Opinion ID: 1168234
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the false statements altered the sting of the story

Text: The defendants have conceded that the following statement is false: They [bail bondsmen] contributed approximately half of all campaign money collected by Don Herron, who then beat Ron Hendry in 1974. Clerk's Papers, at 188; Clerk's Papers, at 186. This false statement altered the sting of the story, and it is actionable regardless of the other, true statements made in the story. [3] The trial court granted summary judgment to KING on the ground that the sting of McGaffin's report was true. The sting of a report is defined as the gist or substance of a report when considered as a whole. Where a report contains a mixture of true and false statements, a false statement (or statements) affects the sting of a report only when significantly greater opprobrium results from the report containing the falsehood than would result from the report without the falsehood. See Mark, at 496. In terms of the elements of defamation, Mark requires the plaintiff to show that the falsehood affects the sting of a report as part of his showing of damage. Mark, at 494-97. [2] Judge Schumacher concluded that the sting of McGaffin's report was not affected by the statement that approximately half of Herron's campaign contributions came from bail bondsmen. The gist or the sting of the broadcast was that a prosecuting attorney was being investigated in respect to practices concerning bail bonds, that he had a close friend who was arrested with two local bondsmen, and that he had accepted substantial sums from a bondsman to finance election campaigns, all of which is conceded to be true. Whether bondsmen contributed approximately half of plaintiff's campaign money and whether one of them contributed again in 1978 does not appear to make any appreciable difference in the impact of the broadcast. (Italics omitted.) Clerk's Papers, at 5. This court reversed the trial court on this issue because it concluded that the statement that one-half of Herron's contributions came from bail bondsmen added a distinct and separate implication that Herron had bargained away his ethics and integrity in exchange for campaign contributions. That added implication affected the sting of the report. Herron, at 523. In their motion for reconsideration, KING and McGaffin argue that this court misconstrued Mark 's requirement that the allegedly defaming statement should be considered as a whole. KING lists these true statements made in the broadcast: a. The Pierce County Prosecutor's office was under investigation by the FBI; b. The FBI agents were questioning the Chief Prosecutor, Don Herron, and his deputies about bail bond procedures; c. Earlier that week, eight men were arrested and charged by the Justice Department on racketeering charges, and two of those arrested were bail bondsmen; d. One of the arrested bondsmen, John Carbone, had contributed to Herron's election campaigns in 1974 and 1978; e. One of the other arrested men, Lamont Zemek, was a close friend and vacation companion of Herron, and Zemek's ex-wife, Nina Zemek, was a longtime administrative aide for Herron; and f. Bail bondsmen were irritated at the former Pierce County Prosecutor, Ron Hendry, for pushing to collect forfeited bail bond moneys. KING argues that these true statements are so damaging to the plaintiff that the additional untrue statement does not change the sting of the story, even though it might constitute an additional negative innuendo. KING and the trial court both make the same fundamental error. Both interpret Mark 's instruction to consider the defaming statement as a whole to mean this: In a true, negative story the addition of a further, false negative statement does not change the sting of the story because the story would be damaging in any case without the false statement. They conclude that the true statements contained in KING TV's report were so damaging to Herron that the additional untrue statement could not do further damage. This is not a correct reading of Mark. First, the argument rests on the patently flawed premise that reporting true information harmful to a plaintiff's reputation is somehow a license to report a damaging falsehood in addition. It should be self-evident that Mark does not rest on any such premise. Second, as noted, the sting inquiry introduced by Mark is part of the plaintiff's required showing of damage. The question is whether the false statement has resulted in damage which is distinct from that caused by true negative statements also contained in the same report. If it has not, then whatever damage the plaintiff has suffered does not amount to defamation because it is not solely attributable to the falsehood. In that case, the plaintiff has not made a prima facie case. If, however, the plaintiff can show that the damage resulting from the falsehood is a distinct result of the falsehood, then he has established that element of his prima facie case. Mark requires a court to consider the defamatory report as a whole because it is necessary to determine whether or not the damage caused by the falsehood is distinct from the damage caused by the true statements in the report. If we analyze this case under the true logic of