Opinion ID: 72387
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether women are a protected class

Text: UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), SO THAT SEX-BASED 5 CONSPIRACIES AGAINST THEM ARE ACTIONABLE UNDER THAT PROVISION Lyes claims that the defendants’ actions constituted a conspiracy to deprive her of equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on that claim, because it believed that § 1985(3) prohibits only those conspiracies motivated by racial animus and does not extend to those motivated by sex-based animus against women. We disagree, at least where, as in this case, the conspirators are acting under color of state law. We begin our discussion by addressing the question of whether women are a “class of persons” within the meaning of § 1985(3). Because we conclude that they are, we then address the issue, raised in a dissenting opinion, about the source of Congress’ authority to protect women from sex-based conspiracies against them by persons acting under color of state law. With regard to the scope of § 1985(3), the language of the statutory provision is clear and broad. It unequivocally states that: If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class 6 of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . , the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (emphasis added). The question, then, is whether women are “any class of persons” within the meaning of the statute. Lyes argues that the textual similarity between the statute and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, coupled with the fact that the statute was passed just three years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, indicates Congress intended the scope of the statute to be coextensive with that of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits sex-based classifications unless they “serve important governmental objectives and [are] substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S. Ct. 451, 457 (1976). We need not determine the outer limits of § 1985(3) coverage, nor the precise relationship between the statute and the Equal Protection Clause, in order to decide this case. For present purposes, all we need to decide is whether § 1985(3) protects women as a class of persons from sex-based conspiracies against them where the conspirators were acting under color of state law. We conclude that it does, for the following reasons. 7 “In construing a statute we must begin, and often should end as well, with the language of the statute itself.” United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc)(internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, the text of the statute indicates that women are a protected class within its domain, because the statute’s prohibition of conspiracies against “any person or class of persons” certainly is broad enough to encompass women, and no other language in the statute excludes them from its coverage. As we noted in Merritt v. Dillard, 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997), “the adjective ‘any’ is not ambiguous; it has a well-established meaning.” Quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Gonzales, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 1035 (1997), we said in Merritt that “the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1186. In this case, as in Gonzales and Merritt, “Congress did not add any language limiting the breadth of that word, so ‘any’ means all.” Id. at 1186 (quoting Gonzales)(internal citation omitted). Thus, women are within the plain meaning of “any ... class of persons,” which describes the statutory scope of coverage. Our enthusiasm for applying the plain meaning canon to § 1985(3) is tempered, however, by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 8 403 U.S. 88, 91 S. Ct. 1790 (1971), and United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983). In Griffin, the Court glossed the statutory language with a caution against reading § 1985(3) so broadly (literally) as to turn it into “a general federal tort law” that would “apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others.” 403 U.S. at 101-02, 91 S. Ct. at 1798. In order to avoid such a result, the Griffin Court held that the statute prohibits only those conspiracies motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. . . .” Id. at 102, 91 S. Ct. at 1798 (emphasis added). The Court declined to elaborate on the “perhaps” qualifier, however, stating in a footnote that it “need not decide, given the facts of this case, whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be actionable. . . .” Id. at 102 n.9, 91 S. Ct. at 1798 n.9. Consistent with the gloss it placed on the statutory language in Griffin, the Court held in Scott that § 1985(3) does not reach “conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their economic views, status, or activities,” 463 U.S. at 837, 103 S. Ct. at 3361, the “others” in that case being nonunion members. As it had in Griffin, the Court in Scott withheld judgment on whether 9 § 1985(3) extends beyond “its central concern” of combating conspiracies driven by race-based animus. See id. at 837, 103 S. Ct. at 3360. Thus, Griffin and Scott left open the issue we confront today, namely, whether a conspiracy motivated by sex-based animus against women is actionable under § 1985(3). It is clear to us, however, that if Griffin’s “perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus” means anything at all – and we think it does – it includes sex-based animus against women. Sex-based classifications receive heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, see Craig, 429 U.S. at 197, 97 S. Ct. at 457, and discrimination based on sex frequently has been characterized as “invidious.” See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1770 (1973) (“[S]tatutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.”); United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1083 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Invidious factors, such as race or sex, cannot influence a jury’s recommendation of the death penalty.”). Because the statutory language of § 1985(3) is unambiguous, ordinarily we would not consult legislative history to discern its meaning. See, e.g., United 10 States v. Gonzales, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 1035 (1997) (“Given the straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history.”); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147 - 48, 114 S.Ct. 655, 662 (1994) (“we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear”). In view of the Supreme Court’s Griffin and Scott decisions, however, we think it prudent to note that the legislative history of § 1985(3) is not manifestly inconsistent with our holding. Although “[t]he legislative history of the Act confirms the conclusion that . . . it was primarily motivated by the lawless conduct directed at the recently emancipated