Opinion ID: 1806535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was it error to deny a motion for a new trial?

Text: During the trial Cassel, while being transferred from the courtroom to the jail, was seen by some jurors handcuffed and chained. These incidents occurred in a hall near a tunnel in the courthouse or near the courthouse but outside the courtroom. These views, it is claimed, prejudiced the jury and the court should have granted a motion for a new trial and, failing to do so, should have sua sponte instructed the jury to disregard the incident. The question here presented is whether a view by some members of the jury of the accused in chains and handcuffs outside the courtroom should be treated as such a view in the courtroom by the jury. We think not. In Sparkman v. State (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 133 N. W. 2d 776, this court followed the general rule phrased in Way v. United States (10th Cir. 1960), 285 Fed. 2d 253, 254, that a defendant during the trial of a criminal case should not be in shackles, manacles or handcuffs because such freedom was an important component of a fair and impartial trial. The opinion explained that the evil sought to be avoided was a creation of prejudice in the minds of the jury before whom the defendant is tried. Prejudice is likely to be engendered psychologically by view of a man presumed to be innocent in the chains and handcuffs of the convicted. However, the rule is not absolute as the safety of the court, counsel, witnesses, jurors, and the public may demand shackles on an accused even in the presence of a jury. While the accused is in the courtroom, the balancing of the rights of the accused and of the public is a matter for the trial court to determine. But when it is necessary to have an accused on trial in restraints before a jury in a courtroom, the court has a duty to offset the effect. The recent promulgated American Bar Association standards for criminal justice provide: Defendants and witnesses should not be subjected to physical restraint while in court unless the trial judge has found such restraint reasonably necessary to maintain order. If the trial judge orders such restraint, he should enter into the record of the case the reasons therefor. Whenever physical restraint of a defendant or witness occurs in the presence of jurors trying the case, the judge should instruct those jurors that such restraint is not to be considered in assessing the proof and determining guilt. [1] It is also advisable if restraints are to be ordered that defense counsel be given a prior opportunity to argue the question outside the presence of the jury. We think that when a jury or members thereof see an accused outside the courtroom in chains or handcuffs the situation is psychologically different and less likely to create prejudice in the minds of the jurors. Whether an accused should be in chains and handcuffs outside the courtroom is a matter for the sheriff or the police to determine since such custodian is responsible for the safe-keeping and safe transportation of the accused. The record need not show restraints were warranted before and after the accused's appearance in the courtroom. People normally expect to see a prisoner under some restraints in situations where he is able to escape if not in restraints. One member of the jury so stated. It may even be that seeing a prisoner in chains or handcuffs would generate in some people sympathy rather than prejudice. Here, the views by some members of the jury were casual, momentary and inadvertent. The dramatics of such a situation is essentially different than a court scene. Further the jury was polled after verdict by the defendant on this point and the members who saw Cassel in restraints stated their verdict was not influenced by the incident. In this context we think the court was not obliged as a matter of law to infer the incident was prejudicial. The question still remains whether the trial court's failure sua sponte to instruct the jury to disregard the incident in deciding the issue of guilt constitutes error. Cassel did not request such an instruction and normally it is not error for a court to fail to give an instruction which is not requested. This court has ruled that a trial court should not be required sua sponte to undertake admonitory instructions. State v. Yancey (1966), 32 Wis. 2d 104, 112, 145 N. W. 2d 145 (failure to instruct a jury when an accused pleads the fifth amendment while on the witness stand); Johns v. State (1961), 14 Wis. 2d 119, 109 N. W. 2d 490 (the failure to instruct that no presumption arises from failure of accused to take the witness stand on his own behalf). This rationale is based upon the theory such instructions may do more harm than good and therefore defense counsel should be given the opportunity and responsibility to determine his own trial technique and whether or not he wants an instruction given in such a situation. This rationale was reiterated and affirmed in Price v. State (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 117, 130, 154 N. W. 2d 222. We now apply the proposition to these facts that a trial court is not required to instruct the jury sua sponte when it sees the accused in restraints outside of the courtroom.