Opinion ID: 1547441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unindicted Theory of Co-Conspirator Liability

Text: Appellants Franklin and Sampson argue that the Pinkerton instruction on the vicarious liability of co-conspirators was unconstitutional because there was no indicted conspiracy charge. In Pinkerton, the Supreme Court held that a co-conspirator may be held liable for an offense directly committed by another co-conspirator if the crime was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, was within the scope of the conspiracy, and could be reasonably foreseen as a necessary and natural consequence of the unlawful agreement. 328 U.S. at 647-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180. [I]n order to convict a co-conspirator for the substantive crimes by another conspirator, the jury must be instructed that they must find that the substantive offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the agreement. Gordon v. United States, 783 A.2d 575, 582 (D.C.2001). We have held that a Pinkerton instruction can properly be given even without an indicted conspiracy charge. Thomas v. United States, 748 A.2d 931, 935 (D.C.2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 917, 122 S.Ct. 263, 151 L.Ed.2d 192 (2001). It is argued, however, that the holding of Thomas has been undercut by two subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Any element of a criminal offense that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt must be submitted to the jury. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Any fact that increases the criminal penalty beyond the statutory maximum, an enhancement factor, must be included in the indictment. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002); see also Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (facts supporting a finding that increases a criminal penalty beyond the statutory maximum of the standard range for an offense must be determined by a jury or admitted by the defendant). Appellant argues that because a Pinkerton instruction provides a jury with an alternative definition of the crime, it functions effectively like an element of the offense and therefore must be indicted. However, we reasoned in Thomas that a theory of liability such as the conspiratorial theory argued by the government here is not equal to an element of a crime that must be charged in the indictment. 748 A.2d at 935. We also note here that a Pinkerton theory of conspiratorial liability does not increase the penalty for any charged crime beyond its statutory maximum, because Pinkerton liability is a basis for a conviction not a sentencing enhancement factor. We are not satisfied that the Supreme Court holdings are sufficiently on point to justify our disregard of a square holding of this court binding upon us as a panel. [20] M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971).