Opinion ID: 525037
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenge to Section 2118(a) as Unconstitutionally Vague

Text: 9 The provision of the Controlled Substance Registrant Protection Act pertinent to this prosecution reads: 10 Whoever takes or attempts to take from the person or presence of another by force or violence or by intimidation any material or compound containing any quantity of a controlled substance belonging to or in the care, custody, control, or possession of a person registered with the Drug Enforcement Administration under section 302 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 822) [21 USCS Sec. 822] shall, except as provided in subsection (c), be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, if (1) the replacement cost of the material or compound to the registrant was not less than $500   . 11 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2118(a) (Supp. V 1987). 12 Kaylor asserts that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it permits arbitrary enforcement by failing to specify whether replacement cost    to the registrant means an average wholesale price or the actual cost to the pharmacy of replacing the stolen drugs. Kaylor notes that the Nile Pharmacy incurred an actual replacement cost of more than $500 only because a price increase occurred during the three months between the robbery and replacement. Moreover, the average wholesale price figures the Government submitted in evidence exceeded the discounted prices the pharmacies would have paid if they actually had replaced the drugs at or near the time of the robberies. 13 Kaylor also argues that section 2118(a) is vague because it fails to define the term material or compound. Specifically, Kaylor contends that the statute permits arbitrary enforcement by granting pharmacists discretion to base their replacement cost calculations on the prices of either the brand-name drugs stolen or their cheaper generic equivalents. 14 The void-for-vagueness doctrine evolved from the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. United States v. Articles of Drug, 825 F.2d 1238, 1243 (8th Cir.1987). Due process requires that laws provide notice to the ordinary person of what is prohibited and standards to law enforcement officials to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); D.C. v. City of St. Louis, 795 F.2d 652, 653 (8th Cir.1986). In determining whether a statute is impermissibly vague, courts generally look to the common usage of statutory language, judicial explanations of its meaning, and previous applications of the statute to the same or similar conduct. Postscript Enters., Inc. v. Whaley, 658 F.2d 1249, 1255 (8th Cir.1981) (quoting Balthazar v. Superior Court, 573 F.2d 698, 700 (1st Cir.1978)). 15 We reject Kaylor's contention that section 2118(a) should be voided as unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define the terms replacement cost and material or compound. The common meaning of these phrases provides both adequate notice of the conduct prohibited and standards for enforcement. The fact that the Government may prove the elements of the crime by several methods does not render the statute vague. Thus, we reject the constitutional challenge to the law. 16