Opinion ID: 2831440
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Use Easements

Text: Two decades after we established the necessity easement doctrine for roadways in Alley, we found that framework to be ill suited for other improvements that nonetheless are properly construed as implied easements. In Howell v. Estes, we addressed use of a stairwell to access two buildings. 12 S.W. 62, 62 (Tex. 1888). In Howell, a father had constructed adjoining two-story buildings that jointly used a stairwell in one building. Id. When he died, he left one building to his son and the other to his daughter. Id. In the wake of a familial dispute, the sibling who owned the building with the stairwell denied use of it to the other sibling. Id. Our preexisting doctrine for necessity easements could not adequately address such a situation. The party seeking the easement likely could not claim strict necessity, as he was still able to access his land and the bottom floor of his building.4 Id. But recognizing that the law should 4 W e recognized that he could access his second floor by building a stairwell for the then considerable sum of $50. Howell, 12 S.W .2d at 62. 8 afford a remedy, we established an alternate doctrine for assessing whether to recognize implied easements for improvements across previously unified adjoining property as follows: [I]f an improvement constructed over, under, or upon one parcel of land for the convenient use and enjoyment of another contiguous parcel by the owner of both be open and usable and permanent in its character . . . the use of such improvement will pass as an easement, although it may not be absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of the estate conveyed. Id. at 63. Unlike necessity easements, which are implied out of the desire to avoid the proliferation of landlocked—and therefore, unproductive—parcels of land, the rationale underlying the implication of an easement based on prior use is not sheer necessity. Rather, as this Court has expressly recognized, “[t]he basis of the doctrine [of prior use easements] is that the law reads into the instrument that which the circumstances show both grantor and grantee must have intended, had they given the obvious facts of the transaction proper consideration.” Mitchell v. Castellaw, 246 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tex. 1952). There is a presumption that parties contracting for property do so “with a view to the condition of the property as it actually was at the time of the transaction,” and therefore, absent evidence to the contrary, such conditions which openly and visibly existed at the time are presumed to be included in the sale. Miles v. Bodenheim, 193 S.W. 693, 696–97 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1917, writ ref’d). This Court has explained the requirements for establishing a prior use easement as “fairly standardized,” such that the party claiming a prior use easement must prove: (1) unity of ownership of the alleged dominant and servient estates prior to severance; (2) the use of the claimed easement was open and apparent at the time of severance; (3) the use was continuous, so the parties must have intended that its use pass by grant; and (4) the use must be necessary to the use of the dominant 9 estate. Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, 364 S.W.2d 196, 207–08 (Tex. 1962). Because the actual intent of the parties at the time of severance is often elusive, these factors effectively serve as a proxy for the contracting parties’ intent. It is worth noting that we have elevated the proof of necessity for a subset of prior use easement cases. A prior use easement may arise either by reservation (where the grantor of the previously unified parcel retains the landlocked parcel) or by grant (where the grantor conveys the landlocked parcel). We have expressly held that to establish a prior use easement implied by reservation, a party must demonstrate strict necessity with respect to the easement claimed. Mitchell, 246 S.W.2d at 168. But, with respect to a prior use easement implied by grant, some ambiguity remains as to whether a party must demonstrate strict necessity or reasonable necessity for a party to succeed. See Drye, 364 S.W.2d at 208–09. Because we hold below that the Wards must pursue an implied easement by way of necessity theory, we need not reach this question. The factual circumstances in which we have discussed the prior use easement illuminate its purpose. We have used the prior use easement doctrine to assess situations such as use of a stairwell in an adjacent building,5 grazing cattle,6 and recreational use of adjoining property.7 In addition to access, we have also discussed the application of the prior use easement doctrine to “a part[ition] wall,” “a drain or aqueduct,” “a water [gas] or sewer line into the granted estate,” “a drain from the land,” “light and air,” “lateral support,” and “water.” Drye, 364 S.W.2d at 207–08. In light of the 5 Howell, 12 S.W . at 62. 6 Ulbricht, 325 S.W .2d at 677. 7 Drye, 364 S.W .2d at 208. 10 history and the purpose behind these two types of implied easements, we clarify when parties should pursue each type of easement. 