Opinion ID: 195165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: impermissible regulation of the waterways

Text: 39 Appellants contend that Dartmouth's discriminatory use fee constitutes an impermissible regulation of the nation's waterways. In addition, they argue that Dartmouth's actions in this case are preempted by extensive federal legislation and regulation in this area. In conclusion, appellants state that Dartmouth's actions in assessing the use fees is, therefore, violative of the commerce clause in that it (1) is preempted by federal legislation and (2) it unreasonably impairs access to navigable waters (emphasis added). 40 To the extent appellants' impermissible regulation claims depend on the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, as the above language suggests, we are unable to consider them in our review of the summary judgment decision. The district court found that appellants lacked standing to raise a claim under the Commerce Clause and appellants do not challenge this finding on appeal. 14 Even if these claims are independent of the Commerce Clause, however, they lack sufficient merit to require a reversal. 41 Appellants are correct in their observation that navigable waters of the United States are public property and cannot be obstructed or impeded so as to impair the right to their navigation. Harman v. Chicago, 147 U.S. 396, 412, 13 S.Ct. 306, 312, 37 L.Ed. 216 (1893). However, they are also correct in acknowledging that a state may exact a reasonable harbor fee to defray the costs of harbor traffic. Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 267, 56 S.Ct. 194, 197, 80 L.Ed. 215 (1935). In the present case, appellants fail to point out how Dartmouth's disparate usage fee impairs access to navigable waters in any way, unreasonably or otherwise. Boaters can pass through Dartmouth and even stay in Dartmouth for a few nights without being required to pay any usage fee at all. Furthermore, the use fee, as discussed above, provides a reasonable method of defraying the costs of waterways maintenance. 42 Appellants also provide no support for their claim that federal law preempts Dartmouth's use fee. [W]here a congressional statute does not expressly declare that state law is to be pre-empted, and where there is no actual conflict between what federal law and state law prescribe, [the Supreme Court has] required that there be evidence of a congressional intent to pre-empt the specific field covered by the state law. Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 6, 106 S.Ct. 2369, 2772, 91 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); accord Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 2481-82, 115 L.Ed.2d 532 (1991). For a preemption claim to succeed, the intention of Congress must be clearly manifested, implicit from a pervasive scheme of federal regulation that leaves no room for state and local supplementation, or implicit from the fact that the federal law touches a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Mortier, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2481-82 (internal quotations omitted). 43 The appellants have failed to demonstrate any intent on the part of Congress to preempt boat user fees, nor have they shown any conflict between federal waterways laws and the state and local laws in this case. None of the legislation cited by appellants--The River and Harbor Improvements Acts, 33 U.S.C. Secs. 540-633; The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1954, Pub.L. No. 83-780, Sec. 101, 68 Stat. 1248, 1253; and the proposed but not enacted Shipbuilding Trade Reform Act, most recent version at H.R. 2056, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)--express any intent to preempt local user fees, nor do we find a pervasive regulatory scheme or dominant federal interest that precludes such fees. The fact that federal law has implemented boater use fees does not, by itself, present a conflict with local fees of the same nature where there is no reason to believe that the two fees cannot coincide or that the local fee interferes in some way with the federal one. Appellants provide no basis for finding such interference. Consequently, we find no federal preemption of Dartmouth's use fee. Cf. Beveridge v. Lewis, 939 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.1991) (finding no federal preemption of local moorage restrictions by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1221 et seq.). 44 Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.