Opinion ID: 6536852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Imposition of Death Sentences Against Fry and Allen Is Disproportionate to the Penalties Imposed in Similar Cases

Text: {83} To determine whether Petitioners' death sentences are statutorily proportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, we begin with the framework set forth in Garcia , 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . Under Garcia , Fry and Allen must be compared to other cases with the same aggravating circumstance. Id. [A] defendant convicted of first degree murder under a specific aggravat[ing] circumstance should not be put to death if another defendant or other defendants[ ] convicted of murder under the same aggravat[ing] circumstance is given life imprisonment, unless there is some justification. Id. {84} Fry was sentenced to death based on the aggravating circumstance of kidnapping.  Fry , 2006-NMSC-001 , ¶ 6, 138 N.M. 700 , 126 P.3d 516 . On the night of the murder, he was carrying an eight-inch Bowie knife and told his accomplice that he wanted  'to stick somebody tonight.'  Id. ¶ 2. Fry and his accomplice found the victim stranded at a Farmington convenience store, where she was crying at a payphone, and offered to drive her to her home in Shiprock. Id. ¶ 3. The victim left with Fry and his accomplice but tried to walk away when Fry stopped the car on a dirt road to relieve himself. Id. Fry convinced her to get back in the car and briefly drove on before he stopped and pulled the victim out of the car by her hair. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. He then attempted to disrobe the victim and, when she struggled, stabbed her in the chest. Id. ¶ 4. The victim pulled the knife out and tried to run away, but Fry caught her and hit her in the back of the head with a sledgehammer at least three and possibly five times. Id. The victim died as a result of her injuries. Id. {85} Of cases advancing to a death penalty sentencing hearing, the only other case involving the sole aggravating circumstance of kidnapping which was affirmed on appeal also involved Robert Fry. See State v. Fry , S-1-SC-29025, dec. ¶¶ 1-5 (Aug. 28, 2007). 20 This subsequent case against Fry involved the same accomplice and was prosecuted at roughly the same time as the case for which he received the death penalty. Id. ¶ 4. In that subsequent case, Fry received a life sentence for the kidnapping and murder of a man. Id. ¶¶ 1, 7. Fry and his accomplice offered the man a ride. Id. ¶ 7. As Fry drove the victim outside Farmington, he elbowed the victim's face and Fry's accomplice wrapped a leather belt around [the victim's] chest or neck. Id. ¶ 7. Fry got out of the truck and fought with the victim. Id. At Fry's direction, his accomplice got a shovel out of the truck and hit the victim with it. Id. Fry then kicked and hit [the victim], beat him with a broomstick, then, after the stick broke, used it to stab [the victim] in his face, chest, and groin. Id. Fry and his accomplice then searched the still living victim for money before kicking him over a ledge, where the victim's body was later found. Id. ¶¶ 2, 7. Fry's accomplice testified against him at trial and Fry was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, attempted robbery, and tampering with evidence. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. At the sentencing phase, the jury found the kidnapping aggravator but did not unanimously agree to the death penalty. Id. ¶¶ 5, 13; State v. Fry , D-1116-CR-2000-00542, miscellaneous entry (Sep. 4, 2003). {86} Under a strict application of Garcia , the only case for comparison to Fry is a case involving the same defendant, the same accomplice, and very similar conduct, but which did not result in a death sentence. Similar cases involving two kidnapping aggravators also resulted in life sentences. In State v. Bedford , S-1-SC-30664, dec. ¶ 1, (June 23, 2010) (non-precedential) and Ortega , 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , each defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of first-degree kidnapping. In the penalty phase in each case the jury found the aggravating factor of kidnapping for both murders. 21 While both the Bedford and Ortega juries were unanimous in finding the kidnapping aggravators, neither jury agreed unanimously on the death penalty. Bedford , D-911-CR-2005-00046, special verdict (June 28, 2007); Ortega , 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 . {87} Stanley Bedford received a life sentence for a murder in which the two victims were burned alive in the trunk of their car. Bedford , S-1-SC-30664, dec. ¶¶ 1-3. Bedford and the victims' nephew entered the victims' home. Bedford , S-1-SC-30664, dec. ¶ 2. There, Bedford attacked the victims, took their jewelry and credit cards, restrained them, forced the couple into the trunk of their car, drove them out of town, and beat the husband with a metal pipe. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Bedford and the victims' nephew then filled  gas cans and Bedford watched as the victims' nephew poured the gas on the car and set it on fire with both victims most likely alive in the trunk. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 30. Bedford was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of tampering with evidence, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of disposal of stolen property. Id. ¶ 1. The jury found two kidnapping aggravators but did not agree unanimously on the death penalty. Bedford , D-911-CR-2005-00046, court's jury instructions (June 21, 2007) and special verdict (June 28, 2007). {88} Similar to Bedford, the jury did not impose the death penalty on Richard Michael Ortega for a brutal double murder. Ortega , 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶¶ 1-2, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 . The victims met Ortega in an Albuquerque park and left the park with him under the impression that he could help them buy cocaine. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. The victims were fourteen and twenty-one years old. Id. ¶ 4. Ortega observed that the victims looked rich and told his accomplice that he wanted to rob them and steal their car. Id. ¶ 5. Ortega eventually led the victims to a vacant lot, where he violently stabbed them. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 10. Ortega inflicted twenty-eight stab wounds on one victim and forty-two on the other. Id. ¶ 10. The jury found the aggravating circumstance of kidnapping with respect to both victims but did not unanimously agree on the death sentence. Id. ¶ 2 ; Ortega , D-202-CR-1988-44752, miscellaneous entries (Nov. 15, 1988). Ortega was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus sentences for the other crimes for a total prison term of eighty-seven years. Ortega , 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 . {89} Neither Bedford nor Ortega supports the conclusion that Fry's death sentence is statutorily proportionate. Fry had one victim; Bedford and Ortega each had two. The jury in Fry found one aggravator; the juries in Bedford and Ortega each found two. Yet Fry received a death sentence and Bedford and Ortega did not. Considering Bedford , Ortega , and Fry's later conviction, we conclude that the death penalty was not generally imposed in cases involving the same aggravating circumstances as Fry . {90} Although the statutory proportionality requirement does not require perfect symmetry in sentencing, it does require some justification for a disparity between the death sentence under review and the life sentences in similar cases. Garcia , 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . The only distinction between Fry and the other cases is that Fry involved a conviction of attempted criminal sexual penetration. 22 To determine whether that distinction is sufficient justification for the sentencing disparity, we will consider the expanded pool of factually similar crimes in the next section. {91} Before we consider the expanded pool of factually similar cases, we turn to Allen, who was sentenced to death for murdering a seventeen-year-old girl. Allen , 2000-NMSC-002 , ¶¶ 1-2, 128 N.M. 482 , 994 P.2d 728 . The victim lived with her mother and was last seen walking toward a convenience store about a mile from her home. Id. ¶ 2. The victim had gone into town to apply for a job and pay her mother's water bill, and planned to return by evening. Id. She did not  come home. Id. Six weeks later, her body was discovered in a remote area outside of town. Id. ¶ 3. The victim's pants and underwear had been removed and her shirt pushed up over her bra. Id. ¶ 4. Investigators testified that the condition of her clothing was consistent with sexual assault and that the cause of her death was ligature strangulation. Id. ¶¶ 5 -6. In addition, there was bruising on her legs. Id. ¶ 5. Allen was sentenced to death plus imprisonment for his noncapital convictions of kidnapping and attempted criminal sexual penetration. Id. ¶ 15. {92} For Allen , the comparison cases are clearly identifiable under Garcia . The aggravating circumstances were kidnapping and murder of a witness. Allen , 2000-NMSC-002 , ¶ 15, 128 N.M. 482 , 994 P.2d 728 . Four other cases involved identical aggravators: Clark , Zinn , Hutchinson , and McGuire . The death sentence was imposed in only one of these cases. {93} In more than a half century, Clark is the only case in which the State of New Mexico carried out an execution. Wilson, supra , at 271. Terry Clark was sentenced to death for kidnapping, raping, and murdering a nine-year-old girl. Clark , 1989-NMSC-010 , ¶¶ 1, 3, 108 N.M. 288 , 772 P.2d 322 . Clark abducted the child and took her to his brother's ranch, where he raped her and shot her in the head, killing her. Id. Her body was discovered unclothed in a shallow grave. Id. ¶¶ 3 -4. Clark pleaded guilty to kidnapping and first-degree murder in early December 1986 after learning that Governor Anaya intended to commute the death sentences of all persons on death row later that month. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7. However, the trial court refused to hold the sentencing hearing before the end of Governor Anaya's term, and Clark's case proceeded to a death penalty sentencing hearing where the jury found the aggravating circumstances of kidnapping and murder of a witness. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 54. Clark brought several appeals but ultimately instructed his attorneys to abandon his appeals for relief. Wilson, supra , at 271. He was executed on November 6, 2001. Id. Clark was out on bond when he committed this murder, having previously been convicted of raping a six-year-old girl. Clark , 1989-NMSC-010 , ¶ 3, 108 N.M. 288 , 772 P.2d 322 . {94} Johnny Clifford Zinn and three others kidnapped and gang-raped a woman and then shot her in the head. Zinn , 1987-NMSC-115 , ¶¶ 1-4, 106 N.M. 544 , 746 P.2d 650 . Zinn initiated the murder by directing his accomplices to find a woman to be photographed during sex for a purported pornography ring. Id. ¶ 2. The accomplices kidnapped the victim from an Albuquerque shopping center and took her to an Albuquerque motel. Id. ¶ 3. Together, Zinn and his accomplices repeatedly raped the victim, while taking turns photographing her as she was being sexually assaulted. Id. Zinn then directed the accomplices to take her to the Jemez Mountains and shoot her. Id. ¶ 4. Zinn was convicted of first-degree murder and eighteen additional felonies. Id. ¶ 1. The jury unanimously found the aggravating circumstances of kidnapping and murder of a witness but was not unanimous on sentencing Zinn to death. State v. Zinn , D-202-CR-1986-41129, miscellaneous entry, form of finding (Sept. 30, 1986). The judge imposed a sentence of life imprisonment plus ninety-six years. See Zinn , 1987-NMSC-115 , ¶ 1, 106 N.M. 544 , 746 P.2d 650 . {95} Jerry Wayne Hutchinson abducted a woman from a rest stop before sexually assaulting and killing her. Hutchinson , 1983-NMSC-029 , ¶¶ 1-3, 99 N.M. 616 , 661 P.2d 1315 . Hutchinson and his accomplices hid at a rest stop, waiting to rob someone. Id. ¶ 3. The victim drove up after midnight and went to sleep in her car. Id. Hutchinson then used a tire buddy to break the window of her car and forced his way into her car. Id. After forcing the victim into his accomplice's car and driving to another location, he proceeded to rape the victim and beat her with the tire buddy before stabbing her with a butcher knife. Id. Hutchinson was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery and was sentenced to life in prison plus twenty-seven years for the kidnapping and armed robbery. Id. ¶ 1. The jury found the aggravated circumstances of kidnapping and murder of a witness, but did not impose the death sentence. State v. Hutchinson , CR-80-71,  verdict of the jury (3rd Dist. Doña Ana County Jan. 27, 1981). {96} Travis McGuire enlisted his stepbrother in the kidnapping, rape, and murder of an Albuquerque woman. McGuire , 1990-NMSC-067 , ¶¶ 1, 3, 110 N.M. 304 , 795 P.2d 996 . Planning to steal a car and leave town, McGuire approached the victim, who was sitting in her car outside of an apartment, opened the car door, forced the victim into the back seat, and ordered his brother to drive. Id. ¶ 4. McGuire then bound, gagged, and raped the victim as the three traveled east on I-40. Id. ¶ 4. He discarded the victim's clothing and purse near Moriarty, taking money from the purse. Id. ¶ 5. After driving further east, McGuire directed his brother to pull off on a dirt road and took the victim for a walk in the woods, where he strangled her and left her beneath a tree. Id. McGuire was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and criminal sexual penetration. Id. ¶ 1. The jury found kidnapping and murder of a witness as aggravators. Id. However, the jury did not unanimously agree on the death penalty. See id. {97} Examining these four similar cases involving the same aggravating circumstances, we find no immediately discernible reason for Allen's death sentence. In three of the four cases the jury declined to impose the death sentence for crimes that were very similar to and arguably more heinous than Allen's. Only one of the comparison cases resulted in a death sentence. Clark , 1989-NMSC-010 , ¶ 1, 108 N.M. 288 , 772 P.2d 322 . Therefore, in the majority of cases involving the same aggravating circumstances juries did not agree on a death sentence. {98} We note that both Allen and Clark share the disturbing characteristic of murder of a child. To determine whether that factual similarity is sufficient justification for the sentencing disparity, we explore that similarity in further detail when we consider factually similar crimes in the next section of the opinion. {99} In sum, neither the cases involving the same aggravating circumstances as Fry nor the cases involving the same aggravating circumstances as Allen generally resulted in death sentences. But because Garcia limits the pool of cases for comparison, we turn to consider the expanded pool of comparison including cases factually similar to Fry and Allen in which the jury had the option to impose death but which did not involve the same aggravating circumstances.
