Opinion ID: 1455603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: defendant's presence during playback

Text: Hannagan claims the response to the jury request for an electronic playback of testimony and to the playback itself are stages of the trial and that the defendant's presence is therefore required. The right of an accused to be present at stages of trial has long been recognized in this country. The United States Supreme Court in 1892 stated: A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372, 13 S.Ct. 136, 137, 36 L.Ed. 1011, 1012 (1892). The United States Supreme Court has treated an accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of the trial as a right of constitutional dimension, related either to the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment or to the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. [12] In Alaska, the right to be present is also founded in the state constitutional rights of the accused to due process [13] and to confront the witnesses against him. [14] This court has recognized the common law origins of the right to be present at trial and the constitutional dimension of this right. [15] The constitutional right has been implemented as a procedural requirement by Criminal Rule 38 which states: (a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the preliminary hearing, at the time of plea, at the omnibus hearing, and at every stage of the trial, including the impaneling of the jury and return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided in this rule. In Gafford v. State, 440 P.2d 405, 417 (Alaska 1968), and Noffke v. State, 422 P.2d 102, 105 (Alaska 1967), we held that a defendant has a right to be present when any type of communication occurs between the court and the jury during its deliberations. In the instant case, the jury foreman sent a note to the judge requesting a replay of certain testimony. This request was granted, and the playback made in defendant's absence. Since response to a request by the jury during their deliberations and the playback itself occurred during a stage of the trial, Hannagan's presence was required by Criminal Rule 38(a). The state concedes that normally the rule does mandate a defendant's presence at a playback. The state argues, however, that in this case defendant, through his counsel, waived his right to be present. It points to the fact that Hannagan's attorney explicitly waived defendant's presence, and, in addition, did so for a deliberate tactical advantage while in the midst of litigation. In the post-conviction relief proceeding, the superior court found that the waiver was not for a tactical advantage. In view of defense counsel's statements, we disagree with the trial court's holding that the waiver was not prompted by trial tactics. Even so, we find the state's argument concerning waiver to be unpersuasive. In Lee v. State, 509 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Alaska 1973), this court recognized that an attorney may waive his client's right to be present in a non-capital case. The court stated, however: ... [T]he waiver is effective only if either: (1) the defendant has given counsel express authority in a knowing and intelligent manner, (2) the defendant is present at the time of the waiver, has clearly been informed of his rights, and remains silent, or (3) the defendant subsequently acquiesces in the proceedings in a knowing and intelligent manner. These conditions were not met in this case. In Lanier v. State, 486 P.2d 981, 988 (Alaska 1971), we recognized that a client's rights may be waived by his counsel without his consent under circumstances where the decision was clearly a part of trial strategy which occurred during the trial and where no exceptional circumstances existed. [16] In the Lanier case, however, there existed no constitutional mandate that the right be personally exercised by the client or with his express consent. [17] Unlike Lanier, supra, we are here faced with a situation where the defendant's express consent is constitutionally mandated. Under our decision in Lee v. State, supra , there is a constitutional requirement that the defendant personally waive his right to be present at trial in a knowing and intelligent manner. Absent the defendant's express waiver, an attorney may not waive this right for his client. Where a constitutional mandate of personal waiver exists, the case is distinguishable from the Lanier case, or otherwise stated, where our constitution requires that the defendant personally waive his rights, the exceptional circumstances we referred to in Lanier exist, and an attorney may not waive the right for his client. The Lee case distinguishes Lanier, supra, from a situation such a Hannagan's and is controlling on the issue of waiver. Under these circumstances, the waiver must comply with the criteria established in Lee v. State, supra . In light of the constitutional mandate of defendant's personal waiver, we hold that the waiver of defendant's presence during the playback of testimony was ineffective. Since the defendant did not effectively waive his presence, we hold that it was constitutional error for the judge to communicate with the jury or permit the playback of testimony to the jury in defendant's absence. Having found constitutional error to be present, we must decide if this error is harmless. In Noffke v. State, 422 P.2d 102, 105 (Alaska 1967), the court established the harmless error rule for violations of Criminal Rule 38: We hold that nonadherence by the trial court to the provisions of Crim.R. 38 does not automatically constitute reversible error. A violation of a mandate of Crim.R. 38 is not prejudicial error unless such nonadherence has affected a substantial right of the defendant. (footnotes omitted) The same year, the United States Supreme Court adopted the requirement that a constitutional error is reversible unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [18] In Evans v. State, 550 P.2d 830, 840 (Alaska 1976), we followed the Chapman standard. Therefore, the Noffke requirement that the error not affect a substantial right of the defendant has now been supplanted by the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test. Thus, we must determine whether, based on the evidence presented, the state and federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This court has viewed various cases where violations of Criminal Rule 38 did not affect a substantial right under the old test established in Noffke or did not constitute error which was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the new test established in Chapman. [19] We have also viewed cases where violations of Criminal Rule 38 mandated reversal. [20] Under the facts of this case, we hold that the violation of Criminal Rule 38 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We begin by noting that on the record before us it is impossible to determine whether or not the trial court kept an independent record of the playback proceedings by recording the proceedings on a separate tape recorder. Hannagan does not argue in his brief on appeal that there was no independent record made and does not claim that a failure to do so in itself constitutes error. From the record before us, it appears that the only communications during playback were the discussion of Mr. Hannagan's absence and a question by the court regarding the testimony the jury wanted to hear. [21] Hannagan does not claim that any improper conduct occurred during the playback proceedings or that it was error for the trial court to replay the requested testimony. The playback involved no rights to confront witnesses or cross-examine witnesses and was not a situation in which polling of the jury would be appropriate. The reason the jury would be appropriate. In the presence of the jury, counsel for Hannagan attempted to waive Mr. Hannagan's rights to be present, and the district attorney concurred in this result. The trial court indicated its willingness initially to wait until morning when Mr. Hannagan would be present. Under these circumstances, we believe that it was made sufficiently clear to the jury that Mr. Hannagan had not absconded from the jurisdiction or defied an order of the court, to be present so as to create an unfavorable impression to the jury. There is no allegation here that there was communication between the court and the jury without counsel for both sides present. This case does not involve reinstruction of the jury on matters of law. We do not think that the psychological effects of defendant's absence during a 45-minute replay merits retrial in this case. Hannagan's absence from the courtroom during a stage of trial was error. While we urge trial courts to comply with the constitutional mandate in the future, we find that defendant's absence in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the conviction is reinstated, and the decision of the court granting the post-conviction relief pursuant to Criminal Rule 35(b) is reversed. REVERSED.