Opinion ID: 1785565
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Summary of Effect of Settlement Documents

Text: In summary, we disagree with JBJ's contention that the cumulative operation of the settlement documents was to remove or limit Tracey's authority to sell the assets of Gallop on March 13, 1997, the day of the assignment. JBJ argues, but fails to explain how, the settlement documents collectively had that effect. We have not located, nor have we been directed to, any provision in those documents that sprung into effect and so divested Tracey of his authority. Instead, the settlement documents contemplate that, after a default by Gallop or Tracey, Pace was to provide the defaulting party both notice of that default and an opportunity to cure. Absent that cure by the defaulting party, cross-default provisions in the settlement documents could trigger a multitude of remedies for Pace. When the settlement documents are read together, it is clear that Pace had the right, after an uncured default, to foreclose on the Gallop stock Tracey had pledged, to sell that stock, to document a change of its ownership from Tracey to the purchaser under the stock power, to elect a new board of directors for Gallop, to oust Tracey from his management positions, and to install new officers. Other than its default notices, however, by March 13, 1997, Pace had not completed any of these actions, which were required to terminate Tracey's authority to bind Gallop by that date. JBJ also made this collective operation argument to the trial court. To the extent that the trial court relied on that argument in entering the summary judgment for JBJ, it erred because Pavilion presented substantial evidence indicating that a disputed issue of fact existed as to whether Tracey had the authority to transfer the statutory right of redemption to Lary on March 13, 1997.