Opinion ID: 1767013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.

Text: ¶ 50. The majority states that these warranties cannot be disclaimed; therefore it agrees that these warranties exist in the present case. Implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose do not exist because they have not been disclaimed. They exist if the facts of sale and of the circumstances leading up to the sale imply their existence. ¶ 51. In the present case, upon sale of the motors, Mercury warranted by implication that they were suitable for at least ordinary use or were, rather, merchantable. [4] Section 75-2-314 of the Mississippi UCC states that a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Miss.Code Ann. § 75-2-314 (2000). There is no question as to Mercury's merchant status, or as to whether the motors Mercury sold to Travis were classified as goods sold from Mercury's regular inventory. Therefore, an implied warranty of merchantability under our UCC applies to the motors. Given their repeated failures, the jury obviously found them defective, or rather, not merchantable, which it reasonably could do. Indeed, the motors failed in not one, not two, but in three out of six competitions over one tournament season. ¶ 52. In addition to the implied warranty of merchantability, our UCC implies a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose where (1) the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and (2) the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods for that particular purpose. Miss.Code Ann. § 75-2-315 (2000). ¶ 53. Given the circumstances leading up to the purchase of the motors, this warranty is entirely applicable. During trial, however, Mercury contended that its bargain with Travis was limited to ensuring that his boat simply propelled through water. But as has already been addressed, the record is abundant with evidence that Mercury knew that Travis purchased the motors for use in time-sensitive fishing tournaments. Moreover, Mercury selected the motors for Travis as the best for his intended purposefor the promotional program and for competitive fishing. Mercury's attempt to contradict this reality is really incredible. As the trial judge reasoned: I am persuaded that this is a case clearly where Mercury had a greater obligation than just selling a boat motor to somebody, and that's based on the proof that's already in the record that this was an undertakingeven if there wasn't some kind of sponsorship contract, and nobody is alleging there is. All of that paperwork clearly establishes that before these motors were ever put on Mr. Travis's boat, Mercury knew exactly what he was going to be engaged in competitive fishing, king fishing specifically. [5] ¶ 54. It is hard to disagree with this reasoning. It is apparent from Travis's first contact with Mercury that the motors were to be used in his endeavors as a competitive saltwater fisherman. In exchange for a discounted price on the motors that Mercury, not Travis, selected, Mercury required Travis's promotional support in several ways during the tournament fishing season, including in the press, on the water, and in the public in general. ¶ 55. There is absolutely no way, therefore, Mercury can get around the fact that (1) it knew that Travis required the motors for the purpose of tournament saltwater fishing, and (2) that Travis relied on Mercury's judgement in selecting the best motors for this purpose. Therefore, Mercury implied that the motors it selected and sold to Travis were fit for the particular purpose of competitive tournament fishing under time-sensitive conditions. Due to constant defects, however, these motors were not fit for that purpose. ¶ 56. The jury was appropriately instructed on this warranty and returned a verdict in favor of Travis. Indeed, there is ample evidence in the trial record to support a finding that the seller, Mercury, both made and breached an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose by providing Travis with clearly defective motors.