Opinion ID: 1653760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: did plaintiff kimmins prove its damages with reasonable certainty?

Text: ¶ 29. Sentinel/Centre and Seaboard/St. Paul contend that because Kimmins's only evidence of damages, Plaintiffs Exhibit 323, was ruled inadmissible, the testimony of Kimmins's witnesses as to the amount of damages is based upon speculation and conjecture, contrary to Mississippi law. Plaintiff's Exhibit 323 is a fourvolume Claim Documentation Book containing details of 38 claims brought by Kimmins, separated by tabs with individual cover pages stating the amount of damages requested by Kimmins on each particular claim. Exhibit 320 is a one-page summary of the claims listing those amounts and condensing the number of claims to 33 by combining some of the claim numbers from Exhibit 323. The trial court initially sustained Sentinel/Centre's objections to the introduction of Exhibit 320 on the ground that the proper foundation had not been laid, because the person who prepared the document did not testify at trial. Throughout the trial, the attorneys continued to argue over the admissibility of the two exhibits, and the court issued multiple rulings on their admissibility. Confusion continued over what portions of Exhibit 323 were in evidence. At the close of all the evidence, but before jury deliberations, Kimmins again asked the court to admit Exhibits 320 and 323 into evidence. The trial judge agreed to allow an enlarged version of the summary (Exhibit 320A) into evidence, but only allowed the four volumes of Exhibit 323 to be admitted for purposes of appeal and not to go to the jury, because they would be duplicative, and because he doubted that the jury would read them anyway. ¶ 30. We find that the trial court properly admitted Exhibit 320 into evidence as a summary of the voluminous Exhibit 323. Rule 1006 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of summaries. It states: The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court. Miss. R. Evid. 1006. We examined Rule 1006 in Wells v. State, 604 So.2d 271 (Miss. 1992). There, we approved admission of a summary of business records admitted into evidence with the testimony of a witness, who stated that his secretary initially prepared the summary, which he then reviewed and edited. Wells 604 So.2d at 274. We held that the summary was supported by underlying documents available to the parties and properly authenticated by the witness. Id. at 274-75. ¶ 31. Sentinel/Centre takes issue with the fact that the person who prepared Exhibit 320 was not available at trial, alleging that the proper foundation was therefore not laid for its admission into evidence. However, Mr. English testified that he did compile the documents in Exhibit 323 as business records. Exhibit 323 is the basis for Exhibit 320, and Mr. English testified that Exhibit 320 was an accurate recap of the claims in Exhibit 323. Although he admitted that to be completely certain as to its accuracy, he would have to go through the summary claim by claim, he also stated that he had previewed the summary on the Monday before he testified and had corrected any discrepancies he found at that time. In effect, Mr. English helped to prepare Exhibit 320 when he corrected it, similar to the witness in Wells. There is no dispute regarding the availability of Exhibit 323, the underlying documents, so the requirements of Rule 1006 were satisfied. Whatever confusion may have occurred during trial regarding the admission of Exhibits 320 and 323, we find that in the end the trial judge properly admitted Exhibit 320 in place of the voluminous Exhibit 323. ¶ 32. The next question is whether Kimmins's evidence proved its damages with reasonable certainty. Whatever the measure of damages, they may be recovered only where and to the extent that the evidence removes their quantum from the realm of speculation and conjecture and transports it through the twilight zone and into the daylight of reasonable certainty.... This principle is of importance today, as we remember that a measure of speculation and conjecture attends even damage proof all would agree reasonably certain. Wall v. Swilley, 562 So.2d 1252, 1256 (Miss.1990) (citations omitted). [T]he plaintiff should not be deprived of its right to recover because of its inability to prove with absolute certainty the extent of the loss or the exact amount of money unjustly and illegally collected, and the law does not require such absolute accuracy of proof.... The rule that damages, if uncertain, cannot be recovered, applies to their nature, and not to their extent. If the damage is certain, the fact that its extent is uncertain does not prevent a recovery. Billups Petroleum Co. v. Hardin's Bakeries Corp., 217 Miss. 24, 37, 63 So.2d 543, 548 (1953) (citations omitted). ¶ 33. Exhibit 320, as supported by the detailed documents in Exhibit 323, was sufficient to prove Kimmins's damages with reasonable certainty. In addition to the summary of damages, Kimmins presented the testimony of Mr. English regarding each of the claims outlined in Exhibit 323. Mr. English explained in detail the bases for his conclusions regarding the amount of Kimmins's damages, including time sheets for labor costs, invoices for equipment rentals and subcontractor rates, and rates for equipment usage. His testimony was supported by the conclusions of Kimmins's expert, Mr. Robinson. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Kimmins, the jury's verdict in this case was a reasonable conclusion based upon the evidence presented by Kimmins at trial.