Opinion ID: 4349675
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Explanation of the Sentence

Text: Next, Garcia complains that the district court “failed to address [his] principal sentencing argument that a variance was warranted to offset an upbringing and its consequences that were outside of his control.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 15. This complaint appears to have two components—a failure to acknowledge that “a variance was possible” and a “fail[ure] to explain why . . . a non-frivolous argument for a downward variance” was denied. Id. at 17, 18. As we explain below, both components lack merit. We turn to the record to determine whether the district court acknowledged the possibility of a variance from the Guidelines range. During the sentencing hearing, the district court expressly entertained arguments concerning Garcia’s request for a variance, and the court specifically denied the request, explaining that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors and found that a sentence within the Guidelines range was fair and reasonable. Further, when addressing the terms of Garcia’s incarceration and supervised release, the district court referenced his poor health and drug addiction—conditions that Garcia had asserted in support of a variance. Quite simply, the record on appeal belies Garcia’s assertion that the district court “utter[ly] fail[ed] to consider [his variance] argument,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 13. As for the cursory nature of the denial, we note that where, as here, “a district court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, the court must provide only a general statement of its reasons, and need not explicitly refer to either the § 3553(a) factors or 8 respond to every argument for leniency that it rejects in arriving at a reasonable sentence.” United States v. Lente, 647 F.3d 1021, 1034 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, “[t]he sentencing court . . . is not required to consider individually each factor listed in § 3553(a), nor is it required to recite any magic words to show us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors.” United States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803, 808 (10th Cir. 2010). In this regard, we find our decision in United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2007) instructive. There, the district court denied the defendant’s request for a variance without “specifically address[ing] the [§] 3553(a) arguments [he] pursued in his [sentencing] brief or at oral argument.” Id. at 1199. Instead, the district court merely stated that it had reviewed the [PSR’s] factual findings[;] considered the guideline applications, and the factors set forth in . . . [§] 3553(a)(1) through (7); [and] . . . noted that the defendant reentered the United States subsequent to being convicted of an aggravated felony, and its belief that the sentence advised by the Guidelines was reasonable. Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant didn’t object to the district court’s cursory explanation. On appeal, we reviewed for plain error and found “no error at all,” given that a district court need not “specific[ally] expla[in] . . . a sentence falling within the Guidelines range.” Id. at 1199, 1201. Here, as in Ruiz-Terrazas, the district court indicated that it had reviewed the PSR, considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and found the Guidelines range to be reasonable. While “a more detailed sentencing explanation” might have been desirable, id. at 1202, it wasn’t required. See Wireman, 849 F.3d at 958-59 (observing that “if the 9 defendant’s sentence is within the applicable Guidelines range, the district court may satisfy its obligation to explain its reasons for rejecting the defendant’s arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence by entertaining the defendant’s arguments, and then somehow indicating that it did not rest on the guidelines alone, but considered whether the guideline sentence actually conforms, in the circumstances, to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) statutory factors” (brackets, citation, emphasis, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted)). Garcia’s reliance on United States v. Rose, 185 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 1999), is misplaced. Rose involved “the district court[’s] fail[ure] to state on the record its reason for imposing consecutive sentences.” Id. at 1112 (emphasis added). Rose didn’t address the explanation necessary for imposing a within-Guidelines sentence. That distinction is critical, because different levels of specificity are required for explaining sentences that fall within the Guidelines range versus sentences that fall outside that range. See RuizTerrazas, 477 F.3d at 1199-1200 (observing that within-Guidelines sentences require “only a general statement” of reasons, whereas sentences outside the Guidelines require “reasons . . . stated with specificity” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)).3 3 Garcia also claims that United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2007), and United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2006), require a more detailed sentencing explanation whenever a defendant requests a downward variance. But this court distinguished both of those cases in Ruiz-Terrazas while pointing out that the salient feature guiding a sentencing court’s explanation is whether the court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence. See Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1200 (noting that in Hall the sentencing court “depart[ed] by more than 30% from [the] Guidelines range”); id. at 1202-03 (noting that “the problem in Sanchez-Juarez was that (i) there was no indication by the district court that it had considered the [§] 3553(a) factors, 10 We acknowledge that the PSR stated that a downward variance from the Guidelines range might be warranted. But a PSR isn’t binding on the district court. United States v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 1990). Indeed, “[t]he [PSR] explains the basis for the Probation Office’s calculations and sets out the sentencing options under the applicable statutes and Guidelines.” Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1342. Garcia doesn’t cite, and we haven’t independently found, any authority requiring a more detailed sentencing explanation when the district court declines to follow a PSR’s suggestion. In any event, even if the district court erred by not providing a more detailed explanation for Garcia’s sentence, the remaining plain-error requirements are beyond his reach. First, given the similar sentencing explanation approved in Ruiz-Terrazas, we can’t say that any error the district court might have committed in this case was plain. See United States v. Wolfname, 835 F.3d 1214, 1221 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “[a]n error is plain if it is clear or obvious under current, well-settled law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, even if there was error, and that error was plain, Garcia’s substantial rights wouldn’t have been affected, because there is no “reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the [sentencing] proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 1222 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, despite “the perceived inadequacy of the district court’s recitation of its reasons, the district court’s and (ii) we were otherwise unable ourselves to discern a clear explanation of the sentence in the record” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 11 sentencing decision was amply supported by evidence the government proffered at sentencing.” United States v. Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 2009). Contrary to defense counsel’s sentencing-hearing assertion that a variance down to 120 months would have “deterrent value” and “aid[ ] in the protection of the public,” R., Vol. III at 14, the government in its sentencing memorandum noted that (1) Garcia had an extensive criminal history; (2) Garcia’s prior prison sentence for drug trafficking had no deterrent effect; and (3) Garcia had in this case employed tactics of a dangerous drug trafficker. While defense counsel stressed Garcia’s health problems and difficult childhood as reasons for a variance, we can’t say that, but for the district court’s claimed error in cursorily explaining the need for a within-Guidelines sentence, Garcia’s sentence would have been any different. Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d at 1295; see, e.g., RuizTerrazas, 477 F.3d at 1203 (concluding that district court’s failure to provide a more detailed explanation of its reasons for denying a downward variance “did not affect [the defendant’s] substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” given evidence supporting the within-Guidelines sentence). Garcia has not shown reversible error in the district court’s explanation of his sentence.