Opinion ID: 2014063
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prohibiting the Defense From Arguing Residual Doubt

Text: Defendant raises a second argument based on these same two portions of the State's argument. According to defendant, the circuit court erred by refusing to permit him to argue residual doubt as a response to the State's comments about the strength of the evidence supporting his murder convictions. Defendant asserts that this error requires resentencing. During closing arguments at the aggravation-mitigation stage of sentencing, the circuit court sustained the State's objection to defense counsel's residual doubt argument: Now the other thing that is mitigation is any bit of doubt that remains with you [State]: Objection. Objection if we are going to argue reasonable doubt. It is an improper argument. THE COURT: You may complete your statement, and I will hear the objection. [Defense counsel]: That if there is doubt that remains with you about what happened [State]: Objection. THE COURT: Let her complete her question. [Defense counsel]:on the night in question, then you can consider that. THE COURT: The objection shall be sustained. [Defense counsel]: You know, your decision today, whatever it is, can't be changed. And if in time you learn something about this that's different, you are going to have to live with that. [State]: Same objection. THE COURT: Sustained. [State]: I ask that they be instructed on that. THE COURT: It shall be stricken. Defendant acknowledges that a defendant ordinarily has no right to argue residual doubt. Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have held that a defendant is not entitled to present evidence of residual doubt at the penalty phase of sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-75, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2327-28, 101 L.Ed.2d 155, 165-66 (1988); People v. Emerson, 189 Ill.2d 436, 503, 245 Ill.Dec. 49, 727 N.E.2d 302 (2000); People v. Terrell, 185 Ill.2d 467, 500-01, 236 Ill.Dec. 723, 708 N.E.2d 309 (1998); People v. Hooper, 172 Ill.2d 64, 79, 216 Ill.Dec. 633, 665 N.E.2d 1190 (1996); People v. McDonald, 168 Ill.2d 420, 454-55, 214 Ill.Dec. 125, 660 N.E.2d 832 (1995). The rationale for these holdings is that [r]esidual doubt is not relevant to the circumstances of the offense or to the defendant's character and, as a result, is not relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Hooper, 172 Ill.2d at 79, 216 Ill.Dec. 633, 665 N.E.2d 1190. Defendant contends, however, that an otherwise improper argument may be permitted if it is invited by the other party. According to defendant, the circuit court in this case erred by prohibiting defense counsel's residual doubt argument because it was a proper response to the State's improper argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. As defendant observes, this court has held that otherwise improper argument by the State will not be considered error when invited by the defendant's argument. See, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill.2d at 153, 235 Ill.Dec. 667, 705 N.E.2d 850; People v. Brown, 172 Ill.2d 1, 43, 216 Ill.Dec. 733, 665 N.E.2d 1290 (1996); People v. Mahaffey, 128 Ill.2d 388, 423-25, 132 Ill.Dec. 366, 539 N.E.2d 1172 (1989). Defendant has provided us with no authority for the proposition that an improper argument by defense counsel must be permitted when invited by the State's argument. Even assuming, however, that in some cases fairness may require that a defendant be permitted to make such a response to the State's argument, we do not believe that this is such a case. During closing argument at the second stage of sentencing, the State is entitled to argue that the nature and circumstances of a defendant's crimes are aggravating. See, e.g., People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill.2d 141, 168, 227 Ill.Dec. 448, 687 N.E.2d 930 (1997). Thus, the State was entitled to argue at the aggravation-mitigation stage in this case that defendant's previous use of gloves in a burglary and the lack of fingerprint evidence at the Brewer house suggested that he used gloves when committing the Brewer murders. The State's comment on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting defendant's convictions, however, did not pertain to the circumstances of the offense or to defendant's character or record and were consequently not relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. See Hooper, 172 Ill.2d at 79, 216 Ill.Dec. 633, 665 N.E.2d 1190. Nevertheless, this irrelevant argument by the State did not require that the circuit court permit defendant to argue residual doubt. The circuit court is able to observe trial proceedings and is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial effect of remarks in closing argument. People v. Howard, 147 Ill.2d 103, 168, 167 Ill.Dec. 914, 588 N.E.2d 1044 (1991). Reviewing courts, therefore, afford the circuit court discretion to determine the proper character and scope of argument and indulge every reasonable presumption that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion. People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill.2d 483, 507, 190 Ill.Dec. 744, 622 N.E.2d 774 (1993). In the case at bar, little, if any, prejudice resulted from the State's brief reference to the strength of the evidence to support defendant's convictions, particularly in light of the fact that the jury had already decided to convict defendant of the Brewer murders. Thus, we do not believe defendant was denied a fair sentencing hearing when the circuit court refused to permit him to respond by arguing residual doubt. As stated, a defendant is not entitled to argue residual doubt, and we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in failing to make an exception to this rule in defendant's case as a result of the State's irrelevant arguments.