Opinion ID: 2273678
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is legislative power being delegated?

Text: Appellants' first claim is that the district violated article I, section 29 of Missouri's Constitution by refusing to bargain collectively with the representatives of the employee associations. There is no dispute that the district refused to bargain collectively with its employees. Despite the plain language of the constitutional provision, which states that employees shall have the right to bargain collectively, this Court held in City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542 (1947), that article I, section 29 does not apply to public employees. If the guarantee applies to public employees, this Court said, the legislative powers of the public entity would be unconstitutionally delegated to nongovernmental entities through the collective bargaining process. Id. Clouse recognizes that all employees have the right to join unions and to bring their views and desires to any public officer or legislative body, but distinguishes this from the right to bargain collectively. Id. This distinction is based on the now largely defunct nondelegation doctrine, which holds that it is unconstitutional for the legislature to delegate its rule-making authority to another body. Clouse cites A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935), which has been abandoned in subsequent decisions. Schechter Poultry has been called aberrational because it is one of very few cases that were departure[s] from a generous recognition of congressional power to delegate rulemaking authority[.] United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1010 (3rd Cir.1988). Since 1935, the United States Supreme Court has generally upheld delegations of congressional authority. Id.; see, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694 (1948) (delegation of authority to determine excessive profits); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 64 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333 (1944) (delegation to determine reasonable rates); Nat'l Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943) (delegation to regulate broadcast licensing). Similarly, the nondelegation doctrine has been largely abandoned in Missouri. See Menorah Medical Center v. Health and Educational Facilities Authority, 584 S.W.2d 73, 83-84 (Mo. banc 1979) (recognizing modern tendency towards liberal interpretation of delegation authority); Murray v. Mo. Highway and Transportation Commission, 37 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Mo. banc 2001) (statute requiring the commission to submit disputes to arbitration panel is not an unconstitutional delegation). The nondelegation dictum in Clouse and public employee cases that follow Clouse has rightly been called an anachronism. James E. Westbrook, The Use of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Public Sector Labor Law: Lessons From Cases That Have Perpetuated an Anachronism, 30 St. Louis Univ. L.J. 331 (1986). Clouse disapproves of including public employees in the right to bargain collectively because decisions relating to public employment are legislative. 206 S.W.2d at 544-545. As applied to the municipal employees in Clouse , qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions of public officers and employees are wholly matters of lawmaking and cannot be the subject of bargaining or contract. Id. at 545. For this reason, Clouse found that article I, section 29 did not apply to public employees because the right to bargain collectively in the public sector could amount to no more than giving expression to desires for the lawmaker's consideration and guidance. Id. In 1965, the legislature passed the public sector labor law, which authorized most public employees to form and join labor organizations and to present proposals to any public body relative to salaries and other conditions of employment through the representatives of their own choosing. . . . Section 105.510. The public sector labor law excludes all teachers of all Missouri schools. Id. [2] After the law went into effect, many public employees  including the custodial, transportation, and paraprofessional employees represented by the associations in this case  had a recognized right to bargain collectively, despite this Court's language in Clouse that public employment can never be the subject of bargaining or contract. To be consistent with article I, section 29, the statute's exclusion of teachers cannot be read to preclude teachers from bargaining collectively. Rather, the public sector labor law is read to provide procedures for the exercise of this right for those occupations included, but not to preclude omitted occupational groups from the exercise of the right to bargain collectively, because all employees have that right under article I, section 29. Instead of invalidating the public sector labor law to the extent that it excludes teachers, this Court's reading of the statute recognizes the role of the general assembly, or in this case, the school district  in the absence of a statute covering teachers  to set the framework for these public employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. In this regard, it is noteworthy that prior to this controversy, the district in effect recognized the teachers' right to bargain collectively through its discussion procedure. There is nothing in the law, as it has developed, that requires a public entity to agree to a proposal by its employee unions or organizations. In fact, this Court has repeatedly recognized that the public sector labor law allows employers to reject all employee proposals, as long as the employer has met and conferred with employee representatives. State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 41 (Mo.1969); State ex rel. O'Leary v. Missouri State Board of Mediation, 509 S.W.2d 84, 88-89 (Mo. banc 1974); Curators of the University of Missouri v. Public Service Employees Local No. 45, 520 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Mo. banc 1975); Larry Reichert, et al. v. The Board of Education of the City of St. Louis, 217 S.W.3d 301 (Mo. banc 2007). Under this interpretation, what legislative power or prerogative is being delegated? The answer today, of course, is none. If the public employer is free to reject any proposals of employee organizations, and thus to use its governing authority to prescribe wages and working conditions, none of the public entity's legislative or governing authority is being delegated. Missey, 441 S.W.2d at 41.