Opinion ID: 1202760
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hamilton I

Text: In Hamilton I, we considered the issues going to guilt raised by defendant and concluded that none required reversal. (41 Cal.3d at pp. 419-431.) We also concluded that in violation of our decision in Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131, the court failed to instruct the jury that intent to kill was an element of the felony-murder special circumstances. (41 Cal.3d at p. 431.) Further, we concluded that this error fell within the scope of the rule of automatic reversal laid down in People v. Garcia, supra, 36 Cal.3d 539, and outside the four narrow exceptions enunciated in that opinion. Specifically, we determined that only the so-called Cantrell-Thornton exception was potentially available ( People v. Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672 [105 Cal. Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256]; People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738 [114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267])  viz., that intent to kill was established as a matter of law and there was no contrary evidence worthy of consideration. We then determined that the evidence adduced at trial showed that the exception was in fact not available here. Accordingly, we vacated the special circumstance findings and reversed the judgment as to penalty. Thereupon the Attorney General filed his petition for a writ of certiorari on the issue whether the failure to instruct on intent to kill with regard to a felony-murder special circumstance is subject to harmless-error analysis. The high court granted the petition, vacated the judgment in Hamilton I, and remanded the cause to this court for further consideration in light of its decision in Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 [92 L.Ed.2d 460, 106 S.Ct. 3101].