Opinion ID: 1741618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appointment of Counsel in the Instant Cases

Text: In the instant case concerning D.B., the representation of the mother is not in question. The issues concern the appropriateness of the mandatory appointment of counsel for both the father and the child. In our opinion, the indigent father of D.B. has no constitutional right to counsel. He was never married to the mother, and has neither legally recognized nor supported the child. We do not read Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), as requiring counsel to be appointed in such a circumstance. We recognize that the father is entitled to notice that the child is being permanently committed under section 39.413, Florida Statutes, and is allowed an opportunity to contest the commitment and be represented by private counsel under section 39.406, Florida Statutes. However, we find no statutory authority and no constitutional requirement to provide counsel for this father at public expense. While we hold that the appointment of counsel to serve as guardian ad litem for a child is never constitutionally required in a dependency proceeding, it was an appropriate appointment under the facts of this case which include the mother's contest of a prior surrender of the child, the mother's history as a prostitute and heroin addict, and a father in prison seeking custody. In the case relating to D.S., the sixteen-year-old mother was entitled to the appointment of counsel for the juvenile delinquency offense associated with the abandonment of her child. Absent the delinquency offense, we find there was no constitutional requirement that counsel be provided at state expense for this indigent mother when only temporary custody and supervision was sought. Similarly, the appointment of counsel as guardian ad litem for the nine-month-old child was not constitutionally required. Further, we find the appointment was not appropriate since the proceedings were instituted by HRS to protect the interests of the child and there were no factors here which would justify the appointment of a guardian ad litem in addition to HRS to safeguard the interests of the child. Although we find the appointment of counsel for the father of D.B. and the appointment of a guardian ad litem for D.S. to be neither constitutionally required nor appropriate under the circumstances of these cases, we recognize counsel did in fact represent their designated clients at the trial court's direction with the understanding that they would be paid for their services. Therefore, we find that these causes should be remanded and counsel should be compensated in accordance with the Rush fee formula set forth in this opinion.