Opinion ID: 2317903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: agency questions

Text: Adjectively, Terminal's questions involved include the question whether the Superior Court, Appellate Division, departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial procedure by taking cognizance of a question, submission of the issue of the engineer's alleged agency to the jury, in absence of a trial objection thereto, and in absence of assertion of this point by the authority on the appeal to the Appellate Division. Both these adjective elements are refuted by the authority, which calls attention to its broad objections to the trial court's denial of its many requests to charge, and to its Point VIII of its brief in the Appellate Division. We find adjectively that the Appellate Division did not err in considering this issue. Ordinarily blanket objections to a trial court's instructions to the jury are insufficient to constitute a basis for appeal. Williamson v. Berger, 11 N.J. 500, 505 (1953). In the present case, however, the trial court gave counsel no opportunity to object before the jury retired. And when counsel sought to give reasons for sundry objections to the charge, made after the retirement of the jury, the trial court restricted their opportunity for so doing. The authority not only objected to the trial court's denial of its several requests to charge (which included: No. 45, the statement that neither Mr. Lincoln nor Mr. Ivan L. Bogert, also a Bogert-Childs representative, had the right under the contract to issue Extra Work orders; No. 46, that the authority was a public body, and could act only by resolution; No. 48, that the engineer had no authority to extend the contract or bind the authority; No. 65, that Bogert-Childs and Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Bogert were not agents of the authority) on the ground that they are all material, but also objected: We take exception as a matter of law, to your Honor's statement that an agent can have apparent authority of a public body. We do not believe that to be a correct statement of the law. We believe that people deal with public bodies at their peril, and we believe that the law of this state is that it is incumbent upon them to determine the scope of the agency, if, in fact, one does exist. In other words, they have two obligations: to determine whether he is an agent and, secondly, the scope of his agency. And the authority also stated to the trial court: We object, as a matter of law, to your Honor's statement to the jury that there is no difference between a public body and a private body, and that all of the applicable rules of law applicable to private persons are applicable to public bodies and public corporations. Under the circumstances, the failure of counsel to give adequate reasons for their objections, inclusive of the specific reasons asserted on appeal, does not bar the appellate review of the agency question in this case. Such reasons as counsel were permitted to voice after the retirement of the jury, including the reasons hereinbefore quoted, are deemed adequate upon this question, under the circumstances of this case, in the adjective sense. Cf. Jelinek v. Sotak, 9 N.J. 19, 25-26 (1952). Insofar as the briefs in the Appellate Division are concerned, the issue of the instructions to the jury on the matter of the engineer's agency seems to have been adequately raised, adjectively speaking. On the merits in this respect Terminal contended that the submission to the jury of the question whether the engineer was the agent of the authority was proper. It does not become necessary in this case to consider whether the principles of law relating to implied or apparent authority may be applied in the field of municipal, or public corporations', contracts. The issues here principally relate to construction of a specific building contract, and the general rules of law in this respect are pertinent. We have held in this respect, in Jennings v. Pinto, supra (5 N.J., at pages 569-570): While it is a general rule that the construction of a contract is a question of law for the court, that rule is predicated upon the absence of an issue of fact. Where the effect of a written instrument depends not merely on its construction and meaning but upon disputed collateral facts in pais and extrinsic circumstances, the inferences of fact to be drawn therefrom are for the jury's determination. The contract designated engineer in the present case seems to have been given a multiple status, being for some purposes, but not for all purposes, the agent of the authority. Cf. Van Buskirk v. Board of Education, 78 N.J.L. 650, 655-657 ( E. & A. 1910). That this multiple status was understood by the authority is clearly demonstrable by its choice of contract terms. In the form of contract, Article 1, it expressly provided:  Engineer, or a pronoun in place thereof, shall mean the Bogert-Childs Engineering Associates [2] or their duly authorized representatives, or successors, who are designated by the Authority to perform the duties of the Engineer. The term designated, expressed without qualification, may be used for a variety of purposes. It may mean marked, made known or pointed out. See, for example, State v. Noah, 20 N.D. 281, 124 N.W. 1121, 1126 ( Sup. Ct. 1910); Colgrove v. United States, 176 F. 2 d 614, 617 (9 th Cir. 1949). Cf. State v. Green, 18 N.J.L. 179, 181 ( Sup. Ct. 1840). Or it may be the equivalent of appointed, People v. Fitzsimmons, 68 N.Y. 514, 519 ( Ct. App. 1877), although it may under some circumstances import less stability of tenure than the word appointed, Kaplan v. Sullivan, 290 Mass. 67, 194 N.E. 721, 723 ( Sup. Jud. Ct. 1935). Cf. Hendee v. City of Wildwood, 96 N.J.L. 286, 287 ( E. & A. 1921). Compare Morris Tp. v. Washington Heights Development Co., 137 N.J. Eq. 595, 598 ( Ch. 1946). It also has the connotation of indicated or set apart for a purpose or duty, such as designation of an officer for a command. Mutual Discount Corporation v. Nagy, 111 N.J.L. 592, 594 ( Sup. Ct. 1933). It is clear that in the present contract the engineer was given duties of different characteristics. In some instances he was appointed as an agent of the authority to make determinations, in others he appears to have been selected as a consultant to make tentative determinations subject to the approval of his principals, and in other provisions of the contract he appears to have been pointed out as an arbiter. These various capacities were consolidated in Article 1 of the contract, as hereinbefore quoted, by the use of the term designated. The clear intent was to avoid