Opinion ID: 172808
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Facts proven by a preponderance

Text: Prior to sentencing, Griffith objected to all but $5,118.01 of the district court's loss calculation. See supra ง II.A.3(1).
The record contains evidence demonstrating by a preponderance that beginning in mid-2003, while she was Norvell's fiduciary, Griffith began making unauthorized cash withdrawals (including checks made out to cash) from one of Norvell's bank accounts, sometimes making notations on the checks to the effect that the money was for payment of bills. These withdrawals are substantiated by copies of checks made payable to Cash or to Griffith, as well as by copies of cash withdrawal slips. During the period that Griffith was making these withdrawals, she failed to make payment on a number of Norvell's bills, in the amount of $9,495. The Government has provided copies of these bills, as well as clear evidence that they were not paid. [10] The Government thus proved the $9,495 direct loss by a preponderance. The Government likewise proved by a preponderance the direct loss of $7,000 from the sale of one of Norvell's properties in December 2002, shortly before the VA declared Norvell incompetent to handle [his] own financial affairs (R. vol. III. at 67) on January 13, 2003. The Government put on evidence that Griffith forged the signature of Norvell's son Ross on the check for the proceeds of this sale, deposited the check into one of Norvell's accounts, and then had a cashier's check issued to herself from that account. Far less compelling is the Government's evidence that Griffith should be held responsible for $16,000 in direct loss resulting from Norvell's purchase of a 2002 Pontiac for her exclusive use. After Norvell traded in his 1939 Hudson, valued at $6,000, for the down payment on the Pontiac, he financed the remainder of the $16,000 purchase price with a $10,000 installment loan. When Griffith failed to make payments on the installment loan, the vehicle was repossessed. Yet despite acknowledging the repossession of the Pontiac, which served as collateral on the installment loan, the PSR held Griffith accountable for the unpaid balance on that loan, and the district court adopted this element of the PSR's loss calculation. The Government failed to prove by a preponderance that Griffith's conduct caused a loss of $10,000 in unpaid loan debt where the collateral on that debt was seized. Therefore, the district court clearly erred in including this $10,000 debt in its direct loss calculation. [11]
To arrive at its calculation of $46,126 in estimated loss, the district court accepted the PSR's finding that Griffith was responsible for 60% of $78,876 in questionable expenditures made over the course of her relationship with Norvell. The court explained that the probation officer estimated loss by considering the victim's financial situation, his habits both prior to and after the involvement of the defendant in his life. (R. vol. IV at 10.) The probation officer then determined total funds available during the term of the defendant's involvement with Norvell, with those total funds consisting of income, loans, proceeds from the sale of assets, and credit expenditures. ( Id. at 10-11.) Based on Norvell's lifestyle, expenditures and credit history prior to Griffith's involvement in his affairs and his [financial] recovery since, the PSR deemed it reasonable to conclude that Griffith profited more from [the questionable] expenditures than [did] Norvell. (PSR at 9.) The PSR thus estimated that Griffith benefitted from 60% of those expenditures, while Norvell benefitted from 40%. The district court accepted this estimate, attributing to Griffith as loss 60% of the expenditures at issue. The [district] court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss. U.S.S.G. ง 2B1.1, cmt. n. 3(C); see Ary, 518 F.3d at 788. Having carefully reviewed the record, we are satisfied that the district court's method of estimating loss in this case was reasonable. We are likewise satisfied that the Government proved by a preponderance that Griffith should be held accountable for the dissipation of 60% of $46,660 in Norvell's funds. These funds included a $26,600 mortgage loan, $6,000 in proceeds remaining from the sale of one of his properties after Griffith diverted $9,000 of those proceeds, the $7,000 balance Norvell had held in one of his bank accounts in 2001, and $7,060 in lump-sum benefit payments from the VA. We conclude that the Government failed to prove by a preponderance, however, that Griffith caused Norvell loss, as that term is defined in ง 2B1.1, when she misused [his] credit totaling $30,216. (Addendum to PSR at 11.) In short, the Government offered no evidence that this credit card debt was ever paid, and the commentary to the Guidelines makes clear that loss must constitute pecuniary harm. U.S.S.G. ง 2B1.1, cmt. n. 3(A)(i)-(iii). While we do not doubt that Griffith's conduct caused harm to Norvell's credit rating, pecuniary harm under the Guidelines does not include ... harm to reputation, or other noneconomic harm. Id., cmt. n. 3(A)(iii). Instead, such harm must be monetary or ... otherwise ... readily measurable in money. Id. Here, the Government did not put on evidence demonstrating that Griffith caused Norvell pecuniary harm, and thus loss, when she misused his credit. Nor did it allege or put on evidence that her conduct caused loss to victims other than Norvell, such as the credit card companies. Consequently, the district court clearly erred when it included in its loss calculation $18,130 attributable to Griffith's misuse of Norvell's credit.
The district court clearly erred in including $28,130 in its calculation of loss. Subtracting that amount from the court's overall loss calculation of $83,739 leaves us with total loss of $55,609. Pursuant to Guideline ง 2B1.1(b)(1)(D), the district court thus should have increased Griffith's offense level by six, rather than by eight, leaving her with an advisory sentencing range of twelve to eighteen months rather than eighteen to twenty-four months. However, because the district court stated on the record that it would have sentenced Griffith to the same term of imprisonment โ eighteen months โ even if it had found loss to be under $70,000, the court's error here was harmless. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 202-03, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992) (explaining that remand is not necessary to rectify an `incorrect application' of the Guidelines where the error was harmless, i.e., [where] the error did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed); United States v. Graham, 466 F.3d 1234, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, had the district court properly calculated loss at $55,609, Griffith's sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment would have remained within her advisory Guideline range and thus would have been presumptively reasonable on appeal, see United States v. Mumma, 509 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir.2007). Because the district court's error in calculating loss was harmless, we need not remand for correction of that error.