Opinion ID: 175947
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statute of limitations for Plaintiff Lindhuber

Text: We turn now to Lindhuber, one of the named plaintiffs in the instant action. Lindhuber filed a proof of claim against OC during its bankruptcy proceedings in April 2002 because she believed that OC was responsible for the losses in the OC Stock Fund. In June 2006, OC moved to disallow and expunge her claim. The Plaintiffs now argue that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled for Lindhuber for the time that her proof of claim was pending against OC. Strictly defined, equitable tolling is [t]he doctrine that if a plaintiff files a suit first in one court and then refiles in another, the statute of limitations does not run while the litigation is pending in the first court if various requirements are met. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). We have found only one case where this court has equitably tolled ERISA's statute of limitations. The court did so in Farrell v. Automobile Club of Michigan, 870 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir.1989), because the plaintiffs there had timely filed suit in state court and the state court arguably had jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiffs' lawsuit could have been interpreted as seeking to recover accrued benefits under ERISA, a claim for which federal jurisdiction is concurrent with state court jurisdiction. Id. at 1134. Other courts have interpreted Farrell narrowly in declining to apply equitable tolling. See Shofer v. Hack Co., 970 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Farrell to hold that equitable tolling of ERISA claims applies only where the state court's lack of jurisdiction was not clear); Smith v. Eaton Corp., 102 F.Supp.2d 439, 442 (W.D.Mich. 2000) (This Court reads Farrell to apply equitable tolling only to claims over which state courts have concurrent jurisdiction.). We analyze five factors in determining whether equitable tolling is justified: 1) lack of notice of the filing requirement; 2) lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; 3) diligence in pursuing one's rights; 4) absence of prejudice to the defendant; and 5) the plaintiff's reasonableness [in] remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement. Truitt v. County of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir.1998). Equitable tolling is thus narrowly applied. Egerer v. Woodland Realty, Inc., 556 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir.2009) (declining to apply equitable tolling where the plaintiffs did not exercise due diligence to discover their cause of action under the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act). Applying the above factors to Lindhuber leads us to the conclusion that she did not lack notice of her rights under ERISA. Lindhuber acknowledged that she was told how to access Plan documents prior to 2003. She also said that she had seen the SPDs, but the record is unclear as to whether she had read them. The SPDs had two pages of information on participants' rights under ERISA, and they specifically stated that [u]nder ERISA, the people responsible for operating the Plan are called `fiduciaries.' These individuals have an obligation to administer the Plan prudently and to act in the interest of Plan participants and beneficiaries. The SPDs also had a chart listing the Plan Administrator and the Plan Fiduciary, as well as addresses and telephone numbers so that participants could contact these entities. Moreover, the October 5, 2000 letter from CEO Hiner, which was sent to all employees, notified them that their 401(k) savings plans were protected by federal regulations. Given these facts, Lindhuber did not lack notice of her right to file suit under ERISA. She thus had no basis to claim ignorance of ERISA as the proper avenue through which to pursue her claims. Equitable tolling is therefore not appropriate in the instant case.