Opinion ID: 4352094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: As a preliminary matter, the Court observes that Rafferty identified the wrong jurisdictional basis for her appeal. In Rafferty’s jurisdictional statement, she invokes 28 U.S.C. § 1292 as the basis of this Court’s jurisdiction. But, as Drennen points out, § 1292 does not apply here for two reasons. First, § 1292 requires that the district court state in writing that the order being appealed “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate claims, except it denied Drennen’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Sherman’s Eighth Amendment claim. Drennen appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment. The Court addresses Drennen’s appeal in a separate opinion. -3- No. 18-3138, Rafferty v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio termination of the litigation . . . .” § 1292(b). The district court’s order does not contain any such statement. Second, an appellant seeking to appeal under § 1292 must file an application within ten days after entry of the district court’s order. § 1292(b). Here, Rafferty filed her appeal thirty days after the district court entered its order. Accordingly, § 1292 is not the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. Drennen argues that this Court lacks any jurisdiction over Rafferty’s appeal. But, contrary to Drennen’s argument, this Court has jurisdiction because the district court certified the order which Rafferty appeals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Rule 54(b) provides: When an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). “‘[C]ertification under Rule 54(b) is a two-step process,’ and we review each step under a different standard.” Inhalation Plastics, Inc. v. Medex Cardio-Pulmonary, Inc., 638 F. App’x 489, 494 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 500 (6th Cir. 2012)). The first step is for the district court to direct “entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties . . . .” Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 638 (6th Cir. 2016). This Court reviews this step de novo. Id. (citation omitted). The second step is for the district court to determine “that there is no just reason for delay.” Id. This Court reviews the second step for abuse of discretion. Id. (citation omitted). The district court satisfied the requirements for certification under Rule 54(b). The district court expressly stated that it had entered a final judgment on one, but fewer than all, of the claims in the case. Further, the district court weighed the appropriate factors that this Court articulated in U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, 705 F.3d 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2013) and found that no just reason for -4- No. 18-3138, Rafferty v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio delay exists. There is no basis in the record for this Court to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in determining that there was no just reason for delay. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over Rafferty’s appeal. See Inhalation Plastics, 638 F. App’x at 497.