Opinion ID: 1675746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ford's Appeal from the Order Granting a Trial on Indemnification

Text: White has moved to dismiss Ford's appeal on the indemnification issue on the same basis that Ford moved to dismiss Austins' appeal, i.e., that since the trial was granted on Ford's alternative request, Ford is not a party aggrieved and cannot appeal from such order. However, since we conclude Ford's appeal from the order is distinguishable from Austins' appeal from the order granting it a new trial, White's motion must be granted and Ford's appeal dismissed. Ford purports to appeal from an order which vacates the judgment and grants Ford a trial on the issue of indemnification. The order does not grant Ford a new trial since no trial has yet been held on the indemnification issue. The judgment of January 15, 1976 was based on oral arguments and briefs submitted by the parties. The subsequent order vacates the judgment and grants Ford's motion for a trialnot a new trial. Thus, Ford is not entitled to the benefit of sub. (3m) which by its terms applies to an appeal from an order granting a new trial. Furthermore, sub. (3m) applies only in jury trial situations and the instant order does not involve that circumstance. Ford is not a party aggrieved by the order since the order appealed from was entered on Ford's own motion. See: Lawrence v. Maclntyre (1970), 48 Wis. 2d 550, 180 N. W. 2d 538. [2] Moreover, since the order appealed from vacates the previously entered judgment and orders a trial, it is not a final order since it does not prevent a judgment from which an appeal could properly be taken. Ford's purported appeal from the order must be dismissed. Ford, in its response to the motion to dismiss, contends that its notice of appeal states that the appeal is also taken from the judgment of January 15, 1976, which ordered Ford to pay White's attorney's fees. Ford contends that undeniably it has the right to appeal from this adverse judgment against it. However, if Ford is permitted to maintain the appeal from the judgment, this would leave the trial court's subsequently entered order vacating the judgment and granting a trial on the issue of indemnification, hanging in legal limbo. Ford is apparently contending that the appeal from the judgment which was taken before the trial court's order was formally entered, stripped the trial court of authority to enter the order that it did. This would mean that the trial court's memorandum decision and order were simply nullities serving no purpose. [3, 4] We conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that Ford may not maintain the appeal from the judgment because at the time such appeal was taken, the judgment had already been vacated by the trial court's order. The general rule is that an appeal duly perfected divests the trial court of jurisdiction of the subject matter of the appeal and transfers it to the appellate court. See: State ex rel. Freeman Printing Company v. Luebke (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 298, 302, 152 N. W. 2d 861; Schueler v. Madison (1971), 49 Wis. 2d 695, 720, 721, 183 N. W. 2d 116. This general rule does not apply in the instant case because the appeal from the judgment, although perfected pursuant to sec. 817.11 (2), Stats., by the filing of a deposit in lieu of an undertaking, had not been taken as defined in sec. 817.11 (1), at the time the order vacating the judgment was entered. Thus the appeal from the judgment had not been duly perfected as that term is used in the above cases at the time the order vacating the judgment was entered. The record reveals at the time the order was entered, April 14, 1976, only a notice of appeal from the judgment had been served on the parties. The notice of appeal was not filed stamped in the clerk of circuit court's office until April 23, 1976. Sec. 274.11 (1), now sec. 817.11, provides that an appeal is taken by serving a notice of appeal and by filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the court in which the judgment appealed from is entered. Since the filing in this case didn't take place until April 23d, which was after the time the order vacating the judgment had been made and entered, the purported appeal from the judgment did not strip the trial court of jurisdiction to enter its order. See: Szafranski v. Radetzky (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 119, 141 N. W. 2d 902. Ford has attempted to appeal from a previously vacated judgment. This portion of the appeal must also be dismissed. An order in conformity with this opinion will be entered.