Opinion ID: 1388423
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: California Decisions Discussing Public Employer Liability for Sexually Assaultive Conduct by Police

Text: When the Court of Appeal decided this case, only one published decision in this state had addressed the issue of whether a law enforcement officer who commits a sexual assault while on duty can be deemed to have acted within the scope of employment. In White v. County of Orange (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 566 [212 Cal. Rptr. 493], a deputy sheriff detained a female motorist late at night, placed her in the back of his patrol car, drove her around for hours in an isolated area, and repeatedly threatened to rape and kill her. When she promised to go out with him that weekend, he returned her to her car. After she drove away, he again stopped her, this time to obtain a goodnight kiss. Based on this entire incident, the officer was convicted of kidnapping and false imprisonment. Thereafter, the motorist brought a civil suit against the officer's employer, the County of Orange, on a theory of vicarious liability. The trial court granted the county's motion for summary judgment; the Court of Appeal reversed. The appellate court observed that an officer is entrusted with a substantial degree of authority, and that the motorist submitted to that authority, stopping her car solely because the officer had ordered her to do so. Accordingly, the court held, the officer's wrongful acts flowed from the very exercise of this authority, and the county could be held liable for the officer's conduct. ( White v. County of Orange, supra, 166 Cal. App.3d at pp. 571-572.) Recently, this court had occasion to examine White in John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d 438 (hereafter John R. ), which involved the application of respondeat superior in a different context. In John R., a junior high school student sued the school district, alleging he had been sexually molested by his teacher while at the teacher's apartment as part of an officially sanctioned, extracurricular program. The trial court ruled that the school district could not be held vicariously liable for the molestation, and granted the district's motion for nonsuit. We upheld the trial court's ruling. The lead opinion [2] in John R. did not consider whether the case was factually similar to other cases in which employers had been held liable for the tortious acts of their employees. Instead, it focused on the rationale underlying the imposition of such liability: to prevent recurrence of the tortious conduct, to give greater assurance of compensation for the victim, and to ensure that the victim's losses will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise to the injury. ( Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 967.) After evaluating these three factors, the lead opinion in John R. concluded that imposition of liability against the teacher's employer was not warranted. ( John R., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 452.) Although the opinion declined to determine whether White v. County of Orange, supra, 166 Cal. App.3d 566, was correctly decided, it suggested that the policy reasons underlying the doctrine of respondeat superior would justify its application when a police officer uses his authority to enable him to commit a sexual assault. ( John R., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 452.) The City contends that White v. County of Orange, supra, 166 Cal. App.3d 566, was wrongly decided, and that a police officer's act of rape, even when preceded by an assertion of authority, is outside the scope of his employment as a matter of law. Before addressing the merits of this contention, we first consider whether the doctrine of invited error precludes the City from asserting it.