Opinion ID: 3002707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defense Counsel’s Comments During His Opening

Text: Statement Navar’s first argument, which Thomas joins, is that Navar’s counsel made certain comments during his opening statement that improperly shifted the burden of proof, thereby violating the defendants’ Fifth Amendment right to due process. The following exchanges regarding Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821 9 the burden of proof occurred in front of the jury at trial. During her opening statement, the prosecutor correctly informed the jury that the government must prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, which she explained “is the standard of proof in . . . every criminal case in the city of Chicago.” Following the government’s statement, Navar’s counsel gave his opening statement, in which he made the following remarks to the jury regarding the burden of proof: Members of the jury, Mr. Hyman and I, Larry and I, intend to prove to you—that’s right, we who have no burden, it’s true. As you heard my adver- sary say, Ms. Noller and his Honor will tell you again, instruct you later . . . that the government has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in every criminal case. But in this case, members of the jury, I will respectfully tell you now that we appreciate those advantages, but we don’t want those advantages. He is presumed innocent, that’s true, but we don’t want any advantage at all because we will confidently prove to you . . . by the end of this case that Armando Navar is an innocent person and being set up and being framed by a person who has an absolute visceral hate for Armando Navar. .... I’m going to prove to you that Armando Navar meddled in a relationship between Herrera and Armando Navar’s sister-in-law, because he at some point, many times, told his sister-in-law that Herrera wasn’t good enough for her. . . . 10 Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821 .... I will competently prove—we will competently prove to you that Armando Navar is not a drug dealer, that the indictment is a false accusation . . . . These are the comments that Navar challenges in this appeal. Following Navar’s opening statement, Thomas’s counsel correctly stated that Thomas must be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and also noted that “[t]he government welcomes their burden of proof; it’s your job to hold them to their burden of proof.” During closing argument at the end of the trial, both the prosecutor and Thomas’s counsel again stated the correct burden of proof. Navar’s counsel, perhaps reassessing the strength of his case, abandoned the bravado displayed in his opening statement and referred to the correct burden of proof no less than nine different times during his closing argument. Finally, the district court gave the jury a detailed charge explaining that the defendants are presumed innocent and must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Navar now asserts that trial counsel’s comments during his opening statement were improper. Navar argues that even though “the defense did not make a motion for a mistrial because the defense made the improper argument . . . , the court itself should have stopped the procedure and had a mistrial declared.” (Petr.’s Br. 19.) We find Navar’s argument unconvincing. Not surprisingly, Navar’s counsel did not stop his opening statement to lodge an objection to his own comments; Thomas also did not object. Thus, we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821 11 United States v. Sandoval-Gomez, 295 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2002). In determining whether plain error exists, we ask (1) whether there was any error at all; (2) if so, whether that error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious; and (3) if the error was plain, whether it affected defendant’s substantial rights, i.e., whether it affected the outcome of the case. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993). Placed in the full context of the trial, which included the above statements, Navar’s argument borders on frivolity. First, we agree with the government that the appropriate avenue to address these types of alleged misstatements by one’s own counsel is via a Sixth Amendment claim for ineffective assistance. Navar brought such a claim and included his counsel’s comments as one basis for it, which we address below. Thomas, of course, cannot bring an ineffective assistance claim based upon the conduct of another co-defendant’s attorney. Thus, we consider the merits of defendants’ claims and find that they fail. In support of his argument, Navar analogizes his counsel’s remarks only to cases involving inappropriate comments by a prosecutor, and he invites us, without legal support, to apply the same standard of conduct to defense counsel. (Petr.’s Br. 21 (citing United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Segna, 555 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1977)).) However, overturning a conviction due to a prosecutor’s improper comments is no easy feat. See United States v. Sandoval, 347 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that to constitute prosecutorial misconduct, comments must be both improper and deprive defendant of a fair trial); Sandoval-Gomez, 295 F.3d at 763 (listing 12 Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821 numerous factors a court considers to determine whether defendant was denied a fair trial); see also United States v. Amerson, 185 F.3d 676, 685 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that a prosecutor’s improper comments, even at closing argument, “rarely rise to the level of reversible error” (quotations omitted)). Navar’s attempt to obtain a new trial because his counsel’s comments purportedly deprived him of a fair trial is decidedly more difficult. Navar’s first obstacle to success is to convince us that the standards that apply to a prosecutor’s comments should apply with equal force to defense counsel’s. We do not agree with the comparison. In a criminal case, the prosecutor is in the unique position of representing the government, as opposed to advocating on behalf of a client. As the Supreme Court observed: “The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Therefore, a prosecutor’s statements—and their impact— are evaluated in a different light than those made by defense counsel, for a jury must have confidence in the prosecutor’s faithful observation of the “duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction.” Id. But even more damaging to Navar’s claim is that even if defense counsel could make such a strong statement regarding the burden of proof so as to violate his own Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821 13 client’s constitutional rights, Navar’s counsel made no such statement here. His comments were merely confident assertions regarding the strength of his case and did not shift the burden of proof or confuse the jury. He also referred to the correct burden multiple times, thereby ameliorating any possible self-inflicted prejudice. See Sandoval-Gomez, 295 F.3d at 763 (stating that one factor in determining whether a defendant was denied a fair trial due to a prosecutor’s remarks is the defense’s opportunity to counter any prejudice). Thomas’s counsel and the prosecutor both stated the proper burden of proof, and the court gave the jury the correct instruction, which we assume it understood and followed. See Briggs v. Marshall, 93 F.3d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1996); Bae v. Peters, 950 F.2d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990) (“[A]rguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the court. The former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of argument, not evidence . . . ; the latter, we have often recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law.” (citation omitted)). Consequently, Navar’s argument fails; he does not present any error, much less a plain one affecting substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733-34. Even if the statements were improper under the standard applicable to a prosecutor’s misstatements, they did not deprive Navar of the right to a fair trial, i.e., they did not “ ‘so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ” Kappos v. Hanks, 54 F.3d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 14 Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). Thomas merely adopted Navar’s argument, and his claim fails for the same reasons.