Opinion ID: 2745053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Sources for the Standard of Care

Text: Plaintiffs contend, at length, that the standard of care in this case may be provided by statute, rather than expert testimony, under the doctrine of negligence per se. “To prevail on a negligence per se theory, the plaintiff may, in certain circumstances and under specified conditions[,] rely on a statute or regulation as proof of the applicable standard of care.” Clark v. District of Columbia, 708 A.2d 632, 636 (D.C. 1997) (internal quotations and alteration omitted). Violation of a statute or regulation may constitute negligence per se only “if the statute is meant to promote safety, if the plaintiff is a member of the class to be protected by the statute, and if the defendant is a person upon whom the statute imposes specific duties.” Ginsberg v. Granados, 963 A.2d 1134, 1140 (D.C. 2009) (quoting McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman, 717 A.2d 346, 354 (D.C. 1998)). Moreover, the statute or regulation “must not merely repeat the common law duty of reasonable care, but must set forth specific guidelines to govern behavior.” Chadbourne v. 3 While plaintiffs did provide evidence that the nightclub’s security cameras were not working, a jury would have to engage in speculation about the reasons why the cameras were not working in order to find defendants negligent. 13 Kappaz, 779 A.2d 293, 296 (D.C. 2001) (quoting McNeil Pharm. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 579 (D.C. 1996)). We have held that the standard of care in a negligence action can be established by D.C. Code § 25-781 (b), the statutory obligation of liquor licensees not to permit minors or intoxicated persons to drink on their premises. Jarrett v. Woodward Bros., 751 A.2d 972, 984-85 (D.C. 2000); Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Rest., 534 A.2d 1268, 1276 (D.C. 1987).4 Plaintiffs claim that the applicable standard of care in this case can be derived from § 25-402, which requires nightclubs to submit a security plan with a liquor-license application. D.C. Code § 25-402 (d) (2010 Supp.). Section 25-781 (b) specifically states that liquor licensees may not allow minors or intoxicated persons to drink on their premises. D.C. Code § 25-781 (b) (2001). In contrast, § 25-402 (d) only requires that a security plan be submitted with a nightclub’s liquor-license application, which is subject to review by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. D.C. Code §§ 25-402 (d), -433 (2010 Supp.). 4 Although plaintiffs contend that the nightclub violated § 25-781 (b) by allowing their assailants to drink on the premises, the statute only imposes limits with respect to minors, intoxicated persons, or persons of “notoriously intemperate habits.” D.C. Code § 25-781 (b) (2001). There is no evidence that the assailants fell into any of those categories. 14 Though the statute describes in great detail what topics the plan must address, the specifics are left to the discretion of the applicant and the review board. D.C. Code § 25-403 (g) (2010 Supp.). Accordingly, a standard of care cannot be imported from the statutory requirement that nightclubs submit a security plan with their license applications. Cf. Carleton v. Winter, 901 A.2d 174, 179-80 (D.C. 2006) (declining to import standard of care from statute generally defining a realtor’s obligations). Moreover, even if the nightclub’s security plan could provide the standard of care, plaintiffs did not submit it to the trial court. Plaintiffs alternatively claim that the agreement between the nightclub and the ANC provides the standard of care for security in this case because “[a] jury could infer the connection between D.C. Code § 25-403 and the security plan agreed to by the ANC and FUR . . . .” They contend that violation of the agreement was negligence per se because the nightclub was obligated to comply with the agreement to keep its liquor license. However, the agreement contains no specific instructions on how the security of the nightclub is to be arranged. For example, it states that the nightclub “shall have on the premises a sufficient number of employees to assure adequate security and to control unruly patrons, whether inside or in the immediate area.” It 15 also states that the nightclub “shall operate surveillance/cameras inside and outside of the Premises and preserve surveillance tapes a minimum of two weeks.” Those general requirements, using terms such as “sufficient” and “adequate,” grant the nightclub considerable discretion and do not specifically outline any standards through which its day-to-day security can be evaluated. The agreement therefore cannot establish the standard of care under a theory of negligence per se.5 Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of the applicable standard of care. Accordingly, the judgment on appeal is Affirmed.6 5 Even if the agreement did provide specific instructions, guidelines such as internal policy manuals cannot provide the standard of care under the doctrine of negligence per se. See, e.g., Clark, 708 A.2d at 636 (suicide prevention plan for juvenile detention facility); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 131718 (D.C. 1983) (en banc) (police department general orders). While the agreement may be admissible as bearing on the standard of care, expert testimony is still necessary to establish that standard. See Clark, 708 A.2d at 636. 6 We need not devote much discussion to defendants’ separate appeal from the denial of their repeated motions for sanctions. Under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11, sanctions may be imposed on attorneys or parties that have not made a reasonable inquiry into whether the claims they allege in a complaint are supported by the law and the facts, or will be after adequate discovery. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11 (b), (c). In this case, plaintiffs clearly had a good-faith basis for thinking that the claims in their complaint were meritorious. The weaknesses in their case were (continued…) 16 (…continued) only illuminated at the summary judgment stage, after they had the opportunity to conduct discovery but failed to do so. We therefore affirm the trial court’s refusal to sanction plaintiffs. See Ruesch Int’l Monetary Servs. v. Farrington, 754 A.2d 328, 331 (D.C. 2000) (“Rule 11 is violated only when it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success.” (internal quotations omitted)).