Opinion ID: 197262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Roadblock Effect a Fourth Amendment Seizure?

Text: 15 The defendants contend that the roadblock did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure because it permitted vehicular traffic to maneuver through the fifty-foot opening designedly left between two of the tractor-trailer units parked in the breakdown lane to the right of the westernmost, southbound travel lane. We do not agree. 4 16 Almost a decade ago, the Supreme Court dealt with a vehicular collision involving a so-called deadman's roadblock, designed and constructed to block off an entire roadway by placing an unilluminated tractor-trailer unit just beyond a curve and locating a police cruiser directly in front of the roadblock with its headlights aimed at the oncoming target vehicle, thereby blinding the driver to the impassable highway obstruction just around the curve. Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 594, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1379-80, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). Brower nevertheless enunciates a rule that renders its egregious facts largely immaterial to the required Fourth Amendment inquiry into whether a roadblock seizure has occurred. 17 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia explained that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied, id. at 597, 109 S.Ct. at 1381-82; see also Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir.1990) (same), explaining that it [is] enough for a seizure that a person be stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place to achieve that result. Brower, 489 U.S. at 599, 109 S.Ct. at 1382. The majority opinion went on to say: 18 [A] roadblock is not just a significant show of authority to induce a voluntary stop, but it is designed to produce a stop by physical impact if voluntary compliance does not occur. It may well be that respondents here preferred, and indeed earnestly hoped, that Brower would stop on his own, without striking the barrier, but we do not think it practicable to conduct such an inquiry into subjective intent. Nor do we think it possible, in determining whether there has been a seizure in a case such as this, to distinguish between a roadblock that is designed to give the oncoming driver the option of a voluntary stop (e.g., one at the end of a straightaway), and a roadblock that is designed precisely to produce a collision (e.g., one located just around a bend). 19 Id. at 598, 109 S.Ct. at 1382 (citations omitted). 20 Thus, for purposes of determining whether the roadblock in this case worked a Fourth Amendment seizure under Brower, the controlling consideration is not whether it was brightly illuminated, located at the end of a long straightaway, or afforded a restrictive avenue of egress. 5 Rather, it constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure because Seekamp was meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock--and ... he was so stopped. Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. at 1382-83. 6 21 The Brower standard for determining whether a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred applies whenever there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied. Id. at 597, 109 S.Ct. at 1381-82 (emphasis omitted). Thus, for example, if the MSP troopers had resorted to some other method, such as the use of spike mats, a Fourth Amendment seizure would have occurred provided Seekamp was stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place to achieve that result. Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. at 1382-83. See also Landol-Rivera, 906 F.2d at 796 (It is intervention directed at a specific individual that furnishes the basis for a Fourth Amendment claim.). 22