Opinion ID: 1835515
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: jury instruction on determination of death

Text: The jury was instructed that in order to convict Edwards of murder in the second degree, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Edwards, on or about May 10, 2006, did kill Jessica J. O'Grady; that he did so in Douglas County, Nebraska; and that he did so intentionally, but without premeditation. Edwards proposed an instruction that [o]nly an individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards. At the jury instruction conference, the court sustained the State's objection to the instruction and refused to give it. [12-14] Edwards assigns the refusal of his proposed instruction as error. Whether jury instructions given by a trial court are correct is a question of law. [31] When dispositive issues on appeal present questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision of the court below. [32] And to establish reversible error from a court's refusal to give a requested instruction, an appellant has the burden to show that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct statement of the law, (2) the tendered instruction is warranted by the evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court's refusal to give the tendered instruction. [33] Edwards' proposed instruction was based on the UDDA and quoted § 71-7202 verbatim. So, there is little question that it was a correct statement of the law, at least in the abstract. But it was not warranted by the evidence presented in this case, because § 71-7202 was not implicated by these circumstances. Traditionally, at common law, death was defined by the cessation of the circulatory and respiratory systems. [34] But the development of medical technology, and a better appreciation of human physiology, cast that standard into doubt. [35] Now, a person's respiration and circulation may be artificially supported after all brain functions cease irreversibly, and the medical profession has developed techniques for determining the loss of brain functions while cardiorespiratory support is administered. [36] The UDDA was drafted and enacted to address those advances in lifesaving technology. [37] It codifies the traditional common-law standard for determining death and extends it to include the new procedures for the determination of death based upon irreversible loss of all brain functions. [38] And by providing that the determination of death be made in accordance with accepted medical standards, [39] the UDDA leaves the medical profession free to formulate acceptable medical practices and to utilize new biomedical knowledge, diagnostic tests, and equipment. [40] In this case, the distinction between cardiorespiratory death and brain death is irrelevant. Under Nebraska law, either would be sufficient to prove the victim's death in a homicide case. [41] Presumably, Edwards is concerned with that part of § 71-7202 requiring a determination of death to be made in accordance with accepted medical standards. Obviously, there was no evidence in this case that would support such a finding. But there is no indication that the UDDA was intended to supplant the settled common-law rule, discussed at length above, that the fact of death can be proved by circumstantial evidence. To require that death be medically established would amount to requiring direct evidence of death in every homicide, contrary to well-established law. And for that matter, Edwards' expansive reading of § 71-7202 would place it in direct conflict with § 30-2207, set forth above. [15,16] Generally, statutes which effect a change in the common law are to be strictly construed. [42] We do not read the UDDA as establishing a rule of evidence requiring that in all cases involving an alleged decedent, the fact of death must be medically established. Granted, there may be cases in which the UDDA's medical standards are implicated, when there is a question as to the cause or time of an alleged death, or where there is conflicting medical evidence about the alleged decedent's condition. [43] But in this case, there was no such question. The jury was entitled to conclude from the evidence presented, under any standard, that O'Grady was dead. In short, the court's instructions correctly set forth the elements of the offense and what the jury needed to find for Edwards to be guilty. Edwards' proposed instruction was not warranted by the evidence, because O'Grady's death was not in medical dispute. His assignment of error is without merit.