Opinion ID: 2052578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: charging alternative or multiple means

Text: The first question before this Court involves the proper application of Superior Court Criminal Rule 7(c)(1) to an indictment alleging a violation of 11 Del.C. § 783. Statutory interpretation involves a purely legal determination. Hercules Inc. v. Leu Trust & Banking (Bahamas) Ltd., Del.Supr., 611 A.2d 476, 481 (1992), cert. dismissed, 507 U.S. 1025, 113 S.Ct. 1836, 123 L.Ed.2d 463. Accordingly, [t]he appropriate standard of appellate review requires this Court to determine `whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in formulating or applying legal principles.' Moses v. Board of Educ. of New Castle County Vocational Technical School Dist., Del.Supr., 602 A.2d 61, 63 (1991) (quoting Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Wholesalers, Inc. v. Ayers, Del.Supr., 504 A.2d 1077, 1081 (1986)). Prior to trial, the defense objected to the kidnapping charge in the indictment because it contained two alternative means to find that Richardson possessed the purpose to commit kidnapping in the second degree. The indictment charged that Richardson kidnapped the two-year old for two purposes: (1) to facilitate the commission of robbery; and (2) to take the child from his parent. The Superior Court found that the indictment was proper and charged the jurors that they could convict Richardson of Kidnapping Second Degree if they unanimously found that he possessed either of two purposes. The jury instruction read in pertinent part: The restraint was either (a) for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a felony, Robbery in the Second Degree or flight thereafter; or (b) for the purpose of taking him from the custody of his parent. As to this element, the State has alleged alternative elements (a) or (b) as aforestated. To find this element, all twelve jurors must unanimously find either (a) or (b). The second degree kidnapping statute reads: A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he unlawfully restrains another person with any of the following purposes: ... (3) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or . . . (6) To take or entice any child less than 16 years of age from the custody of his parent, guardian or lawful custodian; and the actor voluntarily releases the victim alive, unharmed and in a safe place prior to trial. 11 Del.C. § 783(3), (6). Richardson asserts that the structure of the statute requires the State to choose only one purpose under which to proceed. Contrary to this assertion, Superior Court Criminal Rule 7(c)(1) allows the inclusion of multiple means in one count. The rule reads in pertinent part, [the indictment may allege] in a single count that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means. Del.Super.Ct.Crim.R. 7(c)(1). This Court addressed the meaning and the purpose of this provision in Demonia v. State, Del.Supr., 210 A.2d 303 (1965). We stated that the rule was designed to abolish any necessity of utilizing multiple counts in order to charge the commission of the offense by different or several means, in those cases where the means must be alleged as a material element of the crime. Id. at 305. The listing of multiple means of committing a statutory offense is a recognized and accepted practice. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991). In analyzing the practice, the United States Supreme Court noted: A statute often makes punishable the doing of one thing or another, ... sometimes thus specifying a considerable number of things.... [T]he indictment on such a statute may allege, in a single count, that the defendant did as many of the forbidden things as the pleader chooses, employing the conjunction and where the statute has or, and it will not be double, and it will be established at the trial by proof of any one of them. Id. at 51, 112 S.Ct. at 470 (quoting 1 J. Bishop, New Criminal Procedure § 436, pp. 355-56 (2d ed. 1913). The Supreme Court accepted this practice one hundred years ago in Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 16 S.Ct. 952, 40 L.Ed. 1097 (1896) (holding that the accused may be found guilty upon proof that he did any one of the things constituting a crime under a statute and that listing multiple means is appropriate). In two recent cases, the Supreme Court affirmed that alternative means could be set forth in one count of an indictment. See Griffin, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466; Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991). It was a historical practice and continues to remain a common practice to list in one count of an indictment alternative means with respect to an element of a crime. In the case sub judice, the indictment alleged, and the jury was permitted to find, that Richardson committed second degree kidnapping with either of two purposes. Arguably, Richardson committed second degree kidnapping by several means, or with multiple purposes. He facilitated the commission of a felony, second degree robbery, by stealing the car, and he took the two-year old from the custody of his mother. The State properly included multiple means in one count instead of placing each mean or purpose in a separate count. This practice is acceptable under Rule 7(c)(1) and this Court's explanation of the rule in Demonia. While listing two possible means to satisfy an element of the offense presents a risk of less than a unanimous jury finding on that specific element, see, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged), the Superior Court, by properly instructing the jury, ensured that the jury would reach an unanimous decision on the mens rea. See Probst v. State, Del. Supr., 547 A.2d 114, 121 (1988).