Opinion ID: 2319967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Excluding a Photograph

Text: When discussing the pattern matching process on cross-examination, Morin explained that experts are looking for quality and quantity of detail that matches, [that is,] striated detail, which are lines, or [] impressed type detail, pot mark type detail, [or] circular detail. Morin then described his laboratory's policy not to take photographs of our examinations[,] due to the fact that photographs are two-dimensional representations of what we are looking at, which is generally three-dimensional. Under a microscope, experts can determine the depth and width of impressed details, which is not easily reproduced in a photograph. According to Morin, based on [] training and experience, experts are also able to filter out some of the extraneous detail that is necessarily left by [] residue in the barrel[.] For those reasons, [a] photograph may lead somebody who is not trained in the examination of firearms to the wrong conclusion. By contrast, Mulderig had taken a photograph through his comparison microscope and defense counsel used it to question him about his exam techniques and conclusions. First, the defense got him to agree that, although there's a pattern of striation marks[] on the primer, which you have determined to be consistent on both casings, ... [t]here are also marks on both the primer and the case head which do not appear to be consistent, right? After Mulderig described the picture, [12] defense counsel questioned him about several specific differences between the two images depicted there. For example, counsel asked: Now on the silver one it would appear that there's a firing pin impression on the very center of the primer? ... And there's a similar crater-looking firing pin impression on the gold sampleevidence sample, but it's to the right of the center of the primer, ... at about 3 o'clock? Defense counsel questioned Mulderig about another mark at 9 o'clock, or maybe at 9:30, on the gold sample which did not appear at the same position on the silver shell casing[.] The defense also inquired whether Mulderig agreed that at 12 o'clock, on the base head of the gold cartridge case there's a remarkable blemish ... [and] there is no similar remarkable image at the same 12 o'clock position on the silver case head? Although Mulderig readily conceded these apparent differences in the markings on the two casings as depicted in the photo, he also explained that a trained examiner doesn't come to any conclusions by looking at pictures. You have to look at the evidence. He emphasized that, just because [i]n the photo there is not a similar mark on the two casings, that doesn't mean it wasn't there under the microscope.... I'm looking at a microscope with very, very expensive equipment, called lenses, and a camera may not capture everything[.] So when conducting an examination, he testified, I don't rely on the photographs; I'm relying on my eyes, and my microscope[.] Subsequently, at a bench conference held so as not to put defense counsel on the spot in front of the jury, the trial court confirm[ed that counsel was] not at a point to move th[e] exhibit into evidence. Defense counsel agreed, but said, I do intend to move it into evidence. The prosecutor then noted that he planned to object, given the experts' testimony that a picture does not fairly and accurately capture everything an examiner sees under a microscope. The prosecutor mentioned this in advance, he explained, because Mulderig would not be available after the prosecution rested, and so that [the defense] wouldn't be trying to [admit it] in the absence of a witness in the defense case. Defense counsel responded: That's fair. And I appreciate it. I'll try and lay the foundation for it right now. Counsel then asked Mulderig: [G]iven th[e] caveat that you testified [about] previously that it may not depict certain marks that you can see with your eyes in the microscope [because] the camera hasn't picked [them] up, is the photograph a fair and accurate depiction of what you looked at through the microscope? Mulderig answered: For the most part, yes. At no point during Mulderig's testimony did defense counsel seek to admit the photograph into evidence. Later, Judge Dixon expressed the tentative view [] that based on the witness's testimony to that point, he would not admit the photograph because it would be more confusing than it is probative. Instead, the defense would need some sort of expert testimony that the photograph was actually demonstrable of either the lack of a comparison, or of the comparison. The court gave such notice just so that if you need to make arrangements with your expert you can do so. Counsel responded: We do intend to do that, Your Honor. Yet, despite having retained a firearms expert who had looked at the photograph, conducted an independent test-fire, and examined the evidence, the defense did not present testimony from him or any other expert. When the defense sought to introduce the picture into evidence at the end of its case, Judge Dixon excluded it, having viewed the photograph with respect to what the defense contends may be differences that the [] expert should have taken into con[sidera]tion, and based on the expert's testimony ... that no expert would use that type of photograph to make an analysis[,] and in the absence of any contrary evidence....
The admission of photographs is `within the sound discretion of the trial judge.' Henderson v. United States, 527 A.2d 1262, 1264 (D.C.1987) (quoting Rich v. District of Columbia, 410 A.2d 528, 531 (D.C.1979)). This is because the trial judge [] is in the best position to determine [the photograph's] relevance and accuracy. Simms v. Dixon, 291 A.2d 184, 186 (D.C.1972); see also March v. United States, 362 A.2d 691, 704 (D.C.1976) (the trial judge ... is in the best position to determine whether [the photographs] properly reflect the testimony or the circumstances sought to be depicted) (brackets in original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The test of admissibility is whether the photograph[] accurately represent[s] the facts allegedly portrayed by [it]. Henderson, 527 A.2d at 1264 (quoting Simms, 291 A.2d at 186). Jones's attorney reasoned that Mulderig explained why the [differences] don't change his opinion about the identification, but it is relevant evidence, and the jury should be allowed to understand what he's talking about. However, both experts testified that such two-dimensional depictions of what examiners observe three-dimensionally under a microscope do not accurately represent the physical differences in the markings on the casings. According to both experts, photographs can be misleading. Because of its inherent deficiencies, Mulderig never unequivocally stated that the photograph was a fair and accurate depiction of what an examiner would see through a microscope. Discretion signifies choice. ( James) Johnson, v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C.1979). We do not render [our] own decision of what judgment is most wise under the circumstances presented, but instead recognize that the decision-maker exercising discretion has the ability to choose from a range of permissible conclusions. Id. at 361-62. Although another judge might have admitted the photograph, perhaps with a cautionary instruction, Judge Dixon did not act outside the range of permissible conclusions by excluding it. Moreover, we are not convinced that seeing the photograph would have affected the jury's verdict. See id. at 367 (a trial court has not abused its discretion unless the exercise of discretion was in error and ... the impact of that error requires reversal) (emphasis added). Testimony that the photograph depicted several readily observable differences in the casings was certainly before the jury. Moreover, defense counsel extensively and effectively cross-examined Mulderig about those dissimilar markings and made the jurors well aware that Mulderig had not provided them with a visual means to evaluate his conclusion. Regardless of whether Judge Dixon erred in excluding the picture, doing so did not cause Jones any significant prejudice, Stone v. Alexander, 6 A.3d 847, 851 (D.C.2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), and reversal is not warranted.