Opinion ID: 1997453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Municipal Official Immunity and the Maryland Tort Claims Act

Text: Maryland public officials may also claim immunity for their official acts on statutory grounds. Under Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ) Section 5-507(b), officials of municipal corporations are entitled to limited immunity. See Md. Code (2006 Repl.Vol.), § 5-507 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. Likewise, certain public officials can claim immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA), which defines the State's limited waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to tort suits against public officials. See Md.Code (2004 Repl.Vol.), §§ 12-101 to -10 of the State Government Article (SG) (the Maryland Tort Claims Act). As the Court of Special Appeals correctly held, neither of these statutes applies in this case. First, municipal official immunity under CJ Section 5-507(b) does not apply because the BCPD was created as a state agency, through an act of the General Assembly, and not as a municipal agency. See 1867 Md. Laws 761-74 (establishing the BCPD and defining its duties); see also Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Clark, 404 Md. 13, 28, 944 A.2d 1122, 1131 (2008) (holding that notwithstanding the Mayor's role in appointing and removing the City's Police Commissioner, the Baltimore City Police Department is a state agency.). Since that time, this Court has consistently held that Baltimore City should not be regarded as the employer of members of the [BCPD] for purposes of tort liability. Clea v. Mayor of Balt., 312 Md. 662, 668, 541 A.2d 1303, 1306 (1988). Thus, for the purposes of tort liability, Houghton is an employee of a state agency and not a municipal agency. He therefore cannot claim to be a municipal official, and cannot claim municipal official immunity. Second, Houghton cannot claim immunity under the MTCA because although the BCPD is a state agency, city police are not defined as state personnel for the purposes of the MTCA. See SG § 12-101(a) (enumerating classes of officials within the scope of the MTCA). This is no mere oversight: the General Assembly amended the statute after our decision in Clea, where we discussed in dicta the possibility that the state might be liable for a BCPD officer's tortious conduct because the BCPD is a state agency. See Clea, 312 Md. at 671 n. 6, 541 A.2d at 1307 n. 6. Shortly thereafter, the General Assembly enacted House Bill 364, for the purpose of altering the definition of State personnel [under the MTCA]. See H.B. 364, 1989 Gen. Assem., 406th Sess. (Md. 1989). The newly modified statute helped clarify that the bounds of immunity and liability under the MTCA applied only to individuals directly paid by or otherwise under direct control of the state itself. See id.; see also State v. Meade, 101 Md. App. 512, 522-24, 647 A.2d 830, 834-36 (1994) (discussing history of the 1989 amendment). The state thus reaffirmed the preservation of its sovereign immunity for acts committed by municipal police, including members of the BCPD. [3] See Balt. Police Dep't v. Cherkes, 140 Md.App. 282, 313-14, 780 A.2d 410, 428-29 (2001) (discussing the amendment process). In doing so, however, it also necessarily excluded municipal police, including Houghton, from the scope of the MTCA. As Houghton is a municipal police officer, the MTCA neither defines his responsibilities nor denies him protections with respect to immunity. The statute is simply inapplicable to Houghton's situation, and he cannot seek shelter beneath it.