Opinion ID: 1708956
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Heading: did the highway patrol troopers have probable cause to arrest floyd?

Text: There is no question that Floyd was apprehended without a warrant. Under such circumstances [A] police officer must have (1) reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed; and (2) reasonable cause to believe that the person proposed to be arrested is the one who committed it.       Probable cause means less than evidence which would justify condemnation, but more than bare suspicion. Hester v. State, 463 So.2d 1087 (Miss. 1985), citing Powe v. State, 235 So.2d 920 (Miss. 1970). Henry v. State, 486 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Miss. 1986). In Jones v. State, 481 So.2d 798, 800-01 (Miss. 1985) it was said: In Swanier v. State, 473 So.2d 180 (Miss. 1985), this Court stated: The existence of probable cause or reasonable grounds justifying an arrest without a warrant is determined by factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act. The determination depends upon the particular evidence and circumstances of the individual cases. Id. at 186, quoting Smith v. State, 386 So.2d 1117, 1119 (Miss. 1980). Our cases recognize that law enforcement officers may detain a person short of an actual arrest for purposes of an investigative stop. McCray v. State, 486 So.2d 1247 (Miss. 1986). Vehicles also may be the subject of an investigative stop. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). An investigative stop may be made even where officials have no probable cause to make an arrest as long as they have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony ... or `some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.' ... McCray, 486 So.2d at 1249-50. An investigative stop must be limited in scope, however. Where a detention ... exceeds the scope of an investigative stop, it approaches a seizure. To justify a search and seizure without a warrant, the state must show probable cause for arrest. Id. at 50. We need not delineate our view of the dividing line between detention and arrest, for as a practical matter it is clear Floyd was arrested, at the latest, when Trooper Graddy handcuffed him. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). No formal declaration is required for the subject to be considered under arrest Swanier, 473 So.2d at 196, and in this factual setting Floyd could not have reasonably believed he was free to leave. See Riddles v. State, 471 So.2d 1234 (Miss. 1985). Indeed, the state does not contend otherwise. Trooper Graddy testified at the suppression hearing that at the time Floyd was handcuffed he was under arrest. Since the arrest was made without benefit of a warrant, and since the arrest preceded the discovery of the marijuana in Floyd's vehicle, probable cause must be based on what the officers knew at the time of Floyd's arrest. Though the issue is not without some difficulty, we think the troopers arrested Floyd at a time when they had at most a suspicion that Floyd was involved in criminal activity. The arrest having been made on less than probable cause, it was illegal. At the time Graddy handcuffed Floyd, the troopers knew that Floyd had pulled off the road into a driveway with the Pontiac driven by Boches before reaching the roadblock. They knew that Boches mentioned Floyd by name. They knew someone had called the Alcorn County jail asking for Boches. It is true Sgt. McDaniel and Trooper Holder had smelled marijuana in the Pontiac Boches was driving, but no one at the roadblock smelled marijuana in Floyd's car as he was passed through the roadblock. Nothing else linked Floyd to the marijuana in the Pontiac. Boches had told police the Pontiac was not his but McDaniel did not testify to anything Boches said which connected Floyd to the marijuana or to the Pontiac. The Pontiac was not reported stolen. No doubt, given the information the patrolmen had concerning the Boches vehicle they had a suspicion that Floyd might have been involved in some criminal activity. This suspicion may or may not have warranted detaining the Oldsmobile to question Floyd. [1] However, we cannot agree with the trial court that Floyd and Boches were obviously working in concert to transport marijuana. The state argues probable cause existed by virtue of the assumption that Floyd must have known what Boches was doing. On the contrary, everything the officers knew at the time of Floyd's arrest was consistent with Boches guilt but was little more than speculation and conjecture as to Floyd. It certainly did not rise to the dignity of probable cause. At the time, the officers had no idea that Boches and Floyd had traveled from Miami. McDaniel only learned Floyd's name as the result of an innocuous question such as who's your friend? Officers at the roadblock did not smell marijuana in Floyd's Oldsmobile when he was passed through, and Floyd's papers were in order. The fact that Floyd approached the roadblock while Boches did not could have denoted some joint criminal escapade, but it also could have meant that Floyd was unaware of what contraband Boches might have been transporting. McDaniel initially told Boches that he would be held until officers could determine if the Pontiac was stolen. No doubt McDaniel might have suspected Floyd knew something about the ownership of the Pontiac, and this could have provided another basis for detaining Floyd. But even if McDaniel was concerned only with Floyd's possible involvement with car theft, there surely existed means of resolving this question short of arrest. Based upon the totality of circumstances of this case, Rome v. State, 348 So.2d 1026, 1028 (Miss. 1977), we hold there was insufficient evidence at the time of Floyd's arrest to establish probable cause that Floyd had committed or was committing a felony. In Rome we found illegal an arrest made by an officer who surmised that the car and its then unidentified driver were possibly on an unlawful mission. The officer's hunch proved to be accurate, but as this Court has previously said, an unlawful search, though made in honest belief of right, remains unlawful and its fruits forbidden. Id. at 1029. Therefore, the motion to suppress should have been sustained and the marijuana and the cocaine found in Floyd's Oldsmobile should not have been admitted over appellant's objection. We note finally that Floyd raises as error his prosecution under a multicount indictment. Since we reverse on other grounds we do not reach this contention. However, it appears to us Floyd's argument is well taken in this instance. Finding that Floyd was illegally arrested, and the search incident thereto was invalid, his conviction is hereby reversed and remanded. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P. JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, ANDERSON, SULLIVAN and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.