Opinion ID: 164588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ross' Dangerous Conditions Claims

Text: 14 Ross complains that the MCDC shower was unreasonably dangerous because it was slippery and it did not contain a shower mat. He alleges that he was injured due to this dangerous condition on November 29, 1999. He claims to have exhausted his remedies as to his dangerous conditions claims by filing a Pre-Grievance Request Form on December 6, 1999. In response, prison officials moved a shower mat into the shower in which Ross had fallen. We agree that Ross sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies as to these claims. 5
15 We note that the federal Courts of Appeals are divided over whether an untimely grievance is sufficient to exhaust a prisoner's administrative remedies under the PLRA. The Sixth Circuit has deemed an untimely grievance sufficient, reasoning that if the state forgoes an opportunity to decide matters internally whether for internal time constraints or any other reason, the PLRA has nonetheless served its purpose, and the prisoner may proceed to federal court. Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 726 (6th Cir.2003). On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has held that [t]o exhaust administrative remedies, a person must follow the rules governing filing and prosecution of a claim ... [T]hese include time limits. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.2002). 16 This dispute boils down to whether the PLRA's exhaustion requirement contains a procedural default rule. In the habeas context, the Supreme Court has recognized that a petitioner who has failed to satisfy state procedural rules meets the technical requirements for exhaustion because there are no longer any state remedies available. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Yet in order to `protect the integrity' of the federal exhaustion rule the Court has grafted a procedural default rule onto the habeas exhaustion requirement: [W]e ask not only whether a prisoner has exhausted his state remedies, but also whether he has properly exhausted those remedies.... O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (emphasis in original). 6 17 The Court explained that the purposes of the exhaustion requirement would be utterly defeated if the prisoner were able to obtain habeas review simply by `letting the time run' so that state remedies were no longer available. Those purposes would be no less frustrated were we to allow federal review to a prisoner who had presented his claim to the state court, but in such a manner that the state court could not, consistent with its own procedural rules, have entertained it. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000) (emphasis in original) (citations and internal quotations omitted). This same policy applies in the PLRA context. Allowing prisoners to proceed to federal court simply because they have filed a time-barred grievance would frustrate the PLRA's intent to give prison officials the opportunity to take corrective action that may satisfy inmates and reduce the need for litigation, to filter out frivolous claims, and to create an administrative record that would facilitate subsequent judicial review. Cf. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524-25, 122 S.Ct. 983. 18 Accordingly, we join the Seventh Circuit in holding that the PLRA, like 28 U.S.C. § 2254, contains a procedural default concept within its exhaustion requirement. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025. A prison procedure that is procedurally barred and thus is unavailable to a prisoner is not thereby considered exhausted. Regardless of whether a prisoner goes through the formality of submitting a time-barred grievance, he may not successfully argue that he had exhausted his administrative remedies by, in essence, failing to employ them. See Jernigan, 304 F.3d at 1033. 7 19 Yet we conclude that Ross did not procedurally default his dangerous conditions claims in this case. Ross filed his Pre-Grievance Request Form seven days after his fall in the shower, but before the allegedly dangerous condition had been made safer. We need not address in the abstract whether Ross' complaint was timely because in this case the prison did actually consider it. Nothing in the record suggests that MCDC treated Ross' complaint as untimely; indeed, Ross received a favorable response and a mat was placed in the shower as he requested. If a prison accepts a belated filing, and considers it on the merits, that step makes the filing proper for purposes of state law and avoids exhaustion, default, and timeliness hurdles in federal court. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025.
20 Having determined that Ross properly invoked the first step of MCDC's grievance process with respect to his dangerous conditions claims, we turn to whether he was obligated to resort to step two of that process, filing a formal grievance. We hold that he was not required to do so because he was successful in the first stage of the grievance process, and nothing in the record suggests that there was any further relief whatsoever available through MCDC procedures. 21 In Booth v. Churner, the Supreme Court held that the PLRA requires a prisoner seeking only money damages to complete administrative processes that offer some sort of relief, albeit not the damages relief the prisoner wants. 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). However, prisoners need not engage in entirely fruitless exercises when no form of relief is available at all. Without the possibility of some relief, the administrative officers would presumably have no authority to act on the subject of the complaint, leaving the inmate with nothing to exhaust. Id. at 736 n. 4, 121 S.Ct. 1819. In other words, the modifier available in the PLRA means that inmates must exhaust administrative remedies so long as there is the possibility of at least some kind of relief. Id. at 738, 121 S.Ct. 1819; cf. Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 58 (2d Cir.2003) ([T]here is no requirement [under the Immigration and Naturalization Act] to exhaust remedies where the relevant administrative procedure lacks authority to provide any relief or to take any action whatsoever in response to a complaint.) (citations omitted). 22 Once a prisoner has won all the relief that is available under the institution's administrative procedures, his administrative remedies are exhausted. Prisoners are not required to file additional complaints or appeal favorable decisions in such cases. When there is no possibility of any further relief, the prisoner's duty to exhaust available administrative remedies is complete. See McGrath v. Johnson, 67 F.Supp.2d 499, 510 (E.D.Penn.1999) (exhaustion complete when a grievance was resolved in the prisoner's favor and there was no basis for him to appeal); Clement v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 220 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1106 (N.D.Cal.2002) (plaintiff was not required to exhaust further administrative appeals when he had received all the relief that the prison administrative appeal system could provide); Brady v. Attygala, 196 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1021 (C.D.Cal.2002) (It would be a strange rule that an inmate who has received all he expects or reasonably can expect must nevertheless continue to appeal, even when there is nothing to appeal.) (quotation omitted); Gomez v. Winslow, 177 F.Supp.2d 977, 985 (N.D.Cal.2001) (Because [the plaintiff] had, in essence, `won' his inmate appeal, it would be unreasonable to expect him to appeal that victory before he is allowed to file suit.). 23 Pursuant to CSC procedures, Ross began the grievance process by submitting a Pre-Grievance Resolution Form complaining that the MCDC shower was unreasonably dangerous because it lacked a shower mat. The prison responded by furnishing the shower with a mat, thus fully alleviating the problem Ross raised. It appears that CSC was unable to do anything more in response to Ross' complaint. In particular, nothing in the record indicates that money damages or any other retrospective relief was available through the prison's grievance process. Having received all the relief the grievance process could offer, Ross was required to do no more in order to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his dangerous conditions of confinement claims.