Opinion ID: 518484
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentences for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions

Text: 41 In Solem, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner had been punished more severely than similar criminals in any other jurisdiction. Id. at 300, 103 S.Ct. at 3014. That is not the case here. At the time of Alford's conviction, at least Texas and West Virginia imposed life sentences with possibility of parole, pursuant to recidivist statutes. Tex.Penal Code Ann., Appendix Art. 63 (repealed Articles of former Penal Code) (Vernon 1974); W.Va.Code Sec. 61-11-18 (Michie 1987). South Dakota's scheme imposed a life sentence without the possibility of parole. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 281-82, 103 S.Ct. at 3005. Nevada provided for life imprisonment with or without possibility of parole after three felonies or five misdemeanors. Nev.Rev.Stat. Sec. 207.010(2) (1987) (punishment clause enacted in 1977; see Assembly Bill No. 383, 59th Sess., 1977 Nev. Laws 360). 42 In conclusion, we believe that Alford's sentence is within the constitutional boundaries set out in Solem. Life imprisonment with possibility of parole after six or fifteen years is not excessively harsh relative to the gravity of Alford's offenses. At the time of his conviction, Alford was not treated excessively harshly in comparison to other Washington offenders. Various jurisdictions had recidivist provisions similar to Washington's habitual criminal scheme. 43 Finally, Alford argues against our application of Solem 's proportionality analysis. He contends that the analysis should not be carried out, as we have done, by reference to Washington's law as it was at the time of Alford's conviction, but by reference to present law. We recognize that the Washington legislature has moved to reduce the penalties for habitual criminals by making the habitual criminal statute inapplicable to felonies committed after July 1, 1984. We nevertheless reject Alford's argument for two reasons. First, Solem itself assumes that the law to be examined is that which is operative at the time of the conviction. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 280-81, nn. 1-6, 103 S.Ct. at 3004-05, nn. 1-6. Second, we see no intent on the part of the Washington legislature to repeal the habitual criminal statute retrospectively. R.C.W. 9.92.900, which discontinued the application of the habitual criminal statute in 1981, merely says [The habitual criminal statute] do[es] not apply to any felony offense committed on or after July 1, 1984. R.C.W. 9.92.900 (West 1988). Alford's offenses occurred before July 1, 1984. 44 AFFIRMED.