Opinion ID: 2166571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial Can Be Invoked Pro Se Even by a Represented Defendant.

Text: The outcome is different, however, in regard to Mr. McKee's constitutional right to a speedy trial. The constitutional right to speedy trial is unique in that its assertion, under some circumstances, can place the defendant in a conflicting position with defense counsel. Unlike the right to an impartial jury or the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, where defense counsel is often in a better position to understand the contours of the right and appreciate situations in which it has not been properly respected, the right to a speedy trial depends, in part, on circumstances that are uniquely experienced by the defendant. [T]he speedy trial right exists primarily to protect an individual's liberty interest, `to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial . . . and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.' United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 190, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (addressing distinction between right to speedy trial and right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982)). Although defense counsel may understand that pretrial incarceration is a vexing condition, the prejudice to the defendant that flows from this condition is neither experienced nor directly shared by defense counsel. A defendant, thus, has a reason, not necessarily shared by counsel, to want trial to proceed as expeditiously as possible. Even excellent defense counsel may not be prepared to go to trial and may seek a continuance, or multiple continuances, due to the press of other business or for other perfectly proper reasons unrelated to the defense of defendant's case. The individual defendant, whose right to a speedy trial is at stake, may not care about those other cases or those other reasons. The defendant incarcerated while awaiting trial is properly concerned with his own need to resolve the charges against him. The tension between the burdens on defense counsel and the defendant's desire to resolve the charges quickly appears to have arisen in this case, in which defendant repeatedly sought a speedy trial, and counsel appears never to have sought to bring the case to trial or to call up the speedy trial motions or motion to dismiss for hearing. Perhaps with this type of situation in mind, our court of appeals repeatedly has allowed a represented defendant to assert his right to a speedy trial through a pro se motion. See e.g., State v. Smith, 849 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Mo.App. E.D.1993) (filing of a pro se motion for speedy trial represents the first formal assertion of [the] right to a speedy trial); State v. McNeal, 699 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Mo.App. E.D.1985) (defendant timely asserted his right to a speedy trial in a pro se motion); State v. Morris, 668 S.W.2d 159, 163 (Mo.App. E.D.1984) (appellant asserted the right when he filed a pro se motion to dismiss based on his constitutional right to a speedy trial and [sec.] 545.780, the speedy trial statute). See also State v. Galvan, 795 S.W.2d 113, 117-18 (Mo.App. S.D.1990) (delays under sec. 217.460, the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law, should be calculated based on the day defendant filed his pro se request for speedy trial). [11] The federal courts, too, have allowed a defendant to assert speedy trial rights through pro se motions. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rothrock, 20 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir.1994) (construing pro se motion for speedy trial as effective to assert both statutory and constitutional rights). In light of this precedent and the unique and conflicting interests of defendant and of his counsel in regard to a request for speedy trial, this Court affirmatively holds what Missouri's court of appeals has long recognized: a represented defendant may assert his constitutional right to a speedy trial through a pro se motion. This Court then must determine whether Mr. McKee's constitutional right to speedy trial has been violated.