Opinion ID: 4538751
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Procedural History in Virginia Case

Text: On August 24, 2015, Green sued Diagnostic Imaging, Dr. Rao, Dr. Bhatti, Clinch Valley Medical Center, Dr. Pimentel, and Clinch Valley Surgery in the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, alleging wrongful death under Code § 8.01-50 and a survival action for personal injury under Code § 8.01-25. On August 11, 2016, Clinch Valley Medical Center filed a plea in bar, contending that the survival action was barred by the statute of limitations. Clinch Valley Surgery and Dr. 4 Pimentel filed a plea in bar on August 12, 2016, which incorporated by reference Clinch Valley Medical Center’s plea in bar. On December 15, 2016, the circuit court granted Green’s motion to nonsuit the case, without prejudice, regarding Clinch Valley Medical Center. On April 3, 2018, the circuit court granted Green’s request for leave to amend the complaint, and Green filed an amended complaint on that same day. The amended complaint does not include Clinch Valley Medical Center as a defendant or assert the survival action for personal injury. The amended complaint solely asserts a wrongful death action under Code § 8.01-50, alleging that Dr. Bhatti, Clinch Valley Surgery, Dr. Pimentel, Diagnostic Imaging, and Dr. Rao (collectively the Virginia Defendants) were negligent and that their “failure to identify and treat [the decedent’s] mesenteric ischemia when her ischemic bowel was salvageable was a proximate cause of her death.” The amended complaint, in part, alleges that the Virginia Defendants diverged from the necessary standard of care as follows: a. they failed to identify ischemic bowel that was clearly present on the CT scan taken on May 26; b. they failed to identify a clearly occluded superior mesenteric artery present on the CT scan taken on May 26; c. they failed to identify an occluded superior mesenteric artery and resulting bowel ischemia as a potential cause of Mrs. Green’s symptoms; d. they failed to rule out an occluded superior mesenteric artery and resulting bowel ischemia as a cause of Mrs. Green’s symptoms; e. they failed to treat Mrs. Green for an occluded superior mesenteric artery and resulting bowel ischemia, f. they failed to have her transferred to another facility for treatment; g. they failed to conduct a proper differential diagnosis with regard to Mrs. Green’s symptoms; and/or 5 h. they failed to comply with the applicable standards of care under the circumstances then and there existing. In late April 2018, the Virginia Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss. The Virginia Defendants later filed a joint memorandum of law in support of their motions to dismiss. They argued that Green’s lawsuits in Kentucky and Virginia asserted the same injuries—“that the Virginia and Kentucky defendants failed to identify and treat the Decedent’s mesenteric ischemia when her ischemic bowel was salvageable, which is alleged to be a proximate cause of her death.” The Virginia Defendants contended that Code § 8.01-56 barred Green’s wrongful death action in Virginia because Green had already elected his remedy when he recovered for personal injury to the decedent in Kentucky. Additionally, the Virginia Defendants argued that the prohibition against claim-splitting and double recovery barred Green from “split[ting] his single cause of action into two separate claims and recover[ing] under both,” and that the wrongful death action was also barred by judicial estoppel. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted the Virginia Defendants’ motions to dismiss on November 15, 2018, and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. In its letter opinion, dated September 20, 2018, the circuit court concluded that Code § 8.01-56 barred Green’s wrongful death action in Virginia. The circuit court stated that Code § 8.01-56 requires plaintiffs in Virginia “to make an election as to whether they want to recover for personal injury or wrongful death,” and that Code § 8.01-56 makes it clear that Virginia law only allows for “one recovery for the same injury.” Noting that the law in Kentucky does not require a plaintiff to make such an election, the circuit court opined that not requiring a plaintiff to make an election, as required by Code § 8.01-56, would be seen as resulting in a “double recovery” or “case splitting” under Virginia law. It concluded that Green’s “Kentucky settlement for personal injury equates to the election required 6 by” Code § 8.01-56. The circuit court stated that under a plain reading of Code § 8.01-56, “the mere acceptance of the recovery in Kentucky for the same injury does foreclose any later acceptance of a recovery in Virginia for the same injury.” Thus, Green could not pursue a wrongful death action in Virginia for the same injury. Lastly, the circuit court also concluded that judicial estoppel applied as a bar to Green’s wrongful death claim. Therefore, it granted the Virginia Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Green appeals to this Court. We granted four assignments of error: 1. The circuit court erred in granting the Defendants’ [m]otion to [d]ismiss. 2. The circuit court erred in finding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by Virginia Code § 8.01-56. 3. The circuit court erred in finding that the Plaintiff’s settlement of the Kentucky case equated to an election of remedy under Virginia law. 4. The circuit court erred in finding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by judicial estoppel.