Opinion ID: 2977419
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timing of merits adjudication

Text: Plaintiffs cite Bentley v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.21 in support of their argument that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on defendants’ statute-oflimitations defense during the class-certification phase. However, the present case is distinguishable from Bentley. In Bentley, defendants opposed class certification because some plaintiffs may have been subject to a statute-of-limitations defense. Bentley, 223 F.R.D. at 485. Here, the statute of limitations was asserted by the defendants as a basis for dismissal of the suit and not as an argument against class certification. The class-certification question was never reached in this case because the Egerer plaintiffs’ claims were time barred by the statute.22 In addition, plaintiffs contend that their hands were “prejudicially tied” in opposing defendants’ motion for judgment on the merits because defendants objected to certain discovery requests as unrelated to class certification. However, even construing the facts in favor of plaintiffs, we cannot conclude on this record that plaintiffs were prejudiced by lack of discovery in responding to defendants’ motion. As discussed, supra, plaintiffs believed that they had sufficient facts to preclude judgment on the statute-of-limitations defense notwithstanding defendants’ objections to discovery that defendants contended was unrelated to class certification. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err by ruling on defendants’ motion during the class-certification phase of this case. D. Boyink’s RESPA Claim In order for there to be a violation of 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) and 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14(b), three elements must be present: 1) a payment or a thing of value; 2) made pursuant to an agreement to refer settlement business; and 3) an actual referral. Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp., 491 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 21 223 F.R.D 471 (S.D. Ohio 2004). 22 The district court denied as moot plaintiffs’ motion for class certification after entering judgment for defendants. (J.A. at 56-57). No. 08-1173 Egerer, et al. v. Woodland Realty, Inc., et al. Page 16 Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp., 132 F.3d 692, 696 (11th Cir. 1998)); Edwards v. First American Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 696)); Paul Barron, Michael Berenson, & Dan Rosin, Federal Regulation of Real Estate and Mortgage Lending, § 2:45 (Dec. 2008); see also Joyce Palomar, Title Insurance Law, § 21:2 (“Only when referrals are motivated by an agreement that the referee will pay or kickback to the referrer a thing of value is RESPA § 8(a) [12 U.S.C. § 2607(a)] implicated.”). The district court held as a matter of law that Boyink did not have a cause of action against defendants under 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a), and therefore granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The basis for that conclusion was that neither Boyink’s real estate agent who recommended Woodland Title to Boyink, nor the agent’s firm, were connected in any way to the defendants. Consequently, Judge Enslen concluded that Parsons’s recommendation of Woodland Title to Boyink was not an “actual referral.” Plaintiffs do not allege or argue that Parsons or Prins Real Estate had any relationship with defendants or any agreement or eligibility with respect to the Marketing Dollars Program that plaintiffs allege violates RESPA. Further, plaintiffs have not alleged or argued on appeal that Parsons or Prins Real Estate received any benefit from Parsons’s recommendation to Boyink regarding settlement services. Accordingly, the district court correctly found that Boyink does not have a cause of action against defendants under 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a), and we affirm Judge Enslen’s dismissal of Boyink’s RESPA claim.