Opinion ID: 2561876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Our Prior Section 12940 Decisions Are Inapplicable to This Case

Text: In Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th 640, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333, we considered whether section 12940, subdivision (a), which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against employees, allows supervisors to be held personally liable for acts of discrimination. The plaintiff in Reno sued her employer and her supervisor, alleging that both had discriminated against her based on her medical condition in violation of the FEHA. ( Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 643, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) Although subdivision (a) prohibits only an employer from engaging in improper discrimination, the plaintiff argued that her supervisor could nonetheless be held individually liable, relying on section 12926, subdivision (d), which defines employer as including any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly.... (§ 12926, subd. (d); Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 644-645, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) The plaintiff accordingly reasoned that the Legislature intended that supervisors be held individually liable because supervisors, acting as employers' agents, fit within the definition of employer. ( Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 647, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) We found section 12926, subdivision (d) to be ambiguous and amenable to two possible interpretations: either that (1) the Legislature intended to make every supervisor individually liable, as urged by the plaintiff, or (2) the Legislature merely intended to ensure that respondeat superior principles would apply by making employers liable for the actions of their supervisors, as urged by the defendant supervisor. ( Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 647, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) In adopting the latter construction, we cited with approval the holding and reasoning of Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 (Janken) . ( Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 663, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) We primarily relied on the FEHA's differential treatment of harassment and discrimination as evidenced by the differing language the Legislature used in the respective subdivisions. ( Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 645, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) We noted that [a]lthough the FEHA prohibits harassment as well as discrimination, it treats them differently. It prohibits `an employer ... or any other person' from harassing an employee. (§ 12940, subd. (h)(1) [now subd. (j)(1) ], italics added.) ... The FEHA, however, prohibits only `an employer' from engaging in improper discrimination. (§ 12940, subd. (a).) [4] ( Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 644, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) We concluded that the Legislature, aware that different types of conduct gave rise to the different claims, properly tailored the FEHA in order to address these distinct claims. ( Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 657, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) The majority in this case argues that our reasoning in Reno applies with equal force to retaliation claims under section 12940, subdivision (h). (Maj. opn., ante, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 628, 177 P.3d at p. 236.) But Reno is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the language of the retaliation provision at issue in this case (subd. (h)) is entirely unlike the language of the discrimination provision (subd. (a)) we considered in Reno. As discussed above, the FEHA's discrimination provision (subd. (a)) makes it an unlawful employment practice only when an employer discriminates. ( Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 644, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) The FEHA's retaliation provision, on the other hand, makes it an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person  to retaliate. (Subd. (h), italics added.) I find unpersuasive the majority's assertion that the language difference between subdivisions (a) and (h) of section 12940 is not as great as initially appears (maj. opn., ante, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 627, 177 P.3d at p. 235). The Legislature's decision to identify additional bad actors whose retaliatory conduct triggers liability is certainly significant, yet the majority accords the Legislature's choice of words no weight. Additionally, the majority's claim that any language difference between the two subdivisions is minimal is belied by Reno. In an opinion written by the author of the majority in this case, we emphasized differences between the language of the FEHA's discrimination and harassment provisions, the latter of which uses language nearly identical to the retaliation provision at issue here. ( Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 644, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) Specifically, we noted that the FEHA prohibits `an employer ... or any other person' from harassing an employee (§ 12940, subd. [(j)(l)]) (our italics) but prohibits only `an employer' from engaging in improper discrimination. (§ 12940, subd. (a).) ( Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 644, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) I find it difficult to comprehend how linguistic differences we found significant in Reno could suddenly be of no interpretive import here. [5] Reno is distinguishable for a second reason. