Opinion ID: 1409710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Law Duty/Factual Error

Text: Petitioner contends the facts of this case establish a legal duty arising from a special circumstance because Deputy Cain set Deborah up as bait to try to arrest Husband. See Jensen, supra (duty can arise from special circumstance). Petitioner argues, in connection with this issue, that the Court of Appeals ignored Deputy Cain's deposition testimony when it concluded that Cain did not convey to [Deborah] that he wanted to use her as `bait' in an attempt to capture Husband. Arthurs, 338 S.C. at 268, 525 S.E.2d at 550. The flaw in petitioner's theory is that there is no evidence that the Department was baiting a trap with Deborah. The evidence is undisputed that when Deputy Cain responded to the first incident, where Husband threatened Deborah's nephew in her yard, he told her that if she refused to go to a safe house, she should stay indoors behind locked doors and call 911 if Husband returned. In his deposition, he testified that after Deborah refused his offer to help her get to a safe house (emphasis added), he told her to stay behind a locked door and call 911 if Husband came back. He continued: Just call us and we'll come down here with all of us, we'll take care of him in the front yard. We'll take care of it. And [Deborah] told me young man, she called me young man or called me son, or something to [sic] that nature. I believe she said young man, he's got a gun, and my response to her was, so do I and my friends and we know what to do with ours and let us take care of a gun problem. You stay inside but whatever you do, don't unlock the door for him. I wanted her to set him up so he was in the front yard when we show up. That's all I was trying to convey to her and we'll take care of the problem, you know, the way we were trained to, and after that I pretty much left. (emphasis added). Cain explained at trial that he did not convey the set up thought to Deborah, but was insuring [sic] her that myself and my fellow law enforcement officers knew exactly what to do once we came in contact with this man and for her to stay behind a locked door if she did not want to leave the area. The Court of Appeals relied on the fact that there was no evidence that Deputy Cain conveyed to Deborah that he wanted to use her as bait in concluding no special circumstances here gave rise to a duty. In our opinion, it is more accurate to say there was no baiting here. Despite Deborah's fear of Husband and his armed appearance in her front yard, Deborah refused Deputy Cain's offer to get her away from there and to a safe location. In context, all that was conveyed was to stay indoors and call at the first sighting of Husband, not to wait for him to act provocatively. He did not encourage her to stay in an effort to lure Husband backhe encouraged her to leave. Husband lived one trailer over, and was therefore bound to return at some point; certainly if he were in Deborah's front yard when officers responded to her 911 call, he would be easy to pick out and arrest. Since we find no evidence of baiting, there is no need to decide whether such conduct can constitute a special circumstance giving rise to a common law duty. In light of the lack of evidence, we decline to adopt a test for determining when such a duty may arise. Further, we vacate that part of the Court of Appeals' opinion which adopts the North Carolina test found in Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 410 S.E.2d 897 (1991). We do this in part because the issue is not before us, and in part because North Carolina characterizes this type of common law duty as a special duty exception to the public duty rule. Id. at 902. We find the North Carolina language potentially confusing because, as explained above, we restrict the terms public duty/special duty to those arising from statutes.