Opinion ID: 1287501
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prejudice from Failure to Investigate

Text: To satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong, Avery must demonstrate that with effective assistance of counsel, the result of his trial would have been different with a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. He must show a reasonable probability that absent his trial attorney's errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Because the Michigan Court of Appeals found Lankford's efforts to be sufficient, it did not analyze whether Avery suffered prejudice. Similarly, the trial court that conducted the post-conviction evidentiary hearing found that Lankford provided effective assistance of counsel. Though the judge presiding over the hearing observed, I can't say that this would have resulted in a different result at all, we do not find in the record evidence that the trial court seriously engaged in a complete Strickland prejudice analysis, which requires a court to consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Id. Thus, here, as in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005), [b]ecause the state courts found the representation adequate, they never reached the issue of prejudice, and so we examine this element of the Strickland claim de novo.  See also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Avery's claim involves alibi witness testimony that the trial jury did not have before it. To evaluate a claim of prejudice, the court must assess how reasonable jurors would react to the additional alibi testimony had it been presented. In this case, the state judge presiding over the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, describing herself as the the factfinder, found Boyd's testimony to be totally incredible and to suggest manufacturing testimony. We do not denigrate the role of the factfinder in judging credibility when we review a record in hindsight, but evaluation of the credibility of alibi witnesses is exactly the task to be performed by a rational jury, see Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 790 (6th Cir.2003), not by a reviewing court. Cf. United States v. Kelly, 204 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir.2000) ([D]etermining the credibility of witnesses is a task for the jury, not this court.). Here, although the factors the state judge highlighted in her credibility assessment  including Boyd's ability to remember exact times while failing to recall the date or day of the week that Avery visited his home  may have ultimately affected the credibility of his testimony in the eyes of the jury, but they do not dispose of the issue of prejudice. Notably, the evidentiary hearing occurred approximately a year and three months after Avery's trial, and the record before us does not demonstrate that the presiding judge found fault with Crimes's testimony. Ultimately, as the district court properly recognized, [O]ur Constitution leaves it to the jury, not the judge, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses in deciding a criminal defendant's guilt or innocence. Avery, 524 F.Supp.2d at 909 (quoting Ramonez v. Berghuis, 490 F.3d 482, 490 (6th Cir.2007)). Moreover, Strickland instructs that a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support. Id. Thus, the availability of willing alibi witnesses must also be considered in light of the otherwise flimsy evidence supporting Avery's conviction. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As the district court accurately observed, Avery's conviction was based almost entirely on Jacklyn Barker's eyewitness testimony, which was weak because the crime occurred at night when visibility was diminished and Barker was peeking at the crime scene from the window at her home across the road. Barker's testimony was also inconsistent: she testified at a preliminary hearing that she saw Avery smiling, but at trial testified that she couldn't see his face. Nor did Barker identify Avery from a lineup as one of the individuals she witnessed at the murder scene, despite her testimony that she had known him since she was little. In sum, we agree with the district court's conclusion that potential alibi witnesses coupled with an otherwise weak case renders the failure to investigate the testimony sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the jury verdict. We do not ask whether Avery was ultimately innocent, but, rather, whether he was deprived a reasonable shot of acquittal. Here, the jury was deprived of the right to hear testimony that could have supplied such reasonable doubt.