Opinion ID: 1613455
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether rhone was improperly impeached therefore denying robert a fair trial and the right to confront witnesses against him

Text: ¶ 9. Anthony Rhone accompanied Robert and Glass to the club the night Cross was killed. Rhone testified for the defense as an eyewitness. On cross-examination, the District Attorney asked Rhone if he had ever been convicted of the crime of dishonesty. After defense counsel's objection as improper predicate was overruled, Rhone replied that he had a felony charge. The District Attorney then said, Right, and that was for stealing what, a necklace off a girl's neck? Rhone was quick to correct the District Attorney in his response. It wasn't off a girl's neck, and I didn't actually steal it. I was with someone who stole it ... Defense counsel objected, but when asked by the judge if he was objecting under Peterson, he simply replied, I object to the details of this crime. The District Attorney said he would move on to something else, but defense counsel moved for a mistrial. ¶ 10. The judge then excused the jury, and the parties established that the conviction was five (5) days short of being ten (10) years old. Also, they established that the conviction was for grand larceny, not robbery. Defense counsel then stated to the court that it was improper for the details of the conviction to be given to the jury. The judge agreed, sustained the objection, and when the jury came back, instructed them to disregard any comments concerning the nature of the offense. ¶ 11. Robert asserts on appeal that he should have been given notice of the felony conviction before Rhone was questioned on the witness stand. He argues further that the Peterson factors were misapplied. See Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1987). Robert complains that the court erred in concluding that grand larceny is a crime of dishonesty. Finally, he renews his argument on appeal that it was reversible error for the District Attorney to go into the details of the crime. ¶ 12. As to giving notice of felony convictions of a witness, our Rules of Evidence are clear. Rule 609(b) says evidence of a conviction more than ten years old requires notice to the opponent. Miss. R. Evid. 609(b). Rhone's felony conviction was not more than 10 years old; it was five days shy of being 10 years old. Therefore, the District Attorney was not required to give Robert notice. ¶ 13. Also, Rule 609(a) states that evidence of a conviction may be used to attack the credibility of a witness if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year ... and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect on a party or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. Miss. R. Evid. 609(a). The judge never concluded that grand larceny is a crime of dishonesty as Robert asserts. The judge said, if it's for impeachment purposes, the issue is whether he has (sic) ever been convicted of a felony crime. It's matter of law as to whether it's a crime of dishonesty. The District Attorney's statement regarding a crime of dishonesty was included in the statements the judge told the jury to disregard. The trial judge was correct in that it was enough that the conviction was a felony punishable, by death or imprisonment in excess of one year. The issue of whether the crime was one of dishonesty is a question of law, not a question of fact for the jury to decide. Further, the judge admonished the jury to disregard the question and answer which implied that grand larceny is a crime of dishonesty. The jury was also admonished as to the details of the crime. We have held that it must be presumed that the jurors followed the court's admonition to disregard [any] unanticipated, unprovoked incident and to decide the case solely on the evidence presented; to presume otherwise would be to render the jury system inoperable. Bell v. State, 631 So.2d 817, 820 (Miss.1994) (citations omitted). ¶ 14. Furthermore, the trial judge properly applied the Peterson balancing test. Peterson, 518 So.2d at 636. Peterson requires the trial judge to consider the following on the record: the impeachment value of the prior crime, the point in time of the conviction and the witness's subsequent history; the similarity between the past crime and the charged crime; the importance of the defendant's testimony, and the centrality of the credibility issue. Peterson, 518 So.2d at 636. ¶ 15. The only issue, sub judice, as regards the Peterson analysis is whether the judge applied the test at the proper time. We held that Rule 609(a)(1) requires the trial judge to make an on-the-record determination that the probative value of the prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect before admitting any evidence of a prior conviction. Id. It was error for the trial judge not to apply the Peterson analysis before evidence of the conviction was admitted. As soon as the District Attorney asked the question, the judge should have stopped the proceedings to conduct a Peterson analysis. While error, it is not a reversible error since the test was properly applied, on the record, and the court concluded that the evidence of Rhone's conviction had more probative value than unfair prejudicial effect. ¶ 16. Finally, Robert's contention that his right to confront the witness was compromised is without merit. Rhone was Robert's witness, and he had the right to, and did, ask questions of him. The State had a right to impeach Rhone on cross-examination.