Opinion ID: 1206013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: prudential exhaustion

Text: Judicially-imposed or prudential exhaustion is not a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction, but rather is one among related doctrines  including abstention, finality, and ripeness  that govern the timing of federal-court decisionmaking. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992), superceded by statute as stated in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 732, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). Although some statutory exhaustion requirements are jurisdictional in nature, [6] prudential exhaustion originated in habeas corpus cases to serve a gatekeeping function preventing unnecessary conflict between [federal and state] courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the [C]onstitution. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886); see also Hemphill v. Moseley, 443 F.2d 322, 323 (10th Cir.1971) (applying exhaustion in habeas case originating in military court system). Exhaustion in this context has been described as grounded in principles of comity. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). The principle of comity also underlies the requirement of tribal court exhaustion. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-15, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975)) ([Exhaustion] reflects the fact that Indian tribes retain `attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.'). Invoking exhaustion out of respect for another sovereign, as we do in the case of tribal courts, resonates most forcefully in the international context.