Opinion ID: 1772790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was the indictment fatally defective for failing to allege malice aforethought?

Text: The indictment under which Christine Johnson was tried reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 2. Did unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously and without authority of law kill and murder Ceddrick Johnson, a human being, while the said Christine Johnson was engaged in acts emminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual, in violation of MCA 97-3-19(1)(b). Mississippi Code Annotated 99-7-37 (1972), provides as follows: In an indictment for homicide it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in which or the means by which the death of the deceased was caused, but it shall be sufficient to charge in an indictment for murder, that the defendant did feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, kill and murder the deceased. ... (Emphasis added). Johnson contends that § 99-7-37 mandates the use of the language malice aforethought, and that it was error to overrule her demurrer to the indictment for its failure to use that language. She is wrong. Rule 2.05, Miss. Uniform Criminal Rules of Cir. Court Practice sets out what form the indictment shall be in. It provides as follows: The indictment upon which the defendant is to be tried shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged and shall fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Formal or technical words are not necessary in an indictment, if the offense can be substantially described without them.  (Emphasis added). This indictment followed the language of the depraved heart murder statute as set out in Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-19(1)(b) (Supp. 1984). Whether an indictment in the language of the statute is sufficient, or whether other words or acts are necessary to properly charge the commission of a crime is dependent upon the nature of the offense and the terms in which it is described by the statute. If the statute fully and clearly defines the offense, the language of the statute is sufficient. Jackson v. State, 420 So.2d 1045, 1046 (Miss. 1982), (following numerous cases cited therein). It is our duty to harmonize our statutes if they appear to conflict, and because we find no conflict between these two statutes that harmony comes readily. § 97-3-19(1)(b) is sufficient in language to properly charge one with depraved heart murder. § 99-7-37 does not mandate malice aforethought in every murder indictment, but merely proclaims that an indictment in that form will be sufficient. Accordingly, in keeping with our statutes, case law and criminal procedure rules, we find that it was not error to overrule the demurrer to this indictment. The case of Buchanan v. State, 97 Miss. 839, 53 So. 399 (1910), which held that a murder indictment which leaves out the word malice is fatally defective, is therefore overruled.