Opinion ID: 1206965
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Legislative Enactment Giving the Power of Eminent Domain to The Tricentennial Commission as General Legislation.

Text: Landowner attacks that the legislation as special legislation prohibited by the South Carolina Constitution on two grounds: (1) The Public Works Eminent Domain Law, which excludes several counties from its effect, is unconstitutional. (2) The legislative enactment granting the power of eminent domain is special legislation since in practice it applies only to this landowner. As far as the issue of special legislation in regard to the Public Works Eminent Domain Laws is concerned, the case of University of South Carolina v. Mehlman , 245 S.C. 180, 139 S.E. (2d) 771, disposes of this issue. Mehlman contended that the Public Works Eminent Domain Laws was special legislation because it excluded seven counties from its provisions. In that case, I held that this law was void and unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court refused to pass on that issue. Instead the court held that the General Assembly merely prescribed the manner in which the University was to exercise the power of eminent domain. The statute, according to the Court's decision, incorporated by reference those parts of the Public Works Eminent Domain Laws which are general in nature. Since this did not include those special provisions excluding certain counties the general provisions only applied and the University's power of eminent domain was upheld. The same reasoning applies to the enactments which gave The Tricentennial Commission the power to condemn. The Joint Resolution merely prescribed the manner in which the power is to be exercised  that is, in accord with the general statutory procedure set out in Chapter 3, Title 25 of the Code. The language used is in the manner prescribed    The Mehlman case is directly in point and is the basis for holding that the enactment is not special legislation. There is no basis for a holding that the provision excluding certain counties in the Public Works Eminent Domain Act constitute special legislation, for this provision is not a part of the procedure prescribed in granting the exercise of the power of eminent domain to this Commission. (2) The legislation is general in its terms and application and the fact that it may only be invoked on account of one landowner would not make this special legislation. On the question of special legislation, the Supreme Court said in Elliott et al. v. Sligh , 233 S.C. 161, 103 S.E. (2d) 923:    The fact that legislation is expressed in general terms is not controlling. A law general in form, but special in its operation, violates a constitutional inhibition of special legislation as much as one special in form. The question must be decided not by the letter, but by the spirit and practical operation of the act. Town of Forest Acres v. Town of Forest Lake , 226 S.C. 349, 85 S.E. (2d) 192. The legislation in Elliott prohibited the sale of fireworks in a county containing a municipality having a population of over sixty five thousand inhabitants according to the last official United States census. Only Richland and Charleston counties were affected. The law was attacked as special legislation prohibited by Article III, Section 34, Subdivision 9 of the South Carolina Constitution. The Court said in Elliott (233 S.C. p. 165, 103 S.E. (2d) p. 925): All considerations involving the wisdom, policy or expediency of an act are addressed exclusively to the General Assembly. We are only concerned with the power of that body to enact a law. Every presumption will be made in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. But when the unconstitutionality of an act is clear to this court, beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is its plain duty to say so, Thomas v. Macklen , 186 S.C. 290, 195 S.E. 539. Holding that a population classification has no natural or logical relation to the purpose of the fireworks statute, the Supreme Court in Elliott held that a general law applicable to the whole state was proper and that the special act was therefore unconstitutional. In the Forest Acres case, the same rule applied as in the Elliott case: although general in terms, the legislative enactment applied only to counties containing a city of over 85,000 in the 1950 census. Only Richland County fitted into this category. The Court held that the classification was arbitrary and that this fact made this special legislation since by its express terms it applied to only one county and four small municipalities in that county which could have been annexed. There are no limitations in the legislation which granted this power to The Tricentennial Commission. The fact the funds have been appropriated for acquisition of lands only in Charleston, Richland and Greenville counties is not determinative of the issue. The General Assembly could have appropriated funds for projects in all 46 counties. The grant of power is in no way restricted. There are therefore none of the evils of special legislation. The power being general in its terms and general in its application, this is not special legislation and does not smack of the evil at which the constitutional prohibition was aimed. As Elliott shows, the purpose of the provision is to prevent the legislature in its wisdom from creating 46 different county governments or penalizing some particular counties. The evil at which the constitutional provision against special legislation was aimed resulted from legislation by delegation. As the Court said in Tisdale v. Scarborough , 99 S.C. 377, 83 S.E. 594:    That kind of legislation [ i.e. , special legislation was deemed pernicious; it lacked the settled consideration and consent of the lawmaking body; it evaded state-wide responsibility; it encouraged local activity; it discouraged the attrition of minds and the consideration of those problems which make for a wise public policy   . The fact that the enactment only affects one person or one local does not make the act special legislation. Spitcaufsky v. Hatten , 353 Mo. 94, 182 S.W. (2d) 86, 160 A.L.R. 990, 1021. In Eyers Woolen Co. v. Town of Gilsum , 84 N.H. 1, 146 A. 511, 64 A.L.R. 1196, the New Hampshire court held that a statute exempting a particular private corporation from taxes was improper, where a general law would have been appropriate. As long as a law operates uniformly, it is not obnoxious to a constitutional provision against special legislation. People ex rel. Curren v. Wood , 391 III. 237, 62 N.E. (2d) 809, 161 A.L.R. 718. The fact that a particular law would apply to only one city where a population basis was provided would not make that law special legislation. State of Iowa ex rel. Welsh v. Darling , 216 Iowa 553, 246 N.W. 390, 88 A.L.R. 218. The designation of the highways to be paved in a particular county contravenes the prohibition against special legislation. Knight v. Hollings , 242 S.C. 1, 129 S.E. (2d) 746. A bill to provide for appointment of members of forestry board of a particular county was unconstitutional where there was a general statute providing for such appointments. McElveen v. Stokes , 240 S.C. 1, 124 S.E. (2d) 592. The case of Ellison v. Cass , 241 S.C. 96, 127 S.E. (2d) 206, involved an attempt by the City of Greenville to allow the construction by private individuals of a motor vehicle parking building over a public street. The city issued a permit for that purpose, and in 1959 that action was enjoined. An act limiting the population bracket to Greenville was vetoed by the Governor in 1960 as special legislation, and an act general in form was held unconstitutional where the act allowed the private owners to encroach over a State Highway in the construction of a private business building and that this privilege is denied to any and all other persons. [ Ellison v. Cass, supra , 241 S.C. at page 101, 127 S.E. (2d) at page 208.] The case of Thomas v. Macklen , 186 S.C. 290, 195 S.E. 539, cited in the Cass case, involved a statute prescribing incorporation of resort communities. The Supreme Court held that act invalid because there was no reasonable basis for the special legislation enacted which was passed to apply to Myrtle Beach. After the hearing and testimony were completed, the landowner's attorneys in connection with the submission of their reply brief asked the Court to consider certain additional evidence which was discovered after the hearing on the merits. That testimony consists of statements made before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly during a hearing on the proposed legislation granting the power of eminent domain to the South Carolina Tricentennial Commission. The members of that committee, according to this offer of testimony, would have testified that the executive director of the Commission advised the committee that the power requested by the Tercentennial Commission of eminent domain was only to be used in Columbia, South Carolina    and that its use was not anticipated elsewhere. These witnesses, according to the landowner's attorneys, would also testify that this assurance expressed the intended purpose of the legislation and was necessary for its approval by the committee. Counsel for the Commission has objected to the offer of all such testimony on the grounds that testimony at the hearing is irrelevant in the absence of an ambiguity in the enactment and additionally that the testimony as to the purpose and circumstances of the approval of the enactment consists of conclusions on the part of the witnesses. While this testimony is not properly before the Court and a complete legislative history might reveal other testimony as to the purposes and course of this legislation's passage, I am considering the same in order to prevent any further delays in the consideration of the issues before the Court on the validity of this statute. If a statute is clear and explicit in its language, then there is no need to resort to statutory interpretation or legislative intent to determine its meaning. The enactment here is clear, precise and explicit; it grants to this Commission the power of eminent domain to be exercised in the manner prescribed in the Public Works Eminent Domain Statute. The fact that this enactment is going to be used in only one locale or that it may be used against this landowner only is not determinative of the issue: the statute is general in its application, and it is not directed at any particular person. The fact that the enactment operates as to only one person is not the test. Had one person or area been excluded from the operation of the statute, that might be fatal, but here the statute has no such exclusions. Where the language of a statute is doubtful or uncertain in meaning, then the Court can look to the circumstances and conditions existing at the time of its enactment. Abell v. Bell , 229 S.C. 1, 91 S.E. (2d) 548. But where the language is clear and explicit, the courts cannot rewrite the statute and inject matters into the statute which are not in the legislature's language. United States v. Shirah , C.C.A. 4, 253 F. (2d) 798, 800. Legislative enactments are to be construed as they are written, and, unless there is an ambiguity in the legislation, resort to statements by members of a committee will not be considered in construing a particular piece of legislation. 50 American Jurisprudence pps. 326-328, Statutes Nos. 335-337. As our Court said in Abell v. Bell , 229 S.C. 1, 4, 91 S.E. (2d) 548: If the intent of the legislature be clearly apparent from its language, the court may not embark upon a search for it dehors the statute.    But where the language of the statute gives rise to doubt or uncertainty as to the legislative intent, the search for that intent may range; for it must be gathered from a reading of the statute as a whole in the light of the circumstances and conditions existing at the time of its enactment.    Nothing is required to interpret or construe the legislative enactment which gave this Commission the power of eminent domain. The grant of power is complete, plain and unambiguous. Legislative intent in such a case is to be determined from the language employed; legislative history only can be resorted to for the purpose of solving doubt, not for the purpose of creating it. This being the case, I hold that this is not special legislation and that the act is constitutional. 6. The Enactment Granting the Power of Eminent Domain Not Defective. The enactment granting the power is specific and clear; that the legislature can delegate the power of eminent domain to subsidiary agencies is settled. The landowner complains because the joint resolution granting the power of eminent domain only referred to the resolutions of 1956 and 1966 in its title and referred to the 1956 act as amended. Even if this title reference alone is considered, that would not destroy the validity of the statute because it is the section adopted in 1966 which is being amended. The body of the resolution uses the simple language as amended in referring to the original (1956) resolution, and this would certainly include all subsequent enactments. The landowner contends that because the express statute was not referred to in the enacting phrase (Act No. 1141, 1966), the enactment is defective. The answer is: (1) The particular enactment being amended (No. 1141, 1966) was referred to specifically in the title, (2) The express section being amended was specifically quoted, and (3) There is no difficulty in determining the amendments to the original (1956) act. The express wording of the statute shows that the General Assembly in explicit and clear language gave to The South Carolina Tricentennial Commission the power of eminent domain. The legislative enactments (other than appropriations bills and bond enactments) show the present status of the 1956 act, as amended in 1966, 1968, and 1969. Wherein there is a defect is not apparent to the Court. The act as enacted is clear and specific, and the legislative authority for the proceedings in eminent domain has been specifically granted by the General Assembly. Accordingly there is no basis for holding the act defective. It is therefore ordered: 1. That the temporary injunction enjoining condemnation proceedings against Annie Mary Timmons is hereby dissolved; 2. That the prayer for a permanent injunction is denied; 3. That the Complaint of the Landowner in Docket No. 3650 is dismissed. We now consider,