Opinion ID: 1444402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conceded Prejudicial Misconduct

Text: On November 30, 1992, in a small claims matter involving construction work done on property, judgment was entered for Thorn Hertwig against Tyrone Henderson as agent for Rickey Henderson. In January 1993, Hertwig amended his claim to add Rickey Henderson as a defendant. On May 24, 1993, the parties appeared for trial, and petitioner conducted a settlement conference. Also present was Ben Savage, the realtor who had sold the property to Rickey Henderson, who came to court as a witness for Hertwig. The parties agreed to a settlement, and a judgment was entered on May 24, 1993, directing Rickey Henderson to pay Hertwig $1,357.93. According to petitioner, the judgment did not mention Savage because Savage, although agreeing to pay damages, did not want a judgment entered against him. Savage disputed petitioner's recollection, testifying that he did not agree or respond when petitioner stated at the settlement conference that Savage should pay half of the damages. Savage later failed to pay Hertwig. In February 1994, although Savage had never been named or served in the action, petitioner directed entry of a corrected judgment that identified him as a defendant and directed him to pay damages. Savage appealed to the superior court, which reversed the judgment. On these facts, the Commission unanimously concluded that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct because he made no effort to comply with or follow the law when he entered judgment without providing Savage, who was never named as a party, notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Commission reasoned that petitioner acted solely upon his belief that Savage ought to pay, and his pique that [Savage] did not. Petitioner does not contest the Commission's findings and conclusion. (See Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1983) 33 Cal.3d 359, 374, 188 Cal.Rptr. 880, 657 P.2d 372 ( Gonzalez ) [basing discipline on disregard for even the minimal requirements of fairness and due process].)
Attorney Nancy Staggs, who was representing a criminal defendant before petitioner, did not appear at a scheduled hearing. After an unrecorded telephone conference with Staggs's office, petitioner stated in open court: She shouldn't be handling criminal cases. [H] Here's another example of a civil attorney who shouldn't be handling criminal cases. Petitioner then commented that Staggs probably had something more important to do today, like go to a PTA meeting. He continued: She has a whole bunch of kids. She's been having kids ever since I've known her. Before the special masters, petitioner denied making these comments, suggested that the court reporter made [them] up to assist petitioner's political opponents, and stated that he had instead made complimentary remarks about Staggs. However, he also admitted sending Staggs a letter of apology. In his petition to this court, petitioner accepts the [Commission's unanimous] finding that his statements concerning Ms. Staggs were inappropriate and could be deemed prejudicial misconduct. (See Kennick, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 325, 267 Cal. Rptr. 293, 787 P.2d 591 [basing finding of prejudicial misconduct on unprofessional, demeaning and sexist remarks].)
During the first half of 1994, petitioner was running for reelection; the primary was scheduled for June 7, 1994. At the end of a court session in late April 1994, petitioner had a group photograph taken of court staff and others who appeared before him. Petitioner's clerk and the public defender initially declined petitioner's request that they pose for the picture. The public defender was busy with clients when petitioner came to her office and made the request. However, after petitioner insisted that they participate, both reluctantly agreed. Petitioner's clerk felt that petitioner had ordered her to participate and that she had no choice. Based on petitioner's representations, almost all of those photographed believed the picture was simply a personal memento; none understood that petitioner would use it in his reelection campaign. [3] Indeed, both the public defender and the clerk had informed petitioner they did not want to be involved in the campaign. Despite this knowledge and contrary to his representations, in May 1994, petitioner asked a local newspaper to print the photograph. The newspaper responded that, because of the imminent election, it would not do so without charge, and that it would publish the photograph only as a paid advertisement. Petitioner agreed to pay to have the picture published. On May 26, one week before the election, the picture appeared in the paper with the caption, PAID POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT. [4] On this record, the special masters concluded that part of [petitioner's] motivation in placing the advertisement was to assist his re-election campaign, and that by failing to get consent from those photographed, his conduct surrounding the taking and use of the photograph ... constitute[d] prejudicial misconduct. The Commission unanimously agreed. In this court, petitioner concedes the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conclusion that he committed prejudicial misconduct in using the photograph for political purposes without getting consent from all participants. However, he contests the conclusion that his conduct surrounding the taking of the photograph constituted prejudicial misconduct. In light of the circumstances here, we reject petitioner's contention. Petitioner himself testified that at least part of his purpose in having the picture taken was to assist his campaign. By insisting (over objections) that everyone participate, securing cooperation by stating that the picture was simply a personal memento, and failing to disclose his intent to use the picture in his campaign, petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct both in taking and using the picture for campaign purposes. (See Gonzalez, supra, 33 Cal.3d 359 at p. 374, 188 Cal.Rptr. 880, 657 P.2d 372 [exploitation of judicial office for political ends seriously and impermissibly undermines public esteem for the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary].)
