Opinion ID: 1388611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Other crimes instructions.

Text: The pertinent sentencing factors were submitted to the jury in the standard language of section 190.3 (see CALJIC, former No. 8.84.1), including factors (a) ([t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding....), (b) ([t]he presence or absence of [violent] criminal activity by the defendant....), and (c) ([t]he presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.). The court refused proffered defense instructions which would have specified that factors (a), (b), and (c) constitute mutually exclusive categories of crimes and do not overlap. [24] Defendant claims this was error. (31) Defendant is correct in his assertion that factors (a) and (b) are mutually exclusive. [T]he term `criminal activity [involving] force or violence' as used in [factor] (b) is limited to conduct other than the immediate circumstances for which the death penalty is being contemplated. [Citation omitted.] ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 763; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 105-106 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) Four years ago we stated that instructions in future cases should make clear the distinction between factors (a) and (b) in order to avoid any possible confusion on this point. ( Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 106, fn. 28.) However, we have not suggested that courts erred in earlier cases by refusing to elaborate upon the statutory language. Indeed, we have stressed that any ambiguity in the earlier standard factor (a)-(b) instruction was unlikely to cause prejudice. Unless invited to do so by the prosecutor, we observed, jurors are unlikely to give the circumstances of the current crime greater weight in the penalty determination simply because they appear to be included in two separate categories of statutory `aggravation.' ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 763.) No such exploitation occurred here. Furthermore, the court did not err by refusing instructions that distinguished factor ( c ) from both factors (a) and (b). The statutory language already separates factor (c) from factor (a) by limiting the jury's consideration to prior felony convictions. And, contrary to the import of the defense instruction, factors (b) and (c) may overlap; if defendant engaged in violent criminal activity which resulted in a prior felony conviction, the jury may consider the violence under factor (b) and the conviction under factor (c). ( Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 764.)