Opinion ID: 2544410
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Meloy's testimony was helpful to the jury.

Text: Under the second prong of the CRE 702 inquiry, the proffered testimony is admissible if it will assist the fact finder to either understand other evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Lanari, 827 P.2d at 502; see also Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee notes. The crucial question is `On this subject can a jury from this person receive appreciable help.' Williams, 790 P.2d at 798 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 3 Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 702[01], at 702-7 to 702-8 (1988) (quoting 7 Wigmore on Evidence § 1923, at 21 (3d. ed.1940))) (emphasis in original). There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute. Id.; see also Lanari 827 P.2d at 502-03; United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir.1985) (expert may be used if his testimony can offer something beyond the understanding and experience of the average citizen); United States v. Burchfield, 719 F.2d 356, 357 (11th Cir.1983) (expert testimony admissible where it is the kind that enlightens and informs lay persons without expertise in a specialized field). In determining whether the proffered testimony will appreciably assist the jury in performing its functions of evaluating evidence and making determinations of fact, the trial court must consider many factors. Lanari, 827 P.2d at 504. Among those considerations are the elements of the particular offense, the nature and extent of other evidence in the case, the expertise of the proposed expert witness, the sufficiency and extent of the foundational evidence upon which the expert witness' ultimate opinion is to be based, and the scope and content of the opinion itself. Id. In People v. Fasy, 829 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1992), we considered the admissibility of a psychologist's testimony concerning the victim's post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 1316. During an in camera hearing, the psychologist testified to the causes of the disorder, that the disorder has gained general acceptance in the medical field, that he had treated persons who suffered from the disorder, and that a sexual assault on a young child can cause the disorder. Id. at 1317. Finally, he testified that the victim suffered from the disorder and explained the basis for this diagnosis. Id. The trial court ruled that this testimony was admissible and qualified the witness as an expert in child psychology. Id. We agreed and held that this testimony was appropriate under CRE 702 because it placed the victim's post-assault behavior into context. Id. at 1316-17. In other words, the testimony provided an explanation outside the common knowledge of the jury for puzzling aspects of the child's conduct and demeanor. Id. at 1317. It was this ability to assist and inform the jury that made the testimony admissible under CRE 702. Likewise, federal courts have ordinarily allowed law enforcement officials `to testify as experts ... to establish the modus operandi of particular crimes,' in order to `explain the actions of the defendants.' United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030, 1050 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Burchfield, 719 F.2d at 357). In Cross, the defendants were convicted of various counts related to their child pornography schemes. Cross, 928 F.2d at 1034. At trial, the court permitted an FBI agent, qualified as an expert on pedophilia, to explain the certain peculiar aspects of pedophile behavior. Id. at 1049. The expert was permitted to testify that certain pictures  that would appear innocent to the average juror  would appeal to the sexual interest of pedophiles and were obscene. He also testified that pedophiles often referred to such pictures by a code word, and in an attempt to circumvent child pornography and obscenity laws, these pictures, rather than more graphic ones, were published in magazines and distributed to pedophiles. Id. at 1049-50. Finally, the expert testified regarding pedophiles' obsession with exchanging stories and photographs with a network of others who share their sexual interest in children. Id. at 1050. Considering the propriety of this testimony, the Eleventh Circuit opined that, It is well settled that such expert testimony is permissible in an obscenity prosecution, particularly when contested materials are directed at such a bizarre deviant group that the experience of the trier of fact would be plainly inadequate to judge whether the material appeals to the prurient interest. Cross, 928 F.2d at 1050 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, [s]uch evidence clearly sheds light on one of the critical issues in the case  whether Cross obtained the photos with the intention of using them to produce and distribute child pornography. Id. Finally, the court reasoned that the testimony about pedophile networks helped to explain the genesis and odd character of [the defendants'] relationship, particularly the fact that they had cooperated in a complex, risky, criminal conspiracy although they had never met and knew little about one another. Id. United States v. Meeks, 35 M.J. 64 (C.M.A. 1992), is perhaps the most similar federal case to the case before us. There, the military judge permitted an FBI investigator to provide the jury with his analysis of the physical aspects of the crime scene. 