Opinion ID: 2640942
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the workers' compensation act and the intentional injury exception

Text: ¶ 16 The Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) relieves employers of any common law liability for injuries sustained by an employee on account of any accident or injury or death that is contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or because of or arising out of the employee's employment. [6] In place of common law remedies, the Act creates an administrative scheme that seeks to provide a simple, adequate, and speedy remedy for workers injured on the job, [7] while also protecting employers from disruptive or vexatious lawsuits for alleged negligence. [8] We often term the Act's remedial scheme as a quid pro quo in which employees are able to recover for job-related injuries without showing fault. . . and employers are protected from tort suits by employees by virtue of the Act's exclusive remedy provision. [9] ¶ 17 The primary objective of workers' compensation has been to remove industrial negligence, in all its forms, from the concept of the law of tort. [10] To this end, the Act includes an exclusive remedy provision, largely unaltered since 1949, that reads as follows: The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer . . . and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this chapter shall be in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee . . . on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or because of or arising out of the employee's employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer . . . based upon any accident, injury, or death of an employee. [11] ¶ 18 In Bryan v. Utah International, we recognized that the exclusive remedy provision did not prohibit an employee from maintaining an action for damages due to an intentional tort. [12] Accordingly, we allowed an employee to bring a tort claim against his supervisor for injuries sustained when the supervisor intentionally caused a large cable to hit the employee's body. [13] This is known as the intentional injury exception. ¶ 19 The scope of the intentional injury exception is at issue in this case. Specifically, the parties disagree regarding the level of intent necessary to trigger the intentional injury exception. Helf urges us to adopt a standard in which intent to injure would be imputed where an injury is substantially certain to occur. She attributes this definition to a battery case, Wagner v. State, in which we relied on the Second Restatement of Torts to define the intent standard for battery. [14] On the other hand, Chevron urges us to adopt the intent to injure standard, which it attributes to a court of appeals case, Lantz v. National Semiconductor Corp. [15] Under this standard, Chevron would not be liable absent a `conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting injury.' [16] Using this definition, Chevron argues that an intentional act is only actionable if it is accompanied by an additional malicious desire to injure. ¶ 20 Both parties misunderstand the intent requirement. Helf conflates probability with intent and Chevron conflates motive or desire with intent. To clarify these misunderstandings, we will first review the existing case law that defines and applies the intentional injury exception. Second, we will affirm the intent to injure standard from Lantz and explain how it aids in distinguishing between intentional and accidental injuries. We will also distinguish intent from both motivation and probability. Finally, we will apply the intent to injure standard to Helf's case, concluding that her complaint satisfies the intent to injure standard.
¶ 21 We first turn to our existing case law. This court first articulated the intentional injury exception in Bryan. Recognizing that the Act is remedial and designed to implement a social policy, we noted that the legislature had defined personal injury, by accident, [to] include injury caused by the willful act of a third person and that willful implied something in addition to mere negligence. [17] We concluded, however, that an intentional act differed from a willful act, and that the word intentional, when used to describe a wrongful act. . . [means] that the act was not only done knowingly, but with the knowledge that it was wrongful to do it. [18] Thus, following Bryan, the exclusive remedy provision barred employee suits for injuries caused by negligent or willful acts, but not for intentionally injuriousi.e., wrongfulacts. ¶ 22 Sixteen years later, in Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., we again applied the intentional injury exception. [19] Mounteer, the plaintiff, brought suit against his employer, Utah Power & Light Co. (UP&L), for injuries caused when his co-employee called the supervisor over a loudspeaker and accused Mounteer of being on drugs. [20] We stated that the exclusive remedy provision barred any common law action against the employer unless he or she intended or directed the injurious act of the co-worker. [21] In applying this rule, we analyzed whether UP&L ordered the broadcast, but did not analyze whether UP&L ordered that the broadcast be injurious. [22] We upheld the dismissal of Mounteer's suit because he had not provided evidence that UP&L directed or intended the broadcast. In fact, the only evidence provided by Mounteer was an allegation that the broadcast violated UP&L's company policy. With only this piece of information, we reasoned that no inference could be made that UP&L directed or intended the broadcast. [23] ¶ 23 During the interim between Bryan and Mounteer, the court of appeals decided Lantz. [24] In Lantz, an employee's injuries from exposure to a chemical spill that occurred in his work area were allegedly exacerbated by delayed evacuation. [25] Lantz argued that the failure to issue an evacuation order constituted an intentional tort because injury was substantially certain to result from his exposure to fumes. Relying almost entirely on Larson's treatise, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, [26] (Larson's), the court of appeals rejected this argument. [27] Instead, the court of appeals concluded that the intentional injury exception only applied in situations characterized by `a conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting injury.' [28] This standard requires an injured employee to show that his employer or fellow employee manifested a deliberate intent to injure him. [29] This is the same standard adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, [30] although twelve states have recognized a broader definition of intentional in order to subject some employers to liability for gross negligence. [31] ¶ 24 We join the majority of states in adopting the intent to injure standard in order to distinguish between intentional injuries that fall within the intentional injury exception and negligent or accidental injuries, which are covered by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act.
