Opinion ID: 3134286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill Const. 1870, art. IV, sec. 22. The distinction between special

Text: and local laws may be stated as follows: A local law is one which applies only to the government of a portion of the territory of the state, and a special law is one which applies only to a portion of the state--its people, its institutions, its economy--in some sense other than geographical. G. Braden & R. Cohn, The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated & Comparative Analysis 206-07 (1969). Delegates to the 1870 constitutional convention criticized special legislation because, instead of establishing and enforcing general principles applicable to every class of citizens, special legislation enriched particular classes of individuals at the expense of others. I Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Illinois 578 (remarks of Delegate Anderson). Delegate Anderson spoke in favor of the prohibition against special legislation and stated: Governments were not made to make the `rich richer and the poor poorer,' nor to advance the interest of the few against the many; but that the weak might be protected from the will of the strong; that the poor might enjoy the same rights with the rich; that one species of property might be as free as another--that one class or interest should not flourish by the aid of government, whilst another is oppressed with all the burdens. I Debates, at 578 (remarks of Delegate Anderson). Evidently in recognition of the value of the prohibition against special legislation, the framers of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 decided to retain the clause, with some modifications. See Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 313-14 (1979). First, because the enumerated categories in the constitution of 1870 clearly reflected the nineteenth century concerns which had lost their relevance with the passage of time, the framers of the 1970 constitution omitted the laundry list of prohibited categories. See G. Braden & R. Cohn, The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated & Comparative Analysis 225-26 (1969). Additionally, the 1970 constitution rejected the previous rule which had vested in the legislature the power to determine whether a general law could be made applicable. Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (1972). Thus, the present version of the special legislation clause contains an express grant of power to the judiciary: Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, sec. 13. The framers of the 1970 constitution retained the special legislation prohibition even though an equal protection/due process clause was included in the Illinois Constitution for the first time. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2 (No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws). A special legislation challenge generally is judged under the same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge. Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 123. Public Act 89--7 does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. See Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 227- 29.[fn2] Thus, the appropriate standard for our review of Public Act 89--7 is the rational basis test. Under this standard, a court must determine whether the statutory classification is rationally related to a legitimate State interest. Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 123. Our task in determining whether the damages cap violates the special legislation clause is not without difficulty. See Grasse, 412 Ill. at 194. Indeed, the dilemma in discerning whether or not a particular statute constitutes special legislation has been described as follows: It is impossible to conceive of a law that has universal impact and affects everyone or everything in the same way. By enacting laws, the legislature can hardly avoid excluding some category of people or objects. In enforcing this prohibition, the courts must decide if the legislature has made a reasonable classification. Differences of opinion are bound to exist in such situations and the ultimate decision must rest with some judgment as to the soundness of the legislature's action. S. Grove & R. Carlson, The Legislature, in Con-Con: Issues for the Illinois Constitutional Convention 106 (1970). The difficulty is not overcome by merely reiterating that a classification has been made, i.e., that the legislature has in some way classified groups of people. Rather, we must determine whether the classifications created by section 2-- 1115.1 are based upon reasonable differences in kind or situation, and whether the basis for the classifications is sufficiently related to the evil to be obviated by the statute. Grasse, 412 Ill. at 195. We note that the legislature has wide discretion in the exercise of its police power. However, in evaluating a challenged provision the court must consider the natural and reasonable effect of the legislation on the rights affected by the provision. Grasse, 412 Ill. at 193. While it is unnecessary to discuss every Illinois Supreme Court case which has evaluated legislation in the context of the special legislation clause, we note the many cases cited by both plaintiffs and defendants in the case at bar. Defendants cite numerous cases in which this court has rejected challenges to legislation on special legislation and equal protection grounds. See, e.g., Brown's Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 171 Ill. 2d 410 (1996) (upholding constitutionality of a use tax); Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409 (1994) (upholding constitutionality of a county motor fuel tax law); People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489 (1992) (upholding constitutionality of criminal statute which allowed an enhanced penalty for selling narcotics with an intent to deliver if the situs of the crime is within 1,000 feet of public housing); Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357 (1985) (upholding constitutionality of an environmental regulation which monitored nighttime baseball games); Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 125 Ill. 2d 230 (1988) (upholding constitutionality of immunity for a transit authority for failure to protect against criminal acts of third parties). In contrast to the above cases, this court has invalidated legislative classifications under the special legislation clause where they have an artificially narrow focus and which appear to be designed primarily to confer a benefit on a particular private group without a reasonable basis, rather than to promote the general welfare. See, e.g., In re Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill. 2d 373, 381-86 (1986) (invalidating a statute which authorized only counties with populations of between 600,000 and 1 million residents to consolidate all fire protection services into one district); Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 325-30 (1976) (invalidating $500,000 limit on compensatory damages in medical malpractice actions); Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 486-87 (1972) (invalidating a limit on recovery applicable to damages inflicted by commercial motorists, but not private motorists); Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 459-60 (1967) (invalidating a statute of repose for construction-related injuries for architects and contractors, but not other potential defendants in the construction process); see also Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit School District No. I, 35 Ill. 2d 362, 364-66 (1966); Hutchings v. Kraject, 34