Opinion ID: 771716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Review of the District Court's Analysis

Text: 74 Because we hold that the District Court's methodology was functionally similar to the Lapp test, we will review the court's decision on its own terms; i.e., using the multi-factored test that the District Court created. In the future, however, for the sake of consistency, district courts should employ the formulation of the test for confusion as set forth in Lapp and in Part III. B, supra.
75 The single most important factor in determining likelihood of confusion is mark similarity. See Fisons, 30 F.3d at 476. The test for such similarity is `whether the labels create the same overall impression when viewed separately.'  Id. (quoting Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1988)). Marks are confusingly similar if ordinary consumers would likely conclude that [the two products] share a common source, affiliation, connection or sponsorship. Id. Side-by-side comparison of the two marks is not the proper method for analysis when the products are not usually sold in such a fashion. Instead, an effort must be made to move into the mind of the roving consumer. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 747 F.2d 844, 851 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirming a district court's conclusion that, in the trade dress context, [r]ealistically, the likelihood of confusion cannot be assessed by a side-by-side comparison of the plaintiff's and defendant's products. It is the overall physical appearance of defendant's trade dress which is critical); 3 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition S 23:59, at 23-162 (4th ed. 2000) (The law does not require that the reasonably prudent purchaser keep a handy file of photographs and labels which he or she must pull out to compare with the label of every product purchased.). 76 The District Court acknowledged this principle, recognizing that side-by-side comparison of the conflicting marks is improper if that is not the way buyers see the products in the market. A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 167-68. However, the general rule that marks should be viewed in their entirety does not undermine the common-sense precept that the more forceful and distinctive aspects of a mark should be given more weight, and the other aspects less weight. See Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d Cir. 1991) (When the dominant portions of the two marks are the same, confusion is likely.). Applying these principles, the court looked at the sight, sound, and meaning of the marks, and considered the effect of the housemarks and Victoria's Secret's disclaimer.
77 The District Court closely examined the sight, sound, and meaning of the competing marks and concluded that, purely on the aesthetic level, the marks alone are somewhat distinct. A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 167. Considering the sound of the marks, it noted that although they share the term MIRACLE, there are different numbers of syllables, and the last syllable of each is different. Moreover, Miraclesuit bleeds two words together while The Miracle Bra consists of three discrete words. In short, the District Court concluded that the two marks sound different. We agree. The court also properly noted that in previous cases, where courts had found a likelihood of confusion based on sound, a closer phonetic similarity was often present. See id. (citing Bell Publ'g Corp. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1634, 1637 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (Dell and Bell); Pocono Rubber Cloth Co. v. J.A. Livingston, Inc., 79 F.2d 446, 448 (3d Cir. 1935) (swavelle and swavel)). 78 The District Court recognized that other, less similar-sounding marks had been found to be confusingly similar, as in Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing Co. v. Davis Manufacturing Co., 251 F.2d 924, 926-27 (3d Cir. 1958), where the court upheld the trial court's determination that the marks Dickie Davis and Dickie's were confusingly similar. However, it concluded that these cases could be distinguished because the presentations of the Miraclesuit and The Miracle Bra marks were sufficiently different to create an overall impression that was not confusingly similar, especially in light of Victoria's Secret's disclaimer and the use of the housemarks, as discussed infra Section IV.A.2. 79 Turning to the visual difference, the court noted that Miraclesuit is often accompanied by the Look ten pounds lighter in ten seconds! slogan, in various incarnations. Moreover, the court observed that: 80 The Miracle Bra is presented in either all capital block letters or in small capital letters with the letters, T,M,B alone in upper capital letters, while the Miraclesuit has sometimes been advertised with the initial letter M capitalized and the rest of the mark in lower-case letters in italicized script or as one word with both the M and S capitalized. 81 A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 167. The court also determined that the meaning of the two marks was slightly different, as the descriptive word bra focused attention on the brassiere portion of the Victoria's Secret product, rather than on the entire suit. See A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 166- 67 (stating that the term bra distinguishes the Victoria's Secret product because it identifies the particular feature of the garment where the `miracle' is manifested). This conclusion accords with the District Court's finding in A&H I, which was upheld by the en banc court. See A&H III, 166 F.3d at 195 ([D]escriptive terms (such as `bra' and `suit') must be considered in assessing infringement.). 