Opinion ID: 4552599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Funk’s Race Discrimination Claims

Text: Funk first alleges that Defendants denied Funk promotion on account of his race, in violation of Title VII.4 A plaintiff may prove discrimination by direct evidence or use indirect evidence under the three-part burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Id. (citing White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir. 1998)). 4 Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). -6- Case No. 19-1691, Funk v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al. The McDonnell Douglas framework first requires that the plaintiff make out a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating he or she (1) “is a member of a protected class;” (2) “was qualified for [the] job;” (3) “suffered an adverse employment decision;” and (4) “was replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.” Id. at 606‒07. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. at 607. If the defendant does so, “the plaintiff then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.” Id. Funk establishes a prima facie case for his failure to promote claim. The parties do not dispute that, Funk, an African American, is a member of a protected class. Nor do they dispute Funk’s qualifications for the promotion to Lieutenant and that Defendant denied Funk that promotion. “For the purposes of Title VII, a failure to promote is an adverse employment action.” Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Hale v. Cuyahoga Cty. Welfare Dep’t, 891 F.2d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 1989)). Defendant also treated Funk differently than a similarly situated employee of a non-protected class: Backus, a Caucasian, was promoted. Funk has thus established a prima facie case. Defendant has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not promoting Funk to Lieutenant. Chief Yankowski explained in his deposition that he did not promote Funk for a variety of reasons. Chief Yankowski considered Funk’s disciplinary history, recommendations from captains, and community outreach, among other things. He explained that Funk had 52 total complaints (22 of which were formal), 3 written reprimands, 3 counseling notations, and 1 suspension. Funk had three awards. During this time Funk also had three open and pending Internal Affairs investigations. Chief Yankowski also stated that Funk “had not volunteered to do -7- Case No. 19-1691, Funk v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al. anything extra within the organization” and that, on the whole, Funk’s “body of work” was not “more deserving” than Backus’s. Chief Yankowski stated that Backus, however, “was involved with community outreach” and volunteered for the Police Benevolent Association, was a union representative, started certain crime prevention and crime strategy programs within the organization,” and “volunteered to write grants.” Backus “was [also] highly regarded inside the organization and outside.” Additionally, Backus had 23 total complaints (12 of which were formal), 1 counseling notation, 0 written reprimands, and 2 suspensions. Backus had 34 awards. Funk must therefore show by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant’s reasons were a pretext for discrimination. A plaintiff can show pretext in three ways: “(1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the employer’s action, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.” Redlin, 921 F.3d at 612. Funk suggests that the reasons given by Defendants were false. The promotional review forms, however, show that Funk had a more extensive disciplinary history at the time of the promotion than did Backus. Funk argues that the violent crime initiative in which Backus was engaged was not “community outreach” but a work assignment, but Funk does not provide any support for this proposition beyond his own assertion. Moreover, Backus’ promotional review form lists numerous activities under the “community outreach” section, and Funk does not claim that he engaged in any community outreach at all. So, even if some of the projects in which Backus was involved were in fact not community outreach, Backus still was involved in more community outreach activities than Funk. Funk cannot show that Defendant’s reasons were false. Nor can Funk show pretext with evidence that Defendants’ proffered reasons did not actually motivate its decision. Funk does not provide any evidence to contradict Chief -8- Case No. 19-1691, Funk v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al. Yankowski’s testimony for promoting Backus instead of Funk. Indeed, Funk’s testimony about the explanation Chief Yankowski provided him is largely consistent with the reasons Chief Yankowski discussed in his own deposition. Defendants’ explanation for promoting Backus instead of Funk thus consists of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. To the extent that Funk argues that his HR complaint and the Palmer incident provide evidence of pretext, those events had not yet occurred at the time of Funk’s promotion denial. Finally, Funk cannot show pretext on the basis that Defendant provided insufficient reasons for not promoting him. Funk maintains that the promotion process consisted of some subjective components, and that White “recognized that subjective components of ‘reasons’ can be rejected by juries[.]” In White, the subjective components of the promotion process the court questioned involved interviews of candidates performed by employees of the same organization who said that the plaintiff was “extremely aggressive” in the interviews. White, 533 F.3d at 386–87, 394–95. Funk does not assert that the interview during his promotion process was the subjective component, however. He instead argues that the “community outreach” component was subjective. But whether an employee engaged in community outreach is an objective consideration. Moreover, there is evidence that Backus was involved with community outreach, was a union representative, volunteered to write grants, and received 34 awards for his work in the Department. And Funk admitted that he understood Chief Yankowski could consider other factors than test scores. Funk has thus failed to show that Defendants’ reasons for denying Funk promotion were pretext for racial discrimination.
