Opinion ID: 1881810
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the doctrines of res judicata and the law of the case

Text: In this case, we must determine whether the Third District properly applied the doctrine of res judicata to preclude DOT from raising a distinct aspect of its defense that it did not raise in the first non-final appeal. In analyzing this issue, it is incumbent upon this Court to first review the important differences regarding the doctrine of res judicata and the related doctrine of the law of the case. This Court has explained that under the doctrine of res judicata: A judgment on the merits rendered in a former suit between the same parties or their privies, upon the same cause of action, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but as to every other matter which might with propriety have been litigated and determined in that action. Kimbrell v. Paige, 448 So.2d 1009, 1012 (Fla.1984) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Wade v. Clower, 94 Fla. 817, 114 So. 548, 552 (1927)). Based on principles of res judicata, a judgment on the merits will thus bar a subsequent action between the same parties on the same cause of action. Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So.2d 503, 505 (Fla.1956) (emphasis supplied). Importantly, the doctrine of res judicata not only bars issues that were raised, but it also precludes consideration of issues that could have been raised but were not raised in the first case. See id. As explained more fully in McGregor v. Provident Trust Company, 119 Fla. 718, 162 So. 323, 327 (1935): Inhering in all courts of civilized nations and, as is said in one case, an obvious rule of expediency and justice, res adjudicata is a fundamental doctrine universally recognized. No better enunciation of it, perhaps, can be found than that given by Black in his work on Judgments. He states it in two main rules, as follows: First, a point which was actually and directly in issue in a former suit, and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a domestic court of competent jurisdiction, cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties or their privies, whether the causes of action in the two suits be identical or different; and, Second, a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, on the merits, is a bar to any future suit between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action, so long as it remains unreversed. Black on Judgments (2d Ed.) vol. 2, § 504. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata provides finality to judgments, predictability to litigants, and stability to judicial decisions. Where successive appeals are taken in the same case there is no question of res judicata, because the same suit, and not a new and different one, is involved. See Beverly Beach Props., Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So.2d 604, 607 (Fla.1953). Under these circumstances, the doctrine of the law of the case applies. The doctrine of the law of the case is also a principle of judicial estoppel, but it is more limited and more flexible in scope. The doctrine of the law of the case requires that questions of law actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court and the trial court, through all subsequent stages of the proceedings. See Greene v. Massey, 384 So.2d 24, 28 (Fla.1980) (All points of law which have been adjudicated become the law of the case and are, except in exceptional circumstances, no longer open for discussion or consideration in subsequent proceedings in the case.); Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1965). Under the law of the case doctrine, a trial court is bound to follow prior rulings of the appellate court as long as the facts on which such decision are based continue to be the facts of the case. See McGregor, 162 So. at 327. Moreover, even as to those issues actually decided, the law of the case doctrine is more flexible than res judicata in that it also provides that an appellate court has the power to reconsider and correct an erroneous ruling that has become the law of the case where a prior ruling would result in a manifest injustice. Strazzulla, 177 So.2d at 5. As to the scope of the law of the case doctrine, this Court in U.S. Concrete, 437 So.2d at 1063, explained that the doctrine is limited to rulings on questions of law actually presented and considered on a former appeal. (Emphasis supplied.) See also Two M. Dev. Corp. v. Mikos, 578 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). By reaffirming the principle articulated in earlier decisions that the law of the case doctrine is limited to questions of law actually presented and considered on a former appeal, U.S. Concrete was consistent with prior cases from this Court. See, e.g., Greene, 384 So.2d at 28; Strazzulla, 177 So.2d at 3; Finston v. Finston, 160 Fla. 935, 37 So.2d 423, 424 (1948). Additionally, the law of the case doctrine may foreclose subsequent consideration of issues implicitly addressed or necessarily considered by the appellate court's decision. See Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Rubin, 238 So.2d 284, 289 (Fla.1970); Dicks v. Jenne, 740 So.2d 576, 578 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). A corollary of the law of the case doctrine is that a lower court is not precluded from passing on issues that have not necessarily been determined and become law of the case. Greene, 384 So.2d at 27. As stated in Wilder v. Punta Gorda State Bank, 100 Fla. 517, 129 So. 865, 866 (1930), the law of the case doctrine has no applicability to, and is not decisive of, points presented upon a second writ of error that were not presented upon a former writ of error and consequently were not before the appellate court for adjudication. Although the scope of the law of the case doctrine would appear to be settled by this Court, several district courts have cited in dicta to this Court's prior decision in Airvac, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co., 330 So.2d 467 (Fla.1976), for the proposition that the law of the case doctrine applies where the issue could have been but was not raised. [4] Indeed, based upon this Court's decisions in Airvac and U.S. Concrete, two appellate commentators have termed the law of the case doctrine to be a misunderstood doctrine for which there is an irreconcilable conflict in Florida law. Raymond T. Elligett, Jr., & Charles P. Schropp, Law of the Case, Fla. B.J. July-Aug.1985, at 23, 23. [5] Although this Court's decision in Airvac may have caused some confusion over the scope of the law of the case doctrine, an understanding of the procedural posture of Airvac explains the result reached in that case. In Airvac, the trial court had initially denied a request by the defendant to amend his answer to include a fraudulent conveyance defense eighteen months after answering and four days before trial. 330 So.2d at 468. The first trial ended in a directed verdict for the defendant, and on appeal by the plaintiff, the defendant failed to raise the trial court's denial of its motion to amend its pleadings on cross-appeal. See id. After the appellate court reversed the directed verdict and remanded for a determination of several factual issues, but before retrial, the defendant again sought to amend its answer to include a fraudulent conveyance defense, which the trial court did not permit. See id. at 469. After a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant asserted as an issue on appeal error in the trial court failing to allow the defendant to amend its answer. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not allowing the defendant's post-appeal amendment. See id. This Court quashed the appellate court's decision, concluding that no error occurred and stating: The record sub judice clearly shows that [defendant] had full knowledge of the purported fraudulent conveyance prior to the initial trial; that it sought by amendment to submit that issue to the court; that it had full opportunity to perfect an appeal, assign as error or otherwise present the issue of the denial of its motion to the appellate court on the initial appeal but did not, thereby waiving any objection to the trial court's rejection of its amendment of the issue. Id. (emphasis supplied). Despite the fact that the Court enunciated the law of the case doctrine in concluding that on remand the defendant could not amend its complaint to include a fraudulent conveyance defense, see id. at 469, this Court decided Airvac on principles of waiver; i.e., the failure of a party to raise an issue on appeal that was the subject of the trial court's ruling. To the extent that Airvac has been construed broadly to stand for the proposition that the law of the case doctrine bars consideration of issues that were neither raised by the parties nor decided by the appellate court in the prior appeal, it is in conflict with our subsequently decided case of U.S. Concrete, which restricts application of law of the case to issues that were decided in a prior appeal. Therefore, we recede from Airvac to the extent it is inconsistent with U.S. Concrete. In summary, the doctrines of the law of the case and res judicata differ in two important ways. First, law of the case applies only to proceedings within the same case, see Beverly Beach, 68 So.2d at 607, while res judicata applies to proceedings in different cases. See Strazzulla, 177 So.2d at 3. Second, the law of the case doctrine is narrower in application in that it bars consideration only of those legal issues that were actually considered and decided in a former appeal, see U.S. Concrete, 437 So.2d at 1063, while res judicata bars relitigation in a subsequent cause of action not only of claims raised, but also claims that could have been raised. See Youngblood, 89 So.2d at 505.