Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court's instructions with respect to mitigating factors c(5)(a) and c(5)(d)

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jurors that in considering mitigating factors c(5)(a) and c(5)(d), they could consider evidence of defendant's mental or emotional disturbance and intoxication only if they determined that those conditions were extreme or great in degree. Defendant again contends that the modifying language of the mitigating factor unconstitutionally circumscribed the jury's evaluation of the mitigating circumstances. The specific language of the mitigating factors is as follows: c(5)(a) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution. [Emphasis added.] 5(d) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law was significantly impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution. [Emphasis added.] On the mental-disturbance mitigating factor, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: Now, mitigating factor [c(5)(a)] deals with the defendant's mental or emotional condition at the time he committed the murder, but this mitigating factor does not require evidence of a mental disease or defect or intoxication. On the other hand, if defendant was suffering from mental disease or defect or was intoxicated, such evidence may be considered along with any other relevant evidence in determining the absence or presence of this mitigating factor. But it is important to remember that this mitigating factor may be present even though defend[a]nt was not intoxicated and had neither a mental disease or mental defect. This mitigating factor is established by evidence showing that defendant was suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that such disturbance influenced him to commit the murder. In this regard you are to consider the evidence on the totality of his intellectual and emotional processes at the time he acted. In other words, what was he thinking or feeling at the time, what was the effect of those feelings and thoughts upon him. Then you must consider whether his thoughts or feelings constituted extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and if they did, whether he was under their influence or power. By disturbance I mean ag[]itation, confusion or violent change. But in order to find this factor present you must be satisfied that the mental or emotional disturbance was extreme, that is that it was great in degree. Similarly, on the intoxication mitigating factor, the trial court informed the jury: Mitigating factor [c(5)(d)] is about disease or defect or intoxication and the effect of such condition upon the defendant during the murder. To find this mitigating factor you must be satisfied the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired by reason of mental disease or defect or intoxication. To appreciate means to understand. By significantly impaired the statute means made worse, weakened or deteriorated, not slightly but to an important, meaningful or substantial degree. Intoxication means a disturbance of a mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of substances into the body. Mitigating factor [c(5)(d)] may be found to be present based on mental disease or defect alone or based on intoxication alone or based on a combination of both. It is particularly important to remember that defendant does not have the burden of establishing a mitigating factor in relation to the question of presence [or] absence of mental disease or defect or intoxication as referred to in the mitigating factor. If you find that mental disease or defect or intoxication was present the question now is not whether such condition rendered defendant unable to form a purposeful or knowing state of mind, nor is it whether the condition disabled defendant from knowing the nature and quality of his acts and that what he was doing was wrong. Rather, under mitigating factor [c(5)(d)] the question is whether the mental disease or defect or intoxication, such condition or conditions significantly impaired defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law. Defendant did not object to those instructions. Now, however, defendant is attempting to delete the words extreme and significantly impaired from the statute. We reiterate what we stated in the prior section: We cannot delete the plain language of the factor. Supra at 299, 619 A. 2d at 1272. Whether the words significantly impaired and extreme modifying the respective mitigating factors unconstitutionally circumscribed the jury's evaluation of the mitigating evidence depends on whether defendant was precluded from presenting mitigating evidence on those factors and whether the jury was precluded from considering and independently weighing those factors. Lockett, supra, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964, 57 L.Ed. 2d at 990. Throughout this trial defense counsel presented evidence that defendant had been suffering from a mental and emotional disturbance and intoxication due to his cocaine addiction. Defendant's ability to introduce evidence of his mental state and his diminished capacity was unlimited. This is not a case in which the penalty-phase jury was barred from considering evidence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 1824-25, 95 L.Ed. 2d 347, 352-53 (1987); Hargrave v. Dugger, 832 F. 2d 1528, 1534-35 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S.Ct. 1353, 103 L.Ed. 2d 821 (1989). This case instead is substantially identical to three California cases previously discussed. Supra at 300-301, 619 A. 2d at 1272-1273. In Benson, supra, the defendant claimed that the trial court's refusal to delete the modifier extreme from the mental- or emotional-disturbance mitigating factor precluded the jury from considering mitigating evidence of non-extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 802 P. 2d at 330. The California Supreme Court rejected that argument because the jury had been instructed on the catch-all mitigating factor provided by the California statute. The court in that case expressly told the jurors that they could take into account any aspect of defendant's character or circumstances of the crime. Thus, there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have inferred    that they would not consider mental or emotional disturbance of any degree whatever in mitigation of penalty. Id. at 360; accord Cox, supra, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 729, 809 P. 2d at 388 (using same analysis on substantial-domination-of-another-person mitigating factor); California v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 870, 274 Cal. Rptr. 849, 799 P. 2d 1282, 1306-07 (1990), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2572 120 L.Ed. 2d 353, reh'g denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 19, 120 L.Ed. 2d 946 (1992); Brown, supra, 758 P. 2d at 1152 (instructions and counsel's arguments thereon viewed as a whole, sufficiently informed the penalty-phase jury it could consider a mental condition of the defendant which, though not characterized as extreme would potentially mitigate the circumstances of the offense). The test therefore is to take all of the trial court's instructions into account and to determine if the jury was adequately informed that it could consider as a mitigating factor the mental condition and intoxication of defendant, even if they did not find that such conditions met the statutory standard. There must be no reasonable likelihood that the jury had applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Boyde, supra, 494 U.S. at 380, 110 S.Ct. at 1198, 108 L.Ed. 2d at 329. The jury must understand the function and meaning of mitigating factors. Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 497, 550 A. 2d 1172. In reviewing the record in its entirety we find that the jury understood that it could consider in mitigation and independently weigh all the evidence of defendant's mental state and diminished capacity. At the outset of the penalty phase the trial court described briefly the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors. With respect to mitigating c(5)(h), the catch-all provision, the court stated the following: And four, any factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or the circumstances of the offense, and any factor which the jury sees from the evidence as being a mitigating factor. At the end of the penalty phase, the trial court instructed the jury that mitigating factors are those which would tend towards the sentence of imprisonment for life. The factors have to do with the circumstances of the crime, personal traits, qualities and background of defendant. The court further charged that evidence of mitigating factors is not offered to justify or excuse a defendant's conduct; rather, it is intended to present extenuating facts about defendant's life or character or circumstances surrounding the murder that would justify a sentence of less than death. Moreover, the court told the jury more than once that the evidence to be considered by you includes that material presented by both sides at both phases of the trial, all of the witnesses and all of the physical evidence   . You can use anything that you've heard, even if its not presented by counsel as a mitigating factor, if you believe it is there. The jury was also specifically instructed that the same facts could be used to prove more than one mitigating factor. With respect to the weighing of mitigating factors, the court informed the jury that if there is evidence of a mitigating factor you must consider the evidence and give it such weight as you deem appropriate. The trial court also instructed the jury on the catch-all mitigating factor, c(5)(h) ([a]ny other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense) as follows: Mitigating factor [c(5)(h)] is not merely a single factor. Rather it requires that you consider all the evidence received as it relates to or concerns the defendant's life, his characteristics or background and the totality of the circumstances of the crime as well as the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. You do not have to describe such evidence or factors in words on the jury verdict form. We'll go over that shortly. All mitigating evidence is to be considered by you, whether it appears during the first part of the trial from witnesses called by the State or the defense, and from the physical evidence, or it appears during this phase of the trial from the evidence produced by either side, or any mitigating factor that you see present. [Emphasis added.] Throughout the penalty phase, defense counsel also focused on the fact that the jurors were to [t]ake into consideration the extreme mental and emotional disturbance that might have been involved. The Court is going to give you some specific instructions and our Supreme Court has come up with various different guidelines on how this is followed. But two things to look at along those lines is his cocaine abuse and intoxication, not only during the commission of the offense, but before and after; the fact that his world fell apart, that he got divorced after being married for forty years. Those are aspects that you're going to hear and think about. In his summation defense counsel likewise emphasized that the jurors were to consider all the evidence presented regarding defendant's drug abuse and his emotional and mental state in determining whether there was any evidence that defendant suffered from a mental or emotional disturbance or had diminished capacity due to a mental disease or defect or intoxication. Further, defense counsel explained the wide scope of evidence that the jury could consider in reviewing the catch-all factor: another thought process that we ask you to utilize in the mitigating factors of taking any other items that you can find either that I brought to your attention or by virtue of something that the Prosecutor said or something the Judge is instructing you clicked off in your mind that you heard at the first trial that helps mitigate the situation. It doesn't make it right. It's never going to make it right, but helps mitigate the situation. You can take all of those factors in. The Legislature has given us a catch-all for that purpose. Even if you had the slightest little doubt during the course of your deliberations on the first trial you can take into consideration and utilize those. Like defense counsel, the prosecutor in her summation also impressed on the jury the broad scope of evidence it could consider in determining mitigating factor c(5)(h). The last mitigating factor, any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or the circumstances of the offense. Did you see anything in mitigation of this crime all throughout the trial? You are entitled to consider anything that you heard, make any excuse that you want for the defendant's actions. When you think about it, were there any? Was this the product of something he couldn't control? Was this the product of some substance he introduced into his body, or were these clear and conscious decisions made by a man who's not sick, who's just evil. Who else but an evil person could concoct such a plan as to kidnap and execute another human being? Someone who's driven by one thing, and it's not cocaine. In Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 145, 586 A. 2d 85, we recognized that [a]lthough arguments of counsel can by no means serve as a substitute for instructions by the court,    the prejudicial effect of the omitted instruction must be evaluated `in light of the totality of the circumstances  including all the instructions to the jury, [and] the arguments of counsel....' (quoting Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 787, 99 S.Ct. 2088, 2089, 60 L.Ed. 2d 640, 643 (1979)). No defendant has the right to select the particular phrasing of the jury instructions. Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 168, 548 A. 2d 887. The important factor is that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury misunderstands its role in the capital sentencing procedure or misunderstands the meaning and purpose of the mitigating factor. We recognize as we did in Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 147-48, 586 A. 2d 85, the desirability of more precise instructions that would clarify even further the scope and function of those mitigating factors. But in assessing the overall adequacy of the trial court's instructions in the sentencing case we are satisfied that the jury did understand its function and the function and meaning of the mitigating circumstances. Defendant was not precluded from submitting any evidence concerning his mental state and diminished capacity: the court properly instructed the jury about mitigating factor c(5)(h) and specifically told it to consider all the evidence from whatever source in determining whether that factor exists, and individually to evaluate the existence of any mitigating factor. The jurors were adequately instructed to take into consideration all of [defendant's] mitigating evidence    and [to] give effect to [t]his mitigating evidence. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2943-44, 106 L.Ed. 2d 256, 274 (1989); Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 52-53, 594 A. 2d 172. There was no reasonable likelihood that the jury    applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevent[ed] the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Boyde, supra, 494 U.S. at 380, 110 S.Ct. at 1198, 108 L.Ed. 2d at 329. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have inferred from the instructions it received that it could not consider mental or emotional disturbance or disease or defect or intoxication of any degree whatsoever in mitigation of defendant's penalty.