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument that section 12940, subdivision (a) imposes individual liability because the word employer includes any person acting as an agent of an employer (§ 12926, subd. (d)), we concluded that the Legislature so defined employer to incorporate respondeat superior principles. ( Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 663, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) Defendants argue that the Legislature may have had a similar purpose in adding the word person to the retaliation provision. Defendants' assertion cannot be correct. The FEHA's retaliation provision applies to any employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person.... (Italics added.) Accordingly, it is the word employer in the provision that incorporates respondeat superior principles (see Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 663, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333) and ensures that an employer would be liable for its supervisors' retaliatory conduct. It would be odd indeed for the Legislature to have added the word person to the retaliation provision to serve a function identical to that of the word employer. Such an interpretation is disfavored because it renders the word person surplusage. ( People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 980-981, 44 Cal. Rptr.3d 261, 135 P.3d 669.) The presumption against surplusage applies with particular force when, as here, the language in question was added by amendment (Stats. 1987, ch. 605, § 1, p.1942); such an interpretation would render the amendment unnecessary. In relying on Reno, the majority also spends a great deal of time reiterating policy concerns that we first discussed in that case regarding the imposition of individual liability on supervisors. (Maj. opn., ante, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 628-631, 177 P.3d at pp. 236-239.) Evaluating and resolving these concerns, however, is the province of the Legislature. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that the Legislature was motivated by these concerns. Indeed, it may have reasonably believed that imposing individual liability would more effectively deter retaliation (ensuring employees would feel free to report unlawful employment actions without fear of retribution) and punish those who retaliate. Whatever the Legislature's motivation, if a statute's language clearly imposes individual liability, it is not for this court to second-guess the wisdom of the Legislature's policy choices. Accordingly, Reno does not support the claim that the word person in subdivision (h) does not impose individual liability. In Carrisales, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1132, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083, we considered whether an employee could be held individually liable for harassment under section 12940. The plaintiff sued her employer, her supervisors, and a coworker for sexual harassment. ( Carrisales, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1134, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083.) Former subdivision (h) (now subdivision (j)) made it unlawful for an employer ... or any other person to harass an employee. As plaintiff does here, the plaintiff in Carrisales argued that the word person in the harassment provision clearly demonstrated the Legislature's intent to impose individual liability on employees who harass. ( Carrisales, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1135, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083.) We disagreed. While we acknowledged that the provision was susceptible of such an interpretation, we emphasized the need to read the language in light of the statute as a whole. ( Carrisales, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1135, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083.) In deciding that the harassment provision did not impose individual liability, we specifically relied on the second sentence of former subdivision (h)(1), which provided that `[h]arassment of an employee or applicant by an employee other than an agent or supervisor ... shall be unlawful if the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.' ( Carrisales, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1136, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083.) Pursuant to that language, an unlawful employment practice occurred only when the employer (or its agents or supervisors) failed to immediately take appropriate corrective action in response to actual or constructive notice of harassment. (Id., at pp. 1135-1136, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083.) We therefore reasoned the Legislature could only have intended for the employer to be held liable. (Id., at p. 1136, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083.) The plaintiffs alternative interpretation would have meant that an employee's individual liability would turn on whether the employer took immediate and appropriate corrective action, an absurd result. (Ibid.) After we decided Carrisales, the Legislature abrogated our holding. (See McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 471, 20 Cal. Rptr.3d 428, 99 P.3d 1015.) As a result, the FEHA's harassment provision now provides that [a]n employee of an entity subject to this subdivision is personally liable for any harassment prohibited by this section that is perpetrated by the employee, regardless of whether the employer or covered entity knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. (§ 12940, subd. (j)(3).) As we acknowledged in McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at page 471, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 428, 99 P.3d 1015, in enacting subdivision (j)(3), the Legislature indisputably expressed its intent to impose individual liability on employees who harass. Defendants argue here that, taken together, Carrisales and the subsequent legislative response stand for the proposition that the word person in a subdivision of the statute does not support imposing individual liability, but rather that such liability is only imposed when the Legislature enacts language similar to that in section 12940, subdivision (j)(3). [6] Defendants interpret Carrisales and the implication of the Legislature's response too broadly. Our decision in Carrisales specifically rested on the second sentence in former subdivision (h)(1) (now subdivision (j)(l))that sentence informed our understanding of the word person in the first sentence of the harassment provision. ( Carrisales, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1135-1136, 90 Cal. Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083.) No such language appears in the retaliation provision. (See § 12940, subd. (h).) To the contrary, unlike the FEHA's harassment provision, subdivision (h) makes it clear that an unlawful employment practice occurs the moment a person retaliates against someone for opposing a forbidden practice. (Ibid.) Accordingly, as with Reno, Carrisales provides no support for the assertion that the Legislature did not intend for subdivision (h) to impose personal liability on individuals who retaliate.