Opinion ID: 213844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prior Unrelated Drug Convictions Improperly Admitted

Text: Hicks next contends that the district court erred by allowing his prior convictions for cocaine dealing and possession to be admitted during the government's case-in-chief. We review evidentiary rulings made over a defendant's objections for abuse of discretion. United States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 819 (7th Cir.2009). If such an error has occurred, reversal is required if the error affects a defendant's substantial rights. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). In determining whether a nonconstitutional error affects substantial rights, our task is to gauge what effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision. United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 622 (7th Cir.1989). Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of other acts is inadmissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith but may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In determining whether evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b), the court considers whether: (1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue, (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the similar act, and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, as required by Rule 403. United States v. Harris, 587 F.3d 861, 864-65 (7th Cir.2009). We must first determine whether the convictions are directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than Hicks's propensity to sell drugs. The district court admitted the convictions to establish knowledge and lack of mistake. Whether the prior convictions are relevant to the issue of knowledge or lack of mistake turns on whether they tend to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable. Fed.R.Evid. 401. As to knowledge, the government contends that Hicks's prior convictions tend to show that Hicks knew about the illicit nature of the drug distributing business. But this argument is a non-starter because Hicks never claimed that he did not know that selling crack cocaine was illegal or that he did not know how to sell drugs. The government also contends, relying on United States v. Hatchett, 245 F.3d 625, 643 (7th Cir.2001), that the convictions were admissible to show that Hicks was a knowing participant instead of an unwitting bystander to the drug deal. In Hatchett, the defendant was charged with distributing crack cocaine to a certain Riley and with aiding and abetting Riley's subsequent distribution of the cocaine to Panzer and Hess. 245 F.3d at 642-43. We found that evidence that the defendant had participated in a prior drug deal was admissible to establish the defendant's knowledge because: Although Hatchett insists that his knowledge was actually not in issue, because he simply argued that he did not supply Riley with the cocaine, the record belies his contention. In fact, Hatchett specifically denied having any knowledge that Riley was distributing cocaine to Panzer and Hess. Under these circumstances, we believe that testimony concerning the [previous] transaction which involved both Riley and Panzer's brotherwas admissible. ... Id. Hatchett is distinguishable from this case. In Hatchett, the evidence was relevant to the aiding and abetting chargeto show that the defendant knew that Riley was redistributing the drugs and that the drugs would end up in the hands of Hess and Panzer. Id. What was important about the previous drug deal was that the defendant had sold drugs to Riley and had witnessed Riley giving half of the drugs to Panzer's brother. Id. at 629. This certainly made it more likely that the defendant knew that Riley was distributing drugs and that he knew all of the players involved. Here, however, Hicks's strategy during the government's case-in-chief was simply to question the agents' ability to witness whether he sold the drugs to Hurd. There was no allegation that Hicks's prior drug deals involved Hurd. And the government has not explained why Hurd's prior convictions for cocaine possession and distribution make it more likely that he was a knowing participant in this drug deal other than by drawing the prohibited inference of once a drug dealer, always a drug dealer. Neither has the government explained why the convictions were relevant to show that Hicks's actions were the result of a mistake. Hicks never contended that he did not know that the substance for sale was crack cocaine or any other controlled substance. See United States v. Chavis, 429 F.3d 662, 673 (7th Cir.2005) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (describing Rule 404(b)'s exception for absence of mistake as I thought [the drugs] were cough drops); United States v. Webb, 548 F.3d 547, 548 (7th Cir.2008) (As for `absence of mistake': how does a conviction show this except via the prohibited inference that someone who distributes drugs once is likely to do it again?). We are also unpersuaded by the government's argument that the prior convictions were admissible to show intent. Because unlawful distribution of cocaine is a general intent crime, in order for the government to introduce prior bad acts to show intent, the defendant must put his intent at issue first. United States v. Moore, 425 F.3d 1061, 1069 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2005) ([U]nlawfully distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) is a general intent crime.); United States v. Manganellis, 