Opinion ID: 878749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Big Ditch Company

Text: The doctrine of attractive nuisance is recognized in Montana and we have recognized the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 as setting forth the elements necessary to establish an attractive nuisance. Big Man v. State (Mont. 1981), 626 P.2d 235, 240, 38 St.Rep. 362, 368; Gagnier v. Curran Construction Company (1968), 151 Mont. 468, 473, 474, 443 P.2d 894, 897, 898; Driscoll v. Clark (1905), 32 Mont. 172, 80 P. 1. Whether the doctrine of attractive nuisance should be applied to drowning incidents in irrigation ditches has not been clearly stated by us. It is true that in Fusselman v. Yellowstone Valley Land and Irrigation Co. (1917), 53 Mont. 254, 163 P. 473, this Court made reference to the elements of attractive nuisance in sustaining a directed verdict by the District Court against a plaintiff seeking damages for the drowning death in an irrigation ditch in Livingston of a three-year-old girl. In 1917, this Court was of the opinion that in a pleading for injuries received upon the defendant's property, the complaint must disclose by what right the injured party was upon the premises. In Fusselman, we held that because of the failure of the plaintiff to allege that the decedent was attracted to the canal or that by reason of its peculiar attractiveness, she went upon the canal and met her death, the complaint failed to state a cause of action under the doctrine of the turntable cases. In the case before us, Connie Limberhand contends that the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable as to the Big Ditch Company and that she meets here the elements of attractive nuisance as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339. Big Ditch apparently accepts the applicability of the attractive nuisance doctrine to this case, but contends the elements are not met. A problem exists with respect to the automatic application of the attractive nuisance doctrine to ordinary irrigation ditches. While such irrigation ditches are artificially constructed, for the most part they have natural characteristics, and there may be little to distinguish them from the numerous streams, rivers and creeks that occur naturally in Montana, and flow in many instances through towns, villages and cities. The attractive nuisance doctrine is not quite applicable to such artificial bodies of water; otherwise it could be contended that a landowner through whose property a natural stream flows is in reality maintaining an attractive nuisance. It is because courts have failed to recognize the distinction between bodies of water having natural characteristics and other artificial bodies such as swimming pools, sewage treatment plants and the like, that there appears to be a disparity in the holdings of courts with respect to drowning incidents in artificial bodies of water. For example, the rule announced in Fusselman, that there must be an implied invitation to a child to come upon the owner's land in order to hold the owner liable is not the law of this state today. There are, however, cases in this State and others from which a proper rule can be drawn. Troglia v. Butte Superior Mining Company (9th Cir.1921), 270 F. 75, was a case involving an eleven-year-old boy who drowned while swimming in a pond on the premises of the defendant mining company. The pond had been constructed to furnish water to a mill, and was formed by damming a small stream. The pond was 100 feet long and 75 feet wide and from 1 to 12 feet deep. It was not enclosed. There were notices posted around it which said no trespassing, private property, 10 feet deep, and keep away. Nonetheless, boys swam there in summer as a matter of practice. This particular decedent was strong, in the seventh grade and able to read. After two hours of swimming in the pond, he apparently got cramps and drowned. The mining company had an attendant for a pump nearby. In Troglia, the Court of Appeals stated: The degree of care required of one who maintains on his land an artificial pool for a useful purpose is not greater than that required of one through whose land flows a natural stream, and he is bound to no special care or precaution for the protection of children who are in the habit of swimming in the same, unless there is in the pool some peculiar danger, in the nature of a hidden peril or trap for the unwary, of which he has or ought to have knowledge. 270 F. at 76. It is noteworthy that Troglia was decided in 1921 before the decision in Erie v. Tompkins (1938), 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, but nevertheless, Troglia spoke a rule applicable to a Montana decedent. In a recent case before the Ninth Circuit, Harmon v. Billings Bench Water Users Association (9th Cir.1985), 765 F.2d 1464, the Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment in favor of the ditch company granted by the federal district court in a drowning case in Montana. The Court of Appeals in Harmon accepted as settled that the attractive nuisance doctrine was applicable to irrigation ditches in Montana. In so stating, it relied on Troglia, supra, and upon Coeur d'Alene Lumber Company v. Thompson (9th Cir.1914), 215 F. 8. The Court of Appeals decided that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the ditch might have presented a hidden danger that Harmon's son did not appreciate. The mother had testified that the concrete sides of the ditch were much steeper than the natural bank they adjoined and that on the day in question, the water was above the concrete sides. The Court of Appeals likened these facts to those in Thompson (of which more later) and thus put the Harmon case within the hidden danger exception of the Restatement on attractive nuisance. The Court of Appeals also disagreed with the Federal District Court's holding that the erection of safety devices such as a childproof fence along the course of the ditch would be an oppressive burden upon the ditch company. Coeur d'Alene Lumber Company v. Thompson, supra, was a case arising from the Federal District Court in Idaho. There the defendant had