Opinion ID: 4239240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jashari’s Arguments on Appeal

Text: Jashari advances five separate arguments on appeal. For the reasons set out below, each of these arguments is unpersuasive. 1. The “Doctrine of Retraction” Does Not Preclude a Finding that Jashari Filed a Frivolous Application for Asylum A substantial portion of Jashari’s brief on appeal is devoted to the argument that the “doctrine of retraction” precludes a finding that he filed a frivolous application. (See Pet. Br. at 16–21.) Jashari briefly touched on the notion of “timely retraction” in his motion to reopen his removal proceedings when he argued that Vllasi was ineffective for failing to “argue the doctrine of retraction as a defense to the fictitious entry date,” (see R. 598), and mentioned this concept again in his BIA appeal in connection with his position that the IJ erred in denying that motion to reopen, (see R. 29) but never raised this argument before the BIA as an independent ground on which to reverse the IJ’s findings. Although the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision to deny Jashari’s motion to reopen, it did not discuss the “doctrine of retraction.” This court lacks jurisdiction over Jashari’s independent “timely retraction” argument because that claim was neither presented to nor considered by the BIA except in relation to Jashari’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Jashari has therefore not exhausted his administrative remedies and this court lacks jurisdiction. See Harmon, 758 F.3d at 737. Even assuming that the court has jurisdiction over this claim, however, Jashari’s argument is unpersuasive for the reasons that follow. -13- No. 17-3457 Jashari v. Sessions
Jashari relies on Ruiz-Del-Cid v. Holder, 765 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2014), for the proposition that the Sixth Circuit has recognized a “timely retraction” defense to findings that an applicant submitted a frivolous asylum application. Although the false statements at issue in Ruiz-Del-Cid had been made in connection with an asylum application, the issue before the court was not whether those statements rendered the application frivolous. Rather, the Ruiz-Del-Cid court considered whether the petitioner had committed perjury so as to preclude a finding of “good moral character” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B), a statute not at issue here. See Ruiz-Del-Cid, 765 F.3d at 641. Ruiz-Del-Cid described the “doctrine of retraction” as follows: “Where an alien in an immigration proceeding testifies falsely under oath as to a material fact but voluntarily and without prior exposure of his false testimony comes forward and corrects his testimony, perjury has not been committed and the charge based thereon is not sustained.” Ruiz-Del-Cid, 765 F.3d at 638–39 (emphasis added) (quoting Matter of M-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 118, 119 (BIA 1960) (internal alteration omitted)). That is, Ruiz-Del-Cid concerned the impact of timely retraction on charges of perjury and did not consider whether timely retraction might preclude a finding that an application was frivolous. The Ruiz-Del-Cid court made clear that its discussion focused on a particular context: whether an applicant who lied under oath can still be found to have “good moral character,” as defined by § 1229b(b)(1)(B), if he timely retracts his false statement. See, e.g., id. at 641 (“To recap: the issue . . . is the statutory requirement that an applicant must be a person of ‘good moral character’ to merit cancellation of removal[.]”); (“[A]pplicants who gave false testimony but corrected their testimony voluntarily and prior to exposure or threat of imminent exposure may still be persons of good moral character.”); (noting that the standard -14- No. 17-3457 Jashari v. Sessions described by the court “rightly places the IJ’s and BIA’s focus on the statutory requirement of good moral character”).
