Opinion ID: 2062895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Extrajudicial Identifications

Text: It is well settled in Maryland that a court may admit, as substantive proof, evidence of a third party testifying as to an extrajudicial identification by an eyewitness when made under circumstances precluding the suspicion of unfairness or unreliability, where the out-of-court declarant is present at trial and subject to cross-examination. Bedford v. State, 293 Md. 172, 176-179, 443 A.2d 78 (1982); Johnson, supra, 237 Md. at 289-291, 206 A.2d 138; see Judy, supra, 218 Md. at 172-176, 146 A.2d 29; Basoff v. State, 208 Md. 643, 650-651, 119 A.2d 917 (1956). An extrajudicial identification is sufficient evidence of criminal agency to sustain a conviction, even though the declarant is unable to identify the accused at trial. Bedford, 293 Md. at 185, 443 A.2d 78. The rationales for this exception to the rule against hearsay have been fully articulated. The extrajudicial identification is admitted for its greater probative value because it occurred closer to the time of the offense, and is therefore more likely to be accurate. Id., 293 Md. at 178-179, 443 A.2d 78, citing Commonwealth v. Torres, 367 Mass. 737, 739, 327 N.E.2d 871 (1975). It is admitted because the original identification was made under less suggestive circumstances than those existing at trial, and is accordingly more reliable. Bedford, 293 Md. at 178-179, 443 A.2d 78, relying on Torres, supra, and People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 626-627, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865 (1960). Because the declarant is available as a witness at trial for cross-examination about the prior identification, some of the danger that the hearsay rule seeks to avoid is not present. Bedford, supra, 293 Md. at 178, 443 A.2d 78; Johnson, supra, 237 Md. at 290, 206 A.2d 138. We observe, also, that the steps of an identification procedure, such as a photographic array or police line-up, can be objectively recounted by the witness and are readily documented, further enhancing the identification's trustworthiness. Petitioners insist that this case, in which the witnesses recanted their prior identifications, differs significantly from Bedford and others where the witnesses merely were unable to identify the accused at trial. They rely on Gibbs v. State, 7 Md. App. 35, 253 A.2d 446 (1969), in which the victim of a robbery testified at trial not only that he was mistaken in his out-of-court identification, but that the defendant was not in fact the robber. The positive exculpation of the defendant in Gibbs is a far cry from the instant case, where the witnesses at trial said only that they did not observe Nance and Hardy engage in criminal acts. Furthermore, the witness in Gibbs did not, as here, repeatedly and consistently confirm his original identification in signed statements to police and in grand jury testimony. Ample authority supports the admission of an extrajudicial identification even where the witness recants at trial. Interpreting the corresponding Federal Rule of Evidence applicable to identifications, 801(d)(1)(C), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the probative use of a prior identification later disclaimed by the witness on the grounds that it was made when the witness's memory was fresher and there had been less opportunity for influence to be exerted upon him. United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 996 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015, 98 S.Ct. 732, 54 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978). Accord United States v. O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 898-899 (7th Cir.1986) (witness recanting identification of defendant as extortionist). See United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir.1981) (rule enacted to remedy problem where before trial witness identifies the defendant and then, because of fear, refuses to acknowledge his previous identification). See also 4 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence at page 801-222 (1992) (Congress intended that absence of memory, or even a denial, by the identifying declarant at trial would not bar testimony of a witness to the identification). State appellate courts have taken the same view. See, e.g., People v. Malone, 193 Mich. App. 366, 483 N.W.2d 470, 471-472 (1992) (extrajudicial identification admitted substantively even though witness refused to acknowledge it at trial); State v. Grover, 55 Wash. App. 252, 777 P.2d 22, 23-25 (1989) (out-of-court statement of identification excluded from operation of hearsay rule notwithstanding that witness denied any memory of crime or of her identification of defendant). More generally, the Supreme Court of Virginia has justified the probative use of prior identifications in these terms: [T]he memory of a witness may fade.... It is also not beyond the realm of possibility that an identifying witness may be inhibited by threat or intimidation from making a positive in-court identification. Niblett v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 76, 225 S.E.2d 391, 394 (1976). This Court in Bedford, supra, 293 Md. at 178, 443 A.2d 78, also implicitly recognized the possibility of witness intimidation: The failure of the witness to repeat the extrajudicial identification in court does not destroy its probative value, for such failure may be explained by loss of memory or other circumstances. Among such other circumstances are threats and fear of retaliation. One final case is applicable. In People v. Lucky, 45 Cal.3d 259, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 18, 753 P.2d 1052, 1070 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S.Ct. 848, 102 L.Ed.2d 980 (1989), the Supreme Court of California stated a refinement to its holding in People v. Gould, supra, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 273, 354 P.2d at 865. The California court held that a repudiated identification may form the basis for conviction if it was reiterated by the witness under oath at a preliminary examination or other judicial proceeding, and there was evidence from which the factfinder could credit the witness's prior testimony over his or her failure to confirm the extrajudicial statements at trial. In the instant case, the petitioners do not contend that the identification procedures were suggestive or otherwise unfair. Rather, they argue that the value of the evidence of the prior procedures lies in the statements that accompanied and were a part of the identifications, and they contend these statements should not have been admitted as substantive evidence. Harris and McCormick twice repeated their identifications, once in signed statements and once under oath in a proceeding before the grand jury. For reasons discussed hereafter, we find those statements to be independently admissible as substantive evidence. Moreover, there was evidence from which the jury could infer that the witnesses had made truthful identifications out of court, only to become disingenuous at trial. There was evidence that an atmosphere of fear and threats of reprisals existed in the interim between the crime and the trial. Witness Antonio Harris was bound by fraternal ties to his half-brother, Nance. The witnesses at trial experienced only a selective failure of memory; they remembered the innocuous features of their prior statements, but forgot the incriminating assertions bearing on identification. Finally, the jurors no doubt perceived that all of the key witnesses similarly recanted, a most unlikely coincidence that was meaningful in itself. Viewing these facts in the light of the cases from Maryland and other jurisdictions cited above, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted, as substantive evidence of guilt, the out-of-court identifications of Petitioners as those responsible for Aaron Carroll's murder.