Opinion ID: 24829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Created Danger Theory

Text: 6 We have recognized that, When state actors knowingly place a person in danger, the due process clause of the constitution has been held to render them accountable for the foreseeable injuries that result from their conduct, whether or not the victim was in formal state 'custody.' 4 In Johnson v. Dallas Independent School District, 5 we discussed the history of and set forth the elements of the state created danger theory without expressly adopting the theory. We acknowledged that other courts uniformly have held that state actors may be liable if they created the plaintiffs' peril, increased their risk of harm, or acted to render them more vulnerable to danger. 6 7 In Piotrowski v. City of Houston (I), 7 we noted the basic requirements of the state created danger theory: First, a plaintiff must show that the state actors increased the danger to her. Second, a plaintiff must show that the state actors acted with deliberate indifference. 8 In Johnson we noted that to establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show: [T]he environment created by the state actors must be dangerous; they must know it is dangerous; and, to be liable, they must have used their authority to create an opportunity that would not otherwise have existed for the third party's crime to occur. Put otherwise, the defendants must have been at least deliberately indifferent to the plight of the plaintiff. 9 8 Since Johnson, we have continued to recognize the existence of the theory and observed that other circuits have found this theory to be constitutionally sound. 10 We have not heretofore explicitly adopted and enforced this theory. We do so now. 9 In general, state and local governments are under no affirmative duty to protect persons from the acts of private citizens. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 11 the Supreme Court clearly held that: 10 [O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual. . . . If the Due Process Clause does not require the State to provide its citizens with particular protective services, it follows that the State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide them. As a general matter, then, we conclude that a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause. 12 11 The Court went on to note, however, that, It is true that in certain limited circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular individuals. 13 Other circuits have recognized two such limited circumstances--when the state has a special relationship with the person and when the state exposes a person to a danger of its own creation. 14 The latter has evolved into the state created danger theory. Most courts adopting the theory have based their decision on language from DeShaney: 12 DeShaney did not rule that custody was required where the state affirmatively causes the harm. In addition to pointing out that Joshua DeShaney was not in state custody when injured, the Court noted that [w]hile the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them. DeShaney thus suggests that had the state created the danger, Joshua might have recovered even though he was not in custody. 15 13 As we stated in Johnson, the key element in the state created danger theory is a determination that the state actor created the danger to the plaintiff or at least made him more vulnerable to it. If the plaintiff advances a genuine issue of material fact that a state actor created such a danger, his claim under § 1983 for a violation of due process rights should not be dismissed on summary judgment. 14 Johnson involved a student killed at a high school by a person not authorized to be on the campus. The evidence established that the shooter, Brown, rode a school bus to the campus that morning and was allowed to enter the school even though he was not wearing a student ID badge. There was also evidence that, although the school had installed metal detectors, they were not being used that day. We found that, assuming the state created danger theory was constitutionally sound, the pleadings in the case fell short of the high standard required for liability. We noted that the school could not be assumed to be a dangerous environment, nor was there any actual knowledge on the part of the school of the danger to the student. Finally, we found no sufficiently culpable affirmative conduct on the part of the school. 16 15 Similarly in Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School District, 17 we found that the school would have had no duty under the state created danger theory because there was no showing of a known danger. In Piotrowski v. City of Houston (I), 18 we found that the plaintiff could not meet the elements of a state created danger theory, even if we were to adopt that theory, because she failed to demonstrate any causal connection between the City and her ultimate injury. Instead, the plaintiff merely demonstrated that certain officers increased her danger. Because the City could not be found liable under a respondeat superior theory, we found the plaintiff failed to support her § 1983 claim. In Piotrowski II, 19 we found that Piotrowski still had not met the requirements of a state created danger theory, noting that the City actors did not create the danger that Piotrowski faced. 16 In the case at bar, the district court determined that, because this circuit had not yet adopted the state created danger theory of liability, Carney was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It also found that, Even assuming that the state-created danger theory was viable in this Circuit, McClendon's claim would fail because Carney did not affirmatively place McClendon in a position of danger, stripping him of his ability to defend himself, and he did not cut off McClendon's potential sources of private aid. 20 The court cited no record evidence in support of these findings. 17 We must determine whether McClendon has set forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact in this case regarding the elements of the state created danger theory. 18 The record reflects that Carney admitted to loaning a handgun to Loftin for protection from McClendon. It also reflects that Carney was aware that Loftin did not have his own gun at the time of the loan. Carney admits in his deposition that McClendon had made threats against Loftin in his presence. Loftin testified in his deposition that when he asked Carney for the gun things were at a boiling point. Loftin further testified that he used the gun given to him by Carney to shoot McClendon. Carney disputes this, stating that, although he did give Loftin a gun, the gun used in the shooting was never found. McClendon provided testimony that the gun loaned to Loftin by Carney was evidence in another case that the Columbia police department was investigating. Carney disputes this, claiming that the gun he loaned Loftin belonged to Carney's father. 19 This case differs significantly from the cases that previously have come before us. Viewing the facts before us in the light most favorable to McClendon, as we must at this stage, we find the affirmative conduct that was missing in Johnson, the knowledge element missing in Doe, the causation requirement missing in Piotrowski I, and the creation of danger that was missing in Piotrowski II. We find more than one genuine issue of material fact regarding the elements of this theory. 20 This evidence supports the proposition that Officer Carney gave Kevin Loftin a gun at a time when he knew or should have known that violence was close to erupting, and at a time when he knew Loftin had no other gun in his possession. McClendon claims that Carney used his authority to provide Loftin with a gun, thus creating an opportunity for Loftin to commit the crime, which Loftin would not have otherwise had because he did not have his own gun. If the facts alleged by McClendon are proven at trial, a reasonable trier of fact could find that Carney created a danger that Loftin would shoot McClendon, and that he contributed to an opportunity for Loftin to commit a crime which otherwise might not have existed. Accordingly, the challenged summary judgment should have been denied.