Opinion ID: 423927
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vegetation Typically Adapted for Life in Saturated Soil Conditions.

Text: 49 In reviewing the federal defendants' interpretation, we must keep in mind that the interpretation given [a] statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566, 100 S.Ct. 790, 797, 63 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450, 98 S.Ct. 2441, 2445, 57 L.Ed.2d 337 (1978)); see also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Quarles v. St. Clair, 711 F.2d 691 at 706 (5th Cir.1983). An agency's construction of its own regulations is entitled to even greater deference. Ford Motor, supra, 444 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. at 797; Udall, supra, 380 U.S. at 16, 85 S.Ct. at 801. Regardless of whether the court would have arrived at the same interpretation, if the agency's interpretation is reasonable the court must respect it. Udall, supra; Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Farrow, 580 F.2d 1260, 1270 (5th Cir.1978). 50 A number of factors will influence the amount of deference due in a given case. These include: the degree of scientific or technical agency expertise necessarily drawn on in reaching the interpretation, Ford Motor, supra; Kinnett, supra; the consistency of the interpretation and the length of adherence to it, undisturbed by Congress; [and] the explicitness of the congressional grant of authority to the agency. Quarles, supra. Evaluation of these factors requires a high degree of deference in this case. 51 Congress has delegated substantial authority to the EPA administrator, and with respect to the dredge-and-fill permits, to the Corps, for the implementation of the CWA. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314, 1342, 1362 (EPA responsible for setting effluent limitations, and water quality standards, issuing National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permits, and prescribing necessary regulations); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 419 (Corps responsible for issuing dredge-and-fill permits and is authorized to prescribe regulations under Rivers and Harbors Act). See also E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 134, 97 S.Ct. 965, 978, 51 L.Ed.2d 204 (1977) (Supreme Court defers to EPA's interpretation of CWA because agency is charged with administering the Act, interpretation is reasonable and supported by scholarly opinion) (quoting Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87, 95 S.Ct. 1470, 1485-86, 43 L.Ed.2d 731 (1976) (deferring to EPA's interpretation of Clean Air Act)). While the methodology used in this case had been recently established, 26 the interpretation of the wetlands definition necessarily drew on the agencies' scientific expertise. The definition concerns the scope of the CWA, and with it the scope of the federal government's ability to control the discharge of pollutants into the waters of the United States. The EPA and the Corps were in the best position to determine precisely what property must come under federal control in order to protect the nation's waters. 27 52 The Corps' 1975 regulations defined fresh water wetlands as those areas that normally are characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction. 42 Fed.Reg. 37128 (July 19, 1977) (emphasis added). In 1977, the Corps revised its regulations to define wetlands as 53 The term wetlands means those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas. 54 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1982) (emphasis added). The Corps explained that this revision was intended to eliminate several problems and to achieve certain results: 55 The reference to periodic inundation has been eliminated. Many interpreted that term as requiring inundation over a record period of years. Our intent under Section 404 is to regulate discharges of dredged or fill material into the aquatic system as it exists, and not as it may have existed over a record period of time. The new definition is designed to achieve this intent. It pertains to an existing wetland and requires that the area be inundated or saturated by water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support aquatic vegetation. This inundation or saturation may be caused by either surface water, ground water, or a combination of both. 56 The use of the word normally in the old definition generated a great deal of confusion. The term was included in the definitions to respond to those situations in which an individual would attempt to eliminate the permit review requirements of Section 404 by destroying the aquatic vegetation, and to those areas that are not aquatic but experience an abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation. Several such instances of destruction of aquatic vegetation in order to eliminate Section 404 jurisdiction actually have occurred. However, even if this destruction occurs, the area still remains as part of the overall aquatic system intended to be protected by the Section 404 program. Conversely, the abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation in a non-aquatic area would not be sufficient to include that area within the Section 404 program. 57 We have responded to the concern for the vagueness of the term normally by replacing it with the phrase ... and that under normal circumstances to [sic] support.... We do not intend, by this clarification, to assert jurisdiction over those areas that once were wetlands and part of an aquatic system, but which, in the past, have been transformed into dry land for various purposes. 