Opinion ID: 1486394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the breadth and scope of relative fault

Text: Determining whether Union Carbide (appellant) may secure noncontractual indemnity from Chemlime (respondent) on account of injuries sustained by Chemlime's employee Parks requires examination of the breadth and scope of Whitehead and Kales and a reexamination of Maryland Heights. Throughout the opinion in Whitehead and Kales , reliance is placed on what is called the principle of fairness. For example: The long history of the law of joint and concurrent tortfeasor liability in our jurisprudence is in fact a rich expositional refinement of the principle of fairness. [566 S.W.2d at 468-69; emphasis added.] Indemnity is theoretically tied to the principle of fairness. [ Id. at 469; emphasis added.] Using the analogy of an old time-worn building, we have added and re-constructed so much of our law of joint and concurrent tortfeasor liability, the origins of which are ancient, that it has lost its architectural integrity and its structural balance. Only the foundationthe principle of fairness remains undisturbed and sturdy. We have therefore determined that, steadfastly consistent with the dictates of our common law tradition and the principles of equity embedded therein, we are obligated to reconstruct upon the principle of fairness a law of joint and concurrent tortfeasor liability which is secure, predictable, and effective. [ Id. at 472; emphasis added.] The principle of fairness imbedded within our law compels this adoption of a system for the distribution of joint tort liability on the basis of relative fault. [ Id. at 474; emphasis added.] The interests of plaintiffs are secure; the interests of joint or concurrent tortfeasors will now be clothed in a rule based upon realism and fairness between them. [ Id. at 474-75; emphasis added.] The principles of equity and fairness on which the adoption of relative fault in Whitehead and Kales is based are very broad principles. The doctrine of relative fault must be equally broad in scope. In order to determine the breadth of the equitable principles underlying the adoption of relative fault, those principles must be given some content. The principle of fairness is stated in Whitehead and Kales as follows: [I]n exchange for the opportunity of some undertaking, we each promise all others that we will be liable for the damage which our own negligence in the undertaking has caused. 566 S.W.2d at 469 n. 4. [1] The Court stated that it is this principle which is the basis of or the premise for our fault-based system of tort liability. The equitable principle which prompted the adoption of the system of relative fault is simply that one is liable for the damage which he has negligently caused.
Several cases from other jurisdictions which adopt a relative fault system of distributing joint tort liability are cited in Whitehead and Kales, 566 S.W.2d 474 n. 7. [2] These cases state the central equitable principle in a variety of ways. In Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971), the court stated: [The] right of contribution among unintentional joint tort-feasors is an equitable right founded upon acknowledged principles of natural justice. [ Id. at 179.] The doctrine of contribution is a judicial concept predicated upon the equitable principle that one of two or more tort-feasors should not in fairness be required to undertake the entire burden of indemnifying the injured party. [ Id. at 180.] We see no reason why in logic or in justice the law should expect that the joint tort-feasor should ultimately be required to contribute moreor lessthan a share of the total damages proportionate to his causal fault. [ Id. ] The court in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972), speaks of the courts' struggle toward fairness and undertakes to re-examine the basic fairness of the system of indemnity: The conclusion reached is that where a third party is found to have been responsible for a part, but not all, of the negligence for which a defendant is cast in damages, the responsibility for that part is recoverable by the prime defendant against the third party. 30 N.Y.2d at 148-149, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387, 282 N.E.2d at 292. In Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 286 N.E.2d 241 (1972), the court states that the new rule of apportionment [adopted in Dole is] . . . pragmatically sound, as well as realistically fair. 31 N.Y.2d at 29, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 854, 286 N.E.2d at 243. The fairer rule, we believe, is to distribute the loss in proportion to the allocable concurring fault. Id. In Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956), the rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors is traced to its origin in Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng.Rep. 1337 (K.B.1799), as founded on the policy that the intentional wrongdoer is not entitled . . . to the aid of the law in adjusting any claims against his confederate . . . in causing a deliberate and planned injury to a third party. 247 Iowa at 807, 77 N.W.2d at 28. Thus, the court held that where there is no claim or showing of an intentional wrong, or of moral turpitude or any concerted action by the alleged tortfeasors . . . there is at least a right of equitable contribution between them. 247 Iowa at 810, 77 N.W.2d at 29. In Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the amount of liability for contribution of tortfeasors who sustain a common liability by reason of causal negligence should be determined in proportion to the percentage of causal negligence attributable to each. 16 Wis.2d at 6, 114 N.W.2d at 107. The court noted: In discussing the right of contribution and its effect, we have often used such terms as his fair and equitable share, equity and natural justice, more than his proportion, more than his just share, and more than his proportionate share. If the doctrine is to do equity, there is no reason in logic or in natural justice why the shares of common liability of joint tortfeasors should not be translated into the percentage of the causal negligence which contributed to the injury. This is merely a refinement of the equitable principle. 