Opinion ID: 6105527
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: William Blackstone

Text: Though philosophically consistent with Locke, William Blackstone provided a more complete description of the contours of natural rights, particularly the right to life, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. See Bedau, The Right to Life, 52(4) The Monist 550, 553 (1968) (If we were to look for the one thinker from the past whose writings, in virtue of their antiquity, detail, and influence, have no peer as a source of the classic doctrine of the right to life, we would have to choose, not Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, or Paine, but Sir William Blackstone.). The United States Supreme Court has recognized Blackstone's influence on the framers of the United States Constitution: Blackstone's Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory exposition of the common law of England. At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, it had been published about twenty years, and it has been said that more copies of the work had been sold in this country than in England; so that undoubtedly, the framers of the 32 Constitution were familiar with it. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69, 24 S. Ct. 826, 49 L. Ed. 99 (1904). Likewise, members of the early state constitutional conventions were so immersed in the common law as expounded by Blackstone that the language of these constitutions cannot be well understood without reference to his teachings. See Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism, 19 Vt. L. Rev. 5, 7-8 (1994). Blackstone divided individual rights into two categories: absolute and relative. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England at 119 (1765). It is important to recognize Blackstone did not define absolute rights in a way that established a higher order of law (where absolute rights would be free from any limitation or infringement, thereby limiting the authority of the government to exercise the power of criminal punishment). Instead, his definition of absolute rights was consistent with Locke's characterization of natural rights—those that appertain and belong to particular men, merely as individuals or single persons, whereas relative rights are incident to them as members of society, and standing in various relations to each other. 1 Blackstone, at 119. For the most part, the purpose of 'relative' rights (including the right of access to the courts, the right to petition for the redress of grievances and the right to bear arms) was to preserve or implement 'absolute' rights in organized communities. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1996). In other words, under Blackstone's terminology, absolute rights are those naturally endowed to persons by the creator: The absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed with discernment to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which appear to him to be most desirable, are usually summed up in one general appellation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of 33 nature; being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endued him with the faculty of freewill. 1 Blackstone, at 121. For Blackstone, political or civil liberty—which is that of a member of society— is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public. 1 Blackstone, at 121. Moreover, the purpose of society, and thus government, is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities. 1 Blackstone, at 120. Blackstone reduced these natural rights to three principal or primary articles; the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property. 1 Blackstone, at 125. He included the right to life under the umbrella of the right of personal security: The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. 1 Blackstone, at 125. Indeed, foremost in Blackstone's right of personal security was the right to life. 1 Blackstone, at 125. A person's life and limbs were of such high value, that it pardons even homicide if committed se defendendo, or in order to preserve them. 1 Blackstone, at 126. Whatever a person might do to save life or limb, is looked upon as done upon the highest necessity and compulsion. 1 Blackstone, at 126. Like Locke, and consistent with delegate Kingman's interpretation of section 1, Blackstone recognized the right to life is not alienable, meaning it cannot be assigned or transferred to another, but it can be forfeited when a person's criminal conduct necessitates punishment, up to and including capital punishment, in civil society. 