Opinion ID: 150737
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admission of the 911 Tape

Text: 10 Case: 09-60400 Document: 00511174536 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/15/2010 No. 09-60400 Appellants argue that the tape of a 911 call placed by a local firefighter based upon information received from two unidentified witnesses who did not testify at trial constituted impermissible double hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 805. At trial, the district court prohibited the firefighter from testifying as to the information provided by the unidentified witnesses on the grounds that the information provided by those individuals constituted hearsay. Whitmore argues that the same objection should have excluded the 911 tape as it contains the same inadmissible hearsay compounded by a second layer of hearsay.5 Nonetheless, even assuming the district court erred, any resulting error was harmless. The 911 tape identifies the location where the SUV went off the road, states that a black male was seen in the vicinity, describes a silver Scion also in the area, and mentions reports of shots fired. All of this information was also admitted at trial through a number of other sources, including the testimony of Mogilles and Jones. Consequently, Appellants are not entitled to relief on these grounds. 2. The Admission of the Government’s Expert Testimony Maureen Bradley, a Ph.D. in analytical chemistry, offered testimony at trial linking paint chips found at the murder scene to the burned SUV found some distance away. Appellants contend the district court erred in admitting Bradley’s testimony on the grounds that there were no studies that established the error rate for paint chip matching, Bradley kept no database of paint chip comparisons, and Bradley kept no statistics on the success and error rates of her paint chip comparisons. In short, Appellants contend Bradley’s testimony was 5 Appellants’ subsidiary argument that the admission of the 911 tape violated the Confrontation Clause is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent designating the information contained in the tapes as “nontestimonial.” See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (“[S]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”). 11 Case: 09-60400 Document: 00511174536 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/15/2010 No. 09-60400 compromised by the fact that she could not satisfy one of the Daubert 6 factors—establishing an error rate for the applied methodology. Yet, the government was not required to satisfy every Daubert factor. See United States v. Norris, 217 F.3d 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Daubert makes clear that these four factors are non-exclusive and do not constitute a definitive checklist or test.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Bradley had testified before as an expert witness on the same subject matter. She described the development of a recognized methodology for comparing paint chips and the scientific literature associated with the field. Her results were peer-reviewed. Finally, Pugh’s cross-examination made the jury aware of the potential error rate issue underlying Bradley’s testimony. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Bradley’s testimony. 3. Rule 403 Objections to the Admission of Photos of McCoy Appellants contend the court erred by failing to exclude numerous photos of McCoy’s burnt body under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Specifically, Appellants claim the admission of several photos of McCoy’s burnt and bloody hands and back, McCoy’s body, and McCoy’s head resulted in unfair prejudice at trial. Under Rule 403, a district court is only required to exclude evidence if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. See United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 354 (5th Cir. 2007); see also F ED. R. E VID. 403. “[W]e will not lightly second-guess a district court’s decision to admit relevant evidence over a Rule 403 objection. . . . Thus, a district court’s decision on Rule 403 grounds is disturbed ‘rarely’ and only when there has been ‘a clear abuse of discretion.’” Fields, 483 F.3d at 354. Though the disputed photos are admittedly gruesome, the district court’s decision to permit their introduction does not rise to the level a clear abuse of 6 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 12 Case: 09-60400 Document: 00511174536 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/15/2010 No. 09-60400 discretion. Appellants concede that at least some of the photos were necessary to support the testimony of the medical examiner. As such, the prejudicial impact of the introduction of additional photos was thereby diminished. Moreover, as the government argues, the photos were also probative of why the government was able to offer little in the way of physical evidence—it had been burned along with the body. The photos also corroborated Mogilles’s testimony and provided evidence of how McCoy had been incapacitated before his death. Consequently, the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion when it concluded that the prejudice created by photos of McCoy’s body did not substantially outweigh their probative value. E. Sufficiency of the Evidence Whitmore and Borden appeal the district court’s denial of their motions for judgment of acquittal.7 Where, as here, a sufficiency of the evidence argument is raised in a timely motion for judgment of acquittal, we “examin[e] the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict, and ask[] whether a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Garcia, 567 F.3d 721, 731 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Arriaga-Guerrero v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 303 (2009). “‘[I]t is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc)). This standard applies regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1993). 7 Pugh has not raised any such claim on appeal. Consequently, any claim of error regarding sufficiency as to Pugh has been waived. Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 668 (5th Cir. 1997) (“All issues not briefed are waived.”). 13 Case: 09-60400 Document: 00511174536 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/15/2010 No. 09-60400 1. Whitmore Whitmore was convicted of kidnapping resulting in death and kidnapping resulting in serious injury on a theory of aiding and abetting. Accordingly, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the underlying offense occurred; (2) Whitmore knowingly associated with the criminal venture; (3) she purposefully participated in the criminal activity; and (4) she sought by her actions to make the criminal venture succeed. United States v. Gulley, 526 F.3d 809, 816 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 159 (2008). Whitmore’s only contention on appeal is that the government failed to provide evidence of any “interaction” between Whitmore and Pugh and Borden regarding the kidnappings. Contrary to Whitmore’s argument, the government presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt she was aware of the kidnapping and voluntarily participated in the crime with an aim towards making the venture succeed. The evidence demonstrated that (1) Whitmore saw Mogilles lying on the patio of Pugh’s home “pleading” after he had been assaulted; (2) Whitmore saw Mogilles being taken to the SUV;8 (3) Whitmore followed the SUV to the scene of murder thereby allowing Pugh and Borden to abandon and burn the vehicle; (4) Whitmore exercised control over the SUV while in transit to the murder scene by making it stop while she purchasing gasoline for the Scion; (5) and Whitmore lied about knowing Pugh and Borden and why her Scion was in the area when confronted by police only to later admit that she had been present at the outset of the criminal venture. In response to this evidence, Whitmore cites United States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d 8 Whitmore vigorously contended at oral argument that evidence in the record contradicts Mogilles’s testimony on this point. Regardless, we cannot and will not usurp the role of the jury to make credibility determinations or weigh contradictory evidence. Brennan’s Inc. v. Dickie Brennan & Co., 376 F.3d 356, 362 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, as those are jury functions.”). 14 Case: 09-60400 Document: 00511174536 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/15/2010 No. 09-60400 138 (5th Cir. 1999), but in that case the defendant never knew of the specific underlying unlawful act. Id. at 146-47. Here, a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Whitmore was aware of the kidnapping that began in her presence within her home, that her participation in the crime was purposeful, and she sought by her actions to make the criminal venture succeed. Consequently, while the evidence was not overwhelming, it was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. As such, the district court correctly denied Whitmore’s motion for judgment of acquittal.