Opinion ID: 2455723
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Additional hearing

Text: Beck contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the prosecutor's motion to hold an additional hearing on the motion to transfer and by admitting various items into evidence at that hearing. We hold that that circuit court's actions did not constitute an abuse of discretion. During the first transfer hearing, on December 8, 1993, the state presented the testimony of one witness and introduced into evidence one letter. Both related to the physical condition of Kenyatta Williams, the victim of the drive-by shooting. Beck, on the other hand, offered the testimony of several witnesses dealing with his character and prospects for rehabilitation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court postponed ruling upon the motion to transfer and the constitutional challenge, allowing the parties ten days in which to submit briefs. On December 13, 1993, the state filed a motion to reopen the hearing, noting that, while the victim had been unable to testify at the December 8 hearing because of his physical condition and the need to remain in Little Rock for treatment, his family had made a videotape depicting his condition. Citing the videotape's relevance to the motion to transfer, the state requested its admission into evidence. In an order filed on December 16, 1993, the circuit court granted the state's motion to reopen the hearing, stating specifically: The Court wishes to have all pertinent information available prior to making its decision in this case. The Court in its discretion believes that further testimony at this time would not prejudice either party, but would aid the Court in making the decision required. Both parties were given the opportunity to introduce additional testimony. At the second hearing, held on the following day, December 17, 1993, the defense renewed its objection to the granting of the motion to reopen, arguing that the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure governed and that none of the criteria for allowing a new trial under Rule 59 had been met. Further, the defense objected to the state having been given a second bite at the apple when it already had adequate time to prepare for and present evidence at the initial hearing. The circuit court overruled the objection. Subsequently, the defense objected to the admission of the videotape on hearsay, relevancy, and confrontation grounds. The circuit court permitted the defense attorney to voir dire Garnette Bell, the victim's mother, regarding the recording of the videotape. When Ms. Bell testified that the videotape had been made on Sunday, December 12, 1993, the defense objected that the videotape didn't even exist prior to the [December 8] hearing and had been manufactured exclusively and purely for this hearing. The defense further objected to the state's attempt to sensationalize these proceedings with after-acquired, hearsay evidence that was not reliable and more prejudicial than probative. The circuit court, in admitting the videotape into evidence, explained that to memorialize certain events after something has happened ... is not manufacturing, it's just getting ready for trial, getting ready for whatever is going to happen in this case. Beck cites no authority, apart from a broad, passing allusion to the rules of criminal procedure, the rules of civil procedure, and the rules of evidence for his contention that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting the motion to reopen the hearing. We reiterate that we do not consider unsupported arguments on appeal. Tisdale v. State, supra . Rule 59 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, to which Beck referred at the second hearing, deals with new trials. It goes without saying that a reopened hearing is not a new trial. In the context of criminal trials, however, we have repeatedly held that the reopening of the case-in-chief for the taking of additional evidence is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court and that we will not reverse the decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 510, 838 S.W.2d 359 (1992); Cameron v. State, 278 Ark. 357, 645 S.W.2d 943 (1983); Williams v. State, 262 Ark. 219, 555 S.W.2d 231 (1977). See also Holloway v. State, 312 Ark. 306, 849 S.W.2d 473 (1993). The principle is also well established in civil cases. See, e.g., Midwest Lime Co. v. Independence Chancery Court, 261 Ark. 695, 551 S.W.2d 537 (1977). The same principle should apply in this situation, as well. With respect to the admission of the videotape showing Kenyatta Williams's physical condition, Beck relies on Ark.R.Evid. 804(a)(5) for his contention that the trial court abused its discretion. That hearsay exception defines unavailability as a witness to include a situation in which the declarant: Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance ... by process or other reasonable means.... According to Beck, there was no showing of a good-faith effort on the part of the state to procure the victim's testimony. See Register v. State, 313 Ark. 426, 855 S.W.2d 320 (1993). The record, however, indicates that Kenyatta Williams was paralyzed from the neck down and incapable of moving his legs or controlling the movement of his arms. At the time of the hearing, he had a blood clot in his left leg and was being treated at Arkansas Children's Hospital in Little Rock. The rule of evidence cited by Beck is inapplicable under the circumstances. In addition, Beck argues that the circuit court improperly considered the information in reaching its decision because the prosecutor did not request that judicial notice be taken of the document. The case on which he relies, Pascall v. Smith, 263 Ark. 428, 569 S.W.2d 89 (1978), which involves judicial notice taken by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, has no bearing whatsoever on the present matter. The information was available to the circuit court in the case file, and the circuit court took judicial notice of it in accord with Ark.R.Evid. 201(c), which provides that A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.