58 Concerns were also expressed over the types and amount of vegetation that would be required to establish a wetland under this definition. We have again used the term prevalence to distinguish from those areas that have only occasional aquatic vegetation interspersed with upland or dry land vegetation. 59 At the same time, we have changed our description of the vegetation involved by focusing on vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. The old definition of freshwater wetlands provided a technical loophole by describing the vegetation as that which requires saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction, thereby excluding many forms of truly aquatic vegetation that are prevalent in an inundated or saturated area, but that do not require saturated soil from a biological standpoint for their growth and reproduction. We intend to publish shortly vegetation guides to indicate the types of vegetation intended to be included in this definition, and to rely on the assistance of biologists, scientists and other technical experts from other Federal and State agencies to assist in delineating those wetland areas intended to be included in this definition. 60 42 Fed.Reg. 37128 (July 19, 1977). 61 Focusing on the Corps' statement in the preamble in the Federal Register to the effect that the section 404 program was being revised to clarify many terms, 42 Fed.Reg. 37122 (July 19, 1977) (emphasis added), the private defendants maintain that the definitional change was intended to be minor. They emphasize that the Corps expressed an intent to include only truly aquatic areas, listing swamps, bogs, and marshes at the end of [the] definition to further clarify [its] intent, 42 Fed.Reg. 37129. They maintain that the facultative hydrophytes were never meant to be considered as wetland indicators. 62 The private defendants' analysis merely begs the question of what is a truly aquatic area within the Corps' definition, since truly aquatic is not defined in the regulations. While the list of aquatic areas at the end of the definition may give us some idea of its scope, that list is inclusive, not exclusive, and the terms swamps, bogs and marshes are also undefined. The obligate hydrophytes might be the only species able to survive in a deep water swamp, but the definition clearly does not limit its scope to such permanently inundated areas. 63 The comments accompanying the promulgation of the 1977 regulations may be read to support the federal defendants' interpretation as easily as they may be read to support the landowners'. The comments explained that the Corps had changed [its] description of the vegetation involved by focusing on vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. 42 Fed.Reg. 37128 (emphasis added). This change was designed to close a technical loophole 28 that had excluded many forms of truly aquatic vegetation that are prevalent in an inundated or saturated area, but that do not require saturated soil from a biological standpoint for their growth and reproduction. Id. These statements suggest that the Corps fully intended to add certain previously excluded species to its list of wetland indicators. 64 We are equally unpersuaded that the federal defendants' position is in error by the landowners' parsing of the definition itself. The landowners would read the words vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions as limiting the wetlands indicators to species able to survive their entire life cycle in saturated soils. The federal defendants argue that typically adapted for life in  these soil conditions means the ability to live in such conditions, although some of the species may require relief at certain points in their life cycles. A reading of the entire definition indicates that the agencies' interpretation is the more reasonable, since wetlands are not limited to areas that are permanently inundated. 65 Finally, we agree with the federal defendants that the decision to analyze the soil and hydrology flows from the language of the definition. The definition speaks of areas that are inundated or saturated at a frequency and duration sufficient to support the wetland indicators. We fail to understand how the agency may determine whether a tract is such an area without examining its hydrology. Similarly, the definition provides that a wetland is an area that under normal circumstances [does] support vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. It would seem that the logical method for determining whether this requirement is met is to examine whether the soil is or is likely to be frequently saturated. Regardless of whether the agencies had engaged in an analysis of soil and hydrology in the past, no new burden not already contained in the definition was imposed on the landowners by this change in practice. See Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 595-96 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914, 94 S.Ct. 211, 38 L.Ed.2d 152 (1973). Since we conclude that the agencies' interpretation of the wetlands definition is reasonable, we are required to respect it. Udall, supra. 29 A fortiori, we agree with the federal defendants that the methodology was not a significant alteration of the 1977 regulations, and therefore notice-and-comment procedures were not required. 66