Opinion ID: 1983619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: D.R.E. 404(b) EVIDENCE

Text: When the State moved to reopen its case, it also sought a ruling on the admissibility of evidence relating to prior violent episodes between Smith and Anderson. The State argued that the repeated acts of violence established a course of conduct that helped prove Anderson's lack of consent to sexual intercourse. In addition, the fact that Anderson was enduring an abusive relationship helped explain why, as the State correctly anticipated, she would recant her prior statements and testify that the sexual relations were consensual. The trial judge agreed and allowed the State to ask Anderson about five other incidents where Smith's conduct resulted in Anderson calling the police, going to a hospital emergency room for treatment, or both. Smith argues that this evidence should have been excluded because it was unfairly prejudicial and was not supported by clear and conclusive evidence. Pursuant to D.R.E. 404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts, although inadmissible to prove a person's character, may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. This list offers examples of purposes for which evidence of prior wrongs could be admitted; it is not exclusive. Pope v. State, Del.Supr., 632 A.2d 73, 76 (1993). In Getz v. State, Del.Supr., 538 A.2d 726, 734 (1988), this Court ruled that, as a precondition to admission of Rule 404(b) evidence, the trial court must find that: (i) the evidence is material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute in the case; (ii) it is being introduced for a purpose permitted by the Rule; (iii) the prior bad acts are subject to proof by clear and conclusive evidence; (iv) the prior acts are not too remote in time from the charged offense; and (v) the probative value of the prior acts evidence out-weighs its prejudicial effect. If the trial court is satisfied that the evidence meets these standards, it may be admitted, but the evidence should be the subject of a jury instruction explaining the limited purpose for which it was introduced. After evaluating each of the Getz factors, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Smith tacitly concedes that the evidence was material, introduced for a proper purpose, and concerned events that were not too remote in time. He argues only that the prior violent episodes were not established by satisfactory evidence and were unfairly prejudicial. With respect to the quality of the evidence, there is no question but that the clear and conclusive standard was satisfied. Anderson reluctantly admitted that she and Smith had fought on the five prior occasions she was questioned about. In addition, the State offered police and medical records corroborating her testimony. Smith's claim of unfair prejudice, likewise, is without merit. The evidence of repeated violent outbursts by Smith was highly probative on the question of whether, during another of the couple's domestic disputes, Anderson consented to sexual intercourse. Although that evidence may well have had a prejudicial effect, the trial judge minimized the risk of prejudice by limiting the amount of evidence the State could introduce for each prior incident and instructing the jury on the purposes for which the evidence of past abuse could be considered. In sum, we find that the trial court properly applied the Getz standards.