Opinion ID: 2736698
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Public Duty Doctrine Applies

Text: At the commencement of this action, the public duty doctrine was assumed to apply; thus, what was litigated in the trial court, and originally briefed here, was that the doctrine applied save for the exception.8 On appeal, it was not until appellants‘ Reply Brief that they argued that the ―public duty doctrine does not apply to the situation presented here.‖ ―Normally, we do not consider arguments 8 Appellants did assert in their sur-reply in opposition to the District‘s dispositive motion that ―the public duty doctrine is entirely inapplicable to the case at bar.‖ They made the same argument in their Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court‘s ruling, saying that ―the Public Duty Doctrine should not have been applied in this case at all.‖ In its order denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the trial court referred to the Allens‘ ―arguments concerning the application of the public duty doctrine generally‖ and said that ―these arguments have been rejected.‖ 10 raised for the first time in a reply brief.‖ Williams v. United States, 52 A.3d 25, 50 n.104 (D.C. 2012). However, we will make an exception when failing to do so ―would permit a clear miscarriage of justice to occur.‖ Cannon v. District of Columbia, 569 A.2d 595, 596 (D.C. 1990). For that reason, and because this court has never addressed whether the public duty doctrine is applicable with respect to conduct by EMS personnel who are assigned to provide on-site vital-signs monitoring of firefighter candidates during administration of a PAT, we requested additional briefing after oral argument on the issue of whether the public duty doctrine is implicated in the first place. Now that both parties have briefed the issue, we believe that it is appropriate for us to decide the issue. 9 After reviewing the supplemental briefs, we find that the public duty doctrine is applicable. ―Under the public duty doctrine, the District has no duty to provide public services to any particular citizen unless there is a ‗special relationship‘ between the emergency personnel — police officers, firefighters, and EMTs — and an 9 See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 339 A.2d 710, 712 n.6 (D.C. 1975) (―Although neither the Commission nor the Telephone Company presented this issue on appeal, this court sua sponte requested supplemental briefs concerning the applicability of the APA to proceedings before the Commission.‖); Outlaw v. United States, 632 A.2d 408, 411 n.7 (D.C. 1993) (―A court may consider an issue antecedent to . . . and ultimately dispositive of the dispute before it, even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief.‖ (quoting United States Nat’l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 11 individual.‖ Woods v. District of Columbia, 63 A.3d 551, 559 (D.C. 2013) (Oberly, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Allison Gas Turbine Div. of Gen Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 642 A.2d 841, 843 (D.C. 1994)); Hines, supra, 580 A.2d at 136 (―[A]bsent some ‗special relationship‘ between the government and the individual, the District‘s duty is to provide public services to the public at large[,]‖ not to any individual who emerges to seek services); id. at 139-40 (agreeing that ―responses to calls for emergency assistance are simply not actionable under the public duty doctrine‖); Wanzer v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127, 129 & 132 (D.C. 1990) (holding, in case where claim was that the decedent ―would have survived his stroke if an ambulance had been sent when first summoned,‖ that the public duty doctrine barred a suit alleging negligent and inept failure to dispatch an ambulance); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 140, 143 (D.C. 1990) (reasoning that the facts pled ―could not sustain liability insofar as they merely represent the failure of the firefighters to perform any particular step that might have alleviated [the decedent‘s] condition‖). We are satisfied that the public duty doctrine applies here because of the evolving role of the EMTs Mason and Johnson. The record shows that, as monitors for the PAT, Mason and Johnson set up their station in a classroom some distance from the PAT apparatus floor (Robinson 12 had to ―run‖ there after seeing Allen in distress) for taking pre- and post-test vital signs of PAT participants. Their role was to ensure that all the candidates were physically qualified to begin the test and to take their vital signs at the end (presumably to determine whether they were in a physical condition as to have ―passed‖ the test) and to ―monitor‖ any candidate observed to be in distress. They brought into the classroom a ―Lifepak monitor and a BP cuff and stethoscope,‖ the equipment needed to take vital signs. PAT monitors were instructed that if they saw signs of distress, they were to have the candidate ―monitored by the on-scene paramedic.