Opinion ID: 783260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether strict or rational basis scrutiny applies

Text: 20 Next, we must consider whether § 9-101.01 substantially burdens the right to vote on municipal incorporation, thereby requiring the application of strict scrutiny. 10 We conclude it does not, and consequently apply rational basis scrutiny. 11 While [i]t is beyond cavil that voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure, Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (quotations omitted), courts do not subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny. Id. (applying rational basis scrutiny to a prohibition on write-in candidates). In the absence of a suspect classification, the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to only two types of voting regulations. The first type includes regulations that unreasonably deprive some residents in a geographically defined governmental unit from voting in a unit wide election. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335-37, 92 S.Ct. 995 (state statute conditioning voter registration on one-year durational residency requirement); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209, 90 S.Ct. 1990, 26 L.Ed.2d 523 (1970) (state statute conditioning right to vote on general obligation municipal bonds on property ownership); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 26 L.Ed.2d 370 (1970) (state statute prohibiting residents of federal enclaves from voting in state elections); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969) (state statute conditioning right to vote on public utility revenue bonds on property ownership); Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627, 89 S.Ct. 1886 (state statute conditioning right to vote in a school board election on real property ownership in the school district); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (state statute conditioning the right to vote on the payment of a poll tax); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93-94, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (state statute prohibiting members of the armed forces from voting in any state election if they moved to Texas during their tour of duty); see also Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68, 99 S.Ct. 383, 58 L.Ed.2d 292 (1978) (canvassing the Court's voting qualifications cases and noting that a common characteristic emerges: The challenged statute in each case denied the franchise to individuals who were physically resident within the geographic boundaries of the governmental entity concerned.). 12 21 The second type are regulations that contravene the principle of one person, one vote by diluting the voting power of some qualified voters within the electoral unit. See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 818-19, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969) (state statute that made it more difficult for residents of populous counties to nominate candidates for the electoral college); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) (apportionment plan for the state legislature that weighted votes from rural counties more heavily that votes from urban counties); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-81, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963) (county unit system that weighted rural votes more heavily than urban votes). 22 Contrary to Plaintiffs' claims, § 9-101.01 is not analogous to either of these types of regulations. Both the Dunn and Moore lines of cases are concerned with the equal treatment of voters within the governmental unit holding the election, be it a school district, a city or a state. See, e.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336, 92 S.Ct. 995 ([A] citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction. (emphasis added)); Gray, 372 U.S. at 379, 83 S.Ct. 801 (Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote — whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever there home may be in that geographical unit.  (emphasis added)). Our decision in Hussey was also concerned with the equal treatment of voters in a given electoral unit. 64 F.3d at 1262 (applying strict scrutiny to and striking down an ordinance that provided a subsidy to some voters in the area to be annexed, but not to other voters in the same area). 23 In this case, the relevant electoral unit is Tortolita — not Pima County as Plaintiffs claim. Only residents and qualified voters of Tortolita, not Pima County generally, may petition for Tortolita's direct incorporation under § 9-101(A) or for an incorporation election under § 9-101(B). And if an election were held on Tortolita's incorporation, it would be held in Tortolita only, not across Pima County. Therefore, our equal protection inquiry must focus on Tortolita rather than Pima County. We must ask whether some voters of Tortolita are prohibited from voting while others are not, or whether the votes of Tortolita residents are given unequal weight. 24 Once the relevant electoral unit is identified as Tortolita, it becomes clear that § 9-101.01 does not merit the application of strict scrutiny. It is undisputed Tortolita's qualified voters are treated equally with respect to the right to vote on municipal incorporation. They each have an equal say in a petition for direct incorporation. Unlike the statutes at issue in Supreme Court's voting rights cases, § 9-101.01 does not prohibit some Tortolita residents from voting while allowing others to do so, nor does it give the votes of some Tortolita residents unequal weight. All Tortolita residents are equally subject to § 9-101.01's consent requirement: none of their petition signatures for direct incorporation under § 9-101(A) has any force or effect unless Tucson, Marana and Oro Valley first consent to Tortolita's incorporation. 25 Section 9-101.01 undoubtedly discriminates, but it discriminates between different electoral units based on their proximity to existing municipalities, rather than between voters in any single electoral unit. The Supreme Court has never applied strict scrutiny to this type of voting regulation, and we decline to do so here. The Supreme Court has long recognized that states have broad authority over the establishment and development of municipalities within their borders. 