Opinion ID: 197179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 Re: Selection Process.

Text: 26 On August 13, 1993, three days before the initial hearing on Legault's motion for preliminary injunction before the Magistrate Judge, Attorney DiLuglio sent a letter to opposing counsel, which he copied to the court. This letter stated, falsely, that [s]tandings in the obstacle course and the written exam determine overall standings in the application process. 27 Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, which parallels Rule 26(g) in all pertinent respects for purposes of this decision, applies to [e]very pleading, written motion and other paper presented to the court. Without contesting the falsity of the representation made in the August 13, 1993 letter, DiLuglio argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to view the letter as an other paper for purposes of Rule 11. 28 Courts have been properly reluctant to characterize a letter generally as an other paper in weighing Rule 11 sanctions. See, Curley v. Brignoli, Curley & Roberts, Assoc., 128 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y.1989). In this case, however, DiLuglio deliberately copied his letter to the presiding Magistrate Judge three days before the preliminary injunction hearing with the purpose to advise the court and all parties of its contents. He repeated the substance of the letter in his memorandum opposing the motion for preliminary injunction. Moreover, the letter's message--that Legault would have a fair chance at getting a job on the fire department if she did well on the tests--actually influenced Magistrate Judge Barry in making his recommendation (later rejected by the district court) that Legault receive only partial injunctive relief. 29 To hold under these circumstances that this particular letter sails beyond the reach of Rule 11 would be to exalt form over substance and reward the rankest game-playing. DiLuglio sent this letter, the trial judge found, with the intent to influence the court, at a time and in a manner calculated to insure its impact. As it happened, it did influence the court substantially. Given this, the imposition of sanctions based in part upon the letter's false contents was no abuse of discretion. 30