Opinion ID: 3061892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Miller’s Motion to Suppress the Money and Gun

Text: The district court did not clearly err in finding that Miller did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the rental house.1 To prove his unconstitutional-search claim, Miller “must establish both a subjective and an 1 We review a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress under a mixed standard of review: we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and the district court’s application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Ramirez, 476 F3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2007). We construe all facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in this case the government. Id. at 1236. Whether a claimant has a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the search is a question of fact that we review for clear error. United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d 1570, 1573 (11th Cir. 1988). 2 objective expectation of privacy.” See United States v. Segura-Baltazar, 448 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006). Thus, Miller has the burden of demonstrating “an actual expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). Further, because Miller was neither the owner nor the lessee of the rental home, he must “demonstrate a significant and current interest” in the property at the time it was searched. See United States v. Garcia, 741 F.2d 363, 366 (11th Cir. 1984). The district court did not clearly err in finding that Miller has failed to carry his burden in this case. Miller did not have a possessory interest in the rental home because he was never a tenant. A couple named Julian and Denise signed the lease to the rental home in November 2006 and Denise paid the first and last months’ rent. The lease for the rental home was a month-to-month lease with an understanding that Bassano, the property manager, would give the occupants between two and three weeks to clear out their belongings if the lease concluded as a result of non-payment. Although Miller did pay rent to Bassano for one month, testimony shows that he did so on behalf of Julian and Denise, not for himself. Moreover, the total rent payments—three months’ worth—covered only November, December, and January; no rent was paid in February or March and Bassano was not informed that a rent payment was forthcoming. Because Miller 3 knew that Bassano would give him at most three weeks to move his belongings out of the house prior to terminating the lease, Miller could not have had an actual expectation of privacy in the rental home when the gun and money were found in March 2007. By that point, rent had been overdue for at least five weeks. Further, Miller was seen at the property only three times, and Miller could not even identify photos of the home at the suppression hearing. Considering all of this evidence, the district court did not clearly err when it found that Miller lacked a subjective expectation of privacy in the rental home at the time of the March 2007 search. See United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1147–48 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding the defendant lacked a subjective expectation of privacy in an apartment because he had failed to show that “he was the tenant or had an unrestricted right of occupancy or control in the apartment at the time of the search”). II. Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Miller’s § 924(c) Conviction The Government’s evidence was sufficient to prove that venue was proper in the Northern District of Georgia for the § 924(c)(1) gun-possession offense (Count 3).2 The Supreme Court has held, “[W]here a crime consists of distinct parts which have different localities the whole may be tried where any part can be 2 We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence and making all reasonable inferences in favor of the government. United States v. Gari, 572 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1562 (2010). 4 proved to have been done.” United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 281 (1999). Thus, “[w]here venue is appropriate for the underlying crime of violence, so too it is for the § 924(c)(1) offense.” Id. at 282. In this case, Tiquila Turner testified at trial that, as part of the ongoing drugtrafficking conspiracy to import drugs into the United States, she had made connecting flights in Atlanta with cocaine stored inside her body. This testimony establishes that a portion of the drug-trafficking conspiracy took place in the Northern District of Georgia. Turner then testified that while in Florida, Miller had used a firearm to intimidate her into keeping quiet if she was ever caught with drugs. Thus, because the government presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that part of the underlying crime took part in Atlanta, the Northern District of Georgia was a proper venue to charge the § 924(c)(1) offense, even though the gun possession itself occurred in Florida. See Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 282 (holding that venue was proper in New Jersey even though the gun was used in Maryland, when a portion of the underlying offense occurred in New Jersey).