Opinion ID: 885472
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 34 Did the District Court err in allowing MRL to present evidence that Jim received workers' compensation benefits? ¶ 35 This Court reviews evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant and admissible. Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, the trial court's determination will not be overturned. Baldauf v. Arrow Tank and Engineering, 1999 MT 81, ¶ 41, 294 Mont. 107, ¶ 41, 979 P.2d 166, ¶ 41 (citing Vincelette v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1998 MT 259, ¶ 12, 291 Mont. 261, ¶ 12, 968 P.2d 275, ¶ 12). ¶ 36 We have repeatedly held that the introduction of evidence of workers' compensation benefits or other collateral source benefits constitutes prejudicial and reversible error requiring a new trial. Mydlarz v. Palmer/Duncan Construction Co. (1984), 209 Mont. 325, 341, 682 P.2d 695, 703. See also Thomsen v. State, Dept. of Highways (1992), 253 Mont. 460, 833 P.2d 1076 (in a personal injury action, admission of evidence concerning availability of medical and rehabilitation services for plaintiff from the Veterans Administration was error); Allers v. Willis (1982), 197 Mont. 499, 643 P.2d 592 (the fact that plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile accident, had a pending workers' compensation claim was inadmissible); Goggans v. Winkley (1972), 159 Mont. 85, 91, 495 P.2d 594, 598 (Injection of collateral matters involving transactions between others, which are in this case conjectural, is collateral inadmissible evidence under the collateral source doctrine.). ¶ 37 MRL argues that while collateral sources are generally excluded from evidence, the prohibition against collateral source evidence is not absolute. MRL contends that in Thomsen, this Court followed the California Supreme Court's reasoning that collateral source evidence is admissible if there is a persuasive showing that the evidence sought to be introduced is of substantial probative value. MRL claims that there was substantial probative value in this case to show that Jim failed to mitigate his damages and that the probative value of this evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect. ¶ 38 In Thomsen, this Court did note the California Supreme Court's statement regarding admissibility of collateral source evidence, however, contrary to MRL's contention, we did not follow that reasoning in Thomsen . Instead, we determined that the District Court in Thomsen erred in allowing the admission of the collateral source evidence and we remanded for a new trial. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court's statement regarding admissibility of collateral source evidence was worded far more strongly against the admission of that evidence than MRL suggests: The potentially prejudicial impact of evidence that a personal injury plaintiff received collateral insurance payments varies little from case to case. Even with cautionary instructions, there is substantial danger that the jurors will take the evidence into account in assessing the damages to be awarded to an injured plaintiff. Thus, introduction of the evidence on a limited admissibility theory creates the danger of circumventing the salutary policies underlying the collateral source rule. Admission despite such ominous potential should be permitted only upon such persuasive showing that the evidence sought to be introduced is of substantial probative value. [Emphasis added.] Thomsen, 253 Mont. at 463, 833 P.2d at 1078 (quoting Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc. (1971), 4 Cal.3d 725, 94 Cal.Rptr. 623, 484 P.2d 599, 604). ¶ 39 Additionally, this Court held in Mydlarz that it was reversible error for a district court to admit evidence that a plaintiff had received workers' compensation benefits. Mydlarz, 209 Mont. at 341, 682 P.2d at 703. The plaintiff in Mydlarz had filed a motion in limine to prevent the defendant from admitting such evidence. The District Court denied the motion and admitted the evidence, but instructed the jury not to use the evidence of workers' compensation benefits to reduce plaintiff's damages. Mydlarz, 209 Mont. at 333, 682 P.2d at 699. ¶ 40 On appeal, the defendants in Mydlarz argued that the evidence of workers' compensation benefits was admissible to show the plaintiff's lack of motive to return to work. Mydlarz, 209 Mont. at 340, 682 P.2d at 703. We disagreed and held that the prejudicial impact of allowing a jury to receive evidence of plaintiff's pending workers' compensation claim vastly outweighs the probative value of such evidence. Mydlarz, 209 Mont. at 340-41, 682 P.2d at 703. ¶ 41 Citing our prior decision in Allers v. Willis (1982), 197 Mont. 499, 643 P.2d 592, we ruled in Mydlarz that evidence of a workers' compensation claim is clearly inadmissible, and that admission of such evidence was reversible error and would require a new trial. Mydlarz, 209 Mont. at 341, 682 P.2d at 703. In reaching that conclusion, we quoted the following passage from Allers : Generally, it has been held to constitute error, requiring a reversal or new trial, to bring to the jury's attention the fact that the plaintiff in a personal injury or death action is entitled to workmen's compensation benefits. The courts have reasoned that such information would tend to prejudice the jury and influence their verdict, either as to liability or damages, as such information is ordinarily immaterial and irrelevant. Mydlarz, 209 Mont. at 341, 682 P.2d at 703 (quoting Allers, 197 Mont. at 503, 643 P.2d at 594-95; 77 A.L.R.2d 1154, 1156). ¶ 42 MRL contends that evidence of Jim's receipt of workers' compensation benefits was offered for the purpose of providing the jury with an understanding of why Jim chose not to return to work. MRL claims that Jim refused to mitigate his damages by obtaining gainful employment in order to preserve his workers' compensation benefits and that Jim was actually malingering by not accepting a supported employment position. ¶ 43 The Mickelsons argue on appeal that the District Court abused its discretion when it permitted MRL to introduce evidence that Jim was receiving workers' compensation benefits because there was no proof that the concepts of malingering or secondary gain applied to Jim. Thus, they argue that the very premise for MRL's entire argument is erroneous and misleading. ¶ 44 Dr. Stone, a board certified physical medicine rehabilitation specialist and Dr. Ross, a board certified physiatrist, each testified at trial that due to the injuries Jim sustained in the accident, he is not capable of being gainfully or competitively employed. Dr. Ross had at one time suggested that Jim enter a supported employment program, however, Jim and Vickie decided against it. Contrary to MRL's contention that this was evidence of Jim's failure to take reasonable steps to mitigate his damages, Dr. Ross testified that the supported employment program was merely therapeutic and was not intended as a means for Jim to earn money. ¶ 45 Moreover, the potential loss of workers' compensation benefits was only one of the reasons Jim chose not accept supported employment. Dr. Ross testified that the Mickelsons had legitimate concerns about the benefit of supported employment for Jim because of his problems with incontinence and depression as well as concerns for Jim's safety. Dr. Ross testified that he was concerned that supported employment would have a negative effect on Jim's pride and self-esteem which would lead to further depression and problems. Since Vickie was able to accomplish in the home setting all of the therapeutic goals that supported employment was intended to achieve, the Mickelsons were able to avoid the problems and concerns associated with a supported employment program. ¶ 46 MRL contends that even if it was error to allow the evidence of workers' compensation benefits, that error was harmless since the jury did not find MRL negligent and thus that evidence did not impact on the amount of damages awarded. On the contrary, as we stated in Thomsen, introduction of collateral source evidence may be much more damaging to a plaintiff's case than just affecting the jury's judgment regarding damages. We agree ... that such evidence can have an impact upon a jury's verdict on the issue of liability, as well as damages. Thomsen, 253 Mont. at 464, 833 P.2d at 1078. ¶ 47 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court erred in allowing MRL to present evidence that Jim was receiving workers' compensation benefits and we reverse and remand for a new trial.