Opinion ID: 1258640
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The statutory deadline dilemma

Text: Despite the harm to children inflicted by delay and despite the clear and unambiguous statutory deadlines, an alarming number of appeals over the past several years have involved significant violations by the trial courts of the statutory deadlines for entering orders of adjudication and disposition, as well as permanency planning orders and orders terminating parental rights. [2] In reviewing these appeals, the Court of Appeals generally weighed the time requirements of the statutes against the practical effects of the delay and examined the alleged harm resulting from the trial court's failure to enter an order within the proscribed period. The Court of Appeals tended to reverse or affirm the orders depending on the length of delay, with six months being the typical tipping-point for reversal. See, e.g., In re R.L., ___ N.C.App. ___, ___, 652 S.E.2d 327, 336 (2007) (reversing order of adjudication entered seven months after the statutory deadline); In re D.M.M., 179 N.C.App. 383, 389, 633 S.E.2d 715, 718-19 (2006) (reversing based in part on seven-month delay in entry of order of termination); In re D.S., 177 N.C.App. 136, 140, 628 S.E.2d 31, 33-34 (2006) (reversing order of termination based solely on seven-month delay in entry of order); In re O.S.W., 175 N.C.App. 414, 415-16, 623 S.E.2d 349, 350-51 (2006) (reversing order of termination due to six-month delay); In re T.W., 173 N.C.App. 153, 161-62, 617 S.E.2d 702, 706-07 (2005) (reversing order of termination based, inter alia, on delay of nearly one year); In re L.L., 172 N.C.App. 689, 697-700, 616 S.E.2d 392, 396-98 (2005) (concluding that a nine-month delay in entry of a custody review order prejudiced the parties). In such cases, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the parents were prejudiced because notice of appeal could not be taken until entry of the underlying order and all parties were denied a sense of closure. In re C.J.B., 171 N.C.App. 132, 135, 614 S.E.2d 368, 370 (2005). Although the errors cited by the appellants in these cases arose only after the hearings, the Court of Appeals nevertheless reversed and remanded for new hearings. See, e.g., In re R.L., ___ N.C.App. at ___, 652 S.E.2d at 336 (remanding for additional proceedings while acknowledging that the ultimate result of our holding today is less permanence for Respondents, and for [the children]). At least one judge at the Court of Appeals has articulated his disagreement with this approach: I am troubled by our unexamined assumption that a permissible and appropriate remedy for delayed entry of the termination of parental rights order is to reverse the order and remand for a new hearing. In the usual case, reversal is an appropriate remedy precisely because the error at issue casts doubt on the outcome or verdict in the proceeding. A new trial or hearing is then required to ensure the fairness of the result in a case. In contrast, the delayed entry of an order for termination of parental rights does not cast doubt on the integrity of the decision. Additionally, reversal of the order with its associated further delay does nothing to remedy the late entry of the termination order. . . . Ironically, this Court's decision to require a new termination of parental rights hearing generally delays finality for at least another year. This compounds the delay in obtaining permanence for the child, and continues the status quo concerning parents' lack of access to their children. Simply put, the remedy of reversing bears no relationship whatsoever to the wrong that it seeks to redress. More significantly, I know of no statutory basis for our authority to reverse in this circumstance. Reversing orders on termination for the trial court's procedural failure to enter an order within the statutory duration is a draconian result that benefits no one. In re J.N.S., 180 N.C.App. 573, 580-81, 637 S.E.2d 914, 918-19 (2006) (Levinson, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). Other judges have echoed these concerns. See, e.g., In re C.L.K., 182 N.C.App. 600, 609, 643 S.E.2d 458, 463 (2007) (Geer, J., dissenting) (With respect to respondent's delayed ability to appeal, the majority opinion has failed to explain in what manner that factor prejudiced respondent. If respondent desired to appeal more quickly, it was within his power to request that the court enter its order so that an appeal could be taken.); In re J.Z.M., 184 N.C.App. 474, 480, 646 S.E.2d 631, 635 (2007) (Steelman, J., dissenting) (The majority opinion confuses personal prejudice with legal prejudice and cannot show that the delay in any manner affected the outcome of [the] case.), rev'd per curiam, 362 N.C. 167, 655 S.E.2d 832 (2008). In accordance with this line of Court of Appeals cases, respondent here argues that the delayed entry of the order of adjudication and disposition negatively affected (1) her ability to appeal, (2) her right to ongoing review of her case, and (3) her efforts to move forward in her civil custody action. Respondent contends she was therefore prejudiced by the trial court's error, such that reversal of the adjudication order is required. Respondent does not assert, howevernor can shethat the delay in entry of the order of adjudication and disposition had any possible impact upon the actual hearing or the ensuing order by the trial court. Indeed, respondent does not argue that the trial court erred in its substantive decision, only that it erred by entering the order three months past the statutory deadline. [3] Under such facts, the delayed entry of an order . . . does not cast doubt on the integrity of the decision. In re J.N.S., 180 N.C.App. at 580, 637 S.E.2d at 918 (Levinson, J., concurring). When the integrity of the trial court's decision is not in question, a new hearing serves no purpose, but only compounds the delay in obtaining permanence for the child. Id. Thus, when delayed entry of an otherwise proper order is the sole purported ground for appeal, a new hearing is not the proper remedy. Instead, a party's remedy lies in mandamus.