Opinion ID: 2225574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 29

Heading: prospective standard of proof for showing civil contempt is clear and convincing evidence

Text: Having overhauled our contempt jurisprudence, we believe that we should take a closer look at our present beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof in civil contempt cases. This standard of proof dates back to our cases holding that all contempt proceedings are criminal in nature and governed by rules applicable to criminal prosecutions. [118] Unfortunately, some of these opinions ignored an earlier decision in which we had tried to reconcile the inconsistency in our case law and the case law of other states. In Maryott v. State, [119] we stated that indirect contempts ÔÇö disobedience committed outside of the court's presence ÔÇö can be either criminal or civil. We recognized that contempt proceedings have both punitive and coercive aspects, but we stated: Where a party to an action fails to obey an order of the court, made for the benefit of the opposing party, the rule is well recognized that such act is, ordinarily, a mere civil contempt, and the rules applicable to a criminal contempt are not applicable. [120] Accordingly, we rejected the contemnor's argument that the State must file an information to commence a contempt proceeding and held that the party injured by the contempt can commence a civil contempt proceeding by affidavit. Later, we clarified that sanctions of fines or incarceration are criminal only if they (1) are intended to vindicate the court's authority and punish a contemnor for a completed act of disobedience and (2) cannot be mitigated by complying with the court's order. [121] In 1975, following U.S. Supreme Court precedent, we held that a jury trial is not required before a court can commit a contemnor for civil contempt or punish petty criminal contempts summarily, when the punishment is not excessive. [122] The Nebraska Court of Appeals has explained that a jury trial with criminal protections is required only when a court commits a defendant for direct contempts if the cumulative incarceration period exceeds 6 months. [123] In 1980, we held that double jeopardy has no application to civil contempt proceedings to enforce child support obligations. [124] And in Grady v. Grady , [125] a 1981 case, we stated that an action to enforce a court order is normally a mere civil contempt and requires the appropriate standard of proof applicable thereto instead of the stricter `proof beyond a reasonable doubt' standard applied to criminal contempts. But we did not overrule cases applying the stricter standard of proof in Grady, and our rule requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in civil contempt proceedings persisted. In 1984, without discussing Grady, we again held in a civil contempt case that guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. [126] In 1987, we cited California cases to support the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof in civil contempt proceedings: The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is justified in contempt cases because of the penalties that may be imposed. [127] And in 1994, also without discussing Grady, we reversed in part a Court of Appeals' opinion relying on Grady as authority for applying a preponderance standard of proof in civil contempt cases. [128] Over the years, both this court and the Nebraska Court of Appeals have stated that beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard of proof in numerous civil contempt cases. [129] But our reinstatement of the stricter standard of proof has put this court in a small minority. Our research has uncovered only three state courts that require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in civil contempt cases: this court, California courts, [130] and Alabama courts. [131] As noted, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that civil contempt sanctions require neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [132] Although the Supreme Court has not adopted a specific standard of proof for civil contempt proceedings, federal courts of appeals have unanimously required clear and convincing proof of civil contempt. [133] Many state courts also require clear and convincing proof of civil contempt. [134] We recognize that many state courts permit parties to prove civil contempt by a preponderance of the evidence. [135] And in some circumstances, Neb.Rev.Stat.  42-358(3) (Reissue 2008) permits a rebuttable presumption of contempt if a prima facie showing is made that an obligor is delinquent in his or her child or spousal support obligations. [136] But apart from a statutory mandate requiring a different standard, we do not believe presumptions or a preponderance standard is consistent with what we have stated about civil burdens of proof. The standard of proof functions to instruct fact finders about the degree of confidence our society believes they should have in the correctness of their factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. [137] In a criminal case, due process requires the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every factual element necessary to constitute the crime charged. [138] But in civil cases, when a party's interests are substantial and involve more than the mere loss of money, but obviously do not involve a criminal conviction, due process is satisfied by an intermediate clear and convincing standard of proof. [139] Although a conditional commitment to jail is clearly not a criminal sanction, it involves more than the mere loss of money. Because a conditional commitment is a possible sanction in a civil contempt proceeding, we conclude that the clear and convincing standard of proof is the most appropriate standard. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, is a criminal trial protection that does not apply to civil contempt proceedings. [140] Accordingly, we overrule all the cases listed in footnote 129 to the extent that these cases hold or imply that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required for civil contempt proceedings. Outside of statutory procedures imposing a different standard, it is the complainant's burden to prove civil contempt by clear and convincing evidence. A clear and convincing standard of proof would not have changed the outcome of this case, but applying the law retroactively could affect parties in pending cases who have justifiably relied upon our longstanding previous case law requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in civil contempt proceedings. Thus, [f]airness and equity dictate that the above-announced rule of law be effective as of the date of this opinion. [141]