Opinion ID: 1311785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Conspiracy and Attempt

Text: Crowder argues that the district court erred by sentencing him for both conspiracy and attempt because doing so punishes him twice for the same criminal undertaking. Because Crowder failed to raise this argument with the district court, we review the district court's imposition of the sentence for plain error. LeShore, 543 F.3d at 939. Our review of the district court's legal conclusions is de novo. United States v. Henton, 374 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir.2004). Both the conspiracy charge and the attempted possession charge arise under 21 U.S.C. § 846, which provides: Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. Crowder does not dispute that a defendant may be charged with and convicted for both conspiracy and attempt under § 846. United States v. Carrera, 250 Fed.Appx. 731, 733 (7th Cir. 2007) ([I]t has long been settled that a prosecution for both conspiracy and attempt does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because each crime requires proof of a fact that the other does not.). However, we have not had occasion to consider whether imposing separate sentences for conspiracy and attempt improperly punishes a defendant twice for the same criminal conduct. Crowder urges us to follow the Ninth Circuit and hold that a defendant cannot be sentenced for both conspiracy and attempt under § 846 if the charges arise out of a single criminal act. In United States v. Touw, the Ninth Circuit held that, although a defendant could be charged and convicted of both conspiracy and attempt, the court could only sentence him on one count if the underlying criminal activity constituted a single course of action. 769 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir.1985); see also United States v. Palafox, 764 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir.1985). But the three circuits to consider this issue after Touw have unanimously rejected the Ninth Circuit's single course of action inquiry, choosing instead to apply the Supreme Court's Blockburger test at the sentencing stage to determine whether separate sentences are appropriate. See United States v. Boykins, 966 F.2d 1240, 1245 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Barrett, 933 F.2d 355, 360-61 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1293 (10th Cir.1988). Under Blockburger which answered the question of whether a single act could constitute multiple crimes under different statutesa court must determine whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Conspiracy and attempt are clearly separate offenses under this inquiry: conspiracy requires an agreement with another person, whereas attempt may be completed alone. See United States v. Corson, 579 F.3d 804, 810 (7th Cir.2009) (noting that conspiracy requires an agreement); United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir.2008) (noting that attempt requires only intent to complete the crime and a substantial step toward completion). We agree with the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits and now hold that the Blockburger test should be applied at the sentencing phase to determine whether separate sentences are appropriate for the crimes charged and convicted, even where those crimes arise out of a single criminal act. The Blockburger test is easily administered and does not lend itself to a fact-specific inquiry that inevitably will lead to unnecessary appeals and leave parties and courts without hope of much guidance. Savaiano, 843 F.2d at 1293. Furthermore, district courts retain their discretion at sentencing to address situations where sentencing on both counts may effect an excessive or otherwise inappropriate sentence. Because we find that a defendant may be sentenced for both conspiracy and attempt, Crowder's appeal on this issue is denied. We find Crowder's remaining claims without merit and therefore decline to discuss them.