Opinion ID: 786759
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extreme youth & extremely small physical size

Text: 29 This court has indicated that when the offense guideline already incorporates the age of the victim, the application of § 3A1.1 is improper if age per se is the sole factor supporting the adjustment: 30 [A]lthough any victim of abusive sexual contact with a minor might be described as vulnerable on account of her minority, her age does not make her any more vulnerable than other victims of this offense; enhancement of the defendant's sentence based only on the victim's status as a minor would therefore be inappropriate. 31 Wetchie, 207 F.3d at 634 n. 4 (emphasis added). It is also inappropriate to include the mere status of age as one of the factors supporting a finding of unique and particular susceptibility when the offense guideline incorporates age. See id. at 634 n. 3 (stating that age could not be considered but applying the vulnerable victim adjustment nonetheless because the 11-year old child was asleep); see also United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 869 n. 5 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that age could not be considered but applying the vulnerable victim adjustment because the 12-year old child was cognitively delayed). 32 Defendants' theory is that because they received the 4-level adjustment under § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) for a victim under 12, the vulnerable victim application note prohibits another 2-level adjustment on account of the victims' infancy. We reject this argument because the victims' vulnerability is not fully incorporated in the victim-under-12 adjustment. See U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, cmt. n. 2. 33 Most children under 12 are well beyond the infancy and toddler stages of childhood during which they are the most vulnerable. The guideline adjusting for victims under 12 does not take these especially vulnerable stages of childhood into account, so there is no double-counting of age in considering infancy or the toddler stage as an additional vulnerability. Though the characteristics of being an infant or toddler tend to correlate with age, they can exist independently of age, and are not the same thing as merely not having attained the age of twelve years, the criterion for the 4-level increase in § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A). 34 In this case, it is without doubt that the victims were unusually vulnerable as a matter of fact, i.e., less able to resist than the typical victim of the offense of conviction. Wetchie, 207 F.3d at 634. In particular, the 11-month old child most likely could not talk and he could not walk away from the abuse. Generally, infants at 12 months are only able to rise and walk at most a few steps alone. See Nelson Textbook of Pediatrics 20-22 (Richard E. Behrman et al. eds., 14th ed.1992); see also Basil J. Zipelli & Holly W. Davis, Atlas of Pediatric Physical Diagnosis 62 (4th ed.2002) (stating that at the median age of 11 months a child can walk three steps alone). By 18 months, an infant typically has a vocabulary of only 18 words. See Nelson Textbook of Pediatrics, 20-22. While we focus here on these physical characteristics and markers of cognitive development, we also recognize that there are unique concerns about the moral and psychological development of a child who is sexually assaulted at such a young age. 35 These attributes of infancy and the toddler stage compel the conclusion that the district court did not err as a matter of law in applying the vulnerable victim adjustment. The extreme youth and small physical size factors challenged by the Wrights account for traits and characteristics — such as an inability to communicate, an inability to walk, and as this court noted in Rearden, increased pain upon sexual penetration — that roughly correlate with age, but are not necessarily related to age. For example, in United States v. Veerapol, 312 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2002), we determined that an adult woman was unusually vulnerable to the crime of involuntary servitude because she could not speak English. Id. at 1133. In that case the victim was unable to communicate, and yet was not a child. 36 Just as the traits and characteristics of extreme youth and small physical size are not necessarily limited to minors, those same attributes do not necessarily apply to all minors. In United States v. Gawthrop, 310 F.3d 405 (6th Cir.2002), the defendant was apprehended because his 3-year old grandchild was able to tell her father that her grandfather made her put his penis in her mouth. Id. at 407. 37 Because the traits and characteristics associated with infancy and the toddler stage can exist independently of age, and because the factors of extreme youth and small physical size recognize a vulnerability beyond age per se, we hold that the district court did not contravene the commentary of § 3A1.1. It correspondingly did not engage in any impermissible double-counting of age under the guidelines. 38