Opinion ID: 782233
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of arbitrary arrest and detention standard to alvarez

Text: 74 The standard then is whether the arrest and detention were arbitrary, that is, not pursuant to law. 21 Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1384. In the case before us, there was, quite simply, no basis in law for the unilateral extraterritorial arrest and related detention of Alvarez in Mexico. 75 The only instrument Sosa can point to as evidence that Alvarez's abduction was pursuant to law is an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Central District of California. But a federal arrest warrant, without more, hardly serves as a license to effectuate arrests worldwide. It is no accident that the warrant is directed to The United States Marshal and any Authorized United States Officer (emphasis added). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect at the time of Alvarez's arrest provided that [a] warrant may be executed... within the jurisdiction of the United States. Fed.R.Crim.P. 4(d)(2). 22 The language could hardly be clearer — within the jurisdiction of the United States means exactly what it says. 23 76 Despite the clear limitation on the extraterritorial reach of the arrest warrant, Sosa would have us believe that Alvarez's arrest in Mexico was authorized under American law. 24 The United States takes the same position in its defense against Alvarez's false arrest claim, which we discuss in a later section but which is also relevant here. Both parties conclude that the federal officers (and, by implication, Sosa) were authorized by statute to make warrantless arrests outside the United States. Because the criminal statutes under which Alvarez was charged have extraterritorial application, the argument goes, Congress must have granted DEA agents broad authority to enforce those statutes beyond our borders. 77 The proper starting point is, of course, the applicable statutory scheme. We begin with a well-established canon of construction. It is a longstanding principle of American law `that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' EEOC v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 69 S.Ct. 575, 93 L.Ed. 680 (1949)). In applying this principle, `we assume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.' Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993) (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227). [T]he presumption is rooted in a number of considerations, not the least of which is the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind. Id. at 204 n. 5, 113 S.Ct. 1178. The canon also serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1963)). 78 The Supreme Court, in recognizing this principle, has carved out an exception for a narrow class of substantive criminal statutes. In United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922), the Court reviewed a criminal fraud provision used to indict individuals who committed acts on a U.S. vessel outside of American territorial waters. The Court reiterated its presumption that, in most cases, if a substantive criminal provision is to be applied extraterritorially, it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute. Id. at 98, 43 S.Ct. 39. But the Court found that the same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated. Id. 79 We have no doubt that the substantive criminal statutes under which Alvarez was charged apply to acts occurring outside the United States. Invoking the rules of construction just described, we reasoned in United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839-41 (9th Cir.1994), that 18 U.S.C. § 1959, the racketeering statute under which Alvarez was indicted, applied extraterritorially. Later, we applied the same principles to conclude that Congress intended to apply statutes proscribing the kidnapping and murder of DEA agents extraterritorially. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d at 1204. 80 These cases reinforce the established proposition that certain criminal statutes are applicable to conduct occurring outside of the borders of the United States. It was precisely this principle of extraterritoriality that led the Supreme Court to conclude that Alvarez could be tried in the United States. Alvarez II, 504 U.S. at 657 & n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2188. And it is this same concept that is invoked in case after case to assert jurisdiction over defendants — whether United States or foreign nationals — for criminal conduct occurring outside of the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 421-23 (9th Cir.2002) (applying extraterritoriality principle to bring citizen of St. Vincent and the Grenadines to trial in U.S. for sexual assault on cruise ship in Mexican territorial waters after cruise ship landed in U.S.); United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 739-40 (9th Cir.2002) (applying harboring statute extraterritorially to bring to trial wife of violator of Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act arrested in U.S.); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (9th Cir.1984) (applying drug importation and distribution statutes extraterritorially to prosecute Malaysian defendant extradited to U.S.); Yousef, 327 F.3d at 87-111, 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS 6437, at -45 (applying provisions of the Destruction of Aircraft Act extraterritorially to conduct of terrorists who, after being arrested by Philippine and Malaysian police and later turned over to the FBI, were prosecuted for their participation in a conspiracy to bomb United States commercial airliners in Southeast Asia). 