Opinion ID: 2199622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Appointment of New Counsel for Post-Trial Proceedings

Text: Defendant next asserts that the circuit court erred by not appointing a new attorney to argue his pro se post-trial motion which alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective. The record reveals that defense counsel had filed a post-trial motion for a new trial at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. Shortly thereafter, defendant filed a pro se Motion For a New Attorney, alleging that defense counsel had filed the motion for a new trial without first consulting or seeking defendant's approval. Defendant further complained that his counsel's motion was inadequate to preserve all issues of error for appellate review. Finally, defendant alleged that his counsel had been ineffective throughout the proceedings and requested that the court appoint a new attorney to represent him in the post-trial proceedings. The court denied defendant's pro se motion for a new attorney on April 19, 1995. On that same day, immediately after the circuit court denied defendant's Motion For a New Attorney, the court allowed defendant to file a pro se Amended Post-Trial Motion. In that motion, defendant raised numerous allegations concerning prosecutorial misconduct, judicial bias, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, defendant contended, among other things, that his attorney failed to adequately prepare for trial because he did not (i) investigate relevant facts and interview relevant witnesses, (ii) utilize available means of discovering exculpatory evidence available to the State or to discover the State's case, (iii) explore plea bargaining opportunities, (iv) have certain physical evidence ( i.e., the duct tape and the papers) examined by an independent forensic expert after the court allowed the appointment for such an expert, and (v) present mitigation evidence that was available that would have prevented the imposition of the death penalty. The circuit court denied both counsel's motion and defendant's amended motion. Defendant now contends that the circuit court erred by not appointing a new attorney to investigate and argue defendant's assertions regarding the ineffectiveness of his original trial counsel. He invites this court to remand the matter to the trial court with directions to appoint new counsel and to hold a hearing on the matter. We decline to do so. This court has never held that new counsel must be appointed every time a defendant presents a pro se motion for a new trial alleging ineffectiveness of counsel. See People v. Nitz, 143 Ill.2d 82, 134, 157 Ill.Dec. 431, 572 N.E.2d 895 (1991). Rather, to determine whether new counsel should be appointed, the circuit court should examine the factual matters underlying defendant's claims and, if the claim lacks merit or pertains to matters of trial strategy, new counsel need not be appointed. Nitz, 143 Ill.2d at 134,157 Ill.Dec. 431, 572 N.E.2d 895. We have carefully examined defendant's claims and conclude that they do not meet the criteria established in Nitz for the appointment of new counsel. To begin with, four out of the five allegations raised by defendant are conclusory and therefore lack merit. For example, defendant claims that his counsel should have investigated relevant facts and witnesses, but he has offered neither the circuit court nor this court any explanation as to what or to whom he is referring. Likewise, defendant has not set forth the nature of the exculpatory information his counsel should have discovered. Nor does defendant elaborate on how defense counsel's failure to pursue plea bargaining possibilities was anything other than trial strategy, particularly where it is not alleged that the other codefendants were offered pleas. See People v. Palmer, 162 Ill.2d 465, 477, 205 Ill.Dec. 506, 643 N.E.2d 797 (1994). Defendant's contention regarding his attorney's failure to adduce mitigation evidence during the sentencing hearing is equally without merit. In his motion, defendant does not reveal the character of the mitigation evidence to which he alludes, nor does he state how it would have changed the outcome. Additionally, the record reveals that his attorney did in fact call a total of eight witnesses during the mitigation phase of the hearing. Thus, this is not a case in which absolutely no evidence in mitigation was presented to the jury. Defendant's remaining claim, that his attorney should have presented the testimony of a forensic expert to dispute the State's fingerprint evidence, fares little better. Trial testimony indicated that the State's expert, Garold Warner, and two of his associates concluded that there were 25 points of agreement between defendant's fingerprints and those found at the scene of the crimes. According to Warner, fingerprint examiners in the United States tend to use between 8 and 10 points of agreement before arriving at a conclusion. Based on this evidence, it cannot be said that defense counsel's decision not to call an independent expert constituted ineffectiveness. It may very well have been a matter of trial strategy to not call an experta withering cross-examination as to the points of agreement could only serve to reinforce the strength of the fingerprint identification in the eyes of the jury. As we stated in Nitz, new counsel should be appointed only if the pro se allegations show possible neglect of the case. Nitz, 143 Ill.2d at 134, 157 Ill.Dec. 431, 572 N.E.2d 895. In the case at bar, however, defendant's contentions either are insufficient to show possible neglect or concern decisions made by counsel which were well within the bounds of proper trial strategy. They simply do not constitute strong and convincing proof of incompetency when considered against the totality of counsel's conduct during trial. See People v. Generally, 170 Ill.App.3d 668, 677, 121 Ill.Dec. 300, 525 N.E.2d 106 (1988). For these reasons, the circuit court's ruling in this matter will not be disturbed.
