Opinion ID: 64509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: pay claims

Text: We next consider the merits of Taylor's arguments on his discriminatory and retaliatory pay disparity claims because the district court apparently considered all of the relevant claimsthose from 1993 to 2004in its September 13, 2007 ruling and November 21, 2007 supplemental ruling dismissing them.
To make out a prima facie case of discrimination in compensation, a plaintiff must show that he was a member of a protected class and that he was paid less than a non-member for work requiring substantially the same responsibility. Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir.1984). Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, [o]nce shown, a plaintiff's prima facie case creates an inference of ... discrimination, which the employer is required to rebut with a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the pay disparity. Ross v. University of Texas at San Antonio, 139 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir.1998) (concerning age discrimination). If the employer provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the employer's stated reason is pretextual. Id. To avoid summary judgment, an age discrimination plaintiff must present evidence that both (1) rebuts the employer's non-discriminatory reason, and (2) creates an inference that age was a determinative factor in the challenged employment decision. Id. An individual plaintiff claiming disparate treatment in pay under Title VII must show that his circumstances are nearly identical to those of a better-paid employee who is not a member of the protected class. See Little v. Republic Refining Co., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991). In making this showing, an individual plaintiff pursuing an individual claim may not rely on the type of pattern-or-practice evidence that is acceptable in class action suits alleging similar conduct, such as general statistical evidence. See Thompson v. Leland Police Dep't, 633 F.2d 1111, 1114 (5th Cir.1980) ([S]tatistical evidence alone does not establish or necessarily imply racially discriminatory practices.). Therefore, Taylor cannot rely on general statistical evidence to establish a pattern of discrimination. Instead, he must present prima facie evidence that his pay was lower than specific employees who are not members of the protected class. Taylor argues that he actually presented such evidence. He relies on evidence included in Dr. Borg's report, covering the period from March 9, 1993 through Taylor's retirement on April 1, 2004 and reporting that Taylor was paid less than two specific white Center Managers in the Gulf South District, identified by the last four digits of their Social Security Numbers. The district court characterized Dr. Borg's analysis as being based solely  on statistics and regression analysis and found it insufficient. Taylor, 2007 WL 4180473, at  (emphasis added). Although the majority of Dr. Borg's report is indeed based solely on statistics and regression analysis, the direct comparison at issue here is not. Dr. Borg's analysis compares Taylor to two specific, apparently similarly situated white employees those with similar evaluations and tenuresover the course of their employment at UPS. That comparison shows Taylor was paid 5.75% less than one of them and slightly over 17% less than the other. Thus, the district court erred in refusing to consider that portion of Dr. Borg's report. The district court further stated, Even assuming that Dr. Borg's statistically-based opinion alone could create a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, it would not be sufficient to rebut UPS' legitimate, non-discriminatory business reasons for the differences in pay. Id. The district court, however, provides us with little or no analysis or discussion of UPS's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. It is clear that Dr. Borg's specific comparison showed that Taylor was a member of a protected class and that he was paid less than a similarly situated non-member of his class; thus, the comparison makes out a prima facie case of race discrimination. Uviedo, 738 F.2d at 1431. The district court erred in finding that Dr. Borg's report was based solely on statistics and regression analysis and that the comparison is insufficient to make out a prima face case of discriminatory pay disparity. We must therefore vacate the district court's dismissal of Taylor's discriminatory pay claims.
The McDonnell Douglas framework also applies to Taylor's retaliatory pay disparity claim. He must show (1) that [he] engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir.1996) (citing McMillan v. Rust College, Inc., 710 F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir.1983)). The same analysis applies to this retaliation claim as we discussed in the connection with the discriminatory pay claim. The district court found that Taylor had failed to make out a prima facie case of general pay disparity and did not consider the evidence discussed above included in Dr. Borg's report. Therefore, we must vacate the dismissal of this claim and remand for further proceedings.