Opinion ID: 1444031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the reference to reneau as the other individual on the special verdict form confused the jury.

Text: The Le'Galls assert that the trial court should not have referred to Reneau as the other individual in the special verdict form. We agree. IDJI 283-B contains the basic special verdict questions for actions in which a nonparty is involved. The special verdict questions at issue in this case are quoted below, with the important modifications by the trial court of IDJI 283-B indicated in italics: QUESTION NO. 5: We find that the parties contributed to the cause of the accident in the following percentages: (a) Plaintiff Richard Le'Gall ___% (b) Defendant Lewis County, Idaho ___% (c) Defendants Robert and Patricia Wherry [the building owners] ___% (d) Russ Reneau ___% Total 100% If the percentage of negligence attributed to Plaintiff Richard Le'Gall is equal to or greater than the percentage of negligence attributed to each Defendant or other individual, then you will not answer any further questions, but will sign the verdict because the law prohibits recovery if the Plaintiff's negligence is equal to or greater than the negligence of any of the Defendants. If the percentage of negligence attributed to Plaintiff Richard Le'Gall is less than the percentage of negligence attributed to any defendant or other individual, then you will answer Question No. 6. QUESTION NO. 6: What is the total amount of damages sustained by Plaintiffs as a result of this accident? ANSWER: $ ____ The county suggested the addition of the words or other individual. The trial court added the second modification, known as a Seppi instruction, which explains what would happen if the jury found Le'Gall's negligence equal to or greater than that of either of the defendants' negligence. Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683 (1978). This Court has stated the standard for reviewing a possible error of law in a special verdict form. Cosgrove v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 117 Idaho 470, 788 P.2d 1293 (1990). In Cosgrove, this Court addressed whether making a proximate cause instruction the first question of a special verdict form caused the jury to decide the issue of negligence and strict liability too quickly. The Court explained that: It was hardly an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court to submit the question of proximate cause to the jury first, since if they found that the product did not cause the appellants' injuries, then the jury would not have to struggle with the other complex scientific issues of whether the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous, or whether Merrell Dow was guilty of negligence. There was no showing that the special verdict form confused the jury, and the jury was correctly instructed on the definition of proximate cause in an instruction patterned after IDJI 230. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in arranging the order of the questions on the special jury verdict form. Id. at 477-78, 788 P.2d at 1300-01 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Based on the analysis in Cosgrove, the Le'Galls must show that the jury was incorrectly instructed on the law at issue or that the special verdict form confused the jury. The part of question five in the special verdict form which refers to the Le'Galls not being able to recover if Le'Gall's negligence was equal to or greater than the negligence of any of the defendants is a correct instruction on the law of comparative negligence. I.C. § 6-801 (1990). The references to the other individual are unnecessary because the relationship between Le'Gall's negligence and Reneau's negligence was irrelevant to this action. The Le'Galls could not recover from Reneau in this action because Reneau was not a party. The Le'Galls have not shown that the jury was incorrectly instructed. The references to the other individual are unnecessary, but not misstatements of law. Also, the comparative negligence instruction is correct. The special verdict form contains an implication, however, that the Le'Galls could recover from someone, perhaps Reneau, if Le'Gall's negligence was less than Reneau's negligence. This implication arises because the third paragraph of question five tells the jury to answer question six if Le'Gall's negligence is less than the negligence of the other individual. The implication is that someone must be liable to the Le'Galls for the damages contained in the answer to question six. We conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have apportioned negligence to the county differently if the special verdict form had not contained the references to the other individual. The fact that the jury answered question six shows the third paragraph confused it. Also, during its deliberations, the jury asked the judge: Who pays for damages? Is it assigned by the % we assigned to each party? This question indicates that the jury was trying to determine how its apportionment of negligence affected the Le'Galls' recovery. If it had understood that its apportionment would prohibit the Le'Galls from recovery, it might have apportioned negligence differently. Jurys are informed about the affect their apportioning of negligence has on recovery to insure that they think carefully about their answers and that the verdict reflects their view of the facts. Seppi, 99 Idaho at 193-94, 579 P.2d at 690-91. We conclude that the jury was confused by the reference to the other individual. The jury may have even believed that the Le'Galls could recover from the county if Le'Gall's negligence was less than Reneau's negligence.