Defendant maintains that the circuit court violated his eighth amendment right to a fair sentencing hearing by allowing members of the victims' families to testify as to their belief that the death penalty should be imposed. Specifically, defendant cites as improper several questions posed by Special Assistant Attorneys General Keith Jensen and Duane Bailey to the three relatives of the victims called by the State during aggravation. Both Jensen and Bailey asked each witness which penalty he or she wanted the jury to impose. In response, each witness expressed the desire that the jury impose the death penalty. Defendant concedes that he has waived this issue because no contemporaneous objection was made during the hearing; however, he posits that defense counsel's failure to object constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we will review the claim on the merits. Generally, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that a reasonable probability exists that, but for the error, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.2d 504, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984) (adopting Strickland ). However, we may resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by reaching only the prejudice component, for lack of prejudice renders irrelevant the issue of counsel's performance. People v. Erickson, 161 Ill.2d 82, 90, 204 Ill.Dec. 231, 641 N.E.2d 455 (1994). The State acknowledges in its brief that the testimony of David Thompson, Sr., Estella Buckles, and Christine Mosby regarding the appropriateness of the death penalty was improper under Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), rev'd in part, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). Such a violation, however, is subject to a harmless error analysis, and, therefore, reversal is not mandated in every instance. See People v. Scott, 148 Ill.2d 479, 554, 171 Ill.Dec. 365, 594 N.E.2d 217 (1992). Contrary to defendant's contentions, we are unconvinced that the outcome in this case would have been different had the complained-of testimony been properly excluded. The remainder of the State's case in aggravation was remarkably strong. Indeed, the murders for which defendant stands convicted were cold-blooded and methodical. Three of the victims were bound hand and foot and summarily executed. Another victim, an unsuspecting neighbor who had no involvement with the drug money, was shot when he understandably acted confused when defendant came to his door, displaying a gun and demanding money. Additional testimony, which we can only characterize as disturbing, revealed that after police released defendant from questioning, he expressed regret over not killing the children who were in Mosby's trailer because they might identify him. Thus, defendant's remorse in the case stems not from the killing of five individuals (two of whom he personally shot), but stems from his not killing three young children. Defendant also told another State witness that he would live to kill again. These facts lead to the inescapable conclusion that defendant utterly lacked any remorse for his crimes or rehabilitative potential. In contrast, the evidence in mitigation was slightfamily members and friends testified that defendant came from a religious household and cared deeply for his children. Accordingly, the State's evidence, coupled with the circuit court's instruction to the jury that its decision was not to be swayed by sympathy, passion, or prejudice, compels our conclusion that the error in admitting the improper testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that no prejudice resulted to defendant from its admission. Therefore, we cannot conclude that counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692-93. That said, we stress that our resolution of this issue is derived from the particular facts of this case and the overwhelming nature of the State's aggravating evidence at the sentencing hearing. The case at bar was tried in 1995, some seven years after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Booth v. Maryland and four years after its decision in Payne v. Tennessee. As such, there is simply no reason for either Jensen or Bailey to have asked the members of the victims' families for their opinions in the manner revealed in this record. We, therefore, are obliged to alert the State that the future commission of such errors may not produce a similar result and caution it that a closer case in aggravation/mitigation may well result in reversal.