82 Taking all of these elements into account, the District Court concluded that, without consideration of the role of the housemark and the disclaimer, the Miraclesuit mark and The Miracle Bra mark are somewhat distinct in sight, sound and meaning. A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 168. A&H challenges this analysis. It begins by asserting that, because the dominant portion of each mark is the word Miracle, and the other words in each mark are generic (bra, swimwear, suit, the), the marks must be deemed confusingly similar. It grounds this analysis on Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1991), in which we noted that it was relevant for purposes of comparison whether, in registering two marks, the PTO required certain descriptive elements of the mark to be disclaimed. Comparing Country Tiles and Country Floors, we held that because floors and tiles were discounted as generic in the application to the PTO, the use of the word `Country' by the Partnership is a material, although not necessarily a controlling, consideration on the Corporation's claim that `Country Tiles' logo directly infringed on the Corporation's federal trademark. Id. at 1065. 83 According to A&H, the same logic dictates that these marks are likely to be confused. Not only is the dominant portion of each mark MIRACLE, but the PTO examining attorney discounted the word bra in Victoria's Secret's PTO application to use The Miracle Bra for swimwear. Furthermore, A&H notes that in Fisons, in which Fairway and Fairway Green were up against each other, we took the district court to task for focusing too heavily on the differences between the marks instead of analyzing the overall impression. There, we held that a subsequent user may not avoid likely confusion by appropriating another's entire mark and adding descriptive or non-descriptive matter to it. Id. at 477 (quoting 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition S 23:15[8], at 23-102 (3d ed. 1992)). 84 We agree with A&H that the words the and bra and suit are not particularly potent, but none of our cases has suggested a per se rule about the impact of generic terms within a nongeneric trademark; ultimately, the weight to be given each word is a judgment call, best suited to the fact-finder. Although the District Court might well have been more emphatic in stating its ultimate conclusions on this score, in our view, the court did not err, much less clearly err, in finding that the sight and sound were distinct, despite the fact that the differences involve generic elements. 9
85 Having found the marks only somewhat distinct, the District Court further concluded that Victoria's Secret's use of its housemark and disclaimer renders the marks dissimilar. 10 As the District Court recognized, affixing a well-known housemark like that of Victoria's Secret can help diminish the likelihood of confusion. See A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 168. We have previously acknowledged the importance of housemarks in comparing the overall impression of two marks. A&H III, 166 F.3d at 195. In our previous decision, A&H III, we noted the relevance of the fact that both The Miracle Bra and Miraclesuit were sold with housemarks. See id. at 195. 86 Although A&H contends that Victoria's Secret's housemark should not have been a part of the similarity of marks analysis, the consideration of the effect of such marks has wide support in the case law. Use of a strong, well-known mark as a part of a composite name reduces the likelihood that the remainder of the composite name will create a commercial impression distinct from that mark. Four Seasons Hotels Ltd. v. Koury Corp., 776 F. Supp. 240, 247 (E.D.N.C. 1991); see also W. W. W. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1993) ([W]hen a similar mark is used in conjunction with a company name, the likelihood of confusion may be lessened.); Astra Pharm. Prods, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1st Cir. 1983) ([O]therwise similar marks are not likely to be confused where used in conjunction with the clearly displayed name and/or logo of the manufacturer.); Henri's Food Prods Co., Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 355-56 (7th Cir. 1983) (Yet even Kraft agrees that a prominent housemark may also tend to lessen confusion.). But see Frehling Enters., Inc. v. International Select Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 1999) (adding brand name did not lessen likelihood of confusion for marks of otherwise striking similarity); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1081, 1091 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Vess's use of its own VESS housemark in conjunction with Chocolate Fudge is not a defense to Canfield's infringement claim, for the use of another's trademark constitutes infringement with or without the use of the infringer's housemark.), aff'd, 796 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1986). 87 Furthermore, and most importantly, the District Court concluded that the disclaimer used by Victoria's Secret create[d] a distinction between the two marks. Therefore, it held that there was no similarity solely based on the presumption that Defendants will continue to use the disclaimer when marketing The Miracle Bra swimwear. A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 169. The court grounded its finding on the fact that 88 [a]lthough the positioning varied, the disclaimer often appeared in dark, black type against a light background at the lower left corner of the actual page on which The Miracle Bra Swimwear Collection was featured in the catalog, just above the telephone number for placing an order. The President of VS Catalogue stated that since there are only a few seconds in which to capture a consumer's attention, placement near the telephone number is particularly appropriate. 