Opinion ID: 1259336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The termination statute

Text: Termination of parental rights is governed solely by A.R.S. § 8-533. Abandonment is one of the enumerated grounds for termination. [10] Although this statute leaves abandonment undefined, § 8-546, in the same chapter, defines abandonment and applies the definition to all sections within the chapter. We conclude, therefore, that the court of appeals incorrectly held that the § 8-546 abandonment definition does not apply to § 8-533. Pima County Juvenile No. S-114487, 144 Ariz.Adv.Rep. at 49, 1993 WL 276801. Abandonment is defined in § 8-546(1) as: [T]he failure of the parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, including the providing of normal supervision, when such failure is accompanied by an intention on the part of the parent to permit such condition to continue for an indefinite period in the future. Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause for a period of six months shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment. Our courts have generally not applied this statutory definition to termination proceedings, resorting instead to a common-law definition. Over the years, in trying to clarify abandonment by addressing intent and conduct, our courts have adopted two tests: settled purpose and conscious disregard. [11] The settled purpose doctrine focuses on parental intent and has been defined as: [C]lear and convincing evidence of intentional conduct on the part of a parent that evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 4, 804 P.2d 730, 733 (1990) (emphasis added). Although the quoted language was probably dicta, it closely follows the language of our holding in In re Appeal in Pima County Severance No. S-1607, 147 Ariz. 237, 238, 709 P.2d 871, 872 (1985). Neither case, however, involved an unwed father who had never even seen his child. Rather, both cases concerned parental relationships that had matured or existed through marriage. Other courts have applied a conscious disregard test that addresses the parent's conduct, intentional or not, and its impact on the child in determining whether parental rights should be terminated. The conscious disregard test looks at: [C]onduct on the part of the parent which implies a conscious disregard of the obligations owed by a parent to his child, leading to the destruction of the parent-child relationship. In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-1182, 136 Ariz. 432, 433, 666 P.2d 532, 533 (Ct.App. 1983) (emphasis added). These two concepts have been variously applied, often in the same case. [12] As the father argues, the conscious disregard test cannot be applied because here he could not form a parent-child relationship, let alone disregard it. And if the settled purpose doctrine applies, then no grounds for termination exist because the trial judge specifically found that  [i]n this case, that purpose cannot be found.  First Order at 1 (emphasis added). The father accurately points out that no evidence rebutting the factual basis for this conclusion was presented at the second hearing. We believe, however, that in cases such as this one, abandonment cannot turn on a bright line formula developed to determine whether a parent abandoned an existing relationship. In this case, the father had assumed no parental duties and no parental relationship had come into existence. There was, in short, nothing to relinquish. The key to this case is the statute defining abandonment, which we apply in common-sense terms, with its meaning in this factual context derived from Quilloin and Lehr. [13] Abandonment is defined by § 8-546(A)(1) as the failure ... to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact ..., including ... normal supervision, when such failure is accompanied by an intention on the part of the parent to permit such condition to continue for an indefinite period in the future. What constitutes reasonable support, regular contact, and normal supervision varies from case to case. It is often difficult, as in the present case, for the unwed father to provide support or supervision, or to even maintain contact. Nonetheless, the father must take concrete steps to establish the legal or emotional bonds linking parent and child. This is Lehr' s message.