Opinion ID: 1438974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admissibility of the Positive Urine Specimen Test Result

Text: Notwithstanding which standard of review the Court of Appeals should have utilized, the real issue in this case is the admissibility of the results of the August 20, 2002, urine test. To support its introduction of the test result, the Department offered: (1) a chain of custody form containing the chain of custody number 0312131; (2) the signature of Mr. Davis certifying that the specimen container(s) was/were sealed with tamper-proof seal(s) in my presence; and that the information provided on this form and on the label(s) affixed to the specimen container(s) is correct; (3) a photocopy of the tamper-proof label, with the initials DD, that was affixed to the lid of the specimen container; (4) the testimony of Chief Wing that he inspected the label on the specimen container containing the chain of custody number prior to recommending termination; and (5) the positive drug test result. On the other side, Mr. Davis testified that: (1) he did not read the chain of custody document before signing it; (2) he signed the document before he provided a urine specimen; (3) he did not remember writing the initials DD on the tamper-proof adhesive label; (4) he did not observe how the specimen was handled after he gave the specimen to the collector; (5) the number that appears on the xerox copy of the label containing the chain of custody number could be either 0312131 or 0312121; and (6) the name of the collector who signed the chain of custody document was unknown. Mr. Davis also offered the results of two other drug tests. One test, taken eight days after the original test, was deemed inconclusive because of dilution of the sample. The second test, taken twenty-four days after the original test, showed that Mr. Davis passed a non-DOT drug screen. After considering the testimony of Mr. Davis, Mr. Houston, and Chief Wing, and the exhibits presented, the Board determined that Mr. Davis was fired for cause in accordance with the Civil Service Merit Act. [19] Given that Mr. Davis' testimony directly conflicted with the evidence presented by the Department, the Board clearly resolved issues of credibility against Mr. Davis. Issues of credibility are for the trier of fact, and this Court must give considerable deference to the trier of fact's factual findings. Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., 984 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn.1999). Mr. Davis, however, argues that the issue before the Board was not one of credibility, but instead, one of admissibility of evidence. As Mr. Davis argues, the chain of custody of the urine specimen is so inherently flawed as to render the test results inadmissible. Mr. Davis argues that had the Board correctly applied the rules of evidence and the general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence, the urine specimen test result would have been deemed inadmissible. As support for his argument, Mr. Davis relies upon the legal principles set forth in Tennessee's Rules of Evidence relevant to the admission of physical evidence. See Tenn. R. Evid. 901. Strict adherence to the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, however, is not required in proceedings before the Board. By their own terms, the Tennessee Rules of Evidence do not apply to administrative hearings, but rather to court appearances. Tenn. R. Evid. 101 (These rules shall govern evidence rulings in all trial courts of Tennessee except as otherwise provided by statute or rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.). Therefore, the Tennessee Rules of Evidence do not apply unless the Board enacted a rule to adopt them. See Goodwin v. Metro. Bd. of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383, 388 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983) ([N]either the technicalities of the Civil Rules of Procedure nor the common law [20] rules of evidence necessarily apply before nonjudicial bodies unless the rules of that body so require. ) (emphasis added) (citing Big Fork Mining Co. v. Tenn. Water Quality Control Bd., 620 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn.Ct.App.1981); L & N Railroad Co. v. Fowler, 197 Tenn. 266, 271 S.W.2d 188 (1954)). In this instance, the Civil Service Merit Act does not provide that Board hearings are subject to the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. [21] 1971 Tenn. Priv. Acts, ch. 110, § 23. Accordingly, in reviewing decisions from these less than legally formal hearings, appellate courts are guided, not by the Rules of Evidence, but instead by a sense of fair play and the avoidance of undue prejudice to either side of the controversy and [must determine] whether . . . the action of the hearing Board in admitting or excluding evidence was unreasonable or arbitrary. Goodwin, 656 S.W.2d at 388. In this case, Mr. Davis was provided the opportunity to attack the positive test result and to proffer evidence supporting his argument that the sample was not his and that he did not have marijuana in his system at the time the test was administered. The Board, however, did not find Mr. Davis' argument credible and admitted the sample. We cannot say that the admission of the sample was unduly prejudicial, unreasonable, or arbitrary. Even if the Tennessee Rules of Evidence were applicable during the Board's hearing, we find the necessary chain of custody was sufficiently, if minimally, established to justify admission of the positive urine specimen. The chain of evidence method of identification is a widely recognized concept in both civil and criminal law. Shell v. Law, 935 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) (quoting Ritter v. State, 3 Tenn.Crim.App. 372, 462 S.W.2d 247, 249 (1970)). In most cases it is not possible to establish the identity of an exhibit in question by a single witness. Several persons have usually handled the specimen before its analysis. Ritter, 462 S.W.2d at 249 (citing 21 A.L.R.2d 1216; 29 Am.Jur.2d Evid. § 830; 32 C.J.S. Evid. § 588(2)). Specimens should be handled with the greatest of care and all persons who handle the specimen should be ready to identify it and testify to its custody and unchanged condition. Shell, 935 S.W.2d at 409. Whether the requisite chain of custody has been established to justify admission, however, is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge and [t]his determination will not be overturned in the absence of a clearly mistaken exercise thereof. Id.;see Woods v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, No. M2001-03143-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22938947, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Dec.10, 2003). The identity of [the] . . . sample [] need not be proved beyond all possibility of doubt or that all possibility of tampering with [it] be excluded. The circumstances need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the sample. Shell, 935 S.W.2d at 409 (quoting Patterson v. State, 224 Ga. 197, 160 S.E.2d 815 (1968)). In this case, we find that the facts reasonably establish that Mr. Davis supplied the positive urine specimen. Although the collector of the specimen did not testify, this is not enough to render the evidence incompetent. See Shell, 935 S.W.2d at 409-10 (noting that the failure to have the phlebotomist available to testify did not render the evidence incompetent and that the circumstances under which the samples were taken and the tests conducted[] are matters affecting the credibility of the evidence rather than the admissibility). Mr. Houston provided testimony regarding the chain of custody number, the bar code, and the chain of custody form signed by Mr. Davis. The chain of custody form contained the signatures of the three individuals who handled the specimen once it arrived at the toxicology lab; one of those individuals being Mr. Houston. [22] Moreover, notwithstanding his later attempt to disavow his actions, Mr. Davis signed the chain of custody form verifying the procedures used during the drug test and acknowledging that the chain of custody number on the sample and the form were identical. Based on these facts, the Board had a reasonable assurance that the positive urine sampled belonged to Mr. Davis, and as such, the Board, in its discretion, determined that the positive urine sample was admissible. We find no error in this determination. Having determined that the positive urine specimen test result was admissible evidence in the Board's hearing, the Board's decision to terminate Mr. Davis' employment was supported by substantial and material evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, we reinstate the trial court's decision to deny Mr. Davis' Petition for Writ of Certiorari.