Opinion ID: 1728745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the alimony issue

Text: In the next issue, Ms. Rosen argues that the district court erroneously converted her alimony from permanent to rehabilitative. As noted previously, this family law proceeding has encompassed numerous appeals since its inception. Initially, the wife was awarded lump sum alimony. The district court reversed the lump sum award, relying on our decision in Canakaris, and found that Ms. Rosen was entitled to permanent periodic alimony. In doing so, the district court noted the following: Although Mrs. Rosen has teaching experience and a master's degree in elementary education, she has worked very little since the marriage and has devoted almost all of her time to her duties as a homemaker and mother. Rosen I, 386 So.2d at 1270. On remand, the trial court awarded Ms. Rosen alimony in the amount of $2000 per month, which Mr. Rosen appealed. The district court found the award to be fully justified both by the record and our prior opinion. Rosen II, 426 So.2d at 1053. In subsequent litigation, the trial court reduced Ms. Rosen's alimony award from $2000 to $500 per month. In reversing that reduction, the district court stated: We reverse a judgment that modified a permanent periodic alimony award previously affirmed by this court because the bases for modification ... do not reflect any significant change in circumstance from the time of entry of the original award. Specifically, the wife's employability was known at the time of the previous award and, thus, could not be considered. Rosen IV, 528 So.2d at 42 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In 1991, Ms. Rosen petitioned the trial court to enforce the district court's mandate in Rosen IV. She also sought an increase in child support and alimony; Mr. Rosen sought a decrease in child support and alimony and a change in the type of alimony. The trial court made the following findings pertinent to this issue: (1) that Ms. Rosen is dependent and the need to maintain her children and the home they share interferes with gainful employment outside the home at this time; (2) that she is definitely in need of alimony; (3) that there has been a substantial change in circumstances as to the financial condition of [Ms. Rosen]; and (4) that there is no finding that [Ms. Rosen] is underemployed or unemployed and the evidence is that she has chosen to stay at home and work in the home. Based on these findings, the trial judge ordered that Ms. Rosen's alimony be increased from $2000 per month to $2750 per month. Child support was also increased. The judge denied the husband's request for a reduction in child support and alimony. The trial judge also granted in part and denied in part other relief requested by the parties. It is this last order that is the subject of the most recent appeal and our review here. The district court affirmed the increase in alimony from $2000 to $2750 per month and the increase in child support. In doing so, however, the district court also converted the alimony from permanent to rehabilitative, stating: The former wife has a master's degree in education, the children will both be in college by the fall of 1995, and there is no justifiable reason why the former wife should not enter the work force. We find error in the award of permanent alimony rather than rehabilitative under the reasoning and dictates found in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Rojas v. Rojas, 656 So.2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Siegel v. Siegel, 564 So.2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Contogeorgos v. Contogeorgos, 482 So.2d 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Perry v. Perry, 448 So.2d 588 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Campbell v. Campbell, 432 So.2d 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); James v. James, 443 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Crees v. Crees, 342 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Reback v. Reback, 296 So.2d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). We therefore convert the permanent alimony to rehabilitative alimony.... Rosen VI, 659 So.2d at 369. The decisions cited by the district court stand for the general proposition that it is an abuse of discretion to award permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony when a spouse has a clear ability to become financially independent at some point in the future. Ms. Rosen contends that the district court was without authority to modify the alimony award given that her employability was contemplated and considered at the time of the original award. She asserts that the trial court made specific findings that she continues to be dependent and in need of alimony, and she argues that the district court itself in Rosen IV reversed a previous decrease in alimony because Ms. Rosen's employability was known at the time of the previous award and, thus, could not be considered in determining whether alimony should be altered. 528 So.2d at 43. She relies on a number of district court decisions in support of this argument. See, e.g., Long v. Long, 622 So.2d 622 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Allison v. Allison, 554 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Gray v. Lauscher, 537 So.2d 708 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Bashaw v. Bashaw, 412 So.2d 433 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Jaffee v. Jaffee, 394 So.2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The issue presented is whether, as a principle of law, a trial judge has the authority to alter alimony from permanent to rehabilitative based, in part, on the same employability evidence that was presented in the initial dissolution proceeding, together with other changed circumstances. The district court's decision in Rosen IV does appear to prohibit the trial court from reconsidering employability status under the circumstances of this case. The other cases cited by Ms. Rosen, however, simply stand for the general proposition that circumstances that were contemplated by the final judgment or specifically agreed to by the parties may not be considered as a change in circumstances in subsequent modification proceedings. For example, in Jaffee, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement in which they specifically agreed that the wife would receive permanent periodic alimony. In Bashaw, a change in alimony was sought based on financial considerations that were specifically reviewed by the trial judge at the time of the initial award. The other cases cited by Ms. Rosen are equally distinguishable. We reject Ms. Rosen's position and the district court's statement in Rosen IV that employability status or the effect of having to stay at home to care for the parties' children cannot be considered years later as a factor in a subsequent modification proceeding. Employability at the time of an initial alimony proceeding and employability years later can be vastly different, even when a party's educational background or job skills remain the same. Numerous circumstances can change the employability of the alimony recipient. Moreover, such changes can work both for and against an alimony recipient. It is important that trial judges be allowed to consider all relevant factors in making the types of decisions at issue. To hold otherwise would result in unjust decisions. As the findings in this case reflect, the demands of supervising and maintaining a home for minor children may justify a higher alimony award because the trial court has determined that it is in the parties' best interests for one spouse to work within the home. Once the minor children have left the home, the justification for the initial alimony award may change. On the other hand, the employability of a party who has remained at home for many years may be diminished given the increased age of the party and the changing job market, even when the party possesses or may seek to possess an outstanding educational background or significant job skills. We made it clear in Canakaris that trial judges have the discretion to convert permanent alimony to rehabilitative alimony or to convert rehabilitative alimony to permanent alimony, depending on the circumstances presented. The point of our findings in Canakaris was that an award of alimony is to provide the current necessary support. In the instant case, at the time the trial court heard the alimony issue, the minor children were still at home. By the time this case reached the district court, however, the district court concluded that the children would be in college by 1995 and that Ms. Rosen should attempt to renew her qualifications to seek employment. We find that the factors considered by the district court would have been appropriate factors for the trial court to consider as of the date the district court rendered its opinion. We conclude, however, that the district court erred in making such factual determinations in light of the record before us and the specific findings of the trial court that Ms. Rosen was definitely in need of alimony and that the parties' children were still at home at the time the trial court considered the alimony award at issue. Under these circumstances, we find that the district court should have affirmed the trial court on this point without prejudice to the husband to reapply for an alteration in the alimony award. Accordingly, we approve the district court's decision concerning the attorney's fee award and quash its decision concerning permanent and rehabilitative alimony. We approve Robbie, Davis, Peacon, Margulies, Adler, Meltzer, and Adams to the extent they are consistent with our findings regarding the attorney's fee issue; we disapprove the district court decisions noted above that are inconsistent. We disapprove Rosen IV to the extent it prohibited the reconsideration of Ms. Rosen's employability status in subsequent modification proceedings. We direct that the district court remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration under the principles articulated in this opinion. It is so ordered. KOGAN, C.J., and HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. OVERTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which GRIMES, J., concurs. SHAW, J., recused.