Opinion ID: 1905163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Testimonies of Blessing and Forney Were Inadmissible Hearsay and Properly Excluded, and Any Error in Excluding Mick's Testimony Was Harmless.

Text: Epp first asserts that the court erred when it did not allow him to present the testimonies of Mick, Blessing, and Forney. Epp makes various arguments with respect to such testimonies. He argues that the court erred in denying his request to transport the witnesses to testify at trial, in requiring him to conduct depositions of the witnesses prior to trial, and in not allowing such depositions to be admitted at trial. He also argues that § 25-1233 is unconstitutional because it denies equal protection based on whether a defendant's trial is held in the county in which witnesses are imprisoned. We conclude that the court did not err in sustaining the State's motion in limine and denying admission of the hearsay testimonies of Blessing and Forney and that any error in excluding Mick's testimony was harmless. We therefore need not consider Epp's arguments regarding transportation of witnesses and the constitutionality of § 25-1233. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking an order barring any evidence, statement, or argument concerning any purported verbal statement or statements made by. . . Mick to . . . Blessing and/or . . . Forney. After reviewing transcripts of Mick's, Blessing's, and Forney's videotaped depositions, the court sustained the motion in limine. The court determined that the evidence was not relevant and not trustworthy and that any probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. The court further determined that the statements were inadmissible hearsay and that the exceptions argued by Epp did not apply in this case. The court sustained the State's objections when Epp offered the depositions as evidence at trial. With regard to the testimonies of Blessing and Forney, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Forney testified in his deposition that Blessing told Forney in Mick's presence that Blessing was in jail because he had robbed a Casey's in Beatrice. Forney testified that Mick responded to Blessing's statement by stating that Mick had robbed the Casey's too. Forney testified that Mick did not specify the location of the Casey's that he robbed and did not say anything more about the matter. Blessing testified in his deposition that he, Mick, and Forney were talking and Mick told them about an armed robbery that he committed. Blessing testified that he cut [Mick] off at that point and let him know that [Blessing] did an armed robbery in Beatrice. Blessing testified that Mick did not give further details about the armed robbery but that Mick specifically said that he did an armed robbery. And I guess that would probably be about it. Such testimonies of Blessing and Forney constitute hearsay. Under Neb. Evid. R. 801(3), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-801(3) (Reissue 2008), hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Epp sought to use Blessing's and Forney's testimonies regarding Mick's statements to them as proof that Mick committed an armed robbery and that he robbed a Casey's. Epp offered the testimonies of Blessing and Forney to support a defense that Mick rather than Epp robbed the Wymore Casey's. The jury could infer that the robbery that Mick admitted to committing was the robbery of the Wymore Casey's on April 24, 2007. [14] Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the rules of evidence. See Neb. Evid. R. 802, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-802 (Reissue 2008). Epp asserts that the testimonies of Blessing and Forney are admissible under the residual hearsay exception. This exception is set forth in rule 803(23) (whether or not the declarant is available as a witness) and Neb. Evid. R. 804(2)(e), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-804(2)(e) (Reissue 2008) (where the declarant is unavailable). Because there is no indication that Mick was unavailable as defined in rule 804, the applicable residual hearsay exception is that in rule 803(23), which provides in part: A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (b) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (c) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. We have stated that in determining whether a statement is admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, a court considers five factors: a statement's trustworthiness, the materiality of the statement, the probative importance of the statement, the interests of justice, and whether notice was given to an opponent. State v. Castor, 262 Neb. 423, 632 N.W.2d 298 (2001) (applying rule 803(23)). See State v. Robinson, 271 Neb. 698, 715 N.W.2d 531 (2006) (applying rule 804(2)(e)). [15] In determining admissibility under the residual hearsay exception, a court must examine the circumstances surrounding the declaration in issue and may consider a variety of factors affecting trustworthiness of a statement. See Robinson, supra . A court may compare the declaration to the closest hearsay exception as well as consider a variety of other factors affecting trustworthiness, such as the nature of a statement, that is, whether the statement is oral or written; whether a declarant had a motive to speak truthfully or untruthfully, which may involve an examination of the declarant's partiality and the relationship between the declarant and the witness; whether the statement was made under oath; whether the statement was spontaneous or in response to a leading question or questions; whether a declarant was subject to cross-examination when the statement was made; and whether a declarant has subsequently reaffirmed or recanted the statement. See State v. McBride, 250 Neb. 636, 550 N.W.2d 659 (1996) (applying rule 804(2)(e)) (citing State v. Toney, 243 Neb. 237, 498 N.W.2d 554 (1993)). The court in this case specifically found that the statements to which Blessing and