Opinion ID: 2668907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment on Exhaustion

Text: The PLRA mandates that inmates exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing “any suit challenging prison conditions,” including, but not limited to, suits under § 1983. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). An inmate is required to exhaust only available remedies. Booth, 532 U.S. at 736; Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2005). To be available, a remedy must be available “as a practical matter”; it must be “capable of use; at hand.” Id. at 937 (quoting Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2002)). The Court made clear in Jones that the defendant in a PLRA case must plead and prove exhaustion as an affirmative defense. In determining the exhaustion burdens applicable to PLRA cases, the three-judge panel in this case cited the exhaustion burdens applicable to claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”). Albino v. Baca, ALBINO V. BACA 17 697 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996)). We agree with the three-judge panel that the burdens outlined in Hilao should provide the template for the burdens here. We wrote in Hilao: The legislature’s intended operation of the exhaustion provision [of the TVPA] is set forth with remarkable clarity in the Senate Report: .... . . . [T]he interpretation of [the exhaustion provision of the TVPA] should be informed by general principles of international law. The procedural practice of international human rights tribunals generally holds that the respondent has the burden of raising the nonexhaustion of remedies as an affirmative defense and must show that domestic remedies exist that the claimant did not use. Once the defendant makes a showing of remedies abroad which have not been exhausted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile. S. Rep. No. 249 at 9–10. Hilao, 103 F.3d at 778 n.5 (emphasis added). 18 ALBINO V. BACA Transposing Hilao’s approach onto the PLRA, we hold that the defendant’s burden is to prove that there was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy. See id. (“[T]he respondent . . . must show that domestic remedies exist that the claimant did not use.”). Once the defendant has carried that burden, the prisoner has the burden of production. That is, the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. See id. (“[T]he burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.”). However, as required by Jones, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant. Our sister circuits generally agree with this description of the respective burdens. For example, in Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit wrote: [A]s this case comes to us, we find the record hopelessly unclear . . . whether any administrative remedy remained open for the prisoners to challenge their transfers through the grievance process. . . . IDOC failed to meet its burden of proving that [the prisoners] failed to exhaust an available administrative remedy . . . . Id. at 580 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2011), the Tenth Circuit similarly put the burden on defendants to prove that the prisoner did not use existing and generally available administrative remedies. Once that was proved, however, ALBINO V. BACA 19 “the onus [fell] on the plaintiff to show that [these] remedies were unavailable to him as a result of intimidation by prison officials.” Id. at 1254; see also Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 697 (8th Cir. 2001). We have considered in several PLRA cases whether an administrative remedy was “available.” In Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), we held that where a prison warden incorrectly implied that an inmate needed access to a nearly unobtainable prison policy in order to bring a timely administrative appeal, “the Warden’s mistake rendered Nunez’s administrative remedies effectively unavailable.” Id. at 1226. In Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2010), we held that where prison officials declined to reach the merits of a particular grievance “for reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by applicable regulations,” administrative remedies were “effectively unavailable.” Id. at 823–24. In Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), we reversed a district court’s dismissal of a PLRA case for failure to exhaust because the inmate did not have access to the necessary grievance forms within the prison’s time limits for filing a grievance. Id. at 1027–28. We also noted that Marella was not required to exhaust a remedy that he had been reliably informed was not available to him. Id. at 1027. In the case now before us, defendants conducted all the discovery that they considered necessary, including taking Albino’s deposition. They then moved for summary judgment, even though not required to do so under our thengoverning precedent, contending that Albino failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. In the alternative, if Albino had successfully exhausted, they contended that 20 ALBINO V. BACA Albino’s claims failed on the merits. The magistrate judge recommended, and the district court granted, summary judgment to the defendants on the issue of exhaustion. The district court did not reach the merits of Albino’s claims. We hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on the issue of exhaustion. We further hold that Albino is entitled to summary judgment on that issue. We discuss in a moment our reasons for so holding, but we first address the contention of our dissenting colleagues that we have improperly “ignore[d] the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review in reviewing the district court’s findings.” Diss. Op. at 30–31. Our dissenting colleagues misunderstand the procedural posture of this case. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. It is black-letter law that in granting summary judgment a district court cannot resolve disputed questions of material fact; rather, that court must view all of the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and rule, as a matter of law, based on those facts. