Opinion ID: 1309189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: failure to exclude student spectators

Text: A claim is made that the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's permitting a group of high school students to be present at the trial during the victim's testimony. The defendant argues that their presence may have psychologically influenced the jurors against the defendant in that the students were of the same age as the victim. There is no suggestion that their appearance was collusively procured. In State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, W.Va., 267 S.E.2d 544 (1980), we discussed at some length our public trial and open-court constitutional rights found in Sections 14 and 17 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution, stating in Syllabus Point 1: Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution, when read in light of our open courts provision in Article III, Section 17, provides a clear basis for finding an independent right in the public and press to attend criminal proceedings. However, there are limits on access by the public and press to a criminal trial, since in this area a long-established constitutional right to a fair trial is accorded the defendant. The Herald Mail case dealt with a pretrial closure order but much of what we said would be applicable to excluding the public at the trial itself. In Syllabus Point 2, in part, we said the ultimate question is whether, if the ... hearing is left open, there is a clear likelihood that there will be irreparable damage to the defendant's right to a fair trial. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), the defendant moved that his murder trial should be closed to the public, and since the prosecutor did not object to the closure, the judge ordered the trial closed. Members of the press objected. Although a majority of the Court could not agree on the details of the reasoning, the United States Supreme Court held the closure order to be improper. There appeared to be agreement that in the absence of some overriding interest the trial court could not close the trial to the public. The fact that the defendant wants the trial closed is not of itself an overriding interest. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982), a Massachusetts statute, which mandated excluding the press and general public from the courtroom during the testimony in certain specified sexual offenses, was found to be unconstitutional as overbroad. The Court indicated that there may be occasions when the State can show a compelling governmental interest to justify the closure but that the closure must also be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. [11] One of the reasons advanced by the prosecution in Globe Newspaper Co. to support the statute was that it would encourage victims of sex crimes to report such crimes as they would have protection against publicly testifying at the trial. The United States Supreme Court in rejecting this argument noted that it was speculative and lacked any empirical data. Much the same criticism can be made of the defendant's argument relative to an adverse psychological impact on the jury. The defendant's argument could be made as to the attendance of the general public since their presence could arguably demonstrate community hostility. Of more direct analogy would be the presence of females at a rape trial or the presence of the victim's family and relatives at any criminal trial. We must assume that a jury has the fortitude to withstand this type of public scrutiny, and cannot presume irreparable harm to the defendant's right to a fair jury trial by the presence of spectators who may have some type of associational identity with the victim of the crime. In neither Globe Newspaper Co., supra, nor Richmond Newspaper, supra, was there any argument presented that the defendant's right to a fair trial demanded a closure. Moreover, each of these cases dealt with an absolute closure whereas, here, a total closure was not sought. Less than absolute closure may in certain instances preclude arguments on constitutional grounds. It can hardly be contended that every exclusion of a spectator at a trial will give rise to a valid claim that the constitutional provisions regarding a public trial and open-courts have been violated. [12] We believe that the general principle found in Syllabus Point 2, in part, of Herald Mail, supra, is applicable where a defendant moves to exclude members of the public from observing his jury trial: [T]he ultimate question is whether, if the ... [trial] is left open, there is a clear likelihood that there will be irreparable damage to the defendant's right to a fair trial. Here, the presence of high school students cannot be shown to irreparably damage the defendant's right to a fair trial.