Opinion ID: 1774411
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Title 13:1055 of the Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances Expressly Preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143?

Text: LSA-R.S. 14:143 provides that [n]o governing authority of a political subdivision shall enact an ordinance defining as an offense conduct that is defined and punishable as a felony under state law. The trial court found that Title 13:1055 of the Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances fell within this statutory preemption. The trial court's ruling was based first upon a construction of the statute as a safeguard against duplication of prosecution under state and local criminal provisions, and second upon the conclusion that the City's ordinance penalized a significant amount of conduct already regulated by state felony statutes. Before we consider the application of this statute to this particular ordinance, however, it is necessary that we first construe LSA-R.S. 14:143 to determine its parameters, as neither this Court nor any court of appeal has had the opportunity to interpret LSA-R.S. 14:143 since its passage in 1983. Because the origins of this particular statute shed much light on its purpose and intended scope, we begin with a brief outline of the developments that led to the passage of LSA-R.S. 14:143.
The problem this statute is designed to address arises as a consequence of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970). In Waller, the Court held that for double jeopardy purposes, a municipality and a state constitute the same sovereign, and therefore a conviction or acquittal entered as a result of the violation of a municipal ordinance bars a later prosecution by a state's attorney under a state statute proscribing the same offense. The difficulties that Waller created for those state jurisdictions, like Louisiana, which allow different tiers of government to define and prosecute criminal violations was well-stated by the California Supreme Court in Kellett v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 63 Cal.2d 822, 48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206, 209 (1966) ( In Bank ): We recognize that in many places felonies and misdemeanors are usually prosecuted by different public law offices and that there is a risk that those in charge of misdemeanor prosecutions may proceed without adequately assessing the seriousness of a defendant's conduct or considering whether a felony prosecution should be undertaken. When the responsibility for the prosecution for the higher offense lies with a different public law office there is also the risk that a well advised defendant may plead guilty to a misdemeanor to foreclose a subsequent felony prosecution the misdemeanor prosecutor may be unaware of or may choose to ignore. Cases may also arise in which the district attorney is reasonably unaware of the felonies when the misdemeanors are prosecuted. In such situations ... a defendant guilty of a felony may escape proper punishment. Compare Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980); People v. Stefan, 146 Ill.2d 324, 166 Ill.Dec. 910, 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Morgan, 785 P.2d 1294 (Col.1990) ( En Banc ); State v. Weide, 775 S.W.2d 255 (Mo.App.1989). This Court first confronted in State v. Suire, 319 So.2d 347 (La.1975), the dilemma presented by a subsequent state prosecution of an offense for which a municipality had already obtained a conviction. In Suire, the defendant was convicted in the Mayor's Court of Lake Arthur for the municipal offenses of disturbing the peace and aggravated battery. When the local district attorney later prosecuted Suire under the state aggravated battery statute, LSA-R.S. 14:34, Suire filed a motion to quash the prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. The district court granted the motion and quashed the prosecution, and the State appealed. The basis of the State's appeal was that the mayor's court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Lake Arthur's ordinance penalizing aggravated battery, a state felony offense, was inconsistent with ... state law and therefore preempted. Suire, supra, 319 So.2d at 349. See also LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 595(1). [4] A unanimous Court rejected the State's argument, finding that the ordinance was a legitimate exercise of the Parish's delegated police power and that it was not inconsistent with or in conflict with any state statutes. Id, at 350. The Court specifically noted that, given the absence of any contrary legislative expression, it