Opinion ID: 2584095
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Criticism of the Tech-Bilt majority opinion

Text: The Tech-Bilt majority opinion has been widely criticized. [21] First, it appears that every court that has reviewed the commissioners' comment to section 4 of the 1955 UCATA has concurred with Chief Justice Bird that the commissioners intended the good faith provision merely to provide courts with the opportunity to prevent collusive settlements. See, e.g., Vertecs Corp. v. Fiberchem, Inc., 669 P.2d 958, 961 (Alaska 1983) (The commissioners have ... recognized that the desire to avoid contribution is an important motive in encouraging settlement.); Copper Mountain, Inc. v. Poma of America, Inc., 890 P.2d 100, 106 (Colo.1995) (Not only does this comment plainly state that the clause is intended only to give the court `occasion to determine whether the transaction was collusive,' it also indicates that the Commissioners had as their express purpose the facilitation of settlement, a goal best fostered if the phrase in question is interpreted as requiring noncollusive conduct.); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Shure, 647 So.2d 877, 880 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) ([T]he Commissioner's Comment to the 1955 revision [of the UCATA] provides that the good faith requirement allows the court `to determine whether the transaction was collusive, and if so there is no discharge.') (Quoting Frier's, Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 355 So.2d 208, 211 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978)); In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill.2d 153, 205 Ill.Dec. 78, 642 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (1994) (clause requiring that a good faith settlement was intended to give courts `occasion to determine whether the transaction was collusive,' and if so, there was no discharge from contribution liability); Noyes v. Raymond, 28 Mass.App.Ct. 186, 548 N.E.2d 196, 199 (1990) (According to the commissioners who drafted the 1955 version, there were two purposes behind the changes[: (1)] to prevent collusion amongst the settling parties[; and (2) ] to encourage settlements.); Smith v. Monongahela Power Co., 189 W.Va. 237, 429 S.E.2d 643, 651 (1993) (The Commissioners clearly placed precedence upon the goal of furthering settlements, rather than equitably apportioning the burdens of liability, commenting: `It seems more important not to discourage settlements than to make an attempt of doubtful effectiveness to prevent discrimination by plaintiffs, or collusion in the suit.'). Second, a number of courts have criticized the Tech-Bilt approach to determining good faith on the basis that it discourages settlements and places a severe burden on the trial and appellate courts. The Noyes court believed: The goal of encouraging settlements may be achieved only to the extent that motions for discharge based upon settlements are routinely allowed, with extended hearings on the question of good faith the exception. If it were otherwise, a party seeking to avoid trial by settling a claim could rarely achieve that objective; either the issue of good faith would be the subject of a full trial or ... a defendant who settles with a plaintiff may, nevertheless, be forced to stand trial on the merits of the tort claim. Faced with such prospects, a defendant would have little incentive to enter into a settlement. 548 N.E.2d at 199. Accord Copper Mountain, 890 P.2d at 105 (rejecting the Tech-Bilt majority's reasonable range standard both for its potentially negative impact on the policy [of] encouraging settlement and for the additional burdens it creates for trial courts in conducting evidentiary hearings to determine a party's likely proportionate liability); Mahathiraj v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 84 Ohio App.3d 554, 617 N.E.2d 737, 740-41 (1992) (noting a number of problems inherent in the Tech-Bilt standard, including: (1) the additional burdens for trial courts in conducting evidentiary hearings, or minitrials, to determine a party's likely proportionate liability; (2) the difficulty and lack of certainty in foreseeing whether a jury would find a particular party liable, and if liable, the proportion of liability the party would likely bear as well as the sum of damages the jury would award; and (3) the effect that the uncertainty and expense of defending a settlement would have on the willingness of parties to settle); Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 139 N.C.App. 637, 535 S.E.2d 55, 62 (2000) (mandating that the court [consider the Tech-Bilt factors] in every case would indisputably be disruptive of, and discouraging to, settlement). [22] Indeed, we are not aware of any state jurisdiction, other than California, that has adopted the Tech-Bilt standard in whole; but see Miller v. Christopher, 887 F.2d 902, 908 n. 2 (9th Cir.1989) (utilizing the Tech-Bilt standard of good faith without deciding whether it would be a proper [standard] should federal maritime law adopt the `good faith' settlement bar mandated by the UCATA); Yusen Air & Sea Services (Guam), Inc. v. Superior court of Guam, 1993 WL 245645,  (D. Guam 1993) (noting that Guam Code of Civil Procedure (GCCP) § 835(e) mandates the use of the Tech-Bilt standard); although, as discussed more fully infra, aspects of Tech-Bilt have been incorporated within other approaches. Rather, courts outside of California, which have addressed the meaning of a good faith settlement for purposes of their own CATAs, have utilized either a non-collusive standard of good faith or a totality of the circumstances approach to the issue.