Opinion ID: 2640513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Motorcycle Gang Affiliation Evidence

Text: [¶ 26] At trial, the appellant sought to introduce photographs of a Grim Reapers biker vest that purportedly belonged to the victim, and to then call Carbon County sheriff's deputy Richard Fowler to testify regarding the significance of a patch displayed on the vest and the general manner in which women are treated by outlaw motorcycle gang members. [11] In particular, Deputy Fowler testified (as an offer of proof) that one patch on the vest was an earned patch indicating that one percent of the American public who ride motorcycles ... don't believe in laws, they are considered outlaws. He further testified (without any specific knowledge of the Grim Reapers' gang culture) that outlaw motorcycle culture views women [as] a subculturesingle women have no rights or privileges within the gang, are considered property of the gang and its members (women can be prostituted, sold, bought, traded at will and disciplined), and exist for the sexual pleasure and economic benefit of the gang members. [¶ 27] The district court excluded this evidence for several reasons: (1) a sufficient foundation had not been established for Deputy Fowler to testify about the Grim Reapers motorcycle gang; (2) the testimony was not relevant because it was too general and tenuous to the circumstances of the instant caseno evidence indicated that this was a motorcycle gang related crime or situation; and (3) any probative value that the testimony may have had was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and the potential to mislead the jury regarding the issues of the instant case. [¶ 28] On appeal, the appellant claims that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Deputy Fowler's testimony. According to the appellant, she established an adequate evidentiary foundation for the testimony and the testimony was relevant to rebut witness testimony elicited by the prosecutor that the appellant and the victim had a good relationship with no signs of physical or sexual abuse, to corroborate the appellant's statements that the victim had mistreated her in the past, and to explain why the appellant was afraid of the victim and took the murder weapon to the yard with her prior to the shooting. [¶ 29] We will focus our discussion on the district court's analysis pursuant to W.R.E. 403, which rule provides that although relevant, [12] evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Our standard of review is as follows: `Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence. This court will generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion.' Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo.1999) (citation omitted). We have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice. Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. `In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination.' [ Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001).] The burden is on the defendant to establish such abuse. Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 19, 49 P.3d at 984 ( quoting Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766 (Wyo.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 994, 122 S.Ct. 1554, 152 L.Ed.2d 477 (2002)). [¶ 30] Evidence of an individual's gang affiliation can be probative of material issues in certain cases. See generally, for example, Johninson v. State, 317 Ark. 431, 878 S.W.2d 727, 730-33 (1994) (collecting cases); People v. James, 117 P.3d 91 (Colo. App.2004), cert. denied, 2005 WL 1864140 (Colo.2005); State v. Roberts, 261 Kan. 320, 931 P.2d 683, 686-87 (1997) (highly probative of witness bias); State v. Tran, 252 Kan. 494, 847 P.2d 680, 687-88 (1993) (res gestae and motive); Butler v. State, 102 P.3d 71, 78-79 (Nev.2004) (probative of motive); State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 874 A.2d 1084, 1093-95 (2005) (collecting cases); and Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Accused's Membership In Gang, 39 A.L.R.4th 775 (1985 and Supp.2005). [¶ 31] However, we find that whatever probative value Deputy Fowler's testimony arguably might have had in the instant case was diminished by the following additional facts: 1. The victim's membership in the Grim Reapers' motorcycle gang is somewhat tenuous. It appears that the only evidence of the victim's association with such a gang is that he purportedly possessed the biker vest at issue. [13] While the appellant's trial counsel stated in her offer of proof that the vest belonged to the victim and that the victim belonged to the Grim Reapers, we have not been directed to any witness testimony (contained in the offer of proof or otherwise) that the vest was indeed the victim's vest or that the victim was an active member of the gang. Deputy Fowler testified that he was not familiar with the victim personally and we are not aware of any statements by the appellant in this regard. 2. Based on Deputy Fowler's testimony, the status of the Grim Reapers in this area is dubious. According to Deputy Fowler, western chapters of the Grim Reapers have passed over to the Hell's Angels and are not even included anymore as outstanding motorcycle clubs that are still active in the west, and the deputy was not familiar with any Grim Reapers chapter that may have existed in Rawlins. He also testified that there have been instances in which someone still possesses a gang's colors but no longer participates in the full culture; such an individual would typically lay low, [and remain] low-key and out of sight, because clubs don't let them retire. 3. Deputy Fowler testified that he was only generally familiar with how outlaw motorcycle gangs treat single women and did not have any specific knowledge of the Grim Reapers' gang culture. 4. Deputy Fowler asked the appellant if she had received the gang's colors indicating that she was the property of the victim and she replied that she had not. 5. At trial, the district court allowed the appellant to elicit more specific and probative testimony as to the victim's past mistreatment of the appellant. 6. Our review of the evidence adduced at trial does not reveal a strong nexus between Deputy Fowler's testimony and the facts and issues of the instant case. [¶ 32] With respect to the danger of unfair prejudice, we have said that trial courts must exercise great caution so defendants will be convicted on the basis of the evidence pertinent to the crimes charged and not on the basis of evidence calculated to appeal to the jury's passions or prejudices. Orona-Rangal v. State, 2002 WY 134, ¶ 15, 53 P.3d 1080, 1085 (Wyo.2002). Evidence of an individual's gang affiliation can be quite prejudicial: Gangs generally arouse negative connotations and often invoke images of criminal activity and deviant behavior. There is therefore always the possibility that a jury will attach a propensity for committing crimes to defendants who are affiliated with gangs or that a jury's negative feelings toward gangs will influence its verdict. Guilt by association is a genuine concern whenever gang evidence is admitted. United States v. Irvin, 87 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 903, 117 S.Ct. 259, 136 L.Ed.2d 184 (1996) (footnote omitted). See also Utz v. Commonwealth., 28 Va.App. 411, 505 S.E.2d 380, 384-88 (1998) (a juror might associate a defendant with such an affiliation as a person of bad character or someone prone to aggressive or violent behavior). [14] We have not been persuaded that similar concerns would not arise in the instant case from the admission of Deputy Fowler's testimony, despite the fact that the alleged gang member was the victim, rather than the defendant. [¶ 33] With these considerations in mind, we conclude that the appellant has not demonstrated that the district court clearly abused its discretion in excluding Deputy Fowler's testimony pursuant to W.R.E. 403. [¶ 34] Affirmed.