‖10 When Captain Robinson ran to get Mason and Johnson after Allen had finished the course and had trouble breathing, he was not seeking monitoring but emergency assistance, telling the EMTs that they would need their oxygen. They had not brought into the PAT site the equipment – for example, oxygen and an ALS jump bag – they needed to act as emergency responders, but went to retrieve them from their ambulance and stepped into the role of emergency first- 10 Appellants make no claim that Mason and Johnson, or any other FEMS personnel at the PAT site, failed to observe the candidates for safety, to monitor whether they were in distress, or to summon help. 13 responders.11 For that reason, no engine-company first responder was dispatched to the PAT site. In thereafter advising that Allen needed to be transported to the hospital but required only a basic life support unit, Mason and Johnson functioned in a manner similar to a 911 dispatcher, who must make a call as to whether an ambulance is needed, and which type is required (basic or advanced life support). Cf. Wanzer, supra, 580 A.2d at 127 (affirming dismissal of suit on basis of the public duty doctrine, where facts were that the 911 caller complained of a headache and asked for ambulance to be sent, the 911 dispatcher declined to send an ambulance and advised the caller to ―take an aspirin,‖ and the caller subsequently died of a stroke). Reviewing paramedic Mason‘s performance after the fact, her superiors concluded that she failed in several ways to respond appropriately to Allen‘s condition.12 Notably, however, they did not find that 11 This was not their usual PAT role: When Mason determined that Allen required hospital transport, Captain Robinson asked whether Mason and Johnson would transport Allen, rather than assuming that they would do so in their ambulance that was parked nearby. Mason ―had worked as a paramedic at many previous PAT‘s‖ and had never had to transport anyone. For its part, see note 3 supra, FEMS had no arrangement in place for replacement EMTs to take the candidates‘ post-test vital signs if (as happened here) those assigned to the task were called away to act as emergency responders. 12 They found, inter alia, that Mason failed to recognize the severity of the patient‘s condition; failed to perform a complete patient assessment; ignored or failed to recognize an abnormal EKG; ignored her (continued…) 14 Mason failed to bring oxygen and advanced life support equipment into the test site when setting up for the PAT. The foregoing facts are described in the documentary evidence and appear to be undisputed. When we consider them in the light most favorable to appellants, as we must, we see no basis for concluding that that any acts or omissions by Mason in responding to Allen‘s health crisis were part of the PAT program rather than a part of the District‘s provision of emergency services. Any negligence of Mason (and Johnson) in treating Allen occurred once their role evolved from basic monitors to emergency responders. And, ―[b]oiled down to their essen[c]e,‖ appellants‘ claims about Mason‘s and Johnson‘s negligent failure to properly evaluate Allen‘s condition ―amount[] to the same basic allegation‖ that we held in (…continued) duty to the patient by requesting a basic life support . . . unit . . . to transport the patient; failed to perform standard ALS [advanced life support] assessment procedures and interventions, such as 12-lead EKG and IV fluid administration, that were clearly indicated; failed to provide a proper report to the transporting unit; [and] ordered the transporting . . . unit to categorize the patient as a stable, non-emergency Priority 3 transport[.] As a result, Mason was removed from ―patient contact status‖, and ―appropriate disciplinary action[,]‖ including the possibility of termination, was recommended. Cf. Morgan, supra, 468 A.2d at 1312 (although public duty doctrine barred suit, ―other effective mechanisms exist to control the behavior of errant . . . officials.‖). 15 Hines is barred by the public duty doctrine: allegations that ―the wrong unit was dispatched‖; ―the call for the correct unit (advanced life support)‖ was not made; and the equipment dispatched was not adequate. 580 A.2d at 139. For these reasons, we conclude that the public duty doctrine is applicable. To hold otherwise would create a perverse incentive for the District to require its EMTs who are assigned to the PAT and thus are nearby to refrain from rendering emergency assistance to candidates lest the District forfeit, as to any deficiencies in their emergency responses, the shield from liability it would enjoy if it waited for emergency response units to be dispatched from elsewhere (just as when a call is made to 911 for emergency assistance). As we have previously recognized,―[t]he District of Columbia should be free to exercise its police power for the benefit of the general public without the fear that by making contact with citizens in the course of carrying out its responsibilities, the District may forfeit its immunity under the public duty doctrine[.]‖ District of Columbia v. Forsman, 580 A.2d 1314, 1319 (D.C. 1990).13 In this case, unless an exception to the public duty doctrine applies, the District was free to use FEMS paramedics who were on duty at the PAT test to respond to 13 ―[O]peration of the EMS is an exercise of the District‘s police power to further the general health and welfare[.]‖ Wanzer, supra, 580 A.2d at 131. 16 the health emergency that arose, without the risk that by doing so it would expose itself to liability.