Opinion ID: 2435493
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of Comparative Fault to Strict Liability in Other States

Text: Courts in a majority of states that have considered the issue of whether comparative fault should apply in products liability actions based on strict liability in tort have decided that comparative fault should apply in such cases. A leading case is Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976). In Butaud , the Supreme Court of Alaska explained the application of comparative fault to strict liability as follows: The defendant is strictly liable due to the existence of a defective condition in the product. On the other hand, the plaintiff's liability attaches as a result of his conduct in using the product. It is appropriate, therefore, that the parties' contribution to the injury be apportioned. The defendant is strictly liable for the harm caused from his defective product, except that the award of damages shall be reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's contribution to his injury. The comparative negligence defense would be applied in the same manner as in any negligence case, with the major difference being that in products liability cases it would not be necessary to prove that a defect was caused by negligence. It is not anticipated that the trier of fact will have serious difficulties in setting the percentage that the damages would be reduced as a result of the comparative negligence of the plaintiff. Further, it would be anomalous in a products liability case to have damages mitigated if the plaintiff sues in negligence, but allow him to recover full damages if he sues in strict liability, particularly where the complaint contains alternate counts for recovery in negligence, strict liability, and/or breach of warranty. 555 P.2d at 45-46. Another leading case dealing with the application of comparative fault to strict liability is Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978). In that case the Supreme Court of California stated as follows: Those counseling against the recognition of comparative fault principles in strict products liability cases vigorously stress, perhaps equally, not only the conceptual, but also the semantic difficulties incident to such a course. The task of merging the two concepts is said to be impossible, that `apples and oranges' cannot be compared, that `oil and water' do not mix, and that strict liability, which is not founded on negligence or fault, is inhospitable to comparative principles. The syllogism runs, contributory negligence was only a defense to negligence, comparative negligence only affects contributory negligence, therefore comparative negligence cannot be a defense to strict liability... . While fully recognizing the theoretical and semantic distinctions between the twin principles of strict products liability and traditional negligence, we think they can be blended or accommodated. ..... Given all of the foregoing, we are ... disinclined to resolve the important issue before us by the simple expedient of matching linguistic labels which have evolved either for convenience or by custom. Rather, we consider it more useful to examine the foundational reasons underlying the creation of strict products liability in California to ascertain whether the purposes of the doctrine would be defeated or diluted by adoption of comparative principles. We imposed strict liability against the manufacturer and in favor of the user or consumer in order to relieve injured consumers `from problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence ... and warranty ... remedies ...' As we have noted, we sought to place the burden of loss on manufacturers rather than `injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.' The foregoing goals, we think, will not be frustrated by the adoption of comparative principles. Plaintiffs will continue to be relieved of proving that the manufacturer or distributor was negligent in the production, design, or dissemination of the article in question. Defendant's liability for injuries caused by a defective product remains strict. The principle of protecting the defenseless is likewise preserved, for plaintiffs recovery will be reduced only to the extent that his own lack of reasonable care contributed to his injury. The cost of compensating the victim of a defective product, albeit proportionately reduced, remains on defendant manufacturer, and will, through him, be `spread among society.' However, we do not permit plaintiff's own conduct relative to the product to escape unexamined, and as to that share of plaintiff's damages which flows from his own fault we discern no reason of policy why it should ... be born by others. Such a result would directly contravene the principle announced in Li, that loss should be assessed equitably in proportion to fault. 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, at 385-387, 575 P.2d 1162, at 1167-1169. (emphasis in original.) In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979), the Supreme Court of New Jersey determined that New Jersey's comparative negligence statute should apply to strict liability actions. [2] In the course of making this determination, the Suter court stated as follows: Dean Prosser has elucidated this idea of fault in the following manner: There is a broader sense in which `fault' means nothing more than a departure from a standard of conduct required of a man by society for the protection of his neighbors; and if the departure is an innocent one, and the defendant cannot help it, it is none the less a departure, and a social wrong. The distinction still remains between the man who has deviated from the standard, and the man who has not. The defendant may not be to blame for being out of line with what society requires of him, but he is none the less out of line [ Prosser, Torts, Section 75, at 493]. So viewed, the notion of fault is readily seen to be inherent in the concept of strict liability. The manufacturer or supplier of a chattel has been charged with the duty of distributing a product which is fit, suitable and duly safe. Failure to comply with this standard constitutes fault. 