Opinion ID: 2647902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Student Loan Claims

Text: As explained above, Mr. Eller’s original complaint contained claims concerning student loans in addition to the NCO Financial account. Mr. Eller’s second amended complaint removed these additional claims, and Mr. Eller was denied leave to reassert them before trial. The district court sustained Trans Union’s objections to the introduction of evidence about his student loan claims on Mr. Eller’s direct examination. Nevertheless, Mr. Eller did testify on cross-examination and redirect regarding student loan account notations on his 2008 Trans Union credit report. At the close of trial, the jury was instructed that it could “only award [Mr. Eller] damages, if any, which you find by a preponderance of evidence [were] proximately caused by Trans Union’s inclusion of the NCO Financial account on a consumer report.” Aplt. Appx. Vol. II at 631-32. Mr. Eller contends that this instruction erroneously precluded the jury from considering his student loan claims, which he now asserts were tried by implied consent because Trans Union introduced evidence related to the loans on cross-examination.
Issues outside the complaint may be tried by implied consent pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b)(2). “When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings.” Id. -24- “A party impliedly consents to the trial of an issue not contained within the pleadings either by introducing evidence on the new issue or by failing to object when the opposing party introduces such evidence.” Green Cnty. Food Mkt., Inc. v. Bottling Grp., LLC, 371 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449, 457 (10th Cir. 1982) (“Implied consent is found where the parties recognized that the issue entered the case at trial and acquiesced in the introduction of evidence on that issue without objection.”).
Although a trial court’s decision to give a certain jury instruction is typically reviewed for abuse of discretion, see Lederman v. Frontier Fire Prot., Inc., 685 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 2012), we are limited to plain error review in this instance because Mr. Eller did not preserve his claim of error by objecting to the challenged jury instruction at trial. See Fed R. Civ. P. 51(c), (d)(2). Mr. Eller contends that he objected, albeit “inartful[ly],” to the proposed instruction precluding the jury from awarding damages related to his student loan claims. See Aplt. Reply Br. at 7 (citing Aplt. Appx. Vol. II at 613-14). When Trans Union argued that a limiting instruction was required to keep the jury from improperly considering student loan account information when assessing damages, Mr. Eller responded: I was questioned about the student loans, and the defendants tried to show through my credit report that—is this student loan yours; is this student loan yours, and they couldn’t even—they claim I had a student loan [in] 06, -25- and they couldn’t even show it on the credit report. Although they inferred to the jury that it appeared and that it was an accurate and truthful piece of information on my credit report, they couldn’t even show that it existed. So I guess I will just leave it at that. Aplt. Appx. Vol. II at 613-14. Mr. Eller’s statement does not indicate a clear objection to the proposed instruction as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(c)(1). See id. (“A party who objects to an instruction . . . must do so on the record, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for the objection.”); United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 867 (10th Cir. 2012) (describing a litigant’s “obligation to lodge a timely and specific objection” to proposed jury instructions). Moreover, immediately after a brief recess— about ten minutes later—the district court asked Mr. Eller if he wished to “make any statement or objection for the record as to this instruction.” Id. at 615. Mr. Eller responded: “No, your Honor.” Id. Because Mr. Eller specifically declined to object to the proposed instruction, as is required to preserve the issue for appeal, we may only review the district court’s instruction for plain error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2); Bader, 678 F.3d at 867. “Plain error occurs when there is (i) error, (ii), that is plain, which (iii) affects the defendant’s substantial rights, and which (iv) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Bader, 678 F.3d at 868 (quotations omitted).
Our analysis stops at the first step of the plain error inquiry because we conclude -26- that the district court did not err by instructing the jury that Mr. Eller’s student loan claims were not compensable. Mr. Eller contends that the student loan issue should be treated as if it were part of the pleadings because it was tried by implied consent pursuant to Rule 15(b)(2). See Aplt. Br. at 18. We disagree. Our case law indicates that Trans Union could have impliedly consented to the trial of the student loan issue in one of two ways: by (1) introducing evidence on the issue or (2) failing to object when Mr. Eller introduced such evidence. See Green Cnty. Food Mkt., 371 F.3d at 1280. The latter option is plainly not satisfied because Trans Union consistently objected to Mr. Eller’s attempts to discuss student loans at trial. See Aplt. Appx. Vol. II at 149-50, 161-62, 186. The district court repeatedly upheld Trans Union’s objections, instructing the jury multiple times to disregard any testimony related to student loans and admonishing Mr. Eller that he had to limit his responses to Trans Union’s crossexamination to comments regarding the NCO Financial account. See, e.g., id. at 200. Nor did Trans Union consent to try Mr. Eller’s student loan claims by introducing evidence on the issue. Mr. Eller contends that by cross-examining him regarding student loan notations on his 2008 credit report, Trans Union essentially brought forth evidence on the matter. See Aplt. Br. at 19. But “implied consent cannot be based on the introduction of evidence that is relevant to an issue already in the case when there is no indication that the party presenting the evidence intended to raise a new issue.” Green Cnty. Food Mkt., 371 F.3d at 1280. Trans Union argues that its cross-examination of Mr. -27- Eller regarding student loan documents was meant to impeach Mr. Eller, see Aplee. Br. at 33, and the trial transcript reflects that the district court permitted Trans Union to introduce these documents specifically for impeachment purposes. See Aplt. Appx. Vol. II at 372. Because the record does not indicate that Trans Union impliedly consented to try the student loan issue, we cannot conclude that the district court erred by instructing the jury to consider only the NCO Financial account claim in its damages calculation. Accordingly, Mr. Eller cannot prevail on this claim under plain error review.