Opinion ID: 773871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Binding Authority of the Previous Section 7(a) Determination

Text: 28 Because Petitioner Glacier raised its second argument in its request for rehearing, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 16 U.S.C. §§ 825l(b). In 1986, a regional forester determined under §§ 7(a) that, due to potential siltation, the proposed Diobsud Creek project would unreasonably diminish the fish and wildlife values of the Skagit WSR. Glacier, which applied for the Diobsud Creek license, appealed this determination to the Chief of the Forest Service. After reviewing the case, the Chief found that the adverse impacts from potential siltation could be successfully mitigated by conditions in the license and remanded for the purpose of, among other things,determin[ing] the appropriate conditions . . . necessary to prevent unacceptable impacts to the wild and scenic river.  By its own terms, the Chief's decision was the final administrative determination of the Department of Agriculture. 29 Glacier contends that in light of the Chief's final decision (the 1986 determination), the regional forester was barred from making the later, contrary 1998 determination, and that FERC therefore erred in relying upon it. FERC counters that (1) it could not inquire into the validity of the Forest Service's internal decision making, and (2) the 1998 determination was not barred because the 1986 determination addressed a far more limited question (whether the Forest Service could withhold consent for the project simply because Glacier had refused to provide data). 30 Although Glacier makes a sympathetic pitch about the lengthy, complicated and often repetitive licensing process, it cites no relevant authority for its claim that the 1998 determination should be barred by principles of res judicata. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments 83 and the Supreme Court case, University of Tennessee v. Elliott , 478 U.S. 788 (1986), upon which Glacier relies, address a very different situation than that presented here. First, Glacier's authorities concern agency decisions that are given res judicata effect by a court in a later proceeding. See University of Tennessee, 478 U.S. at 799 (holding that when a state agency`acting in a judicial capacity . . . resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,' federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts (citation omitted) (alteration in original). At issue here, however, are consecutive decisions reached within a single agency after new information came to light. Second, Glacier's authorities concern decisions reached in a forum with the essential procedural characteristics of a court proceeding. Here, the Forest Service appeal process which resulted in the first final decision arguably is not the equivalent of a court proceeding. See 36 C.F.R.§§ 211.18. 31 Moreover, Glacier's challenge to the 1998 determination should have been raised with the Forest Service, rather than FERC, and Glacier offers no reason why it did not or could not do so. See Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co. v. FERC, 78 F.3d 659, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that it is not [FERC's ] role to judge the validity of [another agency's] position -substantially or procedurally). 32 Finally, it appears that the existence of new information gave the Forest Service good reason to reevaluate the 1986 determination. Cf. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA , 510 F.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (previous refusals to suspend registration of pesticide did not strip EPA of discretion to make a new decision based on a reevaluation of existing data and new information); FTC v. Texaco, Inc. , 555 F.2d 862, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (observing that Federal Power Commission would not[be] precluded from changing its mind concerning an earlier decision).