Opinion ID: 781207
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The union's efforts to secure dismissal of the instant action

Text: 55 The workers have put forth evidence to show that, in its negotiations with Sorrento on a new collective bargaining agreement, the union demanded that the instant case be dismissed before it would allow the resumption of Shapiro work. They argue that this constitutes a breach of the duty of fair representation, effectively denying the workers of the right to sue their own union. The union argues, and the district court found, that there is no evidence of the union's bad faith in advancing this position, and that the union was simply attempting to secure dismissal of a lawsuit it believed to be employer-sponsored. We agree with the district court and find no breach of the DFR. 56 The duty of fair representation unquestionably attaches to contract negotiations by a union. In O'Neill, the Supreme Court held that a union violates the DFR if it acts arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith, in the bargaining process. 499 U.S. at 67, 111 S.Ct. 1127. Unlike the decision to pull the Shapiro work, there is no question that, in its negotiations with Sorrento, the union was acting in its capacity as sole representative of the workers, and so the duty of fair representation is implicated. 57 In asserting that the union's conduct violated its duty, the workers do not indicate whether the union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith; instead, their argument relies on National Labor Relations Board decisions protecting union members' right of access to the Board. See Local 45, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 320 N.L.R.B. 1079 (1996); Constr. & Gen. Laborers, Local No. 304, Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 265 N.L.R.B. 602 (1982). In each of these cases, the Board determined that the actions of the union violated NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), which provides that a union may not restrain or coerce ... employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in [NLRA § 7]. See Local 45, 320 N.L.R.B. at 1081; Constr. & Gen. Laborers, 265 N.L.R.B. at 602. The rights guaranteed by § 7 include the right to engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid or protection, 29 U.S.C. § 157, and these decisions hold that this language protects the employees' right to bring complaints before the Board. See Local 45, 320 N.L.R.B. at 1081; Constr. & Gen. Laborers, 265 N.L.R.B. at 602, 606-08. 58 Contrary to the workers' assertions, however, neither of these cases is a DFR case. 5 Even if we were to conclude that the union's attempts to dismiss this suit violated § 8(b)(1)(A), such conclusion would not compel a finding of a breach of the DFR. The duty of fair representation is not intended to mirror the contours of § 8(b), Breininger, 493 U.S. at 86, 110 S.Ct. 424; our analysis must be governed by the scope of the DFR. Limiting our inquiry to whether the union violated § 8(b)(1)(A) would undermine the Supreme Court's emphasis on the jurisdictional differences between duty of fair representation claims, which are cognizable in the first instance in federal court, and other unfair labor practice claims, which must first be brought to the Board: 59 As we noted in Beck, employees ... may not circumvent the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB simply by casting statutory claims as violations of the union's duty of fair representation. 487 U.S., at 743, 108 S.Ct. 2641. When a plaintiff's only claim is that the union violated the NLRA, the plaintiff cannot avoid the jurisdiction of the NLRB by characterizing this alleged statutory violation as a breach of the duty of fair representation. To invoke federal jurisdiction when the claim is based in part on a violation of the NLRA, there must be something more than just a claim that the union violated the statute. The plaintiff must adduce facts suggesting that the union's violation of the statute was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. 60 Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33, 49-50, 119 S.Ct. 292, 142 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998) (quoting Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 743, 108 S.Ct. 2641, 101 L.Ed.2d 634 (1988)). We therefore turn to whether the union's actions here were in fact arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. 61 Whether a union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily or in bad faith requires a separate analysis, because each of these requirements represents a distinct and separate obligation. Thompson v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 276 F.3d 651, 657(4th Cir.2002). Arbitrariness in the context of contract negotiations is governed by the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in O'Neill: a union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a `wide range of reasonableness,' Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953), as to be irrational. 499 U.S. at 67, 111 S.Ct. 1127. Under this standard, the fact that the union attempted to secure a dismissal of this lawsuit in the bargaining process is not per se unreasonable. The lawsuit was potentially very costly to the union, and it was not irrational for the union to attempt to limit these costs. Furthermore, the union has presented evidence that at least some of the workers were encouraged or recruited to join the lawsuit by Sorrento, potentially in violation of LMRDA § 101(a)(4). The union could have reasonably believed that it was in the best interests of the bargaining unit to seek dismissal of a lawsuit that was supported by the employer and that could be financially damaging. 62 It is true that, by seeking to dismiss the workers' lawsuit, the union was potentially favoring those members of the bargaining unit that had chosen not to sue the union. Nonetheless, [a] union's reasoned decision to support the interests of one group of employees over the competing interests of another group does not constitute arbitrary conduct. Spellacy v. Airline Pilots Ass'n-Int'l, 156 F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir.1998). 63 Whereas the arbitrariness analysis looks to the objective adequacy of the Union's conduct, the discrimination and bad faith analyses look to the subjective motivation of the Union officials. Crider v. Spectrulite Consortium, Inc., 130 F.3d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). With respect to bad faith, we agree with the district court that the workers have failed to present any evidence that shows the union acted in bad faith. Although the workers strenuously argue that the union's unproven assertions of good faith should not be given credit, the structure of the duty of fair representation is that bad faith is required to show a breach; it is not simply that good faith is a defense to liability. The burden is on the workers to produce evidence of bad faith. See Stevens v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 18 F.3d 1443, 1447(9th Cir.1994); see also Vaca, 386 U.S. at 210, 87 S.Ct. 903 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that in a DFR claim, the employee will have the additional burden of proving that the union acted arbitrarily or in bad faith). The workers cite no evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the union acted in bad faith when, during negotiations with Sorrento, it attempted to secure dismissal of this lawsuit. Indeed, the workers cite no evidence at all, arguing only that their own good-faith efforts to pursue intra-union remedies are inconsistent with the union's position that it believed the lawsuit to be employer-sponsored. This evidence is not sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether the union acted in bad faith. 64 Whether the union's actions were discriminatory is a more difficult question. Quite obviously, the efforts to dismiss the lawsuit only affected those workers who had filed the lawsuit against the union, and thus the union could be said to be discriminating against those workers. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the union was motivated by any discriminatory intent based on any other characteristics of the workers who had brought the lawsuit. 65 The Supreme Court and our own published opinions give little guidance as to what constitutes discrimination in the duty of fair representation context. In O'Neill, the Court suggested that only invidious discrimination is prohibited by the DFR. 499 U.S. at 81, 111 S.Ct. 1127. The Tenth Circuit has explained that discrimination is invidious if based upon impermissible or immutable classifications such as race or other constitutionally protected categories, or arises from prejudice or animus. Considine v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 43 F.3d 1349, 1359-60 (10th Cir.1994). We think that these grounds are too restrictive; we have held, for example, that a union may not discriminate on the basis of union membership. Bernard v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 873 F.2d 213, 216 (9th Cir.1989). Nonetheless, we find no evidence of discriminatory intent here. In its contract negotiations, the union did not seek to grant benefits to some members of the bargaining unit that it denied to others, nor did it treat similarly situated individuals differently. It did not seek to punish the workers who brought the lawsuit. Instead, the union's efforts to resolve the lawsuit necessarily only affected those workers who had brought the lawsuit, in the same way that a disciplinary policy necessarily affects only those workers with disciplinary violations. 66 We conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing the workers' claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation when, in the course of contract negotiations, it sought the dismissal of the instant action. The union's actions were not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. 6 67