Opinion ID: 620700
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Social Visibility

Text: Social visibility requires that “society perceive those with the characteristic in question as members of a social group.” Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 957. “Whether a proposed group has a shared characteristic with the requisite ‘social visibility’ must be considered in the context of the country of concern and the persecution feared.” Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. at 74. Although -17- “a social group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm . . . this may be a relevant factor in considering the group’s visibility in society.” Id. In applying this requirement, the BIA looks for two necessary conditions. The first is that citizens of the applicant’s country would consider individuals with the pertinent trait to constitute a distinct social group. See Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 957 (dismissing one proposed social group in part because the applicant did not show that “members of society in general recognize a social group based on informants who act out of a sense of civic duty”); Matter of E-A- G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591, 594–95 (BIA 2008) (“There is no showing that membership in a larger body of persons resistant to gangs is of concern to anyone in Honduras, including the gangs themselves, or that individuals who are part of that body of persons are seen as a segment of the population in any meaningful respect.”). The BIA has sometimes addressed this question by inquiring whether individuals with the relevant characteristic have been targeted for persecution. Where it appears these individuals suffer no more negative attention than the general public, this suggests that the persecutors themselves, and likely society generally, do not perceive this portion of the population as set apart. For example, in Matter of C-A-, the BIA observed that the “drug cartels have directed harm against anyone and everyone perceived to have interfered with, or who might present a threat to, their criminal enterprises. In this sense, informants are -18- not in a substantially different situation from anyone who has crossed the Cali cartel . . . .” 23 I&N Dec. at 960. Based on this fact, the BIA remarked “it is difficult to conclude that any ‘group,’ as actually perceived by the cartel, is much narrower than the general population of Colombia.” Id. at 961; see also Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 586–87 (finding no societal perception of a group where the record did “not suggest that victims of gang recruitment are exposed to more violence or human rights violations than other segments of society”). The second, distinct component of social visibility is that the applicant’s community is capable of identifying an individual as belonging to the group. Here, we consider whether “the shared characteristic of the group [is] generally [] recognizable by others in the community.” Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 586. In Matter of C-A-, the BIA gave the following examples of groups defined by traits that are “highly visible and recognizable”: Filipinos of mixed FilipinoChinese ancestry; young women of a particular tribe who were opposed to female genital mutilation; persons listed by the government as having the status of a homosexual; former members of the national police; former military leaders; landowners; families. 23 I&N Dec. at 959–60. In contrast, confidential informants who gave information about the Cali drug cartel to the Colombian police are not socially visible because “the very nature of the conduct at issue is such that it is generally out of the public view.” Id. at 960. The BIA explained that “recognizability or visibility is limited to those informants who are -19- discovered because they appear as witnesses or otherwise come to the attention of cartel members.” Id. Rivera Barrientos and the UNHCR challenge the social visibility test on several grounds. First, they contend the second prong of the test, the “recognizability” requirement, is unreasonable. They characterize this prong as requiring that “the common attribute be literally visible to the naked eye” or “easily identified by the general public,” Amicus Br. at 13, and cite two Seventh Circuit cases for the proposition that such a requirement is “unexplained and illogical,” Aplt. Reply Br. at 11. In Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh Circuit rejected the social visibility test after concluding the recognizability prong was inconsistent with a long line of unrepudiated cases finding a social group based on a physical trait that is generally “invisible,” such as sexual orientation or female genital mutilation. The court argued the test makes no sense . . . . If you are a member of a group that has been targeted for . . . persecution, you will take pains to avoid being socially visible; and to the extent that the members of the target group are successful in remaining invisible, they will not be “seen” by other people in the society “as a segment of the population.” Id. at 615. The court went on to find that the petitioner, a defector from a Kenyan sect, was a member of a particular social group within the meaning of the statute. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed this holding in Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009), based on its understanding that social visibility means “you -20- can be a member of a particular social group only if a complete stranger could identify you as a member if he encountered you in the street, because of your appearance, gait, speech pattern , behavior or other discernible characteristic.” If we agreed with the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of the social visibility test, we might also find it problematic. But we see no need to interpret social visibility as demanding the relevant trait be visually or otherwise easily identified. The BIA decision adopting this test, Matter of C-A-, does not appear to contemplate such a narrow definition. There, for example, the BIA listed numerous attributes that are not easily recognizable to the public at large as examples of sufficiently visible traits. Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 959–60. If opposition to genital mutilation, kinship ties, and prior employment as a police officer are socially visible, social visibility cannot be read literally. Rather, social visibility requires that the relevant trait be potentially identifiable by members of the community, either because it is evident or because the information defining the characteristic is publically accessible. In light of this understanding, we cannot find the BIA’s recognizability requirement is either inconsistent or illogical. As the BIA asserted in Matter of C-A-, this requirement does not deviate from past precedent, since those populations the BIA has recognized as “particular social groups” meet the relatively undemanding standard of recognizability. And, in contrast to the stricter standard discussed by the Seventh Circuit, this requirement does not -21- exclude groups whose members might have some measure of success in hiding their status in an attempt to escape persecution. The UNHCR also argues that the social visibility test is not entitled to deference because both prongs of the test are inconsistent with the UNHCR Guidelines. The UNHCR notes the BIA’s social visibility requirement departs from the Guidelines in two material respects: first, under the Guidelines, an applicant may establish membership in a social group by showing the relevant trait is a fundamental characteristic, in accordance with the BIA’s formulation in Matter of Acosta, or that society perceives a group to exist. The BIA, in contrast, requires that the applicant show a social group by identifying a fundamental characteristic and social visibility. And second, the requirement that the relevant trait be “recognizable” in some way is completely absent from the Guidelines. No doubt the BIA’s interpretation of the “particular social group” language diverges from that of the Guidelines. Once again, however, this alone is insufficient to show the BIA’s reading is unreasonable. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 427–28. We therefore join those circuits that have accepted the BIA’s social visibility test in interpreting the statute. See, e.g., Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009); Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 2008); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007); Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2007); Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006). -22- Rivera Barrientos also argues that, even if we apply the social visibility test, the BIA erred in finding her proposed social group does not meet this standard. We therefore consider whether the BIA erred in rejecting the view that women between the ages of 12 and 25 who have resisted gang recruitment are perceived to be a social group by Salvadoran society, and, if so, whether they are recognizable as such. The BIA concluded that this question is controlled by Matter of S-E-G-, which held that individuals who have resisted gang recruitment do not make up a socially visible group in El Salvador. See Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 586–87. We agree. As was the case in Matter of S-E-G-, Rivera Barrientos has offered no evidence to suggest that Salvadoran society considers young women who have resisted gang recruitment to be a distinct social group. Rivera Barrientos argues the pattern of persecution alone establishes that the gang perceived her as belonging to a specific group. She notes that she herself was targeted in the past by MS-13 for resisting recruitment, and she cites studies indicating that MS-13 frequently uses force against reluctant recruits. But, as the BIA observed in Matter of C-A-, we must distinguish between persecution based on social status, and an individualized reaction to the applicant based on her threat to the gang’s interests. There, the BIA explained: Were a situation to develop in which former police officers were targeted for persecution because of the fact of having served as police officers, a former police officer could conceivably -23- demonstrate persecution based upon membership in a particular social group of former police officers. On the other hand, if a former police officer were singled out for reprisal, not because of his status as a former police officer, but because of his role in disrupting particular criminal activity, he would not be considered, without more, to have been targeted as a member of a particular social group. Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 958–59; see also Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73 (“When the harm visited upon members of a group is attributable to the incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering those people a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning of the INA.”). The evidence in the record suggests that gang violence is widespread in El Salvador, and that MS-13 directs harm against any individual where doing so may promote the gang’s interests. We therefore agree with the BIA’s finding in Matter of S-E-G- that individuals who resist recruitment are “not in a substantially different situation from anyone who has crossed the gang, or who is perceived to be a threat to the gang’s interests.” 24 I&N Dec. at 587. The fact that Rivera-Barrientos was targeted thus does not provide evidence that society perceives her to be a member of a particular social group. Because we agree with the BIA that Rivera Barrientos’s proposed group fails the first prong of the social visibility test, we must conclude that it is not a “particular social group” within the meaning of the INA. We therefore affirm the -24- BIA’s finding that Rivera Barrientos has failed to show that she was persecuted on account of membership in a particular social group.