Opinion ID: 2220705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: motions for the suppression of evidence seized were properly denied.

Text: Prior to the trial, both Krebs and Davis moved to suppress certain evidence claiming it was seized from the car as a result of an illegal search and seizure contrary to Article VI, § 11 of the South Dakota Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is implicated when a vehicle is stopped. The action constitutes a seizure even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the detention is brief. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). A passenger has standing to challenge the stop of a vehicle because a stop is a seizure of all persons in the vehicle. United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir.1989). Governmental interest in investigating an officer's reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, may outweigh the Fourth Amendment interest of the driver and passengers. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). In accord with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may not stop a vehicle without a reasonable basis for doing so. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The reasonable cause required to make a stop is less than the probable cause required to issue a warrant or make an arrest. Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26, 88 S.Ct. at 1882, 20 L.Ed.2d at 900-909. State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898 (S.D.1993); State v. Anderson, 331 N.W.2d 568, 570 (S.D.1983) (citing Marben v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980)). The United States Supreme Court has articulated the following standard to evaluate the reasonableness of a stop in the absence of probable cause: [W]hether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 879, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905. We have previously set forth the standard by which this court will measure the reasonableness of a stop of a vehicle: [T]he factual basis required to support a stop for a routine traffic check is minimal.... All that is required is that the stop be not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity. It is enough if the stop is based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion[.] Anderson, 331 N.W.2d at 570 (quoting People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 74, 330 N.E.2d 39, 44 (1975)); Lownes, 499 N.W.2d at 899. The finder of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses. State v. Lingwall, 398 N.W.2d 745, 747 (S.D. 1986). A trial court's factual findings resulting from a suppression hearing will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. State v. Smith, 477 N.W.2d 27, 31 (S.D.1991); State v. Pfaff, 456 N.W.2d 558, 560 (S.D.1990). Whether the facts, when taken together, add up to probable cause, is a different question. Smith, 477 N.W.2d at 31. The existence of probable cause is a question of law, fully reviewable de novo by this court. Id.; State v. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d 624, 630 (S.D.1991).
Davis testified that the Krebs vehicle was driven from the 7-11 and parked at Davis' cousin's home; he stated: We were going to that address anyway. The record shows the patrol car followed the vehicle from the 7-11 and, after it had stopped, parked behind Krebs' car. Davis testified he got out of the car and went inside the residence. Wermers then approached the vehicle. Davis stated he did not hear any conversation between Krebs and Wermers and that when he exited the residence, Wermers was pulling away. Davis was not stopped, questioned, detained or seized in any manner in the first stop of Krebs' vehicle. He exited the car before Wermers approached the car and did not return until he was driving away. Davis has no standing to challenge the first stop of Krebs' vehicle.
When Wermers saw Krebs and Davis in the vehicle at the 7-11, Wermers was justified in making a reasonable investigation based upon the police flyer. We have stated: A police officer, in performing his official work, may properly question persons when the circumstances reasonably indicate that it is necessary to the proper discharge of his duties. State v. Burkman, 281 N.W.2d 436, 439 (S.D.1979). Evidence at trial indicated that Krebs intended to stop at the residence. Wermers did not activate his emergency siren to cause Krebs to stop nor did he use his lights. Additionally, as Wermers approached Krebs' vehicle, he became aware of a violation of the law due to the dangling handcuffs on the rear view mirror. Wermers issued a warning ticket for the violation and Krebs removed the object from the mirror. Krebs identified himself to Wermers and identified his passenger as Guy Davis. He also provided his vehicle registration and proof of insurance to Wermers. Wermers used his flashlight to peer into the interior of Krebs' vehicle from the outside. That is the extent of the intrusion of the first stop. In light of the information available to Wermers in the bulletin and his subsequent discovery of a violation of SDCL 32-15-6, the initial investigation of Krebs' vehicle was minimally intrusive and was reasonable under the circumstances. The trial court did not err in finding Wermers acted reasonably.
In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), a unanimous United States Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' determination that a wanted flyer was insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion because the crime was already completed. The Court said: It is enough to say that, if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229, 105 S.Ct. at 680, 83 L.Ed.2d at 612. The Court went on to hold that a flyer or bulletin based on articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed an offense justifies a Terry stop. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232, 105 S.Ct. at 682, 83 L.Ed.2d at 614. It is the objective reading of the flyer that determines whether other officers may act in reliance on the information. Id., 469 U.S. at 233, 105 S.Ct. at 682, 83 L.Ed.2d at 615. In this case, the flyer requested police be on the lookout for a 1977/1978 grey Pontiac LeMans with Rapid City plates, gave general descriptions of two men and reported the second suspect as wearing multicolored barrettes in his ponytail and a distinctive black, quilted welders cap worn backwards. The bulletin stated the two suspects were believed responsible for burglaries in St. Lawrence, Wessington Springs and Artesian. It then reports one of the suspects could be Guy Davis. Krebs had earlier identified his passenger as Guy Davis. Wermers testified he had read the flyer and that the car and two men he saw at the 7-11 fit the description in the bulletin. He testified he did not make the connection with Davis' name until Officers Spiering and Haug questioned him as to the identity of Krebs' passenger. When Wermers realized Davis was named as a suspect in the bulletin, that corroboration gave added credibility to the bulletin. Additionally, Wermers testified that Krebs had told him they were staying at the residence for the night but drove away five minutes later. The trial court found the suspicious behavior, combined with the corroboration of information in the police flyer, gave rise to reasonable suspicion justifying the stop by Officers Haug and Spiering. We agree with the trial court that law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop.

Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 394 (1978) (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1569, 36 L.Ed.2d 208, 214 (1973)). The standard for measuring Davis' claim is whether he possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148, 99 S.Ct. at 433, 58 L.Ed.2d at 404; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Caffrey, 332 N.W.2d 269, 274 (S.D.1983). Therefore, our threshold question is whether Davis had a legitimate expectation of privacy such that a search could have violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Davis bears the burden of proving he had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2562, 65 L.Ed.2d 633, 641 (1980). The United States Supreme Court has stated: [T]he fact that they were legitimately on [the] premises in the sense that they were in the car with the permission of its owner is not determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area of the automobile searched.... We have on numerous occasions pointed out that cars are not to be treated identically with houses or apartments for Fourth Amendment purposes. [citations omitted] But here petitioners' claim is one which would fail even in an analogous situation in a dwelling place, since they made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers. Like the trunk of an automobile, these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49, 99 S.Ct. at 433, 58 L.Ed.2d at 404. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the factors set forth by the First Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether there is a legitimate expectation of privacy: At least the following factors are relevant to a privacy expectation: legitimate presence in the area searched, possession or ownership of the area searched or the property seized, prior use of the area searched or the property seized, ability to control or exclude others' use of the property, and a subjective expectation of privacy. United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 965 (1st Cir.1982); United States v. Carter, 854 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir.1988). The factors are viewed under the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 856-57 (1st Cir.1989). Ownership of the property seized is not determinative of a legitimate expectation of privacy; it is but one factor to be considered. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105, 100 S.Ct. at 2562, 65 L.Ed.2d at 642. Rakas emphatically rejected the notion that `arcane' concepts of property law ought to control the ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Here, the trial court found that Davis had failed to meet his burden of proving a legitimate expectation of privacy. The record indicates the car did not belong to Davis, Davis was not driving the vehicle, did not control the keys or registrationin short, he did not own or possess the automobile. The record does not show Davis established any prior use of the area. Nor does the record indicate he established any ability to control or exclude others from the area searched or property seized. The trial court found there was no mark or label to identify either the baggie or vial of pills seized from the glove box or the blue bag seized from the trunk as the property of Davis. The trial court determined Davis had not carried his burden of establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy. Under the totality of the circumstances, we do not find the trial court's holding to be clearly erroneous.
For consent to a search to be valid, the totality of the circumstances must indicate that it was voluntarily given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2058-59, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 875 (1973); State v. Woods, 374 N.W.2d 92, 100 (S.D.1985). The presence or absence of consent to search is a question of fact. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct. at 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d at 875; State v. Nemeti, 472 N.W.2d 477, 478 (S.D. 1991); Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d at 628. The state bears the burden of demonstrating consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct. at 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d at 875; Woods, 374 N.W.2d at 100. Our standard of review concerning consent to search is as follows: Because the presence or absence of consent to search is a question of fact, the trial court's resolution of that question will be upheld unless our examination of the evidence, construed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings, convinces us that the finding was clearly erroneous. Nemeti, 472 N.W.2d at 478. Krebs' testimony indicates he left his automobile voluntarily; he was not coerced to leave the vehicle. There is no indication that Krebs was verbally threatened in order to obtain his consent to the search. Nor is there any evidence Krebs was physically threatened or given any promises in return for his consent to the search. The only physical contact the record indicates was an officer restraining Krebs' arm when he made an aggressive movement toward Wermers. Krebs claims he consented to a search but then limited Wermers' search to the cigarette package and lighter. Wermers testified Krebs agreed to the search as long as Krebs could watch. Wermers agreed that Krebs could watch him as long as Krebs did not stand near his right side, within reach of his weapon. The trial court, which is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witness, found the only condition Krebs put on his consent to search was that he wished to watch the procedure. The United States Supreme Court has recently stated that the scope of a search pursuant to consent is circumscribed by the officer's reasonable belief as to the extent of consent. United States v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1804, 114 L.Ed.2d 297, 302 (1991). We agree. Where Wermers believed Krebs consented to a search contingent only upon being allowed to watch, and the trial court so found, a review of the record, examined in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, does not reveal the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous.
One of the recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a search warrant is the automobile exception. We have discussed the exception in the following manner: Based on increased mobility and decreased privacy expectations in a vehicle, both the United States and the South Dakota Supreme Courts have held that: [W]hen a law enforcement officer stops a vehicle, and the officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband, the vehicle may be searched without a warrant. The search may include the interior of the car, as well as the trunk. Under the vehicle exception, the Constitution permits a search to proceed without a warrant, but not without probable cause. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d at 627 (citations omitted). We have described the probable cause required for a search as follows: Probable cause justifying a search is present where the facts found by the court or the magistrate would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe its fairly probable that a crime had been committed and that evidence relevant to the crime would be uncovered by the search. Although the evidence supporting the probable cause determination must be more than a bare suspicion, it need not establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even proof by preponderance. Furthermore, each element of evidence need not be individually assessed for veracity and basis of knowledge. Rather, the probable cause determination is a function of the totality of relevant circumstances. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d at 629 (citations omitted). Krebs did not consent to the search of the trunk. The trial court found the search of the trunk was based upon the pills and rolls of quarters found in the glove compartment, the pencil-marked map, the black quilted welder's cap which matched the description in the flyer and the fact that Krebs and Davis left the residence a few minutes after Krebs told Wermers they would be staying for the night. The trial court determined the facts established probable cause. Once probable cause existed to search the vehicle, it extended to anywhere in the vehicle the objects of the search might reasonably be found. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d at 631. While factual findings are reviewed by this court under the clearly erroneous standard, the question of whether the facts add up to probable cause is a question of law, fully reviewable de novo. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d at 629-30. Confirmation of information contained in the flyer, combined with the evidence uncovered in the search of the interior of the car, provided far more than a bare suspicion that Krebs and Davis were involved in the burglaries. Clearly, the police had probable cause to search the trunk.