Opinion ID: 1418188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Affidavit of Daniel Alexander.

Text: Over the objection of counsel for appellant, the Commission admitted into evidence a statement, signed by Daniel Alexander before a notary in Los Angeles, California, on June 18, 1976. The substantive portion of the typed statement read: I freely and voluntarily give this affidavit to DUANE DEMAY who is known to me as INVESTIGATOR for the Nevada Real Estate Division. I DID NOT AUTHORIZE OR GIVE PERMISSION TO ANYONE, AT ANY TIME, TO REMOVE A PORTABLE ELECTRIC FIREPLACE OR ANY OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM MY HOUSE LOCATED AT 3455 GARDEN DRIVE SOUTH IN LAS VEGAS, NEVADA. I will not be available to appear as a witness in any proceeding relating to the above matter. As of July 1, 1976, I will be residing in the State of Florida. I have read the foregoing affidavit consisting of (1) pages, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Appellant suggests that the admission of this statement, and the Commission's purported reliance thereon, is a violation of NRS 645.690(2), which provides that at the hearing required before the revocation or suspension of a real estate license, the licensee shall be entitled: (a) To examine, either in person or by counsel, any and all persons complaining against him, as well as all other witnesses whose testimony is relied upon to substantiate the charge made. We agree. In Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959), the United States Supreme Court overruled the administrative revocation of petitioner's security clearance on the basis of reports made to government investigators. While noting the due process challenge of petitioner, the Court chose to rest its holding upon statutory grounds, refusing to interpret the statute in question as authorizing the Department of Defense to create an industrial security clearance program under which affected persons may lose their jobs and may be restrained in following their chosen professions on the basis of fact determinations concerning their fitness for clearance made in proceedings in which they are denied the traditional procedural safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination. 360 U.S. at 493, 79 S.Ct. at 1412. The Court, in condemning the practices of the administrative board, noted that the testimony of absent witnesses was allowed to stand without the probing questions of the person under attack. Id. at 497, 79 S.Ct. at 1414. (Emphasis added). While respondents urge that testimony, as used in NRS 645.690(2)(a), refers exclusively to the sworn statements of witnesses at trial or hearing, it is clear from the use of the term by the Court in Greene that the term does have a broader meaning. Respondents rely upon the primary definition of the term in Black's Law Dictionary, 1646 (rev. 4th ed. 1968): Evidence given by a competent witness, under oath or affirmation; as distinguished from evidence derived from writings, and other sources. However, Black's Law Dictionary, Id., at 1778, defines witness as A person whose declaration under oath (or affirmation) is received as evidence for any person, whether such declaration be made on oral examination or by deposition or affidavit. (Emphasis added). Thus interpreted, we hold that NRS 645.690(2)(a) is applicable to the Alexander affidavit. The remaining question is whether the Commission relied upon that affidavit for its factual findings, in violation of its statutory authority. Appellant contends that without the affidavit, there is no competent evidence in the record to support the finding that [a]t all times [appellant] was aware that the fireplace was the property of the owners of the condominium and that it was illegally in possession of Tobias Miscevic. We disagree. A review of the evidence, and of the facts admitted by appellant, reveals the contrary. The Commission had before it ample evidence from which the conclusion reached in the challenged finding could reasonably have been inferred. Therefore, the district court's decision and order upholding the Commission need not be reversed on this ground. See Nardoni v. McConnell, 48 Cal.2d 500, 310 P.2d 644 (1957); Richards Realty Co. v. Real Estate Commissioner, 144 Cal. App.2d 357, 300 P.2d 893 (1956); Dittmeier v. Missouri Real Estate Commission, 237 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. App. 1951). We conclude, therefore, that the Commission did not exceed its jurisdiction by considering allegations which may have provided a factual basis for a criminal charge; that the provisions of the real estate Code of Ethics, Part I, subsection 2, as interpreted and applied in this case are not too vague and uncertain to provide a constitutional basis for disciplinary action; that there was no improper commingling of judicial and prosecutorial functions during the Commission proceedings; that the composition of the Commission did not violate appellant's right to equal protection under the law, and that the Commission was not required by NRS 48.105 to exclude the written statement of appellant. Finally, although the Commission was not entitled to rely upon the affidavit of Alexander to support its findings, there was sufficient substantial evidence in the record apart from the affidavit to support the Commission's decision. For these reasons, the decision and order of the district court affirming the decision of the Nevada Real Estate Advisory Commission is affirmed. THOMPSON, GUNDERSON, BATJER and MANOUKIAN, JJ., concur.