Opinion ID: 1233878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deitz's possession of cocaine in 1991 was properly considered as part of the OMC narcotics conspiracy

Text: On March 20, 1991, FBI agents acting on a tip from a confidential informant followed Deitz while he drove from Louisville, Kentucky to Dayton, Ohio and back. At trial, Deitz testified that he had borrowed another Outlaw's car to give a friend a ride to Falmouth, Kentucky to visit his sick father, and that after dropping his friend off he continued on to Dayton to visit friends and speak with an individual about painting his motorcycle. Law enforcement stopped Deitz as he drove back into Kentucky, and a search of his car revealed approximately 195 grams of cocaine in a bag on the floor of the back seat. Deitz was charged in a Kentucky state court with possession of and trafficking in drugs. A jury acquitted Deitz of those charges. Deitz claims that his possession of cocaine in 1991 is not an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and, as such, it does not support his conviction. Deitz also contends that acts prior to the commencement of the conspiracy are irrelevant, and that [t]wo cooperating witnesses (as well as the overt acts listed in the indictment) indicate that the conspiracy began in the Indianapolis chapter during the 1994-1995 time period.  (Deitz Br. 19-20) (emphasis added). As a threshold matter, given that the government need not prove that the defendant committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, Deitz's argument that his possession of cocaine in 1991 was not an overt act proving his participation in the underlying conspiracy is irrelevant. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 711; see also United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 567 (6th Cir.1999). If the government can prove conduct, in any form, which is relevant to prove the conspiracy, that constitutes sufficient evidence under the statute. See Gardner, 488 F.3d at 711. Regardless, Deitz's claim that the conspiracy did not begin until 1994 is belied by the record, and there is ample evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the 1991 cocaine seizure was part of Deitz's willful membership in the OMC narcotics conspiracy. For instance, at the time of the seizure, Deitz was a known Outlaw, and an informant told FBI agents that in late March, 1991, Deitz would be traveling to Dayton to obtain drugs. Deitz did travel from Louisville to Dayton, and on his return, law enforcement stopped him and found the aforementioned cocaine in his possession, in an amount suggesting that the drugs were intended for distribution. See United States v. Nelson, 238 Fed. Appx. 65, 72 (6th Cir.2007) (finding that amount of narcotics found was evidence that defendant intended to distribute the drugs). A complex conspiracy such as the one at issue here cannot develop out of thin air. Because the conspiracy alleged in the indictment involved the Outlaws' transport of drugs between various Green region clubhousesthe same conduct that led to Deitz's 1991 traffic stopthe stop was properly offered as evidence of Deitz's willful participation in the conspiracy, and Deitz's first argument fails.