Opinion ID: 2547207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Were Davis's prior inconsistent statements properly admitted as substantive evidence of Smith's guilt?

Text: ¶ 19. The trial court admitted Davis's prior, unsworn, out-of-court statements to be used as substantive evidence of Smith's guilt under Rule 804(b)(5). In fact, Davis's prior statements to investigators were the only evidence which identified Smith as Davis's assailant. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) is a broad exception, allowing hearsay statements where the declarant is found to be unavailable as a witness. The court found Davis to be unavailable as a witness due to a lack of memory pursuant to Rule 804(a)(3), which provides that unavailability as a witness includes situations in which the declarant testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the statement. Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(3) (emphasis added). ¶ 20. Davis initially testified that he had given a written statement but could not remember what he had said in the statement. The State then presented Davis with his written statement to refresh his memory. Although he initially testified that his memory was not refreshed, Davis then testified that the statement was, in fact, his, and that he had told the police that Smith had shot him about some drugs. Davis further testified that the statement that Smith had shot him was based solely on information Davis had received from his nephew, not from what Davis had observed. ¶ 21. From a review of the record, it is clear that, while Davis first indicated that he did not remember what he told investigators, Davis never indicated a lack of memory as to what happened on the day of the shooting. To the contrary, Davis testified to a different version of events at trial than that which he had provided in his statements to law enforcement officials. In his prior statements, Davis unequivocally stated that he had seen Smith shoot him. At trial, Davis testified that he did not see Smith that day and did not see who shot him. The State sought to introduce these prior statements, not because Davis had no memory of the events, but because Davis had changed his story. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Davis was unavailable as a witness due to memory loss, and we see no reason to further analyze the requirements for admission under Rule 804(b)(5), including trustworthiness and notice. To allow the introduction of these prior inconsistent statements of Davis under Rule 804(b)(5) would allow the exception to swallow the rule. ¶ 22. Our precedent is clear that, while a prior inconsistent statement of a testifying witness can be used to impeach the witness's credibility, it is not admissible as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. In Magee v. Magee, 320 So.2d 779 (Miss.1975), we said that the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement does not mean that the out-of-court statement became evidence on its merits or had any probative value. . . . The rule seems to be universal that the impeaching testimony does not establish or in any way tend to establish the truth of the matters contained in the out-of-court contradictory statements. Id. at 783. Furthermore, this Court has ruled that evidence of extra judicial statements made by a witness who is not a party and whose declarations are not binding as admissions is admissible only to impeach or discredit the witness and is not competent as substantive evidence of the facts to which such statements relate. . . . Hall v. State, 250 Miss. 253, 165 So.2d 345, 350 (1964) (emphasis added). See also Brown v. State, 556 So.2d 338 (Miss.1990) (finding that a witness's prior inconsistent statements regarding the defendant's admission of guilt were admissible for impeachment purposes only); Moffett v. State, 456 So.2d 714 (Miss.1984) (holding that in a capital murder case, the prior, inconsistent, unsworn, out-of-court statement used to impeach the State's own witness was not admissible as substantive evidence); Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468 (Miss.1983) (holding that evidence of extrajudicial statements by a nonparty witness was admissible only for impeachment purposes); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388 (Miss.1975) (finding that a recanting witness's statement that a defendant made incriminating statements was admissible only for impeachment purposes). While Davis's prior inconsistent statements would have been admissible for impeachment purposes, we find that it was error to admit them as substantive evidence under Rule 804(b)(5). ¶ 23. The next question is whether the statements were otherwise admissible under our rules of evidence. ¶ 24. In 1977, before adopting our rules of evidence, this Court held that when the principal witness's identification testimony is impeached, independent evidence of the identification may be introduced through third persons present at the out-of-court identification. Fells v. State, 345 So.2d 618, 622 (Miss.1977). This Court allowed the evidence for substantive purposes because such evidence not only has greater probative force and thus preserves the better evidence, but also because the witness testifying is in court and is subject to cross-examination. Id. This Court has more recently noted that, regardless of whether the witness has been impeached, the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, adopted in 1986, provide that such identification evidence is not hearsay and is admissible as substantive material. Livingston v. State, 519 So.2d 1218, 1221 (Miss.1988). Indeed, Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) provides that a statement is not hearsay if [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person. Miss. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C). Our comment to the rule further explains its applicability and scope: Rule 801(d)(1)(C), which declares that prior statements of identification made by a witness are not hearsay, is not a departure from pre-rule practice. The Court in Fells v. State, 345 So.2d 618 (Miss.1977), departed from the traditional view that such statements were hearsay by adopting what was then the minority view that statements of identification could be admitted as substantive evidence of that identification. The scope of the rule is broader than the Fells holding in that: (1) there is no need for a prior attempt to impeach the witness for the identifying statement to be admissible; (2) the testimony about the prior statement may be from the witness who made it or another person who heard it; (3) the witness who made the statement need not make an in-court identification; and (4) the statement may have been made either in or apart from an investigative procedure.. . . Miss. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C). ¶ 25. Davis testified at Smith's trial and was exhaustively subjected to cross-examination concerning the statements, as discussed supra. In his statements given during police investigation, Davis unequivocally identified Smith as the shooter. Davis gave his statements on December 29, 2004, the day after Davis perceived the man who had shot him. We find that these statements identifying the assailant would have been admissible as statements of identification pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C). We recognize that the admitted statements contain more than a mere identification of the shooter, including statements regarding drugs as a possible motive for the shooting and threats made to Davis's girlfriend. [5] These portions of the statements should not have been admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(C), as they were not statements of identification. However, [t]he mere fact that the trial court committed error in an evidentiary ruling does not by itself warrant a reversal by this Court. Peterson v. State, 671 So.2d 647, 656 (Miss. 1996). The trial court's error must have affected a substantial right of the defendant. Id. In making such a determination, we review the evidence presented in the record as a whole. Id. ¶ 26. After reviewing the trial testimony and comparing it to the audiotaped and written statements introduced into evidence, we find that the bulk of the information contained in the statements was cumulative to Davis's testimony. Further, before introduction of the statements into evidence, Davis testified without objection that he told police investigators Mr. Smith shot me up last night about some drugs. We also note that Detective Harris, who recorded Smith's statements, testified without objection that Davis had identified Smith as the shooter. In addition, Detective Harris's report, admitted into evidence as defense exhibit D-1, stated that Davis told me that Kenivel Smith shot him over some DOPE. Upon consideration of the record as a whole, we find that the admission into evidence of those portions of Davis's statements that contained information other than identification of the shooter was harmless and does not warrant reversal of the trial court. ¶ 27. The only contested issue in this case was the identity of the shooter. We already have found that the statements made by Davis to law enforcement officers on December 27 identifying Smith as the shooter were properly admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(C). Such statements are not deemed to be hearsay and are admissible for substantive purposes. Therefore, we find that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.