34 This natural life, being, as was before observed, the immediate donation of the great creator, cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed by any individual, neither by the person himself nor by any other of his fellow-creatures, merely upon their own authority. Yet nevertheless it may, by the divine permission, be frequently forfeited for the breach of those laws of society, which are enforced by the sanction of capital punishments; of the nature, restrictions, expedience, and legality of which, we may hereafter more conveniently enquire in the concluding book of these commentaries. At present, I shall only observe, that whenever the constitution of a state vests in any man, or body of men, a power of destroying at pleasure, without the direction of laws, the lives or members of the subject, such constitution is in the highest degree tyrannical: and that, whenever any laws direct such destruction for light and trivial causes, such laws are likewise tyrannical, though in an inferior degree; because here the subject is aware of the danger he is exposed to, and may by prudent caution provide against it. The statute law of England does therefore very seldom, and the common law does never, inflict any punishment extending to life or limb, unless upon the highest necessity; and the constitution is an utter stranger to any arbitrary power of killing or maiming the subject without the express warrant of law. (Emphasis added.) 1 Blackstone, at 129. Commentators interpreting Blackstone and, by extension, Locke have confirmed this interpretation of inalienable natural rights, i.e., recognizing that inalienable natural rights may still be forfeited through criminal conduct warranting punishment: (a) If punishments of death are necessary for social defense, then the plea of absolute individual rights will not bar the justifiable imposition of death penalties. But the death penalty may be justifiably imposed only if the criminal's (right to) life is forfeit for his crime (sc. one is excused for killing in self-defense because the aggressor forfeits his right to life). (b) Whenever a person commits a crime, he violates the rights of another. This in turn entails forfeiture by the criminal of those rights which he violated in his victim. '[T]he offender, by violating the life or liberty or property of another, has lost his own right to have his life, liberty, or property respected . . .' The result of (a) and (b) is a justification of the forfeiture of the absolute right to life. 52(4) The Monist at 568. 35 While Bedau critiques this conclusion, it is, nonetheless, the conclusion that both Blackstone and Locke reached in formulating their concept of natural rights. In his discussion of crimes and punishments in Book IV, Blackstone reasons that in the state of nature, the power or right of punishment is vested in every individual. See 4 Blackstone, at 7. It is clear, that the right of punishing crimes against the law of nature, as murder and the like, is, in a state of mere nature vested in every individual. For it must be vested in somebody; otherwise the laws of nature would be vain and fruitless, if none were empowered to put them in execution: and if that power is vested in any one, it must also be vested in all mankind, since all are by nature equal. 4 Blackstone, at 7. Blackstone, like Locke, concludes that upon entering civil society, this right is transferred from individuals to the sovereign power. 4 Blackstone, at 8. Blackstone also recognized a distinction between crimes that are mala in se— wrong or evil in itself—and those that are mala prohibita—offences of human institution. 4 Blackstone, at 9. For Blackstone, it was apparent that civil society could impose capital punishment for crimes that are mala in se. With regard to offences mala in se, capital punishments are in some instances inflicted by the immediate command of God himself to all mankind; as, in the case of murder, by the precept delivered to Noah, their common ancestor and representative, 'whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed.' 4 Blackstone, at 9. 36 But for crimes mala prohibita, capital punishment is only justified 'when offences grow enormous, frequent, and dangerous to a kingdom or state, destructive or highly pernicious to civil societies, and to the great insecurity and danger of the kingdom or its inhabitants, severe punishment and even death itself is necessary to be annexed to laws in many cases by the prudence of lawgivers.' 4 Blackstone, at 9. It was not only the frequency or difficulty in preventing a particular mala prohibita crime that might warrant a penalty of capital punishment, but also its enormity, or dangerous tendency that alone might warrant putting the offender to death. 4 Blackstone, at 9. In sum, both Locke and Blackstone characterized inalienable natural rights, including the right to life, as forfeitable when criminal conduct warrants punishment, up to and including death, in civil society. See Locke, Bk. II, § 23; 1 Blackstone, at 129. This conclusion is consistent with the record of the Wyandotte Convention debates, where the framers made clear that the natural rights in section 1 are forfeitable in civil society and cannot impair the state's ability to punish individuals for their criminal conduct. And both (the teachings of Locke/Blackstone and the record of the Wyandotte Convention debates) are consistent with the legal definition of the term inalienable as used in section 1. C. Kansas' Capital Sentencing Scheme Does Not Infringe Upon the Inalienable Right to Life in Section 1 As noted above, R. Carr claims that section 1 