Opinion ID: 627152
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Determining What Level of Scrutiny Applies

Text: As in all First Amendment cases, we must first determine the correct standard of scrutiny to apply to the challenged statute. Because First Amendment doctrine and the media landscape have changed substantially in recent years, this is no simple matter.
At the threshold of the inquiry, we must determine whether this restriction is content based or content neutral. We have previously held that whether a statute is content neutral or content based is something that can be determined on the face of it; if the statute describes speech by content, then it is content based. G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir.2006). Here, § 399b imposes clear content-based restrictions on the station's speech. First, Minority may broadcast a wide variety of content for a wide variety of purposes, but the station may not air the three types of advertisements banned by § 399b. That is a content-based restriction, since it plainly restricts Minority's speech based on the speech's content. Second, and equally important, § 399b discriminates within the class of speech it defines as advertisements. Public broadcast stations may not broadcast most types of advertising speech, but these stations may broadcast paid promotional messages for products and services of nonprofit corporations. See 47 U.S.C. § 399b(a)(1). For example: the record shows that the FCC allowed a public broadcast station in Indiana to broadcast a paid message which promoted Planned Parenthood's confidential, affordable reproductive health services because Planned Parenthood is a non-profit organization. Nonetheless, a public broadcast station may not broadcast a paid message to express the views of any person with respect to any matter of public importance or to support or oppose any candidate for political office regardless whether the sponsoring entity is an individual, a nonprofit corporation, or a for-profit corporation. 47 U.S.C. § 399b(a)(2) and (a)(3). Thus, had Planned Parenthood sought to air a paid message in support of Presidential candidates who favored abortion rights, or sought to broadcast an issue ad on the importance of sex education in schools, a public broadcast station would have been prohibited from airing it under § 399b(a)(2) and (a)(3). Indeed, in its letter to Planned Parenthood, the FCC specifically stated that its proposed message did not violate § 399b because it did not support any candidate for political office, nor express any views with respect to a matter of public importance. But, as shown, Planned Parenthood could advertise to promote itself. Thus, § 399b prohibits a public broadcast station from broadcasting any advertisement which expresses views on a matter of public importance or on behalf of a political candidate regardless who sponsored the message  Planned Parenthood (a nonprofit), Apple, Inc. (a for-profit), or a committee to re-elect President Obama (a political group). But it allows a public broadcast station to transmit a paid promotional message from a nonprofit, so long as that message does not express views on public issues or political candidates. That is a further content-based restriction on speech, and this restriction in particular burdens speech on issues of public importance and political speech.
Having identified § 399b's speech restrictions as content-based on two levels, we must determine what level of scrutiny to apply in our analysis. Because government regulation of content is one of the primary evils contemplated by the First Amendment, content-based restrictions are strongly disfavored and are often subject to strict scrutiny. Indeed, in the typical case, [c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Further, the bans on public issue and political advertisements appear at first glance to be especially strong candidates for strict judicial scrutiny because political speech is entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment protection. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 at 375, 104 S.Ct. 3106. Under strict scrutiny, the government would be required to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Citizens United v. FEC, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, 898, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). But this is not the typical case, because these particular content-based restrictions on speech apply to broadcasters. For decades now, the Supreme Court has held that content-based speech restrictions that apply to broadcasters are subject to a less demanding form of judicial scrutiny than similar restrictions that arise in other media contexts. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978). Indeed, in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984), the Court held that this intermediate level of scrutiny applies to regulations governing public broadcasters in particular. Id. at 376-77, 104 S.Ct. 3106. Specifically, in League of Women Voters, the Court observed that because broadcast regulation involves unique considerations, our cases have not followed precisely the same approach that we have applied to other media and have never gone so far as to demand that such regulations serve `compelling' governmental interests. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376, 104 S.Ct. 3106. Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress regulates the broadcast spectrum  which is a scarce and valuable national resource  to ensure that stations which broadcast on those frequencies satisfy the public interest, convenience, and necessity. [4] Id. Thus, when Congress acts pursuant to its regulation of the broadcast spectrum, it does not operate under the same First Amendment standards that apply to regulation of other forms of media. Instead, in light of the history behind Congressional regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the Supreme Court has held that laws enacted pursuant to Congressional broadcast regulation  even those which, as here, impose a content-based restriction on core political speech  are subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must prove a challenged statute is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest. Id. at 380, 104 S.Ct. 3106. Despite the Court's pronouncement in League of Women Voters, which was a public broadcasting case, Minority urges us to apply strict scrutiny for two different reasons. First, citing a concurring opinion in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 173 L.Ed.2d 738 (2009), which questioned the continuing validity of the broadcast regulation precedents on which League of Women Voters relied, Minority contends that new technologies such as cable and the Internet have undermined the core spectrum scarcity rationale of broadcast regulation cases. Id. at 1821 (Thomas, J., concurring). Under this theory, because traditional broadcast television and radio are no longer the `uniquely pervasive' media forms they once were, id., courts should no longer treat broadcast restrictions any differently from other restrictions on speech. Minority is surely correct that much has changed in the media landscape since the Supreme Court, in the 1970s, first adopted a standard that treats broadcasters differently under the First Amendment. Indeed, it is possible that the Supreme Court itself may soon declare that the era of a special broadcast exemption from strict scrutiny is over. After briefing and argument in this case, the Supreme Court heard argument in a case in which a coalition of the nation's major broadcasters have asked the Court to overrule Pacifica and its progeny and announce firmly and finally that the time for treating broadcast speech differently than all other communications is over. Br. of Respondents Fox Television Stations et al. in FCC v. Fox Television Stations , No. 10-1293, at 1. But that case has not yet been decided. Thus, just as golfers must play the ball as it lies, so too we must apply the law of broadcast regulation as it stands today. A majority of the Supreme Court has not overruled Pacifica, League of Women Voters, and related cases. Intermediate broadcast scrutiny remains in vigor, and it governs this case. Second, pointing to the bans on public issue and political advertising in particular, Minority contends that § 399b should be subject to strict scrutiny in the wake of Citizens United v. FEC, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, 886, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). Citizens United applied strict scrutiny to 2 U.S.C. § 441b, which prohibited corporations from engaging in electioneering communications [5] within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election, and held that the statute violated the First Amendment. Id. at 890. The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from Citizens United,  contends Minority, is that any restriction or prohibition of political speech on broadcast radio or television is subject to strict scrutiny. We disagree. Citizens United was not a broadcast regulation case, so the Court there had no reason to revisit League of Women Voters and related cases. Instead, the Court relied on its previous application of strict scrutiny in cases which challenged the constitutionality of restrictions on campaign expenditures, not broadcast spectrum regulation. See id. at 899 (citing FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007), a previous case which analyzed § 441b, for the proposition that laws that burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny). Thus, in Citizens United, the Court applied strict scrutiny to § 441b because that statute dealt with regulations on campaign expenditures generally. See, e.g., id. at 897 (listing, as acts that would be outlawed under § 441b, corporations running advertisements, publishing books, or creating websites). Citizens United in no way dealt with the unique considerations inherent in Congress's regulation of the broadcast spectrum. Moreover, Citizens United expressly overruled two of the Court's prior decisions: Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990), which permitted a ban on speech based on corporate identity, and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), which relied on Austin to uphold a facial challenge to § 441b. Neither case involved regulation of public broadcasting. Thus, it is not surprising that the Court in Citizens United did not once mention League of Women Voters; it was neither overruled nor distinguished away. That is fatal to Minority's contention, because in League of Women Voters, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the contention that content-based laws which burden political speech and are enacted pursuant to the broadcast spectrum require the application of strict judicial scrutiny. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376, 104 S.Ct. 3106. We therefore apply intermediate scrutiny to the restrictions. As explained below, we keep in mind as we apply that standard that public issue and political speech in particular is at the very core of the First Amendment's protection. We also must be mindful that the narrow tailoring prong of the intermediate scrutiny standard itself has undergone additional elaboration by the Supreme Court since League of Women Voters was decided in 1984. It is the details of that standard to which we now turn.

