Opinion ID: 186577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Videotape Evidence

Text: 21 Orenuga argues that the District Court's admission of a portion of the June 27, 2002 videotape of his meeting with Mobaidin was improper, because it was unfairly prejudicial. Reprinted below is the transcript of the disputed segment, which picks up as Orenuga assesses the types of people that he and Mobaidin should focus on in any future illicit transactions: 22 Orenuga: [T]his one was too shrewd, I don't like it. It's like, eh, . . . 23 Mobaidin: Well, I never met you before, so it's the first time, you know. But, uh, I wish I met you before. I would be settled [as an] accountant instead of going [in]to car deal[ing] and real estate and all of that junk, you know, but. 24 Orenuga: You have to be able to tell the guy this is it, if you go [to] this guy. . . . If you don't know them, don't do any of this. 25 Mobaidin: No, no. I know them for ten years, I've been working with the guy. 26 Orenuga: If it's a Jew, I don't want to deal with him. If it's a black American, I don't want to do that. 27 Mobaidin: OK. So what do you want to deal with? Foreigners. 28 Orenuga: Yeah. 29 Mobaidin: Yeah, he's a foreigner. 30 Orenuga: It's, eh, it's too dangerous. Like I said. White man, I can't deal with. I just want you to know that. 31 Mobaidin: White man, you don't want? 32 Orenuga: White man, he will need to agree with you. All of, most of them will agree and come back and . . . . 33 June 27 Transcript at 6-7, supra, reprinted in R.M. tab 5. 34 Our analysis of whether the trial court should have excluded this evidence is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which states: 35 Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of . . . needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 36 As applied to this case, the Rule consists of two major components. First, the relevant evidence must be excluded if the prejudice is unfair. The Supreme Court has described unfair prejudice as speak[ing] to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). Second, any danger of unfair prejudice must substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. Since Orenuga properly preserved his objection at trial, we review the District Court's admission of the videotape evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 983 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1999). 37 The Government contends that the contested evidence has significant probative value, because Orenuga's volition is a crucial element in both proving the bribery charges and rebutting his entrapment defense. To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A), the Government must show that Orenuga acted corruptly, which the District Court defined as performed voluntarily and deliberately and performed with a purpose of either accomplishing an unlawful end or unlawful result. Tr. at 15 (4/8/04). A successful entrapment defense requires evidence that (1) the crime was induced by the Government, and (2) appellant lacked a predisposition. . . to engage in the criminal conduct. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988). The latter inquiry focuses upon whether the defendant was an `unwary innocent' or, instead, an `unwary criminal' who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime. Id. (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958)). The Government asserts that the contested comments are integral to its case, because Orenuga's statements about future deals, and the types of people with whom he preferred to deal, help establish that he was a willful participant in the charged criminal activity. 38 Orenuga does not meaningfully rebut the Government's claims. Orenuga's videotaped statements obviously are prejudicial, but this alone does not make the evidence unfairly prejudicial. The gravamen of unfair prejudice is `an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.' Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180, 117 S.Ct. 644 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's notes). Given the relevance of Orenuga's comments to his participation in the crime — he was discussing the people who would make the best targets for his bribery scheme — any prejudice to which he was subjected was related in no small measure to his culpability. 39 Orenuga's videotaped statements were also germane to his entrapment defense. It is reasonable to believe that a jury would find Orenuga's comments on the types of people with whom he preferred to deal in illicit arrangements highly probative in assessing whether he acted voluntarily and deliberately and whether he was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents, Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992). The District Court thus did not abuse its discretion by permitting the entire videotape to be played at trial.