Opinion ID: 1102298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Dealership's Claims Against GMAC

Text: GMAC provides retail financing for a GM dealership by purchasing its retail paper. The customer and the dealership determine the finance rate and other terms of the sale before they enter into their contract. Dealerships generally sell these contracts to third parties, such as banks or financing companies. This allows the dealership to immediately obtain the money due under the contract and relieves it of the administrative burden of collecting the payments. After GMAC buys a contract from a dealership, it collects the payments directly from the customer. The rate at which GMAC buys retail paper from a dealership (the buy rate or the discount rate) is not necessarily the same as the finance rate that the dealership negotiates with its customer. When GMAC's buy rate is lower than the dealership's customer rate, the difference between the two rates is additional profit to the dealership. This profit is called the dealership's participation. When GMAC buys retail paper, it pays the dealership up front the entire value of the contract, including any participation, even though the customer has not yet paid GMAC anything, and even though the customer will pay over time. When Bell became a GM dealer in 1979, GMAC agreed to buy retail paper from his dealership under a recourse agreement. Under that agreement, if a customer defaulted, the dealership had to pay GMAC the unpaid balance on the contract. If the vehicle was repossessed, it was returned to the dealership and the dealership was responsible for disposing of it. In 1980, Bell signed an agreement providing for GMAC to buy the dealership's retail paper on a modified nonrecourse basis. Under this agreement, GMAC would assume the responsibility for maintaining the account, including the handling of any repossession and resale of the vehicle, and absorbing any loss that resulted. Use of a nonrecourse plan limits a dealership's exposure, but increases GMAC's risk of loss. GMAC attempts to manage this increased risk in various ways. GMAC's buy rate is higher under the nonrecourse plan than under the recourse plan. Dealerships agree under the nonrecourse plan that GMAC's buy rate will include an additional amount (nonrecourse reserve increment), which GMAC does not keep as profit for itself, but instead sets aside in a reserve account used to cover losses that are anticipated from repossessions involving a dealership's contracts. GMAC branch managers are responsible for monitoring each dealership's loss reserve account to make sure that it stays around zero. The account balance can become negative when repossession losses exceed the amount reserved for them. When that happens, GMAC suffers a loss. The number of repossessions that a particular dealership experiences depends largely on the amount of marginal (risky) retail paper that has been purchased from that dealership. If a dealership's reserve account balance becomes negative, GMAC managers may address the problem in various ways. Some approaches are designed to increase the amount available in the reserve account to cover losses; others reduce the number of losses drawing on the account. To add money to the reserve account, the branch manager could raise the dealership's loss increment (and thus its buy rate). But this would apply to all of that dealership's contracts, whether or not they go into default, and could make its prices and rates less competitive. To reduce the number of losses, managers can adjust the branch's purchase policy for the dealership's retail paper by telling GMAC employees to watch for the dealership's riskier paper and to buy less of it. Each of these alternatives can adversely impact a dealership's ability to sell vehicles. GMAC has therefore developed other alternatives less burdensome to a dealership for reducing GMAC's repossession exposure and for managing a loss reserve. These alternatives are referred to as modifications to the nonrecourse agreement, and they reduce the amount of the loss that must be taken out of the dealership's reserve account in the event of repossession. One of these modified plans, referred to among GMAC employees as Modification C or Mod C, charges the dealership back for the full participation that GMAC paid the dealership when it purchased the contract (i.e., the dealership's profit on the financing), up to the amount of the repossession loss. Thus, the dealership agrees to pay back more than the prorata portion of its participation. By contrast, nonrecourse dealerships not on a modified plan are charged back on a prorata basis the portion of their participation that the customer did not pay before repossession (this is referred to generally as the rule of 78). GMAC's Montgomery branch included between 45 and 50 dealerships in 1991. A substantial majority of those dealerships (between 35 and 40), including Bell's dealership, were on Modification C. Modification C reduces GMAC's risk from repossession, so that it can buy more retail paper from the dealerships, thus allowing the dealerships the opportunity to sell more vehicles. Moreover, a dealership is never charged back under Modification C if the customer pays in accordance with his contract, and it never has to pay toward a repossession loss more than the amount of the participation that GMAC paid it to begin with. By contrast, another modification, D, requires a dealership to share in the loss beyond refunding its participation. Dealerships wanting to sell GMAC a contract generally telecopy (fax) the