Opinion ID: 1431414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the right of publicity

Text: The fundamental issue in this case is the nature of Lugosi's right to control the commercial exploitation of his likeness. The trial court found Universal's licensing agreements constituted a tortious interference with Lugosi's proprietary or property interest in the commercial use of his likeness, an interest which had descended to plaintiffs. Universal asserts that Lugosi's interest is protected only under the rubric of the right of privacy. Since that right is personal and ceased with Lugosi's death, plaintiffs cannot recover damages based on Universal's conduct. [8] Acordingly, the critical question is whether an individual's interest in the commercial use of his likeness is protected solely as an aspect of the right of privacy or whether additional or alternative protection exists.
The common law right of privacy creates a cause of action for an interference with the right of the plaintiff ... `to be let alone.' (Prosser, Privacy (1960) 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383, 389.) [9] The gist of the cause of action in a privacy case is ... a direct wrong of a personal character resulting in injury to the feelings ... of the individual.... The injury is mental and subjective. It impairs the mental peace and comfort of the person and may cause suffering much more acute than that caused by a bodily injury. ( Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co. (1955) 138 Cal. App.2d 82, 86-87 [291 P.2d 194]. See Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co. (1952) 38 Cal.2d 273, 276-278 [239 P.2d 630]; Hofstadter & Horowitz, The Right of Privacy (1964) § 1.1; Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193.) Since the right of privacy developed to protect an individual from certain injuries to his feelings and assaults on his peace of mind, he need not suffer any injury to his property, business or economic interests as a prerequisite to initiating a suit for an invasion of privacy. ( Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., supra, 138 Cal. App.2d at p. 86.) The appropriation of an individual's likeness for another's commercial advantage often intrudes on interests distinctly different than those protected by the right of privacy. Plaintiffs in this case have not objected to the manner in which Universal used Lugosi's likeness nor claimed any mental distress from such use. Rather, plaintiffs have asserted that Universal reaped an economic windfall from Lugosi's enterprise to which they are rightfully entitled. Today, it is commonplace for individuals to promote or advertise commercial services and products or, as in the present case, even have their identities infused in the products. Individuals prominent in athletics, business, entertainment and the arts, for example, are frequently involved in such enterprises. When a product's promoter determines that the commercial use of a particular person will be advantageous, the promoter is often willing to pay handsomely for the privilege. As a result, the sale of one's persona in connection with the promotion of commercial products has unquestionably become big business. (See Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of Publicity (1978) 29 Hastings L.J. 751; Nimmer, The Right of Publicity (1954) 19 Law & Contemp. Prob. 203, 204, 215-216; Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories (1973) 51 Texas L.Rev. 637, 646.) Such commercial use of an individual's identity is intended to increase the value or sales of the product by fusing the celebrity's identity with the product and thereby siphoning some of the publicity value or good will in the celebrity's persona into the product. This use is premised, in part, on public recognition and association with that person's name or likeness, or an ability to create such recognition. The commercial value of a particular person's identity thus primarily depends on that person's public visibility and the characteristics for which he or she is known. ( Uhlaender v. Hendricksen (D.Minn. 1970) 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283.) Often considerable money, time and energy are needed to develop one's prominence in a particular field. Years of labor may be required before one's skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues are sufficiently developed to permit an economic return through some medium of commercial promotion. (See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc. (1973) 72 Misc.2d 788 [340 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146], affd. as mod. 42 App.Div.2d 544 [345 N.Y.S.2d 17]; Nimmer, supra, 19 Law & Contemp. Prob. at p. 216.) For some, the investment may eventually create considerable commercial value in one's identity. In this context, the marketable product of that labor is the ability of a person's name or likeness to attract the attention and evoke a desired response in a particular consumer audience. That response is a kind of good will or recognition value generated by that person. (See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 447 F. Supp. 723, 728-729; Grant v. Esquire, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1973) 367 F. Supp. 876, 879.) While this product is concededly intangible, it is not illusory. An unauthorized commercial appropriation of one's identity converts the potential economic value in that identity to another's advantage. The user is enriched, reaping one of the benefits of the celebrity's investment in himself. (See Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc. (1967) 96 N.J. Super. 