Opinion ID: 719755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: What Lopez Said

Text: 49 I begin with Lopez. As the majority correctly notes, Lopez struck down the former 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V) ( § 922(q)), the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, 2 as beyond Congress's Commerce Clause power. Lopez, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1626. The Court began its analysis in that case by canvassing its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and drew from that jurisprudence three broad categories of activity Congress is constitutionally authorized to regulate. As the Court explained: 50 [W]e have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.... First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.... Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 51 Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30 (citations omitted). The Court went on to determine that: 52 § 922(q) is not a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor is it an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of interstate commerce; nor can § 922(q) be justified as a regulation by which Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing in interstate commerce. Thus, if § 922(q) is to be sustained, it must be under the third category as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. 53 Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1630. 54 With that background in mind, the Court considered Congress's power under the third category to enact § 922(q). Id. In holding § 922(q) an invalid exercise of Congress's power to regulate intrastate economic activity, the Court wrote: 55 Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulation of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. 56 Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31. 57 I deduce from this language that a federal criminal statute must, in order to be sustained under the third category of Congress's commerce power, satisfy one of two threshold requirements. A federal criminal statute must either (1) by its terms have something to do with commerce or some sort of economic enterprise, or (2) be an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. 3 If either (1) or (2) is satisfied, two additional inquiries must be made in order to determine whether a statute falls within the third category of activities Congress can regulate under its interstate commerce power. 4 58 Because § 922(q) did not satisfy either of the threshold requirements, the Lopez Court struck that statute down as beyond Congress's power. Although this holding effectively resolved the issue before the Court, the Court, presumably for purposes of providing guidance in future cases in which one of the threshold requirements could be satisfied, mentioned the two additional inquiries that courts would have to make when ruling on the constitutionality of a federal criminal statute enacted under the Commerce Clause. One of these inquiries looks to the statute itself, while the other looks to the nature of the regulated activity. 59 First, the Court noted that § 922(q) contained no jurisdictional element that would limit the reach of the statute to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1631. And second, the Court examined whether possession of handguns in school zones could be said substantially to affect interstate commerce. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1631-32. Reasoning that it could not, the Court rejected the government's contention that either the costs of violent crime associated with possession of firearms in school zones, or the adverse impact on the educational process caused by such firearm possessions, had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1632. The Court rejected the government's contention because the government's theories went too far. As the Court put it: [I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate. Id.