Opinion ID: 2010247
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statute of Limitations as to the Maine Purchases

Text: [¶ 10] Because the purchases of three thermostats were made in Maine by a Maine resident, there is no dispute that Maine law, including Maine's statute of limitations, applies to those purchases. The limitations period in Maine for both of McKinnon's causes of actionthe antitrust claim and the UTPA claimis six years: [a]ll civil actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues. 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2008). [¶ 11] McKinnon's compliance with Maine's six-year statute of limitations therefore depends on when his cause of action accrued. In analyzing accrual, we look to both state and federal antitrust law for guidance in the interpretation of the Maine antitrust statute, including the accrual of an antitrust claim. See 5 M.R.S. § 207(1) (It is the intent of the Legislature that in construing this section the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to Section 45(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act ....); see also Tungate v. MacLean-Stevens Studios, Inc., 1998 ME 162, ¶ 9, 714 A.2d 792, 797. We have defined the time of accrual as the time the plaintiff sustains a judicially cognizable injury. Chiapetta v. Clark Assocs., 521 A.2d 697, 699 (Me.1987). Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated: Accrual of a private antitrust cause of action for purposes of the statute of limitations occurs when defendants commit an act that causes economic harm to a plaintiff. Even when defendants continue to perform overt acts of furtherance of an antitrust conspiracy within the statutory period, plaintiffs' injuries also must fall within the limitations period in order not to be time-barred. Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 218 (4th Cir.1987) (citation omitted). [¶ 12] In accordance with this standard, the injury McKinnon purports to have sustained as to the three Maine purchases occurred in 1986, when McKinnon alleges that he overpaid for the three circular thermostats. Thus, pursuant to the plain language of 14 M.R.S. § 752, the six-year limitations period on McKinnon's claim commenced in 1986 and expired in 1992. McKinnon did not file his complaint until 2004, however, eighteen years after his purchases and twelve years beyond the expiration of Maine's statute of limitations. [¶ 13] McKinnon does not dispute these dates, but contends that Maine's six-year statute of limitations is tolled pursuant to one or both of two exceptions to the expiration of the limitations period: the continuing violations doctrine and the fraudulent concealment exception. [¶ 14] The United States Supreme Court has applied the continuing violations doctrine in the context of federal antitrust law, i.e., the Clayton Act, as follows: Antitrust law provides that, in the case of a continuing violation, say a price fixing conspiracy that brings about a series of unlawfully high priced sales over a period of years, each overt act that is part of the violation and that injures the plaintiff, e.g., each sale to the plaintiff, starts the statutory period running again, regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge of the alleged illegality at much earlier times. Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189, 117 S.Ct. 1984, 138 L.Ed.2d 373 (1997) (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Although we have discussed the possible applicability of the doctrine in the context of employment discrimination cases, see LePage v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2006 ME 130, ¶¶ 10-16, 909 A.2d 629, 633-35, we have never adopted the continuing violations doctrine as a means of tolling the statute of limitations, cf. Batchelder v. Realty Resources Hospitality, LLC, 2007 ME 17, ¶¶ 12-25, 914 A.2d 1116, 1121-25 (applying Maine's procedural requirements to claims filed pursuant to a state statute modeled after a federal statute). We decline to adopt the continuing violations doctrine in this case arising from a 1986 occurrence, and in which the statute of limitations period expired in 1992, nine years prior to McKinnon's subsequent purchase of a thermostat in New Hampshire. The New Hampshire purchase did not revive the cause of action based on the 1986 purchases in Maine pursuant to the continuing violations doctrine. [¶ 15] Regardless of when his cause of action initially accrued, McKinnon contends alternatively that the statutory limitations period should be tolled pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 859 (2008) because this action is based on fraud through Honeywell's fraudulent concealment of facts. Section 859 provides: If a person, liable to any action mentioned, fraudulently conceals the cause thereof from the person entitled thereto, or if a fraud is committed which entitles any person to an action, the action may be commenced at any time within 6 years after the person entitled thereto discovers that he has just cause of action, except as provided in section 3580.[ [4] ] 14 M.R.S. § 859. McKinnon does not argue on appeal that Honeywell's antitrust actions were fraudulent per se. Thus, in order for McKinnon to claim the benefit of section 859 based on fraudulent concealment, he must establish either: (1) that Honeywell actively concealed material facts from him and that he relied on Honeywell's acts and statements to his detriment; or (2) that a special relationship existed between the parties that imposed a duty to disclose the cause of action, and the failure of defendants to honor that duty. Brawn v. Oral Surgery Assocs., 2003 ME 11, ¶ 22, 819 A.2d 1014, 1026 (quotations marks omitted). [¶ 16] The Superior Court correctly determined that McKinnon has failed to present sufficient facts to prove fraudulent concealment, particularly given that many of the facts relevant to fraudulent concealment have always been publicly available in the documents filed by Honeywell with the Patent and Trademark Office in 1968 and 1986. [5] See 37 C.F.R. § 2.27(d) (2006). McKinnon has not demonstrated that Honeywell has concealed a cause of action from McKinnon within the meaning of 14 M.R.S. § 859. We are also not convinced, contrary to McKinnon's contention, that the doctrine of a self-concealing fraud, even if it were adopted in Maine, is adequately established in the record.