In determining what the application of intermediate scrutiny entails, League of Women Voters is our starting point. In that case, the Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a statute which forbade any public broadcasting station from transmitting editorials on controversial issues of public importance if that station had received a grant from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. The Court in League of Women Voters held that the ban on station editorials was defined solely on the basis of the content of the suppressed speech. Id. at 383, 104 S.Ct. 3106. In order to determine whether a particular statement by station management constitutes an `editorial,' the Court reasoned, enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the message that is conveyed to determine whether the views expressed concern `controversial issues of public importance.' Id. Although the Court held that the statute at issue in League of Women Voters was viewpoint -neutral  i.e., it prohibited station editorials on all sides of an issue  the Court held the First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion on an entire topic; thus, the Court held the statute was a content-based restriction on speech. Id. at 384, 104 S.Ct. 3106. In light of the First Amendment's hostility towards content-based restrictions on speech touching on controversial issues of public importance on the one hand, and deference afforded to Congress's regulation of the broadcast spectrum on the other, the Court in League of Women Voters held that a robust form of intermediate scrutiny applies to content-based restrictions on broadcast speech which burden political expression. Under the standard applied in League of Women Voters, a restriction on speech will be upheld only if the government proves the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest. Id. at 380, 104 S.Ct. 3106. The Court in League of Women Voters  while declining to require the government to prove a compelling interest under the more stringent strict scrutiny test  required judicial wariness within the standard it described. The Court did so because the statute at issue in that case restricted editorials, which are precisely the form of speech which the Framers of the Bill of Rights were most anxious to protect  speech that is indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth. Id. at 383, 104 S.Ct. 3106. The Court said that it must be particularly wary in assessing [the statute] to determine whether it reflects an impermissible attempt to allow the government to control... the search for political truth. Id. at 384, 104 S.Ct. 3106 (emphasis added). The Court held that the restriction there was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 395, 104 S.Ct. 3106. Rather, a broad ban on all editorializing by every station that receives [Corporation for Public Broadcasting] funds far exceeds what is necessary to protect against the risk of governmental interference or to prevent the public from assuming that editorials by public broadcasting stations represent the official view of government. Id. Although the Court recognized that the Government certainly has a substantial interest in ensuring that the audiences of noncommercial stations will not be led to think that the broadcaster's editorials reflect the official view of the Government, the Court said that this interest can be fully satisfied by less restrictive means that are readily available. Id. For example, the Court stated that Congress could simply require public broadcasting stations to broadcast a disclaimer every time they air editorials which would state that the editorial ... does not in any way represent the views of the Federal Government or any of the station's other sources of funding. Id. Thus, the Court held the ban on station editorials unconstitutional and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the League of Women Voters. Id. at 402, 104 S.Ct. 3106. For the purposes of application of the proper level of scrutiny, the statute at issue in this case is similar to the challenged statute in League of Women Voters. [6] Section 399b makes content-based distinctions which, by their terms, burden speech in a similar manner to the provision at issue in League of Women Voters. Like the statute in League of Women Voters, § 399b was enacted pursuant to Congress's regulation of public broadcast stations  stations which were explicitly set aside for educational programming. Moreover, subsections 399b(a)(2) and (a)(3) share the additional similarity with the provision at issue in League of Women Voters that the provisions burden public issue and core political speech.
