Opinion ID: 2191635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Violation of Section 207 of the Mental Health Procedures Act

Text: This section provides A person who is in voluntary treatment may not be transferred from one facility to another without his written consent. 50 P.S. § 7207 (supp. 1979-80). The section is silent with regards to the situation where transfer is required due to the closing of a particular facility, and its application to such a situation is, therefore, a matter to be resolved by statutory interpretation. Since almost all of Retreat's residents are voluntarily committed patients, appellees interpret section 207 as prohibiting the closing of Retreat as, they argue, closing would necessitate transfers without the consent of the patients in derogation of that section. Such an interpretation ignores the purpose of the Act and the intent of the General Assembly, and leads to an unreasonable and unwarranted result. We are guided by several salient provisions of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501-1991 (supp. pamphlet 1979-80). First, the object of all statutory interpretation and construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly, giving effect, if possible, to all provisions of a statute. Section 1921(a). Section 1921(b) further provides that [w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. (emphasis added). Applied to pending transfers of voluntarily committed patients from a facility in the process of closing, section 207 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (the Act) is certainly not clear and free from all ambiguity. Thus, we must go beyond section 207 to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Some of the relevant considerations are the occasion and necessity for the statute, the circumstances under which it was enacted, the object to be obtained and the consequences of a particular interpretation. Section 1921(c). Further, section 1922 of the Statutory Construction Act establishes certain presumptions in ascertaining legislative intent, as follows: In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute the following presumptions, among others, may be used: (1) That the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable. (2) That the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. ..... (5) That the General Assembly intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest. (emphasis added). Applying these principles of statutory construction, and a little common sense, it is apparent the legislature did not intend section 207 of the Act to be used as a bar to the closing of a particular institution. It is the appellants-not the patients-who are statutorily charged with the responsibilities and duties of maintaining the state-wide system of mental health facilities and programs and of assur[ing] the availability of adequate treatment to persons who are mentally ill. Section 102 of the Act, 50 P.S. § 7102. Appellees' interpretation of section 207 would lead to the unreasonable result that a few patients could, by withholding their consent to transfer, prevent the closing of a particular facility which had been deemed unsafe, uneconomical and unnecessary by those who are charged with the responsibility to make such decisions, and are in fact, in a better position to evaluate and analyze the needs of the entire mental health system. Section 104, 50 P.S. § 7104 of the Act requires that adequate treatment shall be provided to all persons in treatment who are subject to the Act, and provides that adequate inpatient treatment shall include such accommodations, diet, heat, light, sanitary facilities, clothing, recreation, education and medical care as are necessary to maintain decent, safe and healthful living conditions.  (emphasis added). DPW must assure the availability and equitable provision of adequate mental health and mental retardation services for all persons within the state who need them. Section 201(1) of the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 50 P.S. § 4201 (1969). [3] To assure the availability and equitable provision of adequate service, DPW must (4) . . . adopt State-wide plans for the operation of all State operated facilities under the jurisdiction of the department and to assign to each facility or portion thereof, such duties for the care of the mentally disabled, as the secretary shall prescribed. The assignments herein referred to shall be made with due regard to geographical location and population distribution [and must] (5) . . . establish and maintain working relationships with other governmental bodies and public and private agencies, institutions and organizations so as to assure maximum utilization of services and facilities which each such governmental body and public and private agency, institution and organization may have, which may be of benefit to the mentally disabled. Section 201(4), 201(5), id., 50 P.S. §§ 4201(4), 4201(5). (emphasis added). Appellees' interpretation of section 207 is fundamentally at odds with this entire procedure and framework set up by the legislature. Certainly, section 207 requires that the residents of Retreat (all but one of whom are voluntary commitments) give their consent to transfer to a receiving state facility if they wish to continue to receive treatment. [4] If the resident (or his guardian) chooses to withhold consent, he is free to seek alternative treatment elsewhere; however, he may not, by withholding that consent, prohibit appellants from implementing their plans to close Retreat. An almost identical issue was presented to the Commonwealth Court in Hoolick v. Retreat State Hospital, 24 Pa. Cmwlth. 218, 354 A.2d 609 (1976), petition for allowance of appeal denied 476 Pa. 317, 382 A.2d 739 (1978), wherein a patient sought to enjoin the Commonwealth from closing the Retreat facility. That case was decided before the Mental Health Procedures Act was adopted and, thus, appellees there lacked the ammunition of section 207 of that Act. We feel, however, that the principles enunciated in Hoolick are as viable now as then, for, as we have noted, section 207 is not the bar that appellees wish it to be. The Commonwealth Court stated in Hoolick : Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, we can find no duty placed upon the State by this legislation [the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966] that Retreat or any particular mental health facility must remain open and functional for any specific or indefinite future period of time. ..... The manifest object of the General Assembly in enacting the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 was to create a cooperative State-county (or multi-county) program across the Commonwealth for those who suffer mental health or mental retardation afflictions. Its implementation and need for flexibility to meet improved or new methods and means of treatment would be seriously impaired if not totally frustrated if Retreat or another particular State mental health facility were to enjoy such a monolithic status. To retard or restrict State action in the operation of such a program, a clear specific legislative intent that a particular mental health facility shall remain functional would be required. The Act contains no such provisions. Id. at 354 A.2d 611, 612. (emphasis added). From the above, it is clear the preliminary injunction cannot be sustained on the ground that the proposed transfer violates section 207 of the Act.