Opinion ID: 109287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Clayton Act Claim

Text: In the light of the previous discussion, disposition of the Clayton Act claim becomes relatively straight-forward. The issue under § 7 of the Clayton Act is whether the effect of the proposed acquisitions, approved by the FDIC, may be substantially to lessen competition . . . in any line of commerce in any section of the country. The Government established that C&S is the predominant banking institution in DeKalb County, Fulton County, North Fulton County, and the Atlanta area generally; that in these markets the commercial banking industry is quite highly concentrated in terms of market share statistics; and, of course, that the proposed acquisitions would increase C&S's nominal market shares. [31] The District Court did not decide whether the geographic markets proposed by the Government were the appropriate ones. But assuming, arguendo, that they were, the Government plainly made out a prima facie case of a violation of § 7 under several decisions of this Court. See United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 362-366; United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co., 399 U. S. 350, 365-367; United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U. S., at 497. It was thus incumbent upon C&S to show that the market-share statistics gave an inaccurate account of the acquisitions' probable effects on competition. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., supra, at 497-498; United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U. S., at 631. The District Court, like the FDIC before it, concluded that C&S had made the necessary showing that these proposed acquisitions would not lessen competition for the simple reason that under the correspondent associate program that had been continuously in effect, no real competition had developed or was likely to develop among the 5-percent banks, or between these and C&S National. As to present and past competition, the Government agrees there is and has been none. If this state of affairs were the result of violations of the Sherman Act, we agree with the Government that making the evil permanent through acquisition or merger would offend the Clayton Act. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U. S. 131, 135. But we have already concluded that C&S's program of founding and maintaining new de facto branches in the face of Georgia's antibranching law did not violate the Sherman Act, and the de facto branches which C&S proposes to acquire were all founded ab initio with C&S sponsorship. It thus indisputably follows that the proposed acquisitions will extinguish no present competitive conduct or relationships. See United States v. Trans Texas Bancorporation, 412 U. S. 946, aff'g per curiam 1972 Trade Cas. ¶ 74,257 (WD Tex.). As for future competition, neither the District Court nor the FDIC could find any realistic prospect that denial of these acquisitions would lead the defendant banks to compete against each other. The 5-percent banks theoretically could break their ties with C&S and its correspondent associate program, for these banks are each independently owned, but the record shows that none of the shareholders, directors, or officers of the 5-percent banks expressed any inclination to do so, and there was no evidence that the program has been other than beneficial and profitable for both C&S and the 5-percent banks. [32] The Clayton Act is concerned with probable effects on competition, not with ephemeral possibilities. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 323. For the reasons set out in this opinion, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. It is so ordered.