Opinion ID: 796853
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ownership of the Renewal Copyrights in Miller's Songs

Text: 31
32 The renewal term of a copy-righted work is distinct from the original copyright term and can therefore be transferred independently of the original copyright. P.C. Films Corp. v. MGM/UA Home Video, Inc., 138 F.3d 453, 456-57 (2d Cir.1998) (stating that the renewal period is not merely an extension of the original copyright term but a `new estate . . . clear of all rights, interests or licenses granted under the original copyright') (quoting G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951)). There is a strong presumption against the conveyance of renewal-copyright interests simultaneous with the conveyance of the original-copyright interest. Corcovado Music Corp. v. Hollis Music, 981 F.2d 679, 684 (2d Cir.1993) (explaining that the presumption against conveyance of renewal rights serves the congressional purpose of protecting authors' entitlement to receive new rights in the 28th year of the original term). Therefore, a valid transfer or assignment of a renewal-copyright interest must expressly grant rights in the renewal copyright. Id.; see also 3-9 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 9.06[a][1] (2006) (noting that courts are reluctant to infer a transfer of the renewal expectancy absent express language). An assignment by an author that merely references his copyright in general terms, without mentioning the renewal rights, does not include a conveyance of the author's renewal interests. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 653, 63 S.Ct. 773, 87 L.Ed. 1055 (1943). 33 Nevertheless, [s]o long as the parties' intent is clear, a transfer of copyright need not include any particular language. Gilleland v. Schanhals, 55 Fed. Appx. 257, 260 (6th Cir.2003) (unpublished opinion) (citing Radio Television Espanola S.A. v. New World Entm't, Ltd., 183 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir.1999) (No magic words must be included in a document to satisfy § 204(a) of the Copyright Act.)). General words of assignment, such as forever, perpetual, and hereafter, can be sufficient to transfer renewal rights if a court concludes that a transfer comports with the parties' intent. P.C. Films Corp., 138 F.3d at 457; Siegel v. Nat'l Periodical Publ'n, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that general words of assignment can include renewal rights if the parties had so intended). 34 An author of a copyrighted work can assign the right to the renewal copyright before the renewal period commences: An assignment by an author of his renewal rights made before the original copyright expires is valid against the world, if the author is alive at the commencement of the renewal period. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375, 80 S.Ct. 792, 4 L.Ed.2d 804 (1960). An author, therefore, has the freedom to assign both his original and renewal-copyright interests at the same time, even if the renewal-copyright interest has not yet vested. Broad. Music, Inc., 396 F.3d at 768-69. If the author assigns his renewal copyrights and the renewal copyright term begins during the author's lifetime, the author is bound by the assignment. Id. at 768. If, however, the author dies before vesting of the renewal copyright, the party to whom the renewal-copyright interest was conveyed loses the entitlement to that interest. Id.; Miller Music Corp., 362 U.S. at 378, 80 S.Ct. 792 (explaining that assignees of renewal rights take the risk that the rights acquired may never vest in their assignors). 35 When interpreting the various publishing agreements between Miller and Sony, the district court properly relied on Tennessee law. See Yount v. Acuff Rose-Opryland, 103 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir.1996) (explaining that state contract law determines the rights and obligations arising under a publishing contract that assigns a copyright). Under Tennessee law, a court's task when interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intention of the parties based upon the usual, natural, and ordinary meaning of the contractual language. Teter v. Republic Parking Sys., 181 S.W.3d 330, 342 (Tenn.2005) (quoting Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tenn.1999)). The Tennessee Supreme Court explained in Teter that if a contract's language is unambiguous, the literal meaning of the language controls. Id. Additionally, under Tennessee law, a writing may be incorporated by reference into a written contract. If a writing is incorporated by reference, both writings must be construed together. Oman Constr. Co. v. Tennessee Cent. Ry. Co., 212 Tenn. 556, 370 S.W.2d 563, 570 (1963); Real Estate Mgmt. v. Giles, 41 Tenn.App. 347, 293 S.W.2d 596, 599 (1956) ([W]here several instruments are made as part of one transaction, they will be read together and each will be construed with reference to the other.). Lastly, under Tennessee law, the interpretation placed upon a contract by the parties thereto, as shown by their acts, will be adopted by the court and . . . to this end not only the acts but the declarations of the parties may be considered. Hamblen County v. Morristown, 656 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tenn.1983). 