Opinion ID: 2453299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: industrial insurance immunity

Text: ¶ 13 CH2M contends that it and its agents enjoy Industrial Insurance Act immunity under RCW 51.24.035. This statute has not been considered in any published Washington court opinion. However, the Industrial Insurance Act itself is regularly before Washington courts, and there is a body of law to guide us. The legislature has instructed us that the act shall be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries and/or death occurring in the course of employment. RCW 51.12.010. To accomplish the legislative objective, our `guiding principle in construing provisions of the Industrial Insurance Act is that the Act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in order to achieve its purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of the worker.' Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash.2d 801, 811, 16 P.3d 583 (2001) (quoting Dennis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 109 Wash.2d 467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987)). The act is the product of a grand compromise between workers and employers. Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wash.2d 853, 859, 904 P.2d 278 (1995) (citing Stertz v. Indus. Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 590-91, 158 P. 256 (1916), abrogated in part by Birklid, 127 Wash.2d 853, 904 P.2d 278). Injured workers were given a swift, no-fault compensation system for injuries on the job. Employers were given immunity from civil suits by workers, with exceptions not relevant here. Id. The benefits to injured workers, while comparatively quick and sure, are often far less than would be available to them in tort. Minton v. Ralston Purina Co., 146 Wash.2d 385, 390, 47 P.3d 556 (2002). ¶ 14 Third party tortfeasors are not parties to the grand compromise and injured workers may sue such tortfeasors. RCW 51.24.030; Flanigan v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 123 Wash.2d 418, 425, 869 P.2d 14 (1994). If such suits are successful, both the worker and the State benefit as the State has a right to recoup some of its workers' compensation payments. RCW 51.24.060. We have long held that the right to sue a third party tortfeasor is a valuable right to the workman, and, to secure it to him, the act should receive the same liberal construction that is required to be given to other parts of the act in order to secure his rights thereunder. Burns v. Johns, 125 Wash. 387, 392-93, 216 P. 2 (1923) (citing Carlson v. Mock, 102 Wash. 557, 173 P. 637 (1918)). Further, we have long noted, albeit in the context of a predecessor to the current private suit provision, that [t]he industrial insurance fund is provided for the exclusive benefit of the employer and the workman, and we will in all doubtful cases sustain the right of the injured workman against the third party wrongdoer who has not contributed to the fund. Mathewson v. Olmstead, 126 Wash. 269, 273, 218 P. 226 (1923). ¶ 15 With these principles in mind, we turn to the immunity provision before us. (1) Notwithstanding RCW 51.24.030(1),[ [3] ] the injured worker or beneficiary may not seek damages against a design professional who is a third person and who has been retained to perform professional services on a construction project, or any employee of a design professional who is assisting or representing the design professional in the performance of professional services on the site of the construction project, unless responsibility for safety practices is specifically assumed by contract, the provisions of which were mutually negotiated, or the design professional actually exercised control over the portion of the premises where the worker was injured. (2) The immunity provided by this section does not apply to the negligent preparation of design plans and specifications. (3) For the purposes of this section, design professional means an architect, professional engineer, land surveyor, or landscape architect, who is licensed or authorized by law to practice such profession, or any corporation organized under chapter 18.100 RCW or authorized under RCW 18.08.420 or 18.43.130 to render design services through the practice of one or more of such professions. RCW 51.24.035 (emphasis added). Statutory grants of immunity in derogation of the common law are strictly construed. Plano v. City of Renton, 103 Wash.App. 910, 911-12, 14 P.3d 871 (2000) (citing Matthews v. Elk Pioneer Days, 64 Wash.App. 433, 437-38, 824 P.2d 541 (1992)). ¶ 16 CH2M argues that the entire plant was a construction project, entitling it to immunity under subsection .035(1). It also argues that it had not prepared design plans and specifications and thus the exclusion from immunity under subsection .035(2) does not apply. The plaintiffs argue that a working sewage plant is not a construction site as contemplated by the legislature and that CH2M did negligently prepare design plans and specifications.
¶ 17 The immunity found in RCW 51.24.035(1) is limited by its terms to a design professional performing professional services on a construction project or any employee of a design professional assisting or representing the design professional performing professional services on the site of the construction project. The trial judge found that the area of the plant where the skillets were installed was not a construction project nor a construction site within the meaning of RCW 51.24.035(1). CP at 3128 (FOF 94). Whether or not the area where the act of alleged negligence occurred was a construction site is a question of fact. We review questions of fact for substantial evidence. See Soltero, 159 Wash.2d at 433, 150 P.3d 552, (citing Nordstrom Credit, 120 Wash.2d at 942, 845 P.2d 1331). CH2M argues that as a matter of law, the immunity statute unquestionably applies to any building complex where some construction was occurring and that no reasonable person could fail to find that the accident took place on a construction project or on a construction site. Br. of Appellant at 43, 45. ¶ 18 Turning first to whether the statute unquestionably applies, we note that construction project and site of a construction project are not defined statutory terms under Title 51 RCW or relevant administrative regulations. Undefined common statutory terms are given their common dictionary meanings unless there is strong evidence the legislature intended something else. City of Spokane ex rel. Wastewater Mgmt. Dep't v. Dep't of Revenue, 145 Wash.2d 445, 454, 38 P.3d 1010 (2002) (citing State v. Pacheco, 125 Wash.2d 150, 154, 882 P.2d 183 (1994)). The first nongrammatical definition of construction in Webster's is the act of putting parts together to form a complete integrated object: Fabrication. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 489 (2003). Construction project is not defined in Webster's, but project is defined primarily as a specific plan or design, and site is defined as the local position of building, town, monument, or similar work either constructed or to be constructed esp. in connection with its surroundings... a space of ground occupied or to be occupied by a building. Id. at 1813, 2128. [4] Taken together, it appears that a construction site is a space of ground occupied or to be occupied by a building that is or will be put[] ... together to form a complete integrated object. A construction project would be the overarching plan and process of so completing a building (or other structure). ¶ 19 While the trial court made no specific, relevant finding of fact, the findings imply, and the evidence supports, that some parts of the sewage plant campus were under construction. Finding of fact 94 tells us that at all pertinent times prior to and on May 10, 2004, the area of the plant where the skillets were installed was not a construction project nor a construction site within the meaning of RCW 51.24.035(1). CP at 3128. Timothy Pelton, the administrative superintendent of the plant, testified that the nearest construction was several hundred feet away. 8 RP (Sept. 17, 2008) at 1114-15. Thus, it appears that there was construction occurring on the sewage treatment campus. The question is whether the existence of construction somewhere on the campus triggers the immunity of RCW 51.24.035. ¶ 20 We conclude it does not. Clearly, if no construction was occurring on the campus, the immunity provisions of RCW 51.24.035 would not be at issue. CH2M's contract with the city contemplated at least two main activities. One was to retrofit the Spokane Riverside Wastewater Treatment Plant and the other was to maintain the plant to continue to function as it had on a day to day basis. [5] The city and CH2M specifically memorialized this by modifying their contract in 2003, providing, in part, that CH2M would design and manage an upgrade to and redesign of the recirculation and heating system for the digestors, and that CH2M would provide `on-call' services for plant operations. CP at 3110 (FOF 15). The specific design work done to redirect the sludge to address the temperature problem was part of CH2M's on call contract for plant operations and would have been needed whether or not there was any construction occurring on the campus. We agree with the trial court that the placement of the skillets was not a construction project. ¶ 21 CH2M argues that whether or not the discrete act of alleged negligence was related to construction is immaterial. CH2M argues it has immunity for any professional services rendered on a construction project site and that the entire wastewater treatment facility was a construction site within the meaning of the statute. An aerial photograph of the Spokane wastewater treatment facility shows at least a dozen buildings and several parking lots, not unlike our own capitol campus. The record before us does not suggest that any construction was taking place within the digesters themselves. At trial, the superintendent of the plant testified that at the time, the closest construction was either the new aeration basin or rebuilding of the link between the administration building and process building ... several hundred feet away. 8 VRP (Sept. 17, 2008) at 1114-15. We do not believe that the legislature meant that when construction was performed on one building on a campus, engineering professionals were entitled to immunity everywhere on the campus regardless of the nature of their professional services. ¶ 22 We must read statutes in context with the whole statutory scheme, which in this case includes both the injunction to construe the title liberally in favor of reducing suffering and the private suit provision. Rivas v. Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr., 164 Wash.2d 261, 266-67, 189 P.3d 753 (2008); RCW 51.24.030; RCW 51.12.010. Taken as a whole, it appears to us that the legislature intended to protect design engineers from the sort of liability imposed on general contractors for workplace negligence, but not to protect them from their own negligence. [6] Given that the plaintiffs do not allege that CH2M failed to provide them a safe construction site, and given that there was no construction occurring in Digester 3, we agree with the trial judge that this provision provides the defendants no immunity.
¶ 23 In addition to limiting the immunity in question to professional services on the site of the construction project, the statute also excludes from immunity the negligent preparation of design plans and specifications. The trial judge found that [t]he Irving proposal to separate sludge flows referenced above in these Findings constitutes negligent preparation of a design plan within the meaning of RCW 51.24.035(2). CP at 3128. CH2M contends that since it put no relevant plans or specifications in writing, this statutory safe harbor for actions based on negligent design plans and specifications does not apply. Br. of App. at 45. ¶ 24 A similar argument was rejected by the Kansas Supreme Court under the Kansas design professional immunity statute. [7] Edwards v. Anderson Eng'g, Inc., 284 Kan. 892, 894, 166 P.3d 1047 (2007). There, a general contractor had hired an engineering firm to test the quality of pipes used in a project after some failed. An engineer working for the firm directed an employee of the contractor to cut a pipe at specific points for testing. At some point, shortly after the Anderson engineer had left, the pipe split lengthwise and rolled outward, causing Edwards to fall and be crushed when the pipe rolled back. Id. The design firm argued, among other things, that it had prepared no plans or specifications and therefore could not be negligent in so doing. The Kansas legislature, like its Washington counterpart, had not statutorily defined design plans and specifications and the engineering firm suggest[ed] that the common understanding in the construction industry is that those terms refer to blueprint drawings and written specifications for the quantity and quality of materials. Id. at 903, 166 P.3d 1047. The court rejected that argument: Anderson was charged with the responsibility of testing the pipe. In order to perform its professional responsibilities, Anderson required that the concrete pipe be cut into four pieces and gave specific directions on the location of the cut lines. We perceive no appreciable distinction between providing the specifications for pipe cutting through a professional drawing or by physically marking on the pipe. Id. ¶ 25 We agree with the Kansas Supreme Court and perceive no appreciable difference in recommending a change in the piping of the sludge and the locations of the skillets under CH2M's on call service agreement and preparing written plans and specifications to accomplish the same thing. We find it difficult to believe that the legislature intended to allow design professionals to escape liability for negligent work by not writing down their plans or specifications.