Opinion ID: 791158
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct during Closing Statement

Text: 22 Hargrove asserts the government committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument by likening the gun in his possession to the gun used to assassinate President Lincoln. He objected to the government's statements when they were made and later moved for a mistrial. We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion, United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 549 (6th Cir.2002), and find none here. 23 Hargrove admitted being a felon in possession. At trial, he defended against the felon-in-possession charge by asserting that he possessed the derringer pistol for self-defense. Accordingly, Hargrove characterized the gun as being designed principally for defensive use and testified that he declined to get a better gun such as the .45 caliber handgun offered by his nephew. According to Hargrove's testimony on cross examination, the derringer was small, easy to carry, and not unwieldy. Hargrove explained that these qualities made the derringer an ideal defensive weapon. Hargrove admitted it would be easy to quickly draw the weapon on another person. In its closing argument, the government sought to rebut Hargrove's representations that the derringer was only suitable for defensive use. The prosecutor argued: 24 [O]n February 14th of this year, when [Hargrove's] down there with his club . . . a faceless thug comes up who he didn't know. This man didn't know him. Comes up and says he's going to do a drive-by, even though we have no idea why that would happen. He obviously didn't know who Mr. Hargrove was or knew where he lived. 25 So Mr. Hargrove leaves, and instead of getting a .45 gun, which is a big scary gun, you can wave that bad boy around and people know you're packing and people leave you alone, he gets this one, which we've heard is a lousy defense gun, doesn't scare anybody, looks like a toy. It is, though, an excellent killing weapon. If you don't believe me, a derringer killed Abraham Lincoln. Walked up and put it in the back of the head and pulled the trigger. 26 J.A. 213-14. 27 Hargrove objected to the prosecutor's reference to the Lincoln assassination on the grounds that the gun used there was a larger caliber weapon than the .22 caliber in Hargrove's possession. The government argued that the point of the reference was to rebut the defense's suggestion that one would only use a derringer-brand gun in self-defense. The district judge overruled the objection. The government then concluded its argument as follows: 28 Now, he did turn down the .45, but he did tell us something that I found just as scary. That he wanted the derringer because it was small. You've seen the size of my hand, I don't have a big hand, it's small and easily concealable. But in his words, they're small, because he liked to get up close, before they know it's there. 29 That's not a defensive weapon, ladies and gentlemen. When you can sneak up on somebody with a gun in your hand and they don't know it, that serves no defensive purpose. That's an offensive weapon. Common sense, who was threatened on the 14th of February 2003, was it the police or was it him? Who's the real threat? The police, society, or Mr. Hargrove, a convicted felon with a gun? It's all about accountability, ladies and gentlemen, it's all about accountability. 30 J.A. 214-15. 31 After the judge instructed the jury, during which she admonished the jurors not to consider the parties' closing arguments as evidence in the case, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor's reference to the Lincoln assassination denied Hargrove a fair trial. Counsel argued that the prosecutor likened the derringer in Hargrove's possession to the one used to assassinate Lincoln even though he knew that the latter was a .41 or .44 caliber gun while the former was only a .22 caliber gun. Finding that the prosecutor had made the Lincoln assassination reference not for any improper purpose but rather to argue that a derringer could be an effective offensive weapon, the district judge denied the motion. 32 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Even assuming the prosecutor's statement was improper, the evidence that Hargrove violated § 922(g) was overwhelming. This Court's approach to claims of prosecutorial misconduct proceeds as follows. First, we determine whether a prosecutor's remarks were improper, and then we determine whether the impropriety amounts to reversible error. United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1385 (6th Cir.1994). There are two types of reversible error in this area: improper remarks that are flagrant amount to per se reversible error; improper remarks that are not flagrant may amount to reversible error in certain circumstances. This Court determines whether improper remarks were flagrant by considering four factors: (1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the accused. Id.; see also United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 613 (6th Cir.2004); United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir.2001). If a remark is held to be not flagrant, it may nevertheless warrant reversal in cases where (1) the proof against the defendant was not overwhelming, (2) opposing counsel objected to the conduct, and (3) the district court failed to give a curative instruction. Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1385; Trujillo, 376 F.3d at 613; see also United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 633 (6th Cir.2003). 33 In this case, the alleged misconduct consists of one statement made by the prosecutor in closing argument, namely, his reference to the assassination of President Lincoln, in which the prosecutor alleges that a derringer pistol was used. This was by definition an isolated remark. Even assuming the remark was deliberately calculated to mislead the jury, it did not prejudice Hargrove because the evidence against him was overwhelming. Consequently, the prosecutor's remark, assuming it was improper, does not amount to reversible error. 34 There is no dispute regarding the facts relevant to the elements of the felon-in-possession offense. Hargrove stipulated to being a convicted felon found in possession of a firearm that affected and traveled in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The only issue at trial was whether Hargrove's possession of the derringer was knowing in the sense meant by § 922(g), i.e., intentional and voluntary, not by mistake or accident. See United States v. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179, 187 n. 8 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Bennett, 975 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir.1992). As discussed, Hargrove portrayed his possession of the weapon as an innocent necessity. It is the defendant's burden to prove that his possession of a firearm was justified by necessity. United States v. Brown, 367 F.3d 549, 555-56 (6th Cir.2004); United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 472 (6th Cir.1990). This affirmative defense does not negate any element of the offense in question because a felon in possession charge only requires proof of general, rather than specific, intent. Brown, 367 F.3d at 556 (citing Bennett, 975 F.2d at 308). As this Court recently observed: Proving necessity does not necessarily undercut the element of `knowing possession;' one can knowingly possess a firearm but still do so under circumstances of necessity that justify an otherwise illegal act. Id. However, notwithstanding the availability of the necessity or justification defense in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the defense was not available in this case because, as we have just discussed, Hargrove failed to meet the threshold requirements for presenting such a defense. Thus, the only question properly before the jury was whether Hargrove had knowingly possessed the derringer. On this score, the government need not prove that Hargrove's possession of the derringer was for some nefarious purpose, nor disprove Hargrove's assertions that he carried the weapon for self-defense. The government's burden under § 922(g) is to prove only that the possession of a firearm by a felon was knowing and voluntary, not by mistake or accident. The record contains not even a scintilla of evidence suggesting that the derringer came into Hargrove's possession by accident or mistake. Instead, as has been repeatedly pointed out, Hargrove admitted he possessed the gun intentionally. In sum, there was overwhelming evidence that Hargrove violated § 922(g). Accordingly, whether flagrant or not, the prosecutor's remark does not amount to reversible error.