Opinion ID: 1367155
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Heading: Parental Duty of Support

Text: (1a) As we have noted, the principal issue in the case is whether a trial court in determining the nature and extent of a parent's support obligation may consider the child's own independent income. Resolution of the issue involves application of certain well-settled general principles. (2) There is a statutory obligation of child support imposed on parents. (Civ. Code, §§ 242-243, 4700.) This obligation continues notwithstanding the parents' lack of custody ( Kresteller v. Superior Court (1967) 248 Cal. App.2d 545, 546-548 [56 Cal. Rptr. 771]), and is unaffected by any agreement between the parents ( Elkind v. Byck (1968) 68 Cal.2d 453, 457 [67 Cal. Rptr. 404, 439 P.2d 316]; Davidson v. Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal. App.2d 625, 629-630 [38 Cal. Rptr. 274], hg. den.). (3) When a child support agreement is incorporated in a child support order, the obligation created is deemed court-imposed rather than contractual, and the order is subsequently modifiable despite the agreement's language to the contrary. (Civ. Code, § 4811; see generally, 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Parent and Child, § 133, p. 4650.) However, the effect of the modification of the original order is prospective only. (Civ. Code, §§ 4700, 4811; Singer v. Singer (1970) 7 Cal. App.3d 807, 813 [87 Cal. Rptr. 42].) (4) The extent of the parental support obligation is left to the sound discretion of the court ( Primm v. Primm (1956) 46 Cal.2d 690, 694 [299 P.2d 231]; Gudelj v. Gudelj (1953) 41 Cal.2d 202, 209 [259 P.2d 656]) and the trial court's order will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. ( Brockmiller v. Brockmiller (1943) 57 Cal. App.2d 623, 625 [135 P.2d 184].) (1b) Notwithstanding the broad latitude permitted the trial court in support matters, and acknowledging the existence of conflicting views, we conclude that the soundest and most substantial statutory and judicial authority supports the rule that parents bear the primary obligation to support their child and that resort may be had to the child's own resources for his basic needs only if the parents are financially unable to fulfill that obligation themselves. We consider some of these authorities. California has adopted the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, contained in Civil Code section 241 et seq. Sections 242 and 243 impose upon both parents the duty to support their children. Guidance for the application of these sections is found in section 246, which authorizes the court to consider the child's need, relative wealth, and income in determining ... the amount due for support ... (Italics added.) While section 246 allows consideration of the child's independent wealth and income in fixing the amount of the support obligation, this section does not authorize the court to relieve entirely a financially capable parent of his or her obligation to support the child. The section permits reduction in the amount of support but it neither expressly nor by necessary implication frees the parent of the continuing obligation, which we deem primary, to provide the child with at least the basic necessaries of life. Section 1504 of the Probate Code reinforces this conclusion. It provides that if a minor has property, the income of which is sufficient for his or her support, maintenance and education in a manner more expensive than his or her parents can reasonably afford, ... (italics added) then the expenses of support, maintenance and education may be defrayed out of the child's income, in whole or in part, in such amounts as the court deems reasonable. Section 1504 confirms the view that although the parent, if financially able, must provide for the child's basic, minimum support needs, the child's income may be used to supplement the parent's contribution in order to permit the child to live in a more expensive manner by way of special education, travel, etc. It follows as a corollary, however, that only if the parent is unable to provide minimum-level support should the child's outside income relieve the parent entirely of his support obligation. Numerous appellate decisions add strength to the foregoing interpretation of the statutes. As expressed in In re Carboni (1941) 46 Cal. App.2d 605 [116 P.2d 453], The law is well-settled that the primary duty to support a minor rests upon his parents, and that the estate of the minor can only be resorted to where the parents are unable to fulfill the obligation in whole or in part. [Citations.] ( Id., at p. 613.) Several other cases, both before and after Carboni, are in accord: In re Marriage of Cosgrove (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 424, 432 [103 Cal. Rptr. 733]; Hills v. Hills (1966) 245 Cal. App.2d 578, 580 [54 Cal. Rptr. 89]; see also Howe v. Howe (1928) 206 Cal. 1, 2-3 [272 P. 751]; Fagan v. Fagan (1941) 43 Cal. App.2d 189, 198 [110 P.2d 520]; In re Keck (1929) 100 Cal. App. 513, 514 [280 P. 387]. Contrary dicta is contained in others: See Nunes v. Nunes (1964) 62 Cal.2d 33 [41 Cal. Rptr. 5, 396 P.2d 37]; Rosher v. Superior Court (1937) 9 Cal.2d 556 [71 P.2d 918]; Black v. Black (1928) 203 Cal. 173 [263 P. 234]; Mattos v. Correia (1969) 274 Cal. App.2d 413 [79 Cal. Rptr. 229]; Moore v. Moore (1969) 274 Cal. App.2d 698 [79 Cal. Rptr. 293]; Van Diest v. Van Diest (1968) 266 Cal. App.2d 541 [72 Cal. Rptr. 304]; Lakenan v. Lakenan (1967) 256 Cal. App.2d 615 [64 Cal. Rptr. 166]; Levy v. Levy (1966) 245 Cal. App.2d 341 [53 Cal. Rptr. 790]; McClellan v. McClellan (1958) 159 Cal. App.2d 225 [323 P.2d 811]; White v. White (1927) 83 Cal. App. 356 [256 P. 579]. We find that the contrary cases are distinguishable, and in only one of them ( Lakenan v. Lakenan ) does the court affirmatively sanction the avoidance by a parent of all obligations to support through resort to the child's separate income. In Lakenan, unlike the case before us, the express purpose of the trust in question was contribution to the support and maintenance of the child. In the absence of such an evident purpose, we decline to impute to a trustor the intent to relieve a parent of his or her support obligation. The general rule in other states appears to be that the primary obligation of a parent to support his minor children if he is able to do so is not affected by the fact that the child may have his own separate property, or his own income derived from property, trust, or annuity. (59 Am.Jur.2d, Parent and Child, § 77, p. 169, and cases cited; see Annot. 121 A.L.R. 176.) (5) The same authorities recognize only two situations in which resort to a child's estate may be proper: (1) where authorized by the terms of the instrument creating the estate; and (2) where authorized by statute. (59 Am.Jur.2d, supra, at pp. 169-170.) In the instant case, the trust instrument is silent regarding the use of trust income to contribute to plaintiffs' support, and, as discussed above, California statutes permit resort to the child's own income or estate only in a limited and restricted sense. Sound public policy favoring child support (see Williams v. Williams (1970) 8 Cal. App.3d 636, 639 [87 Cal. Rptr. 754]) and the statutory authority to which we have previously referred, in combination, justify the rule expressed in the Carboni line of cases that a parent possessing adequate financial resources has a duty to provide his or her child with basic support regardless of the child's independent resources. Such a rule serves the dual purposes of assuring that a child's independent income is preserved for use of the child during his or her adult years, and at the same time permitting, in an appropriate case, such income to be used to supplement the parents' contribution so that the child might enjoy a higher standard of living during minority than the parents could otherwise afford. In the absence of a clear contrary trust purpose or the inability of the parents reasonably to provide any support, we conclude that this approach both respects the parents' statutory obligations of support mandated by Civil Code sections 242, 243, and maintains the flexibility authorized to trial courts by Civil Code section 246 and Probate Code section 1504.