Opinion ID: 6331052
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Most Analogous State Law

Text: We agree with the Timpsons that the district court erred in finding that their ADA and RA claims alleging discrimination in the provision of public services and retaliation were subject to the South Carolina Human Affairs Law’s one-year statute of limitations. Although “the most analogous [state law claim for statute of limitations purposes] need not be identical,” we have made clear that the controlling state legislation is that which provides substantially “the same rights and remedies” as the ADA. Wolsky v. Med. Coll. of Hampton Roads, 1 F.3d 222, 224–25 (4th Cir. 1993). In Semenova v. Maryland Transit Administration, 845 F.3d 564 (4th Cir. 2017), we held that when a state’s antidiscrimination statute “does not contain a cause of action for disability discrimination in the provision of public services, the closer state-law analog to [an ADA] claim is a general civil action.” Id. at 566. The South Carolina Human Affairs Law prohibits disability discrimination in employment, S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-80, and in conducting certain medical examinations or inquiries of a job applicant or employees, S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-80, not in the provision of public services. Moreover, South Carolina’s public accommodations statute provides that “[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” S.C. Code Ann. § 45-9-10(A) (emphasis added); id. § 45-9- 10(B)(3) (defining “public accommodation” as “any hospital, clinic, or other medical facility which provides overnight accommodations”). That statute is silent about claims for 13 disability discrimination. As a result, under Semenova, the district court erred in applying the South Carolina Human Affairs Law’s statute of limitations rather than the three-year period for general civil actions. See id. § 15-3-530(5). We first address the implications of this error as it applies to Sandra before turning to Johnny’s claims. Though the Timpsons vaguely assert that this decision prevented Sandra from recovering for retaliatory acts before 2015, they mostly fail to specify what retaliation she suffered or how she (and not Johnny) was harmed. See Opening Br. 38 (“Because of this error, the jury was not allowed to award damages for retaliatory acts against Sandra before 2/23/2015, when Defendants concealed records, delayed Johnny’s discharge, refused to provide records, reported to law enforcement that Sandra was exploiting her brother,[19] [and] failed to investigate sexual assaults[.]”). The Timpsons’ sparse record cites offer little guidance in our review. See Rodriguez-Machado v. Shinseki, 700 F.3d 48, 49–50 (1st Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Essentially, [counsel] is asking us to do one of two things: accept what she says as gospel or mine the record ourselves to confirm the truth of her story—and there is no reason for us to do either. . . . [D]oing [counsel’s] work for her is not an option, since that would divert precious judge-time from other litigants who could have their cases resolved thoughtfully and expeditiously because they followed the rules.”); United States 19 The only record citation to support this claim in the opening brief makes no mention of such a report. See Opening Br. 19 (citing J.A. 2189 (detailing various incidents involving Johnny while he was under the Board’s care)). There was a note in a case status report suggesting that Angela Timpson (also Johnny’s sister) had told law enforcement that she believed Sandra “was in the process of building a new home and . . . felt that [Johnny’s complaints were] a means for Sandra Timpson to be able to take Johnny and be able to access his finical [sic] monies.” J.A. 1758. The Timpsons did not name either Angela or the Anderson County Sherriff’s Office (who authored the report) as Defendants. 14 v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (explaining that “[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in [the record]”). Still, Sandra appears to have made one potential claim for ADA and RA retaliation that would be impacted by the district court’s statute of limitations ruling: that Defendants—which ones is unclear—“failed to inform [her] of feasible alternatives under the waiver.” Opening Br. 38. In the amended complaint, the Timpsons generally alleged “Defendants have failed to inform Sandra of . . . feasible alternatives and to provide sufficient services in the home so that she can return to work and so that her brother can avoid institutionalization.” J.A. 258. “Sandra repeatedly complained about Defendants [sic] conduct towards Johnny. In retaliation for those complaints the defendants withheld and delayed services to Johnny for Sandra when she took him into her home” in August 2013. J.A. 259. The amended complaint concluded that “Defendants have retaliated against persons, including Johnny and Sandra, who have advocated for waiver participants and employees who have reported abuse, neglect and exploitation[, and] have experienced reprisals, and these wrongful acts by Defendants have resulted in injury to Johnny and Sandra.” J.A. 266; see also J.A. 2729 (Sandra’s affidavit claiming she “was never told that family members or friends could be paid to provide personal care attendant hours or that if [she] was appointed as Johnny’s guardian, [she] could not be paid to provide attendant care”). Therefore, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of Sandra’s ADA and RA retaliation claims that occurred between February 23, 2013, and February 23, 2015. On remand, we direct Sandra to specify which Defendants, if any, she claims retaliated against her during this period and to state, with specificity, how they did so. 15 We affirm, however, the district court’s dismissal of Johnny’s claims because he has failed to show how this ruling prejudiced him. The Timpsons vaguely allege in their opening brief that, “[a]s a result of [the district court’s ruling], the jury also did not consider Johnny’s pre-2010 claims for ongoing ADA and [RA] violations.” Opening Br. 38. They make no mention of what these claims were or upon what facts they were based. The lone reference in their opening brief to an incident during the 2008 through 2009 period (incorporating the added two years Johnny’s ADA and RA claims would have received had the district court applied the correct statute of limitations) was a claim that his “surrogate was not informed of his elopements and threat to injure himself in 2008.” Opening Br. 11. But this appears to be a reference to the consent-based claims the district court expressly rejected because the Timpsons failed to allege any issue related to it in their amended complaint. See J.A. 5811 (“[I]n the amended complaint there is no claim pled involving consent,” meaning “anything related to consent is really not before the [c]ourt.”). And the Timpsons have waived any challenge to this ruling by failing to raise it on appeal. Therefore, Johnny has no ADA or RA claims for the additional time period.