Opinion ID: 353179
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The State Evidentiary Hearing on Competency.

Text: 97 Pursuant to Judge Duffy's order, on November 17 and December 1, 1975, a hearing was held before Justice Melia, who assumed that he was to hold, and did hold, a full-fledged evidentiary hearing on the issue of Suggs' competency at plea. 35 Counsel for Suggs called Drs. Lubin and Kadar, who testified on their reports; 36 Justice Nunez, who testified by stipulation that he had ordered Suggs sent to Bellevue for all purposes including competency, and that he probably would have ordered a more complete examination had he known of the first Dr. Messinger report, see II, B, 3, supra; and Justice Sandifer, who testified by stipulation that he had no knowledge of the first Messinger report when he rendered his decision on December 6, 1973. See note 34 supra. For the State, Suggs' lawyer, Mr. Tucker, testified that at the time of the September 13, 1968, pleas, he thought Suggs competent, but had he known of the Messinger report he would have requested an additional psychiatric examination before allowing Suggs to plead. The assistant district attorney testified that nothing during the plea colloquy made him think Suggs incompetent. And Dr. Messinger testified as to his July, 1968, and May, 1969, reports and the July, 1968, psychologist's report on which the doctor had relied. 37 Justice Gold did not testify. 98 Justice Melia, in an opinion dated December 3, 1975, found that Suggs was competent on September 13, 1968, when he pleaded guilty before Justice Nunez. People v. Suggs, supra, Nos. 3063/68, 3063A/68, 2251/68, at 29. He relied on the extensive plea colloquy 38 as well as the tactical considerations underlying the plea bargain 39 as clear evidence that Suggs knew where he was and what he was doing in pleading guilty on September 13. Id. at 17. He also considered it significant that Suggs was represented by an extremely able and experienced attorney, id. at 18, who found no reason, either prior to or during plea, to lead him to believe that the defendant was incompetent (although) counsel did agree with Judge Nunez that an examination would be desirable as an aid in imposing sentence. Id. at 29. No mention was made of Tucker's testimony that he would have requested an examination had he been aware of Dr. Messinger's July 23, 1968, report. 99 Similarly, Justice Melia concluded that Justice Nunez could not have considered Suggs incompetent: Certainly an able and experienced jurist such as Judge Nunez did not then believe the defendant to be incompetent else he would not have accepted the plea. Id. The court noted that psychiatric examinations are often made after a guilty plea and prior to sentence as an aid and guide to the court in the imposition of sentence. Id. at 5. Justice Melia did not discuss either Justice Nunez' testimony that he had ordered the Bellevue examination for all purposes including a determination of competency, or the plea minutes containing Suggs' story about his mother's cutting off his finger, which prompted Justice Nunez to order the psychiatric examination. Nor did he find controlling Justice Gold's subsequent November 6, 1968, finding of incompetency. 40 100 And he relied on Dr. Messinger's testimony, which seemed . . . to be highly credible and reliable. The testimony of Drs. Kadar and Lubin was not as impressive. Id. at 28. Yet Dr. Messinger's July, 1968, report was subject to certain shortcomings revealed by Justice Nunez, see note 15 supra, II, B, 3, supra, and subsequently by Dr. Kinzel. See notes 13-15 & accompanying text supra. Moreover, the doctor had no recollection of the person, John Suggs, personally, at the time of his testimony before Justice Melia. 41 Furthermore, the interviews with Dr. Lubin began only six days after the plea proceeding and involved a more extensive psychiatric examination than that performed by Dr. Messinger. 101 Finally, Justice Melia went one step beyond even a broad interpretation of Judge Duffy's order that an evidentiary hearing on competency be conducted. See note 35 supra. He held that assuming Suggs' incompetency at plea, the latter ratified his pleas of guilty at the June 6, 1969, sentencing hearing. This matter had previously been disposed of to the contrary by Judge Duffy. 390 F.Supp. 383, 388-89. 102 4. Judge Duffy Orders a Federal Evidentiary Hearing. 103 On November 16, 1976, Judge Duffy ordered a federal evidentiary hearing on the issue of Suggs' competency at plea. 422 F.Supp. 1042. Initially, he dismissed the State's argument that Suggs' relief lay in appealing Justice Melia's decision in the state courts on two grounds: (1) Suggs had already presented his claim of incompetency to the state courts in a second coram nobis petition 42 that had been omitted from the record on the first appeal to this court; 43 and (2) Judge Duffy had referred the matter to the state court out of respect for the convenience of the Justices in the State system, whose testimony was essential, not out of exhaustion considerations. 422 F.Supp. at 1044. 104 The district court then offered three principal reasons why Suggs was entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing. First, Judge Duffy said that he had remanded the case to the state court for the mere taking of testimony to determine whether those involved with the case had knowledge of the Messinger reports, and that the findings of competency and ratification exceeded the scope of his order. Id. at 1044-45; see note 35 supra. Second, the district court found certain assumptions underlying Justice Melia's determination of competency contradicted by the record. 44 422 F.Supp. at 1045. Third, Judge Duffy determined that the merits of the factual dispute were not fully developed in the state hearing, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), pointing out the glaring omission in not taking the testimony of Justice Gold who had declared Suggs incompetent after the plea proceeding. Id. 105 5. The Federal Competency Hearing. 106 A hearing on Suggs' competency was held on January 17 and 21, 1977. The transcript and exhibits from the state hearing were introduced as well as significant new evidence not before the state court. 