Opinion ID: 2543862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Verdict And Locquiao's Appeal

Text: On June 29, 2000, the jury returned a guilty verdict as to all counts. On July 14, 2000, the circuit court sentenced Locquiao to an indeterminate maximum five-year prison term, subject to a mandatory minimum of two years, in connection with the offense of promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree (Count I) and an indeterminate five-year prison term in connection with the offense of unlawful use of drug paraphernalia (Count II), the two terms to run concurrently. On August 29, 2000, Locquiao filed a timely notice of appeal. As we have indicated, Locquiao asserted, inter alia, that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress, inasmuch as, under the totality of the circumstances, Kim acted as an agent of the HPD and DEA, thereby violating his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution, see supra note 6. Locquiao specifically argued that, because Kim was still bound to the terms of his plea agreement at the time of his arrest, which agreement expressly required Kim to provide total knowledge, whether solicited or not, and to actively assist the police, Kim was an agent of the police and, thus, bound by the same constitutional strictures as the government when he searched and detained him. Locquiao also argued that the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the ignorance-or-mistake-of-fact defense, pursuant to HRS § 702-218(1), see supra note 4, inasmuch as evidence was adduced at trial that he was ignorant as to the glass material's nature and that such ignorance would have negated the states of mind requisite to the charged offenses. Locquiao essentially contended that a reasonable juror could have concluded that his ignorance constituted an honest mistake, the legislature having relatively recently enacted the drug paraphernalia law and there having been no direct evidence adduced at trial that he was aware that the pipe contained a controlled substance. By failing to so instruct, Locquiao maintained that the circuit court had, in effect, relieved the prosecution of its burden to disprove a non-affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The ICA's opinion held, inter alia, that the circuit court correctly ruled that Kim's conduct at the Kalihi Cue occurring on January 19, 1999 fell outside the scope of his contract with the government and that, although Kim may previously have been recruited by the HPD, he acted as a private citizen in the present matter and not as an arm of the government. The ICA's opinion further held that, although Locquiao's testimony at trial supported a jury instruction on the ignorance-or-mistake-of-fact defense, the circuit court's error in refusing the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The ICA opined that the elements of the ignorance-or-mistake-of-fact defense, denominated by the ICA as a flip-side defense, were subsumed within the circuit court's substantive instructions. Consequently, the ICA concluded that, viewing the record as a whole, the circuit court's error in refusing to give the flip-side defense instruction [was] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, inasmuch as there was no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to Locquiao's conviction. Id. Specifically, the ICA noted that: the jury was instructed that Count I required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Locquiao knowingly possessed methamphetamine and that Count II required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Locquiao knowingly possessed drug paraphernalia with intent to use it to ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce methamphetamine into his body. Consequently, if the jury believed Locquiao's testimony that he did not know that the glass material allegedly handed to him by the other man was an ice pipe or that it contained methamphetamine, the jury would have found that Locquiao did not knowingly possess methamphetamine and that he did not knowingly possess the glass material with the intent to use it to ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce methamphetamine into his body and would have found him not guilty. Id. at 320, 59 P.3d at 955. In other words, by finding Locquiao guilty of the charged offenses, the jury, of necessity, must have found that he knew that the glass material was illegal drug paraphernalia and that it contained methamphetamine.