Opinion ID: 2458558
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: It Was Error To Grant Summary Judgment Against Shaffer On His Contract Claims.

Text: We approach contract interpretation generally as a question of law. [13] We look to extrinsic evidence of the parties' contractual intent only if the language of the instrument is ambiguous. [14] In general, Shaffer argues that the Option Agreement is a mixed-up blend between an option agreement and a right of first refusal. [15] He states that the Option Agreement leaves ambiguous whether Shaffer has the right to invoke it. Though Shaffer's briefs never articulate the precise contours of this right, it is hard to see what he could mean other than that he claims some right to purchase the property even if Bellows never elects to sell it. But the Option Agreement could hardly be more clear in establishing that this is not the case. The Option Agreement states: This option shall take effect only in [the] event that Grantor elects to sell the above-described property. In the event is a synonym of [i]f it should happen, [16] a conditional phrase that contemplates the possibility of the event never coming to pass. In addition, another phrase from the Option Agreement that Shaffer discusses in depthThe base sales price, adjusted in this manner, shall be the actual sales price, if Bradley Shaffer elects to exercise this option  (emphasis added)plainly means that if Bellows elects to sell the property and Shaffer's option is thus triggered, then Shaffer may purchase the property at the stated price if he chooses to do so. The italicized phrase simply acknowledges that Shaffer is not required to buy the property if Bellows elects to sell, not that Shaffer has a right to exercise his option in the absence of Bellows's election to sell. We thus affirm the superior court's determination that the terms of the Option Agreement unambiguously give Shaffer a right to purchase the Ring Island property if and only if Bellows elects to sell it. Because the Option Agreement is not ambiguous, the superior court did not err in declining to make further factual findings regarding the intent of the parties. [17]
Shaffer has presented three contractual claims in the course of this litigation: breach of contract, anticipatory breach, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. If there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the conveyance to Hanson was a fraudulent conveyance, then a fortiori there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the conveyance was a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. If upon further factual development it is determined that the conveyance involved some form of consideration, then there is also a question of whether the conveyance breached the explicit terms of the Option Agreement. The superior court did not address the anticipatory breach theory in its summary judgment order. Shaffer did not raise anticipatory breach in his complaint before the superior court, though he did argue it in his opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, and he raised it in this appeal. We have on occasion chosen to treat claims similarly litigated in the trial court as preserved on appeal, [18] and we do so again here. On remand, we direct the superior court to consider Shaffer's anticipatory breach theory as part of its reconsideration of Shaffer's contractual claims.