Opinion ID: 8414571
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Definition of Predisposition

Text: The government and Hilliard each submitted a proposed instruction defining “predisposition” based on Mayfield. The government’s proposed instruction, which the court ultimately adopted, read, “A defendant is predisposed to commit the charged crime if he was ready and willing to do so and likely would have committed it without the government’s intervention, or actively wanted to but hadn’t yet found the means.” Hilliard’s proposed instruction consisted of the complete, verbatim holding in May-field on the definition of predisposition: A defendant is predisposed to commit the charged crime if he was ready and willing to do so and likely would have committed it without the government’s intervention, or actively wanted to but hadn’t yet found the means. The defendant’s predisposition is measured at the time the government first proposed the crime, but the nature and degree of the government’s inducement and the defendant’s responses to it are relevant to the determination of predisposition. A prior conviction for a similar offense is relevant but not conclusive evidence of predisposition; a defendant with a criminal record can be entrapped. However, the district court found that the defense’s proposed instruction was unnecessary, because the first two sentences were already included in the government’s proposed instructions and the third sentence was ultimately made into an independent instruction. Defense counsel expressed a preference to read all of the above as one instruction, but the district court explained, “[T]he reason I like [the government’s breakdown of the definition], is it’s a kind of foreign concept, entrapment, and because I’m turning pages while I’m doing this, .... I think what it does is it gives emphasis to three theories for three aspects of the way we look at entrapment and does it in a way that might be lost if it’s in one instruction.” Given this explanation of the district court’s choice of organization, as well as the fact that the jury did ultimately hear all three sentences from the defense’s proposed instruction, which together accurately stated the law, the district court acted well within its discretion in giving the instruction it did. Jp. Factors to Consider With Respect to Predisposition or Entrapment Lastly, both the government and Hilliard submitted proposed instructions on the factors to be considered in evaluating Hilliard’s defense. Hilliard asked that the court give the pattern instruction listing factors relating to entrapment as a whole, whereas the government proposed a shorter list of factors for predisposition based on Mayfield. The district court ultimately gave the latter instruction, which read: Some factors you may consider in deciding whether the defendant was predisposed include: (1) the defendant’s character or reputation; (2) whether the government initially suggested the criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant engaged in the criminal activity for profit; (4) whether the defendant evidenced a reluctance to commit the offense that was overcome by government persuasion; and (5) the nature of the inducement or persuasion by the government. No one factor controls and you may consider other factors. However, the most significant factor you should consider is whether the defendant was reluctant to commit the offense. In contrast, the pattern instruction on entrapment included as a factor “[w]hether the defendant was reluctant to engage in criminal activity,” and also stated, “It is up to you [the jury] to determine the weight to be given to any of these factors and any others that you consider.” Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit § 6.05. Hilliard argues that the given instruction diverged from the pertinent pattern, which Mayfield never suggested was wrong, and confused the jury by elevating the reluctance factor over all others. The government responds that the pattern instruction predates Mayfield, which clarified which factors apply to inducement, which ones apply to predisposition, and which may apply to both. The instruction given lays out verbatim the language from Mayfield for determining predisposition, including the language stating that the most significant factor is whether the defendant was reluctant to commit the offense. See 771 F.3d at 435 (citation omitted). Mayfield went on to provide the aforementioned “legal definition of predisposition,” so that jurors would know what to look for when weighing the above factors, id.; but consideration of the five factors listed remains the law. Here, it seems the district court did just as Mayfield recommended: It provided the definition of predisposition and the factors to be considered in evaluating Hilliard’s defense.