Opinion ID: 664049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Verdicts and the Trial Court's Ruling

Text: 15 As discussed in greater detail in Part II.A. below, Sec. 333(a) provides two levels of penalties for persons convicted of adulterating or misbranding drugs in violation of Sec. 331. The indictment sought to have defendants punished under Sec. 333(a)(2), which provides felony-level penalties of up to three years' imprisonment and up to $10,000 in fines for, inter alia, persons who have violated Sec. 331 with intent to defraud or mislead. For a person who did not have such an intent and who was not a repeat offender, Sec. 333(a)(1) provides misdemeanor-level penalties, i.e., imprisonment of not more than one year and a fine of not more than $1,000. Section 371 of 18 U.S.C., under which defendants were prosecuted, provides that if the offense whose commission was the object of the conspiracy is a misdemeanor, the punishment for conspiracy is not to exceed the punishment provided for that misdemeanor. Accordingly, in submitting the case to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury to focus on the question of intent to defraud or mislead. 16 The jury was instructed that it must consider each defendant individually, without regard to evidence that related solely to others. The court instructed that, since the indictment alleged that defendants not only agreed to misbrand and adulterate the drugs but agreed to do so with intent to defraud and mislead, before you can convict any one of the three defendants of conspiracy to commit these underlying offenses, you must first find beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual defendant specifically intended that acts done pursuant to the conspiracy would defraud and mislead other persons. (Trial Transcript 939.) The court instructed that if the jury found that the government had failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to any defendant's intent to defraud and mislead, the jury should determine whether that defendant conspired to violate the food and drug laws without intent to defraud or mislead. 17 The court gave the jury a three-part special verdict form, each part dealing with a single defendant and listing three verdicts from which to choose: (1) guilty with intent to defraud, (2) guilty but without intent to defraud, or (3) not guilty. Instructed to check only one box for each defendant, the jury found Acosta guilty with intent to defraud; it found Santos and Chavarro guilty without intent to defraud. 18 Acosta moved pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 and 33 for a judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative, a new trial, complaining principally of a supplemental instruction given by the court in response to a question from the jury. In an Order and Opinion dated March 12, 1993, 1993 WL 77311 (March Opinion), the district court rejected Acosta's challenge to the supplemental instruction but granted relief on another ground. Though noting that there was ample evidence ... for the jury to conclude that [Acosta] knowingly and intentionally altered labels and packaging of prescription drugs, and that he intended to mislead buyers into believing that the drugs were packaged in accordance with the law, March Opinion at 4, the court found (a) that there was no evidence of a conspiracy between Acosta and any person other than the other defendants, and (b) that since the jury specifically found that the other defendants only entered into the conspiracy without intent to defraud, id. at 5, there was insufficient evidence to find that [Acosta] agreed with another person, during the course of the charged conspiracy, to violate the food and drug laws with the intent to deceive consumers, id. at 6. The court concluded: 19 Because there is insufficient evidence of an unlawful agreement to violate the food and drug laws with the intent to defraud and mislead consumers between Jose Vargas Acosta and any other conspirator during the charged conspiracy, the motion for acquittal of that charge is granted, and he is adjudged guilty only of the conspiracy to violate the food and drug laws without fraudulent intent. 20 Id. at 8-9. 21 The government moved for reconsideration, citing, inter alia, United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984), which held that inconsistent jury verdicts of guilty on some counts and not guilty on other counts are not a basis for setting aside the verdicts of guilty. The government argued principally that, in view of the substantial evidence that Acosta had conspired with intent to defraud, any inconsistency between the verdicts was likely an exercise by the jury of lenity and was not a basis on which the court could properly set aside the verdict against Acosta. In an Opinion and Order dated April 30, 1993 (April Opinion), the district court granted reconsideration but adhered to its original decision. Though again noting that [t]here was sufficient evidence ... for the jury to conclude that the defendants conspired with each other to violate the food and drug laws with the intent to defraud and mislead, April Opinion at 2, the court held that the jury's verdict that Acosta had so conspired could not stand in light of the specific finding[s] that defendants Santos and Chavarro did not have the intent to defraud or mislead, id. at 4. 22 The court rejected the government's reliance on United States v. Powell, stating as follows:Here, the jury did not render a verdict of not guilty with respect to any defendant: it found them all guilty of the lesser included offense of conspiracy without intent to defraud, and found that [Acosta] did have the intent to defraud while the others did not. A jury finding that one element of the greater offense is present as to one defendant but absent as to the others does not require, nor even invite, the second-guessing or assumptions concerning the workings of the jurors' minds which Powell and its progeny condemn. It simply leads (given the lack of evidence of other persons with whom [Acosta] could have conspired with intent to defraud) to the conclusion that as to that element he stood alone and there was no conspiracy with intent to defraud. 23 April Opinion at 7. 24 Judgment was entered convicting Acosta of the misdemeanor conspiracy offense, and he was sentenced principally to two years' probation with special conditions, including the requirements that he perform 300 hours of community service and allow the Probation Office to inspect any establishment he manages or owns. This appeal by the government followed.