Opinion ID: 1614964
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Grant New Trial or Enter Remittitur.

Text: Crick further claims the district court erred in failing to grant a new trial or enter a remittitur based upon the excessiveness of the award. We address each separately.
We review the denial of a motion for new trial for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4; Johnson v. Knoxville Community Sch. Dist., 570 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Iowa 1997). However, if the motion is based on a discretionary ground, we review for abuse of discretion. Johnson, 570 N.W.2d at 635. A ruling on a motion for new trial following a jury verdict is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Id. In ruling upon such motions for new trial the trial court has a broad, but not unlimited, discretion in determining whether the verdict effectuates substantial justice between the parties. See Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(3). The discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily and it must have some support in the record. Wilson, 558 N.W.2d at 144; Riley v. Wilson Concrete Co., 184 N.W.2d 689, 690 (Iowa 1971). Generally, we are reluctant to interfere with a jury verdict and give considerable deference to a trial court's decision not to grant a new trial. Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 869 (Iowa 1994). After a review of the record in this case, we find substantial evidence to support the jury's punitive damage award, and that substantial justice was served by the award. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Crick's motion and we affirm the punitive damage award against Crick in the amount of $30,000.
Crick also claims the district court erred in failing to enter a remittitur on the jury's punitive damage award. Crick maintains the ratio between compensatory and punitive damage was excessive. We apply the following standard in considering remittitur: We will reduce or set aside a jury award only if it (1) is flagrantly excessive or inadequate; or (2) is so out of reason as to shock the conscience or sense of justice; or (3) raises a presumption it is a result of passion, prejudice or other ulterior motive; or (4) is lacking in evidentiary support. The most important of the above enumerated tests is support in the evidence. If the verdict has support in the evidence the others will hardly arise, if it lacks support they all may arise. Tullis v. Merrill, 584 N.W.2d 236, 241 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Rees v. O'Malley, 461 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Iowa 1990)). If a verdict meets this standard or fails to do substantial justice between the parties, we must either grant a new trial or enter a remittitur. Spaur, 510 N.W.2d at 869. We have already found sufficient evidence supported the jury's punitive damage award, and that the district court's denial of Crick's motion for new trial was not an abuse of its discretion. The decision to deny remittitur was similarly within the discretion of the trial court. See Burkis v. Contemporary Indus. Midwest Inc., 435 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Iowa App.1988). In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore , the Supreme Court refused to establish a mathematical formula, or a bright line test, to determine the constitutionality of a punitive damage award. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1604, 134 L.Ed.2d 809, 833 (1996). Instead, the decision is made by considering factors such as 1) the reprehensibility of the conduct, 2) the profitability for the company in the conduct, 3) the impact of the judgment on the financial position of the party, 4) the expense of the litigation, 5) the lack of criminal charges filed against the party, and 6) the award bore a reasonable relationship to the harm that was likely to occur from [BMW's] conduct as well as ... the harm that actually occurred. BMW, 517 U.S. at 566-67, 116 S.Ct. at 1594-95, 134 L.Ed.2d at 821 (quoting Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989)). These factors were previously approved of in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1045-46, 113 L.Ed.2d 1, 22 (1991). The Court adopted a grossly excessive standard, and found [i]n most cases, the ratio will be within a constitutionally acceptable range, and remittitur will not be justified on this basis ... [but that a ratio of 500 to 1] must surely `raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.' Id. at 583, 116 S.Ct. at 1603, 134 L.Ed.2d at 831 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 2732, 125 L.Ed.2d 366, 394 (1993)). We find that the ratio of actual damages to punitive damages in this case, nearly 43 to 1, falls within a constitutionally acceptable range based upon the reprehensibility of the act of converting money belonging to an employer, as well as the other relevant factors. As in the Haslip and BMW cases, we similarly refuse to draw concrete limits on the amount of punitive damage other than to emphasize that the punitive damage award in this case was not grossly excessive. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a remittitur. We affirm the district court's denial of Crick's motion for remittitur.