864 F.2d 528, 539 (7th Cir. 1988) (evidence of prior bad acts is ordinarily not admissible to prove general intent crimes such as distribution of cocaine); United States v. Gruttadauro, 818 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 (7th Cir.1987) (prior bad acts evidence was inadmissible to prove intent because defendant was charged with a general intent crime and defendant did not directly put his mental state at issue); United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir.1984), modified on other grounds by Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) ([W]hen intent is only a formal issue, so that proof of the proscribed act gives rise to an inference of intent, then ... evidence of other acts directed toward this issue should not be used in the government's case-in-chief and should not be admitted until the defendant raises the issue.). The government acknowledged as much in its pretrial motions. The government initially sought to introduce the convictions to show intent as well as knowledge and absence of mistake. But it disclaimed that position after the district court found that the convictions could only be used to show knowledge and lack of mistake. The government stated in its response to Hicks's motion for reconsideration: In granting the United States' motion, the Court just as clearly articulated that [knowledge and lack of mistake] and not as a method to prove Defendant Hicks' intent were the bases upon which the Rule 404(b) evidence could be admitted. ... [T]he United States has no intention of offering the Rule 404(b) evidence for [the purpose of showing intent]. (emphasis in original). And Hicks did not put his intent at issue during the government's case-in-chiefhe waived his opening statement and his strategy during the first half of the trial was to undermine the agents' testimony by questioning their ability to tell who gave Hurd the drugs. This case is virtually indistinguishable from United States v. Manganellis. 864 F.2d at 529-31. In that case, the defendant was charged with distributing cocaine to an undercover agent and to a friend. Id. The defendant denied making the sales and claimed he was mistakenly identified by the agent and that the friend was lying. Id. We found that the defendant's claim that he did not commit the alleged acts did not suffice to put his intent at issue and that, as a result, evidence of his prior bad acts involving the sale of drugs on other occasions should not have been admitted into evidence. Id. at 539. As in Manganellis, finding that Hicks put his intent at issue by merely claiming innocence would create an exception that would virtually swallow the rule against admission of evidence of prior misconduct in general intent cases. See id. at 532-33; Shackleford, 738 F.2d at 781 (finding that defendant charged with general intent crime did not place his intent at issue by maintaining throughout trial that he never committed the acts alleged). Neither are we persuaded by the government's contention that the convictions were admissible to rebut Hicks's entrapment defense. Evidence of prior convictions is admissible to prove predisposition in an entrapment case, but, again, the government may not introduce propensity evidence unless the defendant places the issue of entrapment into controversy. Compare United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir.1992) (When the entrapment defense is clearly raised in the defense's opening statement and the entrapment defense obviously materializes through a defendant's presentation of its own witnesses or through cross-examination of the government's witnesses, it is not error for the government to present evidence of predisposition in its case-in-chief), with United States v. McGuire, 808 F.2d 694, 696 (8th Cir.1987) (finding that it was error for the district court to allow the government to introduce rebuttal evidence in its case-in-chief in anticipation of an entrapment defense that was proposed in defense counsel's opening statement but that never actually materialized). Although Hicks's counsel discussed the possibility of raising an entrapment defense prior to trial (after the court ruled that Hicks's prior convictions were admissible), the entrapment defense did not materialize until the defense presented its case. Hicks did not refer to his entrapment defense during an opening statement, which he waived, nor during the government's case-in-chief. In fact, it was not until after the convictions came in at the close of the government's case-in-chief, over Hicks's renewed objection, and after the government rested, that Hicks definitively informed the court that he would be raising an entrapment defense. Had Hicks clearly communicated his intention to present an entrapment defense before the convictions were allowed into evidence, the government's contention that the convictions were admissible to show predisposition would have more force. But Hicks did not do so. The proper course of action would have been for the government to offer the convictions after Hicks's entrapment defense materialized, either during cross-examination or during its rebuttal case. Under the circumstances presented here, however, we cannot conclude that Hicks's prior convictions were properly admitted to rebut his entrapment defense. See United States v. Pineda-Torres, 287 F.3d 860, 865-66 (9th Cir.2002) (defendant's cross-examination of government witness did not open the door to evidence which the district court erroneously determined