customer's application to GMAC for review before it is finalized. GMAC enters the information about the customer and the proposed transaction into its computerized Mechanized Application Processing System (MAPS). The report generated by MAPS is used by GMAC as an aid in determining whether to buy a contract. MAPS evaluates the proposed contract by determining its payback potential. By examining the customer's background and credit history, MAPS develops mathematical odds that the customer will not default. The MAPS score determines which of a number of tiers the contract is assigned tofrom A to D, with A being the most favorable rating. GMAC charges an increasingly higher buy rate with each tier. In exercising their judgment, GMAC employees evaluate not only the odds that the customer will default on the contract, but also how large any potential loss would be. They take into account the amount of money GMAC is being asked to put at risk, the value of the collateral securing the transaction (the vehicle's wholesale value), and the difference between the two. On occasion, GMAC may condition (qualify) acceptance of a contract on changes being made to the agreement, such as a large down payment, that will reduce the amount GMAC will have at risk. Branch managers do not usually review the decisions by GMAC employees concerning a contract before the decision is communicated to the dealership. Dealerships that disagree with the decision may attempt to negotiate better terms with GMAC, sometimes by appealing to a branch manager or other upper management. However, the dealership's 1980 agreement providing for GMAC to buy retail paper under the modified nonrecourse plan stated that GMAC would buy only contracts acceptable to us [GMAC]. The dealership based its misrepresentation claim against GMAC on allegations that GMAC's control branch manager, Bennett Hall, as well as other representatives of GMAC, had represented to Bell that the dealership had the same benefits that all the other dealerships had and allegations that this representation was false. The dealership based its suppression claim on allegations that other dealerships were being treated differently (more favorably) and that Hall and others had suppressed that information. The wantonness claim was based on allegations that GMAC had consciously decided to treat the dealership differently from other GM dealerships, knowing that damage to the dealership was likely to result from such disparate treatment. The alleged differences in treatment concerned two aspects of GMAC's financial interactions with the dealershipthe repossession chargeback agreement (Modification C) between GMAC and the dealership that governed the rights of the parties in the event an installment contract went into default and the financed vehicle was repossessed, and GMAC's purchase of the dealership's retail paper.
As previously noted, Bell signed an agreement in 1980 providing for GMAC to buy the dealership's retail paper on a modified nonrecourse basis. Under this agreement, GMAC charged the dealership back for the full participation that GMAC had paid the dealership when it purchased the contract, up to the amount of the repossession loss. The dealership's misrepresentation claim was based in part on allegations that Hall had misrepresented to Bell in 1980 and on other unspecified occasions that the dealership had the same benefits that all the other dealerships had and allegations that that representation was false because, according to the dealership, from 1980 up to the fall of 1991, when the dealership was removed from the Modification C plan, the dealerships located on the eastern bypass in Montgomery were not on a modified nonrecourse plan, but, instead, were charged back on a prorata basis (under the rule of 78). GMAC contends that the dealership failed to establish that Hall's representations were, in fact, false. After reviewing the record, we must agree. The statutory basis for the dealership's misrepresentation claim is Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-101, which provides: Misrepresentations of a material fact made willfully to deceive, or recklessly without knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if made by mistake and innocently and acted on by the opposite party, constitute legal fraud. The elements of a misrepresentation claim are 1) a misrepresentation of a material fact, 2) made willfully to deceive or recklessly without knowledge, 3) which was justifiably relied on by the plaintiff under the circumstances, and 4) which caused damage as a proximate consequence. Harrington v. Johnson-Rast & Hays Co., 577 So.2d 437 (Ala.1991). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the dealership, does indicate that Hall made the same benefits representation in 1980 at the time the repossession chargeback agreement was signed and on certain unspecified occasions thereafter. However, we can find no evidence tending to show what chargeback plan the Montgomery bypass dealerships were on before 1990. The record is silent on that point. The evidence does show that the Montgomery bypass dealerships were on an unmodified nonrecourse plan in 1990 and thereafter. The evidence also indicates that Hall left his position as branch manager in early 1991. Therefore, the only way any representation on Hall's part could be actionable was if such a representation had been made in 1990 or early 1991, when, according to the evidence, Hall was still the branch manager and the Montgomery dealerships were not on a modified nonrecourse plan. The record, however, does not disclose when Hall's post-1980 representations concerning dealership benefits were actually made. [3] Contrary to the position taken by the dealership, this failure of proof is not insignificant. [4] The burden was clearly on the dealership to prove that Hall had made a false representation of material fact. Because the dealership failed in this respect, it could not base its misrepresentation claim on any statement that may have been made by Hall. The dealership also based its misrepresentation claim on allegations that Milton Edrington, who replaced Hall as control branch manager, had also misrepresented to Bell in 1991 that the dealership was on the same chargeback plan as the Montgomery bypass dealerships. The record does support the dealership's allegations in this regard. The essence of the dealership's misrepresentation claim, as we understand it, was that Bell's lack of knowledge that GMAC would consider putting the dealership under a different nonrecourse chargeback plan effectively prevented him from negotiating for such a plan. [5] Edrington replaced Hall as control branch manager in January 1991. The bypass dealerships were not on the Modification C plan in 1991. Bell's testimony indicates that sometime after Edrington replaced Hall, but before he discovered from another GM dealer, Larry Puckett (a Chevrolet dealer in Prattville), that he was not on the same plan as Puckett, Bell asked Edrington if his dealership was on the same repossession chargeback plan as the Montgomery bypass dealerships. Bell testified as follows: Q. Now, so, my question to youI apologize for not having mentioned Modification C earlier, but my question to you is did there come a time when you finally [got] taken off Mod C? A. Yes. Q. That was after your meeting in Montgomery with Mr. Edrington? A. Yes. Q. Up until [the] time that you got taken off of Modification C, were you familiar with that term at all? A. I had never heard of that term in my life. Q. Let me ask you, in connection with the repossessions of some of your retail customers, had you complained to Mr. Edrington or not about the high rate of repossessions for your customers? A. Yes. Q. In making those complaints to Mr. Edrington, had Mr. Edrington, before you complained in this meeting in Montgomery, had he ever told you that you were under Modification C? A. Never in my life. Q. Had he ever used that term at all? A. No, he had not. .... Q. Mr. Bell, right before the break we were talking about the dealer finance participation with GMAC; do you recall that testimony? A. Yes. Q. I want to ask you, Mr. Bell, during the time that you were doing business with GMAC, when your customers would have repossessions, were you aware that you were losing all your dealer finance participation every time there was a repossession? A. Yes. When GMAC lost money, yes, I was aware of that, very much aware of that. Q. Now, when you talked to Mr. Edrington about your repossession program, about your rate of repossessions for your retail customers, what, if anything, did Mr. Edrington tell you about whether you were on the same program as the dealers on the bypass? .... A. That I was on the same program that the dealers that were on the bypass were on. Q. What I was going to ask you in my follow-up question, and I do ask you now, Mr. Bell, is this: Tell the jury whether or not you asked any specific questions about either Cobb [a Cadillac-Pontiac dealership located on the bypass in Montgomery] or Brewbaker [a Buick dealership located on the bypass in Montgomery] or any of the bypass dealers of Mr. Edrington? A. Oh, yes. I always asked specific questions about General Cobb, Frank McGough [apparently the operator of a Chevrolet dealership on the Montgomery bypass], about Mr. Brewbaker. I always asked questions about them because they were my competitors. Q. Now, during this conversation with Mr. Edrington, what, if anything, did Mr. Edrington say to you in response to those specific questions about the bypass dealers? A. Mr. Edrington would always tell me that he could not discuss those dealers with me under any conditions. (Emphasis added.) The evidence indicates that Edrington misrepresented to Bell, up until Bell confronted him with the information that he had obtained from the other GM dealer, that his dealership was under the same repossession chargeback plan as the Montgomery bypass dealerships, and that Bell relied on that misrepresentation by not attempting earlier to renegotiate his chargeback agreement with GMAC. Bell testified as follows: Q. Mr. Bell, I want to ask you this question as we begin to get into that. First of all, do you recall a meeting or conversation that you had in the early fall of 1991 with Mr. Larry Puckett? A. I certainly do. Q. Who is ... Larry Puckett? A. Mr. Larry Puckett is a previous GMAC employee. Q. Mr. Puckett? A. Mr. Puckett is a previous GMAC employee. He is also the owner of Larry Puckett Chevrolet in Prattville. Q. All right, sir. Do you recall where you and Mr. Puckett were when you had the conversation that you're testifying about? A. Well, it was in Atlanta, Georgia, at a General Motors auto auction. Q. Without getting into anything Mr. Puckett said to you, Mr. Bell, let me ask you what, if any, action did you take after you had this conversation with Mr. Puckett that had to do with the GMAC people over in Montgomery? .... A. What it amounted to, I came back to Montgomery from Atlanta; and I went to Mr. Edrington's office; and what it amounted to, my chargebacks on my reserve were not prorated. I wanted to know, I wanted to know if I was on the