Opinion ID: 787911
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Assimilation Provision

Text: 34 The other key provision of the NATO-SOFA appears in Article VIII, paragraph 5: 35 Claims ... arising out of acts or omissions of members of a force or civilian component done in the performance of official duty, or out of any other act, omission, or occurrence for which a force or civilian component is legally responsible, and causing damage in the territory of the receiving State to third parties, other than any of the Contracting Parties, shall be dealt with by the receiving State in accordance with the following provisions: — 36 (a) Claims shall be filed, considered and settled or adjudicated in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State with respect to claims arising from the activities of its own armed forces. 37 NATO-SOFA, art. VIII, ¶ 5, 4 U.S.T. at 1806 (emphasis added). 8 We observed some time ago that this provision does suggest ... that the foreign serviceman is `assimilated' into the United States military for this limited consideration. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir.1978). Daberkow thus assumed that subparagraph (a) does not simply provide that suit can be filed against the foreign nation on the same basis that suit could be filed against the United States were the defendants our armed forces or members thereof. Instead, Daberkow suggested that, as the district court put the matter in this case, under this treaty, foreign servicemen are effectively considered members of the United States military for purposes of claims arising out of acts or omissions of the servicemen. 38 Although we have never squarely so held, the NATO-SOFA's ratification history supports this conclusion. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., at 13-14 (1953) (In the case of torts committed in the performance of duty, the local citizen who is injured proceeds against his own government exactly as he would if the injury had been caused by a member of his own government's armed forces.). 9 So do the decisions of every district court that has looked at this question. See, e.g., Greenpeace, 946 F.Supp. at 788 (Under the framework established by NATO-SOFA, the foreign serviceman is `merged' or `assimilated' into the United States military for the purposes of claims arising out of the acts or omissions of that foreign serviceman.); Lowry v. Commonwealth of Canada, 917 F.Supp. 290, 291 (D.Vt.1996); Aaskov v. Aldridge, 695 F.Supp. 595, 596-99 (D.D.C.1988); Brown, 683 F.Supp. at 1037-40; Shafter v. United States, 273 F.Supp. 152, 153-57 (S.D.N.Y.1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.1968). 39 The decisive support for construing this part of the NATO-SOFA as a merger provision comes from a contemporaneous Act of Congress — the International Agreement Claims Act of 1954, Pub.L. No. 83-734, 68 Stat. 1006(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2734a-2734b). Under the Act, 40 When the United States is a party to an international agreement which provides for the settlement or adjudication by the United States under its laws and regulations, and subject to agreed pro rata reimbursement, of claims against another party to the agreement arising out of the acts or omissions of a member or civilian employee of an armed force of that party done in the performance of official duty, or arising out of any other act, omission, or occurrence for which that armed force is legally responsible under applicable United States law,... claims may be prosecuted against the United States, or settled by the United States, in accordance with the agreement, as if the acts or omissions upon which they are based were the acts or omissions of a member or a civilian employee of an armed force of the United States. 41 10 U.S.C. § 2734b(a). 10 Enacted specifically to codify the cost-sharing reimbursement procedures of the NATO-SOFA, see Eyskens v. United States, 140 F.Supp.2d 553, 557 (E.D.N.C.2000); Niedbala v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 43, 46-47 (1996), the Act implements article VIII[of the NATO-SOFA] by authorizing funds for payment of SOFA claims, be they NATO SOFA or other SOFAs. The United States pays a pro rata share of awards as determined by the relevant SOFA. Niedbala, 37 Fed. Cl. at 46. Thus, Congress, in enabling the NATO-SOFA claims procedures by enacting them into federal law, see Aaskov, 695 F.Supp. at 596 n. 2, understood article VIII as a merger provision, an interpretation we follow today. 42 Moore's complaint alleges that Southall and the other ten unnamed defendants were acting within their official capacity. This suit is therefore governed by Article VIII, paragraph 5 of the NATO-SOFA, 11 and Moore must pursue such claims as though he ... were injured by the armed forces of the host nation itself. Greenpeace, 946 F.Supp. at 788. In short, the effect of [NATO-]SOFA is to make the United States the only appropriate defendant in this suit. Lowry, 917 F.Supp. at 291. 43 The FSIA, of course, provides for suits against foreign nations, not against the United States. Further, any suit against the United States for a tort by an employee during the course of employment would have to be filed under the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679. The intentional tort exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), bars certain types of claims arising out of intentional, scope-of-duty torts, including assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. See Orsay v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 289 F.3d 1125, 1132-36 (9th Cir.2002) (discussing the intentional tort exception to the FTCA). By contrast, the FSIA does not bar assault, or most other intentional torts, 12 when committed within the scope of duty. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B). The NATO-SOFA thus expressly conflicts with the FSIA in both these respects and, therefore, precludes relief under the FSIA. 44 As the NATO-SOFA controls, there is no jurisdiction under the FSIA over Moore's suit against the United Kingdom. 45 As noted, Moore's only remedy based on the allegations in his complaint is a suit against the United States under the FTCA. Such a claim is now (and would have been, as of the date Moore filed this suit in the district court) time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 13 Additionally, the FTCA does not permit suits against the United States arising out of assault. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Thus, even if his suit were timely, Moore could not have proceeded under the FTCA. There is no basis, consequently, for allowing amendment of the complaint to name the United States as defendant, as any such amendment would be futile. See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 718 n. 20 (9th Cir.2003) (denying leave to amend complaint where such amendment would be futile because the statute of limitations had run at the time suit was filed).