36 The district court correctly determined that the renewal copyrights in the 1958-1963 songs belonged to Sony. Appellants, however, assert that the renewal copyrights were never assigned to Sony. Appellants argue that the renewal copyrights are a separate property right and therefore could have been transferred only if the parties had executed the Exhibit A agreements—the only agreement specifically transferring the renewal copyrights. Because the publishing agreements made no reference to the renewal copyrights and the Exhibit A agreements were never executed, Appellants contend that Sony could not have received the renewal copyrights for Miller's 1958-1963 songs. (Appellants' Br. 17-18.) Appellants are incorrect. 37 First, the language in the Exhibit A agreement is sufficient to convey the renewal-copyright interests because the language evinces a clear intent by Miller to transfer to Tree, and later to Sony, the renewal copyrights in the 1958-1963 songs. The Exhibit A agreement specifically states that Miller authorizes Sony to renew the copyrights in his songs: The Composers hereby authorize and empower the Publisher to renew, pursuant to law, ... the copyright of the said musical composition ... and deliver ... a formal assignment of each renewal copyright to [Tree].... The express use of the term renew here evinces the intent to convey the renewal interest; this is particularly true because even more generic terms, such as forever and hereafter, have sufficed to convey an interest in the renewal copyrights. See, e.g., P.C. Films Corp., 138 F.3d at 457 (noting that use of the word perpetual conveys renewal rights); Corcovado, 981 F.2d at 685 (explaining that use of the word forever or hereafter is sufficient to convey renewal rights); see also Hayes v. Carlin Am., Inc., 168 F.Supp.2d 154, 157 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (Use of the particular word `renewal' is not necessary to transfer renewal rights.). 38 Second, the 1969 agreement successfully incorporated into the parties' prior publishing agreements the language assigning to Tree the renewal copyrights in Miller's songs. The Appellants, however, contend that the language in the Exhibit A agreement, granting Sony the right to the renewal copyrights, was not incorporated into the publishing agreements because the 1969 agreement incorporated the provision in the Exhibit A agreement relating only to royalties and not the provision relating to renewal copyrights. (Appellants' Br. 17-18.) The Appellants' argument hinges on language in the 1969 agreement stating that the signing of separate [Exhibit A] agreements is hereby waived, and the terms and conditions as to royalties and the payment thereof shall be deemed part of the main agreement and shall be made a part thereof — language specifically referencing royalty payments but not renewal copyrights. (JA 446.) The district court dismissed this argument, concluding instead that the parties' conduct indicated an intent to incorporate the entire Exhibit A agreement, including the language assigning Miller's renewal-copyright interests, into the publishing agreements. The district court is correct. 39 The district court properly relied on the parties' course of dealings to ascertain their intent regarding ownership of the renewal copyrights. See, e.g., Reed Bros. Stone Co., v. Pittman Const. Co., 20 Tenn.App. 552, 101 S.W.2d 478, 482 (1936) (explaining that a court can look to the course of dealing between the parties when interpreting a contract); First Tennessee Bank, N.A. v. Nunn & Assoc., Inc., No. 03A01-9103-CH-96, 1991 WL 119293, at  4, 1991 Tenn.App. LEXIS 541, at -12 (Tenn.Ct. App. July 8, 1991) (unpublished opinion) (Guidance in explaining or interpreting an ambiguous word in a contract . . . is found in the course of dealings between the parties ....). Two particular experiences between the parties indicate Miller's intent to transfer his renewal-copyright interests. 40 First, the publishing agreements expressly state that the parties intend to be bound by the Exhibit A agreement: the publishing agreements (for 1958, 1960, and 1962) declare that both [Miller] and [Tree] are to be bound by the terms, covenants, and conditions of [the Exhibit A agreement] as if herein fully set forth. The parties indicated an intent to be bound by the terms of the unexecuted Exhibit A agreement because the 1969 agreement does not alter language in the original publishing agreements binding the parties to all the terms of the Exhibit A agreement. Therefore, although the 1969 agreement specifically mentions only the royalty provisions of the Exhibit A agreement, nothing in the parties' course of dealing shows that the parties did not intend to be bound by all the provisions of the Exhibit A agreement. 41 Second, Sony paid Miller, and his estate, royalties during the original copyright term and during the renewal term, once the original copyright term lapsed, without any objection from the Appellants. Sony correctly points out that the parties' thirty-year business relationship, during which Sony/ATV renewed and openly exploited the renewal copyrights, paying Miller and Appellants their royalties, indicates Miller's intent to assign the renewal copyrights to Sony. (Appellee's Br. 15, 20.) Accordingly, based on the plain language of the publishing agreements between Miller and Tree and the parties' course of dealing, we conclude that Sony is the owner of the renewal copyrights in Miller's 1958-1963 songs. 42
