Opinion ID: 4109422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attorney Fee

Text: The Prison Litigation Reform Act sets limits on attorney fees awarded to prisoners who prevail in civil rights cases. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). Whenever such a prisoner receives a monetary judgment, “a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant.” § 1997e(d)(2). The district court interpreted that language to permit it to exercise its discretion in choosing the percentage of the damage award that should go toward the attorney fee, so long as the choice was no greater than 25 percent. The court allocated 10 percent of the damage award to satisfy the attorney fee award. That interpretation is consistent with decisions of 3 We emphasize that Murphy both alleged and proved the violations in this case. Most Illinois cases dealing with this exception to sovereign immunity focus on the plaintiff’s allegations because the appeals have arisen from motions to dismiss on the pleadings. We believe Illinois also requires a plaintiff ultimately to prove the alleged violations. For example, Leetaru explained that “sovereign immunity affords no protection when agents of the State have acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of their authority,” and in reversing dismissal on the pleadings, the court allowed defendants on remand to show their conduct was not “in fact” unauthorized, illegal, or in violation of plaintiff’s rights. See 32 N.E.3d at 597 (emphasis added). No. 15-3384 13 other circuits, which allow such discretion. See Boesing v. Spiess, 540 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 2008) (“plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) does not require the district court to automatically apply 25 percent of the judgment to pay attorney’s fees”); Parker v. Conway, 581 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2009) (agreeing with Boesing). We have read the statute differently. In Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), we explained that § 1997e(d)(2) required that “attorneys’ compensation come[] first from the damages.” “[O]nly if 25% of the award is inadequate to compensate counsel fully” does the defendant con­ tribute more to the fees. Id. We continue to believe that is the most natural reading of the statutory text. We do not think the statute contemplated a discretionary decision by the district court. The statute neither uses discretionary language nor provides any guidance for such discretion. Accordingly, we REMAND the case to the district court to modify its judgment to require Murphy to pay from the judgment the sum of $76,933.46 toward satisfying the attorney fee the court awarded. In all other respects the judgment is AFFIRMED. 14 No. 15-3384