35 M.J. at 66. However, he was not allowed to opine that any particular individual committed the crime; nor was he allowed to testify about the physical characteristics that he would expect the perpetrator to have. Id. One of the opinions provided by the expert was that the perpetrator arrived at the crime scene with sex and killing on his mind. Id. The Court of Military Appeals affirmed. Interpreting Military Rule of Evidence 702, which was then identical to our Rule 702, it reasoned that [a]nyone who has substantive knowledge in a field beyond the ken of the average court member arguably is an expert within that field. Id. at 67 (emphasis in original). In addition, the court noted that crime scene analysis, in which the witness was qualified as an expert, is generally recognized as a body of specialized knowledge. Id. at 68. The court then turned its attention to whether the testimony was helpful to the fact finder: The court members in this case were tasked with resolving a double homicide to which no eyewitnesses testified. The bodies were discovered in a horribly mutilated condition, raising questions as to the method and order of killing. The members, confronted with such a grotesque scenario, would be greatly assisted by a professional analysis of the crime scene in light of other murder cases. Moreover, extremely sophisticated observations were made by the agent, not elementary comments concerning well known criminal ventures. A homicide and its crime scene, after all, are not matters likely to be within the knowledge of an average court-martial member. Id. at 68-69. Based on this reasoning, the court held that the military judge had not abused his discretion in determining that such evidence would assist the members. Id. at 69; see also People v. Drake, 129 A.D.2d 963, 514 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (1987) (noting an increasing trend to accept expert testimony explaining behavior not commonly understood by the average juror and holding in accordance therewith that the trial court properly admitted expert testimony concerning picquerism because it is a behavioral phenomenon not within the common knowledge of the average juror); cf. also People v. Phillips, 122 Cal.App.3d 69, 175 Cal.Rptr. 703, 712 (1981) (holding that the existence, nature, validity, and applicability to these facts of the phenomenon characterized as `Munchausen syndrome by proxy' are all matters sufficiently beyond common experience that expert opinion would assist the trier of fact); People v. Olguin, 31 Cal. App.4th 1355, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596, 602 (1994) (holding that an officer's expert testimony on the sociology and psychology of gangs was admissible even though it encompassed ultimate issues in the case because the testimony related to matters sufficiently beyond common experience to require interpretation by one having in-depth knowledge of street gangs); State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 692-93, 760 P.2d 27, 31-32 (1988) (proper for expert to testify that child had been sexually abused because whether a child has been sexually abused is beyond common experience). But see State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 835 (Tenn.2002) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony that murder was a sexual homicide). We have no doubt that Dr. Meloy's testimony assisted the jury to either understand other evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Lanari, 827 P.2d at 502. Dr. Meloy testified that sexual homicides represent less than one percent of all homicides committed in the United States each year. If, as the court in Meeks opined, a homicide and its crime scene are not matters likely to be within the knowledge of average laypeople, then a sexual homicide and its crime scene are even less likely to be so. Dr. Meloy's testimony also provided an explanation for the seemingly inexplicable. It is beyond dispute that the murder of Ms. Hettrick, like the Meeks and Cross cases, involved bizarre and deviant behavior that was unlikely to be within the knowledge of ordinary citizens. This testimony placed the crime in context and explained puzzling aspects of the murder, such as the sexual mutilation. See Fasy, 829 P.2d at 1316-17. We thus agree with the trial court that permitting Dr. Meloy to explain the relevance of fantasy to sexual homicides and identify examples of Defendant's written productions that fell within the five categories of rehearsal put into context the physical evidence surrounding the death of Ms. Hettrick and is valuable information that the jury is entitled to consider. Without the testimony of a specialist in this area, lay jurors would be tremendously disadvantaged in attempting to understand Defendant's motivation for killing Ms. Hettrick. On this last point, we find Phillips persuasive. There the court approved of a psychologist's expert testimony explaining an obscure affliction termed Munchausen Syndrome by proxy. Phillips, 175 Cal.Rptr. at 714. This syndrome, the prosecution theorized, supplied the motive for the crime. Id. at 708. The court opined: While a prosecutor ordinarily need not prove motive as an element of a crime, the absence of apparent motive may make proof of the essential elements less persuasive. Clearly that was the principal problem confronting the prosecutor here. In the absence of a motivational hypothesis, and in the light of other information which the jury had concerning her personality and character, the conduct ascribed to [the defendant] was incongruous and apparently inexplicable. As both parties recognize, [the psychologist's] testimony was designed to fill this gap. Id. at 712 (citations omitted). Dr. Meloy's testimony was designed to fill precisely this same gap.