Funk asserts a termination claim under Title VII by way of a constructive discharge. Funk relies on circumstantial evidence, so the McDonnell Douglas framework applies. See Laster v. -9- Case No. 19-1691, Funk v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 727 (6th Cir. 2014). The parties do not dispute the first two elements of Funk’s prima facie case—Funk’s membership of a protected class and his qualifications for Lieutenant. But Funk cannot establish a prima facie case for his constructive discharge claim because here, unlike his failure to promote claim, he cannot show that he suffered an adverse employment action. A constructive discharge is an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII. Id. (citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt. Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir. 1996)). “A constructive discharge occurs when the employer, rather than acting directly, deliberately makes an employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For a constructive discharge claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) “the employer deliberately created intolerable working conditions, as perceived by a reasonable person,” and (2) “the employer did so with the intention of forcing the employee to quit.” Id. at 727–28 (citing Saroli v. Automation and Modular Components, Inc., 405 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2005); Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 568 (6th Cir. 2001)). Laster is instructive here. There, one of the defendant’s employees was “given a direct order to immediately report any wrongdoing” by the plaintiff. Id. at 722. But the court held that the plaintiff was not constructively discharged because he offered no evidence that the defendant took those measures with “with the specific intention” of forcing him to quit. Id. at 728. Here, while Captain Southworth said that Funk’s 2016 disciplinary pattern was unusual, he was never asked to “keep a closer eye” on Funk. Chief Yankowski also stated that, had Funk not resigned, Funk would have “had the opportunity to get promoted.” Moreover, Funk “ultimately resigned not because of the intolerable working conditions,” but because, based on his conversations with Attorney Lett, he thought he would be terminated. Id. As such, Funk cannot show that Defendant - 10 - Case No. 19-1691, Funk v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al. “deliberately created intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing [him] to quit.” Id. Laster also recognized that, in addition to a traditional constructive discharge claim alleging discriminatory harassment, “[w]hen an employer acts in a manner so as to have communicated to a reasonable employee that []he will be terminated, and the plaintiff employee resigns, the employer’s conduct may [also] amount to constructive discharge.” Id. (citing E.E.O.C. v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 276 F.3d 326, 331‒32 (7th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis omitted). “In other words, constructive discharge occurs where, based on an employer’s actions, ‘the handwriting was on the wall and the axe was about to fall.’” Id. (quoting Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 276 F.3d at 332). Defendants did not act in a manner so as to have communicated to Funk that he would likely be terminated. “[I]t is undisputed that [Funk] was not directly told that he would be terminated at the pre-determination hearing.” See id. at 728‒29. Although Attorney Lett told Funk that he would likely be terminated at the hearing, “there is nothing in the record to indicate that [Defendant] actually communicated as much to [Funk].” Id. at 729. Funk resigned because of what Attorney Lett communicated to him, not Defendants. And Funk never saw any documentation regarding his discipline before resigning. Funk cannot establish that he was constructively discharged. C. Funk’s Retaliation Claims Funk also brings two retaliation claims. Funk brings his first retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment. His second alleges Title VII retaliation. - 11 - Case No. 19-1691, Funk v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al. i. First Amendment Retaliation A prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation requires a public employee to show that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected speech or conduct; (2) the employer took an adverse action against him that would deter an ordinary person from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action. Laster, 746 F.3d at 733 (citing Scarbrough v. Morgan Cty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 255 (6th Cir. 2006); Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2004)). Funk fails to satisfy the first element. For a public employee to have a cause of action under the First Amendment, the speech must be of public concern and must be spoken as a citizen, meaning that the speech cannot be “ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014) (“The critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (stating that an “employee has no First Amendment cause of action” if the employee did not speak “as a citizen on a matter of public concern”) (citing Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)). The parties do not dispute that Funk’s conversations with Chief Yankowski about potential racial discrimination within the Department involved matters of public concern. See Hughes v. Region VII Area Agency on Aging, 542 F.3d 169, at 181‒82 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that matters of public concern include speech relating “to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community”) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146). Defendant contends, however, that Funk made those statements pursuant to his official duties, and thus his speech is not protected. We agree with Defendant. In Garcetti, the plaintiff was a supervising deputy district attorney and calendar deputy. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413. The plaintiff reviewed a case, and after - 12 - Case No. 19-1691, Funk v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al. concluding that an affidavit for a search warrant contained misrepresentations, he spoke to his supervisors and wrote a memorandum recommending the case be dismissed. Id. at 413‒14. The Court found that the plaintiff’s expressions were made as an employee, specifically in his role as a calendar deputy. Id. at 422 (“[The plaintiff] did not act as a citizen when he went about conducting his daily professional activities, such as supervising attorneys, investigating charges, and preparing filings.”) Funk, too, was “conducting his daily professional activities” when he spoke to Chief Yankowski about the arrest reports, as part of his job as a jail sergeant was to review such reports submitted by other officers. See Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The fact that [the plaintiff] communicated solely to his superior also indicates that he was speaking in [his] capacity as a public employee . . . .”) (second alteration in original) (internal citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Funk’s speech was thus “ordinarily within the scope” of his duties as jail sergeant, and his First Amendment retaliation claim fails. ii. Title VII Retaliation