Opinion ID: 2617139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Do the Claims Against the County for Trespass, Nuisance, and Interference Allege Wrongful Eviction?

Text: Finally, the insurers contend that the claims against Kitsap County for nuisance, trespass, and interference with use and enjoyment of property are not analogous to a claim for wrongful eviction. With this contention we agree. As we have noted above, in six of the subject policies the definition of personal injury includes only wrongful eviction and does not include wrongful entry or other invasion of the right of privacy. The County provides scant argument for the proposition that the claims against it sounding in nuisance, trespass, or interference with use and enjoyment of property fall within the rubric of wrongful eviction. It suggests only that the claims against the County by tenants at the Norseland site, or by their landlord, were in reality claims arising from the constructive eviction of the tenants and, hence, are covered under the personal injury provisions of the policy as a wrongful eviction. Opening Br. of Pl. at 48. The insurers who provided the six policies that only include wrongful eviction within the personal injury coverage respond in several ways. They first note that none of the plaintiffs in the three actions against the County have alleged that the County had wrongfully evicted them. Indeed, the record we have been furnished bears this out. It shows that in one of the actions by the past and present residents of the mobile home park the allegation was that the contaminants and foul odors emanating from the disposal sites had affected their health and had interfered with their use of the property. In the other action by residents, the plaintiffs sought damages for property devaluation and costs of future medical monitoring as well as injunctive relief. In the action maintained by the mobile home park owner and the possessors of interests in commercial property, only damages for injury to person and property were sought. While some of the former mobile home park residents indicated that they left the property for health reasons, there was no assertion that they were ousted by intentional conduct of the County. See Cline v. Altose, 158 Wash. 119, 127, 290 P. 809, 70 A.L.R. 1471 (1930) (An eviction requires a physical ouster of the tenant by the landlord, or some act done by him on the premises, with the intent of depriving the tenant of the enjoyment and occupation of the whole or part of the same.) (quoting DeWitt v. Pierson, 112 Mass. 8, 10 (1873)). The insurers also make the point that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between Kitsap County and the plaintiffs. [13] This point is significant because the cases cited by the insurers suggest that a constructive eviction occurs only when there is an intentional or injurious interference by the landlord ... which deprives the tenant of the means or the power of beneficial enjoyment of the demised premises or any part thereof, or materially impairs such beneficial enjoyment. Myers v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 75 Wash.2d 133, 134-35, 449 P.2d 104 (1969); see also Priestley Mining, 41 Wash.2d 101, 247 P.2d 688. The County has not cited any authority to contradict this point. Finally, the insurers point out that before there can be a constructive eviction, a tenant must give the landlord notice of the act or condition complained of and an opportunity to remove or correct the condition. Pague v. Petroleum Prods., Inc., 77 Wash.2d 219, 221, 461 P.2d 317 (1969). Even assuming that Kitsap County was a landlord to all or some of these plaintiffs, there is no evidence that notice was given to the County to correct the complained of condition. In sum, we are satisfied that the complaints against Kitsap County for trespass, nuisance, and interference with use and enjoyment of property do not constitute the offense of wrongful eviction.