Opinion ID: 204952
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Effect of Expedited Removal on Vásquez's Eligibility for Cancellation of Removal

Text: Because § 1229b is unclear as to whether an expedited removal ends the accrual of continuous physical presence in the United States, and the BIA's resolution of that ambiguity was reasonable, we reject Vásquez's challenge to the determination that a departure via an expedited removal order halts continuous physical presence in the United States. [4]
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes expedited removal [i]f an immigration officer determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph (F)) who is arriving in the United States ... is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7). § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). An expedited removal order precludes admissibility to the United States for five years. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). However, an alien subject to expedited removal is not entitled to further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum ... or a fear of persecution. Id. The lack of procedural protections accompanying expedited removal stands in contrast to the significant process, specified in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, that is required to effectuate a formal removal. See Juarez-Ramos, 485 F.3d at 511 n. 16. The INA gives the Attorney General discretion to cancel removal if the alien: (A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application; (B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title, subject to paragraph (5); and (D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. § 1229b(b)(1) (emphasis added) (subpart (b)(1)). [5] Although § 1229b does not include a definition of either continuous or physical presence, it does include special rules that inform the meaning of those terms: Special rules relating to continuous residence or physical presence (1) Termination of continuous period For purposes of this section, any period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end (A) except in the case of an alien who applies for cancellation of removal under subsection (b)(2) of this section, when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this title, or (B) when the alien has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title, whichever is earliest. [ (subpart (d)(1)) ] (2) Treatment of certain breaks in presence An alien shall be considered to have failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the United States under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section if the alien has departed from the United States for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days. [(subpart (d)(2)) ] Id. § 1229b(d)(1)-(2). Additionally, the BIA has attempted to clarify what types of events will halt the accrual of continuous physical presence. In In re Romalez-Alcaide, the BIA held that, in addition to the departures exceeding a certain duration specified in subpart (d)(2), a departure under threat of deportation also constitute[s] [a] break[] in the... accrual of continuous physical presence for purposes of cancellation of removal. 23 I. & N. Dec. 423, 423-24 (BIA 2002) (en banc). Later, in In re Avilez-Nava, the BIA reaffirmed its conclusion that § 1229b(d)(2) `does not purport to be the exclusive rule respecting all departures.' 23 I. & N. Dec. at 802 (quoting In re Romalez-Alcaide, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 425) (emphasis in original). The BIA held, however, that a mere refusal to admit at a land border port of entry, without any formal or documented process effectuating that refusal, does not interrupt continuous physical presence. Id. at 803-06. Specifically, the BIA explained: [W]e hold that an immigration official's refusal to admit an alien at a land border port of entry will not constitute a break in the alien's continuous physical presence, unless there is evidence that the alien was formally excluded or made subject to an order of expedited removal, was offered and accepted the opportunity to withdraw his or her application for admission, or was subjected to any other formal, documented process pursuant to which the alien was determined to be inadmissible to the United States. Id. at 805-06 (emphasis added).
Because this case presents us with questions implicating `an agency's construction of the statute which it administers,' we [apply] the principles of deference described in Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (applying Chevron in reviewing a BIA interpretation of a statutory exception to an INA provision mandating the withholding of deportation in certain circumstances); [6] see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 129 S.Ct. 1159, 1163, 173 L.Ed.2d 20 (2009) (It is well settled that principles of Chevron deference are applicable to [the INA]. (internal quotation marks omitted)). That is, we apply Chevron 's two-step analysis in reviewing the BIA's interpretation of § 1229b. The first step in this analysis is to ask[] whether `the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue' before [this court]. ... Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424, 119 S.Ct. 1439 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778). If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If, on the other hand, the statute is silent or ambiguous, we turn to Chevron 's second step and ask `whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.' Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424, 119 S.Ct. 1439 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778). In this second inquiry, the BIA's interpretation will be affirmed if it is a reasonable one. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778).
