Opinion ID: 204120
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Administrative Correctional Defendants

Text: We read plaintiff's complaint to assert a claim of supervisory liability under Section 1983 against the administrative correctional defendants, namely Pereira, Fontanez, Díaz, Negrón, and Soto, premised on the theory that those defendants failed adequately to train the correctional defendants who were implicated in the surgery itself. Although Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior,  Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948, supervisory officials may be liable on the basis of their own acts or omissions. Aponte Matos v. Toledo Dávila, 135 F.3d 182, 192 (1st Cir. 1998). In the context of Section 1983 actions, supervisory liability typically arises in one of two ways: either the supervisor may be a primary violator or direct participant in the rights-violating incident, or liability may attach if a responsible official supervises, trains, or hires a subordinate with deliberate indifference toward the possibility that deficient performance of the task eventually may contribute to a civil rights deprivation. Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1999). In the latter scenario, relevant here, the analysis focuses on whether the supervisor's actions displayed deliberate indifference toward the rights of third parties and had some causal connection to the subsequent tort. Id. In either case, the plaintiff in a Section 1983 action must show an affirmative link, whether through direct participation or through conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit authorization, id., between the actor and the underlying violation. In determining whether allegations state a plausible claim for relief, the Supreme Court has suggested that we begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Turning to plaintiff's complaint, we find that it does little more than assert a legal conclusion about the involvement of the administrative correctional defendants in the underlying constitutional violation. Parroting our standard for supervisory liability in the context of Section 1983, the complaint alleges that the administrative defendants were responsible for ensuring that the correctional officers under their command followed practices and procedures [that] would respect the rights and ensure the bodily integrity of Plaintiff and that they failed to do [so] with deliberate indifference and/or reckless disregard of Plaintiff's federally protected rights. This is precisely the type of the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me allegation that the Supreme Court has determined should not be given credence when standing alone. Id. at 1949. The sole additional reference to the administrative correctional defendants' role in the surgery is the complaint's statement that [t]he pushiness exerted by John Doe [upon the doctors] followed ... the regulations and directives designed by Pereira and construed and implemented by all of the other Supervisory Defendants. [9] However, the only regulations described in the complaint are the strip search and x-ray regulations promulgated by Pereira. The deliberate indifference required to establish a supervisory liability/failure to train claim cannot plausibly be inferred from the mere existence of a poorly-implemented strip search or x-ray policy and a bald assertion that the surgery somehow resulted from those policies. We conclude, therefore, that the complaint has allegedbut it has not `show[n]''that the pleader is entitled to relief from the administrative correctional defendants. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (quoting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)). Although it did so on different grounds, the district court was correct to dismiss the claims against those defendants.