Opinion ID: 2831583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant’s first and second appeals

Text: In appellant’s first appeal before this court, he challenged the trial court’s determination that Ms. Barber was the decedent’s common law wife, and we affirmed. See In re Estate of Reuben E. Waugh, Jr.; Gregory Waugh, Appellant, No. 09-PR-1038, Mem. Op. & J. (D.C. October 19, 2010). Mr. Toulouse represented Ms. Barber in that appeal and received compensation from estate funds. During and after the first appeal, Ms. Barber and Mr. Toulouse continued to administer the estate in accordance with their duties as co-personal representatives. Pursuant to D.C. Code § 20-721 (2001), 2 they submitted two accounts of the 2 D.C. Code § 20-721 provides: Except as provided in section 20-731, a supervised personal representative shall prepare verified written accounts of the management and distribution of the decedent’s property at the times and in the manner (continued . . .) 4 management and distribution of the estate to appellant and to the probate division for approval, the first on July 19, 2010 (“First Account”), and the second and final on April 29, 2011 (“Final Account”). Mr. Toulouse also provided appellant with a proposal to distribute the estate’s assets in kind, pursuant to D.C. Code § 20-1102 (d),3 on March 25, 2011. In this proposal, Mr. Toulouse requested that appellant raise any objections to the distribution in kind within thirty days, though appellant did not meet this deadline. Appellant’s only responses to the co-personal representatives’ communications came in the form of objections to the First and Final Accounts, (. . . continued) prescribed in this subchapter. The personal representative shall file the account with a certificate that there has been mailed or delivered to all interested persons, within the previous 15 days, a copy of the account with a notice that the account will be filed on or before a stated date. 3 D.C. Code § 20-1102 (d) provides: After the probable claims against the estate are known, the personal representative may mail or deliver a proposal for distribution to all persons who have a right to object to the proposed distribution. The right of any such person to object to the proposed distribution terminates if such person fails to object in writing received by the personal representative within 30 days after mailing or delivery of the proposal. 5 filed pursuant to D.C. Code § 20-726 (2001).4 Appellant filed objections to the First Account on April 24, 2010, asserting, among other things, that Mr. Toulouse had abdicated his responsibility as co-personal representative by failing to require supporting documentation for the attorney’s fees paid to him for his services, and abdicated his responsibility as attorney for the estate by failing to provide such documentation. Appellant filed objections to the Final Account on June 1, 2011, renewing his objections to the First Account and, for the first time, objecting to Mr. Toulouse’s proposal for distribution of the estate in kind as “unfair and uneven.” At the time of this filing, more than two months had elapsed since appellant received this proposal, and thus appellant had missed the thirty-day window in which to object to the proposed distribution, pursuant to D.C. Code § 20-1102 (d).5 The trial court denied appellant’s objections to both accounts without making specific findings, and appellant once again appealed to this court.6 4 D.C. Code § 20-726 provides that “[a]ny interested person may file an exception to an account with the Register within 30 days of the filing of the account. Such person shall mail a copy of the exception to the personal representative.” Appellant and the trial court refer to these “exceptions” as “objections.” 5 See supra note 3. 6 Specifically, in its order approving the First Account, the trial court stated that appellant’s objections were denied “[f]or the reasons stated in the opposition to the objection[.]” Similarly, in its order approving the Final Account, the trial court handwrote “the objections filed by Gregory Waugh are denied.” 6 In appellant’s second appeal, he challenged the trial court’s denial of his objections to the First Account and the Final Account, arguing error on the merits. Mr. Toulouse and Ms. Barber countered on procedural grounds, arguing that appellant had failed to file a petition challenging the reasonableness of compensation paid from the estate under D.C. Code § 20-753 (a)7 and that his objection to the distribution of estate assets was untimely under D.C. Code § 201102 (d).8 See In re Estate of Reuben E. Waugh, Jr.; Gregory Waugh, Appellant, No. 11-PR-1427, Mem. Op. & J. (D.C. January 14, 2013). We concluded that the 7 D.C. Code § 20-753 (a) provides: (a) On petition of any interested person (other than one who has consented after fair disclosure, and any person or entity claiming by or through such interested person) or on appropriate motion if administration is supervised, and after notice to all interested persons and hearing, the reasonableness of the need for or scope of employment of any person or entity employed by a personal representative including any attorney, auditor, investment advisor or other specialized agent or assistant, the reasonableness of the compensation of any person or entity so employed, or the reasonableness of the compensation claimed or taken by the personal representative for the personal representative’s own services, may be reviewed by the Court. Any person or entity who has received from an estate compensation for services rendered in excess of what the Court finds to be reasonable may be ordered to make appropriate refunds if such person or entity was given due notice of the petition and hearing, and the right to participate in such hearing. 8 See supra note 3. 7 record was insufficient to assess the merits of either party’s assertions and remanded for the trial court to “further explain its rulings” and make the following inquiries: First, were the objections appellant Waugh filed to the first and second accounts sufficient to challenge the attorney’s fees paid to appellee Toulouse for his legal work to establish and defend appellee Barber’s status as an heir of the estate, or was appellant required to follow a different procedure? Second, assuming appellant’s objections were sufficiently preserved, should the estate be required to pay Toulouse’s attorney’s fees for: services provided to Ms. Barber to establish her status as the decedent’s common law wife; services provided to Ms. Barber defending the ruling on appeal; and/or any other services provided to Ms. Barber in her capacity as heir, or putative heir, as distinguished from her capacity as copersonal representative? Third, to the extent appellant seeks a different distribution of assets, is his claim barred by D.C. Code § 20-1102 (d), or was his objection to the first or second account — or the combination of the two objections — sufficient to raise and preserve this claim?