repetition of reference to Bogert-Childs, or its representatives, namely to avoid using specific terms such as appointed (as agent), selected (as consultant) or pointed out (as arbiter). Wherever necessary to the determination herein we shall hereinafter refer to the governing contractual provision or provisions and the construction thereof called for in respect to the status of the engineer in the particular instance. Pertinent provisions of Contract No. 1, ante, which among others control one or more of the issues involved in this case, were as follows: (Art. 1) Engineer means Bogert-Childs or their duly authorized representatives,    who are designated by the Authority to perform the duties of the Engineer. (Emphasis supplied) (Art. 1) Extra work    refers to and includes work required by the Authority, which in the judgment of the Engineer, involves changes in or addition to that required by the plans, etc. (Art. 1) Wherever in the specifications or upon the drawings the words `directed,' `required,' `permitted,' `ordered,' `designated,' `prescribed,' or words of like import are used    the direction    of the Engineer is intended, and similarly the words `approved,' `acceptable,' `satisfactory,' or words of like import shall mean approved by, or acceptable or satisfactory to the Engineer, subject in each case to the final determination of the Authority, unless otherwise expressly stated. (Emphasis supplied) (Art. 11) The construction program was in the category to be approved by the Engineer. (Art. 14) Neither the acceptance by the Authority or the Engineer, or any of their agents, employees or subordinates, of the whole or any part of the work    shall operate as a waiver of any portion of this contract    or of any power or right herein reserved to the Authority or Engineer   . (Art. 17) Damaged work was to be repaired by the contractor to the satisfaction of the Engineer. (Art. 29) The engineer was given power to explain the meaning and intent of plans, etc.; to give orders; to determine questions in relation to the construction under the contract  to be final and conclusive upon the contractor except as provided in Art. 1, e.g., where authority approval was expressly required. (Art. 36) Extra Work could be required by the authority in writing  by methods approved by the Authority including a method requiring engineer's determination when approved by the Authority. As we have hereinbefore observed, the engineer under the terms of this contract had a multiple status. Cf. Van Buskirk v. Board of Education, supra . In some respects the engineer was an agent, in other respects the engineer was a consultant, and in some respects the engineer was an arbiter. Compare Chism v. Schipper, 51 N.J.L. 1 ( Sup. Ct. 1888); Bradner v. Roffsell, 57 N.J.L. 412 ( E. & A. 1894); Gerisch v. Herold, 82 N.J.L. 605 ( E. & A. 1912). Whether the engineer is an agent, consultant or arbiter depends upon the construction of the pertinent provision or provisions of the contract. Some years ago it was said: Engineers have always claimed to be arbitrators between Owner and Contractor, and not the representative solely of one party. This position is a proper one, but to-day it is more of a myth than a fact. The anomalous position is brought about, not because Engineers are desirous of being unfair, but because of the agreements (or contracts) generally used, which make it extremely hard, if not almost impossible, for Engineers to be fair if they try to conform to the agreement provisions. Bamford, Agreements for Building Contracts (1910), p. 450 (Reprinted from Transactions, vol. LXVII, p. 438 et seq. (1910)) In Parker and Adams, The A.I.A. Standard Contract Forms and the Law (1954), p. 54, it is pointed out that: An analysis of the General Conditions will show that in a large proportion of them a definite duty is laid upon the Architect, in performing which he is acting for and on behalf of the Owner as his agent in some technical matter. Many of these instances are demonstrated in the above mentioned treatise. There are also contract provisions adverted to therein which are arbitration clauses. Id., p. 55 et seq. Compare Architect's Certificate as a Condition of Payment, 185 L.T. 336 (1938). The provisions of a contract may clothe an architect with the status of adviser, of agent of the owner, or of arbitrator. See American Institute of Architects, The Handbook of Architectural Practice (1943), ch. 8, pp. 19, 20; ch. 33, Art. 38- Art. 40, inclusive, pp. 59, 60. The situation disclosed by the pleadings and proofs herein was of considerable complexity. The trial court should have instructed the jury as to the various capacities of the engineer under portions of the contract respectively pertinent to the individual counts and claims of the complaint. If there then remained a disputed question of fact which would result in the invoking or disregarding of a particular clause of the contract in reference to the agency question, that dispute of fact should have been left to the jury. See Jennings v. Pinto, supra . The trial court's instructions to the jury on the subject of agency are concerned in the reversal by the Superior Court, Appellate Division. The appellate court held that neither Bogert-Childs nor Mr. Lincoln nor Mr. Ivan L. Bogert was an agent of either Terminal or the authority, but either (as the engineer) was an independent arbiter and that the trial court issued conflicting and erroneous instructions on this subject. The Appellate Division pointed to the trial court's emphasis on Article 29 of the contract, the trial court's recitation of the opposing contentions of the parties, its failure to instruct the jury whether Mr. Lincoln or his employer, Bogert-Childs, occupied the status of agent of the authority, and its denial of a request to charge, made by the authority, that Mr. Lincoln and Bogert-Childs were not its agents. The Appellate Division and the trial court were both in error. As hereinbefore observed, the engineer under a given circumstance may have been an agent of the authority; under other circumstances the engineer may have been a consultant, or an arbiter. The trial error was the failure to construe the contract and instruct the jury on the alternatives, if any, open to determination on the facts with regard to agency. This error may not cause reversal of the trial court's judgment, however, unless it was prejudicial to the substantial rights of the authority. The effect of the error may be determined only after a construction of the contract as applied to each of the three counts (first, second and fifth) of the complaint which were submitted to the jury.