25 81 This proposition is not, however, the same as the far-reaching principle advocated by Sosa and the government, namely that a statute with extraterritorial application automatically carries with it the authority for United States agents to detain and arrest suspects worldwide. Extraterritorial application, in other words, does not automatically give rise to extraterritorial enforcement authority. Such a leap is too facile. That Congress may have intended the reach of a criminal statute to extend beyond our borders does not mean that Congress also intended to give federal law enforcement officers unlimited authority to violate the territorial sovereignty of any foreign nation to enforce those laws, or to breach international law in doing so. Bowman does not countenance such an extension, and our cases have never so held. 26 82 In Bowman, the Supreme Court focused on the nature of the criminal conduct as a guide to determining the territorial reach of criminal statutes, but balanced that concern against limitations imposed by international law. The Court stated that [t]he necessary locus, when not specially defined, depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by the description and nature of the crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the power and jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law of nations. 260 U.S. at 97-98, 43 S.Ct. 39. The Court repeatedly made reference to the locus of the offense[] and the locus of [the] crime ... in a foreign country, not to extraterritorial enforcement powers of the United States authorities. Id. at 97, 99, 43 S.Ct. 39. The court also emphasized that, by extending the reach of the substantive criminal statutes at issue, it was not imposing upon the sovereignty of other states. 27 Id. at 102-03, 43 S.Ct. 39. 83 Similarly, when we interpreted the criminal statutes for which Alvarez was indicted extraterritorially, we did so only with regard to the location of the conduct at issue. And even then we did so cautiously to ensure that we did not unnecessarily impinge on the sovereignty of other states or ignore accepted principles of international law. See Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 839-40; Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d at 1205-06; Chua Han Mow, 730 F.2d at 1311-12. 84 Taking the extraterritorial application of the applicable criminal laws as a given, the question then becomes whether Congress has separately authorized the unilateral, extraterritorial enforcement of those provisions in a foreign country by agents of the United States. The United States insists that such authority can be found in a provision in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 878, which grants certain powers to DEA and other law enforcement personnel. 28 85 Subsection 878(a)(3) of that provision authorizes DEA agents to make warrantless arrests on probable cause for suspected felony violations. 21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(3). Although this subsection grants DEA agents felony arrest power, no language in the statute provides, or even suggests, that Congress intended that power to extend outside the borders of the United States. Given that the provision applies to DEA agents as well as any State or local law enforcement officer designated by the Attorney General, it would in fact be anomalous to read subsection (3) as the statutory basis for a geographically limitless arrest power. Nor can such power be found in the catchall language of subsection (5), which states that DEA agents, as well as designated state and local officials, may perform such other law enforcement duties as the Attorney General may designate. 21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(5). Again, nothing in the text of the statute remotely indicates that Congress sought to extend DEA arrest authority to any territory outside American borders. 86 Although legislative silence is not necessarily dispositive, these provisions must be construed against the backdrop of Aramco's presumption against extraterritoriality. Even the narrow Bowman exception offers no safe harbor. 29 Section 878(a) regulates executive authority, not criminal conduct. And this provision can hardly be classified as a criminal statute[ ] which [is] ... not logically dependent on [its] locality for the Government's jurisdiction. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98, 43 S.Ct. 39. To hold otherwise would essentially swallow the presumption against extraterritoriality and grant, without express congressional authorization, worldwide law enforcement authority to United States officials (and to state and local officials upon designation by the Attorney General). Virtually a limitless number of statutes would have both extraterritorial reach and the prospect of extraterritorial enforcement. Surely such a result would all but eviscerate the longstanding principle that our laws generally apply only within our territorial borders. 87 Faced with congressional silence on the matter, the United States analogizes this case to United States v. Chen, 2 F.3d 330 (9th Cir.1993). The issue in Chen was whether agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service acted outside their statutory authority by conducting an undercover investigation into the smuggling of Chinese aliens into the United States from international waters. The operation involved planting undercover agents on a chartered boat (the Corinthian) that rendezvoused with a Chinese ship some 320 miles off the coast of California. The agents watched and videotaped as the Chinese aliens boarded the Corinthian, keeping the aliens under surveillance during and after their entry into the United States. Id. at 332. 