Opinion ID: 2336262
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Former Testimony under Lively

Text: Next, Chmiel argues that, under this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992), Attorney Kennedy's ineffectiveness hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial because it was based on the attorney's notes of his conversations with Chmiel. We disagree. The decision in Lively followed from the lead case of Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986), which held that prior inconsistent statements of a non-party witness may be used as substantive evidence where the declarant is a witness at trial and available for cross-examination. While acknowledging the traditional view that such statements were hearsay if offered for truth and, as hearsay, were too unreliable to be admitted as substantive evidence, this Court nevertheless concluded that since the witness in question would testify in court, where she would be under oath and subject to cross-examination, the acknowledged dangers of hearsay were largely nonexistent. Id. at 128-29, 507 A.2d at 69. Lively limited the rule of Brady by holding that a prior inconsistent statement of a non-party witness may be used as substantive evidence only if it was given under highly reliable circumstances: 1) under oath at a formal legal proceeding; 2) reduced to a writing signed and adopted by the declarant; or 3) recorded verbatim contemporaneously with the making of the statement. Id. at 471, 610 A.2d at 8. In the present case, Chmiel contends that Attorney Kennedy became a non-party witness for purposes of the second trial. Chmiel argues that because he did not adopt Attorney Kennedy's notes in any fashion, and in fact denied making the statements attributed to him by Attorney Kennedy, the notes themselves would be inadmissible. Therefore, he asserts, Attorney Kennedy's testimony should be inadmissible as well. The principles of Brady and Lively are not relevant, however, unless the matter at issue involves the prior inconsistent statement of a non-party witness. Here, however, Attorney Kennedy made no prior inconsistent statement; only his testimony from the evidentiary hearing was utilized at Chmiel's second trial. Therefore, Attorney Kennedy cannot be the non-party witness for purposes of a Brady-Lively analysis. Moreover, his recorded testimony, as noted earlier, was admissible under the former testimony exception as codified in Section 5917. Chmiel did make prior inconsistent statements, in the form of his statements to Attorney Kennedy; and those statements were effectively allowed into evidence at his second trial. Chmiel, however, was not a non-party witness. To the contrary, he was the defendant, and his statements to Attorney Kennedy were admissible under the hearsay exception for party admissions. Commonwealth v. Sherard, 456 Pa. 505, 508, 321 A.2d 372, 373 (1974); see also Galloway, 302 Pa.Super. at 158, 448 A.2d at 575. [Party a]dmissions . . . are admissible because it is fair in an adversary system that a party's prior statements be used against him if they are inconsistent with his position at trial. In addition, a party can hardly complain of his inability to cross-examine himself. A party can put himself on the stand and explain or contradict his former statements. PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 805 (footnotes omitted). In sum, as the reliability concerns underlying Brady and Lively are not present here, the Brady-Lively precedents pose no barrier to the admissibility of Attorney Kennedy's testimony.