Opinion ID: 7042
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Barbara Hardaway

Text: The crux of East's Brady claim with regard to Hardaway is that the state failed to disclose that she has an extensive history of severe mental illness and numerous felony and misdemeanor convictions. During the sentencing phase of East's trial, Hardaway testified that East robbed and brutally raped her approximately three months before Sear's murder. She also testified that East threatened to kill her and confessed to murdering several other women. East contends that he could have effectively impeached Hardaway's testimony with evidence of her mental illness. East's habeas petition includes a copy of a mental status report on Hardaway that was in existence at the time of East's trial. This amend his petition to add his due process claim. Because East raises this claim for the first time on appeal, we decline to address its merits. Taylor v. Green, 868 F.2d 162 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 841 (1989). 11 report was apparently prepared as part of a competency hearing before a state district court in Bexar County, Texas, where Hardaway was under indictment for burglary. The report states that Hardaway experienced bizarre sexual hallucinations and that she believed that unidentified individuals were attempting to kill her. Significantly, the report concludes that Hardaway was incapable of distinguishing between reality and the fantasies caused by her hallucinations. The report concluded that Hardaway was mentally incompetent to stand trial on the burglary charge.5 Given the importance of Hardaway's testimony to the prosecution's case during sentencing, her mental records are likely material as impeachment evidence because they cast doubt on the accuracy of her testimony. The state concedes that Hardaway was a critical witness for the prosecution. In contrast to the prosecution's other sentencing-phase witnesses, Hardaway provided the jury with evidence of other unadjudicated murders committed by East. Indeed, the prosecution referred to Hardaway's testimony at least three times during closing arguments. Under these circumstances, we disagree with the state's assertion that East's ability to effectively impeach Hardaway is immaterial because it would not undermine the remainder of the state's case at sentencing. See Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1042 (5th Cir. 1985)(observing that the effective impeachment of a crucial witness has consequences for the prosecution's case far exceeding the effect on that witness). 5 Hardaway was declared competent to stand trial several months later. However, the state dismissed the burglary charge. In exchange, Hardaway pled guilty to criminal trespass. 12 Even if Hardaway's mental records are material impeachment evidence, however, East fails to allege any facts suggesting that the prosecution knew about these records. Our review of the record reveals no evidence that would have put the prosecution on notice that Hardaway was mentally ill. Mere speculative and conclusory allegations that the district attorney might have known about Hardaway's condition are not, however, sufficient to entitle East to discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d at 1367. East alternatively argues that the prosecution had a duty to investigate Hardaway's mental records and, therefore, should be deemed to have knowledge of any exculpatory evidence that a reasonable investigation would have revealed. In United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1980), we held that the prosecution is deemed to have knowledge of any criminal history information pertaining to its witnesses that would be revealed by a routine check of FBI and state crime databases, including a witness' state rap sheet. The court based its holding on its recognition that the prosecution has ready access to certain types of information that are often crucial to the defense. We therefore concluded that the prosecution should bear the burden of obtaining and disclosing the criminal history of its witnesses in the interests of inherent fairness. Id. (quoting Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 223 (5th Cir. 1975)). We disagree, however, with East's contention that a prosecutor's duty to investigate a witness' criminal history extends to a witness' mental history. Neither Auten nor any of the 13 other cases cited by East impose this duty on the prosecution. East fails to show how mental records are any more accessible to the prosecution than to the defense. Typically, mental health records are subject to strict privacy regulations that restrict access.6 East's argument thus runs afoul of other decisions by this court holding that Brady does not place any burden upon the Government to conduct a defendant's investigation or assist in the presentation of the defense's case. United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1000 (1990). We therefore decline East's invitation to extend our holding in Auten to the mental records of prosecution witnesses. East's argument that the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose Hardaway's criminal history presents a more difficult question. The record shows that, at the time of East's trial, Hardaway had been convicted of four felonies: three convictions for check forgeries and one conviction for delivery of marijuana. The record also shows that Hardaway had been convicted of at least two misdemeanors: one conviction for prostitution and one conviction for petty theft. Under Auten, the prosecution was deemed to have 6 In fact, Texas law restricts the disclosure of mental health records. Section 611.002 of the Texas Health and Safety Code provides: Communications between a patient and a professional, and records of the identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient that are created or maintained by a professional, are confidential. Section 611.004 provides that a mental health professional may disclose mental health records to law enforcement personnel only if there is a probability of imminent physical injury by the patient to the patient or others or there is a probability of immediate mental or emotional injury to the patient. 14 knowledge of these convictions and any other facts relevant to Hardaway's criminal history that would have been revealed through a routine FBI check and a review of her state rap sheet. 632 F.2d at 480. Whether the prosecution's failure to disclose Hardaway's criminal history violates Brady, however, turns on its materiality as impeachment evidence. East contends that he would have investigated Hardaway's criminal history and eventually uncovered Hardaway's mental records in the files of the Bexar County district court if the prosecution had disclosed Hardaway's rap sheet. Whether Hardaway's rap sheet would have led to her mental records turns on the nature and extent of the information contained in her rap sheet at the time of East's trial. For example, if Hardaway's rap sheet reveals her burglary indictment in Bexar County, this information may well have led East to the record of Hardaway's competency hearing held in connection with this charge. Hardaway's state rap sheet is not, however, in the record. East specifically requested Hardaway's rap sheet, but the district court denied his request. Because Hardaway's criminal records are critical to resolving East's Brady claim, we conclude that the district court erred in refusing East's discovery request pertaining to these records. On remand, the district court should therefore grant East reasonable discovery on his Brady claim, including production of Hardaway's rap sheet. As with East's due process claim, the court will have an opportunity after discovery to determine whether East's Brady claim presents genuine issues of disputed fact. If no 15 factual issues remain after discovery, the district court may determine the materiality of Hardaway's criminal history as a matter of law without the need for an evidentiary hearing. Tijerina v. Thornburgh, 884 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1989); see also MattaBallesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 258-59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990)(holding that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because discovery placed all the facts essential to deciding the petitioner's claim before the court).