Opinion ID: 2313282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Procedure 7.19 provides alternative grounds for an administrative search

Text: The majority focuses on the third and fourth factors, which involve the sufficiency of tips (anonymous or otherwise), as dispositive of the substantially complied prong of the analysis. We agree with the majority's analysis that the tip was insufficient under LeGrande. [35] Regardless, there still must be consideration of the remainder of the checklist guidelines in Procedure 7.19, which the probation officers testified that they went through in making their decision to conduct an administrative search. According to Robert's testimony during the suppression hearing, Any one of those questions answered yes establishes sufficiency under 7.19 to conduct an administrative search. Procedure 7.19 does not require information from a reliable informant as the sine qua non for a valid administrative search. To the extent that the probation office receives an anonymous tip, this Court's opinion in LeGrande explains why corroboration of the concealed criminal activity in the tip needs more than just the confirmation of facts tending to identify a determinate person. [36] Those requirements do not change when the tip comes indirectly from the police. [37] The majority recognizes this point, but further interprets Procedure 7.19 to require police officers to provide probation officers with sufficient facts so that the probation officers can independently and objectively assess the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the caller's tip. [38] Nothing in Procedure 7.19 requires this sharing of information and it is unnecessary given the well-established standards for evaluating the credibility of tips. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court's reasoning for not creating such a requirement is persuasive: [P]olice may be unwilling to disclose their confidential sources to probation personnel. [39] Further, [i]n some casesespecially those involving drugs or illegal weapons  the probation agency must be able to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene before a probationer does damage to himself or society. [40] More importantly, the tip provided to the probation officewhich was undisputedly and conceded by the State as insufficient to generate either reasonable suspicion or probable causewas but one reason for the administrative search in this case. After concluding that the tip provided here should have resulted in a negative response to the third and fourth factors of Procedure 7.19's checklist requirement, the majority acknowledges that it still must evaluate the other reasons given by the probation office and whether they provide a reasonable basis for the probation officer to conduct an administrative search. The majority states [w]ithout Lt. Ogden's call, we must conclude that the probation officers making this inquiry under the Department of Corrections mandated framework for an analysis would not have concluded there was a reasonable basis to conduct this search. [41] We disagree. An administrative search based upon either drug possession or drug consumption by a probationer stands on its own under either the first and second factors of Procedure 7.19 to justify an administrative search. As conceded by the majority, the officers answered yes to these factors and explained that two of the three reasons why they conducted the search were that (1) Culver had failed drug tests during probation and (2) that he had missed one curfew. The first reason supports answering yes to the first and second factors; the second reason supports answering yes to the second factor. Procedure 7.19 authorized an administrative search for either reason notwithstanding the police officer's tip and the majority's analysis of factors three and four. The officers testified that these were also reasons in addition to the tip that provided a sufficient basis for conducting the search and the Superior Court accepted their testimony. There is no dispute that the search itself was conducted properly. We find no abuse of discretion by Superior Court in concluding that the probation officers substantially complied with the procedural requirements for the administrative search.