Opinion ID: 552465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Interests Underlying DOC's Policy.

Text: 37 Even if the speech at issue here is on a matter of public concern, I would find that the DOC's policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and outweighs any right of the guards to make direct recommendations to the Parole Board. Although the defendants did not raise the issue in their motion to dismiss, 4 the magistrate concluded that the DOC's policy is not justified by important security interests. Mag.Rep. at 6. The magistrate found that the defendants had made no showing that the recommendations could cause disrespect for authority among staff or inmates, or that the recommendations contained confidential information, or that they would be publicized outside of the parole hearing. Id. 38 Given the fact that the majority finds that the plaintiff has standing, the case as it comes before us involves a challenge by a prisoner to an administrative regulation of a prison. As such, we should review the case under the standard of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), which ensures that administrative decisions of prison officials are accorded appropriate deference by the courts. Turner stated that when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261. The Supreme Court recently stated: 39 Our earlier determination to adopt this standard of review was based upon the need to reconcile our longstanding adherence to the principle that inmates retain at least some constitutional rights despite incarceration with the recognition that prison authorities are best equipped to make difficult decisions regarding prison administration. [citing Turner and Jones ] These two principles apply in all cases in which a prisoner asserts that a prison regulation violates the Constitution, not just those in which the prisoner invokes the First Amendment. We made quite clear that the standard of review adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights. 40 Washington v. Harper, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990). 41 The policy being challenged by the plaintiff in this case states in part: 42 [I]ndividual employee recommendations to the Parole Board in behalf of inmates must end. It not only violates the chain of command, but may in fact compromise individual employees. Should there ever be the occasion for recommendation other than in the normal parole review process, employees should forward it to the Warden for his endorsement.... 43 The policy shows on its face that one of its purposes is to eliminate the possible compromise of guards. A requirement that parole recommendations pass through the chain of command certainly appears to be a reasonable measure to avoid such a situation. There is clearly a potential for corruption in the relationship between guard and inmate and this potential goes unchecked when a guard is in a position to do favors for an inmate without the knowledge of prison supervisors. Cf. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356, 100 S.Ct. 594, 600, 62 L.Ed.2d 540 (1980) (Without the opportunity to review materials before they are dispersed throughout his base, a military commander could not avert possible disruptions among his troops) and Jones, 433 U.S. at 134, 97 S.Ct. at 2542 (A prison may be no more easily converted into a public forum than a military base.) The magistrate below dismissed any such reasoning, declaring: Prison staff members simply have nothing to gain or lose from the parole of an inmate, even a 'favorite' inmate.... Mag.Rep. at 4. To say the least, this unfounded conclusion gives no deference whatsoever to the informed discretion of prison officials, nor does it give appropriate recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of penal confinement. Turner, 482 U.S. at 86, 107 S.Ct. at 2260 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977)). Applying the standard of review set forth in Turner, I would find that the magistrate erred in requiring a more extensive showing by the defendants as to the need for the regulation of unsupervised parole recommendations. The prison does not have to produce witnesses and documents demonstrating that it has an interest in maintaining discipline and preventing corruption between inmates and guards. 5 Cf. Jones, 433 U.S. at 132, 97 S.Ct. at 2541. (The interest in preserving order and authority in the prisons is self-evident; it is enough to say that the prison has not been shown to be wrong in its regulations relating to prison security) and id. at 135, 97 S.Ct. at 2543 (Since a prison is most emphatically not a 'public forum,' [the] reasonable beliefs of appellants are sufficient.... The District Court's further requirement of a demonstrable showing that [a prisoner's union] was in fact harmful is inconsistent with the deference federal courts should pay to the informed discretion of prison officials.). I would find that the DOC's policy, which requires that parole recommendations be submitted to the Warden for his endorsement, is reasonably related to legitimate security interests and is not unconstitutional.