Opinion ID: 168147
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: M otions for M istrial

Text: During the trial, Tony moved for a mistrial on two occasions. The district court denied both requests, and Tony appeals. “In determining whether to grant a mistrial, a district judge must first determine whether an error has occurred and, if -6- so, whether that error impaired the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial.” United States v. M artinez, 455 F.3d 1127, 1129 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). W e review a district court’s refusal to declare a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Id. W e will not disturb the district court’s determination absent a showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous conclusion of law, or manifests a clear error of judgment. Id. Tony first moved for a mistrial during the testimony of police officer Anderson Six, a government witness. Before trial, Tony filed a motion in limine requesting a court order prohibiting the prosecutor and government witnesses from referring to the W hitegoats as “victims” in the presence of the jury. The district court granted the motion. At trial, Officer Six testified to receiving a dispatch call regarding two assault victims who had been transported to the Gallup Indian M edical Center. After gathering information about M r. and M rs. W hitegoat from Richard W hitegoat at the medical center, Officer Six went to the W hitegoat’s residence. Officer Six’s testimony described the condition of the residence w hen he arrived, including the location of several pools of blood. He also provided a foundation for several photographs he took of the crime scene that were admitted into evidence. During his testimony, Officer Six referred to M r. and M rs. W hitegoat as “victims” on multiple occasions. The prosecutor also used the term “victim” on one occasion when advocating for the admissibility of an exhibit. Tony objected and then, after Officer Six used the term “victim” a few -7- more times, moved for a mistrial. The district court summarily denied the request. On appeal, Tony argues the district court’s failure to grant a mistrial was error because the references to the W hitegoat’s as victims, combined w ith M rs. W hitegoat’s frail appearance at trial, likely resulted in a jury verdict motivated by sympathy. Tony’s defense strategy focused on discrediting witness identifications of Tony as the assailant. He did not contend that the W hitegoats were not assaulted. In fact, during closing argument, Tony’s defense counsel conceded M rs. W hitegoat had been assaulted. Defense counsel stated “[M rs. W hitegoat] was hit, by someone. . . . Something really frightening happened to M rs. W hitegoat. She is obviously still affected by it. She was injured, and she’s afraid to be in her home by herself. W e do not contest that at all.” Because Tony did not argue M r. and M rs. W hitegoat were not the victims of a crime, Tony’s right to a fair and impartial trial was not impaired by Officer Six’s references to the W hitegoats as victims. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial on this ground. Tony moved for a mistrial a second time at the conclusion of Richard W hitegoat’s testimony, claiming several government witnesses discussed the substance of their testimony outside the courtroom. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Angela Tony, Brian Tony’s wife, testified that she saw Officer Six, Richard W hitegoat, and an unidentified woman talking in the -8- hallway outside the courtroom. M rs. Tony indicated they spoke in English initially, but switched to Navajo when they saw that she was present. According to M rs. Tony, Officer Six told the others he was asked to testify as to the date and location of the assaults. M rs. Tony also indicated when James W hitegoat exited the courtroom after testifying, he approached the group and stated he was asked how many brothers Tony had and where Tony lived. M rs. Tony was not sure whether James was talking to Richard or the unidentified lady. Additionally, according to M rs. Tony, Richard entered the courtroom to testify almost immediately after James exited. The district court also heard testimony from Richard W hitegoat. Richard stated he did not discuss the substance of any testimony with Officer Six or James. Upon further questioning by the district court, Richard indicated Officer Six opened his case investigation file and began talking to Richard, but Richard walked away and did not listen. After considering M rs. Tony’s and Richard W hitegoat’s testimony, the district court denied Tony’s second motion for a mistrial. The district court observed Tony had not requested sequestration of witnesses pursuant to Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. M oreover, although the district court indicated it was troubled by Officer Six’s conduct, it concluded the issues discussed by the government witnesses were not in dispute and were not central to a determination of Tony’s guilt or innocence. -9- The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 615, a party may request that witnesses be excluded from the courtroom so they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. W hen a party invokes the rule, the district court must also instruct witnesses that they are not to discuss events in the courtroom with other witnesses who are to testify. United States v. Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477, 484–85 (10th Cir. 1986). Such an instruction is only required, however, w hen the rule is invoked. See Fed. R. Evid. 615. In the present case, neither party invoked Rule 615. Thus, the district court did not err in failing to instruct the witnesses not to discuss their testimony, and the conduct of the government witnesses did not violate any court order. Even if an error occurred, Tony has not demonstrated the government witnesses’ discussion of their testimony impaired his right to a fair and impartial trial. See M artinez, 455 F.3d at 1129. According to M rs. Tony, the government witnesses discussed their testimony regarding (1) the date and location of the assaults, (2) the place of Tony’s residence, and (3) the number of brothers Tony had. The first issue was not in dispute, and the second issue was not relevant to a determination of Tony’s guilt or innocence. The third issue w as relevant. In particular, Tony claimed he had four brothers, and thus, M r. W hitegoats statement that “W iizii’s late son came into the house” could have referred to at least five individuals. Although the number of brothers Tony had was relevant, James’ -10- alleged discussion of this issue did not have any effect on Richard’s testimony. See Buchanan, 787 F.2d at 485 (concluding witness’ discussion of testimony was not prejudicial in part because it did not affect other witnesses’ testimony). W hen asked on cross-examination about Tony’s brothers, Richard indicated he did not know how many brothers Tony had. M oreover, in closing argument, defense counsel was permitted to argue that Tony had multiple brothers and that M r. W hitegoat’s alleged identification could have referred to any one of them. 4 Because the government witnesses’ discussion of testimony was not prejudicial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a m istrial on this ground.