Opinion ID: 4162273
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Matter Observed While Under a Legal Duty to

Text: Report We have held that a “legal duty to report” within the meaning of Rule 803(8)(A)(ii) may exist even in the absence of “a statute or regulation [that] expressly imposes duties to observe, report, and keep records.” United States v. Lopez, 762 F.3d 852, 862 (9th Cir. 2014). The pertinent question is whether the creation and maintenance of the record at issue is “appropriate to the function of the” relevant government office, given “the nature of the responsibilities assigned to” that office. Id. For instance, a “verification of removal”—a document “designed to record the physical removal of [an] alien across the border,” id. at 856—is the type of record that UNITED STATES V. FRYBERG 9 the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) would be expected to create and maintain in the course of carrying out its duties. Accordingly, a DHS official is “under a legal duty to report” within the meaning of Rule 803(8)(A)(ii) when preparing such a document. Id. at 862. Here, the tribal court required that Defendant be served with notice of the hearing on the protection order. The return of service was intended to notify the tribal court that service had taken place and, thus, that the hearing on the protection order could proceed. We conclude that the completion of the return of service was “appropriate to the function” of the tribal court system and that, therefore, Officer Echevarria was under a legal duty to report when he completed the return of service.6 We also conclude that the fact that service had been effected was a “matter observed” by Officer Echevarria. See id. at 861–62 (concluding that a DHS official who completed a verification of removal “observed” an alien’s removal from the United States). 6 It is true that Officer Echevarria was a tribal police officer and not an employee of the judiciary. But, insofar as he was instructed to carry out orders of the tribal court—such as serving Defendant with the notice of the hearing—his duties were owed to the court system. Cf. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 895–96 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (noting the “wellestablished and well-understood common-law tradition that extended absolute immunity to individuals performing functions necessary to the judicial process “); Chabal v. Reagan, 841 F.2d 1216, 1220 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that “[United States] [M]arshals are officers of the executive branch,” but that “federal courts . . . may direct their actions . . . pursuant to express statutory authority”). 10 UNITED STATES V. FRYBERG