Jashari’s argument relies entirely on Ruiz-Del-Cid; he cites no other cases and does not recognize that Ruiz-Del-Cid concerned an altogether different context. Instead, Jashari incorrectly concludes that “Ruiz is on point in this case.” (Pet. Br. at 20.) Contrary to Jashari’s conclusion, it is well established that “[r]etraction of a materially false application does not necessarily change the fact that a materially false application was ‘made.’” Yousif, 796 F.3d at 634 n. 4 (citing Lazar v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 469, 478 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also Matter of X-M- C-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 322, 326 (BIA 2010)) (“withdrawal of an asylum application after the required warnings and safeguards have been provided does not preclude” a finding that the asylum application was frivolous). Thus, to the extent that Jashari argues that “the formal withdrawal of his application for asylum should prevent” a frivolous finding, “this contention is plainly wrong.” Alexandrov v. Holder, 475 F. App’x 41, 47 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted); see also Lazar, 500 F.3d at 478 (“[W]ithdrawal of [an] asylum application d[oes] not obviate the need for the IJ to determine whether his false application should be deemed frivolous.”). Jashari presents no support for the proposition that timely retraction of false statements precludes a finding that a respondent filed a frivolous application for asylum, and his position is contradicted by established case law. See Lazar, 500 F.3d at 478. We therefore reject Jashari’s argument that the “doctrine of retraction” warrants vacatur of the BIA’s decision. -15- No. 17-3457 Jashari v. Sessions 2. The BIA and IJ Properly Found that Jashari Had Filed a Frivolous Application for Asylum Jashari next argues that the BIA and the IJ erred in determining that he had filed a frivolous asylum application because neither “made a ‘materiality’ finding in their decision pertaining to Petitioner’s false testimony before the asylum court.” (Pet. Br. at 23.) Jashari rightly notes that “courts are required to make a finding that ‘there is sufficient evidence on the record supporting a finding that a material element of the asylum application was deliberately fabricated,’” but then incorrectly concludes that this requirement was not satisfied. (See id. at 23.) It is unclear whether Jashari argues merely that the BIA and IJ failed to articulate a materiality finding or whether he intends to argue that the record is insufficient to support such a finding. Whatever Jashari’s intention, however, his argument is unpersuasive: both the BIA and the IJ found that Jashari had submitted false testimony with respect to a material element of his asylum application, and that finding is supported by substantial evidence. See Dieng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 866, 871 (6th Cir. 2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). a. Applicable Law “If the Attorney General determines that an alien has knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum and the alien has received the notice [of the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application], the alien shall be permanently ineligible for any benefits under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6). An application for asylum is “frivolous” for these purposes “if any of its material elements is deliberately fabricated.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20; see also, 500 F.3d at 475. That is, “frivolousness” requires a finding of “deliberate fraud, not mere triviality or legal insufficiency.” Yousif, 796 F.3d at 627 (citing Matter of Y–L–, 24 I. & N. Dec. -16- No. 17-3457 Jashari v. Sessions 151, 155 n. 1 (BIA 2007)). Instead, the falsehood must be “material” to the application in order to support a finding of frivolousness. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20. As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, a finding of frivolousness “is the veritable ‘death sentence’ of immigration proceedings.” Yousif, 796 F.3d at 627 (quoting Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395, 398 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2006)). An IJ may therefore make a finding of frivolousness “only after complying with several procedural safeguards.” Id. (quoting Alexandrov, 442 F.3d at 398). In particular, a finding of frivolousness requires: (1) notice to the alien of the consequences of filing a frivolous application, (2) a specific finding by the IJ or the BIA that the alien knowingly filed a frivolous application, (3) sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that a material element of the asylum application was deliberately fabricated, and (4) an indication that the alien has been afforded sufficient opportunity to account for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of the claim. Id. at 628 (quoting Ceraj v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20. The BIA has held that a falsified date of entry is material to an asylum application, at least in situations where, as here, the application is filed more than a year after the real entry date but less than a year after the falsified date. See, e.g., Matter of M-S-B-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 872, 876 (BIA 2016). In such a situation, the date of entry is material because it is dispositive of the petitioner’s eligibility for relief, given “the general requirement that [an asylum applicant] file the application within 1 year of the date of arrival in the United States.” Id. at 876 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)). b. Discussion There was no error. Both the IJ and the BIA found that Jashari received notice of the consequences of filing a frivolous application, and Jashari does not contest this finding. (See R. -17- No. 17-3457 Jashari v. Sessions 625 (Jashari “was given notice of the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application”); R. 4 (Jashari “was provided with the required warnings and safeguards”).) Neither does Jashari contest the IJ’s and the BIA’s findings that he knowingly filed a frivolous application. (See R. 625–26; R. 4.) And, Jashari does not challenge the IJ’s and BIA’s finding that he had the opportunity