Opinion ID: 883123
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the prosecutor's comment during opening statements open the door to testimony regarding S.M.'s history of prior sexual abuse?

Text: The standard of review of discretionary district court rulings is an abuse of discretion standard, and we will affirm the district court's ruling absent a showing of clear error. State v. Andersen (1993), 260 Mont. 354, 358, 860 P.2d 115, 118. In its memorandum denying Stuit's motion for a new trial, the District Court stated: Had counsel for the defendant made prompt objection to the prosecutor's statement, requesting either that it be stricken and the jury instructed to disregard it, or for a mistrial, the court would have been able to make a ruling. Moreover, defense counsel did not request such a ruling from the court, even in the hearing in chambers. As shown by the transcript of the hearing in chambers, counsel was more concerned with obtaining a ruling from the court to the effect that the remark had opened the door to evidence of the victim's past sexual abuse. This, the court denied. (See page 17 of transcript.) In essence, the defendant's motion is an attempt to get the court to reconsider its ruling denying counsel the opportunity to put in evidence the victim's past sexual abuse. Section 46-20-104(2), MCA, provides that [u]pon appeal from a judgment, the court may review... any alleged error objected to which involves the merits or necessarily affects the judgment. Failure to make a timely objection during trial constitutes a waiver of the objection except as provided in XX-XX-XXX(2). Section 46-20-701(2), MCA, states: Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. No claim alleging an error affecting jurisdictional or constitutional rights may be noticed on appeal, if the alleged error was not objected to as provided in XX-XX-XXX, unless the defendant establishes that the error was prejudicial as to his guilt or punishment and that: (a) the right asserted in the claim did not exist at the time of the trial and has been determined to be retroactive in its application; (b) the prosecutor, the judge, or a law enforcement agency suppressed evidence from the defendant or his attorney that prevented the claim from being raised and disposed of; or (c) material and controlling facts upon which the claim is predicated were not known to the defendant or his attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence. (Emphasis added.) We have stated that where a criminal defendant fails to make a contemporaneous objection to the prosecution's characterization of the facts during trial, this Court is precluded from addressing the issue under § 46-20-104(2), MCA, unless the criteria under § 46-20-701(2), MCA, can be met or the comments create an exception to the `plain error' doctrine. State v. Arlington (1994), 265 Mont. 127, 157, 875 P.2d 307, 325 (citing State v. Rodgers (1993), 257 Mont. 413, 417, 849 P.2d 1028, 1031). A contemporaneous objection is one which is made at trial in a timely manner and upon specific grounds, which appears on the record, and which is made as soon as the ground for the objection becomes apparent. See Kizer v. Semitool, Inc. (1991), 251 Mont. 199, 207, 824 P.2d 229, 234; Story v. City of Bozeman (1993), 259 Mont. 207, 217, 856 P.2d 202, 208. Stuit asserts that [a]fter the close of opening statements by both sides, Stuit's counsel objected to the [prosecutor's] remarks regarding S.M.'s innocence. Nowhere in the transcript, however, is an explicit statement made by defense counsel objecting to the prosecutor's remarks regarding S.M.'s innocence and stating the grounds for such objection. In fact, the record reveals that the discussion between counsel and the judge in chambers centered on the State's objection to defense counsel's opening statement. Stuit further asserts that the District Court acknowledged [that] the remarks were objectionable. While the District Court stated to the prosecutor, If you're going to open the door, you came dangerously close to doing that, the court concluded that I'm not going to make a ruling [that] she opened the door at this time. Stuit's assertion that the court acknowledged the prosecutor's remarks as objectionable is a mischaracterization of the record. We conclude that Stuit's counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's comment during opening statements, that Stuit does not meet the criteria under § 46-20-701(2), and therefore, the doctrine of plain error is inapplicable in this case. Stuit further argues that the reason his counsel did not move the court for a mistrial or to instruct the jury to disregard the statement [was] that neither [option] was the relief which was proper at the time... . A new trial ... was not in Stuit's best interest at the time of the objection because it would only have the effect of putting Stuit back in the same position as he was at the start of the trial, namely, unable to explain to the jury how S.M. could be making these charges. In essence, the defense chose not to object because it hoped that the prosecution had opened the door for the defense to introduce evidence to explain to the jury how S.M. could be making these charges, that is, to explain that she had been sexually abused by another person in the past. Where the defendant is charged with a sex crime, § 45-5-511, MCA, governs the admissibility of evidence concerning the sexual conduct of the victim. Subsections (2) and (3) of § 45-5-511, MCA, are referred to as the rape shield provisions and provide as follows: (2) No evidence concerning the sexual conduct of the victim is admissible in prosecutions under this part except evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the offender or evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activity to show the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease which is at issue in the prosecution. (3) If the defendant proposes for any purpose to offer evidence described in subsection (2), the trial judge shall order a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (2). The standard of review for the application of the rape shield provisions is a manifest abuse of discretion standard. State v. Howell (1992), 254 Mont. 438, 445, 839 P.2d 87, 91, cert. denied (1993), ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1862, 123 L.Ed.2d 483; State v. Van Dyken (1990), 242 Mont. 415, 435, 791 P.2d 1350, 1362-63, cert. denied (1990), 498 U.S. 920, 111 S.Ct. 297, 112 L.Ed.2d 251. It is well-settled law that the prior sexual abuse of the victim is inadmissible under the rape shield provisions. Howell, 839 P.2d at 92; State v. Rhyne (1992), 253 Mont. 513, 519, 833 P.2d 1112, 1116; State v. Van Pelt (1991), 247 Mont. 99, 103, 805 P.2d 549, 552; State v. Kao (1990), 245 Mont. 263, 269-70, 800 P.2d 714, 717-18. We have held that a defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses is not violated by the exclusion of evidence of the victim's prior sexual abuse unless the victim's accusations or allegations of prior sexual abuse have been proven to be false or are admitted to be false. Rhyne, 833 P.2d at 1116; Howell, 839 P.2d at 91; Van Pelt, 805 P.2d at 552. Stuit does not allege that S.M.'s allegations of prior sexual abuse are false. Stuit argues: [O]bviously, in a case where a 10 year old's testimony is the only evidence for the state and that child has been a victim of the same crime before, any implication by the prosecutor that the defendant was the only abuser is improper. In Van Pelt, 805 P.2d at 552, this Court rejected a similar argument: Appellant cannot argue ... that he does not seek to attack [the child]'s credibility but rather seeks to demonstrate that [the child] could have gained her knowledge of sex outside of her contact with defendant. The major purpose in appellant's attempt to bring into evidence the incidents of prior abuse is to attack [the child]'s credibility. Whether under the guise of showing the jury how [the child] may have obtained her knowledge of sex, or not, the fact is appellant wished to convince the jury that [the child] fabricated the charges against him. The only way the jury could have found appellant not guilty ... would be by finding that [the child]'s allegations were false. This is not to say that [the rape shield provisions] provide[] an impenetrable wall of protection for [the child] and does not allow for her credibility to be questioned or attacked. The Montana Rules of Evidence certainly allow the credibility of a witness to be attacked, however, these rules are not without limitation. See Rule 608, M.R.Evid. Excluding evidence of alleged specific instances of prior abuse was within the discretion of the District Court. (Emphasis added.) Accord Kao, 800 P.2d at 718 (rape shield provisions provide no exception to warrant admission of evidence of prior sexual abuse). We conclude that the District Court properly ruled that the prosecutor's comment did not open the door to testimony regarding S.M.'s prior sexual abuse. The District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in prohibiting under the rape shield provisions testimony regarding S.M.'s prior sexual abuse.