Opinion ID: 1382318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Issue Four: Proffered Jury Instruction

Text: Finally, the appellant asserts that the circuit court erred in failing to give her proffered jury instruction concerning the definition of registered professional nursing found in W.Va.Code § 30-7-1(b) (1992). [15] It is the appellant's position that the jury could not determine the appropriate standard of care absent the proffered instruction. In reviewing this alleged error we are mindful that [a]s a general rule, the refusal to give a requested jury instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. By contrast, the question of whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law, and the review is de novo.  Syllabus point 1, State v. Hinkle, 200 W.Va. 280, 489 S.E.2d 257 (1996). Also, [a] trial court's instructions to the jury must be a correct statement of the law and supported by the evidence. Jury instructions are reviewed by determining whether the charge, reviewed as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so they understood the issues involved and were not mislead by the law. A jury instruction cannot be dissected on appeal; instead, the entire instruction is looked at when determining its accuracy. A trial court, therefore, has broad discretion in formulating its charge to the jury, so long as the charge accurately reflects the law. Deference is given to a trial court's discretion concerning the specific wording of the instruction, and the precise extent and character of any specific instruction will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Syllabus point 4, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995). Finally, [t]he formulation of jury instructions is within the broad discretion of a circuit court, and a circuit court's giving of an instruction is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. A verdict should not be disturbed based on the formulation of the language of the jury instructions so long as the instructions given as a whole are accurate and fair to both parties. Syllabus point 6, Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, 194 W.Va. 97, 459 S.E.2d 374 (1995). Concerning the standard of care applicable to Nurse Grim, the circuit court instructed the jury as follows: For the plaintiff to recover from Linda Grim on her claim, she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: One, that Linda Grim is negligent; and, two, that her negligence was a proximate cause of Ola Mae Taylor's injury. Throughout these instructions, I will be using the term health care provider. That term applies to the defendant, Linda Grim, who is considered to be a health care provider. When you hear the term health care provider in these instructions, you should think of the defendant and apply that term individually. I want to tell you about the standard of care expected of the health care provider. The standard of care is important because in order for the plaintiff to prove negligence, she must establish, one, the degree of care, skill and learning required or expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider in the profession or class to which the health care provider belongs acting in same or similar circumstances; and, two, that the health care provider deviated from that standard; and, three, that the deviation was the proximate cause of the injury.       A health care provider is not required to exercise the highest degree of skill and diligence possible in the treatment of an injury, but is required to possess and exercise that degree of learning, skill, diligence and care ordinarily used and possessed by a health care provider in good standing in the profession or class to which they belong, acting in the same or similar circumstances in 1994, with regard being given to the state of medical and nursing science at that time. We believe that this charge sufficiently instructed the jury so that the jurors properly understood the standard of care required of Nurse Grim. We further believe that, as a whole, it is accurate and fair to both parties. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the appellant's proffered instruction and giving the above instruction instead.