Opinion ID: 1179702
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retroactivity of State v. Brown

Text: In Brown, the defendant was represented by appointed counsel who was also a part-time city prosecutor. Brown, 853 P.2d at 856. He was convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault. Id. at 852. On appeal, he contended that he was denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel when the court appointed a city prosecutor as his trial counsel. We agreed and reversed, holding: Although we do not decide whether it is constitutionally impermissible to appoint a city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities to represent an indigent defendant, we conclude that vital interests of the criminal justice system are jeopardized when [it occurs]. Consequently, we hold that as a matter of public policy and pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, as well as our express power to govern the practice of law, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend indigent persons.... . . . . ... [W]e announce a per se rule of reversal wherever such dual representation is undertaken so as to prevent its recurrence. Id. at 856-57, 859 (emphasis in original). Initially Gordon contends that by ordering his resentencing, this court explicitly recognized that the prohibition against a part-time city prosecutor serving as an appointed defense attorney is applicable to Defendant's case. Gordon reads far too much into our order, which merely stated, Having decided that Gordon was denied his constitutional right to appeal, this court remands the case to the trial court for resentencing, so that Gordon may raise the issues here presented in a first appeal as of right. The order clearly did not address the merits of Gordon's conflict-of-interest argument. It did not mention Brown or discuss its retroactivity. Rather, it merely required Gordon to be resentenced so that he could raise the argument on appeal. Next, Gordon asserts that our decision in Brown entitles him to a new trial. Brown was expressly decided as a matter of public policy under our inherent supervisory power over the courts and our power to govern the practice of law, which powers are well settled. Brown, 853 P.2d at 857; see State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 650 n. 32 (Utah) (and cases cited therein), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 163, 133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995). When we base a decision upon our supervisory power over lower courts, it is a clear indication that the decision will apply only to future cases. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 407 n. 7 (Utah 1994) ([T]he invocation of our supervisory powers... demonstrates a commitment on the part of this court to prospectively prohibit the use of the offending language [in the jury instruction at issue]. (emphasis added)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 910, 130 L.Ed.2d 792 (1995). Furthermore, our decision in Brown announced for the first time that counsel with concurrent prosecutorial duties could not represent indigent defendants, a clear change from past procedures. We have previously held that when a new rule governing criminal procedure constitutes a clear break with the past, it is not generally applied retroactively. State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah 1991) (declining to retroactively apply strict compliance of rule in taking of guilty pleas); Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81, 95 (Utah 1983) (declining to retroactively apply reasonable doubt standard of proof in sentencing defendant convicted of capital offense); see also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986) (from this date forward, defendants are entitled to cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness testimony when that testimony is a central issue). In Brown, we expressly declined to decide whether the appointment of attorneys with concurrent prosecutorial duties was constitutionally impermissible. Brown, 853 P.2d at 856. However, even where we have adopted a new rule that is of a constitutional dimension, we have been reluctant to give it retroactive effect. See, e.g., Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1103-05 (Utah 1994) (due process affords inmates disclosure of contents of their files, including psychological reports, prior to parole hearing; decision to apply prospectively only); Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 913-14 (Utah 1993); Andrews, 677 P.2d at 88. Other reasons favor only prospective application of Brown. The primary purpose of the prohibition in Brown was clearly prophylactic, that is, to forbid such dual representation... so as to prevent its recurrence. 853 P.2d at 859 (emphasis added). Applying Brown retroactively would unjustly benefit many defendants who received competent, effective assistance of counsel, despite their counsel's concurrent prosecutorial duties. Finally, the goal of maintaining the efficient administration of justice also strongly favors the prospective application of Brown. See Labrum, 870 P.2d at 912; Andrews, 677 P.2d at 91 (both examining these factors on collateral review in deciding against retroactivity). Having concluded that the prohibition in Brown should be applied only prospectively, we must determine whether on this direct appeal, Gordon is nevertheless entitled to benefit from its holding. In Menzies, one year after the defendant was convicted, we disapproved of a reasonable doubt jury instruction in another case. 889 P.2d at 407 n. 7. On appeal, Menzies argued that he was entitled to benefit from the new case. We concluded that our invocation of supervisory powers is a clear indication that we would strike down only future verdicts based on the offending [jury instruction]. Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, under Menzies, when under our supervisory powers we articulate a new cautionary policy, the defendants on appeal will not benefit from the new policy. Similarly, in Hoff we held that the defendant on appeal did not benefit from State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987), which mandated strict compliance with the rule governing the taking of guilty pleas. 814 P.2d at 1122. We concluded that Gibbons applied only to guilty pleas taken after its issuance. Id. at 1124. Likewise, we consistently limited the benefit of the cautionary instruction on eyewitness identifications that we mandated in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986), to cases tried after its date of issuance. See State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 881 n. 3 (Utah 1988); State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 108 S.Ct. 1597, 99 L.Ed.2d 911 (1988); State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961, 965 (Utah 1987); State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah 1986). We did so because we decided Long under our supervisory powers, despite our concern that a conviction without such an instruction could well deny the defendant due process of law under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Long, 721 P.2d at 492. We note that in two cases involving constitutional issues, we applied prior holdings to claims pending in the district court and to those on appeal. See State v. Taysom, 886 P.2d 513, 513 n. 3 (Utah 1994) (addressing authority of court commissioners); Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 913-14 (holding that inmates have due process right to review information considered by parole board). However, these cases do not apply here. In Brown, we merely articulated a new cautionary policy under our supervisory powers. We conclude that Gordon does not benefit from the prohibition in Brown since his 1983 trial occurred well before we issued Brown in 1992. Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Justice Durham, states that Brown implicated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that the issues underlying Brown are of a constitutional nature. Yet the Brown opinion, authored just three years ago by Justice Durham and joined by Justice Stewart (writing a concurring opinion on another issue), examined the conflict of interest question at length and concluded: [W]e do not decide whether it is constitutionally impermissible to appoint a city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities to represent an indigent defendant.... [W]e hold that as a matter of public policy and pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, as well as our express power to govern the practice of law, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend indigent persons.... Brown, 853 P.2d at 856-57 (emphasis in original). The dissent would now apparently reverse Gordon's 1983 conviction because of his constitutional right to have trial counsel who did not have concurrent prosecutorial duties, even absent a showing of prejudice. We had the clear opportunity to enunciate such a holding in Brown but expressly refused to do so. We should not do so now. The dissent relies upon cases in which the conflict of interest arose out of joint representation of multiple defendants, where, for example, one codefendant elected to plead guilty and testify against the other. See State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1980). This represents a direct conflict of interest. However, the conflict of interest faced by an appointed defense counsel who also has concurrent prosecutorial duties in another jurisdiction is much more remote. Here, where Gordon was convicted in a trial conducted before we issued Brown, we should require Gordon to show ineffective assistance of his defense counsel.