Opinion ID: 2159212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Publicity and Venue

Text: Defendant asserts that pervasive pretrial publicity deprived him of his federal and state constitutional rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Defendant raises four publicity-related issues on appeal: (1) Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion for change of venue; (2) Did the trial court err in not excusing for cause all jurors who had read or heard about the case; (3) Was the verdict tainted because of certain jurors' knowledge; and (4) Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion for attorney-conducted voir dire. All the issues are interrelated and depend essentially on the same facts and the same principles of law. It is undisputed that the murders of Amie Hoffman and Deirdre O'Brien and the subsequent arrest of James Koedatich were attended by intense publicity. In State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39 (1983), decided before the trial in this case, but which involved defendant as an appellant in the O'Brien murder case, this Court noted the extensive publicity surrounding these cases: The publicity included in the record in the Koedatich case was generated primarily in early December following Ms. O'Brien's stabbing death and again in January following Koedatich's arrest. During these periods, almost-daily reports were published by several newspapers including the Morristown Daily Record, the Easton (Pennsylvania) Express and the Star-Ledger (Morris, Sussex, Warren edition). Other newspapers, including the Dover Daily Advance, the Bridgewater Courier-News, the Passaic Herald News and the New York Daily News, provided less frequent coverage. The December articles chronicled in detail the circumstances surrounding the killing, the statewide manhunt and extensive investigation that ensued and the resulting fear and anxiety felt by many area residents. These articles postulated a possible relation between the O'Brien murder and several other unsolved murders in the area. Koedatich's arrest in January was announced by banners, front page headlines. Published articles extensively reported Koedatich's background and personal history including his prior criminal involvement. In particular, the papers noted that Koedatich had just completed an 11-year prison term in Florida where he was serving a 20-year sentence for murder and armed robbery. Moreover, reports indicated that while in jail Koedatich had choked to death another inmate, although the incident was considered justifiable homicide. Coverage of subsequent legal developments in Koedatich's case reiterated the facts surrounding Ms. O'Brien's stabbing death and Koedatich's criminal history. [ Id. at 50-51 n. 2.] This publicity continued. The Public Defender's Office contacted the Star-Ledger, the Daily Advance, and the Daily Record in May 1984, and found that the Star-Ledger had by that time published more than ninety articles concerning the defendant or the Morris County Murders, more than half of the articles published after defendant's arrest (forty-four before the arrest, forty-eight after); the Daily Advance had published about forty articles about the cases after Koedatich's arrest. The Daily Record offered no estimate. Circulation of each paper was as follows: the Star-Ledger, 45,500 daily, 62,400 Sunday in Morris County; [6] 3,800 daily, 5,800 Sunday in Warren County, 8,100 daily, 12,200 Sunday in Sussex County; the Daily Advance, 14,359 daily, 13,020 Sunday; the Daily Record, 65,000 daily, 72,000 Sunday. The Public Defender also contacted various local radio stations and WABC-TV in New York, with inconclusive results.
Based on the continuing publicity and on a survey purporting to show media saturation in Morris County, defense counsel brought a motion for a change of venue prior to trial. On June 27, 1984, Judge Muir, then Assignment Judge for Morris County, rejected the results of the survey because of methodological flaws; defendant does not contest this finding. The Assignment Judge ruled that there was no reason at that time to order a change of venue, and referred the issue to the discretion of the trial court. In ruling that a change of venue was not warranted at that time, the Assignment Judge relied on the standard articulated in State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 73-74 (1955), namely, whether there was clear and convincing proof that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in a given venue. In State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 63 (1983), we articulated a new standard to be used by trial courts when considering a request for change of venue. Under the Williams standard, courts are to determine whether there exists a realistic likelihood of prejudice resulting from pretrial publicity. While the Assignment Judge admittedly applied the incorrect standard in passing on the change of venue request, the trial court before whom defendant was tried did not. On each of the numerous occasions on which defendant moved for a change of venue, the trial court applied the correct Williams standard. The dissent concludes that the trial court's denial of the change of venue motion was based on the application of an erroneous and antiquated standard. That conclusion is mistaken in that the dissent's reference to the trial court fails to distinguish between the single venue ruling of the Assignment Judge who passed on the admissibility of the survey, and the venue rulings of the court before whom defendant was tried. The latter court never applied the incorrect standard. On the first day of jury selection, September 24, 1984, defense counsel renewed the motion for a change of venue, which the trial court denied. Thereafter, throughout the jury selection period, defense counsel repeatedly moved for a change of venue. Finding that a fair and impartial jury could be selected, the trial court denied all the defendant's motions for change of venue. The sixth amendment of the federal Constitution, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, and Article I, paragraph 10 of the state Constitution guarantee to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, `indifferent' jurors. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed. 2d 751, 755 (1961). In capital cases, it is particularly important for the trial court to preserve the integrity of the jury and minimize the danger that prejudice will infiltrate the adjudicatory process. State v. Williams, supra, 93 N.J. at 63. It is also well established, however, that a defendant is not entitled to jurors who are totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a given case: In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. [ Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 722-23, 81 S.Ct. at [1642-43], 6 L.Ed. 2d at 756 (citations omitted, emphasis added).] In New Jersey, we have recognized the concerns expressed in Irvin v. Dowd by holding that pervasive pretrial publicity does not necessarily preclude the likelihood of an impartial jury. State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 35. While the constitutional standard for a fair trial requires `a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors,' the jurors actually empanelled need not be ignorant of the facts of the case. State v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 23 (1980) (citation omitted). Defendant's basic premise is that because many prospective and deliberating jurors had heard about the case as a result of the extensive pretrial publicity, he was unable to secure a fair and impartial jury. Defendant contends that the best remedy to combat this pretrial publicity was for the trial court to grant defendant's motion for a change of venue. Short of a change of venue, the defendant argues that the only other way to obtain a fair and impartial jury was for the trial court to have excluded for cause any juror who had read or heard about the case. Implicit in both these assertions is defendant's contention that the publicity in this case was so extensive and pervasive that the jurors' prejudice must be presumed. We are unpersuaded. In recent capital cases we held that a trial court has the discretion to change venue where it is `necessary to overcome the realistic likelihood of prejudice from pretrial publicity.' State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 33 (quoting State v. Williams, supra, 93 N.J. at 67-68 n. 13); see State v. Bey, 96 N.J. 625, 630 clarified at 97 N.J. 666 (1984). In State v. Biegenwald , we recognized, as do the federal courts, that in determining whether such a realistic likelihood of prejudice exists in a particular case, a court must first distinguish between cases in which the trial atmosphere is so corrupted by publicity that prejudice may be presumed, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1516, 16 L.Ed. 2d 600, 614 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-44, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1632-34, 14 L.Ed. 2d 543, 550-51 (1965); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73, 85 S.Ct. 546, 549-50, 13 L.Ed. 2d 424, 429 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 1419, 10 L.Ed. 2d 663, 665-66 (1963); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 1172-73, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1250, 1252 (1959) (per curiam), and cases in which pretrial publicity, while extensive, is less intrusive, making the determinative issue the actual effect of the publicity on the impartiality of the jury panel. [106 N.J. at 33.] For instances of the latter type of case, see Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032-35, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2889-91, 81 L.Ed. 2d 847, 854-56 (1984); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 301-03, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2302-03, 53 L.Ed. 2d 344, 361-62 (1977); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800-03, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036-2038, 44 L.Ed. 2d 589, 595-97 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 723-28, 81 S.Ct. at 1642-46, 6 L.Ed. 2d at 756-59; Simmons v. Lockhart, 814 F. 2d 504 (8th Cir.1987), cert. den., ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1489, 99 L.Ed. 2d 717 (1988); United States v. DePeri, 778 F. 2d 963 (3rd Cir.1985), cert. den. sub nom. Murphy v. U.S., 457 U.S. 1110, 106 S.Ct. 1518, 89 L.Ed. 2d 916 (1986). Cases in which prejudice due to pretrial publicity may be presumed are relatively rare and arise out of the most extreme circumstances. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2800, 49 L.Ed. 2d 683 (1976) (citing case in which trial court had failed to use even minimal efforts to insulate the trial and jurors from the `deluge of publicity'). In Biegenwald, we contrasted cases in which prejudice was presumed, such as Rideau v. Louisiana, supra, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed. 2d 663, and cases in which prejudice was not presumed, such as Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed. 2d 589. State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 34-35. In Rideau, during the two months preceding jury selection, the defendant's detailed confession to a murder was televised three times and seen by a substantial number of residents of the parish in which the crime took place. The Supreme Court held that a change of venue should have been granted because the televised confession in a very real sense was Rideau's trial.... Any subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality. 373 U.S. at 726, 83 S.Ct. at 1419, 10 L.Ed. 2d at 665. In Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed. 2d 589, the defendant also received tremendous publicity because of his prior robbery of the Star of India Sapphire from a New York museum. It was undisputed that the publicity about his prior convictions was widespread. Indeed, each juror had some knowledge of defendant's past convictions. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of defendant's change of venue motion, noting that publicity had largely ceased seven months before jury selection. In so ruling, the Court stated: The voir dire in this case indicates no such hostility to petitioner by the jurors who served in his trial as to suggest a partiality that could not be laid aside. Some of the jurors had a vague recollection of the robbery with which petitioner was charged and each had some knowledge of petitioner's past crimes, but none betrayed any belief in the relevance of petitioner's past to the present case. [ Id. at 800, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036, 44 L.Ed. 2d at 595 (footnotes omitted).] As we noted in State v. Biegenwald , the Supreme Court distinguished the intrusiveness of the publicity in Murphy from that found in Rideau v. Louisiana, supra, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed. 2d 663, and similar cases by observing: The proceedings in [those] cases were entirely lacking in the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of a mob. They cannot be made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to information about a state defendant's prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process. To resolve this case, we must turn, therefore, to any indications in the totality of circumstances that petitioner's trial was not fundamentally fair. [106 N.J. at 35 (quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. at 789, 95 S.Ct. at 2036, 44 L.Ed. 2d at 594).] See also Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F. 2d 1487, 1489, 1538 (11th Cir.1985) (held: totality of circumstances permitted finding of presumed prejudice due to pretrial publicity: the manifest picture that emerges is a community that was deeply prejudiced as to both guilt and sentence), cert. den., 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S.Ct. 2289, 90 L.Ed. 2d 730 (1986); Johnson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1195 (Miss. 1985) (court presumed prejudice due to media