Opinion ID: 335464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: prejudicial comments by trial court

Text: 12 Onori objects to the following colloquy, which occurred during cross-examination of a government agent: 13 Q: (by Onori's counsel) To your knowledge, prior to the entry of the agents into the apartment where Mr. Onori was, did he have any advance knowledge that agents were coming to arrest him, to your knowledge? 14 Mr. Koste: I object. 15 The Court: I will sustain in the objection. She (the agent) doesn't know what he knew and what he didn't know, and I would assume that, quite obviously, he did not know or he probably wouldn't have been there. 16 Mr. Moran: I don't know about that, Judge. I would have to object to that. I don't think that is a fair observation. 17 The Court: He would be down to his lawyer's office if he wasn't some place else. (emphasis added) 18 Onori moved for a mistrial, and he now contends that the denial of the motion was reversible error on the theory that the comments reflected the court's conclusion that he was guilty as charged. While these comments do not clearly reflect the court's conclusion of guilt, 3 the jury might have understood the trial court as expressing its opinion that Onori was guilty. In view of the great weight that a jury undoubtedly attributes to judicial comments, trial courts should endeavor to avoid comments such as were made in this case. 19 Although we do not approve of the comments made by the trial court, such comments, even if they suggest that the court believes the defendant to be guilty, are not necessarily reversible error. For example, in United States v. Jackson, 470 F.2d 684, 688-89 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 951, 93 S.Ct. 3019, 37 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1973), this court held that there was no reversible error when the trial court said to the jury, I wish you could find all the defendants guilty, and punish them, and everything else, where the trial judge was not urging the jury to return a guilty verdict but was commenting on the burden that the obligation to sentence represented to the court. The facts in this case do not approach the tenor of those in Jackson. Instead, this case is more analogous to United States v. James, 510 F.2d 546, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855, 96 S.Ct. 105, 46 L.Ed.2d 80 (1976). There, in response to an offer of proof by the defendant's counsel, the trial court said, Do that in the Fifth Circuit. Do it in New Orleans, not here. The appellant argued that the jury could have interpreted those remarks as reflecting the trial court's assumption that there would be a conviction. The totality of the circumstances convinced us, however, not to reverse. We noted that a jury of laymen probably interpreted the comments to mean that an appeal would follow if there were a conviction. We also observed that the dialogue occupied but a few seconds of a lengthy trial and that it occurred in a procedural discussion. Finally, we noted that the trial court gave a typical curative instruction during his charge to the jury. 20 Many of the factors found convincing in James are present here. The allegedly prejudicial comments occupied but a few seconds of a lengthy trial. The comments were directed to defense counsel rather than to the jury. In its instructions the trial court advised the jury that (i)f during the trial, the Court has intimated any opinion as to the facts, the jury may entirely disregard such intimation, since the jurors alone are sole and exclusive judge of the facts. We hold that the comments do not amount to reversible error. 21 Onori and Bukky also assert that the trial court in effect instructed the jury that Patricia Brown was a credible witness. The credibility of witnesses is finally a jury question, of course, and this function is not to be unduly infringed by judicial comment. The credibility of Patricia Brown was a key issue in the trial, and had the trial court actually instructed the jury, explicitly or impliedly, to believe her, there might be grounds for reversal. See United States v. Martinez, 496 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1051, 95 S.Ct. 627, 42 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974); cf. United States v. Fischer, 531 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1976). 22 The court's comments occurred after Onori's counsel asked Brown whether she had ever lied under oath. The court excused the jury and admonished the defense counsel for asking such a question when he had no evidence that Patricia Brown had ever lied under oath. When the jury was recalled, the trial court stated: 23 Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, I have sustained the Government's objection to the last question by counsel as to whether or not this lady has ever lied under oath. That is a completely improper question. 24 Further, I want to instruct you that merely asking a question of that kind is not evidence of any nature that she has ever lied under oath, and you are not permitted to draw any inference or presumption that she did. Does everybody understand that? 25 We dispense, first of all, with Onori's contention that this instruction demeaned his counsel before the jury. The trial court was well within the bounds of discretion in this attempt to eradicate an inference that the court believed was improperly raised. 26 A slightly more serious contention is that the court's comments may be read as prohibiting the jury from drawing an inference that Patricia Brown ever lied under oath, including at the instant trial. But the jury was free, of course, to disbelieve any or all of Patricia Brown's testimony and was so instructed by the court. 4 This instruction mitigates any harm caused by the judge's comments. Moreover, it is clear from the context that the court's remarks constituted nothing more than a reminder to the jury that comments by counsel are not evidence and must not be considered as such. The court did not abuse its discretion in making these remarks, and the attacks upon them are far-fetched to the point of frivolity.