Opinion ID: 2368225
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legality of police observations secured on private property

Text: As noted previously, some of the information relied upon by the police, in stopping the Rand vehicle as the defendant was traveling towards his home, had been secured sometime earlier when the car was parked in a private driveway on Gothic Street. Prints on the ground similar to those seen at the scene of the burglary, fingerprints on the car trunk, the frostless appearance of the car's windows, the license plate of the vehicle, with the aid of artificial lighting, were all observed by the officers after their approach to the automobile by walking up the driveway. We recognize that, absence existent circumstances, the mere fact the police are conducting an official investigation does not authorize or justify resort to police intrusions without consent upon private property in breach of reasonable expectancies of privacy. See State v. Richards, Me., 296 A.2d 129, 137 (1972); State v. Crider, Me., 341 A.2d 1, 5 (1975). The Gothic Street driveway, running as it does from the street to the two multiple-housing buildings at the end thereof and serving as a walkway or path to provide access to people to and from the several apartments therein, negates an actual subjective absolute expectation of privacy on the part of the occupants, but admits of a reasonable expectation that various members of society may use the driveway in their personal or business pursuits with persons residing therein, including the police on legitimate police business. Police officers in the performance of their duties may, without violating the constitution, peaceably enter upon a common driveway of a multiple dwelling without a warrant or express permission to do so. It is not unreasonable for police officers, in the pursuit of criminal investigations, to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses at their homes. No colorable Fourth Amendment question would have arisen from the fact the officers, if they had so chosen to do, had walked up the driveway to the door of the lit-up apartment in order to knock on the door and to seek information respecting the suspect car in the driveway. Thus, knowledge obtained by the officers respecting matters outside the interior of the automobile was in no way acquired in violation of Fourth Amendment rights, since the driveway did not afford, at least to the extent used in this case, the security of an area in which society would deem an expectation of privacy to be reasonable. See State v. Crider, supra, at 4-5; State v. Corbett, 15 Or.App. 470, 516 P.2d 487 (1973); State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash.2d 263, 616 P.2d 649, 651 (1980). See also State v. Warner, Me., 237 A.2d 150, 160 (1967).