Opinion ID: 3009947
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Any compensation or benefits

Text: received under any State workers' compensation law because of death or partial or total disability due to pneumoconiosis . . . . 20 C.F.R. § 725.533(a)(1). The regulations define a workers' compensation law for the purposes of Part C as follows: For the purposes of this subchapter, except where the content clearly indicates otherwise, the following definitions apply: . . . (4) A workers' compensation law means a law providing for payment of benefits to employees, and their dependents and survivors, for disability on account of injury, including occupational disease, or death, suffered in connection with their employment. 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(4) (emphasis added). These regulations comport with the language of the statute and with Congress's apparent intent. The regulations fail to suggest that when a law authorizes benefits to employees solely from general revenues, it is not a workers' compensation statute. In fact, the text of the regulation does not suggest that the source of funding of the law plays any role in its determination as a workers' compensation law. The Director, however, argues that we should defer to her interpretation that the phrase payment of benefits to employees actually means payment of benefits by employers to employees. She offers several reasons for her interpretation of the regulation. First, a now repealed regulation defined workers' compensation law exactly as the Director seeks to interpret the current regulation. The Director argues that prior to 1978, Part C regulations defined workmen's compensation law as follows: A workmen's compensation law means a law providing for payment of compensation by employers to employees (and their dependents) for injury (including occupational disease), or death suffered in connection with their employment. 20 C.F.R. § 715.101(a)(18) (1977) (repealed) (emphasis added). The Director argues that Congress never amended the statute to change the definition of workers' compensation law and that there is no record that the Director intended to change her policy of not reducing federal black lung benefits by the amount of compensation received solely from Pennsylvania general revenues under section 301(i). The issue however, is what the Secretary said through regulation, not what the Secretary might have intended. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 573 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1978). Thus, if anything, this older regulation provides further proof that the current regulations do not exclude laws that provide for payments from a state's general revenues from the definition of workers' compensation laws. Regulations in Part B provide further support that the Director's interpretation of the regulations is inconsistent with the text of the regulation. Part B regulations explicitly define workmen's compensation law to exclude statutes funded by general revenues. Section 410.110(p) provides as follows: A workmen's compensation law means a law providing for payment of compensation to an employee (and his dependents) for injury (including occupational disease) or death suffered in connection with his employment. A payment funded wholly out of general revenues and paid (without regard to insurance principles) solely on account of the financial need of the miner and his family, shall not be considered a payment under a workmen's compensation law. 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(p) (emphasis added). Although the Director argues that DOL looked to the SSA's interpretation of the BLBA in writing the regulations, the SSA regulations are much different than the DOL regulations. This regulation reinforces the impression that the Director must comply with the text of the regulation rather than with what the Secretary may have intended section 725.101(a)(4) to mean. Second, the Director argues that if the words to employees are read without inferring the words by employers the word to employees loses its specific meaning and the more general word individuals could be substituted instead. Director's Br. at 29. This interpretation in not evident from the text of the regulation. The BLBA only provides benefits to injured employees and their dependents. Some other individual who receives compensation pursuant to some state statute, would never be seeking benefits pursuant to the BLBA. The Director's interpretation adds words that are not in the text and are not evident from a plain and natural reading of the statute. Third, the Director argues that the Board's decision confers a windfall on the employers. We agree with the Director that pursuant to the Board's decision, the Respondents' total liability is less than it would have been had there been no state award. This policy concern, however, is one the Secretary must address through rewriting the regulations rather than through interpretation. Finally, the Director argues that the the Black Lung Benefits Act is remedial legislation that ought to be liberally construed, so long as such a construction would not be plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the language of the Act. Director's Br. at 31. While the Director's interpretation is not inconsistent with the statute, it is inconsistent with the statute's implementing regulations, even according substantial deference to the Director. Therefore, we cannot defer to this interpretation. Although the Director claims that she consistently has applied the same policy for twenty years, she is not permitted to imply language that simply does not exist. Director, OWCP v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1324 (3d Cir. 1987). Absent from the text of the regulation is any suggestion that the funding source of a state statute determines its status as a workers' compensation statute. Her interpretation strains the plain and natural meaning of the text. To reach such a result would require consideration of factors far beyond the actual regulation. On the other hand, we also reject the Board's argument that we must accord deference to Pennsylvania's interpretation of section 422(g) of the BLBA. We defer only to the interpretations offered by the agency charged with administering the law. Thus, the fact that section 301 of the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act is in Title 77, entitled Workmen's Compensation, does not influence our decision, nor does the fact that the referee who awarded O'Brockta and Stinner benefits was a Workmen's Compensation Referee for the Commonwealth's Bureau of Workers' Compensation. To hold otherwise would permit the state, rather than the federal government to administer the laws. Thus, we must reject the Board's reasoning that the plain meaning of section 422(g) is that when a state has denominated a law as a workers' compensation law, benefits paid pursuant to it are subject to offset. We reiterate that we cannot accord more deference to the Director's interpretation of the regulation than to the actual regulation. The Director points to a single segment of the legislative history that support her interpretation, but we find her reference unhelpful.4 Congress delegated the Secretary the 4 . During floor debate in 1969, Representative Dent, congressman from Pennsylvania who was the floor manager of the Bill, stated that the offset provisions of §§ 412(b) and 422(g) did not apply to state programs funded through general revenues. He cited the Pennsylvania program that paid benefits out of general revenues as an example of a program that was not a workmen's compensation program within the meaning of the Act. 115 Cong. Rec. 39713 (1969). This isolated floor comment would have provided some support for the Director's position had the Secretary interpreted the provisions of the Act relating to Part C in the same manner as the Social Security Administration interpreted the provisions relating to Part B when it promulgated § 410.110(p) of its regulations. However, the Secretary, whom we believe from the context must have been acting advertently, adopted a regulation regarding Part C claims with a text markedly different from the text of § 410.110(p). Congressman Dent's comment would not justify our reading the Secretary's regulation concerning Part C claims in a manner inconsistent with its text. responsibility to fill in the gaps left in the BLBA. If DOL intends to make an exception for state statutes that are funded solely through a state's general revenues, it has the means and obligation to amend its regulations to provide for this exception. The Director's interpretation does not comport with the language of the regulations.