Opinion ID: 1121338
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Electronic Surveillance

Text: (3a) Petitioners contend that the electronically monitored and tape-recorded conversation between Halpin and his wife is inadmissible because it violated their rights under title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520), the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the California Invasion of Privacy Act (Pen. Code, §§ 630-637.2). Petitioners argue that Congress, in enacting title III, intended to preempt state legislation in the field of wiretapping and electronic surveillance and that since prior judicial approval was thus required but was not obtained for the tap, the telephone conversation between Halpin and his wife is inadmissible. (4a) The People maintain that title III is unconstitutional as applied because it constitutes an unreasonable infringement upon California's right, reserved to it by the Tenth Amendment, to regulate and administer the internal affairs of its penal institutions. [9] Section 2511 of title 18 of the United States Code makes it a crime, subject to the exceptions contained in subdivisions (2)(a) through (3) of that section, to wilfully intercept or disclose any wire or oral communication. [10] Wire communication is defined by section 2510(1) as any communication made ... through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire ... or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications. [11] [O]ral communication is defined by section 2510(2) as any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. Section 2515 makes inadmissible any evidence, and the fruits thereof, obtained in violation of sections 2510-2520. [12] The other sections are not here relevant. (5) Sections 2510-2520 were drafted to meet the standards of Berger v. New York (1967) 388 U.S. 41 [18 L.Ed.2d 1040, 87 S.Ct. 1873] and Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347 [19 L.Ed.2d 576, 88 S.Ct. 507]. [13] (Sen Rep., supra, at p. 66.) [14] The legislation has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized. (Sen. Rep., supra, at p. 66.) [15] (3b) An intent to have certain provisions of the law completely occupy the field of wiretapping and electronic surveillance is evidenced by their plain and all-inclusive wording. (See Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll (3d Cir.1950) 184 F.2d 153, 155.) Section 2511(1)(a) provides penal sanctions for any person who willfully intercepts ... any wire or oral communication, and section 2510(1) defines wire communication as any communication made ... through the use of facilities ... furnished or operated by ... a common carrier ... for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications. (Italics added.) That Congress intended to enact comprehensive national legislation, against which all then existing federal and state legislation was to be measured, is also illustrated by the comments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. [16] At the same time, however, Congress left room for the states to supplement the law in certain areas, [17] provided the regulations are not more permissive. (See, e.g., Sen. Rep., supra, at pp. 98-99.) (4b) Congress' authority in enacting legislation to accomplish its asserted purpose is said to emanate from its plenary power under the commerce clause (see, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin (1946) 328 U.S. 408, 423 [90 L.Ed. 1342, 1356-1357, 66 S.Ct. 1142, 164 A.L.R. 476]; see also Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964) 379 U.S. 241 [13 L.Ed.2d 258, 85 S.Ct. 348]; Weiss v. United States (1939) 308 U.S. 321 [84 L.Ed. 298, 60 S.Ct. 269]; cf. American Power Co. v. S.E.C. (1946) 329 U.S. 90 [91 L.Ed. 103, 67 S.Ct. 133]) to regulate telegraph and telephone lines as instrumentalities of interstate commerce ( Western Union v. Lenroot (1945) 323 U.S. 490, 502 [89 L.Ed. 414, 423, 65 S.Ct. 335]) [18] and the right of privacy arising under certain provisions of the Bill of Rights and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [19] Since title III is a valid exercise of Congress' power under particular provisions of the Constitution, we reject the People's contention that it is unconstitutional as applied because it infringes upon the police power of the state, reserved to it by the Tenth Amendment, to regulate the internal discipline of its penal institutions. [T]he [Tenth] amendment has been construed as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end. ( United States v. Darby (1941) 312 U.S. 100, 124 [85 L.Ed. 609, 622, 61 S.Ct. 451, 132 A.L.R. 1430].) It is no objection to the assertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the states. ( Id. at p. 114 [85 L.Ed. at p. 617]; cf. Benanti v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 96, 104 [2 L.Ed.2d 126, 132, 78 S.Ct. 155].) (3c) Unquestionably the conversation between Halpin and his wife was a wire communication within the meaning of section 2510(1) since it was carried over wires between Ontario and San Diego and operated by a common carrier engaged in interstate communications. Moreover, the conversation was intercepted within the meaning of section 2510(4) [20] and the interception was not authorized in accordance with section 2516. The contents of the conversation are therefore inadmissible. (§ 2515.) Since we hold that title III has preempted particular fields of wiretapping and electronic surveillance, we need not reach the issue whether the Halpins' right of privacy was invaded by monitoring and tape recording the phone call. [21] Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent superior court to suppress the evidence obtained in the execution of the search warrant and from the interception of petitioner's call to his wife from the telephone at the jail.