Opinion ID: 2461283
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We first review the appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence relating to his possession of controlled substances. Motions for a directed verdict on grounds of insufficient evidence were appropriately made by the appellant at the end of the state's case and at the close of all the evidence. Thus, in conducting this review we must look to whether substantial evidence exists to support the verdict. Cerda v. State, 303 Ark. 241, 795 S.W.2d 358 (1990). Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond mere suspicion and conjecture. Hodge v. State, 303 Ark. 375, 797 S.W.2d 432 (1990); Cerda v. State . When there is no evidence from which a jury could find the defendant guilty without resorting to speculation and conjecture, the judge should grant a directed verdict. Scherrer v. State, 294 Ark. 227, 742 S.W.2d 877 (1988). In considering the appellant's argument, this court may only consider the evidence that is favorable to the state and supports the appellant's convictions. Summers v. State, 300 Ark. 525, 780 S.W.2d 540 (1989). The proven facts in this case are more than enough to qualify as substantial evidence. The premises involved here were described by the police officers as the appellant's residence. According to Officer Alexander, the appellant was seated at the kitchen table at the time of the raid with the contraband in plain view on the table in front of him. Though this testimony was disputed by defense witnesses, the jury clearly chose to believe Officer Alexander. Since others joined the appellant around the table, we cannot conclude that the contraband was exclusively within his possession. But we have held that constructive possession exists where joint occupancy of the premises occurs and where there are additional factors linking the accused to the contraband. See Embry v. State, 302 Ark. 608, 792 S.W.2d 318 (1990). Those additional factors include a) whether the accused exercised care, control, and management over the contraband, and b) whether the accused knew the material was contraband. Id; see also Crossley v. State, 304 Ark. 378, 802 S.W.2d 459 (1991). This control and knowledge can be inferred from the circumstances, such as the proximity of the contraband to the accused, the fact that it is in plain view, and th% ownership of the property where the contraband is found. See Plotts v. State, 297 Ark. 66, 759 S.W.2d 793 (1988). We have little hesitancy in holding that substantial evidence of constructive possession exists where the abundant contraband lay in front of the appellant in plain view on the table in his house.