Opinion ID: 2509099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The depravity-of-mind aggravator

Text: Browning claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal in several ways. One claim has merit: appellate counsel failed to challenge the jury instruction defining the aggravating circumstance of depravity of mind. The instruction read: [D]epravity of mind is characterized by an inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude. It consists of evil, corrupt and perverted intent which is devoid of regard for human dignity and which is indifferent to human life. It is a state of mind outrageously, wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman. There was no jury instruction regarding torture or mutilation. The instruction given in this case failed to properly define the term depravity of mind. [24] Absent a proper limiting instruction, depravity of mind fails to provide the required constitutional guidance to jurors. [25] We therefore construed the relevant statute, former NRS 200.033(8), [26] to require torture, mutilation or other serious physical abuse beyond the act of killing itself, as a qualifying requirement to an aggravating circumstance based in part upon depravity of mind. [27] At the time of Browning's trial, this court had not yet deemed the depravity-of-mind instruction unconstitutional; however, the United States Supreme Court had already deemed a very similar instruction unconstitutional in Godfrey v. Georgia. [28] The Supreme Court declared that a state has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty and must channel the sentencer's discretion by `clear and objective standards' that provide `specific and detailed guidance' and that `make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.' [29] The Court concluded that the phrase outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman did not imply an inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence because any person could fairly characterize almost every murder as outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman. [30] In two opinions that preceded Browning's conviction, this court considered challenges to Nevada's depravity-of-mind aggravator based upon Godfrey: Neuschafer v. State [31] and Rogers v. State. [32] In both cases this court concluded that Godfrey was distinguishable and that the Nevada statute regarding depravity of mind was constitutional as applied. [33] Because a challenge based upon Godfrey was unsuccessful in these cases, the State argues that Browning's appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the issue. Neuschafer and Rogers, however, differed from Browning's case because in those cases the juries were instructed on torture as well as depravity of mind and in Rogers the jury was further instructed on mutilation, and this court concluded that the facts of those cases adequately supported the aggravating circumstance. [34] Here, the instruction given referred only to depravity of mind and plainly failed to provide adequate guidance to the jury under Godfrey, and there was no indication that Browning tortured or mutilated the victim. [35] Because Browning's case resembled Godfrey more closely than did Neuschafer and Rogers, the failure of Browning's appellate counsel to challenge the depravity-of-mind instruction based upon Godfrey was objectively unreasonable. We also conclude that prejudice resulted because there is a reasonable probability this court would have recognized that the instruction was unconstitutionally vague, stricken the aggravator, and reversed Browning's death sentence. Once an aggravator is stricken, this court either reweighs the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or applies a harmless error analysis. [36] In reweighing, this court disregards the invalid aggravating circumstances and reweighs the remaining permissible aggravating and mitigating circumstances. [37] A harmless error analysis requires a new sentencing calculus to determine whether the error of the invalid aggravating circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [38] Either analysis asks the same question: is it clear that absent the erroneous aggravator the jury would have imposed death? [39] In State v. Haberstroh , we recently concluded that the district court was correct that the depravity-of-mind aggravator was improperly found because the instruction at issue provided inadequate guidance to the jury, failing to limit the term depravity of mind in a constitutional manner. [40] Like this case, the State in Haberstroh did not allege torture or mutilation. Haberstroh presented no mitigating evidence, and four valid aggravators remained: the murder was committed during a robbery, a first-degree kidnapping, and a sexual assault, and Haberstroh was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence. We nevertheless held that the weight of the remaining aggravators was not enough to convince us beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a death sentence without the depravity-of-mind aggravator, especially since the prosecutor heavily emphasized the depravity of the murder. [41] We are also not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury here would have returned a death sentence even without this aggravator. The jury found four other aggravators: the murder was committed while Browning was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit a burglary; the murder was committed while he was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit a robbery; he was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another; and the murder was committed while he was under a sentence of imprisonment. These remaining aggravators carry no more weight than those remaining in Haberstroh. And in closing argument the prosecutor stressed the aggravating circumstance of depravity of mind and invoked the language of the instruction defining the aggravator. He opened his argument by telling the jury that the human capacity for evil and depraved behavior made the death penalty necessary in this case. Later, after reading the instruction and describing the stabbing death of Elsen, he said: Is that wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman? I suggest to you that's precisely what this instruction is talking about. This instruction is describing Paul Browning to a tee. And finally he argued that the nature of the crime, and you can picture it in your mind, was wantonly vile as the instruction says. We conclude therefore that there is a reasonable probability that on direct appeal a challenge to the depravity-of-mind aggravator would have succeeded. Thus, Browning was prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to challenge it.