72 [232 A.2d 458, 462]; Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law  Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? (1966) 31 Law & Contemp. Prob. 326, 331.) The loss may well exceed the mere denial of compensation for the use of the individual's identity. The unauthorized use disrupts the individual's effort to control his public image, and may substantially alter that image. The individual may be precluded from future promotions in that as well as other fields. Further, while a judicious involvement in commercial promotions may have been perceived as an important ingredient in one's career, uncontrolled exposure may be dysfunctional. As a result, the development of his initial vocation  his profession  may be arrested. (See Treece, supra, 51 Texas L.Rev. at pp. 642-646.) Finally, if one's identity is exploited without permission to promote products similar to those which the individual has already endorsed, the unauthorized use resembles unfair competition. While the product which first used the celebrity paid for the privilege of trading on his publicity value, the second product has secured a costless endorsement. The simultaneous presence in the market of these competing products may cause the latter to be mistaken for the former and will probably diminish the value of the endorsement. (See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 444 F. Supp. 279, 283.) Accordingly, the gravamen of the harm flowing from an unauthorized commercial use of a prominent individual's likeness [10] in most cases is the loss of potential financial gain, not mental anguish. (See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (9th Cir.1974) 498 F.2d 821, 824; Prosser, supra, 48 Cal.L.Rev. at p. 406; Comment, Transfer of the Right of Publicity: Dracula's Progency and Privacy's Stepchild (1975) 22 UCLA L.Rev. 1103, 1104, fn. 8.) [11] The fundamental objection is not that the commercial use is offensive, but that the individual has not been compensated. Indeed, the representation of the person will most likely be flattering, since it is in the user's interest to project a positive image. The harm to feelings, if any, is usually minimal. (See Note, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company: Media Appropriation, the First Amendment and State Regulation (1977) Utah L.Rev. 817, 818-819.) The individual's interest thus threatened by most unauthorized commercial uses is significantly different than the personal interests protected under the right of privacy. Recognition of this difference has prompted independent judicial protection for this economic interest. The individual's interest in the commercial value of his identity has been regarded as proprietary in nature [12] and sometimes denominated a common law right of publicity. [13] This right has won increasing judicial recognition, [14] as well as endorsements by legal commentators. [15] The right of publicity has been regarded as the right of each person to control and profit from the publicity values which he has created or purchased. (Nimmer, supra, 19 Law & Contemp. Prob. at p. 216. See Note, supra, 25 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 1097.) The distinctive aspect of the common law right of publicity is that it recognizes the commercial value of the picture or representation of a prominent person or performer, and protects his proprietary interest in the profitability of his public reputation or `persona.' ( Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., supra, 447 F. Supp. at p. 728.) Two leading decisions are illustrative. In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., supra, 202 F.2d 866, plaintiff, which had an exclusive contract with a baseball player to use the player's photograph in connection with the sale of plaintiff's chewing gum, sued to prevent defendant's similar use of the player's photograph. The viability of plaintiff's lawsuit depended on the court's determination of the player's interest in his own likeness: if the player's interest consisted only of the right of privacy, plaintiff could not maintain its action since the player's right was incapable of assignment. Applying New York law, the federal court of appeals found that in addition to a statutory right to privacy, each person had an enforceable right in the publicity value of his photograph, a right of publicity. Unlike the personal right of privacy, such interest could be transferred `in gross,' i.e., without any accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else.... [¶] ... For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures. ( Id., at p. 868.) Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff's claim had been improperly dismissed. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 400 F. Supp. 836 involved a controversy remarkably similar to the present case. Plaintiffs were the widows of Stanley Laurel and Oliver Hardy (Laurel and Hardy) and a corporation with a contract for the exclusive right to use and merchandise Laurel's and Hardy's names, likenesses and characterizations. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, owners of the copyright to certain Laurel and Hardy motion pictures, had misappropriated the names and likenesses of the two deceased comedians for commercial merchandising purposes. The court, citing Haelan, held that Laurel and Hardy had had a property right in the use of their names and likenesses during their lifetimes completely separate from the right of privacy. Further, their right of publicity was held to descend to their respective wives upon death, without regard to whether either exploited his right to publicity during his lifetime. ( Id., at pp. 843-844, 846.) [16] Accordingly, notwithstanding defendants' interest in certain Laurel and Hardy motion pictures, plaintiffs were held to be entitled to damages and injunctive relief for defendants' unauthorized commercial use of Laurel's and Hardy's rights of publicity. Underlying these decisions is a recognition that each person has a right to enjoy the fruits of his own industry, the right to decide how and when the commercial value in his identity will be exploited. ( Uhlaender v. Hendricksen, supra, 316 F. Supp. at p. 1282. See Nimmer, supra, 19 Law & Contemp. Prob. at p. 216; Note, supra, 1977 Utah L.Rev. at p. 818.) [17] When one makes an unauthorized use of another's identity for his own commercial advantage, he is unjustly enriched, having usurped both profit and control of that individual's public image. [18] Further, there is a broader social objective implicit in according judicial protection to the right of publicity, analogous to the policies underlying copyright and patent law. The Supreme Court recently described the purpose of granting copyright protection as encouraging people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation ..., and thereby secure the benefits of such labors for the entire society. ( Goldstein v. California (1973) 412 U.S. 546, 555 [37 L.Ed.2d 163, 173, 93 S.Ct. 2303]. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright (1978) § 1.03[A].) Similarly, providing legal protection for the economic value in one's identity against unauthorized commercial exploitation creates a powerful incentive for expending time and resources to develop the skills or achievements prerequisite to public recognition and assures that the individual will be able to reap the reward of his endeavors.... ( Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., supra, 433 U.S. at p. 573 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 975].) While the immediate beneficiaries are those who establish professions or identities which are commercially valuable, the products of their enterprise are often beneficial to society generally. Their performances, inventions and endeavors enrich our society, while their participation in commercial enterprises may communicate valuable information to consumers. (See id., at pp. 576-577 [53 L.Ed.2d at pp. 976-977]; Note, supra, 29 Hastings L.J. at pp. 767-768; Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zachini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. (1978) 30 Stan.L.Rev. 1185, 1186, fn. 7.) [19] The reasons for affording independent protection for the economic value in one's identity are substantial and compelling, as attested by the increasing number of jurisdictions which have done so. (See fn. 14, ante. ) [20] I am similarly persuaded that an individual's right of publicity is entitled to the law's protection. [21] The common law can readily accommodate judicial recognition of the right of publicity. `The rules of the common law are continually changing and expanding with the progress of the society in which it prevails. It does not lag behind, but adapts itself to the conditions of the present so that the ends of justice may be reached.' ( Johnston v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp. (1947) 82 Cal. App.2d 796, 815 [187 P.2d 474].) Specifically, this court has long recognized that the concept of property is not static but changes to accommodate creative developments and novel legal relationships. [22] For example, courts have recognized protectible interests in trademarks ( Derringer v. Plate (1865) 29 Cal. 292, 294-295; Hall v. Holstrom (1930) 106 Cal. App. 563, 568 [289 P. 668]), titles of literary works ( Jackson v. Universal International Pictures, Inc. (1950) 36 Cal.2d 116 [222 P.2d 433]; Johnston v. 20th Century-Fox Films Corp., supra, 82 Cal. App.2d 796), the collection and dissemination of news ( International News Service v. Associated Press (1918) 248 U.S. 215 [63 L.Ed. 211, 39 S.Ct. 68, 2 A.L.R. 293]), and ideas communicated in confidence or in reasonable expectation of consideration (see Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502, 506, fn. 3 [121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 535 P.2d 1161, 79 A.L.R.3d 807] [cases collected]; Components For Research, Inc. v. Isolation Products, Inc. (1966) 241 Cal. App.2d 726, 730 [50 Cal. Rptr. 829]). The right of publicity is entitled to similar treatment. [23] (See Nimmer, supra, 19 Law & Contemp. Prob. at p. 223.) Universal argues that judicial recognition of an independent right of publicity is unnecessary in light of the adequate protection afforded under the common law right of privacy. However, the interest at stake in most commercial appropriation cases is ill-suited to protection under the umbrella of the right of privacy. First, the raison d'etre of the common law right of privacy is protection against assaults on one's feelings; an unauthorized commercial appropriation usually precipitates only economic loss, not mental anguish. [24] Second, since the representation of the individual is often flattering, substantial linguistic acrobatics are required to construct a privacy claim on the ground that the use is offensive to a reasonable person. (See Note, supra, 1977 Utah L.Rev. at pp. 818-819. Cf. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 541, 543.) Third, if information about a person is already in the public domain, there can be no claim for an invasion of privacy; to that extent, the right of privacy has been waived. Yet it is publicity which frequently creates value in the individual's identity. To deny a claim for damages for commercial misappropriation because the claimant is prominent is to deny the right to the very individuals to whom the right is most valuable. [25] Fourth, if treated as an aspect of privacy, the use of one's identity for commercial purposes may not be assigned because privacy is a personal, nonassignable right. (See fn. 8, ante. ) Such a limitation precludes transferring this economic interest, thereby substantially diminishing its value. (See Nimmer, supra, 19 Law & Contemp. Prob. at pp. 209-210; Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., supra, 202 F.2d at p. 868.) In short, conforming a claim for the misappropriation of the commercial value in one's identity to the requirements of the right of privacy requires a procrustean jurisprudence.
