Opinion ID: 1098403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: confidential relation instruction

Text: The appellant assigns as error the giving of the following instruction: INSTRUCTION NO. 4-C If you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that there was a relationship between Willola Sullivant and Lois M. Vick in which Willola Sullivant was in a position to exercise a dominant influence upon Lois M. Vick because of Lois M. Vick's dependency upon Willola Sullivant, arising either from a weakness of mind or body, or trust, then the law presumes that Willola Sullivant exerted undue influence over Lois M. Vick in the signing of the Will of Lois M. Vick and the Will, therefore, is invalid and of no effect unless the proponent of the Will, Willola Sullivant, overcomes this presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence of: (1) Good faith on the part of Willola Sullivant; (2) Lois M. Vick's full knowledge and deliberation of her actions and their consequences, and (3) Advice of competent persons, disconnected from Willola Sullivant and devoted wholly to Lois M. Vick's interest. We note in the record that the chancellor refused this instruction initially. Apparently he changed his mind and granted it, and did not consider he had erred in doing so, because this was one of the errors assigned in a motion for a new trial, which he denied. Giving this instruction was error, but harmless, for the reasons given below. In the first place it is doubtful that Mrs. Vick had that dependency upon Willola necessary to create a confidential relationship in fact. Willola lived seventy miles away. The dependency in this case was not singled on any one child. In re Will and Estate of Varvaris, 477 So.2d 273 (Miss. 1986); Costello v. Hall, supra . In the second place, there is no proof that Willola was in any way active in the preparation of execution of this will. Matter of Will of Adams, 529 So.2d 611, 615 (1988); Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 115 So.2d 683, 686 (1959). From this record it appears Mrs. Vick consulted Mr. Finch on her own, and Willola had nothing to do with either the preparation or execution of the will. Finally, if such a presumption of undue influence had been created, it was clearly dissipated by the uncontradicted evidence that Mrs. Vick consulted Mr. Finch on her own, and he never attempted to represent any other person than Mrs. Vick. Thus, the proponents met the burden of showing completely independent advice, devoted solely to the testatrix's own interest. Croft v. Alder, supra, 237 Miss. at 725-726, 115 So.2d at 687; Ham v. Ham, 146 Miss. 161, 174, 110 So. 583, 585 (1926). Also, Lowery v. Will of Smith, 543 So.2d 1155 (Miss. 1988); In re Estate of Harris, 539 So.2d 1040 (Miss. 1989); Blissard v. White, 515 So.2d 1196 (Miss. 1987); Olmstead v. Olmstead, 233 Miss. 621, 103 So.2d 399 (Miss. 1958). Finally, the presumption of undue influence arising from a confidential relation's transaction is a presumption of law. Harris v. Bradley, 539 So.2d 1040, 1041-1042 (Miss. 1989); Miner v. Bertasi, 530 So.2d 168, 170 (Miss. 1988); Matter of Will of Adams, 529 So.2d 611, 614-615 (Miss. 1988); Estate of McRae, 522 So.2d 731, 737 (Miss. 1988); Angle v. Estate of Angle, 519 So.2d 883, 884-885 (Miss. 1988); Costello v. Hall, 506 So.2d 293, 297 (Miss. 1987); Murray v. Laird, 446 So.2d 575, 578 (Miss. 1984); Hendricks v. James, 421 So.2d 1031, 1041 (Miss. 1982); Wofford v. Wofford, 244 Miss. 442, 456, 142 So.2d 188, 195 (1962); Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 715, 115 So.2d 683, 686 (1959); Hickey v. Anderson, 210 Miss. 455, 462, 49 So.2d 713, 717 (1951); Ham v. Ham, 146 Miss. 161, 173, 110 So. 583, 584 (1926); Hitt v. Terry, 92 Miss. 671, 697, 707, 710-712, 46 So. 829 (1908); Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190, 243, 244, 252, 259 (1858). And, ordinarily, it is for the trial court, not the jury, to decide whether the evidence adduced creates a presumption. Moore v. State, 205 Miss. 151, 163, 38 So.2d 693, 695 (1949); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Cuevas, 162 Miss. 521, 525, 139 So. 397, 399 (1932); N.O. & G.N.R. Co. v. Walden, 160 Miss. 102, 112, 133 So. 241, 245-246 (1931); Walker v. State, 146 Miss. 510, 515, 112 So. 673, 677 (1927); see generally, In re Estate of Swantek, 172 Mich. App. 509, 432 N.W.2d 307 (1988); Estate of Berry, 170 Ill. App.3d 454, 120 Ill.Dec. 659, 524 N.E.2d 689 (1988); Estate of Mann, 184 Cal. App.3d 593, 229 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1986); Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, 95 Ill.2d 452, 69 Ill.Dec. 960, 448 N.E.2d 872 (1981); Diederich v. Walters, 65 Ill.2d 95, 2 Ill.Dec. 685, 357 N.E.2d 1128 (1976). This is to not say, however, that the presumption of undue influence arising from a confidential relationship may not be a jury question as well. If the facts are in dispute, there is a two-pronged inquiry: has there been sufficient evidence adduced to create the presumption, and if so, has there been sufficient evidence adduced to dissipate it. When chancellors are confronted with this problem in future cases, they might consider submitting the issue to the jury by interrogatories, the first to determine whether the presumption arises, and if so, the second as to whether the evidence has dissipated it. [2] While the giving of Instruction 4-C was erroneous in our view, we are convinced it was harmless error under the unusual facts of this case. The appellant makes no contention but that the jury was otherwise properly instructed on the law of undue influence generally. Under the proof in this case, Mrs. Vick's only reason for executing the will she made was her conviction that Mr. Vick was devising all his property to the sons. This, coupled with her desire (as expressed through her attorney Mr. Finch, and by herself by implication) to treat all the children equally, was the compelling reason the jury set aside the will. Had they upheld the will, it would have frustrated Mrs. Vick's own wishes. It would be extremely difficult to envision a jury reaching any other conclusion than they reached in this case. We find no merit in the remaining assignment of error. For the reasons stated, the decree of the chancery court invalidating and setting aside the will will be affirmed. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, PITTMAN and BLASS, JJ., concur.