16 Wis.2d at 9, 114 N.W.2d at 109 (footnotes omitted). The court observed that No one denies the proposed change is more just in distributing the loss in proportion to the degree of negligence or fault which caused it. 16 Wis.2d at 10, 114 N.W.2d at 109. The court also observed that it was stressing the basic goal of the law of negligence, the equitable distribution of the loss in relation to the respective contribution of the faults causing it. 16 Wis.2d at 17, 114 N.W.2d at 113. Finally, in Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.1977), the Supreme Court of Minnesota adopted the rule that: Tortfeasors must now accept responsibility for damages commensurate with their own relative culpability. 255 N.W.2d at 367. By limiting the reallocation of loss between joint tortfeasors to contribution based upon relative fault, the more culpable tortfeasor will continue to bear a greater share of the loss, but at the same time his joint tortfeasor will not continue to escape all liability as in the past. Id. The court states that indemnity in cases where the one seeking indemnity has only derivative or vicarious liability for damages caused by the one sought to be charged is justified by the fundamental principle that one who is guilty of injurious misconduct is himself liable therefor. Id. at 366. The supreme courts of two other states have recently adopted a rule of contribution among joint tortfeasors based upon relative degrees of fault. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 70 Ill.2d 1, 15 Ill.Dec. 829, 834, 374 N.E.2d 437, 442, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946, 98 S.Ct. 2849, 56 L.Ed.2d 787 (1977); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183, 190 (1975). The opinions in both cases quote the following statement from W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 50, p. 307 (4th ed. 1971): There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiff's whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free. Skinner, 70 Ill.2d at 13, 15 Ill.Dec. at 834, 374 N.E.2d at 442; Royal Indemnity, 193 Neb. at 763, 229 N.W.2d at 189. Whether called logic, or natural justice, or equity, or fairness, or proportion, the principle which lies at the very center of our system of tort liability is the principle that one is liable for the damage which he wrongfully causes. The converse of this principle, that one is not liable for damage which he did not wrongfully cause, is the true basis of our relative fault system and our rules governing contribution and indemnity.
To state the principle that one is not liable for the damage which he did not wrongfully cause is merely to begin the analysis. Whitehead and Kales applied this principle to discard a number of doctrines that were long a part of Missouri law. Among the doctrines discussed in Whitehead and Kales are the following: (1) Prior to Whitehead and Kales , one joint or concurrent tortfeasor was not entitled to indemnity from other joint or concurrent tortfeasors unless the negligence of the party seeking indemnity was passive and that of the party from whom he sought indemnity was active. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Payway Feed Mills, Inc., 338 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo.1960). Whitehead and Kales thoroughly discusses the active-passive distinction, 566 S.W.2d at 469-72, and concludes that its use had led to illogical results and that its use was not a sensible way to fix responsibility. Id. at 471. The active-passive distinction makes the outcome depend on ingenuity of phrasing, or characterization. Id. The use of the active-passive distinction has been criticized in cases from other jurisdictions. Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23, 28 (1956); Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn.1977); Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1972); Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291-93 (1972); Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 56 Wis.2d 383, 202 N.W.2d 268, 271-72 (1972). (2) Prior to Whitehead and Kales , Missouri's contribution statute, § 537.060, RSMo 1978 (§ 3658, RSMo 1939), was interpreted to allow [] contribution between joint tortfeasors only after a joint judgment [was rendered] against them, and even if the plaintiff amended his petition to name an impleaded third-party defendant, the plaintiff could still by release . . . prevent a third-party defendant from becoming subject to contribution. State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 22, 213 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Mo. banc 1948). See also May v. Bradford, 369 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Mo. 1963); Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Mo. banc 1961); State ex rel. Merino v. Rose, 362 Mo. 181, 240 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Mo. banc 1951); Layman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 220, 225 (Mo.App.1977). This construction of § 537.060, RSMo 1978, was forcefully rejected in Whitehead and Kales in the following terms: To limit any apportionment of damages between tortfeasors to those whom the plaintiff has chosen to sue and against whom judgment is rendered is an inartful and capricious policy, relying in excess upon the whim and wrath of a plaintiff before concurrent wrongdoers can share liability. 