Opinion ID: 1924671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: After an automobile accident that resulted in injuries to the victim, petitioner Laurie Schuette was charged with and convicted of driving with a suspended license and leaving the scene of an accident involving an injury. See Schuette, 782 So.2d at 936. During the sentencing hearing, the State requested the trial court to order restitution for the victim's injuries. See id. The record indicates only that Schuette's license suspension resulted from her failure to provide proof of insurance and failure to appear for two traffic court hearings. [1] The trial court noted that to order restitution, a nexus must exist between the crime and the injuries. See Schuette, 782 So.2d at 936. Finding that the fact that Schuette did not have a valid driver's license did not create the victim's injuries, the trial court concluded that there was no nexus between the criminal act and the injury suffered and, therefore, the court denied restitution. Id. The State appealed, arguing that the offense of driving with a suspended license could and should support an order of restitution. See id. The Fourth District initially stated that [i]t is undisputed that restitution could not be ordered in [sic] from the conviction for leaving the scene of an accident, citing to this Court's decision in State v. Williams, 520 So.2d 276 (Fla.1988). Id. at 936 n. 1. As to the issue of whether restitution could be imposed for the offense of driving with a suspended license, the Fourth District acknowledged that before 1993, the Second District Court of Appeal held that restitution could not be imposed against a suspended driver who caused an accident because the fact that the driver's license was suspended was not causally related to the crash. Schuette, 782 So.2d at 936-37 (citing Ochoa v. State, 596 So.2d 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Stewart v. State, 571 So.2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)). However, the Fourth District observed that the Legislature had amended the restitution statute in 1993 in order to expand the criteria for ordering restitution. Id. at 937. The Fourth District also cited to our decision in Glaubius v. State, 688 So.2d 913, 915 (Fla.1997), which required that before restitution may be imposed, the court must find that the loss or damage is causally connected to the offense and bears a significant relationship to the offense. Schuette, 782 So.2d at 936 (citing Glaubius, 688 So.2d at 915). In reversing the trial court's order denying restitution, the Fourth District concluded that restitution was required in this case because Schuette's driving without a legal right began the criminal episode during which the accident occurred, and but for her driving with a suspended license, the victim would not have incurred damages. Id. at 937 (citing Glaubius, 688 So.2d at 915) (emphasis supplied). [2] The Fourth District certified conflict with the Fifth District's opinion in Cheek, which held that restitution could not be imposed for damages arising from an accident in which the defendant was driving with a suspended license at the time of the accident. See Schuette, 782 So.2d at 937.