Opinion ID: 844211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Subdivision (u)

Text: Subdivision (u) (formerly § 340.1, subd. (s)), [10] provides: The amendments to subdivision (a) of this section, enacted at the 1998 portion of the 1997-98 Regular Session, shall apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1999, and to any action filed prior to January 1, 1999, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action which would have been barred by the laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999. Nothing in this subdivision is intended to revive actions or causes of action as to which there has been a final adjudication prior to January 1, 1999. Plaintiffs suggest that the Legislature's 2002 inclusion of subdivision (u) demonstrates a legislative intent that subdivision (u) apply to revive any case filed after January 1, 1999, against the subcategory of third party defendants described in subdivision (b)(2). They argue that unless we adopt this interpretation, we will be left with the conclusion that subdivision (u) constitutes surplusagea conclusion that should be avoided according to standard rules of construction. We disagree with plaintiffs' analysis. We have described the sequence of amendments that culminated in 1998 with a provision that, for the first time, supplied an enlarged limitations period for claims against parties who were not the direct perpetrators of the alleged abuse. ( Ante, at pt. II.B.1.-4.) Under the 1998 amendment, a plaintiff henceforth would have until the age of 26 (not age 19, as before; see pt. II.B.5., ante ) to file the action. We have explained that as of 1998, when a plaintiff reached the age of 26, the statute raised an absolute bar to a suit against a third party defendant, and, unlike cases against direct perpetrators, the 1998 enlargement would not recognize discovery that adult injury was caused by childhood abuse to delay the running of the limitations period past the age 26 cutoff. It seems evident to us that section 340.1, subdivision (u) constituted an express revival of claims that previously had lapsed but would otherwise now be governed by the 1998 amendmentthat is, claims by persons younger than age 26. Under subdivision (s) (as the provision was designated in 1999), a claim by a person who was 20 in 1998, whose claim previously had lapsed at the age of 19, would, under the 1998 amendments, have a revived claim and would be entitled to sue a third party defendant. Far from constituting surplusage, the revival language was still relevant in 2002 when it was redesignated as subdivision (u). For example, a person who was under the age of 26 in 2003 (when the 2002 amendments went into effect), who had not yet filed suit against a third party defendant (pursuant to the 1998 amendment) would still need the express revival language of subdivision (u) since these claims would have lapsed when he or she had turned 19 years of age. The retention of the language of subdivision (u) in 2002 does not, as plaintiffs suggest, indicate that it was retained to revive any claims filed against the subcategory of third party defendants after January 1, 1999. Such an interpretation becomes all the more unlikely when we recognize that in 2002, when the Legislature adopted new subdivision (c) of section 340.1, it provided an express revival clause for any lapsed claims identified in subdivision (b)(2), but limited the revival to one year. In support of their interpretation that subdivision (u) serves to revive any claim against these third party defendants after January 1, 1999, plaintiffs rely upon Bouley v. Long Beach Memorial Medical Center (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 601 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 813] ( Bouley ). In that case, a statute governing standing in wrongful death actions directed that `[t]his section applies to any cause of action arising on or after January 1, 1993.' ( Id. at p. 607, quoting § 377.60, subd. (d).) Although the provision had been added in 1997 to remedy problems created by a 1996 amendment ( Bouley, supra, at p. 607), the reviewing court concluded the 1997 provision nonetheless applied to render a subsequent 2002 amendment concerning standing applicable to lawsuits instituted after the new amendment took effect. The court pointed out that the Legislature must have retained the language for some purpose, concluding that the retention of the older provision was intended to make the 2002 amendments operate retroactively. ( Id. at pp. 606, 607.) (18) The decision offers no guidance in the matter before us. Section 377.60 concerns standing, and is not a statute of limitations. As we have seen, statutes of limitations are subject to their own rules when it comes to what is seen as a retroactive applicationthat is, enlargement of the limitations period to include lapsed claims. Thus, for example, the statutory language relied upon in Bouley, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at page 607`[t]his section applies to any cause of action arising on or after January 1, 1993'would not constitute sufficiently express language of revival in the context of section 340.1. ( David A., supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 286.) By contrast, and contrary to the analysis appearing in the Bouley decision, we have stated that to apply amended rules that concern solely the issue of standing to cases brought after the amendment ordinarily is considered a prospective application of the new rule. ( Disability Rights, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 232.) Finally, the language in Bouley did not contain language comparable to that appearing in subdivision (u) of section 340.1, that is, language expressly tying the subdivision to the changes made in a particular year.