Opinion ID: 199098
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Property Theory

Text: 48 Confidential information may be considered property for the purposes of §§ 1341 and 1343. See United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1074 (1st Cir. 1997). Where such information is obtained - thus depriving the rightful owner of its property rights - through dishonest or deceitful means, the wire and mail fraud statutes may be violated. See id. However, mere access to the confidential information is insufficient; rather, either some articulable harm must befall the holder of the information as a result of the defendant's activities, or some gainful use must be intended by the person accessing the information, whether or not this use is profitable in the economic sense. Id. In other words, for Martin's convictions to stand under this prong of the wire and mail fraud statutes, sufficient evidence must exist for a reasonable jury to find that Martin knowingly and willingly participated in a scheme to defraud IDEXX of confidential information or other property via false pretenses, and in so doing either harmed IDEXX or intended to use the information for his own gain. 49 Martin claims that because, on their face, the e-mails on which counts 7-10 are based contained no misrepresentations, they cannot provide the basis for a scheme to defraud. 18 However, the e-mails themselves need not be fraudulent; rather, it is the schemeitself that must rely on false pretenses. See United States v.Green, 786 F.2d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 1986) (The causal connection between the mailing and the success of the scheme, not the knavery in the mailings, is what matters.). 50 A reasonable jury could first have found that, as of Julya12 (the date after which the four wire fraud and two mail fraud convictions stem), Camp had agreed with Martin to send him confidential information and tangible property. Camp had previously noted that her e-mails contained information that she should not have spread; Martin's repeated questions designed to elicit further information, including his acceptance of Camp as his spy, provide further evidence of the scheme. A reasonable jury could have found that Martin intended to use such confidential information either to compete with IDEXX, thus harming IDEXX, or at the very least for his own pecuniary gain. For example, Martin and Camp engaged in a lengthy discussion of the best manner in which to design a test kit that would surpass IDEXX's in serving demanding customers in the veterinary profession. A reasonable jury could have found that Martin's requests, including to absorb as much information, physically and intellectually as possible, indicate that his participation in the scheme was both willing and knowing. Finally, a reasonable jury could have found that Camp's actions - including requesting information beyond her job description without informing IDEXX of her conflicted interests, sending Martin information and property under the pretense that he was a customer who had a right to receive information and property free, and relaying confidential information in violation of both her fiduciary duty to IDEXX and her signed non-disclosure and non-compete agreements - constituted false pretenses. 19