Opinion ID: 1324254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Definition of Substantial Burden

Text: Neither RFRA nor RLUIPA defines substantial burden. [1] RFRA states, The purposes of [RFRA] are (1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious freedom is substantially burdened by government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b). The majority uses this statutory text to conclude that the purpose of RFRA was to restore a de facto substantial burden test supposedly employed in Sherbert and Yoder. In the hands of the majority, that test is extremely restrictive, allowing a finding of substantial burden only in those cases where the burden is imposed by the same mechanisms as in those two cases. In the majority's words, Where ... there is no showing the government has coerced the Plaintiffs to act contrary to their religious beliefs under threat of sanctions, or conditioned a governmental benefit upon conduct that would violate the Plaintiffs' religious beliefs, there is no `substantial burden' on the exercise of their religion. Maj. op. at 1063. For six reasons, the majority is wrong in looking to Sherbert and Yoder for an exhaustive definition of what constitutes a substantial burden. First, the majority's approach is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the phrase substantial burden. Second, RFRA does not incorporate any pre-RFRA definition of substantial burden. Third, even if RFRA did incorporate a pre-RFRA definition of substantial burden, Sherbert, Yoder, and other pre-RFRA Supreme Court cases did not use the term in the restrictive manner employed by the majority. That is, the cases on which the majority relies did not state that interferences with the exercise of religion constituted a substantial burden only when imposed through the two mechanisms used in Sherbert and Yoder. Fourth, the purpose of RFRA was to expand rather than to contract protection for the exercise of religion. If a disruption of religious practices can qualify as a substantial burden under RFRA only when it is imposed by the same mechanisms as in Sherbert and Yoder, RFRA would permit interferences with religion that it was surely intended to prevent. Fifth, the majority's approach overrules fourteen years of contrary circuit precedent. Sixth, the majority's approach is inconsistent with our cases applying RLUIPA. The Supreme Court has instructed us that RLUIPA employs the same analytic frame-work and standard as RFRA. I consider these reasons in turn.