Opinion ID: 1777779
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr Jones's remarriage

Text: Ms. Jones also contests the chancellor's reliance on Dr. Jones's remarriage as a material change in circumstances. While we have previously held that remarriage of one of the parties is a factor that may be considered when deciding what is in a child's best interest, we have applied this principle to modifications of support obligations. Thurston v. Pinkstaff, 292 Ark. 385, 730 S.W.2d 239 (1987); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 299 Ark. 200, 771 S.W.2d 764 (1989). Regarding matters of child custody, Professor Atkinson recites the majority view that a change of circumstances of the noncustodial parent, including a claim of an improved life because of a recent marriage, is not sufficient to justify modifying custody. Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice, § 9.07 at 462-463; see also Delgado v. Silvarrey, 528 So.2d 1358 (Fla. App. 3 Dist.1988)(father's remarriage and anticipation of higher standard of living did not amount to circumstances sufficient to support change in custody); Spoor v. Spoor, 641 N.E.2d 1282 (Ind.App. 3 Dist.1994)(changes in lifestyle, including remarriage, do not warrant a change in custody). When examining the facts in this case, we cannot agree that Dr. Jones's remarriage constituted a material change in circumstances. Dr. Jones married his present wife, Diana, five months after the parties' divorce. He admitted at trial that their relationship began in September 1990, predating the parties' November divorce. During oral argument, Dr. Jones agreed that, at the time of the original divorce decree, it was within his reasonable contemplation to remarry. In Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App.1988), immediately following the parties' divorce, the husband remarried a woman who was pregnant with his child before the divorce was final. While the husband stipulated to the initial custody arrangement that the wife be awarded custody, he petitioned for modification only sixteen months later. In his petition, he claimed that, while the wife's full-time job would cause the child's placement in day care, his new wife was a full-time homemaker. The Utah Court of Appeals rejected his argument, reasoning that the alleged change in circumstances was within the reasonable contemplation of the husband and thus not legally cognizable: It is also reasonable to assume that respondent would remarry soon after the parties' divorce and have another child as... his second wife was pregnant with respondent's child before the parties' divorce was final. Given respondent's awareness of the circumstances at the time he voluntarily entered into the stipulation which awarded appellant custody, we find his petition to modify custody the very type of litigation and harassment from which our supreme court has attempted to protect custodial parents. 761 P.2d at 947-948. Stated simply, Dr. Jones cannot use the circumstances he created as grounds to modify custody. Given his awareness of the circumstances at the time he voluntarily entered into the agreement to award custody of Cameron to Ms. Jones, we cannot agree that his remarriage constituted a material change in circumstances.