The parameters of the right of publicity must now be considered. This case presents two questions: (1) whether the right extends to the likeness of an individual in his portrayal of a fictional character; and (2) whether the right dies with the individual or may be passed to one's heirs or beneficiaries. Because the right protects against the unauthorized commercial use of an individual's identity, the right clearly applies to the person's name and likeness. However, such protection would appear to be insufficient because many people create public recognition not only in their natural appearance but in their portrayal of particular characters. Charlie Chaplin's Little Tramp, Carroll O'Connor's Archie Bunker and Flip Wilson's Judge and Geraldine exemplify such creations. Substantial publicity value exists in the likeness of each of these actors in their character roles. The professional and economic interests in controlling the commercial exploitation of their likenesses while portraying these characters are identical to their interests in controlling the use of their own natural likenesses. Indeed, to the extent one's professional endeavors have focused on the development of one or more particular character images, protection for one's likeness in the portrayal of those characters may well be considerably more important than protection for the individual's natural appearance. Hence, there appears to be no reason why the right of publicity should not extend to one's own likeness while portraying a particular fictional character. [26] Lugosi's likeness in his portrayal of Count Dracula is clearly such a case. Many men have portrayed Count Dracula in motion pictures and on stage. However, the trial court found that Universal did not license the use of an undifferentiated Count Dracula character, but the distinctive and readily recognizable portrayal of Lugosi as the notorious Translyvanian count. Universal thereby sought to capitalize on the particular image of Lugosi in this portrayal of Count Dracula and the public recognition generated by his performance. Such use is illustrative of the very interests the right of publicity is intended to protect. Hence, Lugosi had a protectible property interest in controlling unauthorized commercial exploitation of his likeness in his portrayal of Count Dracula. Recognizing Lugosi's legitimate interest in controlling the use of his portrayal of Count Dracula limits neither the author's exploitation of the novel Dracula [27] nor Universal's use of its copyrighted motion picture. Lugosi only agreed to allow Universal to make limited use of his likeness in their 1930 contract. Further, Lugosi's right certainly does not prohibit others from portraying the character Count Dracula. Consequently, nothing established herein suggests that any of the individuals involved in contemporary cinematic or theatrical revivals of Count Dracula's nocturnal adventures have violated Lugosi's right of publicity. The only conduct prohibited is the unauthorized commercial use of Lugosi's likeness in his portrayal of Count Dracula. To the extent that Universal or another seeks such use, that right can be secured by contract. [28] The right of publicity protects the intangible proprietary interest in the commercial value in one's identity. Like other intangible property rights, its value often cannot be reaped if the individual may not transfer all or part of that interest to another for development. Indeed, an exclusive grant of publicity rights may be required before an attempt to use or promote that person's likeness will be undertaken. Since it is clear that the right of publicity is hardly viable unless assignable, I agree with the numerous authorities that have recognized the right is capable of assignment. [29] It is equally clear that the right may be passed to one's heirs or beneficiaries upon the individual's death. In considering the question of the right's descendibility, it must be remembered that what is at issue is the proprietary interest in the value of one's name and likeness in commercial enterprises, not a personal right like the right of privacy. No policy has been suggested which persuades me that the right of publicity ... should not descend at death like any other intangible property right. ( Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., supra, 444 F. Supp. at p. 284.) Further, as with copyright protection, granting protection after death provides an increased incentive for the investment of resources in one's profession, which may augment the value of one's right of publicity. If the right is descendible, the individual is able to transfer the benefits of his labor to his immediate successors and is assured that control over the exercise of the right can be vested in a suitable beneficiary. There is no reason why, upon a celebrity's death, advertisers should receive a windfall in the form of freedom to use with impunity the name or likeness of the deceased celebrity who may have worked his or her entire life to attain celebrity status. The financial benefits of that labor should go to the celebrity's