Opinion ID: 2441386
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Heading: the statute versus common law

Text: Appellant contends that KRS 411.184 is not a departure from the common law standard as there was no well-established standard prior to adoption of our Constitution. She argues that the statute merely clarified the confusion existing in common law and codified an existing standard which would be applicable to all claims for punitive damages. Appellant also argues that pre-1891 case law and decisions in this century reveal that malice, as expressed in various forms, is no different than subjective awareness under the statute; that malice necessarily presumes actual awareness. Appellee responds that the right to recover punitive damages for gross negligence was well established prior to 1891 and that the statutory requirement of subjective awareness of death or bodily harm represents the effective abolishment of negligence-based recovery of punitive damages and substitution of a requirement of knowledge or intent. The decisions of this Court which bear upon the legal question under consideration have been rendered over the course of a century and a half. While the numbers of such decisions are not vast, neither are they insubstantial. In the process of this analysis we will focus on a few of the leading cases trusting that they sufficiently express the major concepts and the development of the law. Going first to the pre-1891 cases, one encounters Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 146 (1859), in which the right to recover vindictive damages was allowed on the basis of recklessness although the killing was not intentional. In Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403 (1883), gross neglect was the basis for recovery of punitive damages, and the court held that the definition of gross negligence required no proof of a defendant's intention to cause harm or show bad faith. This definition was upheld in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Sheets, 11 Ky. L. Rptr. 781, 13 S.W. 248 (1890). Other cases from this period are not inconsistent. Fleet and Sample v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 219, 227, 56 Am.Rep. 563 (1852) (punitive damages were allowed for inexcusable gross negligence whether ignorantly or by design, whether with or without knowledge of the defendants.); Kountz v. Brown, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 577, 586 (1856) (allowed recovery of exemplary damages for injuries recklessly committed); and Hawkins & Co. v. Riley, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 101, 110 (1856) (punitive damages were allowed where a collision was caused by the defendant's wantonness, recklessness, or gross negligence.). It is true that some cases from this period define gross negligence or wantonness or malice to include elements which approach knowing or intentional conduct. See e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Robinson, 4 Ky. 509 (1868), and Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Chism, 47 S.W. 251 (1898). Nevertheless, from our review of the cases, there is little doubt that prior to 1891, Kentucky law was well established that punitive damages could be recovered for negligent conduct which exceeded ordinary negligence whether such conduct was expressed as gross negligence, recklessness, wantonness, or some other such term. In the period immediately after adoption of the Constitution, this Court decided Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Kelly's Adm'x, 38 S.W. 852 (1897), and Illinois Central R. Co. v. Stewart, 63 S.W. 596 (1900). Not only are these cases well-reasoned and comprehensive, but due to the time of their rendition, they provide timely insight as to the state of Kentucky law when our 1891 Constitution was adopted. A powerful passage from Kelly's Adm 'x is directly on point and worthy of repetition: It is well settled in this state that, for injuries not resulting in death, exemplary damages could be recovered where the negligence causing the injury was gross. The civil law affirms the existence of three degrees of negligence,slight, ordinary, and gross. The distinction between these degrees of negligence has been repeatedly recognized in the courts of common law; ... the term `negligence' including all its grades. This is a common-law proceeding to recover damages for a personal injury not resulting in death, and punitive damages were recoverable if the proof showed that the company failed to use such diligence in keeping its railroad bridge in repair as careless and inattentive persons usually exercise in the prosecution of business of like character. The absence of slight care in the management of a railroad train is gross negligence. Id. at 854 (citations omitted). Just four years after rendition of Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Kelly's Adm'x, supra , this Court decided Illinois Central R. Co. v. Stewart, supra , and reaffirmed our reliance on the definition of gross negligence approved a generation earlier in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. McCoy, supra . The Court stated that where gross negligence was shown, punitive damages might be allowed. This rule has been so often followed and approved by this court in subsequent cases that it is not an open question. Stewart, 63 S.W. at 599. Recent case law reaffirms the continued viability of these venerable decisions. Older cases, a number of which pre-date our constitution recognize and approve the award of punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages against corporations and other employers based on gross negligence of their employees. Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., Ky., 690 S.W.2d 382, 388 (1985) (citations omitted). Horton also contains insightful discussion of the theory underlying punitive damages, the circumstances in which such damages may be awarded, and re-states the prevailing rule in this jurisdiction: In order to justify punitive damages there must be first a finding of failure to exercise reasonable care, and then an additional finding that this negligence was accompanied by a wanton or reckless disregard for the lives, safety or property of others. This bears an element not distinguishable from malice implied from the facts. Id. at 389-90. Appellant asserts that the Court will find no `definitive statement,' `point of recognition' or `well-established' rule regarding liability for punitive damages at common law. We disagree. As shown by the decisions discussed hereinabove, the well established common law standard for awarding punitive damages was gross negligence. While the concept was not expressed in the same language in every opinion rendered prior to adoption of our Constitution, and while the language has not remained perfectly constant in this century, there is no doubt that unintentional conduct amounting to gross negligence, as that concept is well defined in Horton , was sufficient to authorize recovery of punitive damages. As the new statute requires proof of a subjective awareness that harm will result, it amounts to a vastly elevated standard for the recovery of punitive damages and a clear departure from the common law. The facts of this case well illustrate the fundamental change brought about by the statute. By the literal language of the statute proof of subjective awareness that such conduct will result in human death or bodily harm is required. Ordinarily, such proof could only be obtained from the party who inflicted the harm, but in the instant case the defendant did not participate and her testimony could not be taken. As such, there was no way to prove essential elements of the statute. From this a new litigation strategy might well emerge. In cases of gross negligence, but where compensatory damages for wrongful death or personal injury would otherwise be modest, a defendant might elect to forego any participation, relying on the court to prevent an excessive award of compensatory damages, safe in the knowledge that despite his gross negligence, no award of punitive damages could be made. Relying on Maysville & Lexington Turnpike Co. v. G.C. Kniffen, 4 Ky. Op. 92 (1870), and other cases which predicate exemplary damages on malicious conduct, appellant argues that `[n]egligence so gross as to raise a presumption of malice' is qualitatively no different than `a subjective awareness that such conduct will result in human death or bodily injury.' With this we vehemently disagree. Gross negligence, however it may be qualified, is conduct lacking intent or actual knowledge of the result. Moreover, and while recognizing that at some point along the continuum between negligent conduct and intentional conduct there may be a convergence of the concepts, this Court must remain mindful that where statutes are applicable, trial courts must instruct in statutory language. It is fundamental that an instruction based on a statute should encompass the wording of the statute so far as possible. Sorg v. Purvis, Ky., 487 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1972). Where the statute speaks in no uncertain terms, it hardly can be said that the use in an instruction of other terms not meaning substantially the same thing is not prejudicial error. McCullouch's Adm'r v. Abell's Adm'r, Ky., 272 Ky. 756, 115 S.W.2d 386, 390 (1938). Under these authorities, whatever theoretical merger of gross negligence and subjective awareness of harm might be perceived by the court and counsel, the jury would be informed only of the legal standard contained in the statute and by any reasonable reckoning, the statutory standard far exceeds gross negligence. We are unimpressed by the argument that the statute could be loosely interpreted so as to avoid limiting or destroying the common law right to recovery of punitive damages. It would be the height of duplicity to at once uphold the constitutionality of a statute and declare that it not be literally observed. Contrary to appellant's assertion, it is unnecessary that we discover a precise, infallible common law rule prior to application of the doctrine of jural rights. Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932), uses phrases such as well-established prior to the enactment of our constitution, long-established rights and safeguarded common law rights. We believe these are sufficiently flexible standards to support the conclusion that recovery of punitive damages for grossly negligent conduct was a recognized common law right which predated the 1891 Constitution.