Opinion ID: 3065914
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State PCR and federal habeas proceedings

Text: Cook, with the help of a lawyer (hereinafter “appellate counsel”), filed a direct appeal in which he raised 16 issues. Cook argued, among other things, that the trial court had erred in allowing him to waive his appointed trial counsel. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this claim, explaining that “[w]hile Cook certainly lacked a lawyer’s skills, the record demonstrates that he was intellectually competent, understood the trial process, and was capable of making—and did make —rational decisions in managing his case.” Cook, 821 P.2d at 739. While his appeal was pending, Cook filed a motion to relieve his appellate counsel for allegedly failing to communicate with him and explain the issues to him. Cook also filed, pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, a PCR petition asserting IAC by his pretrial counsel. Cook’s appellate counsel moved to withdraw or, in the alternative, to have the Arizona Supreme Court clarify his status. The Arizona Supreme Court denied the motion to withdraw and issued an order finding Cook’s PCR petition premature, appointing new counsel for PCR proceedings, and granting additional time to file an amended PCR petition, if necessary. About nine months later, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Cook’s conviction and sentence. Cook, 821 P.2d at 756. The United States Supreme Court denied Cook’s petition for certiorari. Cook v. Arizona, 506 U.S. 846 (1992). In September 1993, Cook filed, through counsel John Williams (hereinafter “first PCR counsel”), a “Supplement to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief” in Arizona Superior 8580 COOK v. RYAN Court. The supplemental petition raised nine claims, two of which were that Cook’s pretrial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and prepare for trial and sentencing, and that this ineffectiveness forced Cook to choose between ineffective counsel and self-representation. In May 1994, Cook’s first PCR counsel moved to withdraw due to a conflict and the court appointed a new attorney, Michael Terribile (hereinafter “second PCR counsel”). In various rulings issued in late 1994 and early 1995, the trial court—which was the same court that presided over Cook’s trial and sentencing—rejected some of Cook’s supplemental PCR issues as precluded or not colorable and denied the others on their merits after holding evidentiary hearings to receive any newly discovered evidence.2 In denying Cook’s pretrial IAC and “forced” self- representation claims, the court explained that Cook failed to show prejudice or deficient performance. Specifically: (1) there was “no evidence of witnesses who could have been called that would have testified in a way that was beneficial” to Cook; (2) the court could only speculate as to what might have happened at trial had Cook not represented himself or had Cook’s pretrial counsel “done a better job”; (3) Cook did not show any specific deficiency, and no case required the judge to inquire into the effectiveness of appointed counsel in determining whether a waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Cook, through his second PCR counsel, filed a motion for rehearing regarding several of the claims asserted in his supplemental PCR petition, as well as one new claim. Cook sought rehearing of his self-representation/waiver claim, but not of his pretrial IAC claim. The court denied the motion for rehearing. Cook then filed a petition for review that simply 2 During one of the evidentiary hearings, Cook’s second PCR counsel elicited testimony about pretrial counsel’s actions in preparing Cook’s case, alleged inexperience with capital cases and applicable law, and personal problems. COOK v. RYAN 8581 stated, “Daniel Wayne Cook, through counsel and pursuant to Rule 32.9 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, petitions the Arizona Supreme Court for review.” The Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition and the United States Supreme Court denied Cook’s petition for certiorari. Cook v. Arizona, 519 U.S. 1013 (1996). In January 1997, Cook filed a federal habeas petition in Arizona district court. The court appointed habeas counsel and granted Cook’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.3 Cook asserted 21 claims for relief, among them the claim that his decision to waive counsel was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, as well as the claim that his pretrial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate mitigating evidence. The district court denied Cook’s waiver claim on its merits, holding that no clearly established federal law required the state trial court to inquire into Cook’s dissatisfaction with pretrial counsel’s performance before allowing him to waive representation. Cook v. Schriro, No. 97-cv-00146-RCB, 2006 WL 842276, at -10 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2006) (unpublished). As for Cook’s independent pretrial IAC claim, the court held that this claim was procedurally barred because Cook had failed to preserve it in his motion for rehearing. Under the version of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9 that applied to Cook, [a]ny party aggrieved by a final decision of the trial court in these proceedings may, within ten days after the ruling of the court, move the court for a rehearing setting forth in detail the grounds for believing the court erred. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(a). Moreover, “[o]n denial of a motion 3 The court originally appointed an attorney from the federal public defender’s office, but he was replaced by a Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”) attorney. That CJA attorney continues to represent Cook, including in this appeal. 8582 COOK v. RYAN for rehearing any party aggrieved may petition the appropriate appellate court for review of the actions of the trial court.” Id. R. 32.9(c). Thus, a petitioner could (but was not required to) seek rehearing, but doing so was a prerequisite to further review. Moreover, failure to file a detailed motion for rehearing waived further review.4 See State v. Gause, 541 P. 2d 396, 397 (Ariz. 1975); State v. Bortz, 821 P. 2d 236, 239 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). On appeal in 2008, we affirmed the district court’s rulings. As relevant here, we concluded that “the state trial court’s determination that Cook’s waiver of his right to counsel was voluntary . . . was not objectively unreasonable.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1015. We also affirmed the district court’s ruling that Cook’s claim that his pretrial counsel was ineffective was procedurally barred. Specifically, we held that “preclusion for failure to preserve the issue on motion for rehearing was proper” under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and 32.9(c), and thus that “Cook must demonstrate cause and prejudice in order to excuse his procedural default.” Id. at 1027 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). Cook argued that he had cause because his second PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve his pretrial IAC claim in the motion for rehearing and the petition for review. We rejected this argument, citing a long line of Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases for the proposition that IAC in postconviction proceedings does not establish cause. Id. at 102728; see, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53; see also Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing these cases); Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (same). We also 4 The Arizona Supreme Court changed Rule 32.9 in June 1992 to eliminate the requirement for a detailed motion for rehearing. However, the court made that change applicable only to defendants sentenced after December 1, 1992, well after Cook’s sentencing. Cook’s first PCR counsel “realized that the former Rule 32.9 governed the case and filed an unopposed motion for rehearing to conform to the old rule.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1026-27. COOK v. RYAN 8583 cited the fact that Cook had no right to counsel at the motion for rehearing stage. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (citing State v. Smith, 910 P.2d 1, 4 (Ariz. 1996) (“After counsel or the pro per defendant submits the post-conviction petition to the court and the trial court makes its required review and disposition, counsel’s obligations are at an end.”)). Because Cook was unable to show cause, we did not consider whether he suffered prejudice. Id. at 1028 n.13. We affirmed the district court’s denial of Cook’s habeas petition, and the Supreme Court denied Cook’s petition for certiorari. Id. at 1031; Cook v. Schriro, 555 U.S. 1141 (2009).