¶ 25 In attempting to apply the intent to injure standard the parties miss the mark by urging us to adopt or reject Lantz's definition of intent. Lantz offers only a rhetorically circular definition of intent as a conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting injury. [32] After reading this definition, the question remains, what does intent mean? Does it mean that the actor knew that his action would inflict injury? Does it require that the actor's motive or desire was to inflict injury? What if the actor knows that his action is likely to inflict injury, but sincerely hopes that no injury will result? These questions suggest that the actor's motive or desire may be irrelevant to the existence of legal intent. ¶ 26 Rather than defining and determining intent, the intent to injure analysis focuses on whether the actor knew or expected that injury would occur as a consequence of his actions, thereby distinguishing between intentional and unintentional workplace injuries under the Act. In clarifying and applying this standard, we draw on the concept of an accident because it is the antithesis of an intentional act. The intent to injure standard is necessary because an accidental injury may result from an intentional act, such as when an employer intentionally pushes a barrel that accidentally hits an employee. We would not say that the employer intentionally injured the employee even though he intentionally pushed the barrel. On the other hand, we would say that the employer intentionally injured the employee if he intentionally pushed the barrel, knowing or expecting that the employee was standing on the other side. Thus, the intent to injure standard distinguishes between intentional acts resulting in unknown or unexpected injuries, which are covered under the Act by workers' compensation, and intentional acts resulting in known or expected injuries, which fall within the intentional injury exception. ¶ 27 The concept of an accident is central to the intentional injury analysis. According to Black's Law Dictionary, an accident is an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence. [33] The concept of an accident is also woven throughout Larson's articulation of the intent to injure standard. For example, when introducing the intent to injure standard, Larson's explains that the legal justification for the intentional injury exception is the nonaccidental character of the injury. [34] For this reason, the liability of the employer cannot . . . be stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, willful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other misconduct of the employer . . . . [35] Perhaps the most obvious example demonstrating how the concept of an accident is integrally related to the intent to injure standard is this statement in Larson's: [W]hat is being tested here is not the degree of gravity or depravity of the employer's conduct, but rather the narrow issue of the intentional versus the accidental quality of the precise event producing injury. [36] ¶ 28 Using the concept of an accident to distinguish between intentional and unintentional injuries also supports the underlying policy of the Act. The primary objective of workers' compensation is to remove industrial negligence, in all its forms, from the concept of the law of tort. [37] The Act's passage was motivated by the inevitable increase in industrial accidents born of the industrial revolution. [38] As the Michigan Supreme Court stated, Accidents are an inevitable part of industrial production; intentional torts by employers are not. [39] ¶ 29 Our body of case law distinguishing between accidents and intentional injuries in the context of insurance claims is helpful because it clarifies that an expected injury is not an accident. [40] In N.M. v. Daniel E., we held that to determine whether an injury is intentional or accidental, we consider whether the result was intended or expected, rather than focusing on whether the act causing the injury was intentional. [41] Under this approach, an intentional act may result in an accident if the result was unexpected [and] unanticipated. [42] The corollary