Opinion ID: 4519828
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Injury on Navigable Waters

Text: The LHWCA establishes a federal statutory workers’ compensation scheme providing certain maritime workers with “medical, disability, and survivor benefits for work-related injuries and death.” 9 Prior to 1972, the LHWCA’s “situs” requirement only extended coverage to employees injured or killed on “navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock).”10 When Congress amended the LHWCA in 1972, it (1) expanded the situs requirement to include certain adjoining land areas and (2) added a “status” component in 33 U.S.C. § 902(3), requiring that employees be engaged in maritime employment within the meaning of the Act. 11 We start with the Supreme Court’s decision in Perini, decided after the LHWCA was amended in 1972. The facts in Perini bear some resemblance to the facts here: an employee was denied benefits after being injured on navigable waters because he was not engaged in maritime employment and, thus, could not satisfy the status test under the LHWCA as amended in 1972. 12 6 Flores v. MMR Constructors, Inc., 50 BRBS 47, 50–51 (2016). 7 B & D Contracting v. Pearley, 548 F.3d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 2008). 8 Baker v. Dir., OWCP, 834 F.3d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 2016). 9 Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 512 U.S. 92, 96 (1994). 10 33 U.S.C. § 903(a), 44 Stat. 1426; see Perini, 459 U.S. 297, 299 (1983). 11 Perini, 459 U.S. at 299; 33 U.S.C. §§ 903(a), 902(3). 12 Perini, 459 U.S. at 300–01. 3 Case: 19-60027 Document: 00515360634 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/26/2020 No. 19-60027 The Supreme Court reversed. 13 It held that the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA sought to expand, not limit, coverage. 14 Before 1972, any claimant injured upon navigable waters in the course of his employment who satisfied the definition of “employee” would have been covered under the Act if employed by a statutory “employer.” 15 The Court concluded that such claimants— “injured on the actual navigable waters in the course of [their] employment”— were still eligible under the amended LHWCA because the Court “consider[ed] these employees to be engaged in maritime employment.” 16 Thus, these claimants satisfied the amended Act’s status requirement, the other statutory provisions notwithstanding. 17 Our first challenge is to determine whether Flores, injured on a floating platform, would have satisfied the “situs” test under the LHWCA prior to 1972. In short, if Big Foot was on navigable waters, then Flores would have been covered under the pre-1972 LHWCA, and Perini teaches that he would also be eligible for coverage under the amended Act, despite his inability to otherwise meet the “status” test. 18 If, however, Big Foot did not rest on navigable waters, then Flores’s claim fails because he cannot satisfy the situs or the status test required by the post-1972 amendments to the LHWCA. Two pre-1972 Fifth Circuit cases are helpful in determining whether Flores was injured on navigable waters. 13 Id. at 325. 14 Id. at 299. 15 Id. at 305. 16 Id. at 324; see also Bienvenu v. Texaco, Inc., 164 F.3d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Id. 17 Flores’s presence on navigable waters may not be “transient or fortuitous,” 18 Bienvenu, 164 F.3d at 908, but that issue does not present itself here. 4 Case: 19-60027 Document: 00515360634 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/26/2020 No. 19-60027 First, MMR contends that because this court previously held that Big Foot is not a vessel, it must be considered an extension of land. 19 But Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. reveals that this case does not hinge on whether Flores was injured on a vessel. 20 In Williams, a claimant was injured on a notyet-commissioned Coast Guard cutter on its final sea trial. 21 The claimant filed multiple claims for relief under the Jones Act, general maritime law, and the LHWCA. 22 The court followed settled law and first held that the Coast Guard cutter was not a vessel since it was uncompleted, thereby barring coverage under the Jones Act. 23 Despite this fact, the court held that the claimant could still seek relief under the LHWCA if injured on navigable waters of the United States as opposed to international waters. 