Opinion ID: 2113802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defective Jury Instructions

Text: The appellant argues that the trial court erred in its jury instructions concerning the government's burden of proof and his affirmative defense of consent. Although the appellant did not object to the instructions at trial, he claims that the trial court's error was plain and warrants reversal. While the instructions were undeniably erroneous, the appellant has not met his burden under the plain error standard to show that the error complained of `affect[ed his] substantial rights.' ( Danny Lee ) Johnson v. United States, 812 A.2d 234, 242 (D.C.2002) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). The trial court gave a number of instructions on the parties' burdens of proof and on the consent defense during the course of the trial. The first came when the trial court interrupted the closing argument of the appellant's counsel. His counsel had included in her argument some comments about missing evidence and the government's burden of proof and said: If there was a witness you wanted to hear from, if there was a photograph you wanted to see, if there was testimony you wanted to hear, you don't look to [the defendant], and you don't look to me. You look right there to the government. It's their burden to present you with evidence. The trial court immediately stopped the argument and called a bench conference. The judge asked the appellant's counsel to correct her statement to ensure that the jury understood that the government's burden extended only to evidence that the appellant committed the crime, and not to evidence that would tend to establish the appellant's consent defense. Appellant's trial counsel indicated that she did not know if she could adequately correct her statement, and thus the trial court agreed to do so. The instruction given by the court was as follows: Let me correct one thing that the defense attorney just said. And at times in the heat of battle, we may inadvertently misstate something. The burden of proof as to the sex this charge here of first degree sex abuse, the government does have and I will read to you the instructions, the elements that the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, each of those elements, otherwise your verdict must be not guilty. On the other hand, the defense of consent, and I will give you an instruction on consent too, the burden on that defense of consent is upon the defendant. The defendant has to prove by [a] preponderance of the evidence, the consent defense. But the overall burden is upon the government. But I just want to make sure you understand that. And I will read those to you when I'm giving you my final instructions. At the conclusion of the closing arguments, the trial court gave the final instructions. Included in the instructions were: (1) the jury should determine whether the government proved the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) if the jury finds that the government did not prove all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict must be not guilty and that the jury need not go to the issue of consent; (3) should the jury find that the government met its burden, the appellant then had the burden of proving the affirmative defense of consent by a preponderance of the evidence; and (4) if the appellant met the burden of proving consent, the jury was required to find him not guilty. The trial court instructed the jury to consider all the evidence in the case on at least three occasions. When instructing the jury on direct and circumstantial evidence, the court stated: [I]n reaching your verdict in this case, you should consider and weigh all the evidence presented, whether direct or circumstantial. In deciding whether the government has established the charge against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, you must consider and weigh the testimony of all the witnesses who have appeared before you, including the defendant. With respect to the charge of first-degree sexual abuse, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: The essential elements of the offense of first degree sexual abuse, each of which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are one, that the defendant engaged in a sexual act. Now here the specific sexual act alleged is that the defendant put his penis in the vulva, that is the external part of the female organ.... And then that he did so with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of himself or K.W. See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.60 (4th ed.2008 rev.). Because an additional element of first-degree sexual abuse is the use of force, the court went on to explain the meaning of force in this context, specifically that [f]orce ... means the use of such physical strength or violence as is sufficient to overcome, restrain or injure a person. See id. Later, it instructed the jury to consider all the circumstances in evidence that you think are relevant in determining whether the government had met its burden with respect to the mental state element of first degree sexual abuse. Finally, the court returned to the subject of burdens of proof, instructing the jury that its duty was based on all the evidence, to determine what the facts were; that it should first consider all the evidence in determining whether the government met its burden before it gets to this business of consent; that if the jury found that the government had not met its burden, it should acquit; and that if it found the government had met its burden, it must consider whether K.W. consented. The appellant contends that the trial court's instructions failed to inform the jury that it could consider appellant's evidence of consent with respect to whether the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the act charged was accomplished by force, and that this constitutes reversible error. As the government concedes, our decisions in Hicks and Russell [5] leave no room for doubt that the trial court erred by instructing the jury not to get to this business of consent until after it had considered all of the other evidence. See Hicks v. United States, 707 A.2d 1301, 1303 (D.C.1998) and Russell v. United States, 698 A.2d 1007, 1015-16 (D.C.1997) ([W]hen the legislature has not specified otherwise ... the jury should be expressly instructed that it may consider the affirmative defense evidence when it determines whether the government has met its burden to prove all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.). In Hicks and Russell, we declined to apply a plain error analysis in either case because we found that, unlike here, the objections to the instructional error were preserved. See Hicks, supra, 707 A.2d at 1304-05 (holding that plain error review was not warranted where Hicks expressed concern that the