Opinion ID: 1281413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Dual Use of the Instant Crimes

Text: (60) Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to modify CALJIC No. 8.84.1 sua sponte to make clear that section 190.3, factor (b) (criminal activity involving force or violence), and factor (c) (prior felony convictions), applied only to other crimes and not the crimes for which he was convicted in the present proceeding. We have previously rejected this identical argument. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 105-106; see People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 763-764 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) Although defendant correctly observes that factors (b) and (c) pertain only to criminal activity other than the crimes for which he was convicted in the instant proceeding, [o]n this record ... there is absolutely no indication that the jury would have understood that the guilt phase crimes came within [factor] (b) or (c). ( Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 106.) Here, as in Miranda, [n]either the judge nor the prosecutor suggested to the jury that the guilt phase crimes were to be considered as aggravating factors under [factor] (b) or (c). The judge simply instructed the jury on the mitigating and aggravating factors in the language of section 190.3. (44 Cal.3d at p. 106.) In his closing argument, the prosecutor went down the list of statutory factors, discussing under factor ( a ) [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true. In discussing factors (b) and (c), he noted that no uncharged criminal activity involving force or violence had been presented under the former factor, and he listed the three prior felony convictions which had been admitted under factor (c). Thus, the jury was not misled into believing it could double count the instant crimes under factors (a), (b), and (c).