Opinion ID: 775783
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Computer Programs as Speech

Text: 71 Of course, computer code is not likely to be the language in which a work of literature is written. Instead, it is primarily the language for programs executable by a computer. These programs are essentially instructions to a computer. In general, programs may give instructions either to perform a task or series of tasks when initiated by a single (or double) click of a mouse or, once a program is operational (launched), to manipulate data that the user enters into the computer. 16 Whether computer code that gives a computer instructions is speech within the meaning of the First Amendment requires consideration of the scope of the Constitution's protection of speech. 72 The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech.... U.S. Const. amend. I. Speech is an elusive term, and judges and scholars have debated its bounds for two centuries. Some would confine First Amendment protection to political speech. E.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971). Others would extend it further to artistic expression. E.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 73 (1996). 73 Whatever might be the merits of these and other approaches, the law has not been so limited. Even dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic expression, has been accorded First Amendment protection. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) (The First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.... (emphasis added)); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (First Amendment embraces [a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance, including the 'advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general.' (quoting 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 108 (1774))); Board of Trustees of Stanford University v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D.D.C. 1991) (It is... settled... that the First Amendment protects scientific expression and debate just as it protects political and artistic expression.); see also Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime and the Uses of Language 85 (1989) ([A]ssertions of fact generally fall within a principle of freedom of speech....); cf. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) (prescription drug price information is speech because a consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information may be keener by far than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate). 74 Thus, for example, courts have subjected to First Amendment scrutiny restrictions on the dissemination of technical scientific information, United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), and scientific research, Stanford University, 773 F. Supp. at 473, and attempts to regulate the publication of instructions, 17 see, e.g., United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804, 815 (7th Cir. 2000) (First Amendment does not protect instructions for violating the tax laws); United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1020-25 (5th Cir. 1987) (First Amendment protects instructions for engaging in a dangerous sex act); United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1122-23 (5th Cir. 1972) (First Amendment does not protect instructions for building an explosive device); see also Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (Instructions, do-it-yourself manuals, [and] recipes are all speech). 18 75 Computer programs are not exempted from the category of First Amendment speech simply because their instructions require use of a computer. A recipe is no less speech because it calls for the use of an oven, and a musical score is no less speech because it specifies performance on an electric guitar. Arguably distinguishing computer programs from conventional language instructions is the fact that programs are executable on a computer. But the fact that a program has the capacity to direct the functioning of a computer does not mean that it lacks the additional capacity to convey information, and it is the conveying of information that renders instructions speech for purposes of the First Amendment. 19 The information conveyed by most instructions is how to perform a task. 76 Instructions such as computer code, which are intended to be executable by a computer, will often convey information capable of comprehension and assessment by a human being. 20 A programmer reading a program learns information about instructing a computer, and might use this information to improve personal programming skills and perhaps the craft of programming. Moreover, programmers communicating ideas to one another almost inevitably communicate in code, much as musicians use notes. 21 Limiting First Amendment protection of programmers to descriptions of computer code (but not the code itself) would impede discourse among computer scholars, 22 just as limiting protection for musicians to descriptions of musical scores (but not sequences of notes) would impede their exchange of ideas and expression. Instructions that communicate information comprehensible to a human qualify as speech whether the instructions are designed for execution by a computer or a human (or both). 77 Vartuli is not to the contrary. The defendants in Vartuli marketed a software program called Recurrence, which would tell computer users when to buy or sell currency futures contracts if their computers were fed currency market rates. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission charged the defendants with violating federal law for, among other things, failing to register as commodity trading advisors for their distribution of the Recurrence software. The defendants maintained that Recurrence's cues to users to buy or sell were protected speech, and that the registration requirement as applied to Recurrence was a constitutionally suspect prior restraint. We rejected the defendants' constitutional claim, holding that Recurrence in the form it was sold and marketed by the defendants did not generate speech protected by the First Amendment. Vartuli, 228 F.3d at 111. 78 Essential to our ruling in Vartuli was the manner in which the defendants marketed the software and intended that it be used: the defendants told users of the software to follow the software's cues with no second-guessing, id., and intended that users follow Recurrence's commands mechanically and without the intercession of the mind or the will of the recipient, id. We held that the values served by the First Amendment were not advanced by these instructions, even though the instructions were expressed in words. Id. We acknowledged that some users would, despite the defendants' marketing, refuse to follow Recurrence's cues mechanically but instead would use the commands as a source of information and advice, and that, as to these users, Recurrence's cues might very well have been `speech.' Id. at 111-12. Nevertheless, we concluded that the Government could require registration for Recurrence's intended use because such use was devoid of any constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 112. 79 Vartuli considered two ways in which a programmer might be said to communicate through code: to the user of the program (not necessarily protected) and to the computer (never protected). 23 However, this does not mean that Vartuli denied First Amendment protection to all computer programs. Since Vartuli limited its constitutional scrutiny to the code as marketed, i.e., as an automatic trading system, it did not have occasion to consider a third manner in which a programmer might communicate through code: to another programmer. 80 For all of these reasons, we join the other courts that have concluded that computer code, and computer programs constructed from code can merit First Amendment protection, see Junger, 209 F.3d at 484; 24 Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1434-36; see also Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1140-41; Karn v. United States Department of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 1996) (assuming, without deciding, that source code with English comments interspersed throughout is speech), although the scope of such protection remains to be determined. 81