Opinion ID: 874428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Rock Creek must be vacated.

Text: Herrera advanced two theories in support of his claim that Rock Creek was negligent before the district court: (1) Rock Creek exercised sufficient control over the manner, means and method of the workplace and FrameIt's performance of its contractual obligations such that Rock Creek owed him a duty of care; and (2) Rock Creek is vicariously liable for the negligent removal of the scaffold support.
With regard to Herrera's first theory, the district court concluded that [i]f Rock Creek controlled the means, manner, and method of work performed by Herrera, then it owed a general duty of ordinary care to Mr. Herrera.... In support of this legal conclusion, the district court properly considered earlier decisions of the appellate courts of this State, citing Vickers v. Hanover Const. Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 832, 875 P.2d 929 (1994), Harpole v. State, 131 Idaho 437, 958 P.2d 594 (1998), and Gneiting v. Idaho Asphalt Supply, Inc., 130 Idaho 393, 941 P.2d 932 (Ct.App.1997). The district court then determined that Herrera had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact supporting his claim that Rock Creek exercised the requisite control over FrameIt or Herrera. The district court's latter determination was based upon its review of the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions to ascertain if they raise material issues of fact for trial. Rather than identifying the evidence proffered by Herrera that it found to be inadmissible, by way of footnote, the district court simply stated: Much of the material contained in the affidavits and depositions is not admissible because it is based on hearsay, speculation, or is conclusory. This Court has not considered such evidence in ruling on the pending motion. The district court did not specify what testimony from the depositions and affidavits that it found to be inadmissible. There is some evidence in the record before this Court that suggests that Rock Creek exercised control over the jobsite. Herrera's affidavit contains two paragraphs that indicate that Rock Creek exercised control over his work. [4] Two paragraphs in Francisco Herrera's affidavit contain similar testimony. Additionally, Jesus Herrera indicated in his deposition testimony that Peter asked him to just do things for him, maybe frame a wall, things like that. The admissibility of evidence under I.R.C.P 56(e) is a threshold question the trial court must analyze before applying the rules governing motions for summary judgment. Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 128, 75 P.3d 180, 182 (2003) (citing Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994)). The trial court must look at the affidavit or deposition testimony and determine whether it alleges facts, which if taken as true, would render the testimony admissible. Id. (citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg. Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002)). The admission of evidence is committed to the discretion of the trial court. Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Inv., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 370 n. 4, 179 P.3d 323, 333 n. 4 (2008) (citing City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 586-87, 130 P.3d 1118, 1124-25 (2006)). Thus, this Court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, Shane, 139 Idaho at 128, 75 P.3d at 182, and we consider whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). When the trial court does not identify the evidence that it has excluded, much less identify the reasons for its ruling or rulings, this Court is simply unable to fulfill its function as a reviewing court and determine whether the trial court has acted within the bounds of its discretion. It is not appropriate for us to determine, for the first time on appeal, the admissibility of evidence. See Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15, 175 P.3d 172, 177 (2007). When the record is such that this Court is incapable of reviewing the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, we must remand for appropriate findings. Soria v. Sierra Pac. Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 609, 726 P.2d 706, 721 (1986) (addressing summary denial of motion for new trial). For this reason, we vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to this first theory of negligence advanced in Herrera's claim against Rock Creek.
Herrera also asserted that Rock Creek employees were responsible for removing the scaffold support. His affidavit asserted: On the day that I was seriously injured, December 16, 2002, the supporting wooden beam was removed by workers that were laying felt on the roof on top of the residence. The defendant Rock Creek Development was responsible for laying the felt on the rooftop. I saw workers from Rock Creek Development placing the felt on Pedro Estay's rooftop. It is my belief that the defendant Rock Creek Development and its employees were responsible or [sic] the removal of the supporting wooden structure, which caused the scaffolding to break and my fall. Herrera's deposition testimony reiterated this claim. Francisco Herrera's affidavit also asserted his belief that the scaffold support was removed by Rock Creek's workers and/or employees. An employer is liable in tort for the tortious conduct of an employee committed within the scope of employment. See Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897, 155 P.3d 695, 698 (2007) (citing Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 115 Idaho 298, 302, 766 P.2d 768, 772 (1988)). The district court simply did not address Herrera's second theory of negligence when granting summary judgment in favor of Rock Creek. Although in this appeal, Rock Creek asserts that the Herreras' testimony is inadmissible, this is a matter to be addressed in the first instance by the trial court. Accordingly, on remand, the district court is directed to consider the admissibility of the evidence offered in opposition to Rock Creek's motion for summary judgment and to address Herrera's second theory of negligence.