Opinion ID: 758679
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Controlled Substances Violations

Text: 138 To prove a drug conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 the government must establish: (1) the existence of an agreement between two or more persons [to violate the narcotics laws]; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the agreement; and (3) the defendant's voluntary participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Thomas, 120 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 721, 139 L.Ed.2d 660 (1998) (quoting United States v. Brown, 29 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir.1994)). 139 To convict a defendant of possession of an illegal drug with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), the government must establish that the defendant (1) knowingly (2) possessed a controlled substance (3) with intent to distribute it. See id. 140 To convict a defendant of aiding and abetting the possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute it the government must establish that the defendant (1) associated with the criminal venture, (2) participated in the venture, and (3) sought by action to make the venture succeed. See United States v. Lombardi, 138 F.3d 559, 561 (5th Cir.1998). In addition, the defendant must share the intent to commit the crime and must play an active role in its commission. Id. 141
142 Although we have concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to support Mena's RICO conspiracy conviction under count 1, we are satisfied that Mena's conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute as charged in count 3 of the indictment is supported by the evidence discussed in Part I.G., supra. 11 143
144 In her brief Murga offers no real analysis of the evidence of guilt on these counts and concedes that this is her weakest argument. Our review of the evidence against Murga summarized in Part I.C., supra, satisfies us that the jury had sufficient evidence to convict her of counts 3 and 41. 145
146 Gamboa was not charged in counts 1-3 of the indictment; he was charged and convicted of count 42 for a separate conspiracy with Mena to distribute cocaine and of count 43 for aiding and abetting the underlying substantive offense. Gamboa argues that, at best, the evidence only established that he associated with people engaged in a conspiracy and that he was in a climate of activity that reeks of something foul, see Maltos, 985 F.2d at 746, and he attempts to compare the facts of his case to those of other cases in which the defendants' convictions were reversed on appeal for insufficient evidence. Drug cases are fact specific. Gamboa's testimony denying that he was present at the Giro El Calima and denying any knowledge of the Nissan Maxima, coupled with the other evidence against him summarized in Part I.G., supra, was sufficient to sustain his convictions on counts 42 and 43. See Thomas, 120 F.3d at 570 (false statements by a defendant are evidence of guilty knowledge). 147
148 Our discussion above of the evidence that supports Parada's conviction for conspiring to violate RICO satisfies us that the evidence was also sufficient to sustain his conviction on count 3 for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846. 149
150 Gage argues that because the jury acquitted him on counts 6 and 21, which were based primarily on the testimony of Wonda Cortes, the jury's guilty verdicts on counts 3 and 5 were inconsistent and based on confusion. We reject this argument because inconsistent verdicts do not impact the court's sufficiency of the evidence analysis. See United States v. Parks, 68 F.3d 860, 865 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1098, 116 S.Ct. 825, 133 L.Ed.2d 768 (1996). It was within the jury's discretion to disregard Cortes's testimony in some respects and accept it in other respects. Gage also argues that there was no corroborating surveillance of his meetings with Wonda Cortes. It is well settled, however, that a conviction may rest solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, even one who has chosen to cooperate with the government in exchange for leniency, as long as the testimony is not insubstantial on its face. See United States v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 228 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 868, 139 L.Ed.2d 765 (1998). Testimony is incredible as a matter of law only if it relates to facts that the witness could not possibly have observed or to events which could not have occurred under the laws of nature. See United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1552 (5th Cir.1994). Wonda Cortes's testimony is not susceptible to either vice. We have considered Gage's other factual sufficiency arguments and are not persuaded by them. There was ample evidence that Gage conspired with other defendants to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it, as charged in count 3, and that he possessed 14 kilograms of cocaine in August of 1991 with the intent to distribute it, as charged in count 5. 151 4. Jackquet's conviction for use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 152 Count 52 of the superseding indictment charged Jackquet with using and carrying a 12-gauge shotgun on August 13, 1992, during and in relation to the drug trafficking crime charged in Count Three ... The district court instructed the jury on both the use and carry prongs of § 924(c). Jackquet argues that the evidence was not sufficient to show that he used a firearm within the meaning of Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), or that he used a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense. 153 The first argument clearly has no merit. The evidence showed that Jackquet used the shotgun to shoot DPS officer Larry Allen to avoid being arrested. As the Supreme Court explained in Bailey using a firearm includes brandishing, displaying, ... and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a firearm. Id. at 148, 116 S.Ct. at 508. Jackquet's conduct meets Bailey 's definition of use. 154 Jackquet's argument that his use was not during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense is based on the fact that his arrest on August 13, 1992, occurred six months after the last specific drug trafficking transaction with Wonda Cortes. In United States v. Tolliver, 116 F.3d 120, 125 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 324, 139 L.Ed.2d 251 (1997), the court explained that [t]he phrase 'in relation to' ... requires only that the firearm have played a role in the crime for which the defendant is charged; the firearm cannot have been inadvertently used or carried 'in relation to' an obviously unrelated crime. In Tolliver defendant Shane Sterling was convicted under § 924(c) based on evidence that he reached for a loaded pistol as federal agents entered his bedroom to arrest him on drug charges. On appeal Sterling argued that he did not use the pistol in relation to the underlying drug conspiracy because his use of the pistol related only to the assault of a federal officer, not the underlying drug offense. Id. at 125. This court disagreed, concluding that his use of the pistol had the potential to facilitate the drug distribution conspiracy for which Sterling is charged. Id. at 126. The court concluded that Sterling's use of the gun was 'in relation to' the underlying drug conspiracy; such use could have facilitated that conspiracy by preventing the arrest of two conspirators and forestalling the seizure of various instrumentalities of the conspiracy. Id. In this case we likewise conclude that Jackquet's use of the shotgun to avoid arrest on drug charges provided a sufficient factual basis for the jury to conclude that he used the gun in relation to the underlying drug conspiracy. 155 5. Murga's conviction for making a false statement on a visa application in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) 156 Murga challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction on count 48 for knowingly making a false statement on a visa application that she signed on March 9, 1992, at the American Embassy in Bogota, Colombia. Question 33.B on the application asked whether you are an alien who is or has been a trafficker in any controlled substance. Murga answered no to the question, and the United States issued her a visa based on the application. The jury heard evidence, summarized in Part I.C., supra, that Murga delivered a 25-kilogram load of cocaine and a 75-kilogram load of cocaine to Esnoraldo Posada-Rios in 1988 at the direction of Ariel Ochoa and that Murga sold cocaine to Jose Antonio Ortiz in 1989. 12 We have considered all of Murga's arguments and are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict her of count 48. 13