Opinion ID: 6930060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Under The Veterans’ Act

Text: We turn now to analysis of the Veterans’ Act. The key provision of that Act states: Any person who seeks or holds a position [in the employ of a State] shall not be denied hiring, retention in employment, or any promotion or other incident or advantage of employment because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces. 38 U.S.C. § -4301(b)(3). The question to be decided is whether the Department’s alteration of pass days through the application of Directive No. 2212 deprived plaintiffs of an “incident or advantage of employment” thus violating § 4301(b)(3) of the Veterans’ Act. It does not automatically follow, as the district court held, that breach of the collective bargaining agreement is a violation of the Veterans’ Act. In Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 552 n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 2510, 2513 n. 2, 69 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981), the seminal case applying the Veterans’ Act to reservists, the Supreme Court concluded § 4301(b)(3) provides protection to both Ready Reservists and National Guardsmen. See also United States ex rel. Reilly v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 737 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (2d Cir.1984). Congress’ aim in this legislation is plain. It is “to prevent reservists and National Guardsmen not on active duty who must attend weekly drills or summer training from being discriminated against in employment because of their Reserve membership.” S.Rep. No. 1477, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3421, 3421. The House Report described the bill as providing: “job protection for employees with obligations as members of a reserve compo-nent_ Section (1) amplifies existing law to make clear that reservists not on active duty, who have a remaining Reserve obligation, whether acquired voluntarily or involuntarily, will nonetheless not be discriminated against by their employees [sic ] solely [sic ] because of such Reserve affiliation. It assures that these reservists will be entitled to the same treatment afforded their coworkers without such military obligation.” H.R.Rep. No. 1303, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968) (quoted in Monroe, 452 U.S. at 558, 101 S.Ct. at 2516 (emphasis added)). In the House Committee hearing Rear Admiral Burton H. Shupper, U.S.N., testified that one aspect of the bill protects employees against being “‘denied retention in employment or advantages of employment because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces.’” Hearings on H.R. 11509 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm, on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5315 (1966) (quoted in Monroe, 452 U.S. at 559, 101 S.Ct. at 2516). Section 4304(d) of the Veterans’ Act grants an employee the right upon request to be granted leave by the employer “for the period required to perform active duty for training or inactive duty training in the Armed Forces of the United States.” Significantly, for our purposes, it was never Congress’ purpose in protecting the rights of employee-reservists to afford them special privileges or benefits not available to their co-workers. See Monroe, 452 U.S. at 561, 101 S.Ct. at 2517. In order for Directive No. 2212 to violate the Veterans’ Act, the awarding of pass days must be considered an “incident or advantage of employment” under § 4301(b)(3), and must be found to be within Congress’ focus of “protect[ing] reservists from the temptation of employers to deny them the same treatment afforded their coworkers without military obligations.” Id. at 560, 101 S.Ct. at 2517. An employer may not by the use of slippery words or a contrived definition deprive its employee-reservists of substantial rights granted them under the Act. See Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225, 229, 86 S.Ct. 768, 771, 15 L.Ed.2d 717 (1966). Here the Department characterizes the change of pass days or regular days off as being less than a substantial right and therefore not covered by the Act. In support of that proposition, the Department points out that the Directive did not reduce plaintiffs’ compensation — employee-reservists continued to earn the same amount of pay for the same amount of work as non-reservists — nor did it affect promotion rights or pension rights or the opportunity to earn overtime pay. Cases holding that an employer has violated the Veterans’ Act have involved more dire actions vis-a-vis the employee-reservist’s status as an employee: for example, loss of employment, see Peel v. Florida Department of Transportation, 600 F.2d 1070, 1073 (5th Cir.1979), or workplace assignment and duties assigned, see Carlson v. New Hampshire Department of Safety, 609 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir.1979) (employer may not permanently reassign an employee to a new post with different duties and work schedule on account of employee’s reserve obligation), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913, 100 S.Ct. 1844, 64 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980). Perhaps