566 S.W.2d at 473. And again: there is no sound reason why this issue should not be decided by the jury prior to judgment on the basis of relative fault. Id. at 474. Instead, the distribution of joint tort liability on the basis of relative fault would apply whether the tortfeasors were joined as defendants by the plaintiff or a third party defendant was added to a cause under our rule 52.11. Id. (3) Whitehead and Kales did not, however, extend the principle that one should pay only for the damages which he wrongfully caused to abolish the rule of joint and several liability among joint and concurrent tortfeasors. [3] The Court stated that, whether tortfeasors were joined as defendants by the plaintiff or joined as third-party defendants under rule 52.11, the ability of a plaintiff to sue and ultimately collect judgment against his or her choice of tortfeasor need not be impaired. Plaintiff continues free to sue one or more concurrent tortfeasors as he sees fit and nothing that transpires between them as to their relative responsibility can reduce or take away from plaintiff any part of his judgment. 566 S.W.2d at 474. Or again: The interests of plaintiffs are secure . . .. Id. The Court held that while it is inartful and capricious and gives unnecessary effect to the whim and wrath of the plaintiff to bar contribution among joint tortfeasors unless a joint judgment has been entered against them, the plaintiff may ultimately collect judgment against his or her choice of tortfeasor regardless of the proportion of damages caused by each tortfeasor. While it may appear difficult to reconcile a rule that permits a plaintiff to collect his or her entire judgment from one who is only partly at fault with the principle that one is not liable for damages one did not wrongfully cause, closer examination of the rule of joint and several liability discloses the extent to which it is supported by the principle of fairness. [4]
The general trend toward the adoption of comparative negligence has led to a trend toward the adoption of comparative fault on the defendants' side. The reexamination of the rules concerning contributory negligence and contribution among joint tortfeasors has also led to reexamination of the rule of joint and several liability. Four arguments have been presented for retaining the rule of joint and several liability in a comparative fault system. American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal.3d 578, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899, 904-06 (1978). These arguments may be summarized as follows: (1) A tortious injury is indivisible, and a joint or concurrent tortfeasor is liable for any indivisible injury of which his negligence is a proximate cause. The fact that fault is apportioned on a comparative negligence basis does not render a tortious injury divisible for purposes of the rule of joint and several liability. (2) The law is loath to permit an innocent plaintiff to suffer loss as against a wrongdoing defendant. A faultless plaintiff should not bear the risk of loss if one of the concurrent tortfeasors is unable to satisfy his proportionate share of the damages. (3) A plaintiff's culpability is unlike that of a negligent defendant, because the plaintiff's negligence relates to a lack of care for his own safety, while the defendant's negligence relates to a lack of care for the safety of others; the latter is tortious, but the former is not. (4) Adoption of a rule of proportionate liability would, in practice, impair the ability of negligently injured persons to receive adequate compensation. Fairness dictates that the wrongdoers should be left to work out among themselves any apportionment. Brief analysis of these arguments discloses the sound policy underlying retention of a limited form of the rule of joint and several liability of joint and concurrent tortfeasors. [5] The argument that a concurrent tortfeasor is liable for all damages flowing from an indivisible injury of which his negligence is a proximate cause is clearly inconsistent with the principle that liability for damage will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault. The attempt in argument (1) above to justify the rule of joint and several liability by formulating a restrictive definition of divisibility of tortious injury appears to assume the conclusion it purports to establish. The argument leaves unanswered the central question whether liability should be assessed in accordance with the proportion of damage for which a defendant is at fault or in accordance with the character of the injury. No reason appears for characterizing tortious injuries as indivisible except to rationalize continuing the rule of joint and several liability. Placing reliance on characterization of the injury as divisible or indivisible to determine the distribution of liability is as arbitrary as was the use of the labels active and passive or primary and secondary prior to Whitehead and Kales . The terms indivisible injury and relative fault would appear to be mutually exclusive. Argument (3) is also subject to criticism: it is not made clear why the fact that the self-directed negligence of a plaintiff is nonactionable should justify permitting the plaintiff to execute for 100% of his or her judgment against a defendant who was causally responsible for only a portion of the damages. Reliance on these two arguments represents a form of judicial inertia; in fact, decisions that recite these arguments also rely on the claim that no state has abolished the rule of joint and several liability unless a statute specifically abolishes it. Seattle First National Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash.2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308, 1313 (1978); American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal.3d 578, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899, 906 (1978). [6] That claim is no longer true. Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Okl.1978). Even if the rule were universally retained, however, the principle of fairness propounded in Whitehead and Kales requires its reexamination. Whitehead and Kales presents a paradigm case of reasoned departure from the rule of stare decisis. The fact that a rule has long been followed does not require that we continue to follow it, if the reason for the rule has ceased to operate. As Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out: It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past. O. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 187 (1920); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv.L.Rev. 457, 469 (1897). In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas, a judge cannot avoid reexamining precedents unless he lets men long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives do his thinking for him. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum.L.Rev. 735, 736 (1949). At least some of the reasons originally offered for the rule of joint and several liability in Missouri have vanished long since. In Newcomb v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., 169 Mo. 409, 426, 69 S.W. 348, 353 (1902), the Court quoted Bishop, Noncontract Law § 518, for the reason underlying the rule of joint and several liability: [S]ince the habitations and life of man are in the midst of constantly active forces in nature, and his necessities compel him to be perpetually active also, it is not possible in jurisprudence, nor would it be just to limit one's responsibility for harm inflicted on another through his acts, to the particular injuries whereof those acts are the sole cause. Indeed, a sole cause is a thing seldom found in our complicated world. Nor would it be practicable, nor yet is it demanded by any principle of justice, to take into the account all the combining causes of an injury, and charge the author of each cause with simply his proportion of the damage. Therefore the rule of the law is, that a person contributing to a tort, whether his fellow-contributors are men, natural, or other forces, or things, is responsible for the whole, the same as though he had done all without help. The limit to this rule, in civil jurisprudence is simply what is required by another rule, namely, that [a person who has suffered an injury is entitled to receive his damages but once] . . . . J. Bishop, Noncontract Law § 518, p. 229 (1889); 169 Mo. at 426, 69 S.W. at 353. (Emphasis added.) The rule of joint and several liability can no longer be justified by the impracticability of assessing proportionate fault among multiple tortfeasors. This reason for the rule was completely eradicated by Whitehead and Kales , in which the Court stated that instructing a jury to apportion the respective fault of concurrent tortfeasors would present no insurmountable problem to the jury. We already differentiate verdicts among joint tortfeasors where punitive damages are involved. The jury is instructed that they may find punitive damages against several defendants in differing amounts, depending upon differing degrees of culpability, State ex rel. Hall v. Cook, 400 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Mo. banc 1966); MAI 10.03; MAI 36.12. A system of apportionment of damages has long been in use in Missouri in Federal Employer's Liability Act cases, where the assessment of the extent of plaintiff's relative fault (contributory negligence) is handled by a simple instruction that if the plaintiff is found to be contributorily negligent, then the jury must diminish the sum in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to [plaintiff] [decedent]. MAI 32.07, Notes on Use (2d ed. 1969). 566 S.W.2d at 472. More importantly, the holding of Whitehead and Kales shows how far we have moved from the view expressed in Newcomb that no principle of justice demands that we take into account all the combining negligent causes of an injury and charge the author of each cause with simply his proportion of the damage. The principle of fairness articulated in Whitehead and Kales demands precisely the kind of apportionment that Newcomb rejected. The only remaining rationale for retaining a rule of joint and several liability is the practical consideration that in certain cases the plaintiff is completely innocent and one or more of concurrent tortfeasors is unable to pay his or her proportionate share of the damages. In such a case, the plaintiff should be permitted to receive complete compensation from any one of the tortfeasors, leaving that wrongdoer to seek indemnity or contribution from the other concurrent tortfeasors. See arguments (2) and (4) above. Where one of several concurrent tortfeasors is insolvent, complete abolition of the rule of joint and several liability would result in an innocent plaintiff bearing the burden of a loss that he or she in no way caused, which would violate our principle of fairness. Placing the risk of a tortfeasor's insolvency on other tortfeasors through a limited rule of joint and several liability may be seen as applying the principle of fairness to innocent plaintiffs: the plaintiff should not be forced to bear the burden of losses which others have caused him and which did not result from his own negligence. [7] These considerations, however, do not justify retention of a blanket rule that a plaintiff may always execute for 100% of his or her judgment against one who is less than 100% at fault. The rule of joint and several liability should be retained only to the extent necessary to ensure that a faultless plaintiff does not bear a loss which he or she did not negligently cause. Only to that extent is the rule of joint and several liability compatible with our system of relative fault. Accordingly, no plaintiff should be able to recover from one of multiple tortfeasors more than that tortfeasor's proportion of fault, absent a showing that the plaintiff is unable to satisfy his or her judgment against another of the concurrent tortfeasors.
I believe that our decision in Maryland Heights failed to appreciate the full implications of the fundamental principle articulated in Whitehead and Kales , that one is not liable for damage which he did not negligently cause. The effect of Maryland Heights was to require the non-employer defendant to bear 100% of the employee's loss, regardless of the non-employee defendant's proportion of fault. The Court in Maryland Heights relied on Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Smith, 359 So.2d 427, 429-30 (Fla.1978) for its view of the effect of the statutory immunity of the employer under the workmen's compensation provisions. It is not clear that the Florida court's treatment of the question should be persuasive in Missouri after Whitehead and Kales . Whitehead and Kales created a system of relative fault that applies regardless of whether the issue is presented by a claim for contribution or by a claim for indemnity. Florida, however, rejects indemnity between joint tortfeasors and rejects weighing the relative fault of tortfeasors on a claim for indemnity. Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So.2d 490 (Fla.1979). [8] The question whether the employer's fault should be determined in order to fix the non-employer defendant's measure of liability must be answered in the light of the principles laid down in Whitehead and Kales . The court in Seaboard pointed out that the employer's liability to pay workmen's compensation benefits replaces tort liability of the employer and substitutes for the employer's common law liability for damages. See Maryland Heights, 588 S.W.2d at 491, quoting Seaboard, 359 So.2d at 429-30. It is precisely because workmen's compensation benefits substitute for the employer's common law liability that the employee should not be permitted to recover 100% of his damages from the non-employer whose negligence concurred with that of the employer to cause the employee's injury. Such a result clearly violates the principle that one tortfeasor is ultimately liable only for the amount of damages that he caused. The employer, through the payment of workmen's compensation benefits, has borne his proportionate share of liability for the employee's injury. That proportion should not be paid to the employee a second time by the non-employer tortfeasor. The policy against multiple recovery by injured employees eligible for workmen's compensation benefits is set by statute. § 287.150, RSMo 1978. Certainly that policy could be given effect and the system rendered more efficient, if the non-employer defendant is held liable only for the share of the damages that he caused to the employee. In keeping with the principle of fairness, I would hold that the employer is a person in whose absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, and hence the employer should be joined in the action under our Rule 52.04(a), (b). See Maryland Heights, 588 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Mo. banc 1979) (Donnelly, J., dissenting). The proportion of the employee-plaintiff's injury that was caused by the employer's negligence should be determined by the jury, so that the judgment entered against the non-employer defendant will reflect only that portion of damages for which the non-employer defendant was responsible. Consequently, I believe the trial court's order granting respondent Chemlime's motion for judgment on the pleadings was in error, and that it should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the rule requiring apportionment of liability in direct relation to the degree of fault.
