Opinion ID: 792262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petit's Claims

Text: 37 Timothy Petit sought damages under § 1983 against Sergeant Davis, Officer Goenner, Indiana University of Pennsylvania administrators Appolonia and Luckey, and William Montgomery, the Director of Public Safety who supervises the Indiana University of Pennsylvania police department. The District Court held that Petit's claims were barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Under Heck, a § 1983 action that impugns the validity of the plaintiff's underlying conviction cannot be maintained unless the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal or impaired by collateral proceedings. As the District Court noted, Petit resolved the charges against him by entering into Pennsylvania's Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition program. 8 After a successful probationary period, the charges were expunged from his criminal record. The District Court found, however, that under Heck expungement under the ARD Program is not a result favorable to the plaintiff. 38 When a criminal defendant is selected for and decides to participate in the ARD program, he avoids trial and potential jail time, and receives expungement of the record in exchange for successfully completing a probationary period. See generally Pa. R.Crim. P. 300 et seq.; Junod v. Bader, 312 Pa.Super. 92, 458 A.2d 251, 253-54 (1983). 9 The Comment to Rule 312 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states that acceptance into an ARD program is not intended to constitute a conviction, but it may be statutorily construed as a conviction for purposes of computing sentences on subsequent convictions. Pa. R.Crim. P. 312 (Comment). By entering the ARD program, the defendant waives his right to prove his innocence, but at the same time, does not admit guilt. 39 As Heck noted, § 1983 creates a species of tort liability. 512 U.S. at 483, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Thus, common law bars to suit apply to claims brought under § 1983. Id. In Heck, the Court held a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim was subject to the common law requirement that the plaintiff show the prior criminal proceeding terminated in his favor. Id. at 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364. The purpose of the requirement, the Court explained, is to avoid parallel litigation of probable cause and guilt. Id. It also prevents the claimant from succeeding in a tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, which would run counter to the judicial policy against creating two conflicting resolutions arising from the same transaction. Id. 40 These reasons are equally applicable in this context. Petit's underlying disorderly conduct charge and his § 1983 First Amendment claim require answering the same question—whether Petit's behavior constituted protected activity or disorderly conduct. If ARD does not constitute a favorable termination, success in the § 1983 claim would result in parallel litigation over whether Petit's activity constituted disorderly conduct and could result in a conflicting resolution arising from the same conduct. 41 We recognize that concurring and dissenting opinions in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998), question the applicability of Heck to an individual, such as Petit, who has no recourse under the habeas statute. See id. at 19-20, 118 S.Ct. 978 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 978 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 25 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But these opinions do not affect our conclusion that Heck applies to Petit's claims. We doubt that Heck has been undermined, but to the extent its continued validity has been called into question, we join on this point, our sister courts of appeals for the First and Fifth Circuits in following the Supreme Court's admonition to lower federal courts to follow its directly applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears weakened by pronouncements in its subsequent decisions, and to leave to the Court `the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.' Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 81 n. 3 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997)); see Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301-02 (5th Cir.2000). 42 Because the holding of Heck applies, Petit cannot maintain a § 1983 claim unless successful completion of the ARD program constitutes a termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused. Heck, 512 U.S. at 485, 114 S.Ct. 2364. We have not had occasion to address this issue directly. 10 Our trial courts have held that ARD is not a termination favorable for purposes of bringing a subsequent § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. 11 43 We find instructive opinions from the Second and Fifth Circuits that have addressed whether similar pre-trial probationary programs are a favorable termination sufficient to bring a subsequent civil suit. In Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850 (2d Cir.1992), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that dismissal of a Connecticut criminal prosecution under its accelerated pretrial rehabilitation program was not sufficiently favorable to support a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. 12 The court reasoned that permitting a criminal defendant to maintain a section 1983 action after taking advantage of accelerated rehabilitation, the program, intended to give first-time offenders a second chance, would become less desirable for the State to retain and less desirable for the courts to use because the savings in resources from dismissing the criminal proceeding would be consumed in resolving the constitutional claims. Id. at 853. 44 Roesch relied upon Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 193-95 (2d Cir.1980). In Singleton, the court considered a mechanism under New York Criminal Procedure similar to the ARD program, termed adjournment in contemplation of dismissal. See N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 170.55. Under an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, after the accused serves a probationary period, the charges are dismissed. The court likened the adjournment in contemplation of dismissal to a consent decree, reasoning that both leave open the question of guilt. Id. at 193. But the court refused to equate dismissal with acquittal. Id. The court found significance in the probationary period, calling it an unfavorable period of observation ... to determine whether the prosecutor's acquiescence in the adjournment was justified. Id. at 194. Regarding expungement of the records related to the charge, the court found this erased the stigma that might otherwise be borne by the defendant, in the same way laws treat juvenile delinquents who have committed criminal acts, but does not constitute a finding of not guilty. Id. 45 In Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455-56 (5th Cir.1994), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted Singleton' s reasoning, holding that a pre-trial diversion order is not a favorable termination. Like the ARD program, offenders who successfully complete Texas' diversion program receive dismissal of their charges. The court held that criminal defendants are effectively foregoing their potential malicious prosecution suit in exchange for conditional dismissal of their criminal charges. Id. at 456. 46 The ARD program is a court-supervised compromise. See Davis, 493 F.Supp. at 92; see also Commonwealth v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99, 371 A.2d 1346 (1977) (describing termination of criminal charge under ARD program as a court-supervised compromise). Nevertheless, the ARD program imposes several burdens upon the criminal defendant not consistent with innocence, including a probationary term, restitution ... imposition of costs, and imposition of a reasonable charge relating to the expense of administering the program, and such other conditions as may be agreed to by the parties. Pa. R.Crim. P. 316(a). We agree with Singleton that probation constitutes an unfavorable period of judicially imposed limitations on freedom in which the probationer's violation of the program's terms may result in criminal prosecution. Singleton, 632 F.2d at 193-95. Viewing these factors together, we hold the ARD program is not a favorable termination under Heck. 13 Petit's participation in the ARD program bars his § 1983 claim. 14