same program that the rest of the dealers in Montgomery were on. I was told at the time that I went there that I was on the same program as the rest of the dealers. .... Q. Mr. Bell, I don't want to be repetitious at all about this. I want to be clear about it. Let me ask this question: Were there any dealers that you discussed in that fall meeting at Mr. Edrington's office in Montgomery other than the dealers located on the eastern bypass in Montgomery? If so, tell me. A. No. Q. All right. A. The dealers [on] the eastern bypass. Q. All right. Now I want to know at the time that you went in to talk to Mr. Edrington what you said to Mr. Edrington, first of all, and then what did Mr. Edrington say to you? A. Well, let me make sure this is right. I told him ... what I had heard Q. All right, sir. A. And I wanted to know if I was on the same program that the other dealers in Montgomery were on because I had been told that .... Q. Mr. Bell, when you made your statements to Mr. Edrington in his office, what, if anything, did Mr. Edrington say about the program that you were on and the program that the bypass dealers were on? A. That we all were on the same program. Q. Now, did you challenge Mr. Edrington on that statement? A. I did. I went back a second and maybe a third time. Q. What did you say in your subsequent visit or visits to Mr. Edrington about the program that you were on? A. I asked him again if I was on the same program that the dealers were on that were on the bypass. Q. What did Mr. Edrington say? A. At that time he told me that I was. Q. All right. What, if anything, did you say to Mr. Edrington about what Mr. Puckett had told you? A. That his chargebacks were prorated. .... Q. My question to you is, first of all, did you tell Mr. Edrington, over there, what Mr. Puckett had said to you? A. Yes, I did. Q. All right. After you told Mr. Edrington what Mr. Puckett had said, what did Mr. Edrington say at that time? A. Well, the third time, I think he admitted on the third time that I was on a different program. Q. All right. When you heard that from Mr. Edrington, what did you say to him? A. It took a lot out of me. Q. What did you say? A. I was very disappointed. I was very angry. Mr. Edrington was very much aware of that. Q. Did you tell him that you were upset? A. Oh, yes. He knew that. Q. What did you ask him to do for you, if anything? A. I told him that I wanted to be treated fair, and I felt that the dealers that were on the bypass were on a program where their chargebacks were prorated on the reserve and mine was not and I thought it was very unfair and that they had taken a lot of money from me. Q. Mr. Bell, did you ask Mr. Edrington to give you your money back? A. I certainly did. Q. What did Mr. Edrington say when you asked for your money back? A. Mr. Edrington told me that was his call and he was not going to give me my money back but he would put me on the program that the dealers, that the other dealers were on on the bypass. For the reasons set out above, we conclude that GMAC was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on this aspect of the dealership's misrepresentation claim. The dealership based its suppression claim on allegations that GMAC did not inform it that Modification C was not the only nonrecourse chargeback plan available to GM dealerships. Specifically, the dealership argues that GMAC should have disclosed to it that the Montgomery bypass dealerships were on a different nonrecourse chargeback plan. GMAC argues that the terms of its contracts with other dealerships were confidential and that it was under no legal duty to disclose to the dealership the nature of other chargeback plans that other dealerships may have been operating under. Initially, we note again that the record contains no evidence tending to show what chargeback plan the Montgomery bypass dealerships were on before 1990. Therefore, the dealership's suppression claim would have to be based on an alleged failure on the part of GMAC (Hall and Edrington) to disclose this information during 1990 and thereafter. The statutory basis for the dealership's suppression claim is Ala. Code 1990, § 6-5-102, which provides: Suppression of a material fact which the party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case. The elements of a suppression claim are 1) a duty to disclose the facts, 2) concealment or nondisclosure of material facts by the defendant, 3) inducement of the plaintiff to act, and 4) action by the plaintiff to his injury. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So.2d 756 (Ala.1986). Under § 6-5-102, silence is not fraud unless an obligation to communicate a material fact exists. Such an obligation may arise where a confidential relation or particular circumstances exist. Trio Broadcasters, Inc. v. Ward, 495 So.2d 621 (Ala.1986). This Court has defined a confidential relationship as follows: `[A relationship in which] one person occupies toward another such a position of adviser or counselor as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act in good faith for the other's interests, or when one person has gained the confidence of another and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in mind; where trust and confidence are reposed by one person in another who, as a result, gains an influence or superiority over the other; and it appears when the circumstances make it certain the parties do not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side, there is an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably reposed; in both an unfair advantage is possible. It