to this holding is that an act is not accidental if the result was expected and anticipated, even if the actor subjectively hoped that injury would not occur. Thus, a speeding motorist who collides with another vehicle is still involved in an accident because while the motorist did intend to exceed the speed limit, he did not intend to cause a collision. [43] Under this standard, intent attaches not based on a recognition of what possibly could happen, but rather, what probably would happen. [44] Thus, under our case law, a plaintiff may successfully plead an intentional injury by showing that the injury was either intended or expected. ¶ 30 Although not clearly articulated in the cases, the purpose of the intent to injure standard as a tool for distinguishing between intentional and accidental or unexpected injuries is apparent if we step back and compare Lantz to Bryan and Mounteer. Lantz involved an accidental chemical spill. There was no allegation that the chemical spill was expected or intentional. Instead, Lantz alleged that because it was substantially certain that he would be injured by the chemical fumes, the refusal to issue an evacuation order was an intentional injury. The facts revealed, however, that the factory where Lantz worked had a policy allowing workers to evacuate themselves if they felt that they were in danger, and many of Lantz's co-workers did so. [45] Thus, Lantz's intentional injury claim boiled down to an allegation that when Lantz asked permission to evacuate, the supervisor, who was not Lantz's supervisor, was negligent for failing to ascertain the danger posed by the chemical spill that occurred in a distant part of the factory and for assuming that Lantz would evacuate himself if the conditions became too dangerous. Using the intent to injure standard, the court of appeals rejected Lantz's effort to transform a negligence claim into an intentional injury claim. Under the intent to injure standard, the supervisor would only be liable if he knew or expected that injury would result from his failure to evacuate and he intentionally chose not to evacuate. By focusing the court's attention on the subjective knowledge or expectation of the actor, the intent to injure standard aids in distinguishing between an intentional injury and an accidental injury that arises from an intentional decision. ¶ 31 In contrast to Lantz, the decisions in Bryan and Mounteer addressed indisputably intentional, rather than negligent, acts. Accordingly, it was not necessary to apply the intent to injure test to determine whether the injury was the product of negligence or intent. In Bryan, the supervisor intentionally caused a large steel cable to hit Bryan's body. [46] There was no allegation that the cable accidentally hit Bryan or that the supervisor made an intentional but foolish choice, unintentionally causing the cable to swing into Bryan's body. Similarly, in Mounteer, there was no allegation that the announcement over the loudspeaker was accidental or inadvertent. [47] Thus, in Bryan and Mounteer, the injury-producing activities were clearly intentional, while in Lantz, the injury-producing activitythe chemical spillwas an accident. This is why only Lantz applied the intent to injure standard to distinguish between intentional and unintentional injuries. ¶ 32 We also note that the intent to injure standard that we have adopted is consistent with the intentional injury standard articulated in Bryan. In Bryan, we held that the exclusive remedy clause did not insulate an employer from liability for a wrongful act that was done knowingly [and] with the knowledge that it was wrongful to do it. [48] Obviously, directing an employee to perform an act that the employer knows or expects will result in injury is a wrongful act that is done knowingly and with knowledge that it is wrongful. The intent to injure standard is simply a narrower version of the Bryan standard that we apply to determine whether the injury was the product of intent or negligence. In applying the standard, however, we caution courts to avoid two traps that could produce an erroneous application of the intent to injure standard.
