Opinion ID: 766768
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Otten's First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Text: 40 In his appeal, Dr. Otten argues that the district court should not have dismissed his First Amendment claim under Bush v. Lucas. In Bush, a federal employee brought a First Amendment retaliation claim under sec. 1983 and Bivens against the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Bush, 462 U.S. at 369. In both administrative and federal court proceedings, Bush alleged that he had been demoted because he made public statements that were critical of his supervisors and of NASA policies. Id. at 369-70. The Supreme Court concluded that Bush could not maintain his First Amendment Bivens claim against NASA because Congress had established an elaborate remedial scheme through which federal employees could seek redress for constitutional wrongs related to their federal employment. Id. at 388-90. The Court reasoned that Congress is in a better position than courts to decide whether federal employees should have a Bivens cause of action when those federal workers have such an extensive administrative remedy available. Id. at 390. The Court found that the comprehensive administrative remedy available to Bush constituted a special factor which required the Court to refrain from creating a judicially-fashioned Bivens remedy. Id. at 389-90. 41 Our cases interpreting Bush make it abundantly clear that Dr. Otten has no Bivens remedy in federal court for the claimed retaliation. For example, in Robbins v. Bentsen, 41 F.3d 1195, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994), we held that an employee of the Internal Revenue Service could not maintain a First Amendment retaliation claim because we were clearly presented with a situation in which Congress has provided an elaborate remedial scheme, the CSRA, for the protection of . . . constitutional rights in the employment context. Similarly, in Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 851-56 (7th Cir. 1989) we expressly found that the CSRA's extensive remedial scheme precluded a First Amendment retaliation claim by a former employee of the United States Forest Service. In Moon v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 147, 150 (7th Cir. 1988), we observed that subject to narrow exceptions, a federal employee cannot file a suit for damages against his supervisor for an unconstitutional adverse personnel action when Congress has provided an adequate administrative remedy. Citing the provisions of the CSRA, we held that a federal employee could not maintain a First Amendment retaliation claim. Id. at 152. Finally, in Ellis v. United States Postal Service, 784 F.2d 835, 839-40 (7th Cir. 1986), we affirmed the dismissal of political discrimination claims under Bush because postal employees have an extensive remedy under the collective bargaining agreement established by federal law. 42 Here, Dr. Otten was a federal employee who could have used the CSRA to complain about the alleged retaliation which he asserted violated his First Amendment rights. As we explained in great detail in Feit, the CSRA creates an elaborate remedial scheme through which federal employees can seek review of allegedly unconstitutional employment actions. See Feit, 886 F.2d 852. Where, as in this case, Congress has fashioned such a detailed and comprehensive administrative process for federal workers to lodge complaints, 'Bush does not permit us to apply a separate constitutional cause of action.' Robbins, 41 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Ellis, 784 F.2d at 840). Dr. Otten fails to offer any principled reason for this court to hold that Bush v. Lucas does not doom his First Amendment claim; nor has Dr. Otten even attempted to distinguish the facts of his case from our precedent concluding that the CSRA constitutes his only remedy for the alleged retaliation. 43 Dr. Otten does, however, creatively attempt to resurrect his First Amendment claim by emphasizing that the district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. According to Dr. Otten, if the viability of his First Amendment claim depends on whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction, then we should reverse because the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over his claim under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1367(a). Dr. Otten's novel theory begins with the premise that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Massey's Eighth Amendment claim. Dr. Otten then points out that his First Amendment retaliation claim is related to Massey's Eighth Amendment claim because they are both based on the same allegedly unconstitutional medical policies. Dr. Otten concludes that the trial court had supplemental jurisdiction over his First Amendment claim because it forms part of the same case or controversy as Massey's Eighth Amendment claim over which the district court had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1367(a). 44 There is a fundamental flaw in this theory. Although the district court dismissed Dr. Otten's retaliation claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1116, this was not the correct basis for the dismissal. Instead, the district judge should have dismissed the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Federal courts do have jurisdiction to hear a First Amendment retaliation claim by a federal employee. The Supreme Court made this clear in Bush by stating: 45 [t]he federal courts' power to grant relief not expressly authorized by Congress is firmly established. Under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1331, the federal courts have jurisdiction to decide all cases aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. This jurisdictional grant provides not only the authority to decide whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiff's claim that he has been injured by a violation of the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946), but also the authority to choose among available judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights. 46 Bush, 462 U.S. at 374. It is clear that 28 U.S.C. sec. 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims such as Dr. Otten's First Amendment claim. 47 After declaring that federal courts have jurisdiction over such claims, the Court explained that the extent to which courts should exercise this power must be tempered by policy considerations. Id. at 376. The Court summarized the interplay between jurisdiction and the responsibility to refrain from creating new causes of action by stating: 48 [t]he federal courts' statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers adequate power to award damages to the victim of a constitutional violation. When Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the statutory remedy itself, that the Court's power should not be exercised. In the absence of such a congressional directive, the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counseling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation. 49 Id. at 378. The Supreme Court's cases have unequivocally established the power to grant relief that is not expressly authorized by statute, but they also remind us that such power is to be exercised in light of relevant policy determinations made by the Congress. Id. at 373. Based on these competing principles, the Court concluded that Congress, not the judiciary, must decide whether 'to create new substantive legal liability' for federal employees who claim constitutional deprivations. Bush, 462 U.S. at 390 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 302 (1947)). 50 Bush therefore teaches that the rule precluding constitutional claims by federal employees who have adequate administrative remedies stems from the absence of substantive legal rights rather than the courts' lack of subject matter jurisdiction. These substantive rights do not exist because Congress has not created such a cause of action and the Supreme Court has recognized that courts must defer to congressional judgment on the issue. Accordingly, the appropriate basis for dismissing a Bivens claim under Bush v. Lucas is failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, not lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 7 51 In this case, the district court dismissed Dr. Otten's First Amendment claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In doing so, the court applied analysis which shows that Dr. Otten's First Amendment claim should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In these circumstances, we have previously held that if remanding a case dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction would be futile because appellant has also failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we will affirm the district court, even though the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was improper. Gammon v. GC Services Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir. 1987); White v. Elrod, 816 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1987)). Because the analysis employed by the district court shows that Dr. Otten's First Amendment claim was legally insufficient under Rule 12(b)(6), we affirm the dismissal of Dr. Otten's First Amendment claim. 52