Opinion ID: 1735100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Inquiry into Prior Convictions

Text: Floyd argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial, made during the penalty phase. Floyd testified on direct examination, without equivocation or elaboration, that he had nineteen prior convictions. Nevertheless, on cross-examination the prosecutor also asked the question, and appellant responded: I don't really know. I'm guessing 19. Although the number was correct, the prosecutor then inquired into the nature of each conviction and asked Floyd whether he actually committed each crime. Without objection, Floyd responded to a litany of questions regarding his prior convictions. Defense counsel finally objected after the prosecutor asked about Floyd's 1963 conviction for child molestation and Floyd stated that he did not commit the crime. In response to defense counsel's objection on the ground of improper impeachment, the prosecutor argued that because Floyd said he was guessing about the number of convictions, further inquiry was permitted. The court denied the mistrial motion but instructed the jury to disregard the last question and answer. In addition, at Floyd's request, the court permitted him to address the jury  directly and without cross-examination  to explain the basis for his claim that he was wrongly convicted of child molestation. As previously stated, we apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to motions for mistrial and will reverse only when the error is deemed so prejudicial that it vitiates the entire trial. Dessaure, 891 So.2d at 464. We find that the State's further inquiry into the nature of Floyd's prior conviction constituted improper impeachment. Fulton v. State, 335 So.2d 280, 284 (Fla.1976) (stating that if a witness denies a prior conviction, the specific offense may be identified only by entry of its record into evidence, but if a witness admits the conviction, no inquiry into the name or nature of the crime is permitted); accord Cummings v. State, 412 So.2d 436, 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (If the witness admits the number of his convictions, the prosecution may not ask further questions regarding prior convictions, and in particular the prosecution may not question the witness as to the nature of the crimes.); see also Gavins v. State, 587 So.2d 487, 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We do not find, however, that mention of the molestation conviction requires a new penalty phase. First, until mention of the child molestation charge, the jury already had been told about the other convictions and their nature. Floyd stipulated that he absconded from federal parole in 1973 and was under sentence of imprisonment at the time of the Commesso murder and stipulated to his convictions for the prior violent felonies of bank robbery, kidnapping, carjacking, burglary, and assault. In fact, the jury had heard further testimony during the penalty phase from Davis regarding Floyd's 1994 kidnapping and carjacking convictions. In addition, Carrie Box testified about her ordeal when appellant attacked her with a knife, which resulted in his 1997 convictions for burglary and assault with a dangerous weapon. Further, defense counsel objected specifically to the question and answer regarding the molestation conviction, and in response the court directed the jury to disregard both and permitted Floyd to make a statement to the jury. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the mistrial motion.