Opinion ID: 853024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Delay in Presentation to Magistrate

Text: In his second motion to suppress his confession, Griffith asserted that the delay between his arrest and the probable cause hearing violated his rights under the United States Constitution. An individual detained following a warrantless arrest is entitled to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to any further restraint on his liberty. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). The promptness requirement is satisfied under Gerstein when the administrative steps incident to arrest are completed. Id. In Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (citations omitted), the Court was more specific about the Gerstein standard: a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein. The law of Due Process acknowledges that delays cannot always be avoided, [1] but the government must justify such delays. Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, ... the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. Id. at 57, 111 S.Ct. 1661. The fact that in a particular case it may take longer than forty-eight hours to consolidate pretrial proceedings does not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance. Id. The facts show that approximately sixty-three hours passed between Griffith's arrest and his appearance before the magistrate for a determination of probable cause. Thus, the burden shifted to the State to demonstrate a bona fide emergency or extraordinary circumstance. Because Griffith was not included on the jail population list, his appearance before a magistrate was delayed. Of course, Riverside stands for the proposition that preliminary paperwork and pretrial proceedings do not constitute an extraordinary circumstance. The State is thus correct to acknowledge that the detention for sixty-three hours prior to a probable cause hearing was unreasonable under the Riverside analysis. Whether this requires suppression of Griffith's confession is another matter. Even where a confession occurs before the defendant sees a magistrate, suppression may not be the inevitable remedy. Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 84, 114 S.Ct. 1280, 128 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994) (delay in presentation to judge was unconstitutionally delayed, but [i]t does not necessarily follow, however, that Powell must `be set free'). The trial court in this case ordered suppression of any evidence gained after the forty-eight hours elapsed but before the probable cause hearing occurred. (App. at 585.) Griffith's confession, however, did not occur until two days after he saw the magistrate. And it occurred because he asked to speak with officers from the Greenwood Police Department. We think it plain enough that Griffith's confession was not the product of delay in bringing him before the magistrate and that the trial court correctly declined to suppress it.