Opinion ID: 552750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Immunized Testimony at Trial

Text: 5 The IC claims that we misapplied United States v. Rinaldi, 808 F.2d 1579 (D.C.Cir.1987), in remanding for a massive inquiry into 'the taint of the testimony and the derivation of the testimony.'  Petition for Rehearing at 7-8 (Pet. for Reh'g) (quoting Majority Opinion 910 F.2d at 866 (Maj. Op.) (emphasis in original)). The IC's argument rests on the ipse dixit that the prosecution's freedom from taint establishes that its evidence was necessarily derived independently and therefore that the inquiry mandated by Rinaldi would be superfluous. Pet. for Reh'g at 8. This bold proposition, however, would convert Kastigar 's total prohibition on use, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1661, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1973), to a mere ban on significant prosecutorial exposure to the immunized testimony. It simply does not follow that insulating prosecutors from exposure automatically proves that immunized testimony was not used against the defendant. Kastigar is instead violated whenever the prosecution puts on a witness whose testimony is shaped, directly or indirectly, by compelled testimony, regardless of how or by whom he was exposed to that compelled testimony. Were the rule otherwise, a private lawyer for a witness sympathetic to the government could listen to the compelled testimony and use it to prepare the witness for trial. The government would presumably thereby gain the advantage of use of the immunized testimony so long as it did not actually cooperate in that effort. This interpretation of Kastigar (Look ma, no hands) pressed by the IC, if accepted, would enormously increase the risk of providing immunized testimony. To reject it, it is unnecessary to decide whether, as North asserts, particular significance should be placed on the fact that other government personnel in the legislative and executive branches outside the Independent Counsel's office were, after exposure to immunized testimony, actively involved in preparing witnesses. 6 Indeed, Rinaldi explicitly recognizes that witnesses' exposure to immunized testimony can taint their trial testimony irrespective of the prosecution's role in the exposure and that an inquiry is therefore necessary into whether the content of witnesses' testimony was derived from or motivated by the immunized testimony. It specifically mandates an inquiry into what a witness knew prior to exposure to the immunized testimony and what information she gleaned from that exposure: [t]here is accordingly a question of fact as to how much Reardon [the witness] knew prior to that meeting [at which she was exposed to the immunized testimony] and what additional knowledge, if any, she may have gained as a result of listening to Rinaldi's testimony. 808 F.2d at 1583. And even where the witness testifies from personal knowledge, use within the meaning of Kastigar may occur, as Rinaldi points out, if the immunized testimony influenced the witness' decision to testify. Rather than recognizing, as the IC claims, that a Kastigar hearing may not focus on the psychological processes of witnesses, Pet. for Reh'g at 7 n. 4, Rinaldi directed inquiry into whether a witness' testimony was motivated by, and therefore indirectly derived from, Rinaldi's immunized statements to the police. 808 F.2d at 1584 n. 7 (emphasis added). 1 Our opinion is thus entirely consistent with Rinaldi in calling for an inquiry on remand into the content and circumstances of witnesses' testimony. 7 Our dissenting colleague does not disagree with us on this central point so vigorously disputed by the IC--that the content and circumstances of testimony given by a witness exposed to the defendant's immunized testimony may constitute use of the immunized testimony in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights regardless of the prosecutor's fault. But she does contend that we have extended Rinaldi by insisting that the testimony of any witness exposed to the immunized testimony be pre-recorded in much the same way as prosecutors memorialize their investigative material, including witnesses' statements, so as to be able to prove in a Kastigar hearing that the government has obtained no leads from the immunized testimony. We did not, however, set forth such a requirement; we only said this burden may be met by cann[ing] the testimony beforehand, Maj.Op. at 872-873, just as wise prosecutors meet their burden of showing independent investigation by canning the results of the investigation before the defendant gives immunized testi mony.. 2 8 To be sure, if such steps are not taken, it may well be extremely difficult for the prosecutor to sustain its burden of proof that a witness exposed to immunized testimony has not shaped his or her testimony in light of the exposure, or as the Rinaldi court observed, been motivated to come forward and testify in light of the immunized testimony. But we surely did not mean to preclude the use of any techniques of which we are not aware, nor did we mean to even suggest that the prosecutor was barred from trying to show in any fashion that a witness' testimony was not influenced by the immunized testimony. 3 9 What we did insist upon, however--and here we quite definitely part company with the Chief Judge--is that the prosecutor has to prove that witnesses who testified against the defendant did not draw upon the immunized testimony to use it against the defendant; the burden of disproving use cannot, under Kastigar, be shifted onto the defendant, nor can the defendant be required to assume the burden of going forward with evidence that puts in issue the question of use. Most important, the defendant is entitled to a hearing at which he would be able to challenge the prosecution's case for non-use. 10 Although our dissenting colleague expresses concern over the special institutional interests of the Independent Counsel, she does not suggest, nor could it plausibly be suggested, that the defendant's constitutional rights are somehow lessened because he was prosecuted by the Independent Counsel rather than a United States attorney or the criminal division of the Justice Department. Therefore, the dissent's rationalization (truly post hoc ) of the district judge's refusal to put the IC to its proof at a hearing must apply