Opinion ID: 2006874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Just Cause.

Text: The district court concluded that the decision of the board to terminate the contract of the plaintiff was not supported by competent evidence when viewed as a whole, that the record fail[ed] to establish the existence of just cause, and that the decision of the district and the adjudicator was not supported by a preponderance of the competent evidence when viewed as a whole. Section 279.15 provides that the notification by the superintendent that he intends to recommend termination of the teacher's contract shall contain a short and plain statement of the reasons, which shall be for just cause why the recommendation for termination is being made to the board. The evidence at the board hearing is limited to the reasons stated in the notice. Iowa Code § 279.16. In the present case, the superintendent gave the following reasons for Smith's termination: 1. Lack of funding due to declining enrollment. 2. Lack of funding due to recent legislative action. 3. Unavoidable budget limitations. 4. Compliance with staff reduction procedures and master agreement. The parties do not dispute that the first three reasons given by the superintendent are supported by the record. Indeed, both the adjudicator and the district court found that there was no argument advanced challenging those findings. Rather, the dispute involves only the fourth reason given for terminating Smith's contract: Compliance with staff reduction procedures in the master agreement. The master agreement provided that if necessary staff reduction could not be accomplished by attrition or reassignment, [t]he employer will base the decision regarding the employee(s) to be terminated on the needs of the district and the skill, ability, competence, certification, qualifications and experience (in and out of the district) of professional employees relative to available work. If a choice must be made between two or more professional employees who are judged by the employer to meet the needs of the district and to be equal in skill, ability, competence, certification, qualifications and experience relative to available work, preference will be given to the professional employee(s) with the greater continuous length of service in the Mediapolis School District. Under the master agreement, therefore, the existence of just cause for termination of a teacher must turn on whether the superintendent adequately considered the needs of the district and the skill, ability, competence, certification, qualifications and experience (in and out of the district) of professional employees relative to available work.... In this connection, we must point out the distinction between just cause for discharge of a teacher under section 279.27, or nonrenewal of a contract under section 279.15 based on a defect in a teacher's performance on one hand, and just cause for nonrenewal based upon reasons not personal to the teacher, such as declining enrollment or budget constraints, on the other. Just cause for the latter purpose may be based upon a district's personnel and budgetary requirements and does not necessarily require evidence of a teacher's faults. See Briggs v. Board of Directors of Hinton Community School District, 282 N.W.2d 740, 742 (Iowa 1979); Youel, 282 N.W.2d at 680. In a staff-reduction termination, such as we have here, the only inquiry as to the qualifications of a particular teacher is for comparative purposes to decide which of several prospects will be terminated. We must, of course, be wary of any subterfuge by which an unscrupulous school board would use a fictitious necessity for staff reduction as a pretext for discharging a teacher. Hagarty v. Dysart-Geneseo Community School District, 282 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Iowa 1979). A court must also be assured the decision to terminate is not the result of arbitrariness or capriciousness on the part of the superintendent or board. In the absence of these abuses, however, recommendations as to who must be terminated in these circumstances must be largely based upon the informed judgment of the superintendent. The master agreement between the district and its teachers recognizes this reality. It provides that [i]f a choice must be made between two or more professional employees who are judged by the employer to meet the needs of the district and to be equal in skill, ability, competence, certification, qualifications and experience relative to available work, preference will be given to the professional employee(s) with the greater continuous length of service in the Mediapolis Community School District. (Emphasis added.) Comparisons of the relative value of several teachers to the school district do not lend themselves well to any legal, mathematical, or scientific means of resolution. Courts should, therefore, be reluctant to act as super school boards by viewing each facet of a given teacher's skill, experience, or ability and weighing them against those of other teachers. It is under circumstances such as these that the rationale of the rule, that we are to give weight to the findings of the board, becomes apparent. See § 279.18. Having made these observations, we proceed to look at the evidence presented to the board. The superintendent testified he had first tried to meet the budget problem by natural attrition of the staff members and by seeking to renegotiate the salary terms of the master contract. Failing these, he began to consider who among the teaching staff must be terminated. A study was made to determine which of the teaching positions were least essential to the needs of the district, without regard to personalities. It was determined that a junior high English position, as well as others, fell within the category of least needed positions. Smith was a junior high English teacher. A study was made, through several administrative meetings, as to each of the criteria of the master contract relating to the staff-reduction procedures. The superintendent, with the assistance of his principals, compared each teacher with regard to the needs of the district and the skill, ability, competence, certification, qualifications and experience of the available teachers. He testified that all teachers considered were evaluated for all positions for which Smith was certified to teach, and a comparison was made as to the endorsement and approval elements bearing on their certification. The superintendent further testified that the plaintiff had only an elementary endorsement and lacked the necessary approvals to teach beyond the eighth grade. As a result, the plaintiff was less mobile than other teachers, that is, she was less capable of reassignment within the school district. In addition to the testimony of the superintendent, exhibits showing the relative certifications were received in evidence by the board. Smith and the others recommended for termination did not present any evidence to the board. We do not agree with the district court that the decision of the board was unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence. The superintendent's recommendation for termination, while in part the result of subjective evaluation, was not, as Smith contends, unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence.