Opinion ID: 4458383
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: From bombs to brownfield

Text: 1. The site’s troubled history. During World War II and the Korean War, Unexcelled Manufacturing Co. operated a weapons factory in Cranbury, New Jersey. It made bombs, antiaircraft ammunition, grenade fuses, and other high-powered weapons for the U.S. military. 8 In 1954, a warehouse at the site containing hundreds of thousands of grenade fuses exploded. Two people died and several were injured. Though the military sent soldiers from nearby Fort Dix to help with the cleanup, lots of hazardous materials were left, including unexploded weapons and dangerous chemicals. Soon after, the factory shut down. But the pollution remained. 2. New Jersey’s enforcement action. Twenty years later, Cranbury Development Corp. bought the site. Thirty years after that, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) finished an investigation of the site. It issued a directive identifying the parties responsible for the site’s contamination: Cranbury Development (the site’s owner), Maxxam Group, Inc. (the successor to Unexcelled Manufacturing), and the U.S. Navy (which had funded and effectively controlled the site). NJDEP directed them to “memorialize their commitment to perform the remediation in an Administrative Consent Order.” App. 139. But the Navy rebuffed NJDEP and refused to take part. In 2005, Cranbury Development and Maxxam entered into a Consent Order with NJDEP. The Consent Order did three things: First, Cranbury Development and Maxxam agreed to clean up the site. Second, NJDEP agreed not to sue them if they complied. Third, all the parties agreed that the “Consent Order constitutes an administrative settlement within the meaning of CERCLA” and “resolve[s] the liability of [Cranbury Development] and Maxxam to the State of New Jersey for some or all of” the cleanup costs. App. 147. That settlement with NJDEP let Cranbury Development and Maxxam seek contribution 9 from other polluters (like the Navy), while immunizing them from such claims. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). 3. Cranbury Brick Yard buys the site and joins the Consent Order. In early 2006, Cranbury Brick Yard bought the site from Cranbury Development with plans to redevelop it into commercial warehouses. But first, it sought an agreement with NJDEP to assume Cranbury Development’s cleanup obligations. Rather than strike its own deal with NJDEP, Cranbury Brick Yard agreed to join the existing agreement. So the Consent Order was amended to “remove Cranbury Development” and “replace” it with Cranbury Brick Yard “as a Respondent.” App. 159. That substitution applied throughout the whole original agreement, which “remain[ed] in full force and effect.” App. 160. NJDEP approved the amendment, to which the parties attached the original agreement. By joining the Consent Order, Cranbury Brick Yard, like Cranbury Development, agreed to clean up the site and settle its potential CERCLA liability to NJDEP. In return, it too gained immunity from contribution claims. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). 4. The cleanup runs into problems. After joining the Consent Order, Cranbury Brick Yard inspected the site thoroughly and developed a cleanup plan. In 2013, after Cranbury Brick Yard got the permits it needed, its contractors began cleaning up the site. 10 But during the cleanup, problems arose. Among them, the contractors unexpectedly punctured and dug up an underground tank holding water and roughly twenty gallons of petroleum. Some of the liquid spilled. Cranbury Brick Yard promptly notified NJDEP. Then it mixed the contaminated dirt with clean dirt and reburied it on-site. Despite this and other bumps in the road, Cranbury Brick Yard kept cleaning up the site. It claims to have spent well over $50 million in the process. B. Cranbury Brick Yard sues the federal government In April 2015, nine years after joining the Consent Order but just over two years after it began the cleanup, Cranbury Brick Yard sued the federal government. It claimed that the government was responsible for some of the cleanup costs because the military was partly responsible for the site’s contamination. It sought both cost recovery and contribution under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f)(1). The government unsuccessfully moved to dismiss. It then counterclaimed for contribution, alleging that Cranbury Brick Yard was also responsible for some of the site’s pollution. In response, Cranbury Brick Yard raised an affirmative defense: even if it were liable, the amended Consent Order would immunize it from contribution liability. After discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted the government’s motion and denied Cranbury Brick Yard’s. Cranbury Brick Yard, LLC v. United States, No. 3-15-cv-02789, 2018 WL 4828410, at  (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2018). It reached three holdings. 11 First, the District Court held that the amended Consent Order was a settlement under § 9613(f)(2), so it immunized Cranbury Brick Yard from contribution liability. 2018 WL 4828410, at . Under our holding in Agere Systems, this meant that Cranbury Brick Yard could not bring a costrecovery claim. Id. at –5 (citing Agere Sys., 602 F.3d at 229). Second, it held that Cranbury Brick Yard brought its remaining contribution claim too late. Id. at . It reasoned that the “applicable statute of limitations is three years” from “when all parties to the [Consent Order] Amendment . . . signed it.” Id. Because Cranbury Brick Yard sued nine years later, its contribution claim was untimely. Id. at –6. Third, it rejected Cranbury Brick Yard’s argument that it had immunity as a “bona fide prospective purchaser.” Id. at ; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40), 9607(r)(1). The District Court found that reburying the contaminated dirt on-site amounted to a “disposal.” 2018 WL 4828410, at –7 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(B)(i)); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(3), 9601(29) (defining “disposal”). And because this alleged disposal happened after Cranbury Brick Yard acquired the site, the District Court determined that it had lost its status as a bona fide prospective purchaser. 2018 WL 4828410, at . Cranbury Brick Yard appeals all three holdings. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction under § 1291. We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Tundo v. County of Passaic, 923 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2019). 12