Opinion ID: 1956637
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the commission's finding of appellee's total incapacity

Text: The Commission's findings of fact are final if supported by competent evidence and the reasonable inferences which arise therefrom. McQuade v. Vahlsing, Inc., Me., 377 A.2d 469, 471 (1977); Bowen v. Maplewood Packing Co., Me., 366 A.2d 1116, 1118 (1976). The extent of an employee's incapacity is a question of fact. McQuade, 377 A.2d at 471. Under Maine law an employee is entitled to compensation for total disability not only when he is incapable of doing any work, but also when he is partially disabled and is unable to find work after reasonable efforts, either because employers in his community would not hire people with such a limited capacity to do the type of work within his tolerance, or because there was no reasonably stable market in his community for that restricted work of which he was capable. Lancaster v. Cooper Industries, Me., 387 A.2d 5, 7 (1978), citing Bowen v. Maplewood Packing Co., supra at 1119. The reasonableness of a work search is a mixed question of law and fact . . .. [but] the question of market stability is a pure question of fact. Lancaster, supra at 7. The Commission found that there was no work available within the appellee's capacity and that her loss of earnings was, therefore, a result of her injury. The sole question, then, is whether this conclusion was supported by the evidence. Cf. Justard v. Oxford Paper Co., Me., 384 A.2d 441, 443 (1978). The appellants contend that the appellee failed to show that there were no jobs which she could perform in the Bangor-Brewer area. However, that is not the only basis on which she could be entitled to compensation. Mrs. Page testified that several employers would not hire her because of her disability, regardless of whether or not they had work available which she could do. Under the principle stated above, this was sufficient to establish incapacity. Lancaster v. Cooper Industries, supra ; Ray's Case, 122 Me. 108, 119 A. 191 (1922). Ray's Case presented the same situation. It did not matter that Ray was partially able to work if his failure to find work after reasonable effort was not shown to have been due to any fault of his, nor to general business depression, but . . . rather to a general disinclination on the part of persons requiring help to employ . . . crippled men when sound men are available. Id. at 111, 119 A. at 192. Under this principle the Commission's findings are thoroughly supported by the evidence. The appellants also argue that appellee should have been compensated only for partial incapacity because she applied for and received unemployment benefits during the period in question. Under 26 M.R.S.A. § 1192(3), in order to qualify for unemployment benefits it is necessary for an unemployed person to be able to work; therefore, the appellants argue, Mrs. Page could not have been totally incapacitated. This argument has no merit. To be eligible for total disability compensation one must have placed himself on the labor market and made a diligent effort to find work. This requirement corresponds to the conditions of eligibility for unemployment set out in 26 M.R.S.A. § 1192(2), (3); appellee could clearly meet both conditions at once. In Dubois v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 150 Me. 494, 507, 114 A.2d 359, 366 (1955), we ruled that claimants for unemployment benefits were available for work when they demonstrated their ability and willingness to accept suitable work, notwithstanding the fact that they were partially disabled because they were too old for the jobs which they had left. That they had received the equivalent of a pension fund was held not to preclude unemployment benefits. In McQuade v. Vahlsing, Inc., 377 A.2d at 471, we held that the fact that a workmen's compensation claimant received Social Security benefits does not necessarily mean that he has withdrawn from the labor market . . . [or] no longer has earning capacity. McQuade, which was remanded for further fact-finding, held that if it were found that the claimant had not withdrawn from the labor market, he would be entitled to workmen's compensation for total incapacity under the same principle that was applied in Ray's Case, supra ; McQuade, supra at 470-71, citing Dunkin Donuts of America, Inc. v. Watson, Me., 366 A.2d 1121 (1976). Here, the appellee was seeking and available for work within the limits set by her disability. The mere fact that this made her eligible for unemployment compensation does not mean that she was not also eligible for total disability compensation, given the expanded definition of the latter. [2] The Florida Supreme Court, faced with a case similar to the one here, concluded: A claimant may honestly represent to the unemployment compensation agency that he is able to do some work if a job is made available to him. At the same time, with equal honesty, he might properly represent to the workmen's compensation agency that he was totally disabled during the same period because no one would give him a job in his then physical condition. Edwards v. Metro Tile Co., Fla., 133 So.2d 411, 412 (1961). The appellants also argue that the Commission's findings of fact were insufficient to explain and justify its ultimate conclusions, as required by 39 M.R.S.A. § 99. It is true that the Commission's decree did not state why the work which Mrs. Page sought was unavailable, and did not mention the testimony regarding employers' unwillingness to hire her because of her injury. It is clear from the record, however, that the Commission's findings were supported by Mrs. Page's testimony. While we have frequently deplored the failure to set forth specific findings of fact sufficient to explain the Commission's holding, we will uphold a decision when we can clearly ascertain what the Commissioner had to find in order to reach the ultimate decision. McQuade v. Vahlsing, Inc., 377 A.2d at 471; Bolduc v. Pioneer Plastics Corp., Me., 302 A.2d 577, 580 (1973); Leclerc v. Gilbert, 152 Me. 399, 402, 131 A.2d 202, 203 (1957). Here, there is no ambiguity as to the basis of the Commission's findings, as there was in McQuade, nor is the record lacking in sufficient evidence to support the conclusion. Cf. Oliver v. Wyandotte Industries Corp., Me., 360 A.2d 144, 148 (1976).