Opinion ID: 2424378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Gross

Text: In Gross v. State, 186 Md.App. 320, 973 A.2d 895 (2009), Gross, represented by counsel, entered an ABA plea [15] to the charge of possession with the intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine. During the plea colloquy, Gross answered in the affirmative to the trial court's query if he [h]a[d] gone over the charges with your attorney . . . and the elements of the offenses that [he was] charged with. Gross, 186 Md.App. at 325, 973 A.2d at 898. Further, at the Coram Nobis hearing, Gross's counsel testified and confirmed that he went over the elements with [Gross]. Gross, 186 Md.App. at 330, 973 A.2d at 900. After the prosecutor recited an agreed statement of facts, the trial court accepted Gross's plea and sentenced him to five-years' incarceration. See Gross, 186 Md.App. at 328, 973 A.2d at 899. Thereafter, confronted by the label career offender for purposes of the federal sentencing guidelines, Gross filed a petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, arguing that he was denied due process of law because the record failed to show that his plea was entered knowingly and intelligently. Gross, 186 Md.App. at 323, 973 A.2d at 896. The Circuit Court denied Gross's Coram Nobis petition. See id. The Court of Special Appeals framed the question before it as: [W]hether a representation to the plea judge by the defendant that his counsel had discussed with him the elements of the charges he faces will suffice to show that the defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered. Gross, 186 Md.App. at 341, 973 A.2d at 907. After discussing Priet and Lonberger, the Court of Special Appeals stated that the trial judge complied with the dictates of Priet and Lonberger because the court was entitled to presume that Gross's counsel explained to him the charges to which he pled guilty in sufficient detail to give Gross notice of what he was being asked to admit. [16] Gross, 186 Md.App. at 337, 973 A.2d at 905. The issue with which the intermediate appellate court wrestled, however, was whether Bradshaw and the two earlier Court of Special Appeals cases effected a change in the legal landscape. After examining various post- Bradshaw decisions from other jurisdictions, the appellate panel explained that, because Gross told the plea judge that he had received a copy of the indictment . . . and had discussed the charges and `gone over' the elements of the charges with his counsel, it was entirely proper for the court to presume that [Gross] knew the elements of the charge to which he agreed to plead guilty. Gross, 186 Md.App. at 350-51, 973 A.2d at 912-13. The Court then reiterated: We hold that when a defendant, in response to questioning by the court, says on the record that he has discussed the elements of the crime to which he is pleading guilty with his attorney, that representation is sufficient to show that the plea was knowingly entered. Gross, 186 Md.App. at 351, 973 A.2d at 913.
The State concedes that [i]t is beyond dispute that a defendant who has entered a guilty plea ignorant of the nature of the charge to which he has pled guilty has not entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. The State relies on Priet, however, for the proposition that Rule 4-242(c) does not impose any ritualistic or fixed procedure to guide the trial judge in determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily and intelligently entered, and that the Rule simply contemplates that the court will explain to the accused, in understandable terms, the nature of the offense to afford him a basic understanding of its essential substance, rather than of the specific legal components of the offense to which the plea is tendered. According to the State, in Priet (quoting Henderson ) the Court held that it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit. Further, as the argument goes, Bradshaw did not change the landscape, as  Bradshaw did not hold that in order to satisfy the requirements of due process . . . a guilty plea court must ascertain on the record the source of the defendant's knowledge with respect to the nature or elements of the charges to which the defendant is pleading guilty. Finally, the State contends that such a conclusion  i.e. that courts may presume that counsel explain routinely the nature of the elements of the crimes of which his or her client is charged  is in accord with numerous other jurisdictions considering the matter post- Bradshaw. In response, Daughtry argues generally that [t]he record in this case does not reflect that [he] knew that he was pleading guilty to `first degree' murder, or that he knew the elements of that offense, considering that [t]here is no explanation on the record of premeditated murder or felony murder, and no distinction is made between first and second degree murder. Further, Daughtry maintains that the presumption language was dicta as applied in Henderson and the consolidated cases in Priet. Any uncertainty as to the viability of the Henderson/Priet presumption, Daughtry contends, was clarified in Bradshaw, in which the . . . Supreme Court used language which understandably caused the Maryland Court of Special Appeals to question the viability of the language from Henderson,  as [t]he [presumption] language used in Henderson . . . was glaringly absent from the Court's opinion in Bradshaw.  