Opinion ID: 1951964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Transfer Trial From Mercer County

Text: 1. Defendant challenges his conviction on the ground that prejudicial pretrial and midtrial publicity in Mercer County undermined his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, a right guaranteed to criminal defendants by the state and federal constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. 14; N.J. Const. art. 1, ¶ 10; see Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 59-62, 459 A. 2d 641. Justice Stein set forth a concise account of the relevant principles in State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 548 A. 2d 846 (1988) ( Bey I ): The securing and preservation of an impartial jury goes to the very essence of a fair trial.    [This right] is of exceptional significance.    [T]riers of fact must be as nearly impartial `as the lot of humanity will admit.' It is axiomatic that a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial requires that he be tried before a jury panel not tainted by prejudice. [F]ailure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process. Of particular significance here is that aspect of impartiality mandating that the jury's verdict be based on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources. As expressed by Justice Holmes, [t]he theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print. ... The Court has consistently required trial courts to protect both jurors and their deliberations from illegitimate influences that threaten to taint the verdict. [T]rial judges must seek out and expose outside factors impinging upon the jury's freedom of action and its impartiality and essential integrity. [ Bey I, supra, 112 N.J. at 75, 548 A. 2d 846 (citations omitted).] Before applying these principles, we digress to examine important differences in four related concepts: (1) media publicity that is inherently prejudicial; (2) media publicity that is presumed to prejudice a fair trial; (3) the federal standard for reversing a state court conviction, and (4) the state standard for ordering a change of venue. Obviously, not all publicity about a crime is prejudicial to an accused. Some news accounts may simply report that charges have been made and include an outline of facts alleged in the indictment. Other types of media publicity, however, are prejudicial to fair trial rights because the publicity is inherently prejudicial or inflammatory. Several types of publicity fall into this category. The [perfect example] is a report of a confession or of other significant evidence that is suppressed or otherwise inadmissible. Closely related are reports of important factual details that the defendant will actively seek to dispute at trial. Also included are emotionally charged editorials. This category [of inherently prejudicial publicity] further encompasses prejudicial accounts of the defendant's criminal history, particularly when such accounts are inaccurate. [ Newcomb v. State, 800 P. 2d 935, 939 (Alaska Ct.App.1990).] Our cases have described such publicity as presumptively prejudicial. Koedatich I, supra, 112 N.J. at 351, 548 A. 2d 939. It is preferable to refer to the type of such media publicity described in Newcomb as inherently prejudicial publicity in order to distinguish such publicity from publicity that is presumptively prejudicial to fair trial rights. The latter concept describes a torrent of publicity that creates a carnival-like setting in which the trial atmosphere is so corrupted by publicity that prejudice may be presumed. State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 33, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987) ( Biegenwald II ). In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1975), the Supreme Court described the cases in which prejudice may be presumed. In such cases, the influence of the news media, either in the community at large or in the courtroom itself, pervaded the proceedings.... The trial in Estes [,for example,] had been conducted in a circus atmosphere, due in large part to the intrusions of the press, which was allowed to sit within the bar of the court and to overrun it with television equipment. Similarly, Sheppard arose from a trial infected not only by a background of extremely inflammatory publicity but also by a courthouse given over to accommodate the public appetite for carnival. The proceedings in these cases were entirely lacking in the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of a mob. [ Id. at 799, 95 S.Ct. at 2035-36, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 594.] Cases of presumed prejudice due to pretrial publicity are relatively rare and arise out of the most extreme circumstances. Koedatich I, supra, 112 N.J. at 269, 548 A. 2d 939. Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F. 2d 1487 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S.Ct. 2289, 90 L. Ed. 2d 730 (1986) offers an example of the analysis that is required to reach the conclusion that the presumed prejudice standard may be invoked. In Coleman, the community had been saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory pretrial publicity and an insufficient effort had been made to root out jurors exposed to the publicity. The doctrine of presumed prejudice arising from massive and pervasive publicity is one of two tests currently prescribed by the federal courts to demonstrate that fair trial rights have been infringed. The other is a test for actual prejudice. If prejudicial pretrial publicity makes it impossible to seat an impartial jury, then the trial judge must grant the defendant's motion for a change of venue. The prejudice requirement will be satisfied by a finding of: (1) presumed prejudice; or (2) actual prejudice. 1. Presumed Prejudice Prejudice is presumed when the record demonstrates that the community where the trial was held was saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the crime. Courts rarely find presumed prejudice because saturation defines conditions found only in extreme situations. .... 2. Actual Prejudice Actual prejudice exists if the jurors demonstrated actual partiality or hostility that cannot be laid aside. [J]urors need not, however, be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. [ Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F. 3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir.1993) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191, 114 S.Ct. 1294, 127 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1994).] According to the Ninth Circuit, trial courts must grant a defendant's motion for a change in venue if either test is met. Ibid. And federal habeas corpus relief is warranted if a state trial court has failed to comply with the rule. See ibid. The federal standard for reversal of a state court conviction should not, however, be confused with the state standard for granting a change of venue. See United States v. Houlihan, 926 F.Supp. 14, 16 n. 3 (D.Mass.1996) (observing that the [supervisory] threshold for unacceptable prejudicial publicity triggering a change in venue may well be lower than the constitutional standard). New Jersey Rule 3:14-2 authorizes a change of venue or trial by a foreign jury if the court finds that a fair and impartial trial cannot otherwise be had. Our law respecting motions for a change of venue in capital cases was initially considered in Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. 