¶ 33 We first caution courts to maintain the distinction between motive and the legal concept of intent. Distinguishing between these concepts is difficult because intent and motive, as used in our everyday language, are often synonymous. For example, when we state, John intentionally injured Sheila, we assume that John's motivation was to injure Sheila. The legal concept of intent, however, is broader than motive or desire. Under the legal definition of intent, we would say that John intentionally injured Sheila if he took an action that he knew or expected would result in injury to Sheila, even if his motive for acting was not to injure Sheila. For example, if John intentionally shot a gun in Sheila's direction, Sheila's injury would be intentional, even if John's motivation was to joke rather than to injure. [49] Thus, the legal definition of intent encompasses more than simply motive. ¶ 34 The distinction between intent and motive is particularly important in applying the intent to injure standard because an intentional injury may arise in instances where the employer intentionally placed an employee in harms way, but the employer's motive was to increase profitsnot to inflict injury. A tragic case from New Mexico illustrates the danger of ignoring this distinction. ¶ 35 In Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., the plaintiff-employee worked in a smelting plant that distilled copper ore from rock by superheating the unprocessed rock to over 2000 degrees Fahrenheit. [50] On the night of his injury, Delgado's crew was shorthanded and was pressured by the supervisors to work harder in order to compensate for losses that the plant sustained during a recent ten-day shut down. [51] An emergency situation arose when the processing system malfunctioned, threatening an overflow of molten rock. The situation could have been safely resolved by shutting down the furnace. Instead, the supervisors directed Delgado, who had never addressed this type of emergency situation, to go into a tunnel below the furnace and stop the flow of molten rock. [52] Delgado entered the tunnel and saw that the molten rock was overflowing its container. He radioed his supervisor for help, explaining that he was neither qualified nor able to address the situation. His supervisor insisted that he proceed alone. Shortly after Delgado entered the tunnel, the lights shorted out and black smoke poured from the mouth of the tunnel. Delgado's co-workers watched as he emerged from the smoke-filled tunnel, fully engulfed in flames. [53] Delgado died three weeks later. ¶ 36 The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the intent to injure standard, partially based on its conclusion that the intent to injure standard would allow an employer who knows his acts will cause certain harm or death to an employee [to] escape personal responsibility for an act by merely claiming that he/she hoped the employee would make it. [54] The court also concluded that under an intent to injure standard, [a]s long as the employer is motivated by greed, rather than intent to injure the worker, the employer may abuse workers in an unlimited variety of manners while still enjoying immunity from tort liability. [55] ¶ 37 We disagree with the New Mexico Supreme Court's approach to the intent to injure standard because we believe it conflates intent with desire or motive. `[Intent] is broader than a desire or purpose to bring about physical results . . . . The actor who fires a bullet into a dense crowd may fervently pray that the bullet will hit no one, but if the actor knows that it is unavoidable that the bullet will hit someone, the actor intends that consequence.' [56] Under the intent to injure standard, it does not matter whether Delgado's supervisors sent him into the tunnel because they wanted to maintain production quotas, or whether they sent him into the tunnel because they disliked him and hoped he would be injured. If the supervisors, expecting injury as a consequence, chose to send an inexperienced employee into a tunnel where molten rock was threatening to overflow instead of shutting down the furnace, the resulting injuries cannot be considered accidental. Thus, we believe that the facts in Delgado would have satisfied the intent to injure standard regardless of the supervisor's motivation. Delgado also illustrates the importance of distinguishing between intent and motive or desire when applying the intent to injure standard.
¶ 38 We also caution courts to remain cognizant of the distinction between intent and probability. Helf urges us to reject the intent to injure standard and instead adopt the substantially certain standard, arguing that an actor need not actually intend harm in order to commit an intentional tort if harm is substantially certain to result. Helf's primary argument against the intent to injure standard is that it would insulate employers from the consequences of their intentional, wrongful acts so long as the actor does not intend to bring about the harm although it is substantially likely to occur. ¶ 39 We decline to adopt the substantially certain test for two reasons. First, Helf fails to recognize that it is the Act, not the intent to injure standard, that insulates employers and fellow employees from liability for injuries or accidents that are likely, but not certain, to occur. These injuries are the product of negligence and, as such, are covered by the exclusive remedy provision. Whether the social benefits of this system outweigh the concerns articulated by Helf is a question for the legislature. ¶ 40 Second, Helf conflates probability with intent, suggesting that intent may be imputed where a high probability of injury exists because the employer knew that harm was substantially likely to occur sometime to some employee. Adopting this standard would unravel the structure of the Act. Almost every form of employment bears some risk of injury. Employers willing to expend the time and effort could sit down and calculate with some specificity the number of employees likely to be injured on the job in a year. In fact, these types of calculations inform insurance decisions and OSHA regulations. It does not make sense that a risk calculation, which is intended to expose the likelihood of an uncertain or unexpected event, could transform an unexpected or uncertain event (an accident) into an intentional injury. Such an approach would ignore the intent requirement altogether. ¶ 41 We agree with the South Dakota Supreme Court, which has carefully maintained the distinction between intent and probability in intentional tort cases. More than knowledge or appreciation of risk is required to establish intentional conduct. The known danger must cease to become only a foreseeable risk which an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person would avoid (ordinary negligence) and become a substantial certainty. [57] In Fryer v. Krantz, the court concluded that an injury was unintentional because it was not a matter of when [the injury] would happen (a certainty), it was a question of if it would [happen] (a probability). [58] Thus, to demonstrate an intentional injury in South Dakota, the plaintiff must show that the employer had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and that the employer still required the employee to perform. [59] This approach maintains the distinction between intent and probability by focusing on whether the actor knew or expected that injury would occur to a particular employee performing a specific task in determining whether an injury was intentional. It does not focus on whether an injury was substantially certain to occur to an unknown employee at some future timean inquiry driven by probability, not intent. ¶ 42 Other courts have failed to maintain the distinction between intent and probability. For example, Ohio courts determine whether an injury is substantially certain to occur in order to evaluate whether the injury is intentional and they occasionally resort to statistics to determine the likelihood that the injury will occur. [60] We agree with the South Dakota Supreme Court that such an approach blur[s] the line between cases involving only negligent or reckless conduct and those involving true intent to injure. [61] ¶ 43 We therefore hold that the intent to injure standard requires a specific mental state in which the actor knew or expected that injury would be the consequence of his action. To demonstrate intent, a plaintiff may show that the actor desired the consequences of his actions, or that the actor believed the consequences were virtually certain to result. But a plaintiff may not demonstrate intent by showing merely that some injury was substantially certain to occur at some time. For a workplace injury to qualify as an intentional injury under the Act, the employer or supervisor must know or expect that the assigned task will injure the particular employee that undertakes it. In other words, the employer must know or expect that a specific employee will be injured doing a specific task. In these situations, the knowledge and expectation that injury will occur robs an injury of its accidental character, moving it out of the realm of negligence and into the realm of intent.
¶ 44 Helf's complaint alleges facts supporting the conclusion that her injury was intentional, rather than accidental, because her supervisors knew or expected that re-initiating the neutralization process would result in her injury. When Helf arrived at work on January 28, 1999, the neutralization process had already been initiated once, resulting in a noxious purple cloud that contained concentrated hydrogen sulfide, mercaptan gases, and other toxic chemical compounds. As the cloud drifted across the Refinery, it set off safety alarms and caused employees hundreds of yards away to fall ill and be sent home. Between this initial incident and Helf's incident, no safety measures were taken, such as pumping out the pit or locking out the sulfuric acid. When Helf was directed to start the neutralization process after she arrived at work, she was neither warned of the earlier incident, nor instructed that she would need protective respiratory gear. ¶ 45 Furthermore, Chevron had additional knowledge regarding the dangerousness of the caustic solution. Chevron knew that the caustic sludge was extremely toxic and that the neutralizing process produced intense and violent reactions and ultrahazardous vapors. On one previous occasion, Chevron had attempted to neutralize the caustic sludge onsite in a procedure that was more controlled than the open-air pit technique. That attempt produced large amounts of heat and noxious vapors, exposing the employees to a great risk of injury. ¶ 46 In light of the incident earlier in the day on January 28, 1999, the fact that no mitigation measures were employed to protect Helf from the same fate, and Chevron's knowledge, gained through experience and expertise, of the toxic character of the sludge, Helf's complaint alleged facts that could convince a reasonable jury that her injuries were the expected result of re-initiating the neutralization process. Thus, Helf's complaint satisfies the intent to injure standard because it alleges that Helf's supervisors knew or expected that whoever re-initiated the neutralization process in the open-air pit would be injured by exposure to the toxic gases released by the process.