Opinion ID: 477762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jay Teitler

Text: 13 Appellant Teitler argues that, with respect to his alleged participation in a RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(d), the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that it need only find an agreement on his part to commit two predicate acts, rather than actual commission of the acts. He also contends that the jury could not, on the evidence before it, find an agreement to commit the predicate acts without first finding that he actually committed the acts. Finally, Teitler posits that the acts of racketeering underlying the RICO conspiracy conviction were insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a pattern of racketeering. We are not persuaded by these arguments. 14
15 Jay Teitler asserts that the two acts with which he was charged will not suffice to establish the requisite pattern of racketeering required by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5). 16 Appellant argues that the trial judge improperly charged the jury because he did not instruct the jurors that they had to find at least two and possibly more acts of racketeering activity. He contends that this is required by footnote 14 of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985), and points out that Justice White stated that the language of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961 requires at least two acts, not that it 'means' two such acts. Id. at 3285 n. 14. In other words, it is argued that two such acts are required, but will not alone constitute a pattern. Appellant therefore believes that the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury that it had to find at least two and possibly more acts of racketeering activity. 17 We do not accept appellant's interpretation of footnote 14. Justice White stressed that the number of acts is not crucial: [W]hile two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Id. Instead, the key question is whether the factor of  'continuity plus relationship'  shows that the subject acts were not  'sporadic activity,'  but part of a pattern. Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969)) (emphasis in original). The most stringent reading of footnote 14 would require that the prosecution show  'the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission....'  Sedima, 105 S.Ct. at 3285 n. 14. (quoting 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575(e)); see generally Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Industries, Inc., 770 F.2d 717, 718 n. 1 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 799, 88 L.Ed.2d 776 (1986); Rojas v. First Bank National Association, 13 F.Supp. 968, 971 n. 1 (E.D.N.Y.1985); Systems Research, Inc. v. Random, Inc., 614 F.Supp. 494, 497 (N.D.Ill.1985). Even if we were to accept this interpretation, Chief Judge Weinstein's charge clearly addressed these concerns: 18 A pattern of racketeering activity is committed if the Defendant committed at least two of the racketeering acts charged against him or her in the indictment.... 19