Opinion ID: 884016
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Heading: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in admitting David Ferree's testimony regarding his discussions with Smith?

Text: In addition to charging Smith, the State also charged Ferree with felony theft of the bikes. Ferree agreed to testify against Smith and to plead guilty to any offense of which Smith ultimately was convicted. In anticipation of Ferree's testimony on the State's behalf, Smith filed a pretrial memorandum addressing coconspirator testimony. During the State's direct examination of Ferree, the State questioned him regarding his statements to Smith and their discussions about the bikes. Based on the arguments in his pretrial memorandum, Smith objected to Ferree's testimony concerning both his statements to Smith and the discussions between himself and Smith. The District Court overruled the objection and Ferree testified that he and Smith discussed the ownership of the bikes and suspected the bikes were stolen; at one point, Ferree affirmatively stated that he and Smith were sure the bikes did not belong to the juveniles Ferree observed riding them. Ferree also testified that he and Smith discussed attempting to either collect a reward for the bikes or sell them and send them out of state. Smith argues generally that Ferree's testimony was inadmissible. More specifically, he argues that Ferree testified as a coconspirator and that, because the State did not first establish the existence of a conspiracy between Smith and Ferree by independent evidence, Ferree's testimony regarding his discussions with Smith and anything Smith said to him was not admissible pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E), M.R.Evid. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings to determine whether the court abused its discretion. State v. Stringer (1995), 271 Mont. 367, 374, 897 P.2d 1063, 1067 (citation omitted). A statement is not hearsay if: ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Rule 801(d)(2)(E), M.R.Evid. Before a coconspirator's statement may be admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), M.R.Evid., the State must establish a proper foundation, by a preponderance of the independent evidence, that a conspiracy exists. State v. Stever (1987), 225 Mont. 336, 342, 732 P.2d 853, 857. The State must show that a conspiracy exists, that the declarant coconspirator and the defendant were members of the conspiracy and that the declaration was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Stever, 732 P.2d at 857 (citations omitted). Smith contends that the State failed to meet the foundational requirements of Stever and, therefore, that the District Court abused its discretion in admitting Ferree's testimony. The State does not assert that it established the requisite foundation for admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), M.R.Evid. It argues that Ferree's testimony was admissible under other provisions of the Montana Rules of Evidence and, therefore, that whether it met the foundational requirements for admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is not relevant. We observe, at the outset, that if evidence is admissible under one provision of the rules of evidence, it is admissible regardless of inadmissibility under another rule. See, e.g., Smith v. Updegraff (8th Cir.1984), 744 F.2d 1354, 1364-65 n. 5 (citing United States v. Hewitt (11th Cir.1981), 663 F.2d 1381). Thus, if Ferree's testimony regarding his own statements to Smith and the discussions between the two is otherwise admissible, we need not address Smith's contention that it was inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), M.R.Evid., because the Stever requirements were not met. We first address Smith's objection to the State's question to Ferree regarding what Ferree told Smith. The record reflects that, subsequent to the posing of the question and the District Court's indication  in response to Smith's objection  that the question did not appear to solicit hearsay, Ferree responded that he told Smith about the bikes and his feelings about the ownership of the bikes. A witness may testify to facts within that witness' personal knowledge. Rule 602, M.R.Evid. Here, Ferree testified to facts that were within his own personal knowledge, namely his own statements. Moreover, Ferree himself was the declarant under Rule 801(b), M.R.Evid., with regard to his own statements and he was testifying at trial as to those statements. For these reasons, Ferree's testimony about his own statements did not come within the definition of hearsay contained in Rule 801(c), M.R.Evid. We next address Smith's objection to Ferree's alleged coconspirator testimony concerning his discussions with Smith and Smith's statements during those conversations. The State argues that Smith's statements in these conversations were admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), M.R.Evid., and, therefore, not hearsay pursuant to the express language of Rule 801(d). We agree. An admission by party-opponent under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), M.R.Evid., is a statement which is the party's own statement offered against the party. Here, Smith is the party defendant. Smith's statements during discussions with Ferree obviously were Smith's own statements. Moreover, those statements of Smith's were offered against Smith, via Ferree's testimony, by the State. As was the case in State v. Ottwell (1989), 239 Mont. 150, 158, 779 P.2d 500, 505, Smith's statements were made by the party defendant in a criminal case and offered against the party, by the prosecution, through the testimony of the person to whom they were made. We conclude that Smith's statements to Ferree were not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), M.R.Evid. Finally, it is clear that Ferree's testimony about his statements to Smith and Smith's statements during their discussions was relevant under Rule 401, M.R.Evid., in that it related to Smith's knowledge and mental state both at the time he and Ferree obtained control over the bikes and at later times. The mental state element of the alternative offenses with which Smith was charged is purposely or knowingly. See §§ 45-6-301(1) and (3), MCA. Generally, [a]ll relevant evidence is admissible. Rule 402, M.R.Evid. We conclude that Ferree's testimony about his own statements and Smith's statements to him was not hearsay and was relevant. Therefore, we further conclude that it was admissible under Rule 402, M.R.Evid., without regard to the foundational requirements for admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), M.R.Evid. See Smith, 744 F.2d at 1364-65. We hold, therefore, that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ferree's testimony concerning his discussions with Smith or Smith's statements to him.