Opinion ID: 146274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Rocky Top Tavern

Text: Although the district court did not make findings with respect to the contents of the videos aside from their unsuspecting adult female subjects, this court has previously stated the facts related to the videotapes as follows: During the search, officers discovered a locked room, which Defendant Savoy opened for them. Mr. Savoy described this room as his office. The room contained a single bed, a desk, a television (TV), a video cassette recorder (VCR), and several videotapes. Defendant advised officers that the TV and VCR were used in relation to his video-surveillance system. According to the officers, Mr. Savoy consented to the officers viewing the videotapes on his TV and VCR. Agents played the tapes to determine whether they contained illegal liquor or beer sales. However, the tapes actually depicted sex acts between Mr. Savoy and unknown females, what appeared to be minor females removing their clothing and dancing, and sexual acts between a male and what appeared to be a minor female. Officers then found a camera and microphone hidden in a hollowed-out two-by-four (2 x 4) stud behind the bar. The camera and microphone were not readily visible to persons inside the bar, and were recovered only after Defendant Savoy advised agents of their respective location. The officers seized all of the videotapes for further review. Savoy, 280 Fed.Appx. at 506 (footnote omitted). Because Savoy was charged with child-pornography related offenses, this court discussed only the contents of the videos admitted into evidence at trial, and those tapes depicted only minorsnot the adult females in the videotapes at issue here. However, this court recounted that the videotapes admitted into evidence at trial depicted minor females in various states of nudity and/or engaged in sex acts behind the bar. Id. at 507. None of the four videotapes admitted into evidence contained footage from within the locked room, and it seems that the camera captured events solely in the area behind the bar because the camera was located behind the bar. See id. at 506-07. Our inquiry is therefore confined to the business premises of the Rocky Top Tavern. An expectation of privacy in commercial premises ... is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987); see also Carter, 525 U.S. at 90-91, 119 S.Ct. 469; Autoworld Specialty Cars, Inc. v. United States, 815 F.2d 385, 388 (6th Cir.1987) (`[Proprietor] did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of the store where the public was invited to enter and to transact business.' (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985))). Tennessee courts have recognized that even when a person visits another's [private] home for a short period of time and is essentially at the location to conduct a business transaction, the [person] possesses no expectation of privacy in the home. Kyles v. State, No. W2004-00374-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 645161, at  (Tenn. Crim.App. Mar.16, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (citing Carter, 525 U.S. at 89-91, 119 S.Ct. 469). And the Tennessee courts abide by the now-classic principle: `What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.' State v. Medford, No. W2002-00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22446575, at  (Tenn. Crim.App. Oct.21, 2003) (unpublished opinion) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)); see State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 843 & n. 9 (Tenn.2001). Public accessibility, in other words, does not invariably defeat a reasonable expectation of privacy. Medford, 2003 WL 22446575, at ; see State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 494-95 (Tenn.2001) (holding that defendant who requested to be alone with parent in police-station interview room and to have the recording equipment turned off had reasonable expectation of privacy from being recorded by hidden audio and video recording system after police complied with both requests and closed the door behind them when they left the room); State v. Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn.1982) (holding that helicopter surveillance of area of defendant's property within public view did not violate reasonable expectation of privacy). However, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of [a business] where the public was invited to enter and to transact business. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985); see State v. Heller, No. W2007-01455-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2901581, at -9 (Tenn.Crim.App. July 24, 2008) (unpublished opinion) (holding that defendant had standing to challenge search of his person at a business but not to challenge the search of the business itself because present only as casual visitor without a reasonable expectation of privacy); State v. Norton, No. E2001-01903-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1585634, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. July 18, 2002) (unpublished opinion) (noting that owner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his tavern because it was open to the public at the time the search warrant was executed, but expressly not ruling on privacy interests of customers present). The district court failed to make findings of fact to support that the reasonable expectation of privacy element of § 39-13-605 was satisfied under the totality of the circumstances here. Without such findings, we are unable to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in