Opinion ID: 151783
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Recording and Sealing Requirements

Text: Pager eavesdropping warrants are controlled by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which was amended by Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (the ECPA) to extend Title III's coverage to electronic communications. The procedures for lawful interception of electronic communications are codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2518, which requires that [t]he contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted by any means authorized by this chapter shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. The recording of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication under this subsection shall be done in such a way as will protect the recording from editing or other alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge orders. They shall not be destroyed except upon an order of the issuing or denying judge and in any event shall be kept for ten years. Duplicate recordings may be made for use or disclosure pursuant to the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of section 2517 of this chapter for investigations. The presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom under subsection (3) of section 2517. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a). Although the statute permits recordings on tape or wire or other comparable device, it also states that regardless of the means of recording, it shall be conducted in a way that safeguards the recorded communications from editing or alterations. Id. We have not yet considered whether the method of recording at issue in this caseby handwritten transcription in a log booksatisfies the recording requirement of § 2518(8)(a). The Fourth and the Ninth Circuits, however, have determined that it does not. See United States v. Suarez, 906 F.2d 977, 983 (4th Cir.1990) ([T]ranscribing by hand in a log book the images appearing on a display pager is not recording on a comparable device within the meaning of [§ 2518(8)(a)].); United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1089 (9th Cir.2002) (citing Suarez and holding the same). In Suarez, the Fourth Circuit explained that the reliability of intercepted electronic communications is guaranteed in two ways: mechanical recordation as received and relatively prompt sealing. Suarez, 906 F.2d at 983-84. The mechanical means of recording required by the statute minimize human involvement and limit the opportunity for intentional alteration and human error. Hermanek, 289 F.3d at 1089. These protections, inherent in mechanical recordings, safeguard the integrity of the records and cannot be replaced by handwritten logs. Based on that same rationale, we join the Fourth and Ninth Circuits in holding that the handwritten transcription in a log book of images appearing on a display pager is not sufficient to meet the recording requirement of § 2518(8)(a). Having determined that handwritten transcription fails to meet the recording requirement set out in § 2518(8)(a), we must now consider whether it was possible for the State Police to have utilized a proper recording method. As noted earlier, the State conceded that a pager recorder, which would have satisfied the requirements of § 2518(8)(a), was available in Albany, New Yorka few hours away from Monroe County by car. Additionally, as noted above, the State offered no explanation for why the investigators had not used the Albany pager recorder. In light of the fact that the investigators could have obtained a proper recording device and have supplied no reason why it was not used, we conclude that it was, indeed, possible to record the interceptions on tape or wire or other comparable device as required by § 2518(8)(a), and the investigators' failure to do so cannot be excused. In reviewing the requirements of § 2518(8)(a), we are left to assess whether, after failing to meet the recording requirement of the statute, the investigators met the statute's sealing requirement, in light of the fact that they submitted their handwritten notes to Judge Keenan for sealing on May 17, 2002. Here, we note that § 2518(8)(a) requires that interceptions shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device.... Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (emphasis added). Based upon the plain language of the statute, records that do not comply with the recording requirements of the statute are not susceptible to sealing. In other words, a determination that handwritten transcriptions do not meet the recording requirement requires the further conclusion that the sealing contemplated by the statute simply was not possible. See Hermanek, 289 F.3d at 1089 n. 5 (Section 2518(8)(a) requires recordation, where possible, and requires sealing only of ` such recordings'.... The handwritten logs were not recordings; thus, sealing was not required.). Our reading of the statute is informed by the very purpose of the sealing requirement of § 2518(8)(a). As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257, 263, 110 S.Ct. 1845, 109 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990), the seal is a means of ensuring that subsequent to its placement on a tape, the Government has no opportunity to tamper with, alter, or edit the conversations that have been recorded. A seal is, in essence, a verification of the integrity of the underlying recordings once those recordings have been submitted to a judge. Because it is already possible that handwritten documents lack integrity because of errors introduced in transcription, or because of intentional alteration, the sealing of such documents is of little purpose. As the Fourth Circuit stated in Suarez : [Section 2518(8)(a)]'s whole premise is that the evidentiary reliability of particular electronic communications can be ensured by two means: (1) their mechanical recordation as received, which ensures their original integrity; followed by (2) the relatively prompt sealing of the mechanical recordation. In this way, the opportunity for human alterations is completely avoided at the point of interception and minimized thereafter. That premise, hence the statute's intended application, is completely undercut where simultaneous mechanical recordation is impossible, and human alteration made possible in the very act of manual recordation. The complete futility of any sealing requirement ... is the best indication that the statute imposes none.  Suarez, 906 F.2d at 983-84 (emphasis added). Accordingly, if handwritten documents do not meet the recording requirement of § 2518(8)(a), they simply cannot be sealed in accordance with the statute's sealing requirement.