Opinion ID: 4683791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Federal Generic Theft Offense

Text: In removal proceedings, an alien who has committed a statutorily identified “aggravated felony,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), is ineligible for certain forms of relief. See Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2016). Because aggravated felonies constitute particularly serious crimes, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B), a conviction for such an offense disqualifies the alien from asylum. See id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii). Similarly, an aggravated felony that results in a sentence of at least five years bars the alien from seeking withholding of removal under both the INA and the CAT. See id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2). As amended, the INA identifies various offenses as aggravated felonies. One of those is a “theft offense”: The term “aggravated felony” means . . . a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year[.] 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G); see also Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, sec. 222(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4321 (adding “theft offense (including receipt of stolen property)” to the list of aggravated felonies). Unlike some other aggravated felonies, “theft offense” does not contain language limiting its scope by 8 “refer[ence] to the specific circumstances in which [the] crime was committed.” Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009); see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(ii) (an offense “relating to transportation for the purpose of prostitution[] if committed for commercial advantage” (emphasis added)). Instead, due to its more abstract formulation, the term “theft offense” refers to a generic formulation of a theft offense, and not any specific theft crime. See Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190, 198 (considering “generic” federal offenses “in the abstract”); Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185 (2007) (finding aiding and abetting a “theft offense” to fall within the generic definition). Consistent with that understanding, courts have developed a definition for a generic theft offense: [T]he taking of property or an exercise of control over property without consent with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 189 (quoting Penuliar v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Lewin v. Att’y Gen., 885 F.3d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2018) (observing that this definition is “an accepted generic definition of a ‘theft offense’”). As formulated, the generic theft offense consists of three elements: (i) the taking of property or an exercise of control over property; (ii) without consent; and (iii) with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent. 9 To date, this Circuit has not considered the precise contours of the second element – the without-consent requirement. And in this context, the term ‘consent’ is capable of multiple meanings. It may refer only to assent – the act of agreeing. See, e.g., Consent, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993) (definition 1a: “compliance or approval esp. of what is done or proposed by another: acquiescence, permission”); Consent, The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed. 1987) (“permission, approval, or agreement; compliance; acquiescence”). But ‘consent’ may require more than the mere act of agreeing; it may also require that the assent be voluntary and intelligent. See, e.g., Consent, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993) (definition 1b: “capable, deliberate, and voluntary agreement to or concurrence in some act or purpose implying physical and mental power and free action – distinguished from assent”). In articulating the generic theft offense, other circuits have used the first definition of ‘consent’ – consent as only assent. See Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 282–84 (4th Cir. 2005) (originating this theory); see also, e.g., Vassell v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 1352, 1356–59 (11th Cir. 2016); Carrillo-Jaime v. Holder, 572 F.3d 747, 751–54 (9th Cir. 2009); In re GarciaMadruga, 24 I. & N. Dec. 436, 439–41 (B.I.A. 2008). But for three reasons, the second definition of ‘consent’ – consent as voluntary and intelligent assent – better fits the definition of a generic theft offense. First, statutory text favors the reading of ‘consent’ as voluntary and intelligent assent. By using the term “theft offense” – not merely ‘theft’ – in its itemization of aggravated felonies, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), the INA includes conduct beyond ‘theft’; it extends to a family of crimes related to theft. See Hernandez-Mancilla v. INS, 246 F.3d 1002, 10 1008–09 (7th Cir. 2001) (reading the term “theft offense” as “an umbrella label” that “encompasses a myriad of offenses”); see also Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162, 174 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Congress used the words ‘theft offense’ rather than just ‘theft,’ thus indicating that the phrase ought be read to incorporate different but closely related constructions in modern state statutes.” (parenthetically quoting United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc))), overruled on other grounds by Al-Sharif v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 734 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). Similarly, the INA expressly includes “receipt of stolen property,” as a theft offense, signaling again that the term “theft offense” should not be limited to a narrow conception of theft. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). Also, in terms of impact, a construction of the without-consent element to mean ‘without assent’ would exclude a multitude of state-law theft crimes from the federal generic definition.1 But significantly 1 See, e.g., Lopez-Aguilar v. Barr, 948 F.3d 1143, 1147–49 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that third-degree Oregon robbery is not a theft offense because “a defendant could be convicted if she threatened force against a third party to compel that third party to convince a property owner, by deception, to give the property to the defendant consensually” or “if the taking was consensual (although deceptive), but force was used against a third party to prevent that person from retrieving the property right after it was received by the thief”); Vassell, 839 F.3d at 1359–61 (holding that Georgia theft by taking is not a theft offense because it does not “require any lack of consent on the part of the victim”); Mena v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 114, 118–20 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that federal receipt of embezzled property is not a theft offense because “[b]y definition, 11 diminishing the volume of theft-related crimes included within the federal generic definition of “theft offense” is incompatible with the INA’s use of the broad term “theft offense.” Second, the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘theft’ supports this construction of the without-consent element. At the time Congress amended the INA to include “theft offenses” as embezzlement . . . involves property