Opinion ID: 1641838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of Deardorff's prior bad acts?

Text: Deardorff specifically challenged certain testimony that he asserts constitutes the improper admission of evidence of prior bad acts: testimony that Deardorff had killed several people before Turner's murder, that he had illegally possessed a handgun, and that he had been incarcerated in the penitentiary before Turner's murder. Because no objection was made to this testimony at trial, Deardorff has petitioned this Court for plain-error review of this issue, under Rule 39(a)(2)(A), Ala. R.App. P. As this Court stated in Hall v. State, 820 So.2d 113, 121-22 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999), aff'd, 820 So.2d 152 (Ala.2001), regarding our standard of review when conducting a plain-error analysis: `The standard of review in reviewing a claim under the plain-error doctrine is stricter than the standard used in reviewing an issue that was properly raised in the trial court or on appeal. As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the plain-error doctrine applies only if the error is particularly egregious and if it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Ex parte Price, 725 So.2d 1063 (Ala.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1809, 143 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1999); Burgess v. State, 723 So.2d 742 (Ala.Cr. App.1997), aff'd, 723 So.2d 770 (Ala. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S.Ct. 1360, 143 L.Ed.2d 521 (1999); Johnson v. State, 620 So.2d 679, 701 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), rev'd on other grounds, 620 So.2d 709 (Ala.1993), on remand, 620 So.2d 714 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 905, 114 S.Ct. 285, 126 L.Ed.2d 235 (1993).' Irvin v. State, 940 So.2d 331, 341 (Ala. Crim.App.2005). As to the testimony that Deardorff had previously killed several other people, we note that defense counsel, during the cross-examination of Walter Fambro, a convict in whom Deardorff had confided while they were both incarcerated, admitted into evidence a letter from Fambro to federal authorities detailing conversations Fambro alleged he had had with both Peacock and Deardorff about Turner's murder. On redirect examination, the prosecutor questioned Fambro concerning that letter. When asked to read a page of the letter, Fambro stated that Deardorff had mentioned to him that he had committed other murders. The now complained-of testimony by Fambro was based entirely on the letter admitted into evidence as a defense exhibit. State's brief at 30. Likewise, as to the testimony that Deardorff had previously been incarcerated in a penitentiary, Alabama Bureau of Investigation Agent Andrew Huggins read from a report that had been admitted into evidence by the defense for impeachment purposes; the report stated that Deardorff told police when he was arrested for Turner's murder that he was on probation for another offense. Deardorff now complains that this testimony was admitted in error, when this information was in fact placed in evidence by defense counsel. The scope of cross-examination in Alabama is quite broad. Rule 611(b), Ala. R. Evid. This means that any question may be asked on cross-examination that is relevant either to any substantive issue in the case or to the witness's credibility. See Rule 611(b), Ala. R. Evid., Advisory Committee's Notes. The trial court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence. Rule 611(a), Ala R. Evid. Deardorff challenges both the testimony that he had previously killed several people and that he had previously been incarcerated and he asserts that such testimony constitutes the improper admission of evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid. The testimony, however, was not offered to introduce Deardorff's prior bad acts and to show that he acted in conformity with those prior bad acts, but was elicited on redirect examination by the State regarding documents that had already been offered into evidence by the defense on cross-examination. [O]n redirect examination, the object is to answer any matters brought out on the cross-examination of the witness by his adversary. Whether, on redirect examination, a calling party may elicit from a witness matters which do not rebut that which was brought out on cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial court. Charles Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 439.01(1) (5th ed.1996) (footnote omitted). See Sistrunk v. State, 596 So.2d 644, 647 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). It does not seem consonant with sound principles of judicial administration to allow a party to introduce evidence and assert on appeal that the trial court erred to reversal by admitting that evidence. In 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1040(1) (1964) the appropriate rule is stated: `[A] party who has introduced certain evidence cannot subsequently object that ... it should not be given such consideration as its natural probative value entitled it to, or that it is insufficient to sustain a judgment based thereon.' (Footnotes omitted.) Peterson v. Jefferson County, 372 So.2d 839, 842 (Ala.1979). `Under the doctrine of invited error, a defendant cannot by his own voluntary conduct invite error and then seek to profit thereby.' Phillips v. State, 527 So.2d 154, 156 (Ala.1988). Although evidence that he had been convicted of a prior crime would not ordinarily have been admissible at trial, the appellant cannot claim that it was error to receive testimony concerning his arrest for a parole violation when he injected the issue into the trial. Franklin v. State, 644 So.2d 35, 38 (Ala. Crim.App.1994). As to the testimony that Deardorff was in illegal possession of a gun, testimony was elicited that Deardorff had told Peacock that his grandmother's house had been broken into and that the gun was reported stolen. However, the testimony indicated that Deardorff later found the gun but did not tell anyone it had been recovered; instead, he kept it. Deardorff was questioned as a suspect in Turner's disappearance on October 1, 1999, when the car in which he was riding was stopped by the police. A gun was found during a search of the car, along with the proceeds from the checks Deardorff had forced Turner to write. In a tape-recorded interview, Deardorff admitted that he had lied about having the gun because he was afraid of going back to the penitentiary. Deardorff was arrested on a charge of possessing a firearm without a permit; the offense he expressed concern about was possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. `[T]he State is not permitted to give in evidence other crimes alleged to have been committed by the defendant unless they are so connected by circumstances with the particular crime charged as that proof of one fact with its circumstances has some bearing on the issue on trial other than to show in the defendant a tendency or disposition to commit the crime with which he is charged.' Ex parte Casey, 889 So.2d 615, 618 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Garner v. State, 269 Ala. 531, 533, 114 So.2d 385, 386 (1959) (emphasis omitted)). Deardorff challenges the admission of this testimony  two concerning prior bad acts and one concerning the source of a gun in Deardorff's possession, also involving a prior bad act. The first two were derived from evidence admitted by Deardorff, and, under the doctrine of invited error, he may not challenge evidence he has presented to the court. The testimony regarding his retention of a gun after it was reported stolen from his grandmother's house was related to one of the offenses actually charged in the indictment, receiving stolen property, in that it was intended to establish the source of the gun in his possession. His challenge on appeal to the evidence has no merit, and there was no error in admitting the testimony at trial.