Opinion ID: 4766420
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mitchell’s Excessive Force Claim

Text: 1. Violation of Mitchell’s Fourth Amendment Rights The preceding section focused on whether Defendants’ warrantless entry into Plaintiffs’ apartment was unreasonable so as to violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. But, under the Fourth Amendment, No. 20-1996 Williams, et al. v. Maurer, et al. Page 24 “the ‘reasonableness’ of a particular seizure depends not only on when it is made, but also on how it is carried out.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985)). Thus, through an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, “physically intrusive governmental conduct” that “arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen” can be challenged as violating the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 394–95. As explained above, when Mitchell opened her door, she “put [her] knee to the door just for protection so that the door wouldn’t be all the way opened.” (R. 22-12 at PageID# 514.) Mitchell asserts that Defendants used excessive force when they forcibly pushed open the door in a manner that caused her knee to bleed and left a permanent scar. To determine whether force used by law enforcement was excessive, we “apply an objective reasonableness test, looking to the reasonableness of the force in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting the defendants, and not to the underlying intent or motivation of the defendants.” Brown v. Lewis, 779 F.3d 401, 418 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2013)). This approach entails “balanc[ing] the consequences to the individual against the government’s interests in effecting the seizure.” Morrison v. Bd. of Tr. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 2002)). “Three factors guide the reasonableness test: ‘the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether [s]he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”’ Brown, 779 F.3d at 418 (quoting Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 958 (6th Cir. 2013)). “Though important, these factors are not the end of the matter, as the court ultimately must determine ‘whether the totality of the circumstances justifies a particular sort of seizure.’” Martin, 712 F.3d at 958 (quoting St. John v. Hickey, 411 F.3d 762, 771 (6th Cir. 2005)). Moreover, “[t]his standard contains a builtin measure of deference to the officer’s on-the-spot judgment about the level of force necessary in light of the circumstances of the particular case.” Burchett, 310 F.3d at 944 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). No. 20-1996 Williams, et al. v. Maurer, et al. Page 25 Defendants argue that, as a matter of law, the force they used to open the door to Mitchell’s apartment was not excessive because it only caused de minimis injury to Mitchell. However, “[t]he ‘extent of the injury inflicted’ is not ‘crucial to an analysis of a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.’” Coley v. Lucas County, 799 F.3d 530, 539 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Morrison, 583 F.3d at 407); see also Baskin v. Smith, 50 F. App’x 731, 737 n.2 (6th Cir. 2002). “We look instead to whether ‘gratuitous violence’ has been inflicted.” Coley, 799 F.3d at 539 (quoting Pigram ex rel. Pigram v. Chaudoin, 199 F. App’x 509, 513 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Morrison, 583 F.3d at 407. For example, in Miller v. Sanilac County, the plaintiff brought an excessive force claim based on allegations that a police officer “effected the arrest by spinning him around, kicking his feet apart, and slamming him against his vehicle.” 606 F.3d 240, 246 (6th Cir. 2010). But the plaintiff conceded “that he was not hurt by any of these actions.” Id. On the grounds that “[i]t is not objectively unreasonable for an officer to place an individual under arrest using force that does not cause harm,” the district court granted summary judgment to the officer. Id. at 252. We reversed because “a plaintiff may ‘allege use of excessive force even where the physical contact between the parties did not leave excessive marks or cause extensive physical damage.”’ Id. (quoting Morrison, 583 F.3d at 407). And because “the offense [was] non-violent, the arrestee posed no immediate safety threat, and the arrestee had not attempted to escape and was not actively resisting,” we held that “a jury could reasonably find that slamming an arrestee into a vehicle constitutes excessive force.” Id. at 253–54. Accordingly, Defendants incorrectly seek summary judgment on the basis that a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim contains a de minimis injury requirement.7 Defendants also appear to alternatively argue that the force was reasonable because Mitchell was blocking the door from opening and they had to act “swiftly to ensure the safety of everyone inside the apartment.” (Appellants Br. at 60.) But as explained above, a reasonable 7Furthermore, even if there is a de minimis injury requirement, Mitchell’s injuries were more than de minimis because she suffered a bloody knee and a permanent scar from the alleged excessive force. See Carlton v. Turner, No. 05-1009, 2006 WL 955886, at  (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 2006) (holding that force used against a convicted prisoner was more than de minimis because, even though the “resulting injury was ‘minor,’” the force “drew blood”). No. 20-1996 Williams, et al. v. Maurer, et al. Page 26 juror could find that when Defendants forced open Mitchell’s door, the information known to them did not support a conclusion that there was a “real exigency” within Mitchell’s home that required a warrantless entry. King, 563 U.S. at 470. Therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude that the force used by Defendants to forcibly open Mitchell’s door while she lawfully attempted to assert her Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure was “gratuitous,” and accordingly, violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Coley, 799 F.3d at 539; see also Martin, 712 F.3d at 960. 2. Clearly Established Right Having determined that Mitchell has made a sufficient showing that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, the inquiry turns to whether the right was clearly established. As explained above, it is “clearly established that warrantless entry into a home without an exception to the warrant requirement violate[s] clearly established law.” Barton, 949 F.3d at 949 (citing Armstrong, 432 F.3d at 700). Likewise, it is clearly established that “[g]ratuitous violence is never reasonable” because “there is ‘simply no governmental interest’ justifying gratuitous violence.” Walters v. Stafford, 317 F. App’x 479, 491 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 302 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (explaining that the use of unreasonable force while effecting the ‘“seizure’ of a free citizen” violates the Fourth Amendment). If Defendants forcibly entered Mitchell’s home armed with neither a warrant nor an exception to the warrant requirement, the use of any amount of force to effectuate this unconstitutional action constituted unreasonable “gratuitous violence.” Walters, 317 F. App’x at 491; see also Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 53 (explaining that qualified immunity is inappropriate when “any reasonable officer should have realized” that their conduct “offended the Constitution.”); Moderwell, 997 F.3d at 662 (same); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199 (explaining that, in “an obvious [excessive force] case,” Graham and Garner “alone” can “offer a basis” for denying qualified immunity); cf. Shreve v. Jessamine Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 453 F.3d 681, 688 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that it is clearly established that police cannot use gratuitous violence when there is “no safety risk”). Put differently, “[o]f course, if Defendant[s] had no right to be inside the home, then [they] had no right to use force.” Hickey v. Hayse, 188 F. Supp. 2d 722, 728 No. 20-1996 Williams, et al. v. Maurer, et al. Page 27 (W.D. Ky. 2001). Accordingly, assuming the absence of exigent circumstances, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mitchell, when Defendants forcibly slammed Mitchell’s door open and hit her knee, they violated her clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force.