Opinion ID: 3011017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defective Packaging Claims

Text: Hawkins also alleges that Leslie's Pool Mart negligent[ly] fail[ed] to package the product in a manner adequate to prevent excessive chemical decomposition, contamination, 12 combustion, or generation of fumes and gases. Compl. P 18(c); App. at 4a. During oral argument, Hawkins contended that Leslie's Pool Mart's failure to individually wrap the chlorinator tablets facilitated the generation of fumes. The District Court read section 136v as preempting all state law claims based on packaging and labeling. Accordingly, the District Court granted summary judgment for Leslie's Pool Mart. On appeal, Hawkins asserts that because the only area of packaging the EPA has regulated is child-resistant packaging, her claims alleging inadequate packaging would not impose a requirement in addition to, or different from, federal packaging requirements. Therefore, Hawkins argues, the preemption doctrine does not apply. Leslie's Pool Mart responds that the EPA's limited exercise of authority is of no consequence to the broad preemptive scope of FIFRA. Leslie's Pool Mart argues that because section 136v specifically mentions state imposed labeling and packaging requirements, these areas are the exclusive domain of the federal government and any state requirement concerning labeling or packaging is preempted. Thus, our task is to determine whether the scope of federal preemption of packaging claims under FIFRA is limited to the discrete area of child-resistant packaging when the EPA has not evaluated and approved the packaging methods in dispute. Once again, we begin our preemption analysis by identifying the domain preempted. When identifying the domain preempted, we first acknowledge that the text of FIFRA makes it clear that the EPA has authority to regulate all aspects of packaging. See 7 U.S.C. S 136q(e) (stating that the Administrator of the EPA shall . . . promulgate regulations for the design of pesticide containers that will promote safe storage and disposal of pesticides); id. S 136w(a)(1) (authorizing the Administrator of the EPA to prescribe regulations to carry out the provisions of[FIFRA]; id. S 136w(c)(3) (authorizing the Administrator of the EPA to establish standards . . . with respect to the package, container, or wrapping in which a pesticide or device is enclosed for use or consumption, in order to protect children and adults from serious injury or illness resulting 13 from accidental ingestion or contact with pesticides or devices regulated by this subchapter as well as to accomplish the other purposes of this subchapter). We also consult FIFRA's legislative history to glean Congress's intent. The legislative history notes that Subsection (b) [of section 136v] preempts any State labeling or packaging requirements differing from such requirements under the Act. Sen. Rep. No. 92-838 (1972) reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 4021 (emphasis added). It also allows for the inference that state and federal labeling and packaging requirements might coexist. See id. at 4111 (commenting that [t]he amended language would prohibit local governments from imposing requirements as to labeling and packaging which differ from those imposed by Federal and State authorities (emphasis added)). Finally, we must also consider the appropriate EPA regulations because, as explained supra, the preemptive reach of FIFRA is dependent on agency regulations. With these guideposts, we now turn to the pertinent federal statutes and regulations. In contrast to the numerous regulations and statutes governing pesticide labeling requirements, only one EPA regulation governs pesticide packaging. See 40 C.F.R. S 157.20. Section 157.20 states in pertinent part: This subpart prescribes requirements for child-resistant packaging of pesticide products and devices. The requirements are established under the authority of FIFRA section 25(a)(1)4, which authorizes the Administrator to issue regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act, and FIFRA section 25(c)(3) 5, which authorizes the Administrator to establish standards with respect to the package, container or wrapping in which a pesticide or device is enclosed in order to protect children and adults from serious injury or illness resulting from accidental ingestion or contact with pesticides or devices regulated under the Act. Id. Accordingly, despite a potentially broad scope of _________________________________________________________________ 4. FIFRA section 25(a)(1) can be found at 7 U.S.C. S 136w(a)(1). 5. FIFRA section 25(c)(3) can be found at 7 U.S.C. S 136w(c)(3). 