saturation and totality of circumstances, including fact that murder victim was the white mother of a police officer and defendant was black). The Supreme Court of California has adopted a standard for granting changes of venue due to potentially prejudicial publicity that is very similar to our realistic likelihood of prejudice standard: A motion for change of venue or continuance shall be granted whenever it is determined that because of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial material, there is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. ... A showing of actual prejudice shall not be required. [ Maine v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 438 P. 2d 372, 377, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729 (1968) (emphasis added).] A California court, however, will not presume prejudice without first examining certain factors that measure the potentially prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity. Martinez v. Superior Court of Placer County, 29 Cal. 3d 574, 629 P. 2d 502, 174 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1981). These factors include the nature and extent of the news coverage, the size of the community, the nature and gravity of the offense, and the respective standings of the victim and the accused in the community. Id. at 578, 629 P. 2d at 504, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 703 (based on cited factors there was reasonable likelihood that fair trial could not be had without venue change); Williams v. Superior Court of Placer County, 34 Cal. 3d 584, 668 P. 2d 799, 194 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1983) (held: change of venue motion mistakenly denied; defendant was member of minority group and stranger to community; victim was white and from prominent family; and case had political overtones). But see People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 711 P. 2d 480, 496-99, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. 1985) (held: pre-trial publicity not presumptively prejudicial where (1) neither victim nor defendant prominent; (2) county population equals 405,600; and (3) no evidence of unusual local hostility toward defendant's ethnic group); Odle v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 32 Cal. 3d 932, 654 P. 2d 225, 187 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1982) (held: venue motion properly denied where more than two years passed between time of intense media coverage and prospective trial date, publicity not geographically pervasive, publicity not particularly hostile, and standing of accused and victim were neutral factors in case). According to California's high court, a defendant whose pretrial venue motion is denied may renew that motion if the voir dire later reveals that there is actual prejudice against the defendant due to pretrial publicity. Id. at 947, 654 P. 2d at 234, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 464. In State v. Biegenwald , we recognized that there was extensive pretrial publicity, including numerous articles in which the prosecutor repeatedly assumed defendant's guilt and also stated that defendant killed only for pleasure. 106 N.J. at 31. We concluded, however, that this is not a case in which the trial court was required to presume prejudice prior to the jury voir dire. The extensive pretrial publicity was concentrated in April and May, 1983. In addition to prohibiting further comment by counsel, the trial court adjourned the trial date until mid-November, allowing nearly six months to permit the impact of the publicity to subside. [ Id. at 35.] In our view, the instant case is distinguishable from those cases in which courts have presumed prejudice as a result of pretrial publicity. The facts of this case differ in several important respects: (1) there was no evidence of extreme community hostility, as distinct from fear, directed specifically against defendant; (2) neither the victim nor the defendant was a prominent member of the community; (3) the victim was not a public servant; (4) the defendant was not an outsider; and (5) the community was not predisposed to his guilt. The absence of these factors persuades us that the pretrial publicity was not presumptively prejudicial. See Johnson v. State, supra, 476 So. 2d at 1213-1215. We find further support for this conclusion in the fact that two years elapsed between the time of most intense publicity and the commencement of jury selection. See State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 35. We also note that the nature of the publicity in the instant case was not as inflammatory as that found in Rideau v. Louisiana, supra, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed. 2d 663, and Coleman v. Kemp, supra, 778 F. 2d 1487, nor was the defendant's trial conducted in the circus-like atmosphere of Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed. 2d 600, and Estes v. Texas, supra, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed. 2d 543. Our dissenting colleagues are of the view that the case of Fisher v. State, 481 So. 2d 203 (1985), requires us to find reversible error in the trial court's refusal to grant a change of venue. We think not. That case is neither binding on this court, nor dispositive of the issue before us. In Fisher, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the quantity and quality of pretrial publicity surrounding that case gave rise to a presumption of prejudice. As noted earlier, we find that such a presumption is not warranted in the instant case. In a very real sense, therefore, our disagreement with the dissenters is one of factual interpretation. We do not believe that the nature and quantity of pretrial publicity in this case gave rise to a presumption of prejudice; our dissenting colleagues, however, have examined the same facts and have reached a different conclusion. We do not, as the dissent suggests, hold that Fisher was wrongly decided. We simply find that while the facts in Fisher might very well have warranted a presumption of prejudice, our interpretation of the facts before us does not command the same result. The publicity regarding defendant Fisher was more widespread and pervasive, and was markedly more hostile than any publicity concerning Koedatich. Moreover, the publicity in Fisher saturated a considerably smaller community, and reached its most intense level only 10 1/2 months prior to trial. Given these factual distinctions, we do not feel that a result similar to the one reached in Fisher is warranted here. Where prejudice is not presumed, the appropriate inquiry in determining whether a change of venue is necessary to overcome the realistic likelihood of prejudice is whether under the totality of circumstances the jury process resulted in a fair and impartial jury. State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 35-36. Thus, the court must examine the extent to which potential jurors are biased as a result of any publicity surrounding the case. In determining the actual bias of a juror, courts