Opinion ID: 2509294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Relating to Removal and Replacement of Second Counsel

Text: On December 14, 1993, attorney Syamak Shafi-Nia, who had been privately retained, appeared on defendant's behalf at his arraignment. Defendant was also represented at that point by Milton Kerlan. After Kerlan withdrew from the case, Robert Sheahen was substituted in to conduct the preliminary hearing. Shafi-Nia had limited experience in criminal law and described his role as being there to help defendant. Sheahen, by contrast, was a veteran criminal lawyer with death penalty experience. [3] On February 25, 1994, Shafi-Nia and Sheahen were appointed by Judge Ito to represent defendant to settle the case. Shafi-Nia was appointed pursuant to Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786, 140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750, notwithstanding his lack of criminal law experience, because of his personal relationship with defendant. Judge Ito made it clear that Shafi-Nia was being appointed as second counsel because of his lesser qualifications as a criminal lawyer. On June 1, 1994, Judge Ito reappointed Shafi-Nia and Sheahen for all purposes. The case was transferred to Van Nuys where it was ultimately tried by Judge Kriegler. On November 21, 1994, defendant made a Marsden motion ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44) primarily directed at removing Shafi-Nia. He objected to Shafi-Nia's inexperience in not being a criminal attorney and definitely not qualifying for first degree death penalty cases, and also faulted Shafi-Nia for his inadequate translation of a magazine article from Farsi to English. Defendant requested a second outstanding criminal attorney with appropriate experience and expertise in death penalty cases. The trial court denied the motion, remarking, I don't think there's any need for a second attorney in this case. I think it's nice that Mr. Shafi-Nia has been here to serve the function that he was appointed to serve, but it's more than the defendant necessarily would have received. On November 29, Sheahen informed the court that Shafi-Nia had been in a traffic accident the previous day for which he was being treated, but did not request a continuance. The following day, jury selection began. Sheahen waived Shafi-Nia's presence. The court expressed its understanding that Sheahen would be handling all the jury selection. Sheahen agreed that he would be making the calls here. At the afternoon session, however, he said Shafi-Nia was his communication link to defendant and that it was very important that he be here. He acknowledged he was not unable to proceed in Shafi-Nia's absence and asked that, if Shafi-Nia could not be present, another lawyer be appointed. He conceded he had not asked the case to be put over and was prepared to go the distance on jury selection. He also acknowledged that 97 percent of the decisions in this case have been made by me, and that Shafi-Nia's learning curve had been like a fifty-pound weight that we are dragging around. Nonetheless, he said, Shafi-Nia had assisted him on the juror questionnaires. The prosecutor suggested a recess to allow Sheahen to read the questionnaires. Sheahen requested that the proceedings be adjourn[ed] until Shafi-Nia could return or, if the court declined to do so, he requested that the court appoint a new and different second counsel for Mr. Panah. The court did not rule on the request, nor did Sheahen press for a ruling. At some point, the court received a fax from Southern California Orthopedic and Medical Associates, dated November 29. It stated Shafi-Nia required bed rest for five days because of back pain due to the traffic accident. On December 1, both Sheahen and Shafi-Nia appeared. Shafi-Nia wanted more time to discuss possible settlement and asked for a 10-day continuance or, alternatively, that another lawyer be appointed for defendant. The prosecutor said he would not object to the five-day continuance requested for Shafi-Nia to recover, but would object if the continuance was sought to give the defense more time to talk defendant into taking a plea. That afternoon, Shafi-Nia's representation of defendant was again discussed. The trial court had reviewed the transcript of Shafi-Nia's appointment and observed that he had been appointed to facilitate a settlement and because of his long-standing relationship with defendant. The court remarked that the latter ground has nothing to do with this case. And I think in retrospect it has created nothing but problems for the court and the orderly processing of this case. The court also reiterated its belief that the case did not require two lawyers. It denied the request for a 10-day continuance, noting that it was giving Shafi-Nia until Monday, December 5 â the five days requested in the November 29 fax. On December 5, the court received a fax from Dr. Solomon Hakimi saying Shafi-Nia continued to have severe lower back pain and required bed rest until December 10, at which point he would be evaluated again. The defense requested a continuance. It was denied. The next day, defendant requested that the case be continued until Shafi-Nia could return or alternatively, for appointment of new counsel. Sheahen told the court he had spoken with a possible replacement, Marcia Morrissey. The court indicated it was willing to entertain this request but denied the continuance. Later that day, when the court was informed Ms. Morrissey was not available, the court said it would consider another attorney if Sheahen proposed one. At the end of the court day, the trial court noted Shafi-Nia had not appeared. It terminated Shafi-Nia's appointment and appointed William Chais in his place as second chair. Defendant thanked the court, but Sheahen objected that replacing Shafi-Nia deprived defendant of Shafi-Nia's preparation and communication skills. He also complained that Shafi-Nia remained in possession of some files. The trial court responded that it would order him to return the files. The following day, the court made the following statement to Mr. Sheahen to clarify the record: You had, in fact, requested that a new second attorney be appointed and . . . your client last week had made that request. [ķ] And I denied that request from [ sic ] the grounds Mr. Shafi-Nia was fulfilling the limited function he had been appointed to fulfill. [ķ] You repeated your request for a new second lawyer yesterday, and I took action to ensure that an experienced criminal lawyer was