406 A.2d at 146. An overwhelming majority of states have adopted the view that comparative fault should apply to products liability actions based on strict liability. See Elliot v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 229 Conn. 500, 642 A.2d 709 (1994); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Kanecko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Haw. 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982); Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536, 726 P.2d 648 (1985); Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill.2d 104, 73 Ill. Dec. 337, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983); Forsythe v. Coats Co., 230 Kan. 553, 639 P.2d 43 (1982); Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So.2d 166 (La. 1985); Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984); Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 429 Mich. 540, 418 N.W.2d 650 (1988); Jack Frost, Inc. v. Engineered Bldg. Components Co., 304 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 1981); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck Company, 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Jaramillo v. Fisher Controls Co., Inc., 102 N.M. 614, 698 P.2d 887 (App. 1985); Day v. General Motors Corp. 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984); Sandford v. Chevrolet Division, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982); Fiske v. MacGregor, 464 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1983); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Lundberg v. All-Pure Chemical Co., 55 Wash. App. 181, 777 P.2d 15 (1989); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 171 W. Va. 79, 297 S.E.2d 854 (1982); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Keltner v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir.1984) (based on Arkansas law); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D.Mont. 1981) (based on Montana law). See Applicability of Comparative Negligence Doctrine to Actions Based on Strict Liability in Tort, 9 ALR 4th 633. On the other hand, a minority of jurisdictions decline to apply comparative fault to strict liability actions. The minority view is expressed by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979), in which that court stated: Strict liability is an abandonment of the fault concept in product liability cases. No longer are damages to be borne by one who is culpable; rather they are borne by one who markets the defective product. The question of whether the manufacturer or seller is negligent is meaningless under such a concept; liability is imposed irrespective of his negligence or freedom from it. Even though the manufacturer or seller is able to prove beyond all doubt that the defect was not the result of his negligence, it would avail him nothing. We believe it is inconsistent to hold that the user's negligence is material when the seller's is not. 278 N.W.2d at 160. Moreover, in Kinard v. Coats Company, Inc., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976), the Colorado Court of Appeals stated the following rationale in support of the minority view: Products liability under § 402A (of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ) does not rest upon negligence principles, but rather is premised on the concept of enterprise liability for casting a defective product into the stream of commerce... . Thus, the focus is upon the nature of the product, and the consumer's reasonable expectations with regard to that product, rather than on the conduct either of the manufacturer or of the person injured because of the product. 553 P.2d at 837. (citations omitted.) [3] Other decisions that express the minority view include Bowling v. Heil Co., 31 Ohio St.3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373 (1987); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okl. 1974); Phillips v. Duro-Lasting Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1991). It appears that many legal scholars agree with the majority position that comparative fault should apply to products liability actions based on strict liability in tort. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, 3d Ed., Section 11.2 (1994); Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57 Tenn.L.Rev. 199, at 302 (1990); Grey Greenlee & Ann Rochelle, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability  A Marriage of Necessity, 18 Land & Water L.Rev. 643 (1983); Victor E. Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 Tenn. L.Rev. 171 (1974). Most of the states which have a modified form of comparative fault, such as the one adopted by this Court in McIntyre , have concluded that the same type of modified comparative fault that applies generally should apply to strict liability actions. Included in the decisions that express this view are Forsythe v. Coats Co., 230 Kan. 553, 639 P.2d 43 (1982); Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984); Sandford v. Chevrolet Division, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 171 W. Va. 79, 297 S.E.2d 854 (1982). A minority of jurisdictions that otherwise apply a form of modified comparative fault apply pure comparative fault to strict liability actions. See e.g., Hao v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 69 Haw. 231, 738 P.2d 416 (1987).