Opinion ID: 810773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Augustus’s and Campbell’s Motions to Sever

Text: Prior to trial, Campbell moved to sever his trial from Blair’s and Augustus’s trial. Although McClain moved to adopt Campbell’s motion, Augustus did not. The district court denied these motions. On appeal, both Augustus and Campbell contend that the district court abused its discretion by not severing their trials from Blair’s trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14.7 Specifically, Augustus and Campbell assert that the trial evidence solely about Blair, such as the marijuana and firearms sales forming the basis of Counts 3 through 7, resulted in compelling prejudice that compromised their right to a fair trial. Rule 14 provides that the district court “may . . . sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). If the 7 This Court reviews for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for severance. United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1268 (11th Cir. 2007). We note that Augustus did not join in Campbell’s motion to sever, making plain error review the appropriate standard for Augustus’s claim. See United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 832 (11th Cir. 2011). However, we need not separate out Augustus’s claim from Campbell’s claim, because under either standard of review, we conclude the district court did not err in denying the severance motion. 18 Case: 10-13161 Date Filed: 10/24/2012 Page: 19 of 41 district court does not sever the defendants’ trials, the defendants have the “heavy burden” of showing “compelling prejudice” from the joint trial. United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1268 (11th Cir. 2007). “It is well settled that defendants who are indicted together are usually tried together,” and this principle “is particularly true in conspiracy cases.” Id. Thus, this Court is “generally reluctant to second-guess the district court’s decision on severance.” Id. To determine whether the district court’s denial of severance should entitle Campbell and Augustus to a new trial, we apply the two-step test established by the Supreme Court in Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538-39, 113 S. Ct. 933, 938 (1993). First, Campbell and Augustus must demonstrate that the joint trial prejudiced them individually. Id. If they meet that step, they each must then show that severance is the proper remedy for that prejudice. Id. This is because Rule 14 does not dictate severance, but instead “leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court’s sound discretion.” Id.; see also United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1122-23 (11th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court emphasized in Zafiro that “a district court should grant severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S. Ct. at 938. 19 Case: 10-13161 Date Filed: 10/24/2012 Page: 20 of 41 Here, Augustus and Campbell have not shown how the joint trial prejudiced them individually. The evidence relating to Blair, such as Blair’s recorded statements about stealing his customers’ cars or Blair’s marijuana and firearms sales, was not gruesome or so inflammatory as to prevent the jury from fairly considering the evidence against Augustus and Campbell. Furthermore, the district court gave a limiting instruction to the jury to consider separately both the evidence for each count and the case of each defendant, and we presume the jury follows the district court’s instructions and evaluates the evidence against each defendant individually. United States v. Walser, 3 F.3d 380, 387 (11th Cir. 1993). That this jury actually followed the district court’s instructions is evidenced by the fact that the jury acquitted McClain on all counts. See United States v. York, 428 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to sever where the court instructed the jury to consider each count separately and where “the jury acquitted [the defendant] on two of the thirteen counts”); United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 984 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever, and noting the jury verdict, which acquitted one co-defendant on all counts and acquitted the other co-defendant on eight counts, evidenced that the jury followed the district court’s instructions). 20 Case: 10-13161 Date Filed: 10/24/2012 Page: 21 of 41 Also, this trial involved only four defendants, who were all charged with the same two offenses. These factors reduced the possibility of jury confusion. See Blankenship, 382 F.3d at 1124 (discussing the possible appropriateness of severance where the “sheer number of defendants and charges with different standards of proof and culpability, along with the massive volume of evidence, makes it nearly impossible for a jury to juggle everything properly and assess the guilt or innocence of each defendant independently”). In light of the ample evidence against Augustus and Campbell, the court’s jury instructions, and the acquittal of McClain, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever.