Opinion ID: 4551519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fall Line’s Real Party-in-Interest Challenge

Text: Section 312(a) of Title 35 specifies that a petition “may be considered only if” it includes, inter alia, an “identification” of “all real parties in interest.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). In ESIP Series 2, we explained that preclusion of judicial review under § 314(d) extends to a Board decision Case: 19-1956 Document: 92 Page: 6 Filed: 07/28/2020 6 FALL LINE PATENTS, LLC v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC concerning the “‘real parties in interest’ requirement of § 312(a)(2).” 958 F.3d at 1386. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Techs., LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020), we held that § 314(d) precludes our review of the real party-in-interest determination. ESIP Series 2, 958 F.3d at 1386 (quoting Thryv, 140 S. Ct. at 1373–74). Fall Line “acknowledges that this [c]ourt . . . should rule that it lacks normal appellate jurisdiction over the RPI issue” in light of Thryv, Appellant Supp. Br. 1, but nevertheless insists that we may review the Board’s decision under our “mandamus jurisdiction.” Id. Relying on the Supreme Court’s stipulation that Cuozzo does not “categorically preclude review,” Fall Line contends that mandamus is authorized and necessary when the Board engages in “shenanigans.” Appellant Supp. Br. 2–3 (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141). According to Fall Line, in this case, such “shenanigans” constitute the Board’s § 312(a)(2) determination. Appellant Supp. Br. 3. Fall Line misrepresents the Cuozzo Court’s qualification and misunderstands the role of mandamus. In Cuozzo, the Supreme Court explained that its interpretation of § 314(d) applies where the grounds for challenging the Board’s decision “consist of questions that are closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to [the Board]’s decision to initiate inter partes review.” Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141. It emphasized that its holding did not decide “the precise effect of § 314(d) on appeals that implicate constitutional questions, that depend on other less closely related statutes, or that present other questions of interpretation that reach, in terms of scope and impact, well beyond ‘this section.’” Id. And to provide an example of the type of review that was not “categorically precluded” by its holding, the Court explained: [W]e do not categorically preclude review of a final decision where a petition fails to give “sufficient Case: 19-1956 Document: 92 Page: 7 Filed: 07/28/2020 FALL LINE PATENTS, LLC v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC 7 notice” such that there is a due process problem with the entire proceeding, nor does our interpretation enable the agency to act outside its statutory limits by, for example, canceling a patent claim for “indefiniteness under § 112” in inter partes review. Id. at 2141–42. Thus, institution decisions that implicate constitutional or jurisdictional violations are not “categorically precluded” from judicial review under § 314(d). The Cuozzo Court did not hold, however, that this court may exercise its mandamus powers to review “an ordinary dispute about the application of” an institution-related statute. Id. While we once relied on this precise language in Cuozzo to conclude that statutory prerequisites to the Director’s authority to institute an IPR were not related to institution within the meaning of § 314(d), the Supreme Court disagreed with that conclusion in Thryv. It is true that, in the context of concluding that § 314(d) bars appellate review of the Board’s § 315(b) determination, the Thryv Court said it did “not decide whether mandamus would be available in an extraordinary case.” Thryv, 140 S. Ct. at 1374 n.6. But as Justice Gorsuch recognized, we have addressed that question and concluded that mandamus is not available to address decisions that are barred from appellate review under § 314(d). Id. at 1389 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today will not say whether mandamus is available where the § 314(d) bar applies, and the Federal Circuit has cast doubt on that possibility.”). Specifically, we recently held that statutory prohibitions of appellate review “cannot be sidestepped simply by styling the request for review as a petition for mandamus.” In re Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F.3d at 1319 (collecting cases). Where an appellant’s claim is nothing more than a challenge to the Board’s conclusion that the information presented in the petition warranted review, there is “no ‘clear and indisputable’ right to challenge [the] noninstitution decision directly in this court, including by way of mandamus.” In re Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC, 749 Case: 19-1956 Document: 92 Page: 8 Filed: 07/28/2020 8 FALL LINE PATENTS, LLC v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014). See also GTNX, Inc. v. INTTRA, Inc., 789 F.3d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2015). So, while the Supreme Court side-stepped the issue in Thryv, we have not. In its mandamus request, Fall Line simply rehashes the procedural timeline of its § 312(a)(2) challenge and the evidence in support of its claim. Appellant Supp. Br. 3. These are the types of arguments that appellants regularly raised in their § 312(a)(2) appeals, prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Thryv and our decision in ESIP Series 2. See, e.g., Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Moreover, as evident from the Board’s decision and the record, this appeal involves no issues extraneous to the Board’s § 312(a)(2) determination. Accordingly, we reject Fall Line’s contention that the present appeal justifies mandamus review. “For this court to entertain such claims in response to a petition for mandamus would convert the mandamus procedure into a transparent means of avoiding the statutory prohibition on appellate review of agency institution decisions.” In re Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F.3d at 1321. 1