to any case in which the defendant gave immunized public testimony to a congressional committee. The dissent's focus is on executive branch misconduct, but congressional committees have held highly publicized hearings into a number of other perceived problems, like the influence of organized crime, corruption in the labor movement, dubious practices on Wall Street, and even, as some will recall, communist influence in Hollywood. We cannot imagine what subjects will be of public and thus congressional interest in the future. We must assume that any American could be compelled to testify in return for use immunity under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 6005 (1988), which authorizes Congress to grant that immunity, even over protests of the prosecutor, independent or otherwise. And thus the novel approach suggested by our colleague would apply to any person who finds him or herself in the position of being prosecuted after having testified publicly before Congress. 11 The dissent argues that the district judge was not obliged to hold a hearing to determine whether or not the witnesses changed or shaped their testimony (or, for that matter, offered to testify) because of the immunized testimony. It is not because the question is irrelevant, according to the dissent, but rather because the IC produced something like a prima facie case that the witnesses' testimony was not tainted. Dissent on Pet. for Reh'g at 954. We are rather puzzled because we do not perceive that the IC put on any evidence whatsoever directed to this issue. Indeed, the district judge (as did our colleague) relied on an in-chambers review, a sort of self-directed ... inquiry, Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C.Cir.1983), to satisfy himself that there was no taint. Of course, this review neatly avoided any cross-examination of witnesses who were admittedly exposed to the immunized testimony (which, coupled with the switch in testimony of one key witness, may be at the core of this dispute). Even if such a proceeding could substitute for an adversary hearing (which we think quite a remarkable proposition), it could not possibly do so in this case because the district judge believed that independent exposure can never violate Kastigar. See United States v. Poindexter, 698 F.Supp. 300, 307, 313-14 (D.D.C.1988). Therefore, his preliminary Kastigar finding, which the dissent describes as based on a thorough reading of preliminary witness interviews and the grand jury record, Dissent on Pet. for Reh'g at 955, seems not only inadequate, but quite beside the point as well. 12 If the prosecutor were to demonstrate through testimony that a particular witness exposed to the immunized testimony had not been affected by the exposure, for example, by showing that the witness had set down his story before exposure, then the burden of going forward would shift to the defendant to challenge that version. But the dissent constructs the prima facie case out of whole cloth by relying merely on the district court's admonition to witnesses to testify based on personal knowledge, 4 as if that satisfied the prosecutor's Kastigar burden. 13 The IC (and the district court) obviously wished to avoid cross-examination of the exposed witnesses. Some might convincingly testify that their exposure had no effect on their trial or grand jury testimony. Others might well testify that they simply were unable to determine just how much exposure affected their testimony, in which case that uncertainty would surely be a grave problem for the party with the burden of proof--the prosecutor. In this case, however, we know that at least one crucial witness changed his testimony before Congress after hearing the immunized testimony, and then presumably told the modified version to the trial jury. If by some alchemy the burden of going forward at the outset were to be shifted to the defendant (which we think plainly impermissible), we find it impossible to understand why that undisputed showing alone would not satisfy that burden. Why does it not meet even our dissenting colleague's requirement for a contradiction between testimony prior to exposure and testimony subsequent to exposure? 5 14 When all is said and done, the district judge denied the defendant a hearing to which the Constitution entitled him. The Chief Judge's new formulation of constitutional law does appear to justify that denial, but we think it does so only by subordinating the defendant's constitutional rights to various other interests. 15 The premise of the Chief Judge's position is that the federal courts must treat the issue of witness exposure quite differently from prosecution staff exposure because a federal prosecutor can control only the latter. We think it is a mistaken premise because, as we have noted, it does not matter to a defendant if his immunized testimony is used against him by a key witness (and his lawyer) rather than by the prosecutor. The damage to the defendant--which is the focus of Kastigar--is the same in either case. 16 In any event, although it is not an insignificant problem, we think the dissent exaggerates a prosecutor's difficulties. We can think of a number of ways that a federal prosecutor could seek to prevent exposure of witnesses he or she may intend to use, and even more ways to memorialize a witness' testimony before exposure. The dissent is apparently concerned about a witness hostile to the prosecution who deliberately exposes himself to the immunized testimony in order to destroy the value of his testimony. There is, of course, not a shred of evidence that the IC encountered this problem in this case. Indeed, only the Chief Judge raises this problem--not the IC and not the district judge. If a prosecutor had such a concern about a particular witness, that witness would be at the very top of the list of those whose testimony should be prerecorded. And if at a Kastigar hearing such a witness should seek to undermine the case, the prosecutor would be entitled to bring out such a motivation in his examination of the witness. 