Opinion ID: 1159049
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Within the Scope of Employment

Text: The second requirement for recovery under the doctrine of respondeat superior is that the employee's negligent act must have been within the scope of the employment. Henderson, 72 Haw. at 392, 819 P.2d at 88; Onorato Garages, 50 Haw. at 632, 446 P.2d at 825. Whether an employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined in light of the evidence of the particular case. Henderson, 72 Haw. at 393, 819 P.2d at 89; Kang, 5 Haw.App. at 8, 675 P.2d at 808; Nordmark, 1 Haw.App. at 489, 620 P.2d at 765. [11] In determining the scope of employment, the applicable test is whether the employee's conduct was related to the employment enterprise or if the enterprise derived any benefit from the activity. Henderson, 72 Haw. at 394, 819 P.2d at 89; Kang, 5 Haw.App. at 11, 675 P.2d at 809. More specifically, as outlined in both Henderson and Kang, two key factors must be considered: 1) whether the enterprise of the employer would have benefitted by the context of the act of the employee but for the unfortunate injury; and 2) whether the employer's risks are incident to [the] enterprise. Henderson, 72 Haw. at 395, 819 P.2d at 89. Kang, 5 Haw.App. at 11, 675 P.2d at 809. [12] Liability under the respondeat superior or theory, however, does not require fault or knowledge on the part of the employer. [13] The three Hawai`i cases that are most closely related to the instant facts are Henderson, Kang, and Costa. As indicated previously, the court in each case affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer. [W]here the facts are susceptible of but one reasonable conclusion, the question [whether the employee is acting within the scope of his employment] may become a question of law for the court. Henderson, 72 Haw. at 393, 819 P.2d at 89 (citations omitted). In the instant case, however, this exception to the general rule regarding summary judgment does not apply. There are genuine issues of material fact relevant to the scope of employment that remain to be determined by a jury. Each of the cases is distinguishable with respect to the issues raised in Wong-Leong and Sugimoto's respondeat superior claim. In Henderson, the employer sent several employees, including Hughes and McLean (also a part-owner of the company), to Kaua'i for a painting job expected to last approximately one month. While on Kaua'i, McLean allowed Hughes to use one of the company's rented cars to attend a party unrelated to the job. Hughes went to the party, became intoxicated, and later collided with (and injured) Henderson. Henderson sued under theories of respondeat superior and negligent entrustment. With respect to the respondeat superior claim, the court held that the enterprise theory did not apply because the acts involved ... did not occur within authorized work hours and were not actuated, even in part, by a purpose to serve [the] employer. Id. at 394, 819 P.2d at 89. The only connection to the employer was that the company rented the car and the employer's part-owner gave Hughes permission to drive it on a personal journey. Consequently, the court observed that [t]here was no intention to act in the employer's interest, nor was there any direct benefit to the employer. Id. (citations omitted). In Kang, defendant Glen Pluid was sent to Kaua'i by his employer. The employer paid Pluid his wages, a per diem subsistence allowance to cover housing and food expenses, and reimbursed him for travel from his home to the job site on a mileage basis. Pluid shipped his car, at his own expense, to Kaua'i for transportation. One day, Pluid went to a bar after work and consumed a few beers. He then went home and, a couple hours later, left to meet some friends. On the way, Pluid collided with a vehicle driven by Kang. Kang and his passenger were seriously injured. Kang sued Pluid's employer, claiming respondeat superior liability. Kang argued that it could be inferred that Pluid's act of driving from home to meet some friends was incidental to, and in furtherance of, the employer's business. Kang also argued that Pluid's presence on Kaua'i was incidental to his employment with Pankow. The ICA disagreed, noting that the accident occurred several hours after work, and that Pluid was neither coming from nor going to the worksite. Id. at 5, 675 P.2d at 806. The ICA held that Pluid was not actuated in any way at that time by a purpose to serve his employer. Id. at 9, 675 P.2d at 808. Refusing to extend the theory of respondeat superior to cover such situations, the ICA stated as follows: We do not believe that the respondeat superior doctrine is so pliant that where an employee is hired in one locality and relocated to another by his employer for an indefinite period of time, any act of the employee before, during, or after his working hours is one within the scope of his employment as long as he works for the employer in the latter locality. Id. Whereas Henderson and Kang involved drinking and driving incidents that clearly were not related to the negligent employee's employment, nor benefitted the employer in any way, the following case provides closer guidance under the instant facts. In Costa, the ICA considered an accident involving Richard Arata, who was president, manager and one of two employees of Able Distributors, Inc. (Able). Arata's friends regularly came to Able's premises after work to drink beer and socialize. After a few hours of drinking on one such occasion, the group left and Arata subsequently collided with and injured Costa. Costa, 3 Haw.App. at 487-88, 653 P.2d at 103. Costa appealed from a summary judgment in