Opinion ID: 739085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of the Tapes

Text: 17 We are confronted with two issues in this appeal. First, we must decide whether the district court erred in holding that the tapes were not relevant. Second, we must also decide whether the district court correctly held, that even if relevant, the tapes should be excluded as confusing and misleading pursuant to FRE 403.
18 Evidence is relevant if it has the tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. FED.R.EVID. 401 (emphasis added). The fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action, i.e., the essential issue in this case, is whether Carlson and Lynch failed to disclose to LaBeau information indicating that probable cause to believe that Sutkiewicz murdered Gloria Krouse no longer existed. 6 An essential element of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of law is that probable cause did not exist at the time the claimant was subjected to the unconstitutional deprivation. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273-74, 114 S.Ct. 807, 813, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)); Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1213 (6th Cir.1995); Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 172 (6th Cir.1987); see also DeAnda v. City of Long Beach, 7 F.3d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir.1993). 19 The district court ruled, and Carlson and Lynch argue, that the audio tapes were properly excluded because they were not relevant to any issue being tried in the case. Sutkiewicz, however, contends that had Carlson and Lynch turned the tapes over to LaBeau, the contents of the tapes would have undermined LaBeau's original probable cause determination by marring the reliability of the confessions that established the basis for probable cause to suspect Sutkiewicz. Thus, Sutkiewicz reasons that the tapes are relevant because they make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action, i.e., the existence of probable cause throughout Sutkiewicz's incarceration, less probable. 20 Probable cause has been defined as the facts and circumstances within [an] officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing that [a] suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2632, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979); see also Centanni v. Eight Unknown Officers, 15 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir.1994). The definition implies that where there are facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that a suspect has not committed a crime, those facts would tend to negate probable cause, or at the very least, sway the probable cause calculus in favor of the suspect. See, e.g., Reid v. State of New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 341 (1st Cir.1995) (indicating that exculpatory evidence may favorably affect the probable cause determination in favor of a suspect); Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 290 & n. 5 (9th Cir.1994) (stating that [p]robable cause to continue a prosecution may disappear with the discovery of new exculpatory evidence). Additionally, even though an officer is not obligated to actively search for exculpatory evidence, when an officer is aware of exculpatory facts and circumstances, he has a duty to disclose those facts and circumstances to the prosecutor. Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1161 (5th Cir.1992); Knudsen v. United States, 966 F.2d 733, 737 (2d Cir.1992); Geter v. Fortenberry, 882 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir.1989). 21 Because we find the tapes relevant, due to the possible negating effect they may have on the probable cause determination, we hold that the order of the trial court excluding the audio tapes and denying Sutkiewicz's motion for a new trial is erroneous and inconsistent with substantial justice. 22 Sutkiewicz's primary argument is that the tapes contain exculpatory evidence that sways the probable cause calculus in his favor. We agree. An examination of the tapes reveals that they do contain exculpatory evidence that would tend to negate probable cause to suspect Sutkiewicz. Throughout the tapes, under the guise of friendship, Younts's attempts to secure a confession from Sutkiewicz. Younts repeatedly asks Sutkiewicz if he committed the murders. 7 He lectures Sutkiewicz on the importance of confession. 8 More importantly, however, the tapes contain evidence that Younts, at the very least led Sutkiewicz to confess certain facts about the murder, 9 and more likely fed Sutkiewicz those facts. 10 For example, with respect to the age of the deceased, Younts asks Sutkiewicz if she was young or old. Sutkiewicz replied that she was old. How old? asks Younts. About 60. Sutkiewicz replied. About 60? She wasn't in her 30s, ah 35? asks Younts. As the district court itself noted after having examined the tapes: 23 There are clearly questions as to whether Sutkiewicz was truly relating and describing his involvement in the Krouse murder to Younts or whether the statements were influenced or tainted--perhaps inadvertently--by Reverend Younts having strongly suggested to Sutkiewicz that he should confess and whether, by Younts's discussion of the facts of the murder, he fed Sutkiewicz facts that Sutkiewicz, in turn, related to the officers who interviewed him after they talked to Younts. 24 Undoubtedly, the strongest evidence linking Sutkiewicz to the murder are his confessions to Younts and the officers, and it is those confessions that provide the requisite probable cause. 11 Thus, if Sutkiewicz, through the tapes, is able to cast doubt upon the reliability of the confessions there can be no doubt as to the tapes' relevance. 12 As it is our conclusion that the tapes contain evidence that, if believed, would negate the requisite probable cause necessary to legitimize Sutkiewicz's continued detention, we find the tapes relevant.
