Opinion ID: 3064398
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: As a descendant, Cruz was subject to the crimi-

Text: nal jurisdiction of the tribal court7 and was at one time prosecuted in tribal court. 6. Cruz attended a public school on the reservation that is open to non-Indians and worked as a fire- fighter for the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs, a job that is also open to non-Indians. 7. Cruz has never participated in Indian religious ceremonies or dance festivals, has never voted in a Blackfeet tribal election, and does not have a tribal identification card. [3] Analyzing this evidence, it is clear that Cruz does not satisfy any of the four Bruce factors. As to the first and most important factor, it is undisputed that Cruz is not an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe or any other tribe. In fact, Cruz is not even eligible to become an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe, as he has less than one quarter Blackfeet blood, which is the minimum amount necessary for enrollment.8 7 The parties have not cited to us any Blackfeet ordinances or codes establishing this point. As we explain infra pp.1611-12 & note 15, the fact that charges were brought against Cruz in tribal court does not necessarily mean the tribal court had jurisdiction over him. Our own reading of the Blackfeet code suggests that perhaps the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction is limited to enrolled members of the Blackfeet Tribe and other tribes. Cf. BLACKFEET CODE § 1.1 (“The Blackfeet Tribal Court has jurisdiction over all persons of Indian descent, who are members of the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana and over all other American Indians unless its authority is restricted by an Order of the Secretary of the Interior.”) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Cruz is not an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe or a member of any other American Indian tribe. However, because the Director of Tribal Enrollment testified that Cruz was subject to the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction by virtue of his descendant status, and because Cruz did not contest this point below or on appeal, we assume for purposes of our analysis that Cruz was subject to the tribal court’s jurisdiction. 8 We also note that BLACKFEET ORD. 14, which establishes “procedures governing enrollment” and which was admitted into evidence at trial, states that children born after August 30, 1962 must have “one-fourth UNITED STATES v. CRUZ 1607 See BLACKFEET CONST. art. II, amd. III, § 1(c). Our dissenting colleague would hold that the government has “plainly” met its burden under Bruce because it has established that Cruz has “ ‘descendant’ status” and has therefore been “recognized” by “the tribal authorities.” Dissenting Op. at 1614-15. The government, however, has expressly waived any argument that Cruz satisfies the first Bruce factor, and does not contend that his descendant status, in and of itself, is a factor we should consider in performing the Bruce analysis.9 Rather, the government’s argument is that “descendant status” is relevant only insofar as it renders someone “eligible to receive certain assistance reserved for Native Americans,” language that directly tracks the second Bruce factor, except for substituting “eligible to receive” for actually receives. However, as we explain below, mere eligibility for benefits is of no consequence under Bruce. Given Bruce’s clear admonition that “tribal enrollment,” and therefore a fortiori descendant status, “is not dispositive of Indian status,” 394 F.3d at 1224-25, we reject the dissent’s argument that mere descendant status with the concomitant eligibility to receive benefits is effectively sufficient to demonstrate “tribal recognition.” To do otherwise would elevate tribal status to a “dispositive” determinant of degree of Blackfeet Indian blood or more” in order to qualify for descendant status as well. Id. § 2(d). Under this ordinance, Cruz would not appear to qualify for any tribal status whatsoever. However, because the Director of Tribal Enrollment testified that Cruz enjoys descendant status — apparently despite the tribal regulations to the contrary — we treat him as enjoying that status for purposes of our analysis. We note the incongruity between his blood quotient and the tribal ordinance only to underscore the error of the dissent’s placing near exclusive weight on Cruz’s descendant status in concluding that Cruz is an Indian. 9 This concession reflects a sensible understanding of the law. If, for example, a tribal authority declared that anyone with an ancestor who was a member of the tribe, no matter how distant, counts as a “descendant,” we would be hard pressed to consider such an individual subject to prosecution under § 1153, even though “tribal authorities [would clearly] recognize [such a person] as an Indian” under our dissenting colleague’s formulation. Dissenting Op. at 1615 (emphasis omitted). 1608 UNITED STATES v. CRUZ Indian status, as Bruce explicitly forbids. Furthermore, given the government’s explicit waiver of the argument, to hold as the dissent suggests would violate our longstanding general rule that we will not decide questions not raised by the parties before us. See, e.g., Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996); cf. United States v. Ziegler, 497 F.3d 890, 901 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“We apply [the waiver] rule with some vigor against criminal defendants; we should be no less vigorous in applying it against the government.” (internal citation omitted)). [4] Nor is there any evidence that Cruz satisfies the second most important factor, “government recognition . . . through receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians.” Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224 (emphasis added). To the contrary, the only evidence in the record demonstrates that the opposite is true: Cruz testified that he had never “received . . . any benefits from the Blackfeet Tribe,” and the government did not present any evidence to the contrary.10 Nor did Cruz enjoy any benefits of tribal affiliation, as required by Bruce’s third most important factor. There is no evidence that he hunted or fished on the reservation, nor has it been suggested that his employment with the BIA was related to or contingent upon his tribal heritage.11 The only evidence supporting any of the Bruce factors is that, for less than a quarter of his short life, Cruz lived 10 While Cruz did attend school on the reservation for a period of time, the school was open to non-Indians. 