that came into the initial wrongdoer’s hands with the owner’s consent”); LopezValencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that California theft is not a theft offense because it could be committed through theft by false pretenses); Castillo v. Holder, 776 F.3d 262, 268–70 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that Virginia unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is not a theft offense because a conviction is possible for “a defendant’s use of a vehicle in a manner not specifically authorized by its owner, even if such use is consistent with the owner’s general policy regarding use, occurs during the period the vehicle is entrusted to the defendant, and results in no damage to the vehicle”); Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 197 n.9 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that Virginia grand larceny is not a theft offense because “under the generic federal definition of ‘theft,’ fraudulent takings do not constitute takings ‘without consent’” (citation omitted)); Carrillo-Jaime, 572 F.3d at 750–54 (holding that, in California, owning or operating a premises where any person has engaged in destroying a car or car parts “known to be illegally obtained by theft, fraud, or conspiracy to defraud” is not a theft offense because the car or car parts could be obtained through theft by false pretenses, fraud in the inducement, or through similar conspiracies to defraud (citation omitted)). 12 aggravated felonies, the prevailing legal understanding of ‘theft’ described the offense as including the following: The taking of property without the owner’s consent or from the possession of some person holding the same for him, with intent to deprive the owner of the value of the same, and to appropriate it to the use or benefit of the person taking. Theft, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). See generally Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2070 (2018) (observing that a court’s “job is to interpret the words consistent with their ‘ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute’” (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))). This definition of ‘theft’ continued, expressly including within the offense’s scope “swindling; embezzlement; theft by deception; theft by threat or extortion; theft by false pretext; and theft of services.” Theft, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). But some of those crimes could not be considered thefts if the withoutconsent element meant only ‘without assent,’ as opposed to ‘without voluntary and intelligent assent.’ Similarly, the Model Penal Code consolidated theft and related offenses into a single offense. See Model Penal Code § 223.1(1) (1962). In grouping together related theft offenses as thefts, the Model Penal Code specifically included categories of theft that could not be thefts if the without-consent element were read to mean only ‘without assent.’ Those include theft by unlawful taking or disposition; theft by deception; theft by extortion; theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake; receiving stolen property; theft of services; theft by failure to make required disposition of funds received; and unauthorized use of 13 automobiles and other vehicles. See id. §§ 223.2–223.9. Thus, when Congress added the term “theft offense” to the INA’s list of aggravated felonies, the comparatively narrower term, ‘theft’ was understood to include crimes that can be committed only without ‘voluntary and intelligent assent.’ That is telling, as it is implausible that without any indication in the statutory text, Congress intended for the comparatively broader term “theft offense” to exclude crimes that were generally understood to be ‘thefts.’ Third, the historical evolution of theft crimes indicates that the without-consent element now means ‘without voluntary and intelligent assent.’ Theft originated from common-law larceny, which occurred “when one person misappropriated another’s property by means of taking it from his possession without his consent.” Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Substantive Criminal Law § 19.1(a) (3d ed. Oct. 2020 update). But over time, larceny by trick emerged as a common-law offense for obtaining possession of another’s property through a lie, with the intention of, and succeeding in, misappropriating that property. See id. In the eighteenth century, the English Parliament established the related crime of false pretenses (and it later recognized embezzlement as well). See id. § 19.1(b). The Model Penal Code remained true to that tradition by defining consent to exclude instances in which assent alone was given. Those circumstances include legal incompetency, youth, mental disease, intoxication, improvident consent, and inducement “by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.” Model Penal Code § 2.11(3). Deeply engrained in Anglo-American jurisprudence is the principle that “an apparent consent is not effective unless, as a factual matter, it is voluntary and intelligent.” Charles E. Torcia, 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law 14 § 46 (15th ed. Aug. 2020 update). It would contravene that legal heritage to apply a different understanding of consent to the without-consent element of the federal generic theft offense. Nor does anything in the INA’s text or structure undermine this conclusion. The INA does separately identify offenses involving “fraud or deceit” as aggravated felonies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i); see also, e.g., Soliman, 419 F.3d at 282–84 (relying, in part, on this distinction); Vassell, 839 F.3d at 1356–59 (same); In re Garcia-Madruga, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 439–41 (same). And it may well be that fraud-or-deceit offenses under the INA require proof of a lack of voluntaryand-intelligent-assent. But that does not mean that such an element applies only to fraud-or-deceit offenses. Sitting en banc, this Court has recognized that the elements of multiple aggravated felonies can overlap. See Al-Sharif, 734 F.3d at 210 (“Although some of these categories of aggravated felonies can overlap, each category is separate from the others, and a particular conviction may constitute an aggravated felony under multiple sections of [8 U.S.C.] § 1101(a)(43).”). Specifically, the elements of the “theft offense” and the “fraud or deceit” aggravated felonies do overlap. See id. at 210–12. The same is also true for other aggravated-felony pairs. See, e.g., Bobb v. Att’y Gen., 458 F.3d 213, 217–19 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that forgery can be an aggravated felony as either an “fraud or deceit” offense under § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) or a “forgery” offense under § 1101(a)(43)(R)). Thus, even supposing that fraud-or-deceit offenses require a lack of voluntary and intelligent assent, that would not preclude theft offenses from having the same element. 15 For these reasons, the term ‘consent’ as used in the federal generic definition of “theft offense” means ‘voluntary and intelligent assent,’ not merely ‘assent.’ This understanding embraces the full family of theft-related crimes – an outcome that is more consistent with the statutory text, the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘theft,’ and the historical legal conception of consent.