Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Abouhalima--Terrorist Materials

Text: 263 Abouhalima next argues that the district court violated his due process rights by instructing the jury to disregard his argument that only one terrorist magazine article was found during the government's search of his apartment, an article entitled Facing the enemies of God--[T]errorism is a[R]eligious [D]uty and [F]orce is [N]ecessary. Abouhalima maintains that the court's remarks denied him the ability to argue lack of incriminating evidence, gave the appearance of bias against him and infected his right to a fair trial. 264 Specifically, during summation, Abouhalima's counsel argued that although agents who searched his client's apartment took a lot of materials, books, everything, the government only presented two of them. The government, disputing the accuracy of this argument, sought clarification, given that it had offered a total of seven items but the court had only allowed two of them into evidence--the terrorist magazine that Abouhalima refers to (Facing the enemies of God) and a book that described the destruction of buildings, entitled Rapid Destruction and Demolition. The court addressed that issue when it instructed the jury on the meaning of cumulative evidence, specifically stating: 265 Now, [Abouhalima's counsel] argued to you that the government only offered into evidence one magazine from his client Abouhalima's house, but what happened was the government wanted to put in a pile of stuff. The objection was properly taken. I thought it was cumulative. And I said it was cumulative. I tell you, you can draw no inference whatsoever from the absence of cumulative evidence. 266 During a break, Abouhalima's counsel objected to the instruction on grounds the court had actually excluded the evidence on the basis of lack of relevance, not because it was cumulative. Consequently, after that break the court gave the following curative instruction: 267 [Abouhalima's counsel] points out to me that he didn't object to any evidence on the basis of anything being cumulative. He objected on the basis of relevance. 268 Now, relevance means that something has a logical tendency to convince the mind that a fact is so or not so. That's what relevance is, and I ruled, apparently, not that it was cumulative, but that it was irrelevant because it has nothing to do with the issues in this case. I am quite sure he stated it right, so when I was talking to you about cumulative evidence I made a mistake. 269 Abouhalima did not object to this curative instruction or request additional corrective measures. On appeal, however, Abouhalima asserts that the correction was insufficient to cure the harm, and that the court should have apologized and instructed the jury to reevaluate Abouhalima's argument. 270 This Court will reverse when 'it appears clear to the jury that the [district] court believes the accused is guilty.'  United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137, 141 (2d Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d 302, 303 (2d Cir.1973)). The vital question is not whether the trial judge's conduct left something to be desired but 'whether his behavior was so prejudicial that it denied ... appellant[ ] a fair, as distinguished from a perfect, trial.'  Id. (citation omitted). [W]e must make an examination of the entire record ... in order to determine whether the defendant received a fair trial. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, when a court errs in the jury charge and delivers a timely curative instruction, we ordinarily may presume that the jury adhered to that correction unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury [was] unable to follow the court's instructions and the evidence is devastating to the defense. United States v. Colombo, 909 F.2d 711, 715 (2d Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (where prosecutor links a RICO defendant to the rape and sodomy of a woman as background information, but those charges are not before the jury, there is an overwhelming probability that, despite a court's curative limiting instruction, a jury would be unable to consider this evidence dispassionately). When a defendant fails to object to the curative instruction at trial, we review the court's instruction for plain error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Under this standard, the appellant has the burden of demonstrating a miscarriage of justice, or ... an obvious instance of misapplied law. Latsis, 20 F.3d at 49 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 271 We conclude that Judge Duffy's mistaken instruction did not convey to the jury that he believed Abouhalima was guilty. Such a message is, at the very least, muddled by the court's admission of error. We also conclude that based on the record as a whole, the court's error did not deprive Abouhalima of a fair trial. While the instruction may have momentarily undermined Abouhalima's narrow argument that there was a lack of incriminating evidence found in his apartment, the court's timely admission of error and corrective instruction minimized whatever prejudice could have been created by that mistake. See, e.g., United States v. Messina, 131 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1546, 140 L.Ed.2d 694 (1998). Because under these circumstances there is no overwhelming probability that the jury was unable to follow the curative instruction, Abouhalima cannot demonstrate prejudice, let alone a miscarriage of justice to warrant reversal under the plain error standard.