Opinion ID: 2209464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: freedom of expression under article i, section 7

Text: Pap's argues that this Court should adopt the substantive analysis in our decision in Pap's I for purposes of Article I, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, i.e. that we should conclude that the Erie ordinance is a content-based restriction that burdens the Pennsylvania right to freedom of expression, subject the ordinance to strict scrutiny, and conclude that it cannot stand. Citing this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991), Pap's accurately notes that, on questions sounding under our state charter, this Court is not bound by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court on similar federal provisions, but may find that Pennsylvania provides greater protection for individual rights. See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 894 (we are not bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret similar (yet distinct) federal constitutional provisions). Pap's further notes that this Court already has recognized that our Declaration of Rights was the direct precursor of the freedom of speech and press, see Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896, and that this Court has long construed the freedom of expression provision in Article I, § 7 as providing greater protection of expression than its federal counterpart. Pap's adds that other states also have provided greater protection for expression under their state charters than has been afforded by the U.S. Supreme Court under the First Amendment. Brief for Appellant at 15 (citing cases from New York and Washington). In arguing that we should adopt the analysis in Pap's I as a matter of Pennsylvania constitutional law, Pap's notes the state of flux resulting from the U.S. Supreme Court's precedents in this particular area, including its fractured decision in this case. Relying upon Justice Stevens's dissent, Pap's argues that we should not follow the most recent, uncertain teachings of that Court because the secondary effects approach adopted by the High Court plurality (and also approved in theory by a fifth Justice, i.e., Justice Souter) involved dramatic changes in prior First Amendment legal doctrine. Pap's suggests that the appropriate approach is not that dramatic change, but the analysis this Court employed when it was obliged to confront this freedom of expression question without the benefit of controlling federal authority. Applying that analysis, Pap's argues that the Erie ordinance violates Article 1, § 7 because its purpose and effect is to suppress protected expressive conduct. According to Pap's, the ordinance seeks to prohibit nude dancing precisely because of its communicative attributes. Brief for Appellant at 17 (citations and quotation omitted). In response, Erie does not dispute that Article I, § 7 has been a source for greater protection of individual rights, but it maintains that the Pennsylvania and federal protections of expression are nearly co-extensive. Citing to Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 23, 515 A.2d 1331 (1986) (plurality opinion by Hutchinson, J.), Erie concedes (in a point we discuss below) that the very structure of Pennsylvania government differs from the federal model, and it differs in a fashion which necessarily requires a more expansive protection of speech than is provided by the First Amendment. Erie also concedes that expressive conduct, like the nude dancing at issue here, is subject to some level of protection under Article I, § 7. Like Pap's, Erie suggests that the constitutional analysis set forth in Edmunds is an appropriate model for deciding the question here. Erie also acknowledges that this Court has in the past specifically rejected, on state constitutional grounds, less protective First Amendment authority in the area of free speech. Erie maintains, however, that this greater protection has been, and should continue to be, confined to the area of prior restraints and censorship. Erie argues that, for purposes of our inquiry into its ban on public nudity and nude dancing, the intermediate scrutiny standard outlined in United States v. O'Brien for symbolic speech is compatible with Article I, § 7. Citing to the approaches outlined by the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court who agreed that the O'Brien test controls, Erie argues that nude dancing is expressive conduct, and not pure speech. Erie thereby suggests that this Court should construe Article I, § 7 as requiring a similarly graduated approach to free expression issues, i.e., that expressive conduct should be subject to a diluted protection under Article I, § 7. As such, expressive conduct, in Erie's view, should be subject to reasonable regulation without that regulation being deemed to have an impermissible impact on the communicative nature of the conduct. Erie also argues that there is no existing tradition of subjecting expressive conduct to strict scrutiny under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Erie concludes that its ban places a limit on expression which should be deemed consistent with Article I, § 7 because that provision should be construed as tolerat[ing] a balancing of competing interests. Brief for Appellees, 19. Although Erie has forwarded a cogent and able argument, for the reasons set forth below, we believe that this ordinance, which on its face prohibits all public nudity (and simulated nudity), but which unquestionably was targeted at nude live dancing such as was performed at Kandyland, violates the freedom of expression guaranteed Pennsylvania citizens by Article I, § 7. As a Pennsylvania constitutional matter, we adopt the unitary analysis that both the Majority and the Concurrence in Pap's I actually employedalbeit for different reasonswhen this Court rendered its independent judgment in Pap's I. As we will explain below, we believe that this analysisas conducted by Mr. Justice Cappy for the Court in Pap's I also is consistent with a less restrictive means analysis this