Opinion ID: 2291879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal of the Loss of Consortium Claim

Text: Kaiser contends that under the District's choice of law principles, Virginia law, which prohibits actions for loss of consortium by the husband for injuries to the wife, should have been applied to the consortium claim, and therefore Stutsman would have no cause of action for loss of consortium on the basis of personal injuries sustained by Mary Stutsman. Accordingly, Kaiser maintains that the damage award for loss of consortium must be reversed. Stutsman responds that Stutsman I applies, since Virginia has no interest in seeing its laws applied to deny recovery to its citizens for an injury perpetrated by District of Columbia corporations. In the District of Columbia, a husband may seek damages for the loss of consortium sustained due to injuries negligently inflicted upon his wife. Curry v. Giant Food Co., 522 A.2d 1283, 1293-94 (D.C. 1987); Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 87 U.S. App.D.C. 57, 60, 183 F.2d 811, 814, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852, 71 S.Ct. 80, 95 L.Ed. 624 (1950). Virginia, in contrast, has abrogated this common law right of action and does not permit a husband to recover damages from a third party for loss of consortium due to injuries negligently inflicted upon his wife. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-36 (1986 Repl.Vol.). [8] The federal courts in Virginia, relying on the legislative history, have construed this statute to mean that the husband in Virginia has no right, directly or indirectly, to recover for his loss of his wife's companionship and affection..... Carey v. Foster, 345 F.2d 772, 776 (4th Cir.1965) (reviewing amendments of 1932 and 1950); see Miller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 436 F.Supp. 460, 462 (E.D. Va. 1977). Nor may a husband recover for a wife's medical expenses or loss of services. Bolen v. Bolen, 409 F.Supp. 1374, 1375-76 (W.D. Va.1976). [9] Given the clear conflict between the laws of the two jurisdictions, we must decide which jurisdiction has the greater interest in the application of its substantive law. For more than twenty years, the District of Columbia has adhered to the governmental interest analysis approach to choice of law. Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc., 534 A.2d 1268, 1270 (D.C. 1987); Gaither v. Myers, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 216, 222, 404 F.2d 216, 222 (1968); Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 341, 350 F.2d 468, 471 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943, 86 S.Ct. 1195, 16 L.Ed.2d 206 (1966). This approach was applied in Stutsman I. It requires, broadly speaking, a two-step inquiry; the first identifying the governmental policies underlying the applicable laws, and the second determining which jurisdiction's policy would be most advanced by having its law applied to the facts of the case before us. Stutsman I, supra, 491 A.2d at 509; Williams v. Williams, 390 A.2d 4, 5-6 (D.C.1978). In Stutsman I, this court held that the substantive tort law of the District of Columbia would apply to Mary Stutsman's medical malpractice action against Kaiser because the health benefits provided by her District of Columbia employer resulted in her participation in Kaiser's health plan and her subsequent negligent treatment by Kaiser's agents. 491 A.2d at 510. This does not require, however, that the District's substantive law also be applied to her husband's action for loss of consortium. This jurisdiction has long recognized that the tort of loss of consortium is a distinct cause of action for injury to the marriage itself involving the prosecution of separate and independent rights, even when the claim is joined in the wife's suit for damages for injuries to her by the defendants. Langsburgh & Bros., Inc. v. Clark, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 339, 340-41, 127 F.2d 331, 332-333 (1942) (In the prosecution of these separate and independent rights there is no privity, and a judgment against one is not a bar to an action by the other.). By focusing on the governmental policies underlying a potentially interested jurisdiction's substantive laws, the issue-by-issue approach of interest analysis makes it far more likely that the law of one jurisdiction will be found to govern one aspect of a case while the law of another jurisdiction will control another aspect of that case. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 72 (1980). This process of applying the law of different states to determine different issues in the same case is known as depecage. Id. at 73. [10] Although the term may rarely be used, [11] the concept that it embodies is not unfamiliar to the choice of law field. For example, it has long been the practice of courts to apply the forum's procedural law even while applying the substantive law of another jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 42, 172 N.E.2d 526, 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 138 (1961) (applying forum rules on damages to action brought under Massachusetts wrongful death statute); see also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1932) (validity of contract determined by law of the place of contracting, but sufficiency of performance judged by law of place of performance); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 221-22 (1977). Depecage under the interest analysis in choice of law is simply the application of the rule of law that can most appropriately be applied to govern the particular issue, [12] and its rationale is no less applicable to different causes of action. Thus, upon applying the interest analysis principle of Stutsman I, the law of Virginia should be applied to Stutsman's action for loss of consortium if our examination of the relevant governmental policies reveals that Virginia has the more significant interest in the application of its substantive law. The following facts are pertinent to our choice of law determination. Stutsman and his deceased wife were at all times residents of Virginia. Virginia was the situs of their marital domicile. The negligence which gave rise to Stutsman's cause of action for loss of consortium occurred entirely in Virginia. Stutsman, unlike his deceased wife, who was employed in the District, had no contact with the District relevant to this lawsuit; he lived and worked in Virginia. As between the potential interests of the jurisdictions involved, the interest of Virginia is clear. It has an obvious interest in regulating the legal rights of married couples domiciled in Virginia. In pursuit of this interest, Virginia's legislature has eliminated the common law restrictions on a married woman's capacity to sue by giving a married woman the exclusive right to sue for damages for her personal injuries. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-36, supra note 8. The purpose of this enactment was to enlarge the personal rights of married women and to grant them separate legal estates. Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 197 Va. 216, ___, 89 S.E.2d 69, 71 (1955); see Carey v. Foster, supra, 345 F.2d at 774. Subsequent revisions to the Virginia statute have retained the prohibition on the husband's maintenance of any action for loss of consortium. See Carey v. Foster, supra, 345 F.2d at 775. We are faced, therefore, with a long-standing policy on the part of Virginia to grant the injured wife the sole right to seek damages for her personal injuries. Unlike Stutsman I, 491 A.2d at 509, where the court was presented with a false conflict between District of Columbia and Virginia public policies, we confront a real conflict between the policies of the two jurisdictions. Looking to the potential interest of the District of Columbia in application of its law to Stutsman's loss of consortium action, it is clear that a key factor which underlay the application of the substantive tort law of the District to the medical malpractice action in Stutsman I is absent from the instant case. A significant premise of the prior decision was the District's interest in protecting a member of its work force who contracts for health services with a District of Columbia corporation within this forum and then is injured by the negligence of that corporation's agents. Stutsman I, supra, 491 A.2d at 510. The police power responsibilities upon which this interest is based, however, would not be served by permitting Stutsman to maintain a suit for loss of consortium, since he is not a member of the District's work force. On the other hand, the District certainly has an interest in holding its corporations liable for negligent acts attributable to their agents. See id. at 509-10. Several factors persuade us that Virginia has the more significant interest in the application of its law to Stutsman's loss of consortium action. First, the courts following governmental interest analysis choice of law principles have held that an action for loss of consortium is governed by the law of the state where the marriage is domiciled. Felch v. Air Florida, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.D.C.1983) (citations omitted). See also Linnell v. Sloan, 636 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1980) (using District of Columbia choice of law rules and applying the law of marital domicile to loss of consortium action). As explained in Felch, the District of Columbia has little, if any, interest in the marital relationship of Virginia residents. Felch, supra, 562 F.Supp. at 386-87. Virginia, however, has a great interest in determining the legal rights of its married residents. Id. [13] Second, Virginia has enacted a statute tailored to the specific cause of action asserted here, and under Virginia choice of law principles a Virginia court would apply that state's own law if this case were before it. See McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va. 1127, 1128, 253 S.E.2d 662, 663 (1979) (substantive rights of parties in multi-state tort action are governed by law of place of the wrong). Our analysis here is similar to that employed in