Opinion ID: 47002
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equal Protection/Eighth Amendment

Text: The district court improperly determined that Anderson raised these issues for the first time in his reply brief; a liberal reading of his complaint clarifies that he did allege equal protection and Eighth Amendment violations in his amended complaint. Nevertheless, summary judgment was proper on these claims.3 First, Anderson cannot establish an equal protection violation for the manner in which the Board calculated his tentative release date or his guidelines and severity level because he offers no evidence that he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates. See Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2001); Fuller v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 1988). Second, because Anderson did not allege that he was mistreated in prison or that the prison conditions offend society’s notions of decency, he has not stated an Eighth Amendment claim. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). To the extent that he complains of his treatment while under arrest, the proper avenue of relief is pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections.4 Tittle v. Jefferson County Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 n.3 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). 3 This court may affirm on any adequate grounds even if those grounds differ from the district court’s. Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 613 (11th Cir. 1995). 4 Notably, the standards are the same as under the Eighth Amendment. Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1024 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 8 Nevertheless, Anderson failed to establish that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his needs. Because the crux of his argument pertains to officials’s alleged deliberate indifference to his right to a hearing, it will be addressed in the context of his due process claim below.