Opinion ID: 2621477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: warrantless seizure analytical process

Text: The analysis I propose has two distinct separate steps. First, the court must determine whether a warrantless seizure of the person within the meaning of article I, section 7 has occurred. Second, the court must determine if the resulting seizure of the person was permissible under article I, section 7. These steps must remain analytically separate. The standard in the first step, whether a seizure has occurred, is objective. The subjective motives, intentions, and suspicions of the law enforcement officer are relevant in the next step, whether the warrantless seizure was permissible under article I, section 7. Compare State v. Young, 135 Wash.2d 498, 501, 510-11, 957 P.2d 681 (1998) with State v. Williams, 102 Wash.2d 733, 739, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984). See also majority at 496. [1] A. Has a seizure of the person occurred? A person is seized under article I, section 7 when by means of physical force or a show of authority his or her freedom of movement is restrained such that a reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe that he or she is not free to leave or decline the officer's request and terminate the encounter. Young, 135 Wash.2d at 509-10, 957 P.2d 681, citing with approval United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); State v. Thorn, 129 Wash.2d 347, 352, 917 P.2d 108 (1996). The standard in this first step is a purely objective one, looking at the actions of the law enforcement officer from the perspective of the person subject to seizure. [2] Young, 135 Wash.2d at 501, 957 P.2d 681. Furthermore, the defendant has the burden of showing that a seizure occurred under article I, section 7. Young, 135 Wash.2d at 510, 957 P.2d 681. If the officer's actions under the totality of the circumstances objectively amounted to a seizure, then the analysis continues to the next step. B. Was the seizure of the person permissible under article I, section 7? It is well settled that article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution provides individuals more protection from searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. White, 135 Wash.2d 761, 769, 958 P.2d 982 (1998). Article I, section 7 provides that [n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law. Warrants and certain well established principles of common law provide the authority of law necessary to justify a seizure. State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343, 350, 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (citing City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash.2d 454, 457, 755 P.2d 775 (1988) and quoting City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash.2d 260, 273, 868 P.2d 134 (1994)). A warrantless seizure of either a person or evidence is per se unreasonable, but certain well established exceptions exist. See State v. Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 149, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980). If a valid warrant was issued for the seizure, then the analysis ends. However, if the seizure was made without a valid warrant, then the analysis continues to determine whether the seizure was constitutionally permissible under a recognized exception. We place the heavy burden on the State to show that seizures (of people or of evidence) fall within one of the limited number of `jealously and carefully drawn' exceptions to the warrant requirement. Houser, 95 Wash.2d at 149, 622 P.2d 1218 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979)). The only exceptions to the warrant requirement are those created by our well established common law principles. McCready, 123 Wash.2d at 273, 868 P.2d 134. [3] While statutes may authorize courts to issue warrants, statutes may not dispense with the warrant requirement because `[i]t is the court, not the Legislature, that determines the scope of our constitutional protections.' Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 352 n. 3, 979 P.2d 833 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Maxfield, 133 Wash.2d 332, 345-46, 945 P.2d 196 (1997) (Madsen, J., concurring)). The officer's subjective reason for seizing an individual is often, but not always, a relevant consideration in determining whether an exception applies. For example, if the applicable common law exception is to render emergency aid or community caretaking or to make a traffic or investigatory stop, then the court must determine the officer's subjective motives. E.g., State v. Loewen, 97 Wash.2d 562, 568, 647 P.2d 489 (1982) (officer must be actually motivated by a perceived need to render aid or assistance); State v. Kinzy, 141 Wash.2d 373, 385, 5 P.3d 668 (2000) (officer's actions must be totally divorced from investigation of crime); Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 353, 979 P.2d 833 (court required to look beyond the formal justification to the actual reason for a traffic stop); State v. Glossbrener, 146 Wash.2d 670, 677, 49 P.3d 128 (2002) (officer's subjective intentions determines scope of permissible seizure). In addition, if the applicable exception is the existence of probable cause and there is evidence of pretext, then the officer's subjective motives and intentions are especially relevant. See State v. Johnson, 71 Wash.2d 239, 242-43, 427 P.2d 705 (1967); accord Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 357, 979 P.2d 833. I briefly review some established exceptions which may be relevant to the case at bar. 1. Community Caretaking Exception The community caretaking exception, which recognizes the public's interest in having law enforcement officers assist citizens in a variety of situations, may provide reasonable common law grounds for a warrantless seizure of the person. If the officer responds to apparent health or safety needs of a person or the community and discovers evidence of wrongdoing, then the community caretaking exception might provide the authority of law for a warrantless seizure of the person. [4] To determine whether the community caretaking exception applies, the court must examine the subjective intent of the officer and determine whether the law enforcement officer's actions leading up to the seizure were ` totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. ' Kinzy, 141 Wash.2d at 385, 5 P.3d 668 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973)). If a law enforcement officer's actions are subjectively divorced from a criminal investigation, then the court must weigh the public's interest in having the community caretaking function performed against an individual's interest in freedom from law enforcement intrusion. If the public interest outweighs the individual's interest, then the warrantless seizure was permissible under our state constitution. Kinzy, 141 Wash.2d at 387, 5 P.3d 668. 2. Probable Cause to Arrest Exception Under the common law exception, officers have the authority to make warrantless arrests where a misdemeanor is committed in the officer's presence or the officer has probable cause to believe the individual committed a felony. State v. Barker, 143 Wash.2d 915, 921, 25 P.3d 423 (2001). Although the legislature has codified situations where an officer may make a warrantless search, we have not yet had occasion to review this codification's constitutionality. See RCW 10.31.100; see also Barker, 143 Wash.2d at 922 n. 3, 25 P.3d 423. Probable cause to arrest exists when a person of reasonable caution would conclude that the individual has committed a crime based on the facts and circumstances. State v. Graham, 130 Wash.2d 711, 724, 927 P.2d 227 (1996) (quoting State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash.2d 632, 643, 716 P.2d 295 (1986)). The existence of probable cause is determined by an objective standard. Graham, 130 Wash.2d at 724, 927 P.2d 227. However, an officer's decision not to arrest properly ends his authority to search under this exception. Cf. Johnson, 71 Wash.2d at 242-43, 427 P.2d 705; accord Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 357, 979 P.2d 833.