Opinion ID: 216584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possession Of The Drugs

Text: “To sustain the charge of possession with intent to distribute, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about [May 15, 2008, Leary] (1) knowingly; (2) possessed a controlled substance; (3) with intent to distribute.” United States v. McGee, 529 F.3d 691, 696 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Leary argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he was “trafficking or was possessing the drugs with the intent to traffic,” 1 When a defendant who makes a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case fails to renew that motion at the close of all the evidence, we ordinarily review for “manifest miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059, 1063 (6th Cir. 1989). The government, however, has not raised this argument on appeal, and instead argues that our review is de novo, thereby waiving any objection to the application of the ordinary standard of review. See United States v. Tosh, 330 F.3d 836, 840 n.4 (6th Cir. 2003) (deeming an argument not made by the government on appeal to have been waived); FED . R. APP . P. 28(b) (stating the requirements of appellee’s brief and noting that “the statement of the standard of review” need not appear “unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the appellant’s statement”). 7 No. 09-5418 United States v. Leary taking issue with the government’s use of Shane Ensminger in particular. Leary Brief at 20. To support his arguments Leary points out that Easy and Branch both had access to the closet, and Easy even kept some of his belongings there. Leary also observes that Ensminger had no personal knowledge of the facts of Leary’s case and that there were “no indications of paraphernalia, no smells, no cooking materials, no scales, no notebooks, no anything other than the simple existence of 4 grams of rock cocaine in a closet shared by at least 2 people and used by 3 or 4.” Id. at 21. We do not believe there is merit in these arguments. “A conviction for possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute can be based upon a showing of actual or constructive possession.” United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1998). “Constructive possession requires evidence supporting the conclusion that the defendant had the ability to exercise knowing dominion and control over the items in question.” United States v. Wettstain, 618 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ability to exercise dominion and control over the drugs can be direct or through others. United States v. Cobbs, 233 F. App’x 524, 534 (6th Cir. 2007). Furthermore, this element may be established by evidence showing Leary’s proximity to the drugs combined with some other evidence—a specific nexus—linking him to the drugs. See, e.g., id. (“While mere proximity to the drugs is not sufficient, proximity combined with other evidence of the defendant’s involvement in a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine will suffice to establish possession.”). Additionally, we have emphasized that constructive possession requires a specific intent, see United States v. Bailey, 553 F.3d 940, 945 (6th Cir. 2009); a defendant must “‘knowingly ha[ve] the power and the intention at a given time to 8 No. 09-5418 United States v. Leary exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others,’” United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 507 (6th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Kincade, 145 F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 606 (6th Cir. 2006). Proof that one knowingly and intentionally has dominion over the premises where the contraband is found “is sufficient to establish constructive possession.” Kincaide, 145 F.3d at 782. Here, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that Leary constructively possessed the crack cocaine found in the closet. First, it is clear that Leary knowingly and intentionally exercised dominion over the premises because he and Luhman admitted that they both lived in the apartment, and he further admitted that he kept his possessions on the left side of the walk-in closet. The drugs were also found on his side of the closet, underneath his hats. Officers Burnett and Muller both testified that Leary admitted that the hats, along with the men’s clothing and the duffel bags on that side of the closet, were his. In addition, Luhman testified that she had seen Leary in the past with crack cocaine in a small, plastic bag, just as it was found here. This is sufficient to establish that Leary had the “ability to exercise knowing ‘dominion and control’” over the drugs. Wettstain, 618 F.3d at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted); Cobbs, 233 F. App’x at 534. Furthermore, although it is clear that others, namely Easy and Branch, had access to the closet and could have possessed the drugs, the focus of this inquiry is on whether the evidence, “‘viewed in the light most favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Burchard, 580 F.3d at 352 (quoting Solorio, 337 F.3d at 588). The evidence, we believe, meets this standard. 9 No. 09-5418 United States v. Leary