Opinion ID: 77837
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Incident-to-service test

Text: We think it quite clear that the incident-to-service test sweeps far too broadly to protect this concern. Some suits barred by the incident-to-service test simply do not involve sensitive military judgments that courts lack the competence or authority to deal with. For example, where a private contractor agent is running a mess hall on a peacetime base, and a soldier gets food poisoning attributable to the contractor's negligence, the suit would be barred under the incident to service test. But in such a suit, there is no concern about interfering with sensitive military judgments. Courts do not lack well-developed standards for dealing with negligent food service. Nor does it offend separation of powers for a court to say that a private contractor agent must pay for its negligence in serving tainted food to soldiers. Because incident to service necessarily includes a large number of these non-sensitive military judgments, it is far too broad to protect contractors from suits that might interfere with sensitive military judgments. Proof that some suits incident to service do not offend separation of powers or present justiciability problems is easily found in the fact that civilians are not barred from bringing some such suits against the government, even though a soldier would be. It is well-established that Feres applies only to soldiers, and therefore does not bar civilian suits along some portion (probably a large portion) of the incident-to-service spectrum. See, e.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510-11, 108 S.Ct. at 2517-18 ( Feres covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries caused by the military to civilians, and as a result, it could not be invoked to prevent, for example, a civilian's suit against the manufacturer of fighter planes, based on a state tort theory, claiming harm from what is alleged to be needlessly high levels of noise produced by the jet engines); Taber, 67 F.3d at 1047 ( Feres does not bar suits against the government when the injured plaintiff is a civilian. This remains the case even though the injurer is in the military and military discipline is directly involved.) (emphasis in original). Civilians are barred from bringing suit against the government only to the extent the government has not waived its sovereign immunityfor example, where the combatant activities exception applies. As a result, a large number of suits on the incident to service spectrum can be brought by civilians. This means that some number of incident to service suits must not inherently offend separation of powers or present problems of justiciability. If they did, civilians too would be barred from suing the government. But, as Judge Calabresi has observed, [I]n any number of civilian cases, the alleged judicial inquiry into (and interference with) military affairs, occurs anyway. And if this interference occurs regularly in any event, it cannot possibly raise the constitutional concerns that warrant tortured statutory construction and judicial abstention. Taber, 67 F.3d at 1047. The fact that civilians are not barred from suing the government along some part of the incident-to-service spectrum indicates that those suits are not inherently non-justiciable, and do not involve sensitive military judgments that are outside judicial competence. The government, of course, does receive immunity in service-related suits brought by soldiers, even when they do not implicate sensitive military judgments. For example, the soldier may not sue the government in the mess hall hypothetical discussed above, if it is the government that is operating the mess hall. But that is because the government's Feres immunity is supported by policies other than protecting sensitive military judgments: namely, the uniformity, cap, and discipline policies. First, the government needs a uniform rule, even where sensitive military judgments are not implicated. Second, the soldier's statutory benefit represents the cap on the government's liability. And third, the suit may impair discipline because it would pit the soldier against his employer and may involve conflict with his superior officer or another soldier. As discussed above, these rationales do not apply to a private contractor. Immunity for private contractors is justified only by the need to protect the making and execution of sensitive military judgments. And, as demonstrated above, a number of incident to service suitsprobably a substantial numberdo not implicate sensitive military judgments, because they can be brought by civilians. [20] As a result, the derivative Feres immunity of private contractors cannot possibly extend to the outer limits of incident to service. We therefore hold that private contractors, even if they are agents, are not entitled to immunity from all service-related suits brought by soldiers.