24 Williams, then, stands for the solid proposition that an injury on a non-vessel located on navigable waters of the United States satisfies the situs requirement for purposes of coverage under the pre-1972 LHWCA. MMR’s attempt to distinguish Williams fails. MMR relies upon cases that deal with whether crafts in various forms are vessels for purposes of the Jones Act or general maritime law. 25 Those cases are irrelevant for our purposes in determining coverage under the LHWCA. 19 See Baker v. Director, OWCP, 834 F.3d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 2016). 20 452 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1971). 21 Id. at 957. 22 Id. 23 Id. at 958. 24 Id. at 959. It ultimately remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the accident occurred on navigable waters of the United States, as opposed to the high seas (since the LHWCA only extends to the former, whereas general maritime law extends to both). Id. at 960–61. 25 See, e.g., Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 568 U.S. 115, 122 (2013) (a house boat could not be considered a vessel because it was not designed for transportation on water); Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co, 119 U.S. 625, 630 (1887) (a floating drydock cannot be considered a vessel); Manuel v. P.A.W. Drilling & Well Serv., Inc., 135 F.3d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 1998) (a rig bolted to a barge was a vessel under the Jones Act); Leonard v. Exxon Corp., 581 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir. 1978) (a floating work platform was not a vessel for purposes of the Jones Act); Cook v. Belden Concrete Prod., Inc., 472 F.2d 999, 1002 (5th Cir. 1973) (a floating dry dock is not a vessel within the scope of the Jones Act or general maritime jurisdiction). 5 Case: 19-60027 Document: 00515360634 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/26/2020 No. 19-60027 Travelers Insurance Co. v. Shea is also helpful in our effort to determine whether Flores was injured on navigable waters. It teaches us that, pre-1972, if an employee was injured on a floating structure permanently attached to land, he was not covered under the LHWCA. 26 In Shea, the claimant was injured on a floating outfitting pier, which was an extension of a ramp that had been permanently anchored to both the shore and seabed with steel pillars.27 We determined the pier was not on navigable waters and should instead be considered an extension of land. 28 Indeed, “[i]ts permanent home was in the water, and the waters below it had been completely removed from navigation.” 29 Despite the fact that it was floating, the court treated it as a pier or extension of land because it was “permanently anchored . . . for eighteen years” with no plans to ever move it from its fixed position. 30 We have since followed this analysis, emphasizing that the extent to which a craft or pier is permanently attached to land is critical. In Peytavin v. Government Employees Insurance Co., for example, the court held that a floating pontoon fastened to the shore by means of cables could not be considered an extension of land. 31 Structures typically deemed extensions of land, the court noted, “were in some manner firmly and permanently fastened to the land.” 32 “A vessel moored to a dock does not become an extension of the 26 382 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 1967). 27 Id. at 345–46. 28 Id. at 349. 29 Id. See also Nat’l Maint. & Repair v. Illinois Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 395 Ill. App. 3d 1097 (2009). The Appellate Court of Illinois there held that the barge in question was an extension of land, because it had been affixed to the shore with mooring lines and a “spud” (essentially a temporary piling) for five or six years. Id. at 1102. 30 Shea, 382 F.2d at 349. 31 453 F.2d 1121, 1126 (5th Cir. 1972). 32 Id. at 1125. 6 Case: 19-60027 Document: 00515360634 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/26/2020 No. 19-60027 land nor do other structures secured to the shore by cables, or other temporary means.” 33 From these cases, it is clear that if a craft resting on navigable waters is permanently attached to land, then the water underneath the craft is removed from navigation and is not navigable under the LHWCA. 34 While Big Foot was attached to land bordering Corpus Christi Bay, its attachment was not permanent. Big Foot was attached only temporarily while under construction—it was built to be moved offshore to drill for oil and gas in the Gulf of Mexico. Because it was not permanently attached to land, the water underneath it was not removed from navigation. Thus, Flores was injured on navigable waters and is entitled to benefits under the Act if MMR was a statutory “employer.” We now turn to that question.