Opinion ID: 854149
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subsection (b)(1) requires intentional conduct

Text: The sentencing in this case must comport not only with the Eighth Amendment but also with the terms of subsection (b)(1). The State contends that Tison culpability is all that need be shown to prove the (b)(1) aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. [21] We do not agree. A person engages in conduct `intentionally' if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so. IND.CODE § 35-41-2-2(a) (1993). In contrast, reckless indifference to human life, as used in Tison, 481 U.S. at 150-51, 107 S.Ct. at 1684-85, is akin to the definition of recklessly in the Indiana criminal code: A person engages in conduct `recklessly' if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result.... IND. CODE § 35-41-2-2(c) (1993). In requiring a showing that the defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim, the General Assembly therefore clearly mandated a higher degree of mental culpability than that permitted in Tison. Our cases have repeatedly emphasized that the (b)(1) aggravating factor requires a finding of intentional killing. [22]