to account for any discrepancies but could not do so. (See R. 626; R. 4.) Jashari does, however, challenge the finding that he had deliberately fabricated a material element of his application. Contrary to his position, both the IJ and the BIA made specific materiality findings that were adequately supported by the record. (See R. 626 (Jashari provided the false date “in order to establish he filed his asylum application within one year of his entry, thus making the false information material”); R.4 (Jashari “admitted . . . that he provided a false arrival date on his asylum application and . . . during his asylum interview in order to establish his eligibility to seek asylum”); R. 169 (Jashari testified that he lied about his date of entry “because you cannot stay longer than one year without documents in the United States,” admitting that his lie was intended to establish his eligibility for asylum).) All the prerequisites to a finding that Jashari had filed a frivolous application were satisfied. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary[.]”). Jashari’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive. 3. The BIA and IJ Did Not Err in Denying Jashari’s Motion to Reopen Jashari next argues that the “BIA erred in upholding IJ’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to reopen IJ’s prior removability and frivolous asylum findings, because prior counsel’s ineffective assistance prejudiced the outcome of Petitioner’s case.” (Pet. Br. at 24.) -18- No. 17-3457 Jashari v. Sessions a. Applicable Law The decision whether to grant a motion to reopen is discretionary and, therefore, is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992). However, where a motion to reopen involves the legal aspects of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel “we review this question of law de novo.” Allabani v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 668, 676 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1994); Gjonaj v. INS, 47 F.3d 824, 826 (6th Cir. 1995)). Motions to reopen removal proceedings premised on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy both procedural and substantive requirements. See, e.g., Sako v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 857, 863 (6th Cir. 2006); Lyagoba v. Holder, 393 F. App’x 357, 360 (6th Cir. 2010). First, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must comply with the procedural requirements set out in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). Those requirements are “(1) that the motion be supported by an affidavit detailing counsel’s failings, (2) that counsel be informed of the allegations, and (3) that the motion show that disciplinary charges have been filed with the appropriate authority.” Sako, 434 F.3d at 863 (citing Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639; Ljucovic v. Gonzales, 144 F. App’x 500, 502 (6th Cir. 2005)). Both the IJ and BIA found that Jashari satisfied the Lozada requirements, and all parties agree that that they were satisfied. After satisfying the Lozada requirements, a petitioner must then “establish that, but for the ineffective assistance of counsel, he would have been entitled to continue residing in the United States.” Id. at 863. Put another way, Jashari “carries the burden of establishing that ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced him or denied him fundamental fairness in order to prove that he has suffered a denial of due process.” Id. (quoting Huicochea–Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2001)). The prejudice inquiry turns on an ex post determination -19- No. 17-3457 Jashari v. Sessions “whether the alien’s claims could have supported a different outcome,” and the “fundamental fairness” inquiry “examines the process afforded ex ante, considering whether the denial of effective counsel makes such a proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 864. b. Discussion Jashari cannot prevail on his claim because he cannot show prejudice or a denial of fundamental fairness. Jashari argues only that his representation by Vllasi was ineffective; he makes no claims regarding the representation provided by any of his other attorneys. The entire relevant portion of Jashari’s brief on appeal reads as follows: [Jashari] demonstrated through his motion [to reopen] that but for his prior counsel’s failure to properly advise him on the consequences of withdrawing his application for asylum; failure to submit evidence to the court; wrongful [advice] to blame prior counsel for the use of the false entry date; wrongful [advice] not to bring his wife in court to testify; and, failure to articulate the Doctrine of Retraction as a defense to the incorrect date of entry, he would have been able to establish entry into the US, and would not have received a frivolous asylum finding. (Pet. Br. at 25.) The IJ denied Jashari’s motion to reopen—and the BIA affirmed—based on the finding that Jashari had filed a frivolous asylum application and was therefore ineligible for any immigration benefits. That was correct: unless Jashari can demonstrate that Vllasi’s allegedly ineffective assistance either caused the frivolous finding in the first instance or resulted in the IJ’s or BIA’s decision not to set that finding aside, Jashari’s claim fails. Thus, to the extent that Jashari claims that ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in the removability finding, the claims fail in light of the finding that Jashari filed a frivolous application. The only potentially relevant claims are therefore those that touch on the frivolous finding: the claim that Vllasi advised Jashari “to blame prior counsel for the use of the false entry date” and the claim that -20- No. 17-3457 Jashari v. Sessions Vllasi failed “to articulate the Doctrine of Retraction as a defense to the incorrect date of entry.” (Pet. Br. at 25.) First, even assuming that Vllasi instructed Jashari to lie about what his former counsel had told him to do, that instruction neither prejudiced Jashari nor deprived him of fundamental fairness. None of the criteria for a frivolous finding turns on whether Jashari’s prior counsel told him to fabricate the date of entry and, as discussed above, all of the factors are satisfied here. Thus, even assuming that Vllasi instructed Jashari to say that his prior counsel told him to lie, that advice neither prejudiced Jashari nor deprived him of fundamental fairness. Second, Vllasi’s failure “to articulate the Doctrine of Retraction as a defense to the incorrect date of entry” neither prejudiced Jashari nor deprived him of fundamental fairness. As discussed above, timely retraction does not preclude a finding that an immigrant filed a frivolous asylum application. Because the allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel did not result in the finding that Jashari had filed a frivolous application, Jashari’s argument fails. Neither the IJ nor the BIA erred in denying Jashari’s motion to reopen his removal proceedings. 4. Jashari Voluntarily Withdrew His Entire I-589 Application Jashari next argues that the “BIA violated [his] due process right by arbitrarily depriving him from [sic] applying for withholding of removal as a form of relief.” (Pet. Br. at 26.) This argument is premised on Jashari’s assertion that when he withdrew his application for asylum pursuant to Form I-589, he did not intend also to withdraw his application for withholding of removal. This claim is without merit. -21- No. 17-3457 Jashari v. Sessions a. Applicable Law In order to demonstrate a due process violation, Jashari must “demonstrate that (1) there was a defect in the removal proceeding; and (2) the defect was prejudicial.” Debek v. Holder, 380 F. App’x 492, 497 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Ndrecaj v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 667, 673 (6th Cir. 2008)). “A due process violation occurs only when ‘the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.’” Lin, 565 F.3d at 979 (quoting Hassan v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2005)). In order to prevail on a due process challenge, a petitioner must therefore show that “the alleged violation affected the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. (citing Gishta v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also Warner v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 534, 539 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[P]roof of prejudice is necessary to establish a due process violation in an immigration hearing.”). “We review de novo alleged due process violations in immigration proceedings.” GarzaMoreno v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 239, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 1998)). b. Discussion First, there was no “defect” in the removal proceeding because the IJ correctly found that Jashari had withdrawn his entire I-589 application. When Jashari notified the court that he wished to withdraw his application, the IJ informed him that that application was “the only form of relief” he had pending. (R. 130–31.) After indicating that he understood, Jashari proceeded to withdraw his application. Based on this record, it was not error to find that Jashari had knowingly withdrawn his entire I-589 application. Even assuming that the IJ and the BIA had erred in this determination, however, Jashari cannot demonstrate any resulting prejudice because of the separate finding that he had filed a -22- No. 17-3457 Jashari v. Sessions frivolous asylum application. As discussed above, that finding prevents Jashari from receiving any immigration benefits. Therefore, even if the IJ and the BIA erred in finding that Jashari had withdrawn his entire I-589 application, that error does not amount to a due process violation. 5. Jashari Has Not Demonstrated Changed Circumstances Finally, Jashari argues that the BIA erred by not “remanding the case to the IJ to address the issue of changed circumstances at a full and fair hearing.” (Pet. Br. at 29.) Jashari appears to advance this argument as an additional ground on which he was denied due process. In order to prevail, Jashari must therefore “demonstrate that (1) there was a defect in the removal proceeding; and (2) the defect was prejudicial.” Debek, 380 F. App’x at 497 (citing Ndrecaj, 522 F.3d at 673). On appeal to the BIA, Jashari argued that he was denied due process when he was not granted a new hearing to consider possibly changed circumstances arising from his conversion from Islam to Christianity. The BIA rejected this argument, finding that “there is no evidence in the record to support the respondent’s claim of changed circumstances” and “no evidence in the record to show that the respondent will be harmed in his country based on his alleged conversion.” (R. 5.) The BIA further noted that despite being “provided with several opportunities to advise the [IJ] about his changed circumstances,” Jashari “never argued before the [IJ] that circumstances had changed . . . or articulated a need to have a merits hearing based on the changed circumstances,” suggesting that Jashari had failed to preserve this argument. (Id.) Even assuming that we have jurisdiction because the BIA considered the merits of this argument despite Jashari’s failure to preserve it, Jashari has not demonstrated any error. In relevant part, the submitted evidence consists of a letter indicating that Jashari had converted to -23- No. 17-3457 Jashari v. Sessions Christianity from Islam and copies of the State Department’s “International Religious Freedom Report for 2013” concerning Kosovo and “Human Rights Report” for Kosovo and Serbia. Jashari appears to argue that the information in these documents warrants a finding of “changed circumstances” impacting his eligibility for asylum. Jashari does not, however, cite to any particular part of the report as support of his argument that his circumstances had changed; the entirety of his argument is that the BIA “erroneously found that there is no evidence that [Jashari] will be harmed if return [sic] to his home country.” (Appellant’s Br. at 29.) We agree with the BIA’s conclusion: there is “no evidence in the record to show that [Jashari] will be harmed in his country based on his alleged conversion.” (R. 5.) Even assuming that Jashari demonstrated changed circumstances, however, he cannot demonstrate prejudice, a necessary element of a due process claim. As discussed at length above, Jashari filed a frivolous asylum application and the requested relief was denied on that independent basis. Jashari’s claim is therefore without merit.