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–50 (1986); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). On appeal, we review de novo a district court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion. Whitman, 541 F.3d at 931. Like the district court, we cannot resolve any disputed questions of material fact; rather, like the district court, we must view all of the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and rule, as a matter of law, based on those facts. San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n, 568 F.3d at 733. Our dissenting colleagues misread our decision in Morton v. Hall, 599 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2010). Diss. Op. at 34. The ALBINO V. BACA 21 district court in that case conducted an evidentiary hearing on the question whether Morton, a prisoner, had exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. at 944. Defendants put on two witnesses who testified about administrative procedures at the prison, and who testified that they had found no evidence that Morton had ever filed a grievance. Morton contended that he had exhausted his administrative remedies, but he put on no witnesses of his own. Id. We wrote, “The district court found that Morton had failed to exhaust administrative remedies on his § 1983 claims . . . and dismissed those claims without prejudice.” Id. We concluded, “On this record, the district court did not commit clear error by finding that Morton had failed to exhaust administrative remedies on his § 1983 assault claim.” Id. at 945. Contrary to the contention of our dissenting colleagues, there is no indication in Morton that we thought we were reviewing a summary judgment by the district court on issue of exhaustion. And there is not so much as a hint in Morton that we thought we were changing our summary judgment procedure, such that we were required to review for clear error the district court’s understanding, on summary judgment, of the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Our dissenting colleagues contend that in this case we must review for clear error the district court’s understanding of the facts because that court “did decide disputed factual issues.” Diss. Op. at 34. We disagree that we must review for clear error the district court’s understanding of the facts. The district court was explicit in stating that it was deciding a motion for summary judgment. Because the district court was deciding a motion for summary judgment, it could not decide disputed issues of material fact; and because it could not decide any disputed issue of material fact, we are not 22 ALBINO V. BACA required (or even allowed) to review its understanding of the facts for clear error. Defendants introduced two declarations specifically directed to exhaustion. First, Deputy Ford provided a declaration to which he attached a copy of Custody Division Manual § 5-12/010.00, titled “Inmate Complaints.” This portion of the Manual is four and a half pages long, singlespaced. It sets out in some detail the administrative procedures to be followed in processing prisoner complaints. Among other things, the Manual provides: Each unit commander shall designate a supervisor, at the permanent rank of sergeant or above, to assume the collateral duty of Inmate Complaint Coordinator. The unit commander shall also ensure that each housing unit within the facility has an adequate supply of Inmate Complaint Forms available, and that the inmates have unrestricted access to the forms. All inmates are permitted to report a complaint, whether or not it is written on the specified form. Each housing area shall have a locked repository accessible to inmates, where they are allowed to deposit their completed forms without interference. Second, Deputy Kelley provided a declaration in which he states: I have personal knowledge of the policies and procedures in place regarding inmate complaints/grievances at Men’s Central Jail as ALBINO V. BACA 23 of the time of the incidents alleged in the First Amended Complaint. At Men’s Central Jail, inmates are given access to Inmate Complaint Forms to fill out, or they may submit a written complaint of any kind, to address any number of issues, including but not limited to personnel conduct, medical care, classification actions and conditions of confinement. The Inmate Complaint Forms are available at various locations within the facility, and an adequate supply is maintained and available for any inmate who requests them. Inmates may place their complaints in a locked complaint box, or give them directly to the staff. (Emphasis added.) For his part, Albino provided a declaration in which he states: At no time during my stay was I interviewed by jail staff, or given any type of orientation. . . . At no time during my stay at the jail did I see a LASD Custody Division Manual § 5- 12/010.00, or if I did it was not in Spanish where I could read and understand what it was. I have never seen or heard of a LASD Jail complaint form. 24 ALBINO V. BACA .... I never seen [sic] a complaint box, and no one told me of such a complaint box. . . . After the first attack, I pleaded with many staff members for help but the only thing anyone told me was; it is your attorney[’]s job to protect me. .... During the 10 or so times I begged officers to be placed in segregation. Not one officer or staff member handed me a complaint form or a rule book and told me to fill out the form and they would put it in a box. All any of the staff told me was my public defender[’]s job to protect me. My public defender also never informed me of a LASD complaint form. The Custody Division Manual, with its section dedicated to “Inmate Complaints,” is of little help to defendants. Defendants have conceded that the Manual was a personnel manual that was available only to jail employees. Prisoners, including Albino, were not given access to the Manual. Indeed, so far as the record shows, inmates were not even told of the existence of the Manual. Deputy Kelley’s declaration is hardly more helpful. He states that an “adequate supply” of Inmate Complaint Forms is “maintained,” and that they are “available for any inmate who requests them” (emphasis added). The clear implication ALBINO V. BACA 25 of Deputy Kelley’s statement is that the forms are available only on request; that is, they are not placed where inmates may see and take them on their own. Further, there is nothing in Deputy Kelley’s statement indicating that inmates are told that a complaint must be in writing, or that a written complaint, even if not on an official form, will be considered. Finally, Deputy Kelley declares that inmates may place their complaints in a “locked complaint box,” but he does not describe the box or its location in the unit. Nor, indeed, does he say that the box is labeled in any way to indicate its function. When pressed at oral argument, defendants’ attorney rested on Deputy Kelley’s declaration, even though he was obliged to concede that Deputy Kelley did not say where the complaint box was placed or whether there was anything written on the outside of the box. Thus, so far as the record shows, there is a personnel manual describing a complaint process, but the manual is not available, or even known, to the prisoners. There are also “locked complaint boxes” located somewhere in the prison where, we may infer from Deputy Kelley’s declaration, prisoners have access to them. But there is nothing in the record to indicate that the boxes have anything written on them to signify their purpose, or that prisoners are otherwise advised of their purpose or location. Deputy Kelley states that a written complaint may be “give[n] directly to staff,” but there is nothing in