Opinion ID: 1512208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: illegal grant of immunity to young

Text: Trimble also contends that the circuit court erred in refusing to grant his motion for new trial due to the acquisition of evidence against him occasioned by an illegal grant of immunity to Young. In support of this point, he offers that the grant of immunity to Young was improper because it was full transactional immunity while the applicable statute, Ark.Code Ann. § 16-43-601 (1987), only permits use immunity. In addition, he argues that had this grant of immunity not been made to Young, Young would not have cooperated with the authorities and without Young's help, the police would not have amassed the evidence which was necessary to convict Trimble. The precise items of evidence listed in Trimble's brief which were gathered from Young are the name of the Wal-Mart store in Clinton, the clerk's name at the Wal-Mart store, and the name of the motel in Benton. No other contested evidence is listed in Trimble's brief. Trimble concludes by advancing the argument that this evidence is tainted irrespective of Trimble's later statement which covers the same ground. Trimble notes on this point that the prosecutor assured the circuit court that he would not use any evidence or testimony gleaned from Young after the grant of immunity. As a threshold matter, we conclude that Trimble has no standing to contest the kind of immunity granted to Young. See generally Vickers v. State, 313 Ark. 64, 852 S.W.2d 787 (1993); Manatt v. State, 311 Ark. 17, 842 S.W.2d 845 (1992). Information gathered by virtue of Young's immunity, however, is a different matter, at least with respect to the use of such evidence against the person who was granted immunity. See United States v. Brown, 801 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.1986). Here, that person is Young. Yet, the prosecutor also advised the circuit judge that he would not use the Young evidence against Trimble. According to Trimble, he did exactly that when he used the evidence gathered at the Wal-Mart store and the Benton motel. We do not consider this circumstance, though, to be a basis for reversal. Trimble made no objection to the evidence alleged to be dubious when offered so as to alert the circuit judge to its questionableness and to preserve the matter for appeal. See Tucker v. State, 313 Ark. 624, 855 S.W.2d 948 (1993); Hegwood v. State, 297 Ark. 218, 760 S.W.2d 859 (1988). The point, accordingly, is not reviewable.