Opinion ID: 1177499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lack of Jurisdiction to Entertain Commitment Proceedings

Text: To resolve the jurisdictional issue it is necessary to view the statutes in their setting. The legislation establishing a program of civil commitment of narcotics addicts and those in imminent danger of addiction is found in chapters 11 and 12 of title 7, part III of the Penal Code. (See generally In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128; Notes, 1 San Diego L.Rev. (1964) 58; 8 Utah L.Rev. (1962-1964) 367.) [7] Articles 2 and 3 of chapter 11 provide two distinct commitment procedures, ostensibly differentiating between Persons Charged with a Crime (art. 2) and Persons not Charged with a Crime (art. 3). Such headings, however, do not affect the scope, meaning, or intent of the legislation (Pen. Code, § 10004; In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 137 [1]) and it appears that in practice the distinction actually observed is between persons who have been brought to trial and convicted (which in this context means whose guilt of crime has been established by plea, verdict, or finding) and those who have not. [3] Far more serious, though, is the confusion which has been engendered by the very fact that there are two such distinct statutory mechanisms for the commitment of addicts to the same rehabilitation program: article 2 simply declares (in Pen. Code, §§ 6450 and 6451) that proceedings brought thereunder shall be conducted in substantial compliance with Sections 5353, 5053, 5054, and 5055 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, whereas article 3 undertakes to spell out in detail (Pen. Code, §§ 6502-6508) the various steps required in processing a petition for commitment filed under its provisions. Our continuing concern with the fair and effective administration of the narcotic commitment program constrains us to examine the experience of the courts with the actual operation of the statutory scheme following our decision upholding its constitutionality in In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128. That experience, insofar as revealed to us, prompts the following observations: First, the wholesale importation into article 2 of the listed provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code (§§ 5353, 5053, 5054, and 5055) has proven to be costly and inefficient. As we observed in In re Jones (1964) 61 Cal.2d 325, 328, fn. 3 [38 Cal. Rptr. 509, 392 P.2d 269], The Legislature could not have intended literal compliance with all of the provisions of sections 5053, 5054 or 5055 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. These sections were enacted to provide a hearing procedure for mentally irresponsible persons. For that reason, if taken literally, they would be, in part, inappropriate for a civil narcotics commitment procedure. In an effort to minimize this patent inappropriateness the Legislature provided that in commitments under article 2 there need only be substantial compliance with the listed Welfare and Institutions Code sections. But the introduction of this element of uncertainty into an already novel procedure appears to have created more problems than it has solved. For example, if the statute referred to expressly requires the attendance at the hearing of at least two medical examiners (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5053), can the attendance of any less than two be countenanced? How could the attendance of only one examiner (as appears in the case at bench) constitute substantial compliance with a requirement that there be at least two? [4] To further complicate matters, jurisdiction to enter an order of civil commitment to the narcotic addict rehabilitation program depends on strict compliance with each of the specific statutory prerequisites for maintenance of the proceeding. (Italics in original.) ( In re Raner (1963) 59 Cal.2d 635, 639 [4] [30 Cal. Rptr. 814, 381 P.2d 638].) [8] It follows that in processing a petition for narcotic commitment under article 2 the prosecuting attorney and the court must, as the law now stands, (1) decide which requirements of the listed Welfare and Institutions Code sections are to be observed in order that the committing procedure be in substantial compliance with those sections, and then (2) conduct the commitment procedure in strict compliance with the requirements thus selected. In view of the mental gymnastics necessary to accomplish this feat with any consistency it is not surprising that a substantial number of narcotic commitments, although supported by ample evidence of addiction, have had to be set aside for failure to accord the defendant full measure of his statutory rights. Secondly, no compelling reason has appeared in practice to justify the difference between the commitment procedures prescribed in article 2 and article 3. [5] We do not imply that there should be no provisions for prosecution of the criminal trial until determination of guilt, for suspension of the criminal proceedings, and for certification or transfer of the defendant to an appropriate civil court. [9] Society has a recognized interest in prompt