Opinion ID: 2782387
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Michigan State-Law Claim

Text: Brown brings a state-law claim for assault and battery against the officers, and they invoke Michigan’s affirmative defense of governmental immunity. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407. We have jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal of the denial of governmental immunity on a Michigan state-law claim. Livermore ex rel. Rohm v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 407–08 (6th Cir. 2007). Michigan’s Governmental Tort Liability Act confers tort immunity on governmental agents. Subsection (2) of the Act establishes general criteria for governmental immunity in tort, and subsection (3) addresses intentional torts in particular, including assault and battery, providing “Subsection (2) does not alter the law of intentional torts as it existed before July 7, 1986.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(3). This language “indicates the Legislature’s intent to confer immunity on governmental employees for intentional torts to the same extent allowed under the common law as it existed before July 7, 1986.” Odom v. Wayne County, 760 N.W.2d 217, 223 (Mich. 2008) (emphasis in original). The Odom court restated the common-law rule as granting immunity only if the government employee or official can show by the preponderance of the evidence that: (a) The acts were undertaken during the course of employment and the employee was acting, or reasonably believed that he was acting, within the scope of his authority, (b) the acts were undertaken in good faith, or were not undertaken with malice, and (c) the acts were discretionary, as opposed to ministerial. Id. at 228 (citing Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing), 363 N.W.2d 641 (Mich. 1984)). In other words, Michigan state law imposes a subjective test for governmental immunity for intentional torts, based on the officials’ state of mind, in contrast to the objective test for federal qualified immunity. Michigan governmental immunity “protects a defendant’s honest belief and good-faith conduct with the cloak of immunity while exposing to liability a defendant No. 14-1392 Brown v. Lewis, et al. Page 21 who acts with malicious intent.” Odom, 760 N.W.2d at 228. That malicious intent is defined as “conduct or a failure to act that was intended to harm the plaintiff . . . [or] that shows such indifference to whether harm will result as to be equal to a willingness that harm will result.” Id. at 225. The district court incorrectly applied an objective test to the assault-and-battery claim: “There is, at the very least, a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Officers’ actions were reasonable.” Brown, 2014 WL 353842 at  (citing VanVorous v. Burmeister, 687 N.W.2d 132, 142 (Mich. 2004)). To the extent that VanVorous put forward an objective test for immunity against such claims, it was overruled by Odom. See Odom, 760 N.W.2d at 224 n.33 (“Cases holding that governmental employees are protected by more or less than the qualified immunity for intentional-tort liability provided in Ross are overruled to the extent that such cases are inconsistent with Ross.”). This court has recognized that overruling. Smith v. Stoneburner, 716 F.3d 926, 934 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying the subjective, Odom, test); Bletz v. Gribble, 641 F.3d 743, 757 (6th Cir. 2011) (same); but see Bennett v. Krakowski, 671 F.3d 553, 560–61 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing VanVorous to apply an objective test); Jefferson v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 454, 458 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010) (same). Taking Brown’s version of events as true, the officers threw her onto the ground, despite the fact that she was clearly afraid and cooperating with their orders. A jury could find that this behavior “shows such indifference to whether harm w[ould] result as to be equal to a willingness that harm w[ould] result.” Odom, 760 N.W.2d at 225; see also Smith, 716 F.3d at 934–35 (“If, as the Smiths allege, the officers banged Charles' head against a wall, refused to loosen his cuffs when asked and gratuitously shoved Donnetta, a reasonable jury could find that they acted maliciously.”). We therefore affirm the district court’s ruling on this issue, albeit on a different ground.