Opinion ID: 771682
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 103(10)(a): Were CRLC and CRG Formed For the Purpose of Making Independent Expenditures?

Text: 74 Colorado's next argument relates to the definition of political committee in 103(10)(a), and relies heavily on Common Sense Alliance v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748 (Colo. 2000). In that case, the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted an analogous FCPA provision, 103(8), which defines issue committee, in part, as [t]wo or more persons who are elected, appointed, or chosen, or have associated themselves, for the purpose of accepting contributions and making expenditures to support or oppose any ballot issue or ballot question . . . . Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-103(8)(I) (2000) (emphasis added). In response to the certified question of whether an organization formed for other purposes may later become an issue committee as defined by the FCPA, Common Sense Alliance, 995 P.2d at 749, the court held that the phrase for the purpose of must be read to include only those issue committees that were formed for the purpose of supporting or opposing a ballot initiative. Organizations that form for another purpose and later commit to ballot issue activity are not within the clear ambit of the statute. Id. at 758 (emphasis added). 75 This court is bound by the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of 103(8). Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (Neither this Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one rendered by the highest court of the State.); Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1106 (10th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 525 U.S. 182 (1999). Although Common Sense Alliance construed for the purpose of in 103(8) rather than 103(10)(a), it is a well-settled rule that identical words or phrases in the same statute have the same meaning. Colo. Common Cause, 758 P.2d at 161 ([W]hen . . . the legislature employs the same words or phrases in different parts of a statute, then, in the absence of any manifest indication to the contrary, the meaning attributed to the words or phrases in one part of the statute should be ascribed to the same words or phrases found elsewhere in the statute.). Thus, we hold that a political committee is formed when two or more persons associate themselves with the original purpose of making independent expenditures. 76 CRLC, CRG, and Citizens for Responsible Government State Political Action Committee (CRGS-PAC) filed their initial complaint on December 10, 1996. See 1 J.A. 3 (Docket for No. 96-S-2844). The district court dismissed their 103 claims on June 18, 1997. 2 J.A. 288-90. Common Sense Alliance was decided almost three years later, on March 13, 2000. It is therefore not surprising that Plaintiffs' complaint only sets forth the organizations' present purposes, without specifically alleging the purposes for which they were originally formed. Giving Plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we surmise that the organizations' current purposes are consistent with their original purposes, and that they would be permitted to amend their complaint accordingly. Thus, CRLC and CRG are political committees, as the term is defined in 103(10)(a), and the district court's ruling to the contrary was erroneous. 7 Accordingly, 103(7)'s exception for expenditures made by persons, other than political parties and political committees, in the regular course and scope of their business does not apply to CRG or CRLC. 77 b. Do CRLC and CRG Face a Credible Threat of Prosecution Under the FCPA? 78 A plaintiff need not await and undergo a criminal prosecution in order to challenge a statute on constitutional grounds. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)). Article III standing exists [w]hen the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder . . . . Id. The plaintiff need not demonstrate to a certainty that it will be prosecuted, Vt. Right to Life, 221 F.3d at 382, only that it has an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against [it]. Id. (quoting Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 393). 79 Throughout this litigation, Colorado has insisted that under the State's construction of 103(7), (10)(a), and (11), organizations like CRLC and CRG will not be prosecuted under the FCPA. E.g., Colo. Answer Br. at 13-21 (Jan. 14, 2000). Such representations, however, are insufficient to overcome the chilling effect of the statute's plain language. In this sense, this case presents an even more compelling threat of prosecution than the plaintiff faced in Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2000). The statute challenged in Vermont Right to Life established content requirements for political advertisements -- including advertisements that only implicitly advocate[d] the success or defeat of a candidate. Id. at 380 (quoting Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, 2881). The statute required all such advertisements to clearly designate the name of the candidate, party or political committee by or on whose behalf the same is published or broadcast. Id. (quoting Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, 2882) (emphasis added). The State read on whose behalf to mean only as the agent or representative of; the plaintiff read the phrase to include any advertisement supporting a viewpoint with which a candidate is associated or with which his or her opponent takes issue . . . . Id. at 383. While suggesting that the State's construction was perhaps even better, the Second Circuit deemed the plaintiff's construction reasonable enough to support a legitimate fear of prosecution. Id. In this case, we need not defer to either side's construction. As discussed above, CRG and CRLC are clearly covered by the plain language of the statute. 80 This case is also distinguishable from Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1998), in which the court denied the plaintiff standing to challenge an ambiguously worded statute because the interpretive mandate sought in the lawsuit was already codified in an advisory opinion by the Wisconsin Attorney General and in regulations promulgated by the Wisconsin Election Board. Id. at 1185. The court therefore held that the plaintiff's fear of prosecution was not well-founded, id. at 1186, characterizing the lawsuit as an attempt to resolve a controversy that has not yet arisen and may never arise. Id. at 1187-88. In the present case, we are aware of no such administrative regulations, and the Secretary's representations in this litigation are not binding on this or future administrations. See Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 395 ([A]s the [State] Attorney General does not bind the state courts or local law enforcement authorities, we are unable to accept her interpretation of the law as authoritative.); accord Vt. Right to Life, 221 F.3d at 383-84 (citations omitted). We therefore hold that the fear of prosecution alleged by CRLC and CRG is sufficiently well-founded to support Article III standing. 81