Opinion ID: 859180
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the declarant had at the time of making

Text: the statement pled guilty or was still exposed to prosecution for making the statement, (2) the declarant’s motive in making the statement and whether there was a reason for the declarant to lie, (3) whether the declarant repeated the statement and did so consistently, (4) the party or parties to whom the statement was made, (5) the relationship of the declarant with the accused, and (6) the nature and strength of independent evidence relevant to the conduct in question. United States v. Bumpass, 60 F.3d 1099, 1102 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Claimants challenge the following statements: (1) testimony by a former employee who overheard Dr. Kivanc refer to Remicade as the money maker during conversations with 14 UNITED STATES v. KIVANC Nguyen, J.A. 1207; (2) testimony by a former employee that Dr. Kivanc told her there was an investigation going on and directed her to lie to the FBI, J.A. 1220-21; (3) Nguyen’s testimony about how he and Dr. Kivanc doctored documents to obtain Nguyen’s medical assistant license, J.A. 1238; (4) Nguyen’s statement that Dr. Kivanc told him Turan was going to gather all of his [financial] records following the government’s request for Dr. Kivanc’s business records, J.A. 1244; (5) Nguyen’s testimony that Dr. Kivanc told him to give the two [remaining] vials of Remicade to a patient who was supposed to receive five vials, J.A. 1261-62; (6) Nguyen’s testimony that Dr. Kivanc told him not to write [patient notes] up like this anymore because . . . if this were to get into the wrong hands . . . they would know we were doing fraud, J.A. 1279; and (7) Nguyen’s testimony that Dr. Kivanc said he was being persecuted and investigated, didn’t know what he was going to do, and was just going to try to get the house. J.A. 1288. We first note that certain of the challenged statements are not hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); see also United States v. Diaz, 670 F.3d 332, 346 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating that [o]utof-court statements providing directions from one individual to another do not constitute hearsay when not offered to prove the truth of what was asserted). For the remaining statements, the following circumstances corroborate their trustworthiness: (1) Dr. Kivanc appears to have made each statement while at his medical office in the course of discussing work-related issues with his employees, and there was no apparent reason for Dr. Kivanc to lie to his employees; (2) several of the statements convey Dr. Kivanc’s then-existing plans, cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) (declarant’s then-existing state of mind, such as motive, intent, or plan); and (3) Dr. Kivanc’s statements expose him to criminal liability, see United States v. Brainard, 690 F.2d 1117, 1125 (4th Cir. 1982) (concluding that circumstances surrounding the declarant’s statements provided the required corroboration in part because they tended to inculpate him). UNITED STATES v. KIVANC 15 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr. Kivanc’s statements.