Opinion ID: 2544552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: On December 4, 1998, a search warrant for the premises of the Fil-Am Video store was executed. At approximately 6:45 p.m., police officers and detectives with the Honolulu Police Department (HPD) arrived at the video store during regular business hours. [3] The detectives observed an unidentified man leaving the video store and requested that he re-enter the store. The detectives followed this man into the store, and, upon entering, the detective identified his office and stated that he was executing a search warrant. The detective asked one of the customers if a door located on the makai [4] side of the store was an office door. After receiving an affirmative response, HPD Officer William Richardson testified that he approached that door and [] knocked three separate times announcing myself, and the purpose being there with the search warrant, and there was no  no one came to the door to open it. Specifically, the officer stated, [P]olice department, search warrant. After waiting approximately fifteen seconds, he turned to his sergeant and was instructed to break the door. The office door was then kicked in. Upon breaking the door, the officers discovered Diaz standing in front of a desk holding a white unsealed envelope. Diaz then dropped the envelope on the floor, stating that she had just found that particular envelope on the ground. Inside the unsealed envelope that fell to the floor were baggies that the officers identified as resembling ice. Diaz's name was written on the outside of the envelope. On October 27, 1999, Diaz was indicted on one count of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree and one count of unlawful use of drug paraphernalia. A grand jury issued a bench warrant on October 28, 1999. On January 12, 2000, Diaz was served with the bench warrant for her arrest. On July 31, 2000, Diaz was convicted as charged. This timely appeal followed.
On July 18, 2000, Diaz filed a motion to dismiss charges for violation of HRPP Rule 48. [5] A hearing commenced on July 21, 2000, in which Diaz argued that the deputy sheriff's efforts to locate Diaz did not amount to due diligence. As evidence for this argument, Diaz noted that the deputy sheriff completed a computer check, but failed to check with the post office, the phone company, [6] or white pages of the telephone book. Diaz argued that she had reported the theft of her car to the police on November 15, 1999 and at that time had given the correct address. She further argued that on December 10, 1999 she had been involved in a minor traffic accident and had given the police her address. The prosecution argued that the deputy went to three different addresses. Neighbors at two locations had no knowledge of Diaz. The third address was a closed road. Finally, the prosecution argued that the deputy completed monthly computer checks. The trial court concluded that the 77 days that it took for the sheriffs to serve the grand jury bench warrant upon the defendant. . . [was] based upon the unavailability of the Defendant. The prosecution had requested a continuance of the trial on March 10, 2000 because a material witness was going to school on the mainland and unable to attend trial until the summer break. At the hearing, both defense counsel and Diaz consented to continuing the trial until the summer. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss charges finding that 125 days remained to try the case under HRPP Rule 48.
On July 27, 2000, the second day of trial, Diaz filed a motion to suppress evidence collected during the execution of the search warrant at the Fil-Am Video store. The prosecution argued that HRPP Rule 12(f) [7] provides that pretrial issues such as motions to suppress are deemed waived if not raised before trial. The trial court ruled that there was no good cause shown to grant relief because both counsel had full discovery, both counsel had full access to the defendant, and a motion could have been put forth within the deadline required.
Prior to trial commencing, Diaz filed a motion in limine seeking the exclusion of certain evidence, including reference to the search warrant addressed to Diaz. [8] The trial court limited the reference to the search warrant addressed to the Fil-Am Video store. The following exchange occurred among the court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor: THE COURT: . . . [Prosecutor], I think considering, among other things, that there are two, I'm going to deny your request to submit written documents into evidence and grant the defendant's motion to exclude them. I think the State does have obviously a legitimate right to show the jury that the police acted properly, shall we say, so you may, you know, elicit testimony with respect to the existence of the search warrant. With respect to the search warrant that permitted police to search the defendant, I would prefer that you  that perhaps you can lead and just keep it down to `pursuant to search warrant, did you search the defendant.' . . . . DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, so that I do not overly mention the fact of the search warrant to the jury, I would ask this Court if I could have a running objection to even the mention of a search warrant with respect to the search of the defendant. . . . . DEFENSE COUNSEL: The search warrants with respect to 3480 Salt Lake Boulevard, or her residence, nothing was found there. THE COURT: Okay, I think  unless the Defense wants that in, I think that's irrelevant, and I'm going to ask [prosecutor] not even to talk about two search warrants, one for her home, one for this individual, the man, whoever he may be. DEFENSE COUNSEL: And that's precisely the point. The search warrant that in fact recovered the illicit items, it was not addressed specifically with respect to Ms. Diaz, so if the prosecuting attorney will start asking questions with respect to did you search the defendant with regards to that search warrant, there will be the impression by the jury that that particular search warrant for Fil-Am Video was addressed for Ms. Diaz, and that's not the case. That search warrant was addressed to Aris Garcia, not Ms. Diaz. . . . . PROSECUTION: Your Honor, the State's not going to over-emphasize it. It's just going to ask the officers were you there pursuant to a search warrant, were you executing a search warrant, and that's it. THE COURT: All right. DEFENSE COUNSEL: And then I'd like to be free at that point to expand on that particular search warrant for the Fil-Am Video to point out to the officer that in fact the attention or focus of that search warrant was not Ms. Diaz, but someone else. PROSECUTOR: I'm going to object to that, Your Honor. He can't have part of it coming in. THE COURT: It's up to you, [defense counsel]. But, you know, if you open the door, then  you know, I don't know what you're going to ask or what the answer may be.

