Opinion ID: 2998862
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Orders of Disbursement

Text: It has been long established that there may be multiple final orders in an action to foreclose a mortgage. See Sage v. Cent. R.R. Co. of Iowa, 96 U.S. 712, 714 (1877). As relevant here, typically the first final order is the order confirming sale, which establishes “who gets the property, at what price, and what deficiency judgment (if any) will be entered against the [mortgagor],” and thereby ends the underlying dispute between the mortgagor and mortgagee. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Estrella, 390 F.3d 522, 523–24 (7th Cir. 2004). Apart from Nos. 03-3471 & 03-4192 Page 6 serving as the means to resolve the underlying dispute over the debt, an order confirming sale is final and appealable for another, practical reason: delay could cause the mortgagor to suffer irreparable harm, stemming from the sale of the mortgaged property. See United States v. Davenport, 106 F.3d 1333, 1334-35 (7th Cir. 1997). Still, even after the order confirming sale becomes final, the distribution of proceeds sometimes remains. Because the distribution process cannot undo the confirmed sale, it is a bit like a second leg of litigation. This stage of proceedings will not become final until the court issues an order disposing “of all claims against all parties” and determining the parties’ respective rights to the surplus. See id. at 1334-35 (noting that distribution of proceeds from a tax sale was not final because it left the property owner’s rights undetermined). Here, at the time this appeal was filed, the rights to the $32,000 surplus were still undecided. Although the prior orders of disbursement (Case Nos. 03-3471 and 03-4192) settled the respective rights of Mr. Biasiello and Mr. Byrne (Contimortgage received its share earlier), these orders did not determine whether Mr. Anglezis also had a right to surplus; therefore, the disbursement orders were not final at the time of appeal. See id. Nor was there a basis for immediate appeal: There was neither a certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), nor a discernable risk of irreparable harm under the practical finality or collateral order doctrines. See Cleveland Hair Clinic, Inc. v. Puig, 104 F.3d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1997); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ. Dist. No. 205, 921 F.2d 132, 134–35 (7th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, the district court now has disposed of all remaining claims by disbursing the rest of the surplus, resolving our concerns. Under 4(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, premature notice of appeal relates forward to entry of final judgment, when the notice was filed from an order that would have been appealable had a judgment been entered immediately afterward. FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991).2 Specifically, we have repeatedly held that, “once a decision is announced, a premature notice of appeal lingers until the final judgment is entered.” See Garwood Packaging, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 378 F.3d 698, 700-01 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the notice of appeal, filed after the district court entered judgment as to one defendant but before the court dismissed the claims against the other defendants, would have become effective when those defendants were later dismissed). The orders in this case had, 2 Several of our sister circuits have adopted similar rules. See Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284, 287–89 (4th Cir. 2005); Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 539 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005); Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 104 F.3d 93, 95-96 (6th Cir. 1997); Clausen v. Sea-3, Inc., 21 F.3d 1181, 1186-87 (1st Cir. 1994). Nos. 03-3471 & 03-4192 Page 7 prior to appeal, disposed of the claims by Mr. Biasiello3 and Mr. Byrne; when the district court, on remand, finally determined the rights of Mr. Anglezis to the surplus, its distribution order became final. Under our precedent, the appellant’s notice of appeal was merely premature. We therefore have appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s partial disbursement orders. See id.