Opinion ID: 2386462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Respondeat Superior Claims

Text: Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held liable for the acts of his employees committed within the scope of their employment. Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 561 (D.C.1984) (citation omitted). As a general rule, whether an employee is acting within the scope of his employment is a question of fact for the jury. It becomes a question of law for the court, however, if there is not sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the action was within the scope of the employment. Id. at 562 (citations omitted). In this case we conclude that summary judgment in favor of Argenbright on the respondeat superior issue was unwarranted because, on the evidence presented, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Hunter's actionsas described by Octaviawere, at least in part, within the scope of his employment. In Johnson v. Weinberg, 434 A.2d 404 (D.C.1981) ( Johnson I ), we addressed a respondeat superior claim brought by a laundromat customer who was shot by a laundromat employee. After the two men had argued over some missing laundry, the employee drew a gun and shot the customer. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the laundromat's owner, ruling that the employee's action was outside the scope of his employment. We reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that [r]easonable minds could find that the shooting arose out of and was related to [the employee's] employment. . . and the court committed error by taking the question from the jury. Id. at 409. A second trial resulted in a verdict for the customer. The laundromat owner appealed, arguing inter alia that the trial court should have directed a verdict in his behalf because the shooting was not within the employee's scope of employment. He maintained that there had been a substantive change in the law resulting from our decision in Boykin v. District of Columbia, supra . [7] We held that Boykin had not changed the law, and stated: The employer does not avoid liability for the employee's intentional torts . . . if the tort is committed partially because of a personal motive, such as revenge, as long as the employee [is] actuated, at least in part, by a desire to serve his principal's interest. Weinberg v. Johnson, 518 A.2d 985, 988 (D.C.1986) ( Johnson II ) (citations omitted). Applying Johnson I and Johnson II, we must reject as too broad the statement in the trial court's order that sexual assaults are, as a matter of law, solely for the employee's benefit. While it is probable that the vast majority of sexual assaults arise from purely personal motives, it is nevertheless possible that an employee's conduct may amount to a sexual assault and still be actuated, at least in part, by a desire to serve [the employer's] interest. Jordan v. Medley, 228 U.S.App. D.C. 425, 428, 711 F.2d 211, 214 (1983) (emphasis added) (cited in Johnson II, 518 A.2d at 988); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). [8] The conduct at issue in this case, ostensibly a physical search of a suspected shoplifter, is particularly susceptible to this interpretation, especially when the search was initiated by Hunter only after he had reason to believe that his employer's interests had been affected ( i.e., that merchandise had been stolen by the person he was about to search). At what point, if ever, Hunter's personal desires motivated his alleged physical contact with Octavia is a factual question that should have been considered by a jury. See Boykin, 484 A.2d at 562. Since we must view the evidence presentedin particular, Octavia's deposition testimonyin the light most favorable to appellant, see Angulo v. Gochnauer, 772 A.2d 830, 836 n. 9 (D.C.2001), we conclude that a reasonable juror could have found that Hunter's actions were, at least in part, within the scope of his employment. Consequently, summary judgment should not have been granted to Argenbright on the issue of vicarious liability. See Johnson II, 518 A.2d at 988-989. Whether Mr. Hunter physically searched Octavia, and whether his conduct, if proven, was motivated to any extent by his desire to serve his employer or was entirely his own personal adventure, are questions that a jury must answer. As for appellant's respondeat superior claim against Safeway, however, we agree with the trial court that summary judgment was appropriate. Since Hunter was not Safeway's employee but was a contracted security guard, Safeway can be held vicariously liable for Hunter's conduct only if the evidence establishes a master-servant relationship between Safeway and Hunter. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Kelly, 448 A.2d 856, 860-861 (D.C.1982). No such relationship was shown on this record. In Kelly we held that a store could be held liable for torts committed by a security guard who was employed by a contractor. In determining whether a master-servant relationship exists, we noted that, while no single factor is controlling, the decisive test . . . is whether the employer has the right to control and direct the servant in the performance of his work and the manner in which the work is to be done. Id. at 860 (citations omitted). In Kelly, there was a full trial before a jury and ample evidence showing that Safeway had the right to control the security guard's conduct. See id. at 860-861. In this case, by contrast, there was no evidence whatever showing that Safeway had such authority over Hunter. The only suggestion to that effect was the statement in an affidavit by the manager of Argenbright that a security guard's performance and conduct is monitored by Safeway management. Under Kelly and other cases, this statement does not demonstrate the kind of control sufficient to establish a master-servant relationship upon which liability may be founded. See Kelly, 448 A.2d at 860-861; see also, e.g., District of Columbia v. Hampton, 666 A.2d 30, 38-41 (D.C.1995); Giles v. Shell Oil Corp., 487 A.2d 610, 611-613 (D.C. 1985). Since there was no proof of a master-servant relationship, Safeway had no potential liability for Hunter's alleged sexual assault on a theory of respondeat superior. [9]