89 Id. (citations omitted). The disclaimer, the court concluded, tips the balance and makes it unlikely that consumers will be confused by the marks themselves. 11 90 A&H argues that disclaimers cannot be considered when determining likelihood of confusion, relying heavily on United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 142 (3d Cir. 1981), in which we held that an injunction requiring an infringing organization to add the word Philadelphia to its use of the word Jaycees was too narrow a remedy for a Lanham Act violation. However, Jaycees does not control for two reasons. First, the addition of a geographical term, unlike the use of a housemark, is unlikely to vitiate confusion, as one could easily conclude that the Philadelphia Jaycees was a subgroup of the larger national organization. In this case, the contest is not between Miraclesuit and Philadelphia Miraclesuit, a situation that would probably cause confusion, but rather is between two different names, one of which has a prominent disclaimer highlighting the difference. Second, our decision in Jaycees addressed the propriety of a remedy, and was premised on a finding of a Lanham Act violation, whereas in this case, we analyze the disclaimer and housemark to determine whether there was any violation at all. 91 In sum, the District Court committed no legal error in considering the disclaimer. We are also satisfied that the District Court committed no factual error in concluding that Victoria's Secret's disclaimer helped to dispel potential consumer confusion between the Miraclesuit and The Miracle Bra swimwear. 92
93 Finally, A&H argues that the District Court erred in failing to give weight to the fact that the PTO attorney rejected Victoria's Secret's application to register The Miracle Bra for swimsuits, bathing suits and bikinis on the ground that there was a likelihood of confusion between its mark and Miraclesuit. 12 A&H does not argue that a PTO determination is controlling, but rather that it is important evidence that should be given considerable weight. 13 94 There is some jurisprudence, although not in Third Circuit case law, suggesting that a PTO determination that marks are likely to be confused should be given weight as a matter of law. See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. American Guardian Life Assur. Co., 943 F. Supp. 509, 523 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (While not dispositive of the issue of likelihood of confusion, the PTO's refusal to register Defendant's marks is entitled to substantial consideration by this Court.); Driving Force, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 21, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (same); Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharm. Co., 437 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1971) (refusal of Patent Office to register a mark is entitled to great weight). 95 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has held that a preliminary determination by a low-level PTO administrator should not be accorded much weight, especially where the PTO officer did not have access to the full panoply of information that might inform a likelihood-of-confusion analysis. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1970). The court explained: 96 Any such determination made by the Patent Office under the circumstances just noted must be regarded as inconclusive since made at its lowest administrative level. . . . The determination by the Patent Office is rendered less persuasive still by the fact that the Patent Office did not have before it the great mass of evidence which the parties have since presented to both the District Court and this court in support of their claims. 97 Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, other courts have held that a court need not defer to the patent office when there is relevant evidence not considered by the office that informs the analysis. See, e.g., Marketing Displays, Inc. v. Traffix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 934 (6th Cir. 1999). 98 We find Carter-Wallace and Marketing Displays persuasive, and conclude that, although an initial PTO determination by an examining attorney may be considered, it need not be given weight when the PTO attorney did not review all the evidence available to the District Court. In A&H I, 926 F.Supp. at 1255, the District Court concluded that even a preliminary PTO determination should be given substantial weight, but it gave no weight to the PTO's decision in its most recent opinion. It was not clear error to refuse to do so. As in Carter-Wallace, the PTO in this case was making a low-level preliminary determination, and did not have the benefit of the complete record before the District Court. Furthermore, the PTO attorney's decision was conclusory, not searching or analytical. See note 9, supra. Although we prefer to avoid conflicts with the PTO, we do not think that such a decision needed to receive deference here, where the District Court's conclusion that the marks were not confusingly similar relied upon the housemarks and Victoria's Secret's disclaimer, matters apparently not considered by the examining attorney.
99 In sum, we conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in concluding that the marks themselves were not confusingly similar, considering their overall commercial impression, and did not make an error of law in choosing to consider Victoria's Secret's housemark and the disclaimer, or in refusing to give weight to the decision of the PTO attorney.
100 With respect to Lapp factor (2),the strength of the owner's mark, the District Court applied the Fisons test, which measures mark strength by (1) the distinctiveness or conceptual strength of the mark; and (2) the commercial strength or marketplace recognition of the mark. A&H IV, 57 F.Supp. 2d at 164. The first prong of this test looks to the inherent features of the mark; the second looks to factual evidence of marketplace recognition. See Fisons, 30 F.3d at 479. The District Court concluded that the mark Miraclesuit ranged conceptually from suggestive to arbitrary, and that evidence of A&H's advertising expenditures demonstrated that Miraclesuit had commercial strength, as well. Level of distinctiveness and mark strength are factual determinations that we review for clear error, see Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 292 n.18 (3d Cir. 1991), but our review of legal conclusions is plenary.
101 In order to determine whether a mark is protectable as a trademark, marks are divided into four classifications: (1) generic (such as DIET CHOCOLATE FUDGE SODA); (2) descriptive (such as SECURITY CENTER); (3) suggestive (such as COPPERTONE); and (4) arbitrary or fanciful (such as KODAK). See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). 14 Arbitrary or fanciful marks use terms that neither describe nor suggest anything about the product; they bear no logical or suggestive relation to the actual characteristics of the goods. A.J. Canfield, 808 F.2d at 296 (citation omitted). Suggestive marks require consumer imagination, thought, or perception to determine what the product is. Id. at 297. Descriptive terms forthwith convey[ ] an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods. Id. Generic marks are those that function as the common descriptive name of a product class. Id. at 296. In order to qualify for Lanham Act protection, a mark must either be suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful, or must be descriptive with a demonstration of secondary meaning. See id. at 297. Generic marks receive no protection; indeed, they are not trademarks at all. See id. at 305. 102 Under the Lanham Act, stronger marks receive greater protection. See, e.g., Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.) Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 1995) (observing that stronger marks carry greater recognition, and that therefore a similar mark is more likely to cause confusion). Although the conceptual strength of a mark is often associated with the particular category of distinctiveness into which a mark falls (i.e., arbitrary, suggestive, or descriptive), that is not the only measure of conceptual strength. This is because the classification system's primary purpose is to determine whether the mark is protectable as a trademark in the first place--that is, to determine whether consumers are likely to perceive the mark as a signifier of origin, rather than as a mere identification of the type of product. See A.J. Canfield, 808 F.2d at 296; Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1988). The classification of a mark as arbitrary, suggestive, or descriptive is only secondarily used to determine the degree of protection a mark should receive once protectability has been established. These two inquiries--whether a mark is, in fact, a trademark, versus how much protection the mark should receive--are often identical, but they do not have to be. See Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir. 1983) (Although this classification system is a helpful tool [for determining strength] . . . it is not determinative . . . .). 103 Suggestive or arbitrary marks may, in fact, be weak marks, particularly if they are used in connection with a number of different products. For instance, in H. Lubovsky, Inc. v. Esprit de Corp., 627 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the court concluded that the mark Esprit, though suggestive, was, in fact, a weak mark. See id. at 487. Similarly, common marks like Arrow, though certainly not particularly descriptive of the underlying product, have been held to be weak marks. See Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 347, 351 (4th Cir. 1941). Self- laudatory marks like Sure, see Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), Super Duper, see S.M. Flickinger Co., Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 174 U.S.P.Q. 51, 56 (T.T.A.B. 1972), Plus, see Plus Prods., 722 F.2d at 1005, or, in this case, Miracle, are generally held to be weak marks. See 2 McCarthy, supra, S11:81, at 11-146 to 147. 