Opinion ID: 180796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Judgment as a Matter of Law and New Trial Motions

Text: A district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de novo. Che v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir.2003). But [o]ur review is `weighted toward preservation of the jury verdict' because a verdict should be set aside only if the jury failed to reach the only result permitted by the evidence. Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 393 (1st Cir.2002)). We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Granfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 597 F.3d 474, 488 (1st Cir.2010). CFI's appeal from the denial of both of its post-verdict motions is predicated on its assertion that the district court erred in instructing the jury. The question of whether CFI adequately objected to the instructions at trialand the contingent question of whether we review the instructions de novo or for plain erroris complicated by CFI's equivocation as to what element of the jury instructions it challenges on appeal. [4] We bypass the question of preservation of the objection. Each of the particular jury instructions that CFI's claim on appeal can be read as contestingthat Greenspoon Marder was CFI's undoubted agent and that Greenspoon Marder acted only as authorized by CFI throughout the Bluegreen litigation were supported by the record. Under either de novo or plain error review, neither of those instructions constitutes error. [5] CFI's admission that Greenspoon Marder remained one of CFI's litigation counsel throughout the Bluegreen litigation and acted throughout such litigation only as directed and authorized by CFI removed from trial any question of whether Greenspoon Marder had acted as CFI's agent in the underlying litigation. By its plain meaning, the admission sufficiently establishes that if Greenspoon Marder acted, it necessarily did so with full authority from CFI. See Brook Village North Assocs. v. Gen.Elec. Co., 686 F.2d 66 (1st Cir.1982) (citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 36). The jury instruction goes no further. That Greenspoon Marder's agency to act for CFI was never in dispute at trial is also manifest in CFI's pretrial memorandum. CFI identifies the crucial agency issue for trial as: Whether [AGI] can demonstrate that CFI actually authorized White & Case to act as its agent and to enter into the contract with [AGI] where . . . White & Case did not consult with Greenspoon Marder or CFI on the decision to contact [AGI] regarding expert services [and] White & Case did not consult with Greenspoon Marder or CFI before interviewing AGI. (Emphasis added.) This implicitly makes clear that, if Greenspoon Marder in fact authorized White & Case to retain AGI, that authorization would have sufficed. In sum, whether instructing White & Case to hire AGI fell within the scope of Greenspoon Marder's authority from CFI was never an issue at trial; the issue was whether Greenspoon Marder did authorize White & Case to hire AGI. [6] That question of fact was properly left for the jury to decide. CFI cannot now pursue an alternate defense merely because the one it put forth at trial failed. The jury instructions do not entitle CFI to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. [7]