Opinion ID: 195333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Murphy Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: 39 As a threshold matter, two arguments advanced by Timberlane on the merits have been foreclosed by our recent decision in Pihl v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 9 F.3d 184 (1st Cir.1993), recognizing a compensatory education claim under the IDEA, id. at 187-89, notwithstanding that the student was beyond the eligible age for a free education under state law, id. at 189-90. Thus, two further issues remain unaddressed.
40 The district court held Timberlane liable for failing to fulfill its section 1125 responsibility either to present an acceptable IEP or seek administrative enforcement. The district court simply applied our own straightforward construction of section 1125: 41 In New Hampshire, if the parents disagree with a proposed IEP and the local educational agency feels it would be in the best interest of the child to implement the IEP, the local agency is required to initiate administrative procedures to obtain permission from a hearing officer to implement the IEP. N.H.Code Admin.R.Ed. 1125.01(b)(3)-b. No such procedures were ever initiated by Timberlane. 42 Murphy I, 973 F.2d at 17 (footnote omitted & emphasis added). Under section 1125, the school district must take the initiative to ensure that intransigence and foot-dragging in the IEP process, whether bureaucratic or parental, do not indefinitely compromise the child's right to a free and appropriate public education. See, e.g., W.G., 960 F.2d at 1486 (parental conduct does not waive responsibility of school district); Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 795 (1st Cir.1984) (same), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). 43 Timberlane's primary argument on appeal is that an IDEA claim, a federal cause of action, cannot be premised on a violation of a state administrative regulation. 12 Its argument overlooks the IDEA framework and our case law. The IDEA invests expansive discretion in the states to structure implementing procedures and enforcement mechanisms, thereby constructively incorporating duly promulgated state regulations: 44 [S]tate standards, be they substantive or procedural, that exceed the federal basic floor of meaningful, beneficial educational opportunity.... will operate to determine what an appropriate education requires for a particular child in a given state. 45 Id. at 789 (footnotes omitted); accord David D., 775 F.2d at 417 (1st Cir.1985) (it is beyond cavil that the federal [IDEA] standard explicitly incorporates certain state standards); Doe v. Board of Educ. of Tullahoma City Sch., 9 F.3d 455, 457 (6th Cir.1993) (same, citing cases). It is plainly true, of course, as Timberlane argues, that not every procedural irregularity gives rise to liability under the IDEA. Nevertheless, procedural inadequacies [that have] compromised the pupil's right to an appropriate education ... or caused a deprivation of educational benefits are the stuff of successful IDEA actions. Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir.1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 912, 111 S.Ct. 1122, 113 L.Ed.2d 230 (1991). And that is exactly what happened here. 46 We emphasized in Murphy I that whereas parents are entitled to request a hearing if they disagree with an IEP, state regulations impose upon Timberlane not only the right, but the obligation to do the same. 973 F.2d at 17 (emphasis in original). 13 Thus, by its longstanding procedural lapse in failing to initiate administrative review as required under section 1125, Timberlane abdicated its responsibility to terminate the IEP impasse preventing Kevin's access to a free and appropriate education. We think a procedural default which permits a disabled child's entitlement to a free and appropriate education to go unmet for two years constitutes sufficient ground for liability under the IDEA. See, e.g., W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484 (when severe procedural flaws infect IEP process an action lies under IDEA); Roland M., 910 F.2d at 994 (same); Mrs. C., 916 F.2d at 72-73 (same); cf. Hampton Sch. Dist. v. Dobrowolski, 976 F.2d 48, 53-54 (1st Cir.1992) (technical IDEA violations may be insufficient to warrant setting aside IEP).
47 Lastly, Timberlane claims that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment as to whether: (1) Kevin's parents were intransigent and at least partly responsible for interrupting Kevin's education, and (2) the educational services Timberlane provided from 1985 to 1989 were more than appropriate, and thus compensated for the educational loss occasioned during 1982-84. The party resisting summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the ... pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). There is no trialworthy issue unless there is sufficient competent evidence to enable a finding favorable to the opposing party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 48 A painstaking review of the entire record has not disclosed, nor does Timberlane identify, any evidence sufficient to generate a genuine factual issue as to either contention, even assuming their materiality. 14 Instead, consistent with its prior strategy, Timberlane elected to try to fend off summary judgment through recourse to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), which permits a party to establish, by affidavit, that evidence which would demonstrate a trialworthy issue is for some valid reason unavailable. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice pp 56.22-56.24 (1993). Timberlane relied entirely on its contention, unsubstantiated by the required affidavit, 15 that it needed an opportunity to conduct discovery to reconstruct [the] chronology [of Kevin's education] and to fill in critical gaps about events which occurred before, during and after the years in question[,] and to depose the out-of-state witnesses. 49 The district court rejected Timberlane's Rule 56(f) initiative, on the ground that the evidence adduced at the hearing on the laches defense demonstrated that Timberlane had made no serious effort to present its putative evidence. The court accordingly ruled that Timberlane could not take refuge from summary judgment under Rule 56(f) since the memories of its witnesses were available for affidavit purposes in opposition to the Murphys' motion for summary judgment. The Rule 56(f) determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 294, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1595, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). We find none. 50 In March of 1993, more than one month after the evidentiary hearing on the laches defense, the district court entered a scheduling order requiring the parties to submit law and/or evidence on the merits of the compensatory education claim--thereby plainly signaling its intention to proceed beyond the procedural defenses interposed by Timberlane. Shortly thereafter the Murphys filed their motion for summary judgment. Thus, although it had clear notice that the district court would proceed to the merits, Timberlane made the strategic decision to persist with its litigation position, viz., that it could not provide evidence because its witnesses (or their memories) were unavailable. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to credit or revisit the flawed premise underlying Timberlane's Rule 56(f) motion. III