Opinion ID: 836142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: reference to polygraph at trial

Text: Defendant maintains that the court erred in denying his motions to dismiss and for a mistrial because a witness made a passing reference to the fact that defendant had taken a polygraph test. Trooper Nguyen testified at trial that he had been present when defendant was interviewed at the police station on August 22, 1994, and that he had accompanied Corson when they drove defendant home. Specifically, Nguyen testified on direct examination: Q: [Prosecutor] And after you got back to the police station at about 7:40, did you place a telephone call to the defendant? A: [Nguyen] That's correct, I did. Q: Before doing that, did you discuss that with Detective Corson? A: Yes, I did. Q: What did youwhat was the conversation you had with [defendant] on that occasion?      A: On that day what I did was I placed a telephone call to [defendant] and spoke to him in general conversation at first. And then [defendant] initiated conversation with me further. Q: What did you tell him about why you called when you first called him? A: Oh. I stated to [defendant] that I called because I wanted to see how he was doing because I knew that the polygraph examination that he took and the interviews Defense counsel cut off the witness, stating that he had a matter for the court. Outside the jury's presence, defense counsel stated that, [i]t was our understanding, Your Honor, that all witnesses had been cautioned not to get into the issue of polygraphs taken, polygraphs not taken. The prosecutor apologized that he had forgotten to caution Nguyen about referring to any polygraph and did not know that Nguyen was going to mention one. Defendant moved for a mistrial or, alternatively, for a curative instruction. The trial court observed that Nguyen's answer was not responsive to the question asked and that no one in the room had expected the answer that followed. The court adjourned for the day before making a decision. The next day, defendant moved to dismiss the case or, alternatively, for a mistrial, and argued that a curative instruction was insufficient because implicit in Nguyen's statement was an inference that defendant had failed the polygraph examination. The trial court denied those motions and opined that a curative instruction would be adequate: [W]hen words are said in a courtroom, they ring in our ears and I don't know what they ring to the juror's ears. I think it was stated in a context that didn't indicate a result. That, at best, an instruction that is neutral along the line prepared by the State that `disregard the last response' won't bring that response back to their attention. And I assume the jurors follow the instructions that judges give them, that they disregard that evidence. Consistent with the foregoing observations, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: Yesterday there was an answer given by the witness on the stand, Mr. Nguyen, that wasn't responsive to the question asked. That testimony is stricken. You will disregard it. This court reviews a trial court's decision to deny a mistrial motion for abuse of discretion. State v. Larson, 325 Or. 15, 22, 933 P.2d 958 (1997). We recognize that [t]he trial judge is in the best position to assess the impact of the complained-of incident and to select the means (if any) necessary to correct any problem resulting from it. State v. Wright, 323 Or. 8, 12, 913 P.2d 321 (1996). With respect to the polygraph, this court has held that evidence of the results of a polygraph examination is inherently prejudicial. See State v. Lyon, 304 Or. 221, 233-34, 744 P.2d 231 (1987) (polygraph evidence not admissible by stipulation); State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 445, 687 P.2d 751 (1984) (polygraph evidence inadmissible over proper objection); State v. Middleton, 295 Or. 485, 492, 668 P.2d 371 (1983) (polygraph evidence inherently prejudicial). Despite the general inadmissibility of polygraph evidence, law enforcement agencies often use polygraph tests in the course of investigation and, despite vigilant efforts, reference to them occasionally finds its way into courtroom testimony. This court has held that it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse a motion for a mistrial based on a passing reference to a polygraph examination when that reference did not disclose the results of that examination. For example, in State v. Farrar, 309 Or. 132, 786 P.2d 161 (1990), defense counsel asked a state witness whether he had reviewed his statement with the police or a prosecutor, to which he replied, [w]e went over roughly the same questions that were asked during the lie detector test and during tapings they took at [the] police station. Id. at 162, 786 P.2d 161. The defendant moved for a mistrial, which the trial court rejected. This court affirmed, reasoning that [t]he reference did not warrant a mistrial because it was isolated and made only in passing, the results of the test were not disclosed, and the state never argued that the test had any significance to the witness's credibility or to any other issue in the case. Id. at 164, 786 P.2d 161. Likewise, in State v. Eby, 296 Or. 63, 673 P.2d 522 (1983), this court affirmed a lower court's decision to deny a mistrial motion based on a witness's brief reference to a polygraph examination, because reference to the word `polygraph,' without more, was so indefinite as to render any prejudicial effect speculative at best. Id. at 77-78, 673 P.2d 522. In this instance, the trial court found that the witness's testimony referring to the polygraph examination was inadvertent and did not imply the results of the examination. The court was uncertain whether the jury might have understood the reference to it at all. Although Nguyen's telephone call to defendant possibly could have indicated a sign of concern on Nguyen's part that defendant had failed the test, the call also could have suggested that defendant's performance in the test had been favorable, because defendant had been released and Nguyen was calling him at home. Hence, Nguyen's testimony was ambiguous as to whether defendant's polygraph results were favorable or unfavorable to defendant. In such circumstances, a curative instruction is sufficient to neutralize the possibility of prejudice to the defendant. Jurors are assumed to have followed their instructions, absent an overwhelming probability that they would be unable to do so. Smith, 310 Or. at 26, 791 P.2d 836. The instruction did not mention the critical testimony and informed the jurors to disregard as unresponsive what Nguyen had mentioned. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motions to dismiss and for a mistrial, in light of the curative instruction given.