Opinion ID: 1918224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Police Broadcast

Text: Gomes asserts here on appeal that the description given of the suspected murderer by Tavell Yon to Officer Thomas Calabro and then broadcast by Calabro via police radio to other officers in the immediate area of the murder scene constituted rank hearsay and should not have been admitted into evidence at his trial, and that its admission constituted prejudicial error. It is axiomatic that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay unless it is offered for the truth of the matter asserted. State v. Johnson, 667 A.2d 523, 530 (R.I.1995) (citing State v. Brash, 512 A.2d 1375, 1379 (R.I.1986)). Statements not offered to prove the truth of what they assert are not hearsay and as such do not require the assistance of an exception to the hearsay rule in order to be00485B admissible. In re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625, 629 (R.I.1989) (citing Gordon v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 496 A.2d 132, 136 (R.I.1985)). In the present case, [t]he entire purpose of [Officer Deschamps's] testimony was to show why he apprehended [the defendant]. It was not objectionable hearsay because the radio message was not offered to prove [the defendant's] guilt. State v. Palmigiano, 112 R.I. 348, 359, 309 A.2d 855, 862 (1973). See also State v. Mastracchio, 112 R.I. 487, 498, 312 A.2d 190, 197 (1973). It is well settled that reliable hearsay may be used in order to establish probable cause for the purpose either of an arrest or issuance of a warrant. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed.2d 684 (1965); Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825, 11 L. Ed.2d 887 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). Rule 801 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as being a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Gomes apparently neglects to note that Rule 801(d)(1) provides that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay if: [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is    (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the declarant. In this case, the declarant was Tavell Yon. At the murder scene, Tavell Yon gave the description of the suspected murderer to Officer Calabro within minutes of the shooting. He later testified under oath at the defendant's trial. He was subjected to cross-examination concerning his00485B identification and description of the person who had lured his friend, Robert Wray, out of the apartment to be shot and killed, and confirmed the accuracy of the description that was broadcast by Officer Calabro. Thus, the pertinent inquiry for this Court to undertake is not, as Gomes contends, that the police radio description broadcast was inadmissible hearsay, but instead, whether it was sufficiently reliable when relayed by Officer Calabro to Officers Deschamps and Matracia to constitute the probable cause necessary to permit the officers later to detain, arrest and search Gomes in Olneyville Square minutes after the murder of Robert Wray. That was the purpose for the testimony concerning the radio broadcast of the murder suspect's description and not whether the murderer was, in fact, Gomes. Thus, Gomes's rank hearsay allegation of error is without merit.