Opinion ID: 2612398
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The special/local law test

Text: Although the constitutional analysis under both provisions begins in the same manner, the analysis under the special/local law provision encompasses more than an assessment of the statute's rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. Looking to earlier opinions of this Court, the Court of Appeals, Division One, phrased the test for analysis under the special law provision as follows: [T]he court must first ascertain whether the law has a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective. If it does not, of course, our inquiry is over. But if it does, we must further decide if the act legitimately classifies by population, geography, or time limitations. If we find a legitimate classification, we must then determine if the act permits other individuals or entities to come within the class, and thus within operation of the law, within a reasonable time, or if at all. 160 Ariz. at 472, 773 P.2d at 1031 (citations omitted). To determine whether a law is a general law, as opposed to a special or local law, therefore, we consider two factors in addition to whether the classification has a reasonable basis: (1) whether the classification encompasses all members of the relevant class; and (2) whether the class is elastic, allowing members to move into and out of the class. Arizona Downs, 130 Ariz. at 557-58, 637 P.2d at 1060-61. [3]
A statute conferring rights and privileges or imposing restrictions on persons, places or things as a class is a general law, while a statute relating to particular persons, places or things of a class is a special or local law. Arizona Downs, 130 Ariz. at 557, 637 P.2d at 1060. The constitutional prohibition against special or local laws when a general law could apply does not prohibit classification entirely. To be general, a law need not operate on every person, place, or thing within the state; however, it must apply uniformly to all cases and to all members within the circumstances provided for by the law. Arizona Downs, 130 Ariz. at 558, 637 P.2d at 1061. In other words, it must, as Division One noted, encompass a legitimate classification by population, geography, or time limitations. Petitioners for Deannexation, 160 Ariz. at 472, 773 P.2d at 1031. A law may be general and still apply to only one entity, if that entity is the only member of a legitimate class. See generally 2 E. McQuillan, supra, § 4.44, at 109 ([A] general law may operate only in a particular county and only affect a small group of persons at the time of its enactment.... [T]he statute must apply equally to all in a similar situation coming within its scope.).
A statute is special or local if it is worded such that its scope is limited to a particular case and it looks to no broader application in the future. [4] Arizona Downs, 130 Ariz. at 558, 637 P.2d at 1061; see also Barbee v. Holbrook, 91 Ariz. 263, 265, 371 P.2d 886, 888 (1962); Luhrs v. City of Phoenix, 52 Ariz. 438, 451, 83 P.2d 283, 289 (1938). To be general, the classification must be elastic, or open, not only to admit entry of additional persons, places, or things attaining the requisite characteristics, but also to enable others to exit the statute's coverage when they no longer have those characteristics. Sutherland's, § 40.09, at 233; see also Barbee, 91 Ariz. 263, 371 P.2d 886; Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 451, 83 P.2d at 289; City of Prescott v. O'Sullivan, 46 Ariz. 551, 555, 53 P.2d 69 (1935). As Division One noted, this court forecast the requirement for a general law almost a century ago: A classification of cities may be made, based upon population; ... And this even though but one city in the state or territory comes within the provisions of the statute at the time of its enactment. But the statute must be elastic, so that other cities may, as they attain the requisite conditions, come within the operation of the statute. We think the rule may safely be stated to be that the classification of municipalities, and the incidental imposition of different obligations and granting of different powers to them according to such classification, must be such that other municipalities may, upon the attainment of the conditions characterizing any particular class, enter that class, and the conditions themselves must be not only possible, but reasonably probable, of attainment. Petitioners for Deannexation, 160 Ariz. at 471, 773 P.2d at 1030 (quoting Bravin v. Mayor and Common Council, 4 Ariz. 83, 89-90, 33 P. 589 (1893)) (emphasis added). A statute worded so as to admit entry and exit from the class implies that the class formation was separate from consideration of particular persons, places, or things and, thus, not intended as special or local in operation. J. Winters, supra, at 93. Although the number in the class is not determinative, as that number decreases in size, courts are more likely to find the classification invalid. Id. A classification limited to a population as of a particular census or date is a typical form of defective closed class; such an act is a form of identification, not of classification, because it is impossible for entities to enter or exit the class with changes in population. Id.; Sutherland's, § 40.09, at 233. To decide whether a statute legitimately classifies, we will consider the actual probability that others will come under the act's operation when the population changes. Where the prospect is only theoretical, and not probable, we will find the act special or local in nature. Bravin, 4 Ariz. at 90, 33 P. 589; Sutherland's § 40.09, at 432-33.