Thoughtfully, Daughtry lays out various paths for the Court to take in deciding his case: [T]his Court could hold that the record of a guilty plea must include one of three things: advice of the elements of the crime on the record; an acknowledgment by defense counsel that he advised his client of the elements of the offense; or, an acknowledgment by the defendant that his attorney advised him of the elements of the offense. . . . This Court could also hold that circuit courts do not need to do any one of these three things; that the totality of the circumstances will still control, as it did in Priet, supra , but that there will be no presumption that an attorney has advised his client of the elements of the offense to which he pleads guilty based solely on the fact of representation. The record would have to contain facts from which an inference could be drawn that the defendant had been advised of the elements and the nature of the crime to support a conclusion that the defendant has knowledge. To begin, we agree with Daughtry that [s]hort of this Court adopting the State's argument that it may be presumed from the fact of [legal] representation [] Daughtry was informed of the nature and elements of first degree murder, [his] conviction and sentence based upon his guilty plea . . . must be vacated. Accordingly, we must confront the viability of the notion of the Henderson/Priet presumption, post- Bradshaw. We are convinced that the Supreme Court's decision in Bradshaw did not affect the limited viability of the presumption as set forth originally in dicta in Henderson. To be sure, the Bradshaw opinion does not acknowledge any presumption that counsel, in most cases, explains the nature of the charges to his or her client. This, however, is unremarkable, as the Court did not need to employ the presumption, considering that [i]n Stumpf's plea hearing, his attorneys represented on the record that they had explained to their client the elements of the aggravated murder charge. . . . Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 183, 125 S.Ct. at 2405, 162 L.Ed.2d at 153; see Miller v. State, 185 Md.App. at 304-05, 970 A.2d at 339 (The Court said nothing about the presumption language it had used in Henderson (or in Lonberger ). That is not surprising, however, because the facts in Bradshaw supported a `knowledge of nature and elements of the crime' finding without applying any such presumption.). Thus, to the extent that a presumption was identified in Henderson, it remains unaffected by Bradshaw. See Castellon-Gutierrez, 754 F.Supp.2d at 780 ( Bradshaw does not address Henderson 's holding, and other federal courts have applied the presumption without questioning its post- Bradshaw validity.); Phillips v. Spencer, 477 F.Supp.2d 306, 311 (D.Mass.2007) (The decision in Bradshaw . . . underscored the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Henderson. . . .). That the limited viability of the Henderson/Priet presumption remains intact after Bradshaw, however, does not carry the day for the State. Our jurisprudence, in determining the validity of a guilty plea, has focused always on whether the defendant, based on the totality of the circumstances, entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily. See, e.g., Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, 604 n. 18, 755 A.2d 1088, 1104 n. 18 (2000); State v. Brazle, 296 Md. 375, 383, 463 A.2d 798, 802 (1983); Priet, 289 Md. at 276, 424 A.2d at 354; Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 473, 408 A.2d 1302, 1317 (1979); Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 109, 361 A.2d 113, 116 (1976); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 757 (1970). Employing the Henderson/Priet presumption in cases in which the only evidence proffered to show that a defendant is aware of the nature of the charges against him is the fact that he or she is represented by an attorney and that the defendant discussed the plea with his or her attorney undermines the purpose of a totality of the circumstances test. Utilizing the presumption on an otherwise bare record obviates the need to look any further than the mere fact of representation itself. We do not disagree necessarily with the notion  quoted