Opinion ID: 2394603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Jury Findings

Text: The jury in this case returned both a general verdict in favor of appellant, and a special verdict, finding that appellant knew or should have known of the unfair and deceptive trade practices on October 28, 1998. Appellant argues that the jury must have determined that the statute of limitations did not apply, because it returned a verdict in her favor on that claim, and awarded her damages. We do not find this argument persuasive. The jury was neither instructed on the statute of limitations, nor the legal ramifications of its finding that appellant knew or should have known of the unfair and deceptive trade practices on a particular date. Instead, the jury was told that [a] cause of action accrues when a Plaintiff knows, or by reasonable, diligent investigation should have known, of the injury or damage. The jury was also given general instructions on the definition of unfair trade practices. Nowhere in the instructions was the jury told about the statute of limitations or the legal effect of finding that appellant knew or should have known of the unfair and deceptive trade practices on October 28, 1998. Furthermore, it is counsel's responsibility to assure that all critical issues are submitted to the jury. Edwards v. Gramling Eng'g Corp., 322 Md. 535, 549, 588 A.2d 793, 800 (1991). Appellant may not, on appeal, bemoan the imprecise language of the special verdict, when she did not object to the questions submitted to the jury. Id. at 550, 588 A.2d at 800. Moreover, the trial court reserved on the issue of statute of limitations, which suggests that the Court would later apply the law to the facts, as found by the jury. Appellant argues that the jury's award of damages, coupled with its finding that appellant knew or should have known of the cause of action more than six years before she filed her complaint, indicates that the jury determined that the statute of limitations did not apply. We do n ot find this argument persuasive either. The jury's award of damages and its finding that appellant knew or should have known of her potential claim on October 28, 1998 are not inconsistent, because the jury was asked to render a verdict on the merits of the claim, and asked separately to determine the accrual date of the claim, but was not asked to apply the statute of limitations. This Court will reconcile the jury's response to a special verdict under the assumption that the jury acted rationally and consistently. Edwards, 322 Md. at 547, 588 A.2d at 799. Even assuming, arguendo, that there is any inconsistency between the jury's determination that appellant's claim accrued on October 28, 1998, and its verdict in favor of appellant, the apparent inconsistency may be reconciled. Without instructions on the legal ramifications of determining that appellant's claim accrued on October 28, 1998, the jury would have no reason to apply the statute of limitations to appellant's claim. We, therefore, interpret the jury's decision under the assumption that it acted rationally, and attribute its award of damages to its inability to apply a law on which it was never instructed. We have said that the question of when an action accrues, is one that is left to judicial determination. Frederick Rd. Ltd. P'ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 95, 756 A.2d 963, 973 (2000). In order to determine when an action accrues, this Court has adopted the discovery rule, which tolls the accrual date of the action until such time as the potential plaintiff either discovers his or her injury, or should have discovered it through the exercise of due diligence. Id. at 95-96, 756 A.2d at 973. The determination as to whether the plaintiff's failure to discover his cause of action was due to failure on his part to use due diligence, or to the fact that defendant so concealed the wrong that plaintiff was unable to discover it by the exercise of due diligence, is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 96, 756 A.2d at 974 ( quoting O'Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 294-95, 503 A.2d 1313, 1320 (1986)). In this case, the jury properly determined that appellant knew or should have known of the cause of action on October 28, 1998. The trial judge then applied the statute of limitations to the jury's factual findings, and determined that the claim was barred.