Opinion ID: 365589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Manuel Valenzuela

Text: 2 Manuel's sole argument is that, because the evidence pertaining to him related only to 1971 through 1973, the government's delay in prosecuting him substantially prejudiced him because it forced him to stand trial with his brother, Jose Valenzuela. The government conceded in the district court that it had delayed prosecution until evidence against the entire organization could be amassed. 3 Assuming, without deciding, that Manuel was actually somewhat prejudiced by the delay, 1 his argument for dismissal cannot stand, as the very cases he cites make clear. In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), in which a preindictment investigative delay of 18 months was found not unreasonable, the Court stated that prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. Id. at 790, 97 S.Ct. at 2049. In the Court's view, compelling a prosecutor to file public charges as soon as the requisite proof has been developed against one participant on one charge would cause numerous problems in those cases in which a criminal transaction involves more than one person or more than one illegal act. Id. at 792-93, 97 S.Ct. at 2050. Such problems, including the impairment of investigations and the burdening of courts with multiple trials involving the same facts, led the Court to conclude that to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time. Id. at 796, 97 S.Ct. at 2052. See also United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 678 (9th Cir. 1977) (despite actual prejudice, dismissal requires intentional misconduct or negligence by the government). Similarly, no deprivation of due process occurred in Manuel's case.