Opinion ID: 1230804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Regaining Custody Following Permanent or Temporary Transfer of Custody to a Third Person [6]

Text: We are constantly vigilant in recognizing that the goal of every decision relating to custody of children is to advance the welfare of the child. This responsibility has been translated in what has become a mantra of this Court that in a contest involving the custody of a child, the welfare of that child is the polar star by which the discretion of this Court will be guided. State ex rel. Harmon v. Utterback, 144 W.Va. at 419, 428, 108 S.E.2d at 521, 527. In the shadow of this star is the concept that an unoffending natural parent will not be deprived of the custody of her child. We recognized in Hammack v. Wise, 158 W.Va. 343, 347, 211 S.E.2d 118, 121 (1975), that: Although this Court adheres to the polar star concept in child custody cases, it has refused to apply it in cases where the parents have not abandoned the child or have in no manner been proved to be unfit to have the care and custody of such child. We established this general rule in the Syllabus of State ex rel. Kiger v. Hancock, 153 W.Va. 404, 168 S.E.2d 798 (1969): A parent has the natural right to the custody of his or her infant child and, unless the parent is an unfit person because of misconduct, neglect, immorality, abandonment, or other dereliction of duty, or has waived such right or by agreement or otherwise has permanently transferred, relinquished or surrendered such custody, the right of the parent to the custody of his or her child will be recognized and enforced by the courts. We strayed from protecting the rights of a natural parent who has relinquished custody to a third person in Lemley v. Barr, 176 W.Va. 378, 343 S.E.2d 101 (1986), where we recognized that the equitable rights of a child could be placed above the legal rights of a parent, and commented: The day is long past in this State, if it had ever been, when the rights of a parent to the custody of his or her child, where the extraordinary circumstances are present, would be enforced inexorably, contrary to the best interest of the child, on the theory solely of an absolute legal right. Instead, in the extraordinary circumstance, when there is a conflict, the best interest of the child has always been regarded as superior to the right of parental custody. Indeed, analysis of the cases reveals a shifting of emphasis rather than a remaking of substance. This shifting reflects more the modern principle that a child is a person, and not a subperson over whom the parent has absolute possessory interest. A child has rights too, some of which are of constitutional magnitude. Lemley v. Barr, 176 W.Va. at 386, 343 S.E.2d at 109 (citations omitted). Following Lemley v. Barr , we decided In the Interest of Brandon L.E., 183 W.Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515 (1990), in which we modified a Florida custody decree that required that a custodial grandmother transfer custody of a child to his father with whom he had little contact. We wrote: To protect the equitable rights of a child in this situation, the child's environment should not be disturbed without a clear showing of significant benefit to him, notwithstanding the parent's assertion of a legal right to the child. In the Interest of Brandon L.E., 183 W.Va. at 121, 394 S.E.2d at 523. We believe the time has come to reformulate the legal standards guiding those extraordinary cases where a natural parent, following the transfer of either temporary or permanent custody of a child to a third person, attempts to regain custody of that child. We look to our past decisions to map the future. A synthesis of our decisions provides a logical foundation to modify our jurisprudence relating to the burden and quantum of proof required when a natural parent attempts to regain custody of a child after either a transfer of temporary or permanent custody to a third person. In the Interest of Brandon L.E., 183 W.Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515 (1990) (holding that a child's environment should not be disturbed without a clear showing of significant benefit to the child); In re Cottrill, 176 W.Va. 529, 346 S.E.2d 47 (1986) (per curiam) (reiterating that a fit parent has the natural right to the custody of their infant child unless permanently transferred or relinquished); McCartney v. Coberly, 250 S.E.2d 777 (W.Va.1978) (holding that a parent seeking to regain custody after transferring temporary custody need only prove that the parent is fit, without showing that the change of custody will promote the welfare of the child); State ex rel. Harmon v. Utterback, 144 W.Va. 419, 108 S.E.2d 521 (1959) (stating that the welfare of a child is the polar star by which the discretion of this Court will be guided; also, a parent seeking to regain custody after transferring permanent custody must prove a change of custody will promote the welfare of the child). We fashion the rule as: when a natural parent transfers temporary custody of their child to a third person and thereafter seeks to regain custody of that child, the burden of proof shall be upon that parent to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is fit; thereafter the burden of proof shall shift to the third party to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child's environment should not be disturbed because to do so would constitute a significant detriment to the child notwithstanding the natural parent's assertion of a legal right to the child. [7] When a natural parent transfers permanent custody of his or her child to a third person and thereafter attempts to regain custody of that child, the burden of proof shall rest exclusively upon the parent attempting to regain custody of his or her child by proving with clear and convincing evidence (1) that he or she is fit; and (2) that a transfer of custody so as to disturb the child's existing environment would constitute a significant benefit to the child. The reformulation of the legal standards guiding the attempt to regain the custody of a child maintains the delicate balance between the best interests and equitable rights of a child and the rights of a natural parent to custody of the child vis-à-vis any other person. The reformulation of these legal standards also recognizes the shifting emphasis to reflect the modern principle that a child is a person, and not a subperson over whom the parent has an absolute possessory interest. A child has rights too, some of which are of a constitutional magnitude. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (1976). Lemley v. Barr, 176 W.Va. 378, 386, 343 S.E.2d 101, 109 (1986) (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 546, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (1976)). The reformulation of these legal standards makes the centerpiece of those extraordinary circumstances when there is a conflict between a child and the adults competing for the custody of that child, a recognition that the best interests of the child must be regarded as superior to the right of parental custody. Finally, a reformulation of the legal standards relating to a natural parent's attempt to regain custody of the child is particularly apposite in the factual pattern of this case, where nearly five years have passed since the children were placed in the custody of the Overfields. The reformulation standard which shall be applied in this case will take into account the fact that the children have resided with their grandmother for a significant period of time, such that the grandmother with whom the children have resided may serve as the children's psychological parent. [8] What we accomplish in this decision is a recognition that whatever the status of the custodial transfer, be it temporary or permanent, any change in that custodial status will concentrate on whether the change will enure to the benefit of the child. To the extent that our decisions in State ex rel. Harmon v. Utterback, 144 W.Va. 419, 108 S.E.2d 521 (1959) and McCartney v. Coberly, 250 S.E.2d 777 (W.Va.1978), relating to the burden and quantum of proof in a proceeding by a natural parent to regain custody of a child either permanently or temporarily transferred to a third party, are inconsistent with this opinion, they are expressly overruled. C.