Opinion ID: 483247
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Heading: The Statute of Limitations Applicable to Civil RICO

Text: 83 RICO does not contain its own statute of limitations for civil actions and hence the court must apply the most appropriate limitations period provided by state law. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975); Durante Brothers & Sons v. Flushing National Bank, 755 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3530, 87 L.Ed.2d 654 (1985). In Durante, whose civil RICO claims were based principally on the defendants' alleged collection of unlawful debts, we concluded that the most appropriate limitations period was New York's three-year period for suits to enforce a liability created by statute, see CPLR Sec. 214(2). We reached this conclusion notwithstanding some similarity between a claim for the collection of an unlawful debt and a claim for state-law usury, to which the one-year limitations period provided by CPLR Sec. 215(6) would apply, principally because the components of the two claims are fundamentally disparate (a state law claim governed by Sec. 215(6) could be established without proof of nine of the ten listed elements of the civil RICO claim), 755 F.2d at 249, and because the aims of Congress in enacting RICO far exceeded the elimination of simple usury (i.e.,  'the eradication of organized crime in the United States ... by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime' ), id. at 248 (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (Statement of Purpose), reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News (USCCAN) 1073). 84 We consider the Durante -type analysis equally applicable to civil RICO claims based on racketeering activity, notwithstanding plaintiffs' suggestion that Durante 's selection of the limitations period governing actions to enforce a liability created by statute has been overruled by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). In Wilson, the Court rejected the view that the state limitations period applicable to actions to enforce a liability created by statute governs claims under Sec. 1983. Observing that Sec. 1983 merely added to the remedies available to enforce existing rights and did not purport to create substantive rights, that it had been enacted principally to provide remedies for personal injuries plainly sound[ing] in tort, that state statutory claims challenging conduct covered by Sec. 1983 were scarce when Sec. 1983 was enacted, and that even today few Sec. 1983 claims are based on violations of statutory rights, the Wilson Court concluded that for statute-of-limitations purposes the Sec. 1983 action should be likened to an action to redress personal injury, not to an action to enforce a liability created by statute. 471 U.S. at 276-79, 105 S.Ct. at 1947-49. 85 We find this reasoning inapplicable to claims under civil RICO. As we observed in Durante, Congress intended in RICO to establish new prohibitions, enhanced sanctions, and new remedies; its goal was to attempt to eradicate organized crime, rather than simply to provide an avenue of redress for wrongs cognizable at common law. Thus, most of the racketeering activity that could form the predicate for a civil RICO claim is defined in terms of specific federal statutory violations; additional elements of a civil RICO claim, such as effect on interstate commerce, commission of two predicate acts within a span of ten years, and the required existence of a RICO enterprise, also find no counterparts at common law. Further, civil RICO remedies are designed not simply to compensate injured persons but to deter would-be wrongdoers by awarding treble damages and attorneys' fees to every successful plaintiff. Finally, unlike Sec. 1983, which was enacted in the 1870's, RICO was enacted in 1970 when catchall limitations periods for statutory causes of action had long been commonplace. See Malley-Duff & Associates v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341, 347-49 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 569, 93 L.Ed.2d 573 (1986). 86 In light of the significant differences between civil RICO and other types of claims cognizable at common law or under state law, we have found no New York statute of limitations provision more appropriate for civil RICO actions than that governing actions to enforce a liability created by statute. Plaintiffs have argued for the application of CPLR Sec. 213(1) or Sec. 213(6), each providing a six-year period. We find neither appropriate. Section 213(1) has generally been understood to govern only actions for equitable relief. Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 863 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 1631, 71 L.Ed.2d 866 (1982). Civil RICO makes no provision for equitable relief. Section 213(6) is no more apt, for it governs actions for gross misconduct and constructive fraud, claims that could be established without proof of any criminal conduct (compare S.Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) (racketeering activity is an act subject to criminal sanction); see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)), or indeed without proof of any other elements of civil RICO. In short, we conclude that CPLR Secs. 213(1) and (6)  'fall[] far short of capturing the multitude of factual bases on which RICO can be based.'  Malley-Duff & Associates v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d at 351 (quoting Electronic Relays (India) Pvt., Ltd. v. Pascente, 610 F.Supp. 648, 651 (N.D.Ill.1985)). 87 We conclude that the district court was correct in applying to plaintiffs' RICO claims the three-year period provided by CPLR Sec. 214(2) for actions to enforce a liability created by statute. 88