Opinion ID: 2013856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: C. Burton

Text: As his next claim, defendant alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of R.C. Burton, defendant's landlord. Burton was hospitalized during the time of defendant's second trial, and the trial court granted defendant leave to take Burton's evidence deposition. Counsel ultimately decided, however, to proceed without Burton's testimony. According to defendant, Burton would have testified that, at 6:30 a.m. on August 10, 1987, he saw Diane Gonzales' maroon car in the parking lot outside defendant's apartment. This vehicle, therefore, could not have been the vehicle seen leaving the parking lot outside Entrata's apartment building that morning. Defendant has failed to support this claim with the necessary affidavit from Burton. See Johnson, 183 Ill.2d at 192, 233 Ill.Dec. 288, 700 N.E.2d 996. Although defendant states in his reply brief that Burton is deceased and not now available, it remains unclear whether defendant could have obtained an affidavit from Burton in November 1996 when defendant filed his amended post-conviction petition. Defendant argues that, notwithstanding the absence of an affidavit from Burton, it was established in the first trial that Burton would testify that the maroon vehicle was parked outside defendant's apartment on the morning of the murder. Defendant mischaracterizes Burton's testimony. At defendant's first trial, the State called Burton as a witness. On cross-examination by defense counsel, the following exchange occurred: Q. When you left for work on the morning of August 10th at 6:30 in the morning, that maroon car that belonged to Tony and Diane was still parked in the parking space, wasn't it? A. I can't say for sure whether it was or was not.    Q. Do you remember having a conversation with the Lieutenant Stevenson on that day? A. Yes.    Q. Did you tellisn't it true you told Lieutenant Stevenson on that date that when you left for work this morning at about 6:30 you noticed a maroon car which Enis drives still in the driveway this morning when you left at 6:30? A. I don't know whether I said that or not. On redirect, the prosecutor asked Burton whether he remembered talking to an investigator from the public defender's office on February 7, 1988. Although Burton was not sure of the date, he thinks he told investigators that he could not testify as to whether the maroon car was parked behind the building when Burton left for work on the morning of August 10, 1987. Officer Stevenson subsequently testified that Burton told him that the maroon car was parked behind defendant's apartment that morning. Thus, contrary to defendant's contention on appeal, it was not established in the first trial that Burton would testify on retrial that the maroon vehicle was parked outside defendant's apartment on the morning of the murder. Assuming that Burton's testimony on retrial was established in the first trial, as defendant claims, and that Burton would have testified consistent with his conversation with Officer Stevenson, defendant has waived review of this issue by failing to raise counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal. See Olinger, 176 Ill.2d at 365, 223 Ill.Dec. 588, 680 N.E.2d 321. Defendant maintains, however, that his appellate counsel was ineffective as a result. A defendant who argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a particular issue on appeal must show that the failure to raise that issue was objectively unreasonable and that the decision prejudiced defendant. Childress, 191 Ill.2d at 175, 246 Ill.Dec. 352, 730 N.E.2d 32; Olinger, 176 Ill.2d at 365, 223 Ill.Dec. 588, 680 N.E.2d 321. We must determine, therefore, whether defendant's underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel would have been successful if raised on direct appeal. See Childress, 191 Ill.2d at 175, 246 Ill.Dec. 352, 730 N.E.2d 32. Testimony by Burton that Gonzales' car was parked behind defendant's apartment on the morning of the murder would have been subject to impeachment based on Burton's inconsistent statements to investigators and his sworn testimony at the first trial. In addition, there was evidence introduced on retrial tending to establish that the maroon vehicle had been moved on the morning of the murder. See Enis, 163 Ill.2d at 384, 206 Ill.Dec. 604, 645 N.E.2d 856. Thus, Burton's testimony would not have gone unrebutted. Finally, three prosecution witnesses made in-court identifications of defendant. Based on this record, defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant's trial would have been different had defendant's counsel introduced Burton's testimony. Defendant has, accordingly, also failed to make a substantial showing that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, on direct review, trial counsel's ineffectiveness in not calling Burton as a witness. See Childress, 191 Ill.2d at 175, 246 Ill.Dec. 352, 730 N.E.2d 32.