Opinion ID: 6800285
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The DOH Investigations

Text: The evidence from the two DOH investigations consists primarily of the June 2016 report authored by Derek V. Brooks and the September 2016 report prepared by Emilia Moran. Appellant argues that certain statements in the reports substantiate the objective reasonableness of her belief that the two youths posed a substantial and specific danger to public safety. 57 See, e.g., Stone v. Alexander, 6 A.3d 847, 851 (D.C. 2010) (citations omitted). Appellant’s contention that we should review de novo the exclusion of the DOH evidence – apparently on the ground that it was admissible as a matter of law – has no merit. The trial court excluded all evidence after January 6th, which it concluded was the date (not June 8, as Dr. Bellard testified) when the DYRS decision to terminate appellant’s employment was made. The date of termination had no bearing on admissibility of the DOH reports; and, as elaborated below, exclusion of that evidence was not erroneous either as an abuse of discretion or as a matter of law. 58 Id. (quoting Johnson (James) v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 366 (D.C. 1979)). 35 Appellant does not identify any evidence contained in the reports which could support the objective reasonableness of her belief that the youths were contagious. Her opening brief makes only general reference to “numerous shortcomings in DYRS’s medical and nursing practices” documented in the reports, “many of which were the subject of Ishakwue’s protected disclosures.” As we have previously stated, “it is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.” 59 Hence, appellant cannot rely upon unidentified statements in the two reports as supporting the reasonableness of her belief at the time she made the disclosures. The only evidence appellant explicitly references in her opening brief is deposition testimony by investigator Brooks, who allegedly “corroborated [appellant’s] disclosure that a DYRS resident with an elevated PPD level was improperly released into the general population.” The District points out, however, that appellant failed to include the deposition transcript as an exhibit to her opposition motion in which she referenced the testimony. That testimony, 59 Johnson (Nancy), 225 A.3d at 1276 n.5 (quoting Gabramadhin v. United States, 137 A.3d 178, 187 (D.C. 2016)). 36 therefore, is not part of the record before us on appeal, and thus we have no basis for considering it. For the first time in her reply brief, appellant also highlights alleged statements in the Brooks report that DYRS transferred “an at-risk youth to a shelter house without knowing whether he was infected with tuberculosis”; that “[u]pon his return to the medical unit, DYRS referred him to a tuberculosis clinic for treatment”; and that a second youth “with elevated PPD levels . . . was reintegrated into the community before treatment was completed.” As an initial matter, “[i]t is the longstanding policy of this court not to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” 60 In any event, assuming the two youths discussed in the report were the same youths that were the subject of appellant’s disclosures, the statements in the report do not substantiate the objective reasonableness of appellant’s concern. 61 That one of the youths was eventually referred to the TB 60 Holbrook v. District of Columbia, 259 A.3d 78, 86 n.2 (D.C. 2021). 61 The report does not actually state that DYRS transferred an at-risk youth “without knowing whether he was infected with tuberculosis”; it simply notes that “prior to reading the PPD, the youth was transferred to a shelter house.” Similarly, the report does not state that a second youth with “elevated PPD levels was reintegrated into the community before treatment was completed”; it simply notes that his “PPD was 15 mm on 12/29/15 when he was brought from a shelter house to YSC for reading,” and that he was “immediately referred to Children’s National Medical Center for treatment.” This statement could actually undercut appellant’s (continued…) 37 clinic does not establish that the youth was contagious, as the youth may have been receiving treatment for latent tuberculosis. Moreover, the fact that the two youths were not isolated prior to their PPD readings was already part of the record and was undisputed. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, let alone err as a matter of law, in denying admission of the DOH investigative reports in evidence.