arises in cases in which confidence is reposed and accepted, or influence required, and in all the variety of relations in which dominion may be exercised by one person over another.' See Holdbrooks v. Central Bank of Alabama, N.A., 435 So.2d 1250, at 1252 (Ala.1983), quoting 15A C.J.S. Confidential (1967). There is no question that the dealership and GMAC were, at all times, dealing with each other at arm's length. The evidence shows that Bell was intelligent and knowledgeable about the workings of an automobile dealership. In short, he was an experienced businessman. The evidence also shows that GMAC was in business to purchase retail paper from GM dealerships, provided that that paper was acceptable to GMAC. Although Bell sought, and GMAC provided, advice and financial assistance to the dealership, there is no evidence indicating that a confidential relationship existed between the dealership and GMAC that would impose a duty on GMAC to inform the dealership that Modification C was not the only nonrecourse chargeback plan used by GMAC. See Norman v. Amoco Oil Co., 558 So.2d 903 (Ala.1990), wherein this Court held that Amoco was under no duty to give a detailed explanation of its profitability index to one of its franchisees (Norman), even though Amoco used that index as a basis for not renewing Norman's contract. There is no evidence that GMAC was under any contractual obligation to allow the dealership to pick and choose which plan it would operate under. To the contrary, the evidence indicated that the majority of the dealerships in the Montgomery branch had at one time or another been on the Modification C plan, presumably to reduce the risk of loss to GMAC resulting from its purchase of marginal or risky retail paper. In this respect, GMAC's relationship with the dealership was similar to that of creditor and debtor, much like the relationship that exists between a bank and its customer, where the creditor dictates the terms for extending credit. In the absence of special circumstances, such as when a customer reposes trust in a bank and relies on financial advice, no fiduciary or confidential relationship exists between a creditor and a debtor. See Power Equipment Co. v. First Alabama Bank, 585 So.2d 1291 (Ala.1991). Application of the particular circumstances language contained in § 6-5-102 necessarily requires a case-by-case consideration of several factors. Quoting from Jim Short Ford Sales, Inc. v. Washington, 384 So.2d 83, 86-87 (Ala.1980), this Court, in Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Hospital, 454 So.2d 496, 505 (Ala.1984), stated: `A duty to speak depends upon the relation of the parties, the value of the particular fact, the relative knowledge of the parties, and other circumstances. Hall Motor Co. v. Furman, 285 Ala. 499, 234 So.2d 37 (1970).... Thus, each case must be individually examined to determine whether a duty of disclosure exists; a rigid approach is impossible, and, indeed, the words of the statute itself counsel flexibility.' Before an obligation to disclose can be imposed under the particular circumstances of a case, the relationship existing between the parties, while not necessarily required to be confidential, must nonetheless be such that a disclosure of material information is dictated. In Bama Budweiser of Montgomery, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 611 So.2d 238, 246 (Ala.1992), this Court, citing Norman v. Amoco Oil Co., supra, noted that [w]hen the parties to a transaction deal with each other at arm's length, with no confidential relationship, no obligation to disclose arises when information is not requested. (Emphasis added.) As previously noted, GMAC had the right to contractually limit its exposure by requiring the dealership to participate in the Modification C plan as a condition to its purchasing the dealership's retail paper. GMAC was certainly within its rights in doing this to protect its financial interests. Considering the particular business enterprise involved here; the fact that Bell was an experienced businessman; the fact that it was GMAC's policy to treat as confidential its business dealings with individual GM dealerships; and the fact that GMAC was under no contractual obligation to allow the dealership to participate in any particular chargeback plan, we cannot hold that GMAC was under any general legal duty to disclose to the dealership the existence of other nonrecourse chargeback plans that it was using with other dealerships. Therefore, as our previous discussion illustrates, because there is no evidence indicating that Hall made a misrepresentation to the dealership with respect to the chargeback plan, the dealership could not base its suppression claim on any allegations of nondisclosure by Hall. However, because the evidence indicates that Bell specifically asked Edrington about the chargeback plan and that Edrington misrepresented that the dealership was on the same plan as the Montgomery bypass dealerships, a duty on GMAC's part to disclose the truth arose. [6] When a party, in a commercial setting, elects to make a representation, the party is under a duty to make a full and fair disclosure. This duty is not unlike the obligation that may arise between parties in a confidential or fiduciary relationship. See Sperau v. Ford Motor Co., 674 So.2d 24 (Ala.1995), judgment vacated 517 U.S. 1217, 116 S.Ct. 1843, 134 L.Ed.2d 945 (1996). Therefore, GMAC was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law with respect to the dealership's suppression claim. With respect to the wantonness claim, GMAC was under no contractual obligation to let the dealership operate under an unmodified nonrecourse chargeback plan, and there is no common law duty that we are aware of that would preclude a finance company, such as GMAC, from dictating reasonable terms to govern its purchasing of retail sales contracts from a company such as the dealership. The dealership had no legal basis for insisting that it be allowed to operate under the chargeback plan of its choosing. The absence of a duty on the part of GMAC in this respect was fatal to the dealership's wantonness claim, and the trial court erred in submitting that claim to the jury.
