Opinion ID: 171479
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Smith v. Doe

Text: Mr. Hinckley further challenges SORNA's overall applicability, arguing that the statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because it increases punishment retroactively. In making this argument, Mr. Hinckley unsuccessfully attempts to distinguish the retroactive registration scheme at issue in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164, which the Supreme Court held did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Because we agree with the May court, which held that a defendant, like [Mr. Hinckley], is not even subject to the Attorney General's regulation under § 16913(d), we now analyze the statute's retroactive registration requirements under Smith and agree that they do not constitute an ex post facto violation. May, 535 F.3d at 919. To determine whether the retroactive application of a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, a court must decide whether the statute is civil or criminal in nature. See id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997)). The analysis requires an inquiry into the legislative intent, including the statute's manner of codification and its enforcement procedures, as well as the statute's effect. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 93-106, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The Supreme Court has held that a legislative label of civil is insufficient to render a statute civil in nature, and the Court has stated that it will reject the civil label upon a showing of the `clearest proof' that `the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it `civil.' Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (quoting U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)) (alteration in original). Distinguishing Smith, Mr. Hinckley characterizes SORNA as a punitive criminal statute that violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Unlike SORNA, he argues, the Smith scheme was primarily civil in nature, did not require Internet dissemination of offenders' information, did not establish a community notification program, did not require in-person reporting, and did not include felony criminal penalties. However, SORNA's declaration of purpose shapes the statute as one involving public safety concerns, making clear that the law is designed to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and comes as a response to the vicious attacks by violent predators. 42 U.S.C. § 16901; see May, 535 F.3d at 920; Hinen, 487 F.Supp.2d at 755-56 (discussing the legislative intent behind SORNA); Gill, 520 F.Supp.2d at 1348 (same). Therefore, the statute bears a legislative label of civil. To make our determination definitive, we must further explore whether such a civil statute is `so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [Congress's] intention' to deem it `civil.' Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49, 100 S.Ct. 2636); see also May, 535 F.3d at 919-20. SORNA clearly uses criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 to further its public safety ends, but [i]nvoking the criminal process in aid of a statutory regime does not render the statutory scheme itself punitive. Smith, 538 U.S. at 96, 123 S.Ct. 1140. In addition, SORNA's codification of its failure to register provisions in the criminal code does not negate the fact that Congress codified the statute's general registration provisions under the heading of public health and welfare. See id. at 94, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (The location and labels of a statutory provision do not by themselves transform a civil remedy into a criminal one.). Furthermore, SORNA, just as the Smith scheme, merely provides for the dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, most of which is already public. Id. at 98, 123 S.Ct. 1140. While the public display of this information could result in shame for Mr. Hinckley, this is not an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme. Id. at 99, 123 S.Ct. 1140. SORNA aims to inform the public for its own safety, not to humiliate the offender. Widespread public access is necessary for the efficacy of the scheme, and the attendant humiliation is but a collateral consequence of a valid regulation. Id. The statute's primary effect supports Congress's intention that it operate as a civil regulatory scheme designed to protect the general public welfare. Ultimately, SORNA, a civil retroactive registration scheme, relies on criminal penalties to further its civil intent. It includes such penalties for the failure to register following interstate travel, thereby creating an entirely new offense imposed only upon violation of SORNA's registration requirements. Contrary to Mr. Hinckley's arguments, SORNA does not increase punishment for acts committed prior to SORNA's effective date. Therefore, the prosecution of Mr. Hinckley under SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.