Opinion ID: 2631143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: RETROACTIVITY OF STATE v. ELLIS

Text: In this case, the King County Superior Court's decision on February 18, 1998 to exclude Dr. Rose's testimony was made prior to our decision in State v. Ellis on October 1, 1998. The trial court thus could rely upon the nine foundational criteria announced in State v. Edmon , a Division One case. The rule announced in State v. Ellis , a capital case, may nevertheless be applied to noncapital cases such as this one. [32] This court considers three factors outlined in Chevron Oil v. Huson in determining whether an appellate decision applies prospectively or retroactively: (1) whether the decision establishes a new rule of law by overruling clear past precedent or deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) whether retroactive application would further or retard the purposes of the rule; and (3) whether retroactive application would be inequitable. [33] Employing the Chevron Oil test favors retroactive application of State v. Ellis to facts antedating its pronouncement. Determining the admissibility of Dr. Rose's testimony under ER 401, ER 402 and ER 702 instead of under the Edmon criteria would not be inequitable because those rules of evidence have been in effect since April 2, 1979 before State v. Edmon was decided on January 5, 1981. [34] While the trial court in this case properly relied upon State v. Edmon as precedent, the 1981 Court of Appeals decision should not be elevated to the status of the last, absolute and definitive word on foundational requirements for presentation or admissibility of expert testimony on diminished capacity. [35] The better approach is that announced in the 1998 cased of State v. Ellis . The relevant inquiry thus is whether Dr. Rose's testimony was admissible under ER 401, ER 402 and ER 702. ER 401 defines relevant evidence: Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. ER 402 provides: All relevant evidence is admissible, except as limited by constitutional requirements or as otherwise provided by statute, by these rules, or by other rules or regulations applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. ER 702, referring to expert testimony, provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Under ER 702, expert testimony will be considered helpful to the trier of fact only if its relevance can be established. [36] [I]t is not enough that ... a defendant may be diagnosed as suffering from a particular mental [disorder]. The diagnosis must, under the facts of the case, be capable of forensic application in order to help the trier of fact assess the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime. [37] The opinion of an expert concerning a defendant's mental disorder must reasonably relate to impairment of the ability to form the culpable mental state to commit the crime charged. [38] In this case, Dr. Rose's testimony was neither relevant under ER 401 nor helpful to the trier of fact under ER 702. To satisfy either rule of evidence, her testimony must have the tendency to make it more probable than not that defendant suffered a mental disorder, not amounting to insanity, that impaired the defendant's ability to form the culpable mental state to commit the crime charged. Respondent was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver under RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(i). The statutory elements for this crime include (1)unlawful possession of (2) a controlled substance (3) with intent to deliver. [39] The culpable mental state is intent to deliver. Under RCW 9A.08.010(1)(a), [a] person acts with intent or intentionally when he acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime. The testimony of Dr. Rose did not reasonably relate to impairment of Respondent's ability to form the intent to deliver the controlled substance. She testified that Respondent was diagnosed as suffering from syphilitic encephalopathy, major depression and substance abuse problems. She further testified how syphilitic encephalopathy pathologically affected Respondent's brain. Despite his diagnosed disorders and pathology, Respondent still had the ability on March 28, 1996 to form the requisite culpable mental state. When asked whether Respondent could form the intent to deliver an object to a person, Dr. Rose responded I believe he would have been able to respond to a request to buy something and give it to another person. [40] She further stated I think his intent to [sic] was to deliver to the police officer. [41] Judge Aitken considered this testimony as evidence that Respondent's ability to form the intent to deliver was not impaired. She did not abuse her discretion under the test that no reasonable person would reach a conclusion contrary to that reached by the trial court. The Court of Appeals correctly noted the traditional rule that evidence of diminished capacity could negate specific intent but not general intent. [42] It also correctly noted the traditional rule was abolished by legislative enactment of RCW 9A.08.010 with the result that expert testimony regarding a defendant's mental disorder should no longer be excluded or admitted on the basis of common-law distinctions of intent. [43] In reversing the trial court, however, the Court of Appeals distinguished between Respondent's ability to form specific intent and his ability merely to respond to a request to perform a physical act within a short period of time. [44] Perhaps unintentionally, the Court of Appeals resorted to common-law distinctions of specific intent and general intent in determining admissibility of Dr. Rose's testimony. The term specific intent, as defined by the Court of Appeals, is the intent to produce a result in addition to the intent to do the physical act which the crime requires. [45] The term general intent is the intent to do the physical act which the crime requires, [46] which in this case entailed respond[ing] to a request to perform a physical act within a short period of time. The Court of Appeals also stated [I]f Atsbeha believed that he was helping the police capture a `main' drug dealer, that beliefeven though irrationally formed because of the very nature of his profound disorderwould indeed negate specific intent, that is, acting with the objective to produce a result that constitutes a crime, even though Atsbeha could, according to Dr. Rose, respond to a request to do a physical act, that is, to buy something and give it to another person right away. [47] Any belief by Respondent concerning his relationship with the police officer, however, was not evidence of impairment of his ability to form the intent to deliver the controlled substance. It was some indication that Respondent also had the ability to form an intent to help Detective Caldwell catch a main drug dealer. This evidence would be relevant and admissible to establish an insanity defense under RCW 9A.12.010, [48] but not relevant and admissible to establish a diminished capacity defense. Petitioner's belief, as indicated by Dr. Rose's testimony, would be some evidence under an insanity defense of his inability to perceive the nature and quality of the act with which he was charged. Respondent chose not to raise the defense of insanity when the trial court offered the opportunity. The trial court properly excluded the testimony of Dr. Rose offered to establish the defense of diminished capacity.