operated a lumber mill at St. Maries and had built a cistern or well for storage of water. The water was used in connection with the operation of the lumber mill. The particular water body had been constructed by the company or its lessee by digging around a natural spring, and placing around the spring a wooden wall approximately 4 feet high and 4 feet square through which the water bubbled up and escaped. The lessee in operating the mill had dumped sawdust and other debris in such manner as to obstruct the discharge of the spring after it filled the well. A pond of water accumulated about 1-2 feet over the level of the planked well. Moreover, sawdust floated on top of the resulting pond. The shallow pond was 12 to 15 feet wide and 25 to 30 feet long and the wooden construction underneath the water was hidden from view. Two boys waded into the pond and one of them suddenly dropped into the constructed well. The other boy tried to save him and both of them drowned. The Court of Appeals found that the circumstances of the well constituted a hidden trap and affirmed a judgment for the wrongful death of the decedent. From Harmon, Troglia and Thompson, supra, we can deduce a rule proper for application to drowning incidents involving immature children rather than the attractive nuisance doctrine. Accordingly, we hold that the degree of care of one who maintains on his land an artificial stream or body of water for a useful purpose, where the stream or body of water has natural characteristics, is no greater than the degree of care required of one through whose land flows a natural stream or contains a natural body of water. The owner or user of an artificial stream or body of water having natural characteristics is bound to no special duty of care or precaution for the protection of children who may enter therein, unless there is in or about the artificial stream or body of water some peculiar danger, in the nature of a hidden peril or trap for the unwary, of which the owner or user has or ought to have notice. The doctrine of attractive nuisance as such does not apply to such artificial streams or bodies of water anymore than it applies to natural streams or bodies of water. Such a holding has these advantages: (1) It avoids the disparity in the cases, some of which hold that attractive nuisance is applicable to irrigation ditches, and most of which hold it is not; (2) the holding is based more on the concept of negligence than attractive nuisance, and the ordinary concepts of negligence, that is, duty, breach and proximately-caused injuries are more useful in determining liability in such instances; and (3) the holding avoids legal fictions, such as attractive nuisance, which developed originally to excuse the unwitting trespass by children. In Harmon, in footnote 3, the Circuit Court of Appeals felt that this Court had vacillated on the necessity of status of the injured party in determining the duty owed by a property owner to an injured party. 765 F.2d at 1467. In Corrigan v. Janney (Mont. 1981), 626 P.2d 838, 841, 38 St.Rep. 545, 549, in construing section 27-1-701, MCA (formerly section 58-607, R.C.M. 1947), we held that the statute prevented us from distinguishing between social guests and invitees in determining the liability of the landowner for injuries received. We regard the same statute as declaring the applicable law as to the duty of landowners to persons though they may be trespassers. The test is always not the status of the injured party but the exercise of ordinary care in the circumstances by the landowner. The statute provides: Everyone is responsible not only for the result of his wilful acts but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person except so far as the latter has wilfully or by want of ordinary care brought the injury upon himself. Section 27-1-701, MCA. Although in a later case, Cereck v. Albertson's, Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 409, 412, 637 P.2d 509, 511, we stated that the duty imposed on a property owner depends on the status of the injured party, that statement is not correct in the light of section 27-1-701, MCA, above quoted. It appears plain therefore, that the motion for summary judgment was submitted for decision to the District Court as to Big Ditch Company upon an incorrect theory of liability. We therefore remand this cause to the District Court with respect to Big Ditch for a reconsideration of the motion for summary judgment based on the rule of law expressed herein. We express no opinion as to what that decision should be at this juncture.
In addition to her theory on attractive nuisance, Limberhand alleged in her amended complaint that the water flow in the ditch was great and that the maintenance of the ditch created a deceptive condition because of grass and weeds growing along the edge of the ditch and under the surface of the water. She also alleged that the construction, design and maintenance of the ditch omitted all safety measures such as warnings, fences or other protective devices, and that the hazards and dangers of the ditch were hidden and not discoverable by a child of tender years. In the discussion on attractive nuisance, we have set forth a rule to determine liability, if any, of the owner of lands which contain artificial streams or bodies of water with natural characteristics. If on remand the District Court determines that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the irrigation ditch here in question presented a peculiar danger in the nature of hidden peril or trap for the unwary, a fact issue would arise for a jury or other trier of fact. It would follow that the court would then instruct the jury that the duty of providing warnings, fences or other protective devices for the unwary would be measured by the landowner's duty to exercise ordinary care or skill in the management of his property pursuant to section 27-1-701, MCA. All questions of negligence in this case on the part of Big Ditch Company are inextricably bound up in the primary issue whether the ditch presented a peculiar danger in the nature of a hidden peril or trap for the unwary.