43 The district court concluded that the renewal copyrights for the 1964 songs vested in Mary Miller and Roger Miller's children upon his death. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24813, at -45. The court based its conclusion, in part, on the parties' statements that ownership of the renewal copyrights in the 1964 songs vested in Miller's wife and children because Miller died prior to the start of the renewal term for those songs. In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, Sony conceded that under 17 U.S.C. § 304, because Miller died prior to the first day of the renewal term for the 1964 songs, the renewal copyright vested in the author's widow and children, and not in Sony. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of its Mot. for J. on the Pleadings 18-19.) The renewal term for the 1964 songs began on January 1, 1993, and Miller died on October 25, 1992. 44 Following the court's decision, Sony filed a motion to alter or amend the court's judgment, under Rule 59(e), arguing that it had incorrectly interpreted 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(2)(B)(i) and consequently Sony, and not the Appellants, owns the renewal copyrights in the 1964 songs. (Appellee's Br. 32-36.) The district court denied the motion, concluding that Sony's statements, admitting that Mary Miller was the owner of the renewal copyrights in the 1964 songs, were judicial admissions. 45 We review a district court's determination as to whether a particular statement constitutes a judicial admission under the abuse-of-discretion standard. MacDonald v. GMC, 110 F.3d 337, 340 (6th Cir.1997). A judicial admission is generally treated as binding. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir.1963). Judicial admissions dispense with the need to offer proof on facts about which there is no real dispute. Id. Thus, these admissions go to matters of fact which, otherwise, would require evidentiary proof. Id. In MacDonald, we reiterated that we are reluctant to treat [statements dealing with opinions and legal conclusions] as binding judicial admissions. 110 F.3d at 341. Further, we explained that [j]udicial admissions . . . typically concern only matters of fact. Id. In MacDonald, General Motor's counsel made statements regarding the defendant's negligence and whether the defendant had caused the car accident that was the subject of the litigation. The district court concluded that the comments by General Motor's counsel were not judicial admissions, and we affirmed the court's determination because the statements dealt with opinions and legal conclusions. Id. at 341. 46 In the present case, Sony's statements dealt with legal conclusions, and not matters of fact, and therefore the district court erred in concluding that the statements were judicial admissions. Sony conceded that it was not the owner of the renewal copyrights in the 1964 songs based on its interpretation of § 304 and its reading of the Supreme Court's decision in Miller Music. These statements by Sony are not statements regarding matters of fact; they are statements regarding Sony's interpretation of the law given the facts of the case. The MacDonald court specifically stated that judicial admissions concern only matters of fact. Id. Accordingly, because Sony's statements do not concern matters of fact, we reverse the district court's holding that Sony's statements are judicial admissions. 47 Further, under Rule 59(e), parties cannot use a motion for reconsideration to raise new legal arguments that could have been raised before a judgment was issued. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that [a] motion under Rule 59(e) is not an opportunity to re-argue a case); FDIC v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1 st Cir.1992) (explaining that a Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to argue a new legal theory). Rather, a motion under Rule 59(e) must either clearly establish a manifest error of law or must present newly discovered evidence. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d at 16; FDIC v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir.1986); see also Walker v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 128 Fed.Appx. 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion). The district court, however, did not consider Sony's new legal argument (that it was the owner of the renewal copyrights in the 1964 songs) because the court concluded that Sony's earlier statements were judicial admissions. In light of the court's error on this point, we remand the case to the district court so it can determine whether it should hear Sony's new argument regarding its ownership of the renewal copyrights in the 1964 songs. 48 Further, because we are remanding the case for a determination as to whether Sony can raise its argument that it is the owner of the renewal copyrights in the 1964 songs, we need not decide whether the district court correctly determined that Sony has an implied, non-exclusive license in Miller's 1964 songs. A determination as to whether Sony has an implied license in the 1964 songs is relevant only if the district court concludes that Sony is not the owner of the renewal copyrights in those songs, because a license is a defense to a claim of copyright infringement. Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 500 (6th Cir.1998) (explaining that the existence of an implied license in a copyrighted work is an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement); see also John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Prop., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir.2003) (Uses of the copyrighted work that stay within the scope of a nonexclusive license are immunized from infringement suits.). In short, if the district court concludes that Sony is the owner of the renewal copyrights in the 1964 songs, it is immaterial whether Sony also has an implied, non-exclusive license in those songs.