Opinion ID: 1447881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Use of Robbery Evidence at Penalty Phase

Text: As noted earlier, the four robbery counts with which defendant had originally been charged were severed before the guilt phase trial began. (25) At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence regarding those robberies. Defendant contends this unconstitutionally forced him to choose between testifying about four charged but severed robbery counts or remaining silent at the penalty phase. In People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1056 [251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680], we rejected a virtually identical contention, relying on McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [28 L.Ed.2d 711, 91 S.Ct. 1454]. Defendant seeks to distinguish Caro on the basis that, unlike the defendant in Caro who faced no pending charges on the crimes as to which he contended he was forced to testify, here defendant was actually facing pending charges on the robbery counts. The defendant in Caro challenged the introduction of evidence of killings for which he might at some future date be tried.... ( People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1055.) The possible consequences of defendant's choice to testify or not are identical here. Moreover, if defendant had testified at the penalty phase, but not testified about the robberies on direct examination at the penalty phase, any attempt to cross-examine him on that subject would not have survived a timely objection as to scope. ( Id. at pp. 1056-1057.)