Opinion ID: 8312832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiffs' Motions for Extra-Record Review

Text: Plaintiffs have also filed two motions for extra-record review. Pls.' Supp. Br.; Pls.' 2d Supp. Br. For the reasons explained below, and as reflected in the analysis in Section II(B)(3)(a), the Court will grant both motions.
It is black-letter administrative law that in an APA case, a reviewing court 'should have before it neither more nor less information than did the agency when it made its decision.'  Hill Dermaceuticals , 709 F.3d at 47 (quoting Walter O. Boswell Mem'l Hosp. v. Heckler , 749 F.2d 788 , 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ). And the agency enjoys a presumption that it has properly compiled the entire record of materials that it considered, either directly or indirectly, in making its decision. See, e.g., Maritel, Inc. v. Collins , 422 F.Supp.2d 188 , 196 (D.D.C. 2006). The D.C. Circuit has observed that this rule against extra-record evidence exerts its maximum force when the substantive soundness of the agency's decision is under scrutiny. Esch v. Yeutter , 876 F.2d 976 , 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989). On the other hand, when the procedural validity of the [agency's] action also remains in serious question[,] ... it may sometimes be appropriate to resort to extra-record information to enable judicial review to become effective. Id. Although the exceptions to this rule are quite narrow and rarely invoked, CTS Corp. v. EPA , 759 F.3d 52 , 64 (D.C. Cir. 2014), in Esch the D.C. Circuit set forth eight circumstances in which a court might consider extra-record evidence. Since then, it has appeared to substantially narrow the circumstances under which extra record review is appropriate, as Judge Mehta explained in detail in United Student Aid Funds v. DeVos , 237 F.Supp.3d 1 , 4 (D.D.C. 2017) (collecting cases). The Court need not review all those cases here. It suffices to say that although the number of situations in which extra-record evidence may be considered has dwindled over time, the D.C. Circuit has consistently stated that where the district court cannot determine from the administrative record whether the agency complied with its procedural obligations, the district court may consider extra-record evidence. Id.
During and after briefing on the parties' motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs twice moved the Court to allow for extra-record review of documents that they allege provide irrefutable evidence of the Department's changed interpretations of the relevant statutory and regulatory  terms at issue in this case. 16 Pls.' 2d Supp. Br., Mot. Plaintiffs urge the Court to make an exception to the default rule in APA cases here, because they challenge gross procedural deficiencies in that the current record precludes judicial review as to whether the Department adopted the Primary Purpose and School-like Setting standards as new interpretations of the PSLF regulation following its promulgation. Pls.' Supp. Br. at 3-4. The Court agrees that this is the rare APA case in which consideration of Plaintiffs' proffered extra-record evidence is permissible. First, it is the procedural-as opposed to substantive-validity of the Department's actions that are primarily at issue, so the usual rule prohibiting extra-record evidence applies with less potency. As the D.C. Circuit recently reaffirmed, district courts may consult extra-record evidence when 'the procedural validity of the [agency's] action ... remains in serious question.'  Hill Dermaceuticals , 709 F.3d at 47 (alterations in original) (quoting Esch , 876 F.2d at 991 ). Second, the administrative record itself is so deficient as to preclude effective review as to whether the Department changed its interpretation of the PSLF regulation when it adopted the Primary Purpose and School-like Setting standards. Id. Defendants argue that this lack of evidence in the record supports their contention that no such change occurred. See, e.g. , Dfs.' MSJ Br. at 24. But there is also no evidence supporting their own assertion that the Department's practices have been consistent and unchanged all along, id. at 30, even after the Court requested Defendants to direct it to any such evidence. See supra note 8. Certainly, the Department's reversals of its decisions relating to the Individual Plaintiffs and the ABA's other employees are consistent with such a change. But these handful of individual cases hardly provide an adequate record for the Court to evaluate Plaintiffs' claims. The extra-record evidence offered by Plaintiffs is the only direct evidence relevant to the question of whether the Department changed its interpretations of the PSLF regulation in the ways claimed by Plaintiffs. For all the reasons explained in Section II(B)(3)(a), the extra-record evidence at issue here shed[s] light on an issue not addressed by the administrative record itself, and may therefore be considered. Nat'l Min. Ass'n v. Jackson , 856 F.Supp.2d 150 , 158 (D.D.C. 2012). In United Student Aid Funds , Judge Mehta recently reached the same conclusion in a highly similar circumstance. In that case, the administrative record was silent on two factual issues central to resolving whether [a] Dear Colleague Letter announced a 'new rule' in a manner that satisfie[d] the APA. 237 F.Supp.3d 1 , 5 (D.D.C. 2017). Like here, the question in that case was whether an agency action constituted [a] type of change in position that triggered procedural obligations under the APA. Id. In that case, the court held that the relevant lack of evidence in the record on the agency's alleged change was a  'gross procedural deficiency' that preclude[d] effective review of [the plaintiff's] APA claims and thus warrant[ed] admission of extra-record evidence.  Id. at 6 (quoting Hill Dermaceuticals , 709 F.3d at 47 ). Such is the case here. Defendants advance several arguments urging the Court not to consider the extra-record evidence, but none of them are persuasive. First, Defendants argue that the extra-record evidence should not be considered because the documents at issue were not before the agency at the time of the decisions at issue. Defs.' Opp. to Supp. at 4. But extra-record review of documents not before the agency is precisely what the exceptions to the general rule in APA cases permit. See, e.g., Univ. of Colo. Health at Mem'l Hosp. v. Burwell , 151 F.Supp.3d 1 , 13 (D.D.C. 2015) ([A] party may seek to supplement the record with 'extra-judicial evidence that was not initially before the agency' but [which] the party 'believes should nonetheless be included in the administrative record.'  (alteration in original) (quoting WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar , 670 F.Supp.2d 1 , 5 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009) ) ). Second, Defendants assert that the extra-record evidence is irrelevant, for a variety of reasons-either because it postdates the agency actions at issue, or it relates to FedLoan Servicing (as opposed to Department) employees, or it concerns individual borrowers or employers not at issue in this case. Defs.' Opp. to 2d Supp. at 4. None of these arguments withstand scrutiny. The extra-record evidence is highly probative as to whether the Department changed its interpretation of the PSLF regulation by introducing the Primary Purpose and School-like Setting standards. The evidence concerning Voigt's claim makes the point the most clearly. As described in Section II(B)(3)(a), one email depicts a Department employee announcing in August 2014 that the Department had settled on a definition of public education that required such services to be provided in a school or school-like setting. See Pls.' Supp. Br., Ex. C. He did so only after the Department told Voigt in June 2012 that her employment at AILA qualified, but well before the Department sent her a denial letter in December 2014. And although the email does not concern Voigt's case specifically, that is part of the point-it demonstrates that the Department adopted a new standard for public education services and then applied that standard across the board, to the borrower reflected in the email as well as others, like Voigt. As for Quintero-Millan and Burkhart, the extra-record evidence does indeed postdate their denial letters. And to be sure, in some cases the evidence reflects communications from FedLoan Servicing employees, as opposed to the Department's-a distinction that in this context hardly makes a difference given the integrated way in which ECFs are processed. See AR 143, 160-61 (guidance instructing that all ECF submissions for non-501(c)(3) not-for-profit organizations be escalated to the Department). But in any event, the most important of these emails reflects a Department employee discussing an earlier effort to implement the Primary Purpose standard to public interest legal services organizations. Pls.' Supp. Br., Ex. B. And at that time, the Department apparently tasked FedLoan Servicing employees with compiling a list of ECFs that had to be reevaluated based on its introduction of this new standard. Id. This is highly relevant evidence-notwithstanding the date of the communication itself, and that it concerned processing of another borrower's ECF-that the Department had previously introduced the Primary Purpose standard as a general, broadly-applicable interpretation of the PSLF regulation that required a reevaluation of prior determinations, contrary to its position here.  Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' Motion to Allow for Extra-Record Review and Supplemental Motion to Allow for Extra-Record Review, and, as reflected above, has considered the extra-record evidence submitted by Plaintiffs in its evaluation of their claims.