Court already has employed in Article I, § 7 cases involving restrictions on commercial speech. Adoption of such a unitary standard, we believe, adequately balances the fundamental right and governmental interests involved, and will also provide a consistent and ascertainable standard to govern future questions under Article I, § 7. We agree with the parties that the nude dancing that is targeted for elimination by the Erie ordinance is expressive conduct that is subject to protection under Article I, § 7. We believe this is so not only for the reasons articulated in precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court so holding, see City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (citing cases), but also for the reasons expressed in Justice White's dissent in Barnes, which were echoed by both the Majority and the Concurrence in Pap's I. The fact that nude adult entertainment of the sort performed at Kandyland may not ascend to the level of high art form, see Pap's I, 719 A.2d at 284 (Castille, J., concurring), does not mean that the expression is unprotected. See generally Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089-1104 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) (outlining, inter alia, long history of erotic and nude dancing and explaining why it must be deemed expressive conduct), reversed sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991). We also agree with the parties that it is helpful to conduct our Pennsylvania constitutional analysis, to the extent possible, consistently with the model suggested by Edmunds. [5] Under Edmunds, the Court should consider: the text of the relevant Pennsylvania Constitutional provision; its history, including Pennsylvania case law; policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern and the impact on Pennsylvania jurisprudence; and relevant cases, if any, from other jurisdictions. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895. A consideration of the question in light of these factors convinces us that the challenged provisions of the Erie ordinance cannot stand. Freedom of expression has a robust constitutional history and place in Pennsylvania. The very first Article of the Pennsylvania Constitution consists of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, and the first section of that Article affirms, among other things, that all citizens have certain inherent and indefeasible rights. Among those inherent rights are those delineated in § 7, which addresses Freedom of Press and Speech; Libels. That section provides, in the part relevant here, that: The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. PA. CONST. Art. I, § 7. [6] Section 25, entitled Reservation of Powers in People, then provides that: To guard against transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, we declare that everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government and shall forever remain inviolate. Id. § 25. The text of the First Amendment of the federal Constitution provides, in relevant part, that, Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.... U.S. CONST. Amend. I. As a purely textual matter, Article I, § 7 is broader than the First Amendment in that it guarantees not only freedom of speech and the press, but specifically affirms the invaluable right to the free communication of thoughts and opinions, and the right of every citizen to speak freely on any subject so long as that liberty is not abused. Communication obviously is broader than speech. Nevertheless, we do not overstate this distinction, since the U.S. Supreme Court has long construed the First Amendment as encompassing more than what constitutes purely speech; indeed, it has recognized that nude dancing is expressive conduct that falls within the First Amendment, albeit the Court deems it to be a form of expression falling only within its outer ambit, thus warranting a lesser degree of protection. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (citing cases). A second distinction has to do with the very structure of Pennsylvania government. Erie recognizes this distinction by quoting the following observation by Justice Hutchinson in his plurality opinion in the Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers case: The United States Constitution established a government of limited and enumerated powers. Consequently, the national government possesses only those powers delegated to it.... State constitutions, on the other hand, typically establish governments of general powers, which possess all powers not denied by the state constitution.... Our state constitution functions this way and restrains these general powers by a Declaration of Rights. 515 A.2d at 1334 (citations omitted). Accord 515 A.2d at 1340 (Zappala, J., concurring) (The federal government possesses limited powers delegated by the states and enumerated in the United States Constitution. The state government possesses general powers founded on the authority of the people, with the exception of certain matters as to which the powers of the state are limited and the rights of the people are declared inviolable.). What this Court said in Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 A. 70 (1921), respecting the freedom to petition, is no less true for the right to free expression guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights: The right in question is a fundamental one, expressly recognized in the organic law of our state as belonging to citizens. In other words, it is possessed by members of the state, or citizens ( United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549, 23 L.Ed. 588 [ (1875) ]) to work out the public weal, rather than by individuals, to protect their persons or property or serve private ends. The Constitution does not confer the right, but guarantees its free exercise, without let or hindrance from those in authority, at all times, under any and all circumstances; and, when this is kept in view, it is apparent that such a prerogative can neither be denied by others nor surrendered by the citizen himself.