Opinion ID: 3065443
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Impact of Case Law Other Than Heller on the

Text: Constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) [3] In United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1192 (9th Cir. 2005), we held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment rights of a convicted felon. However, we performed only minimal analysis of the claim because, at the time, we were bound by Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002), which held that the Second Amendment does not confer an individual right to possess arms. Younger, 398 F.3d at 1192.2 Like Vongxay, Younger argued that § 922(g)(1) unconstitutionally limits “firearm possession by categories of people who have not been deemed dangerous.” Appellant Clydell Younger’s Opening Br., 2004 WL 1810097 at  (Jul. 2, 2004). We declined to make a distinction between violent and non-violent felons and held that § 922(g)(1), which prohibits all felons from possessing firearms, was constitutional. [4] The reasoning upon which Younger was based—that the Second Amendment does not give individuals a right to bear arms—was invalidated by Heller. However, we are still bound by Younger. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “[f]irst, a panel of this court may not overrule a decision of a previous panel; only a court in banc has such authority” and “[s]econd, the doctrine of stare decisis concerns the holdings of previous cases, not the rationales” (internal citations omitted)). Therefore, Younger controls.3 2 In Younger we also cited a Fifth Circuit case holding that, even though an individual right to bear arms was recognized in the Fifth Circuit, felon restrictions were permissible “narrowly tailored exception[s]” to the right. Younger, 398 F.3d at 1192 (citing United States v. Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004)); see also our discussion of Everist infra p. 2355. 3 Prior to Heller, the Supreme Court upheld a previous version of the felon-in-possession statute. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980). However, Lewis is not binding with regard to Vongxay’s Second Amendment claim because it involved only Fifth and Sixth Amendment chalUNITED STATES v. VONGXAY 2355 Although our legal inquiry ends with Younger, our holding is buttressed by the fact that Younger upheld the very type of gun possession restriction that the Supreme Court deemed “presumptively lawful.” Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.26. Our examination of cases from other circuits and of historical gun restrictions also lends credence to the post-Heller viability of Younger’s holding. For example, prior to Heller, the Fifth Circuit upheld § 922(g)(1) as a “limited and narrowly tailored exception to the freedom to possess firearms, reasonable in its purposes and consistent with the right to bear arms protected under the Second Amendment.” United States v. Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004). Fifth Circuit cases from that era are particularly instructive for post-Heller analyses because, even before Heller, the Fifth Circuit held that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to possess lenges; no Second Amendment claim was presented. In fact, Lewis’s Second Amendment reference was limited to a sentence that Heller itself minimizes, stating: No Second Amendment claim was raised or briefed by any party. In the course of rejecting the asserted challenge, the Court commented [on the Second Amendment] gratuitously, in a footnote . . . . It is inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill of Rights upon such a footnoted dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was not argued. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816 n.25. Lewis is therefore inapposite to Vongxay’s Second Amendment claim. On the other hand, in making its equal protection determination, the Lewis Court necessarily had to find (or assume) that the Second Amendment did not confer an individual, fundamental right to bear arms. See Lewis, 445 U.S. at 66 n.8. To the extent that the Second Amendment conclusion is considered essential to the decision, this court would be bound by Lewis. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). However, because Younger more clearly decided this issue on Second Amendment grounds, we need not engage in a protracted analysis of whether or not Lewis’s Second Amendment discussion was a reasoned decision or a “gratuitous” comment. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816 n.25. 2356 UNITED STATES v. VONGXAY guns. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, the Fifth Circuit determined that, although there is an individual right to bear arms, felon restrictions are permissible even under heightened scrutiny. Everist, 368 F.3d at 519 (“Irrespective of whether [the] offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown manifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not justly complain of the limitation on his liberty when his possession of firearms would otherwise threaten the security of his fellow citizens.”). In addition, the D.C. Circuit opinion that Heller affirmed recognized an individual right to bear arms. It held: [T]he government is [not] absolutely barred from regulating the use and ownership of pistols. The protections of the Second Amendment are subject to the same sort of reasonable restrictions that have been recognized as limiting, for instance, the First Amendment. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[G]overnment may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . . .”). Indeed, the right to keep and bear arms . . . was subject to restrictions at common law. We take these to be the sort of reasonable regulations contemplated by the drafters of the Second Amendment. Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted in part sub nom. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 552 U.S. 1035 (2007), and aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). We also note that to date “no court that has examined Heller has found 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) constitutionally suspect.” United States v. Baron, Nos. CR-06-2095-FVS, CV-08-3048FVS, 2008 WL 5102307, at  (E.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 2008); see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 329 F. App’x 109, 111 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Heller did not disturb Lewis’s narrow holding— UNITED STATES v. VONGXAY 2357 that felons have no constitutional right to possess firearms.”); United States v. Gilbert, 286 F. App’x 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that, under Heller, convicted felons do not have the right to possess firearms). Thus, there appears to be a consensus that, even given the Second Amendment’s individual right to bear arms, felons’ Second Amendment rights can be reasonably restricted. Denying felons the right to bear arms is also consistent with the explicit purpose of the Second Amendment to maintain “the security of a free State.” U.S. Const. amend. II; see also Parker, 478 F.3d at 399 (holding that “[r]easonable restrictions also might be thought consistent with a ‘well-regulated Militia,’ ” and noting that “felonious conduct” would render a person “unsuitable for service in the militia”). Felons are often, and historically have been, explicitly prohibited from militia duty. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 49-401 (outlining current prohibition on felons in the militia).4 Finally, we observe that most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was “inextricably . . . tied to” the concept of a “virtuous citizen[ry]” that would protect society through “defensive use of arms against criminals, oppressive officials, and foreign enemies alike,” and that “the right to bear arms does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e. criminals) . . . .” Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 143, 146 (1986); see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 480 (1995) (noting that felons “were excluded from the right to arms” because they were “deemed incapable of virtue”). We recognize, however, that the historical question has not been definitively resolved. See C. Kevin 4 In Heller, the Court anticipated the need for such historical analyses, stating that “there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications for exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.” 128 S. Ct. at 2821. 2358 UNITED STATES v. VONGXAY Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 695, 714-28 (2009) (maintaining that bans on felon gun possession are neither long-standing nor supported by common law in the founding era). [5] In sum, we hold that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment as it applies to Vongxay, a convicted felon. See Younger, 398 F.3d 1179.