Opinion ID: 2543851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instruction 13 and WPI 140.01

Text: Jury instructions are sufficient when they allow counsel to argue their theory of the case, are not misleading, and when read as a whole properly inform the trier of fact of the applicable law. Bodin, 130 Wash.2d at 732, 927 P.2d 240. Even if an instruction is misleading, it will not be reversed unless prejudice is shown. Walker, 67 Wash.App. at 615, 837 P.2d 1023. A clear misstatement of the law, however, is presumed to be prejudicial. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash.2d 221, 239, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). Keller argues that because instruction 13 limits a municipality's duty to only fault-free plaintiffs, it conflicts with the waiver of sovereign immunity for municipalities and the doctrine of comparative fault. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 11. Because we hold that the challenged language merely defines the standard of care a municipality must exercise and does not limit the class of plaintiffs to only those who are fault free, we find no conflict between the challenged language and Washington's waiver of sovereign immunity or adoption of comparative fault. [13] However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that to the extent instruction 13 allowed the jury to premise the City's duty on Keller's negligence, it was misleading and legally erroneous. The trial court specifically refused to give Keller's requested instruction regarding comparative fault [14] to clarify the City's duty because it erroneously concluded that that was not the law. RP at 2667. However, as discussed above, this court has not limited the class of potential plaintiffs to only those using the roads in a nonnegligent manner. See Berglund, 4 Wash.2d at 321, 103 P.2d 355. The confusion inherent in the challenged language in instruction 13 and WPI 140.01 is evident when one examines how it has been interpreted by the Court of Appeals. Compare Gunshows, 77 Wash.App. 430, 891 P.2d 46, Walker, 67 Wash.App. at 617, 837 P.2d 1023 and McKee, 54 Wash.App. at 267-68, 773 P.2d 434, with Keller, 104 Wash.App. at 554-55, 17 P.3d 661, Wojcik v. Chrysler Corp., 50 Wash.App. 849, 854, 751 P.2d 854 (1988) (holding that [a] county has a duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition for its users), and Raybell v. State, 6 Wash.App. 795, 802, 496 P.2d 559 (1972). Furthermore, taken as a whole, instruction 13 did not allow Keller to argue his theory of the casethat the City's negligence is to be determined independent of Keller's negligence. The second two paragraphs of instruction 13, which include the City's duty as to inherently dangerous conditions, do not clarify the City's primary duty. It would still be possible for the jury to conclude that the City owed Keller no duty at all if it determined that Keller was negligent. Although it is unclear whether the jury would have reached a different conclusion had it been properly instructed, to the extent that the instruction misstated the law, it is presumed to be prejudicial. Cf. Wanrow, 88 Wash.2d at 239, 559 P.2d 548. Finally, as Keller contends and the Court of Appeals agreed, the instruction erroneously allows a jury to determine the City's primary duty, a function which is properly left to the court. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 12 (citing Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wash.2d 658, 958 P.2d 301 (1998); Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Market, Inc., 134 Wash.2d 468, 951 P.2d 749 (1998)); Keller, 104 Wash. App. at 556, 17 P.3d 661. Therefore, we hold that instruction 13 and WPI 140.01 are inherently misleading and legally erroneous to the extent that they allow a jury to premise a municipality's duty on the absence of negligence by the plaintiff. The City and WDTL argue that by rejecting a more limited duty for municipalities, we will make municipalities liable for all traffic accidents. Pet. for Review at 16-18; Br. of Amicus Curiae WDTL at 5. The City asserts that government entities stand in a somewhat different relation to accident victims that [sic] do other persons, Pet. for Review at 16 (citing McCluskey, 125 Wash.2d at 9, 882 P.2d 157). By rejecting WPI 140.01, the City contends that the delicate balance between a municipality's tort liability and its obligation to build and maintain roads will be altered. Id. at 17-18, 882 P.2d 157 (citing McKee, 54 Wash.App. at 268, 773 P.2d 434). We have held that municipalities are not insurers against accidents nor the guarantors of public safety and are not required to anticipate and protect against all imaginable acts of negligent drivers. Stewart, 92 Wash.2d at 299, 597 P.2d 101. Contrary to the City and WDTL's assertion, however, by removing the challenged language from the jury instruction, we will not render municipalities liable for all acts of negligence. As discussed in Berglund, a municipality only has a duty to exercise ordinary care to build and maintain its roadways in a reasonably safe manner for the foreseeable acts of those using the roadways. Berglund, 4 Wash.2d at 319-21, 103 P.2d 355. Furthermore, the court still retains its gatekeeper function and may determine that a municipality's actions were not the legal cause of the accident. See King, 84 Wash.2d at 247-48, 525 P.2d 228. [15] Finally, even if a jury were to find that a municipality was negligent, it may still conclude that the municipality's negligence is not the cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries. Thus, by changing the jury instruction to eliminate the challenged language, a municipality would not become liable for every accident that occurs on its roadways.