heirs.... (Note, supra, 42 Brooklyn L.Rev. at p. 547.) [30] However, encouraging the investment of resources in activities and careers from which publicity values arise and providing protection for the resulting proprietary interest does not necessitate perpetual protection for the right of publicity. Assurance that one's immediate family and successors will be entitled to the residual value of one's right of publicity after death is a sufficient incentive. Further, recognition of the right of publicity is premised in part on an individual's interest in controlling the manner in which he or she is commercially exploited, so that such use furthers rather than undermines his or her professional activities. With death, the individual's need to control the commercial uses of his identity as an adjunct to his career ceases. Providing legal protection long after death basically serves to protect the continuing exploitation of the right, a protection which may already be available under the theory of unfair competition. (See maj. opn., ante, pp. 818-819. See generally, Fields, What's in a Stage Name? (1962) 35 So. Cal.L.Rev. 149, 149-154.) Finally, with the passage of time, an individual's identity is woven into the fabric of history, as a heroic or obscure character of the past. In that sense, the events and measures of his life are in the public domain and are questionably placed in the control of a particular descendent. The fixing of the precise date for the termination of the right of publicity is inherently a policy decision, one that the Legislature may be best able to determine. However, in the absence of legislative action, a limit must be prescribed. In fashioning common law rights and remedies in the past, this court has often considered federal and state statutory schemes for guidance. (See, e.g., In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 224 [42 Cal. Rptr. 9, 397 P.2d 1001]; Estate of Mason (1965) 62 Cal.2d 213, 217 [42 Cal. Rptr. 13, 397 P.2d 1005].) Since the right of publicity recognizes an interest in intangible property similar in many respects to creations protected by copyright law ( Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., supra, 433 U.S. at p. 573 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 975]), that body of law is instructive. The Copyright Act of 1976 (17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.) provides that a copyright in new works shall be recognized during the author's life and for 50 years thereafter. (17 U.S.C. § 302 (a).) That period represents a reasonable evaluation of the period necessary to effect the policies underlying the right of publicity. Therefore, I would hold that the right of publicity should be recognized during the subject's life and for 50 years thereafter. (See Comment, supra, 22 UCLA L.Rev. at pp. 1124-1128; Note, supra, 29 Hastings L.J. at p. 773. Cf. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press? (1970) 17 UCLA L.Rev. 1180, 1193-1194.) [31] The final question presented is whether an individual must exercise the right of publicity during his or her lifetime as a condition of its inheritability. The weight of authority holds that an individual need not exercise one's right of publicity to protect it from use by others or to preserve any potential right of one's heirs. ( Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., supra, 400 F. Supp. at p. 846.) [32] A person may not have commercially exploited his name or likeness during his lifetime due to the absence of the appropriate medium or an early death. Perhaps the individual chose not to exercise the right to retain its full value as a legacy for his heirs. Since those choices do not conflict with the rationale for recognizing the right, the failure to exercise the right should not affect its inheritability. Further, there is no reasonable method for ascertaining in a particular case if the right has been sufficiently exploited to warrant passing the right to the decedent's beneficiaries. There are no practical standards for measuring which uses and what period of use are required to create a protectible right. Absent clear rules, the right of publicity might be lost by the unwary. Hence, requiring the exercise of the right of publicity during the person's lifetime as a condition for inheritability is not only inconsistent with the rationale underlying the right but imposes an ill-defined prerequisite on its preservation. [33] In summary, I would hold that a prominent person's interest in the economic value of commercial uses of his or her name and likeness is protected under the common law. This interest is denominated a right of publicity and is assignable. The right is descendible and is accorded legal protection during the individual's lifetime and for a period of 50 years thereafter. Having found Universal licensed Lugosi's likeness in his distinctive portrayal of Count Dracula, the trial court properly held such use infringed on Lugosi's right of publicity. Since plaintiffs inherited that right upon Lugosi's death, they are entitled to relief for Universal's tortious conduct.
