Opinion ID: 867126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior to the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Begay,

Text: Brown’s Argument was Foreclosed by Binding Precedent The Government argues that even if Brown was mis- takenly sentenced as a career offender, he is not entitled to pursue his claim because he has not established that section 2255 was inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. (Appellee’s Br. at 43). Specifically, the Government asserts that Brown could have raised his claim earlier. As previously mentioned, in Rios we determined that the prisoner had met the second Davenport condition (requiring the prisoner to show that he relies on a retroactive decision that he could not have invoked in his first § 2255 motion) because his challenge was based on Begay (a retroactive Supreme Court decision), and his § 2255 petition was No. 12-1439 25 denied prior to Begay. 696 F.3d at 640. Likewise here, Brown’s § 2241 petition is based on Begay and the Delaware District Court denied his § 2255 motion prior to Begay. In Werlinger, however, we employed a slightly higher standard for proving that § 2255 was inadequate or ineffective: We required the prisoner to show that his claim was “foreclosed by binding precedent” at the time of his direct appeal and § 2255 motion. Werlinger, 695 F.3d at 648. Brown argues that he can meet this heightened standard and is therefore eligible for § 2241 relief. To this end, Brown argues that binding Third Circuit precedent prior to Begay foreclosed any contention that his conviction for Arson in the Third degree was not a “crime of violence” under the career offender Guideline. Brown points us to United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992), a case in which the Third Circuit held that a defendant’s prior conviction for first-degree “reckless endangering” was a “crime of violence” under the career offender Guideline. Id. at 860. The Third Circuit observed that “crimes such as drunk driving . . . present a serious risk of physical harm to a victim and therefore qualify as predicate ‘crimes of violence’ for purpose of the career offender Guideline.” Id. at 874; see also United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 729 (3d Cir. 1996) (reaffirming that “ ‘purely reckless’ crimes continue to count as predicate offenses for purposes of ‘career offender’ consideration”). 26 No. 12-1439 Following Begay, the Third Circuit has since recognized that Parson is no longer good law: In Parson, we held that a reckless endangering conviction was a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a) of the federal sentencing guidelines. 955 F.2d at 860. In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Begay, which held that a DUI conviction under New Mexico law did not fall within the definition of a “violent offender” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii), since violent felonies were limited to offenses which “typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” 553 U.S. at 144-45, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Post-Begay, we have held that “a conviction for mere recklessness cannot constitute a crime of violence” under the federal sentencing guidelines. United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 195-97 (3d Cir. 2010). Aguilar v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 663 F.3d 692, 698 n.12 (3d Cir. 2011). Taken together, this precedent suggests that if Brown had made the argument he cur- rently advances—that the “recklessness” mens rea in the Delaware criminal statute rendered it ineligible for treatment as a career-offender predicate—he would clearly have lost under Parson. It therefore follows that pre-Begay binding precedent foreclosed Brown’s argument that Arson in the Third Degree is not a “crime of violence,” as, its mens rea is mere recklessness. The Government’s only response to this line of argument is its familiar claim that Brown’s Delaware No. 12-1439 27 offense is not a “recklessness” crime because it requires the intentional act of lighting a fire. (Appellee’s Br. at 4647). But we have accepted Brown’s claim in the first instance that Arson in the Third Degree is fairly characterized as a crime requiring a mens rea of recklessness, and the Government offers no counterargument to the notion that Begay changed the law in the Third Circuit for “recklessness” offenses. Put simply, the Government does not claim that Brown’s “recklessness” argument, currently advanced in this Court, would have had any chance of prevailing in the Third Circuit at the time of his conviction, nor does it dispute that Begay changed Third Circuit law and overruled Parson. Because prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Begay Third Circuit precedent foreclosed the argument advanced today, Brown has demonstrated that § 2255 would provide an inadequate or ineffective remedy.