Opinion ID: 2344662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Jury's Award of Emotional Distress Damages was Proper

Text: Childers argues that Adkins is not entitled to damages for emotional distress because KRS 344.450 limits her recovery to actual damages sustained. Alternatively, Childers argues that Adkins has not proven the four elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress to an extent that would warrant the $50,000 verdict. Both of these arguments are incorrect applications of the law. KRS 344.450 was enacted in 1974, and during the next decade it appeared that compensatory damages for emotional distress would not be recoverable damages under the statute. See Ellis v. Logan Co., 543 F.Supp. 586 (W.D.Ky.1982) (holding that damages for humiliation and embarrassment were not recoverable under KRS 344.450); Berry v. General Electric Co., 541 F.Supp. 800 (W.D.Ky.1982) (same). However, in 1983 the Court of Appeals held that damages for humiliation, personal indignity, and other intangible injuries were recoverable under the statute. McNeal v. Armour & Co., 660 S.W.2d 957, 958-59 (Ky.App.1983). Since then the holding in McNeal allowing recovery for damages resulting from humiliation and emotional distress in actions brought under KRS 344.450 has been embraced by this Court. Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., 840 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Ky.1992). There is no doubt that at this point in time damages for humiliation and emotional distress are recoverable as actual damages under KRS 344.450. Childers's alternative argument is likewise grounded on a misapplied principle. In its brief, Childers bases its alternative argument on case precedent and analysis of the elements of the tort action of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Based on this analysis, Childers claims that the jury award is excessive because Adkins has not shown that her embarrassment rose to the level of severe emotional distress required by the tort law. Childers may be right that the evidence does not bear out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but analyzing this jury verdict under that tort law is entirely incorrect. Adkins did not bring an action for IIED; rather she requested an instruction for compensatory damages under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, which would include emotional distress. As discussed above, it is clear that compensatory damages, including humiliation and emotional distress, are allowable under KRS 344.450. As such the standard of review in this situation is simply whether the trial court abused its discretion by not granting a new trial on the ground that the award of damages was excessive. Hazelwood v. Beauchamp, 766 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Ky.App.1989). The standard for determining whether the circuit court abused its discretion by not granting a new trial on the ground that the award of damages was excessive is as follows: The amount of damages is a dispute left to the sound discretion of the jury, and its determination should not be set aside merely because we would have reached a different conclusion. If the verdict bears any relationship to the evidence of loss suffered, it is the duty of the trial court and this court not to disturb the jury's assignment of damages. Id. (citations omitted). Childers has argued correctly that the evidence supporting Adkins's claim for emotional distress is not strong. The only evidence specifically supporting the claim is Adkins's own testimony on the witness stand. However, unless the verdict bears no relationship to the evidence, it should not be set aside. The assessment of damages is a matter left in the hands of the jury, and their decision should be disturbed only in the most egregious circumstances. Furthermore, the jury instructions clearly stated that the jury award was to be based on damages for injury caused by the discharge, including emotional distress.  (Emphasis added.) Of course, the Court does not have a dissertation issued by the jury explaining their reasoning in full detail, but the wording of this instruction leaves open the possibility that Adkins, in fact, received nothing at all for her emotional distress. The jury awarded Adkins a total of $50,000 for damages resulting from the discharge, and the Court has no way of knowing how much of that award was based on emotional distress and how much was based on other damages which the jury determined. There was enough evidence to support some finding of emotional distress as well as other types of damage, and the award is not so disproportionate to the evidence so as to warrant the verdict being set aside or the order for a new trial.