is immaterial that the same conduct is punished by both state and municipality in the concurrent exercise of police power. Id. Justice Tate, the author of the Court's opinion, also authored a special concurrence. In his concurrence Justice Tate stressed that the Court had declined to decide whether Article VI, § 9(A)(1) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 [5] was intended to exempt from local regulation any conduct which the state legislation punishes as a felony. Suire, supra, 319 So.2d at 351 ( Tate, J., concurring ). In addition, Justice Tate speculated that the legislature might soon enact clarifying legislation, and that if such legislation were to statutorily deny local governments the power to enact police regulations punishing conduct which the state punishes as a felony there would be no need to reach the underlying constitutional question. Id. Justice Tate concluded by reiterating the need for legislative attention to the problem of concurrent state and local police regulation under the 1974 Constitution. Id. Despite Justice Tate's entreaties, no legislative action was immediately forthcoming, and six years later this Court revisited the issue in State v. Foy, 401 So.2d 948 (La.1981). In Foy, the defendants pleaded guilty in the Mayor's Court of Tallulah to the violation of a city ordinance defining the crime of burglary and specifying it as a misdemeanor. Foy, supra, 401 So.2d at 949. The local district attorney later prosecuted the defendants in district court under the State felony burglary statute, LSA-R.S. 14:62. Id. The district court quashed the State prosecution on double jeopardy grounds, and the State appealed. Id. As in Suire, the basis of the State's appeal was that the mayor's court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offense, and that therefore jeopardy had never attached in the initial prosecution. Foy, 401 So.2d at 949. See Note 4, supra. The Court in Foy began by noting that LSA-R.S. 33:441 granted the mayor's court jurisdiction over all violations of municipal ordinances. Id. The Court then found that under Suire the State had no standing to challenge any constitutional infirmity in the statute establishing the jurisdiction of the mayor's court, and therefore affirmed the district court's judgment. [6] Id., at 950. Justice Dennis, although concurring in the majority's decision in the case, wrote separately to address the State's argument that Article VI, § 9(A)(1) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, see Note 5, supra, in and of itself preempted the city court's subject matter jurisdiction. [7] After pursuing an extensive examination of the transcripts of the constitutional convention debates dealing with Article VI, § 9(A)(1), Justice Dennis concluded that the constitutional intent was merely to limit the power of municipalities to the imposition of punishment without hard labor for a violation of a municipal regulation and not to also limit what conduct those regulations might address. Foy, supra, 401 So.2d at 951 ( on rehearing ) ( Dennis, J., concurring ). However, Justice Dennis, hearkening back to the sentiments expressed in Justice Tate's special concurrence in Suire, also remarked that the abuses referred to in the state's application for rehearing and oral argument on rehearing indicate a possible need for legislative attention to the problem of concurrent state and local jurisdiction of criminal prosecutions based on felonious conduct. Id., at 951. In 1983, the legislature responded to the suggestions of Justice Tate in Suire and Justice Dennis in Foy with LSA-R.S. 14:143. 1983 La.Acts, No. 531, § 1. The minutes of the House committee which considered it reveal that the statute is designed to alleviate a person pleading guilty to a municipal offense of something like burglary and then it is impossible for the district attorney to prosecute as a state offense (which is a felony). Committee Meeting Minutes, House Comm. on Admin. of Criminal Justice, House Bill No. 275, Pp. 4-5 (April 21, 1983). The factual scenario discussed in committee was identical to that in Foy, indicating a legislative awareness of this Court's decision in Foy and a legislative desire to resolve the concurrent jurisdiction problem in the favor of the State. [8] In construing LSA-R.S. 14:143, therefore, we must examine the terminology employed in the statute in light of its purpose as revealed by this history. That purpose is to prevent local governments from passing criminal ordinances defining as a misdemeanor the same offense (as that term is understood in the double jeopardy context) proscribed by a State felony statute.