place great reliance on a trial court's voir dire examination of a juror. Patton v. Yount, supra, 467 U.S. at 1038-1039, 104 S.Ct. at 2892-2893, 81 L.Ed. 2d at 858. This is so because the determination of a juror's bias is essentially one of credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor.... [T]he trial court's resolution of such questions is entitled, even on direct appeal, to `special deference.' Ibid. In sum, in the absence of presumed prejudice resulting from pretrial publicity, the Sixth Amendment inquiry turns largely on the adequacy of the voir dire. Welch v. United States, 466 A. 2d 829, 835 (D.C. 1983). In New Jersey, we give great deference to the trial court in conducting the voir dire. As this Court stated in State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, (1964), cert. den. sub nom. Ravenell v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 982, 85 S.Ct. 690, 13 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1965), the trial court is vested with broad discretionary powers in determining the qualifications of jurors.... [I]ts exercise of discretion will ordinarily not be disturbed on appeal. Id. at 160. In State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55 (1979), this Court discussed the rationale underlying this rule: Decisions concerning the potential bias of prospective jurors are primarily subjective in nature. They require at bottom a judgment concerning the juror's credibility as he respond to questions designed to detect whether he is able to sit as a fair and impartial trier of fact. Consequently, such evaluations are necessarily dependent upon an observation of the juror's demeanor during the course of voir dire  observations which an appellate court is precluded from making.         Although a juror's professions of impartiality will not always insulate him from excusal for cause, see, e.g., State v. Jackson, supra ; State v. Deatore, supra [70 N.J. 100 (1976)] they will be accorded a great deal of weight, see, e.g., State v. Grillo, supra; State v. Jefferson, 131 N.J.L. 70, 72 (E & A 1943). Inasmuch as the trial judge observed the venireman's demeanor, he was in a position to accurately assess the sincerity and credibility of such statements, and we should therefore pay due deference to his evaluation.... [ Id. at 63, 64.] Thus, this Court has upheld the trial court's discretion in refusing to excuse for cause jurors whose exposure to pretrial publicity led them to form an opinion about the facts of the case and the guilt or innocence of the accused: While the constitutional standard for a fair trial requires a panel of impartial, `indifferent' jurors, Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 [81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642], 6 L.Ed. 2d 751 (1961), the jurors actually empaneled need not be ignorant of the facts of the case.... `It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.' [ State v. Sugar, supra, 84 N.J. at 23 (citations omitted).] In State v. Williams, supra, 93 N.J. at 66-67, we set forth an entire panoply of procedures that a trial court may use to determine and evaluate the character, availability, feasibility and efficacy of alternative methods of safeguarding against prejudice. In doing so, the trial court must draw upon its own special judicial expertise and experience. Id. at 67. In addition to the options of securing foreign jurors to augment the jury pool, adjournment of the trial date and change of venue, we identified the voir dire as one of the most critical and important means of assuring jury impartiality: [An] important, indeed critical, means for dealing with potential and latent bias is the voir dire. The court should consider the efficacy of more exhaustive and searching voir dire examinations. The court in conducting the voir dire should be particularly responsive to the requests of counsel regarding the examination of prospective jurors as to potential bias. The court could consider whether there should be a greater willingness to resolve doubts in favor of the defendant in excusing jurors for cause. Particularly in capital cases, trial judges should exercise extraordinary care in the voir dire of potential jurors   . [ Id. at 68-69 (footnotes omitted).] In State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 35-37, and State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256-57, we continued our special deference to the trial court in reviewing the voir dire on both death qualification and publicity. In Ramseur, we noted both that [a] sensitive weighing and appraisal of a juror's entire response must be made by the trial court in its duty to resolve the question of whether the juror has shown bias or prejudgment, 106 N.J. at 257, and that this Court is perhaps too far removed from the realities of the voir dire to appreciate the nuances concealed by a bloodless record; thus, deference to the trial court is usually in order. Id. at 260 (quoting State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 547 (1986) (Clifford, J., dissenting)). We recognize that an appellate court faces certain difficulties when reviewing the adequacy of the voir dire. Among other things, the appellate court does not share the benefit of having made in-court observations of the potential juror. Despite an appellate court's inherently inferior vantage point, we perceive our role in reviewing the voir dire as follows: [A]n appellate tribunal is likewise under a duty to make an independent evaluation of the facts and circumstances and of the juror's voir dire examination. It should determine for itself whether the pretrial newspaper stories are so pervasive and so prejudicial, or the juror's protestation of unaffected impartiality after reading them so unconvincing or doubtful that a new trial should be ordered. [ State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 386 (1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 987, 85 S.Ct. 1359, 14 L.Ed. 2d 279 (1965).] In this case jury selection began on September 24, 1984, and ended on October 3, 1984. On the first day of jury selection, defense counsel renewed his motion for a change of venue, supplementing the record with a Sunday, September 23, 1984, front-page article from the Morris County Daily Record. The court denied the motion as premature. At the end of the first day of jury selection, defendant renewed the motion. The trial court again denied it. It noted that during the first day of jury selection, five out of twelve potential jurors had been preliminarily qualified (not excused for cause). It noted that of these five, two had no prior knowledge of the case. Based on the first day of jury selection, the trial court stated that a fair and impartial jury could be selected. Publicity continued through the first few days of jury selection. Defense counsel renewed his motion for a change of venue on the second day of jury selection, when he introduced an article from the previous day's Daily Record depicting the defendant shackled and with armed guards escorting him