Opinion ID: 6103947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Implied-Revocation Doctrine

Text: Angel 44 asserts that the Bank’s consummation of a deal to collect $3 million on the judgment met the standard for an implied revocation under both Antwine and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts because (1) execution of the assignment agreement was a definite and unequivocal action inconsistent with an intent to settle and release the debt for $2 million and (2) Tauch acquired reliable information about 43The assignment agreement arguably created an agency relationship between Angel’s counsel and the Bank by virtue of a provision granting the Bank’s consent and permission for Angel’s law firm “to take any and all necessary and appropriate steps to collect the [Bank’s] Judgment.” Angel and the Bank do not claim an agency relationship with respect to the April 13 communications and state the contrary in briefing. To the extent the assignment created an agency relationship, which we do not consider, it would not have done so until the contract’s stated effective date of April 14. 44 Angel and the Bank are aligned in this proceeding and have filed joint briefing. Accordingly, in discussing the arguments on appeal, we refer to them collectively as Angel for convenience. 16 the Bank’s inconsistent action no later than when he had the assignment agreement in hand. With both a clear manifestation of intent not to move forward with the settlement offer and Tauch’s knowledge about the same, Angel contends that Tauch’s power of acceptance terminated before he exercised it. Echoing the dissenting opinion below, Angel maintains that the contract’s effective date does not compel a different result because the decisive criterion is inconsistency coupled with the offeree’s knowledge of the inconsistency, both of which are satisfied on the undisputed facts here. Tauch takes the position that (1) Texas does not recognize the implied-revocation doctrine; (2) even if it does, the doctrine only applies to offers for the sale or purchase of land; (3) if the doctrine is not limited to the real-estate context, the undisputed evidence negates an implied revocation because the assignment agreement’s terms were not unequivocally inconsistent with the Bank’s April 11 settlement offer; and (4) even if the Bank took inconsistent action, a reasonable person would not consider a third-party competitor’s claims about the Bank’s actions to be reliable enough to confer knowledge sufficient to effect a revocation. We reject Tauch’s arguments. Revocation by inconsistent action is firmly rooted in contract law without limitation to any specific contractual context. The touchstone of the doctrine is inconsistency, and that standard is met here. As explained below, the Bank’s action in assigning the judgment to Angel for collection is, in the words of Antwine, “some act inconsistent” with the settlement offer 45 and, in the words of Sections 42 and 43 of the 45 199 S.W.2d at 485. 17 Restatement, a definite action inconsistent with an intention to enter the proposed settlement transaction. 46 The court of appeals’ suggestion that only a presently enforceable contract would suffice is at odds with extant jurisprudence and learned treatises. While such a circumstance, if known to the offeree, would undoubtedly be sufficient to terminate the power of acceptance, our opinion in Antwine establishes that actions other than a preclusive alternative contract can suffice. Finally, although no revocation—express or implied—can be effective absent the offeree’s knowledge of any such manifestation of intent, Tauch’s receipt of the assignment agreement constitutes such notice. The assignment’s transmission to Tauch by a third party—even one who is a competitor for the judgment—does not render it unreliable as a manifestation of revocatory intent where there is neither evidence nor argument impugning the assignment’s authenticity. Whether a reasonable person would find statements made by Angel’s counsel reliable or not, the document speaks for itself. In arguing that Texas has never recognized implied revocation, Tauch conflates indirect communication with implied revocation. A revocation implied by the offeror’s actions may be 46RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 42 cmt. d (offeror need not expressly “revoke” an offer “[b]ut equivocal language may not be sufficient”), 43 & cmt. d (recognizing a valid revocation “when the offeror takes definite action inconsistent with an intention to enter into the proposed contract” but not when “the offeror takes no action or takes equivocal action”). But see 1 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 5:8 (stating that “equivocal or inexplicit language . . . may not be sufficient to operate as a revocation [and whether it does] will ordinarily be a question of fact, depending upon what a reasonable person in the position of the offeree would have thought” but citing a case where the only fact issues concerned actual satisfaction of conditions precedent and whether the offeree had knowledge before acceptance that the offeror had contracted with another party to sell the same property). 18 communicated either directly from the offeror to the offeree, as Antwine affirms, or through other channels if the information about the offeror’s actions is objectively reliable.
The implied-revocation doctrine dates at least as far back as the classic English contracts case of Dickinson v. Dodds, 47 which recognized that an offer need not be expressly withdrawn or retracted to terminate the power of acceptance. 48 There, an offer to sell improved real property was outstanding with a stated expiration date that had not yet come to pass when the putative buyer learned from his agent that the putative seller had offered or agreed to sell the property to someone else. 49 How the agent had acquired this information was not disclosed, 50 but on learning about this development, the buyer promptly hand-delivered his written acceptance to the seller’s abode and attempted to serve him with a duplicate as he entered a railway carriage. 51 Through these actions, the buyer endeavored to communicate his acceptance before the offer’s stated expiration date. 52 When approached, the seller declined to take 47 2 Ch. Div. 463 (1876). 48 Id. at 472. 49 Id. at 464. 50 Id. at 474 (“Then [the buyer] is informed by [his agent] that the property has been sold by [the seller to a third party]. [The agent] does not tell us from whom he heard it, but he says that he did hear it, that he knew it, and that he informed [the buyer] of it.”). 51 Id. at 464. 52 Id. 19 the written acceptance, declaring: “You are too late. I have sold the property.” 53 In adjudging the offer terminated before acceptance, Lord Justice James of the Court of Appeal in Chancery observed, “[T]here is neither principle nor authority for the proposition that there must be an express and actual withdrawal of the offer, or what is called a retractation.” 54 And while “one man is bound in some way or other to let the other man know that his mind with regard to the offer has been changed, . . . in this case, beyond all question, the [buyer] knew that [the seller] was no longer minded to sell the property to him as plainly and clearly as if [the seller] had told him in so many words, ‘I withdraw the offer.’” 55 The buyer, “knowing all the while that [the seller] had entirely changed his mind,” no longer had the power to accept the offer and no binding contract had come into being. 56 The Restatement recognizes Dickinson as a case involving indirect communication of revocation under Section 43. 57 Williston on Contracts describes Dickinson as “[t]he leading case” on indirect communication of revocation and notes that it “has generally been followed in the United States.” 58 Although Dickinson involved an offer to sell real property, the opinion does not suggest that the rule of implied revocation is limited to 53 Id. 54 Id. at 472. 55 Id. 56 Id. at 473. 57 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 43, Reporter’s Note cmt. b. 58 1 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 5:10. 20 that context. Rather, the analysis was rooted in the necessity of a meeting of the minds to form a binding contract. 59 To illustrate the point, Lord Justice Mellish, in announcing his agreement with the judgment, provided an example involving an offer to sell a particular horse where the offeror had, the next day, sold the horse to someone else. 60 Lord Justice Mellish found it “simply absurd” that if the offeree knows that the offeror “has sold the property to someone else, and that, in fact, he has not remained in the same mind to sell it to him, [that] he can be at liberty to accept the offer and thereby make a binding contract[.]” 61 Dickinson imposes no express constraint on the implied-revocation doctrine’s application to real-estate transactions, and one cannot reasonably be inferred. The same is true for Antwine. There, a bank had listed a parcel of land for sale with a real-estate broker. 62 The putative buyer, Reed, had authorized the bank’s broker to make an offer to purchase the land on his behalf. 63 The bank, in turn, made Reed a written, signed counteroffer, which conditioned acceptance on an earnest-money deposit. 64 Before Reed had accepted the counteroffer by depositing the earnest money (an express condition of acceptance), the bank instructed 59 Dickinson, 2 Ch. Div. at 473-75. 60 Id. at 474-75. 61 Id. at 474. 62 Antwine, 199 S.W.2d at 483-84. 63 Id. at 484. 64 Id. 21 the broker to take the property off the market. 65 After learning about the bank’s instruction from the broker, Reed attempted to accept the counteroffer by depositing the earnest money. 