Opinion ID: 2313020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of defendant's statement to an investigator whom he may have assumed to have been sent by an attorney acting in his behalf?

Text: We have before us the question of whether the prosecution's use of a certain statement made by the defendant to an investigator violated the attorney-client privilege. The prosecutor had introduced at trial defendant's statement to an investigator to impeach the credibility of a defense witness. While defendant was awaiting trial, Mr. Blomberg, the victim's father, had hired independent counsel, Robert Bailey, and a private investigator, James Gardner, to investigate the involvement of Michael Muccio in the murder of his daughter. Trial counsel related that Mr. Blomberg had been visiting Davis regularly in jail and allegedly told Davis that if he implicated Muccio in the murder, Davis would be out of jail by Christmas. When Davis' trial counsel learned of Mr. Blomberg's activity in the case, he sought leave for and was granted a withdrawal from the case. Davis then spoke with the investigator, recanted his prior confession, and stated that it was really Muccio who had murdered Barbara. Almost immediately, Davis called Gardner and repudiated his statement, stating that he lied because Mr. Blomberg asserted that by saying what he did he would be released. Davis then severed any relationship he had with Bailey and asked trial counsel to resume his representation. In New Jersey, the privilege regarding confidential communications between an attorney and client extends to the necessary intermediaries and agents through whom the communications are made. State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 413 (1957). We have long recognized that a client's privileged communications are permanently protected from disclosure by himself, or by the legal advisor, or by the agent of either confidentially used to transmit the communications   . State v. Loponio, 85 N.J.L. 357, 360 (E. & A. 1913). This privilege has been held to include confidential communications to private investigators acting on behalf of counsel for the defendant. Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1264, 104 S.Ct. 3559, 82 L.Ed. 2d 860 (1984); People v. Knippenberg, 66 Ill. 2d 276, 6 Ill.Dec. 46, 362 N.E. 2d 681 (1977); State v. Tapia, 113 N.J. Super. 322 (App.Div. 1971); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 290 Pa.Super. 254, 434 A. 2d 740 (1981). The investigator, who may act as an agent of either the defendant or his counsel, renders services on behalf of the defendant. Although the record is unclear concerning the nature of the relationship established between Davis and Bailey (or for that matter, Bailey and the investigator), the record suggests that Davis was making a statement to Gardner to be utilized as a part of his defense. When trial counsel sought to be relieved, he stated that he had spoken with both Davis and Bailey, and learned that defendant decided to retain new counsel. (In fact, at the motion to withdraw as counsel, trial counsel stated that it was defendant's father who retained new counsel because of the cost of representation and a disagreement about trial defense strategy.) Although Bailey was never formally substituted as counsel, the statements made to Gardner would be within the bounds of legal counseling and be considered privileged if either Bailey was undertaking Davis' defense or if Davis reasonably believed he was. Cf. State v. Tapia, supra, 113 N.J. Super. 322 (statements made by defendant under mistaken belief investigator was agent of own attorney held to be privileged as an attorney-client communication); State v. Loponio, supra, 85 N.J.L. at 363 (letter written by third party for inmate who seeks to retain counsel held protected by attorney-client privilege). We note that the record is far from clear concerning Davis' own understanding of his relationship with Bailey. At one point, Davis acknowledged that he did not have a lawyer after trial counsel withdrew. The waiver of the attorney-client privilege rests solely with the client, not counsel; an attorney or agent may exercise this power only acting with a client's authority. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence on Trials at Common Law, §§ 2321, 2327 (McNaughton rev. 1961). This privilege continues, despite the termination of the attorney-client relationship. Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, supra, 290 Pa.Super. at 262-63, 434 A. 2d at 744-45; 8 J. Wigmore, supra, at § 2323. There is no suggestion that Davis authorized any waiver. Regardless of how the prosecution received such privileged materials, it may not use them as substantive evidence or for impeachment of defendant in trial. People v. Shiflet, 125 Ill. App. 3d 161, 171, 465 N.E. 2d 942, 949 (1984). This evidence was first used to test the reliability of defendant's experts' belief that the defendant was remorseful. The evidence showed the defendant to be devious, if not totally a liar. Defendant's trial counsel then felt compelled to spread the whole story on the record and before the jury. It was plainly damaging testimony and could not be considered harmless. On remand, the factual issue of the extent of the relationship between Bailey and Davis must be resolved. The trial proceedings should also reveal what representations were made to Davis by Gardner or others. Should a privileged relationship be found to exist, the application of the crime or fraud exception to the privilege may be tested in light of that record. In re Nackson, 114 N.J. 527, 535-37 (1989).