Opinion ID: 159922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Garcia’s Cross-Appeal

Text: -23- Garcia appeals from the district court’s determination, on GOA’s motion for summary judgment, that Garcia failed to redeem the property in accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 6337, and that GOA was therefore entitled to the deed to the property at the end of the redemption period. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards the district court did under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp. , 149 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Rule 56(c)). Section 6337(b)(2) provides that real property sold pursuant to § 6335 may be redeemed by the original owner, or certain others, upon payment to the purchaser, or in the case he cannot be found in the county in which the property to be redeemed is situated, then to the Secretary, for the use of the purchaser . . . , the amount paid by such purchaser and interest thereon at the rate of 20 percent per annum. The property is located in Albuquerque, which is in Bernalillo County. The certificate of sale listed the purchaser as “Gaechter Outdoor Advertising, Inc.” and its address as “P.O. Box 13059, Albuquerque, NM 87192.” GOA’s Suppl. App. at 25. In response to GOA’s requests for admissions and in its opposition to -24- GOA’s summary judgment motion, Garcia admitted that in 1995, GOA’s “business office was located in Bernalillo County at 3540 Pan American Freeway NE, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87110,” and that GOA’s registered agent’s office was also located in Albuquerque. See id. at 1; Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 at 33; id. Vol. 2 at 147, 149. In attempting to redeem the property, Garcia paid the apparently correct amount to the Secretary, through the local IRS office, several days prior to the end of the redemption period. It did not pay GOA, though it notified GOA by fax that it had paid the IRS. The district court determined that because GOA could be “found” at the post office box listed on the certificate of sale, Garcia was required to make his redemption payment to GOA at that address. It concluded that Garcia’s payment to the IRS was therefore ineffective to redeem the property. On appeal, Garcia contends that the district court was wrong in holding that he was required to send his payment to GOA’s post office box. He concedes, however, that this issue is not dispositive because the question remains “whether the district court’s decision was nonetheless correct, albeit for the wrong reasons. Thus, this Court must decide whether Gaechter could have been ‘found’ in Bernalillo County for purposes of paying the redemption funds.” Garcia’s Br. at 27. He contends that there was some question as to GOA’s legal status and address and that GOA failed to respond to his counsel’s telephone calls seeking to -25- clarify this information. Relying on Guthrie v. Curnutt , 417 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1969), Garcia argues that GOA’s purposeful refusal to return his telephone calls frustrated his efforts to “find” GOA in the county, and therefore relieved him of his obligation to pay GOA. See id. at 766 (holding that where purchaser purposefully avoided owner in effort to prevent redemption, purchaser would be considered “not found” in county where property was situated). We begin our analysis by first noting that none of the authority Garcia cites, see Fitshugh v. Ryles , 517 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Silver Bell Indus., Inc. v. United States , No. C-4168, 1974 WL 653 ( D. Colo. July 25, 1974), supports his contention that a purchaser cannot be “found” under § 6337(b) at a post office box address. While we have no reason to disagree with the district court’s conclusion regarding this matter, we note we have not located authority one way or the other. In any event, we need not address the issue since Garcia concedes it is not dispositive of the appeal. See Perry v. Woodward , 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999) (court of appeals may affirm district court’s ruling for any reason supported by record). The dispositive issue is whether GOA could be found in Bernalillo County. However, we also need not address Garcia’s argument based on Guthrie that GOA should not be considered “found” in Bernalillo County because of its purposeful acts to frustrate his effort to verify its status and address. He failed to make this -26- argument in the district court. See Sac & Fox Nation , 213 F.3d at 575. In the district court, Garcia argued that because his counsel was uncertain as to GOA’s proper legal status and address, it was reasonable for him to “constructively pay” GOA by making the redemption payment to the IRS. GOA’s App. Vol.1 at 38-42, id. Vol. 2 at 147-58. Even were we to consider his appellate argument as pursuing this contention, we would find it unpersuasive. As noted above, Garcia admitted that GOA could be found at a Bernalillo County address. There being no disputed issue of fact regarding this issue, we conclude the district court correctly granted summary judgment to GOA on the redemption issue. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. Entered for the Court David Ebel