the record to indicate that inmates are told that a complaint must be in writing in order to be considered. Finally, we may infer from Deputy Kelley’s declaration that complaint forms are available only if a prisoner knows to request them. Albino declares, without contradiction, the following. He declares that he was never given any orientation at the jail, 26 ALBINO V. BACA during which he could have been informed of a complaint process. He also declares that he has never seen the jail’s personnel manual, a complaint box, or a complaint form. Finally, he declares that he repeatedly sought, and was denied, help from the prison staff. Specifically, he declares that he repeatedly complained “directly to the staff” (to use Deputy Kelley’s words) that he needed to be placed in protective custody. Staff members never told him that complaint forms were “available for any inmate who requests them” (again to use Deputy Kelley’s words), and they never construed Albino’s complaints as requests for such forms. Nor did staff members tell Albino that he could put in a complaint box, or give directly to them, a written complaint, even if not on an official form. Instead, staff members repeatedly told Albino that he should seek relief by talking to his criminal defense attorney. As we noted above, failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead and prove in a PLRA case. Jones, 549 U.S. at 212. Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Albino, we conclude as a matter of law that defendants have failed to carry their initial burden of proving their affirmative defense that there was an available administrative remedy that Albino failed to exhaust. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on the issue of exhaustion. Albino, acting pro se, did not make a cross-motion for summary judgment. However, we conclude he would have succeeded had he made such a motion. We therefore direct sua sponte that summary judgment be granted to Albino on the issue of exhaustion. ALBINO V. BACA 27 We have long recognized that, where the party moving for summary judgment has had a full and fair opportunity to prove its case, but has not succeeded in doing so, a court may enter summary judgment sua sponte for the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 311 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Gospel Missions of Am. v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even when there has been no cross-motion for summary judgment, a district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte against a moving party if the losing party has had a ‘full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues involved in the matter.’”) (quoting Cool Fuel, Inc., 685 F.2d at 312). The Supreme Court implicitly recognized this authority in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), noting that “district courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.” Id. at 326. The authority to grant summary judgment sua sponte was made explicit in the current version of Rule 56, effective as of December 2010. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). If the record is sufficiently developed to permit the trial court to consider summary judgment, ant if the court finds that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to a moving party the movant has not shown a genuine dispute of fact on the issue of exhaustion, it may be appropriate for the district court to grant summary judgment sua sponte for the nonmovant on this issue. See 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720, at 351–52 (3d ed. 1998) (“[T]he practice of allowing summary judgment to be entered for the nonmoving party in the absence of a formal cross-motion is appropriate. It is in keeping with the objective of Rule 56 to expedite the disposition of cases . . . .”). Before sua sponte 28 ALBINO V. BACA summary judgment against a party is proper, that party “must be given reasonable notice that the sufficiency of his or her claim will be in issue: Reasonable notice implies adequate time to develop the facts on which the litigant will depend to oppose summary judgment.” Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in Kassbaum v. Steppenwolf Productions, Inc., 236 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 2000), we noted that “if a court concludes that a non-moving party is entitled to judgment, ‘great care must be exercised to assure that the original movant has had an adequate opportunity to show that there is a genuine issue and that his [or her] opponent is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. at 494 (quoting Ramsey v. Coughlin, 94 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1996)). We further noted that “we should not reverse a summary judgment and order judgment for a non-moving party based on an issue that the movant had no opportunity to dispute in the district court.” Id. at 495. We conclude that the concerns expressed in Buckingham and Kassbaum have been satisfied in a case such as this one, where, after having had a full opportunity to gather evidence, a defendant moves for summary judgment based on a failure to exhaust under the PLRA. As the movants for summary judgment in this case, defendants were on notice of the need to come forward with all their evidence in support of this motion, and they had every incentive to do so. Defendants had ample opportunity to conduct discovery and to provide evidence to carry their burden of proof that administrative remedies were available. There is nothing in the record to suggest that defendants’ discovery with respect to exhaustion was curtailed in any way. Indeed, most of the relevant evidence was within their knowledge and control. In other ALBINO V. BACA 29 words, defendants “had a full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues involved.” Cool Fuel, Inc., 685 F.2d at 312. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendants, defendants have failed to show a genuine dispute as to whether administrative remedies in the jail were available. Albino was beaten several times and repeatedly complained orally to deputies in the jail, asking repeatedly to be placed in protective custody. The jail had a manual describing a procedure for handling inmate complaints, but this manual was for staff use only and was not made available to inmates. An “adequate supply” of Inmate Complaint Forms was kept “at various locations” within the jail. But such forms had to be requested by an inmate and were never provided to Albino, despite his repeated complaints. Nor was Albino told that he could write a complaint on an ordinary piece of paper and hand it to one of the deputies. Instead, Albino was told that it was his criminal defense attorney’s job to protect him from attacks in the jail. In these circumstances, we conclude as a matter of law that defendants have not carried their burden of proving that the jail provided an “available” administrative remedy.