Opinion ID: 987025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motions to Strike and Amend

Text: A. After TESCO and Anderson renewed their summary judgment motion, Williams attached to his responsive brief a second report from expert witness Gregg Perkin opining that, “during casing operations, DeSoto personnel operated Rig 9 at the direction and control of Tesco,” that “Tesco had a duty to SWE and DeSoto to direct, oversee and control the operations of Rig 9 insofar as assembling joints of casing to the casing string,” and that “Tesco had the authority to resume casing operations.” Williams appeals the district court’s order striking this report, and two Recommended Practice Standards from the American Petroleum Institute, because -11- they were new materials submitted long after the summary judgment record was closed and contrary to the court’s prior order inviting the parties to submit additional briefing with “focused excerpts from the evidentiary record” concerning the relationship between DeSoto and TESCO. Williams, 2011 WL 4527361, at  (emphasis added). Without noting the appropriate standard of review, as Rule 28(a)(9)(B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires, Williams argues the district court erred because Rules 26(a)(2)(E) and (e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permitted him to supplement Perkin’s initial expert report in response to the district court’s request for additional briefing. This contention is without merit. First, district courts have broad discretion in maintaining compliance with discovery and pretrial orders, and we review this ruling for “clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.” In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 596 F.3d 884, 888 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted); Trost v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 162 F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (8th Cir. 1998). Second, these additional materials were clearly untimely -- Williams’s expert report was due on August 23, 2010, and discovery closed on November 15, 2010. Third, Perkin was materially altering, not merely clarifying his original report, where he said, “[a]s is the custom and practice in the industry . . . Tesco would work in cooperation with DeSoto’s Rig Crew to pick-up, handle, make-up and run the . . . casing into the hole,” and his deposition testimony, where he said that DeSoto and TESCO employees worked together and anyone can stop work because of safety concerns, but only Long, Hargis, and Nathan Francis (all DeSoto employees) had the authority to restart the casing operation. Fourth, the untimeliness was not substantially harmless because allowing the belated second report would require reopening discovery so Defendants may redepose Perkin, thus delaying trial. See Popoalii v. Correctional Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 498-99 (8th Cir. 2008). Finally, any error by the district court was clearly harmless because Perkin’s second opinion on the control issue was either an assertion of fact based on no firsthand knowledge, or a legal conclusion he was not qualified to make regarding a question of law within the province of the district court. -12- B. Approximately seven weeks before the scheduled trial, Williams moved to amend his complaint to add a direct claim of negligence against TESCO for its failure to train Anderson on SWE’s safety rules, as the contract required. In granting TESCO and Anderson summary judgment two weeks later, the district court denied the motion, noting that the deadline for amending pleadings had long passed and it would be unfair to Defendants to add a new, direct theory of liability when TESCO had prepared to defend a claim of respondeat superior liability. See Anderson, 2012 WL 1314150, at . Citing the liberal standard for amending pleadings set forth in Rule 15(a)(2), Williams argues the court abused its discretion in denying this motion because the additional theory would not prejudice Defendants. We disagree. First, a motion for leave to amend filed outside the district court’s Rule 16(b) scheduling order requires a showing of good cause, and Williams failed to demonstrate diligence in attempting to meet the court’s December 7, 2010 deadline. See Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2008); In re Milk Prods. Antitrust Litig., 195 F.3d 430, 437 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1038 (2000). Second, as the district court noted, Williams’s proposed amendment just weeks before trial was plainly prejudicial. Finally, given the district court’s decision on the merits that Anderson was not negligent as a matter of law, we fail to see how TESCO’s failure to train Anderson could have caused Williams’s injury, so the proposed amendment was futile. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to amend. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. ______________________________ -13-