{100} In order to ensure that we are conducting a thorough proportionality review, we now expand upon the Garcia approach to include factually similar cases in which the death penalty was an option. In the sentencing phases, the Allen jury found the aggravating circumstances of kidnapping and murder of a witness, the Fry jury found only the kidnapping aggravator, and both received the death sentence. Juries did not generally impose the death sentence for crimes with the same aggravating circumstances as either Fry or Allen , but juries had the option to impose the death penalty based on different aggravating circumstances in many cases involving facts similar to the facts in Fry and Allen . We therefore go beyond a strict application of Garcia to compare Petitioners' death sentences to the sentences imposed in cases in which the victim was a child (as in Allen ) and in cases involving the attempt or commission of criminal sexual penetration (as in both Fry and Allen ). {101} By examining these cases, we can see whether juries generally imposed the death penalty in cases factually similar to Fry and Allen . We conclude from our examination that, although the death penalty was an option in many cases predicated on similar facts, the death sentence was rarely imposed. Our review of these cases does not reveal a justification for Petitioners' death sentences and instead demonstrates that Fry and Allen were singled out for the death penalty.
{102} We consider the age of the victim to be a salient fact in our comparative proportionality review. New Mexico prosecutors  considered the age of the victim in determining whether to pursue the death penalty. Final Report, 14. The only execution to be carried since the 1979 enactment of the capital sentences scheme was for the murder of a nine-year-old girl. Wilson, supra , at 271; see Clark , 1989-NMSC-010 , ¶ 3, 108 N.M. 288 , 772 P.2d 322 . The murder of a child can quite reasonably be classified among the most heinous crimes and is a statutorily designated aggravating circumstance in many states. See, e.g. , 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711 (d)(16) (1999); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (i)(7) (2011); cf. Ind. Code. 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(c) (2016) (specifying death eligibility for murder aggravated by a conviction of [c]hild molesting). In New Mexico, however, the death penalty was imposed in very few such cases. {103} Of the cases involving a child victim which reached a death penalty sentencing hearing, Clark , Ortega , and Stills , 23 Clark is the only case in which a death sentence was ultimately imposed. As we have discussed, Ortega murdered two youthful victims-one fourteen years old, and the other twenty-one-and the death penalty was not imposed. Ortega , 1991-NMSC-084 , ¶¶ 1-2, 4, 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 . Likewise, Stills received a life sentence for murdering his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. State v. Stills , D-202-CR-1993-01065, third amended judgment, sentence, and commitment (Nov. 4, 2002). Earlier that day, the victim called her friend in tears and asked if he could come to her apartment. Stills , 1998-NMSC-009 , ¶ 4, 125 N.M. 66 , 957 P.2d 51 . When her friend called back, the victim did not pick up the phone. Id. Paramedics found Stills engaged in mouth-to-mouth resuscitation with her lifeless body. Id. ¶ 2. He had strangled her with his hands and a bathrobe sash. Id. ¶ 13. The victim's shorts were around her ankles and her shirt was around her neck with her chest exposed. Id. ¶ 2. The cause of death was a severe beating to the head, and she had also sustained injuries around her face, head, and neck. Id. ¶¶ 2, 13. Stills later confessed to beating the victim after she ... said she was not going to let him 'use her' anymore. Id. ¶ 12. Stills was convicted of first-degree felony murder and criminal sexual penetration, as well as child abuse and tampering with evidence. Id. ¶ 1. The State proved the aggravator of criminal sexual penetration, but the jury did not unanimously agree on the death penalty. Stills , D-202-CR-1993-01065, verdict guilty and verdict not guilty (Dec. 22, 1994). {104} Other offenders did not receive a death-penalty review at sentencing because-although guilty of conduct resulting in the death of a child-they were not charged with a death-eligible offense. See, e.g. , State v. Jojola , 2005-NMCA-119 , ¶¶ 1-2, 4, 138 N.M. 459 , 122 P.3d 43 (finding sufficient evidence to support a conviction of child abuse resulting in death where the eighteen-month-old victim died of a fractured skull but vacating the conviction on other grounds); State v. Sheldon , 1990-NMCA-039 , ¶¶ 3, 11, 110 N.M. 28 , 791 P.2d 479 (affirming a child abuse conviction where the thirteen-month-old victim died from skull fractures on both sides of her head incurred while the side of her head was against a hard surface). These crimes could quite reasonably be deemed among the most serious, but it is for the Legislature to define criminal penalties. See Santillanes v. State , 1993-NMSC-012 , ¶ 41, 115 N.M. 215 , 849 P.2d 358 . Because the Legislature did not consider the death penalty to be an appropriate sentencing option for these cases, we do not consider them to be similar cases for purposes of proportionality review. {105} We also consider cases involving an elderly victim because some prosecutors reported that the age of the victim was important in deciding whether to pursue the death penalty. Final Report, 14. Robert Henderson, Jr. beat, raped, and strangled an eighty-nine-year-old  woman. Henderson , 1990-NMSC-030 , ¶¶ 2-4, 109 N.M. 655 , 789 P.2d 603 . Henderson was initially sentenced to death, but his death sentence was vacated and he was resentenced to life in prison. See State v. Henderson , D-202-CR-1986-42080, judgment, sentence & commitment (Jan. 4, 1988) and judgment, sentence, and commitment (May 2, 1991). The victim was known for hiring transients to help with tasks around her home and to have welcomed them into her home to feed them. Henderson , 1990-NMSC-030 , ¶ 3, 109 N.M. 655 , 789 P.2d 603 . Although Henderson claimed that he had an ongoing sexual relationship with the victim and that he blacked out during consensual sex, the victim had suffered several blows to the head, [h]er ribs were fractured, presumably by someone pushing on her chest or crushing her, and her vagina had been forcibly penetrated. Id. ¶¶ 4 -5. Additionally, Henderson had entered the home through a broken window and stolen items from the victim's home. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. Henderson was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal sexual penetration, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and larceny. Id. ¶ 2. At his initial sentencing hearing, the jury found three aggravating circumstances: (1) murder of a witness, (2) murder during the commission of [criminal sexual penetration], (3) murder during the commission of kidnapping. Id. This Court determined that the evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping aggravator. Id. ¶¶ 22 -23. On remand, the jury did not agree on murder of a witness as an aggravator but did find the criminal sexual penetration aggravator. See Henderson , D-202-CR-1986-42080, miscellaneous entries (Apr. 24, 1991). However, the jury did not reach unanimous agreement on the death penalty, id. , and Henderson received a life sentence. Henderson , D-202-CR-1986-42080, judgment, sentence, and commitment (May 2, 1991). {106} Eddie Lee Adams raped and murdered an eighty-year-old Clovis woman and was convicted of kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration, aggravated burglary, robbery, tampering with evidence, and first-degree murder-where findings of the aggravating circumstances of murder of a witness, murder in the commission of a kidnapping, and murder in the commission of a criminal sexual penetration allowed the jury to consider the death penalty. 24 Although a death sentence was imposed, it was commuted before Adams had the chance to appeal. Wilson, supra , at 270 n.106; see also Adams , CR-86-0064 (10th Dist. Quay County Dec. 5, 1986) (waiving the right to directly appeal the judgment and sentence of death, anticipating commutation). Because Adams did not appeal, Adams does not qualify for consideration under Garcia , and we do not consider Adams a reliable indicator of facts warranting the imposition of the death penalty. Garcia , 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . {107} Of cases involving a child or elderly victim, Clark is the only case in which the defendant was ultimately sentenced to death. The majority of cases involving the murder of a child or elderly victim resulted in a life sentence. Because the death penalty was not generally imposed for cases involving a child or elderly victim, these cases suggest that the age of Allen's victim provides no rational justification for his death sentence and that it is therefore disproportionate.
{108} Because Fry and Allen were both convicted of attempted criminal sexual penetration, cases with that aggravator serve as a useful point of comparison for purposes of comparative proportionality review. New Mexico prosecutors also considered the commission of a criminal sexual penetration to be a relevant factor in deciding whether to seek the death penalty. See Wilson, supra , at 275 (stating that kidnapping, murder of a witness, and criminal sexual penetration were the most commonly filed and continue to be the most common aggravators in penalty  phase cases). Furthermore, cases involving a criminal sexual penetration were among the most likely to proceed to a death penalty sentencing hearing. Id. Many cases besides Fry and Allen involved the aggravating circumstance of criminal sexual penetration, including Clark , Gilbert , Guzman , Cheadle , Adams , Stills , McGuire , Henderson , Zinn , Hutchinson , Lovett , Harris , and Bryant . We compare these cases to Fry and Allen . {109} The death penalty was imposed in five cases involving the aggravating circumstance of criminal sexual penetration: Clark , Gilbert , Guzman , Cheadle , and Adams . Except for Clark , each of these death sentences was vacated or commuted. Exec. Orders Nos. 86-37 (Gilbert), 86-39 (Guzman), 86-41 (Adams) (Nov. 26, 1986); Cheadle , 1987-NMSC-100 , ¶ 1, 106 N.M. 391 , 744 P.2d 166 (affirming the life sentence imposed after the district court vacated the death sentence and resentenced to life). As we have discussed, Clark involved the rape and murder of a nine-year-old girl. Clark , 1989-NMSC-010 , ¶ 3, 108 N.M. 288 , 772 P.2d 322 . William Wayne Gilbert was sentenced to death for murdering and sexually brutalizing a married couple. See Gilbert , 1983-NMSC-083 , ¶¶ 1, 38, 100 N.M. 392 , 671 P.2d 640 . Gilbert entered the newlyweds' home and held them at gunpoint. 25 Gilbert then raped the wife, attempted to rape the husband, and forced the wife to penetrate herself with a wooden spoon purportedly doused in semen. See id. ¶¶ 36 -38 ; Coates, supra . At trial, Gilbert testified that he suffered from an irresistible urge to rape and kill. Gilbert , 1983-NMSC-083 , ¶ 6, 100 N.M. 392 , 671 P.2d 640 . Gilbert was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of kidnapping, and two counts of criminal sexual penetration. Id. ¶ 1. The jury found that the evidence supported a total of three aggravators: murder of a witness, and murder consistent with Section 31-20A-5(B) -which includes either criminal sexual penetration or kidnapping-with respect to both victims. See Gilbert , 1983-NMSC-083 , ¶ 1, 100 N.M. 392 , 671 P.2d 640 . In addition to these murders, Gilbert was convicted of murdering his wife and another woman, for which he received sentences of life imprisonment. See State v. Gilbert , 1982-NMSC-137 , ¶¶ 1, 4, 11, 16, 99 N.M. 316 , 657 P.2d 1165 (discussing Gilbert's murder of his wife, affirming that first-degree murder conviction, and referring to the murder of the fourth victim); see also State v. Gilbert , 1982-NMSC-095 , ¶ 2, 98 N.M. 530 , 650 P.2d 814 (discussing Gilbert's murder of the fourth victim). Governor Anaya commuted Gilbert's death sentence. Exec. Order No. 86-37 (Nov. 26, 1986). The exercise of executive clemency does not render an otherwise valid death sentence unconstitutional, and we consider it a death sentence for purposes of the comparative proportionality review. See Gregg , 428 U.S. at 199, 203, 96 S.Ct. 2909 . {110} Governor Anaya also commuted the death sentence of Michael Anthony Guzman. Exec. Order No. 86-39 (Nov. 26, 1986). Guzman was sentenced to death for an attempted double murder where one victim died and one victim was injured but survived. Guzman , 1984-NMSC-016 , ¶¶ 1, 3-5, 100 N.M. 756 , 676 P.2d 1321 . Guzman kidnapped two female college students from just outside the University of New Mexico and forced them into his vehicle at knifepoint. Id. ¶¶ 3, 4. The victims had been studying and went to get coffee from the Frontier Restaurant. See id. ¶ 3. Guzman drove the victims to a remote location, where he threatened to shoot them if they did not comply with his orders. Id. ¶ 4. He then ordered one victim to undress and forced the second victim into the trunk. Id. ¶¶ 4 -5. The first victim was later found dead, having been raped and stabbed in the heart. Id. ¶ 7. The second victim escaped and attempted to run away; Guzman chased and stabbed her in the back, chest, and neck. Id. ¶ 5. As he stabbed her, Guzman remarked that [a]ll my problems are because of you Anglos. Id. ¶ 5. When he left the second victim to let her die in peace, she crawled to the highway for assistance. Id. Guzman was convicted of two counts of kidnapping and one count each of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, criminal sexual penetration, and tampering with evidence.  