Opinion ID: 1385454
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Incorporate Statutory or Regulatory Standards into Jury Instructions

Text: Johnson argues that the trial court erred in not incorporating into the jury instructions the following statutory standards of care prescribed for the holders of utility permits: [27] An electric transmission, telephone or telegraph line, pole line, railway, ditch, sewer, water, heat or gas main, flume, or other structure which by law may be constructed, placed, or maintained across or along a highway by a person or political subdivision may be maintained or constructed only in accordance with regulations prescribed by the department. No utility project of this nature may be undertaken until it is authorized by a written permit issued by the department. (emphasis added). AS 19.25.010. [28] The permitee shall take all measures necessary to provide for the continued travel of the highway by the public during construction or maintenance of a facility authorized by a utility permit, and shall protect, barricade and sign any obstruction, excavation or hazard across or along the traveled way. 17 AAC 15.060(a). The trial court denied Johnson's request on the ground that the statute and regulation apply only if active construction work is taking place. Johnson argues that the statute and regulation apply because the city was maintaining the railway crossing (the object of the permit). She relies on the statute's definition of maintenance: `maintenance' means the preservation of each type of highway, roadside structure and facility as nearly as possible in its original condition as constructed, or as subsequently improved, and the operation of highway facilities and services to provide satisfactory and safe highways; AS 19.05.130(9). The city, on the other hand, argues that the above definition implies that maintenance refers to some type of active work undertaken to preserve the facility. It argues that applying the statute to the facts of this case would create onerous burdens: If ... the mere existence of a constant, continuing condition is [to be within the term] maintenance, the City would, for example, have to sign every manhole whether being used in active work or not. The city urges us to look not at the statutory definition of maintenance, but rather to the department's regulations which more particularly define the term. Those regulations divide maintenance into routine or major. [29] Each, it argues, implies actual work. Thus, under the city's view, the regulatory obligations of adequate signing would apply only when city crews perform actual work on the crossing. We agree. The regulation specifies certain duties that a holder of a utility permit must undertake when performing actual work on the MUS spur track crossing. No active maintenance work was being performed on the crossing at the time of Johnson's accident and, therefore, the regulatory standard was not applicable. The trial court properly refused to incorporate it into the instructions. Further, we believe the regulation was sufficiently ambiguous such that a prudent person could not reasonably determine whether it applied to other than active maintenance work; accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to adopt the standard in a negligence per se instruction. See McLinn v. Kodiak Electric Association, Inc., 546 P.2d 1305, 1314 (Alaska 1976). Because the standard was inapplicable on the facts, we do not address whether it was specific enough to warrant a negligence per se instruction. [30]
Johnson argues that the trial court erred both in not allowing Johnson's attorney to examine an MUS supervisory engineer, and in not instructing the jury, on the following requirements of 13 AAC 02.400: A person operating a bicycle upon a highway shall ride as near to the right side of the roadway as practicable, exercising due care when passing a standing vehicle or one proceeding in the same direction. ..... A person operating a bicycle on a highway shall give way to the right as far as practicable to a motor vehicle proceeding in the same direction when the driver of a motor vehicle gives an audible signal. Although an automobile was approaching Johnson from behind when she fell, there was no evidence that the driver gave an audible signal. Thus the second paragraph of the instruction was not applicable to the facts. It was properly omitted. The court, however, ruled that both paragraphs were inapplicable. It viewed the entire regulation as pertaining solely to passing, and the city urges the same view on appeal. The trial court did not err in not allowing Johnson to cross-examine the engineer on his knowledge and interpretation of highway regulations contained in the Alaska Administrative Code. The existence and interpretation of those regulations was a matter of law for the court, to be dealt with in the court's instructions to the jury, if at all. The engineer was not qualified to give a legal opinion on the regulation. C. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 12, at 28 & n. 55, § 335, at 776 (2d ed. 1972). We do conclude, however, that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the requirements found in the first paragraph of 13 AAC 02.400. Because the regulatory requirements were relevant to the reasonableness of Johnson's conduct under the circumstances, the jury should have been made aware of them. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 36, at 201-02, 203-04 (4th ed. 1971). The evidence showed that one method of reducing the hazard posed to bicyclists by the angled crossing would be to construct a pad or pathway to the side of the road, thus allowing bicyclists to swing out and approach the tracks more perpendicularly. [31] The city attempted to refute the need for such a pad by bringing out, on cross-examination of the MUS engineer, the point that a bicyclist could accomplish the same maneuver by utilizing the entire lane, i.e., by approaching the crossing from a leftside angle. In light of this testimony and the fact that cars were approaching Johnson from both the front and rear, plus the testimony of a state regional traffic engineer that [t]here isn't much room for a bicycle and a car on the Phillips Field Road, the issue of Johnson's right to use the entire lane was raised and the jury should have been instructed on the obligations of a bicyclist using the road. On remand, the first paragraph of 13 AAC 02.400 should be incorporated into the jury instructions.