Opinion ID: 2518344
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the follow-up investigation report material?

Text: The third element of a Brady claim is that the suppressed evidence be material, for not every nondisclosure of favorable evidence denies due process. ( In re Brown, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 884, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 952 P.2d 715.) [T]he prosecution has no general duty to seek out, obtain, and disclose all evidence that might be beneficial to the defense ( In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 135, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 851 P.2d 42), since the Constitution is not violated every time the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the defense. ( Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 436-437, 115 S.Ct. 1555.) Rather, a violation occurs `only if there is a reasonable probability that, had [it] been disclosed to the defense, the result ... would have been different.' [Citations.] The requisite `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to `undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome' on the part of the reviewing court. ( In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 544, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527.) In general, impeachment evidence has been found to be material where the witness at issue `supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to the crime,' United States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.1987); see also Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. [150,] 154-55, 92 S.Ct. [763,] 766 [31 L.Ed.2d 104] [(1972)] ( Brady violation found where government failed to disclose promise not to prosecute cooperating witness on whom government's case against defendant `almost entirely' depended), or where the likely impact on the witness's credibility would have undermined a critical element of the prosecution's case, see United States v. Badalamente, 507 F.2d 12, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1974) (same re nondisclosure of `hysterical' letters that would have had `powerful adverse effect' on witness's credibility, where that credibility was `crucial to the determination of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence'); cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911, 95 S.Ct. 1565, 43 L.Ed.2d 776 (1975). In contrast, a new trial is generally not required when the testimony of the witness is `corroborated by other testimony,' United States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d at 89 ...; [citation]; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766 (new trial not required where newly discovered evidence is merely `possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict'). ( U.S. v. Payne (2d Cir.1995) 63 F.3d 1200, 1210.) Petitioner asserts that [w]ithout [Dr. Ribe's] testimony, the prosecution could not effectively connect [him] with the time frame in which the baby suffered the injuries that resulted in her death, but this claim is belied by the record. Dr. Ribe's testimony was not the only evidence linking petitioner to the crime, since his opinion that the death was nonaccidental was corroborated by Dr. Gilbert Mellin, the radiologist; by Dr. Dorothy Calvin, the pediatric ophthalmologist; and by Dr. Harold Lowder, who treated Adriana when she arrived at the emergency room. Dr. Ribe's opinion concerning the timing of the injuries was corroborated by Dr. Lowder, who testified that Adriana's symptoms, including loss of consciousness, would have appeared immediately. Indeed, the People could have obtained the same testimony from additional witnessesincluding the chief medical examiner, Dr. Sathyavagiswaranwho could not have been impeached by the Helms investigation. Petitioner's guilt was also established by his inconsistent accounts of what happened during the period he was alone with Adriana. He gave conflicting reports as to when Adriana started vomiting; whether Adriana knocked the spoon out of his hands and spit or threw food at him; whether he lifted her up, tossed her in the air, or shook her before she vomited; and whether she was fine before he started feeding her. These inconsistencies substantially undermined petitioner's attempt to shift the blame to others. (See People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 450, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Petitioner's guilt was additionally supported by the inconsistency between his account of what occurred and the injuries Adriana had suffered. Indeed, it seems quite improbable that petitioner could have picked the infant up from her bed, stroked her head, and brought her up to eye level to check[ ] her a few times without noticing that her skull had been fractured and the back of her head was very boggy. It is equally improbable that petitioner noticed the condition of Adriana's head but innocently forgot to mention it to the 911 operator, especially since petitioner informed the 911 operator that Adriana had been fine until she started to have trouble breathing. Accordingly, even successful impeachment of Dr. Ribe's testimony would not have materially affected the jury's assessment of petitioner's guilt. Finally, it is unlikely the follow-up investigation report in the Helms murder would even have been viewed as significant impeachment evidence in petitioner's case. Petitioner's theory that Dr. Ribe shapes his testimony to fit the prosecution's case is neither the inevitable nor the most logical inference from the follow-up investigation report. As Dr. Ribe explained, his opinion concerning the Helms murder, in the main, remained consistent throughout. He merely shortened the long end of his estimate of the time of injury and loss of consciousness based on consultations with outside experts and closer examination of the injuries Lance had sufferedbut neither of these factors indicates that Dr. Ribe was biased nor that Dr. Ribe's modification to his earlier opinion was inaccurate or unjustified. Although Dr. Ribe considered David Helms's history of abusive behavior in assessing whether the medical evidence tended to correlate or not correlate with that type of information and (thus) whether his original opinion warranted a reexamination, Dr. Ribe did not rely on those facts in revising his opinion. Petitioner's attempt to focus the blame for the prosecution of Eve Wingfield entirely on Dr. Ribe also ignores the time estimates Dr. Ribe provided to police and the district attorney as well as at the preliminary hearing that implicated David Helms; the misleading and incomplete version of events provided by Eve Wingfield; and the incompetent investigation undertaken by the original investigating officer. [7] In sum, the evidence does not strongly supportif at allpetitioner's claim that Dr. Ribe was a mere puppet of the prosecution and thus should have been disbelieved in this case. [8] Moreover, even if petitioner could have succeeded in impeaching Dr. Ribe, equivalent testimony was supplied by other witnesses and could have been supplied by still others. In light of that testimony, as well as other circumstantial evidence of petitioner's guilt, it is not reasonably probable the result would have been different had the defense sought to use the Helms murder investigation to impeach Dr. Ribe's testimony. (See Strickler v. Greene, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 294, 296, 119 S.Ct. 1936.) [9] We therefore conclude that petitioner has failed to establish the materiality of this evidence under Brady.