Opinion ID: 789385
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Promotion — Position Awarded to Brian Nelson

Text: 9 To survive summary judgment, Septimus must satisfy the burden shifting test found in McDonnell Douglas, 21 and recently reaffirmed in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc. 22 Under this test, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and if she successfully does so, the defendant shall respond by setting forth its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision. 23 If the defendant produces a legitimate reason, any presumption of discrimination raised by the plaintiff's prima facie case vanishes. 24 However, the plaintiff may still avoid summary judgment if she demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact whether the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant are not its true reasons, but instead are a pretext for discrimination. 25 10 Septimus may establish her prima facie case by showing that she 1) is a member of a protected class; 2) was qualified for her position; 3) was subjected to an adverse employment action; and 4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class, or that other similarly situated persons were treated more favorably. 26 11 The summary judgment record shows that in January 1998, the University posted an opening for an AGC to handle employment and litigation matters. Although Septimus admits she was not qualified for that position, she expressed interest to Duffy in being promoted to Williams's former AGC position, for which she was qualified. Earlier that day, before Septimus expressed interest in being promoted, Duffy had interviewed Nelson. Septimus claims that although Nelson was officially hired for the litigation position, for which she admits she was unqualified, he was actually hired, over her, for the business counsel position she sought. Accepting these facts as true, we presume that Septimus sufficiently established her prima facie case. Continuing with the applicable burden shifting analysis, the University has set forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions: Septimus was less qualified than Nelson for the litigation counsel position. 12 Finally, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Septimus did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext. There is no dispute that she was not qualified for the litigation counsel position for which the University says it hired Nelson. Furthermore, even assuming, as Septimus asserts, that the University actually hired Nelson for a business counsel position similar to the position Septimus wanted, she admits that when she raised the issue with Duffy, he stated that because she had not stepped up to assume management responsibilities, she would not be promoted to such a position. 13 Septimus offered no evidence to contest the reasons Duffy gave to support his decision. The mere fact that Nelson was hired instead of Septimus does not sufficiently raise a material fact issue concerning discriminatory intent by Duffy. Septimus's belief that Duffy's decision was motivated by discrimination, however genuinely held, is not sufficient evidence of pretext. 27 Septimus's reliance on McElvaney's conclusion that she suffered gender discrimination with respect to the hiring of Nelson and the EEOC's determination letter containing a reasonable cause finding in her favor as evidence of discrimination also do not permit her to proceed past the summary judgment stage. Septimus did not dispute that she was unqualified for the litigation counsel position, and she proffered no evidence to contest the validity of Duffy's statement that she would not be promoted because she lacked management experience. Therefore, upon review of the relevant underlying facts related to this incident, the court concludes that summary judgment was appropriately entered because Septimus failed to set forth sufficient evidence of pretext.