Opinion ID: 40564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Caselaw and Commentary

Text: 56 To resolve textual ambiguity, we consult the interpretations given to the statute by Louisiana courts. Jesco Const. Corp. v. NationsBank Corp., 278 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir.2001). In looking at caselaw, we steer clear of the common law principle of stare decisis and . . . apply instead the distinctly Civilian doctrine of jurisprudence constante.  12 Songbyrd, 104 F.3d at 776. The decisions of Louisiana courts do not so much establish a rule we are bound to follow as interpretations invaluable to our understanding. Id. at 777; Orso, 283 F.3d at 695. Because the Louisiana Supreme Court has not addressed whether the peremption period begins to run when notice of the contract has been filed but notice of termination has not, we make an  Erie guess as to what its answer would be. Rogers, 42 F.3d at 295. 13 In examining the opinions of lower courts, we are mindful that `an intermediate appellate state court' . . . is datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise. Id. (quoting Comm'r. v. Estate of Borsch, 387 U.S. 456, 465, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1967)). 57 In the situation at hand, lower Louisiana courts reach the conclusion that the peremption period does not trigger. In Bernard Lumber Co., Inc. v. Lake Forest Constr. Co., the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal examined section 9:4822 and held: 58 The terms of the statute clearly establish that La.R.S. 9:4822(A) governs those situations in which a notice of contract has been filed, and La.R.S. 9:4822(C) governs those situations in which no notice of contract has been filed. Therefore, where an owner has neglected to file a notice of termination, the 30-day period provided for in La.R.S. 9:4822(A) never begins to run. 59 572 So.2d 178, 181 (La.Ct.App.1990). Bernard Lumber involved a subcontractor who sued the general contractor and the owner to recover for services and material supplied for the renovation of a restaurant. The court considered the legislative intent behind the Private Works Act, protecting materialmen, laborers and subcontractors, and determined that the legislature intended to place the onus for filing on the owner. Where the owner fails or neglects to take such affirmative action, the court wrote, he should be made to bear the consequences of his failure to file a notice of termination, not the claimant. Id. Likewise, although it reviewed an earlier version of section 9:4822, the Rowley Co. v. Southbend Contractors, Inc. court determined that the thirty-day period would not run without proper filing on the part of the owner. 517 So.2d 1260 (La.Ct. App.1987). In Rowley, a subcontractor sued the general contractor and its surety to recover labor costs. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal determined that the notice of termination's pithy description-of the address of the project-was insufficient. Id. at 1261. While the court was primarily concerned with a different issue, its conclusion is consistent with the court in Bernard Lumber : the thirty-day period will not begin to run until the owner acts. 60 F&D argues that both Bernard Lumber and Rowley are inapplicable. It points to the fact that Bernard Lumber did not involve a suit against a surety; but this distinction is irrelevant as applied to section 9:4813. That provision, which creates the surety's liability, explicitly refers to section 9:4822, which the First Circuit interpreted in Bernard Lumber. Moreover, subsection (E) says that claims must be asserted against the owner, the contractor, or the surety § 9:4813(E)(emphasis added). Whether the defendant is the owner or the surety is irrelevant for purposes of the claim itself, and a case determining the time limit for a suit against an owner applies as well to a suit against a surety. F&D attempts to distinguish Rowley because that case dealt with the requirements for a valid notice of termination. But, again, the primary holding of Rowley is not relevant; the result reached by the court is: that the time period would not begin to run without a proper notice of termination. Rowley supports the proposition that the time period will not commence without affirmative action on the part of the owner. 61 The reading given section 9:4822 by Louisiana courts is bolstered by language in the official comments to section 9:4822. This language suggests that subsection (A), not subsection (C), applies to the present situation. If a notice of contract is filed, the commentary reads, a notice of termination is always required to commence the 30 day time for filing. Where no notice of contract is filed the owner may still file a notice of termination. § 9:4822 cmt. (a). If a notice of contract is filed but the notice of termination is not, the comments suggest that the thirty day period simply does not commence. 62 Finally, F&D argues that construing subsection 9:822(A) to mean the time period never triggered would create an openended lien period inconsistent with the general structure and policy underlying the PWA. First, it contends the Act is a unified scheme, and that all situations should fit snugly into the thirty-sixty day structure articulated in section 9:4822. According to this account, the broad language in subsection 9:4822(C) includes all situations other than that one explicitly outlined in subsection 9:4822(A), when notice of the contract and notice of termination have both been filed. This interpretation does not follow directly from the statutory language, and it is inconsistent with all of the aforementioned sources. F&D also asserts that the PWA seeks to balance new rights created in laborers, contractors and the like with the liability concerns of sureties. It points to strong peremption language in § 9:4813(E). This may well be true; but it is not our prerogative to dictate to the Louisiana legislature where to strike the balance between the rights of sureties and construction creditors. 63 A plain reading of subsection 9:4822(A), extant caselaw and official commentary all bolster our understanding of section 9:4822, that when notice of a contract has been filed but notice of termination is not, the time period for making claims is not triggered. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's determination that the peremptive period was not triggered. Because the period was not triggered, FitzGerald's adversary action in July 2003 was timely under the PWA; and its claim in the Lifeshare matter is not perempted.