Opinion ID: 1295913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Jury Selection.

Text: Tubbs also complains that the prosecutor conducted improper voir dire examination of jurors, as set out in this objection made at trial: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: ... [The prosecutor] began asking questions of the jurors as to what symptoms they might observe in someone they believed might be intoxicated. A juror started talking about slurred speech. [The prosecutor] continued to follow up with maybe other symptoms that a juror might see in a person who might be intoxicated and my objection is that those type of questions are basically eliciting testimony from the jurors rather than trying to determine whether the juror can be a fair and impartial witness and we would object to that line of questioning. The jury selection was not reported, and it does not appear that similar questions were asked of other potential jurors. In any event, the court overruled the objection. Tubbs claims the court abused its discretion by allowing this questioning. Specifically, he claims the questions were improper because (1) they did not relate to any of the enumerated for-cause challenges listed in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.18(5), and (2) the questions were asked to bias[ ] the panel, or get[ ] jurors to commit to voting any particular way. At the outset, we note that the district court has broad discretion in the selection of juries. `Control of jury voir dire is lodged in the sound discretion of the trial court.' State v. Proctor, 585 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Iowa 1998) (quoting State v. Reed, 482 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Iowa 1992)). We will reverse only if the court has manifestly abused its discretion. Id. With respect to Tubbs' first argument, he has not cited any cases, and we are aware of none, that have limited voir dire to those matters on the laundry list of challenges for cause contained in rule 2.18(5) (e.g., previous conviction of a felony, having formed or expressed an opinion on guilt or innocence, having been a defendant in a similar case, and other enumerated grounds). To illustrate, we have held that in cases involving racial diversity between a defendant and a victim the court should make or allow counsel to make specific inquiry on voir dire concerning possible racial prejudice, even though racial prejudice is not listed in rule 2.18(5) as a ground for challenge. State v. Windsor, 316 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Iowa 1982). As to Tubbs' second voir dire argument, we believe a reasonable view of the questions asked is that the prosecutor was attempting to assess potential jurors' understanding of what evidence is relevant on the question of intoxication, especially when, as here, there was no chemical test in evidence. In addition to assisting counsel in bringing challenges for cause, voir dire affords counsel an opportunity to discover information that may be useful in exercising peremptory challenges. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1908, 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 509 (1991) ( Voir dire examination serves the dual purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting counsel in exercising peremptory challenges.). We have said that a wide latitude is necessarily allowed counsel in examining the jurors for the purpose of advising him as to how to exercise his peremptory challenges. Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 1253, 239 N.W. 36, 37 (1931). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the defendant's objections.