Opinion ID: 1963191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions on Elements of Attempted Murder

Text: Cruz also argues that the district court erred in its instructions in reciting the elements for each attempted murder charge. [3] Before going through the elements of the various attempted murder charges, the court defined attempt. The court stated: The statutes of Minnesota provide that a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit the crime, the person does an act that is a substantial step toward, and more than mere preparation for, the commission of the crime. An attempt to commit a crime requires both an intent to commit the crime and a substantial step toward commission of the crime. Then, in reciting the elements of the attempted murder charges, the court stated that the jury must find that the Defendant intended to commit the crime of attempted murder drive-by. [4] (Emphasis added.) The court went on to say: The statutes of Minnesota provide that whoever, while committing or attempting to commit the crime of drive-by shooting, causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another is guilty of a crime. Second, the Defendant did an act that was a substantial step toward, and more than mere preparation for, the commission of that crime. We examine whether the attempted murder instructions, after being reviewed as a whole, materially misstate the law and were therefore erroneous. See Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d at 730. A defendant is guilty of attempted murder if he or she, with intent to commit [murder], does an act which is a substantial step toward ... the commission of [murder]. Minn.Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1 (2008). Under this statute, the district court improperly instructed the jury as to the element of intent in the specified attempted murder crimes. But when reading the jury instructions as a whole, we cannot characterize the instructions as a material misstatement of the law. Before reading the instructions on the attempt counts, the court correctly defined attempt as requiring an intent to commit the crime, and a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. When defining the elements of the attempted murder crimes, the court correctly stated that the murder statutes require the defendant to intend to cause the death of a person, and the defendant to take a substantial step toward committing that crime. Finally, the record reflects that defense counsel worked for an hour with the State and two hours with the State and the district court on the jury instructions. Defense counsel made no objection on the record to the jury instructions, which further demonstrates that the incorrect language did not rise to the level of a material misstatement. Because we conclude there is no error in either the transferred intent instructions or the attempted murder instructions, we do not reach the next steps in the plain error analysis.
Cruz's next claim is that there was insufficient evidence to prove the element of intent to kill, an element required for each of the 18 guilty verdicts. Cruz also claims that there is insufficient evidence of premeditation to support the first-degree murder verdicts. Cruz argues that the circumstantial evidence is just as consistent with the hypothesis that Cruz did not intend to kill and was merely shooting at trespassers in an attempt to scare or injure them. When reviewing a question on the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the fact finder rejected any evidence inconsistent with the verdict. State v. Pendleton, 759 N.W.2d 900, 909 (Minn.2009). The verdict will not be overturned if the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hughes, 749 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Minn.2008). Circumstantial evidence is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence and will permit a conclusion that evidence was sufficient if a detailed review of evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence are consistent only with defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. See State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 452-53 (Minn.1997). Minnesota Statutes § 609.185 defines first-degree murder as an intentional killing committed with premeditation or in the course of committing a drive-by shooting. Intent is defined as when a person has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result. Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2008). Intent may be inferred from the manner of the killing. Hall, 722 N.W.2d at 477; see State v. Harris, 405 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn.1987) (concluding that intent to kill was proven when defendant shot victim in the head from three or four feet away with a shotgun). Premeditation is a state of mind generally proved circumstantially by drawing inferences from a defendant's words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d at 563. Premeditation can be inferred if there is: (1) planning activity shown by the defendant's actions prior to the actual killing; (2) motive inferred from the defendant's prior relationship with the victim; or (3) evidence as to the nature of the killing from which it can be inferred that the killing was premeditated. See State v. McArthur, 730 N.W.2d 44, 49-50 (Minn. 2007); State v. Kendell, 723 N.W.2d 597, 606-07 (Minn.2006) (concluding that the nature of the killing [evidence was] significant where the defendant (1) fired multiple shots; (2) shot the victim in the head at close range; and (3) fled the scene following the shooting). Motive can be inferred by the defendant's prior relationship and conduct with the victim. Kendell, 723 N.W.2d at 607. There was sufficient evidence in this case for the jury to conclude that Cruz premeditated and intended to kill Hernandez Leon and the other shooting victims. The evidence showed that Cruz left a car carrying a semiautomatic weapon. Cruz asked people what gang they were from and then started shooting even though no one in the group made a statement or gesture. Cruz shot at a small group of people less than 10 feet away from him, and he continued to shoot even as victims fell to the ground. Cruz then fled the scene of the shooting. Premeditation is furthered proven by evidence that Cruz and the victims belonged to rival gangs that were concerned with geographical dominion and that the shooting happened within the claimed area of Cruz's gang. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support that Cruz acted with premeditation and the intent to kill.
Cruz next claims that the district court erred by entering convictions against Cruz on all 18 guilty verdicts. Cruz was given four sentences, one for each victim. Cruz asks that his unsentenced convictions be vacated pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 609.04 (2008). The State does not object to vacating the convictions, but asks us to note that the underlying guilty verdicts remain in force. Minnesota Statutes § 609.04 states that a defendant may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both. Included offenses include [a] lesser degree of the same crime or [a] crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were proved. Minn.Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1(1), (4). We have vacated convictions where there are multiple murder convictions from a single criminal act, even if the crime satisfies more than one definition of first-degree murder. State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 730 (Minn.2000). We have also stated that for a crime committed for the benefit of a gang, the underlying crime is an included crime. Lopez-Rios, 669 N.W.2d at 615. Because the State does not object to vacating the unsentenced convictions, it is not necessary for us to answer definitively whether each of Cruz's convictions is an included offense. It is sufficient to vacate the unsentenced convictions and recognize, as we did in State v. Earl, that the jury verdicts on [the vacated] counts remain in force. 702 N.W.2d 711, 724 (Minn.2005).
By pro se supplemental brief, Cruz makes five additional arguments. One argument is that Cruz's convictions should be vacated because they are based solely on circumstantial evidence, as there is no physical evidence connecting him to the crimes. This is essentially an argument of insufficient evidence to support Cruz's convictions, an argument that we have already addressed. We address Cruz's other arguments, which assert that the district court committed reversible error by allowing evidence from the photo lineups, unnecessarily repeated instructions to the jury on media coverage, and sentenced Cruz improperly on more than one count. Cruz also argues that prosecutorial misconduct was committed.