Opinion ID: 1057956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant Scarborough

Text: On March 10, 1999, defendant Bruce Warren Scarborough pleaded guilty in Blount County to committing aggravated burglary, theft, and sexual battery on August 25, 1998. Aggravated burglary and sexual battery are Class C and E felonies, respectively. See id. §§ 39-14-403(b), 39-13-505(c). Scarborough was incarcerated for his crimes and, on April 22, 1999, participated in the prison facility's health screening for new inmates. During this screening, he was requested to submit a blood specimen pursuant to the DNA collection statute for DNA analysis, defined as the process through which deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in a human biological specimen is analyzed and compared with DNA from another biological specimen for identification purposes. Id. § 40-35-321(a). Scarborough signed a consent form for the blood draw and DNA analysis, and a blood specimen was obtained. A DNA analysis was performed, and the results were submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). In June 2002 the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation reported that the DNA profile obtained from the 1999 specimen submitted by Scarborough matched the DNA profile obtained from a sample of forensic evidence recovered during a physical examination conducted on J.S., a woman who reported that she had been raped in Knox County on March 2, 1997. [1] Following this match, a search warrant was obtained on July 8, 2002, and a second specimen of blood was taken from Scarborough. Analysis of the second specimen confirmed that Scarborough was the source of the forensic evidence obtained during the examination of the 1997 rape victim. Scarborough was subsequently charged with four counts of aggravated rape against J.S. That case is before us today. Scarborough filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the blood specimen drawn in 1999 pursuant to the DNA collection statute, asserting that the DNA collection statute is unconstitutional because it violates his federal and state constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The trial court denied the motion on its merits but granted an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals accepted the interlocutory appeal and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Scarborough then sought this Court's review, which we granted. [2]