14 authority, the EPA has thus far limited its exercise of power to the area of child-resistant packaging. We conclude that this limited exercise of power is significant and seriously undermines Leslie's Pool Mart's argument. In sum, we hold that where, as here, a preemption provision is dependent on government regulations, we cannot extend the reach of that provision to areas not actively regulated by the federal government. In other words, the EPA's failure to promulgate packaging regulations outside the area of child-resistant packaging is fatal to Leslie's Pool Mart's preemption argument. When no federal packaging requirements have been established, logic dictates that a state law packaging requirement cannot be different from or in addition to the absent federal requirement. We believe this decision is consistent with the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement on preemption in Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 470, 116 S. Ct. at 2240 (1996).6 In Medtronic, the Court analyzed the preemptive effect of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 on state law claims for common-law negligence and strict liability brought against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective pacemaker. See id. at 474, 116 S. Ct. at 2245. The Court concluded that defective design claims were not preempted even though the Food and Drug Administration approved the pacemaker. See id. at 492, 116 S. Ct. at 2254. The Court reached its decision after noting that the Food and Drug Administration did not `require' Medtronic's pacemaker to take any particular form for any particular reason; the agency simply allowed the pacemaker, as a device substantially equivalent to one that existed before 1976, to be marketed without running the gauntlet of the [premarket approval] process. Id. at 494-95, 116 S. Ct. at 2254. As such, the federal requirements did not reflect an unambiguous conclusion that was reached after a deliberate weighing of competing interests. Id. at 501, 116 S. Ct. at 2258. Rather, the requirements reflect[ed] important but entirely generic concerns about device _________________________________________________________________ 6. Our reliance on Medtronic should not be read as implying that the Supreme Court effectively overruled Cipollone. To the contrary, Cipollone remains good law and provides the basic background for preemption analysis. 15 regulation generally. Id., 116 S. Ct. at 2258. Therefore, the recipient's manufacturing and labeling based claims were not preempted. We read Medtronic as instructing that only when the Federal Government has weighed the competing interests . . . [and] reached an unambiguous conclusion about how those competing considerations should be resolved in a particular cases . . . and implemented that conclusion via a specific mandate are general state common-law claims preempted. Id., 116 S. Ct. at 2258. Here, the record reveals no evidence that the EPA considered the packaging methods at issue. Additionally, it is undisputed that no federal requirements exist in the area of pesticide packaging, exclusive of child-resistant packaging. Accordingly, we will not infer that the EPA approved the packaging for the chlorinator tablets after weighing the competing interests and reaching an unambiguous conclusion. Therefore, in keeping with the reasoning underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Medtronic, we conclude that allowing Hawkins's defective packaging claims would not impose state law requirements that are in addition to or different from federal regulations. We recognize that our holding might be viewed as conflicting with Lowe v. Sporicidin International, 47 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 1995), Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir. 1993), and Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 518 (11th Cir. 1993). However, none of these cases was decided after the Supreme Court's decision in Medtronic. Moreover, these cases do not stand for the blanket proposition that all packaging claims are preempted. In Lowe, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals limited its mention of defective packaging based claims to the comments that any state law claim that would require the defendant to alter its EPA-approved warning label, labeling, or packaging to avoid liability is preempted. 47 F.3d at 129. In Worm, the court focused on failure to warn and labeling requirements, not design requirements. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Papas limited its discussion of defective packaging to labels and/or warnings located on the package and concluded that to the extent [those] claims require a showing that [the defendant's] labeling or packaging `should have included additional, or more clearly stated, warnings, those 16 claims are pre-empted.'  985 F.2d at 518 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524, 112 S. Ct. at 2621). 7 Except for these cases that peripherally mention preemption of packaging claims, no courts of appeal have addressed the preemptive reach of FIFRA to allegations of inadequate packaging. Despite Leslie's Pool Mart's contention that all packaging claims are preempted, we conclude that unless the EPA has specifically considered the packaging methods for a pesticide product, the domain preempted is the narrow area of child-resistant packaging. As such, Hawkins's claims for defective packaging are not preempted.