Opinion ID: 2982291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: DeJesus & Ruffin

Text: In 1986, Congress enacted the Anti–Drug Abuse Act, 100 Stat. 3207, which set forth mandatory minimum penalties of five and ten years depending primarily upon the kind and amount of drugs involved in the offense. To relieve a gross disparity between the penalties for cocaine and crack cocaine offenses, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372, which increased the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger these mandatory minimums. In Dorsey v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the Act’s reduced penalties applied to those who committed a qualifying offense before the Act was enacted on August 3, 2010, but who were sentenced after its enactment. 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012). Relief under Dorsey - 61 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. is limited to this narrow tranche of offenders, however, and does not apply to pre-Act offenders with pre-Act sentences. United States v. Blewett, 2013 WL 6231727 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 1. DeJesus. DeJesus was sentenced on August 30, 2011, for two convictions of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine (Count 1) and fifty grams or more of cocaine base (Count 5). While the Presentence Investigation Report indicated that DeJesus’s total offense level of 30 and criminal history category of III corresponded to a range of 121 to 151 months, it concluded that a pre-Act twentyyear mandatory minimum restricted the range to twenty years. DeJesus objected to the report, requesting the district court apply the Act’s reduced penalties. The district court declined to do so and sentenced DeJesus to twenty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, both DeJesus and the government agree that DeJesus qualifies for resentencing pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act in light of Dorsey. Given that DeJesus falls squarely within Dorsey’s holding, we agree and remand DeJesus’s case to the district court for re-sentencing pursuant to the reduced penalties afforded by the Act.11 2. Ruffin. Ruffin also argues he qualifies for Dorsey relief under the Fair Sentencing Act. Though the district court sentenced Ruffin on September 30, 2011—well after the Act’s enactment—it explicitly rejected a request by Ruffin to apply the Act’s provisions to his sentence, based on the law of the circuit at the time. On appeal, Ruffin and the government agree that his Guidelines range would not change under the Act. Even so, Ruffin argues that we should remand his case for re-sentencing to provide the district court the opportunity to revisit its decision based on the Act’s policies. For 11 DeJesus makes several other arguments regarding the constitutionality of his twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence. We decline to address these in light of the remand for resentencing. - 62 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. support, he cites our unpublished decision in United States v. Boyd, 478 F. App’x 323 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), in which we remanded a case for re-sentencing in light of Dorsey, even though we determined the defendant’s objection to his sentence on appeal was without merit. The trial court in Boyd had similarly rejected the defendant’s request to grant a downward variance based on the Act, though it did grant one on a different basis. Id. at 324. We concluded that “[i]t may well be that the district court, now aware of the subsequent decision in Dorsey, might well conclude that an additional variance is justified.” Id. Here, the district court did not grant a downward variance from Ruffin’s thirty year Guidelines range, despite argument from Ruffin that his medical condition merited special consideration. Nonetheless, because the district court did not state whether its sentencing decision would have differed had it applied the Act, we remand the case to the district court to reconsider the sentence in light of the Act and Dorsey.12