Opinion ID: 1152999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Distance Requirements

Text: Two distance requirements are at issue here: the four-foot requirement between dancers and patrons during individual performances and the eight-foot requirement between stage dancers and patrons. Respondents challenge the four-foot rule for individual dances as a prior restraint on expression. [5] Before we will apply the highly protective rules against prior restraints, first we must determine whether the challenged rule affects expression. Respondents presented evidence that entertainers use close proximity during table and couch dances to convey a message of erotic intimacy. The trial court acknowledged this evidence in finding of fact 27. Courts previously have held that the communication of a nude dancer receives constitutional protection, although nudity itself is conduct subject to the police powers of the state. See, e.g., Kitsap County v. Kev, Inc., 106 Wash.2d 135, 140, 720 P.2d 818 (1986); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2459-60, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (plurality opinion); Id. at 581, 111 S.Ct. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring); Id. at 587, 111 S.Ct. at 2471 (White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); O'Day, 109 Wash.2d at 802, 749 P.2d 142. Based on Respondents' evidence and the trial court's findings of fact, we conclude that the four-foot rule does regulate expression. Respondents also must show that the challenged regulation rises to the level of a prior restraint, and thus is subject to the more protective rules against prior restraints than those against regulations affecting only the time, place, or manner of expression. This court has defined prior restraints as official restrictions imposed upon speech or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication. City of Seattle v. Bittner, 81 Wash.2d 747, 756, 505 P.2d 126 (1973) (quoting Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Probs. 648 (1955)). We have applied prior restraint analysis in cases involving licensing schemes and court orders that effectively banned speech. For example, in Bittner we held that government officials imposed prior restraints when they required licensing for operation of adult entertainment establishments, but refused to issue licenses to applicants who previously had engaged in illicit activities. Bittner, 81 Wash.2d at 755-56, 505 P.2d 126; see also JJR, Inc., 126 Wash.2d at 6, 891 P.2d 720 (licensing scheme); Coe, 101 Wash.2d at 372, 679 P.2d 353 (court order); State ex rel Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash.2d 69, 75-78, 483 P.2d 608 (court order), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939, 92 S.Ct. 272, 30 L.Ed.2d 252 (1971). However, not every regulation of speech or expression rises to the level of a prior restraint. This court has analyzed regulations which do not ban expression but impose temporal or geographic limitations as time, place, or manner restrictions. See Collier, 121 Wash.2d at 747, 854 P.2d 1046 (analyzing an ordinance which did not completely ban political signs as a time, place, or manner restriction); Coe, 101 Wash.2d at 373, 679 P.2d 353 (stating that a regulation may not rise to the level of a prior restraint if it merely restricts the time, place, or manner of expression). Respondent Ino Ino, Inc., argues that under Const. art. I, § 5 the distance restriction is unconstitutional as a prior restraint because the restriction denies entertainers a full opportunity to use space and proximity as an element of their dance and the individual has no opportunity to demonstrate in a judicial forum that there is no basis for imposing the restraint. Br. of Resp't at 35-36. Ino Ino, Inc., claims that a party subjected to this restriction should have the same procedural rights as one who faces abatement. Id. This requirement would be consistent with the text of art. I, § 5 that free speech rights should not be abridged, unless they have been previously abused. Id. Respondents thus base their prior restraint claim on the premise that each adult cabaret should have an opportunity to show that it prohibits public sexual contact before the City can require compliance. A regulation is not a prior restraint, however, simply because a party can present evidence that it does not cause the problems targeted by the regulation. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 801, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2759, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (stating that the validity of a regulation depends on its relation to the overall problem a city seeks to correct), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 23, 106 L.Ed.2d 636 (1989). Moreover, the four-foot distance regulation at issue here does not ban table dancing. Rather, it imposes a place or manner restriction on the performance of the dance. Thus, it is more properly analyzed as a time, place, or manner restriction. BCC § 5.08.130 also provides the individual cabaret an opportunity to establish in a judicial proceeding that it complies with the distance requirements before the city can impose sanctions. [6] Respondents have failed to show that the four-foot rule for individual dances rises to the level of a prior restraint. Nevertheless, the rule does regulate the time, place, or manner of expression. Under O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377,88 S.Ct. at 1679, the government's regulation of the time, place, or manner of expressive conduct is sufficiently justified if (1) the regulation is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) the regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest. In this case, the O'Brien test is the applicable standard. [7] See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566, 111 S.Ct. at 2460. The four-foot rule meets the requirements of the O'Brien test. The provision is within the constitutional power delegated by the State to the City of Bellevue to protect the health and welfare of its citizens. See State v. Brayman, 110 Wash.2d 183, 192-93, 751 P.2d 294 (1988) (stating that art. I, § 1 of the Washington Constitution empowers the Legislature to enact laws promoting the health, peace, safety, and general welfare of the people). The provision furthers an important or substantial governmental interest because it facilitates the detection of public sexual contact and discourages contact from occurring in the first place. Courts have recognized the government's substantial interest in curbing these secondary effects of adult entertainment. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48, 106 S.Ct. 925, 929, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (holding that the City of Renton had a substantial interest in combating the undesirable secondary effects of adult theaters, such as crime and a drop in property values), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1132, 106 S.Ct. 1663, 90 L.Ed.2d 205 (1986); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582, 111 S.Ct. at 2468-69 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that the governmental interest in combating secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments is substantial); BSA, Inc. v. King County, 804 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.1986) (recognizing sexual contact as a secondary effect of adult entertainment). Furthermore, Bellevue may rely on experiences of other jurisdictions to show that its ordinances further the substantial interest in curbing secondary effects. See Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. at 930-51. Respondents imply that the actual purpose of the ordinances is to eliminate adult entertainment from the City of Bellevue. However, a court should not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the assumption that the legislative body had a wrongful purpose. O'Brien, 391 U.S.at 383, 88 S.Ct. at 1682-33; McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56, 24 S.Ct. 769, 776-77, 49 L.Ed. 78 (1904). Therefore, the possibility of a wrongful purpose on the part of the City Council is insufficient reason to strike down a provision with the stated purpose of preventing criminal behavior. Respondents also argue that applying the four-foot rule to their adult cabarets does not serve the stated purpose of the rule because the City has not proven that these particular cabarets produce the targeted secondary effects. The validity of a regulation, however, depends on its relation to the overall problem a city seeks to correct. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 801, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2759, 105 L.Ed.2d 661, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 23, 106 L.Ed.2d 636 (1989). In Ward, a party challenged a requirement that the city's sound technician control amplification equipment for all concerts. The court considered all bands affected by the regulation, rather than just the plaintiff, to judge whether the requirement related to the overall problem of inexperienced technicians and insufficient sound volume. Id. In this case, the City relied on evidence that adult cabarets generally produce certain harmful secondary effects. In order to prevent these secondary effects, the City may regulate all adult cabarets and require Respondents' compliance despite their claims that they do not produce the secondary effects targeted by the regulation. As required by the third O'Brien factor, Bellevue's interest in curbing the secondary effects of adult entertainment is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Although the challenged ordinances apply only to adult theaters, as opposed to other kinds of theaters, the Supreme Court has held that the interest in controlling secondary effects justifies different treatment for adult entertainment establishments. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n. 34, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2453 n. 34, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (plurality opinion) (upholding an ordinance that affected only adult theaters because it had the purpose of preventing urban areas from becoming the focus of crime), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873, 97 S.Ct. 191, 50 L.Ed.2d 155 (1976); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 586, 111 S.Ct. at 2470-71 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Collier v. Tacoma, 121 Wash.2d 737, 752, 854 P.2d 1046 (1993) (indicating a willingness to distinguish adult theaters from other kinds of theaters based on the secondary effects of adult entertainment). The fourth O'Brien factor is also satisfied because the distance restriction is no greater than essential to further the interest in preventing public sexual contact. The four-foot rule requires just an arm's length distance between a dancer and patron. Furthermore, it allows dancers to engage in all types of movement, with the exception of pure sexual conduct, in order to convey eroticism. However, Respondents argue that the four-foot rule is so restrictive as to deny dancers a reasonable means of earning a living and cause the imminent failure of all adult cabarets in Bellevue. If such a failure was inevitable, then the distance requirement would be unconstitutional. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340-41, 81 S.Ct. 125, 126-27, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960), the Supreme Court sustained a complaint which, if true, established that newly drawn municipal boundaries would have the inevitable effect of depriving a racial group of their constitutional right to vote. The stated purpose of the legislation in Gomillion was irrelevant because inevitably its provisions violated a constitutional right. Id. ; see also O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 385, 88 S.Ct. at 1683-84 (finding that the destruction of Selective Service certificates was not necessarily expressive, and thus a statute prohibiting this activity did not inevitably violate a constitutional right). In this case, Respondents presented evidence showing only that financial failure was possible, and thus failed to show an inevitable effect such as that in Gomillion. Respondents also contend that the four-foot rule is too restrictive because the dancers' message would be significantly less well received by the intended audience from four feet away. Reply Br. of Resp't at 20. They argue that customer dissatisfaction will result in lower revenues for dancers, who then will be unwilling to pay rent to the cabarets. Even if these predictions prove true, such a result would not necessarily mean that the four-foot rule denies dancers and club owners a reasonable means of earning a living. Decreased opportunity for illegal sexual contact could be one cause of customer dissatisfaction. The instant case also is easily distinguishable from a case cited by Respondents, United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995), in which the Supreme Court invalidated a regulation prohibiting federal workers from receiving compensation for speaking engagements. By contrast, Bellevue places no restrictions on the amount of payment dancers may receive and, thus, does not effectively foreclose a reasonable means of earning a living. Our decision upholding the four-foot restriction is in accord with other courts which have upheld more restrictive separation requirements. See, e.g., Kev, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir.1986) (upholding a regulation requiring that all dancing in erotic dance studios take place at least ten feet from patrons); DLS, Inc., v. City of Chattanooga, 894 F.Supp. 1140, 1145-46 (E.D.Tenn.1995) (upholding a regulation requiring at least six feet between dancers and patrons in order to prevent sexual contact during table and couch dances). Although Respondents presented evidence that the four-foot rule regulates expression, they presented no evidence that the eight-foot rule for stage dancing affects expression. As a result, the trial court found that proximity is not an instrument of communication for stage dancing, in which the dancers direct their erotic message to the entire audience in the adult cabaret. [8] The judge therefore applied rational basis scrutiny and upheld the regulation. Because the eight-foot requirement limits only proximity and does not restrict the expressive aspect of stage dancing, the rational basis test is applicable. See BSA, Inc. v. King County, 804 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.1986) (upholding a six-foot stage requirement because the plaintiffs presented no evidence that the distance between entertainer and patron was an integral part of the expression). In O'Day, this court found that a similar distance requirement did not affect expression because it merely specified the place from which dancers may convey an erotic message. We not only upheld the distance requirement, but also refused to do a time, place or manner analysis because the restriction affected only conduct. O'Day, 109 Wash.2d at 810, 749 P.2d 142. We similarly find in this case that the eight-foot requirement for stage dancing regulates only conduct, and therefore examine this rule under the rational basis test. The City performed an experiment demonstrating that a very tall customer could reach a nude stage dancer with only a separation of six feet. As the trial court concluded, the governmental interest in preventing illegal contact is a rational basis for extending the minimum distance to eight feet. C.