Opinion ID: 6104768
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(1) Claim

Text: Reyes's statutory claim has no legal basis and fails. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 provides that a defendant must be present at: (1) the initial appearance, the initial arraignment, and the plea; (2) every trial stage, including jury impanelment and the return of the verdict; and (3) sentencing, Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)); the rule further states a defendant need not be present when '[t]he proceeding involves only a conference or hearing on a question of law,' United States v. Veloz, 948 F.3d 418, 434 n.4 (1st Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(3)); see also Karmue, 841 F.3d at 28 (holding no clear or obvious violation of Rule 43 where defendant was not present at pretrial Daubert hearing). In Reyes's case, a review of the relevant case filings reveals that the contested pre-trial proceedings from which Reyes was absent were status conferences to discuss discovery and scheduling. We, thus, find that Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 did not require Reyes to be present, and Reyes has not established that proceeding at these pre-trial hearings without him present constituted a clear or obvious error.