Opinion ID: 2508525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Cult Expert Testimony

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to admit at the guilt phase the testimony of Randy Cerny. Cerny was a former Stanislaus County Sheriff's detective who specialized in the study of cults. Defense counsel offered Cerny's testimony to establish that defendant, under the mind control techniques of Cruz, was unable to form the mental state required for first degree murder. The trial court excluded Cerny's testimony because he was not a qualified expert on whether defendant had a mental defect, mental disorder, or mental disease at the time he committed the murders. Defendant claims the trial court erred, and that the error deprived him of his rights to due process and compulsory process under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We conclude there was no error. A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewable for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618.) No such abuse occurred here. Expert opinion on whether a defendant had the capacity to form a mental state that is an element of a charged offense or actually did form such intent is not admissible at the guilt phase of a trial. [Citation.] Sections 28[ [9] ] and 29[ [10] ] permit introduction of evidence of mental illness when relevant to whether a defendant actually formed a mental state that is an element of a charged offense, but do not permit an expert to offer an opinion on whether a defendant had the mental capacity to form a specific mental state or whether the defendant actually harbored such a mental state. ( People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 582, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081, overruled on another point by Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618.) Here, the trial court concluded that Cerny, who was not a psychologist or a psychiatrist, was not qualified to render an opinion as to whether defendant suffered from a mental illness at the time he committed the murders that would raise a doubt about whether defendant had the mental state requisite for first-degree murder; nor was Cerny qualified to testify generally about the relationship between mental illness and certain types of behavior. (See Coddington at pp. 582-583, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Cerny's testimony was not relevant to any guilt phase issue and should be excluded.