Opinion ID: 552340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Applied in This Case

Text: 21 We turn now to consider first whether the procedures used by the district court satisfy the requirements of due process. Analysis begins by balancing (1) the nature of the individual interest affected, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedure used, (3) the probable value, if any, of additional safeguards, and (4) the government's interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725, 729 (2d Cir.1987). 22 As is generally the case when Mathews is applied in the criminal context, Prescott's great interest in his future liberty balances the government's interest in halting the distribution of large quantities of cocaine by punishing those involved in drug trafficking. Thus, the test quickly collapses into whether the procedure used was sufficient to guard against an erroneous deprivation of his liberty interest or whether more stringent procedures are feasible and necessary. We believe the procedures used were adequate to protect against the risk of erroneous results. Appellant was able to dispute the evidence in the presentence report as well as the government's proffer to corroborate it. His attorneys submitted objections to the report and a memorandum in support of those objections, and directed argument and comment to the district court. Although the government had a witness present at the hearing, the defense chose not to call him or any other witnesses. In short, Prescott had an effective opportunity to rebut allegations likely to affect his sentence. 23 We turn next to analyze appellant's contention that the government did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he distributed 150 kilograms of cocaine, asserting that the hearsay testimony relied on by the government was inherently unreliable because cross-examination of the witnesses was unavailable. The presentence report relied on the statements of several cooperating individuals as well as Prescott's own statements in fixing this amount. When defendant contested the quantity of this proof, the government presented a sentencing memorandum that tracked the presentence report with cross-references to an appendix containing corroborative reports, transcripts of consensually-monitored conversations involving Prescott, witness statements, grand jury testimony, and exhibits. 24 The testimony of the cooperating individuals supports the finding that Prescott distributed at least 150 kilograms of cocaine. One individual testified before a grand jury that he made one kilogram purchases from Prescott on five occasions. Prescott's mobile phone records corroborate that testimony, revealing a sequence of calls to this individual during the relevant time period. Another person testified before a grand jury that he and Prescott broke up and packaged kilograms of cocaine for sale on at least three occasions and Prescott told him he sold three kilograms per week. Similar statements were made by two other individuals, appellant's former business partner and appellant's girlfriend, who later became his wife. 25 Another person, while working for Prescott--and also providing information to an officer of the Darien Police Department--told that officer he had personally seen Prescott in possession of about 20 kilograms of cocaine. Several other individuals stated Prescott dealt in large quantities of cocaine. The testimony of those cooperating individuals is corroborated by telephone and hotel records, and statements made by Prescott. The cooperating individuals made their statements independently of one another; in three cases the statements were made before a grand jury, in others the statements were made at the time of the person's arrest. Prescott himself stated that he engaged in this activity for three years. Based on this information, the district court accepted the conclusion of the presentence report that Prescott was involved in the sale or distribution of one kilogram of cocaine per week over 150 weeks. 26 The accounts relied on by the district court were numerous and independent, and they described with a high degree of inter-correlation the same kind of behavior by Prescott. Thus, this hearsay testimony had a sufficient indicia of reliability for the district court to conclude it was accurate. Guidelines Sec. 6A1.3(a); see United States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 575 (2d Cir.1989) (all independent accounts meshed and plainly gave [the district court] an ample basis for ruling that the hearsay testimony was reliable). As a consequence, the district court properly found the evidence proffered by the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Prescott distributed 150 kilograms of cocaine over a three-year period. The procedure used in arriving at Prescott's sentence did not offend his right to due process. II 27 The next question raised is whether the refusal to depart downwardly from the guidelines range presents a cognizable appellate claim. It is now well established that a district court's refusal to depart downwardly is not appealable. See United States v. Soliman, 889 F.2d 441, 443 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 553, 107 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989). Prescott concedes this, but argues that a recognized exception should be applied in his case. It is true that an exception exists where the refusal to depart downwardly was based on the district court's mistaken view that it did not have the discretion to do so. See United States v. Sharpsteen, 913 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Adeniyi, 912 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 31 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 65, 112 L.Ed.2d 39; United States v. Fossett, 881 F.2d 976, 979 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Russell, 870 F.2d 18, 20-21 (1st Cir.1989); see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(a)(1) (1988) (defendant may appeal sentence imposed in violation of law). We are not faced with that situation. In this case the maximum sentence under the statute is 20 years, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(C) (1988), which is 22 months less than the minimum guidelines range when defendant's 38 base offense level is combined with his criminal history category II. Constrained ultimately by the statute, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374-75, 109 S.Ct. 647, 655-56, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989), the district court therefore imposed the lesser 20-year maximum sentence. It then refused to depart downwardly, not because it believed it could not depart downwardly, but because, as it carefully noted, defendant had not satisfied either of the two elements required for a Sec. 5K2.13 downward departure, that is, reduced mental capacity and a causal link between that reduced capacity and the commission of the charged offense. III 28 Prescott next argues that the district court erred in sentencing him to imprisonment rather than committing him for care or treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4244(d). Section 4244(d), enacted by Congress in 1984 as part of the Insanity Defense Reform Act, provides in relevant part: 29 If, after the hearing [on the defendant's mental status], the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect and that he should, in lieu of being sentenced to imprisonment, be committed to a suitable facility for care or treatment, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General ... [who] shall hospitalize the defendant for care or treatment in a suitable facility. 30 The sentencing judge found that Prescott was not suffering from a mental disease or defect that would qualify him for the provisional sentencing of Sec. 4244(d). This is a finding of fact reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1341 (2d Cir.1990) (determination of defendant's competence to stand trial under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4241 is a question of fact). 31 In making her determination, Judge Burns had before her the Butner Report which stated Prescott was not suffering from a mental disease or defect, and the testimony of Prescott's examining psychiatrist, Dr. Whitney, which was to the effect that defendant's mental disorder--severe borderline personality--was not considered a mental disease or defect within the mental health community, a view opposite to that taken in his written report on this matter. In light of this proof, the district court's finding cannot be said to be clearly erroneous. IV 32 Prescott's final argument is that the district court's denial of his last three motions for continuances of sentencing was arbitrary and prejudicial. On February 9 both of Prescott's attorneys moved for a continuance of his sentencing to grant them additional time to review the government's sentencing memorandum--which was filed with the court on February 2 and which was received by one of his attorneys on February 7--to allow time for Dr. Whitney to prepare a report after his February 11 psychiatric examination of appellant, and for counsel to have time to review the report. These motions came just one day after the district court--granting Prescott's motion that he be made available on February 11 for Dr. Whitney's examination--specifically warned that no further continuances of sentencing would be entertained. Both motions were denied, as was Prescott's oral motion for a continuance at the sentencing hearing. 33 A sentencing court has broad discretion respecting the scheduling of sentencing proceedings. Absent a showing both that the denial was arbitrary and that it substantially impaired the defendant's opportunity to secure a fair sentence, we will not vacate a sentence because a continuance was denied. See United States v. Alexander, 860 F.2d 508, 512 (2d Cir.1988); United States v. Weinberg, 852 F.2d 681, 687 (2d Cir.1988). Prescott has not satisfied this standard. The district court's denials of appellant's motions were not arbitrary. It was reasonable for it to require more compelling reasons to further delay the proceedings. The denials came after Prescott had successfully moved twice for a continuance. The date of sentencing had already been pushed back two months, and over four months had elapsed since Prescott's guilty plea was entered. 34 Additionally, Prescott's attorneys' asserted reasons for the continuance were not persuasive. His new attorneys had sufficient time, nine days, to review the government's sentencing memorandum. This differentiates the present circumstances from those in United States v. Sullivan, 694 F.2d 1348 (2d Cir.1982), upon which Prescott relies. In Sullivan we held the district court abused its discretion in denying defendant's request for an adjournment of sentencing because--at the time when sentence was imposed--the defense attorney had not received the trial transcript and therefore had not had a reasonable opportunity to familiarize himself with it. Id. at 1348-49. Prescott's attorneys had the government's sentencing memorandum in advance of sentence, and the time afforded Prescott's attorneys was sufficient to enable counsel to familiarize themselves with the contents of that memorandum. 35 Defendant's attorneys' failure to schedule his psychiatric examination until five days before the hearing further undermines the suggestion of arbitrariness. Prescott had been granted a motion for continuance in part to obtain an independent psychiatric evaluation more than a month prior to the sentencing hearing. Whatever time pressures were felt in connection with presenting Dr. Whitney's testimony were caused by defense counsel's selection of a doctor who would not be available until such a late date, without informing the sentencing court of the problem. Hence, the pressure stemmed from counsels' own actions and not from any arbitrary action on the part of the district court. Cf. Sullivan, 694 F.2d at 1348 (district court abused its discretion in not granting adjournment because defendant and counsel not responsible for delay in obtaining trial transcript). 36 Neither did Prescott show that his opportunity to obtain a fair sentence was prejudiced by the lack of a continuance. As indicated, defense counsel had sufficient time to familiarize themselves with the government's sentencing memorandum which contained the same information as the presentence investigation with the only addition being some additional, corroborative material. They were also allowed, though perhaps more quickly than they wished, to have Dr. Whitney conduct an examination and present his findings to the attorneys and the court. Although appellant may have been able to present more evidence of a mental condition supporting his request for a downward departure had he been granted a continuance, he nevertheless was able to submit to the court both Dr. Whitney's report and testimony, and he has not suggested what he would have done differently had he been given more time. We see no prejudice.