Opinion ID: 1718571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: hamilton's claim under uifsa

Text: The trial court also dismissed Hamilton's claim for child support, determining that Hamilton did not state a cause of action against Foster for child support under UIFSA. The court further determined that Hamilton could not amend his petition to establish a legal duty on the part of Foster to pay support. Hamilton asserts that his petition contained sufficient facts to state a cause of action under UIFSA. Foster claims that UIFSA is simply not applicable to the claim Hamilton is asserting in this case. UIFSA, as its name implies, deals with the interstate enforcement and modification of support orders. The general purpose of UIFSA is to unify state laws relating to the establishment, enforcement, and modification of child support orders. Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb. 525, 600 N.W.2d 159 (1999); Kasdan v. Berney, 587 N.W.2d 319 (Minn.App.1999). The goal of UIFSA is to streamline and expedite interstate enforcement of support decrees and to eliminate the problems arising from multiple or conflicting support orders from various states by providing for one tribunal to have continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to establish or modify a child support order. See, OCSE v. Clemmons, 65 Ark.App. 84, 984 S.W.2d 837 (1999); Reis v. Zimmer, 263 A.D.2d 136, 700 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1999); In re Marriage of Zinke, 967 P.2d 210 (Colo.App.1998); Cowan v. Moreno, 903 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. App.1995). UIFSA provides a system where only one child support order may be in effect at any one time. See Unif. Interstate Family Support Act, Prefatory Note, 9IB U.L.A. 241 (1999). See, also, Linn v. State Child Support Enforcement, 736 A.2d 954 (Del.1999). UIFSA allows, under certain circumstances, a Nebraska court to enforce or modify a support order issued in another state or to establish a support order on behalf of a nonresident of this state when a Nebraska court has jurisdiction over the person obligated to pay support. See §§ 42-701 to 42-7,105. Hamilton asserts that under UIFSA, [a] person can assume a duty to support a child. Brief for appellant at 12. However, UIFSA does not create an independent duty of support. The purpose of UIFSA in regard to child support is to enforce or establish a child support order against someone who has a duty to pay support or to modify an existing child support order when interstate aspects are involved. See § 42-714. Thus, Hamilton cannot use UIFSA to create a duty on Foster's part to pay support. UIFSA's provisions may only be used to enforce an existing support order, establish a support order where no order has previously been established, or modify an existing support order. See §§ 42-714 and 42-733. Hamilton may utilize UIFSA only if his claim fits one of these categories. The claim does not fit for several reasons. First, Hamilton's claim is not for enforcement of a child support order issued in another state. He is not seeking enforcement of the biological parents' child support obligation as established in the Colorado order. Hamilton's petition states that any possibility that the biological parents will pay support is nonexistent. Second, Hamilton's claim is not for the establishment of a child support order. Section 42-733 provides in relevant part: (a) If a support order entitled to recognition under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act has not been issued, a responding tribunal of this state may issue a support order if: (1) the individual seeking the order resides in another state.... This section is inapplicable to Hamilton's claim for two reasons. Section 42-733 applies only when a support order entitled to recognition under UIFSA  has not been issued.  In the present case, a support order entitled to recognition regarding these children has been issued by the Colorado court. Section 42-711 provides for recognition of support orders under UIFSA. This section provides that if only one tribunal has issued a child support order, the order of that tribunal controls and must be so recognized. § 42-711(a). In the present case, only one tribunal has issued a support order, and thus the Colorado order is entitled to recognition and is the controlling order. Additionally, under § 42-733(a)(1), the individual seeking the order must reside in another state. In the present case, Hamilton, the person seeking the order, does not reside in another state, but resides in Nebraska. Thus, this situation does not involve the establishment of a support order under § 42-733. Third, Hamiliton's claim is not for modification of a support order recognized under UIFSA. Sections 42-746 and 42-747.01 provide for modification of a child support order issued in another state. However, the facts as pled by Hamilton show that § 42-747.01 is not applicable in this case. This section provides in relevant part: If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuing state's child support order in a proceeding to register that order. § 42-747.01(a). In the present case, all of the parties to the original child support order do not reside in Nebraska. Only Hamilton, Foster, and the children reside in Nebraska. According to Hamilton's petition, the biological parents, who were ordered to pay support under the Colorado order, do not reside in Nebraska. Thus, all parties to the original Colorado support order which Hamilton seeks to modify do not reside in Nebraska and § 42-747.01 is not applicable. When § 42-747.01 is not applicable, § 42-746 may allow modification of a support order entered in another state. Section 42-746 provides in relevant part: (a) After a child support order issued in another state has been registered in this state, the responding tribunal of this state may modify that order only if section 42-747.01 does not apply and after notice and hearing it finds that: (1) the following requirements are met: (i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do not reside in the issuing state; (ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks modification; and (iii) the respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state; or (2) the child, or a party who is an individual, is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state and all of the parties who are individuals have filed written consents in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of this state to modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. The facts as plead by Hamilton reveal that § 42-746 is not applicable in this case. This section is inapplicable because the petitioner, Hamilton, is not a nonresident of this state as required under § 42-746(a)(ii). Hamilton's petition states that he is a resident of Nebraska. Furthermore, Hamilton's petition contains no allegation that the