Opinion ID: 2507985
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prospective juror exposure to media and gender bias

Text: Defendant next complains that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and unbiased jury because the court refused to remove jurors who were exposed to the media and who were sensitive to issues involving gender bias. (See People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 852-853, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15 [trial court must conduct adequate voir dire to ensure defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury].) Initially, we note that defendant has forfeited the right to raise any alleged error because he failed to object on either basis during trial. ( Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 61-62, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) Even on the merits, we would reject the claims. The jury questionnaire that the parties provided the court fully explored potential media bias and whether the jurors could avoid media exposure. The questionnaire also probed the effect of media exposure on the panel and satisfied the court that the voir dire adequately probed the media question. In addition, the trial court supplemented the questionnaire with follow-up questioning on potential media exposure. For example, the court's discussion with prospective Juror C. about the potential media influence on her views of the case proceeded as follows: [Court] Now that you have sat through this process before, do you feel you have heard something about the case, or heard something about the case beyond what is in this questionnaire answer? [Juror C.] I remember reading a little bit about the  it, when it happened. [Court] Would you be able to set aside what you might have read about it, and decide this case based on the evidence  [Juror C.] Yes. [Court] Received here? [Juror C.] Yes, I can. [Court] You heard the questions I have asked other jurors that may have read something about this. It is important that this case be decided with a fresh mind, based only on evidence that appears here in the courtroom. [Juror C.] Um-hum, yes. [Court] Okay. Even though you may have some vague recollection about reading something, the case can not be based on that. Would you be able to set that aside and listen to the evidence here? [Juror C.] Yes, I can. The above colloquy is typical of the trial court's follow-up voir dire on media exposure, and adequately explored the potential for prejudice. After reviewing the entire voir dire of all prospective jurors, we are satisfied that the inquiry into possible media bias was adequate under the Sixth Amendment. We find no error here. Defendant's additional claim that gender bias was not fully explored on voir dire is also without merit. First, defendant failed to preserve the issue by timely objection. ( Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 61-62, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) In addition, his claim that gender bias caused him to commit the murders is without merit. The jury had ample evidence that defendant's violent acts were not gender specific, and that his prior criminal activity included several acts of violence against men. For example, defendant committed acts of violence against male jail and prison personnel and threatened to harm male acquaintances, including Jess Martin, Mary Cagle's boyfriend. In addition, the fact that the jury may have been exposed to a newspaper article discussing defendant's apparent disdain for women serving in combat does not make his gender bias defense claim any more credible, and his attempt to blame Cagle for inciting his murder spree is nothing more than an attempt to refuse to take responsibility for the brutal murders. Because the case did not involve a credible gender bias claim, no need arose for the additional voir dire questioning on the subject.