Opinion ID: 2446239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subsequent Purchasers

Text: [¶ 25] Fundamentally, the parties disagree over the scope and purpose of their non-competition agreement. Coastal contends that the agreement is a personal obligation of the Bushes that forbids them from using their personal expertise to directly compete with Alsham after the completion of the sale. Alsham contends that the agreement not only limits Coastal and the Bushes from competing with Alsham, it also prevents them from selling their remaining businesses to a third party they know will compete with Alsham's businesses. At trial, the parties focused on this language in paragraph twelve of the agreement: This Agreement shall inure to the benefit and be binding upon the Parties and their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors, and assigns. Alsham contends that this provision is unambiguous and includes all types of successors and assigns and the court erred by admitting extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. See Handy Boat Serv., Inc. v. Prof'l Servs., Inc., 1998 ME 134, ¶ 13, 711 A.2d 1306, 1309 (Extrinsic evidence concerning a specific provision of an integrated agreement may not be considered unless the court determines the language of that provision to be ambiguous.). [¶ 26] Whether a contract term is ambiguous is a question of law that we review de novo. Richardson v. Winthrop Sch. Dep't, 2009 ME 109, ¶ 9, 983 A.2d 400, 403; Villas by the Sea Owners Ass'n v. Garrity, 2000 ME 48, ¶ 9, 748 A.2d 457, 461. [A] contractual provision is considered ambiguous if it is reasonably possible to give that provision at least two different meanings. Villas by the Sea Owners Ass'n, 2000 ME 48, ¶ 9, 748 A.2d at 461. Further, [i]t is a well established principle that a contract is to be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties as reflected in the written instrument, construed in respect to the subject matter, motive and purpose of making the agreement, and the object to be accomplished. Estate of Barrows, 2006 ME 143, ¶ 13, 913 A.2d 608, 611 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 27] The court concluded, and we agree, that the provision, within the context of the rest of the agreement, is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation and therefore ambiguous. Madore v. Kennebec Heights Country Club, 2007 ME 92, ¶ 7, 926 A.2d 1180, 1183. Although paragraph twelve states that the agreement shall inure to the benefit and be binding upon the Parties and their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors, and assigns, the previous paragraph states that [n]either party to this Agreement may assign any of its rights or delegate any of its responsibilities under this Agreement except that Alsham may assign this Agreement to any entity that succeeds to all or substantially all of the Business through any purchase of assets, merger, or otherwise. Paragraph twelve thus lends itself to both the interpretations that Alsham and Coastal ascribe to it. See id. ¶ 8, 926 A.2d at 1183-84. Because the contract language gives rise to two reasonable and different interpretations, the court did not err by admitting extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent to construe the agreement. Id. (citing Barrows, 2006 ME 143, ¶ 23, 913 A.2d at 614). [¶ 28] Based on the testimony of Mrs. Bush and Coastal's real estate broker, the court properly found that the purpose of the agreement was to prevent the Bushes from using their expertise, experience, and good will to open another supermarket or clothing store in direct competition with Alsham within a twenty-mile radius. See Madore, 2007 ME 92, ¶ 9, 926 A.2d at 1184; Barrows, 2006 ME 143, ¶ 18, 913 A.2d at 613 (noting that ambiguity in a document is properly resolved by consideration of extrinsic evidence). The non-competition agreement is thus a personal obligation, and does not prevent Coastal from selling its remaining businesses to a third party who may eventually compete with Alsham, and the court did not clearly err in so finding. Spottiswoode v. Levine, 1999 ME 79, ¶ 16, 730 A.2d 166, 172 (The intent of the parties in entering a contract is a question of fact that we review for clear error.). Alsham's remaining arguments regarding the effect of the non-competition agreement on subsequent purchasers are not persuasive, and we do not address them.