determination of guilt or innocence when a criminal charge has been filed; and, when guilt is found, the subsequent suspension of proceedings and transfer of the case are necessary preliminary steps to instituting an inquiry into defendant's addictive status. But from and after that point in the proceedings, all persons being subjected to examination and hearing for possible civil commitment should receive the benefit of the same statutory safeguards. We held as much in In re Jones (1964) supra, 61 Cal.2d 325, 328-330 [4], where we noted that there is no express authorization in article 2 for waiver of hearing, whereas article 3 contains such a provision (Pen. Code, § 6507); reasoning that the policy respecting waiver should be the same under either article, we in effect construed section 6507 to be applicable to both article 2 and article 3. [10] Such common treatment would further the declared remedial purpose of the subject legislation, i.e., that all persons addicted to narcotics or in imminent danger thereof shall be treated for such condition and its underlying causes, and that such treatment shall be carried out for nonpunitive purposes not only for the protection of the addict, or person in imminent danger of addiction, against himself, but also for the prevention of contamination of others and the protection of the public. (Pen. Code, § 6399; [6] see also In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 148 [12]; People v. Ortiz (1964) supra, 61 Cal.2d 249, 255 [3].) To the extent that persons convicted of a crime are singled out by reason of the different method of handling their petitions for commitment set up by article 2, the statute can be viewed as creating further external indicia of criminality which, as we said in In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 149 [13], are both unnecessary and unfortunate, and which run counter to the declared policy of treating all persons committed under this program for nonpunitive purposes only (Pen. Code, § 6399). [11] Moreover, a sufficiently serious discrepancy between the procedural rights afforded under the two types of commitments could result in a denial of equal protection of the law. (Cf. In re Trummer (1964) 60 Cal.2d 658, 662-664 [4] [36 Cal. Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177].) [12] On their face, the provisions of article 2 and article 3 show several apparent divergencies. [7] In practice, however, these differences have been minimized by an indiscriminate borrowing of procedural devices one from the other, so that the actual processing of petitions for commitment under article 2 and article 3 tend toward an improvised, overall uniformity. But the price of such a makeshift solution has been frequent disregard of the statutory language and a consequent uncertainty as to the validity of a number of narcotic commitments. [8] The present case offers another illustration of a situation arising in the operation of the statute for which no enabling provision has been made. Here the extent of defendant's addiction problem was apparently not recognized until after he had been convicted of a crime, sentence had been imposed (and partially suspended), and he had begun to serve his probationary period of confinement in jail. [13] As it now reads, section 6450 requires the judge of the criminal court to decide upon conviction (i.e., upon establishment of guilt by plea, verdict, or finding) whether the defendant should receive treatment for narcotic addiction or punishment for his crime, and that choice must be made before sentence is imposed. [9] [14] The latter limitation is consonant with the purpose of the statute to provide essentially civil confinement for treatment of narcotic addicts, in that (1) it insures that no person shall begin such treatment while under the disabilities resulting from entry of a criminal judgment against him (see People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 384 [9] -386 [16] [1 Cal. Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102]), and (2) upon successful completion of treatment and discharge from the program, the absence of such a judgment will facilitate dismissal of the original criminal charges if the court should be so minded (see Pen. Code, § 6520). [10] [15] But here the proceedings were neither adjourned in any sense of the term nor was the imposition (as distinguished from the execution) of the sentence suspended. It follows from the face of the statute that after defendant had been sentenced, section 6450 was no longer available to support a commitment to the narcotic addict rehabilitation program. [16] The Attorney General urges that it was nevertheless proper to commit defendant pursuant to article 3 (Pen. Code, §§ 6500-6510). The position is untenable. [17] It is true that section 6500 does not in so many words forbid the filing of a petition for commitment in these circumstances; yet because the subject civil commitment procedure is entirely a creature of statute ( In re Raner (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 635, 639 [4]), there must be shown express authority to file such a petition. [18] Not only is expression of that authority