Opinion ID: 1778548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: brasfield

Text: In Brasfield, the defendant was convicted in federal court for conspiracy to possess and transport intoxicating liquors, and the Supreme Court overturned the conviction because the trial judge inquired into the numerical split of the jury during its deliberations. Although the judge did not make reference to which number favored conviction, the Court concluded that such inquiry was error, requiring reversal: We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial, that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal. Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division. Its effect upon a divided jury will often depend upon circumstances which cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to the appellate courts and may vary widely in different situations, but in general its tendency is coercive. It can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some degree, serious although not measurable, an improper influence upon the jury, from whose deliberations every consideration other than that of the evidence and the law as expounded in a proper charge, should be excluded. Such a practice, which is never useful and is generally harmful, is not to be sanctioned. 272 U.S. at 450, 47 S.Ct. 135. The Supreme Court considered a similar, but separate, issue in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988), in resolving whether the trial court's combined acts of giving a supplemental charge and of polling the jury as to whether further deliberations would be helpful in reaching a verdict, unduly coerced the jury into finding the defendant guilty: Although the decision in Brasfield was an exercise of this Court's supervisory powers, it is nonetheless instructive as to the potential dangers of jury polling. Petitioner's attempt to fit the instant facts within the holding of Brasfield is, however, unavailing. Here the inquiry as to the numerical division of the jury was not as to how they stood on the merits of the verdict, but how they stood on the question of whether further deliberations might assist them in returning a verdict. There is no reason why those who may have been in the minority on the merits would necessarily conclude that further deliberation would not be helpful, or that those in the majority would necessarily conclude otherwise. The two questions are clearly independent of one another. We believe the type of question asked by the trial court in this case is exactly what the Court in Brasfield implicitly approved when it stated: [An inquiry as to numerical division] serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division. . . . . We hold that on these facts the combination of the polling of the jury and the supplemental instruction was not coercive in such a way as to deny petitioner any constitutional right. By so holding we do not mean to be understood as saying other combinations of supplemental charges and polling might not require a different conclusion. Any criminal defendant, and especially any capital defendant, being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body. For the reasons stated we hold that there was no coercion here. Id. at 239-41, 108 S.Ct. 546 (citations and footnotes omitted). Hence, Brasfield and Lowenfield resulted in different outcomes while treating related, but distinguishable, circumstances. While Brasfield clearly condemned the practice of inquiring into the jury's numerical division and found such error to automatically mandate reversal without consideration of any other circumstances, the opinion was not grounded on any constitutional provision. Rather, as noted in Lowenfield, the decision was an exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory powers over the federal courts. 484 U.S. at 240, 108 S.Ct. 546. As such, Brasfield's per se reversal approach is not binding on the states. See Cornell v. Iowa, 628 F.2d 1044, 1048 (8th Cir.1980) (holding that under the principles of federalism, the better rule is to leave the decision of whether to allow inquiry into the jury's numerical division to the supervising state court) (quoting Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d 1195, 1200 (4th Cir.1979); State v. Roberts, 131 Ariz. 513, 642 P.2d 858, 861 (1982); State v. Rickerson, 95 N.M. 666, 625 P.2d 1183, 1185 (1981)). Nevertheless, although not constrained by the rule in Brasfield, we still must determine whether we should adopt its holding for Florida courts. For the reasons well articulated in Judge Gross' opinion, we decline to adopt the per se approach of Brasfield. [2]