Opinion ID: 1177218
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inadmissible Testimony

Text: In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Arthur Egelman (Egelman), a psychiatrist, as an expert witness who had worked with a number of Vietnam veterans. During examination by the State, Egelman testified on the substance of an interview he had with Killingsworth. In response to a question, Egelman testified from his notes quoting a statement that Killingsworth had made to him: I asked [Killingsworth] if [Simonson] had ever talked crazy, and [Killingsworth] said that Simonson had talked about shooting people before and I told him to punch them out, not shoot them. And [Simonson] remarked that if he ever did anything like that, they would never convict him because, they'd think he was crazy because he'd been in Vietnam and was exposed to Agent Orange. He [Killingsworth] says that this happened a few months before [the shootings] happened. Simonson objected and moved for a mistrial because the statement that Egelman made was not given to the defense until the morning of Egelman's testimony; therefore, Simonson did not have an opportunity to cross-examine Killingsworth about the statement. Also, Killingsworth did not testify to this statement during his examination. Prior to trial, the State had previously given the defense everything they had received from Egelman. After Egelman's testimony, Egelman was questioned both by the State and the defense, out of the presence of the jury. Egelman stated that he had given his notes containing Killingsworth's statement to the State that morning. At which time, the State testified that they immediately turned a copy of Egelman's notes over to the defense. During the questioning of Egelman out of the jury's presence, it was also discovered that after the trial started and NMSA 1978, Evid.Rule 615 had been invoked, Egelman had interviewed Killingsworth. Simonson, therefore, objected to Egelman's testimony and asked for a mistrial because the defense had been denied a chance to depose or evaluate the notes in preparation for trial and because Rule 615 had been violated. The trial court denied the request for mistrial but immediately struck the testimony and admonished the jury, stating that: I would instruct the jury at this time they are to disregard any testimony that Dr. Egelman has given today that deals with the substance of his conversation with Mr. Killingsworth    and any statements [he] made to the doctor. A second cautionary instruction was given by the trial court during instructions to the jury, in which the trial court stated that the testimony should not enter into their deliberations. However, Simonson asserts that the testimony was so prejudicial that in spite of any admonition to the jury, the jury could not disregard the testimony during deliberations. The general rule in New Mexico, concerning striking improper testimony is that: [W]hen improper evidence is introduced, objected to and withdrawn from the consideration of a jury with later instruction to disregard such testimony, the withdrawing and admonition cure any prejudicial effect the evidence might have had. State v. Ferguson, 77 N.M. 441, 444, 423 P.2d 872, 874 (1967) (citations omitted). Simonson argues State v. Rowell, 77 N.M. 124, 419 P.2d 966 (1966), in which the Court found that an admonition to the jury did not cure inadmissable testimony. However, in Rowell it appears that the prosecutor deliberately asked a question concerning subject matter which the prosecutor knew was improper. This is not the situation in Simonson's case and is therefore distinguishable. The overwhelming New Mexico case law states that the prompt sustaining of the objection and an admonition to disregard the answer cures any prejudicial effect of inadmissible testimony. State v. Vialpando, 93 N.M. 289, 599 P.2d 1086 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 172, 598 P.2d 215 (1979); State v. King, 90 N.M. 377, 563 P.2d 1170 (Ct.App. 1977); State v. Baca, 81 N.M. 686, 472 P.2d 651 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 81 N.M. 721, 472 P.2d 984 (1970). Therefore, since the granting of a mistrial is discretionary with the trial court, we will not disturb the decision on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Ewing, 97 N.M. 484, 641 P.2d 515 (Ct.App. 1982). An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case. State v. Brown, 91 N.M. 320, 573 P.2d 675 (Ct.App. 1977), cert. quashed, 91 N.M. 349, 573 P.2d 1204, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 928, 98 S.Ct. 2826, 56 L.Ed.2d 772 (1978). After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion denying the motion for a mistrial. Simonson also asserts that Egelman violated Rule 615, which states: At the request of a party the judge shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses   . At the beginning of Simonson's trial, Rule 615 was invoked which required witnesses to leave the courtroom and remain outside the courtroom until that particular witness was called to testify. State v. Barboa, 84 N.M. 675, 506 P.2d 1222 (Ct.App. 1973). As a part of this rule, a witness is prohibited from talking to another witness. State v. Kijowski, 85 N.M. 549, 514 P.2d 306 (Ct.App. 1973). The purpose of this rule for excluding witnesses is to give the adverse party an opportunity to expose inconsistencies in witnesses' testimony and to prevent the possibility of one witness shaping his testimony to match that given by another witness at trial. State v. Ortiz, 88 N.M. 370, 540 P.2d 850 (Ct.App. 1975). Permitting a witness to testify who had violated the rule is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Kijowski . In view of the fact that Egelman was an expert and was not a witness to the shooting, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Egelman to testify.