Opinion ID: 4402103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: lobbying restrictions

Text: Before addressing the merits, we consider whether the legislators have standing to assert challenges to the four ethics provisions governing only the conduct of lobbyists. If the Nos. 17-6456/6505 Schickel, et al. v. Dilger, et al. Page 5 legislators cannot establish constitutional standing, “their claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 505 F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing standing, and they must support each element “in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at successive stages of the litigation.” Fair Elections Ohio v. Husted, 770 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). The legislators may not rely on mere allegations, but “must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts” to show standing. McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 867 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). “[T]he nature and extent of facts that must be averred . . . to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. When he is, “there is ordinarily little question” that the plaintiff has standing. Id. at 561–62. But when he is not—when his “asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation . . . of someone else”—we require much more. Id. at 562. In such circumstances, “causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction.” Id.; ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989) (noting that plaintiff’s ability to satisfy the essential elements of standing “depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict”). The burden therefore falls on the plaintiff to present facts showing that the third party’s “choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. This does not preclude a showing of standing, but it ordinarily makes it “‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.” Id. (citation omitted); see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975). The legislators face an uphill climb: they are not the object of the lobbying restrictions. But the legislators can establish standing from the operation of these lobbying restrictions; that is, by showing that a restriction has been applied to a lobbyist, his employer, or a PAC—or imminently will be—and “ha[s] caused or will imminently cause” plaintiffs’ concrete injury. See Tenn. Republican Party v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 863 F.3d 507, 520 (6th Cir. 2017). Here, the Nos. 17-6456/6505 Schickel, et al. v. Dilger, et al. Page 6 legislators claim the operation of these statutes infringe their right to associate, “receive information,” and “receive[] contributions.” An individual’s right to associate, “broadly defined” by the Supreme Court, includes “the ancillary right of the candidate to ‘amas[s] the resources necessary for effective advocacy.’” Frank v. City of Akron, 290 F.3d 813, 818 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 396–97 (2000)). Thus, the legislators could also prove injury by showing that the challenged laws “w[ere] so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless.” Shrink, 528 U.S. at 397. Affidavits from Schickel and Watson do not establish an injury from the operation of the contribution ban or regular session contribution ban. Even assuming a right to receive contributions, compare Dean v. Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[A]lthough Randall did not recognize a First Amendment right to receive campaign contributions, its analysis did not foreclose such recognition.”), with Interpipe Contracting, Inc. v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 879, 894 (9th Cir. 2018) (“But while the First Amendment protects the right of an individual to express herself through the medium of finance, it does not establish a free-floating right to receive the funds necessary to broadcast one’s speech.”), the legislators have not shown these restrictions have caused or imminently will cause them injury. Because they have not done so, “by affidavit or other evidence,” they lack standing to challenge these lobbying restrictions. See McKay, 823 F.3d at 867. The legislators offer no affidavit from a lobbyist or his employer regarding these restrictions, and they fail to provide evidence that a specific lobbyist, his employer, or a PAC attempted to help in ways proscribed by the provisions—e.g., serve as treasurer, solicit contributions, or make a contribution—but was turned away due to the lobbying restrictions. The lack of such evidence dooms their claims. See Tenn. Republican Party, 863 F.3d at 517 (“[T]here is no reason why Petitioners could not have put forth an affidavit from a particular municipal advisor professional who would have contributed more than $250 were it not for the 2016 Amendments.”); Lavin v. Husted, 689 F.3d 543, 545–47 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that Medicaid providers had standing to challenge a law that did not punish them because they had “attempted to contribute” to a state Attorney General candidate who “refused to accept their contributions, citing Ohio law”). Nos. 17-6456/6505 Schickel, et al. v. Dilger, et al. Page 7 Instead, Schickel and Watson offer their own affidavits, stating their belief that others would like to violate the restrictions. Schickel asserted that, if not for the contribution restrictions, he “would accept campaign donations[] from employers of lobbyists” and “from certain registered lobbyists . . . whose values I share.” R. 65-2, Schickel Aff. ¶¶ 26, 27. Mirroring Schickel’s affidavit, Watson averred that “I would, if not prohibited, accept donations from [two organizations], and would also accept, if not prohibited, donations on behalf of the lobbyists that lobby for them.” R. 65-3, Watson Aff. ¶ 37. But the assurance that both would accept such contributions means nothing in the absence of an affidavit or other evidence establishing that such contributions were attempted or would be in the imminent future. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2) (“[I]mminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, [but] it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.”). As for the provision that bans gifts by lobbyists, the legislators’ statements fall short. Both attested that, before this law’s enactment, they “would not hesitate to take a meeting at a lobbyist’s office.” R. 65-2, Schickel Aff. ¶ 29; R. 65-3, Watson Aff. ¶ 39. After the 2014 amendment removed the de minimis exception, however, both fear doing so, since “sitting in an air conditioned office” or “receiving a piece of paper to take notes” could be considered “something of value.” R. 65-2, Schickel Aff. ¶ 29; R. 65-3, Watson Aff. ¶ 39. But the legislators cannot manufacture standing by “inflicting harm on themselves based on their fear of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416. According to Schickel, he “used to take turns buying the soda or cup of coffee” with constituents and lobbyists but now does so with only constituents “given the rules in place,” R. 65-2, Schickel Aff. ¶ 28, but this alleged injury hinges entirely “on the unfettered choices made” by lobbyists to purchase coffee for him, Kadish, 490 U.S. at 615. This statement offers little more than Schickel’s own guess as to why legislators have stopped purchasing coffee for him (perhaps they prefer the new status quo), and thus fails to adduce facts sufficient to show that the choice not to buy him coffee can be fairly traced to this provision. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 567 (“Standing is not ‘an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.’” (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973))). Nos. 17-6456/6505 Schickel, et al. v. Dilger, et al. Page 8 The legislators’ affidavits also fall short on the solicitation/treasurer restriction. Each includes just the lone statement referencing an injury: “[I] would like to have a legislative agent serve as my campaign treasurer, and I am aware of legislative agents that would like to solicit others to make campaign donations to me, but cannot under the current legislative ethics scheme.” R. 65-2, Schickel Aff. ¶ 33; R. 65-3, Watson Aff. ¶ 42. This is not the proof needed at summary judgment. Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 45 F.3d 126, 127 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding at summary judgment stage that plaintiff lacked standing because she “merely asserted a general complaint that an unidentified candidate that she may want to vote for may not be eligible to run for that office”). Last, we turn to the legislators’ suggestion that “receiving donations and giving of donations are two sides of the same coin,” such that a party who has standing to challenge one has standing to challenge the other. Appellee Br. at 59. But in the one case they cite for this proposition, the political committee and lobbyist acquired standing to challenge the restricting of soliciting by legislators based on showing that the provision injured them rather than the legislators or candidates. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1999). In the absence of specific evidence supporting standing to challenge the lobbying restrictions, the legislators may not.