Opinion ID: 203972
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Santiago's testimony (Torres)

Text: Torres argues that the district court erred when it allowed Santiago, one of the government's two cooperating witnesses, to testify. Torres contends that the court should have excluded Santiago's testimony, because the government committed a discovery violation when it belatedly disclosed materials to the defense that related to this testimony. [3] Torres alleges that these delayed disclosures precluded his counsel from adequately representing him at trial. We doubt that this delayed disclosure claim has been preserved, as Torres failed to request a continuance from the trial judge. See United States v. Van Anh, 523 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir.2008) (Because the defendants failed to ask for a continuance, we seriously doubt they have preserved their delayed discovery claim.); United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 103-103 (1st Cir.2002) ([D]efense counsel must typically request a continuance to preserve a claim of prejudice by delayed disclosure of evidence.). In any event, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Santiago's testimony. Where the government is aware of evidence that is potentially useful to impeach a witness, it must provide that evidence to the defense in a timely fashion. Id. at 51 n. 5 (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972)). If disclosure of such evidence is delayed, the delay leads to reversal if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense in a timeous manner or had the trial court given the defense more time to digest it, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 8-9 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). Apart from the ultimate question of the probability that a timely disclosure would have changed the result of the proceeding, however, we ordinarily require the appellant to first show that the delay prevented defense counsel from using the disclosed material effectively in preparing and presenting the defendant's case. Van Anh, 523 F.3d at 51; United States v. Lemmerer, 277 F.3d 579, 587 (1st Cir. 2002). [T]he defendant must at a minimum make a prima facie showing of a plausible strategic option which the delay foreclosed. United States v. Misla-Aldarondo, 478 F.3d 52, 63 (1st Cir.2007). Torres has made no such showing here. Although he summarily claims that the late disclosure of the evidence prevented his lawyer from providing effective representation, he has failed to identify how it did so. This failure is fatal to his claim. See United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1409 (10th Cir.1995) ([A]ppellant's vague assertion that the late disclosure affected preparation of the defense is not sufficient.). Moreover, we note that we have held that similar delays did not preclude defense counsel from using the late-arriving materials effectively. See Van Anh, 523 at 52 (It is not surprising that defense counsel effectively used this evidence [during cross-examination], having had three days to determine how to best put it to use.); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1179 (1st Cir.1993) (observing that delayed disclosure did not prevent defense counsel from effectively preparing and presenting case where counsel received evidence while the witness was testifying and effectively incorporated its contents into the cross-examination).