Opinion ID: 77737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Misleading conduct count

Text: Tampas also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on his conviction for misleading conduct. To prove that Tampas engaged in misleading conduct, the government had to show: 1) Tampas knowingly and willfully engaged in misleading conduct toward another person, 2) with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of information to a federal law enforcement officer, 3) about the commission or the possible commission of a federal crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b); United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1253 (11th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1147, 119 S.Ct. 2024, 143 L.Ed.2d 1035 (1999). This charge was based on Tampas's actions in asking Arambula to make a spreadsheet attributing two years' worth of Patrick's hand receipts to jobs Patrick's company performed at the YMCA. See Veal, 153 F.3d at 1247 (misleading conduct statute encompasses a wide range of conduct that thwarts justice, including us[ing] unwitting third parties to conceal the truth). Tampas contends that the evidence shows only that he asked for a spreadsheet organizing legitimate financial documents, and no reasonable juror could conclude his conduct was misleading because Fillyaw had left the YMCA's books in disarray and everyone, including Tampas, was sorting through various receipts in an organization-wide effort to straighten out the financial records. The government produced sufficient evidence, however, from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Tampas's superficially benign request was really an effort to mislead Arambula into creating a record that would hide the scheme Tampas had undertaken with Patrick. A reasonable juror could conclude that the receipts Tampas tendered to Arambula were not legitimate business records, but fraudulent, padded bills, in light of the government's evidence that Patrick's employees frequently received paychecks issued by the YMCA for time they spent at other clients' sites. It is also reasonable to infer that Tampas's goal was to create a record justifying the YMCA's inflated payments to Patrick, which the YMCA treasurer and auditor both had begun to question. In light of this evidence and Arambula's testimony on the great disparity between the vague receipts and the value of the jobs Tampas asked him to reconcile, the jury was free to reject Tampas's innocent explanation for his conduct. Tampas also challenges the government's proof on the misleading conduct count as varying from the allegations set forth in the indictment, which alleged that he asked Arambula to create backdated records. It is true that Arambula did not testify that Tampas asked him specifically to backdate the records, but this does not give rise to reversible error. The government proved the statutory elements of misleading conduct, the offense alleged in the indictment, and Arambula's testimony does not so materially diverge from the allegations in the indictment that Tampas has suffered substantial prejudice. See United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111, 1114 (11th Cir.1990) (variance between indictment and evidence is reversible error only if facts proved diverge materially from those alleged and the defendant suffers substantial prejudice). Thus, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Tampas's convictions on all counts.