Opinion ID: 2383777
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Financial Disclosures

Text: The Restitution section of the Division's Final Order provides that within 30 days of the date of the Final Order, George must pay the Division $32,510.92, to be placed in an account for the payment of restitution to consumers. A mechanism for determining individual consumer claims is also set forth in the Order. Additionally, if the $32,510.92 proves to be insufficient for satisfying claims against George, the Division is required to notify him of any necessary additional sums. George would then have 14 days to comply by submitting the additional funds. The two provisions of the restitution section in question on this appeal state: 31. [George] shall, within forty-five (45) days of the date of this Final Order, provide the [Division] with a complete listing of all of his assets and sources of income. The listing shall cover all assets in which [George] has any interest whatsoever. The listing shall fully identify any banks or similar institutions in which [George] has deposited money or other assets. 32. [George] shall, within forty-five (45) days of the date of this Order, provide the [Division] with a complete listing of all transfers of assets he has made within the past two (2) years and of all payments he has made to anybody in the amount of $1,000 or more within the past two (2) years. The trial court reversed the Final Order regarding the two provisions mentioned above, stating that [t]he statute does not give that authority; the Division can point to no specific case law interpreting any part of the State or Federal consumer protection statutes as giving this authority and no case law interpretation can be strained or bent to say the authority exists. As a follow through, the Division points to Rule 2-633 allowing a creditor to take steps in aid to enforce a judgment. Simply stated, the Division does not yet have a judgment. [14] The Division, on the other hand, contends that the authority to require the disclosure is encompassed in CL §§ 13-403(b)(1) and 13-410 which authorize the Division to order restitution and civil penalties. As previously noted, George has been ordered to pay $32,510.90 in restitution and $75,000 in civil penalties. The disclosure provisions, according to the Division, are designed to facilitate the payment of the money owed by George. It contends that, [r]equiring George to provide [the financial] information was a reasonable exercise of the [Division's] authority to order affirmative action, including the payment of restitution ... and fulfill the General Assembly's stated purpose of `assisting the public in obtaining relief from these [unlawful] practices'. There is no doubt that the Division may order an alleged violator to pay restitution if, based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Division determines the alleged violator violated the Act. CL § 13-403(b)(1). The Division may also assess civil penalties, not to exceed $1,000 per violation of the Act, for first time offenders, (CL § 13-410(a)), and not more than $5,000 per subsequent violation. CL § 13-410(b). The question is whether the Division's authority to assess penalties encompasses the authority to enforce the penalties through the disclosure of financial information as a requirement in a cease and desist order. We hold that it does not. We have held that an order of restitution pursuant to the Act is intended to divest a violator of `benefits it would be unjust for him to keep.' Luskin's Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division, 353 Md. 335, 383, 726 A.2d 702, 726 (1999) (discussing the purpose of restitution verses damages and finding that an order of restitution is `not aimed at compensating the plaintiff but at forcing the defendant to disgorge benefits it would be unjust for him to keep.') (quoting Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 776, 501 A.2d at 71); State v. Andrews, 73 Md.App. 80, 89 n. 7, 533 A.2d 282, 287 n. 7 (1987) (To permit the [retention of] even a portion of the illicit profits would impair the full impact of the deterrent force that is essential if adequate enforcement [of the law] is to be achieved.) (quoting Consumer Publishing ). To this end the General Assembly has expressly authorized the Division to apply to a court for an order of judgment necessary to restore to a person any money or real personal property acquired from him by means of any prohibited practice. CL § 13-406(c). In this case, the order of restitution represents money George took from consumers in violation of the Act. Clearly, it would be unjust for George to continue to profit from his behavior by eluding the restitution order. The proper procedure for preventing this outcome, according to the express language of the statute, is for the Division to obtain a judgment. Armed with a money judgment, the Division could obtain information to aid in its enforcement of the judgment. See Md. Rule 2-633(a) (Circuit Court) (A judgment creditor may obtain discovery to aid enforcement of a money judgment (1) by use of depositions, interrogatories, and request for documents.); Md. Rule 3-633(a) (District Court) (A judgment creditor may obtain discovery to aid enforcement of a money judgment (1) by use of interrogatories pursuant to Rule 3-421.). On March 12, 2004, the Division obtained a judgment against George in the amount of $111,867.92. Pursuant to the above mentioned rules the Division is in the position to enforce the judgment. The Division erred by seeking the information prior to receiving an order of judgment from a court of appropriate jurisdiction. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.