18 for which he was sentenced as an adult. We think that adult modifies sentence, and does not refer to the defendant's age. Hence, we see no basis to stray from the guideline's language to find Keller was not sentenced as an adult. This conviction was properly included in calculating his criminal history. 40 Appellant next alleges that the two attempted robbery convictions were related and therefore should be treated as one. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2(a)(2). We review de novo a district court's determination of whether convictions are related under Sec. 4A1.2. See United States v. Lopez, 961 F.2d 384, 386 (2d Cir.1992). Prior convictions are considered related if they resulted from offenses that (1) occurred on the same occasion, (2) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (3) were consolidated for trial or sentencing. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2 (application note 3). 41 The two robbery attempts in question occurred four days apart. Apparently they were committed at different locations--one was a Gulf gasoline station--and had separate victims. Appellant tells us that they were part of a robbery spree and the two crimes had robbery as their common purpose. Temporal proximity does not demonstrate the close factual relationship between these separate crimes that is required to show they were related. See United States v. Rappaport, 999 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.1993) (robberies committed three days apart, involving different victims and different crime sites not part of a common plan or scheme); United States v. Chartier, 970 F.2d 1009, 1016 (2d Cir.1992) (committing robberies when and as money is desired or needed does not constitute a single common scheme or plan); United States v. Butler, 970 F.2d 1017, 1027 (2d Cir.) (we cannot conclude that two similar robberies were part of a single common scheme or plan as a matter of law solely because they were committed 15 minutes apart), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 480, 121 L.Ed.2d 386 (1992). We see no common scheme or close factual relationship present in these two robbery attempts. 42 As an alternative ground for finding these two convictions related, appellant points out that the robbery attempts were in fact consolidated for sentencing since he was sentenced for them simultaneously and given identical concurrent sentences. In making this argument, Keller relies on a line of decisions in the Ninth Circuit holding, in similar circumstances, that cases were related under Sec. 4A1.2, notwithstanding the lack of formal consolidation. See United States v. Hummasti, 986 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir.) (two armed robberies committed on two consecutive days, prosecuted under different case numbers, sentenced by the same court in one proceeding to two identical concurrent sentences considered consolidated for sentencing for guidelines purposes), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2984, 125 L.Ed.2d 680 (1993); United States v. Bachiero, 969 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (three offenses for which defendant had been sentenced to identical concurrent sentences in the same proceeding considered consolidated for sentencing for guidelines purposes). 43 This decisional law from our sister circuit does not accurately reflect the law of this Circuit. Simply because the same court imposes concurrent sentences at the same time does not establish that two or more otherwise unrelated cases were consolidated for sentencing, and therefore related. See United States v. Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133, 1142-43 (2d Cir.1995); Lopez, 961 F.2d at 387; see also Rappaport, 999 F.2d at 60; United States v. Aubrey, 986 F.2d 14, 14-15 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2969, 125 L.Ed.2d 668 (1993). There is no suggestion in the record before us that the two sentences were imposed simultaneously in one proceeding for any reason other than administrative convenience. Hence, the two convictions were properly separately counted in determining appellant's criminal history category. IV Due Process Violation 44 Keller's final contention is that the failure of federal prosecutors to initiate action against him for 27 months after his state sentencing denied him due process of law. This delay resulted in his having served additional time in state prison before his federal sentence was imposed. Since such time was not being credited against his federal sentence, the result, appellant declares, is more total time of incarceration. The injury complained of is that, in effect, appellant served jail time due to prosecutorial delay. 45 In light of our remanding this case for resentencing under the 1993 Guidelines we need not address this issue. In fact, the length of this delay, by offsetting the increased penalty under the 1993 Guidelines and thereby obviating the potential ex post facto problem, has actually worked to defendant's favor.