Opinion ID: 185504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Smith's Base Offense Level

Text: 13 Smith's challenges to his sentencing stand on a different footing, however. We agree with Smith that the District Court committed plain error in determining the base offense level (BOL) for his conspiracy conviction, a mistake that requires us to vacate and remand his sentence. When a defendant is convicted of conspiracy, the Sentencing Guidelines direct the court to apply the offense level that would have applied had that defendant been convicted of the substantive offense on which the conspiracy charge is based. See U.S.S.G. 2X1.1. However, where a count charges a conspiracy to commit more than one offense, and where the guilty verdict does not establish which particular offense was actually the object of the conspiracy, the above Guideline may be applied only if the court, were it sitting as a trier of fact , would convict the defendant of conspiring to commit that offense. U.S.S.G. 1B1.2(d) & cmt. n.4 (emphasis added). 14 In this case, Smith's indictment listed both conflict of interest and the more serious gratuities offense as possible predicates for his conspiracy charge. The jury convicted Smith of the substantive conflict of interest violation, but hung on the gratuities counts. It did not specify on which of these offenses its conspiracy conviction was hinged. Subsequently, however, the trial court found that the evidence proven by a preponderance at trial amply demonstrates that defendant conspired to commit the offense of Receipt of Illegal Gratuities and/or Payment of Illegal Gratuities. See Sentencing Order at 4. Thus, although the jury, bound by a reasonable doubt standard, had deadlocked as to whether Smith had violated 18 U.S.C. 201(c), the trial court judge, relying on a far more relaxed evidentiary standard, concluded that Smith had at least conspired to do so, and sentenced him accordingly. 15 The District Court's use of a preponderance standard to make this finding was undoubtedly erroneous. The phrase sitting as a trier of fact in the Commentary to 1B1.2(d) clearly contemplates that when a court sets the basis for a conspiracy conviction, it will do so under a heightened burden of proof. Both the Sentencing Commission and the courts that have considered this issue have held that the appropriate standard is beyond a reasonable doubt. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 75; United States v. Conley, 92 F.3d 157, 162 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. McKinley, 995 F.2d 1020, 1026 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Macklin, 927 F.2d 1272, 1280 (2d Cir. 1991). We agree. This, however, does not settle the issue before us. 16 The central question that we face is not what the evidentiary standard should be, but whether the District Court's failure to use the proper standard amounts to reversible error. The Government claims that Smith did not object on the burden of proof issue at sentencing, and thus that our review can only be for plain error. Smith counters that in fact he did preserve the issue, and that a harmless error standard is therefore appropriate. We need not resolve whether Smith offered a timely objection, because we conclude that the court's error was plain. 17 To prevail on an unpreserved issue, a criminal defendant must establish that the error is plain or obvious under current law, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, Smith bears the burden of proving plainness, prejudice, and public harm. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993); United States v. Gartmon, 331 U.S. App. D.C. 74, 146 F.3d 1015, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Here, the Government has conceded that the trial court's error was plain. See Br. for Appellee 18. Moreover, we have no trouble concluding that a misapplication of the burden of proof that results in a defendant serving a longer sentence adversely affects the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceeding. See United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 932 (9th Cir. 2001) (But, where, as here, the district court applied the wrong standard of proof, we must necessarily conclude that the fairness and integrity of the proceeding is threatened.); cf. Tippett v. Mayland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part) (The standard of proof is more than an empty semantic exercise; it reflects the value society places on individual liberty.). 18 The only remaining question is whether Smith suffered prejudice as a result of the court's error; in other words, whether he has demonstrated that his sentence might likely have been different had the court used the correct standard of proof. In answering this question, it is significant that the error occurred during sentencing. For, while the plain error analysis applies to mistakes committed during trial, this court has held that the burden of persuasion in showing 'prejudice' should be somewhat lighter in the sentencing context. United States v. Saro, 306 U.S. App. D.C. 277, 24 F.3d 283, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1994). That is, while the defendant in such cases must still show a reasonable likelihood that the sentencing court's obvious errors affected his sentence, we are more willing to infer such a causal relationship when the consequence is not that a conviction is overturned, but rather that a sentence is vacated. Id. 24 F.3d at 287-88. Guided by this principle, we conclude that Smith has indeed met his burden. 19 As an initial matter, there is little doubt that had the District Court used the conflict of interest violation, instead of the illegal gratuities offense, as the predicate for Smith's conspiracy conviction, the resulting sentence would have been less than the 46 months that he actually received. This is so not only because the BOL for the former is less, but also because a number of the enhancements that the court used to augment Smith's offense level (based on the number and value of the gratuities involved) are not available under the conflict of interest guideline. Compare U.S.S.G. 2C1.3 (conflicts) with 2C1.2 (gratuities). As such, the length of Smith's sentence depended on his being convicted by the court of conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. 201(c). Cf. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 75 (noting that when the jury does not specify which offenses were the object of the conspiracy, a court's 1B1.2(d) finding creates what is, in effect, a new count of conviction). And, because we find that it is reasonably likely that Smith would not have been similarly convicted under a reasonable doubt standard, it follows that the court's use of a more lenient standard of proof was prejudicial. 20 We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, we are mindful of the significant difference between a preponderance standard and a reasonable doubt standard. Although the phrases 'preponderance of the evidence' and 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' are quantitatively imprecise, they do communicate to the finder of fact different notions concerning the degree of confidence he is expected to have in the correctness of his factual conclusions. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Indeed, the reasonable doubt standard requires the fact-finder to enter a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979). A preponderance standard, in sharp contrast, requires merely that the fact-finder believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than the non-existence of that fact. See Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. PENN. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1983); see also United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Weinstein, J.). Whereas a reasonable doubt standard is designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment against a criminal defendant, a preponderance standard compels the litigants to share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979). For this reason, the Supreme Court has indicated that a trial judge's improper jury instruction regarding the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt can never be harmless error. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993). Thus, a defendant whose guilt was actually proved by overwhelming evidence would be denied due process if the jury was instructed that he could be found guilty on a mere preponderance of the evidence. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320 n.14 (internal citations omitted). 21 This case raises a similar concern. Here, the District Court, in effect, erroneously instructed itself that it could convict Smith of conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. 201(c) based on a finding to that effect by a mere preponderance of the evidence. Given (1) the substantial difference between the standard that the trial court used and the proper standard, (2) the due process concerns associated with convicting and sentencing criminal defendants under the appropriate burdens of proof, (3) the difficulties of determining whether an erroneous burden of proof was outcome determinative, see Carvalho v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 794 F.2d 454, 455 (9th Cir. 1986), and (4) our greater willingness to find prejudice in the context of sentencing errors, we find that Smith has satisfied his burden of proof. One of our sister circuits has reached the same result in like circumstances. Indeed, United States v. Farese, 248 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2001), presented a similar situation to the one that now confronts us: a sentencing court that had failed to use a reasonable doubt standard to fix the unspecified predicate offense for a conspiracy conviction. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court's failure to apply the proper standard of proof at sentencing compels us to vacate the appellants' sentences and remand this case to the district court for resentencing. Id. at 1061; see also United States v. Nguyen, 255 F.3d 1335, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2001) (vacating sentences imposed under a RICO conspiracy conviction where court determined unspecified predicate offense under a preponderance standard, and where that determination increased defendants' offense levels); United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 994 (11th Cir. 1997) (vacating sentence imposed under U.S.S.G. 1B1.2(d) where district court did not state that it had determined that the evidence was sufficient to persuade it beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants had conspired to commit a particular substantive offense). 22 Apart from misconstruing the burden of proof, the trial court determined that Smith conspired to commit an offense with respect to which the jury failed to convict. Normally, this would not be noteworthy, because it is settled that conspiracy and the substantive offense underlying a conspiracy are treated as separate and distinct crimes; indeed, a defendant can be convicted of the former while simultaneously acquitted of the latter. See Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-78, 43 L. Ed. 2d 616, 95 S. Ct. 1284 (1975); United States v. Hernandez, 141 F.3d 1042, 1052-53 (11th Cir. 1998). In this case, however, the result is anomalous. The discrepancy here between the actions of judge and jury is most readily explained in one of two ways: (1) the difference between conspiracy crimes and substantive crimes or (2) the difference in the burdens of proof applied with respect to each. None of the District Court's pronouncements give any reason to credit the former explanation. 23 In its Sentencing Order, the trial court announced that its task under U.S.S.G. 1B1.2(d) was to make a finding as to whether the evidence proven at trial establishes the object offense of Receipt of Illegal Gratuities and/or Payment of Illegal Gratuities. Sentencing Order at 4. True to its stated intention, the trial court's analysis fails to address the sine qua non of the statutory crime of conspiracy, i.e., the existence of an agreement to commit an illegal act, United States v. Wilson, 333 U.S. App. D.C. 103, 160 F.3d 732, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Rather, the District Court focuses instead solely on the evidence suggesting that Smith engaged in the object acts that would render him criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. 201(c) itself. See Sentencing Order at 4-13. Moreover, at Smith's sentencing hearing, the trial court opined that the defendant did, in fact, take gratuities by taking these monies and the loans, and charging the interest rates that [he] did while [he was] in a position over the contracting. Tr. 12/12/2000 at 15. These statements suggest that the District Court's determination was based not on the technical differences between the elements of the federal conspiracy statute and the federal gratuities statute, but rather on its conclusion that Smith had in fact violated the latter. As such, in light of the jury's inability to reach a similar conclusion based on a reasonable doubt instruction, it is at least reasonably likely that the court would not have done so had it employed the same (and the proper) standard of proof. 24 A final reason to think that the District Court's burden of proof error was prejudicial lies in the court's treatment of the elements of 201(c). The Supreme Court has recently made clear that, in order to obtain a conviction under this statute, the Government must prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific 'official act' for or because of which it was given. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 414, 143 L. Ed. 2d 576, 119 S. Ct. 1402 (1999). While the District Court here did identify Smith's official acts and the things of value that he received, it never attempted to articulate or to prove a link between the two. The court's bare assertion that Braxtonbrown-Smith undertook to enrich Smith and bestow reciprocal benefits on him in acknowledgment of his referrals to PDA, Sentencing Order at 7, is not sufficient to satisfy a reasonable doubt standard. This court is simply not empowered to comb the record on its own to make a determination that the District Court should have, but did not, make under a significantly heightened evidentiary burden that the District Court should have, but did not, use. See Jordan, 256 F.3d at 933 (remanding where district court used a preponderance standard for a sentencing determination that should have been governed by clear and convincing evidence; the Court of Appeals declared that we are not in a position to weigh conflicting evidence, which is an important responsibility of the district court); cf. Hernandez, 141 F.3d at 1052 (It is emphatically not within the province of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses at trial.). 25 In sum, then, we hold that the court's use of a preponderance standard to reach a conclusion that should have been determined beyond a reasonable doubt was prejudicial. Accordingly, Smith's sentence must be vacated and the case remanded so that the District Court may recalculate his offense level under the proper standard of proof.