66 After articulating the principle that “‘[f]ormal notice [of revocation] . . . is not always necessary, it being sufficient that the person making the offer does some act inconsistent with it,’” 67 we held that Reed’s power of acceptance terminated when the broker told him that the bank had directed him to take the property off the market: According to the evidence the broker communicated with Reed concerning the transaction on or about the 27th or 28th of December, 1944, and advised Reed that the bank had directed him to take the land off the market. .... Thus it appears from the evidence offered by Reed that the proposal of the bank was never accepted in all of its terms by Reed until after Reed was advised of the bank’s instructions to the broker to take the land off the market. Under the evidence stated and the authorities cited we hold that Reed had received notice of the bank’s revocation of the proposed written contract before he had accepted it in all of its terms. Accordingly, there was no contract to sell the land between the parties. 68 Like Dickinson, Antwine is a real-estate case. And also like Dickinson, it erects no barrier to the implied-revocation doctrine’s 65 Id. at 486. 66 Id. 67 Id. at 485 (emphasis added) (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 50d). 68 Id. at 485-86 (recitation of the broker’s trial testimony omitted). 22 application to contracts generally. Not by word or by analytical underpinning. In fact, it seems that no jurisdiction has limited the doctrine to offers involving the sale of land, and to the contrary, many have applied it outside of that context. 69 For its part, the Restatement 69 See USHealth Grp., Inc. v. South, 636 F. App’x 194, 202-03 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that no agreement to arbitrate was formed where the purported offeree “did not accept the offer” before the purported offeror impliedly “revoked any offer that could have existed” by filing suit (citing Antwine, 199 S.W.2d at 485)); Varney Ent. Grp., Inc. v. Avon Plastics, Inc., 275 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 403 (Ct. App. 2021) (holding that a settlement offer was impliedly revoked by the offeror’s inconsistent offer to enter into a stipulated judgment (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 43)); Lasco v. Town of Winfield, 204 CV-467-PPS, 2007 WL 2349685, at  (N.D. Ind. Aug. 14, 2007) (holding that parties impliedly revoked their settlement offer prior to acceptance; although they never used words such as “withdrawn, revoked, or rescinded,” “the[] facts clearly demonstrate[d] that . . . Plaintiffs manifested their unwillingness to enter into the[] proposed settlement agreement”); see also Trs. of Teamsters Union Local No. 142 Pension Tr. Fund v. McAllister, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 948, 955 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (noting, in analyzing whether the parties had a valid settlement agreement, that “[a]ny act or communication that would cause a reasonable person to believe that an offer has been withdrawn or revoked is sufficient to constitute a withdrawal or revocation of the offer (no specific words or magic words are necessary)” (citing 1 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 5:8)); Gabriel v. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 3:06-CV-00192-TMB, 2008 WL 11284863, at  (D. Alaska Sept. 30, 2008), aff’d, 773 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 43 and holding offer to reinstate pension benefits was impliedly revoked by subsequent letter indicating offeror’s determination that offeree was never entitled to benefits); Abrams-Rodkey v. Summit Cnty. Child. Serv., 836 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (“A subsequent, inconsistent offer revokes an earlier offer. Thus, even if we find that the statement was intended to apply to all offers between SCCS and the union, a later, inconsistent offer—in this case, the offer to continue working—revokes the earlier offer.” (citations omitted)); Palmer v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 342 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding initial settlement offer was revoked by subsequent offer); Wilson v. Sand Mountain Funeral Home, Inc., 739 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (holding that an offer to buy stock was impliedly revoked by the offeror’s service of a lawsuit on the offeree); Norca Corp. v. Tokheim Corp., 227 A.D.2d 458, 458-59 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding that a subsequent offer to sell fuel pumps for a 23 acknowledges that the rule recognizing an indirect communication of an implied revocation “has been applied most frequently to offers for the sale of an interest in land,” while simultaneously observing that the rule’s animating principles are “equally applicable [but not limited] to offers to sell other specific property[.]” 70 We decline Tauch’s invitation to limit the implied-revocation doctrine’s application to certain transactions because no principle or authority supports doing so. 71 To the contrary, the necessity of a meeting of the minds is integral to the formation of any binding contract. 