Opinion ID: 153281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Frisk of Mr. McRae:

Text: 44 The district court found that Officer Colyar had a reasonable suspicion to frisk Mr. McRae. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, an officer may frisk a suspect for weapons if he has a reasonable articulable suspicion that his safety or that of others [is] in danger. In this case, Officer Colyar had just received permission to search the vehicle, and he had just received information that Mr. McRae had a criminal history and should be approached with extreme caution. He had, however, no other specific information leading him to believe that Mr. McRae was armed or dangerous. As the government argues, a search of the car might compel Officer Colyar to turn his back on Mr. McRae, and the two men were on an isolated stretch of highway. On the other hand, Officer Colyar permitted Mr. McRae to put on his jacket before getting out of the car, and a jacket is a likely place in which to store a weapon. Officer Colyar did not himself ever indicate, nor testify, that he in fact felt that his safety was in jeopardy. 45 We nonetheless hold that the district court did not err in finding that Officer Colyar had articulable suspicion to frisk Mr. McRae. The Terry stop standard is objective: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate? Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. The facts available to Officer Colyar here (he was alone on an isolated stretch of highway, he was about to engage in a search of a car, and he had just been warned to approach Mr. McRae with extreme caution) would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that a frisk would be necessary to protect himself.