Opinion ID: 1193884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: fund's right to litigate

Text: Whether the Fund has standing to contest liability for an employer's overpayment of workers compensation benefits under K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 44-534a(b) is a question of statutory interpretation over which we have unlimited review. See Foulk v. Colonial Terrace, 20 Kan. App.2d 277, Syl. ¶ 1, 887 P.2d 140 (1994), rev. denied 257 Kan. 1091 (1995). We recognize that an agency ruling within its area of expertise is entitled to some deference. Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 251 Kan. 240, 246, 834 P.2d 368 (1992). However, if we find that the administrative body's interpretation of a question of law is erroneous as a matter of law, this court should take corrective steps. Hixon v. Lario Enterprises, Inc., 257 Kan. 377, 379, 892 P.2d 507 (1995). The Fund asserts that it is a necessary party because of its statutory liability under K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 44-534a(b) to reimburse the employer's overpayment of benefits. The Fund contends that, as a necessary party, it has standing to contest jurisdiction and litigate the merits of disputed reimbursement claims. In this case, the Fund is not challenging the compensability of individual medical expenses; the Fund is alleging that U.S.F. & G. mismanaged Wasson's claim to the extent that it neglected to note that the claimant had been released for work without restrictions, and the failure of the insurance company to properly monitor the claim resulted in more than $40,000 in expenses for which the Fund should not be liable. The essence of the Fund's argument is that requiring vigilant case monitoring of the status of the worker's right to compensation by an employer or an employer's insurer would not frustrate the policies or objectives of the Workers Compensation Act. The right to appeal is entirely statutory and not contained in the United States or Kansas Constitutions. Appellate courts and administrative tribunals have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only if an appeal is prescribed by statute. McDonald v. Hannigan, 262 Kan. 156, 160, 936 P.2d 262 (1997). Standing is a question of whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation of jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or her behalf. A party must have a sufficient stake in the outcome of an otherwise justiciable controversy in order to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. Moorhouse v. City of Wichita, 259 Kan. 570, 574, 913 P.2d 172 (1996). The Fund was created and exists pursuant to K.S.A. 44-566a, and it receives its funding from essentially three sources: (1) appropriations from the state general fund, K.S.A. 44-566a(b); (2) assessments against insurance carriers and self-insurers, K.S.A. 44-566a(b); and (3) payments by employers where an employee is killed in an otherwise compensable accident, but in which there are no eligible dependents, K.S.A. 44-570 (non-dependent death). One of the purposes of the Fund, sometimes referred to as the Second Injury Fund, is to encourage the employment of persons handicapped as a result of specific impairments by relieving employers, wholly or partially, of workers' compensation liability resulting from compensable accidents suffered by these employees. K.S.A. 44-567(a). If the handicapped employee's impairment contributes causally to the injury or disability, the Fund may be liable for a portion of the compensation and benefits awarded to the claimant. The apportionment of the award is based on the amount of disability attributable solely to the second injury and the extent that the pre-existing impairment contributed to the second injury. Brozek v. Lincoln County Highway Department, 10 Kan. App.2d 319, 325, 698 P.2d 392 (1985). The award of contribution must be equitable and reasonable and based upon all the evidence. The Fund is also required to pay benefits to injured workers where the employer has no insurance and is financially unable to pay compensation to the injured worker or where the employer cannot be located to pay compensation. K.S.A. 44-532a. Responsibility for payments made under K.S.A. 44-567(a) and K.S.A. 44-532a and administration of the Fund lies with the Commissioner of Insurance. K.S.A. 44-566a(a). The Fund must be impleaded as a party in all cases where it may be held liable for payment of any amounts in proceedings under the Workers Compensation Act. K.S.A. 44-566a(c)(1). Where the Fund has been properly impleaded, it shall be liable for reimbursement of an employer or insurance carrier pursuant to the provisions of K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 44-534a. K.S.A. 44-566a(e)(3). Clearly, the issue of statutory Fund liability under K.S.A. 44-567(a) (second injury) and K.S.A 44-532a (insolvent employer) is a justiciable question, and under those circumstances, the Fund would have a significant interest in the outcome and must be impleaded as a party. On the other hand, K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 44-534a(b) states the procedure for an employer to seek reimbursement from the Fund when compensation paid a worker exceeds the amount of compensation awarded or if compensation is totally disallowed. The statute provides: If compensation in the form of medical benefits, temporary total disability benefits or vocational rehabilitation benefits has been paid by the employer or the employer's insurance carrier either voluntarily or pursuant to a preliminary award entered under this section and, upon a full hearing on the claim, the amount of compensation to which the employee is entitled is found to be less than the amount of compensation paid or is totally disallowed, the employer and the employer's insurance carrier shall be reimbursed from the workers compensation fund established in K.S.A. 44-566a and amendments thereto, for all amounts of compensation so paid which are in excess of the amount of compensation the employee is entitled to as determined in the full hearing on the claim. The director shall determine the amount of compensation by the employer or insurance carrier which is to be reimbursed under this subsection, and the director shall certify to the commissioner of insurance the amount so determined. Upon receipt of such certification, the commissioner of insurance shall cause payment to be made to the employer or the employer's insurance carrier in accordance therewith. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the appellate courts will not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read such a statute so as to add something not readily found in the statute. In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 43, 955 P.2d 1228 (1998). The evidence clearly supports the ALJ's finding that Wasson did not receive an injury while working for his employer on March 9, 1993. The employer and the employer's insurance carrier sought reimbursement from the Fund pursuant to K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 44-534a(b). The procedure by which the employer and its insurance carrier is to be reimbursed for any excess payment of workers compensation or where compensation is totally disallowed is set out in K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 44-534a(b). That statute provides that the reimbursement be from the Fund, not the claimant. The statute merely requires that the amounts overpaid to a claimant shall be determined by the Director and certified to the Commissioner of Insurance for payment to the employer or its insurer. The language of K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 44-534a(b) is quite clear. Under the statute, reimbursement by the Fund is merely a ministerial act and the Fund has no right to litigate its liability for the overpayment. The employer's insurance carrier is entitled to reimbursement by the Fund. Affirmed.