15 Thus, the classification of a mark as descriptive or arbitrary for the purpose of determining whether it receives trademark protection at all--though a useful guide in assessing the strength or weakness of a mark--is not dispositive. See Express Servs., Inc. v. Careers Express Staffing Servs., 176 F.3d 183, 186 (3d Cir. 1999) (observing that classification of distinctiveness is useful in determining conceptual strength (citing Banff, Ltd., 841 F.2d at 491)). 104 The District Court originally determined that the MIRACLE part of Miraclesuit was fanciful because it does not describe or reveal anything about the product. However, the court believed that the SUIT part was generic because it merely describes the qualities of the product. In sum, taking the mark's parts together, the court concluded that Miraclesuit ranges from suggestive to arbitrary because it requires some consumer imagination to determine its meaning, and therefore that the mark should receive the highest level of protection. A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 165. 105 For reasons we will presently explain, we conclude that the District Court's categorization of the Miraclesuit mark was clearly erroneous, and that the term m Miraclesuit does not rise to the arbitrary level but is, at best, merely suggestive. Further, we believe that the Court erred as a matter of law in holding that its categorization of the mark was dispositive of the inquiry into the mark's strength. Because both of these conclusions were relevant to the District Court's determination that the mark was entitled to a high level of protection, we review each separately. 106 The District Court concluded that the Miraclesuit mark ranged from suggestive to arbitrary because it believed that the word MIRACLE did not reveal anything about the product. To the contrary, we believe that both parts of the mark describe or suggest something about the product: The word suit has many meanings, but bathing suit is a frequent and familiar one. The word MIRACLE, unlike, say, XEROX, indicates the effect that the product is supposed to have on the user or wearer, and is ultimately merely a declaration of praise. Just as a miracle worker is a person who works miracles, a miraclesuit is a suit that works miracles. Whether the slimming effect is literally miraculous may be subject to debate, but the mark itself communicates something about the product. Suggestive or descriptive marks are, of course, protected, but, depending on surrounding circumstances (discussed below), they may receive lesser protection than arbitrary marks. 107 We also believe that the District Court committed an error of law in its automatic conclusion that, because the Miraclesuit mark range[d] from suggestive to arbitrary, it therefore should receive the highest level of protection, thus dismissing efforts by Victoria's Secret to show that the Miraclesuit mark is conceptually weaker because MIRACLE has been used by several other companies. MIRACLE is used in other apparel markets, such as hosiery, children's wear, ready-to-wear, and maternity wear. The court held that these other uses were irrelevant because the term MIRACLE was not used specifically in conjunction with swimwear. See A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 165 n.16. Although the wide use of a term within the market at issue is more probative than the wide use of a term in other markets, see Fisons, 30 F.3d at 479, the extensive use of the term in other markets may also have a weakening effect on the strength of the mark. 108 For example, in Sun Banks of Florida, Inc. v. Sun Federal Savings & Loan Association, 651 F.2d 311, 316-17 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1981), the court gave special weight to the fact that 25 competing financial institutions used the word sun in their titles, but also noted that over 4,400 Florida businesses used the term. The Sun Banks court thus clearly considered extensive use in other markets in its assessment of the weakness of the contested term m. See also Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph Int'l Corp., 308 F.2d 196, 199 n.2 (2d Cir. 1962) (The mark `Triumph' is a so- called weak mark, i.e. it has been used many times to identify many types