Opinion ID: 2216612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of the Commission's September 7, 2006, Order

Text: We first consider the Attorney General's argument that its application was timely because the order served on September 7 constituted an amended order that reset the time period for filing a petition for rehearing. The Attorney General contends that the Public Utilities Act applies to any and all alterations in a Commission order. The Attorney General cites section 10-113, which authorizes the Commission to rescind, alter or amend any order or decision made by it. 220 ILCS 5/10-113 (West 2006). The Act provides that any alteration or amendment shall have the same effect as the Commission's original order. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Wisniewski v. Kownacki, 221 Ill.2d 453, 460, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243 (2006). Although the issue is one of first impression for this court, the United States Supreme Court has considered this precise issue in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 245, 97 L.Ed. 245 (1952). In Minneapolis-Honeywell a dispute arose over whether the appellant timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The appellant claimed, as in this case, that a second order issued two months after the first renewed the time period from which the parties could petition for certiorari. The appellate court had made no substantive change to the original order and, instead, made a change to the title of the document. The first document was labeled Decree, while the second document was labeled Final Decree. In answering this question, the Supreme Court recognized that the mere fact that a judgment previously entered has been reentered or revised in an immaterial way does not toll the time within which review must be sought. Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S. at 211, 73 S.Ct. at 248, 97 L.Ed. at 252. Only when the lower court changes matters of substance, or resolves a genuine ambiguity, in a judgment previously rendered should the period    begin to run anew. Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S. at 211-12, 73 S.Ct. at 248-49, 97 L.Ed. at 252. The Court also noted the test is a practical one. The question is whether the lower court    has disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment, had been plainly and properly settled with finality. Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S. at 212, 73 S.Ct. at 249, 97 L.Ed. at 252. Although Minneapolis-Honeywell does not bind this court, we find its reasoning sound and persuasive. The factual similarity between Minneapolis-Honeywell and the present case is apparent. The only change to the Commission's August 30 order was removal of three words from the document's title. Rather than read Order the Commission's original order read Post Exceptions Proposed Order. As the Court concluded in Minneapolis-Honeywell, the question of whether the time    was to be enlarged cannot turn on the adjective which the court below chose to use in the caption of its second judgment, when the first judgment was for all purposes final. Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S. at 212-13, 73 S.Ct. at 249, 97 L.Ed. at 252. Here, the record and argument before us indicate that the August 30 order was for all purposes final. The September 7 document did not disturb or revise either party's legal rights and obligations that had been plainly and properly settled with finality. The parties understood the August 30 order to be a final order. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for the Attorney General acknowledged that the Attorney General had been proceeding with the original order in mind, and suggested that an application for rehearing based on either order would be proper. Rather than affect the parties' legal rights, the alteration here was de minimus, as removing three words from the document's heading merely corrected a trivial, clerical error. As such, the change did not serve to extend the parties' opportunity to file an application for rehearing. We further conclude that section 10-113 does not change this analysis. Section 10-113 is a formal procedure the Commission must follow if it intends to rescind, alter or amend one of its decisions. However, the record indicates that the Commission did not rely on section 10-113 when it served the September 7 document. Although served on September 7, the second document was also dated August 30. The Commission's e-docket shows that the two orders were both entered on August 30, 2006. The docket lists the first as a Final Order, and the second as a Corrected Final Order. The docket likewise contains no entry of an order on either September 6 or 7. Further, nothing indicates the Commission intended to rely on its statutory authority to rescind or amend its decision. Section 10-113 requires that the Commission notify the public utility, and provide the utility an opportunity to be heard, if it decides to rescind or amend an order. Here, the Commission did not serve notice, nor did it provide an opportunity to be heard. The legislature, in enacting section 10-113, intended to provide for notice and opportunity to the parties in the event that the Commission decided to reconsider its decision. The procedure ensures that any amendment to a Commission decision will not be undertaken without serious consideration. It is equally evident that the legislature did not intend to require notice, and an opportunity to be heard, for mere clerical mistakes that do not materially affect the decision. Section 10-113 cannot be read to apply to nonsubstantive corrections to the Commission's orders. Therefore, we hold that the Commission's September 7 order did not extend the time in which the Attorney General could file its application for rehearing.