The dealership specifically alleged that GMAC's representatives had misrepresented to it that it was being treated the same as the Montgomery bypass dealers, because, it says, GMAC was buying less of its retail paper than it was buying from those Montgomery dealerships. This alleged disparate treatment also formed the basis for the dealership's suppression claim (that GMAC did not disclose that it was treating the Montgomery bypass dealerships more favorably by buying more of their retail paper), as well as its wantonness claim (that GMAC consciously disregarded the consequences of intentionally discriminating against the dealership in its retail paper purchasing policies). After carefully reviewing the briefs, and after an exhaustive review of the record, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find that Hall, or any other representative of GMAC, lied to Bell about GMAC's retail paper purchasing policies. The record discloses no contract requiring GMAC to buy any particular amount of the dealership's retail paper. To the contrary, the dealership's 1980 agreement with GMAC stated that GMAC would buy contracts acceptable to us [GMAC]. The dealership's misrepresentation claim is based, in part, on allegations that Gregory Bemister, Hall's assistant, had told Bell that GMAC was buying deeper into the pot and that GMAC was treating the dealership the same as the Montgomery bypass dealers. Bell testified as follows as to what was meant by buying deeper into the pot: Q. All right, sir. Are you saying to this jury, Mr. Bell, that GMAC did not repeatedly approve deals for you on paper where the ratings were `C' papers in many instances, `D' papers in many instances? And that GMAC did, in fact, buy not only deeper, but very, very deeper into the pot for Charles Bell Motor Company? Is it your sworn testimony that GMAC did not do that? A. I couldn't say that they bought deeper in the pot, because most of my customers they gave `D tier.' And, if that's deeper into the pot, I guess that's deeper into the pot. The plaintiffs' attorney explained the phrase during argument at trial, as follows: Deeper than what? The logical assumption is deeper than they [GMAC] would with other GM dealers who were not sending them all of their contracts like Mr. Bell was doing. Bemister testified as follows: What we're talking about when we're talking about `buying deeper in the pot' is that if you get a wide range of business from a particular dealer, one of the things that GMAC offers a dealer because we feel that we have such a good collection effort is that we can buy deals that our competitors can't buy. Because normally banks aren't staffed with a collection staff to go out and knock on doors or to call people. They have to buy more limited or narrower range of customers. So with GMAC if a dealer is sending us all of his business and its a good spread of business, a good mix, then we can go ahead and buy some of those deals that our competition normally wouldn't. Another GMAC employee, James Redden, testified that buying deeper to me just meant buying more marginal deals. Milton Edrington, who replaced Hall on January 1, 1991, testified that he told Bell later that year that the dealership was being treated like other dealers in his area and that the dealership was receiving the same considerations as all the dealers in his area. Edrington explained: If you mean was the relationship between his dealership and GMAC the same as it was with all dealerships, it was not. But the consideration he was given would have been the same, any difference in the treatment would have been based on the financial condition of the dealership and things like that. Edrington also answered in the affirmative when asked whether giving the dealership the same consideration as any other dealership... sometimes result[ed] in a different decision for the Bell dealership; however, he answered in the negative when asked whether GMAC ever made such a different decision that [GMAC] felt was not justified because of the financial condition. The dealership advertised across the country with a toll-free telephone number and ran a number of print media ads for customers with low credit, little money, no credit, weak credit. Bell understood, however, that GMAC would buy contracts with people who had low credit and little money only [i]f they [GMAC] found that it was a good customer. In July 1991, Bell began complaining to GMAC that it was not buying the dealership's retail paper at branch average. However, the record indicates that the dealership was sending GMAC an extraordinarily higher percentage of contracts rated in the worst category of very high risks than other dealers sent. GMAC nonetheless was buying the dealership's retail paper at branch average. As a result, GMAC experienced a repossession rate almost twice the branch average on the dealership's retail paper. Thus, it is clear that GMAC bought many marginal contracts from the dealership. Even