Opinion ID: 6500514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pelullo’s Sixth Amendment Ineffective

Text: Assistance of Counsel Claim47 Pelullo’s longtime attorneys – William Maxwell, Donald Manno, and Gary McCarthy – were all indicted alongside Pelullo, leaving him without counsel. Therefore, the District Court appointed Troy Archie to represent him under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. Given the case’s complexity and discovery demands, the Court shortly thereafter appointed J. Michael Farrell as co-counsel. Pelullo now seeks a new trial or an evidentiary hearing for further factfinding because, he argues, Farrell’s performance was rendered deficient by a previously undisclosed conflict of interest. We are not persuaded and hold that Pelullo did not suffer ineffective assistance of counsel.
Pelullo and Farrell had their fair share of disagreements at the outset of Farrell’s engagement. The two apparently did not see eye-to-eye on trial strategy, and Pelullo did not appreciate Farrell’s lack of engagement. Those disputes are unrelated to the conflict-of-interest issue before us, but, within 47 Whether a trial counsel’s representation of a defendant was constitutionally inadequate is a mixed question of law and fact. When reviewing mixed questions, we apply de novo review to applications of law, but review for clear error “case-specific factual issues” like the “weigh[ing of] evidence” and “credibility judgments[.]” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 967-69 (2018). 74 a few months of Farrell’s appointment, they led to Pelullo’s request that Farrell be replaced. Although the Court granted that request, Pelullo soon regretted losing Farrell, and he asked to have him reappointed. Pelullo explained that he had “irreconcilable differences” with the lawyer who had been appointed in Farrell’s stead and that replacing Farrell was “an error in … judgment” that arose from his “not clearly understanding [the] situation and how fortunate [he] was to have Mr. F[a]rrell.” (D.I. 486.) Pelullo praised Farrell, stating he was “up to speed” and “more than comp[etent] and more than effective[.]” (D.I. 486.) The Court acquiesced to Pelullo’s wishes and reappointed Farrell in July 2013. Farrell represented Pelullo through trial (alongside Archie), employing aggressive litigation tactics. The District Court repeatedly reprimanded Farrell for, among other things, repeated interruptions and argumentativeness. At several points, the Court warned him that, “if [he thought his] goal here [was] to set up an ineffective assistance of a counsel defense[,]” he would be “take[n] … off th[e] case[.]” (E.g., JAC at 318.) After trial, the Court determined that Pelullo required only one attorney at sentencing and terminated Farrell’s appointment in November 2014, after which Pelullo requested Farrell’s reassignment. He told the Court that, despite their early differences, he and Farrell had formed “a bond” and that “Farrell [was] agreeable to [his] defense strategy[.]” (D.I. 1231; JAE at 463-64.) Pelullo noted that he “d[id] not seek counsel of choice, [but] rather effective counsel.” (D.I. 1231.) The Court denied that request in April 2015. Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Pelullo, Farrell had been dealing with his own legal troubles. In March 2014, about halfway through Pelullo’s trial, a subpoena was issued for 75 Farrell’s office manager to testify about Farrell before a grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Farrell, in response, retained Joseph Fioravanti, a former federal prosecutor. Fioravanti tried to discover whether Farrell was either a subject or target of the investigation. Those efforts proved unsuccessful, so Fioravanti advised Farrell not to inform his clients, including Pelullo, because he was not yet known to be a subject or target. Farrell heeded that advice and kept from Pelullo, Archie, and the District Court that some kind of investigation in Maryland was underway. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey, which was prosecuting the Defendants here, remained similarly unaware of the grand jury investigation in the District of Maryland. It was not until August 2014, the month after the trial in this case ended, that Fioravanti received a “target letter” informing him that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland was considering filing criminal charges against Farrell. (JAE at 927, 1093, 1102.) In January 2016, more than eighteen months after the guilty verdicts here, an indictment charging Farrell with crimes relating to a large marijuana trafficking ring was unsealed. That charge bore no relation to Pelullo’s crimes. United States v. Farrell, 921 F.3d 116, 123 (4th Cir. 2019). It was only after Farrell’s indictment became public that the prosecutors on Pelullo’s case became aware of the charges. By the time Farrell’s indictment was unsealed, Pelullo had already appealed his conviction. Once that indictment came to light, however, Pelullo sought and obtained from us a limited remand for further factfinding on what Pelullo claimed was a conflict of interest with Farrell. On remand, Pelullo filed a Rule 33 motion for a new trial on the ground that the evidence 76 revealed Farrell had provided ineffective assistance of counsel. In his motion, Pelullo claimed that Farrell had labored under a conflict of interest during the trial due to the investigation in Maryland. Despite previously not just accepting but actively promoting Farrell’s aggressive trial tactics, Pelullo alleged that Farrell’s aggression was caused by the stress of being under investigation himself and that those tactics were damaging. The District Court held a hearing on the motion, at which Farrell bolstered that line of argument. He confirmed that his “aggressive nature” had been due to the pending investigation and that it “affected [his] ability to represent [Pelullo] in a conflict-free manner[.]” (JAE at 615-16.) He explained that he viewed the prosecution of himself as “a direct threat on the ability of criminal defense attorneys in Maryland – in America to defend their clients” and that “it was inconsistent with the principles of our Republic[.]” (JAE at 579.) It was, he claimed, his personal indignation that fueled his overly aggressive defense of Pelullo. The District Court denied the new-trial motion. It found Farrell’s testimony entirely unreliable, and it determined that the investigation in the District of Maryland did not affect Farrell’s performance at trial. The Court explained further that Pelullo may have “at most” had a potential conflict-of-interest claim due to Farrell’s failure to disclose the investigation, rather than by virtue of Farrell’s aggressive defense. (JAE at 1046.) But, given the overwhelming evidence of Pelullo’s guilt and his evident approval of Farrell’s tactics, the Court concluded that Pelullo “fail[ed] utterly to demonstrate any prejudice.” (JAE at 1046.) 77
Although we typically do not entertain ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal, we may do so “when the record is sufficient to allow determination of the issue.” United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003). Because we previously remanded the issue for further factfinding and the District Court conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing, the record is sufficient for us to consider the issue now. There is no clear error in the finding that Farrell’s self-deprecatory testimony was unreliable and that his representation of Pelullo was unaffected by the Maryland investigation. See United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1071 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying clear-error standard to district court’s factfinding with respect to “external events and the credibility of the witnesses”). On the record developed in the District Court, we agree that this argument for a new trial fails. As already discussed, supra Section V.A.2, the Sixth Amendment protects a criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-57 (1984). That right is “recognized … because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. Pursuant to that right, counsel owes a defendant certain duties, including the “duty to perform competently” and the “duty of loyalty[.]” Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 131-32 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). Nonetheless, “[a]n error by counsel … does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error 78 had no effect on the judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Accordingly, a criminal defendant pursuing an ineffective assistance claim must show not only that his counsel’s performance was deficient, but also that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687. Although a defendant must make both showings to succeed, in certain circumstances prejudice may be presumed. One such circumstance is when counsel breaches the duty of loyalty to his client by maintaining an actual conflict of interest during the representation. Id. at 692. Conflicts arise when counsel’s personal interests are “inconsistent, diverse or otherwise discordant with those of his client and … affect[] the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client.” Zepp, 748 F.2d at 135 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When there is “a[n actual] conflict that affected counsel’s performance – as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties” – the defendant need not make a separate showing of prejudice. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002). A defendant alleging an actual conflict must establish that “trial counsel’s interest and the defendant’s interest diverge[d] with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action.” Zepp, 748 F.2d at 136 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A criminal investigation of counsel, even for crimes unrelated to those being prosecuted in the defendant’s trial, can generate an actual conflict when counsel seeks to curry favor with the attorneys prosecuting his client, thus resulting in counsel “pull[ing] … his punches.” Reyes-Vejerano v. United States, 276 F.3d 94, 99 (1st Cir. 2002). Conversely, a lack of evidence that counsel pulled his punches may serve as an 79 indication that he was not “intimidated by a threat of prosecution” in defending his client. United States v. Montana, 199 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 1999). And where a defendant “show[s] only that his lawyer was under investigation and that the lawyer had some awareness of an investigation” during the defendant’s trial, but fails to demonstrate that the lawyer’s interests diverged from that of the defendant, beyond “the general and unspecified theory that [the attorney] must have wanted to please the government[,]” he has not demonstrated an actual conflict. Reyes-Vejerano, 276 F.3d at 99. That is the case here. Pelullo has presented no evidence that prosecutors in the District of New Jersey knew of the case against Farrell in the District of Maryland or that Farrell thought they did. Cf. Armienti v. United States, 234 F.3d 820, 824-25 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendant presented a “plausible claim” of an actual conflict where his attorney “was being criminally investigated by the same United States Attorney’s office that was prosecuting” the defendant, and, during trial, he failed “to conduct further investigation, fail[ed] to vigorously cross-examine the government’s witnesses, … fail[ed] to make various objections[,]” was “ill-prepared and distracted[,]” and “misadvised [the defendant] not to talk to the probation department