Opinion ID: 2053330
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: nature of the counties code

Text: With respect to the bases of this court's decision in City of Decatur, the county argues that the civil service provisions of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 34, par. 1-1001 et seq. ) are other laws specifically providing for the matter over which AFSCME seeks to bargain. Specifically, the county cites sections 3-14013 and 3-14016 of the Code. Section 3-14013 requires the classification of all the offices and places of employment in said county with reference to the examination provided for in section 3-14016. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 34, par. 3-14013.) Section 3-14016 provides that all applicants for offices or places in the classified service shall be subjected to examination. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 34, par. 3-14016.) The county argues that those provisions are not, unlike the civil service system at issue in City of Decatur, optional with or subject to unilateral change by the county, but mandatory upon it. We disagree. In support of its assertion that it does not have the authority to unilaterally alter the civil service provisions of the Counties Code, the county notes that the legislature first enacted the civil service provisions of the present Code in 1941 and has not significantly altered them since. In so arguing, the county ignores that the provisions were enacted prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1970 and the creation therein of home rule powers for certain Illinois counties and municipalities, including the county. (Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, § 6.) More importantly, it ignores the consequence of that fact upon its power to alter, amend, or simply abandon the civil service system provided for in the Code. In Kanellos v. County of Cook (1972), 53 Ill.2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240, this court was asked to decide whether the home rule provisions of the Constitution of 1970 required referendum approval for the issuance of general obligation bonds by home rule counties. The court was also asked to decide whether the pre-1970 Constitution requirement to that effect in section 40 of the Counties Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1969, ch. 34, par. 306), one of the predecessor statutes of the present Code, was still in full force and effect pursuant to section 9 of the Transition Schedule of the Constitution of 1970 (Ill.Const.1970, Trans. Sched. § 1 et seq. ). This court, while disagreeing with the county that the legislature did not have authority, under the provisions of article VII, section 6, of the Constitution of 1970, to impose a referendum requirement upon home rule counties for the issuance of general obligation bonds, nonetheless noted that the legislature had not done so. ( Kanellos, 53 Ill.2d at 165-66, 290 N.E.2d 240.) More relevantly to this case, this court also held that the Counties Act was inapplicable to home rule counties notwithstanding the provision of the Transition Schedule that, inter alia, [a]ll laws, ordinances, regulations and rules of court not contrary to, or inconsistent with, the provisions of this Constitution shall remain in force, until they expire by their own limitation or shall be altered or repealed pursuant to this Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, Trans. Sched. § 9). Kanellos, 53 Ill.2d at 166-67, 290 N.E.2d 240. Specifically, the court noted that to accomplish the greater independence granted thereunder to local governmental units, designated as home rule units, to determine their government and affairs, the Constitution of 1970 conferred substantial powers upon such units subject only to the restrictions imposed or authorized therein. The court also noted that the Counties Act had been enacted prior to and not in anticipation of the introduction of the concept of home rule and the limitations thereon in the Constitution of 1970. It reasoned that, because such considerations were totally foreign in the contemplation of legislation predating the 1970 Constitution, section 40 of the Counties Act was inconsistent with the provisions of section 6(g) and the Transition Schedule. Kanellos, 53 Ill.2d at 166-67, 67, 290 N.E.2d 240. Applying the rationale employed in Kanellos to the issue whether the civil service provisions of the Code are binding upon the county perforce yields but one conclusion: they are not and may be unilaterally altered, amended or even abandoned by the county. In so concluding, we are mindful of the fact that Kanellos and the case sub judice involve, but different provisions of, the former Counties Act. It is thus easy to conclude that sections 3-14013 and 3-14016 of the Code, having been first enacted, like section 40 of the Counties Act, prior to and not in anticipation of the concepts of home rule and the specific limitations thereon introduced by the Constitution of 1970, are as inconsistent with those concepts as was section 40 of the Counties Act. While we conclude that the civil service provisions of the Code are inconsistent with the home rule powers of the county, we do so only to illustrate the optional nature of the civil service system provided thereunder, not to invalidate that system. The county has, apparently, decided not to exercise its home rule powers to establish an alternate civil service system. That decision is as valid and entitled to recognition by this court as would be the contrary decision. However, the county's decision not to exercise its home rule powers to create an alternate civil service system cannot control the determination whether the civil service system which it has chosen to employ is actually mandated by the legislature. As Kanellos clearly reveals, it is not. That being the case, we need not address either AFSCME's or the county's remaining arguments. However, in order to make the bases of our decision as clear as possible, we will address all of the county's arguments.