to the Court.... Defense counsel asserted that since many people read or heard about the case in the paper, he was forced to use peremptories for publicity purposes rather than for other reasons. [7] The court then denied the motion, stating: I do not regard as an appropriate test the fact that someone has read about this case before.... There are people who don't even remember what they read ... and there are people who say that they don't rely upon the press ... for determining guilt or innocence but will rely upon the evidence presented in the courtroom.... [T]here is no evidence ... that the citizens of Morris County cannot give to the defendant a fair and impartial trial by jury. The defendant renewed his motion again on the third day of jury selection and again on October 1. The motions were denied. The trial court held that a fair and impartial jury could be selected. The trial court took numerous precautions in conducting the voir dire. All 105 prospective jurors were required to fill out a questionnaire. The questionnaire contained general questions concerning the juror's education, occupation, physical condition, familiarity with the defendant, the prospective witnesses, and the lawyers in the case, and whether the juror or a member of his or her family or a close friend had ever been charged with a criminal violation or had ever been the victim of a crime. The questionnaire also contained the following questions: Do you have any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Mr. Koedatich on the charge contained in the indictment? Yes [] No [] Have you expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Mr. Koedatich at any prior time? Yes [] No [] Have you read anything about this case in any newspaper? Yes [] No [] How often do you read the following newspapers (circle one)? a. Star Ledger Daily Very often Infrequently Never b. Daily Record Daily Very often Infrequently Never c. Daily Advance Daily Very often Infrequently Never d. New York Times Daily Very often Infrequently Never Do you read any other newspapers? Yes [] No [] If so, list their names _______________________________________ _______________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________ Do you watch television news programs almost daily? Yes [] No [] If so, list which channels and what usual time of day. CHANNEL TIMES _______ _____ _______ _____ _______ _____ If you are selected to sit as a juror on this case, would you be willing and able to render a verdict based solely on the testimony you will hear, the other evidence presented and the law as the court will give it to you in its instructions, disregarding any other ideas, notions or beliefs about the law that you may have encountered? Yes [] No [] _______________________________________________ (Signature of juror) _______________________________________________ (Please print name) The trial court excused twenty-six potential jurors based solely on their written responses to the questionnaire. Of the seventy-nine prospective jurors who were asked if they had read or heard about the case, nine said that they had not; four of these nine became deliberating jurors. Seventy-seven jurors were excused by the trial court. Of these, forty were excused because of their knowledge of the case, twenty were excused for hardship reasons, five were excused because of their feelings on capital punishment, and twelve were excused for miscellaneous reasons. The court excused for cause any prospective juror who indicated knowledge of defendant's prior murder conviction or the pending charges in the O'Brien case. Additionally, the court excused for cause any juror who indicated he or she had formed an opinion about the defendant's guilt or innocence. Approximately thirteen percent of ninety-six jurors questioned by the Court indicated that they had formed such an opinion. Defense counsel exercised nine peremptory challenges. The State exercised four. Of the fifteen jurors who sat during the trial, five had not read or heard anything about defendant: Edgar Jadwin, Herman Nadel, Joseph Fiorentino, William Festa, and Robert O'Shaughnessy. Of the remaining jurors, Judith Deelsnyder had read about defendant's arrest, Dan Zingone had not read about the defendant but had noticed his picture in a paper, Loraine Zaccaro and Glen Cosentiono had read about the case primarily two years earlier but recalled nothing of the defendant's background. Leslie Fascia, who served as an alternate, read something about the defendant two years ago, and initially stated that she remembered reading something about the body being found out on Route 80, but then remarked, I don't remember. Elizabeth Criares last read about the case three months before jury selection, and associated the defendant with stabbing. Alice Budd, Deborah Brown, Margaret Andrews, and Barbara Herzig each had knowledge of the case and of defendant's arrest, but disclaimed any knowledge of defendant's background. Deborah Brown, for instance, testified that she talked about details of the case, and saw pictures in the Sunday paper but did not read the whole article and could remember nothing in particular about defendant's background. Margaret Andrews also testified to reading about the defendant in the papers, most recently [t]his weekend in the Daily Record, but could remember nothing in particular about defendant's background. When asked if she remembered reading or hearing anything about defendant's background, Barbara Herzig replied, It was a while ago. I have forgotten. Loraine Zaccaro answered No when asked if she had ever read or hear[d] anything about Mr. Koedatich despite her knowledge of the circumstances of the crime. In a recent capital case, we rejected a trial court's exclusive reliance on protective instructions in order to prevent juror exposure to prejudicial, midtrial publicity. State v. Bey (I), 112 N.J. 45, 80 (1988). In the instant case, we rely principally on the strength of the voir dire in upholding the trial court's denial of the change of venue motion. We rely on the court's use of repeated admonitions to the jury to avoid publicity only insofar as it provides additional support for our conclusion. Throughout the jury selection process and throughout trial, the trial court made every effort to preserve the jury's impartiality by reminding the jurors of their duty to avoid any publicity about the case. Once a juror was preliminarily qualified but not yet selected as a final juror, the trial court advised the juror not to read about the case in the newspapers, not to listen to any news accounts of the case on radio or television, and not to discuss the case with anyone. Prior to swearing in the jury, the trial court asked each juror individually if he or she had followed the court's order not to read or listen to any accounts of the case or to discuss the case with anyone. Each juror stated that he or she had obeyed that order. Immediately after swearing in the jury, the trial court reminded the jurors that they had just taken the oath to discharge their obligation