Opinion ID: 486432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: liability in official capacity.

Text: 33 The majority's distinction between official capacity liability and supervisory liability is well taken. To show official capacity liability, the plaintiff must prove that a policy or custom of the Sheriff's Department caused the violation in question. See supra p. 1170. The following portion of the instructions adequately poses the question of the existence of a policy or custom in the Sheriff's Department: 34 You are instructed that Collidge [sic] Conlee as sheriff is not liable for the acts of his deputies or jailers in his employ unless it is shown that their actions were carried out at his direction or with his approval or that their actions constituted a course of conduct or a custom that had been approved by him as sheriff. 35 In addition to Department custom, this instruction also mentions actions carried out at Conlee's direction or with his approval. The inclusion of these elements, while not necessary to an official-capacity liability instruction, does not introduce error into the instruction. 36 In Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), the Supreme Court considered a case similar to the present one. In Pembauer, a grand jury indicted a physician for fraudulently accepting welfare payments. After two of the physician's employees were subpoenaed and failed to appear before the grand jury, a court issued an order commanding the sheriff to bring the employees before the court to testify and to answer for contempt. When the physician refused to allow the deputies into his clinic, a county prosecutor instructed the deputies to go in and get the witnesses. Upon receiving instructions from their supervisors to follow the prosecutor's advice, the deputies, along with city police officers, entered the clinic by chopping down the door with an axe. The physician filed a section 1983 action against the city and county for violations of his fourth amendment rights. The Supreme Court found the county liable because the decision of the prosecutor caused the violation of the physician's fourth amendment rights. 37 The Court analyzed what constituted government custom or policy. The Court observed that in order for governmental liability to exist for actions by non-policymakers, the decision to adopt that particular course of action [must] properly [be] made by that government's authorized decisionmakers. Moreover, where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is    responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly. 475 U.S. at ---- - ----, 106 S.Ct. at 1298-99, 89 L.Ed.2d at 463-64. 38 With these principles in mind, the instruction which allowed the jury to find Conlee liable in his official capacity if he either directed the deputies to act as they did in arresting Clay or if he approved of their actions was proper. In either case, the Sheriff himself would be the one making the ultimate decision as to how the deputies were to proceed. Such a choice by an authorized decisionmaker would be sufficient to create a causal link between the Sheriff's Department's policy and the constitutional tort against Clay. 39 The only question which poses any difficulty is whether Conlee was in fact the local government's authorized decisionmaker with respect to arrest procedures. The record permits a finding that he was. Sheriff Conlee was asked whether he was the supervisor responsible for making sure that arrests are made and everything is in compliance with the law. Conlee answered that he was the administrator in the Sheriff and Collector's office. Conlee was also asked whether you have a policy or a practice established in the Sheriff's Department relating to the investigation of crimes, whether the arresting officers performed according to your established procedure, and whether meetings were held to discuss policy and procedure. In responding to each question, the Sheriff indicated that he ultimately had control over the operation of the Department as it concerned arrest procedures. I therefore believe the jury verdict should not be overturned.