Opinion ID: 799452
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Severity or Pervasiveness of Certain Harassment

Text: The district court granted CRST summary judgment on the EEOC's hostile work-environment claims on behalf of three women, [17] concluding that, as a matter of law, each alleged harassment that was neither sufficiently severe nor pervasive to support a hostile work-environment claim. The district granted CRST summary judgment on the EEOC's claims on behalf of 11 additional women, [18] again citing, inter alia, [19] insufficient severity or pervasiveness as a matter of law. The EEOC appeals these rulings, maintaining that the summary-judgment record contains enough evidence to create a fact question regarding the severity or pervasiveness of the harassment that each woman suffered. A district court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mayer v. Countrywide Home Loans, 647 F.3d 789, 791 (8th Cir.2011). On each female trucker's behalf, the EEOC must create a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of [her] employment. Carter, 173 F.3d at 700. Such discrimination extends beyond terms and conditions in the `narrow contractual sense' and includes discriminatory harassment so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile working environment. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399). There can be no doubt federal harassment standards are demanding.... Indeed, the Supreme Court has `made it clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.' Al- Zubaidy, 406 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275) (internal citation omitted). Only [w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment [is] Title VII violated. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Conversely, [c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environmentan environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusiveis beyond Title VII's purview. Id. A number of factors are relevant in assessing the magnitude of harassment, including the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or only an offensive utterance, [and] whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance.... Carter, 173 F.3d at 702. We also consider a harassment victim's physical proximity to the harasser[] and the presence or absence of other people. Id. (internal citations omitted). Proximity and the absence of others are relevant here given the confined quarters and remote setting in which CRST's trainees worked with their Lead Drivers. Once there is evidence of improper conduct and subjective offense, the determination of whether the conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in the hands of the jury. Sheriff, 619 F.3d at 931. Applying these standards we conclude that, except as to two womenSherry O'Donnell and Tillie Jonesthe district court did not err in granting CRST summary judgment after determining that the women complained of harassment that was neither sufficiently severe nor pervasive. The record reveals complaints about their Lead Drivers' poor personal hygiene, [20] boasting about past sexual exploits, sporadic remarks of sexual vulgarity, and highly offensive but isolated instances of propositioning for sex. None of the relevant factors listed above, including the women's physical proximity to [their] harasser[s] and the presence or absence of other people, Carter, 173 F.3d at 702, meet the applicable standard that the alleged harassment was so severe or pervasive that it alter[ed] the conditions of the [women's] employment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Regarding the Lead Drivers' poor hygienic practices, we have noted that Title VII ... is not a general civility code for the American workplace. Wilkie v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 638 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2011) (quotations and citation omitted); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275. Although a Lead Driver's poor hygiene undoubtedly made for an unpleasant work environment, this [m]erely rude or unpleasant conduct is insufficient to support a claim for hostile work environment. Id. (quotations and citation omitted). As for the boasting about past sexual exploits and sporadic, sexually vulgar remarks, a de novo review reveals that they mostly constituted mere offensive utterance[s], Clearwater v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 166, 231 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir.2000) (quotations and citation omitted), and we have cautioned that [s]poradic or casual comments are unlikely to support a hostile environment claim, Carter, 173 F.3d at 702. With respect to the isolated propositioning, this court and the Supreme Court have stated that `[m]ore than a few isolated incidents are required' to support a hostile work-environment claim. Clearwater, 231 F.3d at 1127 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399). Consequently, the district court did not err in concluding, as a matter of law, that 12 women did not suffer sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment to survive summary judgment. The EEOC did, however, establish material issues of fact regarding the harassment that O'Donnell and Jones allegedly suffered. We hold that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the harassment they suffered was insufficiently severe or pervasive. O'Donnell testified in her deposition that, among others, co-driver Anthony Sears subjected her to persistent sexual harassment during the seven days that she spent with him over the road. Specifically, O'Donnell testified that, over the course of that seven-day trip, Sears (1) asked her, on three to five occasions, to drive naked; (2) refused O'Donnell's repeated requests to exit at a truck stop so she could go to the bathroom, ordering her to urinate in a parking lot instead; and (3) in a culminating incident, grabbed O'Donnell's face while she was driving and began screaming that all he wanted was a girlfriend. Regarding this third incident, O'Donnell testified that Sears grabbed her face so vigorously that it caused one of her teeth to lacerate her lip. Viewing all facts and drawing all inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the EEOC, as we must, Mayer, 647 F.3d at 791, this testimony creates a genuine fact issue as to the severity of the harassment that O'Donnell allegedly suffered. Given that Sears allegedly perpetrated all of these acts in a week's time, the conduct was frequent. See Carter, 173 F.3d at 702. Sears's directive that O'Donnell publicly urinate in a parking lot is a patent attempt at humiliation. See id. (citation omitted). Moreover, Sears's act of grabbing O'Donnell's face, was, by its very nature, physically threatening. Id. Finally, upon assessing these characteristics of Sears's alleged conduct in light of O'Donnell's physical proximity to Sears and the absence of other people, we must conclude that the EEOC has produced enough evidence of severity of O'Donnell's alleged harassment to make it a question for the jury. See Sheriff, 619 F.3d at 931 (Once there is evidence of improper conduct and subjective offense, the determination of whether the conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in the hands of the jury.). [21] The district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Tillie Jones suffered harassment that was neither sufficiently severe nor pervasive. Jones testified that, on three or four occasions over the course of a two-week training trip, her Lead Driver, James Simmons, entered the cab wearing only his underwear and rubbed the back of her head, despite repeated requests by Jones that he stop. Jones also testified that, everyday, Simmons entered the cab in his underwear while she was driving. Additionally, according to Jones, Simmons called her his bitch five or six times, including on one occasion when, in response to Jones's complaints about his slovenly habits, he ordered Jones to clean up the truck, declaring that's what you're on the truck for, you're my bitch. I ain't your bitch. Shut up and clean it up. Finally, Jones testified that, like many of CRST's Lead Drivers, Simmons routinely urinated in plastic bottles and ziplock bags while in transit. However, Jones testified that Simmons would leave his urine receptacles about the truck's cab and that when Jones implored Simmons to gather them, Simmons ordered her to shut up and clean it up. No overt physical threat or contact was present, but the evidence suffices to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning the severity or pervasiveness of the harassment which the EEOC alleges that Jones suffered. In sum, we affirm the district court's summary judgment, in CRST's favor, on the EEOC's hostile work-environment claims on behalf of 12 women, [22] concurring in the district court's conclusion that, as a matter of law, the alleged harassment was neither sufficiently severe nor pervasive. However, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the EEOC's claims on behalf of Tillie Jones. We conclude that the EEOC created a genuine issue of material fact as to the severity or pervasiveness of the harassment that Jones allegedly suffered. Finally, although we also conclude that the EEOC has created a genuine fact issue as to the severity or pervasiveness of the harassment that Sherry O'Donnell allegedly suffered, for the reasons stated in Part II.C.3. infra, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the EEOC's claims on her behalf.