Opinion ID: 2826208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duplicative Punishment

Text: [¶11] The double jeopardy clause bars “multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Labbe, 2009 ME 94, ¶ 4, 979 A.2d 693 (quotation marks omitted). The traditional test for determining whether multiple punishments are for the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes—the “same-elements” test, sometimes referred to as the “Blockburger test”—“inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the same offen[s]e and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution.” United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)). As Hoover concedes, the same-elements test is inapplicable here because the state crime of gross sexual assault and the federal crimes of sexual exploitation of a child and possession of child pornography contain different elements. Compare 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(C), with 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2251(a), (e)(1), 2252A(a)(5)(B). [¶12] However, citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995), Hoover argues that, because the sexual assaults weighed so heavily in the federal court’s sentencing decision on the production and possession charges, the State’s current 7 prosecution related to that same conduct presents the risk of unconstitutional duplicative punishment. [¶13] In Witte, the defendant was convicted of federal marijuana distribution charges. Id. at 391-93. In imposing a sentence on the marijuana conviction, the federal sentencing court took into account the defendant’s prior conduct related to the importation of cocaine because it considered the cocaine-related activities to be “part of the same continuing conspiracy,” and therefore “relevant conduct” for sentencing purposes. Id. at 393-94. The defendant was later indicted on cocaine importation charges based on the same conduct that the sentencing court had previously considered. Id. at 394-95. [¶14] The United States Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not implicated by the second indictment, reasoning that “use of evidence of related criminal conduct to enhance a defendant’s sentence for a separate crime within the authorized statutory limits does not constitute punishment for that conduct within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Id. at 399. Rather, the Court held, a defendant in that situation is “punished, for double jeopardy purposes, only for the offense of which the defendant is convicted.” Id. at 397. However, the Court indicated that if the enhancing role played by the relevant conduct is too significant, “consideration of that conduct in 8 sentencing [may] become a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.” Id. at 403 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)). [¶15] Here, the United States District Court expressly considered Hoover’s sexually assaultive conduct in sentencing Hoover on the federal production and possession charges, and substantially increased Hoover’s sentence as a result of that conduct. If Hoover’s sexually assaultive conduct effectively became the operative factor in Hoover’s federal sentence, the State’s current prosecution might, as the trial court found, result in Hoover being punished twice for the same criminal conduct.2 [¶16] However, we need not decide whether the sexual assaults became the tail that wagged the dog of the substantive federal offenses. Even if the State’s current prosecution subjects Hoover to the risk of being punished twice for the same conduct, such duplicative punishment is constitutional when, as is the case here, the punishments are imposed by separate sovereigns.