Opinion ID: 661459
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Admission of Evidence Regarding Prior Bad Acts.

Text: 45 The government elicited a number of statements regarding Johnson's prior bad acts from defense expert witnesses whom Johnson had called to offer testimony concerning Johnson's insanity defense, and from two psychologists called by the government as rebuttal witnesses. The testimony concerned Johnson's prior acts of burglary, armed robbery, rape, and forcible sodomy, his prior escapes from psychiatric hospitals, and various crimes that he allegedly committed while in prison. Johnson argues that the admission of this evidence was unduly prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial. 46 The government responds that the evidence was properly admitted to rebut defense testimony regarding Johnson's insanity defense. We agree. Johnson asserted that he was suffering from auditory hallucinations, and that the voices he heard compelled this conduct. The evidence that the government elicited tended to establish that Johnson appreciated the wrongfulness of his actions, and that he was not merely responding to auditory hallucinations. It was therefore directly relevant to the issue of Johnson's sanity. See United States v. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d 295, 301 (D.C.Cir.1991); United States v. Medved, 905 F.2d 935, 939 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1101, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); United States v. Hauck, 586 F.2d 1296, 1299 (8th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 2170, 60 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1979). 47 For example, a psychologist called by the defense testified on cross-examination that Johnson had used an accomplice in committing a rape, and conceded that persons suffering from auditory hallucinations would not normally be able to do so. Similarly, a government psychiatrist recounted that Johnson had begun wearing a mask to conceal his identity after he had been apprehended for prior rapes, which the psychiatrist testified was an indication that Johnson appreciated the wrongfulness of his actions. This witness also testified that Johnson had a history of feigning mental illness to avoid responsibility for his crimes. This evidence was directly relevant to Johnson's sanity at the time he made the statements at issue in this litigation. Once Johnson raised the insanity defense, the government was properly allowed to present[ ] the basis for the contrary opinion of its own expert, United States v. Bell, 500 F.2d 1287, 1290 (2d Cir.1974), as well as to expose facts inconsistent with the opinion of the defense experts. 48 In any event, the prior bad acts evidence was not so prejudicial as to deprive Johnson of a fair trial. Because Johnson did not contest making the statements at issue, there was no risk of the primary prejudicial effect of prior convictions, that the jury will 'prejudge [a defendant's] guilt on the basis of his past criminal record, because [the defendant does] not deny commission of the act.'  Bradshaw, 935 F.2d at 302 (quoting Rogers v. United States, 483 A.2d 277, 288 (D.C.App.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227, 105 S.Ct. 1223, 84 L.Ed.2d 363 (1985)) (alterations in Bradshaw ); see also Medved, 905 F.2d at 939. The court admonished the jury that evidence of prior crimes was not to be considered as evidence of guilt in this case during the voir dire. The court also gave curative instructions both immediately following the cross-examination in which the government first elicited the evidence of prior bad acts, and during the final jury charge. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony into evidence. See Hauck, 586 F.2d at 1299 (In analyzing [the issue of admitting prior bad acts evidence to rebut an insanity defense, a] court must give great deference to the trial court.). 49