11 Employment with the BIA is open to non-Indians. While it is true that the BIA is permitted to give preference to Indians when making hiring decisions, see 25 U.S.C. §§ 472, 472a; Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); 25 C.F.R. § 5.1, there is no indication in the trial record that Cruz ever received any preferential treatment on the basis of his ancestry. In fact, Cruz would not have been eligible for preferential treatment under the Indian Preference Laws, as he is not a member of a recognized tribe and has less than “one-half or more Indian blood of tribes indigenous to the United States.” 25 C.F.R. § 5.1. UNITED STATES v. CRUZ 1609 on the Blackfeet Reservation.12 But even this only partially supports the government’s position under the fourth Bruce factor, which also requires a showing of “participation in Indian social life.” Id. Testimony both from Cruz and from a government witness indicated that Cruz does not practice Indian religion, has never “in any way participated in Native religious ceremonies,” does not participate in Indian cultural festivals or dance competitions, has never voted in a Blackfeet election, and does not carry a tribal identification card. The government did not present any evidence suggesting that Cruz participated in any way in Indian social life. [5] In sum, the evidence in this case, when taken in the light most favorable to the government, demonstrates that Cruz satisfies at best only a small part of the least important of the four Bruce factors. He does not satisfy any of the factors in full, and there is not even a scintilla of evidence suggesting that he satisfies a single one of the three most important factors. Were we to hold that evidence satisfying merely a portion of the least important Bruce factor is, in itself, sufficient to support a § 1153 conviction, we would be ignoring Bruce’s mandate in various respects, including its requirement that the factors be considered “in declining order of importance.”13 Id. The first three factors could not realisti12 Although we base our analysis on the evidence in the record and not on the Pre-Sentencing Report, we note that the Report indicates that Cruz “returned to [the reservation] shortly before the instant offense.” The evidence at trial was that he lived on the reservation for three to four years during his childhood and then moved back shortly before the instant offense. 13 The dissent would have us excise this portion of Bruce’s holding from that opinion by dismissing it as “a stray comment.” Dissenting Op. at 1615. This is a curious suggestion from our colleague, who, at one point, was the most vigorous proponent of the proposition that “an[y] issue germane to the eventual resolution of the case, [that has been] resolve[d] after reasoned consideration in a published opinion [is] the law of the circuit.” United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Miller v. Gammie, 1610 UNITED STATES v. CRUZ cally be deemed more important than the fourth if a partial satisfaction of the fourth could outweigh the complete failure to satisfy any of the first three. The government does not dispute our assessment of the record. Rather, in light of the near total lack of evidence that could satisfy the Bruce test as it is written, it urges us to expand Bruce by holding that mere “eligibility for . . . assistance” reserved to Indians is sufficient under the second Bruce factor.14 But this is not what Bruce says. Bruce says that the second factor requires a showing of “receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians.” Id. (emphasis added). We are not empowered to ignore such clear language in our circuit’s precedent, see Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), especially when construing a statute that creates a “carefully limited intrusion of federal power into the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes,” Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1220 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 642-43 n.1 (1977). Even were we free to follow the government’s recom335 F.3d 889, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring). Here, the factors announced in Bruce and their relation to one another were indisputably part of the reasoning employed by the court in reaching its central holding. Accordingly, even under our dissenting colleague’s more recent view on the due weight (or lack thereof) to be accorded to dicta, the language in Bruce cannot be ignored as the dissent urges because it is clearly not dicta. Cf. Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 545 F.3d 1113, 1119 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski, J.) (“Anything [a prior case] has to say as to matters not presented in that case is . . . dicta and thus not binding on us.”). Unless and until some intervening higher authority alters Bruce, we are bound by that decision. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 899 (majority opinion). 14 As indicated above, the record demonstrates that descendants of enrolled Blackfeet members are entitled to use Indian Health Services, are eligible for certain scholarships, and are permitted to hunt and fish on the reservation. The government does not dispute that Cruz never took advantage of any of these benefits. UNITED STATES v. CRUZ 1611 mended course, we would not. The four factors that constitute the second Bruce prong are designed to “probe[ ] whether the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link to a formerly sovereign people.” Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224 (quoting St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988)). Bruce intentionally requires more than a simple blood test to determine whether someone is legally deemed an Indian. Given that many descendants of Indians are eligible for tribal benefits based exclusively on their blood heritage, the government’s argument would effectively render the second Bruce factor a de facto nullity, and in most, if not all, cases would transform the entire Bruce analysis into a “blood” test. Cf. id. at 1223. For similar reasons, we cannot accept our dissenting colleague’s argument that the sole test under Bruce’s second prong “is whether the tribal authorities recognize [someone] as an Indian, not whether he considers himself one.” Dissenting op. at 1615 (second emphasis added). Under Bruce, the extent to which an individual considers himself an Indian — whether by deciding, for example, to “reside[ ] on a reservation,” to “participat[e] in Indian social life,” or to “recei[ve] assistance reserved only to Indians,” Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224 — is most certainly relevant in determining his Indian status. The dissent simply ignores the fact that Bruce clearly requires an analysis from the perspective of both the tribe and the individual. The government and our dissenting colleague also argue that the fact that Cruz was prosecuted by the Blackfeet tribal court demonstrates that he is an Indian because a “tribe has no jurisdiction to punish anyone but an Indian.” Id. at 1227; see Dissenting Op. at 1615. This argument is meritless for multiple reasons. First and foremost, the record in this case is incredibly thin with respect to Cruz’s contact with the tribal justice system: all we know is that he has “been prosecuted.” There is no evidence regarding the nature of that prosecution, to what stage, if any, it proceeded, and certainly the record does not indicate whether Cruz was ever determined for purposes of that prosecution to be an Indian. Finally, the record 1612 UNITED STATES v. CRUZ does not suggest that the prosecution resulted in a conviction. Based on the evidence contained in the trial record, which is all that we may consider, Cruz’s case may well have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction after a finding that he is not an Indian.15 [6] Furthermore, while the government makes much of the fact that the court in Bruce considered the exercise of tribal jurisdiction over the defendant throughout her entire lifetime relevant, it fails to recognize the significantly different posture of that case. Bruce addressed a prosecution under § 1152. However, under § 1152, the question of Indian status is an affirmative defense. Id. at 1222-23 (citing United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983)). Generally, “the defendant must prove the elements of [an] affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence,” unless some other standard is set by statute.16 United States v. Beasley, 346 F.3d 930, 15 Our dissenting colleague would equate the power to arrest with the power to determine Indian status, thereby delegating to every tribal police officer the determination of whether an individual may be prosecuted federally as an Indian. See Dissenting Op. at 1615 (“[T]ribal authorities recognize [Cruz] as an Indian . . . . That they do is confirmed by the fact that . . . the tribal police took him before the tribal court rather than turning him over to state or federal authorities. How that case was finally resolved is irrelevant . . . .” (second emphasis added)). We reject the dissent’s unusual approach: both the legitimate reach of federal authority under the Constitution and the delicate question of whether an individual “counts” as an Indian for purposes of a federal criminal prosecution that could lead to his incarceration are issues too important to be decided on the basis of a single arrest and in the absence of any true judicial consideration. 16 “[O]nce a defendant has satisfied his burden of production with respect to an affirmative defense, the burden shifts to the government to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Dominguez-Mestas, 929 F.2d at 1383. Of course, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard “requires more exacting proof” than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 377 (1999). Simply put, “more ‘facts in evidence’ are needed . . . when the proponent is required to establish [a claim] not merely by a preponderance of the evidence but . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253 (1986) (alteration and second omission in original) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 242 (2d Cir. 1972). UNITED STATES v. CRUZ 1613 935 (9th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. DominguezMestas, 929 F.2d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1991); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (affirmative defense of insanity requires clear and convincing evidence). By contrast, under § 1153 Indian status is “an essential element of [the] offense which the government must . . . prove beyond a reasonable doubt” in every case. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1229 (emphasis added). All that Bruce held was that “[t]he assumption and exercise of a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction . . . bolster[ed] the argument that Bruce met her burden of producing sufficient evidence” for an affirmative defense. Id. at 1227. The court explicitly “caution[ed] that Bruce was only required to meet a production burden,” which it later described as a “mere” burden of production. Id. (emphasis added). The burden here, by contrast, is on the government to prove Cruz’s Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt. In this context, a showing that a tribal court on one occasion may have exercised jurisdiction over a defendant is of little if any consequence in satisfying the status element in a § 1153 prosecution. [7] Because the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government does not demonstrate that Cruz is an Indian or that he meets any of the Bruce factors, no rational trier of fact could have found that the government proved the statutory element of § 1153 beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the district court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal was error. Where the government has failed to show that any of the Bruce factors has been satisfied, we have no trouble concluding that the error was “clear” and “obvious.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. As described earlier, a conviction that erroneously rests on insufficient evidence necessarily implicates “substantial rights” and seriously affects the “fairness” and “integrity” of the judicial process. Accordingly, the denial of Cruz’s motion for acquittal was not only error, but was plain error. We reverse the decision below and instruct the district court to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal.17 17 Because we reverse the district court’s denial of Cruz’s motion for judgment of acquittal, we need not reach his claim that the district court 1614 UNITED STATES v. CRUZ