Opinion ID: 2787425
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The results of any mental health assessment,

Text: risk assessment, or evaluation of the juvenile offender as to rehabilitation. (7) If the court determines at a sentence review hearing that the juvenile offender has been rehabilitated and is reasonably believed to be fit to reenter society, the court shall modify the sentence and impose a term of probation of at least 5 years. If the court determines that the juvenile offender has not demonstrated rehabilitation or is not fit to reenter society, the court shall issue a written order stating the reasons why the sentence is not being modified. Ch. 2014-220, §§ 1-3, Laws of Fla. Under the provisions of chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, a juvenile convicted of a capital homicide offense who “actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim” must receive an individualized sentencing hearing and must receive a life sentence if the trial court determines that a life sentence is appropriate after considering various age-related factors. Ch. 2014-220, § 1, Laws of Fla. If the trial court determines that a life sentence is not warranted, the trial court must impose a term-of-years sentence of at least forty years’ imprisonment. Id. However, a subsequent judicial review of the sentence is available after twenty-five years, as long as the juvenile offender was not previously convicted of - 23 - an enumerated felony, from section three of the legislation, that arose out of a separate criminal transaction or episode. Ch. 2014-220, §§ 1, 3, Laws of Fla. Only one subsequent review of the sentence is provided for juvenile offenders in this category. For those juveniles convicted of a capital homicide offense who “did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim,” a life sentence may be imposed if the trial court conducts an individualized sentencing hearing and finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. Ch. 2014-220, § 1, Laws of Fla. Any juvenile offender in this category who is sentenced to more than fifteen years’ imprisonment is entitled to a review of his or her sentence after fifteen years. Ch. 2014-220, §§ 1, 3, Laws of Fla. Only one subsequent review of the sentence is provided. A similar sentencing structure applies to those juvenile offenders convicted of life or first-degree felony homicide offenses. Life imprisonment remains a possibility if the trial court conducts an individualized sentencing proceeding, with mandatory subsequent judicial review available for those juvenile offenders who “actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill” that are sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than twenty-five years. Id. For those offenders in this category who “did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill,” the - 24 - subsequent judicial review is available for a sentence of more than fifteen years. Id. Juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses, thereby implicating Graham rather than Miller, also may be sentenced to life imprisonment if the trial court, after considering the specified factors during an individualized sentencing hearing, determines that a life sentence is appropriate. Ch. 2014-220, § 1, Laws of Fla. Those juvenile offenders sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than twenty years for a nonhomicide offense are entitled to subsequent judicial review of their sentences. Ch. 2014-220, §§ 1, 3, Laws of Fla. This class of nonhomicide offenders is also eligible for “one subsequent review hearing 10 years after the initial review hearing,” if the juvenile nonhomicide offender is not resentenced at the initial review hearing. Ch. 2014-220, § 3, Laws of Fla. This is the only class of juvenile offenders entitled to more than one subsequent sentence review. Finally, and significantly for purposes of this case, section eight provides that chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, “shall take effect July 1, 2014.” Ch. 2014220, § 8, Laws of Fla. This effective date is critical in evaluating the impact of chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, on all of those juvenile offenders whose offenses were committed prior to that date but whose sentences are nevertheless unconstitutional under Miller. - 25 - Indeed, although chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, addresses the concerns of Miller moving forward, the legislation does not completely foreclose the arguments about the appropriate remedy under Miller because it provides only a prospective effective date. Therefore, it remains our task to determine what remedy should apply to those juveniles whose offenses were committed prior to the legislation’s July 1, 2014, effective date, but whose sentences remain unconstitutional under Miller. III. The Appropriate Miller Remedy The Legislature has now clearly expressed its intent as to how to comply with Miller—providing judicial discretion and term-of-years sentencing options, with the recognition that a juvenile’s sentence should be revisited at some later point through subsequent judicial review. In determining the remedy for those juveniles not covered by the express terms of chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, this Court is faced with three potential options. First, we could fashion our own remedy, as was suggested by Judge Wolf in Washington, based solely on the requirements established by the United States Supreme Court in Miller. Although this option would satisfy our duty to give effect to the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court, it would also require us to ignore the primary role of the Legislature in criminal sentencing by - 26 - crafting a remedy without a statutory basis. Therefore, we conclude that this remedy is inconsistent with our respect for the separation of powers. Second, we could revive a prior sentencing statute in an attempt to comply with Miller, as embodied in Judge Makar’s approach in Partlow and advocated for by the State. While this approach may have been appealing prior to the enactment of chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, because it was the only evidence of legislative intent at that time, the statutory revival approach has now been rendered inconsistent with the legislative intent revealed in chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida. Finally, even though the effective date is prospective, we could determine that the appropriate remedy is to apply chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are unconstitutional under Miller. For the following reasons, we have determined this to be the best approach—and that we are not precluded from adopting this remedy under these unique circumstances. A. Applying Chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida We conclude that applying chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are unconstitutional under Miller is the appropriate remedy. We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First and foremost, this is the remedy that is most consistent with the legislative intent regarding how to comply with Miller, as it is the remedy the - 27 - Legislature itself has specifically adopted. Applying chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, does not require this Court to speculate as to what the Legislature would do in response to Miller, nor does it require us to fashion our own remedy out of whole cloth. It respects the separation of powers and acknowledges the Legislature’s role in establishing the sentence for criminal offenses. Applying chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, as a remedy is also faithful to Miller. This legislation was enacted in direct response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller and Graham, and it appears to be consistent with the principles articulated in