Opinion ID: 2390226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standards Governing the Admission of Expert Opinion Evidence of CSAAS in Criminal Trials

Text: We need not retrace the development of these standards in any extensive detail. In a long series of cases, we have outlined the general standards that govern the admissibility of such evidence. See State v. Spann, 130 N.J. 484, 617 A. 2d 247 (1992); State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 548 A. 2d 1022 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S.Ct. 1146, 103 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1989); State v. R.W., supra, 104 N.J. 14, 514 A. 2d 1287; State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A. 2d 364 (1984); State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 443 A. 2d 1020 (1982). A summary may be found in State v. R.W., supra , describing the accepted grounds for admitting expert testimony: As provided in the Rules of Evidence, Evid.R. 56, and reiterated by many cases, the testimony of an expert is allowed when it relates to a subject-matter beyond the understanding of persons of ordinary experience, intelligence, and knowledge. E.g., State v. Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. 178 [478 A. 2d 364] Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399 [471 A. 2d 405] (1984). This applies as well to the field of child sex-abuse offenses. As we have seen, such testimony may be allowed to explain generally the behavior, feelings, and attitudes of such victims when it is shown that their condition is not readily understood by persons of average intelligence and ordinary experience; an expert or scientific explanation of their condition, one accepted as reliable by the scientific community that is involved in the diagnosis, treatment, and care of such individuals, can assist a jury in understanding the evidence. [104 N.J. at 30-31, 514 A. 2d 1287.] Acceptance within a scientific community can sometimes be an elusive premise to prove. There will always be some detractors to any theory or clinical approach. State v. Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. 178, 208-14, 478 A. 2d 364, illustrates the kind of inquiry that must be made concerning the definition of the scientific community, the degree of acceptance within that community, and the method of proof of that acceptance. [6] See also Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 125 N.J. 421, 593 A. 2d 733 (1991) (discussing special difficulties encountered in certain forms of scientific analysis). Some courts have admitted expert testimony that a child has been sexually abused without any reference to scientific reliability. In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App.3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Ct.App. 1984). However, even a qualified expert's opinion must have a reliable basis. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 417, 420, 605 A. 2d 1079 (1992) (stating that whether an expert may testify to cancer causation depends on degree of acceptance within relevant scientific community of the methodology of analysis). Certainly, we should be even more hesitant to depart from the general-acceptance requirement in a criminal case. State v. Spann, supra, 130 N.J. at 510, 617 A. 2d at 259-260. Finally, we have consistently recognized that juries have exclusive responsibility in the determination of criminal guilt or innocence. State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 398 A. 2d 861 (1979). Hence, in State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65, 560 A. 2d 1198 (1989), we permitted a State's expert witness to testify that, in his opinion, based on his experience and specialized knowledge, the quantity of drugs was there possessed with the intent to distribute them. We therefore concluded that as long as the expert does not express his opinion of defendant's guilt but simply characterizes defendant's conduct based on the facts in evidence in light of his specialized knowledge, the opinion is not objectionable. Id. at 79, 560 A. 2d 1198. We realize that the line drawn in Odom may be thin at times but believe that properly charged juries can see the distinction. There does not appear to be a dispute about acceptance within the scientific community of the clinical theory that CSAAS identifies or describes behavioral traits commonly found in child-abuse victims. See, e.g., Myers, supra, 68 Neb. L.Rev. at 66-69; Holmes, supra, 25 Tulsa L.J. at 158-59. The most pointed criticism of the theory is that the same traits may equally appear as the result of other disorders. Holmes, supra, 25 Tulsa L.J. at 158, 162-63. Even extreme poverty or psychological abuse can produce the sense of entrapment or accommodation. In other words, the existence of the symptoms does not invariably prove abuse. That would be a valid criticism if the CSAAS evidence were offered for a purpose beyond the scope of the scientific theory. An analogy may be drawn from State v. Cavallo, supra, 88 N.J. 508, 443 A. 2d 1020 (1982). In that case, defense counsel offered to prove that the defendant did not have the characteristics common to all or most rapists and thus to disprove the fact of rape. After reviewing the literature and cases in other jurisdictions, the Court was convinced that the medical or legal communities do not generally accept the view that psychiatrists possess the knowledge or capability to state the likelihood that an individual behaved in a particular manner on a specific occasion. In contrast, State v. Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A. 2d 364, explained that expert scientific evidence concerning battered-woman's syndrome does not aid a jury in determining whether a defendant had or had not behaved in a given manner on a particular occasion; rather, the evidence enables the jury to overcome common myths or misconceptions that a woman who had been the victim of battering would have surely left the batterer. Thus, the evidence helps the jury to understand the battered woman's state of mind. Id. at 190-97, 204-05, 478 A. 2d 364. Because the State in Kelly had reinforced those myths by repeatedly asking the victim why she had taken her husband back after the battering, the Court ruled such evidence admissible to counter the myths if reliability of the evidence of a counter-intuitive behavioral pattern were established within the scientific community. Id. at 205-06, 211-14, 478 A. 2d 364.