Before we continue, however, we consider it advisable to first discuss whether the statute rests upon firm constitutional grounds, particularly since issue of whether the statute impermissibly robs local governments of powers delegated to them by the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 was raised below by the city prosecutor in response to the defendant's preemption argument. As the foregoing discussion reveals, the statute aims to deprive local governments of a degree of their lawmaking authority. Such a result invites our scrutiny, particularly when Home Rule Charter governments like the City-Parish government of Baton Rouge are affected. Home rule entities must be regarded as more than creatures of the legislature, since their powers and functions are granted directly by the constitution and their discretion is constitutionally preserved against undue interference. Francis v. Morial, 455 So.2d 1168, 1173 (La.1984) (citation omitted). We have no difficulty in deciding that LSA-R.S. 14:143 is constitutional insofar as it is directed at those local governments that function under a Home Rule Charter adopted after the effective date of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Article VI, § 5(E) of our constitution provides that such a home rule charter government may only exercise any power ... not denied by general law. The same limitation applies to governmental subdivisions not under the authority of a Home Rule Charter. La. Const. Art. VI, § 7(A). LSA-R.S. 14:143, as a law of statewide concern enacted by the legislature which is uniformly applicable ... to all political subdivisions, is just such a general law, and therefore may constitutionally circumscribe the authority of such local governments. La. Const. Art. VI, § 44(5). Compare Lafourche Parish Council v. Autin, 94-CA-0985, 648 So.2d 343 (La.1994). However, in this particular case we are dealing with a Home Rule Charter Government that pre-existed the 1974 Constitution. See Note 2, supra. For such an entity different rules apply, as we recently stated in City of New Orleans v. Board of Com'rs, No. 93-C-0690, 640 So.2d 237 (La.1994). In City of New Orleans, we concluded that Article VI, § 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provided not only that those Home Rule Charter governments existing prior to our 1974 constitution retained the power they had exercised under the 1921 constitution, but also that they retained this power absent the limitation that legislative supremacy had previously presented. We thus made it clear that when confronting such home rule entities the legislature no longer possesses, as it did under the 1921 Constitution, the unqualified power to withdraw, preempt, or overrule a local law that is consistent with the constitution and was enacted pursuant to a constitutionally maintained preexisting home rule charter. City of New Orleans, supra, 640 So.2d at 251. Contrast City of New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors, 43 So.2d 237, 242 (La.1949). However, we also recognized that Article VI, § 9(B), which provides that the police power of the state shall never be abridged, demands that the ascendancy of pre-1974 Home Rule Charter governments not be absolute. See also Hildebrand v. City of New Orleans, 549 So.2d 1218, 1225 (La. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1028, 110 S.Ct. 1476, 108 L.Ed.2d 613 (1989) ([Art. VI, § 9] does not purport to strip the subdivision entirely of its police power, but simply sets forth specific limitations in certain areas). We then articulated the test by which the balance between these two competing constitutional interests should be resolved: a litigant claiming that a home rule municipality's local law abridges the police power of the state must show that the local law conflicts with an act of the state legislature that is necessary to protect the vital interest of the state as a whole. City of New Orleans, supra, 640 So.2d at 252 ( citations omitted ). [9] We apply that test to the constitutional validity of LSA-R.S. 14:143, examining the statute to see if it is necessary to protect the vital interest of the state as a whole. The statute, as has already been discussed, is designed to prevent municipal interference in State felony prosecutions. The responsibility to protect citizens from criminal depredation is one of the most fundamental aspects of the State's police power. [10] One way in which the State, through its legislature, acts upon that responsibility is by assessing the harm that certain conduct causes, proscribing that conduct, and imposing punishment for engaging in that conduct. The most severe of these crimes are those for which an offender may be sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor, i.e. felonies. LSA-R.S. 14:2(4). In this case the State's interest is one of constitutional import, since the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 expressly accords to the legislature, and not to local governments, the exclusive right to define felonies and to the district attorneys the exclusive right to prosecute them. See La. Const. Art. VI, § 9(A)(1); Art. V, § 26(B). More particularly, the Louisiana Constitution