affords him an absolute, nonforfeitable right to life that precludes capital punishment. However, as discussed more fully below, our construction of section 1 forecloses this argument. The text and relevant historical record demonstrate the framers intended section 1's inalienable right to life to be subject to forfeiture through criminal conduct. Accordingly, R. Carr's and J. Carr's asserted right to or declared interest in an absolute, nonforfeitable right to life does not 37 fall within the purview of rights protected by section 1. Instead, when a person is convicted of capital murder beyond reasonable doubt, he or she forfeits the inalienable right to life under section 1 and the state may impose lawful punishment for that crime. We adopted a similar rationale in Kleypas I, albeit under a substantially different legal framework that predated this court's decision in Hodes. See State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 136, 40 P.3d 139 (2001) (Kleypas I), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002), overruled on other grounds by Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2006). There, Kleypas attempted to distinguish section 1 from the Fourteenth Amendment by highlighting the fact that the text of section 1 does not contain any limiting language or exception authorizing governmental infringement of natural rights upon satisfaction of due process requirements. Kleypas I, 272 Kan. at 1051. Kleypas argues that, unlike the federal version which does not allow the taking of life without due process of law, the above language in our state constitution simply does not contemplate the taking of a life by the State under any circumstances. He contends that the Kansas Constitution confers upon him an absolute right to life. 272 Kan. at 1051. The court rejected Kleypas' argument without much discussion. It quoted from the same constitutional convention debates discussed above in concluding that the right to life under section 1 does not limit the state's power to impose punishments for crimes. 272 Kan. at 1051-52. The court characterized the argument as somewhat novel but listed a variety of cases from other state courts that had soundly rejected similar challenges. 272 Kan. at 1052 (citing Ruiz v. Arkansas, 299 Ark. 144, 152-53, 772 S.W.2d 297 [1989]; Missouri v. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606, 612-13 [Mo. 1982]; Slaughter v. Oklahoma, 950 P.2d 839, 861-62 [Okla. Crim. App. 1997]). Ultimately, the court decided Kleypas' argument stretched the meaning of the venerable words in § 1 of the state Bill 38 of Rights far beyond their intended purpose. This we decline to do. Kleypas I, 272 Kan. at 1052. It is no surprise the Kleypas I court focused on the framers' discussion of inalienability in rejecting the section 1 challenge. The delegates' remarks reflect the framers' intent to construe the term inalienable within section 1 consistent with its legal meaning—a right or interest that cannot be transferred or assigned to another person. Though inalienable, i.e., nontransferable, an individual may forfeit his or her natural rights by engaging in criminal conduct that is subject to punishment in civil society. Therefore, delegate Kingman believed his proposed language for section 1 (which was ultimately adopted by the convention) would establish the existence of natural rights that were forfeitable, thereby authorizing the state to impose punishment for criminal conduct without offense to section 1. Locke and Blackstone, whose teachings greatly influenced the development of both federal and state constitutions alike, recognized a similar construction of inalienable natural rights, i.e., that they were subject to forfeiture. Natural rights theorists generally posited a state of nature that included within it a set of rights that every individual possessed in that state of nature. But when humans enter civil society, they relinquish certain powers and rights to the sovereign or government. As discussed above, the right to impose punishment, up to and including capital punishment, was one of the rights transferred from the individual to the sovereign. Thus, according to Locke, Blackstone, and the drafters of the Kansas Constitution, an individual who commits a crime warranting punishment in civil society forfeits his or her natural rights, thereby enabling the state to impose just punishment. After careful examination of the text of section 1, the historical record, and the documents and writings that inspired the drafters of the Kansas Constitution, we conclude 39 that section 1 recognizes an inalienable right to life, but that right is not absolute or nonforfeitable. We hold that once a defendant has been convicted of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant forfeits his or her natural rights under section 1 (among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) and the state may impose punishment for that crime pursuant to Kansas' capital sentencing scheme. In so holding, we do not mean to suggest the state's power to punish is unabated upon a defendant's forfeiture of natural