Opinion ID: 781892
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Midtrial Instruction

Text: 28 The Supreme Court's holdings in Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989), and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), provide the controlling authority here. Because the California Court of Appeal failed to apply the correct analysis as determined by Carella and Sandstrom and reached a result that contradicts the reasoning and result of those cases, its decision was contrary to federal law. Packer, 123 S.Ct. at 365. The trial court's instruction improperly removed the element of specific intent to evade the court process — the only contested issue — from the jury's consideration and in effect commanded a directed verdict for the state. Under Carella and Sandstrom, this was error. 29 In Carella, the Supreme Court reiterated its rule that a mandatory presumption — a specific instruction that both alone and in the context of the overall charge, could have been understood by reasonable jurors to require them to find the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts — violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it directly foreclose[s] independent jury consideration of whether the facts proved establish[] certain elements of [the charged offense] ... and relieve[s] the State of its burden of ... proving by evidence every essential element of [the] crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 491 U.S. at 265-66, 109 S.Ct. 2419 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)); accord Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 521, 99 S.Ct. 2450 (holding unconstitutional instruction that [t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts because the jury could have interpreted it as either a burden-shifting or conclusive presumption). 30 Here, the trial court told the jury that Powell's testimony was an admission that he intended to evade the court process, and that 31 [w]hat [Powell is] saying by his repeated statements against [the court's] order is that he didn't come to court because he wanted to evade the process of the court, because he knew in all reason that he was going to be sent to prison. And that's what ... the intentional element of this offense is all about: Intent to evade the court process. 32 This instruction went beyond the mandatory presumption instructions found unconstitutional in Carella and Sandstrom. The jury was not merely instructed to find specific intent to evade the process of the court once it found certain predicate facts. Rather, the court stated that Powell's testimony starts with an admission that he intended to evade the process of the court. 4 The court thus in effect instructed the jury that the specific intent element had been satisfied. Moreover, the court's later instructions were inadequate to undo the damage caused by the court's earlier definitive statement. The court's qualification that I have not intended by anything I have said or done ... to intimate or suggest what you should find to be the facts was too general and too late to ensure that the jurors would entirely disregard the court's instruction that the only contested issue in the case should be decided against Powell. Therefore, the midtrial instruction clearly violated the principles enunciated in Carella and Sandstrom. 33 Respondent urges us to analyze the judge's midtrial instruction under Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933). The instruction, however, is more appropriately analyzed under Carella than Quercia, which addressed the proper limits on a trial judge's comments to the jury. Quercia is distinguishable because the court here was not merely commenting on the evidence or making passing remarks during the course of the trial. Rather, as the court itself recognized, it was instructing the jury about the specific intent element. 5 Accordingly, the trial judge's statement should be assessed under the standards employed in scrutinizing other jury instructions, and Carella and Sandstrom, rather than Quercia, constitute the correct controlling authority. 34 In any event, the state court decision is contrary to Quercia and its progeny. In Quercia after the trial court charged the jury, it stated: 35 And now I am going to tell you what I think of the defendant's testimony. You may have noticed, Mr. Foreman and gentleman, that he wiped his hands during his testimony. It is rather a curious thing, but that is almost always an indication of lying.... I think that every single word that man said, except when he agreed with the Government's testimony, was a lie. 36 Now, that opinion is an opinion of evidence and is not binding on you, and if you don't agree with it, it is your duty to find him not guilty. 37 Id. at 468-469, 53 S.Ct. 698. The Supreme Court stated that a trial judge may express his opinion upon the facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all matters of fact are submitted to their determination. Id. at 469, 53 S.Ct. 698. The Court reversed the defendant's conviction because the trial judge added to the evidence and put his own experience, with all the weight that could be attached to it, in the scale against the accused. Id. at 471, 53 S.Ct. 698. The Court also rejected the argument that the latter portion of the statement cured the error, because the judge did not withdraw his opinion and it was of a sort most likely to remain firmly lodged in the memory of the jury and to excite a prejudice which would preclude a fair and dispassionate consideration of the evidence. Id. at 472, 53 S.Ct. 698. 38 As in Quercia, the trial court's comments here went far beyond innocuous analysis of the evidence. Although the trial court did not say explicitly that Powell was lying, its statements were just as damaging. Upon the heels of Powell's testimony indicating that he did not intend to evade the process of the court, the trial court told the jury that the substance of Powell's testimony amounted to an admission of specific intent to do just that. The court did not follow its opinion regarding Powell's testimony with an immediate reminder that the jury could disregard the court's opinion because the jury alone was responsible for determining the specific intent element. Accordingly, the trial court's statement was contrary to Quercia. 6 39 The Ninth Circuit authority Respondent cites does not suggest otherwise. In Rodriguez v. Marshall, 125 F.3d 739, 748-49 n. 12 (9th Cir.1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Payton v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.2002), the trial judge noted that there had been conflicting evidence and highlighted questions the jurors might have wished to take into account when considering the testimony of one particular witness. The trial court also interspersed these comments with cautionary admonitions that it was the jury's responsibility to determine the facts using its own independent judgment. Id. at 749. We held that the trial judge's comments were permissible because he repeatedly reminded members of the jury that they were to determine the facts of the case based on their own view of the evidence. Id. Similarly, in United States v. James, 576 F.2d 223 (9th Cir.1978), the trial court explained its views of the significance of certain testimony and the relationship between the different counts. Id. at 227-228. 40 Unlike both Rodriguez and James, the trial judge here made a conclusive statement about the significance of Powell's testimony and failed to accompany his statement with any caveat or reminder that the jury was ultimately responsible for determining the intent element. See People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal.3d 730, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113, 138 n. 10 (1986) (quoting text of challenged statement); James, 576 F.2d at 228 n. 5 (same); see also Bradley v. United States, 338 F.2d 493, 494-95 (9th Cir.1964) (holding erroneous instruction regarding admissions made by defendant to be nonprejudicial in light of accompanying cautionary language). The trial judge's later instruction — delivered four days after the damaging instruction at issue — did not explicitly refer to his earlier statement or otherwise alert the jury to the connection. 7 See James, 576 F.2d at 229 (finding significant the later instruction that I have made mention of the evidence but not in any manner for the purpose of suggesting to you whether or not I think Mr. James is guilty.... [A]ny view that I might have with respect to the guilt or innocence of Mr. James ... is altogether beside the point. Yours is the job of making that determination.). Consequently, the midtrial instruction was impermissible under Quercia and its progeny, as well as under Carella and Sandstrom.