Opinion ID: 159704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the “three strikes” law

Text: Fortune challenges both the constitutionality and the district court’s application of the “Three Strikes” provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). The statute requires a trial court to “sentence to life in prison any person who is convicted in federal court of a ‘serious violent felony’ if that person has previously been convicted in state or federal court of two or more ‘serious violent felonies.’” United States v. Gottlieb , 140 F.3d 865, 866 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting § 3559(c)(1)); accord United States v. Mackovich , ___ F.3d ____, Nos. 99-2006 & 99-2179, 2000 WL 485091, at  (10th Cir. Apr. 25, 2000); United States v. Willis , 102 F.3d 1078, 1085 (10th Cir. 1996). The offense of robbery is “generally considered a ‘serious violent felony’ for purposes of the Three Strikes statute.” Gottlieb , 140 F.3d at 866 (citing § 3559(c)(2)(F)); accord United States v. Oberle , 136 F.3d 1414, 1423 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 197 (1998). However, not all serious violent felonies count as “strikes.” The statute provides that a robbery is a “nonqualifying felony” if the defendant establishes, by clear 17 and convincing evidence, that (i) no firearm or other dangerous weapon was used in the offense and no threat of use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon was involved in the offense; and (ii) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365) to any person. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(3)(A); accord Mackovich , 2000 WL 485091, at -; Romero , 122 F.3d at 1342. Against this statutory backdrop, we address Fortune’s arguments in reverse order.
The district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment on the following grounds. The court counted as Fortune’s first “strike” a conviction in Oklahoma state court for robbery with firearms (case number CRF-69-2665). The court counted as Fortune’s second “strike” a conviction in Oklahoma state court for first degree rape. The court also noted that, “although not necessary for the enhancement,” Fortune pleaded guilty to robbery with firearms in a separate case in Oklahoma state court (case number CRF-69-2975). Tr. at 194. After reviewing court records and police reports relating to these charges, the court determined that Fortune’s previous robbery convictions involved firearms and did not constitute “nonqualifying felonies” under § 3559(c)(3)(A). On appeal, Fortune concedes the district court’s use of the rape conviction was proper, but argues that his previous robbery offenses should not have been 18 counted as “strikes.” Fortune asserts that “[t]here is no evidence that death or serious bodily injury occurred as a result of the alleged robberies,” Appellant’s Brief at 35, and the government does not contend on appeal that Fortune failed to satisfy the requirements of § 3559(c)(3)(A)(ii). Fortune then asserts that he satisfied the requirements of § 3559(c)(3)(A)(i) by presenting clear and convincing evidence that neither CRF-69-2665 nor CRF-69-2975 involved the use (or threat of use) of a firearm. The government disagrees, arguing that firearms were indeed “used” in both of these cases. “We review de novo a sentence enhancement imposed pursuant to section 3559(c).” Romero , 122 F.3d at 1342; accord Gottlieb , 140 F.3d at 868; see also Willis , 102 F.3d at 1085 (stating that this court reviews de novo “challenges to the legality of a sentence”). Our analysis necessarily begins with the Gottlieb decision, in which we discussed the meaning of “use” and “threat of use” for purposes of § 3559(c)(3)(A)(i) . Analogizing to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), we borrowed the Supreme Court’s definition of “use” in Bailey v. United States , 516 U.S. 137 (1995). We thus concluded that “use” involves “active employment of the firearm by the defendant” that “makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.” Gottlieb , 140 F.3d at 868 (quoting Bailey , 516 U.S. at 143). “Active employment” includes “brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a firearm.” Id. (quoting Bailey , 516 U.S. 19 at 148); see also id. at 869 (“As the Bailey Court recognized, the plain meaning of the word ‘use’ implies ‘action and implementation.’”). We added that the term “use” does not encompass “mere possession or storage of a firearm.” Id. at 868. We then commented that the phrase “threat of use” in § 3559(c)(3)(A)(i) could