Opinion ID: 1297188
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Circumstantial Evidence and Intent to Kill

Text: Regarding circumstantial evidence, which was relevant to the question of intent to kill, the court instructed: [Y]ou cannot find a defendant guilty of any charge against him based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the crime but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion. Each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish a defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, if the circumstantial evidence as to any count is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant's guilt and the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt that which points to his innocence and reject that which points to his guilt. If, on the other hand, one interpretation of such evidence appears to you to be reasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it is your duty to accept the reasonable interpretation and to reject the unreasonable. The court gave similar instructions regarding proof of the special circumstance. (21) Defendant challenges the word appears in the final paragraph of the language quoted above, which is found in several standard instructions. (See CALJIC Nos. 2.01, Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence  Generally; 2.02, Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Specific Intent or Mental State; 8.83, Special Circumstances  Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence  Generally; 8.83.1, Special Circumstances  Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Required Mental State.) We have already rejected a similar challenge. ( People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 386 [279 Cal. Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009].) The plain meaning of these instructions merely informs the jury to reject unreasonable interpretations of the evidence and to give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt. No reasonable juror would have interpreted these instructions to permit a criminal conviction where the evidence shows defendant was `apparently' guilty, yet not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Ibid.; see also People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 942-943 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212].) Defendant also complains that, immediately following the first paragraph quoted above, the court did not give the following sentence found in CALJIC No. 2.01: In other words, before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance upon which such inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (See also comparable language in CALJIC No. 8.83, which the court also did not give.) In this case, circumstantial evidence was not significant to the question of identity. That was shown by multiple eyewitness identifications and evidence that defendant admitted his involvement to Horton. Regarding the mental state of intent to kill, the titles, text and use notes of the instructions all indicate that CALJIC Nos. 2.02 and 8.83.1, not 2.01 and 8.83, are the correct instructions. The correct instructions do not include the omitted sentence. In fact, the court added this sentence from CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 8.83 that is not in CALJIC Nos. 2.02 and 8.83.1: [E]ach fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish a defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether that sentence is appropriate to questions of mental state is problematic, but defendant cannot complain of any error in that regard, as it tended to increase the prosecution's burden. We find no error prejudicial to defendant. (22) Defendant also argues that in instructing the jury on the elements of the special circumstance, the court erroneously did not give CALJIC No. 3.31, which tells the jury there must be a concurrence of the act and specific intent. Failure to give the instruction, defendant argues, removed the element that defendant must have intended to kill at the time of the act, i.e., at the time he shot Koger. The jury, however, was told that for the special circumstance to be true, defendant must have intended that a human being, to wit, Donald Koger, be killed. The court also discussed with the jury the question of how it should determine the mental state with which an act is done.... There is no reasonable likelihood the jury would interpret these instructions as allowing it to find the special circumstance true if it believed defendant intended to kill Koger at some time, but not at the time he actually killed him. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 525.) Nor is there any evidence whatsoever upon which the jury could base such a finding. Under the evidence, no reasonable jury could possibly find that defendant did not intend to kill Koger at the time he shot him, but did intend to kill him either some time before or after the shooting. There was no error.