Opinion ID: 2767162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: directed verdict on breach of contract

Text: COUNTERCLAIM NARP argues the court of appeals erred by affirming the trial court's denial of its directed verdict motion on Richardson's breach of contract claim. We agree. When considering a directed verdict motion, the trial court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jones v. Lott, 387 S.C. 339, 345, 692 S.E.2d 900, 903 (2010). This Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only where there is no evidence to support the ruling or it is controlled by an error of law. Id. The primary concern of the court interpreting a contract is to give effect to the intent of the parties. Lee v. Univ. of S.C., 407 S.C. 512, 517, 757 S.E.2d 394, 397 (2014). The best evidence of the parties' intent is the contract's plain language. Id. The question of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Id. A contract is ambiguous when it is capable of more than one meaning or when its meaning is unclear. Ellie, Inc. v. Miccichi, 358 S.C. 78, 93, 594 S.E.2d 485, 493 (Ct. App. 2004). If a contract's language is unambiguous, the plain language will determine the contract's force and effect. Lee, 407 S.C. at 517–18, 757 S.E.2d at 397. A contract must be read as a whole document so that one party may not create ambiguity by pointing out a single sentence or clause. S. Atl. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Middleton, 356 S.C. 444, 447, 590 S.E.2d 27, 29 (2003). Interpretation of a contract is governed by the objective manifestation of the parties' assent at the time the contract was made, rather than the subjective, after-the-fact meaning one party assigns to it. Laser Supply & Servs., Inc. v. Orchard Park Assoc., 382 S.C. 326, 334, 676 S.E.2d 139, 143–144 (Ct. App. 2009). We fail to discern any ambiguity in the Termination Agreement and find it clearly terminated the obligations between the parties. In pertinent part, the Termination Agreement states: The parties agree that the 2000 Outline and any and all agreements, understandings, undertakings or arrangements that in any way arose or may have arisen out of or relate in any manner to the 2000 Outline are terminated. Additionally, both parties are released from [a]ll claims and potential claims of any nature whatsoever . . . arising out of or relating in any manner to the 2000 Outline. The only provisions of the Termination Agreement which stand in contradiction are those which purport to reserve Richardson's rights under a separate option contract dated Dec 15. However, both parties agree that no option contract dated December 15, 2004 was ever created or executed. We decline to hold that a provision mentioning a nonexistent document can defeat the plain language of an agreement. Testimony from Richardson's wife and his former attorney support his claim that the Termination Agreement was one part of a three-part agreement which was meant to be executed contemporaneously with the others. However, only if the document itself creates an ambiguity should a court look to outside evidence to aid in interpretation. See Laser Supply & Servs., 382 S.C. at 334, 676 S.E.2d at 144 (Once the court decides that the language is ambiguous, evidence may be admitted to show the intent of the parties.) Further, even if the parties intended a tripartite agreement, the Termination Agreement was the only part executed. Provisions which are essentially agreements to agree in the future have no legal effect. See Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 249, 449 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1994) (A contract provision leaving material terms open for future agreement is void for indefiniteness.). Thus the mere mention of a future option agreement that was never executed does not create an ambiguity in an otherwise unambiguous document. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of NARP's motion for directed verdict. II. DIRECTED VERDICT ON PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIM NARP also argues the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of its directed verdict motion as to Richardson's promissory estoppel claim. We agree. Promissory estoppel is a quasi-contract remedy. See Higgins Constr. Co. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 276 S.C. 663, 665, 281 S.E.2d 469, 470 (1981). Courts have used the doctrine where the refusal to apply it 'would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of a fraud or would result in other injustice.' Satcher v. Satcher, 351 S.C. 477, 484, 570 S.E.2d 535, 538 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Citizens Bank v. Gregory's Warehouse, Inc., 297 S.C. 151, 154, 375 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct. App. 1988)). The elements of promissory estoppel are (1) an unambiguous promise by the promisor; (2) reasonable reliance on the promise by the promisee; (3) reliance by the promisee was expected by and foreseeable to the promisor; and (4) injury caused to the promisee by his reasonable reliance. Davis v. Greenwood Sch. Dist. 50, 365 S.C. 629, 634, 620 S.E.2d 65, 67 (2005). Because the Termination Agreement severed any and all agreements, understandings, undertakings or arrangements that in any way arose or may have arisen out of or relate in any manner to the 2000 Outline, it precludes any promissory estoppel claim that could have arisen between the parties prior to the Termination Agreement. Further, there is no evidence in the record to support a promissory estoppel claim arising after the Termination Agreement was executed. While there is evidence Castellani made subsequent assurances to Richardson—for instance, Castellani wrote in an e-mail that nothing has changed in my mind about getting this done for you and [your family]—none of these statements rise to the level of an unambiguous promise. Finally, there is no evidence Richardson relied on any alleged promises by Castellani to his detriment; he argues to this Court only that he held 7.5% of the proceeds from the sale of Reeves for the potential exchange for NARP stock, but does not explain how that prejudiced him. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of NARP's directed verdict motion as to Richardson's promissory estoppel claim.5