72 different price impliedly revoked a prior offer); Petterson v. Pattberg, 161 N.E. 428, 429-30 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that an offer to settle existing mortgage at a discount with a lump-sum payment was revoked when the mortgagee sold the note to a third party and informed the principal about that transaction (citing Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. 463 (1876))). 70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 43 cmt. b; see 1 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 5:10 (“The reported cases invariably involve land, though neither Restatement [First or Second] limits the application of the rule to offers to sell land.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 42 (AM. LAW INST. 1931) (“Where an offer is for the sale of an interest in land or in other things, if the offeror, after making the offer, sells or contracts to sell the interest to another person, and the offeree acquires reliable information of that fact, before he has exercised his power of creating a contract by acceptance of the offer, the offer is revoked.” (emphasis added)). 71 Tauch’s only authority for a contrary proposition, Winrow v. Discovery Ins. Co., No. COA06-1681, 2008 WL 565678, at  (N.C. Ct. App. 2008), cannot be read as proscriptively as he suggests. In that case, the court noted the absence of any North Carolina authority applying Dickinson’s rule outside the real-estate context and “decline[d] to extend” the rule “on the[] facts” of that particular case where the court had already determined that, as a threshold matter, there “was not a sufficiently definite action to revoke the [settlement] offer.” Id. See David J. Sacks, PC v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. 2008) (“A 72 meeting of the minds is necessary to form a binding contract.”). 24 That being the case, we turn now to the two essential components for a valid implied revocation: (1) inconsistent action and (2) communication. Both are in dispute here. The court of appeals disposed of the case on the ground that the Bank’s conduct in executing the assignment agreement did not imply a revocation, so the court did not consider whether the method by which Tauch learned about it was sufficient to terminate the power of acceptance.
In Antwine, the Court recognized the principle that the power of acceptance terminates when the offeree has knowledge that the offeror has undertaken “some act inconsistent” with the offer. 73 The opinion does not elaborate further. Sections 42 and 43 of the Restatement are comparatively more specific in requiring the offeror’s actions to be definite and clearly inconsistent with an intent to proceed with the proposed bargain. 74 In describing “what constitutes a revocation,” Section 42 states that “[a]ny clear manifestation of unwillingness to enter into the proposed bargain is sufficient. Thus a statement that property offered for sale has been otherwise disposed of is a revocation.” 75 But objectively “equivocal” language may be insufficient 73 Antwine, 199 S.W.2d at 485. 74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 42, 43. 75Id. § 42 cmt. d; see, e.g., Normile v. Miller, 326 S.E.2d 11, 18 (N.C. 1985) (“In this case, plaintiff-appellants received notice of the offeror’s revocation of the counteroffer in the afternoon of August 5, when Byer saw Normile and told him, ‘[Y]ou snooze, you lose; the property has been sold.’”); Bancroft v. Martin, 109 So. 859, 860 (Miss. 1926) (“The contract for the sale of the land entered into by the Martins with Rennyson and Passera, which came to the knowledge of the appellant before he attempted to accept the Martins’ 25 to effect a revocation 76 or may create a fact issue about “what a reasonable person in the position of the offeree would have thought.” 77 offer of sale, constituted a revocation thereof.”); Wm. Weisman Realty Co. v. Cohen, 195 N.W. 898, 899 (Minn. 1923) (“We think that such offer, based upon no consideration, is revoked by a sale with notice.”); Watters v. Lincoln, 135 N.W. 712, 715 (S.D. 1912) (“[P]laintiff should not be permitted to recover in this action for the reason that prior to the time he sent his night message of acceptance he was aware of the fact that defendant had sold and disposed of the land in question, thereby making it impossible for defendant to make a sale thereof to plaintiff.”); Thurber v. Smith, 54 A. 790, 791 (R.I. 1903) (“The fact of a sale would show that the person giving the notice no longer had the power to carry out the offer. If such was not the purpose of the notice, it would be meaningless. We think that its purpose and effect was a revocation of the defendant’s offer.”). 76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 cmt. d (stating that equivocal language “may not be sufficient”). Compare Bovino v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 13-CV-02111-MSK-MJW, 2015 WL 13612169, at  (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2015) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 illus. 