Opinion ID: 215635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The district court reasonably denied Kemp's discovery request and request for an evidentiary hearing.

Text: We first consider whether AEDPA bars Kemp from having an evidentiary hearing on his claim that correctional officers deliberately elicited incriminating statements, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. If AEDPA imposed such a bar in this case, the petitioner could not show good cause, and the district court would not have abused its discretion by denying Kemp's discovery request. [8] Section 2254(e)(1) of AEDPA bars most evidentiary hearings if the applicant failed to develop the factual basis for the claim in state court. In this context, failed connotes some omission, fault, or negligence on the part of the person who has failed to do something. Williams, 529 U.S. at 431-32, 120 S.Ct. 1479. If the petitioner is not at fault (as defined for purposes of § 2254(e)(1)), we evaluate the propriety of an evidentiary hearing under the factors prescribed by Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), overruled on other grounds, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992). Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir.2005). If the court determines that the applicant did fail to develop the factual basis for a claim in state court, the district court can hold an evidentiary hearing only if the petitioner meets two demanding requirements: First, the claim must rely on a rule of constitutional law newly announced by the Supreme Court and available to habeas petitioners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(I), or must be based on facts that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence, § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii). Second, even if a petitioner raises a new claim or one based on a new factual predicate, a hearing is required only if the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found applicant guilty of the underlying offense. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Our first inquiry, then, is whether Kemp failed to develop the factual basis of [his] claim in State court proceedings. § 2254(e)(2). Kemp admits that he did not develop his claims in the state courts but claims that his course of action was reasonable, and hence not a failure within the meaning of § 2254(e)(2), because he did not have necessary information while his case was still in state court. [9] This argument fails, because the information that, according to Kemp, provided a new basis for his claim that the officers deliberately elicited incriminating information, does not actually provide such a basis. He has only the officer's testimony in Eastlack, 883 P.2d 999, allegations concerning the proceedings in Moody, 94 P.3d 1119, and the attorney discipline actions against prosecutors Peasley and Zawada. None of these support the assertion that there was a policy in the Pima County Jail to subtly interrogate the inmates. The officer in Eastlack only testified that (a) Eastlack was speaking to another inmate in a loud voice and refused to lower his voice, (b) he recorded the conversation because it struck him as interesting that Eastlack was talking about his case, and (c) note paper was available for whatever need there might be, not just for recording incriminating statements. Eastlack, 883 P.2d at 1008. Similarly, in Moody, the officer was sitting approximately fifteen feet from Moody, who knew he was there and made no effort to lower his voice or speak softly. 94 P.3d at 1143. The Arizona Supreme Court held that there was no surreptitious eavesdropping, recording, or reporting of communications and that the trial court could reasonably have concluded that Moody waived the confidentiality of the communication with his attorney by making no effort to safeguard the content of his conversation. Id. at 1144. Thus, neither case suggests that there was any policy of deliberately eliciting incriminating information from inmates. Furthermore, Kemp's assertion of a policy of deliberately eliciting incriminating information is not advanced by the reference to the attorney discipline actions against Zawada and Peasley. Peasley's unethical behavior concerned an officer stating under oath that he had not known that a person was a suspect, when he had. See Peasley, 90 P.3d at 769. Zawada was disciplined for knowingly implying unethical conduct by expert witnesses without supporting evidence. See Zawada, 92 P.3d at 867. In neither case is there anything that suggests the existence of a policy of interrogating inmates. [10] As the above discussion shows, none of the evidence that Kemp has acquired since his conviction even remotely supports his assertion of a policy of deliberate subtle elicitation of information by Pima County correctional officers. The only salient fact Kemp has to buttress his claim is that two correctional officers spoke with him and both eventually made a report of that conversation, yet that information was available to him before his original criminal trial. He thus possessed all relevant information that would support his claim well before the conclusion of his state proceedings. Accordingly, Kemp has failed to develop the bases of his claim and it is barred under § 2254(e)(1) unless he can satisfy the strictures of § 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B). [11] Kemp, however, cannot meet this demanding standard. His claim does not rely on a new rule of constitutional law available to habeas petitioners. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(I). Moreover, because Kemp has not shown that his failure to develop the factual basis for his claim in state court was due to the discovery of new information not available until after trial, Kemp has also failed to show a a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence, § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii). Because Kemp is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the district court did not err in denying his request for discovery, as well as his request for a hearing. First, because the district court was not authorized to hold an evidentiary hearing on Kemp's deliberate elicitation claim, obtaining discovery on that claim would have been futile. Moreover, Kemp's claim of a jail-wide policy of eliciting incriminating statements has many of the indicia of an improper fishing expedition, and the desire to engage in such an expedition cannot supply good cause sufficient to justify discovery. See Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir.1999) (noting that in habeas proceedings discovery is only available in the discretion of the court and for good cause shown and is not meant to be a fishing expedition for habeas petitioners to explore their case in search of its existence.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the district court's discovery denial also was not an abuse of discretion.