Opinion ID: 657159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Superior Qualifications as Background Circumstances

Text: 14 The evidence that this Court has found in the past to constitute background circumstances can be divided into two general categories: (1) evidence indicating that the particular employer at issue has some reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously against whites, see Daye v. Harris, 655 F.2d 258, 261 (D.C.Cir.1981) (minority nurses over-represented among promotees); Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786-87 (D.C.Cir.1986) (among other factors, minority supervisors and proposed affirmative action plan); Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1315 (D.C.Cir.1983) (pressure on hiring authority to hire minorities and proposed affirmative action plan); and (2) evidence indicating that there is something fishy about the facts of the case at hand that raises an inference of discrimination. See Daye, 655 F.2d at 260-61 (plaintiff alleged scheme to fix performance ratings); Lanphear, 703 F.2d at 1315 (plaintiff was given little or no consideration for the promotion, and supervisor never fully reviewed qualifications of minority promotee); Bishopp, 788 F.2d at 786-87 (promotee was less qualified than four white plaintiffs and was promoted over the[ir] heads ... in an unprecedented fashion). Apparently, we have never had occasion to state clearly that the second type of background circumstance may create a prima facie case by itself. Accordingly, we will take this opportunity to hold precisely that. Background circumstances need not mean some circumstance in the employer's background. On the contrary, other evidence about the background of the case at hand--including an allegation of superior qualifications--can be equally valuable. 15 It is true, as appellees argue, that we have never yet been confronted with a prima facie case based entirely upon the plaintiff's superior qualifications. But we see nothing in Parker, nor any of our cases, that would suggest superior qualifications are not enough. Indeed, such an interpretation would be inconsistent both with Parker and with the essential purpose of the background circumstances test: determining when an employer's conduct raises an inference of discrimination under the Supreme Court's McDonnell Douglas/ Burdine standard. 16 Under that test, if a more qualified white applicant is denied promotion in favor of a minority applicant with lesser qualifications, we think that in itself raises an inference that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017. A rational employer can be expected to promote the more qualified applicant over the less qualified, because it is in the employer's best interest to do so. And when an employer acts contrary to his apparent best interest in promoting a less-qualified minority applicant, it is more likely than not that the employer acted out of a discriminatory motive. The McDonnell Douglas/ Burdine allocation of the burden of proof relies on this very presumption. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-77, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949-50, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (court should ask whether discriminatory motivation is more likely than not, and employer who acts irrationally is presumed to have such motivation). As the Supreme Court has observed, we know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Id. at 577, 98 S.Ct. at 2949-50. Absent a legitimate reason for the employer's action, then, such an irrational promotion raises an inference of discrimination against the better-qualified non-minority applicant. 17