Opinion ID: 551508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Forfeiture of Real Property under Section 1955(d)

Text: 36 Finally, claimant argues that the Building cannot be forfeited because 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(d), though it allows for the forfeiture of any property, does not specifically provide for the forfeiture of real property. Claimant believes that the legislative history of the statute supports the conclusion that Congress intended only personal property to be forfeited under the statute. This Court has not previously considered the question of whether 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(d) authorizes the forfeiture of real property. 37 The starting point in statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 1935, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975). Looking beyond the express language of a statute is unnecessary unless the statutory language is ambiguous or where a literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result or thwart the purpose of the overall statutory scheme. See United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir.1978). 38 The language of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(d) is unambiguous. Any property, including money, used in violation of the provisions of this section may be seized and forfeited to the United States. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(d). The ordinary meaning of the phrase any property encompasses real, as well as personal, property. Black's Law Dictionary 1095 (5th ed. 1979). This Court joins the Second and Eighth Circuits in holding that the forfeiture of real property is permitted under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(d). See 614 Portland Avenue, 846 F.2d at 166; United States v. The South Half of Lot 7 and Lot 8, 910 F.2d at 488. Only two district courts, with which we disagree, have held that the forfeiture of land is inappropriate under the statute. See United States v. Building and Property known as 123-125 East Twelfth St., 527 F.Supp. 1167 (W.D.Pa.1981); Di Giacomo v. United States, 346 F.Supp. 1009 (D.Del.1972). 39 The legislative history of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(d) furnishes no reason to depart from the plain meaning of the statutory language. Section 1955 was passed as part of a larger piece of legislation, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. 91-452. Congressional discussions specifically about the Section 1955(d) forfeiture provision are sparse. See 614 Portland Avenue, 670 F.Supp. at 477-478; The South Half of Lot 7 and Lot 8, 910 F.2d at 490-491 (containing detailed examinations of the relevant legislative history). The Senate and House Reports both recommended the any property language for Section 1955(d) without comment. S.Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R.Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. Admin.News 4007. Floor debate on the forfeiture section also is limited and unenlightening. One representative did note the inclusion of: 40 a forfeiture provision which will permit any property used in illegal gambling, including money to be seized and subjected to judicial forfeiture procedures. This provision will be of tremendous assistance in closing down gambling establishments and keeping them out of business. 41 116 Cong.Rec.H. 32,295 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). This comment provoked no further discussion. 42 Since the passage of the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA), the forfeiture provisions of two closely-related statutes have been held to provide for the seizure of land and buildings, though, like Section 1955, neither originally specifically mentioned real property. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961 et seq., was passed as part of the OCCA, and provided for the forfeiture of any ... property ... of any kind belonging to those convicted of racketeering. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1963(a) (1982). The Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848, enacted in the same year as the OCCA, used identical language to authorize the seizure of property used in drug-related continuing criminal enterprises. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848(a)(2) (1982). The original forfeiture provisions in both statutes, though neither made reference to real property, were interpreted to allow the forfeiture of real property. See United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir.1982), certiorari denied, 464 U.S. 959, 104 S.Ct. 390, 78 L.Ed.2d 334 (1983) (RICO); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir.1982) (RICO); United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110 (2d Cir.1980) (CCE); United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir.1980) (CCE). 43 Claimant makes much of the fact that Congress amended the RICO and CCE statutes in 1984 to allow explicitly for the forfeiture of real property, in spite of the above-cited cases holding that such forfeitures were contemplated by the statute. Claimant reasons that Congress' failure to amend 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(d) at the same time indicates its desire to exclude real property from that section's scope. This Court finds claimant's argument unpersuasive. Only the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions from [the legislative history] would justify a limitation on the 'plain meaning' of the statutory language. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 105 S.Ct. 479, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984). In the absence of any direct evidence of Congressional intent, claimant's interpretation of Congress' actions in 1984 amounts to speculation. It would furnish only an infirm basis upon which to contradict clear statutory language. 44 Finally, the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955(d) is best served by allowing the forfeiture of real estate as well as personal property. The Organized Crime Control Act was a comprehensive set of legislation which recognized that organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, S. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), and thus sought to strike[ ] at the economic roots of organized crime. 116 Cong.Rec.S 602 (1970). The Supreme Court has held that forfeiture statutes enacted 45 to suppress a public wrong, ... although they impose penalties or forfeitures, [are] not to be construed, like penal laws generally, strictly in favor of the defendant, but ... are to be fairly and reasonably construed, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature. 46 United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 12, 10 S.Ct. 244, 246, 33 L.Ed. 555 (1890). Allowing the forfeiture of buildings and land that house illegal gambling operations, as well as the equipment and currency that may be within, best advances the stated goal of the statute.