with chargebacks under Modification C, the dealership's loss reserve was $200,000 in the negative as of mid-1991. Bell also complained in 1991 that the dealership's approval rate was low because GMAC's personnel in charge of approving the purchase of retail paper were not evaluating his contracts thoroughly. Because GMAC felt that the dealership's high employee turnover was causing incomplete applications to be presented to GMAC, GMAC created a special system to increase the likelihood that the dealership's retail paper would be approved. Under this system, a contract that might otherwise have been rejected was to be reviewed to identify any important missing information that the dealership might be able to supply. In addition, before the responsible GMAC employee informed the dealership that GMAC was rejecting or conditioning a dealership contract, it had to be reviewed by management. The evidence showed that some contracts were approved by GMAC that otherwise would not have been. At the dealership's request, it was taken off Modification C in the fall of 1991. Despite the dealership's large negative loss reserve balance, there is no indication that GMAC adjusted its purchase policy or decreased its buy rate for the dealership. The dealership called an economist, Charles Carter, to testify in support of its allegations that GMAC had falsely represented that it was buying deeper into the pot and that it was treating the dealership just like all the rest of the dealerships. Carter performed a computer analysis of GMAC's purchases of retail paper from the dealership. However, Carter did not compare GMAC's purchases from the dealership with the branch average of GMAC's purchases from the other GM dealerships in the branch. Nor did Carter compare GMAC's purchases of retail paper from the dealership with GMAC's purchases from all those dealerships that were not sending all or most of their contracts to GMAC. Furthermore, Carter did not analyze the extent to which GMAC agreed to buy contracts from the dealership that GMAC's competition [other banks or financial institutions] normally wouldn't have bought. Instead, Carter compared GMAC's purchases of retail paper from the dealership with its purchases from three dealerships on the eastern bypass in Montgomery by comparing the MAPS scores of a number of applications submitted to GMAC for approval. Carter made this comparison even though he had no evidence that the financial condition, repossession rate, or other circumstances of any of the bypass dealerships were comparable to those of Bell's dealership. Carter concluded that between 1986 and 1993 GMAC rejected approximately 52% of the dealership's applications and that GMAC would have approved about 25% of the dealership's rejected applications if GMAC had purchased contracts from the dealership at the same rate and with the same MAPS scores that it did from the three bypass dealerships. [7] (This would have amounted to 25% of the 52% that were rejected, or approximately 13% with respect to the total number of applications submitted.) Carter concluded that the discrepancy between the rate at which GMAC purchased retail paper from the dealership and the rate at which GMAC purchased retail paper from the dealership's Montgomery bypass competitors was statistically significant; however, he offered no opinion as to why there should have been a difference between the amount of retail paper purchased from the dealership and the amount purchased from the other three dealerships. Although Bell testified that he had been told by Hall and others that GMAC had no discretion to override the MAPS scoring with respect to a credit application, GMAC presented witnesses who explained, without contradiction, that a contract's MAPS odds score was only the beginning of GMAC's analysis and that MAPS odds and reports were only a tool for GMAC to use in deciding whether to agree to purchase a contract. [8] An additional important factor for GMAC concerned how much it was being asked to finance above the collateral's wholesale value. The undisputed evidence suggested that the greater the spread between the amount financed and the collateral's wholesale value the higher GMAC's risk was and the less likely it would be to agree to buy a given contract. Customers with identical MAPS odds scores could be turned down at one dealership but approved at another, if one dealership charged the customer more for the same vehicle than the other dealership did or if the information contained in the two applications with respect to the two customers was different. [9] The dealership's gross profits per new car sold were higher than the average for other dealerships in its zone. A former manager of the dealership testified that a number of its potential retail sales had too much profit built into them to get approved by GMAC and that he had had to restructure some of the dealership's deals in order to get them approved by GMAC. Carter did not take this into account. In fact, Carter's data showed that even the Montgomery bypass dealerships experienced different rates of acceptance and rejection of retail paper that MAPS had scored the same. To sum up, the dealership's evidence (Carter's testimony) did show that GMAC had declined to purchase a statistically significant percentage of the dealership's retail paper, in comparison to GMAC's purchase of retail paper from the Montgomery bypass dealerships. However, the basic issue presented by the dealership's misrepresentation claim was not whether the dealership had had a statistically significant amount of its