Opinion ID: 3002492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); United States v. Diekhoff, 535 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2008). Such evidence is admissible, however, where admitted for purposes other than showing propensity, such as to establish intent, knowledge, lack of mistake, motive, or opportunity. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); United States v. Chavis, 429 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2005). In determining whether to admit “other acts” evidence under Rule 404(b), courts are to examine whether: No. 07-2026 9 (1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged; (2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the similar act; and (4) the evidence has probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Diekhoff, 535 F.3d at 617. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Price, 516 F.3d 597, 603 (7th Cir. 2008). We give special deference to the trial judge regarding these matters because of his first-hand exposure to witnesses, familiarity with the case, and ability to gauge the impact of the evidence in the context of the entire proceeding. United States v. Hicks, 368 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2004). Only where no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court will we reverse an evidentiary ruling. Id. Vargas argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his prior involvement in drug transportation. Specifically, he argues that the evidence is not probative of his knowledge, that it is not similar enough to be relevant, and that the danger of unfair prejudice from admitting the evidence outweighs its probative value. We discuss each argument in turn. Vargas first argues that the government did not meet its burden of demonstrating how the “other acts” evidence 10 No. 07-2026 established that Vargas had knowledge that the trailer contained cocaine. He correctly notes that this circuit has rejected a per se rule that all prior drug convictions are admissible to show knowledge and intent. See United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1987) (“A rule that a judge may admit all evidence that the de- fendant committed crimes of similar varieties produces the gravest risk of offending the central prohibition of Rule 404(b).”). We are not convinced, however, that the government failed to show how the evidence in this case was relevant to Vargas’s knowledge that the trailer contained drugs. This court has repeatedly held that when a defendant claims to be merely an “innocent bystander,” evidence of prior drug convictions is relevant to show that the defendant knew that he was distributing drugs. See, e.g., Chavis, 429 F.3d at 668; United States v. Smith, 995 F.2d 662, 672 (7th Cir. 1993). For example, in Smith, the defendant claimed that he was unaware that he had hauled marijuana from Louisiana to Colorado. 995 F.2d at 671-72. The court held that evidence that the defendant had “picked up” a previous load of marijuana was relevant to establishing his knowledge and intent to distribute marijuana as charged. Id. at 672. Similarly, in United States v. Moore, 531 F.3d 496, 499-500 (7th Cir. 2008), we held that evidence of a prior drug buy was admissible to show that the defendant knew that a bag he threw from a vehicle contained drugs. Vargas’s prior involvement in drug distribution was likewise relevant to his knowledge in this case. Vargas concedes that his sole argument at trial was that he was No. 07-2026 11 unaware that the trailer contained a secret compartment in which drugs were stowed. The fact that Vargas had, on previous occasions, hauled marijuana in refrigerated trailers containing produce makes it more likely that he knew the trailer contained drugs and less likely that he was an innocent victim. As the crux of his argument that the prior bad acts were not relevant to establish knowledge, Vargas contends that the prior acts were not similar enough to the charged crime. Vargas argues that although these acts were similar in some respects, they were not similar in a way that shows knowledge. Namely, Vargas maintains that the evidence had little bearing on Vargas’s knowledge that the trailer contained a hidden compartment. We have repeatedly held in the context of Rule 404(b) that “similarity is relevant only insofar as the acts are sufficiently alike to support an inference of criminal intent. . . . The prior acts need not be duplicates of the one for which the defendant is now being tried.” United States v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 1256, 1265 (7th Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). This test is not unduly rigid, and the term “similarity” has been loosely interpreted and applied. United States v. Montani, 204 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, we analyze whether the prior conduct is similar enough on a case-by-case basis, a determination that “depend[s] on the theory that makes the evidence admissible.” United States v. Wheeler, 540 F.3d 683, 692 (7th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Vargas’s prior involvement in transporting drugs under cover loads of produce was certainly similar enough to 12 No. 07-2026 produce an inference of criminal intent. The government’s theory was that Vargas was aware that refrigerated trailers and produce are commonly used to transport drugs. Although the previous instances did not involve the use of hidden compartments, this distinction is not substantial enough for us to overturn the district court’s decision. Vargas’s prior bad acts certainly show that he was familiar with the technique of using cover loads of produce and refrigerated trailers. The jury could have easily believed that because Vargas had previously participated in this type of drug-hauling activity, it was more likely that he knew that the trailer he was hauling contained contraband. Yet Vargas goes so far as to ask us to adopt a per se rule that “standard operating procedures” of drug dealers alone cannot establish sufficient similarity to be probative of knowledge under Rule 404(b). For this, Vargas relies upon United States v. Owens, 424 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2005). In Owens, we held that evidence of a prior bank robbery was not admissible to demonstrate the defendant’s knowledge, namely his familiarity with the bank that he robbed in the charged incident. Id. at 655. After ruling that knowledge was not in issue in the case, we noted that, at any rate, “the evidence of the [prior] robbery does not demonstrate any special knowledge of the bank used to commit the present crime. While both . . . robberies were committed in substantially the same way, in that both involved the use of a demand note, the same may be said of most all bank robberies.” Id. Thus, we