of products and services.). The relevance of such other uses of similar marks is apparent; if a consumer is aware that a particular mark, like Triumph or Ace, is often used to designate a variety of products made by a variety of manufacturers, that consumer will be less likely to assume that in a particular case, two individual products, both with the mark Triumph, come from the same source. See Steve's Ice Cream v. Steve's Famous Hot Dogs, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1477, 1479 (T.T.A.B. 1987) ([T]he numerous third-party uses [of Steve's] demonstrate that the purchasing public has become conditioned to recognize that many businesses . . . use the term . . . and . . . is able to distinguish between these businesses based on small distinctions among the marks.); cf. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir. 1940) (When all is said, if a man allows the good will of his business to become identified with a surname so common as Johnson, it is fair to impose upon him some of the risk that another Johnson may wish to sell goods not very far afield. . . .). 109 A&H notes that in Fisons we stated that[w]hile other registrations and uses of Fairway for related products and services would make the mark less strong if they were in the same market, their use in different markets and for products and services that are not closely related does not necessarily undermine Fisons' claim of strength. 30 F.3d at 479. We read this sentence to mean no more than it says, and not, as A&H urges, as a per se rule against considering the use of the mark in different markets and for unrelated products. The short of it is that, whatever category of distinctiveness into which the mark falls, the multiple uses of MIRACLE in other markets is relevant to a determination of A&H's mark's strength.
110 Turning to the second part of the test, the District Court determined that the Miraclesuit mark has a high level of commercial strength. It based its finding on the fact that A&H had spent so much money on advertising, and that their efforts undoubtedly resulted in increased public recognition. A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 165. The court also noted that A&H's swimwear sales have steadily increased. Taking these two indications of commercial strength into account, the District Court concluded that the commercial strength inquiry weighed in favor of A&H. Although evidence of money spent does not automatically translate into consumer recognition, it is clearly relevant, and hence the District Court's methodology and conclusion does not appear to be in error or to involve a misapplication of the law.
111 The District Court erred in concluding that the Miraclesuit mark contained an arbitrary component, and in concluding that the mark Miraclesuit was conceptually strong solely on the basis of its categorization. However, if anything, the District Court's error weighed in A&H's favor by leading the court to reject evidence that the Miraclesuit mark was weaker than A&H claimed. Therefore, the District Court's error does not affect our affirmance of the District Court's conclusion that there was no likelihood of direct confusion between Miraclesuit and The Miracle Bra.
112 In discussing product similarity, the District Court first noted that although the products were both swimsuits, they have slightly different functions: The Miraclesuit is designed and advertised to make the figure appear slim, whereas The Miracle Bra suit is designed and advertised to enhance cleavage. However, the court also noted that most Miraclesuits have bras--some even have cleavage enhancing bras--and that a few Miracle Bra suits have lower body control. A review of these facts led the District Court to conclude that the Miraclesuit and Miracle Bra suits were somewhat interchangeable. A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 170. Therefore, it concluded, the product similarity factor favored A&H. 113 Given the evidence that, although both products may have a primary bust or midriff focus, both products also have attributes that enhance both aspects of the female figure, we do not think that the District Court clearly erred in making this finding. Furthermore, there was evidence that both products pitch themselves as improving female shapeliness through swimwear, and although the means of improvement are different and the products have different foci, the two suits are similar. In sum, while the products are not identical, the court committed no error of law here, and its conclusion on product similarity is supported by the record.
