Opinion ID: 76998
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: History and Tradition

Text: 22 With this description, we now ask whether this right is `deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.' Id. at 1239. We conclude that it is not. 23 The circuit courts that have considered this substantive due process argument regarding sex offender registries have upheld such registration and publication requirements finding no constitutional infirmities. See, e.g., Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (Persons who have been convicted of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free from ... registration and notification requirements....); Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 643 (8th Cir.2003) (sex offender registration statute did not infringe the fundamental right to a presumption of innocence); Paul P., 170 F.3d at 404, 405 (holding that sex offender registration did not infringe fundamental right of family relationships, and although the registration of offenders home address invaded the fundamental right to privacy, the state had a compelling interest to prevent future sex offenses). 5 In Paul P., the court held that the indirect effects of members of the public on the offender's relationship with his family did not rise to the infringement of a fundamental right by the state. 170 F.3d at 405. As the court conceded, even if the effect of registration places a constitutionally recognizable claim on the offender's family relationships, it did not fall under a fundamental right classification because the sex offender statute did not restrict plaintiffs' freedom of action with respect to their families and therefore does not intrude upon the aspect of the right to privacy that protects an individual's independence in making certain types of important decisions. Id. 24 Furthermore, in Paul v. Davis the Supreme Court determined that there was no fundamental right to prevent the public disclosure of a person's arrest for shoplifting. 424 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 1166. In Paul, local police departments distributed fliers to area stores alerting them to possible shoplifters during the holiday shopping season. Id. at 694-95, 96 S.Ct. at 1157. The fliers contained the mug shot and name of the plaintiff in the case who had been arrested for and charged with shoplifting. Id. at 695, 96 S.Ct. at 1158. At the time of the flyer distribution, however, he had not been convicted of the crime, and shortly thereafter the charge was dismissed. Id. at 696, 96 S.Ct. at 1158. The Supreme Court refused to extend substantive due process protection to the publication of official acts like arrest records, noting that the right claimed was far afield of its previous decisions that limited a state's power to regulate private conduct. Id. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 1166. 6 25 Though the Supreme Court has not addressed whether substantive due process invalidates sex offender registration statutes, see Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. at 1165, we can find no history or tradition that would elevate the issue here to a fundamental right. In fact, the case law we have found supports the contrary conclusion. We can certainly understand how a person may be shunned by a person or group that discovers his past offense. However, a state's publication of truthful information that is already available to the public does not infringe the fundamental constitutional rights of liberty and privacy. Therefore, we do not review the statute with strict scrutiny, but only under a rational basis standard. 26