Opinion ID: 2978017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Drug Quantity Calculations (Manjate)

Text: Defendant Manjate challenges the district court’s findings regarding the quantities of heroin and cocaine he was responsible for. He contends essentially that the court erred by relying on the uncontested presentence report estimates that he was responsible for distributing 559.75 grams of heroin and 1.7 kilograms of cocaine. Manjate acknowledges that these estimates were based largely on trial testimony, but contends it was error for the court to adopt estimates consisting of “rough guesses” from witnesses whose credibility was questionable. He acknowledges that because no objection was asserted below, this matter, too, is reviewed only for plain error. See United States v. Treadway, 328 F.3d 878, 883 (6th Cir. 2003). In fact, not only did Manjate refrain from asserting any objection to drug quantities at sentencing, but his attorney affirmatively waived objection, saying, “I don’t believe the quantity is an issue.” Sent. tr. p. 3, JA 1860. Clearly, the district court’s reliance on quantity approximations was not inappropriate. United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 699 (6th Cir. 2000). Estimates suffice as long as they are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Jeross, 521 F.3d at 570. Testimonial evidence from other coconspirators may be a reliable and sufficient basis for drug quantity determinations. Id. The district court’s credibility determinations are entitled to great deference. Id. We are thus in no position to second-guess the district court’s assessment of these matters—much less find plain - 14 - Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis error—where defendant Manjate (a) declined to even meet with the probation officer who prepared the presentence report, (b) failed to object and even waived his right to object to the estimated drug quantities at sentencing, and (c) has failed to identify any evidence that refutes the evidence relied on by the district court in adopting the uncontested quantities proposed in the presentence report. Manjate’s untimely and unsupported drug quantity objection is therefore overruled. VII. Reasonableness of Sentences (Manjate and Lewis) Both defendants challenge their sentences as unreasonable. We review the district court’s sentencing judgments under the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard, evaluating both their procedural and substantive reasonableness. Gall v. United States, —U.S.—, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 598 (2007). A district court will be deemed to have abused its discretion if it committed significant procedural error, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Id. at 597. The standard for evaluating whether a sentence is substantively unreasonable is summarized in Gall as follows: When conducting this review, the court will, of course, take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range. If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness. [Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462-68, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)]. But if the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness. It may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify - 15 - Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis the extent of the variance. The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. In the Sixth Circuit, we accord a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to sentences within the properly calculated Guidelines range. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2008).
Defendant Lewis was sentenced to 420 months in prison. He contends the sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not properly consider the § 3553(a) factors. He contends the sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing. Both arguments ignore the fact that the district court imposed the shortest term of imprisonment that it could within its lawful discretion, 35 years, the very sentence which Lewis’s counsel asked the court to impose at sentencing. The district court duly calculated the applicable Guidelines range to be 78 to 97 months. Based on the crimes of conviction, however, the court had no authority to impose a sentence below the applicable statutory mandatory sentencing minimums, because the exceptions recognized at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and (f) do not apply. See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 582, 594-95 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Franklin, 499 F.3d 578, 585-86 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Burke, 237 F.3d 741, 744 (6th Cir. 2001). The resulting sentence is undeniably long, but this is a product of legislative judgment, not judicial discretion. - 16 - Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis
Defendant Manjate received a prison sentence of 224 months. He contends the sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court improperly calculated the applicable advisory Guidelines range to be 188 to 235 months based on erroneous drug quantity determinations. As explained above, Manjate has failed to demonstrate any error in the district court’s drug quantity determinations. It follows that his procedural unreasonableness challenge is meritless. Manjate also contends his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court, in considering the § 3553(a) factors, placed inordinate weight on his lack of remorse and on the social ills that flow from the illegal drug trade generally. Manjate maintains that a prison sentence at the low end of the applicable advisory Guidelines range, rather than in the upper half, would, in the words of the parsimony clause, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of sentencing. Manjate’s sentence is within the properly calculated advisory Guidelines range and is therefore subject to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 389. This presumption is not rebutted by a defendant’s mere argument that a shorter prison sentence would be sufficient. United States v. Ward, 506 F.3d 468, 478-79 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Dexta, 470 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2006). Nor are we persuaded, upon review of the sentencing record, that the district court improperly weighed such factors as Manjate’s lack of remorse and the destructive consequences of drug trafficking on individual lives, families, and whole communities. Such considerations come squarely within the ambit of such § 3553(a) factors as “the nature and - 17 - Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;” as well as the need for the sentence imposed “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,” “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” and “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” Accordingly, we reject Manjate’s substantive unreasonableness challenge.