Opinion ID: 1971691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Grants of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Text: The Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction, Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 992 (D.C.1979), but its subject matter jurisdiction has from time to time been expanded or contracted by statute. D.C.Code § 11-921(a) (2001) provides that the Superior Court has jurisdiction of any civil action or other matter (at law or in equity) brought in the District of Columbia. The Family Court, a division of the Superior Court, has jurisdiction over . . . actions for divorce . . . including proceedings . . . for support and custody of minor children. D.C.Code § 11-1101(a)(1) (2001 & 2007 Supp.). Thus, our statutes expressly grant subject matter jurisdiction over actions for divorce and child support. The legislature has limited the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to grant divorces and to determine child custody. For example, [n]o action for divorce or legal separation shall be maintainable unless one of the parties to the marriage has been a bona fide resident of the District of Columbia for at least six months next preceding the commencement of the action. D.C.Code § 16-902 (2001). Moreover, a court of the District has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only under circumstances described in D.C.Code § 16-4602.01(a) (2007 Supp.). [3] Except, perhaps, for UIFSA, which we will discuss shortly, no comparable provision of the D.C.Code limits the authority of the Superior Court to issue orders for child support. Indeed, the Council of the District of Columbia has codified the doctrine of continuing jurisdiction with respect to entering or modifying child support orders. D.C.Code § 16-914.01 (2007 Supp.) states that [a]fter the issuance of a judgment, decree, or order granting custody, child support, or alimony, the Court retains jurisdiction for the entry of future orders modifying or terminating the initial judgment, decree, or order to the extent the retention of jurisdiction does not contravene other statutory provisions. Here, of course, the divorce decree granted Ms. Connole custody of the children. This court has not yet addressed the reach of § 16-914.01, which was enacted by D.C. Law 14-207 (effective October 19, 2002). However, we have interpreted an earlier version of the statute to grant continuing jurisdiction to make orders for support where the original divorce decree was silent on that topic. Clark, 485 A.2d at 622-23 (citing Alves, 262 A.2d at 117, for proposition that D.C.Code § 16-914 gives [the] trial court continuing jurisdiction over issues of custody and child support even where the decree is silent as to custody or child support). We see no evidence that by enacting § 16-914.01 the Council intended to curtail the continuing jurisdiction of the court. If anything, the revised language was intended to make that jurisdiction even more clear. [4]