in only one case post- Priet, Lovell, 347 Md. at 635, 702 A.2d at 267  that it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit. Priet, 289 Md. at 290, 424 A.2d at 361 (quoting Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647, 96 S.Ct. at 2258, 49 L.Ed.2d at 116) (emphasis added). Accordingly, regardless of whether the presumption language as employed by either or both Henderson and Priet is construed as a holding or as dicta, the quoted language is replete with sufficient precatory language such that we need not apply it in every case. The record in the present case reflects that the only portion of the plea colloquy relating to ascertaining whether the plea was knowing and voluntary was Daughtry's affirmative response to the trial judge's question, Have you talked over your plea with your lawyer? Thus, the record in this case is more anemic than any of the aforementioned cases Gross (defendant answering in the affirmative to the trial court's asking if he [h]a[d] gone over the charges with your attorney ... and the elements of the offenses that [he was] charged with); Abrams (the trial court's recitation of uttering included all of the elements of the crime); Bradshaw (defendant's attorneys represented on the record that they had explained to their client the elements of the aggravated murder charge); Priet (defendant acknowledged that he had discussed his plea, the facts of the case and possible defenses to the charge with his attorney); Pincus (defendant said he knew the difference between first and second degree murder); and Vandiver (defendant acknowledged during his testimony that he had discussed the elements of robbery with his counsel and understood what he had been told). Rather, the present case is more like Miller, where the Court of Special Appeals held that defendant's plea was not entered voluntarily and knowingly, considering that, in both cases, the attorneys did not explain the nature and elements of [the charges], defense counsel did not represent that he had explained the nature and elements of the crime to [the defendants], and [the defendants] did not represent that [they] understood the charge. Neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor explained the nature and elements of [the charges]. Miller, 185 Md.App. at 307, 970 A.2d at 340. At bottom, we are guided in deciding Daughtry's case by Rule 4-242(c), which requires an examination of the defendant on the record in open court. Relying on a mere presumptionand nothing moreto conclude that a defendant is pleading voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge, would encourage trial courts to circumvent or give short-shrift to the Rule's requirement that a defendant be examined on the record in open court. See Hicks v. Franklin, 546 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir.2008) (We will not apply the presumption that the attorney explained the element to the defendant... unless there is some factual basis in the record to support it.). Therefore, we hold that, regarding the issue of the defendant being made aware of the nature of the charges against him, where the record reflects nothing more than the fact that a defendant is represented by counsel (as in the present case) and that the defendant discussed generically the plea with his or her attorney, such a plea colloquy is deficient under Rule 4-242(c), and the plea must be vacated. We reiterate that the test, as stated in Priet, [17] in determining whether a guilty plea is voluntary under current Rule 4-242(c), is whether the totality of the circumstances reflects that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea. [18] Instead of merely informing practitioners and judges what conduct merely will not pass muster under Rule 4-242(c) ( i.e. the mere fact of representation alone and that the defendant discussed the plea with his or her attorney), we shall elaborate somewhat on what factors can and should aid a trial court in determining whether to accept a guilty plea. Priet provided a starting point, when we stated that the required determination can only be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account ... among other factors, the complexity of the charge, the personal characteristics of the accused, and the factual basis proffered to support the court's acceptance of the plea. Priet, 289 Md. at 277, 424 A.2d at 354 (emphasis added). Regarding the complexity of the charge, Priet explained that [t]he nature of some crimes is readily understandable from the crime itself. [19] Id.; see State v. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731, 750 (Tenn.2005) ([I]n some cases ... the offense or the relevant element of the offense is a self-explanatory legal term, [and is] so simple in meaning that a lay person can be expected to understand it.). We do not attempt to undertake here an enumeration of what crimes fall under this category, but we think it clear that the nature of first-degree murder is not readily understandable from the label of the crime itself. [20] , [21] See 1 DAVID E. AARONSON, MARYLAND CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND COMMENTARY § 5.51(A) (3d ed. 2009) (In order to convict the defendant of murder in the first degree, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) [the defendant's] conduct caused the death of [the victim and] (2) the killing was willful, deliberate and premeditated; [(3) there were no mitigating circumstances;] [and, (4) the killing was not justified.]; Willey, 328 Md. at 138, 613 A.2d at 961 (noting the fine and often difficult distinction between first degree murder and ... second degree murder)); Pinkney v. State, 151 Md.App. 311, 356, 827 A.2d 124, 151 (2003), cert. denied, 377 Md. 276, 833 A.2d 32 (2003) ([T]he distinction between second degree and first degree premeditated murder often confounds juries.). But see Lovell, 347 Md. at 635, 702 A.2d at 266-67 (quoting Priet, 289 Md. at 288, 424 A.2d at 360) (The first-degree murder to which Lovell pled is one of those crimes, `the nature of [which] is readily understandable from the crime itself.'). Next, the personal characteristics of the accused are important, as one with a diminished mental capacity is less likely to be able to understand the nature of the charges against him than one with normal mental faculties. See Henderson, 426 U.S. at 641, 96 S.Ct. at 2256, 49 L.Ed.2d at 112 (noting that the defendant was, in his youth, committed to the State School for Mental Defectives where he was classified as `retarded'); Edwards v. United States, 766 A.2d 981, 991 (D.C.2001) ([W]here it is alleged that an individual is mentally retarded, the trial court must consider that factor when determining whether an individual has the mental capacity to achieve the necessary understanding of a guilty plea.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, it is possible that the factual basis proffered to support the court's acceptance of the plea may describe the offenses charged in sufficient detail to pass muster under the Rule. [22] See Crowe, 168 S.W.3d at 750 (Another source from which a defendant may gain an understanding of the nature of the offense is the prosecution's summation at the plea submission hearing of the facts relevant to the elements of the plea offense.). Although Rule 4-242(c) and the caselaw require on-the-record, in open court, evidence from the plea colloquy that the defendant is aware of the nature of the charges against him, the source or speaker from which such evidence emanates is immaterial. Thus, it is of no matter whether (1) the defendant informs the trial court that either he understands personally or was made aware by, or discussed with, his attorney the nature of the changes against him (as in Pincus, Vandiver, and Gross; see also State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 764, 894 A.2d 963, 976 (2006)); (2) the attorney informs the trial court that he informed his client of the charges against the client (as in Bradshaw ); or (3) the trial court itself informs the defendant of the charges against the defendant (as in Abrams ). See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(c) (3d ed. 2007) (It is not surprising ... that lower courts have often denied relief upon a showing that defense counsel had explained the elements of the offense charged to the defendant....). The presence of any one of these scenarios on the record is strong evidence, absent other circumstances tending to negate a finding of voluntariness ( e.g., mental incapacity, lack of grasp of English language, etc.), that the defendant entered the guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. In the present case, none of these indicia are present. It may be that, in answering in the affirmative to the trial court's question, Have you talked over your plea with your lawyer?, the defendant understood merely the terms of the plea, but not the nature of the charges to which he plead guilty. See Miller, 185 Md.App. at 309, 970 A.2d at 341 (An accused can understand the terms of a plea agreement without knowing the nature and elements of the charge to which the plea applies.). Because employing the Henderson / Priet presumption on an otherwise naked record would be contrary to Rule 4-242's requirement that there be an examination on the record in open court, we hold that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Daughtry's plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily, and it must be vacated. [23] See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, supra § 21.4(c) (calling a court's reliance on the presumption in order to defeat a defendant's Henderson claim a highly questionable result). We are not sounding the death knell for the Henderson / Priet presumption. [24] We hold today merely that when the only hook upon which the State hangs its hat in arguing that a defendant enters a plea of guilty knowingly and voluntarily is that the defendant is represented by counsel and that the defendant discussed the plea with his or her attorney, such a plea colloquy is deficient and the guilty plea must be vacated. Because Rule 4-242(c) requires an on the record examination before accepting a plea as voluntary, we agree with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in that [w]e will not apply the presumption that the attorney explained the element to the defendant ... unless there is some factual basis in the record to support [the presumption]. Hicks, 546 F.3d at 1284. [25]
As explained in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Goldstein, 312 Md. 583, 591, 541 A.2d 955, 958-59 (1988), [i]n the overwhelming majority of cases, a judicial decision sets forth and applies the rule of law that existed both before and after the date of the decision.... [I]n the ordinary case, no issue of a `prospective only' [26] application arises. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2443, 115 L.Ed.2d 481, 488 (1991) (stating that retroactivity is overwhelmingly the norm, and is in keeping with the traditional function of the courts to decide cases before them based upon their best current understanding of the law) (internal citations omitted). Where, however, a decision of this Court with regard to a constitutional provision, a statute, or a common law principle, [27] is overruled on the ground that the decision represented an erroneous interpretation or application of the constitutional provision, statute, or common law principle, the question of whether the new ruling should be applied prospectively only is governed by the principles set forth in Owens-Illinois [ , Inc. ] v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 470-72, 601 A.2d 633, 658 (1992).... [28] Walker v. State, 343 Md. 629, 637, 684 A.2d 429, 432-33 (1996). [29] Accordingly, both the State and Daughtry, anticipating a shift in the law, rely on Zenobia in their respective briefs; however: [T]he question of whether a particular judicial decision should be applied prospectively or retroactively, depends in the first instance on whether or not the decision overrules prior law and declares a new principle of law. If a decision does not ... no question of a prospective only application arises; the decision applies retroactively in the same manner as most court decisions. Houghton v. County Comm'rs of Kent County, 307 Md. 216, 220, 513 A.2d 291, 293 (1986); see Jones v. State, 297 Md. 7, 24-25, 464 A.2d 977, 985 (1983) (There was no overruling of a prior decision or overruling of an interpretation by this Court ....[, t]herefore, the issue of retroactivity is not presented.). In the present case, the State contends: Any holding by this Court that the record of a guilty plea proceeding must contain affirmative evidence that the defendant has been made aware of the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty, would represent a significant departure from its prior holding in Priet wherein this Court held that a court, accepting a guilty plea, need not engage the defendant in any particular fixed litany in order to ascertain whether the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary. Thus, if this Court, contrary to other courts considering pleas post- Bradshaw, should hold that Bradshaw represents a retreat by the Supreme Court from reliance upon the Henderson presumption to satisfy the requirement that the defendant's plea is knowing, it should also hold that pleas entered prior to its decision in this case are to be reviewed under the standard announced in Priet, with full reliance upon Henderson. [30] In response, Daughtry argues that, because [t]he Court of Special Appeals based its Abrams, Miller and Gross opinions on its understanding of what the Supreme Court said in Bradshaw : If this Court concludes that the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel[,] or that [w]here a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually may rely on that counsel's assurance that the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty[,] but that a presumption of advice will not suffice, then the Court's ruling in this case should apply to any Maryland case in which the plea was entered after the Bradshaw v. Stumpf case which was decided on June 13, 2005. Our decision in the present case in no way overrules prior law and declares a new principle of law. The law of this State with respect to the voluntariness of guilty pleas has been the same over the past thirty years since we decided Priet (if not longer): [W]hether, considering the record