rights under section 1. To the contrary, a defendant is entitled to due process of law throughout the penalty phase proceedings. See, e.g., Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 10. Additionally, the punishment imposed may not be cruel or unusual. See, e.g., Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 9. But these protections do not arise under section 1. In fact, where a defendant has been lawfully convicted of capital murder, the imposition of the capital sentence no longer implicates his or her inalienable natural rights under section 1. However, other constitutional guarantees, including but not limited to those contained in sections 9 and 10, continue to regulate the state's authority to punish and guard against arbitrary applications of such authority. Cf. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 114 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1991) (fundamental right to liberty limits government power to punish prior to jury's verdict of guilt; thereafter a person is eligible for, and the court may impose, whatever punishment is authorized by statute for his offense, so long as that penalty is not cruel and unusual). For these reasons, R. Carr's and J. Carr's asserted right to, or declared interest in, an absolute, nonforfeitable right to life is not included within or part of the guarantees or protections of section 1. Instead, the natural right to life is forfeitable, and the government's imposition of the death penalty pursuant to Kansas' capital sentencing scheme does not impair the inalienable right to life protected under section 1. Accordingly, the jury's capital sentencing verdicts in R. Carr's and J. Carr's cases do not implicate section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. 40 II. Death Qualification of Jurors Under K.S.A. 22-3410 Does Not Violate Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights In an amicus brief filed in J. Carr's case, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) raises a state constitutional challenge to the practice of death qualifying juries in Kansas—the process of removing prospective jurors for cause, pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3410, when their conscientious objection to capital punishment substantially impairs their ability to fulfill the oath and obligations of a juror. Though not raised by R. Carr, the LDF and the State briefed the issue to the court, and we advised J. Carr and the State to be prepared to address the issue at oral argument. After oral argument concluded, R. Carr filed a motion requesting the court consider this section 5 challenge in his appeal. We deny R. Carr's motion because it is an improper procedural vehicle for advancing this new, state constitutional challenge. See State v. Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, 774, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017) (Cheever II) (denying similar motion on instruction issue); State v. Gleason, 305 Kan. 794, 798, 388 P.3d 101 (2017) (Gleason II) (same). Nevertheless, we address the merits of the claim given our statutory obligation in capital appeals to both consider the question of sentence and notice unassigned errors appearing of record if the ends of justice would be served thereby. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6619(b); Cheever II, 306 Kan. at 774 (electing to reach merits of similar issue [u]nder the unique circumstances of [the] case and in the interest of judicial economy); Gleason II, 305 Kan. at 798-99 (same). Kansas statute authorizes a district judge to remove prospective jurors for cause where their state of mind with reference to the case or any of the parties is such that the court determines there is doubt that [the prospective juror] can act impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party. K.S.A. 22-3410(2)(i). Under this provision, parties in a capital case may successfully challenge prospective jurors for 41 cause if their views on the death penalty prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors. See R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 113-14. The statute is designed to balance a defendant's due process and jury trial rights with the State's strong interest in seating jurors who can apply the sentence of capital punishment according to the framework provided by law. 300 Kan. at 113. Nevertheless, the LDF contends the State's removal of prospective jurors under this statute violates the right to trial by jury preserved in section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. A. Standard of Review and Legal Framework As previously noted, constitutional challenges raise questions of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Coleman, 312 Kan. 114, 117, 472 P.3d 85 (2020). To the extent resolution of this issue requires us to interpret the language of section 5, our review is likewise unlimited. 312 Kan. at 117. Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides that [t]he right of trial by jury shall be inviolate. This court has consistently held that section 5 'preserves the jury trial right as it historically existed at common law when our state's constitution came into existence' in 1859. Albano, 313 Kan. at 641. A section 5 analysis generally involves two inquiries: (1) In what types of cases is a party entitled to a jury as a matter of right? and (2) [W]hen such a right exists, what does the right protect? State v. Love, 305 Kan. 716, 735, 387 P.3d 820 (2017). Prosecutions for violations of state criminal statutes unquestionably implicate Section 5. 305 Kan. at 736. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the scope of that right—that is, does section 5 foreclose death qualification of jurors under K.S.A. 22-3410? 42 B. The Plain Meaning of the Term Jury and the Historical Record Demonstrate that Death-Qualification Under K.S.A. 22-3410 Is Beyond the Scope of Section 5 To determine the scope of the jury trial right under the Kansas Constitution, it is first instructive to explore the meaning of the term jury as used in section 5. In doing so, we rely on established rules of constitutional construction: In ascertaining the meaning of a constitutional provision, the primary duty of the courts is to look to the intention of the makers . . . and the adopters . . . of that provision. A constitutional provision is not to be narrowly or technically construed, but its language should be interpreted to mean what the words imply to persons of common understanding. Words in common usage are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning in arriving at a proper construction. [Citations omitted.] Board of Leavenworth County Com'rs v. McGraw Fertilizer Serv., Inc., 261 Kan. 901, 905, 933 P.2d 698 (1997). When the words themselves do not make the drafters' intent clear, courts look to the historical record, remembering 'the polestar . . . is the intention of the makers and adopters.' Hunt, 150 Kan. at 5; see State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 254 Kan. 632, 655, 867 P.2d 1034 (1994). Here, both the plain meaning of the term jury and the historical record each undermine this section 5 challenge. To ascertain the meaning of the term jury under section 5, we first look to the common, ordinary meaning of this term. Dictionary definitions provide a reliable source for that meaning. Midwest Crane & Rigging, LLC v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 306 Kan. 845, 851, 397 P.3d 1205 (2017). Black's Law Dictionary defines a jury as [a] group of persons selected according to law and given the power to decide questions of fact and return a verdict in the case submitted to them. Black's Law Dictionary 1024 (11th ed. 2019). Similarly, the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines jury as [a] body of persons selected to decide a verdict in a legal case, based 43 upon the evidence presented, after being given instructions on the applicable law. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 953 (5th ed. 2011); see also Webster's New World College Dictionary 790 (5th ed. 2014) (defining jury as a group of people sworn to hear the evidence and inquire into the facts in a law case, and to give a decision in accordance with their findings). Thus, we construe the term jury, as used in section 5, to denote a legally selected group of persons sworn to determine issues of fact and return a verdict based on the evidence and the law as instructed. This construction is also in accord with our precedent defining the traditional function and duty of a Kansas jury. See State v. McClanahan, 212 Kan. 208, 217, 510 P.2d 153 (1973) ([I]t is the proper function and duty of a jury to accept the rules of law given to it in the instructions by the court, apply those rules of law in determining what facts are proven and render a verdict based thereon.); see also State v. Boeschling, 311 Kan. 124, 130, 458 P.3d 234 (2020) (recognizing same traditional functions and duties of jury). Under this plain meaning interpretation, section 5's right to trial by jury does not prohibit the state from death qualifying juries. Importantly, K.S.A. 22-3410 does not permit the removal of any or all prospective jurors who have conscientious objections to the death penalty. The death qualification process is constrained by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits the state from excluding jurors in capital trials simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968). Instead, the State may only remove those prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties as [jurors] in accordance with [their] instructions and [their] oath[s].' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985). 44 In other words, death qualification eliminates only those prospective jurors who cannot decide issues of fact and reach a decision based on the evidence presented and the law as instructed—i.e., those persons who are unable to fulfill the traditional functions and duties of a Kansas jury. And, as established above, the plain meaning of the term jury, as used in section 5, excludes these types of prospective jurors from its definition. In this regard, the process of death qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410 facilitates the very trial by jury that section 5 guarantees. C. Death Qualification Does Not Implicate Section 5 Because the Common Law Did Not Prohibit the Practice When the Kansas Constitution Was Adopted in 1859 Furthermore, the LDF concedes that when our state Constitution was adopted, the common law permitted a trial judge to remove individuals whose conscientious scruples against the death penalty would substantially impair their ability to perform the oath and duties of a juror. However, the LDF asserts this common-law rule arose from circumstances peculiar to the structure of capital trials at the time. Historically, neither the jury nor the trial judge possessed sentencing discretion in capital trials—once convicted, a judge sentenced the defendant to death as a matter of law. See Novak, The Role of Legal Advocates in Transnational Judicial Dialogue: The Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty and the Evolution of International Law, 25 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 179, 210 (2017) (At common law, the mandatory death penalty shifted sentencing discretion from a trial judge to a clemency authority.). Thus, a death-scrupled juror could only circumvent the death penalty by acquitting a defendant, regardless of what the evidence established or the law required. The LDF speculates that death-scrupled jurors were thus disqualified at common law for a very narrow reason— the need to ensure the fair adjudication of the defendant's guilt. The LDF contends this 45 rationale no longer applies to Kansas' modern capital sentencing scheme, which requires a bifurcated trial with separate guilt and sentencing phases. As such, the LDF concludes that section 5 no longer authorizes death qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410. We question the LDF's narrow characterization of the rationale behind the common-law rule and the dubious assertion it has no application to Kansas' current capital sentencing scheme. More fundamentally, however, the LDF's argument fails to demonstrate how death qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410 offends any jury trial right protected under section 5. Instead, the LDF's argument is founded on the mistaken premise that section 5 authorizes the Legislature to create or modify juror qualification and selection standards only if such legislation is affirmatively authorized by common law (and the original rationale underlying it). But there is no support for this proposition. In fact, the premise is simply incorrect. Section 5 does not define the constitutional scope of legislative power. Instead, such powers are defined in article 2 of the Kansas Constitution. State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 898, 179 P.3d 366 (2008) (Article 2 of the Kansas Constitution gives the legislature the exclusive power to pass, amend, and repeal statutes.). Section 5 limits the Legislature's exercise of article 2 powers only when an act conflicts with or limits a jury trial right that existed at common law when the Kansas Constitution was adopted in 1859. See Jansky v. Baldwin, 120 Kan. 332, 334, 243 P. 302 (1926) (Since the people have all governmental power, and exercise it through the legislative branch of the government, the legislature is free to act except as it is restricted by the state constitution.); Atchison Street Rly. Co. v. Mo. Pac. Rly. Co., 31 Kan. 660, 665, 3 P. 284 (1884) (Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights limits legislative power where act trenches upon the rights guaranteed by them, or which conflicts with any limitation expressed in them.); see also Love, 305 Kan. at 735 (rejecting defendant's argument that because 46 juries were instructed on lesser included offenses at common law, the practice was frozen for all time as an overbroad interpretation of Section 5 and its protections). As established above, the parties agree that the prevailing common law in 1859 permitted death qualification, and Kansas' territorial laws were consistent with this common-law rule. Kan. Terr. Stat. 1859, ch. 27, § 179. The LDF fails to identify any common-law rule in Kansas that prohibited death qualification at the time our Constitution was adopted in 1859. See Prouty v. Stover, 11 Kan. 235, 256 (1873) (The mere silence of the constitution on any subject cannot be turned into a prohibition.). Therefore, death qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410 does not violate section 5. See Kimball and others v. Connor, Starks and others, 3 Kan. 414, 432 (1866) (Trial by jury is guaranteed only in those cases where that right existed at common law.). Quoting State v. Peterson, No. 116,931, 2018 WL 4840468, at  (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished opinion), the LDF asserts that 'citizens called for jury duty have a constitutional right to serve if they are otherwise qualified.' (Emphasis added.) This unpublished Court of Appeals decision fails to advance the LDF's section 5 claim. Peterson addressed a challenge brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, not section 5. Also, Peterson does not identify any common-law right incorporated into section 5 that would prohibit death qualification pursuant to K.S.A. 223410. Moreover, Peterson acknowledges that potential jurors must still be qualified to serve—that is, jurors must be able to fulfill the traditional functions and duties of a Kansas jury. 2018 WL 4840468, at . And, as established above, the term jury, as used in section 5, excludes potential jurors who cannot fulfill these traditional functions due to their conscientious objection to the death penalty. 