Opinion ID: 215752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kimbrough Sentencing Discretion

Text: In Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), the Supreme Court considered whether district courts have authority to consider the disparity between the Sentencing Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses when deciding on a sentence. Id. at 91, 128 S.Ct. 558. In its analysis, the Court emphasized that while the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, the Sentencing Commission continues to hold a key role in the criminal system. Id. at 108, 128 S.Ct. 558. Sentencing courts must treat the Guidelines as the `starting point and the initial benchmark.' Id. at 108, 128 S.Ct. 558 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 49, 128 S.Ct. 586). Congress established the Commission to formulate and constantly refine national sentencing standards. Id. Carrying out its charge, the Commission fills an important institutional role: It has the capacity courts lack to base its determinations on empirical data and national experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate expertise. Id. at 108-09, 128 S.Ct. 558(internal quotations omitted). Therefore, in the ordinary case, the Commission's recommendation of a sentencing range will `reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)'s objectives.' Id. at 109, 128 S.Ct. 558 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)). The Court nonetheless recognized that sentencing judges have greater familiarity with ... the individual case and the individual defendant before him than the Commission or the appeals court. Id. (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-58, 127 S.Ct. 2456). In light of these discrete institutional strengths, the Court held that different levels of deference are due a sentencing court's decision to vary from the Guidelines based on its reason for doing so: [A] district court's decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines may attract greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a particular case outside the `heartland' to which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply. Rita, 551 U.S., at 351, 127 S.Ct., at 2465. On the other hand, while the Guidelines are no longer binding, closer review may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidelines based solely on the judge's view that the Guidelines range fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations even in a mine-run case. Ibid. ... Id. at 109, 128 S.Ct. 558. The Court held, however, that the crack-cocaine Guidelines present no occasion for elaborative discussion of this matter because those Guidelines do not exemplify the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role. Id. In formulating the Guideline ranges for crack cocaine offenses, the Commission looked to the mandatory minimum sentences for cocaine offenses, which adopted a ratio that treated every gram of crack cocaine as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine, and did not take account of empirical data and national experience. Id. Yet the Commission itself has reported that the crack/powder disparity produces disproportionately harsh sanctions, i.e., sentences for crack cocaine offenses greater than necessary in light of the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a). Id. at 110, 128 S.Ct. 558. The Court therefore held that it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence `greater than necessary' to achieve § 3553(a)'s purposes, even in a minerun case. Id. In Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 129 S.Ct. 840, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009), the Court clarified that  Kimbrough ... holds that with respect to the crack cocaine Guidelines, a categorical disagreement with and variance from the Guidelines is not suspect. Id. at 843. The Court emphatically stated: That was indeed the point of Kimbrough: a recognition of district courts' authority to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreement with them, and not simply based on an individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a particular case. Id. at 842-43. Kimbrough 's rationale is not limited to the crack-cocaine Guidelines. See United States v. Mitchell, 624 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir.2010) (As the Supreme Court through Booker, Kimbrough, and Spears has instructed, and as other circuits that have confronted the crack/powder variance in the sentence of a career offender have accepted and clarified in their circuit law, sentencing judges can reject any Sentencing Guideline, provided that the sentence imposed is reasonable.) (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir.2010) (We understand Kimbrough and Spears to mean that district judges are at liberty to reject any Guideline on policy groundsthough they must act reasonably when using that power.) (emphasis in original). Moreover, as we will now explain, the history of the child pornography Guidelines reveals that, like the crack-cocaine Guidelines at issue in Kimbrough, the child pornography Guidelines were not developed in a manner exemplify[ing] the [Sentencing] Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109, 128 S.Ct. 558, so district judges must enjoy the same liberty to depart from them based on reasonable policy disagreement as they do from the crack-cocaine Guidelines discussed in Kimbrough.