Opinion ID: 2116910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion to vacate the december 15, 1986, order

Text: In case No. S-89-1180, Ackerman filed a motion in the county court on March 27, 1989, to vacate its order of December 15, 1986, admitting Seidler's 1985 codicil to probate. The motion was timely, since the order admitting the codicil to probate was not final until it was journalized pursuant to the nunc pro tunc order on February 17, 1989. A valid petition to vacate an order admitting a codicil to probate must be filed within 12 months after the entry of the order sought to be vacated. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2436(3)(iii) (Reissue 1989). Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2209(53) (Reissue 1989) defines a will to include a codicil. Entry of a judgment is the court clerk's act of spreading the proceedings had and the relief granted or denied on the journal of the court. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1301(3) (Reissue 1989). However, the motion to vacate was not valid. A formal testacy order is final as to all persons with respect to all issues concerning the decedent's estate that the court considered or might have considered incident to its rendition relevant to the question of whether the decedent left a valid will, and as to the determination of heirs. § 30-2436. The court shall entertain a petition for vacation of its order and probate of another will of the decedent if it is shown that the proponents of the later-offered will were unaware of the earlier proceeding and were given no notice thereof except by publication. § 30-2436(1). The same rule applies when the same will is offered for probate by a second proponent. The record reflects that Ackerman not only received notice by publication, but that he received notice of the December 15, 1986, hearing by U.S. mail. Ackerman admitted that he was aware of the December 15, 1986, hearing. He argued in various motions and pleadings that he was not aware that the codicil was being offered for probate because the notice of the hearing revealed only that the will was being offered. This argument fails under scrutiny of statutory and constitutional requirements regarding notice and in light of the notices the appellant received. By statutory definition, a [w]ill means any instrument, including any codicil or other testamentary instrument complying with sections 30-2326 to 30-2338, which disposes of personal or real property, appoints a personal representative, conservator, guardian, or trustee, revokes or revises an earlier executed testamentary instrument, or encompasses any one or more of such objects or purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) § 30-2209(53). Clearly, a codicil is included in the definition of a will. The statutory requirements for notice of a formal testacy proceeding are that notice of the time and place of hearing of any petition is to be given to any interested person. Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 30-2427 (Reissue 1985) and 30-2220 (Reissue 1989). Notice shall be given to... heirs of the decedent, the devisees and executors named in any will that is being, or has been, probated, or offered for informal or formal probate in the county.... (Emphasis supplied.) § 30-2427(a). There is no statutory requirement that the interested parties be notified as to the content or date of execution of the document or documents offered for probate. The statutory requirement is for notice that there is a petition to probate the estate. The notice herein was not statutorily insufficient. Nor did the notice given fall short of constitutional due process requirements. The criterion for a constitutionally sufficient notice is found in Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950): An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections .... The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information ... and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.... But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied. (Emphasis supplied.) In re Appeal of Levos, 214 Neb. 507, 511-12, 335 N.W.2d 262, 266 (1983). Had the appellant exercised due diligence when he received notice of the hearing in regard to the probate of Seidler's will, at the very least he should have inquired as to his status as a beneficiary of the will for which he did receive notice. Upon inquiry, he would have learned of the existence of the codicil. The appellant was given notice of the pendency of the action, and he was given the opportunity to present his objection at the December 15, 1986, court hearing. Whatever fairly puts a person on inquiry is sufficient notice, where the means of knowledge are at hand; and if he omits to inquire, he is then chargeable with all the facts which, by a proper inquiry, he might have ascertained. League v. Vanice, 221 Neb. 34, 374 N.W.2d 849 (1985). As the district court said in its decision on appeal, The notice was sufficient for an interested person to go to the county court to see what was proposed as the decedent's last will. The appellant apparently chose not to inquire as to the specific subject matter of the hearing for which he received adequate notice. However, he is charged with knowledge of all of the facts he might have obtained had he only asked. Because the appellant is charged with being fully aware of the scheduled December 15, 1986, hearing, and even though he failed to attend it, he is not statutorily entitled to have the county court vacate its order of December 15, admitting the decedent's will and codicil to probate. Toedtli filed a plea in abatement in response to the appellant's motion to vacate. A plea in abatement may be filed when there is another action pending between the same parties, involving the same or substantially the same subject matter, cause of action, and relief. Kash v. McDermott & Miller, 221 Neb. 297, 376 N.W.2d 558 (1985). As there was no other action pending regarding the issues raised in the motion to vacate, a plea in abatement was not a proper response. However, in light of our ruling that the appellant's motion to vacate had no merit, this issue is moot, as is the appellant's first assignment of error in case No. S-89-1180.