47 D. The Lack of Factual Findings Forecloses Our Review of the Disparate Impact Challenge Finally, the LDF claims death qualification disparately impacts the racial composition and biases of juries in capital sentencing proceedings, contrary to R. Carr's section 5 right to trial by jury. Specifically, the LDF argues death qualification disproportionately excludes Black venirepersons and produces a jury with higher levels of implicit and explicit racial bias; and such juries are 'disproportionately guilt-prone and death-prone.' These allegations most certainly warrant careful analysis and scrutiny. But the issue—whether death qualification disparately impacts the racial composition of the jury or its propensity to convict and sentence a defendant—raises a question of fact. Indeed, the LDF cites several empirical studies to support its claims. However, the issue was not raised or developed at trial. As a result, the district court made no factual findings related to the LDF's claim. '[A]ppellate courts do not make factual findings but review those made by district courts.' State v. Reed, 300 Kan. 494, 513, 332 P.3d 172 (2014). And the absence of such findings precludes us from conducting any meaningful review of this issue. See State v. Wright, 305 Kan. 1176, 1179, 390 P.3d 899 (2017) (lack of factual findings precluded meaningful review of harmless error analysis of constitutional challenge). This holding is bolstered by our previous decision in R. Carr, where we affirmed the district court's rulings on the for-cause challenges R. Carr had raised on appeal. In other words, we previously determined that substantial competent evidence supported the district court's conclusion that the individuals empaneled as members of R. Carr's jury were impartial and qualified. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 114-24. This holding, which is now the law of the case, further suggests the sentence of death was not imposed under the 48 influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, including the State's ability to death qualify jurors under K.S.A. 22-3140. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6619(c)(1) (requiring court to determine whether sentence was imposed under such improper circumstances). In sum, both the plain meaning and historical record confirm that a jury is defined as a group comprised of persons who will determine issues of fact and return a decision based on the evidence and in accordance with the law as instructed. Death qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410, as limited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, removes only those prospective jurors who cannot fulfill these obligations due to conscientious objection to the death penalty, i.e., the statute authorizes removal of those prospective jurors excluded from the constitutional definition of a jury. Thus, death qualification facilitates the very jury trial right guaranteed by section 5. Moreover, when the Kansas Constitution was adopted in 1859, the common law did not preclude, and in fact authorized, this procedure. For these reasons, we hold that death qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410 does not violate section 5. III. The Motion and State Law Challenge to the Mitigating Circumstances Instruction Having resolved the challenges raised under the Kansas Constitution, we next address R. Carr's pending motion to apply state law to the burden-of-proof jury instruction for mitigating circumstances. This equivalent federal constitutional issue was designated P10 in our earlier decision. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 256, 302-03. We deny the motion but reach the claim's merits. We hold that an instruction on the burden of proof for mitigating circumstances is not required under state law, overturning the holding in Cheever II, 306 Kan. 760, Syl. ¶ 5, that K.S.A. 21-4624(e), now codified as K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6617(e), requires such an instruction. 49 A. Standard of Review and Legal Framework We apply a four-step analysis to review jury instruction challenges: (1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the appellate court must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in [State v. ]Ward. State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 163, 283 P.3d 202 (2012). To the extent the legal appropriateness of the instruction requires statutory interpretation of K.S.A. 21-4624(e), we review that issue de novo. See State v. Harris, 311 Kan. 816, 821, 467 P.3d 504 (2020).