Opinion ID: 2298009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Question Four: Mitigating Factors on Sentencing Form

Text: Grandison's final argument in support of his motion to reopen postconviction proceedings [15] is that he was harmed by the trial court's markings on a sentencing form provided to the jury. The Circuit Court described this argument in fuller detail: At [Grandison's] 1994 re-sentencing hearing, the jury was provided with two forms [titled] Findings and Sentencing Determination. The first concerned the death of Scott Piechowicz; the other, the death of Susan Kennedy. With the exception of the Court marking two mitigators, both forms were blank. Grandison argues in his motion: [I]f the jury [were] told that they must accept the Court's determination as to what mitigators existed, then little or no discussion would have occurred as to the positive aspects of [Grandison's] character. The jury would then have spent almost the totality of their deliberations discussing the aggravator. (Citations omitted). The Circuit Court considered this argument without merit, and denied Grandison's motion. As the State observes, Grandison did not, during his 1994 resentencing hearing, object to the manner in which the sentencing form was marked. He did not make any exceptions to the resentencing court's jury instructions pertaining to how the jury used the sentencing form. Grandison has also never raised this claim in any of the five previous appeals to this Court that span the seventeen years since the resentencing hearing. Grandison never raised this claim during previous postconviction proceedings, either standing alone or as part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Grandison also makes no argument that reopening his postconviction proceedings on this point is somehow in the interests of justice. In his brief, Grandison even references that the postconviction judge already, in 1998, ruled about the pre-marking of the sentencing forms on a different point. This makes it further clear to us that Grandison had knowledge of the sentencing form, and that he had ample opportunity to raise this claim in earlier proceedings. That he did not do so constitutes waiver. As such, we affirm the Circuit Court's denial of Grandison's motion on this question.