Opinion ID: 1421093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriate Utilization of the Battered Woman's Syndrome Evidence

Text: The majority writes: [w]e cannot conclude that the trial judge committed reversible error in limiting the testimony of Dr. Veronen to psychological testimony relating to Ms. Wyatt's state of mind and prohibiting her testimony on battered women's syndrome. 198 W.Va. at 541, 482 S.E.2d at 158. Such statement would lead the reader to the believe that the majority did not intend to disturb the ruling of the lower court and affirmed in that regard. Yet a few short lines later, the majority somewhat paradoxically continues by stating that the retrial will present ample opportunity ... to revisit the issues presented by Dr. Veronen's testimony. Id. The lower court ruled that Dr. Veronen would be permitted to testify regarding the Appellant's state of mind, but would not be permitted to testify regarding the battered woman's syndrome as a defense. Yet, as the majority recognizes, the defense somewhat surprisingly decided not to introduce any testimony of Dr. Veronen. Having had the opportunity to present expert testimony concerning the issue of the Appellant's state of mind at the time of Derek's death, the defense failed, for whatever reason, to offer such evidence. While the majority initially states that it did not find reversible error in the lower court's decision to limit testimony, it thereafter hints that the issue should be reexamined, potentially allowing the defense another bite at the same apple it previously declined. The majority also presents a perplexing morass of comments apparently designed to provide guidance to the lower court in this area of the law in which the majority had previously found no reversible error. The majority correctly noted that the principal use of the battered women's syndrome testimony has been in the context of self-defense, in cases where the battered person is accused of murdering her batterer. 198 W.Va. at 541, 482 S.E.2d at 158. The majority also aptly noted that our Lambert opinion, in which we recognized that a history of domestic violence, can be a factor which may negate criminal intent, dealt with the issue of the batterer coercing the battered woman to participate in fraud and the woman's subsequent right to a coercion instruction. State v. Lambert, 173 W.Va. 60, 64, 312 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1984). The majority is also correct in its recognition that the present case contains no direct connection between the prohibited conduct (failure to provide medical care) and the risk of further battering. [3] 198 W.Va. at 541, 482 S.E.2d at 158. Yet, having assembled this collection of accurate assertions, the majority stumbles aimlessly. Building what at first blush appears to be the basis for a reasonable conclusion, the majority abruptly changes course and impliedly, although not expressly, finds that evidence of the battered woman's syndrome may be introduced as a legitimate basis for negating criminal intent with regard to a two-year-old child, dependent only upon a showing of admissibility under the standards governing expert scientific evidence. So, what has the majority constructed? No reversible error was found in the lower court's decision to prohibit evidence of the battered woman's syndrome. Yet, issues of the testimony may be revisit[ed] on retrial, and expert testimony may tend to establish either the lack of malice, intention, or awareness, and thus negate or tend to negate a necessary element of one or the other offenses charged. Slip op. at 23, 25, 198 W.Va. at 541, 542, 482 S.E.2d at 158, 159. The majority opinion leaves the reader immensely confused. The majority accurately assessed the typical and principal use of the battered woman's syndrome, yet failed to properly apply that standard to this case. That is the juncture at which the majority so fatally veered. Our prior cases on the issue of negating criminal intent have involved the relationship between the batterer and the battered individual. In Lambert, the batterer, by physical threats specifically indicating that the defendant was not permitted to inform the Department of Welfare about current employment status, forced the defendant to assist in the commission of fraud. 173 W.Va. at 62, 312 S.E.2d at 33. In a prosecution for first-degree murder in State v. Dozier, 163 W.Va. 192, 255 S.E.2d 552 (1979), wherein defendant's primary theory of defense was self-defense, we held that the defendant would be entitled to elicit testimony about prior physical beatings she received from the victim, explaining that the jury could thereby fully evaluate and consider defendant's mental state at time of commission of offense. Id. at 195, 255 S.E.2d at 555. The defendant in Dozier had shot and killed a man with whom she had been intermittently cohabiting for approximately ten years. Id. If the majority intends the result that it appears to have reached, this represents a significant and virulent expansion of our prior pronouncements regarding the methods through which criminal intent can be negated and the scope of the battered woman's syndrome as a defense to criminal conduct. Our prior cases permitting evidence of physical abuse to negate criminal intent involved the relationship between the batterer and the battered individual, not harm to a third innocent person. Perhaps this Appellant could have legitimately employed the battered woman's syndrome as a defense if she had murdered Mr. Browning. But the majority implies that it may also be used to negate her criminal intent when charged with intentional and reckless killing by failure to provide medical care to a third party, a small child in her care, at a time when the alleged batterer wasn't even present. I vehemently disagree, especially under the evidence in this case. The majority accurately stated that evidence of the battered woman's syndrome, to be considered, must meet the qualifications for admissibility of scientific evidence, and the expert must be properly qualified. [4] However, the second and more pivotal issue is under what circumstances such evidence