39, 459 A. 2d 641. It was further developed in Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A. 2d 130, and in Bey I, supra, 112 N.J. 45, 548 A. 2d 846. In Biegenwald II the Court observed that under the former test set forth in State v. Wise, 19 N.J. 59, 73-74, 115 A. 2d 62 (1955), which required clear and convincing proof that an impartial jury could not be obtained in the county where the indictment took place, few defendants succeeded in obtaining a change of venue. Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 33, 524 A. 2d 130. Accordingly, in Williams I, the Court modified the defendant's burden, conferring on trial courts the discretion to change venue when it is necessary to overcome the realistic likelihood of prejudice from pretrial publicity. Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 67 n. 13, 459 A. 2d 641. 2. There can be no doubt that this case was accompanied by widespread, inherently prejudicial pretrial media coverage. Strong measures were necessary to overcome the realistic likelihood of prejudice from pretrial publicity. Id. at 67-68, 459 A. 2d 641. The trial court found that one media source, the Trentonian, a Mercer County newspaper, had conducted a vengeance seeking crusade against defendant. It had published a stream of invective that had been constant, prolonged, and sensationalized. According to the trial court, there was a reasonable likelihood of its taint permeating the trial. The newspaper ran many front-page, invective-filled headlines: Ex-Inmate: Suspect is a Loudmouthed Punk, Huggins Suspect `Would Kill You in a Heartbeat,' Profile of a Monster: The Man Who Killed Kristin Huggins Committed His First Rape as a Teenager, From Boy to Beast, Huggins Slayer Terrorizes Prison, He's Satan in Disguise. Other news accounts discussed the defendant's prior criminal record as well as other crimes he was suspected of committing. An editorialist predicted that death by lethal injection would rid society of one of the biggest pieces of human trash ever to blight Trenton streets. A sample of the accounts is attached as Schedule A. Based on the content of the newspaper coverage and the paper's editorial stance, the trial court concluded that Ambrose Harris was no longer the subject of a news story, but rather the target of the newspaper's crusade. The court concluded that the pretrial publicity met the federal standard of presumed prejudice. In its decision affirming the importation of foreign jurors the Appellate Division observed that such coverage had continued unabated, even during the oral argument of the interlocutory appeal. That event generated a full-page headline: Justice for Kristin Delayed Again. State v. Harris, supra, 282 N.J.Super. at 415, 660 A. 2d 539. The reason that we do not reverse defendant's conviction is that the trial court agreed with defendant that there was a realistic likelihood of prejudice from prejudicial trial publicity and used one of the trial management techniques specifically approved to ensure that a defendant's right to an impartial jury is not compromised. We said in Biegenwald II : In criminal cases attended by widespread and inflammatory publicity, various trial management techniques can be employed to assure that the defendant's right to an impartial jury is not compromised. One available option is a change in venue. Other means of protecting the defendant's constitutional rights include the use of searching voir dire examinations, the impaneling of foreign jurors to augment the pool of eligible jurors in the vicinage, adjournment of the trial date, and restraints on public comments by participants in the trial. [ Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 32, 524 A. 2d 130 (emphasis added).] In fact, the empanelment of foreign jurors was the first trial management technique that Williams I suggested to combat the effects of preexisting prejudicial pretrial publicity. The Court said: The court should explore the feasibility of augmenting the pool of eligible jurors in the vicinage, and should consider the practicability of using citizens from beyond the particular vicinage to serve as potential jurors, the use of so-called `foreign jurors.' Similarly, a change of trial venue may help to overcome the risk of prejudice. Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 67, 459 A. 2d 641 (emphasis added). In the footnote to its opinion, the Williams I Court observed that a change of venue has the same benefits and drawbacks as the impanelling of a foreign jury since both methods utilize jurors from communities where publicity may be less intense. Id. at 67 n. 13, 459 A. 2d 641. In order to facilitate the empanelment of foreign juries, the court held that the number of peremptory challenges should not be reduced if a foreign jury was chosen by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion. Id. at 67 n. 12, 459 A. 2d 641. In short, every intendment of our law was that the empanelment of a foreign jury be an adequate response to the realistic likelihood that the jury would be subjected to adverse trial publicity. 3. Hence, we find no error in the trial court's decision to empanel a foreign jury rather than to transfer venue. When, however, a capital case is accompanied by a stream of public invective such as surrounded this case, it occasions us to reconsider our precedent. In analyzing this conflict between free press and fair trial rights, we take guidance from Justice Jackson. He wrote: The right of the people to have a free press is a vital one, but so is the right to have a calm and fair trial free from outside pressures and influences. Every other right, including the right of a free press itself, may depend on the ability to get a judicial hearing as dispassionate and impartial as the weakness inherent in men will permit. [ Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 394-95, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1263, 91 L. Ed. 1546, 1561 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).] In an ideal world a free press would seek to foster fair trial rights by not circulating inherently prejudicial publicity at least during a time of trial. See Fred W. Friendly & Martha J.H. Elliott, The Constitution: That Delicate Balance 148 (1984). If this cannot be so, courts must guarantee the preservation of fair trial rights without any restraint of the editorial freedom of the press. We long ago made the choice that free speech is the national currency. Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 201, 445 A. 2d 376, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907, 103 S.Ct. 211, 74 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1982). In future capital cases a court should change the venue of a capital trial when there is a realistic likelihood that presumptively prejudicial publicity will continue during the conduct of a trial. Presumptively prejudicial publicity is recognized as a barrage of inflammatory reporting that may but need not include all of the following: evidence that would be inadmissible at the trial, editorial opinions on guilt or innocence, and media pronouncements on the death-worthiness of a defendant. We realize that this respect for a free press imposes an added expense and inconvenience on the State and the victims of crime. The alternatives, sequestration of jurors or gag orders on the press, have proven unacceptable. See generally Allen, supra, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A. 2d 377. B.