Opinion ID: 1405826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Investigator Bracken's Testimony

Text: Appellant argues the trial court erred in admitting the out-of-court statement of Victim to Bracken under section 17-23-175 because it violated the ex post facto laws, violated the rule against hearsay, and was prejudicial to Appellant. We find that Appellant's hearsay and prejudice arguments are not preserved for review. We also find that section 17-23-175 does not violate the ex post facto laws.
An objection must be made on a specific ground. State v. Nichols, 325 S.C. 111, 120, 481 S.E.2d 118, 123 (1997). For an issue to be properly preserved it has to be raised to and ruled on by the trial court. State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21, 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004). A party need not use the exact name of a legal doctrine in order for the issue to be preserved, but it must be clear the argument has been presented on that ground. State v. Russell, 345 S.C. 128, 132, 546 S.E.2d 202, 204 (Ct.App.2001). At trial, defense counsel argued Victim's statement to Bracken was inadmissible because application of section 17-23-175 violated the ex post facto laws and his right to confrontation. However, defense counsel did not contend Victim's statement constituted impermissible hearsay, that it was unduly prejudicial because it was inconsistent with Victim's trial testimony, or that the State failed to comply with section 17-23-175. Hence, the only issue preserved on appeal is whether section 17-23-175 violated the ex post facto laws. [2]
[T]he reason the Ex Post Facto Clauses were included in the Constitution was to assure that federal and state legislatures were restrained from enacting arbitrary or vindictive legislation. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). An ex post facto law imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 278, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866). [I]n order for a law to fall within the ex post facto prohibition, two critical elements must be present: (1) the law must be retrospective so as to apply to events occurring before its enactment, and (2) the law must disadvantage the offender affected by it. State v. Huiett, 302 S.C. 169, 171, 394 S.E.2d 486, 487 (1990) (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has set forth four general categories of law that are violative of the United States Constitution's ex post facto clause: 1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). [I]n order for the ex post facto clause to be applicable, the statute or the provision in question must be criminal or penal in purpose and nature. Huiett, 302 S.C. at 172, 394 S.E.2d at 487. A change in the law does not violate the ex post facto clause if it merely affects a mode of procedure and does not alter substantial personal rights. Id. at 171, 394 S.E.2d at 487 (citation omitted). Even though a procedural change may have a detrimental impact on a defendant, a mere procedural change which does not affect substantial rights is not ex post facto. Id. at 171-72, 394 S.E.2d at 487. The United States Supreme Court has held changes in laws that made previously inadmissible evidence admissible did not violate the ex post facto clause. See Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (holding a law admitting previously inadmissible handwriting samples did not violate ex post facto clause); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (holding admission of convicted felon's testimony, which was inadmissible at the time the crime was committed, did not violate ex post facto clause). Furthermore, other jurisdictions that have considered the admission of hearsay statements of child victims have reached the same conclusion. See State v. Stevens, 757 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Mo.Ct.App.1988) ([A] change in a statute after the alleged crime which allowed the hearsay statements of a child victim of sexual abuse to be admitted against an accused at trial when previously such a statement was inadmissible was not a prohibited ex post facto law because it simply authorized the introduction of additional evidence of guilt.); accord Cogburn v. State, 292 Ark. 564, 732 S.W.2d 807 (1987); People v. Koon, 724 P.2d 1367 (Colo.Ct.App.1986). Section 17-23-175 allows an out-of-court statement of a child under twelve to be admissible under certain circumstances. [3] In interpreting section 17-23-175, the court of appeals concluded the section was not penal in nature but rather deals with procedural, evidentiary matters. State v. Bryant, 382 S.C. 505, 512, 675 S.E.2d 816, 820 (Ct.App.2009). Furthermore, section 17-23-175 does not fall into one of the four categories set forth in Calder. See id. The amount or type of evidence required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender is not altered by section 17-23-175. Because section 17-23-175 merely authorizes the introduction of new evidence and does not alter substantial personal rights, it does not violate the ex post facto laws. Therefore, the trial court committed no error in allowing Bracken's testimony pursuant to section 17-23-175.