one of the most important incidents or advantages of employment is the salary assured by a 40-hour work week guaranteed under a collective bargaining agreement. See West v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 609 F.2d 147, 150 (5th Cir.1980) (employer required to schedule employee’s 40-hour work week around the employee’s military training obligation). In the ease at hand, plaintiffs were paid for and worked a full 40-hour week. Concededly, plaintiffs lost the privilege of working 24 hours and being paid as though they had worked 40 hours, a benefit they previously enjoyed before the advent of Directive No. 2212. But the new rule did not penalize them, or treat them differently than the other non-reservist correction officers, on account of their reservist status. Decisions under the Veterans’ Act differ with respect to a contractual obligation to afford opportunities to earn overtime. Compare Breeding v. TRW, Inc., Ross Gear Div., 477 F.Supp. 1177, 1184 (M.D.Tenn.1979) (where collective bargaining agreement provides opportunities to work overtime such must be offered to employees equally; an employee unavailable to work overtime on account of military training was not entitled under the Act to an alternative opportunity), aff'd, 665 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir.1981) with Lott v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 395 F.Supp. 866, 869-70 (N.D.Ohio 1975) (similar circumstance held to deny the employee an incident of employment) and Carney v. Cummins Engine Co., 602 F.2d 763, 766-67 (7th Cir.1979) (employer must grant employee overtime opportunities missed by reason of National Guard service), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 754 (1980). In the present litigation the reservists were not seeking the opportunity to earn overtime. It was their co-workers substituting for the reservists who earned such pay. As the district court found in its February 19,1987 decision, “the overtime of the particular National Guardsman/Reservist whose pass days are being changed may not be affected.” Section 4301(b)(3) has as its aim the limited purpose of safeguarding the employee-reservist from discrimination such as a failure to promote or a discharge prompted solely by the employee’s reserve status. See ■ Monroe, 452 U.S. at 559, 101 S.Ct. at 2516. True, the Department’s action touched the general subject of overtime, but it did not diminish a reservists’ right to earn overtime pay when he or she worked overtime. The changing of a reservist’s pass days is not a substantial right such as, for instance, discharge, demotion, or failure to promote, all matters safeguarded by the Act. In sum, the district court wrongly ruled that the violation of the collective bargaining agreement by itself constituted a violation of § 4301(b)(3). Directive No. 2212 did not deprive plaintiffs of an “incident or advantage of employment” in violation of the Veterans’ Act. Accordingly, we need not reach the issue of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the award of retroactive damages against the state. II Damages Discussion now proceeds to' the issue of damages. The contractual breach of plaintiffs’ collective bargaining agreement caused by the Directive gives rise to damages. The labor agreement provides at ¶ 15.1(g) that “[t]ime during which an employee is excused from work because of vacation, holidays, personal leave, sick leave at full pay, compensatory time off or other leave at full pay shall be considered as time worked for the purpose of computing overtime.” In its February 19, 1987 decision the district court found plaintiffs “lost the value of their pass days, which value is to be measured by the salary they would have been paid, had their pass days not been reassigned and they had been granted military leave.” The parties were directed to submit information regarding the number of pass days reassigned for each member of plaintiffs’ class since March 30, 1982 and the wages each member would have received had pass days not been reassigned to coincide with military leave days. Because we hold there was no violation of the Veterans’ Act, we affirm the calculation of damages for plaintiffs set forth in the trial court’s December 31, 1991 decision only as related to a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. We recognize that pass days rescheduled as a result of Directive No. 2212 will be compensated at the overtime rate and confined to the application of ¶ 15.1(g). Because of the dynamics of ¶ 15.1(g), the district court must review the damage award on an individual basis to ensure it is not of a speculative nature. Damages should not be awarded under the Veterans’ Act because it was not transgressed by the Department’s promulgation of Directive No. 2212. On plaintiffs’ cross-appeal, they contend they should recover straight time for each day in excess of 30 that an officer’s pass days were changed to accommodate military reserve duty. This argument is unavoiding because compensation is provided pursuant to N.Y.Mil.Law § 242(5) for only 30 days. Damages should apply up to the 30-day maximum per year authorized by § 242(5) because after these 30 