court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof); Russell, supra, 698 A.2d at 1012-13 (holding that plain error review was not warranted where Russell explicitly challenged the given instructions, though not with the specificity normally required to avoid plain error review). Here though, no objection, however peripherally related to the instructional error, was raised by the defense, and thus we conclude that plain error review is appropriate. See Super. Ct.Crim. R. 52(b) (2008). Under the plain error doctrine, this court may, at its discretion, notice defects raised for the first time on appeal if substantial rights were clearly and prejudicially denied below. ( Linwood ) Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084, 1088 (D.C.1978). To satisfy the plain error test, however, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that there [was] `error,' i.e., `[d]eviation from a legal rule'; that the error was `plain,' i.e., `obvious' or `clear under current law'; and that the error `affect[ed his] substantial rights.' ( Danny Lee ) Johnson, supra, 812 A.2d at 242 (quoting Olano, supra, 507 U.S. at 732-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (1993)). Even then, we will not reverse unless the defendant makes the additional showing of either a miscarriage of justice, that is, actual innocence; or that the trial court's error `seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Wilson v. United States, 785 A.2d 321, 326 (D.C.2001) (quoting Olano, supra, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770). In reviewing jury instructions, we must look at the instructions `as a whole in assessing whether they constituted prejudicial error.' Hunt v. United States, 729 A.2d 322, 325 (D.C.1999) (citations omitted). Here, the government concedes that there was error and that the error was plain, that is, obvious. An error affects a substantial right when it has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the ... verdict. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004). Thus, the standard for whether an error affects a substantial right is similar[ ] to the Kotteakos formulation in requiring the showing of `a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Id.; Wilson, supra, 785 A.2d at 325 (citing United States v. Gomez, 255 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001)). In this case, the appellant cannot show that the error has affected a substantial right. The factual issues in this case essentially came down to a credibility contest between K.W., who testified that the appellant raped her, and the appellant, who testified that after engaging in consensual sex, K.W. attacked him in a jealous rage when a girlfriend called him at his apartment, causing him to injure her in the course of defending himself. The evidence in support of K.W.'s version of events was compelling. K.W. had taken her two year old son to the apartment with her to visit appellant; she specifically informed the taxi driver not to leave without her even if appellant said he could; while waiting for her to return, the taxi-driver saw someone grappling with the window blinds (as K.W. testified that she had); K.W., half-naked, ran out of the apartment with her clothes in disarray, crying and screaming, He raped me, he raped me, while trying to cover her private parts. But as persuasive as this evidence might be, an even more powerful portion of the evidence before the jury were the phone messages that the appellant himself left on K.W.'s answering machine (despite a court order barring him from having any contact with her) that were played and made available to the jury. The first message was left five days after the events at issue. In it, appellant said, inter alia, that he had not meant to lash out at K.W. as he did, that he was getting psychological counseling, that he had enrolled in anger management classes, that he was deeply sorry, and that he had turned into something that [he] never wanted to be. In the message that he left five days later, he admitted that he messed up and made big mistakes with [her], that he would love to reconcile, but [he knew] that [she] would have no trust in me, and concluded by saying that he was going to f k all of the s t out of [her]. The next day, he left a third message in which he said, I'm learning how to deal with all this anger, okay? Because you know I could snap and resort to violence once again, but I'm trying not to do so, and he again apologized, adding but I know you can't forgive me for that and I respect you for that. Although the trial court gave clearly erroneous final instructions when it told the jury that it should not get to this business of consent until after determining that the government had met its burden, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that it should first consider all the evidence in the case in determining whether or not the government has proven each of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It also instructed the jury to consider all of the evidence in the case when it instructed the jury on direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as intent. Furthermore, the trial court provided proper instructions to the jury on the defense of consent and on the appellant's theory of the case. Jurors are presumed to follow the trial court's instructions, see, e.g., Coates v. United States, 558 A.2d 1148, 1150 (D.C.1989). Indeed, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the court's error in instructing the jurors to first consider all the evidence to determine if the government had met its burden of proof before get[ing] to this business of consent resulted in the jury overlooking the issue of consent or declining to take the entire record into account during its deliberations. Indeed, it would seem that the tapes in which the appellant essentially admitted to the required element of force (defined by the court's instructions as such physical strength or violence as is sufficient to overcome a person) virtually ensured discussion of consent, and the jurors deliberated for several days. Given the tapes of the calls, in appellant's own voice and showing clear contrition, as well as the admissions he made on the calls, we conclude that the strong evidence of appellant's guilt, combined with the efforts made by the trial judge to clarify that the jury was to consider all of the evidence, make it highly improbable that but for the trial court's error the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 21-22 (D.C.2006) (citing Dominguez Benitez, supra, 542 U.S. at 81-82, 124 S.Ct. 2333). In short, given the strong evidence of appellant's guilt and the efforts made by the trial judge to clarify that the jury was to consider all of the evidence, we conclude that appellant is not entitled to a reversal due to the instructional error because the error did not affect his substantial rights.