Opinion ID: 2831057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 1. Admitted. 2. Denied. The averments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. PagcI of 32 v3 PARTY SEEKING REVIEW 2. Admitted. GOVERNMENT UNIT RESPONSIBLE FOR DETERMINATION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED 3, Admitted. DETERMINATION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED 4. Admitted. 5(a)-(d) Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted that the four(4) Orders referenced by Petitioner: 8/27/14 Protective Order (the Protective Order), and accompanying Sealing Order- Exhibit B; (ii) 9/17/14 Order for Hearing in Response to the OAG Motion for Reconsideration of the Protective Order (Order for Hearing), and the scheduling of such Hearing at the convenience of the interest parties, and accompanying Sealing Order — Exhibit C; (iii) 9/17/14 Order Amending the Protective (Amended Protective Order) adopting certain limitations in scope of the Protective Order in response to the OAG's Motion for Reconsideration, and accompanying Sealing Order — Exhibit D; (iv) 10/30/14 Order denying OAG's Motion for Reconsideration of the Protective Order, together with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and accompanying Sealing Order — The numbering of paragraphs in this pleading adopt the misnumbered paragraphs of Petitioner's pleading for ease in review by the Court. Page #2 of 32 v3 Exhibit A All of the foregoing Orders ofthe Court are documents which speak for themselves, and any attempts to paraphrase their import, is strictly denied. STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS TO THE DETERMINATION
6. Admitted. 7, Admitted. 8. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is adrnitted that for a period of time, the OAG provided reasonable accommodations to the requested needs of the Special Prosecutor, and worked in a collaborative manner with him in addressing the Gran.d Jury's activities in seeking to fulfill its stated charge. However, it is denied that the characterization presented in the footnote to this paragraph provide a full disclosure of the issues of concern which warranted the Protective Order being issued by the Supervising Judge. By way of further answer, the footnote correctly identifies particular accommodations that were extended to the Special Prosecutor by the()AG. However, to the contrary, due to events more fully developed in New Matter below, the Special Prosecutor later learned of events and received stated concerns of subpoenaed witnesses that their identities and the date and time of their scheduled testimony had been breached and communicated to one or more persons outside the ambit of the Grand Jury. Upon further investigation, the Special Prosecutor reasonably maintained significant concerns that such breaches emanated from the OAG. Of Page #3 of 32 v3 particular concern was that, such restricted information was included with information pertaining to the OAG's uncovering emails of questionable character together with vague representations that there was a nexus between the subpoenaed witnesses and such emails. As such, consequential information suggested to the Special Prosecutor that rnembers of the state news rnedia may have been alerted by person(s) within the OAG of such questionable nexus and encouraged by design to file what are commonly referenced as Right to Know Requests pertaining to information that is subject to grand jury secrecy associated with both the underlying 35th Investigating Grand Jury together with a preceding grand juiy. 9. Admitted. By way of further answer, the Supervising Judge issued the initial protective order on August 26, 2014 Order in accordance with the Rules of Court, and consistent with prevailing case law. See Commonwealth v. Hood, 2005 PA Super 93 (2005) and In Re: Dauphin County Fourth Investigating Grand Jury, 610 Pa. 296, 19 A.3d 491 (2011). 10. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted the Supervising Judge issued is Protective Order of August 26, 2014, a document which speaks for itself and any attempts to paraphrase its import here, is strictly denied. 11. Admitted. 12. Denied. Respondent lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this Paragraph, and therethre deny the same, To the extent that the import of the allegations of this paragraph imply that an ex-parte, in camera Hearing was improperly convened and conducted by the Supervising Judge such allegation is expressly denied. To the contrary the very essence of grand jury proceedings demands secrecy. Indeed, the need for grand jury secrecy is especially relevant within the context of the underlying 351h Grand Jury investigation Page #4 of 32 v3 which must responsibly seek the invocation of measures to protect witnesses from intirnidation, harassment and/or retaliation. 13. Admitted. the Protective Order, is a document which speaks for itself and any attempts to paraphrase its import here, is strictly denied. 14. Admitted. Although Petitioner references a single Order of 9/17/14, in fact there where actually two (2) Orders made on such date -- the Order for Hearing and the Amended Protective Order. It is admitted that both Orders omitted to specify any person or conduct that was in issue associated with allegations of improper witness identification, witness intimidation and/or retaliation. As stated, such omissions are entirely proper in accordance with the Rules of Court, and consistent with prevailing case law. See Commonwealth v. Hood, 2005 PA Super 93 (2005) and In Re: Dauphin County Fourth Investigating Grand Jury,610 Pa. 296, 19 A.3d 491 (2011). 15. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted that the Order for Hearing (9/17/14 Order) omitted to explain, elaborate or otherwise provide a context for the concern associated with allegations of obstruction, witness intimidation and/or retaliation. It is asserted that such omissions are proper under law and indeed are in accordance with the Rules of Court, and consistent with prevailing case law. See Commonwealth v. Hood, 2005 PA Super 93 (2005) and In Re: Dauphin County Fourth Investigating Grand Jury,610 Pa. 296, 19 A.3d 491 (2011). 16. Admitted. It is admitted that the such omission of the souree(s) who made allegations of obstruction, witness intimidation and/or retaliation is/ are proper under law and indeed are in accordance with the Rules of Court, and consistent with prevailing case law. See Commonwealth v. Hood, 2005 PA Super 93 (2005) and In Re: Dauphin County Fourth Investigating Grand Jury, 610 Pa. 296, 19 A.3d 491 (2011). By way of further answer, it would have been improper for the Page #5 of 32 v3 Supervising Judge to identify the source of the allegations represented by the Special Prosecutor to warrant the relief provided under the Protective Order. 17. Admitted in part and denied in part. Admitted that the Supervising Judge issued his Amended Protective Order in response to the OAG's Motion For Reconsideration of the Protective Order. The Amended Protective Order is a writing that speaks for itself, and any characterization of its import is denied. 18. Denied. The Arnended Protective Order is a writing that speaks for itself, and any characterization of its irnport is denied. 19. The Respondent is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averments contained in this paragraph pertaining to the number of persons to which the Amended Protective order may or is applicable. 