Opinion ID: 1810730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was a statement made by the defendant to the police obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional right to counsel?

Text: It is contended by the public defender that Jordan's statement was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel during a critical stage of the prosecution. [1, 2] The individual's right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him  `whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed.2d 424 (1977). A more specific right to counsel attaches as an incident to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination whenever a suspect is subject to in custody interrogation by the government. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-473, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966). Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 397. Jordan had been arrested in Chicago and brought back to Milwaukee after waiving extradition before a judge in Illinois. He was placed in an interrogation room and was being questioned by police officers when he gave his statement. He clearly had a Miranda right to counsel during this questioning unless the right was waived. The public defender argues that Jordan had a Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed.2d 246 (1964). Massiah held that a Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the time when judicial proceedings are instituted against a defendant. This right to counsel is applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356, 85 S. Ct. 1556, 14 L. Ed.2d 682 (1965). [3] However, this court has recently held that when custodial interrogation takes place, it need not be determined . . . whether the right to counsel stems from the constitutional rights explained in Massiah, for under Miranda . . . [the defendant] had the undoubted right to counsel from the outset of custodial interrogation. [5] Schilling v. State, 86 Wis.2d 69, 79, 271 N.W.2d 631 (1978). [4] This court takes the position that the standard for determining waiver of the right to counsel in criminal proceedings is the same whether that right arises under Miranda or Massiah. [6] Schilling v. State, 86 Wis.2d at 79. The question then is whether Jordan had waived his right to counsel when he made the statement admitted at trial. [5, 6] Once the right to counsel has attached the state may not interrogate the defendant unless there is a voluntary and knowing waiver of that right. In addition, it is the burden of the state to show that the defendant in fact waived his right to counsel before the police interrogated him. Schilling v. State, 86 Wis.2d at 79-80; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 409-410 (Powell, J., concurring). [7] The appropriate standard to be applied in determining the question of waiver as a matter of federal constitutional law is whether there has been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 404. The defendant must have . . . knowingly and intelligently waived his . . . right to retained or appointed counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475. [8] Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475. Neither does the right to counsel depend upon a request by the defendant. [W]aiver requires not merely comprehension but relinquishment. . . . Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 404. [9] Under Miranda or Massiah the state must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant understood his right to counsel and voluntarily waived that right. Schilling v. State, 86 Wis.2d at 80. State v. Hernandez, 61 Wis.2d 253, 258, 212 N.W.2d 118 (1973). [10] The trial court's determination as to compliance with the above-mentioned standards and burdens for determining waiver is not to be disturbed by this court unless those findings are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Roney v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 522, 533, 171 N.W.2d 400 (1969); Leach v. State, 83 Wis.2d 199, 208, 265 N.W.2d 495 (1978); Schilling v. State, 86 Wis.2d at 81. The question then is . . . whether the findings of the trial court supporting the conclusion that . . . [defendant], beyond a reasonable doubt, waived his right to remain silent and to have counsel present are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Schilling v. State, 86 Wis.2d at 81. [11] The court must inquire into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forego his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S. Ct. __, 61 L. Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979). [12] It is not constitutionally required that the defendant either orally or in writing expressly waive his right to remain silent or his right to counsel although, if there is such an express waiver, it is strong proof of its validity. Silence coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct consistent with waiver may support the finding of an intelligent and understanding rejection of counsel in situations where the defendant did not expressly state as much. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 60 L. Ed.2d 286, 292 (1979). (Fn. 4, emphasis in original.) In Schilling v. State, supra , the defendant argued that a statement obtained from him through interrogation was inadmissible because at the time he made the statement he was represented by counsel. His attorney was not notified of the questioning nor was he present during the questioning. This court rejected this contention and held that . . . waiver of the right to have prior-retained counsel present at interrogation is sustainable where the waiver is clear. Id. at 84. The court has rejected a per se rule barring admission of any statement, however freely and intelligently made, after counsel is retained by one who is accused of a criminal offense. It was not error to admit Jordan's statement. The facts indicating that the statement was voluntarily made with a clear understanding of the right to counsel are numerous. The defendant, Jordan, was twenty years old when he was arrested on these charges. He had a record of at least thirteen arrests prior to the arrest involved in this case. He was thus familiar with the criminal justice system. He had been in custody less than twenty-four hours before making the statement. He had been told to remain silent by his attorney and he had been given his Miranda rights fully twice prior to the interrogation. In Chicago he was advised of his rights, and upon being asked if he understood those rights he said, yes. He was then asked if he wanted to make a statement. He said no, and all questioning ceased. From this experience he must have known that his right to remain silent and his right to the presence of an attorney before questioning would be honored. [13] He also had the opportunity to consult with his attorney by phone when he arrived at the police station and was not questioned until he had that opportunity. He was given the Miranda warnings and he indicated that he knew his rights because the same warnings were given to him by the Chicago police. The statement here involved was made within an hour and one-half of Jordan's arrival at the police station. There had been no threats or promises made in connection with the rendering of the statement. The statement was given in narrative form and not in response to a series of questions. True, the detectives did confront Jordan with a statement made by Battites Wesley but that fact alone cannot render the defendant's subsequent statement involuntary or made without full understanding of his right to counsel. [14] The United States Supreme Court stated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 473-474 that: Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. . . . If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with an attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. Jordan did not request that his attorney be present after the warnings were given, even though he stated that he understood his right to have his attorney present during questioning. Although a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are give. . . ., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475, the fact that Jordan knew his rights, had previously asserted those rights, and almost immediately after questioning began, gave a statement in narrative form, demonstrates that in the totality of the circumstances of this case there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. [15] On these facts it cannot be said that the findings of the trial judge at the suppression hearing, that the statement of Kenneth Jordan was beyond a reasonable doubt made voluntarily and intelligently, were against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.