Opinion ID: 563275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: This case presents the following: 6 (1) Did the district court err in providing Delgado with a two-level upward enhancement for obstruction of justice under Guideline Sec. 3C1.1; 7 (2) Should Delgado have received a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under Sec. 3E1.1 of the Guidelines; 8 (3) Should the trial court have summarily dismissed Delgado's motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255?III. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 9 Delgado challenges the court's two-level upward adjustment for his obstruction of justice under Guidelines Sec. 3C1.1. 1 As we noted in United States v. Osborne, 931 F.2d 1139, 1153 (7th Cir.1991): 10 In reviewing a district court's finding that a preponderance of the evidence supported a determination that a defendant obstructed justice, we have held that: 'The sentencing court's determination that a defendant obstructed justice is ... a finding of fact. Thus, our review is under a clearly erroneous standard.' United States v. Brown, 900 F.2d 1098, 1103 (7th Cir.1990). 11 Delgado misrepresented his criminal history to the probation officer conducting his pre-sentence investigation. As we noted in United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968, 973 (7th Cir.1989), a case upholding an upward adjustment for obstruction of justice: The application notes [to Guideline Section 3C1.1] list examples suggestive of behavior that would call for the adjustment, including '... furnishing material falsehoods to a probation officer in the course of pre-sentence or other investigation of the court.'  (Quoting Application Note 1(e)). It is difficult to conceive of a more material falsehood than a defendant lying to a probation officer concerning the extent of his criminal record during the pre-sentence investigation. This is particularly true when the defendant fails to appear for a violation of probation hearing, was subject to an outstanding arrest warrant for the failure and, thus, was an absconder from probation (detainer filed). Thus, the false information Delgado gave the court officer concerning his New Jersey criminal record provided a sufficient factual basis for the court to find obstruction of justice under Sec. 3C1.1 of the Guidelines. See also United States v. Ojo, 916 F.2d 388, 392-93 (7th Cir.1990) (upholding obstruction of justice adjustment where a defendant provided false information concerning her name, date of birth, length of residence in the United States, current address, family history, financial status and arrest record to a pre-trial services officer during an investigation concerning setting the amount of an appearance bond); United States v. Gaddy, 909 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir.1990) (upholding obstruction of justice adjustment where a defendant provided a false name to FBI agents and lied about his arrest and fingerprint record). 12 In United States v. Osborne, 931 F.2d 1139, 1164-68 (7th Cir.1991), we considered the related issue of whether the government was required to honor a term of a plea agreement requiring it to recommend a particular criminal history category under the Sentencing Guidelines in light of the defendant's inaccurate representation of his criminal record. Id. at 1166. We held that: Where a defendant has failed to fully disclose his complete criminal history during plea agreement negotiations, the government is not required to be bound by an inaccurate recitation of the defendant's criminal history. Id. Just as the Osborne court held that the defendant's misrepresentations regarding his criminal record relieved the government of an obligation to carry out the agreement to recommend a particular criminal history category, it was proper for the trial court here to conclude that Delgado's inaccurate declarations regarding his criminal record in combination with his false statements concerning his drug use, interfered with the Probation Office's investigations and recommendations and merited application of the upward adjustment for obstruction of justice. 13 Although Delgado's provision of false information concerning his criminal record, in itself, justifies the application of the obstruction of justice adjustment, this enhancement is further supported by Delgado's denial of drug use while released on bail to pre-trial services personnel following positive drug tests. In Jordan, we also considered a situation where a defendant denied drug use when confronted with a drug test which was positive for the presence of cocaine. We held that: 14 The district court did not clearly err in finding that Jordan's continued drug use while out on bail for a drug-related conviction was material to the disposition of his case, and therefore that his lie about that conduct was a material falsehood. Jordan's drug abuse during the pendency of his drug-dealing prosecution was directly relevant to both the Probation Officer and the district court in determining how Jordan's case should be handled. Monitoring the behavior of convicted defendants is a integral and critical function of the Probation Officer and of the courts in criminal case management. Such monitoring is particularly important in cases involving defendants with criminal records who have pleaded guilty to drug dealing. The importance of monitoring is buttressed by the very fact that the Probation Office takes urine specimens from defendants in Jordan's position. 15 We infer that the district court found that Jordan was trying to obstruct investigation of his drug-related activities as a whole, a finding bolstered by the two incidents of drug dealing that followed his plea on the urinalysis test. Jordan willfully attempted to hinder the prosecution and disposition of his case. A false statement about drug use during the sentencing stage of criminal court proceedings could thus be seen as constituting 'obstruction of justice during ... prosecution' of the case against Jordan. 16 Jordan, 890 F.2d at 973. Although Jordan's positive drug test and denial of drug use took place while awaiting sentencing, and Delgado's occurred when he was on bail prior to the entry of his guilty plea, we have determined that furnishing false information to court officials prior to conviction can constitute obstruction of justice. In United States v. Ojo, 916 F.2d 388, 392-93 (7th Cir.1990), we held that provision of false information concerning name, date of birth, residence in the United States, current address, family history, financial status and arrest record to a pretrial services officer in connection with the setting of bail conditions constituted obstruction of justice under Section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines. Likewise, the provision of false information to a pre-trial services officer with respect to drug use while under court supervised bail release constitutes a material falsehood that, of itself as well as in combination with the false declarations to the probation officer during the pre-sentence investigation, justifies the court's two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under Guidelines Section 3C1.1. 2 Cf. United States v. Osborne, 931 F.2d 1139, 1164-68 (7th Cir.1991) (Holding that government did not breach a plea agreement in recommending a higher criminal history category where the defendant's representation of his criminal record was materially false).IV. ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY 17 Delgado contends that the trial court should have entitled him to a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under Section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines. 3 Delgado did not raise this challenge in the district court. Thus, we may reverse the trial court's failure to grant the acceptance of responsibility adjustment only if it was plain error. United States v. White, 903 F.2d 457, 466-67 (7th Cir.1990). We observed that: 18 A plain error is an error that is 'not only palpably wrong but [is] also likely to cause the outcome of the trial to be mistaken.' United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 363 (7th Cir.1986). 'A reversal on the basis of plain error can be justified only when the reviewing court is convinced that it is necessary in order to avert an actual miscarriage of justice. ' [United States v. Requarth, 847 F.2d 1249, 1254 (7th Cir.1988) ] (quoting United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 792, 83 L.Ed.2d 785 (1985)). 19 United States v. Dietrich, 854 F.2d 1056, 1060 (7th Cir.1988). In Osborne we stated: 20 As we noted in United States v. Camargo, 908 F.2d 179 (7th Cir.1990): ' [T]he sentence judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility, and thus the judge's determination is entitled to great deference on review and should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation. ' 908 F.2d at 185. In [United States v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1990) ] we recognized that the Guidelines authorize a trial judge to consider a number of relevant factors in determining whether a defendant has accepted responsibility: 21 'The Application Notes following Sec. 3E1.1 of the Guidelines sets forth a non-inclusive list of considerations that a court may use in determining whether a defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct. Several relevant considerations include: (1) voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or association; (2) voluntary and truthful admission to authorities of involvement in the offense and related conduct; (3) voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after the commission of the offense; and (4) the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility.' Sullivan, 916 F.2d 420. 22 Osborne, 931 F.2d at 1154. 23 A downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under Section 3E1.1 is warranted in a case where the defendant has obstructed justice only under very unusual and exceptional mitigating circumstances. Application Note 4 to Section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines reads: 24 Conduct resulting in an enhancement under Section 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both Secs. 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply. 25 And we hasten to add Delgado has failed to convince us that this is an extraordinary case meriting an acceptance of responsibility adjustment despite the finding of obstruction of justice. When a defendant gives false information to the Probation Officer concerning his criminal record in the course of a pre-sentence investigation, and denies the use of drugs during interviews with his pretrial services officer, his conduct certainly will not be considered as meriting consideration for acceptance of responsibility for his criminal activity. Thus the trial court did not commit plain error when it failed to grant Delgado a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under Section 3E1.1. 26