Opinion ID: 1287078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: direct examination regarding identi-kit

Text: Copeland maintains that the trial court erred in overruling his objection that there was inadequate foundation for the prosecutor's questioning of Detective Donald Winters as to estimates of the total possible combinations of faces possible using an Identi-Kit. Winters used an Identi-Kit when he met with witness Connie Taff to construct a composite of the facial features of the man she saw near the victim's residence. Winters estimated that the number of possible combinations of faces is in the millions, based upon the prosecutor's questions using the product rule. Later, the prosecutor moved to admit a diagram listing the number of choices for each of the facial characteristics Winters testified to. Next to the list were examples showing how the jury could use the product rule as it would apply to three different pairs of eyes and three different noses (to result in a total of nine possible combinations). Defense counsel objected to this exhibit on the grounds the figures were the prosecutor's and not the witness's, and no foundation had been laid. The objection was overruled and the exhibit was admitted for illustrative purposes. Copeland contends the alleged errors invited the jury to apply the product rule to events which were not shown to be independent, thus prejudicially affecting Copeland's right to a fair trial. [T]here is no prohibition against using well-founded statistics to establish some fact that will be useful to the trier of fact. Russell, 125 Wash.2d at 70, 882 P.2d 747; State v. Briggs, 55 Wash.App. 44, 62-63, 776 P.2d 1347 (1989). The product rule is used to calculate the joint probability of a series of independent events as the product of the probabilities of each event, but it may not be used where there is no showing of the independence of the individual events. People v. Collins, 68 Cal.2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal.Rptr. 497, 36 A.L.R.3d 1176 (1968). However, there is a difference between calculating probabilities of events, which concern the likelihood of the result, and statistics which speak in terms of certitude, not likelihood. David McCord, A Primer for the Nonmathematically Inclined on Mathematical Evidence in Criminal Cases: People v. Collins and Beyond, 47 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 741, 742 (1990). Here, insofar as the prosecutor's question elicited an opinion as to the certain number of possible combinations of the Identi-Kit components, probabilities are not involvedthere is, in fact, mathematically a definite number of possible combinations, and it exceeds the millions response given by Detective Winters. On the other hand, the prosecutor's questions and notations can be construed as inviting the jury to infer that the total number of combinations represents the total number of composites which could have resulted from Taff's observations of a man near the victim's residencethus leading to the inference that Copeland's resemblance to the Identi-Kit is an extremely rare event which identifies him as the person Taff saw. To the extent this inference was invited, it does involve an improper use of the product rule, because there was no showing that actual people's head hair, facial hair, skin tones, age lines, lips, nose, eyebrows, glasses, and so on, are truly independent of each other in the human population, in contrast to the possible combinations which can be made of the Identi-Kit components. When estimates of statistical probabilities lack foundation and involve the identification of a defendant as the offender, convictions have been reversed in some cases. Collins, 68 Cal.2d 319, 66 Cal.Rptr. 497, 438 P.2d 33; Miller v. State, 240 Ark. 340, 399 S.W.2d 268 (1966); State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858 (1966). However, we conclude that error in this case, if any, was harmless. The composite did look like Copeland, and the jury could easily see that. Further, Taff identified Copeland in trial as the man she had seen to a 99 percent certainty. Within reasonable probabilities, the outcome of the trial was not affected by the alleged error. See State v. LeFever, 102 Wash.2d 777, 785, 690 P.2d 574 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 113 Wash.2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013, 787 P.2d 905, 80 A.L.R.4th 989 (1989); State v. Robtoy, 98 Wash.2d 30, 44, 653 P.2d 284 (1982).