Opinion ID: 1698626
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Heading: Continuing Trespass Origin of Continuing Tort Doctrine

Text: The continuing tort doctrine originated in trespass and nuisance cases. In those property law cases, the concept served to enlarge the period of tort liability by considering the relationship between the defendant's course of conduct and the continued ill effects of such conduct on the plaintiff. In those cases, a distinction is drawn between continuous and discontinuous operating causes; specifically: When the operating cause of the injury is continuous, giving rise to successive damages, prescription begins to run from the day the damage was completed and the owner acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of the damage. See South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 418 So.2d 531 (La.1982), and cases cited therein. When the operating cause of the injury is discontinuous, there is a multiplicity of causes of action and of corresponding prescriptive periods. Prescription is completed as to each injury, and the corresponding action is barred, upon the passage of one year from the day the owner acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of the damage. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes, § 63 (1982). Official Revision Comment (c) to LSA-C.C. Art. 3493 (1983). Recently, we clarified the continuing tort doctrine in a property law case, Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 98-2326 (La.6/29/99), 737 So.2d 720. We held that [a] continuing tort is occasioned by [the continual] unlawful acts, not the continuation of the ill effects of an original, wrongful act. 98-2326 at p. 9, 737 So.2d at 728. Addressing the requirement that there be continuous conduct by the defendant, we stated that [t]he continuous conduct contemplated in a continuing tort must be tortious and must be the operating cause of the injury. 98-2326 at p. 11, 737 So.2d at 729 n. 7. When a defendant's damage-causing act is completed, the existence of continuing damages to a plaintiff, even progressively worsening damages, does not present successive causes of action accruing because of a continuing tort. Derbofen v. T.L. James & Co., 355 So.2d 963 (La.App. 4th Cir.1977), writs denied, 357 So.2d 1156, 1168 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 280, 58 L.Ed.2d 257 (1978). The continuing tort doctrine has been invoked primarily in the property law context; only a handful of Louisiana cases have invoked it in other contexts. Two cases are illustrative: Wilson v. Hartzman, 373 So.2d 204 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 376 So.2d 961 (La.1979), which involved an occupational disease; and Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So.2d 532 (La.1992), which involved an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. In Wilson, the plaintiff was subject to continuous exposure to silica dust in the workplace for over a decade, which resulted in him contracting silicosis. In reversing the trial court's holding dismissing his claim as prescribed, the appellate court invoked the continuing tort doctrine. Writing for the court, Justice (then Judge) Lemmon reasoned: [T]he continuing and repeated wrongful acts are to be regarded as a single wrong which gives rise to and is cognizable in a single action, rather than a series of successive actions. Therefore, the date for commencing the accrual of prescription of an action based on the single wrong is the date of the last wrongful exposure, and the single action may be filed within the prescriptive period reckoning from the cessation of the continuing wrongful acts. See 51 Am. Jur.2d, Limitations of Actions, § 137 (1970). 373 So.2d at 207. [12] Similarly, in Bustamento, we characterized an entire course of harassment as a single cause of action with prescription running from the date of the last incident. Noting that the continuous nature of the alleged conduct had the dual effect of rendering such conduct tortious and tolling the commencement of prescription, we reasoned: It would be entirely inconsistent to say that such cumulative, continuous acts constitute a tort, but that prescription runs from the date of each distinct act. Indeed, it would be most difficult to pin-point the specific moment in time when such continuous conduct became sufficiently outrageous, and such continuing damages rose to the level of severity, to become actionable and thus to commence the running of prescription. Thus, we find Tucker's alleged actions constitute a pattern of conduct analogous to the continuing trespass or nuisance situations discussed in South Central Bell, supra, and we find the practical rule adopted in those property damage cases that prescription does not run until continuous conduct is abated applies. 607 So.2d at 538-39. Summarizing, we stated that when the acts or conduct are continuous on an almost daily basis, by the same actor, of the same nature, and the conduct becomes tortious and actionable because of its continuous, cumulative, synergistic nature, then prescription does not commence until the last act occurs or the conduct is abated. 607 So.2d at 542. Similar logic has been recited as supporting application of the continuing tort doctrine, albeit under the different rubric of continuing treatment, in the medical malpractice setting when the medical negligence consists of a course of conduct, a series of negligent acts, or a continuing impropriety of treatment. Louissell & Williams, supra ¶ 13.02[3] at 13-47. [13] As one commentator notes: Certainly it would not be equitable to bar a plaintiff who, for example, has been subjected to a series of radiation treatments in which the radiologist negligently and repeatedly administered an overdosage, simply because the plaintiff is unable to identify the one treatment that produced his injury. Indeed, in such a situation no single treatment did cause the harm; rather, it was the result of several treatments, a cumulative effect. Louissell & Williams, supra ¶ 13.02[3] at 13-52. Stated otherwise, the classic case of the continuum of negligent treatment... [is one] in which a patient is gravely injured because of negligent or unnecessary exposure to x-ray radiation or administration of medication over a span of years. Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 522 (Iowa 1995). Louisiana appellate courts have recognized a continuing tort based on each of these types of classic continuum of negligent treatment cases. A series of radiation treatments negligently administered to a plaintiff who was misdiagnosed with cancer that allegedly resulted in the plaintiffs death was held to be a continuing tort in Winder v. Avet, 613 So.2d 199 (La.App. 1st Cir.1992), writs denied, 617 So.2d 907 (La.1983). [14] Similarly, a course of administration of narcotic drugs spanning several years that allegedly resulted in addiction was held to be a continuing tort in Chiasson v. Doe, 618 So.2d 38 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 624 So.2d 1225 (La.1993). Another illustration of a course of narcotic drug administration that was held to be a continuing tort is presented in Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818 (D.C.Cir.1984). Describing the continuing tort concept to mean that `when a tort involves continuing injury, the cause of action accrues, and the limitation period begins to run, at the time the tortious conduct ceases,' the federal court invoked the continuing tort concept to toll the statutory time limit until the termination of the continued drug therapy. 729 F.2d at 821. Noting the difficulty of pinpointing a single incident in a continuous chain of tortious activity as the cause of significant harm and stressing the cumulative effect of the conduct as actionable, the court stated: We view the injury claimed by Page as gradual, resulting from the cumulative impact of years of allegedly tortious drug treatment. To us it seems unrealistic to regard each prescription of drugs as the cause of a separate injury, or as a separate tortious act triggering a new limitation period. Page charges precisely the sort of continuous conduct accreting physical and mental injury that justifies characterization as a continuing tort. Resultingly, the cause of action Page stakes on continuous drug treatment did not accrue, and the statutory limitations did not come into play, until the allegedly tortious conduct came to a halt in 1980. 729 F.2d at 822-23. [15] The Page court, however, distinguished the continuing tort doctrine it invoked based on the ongoing tortious conduct from the discovery rule that applies when a plaintiff's injury continues or manifests after the defendant's tortious conduct ceases. 729 F.2d at 821 n. 23. A common characteristic shared by Winder, Chiasson, and Page, is that they present a plaintiff who was harmed as a result of the cumulative effect of a course of negligent treatment, not by a single act of malpractice. This characteristic was also present in both Wilson and Bustamento, the two cases discussed above involving occupational disease and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively, in which a continuing tort was found to exist. This characteristic clearly is lacking in this case; neither cumulative damage to plaintiff, nor continuing treatment by defendant are present; rather, this case involves a single act of medical malpractice.