Opinion ID: 1510072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Searches and Seizure of Hughes

Text: Hughes drove voluntarily to the Country Store and parked in front. The officers followed and parked alongside. Captain Stafford approached the automobile and Hughes rolled down the window, under circumstances that we fully expected the Trial Judge to determine on remand. Hughes testified that he was directed to roll down the window. It is his testimony that at the time Captain Stafford approached the car the windows were all up, the night being cold; that the Captain asked for his driver's license and that he had to roll the window down in order to comply. Neese testified that the Captain directed the window be rolled down by making a circular or rotating motion with his hand and forearm. Captain Stafford's testimony is somewhat less than helpful. He admits asking for Hughes' driver's license, and that the window was up at the time. First he denied asking Hughes to roll down the window. When asked if he made any movement indicating that he wanted it rolled down, his response was: I don't recall it. I don't recall doing anything like that, no sir. (Emphasis supplied)       The best I can recall it seems as though as I walked up to the car itself and  the window was possibly being rolled down at that time. (Emphasis supplied). At another place he said he asked for Hughes' driver's license after the window was coming down. Again, he testified: I don't recall whether the window was being rolled down prior to my asking. ... (Emphasis supplied). Immediately thereafter he testified that it all happened within the same instant. This question and answer followed: Q... . and it could be that you asked for the driver's license and he rolled the window down in response to it, isn't that true? A. It's possible. Again: Q... . he could have very easily rolled the window down after you asked for the driver's license, couldn't he? A. Yes, sir.       Q. Well, as the window was being rolled down, at that point had you asked to see his driver's license? A. The best I recall he asked him for the driver's license  I just honestly can't say whether the window was up or down. (Emphasis supplied).       Q. Did you make a motion  and I would like for you to think about this  did you make a motion with your hands in a circular fashion. A. I could have  I just don't recall. (Emphasis supplied). The testimony on this material issue leaves much to be desired. It was the nebulous nature of the proof as to this aspect of the case on the first trial, that, in part, prompted our remand. The Trial Judge made no finding. See footnote 1, supra. The Court of Criminal Appeals took the position that the officer did not infringe on Hughes' rights when he smelled the escaping marijuana, [6] regardless of when Hughes rolled down the window. We disagree; this conclusion not only overlooks the significance our former opinion placed on the reasons prompting the window to be rolled down, but also sidesteps the critical inquiry relating to the officer's right to approach the Hughes' vehicle in the first instance. At no time, had anyone pointed the finger of suspicion at Hughes and, as the officer stated, I seen him do nothing. It is a familiar rule of law in Tennessee jurisprudence that contradictory statements of a witness in connection with the same fact have the result of `cancelling each other out.' Taylor v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 573 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). Perhaps the leading case is Johnston v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co., 146 Tenn. 135, 240 S.W. 429 (1921). There the Court speaking through Mr. Special Justice Trabue, stated the rule thusly: The question here is not one of the credibility of a witness or the weight of the evidence; but it is whether there is any evidence at all to prove the fact. If two witnesses contradict each other, there is proof on both sides, and it is for the jury to say where the truth lies; but if the proof of a fact lies wholly with one witness, and he both affirms and denies it, and there is no explanation, it cannot stand otherwise than unproven. For his testimony to prove it is no stronger than his testimony to disprove it, and it would be mere caprice in a jury upon such evidence to decide it either way. 146 Tenn. at 158, 240 S.W. at 436. The wishy washy nature of the officer's testimony leaves the issue clouded. If it be established that Hughes rolled the window down voluntarily, it must be upon the officer's testimony. Hughes testified that he was directed to roll down the window in that when the officer asked for his driver's license he had to roll down the window [or alight which has the same legal significance] in order to comply. Neese testified that the officer directed that the window be rolled down by making a circular motion with a hand and arm. The testimony of the officer is self-emasculating; it does not establish a voluntary lowering of the window. Moreover, the burden of proof lies heavily upon the State to establish that the window was rolled down voluntarily and the vehicle then exposed to the officer's view and sense of smell. This follows because we are dealing with an exception to the search warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment and the burden of proving voluntariness lies upon the State. The burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971). See also, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Additionally, the element of voluntariness is a part of the State's case and, like all other necessary elements, must be established by the prosecution. We hold that the proof does not establish that the window was rolled down voluntarily. We would be entirely justified in reverting to our initial holding that the officer had no authority to demand exhibition of a driver's license, under Sec. 59-709, T.C.A., and if the window was rolled down pursuant to demand for such exhibition, a different question would be presented. Having now held that the window was not rolled down voluntarily, we would be wholly warranted in finding that all else that transpired constituted an unwarranted intrusion and an infringement upon the personal security and liberty of a citizen. Instead we prefer to rest our decision, under all the facts and circumstances as developed on the second trial, on Fourth Amendment considerations, divorced from the narrow proposition of the entitlement of the police officer to demand the production of a driver's license. [7]