88 In evaluating whether the INS exceeded its statutory authority, we looked to 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), the statute charging the Attorney General with enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and determined that Congress had given the Attorney General extremely broad powers to administer and enforce the immigration laws by directing the Attorney General to perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter. Chen, 2 F.3d at 333 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We inferred from the broad language of § 1103(a) that Congress intended to grant the Attorney General the corresponding power to enforce the immigration laws both within and without the borders of the United States. Id. We also pointed to § 1103(b), which specifically authorizes the Attorney General to delegate this broad authority to the Commissioner of the INS. Finally, we were careful to note that the Attorney General had in fact exercised this authority and had explicitly delegated her broad enforcement powers to the Commissioner under 8 C.F.R. § 2.1. Id. at 334. This chain of authority, we reasoned, provided the legal basis for the INS and its agents to undertake offshore undercover investigations such as this one. Id. 89 But this case is not Chen. First, the INS operation in Chen, which consisted solely of observing and recording events, did not take place within the boundaries of another sovereign, but rather in international waters. That operation — unlike the abduction of a foreign citizen from a friendly neighbor — did not trigger any allegations of a breach of a law of nations. In fact, Chen did not even address international law, as traditional sovereignty concerns were not at issue. This distinction is critical, for one of the bedrock principles embodied in the presumption against extraterritoriality is that we must protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227; see also Kollias, 29 F.3d at 70 (applying the same rationale). If Chen's expansion of INS authority to the high seas did not raise concerns about clashing with laws of another sovereign, the case before us most certainly presents that danger. 90 Second, the demonstrated chain of delegated authority on which Chen relied, extending from Congress to the Attorney General to the INS Commissioner to the INS agents, has not been shown to exist with respect to the DEA. Section 878(a)(3) does grant DEA agents broad authority to make warrantless arrests, and § 878(a)(5) does confer the authority to perform such other law enforcement duties as the Attorney General may designate.  21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(5) (emphasis added). But even if Chen were to direct us to infer extraterritoriality from this bare language — a proposition that we do not accept — there is no evidence in this record that the Attorney General has in fact authorized the DEA Administrator to perform whatever extraterritorial enforcement powers the Attorney General may have—either generally or as to this abduction. 30 91 The importance of obtaining specific authorization for extraterritorial law enforcement operations is brought into sharper relief by the fact that had the INS operation in Chen occurred within the boundaries of a foreign nation, rather than in international waters, the Attorney General (or the Commissioner, acting under delegated authority) would have been statutorily required to consult with the Secretary of State before deploying INS agents abroad. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(7) ([A]fter consultation with the Secretary of State, [the Attorney General] may, whenever in his judgment such action may be necessary to accomplish the purposes of this chapter, detail employees of the Service for duty in foreign countries.). Such a restriction on the Attorney General's extraterritorial enforcement power, even in an area as obviously international as immigration, is evidence that Congress did not contemplate giving field agents the authority to act unilaterally in deciding to cross the borders of a friendly nation and abduct one of its citizens over that nation's objection. If the Attorney General must consult with the Secretary of State before dispatching INS agents to foreign lands, then surely, absent explicit statutory authorization, the Deputy Administrator of the DEA is not free to take it upon himself to send agents across the border into Mexico or to hire Mexican bounty hunters to act as surrogates to abduct a suspect. 92 Chen thus stands for only the proposition that the INS possesses limited delegated authority to conduct an operation on the high seas. At no point did we hold or even suggest that Congress has given license to the executive branch to violate international law in the course of enforcing criminal statutes that have extraterritorial reach. And surely Chen does not support the proposition that Congress has sub silencio delegated to the executive branch the authority to unilaterally enter a friendly nation and abduct one of its citizens in violation of international law. 93 Reading a generally worded statute like 21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(5) as evidence that Congress has given the DEA carte blanche to effectuate arrests within any sovereign state would require us to make the untenable assumption that Congress, in drafting such a statute, turned a blind eye to the interests of equal sovereigns and the potential violations of international law that would inevitably ensue. 31 This we cannot do. See McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21, 83 S.Ct. 671 (1963) (`[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.' (quoting Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804))). 94 We are not suggesting that Congress lacks the power to enact laws authorizing extraterritorial law enforcement powers. Nor do we question the powers of the political branches to override the principles of sovereignty in some circumstances, should the need arise. Rather, we are simply saying that we cannot impute such an intent where it is not expressed, and Congress has expressed no such intent here. 32 95 Congress has shown that it is quite capable of making clear when arrest powers should have extraterritorial effect. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (Congress' awareness of the need to make a clear statement that a statute applies overseas is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions on which it has expressly legislated the extraterritorial application of a statute.). In defining the law enforcement powers of the Coast Guard, for example, Congress provided that [t]he Coast Guard may make ... arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a). The powers of customs officials on the high seas have likewise been clearly articulated. See 19 U.S.C. § 1701 (permitting customs officials to seize or arrest in those areas of the high seas designated as customs-enforcement areas by the President). 96 More recently, in the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 33 Congress included clear and separate provisions pertaining both to the extraterritorial scope of the substantive crime and the executive agency's power to arrest. Section 3261(a), relating to certain members and employees of the Armed Forces, addresses the extraterritorial scope of the substantive crime: 97 Whoever engages in conduct outside the United States that would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States ... shall be punished as provided for that offense. 98 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (emphasis added). Section 3262(a), pertaining to arrest and commitment, explicitly lays out the scope of arrest powers: 99 The Secretary of Defense may designate and authorize any person serving in a law enforcement position in the Department of Defense to arrest, in accordance with applicable international agreements, outside the United States any person described in section 3261(a) [of the Act] if there is probable cause to believe that such person violated section 3261(a). 100 18 U.S.C. § 3262(a) (emphasis added). 34 If Congress thought it could rely on courts to supply extraterritorial scope through searching interpretations of vague statutes, no such language would be necessary. 101 Wishful thinking is no substitute for clear congressional authority. Congress surely knows how and when to expand the reach of its laws beyond our borders. There is little doubt that Congress has the authority to do so; there is also little doubt that it has not done so here. Thus, although we recognize that the kidnapping and murder of DEA agents abroad necessitates the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, absent a clear directive, we cannot conclude that Congress has given the DEA unlimited enforcement powers abroad. Finding no basis in law for the DEA's actions, and left only with a warrant issued by a United States court, we conclude that Alvarez's arrest, and hence his detention, were arbitrary because they were not pursuant to law. Consequently, Alvarez established a tort committed in violation of the law of nations. 102 II. ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT — SUBSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DEA AGENTS 103 We next consider whether the district court appropriately substituted the United States for the individual government defendants. The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (the Westfall Act), 28 U.S.C. § 2679, provides that, for civil actions arising out of the wrongful act of a federal employee acting within the scope of his official duties, the United States is to be substituted as a defendant and the claims may proceed only under the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). This exclusive remedy provision does not apply, however, in an action which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(B). Alvarez argues that the ATCA falls within this exemption. 104 But we agree with the three-judge panel's conclusion that the exemption does not apply here, and that the United States was properly substituted for the individual DEA agents. Alvarez-Machain IV, 266 F.3d at 1053. Accordingly, we adopt the relevant portion of that opinion: 105 The district court held that an action under the ATCA was not exempt from the exclusive remedy provision of the Liability Reform Act. It reasoned that it is international law, not the ATCA, that gives individuals fundamental rights. Therefore, a claim under the ATCA is based on a violation of international law, not of the ATCA itself. 106 This reading is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 111 S.Ct. 1180, 113 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991). In Smith, the Court rejected the argument that a claim for medical malpractice was authorized by the Gonzalez Act and therefore fit the 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(B) exception for violations of a statute. The court explained: [n]othing in the Gonzalez Act imposes any obligations or duties of care upon military physicians. Consequently, a physician allegedly committing malpractice under state or foreign law does not `violate' the Gonzalez Act. Smith, 499 U.S. at 174, 111 S.Ct. 1180. 35 The same can be said of the ATCA. The language of § 1350 creates no obligations or duties. Admittedly, the ATCA differs from the Gonzalez Act in that it creates a cause of action for violations of international law, whereas the Gonzalez Act limited the common law liability of doctors. See Marcos II, 25 F.3d at 1475 (rejecting the argument that the ATCA is merely jurisdictional); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir.1996); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885-86. Nonetheless, we find nothing in this distinction to cause us to deviate from the plain language of the statute. We therefore agree with the district court that Alvarez's claims under the ATCA were subject to substitution under the Liability Reform Act. Accordingly, Alvarez's exclusive remedy against the United States, in lieu of the DEA agents, is through the FTCA. 107 Id. at 1053-54. 108 Because the United States is substituted for the DEA agents, we treat the claims brought against the agents within the context of the FTCA. See § IV infra.