expressly provides that [n]o local governmental subdivision shall ... define and provide for the punishment of a felony. La. Const. Art. VI, § 9(A)(1). When a municipality defines as a misdemeanor an offense that the legislature has designated a felony, and places a defendant in jeopardy for committing that offense so that the State cannot later retry the defendant, the municipality effectively prevents the State from inflicting upon the defendant the punishment the Legislature has decided is appropriate for the severity of that defendant's conduct. [11] While such a substitution of judgment may be quite proper in matters of local concern, criminal justice is a field which is perhaps uniquely a matter of statewide, and not local, concern. Accord, Township of Chester v. Panicucci, 62 N.J. 94, 299 A.2d 385, 390 (1973); People v. Stone, 190 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 236 Cal.Rptr. 140, 146 (1987). This is particularly true in Louisiana, where the legislature has traditionally enjoyed plenary power over the determination and definition of acts which are punishable as crimes. State v. Taylor, 479 So.2d 339, 341 (La.1985). See also La. Const. Art. III, § 1(A); State v. Rodriguez, 379 So.2d 1084, 1085 (La.1980). For these reasons, we can only conclude that when the legislature took the advice of two respected justices of this court and enacted LSA-R.S. 14:143, it did so in pursuit of a vital interest of the state as a whole. We also find that the statute is necessary to further that interest. In City of New Orleans, we stated that to demonstrate that the state statute is `necessary' it must be shown that the protection of such state interest cannot be achieved through alternate means significantly less detrimental to home rule powers and rights. City of New Orleans, supra, 640 So.2d at 252. In this case the state interest is imperilled because of the existence of a municipal ordinance which defines the same offense, as that term is understood in the double jeopardy context, as an existing state felony statute. There simply is no alternative to preempting such an ordinance if the vital state interest in ending local governmental interference in state felony prosecutions is to be advanced. Thus, we find that the statute is a constitutional exercise of the legislature's police power. We are obligated not to forget, however, the constitutional backdrop against which we proceed with our construction of the LSA-R.S. 14:143. Although on its face we find LSA-R.S. 14:143 to be a constitutional exercise of legislative authority, it remains so only if narrowly construed, since an expansive reading of the preemptive scope of the statute might impermissibly infringe upon the local affairs of a home rule government. Bayou Cane Fire Dept. v. Terrebonne Parish, 548 So.2d 915, 920 (La.1989). With this limitation in mind, we advance to the construction of LSA-R.S. 14:143.
In drafting LSA-R.S. 14:143, the legislature was aware of the constitutional implications of preempting a significant part of Louisiana local governments' criminal jurisdiction. Thus, to specify the scope of the statute's effect, the legislature utilized a number of terms which are defined in the constitutional article dealing with local governments. See La. Const. Art. VI, § 44. We now turn to those definitions to assist us in our construction of the statute. A [g]overning authority is the body which exercises the legislative functions of the political subdivision. La. Const. Art. VI, § 44. A [p]olitical subdivision is a parish, municipality and any other unit of local government... authorized by law to perform governmental functions. Thus, LSA-R.S. 14:143 by its express terms is aimed at the legislative branch of local government. [12] Compare LSA-R.S. 40:1796 ([n]o governing authority of a political subdivision shall enact... any ordinance or regulation more restrictive than state law concerning ... firearms or ammunition). From the legislature's choice of these terms, viewed in light of the statute's purpose, we conclude that the legislature intended that the preemption of a local ordinance under this statute be accomplished through a facial challenge of the ordinance as written, and not from one or more case-by-case adjudications based upon particular facts. A corollary to this conclusion is that any ordinance which falls within the preemptive scope of the statute cannot be given a saving construction; rather, if the ordinance, according to its plain language, presents a substantial risk that a prosecution under it will place a defendant in jeopardy so as to bar a subsequent state felony prosecution, that ordinance must fall. We reach this determination because of the need for uniformity in this area (a need which substantiates the State's interest), as well as the practical difficulties of having trial judges prophesy upon an empty record the evidence and argument to be proffered in any given proceeding. Having determined that the preemption under LSA-R.S. 14:143 is limited to a facial comparison of the municipal ordinance and comparable state felony statutes, we must next consider what municipal ordinances fall within its scope. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the statute is meant to preempt any penal ordinance which is sufficiently similar to a state felony statute as to constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Therefore, we look to double jeopardy jurisprudence to discover a standard by which we may determine whether an ordinance is preempted under the statute. Under LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 596, Double jeopardy exists in a second trial only when the charge in that trial is: (1) Identical with or a different grade of the same offense for which the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial, whether or not a responsive verdict could have been rendered in the first trial as to the charge in the second trial; or (2) Based on a part of a continuous offense for which offense the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial. [13] See U.S. Const. amend. V (nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb); La. Const. Art. I, § 15 ([n]o person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense ). [14] In determining whether two prescribed offenses constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, Louisiana courts have applied two different standards, the same evidence test and the Blockburger or same elements test. State v. Fontenot, 408 So.2d 919, 921 (La.1981). The same evidence test focuses upon the actual physical and testimonial evidence necessary to secure a conviction. [15] Under the same evidence test, [i]f the evidence required to support a finding of guilt of one crime would also have supported conviction of the other, the two are the same offense under a plea of double jeopardy, and a defendant can be placed in jeopardy of only one. State v. Steele, 387 So.2d 1175, 1177 (La.1980). The `same evidence' test depends upon the proof required to convict, not the evidence actually introduced at trial. State v. Knowles, 392 So.2d 651, 654 (La. 1980) ( citations omitted ). See also State v. Jones, 642 So.2d 252, 254 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1994): State v. Roblow, 623 So.2d 51, 56 (La.App. 1 Cir.1993). Thus, under the same evidence test our concern is with the evidential focus of the facts adduced at trial in light of the verdict rendered, i.e. how the evidence presented goes to satisfy the prosecution's burden of proof. [16] State v. Miller, 571 So.2d 603, 606 (1990); State v. Powell, 598 So.2d 454, 470 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1089 (La.1992). Although the primary test employed by Louisiana courts to determine whether double jeopardy lies for any given prosecution, the same evidence test provides no workable standard for the preemption of ordinances under LSA-R.S. 14:143. This is because, by its very nature, the same evidence test requires that at least one trial be completed so that a trial judge may compare the evidence offered to convict the defendant at the first trial with that which the prosecution intends to offer at the second trial. [17] Since double jeopardy under the same evidence test revolves around how particular facts are utilized at trial, this test does not lend itself to the sort of facial statutory comparison which we find LSA-R.S. 14:143 mandates. A different result obtains when the Blockburger or same elements test, employed by the United States Supreme Court to determine when two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes, is considered. United States v. Dixon, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). See also Peter J. Henning, Precedents in Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 Am.Crim. L.Rev. 1 (1993). The Blockburger test, first articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), requires a comparison of the elements of the statutes under which a defendant is charged. After the statutory elements are compared, if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not then those statutes do not define the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. People v. Mendoza, 190 Colo. 519, 549 P.2d 766, 769 (1976) ( En Banc ) ( citations omitted ). [18] Application of the Blockburger test serves the purpose of LSA-R.S. 14:143 well, in that it provides a straightforward method of determining whether, on its face, a municipal ordinance constitutes the same offense as a state felony statute. We thus hold that a trial court, when faced with a challenge to a municipal ordinance on the ground that it is preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143, should apply the Blockburger test. [19] If the trial court finds that the elements of that municipal ordinance establish the same offense as any felony offense established by the legislature, i.e. that the municipal ordinance and the comparable state statute do not each require proof of a fact that the other does not, then that municipal ordinance is preempted and must be declared void. See Note 18, supra. In addition, the entire range of lesser-included offenses contemplated by the municipal ordinance or the state statute should be considered in this analysis; if any hypothetical combination suffices to constitute the same offense under Blockburger, the entire ordinance must fall. Id.
