Opinion ID: 455846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer of the Day Program

Text: 31 The Officer of the Day Program, which was developed by Mr. Caldwell and another party, was initiated in April or May of 1978 for the purpose of providing Mr. Caldwell and his staff with a person to answer the phone after hours, thus providing Mr. Caldwell and other senior executives with an opportunity to leave work at a normal time. Apparently, the program was viewed as a means for individual executives to demonstrate their ability to handle the agency's various problems. However, program participants were not afforded special consideration for assignments or promotions merely because of their participation. 32 The initial program proposal included all of the section chiefs and other persons who were GS-14 and above. The plaintiff's name was not on the initial proposal. The district court found that the individuals listed on the proposal were volunteers. There was also testimony that at least one white employee, who was a grade GS-13, volunteered and thus was allowed to participate in the program. The plaintiff testified that he did not participate in the program because he was not permitted to serve. However, Mr. Caldwell testified that the plaintiff never volunteered. The Officer of the Day Program was discontinued after approximately six to eight weeks of operation because it did not accomplish its objectives. 33 In this appeal the plaintiff argues that the CSC discriminated against him by failing to extend to him the same terms and conditions of employment as those extended to whites in comparable positions. According to the plaintiff his exclusion from the program constituted impermissible race discrimination. The defendants contend that the court did not err when it ruled that the plaintiff did not prove that the failure to include him in the Officer of the Day Program was based on discriminatory intent. 34 Because the district court found that the plaintiff established a prima facie case, the defendants' burden was to produce evidence that [their] action was not motivated by discriminatory intent. See Baylor v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 733 F.2d 1527, 1532 (11th Cir.1984). The defendants carried their burden when they presented evidence that the program was voluntary and that all of the program participants were volunteers and were not specifically requested by an official to participate. 35 The plaintiff failed to meet his ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendants intentionally discriminated against him. The plaintiff simply did not show that a discriminatory reason motivated the defendants or that the defendants' proffered explanations were unworthy of credence. Because we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, we cannot hold that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the district court on this issue.