Opinion ID: 180830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fifth and Sixth Amendments

Text: Beigali also asserts that the district court erred in rejecting his claim that the preindictment delay in this case violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We find no such error. While the statutes of limitations provide the primary guarantee against the prosecution of stale criminal charges, “the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment also plays a ‘limited role’ in protecting against excessive preindictment delay.” United States v. Brown, 959 F.2d 63, 65 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977)). Dismissal for preindictment delay under the Fifth Amendment is warranted only where the defendant shows (1) substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial, and (2) that the delay was an intentional device by the government to gain a tactical advantage. Id. at 66 (citations omitted). A defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process rights are generally not implicated where the government offers a valid reason for the delay. Id. (citation omitted). See also United States v. Schaffer, 586 F.3d 414, 425-26 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that the burden is on the defendant to show that government had no valid reason for preindictment delay and that the delay was an intentional device to gain a tactical advantage). 12 No 09-1588 United States v. Beigali Beigali fails to make any showing that the government’s delay in indicting him was a deliberate device intended to afford it a tactical advantage in his prosecution. For this reason alone, his Fifth Amendment claim fails. Schaffer, 586 F.3d at 426. Further, the ongoing effort by the government to reach a plea agreement with Beigali’s counsel before filing an indictment that included the weapons charge constitutes a valid reason for the delay. Beigali also asserts a Sixth Amendment claim. This court reviews de novo the constitutional question of whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated, but the district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Conceptually similar to the Speedy Trial Act claim, a Sixth Amendment claim alleging improper delay requires the court to engage in a balancing test by considering at least the following four factors: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). The burden is on the prosecution to explain the cause of the pretrial delay. Id. at 349 (citation omitted). Our balancing of these factors leads us to conclude that no violation of Beigali’s Sixth Amendment right occurred. First, while the delay in this case was not insubstantial, it was, as the district court noted, “significantly shorter than the five-year statute of limitations for the offenses charged.” [R. 29 at 7] Second, the government has given a valid reason for the delay, which was confirmed by Beigali’s counsel: ongoing efforts to strike a plea deal which would enable Beigali to avoid prosecution for a weapons charge that carried a hefty mandatory minimum prison sentence. 13 No 09-1588 United States v. Beigali Third, even assuming that Beigali pressed his counsel to move his case forward, he has shown no actual prejudice from the delay herein. This factor is much like the Speedy Trial Act prejudice analysis which, for the reasons already stated, demonstrates that no material prejudice to Beigali’s defense resulted from the delay. We therefore find that the district court properly rejected Beigali’s Sixth Amendment claim.