Opinion ID: 1694971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ernest Robertson

Text: The information provided by the confidential informant in the arrest of Robertson did not include as many important specific facts as the information in Buckley's arrest, but the tip did include the crucial link between the criminal activity in the area and the defendant. The credibility of the informer was again proved on the basis of the past performance. Officer Selby testified that this particular informant had provided information leading to approximately nine or ten arrests resulting in four or five convictions with other cases still pending. As to the informant's basis of knowledge, Selby testified that the confidential informant stated that he had observed a particular male and female engaging in several narcotics transactions (personal knowledge from observation). The police set up a surveillance from a building across the street. While the descriptions of the male and female were not detailed, they were sufficient for the officer to recognize them from his vantage point. While the pair was under surveillance, they were approached by Robertson who engaged them in conversation. The female received money from Robertson and then went inside the bar. Upon her return a short time later, the officer observed her hand objects to Robertson which he cupped in his right hand. Even with the aid of binoculars, the officer could not identify the object that was passed from hand to hand. Robertson was arrested one block from where his transaction was observed. The defendant cites cases holding that a person's associations do not provide probable cause for his arrest. State v. Blanton, 400 So.2d 661 (La.1981) (no probable cause to arrest after transporting several people under surveillance for drug violations); State v. Jones, supra; State v. Saia, supra; State v. Kinnemann, supra; Sibron v. New York, supra. Defendant also compares the present facts to those found in State v. Herbert, 351 So.2d 434 (La.1977), where this court on rehearing found that the passing of an object between admitted narcotics addicts followed by the passing of an object to a woman who fled at the sight of the police was not sufficient for a finding of probable cause. The majority in this decision stated, quoting State v. Kinnemann, supra: ... These `facts' cannot be said to furnish probable cause for an arrest or search. They do not connect defendants with criminal activity. They are at least as consistent with innocent activity as with guilt. State v. Herbert, supra at 440. The court in State v. Herbert, supra, had only the fact that the object had previously been passed between narcotics addicts to support the ultimate conclusion that the object was an illegal drug. In the present case, the police had the informant's tip that the described pair was engaging in narcotics transactions, and had also observed the exchange of money for the object. We find the decisions relied on by defendant factually distinguishable from the present case. Those cases correctly state the rule that a person's associations or the area in which an innocent activity occurs alone do not support a finding of probable cause. The requisite connection of the defendant with the criminal activity suspected was missing in the cases relied on by defendant. The trial judge in written reasons correctly stated that the information provided by the confidential informant was not sufficient to provide probable cause for the arrest of the defendant. The trial judge also correctly stated that the action of Robertson at the intersection was not inconsistent with ordinary everyday behavior and in and of itself insufficient to supply articulable facts for the arrest of the defendant. However, considering the cumulation of all of the facts known to the police at the time Robertson was arrested, it is reasonable for an average policeman to conclude that the object passed to Robertson was an illegal drug, the possession of which is a crime. Under all of the circumstances, innocent explanations for this exchange seem implausible. The trial court erred in sustaining defendant Robertson's motion to suppress the evidence seized from him at the time of his arrest. The ruling of the trial judge sustaining the motions to suppress the evidence as to both Gloria Buckley and Ernest Robertson is reversed. Both cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. WATSON, J., concurs in the result.