Opinion ID: 1810730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was it prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury as to third-degree murder?

Text: The defendant argues that his request for submission of an instruction on third-degree murder, under sec. 940.03, Stats. 1975, [7] should have been granted as a lesser included offense of the charge of first-degree murder. See, sec. 939.66(2), Stats. 1975. [16] In order for a lesser included offense to be submitted to the jury two requirements must be met. First, there must be reasonable grounds for acquittal on instructed offenses greater than that requested. Secondly, there must be reasonable grounds for conviction on the lesser offense requested. Garcia v. State, 73 Wis.2d 174, 186, 242 N.W.2d 919 (1976); Leach v. State, 83 Wis.2d 199, 217, 265 N.W.2d 495 (1978). Trial counsel for the defendant apparently did not request submission of a second-degree murder charge. We need not decide whether there were reasonable grounds for conviction on the requested instruction for third-degree murder because there were no reasonable grounds for acquittal on the first-degree murder, party to a crime charge. [17, 18] The jury was instructed as to the elements for first-degree murder, party to a crime, on a conspiracy theory. [8] In State v. Charbarneau, 82 Wis.2d 644, 264 N.W.2d 227 (1978), this court explained the party to a crime liability under the conspiracy theory. A person may be vicariously liable for the substantive crimes of another in either of two circumstances: `(1) The parties may enter into an agreement to commit a particular crime. The fact of agreement imposes liability for the substantive offense on all conspirators when the crime is consummated by a single perpetrator. `(2) During the course of executing the crime on which there is agreement, one person commits another crime which is, objectively, the natural and probable consequence of the agreed-upon crime. Under these circumstances, the fact of agreement renders all parties liable for the incidental crime.' State v. Charbarneau, 82 Wis.2d at 652, quoting from State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 555-556, 129 N.W.2d 155 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 918 (1965). Jordan's statement to the police asserted that Wesley proposed that they pull a holdup and that Jordan then armed himself with a gun. The testimony at trial summarized above, shows that Jordan walked into the tavern first and announced the holdup. The bartender and patrons at the bar who witnessed the shooting, testified that the first man to enter the bar fired directly at Mr. Reagan. Only then did Mallory and Wesley commence firing. The contention that Jordan was firing the gun just to effect an escape and the argument that it was never shown that a bullet fired by Jordan killed Mr. Reagan are irrelevant because from the facts shown here, there were no reasonable grounds for a finding that the killing was not intentional. In State v. Shears, 68 Wis.2d 217, 242-243, 229 N.W. 2d 103 (1975), five men robbed a tavern and in the process shot and killed two men. The evidence produced at trial did not reveal which of the five men did the actual shooting. However, the evidence showed that the killings were intentional. Three of the five men, who were defendants in a consolidated trial, were found guilty of first-degree murder. This court held that . . . it would have been unreasonable to instruct the jury that they might find the homicide. . . to have been third degree murder. State v. Shears, 68 Wis.2d at 243; See, also, State v. Estrada, 63 Wis.2d 476, 217 N.W.2d 359 (1974). In Shears, the fact that the individual firing the fatal bullet was not identified had no effect because the armed robbery was accomplished pursuant to an agreement and an intentional killing resulted. In this case, Jordan agreed and participated in the armed robbery. The ten bullet wounds and the conduct of the defendant and his co-conspirators demonstrated an intent to kill Mr. Reagan. There was no reasonable ground to justify an acquittal of first-degree murder, party to a crime, on these facts. State v. Cydzik, 60 Wis. 2d 683, 211 N.W.2d 421 (1973), (defendant convicted of first-degree murder although he claimed he only intended to commit the robbery and his accomplice did the fatal shooting). Compare, Wilson v. State, 59 Wis.2d 269, 284-285, 208 N.W.2d 134 (1973). [19] We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on third-degree murder.