Opinion ID: 2737823
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fuller’s denial-of-promotion claim

Text: Both parties agree with the district court’s determination that the McDonnell Douglas framework governs Fuller’s denial-of-promotion claim and that he established a prima facie case of racial discrimination on this issue. The burden thus shifted to the Bridge Authority to offer legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its 2010 decision to promote Lilliquist and Miller instead of Fuller. In this case, the parties agree that the decision was made jointly by a panel of Steiner, O’Brien, and Brown and then approved by Sweeney. The essence of the reasons given for not selecting Fuller for either of the two available permanent positions was that the chosen applicants (1) were more accurate in handling money, (2) came in more frequently when called for fill-in duty, and (3) responded better to the interview questions. Fuller responds by arguing that these stated reasons are false and shifting. False and shifting reasons are acceptable methods of demonstrating that the employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory reasons are in fact pretextual. Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 545 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The plaintiff may show that (1) the employer’s stated reason for terminating the employee has no basis in fact, (2) the reason offered for terminating the employee was not the actual reason for the termination, or (3) the reason offered was insufficient to explain the employer’s action.”); see also Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, - 16 - Case No. 13-2717 Fuller v. The Michigan Department of Transportation 1167 (6th Cir. 1996) (“An employer’s changing rationale for making an adverse employment decision can be evidence of pretext.”). Regarding the factual accuracy of an employer’s claims, “a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). Fuller argues, first, that his response to call-ins was better than Lilliquist’s. Second, Fuller claims that his money handling was sufficiently accurate. Finally, Fuller contends that the panel’s proffered rationale for not selecting him changed over time and was inconsistent. Fuller’s first argument is supported by an exhibit purporting to show that he was called in to work 291 times during 2009 and 2010 and worked 40 shifts, or 14% of the time, whereas Lilliquist received 148 calls and worked only 15 shifts, or 10% of the time. The Bridge Authority counters that the exhibit is an unauthenticated document prepared by Fuller’s counsel. Generally, “[t]he proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court.” Fed. R. Evid. 1006. Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of evidence, however, requires that “the summary must be properly introduced through the testimony of a witness who supervised its preparation.” United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 409 (6th Cir. 2005) (further citation omitted). We have doubt as to the admissibility of Fuller’s summary chart because Fuller points to neither an affidavit nor deposition testimony authenticating the document. On the other hand, the Bridge Authority does not appear to dispute the key point made by the summary chart; i.e., that considering both 2009 and 2010 together, Fuller came in more frequently than did Lilliquist. - 17 - Case No. 13-2717 Fuller v. The Michigan Department of Transportation This fact tips the scale slightly in Fuller’s favor. Cf. Satawa v. Macomb Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 689 F.3d 506, 513 n.7 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding no error in considering a transcript at the summary-judgment stage of the case even though the “transcript was likely inadmissible at the time of summary-judgment briefing because it had not been properly authenticated [but considering the same] on the assumption that the parties would reduce it to admissible form at trial”). The Bridge Authority attempts to rebut this evidence by suggesting that Lilliquist was more reliable in the single year 2010, that O’Brien may simply have been referring to the aggregate number of times that Fuller was unavailable, or that O’Brien may have been referring only to his own attempts to call Fuller, not to calls made by others. All of these explanations are plausible, but the test is whether Fuller has produced “sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. A jury could so find if Fuller came in more frequently than did Lilliquist over the course of 2009 and 2010. Fuller’s attempt to disprove the money-handling rationale raised by Steiner and O’Brien is less persuasive. Using his own calculations, Fuller claims that the percentage of his monetary errors was only .11%, not the .15% that the Bridge Authority cited. The district court, however, was unable to duplicate Fuller’s calculations because of the highly questionable mathematical method used by Fuller. As explained by Administrator Sweeney, the Bridge Authority calculates money-handling errors based on the overall cash handled by the toll collectors, which varies seasonally, and thus monthly. It then evaluates the overall number of errors relative to the revenue taken in by the toll collector. In this regard, Lilliquist’s and Miller’s numbers were better—.11% for Lilliquist and .07% for Miller—compared to .15% for Fuller. Fuller has thus - 18 - Case No. 13-2717 Fuller v. The Michigan Department of Transportation failed to call into question the Bridge Authority’s money-handling rationale for not selecting him. But Fuller’s final argument—that the Bridge Authority’s rationales have shifted in ways suggesting that they are pretextual—has more merit. Bridge Safety Supervisor O’Brien testified that Fuller answered all of the interview questions correctly. This contradicts the testimony of Personnel Liaison Brown and Administrator Sweeney that Fuller’s failure to answer an interview question correctly was dispositive. Moreover, Brown’s memo recommending Lilliquist and Miller made no mention of an incorrect answer to an interview question. This conflicting testimony, together with the fact that Fuller’s call-in percentage was actually better than Lilliquist’s for 2009–2010, creates a genuine dispute of material facts that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Accordingly, a jury should evaluate whether the Bridge Authority’s purported justifications for not promoting Fuller in 2010 were truthful or pretextual.