Opinion ID: 721476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Civil Contempt Finding

Text: 33 After the jury returned its verdict on November 30, 1995, the district court issued a permanent injunction, reflected in the following exchange: 34 THE COURT: In view of the jury's verdict, the defendant Aastar Mortgage Corporation, its agents, servants, employees, and all other persons acting in concert therewith, are hereby permanently enjoined from continuing to do business under the name and style of Aastar Mortgage Corporation with two A's before the style, Aastar Mortgage Corporation with one A before the style, and they shall not in the future ... for so long as the plaintiff Star Financial Services shall possess the trademark Star Mortgage, either federal or state, use the letters S-T-A-R in their name in any combination with any other word. Further, they shall in no form or fashion use a logo or depiction of a five pointed star in relation to any of those words. Fourth, they shall in no fashion refer to themselves as formerly Aastar Mortgage in either of its capacities.... 35 [I]n addition, Aastar Mortgage shall take all reasonable efforts to recall, terminate advertisements with the infringing marks and logos.... 36 MR. MURRAY [Counsel for AASTAR]: Your Honor, may I be heard on one other thing? 37 .... 38 There are presently several loans and consumers about to close within the next week where the paperwork has been submitted on HUD forms and things like that. In light of the fact that there's no damage that's been found that relates to the plaintiffs in this case relative to the use of that name, the defendants, in order to provide no harm to the consumer, would like to be able to close those loans with the understanding that there would be no publication and no advertising relative to-- 39 THE COURT: Any forms that are out of Aastar's office, either now before HUD or any lending institution, they are not in my requirement of use of best efforts, they do not have to recall any consumer forms. No more forms go out with the word Aastar starting now. Tomorrow morning no form, no paper goes out of that office using Aastar, single or double A's, using the star or using the word S T A R. 40 That's the order of the Court. 41 About one week after the injunction issued, employees at AASTAR sent name-change facsimiles to several mortgage lenders. These notices displayed the AASTAR logo (containing a star symbol in the third A) in large, bold letters at the top of the page, and thereafter stated, WE'VE CHANGED OUR NAME; WE ARE NOW KNOWN AS: AACTION MORTGAGE CORP.; PLEASE CORRECT YOUR RECORDS. STAR's counsel immediately notified AASTAR's counsel about the notices, and AASTAR ceased using them. Over one month later, after it had moved and argued for attorneys' fees from the underlying action, STAR filed a motion for civil contempt stemming from the use of the facsimiles. The court then held an evidentiary hearing on that motion. 42 At the hearing, employees of AASTAR (now AACTION) admitted to transmitting the facsimiles, but professed a belief that such notices were in compliance with the court's order, as modified. Specifically, they stated that the notices were sent only to lenders with loans in progress, and explained that their interpretation of the injunction was that the court only ordered them to do the best that they could with respect to pending loans. One witness indicated that he thought he could go a little further than the court's injunction by informing lenders (that, he said, were processing loans that were out of AASTAR's control) of the name change with the facsimiles. When queried by the court, however, all of the witnesses acknowledged that they understood the court's order--specifically, no paper goes out of that office using Aastar--and that the notices fell within that language. 43 In explaining its ruling on the motion, the court acknowledged AASTAR's substantial efforts to comply with the injunction, but stated that the wording of the order was clear and unambiguous and that if there were any doubts, clarification or modification from the court should have been sought. The court found that AASTAR, in an effort to preserve the goodwill to which [it] had no right, deliberately disobeyed the order. Having found a clear and undoubted disobedience, the court held AASTAR in civil contempt, and ordered it to pay attorneys' fees to STAR (in the amount of $750) as well as costs associated with bringing the contempt proceeding. 44 On appeal, AASTAR contends that the civil contempt finding was unfair because the injunction was overly broad, ambiguous, and impossible to comply with. We disagree. As a preliminary matter, we note that nothing in the record indicates that AASTAR objected to the breadth of the injunction, or complained of impossibility of compliance either before, during or after the contempt proceeding. AASTAR raises these issues for the first time on appeal in its effort to avoid the contempt citation, and it does not argue that it continues to suffer from the purported overbreadth. Thus, we will discuss the issues of the breadth and ability to comply only insofar as they relate to the civil contempt adjudication. 45 Next, we agree with the district court that the injunctive order was not ambiguous. See 11A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2960 (1995) (explaining that, in civil-contempt proceeding, the court must find that the order was clear and unambiguous). The court ordered AASTAR to cease all use of the trade name AASTAR or its star logo, to refrain from referring to itself as formerly Aastar Mortgage, and to use its best efforts to recall or cancel advertising with the infringing mark. In response to AASTAR's inquiry about pending loans and already-submitted paperwork, the court explained that any such paperwork was not within its requirement to use best efforts to recall. The court completed its injunctive order with the following unequivocal language: No more forms go out with the word Aastar starting now. Tomorrow morning no form, no paper goes out of that office using Aastar. That directive was clear. 46 Based on the evidence, we conclude that the court supportably found that AASTAR deliberately and unjustifiably disobeyed the injunction. AASTAR's employees testified that they did not intend to violate the injunction, and that they transmitted the facsimiles in the belief that that conduct was in compliance with the order. Such assertions are unavailing, however, because good faith, or the absence of willfulness, does not relieve a party from civil contempt in the face of a clear order. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct. 497, 499-500, 93 L.Ed. 599 (1949) (explaining that [a]n act does not cease to be a violation of a law and of a decree merely because it may have been done innocently); Morales-Feliciano v. Parole Bd. of P.R., 887 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046, 110 S.Ct. 1511, 108 L.Ed.2d 646 (1990). 47 While good faith will not excuse civil contempt, impossibility of compliance does constitute a defense. See Morales-Feliciano, 887 F.2d at 5. Here, however, even assuming the injunction was overbroad, AASTAR has not shown how its particular conduct stems from the impossibility of compliance with the order. Rather, the evidence plainly shows that AASTAR's employees voluntarily chose to transmit the offending facsimiles. 48 As the district court correctly admonished, if AASTAR was confused about the scope of the order or felt that it was unable to comply, it should have sought relief from the court. See McComb, 336 U.S. at 192, 69 S.Ct. at 500 (stating that if there were extenuating circumstances or if the decree was too burdensome in operation ... [the contemnors] could have petitioned the District Court for a modification, clarification or construction of the order). Instead of seeking help or information from either the court or its attorney, AASTAR's employees undertook to make their own determination of what the decree meant and thereby acted at their peril. Id. 49 For the above reasons, we uphold the district court's adjudication of civil contempt.