Opinion ID: 23906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 3d Prong: The statutes provide an adequate substitute for a warrant.

Text: 29 Burger requires that the statute's inspection program must: 1) advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to law; and 2) limit the discretion of the inspecting officers. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 703. 30 The district court concluded that the Texas statutory scheme met both requirements because Texas law provides property owners with adequate notice that their vehicles may be seized and searched on the highways under section 644.103(a), and limits the discretion of the inspecting officers under section 644.104(b). 31 We agree, even though both statutes could have been more comprehensive and defined. There is enough, however, to permit any owner of a commercial vehicle to be aware that he would be subject to warrantless and suspicionless stops while driving. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 703. Although the sections do appear to limit the discretion of an officer after the stop, see Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 644.103(c) and 644.104(b), they are subject to criticism for failing to provide specific limitations on the officer's discretion in making the decision to stop. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 703. We are satisfied, however, from the background testimony, that this stop met constitutional muster. 32 We conclude that the warrantless stop and inspection of Fort's commercial vehicle were valid under Burger's regulatory exception to the warrant requirement. 33 Given our conclusion that the stop was permissible, we need not address the government's argument that this court should affirm because Officer Scales had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Fort's truck based on his observation of a regulatory violation. We note, however, that the government waived this argument at the suppression hearing by expressly representing to the district court that it was relying on this evidence only as background and not reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the stop. See Matter of Christopher, 28 F.3d 512, 521 (5th Cir. 1994) (waiver may be demonstrated by a showing that a party intended to relinquish a known right or privilege). As a result of the government's representation, the facts concerning the officer's observation were not developed. The time for doing so has passed. 34