Opinion ID: 201060
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The link between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce

Text: 33 The final Morrison factor asks whether the link between [the regulated activity] and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was attenuated. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612, 120 S.Ct. 1740. Given the manifest nature of the national child pornography market, and Congress's related findings, there is no question that Congress can regulate the national child pornography market. The issue, then, is whether Congress may reach local, intrastate conduct in order to effectively regulate a national, interstate market. Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 229. 34 The seminal case in this area remains Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). There, the Supreme Court upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which levied penalties on crops that exceeded the act's quota. Filburn, a farmer who grew wheat exclusively for consumption on his own farm, challenged the constitutionality of the act, arguing that the breadth of the regulation exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority because it reached purely local production and consumption. In upholding the statute, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could regulate intrastate activity when such activity, taken in the aggregate, might ultimately have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125, 63 S.Ct. 82 (Even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce....). 35 Defendant argues that Lopez and Morrison prohibit applying the aggregation principle to the child pornography laws. We have encountered this argument before in relation to 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), which uses language analogous to § 2251(a) to criminalize possession of child pornography. 5 See United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652 (1st Cir.1998). Because of the similarities in the statutory language, we find the analysis of § 2252(a)(4)(B) persuasive in assessing the constitutionality of § 2251(a). See United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 89 n. 2 (2d Cir.2003)(finding § 2252(a)(4)(B) precedent applicable when considering a challenge to § 2251(a) because the relevant jurisdictional language is equivalent); United States v. Galo, 239 F.3d 572, 575 (3d Cir.2001)(same). 36 In Robinson, we upheld the constitutionality of § 2252(a)(4)(B) because the local possession of child pornography `through repetition elsewhere' helps to create and sustain a market for sexually explicit materials depicting minors. Robinson, 137 F.3d at 656 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624). Echoing the 1996 congressional findings that child pornography inflames the desires of child molesters, pedophiles, and child pornographers who prey on children, thereby increasing the creation and distribution of child pornography, Pub.L. No. 104-208, Robinson held that [b]y outlawing purely intrastate possession of child pornography ..., Congress can curb the nationwide demand for these materials. Id. 6 37 As the Third Circuit observed, [t]here is a subtle transformation at work in applying the Wickard aggregation rationale to situations where the home-grown production and consumption of a commodity does not necessarily substitute for a commercially produced version that the defendant would otherwise have purchased in the marketplace. Rodia, 194 F.3d at 476. The Rodia court noted that Wickard has not been limited strictly to scenarios of commodity substitution, however, and Wickard's generic principle — that intrastate activity, if repeated, may substantially affect interstate commerce, id., is still sound. In both Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the vitality of Wickard while emphasizing that its aggregation principle should be applied only to statutes that regulate economic or commercial activities. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. 1624; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610, 120 S.Ct. 1740. 38 In addition to our own precedent applying Wickard's principles to a child pornography statute in Robinson, the Supreme Court long ago recognized that child pornography is a commodity influenced by and subject to economic market forces. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-10, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990)(finding that it is surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess and view the product, thereby decreasing demand while upholding an Ohio pornography statute against a First Amendment challenge). As the Seventh Circuit succinctly said: A market has two sides, supply and demand; without both, the market collapses. United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 842 (7th Cir.2001)(discussing §§ 2252(a)(2) and (a)(4)(B) in a sentencing context). See also Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 231 (A true market is inevitably commercial, and is pushed by supply and demand, whether manifested in swaps or purchase and sale.). In Robinson, we addressed possession, the demand side of the child pornography market. Here, we address production, the supply side of that market. While possessing child pornography fuels the demand side of the market, producing child pornography fuels the supply side of the market. The same logic we used in Robinson applies here: by outlawing the purely local production of child pornography, Congress can curb the nationwide supply for these materials. See Robinson, 137 F.3d at 656. The prohibition on intrastate production curb[s] the supply of child pornography at its source, before it [is] released into the interstate market. Rodia, 194 F.3d at 477 n. 5. 39 Defendant's reading of Lopez and Morrison ignores our analysis in Robinson. Producing child pornography is an economic activity because it creates a product for which there is an extensive national market, and in every case where we have sustained federal regulation under the aggregation principle in Wickard, the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial character. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 n. 4, 120 S.Ct. 1740.(citation omitted). 40 Here, Congress wishes to regulate the availability of child pornography in the national market. Because a significant portion of the child pornography about which Congress was concerned is homegrown, untraceable, and enters the national market surreptitiously, [the Second Circuit] conclude[d] that Congress, in an attempt to halt interstate trafficking, can prohibit local production that feeds the national market and stimulates demand, as this production substantially affects interstate commerce. Holston, 343 F.3d at 90. We agree. Often, as is the case here, it is necessary to control local behavior to ensure the effectiveness of interstate regulation. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37-38, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937); see also Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 231 ([W]e have little hesitation in concluding that where the product is fungible, such that it is difficult if not impossible to trace, Congress can prohibit local possession in an effort to regulate product supply and demand and thereby halt interstate trade.). We conclude, therefore, that § 2251(a) reaches intrastate activity that substantially affects the interstate child pornography market. It is a facially valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 7 41