Opinion ID: 2331534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reyes Prior Testimony

Text: On January 5, 1997, Reyes pled guilty to Murder in the Second Degree and other criminal offenses. Those charges related to a different homicide: the murder of Fundador Otero on January 5, 1995 in the City of Wilmington. As part of the plea agreement, Reyes agreed to testify for the prosecution against Cabrera, who was also Reyes' co-defendant with regard to the murder of Fundador Otero. In this appeal, Reyes' second argument is that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting a portion of the testimony given by Reyes during his cross-examination in Cabrera's trial for the murder of Fundador Otero. In particular, Reyes objects to the introduction of the following testimony from the Otero case: Q. [Prosecutor] Okay. And you don't recall telling your girlfriend that or do you recall telling your girlfriend that you were with Luis and somebody came over to the house and you went down the basement and beat them up? A. [Reyes] I don't recall telling her that. Not that moment. I told her that another time. Reyes challenges the general relevance of his statement to Santos, Reyes' girlfriend, under D.R.E. 402. Alternatively, Reyes contends that it was error under D.R.E. 403 for the judge to admit into evidence that portion of his prior testimony from the Otero trial. Delaware Rule of Evidence 402 provides that all relevant evidence is admissible. [7] Relevant evidence, as defined under Rule 401, is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. [8] Pursuant to D.R.E. 403, even relevant evidence, however, may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.... [9] The appellate standard of review in determining whether a trial judge should have admitted or excluded otherwise relevant evidence pursuant to D.R.E. 403 is abuse of discretion. [10] Reyes contends that his statement at Cabrera's trial for Otero's murder is too vague in time and place to be relevant to the murders at issue in this trial. The record reflects that Reyes' statement during the prior trial was corroborated by Santos's independent statement to the police. Santos placed both Reyes and Cabrera in the basement of Cabrera's apartment participating in the beating of another person. Reyes' arguments, suggesting that there was no temporal connection between his testimony at the prior trial and the murders of Rowe and Saunders, go to the weight of that evidence rather than its admissibility. The record supports the trial judge's determination that Reyes' statement at the prior trial qualified as relevant evidence in this case under Rule 402. [11] After determining that Reyes' prior testimonial statement was relevant under D.R.E. 402, the trial judge was called upon under D.R.E. 403 to weigh the potential probative value of the statement to the State's case against the possible unfair prejudice that evidence could cause to Reyes. [12] The record supports the trial judge's determination that the probative value of Reyes' statement to the State's circumstantial case was significant. The evidence was not unfairly prejudicial to Reyes. Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge acted within his discretion by admitting into evidence Reyes' testimonial statement from Cabrera's prior trial.