faithfully, impartially and justly. Once again the trial court forcefully reminded the jurors that they could not be subject to any outside influences. The court impressed upon the jurors that the case must be decided on the evidence to be presented in the courtroom, and again instructed the jurors not to read any newspaper accounts of the case. The trial court further instructed the jurors not to watch anything on television about the case or to listen to any radio accounts of the case, and not to discuss the case with any other people or let other people discuss the case with them. Finally, the jurors were instructed not to discuss the evidence or case among themselves while it was in progress. The trial court repeated these instructions at the end of each day of trial and prior to each lunch recess. In capital cases, we have emphasized the trial court's obligation `to preserve the integrity of the jury and minimize the danger that prejudice will infiltrate the adjudicatory process....' State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 32 (quoting State v. Williams, supra, 93 N.J. at 63). While we recognize that a change of venue may disrupt court administration, it is imperative that the defendant in a capital case receive an impartial jury. Trial courts should not be reluctant to grant motions for change of venue in capital cases. On the contrary, courts should grant such motions liberally. While perhaps defendant's motion for change of venue could well have been granted, we do not find that the court's failure to follow that course constitutes reversible error. Instead, we conclude in this case, as we did in State v. Biegenwald, supra , that the voir dire assured the selection of an impartial jury: Although in some instances the trial court's interrogation was more general and less searching than that requested by counsel, our independent review of the record reveals that the overall scope and quality of the voir dire was sufficiently thorough and probing to assure the selection of an impartial jury. [106 N.J. at 29.] Based on this record, we are satisfied that the trial court took adequate measures during voir dire to insure that an impartial jury was impanelled. The trial court conducted a thorough voir dire. It discharged any juror who stated that he or she had read of the prior murder, or the O'Brien charges, or had formed an opinion about defendant's guilt or innocence. If a juror indicated he or she had read or heard about the case, the trial court carefully probed the juror about the juror's knowledge of the case and of the defendant. Finally, the court willingly accepted suggestions from defense counsel about questions to be asked and areas to be probed. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a change of venue. In our view, defendant failed to show that a change of venue was necessary to overcome the realistic likelihood of prejudice resulting from pretrial publicity. Our independent review of the record persuades us that the trial court's voir dire assured the selection of an impartial jury. Justice Handler in his dissent in this case and in State v. Bey (I), 112 N.J. 45, 105 (1988), urges the Court to adopt an enhanced standard of appellate review for determining reversible error in capital cases. According to Justice Handler's proposed standard, error of constitutional dimension is reversible unless the State can demonstrate that such error had no effect on the jury's deliberations and non-constitutional error is reversible unless the State can demonstrate that the error had no realistic likelihood of prejudicing the jury's deliberations. 112 N.J. at 116. The proposed standard would apply to all phases of a capital murder prosecution. Its application would not be restricted to the sentencing phase of the trial, but rather would apply with equal force to the guilt phase. Id. at 116. The standard would eliminate all other tests for determining reversible error, such as plain error and harmless error. Justice Handler thus proposes a new substantive standard, one that he intends be used exclusively in capital prosecutions. For the reasons the Court expressed in State v. Bey (I), supra, 112 N.J. at 91, we reject Justice Handler's enhanced standard of review. Cognizant of the severity of the death penalty, we shall continue to conduct a searching and scrupulously careful review of the entire record of a capital case. Nonetheless, the substantive standard of appellate review remains the same. We thus disagree with Justice Handler's finding that certain alleged errors are reversible under the enhanced standard. The dissenter relies on his enhanced standard of review to support his conclusion that reversible error was committed on any one of the following grounds: failure of the trial court to grant motion for change of venue; failure of this Court to grant limited remand to interrogate jurors in connection with a newspaper article of March 1985; prosecutorial misconduct with respect to the cross-examination of David Baldwin; and the prosecutor's summations in both the guilt and penalty phases. Finally, in an issue not raised by either the State or defendant, the dissenter uses the enhanced standard of review to conclude that the trial court's instruction to the jury that its finding of a mitigating factor had to be unanimous resulted in a coercive charge that requires that the defendant not be exposed to the death sentence on remand. We do not agree.
Defendant claims that this case is unlike State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. 13, in that so many of the jurors here read or heard about the case. In State v. Biegenwald , the sixteen impanelled jurors indicated that they had encountered little or no publicity regarding the case.... [A] substantial segment of the jury panel ... unequivocally and credibly demonstrated that the pretrial publicity had passed them by, and, thus, this Court was satisfied that the jury that was impanelled was as a whole impartial. Id. at 36. The Biegenwald jury, like the jury in this case, did not include anyone who recalled having previously read anything about other murders or a prior murder conviction. Id. at 37. After reviewing the jurors' questionnaires and after examining them extensively on voir dire, the court did in fact qualify as final deliberating jurors some veniremen who recalled reading or hearing about defendant in the papers or television but who remembered little or nothing about the defendant. Jurors who did recall some of the details reported in media accounts did not recall anything regarding the defendant's prior murder conviction and his indictment for the O'Brien murder. Their recollection of the factual circumstances of the murder and of the defendant was slight. It is important to recall that in State v. Biegenwald one of the impanelled jurors knew of defendant's alleged prior murders but not of his prior conviction. She apparently learned of the prior murders from other veniremen. Yet, the trial court and the defense were convinced by her voir dire that she