Opinion ID: 3008624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Meaning of An Actual Threat

Text: The next question is whether Cissell communicated an actual threat at all. The word threat is an ordinary English word in common usage and readily understood by English-speaking people . It requires no specialized legal definition, but in common usage the word threat carries two different meanings . In the trial court, and again in this Court, each party argued a different meaning of the word . The trial court did not resolve the difference, but instead ruled that the meaning of threat was for the jury to determine . We disagree . The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law, to be resolved by the court, and on appeal is resolved de novo. Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet, 983 S .W .2d 488, 490-491 (Ky.1998) . When the language of a statute is capable of two different meanings, it is for the court to determine which meaning was intended by the legislature and to instruct the jury accordingly. In one sense, threat means: an expression or declaration indicating the intent or desire to inflict injury, harm, punishment, or some other disagreeable consequence upon another . The word threat also means : a thing or person that threatens, an impending menace or danger. In that sense of the word, a thing like a hurricane, an earthquake, a rabid dog, or a physically violent boyfriend is a threat. It is around these two meanings of the word threat that the issue in this case revolves . Under either meaning, a threat is actual when it exists in fact, is real and genuine, as opposed to a vague or uncertain indication of a potential harm, or a statement made in jest or obvious exaggeration . Dr. James argued at trial, and argues now, that the evidence failed to establish that Cissell ever communicated to him, directly or indirectly, an actual threat, in the form of an expression indicating that he would commit physical violence against Crady. DeVasier's argument is based upon the latter meaning of the word threat, that Cissell by his prior conduct of aggression toward Crady, posed an actual threat to her . There is no genuine issue of fact as to what Cissell did and said. James simply argues that the information communicated to him from Cissell did not constitute an actual threat, while DeVasier argues that the information communicated to James demonstrated to him that Cissell was an actual threat to Cradv. When a word in a statute lends itself to different interpretations, we must resolve the ambiguity by looking at the statute as a whole . The clue to which meaning was intended by the legislature is found in the grammatical structure of the sentence in which the phrase is used - its statutory context : No . . . liability and no cause of action shall arise against (a psychiatrist) for failing to predict, warn of or take precautions to provide protection from a patient's violent behavior, unless the patient has communicated to [the psychiatrist] an actual threat of physical violence . . . or. . . an actual threat of some specific violent act. KRS 202A .400(1) By using the word communicated, we believe the legislature intended to require a current, active expression, by words or gestures, verbal or nonverbal, to the professional ; a threat capable of avoidance; not a mere passive presence from which the professional must attempt to discern if a patient poses a threat of harm . A part of the obvious purpose of the statute, because subsection (3) addresses it, is to strike a balance between the ethical duty of the mental health professional to protect a patient's confidentiality and the moral duty to prevent harm to others . The legislature did so by requiring 10 disclosure of threats communicated by a patient, not threats posed by a patient. Thus, we hold that the duties described in KRS 202A .400(2) arise only when the patient has communicated to the mental health professional, directly or indirectly, by words or gestures, that he will commit an act of physical violence . Simply being a threat of physical violence does not constitute communicating a threat of physical violence . V. Application of KRS 202A.400 to the evidence presented To refute Dr . James' claim that no threat was communicated to him by Cissell, DeVasier directed our attention to the testimony of Yount, intake nurse Howell, Tanamachi, and Cissell himself. We have examined the record of the testimony of those witnesses . From the information provided to him, directly and indirectly, Dr. James knew that Cissell had been abusive to Crady, that he had previously threatened her by holding a knife to her throat, and that he had run the car in which she was riding off the road by ramming it with his car . He learned much about their troubles . One could reasonably conclude from that evidence that Dr . James knew that Cissell was a continuing danger or menace to Crady. But the evidence cited by Appellant does not establish that Cissell communicated to James an actual threat to inflict harm upon Crady by physical violence . Yount, who knew Cissell to be a threat to Crady, testified that she did not witness him communicating a threat of violence against Crady to Howell, Tanamachi, or anyone at the hospital. Howell testified that Cissell was largely uncooperative and unresponsive, and said very little . When Howell asked Cissell if he had thoughts of hurting someone, Cissell did not respond. Crady answered for him by showing her bruises to Howell. Howell's notation on Cissell's chart of homicidal ideation was based upon what Crady and Yount had told him about the prior aggressive action of Cissell. Cissell never in his own words and gestures expressed or otherwise communicated an actual intent or desire to harm Crady. In fact, he said the opposite - that he did not want to hurt her. Tanamachi, describing Cissell as a man of few words, testified that Crady told him about the prior acts of violence by Cissell, that Cissell admitted those acts, but denied any present intention to harm Crady. Cissell testified that he told Tanamachi that he loved Crady, and that he did not want to harm her, but was afraid that he could not control himself. That is the most threatening remark Cissell made, and we conclude that it is not clear and certain enough to constitute the communication of an actual threat as required by KRS 202A .400 . By his prior conduct and his demeanor in the presence of Howell, Tanamachi, and James, Cissell may have been an obvious threat to her, but he did not communicate to James or his associates an actual threat against her. KRS 202A.400 places no duty on James to warn Crady or to notify the authorities when a patient merely appears to be an actual threat of harm to another person. It is only when the patient communicates to him, or his associates, an actual threat that he may have liability. Absent the communication of such a threat, the statute shields him from liability stemming from Cissell's violent conduct. On that basis, we conclude Dr. James was entitled to a directed verdict, and an order affirming the judgment rendered in his favor.