114 The District Court concluded that the channels of sale and advertising of the products overlap. It noted that both the price range for the suits and their means of sale are similar. It observed that the Miraclesuit has been advertised in in-store promotions, magazines, department store bill enclosures, and press kits to buyers, editors, and publishers, and that The Miracle Bra suits have been marketed in point-of-sale promotions in Victoria's Secret stores, and through press kits and print and television advertising. The court held that the channels of trade were similar, in that Miraclesuit is sold to department stores and catalogues that compete with Victoria's Secret Stores and Victoria's Secret Catalogue. Although the court noted that The Miracle Bra suits are never sold outside of the Victoria's Secret store or catalogue, and that [s]uch fine distinctions between the channels in which the products are sold may weigh in favor of diminishing a likelihood of confusion, A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 171, it concluded that the conditions of purchase were similar, and weighed this factor in favor of A&H. 115 Although there are significant differences in trade channels--notably, that Victoria's Secret sells its product only in its own stores and catalogues--perfect parallelism will rarely be found. Furthermore, the Miraclesuit has twice been sold in Victoria's Secret catalogues. Thus, the District Court did not clearly err in its factual conclusion that channels of marketing and advertising weigh in favor of A&H.
116 The District Court next considered the sophistication of consumers, which is the functional equivalent of Lapp factor (3), the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers when making a purchase. The court concluded that the products' consumers were likely to be sophisticated, and weighed this factor in favor of the defendants. Three considerations drove this decision. The court relied on cases holding that buyers of women's apparel are sophisticated purchasers, and on the fact that A&H had presented no evidence that its consumers were not sophisticated. The court also noted that the entire success of each brand relies on the premise that consumers will discern the slimming effect and cleavage enhancement features of their respective swimsuits. A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 172. 117 A&H submits that the District Court erred in reaching this conclusion. It points to Victoria's Secret's admission during this litigation that the attention of consumers must be captured within a few seconds. See A&H II, 967 F. Supp. at 1466. However, there are no hard and fast rules for this determination, and the celerity with which one makes a decision does not correlate exactly with the extent of one's discrimination in matters of taste. The District Court's conclusion that consumers will be discriminating in their selection of swimwear, whether one-piece or bikinis, rings especially true. We find no error in the District Court's conclusion that this factor weighs in favor of Victoria's Secret.
118 Before discussing this factor, it is important to reiterate the purpose of the intent inquiry in the Lapp analysis. Intent is relevant to the extent that it bears on the likelihood of confusion. We have held that a defendant's mere intent to copy, without more, is not sufficiently probative of the defendant's success in causing confusion to weigh such a finding in the plaintiff's favor; rather, defendant's intent will indicate a likelihood of confusion only if an intent to confuse consumers is demonstrated via purposeful manipulation of the junior mark to resemble the senior's. See Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.) Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 205-06 (3d Cir. 1995). 16 Courts' willingness to infer the efficacy of an intent to confuse is thus somewhat punitive, due in part to a willingness to believe that a closer nexus exists between an intent to deceive and success in that effort than exists between an intent to copy and success in causing confusion. See id. at 205-07. Some degree of bad faith is also relevant to the selection of an appropriate remedy. See A&H III, 166 F.3d at 208-09. 119 The District Court found that Victoria's Secret had not intended to confuse customers when it began using The Miracle Bra in conjunction with its swimwear line. The record supports the conclusion that Victoria's Secret brought the mark into swimwear because of its success in lingerie. The court thus properly found that Victoria's Secret had not expanded The Miracle Bra into swimwear in an effort to ride on A&H's good name. 120 A&H argues that the court should have weighed the intent factor in its favor because when The Miracle Bra was registered for lingerie, Victoria's Secret's counsel learned that there were several pre-existing MIRACLE marks, including A&H's Miraclesuit. However, the court credited evidence that in 1994, when Victoria's Secret attempted to register The Miracle Bra for swimsuits, bathing suits and bikinis, Victoria's Secret Stores assumed that its original trademark search had uncovered no confusingly similar registrations. See A&H IV, 57 F.Supp. 2d at 173. The court also credited the evidence that no one at Victoria's Secret Stores responsible for the expansion of The Miracle Bra to swimwear had ever heard of the Miraclesuit or knew that Victoria's Secret Catalogue had ever sold Miraclesuits. Further, the court found that Victoria's Secret Catalogue had chosen to expand the mark into swimwear for legitimate reasons. Id. The PTO attorney's denial of registration occurred after this suit had been filed. See id. The District Court held, therefore, that it was entirely credible that no one at Victoria's Secret Stores knew about Miraclesuit and that [a]t best, this lack of communication was a result of bureaucratic carelessness and was not intentionally done for the purpose of profiting from the notoriety of Plaintiffs' Miraclesuit mark. Id. at 173-74. We discern no clear error or misapplication of law in these findings, or in the District Court's weighing of the intent factor in Victoria's Secret's favor.