citizens,” Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 319, 113 S. Ct. 753, 785 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting), it also reveals that at least some members of Congress believed actionable conspiracies would include those “against a person because he was a Democrat, . . . or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter . . . .” Id. at 296, 113 S. Ct. at 773 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing remarks of Senator Edmunds, who managed the bill on the Senate floor) (citations and quotations omitted). See also Scott, 463 U.S. at 837, 103 S. Ct. at 3360 (although the operative provision originated in a 11 House bill, “Senator Edmunds’ views, since he managed the bill on the floor of the Senate, are not without weight.”). Given prevailing attitudes at the time § 1985(3) was enacted, it is certainly possible, if not probable, that many legislators who voted for the statute were not concerned about affording legal protection to women as a class. Nonetheless, we follow the plain meaning of the statute, because “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998). Any conclusion that women are not a protected class under § 1985(3) would run into a solid wall of contrary precedent. Relying primarily on the statutory language and the Supreme Court’s statement in Griffin, the seven other circuits that have actually decided the issue are unanimous in their view that § 1985(3) applies to conspiracies motivated by sex-based animus against women. See Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 448-49 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is logical that, at the very least, the classes protected by § 1985(3) must encompass those classifications that merit heightened scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause 12 analysis, of which gender is one.”); National Org. For Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990) (collecting circuit cases), rev’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993); New York State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir. 1989) (“By its very language § 1985(3) is necessarily tied to evolving notions of equality and citizenship. As conspiracies directed against women are inherently invidious, and repugnant to the notion of equality of rights for all citizens, they are therefore encompassed under the Act.”); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[Section] 1985(3) extends beyond conspiracies to discriminate against persons based on race to conspiracies to discriminate against persons based on sex, religion, ethnicity or political loyalty.”); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[W]e conclude that women purchasers of disability insurance are a sufficient class [under § 1985(3)].”); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1978) (“The fact that a person bears no responsibility for gender, combined with the pervasive discrimination practiced against women, and the emerging rejection of sexual stereotyping as incompatible with our ideals of equality convince us that 13 whatever the outer boundaries of the concept, an animus against women includes the elements of a ‘class-based invidiously discriminatory’ motivation.”), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978) (concluding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction where plaintiff had alleged a cause of action under § 1985(3) based in part on sex discrimination). In addition to the holdings of the circuits we have set out above, one other circuit has said in dicta that sex-based animus is actionable under § 1985(3). See Haverstick Enters., Inc. v. Financial Fed. Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir. 1994). Only two circuits have indicated – and then only in dicta – that they would hold women do not constitute a protected class under § 1985(3). See Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Sav. Bank, 820 F.2d 754, 757 (5th Cir. 1987); Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1984).1 1 While the views of other circuits are not binding upon us in any event, we do accord them respect. But we give views espoused as mere dicta less respect than we give those that are forged as part of the holding in a case. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 1998) (Carnes, J., concurring) (explaining why conclusions stated as dicta are less reliable than those that are part of a holding in a case). 14 The grand tally is this. Of the circuits that have squarely confronted and decided the issue, seven have held that women are a protected class of persons under § 1985(3), and none have held that they are not. If both holdings and dicta are counted, eight of the circuits that have taken a position have said that women are a protected class under § 1985(3); only two have said that they are not. Even though the views of individual Justices are not binding on us, see, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 924 (11th Cir. 1995), it is appropriate in a case of first impression in this circuit to consider the views of those Justices who have expressed themselves on the issue. In Bray, Justices Souter, Stevens, and O’Connor all stated independently and unequivocally that they believe women are a protected class under § 1985(3). See Bray, 506 U.S. at 295-96, 113 S. Ct. at 769-75 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 322, 113 S. Ct. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 350, 113 S. Ct. at 802 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). We add the views of those three Justices to the decisional mix and give them weight. In addition, although the majority opinion in Bray does not explicitly hold that women are a protected class under § 1985(3), some of its analysis seems to 15 suggest that they are. The issue in Bray was whether attempts to blockade abortion clinics to keep people from going inside constituted a conspiracy to deprive a person or a class of persons of equal protection of the laws in violation of § 1985(3). See Bray, 506 U.S. at 266, 113 S. Ct. at 757-58. The Court rejected “the claim that petitioners’ opposition to abortion reflects an animus against women in general,” and explained that “[w]e do not think that the ‘animus’ requirement can be met only by maliciously motivated, as opposed to assertedly benign (though objectively invidious), discrimination against women. It does demand, however, at least a purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their sex. . . .” Bray, at 269-70, 113 S. Ct. at 759. Although Bray did not hold § 1985(3) outlaws conspiracies driven by sex-based animus against women, language from the opinion at least hints that it does. We take the hint. For all of the stated reasons, we conclude that women are a “class of persons” within the meaning of § 1985(3), and therefore are protected by that provision from conspiracies against them motivated by sex-based animus. We