Opinion ID: 349523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Jurisdictional Theories

Text: 41 In the alternative, the district court held that it had direct jurisdiction over the claims against the District on the basis of diversity of citizenship. This holding was based upon the district court's reasoning that the District of Columbia is a municipal corporation, D.C.Code § 1-102(a) (Supp. IV 1977), and that like other municipal corporations it is subject to suit under the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. 59 Rieser supports this conclusion, arguing that the District particularly possessed the characteristics of a municipal corporation on August 31, 1973, when the complaint was filed, before the advent of home rule under the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act. 60 We note that the statute on its face poses some difficulty with this conclusion. Section 1332(a)(1) establishes federal diversity jurisdiction over suits between citizens of different States. Whether or not the District is or was a municipal corporation, the statute appears to require that it be a citizen( ) of (a) State( ) for federal diversity jurisdiction to attach. While section 1332(d) defines the District as a state for the purpose of the diversity statute, the District would arguably have to be a citizen of itself to fit within section 1332(a). 61 Since we have concluded above that section 1332(d) does not negate the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the claim against the District, and that the district court otherwise properly exercised such jurisdiction, we need not resolve the more difficult question of whether section 1332(a) affirmatively grants diversity jurisdiction over claims against the District of Columbia. 42 Neither do we resolve the question, raised by Rieser only on appeal, of whether the district court had jurisdiction over the claim against the District ancillary to the claims earlier filed against Whalen and CBI Fairmac. 62