Opinion ID: 418106
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Striking of Plaintiffs' Acceptance of Defendants' Offer of Judgment

Text: 18 In July 1980, eight months after the consent decree became effective and more than a month before the fee hearing, the defendants submitted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 a formal offer to allow judgment to be taken against [them] in this action in the amount of $75,000 for attorney's fees, expenses and costs. Plaintiffs purported to accept the offer, but stated that the acceptance only settled the fees and expenses for work done prior to January 15, 1980, the day they filed their outstanding motion for fees and expenses incurred through January 14. In other words, plaintiffs' acceptance did not cover their claim for fees incurred while litigating the fees issue or any fees incurred in the future to enforce the consent decree. Defendants immediately filed a motion to strike the acceptance, which the district court granted, directing the clerk not to accept a judgment inconsistent with the offer. Plaintiffs did not file a second, broader acceptance, and the offer expired pursuant to Rule 68. 19 This issue turns on defendants' intent in making the offer. Under elementary principles of contract law, an offeree cannot accept a different offer from that made by the offeror. There must be a meeting of the minds. See Cruz v. Pacific American Insurance Co., 337 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir.1964); Greenwood v. Stevenson, 88 F.R.D. 225, 230 (D.R.I.1980). 20 On appeal, plaintiffs assert error in the striking of their acceptance of the offer. The district court's determination that the acceptance and offer were inconsistent is not clearly erroneous. The offer nowhere indicated that it encompassed only costs and fees incurred prior to the January 15 motion. To the contrary, the language seems all encompassing.