Opinion ID: 1748866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Six Domain Names

Text: Counsel purportedly appeared directly on behalf of six domain names and participated in the writ action at the Court of Appeals. The advocacy on behalf of five of these domain names was consolidated into one representation. These five domain namesplayersonly.com, sportsbook.com, sportsinteraction.com, mysportsbook.com, and linesmaker.comhave been referred to as the group of five. The sixth, vicsbingo.com, joined in the appeal through separate counsel, together with the Interactive Gaming Council, one of the gaming associations. Counsel for these six domain names have consistently claimed the names are some of the intangible property seized by the trial court and that the names are appearing to protect their own interests in themselves. Put simply, counsel purports to represent property that is protecting itself. Although unaddressed in the Court of Appeals opinion below, the Commonwealth has apparently challenged the standing of these individual domain names at every stage of the proceedings. It has insisted that the property seized cannot defend itself, but can only be defended by those having an interest in the propertynamely owners and registrants of domain names. Since no owners or registrants have ever claimed to be participating in this case at any level, the Commonwealth requests that this Court vacate the writ and restore the seizure of the domain names. The domain names' assertion of standing hinges on the origination of this controversy as an in rem proceeding. They claim that since the Commonwealth named the domain names as the in rem defendants, the names must have an opportunity to represent themselves. The domain names' argument confuses the nature of in rem litigation. It has long been recognized in Kentucky, as well as elsewhere, that in in rem litigation, only those with an interest in the property, such as current owners, have an interest in the litigation. See Taylor v. City of La Grange, 262 Ky. 383, 90 S.W.2d 357 (1936); City of Middlesborough v. Coal & Iron Bank, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 469, 110 S.W. 355, 356 (1908); United States v. One 1965 Cessna 320C Twin Engine Airplane, 715 F.Supp. 808, 810 (E.D.Ky.1989). The property does not have an interest in itself and, therefore, does not have any interest in the litigation. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 831 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir.1987) ([O]wners are persons, not pieces of real property; [a] piece of real property has no standing to contest its forfeiture.). An internet domain name does not have an interest in itself any more than a piece of land is interested in its own use. Just as with real property, a domain name cannot own itself; it must be owned by a person or legally recognized entity. Nor does the property itself care whether it is owned and operated by private business or seized by state government. When faced with a similar claim, the Fifth Circuit found the concept of property having in rem standing to be so far-fetched as to be not arguable on its merit s and frivolous, id., that it issued sanctions against the attorneys purporting to represent such property. See id. at 568-69. This Court agrees that the contention that mere property can represent itself is frivolous. The fundamental standing requirement of an interest in the property does not dissipate in a writ case. A writ of prohibition, just like any other judicial remedy, may only be sought by a party with a judicially recognizable interest. Schroering v. McKinney, 906 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Ky.1995). The writ granted below serves only the interests of the owners and registrants of the domain names. It does not benefit the domains themselves; they are the interest at question in this case and belong to still unnamed owners and registrants. The group of five mistakenly suggests unfairness in the Commonwealth proceeding in rem against property without giving the property a right to defend. Property possesses no such right. Kentucky's judicial system exists to protect the interests of personsboth individuals and groups not property. Property does not have constitutional or statutory rights. Nor does it have a right of access to the judicial system. Nor does it have a judicially recognizable interest in this writ. Counsel for vicsbingo.com, meanwhile, misinterprets the unorthodox styling of in rem case names to mean that the usual standing requirements do not apply. It cites Three One-Ball Pinball Machines v. Commonwealth, 249 S.W.2d 144 (Ky.1952), as an example of property contesting its own seizure under Kentucky's old gambling laws. To be sure, that case name is styled so that the pinball machines themselves are listed as a party (in that case, the appellant), as is routine for civil forfeiture proceedings. This is because in rem case captions have historically referenced the property subject to forfeiture and not the interested parties. Commonwealth v. Maynard, 294 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Ky.App. 2009). But as Justice Combs pointed out in the second sentence of Three One-Ball Pinball Machines, [t]he style of the case is a misnomer. Although the machines are designated as the appellants in the case, it is their owners who argue against the seizure. 249 S.W.2d. at 145 (emphasis added); see also 14 Console Type Slot Machines v. Commonwealth, 273 S.W.2d 582, 582 (Ky.1954) (On this appeal by the slot machines (through their owner), the main contention is that ....) (emphasis added). Likewise, in the situation at hand, the style of the case title does not change the fact that only those with an interest in the property have standing. The writ may be styled as being sought in the name of the domains, but the parties arguing on their behalf must be ones with standing, such as owners. The domain names are not their own owners or registrants, nor do they claim to be. Thus, they lacked standing to pursue the writ.