Opinion ID: 2065651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: murder defined

Text: The following description of murder under Maryland law serves as a basis for our analysis: Under Maryland law the crime of murder remains a common law crime, although first and second degree murder have been delineated by statute. See Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 116, 138, 857 A.2d 88, 100 (2004); Mitchell v. State, 363 Md. 130, 146-47, 767 A.2d 844, 854 (2001). Section 407 of Art. 27 defined first degree murder as: All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or by any kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing shall be murder in the first degree. Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 407 was recodified without substantive change as Maryland Code (2002), § 2-201 of the Criminal Law Article. Section 411 of Art. 27 defined second degree murder as: All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree. Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 411 was recodified without substantive change as Maryland Code (2002), § 2-204 of the Criminal Law Article. Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 345 n. 2, 896 A.2d 1059, 1062 n. 2 (2006). Although second-degree murder is defined by statute as encompassing all other kinds of murder, this Court has distinguished four different types of second-degree murder. [6] Mitchell, 363 Md. at 146-47, 767 A.2d at 853. In 1997, this Court stated in Burch, 346 Md. at 274, 696 A.2d at 454, that: Second-degree murder embraces a killing accompanied by any of at least three alternative mentes reae: killing another person (other than by poison or lying in wait) with the intent to kill, but without the deliberation and premeditation required for first degree murder; killing another person with the intent to inflict such serious bodily harm that death would be the likely result; and what has become known as depraved heart murder  a killing resulting from `the deliberate perpetration of a knowingly dangerous act with reckless and wanton unconcern and indifference as to whether anyone is harmed or not.' (Citations omitted.) Earlier, in Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340, 519 A.2d 735, 736 (1987), we summarized the crime of murder and the requisite malevolent states of mind but did not mention the concept that death would be the likely result of the harm as we did in Burch and Mitchell. [7] We said in Ross: Murder is the killing of one human being by another with the requisite malevolent state of mind and without justification, excuse, or mitigation. These qualifying malevolent states of mind are: 1) the intent to kill, 2) the intent to do grievous bodily harm, 3) the intent to do an act under the circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (depraved heart), or 4) the intent to commit a dangerous felony. Id. (citing Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law 46 (2d ed.1969)). Stated differently, [a] murder conviction may . . . be supported by proof of any one of four separate mentes reae.  Glenn v. State, 68 Md.App. 379, 384-85, 511 A.2d 1110, 1113 (1986); see also Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Criminal Homicide Law 38 (2002). [E]ach of these four intents is independently blameworthy to support a murder conviction in its own right and [they are not] mere[ly] evidentiary avenue[s] to [proving an intent to kill]. [8] Id. at 39. In addition, [t]he presence of one of these intents is an indispensable ingredient, although not the only necessary ingredient, of that slippery legal concept known as `malice.' Glenn, 68 Md.App. at 385, 511 A.2d at 1113. (See our discussion, infra. )