We are conscious, of course, that First Amendment doctrine has not been stagnant in the nearly thirty years since League of Women Voters was decided. We must also consider further elaborations of the narrow tailoring inquiry under intermediate scrutiny. We thus take guidance in particular from two cases together known as the Turner cases, as well from select commercial speech cases that applied intermediate scrutiny, especially Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993). In the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court had occasion comprehensively to describe intermediate broadcast scrutiny, albeit in a slightly different context from that here, in a pair of cases known as the Turner cases. In Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) ( Turner I ), the Supreme Court reversed, for further factfinding, the district court's grant of summary judgment to the FCC on a First Amendment challenge to a statute which compelled cable companies to carry local broadcast stations. 512 U.S. at 667, 114 S.Ct. 2445. The Court held that there was not enough evidence in the record to determine whether local broadcast stations would go out of business if cable companies were not required by law to carry local broadcast stations. Id. at 668, 114 S.Ct. 2445. The Court revisited the dispute after additional discovery in district court in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) ( Turner II ). In Turner II, the Court upheld the district court's decision on remand in favor of the FCC because the additional record evidence supported Congress's determinations. Id. at 224, 117 S.Ct. 1174. As relevant here, the guiding principle of narrow tailoring under intermediate scrutiny is that the government must demonstrate that the recited harms to the substantial governmental interest are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate those harms in a direct and material way. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664-65, 114 S.Ct. 2445. Furthermore, although a statute is not invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech, Turner II, 520 U.S. at 217, 117 S.Ct. 1174, the government must prove that the statute does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 665, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (internal quotations omitted). Importantly, the government must prove both the reality of the recited harms and that the statute does not burden more speech than necessary by substantial evidence. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 211, 117 S.Ct. 1174. Substantial evidence must include substantial evidence in the record before Congress at the time of the statute's enaction. [7] Id. Additional instruction on what narrow tailoring requires comes from Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993). In Discovery Network, the Court was faced with a content-based restriction on speech: a city ordinance banned sidewalk newsracks which distributed commercial handbills, but not newsracks which distributed newspapers. Id. at 429, 113 S.Ct. 1505. A group of publishers of commercial handbills challenged the statute as an impermissible content-based restriction on speech prohibited by the First Amendment. Id. at 412, 113 S.Ct. 1505. The city defended the ordinance by contending it furthered its legitimate interest in ensuring safe streets and regulating visual blight. Id. at 415, 113 S.Ct. 1505. Cincinnati contended newsracks in general undermined safety and esthetics in the public right of way; thus, the ban on newsracks which contained a certain type of content was justified because it necessarily reduced the total number of newsracks on sidewalks. Id. at 415, 113 S.Ct. 1505. The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, because the selective and categorical content-based ban on newsracks containing handbills was not narrowly tailored to the city's purported interest. Id. at 417, 113 S.Ct. 1505. Although the city's desire to limit the total number of newsracks is justified by its interests in safety and esthetics, the statute was unrelated to any distinction between `commercial handbills' and `newspapers,' and thus was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 429-30, 113 S.Ct. 1505 (emphasis added, some internal quotation marks omitted). The Court said: The city has asserted an interest in esthetics, but respondent publishers' newsracks are no greater an eyesore than the newsracks permitted to remain on Cincinnati's sidewalks. Each newsrack, whether containing newspapers or commercial handbills, is equally unattractive.... [T]he city's primary concern, as argued to us, is with the aggregate number of newsracks on the streets. On that score, however, all newsracks, regardless whether they contain commercial or noncommercial publications, are equally at fault. Id. at 425-26, 113 S.Ct. 1505. Thus, the Court held the newsrack ordinance was not narrowly tailored, because there was no proof that newsracks containing handbills (banned) threatened the governmental interests in esthetics and safety to a greater degree than news-racks containing newspapers (permitted). Therefore, the Court held the costs and benefits of the statute had not been carefully calculated to meet the substantial governmental interest. See id. at 416 n. 12, 113 S.Ct. 1505. Notably, the ordinance did not regulate the number of newsracks permitted on the city's sidewalks, regardless their content. [8]
Synthesizing three decades of First Amendment cases, then, we take heed of two key principles. First, for us to sustain any content-based restriction, the government must prove both the reality of the recited harms and that the statute does not burden more speech than necessary by substantial evidence. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 211, 117 S.Ct. 1174. Substantial evidence must include substantial evidence in the record before Congress at the time of the statute's enaction. Id. Second, when Congress enacts a selective and categorical ban on speech, as here, the government must prove that the speech banned by a statute poses a greater threat to the government's purported interest than the speech permitted by the statute. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 425, 113 S.Ct. 1505.