Opinion ID: 201324
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aiding and Abetting Murder of a Witness

Text: Rodriguez also claims that the evidence that the government introduced to prove that he murdered Llaurador was insufficient to establish a violation of the Witness Protection Act, which states: [W]hoever kills . . . another person, with intent to (A) prevent the attendance or -20- testimony of any person in an official proceeding [or] . . . (C) prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense . . . shall be punished . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1). The government argues that Rodriguez killed Llaurador to prevent him from communicating with authorities regarding federal offenses. To establish a crime under the law enforcement officer section of the Act, the government must prove that:
a person; (2) the defendant was motivated by a desire to prevent the communication between any person and law enforcement authorities concerning the commission or possible commission of an offense; (3) that offense was actually a federal offense; and (4) the defendant believed that the person in (2) above might communicate with the federal authorities. United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 918 (3d Cir. 1996). The Act explicitly relieves the government from having to prove that the defendant suspected that the witness would communicate to federal, as opposed to state, officials regarding the crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1512(g) (stating that [i]n a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance . . . that the law enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal Government); therefore, the fourth prong may be proven, among other ways, by demonstrating that the underlying offense was a federal offense and that the federal -21- authorities had begun an investigation prior to the informant's murder or attempted murder. United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1349-50 (3d Cir. 1997). The government easily met its burden here. Although Rodriguez repeatedly refers to Caballo's murder as a Commonwealth offense, the second superseding indictment lists the murder as a charged offense and identifies it as an overt act in furtherance of the federal drug conspiracy. The federal government, through the DEA, had opened an investigation into this conspiracy and had interviewed Llaurador prior to his murder. Rodriguez's claim that he did not realize that he was helping to conceal a federal crime by murdering Llaurador is irrelevant. See United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 687 (3d Cir. 1999) (All that [a parallel provision in the Witness Protection Act] requires is that the government establish that the defendants had the intent to influence an investigation that happened to be federal.).