Opinion ID: 1616730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Due Process Claim: Existence of Prejudice.

Text: To show a denial of due process, the defendant must establish the prosecutor's misconduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial. There are many components of a fair trial. See generally 21A Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 998, at 259-60 (1998). The aspect of a fair trial implicated in the present case is the accused's right to have his or her guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial. Id. at 260. This right is threatened by any incident likely to prejudice the jury. 21A Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 1004, at 265; accord 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 192, at 418 (stating the very heart of a fair trial embodies a disciplined courtroom where an accused's fate is determined solely through the exercise of calm and informed judgment). As applied to the present case, we must determine whether there is a reasonable probability the prosecutor's misconduct prejudiced, inflamed or misled the jurors so as to prompt them to convict the defendant for reasons other than the evidence introduced at trial and the law as contained in the court's instructions. In making this determination we consider the factors noted previously: (1) the severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct; (2) the significance of the misconduct to the central issues in the case; (3) the strength of the State's evidence; (4) the use of cautionary instructions or other curative measures; and (5) the extent to which the defense invited the misconduct. A. Significance of the misconduct to central issues. The misconduct at issue here centered on the credibility of the defendant and of Officer Steil. Their credibility was a significant issue in this case because the statements purportedly made by the defendant to the police officer were the strongest evidence that tied Graves to the contraband serving as the basis for the State's charges. Because the defendant was not in exclusive possession of the premises where the marijuana was found nor in exclusive and immediate possession of the place where the contraband was discovered, the State could not rely on an inference of constructive possession based on Graves' alleged residence in Quick's house. See State v. McDowell, 622 N.W.2d 305, 308 (Iowa 2001). The only link the State had between Graves and the dried marijuana plant was the statement allegedly made by Graves to Officer Steil that the defendant had assisted Quick in picking the plant and tying it up in the basement to dry. Connecting Graves to the box of marijuana found in the living room was even less direct. The State's case rested on the money and, more importantly, the scales found in the bedroom the State alleged was occupied by Graves, items the State argued were used by Graves in a drug operation. To prove the bedroomand inferentially the scaleswere Graves' the State relied on Steil's testimony that both Quick and Graves had told Steil that the defendant was living in Quick's house and using that bedroom. Thus, the jury's belief in the truth of Steil's testimony concerning his conversation with Graves, and to some extent with Quick, was critical to the State's case, as was the jury's disbelief of Graves' denial that he had made the disputed statements to Steil. We conclude, therefore, the prosecutor's misconduct, directed as it was to the credibility of the defendant and Steil, was extremely significant to the central issues in the case, namely, Graves' participation in the manufacture of marijuana and Graves' possession of marijuana. B. Strength of State's evidence. The State's case in the absence of Steil's testimony concerning Graves' admissions was weak. Without the statements allegedly made by the defendant to Steil, the only facts tending to show Graves played a role in the manufacture or possession of marijuana was the presence of Graves' belongings in Quick's spare bedroom, the evidence tending to show Graves gave Quick's address as Graves' residence to the jailor, and Quick's statement to Steil that Graves was staying with Quick. Even if the jury believed that Graves lived with Quick, this fact was not necessarily convincing proof that the marijuana found in the common areas of the house was Graves' property or that Graves was involved in Quick's illicit activities. In fact, evidence of Graves' mere proximity to the contraband would not, without more, support his conviction of the charges. See State v. Atkinson, 620 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2000) (holding physical proximity to contraband is insufficient in itself to constitute dominion and control). Thus, the State's case was far from overwhelming. C. Use of cautionary instructions or curative measures. The trial court gave cautionary instructions, but these instructions were only those routinely given in criminal trials. Before opening statements and again before closing arguments, the court orally advised the jury that the comments of the attorneys were not evidence and should not be considered as evidence by the jury. A similar admonition was contained in the written instructions given to the jury by the court. No curative measures directed specifically to the misconduct that occurred here were given, presumably because defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's cross-examination or closing arguments. D. Whether misconduct was invited and pervasiveness and severity of misconduct. We consider these