Opinion ID: 2213625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Necessity of Bringing Independent Action to Enforce Indemnification Provisions of Consent Decree.

Text: Plaintiff contends that the action taken by the district court in ordering payment by plaintiff of the University's attorney fees constituted a sanction for contempt illegal under Iowa Code section 665.4 (1983). As support for this contention, it relies on Wilson v. Fenton, 312 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Iowa 1981). We believe this argument misapprehends the court's basis for ordering reimbursement of the University's attorney fees. The court specifically bases its order on the language of the consent decree which provides for indemnification against any loss, damage, or expense including reasonable attorneys' fees which may be sustained by reason ... of having to enforce the stipulation or this judgment. Thus, we believe that although the order relating to attorney fees was preceded by a finding of contempt on the part of the plaintiff it was clearly not intended by the court as an additional sanction under the contempt power. Plaintiff urges that the language of the indemnification clause in the consent decree which states [t]he parties are entitled to bring an action for specific performance, damages at law or in equity should be interpreted as requiring the commencement of an independent action at law in order to obtain indemnity for attorney fees incurred in seeking to curb alleged violations of the decree. It asserts that the proceedings employed by the district court denied its right to a jury trial. We disagree. We recognized in Bailey v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 213 N.W.2d 642, 644 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830, 95 S.Ct. 52, 42 L.Ed.2d 55 (1974), that a provision in a consent decree retaining jurisdiction for enforcing its terms will be enforced in accordance with its plain meaning. The present consent decree contains a clause which provides, The parties agree that the court shall retain jurisdiction over plaintiffs and intervenors for the purpose of enabling any of the parties to the final judgment of the court to apply to the court at any time for such further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate for the construction or carrying out of this final judgment and for the enforcement of compliance and punishment of violations of the judgment. Because plaintiff was already enjoined under the decree from performing the prohibited acts upon which the present attorney fee dispute is based, and because a court always retains its contempt powers, a likely purpose for the express retention of jurisdiction in the decree was to permit the granting of appropriate monetary relief for violation of the judgment. We believe the district court correctly interpreted its own decree in allowing the University to file its application for indemnification in the original action. Plaintiff was afforded adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on the University's claim for indemnity. Because we interpret the consent decree as authorizing the procedure invoked by the court as a matter ancillary to the original litigation, plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial.