Opinion ID: 6221425
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Batson Test as Applied to These Facts

Text: ¶32 To begin, there is no real dispute that Ojeda met his burden as to step one under Batson. When the prosecutor first attempted to excuse Juror R.P., defense counsel promptly asserted a Batson objection, noting his concern about excusing Hispanic men from the jury. ¶33 When shortly thereafter, the prosecution again attempted to excuse Juror R.P., this time with a peremptory strike, defense counsel renewed his Batson challenge. The prosecution immediately responded with an explanation regarding the challenged peremptory strike. It did not, at any point, argue that defense counsel failed to set forth a prima facie case. We interpret the prosecution’s immediate response to the Batson objection as its acknowledgement that Ojeda met his burden under step one. We also conclude, based on the substance of defense counsel’s argument, that Ojeda met his burden in this regard. 16 ¶34 Next, we turn to step two. As we do so, we review, in greater detail, the state of the record leading up to the prosecution’s Batson response. Recall that defense counsel asserted Batson challenges to both of the prosecution’s efforts to excuse Juror R.P. ¶35 After the first Batson challenge, when the prosecutor attempted to excuse Juror R.P. for cause, she stated that she “found it to be significant” that Juror R.P. had “devoted his career to . . . a quality of healthcare for individuals.” She told the court that Juror R.P., “himself a person of color,” appeared to have a distinctive leaning, as evidenced by his discussion of the defendant being a person of color and his commitment to his career serving people of color. The trial court denied the prosecution’s request, concluding that there was “a completely inadequate record to challenge Juror R.P. in this case,” and that “[there was] no indication he couldn’t follow my instructions and reach a verdict based on the evidence.” The trial court specifically noted that it did not reach the Batson issue. ¶36 Not long thereafter, the prosecution again sought to excuse Juror R.P., this time with a peremptory challenge. Defense counsel reasserted his Batson objection. In response, the prosecutor specifically incorporated her unsuccessful argument regarding her challenge for cause. Then, she explained that the prosecution’s strategy was focused on trying to select jurors who are “establishmentarian.” She elaborated that the problem was that the “defendant is 17 a Latino male,” and because Juror R.P. had discussed his own concerns about being racially profiled, Juror R.P., whom she described as a “polished, educated,” and “persuasive individual,” might then “steer the jury towards a race-based reason why” Ojeda was “charged in the case.” ¶37 Defense counsel again countered that these reasons were overtly race-based: “With respect to [Juror R.P.], I think [the prosecutor] made my argument for me. She’s concerned about a race-based argument being made by [Juror R.P.] because he’s Hispanic.” ¶38 The trial court denied the Batson challenge, identifying three race-neutral reasons to explain the strike—none of which were offered by the prosecution. First, that Juror R.P. was a victim of a sex assault, as was his ex-wife, and he seemed remarkably unconcerned about those events; second, that Juror R.P.’s first thought when discussing the time it took to get the case to trial was that the victim delayed disclosure; and, third, that Juror R.P. had an anti-law enforcement bent. ¶39 All three members of the division below, relying on Valdez, concluded that the trial court improperly supplied its own race-neutral reasons for the prosecutor’s strike, although they each ultimately reached different conclusions as to how the trial court erred in denying Ojeda’s second Batson challenge. See Ojeda, ¶ 13, 487 P.3d at 1121 (majority opinion) (citing Valdez, 966 P.2d at 592 n.11, for the proposition that a trial court may not supply its own race-neutral reasons for a 18 strike); Id. at ¶ 63, 487 P.3d at 1130 (Harris, J., specially concurring) (same); Id. at ¶ 104, 487 P.3d at 1137 (Hawthorne, J., dissenting) (same). ¶40 The People argue that all three members of the division erroneously concluded that the trial court provided its own race-neutral explanation for the strike. They contend that the trial court’s ruling can, instead, be read to “implicitly credit” the prosecutor’s explanation. They lean, as they did below, on People v. Beauvais, 2017 CO 34, 393 P.3d 509, in support of this assertion. We are unpersuaded. ¶41 In Beauvais, the defendant, who was female, asserted a Batson objection to the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to excuse female potential jurors, arguing that the prosecutor’s reasons for the strikes were pretextual. ¶ 7, 393 P.3d at 513. After hearing from both attorneys, the trial court found that the defendant had not established purposeful discrimination. Id. at ¶ 12, 393 P.3d at 515. The trial court did not make any specific credibility findings about the reasons proffered by the prosecutor in response to the Batson challenge. See id. On appeal, the majority of a division of the court of appeals concluded that the record was insufficient to facilitate review and remanded to the trial court to make specific step-three credibility findings about the prosecutor’s three justifications for striking certain female potential jurors. Id. at ¶ 14, 393 P.3d at 515. 19 ¶42 We reversed after concluding that an appellate court conducting a clear error review should defer to the trial court’s step-three ruling “so long as the record reflects that the trial court weighed all of the pertinent circumstances and supports the court’s conclusion” regarding purposeful discrimination. Id. at ¶ 32, 393 P.3d at 519. We viewed the record as sufficient to facilitate review and observed that, under certain circumstances, a trial court’s ultimate decision to overrule a Batson objection can be taken as an “implicit crediting” of the prosecution’s reasons and could, thus, survive clear error review. Id. at ¶ 27, 393 P.3d at 518. ¶43 But here, at step two of the Batson analysis, we apply de novo review. And here, importantly, the trial court did not implicitly accept the prosecutor’s explanation. Rather, by supplying its own race-neutral reasons to justify the strike, the trial court implicitly rejected that explanation. ¶44 Moreover, by providing its own race-neutral reasons to explain the strike, the trial court answered the wrong question. The question under Batson is: Whether the prosecutor actually struck the potential juror based on race. By supplying its own reasons, the trial court instead answered whether there was some race-neutral explanation for the strike that could be gleaned from the record irrespective of the prosecutor’s actual reason for doing so. See Miller-El v. Dretke , 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005) (“Miller-El II”) (explaining that the focus is on the striking 20 party’s stated reasons, regardless of whether “a trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might” withstand scrutiny). Thus, the trial court erred by supplying its own reasons for the peremptory strike. ¶45 The People next contend that the trial court’s third justification—that Juror R.P. had an “anti-law enforcement ben[t]”—was not a new reason offered up by the trial court but, instead, simply another way of describing the prosecutor’s argument regarding establishmentarian jurors. Even if this is so, it does not move the needle here because the inquiry at step two is whether—accepting what the prosecution said as true—the explanation for the strike was race-neutral or racebased. ¶46 Applying that standard, we conclude that the prosecution’s explanation was based in part on Juror R.P.’s race. Here, the thread that runs through the prosecution’s lengthy explanation was its overtly race-based concern that Juror R.P.—a polished, educated, persuasive Hispanic man, who the prosecution said voiced concern about racial profiling—might look to Ojeda who, like him, was a Hispanic man, and “steer the jury towards a race-based reason why” Ojeda was “charged in the case.” Judge Harris explained the overtly race-based rationale for the prosecution’s strike well: [The prosecutor] explicitly tied Juror R.P.’s race to his views on the justice system. It was not just that Juror R.P. had concerns about the system; it was also that he was a person of color, like the defendant, and the combination of those facts made it more likely that he would 21 find a “race-based” reason for the prosecution and then try to persuade the other jurors to adopt his view. Ojeda, ¶ 69, 487 P.3d at 1131 (Harris, J., specially concurring). ¶47 At base, part of the prosecution’s explanation boiled down to the suggestion that Juror R.P. might not give the prosecution a fair shake because of his race. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 104 (Marshall, J., concurring) (explaining that the exclusion of Black jurors cannot “be justified by a belief that [B]lacks are less likely than whites to consider fairly or sympathetically the State’s case against a [B]lack defendant”). ¶48 Though not dispositive here at step two, we also note that, contrary to the People’s assertions, Juror R.P. (1) did not “talk[] about” the defendant being a person of color; (2) did not “talk about” or “make comments” regarding his own, or anyone else’s, “concerns” about racial profiling; (3) did not “inject[] his personal views about racial profiling”; and (4) did not attribute his views regarding the justice system to his race. It was the prosecution that focused on the defendant and Juror R.P. as persons of color and then connected Juror R.P.’s race to his purportedly “anti-establishment” views. And in making this connection, the prosecution misattributed certain statements and views regarding race and racial profiling to Juror R.P. to argue that he might not consider the prosecution’s case fairly because both he and Ojeda were Hispanic men. ¶49 On this record, we conclude that the prosecution did not meet its burden at step two of the Batson analysis to offer a race-neutral reason for striking Juror R.P. 22