Opinion ID: 2099836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence/instructions.

Text: With respect to the sexual offenses, the indictment charged Appellant with 166 counts of first-degree rape either with a child under the age of 12 (Class A felony, KRS 510.040(1)(b)(2)), or by force or threat of force after her 12th birthday (Class B felony, KRS 510.040(1)(a)); and 166 counts of first-degree sodomy either with a child under the age of 12 (Class A felony, KRS 510.070(1)(b)(2)), or by force or threat of force after her 12th birthday (Class B felony, KRS 510.070(1)(a)). Based on A.M.'s testimony, the trial court selected July 31, 1996, through September 1, 1999, as the maximum inclusive dates of the sexual offenses, which was then rounded to three years; then, mathematically extrapolating A.M.'s testimony as to the frequency of the offenses, instructed the jury that it could find Appellant guilty of 150 counts of first-degree rape (once per week for 34 weeks and twice per week for eight additional weeks = 50 offenses per year × 3 years), and 75 counts of first-degree sodomy (every other time she was raped). The instructions under which Appellant was convicted of rape and sodomy read as follows: INSTRUCTION NO. 1 FIRST-DEGREE RAPE (Counts 150) You will find the Defendant guilty of First-Degree Rape under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about beginning July 31, 1996 and continuing through September 1, 1999, for a maximum of 150 occasions, and before the finding of the indictment herein, he engaged in sexual intercourse with [A.M.]; AND B. That at the time of such intercourse [A.M.] was less than 12 years old OR that he did so by forcible compulsion. If you find the Defendant guilty under this Instruction, you shall say so by your verdict and nothing more. You shall make a separate finding for each of the counts. (Emphasis added.) INSTRUCTION NO. 4 FIRST-DEGREE SODOMY (Counts 75) You will find the Defendant guilty of First-Degree Sodomy under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about beginning July 31, 1996 and continuing through September 1, 1999, for a maximum of 75 occasions, and before the finding of the indictment herein, he engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with [A.M.]; AND B. That at the time of such intercourse [A.M.] was less than 12 years old OR that he did so by forcible compulsion. If you find the Defendant guilty under this Instruction, you shall say so by your verdict and nothing more. You shall make a separate finding for each of the counts. (Emphasis added.) In the event the jury did not find forcible compulsion, the instructions also defined lesser included offenses of 100 counts of second-degree rape and 50 counts of second-degree sodomy occurring between January 28, 1997, A.M.'s twelfth birthday, and January 28, 1999, her fourteenth birthday (Class C felonies, KRS 510.050 and KRS 510.080); and 34 counts of third-degree rape and 17 counts of third-degree sodomy occurring between January 28, 1999 and September 1, 1999 (Class D felonies, KRS 510.090). Perhaps, it was assumed that the jury would designate which counts of first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy were premised upon A.M. being less than twelve years of age, i.e., those that occurred prior to January 28, 1997, and which counts were premised upon forcible compulsion. However, the verdict forms made no such distinction, and the jury returned verdicts simply finding Appellant guilty of 150 counts of first-degree rape and 75 counts of first-degree sodomy. Obviously, no construction of A.M.'s testimony would support Appellant's convictions of 225 Class A felonies. A defendant cannot be convicted of a criminal offense except by a unanimous verdict. Ky. Const. § 7, as interpreted in Cannon v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 50, 163 S.W.2d 15 (1942); RCr 9.82(1). We have held that a combination instruction permitting a conviction of the same offense under either of two alternative theories does not deprive a defendant of his right to a unanimous verdict if there is evidence to support a conviction under either theory. Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 12 S.W.3d 258, 265-66 (1999) and cases cited therein. Otherwise, the verdict cannot be shown to be unanimous, and the conviction must be reversed. Burnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d 878, 883 (2000); Hayes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 625 S.W.2d 583, 584 (1981); Boulder v. Commonwealth, Ky., 610 S.W.2d 615, 617 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Dale v. Commonwealth, Ky., 715 S.W.2d 227 (1986). Here, the combination instructions on first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy did not describe two alternative theories by which the same offense could be committed but described offenses of two different classes, a Class A felony and a Class B felony. Furthermore, as will be more fully discussed below, there was insufficient evidence even by mathematical extrapolation to support more than thirty Class A felony convictions and insufficient evidence of