Opinion ID: 2339611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Identity Theft Conviction

Text: [¶ 21] Rodgers next challenges the validity of his conviction for felony identity theft under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-901 (LexisNexis 2011). The statute defines identity theft generally as: (a) Every person who willfully obtains personal identifying information of another person, and uses that information for any unlawful purpose, including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services or medical information in the name of the other person without the consent of that person is guilty of theft of identity. The statute then classifies the grade of the crime between misdemeanor and felony as follows: (c) Theft of identity is: (i) A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both, if no economic benefit was gained or was attempted to be gained, or if an economic benefit of less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) was gained or was attempted to be gained by the defendant; or (ii) A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if an economic benefit of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or more was gained or was attempted to be gained by the defendant. [¶ 22] In attacking his conviction, Rodgers does not dispute that he committed the crime of identity theft. Rather, his complaint concerns the felony grading of his criminal conduct. Rodgers' challenge is three-fold. First, he contends that his successful intent to avoid criminal fines in the first criminal case did not constitute an economic benefit for purposes of the grading provisions of § 6-3-901(c). Second, Rodgers contends the State improperly aggregated the economic benefits of two separate acts of identity theft to reach the felony threshold amount of $1,000.00. Lastly, he claims the State presented insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of an economic benefit in the felony amount of $1,000.00 or more. [¶ 23] Our resolution of this issue requires that we construe the pertinent statutory phrase economic benefit ... was gained or was attempted to be gained. § 6-3-901(c). We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Dougherty, ¶ 4, 237 P.3d at 404. When interpreting a statute, we are guided by these principles: We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent. State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo.1994). We begin by making an `inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.' Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia. 845 P.2d at 1042. When the words used are clear and unambiguous, that language establishes the rule of law. A statute is ambiguous only where its meaning is vague or ambiguous and subject to varying interpretations. Only if the wording is ambiguous or unclear to the point of demonstrating obscurity with respect to the legislative purpose or mandate do we resort to additional construction. Rivera v. State, 846 P.2d 1, 6 (Wyo.1993) (citations omitted). Penal statutes must be strictly construed and cannot be enlarged by implication or extended by inference or construction. Smith v. State, 902 P.2d 1271, 1284 (Wyo.1995). Solis v. State, 2010 WY 165, ¶ 7, 245 P.3d 323, 325 (Wyo.2010) (quoting Hampton v. State, 2006 WY 103, ¶ 7, 141 P.3d 101, 104 (Wyo.2006); Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 223-24 (Wyo.1997)). [¶ 24] Gain is defined as [t]he act of acquiring something. Webster's II New College Dictionary 466 (3rd ed. 2005). The term economic is commonly understood as relating to the management of material wealth or matters of finance. Id. at 364. A benefit is defined as [s]omething promoting or enhancing well-being: ADVANTAGE. Id. at 105. Thus, giving effect to the ordinary meaning of these words, the felony provision of § 6-3-901(c)(ii) applies in situations where the defendant has acquired or attempted to acquire a financial advantage or an enhancement of his financial position in the amount of $1,000.00 or more. [¶ 25] Considering the statute's plain language, we fail to see how this case falls within the reach of § 6-3-901(c)(ii). Rodgers' felony conviction is based on the notion that he used Hood's identity in an effort to avoid the monetary penalties associated with the initial DUI and check fraud charges. However, we do not believe the avoidance of a potential financial obligation is tantamount to the acquisition of a financial advantage. In the former situation, the individual is essentially seeking to avert a financial loss in order to maintain his financial status quo; whereas in the latter situation, the individual is seeking to enhance his wealth or financial position. We find nothing in this case to support a conclusion that Rodgers sought to enhance his financial well-being in the initial criminal case. Consequently, Rodgers' conviction for felony identity theft cannot stand. [¶ 26] Although we are reversing Rodgers' felony conviction, it has long been recognized that this Court has the authority to order that the defendant be resentenced on the lesser-included offense if the jury verdict supports a conviction for that offense. Kelly v. State, 2007 WY 45, ¶ 24, 153 P.3d 926, 931 (Wyo.2007); Goodwine v. State, 764 P.2d 680, 684 (Wyo.1988); Simonds v. State, 762 P.2d 1189, 1193 (Wyo.1988). Here, no question exists that the jury's verdict also supports a conviction on the lesser offense of misdemeanor identity theft. Accordingly, we set aside Rodgers' felony conviction, order entry of a misdemeanor identity theft conviction, and remand to the district court for resentencing on the misdemeanor conviction.