Universal asserts that a common law proprietary interest in one's name and likeness may not be recognized because such recognition is preempted by congressional legislation under the copyright clause of the United States Constitution. (See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. (1964) 376 U.S. 225 [11 L.Ed.2d 661, 84 S.Ct. 784]; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. (1964) 376 U.S. 234 [11 L.Ed.2d 669, 84 S.Ct. 779].) That section provides that Congress shall have the power [t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors ... the exclusive right to their ... writings.... (U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.) Under this clause, Congress could, at most, enact legislation governing all writings. (See 17 U.S.C. § 102.) [34] The United States Supreme Court has recently defined writings to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor. ( Goldstein v. California, supra, 412 U.S. at p. 561 [37 L.Ed.2d at p. 177]. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright, supra, § 1.08.) The intangible proprietary interest protected by the right of publicity simply does not constitute a writing. That interest may be valuable due to the individual's creative intellectual labors, but the publicity value generated by these labors is not focused in a physical rendering. To conclude that the right of publicity is subject to congressional regulation under the copyright clause is to find that not only an author's writings, but also his mind, are subject to such control. Such a position is untenable. Thus, congressional action has not preempted the recognition of common law protection for the right of publicity. (Accord Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., supra, 400 F. Supp. at pp. 845-846.) Any doubt on this issue was removed by the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcastig Co., supra, 433 U.S. 562. That case involved a television broadcast of plaintiff's entire performance in a human cannonball act. The Supreme Court found no impediment to the State of Ohio providing plaintiff with the `right to the publicity value of his performance.' ( Id., at p. 565 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 969].) The Constitution does not prevent Ohio from... deciding to protect the entertainer's incentive in order to encourage the production of this type of work. ( Id., at p. 577 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 977].) If federal copyright law does not preclude a state from granting protection to an uncopyrighted performance, a fortiori the recognition of common law protection for the proprietary interest in one's name and likeness is immune from such attack. (See Note, supra, 42 Brooklyn L.Rev. at p. 545, fn. 85; Note, supra, 30 Stan.L.Rev. at pp. 1188, fn. 8, 1192-1194. Cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. (1974) 416 U.S. 470 [40 L.Ed.2d 315, 94 S.Ct. 1879]; Goldstein v. California, supra, 412 U.S. 546.) [35] Recognizing plaintiffs' succession to Lugosi's right of publicity in his portrayal of Count Dracula does not interfere with the rights granted Universal under federal law in its copyrighted motion picture Dracula. In producing the film, Universal bargained and paid Lugosi for only limited rights: to employ Lugosi to portray Count Dracula in the production of one motion picture. (See discussion in section III, post. ) Universal was and is free to exploit Lugosi's performance in that film within the confines of the copyright law. Universal can no more complain that its inability to merchandise Lugosi's image precludes the full use of its motion picture than protest that its inability to use scenes from Dracula in another motion picture restricts such use. Not having bargained for such rights, there is no entitlement. (Accord Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., supra, 400 F. Supp. at pp. 842-843.) [36] Finally, I am sensitive to the fact that enforcement of the right of publicity may conflict with freedom of expression in some cases. However, such a conflict is not presented in this case. Plaintiffs challenged Universal's licensing of Lugosi's likeness in his portrayal of Count Dracula in connection with the sale of such objects as plastic toy pencil sharpeners, soap products, target games, candy dispensers and beverage stirring rods. Such conduct hardly implicates the First Amendment. (See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., supra, 72 Misc.2d 788 [340 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 146-147], affd. as mod. 42 App. Div.2d 544 [345 N.Y.S.2d 17] [games]; Rosemont Enterprises v. Choppy Productions (1972) 74 Misc.2d 1003 [347 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85] [T-shirts, sweatshirts]. Compare Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., supra, 579 F.2d 215 [production of poster of Elvis Presley entitled In Memory not protected] with Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc. (1968) 59 Misc.2d 444 [299 N.Y.S.2d 501] [Production of poster of Pat Paulsen in comic attire entitled For President protected].) This unauthorized exploitation of plaintiffs' proprietary interest in these commercial merchandising products is no more insulated from suit by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression than Universal's refusal to pay Lugosi for his services in portraying Count Dracula in Dracula would be. (Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., supra, 433 U.S. 562; Grant v. Esquire, Inc., supra, 316 F. Supp. at p. 884.)