Opinion ID: 1172193
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Lead Opinion's Other Arguments Are Unpersuasive

Text: The lead opinion announces other reasons for declining to apply the federal double jeopardy clause in this case, but none is persuasive. For example, the lead opinion asserts that a criminal defendant is not entitled as a federal constitutional matter to a trial, formal or informal, of sentencing issues, even when the sentence turns on factual determinations such as the existence of prior convictions. (Lead opn., ante, at p. 832.) Because California thus could choose to provide very few procedural protections for sentencing allegations, reasons the lead opinion, it could certainly choose to provide less than full protection. From this, the lead opinion concludes a trial of sentencing allegations arguably need not provide double jeopardy protection. ( Id. at p. 833, italics added.) This argument is beside the point. While it may be true our Legislature could choose to provide fewer procedural protections for sentence enhancements (see People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 286 [62 Cal. Rptr.2d 754, 934 P.2d 1279] (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.)), it has not done so. If anything, legislative action has moved in the opposite direction, ensuring a high degree of procedural protection for defendants charged with sentence-enhancing allegations. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (c) [prior convictions under legislative Three Strikes law must be pled and proved], 1170.12, subd. (a) [same under initiative Three Strikes law], 667.5, subd. (d) [prior prison term enhancements shall not be imposed unless they are charged and admitted or found true], 1025 [right to jury for prior felony conviction enhancements], 1102 [rules of evidence apply to criminal actions]; see also Pen. Code, § 190.3 [in penalty phase of capital case, evidence of prior criminal activity shall not be admitted for an offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted].) The lead opinion also suggests federal double jeopardy cannot apply here because the Fifth Amendment specifically refers to the offense, and [t]he [double jeopardy] clause makes no express reference to sentencing determinations. (Lead opn., ante, at p. 834.) This argument is belied by Bullington itself, for the high court applied the federal double jeopardy clause to the Missouri capital sentencing trial although no offense was involved therein. Clearly any suggestion the federal double jeopardy clause is limited to criminal offenses is incorrect.