Opinion ID: 2008604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: statutes of limitation: application

Text: Now that we have established the outside date of accrual of the College's claims, we will apply the statutes of limitation. The College asserted claims for breach of warranty, claims in tort and claims for fraud. The applicable statute of limitations for breach of warranty, 13 Pa.C.S. § 2725, permits an action to be brought within four years from tender of delivery of the goods. The building was completed in 1973. An exception addressing the situation in which the warranty extends to future performance does not apply in this case because there was no express warranty extending to future performance. Cucchi v. Rollins Protective Services, 377 Pa.Super. 9, 546 A.2d 1131 (1988). Further, the tort discovery rule does not apply to breach of warranty actions. Patton v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 360 Pa.Super 1, 519 A.2d 959 (1986). Therefore, the action would have had to have been brought by spring of 1983. We do not reach the issues of standing and status of parties raised by the College. The College's strict liability and failure to warn claims in tort are also time-barred. The statute of limitation for these actions, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524, sets forth a two-year time period. Therefore, these actions were time-barred after the spring of 1981 at the latest. Finally, the College received leave to amend its complaint on December 30, 1985 to bring fraud charges against Dow. Generally a claimant has six years in which to bring suit for fraud claims arising before February, 1983. Borysowski v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 368 Pa.Super. 399, 534 A.2d 496 (1987); 42 Pa.C.S. § 5527. Because the building was substantially completed in 1973, the College would have had to bring fraud claims based upon fraudulent misrepresentation upon sale of Sarabond by 1979. The College asserts that because Dow's concealment prevented it from discovering that Sarabond caused defects, the statute should not have begun to run until the College's claimed date of discovery, or, in the alternative, that Dow should be estopped from asserting a statutes of limitation defense altogether. If the party committing fraud is also guilty of some acts of concealment or deception which hides from the plaintiff that he has a cause of action, then the statute will run from the time discovery of the alleged fraud is made, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been made. Turtzo v. Boyer, 370 Pa. 526, 88 A.2d 884 (1952). The College alleged that Dow's report was a fraudulent misrepresentation that lulled it into believing that it could have no action against Dow. We agree with the trial court that, following Dow's 1979 letter recommending that the College have an independent inspection performed, the College's discovery of cracks and the knowledge that Dow was being sued elsewhere for damages due to Sarabond, no reasonable person would have relied on Dow's subsequent denial of liability in the report. We also agree with the trial court that Dow's behavior was not such that the equitable principle of estoppel should preclude it from asserting the statute of limitations. Where by fraud or concealment the defendant causes the plaintiff to relax viligance or deviate from his right of inquiry, the defendant is estopped from invoking the statute of limitations. Molineux v. Reed, 516 Pa. 398, 532 A.2d 792 (1987). Although mere silence or nondisclosure is not enough to trigger estoppel, the adversary must commit some affirmative independent act of concealment upon which the plaintiffs justifiably rely in order to toll the statute. Walters v. Ditzler, 424 Pa. 445, 227 A.2d 833 (1967); Dobbs on Remedies § 2.3 at 42 (1973). Dow's 1979 letter actually served to warn the College, not lull it into complacency, about a possible cause of action. The College was not even aware before receipt of the letter that its building contained Sarabond. Further, the letter suggested that the College have an independent inspection. Following this entire chain of events, it was completely unreasonable for the College to rely on Dow's disclaimer of liability in its later report, and, in fact, this disclaimer of liability cannot even be characterized as concealment. Therefore, we conclude, as did the trial court, that no estoppel principle operates here. The trial court refuted Dow's assertion in its motion for summary judgment that the statute of repose for construction projects, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536, bars any action against Dow. We do not address this issue. The purpose of the statute is to bar actions brought beyond twelve years from completion of construction for personal injuries resulting from construction defects. Catanzaro v. Wasco Products, Inc., 339 Pa.Super 481, 489 A.2d 262 (1981). The present case does not involve a claim resulting from personal injuries. The trial court's exhaustive analysis of all aspects of the motion for summary judgment led it to conclude that the College demonstrated an egregious lack of diligence in bringing its cause of action against Dow. No facts were disputed. The nonmoving party, in response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, must in response set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Pa.R.C.P. 1035(d). The trial court concluded that the College failed to do this. The trial court's grant of Dow's motion for summary judgment was proper. Hence, we affirm the order. Order affirmed.