Opinion ID: 2067354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Distinction Between Alimony and Disposition of Property

Text: As previously stated, in the absence of a statutory definition of the term alimony, this Court repeatedly defined alimony as a money allowance payable under a judicial decree by a husband at stated intervals to his wife, or former wife, for her support and maintenance during their joint lives or until the remarriage of the wife, so long as they live separately. E.g., Thomas, 294 Md. at 615, 451 A.2d at 1220; Grove, 285 Md. at 695, 402 A.2d at 895; Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 612, 6 A.2d 366, 368-69 (1939); Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. at 488. Moreover, this Court repeatedly recognized a distinction between alimony and disposition of property incidental to a divorce. Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 186, 129 A.2d 917, 919 (1957); Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Md. 513, 523, 154 A. 95, 99 (1931); Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 172-73, 145 A. 488, 491 (1929); Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 590-91, 87 A. 1033, 1036 (1913); Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. at 488. As long ago as 1823, in Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. 485 (1823), a wife filed a petition seeking, among other things, a proper and reasonable allowance for her support. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. at 485. In his answer, the husband stated that he was willing to allow her $2,000.00 for a maintenance from such of his property that she might choose. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. at 485. The husband moved to quash the proceedings on the ground that the wife had left his bed and board, without any just cause or provocation, and that he was perfectly willing that she return and live with him if she chose to do so. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. at 486. The husband's motion was overruled. The trial court ordered that a part of the husband's real estate be sold and the proceeds paid to the wife. In concluding that the order could not be sustained because it constituted a disposition of property over which equity courts had no authority and not an award of alimony over which equity courts did have authority, this Court said: Alimony is a maintenance afforded to the wife, where the husband refuses to give it, or where from his improper conduct compels her to separate from him. It is not a portion of his real estate, to be assigned to her in fee simple, subject to her control, or to be sold at her pleasure, but a provision for her support, to continue during their joint lives, or so long as they live separate. Upon the death of either, or upon their mutual consent to live together, it ceases, and the amount of this allowance must depend upon the value of the husband's estate. ..... The decree does not direct an income to be paid for the maintenance of the wife. It does not create a personal liability in the husband to pay any sum of money, but orders in the first instance his land to be sold. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. at 488-89 (emphasis added). Thus, this Court established that in divorce cases alimony and disposition of property were separate and distinct. An award of a specified sum of money resulting from a court-ordered sale of a husband's property constituted a disposition of property. It did not constitute alimony. The distinction between alimony and disposition of property was again considered in Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 87 A. 1033 (1913). There the trial court incorporated into the divorce decree an agreement that provided that the husband shall pay the wife $28,800.00 per annum, in monthly installments, during her life. Emerson, 120 Md. at 586, 87 A. at 1034. This Court determined that the trial court's order, incorporating agreed upon money payments that were not made terminable upon the remarriage of the wife or the death of the husband, did not constitute an award of alimony and, therefore, could not be modified. In reaching this result, this Court construed ch. 262, § 3 of the Acts of 1841, which authorized equity courts to award alimony to a wife incidental to divorce. The Court's construction of that Act was premised upon the rationale that in Maryland there is a distinction between alimony and disposition of property. There this Court said:  We think it is clear, then, that the Act providing for alimony upon this decree, new to the Courts, was intended to provide for alimony of the same character and limitations as the alimony the Courts had for so long dealt with. In a great many of the States statutes provide that the Court shall award to the wife by way of alimony upon a decree for divorce a portion of the property held by the husband and wife or a sum of money in lieu of the property, to be absolutely hers. Although this is designated as alimony it is totally different from the theory of alimony as recognized in Maryland. One is a division of property, while the other is the maintenance of the wife out of the income of the husband. Emerson, 120 Md. at 590-91, 87 A. at 1036 (emphasis added). Thus, this Court reiterated that in divorce cases alimony and disposition of property were separate and distinct. An award to the wife of property held by the husband and wife, or an award of a specified sum of money in lieu of such property, constituted a disposition of property. It did not constitute alimony. The distinction between alimony and disposition of property was again emphasized in Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929), a case with facts strikingly similar to those here. There, a divorce decree incorporated an agreement between a husband and a wife for the payment of $40,000.00 in four equal installments. The decree, in accordance with the agreement, provided that the four installments would be in full satisfaction and discharge of any and all claims by way of alimony.... Bushman, 157 Md. at 171, 145 A. at 491. The husband failed to pay some of the installments and was held in contempt of court. This Court considered the question whether the [equity] court had jurisdiction to enforce payment of the sums awarded by the decree by an order committing the defendant to prison for contempt of court. Bushman, 157 Md. at 170, 145 A. at 490. This Court noted that [t]he answer depends upon whether the decree is for alimony, because alimony does not constitute a debt within the meaning of that term in the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt. Bushman, 157 Md. at 170, 145 A. at 490. Commenting upon its previous construction in Emerson of ch. 262, § 3 of the Acts of 1841, which distinguished between alimony and disposition of property, this Court said: This is a clear and pertinent construction of the Maryland statute, empowering the allowance of permanent alimony in a decree dissolving the bond of marriage. Whatever may be the statutory rule and construction in other jurisdictions, in this state the allowance of alimony in cases of separation or either kind of divorce is of the nature and in the form according to the practice derived from the English ecclesiastical courts. The rule is thus stated in Bishop on Marriage and Divorce: `The court cannot decree to the wife as alimony, a gross sum, or absolute title in specific property, or a sale of a part of the husband's estate for her use. But we have statutes, to be explained in future chapters, allowing this sort of provision, and sometimes it is termed alimony.' If a gross sum were allowable in the discretion of the court as a substitute for regular payments, the gross sum would represent the capitalization of a proportion of the husband's income; and a compliance with the decree would immediately reduce his principal or property by that amount, and transfer a specific proportion of the husband's estate absolutely to the wife. 2 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, secs. 1030-1036; Ricketts v. Ricketts, 4 Gill 105, 109. In the event of her death a day later, the lump sum, undiminished by any appropriation to her maintenance, would pass to her personal representatives for distribution as part of her estate; and, if she lived, it was her absolute property to do with as she liked. In no true sense would the award of a gross sum be alimony, since it could neither be increased nor be reduced according to the exigency of circumstances; nor would the obligation to pay it as decreed be affected by the death of either the husband or the wife. ..... Since the decree in this case was not for alimony within the meaning of the statute, but was for the payment of a specified sum of money in accordance with the agreement of the parties, the defendant could not be punished by imprisonment because of his refusal to pay the money as decreed. Bushman, 157 Md. at 173-74, 145 A. at 491-92 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, this Court again reiterated that the award of a specified sum of money, even when required to be paid in installments, did not constitute alimony. Indeed, it concluded that [i]n the absence of special agreement of the parties or of statutory authorization the [equity] court may not decree alimony in gross. Bushman, 157 Md. at 172, 145 A. at 491.