was admissible before trial because the defendant was simply responding to the district court's pre-trial order); United States v. Higham, 98 F.3d 285, 292 (7th Cir.1996) (finding that prior convictions, which the district court found were not admissible during the government's case-in-chief, should have been allowed into evidence during cross-examination after the defendant presented an entrapment defense because the landscape had changed). The government's contention that the convictions were admissible to show accomplice liability suffers from the same defect as its theory that the convictions were admissible to rebut Hicks's entrapment defense. The government did not request an accomplice liability instruction before trial began nor did it ever indicate during its case-in-chief that accomplice liability was an alternative basis for Hicks's guilt. Only after Hicks testified that he had arranged for the drug sale did the government assert an accomplice theory of the case. As with the entrapment defense, Hicks's intent was only placed at issue [1] after the convictions had already been admitted into evidence. When asked about this during oral argument, the government at one point conceded that intent became an issue only after Hicks testified, but later claimed that this was always an accomplice case. But if accomplice liability was always the government's theory of the case, it would not have initially disavowed intent as a basis for the admission of the convictions. In our view, the only apparent relevance of the prior convictions was the very inference that Rule 404(b) prohibits that is, that Hicks had sold drugs in the past and probably did so this time as well. And the government's opening statement implies that its theory of the case from the outset was propensity. The first words uttered by the government to the jury were: When the Defendant was initially arrested in this case in March 2008, he told police that he was a drug dealer. He admitted that he dealt in cocaine, and he admitted that he dealt in ounce quantities of crack cocaine. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that is exactly going to be our evidence as to what occurred on July 18, 2006, that the Defendant dealt crack cocaine, ounce quantities of crack cocaine to a confidential informant, who was working at the direction of the DEA. The government's statement suggests that Hicks's other crimesi.e., that he was a drug dealercould be a basis for the jury to convict him for the charged offense, despite the fact that sixteen months separated Hicks's statement and the charged conduct. The government has failed to demonstrate that Hicks's prior convictions established knowledge, lack of mistake, or intent. Accordingly, we find that admitting the prior convictions violated Rule 404(b). We also find that the Rule 404(b) error affected Hicks's substantial rights. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). Although the evidence may have been sufficient to convict Hicks, we conclude that an average juror would have found the government's case significantly less persuasive without the prior convictions. See United States v. Blanchard, 542 F.3d 1133, 1151 (7th Cir.2008) (the test for harmless error is whether, in the mind of the average juror, the prosecution's case would have been significantly less persuasive had the improper evidence been excluded). Drugs were not explicitly mentioned during the initial conversation between Hicks and Hurd. Instead, the government had to translate that conversation for the jury using a decoder, who testified that Hicks and Hurd were discussing drugsa conclusion the jury may not have reached on its own and could have discredited. There was also no direct evidence that Hicks himself sold the crack cocaine to Hurd. While Hicks's discussion with Hurd about prices when the two were in the house suggests that Hicks could have sold Hurd the drugs, no one witnessed the drug deal and it is possible that one of the other people whose voices were picked up by the recording gave Hurd the cocaine. Lastly, Hicks's statement to the police sixteen months after the charged deal to the effect that he had engaged in other drug deals was not an acknowledgment of responsibility for this deal. See United States v. Simpson, 479 F.3d 492, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2007), abrogated in part on other grounds by United States v. Boone, 628 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir.2010) (defendant's admission that he had engaged in similar drug deals in the past and had been dealing drugs for several years making possible his responsibility for the drug deal charged was not tantamount to an acknowledgment of responsibility for the charged deal and was admitted in violation of Rule 404(b)). Without the propensity evidence, an average juror may very well have concluded that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hicks supplied Hurd with crack cocaine. Allowing a prosecutor routinely to introduce drug convictions in the case in chief without demonstrating relevance to some concrete dispute between the litigants creates needless risk that a conviction will rest on the forbidden propensity inference. United States v. Jones, 455 F.3d 800, 812 (7th Cir.2006) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Given the lack of direct evidence and the relative weakness of the government's circumstantial case, we find that the admission of the convictions affected Hicks's substantial rights, and we therefore reverse. [2]