Opinion ID: 1160538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: statutory reduction

Text: DePiano's sentence is constitutional because the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment embodies a very narrow proportionality principle. A sentence is cruel and unusual only where there is gross disproportionality between the crime generally and the sanction imposed by the legislature. We ordered supplemental briefing on whether DePiano's sentence should nevertheless be reduced under A.R.S. § 13-4037(B), which, in contrast to the Eighth Amendment, allows the court to look at the particular circumstances of the crime and the offender and reduce any sentence that it finds to be excessive, even though the sentence is constitutional. A.R.S. § 13-4037(B) provides: Upon an appeal from the judgment or from the sentence on the ground that it is excessive, the court shall have the power to reduce the extent or duration of the punishment imposed, if, in its opinion, the conviction is proper, but the punishment imposed is greater than under the circumstances of the case ought to be inflicted. In such a case, the supreme court shall impose any legal sentence, not more severe than that originally imposed, which in its opinion is proper. Such sentence shall be enforced by the court from which the appeal was taken. This court cannot engage in appellate sentencing. Nor can we ordinarily substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge. We cannot and would not micromanage the administration of criminal justice in Arizona. We have neither the competence nor the ability to do so. We thus exercise our power under this statute only with great caution. E.g., State v. Patton, 120 Ariz. 386, 388, 586 P.2d 635, 637 (1978); State v. Killian, 91 Ariz. 140, 142, 370 P.2d 287, 289 (1962). We will only reduce a sentence if it clearly appears to be too severe. E.g., State v. Herrera, 121 Ariz. 12, 15, 588 P.2d 305, 308 (1978). As we said in Patton, [t]he power of this Court to modify sentences should further be tempered by the realization that a defendant appears in person before the trial judge, rendering that judge, in most instances, more able than ourselves to evaluate the defendant and his circumstances. 120 Ariz. at 388, 586 P.2d at 637. Such cases will be rare. Indeed, until today, we had not seen such a case in years. Although her children were with her, the crime here is essentially a botched suicide. Her suicide note, uncorrected, reads in part: To all the people who made my life somewhat bearable; Although none of this makes much sense to you  I just know that I cannot put my sons through the coldness + hate that goes on  People talk above love  what does that mean  your parents tell you your out of house when your 18  your spouse leaves + believes he doesn't need to pay child support  Your children look up to you  what do you have to offer  Dear God  I've taken my sons with me in hopes that we'd be somewhere away from the place we are now . .. To my Mom  You've instilled in me that raising children is a nightmare + all they do is grow up to resent you  That's all the appreciation I get huh,  a resentment  You don't even call me!  Boy  that really pisses me off  Jeff [1]  I lived your life, your problems your confusion  I loved you  what a waste  Jim [2]  what a loser you are for not helping me with the boys  I tried so hard to do it by myself  I tried so hard!  You bastard  how can anyone not want to see these two boys succeed  They deserve more than what I can offer as a single income family  Why couldn't you help us  Just with day care expenses  they're your kids  God only know how much I believe in life  but I look around me + see everyone lying cheating stealing[.] no one has any morals  I'm not a 90s person  I don't want my sons to be a part of the hate we all spread around  They are beautiful and pure + no one will take that away from us  We are descent + honest ... Jordan  You've been the best of friends  I love you with all my heart  I love you  I love you  You've been wonderful to us  Jordan you of all people know how disheartened I am with the hatefulness of people  People look at you tell you they love you + walk away  This note, and all of the other matters of record leading up to this sad incident, illustrate that DePiano's suicide-infanticide attempt was motivated by despair, not the evil, wicked, depraved, or otherwise bad state of mind one associates with child predators. Neither her depression nor her despair excuse her guilt, but we believe it is so mitigating here that it sets this case apart from the norm. The trial court found her lack of a prior criminal record and the absence of injury to the children to be mitigating. But he found her two month flight after the verdict was announced to be aggravating. He believed these factors balanced out and sentenced her to the presumptive term. In the ordinary case, a presumptive sentence could well be indicated. But the sentence here was driven more by the confluence of a series of nondiscretionary sentencing enhancements than individual judgment tailored to this particular offense and offender. We do not criticize the trial judge. Given these enhancements, the range available to him was narrowly severe. But A.R.S. § 13-4037(B) gives this court the responsibility to put the sentence in context. Had this been a typical child abuse case, we would have left this defendant where we found her. But it is not. Even most first degree murderers are eligible for parole after 25 years. A.R.S. § 13-703. We believe a 34 year flat sentence is excessive for this case and therefore DePiano is entitled to some relief under A.R.S. § 13-4037(B). Our authority to reduce an otherwise constitutional sentence is limited by § 13-4037(B) to one within the statutory range enacted by the legislature. State v. Bartlett, 164 Ariz. 229, 241, 792 P.2d 692, 704 (1990) ( Bartlett I ). We therefore give her only the relief we are authorized to give. We reduce her sentence to 24 years (two consecutive 12-year terms), the minimum mitigated term to which she could have been sentenced. Executive clemency is an avenue of potential further relief in the future. Compare Ariz. Const. art. 5, § 5 with A.R.S. § 13-604.01(E) (1989) (amended 1993).