retail paper rejected by GMAC, as compared to the bypass dealerships, or whether the dealership would have possibly made more money had GMAC purchased more of its retail paper. The dispositive issue was whether GMAC had provided the dealership with the same benefits or had treated the dealership the same, vis-à-vis the Montgomery bypass dealerships. The evidence simply did not show that Hall's representations that GMAC was buying deeper into the pot and that the dealership had the same benefits that all the other dealerships had were false. The only reasonable inference one could draw from the evidence is that GMAC based its purchasing decisions primarily on the financial risks involved in accepting a particular dealership's retail paper. Our examination of the record, including Carter's testimony, has revealed no evidence from which one could reasonably infer that GMAC discriminated against the Bell dealership and in favor of any dealership on the eastern bypass in Montgomery by deliberately buying more retail paper from those dealerships than it did from the Bell dealership. To the contrary, the record is replete with testimony indicating that GMAC worked diligently with the dealership to ensure that those contracts that could, from a sound business perspective, be purchased were in fact purchased. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the dealership's misrepresentation and suppression claims, for they were based on allegations that GMAC either misrepresented that it was treating the dealerships the same as the Montgomery bypass dealerships or did not disclose that it was treating the bypass dealerships more favorably by buying more of their paper. As to the wantonness claim, the dealership argues in its brief that it established from the evidence that `with knowledge of the danger or [with] a consciousness that injury was likely to result from an act or omission to act,' GMAC nevertheless purposefully and intentionally defrauded [it] with regard to the matter of retail paper buying policies, procedures, and actual practice. According to the dealership, [t]here clearly was a `conscious appreciation of the wrong' because Bennett Hall, [Milton] Edrington and Greg Bemister all, separately and severally, made the same misrepresentations and suppressed the same information from Charles Bell. This argument suggests that there is a cause of action in Alabama for wanton intentional fraud. The legislature has defined wantonness as [c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3). This definition is consistent with our basic understanding of the difference between willfulness and wantonness. See, e.g., Dixie Electric Co. v. Maggio, 294 Ala. 411, 414, 318 So.2d 274, 276 (1975), wherein Justice Shores, writing for this Court, noted: `Wantonness is the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty under the knowledge of the existing conditions, and conscious that from the doing of such act or omission of such duty injury will likely or probably result....' Kilcrease v. Harris, 288 Ala. 245, 251, 259 So.2d 797, 801 (1972); Culpepper & Stone Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Turner, 276 Ala. 359, 162 So.2d 455 (1964). One may be guilty of wanton misconduct without actual intent to [injure] anyone. Birmingham Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Murphy, 2 Ala.App. 588, 56 So. 817 (1911). In this sense, `... A willful or intentional act is not involved in wantonness....' Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brackin, 248 Ala. 459,461, 28 So.2d 193,194 (1946). See, also, Rosen v. Lawson, 281 Ala. 351,356, 202 So.2d 716, 720 (1967) ([i]n wantonness, the party doing the act or failing to act, is conscious of his conduct, and without having the intent to injure, is conscious, from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that his conduct will likely or probably result in injury). The dealership has made it very clear in its written and oral arguments to this Court that its fraud claims were based on allegations that GMAC set out intentionally to put it out of business. Thus, we find unpersuasive any suggestion that the dealership can piggyback its wantonness claim on its fraud claims. A concept of a wanton intentional fraud would be an unacceptable contradiction in the law. However, as we understand the complaint, the dealership's wantonness claim was actually based on allegations that GMAC had consciously treated the dealership differently from other GM dealerships (namely, those on the Montgomery bypass) by buying on average more retail paper from those other dealerships. According to the dealership, GMAC knew that this alleged disparate treatment was likely to result in financial loss to the dealership. In this regard, we note that GMAC was under no contractual obligation to buy any particular amount of the dealership's retail paper. To the contrary, the dealership's 1980 agreement with GMAC stated that GMAC would buy contracts acceptable to us [GMAC]. Thus, GMAC owed no duty to the dealership, outside the confines of its agreement with the dealership, to purchase the same amount of retail paper that it was purchasing from other GM dealerships, including those on the Montgomery bypass. See Cahaba Seafood, Inc. v. Central Bank of the South, 567 So.2d 1304 (Ala.1990). And, as previously noted, the evidence was insufficient to show that GMAC did not, relatively speaking, treat the dealership the same as the Montgomery bypass dealerships, insofar as purchasing retail paper was concerned. The wantonness claim should not have been submitted to the jury.