could disregard what she had heard and could serve impartially. We affirmed that conclusion by finding that the final Biegenwald jury was an impartial and fair one. Id. at 37. The fact that those jurors who admitted exposure recalled nothing regarding this defendant's prior murder convictions and his indictment in the O'Brien matter, coupled with their assurances of impartiality, persuades us to reach the same conclusion we reached in State v. Biegenwald , namely, that defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury. Implicit in defendant's contention that the trial court should have excluded for cause any juror who read or heard about the case is the notion that voir dire is an ineffective means of determining juror prejudice under such circumstances. Defendant thus suggests that we adopt a rule whereby any juror who has heard or read about the case would be automatically disqualified regardless of the extent of his or her recollection. We decline to adopt such a rule for which we find no support in this or any other jurisdiction. In fact, such a rule would be inconsistent with long-established precedent holding that acceptable jurors need not be entirely ignorant of the matter at hand. See Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at 799-800, 95 S.Ct. at 2035-36, 44 L.Ed. 2d at 594-95 (Qualified jurors need not ... be totally ignorant of the facts and issues.); Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 722-23, 81 S.Ct. at 1642, 6 L.Ed. 2d at 756 (rejecting proposition that any preconceived notion as to guilt or innocence of an accused is sufficient to disqualify prospective juror); State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 161 n. 8 (1977) (Pashman, J., concurring) (juror who has seen news reports should not automatically be excused for cause); State v. VanDuyne, supra, 43 N.J. at 385-87; see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed. 2d 78, 86 (1982) (due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation). As we mentioned earlier, [i]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 722-23, 81 S.Ct. at 1642, 6 L.Ed. 2d at 756.
Defendant argues that the jury's verdict is invalid because a few deliberating jurors were aware of defendant's involvement in the O'Brien murder. In support of this contention, defendant relies solely on a newspaper article appearing in the Daily Record following defendant's conviction and sentencing. The article quoted statements made by two deliberating jurors and one alternate juror. See Koedatich Defense Wins Juror Appeal, Daily Record, Mar. 10, 1985, at 1, col. 1. Although defendant was first indicted for the O'Brien murder, he was tried first for the murder of Amie Hoffman. Approximately four months after the Hoffman trial but during the O'Brien trial, the Daily Record published an article concerning jury selection in the O'Brien case. In contrasting the jury selection in the O'Brien case with that in the Hoffman case, the article noted that Judge Stein excluded any juror who knew of Koedatich's arrest record. Ibid. The article then related that Stein's conservative approach did not prevent some jurors from linking Koedatich to both murders once the trial began. The Daily Record has learned that some of the jurors who convicted Koedatich of the Hoffman murder knew he was also charged with killing O'Brien. This information was not allowed to be brought before the Hoffman jurors because it could prejudice Koedatich's case. But a few jurors said once the trial got under way they realized Koedatich was charged with killing both women. Ibid. Specifically, the article quotes three jurors, two of whom were deliberating jurors, Ms. Zaccaro and Ms. Herzig, and one alternate who did not deliberate, Ms. Fascia. Ms. Zaccaro stated, I didn't know he did it in the beginning but halfway through the trial I realized he was linked to O'Brien. Ibid. Zaccaro also said that the O'Brien murder was not discussed until after the verdict was returned. From the article, it is unclear whether Ms. Herzig acknowledged that she or the other jurors knew that defendant was charged with having murdered O'Brien. However, she did state that the O'Brien murder played no part in the jury's decision to convict Koedatich of Hoffman's murder. It had no bearing on the Hoffman case, she said. The Hoffman case was based on evidence at the trial. Ibid. Ms. Fascia said she thought most of the jurors were aware that Koedatich was charged with the O'Brien murder. She said jurors were surprised to learn during the penalty phase of the trial that Koedatich was convicted of murder in Florida. Ibid. Ms. Fascia was an alternate juror. [8] In July 1985, defendant submitted a copy of the Daily Record article of March 10, 1985, to this Court in support of his motion for a limited remand to the trial court. On remand, defendant proposed to move for a new trial and for confidential interviews of the jurors pursuant to Rule 1:16-1. In support of the remand motion before this Court, defense counsel submitted an affidavit in conjunction with the Daily Record article. The affidavit essentially repeated the allegations of the newspaper article and did not advance any other evidence or justification for a jury interrogation. The State opposed the motion arguing that defendant had not made a sufficient showing of possible jury taint to justify an interrogation pursuant to Rule 1:16-1 and, further, that the jury recall motion was not ripe for adjudication. On October 7, 1985, we denied defendant's motion. We have long held that [c]alling back jurors for interrogation after they have been discharged is an extraordinary procedure which should be invoked only upon a strong showing that a litigant may have been harmed by jury misconduct. State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 250 (1966). We determined that investigations into secret jury deliberations should not be readily used to invalidate verdicts because disappointed litigants would be encouraged to tamper with jurors, to harass them and to employ fraudulent practices in an effort to induce them to repudiate their decisions. Moreover, an open invitation would be extended to any disgruntled juror who might choose to destroy a verdict to which he had previously assented. Ibid. (citations omitted). Furthermore, we have observed that secrecy surrounding jury deliberations is necessary not only to prevent the unsettling of verdicts, but also as an aid to the deliberative process itself. Each juror must be free to discuss his or her thoughts freely. State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 106 (1964). Freedom of debate would be stifled if jurors were aware that their argument and votes would be broadcast to the world. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13, 53 S.Ct. 465, 469, 77 L.Ed. 993, 999 (1933). For strong policy reasons, courts have generally refused to accept from jurors, for the purpose of impeaching a verdict, any evidence of the discussion which they may have had among themselves while considering their verdict. State v. Athorn, supra, 46 N.J. at 251 (citing cases). We do, however, recognize two general exceptions to this rule when the plainest principles of justice require a new trial. State v. Athorn, supra, 46 N.J. at 251-52. First, we have held that any racial or religious bigotry manifested in jury deliberations may invalidate a verdict. State v. Levitt, 36 N.J. 266 (1961). The second exception arises when a juror informs or misinforms his or her colleagues in the jury room about the facts of the case based on his personal knowledge of facts not in evidence. In State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92 (1955), a juror's affidavit revealed that the disclosure of other pending charges was the determinative factor in reaching a unanimous verdict for the imposition of the death penalty. The affidavit stated that the jury arrived at the death verdict only after some jurors mentioned, and the entire jury considered, another indictment against defendant not in evidence. Id. at 94. According to the juror's affidavit, this prejudicial information changed an eight-to-four consensus for life imprisonment into a unanimous verdict for the death penalty. Id. at 95. There is no juror affidavit in this case. Furthermore, we strongly believe that the contents of a single newspaper article, indisputably hearsay, cannot be the sole basis for the extraordinary procedure of a post-trial jury interrogation. We have long recognized a need to protect all the jurors against efforts of others to browse among their thoughts in search of something to invalidate their verdict. State v. LaFera, supra, 42 N.J. at 106. In LaFera, the convicted defendants engaged a private investigator to conduct a costly and extensive postconviction investigation of the jury in order to uncover some basis for impeaching the verdict. The investigation revealed some indication of one juror's prejudice and prejudgment, which that juror had expressed to former associates at his place of employment. We rejected this proffered evidence as a ground for a post-trial interrogation of the jury. We concluded that it was unfair to jurors to permit a disappointed litigant to pick over their private associations in search of something to discredit them and their verdict. Id. at 107. The inconclusive hearsay contents of the March 10, 1985, Daily Record article do not warrant a post-trial jury interrogation any more than the private investigation results warranted an interrogation in LaFera. This is particularly true where, as here, the newspaper interviewed the jurors five months after the conclusion of the penalty phase and during defendant's well-publicized trial for another murder. We continue to believe that post-trial jury interrogations are an extraordinary procedure which should be invoked only upon a strong showing that a litigant may have been harmed by jury misconduct. State v. Athorn, supra, 46 N.J. at 250. Defendant has not made the requisite strong showing of misconduct; the only supporting evidence that defendant has ever presented is defense counsel's affidavit that relies solely on the contents of the newspaper article. Defendant has never asserted that any juror impermissibly considered defendant's involvement in the O'Brien murder in reaching a decision in this case. Even assuming, as the dissenter does, the quoted juror statements that appeared in the article to be true and construing those statements most favorably to defendant, there still is no basis for concluding that defendant has made a strong showing of jury misconduct during deliberations or that any individual juror did not make an impartial determination. No juror expressed in the article that his or her decision was influenced by knowledge that defendant had been charged with the O'Brien killing; in fact, the interviewed jurors specifically stated that they had not been so influenced. Moreover, no juror stated that knowledge of defendant's involvement in the O'Brien killing had prevented him or her from reaching an impartial determination. None of the interviewed jurors suggested that the extraneous fact of Koedatich's involvement in the O'Brien murder had entered the jury deliberations. Finally, no member of the jury ever came forward to the court or counsel for the State or the defense and informed anyone of possible taint in the jury proceedings. Accordingly, there has never been any suggestion that any juror did not base his or her verdict solely on the evidence in the case. Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 722-23, 81 S.Ct. at 1642.
Defendant contends that the trial court's refusal to permit defense counsel to interrogate the jury during voir dire was prejudicial error. He argues that neither our decision in State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259 (1969), nor Rule 1:8-3(a) [9] should be construed to prohibit attorney-conducted voir dire in capital cases. We recently decided this issue in State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 27-30, where we held that our decision in State v. Manley was intended to apply in capital cases. In State v. Manley , we announced our adoption of the predecessor of Rule 1:8-3(a), which in its current form leaves the conduct of voir dire to the trial court, and grants it the discretion to permit or restrict supplemental questioning by counsel. State v. Biegenwald , 106 N.J. at 28 (citing State v. Manley, supra, 54 N.J. at 281-83). As we stated in State v. Biegenwald , our decision to extend the decision in State v. Manley to death penalty cases was based on the Manley opinion's `call[] for a much more guarded discretion than previously announced in State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. [at] 239-40; 54 N.J. at 283, a capital case, and the text of Rule 1:8-3(a).' Id. 106 N.J. at 28-29. Given our holding in State v. Biegenwald , the issue in the instant case is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for attorney-conducted voir dire. As we explained in State v. Biegenwald , [o]ur present Court rule is intended to see that voir dire is conducted to the extent reasonably possible by the court. The trial court is given discretion to permit counsel to supplement the court's interrogation of jurors by submitting questions to the court and, where the court approves, by additional personal questioning by counsel. Id. at 29 (citing R. 1:8-3(a) and State v. Manley, supra, 54 N.J. at 282-83). In the instant case, the trial court adhered to this procedure, showing itself to be very responsive to questions proposed by counsel. As in State v. Biegenwald , [n]o instances have been cited to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow questions to jurors. Id. 106 N.J. at 29. We also note that the trial court's voir dire was sufficiently thorough and probing to assure the selection of an impartial jury. Ibid. We therefore hold that the trial court's refusal to permit the voir dire interrogation to be conducted by counsel was within the limits of our decision in State v. Manley, supra, 54 N.J. 259, and of Rule 1:8-3(a).