Opinion ID: 783030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Fee Calculation

Text: Having found that section 1997e(d)(2)'s fee limitation did not apply in this case, the district court granted appellee's motion for attorneys' fees in its entirety. Appellants contend that the court erred by not reducing the fee award to reflect appellee's incomplete success on the merits. `[T]he most critical factor' in determining the reasonableness of a fee award `is the degree of success obtained.' Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)). While it is the district court's responsibility to make the assessment of what is a reasonable fee under the circumstances of the case, id. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 (quoting Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989)), the court must exercise its discretion with an eye toward the relationship between the extent of success and the amount of the fee award. Id. at 115-16, 113 S.Ct. 566(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 438, 103 S.Ct. 1933). When a plaintiff achieve[s] only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount. Id. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933). Here, the district court awarded Dannenberg fees for all 511.7 hours that counsel expended on his case subsequent to enactment of the PLRA. According to Dannenberg, this number includes hours that counsel spent deposing numerous witnesses as well as preparing for and conducting a five-day jury trial. In the view of the district court, all of this time was directly and reasonably attributable to proving this violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. It is undisputed, however, that Dannenberg did not prevail on all of his claims. Dannenberg's causes of action for denial of medical treatment and access to the courts were decided against him by way of summary judgment. On his claim for retaliation, Dannenberg prevailed against four defendants but was unsuccessful against four others. Moreover, Dannenberg obtained only a fraction of the damages he sought and only part of his desired injunctive relief. The district court based its determination that Dannenberg was entitled to full fees on the fact that Dannenberg prevailed on his principle [sic] contention. Be that as it may, unless Dannenberg's counsel expended no time pursuing the claims on which Dannenberg was unsuccessful, the district court's conclusion that all 511.7 hours were directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of plaintiff's rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1197e(d)(1), cannot be correct. On the record before the Court, therefore, it appears that the district court did not properly consider appellee's degree of success in arriving at a reasonable fee award. Accordingly, the district court's order granting Dannenberg's motion for attorneys' fees is hereby vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. VACATED AND REMANDED.