Opinion ID: 2047322
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: David Sullivan's Former Testimony

Text: ¶ 25. Sullivan testified at Jones's trial, which was tried two months prior to Hale's scheduled trial. On direct examination, he said he had known Hale for a long time, indicating that they have been friends since childhood. Sullivan testified that the gun shown to him at Jones's trial look[ed] like the gun he provided to Hale at Hale's request. Although he did not know for sure, he guess[ed] that he had given the gun to Hale at the Jones/Hale residence about six months ago, which would have been November 2001, before the double homicide of December 8, 2001. ¶ 26. On cross-examination, Sullivan acknowledged that shortly before the start of the trial, he had written a letter to the prosecutor and the judge, asserting that he was afraid to take the stand and had suffered from some kind of altered mental state that deprived him of the ability to distinguish between the truth and [falsity] of what [he had] written in [his] previous statements. Sullivan also testified that he told authorities that he was sure he had given the gun to Hale and not to Jones. ¶ 27. Finally, on redirect examination, Sullivan conceded that his mental state was attributable in part to the guilt he felt about having given Hale the murder weapon. The jury found Jones guilty of the charges. ¶ 28. Subsequently, the State subpoenaed Sullivan to testify on its behalf at Hale's trial but was unable to locate him. According to the State, Sullivan's mother gave police his address, but Sullivan's girlfriend refused them access to the residence. The court then issued a material witness warrant for Sullivan. At the close of the second day of trial, the State reported that he was still being sought. ¶ 29. Anticipating that the State may seek to use Sullivan's prior testimony from Jones's trial, Hale's counsel filed a motion to exclude such evidence. She argued that the testimony did not satisfy the applicable hearsay exception because Jones's motive and interest in cross-examining Sullivan were not sufficiently similar to Hale's. Defense counsel also asserted that Hale's right to confrontation was violated by the admission of the testimony. ¶ 30. On the morning of the third day of trial, the State informed the court that police had searched the residence where Sullivan was believed to be staying but did not find him. The State submitted that Sullivan's prior testimony from Jones's trial was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at Hale's trial because it was given under oath in a setting where Jones's counsel had complete ability to conduct cross-examination. ¶ 31. The circuit court allowed the State to introduce Sullivan's prior testimony from Jones's trial. It determined that the evidence fit the former testimony hearsay exception of Wis. Stat. § 908.045(1) (2001-02) because Jones's interest in cross-examining Sullivan was similar to Hale's and Sullivan was unavailable. [4] The court also concluded that Sullivan's prior testimony would not violate Hale's confrontation right because the exception was firmly rooted. ¶ 32. Sullivan's prior testimony from Jones's trial was then read to the jury, identified for jurors as testimony at a prior proceeding. The prosecutor and Hale's counsel read, respectively, the direct and cross-examination questions of Sullivan, while a police detective read Sullivan's answers to the questions. ¶ 33. The jury found Hale guilty of six crimes, including two counts of first-degree intentional homicide, party to a crime. After his conviction, Hale appealed the circuit court's admission of Sullivan's testimony. ¶ 34. On appeal, Hale maintained that Sullivan's prior testimony did not satisfy the former testimony exception of Wis. Stat. § 908.045 because Jones did not have motive and interest similar to Hale in his cross-examination. Alternatively, Hale argued that admission of Sullivan's prior testimony violated his right to confrontation because the former testimony exception, as applied to Sullivan's prior testimony, was not firmly rooted and lacked particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. ¶ 35. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court decision. It determined that Sullivan's prior testimony satisfied the former testimony hearsay exception because Jones had a motive and interest similar to Hale to discredit any link between Hale and the murder weapon. State v. Hale, 2003 WI App 238, ¶ 17, 268 Wis. 2d 171, 672 N.W.2d 130. ¶ 36. With respect to Hale's right to confrontation, the court of appeals expressed doubt that the former testimony exception was firmly rooted as applied to the facts of the case. Id., ¶¶ 25-30. However, the court noted that it was bound by its prior decision in State v. Bintz, 2002 WI App 204, ¶ 20, 257 Wis. 2d 177, 650 N.W.2d 913, which concluded, without explanation, that the former testimony hearsay exception was firmly rooted. ¶ 37. In addition, the court of appeals observed that Sullivan's testimony would still be admissible even if the former testimony exception were not firmly rooted. Id., ¶ 31. It did so because the prior testimony at issue bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id., ¶¶ 31-32. ¶ 38. Finally, the court of appeals offered two alternative bases for its holding. First, it observed that Sullivan's testimony was also admissible under the residual hearsay exception of Wis. Stat. § 908.045(6). [5] Id., ¶ 32, n. 5. Second, even if the circuit court had erred in admitting the evidence, the error was harmless. Id. ¶ 39. This court granted Hale's petition for review. Less than two weeks later, the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), which dramatically altered the legal landscape of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.