brought in as second chair in an exercise of my discretion. [ķ] That was not done because I felt that defendant was receiving inadequate representation or that the absence of Mr. Shafi-Nia had any impact whatever on how the trial had progressed to that point. [ķ] It was done because the case started with two lawyers, and I thought really just to continue having two lawyers would be in the defendant's best interest. Sheahen responded that the defense would have preferred a continuance and complained again that Shafi-Nia was in possession of files in the case. At the end of the day, the defense investigator informed the court that he had spoken to Shafi-Nia and arranged for the missing files to be brought to court. At the end of the guilt phase, the trial court observed that Chais had done an outstanding job, and that what he added to the trial in terms of good lawyering, coordination, and communication is far beyond what Mr. Shafi-Nia could have ever hoped to have added in this case because of his complete lack of criminal experience. Sheahen argued that Chais, who was 32 years old, lacked trial experience in murder cases and should have been given time to prepare. The court pointed out that the defense had not requested a continuance for that purpose nor had Chais ever indicated he was unprepared.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by: (1) denying his request for a continuance to permit Shafi-Nia to recover from his back injury; (2) removing Shafi-Nia over his objection; (3) appointing Chais; and (4) failing to give Chais adequate time to prepare. He asserts the errors were of federal constitutional magnitude. As we explain, we reject his claims. `The granting or denial of a motion for continuance in the midst of a trial traditionally rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge who must consider not only the benefit which the moving party anticipates but also the likelihood that such benefit will result, the burden on other witnesses, jurors and the court and, above all, whether substantial justice will be accomplished or defeated by a granting of the motion.' [Citation.] In the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion and prejudice to the defendant, a denial of a motion for a continuance does not require reversal of a conviction. [Citation.] ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1125-1126, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384, quoting People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 972, 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704; § 1050, subd. (e).) Defendant bears the burden of establishing that denial of a continuance request was an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 1003, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) There was no such abuse of discretion here, but even if there was, defendant was not prejudiced. The trial had already commenced and the respective roles of defendant's two lawyers, Sheahen and Shafi-Nia, were clearly delineated. It was understood that Sheahen would be conducting the defense at trial because, by his own admission, Shafi-Nia was not qualified to try the case. Sheahen had, at least initially, waived Shafi-Nia's presence for purposes of jury selection and even after Sheahen argued that Shafi-Nia should be present, he acknowledged that he, not Shafi-Nia, was making 97 percent of the decisions in the case. Sheahen also conceded he was able to proceed in Shafi-Nia's absence. Additionally, the continuance requests escalated from an initial request of five days, which, in effect, the court granted, to 10 days, and then, ultimately, to an open-ended request. [4] Furthermore, the trial court had reason to believe that the underlying reason for the request was not to allow Shafi-Nia to recover, but to obtain more time for defense counsel to persuade defendant to plead guilty after many months of fruitless plea negotiations. Thus, the trial court was being asked to continue a trial that had already begun to some unknown point in the future to accommodate defendant's secondary lawyer whose role in the trial, it was understood by all participants, was to have been, at best, limited. Given these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the request. Defendant argues that Shafi-Nia's status as  Harris counsel, because of his long-standing and unique relationship with defendant, rendered his participation in the trial essential. We disagree. In Harris, while affirming the general principle that an indigent defendant's choice of counsel is not a dispositive factor in the appointment of counsel, we concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it rejected defendants' request to appoint as counsel attorneys who had represented them in prior related criminal proceedings and with whom defendants had developed a relationship of trust and confidence over a substantial period of time. ( Harris v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 799, 140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750.) We laid particular stress on the prior representation factor because it served to provide those attorneys with an extensive background in various factual and legal matters which may well become relevant in the instant proceeding â a background which any other attorney appointed to the case would necessarily be called upon to acquire. ( Id. at p. 798, 140 Cal.Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750.) In this case, there was no prior history of representation like that present in Harris and, unlike the attorneys in Harris, Shafi-Nia was so wholly inexperienced in criminal matters that, even in appointing him, Judge Ito made it clear he was to function as second counsel, behind Sheahen. The only basis supporting Shafi-Nia's appointment was his prior personal relationship with defendant. Fully aware of the circumstances of Shafi-Nia's appointment, the trial court concluded that he was not essential to the defense, but was, at most, a special benefit bestowed on defendant by Judge Ito. The record bears this out. Just one week before trial began, defendant specifically sought to remove Shafi-Nia because of Shafi-Nia's lack of criminal law experience and his deficiencies as a translator. [5] Additionally, the various defense requests for a continuance also alternatively requested appointment of new counsel. Moreover, lead counsel Sheahen acknowledged that Shafi-Nia's lack of criminal experience was, in essence, a dead weight on the defense. Plainly, by the time this case reached the trial stage, any value Shafi-Nia may have had to the defense was exhausted. Defendant also contends that the denial of his request for a continuance was detrimental because Shafi-Nia had been in contact with a number of potential witnesses in Iran and with defendant's German girlfriend, all of whom may have testified at the penalty phase but, ultimately, did not. This argument was not made to the trial judge at the time defendant requested the continuance and to the extent he bases his claim of error on this point, his claim is forfeited. (Cf. People v. Crovedi (1966) 65 Cal.2d 199, 207, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868 [whether denial of a continuance constitutes a due process violation `must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied'].) In any event, defendant fails to establish either that the testimony of these witnesses â all of them unidentified except defendant's German girlfriend â would have been anything other than cumulative to his mother's penalty phase testimony. [6] Accordingly, Shafi-Nia's asserted status as  Harris counsel did not render the denial of defendant's request for a continuance an abuse of discretion. Since there was no abuse of discretion there is thus no predicate error on which to base the [defendant's] constitutional claims. ( People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 506, fn. 2, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521.) Accordingly, we reject them as well. Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights when it removed Shafi-Nia from the case. On appeal, a trial court's removal of counsel for an indigent criminal defendant is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1187, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811; People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 629, 194 Cal.Rptr. 462, 668 P.2d 769 [a trial court may remove defense counsel, even over a defendant's objections, in order to eliminate potential conflicts, ensure adequate representations, or prevent substantial impairment of court proceedings...].) Whether the trial court acted within its discretion in removing counsel to prevent disruption of the orderly processes of justice is to be determined under the circumstances of the particular case. ( People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 208, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868; People v. Strozier (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 55, 62, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 362.) A court abuses its discretion when it acts unreasonably under the circumstances of the particular case. ( People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1185, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.) In this case, given Shafi-Nia's indeterminate unavailability coupled with defendant's insistence that he was entitled to two attorneys, the trial court acted within its discretion in relieving Shafi-Nia and replacing him. Defendant advances the same arguments he raised in connection with his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance. We find them no more persuasive in this context than in the continuance context and for the same reason we reject them. Further, the cases upon which he relies are inapposite because they involve the removal of lead counsel (e.g., People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d 199, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868) or removal for reasons not present here (e.g., Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 68 Cal.Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65 [trial court exceeded its authority by removing counsel for incompetence].) Even if the trial court abused its discretion either by denying defendant's requests for a continuance or by removing Shafi-Nia, we would find any error harmless. Preliminarily, we reject defendant's assertion that the removal of Shafi-Nia, if error, is reversible per se. For this proposition, defendant relies on People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d 199, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868. In Crovedi, we found that the trial court denied defendant his federal and state constitutional right to counsel when it denied his request for a seven-week continuance of trial to permit his attorney to recover from a heart attack, and removed counsel, and replaced him with the attorney's law partner over the latter's protest. ( People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 201-203, 208-209, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868.) In this situation, we concluded the constitutional violation required reversal  regardless of whether a fair trial resulted. ( Id. at p. 205, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868; accord, People v. Gzikowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 589, 186 Cal.Rptr. 339, 651 P.2d 1145 [denial of continuance to permit counsel to associate more experienced cocounsel, after withdrawal of original, experienced cocounsel, reversible regardless of whether a fair trial resulted].) Here, Shafi-Nia was secondary counsel who had, from the beginning of his representation of defendant, disavowed any intention of trying the case, leaving that duty to Sheahen. Under these circumstances, a reversible per se standard is not required. (See People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 952, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103 [after one cocounsel withdrew, the defendant agreed to proceed with remaining counsel and nothing in the record suggests [remaining counsel] was an inexperienced attorney or was otherwise unable to assume lead counsel status; distinguishing Gzikowski ].) Defendant was represented by two competent lawyers, and nothing in the record shows he was prejudiced by Shafi-Nia's removal. Accordingly, any error, if there was error, was harmless under any standard of review. Defendant makes two additional, related claims. He asserts that the trial court erred by appointing Chais because he was unqualified to try a death penalty case and that the court erred by failing to give Chais sufficient time to prepare. These claims are forfeited because defendant did not object to the appointment of Chais on grounds he was unqualified, nor did Chais request a continuance to prepare. In any event, defendant does not demonstrate Chais rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, he fails to show any prejudice arising from his claims of error.