Opinion ID: 776296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denial of Due Process on Post-conviction Review

Text: 64 As described above, on post-conviction review, Gattis argued to the Delaware Supreme Court with regard to his ineffectiveness claims that James would, if given the chance, testify that the prosecution's theory of the case was physically impossible. On remand, at the evidentiary hearing the government presented video and testimony to show that even if the apartment door had been open only twelve inches it would have been possible for Gattis to reach around the door and shoot her. As noted above, the state courts found Gattis' ineffectiveness claim meritless. 65 Based on these facts, in his habeas corpus petition Gattis claims that his due process rights were violated when his conviction and death sentence were affirmed on state postconviction review on a theory not originally presented to the jury or the court that tried and sentenced him. According to Gattis, at trial the state argued that Gattis entered Slay's apartment and shot her face-to-face, not that he reached around the door and shot her. He relies on Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106, 99 S.Ct. 2190, 60 L.Ed.2d 743 (1979) (To uphold a conviction on a charge that was neither alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial offends the most basic notions of due process). As far as we can determine, this claim has not been presented to the state courts and, thus, is unexhausted. 6 However, because we agree with the District Court that the claim is meritless, and because the District Court could have dismissed the claim as meritless regardless of whether it was exhausted pursuant to section 2254(b)(2), we shall not vacate the District Court's judgment and remand for further proceedings with regard to this claim. 66 The District Court found the claim meritless because Gattis' conviction and sentence are supported by either a theory that he shot Slay face-to-face at close range or a theory that he reached around the door and shot her at close range. The District Court also found that the state courts did not sustain Gattis' conviction and sentence on post-conviction review on different facts or on a different theory than was presented to the jury. The Delaware Supreme Court stated that the State never presented testimony from its witnesses nor offered any argument by prosecutors asserting that the door was fully open when the face-to-face confrontation took place, Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d at 1185, a finding of fact presumed correct because Gattis has not provided clear and convincing evidence to the contrary as required by section 2254(e)(1). Moreover, both Dunn and the decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals on which Gattis also relies, Cola v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 681 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 398, 93 L.Ed.2d 351 (1986), involved a failure to charge the defendant in the indictment for the specific acts for which he was convicted, which is not the case here. 67 The fundamental flaw in Gattis' argument is that in the decisions of which he complains the state courts did not uphold [his] conviction on a charge that was neither alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial. Dunn, 442 U.S. at 106, 99 S.Ct. 2190. The allegedly different theory of guilt was not presented on direct appeal in support of his conviction but in the course of a post-conviction hearing held in connection with his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert testimony concerning the implausibility of the state's account of the murder. The Superior Court and Delaware Supreme Court did not affirm his conviction based on the state's theory but merely found his ineffectiveness claim unpersuasive. The state's theory played a small role, if any, in the courts' reasoning. In this context Dunn and Cola are simply not applicable. 7 68