Opinion ID: 1735172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: doctrines of unclean hands, waiver, and estoppel

Text: Bennett first asserts various equitable defenses which Bennett argues preclude the Stewarts from benefiting from any public policy invalidation of the attorney fee provision. Bennett is unable to cite any case law directly applicable to this point. Rather, Bennett relies on generalized references to the doctrines of unclean hands, waiver, and estoppel to argue that because the Stewarts signed the lease agreement with the attorney fee provision and also because they requested such fees in their original petition, they could not later assert that the attorney fee provision was void as against public policy. The doctrines of unclean hands, waiver, and estoppel clearly do not apply to the Stewarts' claim that the attorney fee provision is invalid. First, it is axiomatic that a party cannot waive the invalidity of a contractual provision by entering into a contract containing such a provision. As to the idea that by asking the court for fees under the provision, equity precludes the Stewarts from later denying the validity of the provision, we first note that the underlying claim is an action at law in which some of these equitable defenses simply do not apply. See, Mason v. City of Lincoln, 266 Neb. 399, 665 N.W.2d 600 (2003); Buckingham v. Wray, 219 Neb. 807, 366 N.W.2d 753 (1985). In any case, there is no evidence that the Stewarts acted inequitably, unfairly, or dishonestly in their initial claim for attorney fees. See, e.g., Manker v. Manker, 263 Neb. 944, 644 N.W.2d 522 (2002). There is not any evidence that the Stewarts gained any benefit from their unsuccessful claim under the attorney fee provision or that Bennett detrimentally relied on the Stewarts' prior claim. Closer to the point is Bennett's assertion of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which holds that one who has successfully and unequivocally asserted a position in a prior proceeding is estopped from asserting an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding. Vowers & Sons, Inc. v. Strasheim, 254 Neb. 506, 576 N.W.2d 817 (1998). The doctrine protects the integrity of the judicial process by preventing a party from taking a position inconsistent with one successfully and unequivocally asserted by the same party in a prior proceeding. Id. However, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply in this case because the district court never accepted the claim that the attorney fee provision was applicable. `Absent judicial acceptance of the inconsistent position, application of the rule is unwarranted because no risk of inconsistent results exists.' Vowers & Sons, Inc. v. Strasheim, 254 Neb. at 514, 576 N.W.2d at 824. This court has said that a party will be bound by allegations in the pleadings and cannot subsequently take a position inconsistent thereto, as such allegations are judicial admissions. See, Jorgensen v. State Nat. Bank & Trust, 255 Neb. 241, 583 N.W.2d 331 (1998); Ryder Truck Rental v. Transportation Equip. Co., 215 Neb. 458, 339 N.W.2d 283 (1983). But we have clarified that a party cannot judicially admit conclusions of law in the pleadings because the pleadings admit only facts. See Jorgensen, supra . The Stewarts' implicit allegation that the attorney fee provision was valid was a conclusion of law.