Opinion ID: 2598484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: plaintiff's claims other than psychiatric malpractice

Text: Defendants sought partial summary judgment on all of Dawson's claims other than the medical malpractice claim on the general basis that Plaintiff should not be allowed to take what is essentially a malpractice claim and transform it into multiple claims. The district court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. On Dawson's claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and outrage, the district court concluded that the proper remedy for all alleged injuries was through the malpractice action. On her claims for money had and received and breach of fiduciary duty, the district court faulted Dawson for resting on her allegations rather than setting forth specific facts that would establish that there was no genuine issue for trial. On her claim of breach of nondelegable duty, the district court concluded that Menninger cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of Dr. Prager. Rule 141. On appeal, Dawson argues that her failure to comply with Rule 141 (2002 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 189) was not a proper basis for the district court's granting summary judgment against her. Rule 141(b) requires any party opposing a motion for summary judgment to state whether each of the movant's factual contentions is controverted, and if so, to supply a concise summary of conflicting testimony or evidence. The trial court, in fact, did not mention Rule 141, but quoted K.S.A. 60-256, the statutory counterpart. K.S.A. 60-256(e) provides in part: When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this section, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party. Because Dawson merely denied defendants' contentions of fact and failed to come forward with anything of evidentiary value that would establish a disputed material fact, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on her claims for money had and received and breach of fiduciary duty. Dawson alternately argues that defendants' failure to comply with Rule 141 prevented her from complying with the rule or she complied even though defendants did not. Her arguments do not address the basis for the trial court's entry of summary judgment and consequently are unavailing. Moreover, Dawson seems to concede that she did not comply with the statutory requirements. The trial court stated that Dawson failed to come forward with evidence that would establish disputes of fact. In her brief, she attempts to justify her failing to do so: [Defendant] merely recited allegations in Plaintiff's petition without support from any factual source. For example, Fact No. 4 indicated: `4. Each of Plaintiff's factual allegations against both Defendants arise out of these Defendants' care and treatment of Plaintiff.' This kind of allegation requires only a denial that the allegations all arose from Defendant's care and treatment. Money had and received. In her appellate brief, Dawson describes two very different grounds for her claim for money had and received. First, she alleges that, as a matter of contract, she paid for treatment that did her no good. Second, she alleges that defendants' billing mistakes caused her to overpay. The trial court rejected Dawson's contract theory to the extent it is connected with Plaintiff's allegations of Defendant's failure to maintain the standard of care required of physicians under the law. The trial court cited Bonin v. Vannaman, 261 Kan. 199, 929 P.2d 754 (1996). In that case, Bonin tried to state a cause of action in fraud against Dr. Vannaman for his failure to diagnose her scoliosis and failure to disclose that a radiologist had noted possible scoliosis in a chest x-ray. Even though the doctor's alleged conduct matched the elements of fraud by silence, the court concluded that Bonin's cause of action was for malpractice, not fraud. The court explained: This does not mean that a doctor can never be liable for fraud or breach of contract. Instead, this simply means that a fraud or breach of contract cause of action can only be based upon a physician's misconduct if that misconduct is beyond a breach of the legal duty which every doctor has the obligation to uphold. 261 Kan. at 210. In the present case, there is no showing that Dawson's contract allegation is based on misconduct that is beyond a breach of legal duty. The second ground was raised only in Dawson's answer to defendants' counterclaim. The record on appeal does not contain a file-stamped copy of the answer  the copy in the record on appeal is attached to a motion for leave to file it. The district court observed in its decision that Plaintiff's petition fails to allege that Plaintiff was improperly billed for services rendered. In addition, in her opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, Dawson did not satisfy the K.S.A. 60-256 requirement that she demonstrate improper billing with specific facts and supporting documentation. In her brief on appeal, Dawson asserts that [i]t appears from the records that Menninger Clinics, Inc. engaged in billing irregularities concerning plaintiff, and the citation she gives for the assertion is  See infra Section IV. Section IV of her brief is the statement of facts, where Dawson primarily sets out her contentions of billing irregularities rather than facts. Examination of the citations to the record on appeal contained in the portion of the statement of facts that addresses billing reveals only contentions, nothing of evidentiary value. Outrage. According to the trial court, Dawson alleged in support of her claim for the tort of outrage (intentional infliction of emotional distress) that Dr. Prager failed to keep appropriate boundaries, failed to protect plaintiff from her own self-destructiveness, abruptly abandoned her relationship with Plaintiff and was negligent in handling the therapeutic process. On defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court considered materials outside the pleadings and examined Dawson's allegations, considering their sufficiency and how they related to the malpractice claim before concluding that summary judgment was proper on the claim of outrage. Accepting Dawson's allegations as true, the trial court considered whether they were sufficient to establish the threshold requirements for liability for the tort of outrage. Comparing the allegations in the present case with the circumstances of Taiwo v. Vu, 249 Kan. 585, 822 P.2d 1024 (1991), and Gomez v. Hug, 7 Kan. App. 2d 603, 645 P.2d 916, rev. denied 231 Kan. 800 (1982), the district court concluded that Prager's alleged conduct may not reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to meet the threshold requirements for submission to a jury. In addition, the district court found that the alleged conduct, while certainly a potential cause of action for malpractice, would not rise to the level of outrageous. The allegations point to a substandard of care but not extreme and outrageous under the law. We agree. Because Dawson's allegations stated a cause of action for malpractice, the trial court returned to the principle of Bonin, 261 Kan. 199, which disapproved theories of recovery against a physician to the extent they are connected with plaintiff's allegations of defendant's failure to maintain the medical standard of care. The trial court concluded that adequate remedies for Dawson's alleged emotional distress were available under the tort of medical negligence and that her allegation remained an action for malpractice, not one for outrage. On appeal, Dawson argues that Bonin does not stand for the principle that intentional acts are subsumed within the malpractice action. Dawson's argument is meritless. The cause of action at issue in Bonin was fraud, an intentional act. 261 Kan. at 210. Breach of fiduciary duty and breach of nondelegable duty. On appeal, Dawson merely asserts that these torts are not subsumed by the malpractice cause of action. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on these claims. On the breach of fiduciary duty claim against Prager, the district court noted that Dawson provided nothing of evidentiary value and concluded that Dawson's mere allegations are not enough under K.S.A. 60-256 to demonstrate that a viable claim exists and survive summary judgment. On the breach of nondelegable duty against Menninger, the district court held that K.S.A. 40-3403(h) precluded Menninger, a health care provider within the meaning of K.S.A. 40-3401(f), from being held vicariously liable for the actions of Dr. Prager. K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 40-3403(h) provides in part: A health care provider who is qualified for coverage under the fund shall have no vicarious liability or responsibility for any injury or death arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services inside or outside this state by any other health care provider who is also qualified for coverage under the fund. Dawson, on appeal, has not addressed applicability or meaning of the statute.