Opinion ID: 677451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Indispensible Party

Text: 24 Appellant argues that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party, Miller. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, without explanation. A district court's decision concerning joinder pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir.1992); Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir.1986). To the extent that the determination of whether the movant's interest is impaired involves an interpretation of law, it is reviewed de novo. Hughes, 953 F.2d at 540; Aguilar v. Los Angeles County, 751 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125, 105 S.Ct. 2656, 86 L.Ed.2d 273 (1985). 25 A court deciding whether an action must be dismissed for failure to join an indispensible party engages in a two-part analysis: it must first determine if an absent party is 'necessary' to a suit; then if ... the party cannot be joined, the court must determine whether the party is 'indispensible' so that in 'equity and good conscience' the suit should be dismissed. Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir.1990). 26 The inquiry into whether the absent party is necessary involves a second, two-part analysis. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a); 5 Makah, 910 F.2d at 558-59. Rose first argues that complete relief could not be afforded the Band because the Band originally sought to enjoin Miller and other Indians from holding further bingo games. Rose relies more heavily on the alternative argument that Miller claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and that disposition of the present action would impair Miller's ability to protect that interest. Specifically, Rose argues that Miller's interests are implicated because the validity of the contractual defense asserted by both Miller and Rose must be determined in this action, and Miller is a party to the contracts in question. 27 We first consider whether complete relief is available to the Band. This factor is concerned with consummate rather than partial or hollow relief as to those already parties, and with precluding multiple lawsuits on the same cause of action. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S.Ct. 156, 78 L.Ed.2d 144 (1983). Outside the pecuniary relief, the Band sought sweeping declarations about its authority to enforce the bingo ordinance. The Band also sought permanent injunctive relief against Rose and all other persons acting in concert with him or under his direction or control. Rose cites those passages for his claim that the band cannot obtain complete relief without Miller. We disagree. The Band may have sought relief beyond any within the power of the federal courts to grant. But such overreaching in the pleadings cannot mean that every non-Indian who might play bingo on the Band's land or every person who might associate himself with Rose in the future is a necessary party. Totally effective declaratory and injunctive relief clearly may be consummated against Rose, and complete relief may therefore be accorded among those already parties. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(1). 28 The second question is whether Miller must be joined if feasible in order to protect Miller's own interests. Rule 19(a)(2)(i) allows the moving party to assert that an absent party must be joined if feasible because the disposition of the action in the person's absence may [ ] as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect [their] interest in the action. Rose asserts that Miller may be adversely affected by the determination that the contracts do not provide a defense to the the enforcement of the bingo ordinance. The issue normally involves an inquiry into the possibility of the absent party being collaterally estopped in another proceeding. See Takeda v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 821 (9th Cir.1985) (stating that we need not conclusively determine how collateral estoppel would operate in future litigation, but only whether a significant possibility exists that the absent party would be estopped). In this case, however, such an inquiry would be inappropriate. 29 The purpose of Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(2)(i) is to protect the legitimate interests of absent parties, as well as to discourage multiplicitous litigation. Ordinarily, any party may move to join any such interested party. In this case, however, the procedural history is such that it is inappropriate for one defendant to attempt to champion an absent party's interests. Miller was originally a defendant in the action, but he and the Band stipulated to his dismissal shortly after this court's resolution of the first appeal. 6 Therefore, Miller's voluntary dismissal indicates that Miller himself did not feel that it was necessarily in his interest to remain a party in this action. This is the best evidence that Miller's absence would not impair or impede his ability to protect his interests. Moreover, Miller filed declarations in support of his position, and Rose had every incentive to pursue the defense based on the contract[s] to which Miller was a party. Impairment may be minimized if the absent party is adequately represented in the suit. Makah, 910 F.2d at 558. We believe that these facts provide a solid basis for a conclusion that Miller's interests would not be prejudiced by his absence. 30 Finally, Rule 19(a) provides that an absent party with an interest in the action must be joined where the absence may leave any of the parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. Such a risk is typically created by allocation of a limited fund to which absent parties are entitled. Makah, 910 F.2d at 559. Rose does not argue that Miller's absence will subject him to any such risks. 31 Therefore, we conclude that Miller was not a person to be joined if feasible under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a). He therefore cannot be an indispensible party, and the district court was correct to deny the motion to dismiss the action against Rose for failure to join Miller.