Opinion ID: 1526377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: moda participation issues

Text: On February 9, 1978, MODA and ten residential customers of Central Maine filed a complaint with the Commission, allegedly based upon 35 M.R.S.A. § 291, challenging as unjust and discriminatory the proposed rates filed with the Commission by Central Maine Power on January 16, 1978 ( the CMP rate case ). The § 291 Complaint was designated Docket F.C. # 2336, in contradistinction to the Central Maine Power rate case, Docket F.C. # 2332. The § 291 Complaint alleged no jurisdictional basis other than 35 M.R.S.A. § 291. Subsequently, on March 17, 1978, the Commission (a) granted a March 7, 1978 motion by MODA to consolidate its § 291 complaint with the pending rate case, (b) denied a February 28, 1978 CMP motion to dismiss MODA's § 291 complaint, and (c) granted MODA intervenor status in the rate case. The Commission erred in denying CMP's motion to dismiss the § 291 complaint and in allowing its consolidation with the pending rate case. It did not err in allowing MODA's petition to intervene.
In its Order on Pre-hearing Conference, the Commission concluded, after a brief discussion of the legislative history of 35 M.R. S.A. §§ 69 and 291 and their predecessor provisions, that any 10 persons, firms, corporations, or associations aggrieved may file a complaint against proposed rates of a public utility under Sections 69 and 291. Central Maine Power Company's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in F.C. # 2336 is denied. We sustain Central Maine's appeal from the denial of this motion. Section 291 states in relevant part: Upon written complaint made against any public utility by 10 persons, firms, corporations or associations aggrieved, that any of the rates, tolls, charges or schedules or any joint rate or rates of any public utility are in any respect unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory . . . the commission, being satisfied that the petitioners are responsible and that a hearing is expedient, shall proceed with or without notice to make an investigation thereof . . . . It is a universally recognized principle of statutory construction that legislative intent must first be sought in the plain meaning of words used in the statute. State v. Hussey, Me., 381 A.2d 665 (1978). Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for resort to rules of statutory interpretation to seek or impose another meaning. State v. Millett, Me., 392 A.2d 521 (1978). The plain meaning of § 291 is that a complaint under that section may be filed solely with regard to existing rates: the complaint is to be made against rates which  are in any respect unreasonable,  by persons  aggrieved  by them. Proposed rates are not rates within the meaning of § 291. Though they will become effective if not acted upon by the Commission in a timely fashion, 35 M.R.S.A. § 64, they are initially inchoate, having only potential effect. Like the first bid made at an auction, they are simply the starting point for a process which may yield a far different final result. The statute does not allow complaints against  rates  which  would be  unreasonable, but only those which  are.  A clearer indication that the Legislature intended to refer only to existing and effective rates is difficult to conceive. So, too, it is difficult to believe that ten persons can be  aggrieved  by proposed rates, which have no substantive effect. Compare, Heald v. School Administrative Dist. No. 74, Me., 387 A.2d 1 (1978); Matter of Lappie, Me., 377 A.2d 441 (1977). In addition, § 292, requiring the Commission to set a hearing if, after seven days' notice  such public utility shall not have removed the cause of complaint . . . suggests that the complaint process is intended to provide a vehicle for filing grievances against existing practices. It seems highly unlikely that, if the cause of complaint is the proposed rates, the utility may be expected to withdraw or revise the schedules within seven days. Moreover, the availability of such a mechanism, which requires the Commission to hold a hearing, would go far toward rendering the § 69 discretionary hearing process a dead letter. In our decisions in New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, Me., 354 A.2d 753, 757 (1976) and New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, Me., 362 A.2d 741, 747-48 (1976) we spoke of the use of § 291 to investigate  a currently effective rate , and  rates and charges then in effect.  The Commission concedes that in 1913, when the basic structure of our utility regulatory scheme was promulgated, the predecessor of § 291 applied solely to existing rates. It contends, however, that the 1917 enactment of the predecessor of § 69 incorporated by reference the § 291 complaint mechanism with respect to proposed rates. [7] Section 69 refers to a  complaint  twice, stating in relevant part: Whenever the Commission receives a notice of any change or changes proposed to be made in any schedule of rates filed with said Commission under the provisions of law, it shall have power at any time before the effective date of such change or changes, either upon complaint or upon its own motion and after reasonable notice, to hold a public hearing and make investigation as to the propriety of such proposed change or changes. At any such hearing . . . the burden of proof to show that such change is reasonable shall be upon the public utility. After such hearing and investigation, the Commission may make such order with reference to any new rate, joint rate, fare, rental, toll, classification, charge, rule, regulation or form of contract or agreement proposed as would be proper in a proceeding initiated upon complaint or upon motion of the Commission in any rate investigation. (Emphasis added). In the first sentence, the Commission is said to have the power, upon  complaint  to hold a public hearing. However, § 292, implementing § 291, requires the Commission to hold such a hearing if the cause of the (§ 291) complaint is not timely removed. One suggestion that the first reference to  complaint  cannot mean a § 291 complaint must thus be noted. Later in the section, the Commission is empowered, in a § 69 proceeding, to make such order  as would be proper in a proceeding initiated upon complaint.  Obviously, a § 69 proceeding cannot be one  initiated upon complaint  if that reference is not to be meaningless. The section does not refer to itself. The only logical construction which may be placed upon these references to  complaint  is that the second reference (to  a proceeding initiated upon complaint ) is to § 291, the effect of which is to incorporate into § 69 the order provisions of § 294 (entered in a § 291 investigation), to be exercised [a] fter such [§ 69] hearing and investigation.  The first reference to  complaint , authorizing but not requiring a hearing, cannot mean § 291, but must envision simply a request that an investigation be made after the proposed rates have been filed by the utility. [8] Unlike the case of a § 291 complaint, a hearing need not be held though the utility shows no intention of removing the cause for complaint, i. e., the proposed rates. The Commission may simply allow them to take effect, leaving open the § 291 remedy of a complaint against existing rates. Our discussion of the meaning of § 69 in New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, Me., 354 A.2d 753 (1976) supports this view. The Commission cites that opinion, 354 A.2d at 762, n.5 in support of its position, quoting our holding that Essentially, Section 69 is concerned with the power of suspension that Section 69 confers upon the Commission. Its thrust, therefore, is basically to adapt to the suspension power the Commission's investigational and decisional methodology as operative under a Section 291 (10 persons complaint) or a Section 296 (Commission's own motion) proceeding. Notably, we held the section to  adapt  rather than wholly incorporate§§ 291 and 296 investigational and decisional methodology. We did, in the same footnote, hold that In this manner Section 69 is really incorporating, by reference, the order provisions of Section 294 (as the order properly entered in a Section 291, Section 296 or Section 298 rate investigation) i. e., an order requiring that the utility substitute for the changed schedule of permanent rates initially placed on file under Section 64 the changed schedule of permanent rates determined by the Commission, after investigation, to be just and reasonable. 354 A.2d at 762, n.5. (Emphasis added). We nowhere held § 69 to incorporate, as part of  investigational and decisional methodology,  the complaint mechanism of § 291, a conclusion which would have been plainly contrary to statutory language (particularly the second reference to  complaint  in § 69) and to the entire statutory scheme. A § 291 complaint may only be brought with respect to existing rates. The Commission therefore erred in denying CMP's motion to dismiss, and in consolidating the improperly allowed action with the pending rate case. [9] On remand, the Commission is ordered to dismiss MODA's § 291 complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
