Opinion ID: 2161601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Exclusion for Cause of Jury Panel Members Who Expressed General Objections to the Death Penalty

Text: Grandison next contends that of the twenty six prospective jurors who expressed some hesitation about imposing the death penalty, all but three were excused for cause. He argues that it is clear that the court improperly struck these jurors because their beliefs were not such as to prevent them from rendering an impartial verdict. The State, on the other hand, contends there was no error by the trial judge. We have carefully reviewed the record and agree with the State's position. The Court has recently been confronted with two death penalty cases in which the same basic argument was made as is now presented by Grandison; in both cases we rejected that argument and do so here. See Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 499 A.2d 1236 (1985) and Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985). The only variation in Grandison's argument stems from Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), wherein the Supreme Court modified the standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment. [13] The Court stated, That standard is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-52 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)). After reviewing the record we are satisfied that where the trial judge excused a prospective juror for cause he followed the standard set out in Witt. In reaching this conclusion we recognize that deference must be given to the trial judge's decision to exclude. In Witt, in pertinent part, the Supreme Court stated: We note that, in addition to dispensing with Witherspoon's reference to `automatic' decisionmaking, this standard likewise does not require that a juror's bias be proved with `unmistakable clarity.' This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made `unmistakably clear'; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. For reasons that will be developed more fully infra, this is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. ___ U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 852-53, 83 L.Ed.2d at 852-53 (footnote omitted). In our view, Judge Simpkins was painstakingly thorough in the questioning of prospective jurors, particularly those who obviously had problems with the death penalty in general. Furthermore, the trial judge afforded Grandison, his standby attorney, and the State's attorney ample opportunity to question the prospective jurors. In short, we are satisfied that the entire procedure was carefully executed in an effort to obtain a fair and impartial jury both as to the defendant and to the State.