Opinion ID: 1435326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonableness of delay.

Text: The record indicates that, following the February 27, 1975 hearing on the prosecution's first waiver petition, numerous attempts were made to place appellee in alternative treatment plans pursuant to the family court's interim order. When it became apparent to the family court that appellee was not amenable to treatment as a juvenile, it decided to waive its jurisdiction over appellee and ordered him to be held for criminal proceedings. Thereafter, appellee moved to dismiss the indictments against him, and a hearing was held thereon. During the course of this hearing, the trial court seemed to recognize that the delay in indicting the appellee was not attributable to any fault on the part of the prosecution, but rather, stemmed from the beneficent intent of the family court in trying to seek alternative juvenile treatment plans in which to place appellee. Nevertheless, the trial court discounted the family court's placement efforts as insufficient justification for the delay and primarily concerned itself with the asserted prejudice to appellee. In this appeal, the State contends that the family court's attempt to place appellee in a treatment program before waiving its jurisdiction over him was adequate justification for the delay. In particular, it argues that, in postponing the waiver of appellee, the family court was serving both the State's interests in public justice and rehabilitation of juveniles and the appellee's interest in remaining within the protective jurisdiction of the family court. We think the reason cited by the State to justify the delay should be weighed heavily in its favor. First of all, the delay asserted here was not for the purpose of hampering the defense or gaining some tactical advantage over appellee. Nor can it simply be characterized as neutral, as in cases where a speedy disposition is precluded by some unforeseeable event or unavoidable condition. [11] Indeed, we are of the opinion that the type of delay alleged here was due, in substantial part, to a benefit accruing to appellee. The language of the family court's interim order clearly suggests that appellee would have remained within the jurisdiction of the family court, provided that he could be placed in a suitable juvenile treatment program. So long as the family court retained jurisdiction over appellee, he could only be exposed to the possibility of an additional one year of commitment in a treatment facility for the commission of the alleged burglaries. HRS §§ 571-13, 571-48 (1976). On the other hand, once waived by the family court, appellee would have been susceptible to criminal conviction and long-term imprisonment. [12] We have held that one may not complain of adverse effects and prejudice resulting from a delay in the prosecution of a case where such delay was the result of a benefit granted to him. State v. Smith, supra, 583 P.2d at 345-346. Further justification for the delay in waiving appellee over to the circuit court can be found in the language of the waiver provision itself. Pursuant to HRS § 571-22, the family court can only waive a juvenile when it finds, inter alia, that the person is not treatable in any available institution or facility within the State designed for the care and treatment of children, or that the safety of the community requires that the person continue under judicial restraint for a period extending beyond his minority. Hence, in postponing its waiver order, the family court only seemed to be heeding the statutory preference of keeping the juvenile within its protective jurisdiction. In conclusion, we do not believe that the action complained of here  requiring appellee to stand trial as an adult after a pre-indictment delay precipitated by the family court's attempt to place him in a suitable juvenile rehabilitation program  contravenes those `fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions' and which define `the community's sense of fair play and decency.' United States v. Lovasco, supra, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. at 2049 (citations omitted). Not only has appellee failed to demonstrate that he has suffered actual prejudice as a result of the pre-accusation delay, but also, given the particular circumstances of this case, we do not think the delay was unreasonable. [13]