Opinion ID: 1513072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Promoting the general welfare; providing for the public safety.

Text: In reference to this subsection the then incumbent Attorney General in his report to the Legislature prior to the enactment of the law said: This subsection is a general statement of police power. `Promoting the general welfare,' which includes `prudential affairs' is a general statement following the language of the Federal Constitution. Along with `providing for the public safety,' it expresses a broad general power.  It is my opinion that the Augusta City Council, if it did not already have the power under its charter, was given direct authority to enact the ordinance now before us for consideration, and to appropriate money to give effect thereto. In Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957 under the heading Municipal Finance, by Section 12 subsection VII, a municipality is given authority to raise and appropriate money for  providing for any operations authorized by law which, by their nature, require the expenditure of money.  This section gives the Augusta City Council definite and positive legal warrant to appropriate and expend funds for the administration of the ordinance which was enacted pursuant to its police power specifically delegated and authorized by the City Charter and by section 3, I, A of Chapter 405, supra. The majority opinion says that Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957 is not a revision, but a mere consolidation. It requires only a cursory study of the 1957 statute to discover that this enactment is not a simple consolidation, but an important revision of the laws relating to the powers of municipalities. Section 100, Chapter 91, R.S. 1954, was the statute which specified the purposes for which municipalities could raise and appropriate money and the last clause of this section read: And for other necessary town charges. The majority opinion properly says that public funds cannot be spent except for purposes authorized by law; and then using the last clause of Section 100, Chapter 91, says that the words other necessary town charges do not constitute a new and distinct grant of indefinite and unlimited power to raise money for any purpose whatsoever at the will and pleasure of a majority. Apparently the fact that Section 100, Chapter 91, R.S.1954 was repealed by Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957 was overlooked. I agree thoroughly with the statement of the law to the effect that money derived from taxation, in order to be legally expended, must be made available by lawful appropriations and that public funds cannot be spent except for purposes authorized by law. However, I am convinced that the provisions of Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957 cited above definitely and specifically authorize the City of Augusta to appropriate and expend money from a special fund for the conveyance of private school pupils. The appropriation made by the Augusta City Council and under attack by the appellants herein was a lawful appropriation. It is not necessary that the Legislature specifically denote by statute all of the multiple purposes for which a municipality may raise or expend public funds. Under the broad general police power accorded by its charter, now confirmed by Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957, the Augusta City Council acted within its delegated authority. The very fact that the Legislature repealed the clause, and for other necessary town charges, which clause has been limited in the scope of its application, by various decisions of this Court, is strong evidence that it was the intent of the Legislature to remove from the prior existing statute, any restriction contained therein. In the interpretation of statutes there are, of course, certain applicable rules, and the fundamental rule of construction is legislative intent. However, the interpretation of such intent is but the composite opinion of the individual thinking of those who constitute the Court. In other words a statute means what a majority of the Court says it means, and it is not difficult to find in the statute before us for consideration, legislative authority for the exercise of police power for the protection and safety of young children who happen to attend a private school, and who like all other children in America are entitled to the equal rights ordained in the Preambles of the Constitutions of the United States of America and of the State of Maine. In the instant case the words of the empowering statute are simple and plain. Interpretation thereof presents no unusual difficulties. Divorced from the specious argument that a municipality cannot provide by special appropriation for the conveyance of elementary school children who attend a private school, because such authority is not included in the body of statutes relating to education, the legislative intent is manifest and clear. To find legislative authority in support of the ordinance in question we do not have to read words into the statute. All the necessary words are present. It is assumed that the majority concedes that properly authorized municipal expenditures for the conveyance of pupils to private schools, not operated for profit, are legal and not inconsistent with constitutional limitations or restrictions, and that such expenditures do not constitute direct aid to the religious sect which is operating such schools. Under the rule laid down by this very Court in Re Opinion of the Justices, 124 Me. 501, 509, 128 A. 181, the Augusta City Council had charter authority, in the exercise of its police power, to enact the ordinance which is now under question. This authority has been confirmed and strengthened by the provisions of Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957. The ordinance, and the appropriation made pursuant thereto, are a valid exercise of delegated power. The majority suggests the need of further legislation. Unfortunately this decision will bring to naught the efforts which seek to conserve the safety and welfare of elementary school pupils in Augusta, and will nullify the laudable efforts of many other communities in our State, which are now providing, without objection, for the conveyance of elementary school pupils who attend private non-profit schools. In the meantime, the consequences, initiated by the plaintiffs herein, will descend on little children. Such a course of action must be without my sanction. Delay is unnecessary. Substantive and authoritative warrant of law to support the ordinance before us is already in existence. The bill should be dismissed.