Opinion ID: 1060405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: application of the tennessee uniform simultaneous death act

Text: Although both Mr. and Mrs. Ellis left wills purporting to dispose of their respective estates, only the will of Mrs. Ellis has been admitted to probate and is before the Court today. Nevertheless, our resolution of the issues in this case must naturally rely upon the construction of both wills, if only because the composition of Mrs. Ellis's estate depends largely upon whether she received any of her husband's interests in property following his death. As such, the arguments of both parties are primarily concerned with whether Mr. Ellis's interests in the couple's entireties property passed to his wife immediately upon his death or whether these interests remained in his estate due to her death only three days later. With this brief background in mind, therefore, we turn to the specific arguments advanced by the parties. SCOPE OF THE 120-HOUR SURVIVAL RULE CONTAINED IN TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 31-3-120 The appellants first argue that as a result of the addition of section 31-3-120 to the TUSDA in 1997, see 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts. ch. 426, § 16, Mrs. Ellis was required to survive her husband by 120 hours before she could obtain fee simple title to property formerly held by the entirety. In support of their position, the appellants argue (1) that application of the 120-hour survival rule is not limited to common disaster cases, and (2) that this survival rule applies to all cases in which a spouse fails to survive the other by this statutory time period. As such, they conclude, because Mrs. Ellis did not survive her husband for at least 120 hours, none of her husband's interests in the couple's entireties property can comprise any part of her estate. We agree with the appellants that section 31-3-120(b) is in no way limited to common disaster cases and that this section may apply even when spouses or other beneficiaries die of separate and unrelated causes. As demonstrated by its language, this section not only applies in cases when the will does not contain language addressing simultaneous deaths, but it also applies when the will merely fails to require that the devisee survive by a stated period of time in order to take under the will. Consequently, the scope of section 31-3-120 reaches beyond common disaster cases, and it sets forth a default rule of substantive law that applies in the absence of a contrary survival provision in the will itself. Cf. Tenn.Code Ann. § 31-3-106 (This chapter shall not apply in the case of wills, living trusts, deeds, or contracts of insurance wherein provision has been made for the distribution of property different from the provisions hereof.); Brundige v. Alexander, 547 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tenn.1976) (stating that the provisions of the TUSDA constitute rule[s] of substantive law and are not merely presumptions of survivorship or rules of evidence). Nevertheless, even though section 31-3-120 does apply outside of common disaster cases, we conclude that it only partially affects the disposition of Mr. Ellis's property in this case. Significantly, section 31-3-120 does not apply to all types of property interests, and its language is quite specific as to those interests affected by the 120-hour survival rule. For example, subsection (a) states that the 120-hour survival rule applies for purposes of the homestead allowance, year's support allowance, exempt property, elective share and intestate succession. In addition, subsection (b) applies to all interests passed by the will of the decedent. However, no other interest in property is specifically covered by the language of section 31-3-120. Therefore, with regard to any property held by Mr. Ellis as a tenant by the entirety, we conclude that the passing of this property to his wife's estate was unaffected by the enactment of section 31-3-120. Importantly, no part of section 31-3-120 addresses property held by the entirety. Subsection (a) does not include entireties property within its list of affected interests, and subsection (b) does not include entireties property because it only affects devisees, or those persons designated in a will to receive a devise. Cf. Tenn.Code Ann. § 31-1-101(3). Because the law is well settled that the interest of a tenant by the entireties cannot be passed by will, Brundige, 547 S.W.2d at 236; see also White v. Watson, 571 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tenn.Ct.App.1978) meaning that a surviving spouse in this context is not a devisee under the lawsection 31-3-120(b) simply does not apply to affect the disposition of entireties property. Accordingly, we disagree with the appellants that section 31-3-120 requires a spouse to survive the other by 120 hours in order to obtain fee simple title to property formerly held by the entirety. With regard to any of Mr. Ellis's property that would pass under his will, however, this individual property is subject to the 120-hour survival rule. Because Mr. Ellis made no provision requiring that [his wife] survive [him] by a stated period of time in order to take under [his] will, section 31-3-120 operates as a default rule to require his wife to survive him by 120 hours to take any devise under his will. Accordingly, because his wife did not survive him for the required statutory period, she is deemed to have predeceased him as a matter of law, and his individual property, if any, could not have passed to her estate. [4] CONSTRUCTION OF TERM SIMULTANEOUSLY IN TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 31-3-104 The appellants next argue that even if section 31-3-120 does not strictly apply to property held by the entirety, this Court should nevertheless construe the term simultaneously in Tennessee Code Annotated section 31-3-104 to mean within 120 hours. More specifically, they argue that the legislature enacted section 31-3-120 specifically to define the term simultaneously as that term is used throughout the TUSDA. Consequently, the appellants maintain that when these two sections are construed together, section 31-3-104 requires a spouse to survive the other by 120 hours in order to obtain fee simple title to property formerly held by the entirety. Initially, the appellants' arguments appear to have some merit because, ordinarily, [a] statute should be construed, if practicable, so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable. See Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 48, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968). However, the polestar of statutory interpretation has always been the intent of the legislature. As such, where the carrying out of the legislative intention, which is the prime and sole object of all rules of construction, can only be accomplished by departure from the literal interpretation of the language employed, then the legislative intent should be applied over the