Opinion ID: 2413244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proof of Common Source

Text: Hart did not attempt to deraign title from the sovereign. He attempted to prove a common source of title in James Barker. He introduced a deed from Gates and Brooke to Barker. He then introduced a deed, dated 1933, from Barker to himself conveying a one-half interest in the land in question. Hart next introduced a deed from Barker, E. E. Davis, and E. A. Lindsey, dated in 1943, to Marshburn purporting to convey the entire title to the land, and a deed from Marshburn to the Temple Lumber Company. Evidence was introduced that the Temple Lumber Company was a predecessor of the Respondent Southern Pine Lumber Company. We hold that under this Court's opinion in Howard v. Masterson, 1890, 77 Tex. 41, 13 S.W. 635, this does not constitute proof of common source. Reduced to the simplest terms, a deed from X to A does not prove a common source from X, Y, and Z to B. In Howard v. Masterson, the plaintiff sought to show common source by introducing a deed from McGreal to Lucy Howard, the plaintiff's wife. He then introduced a sheriff's deed which purported to convey the interest of McGreal and Cornelia Levin to the defendant. The plaintiff argued that McGreal was common to both grantees and that in fact the sheriff's deed conveyed no interest from Levin. It was held that common source was not proved even though the deed passed no interest of Levin. In the opinion, Judge Gaines explained the reason for the holding. When a plaintiff proves that he and the defendant claim from the same grantor and that he has the superior title from him, he has made out a prima facie case. It is presumed that the defendant claims no other title. Hence the plaintiff is relieved from making further proof. In the Masterson case, plaintiff had a deed from McGreal and introduced a deed to defendant conveying the interest of McGreal and another person. It was held that the presence of the other person tended to show that defendant was not claiming only under the common grantor, McGreal. So here, Hart has a deed from Barker. Then he introduced a deed from Barker, Davis and Lindsey to the predecessor in title of the lumber company. Under the holding and reasoning of the Masterson case, Hart's record title cannot stand on that proof as establishing common source. Counsel for Hart contends, and the Court of Civil Appeals said, that the Masterson decision by this Court had been limited by an opinion of a Court of Civil Appeals to execution sales and sheriffs' deeds, citing Gilmer v. Beauchamp, 40 Tex.Civ.App. 125, 87 S.W. 907, in which a writ was refused in 1905. There are several reasons why this is not so: (1) the Masterson opinion has been construed by this Court to lay down general rules regarding common source; [1] (2) the refusal of a writ of error at that time did not have the effect of the approval by this Court of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners v. Koepsel, Tex.1959, 322 S.W.2d 609; (3) under the facts in the Gilmer case, there was an earlier common source of title in one Hinkley under whom all the parties claimed in addition to the common source relied upon by the Court of Civil Appeals. So this Court might well have concluded that a correct result had been reached. In any event, we do not regard the Masterson case as being limited by the Gilmer case.