Our decision in Whitehead and Kales left unanswered numerous questions concerning the effect of a settlement agreement with one concurrent tortfeasor on the liability of other settling and nonsettling tortfeasors. Can the settling tortfeasor be held liable for contribution or indemnity to the nonsettling tortfeasor if the amount of the settlement is less than the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of the obligation? Or does the settlement contract discharge the settling tortfeasor from all further liability to the plaintiff and from the obligation to contribute to or indemnify the remaining tortfeasors? Does settlement reduce the plaintiff's ultimate judgment for damages against the remaining tortfeasors by the amount paid in settlement or by the amount of the settling tortfeasor's portion of fault? Without answers to these questions, neither plaintiffs nor defendants are able to compromise lawsuits with any confidence as to the legal effect of such agreements. The principles discussed above may be used to generate answers to these questions that are both simple and fair. The purposes of both plaintiffs and defendants in compromising lawsuits are similar. A plaintiff seeks certainty of recovery free from the expense and trauma of litigation; a defendant seeks to avoid the costs of litigation and to avoid the risk that trial might result in a judgment for damages in excess of the amount the plaintiff is willing to accept in settlement. Our rules concerning the effect of a settlement should be tailored to encourage settlements without sacrificing the overall purpose of fairly resolving disputes. The law favors compromise and settlement of disputed claims. `It is to the interest of the commonwealth that there should be an end to litigation.' Mateer v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 105 Mo. 320, 354, 16 S.W. 839, 848 (banc 1891). Accord, Vondera v. Chapman, 352 Mo. 1034, 1038, 1039, 180 S.W.2d 704, 705-06 (1944). In order for a settlement to achieve the purpose of resolving disputes, and the parties' purposes of avoiding litigation, we must hold that a tortfeasor who has entered into a good faith settlement is discharged from any claim for indemnity or contribution that may be pressed by a joint or concurrent tortfeasor. See American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal.3d 578, 604, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 198, 578 P.2d 899, 915 (1978). Any other rule would remove incentive for one of multiple tortfeasor defendants to settle the case: settlement would not free them from further litigation expenses or from uncertainty of liability. `Few things would be better calculated . . . to discourage settlement of disputed tort claims, than knowledge that such a settlement lacked finality and would lead to further litigation with one's joint tortfeasors, and perhaps further liability.' Id. [A] settlement is made and a general release taken for the purpose of foreclosing further claims. Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Mo. banc 1972). A settlement, release, or covenant not to sue, agreed upon between the plaintiff and one tortfeasor in a multiparty case, should be interpreted to satisfy that portion of the plaintiff's damages that corresponds to the settling tortfeasor's proportionate fault. This rule has been adopted in other jurisdictions that have adopted a system of comparative fault among joint and concurrent tortfeasors. Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of New Jersey, 81 N.J. 548, 410 A.2d 674, 685 (1980); Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 122 (N.D.1979); Geier v. Wikel, 4 Kan.App.2d 188, 189, 603 P.2d 1028, 1030 (1979). Cf. Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn.1978); Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis.2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106, 111-12 (1963). This rule also comports with Section 6 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. 12 U.L.A. 42 (Supp.1979). Courts in other states that have adopted a system of comparative fault among joint and concurrent tortfeasors have held that comparative fault does not alter the rule that a settlement with one tortfeasor effects a pro tanto or dollar-for-dollar reduction in the plaintiff's judgment against remaining tortfeasors. See, e. g., American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal.3d 578, 604, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 199, 578 P.2d 899, 916 (1978); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 887 (W.Va.1979). Although the rule of pro tanto reduction would encourage a plaintiff to settle at a discount with some defendants, it would require the plaintiff to retain his or her claim against at least one defendant in order to recover a full measure of his or her damages, diminished only by the amount of the settlements. Plaintiffs under this rule are often not willing to settle with the one tortfeasor whose negligence is proved most easily and against whom a judgment could be collected most easily. Thus, the rule virtually requires that there be at least one lawsuit. Moreover, the ultimate distribution of liability clearly violates the equitable principles underlying adoption of relative fault. In a system in which the plaintiff's damage judgment against nonsettling tortfeasors is reduced only by the amount of payments received from settling tortfeasors, the liability of the remaining defendants would be determined without considering the relative fault of the settling tortfeasor. Such a system permits a disproportionate burden to be placed on nonsettling tortfeasors. For example, suppose that plaintiff A suffers $100,000 in damage resulting from the concurring negligence of defendants B, C and D. Suppose further that B 's proportion of fault is 10%, C 's proportion of fault is 30%, and D 's proportion of fault is 60%. Under our system of relative fault, trial would result in B paying $10,000, C $30,000, and D $60,000. Suppose A settled with B for $1,000. [9] Suppose that C agrees to pay A $25,000 in exchange for a release from liability. A would be permitted to recover the remaining $74,000 from D despite the fact that D was only responsible for $60,000 of A 's loss. A will have little incentive to settle his or her claim against D. The rule that settlements work a dollar-for-dollar reduction in plaintiff's damage judgment against nonsettling tortfeasors thus makes the process of compromising claims into a form of musical chairs in which the last tortfeasor to agree to a settlement often will not be able to settle the case, and will be required to pay more than his proportionate share of the loss. Such a rule of settlements would establish a system of apportioning damages among concurrent tortfeasors that is inartful and capricious and which rel[ies] in excess upon the whim and wrath of a plaintiff, something this Court justly condemned in Whitehead and Kales . 