factors together as they both revolve primarily around the closing arguments made by the prosecutor. To some extent, the defense invited the prosecution's focus on the credibility of the defendant vis-a-vis Steil. In his opening statement to the jury, defense counsel stated: You will hear the police story, you will hear the ordinary citizen story. You will have the opportunity to evaluate those two stories. You will have an opportunity to listen to both of those witnesses. You will have an opportunity to use your own common sense in listening to those witnesses and determining what the facts are.... .... ... The issues here are going to be how it [the marijuana] got there, whose it was, what its purpose was, and, again, as I have said, and I think this is very, very crucial, you will need to listen to the evidence as provided by Mr. Steil, the evidence provided by Mr. Graves. You will need to compare them. You will need to make your own decision as to what actually did happen and what did not happen. The first overt reference to lying, however, came in the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant. It was during the course of this questioning that the prosecutor asked the defendant repeatedly whether Officer Steil was making up what Graves had said at the police station. The prosecutor subsequently singled out this line of questioning in his closing argument. After reviewing Officer Steil's testimony concerning the defendant's arrest, Steil's search of Quick's house, Steil's conversation with Graves at the police station, and Steil's search of the bedroom upon returning to the residence with Graves, the prosecutor stated: Keeping all of this in mind, the Defendant gets on the witness stand and testifies, in effect, that Officer Steil is a liar. He didn't use those words, but he might as well have said it. [The prosecutor then reviews Steil's testimony concerning Graves' admissions.] Defendant denies all of this. He's calling Officer Steil a liar. The prosecutor made no statements directly disparaging the defendant in his initial argument. In defense counsel's closing argument, the defendant's attorney mentioned the theme he had first developed in his opening statement: The key to this case, in my humble opinion, is Officer Steil's testimony about the admissions, the statements that he said Mr. Graves told him and his testimony of that, and on the other hand Mr. Graves' testimony of what he said. It seems to me this case revolves around how you determine what actually happened. This argument was the only direct reference to the conflict in the witnesses' testimony made by defense counsel in closing argument. Importantly, Graves' trial counsel also argued that even if Graves had a room in Quick's house that did not mean Graves was responsible for everything in the house. Despite the prosecutor's assertion in his closing argument that Graves had called Steil a liar, defense counsel did not address that issue in his remarks. Graves' counsel did not mention the cross-examination in question, did not call Steil a liar, and did not state that Steil was lying. Defense counsel simply pointed out the circumstances that made the various factual scenarios suggested by the evidence believable and not believable. In rebuttal, the prosecutor mounted a full attack on the credibility and character of the defendant. He referred to the problem of Mr. Graves coming into Court and lying like he did. He made five additional references to the defendant's lying and one statement that Graves was not telling the truth. The prosecutor also asserted that the reason Graves lied was because he's guilty and he knows it and to save himself from conviction. Thus, the objectionable comments by the prosecutor were not isolated, but rather reflected a pattern of misconduct, commencing with the county attorney's cross-examination of the defendant. See Anderson, 448 N.W.2d at 34 (`[P]rejudice results from persistent efforts to inject prejudicial matter before the jury.' (Citation omitted.)). In addition to the misconduct identified by appellate counsel, we also note other statements made by the prosecutor in his rebuttal argument that exacerbated the situation. See generally Freeman v. State, 717 So.2d 105, 106 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.1998) (stating that comment not by itself prejudicial may still contribute to overall effect of prosecutorial misconduct). First, the county attorney referred to defense counsel's argument that there was no proof the scales were used in a drug operation because there was no residue identified on the scales as a smoke screen. See Sanchez, 176 F.3d at 1225 (stating prosecutor committed misconduct in ... denigrating the defense as a sham). He also impermissibly attempted to enhance Steil's credibility. In discussing who is telling the truth, the prosecutor stated, Officer Steil's stake is what? His pride. He's going to have a job whether he wins this case or loses this case. He will continue to work for the Oskaloosa Police Department.  (Emphasis added.) These comments went beyond any evidence in the case, implying that the prosecutor knew something the jurors did not. See Boyd, 54 F.3d at 871 (holding prosecutor improperly vouched for police witnesses when she indicated in closing argument officers would not risk their careers by lying, because this argument relied on evidence not in the record); Davis v. State, 663 So.2d 1379, 1381 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1995) (holding prosecutor's argument that police officers had nothing to gain by lying because to do so would put their jobs in jeopardy was impermissible attempt to enhance officers' credibility and was not supported by evidence in the record; court reversed defendant's conviction). Similarly, as we have already discussed, the county attorney improperly vouched personally against the credibility of Graves' testimony. But perhaps most disturbing is the following statement by the prosecutor in his rebuttal argument: If you believe Officer Steil, there is no question he [Graves] is guilty as charged. Courts considering such comments have held they are improper because they distort the burden of proof. United States v. Reed, 724 F.2d 677, 680 (8th Cir.1984); United States v. Nwankwo, 2 F.Supp.2d 765, 769 (D.Md. 1998); Williams, 803 A.2d at 930; Freeman, 717 So.2d at 106; see also State v. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d 554, 563-64 (Iowa 1986) (expressing concern about prosecutorial arguments that shift the burden of proof). In addition, such an argument is a misstatement of the law. Richter, 826 F.2d at 209 (holding prosecutor's argument that if FBI agents were telling the truth, then the defendant was guilty was an improper statement of the law and patently misleading). See generally 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.7(e), at 556 (2d ed.1999) (stating misrepresentations of the law also constitute improper argument). As the Seventh Circuit court of appeals has observed, even if the jury believes the government witnesses have told the truth, it might still conclude guilt has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 386-87 (7th Cir.1978). The test for reasonable doubt is not which side is more believable, but whether, taking all of the evidence in the case into consideration, guilt as to every essential element of the charge has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Clewis v. State, 605 So.2d 974, 975 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1992). The case before us illustrates these principles. The State had to prove much more than simply that Graves lied about where he lived or that Officer Steil told the truth concerning his conversation with Graves. The prosecution had to establish that Graves participated in the manufacturing process found in the basement and that he possessed the drugs found in the living room. Even though Graves allegedly acknowledged his participation in the marijuana drying operation, he made no admissions concerning the shoebox of marijuana. Steil's only testimony linking Graves to the latter contraband was Graves' purported admission that he lived at Quick's house. Even if the jury believed Steil on this point, Graves' residency alone would not support a guilty verdict on the possession-with-intent-to-deliver charge. See Atkinson, 620 N.W.2d at 4 (A defendant's close physical proximity to contraband, as virtually all authorities agree, is insufficient in itself to constitute dominion and control.). Thus, not only did the county attorney's statement distort the burden of proof, it was unquestionably incorrect. See Vargas, 583 F.2d at 386-87 (holding argument that jury would have to find that federal officers lied in order to acquit the defendant was a misstatement of the law and improper). In summary, the prosecutor's misconduct in this case may not have risen to the level of a due process violation if it had occurred in isolation. But when we consider the prosecutor's improper cross-examination and argument in the context of the entire trial, we conclude the fairness of the trial was compromised. See Richter, 826 F.2d at 209 (holding prosecutor's cross-examination compelling defendant to state law enforcement officers lied coupled with prosecutor's argument that if officers were telling the truth, the defendant was guilty were so prejudicial as to require the granting of a new trial); Singh, 793 A.2d at 246 (finding prejudice where state's evidence was not particularly strong and the improper comments were made both during cross-examination and in closing arguments). The misconduct related to a critical issue in the case. It was not isolated, but rather became a central theme of the government's prosecution. Other improper arguments made by the prosecution further diverted the jury's attention from the actual issues in the case, exacerbating the impact of the misconduct challenged on appeal. Because trial counsel did not object, the trial judge took no curative measures and the only cautionary instructions given were those customarily included in criminal cases. The effect of the misconduct cannot be minimized, as the State's case was not strong. Finally, the county attorney's actions cannot be excused on the basis they were invited. Although Graves' counsel identified the police station conversation as a key factor in the jury's determination of the case, defense counsel never implied that the jury's resolution of the conflict in the testimony necessitated a finding that someone had lied. Nor did counsel indicate that resolving this conflict was the only matter to be decided by the jury. In addition, the defendant's attorney did not engage in any name-calling. Consequently, we do not think the defendant's opening statement and closing argument justified the prosecutor's personal vouching, his effort to inflame the jury, and his attempt to have the jury's decision improperly depend solely on whether the jury believed the officer lied. Having concluded that a due process violation occurred, we now turn to an analysis of Graves' ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.