favor of Able, arguing that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Arata was acting within the scope of his employment when he consumed the beer on company premises. Id. at 488, 653 P.2d at 103-04. Costa did not, however, file any counter-affidavits or documents. The record merely indicated that Arata and friends often discussed their common experiences and difficulties regarding Arata's former employer, and that they never discussed Able's business. Id. at 487-88, 653 P.2d at 103. Absent any contrary evidence to support Costa's claims, the ICA held that Arata was not acting within the scope of employment. His actions were purely for his own benefit and not the company's. Id. at 490, 653 P.2d at 105. Although the party in the instant case took place after work hours, the record reveals that it was held on HIRI's premises immediately thereafter. Despite factual similarities with elements in each of the above-cited cases, the instant facts as a whole, see supra section I, differ significantly. Considering the facts in a light most favorable to Appellants, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the promotion party was a custom incidental to the enterprise rather than a purely social function. Arguably, the party may have been actuated, in part, by a purpose to serve HIRI, or at least was of some direct benefit to HIRI. Henderson, 72 Haw. at 394, 819 P.2d at 89. See supra note 12 (quoting authority for the proposition that boosting employee morale and furthering employer-employee relations are sufficient benefits to the enterprise for respondeat superior purposes). HIRI's Maintenance Manager, Aldrich Kane, testified that the tradition of parties began shortly after his predecessor went to the company asking for this pau hana thing as a morale builder for the employees. (Emphasis added.) Shift Supervisor Joseph Drogowski testified that the horseshoe games and pau hana parties were not intended as family gatherings but were for employees. He acknowledged further that these parties were more for company purposes. (Emphasis added.) In his deposition, Kane noted that pau hana party attendance decreased significantly in the three-to-five months following Rellamas' accident. Alcohol was no longer served at the parties after the accident. Kane's testimony supports a reasonable inference that the presence of alcohol was a crucial ingredient of these parties, which were designed to boost employee morale and foster good will. According to Kane, during the many years of alcohol consumption at the pau hana parties, the horseshoe club gatherings, and the promotion parties, the HIRI administration discussed the propriety of these activities and possible efforts to control them, but they never said stop it. Drogowski testified that pau hana party attendance had already died out substantially (down from sixty or seventy people to just the contractors, who provided the beer, and a few HIRI employees) at least six months before the accident: People just weren't showing up because [sic] the attitude in the company. It was more or less a company, more or less a company function gathering. Gathering everybody together at the end of the month. People's attitude wasn't too great about management. So they didn't want to show up and drink beer with them. Drogowski also testified, however, that supervisors continued to get together with their crews to celebrate birthdays, promotions, and other events. Based on this testimony, viewed in a light most favorable to Appellants, a reasonable trier of fact could find that HIRI benefitted either directly or indirectly from the promotion party. HIRI relies heavily upon Bruce v. Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, 166 Ariz. 221, 801 P.2d 456 (1990), but the instant case is clearly distinguishable. The analysis in Bruce focuses on the time of injury, rather than the point in time that alcoholic drinks were consumed. Id. at 227, 801 P.2d at 462 (citing Dickinson, 105 Wash.2d at 491-92, 716 P.2d at 832 (Durham J., dissenting)). We have already rejected this approach. See supra notes 6 and 8 (qualifiedly adopting the majority view espoused in Dickinson). The court in Bruce also held that the employer was not liable under the respondeat superior theory because though [it] may have stood to benefit from the presence of Duarte and his fellow employees at the picnic, there is no evidence that Duarte or any other employee's presence was `requested or impliedly or expressly required' by [the employer]. We find a distinct difference between requiring employees to attend a party where the employer supplies all the alcohol, and observing employees in an impromptu picnic. Id. at 227, 801 P.2d at 462 (quoting from Dickinson 's test for recovery from a banquet-hosting employer). [14] However, we have also declined to apply the requested or impliedly or expressly required element of the Dickinson test, see supra note 8, because actual or possible control over the employee is not required for a finding of respondeat superior liability. See supra note 10. A reasonable trier of fact could find a sufficient nexus in the instant circumstances between the employee's negligent act (drinking while aware of the need to drive) and the employer's interest (fostering employee good will). The record provides support for a finding that there was a history and tradition of drinking activities in HIRI's picnic area, and that this practice benefitted the enterprise. The trier of fact could reasonably find that Rellamas was acting within the scope of his employment when he negligently drank alcohol at this party; therefore, HIRI could be held vicariously liable for Rellamas' negligent act.