Opinion ID: 76070
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Fence Requirement

Text: 22 Because Sharon also attacks the district court's application of the enhancement on the ground that she was not a fence, we address whether the totality of the circumstances test operates to the exclusion of the first prong of the fence test: whether stolen property was actually bought and sold. In short, can the enhancement be applied where the defendant was either a seller who did not receive or a receiver who did not sell? We hold that it cannot; a prerequisite to the application of the two-level enhancement in § 2B6.1(b)(2) is that the defendant personally received and sold stolen property. 23 In considering this question, we look first to the plain language and ordinary meaning of the enhancement. See United States v. Singh, 291 F.3d 756, 761 (11th Cir.2002). By stating receiving and selling in the conjunctive, the Sentencing Commission indicated its intent that the defendant must have engaged in both. See U.S.S.G. § 2B6.1(b)(2). Indeed, [t]he common understanding of a person in the business of receiving and selling stolen property is a professional fence.... United States v. Braslawsky, 913 F.2d 466, 468 (7th Cir.1990). In addition, the text of the amendment to the enhancement in § 2B1.1(b)(4) justifies the totality of the circumstances test because it more properly targets the conduct of the individual who is actually in the business of fencing.  U.S.S.G.App. C, Amend. 617 at 182 (2001) (emphasis added). By its plain terms and meaning, then, the enhancement first and foremost requires that the defendant at least be a fence for stolen property. 24 The structure of the guidelines and parallel development of the [other] sentencing guideline governing thefts of property are also instructive. McMinn, 103 F.3d at 219. In 1989, the words receiving and were added to the language of the enhancement in former § 2B1.2 increasing the penalty for those in the business of selling stolen property, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.2(b)(3)(A) (1989), in order to retain its narrow focus upon defendants who `fence' stolen goods. McMinn, 103 F.3d at 220. Also, prior to its consolidation with § 2B1.1 in 1993, § 2B1.2, dealing with offenses involving the receipt of stolen property, included this enhancement while § 2B1.1, dealing only with theft offenses, did not. After consolidation, the enhancement in § 2B1.1 now applies only [i]f the offense [itself first] involved receiving stolen property, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(4) (2001) (emphasis added), and, therefore, does not apply to theft crimes. See McMinn, 103 F.3d at 220-21. Coupled with the fact that other enhancements in the guidelines apply equally to thieves and fences, the Commission must have intended that only fences, who by definition are not thieves themselves, receive the enhancement. See id. at 219-20. 25 We also look to the underlying purpose of the enhancement. See Singh, 291 F.3d at 761 (where there is no particular application indicated by the guidelines, we look both to their language and purpose). When we study its rationale, the enhancement evinces a clear intent to impose heightened punishment on fences. United States v. Sutton, 77 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996) (The enhancement is intended as a punishment for fences, people who buy and sell stolen goods ... as opposed to thieves who merely sell the goods which they have stolen.). Commentary to former § 2B1.2(b)(4)(A), later consolidated with § 2B1.1, reveals this intent: Persons who receive stolen property for resale receive a sentence enhancement because the amount of property is likely to underrepresent the scope of their criminality and the extent to which they encourage or facilitate other crimes. 15 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.2, comment. (backg'd.) (1992). After all, a professional fence facilitates the commission of many thefts by creating a clearinghouse for stolen goods. Braslawsky, 913 F.2d at 468. That the enhancement requires, at a minimum, that the defendant be a fence comports with basic guideline[s] sentencing policy as well. McMinn, 103 F.3d at 221. Specifically, Congress requires that court[s], in determining the particular sentence to be imposed,... consider ... the need for the sentence ... to reflect the seriousness of the offense ... [and] to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(B). 26 [In this regard t]he services of a professional fence undoubtedly facilitate the ready, advantageous disposition of property stolen by the less well-situated thief.... Furthermore, the interposition of a sophisticated fencing operation between the thief and the ultimate purchaser of the stolen property may confound or obstruct the investigation and prosecution of theft offenses ... [as] the loot is more likely to be dispersed before law enforcement agencies can respond. 27 McMinn, 103 F.3d at 221. 28 Moreover, we said in Maung that [a] defendant who has not received and sold cannot be `in the business of receiving and selling.' 267 F.3d at 1119. Other circuits, too, have held that the enhancement applies only when the defendant is first a fence. See, e.g., McMinn, 103 F.3d at 219; Braslawsky, 913 F.2d at 468. 29 Finally, we note that an interpretation of the enhancement requiring that the defendant be a fence is not inconsistent with our adoption of the totality of the circumstances test for applying the enhancement. The fence test has two prongs. 16 The first requires the receipt and sale of stolen goods as a threshold requirement, the second, the facilitation of theft and other crimes. It is the second prong that distinguishes the fence test from the totality of the circumstances test because it sets out the touchstone for determining whether the defendant was actually in the business. That the defendant must also receive and sell stolen goods is the common denominator between the two tests. The decisions of the First Circuit most clearly illustrate this proposition. In St. Cyr, the court rejected the fence test and adopted the totality of the circumstances test. 977 F.2d at 703. Later in McMinn, however, the court held that the enhancement does not apply to mere thieves who are not also fences, 103 F.3d at 219, and rejected the government's argument that the enhancement guideline should be construed simply to require proof that McMinn's sales of stolen goods [, which he himself had stolen,] had a certain regularity or sophistication under the totality of the circumstances test. Id. at 222. In doing so, the court pointed out that its opinion in St. Cyr [adopting the totality of the circumstances test] ... neither expressed nor implied disapproval of the basic proposition that the ... enhancement guideline should apply only to `professional fences.' Id. 30 Other courts agree. Although some Circuits have described the `totality of the circumstances' approach, upon which this Court relies, as a `competing test,' ... [we are not] foreclose[d] ... from requiring in the future that a defendant be a `fence' for the enhancement to apply. Cottman, 142 F.3d at 167 n. 9. Some courts have declined even to adopt one or the other test because the facts of their cases trigger the enhancement under both tests. See, e.g., United States v. Payseno, 104 F.3d 191, 192 (8th Cir.1997) (Because [t]he court's factual findings indicate that Payseno received and sold stolen goods for profit over an extended period of time ... [and] she specifically purchased products ... which she knew were stolen ..., it is not necessary to employ either of the two competing tests....). In fact, we have discovered hardly a [single case] ..., in which a federal appellate court upheld the `in the business' enhancement against a defendant who did not personally participate in receiving and selling (or intending to sell) stolen property, including those courts in the totality-of-the-circumstances-circuits. 17 Maung, 267 F.3d at 1119-20. Thus, we conclude that, even under the totality of the circumstances test, the enhancement in guidelines § 2B6.1(b)(2) only applies if the defendant fenced stolen property.