Opinion ID: 155708
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Michael Snider

Text: Mr. Snider’s sole challenge on appeal is to the denial of the motion to suppress evidence from the search of the house and garage where he and Mr. Chilton lived. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. See United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 785 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996). We accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are -6- clearly erroneous; however the ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a question of law which we review de novo. See id. A protective sweep is a brief search of premises during an arrest to ensure the safety of those on the scene. The Fourth Amendment allows a protective sweep if police have “a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[s] the officer in believing that the area swept harbor[s] an individual posing a danger to the officer or others.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The limited intrusion is justified by the “interest of the officers in taking steps to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack.” Id. at 333. The search must be “narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding,” id. at 327, and may last “no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises,” id. at 335-36. The officer’s protective sweep of the garage complied with these standards. The specific and articulable facts the officer possessed, after speaking with the California police, their informant, and Mr. Snider’s probation officer, included -7- (1) that Mr. Snider was operating a methamphetamine operation at the premises, (2) that others were living at the premises and assisting him, (3) that he had violated probation and was wanted on three arrest warrants, and (4) that he had been seen at the garage a short time before. The officer could rationally infer from these facts that Mr. Snider had accomplices in either the house or garage, and that they might use firearms to protect their drug business. The sweep was properly limited in scope, because the officer did not enter the garage when it appeared no one was in it. And its duration was between thirty and forty seconds, well within the time it took to arrest Mr. Snider and depart. The officer’s actions were also justified as an attempt to locate Mr. Snider, who had been seen standing at the door of the garage approximately fifteen minutes earlier. At the time the officer began his sweep Mr. Snider had not yet been located; the officer was not aware Mr. Snider had been found and arrested until he had completed his sweep. Police officers serving an arrest warrant may enter the premises of the person to be arrested. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980); United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1496 (10th Cir.) (holding that officers executing arrest warrant properly walked around to back of house and looked through windows, when they had reason to believe the suspect was on the premises), reheard in part and aff’d sub nom. United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc). -8- Mr. Snider attempts to raise two issues for the first time on appeal. First, he argues that the protective sweep was pretextual. Because the officers were denied use of the California informant’s knowledge to obtain a search warrant, Mr. Snider contends they used the arrest warrant as an excuse to go onto the premises to obtain probable cause for a search warrant. The issue of pretext is a fact-intensive inquiry, involving weighing evidence and the credibility of testimony, and we would review the resultant factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Maestas, 2 F.3d 1485, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1502 (10th Cir. 1991). We have no findings of fact to review, however. Although Mr. Snider moved for suppression prior to trial, he did not present this basis for suppression at any stage of his motion, and the court did not rule on it. Fed. R. Cr. P. 12(b)(3) requires that motions to suppress be made prior to trial, and Rule 12(f) provides that failure to make the motion prior to trial operates as a waiver. The waiver provision of Rule 12(f) applies not only to the failure to move for suppression, but also to the failure to include a specific argument in the motion. See Dewitt, 946 F.2d at 1502. Mr. Snider has waived the issue of pretext. Rule 12(f) provides that the court may grant relief from this waiver “for cause shown,” Fed. R. Cr. P. 12(f), but Mr. Snider has made no attempt to show -9- cause for his failure to raise the issue below, and we discern nothing that prevented him from raising it. We ordinarily review forfeited error, when raised on appeal, for plain error resulting in manifest injustice. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 52(b); Dewitt, 946 F.2d at 1502. In this circumstance, however, we have nothing to review, because there was no factual development of the issue of pretext in the district court. Once a warrantless search has been justified by the government, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the government’s justification is pretextual. See Maestas, 2 F.3d at 1491-92. Mr. Snider has not pointed to any evidence that satisfies this burden, and our own independent review of the record reveals no evidentiary basis for a pretext. Without a factual basis there is nothing upon which to predicate a finding of pretext either in the district court or on our plain error review of the district court’s rulings. By adopting the arguments of co-defendant Chilton, Mr. Snider also attempts to raise for the first time on appeal whether the California arrest warrant was valid in Oklahoma. Both defendants argue it was not, and that the results of the search are tainted by its use and should be suppressed. For the same reasons discussed above, the defendants have waived this issue by not raising it prior to trial. See Fed R. Cr. P. 12(b)(3), (f); Dewitt, 946 F.2d at 1502. Neither defendant has shown cause why we should grant relief from that waiver, and we - 10 - see no reason to do so. Instead they suggest it was plain error for the court to deny their motion to suppress. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 52(b). We may correct an error not raised at trial under Rule 52(b) if there is (1) error (2) that is plain and (3) that affects substantial rights. See Johnson v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1548-49 (1997); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). If these three elements are present we may exercise our discretion to notice forfeited error, “but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1549 (quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). We find no error. The purpose of the warrant requirement is not jurisdictional, but is to interpose a neutral magistrate’s determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 602. Where state officers are arresting a person within their state, neither precedent nor logic requires a second arrest warrant to be obtained when a valid warrant has been issued in another state. See United States v. Johnson, 815 F.2d 309, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that federal officers were authorized under Texas law to arrest the defendant in Texas on an outstanding California warrant); Ierardi v. Gunter, 528 F.2d 929, 931 (1st Cir. 1976) (stating that nothing prevents another state from making the requisite determination of probable cause); Bandy v. Willingham, 398 F.2d 333, 335 (10th Cir. 1968). - 11 -