Opinion ID: 461631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: testimony of richard schair

Text: 48 Defendant Sharos objects first to testimony by Schair that between 1975 and 1979 the defendant Sharos was present at approximately 100 marijuana deals between Schair and Brian Biagini. Sharos argues that this evidence was not admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). The government contends that Schair's testimony was necessary to establish the relationship between Brian Biagini and George Sharos, and to explain the discrepancy between the stash house records listing a certain number of bales of marijuana delivered to George, and records kept by Jeffrey Bayles showing the same number of bales sold to Brian. The government also contends that Schair's testimony was probative on the issue of the identity of George. 49 As we have already mentioned, Rule 404(b) prohibits the introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts for the purpose of proving the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. See Shackleford, 738 F.2d at 779. Rule 404(b) provides, however, that evidence of prior bad acts are admissible for a number of other purposes. One of these admissible purposes is identity. In this instance, the testimony of Schair was admissible to show the identity of the George listed in the stash house records, and to show that the George appearing in the stash house records was consistent with the Brian in Bayles' records, because Biagini paid Bayles, and Sharos appeared at the stash house to pick up Biagini's marijuana. 11 Although the identity exception in Rule 404(b) usually applies to an unusual modus operandi, this exception is broad enough to include Schair's testimony about the relationship between Sharos and Biagini. Schair's testimony was also probative of Sharos' intent to distribute, see supra Sec. IA, and knowledge of the marijuana distribution business. 50 Sharos also challenges the admissibility of the testimony of Schair containing prior out-of-court statements by Bayles. Sharos argues that these statements by Bayles were hearsay, and that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), does not apply because Sharos was not a member of the conspiracy when Bayles made the out-of-court statements. 51 Although Sharos is correct that the statements by Bayles were hearsay, the statements were nonetheless admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The defendant and the declarant need not both be members of the conspiracy at the time of the statement, for a defendant who joins a conspiracy after its inception adopts all prior acts and declarations in furtherance of the conspiracy by his fellow co-conspirators. United States v. Coe, 718 F.2d 830, 839 (7th Cir.1983). Thus, whether or not Sharos had already become a member of the conspiracy at the time that Bayles made the statements, Schair's testimony was admissible against Sharos under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).