25 Carlson and Lynch argue that the trial court justifiably excluded the tapes because they are highly confusing and prejudicial. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Although a district court has broad discretion in balancing probative value against potential prejudicial impact, United States v. Feinman, 930 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir.1991), [w]here a decision to exclude evidence on the basis of Rule 403 is overly restrictive such that it precludes a plaintiff from the full opportunity to present his case to a jury, it will be deemed an abuse of discretion. Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 515 (6th Cir.1996). We must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect. United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 389-90 (6th Cir.1984). 26 In the instant case, we find that the district court committed reversible error because its ruling excluding the tapes, on the basis that they are prejudicial and confusing, is so overly restrictive that it denied Sutkiewicz a full opportunity to present his case to the jury. This Court has interpreted unfair prejudice to mean the undue tendency to suggest a decision based on improper considerations; it 'does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from legitimate probative force of the evidence.'  Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 515 (6th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir.1993)). Otherwise relevant evidence may permissibly be excluded if it serves to inflame the passions of the jury. United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir.1995); see also Stern v. Shouldice, 706 F.2d 742, 750 (6th Cir.1983) (holding that a trial court correctly excluded evidence that it believed would have inflamed the passions of the jury); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 734 F.2d 1157, 1171 (6th Cir.1984) (Martin, J., dissenting) (stating that it is customary for trial judges to determine whether or not the evidence would inflame the jury's passion for Rule 403 purposes); Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that [d]eterminations of whether to exclude even relevant evidence because of its potential for prejudicial or inflammatory effects upon the jury are made by balancing inflammatory potential against the likely probative value of the evidence); Bohack Corp., v. Iowa Beef Processors, 715 F.2d 703, 710 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding that trial judge correctly excluded evidence where evidence was inflammatory). 27 Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Sutkiewicz, we find that the probative value of the tapes is indeed quite high. The tapes undoubtedly lend credence to Sutkiewicz's claim that at some time during his confinement probable cause supporting continuing confinement ceased to exist. As the district court only addressed the Rule 403 concern in a footnote, and did not state with any specificity what it found prejudicial with respect to the tapes, it is difficult to surmise what facts the court relied on for its ruling. Admittedly, there are portions of the tapes that are confusing. However, the confusion is a product of Sutkiewicz's mental illness. As Younts is attempting to procure a confession from him, Sutkiewicz sometimes launches into nonsensical delusional tirades. We cannot uphold the court's ruling unless the court had determined that the tapes could serve to inflame the jury and suggest a decision on an improper basis. United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir.1995). Because the trial court's ruling was not based upon a determination that the tapes would have an inflammatory effect upon the jury, or that the tapes would lead the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the tapes cannot be admitted under FRE 403.
28 Finally, even though we find that the district court abused its discretion by withholding the Younts tapes from the jury, Sutkiewicz cannot be granted a new trial unless the abuse of discretion resulted in substantial injustice. McGowan v. Cooper Industries, 863 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir.1988). The circumstances of this case compel us to find that the trial court's exclusion of the Younts tapes resulted in substantial injustice. Sutkiewicz spent ten years confined in a mental facility as a result of a crime for which he was never tried, and of which it was apparent to the police, mere months after he was confined, that he was innocent. Soon after his arrest and detention, the Sheriff's Department was made aware that another individual, Thomas Gilbert, was more than likely the one who killed Gloria Krouse. Not only did they not provide that information to the prosecutor, 13 but they may have been involved in an attempt to unconstitutionally acquire a confession from Sutkiewicz. Due to the court's exclusion of the Younts tapes, Sutkiewicz was unable to put before the jury a key piece of relevant evidence that would lend credibility to his assertions. This deficiency resulted in substantial injustice as Sutkiewicz was denied a full opportunity to present his case to the jury. See Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 515-16 (6th Cir.1996); DXS, Inc., v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 100 F.3d 462, 476 (6th Cir.1996). As Sir Edward Coke noted It is the worst oppression, that is done by colour of justice. SIR EDWARD COKE, SECOND INSTITUTE 48. Because exclusion of the tapes resulted in substantial injustice, we are obliged to rule that the tapes should have been admitted as relevant evidence.