Opinion ID: 3065361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantial Evidence of Extreme Hardship

Text: Finally, Singh asks us to review the IJ’s determination that he will not suffer “extreme hardship” if removed to India. We review the IJ’s and BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence. See, e.g., Zhao v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992) (noting that “[t]o reverse the BIA finding we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it”). [12] In considering Singh’s hardship claim, the IJ focused on the following consequences of removal: Singh does not have a job in India and would have a lower standard of living; he would be separated from his family; and he would face “cultural difficulties.” On the other hand, the IJ noted, Singh has spent most of his life in India, speaks the language, and has traveled there several times since leaving. Additionally, Singh is young and healthy, and he has assets he could sell to finance his return to India. It is somewhat unclear from the record whether the IJ considered the hardship factors separately or in the aggregate; he never explicitly stated which he was doing. [13] The BIA conducted a de novo review and “affirm[ed] the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that the respondent has 718 SINGH v. HOLDER not carried his burden of demonstrating the requisite level of hardship either individually or in the aggregate.” Assuming the IJ was required to aggregate the evidence, and assuming he failed to do so, any error was rendered harmless by the BIA’s de novo review and decision, which explicitly considered the evidence in the aggregate. Nor can we disagree with the BIA’s conclusion that the evidence presented by Singh does not establish, even in the aggregate, that “extreme hardship” would result if he were removed. See Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 I. & N. Dec. 629, 635 (BIA 1978) (explaining that “[extreme] hardship . . . encompasses more than the mere economic deprivation that might result from an alien’s deportation from the United States . . . . [T]he readjustment of an alien to life in his native country after having spent a number of years in the United States is not the type of hardship that we have characterized as extreme . . . .”). We therefore conclude that even if the IJ erred in evaluating the evidence concerning hardship, his errors were rendered harmless by the BIA’s de novo review, and the BIA did not err. IV. CONCLUSION [14] For the reasons given, we hold that we have jurisdiction to review determinations of extreme hardship under INA § 216(c)(4)(A). Because the BIA did not err in holding that Balbir Singh’s removal would not result in extreme hardship, we deny the petition for review. PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.