Opinion ID: 1930530
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Color of State Law

Text: Appellants contend that the trial judge erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Sellers and Wigfall acted under color of state law in subduing, arresting and detaining Hillary. We find no error in the judge's resolution of this issue, as Sellers and Wigfall were exercising authority conferred on them by their commission as special police officers. [4] The trial judge relied on decisions of this court holding that special police officers act as agents or instrumentalities of the state in conducting searches and seizures incident to their power to arrest, and thus are subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Lima, 424 A.2d 113, 119-20 (D.C.1980) (en banc); Alston v. United States, supra note 4, 518 A.2d at 441-43; Lucas v. United States, 411 A.2d 360, 362 (D.C.1980). We agree that this principle controls the question presented here. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). A person acts under color of state law when he exercises a power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law. Id. at 49, 108 S.Ct. at 2255 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941)). [5] In Lima, supra, we acknowledged that involvement by the state is necessary to trigger the protections of the Fourth Amendment: a private individual [commits] no constitutional violation... absent governmental involvement in the intrusion. 424 A.2d at 117. The state action we deemed necessary to invoke the Fourth Amendment in Lima, Alston, and Lucas, and action under color of state law for § 1983 purposes, are obviously related if not coextensive concepts. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). The Supreme Court recently iterated that if the defendant's conduct satisfies the state action requirement for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, that conduct is also action under color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. at 49, 108 S.Ct. at 2255 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil, 457 U.S. at 935, 102 S.Ct. at 2753). Thus, we have little difficulty concluding that action by a special police officer fairly attributable to the state for purposes of the Fourth Amendment under Lima, Alston and Lucas also satisfies the color of law prerequisite for a § 1983 suit. United States v. McDougald, 350 A.2d 375 (D.C.1976), on which appellants rely, is not to the contrary. There we held that the mere fact a commissioned special police officer does the allegedly unconstitutional act does not itself denote official action. Id. at 378. In particular, we refused to attribute to the state an alleged due process violation viz., a special police officer's instruction to a witness not to discuss a criminal case with defense counsel outside the presence of the prosecutorbecause the officer, in conveying the policy to the witness, was not performing a public function authorized by his commission as a special policeman. Id. In the present case, the required nexus with the state is furnished not by the fact of the commission aloneas in McDougald but by the convergence of the authority bestowed by the commission and the officers' actions. [6] In Alston, citing McDougald, we recognized that special police officers are not in all their actions equated with regular police officers, 518 A.2d at 443 (emphasis added), but we held that a special police officer does act as a state agent or instrument when the challenge involves the arrest of a suspect and actions related theretothe broad [special police officer] power that distinguishes the [officer] from a private citizen. Id. [7] Appellants may be correct that the immediate impetus for an arrest and accompanying actions by a special police officer is to secure the interests of the private employer. But in exercising authority conferred by the state and not enjoyed by private citizens, the officer exercises a power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. at 49, 108 S.Ct. at 2255. Sellers and Wigfall acted under color of this authority in forcibly arresting Hillary, searching him incident to the arrest, and seizing the allegedly converted two hundred dollars. In acting as public officers they assume[d] all the powers and liabilities attaching thereto. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 429, 67 S.Ct. 1274, 1281, 91 L.Ed. 1575 (1947). [8]