In this case, the step-one question is as follows: is § 1229b silent or ambiguous as to whether an expedited removal ends an alien's continuous physical presence in the United States? Vásquez argues that subpart (d)(1), which constitutes the first part of § 1229b(d), unambiguously precludes an expedited removal order, in and of itself, from interrupting an alien's continuous physical presence. Vásquez reasons that subpart (d)(1)'s specificity [7] evinces a congressional intent to create an exhaustive list of events that end continuous physical presence. Vásquez further bolsters his position by asserting that statutes pertaining to removal should be strictly construed in favor of the alien. We are unpersuaded. Despite its specificity, subpart (d)(1) does not state that these are the only circumstances in which continuous presence `shall be deemed to end'. See Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 218 (5th Cir.2003). In fact, nothing in the entirety of § 1229b expressly precludes expedited removal from ending an alien's continuous physical presence. As the Third Circuit has observed, The statute does not further define `continuous physical presence,' and it is silent as to whether there are additional circumstances under which continuous physical presence may be broken. Mendez-Reyes, 428 F.3d at 191. Further, Vásquez's argument ignores the second part of § 1229b(d): subpart (d)(2). Subpart (d)(2) specifies additional circumstances  specifically, departures from the United States that exceed a certain duration  that end continuous physical presence. The existence of subpart (d)(2) precludes any argument that subpart (d)(1) amounts to an exhaustive list of events that interrupt continuous physical presence. Mireles-Valdez, 349 F.3d at 218 ([S]ubpart (d)(1) cannot be exhaustive because ... subpart (d)(2) provides that certain absences, on the basis of their length, terminate continuous presence.); see also Tapia v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir.2005) (Congress did not explicitly specify when an alien absent for less than ninety days may continue to accrue time toward the continuous physical presence requirement and when the accrual of time is terminated. ...). Nor do we see any clear indication that subparts (d)(1) and (d)(2) together were meant to constitute an exclusive list. See Mireles-Valdez, 349 F.3d at 218; Mendez-Reyes, 428 F.3d at 192 ([T]he fact that Congress has declared [in subpart (d)(2)] that a departure of more than 90 days shall constitute a break in physical presence does not necessarily mean that departures of less than 90 days shall not constitute a break in physical presence.); see also Ascencio-Rodriguez v. Holder, 595 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir.2010) ([A]lthough 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d) sets forth circumstances under which continuous physical presence must be deemed to have been broken, Congress has not spoken on whether other events can also operate to terminate an alien's period of continuous physical presence. (internal quotation marks omitted)). In short, § 1229b(d) does not unambiguously preclude unspecified occurrences, such as an expedited removal, from ending an alien's continuous physical presence in the United States. [8] Consequently, we turn to step two and ask whether the BIA's determination that an expedited removal does in fact interrupt continuous physical presence is a reasonable construction of the statute.
Vásquez argues that, even if this court finds § 1229b ambiguous, the [BIA]'s interpretation is impermissible given the strict construction that should be given immigration statutes, particularly removal statutes. Again, we disagree. First, as the Third Circuit has observed, [i]n light of the INA's enormously broad delegation to the Attorney General, we would be extremely reluctant to hold that his interpretation of the INA is unreasonable. Mendez-Reyes, 428 F.3d at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying step two); see also Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 970 (We must also be mindful that `judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.' (quoting Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439)). Second, an expedited removal order is clearly intended to sever an alien's ties with this country for the five-year period during which it prohibits an alien from re-entering the United States. See § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i); Juarez-Ramos, 485 F.3d at 511. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to conclude that an alien's departure from the United States following such an order constitutes an interruption in that alien's continuous physical presence in the United States. In fact, a contrary rule would seem inconsistent with the congressional intent underlying the INA. See Juarez-Ramos, 485 F.3d at 511 (holding that expedited removal interrupts continuous physical presence because, in at least one important way, expedited and formal removals are similar. Both carry with them an explicit statutory bar to readmission for a period of five years. This statutory bar reflects a congressional intent to sever an alien's ties to this country. (internal citations omitted)); Tapia, 430 F.3d at 1002 (in distinguishing a border turnaround from a voluntary departure under the threat of removal, noting that, [t]o permit an alien who was removed or left pursuant to an administrative voluntary departure to continue to accrue physical presence would thwart Congress's clear intent that such an alien be inadmissible for years following the date of his departure). We are aware that upholding the BIA's decision might be seen as arbitrarily rewarding those aliens lucky enough to have a border official turn them around without placing them in the expedited removal process. See Juarez-Ramos, 485 F.3d at 512 (internal marks omitted). However, any construction of § 1229b will undoubtedly result in some seemingly arbitrary or unfair results, [9] and a line must be drawn somewhere. See id. The BIA was required to interpret the impact of expedited removal, which precludes an alien from returning to the country for five years, on eligibility for cancellation of removal, which authorizes relief for certain aliens who are inadmissible but have continuously lived in the United States for ten years. We cannot say that the way in which the BIA balanced the goals of these provisions of the INA was unreasonable, and we therefore defer to its construction of the statute.