is admissible. Thus, it is not the general acceptance of the battered woman's syndrome with which I now take issue, but the question of the purpose for which the evidence is introduced within a given case. The Ohio General Assembly has recognized this distinction and has enacted legislation recognizing and adopting the battered woman's syndrome as scientifically viable, yet limiting its admissibility to cases in which certain elements are present. Specifically, the Ohio statute, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: If a person is charged with an offense involving the use of force against another and the person, as a defense to the offense charged, raises the affirmative defense of self-defense, the person may introduce expert testimony of the battered woman syndrome and expert testimony that the person suffered from that syndrome as evidence to establish the requisite belief of an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm that is necessary, as an element of the affirmative defense, to justify the person's use of the force in question. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2901.06(B) (Anderson 1996). In State v. Lundgren, No. 90-L-15-125, 1994 WL 171657 (Ohio App. April 22, 1994), the appellant sought reversal of her convictions of complicity in the commission of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and kidnapping. These counts were based upon an incident in which two adults and three children were murdered as part of a religious sacrifice organized by the appellant's husband. In arguing that the battered woman's syndrome was relevant to her claim of duress, the appellant sought to introduce evidence of the syndrome and appealed the lower tribunal's decision to exclude the evidence. The Lundgren appellate court agreed with the lower court and held that such testimony, in accordance with State v. Pargeon, 64 Ohio App.3d 679, 582 N.E.2d 665 (1991), was only admissible where the affirmative defense of self-defense is asserted. The appellant sought extension of the rule to include the scenario where the battered woman attacks a third party because the abuser directs her to do so. The Lundgren court explicitly declined to so extend the rule, holding that the limitation as enunciated in the statute was controlling, and that only where self defense has been raised will evidence of the battered woman's syndrome be admissible. Opinion testimony on the battered woman's syndrome is properly limited to the context of self-defense claims by a woman claiming to be a battered woman. [5] Permitting expansion of the utilization of such evidence is imprudent. In State v. Mott, 183 Ariz. 191, 901 P.2d 1221 (Ariz.App.1995), the lower court permitted evidence of the battered woman's syndrome in a defendant's attempt to negate criminal intent in a child abuse charge, reasoning that such evidence provided information probative of the woman's behavior. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review of that opinion, and in State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1832, 137 L.Ed.2d 1038 (1997), determined that expert testimony challenging the element of knowledge or intent on the child abuse counts was inadmissible. The expert had concluded that defendant was a battered woman and that being a battered woman was relevant to her ability to protect her children. Id., 931 P.2d at 1049. Moreover, the expert explained that her status as a battered woman prohibited her from being able to decide to seek medical attention for the child. Id., 931 P.2d at 1050. The Supreme Court noted that evidence of battered-woman syndrome had ordinarily been offered in self-defense cases and that it need not address the admissibility of the battered woman defense in self-defense cases since the evidence was not presented for that purpose in the Mott case. Thus, it was the defendant's purpose in offering the testimony that was the focus of the analysis. Such evidence was offered to demonstrate that defendant was not capable of forming the requisite mental state of knowledge or intent, and the Supreme Court found such evidence inadmissible in the child abuse case. Id. While it is a sociological reality that battered women are generally less able to protect children, that tragic phenomenon should not constitute a legal defense to crimes against the children. In State v. Dunn, 243 Kan. 414, 758 P.2d 718 (1988), a woman convicted of felony murder, kidnapping, robbery, and battery contended that expert testimony of the battered woman's syndrome should be introduced in her efforts to prove that her boyfriend threatened her into committing the crimes. Restating the general principle that battered woman syndrome evidence is admissible where self-defense has been asserted by a woman who has committed a crime against her batterer, the court rejected the appellant's attempt to intertwine the battered wife syndrome with the statutory defense of compulsion either to justify the crimes committed against innocent third parties or to show that she was compelled to be at the crime scenes. 758 P.2d at 725. The validity of the battered woman's syndrome and its utilization within the context of the affirmative defense of self-defense where a woman is accused of criminal action toward her abuser is well-accepted. It is improvident, however, for the majority to implicitly enlarge the scope of its use, particularly in the absence of full briefing and argument on that issue before this Court. While the legal system's response to domestic violence is one of the most significant issues facing the judiciary in West Virginia, and one that I am personally committed to addressing, I cannot adhere to the view that its victims can escape legal accountability for harming other innocent third persons, especially children who must rely on their caretakers for protection. Perhaps the most disturbing feature of the majority opinion is its unclarity. Opinions of this Court should be clear to the reader. They should elucidate, not obfuscate, the issues. They should clarify, not confuse. The instant majority opinion leaves us all in doubt what the law is, and that is its greatest failing.