Opinion ID: 1227259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prudential Ripeness Test

Text: The Supreme Court has held that [p]roblems of prematurity and abstractness may well present `insuperable obstacles' to the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction, even though that jurisdiction is technically present. Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, [13] 406 U.S. 583, 588, 92 S.Ct. 1716, 32 L.Ed.2d 317 (1972) (citing Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 574, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947)). The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test for determining the prudential component of ripeness in the administrative context: the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). [14] Originally, we generally applied this two-part test in making prudential ripeness determinations without strictly limiting the test to the administrative law context. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 850 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh'g, 312 F.3d 416 (9th Cir.2002); Knight v. Kenai Penninsula Borough Sch. Dist., 131 F.3d 807, 814 (9th Cir.1997); In re Dominelli, 788 F.2d 584, 585 (9th Cir.1986). However, in Principal Life Insurance Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2005), we held that Abbott does not apply to private contract disputes, and suggested that the test may only be appropriate in the administrative law context. The court noted, because an administrative action has consequences for many members of the general public, it is prudent for courts to limit their review of such actions to those involving the possibility of concrete injury greater than speculative or remote financial contingencies. Id. at 670-71. The court also observed that the concerns expressed in Abbott over judicial entanglement, allocation of authority, and the risks of wide-ranging and remote adverse consequences in administrative agency actions do not apply to private party contract disputes. Id. at 671. The court then declined to apply the Abbott test to a private party contract dispute over a rent-adjustment provision, finding the matter ripe even though the provision was contingent upon future property value. Noting that the fundamental role of the courts is to resolve concrete and present disputes between parties, the court held that the proper test for ripeness in private party contract disputes is the traditional ripeness standard, namely, whether `there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.' Id. at 671 (quoting Md. Cas. Co., 312 U.S. at 273, 61 S.Ct. 510). [15] Principal does not tell us whether the Abbott test would be appropriate in this contexta private party dispute that is governed not by contract but by the Bankruptcy Code. However, prior to Principal, disputes in the bankruptcy context were subjected to the Abbott ripeness test. See, e.g., Dominelli, 788 F.2d at 585-86 (dispute as to whether debtor's estate could be required to pay legal expenses of creditor committee ripe under Abbott test even though counsel had not yet sought fees); In re Gen. Carriers Corp., 258 B.R. 181, 186 (9th Cir. BAP 2001) (dispute over bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to enter abstention order ripe under Abbott test). Because Principal did not (and could not) overrule Dominelli 's application of Abbott in the bankruptcy context, we must apply Abbott here. [16]