Opinion ID: 146638
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Length of Delay and Its Impact on Judicial Proceedings

Text: The government argues that even if ineffective assistance of counsel is, in theory, a proper excuse, Munoz failed to act with diligence once Hall took over his representation. Hall filed her notice of appearance on February 13, 2007, and the district court authorized her to appear on February 22, 2007. Munoz did not request leave to file an untimely new-trial motion until five days thereafter, and did not actually file the motion for another ten weeks. We have certainly found delays of this magnitude inexcusable in the past. See, e.g., Nafziger, 467 F.3d at 523 (37-day delay not excusable neglect under circumstances). However, we agree with the district court that Munoz's delay was not clearly inordinate here, given the sensitive posture in which Hall took over the case and the unique difficulties she presumably faced as a result. See Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 Colum. L.Rev. 1103, 1131 (1999) (noting that, where successor counsel will be arguing former counsel's ineffective assistance, former counsel's incentives not to help the client . . . [may] affect cooperation with successor counsel); cf. Massaro, 538 U.S. at 506, 123 S.Ct. 1690 (noting that appellate counsel may be in an awkward position vis-à-vis trial counsel, as trial counsel will be unwilling to help appellate counsel familiarize himself with a record for the purpose of understanding how it reflects trial counsel's own incompetence). We believe that a district judge is in the best position to know how long a diligent successor counsel would require to research and prepare a new-trial motion under the circumstances presented by any given case. Thus, the delay factor does not clearly favor the government. [7]