Opinion ID: 160733
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable belief arrestee lives in the residence

Text: 13 To satisfy the first prong of the Payton test, the officers must reasonably believe Mr. Gay lived in the Pottinger Street residence at the time of entry. We recognize the officers' belief need not prove true in fact[;] it is sufficient if the belief was objectively reasonable at the time of entry. Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1225. In addition, Mr. Gay need not actually live in the Pottinger Street residence, so long as he possesses common authority over, or some other significant relationship to, the residence entered by police. Id. (quotation marks omitted). As we noted in Valdez, people do not live in individual, separate, hermetically sealed residences[, but] live with other people[;] they move from one residence to another. Id. 14 Mr. Gay argues an officer's reasonable belief cannot be based on information acquired from an unknown confidential informant. Mr. Gay cites Florida v. J.L., 526 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000) as support for his argument a bald assertion from an unknown informant fails to demonstrate the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity. In J.L., the Court held an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop and frisk. 120 S. Ct. at 1377-79. This is because an anonymous tip alone lacks the moderate indicia of reliability necessary to justify reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1379-80. 15 The J.L. case is legally and factually distinguishable from this one. To satisfy the Payton test the officers must have a reasonable belief the arrestee lives in the residence, not a reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a stop and frisk under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See United States v. Clayton, 210 F.3d 841, 844 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing reasonable belief from reasonable suspicion). These are two different legal standards. Nevertheless, we note the officers in this case, unlike in J.L., rely on more than an anonymous tip. The officers engaged in a face-to-face discussion with the informant, who knew Mr. Gay was currently involved in criminal activity, told the officers the location of the residence based on personal knowledge, personally accompanied the officers to the residence, pointed at the dwelling, and presumably remained accountable if the tip was fabricated. See United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1991) ([A] face-to-face informant must, as a general matter, be thought more reliable than an anonymous telephone tipster, for the former runs the greater risk that he may be held accountable if his information proves false.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 923 (1992). Based on the evidence as a whole, we find the officers could reasonably rely on the confidential informant's personal knowledge concerning Mr. Gay's residence; thus, the officers possessed an objectively reasonable belief Mr. Gay lived at the Pottinger Street residence at the time of entry. 5 16