Opinion ID: 1449368
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Heading: is partial mental impairment an absolute bar to the death penalty?

Text: The defendant did not raise an insanity defense at trial, and in fact the psychiatric testimony which was adduced for the purpose of sentencing supports the conclusion that defendant was legally sane at the time of the killings. Under the M'Naghten rule adopted in Arizona, this specifically means that defendant Gretzler both understood the nature and quality of his actions, and knew that they were wrong. See Steelman I, supra, 120 Ariz. at 311-13, 585 P.2d at 1223-25; State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 207, 403 P.2d 521, 525 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 1015, 86 S.Ct. 628, 15 L.Ed.2d 530 (1966). At resentencing, however, the trial judge found that the mitigating circumstance described in former A.R.S. § 13-454(F)(1), presently § 13-703(G)(1), was established  that defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution. We thus have a situation in which defendant's mental capacity was only partially, though significantly, impaired. While Arizona has not adopted the standard of partial responsibility in complete abrogation of criminal responsibility, State v. Schantz, supra, our capital sentencing statute specifically requires that significant mental impairment be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance in determining sentence. This mitigating circumstance, together with other mitigating circumstances, is to be carefully weighed against aggravating circumstances present in the case, to determine whether leniency is appropriate. Former A.R.S. § 13-454(D), presently § 13-703(E). Defendant attacks this procedure, claiming that a finding of significant impairment calls for leniency in every case, regardless of the degree of that impairment and the other circumstances of the case. Defendant contends that partial mental impairment of a defendant always renders death an unconstitutionally excessive penalty, citing the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant correctly notes that the United States Supreme Court has stated that a punishment is `excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 2866, 53 L.Ed.2d 982, 989 (1977). Defendant does not argue that the death penalty is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime, and indeed it would be surprising if he did, considering the number of human lives he has taken. We need only examine, therefore, whether in this case a death sentence would serve acceptable goals of punishment. The retributive justification of punishment has been explained in Gregg v. Georgia: In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs. `The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, then there are sown the seeds of anarchy  of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.' Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 308, 92 S.Ct. at 2726 (Stewart, J., concurring). 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2930, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 880 (1976) (judgment of the Court and opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., footnote omitted). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 452-54, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2835-36, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 472-74 (1972). (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Retribution thus serves the twin purposes of reaffirming societal values regarding wrongdoing and dispensing punishment that fits the crime. As discussed above, Gretzler took innocent lives knowing the nature and quality of his acts, and knowing that he was doing wrong. He is thus the proper subject for societal retribution. While the court may take into account defendant's somewhat diminished volitional capacities in determining proper sentence, see infra, it does not follow that partial incapacity will fully exempt defendant from society's condemnation in all instances. Such exemption is certainly not mandated in the instant case. The second and dominant goal of punishment in our judicial system is deterrence. Our first consideration is the specific deterrence of Douglas Gretzler. As United States Supreme Court Justice White has pointed out, It [is] clear enough that death finally forecloses the possibility that a prisoner will commit further crimes, whereas life imprisonment does not. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 354, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 3015-16, 49 L.Ed.2d 974, 993 (1976) (White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, JJ., Burger, C.J., dissenting). Incarceration is intended to serve the goal of isolation of dangerous individuals, but the prison system is a human enterprise, and thus it cannot serve this goal perfectly no matter how diligent the effort. This state has learned through sad experience that even after incarceration a violent person may become a menace to other prisoners, see e.g. State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633 P.2d 315 (1981) (prison inmate committed violent strangulation and stabbing murder of another prisoner; he later killed yet another prisoner by burning him to death, see No. 5698, State v. Vickers ), or may escape and become a menace to the public at large, see e.g. State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 150, 624 P.2d 828 (1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 364, 70 L.Ed.2d 191 (1981) (Greenawalt and fellow inmate Tison escaped prison and murdered four people, including a 22 month old baby). At some point a violent individual has caused so much harm and destruction of human life that society is entitled to foreclose the possibility of further deprivation. The next consideration is that of general deterrence. Gretzler argues that, in view of his partial mental impairment, capital punishment for him will not deter other similarly impaired persons, because such persons cannot be deterred. He further argues that punishing him in this way will not deter unimpaired persons either, because such persons cannot identify with those like Gretzler. We disagree. Gretzler's volitional impairment is only partial, and it does not follow that persons like Gretzler cannot be deterred from aberrant behavior. Also, Gretzler's mental impairment is not so substantial as to make his punishment seem meaningless to unimpaired citizens. Throughout defendant's brief, Gretzler characterizes his plight as that of a mad man facing execution. He is not a mad man, however, and in fact was found sane at trial. Gretzler's condition thus does not make him an improper subject for either the retributive or deterrence justifications of punishment. Acceptable goals of punishment are served by submitting Gretzler's case to capital sentencing consideration. In considering Gretzler's sentence, his partial mental impairment is taken into account, along with other aggravating and mitigating factors, in deciding the appropriate sentence under A.R.S. § 13-703. The eighth and fourteenth amendments require no more. The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of similar capital sentence statutes in other states that require the balancing of such aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Gregg v. Georgia, supra; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 423 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). Further, the law upheld in Proffitt v. Florida , like the Model Penal Code section from which our statute is adopted (§ 210.6, Proposed Official Draft 1962), specifically includes partial mental impairment as one of the statutory mitigating circumstances. A finding of partial mental impairment does not bar the imposition of the death penalty. See A.R.S. § 13-703(E).