Opinion ID: 2027457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admonitions

Text: On appeal before this court, the defendant asserts that the guilty-plea proceedings did not comply with the requirements of either due process or our Rule 402 (87 Ill.2d R. 402), since the trial judge allegedly failed to admonish the defendant of the nature of the charges to which he pled guilty, to adequately advise him of the minimum and maximum sentences, and to determine whether his guilty plea was entered voluntarily. The State maintains that, since the trial judge substantially complied with Rule 402, the guilty-plea proceeding did not violate the defendant's right to due process of law. Rule 402(a) requires substantial compliance with the following in hearings on pleas of guilty: (a) Admonitions to Defendant. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following: (1) the nature of the charge; (2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; [and]    (4) that if he pleads guilty there will not be a trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty he waives the right to a trial by jury and the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. 87 Ill.2d R. 402(a). Rule 402(b) provides in part: Determining Whether the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is voluntary.    The court, by questioning the defendant personally in open court, shall confirm the terms of the plea agreement, or that there is no agreement, and shall determine whether any force or threats or any promises, apart from a plea agreement, were used to obtain the plea. 87 Ill.2d R. 402(b). Rule 402 was adopted in response to the requirement of Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709, that a guilty plea not be accepted in the absence of an affirmative showing in the record that the plea was intelligent and voluntary. See 87 Ill.2d R. 402, Committee Comments. In People v. Krantz (1974), 58 Ill.2d 187, 192, this court, in reference to Rule 402, held: We note first the rule requires that there need be only substantial, not literal, compliance with its provisions. ( People v. Mendoza, 48 Ill.2d 371, 373-374.) Also, the entire record may be considered in determining whether or not there was an understanding by the accused of the nature of the charge. People v. Doyle, 20 Ill.2d 163, 167; People v. Harden, 38 Ill.2d 559, 563, aff'd People v. Harden, 78 Ill. App.2d 431, 444-445. In McCarthy v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 459, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, 89 S.Ct. 1166, the court held that a trial judge, before a plea of guilty is accepted, must, in accordance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, make a personal inquiry of the defendant to determine if he understands the nature of the charge against him. In People v. Mims (1969), 42 Ill.2d 441, this court commented on the holding in McCarthy. In Mims, it was said that McCarthy emphasizes the importance of personal inquiries addressed to the defendant to ascertain directly his understanding of the nature of the charge against him. And although that decision was `based solely' upon the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 11    the underlying reasons apply equally to Rule 401 [predecessor to Rule 402] of this court. 42 Ill.2d 441, 444. The indictment in Mims charged the defendant with murder and involuntary manslaughter. The defendant changed his plea and pleaded guilty to the charge of murder. One of the defendant's attorneys described the advice that he gave the defendant as to the possible consequence of his plea and informed the court that the defendant still wished to plead guilty. The trial judge informed the defendant that by pleading guilty he would waive his right to a jury trial and informed him of the possible penalties that could be imposed. The defendant still persisted in his plea. There was no formal inquiry made of the defendant as to whether he understood the nature of the charge, but this court affirmed the conviction, holding: The recital of the anticipated testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, in the presence of the defendant and his attorneys, without protest and indeed with acquiescence, demonstrates to our satisfaction that the defendant's conduct falls within the charge to which he pleaded guilty. 42 Ill.2d 441, 444. In the instant case, the State maintains that the record sufficiently shows defendant's understanding of the nature of the charges because even his own counsel stated that he had at length, with the court's permission, advised the defendant of the consequences of his guilty plea. We believe that the record demonstrates that the defendant understood the nature of the charges because he changed his plea in response to the State's nol-prossing the counts to which he claimed he had defenses, which indicates that the defendant and his attorneys, who were present through the entire proceeding, understood the nature of the remaining charges. Further, as this court held in Mims, the defendant and his attorneys did not protest and indeed acquiesced in the recital of the State's statement of facts which demonstrated that the defendant's conduct fell within the charges to which he pleaded guilty. At this juncture, it is also important to note that the defendant does not contend that he did not understand the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty or that he is not guilty. Rather, he maintains that the trial judge erred in not explaining the nature of the charges. The defendant was represented by two attorneys throughout the entire proceeding. At the arraignment, the information was read aloud in open court in front of the defendant. We therefore believe that the record demonstrates that the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him. The defendant also contends that he should have been admonished as to the minimum and maximum prison sentences he could have received. The trial judge did fully admonish the defendant regarding the possibility that he might receive a death sentence. In fact, most of the admonishments were aimed at making that clear. The trial judge also admonished the defendant that it was his right to have his case heard by a jury. He told the defendant that he had the right to have the question of the death sentence heard by a jury also. Understandably, no claim is made that the defendant, represented by counsel, was unaware of the possible punishment to which his conduct had exposed him. No complaint of any defect in the trial court's admonition regarding sentencing was made during the proceeding in this case. Our Rule 402 was designed to insure properly entered pleas of guilty, not to provide for a recital of all the possible sentencing situations that might arise. The defendant was made aware and said he understood that he might receive the death penalty; obviously, as that is the ultimate penalty, any sentence short of that was a possible lesser sentence. We are not persuaded that the trial judge failed to substantially comply with Rule 402 because he did not ceremoniously inform the defendant of all the lesser sentences which could possibly be imposed. We are not persuaded by the defendant's argument that the record does not indicate that his plea was voluntary. There is no evidence in the record that he was pressured or forced to enter a guilty plea. The judge went out of his way to explain that by entering a guilty plea he would not be entitled to a lesser penalty, that he was giving up his right to an actual trial, including the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. The judge repeatedly asked the defendant if he understood what he was telling him. The defendant never told the judge he did not understand; he said he did understand. We have no reason to believe that the defendant was not telling the truth. The State argues that the defendant knew what he was doing in pleading guilty in this case because he was no stranger to the criminal justice system. We do not agree with the State's assertion. Just because a defendant has pleaded guilty or not guilty on other charges does not persuade us that he necessarily pleaded guilty voluntarily in this case. We are, however, persuaded by the entire record that the defendant did voluntarily plead guilty.