Opinion ID: 456182
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Requirements of the YCA

Text: 12 Preliminarily, we note that the YCA was repealed in October 1984 by Pub.L. No. 98-473, Sec. 218(a)(8), 98 Stat. 1837, 2027, and was not in effect at the time Bonnet was sentenced. The government does not urge that we reject Bonnet's YCA argument on this ground, noting that some courts have ruled that the repeal of the YCA is an ex post facto law to the extent that it precludes a court from considering the YCA in sentencing a youth offender who committed an offense prior to the repeal of the Act. United States v. Countryman, 758 F.2d 574, 579 n. 2 (11th Cir.1985); accord United States v. Romero, 596 F.Supp. 446, 448-49 (D.N.M.1984). We need not reach this question since we conclude that the district court gave the sentencing of Bonnet the consideration required by the YCA. 13 As we have recently discussed, the YCA was  'designed to provide a better method for treating young offenders convicted in federal courts in that vulnerable [16 to 22] age bracket, to rehabilitate them and restore normal behavior patterns.'  United States v. Fernandez, 748 F.2d 71, 73 (2d Cir.1984) (quoting Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3048, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974)). The YCA was a preferred sentencing alternative for treatment that was to be used in sentencing a youth unless the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under [the YCA]. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5010(d). In Dorszynski, the Supreme Court ruled that although the district court was required by the statute to make a clear no benefit finding, this did not require the use of talismanic phrases: 14 Literal compliance with the Act can be satisfied by any expression that makes clear the sentencing judge considered the alternative of sentencing under the Act and decided that the youth offender would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act. 15 418 U.S. at 444, 94 S.Ct. at 3053. In Fernandez, we remanded for resentencing because the reasons given by the district court for denying YCA treatment did not even suggest, much less make clear, that the defendant would not benefit from treatment under the Act. 16 The present case is quite distinguishable from Fernandez. Although the district court here did not use the phrase no benefit, it is clear that it focused on the circumstances and pattern of behavior of Bonnet, on the scope of his activities, and on his character as revealed by this record. The court noted that Bonnet was not the usual type of first offender, that he was running a complete operation, that it was an ongoing enterprise and not a few isolated incidents, and that Bonnet had displayed the mind of a criminal. These comments reveal that the court had concluded that Bonnet was more a hardened criminal than an impressionable young man who would be restored to normal behavior patterns through less punitive treatment. We conclude that the court found with the requisite clarity that YCA treatment would not benefit Bonnet.