assuming that the element was satisfied because each videotape presents a unique set of circumstances that requires a fact-intensive totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry to determine whether the Rocky Top Tavern qualifies as a place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances of each recording. The videotapes were entered into the record in the district court, but neither Savoy nor the government has presented any evidence as to whether the adult females in the requested videos were present at the Rocky Top Tavern for anything other than business purposes at the time that the nudity and/or sexual activity occurred and was recorded. Because findings of fact are the province of the district court, and the district court has already conducted a review of the twenty videotapes at issue, we vacate the district court's judgment with regard to the adult videotapes and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The district court must determine whether each videotape in question was recorded while the Rocky Top Tavern was open to the public for business purposes, what specific areas of the bar premises the hidden camera captured in each video (whether the videos contain only footage from behind the bar or within public view), and whether any steps were taken in an attempt to maintain the privacy of the activities that occurred in each video. See Heller, 2008 WL 2901581, at ; [5] Carter, 525 U.S. at 88-91, 119 S.Ct. 469 (holding that defendant's expectation of privacy in premises owned by another depends on the purpose of the visit); Lowe v. Clift, 2007 WL 2112672, at  (E.D.Tenn.2007) (unpublished opinion) (Moreover, patrons of a venue into which the public is invited do not have a reasonable expectation of privacythey necessarily encounter others who observe their presence and behavior. (citing Macon, 472 U.S. at 469, 105 S.Ct. 2778)). Only after the district court makes findings of fact that enable it to determine whether the reasonable expectation of privacy element of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-605 was satisfied under the totality of the circumstances for each videotape individually may the court determine whether Savoy is or is not entitled to lawfully possess each videotape for purposes of his Rule 41(g) motion for return of property.
Savoy argues that the district court in reviewing his Rule 41(g) motion should have consider[ed] the validity of the State Search Warrant, and whether it went outside the scope of `things to be searched,[] and/or items to be seized[]' before deciding to only return some of the property to Appellant's designee because the search warrant was obtained because of the sale of liquor in an establishment licensed for the sale of beer only. Appellant Br. at 3; see also id. at 4. This argument has no merit because this court has already decided that the videotapes that were used in Savoy's prosecution were properly seized, Savoy, 280 Fed.Appx. at 510-11, and the same rationale applies to the adult videotapes at issue here. An earlier panel of this court held that the seizure of Defendant's videotapes was valid because the tapes were reasonably related to the offense that formed the basis of his search warrant, in accordance with the Supreme Court's holding in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947), that a law enforcement agent in making a valid search may seize property found on the premises being searched which is the subject matter of a different crime, even though the officer was not aware that such property was on the premises when the search was initiated. Savoy, 280 Fed.Appx. at 511. The fact that the adult videotapes were not later used in Savoy's prosecution for child pornography charges does not impact our analysis. [6]
Savoy acknowledges that he did not include in his Motion for Return of Personal Property a specific request for the return of his video surveillance equipment, but he argues that the district court should have addressed its return anyway because [a] Pro se litigant should not be required to list every little piece of property that was seized. Appellant Br. at 5. Although we are mindful to construe [pro se] arguments liberally, El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir.2008), a claimant may abandon a claim to seized items by not requesting their return in the request filed for the other items seized, see McBean v. United States, 43 Fed.Appx. 853, 855 (6th Cir.2002) (unpublished order). Aside from the liberal construction afforded pro se filings, Savoy presents no arguments on appeal as to why the district court should have returned his video surveillance equipment. Savoy's motion was not a general request for all property seized but rather made specific requests for the return of the videotapes, photographs, and negatives. [7] Savoy's failure to request the return of his surveillance equipment in the district court precludes us from considering the propriety of return of that property in the first instance. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(g); El Bey, 530 F.3d at 412. Savoy may present this request to the district court on remand.
For the above reasons, we vacate the district court's judgment with regard to the twenty videotapes at issue in this appeal, and we remand for the district court to make findings of fact that will enable it to determine whether, consistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), Savoy is entitled to lawful possession of the videotapes under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-605.