Opinion ID: 612543
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relator Fouad

Text: The parties agree Superior Piping does not apply to Fouad and that there was a prior final, valid decision on the merits with respect to Fouad because Fouad was dismissed as a party to the 2002 Action for failure to state a meritorious claim. The parties also agree that the second action involves the same parties or their privies as the first action. Consequently, we must consider whether the district court erred in finding either that the 2008 Action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in the 2002 Action or that the 2008 Action arises out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the 2002 Action. We find that the district court erred in both respects. The relators' arguments concerning the third and fourth elements of claim preclusion are somewhat intertwined, but they essentially argue three new occurrences took place after the filing of the 2002 Action that preclude the application of res judicata: (1) the runways were expanded, moving one runway closer to the home on the subject property and causing dangerously increased decibel levels and new damage to the property; (2) the expanded runways poisoned the relators' sole water supply with jet fuel and toxins; and (3) the relators learned that the City placed the subject property on the Airport Layout Plan (the Plan), thus certifying to the Federal Aviation Administration that it would acquire the property. The relators further argue that their claims related to the expanded runways were not ripe in 2002 because facts necessary to bring those claims were not known at that time, including those related to decibel levels and water contamination. The City takes the position that not a single new event has occurred since the 2002 Complaint was dismissed and that the relators are seeking to compel the City to purchase the property based on the City's alleged interference with their property rights which began since after they purchased the property in 1995. Appellee Br. 17. In addition, the City argues that all of the claims asserted in the 2008 Action were or could have been asserted in the 2002 Action.
Pursuant to Ohio's ripeness doctrine, res judicata does not apply to claims that were not ripe for review in a previous action. See Katt v. Dykhouse, 983 F.2d 690, 693 (6th Cir.1992) (applying Michigan's ripeness doctrine to determine that the plaintiff could not have raised a claim in a previous action because that claim did not ripen until after judgment was entered in that action); State v. Smith, No. 4-06-18, 2006 WL 2795609, at  (Ohio Ct.App. Oct. 2, 2006) (declining to apply the doctrine of res judicata because the issue was not previously ripe). Ohio law dictates that a claim is not ripe if the claim rests upon `future events that may not occur as anticipated, or may not occur at all.' State v. McCarty, No. CA2006-04-093, 2007 WL 1394580, at  (Ohio Ct.App. May 14, 2007) (citation omitted). When an injury is not yet present, a claim is not ripe even when the alleged action of the defendant foretells legal injury to the plaintiff. State ex rel. Elyria Foundry Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 82 Ohio St.3d 88, 694 N.E.2d 459, 460 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the 2008 Action, the relators allege the expansion [of the runway] has resulted in increased runway traffic that has interfered with Relator's use and enjoyment of the[ir] Property. Comp. ¶¶ 4-5; see also id. at ¶ 33 (alleging environmental harm from increased air traffic of the expanded runways). The City had planned the Airport's expansion and undertaken the first stage of the expansion well before the 2002 Action was filed, a point the City relies upon heavily; however, the 2004 and 2007 runway expansions had not yet occurred when the relators commenced the 2002 Action and the environmental damages that the relators would incur from those expansions was indeterminate. Hence, the claims about the effects of the 2004 and 2007 runway expansions were not ripe in 2002 under Ohio law because, although the alleged actions of the City expanding the runway may have foretold their injury, the relators' damages were at best speculative at that time. Res judicata, therefore, cannot bar the claims related to the effects of the expansions in 2004 and 2007.
Ohio's res judicata doctrine precludes later suits based on the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the [first] action arose. Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226, 229 (1995). Transaction is defined as a common nucleus of operative facts. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. b (1982)). `That a number of different legal theories casting liability on an actor may apply to a given episode does not create multiple transactions and hence multiple claims. This remains true although the several legal theories ... would emphasize different elements of the facts. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. c). In Grava, the plaintiff's second application for a zoning certificate [wa]s barred by the doctrine of res judicata  because it and a previous application sought permission to construct exactly the same building on the same tract of land. Id.; see also Hundley v. Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio, Inc., No. 19870, 2003 WL 22763899, at  (Ohio Ct.App. Nov. 21, 2003) (holding that a plaintiff relied on the same operative facts because both of his suits were based upon the invoices that [he] received ... between January and December of 2002 and the only difference was the mathematical errors that he alleged). The plaintiff argued that barring the second action would be unfair, but the Ohio Supreme Court found that,  [a]bsent changed circumstances, refusing to allow [the plaintiff] to use an alternative legal theory overlooked in the previous proceedings does not work an injustice. Grava, 653 N.E.2d at 230 (emphasis added). We find the 2004 and 2007 runway expansions are distinct events from any earlier expansion and that they resulted in new facts and changed circumstances, id., not merely new legal theories. Indeed, the relators submit the expansions completed after the commencement of the 2002 Action caused worsening conditions and that there was a substantial change in the scope of continuing harm related to the noise, property damage, and [health] dangers. Appellant Br. 24. Accordingly, the claims related to the 2004 and 2007 expansions are premised on a new transaction or occurrence and res judicata cannot apply to bar them. In sum, the district court erred in dismissing the 2008 Action as to Fouad because the claims based upon the 2004 and 2007 expansions could not have been raised in the 2002 Action and are premised on a new transaction or occurrence distinct from the subject matter of the 2002 Action.