Opinion ID: 6534115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 574A Mr. Pier's Belligerent and Aggressive Behavior

Text: [¶34] Because it is the factor that in the district court's view caused reasonable suspicion to ripen into probable cause, I begin with Mr. Pier's behavior in objecting to a search of his vehicle and demanding that Deputy Colling close the vehicle's door. Because I believe Mr. Pier had a right to object to the search of his vehicle, even vehemently, belligerently, and aggressively, I would attach no weight to this factor. [¶35] This Court has recognized that an individual's assertion of his right to withhold consent to search cannot play any part in a probable cause analysis. Dimino v. State , 2012 WY 131 , ¶ 13, 286 P.3d 739 , 743 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting Damato v. State , 2003 WY 13 , ¶ 19, 64 P.3d 700 , 708 (Wyo. 2003) ). Although the district court purported to place no emphasis on Mr. Pier's assertion of his right to withhold consent and to instead factor in only the suspicion created by his extreme reactions, I see this as a distinction without a difference. Whether the court was giving weight to the refusal to consent itself, or to Mr. Pier's belligerent behavior in asserting that right, the court's focus was the same: if Mr. Pier has nothing to hide, he should not be concerned with law enforcement searching his vehicle. This premise has no place in a probable cause analysis. 4 [¶36] Other courts have concluded likewise. In State v. Kern , 831 N.W.2d 149 (Iowa 2013), officers conducting a child welfare check asserted that the homeowner purposely stood between them and the interior of the home to prevent them from entering further into the home. Id. at 156 . The State argued this gave the officers reason to believe drugs would be found in the home and probable cause to search. Id . at 157. The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed. Furthermore, neither the invocation of constitutional rights nor the refusal to grant consent to an officer to perform a search can be used alone to support either reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See State v. Maddox , 670 N.W.2d 168 , 173 (Iowa 2003). In the words of the 10th Circuit: Any other rule would make a mockery of the reasonable suspicion and probable cause requirements, as well as the consent doctrine. These legal principles would be considerably less effective if citizens' insistence that searches and seizures be conducted in conformity with constitutional norms could create the suspicion or cause that renders their consent unnecessary. United States v. Hunnicutt , 135 F.3d 1345 , 1351 (10th Cir.1998). We agree. If such a refusal of consent or invocation of constitutional rights could supply officers with the requisite suspicion or cause to conduct a search, then citizens would be exposed to a dangerous catch-22 when officers request consent to conduct a search. If consent is given, the search occurs. If consent is refused, the officer may nevertheless conduct the search pursuant to the probable cause generated by the refusal. This is an unacceptable consequence under our constitutional framework. We have similar doubts about the value of Grant's defensive posture as a factor in the probable cause determination.... [A] defensive posture by an occupant of a home in response to an intrusion by police is not indicative of probable cause of a crime. A homeowner may want personal matters within the privacy of the home protected from unwanted disclosure. The desire of a homeowner to keep police from entering beyond the threshold of the house during an unannounced visit is not probable cause the home contains evidence of a crime. Kern , 831 N.W.2d at 175-76 (footnote omitted). [¶37] The same holds true for defensive behavior in objecting to the search of a vehicle. In State v. Brown , 110 Or.App. 604 , 825 P.2d 282 (1992), the defendant was a parolee whose home and vehicle were subject to  search if there existed reasonable grounds to believe such a search would disclose evidence of a parole violation. The defendant's parole officer conducted a home visit and observed a drug scale, baggies, a bullet, and a couple of knives on a table. Id. at 282. Based on that observation, the parole officer left and returned with a search team. Id . During the home search, the defendant grabbed a set of vehicle keys to keep them out of the officers' reach and became excited and belligerent. Id . at 283. The officers handcuffed him, took the keys, and searched the defendant's vehicles, where they found stolen goods and drugs. Id . [¶38] The defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained in the search of his vehicles, and the lower court denied that motion. Id. The appellate court reversed on the ground that a defendant's refusal to consent to a search cannot establish probable cause to search. Id. at 284-85. The court reasoned: Allowing the police to conduct a search on the basis of the assertion of a privacy right would render the so-called right nugatory. This principle is equally valid, regardless of whether probable cause, reasonable suspicion or reasonable grounds circumscribes the authority for invading the privacy interest. We see no meaningful distinction between State v. Gressel , [ 16 Or.App. 189 , 517 P.2d 1225 (1974) ], State v. Evans , [ 26 Or.App. 883 , 554 P.2d 1031 (1976) ], and this case. All we know is that defendant held onto at least one set of keys until the search team retrieved them by force and that defendant did not want his cars to be searched. Hascall testified that defendant tried to hide the keys and that he became excited and belligerent. The trial court made no express or implied findings about that. See Ball v. Gladden , 250 Or. 485 , 487, 443 P.2d 621 (1968). We lack the authority to make such findings. However, whether defendant tried to hide the keys or simply held onto them is irrelevant. Neither action could amount to more than a manifestation of his desire not to have his cars searched. Until defendant grabbed the keys, the officers had no independent basis to seize them and no reasonable grounds to search the car.    Because the officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the cars contained evidence of a parole violation, defendant's right to refuse consent to their search was the same as the right of any other citizen. Defendant's action in grabbing the keys and secreting them could be nothing more than a clumsy effort to assert his right to the privacy of his cars. Brown , 825 P.2d at 285 . [¶39] Mr. Pier had a right to refuse consent to search his vehicle, and his manner of doing so is not a factor that contributes to a finding of probable cause. I would therefore attach no weight to this factor on which the district court seemingly hinged its ruling.