Opinion ID: 848684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The People's Common Understanding of Public Use

Text: From the ordinance for government of the Northwest Territory of 1787 to the Michigan Constitution of 1963, every document governing the state of Michigan has recognized the sovereign's power of eminent domain. [18] In 1852, this Court noted that the whole policy of this country relative to roads, mills, bridges and canals, rests upon this single power [of eminent domain].... [19] Thus, eminent domain has long been one of the leading principles of government that we must assume the people understood when they ratified each of Michigan's constitutions. [20] While eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, [21] public use is a limitation on the exercise of the power of eminent domain. In every Michigan constitution, the voters of Michigan imposed a public use limitation on the exercise of the power of eminent domain. [22] To ascertain the people's understanding of art. 10, § 2, it is to be remembered that: The primary source for ascertaining the meaning of a constitutional provision is to determined its plain meaning as understood by its ratifiers at the time of its adoption. This is so because the constitution, although drawn up by a convention, derives no vitality from its framers, but depends for its force entirely upon the popular vote. Nevertheless, to clarify meaning, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered. This Court cannot properly protect the mandate of the people without examining both the origin and purpose of a constitutional provision, because provisions stripped of their context may be manipulated and distorted into unintended meanings. Indeed we must heed the intentions of the ratifiers because our constitution gains its authority from its ratification by the people  to do otherwise deprives them of their right to govern. [ Peterman v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 446 Mich. 177, 184-185, 521 N.W.2d 499 (1994) (citations omitted; emphasis added).] As clearly and fully expressed by this Court in Peterman, art. 10, § 2, has `acquired a well-understood meaning, which the people must be supposed to have had in view in adopting them. We cannot understand these provisions unless we understand their history; and when we find them expressed in technical words, and words of art, we must suppose these words to be employed in their technical sense.' [23] To clarify the meaning understood by the ratifiers of art. 10, § 2, Peterman cited an 1857 case discussing the power of and limitations on eminent domain and in a footnote provided the following historical context: Before the American Revolution and the drafting of the United States Constitution, the sovereign was not only empowered to take private property for public use, but such takings were almost always uncompensated.... Nevertheless, the newly formed republic became increasingly hostile to governmental infringement of property rights as states seized loyalist lands, suspended or remitted debts and the collection of taxes, printed inflationary paper money, and delayed legal enforcement of property rights. To address these abuses was born the requirement that government may not take private property for public use without just compensation. [ Id. at 187 n. 14, 521 N.W.2d 499.] Such historical perspective helps clarify the limitations on the exercise of eminent domain intended by the ratifiers. Peterman's approach is entirely distinct from the majority's reliance on the sophisticated understanding of case law addressing the public use limitation. Peterman's commitment to ascertaining the common understanding of the ratifiers stands in stark contrast to the majority's statement that the people's common understanding is fictionalized. Ante at 780, n. 48. Determining whether a particular exercise of eminent domain is for a constitutionally permissible public use has traditionally and necessarily involved consideration of the use to which the condemned property will be put. In 1877, this Court held that to constitutionally exercise the power of eminent domain, the use must be public in fact; in other words, that it should contain provisions entitling the public to accommodations. [24] Thus, this Court upheld the condemnation of land for the laying out of a public highway; [25] the condemnation of land for the opening of a public avenue; [26] a statute delegating condemnation authority to cities, villages, townships, and counties for the construction of airports; [27] and a public school district's condemnation of property for use by the school. [28] In each of these cases the public retained the right to actually use the land. A statute authorizing condemnation that merely requires the use of condemned property to generally serve the public interest is insufficient to justify the exercise of eminent domain authority because, every lawful business does this. [29] It is thus well-established that the public use requirement precludes the condemnation of property for private use even if the private use will generally benefit the public. [30] The public use implies a possession, occupation, and enjoyment of the land by the public at large, or by public agencies; and due protection to the rights of private property will preclude the government from seizing it in the hands of the owner, and turning it over to another, on vague grounds of public benefit, to spring from the more profitable use to which the latter may devote it. [ Portage Twp. Bd. of Health v. Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 533, 538, 49 N.W. 894 (1891), quoting Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th ed.) p. 654.] This Court has held, therefore, that condemnation of land for a rail spur serving a single private company was an unconstitutional exercise of condemnation power because the private company could control its use and exclude the public. [31] Similarly, this Court has held that a statute authorizing condemnation of property to provide a private landowner access to his landlocked private property was unconstitutional. [32] Ultimate private ownership of lands proposed for condemnation, however, does not necessarily render the taking of land unconstitutional under the public use requirement. This Court has upheld the exercise of eminent domain involving lands that remain in private ownership (albeit new private ownership) where the public retains the right to use the lands taken. In every instance of turnpike, plank road, bridge, ferry, and canal companies, [eminent domain] has been employed, as well as those of railroads. All this class of incorporations have been enacted upon the hypothesis that the lands taken for these purposes were taken for public use, and not for private endowment.... The right to purchase and hold lands for the purposes of the road, being a right delegated in virtue of the eminent domain of the government, and derogatory to those of the citizen whose property is condemned, must be construed as conferring no right to hold the property in derogation of the purposes for which it was taken. [ Swan, supra at 439-440 (emphasis added).] Thus, this Court upheld a statute providing for the appropriation of private property for a railroad designed to provide public travel [33] and a statute authorizing the condemnation of property for an interstate bridge available for public travel. [34] In these cases, ultimate private ownership of condemned land did not offend the public use limitation even though the owner would profit from its ownership, because the owner was and could be compelled to continue to devote the condemned land to the public use for which it was condemned. [35] While this Court's evaluation of whether a condemnation is for a public use has traditionally involved consideration of the public's use or control over the use of the property condemned, this Court has considered the government purposes to be achieved by the condemnation. For example, this Court held the transportation of oil throughout the state to be a valid legislative purpose and upheld the constitutionality of a statute allowing the condemnation of lands for a pipeline to serve that purpose. [36] There the Court concluded, however, that the pipeline was a public use benefiting the people of the State of Michigan and emphasized that the state retained control of the pipeline allowing it to ensure its devotion to public use. [37] The Court has also excused the absence of ultimate public use or control over lands taken and then transferred to a private entity in cases involving the removal of slums and blight that endangered public health, morals, safety, and welfare. [38] In these cases, the Court reasoned that slum clearance is in any event the one controlling purpose of the condemnation. [39] Until Poletown, this Court's decisions consistently distinguished public use, as that concept limits the exercise of eminent domain, from private uses and uses that only generally advance the public interest. This distinction was readily traceable in the law and must be assumed to have been well understood by Michigan citizens, the vast majority of whom are not lawyers and are not sophisticated in the law. The distinction between a public use and uses that are strictly private or only generally beneficial to the public protects against the arbitrary exercise of the extraordinary sovereign power of eminent domain. [40] Wayne County's purpose supporting each of the condemnation proceedings at issue is the creation of a contiguous land mass of approximately 1,300 acres for the development of the Pinnacle Aeropark Project. The county states that contiguity is necessary to attract investors and further that the development will create thousands of jobs and tens of millions of dollars in tax revenue, while broadening its primarily industrial tax base. However laudable these goals are, the facts remain that Wayne County intends to transfer these properties to private entities. These entities will be under no obligation to let the public in their doors or even on their lands. There is no way to characterize the county's transfer of dominion over these properties as accommodating public use. Further, Wayne County will not retain control over the properties or enterprises to ensure their devotion to public use. Nor can it be said that a controlling purpose of the condemnations is the removal of blight or slums that endanger the public health, morals, safety, and welfare. This case is indeed a very straightforward example of government taking one person's property for the sole benefit of another.