Opinion ID: 2633165
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Friends demonstrated probable success on the merits.

Text: There is no factual dispute on appeal that the city did not conduct competitive bidding before awarding the original management contract to the club. Whether Friends demonstrated probable success on the merits therefore turns on the legal question whether the pre-amendment version of KMC 7.15.050(5) exempted management of the center from KMC 7.15.040's competitive bidding requirement. Before September 3, 2003 KMC 7.15.050 provided: The following may be purchased without giving an opportunity for competitive bidding: ... (5) Contractual services of a professional nature, such as engineering, architectural, and medical services.
The city, citing Laborers Local No. 942 v. Lampkin, [18] contends that the reasonable basis test applies to the city's interpretation of its procurement code. In Lampkin we held that a city's interpretation of its own procurement code will be upheld if there is a reasonable basis for the interpretation. [19] Under the rational basis test, we will uphold a governmental unit's decision if it is supported by the facts and has a reasonable basis in law, even if we may not agree with the [unit's] ultimate determination. [20] The city argues that because it had a reasonable basis to conclude that the term professional services included management of the center, the superior court abused its discretion by issuing the preliminary injunction. But we apply the reasonable basis standard of review to a municipality's interpretation of its own ordinances only when this interpretation implicates complex matters or the formulation of fundamental policy. [21] Lampkin concerned a Fairbanks North Star Borough requirement that the successful bidder for a school renovation project enter into a previously negotiated Project Labor Agreement (PLA). [22] We noted that the construction project unquestionably presented special challenges, and that the PLA would facilitate necessary flexible scheduling and eliminate the potential for strikes or other labor difficulties. [23] We held the borough had a reasonable basis to conclude that the PLA would allow the borough to satisfy its minimum needs, its procurement code's policy of maximum practicable competition, and the procurement code's provisions dealing with sole source procurement. [24] The legal question in this case is far less complex, involving only the meaning of services of a professional nature. Nor is there any indication that defining that phrase implicates the formulation of fundamental policy. We therefore conclude that although the superior court held that the city's interpretation failed even the reasonable basis test, the court could have interpreted pre-amendment KMC 7.15.050(5) using its independent judgment. Because we review de novo the superior court's legal determinations in issuing the preliminary injunction, [25] we review the meaning of pre-amendment KMC 7.15.050(5) using our independent judgment. We then review for abuse of discretion the superior court's determination of probability of success on the merits and its ultimate decision to issue the preliminary injunction.
The superior court relied on what it characterized as the clear language of the ordinance in determining that management of the center was not a service of a professional nature. The city cites several cases from other jurisdictions holding that in the context of similar procurement codes, management of various facilities was professional in nature. [26] At least some of these cases are easily distinguishable. [27] Moreover, numerous cases from other jurisdictions hold that management of facilities is not professional in nature and requires competitive bidding. [28] Opinions from other jurisdictions interpreting similar statutes can be persuasive, [29] but we turn first to our own methods of statutory interpretation. Interpretation of a statute begins with its text. [30] We apply the same rules of interpretation to municipal ordinances. [31] In interpreting statutes, we have adopted a sliding scale approach, under which [t]he plainer the statutory language is, the more convincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be. [32] Black's Law Dictionary defines professional as [a] person who belongs to a learned profession or whose occupation requires a high level of training and proficiency. [33] Webster's Third International Dictionary provides a similar definition. [34] [S]ervices of a professional nature are therefore commonly understood to be services that are rendered by a member of the learned professions or that require a high level of training and proficiency. The illustrative clause  such as engineering, architectural, and medical services  that follows services of a professional nature provides textual support for this interpretation. [35] Pursuant to the doctrine of ejusdem generis, a general term, when followed by specific terms, will be interpreted in light of the characteristics of the specific terms, absent clear indication to the contrary. [36] Before its 2003 amendment, KMC 7.15.050(5) listed only engineering, architectural, and medical services as examples of services of a professional nature. These specific examples all require extensive education, training, and proficiency. Most professions encompassed by these examples require licensing in Alaska. [37] There has been no contention, much less any evidence, that successful management of the city's recreation center requires education, training, or proficiency equivalent to that required of engineers, architects, and providers of medical services. In light of the plain meaning of services of a professional nature and the specific examples listed in pre-amendment KMC 7.15.050(5), we conclude that the phrase services of a professional nature does not include facilities management. We therefore agree with the superior court that management of the center does not involve services of a professional nature as that phrase was used in pre-amendment KMC 7.15.050(5). The superior court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding that Friends had demonstrated probable success on the merits.