forcible compulsion to support any Class B felony convictions. For both reasons, Appellant was denied his right to unanimous verdicts with respect to his rape and sodomy convictions. Worse, again applying mathematical calculations, the trial court simply designated twenty-five (1/6th) of the first-degree rape convictions and thirteen (rounded up from 12.5, also 1/6th) of the first-degree sodomy convictions as Class A felonies and the remaining 125 counts of first-degree rape and 62 counts of first-degree sodomy as Class B felonies; and so instructed the jury during the penalty phase of the trial. By designating which of the otherwise undesignated convictions were Class A felonies and which were Class B felonies, the trial court usurped the authority of the jury and effectively denied Appellant his right to a jury trial on that issue. The mathematical calculations upon which the guilt phase instructions were premised did not take into account the undisputed testimony that Appellant and A.M. did not begin living in separate residences until January 1998; thus, none of the offenses that occurred two to four times per week when she would visit Appellant's home when I was out there a week at a time and when I would stay there during the summer and during intersession could have occurred prior to January 1998. Thus, applying the formula used by the trial judge and momentarily disregarding the element of forcible compulsion, the maximum number of offenses authorized by mathematical extrapolation of A.M.'s testimony were: 1. July 31, 1996 to January 27, 1997: 25 weeks × 42/52 = 20 first-degree rapes and 10 first-degree sodomies (Class A felonies, victim under age 12); 2. January 28, 1997 to January 27, 1998 (A.M. and Appellant began living in separate residences): 42 second-degree rapes and 21 second-degree sodomies (Class C felonies, victim under age 14); 3. January 28, 1998 to January 27, 1999: 50 second-degree rapes (once per week for 34 weeks and twice per week for 8 weeks) and 25 second-degree sodomies; 4. January 28, 1999 to September 1, 1999: 31 weeks × 42/52 = 25 weeks at once per week + 4.7 weeks (8 × 31/52) at twice per week = 29.7 (rounded to 29) third-degree rapes and 14.85 (rounded to 14) third-degree sodomies (Class D felonies, victim under 16, KRS 510.090). [All of the above illustrates why multiple convictions must be premised on more precise evidence than mere mathematical calculations.] Thus, disregarding the element of forcible compulsion, a mathematical extrapolation of A.M.'s testimony warranted instructions on only the following: 20 counts of first-degree rape; 92 counts of second-degree rape; 29 counts of third-degree rape; ___ 141 total. 10 counts of first-degree sodomy; 46 counts of second-degree sodomy; 14 counts of third-degree sodomy; ___ 70 total. There was no evidence that any of the offenses were accompanied by forcible compulsion. A.M.'s only testimony in this respect was as follows: Q. [D]id you ever want to do this? A. No. Q. During any of these times, from the time it started until the time it stopped, was it ever your idea? A. No. Q. Did you ever tell him to stop? A. Yes. Q. What would he say? A. He'd say OK. Q. He did what? A. He would say OK. Q. Would he usually stop if you asked him to? A. Un-huh [indicating yes]. In fact, A.M. testified that on the first occasion that she had sexual intercourse with Appellant, he stopped when she kicked him. The prosecutor conceded at the instructions conference that the only evidence of forcible compulsion was that A.M. did not give Appellant her permission to have sexual relations with her. Of course, A.M.'s permission, i.e., consent, or lack thereof, was immaterial because she was statutorily incapable of consenting. KRS 510.020(3)(a). That is the very premise of what is sometimes referred to as statutory rape. KRS 510.010(2) defines forcible compulsion as physical force or threat of physical force, express or implied, which places a person in fear of immediate death, physical injury to self or another person, fear of the immediate kidnap of self or another person, or fear of any offense under this chapter. Physical resistance on the part of the victim shall not be necessary to meet this definition. There is little case law interpreting KRS 510.010(2) and none since the last sentence was added by a 1996 amendment. 1996 Ky.Acts., ch. 300, § 2. In Van Dyke v. Commonwealth, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 563 (1979), evidence that the defendant forcibly entered the victim's apartment and threatened to kill her four-year-old child if she did not comply with his sexual demands was deemed sufficient. In Salsman v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 565 S.W.2d 638 (1978), the victim's testimony that she did not resist because she feared the defendant would hurt her was deemed sufficient. And in Yarnell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 834 (1992), evidence that the child victims were subjected to constant emotional, verbal, and physical duress, lived in fear of what the defendant might do to them or their mother, and submitted to the deviate sexual