Opinion ID: 1653157
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Oral Instructions

Text: The trial court also ruled under Conclusions of Law # VIII and XI that the search warrant was facially invalid because, although an anticipatory search warrant, it failed to specify that the warrant could not be executed until after the cocaine was delivered: VIII. When an anticipatory warrant is used, the magistrate should protect against its premature execution by listing in the warrant conditions governing the execution which are explicit, clear and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents. XI. That oral instructions do not sufficiently limit the scope of the search warrant, as was done here. The state contests these two Conclusions of Law also. In United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-704, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that [w]hen an anticipatory warrant is used, the magistrate should protect against its premature execution by listing in the warrant conditions governing the execution which are explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents. (Emphasis added.) While this is unquestionably the preferred procedure in issuing an anticipatory warrant, most courts addressing the question have refused to invalidate a warrant simply because it did not list the conditions precedent to its valid execution on its face. See e.g. People v. Glen, 30 N.Y.2d at 261-262, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 663-664, 282 N.E.2d at 619; Alvidres v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.App.3d at 582, 90 Cal.Rptr. at 686. See also 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.7(c) at 98-99. In State v. Gutman, 670 P.2d at 1173, the Alaska appeals court held that although the warrant itself failed to specify the contingent events which would make its execution valid, those events were adequately spelled out in the supporting affidavit and the warrant incorporated the affidavit by reference. That is also the case here. Moreover, a later affidavit by Wibben established that Judge Johnson orally instructed Wibben not to execute the warrant until the package was delivered. This affidavit was not disputed. We conclude that while express limitations written on the face of an anticipatory search warrant are preferable, oral limitations by the issuing magistrate coupled with clear references to the necessary contingent event in the affidavit can be sufficient to limit the scope of an anticipatory search warrant. This is especially so where, as here, the search is in fact made after the controlled delivery in accordance with said verbal instructions. We hold that the Conclusions of Law to the contrary were error. Therefore, we reverse the trial court because there was sufficient probable cause to justify the search of Engel's residence and the search warrant was adequately limited in scope to the probable cause that existed. The state also argues that even if there was insufficient probable cause to justify the search of Engel's residence, the evidence found there should not have been suppressed under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). However, since we have determined that there was probable cause justifying the search of Engel's house for the cocaine and the other items, we do not reach this question. Reversed and remanded. MILLER, C.J., WUEST, J., and MORGAN, Retired Justice, concur. HENDERSON, J., concurs specially. HERTZ, Circuit Judge, acting as a Supreme Court Justice, not having been a member of the court at the time this case was argued, did not participate.