lacking, but the strong implication of the statutory scheme as a whole is that the Legislature did not intend to allow a commitment under section 6500 that in effect constitutes merely a delayed section 6450 proceeding. [19] The commitment mechanisms provided in article 2 and article 3 must be deemed to be mutually exclusive: if the facts warrant proceeding under article 2  i.e., if the defendant has pleaded or been found guilty of a crime but sentence has not yet been imposed  the court must exercise its discretion under that article; it may not fail to do so and then remedy the oversight by belated recourse to the procedure sent up by article 3. Any other construction would obliterate for all purposes the distinctions drawn by the Legislature in enacting the separate commitment procedures of article 2 and article 3. [20] It is not in any event for the courts to revise such a creature of statute; nor will they adjudicate its possible technical niceties of construction unless and until upon claimed impairment of the constitutional rights of a person subjected to its operation the issue is squarely presented. [21] Moreover, as a practical matter the filing of a petition for narcotic commitment after the imposition of a penal sentence would be a futile act in every case where the defendant was actually serving such sentence at the time, for either (1) the narcotic commitment would have to stand by until the sentence was fully served or (2) the sentence would have to be interrupted or curtailed to allow the defendant to be transferred from prison to the Narcotic Rehabilitation Center. Neither alternative, however, is authorized by these statutes or by any other provision of law. [11] [22] The Attorney General stresses that in the present case defendant was not actually serving a penal sentence at the time the subject petition was filed, but rather was confined in jail for a certain number of days as a condition of his probation. The stressed fact is true, but irrelevant. A judgment of imprisonment had nonetheless been pronounced and entered against defendant by the municipal court, and he was held in the custody of that court pursuant to its order of probation. Defendant was not released from that custody until May 14, 1963; accordingly, the superior court had no jurisdiction to order on April 5, 1963, that the Sheriff of the County of SAN JOAQUIN take, convey and deliver said person to the Director of Corrections at the Medical Facility at Vacaville, California for the execution of this order [of commitment]. The Attorney General points out that the order of April 5 was subsequently stayed pending trial by jury on the issue of addiction; that defendant completed serving his period of probationary restraint and was released from jail on May 13; and that it was only on the latter date that, the jury having found adversely to defendant, he was in fact committed to the custody of the Director of Corrections for placement in the rehabilitation program. [12] There are two answers to this point. First, the superior court order of May 13 expressly relates back to that of April 5, declaring that defendant be remanded to the custody of the Sheriff to be by him delivered into the custody of the Director of Corrections in execution of the Order of the Court heretofore made on the 5th day of April, 1963. Second, although defendant may have been released from actual custody (i.e., from jail) on May 13, he remained in constructive custody of the municipal court until completion of his probationary period on the following day. [23] If these computations seem excessively technical, that very fact emphasizes our conclusion that the Legislature cannot reasonably have intended an improperly filed petition for commitment under article 3 to be retroactively validated simply because the district attorney manages to time the order of commitment (or jury verdict of addiction) to coincide with the defendant's release from prior custody, whether actual or constructive. Finally, the Attorney General contends that the construction here proposed will create a jurisdictional gap in the statutory scheme by denying treatment to those persons whose addition is discovered only after they have reached prison. But in the present state of the law, as noted above, this gap is already inherent in the absence of statutory authorization to interrupt or curtail execution of a prison sentence for the purpose of transferring a convict to the Narcotic Rehabilitation Center. Instead, the Legislature has authorized treatment for narcotics addiction in city or county jails and the state prison system (Health & Saf. Code, § 11391, subds. (b) and (c)), and in particular at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville (Pen. Code, § 6102, subd. 4). The situation in any event does not appear to have serious implications for the future, for in view of the strong legislative policy which favors inquiry into the addictive status of all criminal defendants whose record indicates the presence of an addiction problem ( People v. Ortiz (1964) supra, 61 Cal.2d 249, 255 [3]) few if any of such persons should hereafter fail to be detected at the presentencing stage. [13]