Opinion ID: 2606242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Colman's property taken or damaged or merely regulated under the State's general police powers?

Text: The State suggests that because the breach of the causeway was a valid exercise of the State's police powers, it is not liable for the damage caused to Colman. However, in Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), we plainly stated, The constitutional guarantee of just compensation for the taking or damaging of private property for public use is in no way affected by the fact that the expropriator ... exercis[ed] the police power. 526 P.2d at 928. The State seems to have misled itself on this point by relying on isolated language from discussions of a related but different issue. It is true that the courts will not disturb the legislature's judgment in the exercise of the general police powers as long as it does not violate constitutional limits. Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 355, 145 P. 1047, 1048-49 (1915). The police powers are not, however, beyond the limitations established by the constitution. Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah 107, 125-26, 292 P. 194, 202 (1930). The emphasis the State places on the police powers is often made when there is a close issue that turns on the difference between a taking or damage under article I, section 22 and mere regulation of property and activities on property. Many statutes and ordinances regulate what a property owner can do with and on the owner's property. Those regulations may have a significant impact on the utility or value of property, yet they generally do not require compensation under article I, section 22. Only when governmental action rises to the level of a taking or damage under article I, section 22 is the State required to pay compensation. Previous cases of this Court have wrestled with the issue. In Bountiful City v. De Luca , the Court stated: Broad and comprehensive as are the police powers of the state, still we think it may not successfully be contended that the power may be so exercised as to infringe upon or invade rights safeguarded and guaranteed by constitutional provisions ... . The cases are numerous to the effect that ... the state may without compensation regulate and restrain the use of private property when the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the public requires or demands it; ... that the exercise of proper police regulations may to some extent prevent enjoyment of individual rights in property or cause inconvenience or loss to the owner, does not necessarily render the police law unconstitutional, for the reason that such laws are not considered as appropriating private property for a public use, but simply as regulating its use and enjoyment, and if the owner through a lawful exercise of the power suffers inconvenience, injury, or a loss, it is regarded as damnum absque injuria, provided always, that constitutional mandates have not been invaded by a confiscation, destruction, or deprivation of property, unless it is per se injurious or obnoxious or a menace to public health or public safety or morals or general welfare, or unless under conditions similar to tearing down a building to prevent spreading of a conflagration; but however broad the scope of the police power, it is always subject to the rule that the Legislature may not exercise any power expressly or impliedly forbidden by constitutional provisions. 77 Utah at 119-121, 292 P. at 199-200 (emphasis added). In Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 362, 145 P. 1047, 1051 (1915), we held that a landowner cannot complain because he is inconvenienced in the use of his property, where such inconvenience arises out of the proper enforcement of the police power to protect the public health, and where such enforcement does not amount to a taking or destruction of his property. Here, Colman argues that the State's actions were not a mere regulation of property, but constituted an actual physical taking. It is not relevant that the State's action in this case was a valid exercise of its police power. Rather, the issue is whether sufficient facts were alleged to show a taking of property. It is not alleged that Colman was causing a nuisance on the property. Thus, the case does not fall into the exception for the abatement of nuisances.