Tramontana, supra, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 350 F.2d 468. In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was faced with a choice of law question involving three potentially interested jurisdictions: the forum of the action (District of Columbia), the place of the wrong (Brazil), and the residence of the plaintiff and her decedent (Maryland). [14] In concluding that the Brazilian limitation on damages should govern the extent of the defendant's liability, two elements were crucial to the Circuit Court's analysis. The first was the existence of the Brazilian statute which was specifically tailored to the particular cause of action at issue and which protected the national interest in the financial solvency of the state-owned airline by limiting tort recovery, 121 U.S.App.D.C. at 341-42, 350 F.2d at 471-72, and the second was the fact that under the choice of law principles of the state of the plaintiff's residence (Maryland) the law of the place of the wrong would apply. Id. at 343-45, 350 F.2d at 473-75. In the Circuit Court's view, this indicated a lesser interest on the part of Maryland in the application of its substantive law. Id. The Circuit Court reasoned, therefore, that if, to the detriment of one of its own residents, Maryland would not assert its interest and disregard the Brazilian damage limitation, the District of Columbia courts should not do so in the face of the clearly-expressed interest of Brazil in limiting recovery for deaths in aviation accidents. Id. at 345, 350 F.2d at 475. Applying this analysis here, the focus of [Virginia's] concern could hardly be clearer. Id. at 341, 350 F.2d at 471. Like the Brazilian liability limitation in Tramontana, Virginia has enacted a statute specifically intended to abolish the action that Stutsman, a Virginia resident, seeks to prosecute. Virginia has a clearly articulated policy of allowing only the wife to recover for her personal injuries. Under these circumstances we are unpersuaded that the District's interest in holding its corporations liable for their negligent acts outweighs Virginia's interest in establishing the legal rights of married couples residing in that state, particularly where the negligent conduct and the injury to the plaintiff all occurred in the state of the marital domicile. In addition, Virginia's choice of law rules do not indicate a lesser interest in the application of its substantive law. Had this action been brought originally in Virginia, its courts would have applied Virginia law to Stutsman's loss of consortium claim because the conduct complained of occurred in Virginia. Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 374, 345 S.E. 2d 267, 272 (1986); McMillan v. McMillan, supra, 219 Va. at 1128, 253 S.E.2d at 663. Furthermore, the application of Virginia law to Stutsman's loss of consortium action is consistent with the Stutsmans' reasonable expectations as to the standards by which their marital relations will be governed in the event of suit. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 318 n. 24, 101 S.Ct. 633, 643 n. 24, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981) (plurality opinion); id., 449 U.S. at 324 n. 11, 327 & n. 16, 329-30 n. 22, 330 & n. 23, 331, 101 S.Ct. at 646 n. 11, 648 & n. 16, 648-49 n. 22, 649 & n. 23, 650 (Stevens, J. concurring); id. at 336, 101 S.Ct. at 652 (Powell, J., dissenting); Stutsman I, supra, 491 A.2d at 508 & n. 8; Reese, supra note 12, 73 COLUM. L. REV. at 60, 62 (reasonable expectations of parties is one factor relevant to determining the proper scope of application of depecage ). [15] In Stutsman I we recognized that Virginia undoubtedly has an interest in the welfare of its residents and had enacted a statute limiting malpractice damage awards to protect Virginia health care providers against excessive damage awards. 491 A.2d at 510-11. Mrs. Stutsman's interests, however, the court stated, can in no sense be said to be protected by that statute insofar as her medical malpractice claim was concerned. Id. at 511. Hence, the court reasoned, Virginia's interest in the application of its law becomes attenuated when its intended beneficiaries are foreign corporations with principal places of business outside the State. Id. The same cannot be said with respect to Stutsman's loss of consortium claim since Virginia's clearly-expressed interest in regulating the legal rights of married couples domiciled within its borders would be seriously impaired by application of District law to this claim, see Estrada v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 488 A.2d 1359, 1361-62 n. 4 (D.C.1985) (utilizing principle of comparative impairment), while the District has little recognizable interest in having its law govern the legal relationship of two persons married and living in Virginia. Felch, supra, 562 F.Supp. at 386-87. Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium and the judgment awarding plaintiff damages on this claim must be reversed. Appeal No. 87-143 dismissed as moot; Appeal No. 86-265 judgment against Kaiser for loss of consortium reversed.