Opinion ID: 1753985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: tinnin i ?

Text: In Tinnin I we set aside the chancellor's conclusion that the racial restriction in Hobgood's will was only incidental, not integral. Tinnin I at 668. The Tinnins argue that the chancellor again applied this integral/incidental analysis in Tinnin II. We find from the record that the Tinnins are in error in this suggestion. In Tinnin I this Court found that there existed a general plan to Hobgood's reconstructed will and the question to be determined on retrial was which alternative would be less offensive to Hobgood's general plan. The language used by the chancellor shows that he did not rely on the integral/incidental analysis in deciding the case. He balanced the competing evidence and determined that there were dominant purposes in Hobgood's general plan. See Matter of Estate of Anderson, 541 So.2d 423, 430, n. 13 (Miss. 1989). From these purposes the chancellor adopted the construction which in his opinion resulted in a just and reasonable result as required by this Court in Tinnin I at 669. This argument has no merit. The Tinnins next complain that the chancellor required them under the object of affection guidelines of Tinnin I to prove that Lucille Tinnin would be the person most preferred by Allan Hobgood to receive the assets of the failed trust. The Tinnins are not required to prove that they were the special objects of Hobgood's affections, and clearly they were not since he excluded them from his will. In Tinnin I we requested the chancellor, on retrial, to determine whether the Tinnins were objects of Hobgood's affection. If found to be objects of Hobgood's affection, then the law would favor the Tinnins just as the law favors beneficiaries who appear to be the special objects of the testator's bounty when an instrument is ambiguous and capable of two constructions. New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary v. Lacy, 219 So.2d 665, 672 (Miss. 1969). The burden is properly on the Tinnins to show that they or their mother were objects of Allan Hobgood's affections. Nothing in this record indicates that the chancellor held them to any higher standard than that. The chancellor was not in error in his application of Tinnin I. It appears that the Tinnins believed that if there was any proof of affection at all between Hobgood and the Tinnins, the chancellor was required to terminate the trust. This construction cannot be arrived at from a reading of Tinnin I and in this contention the Tinnins are incorrect. The Tinnins next argue that the chancellor required them to establish racial hatred on the part of the Hobgoods. Tinnin I only required that the chancellor should ascertain, if possible, the power and source of Allan Hobgood's interest in helping young people go to college and how important this was vis-a-vis his clearly expressed racially discriminatory intent. Tinnin I at 670. The Bank correctly points out that the Tinnins introduced testimony emphasizing Hobgood's attitude towards blacks. Therefore, it was appropriate for the chancellor to respond to the extrinsic evidence introduced at trial. In sum, the trial court balanced the evidence to determine which alternative was less offensive to the general plan of Hobgood's will. This was the standard set forth for the chancellor in Tinnin I and the chancellor did not commit legal error.