Opinion ID: 6321798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Grandmother’s Statements

Text: Hearsay is defined as “a statement that . . . the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing,” which “a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” N.H. R. Ev. 801(c). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible, subject to certain welldelineated exceptions. State v. Letendre, 161 N.H. 370, 372 (2011); N.H. R. Ev. 802. “We accord the trial court considerable deference in determining the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” Letendre, 161 N.H. at 372 (quotation omitted). To demonstrate an unsustainable exercise of discretion, the defendant must show that the trial court’s ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. Id. at 372-73. The defendant first argues that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion when it admitted the grandfather’s fiancée’s testimony about a phone call that she had with the grandmother. The grandmother called the fiancée on November 28, approximately twenty-four hours after she learned of the victim’s death. The fiancée testified that the grandmother was “crying” and “very upset” when she called. The grandmother “talked about the bruises [the victim] had on her body,” and said that the defendant “murdered [the victim], beat her.” Over the defendant’s hearsay objection, the trial court admitted the statements as excited utterances.1 The excited utterance exception to hearsay encompasses statements “relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” N.H. R. Ev. 803(2). The theory underlying the excited utterance exception is that “the circumstances under which the utterance was made afford a guarantee of truth in substitution for that provided by oath and cross-examination.” State v. Bonalumi, 127 N.H. 485, 487 (1985). Therefore, the statement must be made “at a time when the speaker was still in a state of nervous excitement produced by [the startling] 1 The defendant did not object to the statements on any other basis. We note that the declarant, the grandmother, testified during the State’s case-in-chief. 4 event, and before he had time to contrive or misrepresent.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[T]o admit the testimony the trial judge must be satisfied that (1) there was a sufficiently startling event or occurrence, and (2) the declarant’s statements were a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought.” Id. at 488. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted the statements as excited utterances because: (1) the statements were made twenty-four hours after the victim’s death; and (2) during the time between the victim’s murder and the phone call, the grandmother engaged in “complex activities” requiring “relatively careful thought,” which gave her “a chance to consider her own culpability.” See State v. Woods, 130 N.H. 721, 726 (1988). The State counters that the trial court reasonably determined the statements to be excited utterances because: (1) the grandmother was crying and very upset during the phone call; (2) “the subject matter of her conversation with the fiancée — the murder of her granddaughter — was inherently distressing;” and (3) the grandmother “was continuing to suffer from the severe emotional trauma associated with” the victim’s murder. The State also asserts that, even if the trial court erred in admitting the testimony, the error was harmless. “The precise amount of time that may elapse before a statement loses its spontaneity as an excited utterance evoked by a startling event and becomes a mere narrative cannot be established by any absolute rule of law . . . . [A]ccordingly, much must be left to the discretion of the trial court in admitting or rejecting such testimony.” State v. Pennock, 168 N.H. 294, 302-03 (2015) (quotation omitted). When deciding whether a statement is an excited utterance, the trial court must consider, in addition to the time elapsed, “all other circumstances surrounding the statements,” including the nature of the exciting event and the declarant’s state of mind. State v. Plummer, 117 N.H. 320, 325 (1977). We find State v. Woods instructive. In State v. Woods, we considered whether a trial court erred when it admitted, as excited utterances, a child’s statements to her mother about being assaulted the prior day. Woods, 130 N.H. at 723-24, 726. We held that the trial court erred when it admitted the statements because, even though there was evidence that the child was troubled by the decision to tell her mother about the assault, id. at 727, the day that elapsed had provided the child with “simply too much time for reflective thought,” and there was insufficient proof that she “was laboring under such stress as to preclude a conscious statement,” id. at 726-27. Here, as was the case in Woods, the twenty-four-hour gap between the exciting event and the statements at issue extends well beyond the limits established by our excited utterance precedents. In addition, during the twenty-four hours between the victim’s death and the phone call, the 5 grandmother “performed tasks requiring relatively careful thought,” such as being interviewed by the police, giving the police her shirt for testing, and allowing the police to search her phone. 2 Robert P. Mosteller et al., McCormick on Evidence § 272, at 395 (8th ed. 2020). Such “[p]roof . . . provides strong evidence that,” by the time of the phone call, “the effect of the exciting event had subsided.” Id.; cf. State v. Fischer, 165 N.H. 706, 711 (2013) (noting the trial court’s determination that “intervening events” precluded admitting hearsay under the excited utterance exception). Therefore, we hold it was an unsustainable exercise of discretion for the trial court to admit the grandmother’s statements as excited utterances. Although the testimony was admitted in error, we agree with the State that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error. State v. Edic, 169 N.H. 580, 588 (2017) (quotation omitted). To establish that an error was harmless, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict. Id. An error may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the other evidence of the defendant’s guilt is of an overwhelming nature, quantity, or weight and if the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt. Id. at 588-89. In making this determination, we consider the other evidence presented at trial as well as the character of the erroneously admitted evidence itself. Id. at 589. To convict the defendant of first degree murder, the State was required to prove that the defendant knowingly caused the victim’s death “before, after, while engaged in the commission of, or while attempting to commit felonious sexual assault.” RSA 630:1-a, I(b)(1). There was substantial physical evidence to establish that the victim was sexually assaulted, brutally beaten in the course of that assault, and died as a result of her injuries. We conclude, based upon a review of the record, that the evidence that the defendant inflicted these injuries is of an overwhelming nature, and that the grandmother’s statements were cumulative and inconsequential in relation to the strength of the other evidence of guilt. See Edic, 169 N.H at 588-89. The defendant, alone, had the opportunity to cause the victim’s death, as he was alone in the apartment with her when she sustained her injuries. There was also evidence that the defendant, alone, expressed a motive to kill the victim. Approximately two weeks before the victim’s murder, the defendant 6 said his life was like “jail” because “he couldn’t leave the house hardly . . . and he had to be home all the time to watch [the victim],” and that “he might as well just go do something to go to jail if he’s going to be treated like he’s in jail.” The other evidence also included the defendant’s behavior after the victim was injured, such as his decision to call the victim’s grandmother instead of the police; his failure to attempt to resuscitate her; his refusal to go with the victim to the hospital; and his nervous demeanor. In addition, there was evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the defendant was conscious of his guilt, including his inconsistent explanations for how the victim died, see State v. Evans, 150 N.H. 416, 420 (2003), and evidence that he hid the victim’s blood-stained pajama top, see Edic, 169 N.H. at 590. Given this evidence, the grandmother’s statements were merely cumulative and inconsequential. Even if the challenged testimony had not been admitted, there was overwhelming evidence that the defendant killed the victim. See State v. Peters, 162 N.H. 30, 38 (2011). Accordingly, we conclude that the State has met its burden of proving that the error in admitting the grandmother’s statements did not alter the verdict and was, therefore, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Edic, 169 N.H. at 588-92.