parties have agreed by written consent to submit to the jurisdiction of the Nebraska court under § 42-746(a)(2). Hamilton would be unable to amend his petition to make such an allegation. Even if Hamilton could obtain the biological parents' consent, it is reasonable to infer from the facts pled that Foster would not be willing to file a consent allowing modification to take place in Nebraska. Thus, neither § 42-746 nor § 42-747.01, which allow for modification of support orders, apply under the circumstances of this case. We conclude that UIFSA provisions are not applicable in the present case because Hamilton's claim does not fit any of the three situations under which UIFSA may be utilized regarding child support. The UIFSA provisions relating to enforcement, establishment, or modification of child support orders simply do not apply to Hamilton's claim. Hamilton's petition also fails to allege facts sufficient to establish a duty of support on Foster's part on any other basis. In his petition, Hamilton alleges that under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the Respondent, as joint permanent custodian of the minor children owes a duty of support to the minor children. Hamilton cites the Alabama case of Ex parte Lipscomb, 660 So.2d 986 (Ala. 1994), in support of this proposition. In Ex parte Lipscomb, a grandfather and his wife, who was not the child's biological grandmother, were granted legal custody of the grandfather's grandchild pursuant to an Alabama statute which expressly provided for this type of custody arrangement. The child's mother was incarcerated, but her parental rights had not been terminated. The grandfather and his wife divorced. The wife was granted custody of the grandchild, and the grandfather was ordered to pay support. The grandfather appealed the order of support, contending that he had no legal duty to pay support. The Alabama Supreme Court determined that the grandfather had a duty to support the child because he was granted legal custody of the child pursuant to the Alabama statute that specifically provided for the grant of such custody and a consequent duty of support. The court determined that because, at the time of the divorce, the grandfather had legal custody as specifically defined by the statute, he had a duty to pay child support as ordered in the divorce decree. Ex parte Lipscomb is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Ex parte Lipscomb did not involve any interstate issues. The majority of the court in Ex parte Lipscomb simply determined that the Alabama legal custody statute created a duty of support in Alabama, the state in which the support order was originally sought. Nebraska has no similar statute. Section 43-1402, which deals with liability for child support, speaks in terms of only parents, the mother and father, being liable for the support of children. Furthermore, as previously determined, UIFSA does not create an independent duty of support and, in any event, UIFSA is not applicable to Hamilton's claim. Hamilton has failed to allege a duty on Foster's part to support the children under this theory and would be unable to amend his petition to establish such a duty under these circumstances. Finally, Hamilton claims that the trial court erred in not allowing him to amend his petition to assert a duty on the part of Foster to pay child support under the doctrine of in loco parentis. A person standing in loco parentis to a child is one who has put himself or herself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship, without going through the formalities necessary to a legal adoption, and the rights, duties, and liabilities of such person are the same as those of the lawful parent. Weinand v. Weinand, 260 Neb. 146, 616 N.W.2d 1 (2000); State on Behalf of Hopkins v. Batt, 253 Neb. 852, 573 N.W.2d 425 (1998). The assumption of the relationship is a question of intention, which may be shown by the acts and declarations of the person alleged to stand in that relationship. Id. Hamilton argues that he was not permitted to amend his petition to show such relationship between Foster and the children. In order to stand in loco parentis, one must assume all obligations incident to the parental relationship. Weinand, supra . These obligations include providing support for the child and providing day-to-day care for the child. See id. Once the person alleged to be in loco parentis no longer discharges all duties incident to the parental relationship, the person is no longer in loco parentis. See Weinand, supra . See, also, Quintela v. Quintela, 4 Neb.App. 396, 544 N.W.2d 111 (1996). Termination of the in loco parentis relationship also terminates the corresponding rights and responsibilities afforded thereby. Quintela, supra . See, also, State on Behalf of Hopkins, supra ; State on Behalf of J.R. v. Mendoza, 240 Neb. 149, 481 N.W.2d 165 (1992); Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d 8 (1991). In the recent case of Weinand, supra, this court determined that a child's ex-stepfather was no longer in loco parentis because he was no longer living in the same household as the child and was not carrying out the day-to-day functions of a father, even though he visited the child two to three times a week and was voluntarily paying child support. We determined that because the ex-stepfather was no longer discharging all of the duties of a parent, he was no longer in loco parentis and could not be ordered to pay child support under that doctrine. Likewise, in the present case, Foster is no longer living in the same household as the children and it is reasonable to infer from the facts pled that she is no longer providing for their daily care. Furthermore, once the person alleged to be in loco parentis denies the obligation to support the child, the in loco parentis relationship terminates. See Quintela, supra . A reasonable inference may be drawn from Hamilton's petition requesting that the court enter an order requiring Foster to pay support that Foster has declined to support the children. Accepting as true the facts pled in Hamilton's petition and the reasonable inferences therefrom, Foster has terminated her in loco parentis relationship because she is no longer discharging all duties incident to the parental relation. Thus, she may not be ordered to pay child support on that basis. Hamilton has failed to allege facts sufficient to show a duty on Foster's part to pay child support. If, upon the sustainment of a demurrer, it is clear that no reasonable possibility exists that an amendment will correct a pleading defect, leave to amend need not be granted. Wilkinson v. Methodist, Richard Young Hosp., 259 Neb. 745, 612 N.W.2d 213 (2000). The trial court properly granted Foster's demurrer as to the issue of Hamilton's claim for child support and properly determined that Hamilton would be unable to amend his pleading to allege a duty of support on Foster's part.