Opinion ID: 1870908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Was the jury's verdict grossly excessive?

Text: The jury awarded Ellis a judgment of $80,000. That amount was not excessive in light of Ellis's injuries, his permanent disability resulting from those injuries, and his projected life expectancy. The injuries suffered by Ellis at the time of the collision were extensive: a severe laceration and fracture of his left knee; two broken ribs; numerous contusions and lacerations over his head, face and entire upper body. Testimony showed that as a result of the accident Ellis incurred $2,264.55 in medical bills, a sum greatly mitigated by the fact that his wife, a registered nurse, was able to provide free care and was able to have him released from the hospital early. Also as a result of the collision, Ellis was unable to work for approximately six to seven weeks. Evidence from both expert and lay witnesses indicated the lingering effects of Ellis's injuries. According to one doctor, Ellis was left with an atrophy of his injured left leg, resulting in a permanent 15% impairment of function in that limb. Acquaintances noticed a marked reduction in Ellis's participation in recreational activities that he had enjoyed prior to the accident. Highway Patrol officers testified to the physical nature of a patrolman's job and the additional difficulties Ellis would face as a result of his weakened leg. In augmentation of the above, Ellis was only 26 years old at the time of the accident; he had a remaining life expectancy of 46.5 years. The permanent disability and impairment of function will affect Ellis for the rest of his life. The amount of damages to be awarded to an injured litigant is primarily a question of fact for the jury. Boyd v. Smith, 390 So.2d 994 (Miss. 1980); New Orleans and N.E.R.R. Co. v. Weary, 217 So.2d 274 (Miss. 1968); Jones v. Welford, 215 So.2d 240 (Miss. 1968). The jury's verdict will not be disturbed unless it is so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience, or evidence bias, passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. G.M.A.C. v. Layton, 353 So.2d 749 (Miss. 1977); Harkins v. Paschall, 348 So.2d 1019 (Miss. 1977); Anderson v. Jaeger, 317 So.2d 902 (Miss. 1975). As this Court said in the case of City of Jackson v. Locklar, 431 So.2d 475 (Miss. 1983): The jury's verdict is a finding of fact. Unless we can say that no rational jury could on this proof have assessed damages [in the amount awarded] the award must be left undisturbed. We will not vacate or reduce a damage award unless it is so out of line as to shock the conscience of the court. Id. at 481. The injuries and permanent impairment suffered by Ellis justified the jury's verdict; it is not so excessive as to shock the conscience, or evidence bias or prejudice. The amount of the award will not be disturbed. For the reasons stated, this case should be and is affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.