Opinion ID: 2651827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Have the Westbergs Exhausted?

Text: Having concluded that administrative exhaustion is required, we have little difficulty concluding that the Westbergs have failed to meet the requirement. Although they filed a timely proof of claim with the FDIC, their claim requested only damages for construction delays. See JA 59– 65. Their claim made no mention of the declaratory relief the Westbergs now seek nor could anything in the claim fairly be construed to put the FDIC on notice that the Westbergs challenged its conclusion that repudiation of the loan agreement did not erase the Westbergs’ duty to repay the previously disbursed amount. Because the Westbergs failed to route their claim for declaratory relief through the administrative review process, section 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) withholds judicial review of that claim. See Auction Co. of Am., 141 F.3d at 1200; Freeman, 56 F.3d at 1400. Their reliance on Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000), is misplaced. That case deals with the failure to raise specific issues in an administrative appeal, see id. at 105–06, whereas the Westbergs failed to press an entirely separate claim. See McGlothlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 913 F. Supp. 15, 18–19 (D.D.C. 1996) (under section 1821(d)(13)(D), plaintiffs’ claims based on negligence and breach of contract not exhausted where not submitted to administrative process, despite fact that separate claim for fraudulent inducement was submitted), aff’d, 111 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (mem.); see also BHC Interim Funding II, L.P. v. FDIC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 131, 138–39 (D.D.C. 2012) (similar, collecting cases). would have been futile had they submitted them within the appropriate time frame.”). 15 Because the Westbergs failed to administratively exhaust their claim for declaratory relief, the district court correctly dismissed their action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and we affirm.4 So ordered. 4 We reject the Westbergs’ argument that dismissal of their claim for failure to exhaust violates due process. We agree that the FDIC’s proof-of-claim form—which has subsequently been amended, see Appellees’ Rule 28(j) Letter, Westberg v. FDIC, No. 13-5080 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 25, 2013)—was, in one provision, incorrect. See JA 60 (“If the institution does not currently owe you any money, it is not necessary for you to complete this form.”). But due process requires only that the Westbergs be “afforded notice of their exclusive opportunity to present their claims,” which notice must be “‘reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Freeman, 56 F.3d at 1403 n.2 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). The FDIC gave the Westbergs adequate notice when it informed them of its repudiation of the loan, specified that it expected the Westbergs to repay the previously disbursed amount and stated: “You may determine that the [FDIC’s] decision to disaffirm the Loan Agreement gives you a claim against the receivership estate. If so, you must file a Proof of Claim in writing . . . . Under federal law, . . . failure to file claims by the Claims Bar Date will result in disallowance by the [FDIC], the disallowance will be final, and further rights or remedies with regard to claims will be barred.” JA 58 (emphases in original).