Opinion ID: 1229029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Petitioner's first two assigned propositions for reversal will be considered together. Each raises questions of the extent conciliation efforts are required under Code section 598.16.

Text: The legislative purpose of enacting the provision for conciliation, now section 598.16, was to foster viable marriage relationships and minimize the problem of hasty divorces. It is this court's obligation to construe the statute with the view of carrying out this obvious legislative purpose if fairly possible. In re Marriage of Penney, Iowa, 203 N.W.2d 380, 381, 382; In re Marriage of Boyd, Iowa, 200 N.W.2d 845, 851. The extent a party is required to participate and cooperate in ordered conciliation proceedings was not reached in In re Marriage of Collins, Iowa, 200 N.W.2d 886, as the issue was raised for the first time on appeal. In this case we have the issue squarely presented for the first time. We hold the statute requires a good-faith reasonable effort by both parties to conciliate and save the marriage if at all possible. Whether such an effort has been made necessarily depends on the particular facts in each case. Respondent attended five conciliation effort sessions over a period of several months. To attend the last two he was required to travel 75 miles from his place of employment in Illinois. Admittedly his feelings and attitude regarding the marriage did not change. He had lost all interest in the marriage, to a great extent because he was keeping company with and intended to marry another woman. Recrimination does not bar dissolution of marriage. Section 598.18. See also 20 Drake L.Rev. at page 216. Our de novo review leads us to the same conclusion as that apparently reached by the trial court that respondent had met the requirements of section 598.16 and further conciliation efforts would be of no avail. Certainly a hasty dissolution had been avoided. The parties separated July 4, 1969. The trial was held March 5, 1971, a period of one year and eight months. The conciliator was appointed eight months prior to decree. II. The trial court's appointment of a clergyman as conciliator was within the specific provisions of section 598.16. We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in refusing to require respondent to submit to psychological evaluation. Petitioner's first two assigned propositions establish no ground for reversal. III. Petitioner's third assigned proposition is that the trial court erred in fixing permanent alimony at $100 instead of $175 per month. Section 598.21 provides that when a dissolution of marriage is decreed, the court may make such order in relation to children, property, parties and maintenance of the parties as shall be justified. The applicable principles to be applied thereunder are thoroughly discussed in our recent cases of In re Marriage of Boyd, Iowa, 200 N.W.2d 845, 853; In re Marriage of Harrington, Iowa, 199 N.W.2d 351, 354 and In re Marriage of Williams, Iowa, 199 N.W.2d 339, 345, 346. Repetition here is unnecessary. The parties were married on July 22, 1944 and separated July 4, 1969. In 1944 petitioner was working as a secretary and continued until a short time before the birth of the parties' only child in August 1948. When respondent became ill late in 1948 petitioner went to work again and later worked part time until the parties separated. Separation resulted in a serious nervous upset to petitioner. Her physician testified she was unable to work but perhaps within a year or two after the trial she would be able to do so. Respondent was a member of the armed forces at time of marriage. He left military service in 1947 and was employed thereafter at various jobs until 1950 when he began working for the Hubinger Company in Keokuk where he remained until 1969. When he left he was being paid about $700 per month for running the mail room and training department. He had $20,817.52 in his employer's pension fund. At trial time the proceeds of that fund were being held in escrow. At trial time respondent was working in an Illinois factory with take-home pay of approximately $100 per week. The trial court considered the amount to be allowed for alimony in relation to the division of assets and the order for payment of debts. Petitioner does not attack the trial court's order in regard thereto. However it has a direct bearing on the question of the adequacy of the permanent alimony allowance. The trial court divided the debts and assets of the parties as follows: The petitioner received the residence at 306 Belknap in Keokuk (valued at $7500), 3 of 6 cemetery lots, 12 shares of stock in Hubinger Company in her name which she inherited from her father, the $1000 savings account in the Keokuk Federal Savings and Loan which petitioner had placed in the name of her daughter, and in addition one-half of the funds from respondent's pension plan remaining in the escrow account with the clerk after her temporary support and income tax liens were subtracted. The pension fund started out at $20,817.52. Payments therefrom of $175 per month were made to petitioner from December 1969 until the decree on May 18, 1971. The tax lien was for $3679.70 plus accrued interest and penalty. An Iowa income tax lien of $515.36 was also first subtracted from the escrow funds. Thus, of the escrow account, $2975 had been given to petitioner as temporary support, and some $6000-6800 was given to her by the decree. The court also awarded petitioner alimony of $100 per month. Respondent was given his 1968 Pontiac (bought for $2000 in 1969), the $1088 in the Credit Union account which he took when he left petitioner, any cash surrender value on his $1000 life insurance policy, 22 shares of Hubinger Company Stock in his name, an equal part of the pension fund (about $6000-6800) and 3 of 6 cemetery lots. The court ordered respondent to pay the $4000 debt to the Keokuk Savings Bank (which went $1000 to pay off mortgage on 308 Belknap, $2000 to buy Pontiac, $1000 for respondent's expenses in leaving home). Respondent was also ordered to pay $350 for petitioner's attorney fees. Remaining debts were to be paid by the party in whose name the bills were owed. Petitioner argues she should have been allowed $175 rather than $100 per month as alimony. Apparently her contention is in part based on the fact she had been receiving $175 during the pendency of the cause in the lower court. It must be noted however that payment was made out of the pension fund rather than from respondent's earnings. From our review of the entire record we, like the trial court, conclude $100 per month is justified. Petitioner's third assigned proposition is without merit. The decree and judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed.