Opinion ID: 1435973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Jurors' Consideration of Rejected Aggravating Factor

Text: In the penalty phase, the trial court charged the jury on basic capital sentencing concepts. The jury was instructed to determine whether the State had proven the existence of each aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was told that unless it unanimously found an aggravating factor defendant would be sentenced to life imprisonment. The jury also was told that if it found one or more aggravating factors, then it would have to decide whether there was support for any of the claimed mitigating factors. The court further instructed the jury that if even a single juror found evidential support for a mitigating factor, all jurors would have to consider that factor in the final weighing process. Last, the jury was charged that if all twelve jurors concluded that one or more aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant would be sentenced to death, and if not, he would be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. The instructions omitted one critical point: if the jury did not unanimously find the existence of an aggravating factor, that factor was to be given no further consideration by any juror in the sentencing process. The poorly crafted special verdict sheet did nothing to ameliorate the absence of that instruction. The verdict sheet returned by the jury indicated that at least one juror balanced a rejected aggravating factor against the mitigating factors. The verdict sheet also suggested that the forbidden subject of the rejected aggravating factor may have been discussed in the final phase of the penalty deliberations. Defendant's trial ended before this Court decided Nelson II, supra, 173 N.J. at 442, 803 A. 2d at 15, and State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 524, 776 A. 2d 144, 192-93 (2001), which squarely held that a rejected aggravating factor is entitled to no further consideration by any juror in the sentencing process. In light of our decision to reverse, we take this occasion to reaffirm that principle and repeat the guidance we have given to the trial courts for future cases. In the penalty phase, the State presented three aggravating factors: murder involved aggravated assault and/or torture, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c); murder committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the defendant, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f); and murder committed while defendant engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery and/or sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g). The jury unanimously found that the State had proven the existence of the 4(c) and 4(g) aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury, by a vote of eleven-to-one, rejected the existence of the 4(f) aggravating factor. Thus, the jury was authorized to weigh only the (4)(c) and (4)(g) aggravating factors against the mitigating factors submitted by defendant. See Nelson II, supra, 173 N.J. at 442-43, 803 A. 2d at 15-16; Koskovich, supra, 168 N.J. at 519, 776 A. 2d at 188-89 (citing Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 159, 548 A. 2d at 905). As noted, the court failed to instruct the jury explicitly that all jurors must disregard any aggravating factor not unanimously found by the entire jury. The lack of clarity in the verdict sheet underscored the importance of such an instruction. The language of the verdict sheet in this case was identical to the ambiguous wording of the one discussed in Nelson II, supra, 173 N.J. at 445-46, 803 A. 2d at 17. The verdict sheet read: If you have unanimously found more than one aggravating factor present, then indicate as to each such factor whether it by itself outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. After deliberations, the jury returned the completed verdict sheet: Aggravating Factor a NO (0) YES (12) [(4)(c)] Aggravating Factor b NO (11) YES (1) [(4)(f)] Aggravating Factor c NO (0) Yes (12) [(4)(g)] Defense counsel did not object at any time to the court's instructions on the weighing process or to the verdict sheet. Upon the return of the special verdict sheet, the trial court did not ask the jury for a clarification of its answers. The verdict sheet reveals that all twelve jurors found that the 4(c) and 4(g) aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. But it also shows that one juror found that the rejected 4(f) aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. That aggravating factor should not have received any consideration in the final weighing process. In view of the fact that a rejected aggravating factor played some role in those final deliberations, we do not know to what extent it may have infected the weighing process of those factors properly considered by the jury. This Court has emphasized that `clear and correct jury instructions are essential for a fair trial,' Koskovich, supra, 168 N.J. at 507, 776 A. 2d at 180 (quoting State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 522, 651 A. 2d 19, 39 (1994)), and are `even more crucial in a capital case because of the jury's responsibility to decide whether a defendant shall live or die.' Id. at 524, 776 A. 2d at 192 (quoting Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 162, 548 A. 2d at 906). [W]e are especially sensitive to ensuring the correctness of jury instructions concerning the jury's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors[ ] because that balancing represents the core of the jury's function in the penalty phase. Ibid. The need for clear verdict sheet directions is no less important because [i]f verbal instructions are unclear, or if jurors do not fully comprehend verbal instructions, the typewritten verdict sheet is likely the primary road map they will use to direct their deliberative path. Nelson II, supra, 173 N.J. at 449, 803 A. 2d at 20. Given the requirement for enhanced `reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case,' Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 162, 548 A. 2d at 906 (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2640, 86 L.Ed. 2d 231, 240 (1985)), there must be little chance that the jury as a whole, or even an individual juror, is confused about the process. Koskovich, supra, 168 N.J. at 526, 776 A. 2d at 193. Defendant did not object to the jury charge at the time it was given; therefore, any challenge to the charge must come under the plain error standard. State v. Josephs, supra, 174 N.J. at 98, 803 A. 2d at 1106; see State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 82, 695 A. 2d 1301, 1328 (1997) ( Chew I ) (noting that defendant must establish `clear' or `obvious' error affecting `substantial rights' to establish plain error) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed. 2d 508, 519 (1993)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1052, 120 S.Ct. 593, 145 L.Ed. 2d 493 (1999). Even under that standard, however, [a]s an indication of the paramount importance of accurate jury instructions, we have held that erroneous instructions on material issues are presumed to be reversible error. State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 359, 801 A. 2d 1142, 1154 (2002) ( Marshall IV ) (citing State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15, 573 A. 2d 1359, 1366 (1990)). We conclude that the jury instructions and verdict sheet suffered from many of the infirmities discussed in Koskovich and Nelson II. As in Koskovich, supra, the court below did not explicitly inform the jurors that if the jury as a group rejected an aggravating factor, no one juror could consider that factor during the weighing process, even if he or she voted for that factor individually. 168 N.J. at 524, 776 A. 2d at 193. In addition to the lack of a clear and explicit instruction on the non-role of a rejected aggravating factor, id. at 525, 776 A. 2d at 193, here the verdict sheet did not fail simply to clarify the law; it exacerbated the ambiguity by suggesting the consideration of aggravating factors not unanimously found. Nelson II, supra, 173 N.J. at 454, 803 A. 2d at 23. One juror, presumably the single juror who found the 4(f) aggravating factor to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, proceeded to erroneously balance that rejected factor against defendant's mitigating factors. In view of our reversal of defendant's conviction, we need not determine whether the imperfect charge and the ambiguous verdict sheet combined to meet the plain error standard. The Model Jury Charge has been modified to encompass our holdings in Nelson II and Koskovich: In order for the jury to find an aggravating factor, all jurors must unanimously agree, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating factor is present. If one or more of you do not agree that the aggravating factor is present, the jury is deemed not to have found that aggravating factor and no juror is permitted to consider that factor or any evidence introduced solely in support of that aggravating factor during the process of weighing aggravating against mitigating factors. In other words, if eleven jurors found that an aggravating factor exists but one juror did not find that the aggravating factor exists, no juror shall consider that aggravating factor in his or her deliberations. [ Judges Bench Manual for Capital Causes, Appendix J-34 (Oct. 22, 2002) (emphasis added).] The trial court in this case did not have the benefit of our holdings in Nelson II and Koskovich or the amended Model Jury Charge. We trust that trial courts in all future penalty-phase proceedings will follow the Model Jury Charge.