We now turn this formula to the ordinance before us. [20] The ordinance is violated if [a] person ... remains in a public place and intentionally solicits, induces, entices, or procures another to engage in unlawful conduct contrary to L.R.S. 40:966 through 40:971.1. The trial court found that the ordinance was invalid because part of proving a violation of the ordinance was a showing that LSA-R.S. 40:966-971.1 had been violated as well. Insofar as the trial court found sections 40:966 through 971.1 of R.S. 40 to be lesser-included offenses of the ordinance, the trial court failed to appreciate the nature of the offense established by the ordinance as one of criminal solicitation. It is clear that solicitation and the other inchoate offenses are not lesser included offenses of the principal crimes. People v. Landwer, 254 Ill.App.3d 120, 193 Ill.Dec. 273, 282, 626 N.E.2d 306, 315 (1993), appeal allowed, 155 Ill.2d 570, 198 Ill.Dec. 548, 633 N.E.2d 10 (1994). Accord, State v. Beavers, 394 So.2d 1218, 1224 (La. 1981) (inciting to riot and participating in a riot are separate offenses); State v. Eames, 365 So.2d 1361 (La.1978) ( Id ). Thus, double jeopardy would not lie under Blockburger for consecutive prosecutions under the ordinance and for the direct commission of any of the felony offenses found in LSA-R.S. 40:966-971.1, and therefore this contention is not sufficient to invoke the preemptive application of LSA-R.S. 14:143. Nevertheless, we find that the ordinance is preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143 because its criminal solicitation provision overlaps with LSA-R.S. 14:28, which makes it a felony offense to incite a felony. The Baton Rouge ordinance makes it a misdemeanor offense to solicit or procure another for the purpose of violating LSA-R.S. 40:966-971.1, the majority of these sections being felonies; LSA-R.S. 14:28(A) makes it a felony offense to incite or procure another person to commit a felony. Insofar as a number of the offenses defined at LSA-R.S. 40:966-971.1 are felonies, the municipal ordinance and LSA-R.S. 14:28 define the same offense under Blockburger. The fact that the ordinance contains as an element of the offense that the proscribed conduct take place in public does not vary our decision, since both the ordinance and LSA-R.S. 14:28 must require proof of a fact the other does not for them to be separate offenses under the Blockburger or same elements test. See Note 18, supra. There is simply no fact that must be demonstrated to show a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:28 that would not also satisfy in part the city prosecutor's burden in proving a violation of the Baton Rouge ordinance. [21] Therefore, we find that Title 13:1055 of the Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances is preempted by LSA-R.S. 14:143. [22]
It must be recognized that this particular case is in some ways a deviation from the scenario envisioned by the legislature when it passed LSA-R.S. 14:143. That statute was passed to prevent criminal defendants from availing themselves of a municipal prosecution and its attendant lesser punishments and thereupon avoiding a later felony prosecution by the State for the same conduct. Thus, this situation, a criminal defendant utilizing LSA-R.S. 14:143 and the existence of a comparable state felony statute to avoid a municipal prosecution, must be considered somewhat anomalous. Furthermore, a state prosecutor may not be able to intervene or institute a parallel felony prosecution in state district court once a municipal prosecution has begun in a municipal court. Although municipal and district courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction, it is a well-established rule of law that, where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter, the court which first obtains jurisdiction obtains it to the end of the controversy to the exclusion of all others. State v. Sawyer, 57 So.2d 899, 902 (La.1952). Thus, once a prosecution has commenced in a municipal court, the district attorney is precluded from intervening and obtaining the dismissal of such prosecution on the grounds of preemption, since [n]o district attorney ... shall appear, plead, or in any way defend or assist in defending any criminal prosecution or charge. La. Const. Art. V, § 26(C). See also LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 65. Finally, the State of Louisiana may have no standing to raise any sort of postconviction challenge to a conviction under a municipal ordinance because it was not party to the original prosecution. See Foy, supra, 401 So.2d at 950, citing Suire, supra . [23] By passing LSA-R.S. 14:143, the Legislature has endeavored to confer upon the state as prosecutor a means of protecting its prerogative to pursue felony prosecutions free from unnecessary obstacles. Compare Board of Comm'rs v. Connick, 94-CA-3161, 654 So.2d 1073 (La.1995). [24] Accordingly, we determine that this necessary State interest may be vindicated by recourse to a declaratory judgment action invoking the remedial, i.e. preemptive, provision of LSA-R.S. 14:143. [25] See LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1871 et seq. Compare Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1958, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The threat of immediate injury that a municipal ordinance proscribing the same offense as a felony statute portends for the state and its prosecutor, given that once a prosecution commences under the municipal ordinance the district attorney is unable to intervene, renders such a situation a justiciable controversy. Church Point Wholesale Beverage v. Tarver, 614 So.2d 697, 701 (La.1993); American Waste v. St. Martin Parish, 627 So.2d 158, 162 (La.1993).