Opinion ID: 2982483
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Breach of Immunity Agreement

Text: Darwich next argues the district court erred in determining that he breached his immunity agreement with the Government. Two main types of immunity the Government may offer a suspect in return for his disclosure of information are transactional immunity and use immunity. Transactional immunity “is full immunity from prosecution for any offenses to which [the suspect’s] testimony relates.” United States v Fitch, 964 F.2d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In contrast, use immunity precludes only the use of the suspect’s statements in a prosecution against him. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). An immunity agreement granting a defendant use immunity is commonly referred to as a Kastigar agreement. “The conditions that will constitute a breach of the immunity agreement are governed by the agreement itself.” Fitch, 964 F.2d at 574 (citation omitted). The Government bears the burden of proving a breach, and 9 Darwich also argues that the district court should have conducted a hearing on his fair-cross section claim. However, the cases he cites in support require a hearing on Batson challenges, not on fair-cross section claims. See United States v. McAllister, 693 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d 542, 559 (6th Cir. 2008). 16 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 the breach must be material and substantial. Id. (citation omitted). “Although an inadvertent omission or oversight would not rise to the level of a materially false statement so as to constitute a breach of the agreement, a bad faith, intentional, substantial omission . . . does constitute a materially false statement and thereby a breach of an agreement.” Id. (citation omitted). On May 13, 2009, Darwich signed a document granting him some level of immunity from prosecution. On May 22, 2009, FBI agents interviewed Darwich. Thereafter, Darwich was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit arson and two counts of arson. Darwich moved to dismiss the indictment, or in the alternative limit the admissibility of any statement he made to law enforcement at the May 22nd meeting, on the ground that he believed the Government granted him transactional immunity. The district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine: (1) the type of immunity agreement that existed between the Government and Darwich; and (2) whether Darwich breached that immunity agreement. The Government argued that the document Darwich signed on May 13th was a Kastigar agreement granting him use immunity and that Darwich breached that agreement by making materially false statements and omissions during his May 22nd proffer. Darwich attempted to establish that he signed a document granting him transactional immunity. He argued that the Government conspired with his counsel to either forge his signature on a separate Kastigar agreement or change the substance of the transactional immunity agreement after he signed it. The district court ultimately determined that the agreement Darwich signed on May 13th was a Kastigar letter granting him use immunity and that Darwich failed to prove the existence 17 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 of a transactional immunity agreement. Thus, it denied Darwich’s motion to dismiss.10 The district court then determined that Darwich substantially and materially breached that Kastigar agreement by intentionally making false statements and omitting relevant facts during his May 22nd proffer. Following multiple motions by Darwich challenging these determinations, the district court granted the Government’s motion in limine preventing Darwich from discussing the alleged transactional immunity agreement at trial. Darwich now argues the district court erred in determining that he was not granted transactional immunity and in finding that he breached whatever immunity agreement he did have. Repeating the same argument he made before the district court, he first contends the Government granted him transactional immunity. Because he does not cogently develop an argument to that effect, however, we decline to disturb the district court’s finding that the only immunity agreement that existed between Darwich and the Government was that for use immunity as outlined in the Kastigar letter. Darwich next argues the district court erred in finding that he substantially and materially breached his immunity agreement. It did not. The Kastigar agreement required Darwich to “make a complete and truthful statement of his knowledge of (and role in) the matters under investigation, and to fully and truthfully answer all questions.” It explicitly clarified that Darwich “may not omit facts about crimes, other participants, or his [ ] involvement in the offenses, and must volunteer all information that is reasonably related to the subjects discussed in the debriefing.” In exchange for such disclosure, the Government would not offer any of 10 Darwich later moved to dismiss the Fourth Superseding Indictment on the same grounds, which the district court also denied. 18 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 Darwich’s statements in its case-in-chief in any criminal prosecution of Darwich for the matters under investigation. If Darwich failed “to provide truthful and complete information (such as by making a false statement, providing false information, omitting facts or otherwise misleading the government),” there would be no restrictions on the Government’s use of any of his statements. In other words, if Darwich breached the agreement, he would no longer enjoy immunity. The district court found that Darwich breached the agreement by: (1) failing to provide information regarding his alias, Abdullah Derbas; (2) intentionally lying to or misleading agents regarding their investigation into the marriage of Fatima Toufaili11 and the paternity of her eldest child; (3) intentionally omitting or downplaying Toufaili’s involvement in the arsons; (4) failing to provide any information regarding the involvement of “Tony,” “Playboy,” Rabih Ali, Mazen Mazraani, and possibly others; (5) failing to volunteer details regarding all of the properties involved in the various arsons; and (6) misrepresenting his business. The district court also pointed to Darwich’s tape recorded post-proffer admissions to his wife that he had lied to the Government as evidence that Darwich did in fact breach the agreement by lying to federal officials. Citing Fitch, 964 F.2d at 571, Darwich argues that his lies were just a thinly veiled attempt to minimize his involvement in the scheme, which he maintains does not constitute a substantial material breach. Fitch is distinguishable. In Fitch, we found that the defendant did not substantially and materially breach his immunity agreement where his false implication of another as the source of a drug deal was nothing more than an effort to minimize his involvement 11 Fatima Toufaili is Darwich’s wife and co-defendant. 19 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723 and that the Government was not misled by his untruths. Id. at 574–75. Even assuming Darwich’s misrepresentations similarly did not constitute a substantial material breach, that does not render clearly erroneous the district court’s finding that his omissions did. Moreover, we emphasized in Fitch that the defendant’s fabrication was not sufficient to constitute a substantial material breach because he supplied the Government with a substantial amount of incriminating information and assisted the investigation in other ways. Id. In other words, we found that although defendant’s fabrications were a technical breach of the agreement, they were insufficient to constitute a substantial material breach because the Government still “received the benefit of its bargain.” Id. at 575. Darwich does not demonstrate a similar result here and neither does our review of the record. Accordingly, to the extent Darwich challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged immunity agreement, we find that the district court’s determination that he substantially and materially breached his Kastigar agreement was not clearly erroneous. See id. at 574 (applying the clearly erroneous standard to review of district court’s decision as to whether the defendant breached his immunity agreement). To the extent Darwich challenges the district court’s order granting the Government’s motion in limine precluding him from discussing the alleged transactional immunity agreement at trial, we cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in preventing discussion of an immunity agreement that it found did not exist. See Abboud, 438 F.3d at 579 (reviewing evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion). We therefore decline to vacate Darwich’s conviction and sentence on this ground. 20 United States v. Darwich Case No. 13-1723