Opinion ID: 2274302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Statutory Aggravator

Text: Johnson alleges that the trial court erred in submitting Instruction 23 over his objections because it included the depravity of mind statutory aggravator, [16] which he argues is unconstitutionally vague. He contends that he was prejudiced by the vagueness of this aggravator because, had it not been given, the jury would have weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors differently and not recommended the death penalty.
Instruction 23 instructed the jury to consider: Whether the murder of [Casey] involved depravity of mind and whether, as a result thereof, the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman. You can make a determination of depravity of mind only if you find: That the defendant committed repeated and excessive acts of physical abuse upon [Casey] and the killing was therefore unreasonably brutal. MAI-CR3d 313.40; section 565.032.2(7). The limiting language [17] in this instruction, which explains what is required for a determination of depravity of mind, is taken from the Notes on Use for MAI-CR3d 313.40. See MAI-CR3d 313.40, Note 7(B)[2]. This Court has repeatedly held that the depravity of mind language and limiting instruction, as represented in Instruction 23, provide sufficient guidance to sentencing jurors such that the instruction is not unconstitutionally vague. Johns, 34 S.W.3d at 115; State v. Knese, 985 S.W.2d 759, 778 (Mo. banc 1999); State v. Ervin, 979 S.W.2d 149, 166 (Mo. banc 1998); State v. Butler, 951 S.W.2d 600, 605-06 (Mo. banc 1997); State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 772 (Mo. banc 1996).
Johnson, however, contends that use of the limiting language is not a cure for the aggravator's vagueness. He argues that the addition of the limiting language improperly usurps legislative power because it adds requirements to section 565.032.2(7) that are not included in the statute. He also maintains that the limiting language wrongly results in judicial fact-finding. These arguments are without merit. The use of limiting language to clarify the requirements of the statutory aggravator is not an effort by the courts to engage in legislation. The limiting language gives meaning to the words used in the statute and ensures that the statute is constitutionally applied. This is statutory construction, which is clearly in this Court's purview. Further, use of the limiting language does not result in judicial fact-finding. The language expressly instructs the jury to determine if depravity of mind was involved based on the evidence in the case.