On August 12, 1992, petitioner met in his chambers with a court clerk to discuss her pending termination from employment. After petitioner informed the clerk of the meeting's purpose and that he was tape-recording their conversation, the clerk replied that she did not want to discuss the issue unless her union representative was present, and she started to leave. Petitioner then stated: Sit down.... I am ordering you to sit down here and talk to me. The clerk left petitioner's chambers. Petitioner followed her and ordered her back into the office, but she refused to come and made a telephone call. As she made the call, petitioner, who was upset, said loudly: [Y]ou are in contempt. Petitioner does not dispute the Commission's unanimous finding that he committed prejudicial misconduct in making this statement.
After his arrest on June 26, 1994, Richard Henderson was charged with possession of cocaine and marijuana. Petitioner later spoke with Henderson's uncle, who asked petitioner whether Henderson's mother could talk to him about Henderson's case and about helping Henderson with his drug problem. Petitioner replied that she could call him, but advised that she should not discuss the case with him. Henderson's uncle, who is a clergyman, expressed an interest in counseling Henderson. Henderson's mother telephoned petitioner at his home a few days later to discuss her son's case and to make an appointment to see petitioner. She related Henderson's version of the arrest to petitioner. She also told petitioner that her son had a drug problem and smoked marijuana with his father. She requested that her son receive a heavy sentence that included Christian counseling. Petitioner, who knew the case would be before him, told her the district attorney would decide whether Henderson received drug counseling as part of any disposition. Petitioner did not believe the contact was improper because he viewed it as a confidential mother asking for help for her son and he believed that [Henderson] would not even know of the conversation. Petitioner did not believe Henderson was entitled to know petitioner was communicating with Henderson's family members regarding his drug use. During the conversation, petitioner set up a meeting with Henderson's parents for sometime during the next two weeks. On August 2, at the beginning of a hearing on Henderson's case, petitioner met with counsel in his chambers and disclosed his discussion with Henderson's parents and uncle about counseling, and the uncle's desire to be involved in the counseling. He also informed counsel that, because of these contacts, he was out of this case, and the probation department should consider whether Henderson qualified for diversion and counseling. After the probation department prepared the diversion report, but before a scheduled September 6 diversion hearing, petitioner met with Henderson's parents in his chambers. He gave them a copy of the diversion report and the police report so they could see the situation there and the problems that they ha[d] with their son. He also advised them about how to deal with Henderson. Henderson's parents again requested that their son receive a heavy sentence that included Christian counseling. Petitioner replied that he could not order someone to receive Christian counseling. Sometime after Henderson received diversion, his father left a telephone message for petitioner. When petitioner returned the call, Henderson's father stated that Henderson was not complying with diversion requirements. Petitioner then determined that the probation department had not received notice Henderson was on diversion because the minute order did not reflect this disposition. The Commission unanimously found that petitioner's ex parte contacts with members of Henderson's family constituted prejudicial misconduct. Petitioner concedes that these contacts gave `rise to an appearance of impropriety,' could reasonably be considered prejudicial to public esteem for the judicial office, and constituted prejudicial conduct. (See former Cal.Code Jud. Conduct, now Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3B(7), adopted eff. Oct. 5, 1992 [prohibiting ex parte communications].) [5]