Opinion ID: 2227991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Indictment and Convictions

Text: Doppler was arrested on May 17, 1995, after he confessed to killing Sargent. On May 19, 1995, authorities in Crow Wing County issued a criminal complaint charging Doppler with murder in the second degree. An omnibus hearing was set for June 5, 1995. On May 22, 1995, Doppler's first attorney of record contacted the Crow Wing County Attorney to inform him that Doppler planned to move to have the May 17 confession suppressed. The two attorneys then agreed that the county attorney would not impanel a grand jury to investigate Sargent's death until after the omnibus hearing. The omnibus hearing was held as scheduled and Doppler, still represented by his first attorney of record, moved the court to suppress his confession. This motion was denied on July 7, 1995. Sometime between the June 5, 1995 omnibus hearing and July 24, 1995  the record does not disclose the exact date  a second attorney was retained by Doppler's family and substituted as counsel for Doppler. From July 17, 1995 until August 7, 1995, the county attorney and Doppler's counsel, initially his first attorney of record, then his second attorney of record, attempted to negotiate a plea agreement. On August 7, 1995, Doppler entered a plea of not guilty to murder in the second degree. A grand jury was convened on September 19, 1995 to investigate Sargent's death. On September 20, 1995, the grand jury issued indictments against Doppler for first-degree premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder. The state dropped the conspiracy charge and Doppler's jury trial for first-degree premeditated murder began on May 28, 1996. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree premeditated murder against Doppler on June 7, 1996. Doppler, through a third attorney, filed a motion with this court, asking us to remand Doppler's case to the Crow Wing County District Court for an evidentiary hearing on, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. We granted his motion. An evidentiary hearing was subsequently held, but the postconviction court denied Doppler's motion for a new trial. Doppler appeals to this court, again arguing that he should be granted a new trial because the attorney who represented him at trial, his second attorney of record, acted ineffectively when he: (1) failed to object to the indictment issued against Doppler by a grand jury that was impaneled more than 14 days after Doppler's first court appearance, (2) failed to present evidence at trial of Doppler's intoxication, and (3) failed to request an intoxication jury instruction. Doppler also directly appeals his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder, contending that the state presented insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's guilty verdict.
Doppler first appeals the postconviction court's denial of his motion for a new trial. He asserts that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We review the postconviction court's proceedings only to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the postconviction court's findings. See Scruggs v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn.1992). [A] post-conviction court's decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 25. The burden rests on Doppler to show that the postconviction court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were the result of an abuse of discretion. See State v. Powell, 578 N.W.2d 727, 732 (Minn.1998). The United States Supreme Court has stated that [t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Accordingly, in Strickland, the Supreme Court adopted a two-pronged test for determining whether a defendant should be granted a new trial because of his counsel's performance. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The two prongs of the Strickland test are the deficiency prong and the prejudice prong. Id. Under the deficiency prong, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558 (Minn.1987) (quoting Strickland). In Minnesota, an attorney acts within the objective standard of reasonableness when he provides his client with the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances. State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Minn. 1993) (quoting White v. State, 309 Minn. 476, 481, 248 N.W.2d 281, 285 (1976)). A strong presumption exists that an attorney acted competently at trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. What evidence to present to the jury, including which witnesses to call, represents an attorney's decision regarding trial tactics and lies within the proper discretion of trial counsel. State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 236 (Minn.1986). Appellate courts, which have the benefit of hindsight, do not review for competency matters of trial strategy. See id. Under the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel's error, whether or not professionally unreasonable, so prejudiced the defendant at trial that a different outcome would have resulted but for the error. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In Strickland, the Supreme Court stated that there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both [prongs] if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one [prong]. Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Supreme Court went on to encourage courts to strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result. Id.