Opinion ID: 2545831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Withdrawal and Appointment of Counsel

Text: Trial in defendant's capital case was scheduled to start on February 14, 1989, in Contra Costa Superior Court before Judge Norman Spellberg. At that time, defendant's counsel of record was the Contra Costa County Public Defender, Charles James, who had been appointed in May 1986. On January 30, 1989, Public Defender James filed an affidavit of conflict, stating that his office refuses to represent defendant because of a conflict of interest. On February 1, James appeared before Judge Spellberg and reasserted the existence of a conflict. But the deputy public defender assigned to the case, who was also present in court, said there was no conflict, and he asked the court to let him continue as defendant's attorney. When the court asked defendant for his view, defendant replied: I would like to keep [the deputy] as my attorney at this point. The court denied the deputy's request, giving these reasons: The Public Defender is Mr. James. He has conflicted in this matter. And if he conflicts, there is no appropriate basis for you [the deputy] to insist that you remain as [defendant's] attorney. The deputy, citing Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786, 140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750 (Harris ), insisted that defendant was entitled to a hearing on the request that the assigned deputy remain his counsel. The deputy added that he would take a leave of absence from the public defender's office if necessary to continue as defendant's attorney. The trial court ruled that because of the declared conflict, the [Office of the Contra Costa County] Public Defender no longer represents [defendant]. It appointed Attorney Stephen Houghton as counsel for defendant regarding the issues raised by the public defender's declaration of a conflict. And it set a hearing for February 3, 1989, to consider both the possibility of defendant's waiver of the asserted conflict and defendant's motion for appointment of the deputy to represent him as private counsel after leaving the public defender's office. Before the February 3 hearing date, the prosecution filed a brief asserting that defendant had a right to know the basis for the public defender's conflict. Defendant too filed a brief, citing Hams, supra, 19 Cal.3d 786, 140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750, as authority for the trial court to appoint as private counsel the deputy (who had offered to leave the public defender's office) because of the special relationship defendant had formed with him during the two-year period that the deputy had been assigned to work on this case. On February 3, Judge Spellberg transferred the attorney conflict matter to Superior Court Judge Michael Phelan. Judge Phelan immediately convened an in camera hearing. Present were Public Defender James, defendant, and Attorney Houghton. The court excluded the prosecutor to protect defendant's attorney-client privilege. The court asked James why he had declared a conflict. In response, James detailed numerous problems with his assigned deputy, including the following: Complaints by experienced investigators that the deputy had not adequately prepared the case for trial; James's own assessment that the deputy had not developed a coherent trial theory; and reports by former supervisors that he often had outbursts of rage, followed by periods in which he seemed catatonic, unable to perform his job at all. One former employer told James he was shocked that the deputy had been assigned a capital case, given his lengthy history of mental health issues. James also explained that on January 11, 1989, less than five weeks before the scheduled trial date, Rebecca Young, an attorney working as a law clerk and assisting on defendant's case, walked off the job after the assigned deputy screamed at her and threatened her with a hammer. Young told Public Defender James that the deputy had blanched in the face, foamed in the mouth, [and] shook with rage. He then ran from the office into a parking lot, where he yelled about the Sapp case at the top of his lungs in earshot of the District Attorney's office. A few days thereafter, James received a letter from the private investigator firm most recently employed on defendant's case. The firm had experience in some 25 capital matters. The letter described defendant's case as being in a state of basic shambles and revealed that the firm's investigators had witnessed inappropriate outbursts and unprofessional conduct by the deputy, including a request for an investigator to impersonate a police officer when interviewing certain potential witnesses. When the investigators suggested that the deputy seemed unstable, he falsely accused them of unprofessional behavior and ordered them off the case. Public Defender James explained to the trial court that just two weeks before the scheduled trial, he faced the following problems: The deputy had alienated everyone who was assisting him; left with no investigator, no support staff, he was inadequately prepared to go to trial. James called the deputy into his office and told him he was considering declaring a conflict. The deputy responded by cupping his hands over his ears and running from the office. After discussing the problem in the abstract with current and former public defenders of other counties and with the president of the California Public Defenders Association, James concluded that he had no choice but to declare a conflict. Public Defender James added that although defendant wanted the deputy to continue to represent him, defendant had previously complained about the deputy. James mentioned that in January 1988, defendant wrote to James requesting that his case be assigned to a different deputy public defender. Defendant had stated that the assigned deputy did not have defendant's interest at heart, and that there was no longer an attorney-client relationship. Defendant wanted to have psychological issues explored but the deputy had not arranged for any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. In response to defendant's letter, James met with defendant and persuaded him that the assigned deputy was an excellent lawyer and should remain on the case. But a year later, defendant telephoned the deputy's assistant, Rebecca Young, and again expressed dissatisfaction with his representation. When Young mentioned this to the deputy, he told her not to have further contact with defendant. The trial court then took a recess so Attorney Houghton could confer with defendant. Thereafter, the hearing resumed in open court. Houghton stated that he had discussed with defendant all aspects of the the allegations, and instances of the behavior chronicled by Mr. James, but that defendant still wanted the deputy to represent him and therefore asked to execute the appropriate waivers so the court