Id. ¶ 1. The jury sentenced Guzman to death based on the aggravating circumstances of kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration, and murder of a witness. Id. ¶¶ 17 -18. {111} David Leon Cheadle was sentenced to death for robbing a man and a woman at gunpoint, attempting to rape the woman, and murdering the man. Cheadle , 1983-NMSC-093 , ¶¶ 1, 3, 101 N.M. 282 , 681 P.2d 708 . Cheadle ordered the two to disrobe and shot the man. Id. ¶ 3. Cheadle tried to rape the woman, but was unable to become aroused. Id. He shot the man again and then attempted to force the woman into a car, but she ran and got away. Id. Cheadle was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and criminal sexual penetration and was sentenced to death based on the aggravating circumstances of murder of a witness and murder in the commission of a kidnapping or criminal sexual penetration. Id. ¶¶ 1, 31. This Court affirmed the death sentence on direct appeal, id. ¶ 46, but later affirmed the life sentence imposed when the district court vacated the death sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Cheadle , 1987-NMSC-100 , ¶ 1, 106 N.M. 391 , 744 P.2d 166 . Because his death sentence was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, Cheadle is not a reliable comparison case. Id. {112} In the majority of cases involving similarly disturbing incidents of criminal sexual penetration the defendants were sentenced to life in prison, despite facing the possibility of death. See, e.g. , Stills , 1998-NMSC-009 , ¶¶ 1-2, 13, 125 N.M. 66 , 957 P.2d 51 (affirming a life sentence where the defendant sexually assaulted his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter before strangling and beating her to death); McGuire , 1990-NMSC-067 , ¶¶ 1, 4, 110 N.M. 304 , 795 P.2d 996 (affirming a life sentence where the defendant forced his way into the victim's car and raped her while the defendant's step-brother drove); Henderson , 1990-NMSC-030 , ¶¶ 2-4, 109 N.M. 655 , 789 P.2d 603 (reversing a death sentence imposed for the defendant's rape, murder, and robbery of an eighty-nine-year-old woman); Zinn , 1987-NMSC-115 , ¶¶ 1-4, 106 N.M. 544 , 746 P.2d 650 (affirming a life sentence plus ninety-six years where the defendant initiated the kidnapping, gang rape, sexual exploitation, and murder of the victim); and Hutchinson , 1983-NMSC-029 , ¶ 1, 99 N.M. 616 , 661 P.2d 1315 (affirming a life sentence where the defendant raped and murdered the victim after kidnapping her with the help of two others). {113} Life sentences were also imposed in Lovett , Harris , and Bryant . Paul Wayne Lovett did not receive the death sentence for the sexual assault and murder of a young woman. Lovett , 2012-NMSC-036 , ¶¶ 1-3, 9, 286 P.3d 265 . Lovett was tried jointly for the unrelated murders of two young women. Id. ¶ 1. The first victim disappeared from her job working the night shift at a gas station in Hobbs. Lovett , 2012-NMSC-036 , ¶ 2, 286 P.3d 265 . Her body was discovered in a vacant field near a dirt road. Id. She had been stabbed fifty-six times. Id. ¶ 12. More than a year later, the second victim was discovered dead in a caliche pit with her shirt pulled over her head and her underwear around her ankles. Id. ¶¶ 3, 16. She had suffered severe, blunt-force trauma to her head and neck, a large slash across her throat, and several injuries consistent with sexual penetration. Id. ¶ 15. Lovett was convicted of first-degree murder with respect to the first victim as well as first-degree murder and criminal sexual penetration with respect to the second victim. Id. ¶¶ 7 -8. In the sentencing phase, the jury unanimously found the aggravating circumstance of murder in the commission of criminal sexual penetration for the second murder but unanimously agreed that Lovett should not be sentenced to death. State v. Lovett , D-506-CR-2003-00406, miscellaneous entry (Apr. 9, 2007) and miscellaneous entry (Apr. 17, 2007). Lovett received a sentence of life imprisonment for each murder. Lovett , 2012-NMSC-036 , ¶ 9, 286 P.3d 265 . On direct appeal, this Court concluded that the trial court committed error by failing to sever the murder charges into separate trials but that the error was harmless with respect to the murder and criminal sexual penetration of the second victim. Id. ¶¶ 52, 85. Accordingly, the Court reversed Lovett's conviction of first-degree murder for the first victim 26 but  upheld his convictions of first-degree murder and criminal sexual penetration for the second victim. Id. ¶¶ 1, 86. {114} Miles Harris was sentenced to life in prison for raping a woman and using her bra to strangle her to death. Harris , S-1-SC-23306, dec. ¶¶ 1, 3. She was found dead in her apartment, in a complex where Harris had worked as a painter. Id. ¶ 3. Harris's DNA and sperm were discovered on the victim, and he had a scratch consistent with fingernail marks. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. Harris was convicted of first-degree willful and deliberate murder, felony murder, criminal sexual penetration, aggravated burglary, larceny, and two counts of child abuse. Id. ¶ 1. Harris had also stolen the victim's car and traded it for cocaine. Id. ¶ 4. The jury found the aggravating circumstance of criminal sexual penetration, but did not unanimously agree on the death penalty. See State v. Harris , D-202-CR-1992-01433, verdict guilty and verdict not guilty (Sept. 21, 1995). {115} Robert Bryant was sentenced to life imprisonment for strangling a woman as he raped her. Bryant , S-1-SC-26112, dec. ¶¶ 1, 22, 27. The victim's body was discovered padlocked inside of Bryant's camper shell. Id. ¶¶ 3, 19. She was wrapped in blankets and unclothed from the waist down, with the exception of her socks and tennis shoes. Id. ¶ 27. A pendant had been pressed deeply into the victim's neck, which was heavily bruised, and her bra was sliced and pushed out of place. Id. ¶¶ 22, 27. Bryant's pubic hair was discovered on the victim and his sperm was still inside of her and intact, suggesting that she had been killed in intercourse and had not moved since then. Id. ¶ 27. Bryant was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration, and tampering with evidence. Id. ¶ 1. The jury found the aggravators of kidnapping and criminal sexual penetration, but did not unanimously agree on the death penalty. See State v. Bryant , D-101-CR-1998-00588, miscellaneous entries (Oct. 6, 1999). {116} While criminal sexual penetration was a commonly alleged aggravating circumstance, see Wilson, supra , at 274, the death penalty was imposed in very few of these cases. Our comparison of these cases has revealed that the death penalty was far from generally imposed in cases involving similarly disturbing incidents of criminal sexual penetration and that these cases provide no rational justification for Petitioners' death sentences. Taken together, the cases suggest that Fry and Allen were singled out for the death penalty and that Petitioners' death sentences are disproportionate.
{117} Considering cases involving the same aggravating circumstances as well as other factually similar cases, we conclude that Petitioners' death sentences are statutorily disproportionate. As we have discussed, death sentences were not generally imposed in cases involving the same aggravating circumstances as either Fry or Allen . Neither the age of Allen's victim nor Fry's and Allen's attempted criminal sexual penetration provide justification for this sentencing disparity, as death sentences were not generally imposed by juries in cases involving similar facts. {118} Out of the entire pool of reliable comparison cases for either Fry or Allen , death sentences were imposed in only three cases, Clark , Gilbert , and Guzman . 27 Each of these three cases involved more aggravating circumstances than Fry and two involved more aggravating circumstances than Allen . Juries found three aggravating circumstances  for Gilbert and Guzman, two aggravating circumstances for Clark and Allen, and a single aggravating circumstance for Fry. Fry , 2006-NMSC-001 , ¶ 6, 138 N.M. 700 , 126 P.3d 516 ; Allen , 2000-NMSC-002 , ¶ 15, 128 N.M. 482 , 994 P.2d 728 ; Clark , 1989-NMSC-010 , ¶ 54, 108 N.M. 288 , 772 P.2d 322 ; Gilbert , 1983-NMSC-083 , ¶ 1, 100 N.M. 392 , 671 P.2d 640 ; Guzman , 1984-NMSC-016 , ¶¶ 17-19, 100 N.M. 756 , 676 P.2d 1321 ; Cheadle , 1983-NMSC-093 , ¶ 31, 101 N.M. 282 , 681 P.2d 708 ; see also Wilson, supra , at 272 (analyzing the distribution of death penalty cases in New Mexico and observing that the likelihood that a defendant would be sentenced to death increased with the number of statutory aggravating circumstances). Moreover, unlike Fry and Allen, Gilbert and Guzman were sentenced to death for murdering or attempting to murder two victims. See Guzman , 1984-NMSC-016 , ¶¶ 1, 3-5, 100 N.M. 756 , 676 P.2d 1321 ; Gilbert , 1983-NMSC-083 , ¶ 1, 100 N.M. 392 , 671 P.2d 640 . {119} Although Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) does not require perfectly symmetrical sentencing, it does require us to identify and invalidate the aberrant death sentence. Clark , 1999-NMSC-035 , ¶ 80, 128 N.M. 119 , 990 P.2d 793 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As we have explained, a death sentence is disproportionate if juries do not generally impose a death sentence for similar crimes and there is no real justification for affirming the death sentence. Gregg , 428 U.S. at 205-06, 96 S.Ct. 2909 . The death sentence was far from generally imposed in cases similar to Fry or Allen and, mindful that our role is not to conduct a traditional proportionality review, we see no real justification for this sentencing disparity. The strikingly small number of similar cases in which a death sentence was imposed leads us to conclude that Petitioners' sentences are statutorily disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases.