Opinion ID: 2736474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sequestration of Greg McPherson

Text: McPherson next challenges the district court’s decision to sequester his son, Greg McPherson, from attending his trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 615. We review the district court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Alvarado, 647 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981). Both the government and defense listed Greg McPherson as a potential witness prior to trial.7 As a result, upon request of one of the parties, the district court was required to sequester Greg McPherson to prevent him from hearing the testimony of other witnesses. Fed. R. Evid. 615 (“At a party's request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony.”). The government made that request before opening arguments began in the trial, and the court had McPherson’s son leave based on that request. Although Rule 615 contains an exception where the person to be excluded is “essential to presenting [a] party’s claim or defense,” see Fed. R. Evid. 615(c), McPherson did not argue either before the district court or on appeal that his son was “essential” to presenting his defense. Instead, he simply claims that the 7 Although McPherson suggests that the government listed Greg McPherson as a potential witness in a bad-faith attempt to exclude him from attending the trial under Rule 615, Fed. R. Evid., that allegation does not merit further inquiry, considering that the defense also listed McPherson’s son as a potential witness. And, contrary to McPherson’s contention, the fact that McPherson ultimately struck his son from his witness list does not alter the analysis. The defense’s listing of Greg McPherson as a witness in the first instance demonstrates his relevance to the case and rebuts McPherson’s allegations that the government’s listing of McPherson was in bad faith. 19 Case: 11-14684 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 Page: 20 of 24 exclusion “rob[bed] the courtroom of a concerned and valuable observer, embolden[ed] witnesses, demoralize[d] the accused, and undermine[d] the legitimacy of the [trial].” Although courts should be reluctant to close the courtroom to a defendant’s family during trial, see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271–72, 68 S. Ct. 499, 507 (1948), “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is not absolute and must, on occasion, give way to other rights and interests,” United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1155 (11th Cir. 1997). The right to a public trial is not an end in itself. Instead, it serves “to ensure that judges, lawyers, witnesses, and jurors perform their functions responsibly; to encourage witnesses to come forward and discourage perjury; and to allow the public to see that a defendant is tried fairly.” Id. The burden is high for a party seeking total closure of a proceeding. See id. (“[A] party seeking total closure of a proceeding would have to show that the measures taken were necessary to serve an overriding interest, and the court would have to consider other alternatives and make findings adequate to support closure.”). However, the sequestration of an individual witness is not a total closure of proceedings. See Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 533 (11th Cir. 1984). Instead, it qualifies as merely a “partial closure.” See id. (finding only a 20 Case: 11-14684 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 Page: 21 of 24 “partial closure” where “members of the press and the defendant’s relatives and clergymen were present at the trial”). When a partial closure is sought, the requesting party need only provide a “substantial” reason for the closure. Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1155. Substantial reasons have included protecting witnesses from unnecessary insult to their dignity, Douglas, 739 F.2d at 533, and protecting testifying witnesses from intimidation by spectators, Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1155–56. We conclude that compliance with Rule 615 similarly provides a “substantial” reason for a partial closure. See United States v. Blanche, 149 F.3d 763, 769–70 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated when the district court, pursuant to Rule 615, refused to allow his sister to be in the courtroom for part of trial); United States v. Juarez, 573 F.2d 267, 281 (5th Cir. 1978) (similar); see also United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 681 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that Rule 615 “prevent[s] witnesses from tailoring their testimony to that of prior witnesses and [aids] in detection of dishonesty”); Opus 3 Ltd. v. Heritage Park, Inc., 91 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[Rule 615] is designed to discourage and expose fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion.”). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sequestering Greg McPherson. 21 Case: 11-14684 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 Page: 22 of 24