Opinion ID: 77958
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legitimate Reason/Pretext

Text: Because the parties agree Appellees had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Rioux's demotion following the OPS and Law Department investigations, the presumption of discrimination is eliminated, see Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 771 (11th Cir.2005), and we accordingly turn to the focused inquiry concerning Rioux's showing of pretext. See Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1258. The inquiry into pretext centers upon the employer's beliefs, and not the employee's own perceptions of his performance. Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1565 (citations omitted). The plaintiff must demonstrate weaknesses or implausibilities in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to disbelieve the reasons. See Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538). It is the plaintiffs burden not merely to raise a suspicion regarding an improper motive, but rather to demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact that the employer's proffered reason for his demotion was pretextual. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024-25 (11th Cir.2000). The district court concluded that none of the other evidence submitted by Rioux [7] was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the proffered reason for his demotion was pretextual. We now address the two general categories of evidence Rioux presented in his effort to show that Appellees' legitimate reason for his demotion was a pretext for discrimination. The first category consists of the first six evidentiary matters identified by Rioux from which a jury could infer discrimination. The second category involves his proposed comparator, Dunham.
Citing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Vessels, 408 F.3d at 771, Rioux argues that his submission of statements by Rubin expressing a desire to conform AFD's personnel to the racial make-up of the City of Atlanta is sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment. Appellees distinguish Vessels, as the district court did, on the ground that the plaintiff in that case offered at least three additional pieces of evidence in addition to allegedly racially-tinged statements by the defendant, in contrast to Rioux, whom they assert cannot offer any additional evidence. In further support of this position, Appellees cite a series of decisions in which racially-tinged statements alone were held to be insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Bd. of Trustees, 188 F. App'x 810, 816-17 (11th Cir.2006); Riley v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ, 154 Fed.Appx. 114, 116 (11th Cir.2005). Appellees also argue that the district court correctly discounted the testimony of Councilman Young, and testimony regarding the role of Brothers Combined in the Rioux investigation, as the record contradicts any assertion that Appellees were influenced by the agenda of either of these parties. Rioux submitted uncontroverted statements by Rubin stating the latter's belief that the racial composition of the AFD should reflect the racial composition of the City of Atlanta generally. In concluding this evidence was insufficient, the district court interpreted Vessels as standing for the proposition that evidence of racially tinged statements must be coupled with other circumstantial evidence of discrimination to survive summary judgment. The district court distinguished Rubin's statements regarding the racial makeup of the AFD from the statements at issue in Vessels, concluding that Rubin's statements did not express a preference for a particular racial group. [8] The district court concluded that the sum total of the evidence did not call into question Appellees' proffered reason for Rioux's demotion and amounted to mere speculation. While speculation may accurately describe some factual assertions by Rioux, other factual assertions find support in the record. Considering all the evidence, a reasonable factfinder could determine the proffered legitimate reason for Rioux's two-step demotion  an altercation during which Rioux was seeking to impress upon his subordinates Rubin's own directive regarding responding more quickly to fires  was not the only event that actually motivated Appellees. Rioux's burden, again, was to demonstrate weaknesses or implausibilities in the proffered legitimate reason so as to permit a rational jury to conclude that the explanation given was not the real reason, or that the reason stated was insufficient to warrant the adverse action. See Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528; Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 643 (11th Cir.1998). Rioux maintains that between May 10 and September 10, Brothers Combined and Councilman Young brought pressure to bear on Appellees. Cameron Dixon, President of the Brothers Combined, had meetings with COO Young to complain about the Rioux investigation and about Rubin's new process for promoting captains. Dixon complained to COO Young about vindictive attacks by Rubin against black managers. The Councilman, too, contacted COO Young and left a message regarding the matter of Chief Rioux with her. COO Young then asked Rubin to bring her up to date on personnel moves, and to also be prepared to update her on the incident involving Rioux and any actions taken as a result. When Rubin offered Rioux's position to Williams, Rubin told Williams he had been instructed to take some actions with Chief Rioux. In his deposition, Rubin only admitted to first offering Rioux's position to Williams after being repeatedly pressed to confirm that fact. Rioux maintains Rubin adheres to a de facto and unwritten affirmative action policy, and an inference can be drawn that Rioux was demoted as part of the overall strategy of race balancing. [9] Rubin presents a copy of his spreadsheet two to three times a year to Councilman Young; if Rubin were to show up at a meeting without documentation of the promotions on the basis of race, Councilman Young would have made a more formal inquiry and would have required that some documentation be provided by the administration. In response to the question, How far away from a 50/50 balance between African Americans and Caucasians do you think promotions would have to get before you would take it upon yourself to say something to Chief Rubin . . .? Councilman Young admitted, If we started getting in the low percentiles of 30 percent or below that. Taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to Rioux, we cannot say, based upon the foregoing summary of additional evidence, that Rioux has not satisfied his burden of presenting disputed facts showing Appellees were motivated by a discriminatory reason in selecting the level of discipline Rioux received, in contrast to any discipline he could or would have received in the absence of the race-based pressure exerted.
