Opinion ID: 213502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ware’s Third Claim

Text: During trial, Ware testified that another individual was using his bedroom as an overnight guest, and that Ware was sleeping on the couch. In rebuttal, the government re-called the arresting officer, who testified that Ware told him that the individual did not live there, but was visiting to get a power cord for a video game, and had nothing to do with anything inside the apartment. The government then asked the officer, “[a]nd did Mr. Ware say anything like, I have been sleeping on the sofa; I don’t know what’s in my bedroom?” To which the officer replied, “No, sir. He didn’t volunteer any kind of information like that.” Ware argues the district court erroneously admitted this evidence of his post-arrest silence in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976). Ware contemporaneously objected to this alleged evidentiary error, so review this claim for abuse of discretion. Turner, 474 F.3d at 1275. Doyle “held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits impeachment on the basis of a defendant’s silence following Miranda 1 Moreover, the majority of the officers’ testimony regarding Ware’s statements were given in rebuttal to impeach Ware’s testimony, so the officers’ testimony would have been admissible even absent Miranda warnings. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26, 91 S. Ct. 643 (1971). 12 warnings.” Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407, 100 S. Ct. 2180 (1980) (per curiam). But Doyle is inapplicable, to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements. Such questioning makes no unfair use of silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all. Id. at 408. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the officer’s testimony. Assuming that the arresting officer administered the Miranda warnings to Ware,2 the record reveals that the officer’s rebuttal testimony addressed the inconsistency between Ware’s post-arrest statement to the officer and his exculpatory testimony at trial, and not Ware’s failure to offer exculpatory information on arrest. “The questions were not designed to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement.” Charles, 447 U.S. at 409. Because the question did not address Ware’s “failure to offer exculpatory evidence upon arrest,” but rather “simply addressed the context of [Ware’s] statement on arrest,” United States v. Dodd, 111 F.3d 867, 869 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam), 2 Alternatively, if Ware was not given the Miranda warnings, the Doyle prohibition is not implicated. See United States v. O’Keefe, 461 F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[D]ue process is not violated by the use for impeachment purposes of a defendant’s silence prior to arrest, or after arrest if no Miranda warnings are given.”). 13 the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the officer’s testimony.