Opinion ID: 538915
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the warrantless entry of corral's residence

Text: At the suppression hearing, Corral asserted that because the initial warrantless entry at 110 Northstar Drive violated the fourth amendment, the evidence seized from the premises necessarily must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. The district court concluded that the entry and securing of the premises was unjustified for lack of probable cause but did not explain the attendant consequences. Corral, 702 F.Supp. at 1548-49. We believe both Corral and the district court misapprehended the import of the warrantless entry. In Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an earlier illegal entry ... requires suppression of evidence seized later from a private residence pursuant to a valid search warrant which was issued on information obtained by the police before the entry into the residence. Id. at 797-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3382. The Court held that where an independent source is present for a search warrant under which evidence is seized, the legality or illegality of an initial warrantless entry has no bearing on the admissibility of the evidence. The Court rejected the notion that but for the illegal entry, the suspects could have destroyed evidence used against them: The essence of [defendant's argument] is that there is some 'constitutional right' to destroy evidence. This concept defies both logic and common sense. Id. at 816, 104 S.Ct. at 3391. Segura controls our resolution of this first issue. The issuance of the search warrant and discovery of the cocaine, marijuana and firearms within the residence were wholly unrelated to the initial warrantless entry. The evidence was uncovered only as a result of the search conducted pursuant to the warrant. Moreover, none of the information on which the warrant was secured related to the initial warrantless entry. Because the evidence in our case, like in Segura, was the product of the search pursuant to the warrant, not the initial warrantless entry, the legality of the warrantless entry is not at issue. See id. at 814, 104 S.Ct. at 3390; [Record, Tr. of Sept. 6, 1988, Suppression Hearing at 271].