Opinion ID: 2192210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of the Maryland Evidence Under D.R.E. 404(b) and Getz v. State

Text: The Superior Court properly admitted the Maryland evidence under D.R.E. 404(b) and Getz v. State . [11] D.R.E. 404(b) permits introduction of evidence of prior misconduct to show a defendant's intent, knowledge, and common scheme or plan. [12] Here, the State introduced the Maryland evidence to prove Kendall's criminal intent to steal from the homebuyers and others, his knowledge of how to carry out the Delaware misconduct, and his common scheme dating back to 1982. This Court reviews for abuse of discretion the Superior Court's decision to admit evidence of prior misconduct under D.R.E. 404(b). [13] In order to admit D.R.E. 404(b) evidence, the trial court must consider six factors: (1) the evidence must be material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute; (2) the evidence must be introduced for a purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b) or some other non-propensity purpose; (3) the evidence proving the prior bad act must be plain, clear, and conclusive; (4) the bad act must not be too remote in time from the charged offense; (5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; and (6) the court must give the jury a limiting instruction. [14] The Superior Court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the Maryland evidence under D.R.E. 404(b). First, the Maryland evidence was material to the charge of Theft. The State sought its admission to prove Kendall's criminal intent in three Theft counts: intent to deprive or appropriate the property of another, 11 Del.C. § 841(a); intent to create or reinforce a false impression, 11 Del.C. § 843; or intent not to engage in the promised future conduct, 11 Del.C. § 844. Kendall's past misconduct was relevant to prove that his actions in Delaware were not accidental, unintended, or simply products of business risk beyond his control, but were in fact intentional actions. [15] Also, the court properly admitted the Maryland evidence, which was unique in nature, to reveal the common pattern of a crime that is not commonplace. [16] Thus, the Maryland evidence was admitted for a purpose sanctioned by D.R.E. 404(b). [17] Second, the Maryland evidence was plain, clear, and conclusive evidence. The State presented the direct testimony of eyewitnesses and homebuyers with personal knowledge of the events. The testimony of eyewitnesses to a defendant's prior bad acts may constitute plain and clear evidence. [18] Third, the bad acts in Maryland were not too remote in time. Evidence is too remote in time only where there is no visible, plain, or necessary connection between it and the proposition eventually to be proved. [19] Here, the events beginning in Maryland in 1982 demonstrated the same pattern of misconduct occurring in the late 1980s and in the charged offenses in Kent County, Delaware in 1992-94. We recognize that this Court in the past has analogized the too-remote factor in Getz to the ten-year time limit contained in D.R.E. 609(b) governing impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime. [20] But we have noted that this is not a bright line rule. [21] The evidence at bar demonstrates a continuous flow of related illicit activity spanning nearly 12 years. Therefore, when viewed in its entirety, the Maryland misconduct was not too remote in time to meet the Getz factors. Fourth, because the Maryland evidence was highly probative of Kendall's intent, knowledge, and his common scheme, Kendall was not unfairly prejudiced by its admission into evidence. Indeed, Kendall's failure to disclose his prior actions was part and parcel of his crime of Theft by False Pretense. Thus, under D.R.E. 403, the Superior Court properly admitted the Maryland evidence. [22] Finally, the court twice gave proper cautionary instructions to the jury on the issue of the Maryland evidence: once at the beginning of trial and again directly prior to the admission of the evidence. At Kendall's request, the court did not give an instruction stating the limited purpose of admissibility. Thus, by adhering to all of the Getz factors, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Maryland evidence under D.R.E. 404(b).