Opinion ID: 2691597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due-Process Considerations

Text: {¶ 53} The inquiry into whether R.C. 2945.39 violates due-process protections is also governed by the rational-basis standard. As stated in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, “due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” See also State v. Sullivan (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 502, 506, 739 N.E.2d 788. {¶ 54} A civil commitment for any purpose is a significant deprivation of liberty and due-process protections must be afforded to a person facing involuntary commitment. Addington v. Texas (1979), 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323. However, the right to be free from physical restraint is not absolute; the United States Supreme Court has consistently upheld statutes authorizing the forcible civil commitment of persons who are unable to control their behavior and who pose a danger to the safety of the public, “provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356-357, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501; Foucha v. Louisiana (1992), 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437. {¶ 55} In arguing that R.C. 2945.39 fails to comport with due process, appellee places great emphasis on the United States Supreme Court’s statement in 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, that “a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” Appellee also relies on this court’s decision in State v. Sullivan, 90 Ohio St.3d 502, 739 N.E.2d 788. Sullivan held that former R.C. 2945.38, requiring all defendants found incompetent to stand trial to undergo treatment for a set amount of time for the purpose of restoring them to competency, violated due-process protections because the defendant’s treatment could not be discontinued even if a court found that the defendant could not be restored to competency in the foreseeable future.2 {¶ 56} The state asserts that the court of appeals erred when it concluded by relying on Sullivan and other decisions that due process requires all efforts to restore competency to cease upon a court determination that a defendant is not restorable to competency within a reasonable time. {¶ 57} The appellate court held that “[b]ecause commitment under R.C. 2945.39 involves attempts at restoration to competency beyond a reasonable period of time,” a commitment under that statute amounts to a due-process violation. 179 Ohio App.3d 584, 2008-Ohio-6245, 902 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 79. Due process requires that an indictment against a criminal defendant be dismissed upon a finding that the defendant cannot be restored to competency, the appeals court reasoned, because “it is fundamentally unfair for an incompetent defendant to have charges pending indefinitely when there is little hope that he may [be] 2. The General Assembly, in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 122, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1081, effective February 20, 2002, amended the provisions of former R.C. 2945.38 that this court struck down in Sullivan to address the holding in that case. See id. at Section 3, 1097, and Legislative Service Commission Final Bill Analysis, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 122, 124th General Assembly, http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses124/01-sb122.pdf (explaining the amendments and discussing Sullivan). No aspects of R.C. 2945.38, including the amendments enacted in the wake of Sullivan, are at issue in this case. 18 January Term, 2010 brought to trial and exonerated.” Id. at ¶ 81. Finally, the appellate court held that R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)(a)’s use of a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard rather than a proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for determining whether an incompetent defendant committed the charged offense violates due process. Id. at ¶ 82. {¶ 58} The appellate court’s conclusions appear to be based on a belief that the statute’s primary goals are to punish the defendant and restore his competency to stand trial. However, as discussed in our analysis above, R.C. 2945.39 is a civil statute with a primary goal of protecting the public. It is of great significance to our due-process inquiry that R.C. 2945.39(D)(1) requires the court to order the least-restrictive commitment alternative available consistent with public safety and the defendant’s welfare, while also emphasizing that the court “shall give preference to protecting public safety.” {¶ 59} It is apparent that a person committed under R.C. 2945.39 is not committed “solely” on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial, unlike the defendant in Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435. Rather, such a person is committed only after being found by clear and convincing evidence to be mentally ill and subject to hospitalization by court order under R.C. 5122.01(B), through the application of R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) and 2945.37(A)(7), and being found to be a danger to the public because he was determined to have committed the offense with which he was charged. See Bretz, 5th Dist. No. CA-98-001, 2000 WL 93739,  7 (upholding the constitutionality of R.C. 2945.39, and distinguishing Jackson because in Jackson, “there was no ‘affirmative proof’ that the accused had committed criminal acts or was otherwise dangerous”). If the person at some point is no longer mentally ill and subject to hospitalization by court order, his commitment under R.C. 2945.39 will terminate, subject to additional court proceedings. R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(a). These statutory 19 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO features are similar to those of the statute upheld in Hendricks. See 521 U.S. at 352-353, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501. {¶ 60} The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) for determining whether the defendant committed the crime charged does not violate the defendant’s due-process rights. Instead, a trial court’s finding under this evidentiary standard that the defendant has committed the offense charged is used only to determine the defendant’s degree of dangerousness. {¶ 61} The state asserts that Sullivan does not support appellee’s argument that his due-process rights were violated here. The purpose of the commitment in Sullivan, which involved the former version of R.C. 2945.38, was to restore the defendant to competency in order to stand trial. Because there was no probability that competency could be restored within the time set by the former statute, the mandatory treatment period bore no rational relationship to the purpose of commitment, and, therefore, the defendant’s due-process rights were violated. See Sullivan, 90 Ohio St.3d at 508, 739 N.E.2d 788. Our limited decision in Sullivan, however, has no application to this case, which involves the distinctly different procedures of R.C. 2945.39. The overriding purpose of this statute is to protect the public from a person who is dangerously mentally ill, has perpetrated felonious conduct, and cannot presently be tried because of his mental incompetency. {¶ 62} Thus, we conclude that R.C. 2945.39 and 2945.401 do not violate a defendant’s due-process rights by allowing the indictment to remain intact, by allowing continued efforts to restore the defendant to competency, or by permitting a defendant to be committed for a term equal to the maximum term of imprisonment that he could receive for the most serious offense charged. “Although    a defendant may be committed until the expiration of the maximum term of imprisonment that he could have received for the charged 20 January Term, 2010 offense, due process is satisfied by the fact that he may be released sooner if he is no longer subject to hospitalization by court order.” Williams, 179 Ohio App.3d 584, 2008-Ohio-6245, 902 N.E.2d 1042, at ¶ 90 (Wolff, P.J., dissenting). Moreover, as the dissent correctly observed, principles of due process do not prevent a person committed under R.C. 2945.39 from being reevaluated for competency. If competency is restored while the person is still mentally ill, he can “be tried on the offense while remaining committed for his mental illness. R.C. 2945.401(J)(2).” Id. at ¶ 91. {¶ 63} For the reasons expressed herein, we conclude that the nature and duration of the commitment that occurs under R.C. 2945.39 bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose for which the person is committed. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435. {¶ 64} We hold that an involuntary commitment under R.C. 2945.39 does not violate principles of due process. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed on this issue.