Opinion ID: 1058852
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Juror Molinaro

Text: Juniper's final challenge is that prospective juror Molinaro should have been struck for cause because she was an acquaintance of the Commonwealth's Attorney. Juniper asserts that when asked if it would affect her ability to sit fairly and impartially[, Molinaro] responded, `[I]'ve been thinking that since nine o'clock this morning, and I don't think so.' This exchange, Juniper contends, reflects Molinaro's clear inability to give an unequivocal answer in light of her familiarity to the prosecutor and illustrated her inability to be a qualified juror for Juniper. The Commonwealth initially notes that Juniper misquotes Molinaro's response to the question regarding her impartiality in such a way that suggests equivocation on Molinaro's part that her actual response does not. The record demonstrates Molinaro's complete response was, I've been thinking about that since nine o'clock this morning, and I don't think so. (Emphasis added.) From Molinaro's actual response, the Commonwealth asserts that far from equivocation, her answers show conscientious introspection with respect to possible bias before reaching the conclusion that she could be fair. In light of this showing of truthfulness and frankness, the Commonwealth contends the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Molinaro. The record shows the following colloquy during Molinaro's voir dire: THE COURT: [W]hat's the nature of your acquaintance with [the Commonwealth's Attorney]? . . . . . MS. MOLINARO: I know his wife from my work at Sentara. I didam I allowed to say I did put some signs up in yard[s] in the neighborhood when he was running for Commonwealth['s] Attorney. THE COURT: Do you believe your acquaintance with Mr. Doyle would in any way prejudice you in favor of the prosecution or impair your ability to give a fair and impartial trial to MS. MOLINARO: I've been thinking about that since nine o'clock this morning, and I don't think so. . . . . . [COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]:... I just wanted to be sure we brought that all out. In fact, you may be acquainted with [Defense Counsel] as well. [MS. MOLINARO]: I know of [Defense Counsel] through soccer. . . . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can you be certain [that you would not be inclined or partial to the Commonwealth in this case]? [MS. MOLINARO]: I feel certain that knowing him the little that I do, that I would be an impartial juror just because I have faith in myself, but the reason I have been asking is because I don't do this very often and so I do not know, but I do not think. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You threw me off. [MS. MOLINARO]: Yeah. Okay. Well, you're more experienced with screening jurors, but I think that I am an impartial juror. In rejecting Juniper's motion to strike Molinaro, the trial court stated: I think she said she'd been thinking about it all morning. The impression I got from observing her demeanor was I imagine she made up her mind she can be fair in this case. ... If people who knew the Commonwealth's attorney were disqualified from being on a jury, in most rural areas in this state you'd never have a criminal trial. Our previous decisions have generally held that relationship does not automatically disqualify a potential juror from being fair and impartial. Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 322, 325, 337 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1112, 106 S.Ct. 1524, 89 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986) (citing Calhoun, 226 Va. at 263, 307 S.E.2d at 900). The overarching consideration is whether the trial court erred in determining that the prospective juror would fairly and impartially decide the accused's case. See, e.g., Jackson, 255 Va. 625, 640-41, 499 S.E.2d 538, 548 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067, 119 S.Ct. 796, 142 L.Ed.2d 658 (1999) (upholding trial court's refusal to strike a juror for cause when the juror's husband was a first cousin of the Commonwealth's attorney); Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 343, 468 S.E.2d 98, 109, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951, 117 S.Ct. 365, 136 L.Ed.2d 256 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Morrisette v. Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 270 Va. 188, 202, 613 S.E.2d 551, 562 (2005) (upholding retention of juror when the Commonwealth's attorney in a capital case formerly represented prospective juror in a matter and the prospective juror still regarded him as his personal attorney); Wise, 230 Va. at 325, 337 S.E.2d at 717 (upholding retention of prospective juror who was the Commonwealth's attorney's golfing buddy and long standing friend). The voir dire of Molinaro demonstrates that after carefully considering her association with the Commonwealth's Attorney, she could be impartial as a juror. We do not find manifest error in the trial court's conclusion that Molinaro would stand indifferent in the cause and act as an impartial and fair juror.