days are used up, the military leave days will no longer be counted under ¶ 15.1(g) as they should not be considered “other leave at full pay” for the purpose of calculating overtime. The district court ruled properly on this aspect of the damages issue. It nonetheless erred when it granted a day’s pay to each plaintiff who used accrued personal leave instead of notifying the Department of their military duties. Even though the provisions- of Directive No. 2212 authorizing pass days to be changed contravene the collective bargaining agreement, the procedures designed to notify the employer of military duty, if pay was expected under New York Military Law, were valid. By taking personal leave for these days, plaintiffs said in effect that they did not desire to have the benefits of § 242(5). The correction officers should have complied with the Directive and then made a claim. They are not entitled to pay for those days on which they claimed personal leave, sick time or the like. Thus, the damages issue must be remanded in order for the district court to recalculate the award to eliminate this overpayment to plaintiffs. Ill Attorney’s Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 The trial court further ruled in its December 31, 1991 decision that although it did not reach the equal protection claim under § 1983, plaintiffs were entitled to attorney’s fees because their equal protection claim was substantial, and even though the Veterans’ Act does not provide for attorney’s fees, neither the statute nor its legislative history precluded awarding attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This ruling was in error. Awarding attorney’s fees under § 1988 may only be based on plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. Here no' such claim exists. Plaintiffs do not contend they have a fundamental right to perform military reservist duties on specific days, but instead insist’the Department discriminates against them because they are members of a class of military reservists. We find no ease law supporting the assertion that a class of military reservists is either a suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny or even a quasi-suspect class entitled to intermediate scrutiny. We therefore proceed to examine their claim only to be sure that Directive No. 2212 is rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (per curiam). Two of the Directive’s objectives, as we have noted, were the maintenance of adequately staffed correctional facilities and a reduction in abuses of the military leave policy resulting in inordinate overtime. Because the means to accomplish these goals— the changing of correction officers’ pass days to coincide with their military duty days — is not a purely arbitrary or irrational means of accomplishing this goal, see Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 943, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979), the Directive is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. As a consequence, plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988. Even were we to conclude that plaintiffs stated a substantial equal protection claim, Congress planned to supplant a § 1983 claim with the enforcement provisions of the Veterans’ Act. The Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3468, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), instructs that the proper inquiry is whether: Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for a substantial equal protection claim. Since 1871, ... § 1983 has stood as an independent safeguard against deprivations of federal constitutional and statutory rights_ Nevertheless, § 1983 is a statutory remedy and Congress retains the authority to repeal it or replace it with an alternative remedy. Id. A § 1983 cause of action is unavailable “when Congress has foreclosed enforcement of the statute in the statute itself, or when a statutory remedial scheme is so comprehensive that there is an implication that it provides the exclusive remedy foreclosing all other remedies.” Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 754 (2d Cir.1987); see also Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 19, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2626, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981). If a § 1983 cause of action is unavailable, attorney’s fees may not be awarded under § 1988. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The enforcement scheme of the Veterans’ Act is particularly detailed and comprehensive. It provides a plaintiff with a private right of action through injunctive relief, compensatory damages in the form of lost wages and/or benefits, and the assistance of the United States attorney. See 38 U.S.C. § 4302. Further, no fees or court costs may be assessed against a person seeking benefits under the Act. See id. These provisions evidence “a statutory remedial scheme [which] is so comprehensive that there is an implication that it provides the exclusive remedy foreclosing all other remedies.” Mrs. W., 832 F.2d at 754. Therefore, attorney’s fees could not properly have been awarded in this case even were a viable equal protection claim alleged.