Opinion ID: 1553718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether this court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the trial court's entry of an order compelling arbitration.

Text: ¶ 11. Section 16 of the FAA states: (a) An appeal may be taken from  (1) an order  (A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title, (B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed, (C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration, (D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or (E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award; (2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against an arbitration that is subject to this title; or (3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title. (b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order  (1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title; (2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title; (3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or (4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). Herrin-Gear and American argue that the trial court's order was not final, and that this Court, in Banks v. City Finance Co., 825 So.2d 642 (Miss.2002), found the appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain appeals of interlocutory orders granting motions to compel arbitration. On the other hand, when a trial court order disposes of an entire case on the merits, that order is final, and thus appealable. ¶ 12. Over the past few years, the procedural vehicles used by aggrieved parties to travel to this Court for review of a trial court's order granting or denying arbitration have varied. Notwithstanding our decision in Banks, in subsequent cases, we have reviewed and considered the issue of arbitration from parties who were aggrieved by the trial court's entry of an order granting a motion to compel arbitration. See Smith v. Captain D's, LLC, 963 So.2d 1116, 1118-19 (Miss.2007) (interlocutory appeal from trial court's entry of order granting motion to compel arbitration and entry of final judgment of dismissal pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b), which this Court found should be treated as timely-filed notice of appeal from final judgment; jurisdiction not raised); In Re Tyco Int'l (US), Inc., 917 So.2d 773, 776 (Miss.2005) (direct appeal from trial-court order granting motion to compel arbitration and denying Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) certification; jurisdiction not raised); Sullivan v. Protex Weatherproofing, Inc., 913 So.2d 256, 257 (Miss.2005) (direct appeal from trial-court order granting motion to compel arbitration; jurisdiction not raised); Sullivan v. Mounger, 882 So.2d 129, 131 (Miss.2004) (grant of interlocutory appeal from trial-court order granting motion to compel arbitration); Russell v. Performance Toyota, Inc., 826 So.2d 719, 721 (Miss.2002) (direct appeal from trial-court order granting motion to compel arbitration; jurisdiction not raised). ¶ 13. On the other hand, we eventually simplified the process for parties aggrieved by a trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration. In a case which was not before the Court by way of an interlocutory appeal or a judgment certified pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), we held that a direct appeal may be taken from a trial-court order denying a motion to compel arbitration. Tupelo Auto Sales v. Scott, 844 So.2d 1167, 1169-70 (Miss.2003). ¶ 14. A review of these cases causes us to conclude that this Court has an inconsistent procedural history in reviewing our trial courts' actions in granting or denying motions to compel arbitration. We thus wish to establish via today's case but one procedure for this Court's review of a trial court's grant or denial of a motion to compel arbitration, and that one procedure shall be via a direct appeal pursuant to the provisions of Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 & 4. ¶ 15. Although Section 16(b) of the FAA states that an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title or compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title, Section 16(a)(3) states that [a]n appeal may be taken from a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title. 9 U.S.C. 16(a)(3) (2006). More than fifty years ago, this Court held that a decree forcing arbitration partook of the nature of a final decree, since once arbitration was accomplished, all of the relief prayed for by appellees would have been granted. Mach. Prods. Co. v. Prairie Local Lodge No. 1538 of Int'l Ass'n, 230 Miss. 809, 94 So.2d 344, 346 (1957) (overruled on other grounds). Although this Court went on to hold that arbitration could not be binding, we nonetheless voiced a vital sentiment. When binding arbitration is compelled, there is nothing left for the court to do but enforce the award. It is inconsequential whether an appeal is titled as interlocutory when the court only has to supervise compliance with an arbitration order or enforce an arbitration award. It is on this issue that this Court now overrules Banks and any other prior decisions of this Court to the extent they hold otherwise. ¶ 16. In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 121 S.Ct. 513, 517, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000), the United States Supreme Court addressed whether an order compelling arbitration and dismissing a party's underlying claims is a `final decision with respect to an arbitration' within the meaning of § 16(a)(3). The Court stated: Section 16(a)(3), however, preserves immediate appeal of any final decision with respect to an arbitration, regardless of whether the decision is favorable or hostile to arbitration. And as petitioners and respondent agree, the term final decision has a well-developed and longstanding meaning. It is a decision that `ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.' Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (both quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)). See also St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28-29, 2 S.Ct. 6, 27 L.Ed. 638 (1883). Because the FAA does not define a final decision with respect to an arbitration or otherwise suggest that the ordinary meaning of final decision should not apply, we accord the term its well-established meaning. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259-260, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992). Id. at 519, 121 S.Ct. 513. The Court concluded that where, as here, the District Court has ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration, and dismissed all the claims before it, that decision is `final' within the meaning of § 16(a)(3), and therefore appealable. Id. at 521, 121 S.Ct. 513. Further, [t]he FAA does permit parties to arbitration agreements to bring a separate proceeding in a district court to enter judgment on an arbitration award once it is made (or to vacate or modify it), but the existence of that remedy does not vitiate the finality of the District Court's resolution of the claims in the instant proceeding. Id. at 520, 121 S.Ct. 513 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10, 11). ¶ 17. In Banks, we held that Green Tree was distinguishable from the case then before us. Looking now at Banks in the rear-view mirror with more than seven years of experience by this Court in addressing numerous arbitration issues, we today conclude that we were simply wrong in Banks and that Green Tree is not distinguishable from Banks, nor is Green Tree distinguishable from today's case. In Banks, this Court attempted to distinguish Green Tree based on the fact that in Green Tree, the Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed with prejudice, thus ending the suit in the district court, whereas in Banks, the order which compelled arbitration did not dismiss the claims nor end the lawsuit. Banks, 825 So.2d at 646. Quite frankly, this conclusion in Banks failed to recognize the crux of the Green Tree decision: Because the FAA does not define `a final decision with respect to an arbitration' or otherwise suggest that the ordinary meaning of `final decision' should not apply, we accord the term its well-established meaning. Green Tree, 121 S.Ct. at 519 (citation omitted). ¶ 18. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has reiterated the well-established meaning of final decision, stating that it is one that `ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.' Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir.2002) (quoting Green Tree, 121 S.Ct. at 519) (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit was faced with an argument similar to the one before us today; the appellees in Orr argued that because the district court's order compelled arbitration and `closed' the case instead of compelling arbitration and `dismissing' the case, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the ruling of the district court. Id. The Court determined that [b]y distinguishing the terms `dismiss' and `close' as they apply to disposition of a case, Appellees attempt to thwart the Court's instruction in Green Tree to apply the well-established meaning of `final decision,' and [t]here is no practical distinction.... [t]he application of each word results in a termination on the merits, leaving the judgment-rendering court with nothing more to do but execute the judgment. Id. at 707-08. In today's case, regardless of the fact that we are neither faced with a stay nor a dismissal, the trial court has nothing left to do but supervise compliance with an order for arbitration or enforce an arbitration award. Orr, 294 F.3d at 715. See also Banks, 825 So.2d at 650 (Diaz, J., dissenting). Thus, [t]here is nothing interlocutory about an order compelling arbitration that does all the court has to do. Id. at 714 (citations omitted). ¶ 19. In an effort to provide uniformity and judicial economy, this Court holds today that an order compelling arbitration which disposes of all the issues before the trial court or orders the entire controversy to be arbitrated is a final decision, and therefore, immediately appealable. Further, any final decision with respect to arbitration is appealable to this Court pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4. See M.R.A.P. 3, 4. As stated by our learned colleagues from the Supreme Court of New Jersey, When the parties are ordered to arbitration, the right to appeal should not turn on whether a trial court decides to stay the action or decides to dismiss the action. Rather, the same result should apply in either case. In that way the parties will know with relative certainty that the order is appealable as of right. Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364, 379, 944 A.2d 642, 650 (2008). The trial court order in today's case compelled arbitration of the entire controversy as to all parties. As such, we find that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over the present matter pursuant to Section 16(a)(3) of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) (2006). To the extent that Banks and its progeny are in conflict with today's decision, those cases are overruled.