literal import of the words. Tennessee Title Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 185 Tenn. 145, 154, 203 S.W.2d 697, 700 (1947). Upon an examination of the statutes in this case, we conclude that the appellants' proposed interpretation would not accurately reflect the General Assembly's intention in this regard. A venerable principle of Tennessee common law has been that property held in a tenancy by the entirety passes immediately to the surviving spouse upon the death of the other spouse. Because each spouse is seized of the whole or the entirety and not of a share, moiety, or divisible part, Sloan v. Jones, 192 Tenn. 400, 402, 241 S.W.2d 506, 507 (1951), the death of one spouse does not put an end to the seisin of the survivor, Bennett v. Hutchens, 133 Tenn. 65, 69, 179 S.W. 629, 630 (1915). Instead, upon the death of one spouse, the surviving spouse possesses an undivided interest in the whole estate that is no longer subject to the undivided interest of another in that estate, or, in other words, the surviving spouse possesses the property in fee simple absolute. Id. Had the General Assembly intended that the appellants' construction of sections 31-3-120 and 31-3-104 be given effect, it is clear that the legislature would have significantly changed the common law of this state. After all, adopting this construction would essentially mean that the undivided interest of the surviving spouse remains subject to that of the deceased spouse for 120 hours, even though the deceased spouse cannot lawfully be seized of any entirety interest under the common law. Nevertheless, while the General Assembly unquestionably has the constitutional and legislative authority to change the common law of this state, see Lavin v. Jordon, 16 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn.2000), it must make clear its intention to do so, see Kradel v. Piper Indus., Inc., 60 S.W.3d 744, 751 (Tenn.2001). Without some clear indication to the contrary, we simply will not presume that the legislature intended to change the common law by implication. See Lavin, 16 S.W.3d at 368. Examining the provisions of the TUSDA as a whole, we see no clear indication that the General Assembly intended to revise the common law operation of estates by the entirety. First, no express language appears in the 1997 amendments to the TUSDA to evidence such an intention. Second, as discussed above, section 31-3-120 does not address the disposition of property held by the entirety, though the statute does cover the disposition of property held in other common law estates. Consequently, while it appears that the term simultaneously may mean within 120 hours in some situations under the TUSDAsuch as perhaps in sections 31-3-102 and 31-3-103 it is not clear that the legislature intended a similar construction with regard to the use of that term in section 31-3-104. Moreover, the legislative background of the 1997 amendments to the TUSDA confirms that the General Assembly did not intend to change the common law operation of estates by the entirety. As evidenced by the similarity of the language, the 120-hour survival rule of section 31-3-120 was taken from sections 2-104 and 2-601 of the Uniform Probate Code of 1969 (UPC) and from sections 2 and 3 of the Revised Uniform Simultaneous Death Act of 1993 (Revised USDA). [5] However, the 120-hour survival rule contained in sections 2-104 and 2-601 of the UPC does not apply to property held by the entirety. Instead, the drafters of the UPC placed the disposition of entireties property in a separate section that deals generally with property in which co-owners possess a right of survivorship. See UPC § 2-702(c). [6] This approach is also consistent with the drafting of the Revised USDA, which likewise placed the rules governing entireties property in a section separate from those provisions forming the basis of the 1997 Tennessee legislation. See Revised USDA § 4. [7] When the legislature enacts provisions of a uniform or model act without significant alteration, it may be generally presumed to have adopted the expressed intention of the drafters of that uniform or model act. See Kradel, 60 S.W.3d at 754 & n. 6. However, when the legislature makes significant departures from the text of that uniform act, we must likewise presume that its departure was meant to express an intention different from that manifested in the uniform act itself. Cf. id. In this case, the General Assembly adopted a form of the 120-hour survival rule created by the UPC and the USDA, but it did not further adopt those uniform provisions that specifically apply to entireties property. Therefore, its omission in this regard must be taken as strong evidence that it did not intend to subject an estate by the entirety to the 120-hour survival rule of section 31-3-120. Without a clear indication that the legislature intended to change the common law operation of estates by the entirety, we conclude that the legislature did not intend the construction urged by the appellants. Accordingly, the term simultaneously should continue to receive its ordinary construction, meaning at the same time. [8] Because the record clearly establishes that Mr. Ellis and his wife did not die at the same time, section 31-3-104 does not apply in this case, and the appellants cannot claim a one-half interest in the couple's entireties property. Accordingly, we hold that all property held by Mr. Ellis as a tenant by the entirety passed to his wife immediately upon his death and that her estate alone may claim this property in fee simple absolute. The Court of Appeals in this case reached a similar conclusion by relying upon interpretations of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act by other courts, but it did not specifically examine the effect that section 31-3-120 has upon the TUSDA's other provisions. Although courts should generally interpret the provisions of the simultaneous death act so as to make uniform the law in those states which enact it, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 31-3-107, we note that such an interpretation is no longer practicable in this regard. With the addition of section 31-3-120 in 1997, Tennessee now has a hybrid simultaneous death scheme that combines elements of the original USDA adopted in 1940 with those of the Revised USDA adopted in 1993. This hybrid statutory scheme is unique to all the states enacting any form of the USDA, and as such, case law from other jurisdictions is not helpful to determine how the newly-added section 31-3-120 affects the other provisions of the TUSDA. In any event, the Court of Appeals reached the correct resolution of the issues presented, and we therefore affirm its judgment. We also agree with the intermediate court that the record does not clearly support the parties' assertion that all of Mr. Ellis's property was held by the entirety. Consequently, we remand this case to the trial court to determine whether any part of Mrs. Ellis's estate is comprised of her husband's individual property.