Opinion ID: 1413065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the $1200 judgment

Text: On January 5, 1966, in a hearing on the mother's motion of October 1965, the father, on cross-examination, testified as follows: Q Was it your understanding that you were to pay $150.00 per month per child? A Yes. Q Is that your understanding? A Except for what I mentioned, yes. Q That's what the Court ordered you to do, is that correct? A Yes, with that one exception. Q Now, the one exception you're talking about, Mr. Broome, is what? A The one exception which was read here a month ago ... during summer vacationthe children's summer vacations I could have care and custody during that period, and while they were in my care and custody the support money was to cease, because in effect I would be supporting them. Q That was your understanding of it, is that correct? A Yes, and I might add that I never did get them except one time. Q It was your understanding that during the summer vacation time while you had the children, you were not to pay support, is that correct? A Yes. In support of the judgment the court made the following Conclusions: 1. That defendant was relieved of supporting said minor child Richard Broome only during the summer months while exercising his rights of visitation. (Apparently defendant was fully cognizant of this fact since the files reflect that on July 1, 1962, he stated in a letter addressed to the Clerk of the District Court: `   according to the terms of our divorce stipulation that I do not pay the usual support of $150.00 per month per child during the summer months'. 2. That defendant could not relieve himself of the obligation to support said minor child by asuming his custody in contravention of the divorce decree which remained in full force and effect as to Richard's custody and until April 28, 1965. 3. That the order of April 28, 1965, had no retroactive effect on the support payments. 4. That the written stipulation filed herein and referred to and approved by the Court in the divorce decree became a part of said decree and by virtue thereof all payments which matured thereunder became a judgment debt. 5. That plaintiff is entitled to interest at the statutory rate. Counsel for the mother argued before the trial court and here that the intention of the stipulation and the decree was expressed by the father as being that child support payments were to cease only during the summer vacation months; and the trial court adopted this position. Counsel has urged upon us the well settled law in this state, as set forth in Engleman v. Engleman, 145 Colo. 299, 358 P.2d 864, that a trial court has no power or authority to cancel past due payments under a valid support order, and that past due installments under a valid support order constitute a debt and are in and of themselves judgments. The father's counsel suggests that we should treat this matter as falling under the law of contracts rather than as coming under the law of judgments because as a practical matter the stipulation of the parties is involved. We cannot subscribe to this argument, and we therefore treat this matter as a judgment containing the same provisions as the stipulation. At the time the stipulation was made the parties had in mind that the mother would have the custody of the children and that the child support payments would not be made during the summer months when the father had their custody. However, we think the language of the stipulation which became a part of the decree is perfectly plain to the effect that when any one of the children was with the father he would not have to pay support for that child during that period. We believe that the phrase during such periods as the father shall have the actual care and custody of the children, does not mean solely periods after the court has changed the custodial arrangements, but rather includes those times at which a child is living with the father, particularly when this is with the mother's consent. The terms of the decree are not changed by the fact that the father later petitioned for an order discontinuing the payments for Richard. This was simply strategy on the part of the attorney as a safeguard in the event he was wrong in his position that support payments were not payable anyway. This is not a case in which a payment became due and, therefore, our holding here is not in conflict with Engleman v. Engleman, supra, to which we adhere and of which we approve. Rather, this is a case in which, under the provisions of the decree, no payments became due nor were to become due for Richard from September 1964 through April 1965.