Opinion ID: 853128
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Some History

Text: Justice Sullivan, concurring in Richardson, identified several situations in which two convictions cannot coexist. They were: 1) lesser included offenses; 2) the two crimes consist of the very same act; 3) one crime consists of the very same act as an element of the other; 4) an enhancement of one crime imposed for the very same behavior or harm as another crime; and 5) conspiracy where the overt act is the very same act as another crime. I thought then, and think now, that the double jeopardy clause of the Indiana Constitution has other and more important work to do in addressing subsequent prosecutions. Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 57-73 (Boehm, J., concurring in result). However, under stare decisis, I accept the Court's view that the Indiana Constitution addresses multiple convictions. Richardson sought to establish a single comprehensive rule [of double jeopardy] synthesizing and superseding previous formulations and exceptions. Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 832 (Ind.2002). Subsequent experience has made clear that this goal was not achievable, at least not without upsetting a number of the precedents supporting the rules cited by Justice Sullivan. For example, the requirement of Richardson that all facts of one crime be embraced within that of the other limits its application to the rules prohibiting conviction for lesser included offenses. In recognition of the incompatibility of the actual evidence test with these precedents, Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826 (Ind.2002), acknowledged that some of these doctrines were not of constitutional dimensions and were not governed by Richardson. Accordingly some of these rules (e.g., the same bodily injury does not elevate two crimes) are not subject to a Richardson analysis, and can prohibit double enhancement through a single common element. At the same time, in Spivey, we reiterated that the Richardson constitutional test required all, not just one, of the evidentiary facts of one crime to be embraced within those of another before the constitutional test of Richardson would bar two convictions. Spivey, 761 N.E.2d at 833. I concur in everything the Court says. I nevertheless believe the widespread confusion reflected in the Court of Appeals cases attempting to apply Richardson requires us to try to explain how future cases are to be analyzed. [2] The first Sullivan rule is the statutory elements test, identical to federal double jeopardy under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). The second and third prohibit dual convictions under an analysis substantially the same as identification of a factually lesser included offense, as that term is explained in Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995). [3] Both Richardson and Wright teach that we look to the charging instruments and evidence to determine whether one crime is a factually lesser included offense. Richardson and several of its progeny make clear that the charging instrument, [4] the instructions, [5] arguments of counsel, [6] and the evidence itself [7] may be relevant to a determination whether the evidentiary facts of one crime are included among those of another. The fourth Sullivan rule requires us to determine whether the very same behavior or harm enhanced two crimes, but we are not told how that is to be determined or reviewed on appeal. The fifth similarly turns on whether the overt act supporting a conspiracy is the very same act as another crime. All of the foregoing is acceptable to me, but I think we should be clear what we are doing and what we expect the Court of Appeals to do in reviewing these claims. Accordingly, I set forth how I think we are, or should be, approaching these claims in light of the Court's holding today.