Opinion ID: 179428
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants Bell and Beck

Text: Reid Machinery sued county officers Bell and Beck in their official capacities, and therefore the suit is essentially against the governmental entity, Williams County. See Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 493 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003). “To succeed on a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must establish that his or her constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom of the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.” Miller, 606 F.3d at 254–55 (quoting Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 606–07 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 44 (2008)). Reid Machinery alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a result of the Williams County policy to escort vehicles over 120,000 pounds to the county garage.9
Reid Machinery argues that requiring the truck to be moved to and kept at the county garage was an unreasonable seizure. The Supreme Court, however, has approved of law enforcement’s removal of vehicles from the roadside for public safety: 9 Reid Machinery also claims that the policy unreasonably interferes with commerce. It made general claims relating to the Commerce Clause in its memorandum opposing summary judgment. The complaint, however, does not plead a claim under the Commerce Clause, and the district court did not address the commerce arguments in its opinion. Because “[a] non-moving party plaintiff may not raise a new legal claim for the first time in response to the opposing party’s summary judgment motion,” Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus., & Textile Emps., 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), we do not address Reid Machinery’s commerce arguments. 12 No. 09-3665 Reid Machinery Inc. et al. v. Lanzer et al. In the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called “community caretaking functions,” automobiles are frequently taken into police custody. . . . To permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic . . . disabled or damaged vehicles will often be removed from the highways or streets at the behest of police engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control activities. . . . The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368–69 (1976) (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). The Court also “accord[s] deference to police caretaking procedures designed to secure and protect vehicles and their contents within police custody.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. Reid Machinery in fact admits “the traditional police authority to impound motor vehicles.”10 Appellants Br. at 62. The state of Ohio prohibits trucks in excess of the legal weight from moving without a SHP. OHIO REV . CODE ANN . §§ 4513.33, 4513.34, 5577.02. Law enforcement, therefore, has a community caretaking responsibility to ensure that trucks unable to continue their travel due to permit violations are protected and secured, and do not “threaten[] public safety and convenience” if they remain on the roadside. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369. Pursuant to this responsibility, Williams County determined that its garage is a safe and secure location for superload trucks to remain until they can legally continue their travel, and thus county deputies are instructed to remove superload trucks in violation of the permitting laws to this location. Reid Machinery argues that “there are 10 Reid Machinery admits this authority in making various arguments that the escort policy violates or conflicts with Ohio’s permitting laws. Appellants Br. at 56–57, 60–65. We remind the plaintiff that it brought claims under § 1983 for alleged violations of its federal rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, not for violations of Ohio law. 13 No. 09-3665 Reid Machinery Inc. et al. v. Lanzer et al. considerably less onerous methods of inducing compliance with Ohio’s weigh[t] laws” than escorting all superload trucks to the county garage. Appellants Br. at 58. The Fourth Amendment, however, requires only reasonableness, and “[t]he reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative less intrusive means.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 (internal quotation marks omitted). We cannot conclude that it is unreasonable for the county to determine, as a matter of policy, that superload trucks threaten public safety by remaining on the roadside and that the county garage is a safe and secure location to which deputies should remove the trucks. Cf. id. at 374–75 (reaffirming, in the context of vehicle inventory searches, that “[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). That there were closer locations allegedly suitable for the truck to be directed does not make the policy unreasonable; the policy “was not drafted to deal specifically with the nuances of every conceivable fact pattern.” United States v. Rose, 16 F.3d 1223, 1993 WL 539248, at  (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1993) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1085 (1994). “The factual circumstances will vary from case to case, and . . . ‘[t]he police cannot sensibly be expected to have developed, in advance, standard protocols running the entire gamut of possible eventualities.’” Id. at  (second alteration in original) (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 (1992)). Thus, we conclude that the county’s escort policy, requiring Reid Machinery to move its truck to the county garage and to maintain the vehicle there until it obtained a replacement permit, was reasonable and did not violate Reid Machinery’s Fourth Amendment rights. 14 No. 09-3665 Reid Machinery Inc. et al. v. Lanzer et al.
Reid Machinery alleges both procedural and substantive due-process claims against Bell and Beck with respect to the escort policy. Procedurally, Reid Machinery argues that the lack of a postdeprivation hearing to challenge the truck’s “impoundment” violates due process. Appellants Br. at 29, 59. In the district court, however, Reid Machinery raised the lack of a post-deprivation hearing only with respect to the deputies’ decision that the SHP was void; it did not raise the issue with respect to the escort policy. Accordingly, the district court did not address the lack of a postdeprivation hearing to challenge the escort policy in its decision. See Reid Mach., Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d at 864–65. As a general rule, we decline to consider arguments not presented in the first instance to the district court. See Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1461 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988). Substantively, Reid Machinery argues that the escort policy is “arbitrary” because “[t]here is no rational justification for treating overweight vehicles weighing in excess of 120,000 pounds differently from those weighing less than 120,000 pounds.” Appellants Br. at 27–28, 50–52. Substantive due process “guarantees ‘protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.’” Jones v. Byrnes, 585 F.3d 971, 976 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)). “‘[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense . . . .’” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 535 (6th Cir. 2008) (second alteration in original) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998)). The conduct must be such that “shocks the conscience.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846. 15 No. 09-3665 Reid Machinery Inc. et al. v. Lanzer et al. Contrary to Reid Machinery’s arguments, we believe that it is rational to have additional safety concerns about larger trucks stopped on the side of a road, and it is not arbitrary to draw the line at 120,000 pounds—a line drawn by ODOT in its permitting regulations. The policy clearly does not rise to the level of egregious conduct necessary to prove a substantive due-process violation.