those cases—that juveniles are different as a result of their “diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change”; that individualized consideration is required so that a juvenile’s sentence is proportionate to the offense and the offender; and that most juveniles should be provided “some meaningful opportunity” for future release from incarceration if they can demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Indeed, because chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, seems to so directly address the remedy, the only justification that has been offered for why this Court should not apply the legislation is that we are prevented from doing so by article X, section 9, of the Florida Constitution, commonly known as the “Savings Clause.” Article X, section 9, entitled “Repeal of criminal statutes,” provides that the “[r]epeal or amendment of a criminal statute shall not affect prosecution or - 28 - punishment for any crime previously committed.” Art. X, § 9, Fla. Const. By its terms, article X, section 9, precludes an “amendment of a criminal statute” from applying retroactively. Art. X, § 9, Fla. Const.; see Smiley v. State, 966 So. 2d 330, 336 (Fla. 2007). This state constitutional “hurdle[]” to effectuating a “legislative solution” to the remedy issue has been recognized in the district courts. Partlow, 134 So. 3d at 1032 n.7 (Makar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Toye, 133 So. 3d at 548 n.7 (Villanti, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[E]ven if the legislature enacts a new sentencing statute this term, such statute will not fill the gap created by Miller.”). Yet, in this unique context, we conclude that the “Savings Clause” is no “hurdle[]” at all. As this Court has previously acknowledged, the purpose of the “Savings Clause” is to require the statute in effect at the time of the crime to govern the sentence an offender receives for the commission of that crime. See Castle v. State, 330 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1976). Here, however, the statute in effect at the time of the crime is unconstitutional under Miller and the federal constitution, so it cannot, in any event, be enforced. The “Savings Clause” therefore does not apply. Even if this state constitutional provision were to apply, though, the requirements of the federal constitution must trump those of our state constitution. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. In other words, fashioning a remedy that complies - 29 - with the Eighth Amendment must take precedence over a state constitutional provision that would prevent this Court from effectuating that remedy. The “Savings Clause” thus does not preclude the application of chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, under these unique circumstances. In sum, applying chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are unconstitutional under Miller is the remedy most faithful to the Eighth Amendment principles established by the United States Supreme Court, to the intent of the Florida Legislature, and to the doctrine of separation of powers. Accordingly, this is the remedy we adopt. B. Rejecting Statutory Revival We also explain why we reject the State’s proposed remedy, and the remedy suggested in several district court opinions, of statutory revival. The linchpin of the statutory revival approach is providing juvenile offenders with parole eligibility. See Partlow, 134 So. 3d at 1032 (Makar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The State of Florida unequivocally advocates that only one constitutional sentencing option exists: revival of the 1993 version of section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, which imposes a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 25 years.”). We conclude that this approach now misses the mark for several reasons. - 30 - First, the Legislature has consistently demonstrated its opposition to parole, abolishing this practice for non-capital felonies in 1983, for first-degree murder in 1994, for all capital felonies in 1995, and for any sentence imposed under the Criminal Punishment Code in 1997. While Graham’s requirement of a “meaningful opportunity for release” brought the abolishment of parole into focus, in providing for a remedy to Graham and Miller, the Legislature elected to provide for subsequent judicial review in the sentencing court of original jurisdiction, rather than review by a parole board. The entire doctrine of statutory revival is premised on discerning legislative intent—in other words, attempting to ascertain what the Legislature would have decided had it known that its enacted statute was unconstitutional. See Horsley, 121 So. 3d at 1132 (“The advantage of relying upon the doctrine of statutory revival is that we simply revert to a solution that was duly adopted by the legislature itself—thereby avoiding the type of ‘legislating from the bench’ that would be required if we were to essentially rewrite the existing statute with original language which we feel might better meet the policy goals of the current legislature.”). But, in light of the enactment of chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, we now actually know what the Legislature would do in response to Miller—adopt a remedy that does not provide for parole. Because the rationale for statutory revival is to foster separation of powers principles by returning to the previous - 31 - statute that best exhibits the Legislature’s intent, reviving a statute that provides for parole as a remedy is clearly inconsistent with how the Legislature itself has remedied the statute. There are other reasons not to adopt statutory revival as the remedy. Among these is that the statute the State seeks to revive is not actually the “immediate predecessor” statute, as required by B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994), but would rather require going back to the statute in effect before the “immediate predecessor” statute. See Partlow, 134 So. 3d at 1036 (Makar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Another concern with statutory revival is that the revived statute would apply to only a subset of offenders—juveniles—for whom the subsequently enacted statute is unconstitutional as applied. As noted by Judge Altenbernd in Toye, “[i]f a statute has been amended in an unconstitutional manner, returning to the last properly enacted statute to assure that a statute exists for application to all persons makes sense,” but it may not even be “permissible to revive a statute for application to a very small population of persons for whom the existing statute is essentially unconstitutional as applied.” 133 So. 3d at 549 (Altenbernd, J., concurring). Moreover, the State’s proposed remedy is, in fact, much more than revival— it is judicial rewriting of the statute. Pure statutory revival, as articulated by Judge Makar in Partlow and adopted by the Fifth District in Horsley, would be to return - 32 - to the pre-1994 statute that provided for life with parole eligibility after twenty-five years as the only sentencing option for these juvenile offenders. The State, however, suggests that life without parole should still be an option that trial courts can consider, and acknowledges that Miller requires an individualized sentencing hearing in implementing that option. So, the State asks this Court to cobble together various statutes in order to arrive at its proposed remedy—declare unconstitutional only that part of the pre-2014 statute that does not allow for parole, then use chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, to provide for an individualized hearing, and revive the pre-1994 statute only if the trial court determines that life without parole under the now-rewritten pre-2014 statute is not proper. This we cannot do. For all these reasons, we decline to adopt statutory revival as the remedy.