Trial commenced on July 26, 2000. During direct examination the prosecution asked Officer Bumanglag [n]ow, were you assigned to execute a search warrant on December 4, 1998? After receiving an affirmative answer, the prosecutor asked where the warrant was executed. No further reference by the prosecution was made regarding the warrants. During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Officer Bumanglag about the search warrant. Officer Bumanglag testified that Diaz was the subject of a search warrant. Defense counsel then asked, [N]ow, if I were to tell you that the warrant itself made no reference to Alicia Diaz, would that be correct? The prosecution objected and asked that the document be marked for identification. After viewing the document, the prosecutor objected because defense counsel was not using the complete warrant. [9] Defense counsel argued that the purpose of introducing that part of the warrant was to impeach Officer Bumanglag by demonstrating that Diaz's name was not on that warrant. The court permitted defense counsel to submit the warrant over the prosecution's objection. Questioning again proceeded with the following exchange: DEFENSE COUNSEL: Officer Bumanglag, again, on December 4, 1998, you saw the warrant, you read the warrant, right? BUMANGLAG: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: And if I were to tell you that there is no mention of an Alicia Diaz, would that be correct? . . . . BUMANGLAG: Not on that search warrant. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I object. May I approach? Your Honor, I would move for a mistrial. There was a clear instruction by this Court that there is to be no mention of the second warrant until I open the door. I have not opened the door. THE COURT: [Defense Counsel] you're on dangerous ground. The trial court ruled that the answer came from the witness and that it was not unreasonable, given the fact that there were two warrants. The trial court subsequently denied the motion for mistrial. Defense counsel continued questioning Officer Bumanglag, eliciting testimony that the warrant for Fil-Am Video store was not addressed to Diaz.
The prosecution questioned HPD Officer Shirley Brown regarding the weight and contents of several baggies containing crystal methamphetamine. Officer Brown testified as to the chain of custody for baggies identified as exhibits 28, 29, 30, and 31. Each piece of evidence was found at the Fil-Am Video store in the possession of Diaz. The combined weight of these exhibits was 4.92 grams. HPD Officer Akina testified as to the chain of custody for exhibit number 4, which was discovered on Diaz during a search of her person and an inventory search at the police station. The search of Diaz's person was delayed until a female officer was present to complete the search. Officer Akina made a written report indicating what was found during the search, but testified that the hard copy of the report was lost and it was not standard operating procedure to make backups on the computers. Defense counsel objected to this testimony, arguing that the defense had a right to the police report and that if police reports or discovery is destroyed or lost for whatever reason, then this Court can strike the testimony. Defense counsel further argued that since Diaz was searched at the scene and the baggie was not found, and then searched again at the police station and the baggie was then found, the veracity of the officer's testimony was legitimately in question. The prosecution stated that there were no female officers at the scene, and, therefore the search at the police station was more thorough. The court admitted the testimony and requested that the prosecution ask Officer Akina to search for the report. Officer Brown testified as to the weight and content of exhibit number 4. The weight of exhibit number 4 was .263 grams and the combined weight of all of the exhibits was 5.189 grams.
The only witness Diaz called was Marissa Rosqueta, whose presence was compelled by subpoena. The trial court made a deputy public defender (DPD) available to Rosqueta because she was present at the Fil-Am Video store when the police executed the search warrant and drug paraphernalia was found in her vicinity. Rosqueta exercised her constitutional right not to testify pursuant to the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. Diaz then requested that the court order the prosecution to either offer Rosqueta immunity for her testimony or that the prosecution seek an indictment against her. The court refused to do so. Diaz was subsequently convicted of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. This timely appeal followed.