Opinion ID: 2649840
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enumerated Offense of Aggravated Assault

Text: Because aggravated assault is not defined by the Guidelines, “we look to the generic, contemporary meaning of aggravated assault, employing a common sense approach that looks to the Model Penal Code, the LaFave and Scott treatises, modern state codes, and dictionary definitions.” Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d at 229 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Esparza-Perez, we relied on these sources to conclude that “the generic, contemporary meaning 1 Section 708.2(3) (“uses or displays a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault”) is redundant of section 708.1(3) and adds no greater specificity to the offense. Therefore, we refer only to the language of section 708.1(3). 4 Case: 12-41231 Document: 00512465250 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/09/2013 No. 12-41231 of aggravated assault is an assault carried out under certain aggravating circumstances.” Id. at 231 (citing United States v. Fierro-Reyna, 466 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2006)). “Assault, in turn, requires proof that the defendant either caused, attempted to cause, or threatened to cause bodily injury or offensive contact to another person.” Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d at 231. “When the statute of conviction encompasses prohibited behavior that is not within the plain, ordinary meaning of [aggravated assault], the conviction is not a crime of violence as a matter of law.” Fierro-Reyna, 466 F.3d at 327 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we consider the statutes under which RicoMendoza was convicted to see if they require (1) causing, attempting to cause, or threatening to cause bodily injury or offensive contact to another (2) under aggravating circumstances. While Rico-Mendoza’s conviction may have included the traditional aggravating circumstance of using a dangerous weapon, he “was not convicted of the enumerated offense of aggravated assault because his [Iowa] offense did not require proof of an underlying assault and therefore does not comport with the generic, contemporary definition of that crime.” Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d at 231. As construed by state and federal courts in Iowa, sections 708.1(3) and 708.2(3) do not require that the defendant cause, attempt to cause, or threaten to cause bodily injury or offensive contact to another. Unlike the “generic meaning,” sections 708.1(3) and 708.2(3) do not require proof that the defendant intended to use the weapon, threatened to use the weapon, or that the acts were intended or reasonably calculated to place another in fear of harmful or offensive contact. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 565 F.3d 438, 440–42 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that the defendant committed assault under section 708.1(3) where he “came into the apartment for about two seconds with a gun in his right hand,” “held the gun straight down at his side,” said “wrong door,” then “closed the door and started knocking on the other apartment’s door”); State v. Harris, 705 5 Case: 12-41231 Document: 00512465250 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/09/2013 No. 12-41231 N.W.2d 105, 2005 WL 1397907 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2005) (table decision without published opinion) (finding substantial evidence for conviction under section 708.1(3) where tenants in disagreement with their landlord peered into the window of the landlord’s office while attempting to get the landlord’s attention and saw the landlord, “who appeared to be very angry,” stand up from behind his desk with a rifle in his hands in a “ready” position); State v. Mott, No. 00-575, 2001 WL 433395, at –2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2001) (unreported) (finding sufficient evidence for conviction under section 708.1(3) where the defendant, who seemed upset, stabbed a calculator and a desk with a knife, but did not display the knife at the victim, point the knife at the victim, or approach the victim with the knife). While we recognize that pointing a gun at someone is a serious offense, we are constrained by precedent to conclude that these are not “sufficiently minor” differences from the definition of generic aggravated assault. See Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d at 231 (quoting United States v. Mungia-Portillo, 484 F.3d 813, 817 (5th Cir. 2007)). In effect, section 708.1(3) proscribes the same conduct that elevates the offense of “assault” to “aggravated assault” under section 708.2(3), i.e., the presence of a dangerous weapon, without clearly requiring the commission of the acts constituting an underlying generic “assault.” Rico-Mendoza’s crime of conviction therefore was not a crime of violence based on the enumerated offense of aggravated assault as listed in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii).