Opinion ID: 1377397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Escape Testimony

Text: (5) Defendant asserts the court erred in admitting evidence of the alleged pretrial escape plan. As noted above, the evidence consisted of a map drawn by defendant and testimony by Oglesby. As we shall explain, this evidence was properly admitted in the guilt phase. In People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756 [103 Cal. Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129], we approved the admission of evidence that a defendant had engaged in conversations with other inmates regarding escape plans. The defendant had shown one inmate places in the jail that were vulnerable to escape, and allegedly said he had arranged to obtain hacksaw blades from someone. Later two women were arrested for attempting to smuggle hacksaw blades into the jail. We stated: Evidence that a defendant was planning an escape, like evidence of flight, [9] tends to demonstrate a consciousness of guilt [citation], regardless of whether the escape was actually attempted [citation]. As such, evidence of a planned escape may be sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. ( Perry, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 778.) Defendant argues, however, that the escape plan never reached fruition and that no affirmative steps had been taken in furtherance thereof. [10] Even assuming, as he contends, that it was error to admit evidence of his escape plans, the overwhelming evidence of his guilt makes any such error nonprejudicial. As described below, the jury was properly instructed that it could give such evidence whatever weight it deserved in determining guilt. Although it is true that evidence of a planned escape from custody months after arrest may be less probative of guilt than flight immediately after a crime, the jury could properly determine the probative value of this circumstantial evidence.
(6) Defendant contends the court erred in giving, over his objection, a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.52, the flight instruction. The court gave the following instruction: The attempted escape of a person after the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but it is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine. (Italics added.) It is clear that the evidence of a plan to escape would not have supported the giving of a standard flight instruction. [11] (See People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal. App.3d 189 [160 Cal. Rptr. 669].) In Anjell, the flight instruction was given based on evidence that robbers had fled the scene of the crime, and that the defendant had made statements about going to Mexico. There was also evidence the defendant and his wife had moved out of the area shortly after the robbery. The court rejected the proposition that the defendant's statements that he wished to borrow money in order to go to Mexico was enough to constitute evidence of flight. The court stated, [w]hile it is true that flight `requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven' [citation], it requires more than mere idle words or thoughts. There was no evidence that appellant actually left the jurisdiction. No case has been found or cited which indicates that statements alone may suffice to justify a flight instruction. ( Anjell, supra, at p. 201.) Defendant asserts, as he did below, that the evidence does not support the instruction, and that the court erred in not defining attempt. The evidence here, however, goes beyond a mere statement of intent to escape. Defendant enlisted Oglesby's help, drew up detailed plans and maps, arranged to contact persons outside the jail, and explained to them the arms and equipment required. Although such planning activity may not legally constitute an attempt, it is sufficient for the limited purpose for which it was used here  to show consciousness of guilt. Even assuming the court's instruction, by referring only to attempted escape may have been incomplete, we discern no prejudice because a more complete instruction encompassing the planning of an escape as showing consciousness of guilt would have been less favorable to defendant.
(7) Defendant next contends the court should have instructed the jury sua sponte that the testimony of the informer  i.e., Oglesby  should be viewed with caution, and that failure to so instruct violated due process. We recently rejected this claim in People v. Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d 543, 565-566. In any event, we note defendant's conviction was not based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Oglesby. Coward testified as a witness to the 7-Eleven killing; Coleman and the Garretts each testified that defendant confessed to the Brookhaven Motel murders. Oglesby's testimony was further corroborated by a series of notes defendant had given him relating to escape plans. We thus find no reversible error in the court's failure to instruct sua sponte that Oglesby's testimony must be viewed with caution.