121 The District Court found that, although there was some evidence of actual confusion, that evidence was insufficient to permit weighing this factor in A&H's favor. A&H produced an article in Women's Wear Daily mentioning the introduction of the Miracle Swimsuit in the upcoming Victoria's Secret Catalog. A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 174. An A&H sales agent testified that a professional swimwear buyer asked him if A&H carried The Miracle Bra swimsuit; that a professional swimwear representative asked if the two were related; that a former buyer asked if the Miraclesuit had that push-up element she had heard so much about; and that a buyer asked him for an appointment to see The Miracle Bra line. See id. A&H also presented testimony that one of its own public relations agents thought that A&H made both Miraclesuit and The Miracle Bra; that a buyer stated that she had heard of the Miraclesuit as a suit that enhanced the bust; and that an A&H receptionist had received two inquiries concerning The Miracle Bra. See id. 122 The District Court, while not explicitly discrediting this evidence, viewed it with great skepticism, given the interested sources and the inability to cross-examine the supposedly confused individuals. 17 Furthermore, it concluded that, even if it credited all the submissions, the evidence of actual confusion was isolated and idiosyncratic. See id. at 175. This decision is supported by the case law. Ownership of a trademark does not guarantee total absence of confusion in the marketplace. Selection of a mark with a common surname naturally entails a risk of some uncertainty and the law will not assure absolute protection. Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1231 (3d Cir. 1978). Although some cases hold that, given the difficulty of proving actual confusion, relatively little showing on the part of the plaintiffs is required, see, e.g., World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir. 1971), other cases warn against using isolated instances of confusion to buttress a claim, see, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980). It is within the District Court's discretion to consider the facts, and weigh them. In our view, the District Court's conclusion as to the absence of actual confusion was supported by the record, and hence we will not disturb its decision to weigh this factor in favor of Victoria's Secret.
123 As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the District Court carefully considered the relevant factors weighing for and against a finding of likelihood of confusion. Most importantly, the court determined that, although the overall commercial impressions of the marks are only somewhat distinct if one looks just to sight, sound, and meaning, the fact that Victoria's Secret uses a housemark and a disclaimer tips the balance and makes this factor, the similarity of the marks themselves, weigh in favor of Victoria's Secret. This factor was essential to the District Court's ultimate finding of fact; it found that solely on the assumption that the disclaimer would continue to be used, the marks were not similar. As to the other factors, the court found that: (1) the products; and (2) the channels of marketing were sufficiently similar to weigh those factors in favor of A&H, but that: (3) the consumers were sophisticated; (4) Victoria's Secret exhibited no culpable intent in selecting its mark; and (5) there was insufficient credible evidence of instances of actual confusion, all of which weighed in favor of Victoria's Secret. We find no reason to disturb any of these findings. Finally, the court also concluded that the mark Miraclesuit merited a high level of protection, and weighed this factor in favor of A&H. Though we believe that the District Court could have been more emphatic in its finding that the marks were dissimilar, and may also have overrated the strength of the Miraclesuit mark, these factors only support our affirmance of the ultimate conclusion that the marks are not likely to be directly confused. 124 Although a number of factors favored A&H, these do not upset the balance. In sum, we find no error in the District Court's careful consideration and weighing of the factors, and its use of them as tools in reaching its ultimate finding of fact. We therefore will affirm the judgment with respect to the direct confusion claim.