at the time of his sentencing”). There is thus no reason to think that Farrell pulled his punches – that he took it easy on the government to secure the prosecutors’ good favor. In fact, he did quite the opposite, something Pelullo acknowledges and now tries to turn to his advantage. Pelullo contends that Farrell’s “rage and a quixotic sense of revenge against an unfair [g]overnment[,]” fueled by the criminal investigation, turned him into “an aggressive madman” driven 80 “not by Pelullo’s best interests but … [instead by] his personal outrage about his own legal problems.” (SP Opening Br. at 4344.) Pelullo offers examples of when Farrell’s “rage” supposedly made his representation inadequate, such as his repeated misspeaking on cross and direct examination, presenting a failed Daubert challenge, and offering a “catastrophic closing argument” that was a three-day “epic rant, devoid of purpose or focus[.]” (SP Opening Br. at 52-54.) Farrell’s personal interest in getting revenge against the government, Pelullo claims, conflicted and interfered with the duty to act in Pelullo’s best interests. Those examples may speak to Farrell’s level of competence, but they do not demonstrate any divergence between his interests and those of Pelullo. Zepp, 748 F.2d at 136. Farrell’s pugnacious approach was fully approved by Pelullo, and Farrell’s mistakes were, as the District Court noted, unsurprising in the course of “a very long trial[.]” (JAE at 529.) See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (warning against “second-guess[ing defense] counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence” and too readily deeming representation deficient in hindsight); United States v. Williams, 631 F.2d 198, 204 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding no ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant concurred in his counsel’s trial strategy). In fact, Pelullo sought out Farrell’s services precisely because of his aggressive defense style. That he got what he wanted but it didn’t produce the desired results does not mean he is free to call it constitutionally deficient advocacy now. The alleged conflict of interest affecting Farrell’s representation is significantly different from fact patterns in which an actual conflict has been found. In Government of 81 Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 136 (3d Cir. 1984), we reasoned that defense counsel should have withdrawn because he “could have been indicted for the same charges on which he represented [the defendant] … and … was a witness for the prosecution.” Farrell, by contrast, was under investigation for activities unrelated to Pelullo’s charges and had no personal stake in the success or failure of Pelullo’s defense. Nor does the trial record present a scenario in which the same United States Attorney’s Office prosecuted both the defendant and investigated his attorney. In such a situation, there is a clear motive for counsel to “temper[] his defense … in order to curry favor with the prosecution, perhaps fearing that a spirited defense … would prompt the Government to pursue the case against [him] with greater vigor.” United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 156 (2d Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Armienti, 234 F.3d at 824-25 (ordering an evidentiary hearing on a potential conflict of interest because defense counsel was under investigation by the same United States Attorney’s Office prosecuting the defendant); United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1463-64 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that when counsel was under investigation by the same United States Attorney’s Office as his client an actual conflict of interest existed, warranting a new trial), overruled on other grounds as recognized by United States v. Watson, 866 F.2d 381, 385 (11th Cir. 1989). Pelullo argues that we should assume that the government attorneys here were aware of the grand jury investigation in the District of Maryland. He asks that we treat the two U.S. Attorneys’ offices as “one combined entity[,]” and thus conclude that he was prejudiced. (SP Opening Br. at 77.) We do not accept that premise. See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining to impute to the prosecution team constructive knowledge of information 82 held by a federal agency that was not involved in the investigation and prosecution of the case). Finally, the timeline belies Pelullo’s argument that Farrell began his representation of Pelullo “motivated by his own personal anima rather than the best interests of his client.” (SP Opening Br. at 45.) As Farrell testified, he was not aware of the investigation’s existence until halfway through trial, in either March or April of 2014. Without that knowledge, Farrell could not have begun his representation with the intention Pelullo attributes to him. Farrell’s consistently aggressive tactics suggest that his litigation strategy was not affected by his being under investigation but was rather a matter of style. We thus conclude that Farrell’s representation of Pelullo did not present an actual conflict. To the extent that Pelullo and Farrell had a potential conflict of interest, Pelullo needed to show that the potential conflict caused him prejudice. He has failed to do that. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. There is no reasonable probability he would have been acquitted in the absence of Farrell’s services, given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. See id. (“This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”). In short, Pelullo was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel and so is not entitled to a new trial.48 48 Because the District Court fully developed the record and did not err, Pelullo is not entitled to yet another evidentiary 83