Forney testified were not trustworthy. Epp argues that Mick's statements to Blessing and Forney were trustworthy because they were similar to statements against penal interest, which are hearsay exceptions pursuant to rule 804(2)(c) when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. We note that rule 804(2)(c) provides in part that [a] statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Thus, under both the penal interest exception and the residual hearsay exception, Epp needed to show that the circumstances of Mick's statements to Blessing and Forney indicated that such statements were trustworthy. Using the factors affecting trustworthiness set forth above, we note that Mick's alleged statements were oral; that the circumstances of Mick's having a casual conversation with fellow inmates does not clearly indicate a particular motive to speak either truthfully or untruthfully; that Mick's statements were not made under oath; that the statements were somewhat spontaneous and, though not in response to leading questions, were in response to a fellow inmate's stating that he had committed a robbery; that Mick was not subject to crossexamination when the statement was made; and that Mick subsequently recanted the statements by denying that he had made the statements and denying that he committed the robbery at issue. We note that the logic of the penal interest exception appears to be that under normal circumstances, one would not make a false statement against one's penal interests; in other words, one would not normally admit to committing a crime he or she had not actually committed. However, when speaking to fellow inmates who themselves have admitted to committing similar crimes, there is likely less stigma to such an admission, whether true or false, and therefore less reason that such an admission was inherently trustworthy. The trial court could properly determine that the trustworthiness of these alleged statements was lacking. We further note that the probative value of the alleged statements is a factor in addition to trustworthiness to be considered under the residual hearsay exception. The probative value of Mick's alleged statements is lessened in this case by the fact that neither Blessing nor Forney testified that Mick admitted to robbing the Wymore Casey's on April 24, 2007. Blessing testified only that Mick stated that he had committed an armed robbery without giving further details, and Forney testified only that Mick stated that he had robbed the Casey's, without specifying the location of the Casey's or the date of the robbery. We noted that in Forney's testimony, Mick's statement that he had robbed the Casey's was prompted by Blessing's testimony that he had robbed a Casey's in Beatrice. Mick's alleged statements to Blessing and Forney had less probative value than they would have if he had said he committed the specific robbery at issue in this case. The diminished probative value of the statements is a factor in addition to trustworthiness that supports our determination that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Blessing's and Forney's testimonies were not admissible under the residual hearsay exception. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Blessing's and Forney's testimonies were not admissible under the residual hearsay exception and that the court did not err in excluding such testimony as inadmissible hearsay. With regard to Mick's testimony, the court excluded Mick's testimony denying that he told Blessing and Forney that he had committed an armed robbery and his testimony specifically denying that he robbed the Wymore Casey's. Without determining whether the district court erred in excluding such testimony, we determine that because the testimony was not helpful to Epp, any error in the court's refusal to admit the evidence was harmless error. [16-18] In a jury trial of a criminal case, an erroneous evidentiary ruling results in prejudice to a defendant unless the State demonstrates that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Iromuanya, 272 Neb. 178, 719 N.W.2d 263 (2006). Harmless error exists when there is some incorrect conduct by the trial court which, on review of the entire record, did not materially influence the jury in reaching a verdict adverse to a substantial right of the defendant. Id. Harmless error review looks to the basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict; the inquiry is not whether in a trial that occurred without the error a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but, rather, whether the actual guilty verdict rendered in the questioned trial was surely unattributable to the error. Id. Whether or not the district court erred in refusing to admit the portions of Mick's testimony at issue, the guilty verdict rendered against Epp was surely unattributable to such error. The court refused portions of Mick's testimony in which he denied that he committed the Wymore Casey's robbery and denied that he told Blessing and Forney that he committed a robbery. Such testimony did not support, and instead refuted, Epp's defense that it was Mick and not Epp who committed the robbery. Epp presented other evidence raising the possibility that Mick rather than Epp robbed the Wymore Casey's. The jury apparently rejected such evidence when it found Epp guilty, and Mick's testimony denying that he committed the robbery and denying that he told Blessing and Forney he committed a robbery would not have made the jury more likely to believe that Mick had committed the robbery at issue in this case. We therefore conclude that if the court erred when it refused Mick's testimony, the error was harmless. Because we conclude that the court did not err when it excluded the testimonies of Mick, Blessing, and Forney, we need not determine whether the court erred by denying Epp's request to transport such witnesses for trial, and we further need not determine whether § 25-1233 is unconstitutional. We reject Epp's first assignment of error.