20. Adrnitted 21. Admitted. 22. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted that the Protective Order was issued pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. §4954. However, it is denied that this statutory reference accurately reflects the Supervising Judge's authority is limited to that quoted. It is well established in numerous court decisions that proceedings before a grand jury are protected by a general rule of secrecy. See Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315, 108 A.2d 780 (1954); Commonwealth v. Kirk, 340 Pa. 346, 17 A.2d 195 (1941), Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 434, 115 A.2d 826(1955); and Commonwealth v Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 197,14 A.2d 907(1940). Respondent's position here is substantiated by the recent opinion issued by the Hon. Judge Castille in In Re Dauphin County Fourth Investigating Grand Jury, 610 Pa. 296, 19 A.23d 491 , wherein he Page #6 of 32 v3 commented upon and quoted from Iii re Twenty-Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 589 Pa 89, 907 A.2d. 505 (Pa, 2006), as follows: [Ajlthough grand jury witnesses are generally permitted to disclose their testimony to others, the supervising judge may prohibit such disclosure for cause shown. 42 Pa.C.S. §4549(d). This Court has adopted procedural rules to ensure the secrecy of such proceedings...The very power of the grand jury, and the secrecy in which it must operate, call for a strong judicial hand in supervising the proceedings. The seminal role of the supervising judge of a grand jury was recognized by this Court in In re Twenty-Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 589 Pa 89, 907 A,2d. 505 (Pa, 2006): 'We are cognizant that the substantial powers exercised by the investigating grand juries, as well as the secrecy in which the proceedings are conducted, yieldn the potential for abuses are reflected in the statutory scheme of regulation, f] which recognizes the essential role of the judiciary in supervising grand jury functions.'  In Re Dauphin County Fourth Investigating Grand Jury, supra p. 317-318. 23. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted that the Special Prosecutor was directed to serve the Protective Order on the OAG (see 116 of the Protective Order). Any representation or characterization that the Special Prosecutor failed to fully and properly serve the Protective Order upon all applicable person(s) is denied. 24. Admitted, It is admitted that the Protective Order provided, in part, that the contents of the Protective order shall not be disclosed, either verbally and/or in writing, by the OAG to an persons outside the OAG under penalty of contempt. (see ¶7 of the Protective Order). 3 25. Admitted. 26. Denied. The averments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. 27. Admitted. 3 The Special Prosecutor would agree to have the Protective Order unsealed if this Hon. Court deems it appropriate in order to eliminate any confusion arising from the public misrepresentation (s) regarding the import of the Protective Order. Page #7 of 32 v3 28. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted that a Hearing was conducted in furtherance of the Motion for Reconsideration by the OAG. The representation that the Hearing was directed by the Supreme Court is denied. Indeed, such statement on the part of the OAG is in direct contradiction to their prior statement in paragraph 26 that the Supervising Judge directed the Hearing on the motion for Reconsideration to take place. Moreover, there is no nefarious set of events undermining the OAG's rights to a Hearing. As stated, the Supervising Judge agreed to the Hearing upon the OAG's Motion, and further agreed such Hearing would be conducted upon the mutually agreeable scheduling of such Hearing. Representations rnade in Footnote #7 accompanying this paragraph represent a misrepresentation of the facts for self-serving purposes and are denied, for the reasons described above. 29. Admitted. It is admitted that an camera Hearing was conducted on 10/17/14 before the Supervising Judge in which the OAG participated (the Reconsideration Hearing). Any characterizations on what is rneant by the phrase attempted to comply are so vague, that Respondent is at a loss on what is plead, such that it can responsibly respond. By way of further answer, the OAG was afforded by the Supervising Judge with multiple opportunities at the 10/17/14 Hearing to present evidence, and except for irrelevant matters associated with questionable ernails sought to be entered, the OAG was encouraged to call witnesses in support of its Petition, but elected to present no evidence and called only one witness. Any reference that the OAG had a right to cross exam witnesses within the context of the iri camera Hearing for reconsideration of the Protective Order is contrary to law. 30. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted that the OAG sought leave to subpoena Frank G. Fina, Esq. and E. Marc Costanzo, Esq. for their appearance and testirnony at the Page #8 of 32 v3 Reconsideration Hearing. Respondent lacks insufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to what the OAG understood to be the substance of claims of witness intimidation, harassment and/or retaliation, and as such the truth of such allegation is therefore denied. 31. Denied. Respondent lacks sufficient knowledge or inforrnation to form a belief as to the truth ofthe allegations of this Paragraph, and therefore deny the sarne. 32. Admitted. It is admitted that the Supervising Judge denied the OAG's request to subpoena Fina and Costanza relative to the reconsideration Hearing. By way of further answer, the decision of the Supervision Judge was proper under law in accordance with the Rules of Court, and consistent with prevailing case law. See Cotnrnonwealth v. Hood, 2005 PA Super 93(2005) and In Re: Dauphin County Fourth Investigating Grand Jury, 610 Pa. 296, 19 A.3d 491 (2011). that the Supervising Judge denied the OAG's request for leave to subpoena Fina and Costanzo. 33. Adrnitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted that the Supervising Judge denied the OAG's request to review a copy of the transcript of the 8/25/2014 ex parte - in camera Hearing that preceded the issuance of the Protective Order (the Ex Parte Hearing Transcript). A copy of the aforesaid transcript is attached hereto and marked Exhibit A. 4 lt is further admitted that such attempt on the part of the OAG represented a thinly veiled attempt to gain by an alternate route possible infonnation into the claims of improper witness identification, and witness intimidation, harassment and/or retaliation. (I3oth Fina and Costanzo are career attorneys who served in the OAG until recently.) It is denied whether one or more of the subpoenaed testimony of Fina and/or Costanzo, and/or the Ex Parte Hearing Transcript would have provided any enlightenment on the subject matter to the OAG. Moreover, the decision of the Supervision judge to deny the OAG the 4 Note, Exhibit A represents witness testimony under seal, and not available to the Petitioner, OAG. Page #9 of 32 v3 aforesaid transcript was proper under law in accordance with the Rules of Court, and consistent with prevailing case law. See Commomvealth v. Hood, 2005 PA Super 93 (2005) and In Re: Dauphin County Fourth Investigating Grand Jury, 610 Pa. 296, 19 A.3d 491 (2011). 34. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is adrnitted that the Supervising Judge denied the OAG request for a copy of the Ex Parte Hearing Transcript. The denial is asserted to be proper under law in accordance with the Rules of Court, and consistent with prevailing case law. 13y way of further answer footnote 1/8 accompanying this paragraph contains information and references to the state of mind of OAG staff and personnel, such that Respondent lacks sufficient knowledge or inforrnation to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations of this Paragraph, and therefore deny the same. 35. Denied. It is denied that the OAG was denied an opportunity to question alleged victims whose testimony served as a basis for warranting the Protective Order is contrary to law, , to which the OAG is keenly aware. To the contrary, the ex-parte, in camera Hearing conducted by the Supervising Judge was in accordance with statutory law a.nd prevailing case law. 5 36. Admitted. 37. Admitted. It is admitted that the Supervising Judge denied the request for leave to call the Special Prosecutor to testify relative to the Reconsideration Hearing. Such action on the part of the OAG represented yet another attempt to gain information regarding clairns of improper witness identification, and witness intimidation, harassment and/or retaliation which served as the basis for the Protection Order. It is asserted that the OAG was well aware that there was no merit in making 5 Of interest, the transcripts of the ex-parte, in camera Hearing was in-fact made available to the OAG in error. The OAG admittedly reviewed the subject transcripts prior to appreciating their being deemed subject to grand jury secrecy. Upon learning of the improper disclosure, the transcripts remain in the possession of the OAG, despite demands of the Supervising Judge for their return. Page #I0 of 32 v3 the request for leave to call the Special Prosecutor because the request was not permitted under the Rules of Court nor consistent with prevailing case law, 38, Admitted, It is admitted that the OAG atternpted to subpoena a journalist (among others) to the Reconsideration Hearing before the Supervising Judge in Court Room C of the IVIontgoinery County Court House. Such actions on the part of the OAG effectively demonstrates an abuse of power on the part of the OAG in seeking to subpoena witnesses through the utilization of subpoenas reserved for the sole official business of the 3.5th Grand Jury under the signature of the Supervising Judge. It is respectfully submitted that the OAG was fully aware in taking this action that it maintained no authority to use the subject subpoenas as it did; but nevertheless elected to ignore law. To further demonstrate the willful conduct of the OAG to evade legal procedures in place pertaining to the deliberations of grand jury systern, one need only review the actual language appearing on the subject subpoenas which reads You are ORDERED to appear as a witness before the PENNSYLVANIA STATEWIDE INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY... Even under a liberal defense for the OAG's misuse of the subject subpoenas it is irrefutable that the Reconsideration Hearing did not involve testimony before the Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, but rather before the Supervising Judge. Further, the Statewide Investigating Grand Jury was not even sitting at all that week. It is asserted that the act of utilizing the subject subpoenas here represent a blatant, willful abuse of power in the OEG's demonstrated disregard of the law pertaining to the use of the subpoenas. 39. Denied. Respondent lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth ofthe allegations of this Paragraph, and therefore deny the sarne. O. Denied. It is noted that the allegations in this Paragraph are purely speculative in nature, Page #11 of 32 v3 and do not plead legal clairns, facts or events to which a response is required. Further, Respondent lacks sufficient knowledge or information to forrn a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this Paragraph, and therefore deny the same. 41. Denied. The Supervising Judge permitted the OAG to present evidence and witness testirnony in support of its Petition at the Reconsideration Hearing. Any claim or characterization that the Supervising Judge failed to afford the OAG the ability to meet its burden of proof regarding the rnerits of its Petition at the Reconsideration Hearing is denied. To the contrary, the OAG is all too farniliar with the rules of procedure and prevailing case law which lirnits the scope of their presentation of witnesses, facts and events at the Reconsideration Hearing, and to assert otherwise undertakes the promotion of a disingenuous position. 42. Denied. It is denied that the OAG was deprived by the Supervising Judge in presenting its case in support of its Petition for Reconsideration. To the contrary, the Supervising Judge permitted the OAG to present evidence and witness testimony in support of its Petition at the Reconsideration Hearing. Any clairn or characterization to the contrary is denied. By way of further answer, the OAG did present a witness, elected to present no evidence (but for irrelevant evidence associated with questionable ernails), and failed to directly address its concerns before the Supervising Judge at the Reconsideration Hearing. 43. Denied. It is denied that the OAG was limited to calling one witness in support of its Petition for reconsideration. To the contrary the Supervising Judge afforded the OAG all opportunity permitted under law to introduce evidence and witness testimony at the Reconsideration Hearing. Further footnote #9 associated with this paragraph is misleading in suggesting that its failure to call more than one witness was entirely due to an abuse of discretion on the part of the Page #12 of 32 v3 Supervising Judge. To the contrary, the Supervising Judge's determination that the subpoenas for testimony of potential witnesses Fina and Costanzo and permitting the OAG to review the Ex Parte Hearing Transcript - were properly prohibited under law; a result to which the OAG could easily have anticipated in that the OAG is conversant with the law relative to such concern. Further, the OAG was not hamstrune by the rulings of the Court. Rather the OAG was hamstrung by its own improper use of Statewide Grand Jury Subpoenas (see paragraph 38). The OAG could have presented relevant witnesses had it elected to properly subpoena witnesses to the Hearing. Of consequence, the OAG elected to present no evidence nor testimony demonstrating any adverse effect on the operations of the OAG arising from the Protective Order. Such evidence and/or testimony is presumed to be germane to the considerations of which the OAG has complained. 44. Admitted.
