Opinion ID: 796549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: defendant's requested jury instruction on state of the art

Text: 35 An abuse of discretion standard also applies when we review a trial court's decision not to give a requested jury instruction. Williams ex rel. Hart v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist., 400 F.3d 360, 366 (6th Cir.2005). The district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, . . . improperly applies the law, . . . or . . . employs an erroneous legal standard. Barner, 399 F.3d at 748.
36 Defendant asserts that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on industry standards, which presumably would have allowed jurors to infer that because no line haul bus company in the country had an entry-resistant barrier installed on its buses, (Def.'s Br. at 43), Defendant should not be held liable for its failure to install such shields. Defendant's requested instruction stated: 37 I charge you that Greyhound did not manufacture the bus in question, nor is it in the business of manufacturing buses. However, because Plaintiff alleges that Greyhound should have installed driver enclosures on its buses, Plaintiff is arguing Greyhound should be held to the same standards as manufacturer of buses. Accordingly, Greyhound is entitled to the same defenses that a manufacturer is ordinarily afforded in product liability actions. 38 I charge you that whether Greyhound complied with industry-wide practices, state of the art, or federal regulations regarding bus design, safety procedures and policies, and safety equipment is a relevant question for you the jury to consider in your deliberations. Greyhound's compliance with the applicable safety regulations and procedures shall raise a rebuttable presumption that the bus design and safety equipment was not in an unreasonably dangerous condition. 39 I charge you that a manufacturer is not an insurer of the product it designs, and it is not required that the design adopted be perfect, or render the product accident proof, or incapable of causing injury, nor is it necessary to incorporate the ultimate safety features in the product. Hence, a departure from the required standard of care is not demonstrated where it is simply shown that there was a better, safer, or different design which would have averted the injury. 40 (J.A. at 708) In support of this request to charge, Defendant cited Clarksville-Montgomery County School System v. United States Gypsum Co., 925 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1991), Kerley v. Stanley Works, 553 S.W.2d 80 (Tenn.Ct.App.1977), and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-104. 4 41 A district court commits reversible error in refusing to give a jury instruction at a party's request where (1) the omitted instructions are a correct statement of the law; (2) the instruction is not substantially covered by other delivered charges; (3) the failure to give the instruction impairs the requesting party's theory of the case. Webster v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 197 F.3d 815, 820 (6th Cir.1999). Tennessee law has not required courts to instruct juries on `state of the art' principles in the negligence context. Rather, such instructions have predominantly been given in products liability cases. See, e.g., Clarksville-Montgomery County Sch. Sys. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 925 F.2d 993, 1005 (6th Cir.1991); Boyd v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 348, 1991 WL 278967, at  (6th Cir.1991) (unpublished); Abbott v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 682 S.W.2d 206, 208, 211 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984) (proceeding at trial solely on theory of strict liability). Indeed, the two cases and the provision of the Tennessee code cited in support of Defendant's requested instruction concern products liability actions. Clarksville-Montgomery County Sch. Sys., 925 F.2d at 995; Kerley, 553 S.W.2d at 81 (wrongful death suit predicated upon the theory of strict liability and negligent design); Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-28-104 (establishing presumptions for products liability actions). 42 Although the plaintiff in Kerley asserted both product liability and negligence claims, that case does not squarely support Defendant's requested instruction. The plaintiff in Kerley presented a similar negligence claim inasmuch as she alleged that, had defendant installed a ground fault circuit interrupter on an electrical panel box, her husband would not have been electrocuted when using a drill attached to that box. Kerley, 553 S.W.2d at 82. There, the evidence demonstrated growing use of the device . . . at the time of the accident, but also that the device was not uniformly used nor was it a requirement of the National Electrical Safety Code. Id. Kerley is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand. First, the court in Kerley found the installation safe and attributed the injuries to the negligence of the deceased, he plaintiff's husband. Id. at 83. Clearly, no negligence can be attributed to Plaintiff in this case. 5 Second, in Kerley, the defendant was a subcontractor employing the plaintiff, while here Defendant is a common carrier that undertook to transport Plaintiff as a passenger. Common carriers are bound to the utmost diligence which human skill and foresight can effect, and if injury occurs by reason of the slightest omission in regard to the highest perfection of all the appliances of transportation, . . . the carrier is responsible. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Hutcherson, 8 Tenn.App. 235, 1928 WL 2105, at  (Tenn. Ct.App.1928). A district court does not err when it declines to give a jury instruction on industry standards not warranted under existing law of the applicable jurisdiction. See Webster, 197 F.3d at 820. Defendant has cited no law mandating the requested instruction, nor have we found any. 43 In point of fact, there is no basis in this record deviating from the generally accepted rule that industry standards may be proven as some evidence of care but are not conclusive on the matter. Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645, 648 (6th Cir.1976); see also Cherokee Ins. Co. v. E.W. Blanch Co., 66 F.3d 117, 123 (6th Cir.1995) (citing Easterly v. Advance Stores Co., Inc., 432 F.Supp. 7, 9 (E.D.Tenn.1976)) (noting that Tennessee courts have recognized the principle that there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission). The same is true of safety regulations, whether promulgated at the federal, state, or local level. Compliance with such regulations (or in this case, absence of regulation) does not relieve one of tort liability for failure to exercise the highest degree of care. City of Elizabethton v. Sluder, 534 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn.1976); see also Kerley, 553 S.W.2d at 82 (While compliance with standards of the National Electric Safety Code is not conclusive as to Defendant's negligence, there must be evidence in the record from which the jury could find the minimum standards of the Code were insufficient under the facts and circumstances of the case.). To the extent that industry standards and compliance with safety regulations may factor into a jury's consideration of Defendant's care in operating its bus line, the district court's instructions on the duty of care owed by a common carrier to its passengers permit consideration of such evidence. 6 See Easterly, 432 F.Supp. at 9 (Customary practice is not ordinary care; it is but evidence of ordinary care.). 44 Further, the district court's instructed the jury on proximate cause, stating plaintiff must show that her injury was a reasonably foreseeable probability, not just a remote possibility, and that some action within Greyhound's power more probably than not would have prevented the injury. (J.A. at 1158) Plaintiff introduced evidence on the feasibility of driver's shields precisely to show the likelihood that some action within Greyhound's power would have prevented the October 3, 2001 accident, and not in support of a products liability claim hinging on the failure to include such shields in Defendant's buses. 7 45 Defendant invokes Hutcherson in support of its argument that a state of the art instruction was warranted here. In Hutcherson, a passenger sued a railroad company for negligence when he fell out an open vestibule door on a moving train. 8 Tenn.App. 235, 1928 WL 2105, at . There, the court stated, A carrier of passengers . . . is held to the exercise of the highest degree of care and foresight for the passenger's safety. This applies to the selection and use of suitable carriages. Id. at . Although common carriers . . . undertake that the . . . carriages employed are roadworthy and properly constructed, and furnished according to the present state of the art, id. at , mere compliance with the present state of the art does not suffice to relieve common carriers of liability in negligence. Common carriers must exercise of the highest degree of care and foresight for the passenger's safety, id. at , and where they fail to do so — even if such exercise requires departure from industry standards — a jury may find them liable in negligence. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to instruct the jury as Defendant requested.