Mark, it is absolutely clear that the false statement contained in KING TV's report did alter the sting of the story. The statement that one-half of Herron's contributions came from bail bondsmen added a distinct and separate implication that Herron had bargained away his ethics and integrity in exchange for campaign contributions. None of the true statements in the KING TV report mitigated this falsehood. Furthermore, the damage inflicted by this falsehood was entirely distinct from that inflicted by the true statements contained in the report. This can be explained by distinguishing this case from Mark. Mark arose out of the prosecution of a Medicaid fraud scheme. The prosecution was based in part on an audit that had indicated over $200,000 in fraudulent billings. The defendant (later the plaintiff in the defamation suit) Albert M. Mark was charged with grand larceny in an amount greater than $75 and was eventually convicted at trial of submitting invalid Medicaid claims totaling about $2,500. Seattle television station KOMO incorrectly reported that the fraud scheme involved $300,000 and $350,000 in false claims. Another station, KIRO, incorrectly reported that Mark was charged with defrauding the State of $200,000. This court held that those false reports did not damage Mark and that he therefore could not establish a prima facie case of defamation. The court reasoned that the sting of the story was the report of the crime and that the defendants' inflating the amount involved did not alter that sting. [W]e think it apparent that the gist of the KIRO-TV and KOMO-TV reports was the arrest for Medicaid fraud involving large amounts of funds. No significantly greater opprobrium attaches to a statement that a person bilked the state out of at least $300,000 .. . than to one that he was charged with larceny based on an audit sample revealing over $200,000 in fraud billing.... The inaccuracy, if any, does not alter the sting of the publication as a whole and does not have a materially different effect on a viewer, listener, or reader than that which the literal truth would produce. Mark, at 496. In other words, it was the theft, not the amount of the theft, that constituted the story's sting. The damage to Mark came from being called a thief. Being called a major thief rather than a petty thief did not add a separate and distinct type of damage to the story. A thief is a thief. Therefore, the inflation of the amounts involved did not affect the sting of the story in Mark. In concluding that the falsehood contained in McGaffin's story did not affect its sting, Judge Schumacher drew a direct analogy to Mark and the other theft cases cited therein. He reasoned that, just as it was the theft and not the amount of the theft that formed the sting of the story in Mark, it was the bail bondsmen's contributing to Herron's campaign, not the amount of the contributions, that formed the sting of McGaffin's story. That analogy is false. Mark is correct in concluding that the sting of the TV reports was in the report of the theft, not the amount. Any theft, no matter how large or small, is a culpable act. This case, however, involves political contributions, not theft. It is not the case that any contribution to a political campaign, no matter how large or small, is culpable. A large contribution may be a sign of corruption; a small contribution is not. In the modern world of politics, campaign contributions are contributed by the rich and poor, the famous and infamous without inference of wrongdoing. A supporter of Prosecutor Herron who saw on KING TV that he had received $825 [3] in contributions to his campaign from bail bondsmen would say so what and continue to support him. There is little or no sting to such a statement. On the other hand, if that supporter heard that the prosecutor, who in many ways affects the incomes of both bail bondsmen and Pierce County by forfeiting or not forfeiting bail bonds, was receiving 50 percent of his campaign funds from the bail bondsmen, he would assume that Herron was dishonest and in the pocket of bail bondsmen. [4] He would never again vote for such a public official, especially a prosecutor, who has so much discretion in administering justice and setting moral standards in the county; 50 percent of all his campaign contributions is the sting. There is no sting to a group of businessmen such as bail bondsmen contributing $825 to Herron's campaign. The $825 constituted only 2 percent of all of Herron's contributions, not 50 percent. The latter statement, but not the former, implied that Herron had taken a bribe. Because it had a distinct and separate damaging implication, the false statement in the KING TV report altered the sting of the story; it had a distinct and damaging implication not otherwise conveyed by the report. In terms of the elements of defamation, Herron did offer evidence from which a jury could conclude that he was damaged by the falsehood in McGaffin's report in a way that was distinct from any damage inflicted by the true statements in the report. The inflated figure, and that alone, suggested that Herron had sold his integrity as a public official. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground that the sting of McGaffin's report was not affected by the false statement.