Opinion ID: 1624390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Penalty Phase Instructions/Judicial Admissions

Text: Parrish complains that the penalty phase instructions for the child murder victim were improper because the phrase engaged in the commission of a robbery was vague and in addition, the Commonwealth admitted in closing argument that the child was killed so he could not serve as a witness to identify Parrish. He asserts that the penalty phase instructions were flawed. Parrish maintains that the prosecution made a judicial admission in the guilt phase argument to the effect that Parrish murdered the child for the sole reason that he would not be able to identify him. He asserts that that was a judicial admission and it would be manifestly unfair to allow the prosecution to turn around and argue in the penalty phase that an aggravator was Parrish's commission of a robbery. Part of the objection by defense counsel at trial was on the grounds of vagueness. The trial judge overruled the defense motion because she did not find the language ambiguous and because Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293 (1997), settled the question of sequence. The evidence indicates that all the murdered victims were killed during the commission of a robbery. Here, there were two aggravating circumstances proven. All that is needed is one. Simmons v. Commonwealth, Ky., 746 S.W.2d 393 (1988). Thus, this argument is without merit. The complained of remark was only a small portion of the closing argument in which the prosecutor recited the proposition that in the course of robberies the victims are often murdered. This part of the argument is not uncontroverted evidence such that no other reasonable conclusion could be drawn therefrom. There was no judicial admission. A prosecutor may comment on tactics, evidence and the falsity of a defense proposition in closing argument. The focus of appellate review is on the overall fairness of the trial and not the culpability of the prosecutor. Slaughter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 744 S.W.2d 407 (1987). The alleged prosecutorial misconduct is not so serious as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Reversal is not required. Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219 (1996). There was no error.