Opinion ID: 1102954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether jra has shown public use and necessity for the taking?

Text: A. Necessity The question of necessity for the taking may be dispensed with rather summarily. Whether the taking is necessary has consistently been held to be a legislative question which the courts should not disturb absent fraud or abuse of discretion. Governor's Office v. Carter, 573 So.2d 736, 739 (Miss. 1990). The burden of proof on this issue is on the landowner to prove one of these. Id. In this case, the owners put on no proof to show either fraud or an abuse of discretion on the part of JRA, therefore, the trial court could only find for JRA on this issue. B. Public Use This is the much more complicated issue in this case, and is subject to a different standard, which is rooted in Section 17 of our Constitution, which states: Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use, except on due compensation being first made to the owner or owners thereof, in a manner to be prescribed by law; and whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be public shall be a judicial question, and, as such, determined without regard to legislative assertion that the use is public. Miss. Const. 1890, art. 3, § 17. The condemnee may assert the lack of public necessity by virtue of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-27-15 (1972), which allows a defendant to file a motion at any time not less than five days prior to the hearing challenging, among other things, that the taking is not one for public use. Once the motion has been filed and the proceeding begun, it is the condemnor which has the burden of proving public use, unlike the question of public necessity, where the lack of public necessity must be shown by the owner. Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. Brown, 248 Miss. 4, 156 So.2d 572, 576 (1963). JRA would then have the burden to affirmatively show the public use at the hearing rather than the owners being required to show a lack of public use. That is not what happened in this case on the motion to dismiss. Not only did the owners call no witnesses, neither did the JRA, which had the burden of proof on the issue of public use. All that appears in the record of these hearings are the lengthy arguments of counsel for the parties, which fill nearly two full volumes. Mississippi Code Ann. § 11-27-15 (1972), does not set out the procedure for the hearing, it merely states that the motion to dismiss, [s]hall be heard and decided by the judge as a preference proceeding, without a jury. However, the court cannot require the owners, who do not have the burden of proof on the issue of public use, to assume the burden of going forward with the evidence. To penalize owners for not doing so would be against the construction this Court has stated must be placed on the eminent domain statutes. In Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, 460 So.2d 107, 111 (Miss. 1984), we reiterated that, The right to exercise the power [of eminent domain] is strictly limited to the purposes specified in the statute conferring it. The proposed use of the lands of the owner must be clearly embraced within the legitimate object of the power conferred. Where there is any doubt in regard to the extent of the power, the landowner must have the benefit of that doubt. Id. [quoting Wise v. Yazoo City, 96 Miss. 507, 51 So. 453 (1910)]. The record in this case does not reveal the specific purpose for which JRA wished to obtain the King Edward Hotel property. The resolutions by the Jackson City Council and JRA contain only bare allegations that the property was to be obtained for the purpose of slum clearance and redevelopment. What is revealed by the record on the question of public use seems to be merely a legislative assertion of public use, not any evidence that the use will in fact be public. The clear mandate of the Miss. Const. 1890, art. 3, § 17, that the question of public use be decided as a judicial, and not as a legislative question has not been complied with in this case. As JRA points out, certain cases decided by this Court in the past seem to point to a different conclusion. Paulk v. Housing Authority of City of Tupelo, 195 So.2d 488 (Miss. 1967), is a case where this Court approved the use of eminent domain powers for urban renewal and slum clearance as a public use. There the owner argued that what the Authority was attempting was in fact a taking of private land for private use, by taking his land and selling it to another. He argued that his land had been cleared so that it no longer contributed to slum conditions. However, the Authority put on evidence at a hearing that at least part of the owner's land would be used for public streets. On the question of public use, we stated: Neither has the public use ended because appellant's land is now clear. When a blighted area as a whole is subject to redevelopment, the condition of the condemnee's property is immaterial if the property lies within the designated project area and its acquisition is necessary to accomplish the paramount purpose of renewal. Hunter v. Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 195 Va. 326, 78 S.E.2d 893 (1953). Id. at 490. The opinion also says that it is not necessary for the condemnor to show final plans for every part of the land taken. Id. at 491. This is a very deferential view of the question of public use. See also, Jackson Redevelopment Authority v. King, 364 So.2d 1104 (Miss. 1978) (public parking facilities, along with incidental private enterprise held a public use). The JRA relies on Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. Brown, 248 Miss. 4, 156 So.2d 572 (1963), which involved acquisition of property near the banks of what would become the Ross Barnett Reservoir. In Brown, the Court relied on the earlier case of Culley v. Pearl River Industrial Commission, 234 Miss. 788, 108 So.2d 390 (1959), which held that the construction of a reservoir to provide recreation was indeed a public use. Culley further held that an incidental benefit to private parties from the taking did not deny the public character of the taking. Id. 108 So.2d at 400. Again in Brown, the theme in allowing the taking was that where the use was public, incidental benefit to individuals did not affect the validity of the taking. The Court furnished examples of incidental uses which are necessary in support of primary, public uses and therefore valid exercises of the power of eminent domain. Along with public parks, buildings, reservoirs, college campuses, schools, courthouses, airports, seaports, and office buildings, the public also requires parking lots, rest rooms, community houses, swimming pools, rental cottages in parks, restaurant facilities, and service stations provided by public sale or lease. These uses are mere incidents to the primary and paramount public uses, but are nevertheless essential uses in connection with the primary public uses. Brown, 156 So.2d at 577. Culley and Brown do not approve the type of taking this Court is confronted with in this case. The primary purpose of the taking by JRA is to sell the property to another private party who will develop the property. The incidental purpose is to remove slum and blighted conditions in downtown Jackson. This is not semantics. It is a matter of whether the takings clause is to have any validity at all and whether private property owners are to be afforded due process of law. The public purpose in Culley and Brown was direct: to provide needed recreation for the citizens of the state. Here, it is indirect and, at best, speculative. We require much more of a showing of public purpose than is shown here. In the words of Chief Justice Hughes: [I]t would seem to be clear that a mere statement by the council that the excess condemnation is in furtherance of such use would not be conclusive. Otherwise, the taking of any land in excess condemnation, although in reality wholly unrelated to the immediate improvement, would be sustained on a bare recital. This would be to treat the constitutional provision as giving such a sweeping authority to municipalities as to make nugatory the express condition upon which the authority is granted. Cincinatti v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 447, 50 S.Ct. 360, 363, 74 L.Ed. 950 (1930). While that statement is probably no longer good federal law due to the recent deferential position taken by the United States Supreme Court on takings issues, it is the proper, skeptical manner in which to view such cases under Mississippi law. Similar reasoning in a Mississippi case may be found in Paulk, 195 So.2d at 492 (Smith, Justice, dissenting). After thoroughly reviewing the evidence of public use, Justice Smith concluded: Here, apparently, the extent of the area and the lack of specificity of the public necessity are limited only by the unrestricted discretion of the Housing Authority commissioners. There may remain some doubt that government boards and agencies have demonstrated that they may be counted upon to exercise such exceptionable judgment that it is always to be preferred to that of the private citizen in dealing with his own property. Id. at 496. Much of the record in this case is filled with complaint by JRA that the King Edward cannot be successfully developed. The owners bought the property believing that it could be. That the owners have not been successful in doing so during the period of time they have owned it should not require them to lose it. It is a serious task, and one which they seem to have been dedicated to. An investment of $450,000 up front and then expenses for taxes, security and renovation plans does not seem to be the kind of money that one would just want to throw down the drain. On the question of public use, JRA has failed to meet its burden of proof and an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether the use to which the land will be put has a primarily public purpose. A remand is therefore mandated.