Opinion ID: 681627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Horse Protection Act Violation

Text: 39 Gray first takes issue with the Secretary's conclusion that he violated 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1824(2)(B). In this regard, he asserts that in order to satisfy the very definition of the violation alleged in this case, the Department must prove that [he] entered the horse, at a time when a specific cause created a specific result in the horse. Gray, then, would have us apply a three-part test to determine whether he has violated the Act. The government, on the other hand, frames the analysis somewhat differently. It urges a two-part test based on the statutory elements of entry and soreness. (emphasis added). We need not resolve this dispute here, however, because we conclude that, even assuming the validity of his test, Gray's claim that he did not violate Sec. 1824(2)(B) is untenable. 4 40 In challenging the Secretary's decision, Gray disputes the reliability, probativeness, and substantiality of the evidence against him. For instance, he makes much of the fact that the government's key witnesses at his June 1991 hearing--Hester, Rushing, and Sutton--could not independently recall the facts and circumstances surrounding his alleged violation. As such, Gray insists, the primary evidence the ALJ and the Secretary relied upon to find a Sec. 1824(2)(B) violation--comprised of the doctors' affidavits, the Summary of Alleged Violation form, and the interview summary prepared by Sutton--is suspect and cannot support the Secretary's ultimate decision. 5 41 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that an agency conducting a hearing may receive [a]ny oral or documentary evidence. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 556(d). The APA adds, however, that the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. Id. On this point, the USDA's implementing regulations state: Evidence which is immaterial, irrelevant, or unduly repetitious, or which is not of the sort upon which responsible persons are accustomed to rely, shall be excluded insofar as practicable. 7 C.F.R. Sec. 1.141(g)(1)(iv) (1994). 42 The documentary evidence of which Gray complains is clearly the sort of evidence upon which responsible persons are accustomed to rely. That this evidence is technically hearsay does not alter our conclusion. See Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir.1980) (Not only is there no administrative rule of automatic exclusion for hearsay evidence, but the only limit to the admissibility of hearsay evidence is that it bear satisfactorily indicia of reliability.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906, 101 S.Ct. 3033, 69 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981). The Calhoun court commented: We have stated the test of admissibility as requiring that the hearsay be probative and its use be fundamentally fair. Id. The documents at issue here satisfy these criteria. They were signed and/or prepared by individuals who were experienced in their tasks and who had no reason to record their findings in other than an impartial fashion. Moreover, the documents were created almost contemporaneously with the observations they relay. 6 43 To determine that this evidence was probative and reliable, of course, is not to say that it also is substantial. Again, as our decision in Murphy makes clear,  '[s]ubstantiality of the evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole.'  801 F.2d at 184. Here, Gray provides little in the way of counter-evidence; rather, he disparages the government's evidence, arguing that it is insufficient to support the charge against him. Gray's position, however, is belied by the record. 44 With respect to whether Gray entered Night Prowler in the Southern Championship there can be little doubt. Gray not only paid the entry fee, but also transported the horse to the show. In addition, as the JO noted: 45 Dr. Rushing stated that [Gray] presented the horse for inspection--such presentation being part of the entry process. Dr. Rushing also requested the name of the person entering the horse ... from the person presenting the horse ( [Gray] and wrote down the response--Billy Gray. Consequently, the record contains reliable, probative and substantial evidence that [Gray] entered the horse. 46 See also Elliott, 990 F.2d at 145 (observing that entering a horse in a show entails paying the entry fee, registering the horse, and presenting the horse for inspection). 47 Equally unavailing is Gray's claim as to the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to the condition of Night Prowler at the time Hester and Rushing conducted their examinations. As is evident from their affidavits, Hester and Rushing confirmed independently what the DQP had already surmised; namely, that Night Prowler was sore within the meaning of the Act. For his part, Gray points out that Hester and Rushing characterized the sensitivity Night Prowler manifested in its forelimbs and hindlimbs as extreme. Only abnormal sensitivity, Gray hastens to add, triggers the statutory presumption of soreness. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1825(d)(5). Notwithstanding Hester's and Rushing's failure to employ the magic word, we reject Gray's contention. Put simply, to contend that extreme sensitivity is not also abnormal sensitivity ignores the meaning of both words. 7 48 With respect to the cause of Night Prowler's sensitivity, we conclude that here, too, substantial evidence supports the JO's decision. At the June 1991 hearing, Rushing testified: In my professional opinion, a horse that was sore would have had some abuse, perhaps resulting from the application of changing the chains, or action devices in conjunction with chemicals or substances applied to the front legs of the horse. He added: [T]o my knowledge, there is no other means of producing this pattern of inflammation or soreness other than soring. This testimony led the JO to conclude that Night Prowler was sored either by the use of a caustic agent or mechanical devices. To the extent causation is, as Gray urges, an element of a Sec. 1824(2)(B) violation, we conclude that such element has been satisfied.