held that the probative value of the evidence was low. Id. No. 07-2026 13 Owens provides no support for a per se rule that prior bad acts involving only “standard operating procedures” cannot meet the threshold requirements of Rule 404(b). First, unlike in this case, we found it significant in Owens that knowledge was in no way at issue. Id. Furthermore, Owens never established that because using a demand note was a relatively standard procedure for bank robberies it could not be considered in a similarity analysis; indeed, we did not hold that the acts were too dissimilar to be relevant. See id. Instead, we merely noted that this particular common procedure did not have sufficient probative value in demonstrating the defendant’s familiarity with the bank he was charged with robbing. Id. The evidence in Vargas’s case, on the other hand, is extremely probative in that it does demonstrate his familiarity with the use of cover loads of produce and refrigerated trailers to transport drugs. If we were to adopt Vargas’s proposed rule that something beyond the “standard operating procedures” of drug dealers is required to show similarity, the government would be hard-pressed to find any evidence that would be admissible under Rule 404(b) in drug cases. Yet this type of evidence is often crucial to the government’s case because the only way to ascertain the defendant’s mental state is often to draw inferences from his prior conduct. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). This is precisely why Rule 404(b) allows such evidence to be admitted when it is probative of knowledge. Thus, whether Vargas’s prior bad acts involved only “standard operating procedures” of drug dealers is irrelevant. What matters is that the evidence was 14 No. 07-2026 directed toward establishing Vargas’s knowledge, and was sufficiently similar to the charged offense to be probative on that issue. Even Vargas conceded in the district court that the government met these two prongs of our test. In his brief to the district court,3 Vargas explicitly noted that “[t]he prior similar drug transactions sought to be introduced by the Government here are very similar to the crime at bar.” Instead, Vargas’s sole argument at the district court level was that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We now turn to this argument. Under Rule 404(b), evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is not admissible where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Diekhoff, 535 F.3d at 617. We have noted that “most relevant evidence is, by its very nature, prejudicial, and that evidence must be unfairly prejudicial to be excluded.” United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 201 (7th Cir. 1995). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it will induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, such as propensity. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180-81 (1997). “[T]he more probative the evidence, the more the court will tolerate some risk of prejudice, while less probative evidence will 3 The brief in which Vargas made this argument is entitled “Response to Government’s Second Notice of Introduction of Evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).” However, because Vargas requested in that brief that the district court bar the evidence, the court treated it as a motion in limine to exclude the government’s proffered evidence. No. 07-2026 15 be received only if the risk of prejudice is more remote.” United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1234 (7th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). As noted above, the evidence of Vargas’s prior involvement in drug transportation was probative of his knowledge of the use of cover loads of produce and refrigerated trailers to haul drugs. Knowledge that the refrigerated trailer contained drugs was not only an element of the crime, but the focus of Vargas’s defense. Cf. Moore, 531 F.3d at 500 (relying, in part, on the fact that lack of knowledge was the focus of the defense in admitting evidence under Rule 404(b)). It is true that the evidence was slightly less probative than it would have been had it involved the use of hidden compartments. However, the risk of unfair prejudice was slight, and therefore did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence to establish Vargas’s knowledge. The district court explicitly instructed the jury that it could consider Vargas’s prior bad acts only on the question of knowledge, and as we have often noted, we assume that limiting instructions are effective in reducing or eliminating unfair prejudice. See id.; United States v. Denberg, 212 F.3d 987, 994 (7th Cir. 2000). Vargas claims that the district court’s “formulaic” limiting instruction “left the jury out to sea” because it failed to explain how Vargas’s prior bad acts were relevant to the issue of knowledge. (Petr.’s Br. 46-48 (citing United States v. Jones, 455 F.3d 800, 811 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)).) This argument is unavailing. First, we have often held that similar or identical jury instructions, 16 No. 07-2026 modeled after pattern instruction 3.04 of this circuit, were effective in removing prejudice. See, e.g., Jones, 455 F.3d at 809; United States v. Puckett, 405 F.3d 589, 599 (7th Cir. 2005). Second, the prosecutor explained to the jury how Vargas’s bad acts were relevant in his opening statement by clarifying that the testimony would “shed light on the defendant’s knowledge of the use of refrigerated tractortrailers and cover loads of produce to transport large amounts of contraband.” Thus, the jury was explicitly told how to consider the evidence. Furthermore, any unfair prejudicial value of the evidence was mitigated by the fact that it was “a drop in the fairly large bucket of evidence” of Vargas’s involvement in drug trafficking. United States v. Coleman, 179 F.3d 1056, 1062 (7th Cir. 1999). Vargas repeatedly engaged in evasive driving maneuvers while the truck was empty, which the jury could interpret as an effort to avoid leading law enforcement to the location where the drugs were to be loaded. Furthermore, he acted nervous and was visibly shaking when pulled over for speeding. Finally, he admitted to Morris, his cellmate after arrest, that he was caught transporting drugs, and that he had expected to be paid between $500 and $1,000 per kilo for his efforts. With 282 kilograms of cocaine in the trailer, that means Vargas would have been paid between $141,000 and $282,000 for this delivery. Considering this payment scheme, it is simply impossible that Vargas believed he was merely transporting produce. With a record replete with evidence of Vargas’s guilt, any prejudice was relatively harmless and did not substantially outweigh its probative value. See id. No. 07-2026 17