566 S.W.2d at 473. The rules governing settlements should be structured in order to give effect to the principle of fairness, that the ultimate liability for tortious injury falls on the person who negligently caused the damage. Our settlement rules certainly should not encourage disproportionate distributions of the burden and discourage complete settlements. A system in which a settlement effects a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the plaintiff's recovery against remaining tortfeasors would deprive a plaintiff of a favorable settlement agreement in cases in which he or she settles with one tortfeasor for more than that tortfeasor's proportionate share of fault. In such a case, the nonsettling tortfeasor would enjoy the benefit of the plaintiff's bargain. For example, suppose again that A suffers $100,000 in damage resulting from the concurring negligence of defendants B, C and D. Suppose again that B 's proportion of the fault is 10%, C 's is 30%, and D 's is 60%. Suppose further that A settles with B for $10,000 and settles with C for $40,000. In a system which reduces the plaintiff's award of damages by the amount received from settling tortfeasors, D will be held liable for only $50,000 of A 's loss, despite the fact that D is responsible for $60,000 of the loss. D would receive the entire benefit of A 's bargain with C. This result is not required by any policy against permitting plaintiffs multiple recovery. The $10,000 premium paid by C is supported by ample consideration. C was spared the burden of litigation expenses defending against A 's claim, and was spared months of uncertainty pending resolution of the suit. No principle of equity requires that D be awarded the benefit of A 's bargain; the principles against unjust enrichment require that A retain that benefit. A settlement contract must operate to satisfy that portion of a plaintiff's loss that corresponds to the percentage of fault of the settling tortfeasor. Such a rule would provide incentive for the plaintiff to settle with all parties, and not require a plaintiff to retain one tortfeasor as a scapegoat. Such a rule would permit the last tortfeasor in the case to negotiate for a settlement on the same footing as the first tortfeasor to settle. Such a rule would not impose on the nonsettling tortfeasors any of the settling tortfeasors' share of the obligation. And such a rule would not let the plaintiff's advantageous settlement agreement with one tortfeasor become a windfall to the remaining tortfeasors. For the same reasons set out above in connection with the workmen's compensation employer, a tortfeasor who has settled is a person in whose absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties. Rule 52.04(a), (b). The relative fault of the settling tortfeasor should be determined so that the judgment entered against the remaining tortfeasors reflects only their proportionate fault. In summary, settlements within a relative fault system of tort liability should be governed by the following rules: (1) a settlement agreement between one tortfeasor and the plaintiff bars any claim for indemnity or contribution brought by a concurrent tortfeasor against the settling tortfeasor; (2) a settlement agreement between one tortfeasor and the plaintiff satisfies that portion of the obligation that corresponds to the settling tortfeasor's proportionate fault; and (3) the settling tortfeasor remains a party to the plaintiff's lawsuit against nonsettling tortfeasors. These rules will carry through our tort law a systematic application of the doctrine of relative fault. Under these rules, if the plaintiff settles with one tortfeasor for less than that tortfeasor's proportionate fault, the difference usually will be attributable to the value of quick and certain recovery. Any difference not so explained may be the result of a bad bargain; but the general rule of freedom of contract includes the freedom to make a bad bargain. Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Mo. banc 1972). See Vondera v. Chapman, 352 Mo. 1034, 1039, 180 S.W.2d 704, 705-06 (1944). If the plaintiff settles with one tortfeasor for more than that tortfeasor's proportionate fault, the plaintiff alone is entitled to the benefit of his or her bargain. The fact that one tortfeasor has agreed to compromise the claim will neither reduce nor increase the amount of liability of the remaining tortfeasorseach will be liable for the plaintiff's damages in direct proportion to his or her degree of fault. [10] The above rules are easily applied in the case at bar. Appellant's briefs indicate that, after the trial court's order sustaining respondent's motion for judgment on the pleadings was made final on January 13, 1978, appellant settled the case with Parks. Respondent's briefs reject appellant's statement of facts as going outside the record and including matters impertinent to the order sustaining respondent's motion for judgment. The transcript filed in this Court does not contain any evidence that the case was disposed of by a settlement agreement. In the absence of a stipulation by the parties, the transcript may not be supplemented by extraneous matter in the briefs of one party, and such extraneous matter may not be considered on appeal. Consumer Contact Co. v. Department of Revenue, 592 S.W.2d 782, 785 n. 1 (Mo. banc 1980); Pretti v. Herre, 403 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Mo.1966). On remand, if the trial court determines that a release has been given to appellant, I would direct the court to treat Union Carbide's proportionate liability to Parks in a manner consistent with this opinion.