Opinion ID: 795659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nature of Questioning By Officers in Park

Text: 14 Martinez also argues that his statements to the officers in the park should be suppressed because they were made in response to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Whether Martinez was in custody for purposes of Miranda after being handcuffed during the Terry stop is a separate question from whether that handcuffing constituted an arrest for which probable cause was required. 15 Miranda warnings are required only where a person's freedom has been so restricted as to render him in custody. United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 720 (8th Cir.2004). The ultimate inquiry is whether (1) the person has been formally arrested, or (2) the person's freedom of movement has been restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest. Id. `Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.' Id. (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)). Thus, the critical inquiry is not whether the interview took place in a coercive or police dominated environment, but rather whether the defendant's freedom to depart was restricted in any way. Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). In answering this question, we look at the totality of the circumstances while keeping in mind that the determination is based on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). See also United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1137 (8th Cir.2006). 16 In this case, Martinez was detained by two officers, patted down for weapons (with none being found), and closely questioned about his possession of weapons. Then, he was handcuffed and told he was being further detained. This occurred before being questioned by the two officers. A reasonable person would not, considering the totality of the circumstances, feel he was at liberty to stop the questioning and leave. Martinez's freedom was restricted to a degree often associated with formal arrest, and we find he was in custody at the time he was handcuffed. He was interrogated about the wad of cash while in this custody, being asked at least twice to explain the presence of the cash. Thus, we find that Martinez was subjected to custodial interrogation. 17 The government argues that so long as the encounter remained a Terry stop, no Miranda warnings were required. But the Supreme Court has indicated that the analysis is not that simple. In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), the Court looked to the circumstances involved in a traffic stop to conclude that the suspect's freedom of action was not curtailed to a `degree associated with formal arrest' as to require Miranda warnings. Id. at 440, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam)). In holding that the traffic stop at issue in Beheler was akin to a Terry stop, the Court held that, by itself, the stop did not render him `in custody.' Id. at 441, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Analyzing the factual circumstances, the Court noted that the respondent has failed to demonstrate that, at any time between the initial stop and the arrest, he was subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest. Id. Thus, the Court looked not to the fact that the detention was a Terry stop, but rather to the circumstances bearing on the question of custody, just as we have done here. The Court noted that some traffic/ Terry stops might involve such restraint, necessitating Miranda warnings. If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him `in custody' for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. Id. at 440, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Citing Berkemer, this court has previously implied the possible need for Miranda warnings during a Terry stop. [M]ost Terry stops do not trigger the detainee's Miranda rights. United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir.2003) (emphasis added). In this case, as we have said, Martinez was, under the circumstances, subjected to restraint associated with formal arrest, and was interrogated during that custody. Therefore, we follow the Supreme Court's cue and find that he was entitled to Miranda warnings at the time he was handcuffed. Since Miranda warnings were not given before Martinez gave conflicting accounts of how he got the wad of cash, those statements should have been suppressed. 18 Though failing to suppress the statements made in the park was error, we find it was harmless. An error is harmless if it does not affect substantial rights of the defendant, and did not influence or had only a slight influence on the verdict. United States v. Davis, 449 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir.2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 19 Martinez argues that his contradictory explanations about the cash, the cash seized, and his participation in the show-up identification were all fruit of the poisonous tree under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). However, we have found that handcuffing Martinez in the park did not convert the Terry stop into an arrest, and that even if it did, it was supported by probable cause. Thus, any arrest that might have allegedly occurred was not unlawful. Martinez has not shown that the police decided to take him to the bank for the show-up identification because he gave them contradictory statements. The Court in Wong Sun proceeded to a fruit of the poisonous tree analysis because [t]he prosecutor candidly told the trial court that `we wouldn't have found [the incriminating evidence] except that [the defendant] helped us to.' Id. at 487, 83 S.Ct. 407. In this case, the record indicates that Atkinson was instructed to bring Martinez to the bank. We think, in this case, the identification of Martinez by the teller at the bank was obtained at least by means sufficiently distinguishable from, if not independent of, Martinez's non-Mirandized statements. Id. at 488, 83 S.Ct. 407. The cash retrieved from Martinez was fair game for seizure, as its discovery did not rely on his statements, and we have found that probable cause existed for his arrest at the time of its discovery. Thus, Martinez's fruit of the poisonous tree argument fails, and only his contradictory statements in the park should have been suppressed. Given the other admissible evidence against Martinez, we find that failure to suppress these statements did not sufficiently influence the jury to merit our reversal, and thus was harmless error.