45 Suggs' entire file from Matteawan, which contained records of his prior hospitalization at Rockland State Hospital, his files from the New York City Department of Correction, his complete 1968 file from the Bellevue Psychiatric Clinic, and his file from the Legal Aid Society were all admitted. A representative of the New York City Department of Correction testified to Suggs' suicide attempt in August of 1968, which, it will be recalled, occurred one week after the first Messinger report was prepared. In addition, Mr. Tucker's testimony revealed that there was something unusual about Suggs' behavior on September 13, 1968, in that Suggs had consistently denied his guilt until the day of his pleas when he became adamant and demanded to plead guilty. 46 107 By far the most illuminating testimony was that of Dr. Augustus F. Kinzel, appointed by the district court. A psychiatrist of impressive credentials, 47 his testimony was heavily relied upon by Judge Duffy in reaching his determination that Suggs was incompetent at the time of his September, 1968, pleas. While a full reading of the doctor's extensive testimony is necessary to appreciate why it was given so much weight, suffice it to say that Dr. Kinzel thoroughly studied all available data on the issue. Based upon various prior medical records 48 unavailable either to Drs. Messinger, Lubin or Kadar, the minutes of the guilty pleas, as well as Dr. Kinzel's examination of Suggs held on January 12, 1977, 49 it was the doctor's opinion that Suggs was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia on September 13, 1968, not merely from a personality disturbance. He disagreed with Dr. Messinger's July, 1968, report which he criticized as the product of an incomplete psychiatric examination, see note 15 supra, in that it gave no medical or childhood history or details of past illness, and appeared to be a cursory description of part of (Suggs') present mental state. He believed that the symptoms Suggs displayed to the many examiners were signs of psychotic illness. Even the psychologist's report on which most of Dr. Messinger's report was based described symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia, rather than of a mere personality disorder, which is probably what the psychologist meant by his diagnosis. See note 13 & accompanying text supra. He also questioned the validity of the psychological tests because Suggs had not cooperated. 108 Dr. Kinzel was aware of Suggs' detention house suicide attempt in August, 1968, a few weeks prior to his plea, a fact unknown to the other psychiatrists who had testified before Justice Melia. He reflected that this was only one incident of a past history of suicidal behavior of a serious kind . . . . In reference to the plea minutes, Dr. Kinzel not only noted the bizarre finger amputation testimony, terming it a confabulation, 50 without relevance to the issue at hand, but also was impressed by Suggs' psychotic lack of judgment as evidenced by his failure to verbalize any motivation or make any attempt to defend his acts. In the doctor's opinion, Suggs had no serious awareness that he was being charged with very serious things that he should defend himself with. As to Suggs' ability to describe the criminal acts at plea, the doctor said that psychotics can account literally for their conduct without understanding why they did it, whether they should have done it and whether they should explain it. Counsel's lack of awareness was readily explicable since laymen are not easily able to recognize such a psychosis. Suggs' insistence on pleading is evidently common among psychotic defendants. 109 Dr. Kinzel agreed with the Lubin-Kadar diagnosis as well as the initial diagnosis at Matteawan. He stressed that Suggs' resulting incompetency was a result of a longlasting psychosis, not episodic in nature, noting that it is very unusual for a patient to be competent one day and incompetent the next. 51 He also felt that even though it was eight years after the fact, given all the history, which even this lengthy exegesis has only touched upon, he could apply basic principles of psychiatry to arrive at his conclusion, with which few psychiatrists would disagree, that Suggs was psychotic when he entered the pleas and probably was then incompetent to stand trial. 110 Judge Duffy held, for the second time, on April 5, 1977, that Suggs was incompetent on September 13, 1968. He recounted much of the evidence which we have discussed and then concluded: 111 Weighing all the evidence, the conclusion is inescapable that petitioner was incompetent on September 13, 1968. Although Dr. Messinger indicated that petitioner was competent on July 23, 1968, that report was prepared some seven weeks before the pleas were entered, and as reflected in the May 20, 1969 report, Dr. Messinger acknowledged petitioner's psychotic condition which prompted the Matteawan commitment. He also conceded the possibility that petitioner may have been experiencing a psychotic episode even at the time the July (1968) examination was being conducted. The only other indicia of competence is Mr. Tucker's testimony and, although an attorney's opinion as to his client's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings and to cooperate in his defense is significant, United States ex rel. Roth v. Zelker, 455 F.2d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 927, 92 S.Ct. 2512, 33 L.Ed.2d 340 . . . (1972), it is by no means controlling, especially in light of Justice Nunez's observation and reaction with which, based on my reading of the plea minutes, I agree. Dr. Kinzel's testimony relating to the account of petitioner's loss of a portion of his finger, and the indications that the finger was crushed and then amputated, rather than chopped off by Suggs' mother, as recalled by petitioner, bolsters my conclusion in this regard. 112 Furthermore, the above, coupled with the fact that petitioner was found to be incompetent by Dr. Lubin only six days after the plea, which conclusion was confirmed and corroborated by Dr. Kadar some four weeks later, and that on the basis of the Lubin-Kadar report, without objection by the respondent, petitioner was committed to Matteawan (by Justice Gold), substantially negates any other conclusion but that petitioner was indeed incompetent at the time of the pleas. 113 430 F.Supp. at 883-84. He vacated the guilty pleas on the basis of McCarthy v. United States, supra, and Pate v. Robinson, supra, since they were null and void because taken while incompetent; implicitly adopted the conclusions of his first opinion, 390 F.Supp. 383, which rejected the State's waiver and ratification arguments; and issued the writ of habeas corpus unless Suggs was permitted to replead within 60 days. 52