Opinion ID: 2630440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 8 We apply a three-part test to determine whether a governmental entity is immune from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The test assesses (1) whether the activity undertaken is a governmental function; (2) whether governmental immunity was waived for the particular activity; and (3) whether there is an exception to that waiver. [8] In this case, there is no dispute that the UHP troopers were undertaking a governmental function for which the government has waived immunity. There is also no dispute that Peck was incarcerated at the time of the injury. He was arrested, handcuffed, and told to stand in front of the police cruiser. Clearly, he was under the control of the State [9] and unable to be released without some kind of permission. [10] ¶ 9 Thus, the only issue before us is the scope of governmental immunity retained by the incarceration exception, which preserves immunity for any injury that arises out of, in connection with, or results from ... the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement. [11] ¶ 10 The first step in any statutory interpretation is to examine the plain meaning of the statute. [O]ur goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent and purpose. [12] Accordingly, we begin with the plain language of the incarceration exception, considering the literal meaning of each term and avoiding interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative. [13] ¶ 11 The phrase arising out of is very broad, general, and comprehensive. [14] In ordinary usage, it imports a concept of causation and is `ordinarily understood to mean originating from, incident to, or connected with the item in question.' [15] The other phrases in the exceptionin connection with and results fromsimilarly connote a causal link between the injury and the government activity for which sovereign immunity has not been waived. Thus, any injury that is caused by or originates from incarceration in a place of legal confinement falls within the incarceration exception. ¶ 12 In their briefs before this court, both parties focused on the spatial scope of the incarceration exception. To this end, they concentrated their arguments on whether the verbally defined patch of concrete where the troopers told Peck to stand was a place of legal confinement. In so focusing their arguments, the parties have missed the forest for the trees. By concentrating on the meaning of the phrase place of legal confinement, the parties failed to consider the broad introductory phrase that retains governmental immunity for all injuries aris[ing] out of, in connection with, or result[ing] from incarceration in a place of legal confinement. This oversight conflicts with the principle of statutory interpretation that requires us to avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative. [16] ¶ 13 As we step back and look at the entire incarceration exception, [17] it is clear that it covers Peck's injury because there is a clear causal link between his injury and his incarceration in a place of legal confinement. Peck had been arrested, handcuffed, and asked to stand in front of the cruiser as he awaited imminent transportation to the county jail. In fact, Peck was standing outside of the police cruiser only because the arresting trooper needed to clear the back seat in order to transport Peck to the county jail. Peck's belligerence as he waited was the reason the trooper physically restrained him, and Peck's injury resulted from the restraint. Whether we refer to the police cruiser [18] or the county jail [19] as the place of legal confinement, the causal link between Peck's injury and his incarceration in a place of legal confinement is clear. ¶ 14 Defining the boundaries of the incarceration exception by focusing on the causal link between the injury and incarceration in a place of legal confinement is consistent with our precedent. For example, in Epting v. State, a prisoner escaped from a work release program and killed a woman. [20] Her children brought a negligence claim against the State. We concluded that their claim was barred by governmental immunity because the woman's death either arose out of the discretionary choice of placing the inmate in the work release program or arose out of his incarceration in the state prison. [21] Thus, in applying the term arises out of ... incarceration in a place of legal confinement, we focused on the causal connection between the injury and incarceration in a place of legal confinement, rather than focusing spatially on whether the actual injury occurred within a place of legal confinement. ¶ 15 The court of appeals adopted a similar approach in both Kirk v. State [22] and Pace v. St. George City Police Department. [23] In Kirk, a prison inmate escaped while being transported to the Hall of Justice to attend court proceedings. [24] In the course of his escape, he shot an unarmed bailiff, who then brought a negligence suit against the State for his injuries. Focusing on the causal connection between the injury and incarceration in a place of legal confinement, the court of appeals held that governmental immunity applied because the injury [was] caused by an incarcerated person under the control of the State. [25] Similarly, in Pace, the court of appeals held that governmental immunity applied to a suicide death that occurred in the police department bathroom because the death occurred `in connection with' the individual's incarceration in a `place of legal confinement.' [26] ¶ 16 Due to the clear causal link between Peck's injury and his imminent transportation in a police cruiser to the county jail, we hold that his claim is barred by section 63-30-10(10) because his injury arose out of, in connection with, or resulted from incarceration in a place of legal confinement. We leave for another day whether a trooper or a police officer may create a place of legal confinement by verbally defining physical boundaries and directing an individual to stand within those boundaries.