Opinion ID: 3051635
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ms. Roman’s State of Mind

Text: [10] Even if the communication furthers a common interest of the parties to the communication, a plaintiff may still defeat the privilege. Section 47(c) specifies that the privilege does not protect statements made with malice. In addition, California courts have held that “ordinarily the privilege is 3830 SDV/ACCI, INC. v. AT&T CORP. lost if defendant has no reasonable grounds for believing his statements to be true.” Inst. of Athletic Motivation v. Univ. of Ill., 114 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12 (1980). We hold that, contrary to the view of the district court, triable issues exist as to malice and good faith, so summary judgment on this issue was improper.
[11] “Malice” as used in section 47(c) includes the following subjectively oriented definition: “Malice” . . . means a state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person. Thus the privilege is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will toward plaintiff, or by any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given. Cabanas v. Gloobt Assocs., 942 F. Supp. 1295, 1301 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Malice may not be inferred from the publication itself. Cal. Civ. Code § 48. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving malice. Lundquist v. Reusser, 7 Cal. 4th 1193, 1211 (1994). A showing that malice merely exists is not sufficient to defeat the privilege. “If the occasion is conditionally privileged, if the defendant’s primary motive is the advancement of the interest which the privilege protects and if he speaks in good faith, the mere fact that he harbors ill will toward the plaintiff should be a neutral factor.” Biggins v. Hanson, 252 Cal. App. 2d 16, 20 (1967). The district court based its conclusion that the plaintiffs could not show malice solely on a bit of deposition testimony where Mr. Metz admitted a belief that Ms. Roman did not “hate” him and his wife at the time Ms. Roman sent the e- SDV/ACCI, INC. v. AT&T CORP. 3831 mails. This admission, however, is but one piece of evidence and it will not bear the conclusive effect that the district court accorded it on the issue of malice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 advisory committee’s note (contrasting the binding effect of a Rule 36 admission with the effect of an evidentiary admission of a party); Sanders v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 757 (2d Cir. 2004) (Rule 801 admission of opinion is not binding admission under Rule 36); Punzak v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 07-1052, 2007 WL 1166087, at  (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2007). Regardless of its truth, Mr. Metz’s statement does not dispose of the question at issue. Cabanas defines malice to include hatred or ill-will, specifying that the privilege is also lost if the communication is motivated “by any cause other than the desire to protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege is given.” Cabanas, 942 F. Supp. at 1301 n.7. Whether or not Ms. Roman hated plaintiffs at the time the e-mails were sent is not the same question as whether Ms. Roman was primarily motivated by ill will, spite, or some other improper motive, in sending the e-mails. Mr. Metz recognized this distinction in his testimony when he stated that Ms. Roman felt “animosity” though she did not hate him. [12] Moving beyond the district court’s reasoning, we hold that the plaintiffs presented enough evidence of malice to survive summary judgment. Ms. Metz stated in her affidavit that when confronted regarding AT&T’s performance under the contract, Ms. Roman made menacing comments to the plaintiffs about the dangers of withdrawing services from such a big company. Ms. Roman made the allegedly defamatory statements shortly after the plaintiffs had renounced the contract. In addition, Mr. Metz formed an impression that Ms. Roman became angry when he withdrew his services, an impression supported by the arguably mocking question Ms. Roman asked about his ability to do business. These circumstances permit an inference that she included the alleged defamation in her e-mail to make good on her prior threat. The 3832 SDV/ACCI, INC. v. AT&T CORP. implication of Ms. Roman’s statement—that plaintiffs were to blame for the situation—might be viewed by a trier of fact as disingenuous in light of the repeated failure of AT&T to pay SDV/ACCI’s bills on time. The fact that Ms. Roman instructed Mr. Metz not to communicate with the managers might also contribute to a finding by a reasonable trier of fact that Ms. Roman had a motive to deceive beyond the common purpose protected by the privilege. Mr. Metz stated in a deposition that he did not believe Ms. Roman harbored animosity toward him prior to December 5. However, the issue in this case is Ms. Roman’s state of mind at the time she sent the e- mails, not her state of mind prior to December 5. Making all inferences in the light favorable to the plaintiffs, we conclude that there is enough circumstantial evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that malice primarily motivated the publication regarding SDV/ACCI’s financial difficulties and ability to perform under the agreement.
[13] Finally, a plaintiff can defeat the privilege by showing that the defendant “ha[d] no reasonable grounds for believing [the] statements to be true.” Inst. of Athletic Motivation, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 12. Prior to sending the e-mails, Ms. Roman was told by Ms. Metz that the plaintiffs had suffered some setbacks stemming from an instance of embezzlement. Mr. Metz also told Ms. Roman, before she sent the e-mails, that the plaintiffs were not in financial distress, and that the only problem of their business was the cost of, and time taken by, the AT&T contract. Nothing in the record suggests that Ms. Roman had firsthand knowledge of the plaintiffs’ financial position, except to the extent AT&T was failing to make timely payments. During her deposition, Ms. Roman admitted that at the time she sent the e-mails, she understood that the plaintiffs “were able to [provide services], but they chose not to.” At another point, Ms. Roman testified that Mr. Metz had told her “he couldn’t do it [provide services] any more.” These factors, particularly when viewed alongside the eviSDV/ACCI, INC. v. AT&T CORP. 3833 dence of malice, raise a triable issue as to her good faith belief in the truth of her statement, an issue that a trier of fact must decide. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on the issue of good faith.