Opinion ID: 2070687
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Remaining Trust Elements

Text: Two additional requirements of an express trust are: the existence of a definite subject matter or trust property, sometimes referred to as the corpus of the trust, and delivery of the trust corpus to the trustee. Zukerman, 218 Ill.App.3d at 329, 161 Ill.Dec. 121, 578 N.E.2d 248. In this case, the trial court determined: [T]he Theatre cannot be the corpus of the trust because Roosevelt has held title in the Theatre since it purchased it in the 1940's and has safeguarded its right, title, and interest since that time. The court ruled that as a matter of law, a trust corpus was limited to tangible property and interests in real property and other intangibles could not be held in trust. Thus, the trial court concluded that the right to restore and operate the Theatre could not constitute the trust corpus. Further, the trial court found that the alleged trust failed for lack of delivery of the trust corpus. According to the court, plaintiffs failed to show that Roosevelt had ever relinquished its right, title and interest in the Theatre. The trial court also found that its determination that there was no charitable trust obviated the need to consider the remaining requirements of an express trust. The appellate court assigned error to the trial court's legal conclusion that the right to restore and operate the Theatre could not be the corpus of an express charitable trust. 321 Ill.App.3d at 776-78, 254 Ill.Dec. 557, 747 N.E.2d 969. The appellate court noted that, [i]n rejecting the fact that the right to operate, restore and maintain the Theatre could constitute the corpus of the trust, the court incorrectly analyzed the issue of delivery of the trust corpus. 321 Ill.App.3d at 778, 254 Ill.Dec. 557, 747 N.E.2d 969. The appellate court also assigned error to the trial court's failure to consider the remaining trust elements. With that approach the trial court failed to consider a variety of circumstances that indicate trust intent contrary to the recognized principle of law that proof of intent may be demonstrated by surrounding circumstances. 321 Ill. App.3d at 779, 254 Ill.Dec. 557, 747 N.E.2d 969. The appellate court held that, based on these perceived errors, the trial court's conclusion that there was no express trust was clearly erroneous. 321 Ill.App.3d at 779, 254 Ill.Dec. 557, 747 N.E.2d 969. We disagree. The appellate court dissent correctly reasoned: I do not agree the trial judge's finding of a lack of intent to create a trust rests on his apparently mistaken view that intangible rights cannot be the corpus of a trust. The judge's first finding that there was no such intent had nothing to do with the corpus issue.    Lack of a permissible corpus was a second, alternative reason offered by the trial judge. It is not the sine qua non of his decision. 321 Ill.App.3d at 787, 254 Ill.Dec. 557, 747 N.E.2d 969 (Wolfson, J., dissenting). The record supports this position. The trial court expressly found: One thing was abundantly clear at the time of the passing of the 1960 ResolutionThe Board of Trustees of Roosevelt was not going to create anything that would diminish their interest in or power over the Theatre. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court expressly determined that Roosevelt did not intend to create a trust of any sort, regardless of what the corpus might be, how that corpus would be delivered, and whether the remaining trust elements were present. In any event, we need not accept the trial court's legal conclusion, as long as its factual determinations are supported by the record. As stated above, the relevant findings were amply supported in this case. Thus, there is no basis for any finding of error. People ex rel. Illinois Historic Preservation Agency v. Zych, 186 Ill.2d 267, 282, 238 Ill.Dec. 23, 710 N.E.2d 820 (1999). The trial court found that Roosevelt did not intend to create a trust of any sort. This finding, supported by ample evidence, compels the conclusion that no trust was created, and obviates consideration of the remaining trust elements. See, e.g., Wilkening, 109 Ill.App.3d at 941-42, 65 Ill.Dec. 366, 441 N.E.2d 158.