Opinion ID: 68288
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prejean’s prima facie case

Text: Two of the four parts of Prejean’s prima facie McDonnell Douglas case are not disputed: he is a member of a protected class and he was qualified for the position he held before his discharge. However, the issues of whether Prejean was constructively discharged and whether Prejean and Knox were similarly situated remain in dispute. The district court found that Prejean raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the constructive discharge question, but not as to the similarly situated inquiry. Because we dispose of this case on the pretext issue, we assume without deciding that Prejean established his prima facie case. ii. RASL’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for discharge RASL has offered several legitimate, race-neutral explanations for Prejean’s constructive discharge. RASL asserts that Prejean had work-related conflicts and issues, including “clashes” and “power struggles” with other members of the organization. In addition, RASL had concerns about Prejean’s professional conduct and behavior towards clients and patients. Finally, several 6 members of RASL believed Prejean’s “rough” tactics caused the group to lose a potential hospital contract. At this stage of the burden-shifting framework, credibility determinations are not appropriate. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 509. Taken as true, these reasons support a finding that RASL was not motivated by racial animus. See id. Therefore, RASL satisfied its burden of production. iii. Prejean’s Evidence of Pretext We must next determine whether Prejean has shown that the discharge was driven by discrimination. Because Prejean does not offer any direct evidence of discrimination,2 he must show by circumstantial evidence that RASL’s “proffered reason[s] [are] simply a pretext for discrimination.” Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 881 (5th Cir. 2003). Keeping in mind the ultimate focus of the court’s inquiry—discrimination vel non—“it is not enough . . . to dis believe the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (omission and emphasis in original, quotation marks omitted). “[S]ummary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence taken as a whole . . . creates a reasonable inference that [race] was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains.” Pratt, 247 F.3d at 606–07 (quotation marks omitted). Where we have applied Reeves to reverse a grant of summary judgment, substantially more evidence of pretext has been required than the evidence presented by Prejean. Price, 283 F.3d at 724. For example, where two unsuccessful candidates for promotion made Title VII and § 1981 claims, they avoided summary judgment by providing evidence that “the plaintiffs were 2 While the record includes several remarks that might arguably be described as direct evidence of racism, Prejean’s counsel specifically stated during oral argument that the argument on appeal rests solely on the disparate treatment between Knox and Prejean as circumstantial evidence of pretext and racial discrimination. 7 obstructed in their efforts to complete the hiring process, the plaintiffs’ qualifications were superior, the successful candidate was given special treatment, and the supervisor had allegedly discriminated on previous occasions.” Id. (discussing Pratt, 247 F.3d at 607). Another Title VII plaintiff was held to have “presented sufficient evidence of pretext when the evidence indicated that the employer’s proffered reason [for not promoting plaintiff]—that plaintiff’s application was not received in time—could in fact be false.” Id. (discussing Blow v. City of San Antonio, 236 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2001)). There, the plaintiff brought forth evidence that her department “deliberately failed to publicize the job opening” and “actively discouraged” her application. Blow, 236 F.3d at 297. In comparison, although Prejean attempts to create a genuine issue of material fact by relying on RASL’s “shifting and conflicting” reasons for Prejean’s discharge,3 his attempt ultimately fails to create an issue of fact with regard to a conclusively nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge: the loss of the contract with Beauregard Hospital. Prejean fails to show that this reason is unworthy of credence. This concern was consistently raised by Lampson in both the deposition and the affidavit four years later. Lampson stated in his deposition that “some of the [RASL shareholders felt] that [Prejean]’s tactics were too rough” and had caused RASL to lose the potential contract. The record does not reflect that any other physicians were to blame for the loss of the contract.4 Prejean did not put forth any evidence—unlike the plaintiffs in Pratt 3 Specifically, Prejean holds out alleged inconsistencies between Lampson’s deposition testimony and affidavit as creating genuine issues of material fact. However, these inconsistencies are largely semantic, rather than substantive. 4 Prejean argues in his brief and at oral argument that the disparate treatment between Prejean and Knox shows evidence of pretext. Prejean insists that he has established disparate treatment on the grounds that Brdlik and Thomas initially had the same complaints against both Prejean and Knox, but Knox was allowed to stay after further negotiations. While some of the complaints leveled against Prejean were also directed at Knox (i.e., the 8 and Blow—to show either that he did not contribute to the loss of the contract or that his fellow shareholders did not believe that he was at fault. Prejean has simply not made any showing that this race-neutral reason was merely pretextual or unworthy of credence. Even if Prejean had successfully demonstrated that RASL’s explanations were pretextual, the record still “does not support an inference that intentional discrimination was the real reason for the employment decision.” Price, 283 F.3d at 723. In sum, Prejean failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact permitting an inference that intentional discrimination motivated his discharge from RASL. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for RASL.