4 (offeror’s statement did not effect a revocation where it was “equivocal enough to suggest that the proposed bargain may yet be entered into”), with Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Clements Paper Co., 241 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tenn. 1951) (offer revoked where offeror’s agent informed offeree that “he didn’t think they were going through with the proposal. . . . That they had other plans in mind and he would let me know. He was not sure if he was going through with the original proposition.”), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 illus. 5 (offer is revoked where offeror informs offeree “Well, I don’t know if we are ready. We have not decided, we might not want to go through with it.”). 77 1 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 5:8 (“[I]f the offeror uses equivocal or inexplicit language, it may not be sufficient to operate as a revocation. Whether it has that effect will ordinarily be a question of fact, depending upon what a reasonable person in the position of the offeree would have thought.” (citing Stone Mountain Props., Ltd. v. Helmer, 229 S.E.2d 779 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976), which held that whether the offeree knew that the property had been sold was a fact question, and other cases where no fact issue existed and revocation was determined as a matter of law)); cf. BPX Operating Co. v. Strickhausen, 629 S.W.3d 189, 198, 202-03 (Tex. 2021) (applying an “unequivocally inconsistent” test with respect to implied ratification contrary to the express terms of the parties’ existing contract and finding a fact issue 26 Section 43 similarly gives effect to “definite” action inconsistent with an intent to proceed with the offer, explaining that the rule “does not apply to cases where the offeror takes no action or takes equivocal action.” 78 Examples of actions that are insufficient to revoke a prior offer are said to include “mere negotiations with a third person”; “a definite offer to a second offeree” that is consistent with an intent to honor the outstanding offer; and “[e]ven a binding contract with a third person [made] expressly subject to any rights arising under the outstanding offer.” 79 The implied-revocation standard quoted in Antwine is not stated in such terms, but there, the offeror’s actions (as reported to the offeree) would satisfy the Restatement’s formulation because taking property off the about intent to alter the parties’ bargain arising from the party’s objective manifestations of intent). 78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 43 & cmt. d; see 1 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 5:10 (“If the offeror has not in fact engaged in the reported conduct, or if the conduct engaged in is equally consistent with an intent to deal with the offeree as with some other individual, the offer is not deemed to be revoked.”). 79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 43 cmt. d; see Nott v. Superior Ct., 204 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1103 (Ct. App. 1988) (“Statements at an arbitration regarding the value and disposition of a case are directed to the resolution of the matter by an adjudication by the arbitrator. They do not address the resolution of the matter by contract. Hence, they manifest no intention to reject or revoke the outstanding section 998 offer. We see no inconsistency between continued contemplation of contractual resolution while putting one’s best foot forward in the adjudicative proceeding.”); Mitchell v. Brimer, 1987 WL 5319, at  (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 1987) (“The mere fact that the seller is entertaining another offer, without more, will not give rise to a mandatory inference that the seller no longer intends to accept a potential buyer’s then outstanding offer.”); S. Oil Co. v. Wilson, 56 S.W. 429, 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ) (offeror’s sale of its stock did not impliedly revoke offer to sell real and personal property because the stock sale did not divest the offeror of the title to the property, so no inconsistency existed). 27 market for sale is definite action clearly inconsistent with an intent to sell it. Here, the Bank’s agreement with Angel constitutes a revocatory act because it is “some act inconsistent” with the offer to release the judgment and is definite action clearly inconsistent with an intent to go forward with that offer. The court of appeals erroneously concluded that Tauch retained the power of acceptance because “an assignment agreement that would not take effect until April 14 is not an action that would prevent the bank’s [offer] from materializing into a contract with Tauch should he accept the proposal before April 14.” 