On February 17, 1978, MODA, on behalf of itself and as representative of its individual ratepayer members, filed with the Commission its petition to intervene in F.C. # 2332, the CMP rate case. The petition was granted by a majority of the Commission in its order of March 17, 1978. The Commission urges that we not reach the merits of this issue, contending that because MODA has not appealed, no live controversy exists for our adjudication. While we agree that Central Maine has failed to show prejudice resulting from MODA's intervention below, and that we can offer no present remedy should we find error, we nevertheless find the issue justiciable. We consider a claim of an improper grant of intervenor status by the Commission to be a claim of right buttressed by a sufficiently substantial interest to warrant judicial protection . . . assert [ed] .. . against a defendant having an adverse interest in contesting it . . . . Jones v. Maine State Highway Commission, Me., 238 A.2d 226, 228-29 (1968). The increase in costs and time which may be prompted by widespread intervention require that the propriety of such grants be reviewable regardless of the presence of the intervenor as a party on appeal. At such stage it is the Commission, not the intervenor, who occupies the status of a defendant possessing an adverse interest, i. e., the protection of its powers to grant intervention on the grounds relied upon and there contested. To deny a right to challenge such decisions would present serious due process questions; we hold such a controversy to be justiciable even absent the party whose intervention is complained of. Commission Rule 16.1 restricts intervenor status to those  directly and substantially affected by the proceeding.  In Central Maine Power Co. v. Maine Public Utilities Commission, Me., 382 A.2d 302, 312 (1978) we observed that the Rule constitutes a  reasonable and in fact a necessary requirement if the Commission is to hear and determine the cases before it promptly and effectively.  We held in that case, decided only weeks before the Commission's action complained of here, that MODA had erroneously been granted intervenor status in that rate proceeding. There, however, MODA  sought intervenor status on the basis, fundamentally, that the rates charged by Central Maine in connection with electric space heating represented unfair competition.  Id., 382 A.2d at 311. Finding the Commission's basic concern in a rate investigation to be  the relationship of ratepayer to public utility (and ratepayer to ratepayer where discriminatory tariffs are at issue ), Id. at 312, we concluded: We discern in the rate regulation scheme no legislative intent that the Commission take into account the interests of unregulated third parties who chance to be somewhat in competition with a regulated utility. Id. We further observed that MODA made no claim that the interests of ratepayers were insufficiently represented in the proceeding, and concluded that, in reality,  intervenor status was sought here to guarantee a right of judicial review rather than to make possible the presentation of testimony.  Id. at 314. MODA's participation in these proceedings before the Commission transpired under far different circumstances. No claim of unfair competition was raised; indeed, the petition [10] to intervene gives no hint of competitive motives whatsoever. [11] More importantly, the Commission itself preempted any surreptitious attempt to evade our holding in the prior Central Maine case by granting intervenor status with the qualification that  the intervention must be limited to participation as ratepayers, and any attempt to introduce evidence which relates solely to the competitive position of the oil dealers will be excluded.  Finally, MODA's bona fides is demonstrated by its averment in its petition that no expert witness would testify as to rate structure, but that MODA wished to offer such evidence and to cross-examine witnesses on the issue. While that prediction held true only with respect to the Commission, it was reasonable for the Commission to consider it appropriate, in light of other intervenors presenting expert witnesses primarily representing the interests of other customer classes, [12] to insure a voice for the small general service customers. While a grant of intervenor status was not necessary to allow either testimony or cross-examination, it served to settle the issue early in the proceedings, and perhaps avoid later challenges to MODA's right to cross-examine. [13] While CMP contends in conclusory terms that MODA paid only lip service to its own general service rate, and focused its case upon residential rates (as to which it is competitor), our inspection of the record does not support an allegation of competitive advocacy. Rather, MODA's concern with residential rates dove-tails precisely with its stated rationale for intervention: to demonstrate cost and return inequities between its own small general service rate and residential rates. Indeed, its interest and position is comparable to that of intervenor St. Regis Paper Company, which sought realignment of customer classes on behalf of the large general service transmission (GST) ratepayers. Like St. Regis, MODA's interest was that of one allegedly prejudiced by a discrimination in favor of residential customers which Central Maine itself recognized and challenged. Presentation of that case necessarily entailed reference to residential rates. We are not prepared to deny the Commission the opportunity to hear a legitimate representative of any customer class merely because the representative may, in some tangential way not presented during the proceeding, be in competition with the utility. Compare, Cole v. Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, 79 Wash.2d 302, 485 P.2d 71, 90 P.U.R.3d 62 (1971). Our holding in the 1978 Central Maine Power v. Public Utilities Commission case is not inconsistent; [14] our earlier decision in Gifford v. Central Maine Power Company, Me., 217 A.2d 200 (1966) controls. In Gifford we recognized the right of an oil dealers group to appeal from a Commission decision, where they had established their status as ratepayers, and claimed aggrievement as such. [15] To deny MODA members the right to intervene on the ground that they are competitors would be to deprive them of a right they enjoy by virtue of their status as ratepayers solely because of a secondary status they possess in an area wholly outside the concern of the Commission. In its decisions with respect to procedural matters, the Commission assumes a status comparable to a court, bound by both its own rules promulgated pursuant to 35 M.R. S.A. § 3 and by the rules of procedure and evidence applicable to civil actions in the Superior Court, 35 M.R.S.A. § 308; see also 35 M.R.S.A. § 299; Central Maine Power Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, 382 A.2d at 313. Accordingly, our review of the Commission's grant of intervention is limited to scrutinizing that action for evidence of an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion, the burden of proving which rests with CMP. In Re O'Donnell's Express, Me., 260 A.2d 539 (1970); W. H. Glover Co. v. Smith, 126 Me. 397, 400, 138 A. 770, 772 (1927). We are satisfied that the Commission properly allowed MODA to intervene as representative of ratepayers  directly and substantially affected by the proceeding,  and properly and effectively limited their participation to issues as to which they possessed a legitimate interest. We deny Central Maine's appeal as to this issue.
Central Maine responded to the Commission's denial of its motion to dismiss MODA's § 291 complaint and its consolidation of that complaint with the pending rate case by taking an appeal on April 14, 1978 to the Superior Court, Kennebec County. This interlocutory appeal, [16] in the form of a Rule 80B, Maine Rules of Civil Procedure complaint, sought injunctive relief pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6051(13) and Rule 65, M.R.Civ.P., declaratory relief pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5951 et seq., and relief in the nature of prohibition. After hearing the Superior Court dismissed the appeal  for lack of jurisdiction,  without further elaboration. Central Maine appeals from this dismissal, alleging that the Superior Court's equitable jurisdiction is not foreclosed by 35 M.R.S.A. §§ 303 or 305 where the claimed error is Commission action in excess of its jurisdiction. We dismiss this appeal as moot. As part of its consolidated § 303 appeal from the final decision of the Commission, Central Maine has placed before this Court the substantive issues (of MODA's § 291 complaint and its consolidation with the rate case) raised initially before the Superior Court. We have sustained Central Maine's appeals with respect to that complaint and consolidation, the merits of which were not reached by the Superior Court. CMP now asks that we reverse the Superior Court's dismissal and hold that jurisdiction existed to entertain the substantive claims of its Rule 80B complaint. As we said recently in Central Maine Power Company v. Maine Public Utilities Commission, et al., Me., 395 A.2d 414, 434 (1978),  [w]e do not reach that question because our decision on the merits of the section 305 action [here, 303 appeal] moots all substantive issues brought before the Superior Court.  Having held the Commission's action in permitting and consolidating the § 291 complaint erroneous, any decision as to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to entertain an interlocutory appeal from such action would now be meaningless. Neither can the Superior Court, were we to decide it has jurisdiction (a question which we explicitly do not determine), provide any effective relief at this stage of the proceedings not already secured to Central Maine by our decision. Accordingly, There being no issues remaining for the Superior Court to determine on the merits, CMP's appeal from that court's dismissal of its Rule 80B complaint must be denied for mootness. Central Maine Power Company v. Maine Public Utilities Commission, et al., supra, 395 A.2d at 434.