Opinion ID: 1790102
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defeasible Fee

Text: In the case of Prindible v. Prindible, 186 Ky. 280, 216 S.W. 583, the will provided: I    do hereby bequeath to my wife    all of my personal and real property, feeling confident that she will make a fair allowance to my daughter, Hazel    and properly provide for Loretto   , my daughter, and John    my son,   . I make no restriction on her remarrying except in case she does she shall at once make proper provision for my children. We held that this devise created a defeasible fee in the wife of the testator subject to being defeated to the extent of having to make proper provision for the children of the testator in the event of her remarriage. In the case of Mann v. Frese, 203 Ky. 739, 263 S.W. 21, 22, all property was given to the wife in fee simple with power to sell for reinvestment. The second paragraph of the will provided that in case the wife should remarry, she should take one third of the estate in fee simple and the remaining two thirds should go to the daughters equally. The court said: The only limitation placed upon the devise reduced the estate by two-thirds in case the widow remarried. It is conceded by appellant though not alleged or proven that the wife did not remarry. She therefore took a fee-simple title to the whole estate. As holder of the fee-simple title, she had the right and power to dispose of what estate remained at her death by will and this she did. It is interesting to compare the foregoing case with the case of Hutter v. Crawford, 225 Ky. 215, 7 S.W.2d 1043, 1044, wherein the wife was devised property until she should remarry, then, in that event, two thirds thereof should go to the children, and where the court said: The authority given her by the second clause of the will was evidently so expressed to the end it could not be questioned but that his wife during her life had the power to sell and convey a good absolute title to the property, although as to two-thirds of it she owned but a defeasible fee.    Mrs. Hutter, then, taking a fee in the property subject to a defeasance as to two-thirds thereof in the event of her remarriage, and she having died without ever remarrying, it results that the condition of defeasance can no longer obtain, and the lower court did not err in holding that on her death without remarrying her estate had ripened into an absolute fee, because in the case of Mann v. Frese, it was indicated that she took a fee simple title to the whole estate subject to defeat while in the Hutter case she took an absolute fee simple title to one third and a defeasible fee in the remaining two thirds. In the case of Hopson's Trustee v. Hopson, 282 Ky. 181, 138 S.W.2d 365, the will reads: I, A. Henry Hopson, of the County of Logan, State of Kentucky, being of sound mind and memory do make and publish this my last will and testament. I give and bequeath to my beloved wife all my personal property and all my realty after all my just debts are paid so long as she remains my widow. The court held that the widow acquired a fee simple estate subject to be defeated upon her marriage and held that the words, so long as she remains my widow, are equivalent to saying provided she remains my widow, and merely attached a condition which made the estate defeasible upon her remarriage. In the case of Cuddy v. McIntyre, 312 Ky. 606, 607, 229 S.W.2d 315, at the suggestion of appellant, the court paraphrased the will so that when rearranged, it read: I, James S. Cuddy, will to my wife, Nanie Cuddy, all my property in Powell County and Wolfe County    she to have and to hold the same as long as she remains my widow, with the power in her to sell and convey any part of this property that she may need for her support. The court held that the will thus translated into phraseology most favorable to appellant was still susceptible of but one construction: viz., the fee simple title to all the property passed to his widow, subject to defeasance only in the event that she should remarry, but which event did not occur. A bare statement of the foregoing cases suggests a condition described by Holmes when he said: The growth of the law is very apt to take place in this way. Two widely different cases suggest a general distinction, which is a clear one when stated broadly. But as new cases cluster around the opposite poles, and begin to approach each other, the distinction becomes more difficult to trace; the determinations are made one way or the other on a very slight preponderance of feeling, rather than of articulate reason; and at last a mathematical line is arrived at by the contact of contrary decisions, which is so far arbitrary that it might equally well have been drawn a little farther to one side or to the other, but which must have been drawn somewhere in the neighborhood of where it falls. The writer of this opinion is unable to draw a true distinction between all the cases above mentioned. A superficial difference might be made by saying that in cases where there is an expressed limitation or gift over to others, this court has held that the first donee received only a life estate subject to defeasance. But the certainty of the person or class which receives the estate in the event the first estate is defeated is not a true criterion because if such persons are not specifically named in the will, they may be definitely determined by the facts. However in consideration of all cases, the court will be guided by the mandate contained in KRS 381.060(1) which provides, Unless a different purpose appears by expressed words or necessary inference, every estate in land created by deed or will, without words of inheritance, shall be deemed a fee simple or such other estate as the grantor or testator had power to dispose of, and resolve any doubt in favor of a fee simple title. It cannot now be said what decision the court might reach if some of the above cases were here for reconsideration but we have concluded that under the language used in the case at bar, testator's widow acquired a fee simple estate defeasible only upon her remarriage. She did not remarry; therefore, she had full right and power to dispose of the property by will. By this opinion, after recognizing the existence of other cases apparently containing a contrary decision, we have construed the expression in this case, but we do not feel that the time has arrived where we may arbitrarily draw the line of demarcation between the sets of cases without reserving a right to seek the intention of the testator among the words used in the entire testament. Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.