be construed to mean “a communicated intent to use a firearm” or “a risk that a firearm would be used in the offense;” we also noted that the phrase could incorporate both meanings. Id. at 873. With these definitions in mind, we affirm the district court’s finding that CRF-69-2665 involved the “use” or “threat of use” of a firearm. The police report submitted in connection with this offense indicates that Fortune and a codefendant used a weapon to steal another person’s leather coat. The report states that the victim “positively identified” Fortune as “the subject who had pulled the gun and taken his coat.” Appellant’s Appendix (“Aplt. App.”) at 50; Tr. at 17172. The witness list for the case similarly states that the victim planned to testify that at the time of the robbery, Fortune “pulled a .25 caliber blue steel pistol from his pocket, threatened him with it & took a black leather coat from his person.” Aplt. App. at 53. A follow-up report reiterates that the victim “positively identified” Fortune as “the one who pointed the gun at him, a .25 automatic, blue steel, and took his black leather coat.” Id. at 54; Tr. at 172-73. These documents affirmatively establish that CRF-69-2665 involved the use or threat of use of a 20 firearm, foreclosing any argument that the robbery fails to qualify as a “strike” under § 3559(c)(3)(A). Because CRF-69-2665 and the rape conviction independently support the district court’s imposition of a life sentence, we need not consider whether CRF-69-2975 constitutes an additional “strike.”
Fortune’s constitutional challenge to the “Three Strikes” provision is twofold. First, Fortune submits that § 3559(c)(3) “unconstitutionally shifts the burden to the defendant to prove a prior robbery conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense.” Appellant’s Brief at 29. In Fortune’s view, the statute “requires that the robbery conviction involve the use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon or death or serious bodily injury before it will qualify as a predicate offense. As written, the statute presumes the existence of these elements and shifts the burden to the defendant to disprove the elements.” Id. Second, Fortune argues that even if this burden-shifting scheme is constitutional, the standard of proof imposed by the statute is too high. According to Fortune, § 3559(c)(3) violates the Due Process Clause by requiring a defendant to establish nonqualifying offenses with “clear and convincing” evidence. “We review de novo challenges to the constitutionality of a statute.” United States v. Hampshire , 95 F.3d 999, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996); accord Bolton , 68 F.3d at 398; United States v. Wilks , 58 F.3d 1518, 1519 (10th Cir. 1995). 21 Our recent decision in United States v. Smith , ___ F.3d ____, No. 98-1188, 2000 WL 345683 (10th Cir. Apr. 4, 2000) forecloses both of Fortune’s arguments. Following cases such as Parke v. Raley , 506 U.S. 20, 28, 31, 34 (1992), Patterson v. New York , 432 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1977), and United States v. Wicks , 132 F.3d 383, 388-89 (7th Cir. 1997), we expressly held in Smith that “the burden shifting scheme found in § 3559(c)(3)(A) does not violate due process.” 2000 WL 345683, at -. We also declined to reach the defendant’s challenge to the “clear and convincing evidence” requirement of § 3559(c)(3)(A), because the defendant could not establish nonqualification “[u]nder any standard of proof.” Id. at . We decline to reach Fortune’s challenge to § 3559(c)(3)(A) in the instant case for the same reason. Here, the government established by at least a preponderance of the evidence that Fortune used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon during the commission of the crime charged in CRF-69-2665. The government made this affirmative showing of nonqualification by submitting the police report, the witness list, and a follow-up report. Consequently, Fortune’s argument fails even if we assume the government (rather than Fortune) should bear the burden of proof. We therefore “affirm the district court while reserving judgment on the constitutionality of the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ provision of § 3559(c)(3)(A).” Mackovich , 2000 WL 485091, at ; see also Smith , 2000 WL 345683, at  (citing United States v. Kaluna , 192 F.3d 1188, 1196-98 (9th 22 Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 1561 (2000) for a similar proposition). AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court Mary Beck Briscoe