Opinion ID: 1678482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether, as applied, sec. 947.01, stats., as adopted by city of oak creek municipal ordinance sec. 9:947:01, is void for vagueness

Text: [7] The concept of vagueness or indefiniteness rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication. The primary issues involved are whether the provisions of a penal statute are sufficiently definite to give reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct to those who wish to avoid its penalties and to apprise judge and jury of standards for the determination of guilt. If the statute is so obscure that people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applicability, it is unconstitutional. State v. McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d 274, 285-86, 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988); Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 406, 407 N.W.2d 533 (1987). [8] Section 947.01, Stats., has previously been challenged for vagueness. In Givens, this court held that the fact that a statute fails to itemize with particularity every possible kind of conduct which would violate such statute does not make it unconstitutionally vague. Givens, 28 Wis. 2d at 117. In addition, we held that the disorderly conduct statute is reasonably explicit. [T]he six types of affirmative conduct which are expressly listed in the statute all tend to disrupt good order and to provoke a disturbance. When the statute, after the specific enumerations, in a catchall clause proscribes otherwise disorderly conduct which tends to provoke a disturbance, this must mean conduct of a type not previously enumerated but similar thereto in having a tendency to disrupt good order and to provoke a disturbance. Such interpretation rests upon the rule of ejusdem generis ....Upon this approach, the instant statute sufficiently identifies the type of behavior which the legislature intended to be contrary to law. Id. at 115 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Zwicker, we determined that sec. 947.01(1), Stats. (1967), sufficiently identified the type of behavior which the legislature intended to be contrary to law and that the statute was not subject to an attack for vagueness. Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d at 507-08. Wisconsin's disorderly conduct statute proscribes conduct in terms of results which can reasonably be expected therefrom, rather than attempting to enumerate the limitless number of antisocial acts which a person could engage in that would menace, disrupt or destroy public order. The statute does not imply that all conduct which tends to annoy another is disorderly conduct. Only such conduct as unreasonably offends the sense of decency or propriety of the community is included. The statute does not punish a person for conduct which might possibly offend some hypercritical individual. The design of the disorderly conduct statute is to proscribe substantial intrusions which offend the normal sensibilities of average persons or which constitute significantly abusive or disturbing demeanor in the eyes of reasonable persons. Id. at 508. Finally, in affirming the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in Zwicker v. Boll, 391 U.S. 353 (1968), we are of the opinion that the United States Supreme Court made a determination that the Wisconsin disorderly conduct statute is not vague. See State v. Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d at 508. [9] The appellant asserts that sec. 947.01, Stats., as applied in this instance, failed to give the appellant notice that his conduct was prohibited. This argument is without merit. The appellant certainly seemed to know that arrest for his conduct was possible, since he was the first to mention it. More importantly, however, is that persons of common intelligence would realize that repeated refusals to obey a police officer's reasonable order in a situation in which crowd control was a major concern, combined with continued penetration into a nonpublic restricted area in the presence of the general public, is conduct which, although not violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous or unreasonably loud, is similar thereto in having a tendency to disrupt good order and to provoke a disturbance. Therefore, we conclude that sec. 947.01, Stats., is not constitutionally void for vagueness as applied.