Opinion ID: 196263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instruction on 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1).

Text: 62 Pagan-San-Miguel argues that the court erroneously instructed the jury on an essential element of the firearms offense, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1). That section requires that the defendant have carried the firearm during and in relation to ... [a] drug trafficking crime. The district court, however, instructed the jury that it was enough if the defendant knowingly carried the firearm during the commission of the crime of drug trafficking. In so doing, the district court appears to have relied on obsolete statutory language. Before 1984, Sec. 924(c)(1) provided that it was a crime to carry a firearm during the commission of any [federal] felony. In 1984, however, Congress amended the language adding the phrase during and in relation to, to make clear that the firearm must be linked to the underlying felony to come within the scope of the statute. S.Rep. No. 225, supra, at 312-13, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3490-92. 63 Because Pagan-San-Miguel did not object to the instruction, the instruction is reviewed for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Pagan-San-Miguel argues that the court's use of the phrase during the commission of was plain error, claiming it omitted an essential element of the offense and it broadened the scope of the conduct under which the jury could convict. 64 The actual charge given here undercuts Pagan-San-Miguel's argument. 6 The district court emphasized that the carrying of the firearm must be linked to the specific underlying drug offense for which the defendants were convicted: 65 First, it must be proven that a[ ] defendant[ ] committed a crime of drug trafficking for which he may be prosecuted in the United States. And second, that during the commission of the crime of drug trafficking the defendant[ ] knowingly carried a firearm. 66 In light of the actual instruction given, Pagan-San-Miguel's attack on the instruction does not rise to the level of plain error. 67 Pagan-San-Miguel also argues that the instruction allowed the jury to convict for a crime not charged in the indictment because the firearms charge was limited to Count 2 of the three drug counts. Pagan-San-Miguel has not and cannot articulate how, in the context of this case, such a possibility created a miscarriage of justice or seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1779, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). 68