Opinion ID: 1919348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Refusal of Lesser Offense Instructions.

Text: ś 126. Hodges claims the trial court erred in denying his request that the jury be instructed on the lesser offense of manslaughter and trespass. Hodges claims that the jury could have reasonably found him guilty of manslaughter and trespass. Hodges argues that the jury could have found that he killed in the heat of passion. Hodges presented an instruction on both manslaughter and trespass. The Court, in refusing to give the manslaughter instruction, stated that under these facts . . . the offense of manslaughter is not justified. ś 127. The State argues that since this issue was not raised at trial or sentencing, Hodges is barred from raising this issue on appeal. However, this Court has stated that the denial of a requested jury instruction: is procedurally preserved by the mere tendering of the instructions, suggesting that they are correct and asking the Court to submit them to the jury. This in and of itself affords counsel opposite fair notice of the party's position and the Court an opportunity to pass upon the matter. When the instructions are refused, there is no reason why we should thereafter require an objection to the refusal unless we are to place a value upon redundancy and nonsense. Carmichael v. Agur Realty Co., Inc., 574 So.2d 603, 613 (Miss.1990). We agree with Carmichael, and find that Duplantis is not procedurally barred from review of this assignment. He only needed to tender his suggested jury instruction in order to preserve review. Duplantis v. State, 708 So.2d 1327, 1339-40 (Miss.1998). We d[o] not intend to . . . require litigants to object to the denial of instructions that they themselves have offered. Id. Therefore, Hodges only needed to tender his suggested jury instruction in order to preserve review. Hodges is not procedurally barred from raising this issue on appeal since he did tender his instruction to the court. ś 128. This Court has repeatedly held that the accused is entitled to have the jury instructed that it may consider convicting him of a lesser offense only where there is in the record an evidentiary basis therefor. Doss v. State, 709 So.2d 369, 377 (Miss.1996) (citing McGowan v. State, 541 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Miss.1989)). However, [s]uch instructions should not be granted indiscriminately, nor on the basis of pure speculation. Id. Also, the accused is not entitled to the lesser offense instruction where the evidence that proves the guilt of the lesser offense necessarily proves his guilt of the principal charge. Id. ś 129. This Court has already held that when a defendant kills the victim during the commission of a burglary, he is not entitled to a manslaughter instruction. Coleman v. State, 804 So.2d 1032, 1038-39 (Miss.2002). In Coleman this Court stated that Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-27 (2000) provides: [t]he killing of a human being without malice, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, while such other is engaged in the perpetration of any felony except those felonies enumerated in Section 97-3-19(2)(e) and (f), or while such other is attempting to commit any felony besides such as are above enumerated and excepted, shall be manslaughter. Burglary is one of the felonies listed in Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) that is excepted by the manslaughter statute. In a case similar to the one at bar, this Court held that a defendant who killed a victim during the commission of rape and armed robbery was not entitled to manslaughter instruction. Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1201 (Miss.1996), overruled on other grounds, King v. State, 784 So.2d 884 (Miss.2001). The Court reasoned that like burglary, rape and robbery are also felonies excepted by the manslaughter statute. 674 So.2d at 1201. 804 So.2d at 1038-39. Hodges was charged with a felony excepted by the manslaughter statute, burglary of Cora and Isaac Johnson's home. Moreover, the evidence at trial was clear that Hodges committed burglary. Hodges was told by Cora several times that he was not allowed in her house. The night of the incident, Hodges was specifically told by Cora that she did not want him to come over and that she was going to bed. After talking to Cora, Hodges decided to go over to her house anyway. Before he went to Cora's house, he went home changed into all black clothes and a ski mask. He then got his mother's gun and her car and drove to Cora's house where he parked the car two houses down. Hodges, armed with a gun and dressed in all black, forced the back door open. While prying the door open, Hodges left pry marks on the door and fresh insulation from the door was left scattered on the floor around the door frame. Cora testified that Hodges told her that he came over for the purpose of shooting her and her mother (if she had been home). Clearly, Hodges broke into the house and entered it with the intent to assault. ś 130. In sum, the trial court did not commit reversible error by refusing the manslaughter instructions. This Court has previously held that if the killing was committed during the commission of one of the enumerated felonies in Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-12(2)(e), one of which is burglary, capital murder is proven and the defendant is not entitled to a manslaughter instruction. Id. (citing Blue, 674 So.2d at 1201). The evidence is clear. Isaac Johnson was murdered during the commission of a burglary of Isaac and Cora Johnson's home. ś 131. Furthermore, since there was no evidentiary basis in the record for the lesser instruction of trespass, the trial court did not err in denying that instruction. Also, the accused is not entitled to the lesser offense instruction where the evidence that proves the guilt of the lesser offense necessarily proves his guilt of the principal charge. Doss, 709 So.2d at 377. Therefore this issue is without merit.