Opinion ID: 766188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Merits of Plaintiff's Substantive Due Process Claim

Text: 37 In the end, Plaintiff's only viable claim is one for prospective injunctive relief against defendant Nielsen in her official capacity for allegedly violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A threshold requirement to a substantive or procedural due process claim is the plaintiff's showing of a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution. Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994). 38 In an early line of cases, the Supreme Court recognized that the liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause includes some generalized due process right to choose one's field of private employment. Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 1292, 1295-96 (1999) (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889), and Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915)); see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (stating that the liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to engage in any of the common occupations of life) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This court similarly has observed that it is well-recognized that the pursuit of an occupation or profession is a protected liberty interest that extends across a broad range of lawful occupations. Wedges/Ledges, 24 F.3d at 65 n.4. Although the precise contours of that liberty interest remain largely undefined, the Supreme Court observed recently that the line of authorities establishing the liberty interest all deal[t ] with a complete prohibition of the right to engage in a calling,  and not merely a brief interruption in one's ability to pursue an occupation or profession. Conn, 119 S. Ct. at 1296. 39 Section 30's disclosure requirement imposes the type of complete prohibition on entry into a profession that implicates a person's liberty interest in pursuing an occupation or profession of her own choice. As illustrated by the facts of this case, the operation of S 30 is clear: If a person seeking an acupuncture license refuses to disclose her social security number, she may not practice that profession in the State of California. Thus, like minimal education and testing requirements, which California also demands of prospective acupuncturists, seeCal. Bus. & Prof. CodeS 4938 (stating initial requirements of licensure), S 30 operates as a complete barrier to entry into the profession of acupuncture. 40 Having concluded that Plaintiff's due process claim is predicated on a protected liberty interest, the question then arises: To what degree of constitutional scrutiny is the regulation subject? The Supreme Court answered that question in a case involving admission to the practice of law, Schware v. Board of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). There, the Court held that [a] State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 238-39 (emphasis added). The Court stated that, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, [a] State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. Id. at 239 (emphasis added). From Schware emerges the fundamental principle that [r]egulations on entry into a profession, as a general matter, are constitutional if they `have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice' the profession. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (quoting Schware, 353 U.S. at 239). 41 Defendants contend, and the district court agreed, that S 30's disclosure requirement withstands constitutional scrutiny, because it is rationally related to the legitimate state interests of collecting taxes and child support. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code S 30(f). 4 The Committee concedes that it uses the social security numbers of applicants for no other purpose. 42 Recently, this court addressed whether the policy of the State of California to refuse to renew drivers' licenses unless the driver first discloses her social security number violates the Free Exercise Clause. See Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (1999). In holding that California's policy did not violate the right of free exercise, this court observed that California's disclosure policy was rationally related to California's legitimate interests in locating the whereabouts of errant parents for purposes of carrying out child support programs, collecting tax obligations, and collecting amounts overdue and unpaid for fines, penalties, assessments, bail, and vehicle parking penalties. Id. at 1207. 43 Although related to the present case, Miller is not controlling. In Miller, the applicable constitutional inquiry was whether the authorizing statute was a rationally based, neutral law of general applicability [that] does not violate the right to free exercise of religion even though the law incidentally burdens a particular religious belief or practice. Id. at 1206 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In short, the court used a pure rational-basis test to evaluate the challenged statute. Here, by contrast, the relevant test requires something more. As Schware makes clear, although a state may regulate entry into a profession, any such regulation must be rationally related, not merely to a legitimate state interest, but more specifically to the the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice the profession itself. Schware, 353 U.S. at 239.Thus, Defendants' and the district court's analysis of whether S 30's disclosure requirement is rationally related to a legitimate state interest is incomplete. The proper inquiry is whether the disclosure requirement and its consequent revelation of an individual's delinquency of paying taxes or child support obligations bears a rational relationship to her fitness or capacity to practice acupuncture. 44 In addressing that issue, we first must ask ourselves a threshold question: In applying the test under Schware, is this court bound by the written reasons that the California state legislature articulated for enacting S 30, or may this court consider any hypothetical basis on which the legislature might have acted? If we are bound by the stated reason for the enactment of S 30, we may ask only whether the state's interest in collecting taxes and child support is rationally related to an applicant's fitness or capacity to practice acupuncture. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code S 30(f) (stating the legislative purpose of S 30); see also, e.g., California State Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Committee Report on A.B. No. 1394, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (1991) (The author states that this bill provides additional enforcement tools for collection of support and additional incentive to obligors to pay their support.). If not, then we may take a more expansive view of the purposes of S 30 in evaluating its constitutionality. 45 Where, as here, a plaintiff relies on substantive due process to challenge a legislative act that does not infringe on a fundamental right, 5 the plaintiff bears a heavy burden. [W]e do not require that the government's action actually advance its stated purposes, but merely look to see whether the government could have had a legitimate reason for acting as it did. Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). In other words, we need to determine only whether the legislation has a conceivable basis  on which it might survive constitutional scrutiny. See Lupert v. California State Bar, 761 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying the conceivable basis standard to a challenge to the California State Bar's requirement that law students attending unaccredited schools take and pass examinations that are not required of students attending accredited institutions). It is therefore irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether, at the time the legislature acted, it articulated the conceivable basis for the legislation. See Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (The government need not state its purposes at the time it acts. It is sufficient that the government could have had a legitimate reason for acting as it did.). Rather, [t]he plaintiff must establish that the facts on which the legislature may have relied could not reasonably have been conceived as true by the governmental decisionmaker. Lupert, 761 F.2d at 1328. 46 Here, the legislature could have had in mind at least two rational bases for relating S 30's disclosure requirement to a person's capacity and fitness to practice acupuncture. First, the state might have enacted S 30 to ensure that acupuncturists have the financial wherewithal to answer liability claims asserted by patients. In an analogous context, the California state legislature has recognized that an acupuncture corporation (that is, one or more licensed acupuncturists who practice in a corporate form) may be required to demonstrate its capacity to pay claims made by patients. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code S 4979 (stating that the Committee may adopt and enforce regulations requiring an acupuncture corporationto provide adequate security by insurance or otherwise for claims against it by its patients arising out of the rendering of professional services). That statute evidences a legislative recognition of the importance of financial accountability to patients. Arguably, S 30 is another means for all acupuncturists (not merely those who practice in a corporate setting) to demonstrate financial responsibility; an acupuncturist who is incapable of paying, or refuses to pay, child support or taxes is less likely to satisfy potential liabilities owed to patients. Concededly, the fit between the state's interest in ensuring the financial accountability of acupuncturists and the means that it has adopted is imperfect. However, when afundamental right is not at stake, the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). 47 In addition, there is a second rational reason for requiring that an applicant, such as Plaintiff, be current in child support and tax obligations as a condition of licensure: A state may require good moral character as a qualification for entry into a profession, when the practitioners of the profession come into close contact with patients or clients. See Schware, 353 U.S. at 239 (A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character . . . , before it admits an applicant to the bar.). As one court has observed, in the context of the legal profession, the [f]ailure to honor legal commitments and obligations is a proper ground for refusing to issue a certificate as to possession of the requisite character and moral fitness. In re Beasley, 252 S.E.2d 615, 617 (Ga. 1979); see also People v. Cully, 675 N.E.2d 1017, 1024 (Ill. App. 1997) (stating, in dictum, that, [i]f the licensee culpably does not repay [his student] loan, this calls his moral character into question and could constitute conduct that defrauds or harms the public). Admittedly, there is no express moral character component to the licensing of acupuncturists in the State of California. Compare Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code S 6060 (providing that an applicant to the California State bar must possess good moral character) with Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code S 4938 (providing no moral character requirement for acupuncturists). However, the legislature need not have made the requirement of good moral character statutorily explicit outside of S 30 itself. We recognize that, as a general matter, California law provides that a license shall not be denied, suspended, or revoked on the grounds of a lack of good moral character or any similar ground relating to an applicant's character, reputation, personality, or habits. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code S 475(c). That statute is not controlling, however, because S 30 is a later, more specific statute addressing behavior that the California legislature deemed unworthy of acupuncturists. See Hellon & Assocs. v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 958 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that, if two statutes conflict, the later and more specific statute usually controls the earlier and more general one). As noted, it is sufficient that the legislature rationally could have believed that moral character is related to an individual's fitness and capacity to practice acupuncture. Through the enactment of S 30, the state imposed an implicit moral-character requirement for acupuncturists, as well as all licensees covered by that statute. 48 In summary, we conclude that, consistent with Schware, S 30's disclosure requirement is rationally related to Plaintiff's fitness or capacity to practice acupuncture. The wisdom of that requirement is not for us to judge. For in the end, it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of . . . new requirement[s].  Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487. Defendant Nielsen need not issue to Plaintiff an acupuncturelicense unless he first discloses his social security number. 49 AFFIRMED.