as a whole, the trial judge could fairly determine that the defendant understood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty. [31] Priet, 289 Md. at 291, 424 A.2d at 361; see Metheny, 359 Md. at 604 n. 18, 755 A.2d at 1104 n. 18; Lovell, 347 Md. at 635, 702 A.2d at 267; State v. Brazle, 296 Md. at 383, 463 A.2d at 802; Countess v. State, 286 Md. at 473, 408 A.2d at 1317; Davis v. State, 278 Md. at 109, 361 A.2d at 116; State v. Gutierrez, 153 Md.App. 462, 477, 837 A.2d 238, 247 (2003), cert denied, 380 Md. 618, 846 A.2d 402 (2004); Barnes v. State, 70 Md.App. 694, 707, 523 A.2d 635, 641 (1987); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 749, 90 S.Ct. at 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d at 757. Today, we reaffirm this totality of the circumstances approach to determining the voluntariness of guilty pleas. It may well be that members of the bar and lower courtsin cases that did not reach this Courtrelied upon and employed the Henderson / Priet presumption in accepting or upholding guilty pleas in cases in which there was no other evidence (aside from the fact of representation) tending to show that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Yet, that `some trial courts and members of the bar seemingly have [mis]construed' a prior case does not mean that a later decision, setting forth a proper interpretation, `comprise[s] a departure from the law applicable to criminal causes in Maryland.' Walker, 343 Md. at 640, 684 A.2d at 434 (quoting Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 27, 400 A.2d 406, 409, 410 (1979)). Because our decision today is consistent entirely with Rule 4-242(c), its predecessor, and attendant caselaw, we need not address the parties' contentions vis á vis Zenobia, and we declare that this opinion must be given full retrospective effect. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE GUILTY PLEAS ENTERED IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY AND TO REMAND TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY. BATTAGLIA, MURPHY, and ADKINS, JJ., Dissent. MURPHY, J., dissenting, in which BATTAGLIA and ADKINS, JJ., join. I agree with the majority's reaffirmation of the `totality of the circumstances' approach to determining the voluntariness of guilty pleas. I also agree with the majority that, when a defendant who has entered a guilty plea claims that the judge who accepted that plea failed to comply with the requirements of Md. Rule 4-242, the court reviewing this claim must determine whether, considering the record as a whole, the trial judge could fairly determine that[, at the proceeding during which the plea at issue was entered,] the defendant understood the nature of the charge to which he [or she] pleaded guilty. (Emphasis supplied). In my opinion, however, the record as a whole includes everything shown to have occurred (1) before, (2) during, and (3) after the defendant pleaded guilty. While the dispositive issue is whether the defendant understood the nature of the charge at the moment the guilty plea was entered, the reviewing court should resolve that issue by examining everything in the record that has probative value. In the case at bar, the record clearly shows that the Respondent (1) gave a detailed confession to the investigating officers, in which he confessed to his role in the armed robbery that resulted in the murder of the robbery victim, (2) aided in the investigation of that crime, which resulted in the arrest of his co-defendant, (3) entered into a plea agreement in which he promised to testify against his co-defendant, and during which he answered Yes when asked by the Court whether the facts stated by the prosecutor were what happened in this case?, (4) breached his plea agreement when called to testify during the trial of his co-defendant, and (5) at sentencing, requested mercy on the ground that, but for his cooperation, the State's case against his co-defendant would not have been likely to come to trial. I therefore dissent from the holding that the Respondent's plea of guilty did not pass the Priet test. The transcript of the Respondent's guilty plea proceeding includes the following statements: THE COURT: What's the State's recommendation on the Court's acceptance of such a plea? [THE PROSECUTOR]: The State's recommendation as to Count I would be life suspend all but 30 years. As to Count 2, would be, I guess, 20 years concurrent, the first five without parole. [RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL]: That's acceptable. [THE PROSECUTOR]: For a total of life suspend all but 30 years.    [RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL]: Not free to allocute. Life suspend all but 30.    