Opinion ID: 510022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statute of Limitations and the Motion to Dismiss

Text: 39 Kropinski filed his complaint on September 9, 1985. Therefore, under District of Columbia law requiring that actions to recover damages for fraud be brought within three years after the time the right to maintain the action accrues, D.C.Code Sec. 12-310(8), his fraud claim is barred if the cause of action accrued before September 9, 1982. 40 Defendants argue that Kropinski must have realized by 1976 or 1977 that he was not obtaining the personal or societal benefits attributed to TM; and as he discovered, or should have discovered, the purported fraud well before September 1982, his claims are barred. Kropinski counters that because defendant employed thought reform, his ability to perceive the fraudulent nature of their representations had been impaired; and as he had attended one of defendants' courses in January 1983 and continued to practice TM until the fall of that year, his suit was timely. He also asserted that the defendants reassured him that his physical discomfort was part of TM unstressing, and that he reasonably relied on those assurances. 41 The district judge noted, when he ruled on their motion for summary judgment, that defendants may be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense if they lulled the plaintiff into inaction. Memorandum at 8 n. 7 (discussing Alley v. Dodge Hotel, 551 F.2d 442 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958, 97 S.Ct. 2684, 53 L.Ed.2d 277 (1977)). He properly concluded that it was for the jury to decide when Kropinski discovered or, under the exotic circumstances of this case, should have discovered the fraud. Id. at 7.