Opinion ID: 166091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Conspiracy to Violate RICO

Text: 47 Section 1962(d) prohibits a person from conspiring to violate § 1962(c). The conspiracy element of § 1962(d) requires the Government to demonstrate only that the defendant knew about and agreed to facilitate the commission of—rather than personally committed or agreed to commit—at least two of the predicate acts constituting a pattern of racketeering activity that were proven at trial. See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 66, 118 S.Ct. 469. In this case, the jury found seven predicate acts, each of which was committed by a member of KMD other than Mr. Smith, and we concluded that at least the first five constituted a pattern of racketeering activity: two shootings at the homes of rival gang members, the attempted shooting of a rival gang member by Mr. Pantelakis, the firebombing, and the murder of Mr. Miera. Therefore, to decide whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Smith of conspiring to violate § 1962(c), we must first determine whether there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Mr. Smith knew about and agreed to facilitate the commission of at least two of those five predicate acts. 48 There is no question that Mr. Smith ordered the murder of Mr. Miera, as he admits to it. Mr. Smith argues, however, that the most the Government proved at trial was that he knew about the remaining predicate acts, as opposed to proving that he agreed to facilitate their commission. We disagree. 49 There was sufficient evidence that Mr. Smith agreed to facilitate the commission of all five predicate acts. With respect to the first predicate act, the walk-up shooting, testimony at trial established that Mr. Smith ordered the shooting, chose the target of the shooting, supplied the gun, and drove the shooters to the location of the target. As to the second predicate act, there was evidence that Mr. Smith indicated at a KMD meeting that the rival gang needed to be driven from KMD's neighborhood. The retaliation in the fourth predicate, like the murder of Mr. Miera, was expressly ordered by Mr. Smith. While he had wanted a shooting, rather than a firebombing, to be the type of retaliation, there is no question that he had ordered some type of violent retaliation. The fact that the event that ultimately took place— throwing gasoline-filled beer bottles and lit rags into a house—was somewhat different than what he had originally ordered, entering the house and shooting its occupants, does not undermine the jury's conclusion that he agreed that a retaliatory act should occur. 50 Finally, with respect to the third predicate act, the attempted shooting of a rival PVCC member by Mr. Pantelakis, the Government did not offer direct evidence of an express agreement by Mr. Smith. A conspiratorial agreement, however, need not be express so long as its existence can plausibly be inferred from the defendant['s] words and actions and the interdependence of activities and persons involved. United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 90 (1st Cir.2004) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the Government established that KMD routinely retaliated against rival gang members for acts of violence committed against its own members, that Mr. Smith often expressly ordered acts of retaliation, and that the purpose of retaliating was to maintain the reputation of KMD which in turn protected individual members. Although Mr. Smith was incarcerated when Mr. Pantelakis was arrested with the shotgun, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Mr. Smith had a tacit agreement between himself and members of KMD that they would retaliate in response to attacks on KMD members. Therefore, we conclude that the Government presented sufficient evidence that Mr. Smith agreed to facilitate the first five predicate acts.