Opinion ID: 2570814
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Broad Interpretation

Text: In arguing that any mention of an attorney must be broadly interpreted, Appleby cites State v. Buck, 331 Mont. 517, 134 P.3d 53 (2006), in which the request made for an attorney was similar to Appleby's question about whether he could talk to an attorney about the DNA search warrant. However, Buck is not cited by Appleby because of its factual similarity but because of the court's recognition that law enforcement officers and courts should give broad effect to any mention of an attorney by a suspect. In Buck, when served with a search warrant allowing officers to obtain fingernail scrapings, the suspect said, `I'll just wait and talk to a lawyer.' Buck, 331 Mont. at 521, 134 P.3d 53. Yet, when given the opportunity to call a lawyer, the suspect refused to do so. Several days later, the suspect  who had remained in custody  was again taken to the police station, Mirandized, and asked if he would answer questions. He agreed and confessed. The suspect later sought suppression of his confession, arguing his statement that he wanted to talk to an attorney before submitting to the fingernail scraping was an unambiguous invocation of his Miranda rights. In considering this argument, the Montana court noted that in Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529-30, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987), the United States Supreme Court observed its past decisions had given broad effect to requests for counsel and that Montana had a long-standing rule of liberally construing any mention of an attorney by a suspect. Buck, 331 Mont. at 536-37, 134 P.3d 53. The Montana court stated: [N]o suspect has an affirmative obligation to explain precisely why he or she wants legal assistance.... [I]f there is any reasonable doubt as to whether a suspect's request for counsel is limited to only certain aspects of his or her interaction with investigating officers, the request must be construed as an invocation of the right to counsel in custodial interrogation. Buck, 331 Mont. at 537, 134 P.3d 53. Appleby urges our adoption of the same viewpoint. We reject that invitation for several reasons. First, the Montana court's statement cannot be isolated from the holding in the case, which followed Barrett. In Barrett, the United States Supreme Court refused to suppress a verbal statement made after a suspect told law enforcement officers he would talk to them, but he would not give a written statement before talking to his attorney. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529-30, 107 S.Ct. 828. Considering Barrett and factually similar cases from other states, the Montana court concluded that Buck had not invoked his right to the assistance of counsel for the purpose of assisting with interrogation when he refused to submit to fingernail scraping until he had talked to an attorney. The Montana court stated: [A] suspect may seek legal assistance for only limited purposes in his or her dealings with law enforcement. Based upon this recognition, and pursuant to Barrett, we hold that a suspect's request for counsel which is unambiguously limited to a police procedure that does not involve verbal inquiry, does not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel in custodial interrogation. Rather, a clearly limited request is properly construed according to its plain meaning, assuming that the suspect fully understands his or her right to counsel. Buck, 331 Mont. at 536-37, 134 P.3d 53. The same conclusion applies in this case to the one comment made by Appleby in the context of the DNA search warrant. Detective Jewiss testified that after being presented with the warrant, Mr. Appleby then asks if he has the right to say no. He also asks if  at that point if he can talk to his attorney about his right to say no for that. This statement was unambiguous and was a request for limited assistance. Clearly, it was not a request for the assistance of an attorney for the purpose of assisting with the custodial interrogation. Undoubtedly, it is because of the precedent of Barrett that Appleby does not isolate the DNA search-warrant comment as a clear invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and relies on Buck only for its dicta about broadly construing a suspect's comments. As to this latter point, we reject the Montana court's analysis because of decisions of the United States Supreme Court decided after Barrett that are not discussed in Buck. Significant to Appleby's argument is Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). The Davis Court noted that Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529-30, 107 S.Ct. 828, and Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 96 & n. 3, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984), mentioned the issue of ambiguous and equivocal requests for counsel but had not addressed the issue on the merits. We granted certiorari, [citation omitted], to do so. Davis, 512 U.S. at 456, 114 S.Ct. 2350. Faced squarely with the issue, the Court held that the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350. Stating the holding in another way, the Court said: We decline petitioner's invitation to extend Edwards and require law enforcement officers to cease questioning immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney. [Citation omitted.] Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350. Further, the Court declined to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350. The Court reasoned: We recognize that requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who  because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons  will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present. But the primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. `[F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.' [Citation omitted.] A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having that right explained to him has indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460-61, 114 S.Ct. 2350. Applying this authority, we reject Appleby's argument that any mention of counsel must be construed broadly. Rather, the trial court was correct in examining whether Appleby's questions were unambiguous requests for the assistance of counsel for the purpose of the interrogation.