3. Roadway Easements to Landlocked, Previously Unified Parcels Must Be Tried as Implied Easements by Way of Necessity The Hamricks claim that we should inject continued necessity as a requirement for prior use easements. The Wards claim that, despite the confusion between necessity easements and prior use easements, we have never required continued necessity for prior use easements. We view the pertinent question not as whether continuing necessity is required of prior use easements but rather as whether the Wards’ use of the roadway is appropriate to assess under the prior use easement doctrine. We clarify that courts adjudicating implied easements for roadway access for previously unified, landlocked parcels must assess such cases under the necessity easement doctrine.8 Admittedly, the express elements required for prior use easements do not restrict themselves to certain easement purposes. Drye, 364 S.W.2d at 207–08. As a result, we have previously encountered a party asserting a prior use easement for a roadway to access his previously unified, landlocked parcel. See Bickler, 403 S.W.2d at 357.9 But we developed the two types of implied easements for discrete circumstances. The less forgiving proof requirements for necessity easements 8 There exist other types of easements, such as prescriptive easements, easements by estoppel, and express easements. Drye, 364 S.W .2d at 204. The W ards also pleaded a prescriptive easement claim, which will be within the scope of our remand to the trial court. 9 Before Bickler, two parties in this Court sought to assess easements for improvements and roadway access together under the prior use easement doctrine. See Ulbricht, 325 S.W .2d at 677 (granting prior use easement for grazing cattle and ingress and egress to a lake); Mitchell, 246 S.W .2d at 164 (assessing a driveway and shed as prior use easements). 11 (strict and continuing necessity) simply serve as acknowledgment that roadways typically are more significant intrusions on servient estates. By contrast, improvements at issue in prior use easements (e.g., water lines, sewer lines, power lines) tend to involve more modest impositions on servient estates. Accordingly, for such improvements, we have not mandated continued strict necessity but instead carefully examine the circumstances existing at the time of the severance to assess whether the parties intended for continued use of the improvement.10 Our clarification today in no way should impact the continued ability of such improvements to qualify as prior use easements. Applying this distinction to the Wards’ claimed easement does not entail prolonged analysis. Their claimed easement concerns a roadway to access a previously unified, landlocked parcel. This is precisely the factual scenario for which we created the necessity easement doctrine well over a century ago, and here, the Wards must pursue a necessity easement rather than a prior use easement. 4. Remand The Wards only pleaded theories of a prior use easement and easement by prescription in the trial court. The trial court and court of appeals held that the Wards conclusively established a prior use easement. Ordinarily, “parties are restricted in the appellate court to the theory on which the case was tried in the lower court.” Safety Cas. Co. v. Wright, 160 S.W.2d 238, 245 (Tex. 1942). Accordingly, we procedurally cannot hold that the Wards prevailed on a theory they have not advanced in the trial court. However, we will not foreclose the Wards from bringing a necessity easement claim in light of our clarification of the law. “We have broad discretion to remand for a 10 W e have, however, required strict necessity when a grantor reserves for himself a prior use easement. Mitchell, 246 S.W .2d at 168. 12 new trial in the interest of justice where it appears that a party may have proceeded under the wrong legal theory.” Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 603 (Tex. 1993). Moreover, “[r]emand is particularly appropriate where the losing party may have presented his or her case in reliance on controlling precedent that was subsequently overruled.” Id. As we have indicated, we have encountered at least one situation in which a party pursued a prior use easement (rather than a necessity easement) for roadway access to a previously unified, landlocked parcel. Bickler, 403 S.W.2d at 357. Although we refrain from opining as to whether the Wards will ultimately prevail on a necessity easement claim, our clarification of the law entitles them to the opportunity to plead and prove such a claim. In addition to the issue of what type of easement the Wards must claim, the parties raise the issues of the Hamricks’ bona fide purchaser defense and the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. Our remand for the Wards to pursue a necessity easement claim precludes us from reaching either issue. We note that the court of appeals held the bona fide purchaser defense is an appropriate defense to prior use easements. 359 S.W.3d at 782. It did not address whether the bona fide purchaser defense applies to a claim the Wards had not yet raised. Accordingly, that issue remains unresolved and is before the trial court on remand. Likewise, we need not assess the propriety of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees because that question will also be within the scope of the remand to the trial court.