Finally, we address Funk’s Title VII retaliation claim.5 As with a Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff may establish a Title VII retaliation claim by direct or circumstantial evidence. Laster, 746 F.3d at 730 (quoting Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008)). Funk again relies on circumstantial evidence, so the McDonell Douglas framework applies. Id. “The elements of a retaliation claim are similar but distinct from those of a discrimination claim.” Id. For a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) his exercise of such protected activity was known by the defendant; (3) thereafter, the defendant took an action 5 Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision states: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made . . . unlawful . . . by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). - 13 - Case No. 19-1691, Funk v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al. that was materially adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The burden of establishing a prima facie case in a retaliation action is not onerous, but one easily met.” Nguyen, 229 F.3d at 563 (citing EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997)). The district court summarily concluded that Funk did not satisfy the first three elements of a prima facie case for retaliation and held that he did not establish causation. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Funk, however, a rational juror could conclude that Funk suffered a materially adverse action and that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Funk does not argue that his conversations with Chief Yankowski are part of his Title VII retaliation claim. As for Funk’s HR complaint, we have “repeatedly held that complaints to human resources personnel regarding potential violations of Title VII constitute protected activity for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.” Trujillo v. Henniges Auto. Sealing Sys. N. Am., Inc., 495 F. App’x 651, 655 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584, 595 (6th Cir. 2007)). Defendant knew of Funk’s HR complaint, which he filed on April 12, 2016. Chief Yankowski learned of Funk’s HR complaint at some point before the HR office hired a law firm to investigate the claim, which conducted the first interview on April 26, 2016.6 6 While Chief Yankowski is the only named defendant other than the City of Lansing, others knew of the HR complaint as well. Lieutenant Bayliss, who worked in Internal Affairs during this time, was aware of the complaint before the Palmer incident (August 8, 2016). Bayliss indicated that the other officer in Internal Affairs also knew of the complaint. Captain Southworth knew of the complaint by May 4, 2016, at the latest, when the law firm interviewed him. - 14 - Case No. 19-1691, Funk v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al. The district court did not discuss whether Funk suffered a materially adverse action but stated that Funk must show that Defendant took an “adverse employment action” against him. A plaintiff claiming Title VII retaliation is not required to prove an “adverse employment action” but instead a “materially adverse” action. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). “[T]hat means that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. Some of the facts underlying Funk’s constructive discharge claim also apply to his Title VII retaliation claim. Funk received an Internal Affairs complaint two days after filing his HR complaint, for which he was issued a three-day suspension. Funk received another complaint on July 3, 2016, for failing to report for duty. Funk stated that the Department called only his work phone, which he was not required to have off duty, and that the Department never called his home phone, which Funk claims would have happened for anyone else. This complaint resulted in another three-day suspension. Funk also claims that Internal Affairs did not take any action on matters that originated in March 2016 until after Funk filed his HR complaint.7 Additionally, the Department later placed Funk on administrative leave when Internal Affairs began investigating the Palmer incident. See Rogers v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 897 F.3d 763, 776 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the plaintiff suffered an adverse action where she was “referred to a fitness-for-duty exam, placed on leave, escorted out of the office, had 7 At the time of his HR complaint, Funk had two pending Internal Affairs complaints. One was dated March 14-20, 2016, for failing to complete routine shift paperwork for six consecutive days. Funk received a counseling notation for this complaint on May 16, 2016. The other complaint was dated March 15, 2016, primarily for leaving his handgun unsecured while on duty in the jail, as jail sergeants are not permitted to be armed while on duty. Funk received a written reprimand for this on May 16, 2016. Funk, however, claims he was suspended for three days. Captain Southworth could not recall any other jail officer ever being written up for violating that policy. - 15 - Case No. 19-1691, Funk v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al. her badge removed” and upon return to work was forced to choose between a severance package and a transfer to an inferior position); Michael, 496 F.3d at 596 (holding that putting plaintiff on brief paid administrative leave and a 90-day performance plan met the “relatively low bar” of a materially adverse action); Halfacre v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 221 F. App’x 424, 432 (6th Cir. 2007) (remanding for reconsideration, in light of Burlington N., whether the plaintiff suffered a materially adverse action when the plaintiff received a lower performance grade than prior evaluations). A rational juror could conclude that, based on the above events, Funk suffered a materially adverse action. Funk must also establish causation between his HR complaint and the materially adverse action. “To establish a causal connection . . . a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the adverse action would not have been taken had the plaintiff not filed a discrimination action.” Nguyen, 229 F.3d at 563. The district court held that Funk did not establish causation because of “the time lapse of several months” between his conversations with Chief Yankowski and his promotion denial. In his response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, however, Funk asserted that the materially adverse action came after his HR complaint when Defendants issued Funk repeated disciplines, placed him on unpaid suspension, recommended his termination, and forced him to risk his monthly pension. The events following Funk’s HR complaint may create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Funk establishes causation. The Internal Affairs complaint issued two days after Funk’s HR complaint is of particular concern. Nguyen, 229 F.3d at 563, 566‒67 (explaining that temporal proximity is relevant to causation). But Funk’s entire 2016 disciplinary history, in light of Captain Southworth’s testimony, could lead a rational juror to conclude that the - 16 - Case No. 19-1691, Funk v. City of Lansing, Mich., et al. disciplinary actions preceding Funk’s resignation would not have occurred had Funk not filed his HR complaint.