behavior only because of this fear was deemed sufficient. Here, A.M. did not testify that Appellant used physical force against her or threatened to harm her or another if she refused his sexual advances, or that she submitted to Appellant's advances out of fear of harm to herself or another. The only threat she described was that, on one unspecified occasion, Appellant told her they would both get in trouble if she told anyone what they were doing. While that might explain delayed reporting, it does not prove that A.M. was compelled by force or threat to submit to sexual intercourse or oral sodomy. A.M.'s only expression of fear was in the handwritten note she wrote to Shonda that should have been excluded as hearsay. It is now elementary that the burden is on the government in a criminal case to prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the failure to do so is an error of Constitutional magnitude. Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). See also KRS 500.070(1); Perkins v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 694 S.W.2d 721 (1985). There being no evidence that any of the sexual offenses in this case were committed by forcible compulsion, it was error to instruct the jury on Class B first-degree rape and sodomy. Nor can multiple similar offenses be proven by mere mathematical extrapolation. We held in Hampton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 737 (1984), that proof of the precise dates on which the offenses were committed is not required of a child sexual abuse victim where the evidence is ample to separately identify the various offenses charged. Id. at 740; see also Garrett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 48 S.W.3d 6, 10 (2001); Stringer v. Commonwealth, supra, at 886. In each of those cases, the victims described a distinct factual basis for each separate charge so that the jury could determine in each instance whether a separate criminal offense had been committed. See also State v. Rudd, 759 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Mo.Ct.App.1988) ([I]f multiple offenses are submitted against a single defendant, the different offenses submitted should be distinguished. As much is inherent in the well established rule that the giving of distinctive instructions is the proper method of submitting multiple offenses.); State v. Wood, 311 N.C. 739, 319 S.E.2d 247, 249 (1984) (Nonsuit may not be allowed on the ground that the State's evidence fails to fix any definite time for the offense where there is sufficient evidence that defendant committed each essential act of the offense. (Emphasis added.)) Whether the issue is viewed as one of insufficient evidence, or double jeopardy, or denial of a unanimous verdict, when multiple offenses are charged in a single indictment, the Commonwealth must introduce evidence sufficient to prove each offense and to differentiate each count from the others, and the jury must be separately instructed on each charged offense. Mere mathematical extrapolation of a described offense based on such vague testimony as almost every other weekend, about ten weeks per year, or every other time will not support convictions of separate offenses. [1] If these issues had been properly preserved for appellate review, we would vacate all but two of the rape convictions and all but one of the sodomy convictions and remand for a retrial only of the first alleged rape as a Class A felony, the last alleged rape as a Class D felony, and the first alleged sodomy as a Class A felony (as well as the charge of intimidating a witness, for which a new trial is granted only because of the evidentiary errors described in Parts I and II of this Opinion). However, defense counsel neither objected to any of these erroneous instructions nor tendered any instructions on Appellant's behalf. RCr 9.54(2). Although counsel did move for a directed verdict on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence, there was sufficient evidence to convict Appellant not only of two rapes and one sodomy, but also of the offense of intimidating a witness. When the evidence is insufficient to sustain the burden of proof on one or more, but less than all, of the issues presented by a case, the correct procedure is to object to the giving of instructions on those particular issues. Kimbrough v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 525, 529 (1977). See also Commonwealth v. Wolford, Ky., 4 S.W.3d 534, 535-36 (1999). Upon this state of the case, Appellant is entitled only to a new trial on all counts of the indictment. However, if the evidence is the same, he will be entitled to directed verdicts of acquittal with respect to those counts unsupported by sufficient evidence to distinguish them as separate offenses. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and sentences imposed upon Appellant are reversed, and this case is remanded to the Taylor Circuit Court for a new trial in accordance with this Opinion. LAMBERT, C.J., GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, KELLER and STUMBO, JJ., concur. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion.