Opinion ID: 772839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Chevron

Text: 22 The threshold consideration under Chevron is whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. 467 U.S. at 842-43. If so, the agency and the courts must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Id. Respondent argues that the stop-time rule as amended unambiguously applies the stop-time rule to pending applications for suspension of deportation, obviating the need for further inquiry. Recently, panels of this court examined the issue and accepted this argument. Bartoszewska-Zajac v. INS, 237 F.3d 710, 713(6th Cir. 2001); Ashki v. INS, 233 F.3d 913, 918-19 (6th Cir. 2000). Likewise, other circuits have found the statutory language as amended clear on its face. Escudero-Corona v. INS, 244 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir. Mar. 22, 2001); Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 515 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2001); Rojas-Reyes v. INS, 235 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2000); Angel-Ramos v. Reno, 227 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 2000); Afolayan v. INS, 219 F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 2000); Rivera-Jimenez v. INS, 214 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Gonzalez-Torres v. INS, 213 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2000); Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704, 708-09 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 140 (2000); Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 2657 (2000). 23 No court has addressed the merits of Sad's proposed interpretation of the transitional rules, the plausibility of which the INS concedes. His reading builds on the observation of the concurring members of the BIA in In re Nolasco-Tofino that, even as amended, the transitional rules for applying the stop-time rule to pending applications for suspension of deportation mediate imperfectly between two different statutory regimes. Sad points out that the amended transitional rule in section 309(c)(5) by its own terms references the stop-time rule in section 240A(d), which in turn terminates the accrual of time toward satisfaction of the continuous physical presence requirement only when the INS serves an alien with a notice to appear. INA § 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). The NACARA amendment adding orders to show cause to section 309(c)(5) did not make a similar change in section 240A(d) and so the stop-time rule cannot apply to Sad's application for suspension of deportation. Under this reading, the transitional rule of section 309(c)(2) of the IIRIRA embodies the limits of the stop-time rule's retroactive application. Section 309(c)(2) offers the Attorney General the option of proceeding with pending cases, the processing of which had not commenced as of April 1, 1997, under the new statutory regime. In this case, Sad posits, an alien would be ineligible for suspension of deportation because such relief no longer exists under the IIRIRA, but could seek cancellation of removal under section 240A. Then, section 240A(d)(1) requires that the alien's period of continuous physical presence stop accruing upon service of the order to show cause that initiated proceedings. In response, the INS accepts Sad's reading as a potentially valid interpretation of the transitional rules, but asserts that the stop-time rule is not limited only to pending cases in which the Attorney General elects to apply the new procedures and substantive legal standards of the IIRIRA. Because these provisions credibly admit of multiple interpretations, we cannot say under Chevron's threshold inquiry that the transitional rules of the IIRIRA as amended by the NACARA are unambiguous. 24 We next ask whether the agency's construction of the statute is permissible. There is no question that the BIA's interpretation of the statute controls for Chevron purposes. Prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA, Congress had delegated to the Attorney General discretionary authority to make determinations regarding applications for suspension of deportation. INA § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994). Creation of the new removal regime did not alter this framework. INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if certain conditions are met). The Attorney General has delegated this authority to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (2000). Therefore, for purposes of the Chevron analysis,the BIA's interpretation of the stop-time rule in In re Nolasco-Tofino merits deference if based on a permissible construction of the statute. The BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1987)). Sad has presented no argument that the BIA interpretation is impermissible other than that it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory language as he construes it. Indeed, that the BIA, this court, and several other circuits have accepted a differing reading suggests that the statutory language may not be quite so lucid as Sad contends. At most, Sad's proposed reading of the statute points to and relies on ambiguities in its language. In such circumstances, we must defer to the permissible interpretation offered by the BIA. Nor has Sad argued that the BIA's interpretation or application of the stop-time rule to his case is arbitrary or capricious.