Opinion ID: 209369
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Construction of Long Term

Text: Cordis also argues that the district court erred by construing long term to mean a period of time and abused its discretion in denying Cordis's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered data. According to Cordis, the district court's construction improperly erases the claim requirement of long term because the claim requires both long term non-thrombogenicity and that the non-thrombogenicity be provided during and after release of the biologically active material, whereas the court's definition only required a period of time that extends both during and after release of the biologically active material. Cordis argues that the court's claim construction lessened the significance of what the specification describes as an important objective of the invention. Moreover, according to Cordis, data that became available after the trial but before entry of judgment showed that its Cypher stent had long-term thrombosis risks, and Boston Scientific itself publicly stated that the Cypher stent had a higher incidence of late thrombosis than bare metal stents. Boston Scientific responds that the long term requirement has not been read out of the claim because the district court's construction includes a time limitation. Neither the specification nor the prosecution history limits long term to the phenomenon of late stent thrombosis, which occurs more than one year after implantation. Moreover, according to Boston Scientific, Cordis has publicly stated that the same data it now relies on is flawed. Boston Scientific also argues that the data Cordis seeks to include is cumulative and existed before trial, so it is not new evidence. We agree with Boston Scientific that the district court correctly construed the long term aspect of the non-thrombogenic limitation. Neither the specification nor the prosecution history defines the period of time that is long term, other than to require that it be longer than two weeks, '536 patent col.7 ll.1-5, and the claim construction includes two time limitations, like the claim itself. The claim construction requires both a period of time and that the period extends both during and after release of the biologically active material. Even assuming, as Cordis argues, that the specification describes long-term non-thrombogenicity as an important objective of the invention, it does not further elucidate the meaning of long term or require that those specific words be used in the claim construction. We thus affirm the district court's construction of the non-thrombogenic limitation, including the long term aspect.