Opinion ID: 149704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proving Specific Intent To Promote

Text: Whether proof of the intent-to-promote element in the transportation prong of the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A), is satisfied by the record in this case is not entirely clear under the existing case authority. In fact, there are no cases from this circuit squarely addressing the quantum or nature of proof required to establish the intent-to-promote element in transportation cases under § 1956(a)(2)(A). Nonetheless, some guidance may be derived from the money laundering statute itself and from cases construing the identical intent-to-promote language in the transaction section of the same statute, § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). [7] The specific intent to promote requirement has been called the gravamen of a § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) violation. United States v. Carcione, 272 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir.2001). To prove it, the Government must satisfy a stringent mens rea requirement. United States v. Brown, 186 F.3d 661, 670 (5th Cir.1999). Essentially, the government must show the transaction at issue was conducted with the intent to promote the carrying on of a specified unlawful activity. Id. It is not enough to show that a money launderer's actions resulted in promoting the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. Id. Nor may the government rest on proof that the defendant engaged in knowing promotion of the unlawful activity. Id. Instead, there must be evidence of intentional promotion. Id. In other words, the evidence must show that the defendant's conduct not only promoted a specified unlawful activity but that he engaged in it with the intent to further the progress of that activity. Brown, 186 F.3d at 670. The justification for this rigorous mens rea requirement is that, in enacting the statute, Congress meant to create a separate crime of money laundering, discrete and apart from the underlying substantive offense. United States v. Febus, 218 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 841 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479, 486 (4th Cir.1994)). Strict adherence to this standard helps ensure that the money laundering statute will punish conduct that is really distinct from the underlying specified unlawful activity and will not simply provide overzealous prosecutors with a means of imposing additional criminal liability any time a defendant makes benign expenditures with funds derived from unlawful acts. Brown, 186 F.3d at 670. Section 1956(a)(2)(A) contains an identical specific intent requirement for transportation cases as its § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) transaction counterpart. While the definitive case authority on specific intent derives from the transaction provision, it is safe to assume the requirement is no less rigorous under 1956(a)(2)(A). See United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir.2008) (noting the use of identical language in the transportation and transaction provisions of § 1956 is a strong indicator that they should be interpreted in the same manner). We conclude that the same stringent specific intent requirement applies in § 1956(a)(2)(A) cases. We now turn to the facts needed to prove it.
Determining whether specific intent to commit promotion money laundering has been proven is necessarily a fact-bound inquiry frequently turning upon circumstantial evidence. Brown, 186 F.3d at 670; see also United States v. O'Banion, 943 F.2d 1422, 1429 (5th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Maggitt, 784 F.2d 590, 593 (5th Cir.1986)) (Intent may, and generally must, be proven circumstantially.'). Because of the myriad forms promotion money laundering can take, divining a factual criterion with any precision from the available cases can prove confounding. Adding to the difficulty is the varying procedural postures in which the cases and attending proof present themselves on appeal. Some are appealed after a full jury trial with all of the facts presented and a comprehensive record available for review. Other cases come before the court after a guilty plea with the factual proffer serving as the primary factual rendition. Despite these obstacles to determining a precise standard of proof for specific intent under § 1956(a)(2)(A), we do nonetheless find some instruction from (a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(A) cases whereas heredrug trafficking serves as the underlying criminal activity. More to the point, in both transaction and transportation cases involving promotion, courts have often relied on proof that the defendant was aware of the inner workings of and/or extensively involved in the drug organization responsible for the criminal activity as circumstantial proof that he had the specific intent to promote its unlawful purpose. To be clear, the cases to which we refer do not expressly stand for the proposition that evidence of a defendant's involvement in the underlying drug business is necessary to prove specific intent in drug transportation cases. Yet, without expressly so holding, a review of those cases nonetheless reveals that it is precisely that type of proof (facts showing the defendant's involvement in and/or knowledge of the illegal organization) on which the courtsat least in partrelied in finding specific intent-to-promote. Most significantly, these cases exemplify the courts' consistent reliance on some additional evidence beyond the bare transaction or transportation itself to infer specific intent. Thus, it is to illustrate this common thread in these otherwise fact-specific cases that we refer to them in this opinion. [8] To sum up, where the specified unlawful activity is drug trafficking, many courts have relied upon facts showing that the defendant knew something about the inner workings of the drug organization to find that he intended to promote its purpose. In the drug money transportation context, this may be the only type of evidence available beyond the bare transportation itself. Oftentimes, this proof comes in the form of facts showing the defendant's direct involvement in the illegal enterprise thereby rendering it more likely that he intended to further its progress by his actions. This is not to say that the type of proof relied on in the above cases is essential in transportation cases involving drug trafficking. Circumstantial proof of intent does not lend itself to such narrow factual categories. Nor, on the other hand, does the commonality of proof in the foregoing cases mean that the presence of such facts will always support a finding of specific intent. Instead, the simple lesson from these cases is that evidence of a defendant's knowledge about the internal operations of a drug organization, for which he is engaging in § 1956(a)(2)(A) transportation activities, may and often is relied upon to establish his specific intent to promote the organization's purpose. This squares with the broader premise that the money laundering statute was directed toward conduct that is distinct from the underlying substantive crime because it contemplates that something more than the bare act of transportation is necessary to prove specific intent to promote. Brown, 186 F.3d at 670. And, requiring more proof, in whatever form, aligns with the stringent mens rea requirement imposed by Congress on money laundering offenses.