could appoint the deputy as private counsel to represent defendant. The trial court ruled that notwithstanding Public Defender James's declaration of a conflict of interest, this is not factually a conflict of interest case. Rather, as the court characterized it, defendant's appointed counsel, Public Defender James, had represented to the court that [his] assigned deputy is incapable of competently handling this case at trial. The court expressed grave misgivings whether a defendant could waive the right to competent appointed counsel, and it found that the criteria of Harris, supra, 19 Cal.3d 786, 140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750, had not been satisfied. It then vacated the public defender's appointment as counsel of record and denied defendant's request for appointment of the deputy as private counsel to represent defendant. Trial in defendant's case did not begin until some two years later, in January 1991. At trial, defendant was represented by private Attorneys Stephen Houghton and Marlene Weinstein. Assisting them was Rebecca Young, who had left the public defender's office and was working as a private attorney. Defendant now contends that the rulings by Judges Spellberg and Phelan denied him the right to counsel. Specifically, defendant argues that he should have been permitted to waive any conflict of interest preventing representation either by the public defender's office or by the deputy who was taken off this case, who by taking a leave from the public defender's office could have represented defendant as private counsel. Defendant further asserts that once the trial court vacated the public defender's appointment as counsel of record, defendant's special relationship with the assigned deputy public defender entitled him to have that attorney appointed as his counsel of record. ( Harris, supra, 19 Cal.3d 786, 140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750.) We are not persuaded. A criminal defendant's right to counsel is guaranteed by both the federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment (applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment), and by California Constitution article I, section 15. The essential aim is to guarantee `an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.'  ( People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 834, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460, quoting Wheat v. United States (1988) 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140.) Questions of appointment and removal of counsel, at least when counsel seeks to withdraw, are addressed to the trial court's sound discretion. ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 846, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906; Drumgo v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 930, 934-935, 106 Cal.Rptr. 631, 506 P.2d 1007.) Here, defendant's counsel of record was Contra Costa County Public Defender James. (See 59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 27 (1976) [In cases handled by the public defender's office, it is the officeholder who is the attorney of record.].) As public defender, James had the authority to assign any of his deputies to represent defendant in this case (see Mowrer v. Superior Court (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 223, 231, 83 Cal.Rptr. 125) and also to seek his own removal from the case (Code of Civ. Proc., ง 284). James asked the trial court to allow him to withdraw from defendant's capital case based upon his evaluation that his assigned deputy was unprepared for the upcoming capital trial, for the reasons we discussed earlier in detail. Because of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the matter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Public Defender James to withdraw as counsel. Defendant insists that our decision in Harris, supra, 19 Cal.3d 786, 140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750, entitled him to continued representation by the assigned deputy public defender, who was willing to leave the public defender's office and accept appointment as private counsel in defendant's case. Under Harris, a trial court contemplating appointment of private counsel to represent a criminal defendant must take into account whether the defendant has a preexisting relationship with an attorney willing to accept appointment. (Id. at p. 799, 140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750.) But even when such a relationship exists, Harris acknowledges that a trial court need not appoint that attorney when there are countervailing considerations of comparable weight. (Ibid.) Here, the facts described by Public Defender James at the in camera hearing raised serious concerns about his assigned deputy's ability to competently represent defendant, thus constituting the requisite countervailing considerations. Under these circumstances, defendant suffered no infringement of his constitutional right to counsel because the trial court refused to appoint the attorney as defendant's counsel., Also of no assistance to defendant is Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 68 Cal.Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65. In that case, this court set aside a trial court's order removing a private attorney from the retrial of a capital case for purported incompetence. The attorney had successfully represented the defendant in his automatic appeal, securing a complete reversal. The trial court's removal of the attorney suggested not so much that the attorney lacked the ability to competently try the case as it did the existence of a personality conflict between the trial judge and the attorney. (Id. at pp. 557-558, 68 Cal.Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65.) That is not the situation here. Defendant points out that the assigned deputy was not present at the in camera hearing before Judge Phelan on February 3, 1989, and thus had no opportunity to counter the version of events described by Public Defender James. We note that on February 1, 1989, the deputy, represented by counsel, appeared before Judge Spellberg and argued that no conflict prevented defendant's representation by the office of the public defender, and alternatively, that the trial court should appoint him personally as private counsel to represent defendant. At that hearing and again on February 3, Judge Spellberg ruled that Public Defender James, not James's deputy, was defendant's attorney of record, and that the deputy therefore lacked standing to oppose James's motion to withdraw for a conflict of interest. When Judge Spellberg then transferred the matter to Judge Phelan, the deputy did not appear before Judge Phelan. Defendant, who was present and represented by counsel, raised no objection to Judge Phelan's deciding the matter without hearing from the deputy. On these facts, defendant cannot complain that his rights were violated.