17 Our dissenting colleague points also to the particular problem faced by an Independent Counsel whose investigation is targeted against one or more executive branch officials. She suggests that other officials in the executive branch who could be called as witnesses might seek to frustrate the conviction of a target by exposing themselves to immunized testimony. That is actually less of a problem than it would be for an ordinary United States attorney targeting a non-government official. Government officials are subject to greater restraints on their behavior than private individuals. The Ethics in Government Act requires the Department of Justice to cooperate with an Independent Counsel. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 594(d) (1988). Other executive departments are expected to cooperate with the Department of Justice, the chief law enforcement arm of the executive. Moreover, the IC presumably has the power to bring charges of obstruction of justice against anyone who attempts to sabotage the investigation. We are not aware that the Independent Counsel made any efforts to prevent government officials who were to testify or who had already testified from exposing themselves to immunized testimony. The IC's position, unlike the dissent's, seems to have been that the matter was irrelevant or perhaps, after the exposure of the key witness and his modification of his testimony, that the horse was out of the barn. 18 Finally, and perhaps at the heart of the dissent's concerns, is the argument that a straightforward application of Kastigar in cases where a witness testifies before Congress, after Congress grants immunity under section 6005, unduly restricts Congress' role in exposing wrongdoing in the nation--including wrongdoing in the executive branch. She even contends that witnesses who wished to frustrate prosecutors would line up to testify before Congress[ ] in exchange for ... immunity. Dissent on Pet. for Reh'g at 953. We do not think Congress would be so naive as lightly to grant use immunity to such prospective defendants. Surely Congress does so only when its perception of the national interest justifies this extraordinary step. When Congress grants immunity before the prosecution has completed preparing its case, the prosecutor, whoever that may be, can warn that the grant of immunity has its institutional costs; in this case, the IC indeed warned Congress that any grant of use and derivative use immunity would create serious--and perhaps insurmountable--barriers to the prosecution of the immunized witness. Memorandum of the Independent Counsel Concerning Use Immunity 1 (Jan. 13, 1987) (Submitted to the Joint Congressional Iran/Contra Committees) (J.A. at 2502). The decision as to whether the national interest justifies that institutional cost in the enforcement of the criminal laws is, of course, a political one to be made by Congress. Once made, however, that cost cannot be paid in the coin of a defendant's constitutional rights. That is simply not the way our system works. The political needs of the majority, or Congress, or the President never, never, never, should trump an individual's explicit constitutional protections. Indeed, the government may not even use immunized testimony to prevent a defendant's subsequent perjury. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 1297, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979) (Testimony given in response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced testimony.... [In the case of immunized testimony,] we deal with the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form. Balancing, therefore, is not simply unnecessary. It is impermissible.). 6 19 The Chief Judge tentatively suggests a post hoc doctrinal justification for the district court's breach of the Kastigar any use wall, but, in doing so, we think she muddles two distinct concepts: (1) how one traces a causal connection between immunized testimony and grand jury or trial testimony to determine whether there is in fact use, and (2) who, if anyone, may use immunized testimony against a defendant. Of course, a ban on any use of immunized testimony requires the prosecution to prove that proffered evidence, which does not appear on its face to be drawn from immunized testimony, is not directly or indirectly derived from such testimony. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 6002 (1988) (emphasis added). And that process also, of course, is focused on the presence or absence of causal links between the immunized testimony and the proffered testimony. That is a factual inquiry; indeed, it is the central purpose of a Kastigar hearing. In our case, for instance, the district judge might find that a particular witness' exposure to immunized testimony was so peripheral--let us say he only saw a newspaper headline--that the judge could safely find that the witness' testimony was not tainted by the exposure, and therefore there is, in that situation, no use of the immunized testimony against the defendant. It is in that context that prior Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment cases on causation discussed under the rubric fruit of a poisonous tree are arguably relevant. 7 As should be quite apparent, however, the exploration of these causation issues demands a Kastigar hearing. Instead, the dissent asks us to permit the district court to wave a wand of benediction over boxes of documents and proclaim a factual finding. But absolutely nothing in the Chief Judge's discussion of Fourth and Fifth Amendment causation cases provides support for assuming non-causation as a matter of law or for affirming on appeal findings made or implied without a hearing, on the mere supposition that these actual or implicit findings must have been based on the totality of the evidence before the district judge. 20 In any event, causation is not the central issue in this case, and therein lies the Chief Judge's muddle. It would seem that witnesses who appeared before the grand jury and trial jury actually studied North's testimony. It is hard to imagine a more direct use of immunized testimony than in such a situation, and therefore the dissent's use of the phrase attenuated use seems quite inappropriate. We take it that the Chief Judge means to imply that such direct use is somehow attenuated if it does not bear the prosecutor's fingerprints, but that is simply another way of putting her main argument, that Kastigar 's protection can be easily evaded so long as an actor, independent of the prosecutor, does the damage to the defendant. None of the cases cited and discussed by the Chief Judge provides a shred of support for that proposition. 21