80 The court’s reliance on the agreement’s effective date was misplaced for a couple of reasons. First, inconsistent action need not rise to the level of a binding contract with a third party to manifest revocatory intent. Second, the existence of such a contract, even executory in nature, suffices. The dispositive issue is not the offeror’s ability to enter the proposed bargain but continued willingness to do so. Taking action that renders the offeror unable to consummate the deal obviously bears on willingness to do the deal, so a binding contract for the same subject matter may objectively speak to the offeror’s intent. But so too could an invalid contract with a third party 81 or even actions without the existence of any other contract at all. 82 80 580 S.W.3d at 817. See Palmer v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 341-42 81 (Ct. App. 2003). See, e.g., Antwine v. Reed, 199 S.W.2d 482, 485-86 (Tex. 1947) (offer 82 to sell land was revoked by action of instructing real estate broker to take property of the market); Norca Corp. v. Tokheim Corp., 227 A.D.2d 458, 458-59 28 The facts in Antwine are illustrative. There, although the offeror had indeed entered a contract to sell the property to a third party, the only information that had been communicated to the offeree was that the offeror had instructed his agent to take the property off the market. 83 Though not contractual in nature, we held that this action was sufficient to impliedly revoke the prior offer. 84 Importantly, taking the property off the market would not have prevented the offeror from honoring the offer, yet the power of acceptance terminated because that action manifested the offeror’s intent not to sell the property to the offeree. Another illuminating aspect of our analysis is the conclusion that, even though the bank’s contract with the third party was executory in nature, the vendee could nonetheless enforce it against the bank’s successor for specific performance: “One who, with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the executory contract acquires the legal title under or through a deed or mortgage executed by the vendor subsequently to (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (offer stating different terms of sale from original outstanding offer revoked the prior offer because the price terms were inconsistent); Wilson v. Sand Mountain Funeral Home, Inc., 739 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (“Sand Mountain’s action in suing Wilson regarding his alleged wrongful acquisition of stock and intentional devaluation of stock constitutes a ‘definite action inconsistent with an intention to enter into the proposed contract’ [to purchase Wilson’s stock shares for $25 each]. Thus, Wilson’s power of acceptance was terminated when he was served with the lawsuit.”(citations omitted)). 83 Antwine, 199 S.W.2d at 484 & 486 (recounting that “[t]he first notice Reed had of the bank’s revocation of its offer to him was communicated by the broker on or about the 28th day of December, 1944,” which was to the effect that the “property was off the market”). 84 Id. at 486. 29 an executory contract for the sale of the land . . . , may be compelled, at the suit of the vendee under the executory contract, to perform the contract by conveying the legal title, if the conditions are such that such relief could have been granted against the vendor if he had not transferred the legal title.” 85 That is to say, even though the terms of the agreement contemplated future performance by one or both parties, it was nonetheless binding. By the same token, when a party binds itself to an executory contract with a future effective date, it is bound to that agreement. Under our precedent, and as articulated in the Restatement, the relevant inquiry is not “whether the Bank took action that would prevent the offer from materializing into a contract” but whether “a reasonable person, in the position of the offeree, would regard the offer as withdrawn.” 86 The focus is on the offeror’s objective manifestations of intent. 87 Applying that standard to the undisputed facts in this case, the assignment agreement objectively manifests the Bank’s intent to pursue other collection methods (as foreshadowed in Holden’s April 11 email) instead of settling with Tauch and releasing the judgment. As 85 Id. at 485 (quoting Langley v. Norris, 173 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex. 1943)). 86 1 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 5:10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 42 cmt. b (“[T]he offeree is 87 justified in relying on the offeror’s manifested intention regardless of any undisclosed change in the offeror’s state of mind.”), 43 cmt. a (indirectly communicated revocation is subject to the same qualifications as a directly communicated revocation); 1 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 5:9 (“[N]o case goes so far as to hold that a change of mind on the part of the offeror, not manifested by an overt act, will operate as a revocation.”). 30