THE COURT: All right. The Court is willing to bind itself to that recommendation. [RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL]: Of course, Your Honor, in exchange for that, the Defendant would be cooperating with the State and would be testifying in any and all proceedings against Mr. Ashton. THE COURT: Okay. Is a condition of his plea that he testify truthfully? [THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes. [RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL]: Yes.    [THE COURT] All right. I want you to have a seat. The Prosecutor is about to describe to me the facts that they're relying upon to support your plea. [PROSECUTOR] If this matter had gone to trial, the State would have produced witnesses who would testify that on December 14, 2005, at approximately 12:49 p.m., uniformed officers from the Prince George's County Police Department were dispatched to 1132 Kennebec Street, Apartment 204, Oxon Hill, Prince George's County, Maryland for the report of a shooting. While responding to that location, officers saw a vehicle leaving the scene at a high rate of speed and in that vehicle were occupants who matched a lookout given by a witness to 911. The officers followed the vehicleit was a Mercury Grand Marquisinto the District of Columbia to Yuma Street, Southeast. Two occupants got out and fled the scene. This Defendant, Demetrius Daughtry, was apprehended by officers and transported to the Metropolitan Police Department Violent Crime Branch where he gave a statement regarding his involvement in this matter. Furthermore, if there was further testimony by Mr. Daughtry, he would testify that he had met up with Adrian Ashton earlier that morning, that the two of them decided to go to 1132 Kennebec Street, Apartment 204 to see Anthony Brown and to rob him of some marijuana. That both Mr. Daughtry and Adrian Ashton had handguns. They both went to that location. That both Adrian Ashton and Demetrius Daughtry went inside of that location. That there was a struggle between Adrian Ashton and Anthony Brown at time Mr. Daughtry fired in the direction of Anthony Brown and then grabbed some marijuana and fled out of the apartment. Mr. Brown, when he was located at the scene by other officers, was pronounced dead at the scene. An autopsy was performed at which time the results of the autopsy were that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds and the manner of death was a homicide. Further, the Prince George's County police technician who was there, well the doctor recovered two bullets which she gave to the technician. The technician marked those bullets as RM-12 and RM-13, the first being a .45 caliber bullet, the second being a .40 caliber bullet. There would be further testimony that between Mr. Daughtry, the Defendant here, and Adrian Ashton, there was a .40 and a .45 caliber handgun. Court's indulgence. All events occurring in Prince George's County. [THE COURT]: Mr. Daughtry, did you hear what the Prosecutor just described to me? [THE DEFENDANT]: Yes. [THE COURT]: Is that what happened in this case? [THE DEFENDANT]: Yes. In my opinion, the nature of the charges to which the Respondent pleaded guilty are readily understandable to any defendant who has (1) confessed to a classic felony murder, (2) aided in the arrest of his co-defendant, (3) agreed to enter a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement that calls for him to testify as a State's witness, and (4) during his guilty plea proceeding, expressed agreement with the Statement of Facts that describe his role in the death of the robbery victim. [1] Under these circumstances, even if subsequent events were inadmissible as a matter of law on the issue of whether the Respondent understood the nature of the charges when he entered his pleas of guilty, the record as a whole at that point in time clearly shows that he did. The record also shows that (1) when called as a State's witness in the trial of his co-defendant, the Respondent asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, and (2) as a result of the Respondent's breach of the plea agreement, the State filed a MEMORANDUM IN AID OF SENTENCING that included the following assertions: On September 7, 2006, the defendant withdrew his previously entered plea of not guilty and plead guilty to count-1, murder 1st degree and count-4, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, before the Honorable Dwight D Jackson. As part of the plea agreement the defendant agreed to testify truthfully against his co-defendant, Adrian Ashton. On May 3, 2007, Daughtry was called as a witness in the trial of State of Maryland v. Adrian Ashton and refused to testify.    