Opinion ID: 2622559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The meaning of discovery as used in NRS 171.095(1)

Text: Although the precise issue we are considering here is one of first impression, our prior case law interpreting other aspects of NRS 171.095 is highly instructive. [13] Beginning in 1988 with Walstrom v. State , [14] this court addressed the secret manner tolling provision of NRS 171.095 for crimes involving the sexual abuse or assault of children. In Walstrom, the defendant had committed child sexual abuse crimes that went undiscovered for eight years. Walstrom argued that prosecution for the crimes was barred by the limitation period because the crimes were not committed in a secret manner. Specifically, Walstrom contended that a crime against a person could not be secret because the crime, by its very nature, involved a victim who remained alive and had knowledge of the criminal act. [15] This court, however, rejected Walstrom's argument and instead focused on the vulnerability of the child-victim and the child's likely reluctance to report the abuse. This reluctance, we noted, often resulted from either the threats or coercive tactics of the perpetrator or from the child's personal fear of not being believed. [16] This court noted that because sexual abuse crimes are inherently repugnant in nature, they are almost always intended to be kept secret. [17] Accordingly, the court concluded that crimes against children, such as lewdness, could be committed in a secret manner for purposes of NRS 171.095(1): [A] crime is done in a secret manner, under NRS 171.095, when it is committed in a deliberately surreptitious manner that is intended to and does keep all but those committing the crime unaware that an offense has been committed. Therefore normally, if a crime of physical abuse, or a related crime, is committed against a victim who remains alive, it would not be committed in a secret manner under the statute. The victim is aware of the crime and has a responsibility to report it. However, given the inherently vulnerable nature of a child, we conclude that the crime of lewdness with a minor can be committed in a secret manner, even though a victim is involved. [18] In reaching this conclusion, however, the court recognized that exceptions to criminal statutes of limitations are to be narrowly construed and read in a light most favorable to the accused. [19] Accordingly, it placed the burden of proving that a crime was committed in a secret manner upon the State. [20] In 1995, the theoretical limitations of the Walstrom decision were tested in Houtz v. State . [21] The victim in Houtz was molested as a teenager by his band teacher, but repressed his memories of the events for years. At age twenty-five, a broken relationship triggered recollections of the molestations and the State filed charges against the teacher ten years after the events occurred. [22] The State argued that because the crime was committed in a secret manner as in Walstrom, the limitation period was tolled until the victim revealed the crimes over a decade later. This court, however, rejected this limitless interpretation of Walstrom and held that the secret manner provisions of NRS 171.095(1) did not toll the limitation period for crimes involving children beyond the victim's eighteenth birthday, the age of majority. [23] In reaching this decision, the court relied on two principal arguments. First, the court noted that the legislative intent in enacting a statute of limitations is to protect defendants from the unfairness of prosecution when evidence is stale and witnesses are unavailable. [24] Second, the court noted that the legislature had never included child sexual abuse among those offenses that are not subject to a statute of limitations. [25] Thus, an interpretation that would nullify the statute and theoretically allow for limitless prosecutions would be unreasonable and absurd. [26] As in Walstrom and Houtz, our interpretation of the term discovery in NRS 171.095 must balance the realities of child sexual abuse crimes against the important fairness interests which underlie criminal statutes of limitation. Accordingly, for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations under the secret manner provision of NRS 171.095, discovery occurs when any person including the victim other than the wrongdoer (or someone acting in pari delicto with the wrongdoer) has knowledge of the act and its criminal nature, unless the person with knowledge: (1) fails to report out of fear induced by threats made by the wrongdoer or by anyone acting in pari delicto with the wrongdoer; or (2) is a child-victim under eighteen years of age and fails to report for the reasons discussed in Walstrom. [27] Under this rule, then, a crime can remain undiscovered even if multiple persons know about it so long as the silence is induced by the wrongdoer's threats. This approach is highly consistent with our decisions in Walstrom and Houtz. By applying the secret manner exception to crimes involving children, Walstrom recognized the realities of child abuse crimes and the silence that may be induced. Similarly, our approach here realistically recognizes that a wrongdoer can perpetrate a secret crime by threatening anyone with knowledge to remain silent about a crime and prevents the wrongdoer from unfairly manipulating the statute of limitations to his advantage. Further, by broadly defining discovery to include all those with knowledge of the act and its criminal nature, our approach is consistent with the fairness principles advanced in Houtz, which recognizes the legislature's intent in enacting criminal statutes of limitations, and our interpretative canon requiring criminal statutes of limitation to be construed narrowly.