26 Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state.... The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. 27 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 15 (1907). Plaintiffs correctly point out that Hunter is a due process case, not an equal protection case, and that it predates the Supreme Court's modern equal protection jurisprudence. The Supreme Court, however, has never expressly limited Hunter 's reach to the due process context and relied on Hunter in applying rational basis review in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 99 S.Ct. 383, 58 L.Ed.2d 292 (1978), an equal protection case. 28 Holt involved an equal protection challenge to state statutes that subjected an unincorporated area to the police powers of Tuscaloosa, the neighboring municipality, without granting residents of the unincorporated area the right to vote in Tuscaloosa elections. Id. at 61-62, 99 S.Ct. 383. The plaintiffs claimed that the statutes infringed their fundamental right to vote and argued for strict scrutiny. After reviewing the same cases that Plaintiffs rely on here — Kramer, Cipriano and Evans — the Court held that the fundamental right to vote was not implicated because the right to vote in municipal elections ends at the city's geographical borders. Id. at 68-69, 99 S.Ct. 383. The Court decided to apply rational basis review, relying in part on Hunter: 29 While the broad statements as to state control over municipal corporations contained in Hunter have undoubtedly been qualified by the holdings of later cases such as Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., we think that the case continues to have substantial constitutional significance in emphasizing the extraordinarily wide latitude that States have in creating various types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon them. 30 Id. at 71, 99 S.Ct. 383. Holt thus suggests that Hunter 's unequivocal language regarding state control over municipalities applies in the equal protection context, tempered only by the Court's voting rights cases, which we have already distinguished above. 31 By enacting § 9-101.01, Arizona delegated some of its control over municipal subdivisions to existing municipalities by authorizing them to veto the incorporation of nearby communities. Tucson, Marana and Oro Valley have each exercised the veto granted to them by Arizona in order to prevent the incorporation of Tortolita. Apart from their claim that the veto violates the equal protection clause, Plaintiffs have not asserted that the municipalities exercised their veto for any unlawful purpose. Based on the reasoning of Hunter and Holt, we conclude that granting existing municipalities this veto falls within Arizona's extraordinarily wide latitude [to] creat[e] various types of political subdivisions and confer[] authority upon them. Id. Strict scrutiny is therefore unwarranted. 32 We draw further support for the application of rational basis review from the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F.Supp. 1397 (D.Col.1970), aff'd, 399 U.S. 901, 90 S.Ct. 2197, 26 L.Ed.2d 555 (1970). Adams dealt with an equal protection challenge to Colorado's annexation statute, which gave voters in the territory to be annexed the right to vote on annexation if the territory was not more than two-thirds contiguous with the annexing city, but withheld the right to vote if the territory was more than two-thirds contiguous. Id. at 1400. The plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court's voting rights cases supported the application of strict scrutiny, but the district court disagreed: 33 [I]t does not appear that the plaintiffs' rights are of the kind that have been upheld by the Supreme Court. The factor present in the cited cases which appears to have been crucial is that the franchise was granted to one group of persons to the detriment of another group. In most instances one group had votes with disproportionate weight as opposed to a group which was partially or wholly disenfranchised, or there has been a purposeful juggling of boundaries for the purpose of excluding a particular group.... In the case at bar ... it cannot be said that there exists the invidious discrimination which has been heretofore condemned by the Supreme Court. Hence, the only question which qualifies for consideration is whether the Assembly's classification is palpably irrational and, hence, constitutionally intolerable. 34 Id. at 1403 (footnote omitted). The district court applied rational basis scrutiny and upheld the annexation statute's constitutionality. 35 As Plaintiffs correctly point out, a summary affirmance by [the Supreme] Court is `a rather slender reed' on which to rest future decisions. Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 203 n. 21, 116 S.Ct. 1186, 134 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784-85, n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)). [T]he precedential effect of a summary affirmance extends no further than the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions. A summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the court below, and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that judgment. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 784-85 n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This limiting language, however, does not undermine the precedential value of Adams for the case at bar because the district court's reasoning in Adams was essential to its holding. If the Supreme Court's voting rights cases had extended to the geographical distinction drawn in Colorado's annexation statute, then strict scrutiny would have applied and the Colorado statute would likely have been struck down. In affirming the district court decision in Adams, the Supreme Court necessarily approved the district court's determination that the voting rights cases were inapplicable and that rational basis scrutiny was the proper standard of review. We similarly conclude that rational basis scrutiny applies.