45. Admitted. 46. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted that Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 70 A.3d 886 (Pa.Super. 2013), represents case law which sets forth an abuse of discretion standard — within the context of its facts. Further, nothing within the case opinion of Sandusky precluded an ex-parte, in camera hearing on the issues involved there. Further, the hearing described in the Sandusky opinion to which legal counsel participated in (including defense counsel for Sandusky) did not address a grand jury witness seeking the right to cross-exam another grand jury witness, or evidence subject to grand jury secrecy ---- all issues in the underlying matter. As such, the opinion in Page #13 of 32 v3 Sandusky may not be dispositive towards the position of the OAG advanced in this pleading. Finally, any representation, expressed or implied, that the Supervising Judge abused his discretion in making his Protection of Abuse Order is denied. 47. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted that Commonwealth v. Alicia, 92 A.3d 753 (Pa. 2014), represents case law on the parameters in which a judge must properly exercise judicial discretion. Any representation, expressed or implied, that the Supervising judge abused his discretion in making his Protection of Abuse Order is denied. 48. Denied. The aveiments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. 49. Denied. The averments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. 50. This paragraph contains an accurate quote from Commonwealth v. Wallace, 97 A.3d 310, 320(Pa. 2014) and no response is required. 51. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted that concerns pertaining to due process of law and notice and opportunity to be heard are relevant and part of the foundation to our criminal justice system. However, in the underlying matter we are addressing grand jury deliberations, and as such the case law cited is not applicable. 52. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted that Cormnonwealth v. Wallace, 97 A.3d 310, 320 (Pa. 2014) contains the cited language. However, the cited cases, and Commonwealth v Maldonado 838 A.2d 710(Pa 2003) in particular do not address the publication of witness identification, facts and/or events which would undermine grand juiy secrecy, as exist here. As such, their holding is not applicable in the underlying manner, and accordingly their reference as Page #14 of 32 v3 relevant and material to the legal dispute here is denied. 53. Admitted in part and Denied in part. It is admitted that the OAG was not provided advance notice of alleged rnisconduct to warrant a Hearing towards the issuance of a protective order. As stated, issuance of protective orders within the context of deliberations of a grand jury arising frorn an ex-parte, in camera hearing is entirely proper under applicable statutory and relevant case law. As such, any inference that it was irnproper for the issuance of the Protective Order arising from a hearing to which the OAG was not provided advance notice is denied. Moreover, the OAG is not a party to the grand jury proceedings(but rather a called witness to such proceedings) and thus would, in norrnal course, not receive notice ofthe subject ex-parte, in camera Hearing. Respondent can only deduce from his review of the representations in this paragraph that the OAG asserts it is engaged in a dual role of both witness and a direct or quasi investigating body to the subject leak(s) to the news media of materials subject to the 2009 Grand Jury. Such dual role is not borne out by the direct facts in this matter and is fraught with inherent conflicts that render such dual role lawfully untenable. Put simply, it is illogical to assert that the OAG can be permitted, in any measure, to investigate itself for alleged leaks from its office of materials subject to grand jury secrecy. 54. Admitted in part and Denied. It is admitted that the Protective Order and the Amended Protective Order address the prohibitions set forth in this paragraph. For the reasons expounded upon above asserting the Protective Order and the Amended Protective Order were proper and lawful in accordance with statutory and prevailing relevant case law, the allegation that the OAG irnproperly received notice of these two Orders only after their issuance is denied. 55. Denied. It is reasonably presumed that the attorneys, staff and personnel comprising the Page #15 of 32 v3 OAG may be properly served with a protective order of the nature addressed in this matter — and as such all such persons have been properly served by delivering a copy of the Protective Order and Amended Protective Order to the OAG — without the administrative maelstrom of serving each and every respective person with the OAG. As such, the allegation that service was insufficient under the circumstances is denied. With regard to footnote #10 associated with this paragraph, it is both reasonable and logical to assume that the OAG can take reasonable measures to educate its attorneys, staff and personnel regarding the prohibitions expressed in the Protective Order and Amended Order, and for such persons to gauge their conduct accordingly. Indeed, it is presumed that the OAG maintains in-place procedures, which are consistently applied, to regularly communicate notices of this nature to OAG attorneys, staff and other personnel through group ernails, of by other reasonable means. By way of further answer, the dual import attributed to the representation of this paragraph is that the Protective Order effectively precludes all communications between persons who are witnesses to the 35th Grand Jury and the OAG. To the contrary, the Protective Order does not eliminate all communications, but only those that represent, ... any act of obstruction, intimidation, or retaliation against any witness summoned by the Grand Jury... Hence, the OAG remains at liberty to communicate with such witnesses, and/or to refer its interest in investigating the alleged leaks of material subject to grand jury secrecy to objective law enforcement agencies which maintain no conflict of interests in the subject matter. 56. Denied. It is denied that the Protective Order was conceived due to partisan conduct and was undertaken in a manner intended to deliberately deprive the OAG of due process rights. 57. Denied. It is denied that the Protective Order was obtained without the benefit of developing a factual record to warrant such judicial action. Further, any representation that the Page #I6 of 32 v3 Supervising Judge undertook rnaking his Protective Order in a manner which ignored the rights of the persons so impacted, and less than an even-handed fashion is categorically denied. 58. Denied. It is denied that the Supervising Judge acquiesced to the OAG's request for a hearing. To the contrary, the OAG properly and within its legal right filed a Petition for Reconsideration of the Protective Order. Further, and to be developed in greater detail in New Matter below, the Supervising Judge made it clear that at all times he was open-rninded towards any proposed modification of the Protective Order which would ameliorate the stated objections and concerns made by the OAG. Regrettably, the OAG ignored availing itself of such opportunity, and the Supervising Judge independently made his Amended Protective Order in a good-faith effort to accommodate the OAG's concerns regarding the broad application of the Protective Order. Fhe process and rnethodology afforded the OAG to promote its Petition for Reconsideration is entirely dictated by applicable statutory and relevant prevailing case law, and as such any characterization that the opportunities afforded the OAG to be heard by the Supervising Judge in support of its Petition for Reconsideration as hollow and meaningless is baseless, represents a red-herring, ignores the applicable law to which the OAG is most familiar, and is denied. 59. Denied, for those reasons previously stated, with particular attention given the response to paragraph 44 above. 60. Denied. It is denied that the deprivation of information irnposed by the Supervising Judge upon the OAG prevented the OAG from proceeding in a meaningful way at the Reconsideration Hearing. To the contrary, the OAG at all times was free to pursue its interests relative to the Protective Order and to engineer the language of the Protection Order, at the invitation of the Supervising Judge, to accommodate the concerns ofthe OAG in its application to its attorneys, staff Page #17 of 32 v3 and personnel. It should be noted that the allegations of improper witness identification, and witness intimidation, harassrnent and/or retaliation were associated with conduct on the part of the OAG. As such, to permit the OAG to confront witness(s) and directly address the introduction of evidence into particulars relating to such alleged misconduct would result in yet a further opportunity to exploit the situation, and thereby compromise (if not undermine altogether) the protections afforded in the grand jury process to promote the free flow of information to the grand jury. 61. Denied for all the reasons that have been recited above. 62. Denied. As stated, the Supervising Judge issued the Protective Order in accordance with the Rules of Court, and consistent with prevailing case law. See Commonwealth v. Hood, 2005 PA Super 93(2005)and In Re: Dauphin County Fourth Investigating Grand Jury,610 P.a. 296, 19 A.3d 491 (2011). 63. Denied. Respondent lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this Paragraph, and therefore deny the same. By way of further answer, footnote 11 attached to this paragraph asserts facts and speculations on the part of the OAG for which no response is required. 64. Denied. The averments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. 13y way of further answer, to the contrary, the OAG proposes actions which elicit an abuse of power in its effort to cross exam witnesses and review transcripts, while only serving in the underlying matter as a witness to the proceedings. The OAG's proposed dual role of being both witness and a direct or quasi investigating body to the subject leak(s) to the news media of materials subject to the 2009 Grand Jury place it in an untenable conflict of interest. Page #18 of 32 v3 Accordingly, the utilization of a Special Prosecutor and grand jury is precisely the best means of assuring the lack of conflicts of interest in investigating the breach of grand jury secrecy, and the OAG's claims to the contrary are hollow and if adopted would result in fatal impairment if not outright abandonment of the grand jury system. Again, put simply, it is illogical to assert that the OAG can be permitted, in any measure, to investigate itself for alleged leaks from its office of materials subject to grand jury secrecy. As such, the procedure in place for the utilization of an investigating grand jury, such as here, is warranted under these circumstances and assures there are no abuses through a blind following of constitutional separation of powers in circumstances such as this. To the extent the OAG asserts it is empowered to undertake an investigation of leaks which rnay have occurred within the OAG proper and pertain to particulars associated with the operation and/or administration of the 35th Grand Jury, then it is suggested that the OAG again may find itself in an conflict-of-interest, and such investigation is best reserved for other law enforcement ageney(ies), such as the F.13.I. to undertake. Hence, the Protective Order in this matter is entirely appropriate and should remain in force. 65. Denied. The terms used in the Order : obstruction, intimidation, retaliation do not exist in a vacuum, and can reasonably be afforded their customary meaning. As such, it is denied that the Protective Order and the subsequent Amended Protective Order are unreasonably vague, such that they have no utility relative to the proceedings of the Grand Jury. 66. Denied. It is denied that the Protection Order and/or Arnended Protection Order provides no discernable context for its prohibition. To the contrary the aforesaid are clear and concise in their text, and the prohibitions thereunder are similarly clear and unequivocal. 67. Denied. The averments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which Page #19 of 32 v3 no responsive pleading is required. 68. Denied. The averments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. 69. Denied. The averments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. By way of further answer, the Petitioner fails to articulate any rationale for citing the case law here, and as such Respondent has no understanding as to the application ofthe First Amendment to the Protective Order. 70. Denied. Both the Protective Order and the Amended Protective Order are clear and concise in their text, and the prohibitions thereunder are similarly clear and unequivocal. As such, the Orders are documents which speak for themselves and any attempts to paraphrase or to project a broad interpretation not warranted in this concern, is strictly denied. By way of further answer, apart from First Amendment speech considerations addressed in the preceding paragraph which are illogically applied here, the Protective Order does not prevent comrnunications (e.g. free speech) between the OAG and grand jury witnesses. Rather, the Protective Order properly restrains such th speech to maintain the integrity of the 35 Grand Jury, to assure its public duty(ies) are pursued, being in part, providing for the free flow of information to the grand jury for consideration, and rnaintaining the privacy and confidentiality of witness identities, testimony and evidence. Any representations to the contrary effectively undermine the grand jury system, and thereby destroy the benefits the systern affords to law enforcement in serving the general public. 71. Denied. Both the Protective Order and the Amended Protective Order are clear and concise in their text, and the prohibitions thereunder are similarly clear and unequivocal. As such, the Orders are documents which speak for themselves and any attempts to paraphrase or to project Page #20 of 32 v3 a broad interpretation not warranted in this concern, is strictly denied. 72. Denied. It is denied that virtually all speech of the members comprising the OAG must be curtailed or eliminated altogether upon application of the Protective Order and the Amended Protective Order. It is further denied that the applicable prohibitions are unlawful or otherwise improper. To the contraiy the two Orders stand to maintain the integrity of the grand jury process. Indeed, perhaps the OAG, amongst others, stands to benefit the most from actions intended to maintain the integrity of the grand jury process and the necessity for pmserving grand jury secrecy. 73. Denied. The averments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. 74. Denied, The averments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. 75. Denied. The averments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. Further and of consequence, the Respondent is puzzled with the internal investigation the OAG asserts it wishes to pursue into the leak(s) of material pertaining to the Mondesire Grand Jury subject to grand jury secrecy. Specifically, Attorney General Kane together with her privately retained legal counsel, have admitted to her directly or indirectly 1h releasing materials to the Philadelphia Daily News — materials which are the focus of the 35 Grand Jury. As reported in the local media: on Monday, Kane testified for more than two hours before a Montgomery County grand jury exarnining if she or her office improperly released confidential information to the Philadelphia daily News in June to embarrass a political foe. Unexpectedly, she acknowledged on her way to testify that her office had released information to a newspaper but added that she did not believe it was grand jury material. But fLannyl Davis, a Washington lawyer who won fame as special counsel to President Clinton in the 1990s argued Tuesday that not all information disclosed by Kane about the 2009 case Page #21 of 32 v3 was necessarily secret. For instance, he said, summary memos, written years after a probe concluded, could very well be public documents. in an interview, Lanny Davis suggested that because Kane was at home raising two children in 2009, she was not bound by the secrecy laws that bar the release of grand jury information.6 Davis said that responsibility did not start until Kane took her oath of office last year, and applies only to subsequent cases. 'It is our legal opinion that there has never been a case decided where a succeeding attorney general has been accused of violating an oath that she never took, said Davis, who said the theory was based on legal research by himself and Kane's other attorney, New York defense layer Gerald Shargel. Craig R. McCoy and Angela Couloumbis, Kane Lawyer Has New Leak Theory, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov.19, 2014, at B-1 and B10. Another news report provided as follows: Before heading into the grand jury last week in Trooper„.. Kane told reporters that releasing information to the Philadelphia Daily News 'was done in a way that did not violate statutory or case law regarding grand jury secrecy.' Brad Bumsted, Lead of Grand Jury information Could Cost Attorney General Kane, TribLlVE( Nov.22, 2014), http://triblive.com/opinion/editorials/7199385-74/kane-attorneygeneral?showmobile= false#axzz3RDPLixx 76. Denied. The averments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. 77. Denied. The averrnents contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. 78. Denied. The averments contained in this paragraph constitute conclusions of law to which no responsive pleading is required. STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 79. The relief sought by the OAG, being: (0 a Review of this Honorable Court to the Protective Order, Order Denying a Petition for Reconsideration of the Protective Order and the 6 To corroborate this statement made to the press, Attorney general Kane in Application for Emergency Relief filed with this Honorable Court, provides on page 7 that at the time of the Mondesire Grand Jury (beginning and ending in 2009) she was a stay-at-home mother, and as such, was not involved in any capacity to such proceedings. Further, she took no oath of secrecy with regard to such proceedings. Page #22 of 32 v3 Amended Protective Order; and (ii) vacating the aforesaid Orders should be denied — for all those reasons set forth above. NEW MATTER 80. Respondent hereby incorporates herein by reference its responses to the Claims reflected in the preceding paragraphs, inclusive, above as though fully set forth at length herein. 81. Further, Respondent incorporates by reference herein, both: (i) the transcript of testimony and deliberations at the 10/17/2014 Reconsideration Hearing to which the OAG participated, attached hereto and identified as Exhibit B 7; and (ii) the transcript of testirnony and deliberations at the Reconsideration Hearing which were conducted through an ex-parte, in camera Hearing before the Supervising Judge to which the OAG did not participate, attached hereto and identified as Exhibit C. 8 l. General Denial that OAG has Raised Valid Claims to Warrant the Protective Order Be Vacated 82. Petitioner has failed to allege credible clairns warranting this Honorable Court to grant the OAG the relief it seeks in its Petition for Review , in that the OAG has not met its burden in asserting: (i) the Supervising Judge abused his discretion in conducting the ex-parte, in camera Hearing prior to entering the Protective Order; (ii) the Supervising Judge violated the due process rights of the OAG at the Reconsideration Hearing in denying the OAG with the right to cross-exam witnesses and/or review transcripts of testimony pertaining to the ex-parie, in camera Hearing; and 7 Such transcript is deemed secret and under seal of the Court, but available to the Petitioner, OAG here. The ex-parte, in camera transcript representing proceedings to which the OAG did not participate are offered under seal of the Court, but are to be deemed not available to the OAG. Page #23 of 32 v3 (ii) the Protective Order, by its terms impermissibly violates the OAG's First Amendment rights, and by its very existence improperly invades the separation of powers Constitutionally guaranteed the OAG, such that it is unable to undertake its own independent internal investigation into the reported leaks of materials subject to grand jury secrecy — all under THE INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY ACT,42 Pa.C.S.A. §4541, et. seq. and relevant case law relevant thereto. II. Concerns Pertaininci the Office of Attorney General A. Concerns Regarding Development of Right-to-Kknow Requests 83. In early july 2014, the OAG was the recipient of only general requests under the RIGITF TO KNOW ACT, which were made shortly after the news media became aware of general concerns that the OAG was being reviewed for a possible role in the leak of materials of a 2009 Grand Jury which were deemed subject to grand jury secrecy. 84. Inexplicably, shortly after the OAG becarne aware of the subpoenaed status of certain witnesses in mid-August of 2014, the OAG experienced what they characterized as a flurry of requests under the RIGHT TO KNOW ACT which specifically identified two former staff attorneys at the OAG. 85. In view of the aforestated events, the Special Prosecutor was warranted in believing the confidentiality of his investigation had been compromised due to acts directly or indirectly attributed to the OAG, which served as a foundation for him to bring thern to the attention of the Supervising Judge and seek the Protective Order. B. The impairment of Having Limited Witnesses At The Reconsideration Hearing Was Self-inflicted 86. As stated, the subject Protective Order was entered by the Supervising Judge after a Page #24 of 32 v3 8/25/14 ex-parte, in camera Hearing at which time certain witnesses and the Special Prosecutor presented testimony that witness called to the 35tb Grand Jury were subject to intimidation, harassment and feared retaliation. 87. In seeking to have the Protective Order vacated — the OAG participated in a subsequent in camera Hearing which was scheduled by the Supervising Judge at the convenience of all interested parties in furtherance ofthe OAG's Motion for Reconsideration ofthe Protective Order. 88. At such 10/17/14 Hearing, the OAG was permitted and encouraged by the Supervising Judge to call any and all witnesses it so desired together with the introduction of evidence, proper under law, in support of its Petition for Reconsideration. 89. Notwithstanding, the OAG was prepared and presented only one(1) witness other than the witnesses it sought to cross exam that had participated in the ex-parte, in camera Hearing. 90. The OAG offered no witness testimony nor evidence to prove that the Protective Order was having an adverse impact on the operations of the OAG, or that the Attorney General was hindered in any way in carrying out the duties of her office. 91. The OAG was well aware of the parameters established under law by which the Supervising Judge was to address the OAG's petition for Reconsideration ofthe Protective Order. 92. Despite the disingenuous argument advanced by the OAG to undermine the 8/25/2014 exparte, in camera Hearing (see Exhibit A), the decision of the Supervision Judge to deny the OAG the aforesaid transcript and use of the subject subpoenas, together with the testimony of the Special Prosecutor was proper under law in accordance with the Rules of Court, and consistent with prevailing ease law. See Commonwealth v. Hood, 2005 PA Super 93 (2005) and In Re: Dauphin County Fourth Investigating Grand „fury, 610 Pa. 296, 19 A.3d 491 (2011). Page #25 of 32 v3 C. Positions Assumed By The OAG Represents An Improper Abuse Of Power 93. The Reconsideration Hearing was conducted by the Supervising Judge in reliance in and consistent with the law. 94. The positions taken by the OAG in challenging the conduct of the Supervising Judge are baseless, and of grave concern the()AG is certainly all too familiar with the rules of procedure and prevailing case law pertaining to the issuance of Protective Orders in grand juries which properly seek to preserve the identity of witnesses and thereby provide them with the freedom to testify and provide invaluable information to the grand jury without fear of intimidation, harassment or retaliation. 95. Without conceding the positions of the Respondent stated herein, for purposes of argument if the OAG were permitted to cross examine witnesses reporting acts of intimidation, harassment and/or retaliation due to acts attributed to the ()AG, and/or if the OAG was permitted to review transcripts of such witnesses testirnony before the Supervising Judge reviewing the need for a protective order — then the OAG would be in a position to learn the identity of such witnesses, which would no doubt have a chilling effect on their continued cooperation with the Special Prosecutor, and perhaps their future testimony before a grand jury. 96. Further, it must be acknowledged that the OAG is a merely a witness before the 35th Grand jury. 97. Any interest on the part of the OAG to undertake its own parallel investigation into the source of leaks within the OAG which lead to the public disclosure of materials subject to grand jury secrecy pertaining to a 2009 Grand Jury must first overcome conflicts of interests, and certainly Page #26 of 32 v3 cannot improperly invade and impair the deliberations of the sitting 35th Grand Jury. 9 98. It is respectfully submitted that the actions of the OAG in pursuing its specious claim that the 8/25/14 Reconsideration Hearing violated its legal rights to confront witnesses (and thereby confirm their identity) served an engineered function to impair the pace of the deliberations of the 35th Grand Jury, and demonstrates a blatant abuse of power. 99. Moreover, for purposes of the Reconsideration Hearing, the OAG sought to compel the testirnony of witnesses who participated in the 8/25/14 ex-parte, in camera Hearing through the improper use of unauthorized Statewide Investigating GrandIwy Subpoenas under the signature of the Supervising Judge. 100. The brazen misuse ofthe Statewide Investigating Grand jury Subpoenas represents a clear demonstration of assurned unbridled power on the part ofthe OAG,and a clear abuse of power. 101. To compel the attendance for testimony of Fina and Costanzo, and its later attempts to both: review the ex-parte, in camera Hearing Transcript of the Hearing leading to the issuance of the Protective Order; and to have the Special Prosecutor testify - all represented improper attempts on the part of the OAG to obtain on the record testimony and events in support of its position. 111. Conduct of Attorney General Kane, both individually and in the capacity of her public office has resulted in undermining the pace of deliberations of the 35th Grand Jury and represents an abuse of power 102. Before heading to the Grand Jury, Attorney General Kane issued a bomb-shell 9 As stated in this pleading, Attorney General Kane has pronounced to the news media that she knew the OAG released an internal memo from the 2009 grand jury investigation of a political activist. She must assuredly be aware of the person(s) who delivered the memo to the news media, and particulars associated with such delivery to make the statement (on numerous occasions to multiple mernbers of the news media) that the so-called 'release' was done in a way that did not violate statutory or case law regarding grand jury secrecy. Page #27 of 32 v3 pronouncement before press assembled at the facility in which the Grand Jury convenes that she knew her office released to the Philadelphia Daily News an internal memo from a 2009 grand jury investigation and that the material ... was done in a way that did not violate statutory or case law regarding grand jury secrecy. 10 103. Any clairn that the materials subject to grand jury secrecy were released by the independent acts of OAG employees without the knowledge of Attorney General Kane can be dismissed in light of her arguments that she personally could divulge the documents because she was not subject to an oath of secrecy associated with the 2009 Grand Jury. 104. Indeed to quote from the Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion to Quash Subpoena, which Attorney General Kane filed with this Honorable Court in her individual capacity through private legal counsel and not frorn the Office of the Attorney General, she expressly states: ... Attorney General Kane was not sworn to secrecy with regard to the 2009 grand jury proceedings. By statute, only a limited group of individuals are sworn to secrecy with regard to grand jury proceedings, and only those individuals can subsequently , 'be in contempt of court if they reveal any information which they are sworn to keep secret, 42 Pa. C.S. § 4549(b). Because Attorney General Kane had no involvement whatsoever with the 2009 grand jury proceedings, she could not as a matter of law be in contempt of court with regard to any disclosure related to that grand jury proceeding. (see page land 2 of Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion to Quash, filed 9/29/14) 105. Attorney General Kane has elected to promote her argument within news media that the Protective Order has effectively prevented the OAG from pursuing investigations not only with regard to those leak(s) which are the focus of the 35th Grand Jury, but also by representing a gag order of sorts which prohibit her to identify actors in an investigation which uncovered obscene lp By a clear reading of the account in the 6/6/14 edition of the Philadelphia Daily News, the leak suggested that former Chief Deputy Frank Fine., who is at odds with Kane, did not aggressively pursue the 2009 investigation leading to indictment of the principal actor being investigated. Page #28 of 32 v3 email transmissions. 106. Specifically, appearing on the news show Anderson Cooper's 360 on CNN, Attorney General Kane stated she is, fighting pervasive public corruption and an abuse of power that led to her being targeted in the leak investigation. I am shocked at how deep it goes [a]nd I arn shocked by how powerful it is. Lack of consistent narrative colors Kane's second year - Philadelphia Inquirer, 11/23/14. 107. The position advanced by Attorney General Kane that she is not bound by grand jury secrecy to which she did not individually assume an oath of secrecy is chilling, particular with regard to its impact to the criminal justice system in general, and the grand jury system in particular. 108. Query whether a direct witness to a fatal shooting would be agreeable to testify before a grand jury knowing that their identity may be preserved by the OAG administration then in place — but subject to exposure in a later administration of the OAG, because the succeeding Attorney General did not individually take an oath of secrecy for prior grand juries. 109. Further, the natural extension to the OAG argument that vacating the Protective Order will enable the OAG appropriate freedom to pursue its own investigation into leaks associated with the 35th Grand Jury will necessarily result in the disclosure of witness identities and materials presently protected under grand jury secrecy pertaining to the 35th Grand Jury. Such disclosure(s) would render a result which is completely antithetical to the objectives of rnaintaining secrecy of grand jury proceedings, and thus rnakes a pointed counter-argument for rnaintaining the standing 111 Protective Order which effectively maintains the integrity and secrecy of the 35 Grand Jury proceedings. 110. It is respectfully submitted that the recent conduct of Attorney General Kane, both as the Page #29 of 32 v3 executive head of the OAG and, individually, creates a clear impression of a governrnental official engaged in self-preservation rather than committed to getting to the truth of whether there was a leak of material subject to grand jury secrecy and the person(s) who perpetrated such a leak. 111. Further, the public positions taken by Attorney General Kane, individually, call into question whether Attorney General Kane has ignored the full import of her oath of office whereby she assuredly accedes to the obligations and duties of her predecessors in office to maintain the secrecy of prior grand juries and thereby preserve the integrity of the function of the entire grand juiy system. 112. To deny that Attorney General Kane does not accede the obligations and oath of secrecy made by her predecessors is to effectively flip THE INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY ACT,42 Pa.C.S.A. §4541, eI. seq. and relevant case law on its ear and upside down. Impact of Persons Interviewed and/or to Testify 113. In the course of his duties, several former employees and present employees have come forward and advised the Special Prosecutor of their willingness to be interviewed and/or testify before the 351h Grand July into matters associated with the leak(s) attributed to materials subject to the 2009 Grand Jury deemed secret. 114. Such persons have made it clear that they will not proceed, or are reticent, to participate unless they are protected by a Protective Order and formally subjected to a subpoena. 1l 115. It is unequivocally clear that the 35 Grand Jury will be best served by the continuation of the Protective Order. Page #30 of 32 v3 V. The Protective Order is working and should remain in place 116. It is respectfully subrnitted that the leaks of information pertaining to the identities of subpoenaed witnesses, their intimidation and harassrnent, and real concerns of retaliation are properly and effectively prevented by operation of the Protective Order being in place. 1 17. It cannot be denied that since the imposition of the Protective Order and later, the Amended Protective Order, adrninistrative affairs of the 35th Grand Jury have been able to proceed without consequential incident, apart frorn the continued unwarranted rnachinations of the OAG and Attorney General Kane to obtain an Order to vacate the Protective Order and/or dismiss the 35th Grand Jury.. 118. Put sirnply, the Protective Order is working as intended. 119. The OAG has failed to articulate how the Protective Order adversely impacts its business operations to warrant the Protective Order being vacated. th 120. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the best opportunity for the 35 Statewide Investigating Grand Jury to tirnely finish its investigation is to allow the Protective Order to remain in place — thereby allowing witnesses and others to come freely forward to testify without fear of intimidation and or retaliation. WHEREFORE, Respondent, Thomas E. Carluccio, Esq. the Special Prosecutor of Investigating Grand Jury No. 435does hereby respectfully request that this Honorable Court deny the Petition.Review ofOrders Entered by Supervising Judge of.the Thirty-Fifth Sktiewide Page #31 of 32 v3 Investigating Grand fury on 8/27/14; 9/17/14 and 10/30/14 — and to permit the Protective Order and Arnended Protective Order to remain in place. Respectfully submitted, 13y: Thomas E. Carluceio, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. # 81858 Plymouth Greene Office Campus 1000 Gerrnantown Pike, Suite D-3 Plymouth Meeting,PA 19464-2484 (484)674-2899 Special Prosecutor of Investigating Grand Jury No. #35 DATED: December 1, 2014 Page #32 of 32 v3 VERIFICATION I, Thomas E. Carluccio, Esq. as Special Prosecutor to the Investigating Grand Jury No 1135 appointed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, hereby state that after due diligence and investigation into the operative events underlying the subject rnatter of the Petitionfor Review qf Orders Entered hy Supervising Judge ofthe Thirty-Fifth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury on 8/27/14: 9/17/14 and 10/30/14 (the Petition) filed of record with the Court by the Office of the Attorney General, I hereby represent that the averments set forth in the foregoing Response to said Petition are true and correct to the best of rny knowledge, information and belief. I understand that false statements herein are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A, §4904 relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. 13y: Thomas E. Carluccio, Esquire Attorney I.D. No. # 81858 Plymouth Greene Office Campus 1000 Germantown Pike, Suite D-3 Plymouth Meeting, PA 19464-2484 (484)674-2899 Special Prosecutor of Investigating Grand July No. #35 Exhibits A through C Remain Under Seal August 26, 2015 FILED UNDER SEAL IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA UNSEALED PER ORDER OF MIDDLE DISTRICT THE COURT DATED AUGUST 26, 2015 PENNSYLVANIA OFFICE OF : No. 171 MM 2014 ATTORNEY GENERAL, : : Petitioner : : : v. : : : SUPERVISING JUDGE OF THE THIRTY- : FIFTH STATEWIDE INVESTIGATING : GRAND JURY, : : Respondent :