Opinion ID: 8414571
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements of Entrapment (Pattern Instruction 6.01)

Text: “Entrapment is a defense to criminal liability when the defendant was not predisposed to commit the charged crime before the intervention of the government’s agents and the government’s conduct induced him to commit it.” United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The two elements of the defense—lack of predisposition and government inducement — are conceptually related but formally distinct. Id. The instruction given on the elements of entrapment read as follows: With respect to Counts One through Nine, the government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped by the informant or law enforcement officers. The government must prove either: 1. Law enforcement officers and their agents did not induce the defendant to commit the offense; or 2. The defendant was predisposed to commit the offense before he had contact with law enforcement offi- . cers or their agents. If the defendant was predisposed, then he was not entrapped, even though law enforcement officers or their agents provided a favorable opportunity to commit the offense, made committing the offense easier, or participated in acts essential to the offense. At the instructions conference, Hilliard’s defense counsel objected based on the difference between subsection 1 of the instruction given and that of Seventh Circuit Pattern Instruction § 6.04, which reads: “Law enforcement officers and their agents did not persuade or otherwise induce .... ” Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit § 6.04 (2012) (emphasis added). Hilliard points out on appeal that we used both “induce” and “persuade” throughout our en banc opinion in Mayfield, in which we “clarif[ied] the doctrine [of entrapment] both substantively and procedurally.” 771 F.3d at 420. Hilliard also notes that the Supreme Court likewise used “persuade” in the “seminal” entrapment cases Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932) and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L,Ed.2d 848 (1958). Two additional instructions that were given — one of which the parties both agreed on and the other one of which defendant agreed to after a minor edit— further defined the term “inducement.” The government argued at the instructions conference and maintains on appeal that Mayfield defined “inducement” in such a way that retaining the word “persuade” from the pattern instruction would be inappropriate. Mayfield held in relevant part that inducement “means more than mere government solicitation of the crime; the fact that government agents initiated contact with the defendant, suggested the crime, or furnished the ordinary opportunity to commit it is insufficient to show inducement.” 771 F.3d at 434; see also id. at 433 (“[Something more is required, either in terms of the character and degree of the government’s persistence or persuasion, or the nature of the enticement or reward....”). Rather, “inducement means government solicitation of the crime plus some other government conduct that creates a risk that a person who would not commit the crime if left to his own devices will do so in response to the government’s efforts.” Id. at 434-35. We then noted that the “other conduct” could include “repeated attempts at persuasion, fraudulent representations, ... coercive tactics, harassment,” etc. Id. at 435. Given May-field’s explicit reference to persuasion as only one part of the required showing for inducement, Hilliard’s proposed instruction (that is, Pattern Instruction § 6.04) could have incorrectly led the jury to believe a defendant could satisfy the inducement prong by showing mere persuasion. The district court thus acted within its discretion in giving the instruction it did.