Opinion ID: 1788581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: kosberg's individual liability

Text: Because there is no probative evidence to support McLaughlin's tortious interference claim, none of the Petitioners have any liability. Nevertheless, we answer the court of appeals' holding that Kosberg could be held individually liable.

Again, we consider the evidence and inferences tending to support the jury's findings against Kosberg. Havner, 825 S.W.2d at 458. Any probative evidence supporting the jury's findings against Kosberg requires us to uphold the verdict against him. Southern States Transp., 774 S.W.2d at 640.
Generally, a corporate officer's acts on the corporation's behalf are deemed corporate acts. See Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117-18 (Tex.1996); Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex.1995). A corporate officer or director may not be held liable for inducing the corporation to violate a contractual obligation as long as he or she acts in good faith on the corporation's behalf. See Holloway, 898 S.W.2d at 795. A corporate officer's potential personal gain is not determinative. Holloway, 898 S.W.2d at 796. A corporate officer's mixed motivesto benefit himself and for the corporation to benefitare insufficient to establish liability. Holloway, 898 S.W.2d at 796; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 772 cmt. c. (1979)(it is immaterial that the corporate agent also profits). Instead, the plaintiff must show that the officer acted in a manner so contrary to the corporation's best interests that his or her actions could only have been motivated by personal interest. Holloway, 898 S.W.2d at 796.
The court of appeals held that although the P & C Agreement might have been a reasonable transaction for a solvent financial institution, it was not in the best interest of an insolvent institution like First Texas. Accordingly, the court of appeals found legally sufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment against Kosberg. We conclude that the court of appeals improperly substituted its business judgment for that of First Texas' board of directors, and that there is no evidence to support individual liability against Kosberg. The record reveals that under the P & C Agreement, First Texas received ACS stock in return for all TransFirst and FTCC stock, which by then, included the AMS Division's assets. When First Texas entered into the P & C Agreement, it was insolvent. Despite First Texas' insolvency, the P & C agreement provided for the transfer of $75.3 million of its assets and cash to ACS, and a partial up-front payment to ACS on a 10-year data processing contract. McLaughlin asserts that First Texas paid more than the value it received when receivership was likely. The evidence also reveals that the P & C Agreement provided Kosberg, First Texas' board chairman, an option to buy a 49.9% interest in ACS. [4] Kosberg approved the P & C agreement along with the board's seven other members. Given the board's unanimous support for the P & C agreement, we cannot conclude that Kosberg was motivated purely by his own personal interests or that he acted contrary to First Texas' best interests despite First Texas' financial troubles and his receipt of ACS stock options. On this record, we conclude that there is no probative evidence that the terms of the P & C Agreement were so contrary to First Texas' interests that Kosberg's personal interests were the only motivation for the agreement. See Holloway, 898 S.W.2d at 796.