Opinion ID: 6324275
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Muñoz’s Motion

Text: We now turn to Muñoz’s newly asserted Davis argument. As previously noted, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Davis shortly before Muñoz filed his reply brief in support of his initial habeas motion and a few months before that motion was decided. Thus, purely as a matter of timing, the Davis argument was available during Muñoz’s initial habeas proceeding. And despite Muñoz’s suggestion that the district court “seemed to deter” amendments or additional filings in his initial proceeding, the record does not establish that he would have been prohibited from amending his initial habeas motion to assert a Davis argument related to his § 924(c) conviction. Nonetheless, Muñoz asserts that his new Davis argument was previously unavailable to him because it is unreasonable to expect a pro se prisoner with an eighth-grade education and no experience filing habeas applications to learn about a new rule of constitutional law and amend his habeas application to add a new claim in such a short time. He also lists other circumstances that added to his difficulty: his first language is Spanish, he taught himself how to look up cases on LexisNexis, and he did not have unlimited access to the prison law library. He further claims he “doesn’t think [the 12 MUÑOZ GONZALEZ V. UNITED STATES Davis decision] was available on the computer in the law library until after [he] mailed in [his] reply.” In describing his difficulties, Muñoz tries to minimize that he in fact did raise an argument based on Davis in his initial habeas proceeding. He contends that he did so only at another prisoner’s suggestion and that he had not read Davis. He further claims that he did not understand Davis or what he had written about it in making his earlier argument. Finally, he asserts that he could not have amended his initial petition because he did “not know what it means to amend” a habeas motion or that he could have done so. We do not dispute that pro se prisoners face unique difficulties when litigating requests for habeas relief, or anything else for that matter. See, e.g., Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing pro se prisoner litigants face “unique handicaps of incarceration” (quoting Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc))). Nor do we doubt that language barriers add to those difficulties. But it is axiomatic that pro se litigants, whatever their ability level, are subject to the same procedural requirements as other litigants. United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir.1984); cf. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). The difficulties that Muñoz identifies in and of themselves do not render a claim based on a new constitutional rule unavailable. See Ross, 578 U.S. at 643 (reasoning that an administrative remedy is unavailable only if it “is not capable of use to obtain relief”); cf. Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that to establish eligibility for equitable tolling in habeas proceedings due to mental impairment, a prisoner must show, among other things, that “his mental impairment was an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ beyond his control” MUÑOZ GONZALEZ V. UNITED STATES 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Instead, his difficulties largely mirrored the general challenges pro se prisoners face when preparing legal filings; they did not effectively create an external barrier to his ability to amend his petition, especially given his awareness of the recent Davis decision. Nor were his difficulties inherently related to his claim being based on a new rule of law as opposed to his pro se status. 4 The authorities discussed above focus on the real-world circumstances impacting whether a legal claim or remedy can be utilized or accessed by a prisoner. The circumstances relevant to this inquiry relate to: (1) the timing of the change in law, see In re Hill, 113 F.3d at 182; (2) whether the prisoner had a factual basis for a claim based on the new law and when the prisoner learned of that factual basis, see In re Cathey, 857 F.3d at 230–33; cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 605 (9th Cir. 1987) (in corum nobis context delay is justified when a petitioner discovered new evidence that he could not reasonably have located earlier); and (3) whether there is a procedural avenue for presenting the new claim that is generally accessible, see, e.g., Ross, 578 U.S. at 642; cf. Lakawanna Cnty Dist. Atty v. Cross, 532 U.S. 394, 405 (2001) (characterizing in dicta that § 2244(d)(1)(B) tolls “[the] 1-year limitations period while petitioner is prevented from filing application by an impediment . . . created by State action”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This analysis typically focuses 4 In a similar context, we recently held that a prisoner is not denied “an unobstructed procedural shot” to present a claim based on a decision issued before the prisoner’s initial § 2255 motion was exhausted because he filed his motion pro se. Pavulak v. Blanckensee, 14 F.4th 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curium). As we explained, to conclude otherwise would “effectively overrule our precedent that there is no right to counsel in federal post-conviction proceedings.” Id. 14 MUÑOZ GONZALEZ V. UNITED STATES on external barriers. See Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 256–57 (2016) (holding that the “extraordinary circumstances” element for equitable tolling requires evidence of “an external obstacl[e],” which reflects the “requirement that a litigant seeking tolling show that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that a habeas petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish some extraordinary circumstance stood in the way of filing his petition within the one-year limitations period); Grant v. Swarthout, 862 F.3d 914, 924–26 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that prison officials’ delay in providing a prisoner with a requested certificate required for an in forma pauperis application caused the federal habeas petition’s untimeliness); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a petitioner’s attorney’s misconduct may justify equitable tolling). This makes sense because, as the Supreme Court has explained, “availability” relates to whether something is “capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose” or “is accessible.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 642 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Perhaps it can be argued that “availability” may be analyzed either objectively (whether a claim is “capable of use” by or “accessible” to an ordinary prisoner) or subjectively (whether a particular prisoner can use or access a claim given his unique characteristics and limitations). But there is nothing in the text or context of AEDPA’s previously-unavailable-claim requirement suggesting that this limited exception to the otherwise broad prohibition against filing second or successive habeas proceedings was intended to be applied subjectively. Indeed, serious fairness concerns would arise if a legal claim were deemed “available” to one prisoner but not another based on personal MUÑOZ GONZALEZ V. UNITED STATES 15 factors specific to the prisoner. And certainly were we to conclude that a prisoner’s comprehension of the law or experience with the legal system dictates whether a legal claim is available to him, the previously-unavailable-claim exception would be broadened far beyond its current application and become an open invitation for litigation. Here, Muñoz points to his personal characteristics in arguing that his Davis argument was unavailable to him during his initial habeas proceeding. Again, we do not doubt that he faced difficulties in asserting his Davis argument. He has limited education, English is not his first language, he lacks legal experience, and he had a relatively short time— approximately three months—to discover the new rule established in Davis and amend his § 2255 motion. 5 But these characteristics, and the relatively short time frame he faced, are not the kinds of circumstances that render a claim based on a new rule of law “previously unavailable.” The new rule existed; Muñoz had the facts that he needed for his claim; no systemic or external barrier prevented him from presenting his claim in his initial habeas proceeding; and Muñoz was clearly aware of Davis because he cited it in his reply brief in his initial habeas proceeding. Therefore, we conclude that Muñoz cannot show that his new Davis argument was unavailable during his initial habeas proceedings. Nothing relevant to our inquiry changed 5 Muñoz argues that his limited access to a law library prevented him from amending his petition. But he does not allege that he was prevented from visiting the law library or that there were prison conditions, such as lockdowns or placement in a secure housing unit, that prevented him from regular access. Indeed, Muñoz states in his declaration that he could research cases on LexisNexis, and that during the time he was writing his reply brief for his initial petition, he visited the law library five times. 16 MUÑOZ GONZALEZ V. UNITED STATES between when Muñoz asserted his first Davis argument in his initial habeas proceeding and when he asserted his new Davis argument in his request for leave to file a second or successive habeas motion. The law and the factual basis on which he relies in asserting his new claim was available to him during his initial habeas proceeding. That he may not have recognized the specific Davis argument that he now seeks to raise until after his initial proceeding was concluded is no different from any other prisoner who fails to raise a habeas claim due to ignorance or lack of diligence, and it is not a basis for granting leave to file a second or successive habeas motion. Muñoz’s request for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 habeas motion is DENIED.