Defendant's Version of The Events Upon his arrest in the District of Columbia, the defendant gave a videotaped statement to the police admitting his involvement in the murder of Anthony Brown. He later had further conversations with law enforcement personnel. In sum and substance he stated that on December 14, 2005, at approximately 12:29 pm, he and Adrian Ashton went to Anthony Brown's apartment at 1132 Kenebec Street, Apt 204, Oxon Hill, Prince George's County, Maryland, to rob Brown of some marihuana. Daughtry and Ashton drove to Brown's apartment. Daughtry was in the driver's seat and Ashton was in the front passenger seat. Both Daughtry and Ashton had handguns. Ashton had a .40 caliber handgun and Daughtry had a .45 caliber handgun. Ashton went into the apartment first. Daughtry entered into the apartment after he heard gunshots. Daughtry saw Ashton and Brown struggling on the couch. Daughtry fired once or twice in the direction of the victim. Daughtry then grabbed a bag of marihuana, ran out of the apartment and back to his car. Ashton followed him out of the apartment, but returned to the apartment to retrieve his handgun magazine. Ashton took Daughtry's handgun with him when he returned to Brown's apartment. Ashton returned to the car and both men fled the scene. Daughtry was apprehended in DC shortly after fleeing Brown's apartment. In his interview with parole and probation, the defendant again admitted his involvement and apologized to the victim's family and to the State of Maryland, but denied having a gun at the time of the offense.    While this may be the defendant's first serious criminal conviction, it is not the first time the defendant has been involved in assaultive behavior. The defendant was found guilty of second degree assault in 2003. The safety of society requires that he be sentenced to a significant period of incarceration. Furthermore, pursuant to the defendant's agreement with the State, the defendant agreed to testify truthfully against his co-defendant. At the co-defendant's trial, the defendant refused to testify. Therefore, the State asserts that it is not bound by any prior agreement as to sentence recommendation. For all the reasons stated above, the State respectfully requests that this Court sentence the defendant to life plus 20 years. The transcript of the Respondent's sentencing proceeding includes the following statements: [RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL]: Mr. Daughtry has accepted his responsibility in Mr. Brown's death. As you do know, he aided the investigation in this matter. He understands what he's been charged with. He understands what he's admitted to.... He did not want to go to trial. He wanted to save the victim's family from any further pain. He wanted to save the State the cost of prosecution of him. And thus, he's placing his future upon the mercy of the Court.    [THE PROSECUTOR]: ... As Your Honor is aware in this case, Mr. Daughtry entered into an agreement. Part of the terms of the agreement was that he was to testify truthfully in any grand juries and any trial and other court proceeding with respect to the matters about which this may require his testimony, specifically, as to the trial of State v. Adrian Ashton. At the trial of State v. Adrian Ashton, Mr. Daughtry was called as a witness. THE COURT: I remember. He took the Fifth. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes. So with that understanding, the State would submit that, basically, there is a violation of the agreement and[] therefore, the state is free to ask for what it feels would be the appropriate sentence.    [RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL]: ... Madam State's Attorney is seeking to ask the Court to punish Mr. Daughtry for violating the terms of the agreement. Mr. Daughtry is not asking the Court to honor the terms of the agreement. We understand. He understands that the agreement is null and void at this juncture.    He knows that once an agreement is breached, there is no agreement any more. He understands that, but he is asking the Court to take into account the fact that he did aid in the investigation. But for Mr. Daughtry, it's not likely that Mr. Ashton would have come to trial. Your Honor, again, he's going to be asking for life suspend all but 40 and a concurrent 20 on the handgun.    Mr. Daughtry wants the Court to know that he madeas he says, he made a stupid mistake. He wasn't thinking in his right mind, so he has to accept his consequences, accept it and keep moving on. He wants to apologize to the victim's family and to the State of Maryland for being involved in a senseless act of malice.    THE DEFENDANT: I'd just say that I truly, truly do apologize to Mr. Brown's family. From my review of the record as a whole, I am persuaded beyond the shadow of a doubt that when the Respondent entered the guilty pleas at issue, he fully understood the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and direct that Court to deny Petitioner's Application for Leave to Appeal. Judges BATTAGLIA and ADKINS have authorized me to state that they join this dissenting opinion.