Opinion ID: 1834950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: should the second indictment have been quashed?

Text: Wilson has already been tried for the capital murder of Mrs. Im under a prior indictment. In the first trial the jury could not agree upon a verdict and a mistrial was granted. Wilson was re-indicted by another grand jury and charged with capital murder of Mrs. Im. The second indictment differed from the first in that in addition to the $70.00 taken during the course of the robbery, Wilson was alleged to have taken a wig or other things of value from the victim. It also differed in that it charged Wilson as an habitual criminal as defined by Miss. Code Ann., § 99-19-81 (Supp. 1990). With the return of the second indictment by the grand jury, the prosecution moved the court to enter a nolle prosequi on the first indictment. This motion was granted by the trial court. The defense filed a motion to quash the second indictment alleging that Wilson was facing double jeopardy and this motion was denied. For an accused to stand trial again when the first trial resulted in a hung jury is not a violation of the double jeopardy clause. Wallace v. State, 466 So.2d 900 (Miss. 1985). Wilson argues that the double jeopardy clause prohibits re-indictment and re-trial for the purpose of allowing the prosecution to strengthen its case. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973). Wilson's argument is that there was no manifest necessity for dismissing the first indictment and that he should not have been re-indicted with the additional allegations concerning the theft of the wig and his habitual offender status. We find no variance between the indictments, the proof offered and the defense asserted. Any evidence that might be introduced to refute the allegation that Wilson stole money from the wig shop during the murder, would also serve as a defense to the additional allegation that a wig was stolen. Nothing indicates that the allegation regarding the wig strengthened the prosecution's case against Wilson or that he was in any way subjected to double jeopardy. The evidence presented by the prosecution for the alleged offense of capital murder was the same whether the indictment was for the theft of the wig or not. The second indictment in no way charged Wilson with a different or additional offense. United States v. Monroe, 164 F.2d 471, 475 (2nd Cir.1947). Wilson's position is grounded on McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir.1973). Wilson's castle is built on sand. In McNeal, the prosecutor requested the nolle prosequi because a government witness offered surprise testimony which did not substantiate the government's case. The defense objected and requested that the trial be continued to a conclusion on its merits or, if the government had no further proof, a directed verdict of acquittal. The trial court granted the prosecutor's motion and discharged the jury, stating that the prosecutor had found out after getting into the trial that he was unable to make out his case. The Fifth Circuit specifically held that granting of the nolle prosequi in order to allow the State an opportunity to shore up that weakness violated McNeal's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 481 F.2d at 1152. That is not the situation we face in Wilson. The mistrial here was declared because of a hung jury and not a crawfishing state witness. The prosecutor in Wilson did not abort the first trial to seal leaks in his case. In McNeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that none of the factors relied upon in making the motion for nolle prosequi arose to the level of manifest necessity which would require a mistrial. However, it is ancient and well recognized law that a hung jury is a manifest necessity that does require a mistrial. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). In Ellis v. State, 469 So.2d 1256, 1258 (Miss. 1985), quoting from Shelby v. State, 246 So.2d 543, 546 (Miss. 1971), we said: It is well settled in this state ... that a change in the indictment is permissible if it does not materially alter facts which are the essence of the offense on the face of the indictment as it originally stood or materially alter a defense to the indictment as it originally stood so as to prejudice the defendant's case. The second point of contention raised by Wilson is that the prosecution cannot amend an indictment by adding, for the first time, that the defendant is charged as an habitual offender. For this he relies upon Akins v. State, 493 So.2d 1321 (Miss. 1986). He has misread Akins which held that a trial court may not amend indictment to change the charge in the indictment to another crime, except by action of the grand jury who returned the indictment. We point out that the second indictment in Wilson's case was not an amendment of the original indictment on motion by the state, it was a second indictment returned by a grand jury. Akins allows this. There is no merit to this assignment of error.