Opinion ID: 3011662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: which order is being reviewed?

Text: The STB argues that FAST actually is challenging the 1990 Order that limited the scope of potentially historically eligible properties to the 83 bridges on the rail line. It is the STB's position that direct judicial review of the 1990 Order is precluded by S 2344, which requir es that a petition for review of final agency action be filed within 60 days. See 28 U.S.C. S 2344; see also ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 277 (1987). Once that 60-day period has passed, an agency order is no longer subject to judicial review. See id. The STB contends that F AST is precluded from making any arguments that in any way address the manner in which the STB identified historic pr operties or its determination that only some bridges and archaeological areas are eligible for historic pr otection. The STB argues that we have jurisdiction to review only the plan for mitigation as to the bridges and the decision to ter minate consultation. It suggests that we may not addr ess any issues relating to the identification of historic properties. We disagree and conclude that we do have jurisdiction to review the entire matter, including those aspects of the STB's decisions relating to the identification of eligible historic properties on the rail line. First, in the 1997 Order, the STB rejected FAST's request that the preservation requirement imposed in the 1990 Or der be broadened to apply to the entire Enola Branch line. However , the 1997 Order expressly stated that [t]his proceeding is reopened. When the STB reopens a proceeding for any reason and, after reconsideration, issues a new and final order setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties, that order-- even if it merely reaffirms the rights and obligations set forth in the original order--is reviewable on its merits. BLE, 482 U.S. at 278 (citing United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 329 U.S. 424 (1947)). The STB urged that the reopening must be understood in context, that the proceeding was reopened only for the limited purpose of narrowing the scope of the historic condition. However, reopening a proceeding for any r eason, even if only to 18 reaffirm the original order , gives us jurisdiction to review every aspect of the reopening order . See BLE, 482 U.S. at 278. Reopening in this case, even if only to narr ow rather than expand the original identification decision, makes the issues of identification reviewable. The STB cannot claim that identification was complete prior to 1997, yet still reopen the proceeding in order to consider some aspect of identification. That further consideration is subject to review, both as to whether it was proper to narrow the scope of the properties to be protected and also as to whether it was improper not to expand the scope of the protected properties. In short, the STB's explicit order to reopen this proceeding meant reopening for all purposes, thereby bringing the issue of identification back into play and making it subject to review at this time. Second, FAST's 1996 petition (resolved in the 1997 Order), seeking reopening of the pr oceedings for the purpose of reconsidering and expanding the identification decision, was based on a claim of new evidence or changed circumstances, particularly evidence of changed opinions and perceptions of how much of the rail line would be eligible for the National Register. Wher e a motion to reopen is based on non-pretextual arguments about new evidence or changed circumstances, the refusal to r eopen or reconsider a decision itself is reviewable for abuse of discretion. See BLE, 482 U.S. at 284 (If the petition that was denied sought reopening on the basis of new evidence or changed circumstances review is available and abuse of discretion is the standard.); Fritsch v. ICC, 59 F.3d 248, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (interpreting BLE to permit merits review of a refusal to reopen wher e the motion is based on non-pretextual grounds of new evidence or changed circumstances); Friends of Sierra R.R., Inc. v. ICC, 881 F.2d 663, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1989) (The or der denying [the] petition is subject to review only if the petition sought reopening on the basis of `new evidence' or`substantially changed circumstances.' ). Even assuming that the STB's 1997 Order declined to reopen for the purposes of expanding the historic condition, that refusal to reopen is itself subject to judicial review. Under BLE, we would have 19 jurisdiction to determine whether the Boar d's refusal to expand the condition was an abuse of discretion. The STB argues that FAST did not actually submit any new or newly discovered evidence because the opinions of the ACHP, the SHPO, the Keeper, and the Curator, regarding the historic eligibility of the entire line, were available all along and could have been presented earlier. The STB contends, therefore, that F AST actually sought reopening and reconsideration based onmaterial error, the denial of which motion unquestionably would not be subject to judicial review. See BLE, 482 U.S. at 280 (holding that where a party petitions an agency for reconsideration on the ground of `material error,' . . . `an order which merely denies rehearing' . . . is not itself reviewable.). The STB's argument fails because it conflates the jurisdictional and merits analyses. Whether the evidence presented actually is new or newly discover ed, as opposed to newly presented, goes to the merits of whether the refusal to reopen or reconsider a prior decision was proper or lawful. It does not go to the jurisdiction of the court of appeals to review that refusal. Jurisdiction and reviewability are based on the fact that the motion before the STB alleged the existence of new evidence or changed circumstances. See Friends of Sierra, 881 F.2d at 666 ([W]e determine reviewability solely by examining the bases advanced in the petition to reopen.). That basis for the motion, assuming it is not a pretext, is sufficient alone to confer jurisdiction to review the Board's refusal to expand the identified historic properties and pr otect the entire rail line. From the record before us, we conclude that FAST sought reopening based on new evidence or changed circumstances, not material error, such that the refusal to reopen is subject to judicial review. FAST moved within 60 days for reconsideration of the 1997 Order, thus tolling the period for seeking judicial review of the 1997 Order until reconsideration was denied. The 1999 Order denied reconsideration of the refusal to reopen and the petition for review wasfiled within 60 days. 20 We have jurisdiction, therefore, to review the 1997 Order through its denial by the 1999 Order . See BLE, 482 U.S. at 279 (stating that a petition for reconsideration tolls the period for judicial review of the original or der, which can be appealed directly after the petition for r econsideration is denied).