Opinion ID: 618222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Public Figures and Geography

Text: The Vicinis' final argument on the limited-purpose public figure issue is a geographic one. They say that none of the above conduct makes them public figures in the United States, where the alleged defamation was published. The argument rests on an analogy to general -purpose public figures, and those authorities that require such individuals to have achieved notoriety where they were defamed. The Vicinis reason that this geographic restriction must also be true for limited -purpose public figures, who are the more protected of the two. The analogy is flawed. Gertz held that the plaintiff was not a public figure for all purposes because he had no general fame or notoriety in the community and was not generally known to the local population. 418 U.S. at 351-52, 94 S.Ct. 2997. Based on that language, some courtswe have not addressed the question and we do not do so todayhave extrapolated that a general-purpose public figure need not attain nationwide fame, only notoriety where he was defamed[,] i.e., where the defamation was published. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295 n. 22. [14] Arguably, this so-called community standard actually expands rather than restricts the applicability of the New York Times rule, at least for general-purpose public figures. That debate, however, has no relevance here. Gertz defined a limited -purpose public figure not in terms of geography but in terms of the controversy that he has stepped into. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (defining a limited-purpose public figure as one who voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular controversy); Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at 772 ([T]he scope of the controversy in which the plaintiff involves himself defines the scope of the public personality.). That suggests to us that, if Gertz envisioned any limitation on public-figure status, it is a limitation inherent in the scope of the controversy itself. Cases on this point, though rare, have reached essentially the same conclusion. See, e.g., Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enters., Inc., 818 F.2d 431 (5th Cir.1987). In Trotter, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure for purposes of a U.S. publication because the controversylabor violence at a Coca-Cola bottling plant in Guatemalaresonated in the United States: Because of the proximity of other Western Hemisphere countries to the United States, social and political turmoil occurring there has aroused particular domestic concern. Id. at 434. Although the plaintiff's affiliation with a U.S. company played some role, the court's analysis focused on the fact that the controversy had captured the attention of a diverse and broadly-based audience [in the United States], including the media, political leaders, human-rights organizations, labor unions, and Coca-Cola shareholders. Id. [15] Similarly, here, the batey controversy was not confined to the shores of the Dominican Republic. Rather, it resounded in the United States for obvious humanitarian reasons and a less-obvious geopolitical one: a long-standing import quota system under U.S. law that subsidizes Dominican sugar producers, including the Vicinis. [16] Indeed, one of Felipe's core responsibilities was seeing to it that this quota system remained intact through lobbying and other efforts. Concerns that negative publicity about the bateyes might jeopardize the quota system prompted him and Juan, at least in part, to launch the PR blitz that reached U.S. media outlets and policymakers, as we have shown. We are satisfied that such conduct is enough to make the plaintiffs public figures in the United States for purposes of this lawsuit. [17]