Rioux's second argument supporting his burden of showing pretext, that Dunham was a similarly-situated employee who was treated more favorably than Rioux following similar misconduct, however, fails. [T]o determine whether employees are similarly situated, we evaluate `whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways.' Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir.1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted)). A comparator is an employee similarly situated [to the plaintiff] `in all relevant respects.' Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562). The `quantity and quality of the comparator's misconduct [must] be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-guessing employers' reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.' Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1368) (citation omitted). Misconduct merely similar to the misconduct of the disciplined plaintiff is insufficient. Id. at n. 2. In his pleadings, Rioux advanced two comparators, Grissom and Dunham. At summary judgment and before this Court, Rioux proposes only Dunham as a comparator. Rioux argues that the district court improperly determined Dunham was not an appropriate comparator because it focused on superficial differences between the employees' respective positions within the AFD. Rioux contends the court should have focused instead on the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed. Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1259. Appellees assert the district court properly determined that Dunham, a Battalion Chief, was not a suitable comparator to Rioux, a Deputy Chief, because of: (1) the material differences in their respective rank and job responsibilities; (2) the differences in the charges levied against them; and (3) the differing nature of the investigations and the different identities of the individuals making a final decision as to what discipline each employee should receive. The following facts regarding Rioux's and Dunham's respective ranks and job responsibilities are undisputed. Rioux, who held the second highest position in the AFD, and Dunham, who held the fourth highest, were both among just 40 discretionary officers in a department of approximately 1,200 members. Prior to his demotion, Dunham was a Battalion Chief. There are approximately 30 Battalion Chiefs in the AFD. A Battalion Chief typically oversees a handful of fire stations and less than 50 people. Prior to his demotion, Rioux was one of only three Deputy Fire Chiefs, second in command to Chief Rubin. As Deputy Chief, Rioux was responsible for five battalions, 35 fire stations, and 45 pieces of equipment. All AFD chief appointments are discretionary; the chiefs serve at Rubin's pleasure. After Chief Rubin, a Deputy Chief has the highest level of supervision in the AFD. Only Deputy Chiefs fill in for Rubin when he is absent. A Deputy Chief would not consider him or herself to have the same status as a Battalion Chief or an Assistant Chief. Deputy Chiefs have greater responsibilities than Battalion Chiefs, supervise hundreds of more people, and are paid more. Rioux's promotion to Deputy Chief was more meaningful than his other promotions because it was rising to the top of his profession. As to any differences in the charges levied against Rioux and Dunham, Appellees submit that while Rioux was found to have violated one of the AFD work rules on violence in the workplace, Dunham was not. The Law Department Compliance Unit concluded that Rioux's actions on May 2, 2004 violated four different AFD work rules and two sections of the City Code. In March 2006, Dunham was charged by OPS with Violating AFD work rules of conduct, courtesy, and truthfulness. Finally, Appellees argue that different decisionmakers were responsible for the sanctions imposed on Rioux and Dunham, and each incident was investigated differently. See Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1261 n. 5 ([D]ifferences in treatment by different supervisors or decision makers can seldom be the basis for a viable claim of discrimination.) (citing Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir.1989)). Appellees assert that, whereas Rubin directly determined Rioux's punishment based on the OPS and Law Department reports, Dunham's discipline (a six-day suspension and letter of reprimand) was determined by a Section Chief of the OPS, Cindy Thompson, and only submitted to Rubin for his approval later. We are persuaded that Dunham was not a valid comparator on the basis of the first two arguments advanced by Appellees concerning the material differences in the men's respective ranks and job responsibilities and the differences in the charges levied against them. Admittedly, differences in job ranks between a plaintiff and another employee are not, in and of themselves, dispositive as to whether the two individuals may be compared for purposes of evaluating a discrimination claim. See Lathem, 172 F.3d at 793 (different job titles not dispositive). Here, however, rank clearly matters, as Rioux was one of only three of the highest-ranked members of the AFD, reporting directly to Rubin. In contrast, Dunham held a position not one, but two levels distant from Rioux, a position shared by 30 men and women;, and consequently, significantly removed from Rubin. It cannot be said that conduct that might be tolerated or treated with progressive discipline at lower ranks must be similarly accepted from the Chiefs immediate advisors, who are held to a higher level of professionalism and who are expected to set the standard of conduct for the department. Neither Rubin nor COO Young selected the charges Rioux and Dunham were found to have violated, and the charges were not the same. Dunham was neither charged with nor found to have violated an AFD workplace violence rule. As Rioux correctly points out, the most important factors in a comparator analysis in the disciplinary context are the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed. Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1259. [T]he comparator's misconduct must be nearly identical to the plaintiffs in order to prevent courts from second-guessing employers' reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The standard for similar conduct is a fairly rigorous one, and here, while the incidents certainly appear to be similar, the offenses Rioux and Dunham were charged with were different. Moore, 137 Fed.Appx. at 239 (We have previously held that a difference in the charged offenses can preclude a comparison for Title VII purposes.). Appellees' argument that different decisionmakers were responsible for disciplining Rioux and Dunham (an argument not considered in the district court's order) is unpersuasive. See Anderson v. WBMG-42 253 F.3d 561, 565-66 (11th Cir.2001) (different supervisors not dispositive). It is undisputed, for instance, that all discretionary officers in the AFD ultimately serve at the pleasure of the Fire Chief, Rubin, and even as Appellees contend that Rubin was not directly involved in the investigation of Dunham, they concede it was necessary for him to approve the ultimate sanction imposed. Dunham, whose discipline was meted out two years following Rioux's, cannot serve as a valid comparator to assist Rioux in showing pretext. Nevertheless, as stated, Rioux's other evidence of an unwritten affirmative action plan and pressures exerted by Brothers Combined and Councilman Young, along with Rubin's offer of the position to an African American and evasive answers regarding that offer, are sufficient to satisfy Rioux's burden with respect to pretext.