Opinion ID: 2976722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Factor Given an Unreasonable Amount of Weight

Text: As explained above, there are two main reasons for vacating Hughes’s sentence and remanding the case to the district court. First, we conclude that the district court attached an unreasonable amount of weight to Hughes’s attempts to repay SunTrust when evaluating the nature of the offense under § 3553(a)(1), seeking to impose a sentence that would reflect the seriousness of the offense and just punishment under § 3553(a)(2), and seeking to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6). J.A. at 57 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 21:21-23). The district court concluded: “This is not a normal bank fraud case. This is a situation where Dr. Hughes agreed to pay this money back years ago, attempted to pay it back for years, and just has never been able to dig himself out of his financial difficulties.” J.A. at 57 (21:19-23). The district court considered the “embarrassment” and “humiliation” Hughes felt as a result of his prosecution. J.A. at 56 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 20:20-21). Also, it considered the fact that Hughes was under “tremendous financial pressure” at the time that he committed bank fraud. J.A. at 57 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 21:14). Although Hughes argues that the district court properly considered that he had “failed to make full restitution because he was financially unable to [do] so, not because he intended to avoid his responsibilities,” Appellee Br. at 21, the record evidence paints a more complex picture. Before we address the weight that the district court attached to Hughes’s attempts to repay the bank, however, we take a moment to highlight an important point. This case requires us to distinguish between situations in which a district court gives weight to an improper factor, and situations in which a district court examines a relevant factor but, despite rigorous analysis, gives unreasonable weight to that factor by failing to examine the full spectrum of information on the record before it relating to that factor. For example, in United States v. Malone, 503 F.3d 481 (6th 9 Cir. 2007), we vacated the defendant’s sentence because the district court improperly considered what sentence the defendant might receive in a Michigan state court. Id. at 486. The rationale underlying Malone can be contrasted with a case such as United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008). In Pugh, the Eleventh Circuit held that the sentence imposed upon the defendant was unreasonable because the district court failed to consider several salient facts elicited during two sentencing hearings, leading the district court to give unreasonable weight to certain relevant factors. Id. at 1193-94; see United States v. Roberson, 474 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the district court did not weigh the factors in a reasonable manner because it “failed to consider their equivocal character” and failed “to compare them with the aggravating factors”). As we examine whether the district court may have given unreasonable weight to a particular factor relevant to the sentencing determination, we are ever mindful of ensuring that we conduct a review for reasonableness, not a review that subtly substitutes our judgment as to the proper weighing of certain factors relevant to sentencing. Gall made clear that our review for reasonableness is not a de novo review. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 600. We do not have authority to vacate and remand each time we determine that a district court has not weighed the sentencing considerations just as we might have done. Id. at 597. However, despite a district court’s extensive, first-hand knowledge of a case gleaned through a trial and/or sentencing hearing and the deference that we are required to give it, there may be occasions, as in Pugh, when the “cold” record before us clearly indicates that the district court failed to consider the full spectrum of information relevant to a particular factor in its analysis; such an oversight could produce an unreasonable sentence. Our role is to bring such an oversight to the attention of the district court through our reasonableness 10 review so that the district court may address it, and make any appropriate adjustments to the sentence on remand. With the above in mind, we now address the unreasonably great weight that the district court attached to Hughes’s attempts to repay SunTrust. The district court justified its determination that this was not a “normal bank fraud case,” J.A. at 57 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 21:19), by stating that Hughes had “agreed to pay this money back,” had “attempted” to do so for years, and had “never been able to dig himself out of his financial difficulties.” J.A. at 57 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 21:20-23). Although it was appropriate for the district court to consider Hughes’s attempts to repay SunTrust as the court analyzed the relevant § 3553(a) factors, our review of the record indicates that the district court did not consider evidence indicating dishonest attempts at repayment by Hughes. As described above, the record shows that Hughes sent SunTrust a check that bounced, executed a promissory note and agreed to a payment plan in June 2004 without informing SunTrust that he had declared bankruptcy two months earlier, and used computer software to create a counterfeit check which he tendered to SunTrust. The “totality of the circumstances,” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597, reveals that some of Hughes’s attempts to repay SunTrust involved subterfuge and dishonesty; yet, the district court did not indicate that it considered the fraudulent nature of these attempts at repayment when crafting a sentence for Hughes. Therefore, because the record contained evidence of fraudulent actions surrounding Hughes’s agreement to repay the money and attempts to repay it, it was unreasonable for the district court to place so much weight in these circumstances on Hughes’s attempts to repay the funds.5 Moreover, because the district court used Hughes’s attempts at repayment as the foundation for its 5 If the district court found these dishonest attempts at repayment to be irrelevant for some reason, the court did not articulate this during sentencing nor was it otherwise apparent from the record. 11 conclusion that this was “not a normal bank fraud case,” the district court’s conclusion that Hughes’s case was unique in comparison to the mine-run of bank fraud cases was also unreasonable. In addition, because we conclude that the district court’s rationale for viewing this as a unique bank fraud case is unreasonable, it was unreasonable for the district court to give weight to Hughes’s embarrassment and humiliation, given that it did not explain why the embarrassment and financial pressure present in Hughes’s case were different from other bank fraud or similar white-collar crime cases (or, indeed, from any criminal case). Finally, to the extent that the district court’s decision implicitly concluded that Hughes had accepted responsibility for his actions6 and taken wholly legitimate steps toward rectifying the situation, such conclusions were also not grounded in record evidence, and therefore were unreasonable. In sum, by failing to consider all of the facts before it regarding Hughes’s attempts to repay SunTrust, the district court placed an unreasonable amount of weight on Hughes’s attempts at repayment when analyzing the § 3553(a) factors. 6 Because Hughes did not plead guilty but proceeded to trial, the adjustment for “acceptance of responsibility” under the Guidelines was not available to him. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2 (2005). The district court was, however, entitled to consider his acceptance of responsibility when fashioning a sentence. We note that our reading of the record did not reveal any indication that Hughes accepted responsibility for his actions. Hughes stated during the allocution that he “made a mistake, honest mistake,” J.A. at 61 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 14:18-19); as reasons for his situation, he cited insurance companies that failed to “pay on time,” J.A. at 63 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 16:3-4), employees to whom he “didn’t pay close enough attention,” J.A. at 63 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 16:7-8), and his exwife, who pursued him for child support payments that he had failed to make, eliminating money available to pay SunTrust. J.A. at 63-64 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 16:23-17:2). Hughes’s troubling statements implicitly and explicitly place the blame for his criminal actions on others, despite the fact that he stated that he was “not blaming them.” J.A. at 63 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. at 16:14). 12