Opinion ID: 416478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the election challenge.

Text: 19 Congress has entrusted the Board with wide discretion in determining whether an election has been conducted fairly, and the Board's decision is accorded special respect on review. NLRB v. Claxton Manufacturing Co., 613 F.2d 1364, 1365 (5th Cir.), modified, 618 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.1980); NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26, 29 (5th Cir.1969). An evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of objections to a Board-supervised election is required only [i]f the objecting party shows, by specific evidence which prima facie would warrant setting aside the election, the existence of substantial and material factual issues which can be resolved only after an opportunity to observe and examine witnesses. Golden Age, supra, 415 F.2d at 32-33; see also NLRB v. Sumter Plywood Corp., 535 F.2d 917, 924 (5th Cir.1976). While the question whether a party has made an adequate showing is a question of law and ultimately a question for the courts, Claxton, supra, 613 F.2d at 1365 (quoting Luminator Division of Gulton Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 1371, 1374 (5th Cir.1972)), considerable weight must be assigned to [the Board's] determinations regarding the existence or nonexistence of substantial and material factual issues. Claxton, 613 F.2d at 1365-66 (quoting NLRB v. Osborn Transportation, Inc., 589 F.2d 1275, 1282 (5th Cir.1979)). The Board's decision whether or not to hold a hearing will be disturbed only for abuse of discretion. Golden Age, supra; NLRB v. Zelrich Co., 344 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir.1965). 20 A party seeking to overturn a Board-supervised election bears a heavy burden. Its allegations of misconduct must be supported by specific evidence of specific events from or about specific people. Golden Age, 415 F.2d at 33 (quoting NLRB v. Douglas County Electric Membership Corp., 358 F.2d 125, 130 (5th Cir.1966)). Further, an election may be set aside only if the objectionable activity, when considered as a whole, either tended to or did influence the outcome of the election. Claxton, 613 F.2d at 1366; see also Home Town Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 392, 397 (5th Cir.1969). 21 The Board concluded in this case that Boston Insulated's evidence was insufficient to warrant an inference that the union's electioneering had interfered with the employees' free choice, and accordingly it refused to set aside the election. Since it was able to reach this conclusion while assuming that all of the company's evidence was true, it found no need to hold an evidentiary hearing. See NLRB v. Carlton McLendon Furniture Co., 488 F.2d 58, 61 n. 4 (1974) (denying enforcement but noting that remand is unnecessary where operational facts are undisputed and matter presented is question of law, or effect of misconduct is apparent on record); but see Hickory Springs Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 506, 510 n. 4 (5th Cir.1981) (one purpose of hearing is to resolve ambiguities in witness statements). While we have scrutinized the allegations of election misconduct somewhat more closely than we might otherwise have in light of the union's slim margin of victory in this case, Sumter Plywood, 534 F.2d at 924, our review of the record indicates that the Board's refusal to set aside the election or hold an evidentiary hearing on the company's objections was within its discretion. 22 Boston Insulated maintains that the election should have been set aside because the union violated the Board's prohibition on electioneering at or near the polls. See Milchem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968). In Milchem, the Board established a strict rule against prolonged conversations between representatives of any party to the election and voters waiting to cast ballots. Id. at 362. Subsequent Board decisions have emphasized that the Milchem strict rule against electioneering applies only where the objectionable conversations were prolonged, see Cumberland Nursing & Convalescent Center, 248 N.L.R.B. 322 (1980), and the conversations occurred at the polling place itself or while the employees were waiting in line. See, Pastoor Brothers Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 451 (1976); Harold W. Moore & Son, 173 N.L.R.B. 1258 (1968); Marvil International Security Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1260 (1968). Where these precise factors are not present, the Board makes a judgment, based on all the facts and circumstances, whether the electioneering substantially impaired the exercise of a free choice so as to require the holding of a new election. Glacier Packing Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 571, 573 n. 5 (1974); see also Moore, supra. 23 As the Board noted in its decision, there essentially was no dispute in this case about what happened during the election. The company's evidence indicated that the electioneering had been conducted away from the polling place and had not been directed at employees who were waiting in line to vote. The Board stressed the fact that the voters standing in line were separated from the electioneering by a set of doors, which remained closed during the election. 6 Since the electioneering did not occur at the polling place or while the employees were waiting in line, the Milchem strict rule is inapplicable; instead, the effect of the conduct on the election must be judged in light of all of the circumstances surrounding that election. See Glacier, supra; Moore, supra. 24 The area immediately outside the doors had not been designated a no-electioneering area, a designation that is left in the first instance to the informed judgment of the Regional Director and his agents conducting the election. Marvil, supra, 173 N.L.R.B. at 1261. The union representatives' presence outside the doors was not contrary to the instructions of the Board agent who was conducting the elections, see Marvil, supra; Star Expansion Industries Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 364 (1968); in fact, the company never complained to the agent about the union's activity during the election, when the agent might have been able to stop that activity. 25 Contrary to the suggestion made by the company, the Board's decision is not inconsistent with the precedent in this circuit or the prior decisions of the Board. See Hickory Springs Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.1981); NLRB v. Carroll Contracting and Ready-Mix, Inc., 636 F.2d 111 (5th Cir.1981). In Carroll Contracting, the electioneering was directed to the employees who were waiting in line to vote, the situation directly addressed in Milchem; here, there was no evidence of communication between the union representatives and the voters waiting in line. 26 In Hickory Springs, there had been pervasive threats of violence before the election and threats were made to the voters near the polls on election day. See also Eds-Idab, Inc. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.1982). Here, there was no evidence of threats of violence. In its attempt to demonstrate that the union representatives' presence outside the doors was coercive, the most that Boston Insulated could produce was an affidavit from Jane Lopresti, who stated: Through the windows [the men] were observing Company employees going into the assembly area to vote .... It is my personal feeling that with these Union men watching Company employees going to vote, this put a great deal of pressure on the voters. Record at 51. A man's glance through a glass-paneled door at a group of people waiting to vote is hardly the kind of threat or coercion normally considered sufficient to set aside an election. We cannot say that the Board's conclusion that Ms. Lopresti's statements did not indicate coercion sufficient to warrant an inference of interference with the exercise of the employees' free choice was unreasonable. 27 We note further that the union's distribution of the campaign leaflet was in response to the distribution of anti-union literature the day before. 7 The only way the union could have effectively responded to the earlier anti-union message was to do what it did, i.e., pass out an answer to the voting employees on their way to, but not at, the polling place. 28