Opinion ID: 43414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search of Manning’s Home

Text: Manning argues that the officers who searched his home acted unreasonably in forcing entry into his home even though he was detained only a short distance away and no exigent circumstances existed. Manning disputes both the district court’s factual finding that Manning was present at the time the officers entered his home and its legal conclusion that the search was conducted in a reasonable fashion.2 As to the factual issue, the district court did not clearly err in determining 2 We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. McGough, — F.3d —, 2004 WL 3389374, at  (11th Cir. June 15, 2005). 12 that Manning was present when the officers began the search of his home. Two officers testified that Manning was present when the search began, and the district court found their testimony to be credible. “We accord great deference to the district court’s credibility determinations.” United States v. Gregg, 179 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Based on the officers’ testimony, the district court did not commit reversible error in concluding that Manning was present. In any event, the district court did not ignore, as Manning alleges, Simmons’s testimony that he saw only one patrol car when he first heard noises in Manning’s apartment and that he did not see Manning until minutes later. Rather, the district court acknowledged Simmons’s testimony, but discounted Simmons’s statement that he did not see Manning because it was unclear whether Manning was in Simmons’s line of view when he looked out the window. The district court did not err in discounting Simmons’s testimony based on his imperfect view of the events, and Manning has failed to show clear error in the district court’s findings. As for the legal issue, a search pursuant to a warrant is valid if it is conducted reasonably, examining the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36, 124 S. Ct. 521, 525 (2003). While police officers are generally required to announce their intent to search before entering closed 13 premises, “the Fourth Amendment normally requires little more notice than a knock on the door prior to a forced entry pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant . . . .” Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003). Indeed, even the knock-and-announce obligation “gives way when officers have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” Banks, 540 U.S. at 36, 124 S. Ct. at 525 (quotation marks, punctuation, and citation omitted). Here, the officers knocked and announced their presence to anyone who might have been inside Manning’s apartment. In addition, they asked Manning whether anyone was in his apartment, and gave Manning an opportunity to cooperate and avoid the forced entry. Manning declined that opportunity by refusing to answer the officers, and it reasonably appeared that it would be futile to ask Manning to open the door immediately. Under these circumstances, in light of the officers’ concern that someone could be in the apartment and easily could dispose of the cocaine in the kitchen, the officers’ forced entry was reasonable.3 3 The government has not argued that the evidence found in Manning’s apartment would be admissible under the inevitable-discovery doctrine even if the officers’ conduct was unreasonable. Accordingly, any such argument was waived. In any event, we conclude that the search was reasonable, and we thus need not address whether the inevitable-discovery doctrine 14 See id. at 41, 124 S. Ct. at 527 (holding that forced entry was valid when officers waited 15 to 20 seconds after knocking and announcing at apartment, where police arrived during the day, when anyone inside probably would have been up and around, and 15 to 20 seconds would be sufficient for getting to the bathroom or kitchen to dispose of cocaine).