Opinion ID: 2595540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitations on Defendant's Arguments

Text: Defendant argues the court placed unconstitutional limits on his penalty phase arguments on four occasions, by prohibiting counsel from speaking about the jurors' direct and individual responsibility for defendant's fate. He argues the court lessened the jurors' sense of the awesome responsibility inherent in the penalty decision, thereby violating his Eighth Amendment right to reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment. We disagree. The right to present closing argument at the penalty phase of a capital trial, while broad in scope, `is not unbounded . . .; the trial court retains discretion to impose reasonable time limits and to ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the mark.' ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 463, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) Juror determinations may not be the product of emotional responses that are not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced during the penalty phase, or extraneous emotional factors. ( California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 542-543, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934.) Nor may jurors be misled to minimize the importance of [their] role, or to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. ( Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 328-329, 333, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231.) As will appear, none of the limitations placed by the trial court could have had the effect of misleading the jury, permitting them to act upon emotional responses, or diminishing their sense of individual, personal responsibility for the verdict. Instead, the court prohibited counsel from improperly inflating the jurors' sense of their responsibility. We thus find defendant's Eighth Amendment argument unconvincing. In the first instance, the court stopped counsel from arguing that the decision the jurors would make as to penalty would have an enormous impact not only on defendant, but also on his family, his attorneys, and on each juror himself or herself. Counsel asserted that she was seeking to urge the importance of the individual verdict of each juror. The court correctly disagreed; counsel's argument improperly sought to engage the jurors' sympathies for defendant's family and friends. Such sympathies have no bearing on the individualized nature of the penalty decision. ( People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 855-856, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152 [sympathy for defendant's loved ones and their reaction to a death verdict do not relate to either the circumstances of the capital crime or the character and background of the accused].) Further, the court correctly stopped counsel from improperly addressing as a factor in mitigation the emotional impact a death verdict would have upon each juror. The jurors' reactions to the penalty imposed would constitute emotional responses untethered to the facts of the case ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 444, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391), not proper factors for consideration. In the second instance, the prosecution objected when defense counsel began to argue that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole would protect society. In sustaining the objection the court correctly stated that the jury was not to consider the underpinnings of death penalty law or attempt to protect society at large. We have long held that the jury should not concern itself with protecting society. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 807, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330 [questions of deterrence or cost in carrying out capital sentence are for Legislature, not for jury considering a particular case]; People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 731, 16 Cal.Rptr. 777, 366 P.2d 33 [misconduct to argue general deterrent effect of capital punishment].) In the third instance, the court stopped defense counsel from arguing that if any one of the jurors voted for life imprisonment instead of death, defendant will not be executed. In so doing, the court correctly prohibited counsel from erroneously telling the jury that a deadlocked verdict would result in a life sentence. (§ 190.4, subd. (b) [if jury unable to reach unanimous verdict as to penalty, court shall dismiss jury and impanel new jury to try issue of penalty].) In the fourth instance, the court sustained the prosecution's objection when defense counsel began to argue that in Utah, the death sentence is carried out by firing squad. In the presence of the jury the court explained, I understand what you were getting to, the marksmen, and the bullets, and so forth, the manner in which they are. . . . That has nothing to do with this case. Later, out of the presence of the jury, the court explained that it would not allow counsel to equate jurors with executioners standing in a firing squad. Defendant renews the arguments presented below, arguing that the court limited his ability to impress upon the jury the seriousness of their role in sentencing in violation of the Eight Amendment, citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231. We disagree. Caldwell's prohibition against misleading the jury as to the importance of their role is relevant only to certain types of comment  those that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision. ( Darden v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 184, fn. 15, 106 S.Ct. 2464.) The limitation on counsel's argument here did not result in the suggestion that the jurors bore less responsibility than they actually did. Instead, it prevented the improper suggestion that the jurors had more responsibility than they actually did and that each one of their votes was akin to a live round of ammunition shot by a firing squad. Such an argument would have mischaracterized the jurors' role in the penalty phase and engendered an emotional response not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced during the penalty phase. ( California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 542, 107 S.Ct. 837.) Contrary to defendant's argument, the jurors were aware of the awesome responsibility inherent in the decision before them and of their individual responsibility for the verdict. The prosecutor began his argument by referring to the very important, very serious decision, defense counsel referred to the terrible decision, the grievous and great and heavy responsibility which will remain with [the jurors], and numerous times counsel referred to the individual decision which would involve the moral conscience of each juror. In sum, none of the limitations imposed on defendant's penalty phase argument affected the reliability of the verdict.
In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor argued that if defendant received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, he could commit crimes in prison without fear of greater punishment. Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was improperly arguing future dangerousness. The court sustained the objection and admonished the jury to disregard the comments about how the defendant might behave, or what crimes might be committed in the future. Later, during her closing argument, defense counsel argued without objection that the prosecution had not presented any evidence of prior acts of violence by defendant, and that specifically there was no evidence of acts of violence during defendant's federal or present incarceration. Counsel also argued, What would be one of the most fundamental concerns you are going to have? Is society protected? And as [the prosecutor] pointed out, and correctly so, our prisons are a part of society. Is society protected? Clearly, this man, Mr. Harris, has demonstrated  At this point, the court interrupted and said, I did it for the People, I'm going to do it for the defense, that's not part of this game. . . . [T]he jury is not being asked at this point to render a decision on penalty to protect society the best way. That would invite them to speculate too much. So I'm going to not let you do it either. Defense counsel then continued to argue, without objection or interruption, that the absence of any evidence whatsoever of any acts of violence or threat of violence was heavily mitigating under section 190.3, factor (b) (presence or absence of criminal activity involving force or violence). Defendant claims the court prevented him from presenting his lack of violent criminal history as a factor in mitigation and from urging the jury to consider that because he was not a violent prisoner in the past, he would not be a risk to other prisoners should he receive a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The court did err to the extent it believed neither side could argue defendant's future dangerousness. The prosecution may argue future dangerousness if the argument is based on the evidence. ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 940, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93.) Accordingly, the defense may argue the opposite. But any error in this case was harmless. Defendant actually gained to the extent he prevented the prosecution from arguing that he might commit crimes in prison. Moreover, defendant was able to argue fully the mitigating impact of his absence of a history of violence while incarcerated. We see no reasonable possibility the verdict would have been different had the court permitted both sides to argue future dangerousness.